The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948 (Cornell Modern Indonesia Project) 0877630356, 9780877630357

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The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948 Ann Swift

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Cornell Modern Indonesia Project

Monograph Series

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The Road to Madiun: The Indonesian Communist Uprising of 1948 Ann Swift

Monograph Series (Publication no. 69)

Cornell Modern Indonesia Project Southeast Asia Program Cornell University Ithaca, New York 1989

©

1989 Cornell Modern Indonesia Project

ISBN 0-87763-035-6

PRICE: $9.00

Typeset by Coraleen L. Rooney

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11

TABLE OF CONTENTS

Preface

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•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Vll

Abbreviations

INTRODUCTION I.

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•••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• lX

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

1

SETTING THE STAGE: POLITICAL FORCES IN JAVA IN JANUARY 1948

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

5

Political Parties in February ............................................................................... . 6 The Politicized Military ..................................................................................... . 12 Above the Parties: The President and Vice President •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 14 A Setting for Conflict ..•....................................................................................... 15 Indonesia and the World ................................................................................... . 16 II.

INTO OPPOSITION--THE BEGINNING...................................................... 17 The Fall of the Sayap Kiri ................................................................................. . Formation of the wyal Opposition ................................................................. . The Socialist Camp Splits ................................................................................. . The Calcutta Conference, Nationalism, and the Cold War ......................... . Hatta--The Consolidation of Political Control ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

III.

17 22 24 26 30

THE OPPOSITION MOUNTS ........................................................................ 33 Russia Comes to Indonesia: The Suripno Affair ............................................ The Dutch Threat: Backdrop to the Political Scene ...................................... The Changing Tactics of the FDR ................................................................... . 1. Labor: The Delanggu Strikes •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 2. The Farmers •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 3. The FDR and the Army ........................................................................... . The Coalition Government--A Fading Dream •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• The Birth of the "International Communist Plot" ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

33 39

40 41 43 44 48 50

IV.

INTO REBELLION ............................................................................................ 51

Musso .................................................................................................................... "The New Road for the Indonesian Republic" •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• The Implementation of the Musso Plan .......................................................... PKI Into Action •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• The Specter of the "Moscow Plot" •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Peristiwa Solo (The Solo Affair) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Macliun •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• The Fall ................................................................................................................

v.

EPILOGUE AND CONCLUSION

51 53

56 60 63 67 73 77

81

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

American Provocation •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• The Moscow Plot ............................................................................................... . The Misfrre Theory •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• An Open Ending ••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

81 87 88 90

APPENDIX A:

Murba Document: People's Democratic Front .................................. 93

APPENDIXB:

Radio Speech by President Sukarno on the Madiun Coup (September 19, 1948) •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 97

APPENDIXC:

Musso Radio Broadcoast (September 19, 1948) .............................. 101

SELECTED BIBLIOGRAPHY

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

103

ANNOTATED BIBLIOGRAPHY OF THE CONTEMPORARY INDONESIAN PRESS ........................................................................................................ 109 NAME INDEX

••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••

111

ILLUSTRATIONS

Plates 1:

2: 3: 4: 5:

6:

7: 8:

9:

President. Sukarno •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Xl• Vice President Hatta General Sudirman Musso Amir Sjarifuddin ............................................................................................................. . 4 Sutan Sjahrir Alimin TanMalaka

11:

Haji Agus Salim •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• 32 Suripno Amir Sjarifuddin

12: 13: 14:

Setiadjit •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Facing page 50 Wikana Abdulmadjid

15: 16: 17: 18:

Musso ....................................................................................................... . Facing page 51 Maj. Gen. Djokosujono Harjono Detachment of Communist Troops in Macliun

10:

Map Division of Java under the Renville Agreement

•• •••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••••• Xll

PREFACE

My thesis on Madiun was written during a year spent at Cornell studying Southeast Asia on a State Department training program. I had just come from a three-year assignment in Indonesia (1968-1971) and was being trained for more service in the area. Searching for a thesis topic, I was drawn to the Madiun period: it was one of the most turbulent periods of the Indonesian revolution and one which had stirred a reasonable amount of controversy. I decided to take an in-depth look at the period, trying to come at it from an Indonesian perspective while keeping an eye cocked to world events. My methodology was simple: I read everything I could fmd on the subject and talked to as many people as possible. The further I got into my research, the more I realized that the key to understanding what had actually happened ih 1948 was the newspapers of the period. These happily were available in abundance in Cornell's outstanding library and gave me not only an accurate chronology of events but a first-hand look at how people of the period viewed those events at the time--without the disadvantage of hindsight. I made what were to me some fascinating discoveries (historians' views of "fascinating" can be a bit obscure) and produced a thesis which is probably a bit more than most people would really like to know about the period. Hating to leave out anything, I added footnotes almost as long as the thesis itself. I had no preconceived notions when I started the thesis and tried to maintain my objectivity throughout. I was not looking for a particular solution to "what happened" and perhaps because of this, the thesis lacks a resounding conclusion. I hope, however, it will add a bit to the knowledge of the period.

Ann Swift American Embassy Kingston, Jamaica June 1988

ABBREVIATIONS

...

Akoma

Angkatan Komunis Muda

Young Communist Forces

ALRI

Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia

Republic of Indonesia Navy

BPRI

Barisan Pemberontakan Republik Indonesia

Insurgent Corps of the Republic of Indonesia

BTI

Barisan Tani Indonesia

Indonesian Peasants' League

BTN

Badan Textil Negara

State Textile Board

CPM

Corps Polisi Militer

Military Police Corps

FDR

Front Demokrasi Rakyat

People's Democratic Front UN Good Offices Committee

GOC

GRR

Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat

People's Revolutionary Movement

KNIL

Koninklijk Nederlands Indisch Leger

Royal Netherlands Indies Army

KNIP

Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat

Central Indonesian National Committee

lasykar Masyumi

irregular armed groups (militia) Consultative Council of Indonesian Moslems

Majelis Syuro Muslimin Indonesia

Mobrig

Mobile Brigade

PGRI

Persatuan Guru Republik Indonesia

Republic of Indonesia's Teacher Union

NIS

Negara Indonesia Serikat

United States of Indonesia

Partindo

Partai Indonesia

Indonesian Party

PBI

Partai Buruh Indonesia

Indonesian Labor Party

Pesindo

Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia

Indonesian Socialist Youth

Peta

Pembela Tanah Air

Defenders of the Fatherland

PKI

Partai Komunis Indonesia

Indonesian Communist Party •

IX

PNI

Partai Nasional Indonesia

Indonesian Nationalist Party

PS

Partai Sosialis

Socialist Party

PSI

Partai Sosialis Indonesia

Indonesian Socialist Party

PSII

Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia

Indonesian Islamic Union Party

SARBUPRI Sarekut Buruh Perkebunan Republik Indonesia

Plantation Workers' Union of the Republic of Indonesia

Sayap Kiri

left wing formed in September 1946 made up of PS, PBI, Pesindo, and PKI Sarekat Buruh Gula

Sugar Workers' Association

SI

Sarekat Islam

Islam Association--first mass-based nationalist organization

SOBSI

Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia

Central Organization of Indonesian Labor Unions

STII

Sarekat Tani Islam

Indonesian Islamic Farmers' Association

TNI

Tentara Nasional Indonesia

Indonesian National Army

TNI Masyarakat

TP, TRIP WFfU

People's TNI Tentara Pelajar [Republik Indonesia]

Student Army [of the Republic of Indonesia] World Federation of Trade Unions

President· Sukamo

Vice President Hatta

Musso

General Sudinnan

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A V A Division of Java under the Renville Agreement (January 19, 1948) White (unshaded) areas remained under Republican control. Shaded areas were to be under Netherlands occupation. Heavy dotted lines show the Renville truce line.

INTRODUCTION

The year 1948 was the darkest of the Indonesian revolution. It was a year of negotiated retreat when Indonesian guerrilla units were withdrawn from behind Dutch lines, and a year of uneasy truce as Republican leaders haggled with the Dutch at the conference table and watched with frustration and growing anger the reinstitution of Dutch rule in the greater part of the Indonesian Archipelago. During the year all the tensions of the new Indonesian Republic, deprived of the unifying release of battle against a common enemy, turned inward to boil within the narrow confmes of that part of Central and East Java still in Republican hands. Left alone these tensions might not have exploded, but 1948 was also the year Indonesia became inescapably entangled in the Cold War. By September the pressures had become too great, and left and right forces of the Indonesian national revolution found themselves pitted one against the other in conflict at Madiun. The Madiun revolt has been pictured in many ways. At one extreme is the Communist explanation that Madiun was a US-inspired "provocation," aimed at forcing the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) into revolt so it could then be destroyed with impunity by the "right-wing reactionaries" in control of the Republican government. 1 At the other extreme is the right wing's counter-explanation that the Madiun Affair was part of a closely coordinated Soviet plot for Communist seizure of nationalist governments throughout Southeast Asia. 2 Neither of these provides a satisfactory explanation of the deeply complex forces, both foreign and domestic, at work within Indonesian society which led during the first half of 1948 to an ever-widening rift in the complex pattern of the Indonesian revolutionary forces, a rift which by September 1948 had become irreparable. By the beginning of 1948, the Indonesian Republic for two and a half years had been fighting a steadily losing battle against the reinstitution of Dutch colonial rule in the Netherlands East Indies. This battle was fought more at the conference table than in the field, as Indonesia's leaders chose to follow the path of negotiated settlement rather than that of protracted guerrilla warfare.3 The Dutch, on the other hand, showed little desire to come to terms with a group of rebels whom they considered incapable of enforcing a rule of law in Indonesia.4 Up to July of 1947, the Dutch strategy was to talk with the Republican gov1 See 2

Mir~jadi, "Tiga Tahun Provokasi Madiun," Bintang Merah, August/September 1951.

See the Masyumi-run newspaper Abadi, September 4, 1953.

3

The conflict between the exponents of "diplomasi" and the guerrilla warfare of "revolusi" is best portrayed in Benedict R.O'G. Anderson, Java in a Time of Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1972).

4

The US Department of State, Foreign Relations of the United States 1947 (hereafter FRUS 1947), vol. 6, The Far East CWashington: US Government Printing Office, 1972), p. 981, gives an example of this Dutch attitude.

1

2

ernment while slowly building its forces for an armed takeover of the Republican-held areas of Java and Sumatra. On July 20, 1947, the Dutch sent their forces into Republicanheld territory, stopping only after they had taken over the most productive areas of the Republic.5 While the Dutch frontal attack ceased on August 3, scattered fighting continued until the end of the year, especially in West Java, as Republican forces, cut off from their Y ogyakarta capital by Dutch columns, fought back in savage guerrilla warfare. By early January 1948, United Nations pressure had again forced the Republicans and the Dutch into new agreements. These "Renville Agreements," as they were called, had four major points: they called for a full cease-fire in all parts of Indonesia and for the withdrawal of Republican troops from Dutch-held territory. This was to be counterbalanced by a Dutch agreement to hold plebiscites in the former Republican areas it now occupied to determine if they wished to return to the Republic or to become separate states in the "United States of Indonesia" (NIS). As previously agreed in the Linggajati Agreements, this "United States of Indonesia" was then to become an independent self-governing member of the Kingdom of the Netherlands.6 The Republic agreed to these conditions with the knowledge that, if they did not, the Dutch would probably launch another frontal attack to take those areas of Java and Sumatra (Bukittinggi, Lampung, Aceh, Yogyakarta, and Banten) still under Republican control. The Republicans were also fairly confident that, if free elections were held in Dutch areas, sentiment was such that the Republic would regain by the ballot what it had lost to the Dutch armies.7 Acceptance of the Renville Agreements caused an immediate parliamentary crisis in the Republic, and the agreements were to become a major source of contention in the months that followed. As the Dutch broke one after another of the Renville principles, refused to hold plebiscites, and plainly stalled for time in political discussions over the fusion of the Republic with the NIS, pressure grew steadily stronger within the Republic to take a firmer stand against the Dutch. Acceptance of the Renville Agreements was to have two far-reaching consequences for the Republic, consequences which were to lead directly to Madiun. First, by accepting the cease-fire and withdrawal of troops, the Republic was accepting a state of uneasy peace where it would have time to concentrate on its own internal problems. These problems were intensified by the tight Dutch blockade aimed (in contravention of Renville) at bringing the Republic to its knees economically. In addition, the people and politics of Republican Indonesia were now concentrated within an area on Java less than a third of its former size. The influx of troops and refugees into Republican-held territory tripled the

Dutch propaganda organs also continually castigated the Indonesians either as pro-Japanese collaborators (Sukarno, Hatta) or as Communist influenced. One good example of the latter was given by Dutch right-wing leader D. V. Stikker who, in a speech on June 26, 1948, said that the government behind Sukarno was very left wing and even Hatta, the Masyumi, and the Catholic Party were PKI-influenced (Merdeka, June 28, 1948). Merdeka, July 1, 1948, p. 1, also discusses this Dutch anti-Communist attitude. 5

George McT. Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1952), pp. 215-16. The Dutch quite probably had no intention of taking over all the territory of the Republic at this time, see FRUS 1947, vol. 6, pp. 942-45 and 989-90.

6 Alastair M.

Taylor, Indonesian Independence and the United Nations (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1960),

pp. 468-70. 7

Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 228-29.

3

population of the capital city of Y ogyakarta (from 300,000 to 900,000)8 and brought with it the problems of both feeding and employing the refugees. As troops from the more Moslem, Sundanese-speaking areas of West Java were quartered amongst their Javanese neighbors, clashes occurred over housing, food, and arms, and these were then exacerbated by linguistic, religious, and cultural differences. With 35,000 troops evacuated from "pockets" in Dutch territory, and a surplus of squabbling military commanders and politically oriented armed youth groups, the Republic could no longer avoid taking the dangerous political decisions necessary to bring its fighting forces under centralized control. The Renville Agreements also gave the Republic's right and centrist groups (the Masyumi and PNI) the opportunity to oust the left-wing coalition (the Sayap Kiri) which had governed Indonesia since 1946. Republican Vice President Hatta's inability to get left-wing participation in the new government, formed on January 29, 1948, was to prove disastrous. At fi.rst, the left wing promised to form a loyal opposition to give constructive criticism. However, as the other groups gradually consolidated their power in the government, the Sayap Kiri became increasingly isolated and its opposition increasingly radical. The confrontation between left and right was to continue to grow over the months that followed the signing of the Renville Agreements, ending at last in armed conflict at Madiun. 8

Andrew Roth, "Jokja Journal," The Nation, June 26, 1948. Roth was a member of the Institute of Pacific Relations and a reporter for The Nation. Despite his strong sympathy for the Republic, his writing seems generally quite balanced.

4

Amir Sjarifuddin

Sutan Sjahrir

Alimin

Tan Ma/aka

CHAPTER I

SETTING THE STAGE: POLITICAL FORCES IN JAVA IN JANUARY 1948

Since November 1945, the Indonesian Republic ha~ been led by a coalition of Socialist groups called appropriately the "Sayap Kiri" or "left wing." Most of these "left-wing" cabinets, however, frrst under Sjahrir and then under Amir Sjarifuddin, included representatives from the Republic's other important political groupings, the Indonesian Nationalist Party (Partai Nasional Indonesia, PNI) and the coalition of Moslem organizations known as the Masyumi. However, in the early revolution attempts to classify organizations as "right" or "left" were misleading. As Sutan Sjahrir later pointed out, most Indonesian nationalists on all sides of the political spectrum were influenced by the ideas of socialism, and the question was never one of pro- or anti-socialism. 1 This "socialism," however, was defmed in many ways, from the "pure" Communist variety, through Sukarno's hazy populist "Marhaenism," to the "religious" socialism of the Moslems which was hardly socialism at all. While political ideology was to play an increasingly important role in 1948, more meaningful divisions within Indonesia's ruling elite, as Ruth McVeypoints out, were based on "collaboration versus non-collaboration with the colonial regime, on orientation towards traditional cultural and religious values or towards secular nationalism."2 Personal relationships, the leader (bapak) to his followers (anak buah ), friendships, and "old boy'' networks (among Sjahrir socialists or among military officers who had served in the Japanese-sponsored Peta [Pembela Tanah Air, Defenders of the Fatherland]), often overrode ideological leanings. It was not unusual, for instance, for a hot-headed radical to remain within a more conservative grouping ( or vice versa) putting aside his ideological leanings for the sake of personal friendships or ~elations. In 1948, politics in Indonesia were played mostly in Java, especially in those parts of East and Central Java still held by the Republic. Traditional sociological differences go deeper within these two areas than in almost any other part of Indonesia and all the politics of 1948 were acted against the background of latent and, as yet not fully developed, communal tensions. Two main cultural streams exist in Java, santri (or Moslem) and abangan (word used to designate those nominal Moslems to whom traditional HinduBuddhist and animist beliefs are more meaningful than Islam). When Islam came to Indonesia in the thirteenth to fifteenth centuries, it penetrated deeply into Sumatra and West Java and along the coastal trading regions in Central and East Java, but the Central Javanese heartland was only partially affected. The development of Islam in Java has a com-

1 Sutan

Sjahrir, Indonesian Socialism (Rangoon: Asian Socialist Publishing House, 1956), pp. 30-31.

2

Ruth T. McVey, "The Southeast Asian Insurrectionary Movements" in Communism and Revolution, The Strategic Uses of Political Violence, ed. Cyril E. Black (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1964), p. 149.

5

6

plex history, but by 1948 a pattern had developed where the Indonesian trading communities, many medium-sized landowners, and some of the peasantry were strongly Islamic (santri), while the civil service (drawn by the Dutch from aristocratic Javanese families) and a large segment of the peasant population were abangan. The pattern of santri and abangan communities in Java followed little rhyme or reason. Large parts of West Java were heavily santri, Central Java was heavily abangan with santri communities sprinkled throughout--and East Java a bewildering mix. Differences between santri and abangan have influenced the composition of political movements in Indonesia throughout the twentieth century. This split was plainly apparent in 1948 when a current of communalism underlay much of the political scene. The left wing or Sayap Kiri and the Nationalist Party, the PNI, were secular parties appealing to abangan and, in the case of the Sjahrir socialists, also to a few highly educated liberal Moslems in the trading community. The Masyumi, on the other hand, was a religious party. Openly Islamic in its appeal, it drew to its banner urban-oriented, modernist Moslems as well as followers of traditional Islam whose beliefs were deeply rooted in Javanese villages.3 While little of this communalist undercurrent will be apparent in the story that follows, it must be kept in mind at all times for it is to reappear with a vengeance at the story's climax. Political Parties in February

The ruling Sayap Kiri socialist coalition was formed in September 1946, from four organizations: the Socialist Party (PS) claiming about 30,000 members; the Indonesian Labor Party (Partai Buruh Indonesia, PBI), a small organization of about 1,000 members; the large, armed paramilitary Indonesian Socialist Youth organization (Pemuda Sosialis Indonesia, Pesindo), with approximately 100,000 members; and the small Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia, PKI), with about 3,000 members.4 The Sayap Kiri also exercised control over two other organizations: the Central Organization of Indonesian Labor Unions (Sentral Organisasi Buruh Seluruh Indonesia, SOBSI), which claimed a membership before the frrst Dutch . "police action" of over one million members, and the smaller Indonesian Peasants League (Barisan Tani Indonesia, BTI).5 The Socialist Party which led the Sayap Kiri was itself a coalition of two groups: the Sjahrir socialists, a small compact group of moderate socialist intellectuals whose influence was greatest amongst the Jakarta elite and in West Sumatra;6 and a more radical grouping centered around Amir Sjarifuddin, a popular and dynamic leader whose main

3

Clifford Geertz, The Religion ofJava (New York, NY: The Free Press, 1960), pp. 121-224.

4

For estimated strength of the Sayap Kiri see Roth, "Jokja Journal," p. 176; also see Soc 1-Iok Gie, "Simpang Kiri dari Sebuah Djalan" (MA. thesis, University of Indonesia, 1969), p. 83. Figures on PKI strength in early 1948 range from 2,000-3,000. PKI Chairman Alimin claimed 2,000 in an intetview with a newsman in June 1948 (see Berita Indonesia, June 8, 1948, p. 2). PKI leader Suripno, however, in early September gave George Kahin a figure of 2,500 for Java and 500 for Sumatra (see Kahin, Nationalism, p. 257).

5

Ibid., p. 261.

6 Merdeka,

March 3, 1948, p. 2. According to Merdeka, when Sjahrir broke with Amir in February 1948, he carried with him Partai Sosialis branches in West Java, Sumatra, and some parts of East Java.

7 source of support was among the youths of the East Java-based Pesindo.7 The AmirSjahrir combination evidently worked well during the first Sjahrir cabinets. Sjahrir, with his well-known disdain for organizational work, supplied the calm, dispassionate leadership and diplomatic skills necessary to build the image of the Indonesian Republic at the international negotiating table. Amir, on the other hand, as an orator second only to Sukarno and a skilled organizer, provided the party with the dynamic appeal among the masses which, for all his admitted brilliance, Sjahrir was unable to match. The SjahrirAmir partnership, however, broke down in July 1947, when Amir withdrew his support in protest over Sjahrir's concessions to the Dutch, and caused the fall of the third Sjahrir cabinet. Although Amir almost immediately reversed himself, Sjahrir, obviously angered and perhaps realizing the hopelessness of staving off a Dutch attack, refused to re-form his government.8 Amir was then given the task of leading the next Sayap Kiri cabinet, and Sjahrir almost immediately went abroad to become the spokesman of the Republic's cause in Europe and at the United Nations. Although relations between Amir and Sjahrir were obviously strained on Sjahrir's departure, Sjahrir's followers remained within the Partai Sosialis, probably hoping to exercise some moderating influence over the party which, after Sjahrir's departure, came increasingly under the control of Amir's followers. The threat of "communism" (especially Stalinist communism) appeared almost negligible to most Indonesians at the beginning of 1948. The Communist takeover in Czechoslovakia had not yet occurred, the Zhdanov two-camp thesis was not yet being applied in Indonesia, and Moscow had been nothing but a frrm ally of the young Indonesian Republic at the United Nations. While Dutch propaganda organs were continuously charging that the Republic was Communist-dominated if not Communist-run,9 Indonesians were well aware that the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) was small and not particularly powerful or well led. The Indonesian Republic had been under Sayap Kiri leadership almost since its inception, yet there was little sign of it becoming a "People's Republic." The PKI at the beginning of 1948 was indeed a small and insignificant party, and an almost totally silent partner in the Sayap Kiri cabinets. In 1946, the PKI Congress had decided not to join Sjahrir's cabinet for fear of laying the cabinet open to the charge of being Communist influenced10 and even Amir's cabinet had only one known Communist, Maruto Darusman, as minister of state. 11 The PKl's low posture appears to have been due to two factors: to the PKI's adherence to the Dimitrov Line which called for cooperation

7 S.

P. Derita, Lima Minggu Sebelum Madiun Affair (Medan: Toko Buku Sarkawi, 1949), p. 7. Also see Merdelca, March 3, 1948, p. 2, which reports that in the split with Sjahrir, Partai Sosialis branches in East and Central Java remained almost entirely loyal to Amir. 8

For accounts of the fall of Sjahrir's cabinet, see Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 207-8; Soc Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri," p. 94; and Ruth T. McVey, The Soviet View of the Indonesian Revolution (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, 1957), the arguments of Setiadjit, PBI leader and secret PKI member until August 1948, who just after Sjahrir's fall returned to Indonesia from a meeting of the Communist-controlled World Federation of Trade Unions (WFfU). McVey raises the question of whether or not Setiadjit might have been canying "orders from Moscow'' which caused Amir's reversal, but concludes ''we cannot point to the Sajap Kiri's reversal as tangible evidence of Soviet policy in Indonesia." McVey, Soviet View, p. 21. 9

See Merdelca, July 1, 1948, p. 1, for discussion of the Dutch attitude. For an example of this type of Dutch propaganda, see Dr. William F. de Bruyn, The Rising Soviet Star over Indonesia. (The Hague: "De Hofstad," 1947?). 10 Soc

11

Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri," pp. 84-85.

Kahin, Nationalism, p. 211.

8

with the national bourgeoisie in the anti-imperialist struggle12 and to the mediocre quality of the PKI's leadership. In 1948, the PKI was under the dual leadership of Sardjono and Alimin. Sardjono seems to have been a weak and fairly nondescript leader. 13 Alimin, on the other hand, had international Communist credentials: a leader of the PKI's ill-fated rebellion in 1926-1927, Alimin spent the years from 1927-1940 in the USSR, 1940-1945 in China, and returned to Indonesia in 1946, via Vietnam where he apparently met Ho Chi Minh. 14 As later events were to prove, however, Alimin was an Indonesian nationalist frrst and foremost and quite content to hold the PKI to a supportive role in the Indonesian revolution. Nevertheless, the Communist role in the Indonesian revolution was a deceptive one, for along with the Dimitrov Line of cooperation with the nationalists, went a policy of infiltration and control of left-wing organizations by underground PKI members. By early 1948, underground Communist members had control of main leadership positions in all the Sayap Kiri organizations, and exercised great influence in SOBSI. In the Partai Sosialis, two top leaders, Abdulmadjid and Tan Ling Djie, became members of the Dutch Communist Party before returning to Indonesia after the war in 1948,15 and Amir Sjarifuddin apparently considered himself a PKI member. 16 Labor Party leader Setiadjit had also been a member of the Dutch Communist Party while in Holland, and the Pesindo was completely under PKI domination with Krissubanu and Wikana in leading positions. 17 The PKI had also been successful in taking over the SOBSI leadership, with Harjono as general chairman, Setiadjit vice chairman, and Njono general secretary. 18 PKI control, however, did not run deep within some of the unions, and the peasants' organization, the BTI, remained under the control of the Sjahrir socialists. 19

12 Arnold

C. Brackman, Indonesian Communism (New York, NY: Praeger, 1963), pp. 29, 53.

13

Ruth T. McVey, The Rise of Indonesian Communism (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1965), pp. 272, 484, and Soe Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri," p. 6. 14 Alimin 15

Prawirodirdjo, Riwajat Hidup Alimin (Jakarta: Kesedjahteraan N.V., 1954), pp. 29-30.

McVey, "lnsurrectionary Movements," p. 165.

16

On August 29, 1948, Amir publicly declared that he had been recruited as a member of the underground PKI by Musso in 1935 (Berita Indonesia, September 1, 1948, p. 1). At almost the same time, Amir also declared himself to be a faithful Christian (see ibid., September 9, 1948). This, and Amir's individualism raised severe doubts in the minds of many as to whether Amir was in fact a Communist. Many simply felt that he feared he was losing his following to Musso, and hoped to join the bandwagon by declaring himself to be a Communist. On the other hand, he was fully accepted into the new PKI Politbureau in a position of influence. There is little question that Amir worked extremely closely with the underground PKI during the war (see Anderson, Java, pp. 205-6), and was very far to the left. Given the loose structure of the PKI during and after the war, it is quite possible for Amir to have considered himself part of the Communist Party without ever having been subject to its discipline. It is very clear, however, from Amir's speeches that he never became immersed in doctrinaire Communist ideology. For various views on this problem, see Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 272-75; Madjallah Merdeka, September 11, 1948, p. 6; PKI History Institute, Forty Years of the Communist Party ofIndonesia, JPRS Translation (Washington, D.C.: US Joint Public Research Setvice, 1961), p. 22; John Coast, Recruit to Revolution (London: Christophers, 1952), p. 163; and Soe Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri," pp. 36, 97. 17

Soe Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri," pp. 69-71, on Wikana, Krissubanu, and Setiadjit. Also see Kahin, Nationalism, p. 273. 18

Soe Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri," p. 68.

19

Ibid., p. 67; Kahin, Nationalism, p. 284. The PKI was not to gain control of the BTI until 1953; see Donald

Hindley, The Communist Party of Indonesia 1951-1965 (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1964), p. 160.

9

While secret PKI control of the Sayap Kiri leadership was impressive, it also had its drawbacks which were to be plainly shown in the months to come. With the exception of the PKI group trained in Holland, few of the younger PKI members had any formal Communist training, and discipline was undoubtedly lax. Thus, while youth leaders like Wikana may have considered themselves Communists, their actual training was minimal. 20 In addition, while PKI members might secretly hold positions of control in Sayap Kiri organizations, they were unable actively to recruit new members or to indoctrinate their organizations openly in Communist ideology. A major case in point is Amir himself, who, while he apparently considered himself a Communist, gives little indication of any thorough knowledge of Communist ideology or terminology. 21 Thus, while the secret PKI organization at the beginning of 1948 disposed of considerable influence, it was disorganized, scattered, and untrained. The PKI also gave little indication of being a disciplined part of an international Communist movement. This was probably due in part to lack of interest in Southeast Asia by the Soviet Union through 1947 and to the fact that the Dimitrov Line, in simply calling on the PKI to support the national revolution, put no restraints on the party's inherent nationalism. As will be seen later, the Zhdanov "Two Camp Doctrine" of 1947, which demanded absolute adherence to the Soviet camp and declared "neutralism" an impossibility, was not forced on the PKI until August of 1948. While the Zhdanov Line, as elaborated by the Soviet East Asian specialist Zhukov in Bol'shevik, did point to the unreliability of the bourgeois nationalists in the independence struggle, Vietnam and Indonesia until Amir's fall were to be singled out as examples of the correct application of the new line, where proletarian forces were taking the leading role in the revolution. 22 Thus, at the beginning of 1948, the PKI, both legal and illegal, were supporting the conservative ''diplomasi" line of negotiation with the Dutch initiated by Sjahrir and continued by Amir. This line necessitated such heresy as a friendly posture toward the United States and a willingness to protect the holdings of foreign investors (including Dutch) in Republican areas while the negotiations were going on. 23 At the opposite end of the political spectrum from the Sayap Kiri was the Masyumi, a conglomeration of Moslem organizations, which with more than 500,000 members 24 was the largest political party in the Republic. While basically "conservative" in outlook,

20 The Sayap Kiri did train cadre at their "Marx House" training center in Madiun. Marx House seems to have

been run, however, both by Amir and Sjahrir socialists; see Soc Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri," p. 70, and Mochtar Lubis in Madjallah Merdeka, February 14, 1948. The need for better-trained cadre was also set out clearly in August 1948, in the PKI's Djalan Baru untulc Republilc Indonesia (republished in Jakarta, 1953), p. 33. Suripno was to deplore the lack of training in the PKI in his writings from jail, published after his capture in late 1948; see Djamal Marsudi, Peristiwa Madam (Jakarta: M:erdeka Press, 1966), p. 93. Also see D. N. Aidit, A Short History of the Communist Party (New Delhi: Peoples Publishing House, 1955), p. 24. 21

Amir's last public radio address, given from Madiun while the city was still in Communist hands in September 1948, is a classic example of Amir's notable lack of Communist terminology in his speeches. See Front Nasional, September 24, 1948. 22

For a full discussion of Soviet attitudes towards Indonesia in 1947, see McVey, Soviet View, pp. 11-37. Also see A. Zhdanov, Situasi Polilik lntemasional (Yogyakarta: Mingguan Revolusioner, 1948) and Zhukov, ''The Aggravations of the Crisis of the Colonial System," Bol'shevik, December 15, 1947, in Helene Carrere D'Encausse and Stuart R Schram, Marxism and Asia (London: Allen Lane, 1969), pp. 261-63. 23

It should be remembered, however, that at this time Ho Chi Minh in Vietnam was also following a very mild line, which had the US government convinced that, if Ho was indeed a Communist, he was not controlled from Moscow (The Pentagon Papers, Senator Gravel edition [Boston: Beacon Press, 1971], vol. 1, p. 34). 24

Roth, "Jokja Journal," p. 716.

10 Masyumi's leadership at the beginning of 1948 was an odd combination of young Moslem "Socialists" like Sjafruddin Prawiranegara and Mohammad Natsir, and traditional religious leaders like Wachid Hasjim.25 This group was held together by the skillful, moderate leadership of Dr. Sukiman, who combined an ability to appeal to the Masyumi's rural Moslem constituency with a reasonably modernist outlook.26 More than anything else, Islam and the idea of creating an Islamic state in Indonesia was the driving force behind the Masyumi party. Even the modernist leaders, who tended to be pragmatic rather than zealous, were often forced to take more conservative stands to maintain the support of their traditionalist followers. This driving concern for Islam led political opponents of the Masyumi to see it as a party with few intellectuals, a party of fanatics who did everything in the name of Allah.'IT To some extent this was true. While the upper levels of the Masyumi leadership did contain modernist Moslem intellectuals, the mass base of the party depended on a largely illiterate but deeply Moslem peasantry.2.8 The middle-level leadership group of the Masyumi also tended to be primarily composed of village religious leaders, medium-sized land holders, and small traders, 29 a factor adding to the party's religious outlook and conservatism on questions of land holding and private business. Enmity between the Masyumi and the Communists traced back to the early 1920s and the bitter struggle then between Moslem leaders and the Communists in the Sarekat Islam (SI) which resulted in the expulsion of the PK.I from the SI in 1921.30 The Masyumi regarded the secularly oriented Sayap Kiri with a distrust born of the split in Javanese society between the santri and abangan and intensified by the Masyumi's suspicion of the atheism and radicalism of the Western-oriented (at times Dutch-educated) left-wing leaders. The PKI was particularly disliked for its atheism, which the Masyumi, not the PK.I, was increasingly to stress during 1948. While frrm in their antipathy toward the Communists,31 the Masyumi also tended to be pro-American, and the close relations between the US diplomats in Jakarta and Masyumi leaders, especially Sukiman, was much noted in the press.32 Like the Sayap Kiri, the Masyumi had its own paramilitary organizations, the Hizbullah and Sabilillah, as well as labor and peasant organizations. All of this made the Masyumi a powerful force and one which had been underrepresented in previous governments.

25

George McT. Kahin, "Some Aspects of Indonesian Politics and Nationalism." Paper for the 11th Conference of the Institute of Pacific Relations (Lucknow, 1950), pp. 3-6. 26 See Berita

Indonesia, March 16, 1948, p. 3, for a description of Sukiman's leadership. "Socialist" is probably

a misnomer for these modernist Moslems who saw their socialism in terms of increased government ownership of communications and utilities, and were often staunch advocates of private property. Sjafruddin, for instance, was to become one of Indonesia's foremost businessmen. Also see Kahin, "Some Aspects," pp. 3-8, for a discussion of ''religious socialism." 'IT Berita Indonesia,

March 16, 1948, p. 3.

2.8

Ibid.

29

Roth, "Jokja Journal," p. 716.

30

McVey, Rise ofIndonesian Communism, pp. 138-46, 155.

31

Masyumi distaste for the PKI was plainly evident throughout the revolution; and appears again and again in dispatches from the US Consulate in Batavia to the State Department. See FRUS 1947, vol. 6, pp. 898-1101, and the report of an intetview with Abu Hanifah in Siasat, March 15, 1947, p. 9. This dislike, however, does not seem to have flared into real enmity with communal undertones until 1948.

32

Manai Sofian, "Surat dari Jokja," Merdeka, February 14, 1948, p. 4. Manai Sofian was one of the PNl's younger, more radical members.

11 Second in size to the Masyumi, the PNI (Indonesian Nationalist Party) occupied a swing position between them and the Sayap Kiri. A party whose leadership was drawn from Indonesia's educated elite of civil servants and teachers, the PNI was fairly conservative in outlook but also secular. Its appeal to its mass following of abangan peasants was due more to traditional ties of respect for authority vested in the aristocratic civil service than to ideology or religious appeal. Toward the middle of 1948, the PNI's younger left wing, close in outlook to the Sayap Kiri, formed a coalition with the PNI center forces and captured much of the PNl's leadership, forcing the older, more conservative civil servantaristocrats to desert the party by the end of 1948.33 At the beginning of 1948, however, the PNI had both conservatives and liberals under a single umbrella. While, during 1948, it was to work in coalition with the Masyumi, the PNI, unHke the Masyumi, never came out in full opposition to the Sayap Kiri. Completely lacking the Masyumi's religious anticommunism, the PNI attempted to act as a buffer between its cabinet partner and the Sayap Kiri. Above all, the PNI thought of itself as the party of Indonesia's President Sukarno, even though Sukarno had chosen to stand above party politics as one of Indonesia's few non-partisan national leaders. While Sukarno attempted to avoid the factionalism which was rending Indonesia in 1948, wherever he led, the PNI would follow. At the beginning of 1948, a scattering of other political groups sprinkled the political horizon, including a splinter "PKI Merah" (Red PKI), which seems to have been of little consequence.34 One group, however, which was to have a great impact over the next six months was at the beginning of 1948 still repressed and scattered. Tan Malaka's followers, the radical left-wing "national Communists,"35 or "Trotskyists" as the PKI termed them, were still either languishing in jail with Tan Malaka or were under close surveillance by Amir's Sayap Kiri forces. In 1946, Tan Malaka had represented the only challenge on the left to the Sayap Kiri. A crisis between the two groups occurred in 1946 over the question of whether Indonesia should follow Tan Malaka's path of guerrilla warfare against the Dutch or the "diplomasi" of the Sjahrir-Amir coalition. The Sayap Kiri carried the day and Tan Malaka and his followers landed in jail.36 While Tan Malaka was jailed in March 1946, neither the Sjahrir nor the Amir government seemed to have any desire to bring him or his followers to trial on charges many felt to have been trumped up.37 Both Amir's Sayap Kiri and Indonesia's right-wing politicians were well aware of the appeal of Tan Malaka's radical nationalism, and the challenge he could thus present to Amir's forces. At the beginning of 1948, several Tan Malaka-oriented lasykar or armed youth groups ( e.g.

33

Kahin, "Some Aspects," pp. 9-10, has a full discussion of the PNl's composition. Even under this center-left leadership, however, the PNI was more conservative in outlook than it was to become in the early 1950s. Also see J. Eliseo Rocamora,''The Partai Nasional Indonesia, 1963-1965," in Indonesia 10 (October 1970): 143.

34

Soc Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri," p. 87, gives one of the fullest accounts of this group.

35

Tan Malaka's followers were a ve-ry mixed bunch, noted more for their radical nationalism than for any theoretical adherence to "communism," although they themselves always insisted on the "Communist" label. They included such young left-wing radicals as Adam Malik and Pandu Karta Wiguna, and unclassifiable people like the Barisan Banteng's M uwardi who was close to Sukarno. 36 Anderson, Java, 37

Ch. 12, 16, and Epilogue.

While some of Tan Malaka's followers were involved in the July 3, 1946, kidnapping of Sjahrir, others, including Tan Mataka himself, had been jailed prior to this event. Tan Mataka and some of these others were to be released in late 1948 for "lack of evidence" (Berita Indonesia, September 16, 1948, p. 1). While Sjahrir was certainly involved in Tan Malaka's arrest, the PSI (Indonesian Socialist Party) later claimed this was done by Amir over Sjahrir's protests; see Berita Indonesia, September 6, 1948, p. 1.

12 Dr. Muwardi's Barisan Banteng) were quietly waiting for the opportunity to gather Tan Malaka's forces together again. The Politicized Military

Political parties, however, were not the only political forces on the scene in 1948. The army (TNI-Tentara Nasional Indonesia) and the armed youth groups (lasykar), 38 some of which were mentioned above, represented very real sources of political power--power that was often out of the control of the civilian government or even the central army command. Efforts to bring some semblance of order to Indonesia's fighting forces had been going on since the Republic's inception, but without any great success. Both army and lasykar commanders tended to be powers unto themselves. This was especially true in late 1947, as the Republic returned to guerrilla fighting against the Dutch and decentralization was a necessity.39 In early 1948, there were two armed forces commands on Java: the TNI, or Indonesian National Army, of approximately 350,000 men40 and the lasykar, which were formally under the TNI Masyarakat (People's TNI), of 470,000 men.41 The reason behind the two command structures was essentially a political one. In 1946-1948, it would have been almost impossible politically to bring the individualistic and widely varying lasykar under strict TNI control; therefore, some form of looser coordinating organization was needed. Thus, the TNI Masyarakat structure, which was originally called the Biro Perjuangan (Resistance Bureau) was officially set up to coordinate the hundreds of independent student fighting units. However, since the first Sjahrir Cabinet, Amir Sjarifuddin had held the Defense Ministry and it had perhaps been his most important weapon in trying to consolidate leftist power in the armed forces. Amir's success in influencing or reorganizing the regular army structure under Sudirman had been minimal, but by using the separate command for the lasykar he was able to increase leftist influence at least over portions of this segment of the armed forces. The high command of the TNI Masyarakat, which had representatives spread throughout Java, was directly responsible to the Indonesian defense minister (Amir) and was staffed almost entirely with loyal Amir socialists.42 The TNI Masyarakat was the basic unit of Amir's people's defense strategy, aimed at building a widespread guerrilla capability for Indonesia. It was disliked by non-socialists as a potential second army in socialist hands and by the TNI leaders as a possible challenge to the

38 The

lasykar were fighting units usually composed of students or young men under the control of local or, at times, national leaders. These units were often small and locally centered, but they could, like Bung Tomo's BPRI (Insurgent Corps of the Republic of Indonesia), lsman's TRIP (Student Army of the Republic of Indonesia), or Pesindo, have wider bases. Their main common feature was independent leadership, often unresponsive to government commands.

39

An interesting picture of the military commanders' independent powers can be seen in US Consul Foote's angry obsetvations on what he felt was the role of General Sudirman (Commander-in-Chief of the TNI) and Sutomo ( commander of one of the Surabaya lasykar-BPRI) in blocking agreements between the Republic and the Dutch in 1947. See FRUS 1947, vol. 6, pp. 952, 958, 968, 984, 1005, 1050.

40 Abdul

Haris Nasution, Tentara Nasional Indonesia, vol. 2 (Jakarta: Seruling Masa, 1968), p. 130. This figure includes the Indonesian Navy (ALRI), but it seems in any event somewhat high.

41 42

Ibid.

Nasution, Tentara Nasional Indonesia, vol. 1 (Jakarta: Jajasan Pustaka Militer, 1956), p. 283, has a description of the Biro and Amir's influence. Also see Sutomo, Sesudah "Madam" dan "Gestapu" Lantas Apa? (Jakarta: Balapan, 1965), p. 11.

13 regular army's authority.43 In reality, however, the TNI Masyarakat was little more than a paper organization. It had little control over units other than those already in the socialist camp (e.g. the Masyumi's Hizbullah and Sabilillah, Isman's TRIP, and Bung Tomo's BPRI were not obedient to its orders).44 The TNI Masyarakat's main source of power seems to have derived from its ability to channel funds to the lasykar, and there are indications that Amir did use this channel to get arms and money to Pesindo and other Sayap Kiri lasykar.45 The other command structure of Java was the formal command of the Indonesian National Army under General Sudirman. Composed in January 1948 of seven territorial divisions, the TNI appeared on paper to be very well organized. Again, however, division commanders tended to be powers unto themselves, and units had to be persuaded rather than commanded to obey orders. Moreover, the central command of the TNI under Sudirman tended to regard itself as independent from the control of the civilian government. A reorganization of the army command structure, drawn up by Amir as minister of defense and "promulgated" by Sukarno on January 2, 1948, had to be quickly rescinded because of strident objections from Sudirman and others in his command.46 General Sudirman himself, the commander of the TNI, is an enigmatic figure, shrouded in the great myth which grew up about him after the revolution. An ardent nationalist, but also very much a Central Javanese, Sudirman was often impatient with those who championed the tactics of negotiation and "diplomasi." This led him to have cordial relations with the Tan Malaka forces at times when their desire for a radical anti-Dutch policy coincided with his.47 Sudirman, however, had no great fondness for Amir Sjarifuddin and seems to have carried on a running battle to stave off Amir's attempts, through his control of the Defense Ministry, to politicize (i.e., propagandize) the TNl.48 On the other hand, Sudirman was very close to the Javanese leaders of the recalcitrant Solo command (see below), and during 1948 appears to have tried to calm tempers between the evacuated West Javanese of the Siliwangi command and the Central Javanese units. Sudirman, however, was quite ill throughout 1948 with tuberculosis, and this may have hindered his leadership of the army. Politics within the army command structure itself are difficult to sort out and seem, except in a few exceptional cases, to have been based more on client-patron relationships

43

See A.H. Nasution, Tentara Nasional. Indonesia, vol. 2 (Jakarta: Sending Masa, 1971), p. 18, for army leaders' views of the 1NI Masyarakat.

44

Ibid., vol. 2, p. 112. When, for instance, a new cease-fire was declared after the signing of the Renville Agreements, it took an appeal from Sukarno to force the Hizbullah and Sabilillah to obey the cease-fire, and then mostly in word not deed; also see Sutomo, SesudahMadiun, p. 11. 45

Nasution, Tentara Nasional Indonesia, 2: 18; also Sutomo, Sesudah Madiun, p. 11; and Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 260-61.

46

Nasution, Tentara Nasional Indonesia, 2: 130-33. This plan, known as Rencana Baharuddin, was to be used in only slightly different form by Hatta in 1948. Under it, the minister of defense was given full control over both the Department of Defense and the army, the army structure would be "simplified," and the staff reduced. Sudirman objected, because, he said, it was unclear to whom he was responsible (i.e., the Chief of State or minister of defense). In reality, he probably suspected an attempt by Amir to cut his power. As long as Amir held the Ministry of Defense, Amir was willing to have the lasykar integrated into the 1NI; once he lost that ministry his viewpoint changed. 47 See 48

Anderson, lava, ch. 16.

Nasution, Tentara Nasional Indonesia, 2: 18; Soe Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri," p. 77.

14 than on ideology (see Chapter III). The two divisions commanded by Nasution (Siliwangi --West Java) and Gatot Subroto (Sunan Gunung J ati--West Java/West Central Java) were conservative and loyal to the Hatta government when it came to power. Nasution was close to Hatta, while Gatot Subroto was a follower of Sudirman.49 The Y ogyakarta command, while not Moslem-oriented like the Siliwangi, was also loyal to the Hatta government. The Solo division (Divisi IV-Senopati), on the other hand, was led by a popular general, Sutarto, who was radical in outlook and whose loyalty to the central government was often in question.50 The East Java regiments again, by dint of being far removed from the capital in Y ogyakarta, were an uncertain commodity when called upon to fulfill orders not to their taste. .Above the Parties: President and Vice President

The role of two other men was of crucial importance in early 1948, although neither was affiliated with any party or organization. Although President Sukarno and Vice President Mohammad Hatta had not taken the front stage in Indonesian politics for the period of the Sjahrir and Amir parliamentary cabinets, they had been active behind the scenes and any major decision which lacked Sukarno's support was unlikely to succeed. Sukarno, in his role as "National Leader of Indonesia," had purposely set himself above party politics. As a Javanese, Sukarno's eclectic brand of Indonesian populist socialism (Marhaenism) placed him closer on the spectrum to the Sayap Kiri than to the Masyumi, but his role during 1948 seems to have been that of a unifier, and he is found appealing again and again for national unity.51 Sukarno's great national popularity, however, made his support absolutely crucial for the success of any major decision. Vice President Mohammad Hatta was the complete opposite of Sukarno. Respected rather than loved, Hatta appeared as the cool, clear-headed "administrator," contrasting dramatically with Sukarno, the "solidarity maker." 52 Educated in Holland, Hatta returned to Indonesia in the 1930s to organize, with Sjahrir, the Club Pendidikan Nasional Indonesia (Indonesian National Education Club), which, until their arrest, competed with Sukarno's Partindo.53 A Sumatran Minangkabau, Hatta's position as Vice President not only balanced Sukarno emotionally but also geographically by giving the important Sumatran region representation in the Republic's Java-based government. Hatta, too, like Sukarno, stood above party politics. While he was later to earn a name as a fervent anti49

See Anderson, Java, p. 244, for Gatot Subroto's relations to Sudirman.

50

Sutarto had opposed the Sjahrir-Amir attempts to control Solo's social revolution in 1946, strongly supporting left-wing populist forces there. He was also sympathetic to the July 3rd kidnapping of Sjahrir. See Anderson, Java, ch. 15, p. 385. 51

Sukarno throughout 1948 was constantly touring both Java and Sumatra, making speeches and keeping his contact with the Indonesian masses vibrant and alive. No other Indonesian leader seems to have had the ability to appeal to Indonesians on all_ sides of the political spectrum as did Sukarno. During the Sjahrir and Amir cabinets, Sukarno's relations had been cool with Sjahrir, but somewhat better with Amir, who was close to Sukarno in temperament and style. On the other hand, Amir's relations with Hatta had always been strained, while Hatta's dry didactic style drew him close to Sjahrir. 52

See Herbert Feith, The Decline of Constitutional Democracy in Indonesia (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1962).

53

Partindo (Partai lndonesia--lndonesian Party) was formed in 1931 after Sukarno had been arrested and the PNI banned by the Dutch. After his release from prison in late 1931, Sukarno took over Partindo, only to be jailed again in 1933 (until his release by the Japanese in 1942). Sukarno did not again join a party during or after the war. See Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 92-94.

15 Communist, this may well have been a consequence of his experiences during 1948, rather than a preconceived idea early in 1948. Unlike Sukarno, Hatta, while widely respected, seems to have had little personal following on Java, and during the latter half of 1947 spent most of his time in Sumatra organizing the government there.

A Setting/or Conflict )

The events of 1948 were played out in three principal cities of Republican-held Java: Y ogyakarta and Solo in Central Java and Madiun in East Java. The distances were short: Y ogya to Solo, about one hour by car; Solo to Madiun, two hours by car. The ideological differ~nces, however, were great: Yogyakarta, a large city,54 was the capital of the Republic of Indonesia, and was controlled by loyal government troops and by lasykar of the popular Sultan of Y ogyakarta, a young aristocrat turned nationalist revolutionary. Solo, close to Yogyakarta in size,55 on the other hand, was traditionally the city of the opposition, in 1948 of the Sayap Kiri. The Sayap Kiri, however, held no monopoly there; not only was Solo the headquarters of Pesindo, it was also the center of the Sayap Kiri's enemy, the Barisan Banteng (an armed lasykar loyal to Tan Malaka) and of the Masyumi's Hizbullah. A gentle revolution in 1946 had taken power from the hands of Solo's royal families, who, unlike Yogyakarta's Sultan, had been unable to move with the times.56 Solo's own Fourth Division was (as mentioned above) left leaning and not amenable to the TNI central command's orders, and since 1947 Solo had been under an emergency military government headed by Wikana, one of the leaders of Pesindo and a secret PKI member. (This military government was removed in May 1948.57) In effect, Solo at the beginning of 1948 was a tinder box of barely controlled competing factions which were to become increasingly violent towards one other. Madiun, a small, provincial city,58 was also a stronghold of the Sayap Kiri. It was a railroad repair center with a high proportion of industrial laborers, and the Sayap Kiri was very influential in their labor unions. It was in Madiun that the Sayap Kiri located its "Marx House" for the training of its cadre and where these cadre came for many of their meetings. On the other hand, Madiun also housed competing Masyumi and PNI organizations and units of various non-Communist lasykar, such as Isman's TRIP. As in Solo, the atmosphere was very tense and political kidnappings between competing groups was

54

Roth, "Jokja Journal," p. 716, says Yogyakarta had swollen to a population of about 900,000 during the revolution. Population figures are not available for this period. However, in 1930, Yogyakarta had a population of 137,000 while Solo had 165,000 and Jakarta (Batavia), the capital, had 533,000. Volkstelling 1930, vols. 1 and 2 (Batavia: Landsdrukkerij 1933, 1936).

55

Population figures are not available for Solo at this period, but Solo before the war was slightly larger than Yogyakarta (see note 54).

56

See Anderson, Java, ch. 15.

51

Sedjarah Diponegoro, p. 179.

58 Madiun

in 1930 had a population of a little over 12,000 (Volkstelling 1930, vol. 3 [1934]). Located on the road and railroad lines from Yogyakarta/Solo to Surabaya, Madiun had some industry, but in comparison to Solo or Yogyakarta, the town was very small.

16 not uncommon.59 Other cities were also to play a role in the months to follow but none were as crucial as these three. Indonesia and the World

At the beginning of 1948, global international issues were of little concern to the Indonesian leaders. Hemmed into their Central Javanese capital at Y ogyakarta by the Dutch, the Republican leaders were primarily concerned, not with the beginnings of the Cold War in the West, but with how to win their own revolution. In their fight, the United States was regarded by all sides, including both Amir's Sayap Kiri and the Masyumi, as a possible ally against the Dutch. Questions of broader Cold War allegiances were simply not raised. Tensions which did exist within the Indonesian Republic were primarily domestic, and they were muted by the commonly felt need for unity against the greater threat represented by the Dutch. While there were distinct differences between the Sayap Kiri, the Masyumi, and to a lesser extent the PNI, they still found it possible to work together within one cabinet. The armed forces with their competing organizations and personalities were a source of problems to any civilian government, but ones which were secondary as long as the armed forces were mainly focused on the war against the Dutch. In late 1947, however, the United States played a major role in bringing the Dutch and Indonesians to the floating conference table on the USS Renville in Jakarta Bay. The Renville Agreements which emerged from these meetings, while giving momentary hope that the basis for settlement of the problems between the Dutch and the Indonesians had been found, were to become the cause ( or rather the excuse) for the beginning of the rift between radical and conservative forces in the Indonesian revolution which developed over the course of the fallowing months. 59 Merdeka,,

September 22, 1948, p. 3.

CHAPTER II INTO 0PPOSITION--THE BEGINNING

Consensus, or the art of giving everyone a slice, however small, of the ruling pie, is a time-honored method of Indonesian rule. Up to the beginning of 1948, the Sayap Kiri had played the game with the deft assurance of a diamond cutter, including almost all facets of Indonesia's contending elite within its cabinet. 1 While the Sayap Kiri never let the reins of command slip from its hands, the techniques of consensus rule encouraged a blurring of the edges of controversy and emphasized personal commitments over ideology. In November 1947, one of the first US "Southeast Asia experts" to be stationed in the US mission in Indonesia had this to say of the Republic: Although government based party system, it [is] clear parties lack real defmition. Haziness of the principles and programs affect even Communist party. Discussion [with Indonesians in Yogyakarta) lead [to the) conclusion Government purely one of leaders with personal followings and that understanding of function [of] parties in representative government scarcely exists. Enormous size present Cabinet (33 members last week, 37 now) indicates all boys must be taken care· of. Fact not only limits Government's ability act with expedition and decision but suggests unreadiness [to] deal with internal rivalries which might shatter coalition in the absence [of an] external foe, particularly since prerogatives public office will be main plums of independent Indonesia. 2 The Fall of Sayap Kiri

In early January 1948, the carefully built structure of political unity upon which the Sayap Kiri's power rested began to crumble. The formal issue was the Amir cabinet's decision to accept the Renville Agreements rather than face what it felt would be an inevitable Dutch attack. It quickly became apparent, however, that the Renville issue was

1 Tan

Malaka's followers, of course, had no role in the Indonesian government, and many in early 1948 were still in jail. 2 FRUS

1947, vol. 6, p. 1072: Confidential cable from the Consul General at Batavia to the Secretary of State.

The cable was sent by Charlton Ogburn, Jr., a foreign setvice officer and member of the Department's Division of Southeast Asian Affairs, who had been assigned to Dr. Graham's staff on the UN Good Offices Committee in October 1947. (Ogburn had previously setved with Merrill's Marauders in Burma during World War II.) When Ogburn wrote the cable, he had just returned from twelve days of meetings in Yogyakarta with the Republic's leaders. His cable is one of the first to show a balanced outlook on the Republic. The US Consulate General up to this point had been relatively uninformed on the internal workings of the Republic and exceptionally pro-Dutch in orientation.

17

18 being used by the Masyumi to gain a more prominent position in the Indonesian Republic's government. On January 9, Vice President Hatta and Prime Minister Amir Sjarifuddin flew to Singapore to meet former Prime Minister Sjahrir who was returning to Indonesia after more than six months abroad. The two men probably hoped to convince Sjahrir to lend his considerable influence to their attempts to win agreement in Y ogyakarta to the Renville proposals. Sjahrir, however, withheld his support on the grounds that international sympathy was now with the young Republic and this was no time to give in to the Dutch.3 The Renville Agreements were rapidly becoming the source of heated controversy and, on January 15, the Masyumi announced its withdrawal from Amir's cabinet because of its opposition to the agreements.4 Amir, however, probably hoping that he could hold the support of the more moderate PNI, proceeded to sign the Renville Agreements on January 17. His hopes proved false, for, on January 18, the PNI announced that it too was opposed to Renville. The PNI then called for the formation of a new cabinet, as Amir had now lost the confidence of the Republic's two largest parties. Even as the PNI joined with the Masyumi to press for Amir's resignation, it maintained its usual ambivalent policy by not withdrawing from Amir's cabinet.5 Masyumi opposition to the Amir cabinet was much more important than its opposition to Renville. 6 Masyumi tempers on Renville were quickly calmed by Dr. Graham, America's representative on the UN Committee of Good Offices (GOC). Graham, who was very close to the Masyumi, immediately exerted his influence on the party's leaders when their opposition to Renville became apparent.7 Graham's arguments appear to have succeeded. While the Masyumi used Amir's "weakness" and "mishandling" of Renville as a tactic in its campaign against his cabinet, 8 within two days of their resignation from the cabinet, Masyumi leader Sjafruddin Prawiranegara announced that the Masyumi would

3 Berita

Indonesia, January 10, 1948, p. 1.

4 Aneta,

January 17, 1948, p. 1; and Berita Indonesia, February 2, 1948, p. 1.

5 Merdeka,

January 20, 1948, p. 1. In a statement issued January 22, 1948, the Sayap Kiri was to denounce the Masyumi effort to bring down the Sjarifuddin government and express its puzzlement over the PNI position. For the text of the Sayap Kiri statement, see Djamal Marsudi, Peristiwa Madiun (Jakarta: Merdeka Press, 1966), pp. 32-34.

6 Berita Indonesia,

February 2, 1948, p. 1. According to the FDR, the Masyumi apparently put out a statement sometime before February 22 that the "first question" was to change the ''weak" Amir government, Renville was only the "second question." See Marsudi, Peristiwa Madi.un, p. 33. 7

See Aneta News Bulletin, January 15, 1948 and January 20, 1948: Graham apparently arranged for Masyumi leaders Suki man, Samsuddin, and Ki Bagus Hadikusumo to come to Jakarta for discussions with him between January 15 and 20. Close relations between Graham and the Masyumi leaders were also noted by Manai Sofian in his "Surat Dari Jokja" (Merdeka, February 11, 1948, p. 4), "Many wonder about the close friendship between the Masjumi (especially Sukiman) and Graham.... It is no longer a secret that these two sides often meet without the knowledge of the government." Graham's efforts to bring the Masyumi into line on the Renville Agreements were later used by the USSR to charge that the United States had conspired with the Masyumi and PNI to bring about the downfall of Amir's government. See McVey, Soviet View, pp. 38-39 for Pravda reports at the time and New Times, November 3, 1948, p. 30 for the later version of this line which was to become part of PKI and USSR history. In January 1948, however, Graham's efforts appear to have been concentrated solely on helping to persuade the Masyumi not to oppose the Renville Agreements. Amir himself was the main Indonesian sponsor of these agreements and Graham was, in effect, supporting Amir rather than working against him. 8 Aneta,

January 29, 1948, p. 5; Berita Indonesia, February 16, 1948, p. 3.

19 obey the Renville ceasefrre.9 A week later, the Masyumi was to join the Hatta cabinet, whose program required support for the implementation of the agreements. Amir fmally resigned on January 23, in the face of strong PNI and Masyumi pressure, and Sukarno, appealing for unity, immediately appointed Hatta as formateur of a new government.10 Hatta, in turn, announced on January 24, his intention of setting up a presidential cabinet (i.e., one which would theoretically be responsible to the President rather than to the KNIP [Central Indonesian National Committee]) 11 and stated frrmly his intention to continue the policy of including all major political groupings in the cabinet. 12 Hatta's failure to pull together a broadly based cabinet set the pattern of left-wing opposition which led directly to Madiun. The reasons for this failure, however, are not immediately apparent. Although a Moslem Sumatran, Hatta was not identified with any single political group. It was undoubtedly for this reason that he was appointed formateur by Sukarno, who, as usual, was trying to mend the developing rift between left and right. The main point of contention to arise in the formation of the cabinet was the disposition of the Defense Ministry. The Sayap Kiri was adamant that it be given the ministry, and the Masyumi was equally adamant in its opposition to the Sayap Kiri demands. 13 In addition, Hatta may have been under pressure from friends in the army (such as Nasution) who had no love for Amir and wished to check the growing "politicization," i.e., left-wing influence, in the armed forces. In any case, Hatta seems to have been absolutely determined to remove the Ministry of Defense from Amir's hands, and his fmal decision to keep the defense portfolio for himself was probably an effort to keep party influence, left and right, out of the army. While Hatta's refusal to bend to Sayap Kiri's demand for the Defense Ministry was crucial, non-inclusion of the left in Hatta's cabinet seems to have been due more to the decision of the left wing's leaders not to join than to any intention by Hatta to exclude them. According to a Socialist Party statement of February 17, the party decided in a

9 Merdeka,

January 19, 1948, p. 1.

10 Ibid., January 24, 1948, p. 1. It had been obvious since January 17 that Amir's cabinet was in trouble, and this may account for the speed with which Sukarno was able to make the decision on a new formateur. 11

The KNIP (Komite Nasional Indonesia Pusat-Central Indonesian National Committee) was set up in 1945 as a temporary committee to assist the President and his cabinet in that period before a "People's Congress" could be elected. Later in 1945, it was given legislative powers, and it continued to function on and off as a Parliament throughout the revolutionary period (see Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 139-40, 152-53). While theoretically a presidential cabinet would not be responsible to the KNIP and thus not need a parliamentary majority, the cabinet which Hatta put together did, in any case, have a majority of seats. Hatta as Vice President did not sit in the KNIP, so it was logical to have his cabinet a presidential one. In practice, of course, he needed a parliamentary majority not only for legitimacy, but for day-to-day work. Kahin, Nationalism (p. 232), comments that the Hatta cabinet in practice "held itself accountable to the Working Committee of the KNIP as well."

12 Merdeka, January 6, 1948, p. 1. 13 In demonstrations on January 24, the FDR made public this demand for the Defense Ministry (Ibid., January 26, 1948). According to Kahin, Nationalism (p. 232), the Sayap Kiri wanted a minimum of four cabinet posts in all: besides Defense, they hoped for the Ministries of the Interior, Finance, and Foreign Affairs or Agriculture. The most important of these posts was, of course, the Defense Ministry which Amir had held without break since the first Sjahrir cabinet in 1946. Unfortunately, there is little indication in the press at the time of what Hatta was willing to offer the Sayap Kiri. However, as reported by Aneta (February 3, 1948), Hatta told reporters that Amir, Abdulmadjid, and Tjokronegoro had been offered seats but that the left-wing parties had not allowed their men to accept.

20 meeting held on January 26, not to agree to the formation of the Hatta government. 14 The Sayap Kiri objected strongly in principle to the establishment of a presidential cabinet, which they felt took power away from the KNIP . 15 Feelings also ran high in the Sayap Kiri over the role of the Masyumi in bringing down Amir's cabinet, and press reports speculated that one reason for the Sayap Kiri's refusal to join was its objection to working in the same cabinet with the PNI and Masyumi. 16 The Sayap Kiri probably also felt that its power was such that within the following weeks it could bring down the Hatta government easily, or at least force inclusion of the Sayap Kiri in the government on terms more favorable than those now being offered. During the week of negotiations for the formation of the new cabinet, tensions and tempers soared throughout the Republic. Masyumi street demonstrations in Y ogyakarta on the day that Amir announced his resignation were rumored to have been a reason for his cabinet's fall. 17 The Sayap Kiri promptly launched counter-demonstrations, starting off in Y ogyakarta on January 24, with demands that Amir be included in any new government and that the Sayap Kiri be given at least the Defense Ministry. 18 These demonstrations did not reach a real crescendo until after the announcement that the left wing would not participate in the government. They seem, however, to have been enough to infuriate the legalistic Hatta, who plainly did not like to be pressured. On January 30, the day before the announcement of his new cabinet, Hatta strongly criticized the left wing. People who merely study Leninism/Stalinism but do not aid their government in the revolutionary struggle, he told a gathering of youth groups, certainly cannot be called revolutionaries. On the other hand, Kiayi (i.e., Moslems) who are willing to fight for their government are certainly nationalist revolutionaries. 19 No one, including Hatta, was satisfied with the basically Masyumi/PNI cabinet announced January 31, 1948:

Minist,y1l Prime Minister Defense Interior Foreign Affairs Justice Finance Economic Affairs Food Education and Culture

14 Beritalndonesia,

Name Mohammad Hatta Mohammad Hatta Sukiman Haji Agus Salim Susanto Tirtoprodjo A. A. Maramis Sjafruddin Prawiranegara Kasimo Ali Sastroamidjojo

Ibid.

l6 Berita Indonesia, 17 Merdeka,

Non-party Non-party Masyumi Non-party PNI PNI Masyumi Catholic Party PNI

March 11, 1948, p. 3 carries the text of the February 17 statement; also see Aneta, February

3, 1948. 15

Party

February 3, 1948, p. 1.

February 12, 1948, p. 1.

18

Ibid., January 26, 1948, p. 1.

19

Ibid., February 2, 1948, p. 1.

20

Kahin, Nationalism, p. 232.

21 Ministry

Party

Name

Health Religion Social Affairs Reconstruction and Youth Communications Information Without portfolio

Johannes Leimena Kiayi Haji Maskoer Koesnan Supeno Djuanda Mohammad Natsir Hamengku Buwono IX (Sultan of Yogyakarta)

Christian Party Masyumi PGRI (Teacher Union)

PSI Non-party Masyumi Non-party

While the Defense and Foreign Affairs Ministries were held by independents Hatta and Haji Agus Salim, the other top priority ministry, Interior, was in Masyumi hands as were the Ministries of Economic Affairs, Information, and Religion. Because of this composition and the exclusion of the Sayap Kiri, the Hatta cabinet was considered by most observers ( other than the Masyumi) to be too conservative. Some also charged it with being "America minded" because of the close relations between Graham and the Masyumi. 21 The cabinet was thus seen as a temporary one which would continue only until a new unity among the parties could be forged. 22 Dissatisfaction with the cabinet is probably best summarized in a prophetic editorial by Berita Indonesia on February 5: We are more afraid that a power struggle may arise later between the left-wing opposition and the right-wing government, [especially] if the Hatta cabinet fails to seek a compromise with the left wing and bases its power only on reactionary-conservative elements. We fear this will cause the rise of a power struggle in the future which on one side will be of a dictatorial nature and on the other, non-cooperative.... For the welfare of our country, we can easily reflect on incidents which arise in other parts of the world.23 The successful Masyumi toppling of Amir's government and two weeks of demonstrations and counter-demonstrations seem to have created a new bitterness between the Masyumi and Sayap Kiri, where only a deep distaste and mutual distrust had existed before. Differences between the two, which had been intentionally muted in the past, were, in the weeks that followed January 31, to be thrown into increasingly sharp relief. Hatta and General Sudirman tried to calm tempers by banning mass demonstrations of the type which flared in East and Central Java to demand Amir's return, 24 but while they succeeded in reestablishing order almost immediately, the rift continued to widen.

21

Manai Sofian, "Surat dari Jokja"; Merdeka, February 14, 1948, p. 4; and Aneta, February 4, 1948 quoting Sumber, Yogyakarta newspaper. 22

Merdeka, February 16, 1948, p. 1; and FBIS, February 2, 1948, quoting Yogyakarta radio. Hatta himself promised that his cabinet was only temporary and would be changed as soon as possible. 23 Betita Indonesia,

24

February 5, 1948, p. 3.

Bintang Merah, August/September 1951, p. 40. According to this PKI publication, Sayap Kiri demonstrations brought out 100,000 people in Madiun, 75,000 in Magetan, and 5,000 in Ponorogo and Ngawi. Sukarno, during a trip to East Java (Kediri, Blitar, Jombang, Madiun) from January 30 to February 3, was also met by demonstrations demanding Amir's return (Berita Indonesia, February 5, 1948, p. 2). Radio Gelora Pemuda in Madiun, a Sayap Kiri radio, threatened widespread demonstrations if Amir was not included in the government (Berita Indonesia, February 3, 1948, p. 1; Keng Po, February 3, 1948, p. 1).

22

Formation of the Loyal Opposition

On February 3, Hatta installed his cabinet and announced the four-point program which was to form its guidelines: implementation of the Renville Agreements; acceleration of the formation of the United States of Indonesia; rationa1ization of the Republic's army and economy; and reconstruction.~ Hatta then told the press that all the parties, including the Sayap Kiri, had accepted his program but that the Sayap Kiri, while supporting Renville, would remain in opposition.2.cs In the weeks that followed, the Sayap Kiri, which was now being called by a formerly little-used name, "Front Demokrasi Rakyat" (FDR--People's Democratic Front), 27 was to corroborate Hatta's statement that the FDR supported Renville and to add that its opposition was "loyal and constructive." 28 The FDR, however, apparently felt that there was no contradiction between being a "loyal and constructive" opposition and continuing its all-out attack on the Masyumi in an effort to bring down Hatta's government. In an emergency session on February 20-21, the FDR came out frrmly against the idea of Hatta's presidential cabinet, but issued a decision that it was willing to aid in carrying out the Renville Agreements.'19 Support of Renville but opposition to the Hatta cabinet was to continue to be the basic FDR policy through August 1948. Amir, in explaining this policy to a Solo branch meeting on February 25, hotly denied the accusation that the FDR's policy was "destroying national unity." 30 By this time, however, the FDR was already doing its best to split the PNI and Masyumi. On February 16, FDR parliamentarians attacked the Masyumi for causing Amir's fall, and by February 20, the FDR had launched frontal attacks on the new Masyumi minister of social welfare, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, calling him a defender of capitalism.31 These attacks were evidently continued and increased through March and April as FDR leaders took to the field to explain their positions. By March 20, Amir himself had spoken to twenty-six

~ Berita Indonesia, February 5, 1948, p. 2; and Kahin, Nationalism, p. 234. 2.6 Berita Indonesia,

February 5, 1948, pp. 2-3; and Aneta, February 3, 1948, p. 1.

27

At what point the Sayap Kiri started using the name Front Demokrasi Rakyat (FDR) is something of a mystery. Kahin, Nationalism, p. 259, dates the formal change to a meeting in Solo on February 26, 1948. The "Maklumat Sayap Kiri" issued January 21, 1948, however, was already signing itself Front Demokrasi Rakyat (Marsudi, Peristiwa Madiun, p. 34) and on February 21, 1948, Berita Indonesia notes that the Sayap Kiri had changed its name to Front Demokrasi Rakjat. 28

PKI member Luat Siregar, for instance, in the name of the FDR, told Parliament on February 16 that in principle the FDR agreed with the four-point program of the government and that the FD R's opposition would be "sehat dan korektif (healthy and corrective]." Berita Indonesia, February 18, 1948, p. 3. Earlier, on January 29, another Sayap Kiri leader had told a Reuter's correspondent that the Sayap Kiri intended to carry out a "constructive and loyal opposition" in the Working Committee of the Parliament (FBIS, January 30, 1948, from Batavia radio, in English, January 29). '19 Merdeka,

March 3, 1948, p. 2.

30 Keng Po,

February 27, 1948, p. 1. Keng Po, quoting.Antara, says the Solo meeting took place on Wednesday, February 25, 1948. The meeting caused so little stir that accounts of it do not appear in other newspapers available in the Cornell Library (and Antara of the period is not available). Most secondary sources discussing Madiun quote Kahin, Nationalism, p. 259, who states that according to Antara this meeting took place February 26, 1948. These secondary sources often go on to see February 26 as a major turning point in FDR history when the Sayap Kiri formally took on this new name and then turned against the Renville Agreements (see Pinardi, Peristiwa Madiun, p. 29 and Brackman, Indonesian Communism, p. 72 for examples). 31

Merdeka, February 18, 1948, p. 1; Aneta, February 20, 1948, p. 1.

32 FBIS,

March 24, 1948, quoting Yogyakarta Radio, March 23, 1948.

23

mass meetings while touring East and Central Java.32 Amir apparently attacked the Masyumi, and specifically Sukiman as minister of the interior, but conspicuously left the PNI alone.33 Through the beginning of May, then, the FDR seems to have played a conventional (if vociferous) role as opposition party. Its aim was to weaken the government and to force either, at the maximum, the formation of a new government under its leadership, or, at the minimum, its inclusion in the government on its own terms. This opposition role was restricted almost entirely to domestic issues. The results of the FDR's party congress in Yogyakarta on April 24-26 read like a left-wing panacea for all ills. The congress called for the government to remove harsh taxes, to free the farmer from feudalistic controls and imperialist influences, to guarantee the right to strike, to supply cheap medicine and doctors to the people, and to increase the fight against world capitalism. On foreign affairs, the meeting called for increased relations "with those nations that are free of capitalism" (i.e., the socialist camp), but while its leaders might berate the Dutch, the FDR did not cease to support negotiations with the Dutch on the basis of Renville.34 While FDR opposition to the Masyumi was noisy, it appears to have remained totally in legal channels. (Only one strike was reported by the press through April, the municipal waterworkers in Solo. This was apparently not politically motivated, as it failed to raise any comment.35) By April, however, rumors of nefarious FDR plans to bring down the government were already abroad, spread by the Sayap Kiri's old enemy, the Tan Malaka radical nationalists. Tan Malaka's followers had been very quiet under Amir, but they seem to have taken on a new lease on life under the Hatta cabinet. At this early period, it is unclear what, if any, encouragement they were receiving from Hatta or other elements in his government. The Tan Malaka forces, however, were well-known enemies of Amir. It would seem a bit more than coincidence that the minute the Amir government fell, announcements were issued that, at long last, the Tan Malaka followers arrested before and at the time of, the July 3rd affair would be brought to trial.36 By the beginning of April, those Tan Malaka forces still free had re-formed themselves into the Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat (GRR--People's Revolutionary Movement) under the leadership of the Barisan Banteng's Dr. Muwardi and were publishing in Solo a paper called Muma. On April 1, in the midst of a series of sensational but rather scurrilous attacks, Mwba printed what it purported to be a FDR February 5 directive to its branches giving instructions for a

33

Manai Sofian, "Surat Dari Jokja," Merdeka, April 10, 1948, p. 2; also see John Sutter, lndonesianisasi (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Southeast Asia Program, 1959), p. 555. Amir's strategy, according to Sofian, was to attack Suleiman as minister of the interior for various "belasting" (taJCes) such as land rent, import taxes, etc. According to Sofian, attacks by FDR leaders Setiadjit (PBI) and Maruto Darusman (PK.I) against Sukiman were particularly offensive and rude.

34 Berita

Indonesia, May 4, 1948, p. 1; Merdeka, May 17, 1948, p. 1; Berita Indonesia, May 20, 1948, p. 1; Berita Indonesia, June 12, 1948, p. 1, quoting Aneta interview with Amir Sjarifuddin. 35

FBIS, April 8, 1948, quotingAntara Radio from Yogyakarta; Keng Po, April 9, 1948, p. 1 and April 13, 1948,

p. 2. 36 Merdeka,

January 29, 1948, p. 1. Tan Mataka in his DariPendjara ke Pendjara, vol. 3 (Jakarta: Widjaja, n.d.), p. iii, says that he was detained until February 1948 without ever having charges brought against him: "Only in the beginning of February 1948, i.e., after almost two years in jail, was I faced again with the question of my imprisonment through the medium of the Deputy Attorney General." (Also see ibid., p. 123.) Hatta's intense sense of legality may also have had a part in the swiftness with which justice moved after he took over the cabinet.

24 new FDR strategy.37 The alleged FDR document stated the FDR could never join the Hatta cabinet because it was Masyumi controlled and it is clear "that communism is unalterably opposed to Islam." The document then went on to outline the methods the FDR would use to topple the Hatta government, which, if necessary, would include disturbances, kidnappings, and thievery to break the people's confidence in the Hatta government's ability to maintain security.38 The Murba story was immediately denied by the FDR and the case sent to the Attorney General for investigation.39 Although the Hatta government itself did not seem to take Murba's charges very seriously, Murba's campaign against the FDR raised suspicions about the FDR's intent which were to take deep root in the coming months. The Socialist Camp Splits

The two wings of the Socialist Party had lived together in an uneasy truce since Sjahrir's ouster in July 1947. As General Simatupang later remarked, in the Sayap Kiri, Amir provided the motor and driving power, and Sjahrir was the driver.40 With Sjahrir away, the Socialist Party was deprived of its brakes and moved steadily to the left.41 The Sjahrir socialists were increasingly uneasy under Amir's leadership, but problems did not come to a head until Sjahrir's return on January 11. Relations between Amir and Sjahrir had soured after Amir's opposition br'ought down the Sjahrir cabinet. On his return, Sjahrir immediately opposed Amir, first by criticizing the Renville Agreements and then by demanding that the socialists support rather than oppose the Hatta government.42 On February 12, shortly after the Socialist Party's decision not to join the Hatta government, the Sjahrir socialists announced they were withdrawing from the Socialist Party to set up a

37

Muhammad Dimyati, Sedjarah Perdjuangan Indonesia (Jakarta: Widjaja, 1951), p. 172; and Manai Sofian, "Surat dari Jokja," Merdeka, April 10, 1948, p. 2. The author unfortunately has been unable to locate any issues of Murba, and the only accounts of the Murba article available are those of Dimyati and Manai Sofian. While I have been unable to locate the text of the "Murba document," it seems clear from Sofian and Dimyati's descriptions of the text that this is the same document which Kahin says is an "11-point document made public by the Republican government just after the beginning of the Communist rebellion and considered to be in part (point 11) a fabrication by some persons hostile to the FDR" (Kahin, Nationalism, p. 269). This 11-point document (see Appendix A) was also used by Sukarno in his radio address to the nation on September 19, 1948 (Appendix B). At that time, Sukarno quoted point 11 to show that since February the FDR had been planning illegal actions. 38

Ibid.

39 Merdeka,

April 10, 1948, p. 2; and Mirajadi "Tiga Tahun," pp. 46-47. Mirajadi in his Binlang Merah article stated that not only had the FDR Central Secretariat (Yogyakarta) put out in various papers a denial of this document, but that its Solo branch had given testimony to the police in the matter of Murba's publication of the "false document." But, says Mirajadi, strangely the police in Solo took no action against the forgers of the false document. Mirajadi's implication is that the government both in Yogyakarta and locally had no desire to punish the wrongdoers. After his capture in November 1948, Amir gave an interview to the Catholic paper, Hitlup, in which he also denied the authenticity of the document and pointed out that he had brought the case not only to the attorney general but to President Sukarno himself. The papers, Amir charged, were a GRR forgery (Hitlup, December 18, 1948, p. 3). Murba, however on September 29, 1948, denied it had forged the documents and as proof pointed to the fact that no action had been taken against it. 40 T.

B. Simatupang, Laporan dari Banaran (Jakarta: Pembangunan, 1959), pp. 93-95. See also the translation of this by Benedict Anderson and Elizabeth Graves, Report from Banaran: f;xperlences During the People's War (Ithaca: Cornell Modem Indonesia Project, 1970), p. 79, where the phrase is rendered "Bung Amir as the motor and Bung Sjahrir as the rudder of our ship of state."

41

Soc Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri," p. 129.

42 Berita Indonesia,

March 11, 1948, p. 5.

25

new organization which would be called the Partai Sosialis Indonesia (Indonesian Socialist Party) or PSI as it soon came to be known. 43 While the bitter feelings between Amir and Sjahrir, the loss of control of the Socialist Party to the Amir socialists, and the question of whether or not to support the Hatta cabinet were all factors in the Sjahrir socialists' decision to pull out of the Socialist Party, the decision also seems to have been based upon major ideological differences.44 Immediately after Sjahrir's return to Indonesia, a set of proposals were put before the Politbureau of the Partai Sosialis making suggestions for changes in the party's organization and discussing foreign policy questions. The proposals stated that Indonesia should not take sides with the US or USSR in the Cold War but should join with India and other newly independent countries in forming a third force. 45 While these proposals were signed by Wirjono, a Sjahrir follower, it is evident that they were inspired, if not drafted, by Sjahrir. Up to this point the rising "Cold War" between the US and the USSR does not seem to have been an issue within Socialist Party ranks. The party was mainly concerned with domestic Indonesian issues and Amir himself during his tenure had cooperated closely with the Americans on the Renville Agreements. Sjahrir, however, had just returned from more than six months abroad (mainly in Europe and the United States) and was probably far more conscious of the "Cold War" and its implications for Indonesia than was Amir, who during the same period had traveled no further afield than Singapore.46 While the Sjahrir socialists were to date the split in Socialist Party ranks on foreign policy as far back as March 1947,47 it seems quite clear that it was Sjahrir who on his return in 1948 sharpened his followers' awareness of Cold War issues and galvanized them into action. By raising the Cold War issue within the Socialist Party ranks, Sjahrir also forced the Amir socialists to reconsider their policies and to take a public stand on the issue of Cold War allegiances. Differences between the two socialist groups emerge very clearly in the battle of statements which occurred immediately after the Sjahrir socialists withdrew from the Partai Sosialis. In its "Maklumat" issued February 12, 1948, the new PSI devoted most of its time to a discussion of the world situation. Asia, the PSI said, must guard its independence 43

Ibid., February 13, 1948, p. 3.

44

For a discussion of the various aspects of this decision, see L. Umar Santoso, "The Birth of the Socialist Party," in ibid., February 17, 1948, p. 4.

45 The

"Wirjono proposals" were never published. In a statement issued February 17, 1948 (Berila Indonesia, March 11, 1948, pp. 3 and 5) the Partai Sosialis (Amir) stated they were basically the same as the statement published by the Sjahrir socialists (PSI) on February 12 (ibid., February 24, 1948, p. 3; see discussion of February 12 statement in text). The PS also charged that before the Politbureau had had time to discuss Wirjono's proposals, they had been illegally circulated in the Socialist Party, causing a great deal of confusion.

The "Wirjono proposals" seem to have been a last ditch effort by the Sjahrir socialists to regain influence in the party. It was evidently apparent that they would be rejected by the Amir socialists. PSI members were later to claim that their decision to leave the PS had been made as they were fearful the stronger Amir socialists would use the "Wirjono proposals" as an excuse to purge them from the party at an upcoming congress in April.

46 As pointed out in Chapter I Sjahrir had traditionally been the diplomat of the Sjahrir/ Amir duumvirate and hence far more attuned to foreign affairs. Amir, on the other hand, was a radical nationalist, far more at home in the nationalist circles in Yogyakarta than in the cosmopolitan atmosphere of Jakarta. 47

"Maklumat Partai Sosialis Indonesia" (February 12, 1948), in Berita Indonesia, February 24, 1948, p. 3. According to Subadio (PSI) in an unpublished work on the PSI, Sjahrir first became aware of the differences between Communist Party lines on foreign policy and those of nationalist (non-Communist) leaders at an InterAsian Conference in March 1947 in India.

26 from the influence of American capital and also from the politics of the Soviet bloc. The Republic should, therefore, ally itself with other Asian countries and extricate itself from "ties which are too close to US capitalistic or Soviet politics."48 On February 17, the Politbureau of the Partai Sosialis replied to the PSI attack. In a statement remarkably close to the Zhdanov line, the Partai Sosialis pointed to the world struggle between US capitalism and the socialism of the USSR and the "new East European democracies." The new countries in Asia were a result of this struggle in Europe, and the idea that one could remain neutral in this struggle as suggested by Sjahrir was nonsense, the party contended. The Partai Sosialis statement, however, stopped short of demanding that Indonesia side solely with the socialist camp.49 The results of the PSI withdrawal from the Socialist Party were not immediately apparent. The Sjahrir socialists were a small group of intellectuals without the mass following of Amir, and their departure did not cause a dramatic weakening of Socialist Party support. The PSI did, however, control many of the Socialist Party's Sumatran branches, and their members held the leadership positions in the farmers' organization, BTI. Also, through the efforts of their minister for youth, Supeno, they were in a position to try to break the left-wing hegemony in Pesindo. The PSI, however, made no effort to attract mass support away from the FDR. It preferred, rather, to remain an elitist organiration in the months that followed, avoiding the rough and tumble politicking of the FDR and Masyumi and concentrating on education of its own small following. 50 The Calcutta Conference, Nationalism, and the Cold War

Although the split in the Socialist Party had brought to light the ideological differences between the radical Socialist/PK! approach to foreign policy and that of the Sjahrir "nationalists," the quarrel remained on a purely theoretical level within the socialist group. At this time, the question of the Republic's relations with the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe was simply a non-issue among Indonesia's other political parties. The Soviet Union was generally viewed as a friendly power for its strong defense of the Republic at the UN, and the Eastern European countries were also seen as friendly anti-imperialist forces. Russian control over its satellites only started to become a real issue after the Communist seizure of power in Czechoslovakia in late February 1948. Indonesia had an "information center" in Czechoslovakia, and while the Amir government had made secret overtures for recognition by the USSR and the bloc countries, this was not generally known. (See Chapter III below.) The USSR had no representatives in Indonesia, although a Tass correspondent did visit the Republic in March.st 48

Ibid.

49

Ibid., March 11, 1948, pp. 3 and 5. The Partai Sosialis does not at this point seem to have been anti-US. Amir had been working very closely with the Americans, especially Graham, on Renville. Kahin, Nationalism, p. 274, says Amir's disillusionment with the US did not come until later in the year when it became clear that the United States was doing little to force the Dutch to implement Renville. It is doubtful that Amir would have been aware at this point that the USSR was charging that Graham helped to topple Amir's cabinet, or that Amir would have believed this line. (Also see McVey, Soviet View, pp. 39-40.) 50 Berita Indonesia,

June 11, 1948, p. 2. Sjahrir himself stated that the PSI would not join any new cabinet (in June) because it did not wish to become involved in intra-party fights. The PSI would keep its organization small and city-centered.

51

Unfortunately, little is known about Tass correspondent Afrin, who seems to have been in Indonesia only briefly. As a Tass correspondent he was working for the Russian government in any case, and he may possibly have been a KGB agent. He undoubtedly contacted PKI leaders during his visit to Yogyakarta in March, but

27 In the late 1940s and early 1950s, the idea became popular among some Western writers that the string of Communist revolutions which occurred during 1948 in Southeast Asia were sparked by specific orders from Moscow passed on to Asian Communist leaders at an Asian youth conference held in Calcutta, February 19-25, 1948. This thesis has many variations. The basics, however, are that the new Moscow (Zhdanov) line of a two-camp (Socialist/USSR and Imperialist/US) world and an order for revolution were communicated to the Southeast Asian Communist parties in late February and early March of 1948 through the Calcutta meeting, and that all the Southeast Asian parties immediately fell into step. This "Calcutta Conference" thesis has been sufficiently refuted by Ruth McVey's writings, which show that both the context and the timing of the Calcutta conference made it an exceedingly unlikely forum for the passing of "orders from Moscow." 52 The 1947 Zhdanov line did represent a new orientation in Communist doctrine, but the question of when and how the line reached Indonesia and when it was accepted by the local Communists has remained a puzzle for historians. The tone of the FDR's February 17 statement seems to indicate some knowledge of the two-camp line, and by May 1, the full text of Zhdanov's famous speech to the Cominform (September 1947) had been translated and printed by the Communist press in Yogyakarta.53 Whatever their theoretical knowledge of the new Soviet line, however, the FDR and PKI gave little indication through May that they felt it had any practical meaning for their organizations in Indonesia. The USSR itself at this time, while criticizing the Renville Agreements,54 refrained from open attacks on the Hatta government.55 FDR decisions on foreign and domestic policy seemed to follow from purely domestic causes, and even the PKI itself as late as June showed little indication of being in step with the world Communist line. In an interview with Daniel Schorr, quoted in Berita Indonesia, June 8, 1948, Alimin told Schorr that Indonesia was not yet ready for socialism and that the left-wing parties must aid the government in its hour of crisis. Alimin said the PKI was

he does not seem to have been carrying any official word. His few public statements are tantalizing. On April 2, 1948, Berita Indonesia (p. 2) carried an Antara report of Afrin's comments that Indonesia was almost totally controlled by the Dutch, and Brackman, Indonesian Communism (p. 2), notes that on his return to Jakarta from Yogyakarta, Afrin commented that the forces of "counterrevolution" were in control in the Republic. The Dutch apparently considered Afrin a threat, as they expelled him from Indonesia on his return to Jakarta (FBIS, March 12, 1948, reporting an Antara Radio Broadcast March 12, 1948). 52

Ruth T. McVey, The Calcutta Conference and the Southeast.Asian Uprisings (Ithaca, NY: Cornell Modern Indonesia Project, 1958). Also see McVey, "Southeast Asian lnsurrectionary Movements" and Soviet View. The Indonesian delegates to the Calcutta conference seem to have had little effect on the PKl's thinking. They were relatively low-level members of the PKI and, in any case, they did not arrive back in Java until some time after late May (Berita Indonesia, May 7, 1948, p. 3). On ·May 4, the first of the Calcutta conference delegates (Samsu Anwar) arrived back in Bukittinggi, Sumatra. The main young PKI delegates, Francisca Fangiday, the chairman of the delegation, Supeno (Pesindo) and Otto Rondonuwu (affiliation unknown) did not return until later. Little information was carried by the press on the Calcutta conference itself. On March 30, Berita Indonesia (p. 4) carried a Tass story simply stating that the conference had called for "hands off Asia." 53 A.

Zhdanov, Situasi Politilc lntemasional (Yogyakarta: Mingguan Revolusioner, May 1948). The text of the Zhdanov speech pointed to Indonesia (under Amir) and Vietnam as examples of countries where the line was being carried out properly. The FDR was probably aware that Hatta's government was not seen as favorably as Amir's by the USSR, although the USSR refrained from criticizing Hatta.

54 Berita Indonesia,

February 28, 1949, p. 2; the paper speculates that Gromyko, who stated Russian dissatisfaction with Renville at a UN session on February 18, might use the USSR veto against a vote praising the GOC's work. On February 29, however, Gromyko abstained on this vote. Also see Berita Indonesia, February 19, 1948, p. 1, and March 1, 1948, p. 1. 55

McVey, Soviet View, p. 47.

28 even willing to see Indonesia accept US aid as long as it did not give the US too much control over the Republic's economy.56 Some writers on Indonesia have charged that FDR policy underwent a drastic change in the two weeks between February 26 and early March to a repudiation of the Renville Agreements, a call for the cessation of all negotiations with the Dutch until after they had withdrawn from Indonesia, plus a generally harder line on nationalization of Dutch and other foreign property.57 From this, the conclusion has been drawn that in late February as a result of the Calcutta conference, the Indonesian Communist Party, both as a legal party and through its control of the FDR, started to fall in line with the harsher Moscow International Communist line. This thesis is difficult to support, however, as there is little evidence that in fact there was any major change in FDR policy from mid-January to midMay of 1948.58 Through early August, indeed, the FDR was to continue to support Renville as a basis for talks, although its public stance towards the Dutch became more hostile as the months went by.59 In this, it was not alone. Most of Indonesia's political parties and leaders became increasingly disenchanted with the possibilities for negotiations with the Dutch, and Republican tempers rose. Although the Dutch had agreed to hold plebiscites in the areas they had seized from the Republic, almost immediately after the signing of the Renville Agreements they proceeded to set up, without properly supervised plebiscites or consultations with the Republic, new states in Madura (January 21, 1948) and West Java (February 26, 1948), and finally an interim United States of Indonesia on March 9, 1948. The Dutch effort to isolate the Republic from support in other areas of Indonesia and to revive regional hostilities against a "Javanese" Republic was evident to all. 60 Republican sentiment was unanimous in condemning the Dutch, and even the calm-tempered Hatta was forced to protest the Dutch attempt to "deride" the Republic and to "flout Renville."61 Feeling ran particularly high against those Indonesians who were working with the Dutch in the "puppet" governments. When the UN Good Offices Committee, accompanied by the Dutch negotiating team and some of the leading Indonesian officials from the

56 Berita Indonesia,

June 8, 1948, p. 2. Berita Indonesia is quoting a Dutch newspaper and the date of this interview, which was either late May or early June, is unknown. 57 See,

e.g., Kahin, Nationalism, p. 260.

58

Dutch propaganda agencies may have attempted to give the impression that Amir was trying to sabotage Renville. There is only one mention, however, of this line in the Indonesian press at the time. On April 21, 1948, Keng Po carried a story that J. H. Ritman, the head of the Foreign Affairs section of the RVD (the Dutch information setvice) in Jakarta, told newsmen in Holland that Hatta was now pro-Renville and Amir was antiRenville.

59

On May 20, 1948, Berita Indonesia carried an FDR statement condemning the amnesty granted to Indonesians working for the Dutch. However, a few days later, Harjono, the PKI leader of SOBSI, stated that one way to win the revolution was through negotiations, but "Renville" is as far as SOBSI was willing to go (ibid., May 22, 1948, p. 2). Moreover, SOBSI, which had earlier (April 26) sent a memo to the Indonesian delegation to the Renville talks which took a mild stand on foreign investments ("these can be worked out later") went on to have a successful meeting with Hatta on the same subject on May 23 (ibid., April 27, 1948, p. 1, and May 29, 1948, p. 3). Soe Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri" (p. 36) says that Amir, as head of the FDR in March and April, stated his readiness to help in the implementation of Renville. 60

See FBIS, February 4 and February 13, 1948, quoting Radio Jogjakarta. Also see Berita Indonesia, February 27, 1948, p. 1, for Ali Sastroamidjojo's statements at the UN.

61

FBIS, February 24, 1948, quoting Batavia radio broadcast of February 23 and FBIS, March 1, 1948, quoting Radio Jogjakarta broadcast of a Hatta speech of February 28.

29 Dutch-held areas, arrived at Yogyakarta's Tugu railroad station on April 12, they were met by hostile demonstrators. While no one was hurt, delegates, especially the Indonesians, were cursed, spat upon, and generally abused. The Dutch promptly protested these indignities as a serious breach of diplomatic protection for the negotiations. Republican apologies were quickly forthcoming, but the Dutch continued to grumble about inadequate police protection, to complain that the Republic's apologies were less than sincere, and to insinuate that the incidents had been "specially organized."62 Press accounts of the time give little indication of who started the demonstrations, which apparently began with a small group of protestors whose ranks were swelled as interested spectators gathered at the station to await the long overdue train.s More important than the actual origins of the demonstration is the fact that most Republican leaders seem to have sympathized with the sentiments of the crowd, embarrassing though it might be to the Republic at the level of world diplomacy. Haji Agus Salim, conservative Moslem leader and foreign minister, even told the PKI newspaper Buruh in an interview then quoted over the official Y ogyakarta radio that the "Tugu Incident" could be excused by the Dutch if they would remember their own feelings toward Dutch traitors who collaborated with the Germans in World War 11.64 Through the beginning of May, then, it seems to have been nationalism and a growing impatience with the Dutch, rather than any adherence to Communist Cold War doctrine, which motivated the FDR and the Communist Party. By May of 1948, only the first dim rumblings of the Cold War in Southeast Asia had reached Indonesia. Among the politicians, only the Sjahrir socialists seem to have been aware of the conflicts that Russiancontrolled Communist doctrine could cause between domestic Communist parties and nationalist movements. In their writings and speeches, Sjahrir and other PSI leaders followed events in Burma closely and gave veiled warnings of what might happen if the nationalist movement split into warring left and right.~ There was in Indonesia a growing awareness of the forward thrust of Russian communism in Europe, especially after the Gottwald takeover in Czechoslovakia on January 26, 1948; but it was not until mid-May that stories started to appear in the Indonesian press that the USSR was about to set up a new Comintern for Asia in Bangkok.66 Even as the first awareness of the potential of Communist revolutionary movements started to enter the Republic, its impact was dulled by the fact that Indonesia's Communist Party seemed small and harmless. In addition, by this time most Indonesians were accustomed to ignoring strident Dutch propaganda that

62

Ibid., April 16, 1948, quoting Batavia radio.

6.1

Berita Indonesia, April 14, 1948, p. 1; April 15, 1948, p. 2; and April 17, 1948, p. 2. The Dutch at first inti-

mated that the government had a hand in the demonstrations (FBIS, April 16, 1948); then a broadcast on April 22, 1948, over Radio Hilversum carried "rumors" that Amir and the FDR had been behind the demonstrations which were aimed at disrupting the Masyumi and causing chaos (ibid., April 22, 1948). Brackman in Indonesian Communism also assumes the FDR started the Tugu Station incident (p. 73). Amir, however, had just arrived back in Yogyakarta with Hatta the day before, and one wonders if he had the time or inclination to start the demonstration (Berita Indonesia, April 12, 1948, p. 1). The Sultan of Yogyakarta went so far as to intimate for his part that the demonstrations were instigated by Dutch agents in an effort to blacken the Republic's international image. (Ibid., April 16, 1948, p. 2.) 64 FBIS,

April 16, 1948, quotingAntara from Yogyakarta.

~ Siasat, May 23, 1948, pp. 10-11, carries a story on the Burmese Communist Party rebellion. Berita Indonesia,

February 18, 1948, p. 3, says that Sjahrir in a speech pointed to the problems occurring in other countries, China, Burma, and Vietnam, where the independence movement was split. 66 Merdeka,,

May 22, 1948, p. 1, carried one of the first rumors that a Comintern might be set up in Bangkok.

30 the Republic was in imminent danger of a Communist takeover. By June, this attitude would start to change and the lines of the Cold War struggle would start to take on domestic significance. At the beginning of May, however, these differences over foreign policy were still muted, even between the FDR and Masyumi. The PNI, Masyumi, and FDR were all increasingly wary of the Dutch but continued grudgingly to feel that negotiations based on Renville should continue, and all supported widening the Republic's relations with any country willing to offer diplomatic recognition. While the FDR wanted the stress to be on relations with Communist countries, it seemed to have no objection to relations with the West as well. For its part, the Masyumi seemed willing for relations to be established with anyone, the Soviets not excluded.67 The Cold War was still a distant blur on the horizon: it would soon arrive.

-The Consolidation ofPolitical Control In early February, there had been doubts expressed over Hatta's ability to control the situation in the face of widespread FDR opposition and seemingly insurmountable economic and military problems. By May, despite FDR efforts to the contrary, Hatta, who was noted even by his enemies as a "strong man," was well in control.68 He had acted quickly and firmly to end disruptive demonstrations by the FDR, and, while his ban on demonstrations had been protested by the FDR,6J they had complied. On February 16, Hatta set forth a program of "rationalization" calling for widescale cutbacks in the armed forces. The government moved first against independent lasykar units, such as Bung Tomo's BPRI and scattered guerrilla and bandit gangs in the Yogyakarta, Solo, and Wonosobo areas. 70 Isolated from sources of outside support, these groups were dealt with effectively by government forces, with only the BPRI putting up any significant resistance (in late March).71 By March, the government had also started to implement rationalization in those units of the TNI under its control, which included some 35,000 troops just evacuated from West Java. By May, 800 TNI officers had been put on reserve and some 50,000 soldiers returned to civilian work. 72 To this point, however, only the easier questions of the army rationalization program had been tackled, and traditionally recalcitrant forces such as Solo's Fourth Division had not yet been severely pressured. On the domestic scene, the economic picture was bleak and growing bleaker with the continuation of the strict Dutch blockade. The Republic issued angry protest after protest to the UN on the blockade, but no action was taken against the Dutch. Only one bright spot appeared on the domestic horizon and this was the Hatta government's attempts to deal with the complicated question of the rights of peasants versus those holding "conversion rights" in areas planted in export crops. These lands were usually held by Indonesian

61

Sia.sat, May 23, 1948, p. 12. In a mass meeting on May 16, the Masyumi and FDR issued a demand for the Republic to continue its foreign relations abroad. This was a standard demand and the Masyumi had not yet been faced with making a decision on relations with the USSR 68

Manai Sofian, "Surat dari Jokja," Merdeka, April 13, 1948, p. 2.

6J

FBIS, February 25, 1948, quoting Batavia radio, February 21, 1948.

10 Berita Indonesia,

71 Merdeka,

12 FBIS,

April 22, 1948, p. 2; Merdeka, April 22, 1948, p. 3.

April 12, 1948, p. 2, April 8, 1948, p. 1; Berita Indonesia, April 2, 1948, p. 3, April 3, 1948, p. 2.

May 5, 1948, quoting Antara from Yogyakarta, May 4, 1948; ibid., May 27, 1948, quoting Voice of Free Indonesia from Yogyakarta, May 25, 1948.

31 princely families or under concession to Dutch or other foreigners. The problem centered on how to give the villagers control over their lands and abolish the "conversion rights" that most agreed constituted a feudalistic system of agriculture, without at the same time diminishing the supplies of export crops needed to shore up the Republic's povertystricken budget and without prejudicing, in contradiction of Renville, the rights of foreign investors. FDR members, particularly the PKI, were calling for complete abolition of the "conversion rights" and some system of redistribution of land to landless peasants, while the more conservative Masyumi wanted to protect the rights of their land-holding members. On April 24, the government was successful in passing a compromise law, which, while not as liberal as the FDR would have liked as it had no effect on the landless peasants, seems to have been a step in the direction of easing the farmers' problems in this one area. The original enthusiasm for the law quickly paled, but at frrst the government's efforts engendered quite a bit of support.73 In spite of the vociferous FDR campaign against the Masyumi, efforts continued to reach a compromise solution for a new cabinet. Hatta's success both in controlling FDR opposition and in taking the frrst steps toward rationalization of the armed forces, however, put him in a strong bargaining position. Sukarno seems to have been the leading force in the effort to fmd a compromise solution. In his speeches as he toured the countryside, the President constantly urged the need for national unity and exercised his influence to moderate the positions of both left and right. 74 The culmination of this effort came on May 20, National Reawakening Day, when all parties put out a joint statement agreeing on the need for national unity.75 This was accompanied by much speculation in the press that agreement was near on a new cabinet to include the FDR. The FDR was apparently ready to submerge its differences with the Masyumi for a place in the cabinet, and even the Masyumi was willing to work with the FDR.76 Apparently, far from having decided that it was impossible to work with the national bourgeoisie, Amir in mid-May was ready to play the politician's game of compromise to win his party a place in the governing of the national revolution. 73

For a full discussion of this question, see Sutter, lndonesianisasi, pp. 636-47. On March 31, 1948, the Yogyakarta branch of the BTI held demonstrations to praise the government declaration that "conversion lands" should be abolished in Yogyakarta and Solo (Berita Indonesia, April 1, 1948, p. 2). The BTI was, of course, PSI controlled, but in the early stages all sectors seemed hopeful that real progress could be made. The law as passed, however, made no provision for land to the landless as demanded by the FDR, and the benefit from the law went to those already holding land in the villages. Also, the effect of the law was delayed so that the government could gain income from that year's hatvest. 74

In a speech on May 20, 1948, in Yogyakarta, Sukarno criticized both the left (for wanting to have social revolution before the national revolution) and the PNI (for being too national and ignoring the "international revolution"). Sukarno went on to appeal to the people not to be split by "class struggle" (Berita Indonesia, May 22, 1948, p. 2).

75 A

full discussion of Sukarno's efforts and the resulting joint statement is found in a Police Report of August 20, 1948, put out in Yogyakarta covering May-July 1948, in a private Indonesian collection. Also see Berita Indonesia, May 22, 1948. 16 FBIS,

June 1, 1948, quoting Voice ofFttt Indonesia from Yogyakarta, May 31, 1948; Berita Indonesia, June 1, 1948, p. 1.

32

Haji Agus Salim

Suripno

Amir Sjarifuddin

CHAPTER III THE OPPOSITION MOUNTS

In mid-May 1948, it seemed possible that the widening breach between the FDR and the Hatta government might be bridged before it became too serious. Events of late May were to shatter these hopes, and in the two months that followed the rift widened rather than narrowed. Increased FDR opposition during June and July, however, had little demonstrable effect, and by August, frustrated in its ambitions to regain a place in the Republic's government, the FDR was ready to accept the new ideas and leadership which were soon to be offered. Russia Comes to Indonesia: The Suripno Alfair

On May 26, a Russian announcement shattered hopes for achieving political unity in Indonesia and set the FDR on a course more in harmony with the Soviet Union's twocamp line: Not long ago a special representative of the Republic of Indonesia, Minister Plenipotentiary Suripno, delivered a communication in the name of the government of the Republic of Indonesia to the Soviet Government through the embassy of the USSR in Prague relating to the establishment of relations between the Soviet Union and the Republic of Indonesia. As a result of discussions in Prague between both governments, an agreement was reached to establish consular relations and a reciprocal exchange of consuls between the USSR and the Republic of Indonesia. The agreement reached was confirmed by an exchange of letters between the Ambassador Plenipotentiary and Extraordinary, M. A. Silin, and the special Envoy Extraordinary and Plenipotentiary Minister of the Republic of Indonesia, Dr. Suripno. Both letters were dated May 22 at the Soviet Embassy in Prague. 1 Almost since its inception, the Indonesian Republic had been engaged in an energetic search for relations with any nation willing to accord the Republic recognition. The prize

1 Pravda,

May 26, 1948, p. 2. Translation by Antony Diller. The word "confirmed" (par. 3) of the text has been translated as "ratification" in McVey, Soviet View, p. 49. However, the word "Zakreplenie" in most Russian dictionaries appears as "to confirm" or "to strengthen" with no alternate meaning of ratification. The word for ratification is usually given as "utverzhdenie" or "ratifikatsiia."

33

34

sought was part of the game of "diplomasi," the recognition by other sovereign nations of the Indonesian Republic's claim to sovereignty in Indonesia. The Republic's efforts, of course, infuriated the legal-minded Dutch, who, since they claimed sole sovereignty in all of Indonesia including that part occupied by the Republic, did everything in their power to block the Republic from gaining international recognition. Relations between the Indonesians and the Russians were anathema to the Dutch, and they were violent in their denunciations of the agreement. In the chaos that ensued after the Russian announcement, fact and fancy became hopelessly intertwined and it is still difficult to reconstruct a clear picture of the events leading to the signing of the agreement. In June 1947, Suripno, an Indonesian youth leader, was sent by Sjahrir to Czechoslovakia to attend an international youth conference in Prague. At the same time, Suripno was authorized by Indonesian Foreign Minister Haji Agus Salim to set up an Information Center in Prague after the youth conference ended.2 Although not well known in Indonesia, Suripno was a brilliant young aristocrat who had spent the war years studying in Holland and fighting with the Dutch Communist underground as one of Setiadjit's recruits to the Dutch Communist Party. On his return to Indonesia in 1946, he continued his interest in international youth activities, participating in Indonesian delegations to various youth conferences.3 At some point in the fall of 1947, Suripno established contact with the Russian ambassador to Prague, Silin, and then requested formal written permission from the Republic to negotiate agreements.4 On December 25 of that year, Sukarno and Acting Foreign Minister Tamzil authorized Suripno "to negotiate and sign agreements to establish friendly relations with the governments of East and Central Europe and the USSR."5 After the agreements were concluded and signed, the authorization stated they should then be returned to "the President and Republic of Indonesia for ratification."6 Suripno claimed to have received his letter of authorization on January 13, 1948, and set about negotiations with the Russians which culminated in the signature of the agreement on May 22, 1948.7

2 Berita Indonesia,

May 28, 1948, p. 2, quoting an intetview with Haji Agus Salim. Also see Kahin, Nationalism, p. 268. As the Republic in 1947 was seeking the broadest possible relations with all countries, it is quite possible that Suripno was also informally told to see what the possibilities were for developing better relations with Eastern Europe and the USSR Indeed, Berita Indonesia (June 2, 1948, p. 2) says that Suripno, like other officials abroad, had received instructions to strengthen relations and to seek aid from foreign governments in face of the increased Dutch threat. 3 Merdeka,

June 30, 1948, p. 1, for a biography of Suripno. Also see Sedjarah Perdjuangan Pemuda Indonesia (Jakarta: n.p., 1965), p. 179 and Soc Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri," pp. 24-25, p. 91.

4 Berita Indonesia,

August 14, 1948, p. 2, for Suripno intetview.

5 Ibid., June

8, 1948, p. 1. The full text of Suripno's authorization in English was released by the Republic. It is probably safe to assume that Suripno requested this written authority at the insistence of the Russians who may have been suspicious of the young (27 years) delegate's credentials, even though he was a Communist. The Republic stressed in its communique on Suripno (May 29, 1948), that the authorization was sent before the Renville Agreements were signed (Berita Indonesia, May 31, 1948, p. 1). The implication was that the Republic could not be charged with actively seeking foreign relations after Renville. 6 7

Ibid.

Ibid., August 14, 1948, p. 1, from an intetview with Suripno. Also see McVey, Soviet View, p. 49, quoting Suripno statement on Radio Jogjakarta (August 13, 1948), that he had opened the negotiations on receipt of his authorization, but that "owing to unforeseen circumstances the agreement could not be signed until May 22." Lt. Governor General van Mook gives a different explanation for these circumstances, saying that Suripno had been trying for agreement before May 22, but he was "consistently staved off by the Russian Embassy until it suddenly accepted the proposal shortly before that date." (H.J. van Mook, The Stakes of

35 There is some controversy over whether or not the Hatta government was fully aware of Suripno's negotiations with the Russians,8 and it is evident in any case that the rapid conclusion of those negotiations caught the Indonesians completely by surprise. On May 27, Foreign Minister Salim denied that the Republic had ever authorized Suripno to negotiate with the Russians.9 On May 29, however, while still denying any personal knowledge of Suripno's mission, Salim admitted the Sukarno authorization had been sent, but pointed out caustically that it was very odd Suripno had not informed his government before signing such an important agreement. 10 It seems hardly likely the Hatta government could have been completely unaware of Suripno's mission. 11 However, it is possible that, having heard little or nothing from Suripno since December 1947, the government had

Democracy in Southeast Asia [New York: Norton, 1950], p. 286). Van Mook here is presumably drawing his information from confidential Dutch or US sources. There is no mention of "ratification" in any of Suripno's early statements when he first arrived back in Indonesia. However, he probably found himself under heavy criticism for signing the agreement without checking back with the Republic first. In the normal course of events an agreement would be negotiated and signed by a properly authorized person (like Suripno) and then sent back to the country for "ratification," i.e., for the country's legislature or other body to enact the agreement into law. Agreements of this type will not come into effect until they are ratified. Suripno (Kahin, "Memorandum of Conversation," September 6 and 7, 1948) told George Kahin that he concluded and initialed an agreement with the Russians before the fall of the Amir government on January 23, and then requested further instructions. As he received no reply, Suripno said he assumed that Amir had been unable to finalize the agreement for fear of jeopardizing the newly negotiated Renville Agreements and that Hatta, when he came to office, "did not wish to undertake any more initiatives relative to the treaty." On May 22, Suripno said, the USSR informed him that they had "ratified" the agreement, but Suripno then found he was unable to get ratification from the Hatta government.

It is unlikely Suripno's ratification tale is true as there is little indication of the agreements having been signed in Prague before May 22. 8

Foreign Minister Salim was out of the country when Suripno's authorization was sent. Deputy Foreign Minister Tamzil was in Jakarta and, according to Salim, the foreign affairs portfolio was being held in Yogyakarta by Amir Sjarifuddin who was working out of his Secretariat rather than out of the Foreign Ministry. (Berita Indonesia, May 28, 1948, p. 2.) The papers on Suripno's appointment seem to have stayed in Amir's office, and thus Salim at least said he had no knowledge of this authorization. While it is possible that Suripno's authorization was purposely kept from Hatta and Salim by Amir and Tamzil (a FDR member), with the complicity of Sukarno, for fear that Hatta would object, this hardly seems likely. Secrets of this type were hard to hold, especially with Sukarno involved, and Tamzil was apparently a cousin of Sjahrir and a nephew of Salim ( conversation with Professor B. R. O'G. Anderson) although he remained in the Partai Sosialis after the PSI split. If Suripno had already been given a broad oral authority to seek relations, however, it is quite possible that the written authorization was considered so "pro-forma" as not to be important. 9 Berila

Indonesia, May 28, 1948, p. 2.

10

Ibid., May 31, pp. 1-2. Salim was a former leader of the Sarekat Islam and a strong anti-Communist (McVey, Rise ofIndonesian Communism, p. 297). An extremely sophisticated Moslem, he was not a member of the Masyumi because of a personal fcud with its leader Sukiman. Known for his intelligence, wit, and shrewdness as the grand old man of Indonesian politics, Salim was unlikely not to have been aware of what was occurring in his own department. His protests to the press, although possibly a smoke screen to confuse critics while the government decided what to do, have a ring of authenticity and it is possible he was unaware of Suripno's written (as opposed to oral) authorization. 11

See note 8 above. The Indonesians had also been given some forewarning that something was happening in Moscow, because on May 21, five days before the Russian announcement, the Dutch with their usual vociferousness had complained to the UN Good Offices Committee that they had a document proving the Republic was trying to establish relations with the Russians. (See Pandji Rajat, June 1, 1948, p. 1, for the Dutch communique on the Suripno affair.) It is quite possible the Indonesians either did not believe the Dutch or felt that the Dutch were simply exaggerating Suripno's presence in Prague. Also see Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 119-20.

36 assumed the talks were stalemated and that the Russians, like the United States, had no intention of extending the Republic formal recognition. 12 Soviet motives in the Suripno affair will probably never be fully understood: Why did they delay the consular agreement so long and why did they choose May as the time for signing? Russian actions in the late forties were usually determined more by events in Europe than by those in East Asia, but, other than a general desire to create havoc for the West European imperialists in the "soft underbelly'' of their colonies, little specific motivation can be found. In April of 1948, the Marshall Plan had been signed into law in the US and, more importantly, on March 17, 1948, the Netherlands had joined in the forerunner of NATO in Europe, the European Western Union. By the beginning of April the Cold War had set in in earnest in Europe, and the Russians had begun to place the restrictions on traffic in and out of Berlin which were to culminate on June 23, 1948, in the Berlin Blockade.13 Thus, any moves which might weaken one of the United States allies in Europe were certainly in line with current Soviet policy. The US State Department saw another reason behind the Soviet move. In addition to speculating that the USSR was trying to disrupt the Renville Agreements, the Department in a cable to Batavia on May 28, 1948, stated "the USSR doubtless desired by this act to minimize offense to Muslim world resulting from USSR recognition Israel."14 Soviet intentions toward the Hatta government are more difficult to ascertain. While the Soviets were at this time refraining from attacks on it, they had shown by their denunciations of the "extreme rightist pro-American" Hatta cabinet when it was first formed without the Sayap Kiri, that they were well aware of the government's conservative bias, and Soviet propaganda agencies had dropped Indonesia from their list of leaders of the Asian revolution after February. 15 Soviet impressions of the Hatta government must have also been confrrmed by reports from Tass correspondent Afrin who visited the Republic in March. 16 However, the USSR had held off from attacks on the government since early February, 17 perhaps feeling that in Russia's Euro-centric view, the Republic's anti-Dutch role was sufficient to merit support, whether or not it was led by a conservative government. By May, however, the Russians were at the height of their dispute with Tito which was to culminate in Tito's expulsion from the Cominform in late July, 18 and the Soviet line toward nationalism was beginning to harden. 19 Ruth McVey has speculated that Russian motives in going ahead with the Indonesian consular agreement may have been both "to

12

It is interesting to speculate what the reaction of the Republic might have been to US recognition. The Dutch, however, kept a close watch on American dealings with the Republic to make sure that its ally did not slip into "de jure" recognition of the Republic. (See FRUS 1947, vol. 6, pp. 912-16 for a 1947 quarrel over the US even extending formal de facto recognition to the Republic.) 13

D. F. Fleming, The Cold War and its Origins, vol. 1 (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1961), pp. 489-500.

14 FRUS

1948, vol. 6, The Far East and Australia (Washington: US Government Printing Office, 1974), p. 190. Israel became independent on May 14, 1948, and was recognized by the Soviet Union on May 18, 1978. Golda Meir, My life (New York: Putnam, 1975), p. 231. 15

McVey, Soviet View, pp. 38-39, 47.

16

Brackman, Indonesian Communism, p. 72, for Afrin's view of the Hatta government as "counterrevolution."

17

McVey, Soviet View, p. 47.

18

Fleming, Cold War, pp. 510-13; and Adam B. Ulam, F.xpansion and Coexistence (New York: Praeger, 1968),

p. 468. 19

McVey, Soviet View, pp. 51-53.

37 serve as a counter weight to that country's [Indonesian] dependence on American good will" and to "strengthen the Soviet claim to be the true defender of the Indonesian cause."20 McVey continues that it is also possible that the Soviets had decided it was time to "call a showdown with the Republic and demand that the Indonesians declare themselves as allies of the Russian cam.p."21 The Russians were probably also aware the agreement would be an embarrassment to the conservative Hatta government, and that Russian willingness to become the first major power to give "de jure" recognition to the Republic would give a boost to Indonesia's left wing. The immediate effect of the Russian announcement was to put the Hatta government in an extremely embarrassing position and to raise for the first time outside internal leftwing politics the question of Cold War allegiances. The Dutch, of course, immediately denounced the agreement and issued a series of "ultimatums" requiring the Republic to repudiate it. 22 The Republic, however, had been adamant in its adherence to the principle that it was free to continue its foreign relations until the political negotiations for the Republic's inclusion in the "United States of Indonesia" as provided by Renville were completed. 23 The Republic had informal relations with several countries and as recently as May 3 had been formally recognized by Yemen. 24 The unexpected Russian announcement faced the Hatta government with a dilemma: to turn down recognition would not only be to bow to strong Dutch pressure, but also to break one of the Republic's most firmly held principles, the right to conduct foreign relations. On the other hand, the Hatta government was well aware that one of the few checks on continued Dutch aggression was American pressure, and establishment of relations with the USSR at this point could well endanger the little leverage that the Republic could exercise with the Americans. While the United States at this point was more concerned with maintaining the Netherlands as a strong ally against the Communists in Europe than in helping the Indonesian Republic against the Dutch,25 it did exercise a moderating influence on the Dutch. The US representative to the UN Good Offices Committee, Coert Dubois, weighed in heavily with Indonesian leaders against the agreement almost immediately. 26 The US views probably

20

Ibid., p. 49.

21

Ibid.

22 Berita Indonesia, 23 Aneta,

June 5, 1948, p. 1.

January 22, 1948; and Berita Indonesia, May 8, 1948, p. 1.

24

Kementerian Luar Negeri, Facta dan Dokumen2, 6, p. 2. The Republic had representatives to the United Nations at Lake Success, in New Delhi, Karachi, Cairo, London, New York, and Singapore. India and Nationalist China both had representatives in Yogyakarta (Beritalndonesia, May 28, 1948, p. 2). Moersahid Wongsodirdjo in his article on the Foreign Ministry in Darius Marpaung, Bingkisan Nasional (Jakarta: Usaha Pegawai Nasional Indonesia, 1955), p. 229, adds Bangkok, Rangoon, Canberra, Prague, and Manila to Berita Indonesia's list of places where the Republic had "Kantor Petwakilan" (representative offices). Moersahid stresses, however, that these offices did not have diplomatic or consular status. 25

Taylor, Indonesian Independence, p. 398. Taylor says US policy favored the Dutch from August 1947 to December 1948; also see Roth, "American Flip Flop," pp. 39-40. 26

The State Department's reaction to the May 26 Russian announcement was very quick. On May 28, it cabled the US Consul General at Batavia, Livengood, that "Soviet announcement agreement exchange consular reps between USSR and lndo Repub occasions Dept great concern." (FRUS 1948, vol. 6, p. 191.) The cable goes on to ask Livengood and Dubois whether they thought they should "catechize" the Republicans because the Department felt that the move to establish USSR-Republic relations was a sign of Indonesian insincerity in carrying out the Renville Agreements (ibid., p. 192). Dubois, however, had already (on May 28) talked with Indonesian representatives to the GOC, Roem and Pringgodigdo, and had pointed out that "in

38 carried a great deal of weight with the Hatta government, ·which, unlike the FDR (see below), had not yet lost faith in the possibility of using US support to gain the Republic's independence. The initial Indonesian reaction to the Soviet announcement was both startled and confused. Salim on the 27th, while stating that the Republic had no intention of widening its foreign relations at the moment, added that if Russia wanted to recognize Indonesia unilaterally without any strings attached that would be acceptable.27 The government's reluctance to open relations with the Soviets, however, became more apparent on May 29. While continuing to insist on its right to conduct foreign relations, it announced on that date that it was recalling Suripno for "further consultations" on the agreements, and stated that the Republic at present had no intention of extending its foreign relations while the Renville negotiations were under way.2A This compromise solution, which amounted to stalling for time (neither refusing nor accepting the Russians' offer), was an obvious solution to a difficult dilemma. Whether the Hatta cabinet took the decision solely because of US and Dutch pressure, as the Russians were to charge on June 8, is difficult to say.'19 The Dutch were certainly violently opposing the agreement and the US· had made its opposition clear. Hatta's own inclination, probably based on a desire to avoid further disruption of the Renville talks, seems to have been to oppose the agreement,30 and the Masyumi too may have been opposed.31 By July, Foreign Minister Salim was to tell an American reporter that he "was completely opposed to the agreement" which he feared would bring "dozens of Soviet correspondents into the Republic,"32 but it is unclear if this was his opinion in May. The FDR, however, favored immediate recognition33 and appears to have been not only angered but also surprised by Hatta's decision to pass up what the FDR considered a golden opportunity to increase the Republic's leverage against the Dutch at the conferabsence clear-cut answer from Republic making plain it had not sought recognition by USSR, position US Del [i.e. Dubois] would be seriously weakened respect its ability get sympathetic hearing by Dutch and State Dept of Republic's case in political negotiations" (ibid., p. 194). Pringgodigdo called on Dubois the next morning (May 29) to give him the Republic's position on the USSR agreement which had been formulated at a cabinet meeting the evening of May 28. Pringgodigdo said that Hatta had never heard of Suripno's orders which had been made by Amir (the cable leaves unclear if Hatta knew of the overall approach); that the cabinet was about to issue a press release that Suripno was to be recalled; and (most importantly) that "Hatta wishes us [Dubois] inform State Department that as long as he Prime Minister, there would be no exchange of consuls with USSR" (ibid., p. 195). Hatta repeated this assurance to Dubois personally June 2 (ibid., p. 208). It should be noted that, while the State Department was plainly concerned with the extension of USSR influence into Indonesia, the cables between Batavia and Washington concentrate on Washington's concern that the Republic was reneging on the spirit of the Renville Agreements that the Republic should not establish more relations with foreign governments in the interim period before the "United States of Indonesia" was formed (ibid., pp. 191-209). 21 Berita Indonesia,

May 28, 1948, p. 2.

2A

Ibid., May 31, 1948, p. 1.

'19

Merdelca, June 9, 1948, p. 1, quoting Pravda of June 8. Pravda continued to refrain from criticizing Hatta,

but attacked the US and the Dutch for "using threats" against the Republic to keep it from entering "forbidden relations." 30

Derita, Lima Minggu, p. 8, says that Hatta's attitude to the agreement was very negative.

31

The Masyumi, however, made no public statement on the issue. See note 36 below.

32

Christian Science Monitor, July 23, 1948, p. 7.

33

Berita Indonesia, June 2, 1948, p. 1. Amir announced (probably on June 1) the FD R's opposition to

Suripno's recall. Also see Derita, Lima Minggu, p. 8.

39

ence table. Fears of American reactions had little impact on the FDR, as by this time FDR leaders, in particular Amir, were becoming increasingly disillusioned by what they considered a pro-Dutch US stance. In agreeing to Renville, Amir had counted on strong US support to assure that the agreements were enforced. Dutch creation of new puppet "states" in Dutch-held territory had brought little US reaction, and by May Amir was becoming convinced that his trust in Washington was being betrayed.34 He was to point this out clearly later in July when he questioned what possible aid the Republic felt it could get from the US, which was plainly pro-Dutch.35 Strident FDR opposition to Hatta's decision to recall Suripno brought to a standstill for the next few weeks the nearly concluded negotiations to form a coalition government. The PNI and Masyumi both seem to have supported the government on Suripno's recall36 and, as FDR opposition was vehement, it was plain that no agreement could be forthcoming until tempers cooled. However, while the FDR over the next few months was to use the recognition issue very successfully to stir up nationalist opposition against the Hatta government, it also continued through mid-August to follow a nationalist rather than a Sovietoriented foreign policy line, as it did not call for relations only with the Soviet bloc or for a stop to negotiations with the Dutch. The FDR campaign for acceptance of the Suripno agreement did, however, put the Cold War question squarely in the middle of Indonesian politics. The FDR became increasingly associated with the Soviet Union both in its own statements and in the minds of its opponents. On the other hand, the Hatta government appeared to the left to be pro-US because of its obvious reluctance to recognize the USSR, and seemed soft toward the Dutch because of its continued willingness to seek compromise solutions. The Dutch Threat: Backdrop to the Political Scene

In the weeks immediately following the Suripno affair, tensions between the Dutch and Indonesians soared to heights they had not reached since just prior to the beginning of the first Dutch "police action" a little less than one year earlier, and many observers felt Indonesia was on the brink of more open warfare. The Dutch, who tended to be very sensitive on the subject of communism in Indonesia, chose to use the possibility that the Republic might open contact with the Soviet Union as an excuse for loud ultimata and saber ratOn June 1, the Dutch representative to the Renville political talks, van tling. Vredenburch, announced that the Republic's decision to call Suripno home did not satisfy the Dutch demand that the Republic denounce the Suripno agreements. Because of this, van Vredenburch continued, he was leaving the talks for Jakarta on June 2, and would discuss with the Netherlands government what further steps should be taken.37 34

Kahin, Nationalism, p. 274.

35 Merdeka,

July 26, 1948, p. 1.

36

Neither the Masyumi nor the PNI issued statements on Suripno's recall, but, as both were in the government, it seems fair to assume that they supported Hatta's decision. The Police Report, August 20, 1948, p. 16, says that Masyumi's attitude was "Tunggu dulu" (wait a while), i.e., much like Hatta's, and that the PNI position, as usual, was unclear. Over the next weeks, the FDR campaign for recognition of Russia pushed the government, which was thought by the FDR to be bending to Dutch pressure, onto the defensive. No Republicans could openly oppose relations with Russia as this would seem against Indonesia's neutral role and her desire for foreign relations. 31 Pandji Rajat,

June 1, 1948, p. 1. The Dutch actions in this case may have been influenced by domestic politics in the Netherlands. Elections were scheduled for the beginning of July, and the Communist issue may have been used by the Dutch government in an attempt to garner right-wing votes at home.

40 Previous Dutch ultimata had ended in "police actions," and the Republic therefore girded itself for battle. Assuming that the negotiations were about to be halted, Hatta issued a warning that the Republic was ready to fight for years if necessary, and General Sudirman called for a general mobilization of troops to meet the Dutch threat. Sudirman also warned that the TNI was ready to take the helm itself if excessive concessions were made by the civilian government to Dutch demands for a dissolution of the TNl.38 While tempers cooled somewhat in the next few weeks, tensions remained high. In a desperate attempt to get negotiations under way again, the US and Australian representatives to the GOC, Dubois and Critchley, on June 10 put forward a compromise proposal calling for a general plebiscite to determine Indonesia's future. The proposal was accepted by the Republic but rejected by the Dutch, who were infuriated by the American representative, Dubois, who had exceeded his instructions in putting forward the plan. 39 By July 1, tensions were up again as Merdeka carried a Dutch report that the Dutch were preparing a new police action, and by July 23 the Indonesians themselves called a halt to the political talks with the Dutch on the basis of the Dutch refusal to accept the Critchley-Dubois proposal. Thus at the beginning of August, while economic talks were continuing with the Dutch, a total impasse had been reached on the sensitive political side, and relations between the Dutch and the Indonesians were on the razor's edge. It is against this background of continual crisis in Dutch-Indonesian relations that the drama of heightened FDR opposition to the government was played in June, July, and early August. FDR opposition, however, continued to center more on domestic issues than on the question of negotiations with the Dutch. The FDR denounced Hatta's decision to recall Suripno and was probably able to make good use of the Soviet statement that Suripno's recall was another example of the Americans and Dutch not allowing the Republic to have relations with "dangerous states."40 Amir came out firmly against the Critchley-Dubois compromise as weakening the Renville Agreements and called for the whole question of Indonesia to be returned to the UN Security Council.41 When the political talks finally broke down on July 23 Amir loudly approved, berating the Dutch for their bad faith and calling for an end to meetings on other (i.e., social and economic) matters. (Amir was joined here by Sjahrir who thought the political talks should have been broken off in June. 42) However, while by the beginning of August most Indonesians were very discouraged over the prospects of the talks with the Dutch and momentarily expecting a Dutch attack, even Amir still hel_d to the false hope that "Renville" could be used as a basis for talks with the Dutch, if only the Dutch would show good faith. The Changing Tactics of the FDR

By early June, the disagreement over the Suripno agreement had forced the FDR back into opposition. Hatta's decision to recall Suripno seems to have genuinely surprised the 38 Keng Po,

June 3, June 4, June 5, 1948; and Berita Indonesia, June 5, 1948, p. 1. Also see FBIS, June 4, 1948, quoting Netherlands government radio Hilversum broadcasting to Indonesia (June 3, 1948), that Hatta had threatened to fight for years if there was a new "police action." Hilversum commented that the breaking off of the talks being threatened by the Dutch did not necessarily cancel the truce.

39

Kahin, Nationalism, p. 249; Taylor, Indonesian Independence, pp. 125, 406; FRUS 1948, vol. 6, pp. 237-66.

40 Berita Indonesia,

June 9, 1948, p. 1.

41

Keng Po, June 22, 1948, p. 1; Merdeka, June 23, 1948, p. 2.

42

Keng Po, July 26, 1948, p. 1; Kementerian Luar Negeri, Fakta dan Dokumen2, vol. 3, pt. 6, p. 60.

41 FDR, and they began to regard the Hatta government in a far more conservative and unpalatable light.43 To date, FDR had had little success in its efforts to topple the government, which indeed appeared to be growing more confident of its ability to rule without the left wing. In view of this, the FDR seems to have decided in late May and early June that stronger methods were needed. The FDR's heightened campaign against the government took place on several levels: primarily, it involved continued attacks against the Masyumi, augmented now by agitation for relations with the USSR and for a stronger stance against the Dutch who were becoming increasingly threatening. The FDR's propaganda campaign was aimed at utilizing sources of discontent and winning support from any possible sectors of the Republic: from the young men who were impatient to fight the Dutch; from the soldiers who were discouraged and concerned over the rationalization program; from the peasantry whose lot had always been difficult in overpopulated Central Java; and fmally from the "workers,"44 the principal target of Amir's left wing, who had been hard hit, especially in the cities, by the Dutch economic blockade and by problems of government corruption which had plagued the Republic since its inception.

1. Labor: The Delanggu Strikes The FDR tactics, however, went beyond simple speechmaking. In June, a new method for undermining the cabinet's authority and gaining public support was brought into play: the strike. Workers on the government-controlled complex of cotton plantations and textile mills in the Delanggu area outside Solo had long been discontent with the government's management of the area. The BTN (Badan Textil Negara, State Textile Board) was reportedly involved in all manner of corrupt dealings with private merchants (both Chinese and Indonesian) at the expense of the laborers. Although the troubles had been going on for some time, the SARBUPRI or Plantation Workers' Union, under PKI leader Maruto Darusman, had held off from attacking the BTN while Amir's government was still in control. During May 1948, however, problems between the workers and the BTN came to a head, and on May 19, thousands of factory workers and cotton growers from the Klaten area outside Solo demonstrated before BTN headquarters in Solo for back pay and allotments of cloth due them since 1947. Whether or not at this early stage the disturbances were "politically motivated" is hard to judge, as the demands went back well before the Hatta government's formation. 45 Local strikes at several of the plantations began on May 26, but by June 1, the issue was starting to involve SOBSI organizations other than the purely local ones. By June 19, negotiations between the local unions and the BTN had broken down and the head office of SOBSI, represented by Maruto Darusman, took full control of the strike. Almost everyone was later willing to admit that the Delanggu strikers had real grievances, but from the moment the conduct of the strike was taken over by SOBSI, the issue became a political football. The Masyumi minister of welfare, Sjafruddin Prawiranegara, quickly charged

43

Derita, Lima Minggu, p. 7.

44

"Workers" in the Republic covered a broad spectrum of government employees, pedicab drivers and other city dwellers, some oil workers (Cepu), and plantation workers. The majority of Indonesia's bonafide workers were in Dutch-held industrial areas in Jakarta, Surabaya, and Semarang. 45 Police Repon,

August 20, 1948, p. 71.

42 that the strikes were solely political,46 and the government radio broadcast statements criticizing the strikers for weakening the national struggle against the Dutch.47 Pro-government forces, including on this occasion Tan Malaka's Murba, pointed out that Amir, who once felt that strikes in a time of national emergency against the Dutch weakened the country and should be avoided, was now supporting the strike. 48 SOBSI on the other hand, supported by the FDR, issued an inflammatory statement that the national struggle which it supported was anti-imperialist externally and anti-colonial and anti-feudal within the country.49 By early July, the issue of the strikes had reached crisis proportions. The FDR was circulating anti-government posters in Y ogyakarta, sentiment evidently was swinging against the government, and the PKI/FDR newspaper Suara R,u Kota, in an effort to bring down the cabinet, went so far as to float the rumor that Sukiman and Sjafruddin already had resigned.50 As the strikes at Delanggu accelerated into a national issue between the FDR and the government (primarily the Masyumi, for it was Masyumi ministers who were involved), the fight became re-reflected on the local level. By July 3, the press was carrying reports that if the strike was not settled soon, "aliran" (i.e., PKI vs. Masyumi) trouble was going to break out between the SARBUPRI strikers and members of the smaller Islamic peasants' union, the STII (Sarekat Tani Islam Indonesia, Indonesian Islamic Farmers' Association).51 The STII was controlled by the Masyumi and, apparently on orders from Masyumi headquarters, was attempting to break the strike and harvest the cotton fields. 52 Both Pesindo and Hizbullah armed units were moved into the area by the FDR and Masyumi to protect their respective workers, and PKI/SARBUPRI leader Darusman as well as Labor Party (PBI) leader Setiadjit were on the scene directing the FDR workers. 53 The issue came to a head on July 9, 10, and 13 when small armed clashes took place between STII strikebreakers and their Hizbullah guards, who had taken control of some areas, and demonstrating SARBUPRI members, guarded by armed Pesindo units.54 Several people were injured on both sides, and the strike threatened to flare into a general conflagration. At this point, Hatta took immediate action to avoid more clashes between the strikers and the Islamic groups and to calm the situation which was threatening to rock his cabinet. Hizbullah units were ordered to leave the area and General Sudirman sent in TNI units (Siliwangi under Colonel Sentot Iskandardinata) to bring the situation under con-

46

Berita Indonesia, June 26, 1948, p. 1.

47

Kahin, Nationalism, p. 266.

48 Berita 49

Indonesia, July 1, pp. 1-2.

Ibid., July 1, 1948, p. 1, July 3, 1948, p. 2.

50 Police Report,

August 20, 1948, p. 15; Berita Indonesia, July 15, 1948, p. 2.

st Berita Indonesia, July 3, 1948, p. 2. 52

Ibid.

53

Ibid., July 4, 1948, p. 2. Siliwangi dari Masa Ice Masa (Jakarta: Fakta Mahjuma, 1968), p. 230, also gives an account of various forces on the ground.

54

Berita Indonesia, July 16, 1948, p. 2. Also see Siliwangi, p. 230. The Hizbullah troops were probably only willing to withdraw because it was "friendly" Siliwangi troops which were sent in. It was normal, however, for the government to use this "resetve unit" to calm strikes. Hizbullah seems to have had many more troops on hand than Pesindo, for they were actually able to take over some areas of Delanggu and hold them under a quasi-military government (see Berita Indonesia, July 16, 1948).

43 trol.55 At the same time, Hatta met with SOBSI leaders on July 14 and made what were apparently reasonable concessions to their demands which by July 17 had brought the strikes to a close.56 During the Delanggu strikes, the FDR had shown its strength and had won a great deal of sympathy for its cause among workers in other Indonesian towns. In the middle of the strike, pro-government forces in the working committee of the KNIP had narrowly defeated an FDR proposal for ending the strikes, but the FDR was able to win in the field what it had lost in Parliament, and the settlement of July 17 forced the government to make major concessions.57 On the other hand, the FDR had not succeeded in its primary goal offorcing a crisis large enough to bring down the Hatta government, and, if anything, Hatta emerged from Delanggu stronger and more certain of his power. Even Sukarno had joined him in urging the workers to return to their jobs.58 The strike had also raised tensions between the FDR and Masyumi supporters in the Delanggu area to almost intolerable levels and had given a portent of the kind of hostilities lying just below the surface. The end of the Delanggu strikes only partially eased tensions. For at least a week after the strike's end small wildcat strikes broke out in other parts of the Republic, forcing the government to state harshly that it might be forced to take further action.59 2 The Farmers

The FDR's activities during this period were not confined solely to labor. It also attempted to win more followers to its banner among the farmers by agitational methods. Because of its earlier emphasis on labor, the FDR had allowed the central organization of the BTI to remain under the control of the PSI, and, in its work, it was now somewhat limited either to those BTI local branches it controlled or to using other peasant organizations such as the PKI's Sarekat Rakyat. Charging that the government was not moving quickly enough to implement the newly passed land reform laws, the FDR started to agitate among farmers in areas around Solo, Madiun, and Purwodadi.60 While the FDR had earlier urged that concession land be given to the landless peasant, the land reform law passed in April 1948 made no provision for this. The FDR now changed its tack, and demanded that village-owned land (kas-desa) and land set aside for allowances for village officials (lungguh) be redistributed among the poor peasants.61

55 Siliwangi, 56 Berita

p. 230.

Indonesia, July 17, 1948, p. 1; and Police Report, August 20, 1948, pp. 77-78.

57 Berita Indonesia,

July 13, 1948, p. 2; and Police Report, August 20, 1948, p. 15. According to Berita Indonesia, the FDR proposal was defeated fifteen to thirteen while the government proposal was accepted fifteen to twenty.

58

Kahin, Nationalism, p. 266.

59 Berita Indonesia,

July 28, 1948, p. 1.

60

Marsudi, Peristiwa Madiun, p. 4. Sjahrir was later to charge in Indonesian Socialism (p. 44) that the "communists taught the struggle against the religious party, the Masjumi, was essentially the struggle against the landlords and usurers in the villages."

61

Selosoemardjan, Social Changes in Jogjakarta (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1962), p. 178.

44

FDR agitation among the peasants resulted in disturbances and brought demands from the peasants that more "conversion lands" be seized and immediately returned to them. 62 FDR agitation by mid-August had reached the point that the Masyumi minister of the interior, Dr. Sukiman, in an effort to bring the FDR under control, issued a prohibition against groups agitating among the peasantry. 63 This prohibition, of course, served only to infuriate the FDR, which charged with some validity that the Masyumi did not wish to implement land reform and was using its position in the government to block FDR efforts.64 3. The FDR and the Anny

While both labor and the peasantry was needed to build the FDR's mass support, neither was as important to the FDR as the army. FDR influence in the armed forces was crucial both to protect itself against attacks from other forces and for any offensive moves the FDR might wish to make. FDR efforts to win rank-and-file support in the TNI and lasykar_units were aided during June and July by increasing Dutch intransigence and by the discontent in the ranks arising from the implementation of Hatta's rationalization program. Amir and the FDR continually attacked rationalization, claiming that the government was not caring properly for those who were being demobilized.6.S Amir also used the growing Dutch threat to point to the need for "total people's defense," 66 or the arming of large groups of irregular troops who would then be ready to face the Dutch in scattered guerrilla warfare ... and of course groups where FDR propaganda efforts could be more effective than in the TNI. Needless to say, the question of reducing the size of the armed forces at a time when the Republic seemed to be facing the another all-out Dutch attack was not popular in the army. Hatta's rationalization plan as formulated in his speech to Parliament on February 16 called for a staged reduction of Indonesia's massive armed forces from an ill-armed and badly trained organization of approximately 800,000 regular and irregular troops to a tightly disciplined army of approximately 160,000 men backed up by militia units in the villages.67 From the beginning of the program, rumors circulated that rationalization was simply a ploy to dissolve the TNI as a concession to Dutch demands that a single (Dutch-controlled) army be formed for all Indonesia. On March 5, the TNI leadership, including

62

Marsudi, Peristiwa Madiun, p. 54.

63

Hatta speech to the Working Committee of the KNIP, September 16, 1948, in Kementrian Luar Negeri, Fakta, vol. 7, p. 40. Replying to PKI criticisms on the government's land-reform program, Hatta said that reforms must be carried out within the law. "What is forbidden by the order [Surat Kawat] of the Minister of the Interior on August 14, 1948, are acts from groups which are irresponsible, who only intend to gain political profit by winning the hearts of the people who are given land .... "

64 Suara /bu Kola, September 17, 1948, reported PK.I complaints against the Masyumi on land reform. Also see Suripno, "Tulisan," p. 79. Suripno says his friends felt threatened by the government's harassment on the local level, especially the "instruction of the Interior Minister to restrict us with an iron fist in the field of agriculture." 6.5 Berita Indonesia, 66

June 12, 1948, p. 1; June 15, 1948, p. 1.

Ibid., July 12 and July 15, 1948.

67 Nasution,

TN/, 2: 130; and Kahin, Nationalism, p. 262. Kahin says that eventually it was hoped that the troop

strength could be reduced to 57,000 troops.

45 Sudirman, produced a statement that the TNI would "refuse any plan which would violate the sovereignty of the TNl." 68 While the FDR played on these army fears in its efforts to gain support, suspicions regarding the Hatta government were not just a creation of the left wing. Sudirman's June 3 statement that the army would take control if it appeared that Hatta was about to sell out the army to the Dutch is an indication of how seriously the TNI took this problem.(/) As late as August 10, Hatta was forced to issue a statement denying that any concessions would be made to the Dutch to dissolve the TNl.70 The rationalization program as drawn up by Sudirman and Nasution during February and March 1948 had two main parts: 71 demobilization of the lasykar, including the dismantling of the FDR-controlled TNI Masyarakat apparatus; and the reorganiration of the regular army. The dismantling of the TNI Masyarakat seems to have proceeded with extreme ease and rapidity, probably because the organization had exercised little real influence over the units under its command, and had worked chiefly as a propaganda arm of the FDR in the lasykar and as a channel for funds to Sayap Kiri forces. Demobilization of the lasykar themselves and reorganization of the TNI, however, was another question, as here the government was face to face with armed groups often under the control of hostile political forces. As mentioned in Chapter II, the government frrst tackled Bung Tomo's BPRI and other scattered lasykar units which in reality were little more than local bandit groups. (Bung Tomo had "retired" from command of the BPRI in January, and his units evidently had got out of control.72) Other lasykar units, such as the Hizbullah and Pesindo, which were controlled by powerful political groupings had not been touched, nor were they to be disturbed in any effective manner until after the Madiun coup. The question of these lasykar is complicated by the fact that parts of their forces were incorporated in regular army units (the Hizbullah in the Siliwangi and Pesindo in Divisions IV and VI). As far as can be seen in the use made of these units by both sides for the Madiun fighting, by September little headway had been made in disarming lasykar troops controlled by either Masyumi or the FDR. Rationalization of the TNI itself proceeded no better than that of the large lasykar. By March 25, 1948, Nasution had drawn up a plan for the reorganization of the existing seven TNI divisions on Java into three new divisions, one for West Central Java including Yogyakarta, one for East Central Java including Solo, one for East Java, and a "General Reserve Unit" composed of the Siliwangi Division centered in Solo.73 Rationalization

68

Nasution, TNI, 2: 15: "Menolak setiap rentjana jang hendak melanggar kedaulatan TNI."

(I)

Beritalndonesia, June 5, 1948, p. 1. Sudirman threatened that the 1NI would take the helm itself (menegang

kendali sendiri). 7o Ibid.,

71

August 10, 1948.

According to Nasution, TN/, 2: 156, on March 8, Sudirman was formally appointed by Sukarno to set up a

committee to carry out reorganization of the armed forces. The committee as constituted included Major General Susalit (representing ex-Peta and lasykar), Major General Suwardi (ex-KNIL) and Nasution (representing younger officers). On March 25, Nasution issued his plan for reorganization called "lnstruksi Panglima Besar Tentang Rekonstruksi Kesatuan2 Mobil dan Territorial" (ibid., 166-67). "Baharuddin's Plan" or the authorizing legislation for the reorganization was not signed into law by Sukarno after passage by the KNIP until May 5 (ibid., p. 151 ). 12

FBIS, January 23, 1948, discusses Bung Tomo's retirement. Also see Merdeka, April 13, 1948, p. 2 and SedjarahDiponegoro, p. 170 on actions to control BPRI troops in Solo. 73

Nasution, TN/, 2: 166.

46 seems to have proceeded smoothly among troops from West and West Central Java who were loyal to the Hatta cabinet and to the new Sudirman-Nasution duumvirate in the armed forces, established in February.74 Nasution, as former commander, held the absolute loyalty of the Siliwangi and the re-stationing of the division as a "General Reserve Unit" around Solo also seems to have gone smoothly. Troops from Gatot Subroto's Division II Sunan Gunung Djati and from Susalit's Division III Diponegoro were also merged into the new Division I under Subroto's old chief of staff, Bambang Sugeng. This new division was headquartered in Magelang (with Susalit commanding troops in Yogyakarta) and was to prove absolutely loyal to the government. 75 Gatot Subroto, by training a police officer,76 in a satisfactory trade off was named the new commander of the Military Police (CPM--Corps Polisi Militer).77 The commander of Division V, Djatikusumo, also seems to have been willing to demobilize his division and take a position on the central command staff of the TNl.78 Sudirman and Nasution, however, had no success in Solo and East Java where they apparently attempted to install men loyal to them as military commanders, rather than simply retaining the popular local commanders, Sutarto (Division IV--Senopati) and Sungkono (Division VI).79 Sutarto, whose division was composed of a large percentage of FDR-controlled ALRI (Angkatan Laut Republik Indonesia, Republic of Indonesia Naval Forces) and Pesindo troops, simply stalled on his orders to demobilize some of his men and merge his command into the new Division II being formed for East Central Java. 80 Sungkono, taking advantage of his isolated position in East Java, informed Sudirman that his commanders refused to merge their troops into the new East Java Command, Division III. (Sungkono's refusal to merge, made at the last minute, caused Sudirman to cancel his trip to attend the installation ceremonies for the new commander, Bambang Supeno, and later forced Supeno to resign from the command he was never able to occupy.81 ) The resistance of both Sutarto and Sungkono to the central command's rationalization orders seems to have been due more to a desire to maintain their local autonomy and influence,

74

Ibid., pp. 145-46: Nasution was appointed second in command to Sudirman on February 27, 1948. Sudirman was head of the active units of the Indonesian armed forces, i.e., Angkatan Pe rang Mobil. The choice seems to have been between Nasution and Djatikusumo. 75

Susalit was half brother to Partai Sosialis (PS) member Abdulmadjid and this relationship may have occasioned Berita Indonesia's comment on September 28, 1948, that the FDR was counting on Yogya troop support. Susalit, however, at this point was close to Sudirman, and, if a rather eliptical remark of Nasution's is to be believed, Sudirman hoped at one point to get Susalit as his deputy (TN/, 2: 156). The Sudirman-Susalit relationship is cloudy, as in mid-1946 Sudirman had apparently blocked Susalit's appointment as commander of Division III until forced to accept him by the younger officers of the division. (See Anderson, Java, pp. 4056.)

76 Subroto setved

in the KNIL from 1928 to 1942 but in 1934 he was given police training in Sukabumi. He was Daidancho in the Banyumas Peta during the war.

77

Nasution, TNI, 2: 214, 177. When rationalization failed in Solo and &st Java, Sudirman temporarily halted the efforts to combine the troops, probably to save face. The only result was that in West Central Java, Susalit was given back command of the old Division III in Yogyakarta (ibid., pp. 185-86). 18 Sedjarah Diponogoro,

p. 175, Djatikusumo was eventually named Chief of Staff of the Army (KSAD). Also see Kahin, Nationalism, p. 264.

79

Ibid., pp. 166, 178, 184, 212; and Nasution, TN/, 1: 299.

80

Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 265-66. Kahin says that Division VI had only 5,000 men.

81

Nasution, TNI, 1: 184.

47 and to save their troops from demobilization, than to motives directly tied to the FDR/ Masyumi fight. Many of the units under Sutarto, like those under Sungkono, were considered FDRcontrolled (the ALRI-Jadau and Pesindo units), and as the TNI command moved to consolidate its control over the Solo Division IV the move was widely interpreted as an effort to weaken FDR influence in the armed forces. On the other hand, the army command could hardly allow its commanders to disobey orders, and the long-recalcitrant Sutarto82 was in the unfortunate position of being closer to the power center in Y ogyakarta than the equally disobedient Sungkono. The government had also stationed its most obedient tool, the Siliwangi Division, in the Solo area, and this factor gave the government a new element of control which had hitherto been lacking. Sudirman's efforts to bring Sutarto to heel, however, seem to have been more through the time-honored method of negotiation than through force. What would have been the result of these negotiations will never be known, as on July 2, 1948, Sutarto was assassinated. 83 Accusations and counter-accusations started to fly. Government supporters blamed the FDR for the assassination, saying that the front wished to cause trouble in Division IV by the assassination of its popular commander, and that the FDR also feared that Sutarto was about to give in to Sudirman's command. The FDR, on the other hand, intimated that the Hatta government was behind the deed in an effort to control Division IV.84 Responsibility for Sutarto's death probably never will be fixed, but the FDR's followers in Division IV were undoubtedly convinced that the hand of the government was present there. Tensions in Solo soared, and the government with the Delanggu strike on its hands was in no position to take immediate action. Colonel Suadi, one of Sutarto's closest lieutenants and a Sudirman, rather than an FDR man, was allowed to replace Sutarto although his views on rationalization seem to have been close to Sutarto's. Suadi promptly • took a large portion of his troops out on troop maneuvers through the Solo area, probably in an attempt to cool off the situation.~ By early August, sympathy for the FDR among the rank and file in Indonesia's armed forces had probably if anything increased, especially in the Solo and East Java areas. However, when dealing with armies, control over commanders is usually much more important than control over the troops themselves. In the rationalization program, the FDR

82

Sutarto in 1946 had supported Dr. Muwardi, the Barisan Banteng, and Solo's social revolutionary forces against attempts by Amir and Sjahrir to reestablish their control over Solo's social revolution (Anderson, Java, ch. 15). Sutarto had also been sympathetic to the Tan Mataka followers who staged the July 3 Affair (Anderson, Java, ch. 16). On May 20, troops from Sutarto's command, apparently with Sutarto's blessing, had demonstrated against rationalization in Solo. This action was considered "machtsvertoning" or a show of force against the central government (see SedjarahDiponegoro, p. 179).

83 Merdeka,

July 5, 1948, p. 2.

84 Bintang Merah,

August/September 1951, p. 42. Another explanation may be that Sutarto was killed by overenthusiastic members of Dr. Muwardi's Barisan Banteng without specific orders from the government. Sutarto, however, may have also just turned down an FDR invitation to join forces with it. Also see Sedjarah Dipo,regoro, p. 177, on Sutarto's death.

Berita Indonesia, August 5, 1948, p. 1. Suadi spent the month chasing down bandits and unruly elements. His "maneuvers" may also have been a show of force to demonstrate he was really in control.

M

48 had lost the TNI Masyarakat command structure,86 although how important this was as an actual weapon is hard to calculate. More important, they had lost a possible recruit by the death of General Sutarto, and the position of their ALRI and Pesindo troops within Division IV was now very exposed, even though Suadi continued, like Sutarto, to stall on rationa1iration. FDR forces in East Java under Sungkono seemed fairly safe, but Sungkono's loyalties were uncertain. More important yet, rationalization had given Hatta's central government a tighter control over the forces in West Central Java and Yogyakarta. The FDR seems to have had few frrm supporters within the higher echelons of the army itself,87 and the army command structure, as reorganized in February, brought pro-government Nasution in as Sudirman's deputy in the Angkatan Perang Mobil (Mobile Army), the actual fighting force of the TNI. While Sudirman was impatient with the government's "soft" stance against the Dutch, and more or less neutral in the FDR/Masyumi fight, he was also very ill during this period with the tuberculosis which was to cause his death in 1950. Thus, much of the rationalization program was in the hands of Nasution, a Moslem Sumatran, who, while attached to no political group, was a frrm supporter of his fell ow Sumatran, Hatta, and, like Hatta, was a no-nonsense administrator. While Nasution later in the 1950s was to start to promote the value of a "people's army,"88 at this point he was determined to consolidate the chaotic Indonesian fighting forces under central TNI command. Thus, at the beginning of August, the FDR's forces tended to be dispersed and disorganized, while the government could now count on the support of its army's central command, of the well-trained and armed Siliwangi Division and, most importantly, of its forces in the capital city of Yogyakarta. The FDR was beginning to feel the pressure of rationalization and many of its military commanders were starting to "run scared." Already the TNI Masyarakat had been dissolved, and some of the young officers such as the Pesindo commander, Sumarsono, saw Sutarto's assassination as a sign that the Hatta government would stop at nothing to bring the left wing's armed forces under its control.89 The Coalition Govemment-A Fading Dream As rationa1iration in the armed forces progressed, the FDR's suspicions of government intentions increased, and the FDR's strikes, agitation among the peasantry, and continual attacks against the government for its "soft" position in talks with the Dutch brought the front into daily and mounting conflict with more conservative forces. To combat FDR propaganda, the Masyumi, starting in mid-May, countered with rallies of its own and sent speakers touring the countryside to warn against what Kasman Singodimedjo, one of the Masyumi's chief propagandists, was to call the FDR's "Sosialiseering Serampangan," ef-

86 The

FDR had two top generals in the 1NI Masyarakat, Djokosujono and Sakirman, both of whom lost their positions (Nasution, TNI, 2: 155). Pepolit, the political propaganda bureau for the army was also dissolved at the same time. (Nasution, TNI, 2: 127.) 87 According

to an alleged FDR document shown to George Kahin after the coup, the FDR claimed control of only one slot in the 'INI, the deputy commander for Java (Kahin, Nationalism, p. 269). 88

See A. H. Nasution, Towards a People's Army (Jakarta: Delegasi, 1964). Judged by Nasution's general attitude towards Sudirman in the second volume of TN/, relations between the two commanders may have been somewhat strained during this period. 89 Police Report,

August 20, 1948, p. 50.

49

forts to stir up the peasants and labor by fake "random socialization.''90 Added to the Masyumi's attacks from the right, the FDR was now under full-fledged attack from the left by the Tan Malaka forces, the ORR (Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat, People's Revolutionary Movement), whose strength was being steadily augmented as some of the younger Tan Malaka leaders were released from prison.91 The GRR's program was close to that of the FDR, except that it was even more radical, calling for immediate revocation of the Renville Agreements and a halt to talks with the Dutch.92 The GRR's mounting campaign against the FDR during June and July naturally attracted some of the firebrand pemuda (youth) support which would otherwise have turned to the FDR. The drive to consensus politics, however, is a strong one in Indonesia, and efforts continued throughout even the most difficult periods in June and July to draft a compromise National Program which could serve as a basis for a new national government. As passed by the Parliament and accepted by the Hatta cabinet on July 27, the new National Program was a broad set of guidelines acceptable to all. In it, the FDR had won acceptance of the principle that the Republic could establish relations with any foreign country without consideration of ideology. Amir's much-vaunted principle of "people's defense" was also recognized, without, however, any provision for arming the people. The National Program demanded that the country be free from foreign economic control, but the FDR was unable to force the insertion of the wording "free from US control.' 793 With the National Program now passed, the FDR pointed out that a consensus had been forced, and it started again to press for a new government. Its maximum demands were a parliamentary cabinet and 50 percent of the seats for the FDR.94 It was later to express its willingness to support a neutral cabinet led by an independent, Djuanda, and there was even some speculation that the FDR might be willing to participate in a cabinet led by Hatta provided it were parliamentary.95 The Masyumi, however, declared it saw no necessity for a change now that the National Program had been accepted by all. The PNI, as usual, was right in the middle on the issue, continuing its support of the Hatta government but willing to see the FDR included.96 Haggling over the FDR demands was still proceeding in mid-August, but chances for agreement did not seem particularly promising. The Republic had reached one of those new lows in the alternating periods of tension and calm which marked the upward spiral of crises within the Indonesian revolution. Relations with the Dutch were hostile, but there was no immediate crisis, and while the FDR, Masyumi, and GRR were at each other's throats, there was no strike or other major question which threatened at any moment to flare into open conflict.

90

Ibid., pp. 18, 30; Hatta Speech to Parliament, September 16, 1948 (FBIS, September 16, 1948).

91

Adam Malik, Sajuti Melik, and Pandu Kartawiguna were released in May. In late July, another group of lower-level people including Trimurti were released; and Sukarno was to issue an amnesty for almost all the remaining Tan Mataka group on August 17. Tan Mataka and Abikusno were not released until September 16.

92 Berita

Indonesia, August 3, 1948, p. 1.

93

Soc Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri," p. 139, quoting from the July 16, 1948 text of the Committee on the National Program and a recommendation of the FDR on May 14.

94 Berita

95

Indonesia, July 28 and August 5, 1948.

Ibid., August 10, 1948, p. 1, August 11, 1948, p. 1; Police Report, August 20, 1948, p. 17.

96 Berita Indonesia,

July 3, 1948, p. 1; FBIS, July 28, 1948, quoting Jogja Voice.

50 The Birth of the "International Communist Plot''

During June and July, although animosity between the FDR and the government was rising, the FDR was still seen as a purely domestic force. True, it was calling for recognition of Russia and for a firmer stance against the Dutch, and against the return of foreign capital. This, however, was fully consistent with the FDR's strongly nationalistic stance. Everyone recognized the FDR as a very radical party but the Communist Party within it was still small and not particularly influential. Amir, in particular, but also the men about him (Tan Ling Djie, Setiadjit, Abdulmadjid, and Wikana), were seen by the government as troublemakers, but nationalist troublemakers, who were as yet untainted with the specter of Soviet control. By June and July, however, the abstract notion of the existence of a Soviet plot, aimed at seizing control in the newly independent countries of Southeast Asia, had appeared in Indonesia, and by August the "plot theory'' seemed to have gained general acceptance in the Indonesian press, at least so far as it concerned countries other than Indonesia. The first real formulation of the "Communist plot" idea to reach the Indonesian press, came in the form of a statement by British High Commissioner Malcolm McDonald in Singapore on June 6. McDonald charged that the Communists, stalemated in Europe, were now turning their efforts to Southeast Asia. The Malayan Communist Party, he said, was at the heart of Malaya's present security problem.97 By the end of June, the press was carrying stories (originating from the United States) that the Communist Party uprisings in Southeast Asia, specifically in Burma and Malaya, were directed from Moscow and run by men trained in the Soviet Union.98 By early August, the local Communist parties were in open rebellion in Malaya, Burma, and the Philippines, and the idea of Soviet direction in these rebellions was firmly fixed in the public mind. However, in the mind of the Indonesians, the Republic of Indonesia was an exception. The Chinese-run Star W~, discussing the "Soviet Plot" during the week of August 15, argued that it was not yet time for a Communist rising in Indonesia, and wondered if the GRR might not be the vehicle of such a plot once Indonesia's time came. Berita Indonesia on the other hand, in a story quoting Andrew Roth, saw FDR activities as part of Communist actions in all of Southeast Asia, even though the FDR was not very influenced by the Communist Party.99 While the moment for Indonesia might not yet have arrived, by August the Indonesians were clearly aware of the "international Communist plot" thesis of Russian-sponsored revolts in Southeast Asia. While no one saw signs of this yet in their country, the signs were not to be long in coming. 91 Merdeka,

June 8, 1948, p. 4.

98 Berita Indonesia,

99

June 21, 1948, p. 1; K.eng Po, June 21, 1948, p. 1.

Star Weekly, August 15, 1948, pp. 1 and 4; Berita Indonesia, August 11, 1948, p. 4.

Setiadjit

Wikana

Abdulmadjid

Musso

Maj. Gen. Djokosujono

Detachnient of Communist troops in Madiun

Ha,jono

CHAPTER IV INTO REBELLION

On August 11, 1948, a short, heavyset man with a round smiling face stepped from a new Indonesian Air Force DC-3 which had just landed in Yogyakarta. It was long since the little man had been in Java, but he: did not seem to mind that he was totally ignored as reporters clustered around his boss, Suripno, besieging him with questions on the Russian agreement. The little man knew his time would come soon enough. His name was Musso and, as he was to tell Sukarno two days later, he had come back from a long exile in Moscow to "set things straight" in the Indonesian revolution. 1 It will probably never be known what sort of orders or authority, if any, Musso carried with him from Moscow. It was soon clear, however, that he brought with him the orthodox international Communist line (the Zhdanov line), and that his return was going to have a momentous effect on Indonesia's FDR.

Musso At 50, Musso was a rotund man with an outgoing manner, overflowing with energy. 2 He was also a fiery revolutionary, as was soon to be seen, with little patience for the ways of compromise. Born in Kediri, East Java, in 1897 he received a Dutch education in Jakarta. In the earliest years of the nationalist movement, Musso lived with Sukarno and Alimin at Sarekat Islam leader Tjokroaminoto's house and had been closely involved in the Sarekat Islam. At the time of the PKI split with the SI, Musso joined the Communists and was soon involved in the planning which led to the unsuccessful Communist revolt against the Dutch in 1926 and 1927. Musso was a fervent supporter of the rebellion and traveled with Alimin to Moscow in 1926 to try to gain Comintern support for the plan which was being strongly opposed by Tan Malaka. The Comintern's reply was an unequivocal no: the imperialist camp was too strong and this was not the moment for revolution. To make sure that such deviationist thoughts would not crop up again, Musso and Alimin were ordered to stay on in Moscow for training courses in the meaning of Trotskyist deviation. However, while Alimin was ready to submit to international party discipline, the hotheaded young Musso was not, and he managed secretly to send off a cable ordering the PKI into rebellion.3 There is some question whether Musso's cable ever arrived, but his action revealed the character of the man who Darsono ( another PKI 1

Derita, Lima J.rmggu, p. 18. The statement appeared in the Pesindo paper Revolusioner, August 18, 1948, describing Musso's visit of August 13 to Sukarno. 2

Pinardi, Peristiwa Madiun, pp. 36, 123.

3

McVey, Rise ofIndonesian Communism, pp. 337-40.

51

52 leader) later remarked had always caused the PKI trouble because of his desire for agitation.4 The next few years seem to have been uneventful for Musso. He became a staff member of the Comintern in Moscow,5 married and had a son sometime in 1929.6 Little is known of Musso's activities until 1935 when he was again given a task to his liking. He was sent to Surabaya to reorganize the PKI which had atrophied since 1927. The underground ("illegal") PKI organiration which Musso set up in accordance with the Dimitrov line was to inftltrate and work with Indonesian nationalist organirations. These new activities of the PKI quickly came to the attention of the ever-vigilant Dutch, who swept down to capture and exile many of Musso's new PKI members to Boven Digul in West Irian. Musso himself, however, had returned to Moscow before the sweep began.7 The remnants of this underground PKI organiration, after ten years of attacks by the Dutch and Japanese, was then incorporated into the new PKI, set up first under Jusuf in 1945 and then under the more moderate leadership of Sardjono and A1imin in 1946. However, the memory of the 1935 PKI lasted and was to give Musso added legitimacy in PKI circles when he returned to Indonesia in 1948.8 After 1935, Musso again vanished into the mists of Moscow and does not seem to have held a position of any great importance.9 Certainly he did not follow the colorful career that led Alimin through Mao's Yenan and Ho's Hanoi. Musso next reappears in Prague helping Suripno work out the details of the USSR-Indonesian consular agreement. According to Bintang Merah in 1951 (a somewhat dubious source), Musso went to Prague in early November 1947 and had the key role in initiating the talks. 10 According to Suripno, however, Musso did not come to Prague until March of 1948 after the talks were already under way. 11 Musso remained with Suripno in Prague until June 21, 1948, when they both departed for Indonesia, Musso traveling incognito as Mr. Suparto to avoid the difficulties

4

Voice ofFree Indonesia, November 11, 1948, pp.1-2.

5 Soc

Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri," p. 13, describes this period and says Musso joined the Comintern.

6 Merdeka,

November 13, 1948, pp. 1-2, includes information on Musso's family.

7

Sidik Kertapati, Seki.tar Proklamasi 17 Augustus 1945 (Jakarta: Pembaruan, 1964), pp. 4-5. The tale of Musso's return to Indonesia seems to have been generally accepted, even though Tan Malaka's followers attempted to circulate the story that it was not really Musso who returned in 1935 but a lower functionary using the same name. (Djamaluddin Tamin, SedjarahPKI, xerox copy, Cornell Library, p. 109.)

8

There is controversy over the composition of this group of underground PKI. Musso told Suara /bu Kota (August 14, 1948) shortly after his return that the illegal PKI was led by Djokosudjono (not to be confused with Maj. Gen. Djokosujono of the TNI Masyarakat), Pamudji, and Achmad Sumadi (Derita, Lima Minggu, p. 28). Pamudji was killed by the Japanese, but Sumadi and Djokosudjono were active on Musso's return. Amir Sjarifuddin was later to say that he too had been recruited in 1935, but there is room for doubt on this (Berita Indonesia, September 1, 1948, p. 1, quoting an Antara interview with Amir). However, Amir did work very closely with the Surabaya group of the underground PKI during the Japanese Occupation, and by this time seems to have begun to consider himself one of the group. (Anderson, Java, pp. 205-6.) For the history of the PKI in the early revolution, 1945-1946, see ibid., pp. 342-47. 9

The PKI historians themselves are notably silent about Musso's activities in Moscow. Some papers of the time implied he was merely a radio announcer (Madjallah Merdeka, September 11, 1948, p. 4), and this apparently is a serious possibility, as Musso's activities in 1926 may have incurred Russian distrust. 10 Bintang Merah, 11

August/September 1951, p. 48.

Suripno, "Tulisan dari Pendjara Sala" in Marsudi, Peristiwa Madiun, p. 79, written after his capture in late 1948. This would make more sense. Musso probably either heard of Suripno's approach and went to Prague to join the action or he was ordered to Prague by Moscow, possibly to help with a language problem.

53 that an ex-Comintern man could be expected to have with Dutch and other authorities along the way. Musso and Suripno reached New Delhi sometime in early June and settled in for a two or three week wait as the Indonesian Air Force completed the purchase of the plane which was to carry them to Indonesia. They then took off again, stopping en route in Thailand and for eight days in Bukittinggi, Sumatra, before reaching Yogyakarta on August 11. Musso apparently remained incognito throughout the trip, not disguising his left-wing affiliations but playing a defmite back-seat role to Suripno. (Suripno, on the other hand, apparently met with FDR leaders in Bukittinggi, gave them his ideas on his agreement, and probably briefed them on the new concepts that he and Musso were carrying home to Java. 12) Sukarno, when meeting with Musso almost immediately after his arrival, was to describe the peppery revolutionary as a "Jago," a fighting cock, the man who back in the days of Tjokroaminoto's house most "liked to fight." 13 For once his fighting spirit was in tune with the Moscow line, and in the next few weeks Musso was to show that he had changed little since Sukarno had known him in the early 1920s. One can seriously wonder, however, if the rotund revolutionary was any more obedient to Moscow's command in 1948 than he had been in 1926. "The New Road for the Indonesian Republic"

Musso's arrival in Yogyakarta did not long remain secret. Two days later, on Friday the 13th, he had a friendly meeting with President Sukarno and then immediately plunged into a series of interviews, meetings, and mass rallies which were to continue with mounting intensity until the outbreak at Madiun on September 18. It quickly became apparent that Musso had indeed returned with a new plan for the Indonesian revolution, one which was completely in line with Soviet policy. Where Musso composed this plan, appropriately entitled A New Road for the Indonesian Republic, is not clear. Perhaps it was in Prague under Russian supervision, or perhaps on the long route home. In any case, the plan, according to Suripno, was conceived well before the two reached J ava. 14 After meeting with the PKI Politbureau on August 13-14, Musso was apparently able to gain their acceptance for his "new path." 15 Musso's ideas on foreign affairs were then put

12 Keng Po,

August 13, 1948, p. 2, quoting "Voice of Free Indonesia" radio broadcast from Bukittinggi.

13

Derita, Lima Minggu, p. 17, from Revolusioner, August 1948.

14

Ibid., p. 79.

15 Bintang Merah,

May/June 1951, p. 260. It was later said that Musso referred to his ideas "as his 'Gottwald Plan' making it clear that he intended to duplicate in Indonesia what Gottwald had just accomplished in Czechoslovakia," i.e., the peaceful takeover of the government through the Parliament and by control of the labor unions, army, and police. {Kahin, Nationalism, p. 275.) While the analogy with Czechoslovakia was much used in the press after the Madiun coup {by the PSI Siasat in late September, and by Schorr in the New York Tunes Magazine, October 3, 1948), little mention of Czechoslovakia was made publicly at least by Musso before the coup. Suripno, in one of his first speeches to the all-Indonesia youth organization BKPRI on August 14, 1948, in calling for the establishment of a United Front, pointed to Czechoslovakia as an example of a country with a properly formed United Front. (Berita Indonesia, August 16, 1948, p. 1; Merdeka, August 16, 1948, p. 1.) This comment was also recorded later in Mimbar Indonesia (August 28, 1948, p. 32) as saying that the parties should correct themselves as had been done in Czechoslovakia. Musso himself seems only to have mentioned Czechoslovakia in passing: e.g. he once used the example of Czechoslovakia along with East Germany in talking about land reform to the BTI (Buruh, September 4, 1948). It would have been normal, having

54 before the rank and file of the PKI in a mass meeting in Y ogyakarta on Sunday, August 22. 16 More difficult questions dealing with the internal structure of the PKI, however, were further discussed in plenary session of the Central Committee of the PKI on August 2fJ-27, and were accepted and written up in a formal resolution called Djalan Baro untuk Republic Indonesia (New Road for the Indonesian Republic). Djalan Baru was meant as a public document to be put forth at a new PKI congress which was to be held October 1-3, 1948, at which time the PKI was scheduled to have completed its reorganization. 17 The contents of Djalan Baro were quickly made public in the press and speeches of the PKI leaders. It is impossible to tell how much of Musso's original plan may have been changed in the PKI meetings. What emerges, however, in this 34-page document is the pure Zhdanov line with a few Indonesian overtones.18 The document begins with a critique of the PKI since 1935: after World War II, the PKI went astray. Instead of setting up one strong Communist Party it allowed its strength to be dissipated among the three parties of the Sayap Kiri. This policy weakened the PKI and allowed class enemies to hinder the Communist Party's development by setting up all sorts of competing leftist groups. 19 The party overestimated the strength of the capitalist world and in its fear gave too many concessions to the imperialists and the bourgeoisie. 20 The PKI also failed to put enough emphasis on either labor or the farmers. 21 Because of this, the PKI, like Tito's Yugoslav Communist Party, had become submerged in the National Front and had allowed the leadership of the revolution to slip from its hands. 22 To correct all these errors drastic changes would have to be made: the PKI must regain the leadership of the working classes as quickly as possible and the PKI must get "HEGEMONI (the largest strength)" [sic] in the leadership of the national revolution. 23 To do this, one legal PKI must be set up and the illegal (underground) PKI leadership be abolished.24 The organizations controlled by the PKI (Partai Sosialis, Partai Buruh Indonesia) must be merged into the new PKI which would then become the true ( only) party of the

just returned from several months in Prague, for Musso to use Czechoslovakia as an example in closed PKI sessions, but no record is available of this. 16 Berita

Indonesia, August 24, 1948. Some of Musso's ideas had already been published on August 14 in the official PKI paper Suara /bu Kota and in the Pesindo paper Revolusioner. The meeting on August 22 drew a crowd estimated at about 50,000 onlookers. 17 Bintang Merah,

May/June 1951, p. 260; and Keng Po, September 16, 1948, p. 1.

18 Djalan

Baru Untuk Republik Indonesia (Jakarta: Pembaruan, 1953). This is the only available copy of this document, which was republished after the revolt by the PKI. Ruth McVey comments that it does not seem to have been altered from the original document. (McVey, Soviet View, p. 58.) 19 Djalan

JJaru.. pp. 7-9.

20

Ibid., p. 9.

21

Ibid., pp. 9-10.

22

Ibid., p. 11.

23

Ibid.

24 Ibid., p. 12. This line reads " ... mengadakan hanja satu partai jang legal daripada klas buruh. Ini berarti hapuskannja pimpinan PKI jang illegal."

55 working class. 25 This new party must be purged and all its members re-educated to understand their past mistakes. The paper goes on to criticize Amir for having withdrawn his cabinet "voluntarily and without any resistance [perlawanan] whatsoever. " 26 This mistake, it said, had permitted "the rapid growth of a reactionary policy over the last six months since the leadership has been held by elements of the bourgeois compradore class."27 Djalan Baru stresses that the PKI alone cannot succeed in the revolution and therefore a "National Front" including other parties must be formed. But this National Front must be set up from below, all who enter must enter individually, and the PKI must hold the leadership.28

Djalan Baru then went on to enumerate the many social and economic changes it had in mind, which included a thorough-going overhaul of the civil service, police, law courts, and the army, to rid them of feudal elements ( e.g. the aristocratic pamong praja civil servants, ex-Dutch-trained soldiers, etc.).29 The PKI also intended to improve the rights of the workers especially by abolishing the Hatta government's restrictions on the workers' right to strike,30 and to improve the lot of the farmer. (This, Djalan Baru admitted, was not something that could be done overnight as land was short on Java, but what land could be gained by abolishing feudal regulations in Java should be redivided among the poor farmers. 31 ) Djalan Baru then continued much in the fashion of a campaign platform to propose a little bit of something for everyone, even the Chinese.32

Djalan Baru's criticisms of the FDR for ignoring labor and the peasantry were somewhat unfair. Djalan Baru itself represented little more than a restatement of what the FDR had been demanding both for labor and for peasants over the last two months. Djalan Baru's policy statement, however, put this policy in a clear, dramatic form for the first time. And, while the FDR's commitment to social revolution in the midst of war against the Dutch had seemed at times more of a tactic than a firmly held principle,33 it was clear from Djalan Baru, that the new PKI line demanded a clear-cut commitment to social reform and to class struggle as a basis, rather than a tactic, of PKI policy. On foreign affairs, Djalan Baru outlined dramatic innovations to bring the PKI completely in line with the two-camp thesis of Zhdanov. The Communists, Djalan Baru firmly

25

Ibid., pp. 12-13.

26

Ibid., p. 19.

Z1

Ibid., p. 26.

28

Ibid., pp. 31-33. If members of groups enter individually, the paper comments frankly, this will reduce the possibility of conflict among squabbling parties. (Of course, it would also make it easier for the PK.I to control the organization.) 29

Ibid., pp. 26-28.

30

Ibid., p. 28. An intetview by Musso in Suara /bu Kota, August 14, 1948, has been used by Derita and others to say that Musso disapproved of Amir's use of strikes in June and July. It seems quite clear, however, that Musso simply said to the reporter who questioned him on the use of strikes that "such actions should be avoided by abolishing the factors which are unsatisfactory to the workers." (Derita, Lima Minggu, p. 28.)

31

Djalan Baru, p. 29.

32

Ibid., p. 30.

33

Amir, for instance, had not encouraged strikes during his time in office and had acted against the social revolution in Solo. Once out of power, however, he clearly used the Delanggu strike as a political tactic. In all cases, he was supported by the PKI.

56 announced, repudiate both the Linggajati and Renville agreements not merely because the Dutch have broken the agreements ("no, no, a thousand times no!").34 The Communists repudiate these agreements in principle, because even if their terms were carried out they would not bring real independence to Indonesia. Rather they would bring the form of neo-colonialism which could now be seen in the supposedly independent Burma, India, and th~ Philippines. The Communists, DjalanBaru stated, demand "full independence."35 Indonesia, the paper stated flatly, must side with the Soviet Union because the "Soviet Union is the vanguard of the fight against the imperialist bloc which is led by the United States. It is clear to us that the US helps and uses the Dutch to strangle our democratic Republic. " 36 In its demand that the Communists take the leadership of the national revolution away from the untrustworthy bourgeoisie and in its call for a strong anti-imperialist stance and for the Republic to side only with the USSR, Musso's Djalan Baru was a very orthodox Stalinist (Zhdanov line) document. Djalan Baru's demands for greater social reform went little beyond what was already being sought by the FDR. The stress on joining the Russian camp and the claim that the PKI had the right to the leadership of the revolution, however, were new. These were to startle most non-Communist Indonesian observers and horrify the anti-Communists, who immediately began to fear that the "Moscow Plot" had now arrived in Indonesia. The Implementation of the Musso Plan

The PKI almo~t immediately set 9ut to put Djalan Baru into action, and the transformation of the PKI which ensued led to much speculation as to why the PKI (and FDR) had so quickly accepted Musso and his new line. On Sunday, August 22, Musso addressed a huge PKI rally in Y ogyakarta calling for denunciation of Renville and Linggajati and recognition of the USSR. The Dutch, Musso said, were thieves and pirates; their blows must be returned with blows because "with imperialism it is impossible to compromise." Relations with Russia would open the Dutch blockade, because the Dutch would not dare stop Russian ships, and even the US would be hesitant if it knew the Republic was under USSR protection.37 Resolutions were then put before the meeting, which, inspired by Musso's vibrant oratory, were enthusiastically approved. These resolutions condemned Dutch treachery and demanded a halt to talks with the Dutch. Consuls should be exchanged with the USSR and a "National Front Government" set up for the Republic. That evening, the presidium of SOBSI, at a meeting immediately following Musso's speech, came out with a new platform which fell into line with the Djalan Baru: it denounced Renville/Linggajati, and called for relations with the USSR and other East European countries and for the establishment of a National Front government which SOBSI announced it would enter. It also took a very harsh line in calling for nationalization of

34 Djalan Baru, 35

36

p. 23.

Ibid. Ibid., p. 24.

31 Berita Indonesia,

August 24, 1948, p. 1.

57 property belonging to enemies of the Republic, for land to the peasants, and for preparation of a scorched earth policy to meet the Dutch threat.38 On August 31, the PKI made the change which was to set its course straight for Madiun. Following the plan accepted by the Central Committee on August 26-27, the PKI announced the merger of the Partai Sosialis and Partai Buruh Indonesia with the PKI, and the dissolution of the FDR. To the surprise, dismay, and at times disbelief of many observers, underground PKI members (including Amir, Setiadjit, Abdulmadjid, Wikana, Tan Ling Djie, and others) then stepped forward to admit their Communist affiliations, and a new PKI Politbureau which included most of the top underground members was now announced:39 General Secretariat: Musso, Maruto Darusman, Tan Ling Djie, Ngadiman Labor Secretariat: A. Tjokronegoro, Aidit, Sutrisno Youth Secretariat: Wikana, Suripno Women's Secretariat: (temporarily managed by the General Secretariat) Defense Secretariat: Amir Sjarifuddin Propaganda-Agitation Secretariat: Lukman, Alimin, Sardjono Organization Secretariat: Sudisman Occupied Territories Secretariat: (managed by the General Secretariat) Secretariat of Foreign Affairs: Suripno Representation Secretariat: Njoto Cadre Secretariat: (managed by the General Secretariat) Financial Secretariat: Ruskak. In the space of three short weeks, Musso had managed to transform the loosely structured conglomeration of left-wing organizations in the FDR into a new centrally controlled Communist Party which promised, in the next few weeks, to purge and tighten its control over its members. All wanted to know how Musso had managed this. Was this simply the spectacle of a monolithic Communist Party bowing to orders from Moscow, or were there other elements involved? At this point, the magical question of "orders from Moscow'' always arises, and it is a question which will probably never be answered. Stalin had received a severe shock in late June of 1948 when relations with Tito became so strained that it was necessary to expel him from the Cominform. Titoism quickly became anathema to the Soviet Union, and the Soviets set .about tightening their control over other national Communist parties, especially those in Eastern Europe which could scarcely escape the Soviet reach. The Soviets were determined to reassert their absolute leadership in the Communist world and to make certain that no other Communist parties followed the path of the heretical Tito.40 Musso was obviously fully apprised of the Soviet line on Tito, as can be seen in his references to Tito in Djalan Baru. It is extremely likely that the Russians were using him as

38

Ibid. The SOBSI decision was evidently made by its PKI-controlled Central Committee and was to cause serious problems over the next two weeks in non-PKl-dominated SOBSI branch unions.

39 40

Kahin, Nationalism, p. 276. From Suara lbu Kota, September 1, 1948.

McVey, Soviet View, pp. 52-54; Jan F. Triska and David D. Finley, Soviet Foreign Policy (New York: Macmillan, 1968), p. 2; Franz Borkenau, European Communism (New York: Harper, 1953); Ulam, ~ansion and Coexistence, pp. 463-66.

58

their instrument to bring the Indonesian Communist Party into line with other parts of the Soviet-controlled world Communist movement. (As Ruth McVey points out, Indonesia at this time was the only country in Southeast Asia where the Communist Party was not fully in harmony with the two-camp line.41 ) Musso had worked for the Comintern, and while the organization was officially dissolved in 1943, there is no reason to believe that he did not simply continue in the work elsewhere in the Russian bureaucracy. On the other hand, Moscow could not have had detailed knowledge of the Indonesian situation, and Musso must have had a great deal of leeway in interpreting the general guidelines of Soviet policy that Communist parties and national movements must side with the Soviet camp and Communist parties must lead the national revolution. Musso himself repeatedly denied that he had any orders from Moscow, but his party was not at all loath to stress that here was a man direct from Moscow with "International Communist credentials."42 Whatever his official relationship to Moscow, Musso undoubtedly played this to the hilt within PKI councils for it would be his main card to gain the acceptance of the PKI leadership. It is hard to see a Mao Tse Tung or a Ho Chi Minh meekly accepting orders from Moscow at this time, and whether or not the same might have been the case for Indonesia under other circumstances is open to question. Musso's return, however, hit the PKI at a very opportune moment. Relations with the Dutch were steadily deteriorating, and the FDR was already giving little more than lip service to the Renville Agreements and then only as "a basis" for negotiations. Musso's Djalan Baru gave the party an excellent theoretical excuse (and one which was also honorable) for dropping their last subservience to the two pacts which they, embarrassingly, had negotiated.43 The FDR had already been calling for relations with the Soviets andDjalan Baru simply served to sharpen their arguments. The same, of course, was true of their approach to labor and the peasantry, although they were forced to swallow the bitter pill of self-criticism on these issues. More importantly perhaps, it was becoming obvious that the FDR was not winning the battle with Hatta. The PKI, which since the departure of the PSI had been given a free field to consolidate its position in the FDR organizations, now had fairly frrm control. The FDR organization, however, was unwieldly, and to frrmly committed Communists it must have been a relief to be told that they could now abandon subterfuge and create one cleancut organization. At the time of Musso's return and later there was much speculation over his relationship to other PKI leaders, and the idea inevitably arose that Musso was simply being used

41 McVey, Soviet View, p. 54. 42 Derita, I.ima Minggu, p. 16, from Revolusioner, August 19, 1948; Berita Indonesia, September 14, 1948, p. 1. 43 According to PSI paper Sikap (September 8, 1948), p. 4, up until Musso's arrival the FDR attitude had been "Renville djangan dikurangi" ("don't downgrade Renville"). In the beginning of October 1948, Masyumi Minister of Information Natsir told an AP correspondent that "only after Musso returned did the Indonesian Communist Party adopt a policy of militant opposition both to the government of Mohammad Hatta and to further negotiations with the Dutch" (Straits Tunes, October 3, 1948, p. 1). Also see Aidit, Shon History of the Communist Party , p. 30, for the PKl's rejection of Renville after Musso's return. The latest FDR statements which seem available on this subject are an Amir intetviewwithAneta on June 11, in which he stated that FDR disagreement with Hatta on internal policy did not mean he objected to Hatta's foreign policy toward Renville (Berila Indonesia, June 12, 1948), and an Amir speech of June 15 (?) stating that Renville only represented an agreement to talk with the Dutch. (Ibid., June 15, 1948.)

59 by various groups within the FDR to further their own ends. It is very clear that the old PKI leadership of Alimin and Sardjono was ruthlessly shouldered aside in Musso's takeover. They both ended up holding insignificant positions in the Propaganda-Agitation Secretariat under the relative newcomer Lukman. The theory most often heard in August and September 1948 was the Murba-inspired one that Musso was being used by Amir to shore up his faltering FDR, and that indeed Musso (who should, according to the Murba liturgy, have joined Tan Malaka's forces) was practically being held incommunicado by Amir.44 This last was plainly nonsense, as from the very frrst Musso made it clear to the press that he considered Tan Malaka a Trotskyite.45 Why Amir was willing to step aside for Musso, however, is far from clear. If Amir had simply been using Musso for his own purposes, he would certainly have kept more power in his own hands. Instead, he stood aside for the older PKI leadership of Musso and Maruto Darusman. It may be that Amir, while considering himself a Communist, had never been forced to submit to party discipline, and had never held any formal place in the party's hierarchy. When Musso returned, with the authority of Moscow (real or imagined) behind him, Amir was faced with losing control over the FDR organization, which was now almost completely Communist controlled, or really joining the party. The PK.I for its part needed Amir for his connections with the military and his credentials as one of the top revolutionary leaders. It is plain, however, that the PK.I too must have regarded Amir as a party member or he would never have been given control over the party's strategic Defense Secretariat.46 Musso may also have used the support of competing factions in the PKI to win acceptance of his candidacy and program. It is, however, hard to identify factions in the old PK.I leadership, and even harder to sort out power relationships in the new Politbureau. According to Soe Hok Gie, who did a detailed study of the PKI in the 1930s and early 1940s, it had basically three groups: those centered around Sardjono and the PKI SIBAR ( exBoven Digul prisoners who had spent the war in Australia working for the Allies); the elite Dutch-trained Communists (Maruto Darusman, Abdulmadjid, Setiadjit, and Tan Ling Djie) who returned to Indonesia just after the war; and the younger, and for the most part more radical, Indonesian-educated Communists epitomized by Aidit, Lukman, and Njoto. To try and find power patterns in the Politbureau either before or after Musso's return is very difficult. Many of the PKI's top leaders in early 1948 were of course underground and not represented on the "legal" PK.I's ruling Politbureau. Because of this, their actual relations to the Politbureau, if indeed they were formalized, are impossible to determine. However, in early 1948, both the PKI SIBAR (Sardjono) and some of the Dutch group

44 Merdeka,

September 21, 1948, p. 2, September 9, 1948, p. 1. Rustam Effendi, a member of the Dutch Communist Party who defected to Tan Mataka on his return to Indonesia, was the sponsor of this line.

45

Derita, Lima Minggu, p. 31. From a Suara /bu Kota stoiyon August 14, 1948, "Musso firmly stated that Tan Mataka was indeed a Trotskyist who does not acknowledge the important place of the peasantiy in the class struggle."

46 Also

see Kah in, Nationalism, pp. 273-75. All this is, of course, highly speculative. Merdeka went so far as to accuse Amir of joining the PKI for protection from revenge by Tan Mataka who was about to be released from jail. (Merdeka, September 3, 1948, p. 3.) After the Madiun coup, the Indonesian government information agencies stressed the "Moscow plot" thesis as an explanation for the coup. At the same time, however, in midOctober, the Ministiy of Information was laying full blame for the coup on Amir rather than Musso, who, after all, had just arrived. (See Persatoean, October 15, 1948, p. 4.)

60 (Maruto Darusman) were in the "legal" PKI leadership, and the younger group of Aidit and company was already working its way upward.47 When the Njoto-Lukman-Aidit triumverate took over the PKI in 1951, they did their best to clear the name of Musso in Indonesia, and this has given rise to the speculation that they considered themselves as Musso supporters.48 Certainly Musso's fiery philosophy would have appealed to these young activist-oriented PKI members, and all three did gain positions on the new Politbureau. On the other hand, the top leadership in the General Secretariat contained Maruto Darusman and Tan Ling Djie (both Dutch trained) and Ngadiman. On the whole, however, Musso's Politbureau, while including most of the older PKI leaders, did have a much younger and more dynamic cast than the previous Alimin/Sardjono group. Undoubtedly Musso did use splits in the PKI leadership to gather support, and his stature as an international Communist figure with credentials from Moscow must have been crucial in making him acceptable to the PKI. However, Musso himself does seem to have been an inspirational leader, and he arrived with a clear, well-conceived plan which had the prestige of international communism behind it, at a time when the left wing was quite plainly in need of new directions.

PK/ Into Action Once the new structure of the PKI was announced, the party swung into action, frrst to carry out the purges and restructuring necessary to merge the FDR parties and organizations into the consolidated PKI, and second to tour the countryside to explain the changes and to stir up mass support for them. The PKI leaders were aware that complete reorganization of the party would be no easy task, but they hoped to have this completed before the party congress planned for October 1-3.49 The integration of the FDR seemed to go well at frrst. The Partai Sosialis announced its fusion with the PKI on August 31, and on September 4-5, a Central Committee meeting of the PBI approved its Politbureau's decision to merge.50 On August 31, Antara announced that SOBSI also intended to "follow the PKI" (berhaluan PK/ pula) and on September 3, Pesindo, meeting in plenary session in Solo also voted to join the PKI.51 Only the BTI, the PSI-controlled farmers organization which held its congress in Yogyakarta

47 Aidit,

24 years old, was in early 1948 a candidate member of the PKI Politbureau, on the executive committee of the FDR, and chairman of the PKI parliamentary group. Lukman, at 28, was a member of the PKI Central Committee, and Njoto, at 23, was chairman of the PKI group in the Working Committee of the Parliament. (See Hindley, Communist Party, pp. 23-24.)

48 Aidit

told Ruth McVey that the younger group of PKI leaders felt themselves generally ignored and looked down on by the top leftist leadership as rather unsophisticated young hot heads. Dr. McVey felt that one of the reasons the Aidit leadership, on coming to power in 1951, made rehabilitation of Musso a major point of emphasis was that they were associated with him and had been given a chance by Musso to rise in the PKI. (McVey letter to the author, July 15, 1972.)

49

According to a conversation between Professor Kahin and Suripno on September 1, 1948, Suripno stated that only 30,000 of the 60,000 Partai Sosialis members and half the smaller PBI would actually be allowed to join the new PKI. Kahin, however, speculates that "this selection of members may well have been in large part a rationalization of the fact that considerable portions of the membership of both the Socialist and Labor parties in Java were opposed to such a fusion with the PKI." (Kahin, Nationalism, p. 227.) 50 FBIS,

September 1, 1948, quoting Yogyakarta radio (Antara) August 31, 1948; Buruh, September 6, 1948.

51 Berita Indonesia,

September 1, 1948, p. 1 and September 4, 1948, p. 2; alsoMerdeka, September 4, 1948, p. 1, which says the decision was taken September 2, 1948.

61 during the frrst week of September, was noticeably cool to the new PKI and made no motion to join.52 According to George Kahin, however, parts of both the Partai Sosialis and the PBI were opposed to the merger and problems became quickly apparent.53 Moderates in the FDR, especially outside East and Central Java, were uneasy, and there may have even been problems within the PKI itself from those members who advocated a small well-trained elite PKI and who were now very unhappy to be faced with a huge expansion of the PKI membership by newcomers with little or no training.54 Yet more problems arose with SOBSI, some of whose member unions protested against the statements of their PKI-controlled leadership and demanded that a SOBSI congress be held quickly to discuss these new issues.55 Workers in the Ministry of Communications withdrew from SOBSI in protest on September 10, but more radical organizations like the Sugar Workers' Association (Sarekat Buruh Gula) in Solo remained frrmly on the PKI side.56 Pesindo, too, seemed united in its decision to support the PKI, although PSI minister Supeno's efforts among the Pesindo youth may have had a disruptive effect.57 All in all, the PKI leadership in early September does seem to have been aware that a great deal of work both organizationally and through indoctrination would be necessary before the new PKI could be thought of as a trustworthy organization.58 In an effort to explain the new PKI line to followers and to garner new support, Musso and other Communist leaders immediately launched a series of mass meetings and speeches. On September 3, Musso addressed the BTI; on the 5th, he met with students; and on the 7th, Musso and a team of high-ranking PKI leaders including Amir, Setiadjit, and Wikana left for a two week tour of Central and East Java which, before it was cut short by the Madiun revolt on the 18th, had given them the opportunity to speak before the mass meetings in Solo (7th), Madiun (8th), Kediri (11th), Jombang (13th), Bojonegoro (14th), Cepu (16th), and Purwodadi, where the group arrived on the afternoon of the 17th.59 The only way to describe Musso's speeches in these meetings is incendiary. They were the speeches of the true revolutionary calling for the revolution, now. The best example of Musso's style comes from his dramatic performance at a mass rally in Madiun on September 8. Here Musso was in one of the bastions of left-wing support and he per-

52 The

dates of the congress are a bit hazy. Sutter, lndonesianisasi, p. 567, puts the dates at September 4-6, but Musso addressed the BTI on September 3, before leaving for a campaign swing through Java (Merdeka, September 6, 1948), and Sudirman addressed the meeting on September 7 (ibid., September 10, 1948). The fact Musso did not stay in town for the main part of the meeting and the rostrum of speakers, including Catholic Party leader Kasimo and Sudirman, is probably an indication of the BTI's more conseivative stance.

53

Kahin, Nationalism and Revolution, p. 277.

54 Betita Indonesia,

September 9, 1948, p. 1.

55

Ibid., September 14, 1948, p. 1; the Serikat Buruh Mobil Indonesia and Serikat Buruh Jawatan Angkatan Motor RI. (both auto drivers' associations) called for this action September 11-12.

56

Ibid; Derita, Lima Minggu, pp. 35-39, quoting Solo, September 8, 1948.

57 Police Report,

August 20, 1948, pp. 64-65. According to the Report, Supeno used funds available to him as minister to win support away from Pesindo leader Sumarsono. Supeno also managed to have the coordinating student body BKPRI appoint one of his followers chairman (Sumarsono was vice chairman) and move BKPRI headquarters to Yogyakarta from Madiun where it was too much under the control of the FDR. Thus FDR influence in this all-Indonesian student organization was decreased.

58

Both Amir and Suripno, after their arrest, were to point to the fact that the party was still in the midst of its reorganization plans at the time of Madiun as proof that they had not planned a coup for that date (see Hulup, December 18, 1948, p. 3 and Marsudi, Peristiwa Madiun, p. 86).

59

Pinardi, Peristiwa M4

· , p. 54.

62 formed well for his appreciative audience. The Indonesian revolution, he said, had not fared well over the last three years because it had fallen into the hands of the bourgeoisie. The proletariat must recapture the leadership if the revolution was to succeed. Only if the revolution was led by the PKI would normal conditions be achieved. The economy must be reorganized and the present aristocratic system (ningrat) changed. The Republic must recognize Russia and must denounce the Renville/Linggajati agreements. The Hatta government's "bootlicking'' attitude toward the United States had only resulted in American support for the Dutch, and if this policy were continued it would carry the Republic into a new colonialism. The frrst strategy should be to fight the Dutch "to kill as many Dutchmen as possible, and to seize their weapons." The PKI honored religion, but if Moslems did not wish to be oppressed, now was the time for the Perang Sabi/ (Holy War).BJ Musso's strong stance, while gravely exacerbating an already tense situation, was well received by his audiences. Economic conditions in the Republic, due to the Dutch blockade, were disastrous, especially in the cities. Inflation was soaring: in one year rice had risen to ten and one half times its original price.61 Everything was in critically short supply, from medicines, bandages, and textiles to housing and food. In a hard-driving revolution, hardships are expected, but the Indonesian revolution had been stalemated for over six months at the conference table, and the Republic's elan was slipping badly. This had become so evident that the PSI paper, Siasat, on August 29, openly commented on the low morale in Yogyakarta.62 Musso's fiery oratory was a breath of fresh air to many radical revolutionaries. He was at long last offering a clearcut solution to the Republic's ills--a solution which not only had the aura of an inevitable world revolution behind it but also one which was very much to their liking. Musso's strong uncompromising stance against the Dutch was particularly popular at this point, for relations with the Dutch seemed, at long last, to be reaching the real breaking point. On August 16, Dutch (ethnic Chinese) police frred on a group of boy scouts illegally celebrating Indonesian National Day at the office of the Indonesian delegation in Jakarta. Three were killed, and this incident so incensed the Republic that the Parliament passed a resolution calling for a halt to the talks until a full apology was made. The Dutch, however, adding insult to injury, replied by evicting all Republican officials from Jakarta and other parts of Dutch-held Indonesia, and then by taking over an Indonesian-run hospital on August 24. "Illegal" Indonesian guerrilla attacks against the Dutch in West Java had evidently increased dramatically in August. On September 7, as Musso's campaign was reaching its height, Dutch East Java military commander Major General Baay precipitated a real crisis. Baay issued an ultimatum demanding that guerrilla attacks cease in his areas within 48 hours. If they did not, he would request permission to take further action, which, he indicated, would mean sending his troops into Republican-held territory. As the Hatta government protested the Dutch ultimatum, the PKI immediately issued an appeal on September 11 calling for people to be prepared to meet the Dutch with a BJ Beritalndonesia, September 14, 1948, p. 1.

Beritalndonesia was quoting the Dutch news serviceAneta which in this case would seem to have been accurate in its reporting, as Musso's comments hold closely to the line set forth in Djalan Ban, and in interviews he gave in the Communist press. See also Merdeka, September 15, 1948, p. 2 and "Sifat Revolusi Kita" in Revolusioner, September 5, 1948 (Derita, Lima Minggu, pp. 19-22). 61

Soc Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri," p. 177, gives figures on inflation. The rice price rose from Rp 1.66 to Rp 17.50 in one year.

62 Siasat

1

August 29, 1948, p. 1.

63 scorched-earth policy.s All of this naturally did nothing to increase the popularity of Hatta's efforts to negotiate with the Dutch, and Musso's insinuations that Hatta was selling the country out to them were probably quite effective.

The Specter of the "Moscow Plot" Musso's return and the sudden transformation of the PKI amazed and horrified many Indonesians. At first, Musso's return was simply greeted with interest, as the return of an old revolutionary hero who might even be able to calm down the left wing.64 However, as Musso overnight transformed the PKI from a badly led, innocuous organization of 3,000 to a mass-based party including the powerful armed fighting unit Pesindo and a massive labor wing (SOBSI), the suspicion dawned that the "red menace" had fmally reached Indonesia. Indeed, here was Musso, fresh from Moscow, doubtlessly carrying orders from the Soviets to set off Communist revolution in Indonesia. When the Communists would rebel was only a question of time. The above sketch is, needless to say, extreme. It does, however, convey much of the atmosphere in the Indonesian press after September 1. Already well indoctrinated in the theory of the "Moscow plot" for Southeast Asia, non-Communist Indonesians were now fully prepared to condemn without trial the intentions of Musso's new Communist Party. Statements by Musso repeating the Communist liturgy that "the bourgeoisie is no longer capable of leading a real anti-imperialist independence struggle"65 and that "the party [PKI] is the commander of the proletariat in seizing the power of the state,"66 did little to assuage non-Communist fears. The Dutch naturally took the lead in pointing to Musso's perfidy. On August 25, their radio was broadcasting the tale t~at twenty Russians had accompanied Musso as far as Bangkok, where they had been forced to deplane because the Republic had refused them permission to enter.67 By September 3, official Dutch spokesmen were accusing Suripno and Musso of having "clear instructions from Moscow'' which they were now carrying out.68 On September 5, the New Yorlc Tunes amplified this with a story from Singapore that renewal of warfare in Indonesia was likely, especially by the PKI which, with the cooperation of the army, might try a coup against Hatta.(I) The Indonesian press in both Y ogyakarta and Jakarta, on the other hand, did not become really concerned until after the formation of the new PKI. By September 2, however, Berita Indonesia in Jakarta was carrying editorial pleas to the Dutch to be more forthcoming in their dealings with the Hatta government in order to help undercut the PKl's popularity. Indonesia, the paper

6.1 Berita

Indonesia, September 13, 1948, p. 1. The Dutch often protested Indonesian "scorched-earth" techniques which consisted of setting up explosives beside equipment in factories and on the estates to destroy Dutch property in case of Dutch aggression.

64 Merdeka, 65

August 30, 1948, p. 1.

Derita, Lima Minggu, p. 21, quoting from an article by Musso in Revolusioner, September S, 1948.

66 Suara lbu

Kota, September 2, 1948, from an editorial by Musso.

_61

FBIS, August 26, 1948, quoting Radio Batavia broadcasting in English August 25, 1948. The story was promptly denied by Suripno, August 28, 1948.

68

Berita Indonesia, September 3, 1948, p. 2. Musso repeatedly denied this accusation (see Berita Indonesia, September 2, 1948, p. 1). (I)

New York Tunes, September 5, 1948, p. 31.

64 said, does not wish to become a second Burma or Malaya, "another battle ground of communism."70 The Republic's news service.Antara on September 1 wondered if the government would take harsh steps against the PKI which had so changed its attitude since Musso's arrival, and the Masyumi paper Guntur the same day asked the PKI if there was already a plan to appoint Musso "dictator of the Proletariat."71 This was only the beginning of the reaction. By September 11, the press was showing distinct traces of hysteria. On September 9, Merdeka encouraged Hatta to use his "iron fist" ( a reference to his September 2 speech, see below) to subdue the opposition if it went beyond the pale, and on September 11, Madjalah Merdeka, warning of the dangers if the Hatta government did not act quickly against the PKI, said that "if we intend to stand firmly between the fire and Satan, one of them must be destroyed."72 The government's reaction to the transformation of the PKI was very firm. On September 2, Hatta made a lengthy speech to the KNIP, discussing the complaints of the left wing and the "state of the nation" and issuing a firm warning against further left-wing "disorders." The speech, which Hatta had apparently cleared with his principal military commanders, shows his firm grasp of Communist ideology and tactics and of the Communist line as it was then issuing from Moscow.73 Hatta first discussed the sudden change in FDR policy, from a defense "to the death" of Renville to the demand that Renville be revoked. Then pointing to the FDR's demand that Indonesia side with the Soviet camp, he argued for a neutral policy that would prevent Indonesia from becoming an "object in the conflict of international politics" between Russia and the United States. Communist ideology, Hatta pointed out, forced Communists around the world unerringly to follow Moscow for, according to Communist doctrine, the success or failure of the world revolution hinges on the success or failure of the Soviet Union in staving off the rapacious forces of imperialism. This meant, as in 1939 when Stalin entered the non-aggression pact with Nazi Germany, that Communists around the world were supposed to follow the Soviet line no matter whether that line went directly against the national interests of their countries or not. Unlike the Communists, Hatta pointed out, a true nationalist works for the good of his own country and refuses to choose sides between the US and the USSR.74 Hatta then went on to discuss what his government was doing to meet the social and economic problems faced by the Republic, and why, in some areas, such as land and labor, these problems were not subject to instant cures. Hatta strongly criticized PKI demands for immediate social revolution, pointing out that Communist theory itself demanded the national revolution be completed before full social revolution could be begun. "The aim [strength] of our revolution will be split if it is interfered with by the aims of the social revolution. " 75

70 Berita Indonesia,

71

September 2, 1948, p. 1. Berita Indonesia was a Jakarta paper.

Merdeka, September 2, 1948, p. 1; Guntur, September 1, 1948. Both Antara and Guntur were published in

Y ogyakarta. 12 MadjalahMerdeka,

September 11, 1948, p. 4. (Published in Jakarta.)

73 The

only reference to Hatta receiving support from Sudirman and "principal division commanders" before his speech comes from Bernhard Dahm, The ITISIOry ofIndonesia in the Twentieth Century (New York: Praeger, 1971), p. 134. This reference is not footnoted, but Dahm should probably be given the benefit of the doubt as this sounds very likely.

74

Hatta, "Speech to Parliament," September 2, 1948, in Facta dan Dokumen2, vol. 2, pt. 7, p. 10.

75

Ibid., pp. 11-20.

65 Hatta's speech was a very clear exposition of his government's position on Social Revolution versus National Revolution, and showed Hatta's absolute determination to prevent the success of Musso's campaign to haul Indonesia into the midst of the Cold War on the side of the Russians. As far as the PKI was concerned, the most important part of the speech was the harsh warning which Hatta issued at the speech's end: Often in a new democracy boundaries are crossed and excesses arise. During these excesses, which are a form of Kindergartenism or Radicalism, the government will be patient and this attitude will often seem like weakness. However, if this Kindergarten-ism goes too far across the boundaries using intimidation and giving rise to anarchy to the point that the security of the nation is threatened, then the government will make corrections. If necessary, these corrections will be carried out with an iron fist. 76 The significance of Hatta's warning was lost on neither right nor left. Over the next week, cries rose from government supporters for Hatta to use his "iron fist" against the PKI, whose mass rallies were raising the tempers of PKI supporters to fever pitch. However, in the midst of all the furor, on September 9, 1948, the PKI issued an invitation to the Masyumi and the PNI to meet with them to discuss the possibility of setting up a National Front government. The idea by this time of the Masyumi joining the PKI in any form of cooperation was mildly ridiculous, and the PKI's invitation was probably meant both as a propaganda move to put the parties in the position of being against "national unity'' and as a last ditch effort to win the vacillating PNI to the PKI side. At a meeting on September 4-5, the Masyumi leadership council had issued a strongly anti-Communist statement fully supporting the Hatta government. While calling for the Republic to widen its contacts abroad, the statement stressed the Masyumi's determination to oppose "Communism and Imperialism" and to help the government in steps against "destructive elements."n On September 10, the Masyumi flatly refused the PKI's invitation, pointing out ( quite correctly from their point of view) that the PKI was untrustworthy. After all, the Masyumi observed, Musso had said publicly that he only intended to use the PNI and Masyumi for the moment. Later the PKI would rule alone.78 The Masyumi then announced its decision to set up a "front Islam" with another small Moslem party, the PSII (Partai Sarekat Islam Indonesia), once an ally of Amir, to oppose the PKI. As usual the PNI's position was not as sharply defmed as that of the Masyumi, and the PNI waited until September 13 to give its negative reply to the PKI. Energetic FDR/PKI agitation in the villages and against the aristocratic classes (kaum ningrat) had undoubtedly already alienated much of the PNI members' good will toward its more radical abangan comrades. On September 11, before its reply to the PKI was given, the PNI participated in a mass rally (50,000) in Yogyakarta with the Masyumi to support Hatta and to counter PKI rallies going on all over the country. The rally called for Hatta to throw off his restraint in dealing with the PKI, and signs carried by demonstrators (probably Masyumi) called for Hatta to show his "iron fist" and for Indonesia to be tied neither to 76

Ibid., p. 24.

n Berita Indonesia, September 7, 1948, p. 1; FBIS, September 7, 1948, quoting Radio Yogyakarta (Antara) September 6, 1948. 18 Berita Indonesia,

September 11, p. 1; Guntur, September 16, 1948.

66 Washington nor Moscow.79 By the 13th, then, when ·the first real clashes started to occur between government forces and the PKI, both the Masyumi and PNI were frrmly ranged against the Communists. For the frrst week in September, however, the real battle raged not between the PKI and Masyumi/PNI but between the PKI and its old Tan Malaka enemies gathered in the Gerakan Revolusi Rakyat (GRR). The government, as everyone was plainly aware at the time, was using the GRR to counterbalance the FDR/PKI on the left, and, if possible, to take some of the wind out of the FDR sails. However, using these radical national Communists was like playing with fire, and it is questionable if the GRR was ever really under frrm government control. Before Tan Malaka's release the GRR leader was Dr. Muwardi, the popular leader of the Solo-based lasykar, Barisan Banteng. Muwardi was very close to Sukarno, and this relationship seems to have lasted into 1948. In Solo, the GRR had long been the chief opponent of the FDR/PKI, and this apparently was a major factor in the vague friendship which existed between the Masyumi and the Barisan Banteng and for the Barisan's near alliance with the Siliwangi Division, as both were also strongly anti-FDR.80 The un1ikely alliance between the GRR and the Hatta government had not begun in earnest until early August. Up until this time, the GRR had opposed both the Hatta government and the Renville Agreements. Now, on August 5, it completely reversed itself and suddenly announced its support of the Hatta government. 81 It is difficult to tell what bargain was struck to achieve this result, but from this time forward the government started mass releases of Tan Malaka supporters, culminating on September 16 in the announcement that Tan Malaka himself would be released. The GRR was not at all opposed to the use of "illegal" methods to achieve its goal of pushing the Indonesian revolution into more radical paths, and its use of fake documents and the tactics of kidnapping and terrorism were well known.82 The day after the PKI announcement, the GRR, too, issued a statement that it had reorganized its governing body. On the same day, September 2, Dr. Muwardi held "secret" (i.e., not fully reported) talks with Sukarno and Hatta for an hour. It was this meeting, which may have simply been to inform Sukarno of the new GRR organization, that was later used by the PKI to "prove" that Muwardi was plotting with Hatta and Sukarno to cause a "provocation" against PKI units in Solo to give the government a chance to move on PKI armed units.83

79 Betita Indonesia,

September 13, 1948, p. 1; Merdeka, September 13, 1948, p. 1.

80 Anderson,

Java, pp. 262-63, describes Muwardi's relations with Sukarno; also see Kahin, Nationalism, pp. '266-67. The usual lineup in Solo was Barisan Banteng and Hizbullah against the Pesindo. One of Muwardi's chief aides in the Barisan Banteng was Muljadi Djojomartono, a Solo Muhammadiyah leader who had also been in the Hizbullah. Muwardi's other top aide, Sudiro, had close links to the PNI. (Conversation with Professor Benedict Anderson.) Some Siliwangi troops were apparently stationed in or at Barisan Banteng headquarters. Also see Merdeka, October 7, 1948, p. 4, for close Siliwangi-Tan Mataka relations. 81

Betita Indonesia, August 3, 1948, p. 3, August 5, 1948, p. 1; Merdeka, August 5, 1948, p. 1; Harian Indonesia, August 3, 1948, p. 3. This was all the more surprising as four days earlier on August 1, a GRR meeting had

issued its usual anti-Hatta, anti-Renville statements. 82 Police Report, 83

August 20, 1948, pp. 83-87.

Merdeka, September 3, 1948, p. 1; Facta dan Documen2, pt. 7, p. 70: the PKI in 1951 charged that Dr. Muwardi had also met with Sukarno on August 5 for a discussion of the FDR and had at that time been given three million rupiah (which had come from the US government) to cause incidents which would give the Hatta government the opportunity to move against the FDR and destroy them. (Bintang Merah, August/September 1948, p. 42.)

67 Until the PKI reorganiz.ation announcement of August 31, the ORR evidently had felt that there was some possibility that Musso might join with them rather than with the PKI. Musso had even met with GRR youth leader Ibnu Pa,rna and others from Akoma (Angkatan Komunis Muda--Young Communist Forces) on August 28, to discuss the possibility of some sort of merger with the PKI. After the PKI reorganiration, however, the GRR gave up these efforts and launched an all-out attack on Musso and the PKI. Rustam Effendi, acting as ORR spokesman, accused PKI leaders Amir and Setiadjit of being henchmen of the Dutch, and GRR spokesmen took to the field calling for Amir to be hung.84 (Amir was to admit that he had accepted money from the Dutch--on PKI orders --to organize an underground against the Japanese.85) The GRR, like the PKI, then began to hold mass rallies frrst in Yogyakarta on September 5 (where Rustam Effendi spoke) and then in Solo on September 8.86 At the same time, the GRR's "illegal" actions were growing, and on September 9 Pesindo headquarters in Solo were attacked, presumably by members of the Barisan Banteng.ff'l Pesindo promptly called this a political act and apparently intimated that the attackers (who were never named) were connected with the government. This was promptly denied by the government, which claimed that neither its troops nor civilian personnel were involved, and threatened to take frrm action unless the kidnappings (which were also occurring in Solo at this time) were promptly halted.88 Peristiwa Solo (The Solo Affair)

The incidents in Solo provided the spark which was to set off the revolt in Madiun one week later, but the events are so clouded in mystery that it is almost impossible to draw a sharp and detailed picture of what actually happened. The broad outlines, however, are clear. A series of kidnappings and attacks on the Pesindo forces in Solo, which were part of Colonel Suadi's Division IV, touched off clashes between Suadi's forces and Siliwangi troops also stationed in the city. A cease-frre was called by Sudirman, but left-wing troops of Suadi's command, after initially obeying the order, went into revolt again as they feared the government was going to use the Solo incident as an excuse to bring their rebellious Division IV under control. The main problem in describing the Solo incidents is ~hat they were only scantily reported by the press at the time. Later reports vary greatly, as each side then had a stake in getting its particular version accepted. The official Siliwangi history claims that the Siliwangi sitnply stepped in to separate fighting going on between Dr. Muwardi's forces and Pesindo, and that Pesindo and ALRI units took this opportunity treacherously to attack the Siliwangi.89 The PKI on the other hand, in its official version, claimed that a team of kidnappers, closely connected to both the Hatta government and the Siliwangi command and led by "Alip Hartojo," started a series of kidnappings on September 1 against PKI officials in Solo. Suadi sent some of his officers to Siliwangi headquarters to investigate 84

Derita, I.ima Minggu, p. 8; Merdeka, September 9, 1948, p. 1; Berita Indonesia, September 9, 1948, p. 1.

85 Berita Indonesia, 86 Merdeka,

September 13, 1948, p. 1.

September 9, 1948, p. 1.

Berita Indonesia, September 14, 1948, p. 1; Keng Po, September 15, 1948, p. 1, quoting Radio Gelora Pemuda from Solo. ff1

88 Merdeka, 89

September 15, 1948, p. 1.

Siliwangi dari Masa, p. 240.

68

the incidents and they too disappeared. (The PKI "proved" government connections with these incidents by charging that some of the kidnap victims were later turned over to government prisons by the Siliwangi command.) According to the PKI account, Suadi then complained to officials (presumably Hatta supporters) in Yogyakarta and got nowhere. General Sudirman when approached, however, gave Suadi permission to bring the situation under control. On September 10, Suadi issued an ultimatum to the Siliwangi to return his officers. The Siliwangi refused, so on September 13 Suadi attacked, only to pull back when Sudirman ordered a cease-frre. Pesindo and ALRI troops, according to the PKI account, then went on the defensive again when it became clear that the Siliwangi was not going to obey the cease-fire and that the government for some mysterious reason was going to support the Siliwangi offenders.90 To add to the confusion of accounts on Solo, a few days after the Madiun coup George Kahin was given yet another version by Republican friends close to the government: on the 8th of September, a number of PKI military officers from the Fourth Division "disappeared," and the PKI blamed Alip, an ex-BPRI officer close to the Siliwangi and then living next to Siliwangi headquarters in Solo. PKI ALRI officers went to Alip's house, and, finding him absent, carried several Siliwangi officers whom they found there back to ALRI headquarters. These men were then retrieved by the Siliwangi. Suadi, who was still suspicious of the Siliwangi's involvement in the kidnappings, then issued his ultimatum.91 The problem with both the 1951 PKI account and that given to Kahin directly after the coup is that both largely ignore the GRR, which plainly was involved. It was probably the GRR which attacked Pesindo headquarters on September 9, and Pesindo was to seek its revenge on September 13 by kidnapping and executing Muwardi and several other GRR members. Also, directly after Madiun started, Musso was to claim that Sukarno in Solo had made use of "Trotskyist traitors to terrorize and kidnap all Communists.''92 Involvement of the Siliwangi in the events in Solo during the week of September 13 were clearly more complex than a simple clash between pro- and anti-Communist troops. The clashes had overtones of the deep-seated rivalries between the West and Central Java troops which had been brewing for months. Unlike the Javanese troops, who were officered by young Javanese soldiers, usually with simple Indonesian, Dutch, or Japanese education, the Siliwangi was an elite corps drawn mainly from Sunda (West Java) and Sumatra, with generally higher education standards.93 Its officers were often Dutch-educated sons of aristocratic West Javanese families, like Achmad Wiranatakusumah (son of the Wali Negara of Pasundan, RAA Wiranatakusumah) and Sentot Iskandardinata (son of Oto Iskandardinata, the well-known Pasundan leader). Unlike the Javanese troops, who tended to be radical nationalist in orientation and abangan in outlook, the Siliwangi, 90 Bintang Merah,

August/September 1951, pp. 42-43. The PKI account of Madiun, published in 1951, was part of a campaign to clear the black mark on the PKl's name by issuing a revised version of the coup. The account is impressively "documented" with names and dates in an obvious attempt to give a ring of authenticity. (See Chapter V.) It is almost impossible to check, without extensive interviews, the names, etc. used in the PKI account of the Solo incident.

91

Kahin notes on interview, 1948.

92

Front Nasional, September 20, 1948 (PKI paper published in Madiun for one week by the National Front

Government). In 1951, the PKI was more friendly with the Tan Mataka forces and this may be one reason their part is played down. It is also charged by some that the Siliwangi sometimes used Barisan Banteng uniforms to attack FDR supporters, but the kidnapping of Dr. Muwardi and other Barisan Banteng leaders on the 13th by the FDR clearly indicates Barisan Banteng involvement in this case. 93

Kahin, Nationalism, pp. 184-85.

69 through its higher-educated leaders, was permeated with Western influences, and it was Islam, rather than the syncretic beliefs of Central Java, which bound the widely diverse Siliwangi troops from Sumatra and West Java together. The pro-US orientation of the Siliwangi was at times pronounced. Achmad Wiranatakusumah's brigade, for instance, was known (proudly) as the "American Brigade" because its officers preferred to use English, rather than Dutch or Indonesian, among themselves and copied the casual lifestyles of their American heroes, such as Clark Gable or Errol Flynn.94 When Siliwangi troops were withdrawn from West Java in early 1948 and stationed in and around Solo, incidents immediately started to occur. The usual problems of "foreign troops" (i.e., Moslem Sundanese) stationed in an alien setting (abangan Central Java) were further exacerbated both by the politics of the times and by lack of discipline among the Siliwangi rank and file. The Siliwangi experienced severe difficulties both in housing and supplies when they were pulled back to the Solo area, and some of the troops apparently had to fend for themselves, being quartered in markets, etc. According to Nasution, conditions were so poor that they "disturbed the health and morality of the troops,"95 who seem to have indulged in a bit of robbery and other mischief making which did nothing to endear them to the local population. The Siliwangi too was immediately plunged into the politics surrounding the capital city and Solo. The FDR at first attempted to infiltrate the Siliwangi. The Siliwangi, however, was strongly anti-Amir, and when infiltration tactics failed the FDR turned their efforts to a campaign of vilification aimed at convincing the Solonese that the Siliwangi were pro-Dutch traitors.96 Tensions rose not only between the pro-FDR ALRI and Pesindo troops in Suadi's Division IV and the Siliwangi, but also between the Siliwangi and other pro-government Javanese troops such as the Tentara Pelajar (TP Student Army) and Bung Tomo's BPRI. Some of these tensions came to a head in mid-August when a Siliwangi unit raided a government depot to seize Lebaran (the main Moslem holiday) presents for their families. Infuriated, Tentara Pelajar troops accompanied by ALRI units from Division IV promptly attacked the Siliwangi unit involved, in an effort to punish those undisciplined and uncouth (kurang ajar) acts. Fighting was halted, but the guilty Siliwangi commander, protesting that he had had enough of living in these hostile surroundings, gathered his troops together and announced that he was heading back home to West Java where his troops would be welcomed and cared for. 97 The fact that the Siliwangi were pro-government and could therefore plainly be used as a government weapon against the Division IV's attempts to resist rationalization only

94

Madjalah Merdeka, December 4, 1948, p. 6.

95

Nasution, TN[, 2: 162.

96

Siliwangi Dari Masa, pp. 238-39, 260-61; Madjalah Merdeka, October 30, 1948, pp. 6-7. Madjalah Merdeka

comments that once FDR attempts to infiltrate the Siliwangi failed, the FDR attacked the Siliwangi as "henchmen of the Dutch," even pointing to the initials on the side of Siliwangi Jeeps SLW to show that they were Stoottroepen Leger Wilhemina (Wilhemina's Shock Troops). Madjalah Merdeka commented that the Siliwangi particularly hated Amir and the FDR who, they felt, had

surrendered West Java to the Dutch and betrayed them. Amir as defense minister had reportedly also done a great deal of maneuvering to bring Siliwangi troops under his control, trying to remove some of the officers as "pro-Dutch," and this too had earned the Siliwangi's enmity. 97

Nasution, TNI, 2: 234; Siliwangi dari Massa, p. 227. In Nasution's account Siliwangi officer Rukman simply departs for West Java. In the Siliwangi history, Rukman is ordered to infiltrate back into West Java to avoid further clashes in Solo.

70 heightened tensions between the two units, and a fight had been brewing for weeks. Whether or not the Siliwangi was actually involved in the kidnappings ( and it does seem likely), Suadi undoubtedly felt they were responsible, either directly or by their friendship with (hence protection of) the Barisan Banteng.98 The PKI for its part also seems to have suspected that the kidnappings were the start of an effort to break the effectiveness of their troops and bring them under the control of the central government. This impression was heightened when on the 12th and 13th, just a few days after the Division IV officers vanished in Solo, the government evidently began clean-up operations against "disruptive elements" in Blitar and Nganjuk by arresting several PKI party members.99 In any case, Suadi, who had long wanted an opportunity to discipline the unruly Siliwangi outsiders, was able to get Sudirman's permission to bring the kidnappings under control. (Sudirman throughout seemed sympathetic to Suadi's dilemma in trying to maintain peace in Solo, and if the kidnappings were government sponsored, Sudirman at least was not involved. 100) Once Suadi issued his ultimatum on Friday, September 11, to the local commander of the Siliwangi, Colonel Sadikin, events were on a collision course. Sadikin, denying any responsibility for the kidnappings even when questioned by Sudirman, had no intention of yielding to Suadi, and Suadi was probably aching to discipline the hated Siliwangi. 101 When Suadi's ultimatum expired sometime after noon on Monday, September 13, Suadi, using ALRI troops from his command, attacked, and immediately Division IV and various Siliwangi units were mixed up in a confusing fire-fight which swirled around Siliwangi headquarters in Srambatan. 102 At 6:00 that evening, Sudirman, arriving in Solo, arranged a cease-frre, ordered all troops to barracks, and called on the elite (pro-government) police "mobile brigade" to take over the maintenance of city security. 103 For the next two days an uneasy truce seems to have reigned. In the midst of the fighting on Monday morning, however, Pesindo troops had kidnapped Dr. Muwardi and several other GRR leaders, probably in retribution for the earlier kidnappings of the PKI officers, and tempers on all sides were now too heated to be restrained for long. 104

98 The

PKI was later to charge that an attack was made on Pesindo headquarters on September 16 by Siliwangi troops dressed in Barisan Banteng uniforms (Bintang Merah, August/September 1951, p. 43). This, of course, is possible although the Barisan Banteng was quite capable of doing the deed themselves.

99

Kahin, Nationalism, p. 288; Berita Indonesia, September 15, 1948.

100

When the fighting first broke out in Solo between the Siliwangi and Division IV, Sudirman first proposed to send the troublesome Siliwangi unit to the front lines to get them out of Solo. He evidently felt strongly that this, rather than punishment of the IVth, was the way to solve the Solo security problem. He was dissuaded by Nasution, who warned that the Siliwangi would feel that they were being unjustly punished and, like Rukman, they would become uncontrollable and simply leave for home, causing all sorts of international problems with the Dutch and Renville. (Nasution, of course, wanted the Siliwangi to remain in Solo precisely as a weapon against the IVth.) Nasution was backed up in his argument by Colonel Sadikin who asked Sudirman "are my actions since PON considered as a revolt or in defense of my country? If they are considered as a rebellion then I don't care any more and will go home to West Java." (See Soc Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri," p. 176, quoting an unpublished work of Nasution.) 101

Ibid., pp. 119, 175.

102 The

Siliwangi claims that Division IV treacherously attacked them (Major Achmad Wiranatakusuma's battalion) at 10:00 in the morning, four hours before Suadi's 2:00 p.m. deadline (Siliwangi dari Masa, p. 234).

103

Merdeka, September 16, 1948, p. 1; Berita Indonesia, September 16, 1948, p. 1; and Nasution, TNJ, 2: 234. Sedjarah Diponegoro, p. 179, however, says that the quarrel was settled by the attorney general who was called in to mediate, and that CPM (Military Police) units were used as well as regular police forces to control the city (of course both Sudirman and the attorney general may have been present). 104 Merdeka,

September 15, 1948, p. 1; and Murba, September 15, 1948.

71 Exactly what happened during the two crucial days (Tuesday and Wednesday, the 14th and 15th) that follow is again unclear. Apparently, some Siliwangi units, which should have stayed in their barracks outside the city, came in to reinforce their fellows, and this both infuriated and frightened the Pesindo and ALRI units in Division IV. 105 By the evening of Wednesday, September 15, fighting had flared again, as more kidnappings (by the GRR ?) took place again in front of Pesindo headquarters. 106 Fighting lasted through the night, and from this point on things went from bad to worse as the Pesindo and ALRI troops apparently made the decision to commit themselves to battle, and the government for its part moved to end the problem of the renegade IVth once and for all. According to Nasution, on Wednesday evening, after the fighting had resumed, Sudirman again took to the air, appealing to his troops to remain neutral and warning that the government and army had decided to take harsh steps to bring the Solo situation under control. 107 By September 16, Thursday, it was apparent that the fighting was totally out of control, and Sudirman called a meeting with the head of the Military Police Corps (CPM), Gatot Subroto, and Nasution. Deciding that the time for compromise was well past, the three met that evening with President Sukarno, to convince him that strong measures had to be taken against Suadi's troops and to suggest that Gatot Subroto be named military governor of Solo with full powers ( e.g. command over the Siliwangi) to normalize the situation. 108 On Friday, September 17, the announcement was made that Solo was considered to be in a "dangerous situation" and that Gatot Subroto had taken over as military governor. 109 By Friday, however, Suadi's troops ( at least the battalions involved, i.e., the Pesindo and ALRI units) had been expelled from Solo by Sadikin's forces, who seem to have been allowed to attack when the fighting flared again. 110 Subroto, a man of action, immediately

105 Bintang Merah,

August/September 1948, p. 43.

106 Persatoean,

September 17, 1948, p. 1, quoting Antara; Berila Indonesia, September 17, 1948, p. 1, quoting Antara report September 16. Bintang Merah in 1951 (p. 43) and Kahin, Nationalism, p. 289, place this attack on Pesindo headquarters on the 16th. However, Bintang Merah agrees that fighting broke out again on the evening of the 15th when Division IV, Pesindo, and ALRI troops, deciding that the Siliwangi would not obey the truce, attacked. 101 Berila Indonesia,

September 16, 1948; Nasional, September 16, 1948. According to the PK.I accounts, fighting commenced again at 6:00 p.m. (Bintang Merah, August/September 1951, p. 43). Sudirman's speech was given in the evening, presumably after the start of the renewed fighting. 108

Nasution, TNI, 2: 237.

109

Ibid., p. 238. The decision to appoint Gatot Subroto military governor was made and orders issued on Thursday, September 16, according to the Sedjarah TN/ Diponegoro, p. 180. Conceivably the announcement could also have been made on the 16th, but indications from press reports are that, as Nasution states, it was not made until Friday, September 17. Berila Indonesia, September 18, 1948, says that Gatot Subroto himself made the announcement that Solo was in "keadaan bahaja." The account given in this thesis contrasts with that of Kahin in Nationalism, p. 289, which says that Sukarno proclaimed martial law for Solo and appointed Subroto military governor on Wednesday, September 15. 110 Only the

PKI (ALRI and Pesindo) units of Suadi's command actually went into rebellion (although this was the majority of his troops). One unit under Slamet Rijadi early in the week refused to aid Suadi against the Siliwangi. (Kahin notes confirmed by Voice of Free Indonesia, September 25, 1948, and accounts in Sedjarah Diponegoro, pp. 182, 203.) (Rijadi, a Sudirman man, was commanding Suadi's old Battalion V.) Suadi himself later appears to have surrendered the units under his direct control to Sudirman. (See Merdeka, October 7, 1948, p. 1, for an account of Suadi's surrender.) It is difficult to tell exactly when this took place because Suadi, proud and adamant in his dislike of the Siliwangi, refused to surrender to Gatot Subroto, ''who was no better a commander than I was." Suadi had never held more than nominal control over the loyalties of the FDR troops in his division, especially the two ALRI battalions; Battalion VII under Lieutenant Colonel Jadau, 25 years old, and Battalion IX under Suadi's former chief of staff, Lieutenant Colonel Sujoto. These FDR troops in tum were suspicious of Suadi and appear to have turned on Suadi's troops when he was procrastinating over

72

took charge and, arriving in Solo on the 18th, ordered the fighting to stop and called for all commanders to surrender by Tuesday, September 21, or be considered rebels. By Sunday, all was quiet in Solo, and Subroto was busily getting youth groups together in peace meetings.111 By this time, however, the action had moved elsewhere. The Solo events were not taking place in a vacuum. Just as they were being anxiously observed by the government forces in Yogyakarta, so, too, were they being studied by hotheaded young Pesindo commanders in Madiun and by the touring campaigners under Musso. Communications on Java were difficult but they were not impossible, and while Musso was out of effective command range he was apparently aware of what was going on. According to Bintang Merah, Musso even sent a message from Cepu to Solo on Thursday, September 16 (when affairs were already well out of hand), asking that the incidents in Solo not be allowed to spread to other areas. 112 It is very difficult to tell exactly what Musso's role was in the events that followed. PKI military commanders only two hours away in Madiun, however, were completely informed of the turn of events in Solo and were increasingly alarmed by these events, which they saw as the beginning of a government drive against the PKl. 113 It would have seemed normal for them to contact Musso to consult him on their actions, but as Musso was apparently caught unawares in Purwodadi when the actual coup in Madiun took place, it seems that at least in this event he was not informed. Disregarding Musso's appeal to localize the Solo incident, if indeed it was made, PKI commanders under the control of radical Pesindo leader Sumarsono, on about Thursday, September 16, started to pull their troops back from the front against the Dutch and redeploy them around Madiun. Some troops may also have been sent forward toward Solo to reinforce PKI, ALRI, and Pesindo troops there who had just been ousted from the city. 114 whether or not to surrender to Gatot Subroto. (See Sedjarah TN/ Diponegoro, pp. 176, 178, 182, 203, for composition of Suadi's troops.)

111 Berita Indonesia, September 21, 1948, p. 2. 112 Bintang Merah, August/September 1951, p. 43. 113 From the moment the revolt began, PKI leaders were to stress that their actions were in response to those of the government in Solo. According to Merdeka, Radio Gelora Pemuda, broadcasting from Madiun on September 18 at 7:30 p.m., charged that the Hatta government was working with the Dutch to keep Indonesia a colony, and at 8:10 p.m. they stated that they feared the government had become fascist and was plotting with the Dutch to destroy the left wing. (Merdeka, September 21, 1948, p. 4.) In a radio broadcast on September 21, from Madiun, Suripno charged that the government had taken no steps in Solo to control the lawless acts of the "Siliwangi, Banteng, and Masjumi, etc." and that seeing this, the "citizens of Madiun acted for their own safety." "The activity to abolish communism has been long in preparation," he said. (Front Nasional, September 22, 1948.) Also see Suripno's "Tulisan dari Pendjara" in Marsudi, Peristiwa Madiun, p. 86, where Suripno says his friends in Madiun saw Solo as the beginning of an anti-FDR campaign. Front Nasional, on September 21, 1948, also charged that Solo was the beginning of an offensive against the Communists and indeed the government in Madiun had "organized military and police forces to enact general suppressions supposedly to begin on the 19th of September 1948."

114 Gadis

Rasid, who accompanied the troops into the Madiun area for the PSI newspaper Siasat, reported that from the 16th, FDR forces had moved in to take control of areas on the outskirts of Madiun (Soe Hok Gie, "Simpang Kiri," p. 178, quoting Siasat, September 26, 1948.) The GRR newspaper Murba reported that this move began on September 12, but Murba is hardly a reliable source. Its report was supposedly a delayed one from Madiun and it appeared on September 21 in Antara. (Berita Indonesia, September 22, 1948, p. 3.) Kahin (Nationalism, p. 290, drawing on Murba), says the troop movements started on September 13. There seems to be some question whether PKI troops were actually pulled back from the front, which was, of course, not that far from Madiun in any case. According to the Siliwangi history (Siliwangi dari Massa, pp. 238, 241),

73 It is, of course, hard to tell at this point whether these movements were simply "preventative" against the possibility of an all-out attack by the Siliwangi against the PKI, or whether some plan for the takeover of Madiun as a base for revolution was already in their minds. (Until the appointment of Gatot Subroto on the 17th, with the accompanying indications that the government intended to take very firm steps, the PKI may have still hoped that they could talk their way out of further action.) In any case, the announcement on Friday seems to have precipitated events, and Sumarsono, backed up by Pesindo units from Brigade 29 under Colonel Dachlan, started making preparations for action early the next • mornmg.

Madam The government of the Republic of Indonesia has issued an official announcement concerning the events in the City of Madioen, East Java, yesterday September 18. This announcement is as follows: Under the auspices and leadership of the former Peoples Democratic Front now in the process of amalgamation into the Indonesian Communist Party, the PKI, and through the use of the units of the Republican Army in East Java, an assault was made on the government organs of the Republic in the City of Madioen on September 18, 1948, and a change has been effected in the regional administration there is an illegal way of using armed forces [sic]. The government of the Republic of Indonesia is now taking steps by all means at its command to restore the legal authority and administration in the area involved. The entire population is asked to give its fullest support for the sake of the well-being of the Republic of Indonesia. Dated Jogjakarta, September 19, 1948. Voice of Free Indonesia broadcasting from Jogjakarta in English to Australia and East Asia, 5:00 p.m., September 19, 1948.115 When Sumarsono's units decided to move in Madiun, they did so quickly and effectively. According to the official PKI account, at one o'clock in the morning of Saturday, September 18, PKI troops of Brigade 29 under Colonel Dachlan moved into the city and quickly put down the minimal resistance they met from the Siliwangi and Police Mobile Brigade units stationed in the city. Police and Siliwangi officers were captured and put in detention. By 8:00, the fighting was over and the city was in Sumarsono's hands. 116 At 10:00 in the morning, Sumarsono took to the air on Radio Gelora Pemuda to announce

Colonel Dachlan's Brigade 29 (a former TNI Masyarakat unit composed mostly of Pesin do troops now in Sungkono's Division VI) was composed of six battalions stationed around the Madiun area. These had been ordered to the front after Baay's ultimatum. However, according to Siliwangi dari Masa, they moved instead to Madiun. 115 FBIS,

September 20, 1948.

116 Bintang Merah,

August/September 1951, p. 45; Nasution, TN/, 2: 238, says the chief of staff of the East Java Command, his officers, and the commandant of the CPM were either arrested or killed.

74 that the people had taken over the government and were establishing a "National Front Government for the Region of Madiun." 117 Later that afternoon (at 5:30 p.m.) a statement was issued that the Communist vice mayor of Madiun would take over the regional government, both military and civilian. 118 The top civilian leadership of the PKI seems to have been taken completely off guard by Sumarsono's coup. Word reached Purwodadi sometime Saturday morning, and, accompanied by Amir, Setiadjit, Djokosujono, and Wikana, Musso set out immediately for Madiun, arriving there sometime before midnight. 119 Other PKI leaders, such as Alimin, Aidit, Lukman, and Tan Ling Djie were caught in Yogyakarta apparently unaware of events in Madiun. Suripno made it through to Madiun only because he was due to speak there and had taken a train from Yogyakarta to Madiun Saturday morning. 120 Amir's wife and children as well as, one presumes, the families of the rest of the PKI leadership were still in Yogyakarta. 121 The PKI leadership was probably none too pleased with this sudden turn of events. If they had been planning a coup, it was certainly not for this moment when their forces were still unconsolidated and their plan of battle unformulated. 122 While undoubtedly there was a great deal of discussion of what should be done once the PKI leaders reached Madiun, no concrete move seems to have been made. The PKI has claimed that it sent cables either on Saturday or Sunday informing the government of its actions to protect the "security" of the city and requesting "instructions" on what it should do next. 123 It is quite pos117

Pinardi, Peristiwa Madiun, p. 80.

118 Front Nasional,

September 20, 1948.

119

Dimyati, Sedjarah, p. 181. Musso's trip to Madiun took longer than one would have expected, but this was probably due to detours around government-held areas. 120

Marsudi, Peristiwa Madiun, p. 86, from "Tulisan Suripno dalem Pendjara Sala."

121

Madjalah Merdeka, October 9, 1948, p. 3. There is no rhyme or reason as to which PKI leaders were where at the time of the coup. Alimin, who disapproved of the coup, was stranded in Yogyakarta, as was Aidit who was generally a Musso supporter. Prisoners captured in Yogyakarta said they knew nothing of a plan to seize power and thought Musso's actions a "bit hasty (agak terburu)" according to Merdeka,, September 30, 1948. 122 Hi