The Rise of the Capital-state and Neo-Nationalism: A New Polanyian Moment 9789004516229, 9004516220

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The Rise of the Capital-state and Neo-​nationalism

Oleksandr Svitych - 978-90-04-51622-9

Global Populisms Series Editors Amy Skonieczny, San Francisco State University Amentahru Wahlrab, The University of Texas at Tyler Editorial Board Roland Benedikter, eurac Research, Center For Advanced Studies Lenka Buštíková, Arizona State University Angelos Chryssogelos, London Metropolitan University Benjamin De Cleen, Vrije Universiteit Brussel Carlos de La Torre, University of Florida Emmy Eklundh, Cardiff University Federico Finchelstein, The New School for Social Research Chris Hudson, rmit University Paul James, Western Sydney University Erin Kristin Jenne, Central European University David Macdonald, University of Guelph Jennifer McCoy, Georgia State University Cynthia Miller-​Idriss, American University Benjamin Moffitt, Australian Catholic University Dirk Nabers, Kiel University Danielle Resnick, International Food Policy Research Institute (ifpri) Matthew Rhodes-​Purdy, Clemson University Larbi Sadiki, Qatar University Colin Snider, The University of Texas at Tyler Manfred Steger, University of Hawaiʽi at Mānoa Frank Stengel, Kiel University Kurt Weyland, The University of Texas at Austin

volume 3 The titles published in this series are listed at brill.com/gpop

Oleksandr Svitych - 978-90-04-51622-9

The Rise of the Capital-state and Neo-​nationalism A New Polanyian Moment By

Oleksandr Svitych

LEIDEN | BOSTON

Oleksandr Svitych - 978-90-04-51622-9

Cover illustration: “London Black Lives Matter Peaceful Protest from Hyde Park to Trafalgar Square via Buckingham Palace”, 2020. By Ehimetalor Akhere Unuabona. www.unspl​ash.com. Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Svitych, Oleksandr, author. Title: The rise of the capital-state and neo-nationalism : a new Polanyian moment / by Oleksandr Svitych. Identifiers: LCCN 2022024664 (print) | LCCN 2022024665 (ebook) | ISBN 9789004516205 (hardback ; alk. paper) | ISBN 9789004516229 (ebook) Subjects: LCSH: Nationalism. | Nation-state. | Economic development–Political aspects. | Capitalism–Political aspects. Classification: LCC JC311 .S9194 2023 (print) | LCC JC311 (ebook) | DDC 320.54–dc23/eng/20220729 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022024664 LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022024665

Typeface for the Latin, Greek, and Cyrillic scripts: “Brill”. See and download: brill.com/brill-​typeface. issn 2666-​2 280 isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​5 1620-​5 (hardback) isbn 978-​9 0-​0 4-​5 1622-​9 (e-​book) Copyright 2023 by Oleksandr Svitych. Published by Koninklijke Brill nv, Leiden, The Netherlands. Koninklijke Brill nv incorporates the imprints Brill, Brill Nijhoff, Brill Hotei, Brill Schöningh, Brill Fink, Brill mentis, Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, Böhlau, V&R unipress and Wageningen Academic. Koninklijke Brill nv reserves the right to protect this publication against unauthorized use. Requests for re-use and/​or translations must be addressed to Koninklijke Brill nv via brill.com or copyright.com. This book is printed on acid-​free paper and produced in a sustainable manner.

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Contents Acknowledgments vii List of Figures and Tables viii 1 Introduction A New Polanyian Moment 1 1 The Argument 6 2 Book Outline 7 2 Bringing the Nation Back In 10 1 What’s New in Neo-​nationalism? 11 2 Enter Populism and Radicalism 14 3 Competing Neo-​nationalisms 16 4 Toward a Polanyian Explanation 21 3 The Rise of the Capital-state 22 1 A New Polanyian Moment 24 2 Theorizing State Transformation under Globalization 26 3 The Rise of the Capital-​state 28 4 Capital-​state Index 34 5 The Greatest Transformation 41 4 Capital-​state and Neo-​nationalism Global Trends 44 1 Neo-​nationalism as a Protective Reaction 46 2 Regression Analysis 50 2.1 Aggregate Analysis 51 2.2 Panel Data Analysis 52 3 Interactive Models 58 4 Conclusion 61 5 The Post-​socialist Capital-​state Movement for a Better Hungary 63 1 The Post-​socialist Capital State 65 2 Perceptions of the Transformation 69 2.1 Nostalgic 70 2.2 Deprived 72 2.3 Status-​frustrated 76

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vi Contents 3 Jobbik: Appeal and Politicization 79 4 Institutional Change, Social Demand, and Political Supply 82 6 The Liberal Capital-​state One Nation Party 84 1 Perceptions of the Transformation 88 2 One Nation Party: Closed Supply 93 7 The Post-​dirigiste Capital-​state National Front 97 1 The Post-​dirigiste Capital-​state 99 2 Perceptions of the Transformation 104 3 National Front: Appeal and Politicization 109 8 The Developmental Capital-​state Korean Progressivism 114 1 Institutional Change and Continuity 115 2 Progressivism in Lieu of Neo-​nationalism 121 9 Conclusion The Pandemic and Beyond 126 1 The Neo-​nationalist Blowback against the Capital-​state 127 2 Contributions and Implications 131 3 The covid Capital-​state and Neo-​nationalism 133 Appendices 137 Glossary 151 Bibliography 154 Endorsements 181 Index 183

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Acknowledgments We are all socially embedded. This book was borne out of my doctoral research at the department of Political Science of the National University of Singapore. I am indebted to my doctoral supervisor Ted Hopf who has played a prominent role in my intellectual development and personal growth. I thank him for all the precious advice, criticism, and time spent in guiding my research. I would also like to acknowledge the members of my doctoral thesis committee Soo Yeon Kim and Ja Ian Chong for their steadfast support. For institutional support, I would like to acknowledge the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences for providing me with the Lee Kong Chian scholarship which enabled this research. I also thank the Centre for European Studies and Comparative Politics at Sciences Po –​and especially Nonna Mayer and Jan Rovny –​for enabling my research visit in the summer of 2018. I am also grateful to many other faculty members, peers, and conference participants who challenged and helped me refine my ideas. For the continuous professional support on the book manuscript, I thank Brill editors Jason Prevost, Debbie de Wit, Kan Wai Min, and Saskia van der Knaap, Brill Global Populisms editors Amentahru Wahlrab and Amy M. Skonieczny, and two anonymous reviewers. I also thank Brill and Taylor & Francis for allowing to re-​use the material that I published earlier as articles (sections of Chapters 5 and 7; sections of Chapter 2, respectively). My final words go to the most precious ones. I thank my wife Tania who made my life more meaningful and emotionally fulfilling. I thank my family –​ Mom, Dad, sister, and uncle –​for giving me both roots and wings. I dedicate this book to them.

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Figures and Tables Figures 1  The rise of neo-​nationalism in the member-​states of the Organization for Economic Co-​operation and Development. Sources: See Appendix for detailed methods and sources 2 2  Neo-​nationalism and the right-​left divide. Source: Adapted from Halikiopoulou et al. (2012) 13 3  Neo-​nationalism: core elements 15 4  Neo-​nationalism in oecd: electoral performance. Sources: Author’s calculation based on the “Parliaments and Governments” database (idem.) and Country specific sources 18 5  New polanyian moment 25 6  The rise of the capital-​state in oecd. Source: Author’s calculation 36 7  Four variations of the capital-​state 40 8  Capital-​state and neo-​nationalism in oecd. Source: Author’s calculation 46 9  Conditional marginal effects of the capital-​state 60 10  Four analytic cases 64 11  Capital-​state and neo-​nationalism in Hungary. Source: Author’s calculations 65 12  Subjective top-​bottom placement: Hungary. Source: issp Social Inequality module 1987, 1992, 1999, 2009; Citizenship module 2004, 2014 78 13  Capital-​state and neo-​nationalism in Australia. Sources: Author’s calculation; “Parliaments and Governments” database (www.parl​gov.org) 85 14  Current job status vs. perceptions about the past: Australia. Source: issp Social Inequality module 1987, 1992, 1999, 2009 89 15  Subjective top-​bottom placement: Australia. Source: issp Social Inequality module 1987, 1992, 1999, 2009; Citizenship module 2004, 2014 92 16  Neo-​nationalism and opportunities structure. Source: Adapted from Koopmans and Statham (1999: 248) 95 17  Neo-​nationalism in France. Source: Author’s calculation based on the “Parliaments and Governments” database (www.parl​gov.org) 98 18  Capital-​state and neo-​nationalism in France. Source: Author’s calculation based on the capital-​state index and the “Parliaments and Governments” database (www.parl​gov.org) 100 19  Favourable opportunity: the unaffiliated electorate in France. Source: Barometer of Political Confidence (cevipof) 2018 111

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ix

Figures and Tables

20  Capital-​state and Korean progressivism. Source: Author’s calculation based on the capital-​state index and the “Parliaments and Governments” database (www .parl​gov.org) 116

Tables 1  Mapping neo-​nationalism 17 2  Capital-​state index (csi): three-​factor model 35 3  Ratings of the capital-​state index (csi). Source: Author’s calculation 38 4  Alternative explanations: correlation coefficients. Sources: oecd, Econstats, imf, ilo, World Bank, kof Globalization Index, World Values Survey 48 5  Neo-​nationalism: ols regression coefficients on aggregate data 52 6  Neo-​nationalism: fem regression coefficients on panel data 53 7  Neo-​nationalism: estimated causal effects of explanatory variables 55 8  Neo-​nationalism: estimated causal effects on three party groups 56 9  Neo-​nationalism: effects of interaction terms 59 10  Job insecurity and dissatisfaction vs. party vote (%) in France. Source: issp Work Orientation modules 1997, 2005, 2015 106 11  The rise of the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism: key findings 130

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Introduction

A New Polanyian Moment

… The control of the economic system by the market is of overwhelming consequence to the whole organization of society: it means no less than the running of society as an adjunct to the market. polanyi 2001: 60

…

Populism is an ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic groups, ‘the pure people’ versus ‘the corrupt elite,’ and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté générale (general will) of the people. mudde 2004: 543

∵ This book is about the political economy of neo-​nationalism* –​the populist nationalism* of the contemporary globalized epoch. We are witnessing a “populist Zeitgeist” (Mudde 2004) expressed by a vast array of movements, parties, and leaders across the globe –​from Marine Le Pen’s Front National in France to Jobbik in Hungary, to Manuel López Obrador’s morena in Mexico and Pauline Hanson’s One Nation in Australia. Nationalist sentiments have surged anew both in the “Global North” –​as symbolized by Trumpism and Brexit –​ and in the “Global South” –​as represented by aggressive nationalisms in places like India and Brazil. The goal of this book is to illuminate the causes of the prevailing tendency towards neo-​nationalism (Figure 1). This book adopts a critical political

* See Glossary for the terms that are frequently used in the book. These terms are marked with an asterisk when first introduced.

© Oleksandr Svitych, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004516229_002

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2 ­chapter economic perspective to explore the systemic forces behind this phenomenon. Such a perspective problematizes taken-​for-​granted socio-​economic and political structures and demystifies relations of power (as noted early by Cox 1981; see also Clift 2014: 155; Gill 2016). The thrust of the argument is that neo-​ nationalism can be understood as a reaction to a renewed “great transformation”* (Polanyi [1944] 2001) –​a structural recalibration of the nation-​state from a market-​limiting to a market-​making one (cf. also Streeck 2001; Levy 2006a). I propose to understand this process as the rise of the capital-​state*. The book’s main insight is that there is an inextricable link between free market reforms, declining state legitimacy, and identity-​based mobilization. This book defines neo-​nationalism as an assertive identity-​maintenance project at the intersection of nationalism* (a political doctrine demanding congruence between the nation and state), populism* (a thin ideology appealing to the “common man”), and radicalism* (a call for drastic changes in the existing governance structures). Neo-​nationalism can take either a left-​wing* (civic) or right-​wing* (ethnic) form. We need to understand the neo-​nationalist phenomenon because it signals a fundamental unrest in the current socio-​ economic order. Unsurprisingly, the recent rise of populist nationalism has been the subject of growing scholarly and public interest. Researchers have defined and theorized populism in many ways: as an ideology (Mudde 2017), a discourse (Laclau

­f igure 1  The rise of neo-​nationalism in the member-​states of the Organization for Economic Co-​operation and Development Note: Mean of the vote share won by 41 right-​wing and 58 left-​wing neo-​nationalist parties in 391 national parliamentary elections in 35 oecd countries from 1980 to 2020.  s ources: see appendix for detailed methods and sources.

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Introduction: A New Polanyian Moment

3

2005; Hawkins 2009), a style (Moffitt 2017), a political strategy (Weyland 2001), or a reaction to neoliberalism* (Fraser 2014; Mouffe 2018). Other analysts have linked populism to democratic decline (e.g. Müller 2016; Frum 2018). Scholars and policy-​makers alike have wondered: Is this a new phenomenon? What are its origins? Why do some populist parties succeed, and others fail? It has been common to group explanations of the electoral success of neo-​nationalist parties into two camps: the “demand-​side”* and the “supply-​ side”* (e.g. Mudde 2007; Kaltwasser et al. 2017). The former studies the socio-​economic factors that make these political actors appealing. The latter examines the internal aspects of the parties (internal supply-​side) and their strategies, as well as political opportunity structures* (external supply-​side). Thus, a broad cluster of studies suggests that the rise of neo-​nationalism reflects a popular reaction against globalization and the advent of a post-​ industrial, “risk” society (e.g. Betz 1994; Betz and Immerfall 1998; Kriesi et al. 2006, Bornschier 2010; Kriesi and Pappas 2015; Rodrik 2018). As a corollary, some scholars stress the subjective perceptions of “modernization losers,” instead of focusing on the objective terms, and point to the dissolution of political and social attachments, such as the sense of community, belonging, or social standing (e.g. Minkenberg and Perrineau 2007; Mair 2013; Spruyt et al. 2016; Gidron and Hall 2017). Other studies, however, do not find an association between globalization and populist nationalism. Furthermore, experts have criticized the modernization grievances approach for being too general. A related category of explanations deals with the economic grievances, most commonly defined in terms of unemployment. Research results, however, have been mixed as well. While some found a positive relationship between rising unemployment and electoral support for neo-​nationalist parties (Jackman and Volpert 1996), others concluded that unemployment had no (Lubbers and Scheepers 2000) or a negative effect (Knigge 1998). Other analysts have explored the combined effect of immigration and unemployment (Golder 2003b; Cochrane 2014, Essletzbichler et al. 2018). Neo-​nationalism has also been associated with cultural grievances –​either as a reaction against the dissemination of post-​material values (e.g. Inglehart 1977; Ignazi 2003; Bustikova 2014; Goodwin et al. 2016; Inglehart and Norris 2016; Norris and Inglehart 2019), a perceived ethnic treat (Knigge 1998), or an increase in immigration (van der Brug et al. 2000; Rydgren 2008, Dinas et al. 2019, DiMaggio 2020). However, these three propositions lack convincing empirical support. The cultural backlash thesis fails to explain why the alleged conflict is unfolding only now, considering that post-​materialism has been on the rise for decades. The ethnic backlash thesis is challenged by the success of neo-​nationalist parties in largely homogenous states (such as Italy, Hungary,

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4 ­chapter or Poland). Finally, while some studies find a positive association between populist-​nationalist support and the number of immigrants or asylum-​seekers (Swank and Betz 2003, Dustmann et al. 2018), others reveal a negative one, or no relationship at all (Dülmer and Klein 2005). Norris and Inglehart’s (2019) cultural backlash thesis is an influential study in the cultural grievances camp. This book both engages in dialogue with and departs from this important study on conceptual, theoretical, and measurement grounds. To begin with, I wholeheartedly embrace the authors’ call to update conventional definitions and classifications of populism and populist parties. To this end, they put forward authoritarianism as the core feature of populism, considering populist rhetoric “the external patina disguising authoritarian practices” (p. 6). Such conceptualization, however, downplays more inclusive non-​authoritarian variations of populism that are only acknowledged briefly, such as the Podemos party in Spain, Bernie Sander’s populist campaign in the US, or the Occupy Wall street movement. This is where I find nationalism a more useful analytical lens and a key feature of populism that accommodates both its inclusionary (civic) and exclusionary (ethnic) manifestations. Similarly, the authors’ conceptual inclination toward the socio-​cultural (authoritarian-​libertarian) cleavage obfuscates the socio-​economic (statist-​ neoliberal) one: neoliberal populists like Emmanuel Macron, for instance, are characterized as “moderate centrist populists” (p. 11). Such an approach overlooks that neoliberalism in Europe and globally fuels populist nationalism sentiments in first place, with the National Front in France, for example, adopting more leftist economic rhetoric and policies precisely as a reaction to the neoliberal status quo embodied by Emmanuel Macron (or Hillary Clinton in the US). Conceptualizing populism as a thin-​centered ideology driven by nationalist appeals allows to trace such important ideological shifts and provide a more nuanced explanation of the neo-​nationalist blowback. I am with Norris and Inglehart that labels such as “radical right” or “right-​wing populists” are conceptually misleading. However, I reject these terms not because of allegedly hidden authoritarian values, but because my metrics show that the “right” is not “right” any more along the economic dimension.1 Perhaps most importantly, the capital-​state thesis defended in this book pays more attention to the socio-​economic side of the populist story, whereas Norris and Inglehart’s cultural backlash thesis gives primacy to the socio-​cultural 1 At the same time, Norris and Inglehart’s approach to measure and classify populist parties using continuous scales (instead of categorical party types employed in this book) is commendable. The differences in our measurement are driven by different conceptualizations of populism: rhetorical style vs. thin-​centred ideology.

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aspects. To be sure, the authors acknowledge the influence of economic factors and their interaction with cultural ones: “material hardship is likely to make groups more susceptible to the anti-​establishment appeals” (p. 18). They validate this intuition empirically on several occasions in the book, showing that “both authoritarian and populist values are consistently stronger among less well-​off people, who are most likely to feel a sense of economic insecurity” (p. 166).2 In one of their analysis covering European countries, Norris and Inglehart find that populist support is also stronger among the working class, less educated, white men. According to the authors, then, the primacy of economic or cultural grievances is unclear in the European context. In this regard, I deduce from the capital-​state theory and examine interaction between the economic and cultural factors on several levels of analysis, highlighting the socio-​ psychological mechanisms which connect state transformations to respective populist nationalist protective reactions. I therefore position this study in dialogue with the cultural backlash theory. Existing research thus offers an invitation to explore the causes of the populist nationalist moment from other perspectives. To this end, this study re-​ evaluates a classic work in political economy –​Karl Polanyi’s study of the “great transformation” –​that is, the attempts to disembed* the economy from society through the “myth of a self-​regulating market” (Polanyi 2001: 3). Drawing initial inspiration from and scaling up Polanyi’s “double-​movement”* thesis, I interpret neo-​nationalism as a societal reaction against the capital-​state –​a polity safeguarding the market order under the auspices of neoliberal globalization. Three clusters of institutional developments exhibit this uncoupling of the state from society: privatization and individuation of the provisions for health, education, and welfare; precariatization of work and the weakening power of labour; and financialization of the economy and redistribution “to the top.” Although Polanyi was somewhat ambiguous about “social protection,” populist nationalism is the most obvious candidate in the double movement framework. As in other demand-​side accounts, I depart from the macro-​level of broad socio-​economic processes to explain how the “fertile breeding ground” (Mudde 2007) for neo-​nationalism emerges. At the same time, I challenge the view that populist nationalism is engendered by abstract forces such as globalization, the invisible hand of the market, or the friction of cultures. This book adopts the view that these transformation processes are filtered and managed within 2 Albeit populist attitudes, operationalized as trust in political institutions, are found to be more influenced by economic security than authoritarian values, which are more linked to birth cohort (ibid.: 114).

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6 ­chapter the space of the nation-​states. As the political economist Ben Clift (2014: 18) has noted, “national states are both ‘architects’ and ‘subjects’ of the world economy.” 1

The Argument

The aim of this book is to provide a comprehensive critical politico-​economic analysis of the neo-​nationalist phenomenon. I argue that neo-​nationalism is driven by a large-​scale incremental process of the renewed “great transformation” wherein the welfarist nation-​state has been reconstituted into the capital-​state. Building on Polanyi’s crucial insight that expansion of the market is enabled through state intervention, I define the capital-​state as the latest paradigm of state development distinguished by intensive commodification* favouring the interests of capital over public ones. Enriching Polanyi’s double movement logic, I show that neo-​nationalist sentiments have surged due to the pro-​market transformation of the postwar “embedded liberal”* order (Ruggie 1982; Cox 1987; Strange 1994; Blyth 2002). The argument is underpinned by developments in the global political economy. During the period of embedded liberalism –​roughly the three decades after World War Two –​states implemented social democratic policies to constrain capitalism in favour of a more humane economic system. Specific directions of these policies under “organized capitalism” included expansion of the welfare state, provision of public goods, and regulation against externalities of the market. The “Golden Age of Capitalism” allowed states to fulfill their social contracts and claim the “mantle of nationalism” to legitimize governance (McGuigan 2009: 182; Wright 2016). The drive toward market freedoms resurfaced, however, in the wake of neoliberal globalization, making Polanyian vocabulary salient again (cf. Jessop 2001; Evans 2008; Dale 2010; Block and Somers 2014; Cahill 2014; Burawoy 2015; Holmes 2018; Tamames 2020). As a contribution to the topic, I theorize that the regulatory nation-​state has been transformed into the marketizing, commodifying capital-​state. According to the capital-​ state theory I put forth in this book, neo-​ national­­ism unfolds as a protective counter-​movement against the erosion of old economic and social structures, creating another iteration of the Polanyian “double-​movement” dynamic. The reconfiguration of the nation-​state and the ensuing loss of its “unifying energy” (King and Le Galès 2017) have destabilized the socio-​political order, opening space for radical politics. The rise of the capital-​state and the subsequent economic, social, and political discontent gives rise to counter-​movements of both the Left and the Right. Neoliberal

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globalization produces neo-​nationalism through the capital-​state. By supporting populist nationalist parties, movements, and leaders, citizens embrace identity-​based solutions –​often in exclusivist and scapegoating* forms –​to socio-​economic problems in order to harness their anxieties and insecurities. The outcome of these processes is both a strengthening of ethnic-​nationalist sources of collective identity (right-​wing neo-​nationalism), and a revival of civic-​based ones to reassert national identities through a class narrative (left-​ wing neo-​nationalism). The capital-​state theory I propose incorporates three parts, building on several distinct strands of scholarship. At the structural institutional level (objective conditions), there has been a long-​standing process of re-​embedding the nation-​state into the capital-​state under the pressures of neoliberal globalization and a drive toward free market. At the level of social demand (subjective legitimacy), citizens generate discontent and perceive these changes –​individually or collectively –​as a breakup of the social contract and a “state betrayal.” In turn, at the political supply level (discursive appeal), populist movements, parties, and leaders “plug into nationalism” through a set of rhetorical, discursive, and symbolic strategies to offer an organizational outlet for channeling and blaming away voters’ resentment. In this manner, populist nationalist entrepreneurs, as experts in politicizing grievances, provide an institutional articulation of popular disenfranchisement. In proposing an alternative theory, I confront the accounts that give primacy either to cultural or economic factors as drivers of populist nationalism. Instead, I combine these in a single explanatory framework, while paying attention to the local contextual factors. Through a novel application of a Polanyian “double-​movement” thesis, I place the structural changes in national political economies at the centre of my analysis. Such an approach fills a gap in the scholarship: while much of the previous work has explored the demand side of populist nationalism, less attention has been paid to the enduring sources of this demand, as well as to how they translate into public grievances and populist mobilization in the name of “the people.” This under-​theorized connection between structure and agency is key to developing a more nuanced and richer account of populist nationalism. 2

Book Outline

To reiterate the main argument, the institutional shift from the nation-​state to the capital-​state –​a polity facilitating the subordination of society to the market economy –​creates genuine grievances exploited by neo-​nationalists

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8 ­chapter on either side of the political spectrum. Populist national sentiments are produced by the specific regulatory practices of the newly disembedded state that fails to protect citizens from the vagaries of the market. To pursue this argument, I have structured the book into nine chapters. In the next chapter, I outline my definition of neo-​nationalism. I begin by reviewing different academic approaches to what has been described as “populism,” “radical right/​left,” or “far right/​left.” I move on to challenge the promiscuous term “populism” which has created a lot of confusion among analysts and policy-​makers. Heterogeneous figures such as Donald Trump and Matteo Salvini on the right or Bernie Sanders and Pablo Iglesias on the left have been labelled “populists.” In this regard, I make an important distinction between neoliberal populism and populist nationalisms of social protection. In this chapter, I also present empirical evidence to support the trend of the rising neo-​nationalism. In Chapter 3, I develop the concept of the capital-​state and scale up Polanyi’s double-​movement thesis to account for the current neo-​nationalist upswing. I frame my theoretical argument in terms of broader research on the state transformation. While I take my starting point from Karl Polanyi’s study, I advocate a relation to his work that is looser, more inventive, and more empirical. Although “double-​movement” is a useful initial heuristic for understanding socio-​economic transformations, it is somewhat mechanical since it lacks the specified causal links and conditions on how society protects itself. Furthermore, as Sandra Halperin (2004) has noted, Polanyi’s treatment of society as an undifferentiated whole and conception of the state as a neutral arbiter are rather problematic. Reformulating the Polanyian thesis into the capital-​state theory, this chapter fills in these lacunae by outlining the mechanisms of change at the structural institutional level, while paying attention to the micro level of voters’ experience and meso level of parties’ politicization. In addition, I provide empirical evidence to exemplify the concept of the capital-​ state and measure it magnitude comparatively both across space and time. Other than an analytical framework, this book provides evidence to explore the linkages between the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism. To this end, I apply a mixed methods approach to combine comparative breadth of statistical analysis with case study depth. Chapter 4 takes on the first task by assessing the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism in 35 oecd countries between 1980 and 2015. I evaluate the effect and significance of the capital-​state on voting behaviour through a series of correlation and regression analyses*, while considering other factors. These quantitative analyses provide a first attempt to assess the general applicability of the capital-​state theory. They also provide a first indication of the impact of the capital-​state transformation across oecd.

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The next four chapters concentrate on four selected oecd countries –​ Hungary, Australia, France, and South Korea –​to examine the mechanisms between the rise of the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism. In each chapter, I use the novel capital-​state index* and historical illustrations to trace how the political economy context provided the background for neo-​nationalist counter-​movements. I also identify “critical junctures”* –​specific watershed moments –​by applying a historical institutional perspective to the respective capital-​state transformations. Next, I add micro-​and meso-​level dimensions, looking at the intersections between socio-​economic transformations, their perceptions, and political strategy. To this aim, I deploy both quantitative and qualitative methods, relying on existing international surveys, secondary literature, parties’ manifestos, and ethnographic work. In tracing out the linkages between the respective capital-​states and neo-​ nationalisms, I also show that the capital-​state comes in several distinct forms due to contingency and historical specificity of the national double-​ movements. In this regard, my results highlight the process of uneven convergence* of oecd political economies. In the concluding Chapter 9, I draw different threads of my argument together. Here, I also discuss the manifestations of the capital-​state and neo-​ nationalism during the Covid-​19 pandemic. I claim that the global health crisis has starkly exposed and crystallized the consequences of the capital-​state transformation and the ensuing societal reactions, including in the populist nationalist forms. Overall, the current book project provides an opportunity to advance the understanding of neo-​nationalism that has become the new normal. By reassessing the Polanyian conceptual arsenal from a critical political economic perspective, it presents the neo-​nationalist appeal as a collective coping strategy adopted by constituencies embattled in the structural crisis of the state. This book helps understand the inter-​related nature of state, capital, and identity politicization through a broader social theoretical perspective.

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Bringing the Nation Back In Behind … the ability to realise that my grievance is equivalent to everyone else’s grievance, is the idea of the nation, the idea of a society which ought to be equal, where no-​one is looked down upon, humiliated, or marginalised. The appeal of populism to this vague but radical egalitarianism is rooted deep in the idea of the nation. anderson 2009: 219

…

There is widespread agreement in the literature that the upsurge of radical right-​wing activities has to be seen in the context of a combination of global and domestic structural change … There is less agreement, however, on the exact link between right-​wing mobilisation and sociostructural change. betz 1999: 301

∵ The extraordinary neo-​nationalist moment is a new global reality that has received a myriad of academic explanations. There is a huge debate among researchers on the importance of certain factors. Each approach seems to emphasize one single aspect and neglect many others. Moreover, both the demand-​side and supply-​side explanations have limitations. The cultural (such as a reaction against immigration, multiculturalism, and cosmopolitanism) and economic (such as economic insecurity, deprivation, and inequality) demand-​side explanations seek to find the most “fertile breeding ground” for neo-​nationalism. They are situated at the macro-​level of analysis and look at broad socio-​economic processes. Because of this, they inadvertently overlook national variations and cannot explain different developments in similar settings. In addition, the link between macro-​level factors and micro-​level behaviour is not clear. This point has been made strongly by the political scientist Cas Mudde (2007: 253), who noted that the demand-​side doesn’t clarify who votes and why.

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In contrast, supply-​side explanations of neo-​nationalism emphasize the strategic means used by the parties or internal aspects of the parties that help attract voters. However, electoral system, party competition, political cleavage structure, and media cannot explain why populist neo-​nationalist parties –​and not other political actors –​seek to use the system to their advantage. These are all facilitating rather than determining factors: they explain electoral breakthrough and persistence rather than why political parties gain support (ibid.). In addition, these explanatory models also miss a “bigger picture” by omitting demand-​side factors. Despite a high number of cross-​national and time-​series studies of populist nationalism, a comprehensive theory is still missing. Before proceeding with this task, the question of definition needs to be addressed. 1

What’s New in Neo-​nationalism?

There has been a terminological confusion among analysts with regards to the resurgence of the “extreme right,” “radical right/​left,” “far right/​left,” “ultra-​ nationalism,” “new extreme right,” “right/​left-​wing populism,” “national populism,” “nativism” (the list is far from being exhaustive). More often than not, the words of the day have been “populism” and “populist.” However, “nation” is admittedly the key characteristic present in the rhetoric of these parties, movements, and leaders, their heterogeneity notwithstanding. Their core ideological feature, then, is nationalism understood as a political doctrine demanding congruence between cultural (nation) and political (state) units through a specific political imaginary (Anderson 1983; Gellner 1983). Nationalism can take an allegedly a more inclusive civic form, with the state being the primary unit of organization, or a more exclusionary ethnic form, with the ethnic nation being the basis for organizing society. In practice, however, nationalism always includes both the political and cultural aspects along a spectrum of possibilities. Cas Mudde (2007, 2011, 2017) added an important nuance by coining the term “nativism.” In contrast to mainstream nationalism, nativism is xenophobic nationalism that gives an exclusive priority to the native group (nation) and treats non-​native elements as a threat to the nation-​state.1 Furthermore, 1 Sociologist Rogers Brubaker (2017: 371) describes nativism as “claims to protect the jobs, welfare benefits, cultural identity and way of life of “the people” –​meaning, of course, the “native” or “autochthonous people” –​against migrants and increasingly, in the last fifteen years or so, against Muslims in particular.”

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12 ­chapter nativism gives rise to what Ruth Wodak (2015: 3) calls the “politics of fear” wherein radical parties instrumentalize an ethnic, religious, political, or other minority as a scapegoat, producing a narrative that juxtaposes the dangerous “Them” against “Us” and “Our” nation. In view of the above, my argument is that “neo-​nationalism” is a better term to refer to the subject matter of this book. I am not alone in adopting this term. Defined as the re-​emergence of nationalism in the current phase of transnational and global development, the concept was first coined by the anthropologists Andre Gingrich and Marcus Banks (2006) and popularized by the sociologists Maureen Eger and Sarah Valdez (2014, 2018). While today’s neo-​nationalism is mostly associated with the (far/​radical/​ extreme/​populist) right (e.g. fpö in Austria, Front National in France, or Pauline Hanson’s One Nation in Australia), it can also be found on the left (e.g. Die Linke in Germany, the Scottish Socialist Party, or the Dutch Socialist Party). The latter group of parties combines (democratic) socialist ideologies with a populist discourse, thus representing the “voice of the people” rather than the proletariat. Right-​wing neo-​nationalism is oriented inwards toward the interests of a nation, whereas left-​wing one looks outwards by taking an international stance. In addition, left-​wing variants oppose capitalism on the grounds of inequality and adopt an egalitarian, universalist agenda, while right-​wing variants deem inequality natural and not subject to state intervention (Mudde 2007; March 2011; Wodak 2015: 47).2 In sum, nationalism as a core ideology mobilizes support on either end of the political spectrum (Clark et al. 2008; Halikiopoulou et al. 2012; Pauwels 2014; March 2017). The differences between the right and the left notwithstanding, on a higher level of abstraction both types of neo-​nationalism invoke inter-​related issues of welfare, sovereignty, and identity (Figure 2). The term “neo-​nationalism” depicts the premises of new political forces, that is a nationalist ideology, rather than methods (radical, extreme), policies and rhetoric (populist), or political spectrum (left/​right). Neo-​nationalism implies assertive identity politics whereby “the nation” is constantly re-​ imagined (Anderson 1983). The parties that subscribe to this ideology draw on

2 The analytical and empirical nuances between the Right and the Left have been well researched and can be summarized as follows: 1) right-​wing neo-​nationalism is more exclusionary (nativism), whereas left-​wing is more inclusionary (egalitarianism); 2) the former focuses on ethnic identity, whereas the latter more on socio-​economic issues; 3) populism trumps ideology for right-​wing neo-​nationalists and vice versa for the left-​wing; 4) the former is triadic (attacking the ruling elites and the “outsiders”), while the latter is dyadic (attacking the “elites” only).

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Bringing the Nation Back In

­f igure 2  Neo-​nationalism and the right-​left divide  s ource: adapted from halikiopoulou et al. (2012).

different political imaginaries to reinforce national identities, such as egalitarian socialist pasts, a perceived threat from Islam, migrants and ethnic minorities, or a traditional Christian agenda (Wodak 2015: 3). Furthermore, nationalist ideologies are used as the basis for all other policies. For instance, “welfare chauvinism” requires states to ensure social security (job, housing, and other social benefits) for the “insiders” while keeping the “outsiders” away –​hence the names and slogans such as “National Front,” “True Finns,” “Danish People’s Party,” “One Nation,” “America First” (italics added). Avoiding the nationalist “elephant in the room” is misleading yet for another reason. Parties that are often labelled as “radical” or “far right” have qualitatively changed since the 1990s: they no longer favor neo-​liberal pro-​market policies and support public spending instead, while their nationalist ideologies aim at boundary-​maintenance rather than nation-​building. Eger and Valdez’s research (2014, 2018), already mentioned, provides an excellent analysis of this (cf. de Lange 2007; Minkenberg 2000; Mudde 2007).3

3 Eger and Valdez (2014: 127) make this point strongly: “For those [radical right] parties, economic concerns were paramount. For neo-​national parties, nationalism is the primary political concern; hence, nationalism is the lens through which policy preferences are determined.”

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14 ­chapter 2

Enter Populism and Radicalism

To expand the minimum ideological definition of neo-​nationalism, I differentiate two other features –​populism and radicalism –​which lead some researchers to refer to “populist” or “radical” parties (e.g. Betz 1994; Taggart 1995; Betz and Immerfall 1998; Taggart 2000). According to Cleen and Stavrakakis (2017), populism and nationalism discursively construct “the people” in distinct ways, as underdog and as nation respectively. Populism has many faces. As a very elusive and contested concept, “populism” has been theorized in a vast number of ways. Social scientists understand it as an ideology, as a discursive frame, or a form of contentious politics, to list just a few accounts. One of the most influential ones describes populism as an ideology that views society divided into “the pure people” and “the corrupt elite,” and demands that politics expresses “the general will of the people” (Mudde 2007, 2011, 2017). Other prominent theorists of populism have highlighted its discursive “equivalential logic” (Laclau 2005: 37) and the tendency to simplify political issues into “black and white” (Eatwell 2004). Importantly, as a “thin ideology,” populism is theoretically compatible with the core concepts of both the left (class) and the right (nation). As an empty signifier with a claim to serve ordinary people against self-​serving elites, populism can be deployed both by capitalists and socialists, as shown by Donald Trump’s campaign in the US to Jean-​Luc Mélenchon’s insurgency in France. This view is given its clearest articulation by Abts and Rummens (2007: 409): All actual populist movements need to supplement their thin-​centered populist ideology with additional values and beliefs that give content to this substantive unity. Paradigmatic possibilities here would be a leftist version of populism that identifies the people in socio-​economic terms as the working class exploited by a bourgeois elite, or a right wing populist movement that refers to ethnonational characteristics to identify the people with the (ethnic) nation. There is yet a conceptual issue with “populism.” As a slippery term, it has been used rather promiscuously both by researchers and the media.4 It seems that populism sticks easily to any movement that challenges the hegemonic liberal democratic and capitalist order. As such, then, the concept conceals long-​term

4 A classic example here is The Guardian‘s study on populism (https://​www.theg​uard​ian.com/​ world/​ser​ies/​the-​new-​popul​ism).

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­f igure 3  Neo-​nationalism: core elements

causes of disenfranchisement and discontent with the status quo. As Jason Frank (2018) expressed it succinctly: “Advocates of the populist thesis emphasize its authoritarian dangers while quietly pushing off stage the more enduring and structural sources of democratic decline …”5 Finally, since nationalism promotes a sense of belonging heavily imbued with emotion (Freeden 1998: 752), it is prone to radicalization. In this book, I understand radicalism as an intense appeal for the reformation of existing political and economic systems (for example, liberal democracy and capitalism in the European context), albeit does not seek to eliminate them altogether.6 Overall, then, according to the maximum definition approach, neo-​ nationalism emerges at the intersection of three core dimensions, in terms of 5 For instance, as Yascha Mounk commented on the victory of Joe Biden in the latest US presidential elections: “Voters stopped an authoritarian populist from destroying the country’s democratic institutions” (Mounk 2020). There are two issues with such a claim. First, it ironically casts “populism” and “populists” as the “other.” Second, it disregards the structural conditions that got Donald Trump elected. 6 As Matt Golder (2016: 478) highlighted: “Radical parties are inherently “anti-​system,” and their radicalism must be understood with respect to the system in which they exist.”

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16 ­chapter significance: nationalism, populism, and radicalism (Figure 3). With the preceding discussion in mind, I will use the terms “neo-​nationalism” and “populist nationalism” interchangeably in this book. 3

Competing Neo-​nationalisms

To identify neo-​nationalist parties for the analysis in this book, I relied on several methods: pre-​selecting the “usual suspects” –​the parties commonly classified as “populist,” “radical” or “far left/​right” in the academic literature; consulting official party literatures (manifestos) to retrieve parties’ core ideologies along three parameters of nationalism –​welfare, sovereignty, and identity; conducting a survey of party websites to check which political issues are displayed on the front page, and how parties convey their policies and positions to voters; and examining the economic platforms of the parties using the Manifesto Project Database. I drew my data from manifestos, published and online statements of party leaders, secondary literature, databases of election results, and country-​specific sources. Using the obtained dataset of nearly a hundred active neo-​nationalist parties (58 left-​wing and 41 right-​wing), I collated their electoral performance from the total of 391 national parliamentary elections from 1980 to 2020 across 35 oecd countries.7 Overall, my analysis shows that neo-​nationalist parties may fall within three distinct camps (Table 1).8 Their ideological differences on the socio-​economic axis also command different strategies to articulate a collective identity around the markers, symbols, and myths of the nation (Gonzalez-​Vicente and Carroll 2017). On the one extreme, there is a classic version of neoliberal populism represented either by challenger movements or state (elite) populism. These actors aim to extend market logic deep into society. On the other extreme, there are class-​based solidarity movements, a form or Polanyian counter-​ movement against marketization* of society. More interestingly, in between 7 See Appendix for detailed methodology and the list of neo-​nationalist parties. I focus on formal political participation on the assumption that elections are at the heart of liberal democratic conception of politics. For a recent and detailed application of Polanyi’s ideas to Brexit and Trumpism, see Holmes (2018). 8 In a similar vein, Pauwels (2014: 26) distinguishes between neoliberal populist parties (based on neoliberalism), national populist parties (based on ethnic nationalism), and social populist parties (based on democratic socialism). In another notable instance, Ivaldi and Mazzoleni (2019) highlight two distinct categories of “producerist right-​wing populism” –​a classic right-​wing neoliberal populist and a more socially oriented one.

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Bringing the Nation Back In table 1

Mapping neo-​nationalism

Political ideology Coupled with populism Right-​wing (for free market)

“New” right-​wing (away from free market) Left-​wing (against free market)

Neoliberal populism (neoliberalism)

Term in the book

Example

Neoliberal populism (Polanyian pro-​market movement) Elite or national Right-​wing populism (ethnic neo-​nationalism nationalism) (Polanyian social protection movement) Social populism Left-​wing (civic nationalism) neo-​nationalism (Polanyian social protection movement)

Norway’s Progress Party, Swiss People’s Party, ukip, Orbán Front National, Danish People’s Party, Jobbik, Trumpa Podemos, Syriza, Die Linke, Bernie Sanders

a The case of Trump points to an important conceptual distinction between right-​wing neo-​ nationalist rhetoric and neoliberal policies once elected into office. His anti-​establishment rhetoric notwithstanding, Trump represented an intensification of the neoliberal status quo. While both Trump and Sanders addressed similar anxieties, they proposed different solutions. Sanders focused on progressive taxation, universal healthcare and education, and income and wealth inequality. Trump pledged to protect industrial interests, rebuild infrastructure, and bring manufacturing jobs back to the US.

there is another manifestation of such double-​movement: a whole spectrum of political parties that shifted their positions from neoliberalism to welfarism and protectionism on the socio-​economic axis yet remained right-​wing on the socio-​cultural one.9 Table 1 shows that –​just as Polanyi would predict –​the left-​right division is blurred along the economic axis, except for staunch neoliberals. The first two party groups both aspire for popular support in the name of the “people” 9 Something that The Guardian measures of populism is oblivious to, resulting in coding of the National Front, for instance, as “far right.” See at: https://​www.theg​uard​ian.com/​world/​ ng-​inte​ract​ive/​2018/​nov/​20/​revea​led-​one-​in-​four-​europe​ans-​vote-​popul​ist.

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18 ­chapter by politicizing the issues of welfare and redistribution, either for all (on the Left) or for the natives only (on the Right). This finding resonates with the research that highlights the de-​facto pro-​left shift of the right-​wing forces on the socio-​economic scale (e.g. Andersen and Bjørklund 1990; Kitschelt and McGann 1995; Mudde 2007; de Koster et al. 2013, Manow et al. 2018). Based on the above analytical distinctions, Figure 4 depicts aggregate electoral performance of neo-​nationalist parties in the national parliamentary elections of 35 oecd member-​states. The figure conveys a steady increase in the average electoral support for left-​ and right-​wing neo-​nationalist parties: from 4.4 per cent in the early 1980s up to 23.3 per cent in the 2010s. In relative terms, this represents a five-​fold rise over the last four decades. The disaggregated year-​by-​year data, in turn, reveal an increase from 3.4 per cent in 1980 to a staggering 33.4 per cent in 2020, that is a ten-​fold change over this period in the oecd region. Both left-​wing and right-​wing neo-​nationalism is insurgent. This finding is important in itself, as media reporting tends to emphasize and sensationalize the right-​wing in search for larger audiences and higher advertising revenues (cf. Mazzoleni 2003; Walgrave and De Swert 2004; Ellinas 2010; Wodak 2015). On a more systemic level, this hints at the hegemony of the rightist discourse whereby the prevalence of immigration issues overshadows the processes of class remaking (Kalb and Halmai 2011).

­f igure 4  Neo-​nationalism in oecd: electoral performance Notes: The 1980–​2020 period covers 391 national parliamentary elections. The available election results for the years 2016–​2020 are added for illustrative purposes.  s ources: author’s calculation based on the “parliaments and governments” database and country specific sources.

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In absolute year-​by-​year terms, left-​wing neo-​nationalism has largely dominated oecd politics. Between 1980 and 2020, it gained less electoral representation vs. the Right in only six years: 1999, 2008, 2010, 2011, 2014 and 2020. In the wake of the global financial crisis in 2009, left-​wing neo-​nationalists gained an average of 9.9 per cent across all oecd states, compared to just 2.5 per cent in the right-​wing camp. Another observation is in order regarding the change of electoral dynamics between the two strands of neo-​nationalism. Thus, left-​wing neo-​nationalism grew on average nearly four times from 3.8 to 13.8 per cent. Remarkably, left-​ wing political mobilization continued and even increased after the “end of history” –​the collapse of the socialist block in the years 1989–​1991. At the same time, however, the Right has practiced radical politics more successfully: right-​ wing neo-​nationalism boomed nearly thirty times from 0.6 to 16.6 per cent in average voting support. One possible explanation for this variation can be provided by the scapegoating hypothesis. Right-​wing neo-​nationalist forces are analytically and practically more exclusionary and are prone to scapegoating minorities, such as migrants, refugees, ethnic or religious groups, while overlooking, deliberately or inadvertently, the deeper structural causes of welfare chauvinism. Right-​wing neo-​nationalism may then be more successful as it provides an avenue to “vent off” socio-​economic frustrations and disenfranchisement onto the “Other” (Douglas 1995; Wodak 2015). A related explanation is that ascriptive identities like national culture or ethnicity are more “stable” since they provide the feelings of belonging and solidarity in a non-​competitive environment (Guibernau 2013; Salmela and von Scheve 2017). In contrast, occupational identities have become more contingent in the wake of welfare cuts and labour deregulation, thus giving leverage to right-​wing mobilization. As the sociologist Zygmunt Bauman noted, the figure of an illegal immigrant serves two latent functions for the state and politicians: “diffusing existential anxieties arising from deregulated labour markets” and “capitalizing on fear … to rebuild depleted political capital …” (2007: 16–​ 17). Throughout the book, I will be exploring in detail and testing these scapegoating and social identity hypotheses. Finally, by way of comparison, support for the “old” radical right, that is movements underpinned by ethnic nationalism and free-​market ideology, also increased sharply between 1980 and 2020: twelve-​fold from 0.8 to 9.8 per cent in average electoral support. On a year-​by-​year basis, they ballooned from no electoral representation in 1980 to a sweeping 26 per cent in 2019, with major increases in 1997, 2007, and 2011. The timing coincides with the Asian and

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20 ­chapter global financial crises, indicating reproduction of the hegemonic “there is no alternative” neoliberal discourse. In quantitative terms, the discussed trends vindicate my argument that much of the “far right” is not completely far-​right any longer, and neoliberal chauvinistic nationalism needs to be separated from the right-​or left-​wing nationalisms of social protection. Further, it suggests that neoliberalism is currently reinventing itself through the embrace of toxic nationalist rhetoric. The parties in this group –​as well as state leaders such as Trump, Bolsonaro, Erdoğan, Orbán, and Modi –​aim to strengthen rather than undo the capitalist hegemony “in the name of the people” (cf. also Mamonova and Franquesa 2019). Although anti-​liberal in identity politics (e.g., anti-​immigration stance, Islamophobia, welfare chauvinism), on economic grounds they defend liberal positions, forming an odd alliance between neoliberalism and protectionist nationalism (cf. Fraser and Jaeggi 2018). As the next chapter will show, this reveals the Polanyian logic of double movement at yet another level of ideological competition. Overall, in terms of the aggregate electoral participation, Figure 4 demonstrates convincingly the ascent of both right-​and left-​wing neo-​nationalism in the oecd region. At the country-​specific level, the steepest rise from 1980 to 2020 (in per cent of electoral support) took place in the US (108.9), Italy (53.1), Mexico (40.3), Greece (32.5), Netherlands (28.9), Austria (26.2), Ireland (24.7), Denmark (24.4), and Spain (21.3), followed closely by Sweden (20), Slovakia (19.4), and Hungary (19.1). Several oecd member-​states had no or insignificant change: Canada, Australia, Luxembourg, New Zealand, and Chile. As for neoliberal populists, the biggest advancement is observed in Slovenia (20.7), Switzerland (15.3), Germany (12.6), and Norway (10.8). Along the right-​left spectrum, Austria and Hungary exhibited right-​wing neo-​nationalism, with the Freedom Party and Jobbik driving the change, respectively. syriza and morena represent left-​wing neo-​nationalism in Greece and Mexico, respectively. In the US, neo-​nationalism instantiated itself both in the left-​wing class-​based campaign of Bernie Sanders and the right-​ wing protectionist “Make America Great Again” rhetoric of Donald Trump. In Italy, Denmark, and the Netherlands, while both right-​wing (Northern League; Danish People’s Party; Party for Freedom) and left-​wing (M5S; Red-​Green Alliance; Socialist Party) neo-​nationalist forces gained electoral support, the rise was largely driven by the former. This finding resonates with the political dualization thesis according to which European radical right parties are dominant in the centre, while radical left ones perform better in the periphery (Palier et al. 2017). My data show indeed that left-​wing neo-​nationalism gained wider support in countries like Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Portugal, and Spain.

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Located in the periphery and most affected by the 2008 crisis and austerity measures, left-​wing neo-​nationalists are more likely to challenge neoliberal policies, as well as local and supra-​national institutions. 4

Toward a Polanyian Explanation

We are living in the times of the populist nationalist challenge to the liberal order. This challenge comes in many forms, including reactionary and progressive ones. If we are to provide a comprehensive understanding of this “resurrection of the nation” (Gonzalez-​Vicente and Carroll 2017), we need to transcend the cultural-​economic dichotomy and look for deeper systemic causes. A broader and a more cross-​disciplinary explanatory model is needed. This is the role that a Polanyian framework can fulfill. Given the complexity of the neo-​nationalist phenomenon, I propose to use additional analytical tools from several political science and sociology literatures: international and comparative political economy, critical theory, contentious politics, social movements, social psychology, party competition, and voters’ preferences. While this book takes political economy as a vantage point, other literatures help “bring society back” into this political economic perspective. In this book, I argue that the root cause of neo-​nationalism is the crisis of global capitalism embodied in the dissociation of the state from national societies. Populist nationalists tap into the ensuing economic anxieties and highlight the failure of the state to fulfill its social contract. They capitalize on the discontent of those who are leading increasingly insecure and precarious lives by taking the task of defending the nation against enemies both within and outside borders. In the next chapter, then, I begin by revisiting and scaling up Karl Polanyi’s argument to develop the model of the capital-​state transformation driving the protective neo-​nationalist reaction.

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­c hapter 3

The Rise of the Capital-​state Polanyi would not be at all shocked that once again the pursuit of a wildly wrong-​headed global project of self-​regulating free markets has generated commanding countermovements driven by extreme nationalist rhetoric, ethnic and immigrant hostility, class resentment toward elites, and contempt for democratic institutions. block and somers 2017: 380

…

Structures of oppression are ontologically real but politically false; enemies are ontologically false but politically real. dolgert 2016: 366

∵ The analysis of neo-​nationalism cannot be detached entirely from the processes occurring in the capitalist global economy. Political economy gives the language and the necessary analytical tools to understand neo-​nationalism in the context of neoliberal globalization. In this chapter, I develop a proposition that the updated political economic legacy of Karl Polanyi offers insights about resurgent populist nationalism. I argue that neo-​nationalism is driven by the renewed “great transformation” in which the nation-​state has been reconstituted into the capital-​state. Consequently, citizens seek protection against this process of renewed Polanyian transformation, while political entrepreneurs galvanize and politicize popular grievances. Re-​discovering Polanyi today offers a powerful initial framework to make sense of the various neo-​nationalist contestations in “times of rupture and transformation” (Aulenbacher et al. 2019). In his seminal work The Great Transformation (hereinafter: tgt) Karl Polanyi analyzed the 19th century transition towards industrial capitalism in Europe that culminated in the crisis of the market economy, the outbreak of World War i, and the rise of fascism. The metamorphoses under neo-​liberal globalization of the last four decades have brought about reorganization of

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the social, political, and economic relations on a scale that allows re-​usage of Polanyi’s term “great transformation.” Polanyi claimed that the doctrine of economic liberalism, based on the organization of society and economy through self-​regulating markets, was a “utopian endeavour.” It had produced disruptive effects such as massive social dislocations, World War i, the economic recession of the 1930s, and European fascism. According to Polanyi, the “satanic mills” of laissez-​faire led to “institutional separation of society into an economic and political sphere” (Polanyi 2001: 71) and commodification of labour, land, and money. This concealed the critical role of the government in economic life. At the same time, it posed a threat to society as none of the three “fictitious commodities” could be detached from the social fabric. As critical theorists Nancy Fraser and Rahel Jaeggi observed, Polanyi helps us understand that society cannot be “commodities all the way down” as markets depend on non-​marketized social relations (Fraser and Jaeggi 2018). Polanyi emphasized that there was nothing natural about laissez-​faire. His key concept in this regard is “embeddedness”* –​the idea that the economy is always subordinated to social relations and is never autonomous. Markets were never more than “an accessory feature of an institutional setting controlled and regulated … by social authority.”1 For Polanyi, then, it was commodification rather than exploitation that constituted the essence of capitalism.2 And any attempts to disembed markets from society through commodification would inevitably lead to protective counter-​movements, constituting a “double movement” (ibid.: 70, 75–​76, 79). There is then an ongoing political struggle between disembedding market forces and a re-​embedding backlash from society.3 While such re-​embedding agencies may come in different forms, from the 1 For an excellent textual analysis of the ambiguities of Polanyi’s embeddedness and disembeddedness, see Dale (2010), Block and Somers (2014: 91–​97), and Holmes (2018: 23–​24). Further, Gemici (2008) argues that Polanyi uses embeddedness as a gradational concept to measure separation of economy from society and as a methodological principle of holism, while Vancura (2011) claims that Polanyi’s disembeddedness requires two interpretations: predominance of profit-​oriented transactions (“economic disembeddedness”) and the absence of social control over production and distribution (“anthropological disembeddedness”). 2 For Polanyi, the watershed was the abolition of outdoor relief in 1834, a “singular departure” that made free markets possible. Following the period of disembeddedness (1834–​1930s), the rise of fascism and World War ii, “embedded liberalism” was established as a social compromise between capital and labour that lasted during 1945–​1970s. Transition from the Fordist to the neoliberal phase of capitalism and another disembeddedness followed next, the trend that was not reversed after the global financial crisis. On embedded liberalism, see Ruggie (1982) and Dale (2012). 3 As Fioretos and Heldt (2019: 1097) put it: “A highly embedded system is one in which public agencies have the authority to intervene in capital, labour, product and other markets. In

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24 ­chapter political-​economic perspective the ultimate agency is the state. In the words of Bishop and Payne (2021: 15): … at the global level we are talking essentially of the ability and willingness of ‘our’ states, acting on behalf of us as their citizens, to respond with a ‘compensatory’ instinct to intervene energetically in economic and social matters in order to enlarge, and equalize to some degree, the range of choice available to their peoples. 1

A New Polanyian Moment

In 1944 Polanyi wrote that “our age will be credited with having seen the end of the self-​regulating market” (2001: 148). He could not have foreseen, however, the rebirth of the “liberal creed” –​a neoliberal round of market disembedding. There is a burgeoning “neo-​Polanyian” research literature that compares the current era with the period documented in tgt (e.g. Jessop 2001; Blyth 2002; Silver and Arrighi 2003; Evans 2008; Dale 2010; Castles et al. 2011; Levien and Paret 2012; Block and Somers 2014; Cahill 2014; Burawoy 2015; Holmes 2018).4 In the context of neo-​liberal globalization, I propose to re-​evaluate Polanyi’s conceptual arsenal as shown in Figure 5. This updated framework will lay the groundwork for the conception of the capital-​state.5 Neo-​liberalism is admittedly the dominant economic ideology of our times. While there are disagreements on the usage of the term, there is a general consensus that two distinct meanings are implied: a set of social, economic, and political policies on the one hand, and an ideological doctrine on the other. From a policy perspective, neo-​liberalism can be understood as a trinity of market-​driven reforms that includes privatization (transfer of ownership from the public to the private sector), deregulation or liberalization (relaxation of highly disembedded systems, by contrast, public agencies lack effective means to structure the behaviour of market participants.” 4 Christopher Holmes (2018: 21–​25) makes a useful distinction between two major streams within the “neo-​Polanyian” political economy scholarship: on the one hand, the dominant critical perspective adopting the critique of commodification (the approach of this book); on the other hand, the cultural approach focusing on the social embeddedness of market economies. In addition, a third “post-​Polanyian” Foucauldian approach is emerging, shifting the focus from the market-​society opposition to the tension between habitation and improvement identified by Polanyi in tgt (ibid.: 25–​40). 5 To instantiate the graph in its contextual specificity, the empirical section that follows presents the comparative data for four different types of the capital-​state.

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­f igure 5  New polanyian moment

government restrictions in economy and trade), and marketization (conversion to a market economy), accompanied by fiscal austerity and withdrawal of the state from many areas of social provision (Harvey 2005; Stilwell 2006). Furthermore, since its initial spread via Thatcherism and Reaganomics in the 1980s, neo-​liberalism has become a commonsensical ideology and a hegemonic discourse of the latest phase in the development of capitalism. In sum, neoliberalism refers fundamentally to the “pattern and ethos of market-​ oriented, market-​disciplinary, and market-​making regulatory restructuring” (Peck et al. 2018: 41). Polanyi argued that a completely free, self-​adjusting market was a myth. Similarly, it has been noted that today’s market fundamentalism conveys a belief in the self-​market regulation akin to Polanyi’s “liberal creed.” As Fred Block points out, market fundamentalism displays “the affinity with religious fundamentalisms that rely on revelation or a claim to truth independent of the kind of empirical verification that is expected in the social sciences” (Block and Somers 2014: 3). Under such a predicament, the so-​called deregulation entails not small states and free markets but intensified re-​regulation to buttress the rule of market via legislative and institutional changes (Gamble 1994; Crouch 2001; Levy 2006a; Peck 2010; Mirowski 2013; Davies 2014). As Peck et al. (2018) highlight, instead of a straightforward retreat of the state, deregulatory rollback is combined with re-​regulatory rollout. In short, the state is redeployed to uphold the neoliberal agenda, and neoliberalism roots itself through the institution of the state. The separation of state and market is thus an illusion.6

6 In this regard, Philip Mirowski (2013) insists that neoliberalism is a constructed political project, and Steven Vogel (1996) argues that “freer markets” mean “more rules.”

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26 ­chapter Polanyi also showed how society took measures to protect itself against the disruptive effects of commodification. Yet he focused mainly on the elite-​ driven legislation (such as social spending), ultimately equating society to state. Besides, he was only concerned with the Global North. At the same time, Polanyi admitted that social disembedding would give rise to multiple counter-​ movements. With the advent of neoliberal globalization, this has indeed happened both locally and globally, as documented in multiple studies (e.g. Udayarigi and Walton 2003; de Sousa Santos 2006; Munck 2006; Fraser 2013; Holmes 2018). Extending the logic of Polanyi’s double-​movement, I surmise that the rise of the capital-​state entails the rise of neo-​nationalism. 2

Theorizing State Transformation under Globalization

The debate on the transforming nature of the state under neoliberal globalization is crucial for the overall argument advanced in this chapter.7 In line with Held et al.’s (1999: 1–​31) mapping of the studies on globalization –​understood as the intensification of economic, political, and cultural interactions across the national boundaries –​my perspective resonates with and renovates the “transformationalist” argument. More specifically, it dovetails with the claims in the political economy scholarship that the dominant governance mode of “disciplinary neoliberalism” (Gill 2016: 34) has reconstituted the state’s role from a market-​steering to a market-​supporting one (Crouch and Streeck 1997; Sodederberg et al. 2005; Levy 2006a). Furthermore, important international developments have facilitated a radical change in the state’s organization, capacities, and goals. Some of these include: the internationalization of capital markets; the growth of international trade and foreign direct investment; the dissolution of the Fordist regime of production; the information technology revolution; the multiplication of institutions, governance structures, and sources of authority above and below the national level under the conditions of “new anarchy” and “transnational neopluralism;” and the increase in the power of business relative to the state and organized labour (Stubbs and Underhill 2006; Cerny 2011; Levy et al. 2015a; 2015b; Zürn and Deitelhoff 2015; Cerny and Prichard 2017).8 7 Following Bishop and Payne (2021), I recognize the essentially neoliberal character of “actually existing” globalization. 8 Several concepts have been advanced to reflect the new situation: “embedded state” (Hanrieder and Zang 2015), “multi-​level governance” (Schakel et al. 2015), and “transnational neopluralism” (Cerny 2010), to name a few. The first two terms denote embeddedness of the state in a vast array of international institutions and governance structures; yet overlook

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In the attempts to conceptualize the impact of these sweeping transformations, some researchers have advanced the thesis of state decline or its convergence on the agenda of neoliberal globalization (e.g. Ohmae 1995; Guehenno 1996). “Skeptics” have emphasized state persistence due to either insignificant role of globalization, enduring public expectations, or path-​dependence (Pierson 1994; Hirst and Thompson 1996; Rodrik 2007). Yet “transformationalists” have insisted that there is space for renewed state activism under the new structural conditions (cf. Cerny 1997; Weiss 2010; Levy et al. 2015a: 44–​47). One account in the transformationalist camp appears to complement the conception of the capital-​state advanced in this book: Philip Cerny’s “competition state” denoting a shift from the welfarist Keynesian nation-​state to the marketized neoliberal one in the pursuit of global capital. Such a state acts as an enforcer of the interests of the market and “a globalizing agent in itself” (Cerny 1990, 1997, 2010, Cerny and Prichard 2017: 7). This account offers a general theory of state transformation in advanced capitalist states. However, scholars of comparative political economy have contested its tenets (cf. Genschel and Seelkopf 2015). Thus, in response to the competition state’s structural determinism –​ whereby states are compelled to compete for mobile capital –​globalization-​ skeptic authors have emphasized the autonomy of national policy-​making in financial regulation or taxation, for instance (e.g. Helleiner 1994; Hay 2008; Genschel and Seelkopf 2015). Instead of the expected convergence toward a liberal market economy, the proponents of the varieties of capitalism approach have highlighted the diversification of state structures (Hall and Soskice 2001). And the predicted decline of the welfare state has been countered with the “compensation thesis” already articulated by Polanyi in tgt. In addition to these conceptual challenges, there are little macro-​quantitative comparative time-​series data to support the competition state thesis.9 In view of the above, I propose the concept of the capital-​state to address the “greatest transformation” with theoretical rigor. As in the competition state thesis and the existing International Relations literature, I recognize the global economic change as a crucial driver of state transformation. At the same time, I choose not to overplay these forces, and line up with the Comparative Politics the dialectic of fragmentation and globalization in world politics. Although this issue is addressed by the third term, all concepts seem to overemphasize the global level. The conception of the capital-​state fills in these analytical lacunae. 9 In a notable exception, Daniel Horsfall (2010) operationalizes and measures the competition state for twenty-​five oecd countries, concluding there are two distinct types –​the liberal and the Nordic models.

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28 ­chapter literature that underscores the role of domestic institutions and political configurations in adapting to exogenous constraints (albeit the latter are normally underplayed in this strand of scholarship). Nor do I give a premium to international capital, a feature of many ideal-​state models.10 Furthermore, as research has shown, states do not submit passively to the external pressures; they ultimately decide whether to pursue privatization, deregulation of labour market, financialization, and so on. In sum, I posit the capital-​state as a political subject at the junction between the domestic and international extremes, while acknowledging the inextricable interactions between the two levels (Clift 2014: 18; Huber et al. 2015). The capital-​state thesis highlights the role of the state as an anchor of neoliberal globalization. In this, it complements, rather than challenges, the competition state thesis that gives a premium to the structural level of analysis.11 3

The Rise of the Capital-​state

I define the capital-​state as the latest paradigm of state development distinguished by the intensive state-​enabled commodification favouring the interests of capital over public ones. Essentially, in such a form, the state supports capital by institutionalizing market control. From the mediator between market and society, it turns into an enforcer of the corporate capital rule.12 I theorize that the primary factors driving the emergence of the capital-​state are

10

This is the case, for instance, with William Robinson’s (2001) conceptions of the “transnational state” and “transnational capitalist class” (cf. also Sklair 2002). In Robinson’s account, globalization is assumed to exert the same impact across different regions, and the global (transnational) level is over-​emphasized at the expense of the state one. By contrast, the capital-​state model deals precisely with “transmission,” that is the national level, while accounting for the transnational one and recognizing that that the two are mutually constituted. 11 Carroll et al. (2019: 790) expressed this complementarity succinctly: “State policy responses … aggressively adopted pro-​capital positions as a means of sustaining their competitive position (emphasis added), legitimizing the attacks on social protections, labour rights and entitlements as a necessary response to new global realities.” 12 This perspective resonates with the Marxist understandings of the state –​both structural and instrumental –​as opposed to the liberal and statist approaches in the International Relations literature (Krasner 1978: 21–​26). The distinction between the two Marxists accounts lies in the degree of agency and intentionality in influencing the state. Structuralists (e.g. Poulantzas, 1978; Przeworski and Wallerstein, 1988) highlight the role of state as a whole in reproducing the capitalist structure, while instrumentalists (Miliband 2009) point to the ties between the capitalist (corporate) and public sectors.

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the “neo-​Polanyian” forces discussed in the preceding section –​neo-​liberalism, market fundamentalism, and disembedded economy –​coupled with globalization and the international developments outlined above. The nation-​state is therefore neither withering nor reinforced in the globalized era as some researchers have claimed. Rather, following the period of “embedded liberalism,” it is being reconstituted into the capital-​state, a unique historic event akin to Polanyi’s “great transformation.” To be sure, the nation-​state has been indispensable for the development of capital throughout history (through institutions such as private property or contract law), the position formulated by Immanuel Wallerstein (1990: 289) as “the correspondence of the boundaries of the capitalist world-​economy to that of an interstate system comprised of sovereign states.”13 What is new about society’s subordination to markets is the amount and scale of commodification –​carried out by the state –​whereby the abandonment of “class compromise” in favour of market freedom is presented as legitimate.14 I identify three clusters of institutional reconfigurations that exhibit the rise of the capital-​state: individualization of welfare (intrusion*), flexibilization of labour (collusion*), and transnationalization of finance (extrusion*). In other words, the capital-​state is constituted and reproduced through several state-​ led institutional dynamics that mediate between the corporate and political worlds. As extended versions of Polanyi’s commodification of housing, labour, and money, these three clusters reflect recalibration between the state and the market and point to the central role of governments in this process. While the three capital-​state components share a common normative logic –​design and implement market-​based and market-​led institutions and practices –​they represent different, albeit inter-​related, developments. Intrusion refers to an expansion of commodification through deregulation and transfer of state-​run provision of public goods to profit-​making enterprises. This reflects the neoliberal logic according to which education, healthcare, social security, and other essential public services –​the social spheres previously outside the logic of capitalist expansion and profit-​making –​are

13

14

In a similar vein, Hojin Karatani argues that the nation-​state must be understood as the Capital-​Nation-​State since the capitalist economy and state are held together by the nation, forming together “Borromean rings, in which the whole collapses if any of the three rings is removed” (Karatani 2014: 220). As highlighted by comparative historical sociologists (e.g. Mann 1999; Tilly 2004, 2007), liberal establishment must negotiate rather than repress the class cleavage in capitalist democracies in order to legitimize governance. Populist nationalism can thus be conceived as a “return of the repressed” (Kalb and Halmai 2011) in the wake of “de-​democratization.”

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30 ­chapter regarded as private commodities to be acquired through the market, rather than “legal or moral entitlements” (Wills 2014) redistributed as public goods. In other words, everything in society should be run as a business. Intrusion then reflects the withdrawal of the state from its role of the custodian of public interest whereby, as Webster et al. (2008: 103) put it, “social relations are reduced to the status of commodity relations where everything is measured by the market.” For example, privatization of public education turns it from a public good that serves the whole community into a competitive private commodity. Not only does this create a “new moral environment of survivalism,” but the whole idea of education changes fundamentally: from public good (use value) to positional good (exchange value); from a shared resource owed by the state to its citizens into a consumer product to ensure a better position at the labour market; from the opportunity to develop one’s potential as a member of society to an object of profit and service sold to clients (Ball and Youdell 2008: 95). In the same manner, housing has become a commodity and a matter of speculative activity. While investors may enjoy high profits from real estate, rising housing costs prevent lower classes from meeting their housing needs. As the state deregulates the private housing market, it fails to adequately meet society’s housing needs. As a result, not only are physical and symbolic borders created between upper and lower classes, but variations in local wealth drive populist appeal and voting behaviour (Adler and Ansell 2020). I choose three aspects to operationalize intrusion –​healthcare, education, and housing –​as these go to the heart of the weakening of the welfare state’s redistributive capacity. Their restructuring is a vivid example of producing insecurity in households, fostering “responsibilization” (O’Malley 1996; Shamir 2008) of individuals, and extending depoliticization by turning citizens into consumers (Wills 2014; Madra and Adaman 2018). As social entitlements have been reduced, more vulnerable citizens have become exposed to more social risks. Yet social structures and forces are no longer held to blame. In terms of validity of measurement, then, the indicators of healthcare, education, and housing reflect neatly the intrusion of corporate power into the activities of the state and a shift from the redistributive type of politics into “politics via markets.” What is important is that welfare retrenchment is not simply a process of deregulation, but re-​regulation (re-​embeddedness on market terms as discussed earlier) carried out by the state. As pointed out in the oecd Governance in Transition report (1995), a new role of the state towards the public sector is expected, wherein corporatization and privatization are deemed as important policy solutions. As McGuigan (2009: 183) highlighted, “the notion of

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‘deregulation’ is something of a misnomer in failing to register that privatised and marketised conditions themselves constitute a regulatory regime.” I conceptualize collusion as weakening of the power of organized labour against strengthening of the power of capital. This institutional mechanism manifests itself in facilitation of capital accumulation through reduction in corporate tax rates and labour market flexibilization, such as through institutionalizing lay-​offs.15 These developments in turn undermine the associational and bargaining power of labour, exemplified by the decrease in trade union density. And, as Bardhan (2017) argues, among others, not only are unions important for wage bargaining, but they also help tame workers’ nativist passions and perceived cultural insecurities by sustaining the network of social insurance and protection. The collusion dimension is based on the premise that work is central to people’s lives. As outlined by the International Labour Organization (ilo 2004: 6): “Work is the source of dignity, stability, peace and credibility of governments and the economic system.” Having a job provides not only resources, but also social recognition. It brings both an earning and a sense of social worth. Following Polanyi’s conception of labour as a fictitious commodity, I measure collusion to bear evidence on the proposition of the “historic victory of capital over labour” (Berger 1999: 453), resulting in the rise of what Guy Standing (2011, 2018) calls the “precariat.”16 The conditions of work have become more precarious, unstable, temporary, and flexible, giving rise to a political economy of insecurity. More importantly, such work arrangements fail to provide occupational narrative and identity. Individuals can perceive economic hardships not only as resource deprivation, but as a threat to their identities. Thus, there is connection between non-​standard employment and a vote against mainstream parties (Galindo 2019). In short, collusion reflects the state’s active role in commodifying labour and making it more insecure in the neoliberal era and captures the ensuing unequal power relations between corporations and workers. As Gøsta Esping-​Andersen (1990: 22) noted in his seminal work on welfare capitalisms, market-​dependent workers are difficult to mobilize for solidaristic action. The capital-​state is thus characterized by the erosion of the “institutional 15 16

Jessop (2002, 2018) refers to such shift in the distribution of power from labour to capital as the “Schumpeterian workfare state,” while Cerny and Evans (2004) use the term the “post-​welfare contracting state.” Ferragina et al. (2020) use the concept of “invisible majority.” See (ibid.: 11) for the literature review of other similar social categories, such as “labour market outsiders,” “the working poor,” and “unprotected workers.”

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32 ­chapter safeguards” (Streeck 2014) that served to protect labour from marketization –​ such as trade unionism, stable working conditions, and corporate taxation.17 And, as the sociologist Michael Burawoy (2015: 20) observed, social movements may be a response to the lifting of these same protections won against commodification. The last institutional dynamics represents the transnational aspects of the capital-​state: freeing of capital from social control and Keynesian “embedded liberalism” measured through financial openness and capital inflows; and transnationalization of society measured through “redistribution to the top” (Streeck 2014: 58). As an extension of Polanyian fictitious commodity of money, the extrusion mechanism stands for lowering of barriers to capital flows as well attracting foreign direct investment under the pressures of international competition (Cerny 1997). Furthermore, it reflects a concentration of income at the top, which facilitates concentrations of wealth and corporate interests, contributes to financialization through speculative profit-​making, and exacerbates inequality (Polanyi Levitt 2013; Piketty 2014, DiMaggio 2021). These developments allegedly decouple the lives of the transnationally oriented elites from those of the ordinary people, undermining social cohesion and national homogeneity.18 While the industrial capitalist class was tied to national space, constructing national identities to strengthen legitimacy, transnational corporate elites of the capital-​state are less bound by national and territorial constraints.19 I propose to use the top 1% of income share to measure transnationalization driven by excessive financialization and the entrenchment of a financial oligarchy. Since restructuring of the nation-​state into the capital-​state creates not only social stress for “have-​nots,” but also opportunities for the “haves,” this indicator allows to capture social polarization. While I use income as the 17

18

19

As Streeck (2014: 50) argues, these constraining institutions can be regarded as “beneficial constraints” for capitalism itself since they “prevented capitalism from destroying its non-​capitalist foundations –​trust, good faith, altruism, solidarity within families and communities, and the like.” On beneficial constraints, see Streeck (1997). This dovetails with Friedman’s (2003) notion of “double polarization” wherein social divisions are accompanied with discourses of cultural difference, and the ruling cosmopolitan elites are juxtaposed against lower working classes, on the one hand, and the lowest racialized strata of society, on the other. As the political sociologist Colin Crouch (2013: 234) argues, wealthy and corporate elites have become “denationalized” and are not interested in electoral and domestic politics. In a similar way, Gill (2005: 181–​182) highlights: “As the state increasingly shuns ‘the nation’ and nation-​building projects to attend to the claims of global creditors, it fails to deal with the demands of ordinary people for decent jobs, health care, education and a range of other services.”

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primary indicator, a gap in earnings also implies a gap between lifestyles, value systems, practices, and even modes of belonging. For instance, the upper class can provide their children with the best private tutoring and, therefore, better chances of upward mobility, which ordinary people cannot afford. More “transnationalized” people can also give up their citizenship or arrange a dual one, which may reflect devaluation of national citizenship and belonging. Such growing heterogeneity and the perceived socio-​economic disparities can affect the national identity and threaten the myth of social cohesion. Moreover, research has shown that there is a link between income inequality, subjective social status, and support for the radical right (Han 2016; Engler and Weisstanner 2020). The latter becomes attractive to voters by cultivating nativism and hence providing non-​economic criteria of social status. In sum, the capital-​state manifests itself through three mechanisms, each representing institutional rules to enhance the power of capital over society and the shift from the sovereignty of the state to the “sovereignty of the market” (Crouch 2004). Privatization turns public goods into private commodities to maximize corporate profits; flexibilization of labour creates more part-​time, temporary, non-​unionized and other forms of precarious work; and financialization lifts state restrictions on capital flows and reinforces social divisions. The capital-​state does not replace the nation-​state completely; there is no sharp line diving the two polities. Rather, there is an identifiable continuum or spectrum of “capital-​state-​ness” along which various states can be rated. Defining the capital-​state in terms of intrusion, collusion, and extrusion provides identifiable dimensions of variation whose effects can be empirically explored. While all states have been exposed to neoliberal globalization and market forces, their impact will not be the same due to unique national socio-​political structures. The capital-​state model, then, allows us to empirically assess and differentiate the impact of these global forces at the domestic level. As a wrap-​up, the capital-​state implies the re-​embedding of state and society within the paradigm of progressive commodification and market fundamentalism. This reflects the shift in balance of power between business and labour. Capitalist accumulation is given preference over social considerations; the “legitimate social purpose” (Ruggie 1982) is therefore challenged. This development, in turn, leads to outbreaks of dissent among disembedded strata of society, as epitomized by the phenomenon of populist nationalism sweeping the globe.

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Capital-​state Index

The three dimensions of intrusion, collusion, and extrusion reflect the essence of the capital-​state –​the institutional facilitation of expanded commodification. Although they are analytically distinct, I expect a high degree of inter-​ correlation. The shift towards privatization of services and the transfer of state assets to corporations (intrusion) signals opportunities for further global investment (extrusion). The increase in transnational capital mobility (extrusion) creates pressures from foreign investors to deregulate labour and lower corporate taxes (collusion). Deregulation of labour entails less stable employment and decreases in corporate tax rates may lead to wider income gaps in society (extrusion) and less revenues for public budgets, respectively (intrusion). The latter may serve as a political argument for another cycle of privatization and cuts in government spending. Furthermore, citizens may turn to precarious jobs (collusion) to cope with welfare-​state retrenchment (intrusion), and precarization in turn reinforces stagnant household incomes (extrusion). Based on the developed theoretical framework, I collected the statistical data along each conceptual property to develop a composite capital-​state index (csi) for 35 oecd member-​states between 1980 and 2015.20 I constructed two measures –​“private expenditure” and “flexible labour” –​through aggregating several more nuanced proxy indicators. Overall, this led to thirteen distinct variables measuring the capital-​state through the csi (Table 2). This newly constructed, comprehensive composite index allows us to explore the salience of the capital-​state both over-​time and cross-​nationally. In line with the outlined propositions that institutional protection of the rule of profit and of market has advanced in recent decades, and the protective limits to commodification have been lifted, I expect evidence of the rising capital-​state. Figure 6 displays the produced index and its major dimensions mapped onto a 0–​100 range. The chart corroborates the salience of the capital-​state both over time and cross-​nationally. It shows a steady, almost linear trend in the rise of the

20

Despite a correlation between the three conceptual dimensions of the capital-​state –​as expected theoretically –​the confirmatory factor analysis demonstrated that the structure of the data was better represented by three factors than by one. I constructed the aggregate capital-​state index from 13 distinct variables by: 1) taking the mean of each variable; 2) converting it to a 0–​100 score range via a min-​max transformation technique; and 3) averaging the number of measures available for each year between 1980 and 2015. I followed the conventional guidelines for constructing indices, e.g. oecd (2008), Mazziotta and Adriano (2013), and undp (2013). See Appendix for more details.

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The Rise of the Capital-State table 2

Capital-​state index (csi): three-​factor model

Sub-​indices and variables intrusion Private healthcare Private education Private expenditure: –​ house prices –​ household debt –​ social spending collusion Corporate tax rates Trade union density Flexible labour: –​ permanent –​ temporary –​ involuntary

extrusion Capital openness

Measures

Sources

Private expenditure on health: voluntary payments (gdp %) Enrollment in private institutions: primary, secondary and tertiary (average of three levels, %) Household private expenditure: –​ Real house price (index) –​ Household debt to gdp ratio (%) –​ Private social expenditure (gdp %)

oecd

Corporate income tax rate (%) Ratio of wage and salary earners that are trade union members (%) Deregulation of labour: –​ strictness of employment protection against dismissals: regular contracts (index) –​ strictness of employment protection against dismissals: temporary contracts (index) –​ share of involuntary part-​time workers in total employment (index)

oecd oecd

World Bank Sub-​index oecd bis oecd

Sub-​index oecd oecd oecd

Financial openness index

Chinn-​Ito index Capital inflows fdi, portfolio investment, international External debt, financial derivatives and reserves Wealth of (gdp %) Nations Wealth concentration Pre-​tax national income: top 1% share World Wealth and Income Database

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­f igure 6  The rise of the capital-​state in oecd Note: score 0–​100 (0 =​minimum value, 100 =​maximum value).  s ource: author’s calculation.

capital-​state across the oecd camp. My indicators suggest that the state has been a key driver in re-​orienting an increasing number of social domains towards market objectives. The change along three major dimensions has been also upward. Notably, the overall trend is driven by flexibilization of labour relations and the increased power of business. This evidence is in line with my framework. Average data, however, can obfuscate differences that are important. While the capital-​state trend holds true across the oecd in general terms, differences are bound to appear across indicators and countries. Indeed, Table 3 displays a substantial variation in the capital-​state index at the more detailed country level. These cross-​country variations invite caution if undertaking a comparative analysis. At first glance, there appears to be a capital-​state spectrum somewhat similar to the “varieties of capitalism” taxonomy in the political economy literature (Hall and Soskice 2001). According to this framework, oecd economies can be roughly classified into the “liberal market economies” of the Anglophone world (Australia, Canada, Ireland, New Zealand, the US, and the UK), “coordinated market economies” (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Germany, Japan, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, and Switzerland), and the rest in between.21 21 Cf. also Cerny’s (2016) nuanced distinction between two varieties of neo-​ liberalism: “Ordoliberalism” (social market economy, e.g. Germany) and more “paleoliberal” version of neoliberalism (e.g. the US). For Coates (2000: 9–​10), there are three types

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The produced data indeed largely match up with the liberal market cluster except Canada. Although it is in the middle of the ranking, its csi score for 2015 is still above the mean oecd value.22 Among the “social democratic cluster” countries, most fit well into this group, except for Switzerland that gravitates toward the liberal market camp. This result is generated by the extreme values along three variables: corporate tax rates (the lowest in oecd), trade union density (one of the lowest in oecd), and capital inflows (one of the highest, accordingly). The last indicator also accounts for the extremely high degree of financialization in Luxembourg, pulling it to the 3rd place in the overall 2015 ranking. Countries such as Latvia, Estonia, and Hungary are in the middle of the 2015 index. This makes intuitive sense in view of the pro-​market reforms initiated in the 1990s, combined with the post-​socialist institutional legacies (Bohle and Greskovits 2012). Countries such as Chile and Turkey are outliers (top and bottom of the rating, respectively), which can be explained by the historical trajectories of their political economies. Chile embarked on a liberalization program much earlier in the 1970s (Mesa-​Lago 1997), while Turkey undertook populist economic policies in the 1990s (Onis and Aysan 2000). A final note is due regarding South Korea and Japan. While scholars largely agree that both countries, seen as exemplars of the state-​led economy, pursued pro-​market reforms in the aftermath of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, there are diametrically opposed views about the degree and extent of these reforms. According to one view, Korea neo-​liberalized its economy substantially (Minns 2001; Lee and Han 2006; Lim and Jang 2006), while Japan preserved the role of the state in managing its economic system (Itoh 2005; Suzuki 2012). The data in Table 3 suggest a somewhat different story. By 2015, both countries had converged on high absolute values of the capital-​state index. In terms of change, however, both Japan and Korea score very low on the csi. This points to an enduring tradition of statism in view of the countries’ distinct trajectories: the legacies of authoritarianism and developmentalism, contentious nature of labour, and unique socio-​political cleavages. The index signals that Korea and

22

of capitalisms: market-​led, state-​led, and negotiated. In a similar vein, Bobbitt (2003: 670–​ 674) differentiates between three models: the entrepreneurial market state (libertarian, US); the mercantile market-​state (social stability, “Asian Tigers”); and the managerial market-​state (social equality, the eu). The results also map with a certain degree onto two other established ideal typologies of advanced capitalist economies: Andrew Shonfield’s liberal, corporatist, and statist models (Shonfield 1965); and Gøsta Esping-​Andersen’s three “worlds of welfare capitalism” –​ liberal, Christian democratic, and social democratic (Esping-​Andersen 1990).

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38 ­chapter table 3

Ratings of the capital-​state index (csi)

Intrusion Collusion Extrusion Summary index

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30

United States United Kingdom Luxembourg Chile New Zealand Switzerland Australia Ireland Japan Korea Latvia Netherlands Estonia Spain Portugal Hungary Israel Austria Canada Germany Italy Belgium Czech Republic France Poland Finland Greece Mexico Norway Sweden

Change

2015 67.9

2015 71.3

2015 56.5

1980 2015 1980–​2015 45.6 65.2 19.6

50.1

75.5

49.0

34.4 58.2

23.8

20.5 50.3 61.6

53.4 72.3 70.7

100.0 50.9 40.8

14.5 58.0 20.6 57.8 19.7 57.7

43.5 37.2 38.0

43.3 54.7 33.5 39.7 47.5 29.6 33.9 32.4 28.1 33.1 21.0 38.2 28.0 32.2 29.8 23.1 39.2 15.5

82.8 73.9 82.0 74.2 75.3 76.9 69.3 72.2 72.3 65.9 76.7 59.8 65.2 79.9 60.4 66.2 47.8 71.0

45.8 40.2 49.1 50.4 36.4 50.4 52.9 50.4 50.5 50.6 50.7 50.3 50.7 30.4 50.6 50.4 51.2 50.3

34.9 24.5 21.7 42.1 37.8 38.4 39.5 13.0 37.4 20.4 7.1 19.3 28.0 32.5 28.7 23.4 32.9 14.4

57.3 56.2 54.9 54.8 53.1 52.3 52.0 51.7 50.3 49.9 49.5 49.5 48.0 47.5 46.9 46.6 46.1 45.6

22.4 31.7 33.2 12.7 15.3 13.9 12.5 38.7 12.9 29.5 42.4 30.2 20.0 15.0 18.2 23.2 13.2 31.2

28.0 24.4 27.1 26.3 27.2 28.7 28.6

62.1 73.0 55.1 68.2 70.0 49.3 56.9

44.6 37.5 50.9 38.1 35.1 50.8 42.0

28.1 11.8 22.9 20.6 29.0 28.2 22.3

44.9 44.9 44.4 44.2 44.1 42.9 42.5

16.8 33.1 21.5 23.6 15.1 14.7 20.2

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The Rise of the Capital-State table 3

Ratings of the capital-​state index (csi) (cont.)

Intrusion Collusion Extrusion Summary index 31 32 33 34 35

Slovakia Turkey Slovenia Denmark Iceland

16.4 19.6 18.9 29.6 37.1

73.1 66.3 71.1 52.7 50.4

37.8 39.7 35.2 30.7 13.0

16.8 28.9 10.5 20.7 13.9

42.4 41.9 41.8 37.7 33.5

Change

25.6 13.0 31.3 17.0 19.6

Notes: All indices range on a 0–​100 scale (0 =​minimum value, 100 =​maximum value). The countries are ranked according to the 2015 summary capital-​state index. The data for Central and Eastern European states are available from the following years: Czech Republic (1993); Estonia (1993); Hungary (1989); Latvia (1995); Slovakia (1994); Slovenia (1990). source: author’s calculation.

Japan have retained the legacy of the developmental state along the simultaneous gradual shift towards the capital-​state in the post-​Asian financial crisis period. Drawing on the developed csi, Figure 7 reveals the structural changes in several distinct political economic regimes: liberal (Australia), coordinated (France), former socialist (Hungary) and developmental (South Korea). Visually, there is both initial divergence and ultimate convergence among the four capital-​states. Theoretically, this indicates that uneven convergence –​the dialectic of institutional stability and change –​transcends the static institutionalism of the varieties of capitalism taxonomy. Australia is a paradigmatic example of the strong liberal capital-​state. The market has been given primacy over other institutions, which is reflected in the more than two-​fold change of the capital-​state index from 20 points in 1980 to 55 points in 2015. As in other advanced industrial oecd nations, Australia had undergone a radical restructuring of the economy and state, the process underpinned by the ideology of “economic rationalism” (Australia’s term for neoliberalism). The transformation began back in the 1970s under Gough Whitlam’s Labor government and gained momentum in the 1980s. In 1986, Treasurer Paul Keating of the Australian Labour Party declared that Australia had to become more “disciplined” to avoid the status of a “banana republic.” This signified a break with the tradition of the “Australian Settlement” and the advancement of policies and practices to deregulate welfare, labour, and

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40 ­chapter finance under the Hawke-​Keating neoliberal governments (1983–​1996). These developments map onto the rising csi for that period. Hungary is an illustrative case of a post-​socialist capital-​state where disembedding of the economy unfolded since the fall of the socialist bloc. The change in csi for Hungary is one of the biggest in my oecd dataset. In quantitative terms, the score rose from 7 index points in 1989 to 50 points in 2015. In substantive terms, this reflects the fervour and “shock therapy” of neoliberal reforms in Central-​East European societies. Importantly, it was deliberate policy-​making, rather than passive erosion of state power, which brought about marketization of Polanyian fictitious commodities of housing, labour, and finance. Both post-​socialist transition to a market economy in Hungary and “economic rationalist” restructuring in Australia were underpinned by a common logic of institutional change: transfer of risks in the provision of public goods and sustaining households, flexibilization of labour markets, and financialization of economies. The capital-​state trend in Korea is distinct from the other cases: it takes off after the 1997 Asian financial crisis, as represented visually by the rising csi. This critical juncture coincides with the adoption of a more neoliberal orientation by the Kim Dae-​jung (1998–​2003) government as part of the imf’s bailout loan. The overall change in the Korean index is the smallest in the graph and one of the lowest across the oecd. Convergence accelerated with the 2008 global financial crisis, however, as pro-​market policies gained further traction during the Lee Myung-​bak (2008–​2013) administration. While there has been a debate over the degree of Korea’s transformation in the late globalization period, the csi displays a mix of change and continuity,

­f igure 7  Four variations of the capital-​state

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suggesting a limited form of convergence toward the developmental capital-​ state. On the one hand, the adoption of the globalization ideology in the early 1990s and the outbreak of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, followed by imf liberalization policies, loosened Korea’s economic nationalist strategy. On the other hand, the state has continued to play a key role in economic planning and welfare provision. In other words, the Korean state has not fully mutated into the capital-​state, even though there has been a clear shift in that direction. The government retained the logic of developmentalism in combination with transition toward the neoliberal capital-​state and introduction of the Keynesian welfare state. The shift toward the capital-​state in France was mediated by the unique institutional and ideational configuration of its political economy, revealing a dual Polanyian shift. While the state transformed in a market-​oriented direction, it also continued its interventionist role, and the restructuring has been less radical than elsewhere. Under such condition of post-​dirigisme, it makes intuitive sense that France scores relatively low on the change in the capital-​ state index. The country’s csi increases moderately by 17 points between 1980 and 2015, well below the oecd average of 27 points. Furthermore, as of 2015 France scores 45 points on the index, occupying a low 24th position in the overall ranking of 35 oecd member-​states –​a decline from the 15th position in the 1980 ranking. The csi picks up from 1983 when the first Mitterrand administration introduced reforms to challenge the “dirigiste” model, breaking with the legacies of the Socialist-​Communist alliance. Overall, the sharpest increase in the index (1983–​1994) maps onto the incumbency of the Socialist Party under François Mitterrand. The cases of Korea and France thus underline the contingency and historical specificity of national responses to the global transformation processes. Korea exemplifies the developmental state, and France represents the continental welfare one. These entrenched interventionist political economic traditions account for modest capital-​state reconfiguration. As important, distinct variegations and uneven convergence in all cases challenge the varieties of capitalism approach which does not recognize hybrid institutional models within its taxonomy. Instead, the cases reveal the dialectic of Polanyian dis-​and re-​ embedding steered by the states. 5

The Greatest Transformation

Karl Polanyi’s commentary on disembedding the economy through the “myth of a self-​regulating market” –​as well as resulting counter-​movements –​is still

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42 ­chapter relevant today. However, Polanyi’s approach needs to be updated and broadened in order to provide a framework to understand the most recent transformation of the state. In this regard, this chapter has developed the capital-​state reformulation of Polanyi’s transformation thesis. The conception of the capital-​state accounts for re-​regulation, rather than retreat, of the state for the market under the wave of neoliberal globalization. It is a polity that serves the interests of capital at the expense of society through several interrelated institutional dynamics, identified as intrusion, collusion, and extrusion. In the current era of the capital-​state underpinned by the logic of Polanyian commodification, society appears “under a double assault from economy and state” (Burawoy 2006: 365). This is the essence of the renewed “great transformation.” My findings also show that the capital-​state comes in different forms, challenging the homogenization argument both theoretically and empirically. In contrast to the neoliberal convergence thesis, there are substantial variations in national political economies. At the same time, against the varieties of capitalism approach, these different institutional configurations do not simply remain intact; they gradually transform as shown by the rising capital-​state indices. The results reveal uneven convergence, i.e. both convergence and divergence as theorized earlier.23 Analytically, the notion of the capital-​state adds to the International Relations literature on the transformations of the state and the Comparative Politics literature on the varieties of capitalisms. Building on insights from both scholarships, I posit the capital-​state as a political subject at the junction between international and domestic levels, while acknowledging the interactions between the two. Exogenous international pressures and domestic institutions and political configurations both matter. Empirically, the capital-​state index provides more granularity in assessing these relationships. Furthermore, the taxonomy of mechanisms intertwining the corporate and the political worlds adds to scholarship addressing state-​market interactions in the neoliberal era. The institutional shift from the nation-​state to the capital-​state, in turn, opens space for counter-​movements. It creates a climate of political instability and social discontent, favouring mobilization in the form of populist-​ nationalist reactions of both the Left and the Right. Given the outlined mechanisms, parts of population are prone to material and social marginalization. As

23

As Carroll et al. (2019: 794) put it, “a veneer of variegation [of neoliberalism or capitalism] appears singularly to cohabit with consolidation.”

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suggested by the capital-​state theory, neo-​nationalism unfolds as a protective movement against the erosion of old economic and social structures, creating another iteration of a Polanyian double-​movement dynamic.

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­c hapter 4

Capital-​state and Neo-​nationalism Global Trends

The reduction of ‘freedom’ to ‘freedom of enterprise’ unleashes all those ‘negative freedoms’ that Polanyi saw as inextricably tied in with the positive freedoms. The inevitable response is to reconstruct social solidarities … –​hence the revival of interest in religion and morality … and even the revival of older political forms (fascism, nationalism, localism, and the like). harvey 2005: 80

…

… One should be attentive here to how even those elements that appear as pure rightist racism are effectively a displaced version of workers’ protests. slavoj žižek

∵ The central proposition of this book is that neo-​nationalism emerges as a Polanyian protective reaction against the capital-​state. State action breeds social conflict. The capital-​state has been instrumental in expanding the centrality of markets through several regulatory architectures: the opening of new areas of social life to marketization and, in parallel, the transfer of risks from markets to vulnerable individuals (intrusion); business friendly tax regimes accompanied with hostility to unionization (collusion); and support of unrestricted capital mobility (extrusion). The rise of neo-​nationalism is a result of these processes. I echo Polanyi in contending that the capital-​state transformation engenders reactions against the ensuing economic insecurity, precarization, and inequalities. These counter-​movements are often reactionary, xenophobic, and violent, with people retreating into nationalism and culture. Ruben Gonzalez-​Vicente (2018) captures this dynamic succinctly with the term “liberal peace fallacy” –​the

© Oleksandr Svitych, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004516229_005

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idea that increased marketization would trigger an anti-​liberal response to the violence of markets. My capital-​state theory suggests a congruence of several elements, adding complexity to the Polanyian double movement logic. On the objective structural side (material dimension), there has been an incremental capital-​state transformation manifested in welfare restructuring, the assertion of corporate power over labour, and the exposure of citizens to financial capital –​all leading to the disenfranchisement of working and lower middle classes. On the subjective demand side (social dimension), citizens perceive these changes as a breach of the social contract by the state, experienced as socio-​economic deprivation and insecurity. Perceived threat of social decline also accelerates xenophobic and authoritarian sentiments, as well as alienation from political institutions. In turn, this opens space for alternative challenger parties who engage in a struggle over the meaning of “Nation,” quite often in an exclusivist ethno-​nationalist form. On the supply side (political dimension), then, populist nationalist entrepreneurs provide an organizational outlet and a coping strategy for citizens by skillfully channeling their anxiety over socio-​economic standing. There is thus an inherent interaction between the processes of socio-​ economic alienation and cultural resentment. This empirical chapter bears evidence for my propositions. I substantiate my transformation-​protection framework from a quantitative perspective by assessing the interrelationship between the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism. Before proceeding, a methodological note is in order. Social scientists are always restricted in their research and explanations. An important way to overcome this is through cross-​disciplinary and mixed methods research. In this book, I use a mixed methods approach (Brady and Collier 2004) to examine the processes of capital-​state formation and neo-​nationalism both across time and space, as well as establish the corresponding causal mechanisms. I combine two types of statistical analysis –​structural equation modeling (the previous chapter) and multiple regression (the current chapter) –​with intensive country-​case studies (next chapters) via historical process tracing (Waldner 2015). Process tracing nested into a mixed method research design allows to examine the mechanisms and schemes translating the capital-​state transformation into neo-​nationalist responses, rather than simply evaluate statistically the effects of the former on the latter (Beach and Pedersen 2019). The quantitative analysis will allow a comparison of a large array of cases at once –​35 oecd countries over 36 years (1980–​2015). This is good for uncovering common patterns in the relationship between the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism and generalizing the findings. Individual case studies, in turn, will help establish the causal mechanisms and conditions for the rise of

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46 ­chapter

­f igure 8  Capital-​state and neo-​nationalism in oecd Notes: R =​0.84; R2 =​0.77.  s ource: author’s calculation

neo-​nationalism, and ensure that the generalizations are not too sweeping. Overall, such mixed methods approach combines the strengths of a time-​ series cross-​sectional design and a single in-​depth time-​sensitive case study.1 1

Neo-​nationalism as a Protective Reaction

The previous chapters presented measurements of the capital-​state and neo-​ nationalism at the aggregate and individual country levels. A test of the relationship between the two variables can now be carried out. My expectation is that capital-​state and neo-​nationalism rose synchronically in the oecd region between 1980 and 2015.2 Figure 8 plots the levels of the capital-​state (measured through the capital-​state index) on the x-​axis against right-​and left-​wing neo-​ nationalisms (measured through electoral support) on the y-​axis for thirty-​five oecd countries. The association is positive, strong (r =​0.84), and statistically significant (p < 0.01).3 The regression line shows the “best fit” relationship between the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism.4 1 Appendix provides more details for those with a taste for methods and data. 2 I chose 2015 as the cutoff date as not all data were available for the following years. 3 Correlation coefficient r of 1 stands for perfect positive linear relationship. P-​values are used in measurements to say whether observed patterns are statistically significant. 4 I calculated this line and all other regression results in the statistical software called R.

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The graph substantiates a clear neo-​Polanyian hypothesis: the renewed drive toward a self-​regulating market since the late 20th century, conceptualized as the capital-​state transformation, engenders a politically organized countermovement in the form of neo-​nationalism. Moving from the big picture to the more nuanced country-​level data, the overall pattern is largely driven –​in the order of statistical significance –​by Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Switzerland, Sweden, Mexico, and the United States (correlation coefficient above 0.80 at p < 0.01). Australia, Chile, France, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia and the United Kingdom display the weakest positive trend (correlation coefficient of below 0.30 at p < 0.1). For three countries –​Latvia, Slovakia, and Japan –​ the relationship between the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism is negative. This preliminary evidence gives weight to the hypothesis that state transformation and populist nationalist mobilization constitute a new Polanyian moment and are part of the same historical process. To situate the result in a broader context, Table 4 shows the results of a correlation analysis between neo-​nationalism and several alternative explanations: indicators of economic performance, globalization, and immigration-​related variables. The focus was not on building a causal model based on the multiple regression analysis (see the next section), but on finding explanatory variables with statistically significant correlation coefficients to give a snapshot of the general trends.5 According to the data in Table 4, the association between neo-​nationalism and economic growth, public debt, and deficit is low and insignificant. The other two economic indicators –​gdp per capita and inflation –​are very strongly related, but the connection runs against conventional wisdom. One would expect neo-​nationalism to be predicted by decreasing gdp per capita and increasing inflation, whereas the data show the opposite dynamics. Unemployment has both a positive and significant correlation, and thus needs to be accounted for as a control variable in the multiple regression analysis. At the same time, the value of the correlation coefficient (0.44) is almost twice as small compared to the capital-​state (0.84). Overall, then, economic indicators are not good predictors of neo-​nationalism in the oecd region. Conversely, globalization levels, measured through the kof globalization index, correlate very strongly and positively with neo-​ nationalism. Globalization, however, complements the capital-​state thesis, rather than

5 As a word of caution, the number of observations is rather small (N =​36 years), as the data are averaged across the oecd camp between 1980 and 2015.

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48 ­chapter table 4

Alternative explanations: correlation coefficients

Group

Variable

Measure

Economy

Inflation gdp Economic growth Government debt Government deficit Unemployment

Globalization

Economic Cultural Political Aggregate Immigration Asylum-​seekers Work Neighbours

Prices, annual change (%) usd/​capita gdp annual growth rate (%) Debt to gdp ratio % of gdp % of active labour force kof globalization index

Immigration

Coefficient

No. of long-​term immigrants No. of asylum applications “Jobs to nationals to first.” “No foreigners or immigrants.”

-​0.51** 0.80*** -​0.14 0.41* 0.22 0.44**

0.72*** 0.75*** 0.72*** 0.77*** 0.75*** 0.55*** -​0.60* -​0.50*

Statistical significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001; N =​36 except “Work” and “Neighbours” N =​25. sources: oecd, econstats, imf, ilo, world bank, kof globalization index, world values survey.

contradicts it. The thrust of this book is that globalization is permissive force enabling transformation of the nation-​station into the capital-​state. Globalization is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for this development. I therefore include globalization as a control variable in further analysis.6

6 At the same time, the data I collected on the subjective perceptions of globalization in oecd do not correlate well with neo-​nationalism, unlike the globalization levels.

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Finally, Table 4 reveals a strong association between neo-​nationalism and the levels of immigration and asylum-​seekers in oecd countries. However, the evidence is somewhat inconsistent. Although there is a relationship with the levels of long-​term migrants and asylum-​seekers, according to the World Values Survey anti-​immigrant attitudes appear to have improved along both the economic and social dimensions, which casts doubt on the cultural backlash hypothesis. As neo-​nationalism rose, more people wanted to see immigrants and foreigners as their neighbours, and less people agreed employers should prioritize themselves over immigrants. In view of this inconsistency, I include the levels of immigration as a control variable in the regression context to adjudicate its impact on the neo-​ nationalist vote. I am with Golder (2003b: 445) that immigration objective figures serve as a reliable indicator, as any subjective perception would need to be added to or subtracted from them. Moreover, as Kitschelt (1997: 61) finds, people have a perception of many immigrants in exactly those countries with large numbers of them. At the same time, in line with my theory, I hypothesize that immigration may have a somewhat different effect than predicted by the cultural backlash thesis. Anti-​immigrant sentiments may arise precisely because of the insecurity produced in the aftermath of state restructuring.7 Inglehart and Norris (2016: 16), for instance, admit a possible interaction: “Goring economic insecurity and rising levels of social inequality may also reinforce cultural shifts.”8 However, while their study does not corroborate this effect, the cultural backlash thesis is different from the scapegoating one proposed here. The latter suggests a combination of predisposing factors and situational triggers: capital-​state restructuring, ensuing voters’ anxiety, and discursive scapegoating of minorities by neo-​nationalist actors. I explore these linkages between class and values politics in the regression analysis and case studies.

7 Again, while objective immigration levels may not automatically translate into subjective anti-​immigration attitudes, I assume the linkage between the two following Kitschelt (1997) and Golder (2003b). 8 The authors extend this point in their later work: “We found support for both the economic grievances theory and the cultural backlash theory. They seem to reinforce each other –​but the cultural factors clearly played the dominant role in people’s decision to vote for Trump or Clinton” (Norris and Inglehart 2019: 459). Similarly, while Anthony DiMaggio (2020) argues that economic security let voters to support Bernie Sanders rather than Donald Trump, he also stresses that “socio-​cultural and economic attitudes work together in defining Trump supporters” (p. 203) and, more specifically, that “the intersection of race, occupational stress, and reactionary social attitudes was significant in driving Trump’s appeal” (p. 212).

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50 ­chapter In concluding this section, two caveats need to be reiterated. In this book, due to methodological considerations I measure neo-​ nationalism solely through electoral results. However, in case studies I do capture to a certain degree how neo-​nationalist forces affect the political mainstream. In addition, I focus on formal political participation since elections enable citizens’ participation in politics. Citizens, however, can bypass conventional channels of political expression, or refuse to behave politically at all (Hay 2007). In this regard, including social movements in the analysis could offer a richer and more nuanced description of the neo-​nationalist phenomenon. Sill, institutionalized electoral politics is an important part of the picture, and can be understood as a form of social mobilization and contentious politics for that matter.9 2

Regression Analysis

The analysis in the previous section demonstrated the synchronic rise of the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism across oecd states between 1980 and 2015. This preliminary evidence gives weight to the book’s intuition that these two processes constitute a new Polanyian moment and are part of the same historical conjuncture. As institutional tensions have built up in the aftermath of the state’s pro-​market reconfiguration, populist nationalist forces of both the Left and the Right have emerged as social protection movements. From a macro-​ economic perspective, the current neo-​nationalist upswing is therefore a deep malaise rather than anomaly, an expected “lame duck” problem rather than a “black swan” surprise (Blyth and Matthijs 2017). In this section, I seek to build up on the obtained evidence and address a straightforward question: Does the capital-​state drive neo-​nationalism? Specifically, using the constructed panel datasets, I investigate the links between the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism via several regression models, while controlling for alternative explanations and exploring potential interaction terms. The application of a time-​series cross-​country regression analysis allows a test of the capital-​state theory on a range of countries across an extended period time, and thus improves its external validity. The two-​fold aim is to evaluate the statistical significance of the effect of the capital-​state on neo-​ nationalism and account for the book’s thesis and the main rival explanations. These steps will corroborate the argument that the rise of the capital-​state 9 In this regard, neo-​nationalism can be considered as a form of contentious politics whereby political entrepreneurs mobilize their constituencies through populist framing, politicizing nationalist identities, and shaping emotions of discontent (Tarrow 1998, 2012).

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leads to the neo-​nationalist reaction, and this effect is statistically significant. The case studies chapters, in turn, will explore how this process unfolds or fails by unpacking the mechanisms that account for this linkage. 2.1 Aggregate Analysis I begin by applying regression analysis to the oecd average data that aggregates the observations from all countries into a single time-​series dataset for the 1980–​2015 period.10 In addition to the main predictor variable csi (capital-​ state index), I include three control variables discussed above: glob (globalization), unemp (unemployment), and immig (immigration). As a recap, the control variables are measured as follows: kof globalization index based on Dreher (2006); percentage of active labour force based on oecd labour statistics; and (log) inflows of foreign population by nationality based on oecd international migration database for immigration. The dependent variable neon (neo-​nationalism) measures the percentage of national electoral support for neo-​nationalist parties. I estimate bivariate (1 to 4) and multiple (5) ols regression models on the differenced data as follows: [1]‌ neon =​α +​β1 [csi] +​ε [2]‌ neon =​α +​β2 [glob] +​ε [3]‌ neon =​α +​β3 [unemp] +​ε [4]‌ neon =​α +​β4 [immig] +​ε [5]‌ neon =​α +​β1 [csi] +​β2 [glob] +​β3 [unemp] +​β4 [immig] +​ε11 After running these models, the capital-​state thesis produces the highest explanatory power, accounting for 12 per cent of the variation in neo-​ nationalism as indicated by the R2 statistic (Table 5). While this percentage is not high, this is hardly surprising as regressions on de-​trended data always reduce statistical significance as a trade-​off for internal validity. What is clear in the oecd aggregate context is that not only is Model 1 the best predictor, but it is also the only significant one. In the multiple regression context (Model 5), the influence is enhanced to 19 per cent, while the coefficient remains almost the same (0.312). This means that every one-​point increase (on a 0–​100 scale) in the capital-​state index translates roughly into a 0.3 per cent increase in voting 10 11

Before the analysis, I addressed a statistical issue of data non-​stationarity (trending) via a technique called “differencing.” See Appendix for details. Where α is the constant, the β’s are the coefficients representing the statistical effects, and ε is an error term. The same applies for all other regression models estimated in this chapter.

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52 ­chapter table 5

Neo-​nationalism: ols regression coefficients on aggregate data

Variable

(1a)

csi

0.311* (0.140)

csi glob

(1b)

0.600** (0.212)

unemp immig (log) R2 Constant

0.12 -​0.422

0.19 -​0.027

(2)

(3)

(4)

(5) 0.312* (0.145)

-​0.319 (0.953)

0.00 0.622

0.336 (0.802) 0.00 0.433

-​3.324 0.06 0.790

-​0.057 (0.957) -​0.028 (0.831) -​3.447 (2.346) 0.19 -​0.059

Statistical significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Notes: N =​36 years. Standard errors are in parenthesis. In model (1b) the capital-​state variable was differenced twice as after the first differencing a slight time trend remained.

support for neo-​nationalist parties, on average, controlling for the effects of globalization, unemployment, and immigration. The effects of globalization and unemployment variables become even more insignificant in the multiple regression context, as shown by the reduced coefficients. Moreover, none of the three controls are statistically significant, and their association with neo-​nationalism is negative (Model 5). 2.2 Panel Data Analysis The above analysis was conducted using the oecd aggregated dataset with a small number of cases (36 years). As such, it can only serve as a preliminary piece of evidence of the significance effect of the capital-​state on neo-​ nationalism. To explore the dynamics in full, I apply regression analysis to the complete time-​series cross-​sectional dataset spanning 35 countries across 36 years (1980 to 2015). This produces 1260 potential observations (country-​ years).12 In addition to the three earlier controls, I add inequality as measured 12

Since national elections do not take place annually, I fill in the missing values for the neon variable with the previous year’s results. For some control variables, the number

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Capital-​s tate and Neo-​n ationalism: Global Trends table 6

csi glob unemp immig ineq

53

Neo-​nationalism: fem regression coefficients on panel data

0.039** (0.011) -​0.152*** (0.048) 0.222*** (0.057) -​0.424 (0.238) 0.194 (0.160)

Statistical significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Notes: N =​401 country-​years. Standard errors are in parenthesis.

through the Gini coefficient estimated by the World Bank. Finally, due to methodological reservations widely shared among researchers of panel data, I estimate the “fixed effects” model (fem) instead of the standard one.13 Using my panel dataset, I estimate a fixed effects regression model with a country dummy and a time trend as a control.14 I test it in both bivariate and multiple setting. Table 6 presents the output of the bivariate analysis where neo-​nationalism is regressed against each explanatory variable. The results show that the capital-​state and unemployment are the only statistically significant predictors of neo-​nationalism. While the coefficient for globalization is significant as well, it has a negative sign, which is the direction opposite to the expected.

13

14

of observations is less due to missing data. Due to many missing values in the inequality (ineq) variable, I end up with 401 observations for the multi-​variate analysis. Although time-​series cross-​sectional data are commonly used in political science and other social science disciplines, applying standard ols regression is problematic due to the nature of the panel data (Beck 2001). While there have been debates on how to estimate the effects, there is a methodological consensus that the ols “fixed effects” models (fem) are appropriate (Jackman and Volpert 1996; Greene 2001; Golder 2003a, 2003b), albeit not unproblematic either (Beck and Katz 2011). Not only are time-​series cross-​sectional data often time-​trended, they are time-​trended at different rates in different units (in this case, countries). Time adjustments are therefore crucial in a panel regression design to avoid the spurious relationship problem.

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54 ­chapter The results of this bivariate analysis, however, do not yet testify for a causal relationship, as the variables do not control for each other’s effects. The full multiple model can be constructed as follows: [1]‌ neon =​α +​β1 [csi] +​β2 [glob] +​β3 [unemp] +​β4 [immig] +​β5 [ineq] +​ β6-​40 [country dummies] +​β41 [trend] +​ε In addition to using csi (capital-​state index) as my main predictor, I also disaggregate it into the major dimensions –​intrusion, collusion, and extrusion –​for a more nuanced understanding of the effects of the capital-​state. Moreover, I add membership in the eu or nafta (dummy variable 0/​1) as another control variable. The results in Table 7 are consistent with the bivariate analysis: capital-​state and unemployment are highly significant predictors of neo-​nationalism. In addition, in the multiple regression context the csi coefficient increased drastically, and the effect of inequality became significant as well (Model 4). csi coefficient of 0.541 means that, for every one-​point increase in the capital-​state index (on a 0–​100 scale), a neo-​nationalist party should expect to see approximately an additional 0.5 per cent of the vote share, controlling for the effects of globalization, unemployment, immigration, and inequality. Conversely, a one-​unit increase in unemployment or inequality increases the vote share by 0.4 per cent, controlling for the effects of the other variables. Finally, the R2 statistic goes up to 0.68 compared to bivariate estimations. This means that the current model explains 68 percent of the variance in neo-​nationalism. Although both the capital-​state, unemployment, and inequality variables predict support for neo-​nationalism, the former has the largest statistical effect. These results were anticipated. As I argued in earlier chapters, the capital-​ state implements, by institutional design, policies that promote flexibilization of labour, thus potentially exacerbating precarious employment, while also increase the transnationalization of society and undermine its homogeneity via “redistribution to the top.” In other words, unemployment and inequality are intervening (mediating) variables in the capital-​state model. Looking at the coefficients of csi (0.541), unemp (0.416), and ineq (0.411), it might be argued that the effects of these variables are rather similar. This conclusion would be premature, however, as the three variables are measured in different metrics. To make the coefficients comparable, it suffices to standardize them into standard deviation units. Such a conversion from multiple scales into a unified one yields the following results: csi (0.772), unemp (0.215), and ineq (0.311).15 These coefficients are interpreted as follows: for a 15

The formula is βSC =​βUC*(SX /​SY), where βSC is the standardized coefficient, βUC is the unstandardized coefficient and SX and SY are the standard deviations of X and Y

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Capital-​s tate and Neo-​n ationalism: Global Trends table 7

Neo-​nationalism: estimated causal effects of explanatory variables

Variable

(1) Intrusion

(2) Collusion

(3) Extrusion

(4) Summary index

csi

0.011 (0.067) 0.399* (0.167) 0.534*** (0.122) 1.086 (0.661) 0.393* (0.186) -​4.501 (2.733) 0.66 401

0.256*** (0.068) 0.089 (0.173) 0.399** (0.125) 1.179 (0.637) 0.447* (0.182) -​3.474 (2.687) 0.67 401

0.182** (0.060) 0.281 (0.157) 0.503*** (0.121) 0.716 (0.654) 0.442* (0.183) -​5.983* (2.735) 0.67 401

0.541*** (0.123) -​0.111 (0.191) 0.416*** (0.121) 0.408 (0.652) 0.411* (0.180) -​5.060 (2.655) 0.68 401

glob unemp imm (log) ineq eu/​n afta R2 Constant

Statistical significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Notes: N =​401 country-​years. The dependent variable is neo-​nationalism. Standard errors are in parenthesis.

one-​standard-​deviation increase in the capital-​state, on average, we expect a roughly 0.8 standard-​deviation increase in a neo-​nationalist party vote share, controlling for the effects of the other independent variables in the model. In turn, for a one-​standard-​deviation increase in unemployment and inequality, we expect, respectively, a smaller 0.2 and 0.3 standard-​deviation increase in the electoral support, controlling for the other variables. The effect of the capital-​ state is roughly 4 and 2.6 times larger compared to the effects of inequality and unemployment, respectively. In substantive terms, these results translate into the following associations. Neo-​nationalist vote in oecd will rise by: 6.5 per cent for every 12-​point increase in the capital-​state index (on a 0–​100 scale); 1.8 per cent for every 4-​per cent increase in unemployment (as share of active labour force); and (Kellstedt and Whitten 2013: 206).

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56 ­chapter 2.6 per cent for every 6-​point increase in the Gini index (on a 0–​100 scale). The analysis thus indicates a robust relationship between the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism. Furthermore, this result is mostly driven by the collusion dimension (column 2 in Table 7). As a reminder, collusion stands for power of business over labour, as expressed in market-​based regulations of employment, diminishing union density, and corporate-​friendly taxation. To conclude the multi-​variate time-​series cross-​sectional analysis, I present a more disaggregated view of the evidence for the three sub-​categories of neo-​ nationalism conceptualized earlier: the social protection movements of the Left and the Right, and a distinct phenomenon of neoliberal populism. The results of the analysis are presented in Table 8. For left-​wing neo-​nationalists (e.g. Podemos, syriza, Die Linke), the two significant effects come from globalization and unemployment, controlling for table 8

Neo-​nationalism: estimated causal effects on three party groups

Variable

(1) Left-​ and right-​wing

(1a) Left-​wing

(1b) Right-​wing

(2) Neoliberal populism

csi

0.541*** (0.123) -​0.111 (0.191) 0.416*** (0.121) 0.408 (0.652) 0.411* (0.180) -​5.060 (2.655) 0.68 401

0.011 (0.079) 0.379** (0.122) 0.246** (0.078) -​0.633 (0.418) 0.047 (0.115) -​1.681 (1.703) 0.76 401

0.471*** (0.099) -​0.393* (0.153) 0.237* (0.098) 1.238* (0.524) 0.430** (0.145) -​1.851 (2.135) 0.57 401

0.021 (0.132) 0.606** (0.205) -​0.063 (0.130) -​0.221 (0.699) -​0.557** (0.193) 3.771 (2.850) 0.66 401

glob unemp imm (log) ineq eu/​n afta R2 Constant

Statistical significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Notes: N =​401 country-​years. The dependent variables are: (1) neo-​nationalism; (1a) left-​wing neo-​nationalism; (1b) right-​wing neo-​nationalism; (2) neoliberal populism. Standard errors are in parenthesis.

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all the other variables (column 1a). The absence of the effects of the capital-​ state and inequality here can be attributed to the polarization of the electoral bases of the right-​wing neo-​nationalists (Oesch 2008; Mayer 2013; Afonso and Rennwald 2018). This view is given its clearest articulation in the work of Nonna Mayer and Pascal Perrineau. As the scholars found out regarding the paradigmatic National Front in France, it “… plays the same part in the French political system as the Communist Party did yesterday. It too had a fringe of protest voters who did not believe in Communist values but saw in the party a defender of the little people …” (Mayer and Perrineau 1992: 134). It is worth noting also that immigration is negatively related (albeit without significance), which validates the argument for more inclusive nature of the Left. Conversely, the effects of all variables are significant for the right-​wing camp, albeit globalization is associated negatively (column 1b). The high impact of immigration is unsurprising. As research has shown, due to the post-​war cleavage realignment processes and the subsequent de-​politicization of the socio-​ economic dimension (Rydgren and van der Meiden 2018; Bornschier 2018), the radical right needs to tap into socio-​cultural dimension to attract voters (Ward et al. 2015). In tandem, however, the positive coefficients for the capital-​ state, unemployment, immigration, and inequality reflect the transformation of the radical right (e.g. Front National, One Nation, True Finns) highlighted earlier and supported by the existing scholarship. Namely, the findings corroborate a leftward shift along the economic dimension with more attention to the issues of welfare and redistribution, yet for the natives only. Such convergence towards “welfare chauvinism” has been well documented (Mudde 2007; de Koster et al. 2013; Eger and Valdez 2014, 2018; Cavallaro 2017; Lefkofridi and Michel 2017; Manow et al. 2018).16 This is not the case for neoliberal populists (e.g. Pim Fortuyn List, Progress Party, Swiss People’s Party), who remain traditionally right-​leaning on the economic issues. This explains a significant and negative coefficient for inequality, coupled with a significant and positive coefficient for globalization (column 2). Neoliberal elites who combine business-​centric approach to development with revisionist nationalism also belong in this camp, forming what Gonzalez-​ Vicente and Carroll (2017) call “national elite populism.” What unities all neoliberal populists –​both challenger parties and incumbent elites –​is their usage of reactionary nationalism to assuage the social disorder brought about by the disintegrative effects of the capital-​state. The new hegemony for capital is 16

In standardized form (standard deviation units), the coefficients in column (1b) would be: csi (0.672); unemp (0.122); imm (0.323); ineq (0.325). The capital-​state has thus the largest effect in the right-​wing neo-​nationalist camp.

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58 ­chapter pursued through exclusionary forms of populist nationalism (cf. also Carroll et al. 2019). The present “illiberal rise” can thus be interpreted in the Polanyian sense both as a counter movement to consolidation of markets (columns 1 in Table 8), or its dialectical and logical extension (column 2). The latter also pre-​empts a potential objection. If the working and middle classes are angry with market-​ driven insecurities and inequalities, why do they gravitate toward capitalists such as Trump, Orbán, Erdoğan, or Modi? Why do they blame immigrants and other minorities rather than corporations that have ravaged their communities (Hochschild 2016) for rising job insecurity and deteriorating living conditions? A neo-​Polanyian explanation that I have put forward and supported empirically in this chapter (and will substantiate further in case studies) says that neoliberal populism harnesses discontent towards the “Other” in order to protect business and elite interests.17 Under the logics of welfare chauvinism and scapegoating “loud values” may go in tandem with “muffled interests” (Maradal 2013). 3

Interactive Models

Based on the above analysis and discussion, my capital-​state theory implies a few interactive effects that can be estimated and tested. Interaction models allow assessing whether the impact of an explanatory variable is conditional upon another variable.18 In this regard, I derive and assess four hypotheses. First, in line with the reasoning that globalization is a permissive force enabling the transformation of the nation-​station into the capital-​state, I expect the effect of the capital-​state on neo-​nationalism to increase with increasing globalization (H1). Second, I expect the effect of unemployment to be conditional on the capital-​state –​specifically, on the collusion dimension –​as the latter includes flexibilization of labour, implying precariatization of working conditions (H2). Third, the effect of immigration is also expected to depend on the capital-​state (H3). Lastly, and similarly, I test whether the increasing support for neo-​nationalist parties is associated with inequality when the capital-​ state –​specifically, the extrusion dimension of “redistribution to the top” –​is strong (H4).

17 18

This also dovetails with the arguments by Patomäki (2018) and Gonzalez-​Vicente (2018). I also estimated and ran a lagged model (see Appendix).

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Capital-​s tate and Neo-​n ationalism: Global Trends

Remembering to adjust the panel data for fixed effects and time trends, the four corresponding statistical models look as follows: [1]‌ neon =​α +​β1 [csi] +​β2 [glob] +​β3 [csi x glob] +​β4-​38 [country dummies] +​β39 [trend] +​ε [2]‌ neon =​α +​β1 [unemp] +​β2 [csi] +​β3 [unemp x csi] +​β4-​38 [country dummies] +​β39 [trend] +​ε [3]‌ neon =​α +​β1 [immig] +​β2 [csi] +​β3 [immig x csi] +​β4-​38 [country dummies] +​β39 [trend] +​ε [4]‌ neon =​α +​β1 [ineq] +​β2 [csi] +​β3 [ineq x csi] +​β4-​38 [country dummies] +​β39 [trend] +​ε I estimate these interactions both on the aggregate capital-​state index (Model 1) and the three major sub-​indices (Models 1a-​1c). Table 9 presents the coefficients for the interaction terms. As per Model 1, the capital-​ state affects the coefficient for immigration, which validates my argument that the discourse on immigration may obscure the processes of state disembeddedness and class remaking (see also Kalb 2011). To rephrase Kitschelt and Rehm (2015), the political dimensions of “group” (collective identification) trumps the “greed” dimension (redistribution) (Kitschelt & Rehm 2015). While resistance to immigrants does unite voters, right-​wing neo-​nationalist parties have also promoted discourses of economic insecurity. Cultural identity cannot table 9

Neo-​nationalism: effects of interaction terms

Interaction

(1) csi

(1a) Intrusion

(1b) Collusion

(1c) Extrusion

glob

-​0.001 (0.000) 0.000 (0.001) 0.011** (0.003) 0.000 (0.000)

-​0.209*** (0.022) -​0.015 (0.067) 0.165 (0.136) -​0.002 (0.085)

0.043 (0.025) 0.097* (0.042) 0.273* (0.117) -​0.233* (0.093)

0.138*** (0.033) 0.042 (0.049) 0.362** (0.139) -​0.120 (0.085)

unemp imm (log) ineq

N 1002 1215 857 401

Statistical significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Note: Standard errors are in parentheses.

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60 ­chapter therefore be separated form economic conditions. Struggles for recognition need to be understood together with struggles for resources (Thorleifsson 2018; Fukuyama 2019). While the interaction term immig tells us that the effect of the levels of immigration on the neo-​nationalist vote depends on the entrenchment of the capital-​state, Figure 9 conveys the magnitude of this conditional relationship. The plot clearly shows that with the increasing capital-​state index (along the x axis), the magnitude of the coefficient for immigration (along the y axis) increases gradually as well.

­f igure 9  Conditional marginal effects of the capital-​state

When disaggregated into the major sub-​indices, there is a positive interaction effect between collusion, on the one side, and unemployment and immigration, on the other (Model 1b in Table 9). This appears plausible as collusion reflects the flexibilization and precariatization of labour, which may lead to rising unemployment and perceptions of threat from cheap immigrant labour. As Algan et al. (2017) find, for instance, anti-​immigrant sentiment is related to the immigrants’ economic impact rather than their cultural identity (see also Essletzbichler et al. 2018). This conclusion and my own result challenge the argument that populist nationalism is driven by cultural factors, which was long thought among researchers (cf. Norris and Inglehart 2019; DiMaggio

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2020).19 Instead, my findings suggest that intolerance is driven by precariousness stemming from the capital-​state transformation, and not by racism. In Charles Tilly’s (2004, 2007) words, the “Other” becomes re-​ethnicized precisely because of the collapse of the public sector, including regulated employment. For example, the Brexit campaign successfully tapped into a sense of precariousness and vulnerability linked to the free market consolidation and European integration, with the ukip demarcating Muslim migrants as convenient scapegoats (cf. also Becker et al. 2017; Pettifor 2017; Thorleifsson 2018). In the similar manner, Donald Trump’s anti-​migrant and anti-​China campaign resonated with the feelings of declining social mobility (and also diverted attention from structural inequalities and power relations in the US), especially in the aftermath of the Global Financial Crisis (cf. also Patomäki 2018; Fukuyama 2019). The interaction effect between extrusion, on the one side, and globalization and immigration, on the other (Model 1c in Table 9), also makes sense since the extrusion dimension represents transnationalization of state and dualization of society. Finally, the absence of a significant and positive interaction effect between all four models and inequality is a bit puzzling but could be attributed to a smaller number of cases due to the missing data for this variable. 4

Conclusion

This chapter has dealt with a comparative statistical analysis to explore the linkages between the rise of capital-​state and neo-​nationalism in oecd countries. My goal was to establish whether there is evidence of a Polanyian counter-​movement expressed in the form of politically channelled discontent. The independent variable in my analysis is the capital-​state index. This index taps into three dimensions of the capital-​state that capture important elements of Polanyi’s notion of “disembeddedness.” The dependent variable is the electoral support for populist nationalist parties. Notwithstanding the differences between the right-​and left-​wing of the political spectrum, these parties have converged on the premise of protecting national sovereignty, welfare, and 19

Albeit both works also make a point, substantiated empirically, that socio-​economic and socio-​cultural attitudes drive populist appeals in tandem. Furthermore, in line with this book’s argument, DiMaggio (2020: 209) suggests that “one could link … economic anxiety to right-​wing efforts to scapegoat the poor, people of color, Muslims, immigrants, and women, with Trump supporters looking for an easy target on which to take out their economic frustrations.”

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62 ­chapter identity against marketization of state and society. Neoliberal populist parties and elites represent a distinction in, yet not diversion from my neo-​Polanyian framework. As agents of the capital-​state, they reproduce a state of affairs when power is tilted away from labour toward capital. I have deployed a country-​level regression analysis to examine the link between the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism, as well as evaluate its statistical significance. Both are supported by the evidence from fixed-​effects and interactive models estimated on the panel dataset covering 35 oecd countries between 1980 and 2015. All estimations reveal a positive and statistically significant relationship between the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism. The findings are also robust with the inclusion of control variables. Overall, there is a strong statistical support for the book’s central proposition that neo-​nationalism has surged as the state has redressed the “class compromise” between capital and society. As the sovereignty of the state has yielded to the “sovereignty of the market,” nations have expressed their insecurities through voting for neo-​nationalist parties, among others means of channelling discontent. Furthermore, my results suggest that the hegemonic right-​wing neo-​nationalism substitutes race struggle for class struggle. There is an inherent interaction between socio-​economic alienation and cultural resentment. From a theoretical standpoint, this finding points to a “blind spot” in Polanyi’s ideas in tgt which somewhat idealized protective counter-​movements. As critical theorist Nancy Fraser (2014: 547) put it succinctly, “struggles to protect nature and society from the market are often aimed at entrenching privilege and excluding ‘outsiders’.” Yet what mechanisms account for the connection between the capital-​state and populist nationalism? How exactly does state restructuring create a reservoir of potential that is translated into tangible electoral outcomes? And how do political agents articulate these latent potentials? The case studies in the following chapters will shed light on the underlying forces that intermediate between the rise of the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism (or lack thereof) in the respective country-​specific socio-​economic and political contexts.

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­c hapter 5

The Post-​socialist Capital-​state Movement for a Better Hungary

We are going to put an end to looting the economy and return from the principle of “the people for the economy” to the principle of “the economy for the people.” vona 2009, jobbik

∵ A political economic perspective allows us to understand neo-​nationalism as part of a unified Polanyian “double movement.” The quantitative cross-​country analysis bears evidence to the proposition that a pro-​market shift conceptualized as the capital-​state transformation produces neo-​nationalist counter-​ movement. Although a useful heuristic, however, such an overarching Polanyian approach comes at the cost of overlooking contingency and historical specificity of national double-​movements. The transformation-​protection thesis cannot be universally confirmed due to variation in different parts of the world. National political and historical contexts matter. Case studies can address this issue via examining how socio-​economic transformations, citizens’ perceptions, political entrepreneurs’ strategies interact to produce neo-​nationalism. In the chapters that follow, then, the dialectic process of manufacturing neo-​nationalism is traced in four countries across the oecd camp: Hungary, Australia, France, and South Korea. Hungary and South Korea stand out as Polanyian prototypes and represent the confirming type of cases: simultaneous big (Hungary) or small (South Korea) increase in the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism. Australia and France represent the disconfirming type: small increase in the capital-​state with big increase in neo-​ nationalism (France) and vice versa (Australia) (Figure 10). The focus of Chapters 5 and 6 is on Hungary and Australia, respectively, which both have a high degree of change in the capital-​state indices yet differ in the degree of change in neo-​nationalism. Hungary saw the rise and electoral

© Oleksandr Svitych, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004516229_006

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64 ­chapter

­f igure 10  Four analytic cases

persistence of the right-​wing Jobbik (The Movement for a Better Hungary),1 while Australia witnessed only a short-​lived success of the right-​wing onp (Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party). Chapters 7 and 8 deal with France and South Korea where the opposite dynamics are observed: a lower degree of state-​transformation and the divergent outcome in neo-​nationalism. People’s perceptions and parties’ strategies matter in the updated Polanyian double-​movement framework. I clarify this conjecture by uncovering the stepping stones of the capital-​state transformations and, following this, drilling beneath the quantitative indices to the qualitative dimensions of people’s experience. In doing so, I build an account of neo-​nationalism which focuses on macro-​contextual elements and theorizes the interplay between the supply (broad socio-​economic process that make neo-​nationalist parties appealing) and the demand (political opportunity structures and party strategies) sides.

1 “Jobbik” is a play of words meaning both “better choice” and “more to the right.”

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The Post-​s ocialist Capital-​S tate: Movement for a Better Hungary

65

­f igure 11  Capital-​state and neo-​nationalism in Hungary Note: Vote share won by neo-​nationalist parties in the Hungarian legislative elections: Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik) and Hungarian Justice and Life Party (miep). Higher index score represents higher degree of the capital-​state transformation.  s ource: author’s calculations.

1

The Post-​socialist Capital State

Hungary is an illustrative Polanyian case where disembedding of the economy since the fall of the socialist bloc has been accompanied with the rise of neo-​ nationalism (Figure 11). As in many other countries, Hungarian neo-​nationalism took the right-​wing form embodied, most notably, by the Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik). A peculiar feature of the Hungarian case is that the incumbent government headed by Prime Minister Viktor Orbán adopted Jobbik’s rhetoric, tactics and symbols, setting the example for other Central European governments, most strikingly Poland. While the phenomenon of mainstreaming the radical right discourse can be observed elsewhere, in Hungary it has been especially pronounced. I begin by tracing the changes in the Hungarian political economy through the trends in the country’s capital-​state index. Where necessary, I also sketch out a historical event-​map to add substantive meaning to the csi numbers. In constructing the narrative, I employ historical institutionalism (Streeck and Thelen 2005) –​a perspective of endogenous, incremental (as opposed to punctuated) and agency-​focused institutional transformation. The change in the capital-​state index for Hungary is one of the biggest in my oecd dataset. In quantitative terms, the score rose from 7 index points

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66 ­chapter in 1989 to 50 points in 2015. In substantive terms, this reflects the fervour and “shock therapy” of the transition reforms in Central-​East European societies. As Appel and Orenstein (2018: 7) have argued, the adoption of neoliberal policies here was “unparalleled in speed and scope.” The presence of strongly conducive scope conditions (post-​communist transition and integration into the European Union) makes Hungary a study case that is well suited for unpacking the underlying mechanics between the capital-​state restructuring and the neo-​nationalist reaction. Several observations are in order with regards to the major components and sub-​components of Hungary’s csi. Overall, the intrusion dimension displays a steady but insistent rise of private provisions for welfare, reflecting recalibration between the state and the market. As a reminder, intrusion, as an extended version of Polanyi’s commodification of livelihood, stands for private-​based provisions for welfare and household, and reflects the transfer of social risks onto individuals. Most notably, the indicators for private expenditures on healthcare (privhealth) and marketization of education (priveduc) go up sharply in the year 1998. Arguably, this is the effect of Hungary’s first dramatic transition reform initiated by the Hungarian Socialist Party (mszp) through the controversial 1996 Economic Stabilization Act, or the so-​called “Bokros package” (nicknamed after Finance Minister Lajos Bokros). The package introduced cuts in all forms of state payments to individuals, such as sick pay, maternity leave, pensions, and labour protections. Overall, the trends in these indicators show that the market had gradually complemented the state in the provision of basic public goods. Tellingly, the Socialists’ attempts to entrench privatization after the 2006 elections were met with resistance.2 The shifting of social risks onto citizens also took place in the field of housing, as reflected in the dynamics of the house variable. Between 1989 and 2000, the trend decreased from 13 to 2 index points. From 2001, however, it slowly reversed upwards, increasing sharply to 28 points in 2007–​2008, and declining slightly to 21 points by 2015. This fluctuation is driven by the sub-​component of household consumer and mortgage indebtedness (housedebt) measured as a percentage share of gdp. The first decline maps onto welfare expansion by Hungarian reformers in the early transition years (Bohle and Greskovits 2007, 2012; Inglot 2008).3 Building on the socialist legacy, Hungary’s welfare state, 2 At the national referendum organized by the then opposition Fidesz party, the abolition of unpopular doctor, medical, and university tuition fees was supported by an 80 per cent vote. 3 Bohle and Greskovits (2007, 2012) distinguish between three varieties of post-​socialist capitalist transformation of Central-​East European societies: a neoliberal type in the Baltic states, an embedded neoliberal type in the Visegrád group (the Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, and Slovakia), and a neocorporatist one in Slovenia.

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just as in the rest of the Visegrád group, stood out for the generosity of its provisions. These were offered even beyond the mid-​2000s to generate consent and keep social protest and political radicalization at bay, albeit at the cost of fiscal revenue.4 In other words, the transition towards a market economy was accompanied with the attempts to preserve social cohesion, just as Polanyi would have predicted.5 These legacies notwithstanding, from the early 2000s Hungarian policy-​ makers explicitly promoted housing privatization through the mortgage boom as part of entrenching a market economy (Bohle 2014). Existing studies of the Central and Eastern Europe (Enoch and Ötker-​Robe 2007; Pistor 2009; Mitra et al. 2010) link this development to the transnationalization and deregulation of the financial sector in the run up to the eu accession. The second dimension of the Hungarian csi –​ collusion –​represents an extended version of Polanyi’s commodification of labour. According to my indicators, a dramatic transformation of the Hungarian labour force took place after the critical juncture of the socialist bloc collapse. The scores of most measures are at the top and rising. Overall, collusion trends up more than two times from 35 index points in 1989 to 77 points in 2015, flattening out from 2013. The last sharp increase is observed in 1996 after the introduction of the Bokros austerity package. One of the most stunning changes has been the scope and speed of corporate tax reduction in the pursuit of foreign capital, as represented by the cortax indicator soaring from 13 to 80 points. This corresponds to the decline in the nominal corporate tax rate from 50 to 19 percent with most of the cuts introduced before 1995. In terms of the rate of change, Hungary compares to other post-​communist Central and Eastern European states (Appel and Orenstein 2018: 109–​111), and ranks 3rd only after Germany and Ireland, according to my dataset. Due to this slashing, as of 2015 the corporate tax rates in Hungary were one of the lowest not only in Europe, but globally, surpassing such liberal market economies as the US or Australia. 4 As Tomasz Inglot (2008: 265) has argued in his study of the Visegrád welfare state legacies: “Hungary … defied conventional wisdom when the government combined aggressive pro-​market economic policies with extremely generous social transfers that brought the welfare state to the brink of financial collapse.” 5 At the same time, social protection was biased in favour of temporarily or fully “non-​ productive” groups, such as “under-​age” pensioners in early retirement and young mothers with children. Conversely, younger workers made redundant during the transition were left with meagre unemployment benefits (Vanhuysse 2006). In view of this pattern of appeasing social groups through ad hoc targeted welfare policies, Bohle and Greskovits (2007: 18) termed the Visegrád states “dual democratic regimes.”

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68 ­chapter Another radical change is observed in the dynamics of trade union density. The indicator unidens swells from 16 to 96 index points, corresponding to the decline from 83 to 9 percent in real terms –​the 2nd biggest rate of change in oecd after Estonia. This reflects the diminishing influence of trade unions and the tripartite tradition that sought to establish a social dialogue between government, business, and labour (Héthy 2001; Tóth 2001). In Hungary, tripartism was embodied in the National Interest Reconciliation Council (oét) founded by the last Communist government in 1988. According to my data, union membership declined sharply in the year 1995. This critical juncture matches again the introduction of the “Bokros package” by the new Socialist-​Liberal government coalition despite protests from the oét.6 In terms of flexibilization of labour, the index scores are high (corresponding to low levels of protection) both for regular employment contracts (labpro1) and temporary ones (labpro2). Moreover, the first indicator goes up from 63 to 72 points in 2013. I attribute this to the new 2012 Labour Code that increased labour flexibility and weakened trade unions (Gyulavári and Kártyás 2015). Finally, the incidence of involuntary part-​time workers (labtemp) rose two-​fold in the wake of the global financial crisis. The score for this variable changed from 9 to 17 points (1.2 to 2.1 per cent of the total employment), albeit these are the lowest numbers in the collusion dimension. In comparison, the extrusion dimension of the Hungarian csi displays the biggest variation. As mentioned earlier, it reflects deregulation and transnationalization of the national financial sector. For Hungary, there is an increase from 0.1 to 51 index points and stabilization from 2009 onwards –​allegedly the effect of the Orbán government’s resistance against the dominance of foreign banks and multinationals (Bohle and Greskovits 2019). The extrusion indicators capinflow and capopen measure dismantling of controls over financial flows. The former increased eight times from 0.2 to 1.5 index points, or from 0.8 to 5.5 per cent of actual capital inflows as a share of gdp.7 Concurrently, financial openness rose from 0 to an all-​o ecd maximum 100 point by 2005. The combined result was one of the most open economies

6 The subsequent 1998–​2002 national-​conservative government of Viktor Orbán dissolved the oét and replaced it with new subordinate bodies, further restricting the role of trade unions. Overall, tripartism was de-​institutionalized, and major austerity packages were administered without social consultation (Héthy 2001; Tóth 2001, Bohle and Greskovits 2012). 7 The scores appear low since the cross-​national data are heavily skewed towards five major offshore zones: Ireland, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, and the uk. When these countries are excluded, Hungary ranks 2nd after Belgium and Finland in the increase of capital inflows.

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in the world, characterized by dependence on external financial investment from the eu and a ceded sovereignty over the flow of capital to foreign banks (mostly Austrian, German, and Italian) and multinational corporations (mostly German), such as Audi, Bosch, Mercedes Benz and General Electric (Bohle 2014; Appel and Orenstein 2018: 161). Finally, the score of the topinc indicator (top 1 per cent national income share) increased steadily from 16 index points in 1992 to 28 points in 2008, or from 6.5 to 9.6 per cent in real terms, which can be accounted for by shrinking redistributive efforts on the part of the government. A very strong and significant association between this variable and the intrusion dimension (r =​0.87, p < 0.01) indicates that marketization of welfare may have had serious equity effects. I also find a very strong association between the extrusion and collusion sub-​indices (r =​0.92, p < 0.01). This makes intuitive sense as financialization, i.e. attracting investment capital, requires labour flexibility, while increased labour flexibility can facilitate financialization.8 In sum, the three clusters of the capital-​state transformation in Hungary form the political economic background for the rise of right-​wing populist nationalism in the country. Importantly, it was deliberate policy-​making, rather than passive erosion of state power, which brought about marketization of Polanyian “fictitious commodities” of housing, labour, and finance. Building on this evidence, I examine how Hungarian citizens perceived such restructuring. 2

Perceptions of the Transformation

The emphasis on real-​life experience and perceptions can shed light on how the transformation of the Hungarian nation-​state has created a latent demand for social protection. The transfer of social risks onto individuals, tilting of balance from labour to capital, and transnationalization of the economy and society are prone to generate vulnerabilities and insecurities experienced either at the personal or collective level, and generate discontent with the existing system. Populist nationalist parties and politicians may offer solutions to voters to cope with this experience. The preceding analysis suggests different kinds of vulnerabilities. These relate to several overlapping yet analytically distinct micro-​ mechanisms

8 While the direction of causality is hard to establish, other researchers observed a similar relationship between labour flexibility and financialization (cf. Tridico 2015).

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70 ­chapter operating between the capital-​ state restructuring and demand for neo-​ nationalism. First, in view of the speed and scope of post-​socialist reforms, Hungarian citizens may long for socio-​economic security of the previous regime, experiencing nostalgic deprivation*. A related mechanism is relative deprivation* whereby people believe they do not get what they deserve compared to others. Finally, there may be also status frustration* at work due to the gap between the promises of better lives in an open-​market economy and actual conditions. Taken together, these dynamics mediate between the political economy context and the rise of neo-​nationalism. These perceptions of social alienation indicate people’s problems in finding a positive social identity. Any of these micro-​level mechanisms may lead to political alienation characterized by the feeling that people’s voices do not matter in politics. Subsequently, under these conditions voters may sympathize with neo-​nationalist challengers to ease off their insecurities via the frame of the “sovereign people.” 2.1 Nostalgic Gest et al. define nostalgic deprivation as “the discrepancy between individuals’ understandings of their current status and their perceptions about their past” (2018: 1695). Such deprivation is about a real or imagined lost past. It does not automatically mean a desire to go back. Rather, it indicates the failure of the existing institutions to live up to citizens’ ideals. This mechanism is especially pertinent in Hungary due to the legacies of social stability and a non-​market economy. If this is correct, I would expect that nostalgic deprivation would unfold from around the mid-​1990s, after the initial anti-​communist fervour had faded, and intensify in the mid-​2000s when the capital-​state index rises sharply to its peak value (Figure 11).9 To test the nostalgic deprivation hypothesis, I draw preliminary data from public opinion surveys. According to a 2009 Pew Survey, while in 1991 there was an overwhelming support of 80 per cent for the transition to capitalism, by 2009 the number had dropped nearly to 46 per cent in Hungary.10 In 2009, 72 9

10

Howard (2012: 29) talks about “post-​communist disappointment” with the new democratic and market institutions. Although he uses it to explain behaviour (namely, the weakness of civil society), rather than attitudes, I share the same premise that people’s prior experience matter. In this regard, my perspective is closer to Richard Rose’s “lifetime learning model” (Rose et al. 1998: 117). The sample size is 1000. I chose 2009 as the threshold to control for the effects of the Great Financial crisis. Since the electoral rise of Jobbik began in 2010, I look at the earlier period to understand the preceding subjective demand for protection against the market. As theorized above, in Hungary it is likely to have started with the adoption of neoliberal

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per cent of respondents believed that the country was worse off economically than under the socialist regime, which was the highest number among the nine countries surveyed (Pew 2009).11 According to the “Life in Transition” surveys conducted by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD 2016), less than one-​third of Hungarian respondents preferred the market economy in 2010 –​a drop from approximately 35 per cent in 2006. The data from the International Social Survey Programme (issp) allow a more nuanced assessment. One question specifically taps into the collusion dimension (flexibilization of work) by comparing a respondent’s job status with that of their father’s.12 In the Hungarian case, the combined proportion of responses “high” and “much higher” dropped from 57 to 32 per cent, while the proportion of responses “low” and “very low” rose from 14 to 19 per cent. The ethnographic account from the anthropologist Eszter Bartha (2011) adds flesh to these figures by highlighting a “palpable nostalgia” for the security of the past Kádár regime among Hungarian factory workers. They unambiguously interpreted their everyday experience of the transition from the “good old days” in terms of decline, impoverishment, vanishing solidarity, and a loss of prestige. Tellingly, even staunch anti-​communist skilled workers admitted that the “liberated” Hungary was far from the capitalist society they had dreamt of. The issp 2009 data also show that perceptions of decline were mostly associated with sympathizers of Jobbik13 and the dissolved radical left Socialist Workers (mszmp), validating the thesis of proletarization of the radical right vote (Ignazi 2003; Snegovaya 2018).14 Nostalgic deprivation is manifested also at the intrusion level of the Hungarian capital-​state. In a 1993–​1994 survey of ten post-​communist states, two-​thirds of the Hungarians reported their households were better off in the

11 12 13

14

reforms during the transition period. At the same time, the crisis is likely to have intensified these trends. Other countries included: former East Germany, Czech Republic, Poland, Slovakia, Bulgaria, Lithuania, Russia, Hungary, and Ukraine. issp Social Inequality modules 1987, 1992, 1999, and 2009: If you compare [your present or last] job to the job your father had when you were , would you say that the level of status of your job is (or was) …. Which political party do you prefer? In the issp 2009 survey, only 60 respondents appeared to prefer Jobbik. Caution is warranted, therefore, in view of this small sample and similar samples in other surveys. The size of the sample is too low to be taken as significant. Caution is also warranted in view of the data diversity. Which political party do you prefer? Among supporters of the Socialist Party the number was a much lower 16 per cent. In the issp 2009 survey, only 60 respondents appeared to prefer Jobbik. Caution is warranted, therefore, in view of this small sample and similar samples in other surveys. The size of the sample is too low to be taken as significant.

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72 ­chapter previous non-​market economy (Rose et al. 1998: 171). These attitudes match exactly the 1993 spike in the intrusion sub-​index that taps into the commodification of households. Ethnographic insights add to this by showing that even those with a “bourgeois” family background of the pre-​war era admitted earlier policies improved the living conditions of the masses (Halmai 2011: 125). Finally, in the extrusion dimension, specifically with regards to “redistribution to the top,” the data from the World Values Survey (wvs) indicate a return to pro-​egalitarian attitudes. After the regime change, 41 per cent of Hungarians supported more equitable income distribution vs. 54 per cent for income differentiation. By the late 1990s, however, the proportion had reversed and widened to 73 vs. 26 per cent. In 2009 the gap narrowed, but egalitarianism still dominated (65 vs. 33 per cent). In sum, Hungarian citizens became vulnerable to populist rhetoric as they were socialized in and carried nostalgia for the Kádárist era of social security and welfare. The challenger Jobbik and the ruling Fidesz parties have played on these sensibilities by supplying radical nationalist rhetoric and programs. 2.2 Deprived In sociological literature, relative deprivation refers broadly to an individual’s or group’s perception of being unjustly deprived of a deserved outcome relative to others (Crosby 1979). Such judgments are usually accompanied by feelings of anger and resentment and, hypothetically, call for ameliorating the situation. Furthermore, relative deprivation can be based on interpersonal (“egoistic”) or intergroup (“fraternal”) comparisons (Runciman 1966).15 Conceptually, neo-​ nationalism is compatible with relative deprivation as both are based on the notions of deservingness and entitlement. The discursive logic of populism –​an element of neo-​nationalism –​structures the socio-​political space into the “virtuous people” and the “corrupt elite,” assuming an antagonistic relationship between the two (Mudde 2004, 2007; Van Kessel 2015). Ethnic nationalism –​an element of right-​wing neo-​nationalism –​ employs an additional horizontal polarization of identity between “Us” and the “undeserving groups.” These friend-​and-​foe distinctions make neo-​nationalism an attractive kind of “redemptive politics” (Canovan 2005) for the people who experience deprivation. As uncertainties drive people to join groups, “the people” and “the nation” can serve as rhetorical coping strategies to depersonalize perceived vulnerabilities (Hogg 2000; Spruyt et al. 2016). 15

Burgoon et al (2018) find that positional deprivation (defined as average income growth) is associated with relative deprivation and increases support for radical ideologies which provide easy scapegoat for people’s misfortunes.

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Furthermore, in line with the capital-​state theory, I expect a relationship between these subjective perceptions and the objective dimensions of the capital-​state. Using the data from the wvs and issp surveys, I measure individual deprivation through one indicator for each of the three capital-​state sub-​ indices. Household financial satisfaction, job satisfaction, and subjective scale of income tap into the intrusion (welfare), collusion (work), and extrusion (redistribution) dimensions respectively. While not perfect, these measures have been used extensively as proxy indicators by researchers.16 I find strong evidence of relative deprivation for the first measure. According to the wvs data, household dissatisfaction in Hungary grew from 12 to 36 per cent between 1984 and 1993, and further from 37 to 60 per cent between 1998 and 2009.17 Correlation with the intrusion dimension is strong and significant (r =​0.95, p < 0.01). By contrast, the percentage of reported satisfaction (aggregate range 8–​10) was twice as high in 1984 (25 per cent) and 1993 (64 per cent) but dropped sharply to 12 per cent in 1998 followed by a recovery to 34 per cent in 2009. As discussed earlier, this reversal is linked to the first dramatic austerity reform in 1995 as reflected by the increasing intrusion sub-​index. As of 2009, the respondents affiliated with Jobbik were most dissatisfied (aggregate range 1–​5) with their household financial situation (80 per cent), followed by the dissolved radical left Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party (74 per cent), centrist Alliance of Free Democrats (65 per cent) and the hegemonic national-​ conservative Fidesz (64 per cent). Furthermore, dissatisfaction with financial situation was a significant predictor of Jobbik support.18 16

17

18

Anthony DiMaggio (2020: 208–​209), for instance, relies on these and similar measures to show that, although predictors of Trump support were mostly socially related, the people were not entirely free from economic anxiety. Thus, Trump supporters were significantly more likely to say they were dissatisfied with their financial situation, as well as more likely to say their families’ financial situations were “worse” in 2016 than in the past. wvs aggregate responses “1” to “3” to the question: How satisfied are you with the financial situation of your household? If ‘1’ means you are completely dissatisfied on this scale, and ‘10’ means you are completely satisfied, where would you put your satisfaction with your household’s financial situation? issp aggregate responses ‘very’ and ‘completely’ (dissatisfied) to the question: How satisfied are you in your (main) job? wvs aggregate responses ‘1’ to ‘3’ to the question: On this card is a scale of incomes on which 1 indicates the ‘lowest income decile’ and ‘10’ the ‘highest income decile’ in your country. We would like to know in what group your household is. wvs sample size (wave): 1464 (1981–​1984); 999 (1989–​1993); 650 (1994–​1998); 1007 (2005–​2009). issp sample size (year): 1000 (1989); 1500 (1997); 1012 (2005). As per the results of the binary logistic regression (where 1 means Jobbik support, and 0 means its absence), the relationship between dissatisfaction and identifying with Jobbik is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, after controlling for respondents’ sex, age, education, and ideology (self-​positioning on the left-​right political scale). Sex and ideology are significant as well at the 5 percent level. I did not include income satisfaction as a

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74 ­chapter Similarly, there are very strong and positive temporal associations between job dissatisfaction and the collusion sub-​index (r =​0.84, p < 0.01), and between income dissatisfaction and the extrusion sub-​index (r =​0.90, p < 0.01). The wvs 2009 data also show that a remarkable 80 per cent of Jobbik affiliates19 positioned themselves between the 3rd and 5th steps of income scale. This resonates with a finding by Bernát et al. (2013) that, compared to the poorest, those in the 2nd and 4th income quintiles are 2.5 times more likely to vote for Jobbik. A related finding at the collective level is that in 2009, 75 per cent of Jobbik supporters saw poverty and need as the most serious problem facing Hungary. This figure ranked highest across the entire political spectrum, surpassing even supporters of Fidesz with 72 per cent. Finally, the relationship between job and income dissatisfaction and Jobbik support is statistically significant, even after controlling for the effects of sex, age, education, ideology, ethnicity, and rural-​urban divide. In line with my expectations, when people were more dissatisfied their work and income status, they were more likely to support the populist right-​wing Jobbik party.20 Ethnographic accounts provide further evidence of Hungarian people’s experience of relative deprivation, either as perceived decline in household security (Halmai 2011), dispossession at the workplace (Bartha 2011), or abandonment by the cosmopolitan elites (Szombati 2018). Feeling silenced and “taken for nothing,” these people “endorse a populism that exalts the nation as a repository of virtue that must be protected against a parasitic elite” (Kalb 2011: 26).21

19 20

21

control due to its relatively strong correlation with the maid predictor variable. No predictors were statistically significant for the Hungarian Socialist Workers’ Party, presumably die to a very low number of affiliated responses. wvs: Which party would you vote: first choice. I ran two separate regressions for job and income dissatisfaction as the data were taken from different sources (issp and wvs, respectively). In the former case, dissatisfaction was the only significant predictor (5 percent level) after controlling for other factors. In the latter case, sex, education, and ideology were also significant predictors. I added ethnicity and rural-​urban residence to the first regression only (data from issp) as similar data in wvs were not available. To add an important nuance, in Hungary the perceptions of decay and collapse coexisted with those of advancement and new opportunities, as documented by the siren project of qualitative interviews (Hentges et al. 2003: 148–​151). However, none of the successful respondents, who were not threatened by a socio-​economic decline, had voted for the radical right. Attraction toward right-​wing populism stemmed from the dual frustration of the family history (exposure to the Communist terror and injustices of the 1950’s) and individual socio-​economic insecurity in the wake of post-​Communist transition.

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The analysis so far suggests that the mechanism of relative deprivation is pertinent in the Hungarian case. This fits with the findings that Jobbik voters are most convinced that both their own and the country’s current and prospective economic situations have worsened drastically (Tóth and Grajczjár 2015: 148). It is harder to establish the salience of this mechanism at the horizontal level, as the available studies and surveys tend to measure attitudes toward rather than “deservedness” vis-​à-​vis minority groups. Moreover, even the data on attitudes –​which can be treated as an indirect proxy at most –​ are ambiguous. For example, according to the Hungarian Tárki report, while in the past on average 31 per cent of the population described themselves xenophobic, by 2016 that number had jumped to 53 per cent (the first available figure from 1992 is 15 per cent) (Bíró-​Nagy et al. 2016: 22). At the same time, the wvs data show that although ten years after regime change, 87 per cent of Hungarians agreed that employers should give priority to them instead of immigrants, by 2009 this proportion had decreased to 77 per cent. In addition, according to Eurobarometer, immigration is much more salient at the collective rather than individual level.22 In this regard, ethnographic studies do point to collective relative deprivation. Cultural anthropologist Kristof Szombati (2018) shows how “de-​ peasantization” and deprivation in rural Hungary translated into the “naming and blaming” of Gypsies.23 In a study of two of such zones of deprivation, he links the processes of transition to the growing sense of frustration and resentment towards the Roma minority perceived as winners of the new liberal regime. There is interaction, then, between economic liberalization, emancipation of ethnic minorities, and the perceptions of privileging Gypsies by the country’s “unpatriotic elites” (Snegovaya 2018; Szombati 2018: 165).

22

23

In 2015 –​amidst the refugee crisis –​68 per cent of Hungarian respondents (up from 18 in 2014) believed immigration was the single most pressing problem for the eu. For the national context, 34 per cent reported this issue. At the individual level, however, immigration ceded to the problems of household finance, health and social security, and rising prices. This dovetails with the growing body of research on rural support for the radical right, including for the French Front National, and the national elite populists, including the Hungarian Fidesz. Cramer (2016) provides a comprehensive account of “rural consciousness” as an interpretative framework which fuses both social and economic considerations and guides the politics of resentment in the US. Furthermore, rural dwellers are more likely to be impoverished, socially polarized, and disenfranchised in the wake of neoliberal restructuring. Mamonova and Franquesa (2019) provide an excellent example of such scholarship. I am with the authors, however, that the fundamental cause of populist nationalism lies with the crisis of neoliberal globalized capitalism.

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76 ­chapter 2.3 Status-​frustrated The last demand-​based mechanism hypothesized is status frustration understood as anxiety about one’s or one’s group socio-​economic status (perceived social position). As with relative deprivation, subjective social status (rather than objective status normally measured through education, occupation, or income) reflects the relative position in the hierarchy of society. What matters are people’s own views on whether they see themselves as central members of society. In developing this mechanism, I draw intuitions from the earlier sociological scholarship (Merton 1938; Cohen 1955; Lipset 1955),24 as well as recent quantitative studies (Gidron and Hall 2017; Hadler 2017; Saar et al. 2017; Mutz 2018; Sides et al. 2019) and ethnographic literature on social recognition (Cramer 2016; Gest 2016; Hochschild 2016; Szombati 2018). At the same time, this social-​psychological mechanism, like the others outlines above, is part of a larger Polanyian double movement framework that connects capital-​state transformation to neo-​nationalism (see also Patomäki 2018). Referring back to Polanyi’s insights, the commodification of labour leads to social dislocation, triggering protective response from various societal groups and classes. However, such dislocation is perceived not only in economic terms, since a human being “does not act so as to safeguard his individual interest in the possession of material goods; he acts so as to safeguard his social standing, his social claims, his social assets” (Polanyi 2001: 48). Therefore, any system of social protection needs to be judged by the goal to “rehabilitate the lives of men and their environment, to give them some security of status, … reducing the flexibility of wages and the mobility of labour, giving stability to incomes” (ibid.: 225). Support for more radical political representation to assert the “will of the people” may thus arise from the perceived status frustration generated by capital-​state restructuring. Hungarian citizens may vote for anti-​establishment challengers not only because they hope for better material conditions, but also because they believe their social standing will be elevated (Gidron and Hall 2017). This can take place either through improvements in socio-​economic conditions or through symbolic appeals to national greatness. The latter may

24

Robert Merton coined the term “anomie” to refer to the imbalance between society’s promoted goals and the legitimate means to achieve them. Similarly, Albert Cohen described “status frustration” as the feelings of personal failure and inadequacy among working class youth stemming from the gap between their aspirations and the available opportunities. Gerhard Lenski (1956) developed the notion of “status incongruence,” but he focused on objective social status. Perhaps most pertinent here is Seymour Martin Lipset’s work on attributing support for the radical right to social isolation and status anxiety.

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be especially attractive to voters who lack other markers of social status, such as education or occupation. Further, marginalized groups can erect sharp boundaries between themselves and others to reinforce their social standing and displace anxieties (e.g. Douglas 1995; Bauman 2007; Salmela and von Scheve 2017; Sides et al. 2019).25 To check whether Jobbik appealed to voters who perceived a threat to their socio-​economic status, I used two measures of subjective social status. First, I examined the “subjective social class” data from the 2005–​2009 wave of the wvs survey (sample of 1007 voters), as this poll precedes Jobbik’s electoral breakthrough in the 2010 general elections.26 Among Jobbik supporters,27 62 percent of respondents identified themselves as lower middle class –​the highest across the political spectrum of eight parties. The rest of the constituency is split between the working (29 per cent) and lower (9 per cent) status categories.28 In comparison, Fidesz had the smallest lower middle class support base across all the parties (44 per cent), yet similar working class constituency (32 per cent), the latter outnumbered only by the Hungarian Workers’ Party. As for the lower class electorate, Fidesz attracted similar numbers as Jobbik (11 per cent), yielding only to its coalition partner Christian Democratic People’s Party (19 per cent). This data snapshot corroborates the argument that support for the populist right is strongest among people who have some social status to defend, who feel they are losing it with respect to other groups, and who position themselves several layers above the bottom of the social ladder (e.g. Immerfall 1998; Bornschier 2010; Gidron and Hall 2017; Mutz 2018). There are two caveats to the above analysis. First, it is static and does not assess the trajectory over time. Second, there is a validity issue at stake: as Saar et al. (2017) note, traditional class identification may not measure subjective status perfectly, and is highly politicized. By way of triangulation, then, I investigate the issp subjective social positions reported on a 1–​10 scale at

25

John Sides and his co-​authors, for instance, argue that racial anxiety was driving economic anxiety, which helped Trump more than Clinton: “The important sentiment underlying Trump’s support was not “I might lose my job” but, in essence, “People in my group are losing jobs to that other group”” (Sides et al. 2019: 8). 26 This wvs question was formulated as follows: Would you describe yourself as belonging to the upper class, upper middle class, lower middle class, working class, or lower class? 27 wvs: Which party would you vote: first choice. 28 At the same time, the regression analysis does not produce evidence that lower socio-​ economic classes are more likely to identify with Jobbik, after controlling for other factors such as sex, age, education, ideology, and self-​positioning on an income scale.

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­f igure 12  Subjective top-​bottom placement: Hungary Note: Aggregated responses “10–​6” and “1–​5” to the question: In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to bottom. Where would you put yourself now on this scale? Sample size (year): 2606 (1987); 1250 (1992); 1208 (1999); 1035 (2004); 1010 (2009); 1007 (2014).  s ource: issp social inequality module 1987, 1992, 1999, 2009; citizenship module 2004, 2014.

roughly five-​year intervals. This measure avoids pre-​specified categories.29 The data reveal a synchronic increase in the bottom and decrease in the top of self-​ placement on the social ladder. Based on the Figure 12, the biggest change between 1987 and 1992 corresponds to the start of the market transition. A slight reversal of the trends in 1999–​2004 may be attributed to Hungary’s accession into the eu.30 When disaggregated, the change in the “bottom” indicator is most pronounced along the 7th step (i.e. three steps from the bottom). The 2009 issp survey, in turn, reveals that 80 per cent of Jobbik’s supporters placed themselves in the lower status categories (6 to 10). Within this sample, the largest share of the status frustrated is along the 7th step, which supports once again the hypothesis that radical right ideologies appeal most to voters who have something to lose.

29 The issp question was formulated as follows: In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to bottom. Where would you put yourself now on this scale? 30 Positive anticipations of the eu membership also explain the “dip” in the neo-​nationalist vote (Figure 11).

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At the same time, the 2009 data show that Jobbik supporters care as much about redistribution as about status recognition. As expected theoretically, they display Polanyian “pro-​embeddedness” sentiments with regards to the role of the state: 83 per cent agree that governments should take on more responsibility; 100 (!) per cent support taxing the rich and subsidizing the poor; and 77 per cent prefer more equal income distribution. These are the highest scores among all the parties represented in the wvs 2009 survey. These findings go against the hypothesis that voters concerned about redistribution will be drawn to the radical left (Fraser and Honneth 2004; Rovny 2012; Gidron and Hall 2017; Rooduijn et a. 2017). Instead, Hungarian voters are drawn toward the Jobbik cause both due to recognition and redistribution concerns. And as Snegovaya (2018) demonstrated, the neoliberal convergence of the ex-​ Communist parties opened their traditional electorates to the redistributive appeals of the radical right elsewhere in Central and Eastern Europe. 3

Jobbik: Appeal and Politicization

The rise of neo-​nationalism in Hungary has been driven by the disembedding process of the capital-​state restructuring experienced through nostalgic deprivation, material decline, and status anxiety. Yet social and political alienation does not translate automatically into votes. The Polanyian double movement is not a structural process. Politicization by neo-​nationalist parties and leaders matters. Jobbik has tapped into this reserve of material and social anxiety to portray itself as the only force capable of recapturing the state to the advantage of citizens. At the ideological level, Jobbik positioned itself as the radical nationalist party able to provide identity and meaning for the disaffected Hungarians outside the established political space. Jobbik’s nationalism implies a strong nation-​state to “restore order” and defend society against the detrimental effects of the market. Such a strong state would achieve “national rebirth” through the elimination of economic, political, and Gypsy crime (Tóth and Grajczjár 2015: 143). Another manifestation of nationalism is the opposition to foreign capital (especially financial) which, according to Jobbik, colonizes and exploits the country, siphoning off the national wealth from the “common people” to the privileged few. This nationalist message is reinforced by radicalism, whereby those who do not share the “sacred rage” are not Hungarians. Allegedly, only radical methods can ensure national rejuvenation and a social order outside the free market. As the party’s leader Gábor Vona expressed it: “In the last decade, Hungary was run over not by a single car but by a dozen

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80 ­chapter trains … Hungary was deliberately and totally smashed. Now, instead of taking further slaps and painkillers, it is time for a radical –​surgical –​intervention” (ibid.: 147). At the related programmatic level, Jobbik’s platform advocates for a “third-​ way” closed “eco-​social market economy” (ibid.: 142). As outlined in its manifesto, policies and speeches, the party supports such objectives as promoting small Hungarian producers and barring multinational supermarket chains, transferring ownership of the foreign banks to Hungarians, renationalizing strategic industries such as in the energy sector, and eliminating private pension funds.31 By endorsing these policies, Jobbik has appealed to the disaffected people seeking protection from expanding commodification, quite as Polanyi described. Vona’s 2013 speech reflects this succinctly (ibid.: 143): We are going to put an end to looting the economy and return from the principle of ‘the people for the economy’ to the principle of ‘the economy for the people.’ The economy must be restricted in order to ensure a decent [eco] environment, a decent [social] life, and the interest of the Hungarians [the nation] … In an eco-​social national economy the state will finally be able to fulfill its duties: to protect our natural treasures, to restore our national identity, to provide for the needy, and to create an independent, livable, and proud Hungary. Jobbik has also championed itself as “the party of the people” through carefully crafted rhetorical and discursive strategies. The party initially relied on politicizing the “Gypsy issue” to build its base in the economically depressed North-​Eastern regions. Following the electoral breakthrough in 2010, however, Jobbik embarked on refashioning its program and image, distancing itself from extremist slogans and rhetoric. Seeking to attract broader popular constituencies, Jobbik repositioned itself as a moderate national conservative force that unites Hungarians from all strata of the society, thus challenging the hegemony 31

The last proposal was undertaken by the ruling Fidesz government as part of the interventionist turn in the wake of the global financial crisis. In line with the party competition thesis, Fidesz has been actively borrowing other Jobbik’s proposals, eventually attracting a large proportion of Jobbik voters. Some of these policies and measures included imposition of taxes on multinational corporations and foreign investors; introduction of a legal framework to put all media under the state surveillance; provision of state funding to schools; promotion of the concept of “illiberal democracy” and a switch from anti-​ Semitism to “anti-​Sorosism;” and capitalization on the refugee crisis and self-​presentation as a “protector of the endangered Hungarian nation” and “European Christian legacy” (Petsinis 2020).

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of Fidesz. In party terminology, it moved from the extremes of the political spectrum toward the centre, a phenomenon observed elsewhere among the European radical right, such as with the National Front in France or the fpö in Austria.32 To maximize its appeal towards the disillusioned centre-​left and centre-​ right voters, Jobbik also skillfully framed its symbolic politics as part of the broader identity shift. Sociologist Michael Pusey argued (1996: 79) that economic restructuring creates a “defensive need for ‘communities of memory’ in which social resistances to commodification congeal in revived memories and imaginary constructions of shared experience.” The “Trianon politics” exercised both by Jobbik and the rival national conservative Fidesz is a good illustration of this process in Hungary.33 Thus, in one case Jobbik acted as the protector of vulnerable communities by building a Trianon memorial in a town that had suffered heavily in the two world wars. The monument comprised the mythological Turul bird, the emblem of Hungarian supremacy in the Carpathian basis (Szombati 2018: 224).34 Replacing “Gypsy talk” with a Trianon discourse allowed the party to position itself as a true nationalist force and extend its influence in the municipalities. In sum, by adopting the strategies of identity construction and symbolic production in congruence with publicly perceived insecurities, Jobbik has achieved political mobilization through a populist nationalist frame.35 The party offered alienated constituencies a meaning within a nationalist story to cope with the experience of pessimistic nostalgia, relative deprivation, and status frustration generated by the renewed Polanyian market transition. 32

33 34

35

As an example of such “new clothes,” on the eve of municipal elections Jobbik organized a “family day” with esteemed Roma individuals, local dog trainers and pensioners, sending a message to the local community that the party broke away from its extremist past and promoted communal harmony (Szombati 2018: 221–​222). In 2010, Orbán’s administration passed a law declaring the 4th of June the Day of National Cohesion in commemoration of the “national tragedy” of Trianon. While Turul bird statues had been spread all over the country, they were also built on the borders of the former Hungarian state, including in the present-​day Romania, Slovakia, Serbia, Ukraine, and Austria. Such placement symbolized the state’s strength in the face of foreign enemies. After the territorial losses in the aftermath of the 1920 Trianon Treaty, the bird became a symbol of Hungarian irredentism (ibid.). To oversimplify, researchers share two approaches on successful collective action. The resource mobilization perspective emphasizes the skillfulness of political entrepreneurs, while the symbolic constructionist approach highlights the creation of new systems of meaning. I am with Diani (1996: 1055) that the theoretical boundaries are not as sharp since both perspectives emphasize the creative role of challengers, as the Hungarian case testifies.

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82 ­chapter Jobbik both responded to the “bottom-​up” demand for protection and recognition and politicized from the “top-​down” these same grievances. Further, my analysis suggests a double interaction at the societal level in line with the argument of Bernát et al. (2013). The predominantly lower middle-​ class Jobbik voters may perceive a threat to their status and identity both from the “underserving scroungers” below (symbolized by the Gypsies) and from the cosmopolitan elites above (symbolized by the Jews). Jobbik’s and increasingly the ruling Fidesz’s ethnically homogenous nationalist solution reinforces the true “Hungarian-​ness” of the “honest, hardworking, law-​abiding” people by comparing them against “parasites” (the Gypsies) and “aliens” (the Jews). The Gypsy crime, Jewish conspiracy, and Trianon trauma narratives have served this function discursively. The 2009 public opinion survey also reveals predispositions toward the former radical left as much as toward Jobbik, which resonates with ethnographic studies (Bartha 2011; Halmai 2011) on the working-​class nature of the radical right in Hungary. And as Snegovaya (2018) shows, it was the pro-​market shift of the ex-​Communist parties that boosted the radical vote in Hungary. As the anthropologist Don Kalb expressed it (2011: 24): “… In the absence of socialist alternatives, populist nationalism … becomes the vehicle by which dispossessed populations fight the symbolic aspects of dispossession in the hope that the material aspects might follow.” 4

Institutional Change, Social Demand, and Political Supply

In this chapter, I have explored the linkages between the capital-​state transformation and the neo-​nationalist surge in Hungary. The results of process-​ tracing, including the analysis of secondary literature, electoral surveys, and public opinion, provide systematic and coherent evidence that large proportions of working and middle classes were made insecure in the aftermath of the reforms. The post-​socialist transition to a market economy in Hungary was underpinned by a logic of institutional change similar in other oecd nations: transfer of risks in the provision of public goods and sustaining households (intrusion), flexibilization of labour markets (collusion), and financialization of economies (extrusion). The perceptions of these changes, namely nostalgic deprivation, relative deprivation, and status frustration, explain well the neo-​nationalist vote. Jobbik has capitalized on these subjective insecurities by combining nativist rhetoric with economic protectionist slogans. The perceptions of social dislocation among the working-​and middle-​class people reinforced the need

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to sharpen social boundaries. Through blaming the “Other” for the decline, Jobbik offered ethno-​nationalist solutions to cope with precariousness and channel resentment stemming from long-​run socio-​economic transformation. Although the party has relied on anti-​immigrant discourse to unify different subgroups of the disenfranchised, its program and ideology respond directly to the Polanyian disembedding of the economy and are rooted in material and social concerns. The Hungarian case suggests that the more vulnerable working class and lower middle-​class voters felt abandoned by the liberal democratic establishment. They are more discontent with experience of socio-​ economic decline and betrayal by the elites, than are essentially intolerant towards minorities and foreign cultures. Why is there no successful left-​wing neo-​nationalist movement in the country? In Hungary, “class talk” has been marginalized after the end of the socialist regime to break away from the Stalinist-​Marxist doctrine, a common feature of the political culture across East Central Europe (Gagyi and Éber 2015). Tamás (2015) argues that class discourse was interrupted back from the 1960s with “goulash communism” which, paradoxically, approximated Western welfare regimes. And after the transition, the Left was delegitimized discursively through Fidesz’s anti-​communist rhetoric.

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­c hapter 6

The Liberal Capital-​state One Nation Party

Their push for globalisation, economic rationalism, free trade and ethnic diversity has seen our country's decline. hanson 2016

∵ Australia is a paradigmatic example of the strong capital-​state. The market has been given primacy over other institutions, which is reflected in the more than two-​fold change of the capital-​state index from 20 points in 1980 to 55 points in 2015. Contrary to the capital-​state theory, however, the neo-​nationalist vote has been low. A notable exception is “Hansonism” of the 1990s that was as quick to rise, as it was quick to fall. Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party (onp) received 8.4 percent of vote share at the 1998 Australian federal election and saw a decline in support ever since (Figure 13). From the 2000s, then, Australia becomes a deviant case. To explore the reasons for the emergence and decline of the onp, I begin by tracing the changes in the Australian economy. As in other advanced industrial oecd nations, Australia had undergone a radical restructuring of the economy and state, the process underpinned by the ideology of “economic rationalism.” Economic rationalism presumes that “economies, markets and money offer the only reliable means of setting values on anything” and “always deliver better outcomes than states and bureaucracies” (Pusey 1996: 69). The transformation began back in the 1970s under Gough Whitlam’s Labor government and gained momentum with the break from the tradition of the “Australian Settlement” and the advancement of policies and practices to deregulate welfare, labour, and finance under the Hawke-​ Keating neoliberal governments (1983–​1996). These developments map onto the rising capital-​state index for that period (Figure 13). The intrusion dimension of the Australian csi displays a gradual increase in private provisions for social welfare and household. In terms of healthcare, there is a modest rise in private expenditures from 24 to 35 points (privhealth). In real terms, this corresponds to a one-​percent spending increase (from 2

© Oleksandr Svitych, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004516229_007

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­f igure 13  Capital-​state and neo-​nationalism in Australia Notes: Capital-​state is the composite index on a 0–​100 scale. Neo-​nationalism is vote share won by Pauline Hanson’s One Nation party (onp) at the Australian federal elections.  s ources: author’s calculation; “parliaments and governments” database (www.parl​g ov.org).

to 3 per cent of gdp) on non-​government schemes and household out-​of-​ pocket payments. At the same time, the expenditures on government schemes had grown at a larger rate from 3.7 to 6.3 per cent of the gdp. The Australian education system (priveduc) reveals a similar upward, yet sharper trend. Marketization of education, as measured through enrollment in private institutions, doubled from 23 to 42 index points between 1980 (with a decline in the late 1990s), and doubled again to 79 points in 2015. While a possible interpretation of these two trends may be a more expansive Australian welfare state, research shows that it also became less equitable under the Hawke-​Keating Labor government (Pusey 2003; Stebbing and Spies-​ Butcher 2010). For instance, higher income earners enjoy special benefits, such as “social tax expenditures” (ste s) and Private Health Insurance Tax Rebate (phitr), which suggests a “dual welfare state” (Stebbing and Spies-​Butcher 2010). Importantly, these policy developments have not been fully embraced by Australian citizens. Drawing on the data from the International Social Survey Programme, Lindh (2017) documents overwhelming public support for government responsibility to provide healthcare in 17 countries, including in liberal welfare states such as Australia.1 Similarly, the longitudinal data 1 On the whole, do you think it should be or should not be the government’s responsibility to provide health care for the sick? Australia scored 90 according to the 2006 data (100 coded as “Definitely should be”).

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86 ­chapter from the World Values Survey show increasing preference for governmental responsibility in Australia (wvs 1999, 2009, 2014).2 These findings indicate that people resist commodification of basic social services. They also suggest that, despite larger public support for welfare marketization in Australia than in other countries, the reforms were driven more by top-​down policy making than by ordinary citizens from below. Commodification of housing is the most vivid manifestation of this process in Australia. Disaggregating the capital-​state index, the composite indicator house rises from 14 to 49 points between 1980 and 2015. This change of 35 points is one of the biggest among oecd states in the dataset and is comparable only with four other liberal welfare states –​the UK (37 points), the US (35 points), Canada (33 points), and New Zealand (33 points). The change along specific sub-​components exhibits variations. There has been a gradual rise of private social expenditures (houseexps) from 1 to 2.6 per cent of gdp, with a somewhat sharper increase between 1995 and 2004. Although public social expenditure was on the rise as well (from 10 to 19 per cent of gdp), it grew at a slower rate. By contrast, the changes in real housing pricing (houseprice) and household indebtedness (housedebt) have been dramatic. The former went up from 7 to 53 index points, placing Australia 3rd after, somewhat surprisingly, Norway (change of 50 index points) and the UK (49 points). The latter soared from 27 to 72 points (or from 38 to 102 per cent of gdp in real terms), placing Australia 2nd after and close to the Netherlands. These developments reflect what Ferreira (2016) describes as a shift from the inclusive social compromise of housing to an “exclusionary model” of home ownership in Australia. In Polanyian terms, this represents a transition from the socially embedded ethos of home and social security to the exchange relations of house, securitized debt, and superannuation assets. Ferreira traces the origins of such “asset-​based welfare” and “risk management” to the deregulation of the financial sector under the Hawke-​Keating governments. As in the Hungarian case, I find a rather strong association between the variables house and capinflow (r =​0.95, p < 0.01). This resonates with numerous studies that attribute deterioration of Australia’s housing model to the structural changes (such as financial deregulation) in the national economy (e.g. Allon 2008; Mortensen and Seabrooke 2008; Wood and Ong 2012). The scores of most measures of the collusion sub-​index of the Australian csi are in the top section and are rising. Overall, collusion doubles from 37 2 Individual vs. government responsibility (range 1–​10). Support for individual responsibility dropped from 57 to 49 per cent (scores 1–​5), while support for governmental one increased from 43 to 49 per cent (scores 6–​10).

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index points in 1980 to 74 points in 2015, flattening out gradually from 2001. The two biggest changes have been in the reduction in corporate taxation and trade union density. The cortax indicator goes up from 21 to 55 points (decrease in taxation from 46 to 30 per cent). While the line flattens in 2001, corporate interests continued to exert influence on the state as revealed, for instance, in the Kevin Rudd government’s back-​down on the “super-​profits” mining tax (Bell and Hindmoor 2014). The unidens indicator rises similarly two-​fold from 52 to 89 index points (decrease in union density from 49 to 15 per cent), signalling the end of the 1983 interventionist “Accord” agreement between the Labour Party and the Australian Council of Trade Unions. The trend was accompanied by demonization of the Australian trade movement through government legislation, which discouraged workers from unionization (Cahill 2007: 223). Emblematic developments included: the establishment of the Australian Industrial Relations Commission (airc) to promote decentralized “enterprise bargaining” over centralized wage fixing; the introduction of enterprise bargaining in 1993 eliminating cross-​company industrial organizing; and the adoption of the 1996 Workplace Relations Act in 1996 introducing individual employment contracts between employers and employees, bypassing collective agreements (Peetz 1998; McSwiney and Cottle 2017: 95; Stokes 2014: 212). Summing up the reforms, Pusey (2018: 14) argues that “the keystone of Australia’s social democratic inheritance was destroyed.” Restructuring took place along the flexibilization of labour dimension as well. The Australian csi reveals an incremental rise of the labflex variable from 73 to 77 index points. In absolute terms, however, this is the highest measure in the collusion sub-​index. As admitted by oecd, in 1988 Australia already had a “flexible and responsive” labour market (oecd 1988: 70). In terms of specific indicators, employment protection against individual and collective dismissals has remained steadily low, as expressed by the scores of the variables for regular employment and temporary contracts. As for the incidence of involuntary part-​time workers (labtemp), it rose sharply from 53 to 75 points, or from 6 to 8.9 per cent of the total employment. Taken together, the collusion indicators suggest the creation of a “reserve army” of precarious Australian employees (Cahill 2007: 224) who experience more precarious conditions, higher job turnover rates, increased overtime and stress (Buchanan and Watson 2001; Kryger 2015). By contrast, the extrusion sub-​index shows a somewhat smaller degree of change –​an increase from 17 to the nearly maximum 39 index points as early as in 1988 (the maximum score of 40 points was reached in 2015). Actual capital flows (capinflow) increased eight times from 0.1 to 0.8 index points, or from 0.4

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88 ­chapter to 3.1 per cent as a share of gdp. By contrast, financial openness grew from 42 to the all-​o ecd maximum 100 points in 1988, dropping to 70 in 2000 and up again to 94 points in in 2015. As for stratification of income (top 1 per cent of national income share), it increased steadily from 8 to 26 points, or two-​fold from 4.5 to 9 per cent in real terms. Furthermore, as demonstrated by Ferreira (2016: 100), mortgage debt and superannuation contributions in Australia have become “a vehicle for capital accumulation for a privileged few.” This is reflected in the rising trend of the topinc indicator and its rather strong association with the house variable (r =​0.93, p < 0.01) Moreover, as in the Hungarian case, there is a robust association between the extrusion and collusion sub-​indices of the csi. This points to a mutually reinforcing relationship between financialization and labour market flexibility. 1

Perceptions of the Transformation

How did the structural changes above facilitate the electoral breakthrough of onp in 1998? And why did its electoral persistence fail despite further entrenchment of the capital-​state? To address the first question, I test the applicability of the already inferred causal psychosocial micro-​mechanisms. In terms of nostalgic deprivation, negative evaluations of one’s job status against that of father’s are almost identical to the perceptions in Hungary, according to the issp data. Yet more positive evaluations mirror this trend, including after the 1998 federal election (Figure 14). This suggests that although onp promised a return to the era of social and economic security, its rhetoric was less likely to resonate with voters in the 2000s. The 1998 aes (Australian Election Study) post-​election survey also captured a sense of nostalgic deprivation: 38 and 41 per cent of respondents agreed with the statements “Best years definitely behind” and “Best years probably behind,” respectively (McAllister and Clive Bean 2000: 392). These findings are supported by a 1996 survey showing preference for the “older” economic institutions (51 percent), that is a system with most businesses private, but some owned by the government, strong trade unions, and high tariff protection for manufacturing. In contrast, only 29 percent were favourable of the new system with more deregulation of business, privatization, job restructuring, and

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The Liberal Capital-​S tate: One Nation Party

­f igure 14  Current job status vs. perceptions about the past: Australia Note: If you compare [you present or last] job to the job your father had when you were , would you say that the level of status of your job is (or was) … Sample size (year): 2606 (1987); 1250 (1992); 1208 (1999); 1010 (2009).  s ource: issp social inequality module 1987, 1992, 1999, 2009.

competition. A follow-​up study revealed an increase in these attitudes between 1996 and 2000 (Pusey 2003: 148–​149).3 There are also manifestations of individual relative deprivation in the Australian case. As a recap, among the intrusion indicators of the Australian csi household indebtedness and house pricing score extremely high. I would expect soaring indebtedness, housing unaffordability, and mortgage stress to exacerbate the feeling of deprivation among Australians. The World Values Survey documents indeed a growing dissatisfaction with the financial situation of households –​from 34 per cent in 1984 to 53 percent in 2009.4 More specifically, based on the aes 1998 survey, the onp voters had the worst retrospective and future evaluations of their household financial situations –​46 and 52 per cent share respectively. This was the highest proportion among all Australian parties, including the two major contenders the Liberals

3 To supplement these data with the lived experience of Australians, one focus-​group study shows that a common reaction (especially among the so-​called “Battlers” and “Hansonites”) to the economic change was a sense of anger and nostalgia for the times when secure jobs as a foundation of social integration were a social right rather than a commodity (Pusey 2003: 75). 4 The trend is strongly associated with the intrusion dimension of the csi (r =​0.73, p < 0.01) and especially with housedebt and houseprice indicators (r =​0.75; r =​0.73, p < 0.01).

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90 ­chapter and Labour. Australians thus resist “responsibilization” and the emphasis on personal agency when it comes to market-​based provision of healthcare, education, and housing. They still expect the government to provide pubic goods and “ensure that the market works rationally for the people rather than the other way around” (Pusey 2003: 156). Relative deprivation is also observed via other measures. There is a strong association between job dissatisfaction and the collusion sub-​index of the Australian csi (r =​0.73, p < 0.01), notably with union density and incidence of part-​time work. An alternative issp measure of job insecurity produces a similar result, corroborating a link between labour flexibility –​a form of Polanyian “disembeddedness” –​and deprivation.5 These results map onto the people’s anger at being treated as commodities in the wake of the labour market reforms as evidenced from the focus-​group studies. The unreconciled working people who “have to work three bloody [casual] jobs to make the same money” (Pusey 2003: 59) generated a latent reservoir of populist mobilization against the system. And the ethnographic study by Webster et al. (2008) shows how the shock of “squeezing Orange” (a city in New South Wales) through Labour’s flexibilization policies pushed factory workers to support One Nation. Finally, income dissatisfaction is strongly related to the extrusion sub-​index, especially the indicator for income redistribution (r =​0.86, p < 0.01). This is accompanied with pessimistic outlooks of Australians on their income and job prospects despite the economic boom, based on the results of six focus groups (Pusey 2003: 53). I surmise that these perceptions contributed to the resentment with the political system, opening space for alternative representations. The wvs 2009 data show that the overwhelming majority of the onp supporters placed themselves into the 2nd and 6th steps of income scale (20 and 19 per cent, respectively).6 These are the highest figures across all parties for these income steps. And the earlier issp 2005 survey reveals that the combined proportion of onp’s supporters dissatisfied with income was an all-​high 65 per cent. Relative deprivation among Australians has been salient at the collective level as well. According to the arguably “populist” issp measure (“People at the top vs. people at the bottom”), 66 per cent of the onp constituency perceived the conflict as salient, the highest proportion among the six parties registered 5 My job is secure (1 “Strongly agree” to 5 “Strongly disagree”). 6 In a similar vein, using the aes 1998 post-​election study, Bean (2000: 140–​142) demonstrated that it is those in the middle ranges of income who voted for onp, though he used “income” as an objective measure.

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in the survey. A related measure from the 1998 aes sample (“Government run by big interests”) supports the result: 78 per cent of onp’s supporters agreed with the statement –​again, more than for any other party. Furthermore, around three-​quarters of surveyed Australians believed that big business has too much power, and there should be more control over their activities (Pusey 2003: 142). When confronted with the question on who was to blame for the declining job and income prospects, the majority mentioned big companies (39 per cent), followed governments and politicians (22 per cent). Notably, only 5 per cent of the respondents internalized the market failures as their own (“We’re not trying hard enough”), and only a tiny fraction transferred the blame “horizontally” to welfare recipients and immigrants (2 and 1 per cent, respectively) (ibid.: 160). Focusing on the blaming aspect, more subtleties emerge. There is systematic and coherent evidence of the overall positive attitudes among Australian citizens toward the indigenous population, asylum seekers, and immigrants (aes 1987–​2016; Cameron and McAllister 2016). As focus group studies reveal, however, this does not seem to be the case with “Battlers” and “Hansonites” –​ the working-​class unreconciled people most hurt by the economic reforms, especially by the deregulation of labour market (Pusey 2003: 58, 72). These are the people who feel resentment at the government taking the side of the underserving “boat people” (refugees), “abos” (Aboriginals) and Asian migrants. It would be premature, however, to conclude that these citizens are racist. As in the Hungarian case, this is rather an indication that racial sensibilities become especially acute in times of economic insecurity.7 To test the salience of the last mechanism –​social status frustration –​the aes post-​1998 election data are abundantly clear that those voters who identified as “working class” were twice as likely to support the onp (50 per cent of respondents) compared to the “middle class” (23 per cent).8 Furthermore, union members were slightly more likely to support the onp than non-​members, and those in manual occupations (semi-​skilled and unskilled workers, tradespeople, and farmers) and associate professionals were more supportive that those 7 This dovetails with the quantitative studies by Bean (2000), McAllister and Bean (2000), and Denemark and Bowler (2002). All find that race, immigration and economic insecurity increased the likelihood of onp vote in the 1998 federal election. Yet, the studies also conclude, while racial sentiments had the biggest effect in predicting the vote, economic discontent was important in providing the context for onp to politicize the ethnic and immigration cleavage. 8 The 1999 issp data show a somewhat different composition of the onp support base: 55 per cent middle class, 37 per cent working class (2nd biggest after the Greens) and 7 per cent lower class (the biggest).

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92 ­chapter in non-​manual ones (managers and professionals) (Bean 2000: 140). The data also suggest the divide between rural (53 per cent) and urban support for the onp, highlighting the “urban fringe” effect (ibid.). This last finding resonates neatly with the case of Jobbik which won initially in the remote north-​eastern counties of Hungary playing on anti-​Roma sentiments among dispossessed rural Hungarians (Szombati 2018). Extending the analysis longitudinally, there was a growing reserve of status anxiety until 2004, with a sharper trend from 1999 (Figure 15) This coincides with the incumbency of the Howard government which pushed for further flexibilization of labour market, massive privatizations, and the consumer goods and service tax. The association of the “bottom” trend with the capital-​state index is strong and significant (r =​0.65, p < 0.01), and is driven by the indicators for household indebtedness and housing affordability, trade union density, and income gap. My hunch is that the 2004 reversal is connected to the mining industry boom driven by the spike in global demand for coal (Rolfe et al. 2007), as well as the Keynesian policies introduced by the Rudd administration (Millmow 2015). The latter maps accurately onto flattening of the Australian csi around this period (Figure 13).

­f igure 15  Subjective top-​bottom placement: Australia Note: Aggregated values for the “10–​6” and “1–​5” responses to the question: In our society there are groups which tend to be towards the top and groups which tend to be towards the bottom. Below is a scale that runs from top to bottom. Where would you put yourself now on this scale?  s ource: issp social inequality module 1987, 1992, 1999, 2009; citizenship module 2004, 2014

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Focusing on the responses of lower status self-​placement in the issp 1999 survey (following the onp’s breakthrough in 1998), the data show that most of the party’s support base comes from the lower 6th and 9th steps of the social ladder. This finding once again confirms the thesis that it is voters who perceive themselves several layers above the bottom who are the likely recruits of the radical right (Immerfall 1998: 250). The onp had tapped into this status anxiety as eloquently expressed by a Labour blue-​collar voter turned One Nation: She talks what she believes in and not what everyone else wants to hear …: the Asians are coming over here and taking the Australian jobs from the Australian youth. And there is just nothing left for us to take … My dad … was on the hierarchy on the State Rail Authority and so was my grandfather before that, and my uncle. But for me, the railway is a dying breed, it’s being run from computers. webster et al. 2008: 150

While this quote suggests the importance of the leadership factor, Bean (2000: 146–​148) finds that, compared to evaluations of John Howard (the Liberal Party) and Kim Beazley (the Labour Party), Hanson was seen as a weak leader by most Australians, and even by onp voters on such traits as intelligence and knowledgeability. This lack of broader support may have contributed to the onp’s eventual decline. At the same time, as of 2009 the onp affiliates had an all-​high preference for strong leadership as shown by the wvs data. 2

One Nation Party: Closed Supply

The structural changes in the Australian economy and state formed a fertile breeding ground for One Nation’s vision of a “Fortress Australia” (Gibson et al. 2002: 824). The capital-​state transformation and the ensuing declining capacity to fulfill the social contract towards working-​and middle-​class Australians translated into the experience of relative deprivation and status anxiety, as well disillusionment with “politics as usual.” In the absence of meaningful alternatives, the onp offered a simple populist nationalist message to harness the fears of material and social displacement: give voice to “battlers,” “the little man” so that every “bloke would have a fair go.” As an ideology and an identity discourse, Hanson’s neo-​nationalism was characterized by “double-​exclusion” akin to the Hungarian Jobbik. On the vertical axis, onp drew the boundaries of Australia to exclude the elites who failed

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94 ­chapter to protect the people from economic and social dislocations. Pauline Hanson Support Group puts it as follows: Ordinary Australians do have a common enemy, but it is not Aborigines, Asians or people of any particular colour, race or creed. Our common oppressors are a class of raceless, placeless cosmopolitan elites who are exercising almost absolute power over us …. stokes 2000: 27

As observed from the party’s website, these anti-​establishment sentiments were accompanied with mistrust towards supranational institutions such as the United Nations and the International Monetary Fund, as well as towards financial markets, international organizations, and big business. Despite the assertion in the above quote, there was also juxtaposition against the more “privileged” groups, most notably welfare recipients, Asian migrants, and Aborigines and who were seen to challenge the “Australian way of life” (Leach 2000). As Pauline Hanson wrote in a letter to Queensland Times: “How can we expect this race to help themselves when governments shower them with money, facilities and opportunities that only these people can obtain no matter how minute the indigenous blood is that flows through their veins …” (Dodd 1997: 39). Yet, although the onp relied on ethno-​migrant cleavage to mobilize voters against the Aboriginal, Muslim, and Asian “Other,” the people’s racial sensibilities did not exist in a vacuum. As this case study has shown, there have been real anxieties over social welfare sustainability, job security, and redistribution stemming from the structural changes in the country’s political economy. In a solution resembling Jobbik’s, the onp offered a chauvinistic and homogeneous vision of Australia as a response to these changes. As McSwiney and Cottle (2017: 95) summed it up succinctly: “The Party’s discursive construction of the Other … provide a racialised scapegoat as the cause of social and material distress.” Despite its strong initial appeal and electoral breakthrough in 1998, within five years the onp collapsed.9 In addition to the possible effect of the economic growth mentioned earlier, I surmise two factors on the supply-​side account for this puzzle. One reason for the onp’s short-​lived success is internal: the party failed to maintain an efficient organizational structure. It has been long

9 I do not consider here onp’s more recent revival securing 4.3 per cent of the Senate vote at the 2016 federal election.

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­f igure 16  Neo-​nationalism and opportunities structure  s ource: adapted from koopmans and statham (1999: 248).

recognized in the literature that charismatic leadership alone is insufficient to sustain a political party, especially at the electoral persistence rather than the breakthrough stage (Betz 1998; Art 2011; Tavits 2012). A party without a well-​ functioning organization (high membership, competent personnel, ideological unity, organizational outreach) is unlikely to endure. The onp lacked such organization structure and unity (Ward 2000). A second external supply side factor is related to the policies of mainstream parties and emphasizes the role of the prevailing strategies towards challengers (Koopmans and Kriesi 1995) (Figure 16). Research by Fleming and Mondon (2018; also Mondon 2012, 2013) shows that Australian politicians had “suffocated” the radical right by borrowing its ethno-​ exclusivist appeal. While European politicians have pursued similar strategies, they were never able to implement “an openly racist regime,” as this would run against their universalist constitutions (Mondon 2012: 357). In contrast, Australia had a “racist definition of belonging” inherent in its settler-​colonial status since the 1901 Commonwealth Immigration Restriction Act. Embedded in the triple identity of racial whiteness, “Britishness” and “Australianness,” the governments were free until the end of the White Australia policy in 1973 to openly apply ethno-​exclusivist policies. The onp’s rise, in turn, was enabled by temporary suspension of the politics of exclusion when Prime Minister Paul Keating pushed for multiculturalism (ibid.: 357–​362).10 In sum, the onp 10

Reversal took place in 1996 when Prime Minister John Howard shifted rightwards and confronted indigenous minorities, refugees, and “battlers,” adopting a populist language to distinguish himself from political rivals (Stokes 2000: 26). A similar rhetorical shift happened in Hungary with Prime Minister Viktor Orbán borrowing Jobbik’s radicalism. As another example, the Biden/​Harris campaign in the US borrowed Bernie Sander’s

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96 ­chapter accessed the Australian political space but lost its influence due to discursive limitations and, subsequently, restrictive political strategies from mainstream political actors. In Koopmans and Statham’s taxonomy of opportunity structures, One Nation moved from the co-​opted to marginalized status. Why no left-​wing version of neo-​nationalism developed in Australia? As in the Hungarian case, the answer is inevitably context specific. The absence of left-​wing neo-​nationalism in Australia can be explained by the unfavourable opportunity structure in the form of a historical anti-​communist bend. Moreover, it seems to validate the dualization thesis which postulates that the radical left thrives in the countries most hit by economic crisis (Palier et. al. 2017). Australia experienced uninterrupted economic growth since the early 1990s. Besides, it was also less affected by the global financial crisis than other developed nations (Saunders and Wong 2011). The country’s steady economic growth and multi-​ethnic population made the ethno-​racial cleavage more salient for politicization. Summing up the two case studies, in contentious political terms, three types of mechanisms (Tarrow 2012: 23) connect the capital-​state and neo-​ nationalism into a unified Polanyian framework: 1) dispositional mechanisms of nostalgic deprivation, relative deprivation, and status frustration; 2) relational mechanisms of mobilizing voters’ discontent through the available institutional and discursive structures; and 3) environmental mechanisms of the parties’ neoliberal convergence, party competition, and normalization of the right-​wing discourse. proposals for free community-​college tuition, a public health insurance option, and simplified unionization process. These instances highlight how challenger’s agendas may be hijacked by more conventional parties and leaders.

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­c hapter 7

The Post-​dirigiste Capital-​State National Front

I am the candidate of the people’s revolt against the system. le pen 2012

∵ In France, neo-​nationalism surged despite moderate disembedding of the economy between 1980 and 2015. The right-​wing populist nationalist National Front (fn)1 has been both electorally successful and persistent. By contrast, left-​wing neo-​nationalism saw a decline in representation, though it regained support in 2012 and especially in 2017 with the breakthrough of the “Unbowed France” (France Insoumise) party (Figure 17).2 Researchers have put forward several explanations to explain the appeal of the fn. Among the demand-​side accounts that commonly focus on “grievance,” such structural factors as unemployment (Golder 2003a; Lubbers and Scheepers 2002), immigration (Mayer 1996; Lubbers and Scheepers 2002; Rydgren 2008), and cultural backlash against post-​materialism (Ignazi 1992; Kitschelt 1997; Minkenberg 2000) have been highlighted. On the supply side, scholars have focused on the fn’s internal opportunity structures –​both discursive and organizational –​to attract discontented voters (Mudde 2007; Mayer 2018). Several empirical and theoretical problems plague these explanations. With regards to unemployment, it is not clear why this issue would be more beneficial to the radical right fn than to the radical left parties which campaigned on socio-​economic issues (Wolfreys 2008). With regards to immigration, it is telling that the fn’s electoral breakthrough in the mid-​1980s happened a

1 Renamed as the National Rally (Ressemblement National, rn) in 2018. 2 Arguably, presidential elections in France are more important in the public imagination than legislative ones. However, I keep the latter one as the measure of neo-​nationalism for cross-​ country comparative reasons.

© Oleksandr Svitych, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004516229_008

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­f igure 17  Neo-​nationalism in France Note: Vote share won by left-​wing and right-​wing neo-​nationalist parties in the legislative elections in France. The data for 2017 are added for illustrative purposes. Left-​wing neo-​nationalism: French Communist Party (pcf); Left Front (FdG); Unbowed France (fi); Workers’ Struggle (lo). Right-​wing neo-​ nationalism: National Front (fn). fn’s earlier results as a pro-​market party are added for comparison.  s ource: author’s calculation based on the “parliaments and governments” database (www.parl​g ov.org).

decade after the great immigration wave from 1956 and 1973.3 In turn, post-​ materialism fails to account for the low popularity of “left-​libertarian” parties in France, such as Ecologists or Les Verts (The Greens).4 From the internal supply side perspective, fn’s organizational capacities had certainly evolved and contributed to the party’s success. I am with Goodliffe (2013: 87), however, that “it seems far-​fetched to believe that the party’s breakthrough and subsequent consolidation had nothing to do with the social costs engendered by the transformation of the French economy.”

3 Furthermore, census figures show that the proportion of immigrants in France remained at the steady level of 7.4 per cent from 1975 to 1999 and has not changed substantially thereafter (Goodliffe 2013: 86, 98). 4 Albeit “The Greens” party (eelv) has been much more successful in the European Parliament elections, gaining 16.2 per cent of the vote in 2009, 8.9 per cent in 2014, and 13.5 per cent in 2019.

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99

The Post-​dirigiste Capital-​state

France is an example of a continental political economic state tradition distinct from the discussed former socialist (Hungary) and liberal (Australia) regimes. Accordingly, transition toward the capital-​state was mediated by the unique institutional and ideational configuration of the French political economy. While the state transformed in a market-​oriented direction, it also continued its interventionist role, and the restructuring has been less radical than elsewhere (Palier 2001; Prasad 2005; Kus 2006). In this regard, Clift (2012: 568) underscores the condition of “post-​dirigisme,” wherein the French state “retains an ambition to exert purchase over how French capitalism evolves, [despite] … dramatic domestic and international institutional and structural changes”; Schmidt (2003) stresses that France’s “state-​led” capitalism moved to “state-​enhanced” one, with a still active, albeit much reduced, role of the state; and Levy (2008) accentuates the shift from the French dirigiste to the “social anaesthesia” state, wherein the state expanded social and labour market programmes as part of the transition. In view of this consensus in the literature, it makes intuitive sense that France scores relatively low on the change in the capital-​state index. The country’s csi increases moderately by 17 points between 1980 and 2015, well below the oecd average of 27 points (Figure 18). Furthermore, as of 2015 France scores 45 points on the index, occupying a low 24th position in the overall ranking of 35 oecd member-​states –​a decline from the 15th position in the 1980 ranking. The csi picks up from 1983 when the first Mitterrand administration (ironically, leftist in its orientation) introduced reforms to challenge the dirigiste model (Schmidt 1996; Levy 2006b), gradually breaking with the legacies of the Socialist-​Communist alliance (“Union of the Left”). Overall, the sharpest increase in the index (1983–​1994) maps onto the two-​term incumbency of the Socialist Party under François Mitterrand. My data reveal a two-​fold increase from 14 to 28 index points along the intrusion dimension (marketization of welfare) of the French capital-​state index, with the biggest change coming from the composite house indicator. This rise is driven both by private social expenditure, household consumer and mortgage indebtedness, and real housing pricing. By contrast, marketization of healthcare and education, measured through non-​government schemes and household out-​of-​pocket payments (privhealth) and enrollment in private institutions (priveduc), grew at a somewhat slower rate: from 15 to 26 points for the former, and 13 to 20 points for the latter. These figures suggest that in France, in line with the oecd trend, an extension of market relations took place through recalibration of institutions toward

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100 ­chapter

­f igure 18  Capital-​state and neo-​nationalism in France  s ource: author’s calculation based on the capital-​s tate index and the “parliaments and governments” database (www.parl​ gov.org).

more personalized allocation of resources and risks. Illustrative developments in this regard include Jacques Chirac’s initiation to reform the public healthcare system and several public-​sector pensions plans, which sparked the “winter of discontent” in 1995 (Singer 1997) and strikes against the pension reform in 2003 (Wolfreys 2008). Another one was the round of austerity measures between 2010 and 2013 by Nicolas Sarkozy and François Hollande (Oxfam 2013). At the same time, oecd data show that France had very high public social expenditure. For instance, although the Socialist-​Green-​Communist coalition government under Lionel Jospin (1997–​2002) pursued a further agenda of privatization and deregulation of public services (Krishnan and Thomas 2008), some welfare obligations of the “Republican state” were retained. Supplementary health schemes were granted to the poor, and the Universal Medical Coverage (cmu) was introduced in 2002 (Simonet 2014: 6). In sum, the French state continued social policy interventions to compensate citizens for socio-​economic restructuring (Schmidt 2003; Levy 2008; Clift 2012). The collusion dimension reflects the tilting of power between labour and capital as part of the French state restructuring. The sub-​index rises slightly from 50 to 62 index points between 1980 and 2015. However, indicator labtemp for part-​time employment trends up more sharply from 40 to 65 points, reflecting an expansion of precarious working conditions such as part-​time jobs and short-​term contracts. Labour flexibility and casualization received a boost under the socialist government in the 1980s. The drop along this indicator in

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1998 corresponds to the recall of Prime Minister Alain Juppé’s retirement plan after the nation-​wide workers’ strike. Conversely, the rise from 2003 matches the pro-​market reforms under Jacques Chirac: a two-​year contrat d’activité that offered a combination of work and training in return for 75 percent of the minimum wage; a contrat nouvelle embauche (cne) allowing employers to fire a worker without cause and separation costs during the first two years; and a similar proposal in 2009 for a contrat première embauche (cpe) targeted at those aged under twenty-​six (Howell 2009: 246). The latter sparked massive student-​led protests and was withdrawn. The high and rising values of the unidens indicator reflect the decline in trade union membership brought about by the government’s abandonment of the state-​organized wage bargaining system as part of the labour market deregulation (Howell 1992; Schmidt 2003). French workers were left with less protection against the employers’ pressures, as shown by one of the lowest unionization rates in oecd (8 per cent as of 2015). This was demonstrated in 2004, for example, when the electronics manufacturer Bosch threatened to redirect investment from its facility in Venissieux in France to a Czech facility with cheaper labour costs (Marginson 2006: 15). The incident is emblematic of the labour “regime competition” driven by the growing internationalization and the declined ability of the French unions to nurture solidarity and collective action (Boltanski and Chiapello 2006). Combined with the drop in corporate tax from 50 to 38 per cent (as displayed by the rising cortax indicator), low union rates facilitated the growth of corporate profits at labour’s expense (Levy 2008: 423).5 Yet despite falling membership, French trade unions remained adversarial and influential until the mid-​2000s (Schmidt 2003; Simonet 2014). In view of their “corporatist” rather than “personal” nature (Chandler 1990), they could resist flexibilization of the labour market (thus the flattening trend of the labflex indicator).6 Further, while the successive governments increased vulnerability of the French workers regarding hiring and firing, they simultaneously expanded social and labour provisions such as subsidies in the “conversion pole” zones, possibilities for early retirement, and a 35-​hour working week,

5 As a more recent illustration, President Hollande’s 2012 “Responsibility Pact” traded €50 billion in public spending cuts for €40 billion package of tax breaks for businesses (Marcetic 2017). 6 In comparison, more personalized trade unionism in Australia may have accounted account for less resistance from Australian workers who were also deprived of unions as an anchor of class identity (see Chapter 6).

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102 ­chapter although the latter actually increased labour flexibility as per Schmidt (2003).7 Equally important, as Levy (2008: 425) points out, the purpose of these reforms was “demobilizing France’s working class and undercutting trade union capacity to mount resistance to industrial restructuring.” As for the extrusion dimension, that is financialization of the economy and society, of the French capital-​state, the respective csi sub-​index rises from the initial low 21 to 42 index points in 1994, flattening out thereafter. The inflows of capital grew dramatically nine-​fold as indicated by the capinflow indicator, with the 2015 value surpassed only by Finland, Belgium, and the well-​established “offshore financial centres” (Fernandez and Hendrikse 2019) such as Ireland, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Switzerland, and the UK. Capital account openness (capopen) reached its maximum value in 1994, indicating the economy’s reorientation towards international financial capitalism away from the state-​and bank-​centered system (Schmidt 2003; Simonet 2014). Finally, the value of the topinc indicator, reflecting “redistribution to the top,” rose moderately from 22 to 32 index points. The trend intensified in 1993 in the wake of the economic recession; it was less pronounced before due to the redistributive efforts of the Mitterrand government. In sum, tracing the structural changes in the French political economy through the country’s capital-​state index reveals a dual Polanyian shift. The state has been moving away from the tradition of dirigiste capitalism of the post-​war “glorious three decades” (Schmidt 2003). Concurrently, it has sought to humanize disengagement from the provision of social services, dissolution of the Fordist compromise, and financialization through compensatory mechanisms. Despite such “cushioning,” however, I argue that the capital-​state transformation alienated French working-​class and middle-​class citizens and created space for more radical political contestation. Before pursuing this argument further, several remarks on the specificities of the French political culture are in order, namely its socio-​political landscape and the nature of party competition. The first observation is on the entrenched socio-​economic cleavage in France that helped sustain one of the strongest communist parties (pcf). The 1789 Revolution laid the foundation for extreme left politics by removing the aristocracy that in other places, such as Great Britain or Scandinavia, mediated between the interests of the industrializing bourgeoisie and the needs of the proletariat (Greene 1973: 333). Further, the long-​standing French “Jacobin” 7 The “flexibility” drive culminated in the 2015 “Macron Law” further deregulating several industries, allowing Sunday trading, and making it easier for employers to fire workers (Marcetic 2017).

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tradition of “equality, universalism, and national unity” and the rhetoric of class struggle have identified the state as the defender of the national interest in opposition to particularistic interests (Lamont 2001). In such a tradition, the welfare state is a “lowest common denominator that symbolizes republican unity and a collective commitment to providing a strong safety net” (Prasad 2005: 374). Politically, this is expressed in the voting support for left-​wing neo-​ nationalists (Figure 17). While the salience of socio-​economic cleavage explains the left-​wing vote, party competition accounts for its puzzling decline over the last three decades. The pcf’s continuing internal struggle, the conservative Stalinist aura (March and Mudde 2005: 6), and the strategy to enter the government (Upchurch et al. 2009: 132) cost it dearly. The party’s downfall allowed the more radical Workers’ Struggle (lo) to gain some ground and, more importantly, opened an opportunity for the right-​wing neo-​nationalist National Front. And as my analysis of the fn’s manifestoes showed, by 2002 the party had adopted a renewed welfarist stance. This dovetails with Nonna Mayer’s (2013) argument on the proletarization of the fn’s electoral base (see also Perrineau 1997), and Gilles Ivaldi’s (2015) finding of the pro-​left shift in fn’s rightist economic policies between 1988 and 1997. In line with the party competition thesis, both right-​wing fn and left-​wing Left Front and Workers’ Struggle also benefited from the moderation of the centre-​left forces, namely the French Socialist Party (ps).8 Such positional “mutation” from the Left towards the Centre (Evans and de Graaf 2013) applies to Hungary and Australia as well, as discussed earlier. It may be objected that moderation of social-​democratic and centre-​left parties has been driven from the “bottom-​up” as voters became increasingly drawn from the middle and upper middle classes. This may reflect the growing affluence and the demographic changes in societies, especially in post-​ industrializing countries (Häusermann 2018). However, as Abou-​Chadi (2018) and Abou-​Chadi and Immergut (2018) have demonstrated, parties’ issue responsiveness depends on the degree of electoral competition that they are facing and cannot be explained solely by the changing electoral constituencies. A related objection is that the decline in communist vote and trade union density reflects the shift to service economies. Thus, in the late 1990s only one in three members of the French workforce was an industrial worker vs. four in 8 The results of the 2007 legislative elections, for instance, are symptomatic. According to the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems survey, only 16 and 13 per cent of the “working class” respondents voted for the Communists and Socialists, respectively, against 11 per cent for Nicolas Sarkozy’s centre-​right ump (Union for a Popular Movement) and 30 per cent for Jean-​Marie Le Pen’s fn.

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104 ­chapter ten in the early 1970s (Mayer 1996: 111). Yet there remains a question of which political force will represent the working-​class voters made vulnerable by socio-​economic transformation. And as Goodliffe (2013: 93) points out, deindustrialization cannot be the main explanation since the proportional fall in the pcf and union memberships in France far exceeded the decline in the size of its working class. 2

Perceptions of the Transformation

Although the capital-​state is a structural phenomenon, it is experiential in people’s lives at the micro level. It is real individuals who live out socio-​economic changes, who allegedly experience insecurity, discontent and alienation, and who vote for populist nationalists. It is therefore necessary to see how these changes are perceived and interpreted to understand neo-​nationalist mobilization despite moderate intensity of the capital-​state transformation in France. Theoretically, this will help understand how the structural macroeconomic processes are linked to the micro processes of electoral choice (Mudde 2007: 203). In Polanyian terms, I expect that disengaging markets from public control would generate a latent counter-​movement in public opinion.9 Is there increasing support for such “re-​embedding” in France? The first type of evidence to evaluate this comes from public opinion on the desired relationship between the state and the market. According to the Globescan poll measuring attitudes towards free enterprise and the market economy, France ranked last among 20 countries with 36 percent of support vs. the average 61 percent (Globescan 2006, quoted in Laïdi 2011: 4). Another comparative study found a reinforcement of these attitudes following the 2008–​2009 financial crisis: commitment to capitalism in France plummeted to 15 percent, compared to 26 percent in Italy, and 42 percent in Germany and the United States (ifop 2010, quoted in Laïdi 2011: 4).10 In addition, according to the survey from the Barometer of Political Confidence (cevipof), between 2009 and 2017 most of the respondents supported either a drastic or some reform of capitalism –​approximately 46 per cent from each category as of 2015 (cevipof 2018). These data demonstrate 9 10

Ethnographic studies would be ideally suited to excavate the daily practices to evaluate the effects of structures. In this book, I take an alternative approach by examining attitudes through public opinion surveys, complementing my account with existing research. The sample size is 1001.

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the overall skepticism of French citizens about the free-​market economy and support for redistribution. These trends are further corroborated by the findings of the increasing demand for interventionism and egalitarianism in European countries (Gonthier 2014) and France, in particular (Lindh 2017). The second body of evidence homes in on the perceptions of restructuring along the intrusion, collusion, and extrusion properties11 of the French capital-​ state, as well as examines whether they are associated with the neo-​nationalist vote. Following the logic of the previous case studies, three measures of relative deprivation –​household financial satisfaction, job satisfaction, and security and income satisfaction –​can be used to tap into the respective three capital-​state dimensions.12 In terms of the first measure, dissatisfaction grew only slightly from 12 to 14 per cent between 1984 and 2009, according to the World Values Survey (wvs).13 Unfortunately, the wvs does not record election results for France. As an alternative measure, the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (cses) asked respondents about prospects of a reduction in household income following the 2012 presidential elections.14 Among voters for the National Front, the proportion of insecure householders constituted a stunning 46 percent, against 34 per cent for the conservative ump’s camp (Nicolas Sarkozy), 29 per cent for the Socialists (François Hollande), and 29 per cent for the new Left Front (Jean-​Luc Mélenchon). I observe similar dynamics about perceived job dissatisfaction and job insecurity.15 According to the data from the issp “Work Orientation” modules, by 11 12

13

14

15

Reflecting, respectively, the transfer of risks in the provision of public goods and sustaining households, increased flexibility in the labour market, and financialization of the economy. As a recap, as theorized and tested in the previous chapters, the feeling of relative deprivation stem from the frustrations caused by subjective comparisons of one’s or one group’s social standards against others. Neo-​nationalism is compatible with relative deprivation as both are based on notions of deservingness and entitlement. Aggregate responses 1–​3 on a scale from 1 “Dissatisfied” to 10 “Satisfied” (wvs 1984, 1999, 2009). Sample size (wave): 1200 (1981–​1984); 1002 (1989–​1993); 1001 (2005–​2009). While the values are low, they are extremely strongly associated with the intrusion sub-​index (r =​0.95, p < 0.01). The sample size is 2009. Aggregate responses “Very likely” and “Somewhat likely” to the question: How likely or unlikely do you think it is that your household’s income could be severely reduced in the next twelve months? (cses 2018) I use presidential elections whenever the data for legislative elections in France are missing. issp 1997, 2005, and 2015: aggregate responses “Fairly,” “Very” and “Completely” (dissatisfied): How satisfied are you in your (main) job? Aggregate responses “Disagree” and “Strongly disagree”: My job is secure. Both correlate strongly with the collusion sub-​index with the coefficient of 0.74 at p < 0.01.

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106 ­chapter 2005 a party identity switch had taken place (Table 10). The dissatisfied and insecure electorate gradually reoriented itself from the Communists (radical left), Socialists (centre-​left), and the Conservatives (centre-​right) toward the National Front, joined by the Left Front by 2015. In view of mistrust toward the establishment and of party competition as discussed previously, the neo-​ nationalist forces of both the Left and Right had captured most of the disaffected voters. Table 10 also demonstrates that, although support for both the National Front and the Left Front has grown, the former has attracted more votes. The possible explanations here are ressentiment and emotional distancing (Bauman 2007; Salmela and von Scheve 2017). already suggested in Chapter 2. In the former case, the National Front may be more appealing as they channel away people’s insecurities onto easy “scapegoats,” thus preserving their sense of self-​worth. In the latter, “nation” serves as a more stable identity for the disenfranchised whose occupational identities linked to class have been fading away in the aftermath of state transformation. In either case, right-​wing mobilization under the tropes of “nation” and “nationalism” helps recreate the sense of ontological security for insecure citizens. Finally, the wvs data show that income dissatisfaction rose sharply from 9 per cent in 1984 to 33 per cent, and further up to 37 and 47 per cent in 2004 table 10

Job insecurity and dissatisfaction vs. party vote (%) in France

Question /​ Party family “Insecurity” 1997 2005 2015 “Dissatisfaction” 1997 2005 2015

Radical left (pcf, FdG*)

Centre-​left (ps)

Centre-​right Radical right (rpr, ump*) (fn)

13 11 13

19 16 10

25 13 12

19 25 21

13 5 6

4 6 3

6 5 7

5 11 10

Notes: *For 2015 only. Abbreviations in French: pcf =​ French Communist Party; FdG =​Left Front; ps =​ Socialist Party; rpr =​ Rally for the Republic; ump =​ Union for a Popular Movement; fn =​ National Front. All figures refer to row percentages. Sample size (year): 2011 (1997); 1075 (2005); 1224 (2015). source: issp work orientation modules 1997, 2005, 2015.

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and 2009, respectively.16 Again, the biggest share of vulnerable voters is found in the neo-​nationalist camp. According to the cses 2018 data, the 2012 presidential vote for the fn’s Marine Le Pen comprised the highest proportion of citizens in the two lowest income scales –​47 per cent (up from 33 in 2002) –​ followed closely by the left-​wing neo-​nationalist Left Front with 46 per cent. The third and final cluster of demand-​side evidence comes from voters’ experience of status frustration.17 According to the issp data on subjective social positions, 13 per cent of the French respondents placed themselves in the three lowest steps (out of 10), up to 20 per cent by the crisis year of 2009, and down to 16 per cent in 2014. In a similar trend, the proportion of “high rankers” declined from 7 per cent in 1999 to 5 per cent, recovering to the initial level in 2014. When disaggregated, the biggest change in the bottom placement took place one step below the middle of the scale (17 to 29 per cent of respondents), as well as in the lowest one (1.4 to 3.4 per cent). The bottom trend is strongly associated with the capital-​state index (r =​0.82, p < 0.01), and especially with the collusion indicator for trade union density (r =​0.75, p < 0.01). As in the other country-​cases, this connection is reasonable since deterioration of occupational markers of social status –​such as decline in union membership, disruption of the old collective recognition system and working-​ class socialization –​may render people concerned about their social status, and push them toward alternative sources of identification (cf. also Sennett 2006; Goodliffe 2013). Indeed, the analysis of two additional data sources reveals a link between individual’s subjective social status and the neo-​nationalist vote among French voters. Further disaggregation of the issp data shows that, whereas in 2004 the core of the National Front’s electoral base was drawn from the middle of the social ladder (steps 5–​6), in 2009 the composition shifted one rung down. And in 2014 the fn became the only major political party attracting voters from three middle rungs (4 to 6), while both the conservative (ump), social-​ democratic (ps), and left-​wing (pcf) forces appealed to voters with higher 16

17

The correlation with the associated extrusion dimension of the French capital-​state index is positive and significant (r =​0.85, p < 0.01). wvs 1984, 1999, 2004, and 2009: aggregate responses 1–​3 on a scale from 1 “Lowest” to 10 “Highest.” Concurrently, the proportion of those in the high-​income scales (8–​10) dropped steadily from 35 per cent in 1984 to 5 per cent in 2009. When expanding the categories “low” and “high” to wider 1–​5 and 6–​10 ranges, the same reversed pattern persists: 20 per cent “low” vs. 58 per cent “high” in 1984, replaced with 74 vs. 15 per cent in 2009. Understood as an anxiety about one’s or one’s group socio-​economic status. As theorized earlier, support for more radical political representation may arise from the perceived status frustration generated by capital-​state restructuring.

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108 ­chapter subjective status (steps 5 to 7). Moreover, in the issp 2014 survey the fn comes out as the absolute champion of French voters at the bottom of the social ladder (three lowest steps) –​25 per cent of the party’s electorate vs. 16 per cent for the Socialist Party and the Left Front each. When expanding the bottom section to five steps, the fn’s share grows to staggering 63 per cent (vs. 49 and 53 per cent for the Socialists and the Left Front, accordingly). This snapshot clearly indicates that the National Front has managed to attract voters from both the middle and working classes. Resounding the Hungarian case study, it implies that Le Pen’s voters are concerned both with status recognition and redistribution.18 The data from the cses 2007 and 2012 surveys complement and give nuance to these findings. While in 2007 the fn’s affiliates were split between the middle (48 per cent) and working (30 per cent) classes, in 2012 the proportion reversed drastically to 64 (working class) vs. 17 per cent (middle class).19 This was by far the biggest gap and the biggest party proletarization on the French political arena. It is hardly surprising, then, that the fn improved its electoral performance at that point after a temporary setback in 2007 (as shown in Figure 17).20 In sum, the fn found its new support among the working-​class voters, as they were made insecure by transformation of the French economy. Perrineau (1997) argues that the new support came from the former left-​wing electorate, while Mayer (2002) claims that it reflects broader depoliticization of French workers. Both these views are compatible with my finding that workers’ attraction to fn coincided with the erosion of unions and the Communist Party that historically sustained solidaristic identity of the French workers.21 18

19 20 21

In a similar vein, the qualitative study by Hentges et al. (2003) finds that the frustrations and feeling of injustice of the various strata of the French society –​small entrepreneurs, sections of working and middle classes –​were related to their need for social recognition and integration. Further, as observed in the Hungarian case study, the vote for the radical right followed the logic of “double demarcation” status struggle. Yet while in Hungary status threat came from above (Jews) and below (Gypsies), in France it developed within the working class between the “sections immediately below on the social ladder, who simultaneously embody competition and the threat of relegation (for example, immigrant workers), and the upper-​class sections, who personify an unattainable redeployment” (ibid.: 142). Current presidential election: vote choice –​1st round (cses 2007) and Current election: vote choice –​lower house (cses 2012). Sample size year: 2000 (2007); 2009 (2012). By way of comparison, the working/​middle class ratio for fn’s major political rivals in 2012 was as follows: 46 vs. 39 per cent for the Left Front; 46 vs. 40 per cent for the Socialist Party (social-​democrats); and 39 vs. 36 per cent for the ump (conservatives) (cses 2018). As summarized by Goodliffe (2013: 92): “By respectively defending their interests in the workplace and the political arena, the unions and pcf strove to improve workers’ social and political standing in French society … Thus, they served as ideological and cultural

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Goodliffe (2013) insists that the French working class was marginalized by de-​ industrialization and competition under the aegis of globalization. Taking a bit different approach, I go down one level of abstraction to emphasize the state-​driven nature of capitalist restructuring and ensuing vulnerability. Moreover, I have established that the National Front has maintained its traditional support among the middle classes (as has Jobbik in Hungary). As discussed earlier, there is substantial literature arguing that these strata are also threatened by socio-​economic changes because they have something to lose. In relation to this, Goodliffe (2013: 88, 99) highlights the core base of petits indépendants among the fn’s supporters –​shopkeepers, artisans, and small family firm owners –​who were later supplanted with industrial workers. The fn thus achieved two major things politically. First, it eclipsed the Communist party as a recipient of labour vote by forging an alliance between the petite bourgeoisie and the working class. Second, it offered an exclusionary “national renewal” solution as a basis of stable identification, meaning, and social reconnection for the groups who perceived a threat to their old identities from the renewed Polanyian transformation. My findings are supported with a vast array of qualitative interviews (Hentges et al. 2003) which show that French citizens became susceptible to right-​wing populist ideologies due to real or perceived déclassement or precariousness in the aftermath of neoliberal revolution and the absence of a strong political Left.22 3

National Front: Appeal and Politicization

To recapitulate the argument thus far, the French working-​class voters have increasingly turned to the National Front as the state has made them insecure through commodification reforms favouring capital. The people were deprived of their traditional collective (unions) and partisan (the Left) attachments. As a result, the exclusionary conception of national identity propelled by the fn became a new basis of identification.

22

agents of class consciousness, imbuing French workers with an interpretive framework by which to apprehend and relate to the broader society.” This is further supported by ethnographic studies. For example, in an auto-​ethnographic work Retour à Reims (“Return to Reims”) the French sociologist Didier Eribon (2018) reveals the working-​class nature of the radical right. The author documents how formerly pro-​Communist workers in a small town turned into supporters of the Front National (and were set in opposition to “foreigners” instead of “capitalists”) in view of the crisis of the Left.

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110 ­chapter Further, as with the middle-​class earlier, the fn has tapped into resentment of working-​class voters. It has sought to harness it by scapegoating non-​European immigrants on whom workers could transfer the blame for the decline in their socio-​economic status, and by offering the myth of a “pure France” to restore their confidence. At the same time, as measured earlier, the party shifted its economic stance from neo-​liberalism to “welfare chauvinism” to appeal to the working-​class audience who allegedly compete with immigrants for jobs and benefits.23 What remains to be discussed is facilitating factors for mobilizing French voters through a populist-​nationalist appeal. In line with the preceding analyses, I approach this piece of the puzzle from the supply-​side by utilizing the concept of the “political opportunity structure” (Tilly 1978; Kitschelt 1986; Snow and Benford 1988). As highlighted earlier, convergence of mainstream parties on the pro-​market ideology –​what Chantal Mouffe (2018) calls “post-​politics” –​is an opportunity for niche political actors to redress voters’ grievances not addressed by the establishment. This general argument applies well to France where a dual process of dealignment of the working class from the mainstream Left and its realignment towards neo-​nationalism (mainly right-​wing) took place. In this regard, it is telling that the fn drew the bulk of supporters from unaffiliated “ninistes” (Mayer 2002; cevipof 2018) (Figure 19). Furthermore, as the fn’s party manifestos, website headlines, and economic positions reveal, by the late 1990s this right-​wing party had incorporated the traditionally leftist agenda of economic regulation and redistribution into its manifestos, advocating for restoration of welfarist capacities of the state. This programmatic adaptation was also favoured by the 2008–​2009 economic recession and the Eurozone crisis.24 At first blush, then, the fn’s transformation validates the “bottom up” approach whereas political parties respond to voters’ socio-​economic preferences (Evans and de Graaf 2013).25

23 24

25

This instrumental explanation casts doubt on the direct causal relationship between immigration and the rise of the fn as inferred by researchers. It would be premature to infer, however, that French neo-​nationalism is fundamentally “Eurosceptic.” As Grunberg (2008) shows, despite lurking Euroscepticism, the French radical left (including the French Communist Party) was anti-​capitalist, rather than anti-​ European, or advocated for a “more social” Europe later. The radical right (the National Front) mostly politicized the issues of law and order as well as immigration. Moreover, voters were not driven by the issues related to the eu project or national sovereignty. To reiterate, I view the supply-​side conditions (such as the skillfulness and creativity of political entrepreneurs) as facilitating, rather than directly causal.

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­f igure 19  Favourable opportunity: the unaffiliated electorate in France  s ource: barometer of political confidence (cevipof) 2018.

The fn’s updated appeal on the socio-​economic dimension was accompanied with Marine Le Pen’s “de-​demonization” (dédiabolisation) strategy to improve the party’s image (Mayer 2018) that culminated in the expulsion of her father and the party’s founder Jean-​Marie Le Pen. fn’s “new clothes” included softening of rhetoric on the issues of racism, extremism, and anti-​Semitism. This allowed the party to improve its reputation, expand its electoral base, and improve support at the local, legislative, presidential, and European elections in the 2000s. Anti-​immigration rhetoric was softened as well; it was deployed no longer to sustain racial differentiation, but in defence of the secular idea of laïcité (Halikiopoulou et al. 2013: 122). It must be noted that the fn did not completely abandon its rightist position on cultural issues despite moderating its extreme edges. As expressed by Marine Le Pen herself in the run-​up for the 2017 presidential elections: “France is not about burkini, France is about Brigitte Bardot.”26 Thus, the second supply-​side factor, applicable to other right-​wing neo-​nationalists as well, emphasizes the “top down” strategy of accentuating the cultural cleavage and “normalizing” the rightist discourse (Mayer and Déloye 2017: 247, Abou-​Chadi 26

Other notorious examples are Le Pen’s comparing the people leaving mosques to the Nazi Occupation during the Second World War, or equating serving halal meat to the Islamization of the country. Goodliffe (2013: 100) suggests that such anti-​Muslim xenophobia has substituted earlier anti-​Semitism to keep the “old core” of the fn’s activists. From a comparative viewpoint, this dualistic rhetorical strategy resembles the shift of Jobbik’s discourse from anti-​Semitism to anti-​Gypsyism (see Chapter 5).

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112 ­chapter 2018). It is worth stressing, however, that the fn transcends such a “bottom-​ up/​top-​down” dichotomy: while the party acquired a leftist economic profile in response to voters’ demands, it has simultaneously sought to protect the French people defined so according to the exclusionary criteria of nationhood. In other words, the fn both led and followed. A related and final point is that the fn has profited from normalizing the “othering” discourse by the media and mainstream political actors such as Nicolas Sarkozy, for instance, who was willing to politicize immigration for electoral gain (Berezin 2013; Mondon 2015).27 In this manner, blaming the Other by the French political establishment ironically enhanced discursive opportunities for the fn. In combination with institutional opportunities such as organizational strength and a favourable two-​round electoral system, this enabled the fn to become an indispensable part of French politics. Overall, the success of the right-​wing populist nationalist National Front is explained by the congruence of structural, demand, and supply factors. The fn has provided an exclusivist ethno-​nationalist solution to the crisis generated by socio-​economic transformation of the French state and economy. The restructuring of the state and decreased role of government in providing for the public good has led to public discontent, which in turn has helped “reinflate” the myth of the organic nation. The fn has managed to crystallize the fears and insecurities of both the traditional left-​wing working-​class populations –​who were most disadvantaged and affected –​and the sections of middle-​class voters who felt threatened by sliding off the “winning track”. The fn has addressed these strata through a political discourse based on the distinction between those who belong and the “others.” The party’s carefully re-​crafted economic platform underpinned by state interventionism, combined with organizational strength and a favourable opportunity, made it a champion of the “people.” In sum, the National Front creatively combined organizational resources, political opportunities, and symbolic production –​in congruence with the perceived grievances produced by the state transformation –​to achieve 27

Another piece of evidence from public opinion highlights indirectly the instrumentality of immigration discourse. When asked in 2015 what the two most important issues facing the eu were, 49 per cent of the French respondents answered immigration and 27 per cent chose terrorism, the only two categories that showed an increase within one year. When asked the same question about their country, however, immigration as a central issue fell to 22 per cent, and unemployment appeared pertinent. And when asked about the two most important personal issues, immigration fell to 4 per cent and rising prices became the main problem, followed by taxation, pensions, and unemployment (cf. also Mondon 2015 on the eu).

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political mobilization through a populist nationalist frame. Despite the elites’ attempts to “humanize” socio-​economic restructuring with social and labour programmes, French citizens developed real or perceived distress that drove them to vote for the fn. This development was mediated by the specificities of the French political culture as discussed in the case study. Overall, the findings from French case support the thesis of the neo-​ nationalist blowback as a reaction against the deepening of the capital-​state. This conclusion refutes the post-​materialist interpretations of populist nationalism which focus on the transition from an industrial to a post-​industrial society (cf. Norris and Inglehart 2019). At the same time, the finding of the dual support-​base of working and middle classes challenge the structural-​level “modernization losers” theory (Betz 1994) which leaves out “winners” (middle class) from the picture.

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­c hapter 8

The Developmental Capital-​state Korean Progressivism

Neoliberal globalization principles … have not reversed the traditional nationalist development trajectory. Rather, the process has strengthened the state’s capacity. lee 2012: 158

∵ In this chapter, I focus on South Korea (hereinafter: Korea) which, similar to France, scores relatively low on the change in the capital-​state index. In view of the moderate degree of pro-​market restructuring, I would expect weak or absent neo-​nationalism in the Korean case. Indeed, no institutionalized populist nationalism developed in Korea, though left-​wing “progressive” parties displayed some elements of it.1 The absence of such political counter-​movement vindicates a Polanyian account for the Korean case. To recapitulate Karl Polanyi’s argument, societies would demand social protection against the process of marketization. The dialectic of double movement implies two intertwined processes: pro-​market disembedding and socializing re-​embedding. According to my capital-​state reformulation of this thesis, pro-​market restructuring of the state generates genuine grievances exploited by populist nationalists of both the Right and the Left. In what follows, I examine the structural changes in the Korean political economy, drawing on the developed capital-​state index, to understand the absence of neo-​nationalism. I contextualize and investigate the Korean case through the lens of the country’s distinct trajectory: the legacies of authoritarianism and developmentalism, contentious nature of labour, and unique socio-​ political cleavages. In doing so, I seek to firstly demonstrate that, in line with 1 Korea thus serves methodologically as a confirming negative case: slower rise of the capital-​ state and absent neo-​nationalism. By contrast, France challenged my theoretical expectations: Marine Le Pen’s Front National (fn) has been both electorally successful and persistent despite somewhat slow transformation of the French state into the capital-​state.

© Oleksandr Svitych, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004516229_009

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Polanyian logic, institutional change is always embedded in society. Secondly, I aim to uncover which mechanisms account for the absence of institutionalized neo-​nationalism. 1

Institutional Change and Continuity

The capital-​state trend in Korea is distinct from the other three cases: it takes off after the 1997 Asian financial crisis (Figure 20).2 This first critical juncture coincides with the adoption of a more neoliberal orientation by the Kim Dae-​ jung (1998–​2003) government as part of the imf’s bailout loan. The overall change in the Korean csi is the smallest among the four country-​cases in this book and one of the lowest across the oecd. However, convergence accelerated with the second critical juncture –​the global financial crisis of 2008 –​as pro-​market policies gained further traction during the Lee Myung-​bak (2008–​ 2013) administration. There is a broad consensus in the political economy literature that Korea’s “economic miracle” since the early 1960s was the result of government intervention and policy-​making. Hence scholars have identified Korea as a “developmental state” (Johnson 1982; Haggard and Moon 1990). There has been a debate nonetheless over the degree of Korea’s transformation in the late globalization period. Some scholars claim that the state has become more neoliberal and less regulative (Minns 2001; Lee and Han 2006; Lim and Jang 2006; Pirie 2012, Um et al. 2014). Others insist that the government still leads development of the economy (Wong 2004; Cherry 2005; Chu 2009, Lee 2012; Suh and Kwon 2014) and enhancement of welfare (Kwon 2007). Korea’s csi bears more balanced evidence, suggesting a limited form of convergence toward the capital-​state under the global economic pressures. As Daniel Šitera (2014) put it, the post-​crises institutional change transformed Korean model from developmentalist and state dirigisme to “embedded neoliberalism.” As neoliberalization attempted to replace state planning with market-​based coordination, the process was countered by the social forces invested in the institutional legacy of the developmental state. As a result, the state-​bank-​chaebol nexus was not abolished, but reshaped, wherein the state no longer planned but permeated the economy (Šitera 2014: 84). 2 I attribute the high (and relatively flat) levels of the csi prior to 1997 to the country’s unique state-​chaebol-​alliance. Part of the broader “statist” approach to governing the economy, it involved close collaboration between government and business circles, as well as exclusion of labour from policy-​making (Shonfield 1965; Levy et. al. 2008, 361–​362).

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116 ­chapter

­f igure 20  Capital-​state and Korean progressivism Note: Vote share won by progressive parties in the legislative elections in Korea: Democratic Labour Party (dlp) and Unified Progressive Party (upp).  s ource: author’s calculation based on the capital-​s tate index and the “parliaments and governments” database (www.parl​ gov.org).

It may be argued that the adoption of the segyehwa (globalization) ideology in the early 1990s and the outbreak of the 1997 Asian financial crisis, followed by imf liberalization policies, loosened Korea’s economic nationalist strategy, as represented visually by the rising csi in Figure 20. Yet as mentioned, this rise is one of the smallest across the oecd camp. And a closer look at the changes in the Korean political economy shows that the state has continued to play a key role in economic planning and welfare provision (cf. also Dent 2003; Lim 2010; Lee 2012; Suh and Kwon 2014).3 In other words, the Korean state has not fully mutated into the capital-​state, even though there has been a clear shift in that direction. The government retained the logic of developmentalism in combination with transition toward the neoliberal capital-​state and introduction of the Keynesian welfare state. The developmental state was readjusted, rather than replaced, producing a distinct variegation of the capitalist institutional setting. Indeed, disaggregating the Korean capital-​state index allows us to trace and give nuance to this ambivalent mix of change and continuity via specific provisions and regulations.

3 To borrow Hall’s (1993: 278) three-​order typology, the policy instruments and means changed, while the overarching goals did not. On policy paradigms as sets of economic ideas, see also Blyth (2002: 10–​11) and Clift (2014: 157–​159).

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While the aggregate Korean capital-​state index did not rise dramatically between 1980 and 2015 –​except for the period following the 1997 financial crisis –​the aggregate data may overlook important subtleties. Thus, the intrusion sub-​index goes up for a short period between 1986 and 1989, stays flat until the 1997 drop during the Asian financial crisis, and recovers with a continuous gradual rise thereafter. As an extended version of Polanyi’s commodification of livelihood, intrusion refers to private-​based provisions for welfare and household, reflecting the transfer of social risks onto individuals. In the Korean case, the biggest change comes from the indicator for household indebtedness –​from 12 points in 1980 to 60 points in 2015. The related indicator for the oecd house pricing index displays high value already in 1986 (65 points), reaches the maximum score of 83 in 1990, and decreases sharply to 33 points in 1999. By contrast, private social expenditure also rose at first from 3 index points in 1990 to 20 points in 1996 but flattened out thereafter. As a cumulative result, the composite sub-​component (house) –​the mean of the three measures above –​had trended up from 12 to 52 points by 1989, followed by a decline and a gradual recovery to 42 points after the Asian financial crisis. Overall, then, recalibration between the state and market along the intrusion dimension has been modest in Korea, indicating a retained role of the government in steering the economy. The Asian financial crisis also seems to be a turning point for private expenditure on healthcare and education. The former had gone down from 32 to 20 points by 1998, recovering to 37 points by 2015, or 3.2 per cent of gdp on non-​government schemes and household out-​of-​pocket payments. As of 2015, this was the 2nd highest proportion of private expenditure on healthcare in oecd after the US. Conversely, marketization of education in Korea had risen from 50 to 78 points by 1996 and declined thereafter with another increase in 2013. In 2015, it ranked 3rd highest after Australia and Chile, while the cumulative 1980–​2015 average score is an oecd all-​high. To give a specific manifestation of this trend, the earlier developmental state banned elite schools and private tutoring which were deemed to create extra pressure on households and unwanted inequalities in education. Since the 1990s, however, private education was gradually legalized to promote competitive individualism (Šitera 2014: 95). Related to these developments, Park (2004) highlights an increase in contracting out municipal public services to private providers in Korea since the mid-​1990s, and Pirie (2012) points out the growth of joint public–​private partnerships and relaxation of restrictions on running hospitals as for-​profit organizations. It is remarkable that the ratio of private to public healthcare expenditure in Korea was the biggest in the entire oecd region up until 1997

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118 ­chapter when the US took over. On the other hand, the growth in public expenditure was unprecedented as well: from 0.7 percent of gdp in 1980 (vs. oecd average of 4.6) to 4.2 percent in 2015 (vs. oecd average of 6.5). In a similar vein, the oecd data show clearly that increases in private education costs and social expenditure were matched with expansion of public provisioning, albeit low in absolute spending terms. In sum, while several reforms were taken in the wake of the financial crisis towards marketization of the public sphere, the Korean public welfare state deepened synchronously. Building on the social safety net introduced by Kim Dae-​jung, president Roh Moo-​hyun (2003–​2008) articulated a “participatory” approach of redistribution towards the workers, the unemployed, and the poor alongside economic growth, instead of just growth as in the earlier developmental state (Chang 2009: 181; Lee 2012). The analysis of the collusion dimension reveals both similarities with and differences from the Western states. As an extended version of Polanyi’s commodification of labour, collusion represents flexibilization of labour in favour of capital. Under the Park Chung-​hee administration of the 1960s, the Korean state developed corporatist and authoritarian structures. A unique characteristic of Korea’s trajectory was the “developmental alliance” between the state and big businesses (chaebol) behind economic and social policies (Wade 1990; Hundt 2009; Fleckenstein et al. 2017). Quantitatively, this is reflected in high values of the collusion sub-​index in Korea’s csi. Chaebols –​family-​owned and managed conglomerates such as Samsung, Hyundai, sk, Daewoo, and lg –​propelled Korea’s export-​driven growth through state aid, loans and benefits, and the control of labour in the 1970s and 1980s (Deyo 1987; Lee 2012; Kim 2018). Even though the state promoted business interests, however, it had the “upper hand” (Holliday and Wilding 2003: 35). The governments set industrial targets, directed lending and protection for chaebols, and regulated financial capital flows through bank control; these policies were accompanied with a tight grip on the corporate sector. As Kim Woo-​choong, former chairman of Daewoo group, described it: “The government tells you it is your duty and you have to do it, even if there is no profit” (Harris 1987: 151). In short, in such an “embedded autonomous” model, as aptly conceptualized by Peter Evans (1995), the state led, and chaebols followed. A related feature of Korea’s development strategy was hard-​working and low-​ cost labour disciplined by the state, seen as a prerequisite for export-​oriented industrialization. As Song (2002:198) highlighted, the state and employers saw unions and labour strikes as a danger to social stability and economic growth and considered dissenting workers to be imbued with pro-​socialist and communist sentiments. As a result, organized labour in the form of trade unions

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was excluded from the political decision-​making (Buchanan and Nicholls 2003; Fleckenstein et al. 2017).4 The Korean collusion sub-​index maps well onto this historical background. Although there is a general rising trend, the scale of restructuring appears less pronounced in comparison with other oecd states. There is an initial increase in the sub-​index between 1982 and 1986 from 64 to 74 index points, followed by a drop and a gradual recovery after the Asian financial crisis. The drop can be attributed to the 1987 Great Workers’ Struggle which led to improvements in the working conditions and formation of democratic unions. The biggest change comes from the cortax variable (34 to 72 index points), corresponding to the corporate tax reduction from 40 per cent in 1980 to 22 per cent in 2015. While trade union density (unidens) changed only slightly from 90 to 95 points, in absolute terms this corresponds to rather thin rates of 14.7 per cent in 1980 and 10.1 per cent in 2015 –​the lowest numbers across the oecd after Turkey and France. By contrast, flexibilization of labour (labflex), measured through deregulation of dismissal legislation for regular and temporary employment contracts, rose from 42 to 59 index points after the adoption of imf-​recommended policies by Kim Dae-​jung in the wake of the Asian Financial crisis. In the same manner, while the Lee Myung-​bak administration announced the Five-​Year-​ Plan for Green Growth as a response to the Global crisis, it was based on flexible and short-​term jobs (Chang et al. 2012). Growing wage inequality and job insecurity began to complement wage equality, stable employment, and leaning towards collective justice. Such incremental Polanyian commodification created a dualism in the Korean labour market. On the one hand, there were core workers who could still enjoy regular long-​term employment, protection, and socio-​economic stability. On the other hand, there were non-​regular employees who could be bought at the lowest price and laid off easily (Šitera 2014: 90). Overall, then, there has been a gradual shift toward the capital-​state form of governance along the collusion dimension. The scope of restructuring was limited and instrumental, as attested both by the presented indicators and existing research (e.g. Lee 2012). As noted above, it was matched with the adoption of welfare measures to assist low-​income earners and the newly 4 These repressive measures against labour backfired with the formation of new democratic unions –​actively assisted by students and intellectuals –​following the 1987 nation-​wide strike (Webster et al. 2008: ch. 6). The long-​standing conflict between the Korean Trade Union Congress (ktuc) formed in 1990, on the one side, and employers and the state on the other, culminated in the formation of the Democratic Labour Party (dlp) in 2000.

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120 ­chapter unemployed (Suh and Kwon 2014). At the same time, a gradual institutional reconfiguration into the capital-​state took place. The process manifested itself in the substitution of market discipline for labour control (Chang 2003), the emergence of “chaebol-​centred developmentalism” in place of “developmental citizenship” (Chang 2012), the rise in non-​permanent labour (Pirie 2012; Kim 2018), and its dissent against precariousness. The basis of the old developmental state model was preserved nevertheless, prompting scholars to highlight the strengthening capacity, rather than retreat, of the Korean state within the “neo-​developmental” paradigm (Kim 2007; Cho 2008; Kalinowski and Cho 2009). In comparison, the values in the extrusion dimension of the Korean csi are low and rise gradually to 36 index points in 2015, especially after the Asian financial crisis. As an extension of Polanyi’s commodification of money, extrusion stands for deregulation and transnationalization of the financial sector. As of 2015, Korea’s extrusion score was the lowest in oecd after Iceland, Mexico, and Slovenia. The values along the indicators measuring dismantling of controls over financial flows increased at the rate below the oecd average. Remarkably, the values of the capinflow variable remained the lowest after Turkey throughout the 1980–​2015 period. As for the score of the topinc indicator (top 1 per cent national income share), it doubled from 18 index points in 1997 to 37 points in 2015. As in the previous case studies, I find a strong and significant association between this indicator and the intrusion (r =​0.73, p < 0.01) and collusion (r =​0.74, p < 0.01) dimensions of the Korean capital-​state index. Quantitatively, this supports Kim’s (2018) argument that Korea’s growing polarization is driven by social exclusion of non-​ regular workers who miss out, together with their children, on opportunities for better life. As with intrusion (marketization of welfare) and collusion (flexibilization of labour), the data on extrusion demonstrate that the Korean developmental state tradition did not dissolve despite the creeping institutional reconfiguration into the capital-​state, thus supporting the argument of “contingent national state adaptation processes” in the literature on comparative capitalisms (Clift 2014: 313). To be sure, financial liberalization was indeed set in motion by Kim Young-​sam’s segyehwa growth strategy and the 1994 “100 Day Plan for the New Economy.” Besides the developments captured by the extrusion sub-​index, a new independent financial regulatory authority and a more autonomous central bank were created (Pirie 2012). However, only limited progress with economic liberalization was made, as the csi data show, due to resistance from the chaebol, bureaucratic inertia, and entrenched economic

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nationalism (Dent 2000).5 And as Lee (2012: 164) argues, liberalization was implemented instrumentally to catch up with the advanced economies in the West and qualify for oecd membership, which Korea acquired in 1996. Importantly, the Korean policy-​makers interpreted “globalization” as increasing exports (in continuity with Park Chung-​hee’s policies) and outward fdi, as could be seen from Korea’s booming investments in Southeast Asian countries (Sachwald 2001). This observation fits neatly with the above finding of the low capital inflows into the country. Overall, the segyehwa drive appeared more rhetorical than substantive, and the dirigiste industrial policy-​making was retained. Similarly, although the 1997 crisis brought about further financial liberalization of the Korean political economy under the auspices of the imf, it was administered through “massive state intervention” (Kalinowski and Cho 2009: 229). As Kim (2007: 25) observed, these governments saw “no contradictions between (instrumental) nationalism and (instrumental) globalization; rather they all viewed globalization as the most expeditious way of developing a national identity of Korea as an advanced world-​class nation state.” The Polanyian approach thus serves as a corrective to the varieties of capitalism approach discussed in Chapter 3 (cf. also Šitera 2014). Whereas the VoC approach focuses on firms and reduces states to passive supporters of employers’ interests, the pre-​crises Korean authoritarian regime had steered the economy in favour of chaebols while simultaneously subjugating them. The institutional changes in the post-​crisis periods were also steered by the state. This exposes the analytical limits of the VoC approach which does not recognize hybrid models. Finally, as Šitera (2014) points out, the VoC framework stresses the national/​global dichotomy and treats globalization as a cause of exogenous shocks. In contrast, since the 1990s the Korean elites promoted the paradigm of segyehwa (globalization) from within the state. 2

Progressivism in Lieu of Neo-​nationalism

The capital-​state index substantiates the claim that Korea has retained the legacy of the developmental state along the simultaneous gradual shift towards the capital-​state in the post-​Asian financial crisis period. The new 5 As summarized by Gill (1999): “The imperative of supporting Chaebol global strategies proved stronger than that of economic liberalization, and that replacing statist, neo-​mercantalist forms with ‘competitive capitalism’ in Korea’s political economy was generally unworkable” (cited in Dent 2000: 283).

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122 ­chapter political-​economic processes began to gradually dislocate the developmental society. Korean citizens have had mixed perceptions towards these changes. Academic and columnist Kim Seong-​kun put it thus: “Our economic system is capitalist, our social structure is socialist, and our mindsets are communist. We adopt capitalism for our economic development, but strive for socialist welfare and demand equal distribution of wealth” (Kim 2014). In a 2008 international survey, 86 percent of Koreans indicated unfair distribution of the benefits and burdens of economic development (Jones and Urasawa 2012: 5).Yet, despite the ostensibly increased social precariousness and inequality (Lee and Han 2006; Lim and Jang 2006), a fully-​fledged neo-​nationalist reaction on the Left or the Right was unlikely due to a combination of historical, institutional, and discursive factors. To understand the absence of neo-​nationalism in South Korea, it is important to consider the peculiarities of the country’s party politics, electoral competition, and socio-​economic cleavages that structure them. Following Lipset and Rokkan’s seminal study (1967), the political science literature has highlighted the critical influence of social cleavages –​distributive (economic policy preferences), socio-​cultural (individualist vs. collectivist) and ethno-​ cultural (ascriptive “friend-​foe” distinctions) –​on party system formation, voters’ preferences, and electoral performance. Yet as a late industrializer and a “late bloomer,” Korea is an outlier (Ufen 2012). Researchers identified other cleavages in the region, especially salient before the democratization period. These are: regionalism and personalism (with political candidates receiving support depending on the region of origin); ideology (attitudes towards North Korea and the US foreign policy), the urban-​rural divide; and the democratic (civilian)-​authoritarian (military) divide (Heo and Stockton 2005; Kim 2010; Wang 2012; Hellmann 2014; Kim and Park 2018; Lee 2018). Traditionally, political leaders viewed parties as “disposable vehicles for their personal electoral ambitions” (Heo and Stockton 2005: 685), while deeply embedded Confucianism rendered individuals’ regional ties a critical element of identity (Lee 2018). In addition, the Korean and Cold Wars marginalized the leftist ideology, obfuscating the differences between communism and social democracy, and preventing labour unions from political engagement up until the 2000s (Kim et al. 2008). These historical legacies and institutional constrains had a profound impact on political mobilization. Korean parties have been less differentiated in their ideologies and platforms, and less likely to make “programmatic effort” (Wang 2012; Lee 2018). The combination of late development and poorly institutionalized political space, combined with the government’s retained capacity to steer the economy and society as established above, made the rise of populist radical challengers

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unlikely. The role of left-​wing parties and electoral competition after democratization made this even more difficult. Unlike France, Australia, or Hungary, Korean left-​wing forces, such as the Democratic Labour Party (dlp) and its successor the Unified Progressive Party (upp), appeared much later and did not converge with the Right on pro-​market policies. Rooted in the democratic and labour uprisings of the late 1980s and the formation of the Korean Confederation of Trade Unions (kctu), dlp was established in 2000 and gained 13 per cent of the vote at the 2004 general election, capitalizing on the post-​1997 reforms and the new proportional representation law. dlp represented the marginalized “underclass”6 –​workers, farmers, and the urban poor –​and opposed the ruling conservative Grand National Party’s policies, from privatization of public utilities to hostility towards North Korea (Chang 2009; Lee 2018). By 2014 when it was forced to shut down, the party had pulled the Korean political spectrum to the left and helped consolidate the political arena intro more pluralistic three-​stream ideological space: conservatives, liberals, and progressives (Steinberg and Shin 2006: 535; Hellmann 2014: 60). Importantly, by becoming “the champion of the welfare state,” the political Left forced other parties to sharpen their programmatic and ideological positions, and galvanized competitive politics (Wang 2012; Hellmann 2014; Fleckenstein et al. 2017). The mainstream parties, aided by the diminishing effect of regionalism and the growing importance of young voters, began outbidding each other on the pledges of expanded social protection and welfare benefits (Hellmann 2014; Lee 2018), which left little potential for more radical populist contestation. These developments also indicate the growing salience of the class and generational cleavages in the Korean society (Kim 2010; Kim and Park 2018). In sum, it may be claimed that, in its socio-​political stance, the Korean political Left displayed some affinity with the ideas of Western social democracy. Consequently, lacking the elements of populism and radicalism, it falls outside the conceptualization of (left-​wing) neo-​nationalism adopted in this book. The dlp and upp parties were outsider challengers nonetheless: they mounted a third alternative to the liberal-​conservative system of the post-​democratization 6 Quantitative evidence reveals a more nuanced picture. According to the World Values Survey, dlp’s constituency comprised 22 per cent of the working class in 2009 and 28 per cent in 2014 –​indeed the highest proportion across the entire Korea party spectrum. The same result emerges from the 2008 and 2012 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems post-​election surveys. In the wvs 2009 and cses 2008 surveys dlp also comes up as the biggest champion of the “upper class” (wvs) or “white collar” (cses) groups.

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124 ­chapter period, and they operated under the communist-​socialist “anathema.” Thus, analytically they could be treated as a nascent form of Polanyian counter-​ movement against the encroachment of the market (see Figure 20). Yet as Hahm (2008: 133) argues, starting with the Kim Dae-​jung’s administration, left-​ leaning policies were accepted as “legitimate alternative tools for governance rather than as subversive ideologies.” In the terminology of political opportunity structures (Koopmans and Statham 1999), the Korean Left had moved from: pre-​emption by the elites in the late 1990s; through co-​optation in the 2000s; to marginalization in the 2010s.7 Concurrently, there have been limited prospects for a right-​wing neo-​ nationalist mobilization due to the country’s low exposure to immigration, degree of foreign population, and salience of racial and ethnic cleavages (iom 2015; Lim and Tanaka 2017: 9), combined with positive public attitudes towards foreigners, immigrants, and minorities (Yoon et al. 2008) and favourable migration and citizenship policies (Pedroza and Mosler 2018). In addition, the current strong nationalist discourse, exemplified by Korea’s anti-​Japanism (Kelly 2015), may crowd out neo-​nationalist alternatives. Moreover, admittedly distancing themselves from the authoritarian legacy, large portions of Korean society place themselves on the left side of the political spectrum.8 The absence of neo-​nationalism in Korea highlights the importance of social context in interpreting national development trajectories. Compared with other oecd states, the rise of the capital-​state was not as drastic in Korea due to the entrenched paradigm of developmentalism. In tandem with few institutional and discursive opportunities, this did not leave space for alternative institutional political representations. Instead, Polanyian counter-​movement in Korea manifested itself in the rich history of worker strikes, culminating with the so-​called June uprising which put an end to the authoritarian regime in the late 1980s. More recently, counter-​movements appeared with the 2008 and 2017 “candlelight protests” against the government. The former was sparkled as a reaction to the government’s decision to reopen South Korea’s beef market to the US. While the protest origins lie in the critique of neoliberalism within the Korean leftist circles (Kang 2008; Kim 2009), they focused on the effects of the government’s policies on people’s daily lives (Lee et al. 2010). As such, then, they should be seen as “a response 7 See also Figure 16 in Chapter 6. 8 According to the data from the World Values survey, while only 20 per cent of the Korean respondents positioned themselves on the left in 1984, the number jumped to 57 per cent in 1998, followed by a drop to 49 per cent in 2009 and a recovery to 58 per cent in 2014 (Aggregated responses 1–​5 on the 0–​10 scale).

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to the reinforced contradictions engendered by neoliberalization and a new alignment of social groups against the prevailing hegemonic conditions in South Korea” (ibid.: 1). The second protest was triggered by the “Choi Soon-​sil gate” of 2016–​2017 leading to the ousting of president Park Geun-​hye accused of embezzlement and collusion with the country’s biggest chaebols. Yet while the protests may have had a lot to do with the specifics of the Park’s regime, “frustrations and grievances had clearly accumulated over the years” (Kim 2018: 290). As but one example, Webster et al. (2009) documented this simmering discontent in their ethnographic study of irregular workers in Changwon, a microcosm representing the growing tensions between labour and capital –​the latter aided by the state’s flexibilization policies. The findings from the Korean capital-​state index support this trend. John Delury (2017) highlighted the peaceful nature of the protest and the power of direct action to overthrow a president. In this regard, the Korean counter-​reaction appears a more progressive and civic manifestation of Polanyian “double-​movement” compared to the Western reactionary politics of (pre-​dominantly) right-​wing neo-​nationalism. Hence, the Korean case, like all the other cases discussed in the book, underlines the contingency and historical specificity of national responses to the global transformation processes. As Tilly (2006: 420) observed, “all political processes occur in history and therefore call for knowledge of their historical contexts.” Korea’s entrenched interventionist political economic tradition accounts for modest capital-​state reconfiguration. The Korean Democratic Labour and Unified Progressive parties displayed elements of left-​wing neo-​ nationalism, yet dissolved or were banned by 2014.9 No horizontal polarization of identity was exploited, and electoral competition with the left-​wing parties stimulated the deepening of the welfare state by all incumbent administrations after the Asian financial crisis. 9 Left-​wing political contestation is alive, nonetheless. The (Progressive) Justice Party, founded in 2012 as a split from the upp, gained 7.2 per cent vote share in the 2016 elective elections, and 6.2 per cent in the 2017 presidential election.

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­c hapter 9

Conclusion

The Pandemic and Beyond

Given that populism often asks the right questions but provides the wrong answers, the ultimate goal should be not just the destruction of populist supply, but also the weakening of populist demand. mudde and kaltwasser 2017: 118

∵ The thrust of this book has been to understand neo-​nationalism from a critical political economic perspective. Drawing inspiration from Karl Polanyi’s “double movement” thesis, I have developed the capital-​state theory to explain populist nationalism as the consequence of pro-​market state transformation and declining state legitimacy under the auspices of neoliberal globalization. I relied on Polanyian insights to chart the links between the capital-​state transformation and the rise of neo-​nationalist politics. The book has argued that populist nationalism is successful because it taps into a popular demand for controlling the markets while re-​asserting the power of the state. In this chapter, I bring together the findings of the book into a unified whole. In addition, I also discuss the trends and prospects of the capital-​state during the coronavirus conjuncture. Overall, this project combines number-​ crunching with storytelling to expose a critical role of the state in creating permissive conditions for the rise and persistence of populist nationalism. It provides a compelling narrative of neo-​nationalism as a “double assault from economy and state” (Burawoy 2006: 365), tying together the scholarships on state transformations, public opinion and voters’ experience, party politics and competition, and critical theory. By highlighting the structural and reproductive power of the capital-​ state, the book helps evaluate prospects for alternatives to capitalism and the neo-​nationalist struggle over belonging and meaning.

© Oleksandr Svitych, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004516229_010

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Conclusion: The Pandemic and Beyond

1

The Neo-​nationalist Blowback against the Capital-​state

In this book, I have defined neo-​ nationalism as an assertive identity-​ maintenance project at the intersection of nationalism, populism, and radicalism. I have pursued and supported the argument that neo-​nationalism is driven by a large-​scale incremental process of the renewed Polanyian “great transformation” wherein the nation-​state is being reconstituted into the capital-​state, understood as the latest paradigm of state development distinguished by the intensive state-​enabled commodification favouring the interests of capital over public ones. According to the capital-​state theory, neo-​ nationalism unfolds as a protective counter-​movement against this process. By choosing populist nationalist solutions, citizens assuage their anxieties and insecurities caused by marketization of state and society. I have tested and supported the validity of these propositions through a mixed methods approach of quantitative analysis and qualitative case studies. Specifically, in this book I developed the time-​series cross-​sectional capital-​ state index (csi); conducted an aggregate comparative statistical analysis as a plausibility probe; and executed a regression analysis to explore the linkages between the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism. My estimates showed that the capital-​state is a significant and powerful predictor of the neo-​nationalist vote, controlling for alternative explanations such as globalization, immigration, inequality, and membership in the eu or nafta. This provided preliminary evidence of a Polanyian counter-​movement expressed in the form of politically channelled discontent. Building on this evidence, I conducted four qualitative country case studies to explore the mechanisms that link macro-​ economic transformations to neo-​nationalist voting. I traced the respective capital-​state indices to expose the contingency and historical specificity of national “double-​movements,” combined with the analysis of individual-​and constituency-​level electoral surveys to track voters’ support for neo-​nationalist parties. I also supplemented the narrative with the existing qualitative interviews, ethnographic, and focus group studies. In tandem, these methods and sources allowed to demonstrate how socio-​ economic developments, citizens’ perceptions, and parties’ political strategy interact to produce neo-​nationalism. In line with the book’s theoretical argument, I established that populist nationalism of both the Left and the Right emerged to compensate for the real and perceived inability of the state to shield citizens from the corrosive effects of market fundamentalism. I also showed that three micro-​level mechanisms –​nostalgia, relative deprivation, and status frustration –​account for citizens’ predispositions toward the neo-​nationalist camp. Furthermore, I demonstrated that populist nationalist solutions were

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128 ­chapter provided as a coping strategy for this experience, and anti-​immigrant appeals have been used to cement the alliance of voters from different social classes. Hungary represented a confirming case where the rise of the capital-​state was matched by the rise of neo-​nationalism. I used this case to illustrate my transformation-​protection theory and exposed a congruence of three processes: a) sweeping capital-​state restructuring in the wake of post-​communist transition; b) ensuing perceptions of material and social dispossession by sections of working and middle classes; c) Jobbik ‘s politicization of this latent discontent by portraying itself as the only force capable of recapturing the state to the advantage of citizens. The party repositioned itself as a moderate national conservative force, thus challenging the hegemony of Fidesz that, conversely, had slipped from the centre of the political spectrum toward the extremes. Several other cases in my dataset fall into this confirming category, including Central and Eastern European states such as the Czech Republic, Estonia, Slovakia, and Slovenia; southern European countries such as Greece, Ireland, Italy, Portugal; the Scandinavian states Finland and Sweden; and other oecd members such as Iceland, Israel, New Zealand, and the US. Australia represented a deviant case where neo-​nationalism did not persist despite the capital-​state restructuring. Here, the free-​market doctrine of “economic rationalism” formed a fertile breeding ground for Pauline Hanson’s One Nation’s vision of a “Fortress Australia” to harness voters’ fears of material and social displacement. Yet, although the onp managed to enter the Australian political space, it lost its influence due to its inefficient organizational structure. Moreover, on the discursive opportunity side, mainstream political actors had “suffocated” the onp’s populist message by borrowing its ethno-​exclusivist appeal. Some other countries where neo-​nationalism did not develop or reduced with time despite the high degree of the capital-​state include Chile, Luxembourg, and New Zealand. France was another instance of a disconfirming case with surging neo-​ nationalism despite the relatively moderate capital-​state restructuring. Front National eclipsed the Communist party as a recipient of the labour vote by forging an alliance between the middle and working classes. The party offered an exclusionary “national renewal” solution as a basis of identification, meaning, and belonging for citizens who perceived their old shared identities as fractured or threatened by the transformation of the French economy to “post-​dirigisme.” Other countries in this disconfirming category are Austria, Denmark, Latvia, Mexico, Netherlands, Spain, and Turkey. Finally, South Korea was the second case where my transformation-​ protection theory was corroborated. Few prospects for neo-​ nationalism emerged in view of the remaining legacy of developmentalism, the increasing

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role of the state in welfare provision, the influence of progressive parties, and a poorly institutionalized political space. Some other states in this category of low degrees of the capital-​state and low neo-​nationalism include Belgium, Canada, Germany, Japan, and Norway. In sum, by showing the similarity of political processes in different settings –​while paying attention to national contexts –​this book increases the breadth and depth of our understanding of neo-​nationalism. Several threads link the findings from each of the cases (Table 11). Firstly, segments of both the working and middle classes were made insecure in the aftermath of capital-​state transition underpinned by a common logic of institutional change: transfer of risks in the provision of public goods and sustaining households, flexibilization of labour markets, and financialization of economies. While working-​class constituencies were mostly affected by the transition, portions of the middle class also perceived a threat to their social standing and called for protection. This indicates that supporters of the radical right are concerned with both redistribution and recognition –​in contrast to the argument that redistribution issues boost support for the radical left only (cf. Fraser and Honneth 2004; Rovny 2012; Rooduijn et al. 2017). Secondly, the country cases reveal that radical politics have been facilitated by the pro-​market convergence of the mainstream centre-​left and centre-​right parties on the socio-​economic dimension, what Chantal Mouffe has termed as “post-​politics” (Mouffe 2018; cf. also Revelli 2019). South Korea is an exception that proves the rule: in contrast to European and Australian counterparts, the progressive parties sharpened their welfarist ideologies and programs, thus pre-​empting left-​wing populist nationalist mobilization. On a related note, as the result of such convergence, both Jobbik in Hungary, Front National in France, and One Nation Party in Australia –​while remaining right-​leaning on the socio-​cultural dimension –​incorporated the traditionally leftist agenda of economic regulation and redistribution into their manifestos, shifting their economic positions from neo-​liberalism to “welfare chauvinism.” Finally, the statistical analysis and case studies revealed that the perceptions of social dislocation reinforced the need to sharpen social boundaries. Through blaming the “Other,” populist nationalist entrepreneurs have sought to channel away the frustrations of middle-​and working-​class voters who are discontent with the experience of socio-​economic decline and feeling of betrayal by the elites, rather than are essentially intolerant towards minorities and foreign cultures. This finding goes against the direct causal relationship between immigration or economic decline and right-​wing neo-​nationalism as inferred by researchers. Instead, this book provides evidence that right-​ wing neo-​nationalism is the product of the capital-​state restructuring in the

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The rise of the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism: key findings

1. oecd average value of the capital-​state index (csi) rose from 27 to 49 points between 1980 and 2015, driven largely by the sub-​index of collusion (flexibilization of labour). 2. There are substantial variations in the country csi s, which challenges the homogenization argument popular among globalization scholars (e.g. Ohmae 1995; Guehenno 1996; Cerny 1997; Jessop 2002). At the same time, by 2015 there have been shifts toward the higher end of the csi s, which challenges the varieties of capitalism approach (Hall and Soskice 2001). 3. The oecd average neo-​nationalist vote rose from 3.4 to 15.8 per cent between 1980 and 2015. Although left-​wing neo-​nationalism has prevailed in absolute terms, right-​wing neo-​nationalism has surged at a much faster rate. 4. Many right-​wing neo-​nationalist parties are left leaning on the economic dimension, albeit in an exclusivist “welfare chauvinist” manner. 5. A one-​point increase in the capital-​state index leads to a 0.5 per cent increase in the neo-​nationalism vote share (driven by the right-​wing camp), controlling for the effects of globalization, unemployment, immigration, inequality, and membership in the eu or nafta. 6. The supporters of neo-​nationalist parties have experienced the capital-​ state restructuring through nostalgia, relative deprivation, and status frustration. Resentment is felt and channelled both upward to the elites and downward to the minorities. 7. Both the working class and sections of the middle class have had this experience, which challenges the “modernization losers” theory (Betz 1993, 1994). “Winners” also support neo-​nationalists, as they perceive a threat to their socio-​economic standing. 8. There is interaction between the insecurity manufactured by the state and the negative perceptions of the “Other,” as supported by the evidence from both the cross-​national interactive regression model and country-​case studies. 9. Neo-​nationalist entrepreneurs both: a) tap into middle-​and working-​ class voters’ demand for social protection generated by the capital-​ state transformation (“bottom-​up”); and b) offer nationalist solutions, often in exclusionary variants, to harness voters’ fears and frustrations (“top-​down).” 10. Discursive capacity is not enough; organizational strength matters. In case of unfavourable political opportunity structures and “closed supply,” the neo-​nationalist vote either does not materialize or fades away.

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absence of leftist alternatives. Neo-​nationalists are successful in articulating radical change precisely because they translate economic decline into loss of identity and status. Even more importantly, then, the book shows that the political economy of neo-​nationalism is intertwined with cultural values. This conclusion also challenges the post-​materialist interpretation of populist nationalism (Norris and Inglehart 2019) and the structural-​level “modernization losers” theory (cf. Betz 1994). 2

Contributions and Implications

This book explains the success of populist nationalism as the outcome of the replacement of state sovereignty by the sovereignty of the market. Its findings resonate with recent scholarship that interprets populist nationalism as a critique of “economism” (Holmes 2018), a societal “catharsis” (Azmanova 2018), an emancipatory counter-​movement (Fraser 2017), and a reaction to the crisis of the neoliberal hegemony (Mouffe 2018; Revelli 2019). The project’s first contribution is adapting and applying a Polanyian political economic perspective to the study of neo-​nationalism. While Polanyian “double movement” is a useful initial heuristic for understanding socio-​economic transformations, it suffers from the lack of specified causal mechanisms on how society protects itself against the market. By using the Polanyian thesis as the starting point of theoretical development and reformulating it into the capital-​state theory, the present book outlined the mechanisms of change at three levels: the macro (structural institutional) level of the capital-​state; the micro (social demand) level of voters’ needs and perceptions; and the meso (political supply) level of political entrepreneurship. This work therefore develops a multi-​layered account of neo-​nationalism that focuses on macro-​ contextual elements, while also examining the interplay between the “demand” and the “supply” sides. In this way it enriches the Polanyian understanding of the relation between economy and society, adding nuances to the somewhat functionalist notion that commodification of social life would automatically lead to counter-​movements. The second contribution comes from the notion of the capital-​state that adds to the International Relations literature on the transformations of the state (Soederberg et al. 2005; Levy 2006a; Cerny 2011; Leibfried et al. 2015) and to the Comparative Politics literature on the varieties of capitalisms (Shonfield 1965; Esping-​Andersen 1990; Hall and Soskice 2001). Building on insights from both scholarships, I develop the capital-​state index which reveals a spectrum of the capital-​state forms, challenging the neoliberal homogenization argument

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132 ­chapter (e.g. Ohmae 1995; Guehenno 1996; Jessop 2002; Cerny and Evans 2004; Crouch 2013). At the same time, against the varieties of capitalism approach, these different institutional configurations do not simply remain intact, but gradually transform and adapt as attested by the capital-​state index. The third contribution of the book is also conceptual and empirical at the same time. I highlight the distinctions between neoliberal populism and populism nationalisms of social protection on both the right and left side of the political spectrum. This ideology-​driven conceptualization explains more of the variation in parties’ support than other classifications, such as based on discourse (Hawkins 2009) or style (Moffit 2017), for instance. As I have shown, anti-​immigrant parties with rightist economic preferences and anti-​immigrant parties with leftist ones occupy distinct political spaces. The latter’s claim for protection capitalizes on the feelings of socio-​economic uncertainty and insecurity among voters. This finding challenges the conventional wisdom which contends that socio-​cultural issues matter most to the radical right. Following the anthropological and sociological literature (Ginrich and Banks 2006, Eger and Valdez 2018), I also use the term “neo-​nationalism” to underscore nationalism as the common denominator underpinning these various movements, parties, and leaders. Taken together, my findings show that the nationalist imaginary in its ethnic variant is advocated for and politicized due to the erosion of the civic welfarist conception of nationhood and the absence of strong leftist alternatives. While populist nationalist parties deploy their narratives according to different ideological legacies, local material and cultural specificities, they all offer protection against an imagined “Us” vs. “Them.” There are both context-​specific peculiarities and essential commonalities. Finally, by filling the capital-​state theory with the micro-​foundations of voters’ perceptions and meso-​foundations of political actors’ resources, this book unifies previous accounts of the success of populist nationalist parties. In the terms of contentious politics literature, three clusters of mechanisms connect the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism into a coherent and updated Polanyian framework: dispositional mechanisms of social alienation, relational mechanisms of mobilizing voters’ discontent, and environmental mechanisms of the parties’ neoliberal convergence, party competition, and normalization of the right-​wing discourse. Several implications arise from the findings and contributions of this book. First, the radical right’s repositioning of socio-​economic policy dimensions towards more statism and redistribution blurs the analytical and practical lines between left-​and right-​wing parties. I have insisted on using the term “neo-​nationalism” precisely because a large segment of the radical right has shifted away from the market ideologically, programmatically, and rhetorically.

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133

Conclusion: The Pandemic and Beyond

Concurrently and second, “populism” is a misleading term to refer to the anti-​establishment parties, movements, and leaders as diverse as Podemos in Spain, Front National in France, or Donald Trump in the US. The thesis of populism as the source of democratic decline (Müller 2000; Frum 2018) overlooks the profound structural economic and political changes within the state and the ensuing loss of its legitimacy, as has been shown in this book. Particularly important, researchers must be wary of lumping together authoritarian neoliberal populists such as Trump, Bolsonaro, Orbán, Erdoğan or Modi –​the agents of the capital-​state who use discourses of national grandeur to misdirect popular anger and confront their domestic neo-​nationalist challengers –​ with right-​wing neo-​nationalists of social protection, such as Marine Le Pen or Pauline Hanson, or left-​wing ones, such as Jean-​Luc Mélenchon or Bernie Sanders. Third, while most studies of the radical right and left parties focus on either demand-​side or supply-​side factors, my case studies show that there is an inherent interaction between the two sides. In this regard, I corroborate Matt Golder’s insight that while grievances create the demand, political opportunity structures and rhetorical strategies determine whether it translates into votes (Golder 2016: 490). Thus, in the cases of France and Hungary, high demand was matched with open supply; in the case of Australia, the demand was high, but the supply side was closed; and in the Korean case, the demand was low, and the supply was closed. In terms of scope conditions, these findings therefore indicate that neo-​nationalism thrives under the joint presence of permissive structural conditions, perceptions of “state betrayal,” and political agency with sufficient organizational resources. 3 The covid Capital-​state and Neo-​nationalism An unprecedented public health crisis induced by the novel covid-​19 virus in 2020 has exacerbated many of the tendencies discussed in this book. The coronavirus crisis is a crisis of the capital-​state that has become dysfunctional. The entrenched logic of marketization has been both the cause and effect of the pandemic, with the ensuing uncertainty animating further populist nationalism. The crisis has brought into sharp relief the damage on institutions of social reproduction, the entrenched precariousness of labour, and the systemic disparities of wealth produced by the capital-​states. It has also demonstrated, quite tragically, that the objective of societies to defeat the virus –​the “imperative of life-​making” –​is at odds with the market imperatives of profit-​making (Bhattacharya and Dale 2020).

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134 ­chapter The transformation of the nation-​state into the capital-​state has created the conditions for this pandemic. As I have argued, the national welfare regimes have been undermined by privatization and austerity as part of renewed Polanyian commodification. The crisis has disclosed that robust social reproduction capacities, such as care, health and education, are indispensable for dealing with global health shocks. It has called into question the states’ preparedness for such shocks, especially in light of their deregulated healthcare systems. Several advanced nations failed to provide adequate health infrastructure, including treatment, protective equipment, and large-​scale testing for their citizens. In the meantime, governments emphasized individual responsibility to “stay home,” quite in line with the neoliberal logic of responsibilization as discussed in earlier chapters. Ironically, the state has continued to abandon public health in push for vaccine development through private pharmaceutical companies, who are primarily concerned with profits and intellectual property rights. It may be argued that the state has stepped in to regulate the economy and society to soften the impact of the pandemic. Such was the case, for instance, with Trump administration disbursing an enormous relief package, including checks to the population, loans to business, and assistance to hospitals and health care workers; or Britain’s government announcing to cover up people’s salaries if companies would keep them employed; or Spain’s government nationalizing private hospitals. It would be, premature, however, to see this as the return of state interventionism and the retreat of the capital-​state. The coronavirus crisis has also had severe repercussions on the people’s economic well-​being, resulting in unemployment, “lockdowns,” and inequalities. The crisis has especially affected the precariously employed citizens –​those on flexible contracts, informally or self-​employed –​exposing the fallacy of flexible labour market practices engrained in the architecture of the capital-​state. In a vicious cycle, the most precarious and marginal layers became even more insecure in the pandemic as job insecurity was intertwined with physical vulnerability (Apostolidis and Azmanova 2020). In the meantime, “cleanliness” in the workplace came as a substitute for real worker protections, while the costs of protective and drugs increased, and the wealth of billionaires mushroomed. Tellingly, the governments across the globe began to take the idea of the universal basic income (ubi) more seriously. Yet these are piecemeal measures that leave the underlying infrastructure of the capital-​state intact, even though the market has failed as an efficient distribution mechanism, as envisaged by Karl Polanyi. On the other side, we have also witnessed an outburst of welfare “from below” with workers leading strikes to demand protective equipment and ordinary people setting up mutual aid networks. Oleksandr Svitych - 978-90-04-51622-9

Conclusion: The Pandemic and Beyond

135

Just as the capital-​state theory stipulates, the neoliberal populist elites have resorted to aggressive nationalism to divert attention away from the structural causes of the hardships engendered by the pandemic. This can be seen, for instance, in the policies and rhetoric of Donald Trump in the US, Jair Bolsonaro in Brazil, Viktor Orbán in Hungary, Binyamin Netanyahu in Israel, and Narendra Modi in India. In the US, the government’s response to the pandemic was punctuated by the police murder of George Floyd, an African American man, leading to a quasi-​populist resurrection. Arruzza and Mometti (2020) have pointed to the heterogeneity of government responses to the pandemic crisis. Still, I am with Bhattacharya and Dale (2020) that there are common drivers and tendencies that can be teased out from the relationship between the state and the capital, as highlighted above. What about neo-​nationalism of social protection that is conceptually and empirically different from neoliberal populism? The comparative findings already highlighted in this book have been amplified by the current crisis. Namely, ideology is a crucial factor that must be considered, and the label “populism” is rather misleading (cf. also Katsambekis and Stavrakakis 2020). To take the cases discussed in the book, in France both Marine le Pen’s National Front and Jean-​Luc Mélenchon’s Unbowed France galvanized their constituencies through populist nationalist discourse either in exclusionary or inclusionary manner, depending on their respective ideologies. Both parties called for respect of the lockdown and developed anti-​establishment critique regarding globalization. Yet the former has continued to draw boundaries between the “French people” and “immigrants,” whereas the latter has deployed the rhetoric of the left and appealed to “the weakest, the most isolated, the most destitute citizens” (Chazel 2020). In Australia, Pauline Hanson’s One Nation Party predictably intensified the rhetoric of welfare chauvinism and scapegoating of immigrants in the wake of the pandemic, exploiting and fuelling anti-​Chinese sentiments (Sengul 2020). The party has also continued to protect “struggling Australians” by attacking international organizations like the World Health Organization and the United Nations, a rhetorical strategy already observed in the Australian case study. And in the Hungarian context, the incumbent Fidesz party increased its grip on power through the so-​called “Enabling Act,” delegitimizing the opposition, including neo-​nationalist Jobbik, as foreign-​like and “anti-​national.” As exemplified by these and other cases, the overused “populism” label by itself explains very little in terms of policies and rhetoric. Nationalism, sometimes with nativist and authoritarian overtones, captures better the political responses to and framing of the coronavirus pandemic.

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136 ­chapter Polanyi argued that commodification of land, labour, and money disembedded economies from societies. The covid-​19 crisis has clearly substantiated this claim by showing that governing society by market alone leads to disastrous consequences. Rather than reverting to “business as usual” after a temporary dose of Keynesianism, the crisis is an opportunity to reconsider what our economy is for and forge a counter-​hegemonic entity. This implies a wave of decommodification in the form of such policies as increased government spending on social protection, including healthcare, education, and family care, improved working conditions and salaries for care and service workers, and higher taxes on corporations, the ultra-​wealthy, and financial entities. As Apostolidis and Azmanova (2020) have put it, the crisis is an invitation for a political economy of trust: “making the satisfaction of human needs rather than the stewardship of capital our social priority.” Otherwise, we may be left with accumulated social suffering that will be misdirected again onto the “Other.” To tackle the social failures of the current disembedded economic order, Wright (2016) advanced the idea of “real utopias,” Fraser and Jaeggi (2018) outlined the contours of a counter-​hegemonic bloc of “social protection” and “emancipation,” and Bishop and Payne (2021) called for “re-​embedded post-​ neoliberalism.” The common thread uniting these ideas is to develop a more emancipatory counter-​movement to destroy the appearance of a “natural capitalist order.” In line with the capital-​state thesis, such a counter-​movement, either in the form of an organized political force or social movement, would redress the balance between capital and labour to favour the latter, constraining the core mechanisms of commodification. Reinforcing welfare state policies, readjusting labour market arrangements, and regulating capital movement will rebuild solidary within national communities. Only by offering a true social and democratic alternative to the capital-​state can we move beyond the populist nationalist order to a better world.

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Appendices

Appendix A. oecd

Member countries of the Organisation for Economic Co-​operation and Development:



Australia

Korea

Austria

Latvia

Belgium

Lithuania (not included in the analysis as joined in 2018)

Canada

Luxembourg

Chile

Mexico

Czech Republic

Netherlands

Denmark

New Zealand

Estonia

Norway

Finland

Poland

France

Portugal

Germany

Slovak Republic

Greece

Slovenia

Hungary

Spain

Iceland

Sweden

Ireland

Switzerland

Israel

Turkey

Italy

United Kingdom

Japan

United States

Appendix B. Capital-​state

In this book, I used structural equation modeling (sem) (Bollen 1989; Schumacker and Lomax 2010) to evaluate the goodness of a fit of the capital-​state model and construct the capital-​state index (csi). This was a prerequisite for further analysis of the relationship between the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism, as well as case selection for both within and comparative study.

© Oleksandr Svitych, 2023 | DOI:10.1163/9789004516229_011

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138 Appendices Inter-​correlations of latent factors

Intrusion Collusion Extrusion

Intrusion

Collusion

Extrusion

1 -​0.987*** 0.924***

-​0.987*** 1 -​0.904***

0.924*** -​0.904*** 1

*** p < .001. Confirmatory factor analysis

Independent variable Major sub-​factors

Capital-​state Intrusion, collusion, extrusion

Confirmatory fit index Tucker-​Lewis index Root mean square error of approximation Standardized root mean residual Akaike information criterion Bayesian information criterion

0.865 0.798 0.360 0.041 220.735 253.989

Summary statistics

Variable

Obs.

Mean

St. Dev.

Min

Max

Intrusion Collusion Extrusion csi

1174 1168 1186 1186

24.9 55.2 34.7 38.0

13.2 17.4 15.4 12.0

0 9.8 0 0.1

67.9 92.8 100 65.2

Capital-​state (X) –​> neo-​nationalism (Y) ↓ Start of sem Measurement model: measure latent variables Confirmatory factor analysis (cfa)

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139

Appendices ↓ Sum the items to form a total score (csi) End of sem ↓ Examine relationships between X and Y (regression analysis) ↓ Proceed to case selection

The independent variable –​capital-​state –​is a latent (unobserved) variable comprising three factors (intrusion, collusion, extrusion). Based on the conducted measurement, I constructed the aggregate capital-​state index from 13 distinct variables by: 1) taking the mean of each variable; 2) converting it to a 0–​100 score range via a min-​max transformation technique; and 3) averaging the number of measures available for each year between 1980 and 2015. The obtained index is discussed in detail in Chapter 3. I restricted the model to three variables per dimension as including more or less variables led to the statistical problems of “overspecification.” and “underspecification.” Capital-​state index: main sources of data Intrusion oecd Health Expenditure and Financing Https://​Stats.Oecd.Org/​Index.Aspx?Datasetcode=​SHA World Bank Educations Statistics Https://​Data.Worldbank.Org/​Topic/​Education oecd Analytical House Prices Indicators Https://​Stats.Oecd.Org/​Index.Aspx?Datasetcode=​HOUSE_​PRICES The Bank for International Settlements Https://​Www.Bis.Org/​Statistics/​Totcredit.Htm oecd Social Expenditure Database: Public and Private Social Expenditure by Country Https://​Stats.Oecd.Org/​Index.Aspx?Datasetcode=​SOCX_​AGG Collusion oecd Tax Database: Statutory Corporate Income Tax Rates Https://​Stats.Oecd.Org/​Index.Aspx?Datasetcode=​TABLE_​II1 oecd Indicators of Employment Protection Https://​Stats.Oecd.Org/​Index.Aspx?Datasetcode=​EPL_​OV oecd Labour Force Statistics Https://​Stats.Oecd.Org/​Index.Aspx?Datasetcode=​TUD Extrusion Chinn-​Ito Financial Openness Index https://​web.pdx.edu/​~ito/​Chinn-​Ito_​webs​ite.htm External Wealth of Nations Http://​Www.Philiplane.Org/​EWN.Html

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140 Appendices World Wealth and Income Database Https://​Wid.World/​



Appendix C. Neo-​nationalism

To classify political parties as neo-​nationalist, I relied on several sources and methods: pre-​selecting the “usual suspects” –​the parties commonly classified as “populist”, “radical,” or “extreme”;1 consulting party manifestos to retrieve a party’s core ideology along the dimensions of welfare, sovereignty, and identity; and conducting a survey of party websites.2 I found that most websites of the examined right-​wing neo-​nationalist parties highlight traditional values, denounce generous asylum policies, and call for stricter controls on immigration. At the same time, they feature stories of the “common man” left behind by the governments, advocate for economic protectionism and market regulation, and welfare state expansion, but for “natives” only. The websites of the left-​wing neo-​nationalist parties, by contrast, espouse the causes of diversity, solidarity, sustainable ecological development, and equal welfare provision, while also framing in negative terms the encroachment of market on the state and society. Both the right-​wing and left-​wing representatives express strong anti-​globalist attitudes. Finally, by way of a triangulation, I examined the economic platforms of the parties using the Manifesto Project Database. In particular, I looked at the variables markeco and welfare to trace fluctuations in the positions over time, which reflects the evolution of the parties’ ideologies.3 The variable markeco is an additive measure of variables “free enterprise” (per401) and “economic orthodoxy” (per414) defined as follows: “Free enterprise” is “favourable mentions of free enterprise capitalism; superiority of individual enterprise over state and control systems; favourable mentions of private property rights, personal enterprise and initiative; need for unhampered individual enterprises.” “Economic orthodoxy” is a statement reflecting a “need for traditional economic orthodoxy, e.g. reduction of budget deficits, retrenchment in crisis, thrift and savings; support for traditional economic institutions such as stock market and banking system; support for strong currency.” The variable welfare is an additive measure of variables “social justice” (per503) and “welfare state expansion” (per504). “Social justice” is a statement reflecting a “concept of equality; need for fair treatment of all people; special protection for underprivileged; need for fair distribution of resources; removal of class barriers; end of discrimination 1 Based on Mudde (2007), March (2008), Funke et al. (2016), and country-​specific sources. 2 In this method I followed Eger and Valdez (2014) in their study of right-​wing neo-​nationalism in Western Europe. 3 Manifesto Project Database, manifesto-​project.wzb.eu.

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Appendices

141

such as racial or sexual discrimination, etc.” “Welfare state expansion” is “favourable mentions of need to introduce, maintain or expand any social service or social security scheme; support for social services such as health service or social housing.” I used the obtained dataset of 99 neo-​nationalist parties (58 left-​wing and 41 right-​ wing) as a basis for measuring their electoral performance in the total of 391 national general elections. For the US, I used populist presidential candidates as a proxy for neo-​nationalism due to the two-​party system in the country. I relied primarily on the “Parliaments and Governments” database (www.parl​gov.org) as well as other databases and country-​specific sources for collecting the election results. The complete list of neo-​nationalist parties is provided below.

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Estonia

Denmark

Canada Chile Czech Republic

Belgium

Austria

Australia

Country

Communist Party of Bohemia and Moravia (kscm) Red-​Green Alliance (En-​O) Socialist People’s Party (sf)

Worker’s Party of Belgium (pa-​p tb)

Left-​wing neo-​nationalist party

List of neo-​nationalist parties

Alliance for the Future of Austria (bzo) Team Stronach (ts) Flemish Interest (vb*) Libertarian, Direct, Democratic (ldd) National Front (fn) Reform Party of Canada (prc)

Neoliberal populist party

Conservative People’s Party of Estonia (ekre)

Danish People’s Party (df)

Estonian National Independence Party (ersp)

Progress Party (FrP)

Freedom and Direct Democracy Dawn -​National Coalition (upd) (spd)

Katter’s Australian Party (Katter) Ona Nation (onp) Free Party Salzburg (fps) Freedom Party of Austria (fpo) Flemish Block (vb) People’s Party (Pp)

Right-​wing neo-​nationalist party

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142 Appendices

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Iceland

Hungary

Greece

Germany

Hungarian Justice and Life Party (miep) Movement for a Better Hungary (Jobbik)

Golden Dawn (ChA) Independent Greeks (anel)

The Republicans (Rep)

National Front (fn)

Finns Party (True Finns) (Ps)

Right-​wing neo-​nationalist party

Alternative for Germany (AfD)

Movement for France mf) National Republican Movement (mnr)

Neoliberal populist party

Appendices

Left-​Green Movement (vg)

Democratic Alternative (DeVa) Finnish People’s Democratic League (skdl) Left Alliance (vas) French Communist Party (pcf) Left Front (FdG) Party of Democratic Socialism (pds) The Left (Linke) Coalition of the Left ( (syn) Coalition of the Radical Left (syriza) Communist Party of Greece (kke)

Finland

France

Left-​wing neo-​nationalist party

Country

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143

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Korea (South)

Japan

Italy

Israel

People Before Profit Alliance (pbpa) Sinn Féin (sf) Socialist Party (sp) The Workers Party (twp) Democratic Front for Peace Sfarad’s guards of the Torah and Equality (Hadash) (Shas) Communist Refoundation Northern League (nl) Party (prc) Five Star Movement (M5S) Party of Italian Communists (PdCI) Proletarian Democracy (dp) Free and Equal (LeU) Power to the People (PaP) Japanese Communist Party (jcp)

Ireland

Right-​wing neo-​nationalist party

Left-​wing neo-​nationalist party

Country

List of neo-nationalist parties (cont.)

Japan Restauration Party (JReP) Party for Japanese Kokoro (pjk)

Brothers of Italy (Fdl-​CN)

Israel is Our Home (yb)

Neoliberal populist party

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144 Appendices

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Communist Party of Luxembourg (kpl) The Left (dl) National Regeneration Movement (morena) Party of the Democratic Revolution (prd) Popular Socialist Party (pps) Communist Party of the Netherlands (cpn) GroenLinks (gl) Socialist Party (sp)

Luxembourg

New Zealand Norway

Netherlands

Socialist Left Party (sv)

Socialist Party of Latvia (lsp)

Latvia

Mexico

Left-​wing neo-​nationalist party

Country

Centre Democrats (cd) Centre Party (cp) Livable Netherlands (ln) Party for Freedom (pvv) New Zealand First (nzfp)

All for Latvia! (vl) For Fatherland and Freedom (tb) For Fatherland and Freedom /​ lnnk (tb/​l nnk) National Alliance (na)

Right-​wing neo-​nationalist party

Progress Party (frp)

Pim Fortuyn List (lpf)

Neoliberal populist party

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Appendices

145

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Sweden

Slovenia Spain

Slovak Republic

Portugal

Poland

Country

Communist Party of Spain (pce) Podemos (P) United Left (iu) Left Party (V)

Left Bloc (be) Portuguese Communist Party (pcp) Association of Slovak Workers (zrs) Communist Party of Slovakia (kss) We Are Family (sr)

Left-​wing neo-​nationalist party

List of neo-nationalist parties (cont.)

Neoliberal populist party

Sweden Democrats (sd)

Slovenian National Party (sns) Vox

Kotleba –​People’s Party Our Slovakia (LsNS) Slovak National Party (sns)

New Democracy (NyD)

Slovenian Democratic Party (sds)

League of Polish Families (lpr) Congress of the New Right (knp) Movement for the Real Politics Union (upr) Reconstruction of Poland (rop)

Right-​wing neo-​nationalist party

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146 Appendices

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United Kingdom United States (presidential primaries)

Turkey

Autonomous Socialist Geneva Citizens’ Party (psa) Movement (mcr) Progressive Organizations of Swiss Democrats (sd) Switzerland (poch) Swiss Party of Labour (PdA) Peoples’ Democratic Party (hdp) British National Party (bnp) Richard Gephardt Pat Buchanan Ralph Nader Bill Bradley John Edwards Mike Huckabee Howard Dean Newt Ginrich Bernie Sanders Donald Trump

Switzerland

Right-​wing neo-​nationalist party

Left-​wing neo-​nationalist party

Country

Independence Party (ukip) Pat Robertson Ross Perot Rick Santorum

Freedom Party of Switzerland (fps) Swiss People’s Part (svp) Ticino League (LdT)

Neoliberal populist party

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148 Appendices

Appendix D. Regression Analysis

Before proceeding with the regression analysis, I addressed the issue of non-​stationarity. In statistics, non-​stationary (i.e. with a trend) data present a potential problem for causal inference. This is because any trended variable will always correlate well with another such variable. This can lead to an unsubstantiated conclusion of a causal connection, which is known as the “spurious regression problem.” One way to tackle the issue is to de-​trend the data via differencing –​subtract the first lag of a variable from its current value. As the first step, then, I differenced all variables as they are highly correlated with time, as diagnosed via an Augmented Dickey-​Fuller test. Capital-​state and neo-​nationalism: correlation with time

Variable Neo-​nationalism Capital-​state Globalization Unemployment Immigration

oecd average (N =​36)

oecd full (N =​1260)

Trending 0.86*** 0.98*** 0.97*** 0.52** 0.95***

Trending 0.38*** 0.84*** 0.57*** 0.13*** 0.05

Differenced 0.09 0.37* -​0.06 -​0.16 0.06

Differenced 0.01 0.03 0.11*** 0.01 0.01

Statistical significance: * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001.

Differencing the variables greatly reduces the trend element (r =​1 is perfect correlation; r =​0 is no correlation). This is especially true for the panel dataset (35 oecd countries x 36 years) where the change is drastic. For example, although the capital-​state displays the highest degree of association on the raw data, after differencing the effect shrinks. This does not mean, however, that there is no association whatsoever. What this indicates is that time needs to be accounted for when estimating regression models –​ either through differencing or controlling for the time trend in the regression model. In this book, I assumed that the relationships between the variables are contemporaneous. However, it is also worth considering whether the capital-​state has an effect over time. Since national elections do not take place on a yearly basis, it is plausible that the impact of state restructuring will not translate to neo-​nationalist vote immediately. Towards that end, I estimated a multi-​variate lagged dependent variable model

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149

Appendices

with five time lags (1 to 5 years), controlling for the country-​fixed effects and alternative explanations: [1]‌ neon =​α +​β1 [csi] +​β2 [glob] +​β3 [unemp] +​β4 [immig] +​β5 [ineq] +​β6-​ 40 [country dummies] +​β41 [lagnn] +​ε where lagnn is the lagged dependent variable (neo-​nationalism). Neo-​nationalism and the explanatory variables: lag structure

Variable/​Lag

1 year

2 years

3 years

4 years

5 years

csi

0.041. (0.025) -​0.041 (0.143) 0.171. (0.096) 0.382 (0.494) 0.170 (0.137) 0.505*** (0.041) 0.84

0.055. (0.030) -​0.024 (0.169) 0.271* (0.111) 0.314 (0.579) 0.224 (0.157) 0.311*** (0.047) 0.79

0.078* (0.034) -​0.005 (0.185) 0.337** (0.121) 0.057 (0.623) 0.216 (0.170) 0.154** (0.050) 0.78

0.070* (0.035) 0.089 (0.184) 0.191 (0.129) 0.062 (0.619) 0.174 (0.169) 0.030 (0.497) 0.78

0.062. (0.035) 0.209 (0.188) 0.096 (0.141) -​0.260 (0.622) 0.067 (0.171) -​0.007 (0.051) 0.79

glob unemp immig (log) ineq LAGNN R2

Statistical significance: p < 0.1, * p < 0.05, ** p < 0.01, *** p < 0.001. Note: N =​401 country-​years. Standard errors are in parenthesis.

The lagged effect of the capital-​state gradually diminishes with time: roughly in 3.5 times in 3 years (lagnn coefficient goes down to 0.154). In 4 years, it reaches zero and loses significance, becoming negative afterwards. Secondly, in one year the only two slight effects are those from the capital-​state and unemployment: the csi and unemp coefficients are at the border of statistical significance. However, and third, they become most significant in 3-​years’ time, controlling for the other variables. At the same time, this is where the time effect wanes, as the value of the lagged dependent variable get closer to 0. The coefficient of 0.154 indicates that only 15 per cent of the effects from the shift in the independent variables persist into the next period (vs. 50 per cent in one-​year time).

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150 Appendices

Appendix E. Databases

The following databases are available in the open access format: Capital-​state Index doi: 10.6084/​m9.figshare.7177907 –​ Combined csi for 35 countries over 36 years (1980–​2015) –​ csi indices per each oecd country (1980–​2015) –​ Index values of the three major dimensions and each sub-​dimension

Note: the actual raw data (before transformation) for each variable are too big to include in these Appendices; the databases with these data can be provided upon request. Neo-​nationalist Vote doi: 10.6084/​m9.figshare.7801328 –​ ideological positions of neo-​nationalist parties along the dimensions of sovereignty, welfare, and identity –​ election results per each oecd country (left-​wing, right-​wing, and neoliberal populists) –​ oecd aggregate results

Double movements doi: 10.6084/​m9.figshare.8869181 –​ Relationship between the capital-​state and neo-​nationalism in 35 oecd countries (1980–​2015) –​ Plots of the double-​movements

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Glossary capital-​s tate:

the latest paradigm of state development distinguished by intensive commodification favouring the interests of capital over public ones; a state which safeguards the market order under the auspices of neoliberal globalization through welfare restructuring, assertion of corporate power over labour, and exposure of citizens to financial capital. capital-​s tate index: a composite index measuring different capital-​ states across time and space along three major dimensions: intrusion, collusion, and extrusion. collusion: the dimension of the capital-​state which reflects precariatization of work and strengthening of the power of capital, operationalized through flexibilization of labour; an extended version of Karl Polanyi’s commodification of labour. commodification: the transformation of goods (housing, labour, money) into objects for sale. critical juncture: a turning point (such as crisis) that has a crucial impact on the evolution of national and global institutions. demand-​s ide neo-​n ationalism: explanations of neo-​nationalism that focus on structural socio-​economic and socio-​cultural factors (e.g., globalization, immigration, unemployment). disembeddedness: separation of economy from society; predominance of profit-​oriented transactions; the absence of social control over production and distribution. double movement: protective counter-​movement against marketization of society; neo-​nationalist reaction against the capital-​state. embedded liberalism: the post-​ war social compromise between capital and labour that lasted during 1945–​1970s. embeddedness: subordination of economy to society. extrusion: the dimension of the capital-​state which reflects financialization of the economy and upward redistribution, operationalized through transnationalization of finance; an extended version of Karl Polanyi’s commodification of money.

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152 Glossary great transformation:

intrusion:

left-​w ing neo-​n ationalism: marketization: nationalism:

neo-​n ationalism:

neoliberalism:

nostalgic deprivation:

the attempts to disembed the economy from society through pro-​market restructuring; the institutional shift from the nation-​state to the capital-​state. the dimension of the capital-​state which reflects deregulation and transfer of state-​run provision of public goods to profit-​making enterprises, operationalized through privatization and individuation of the provisions for health, education, and welfare; an extended version of Karl Polanyi’s commodification of housing. a revival of class-​based (socio-​economic) sources of collective identity. conversion to a market economy and society. a political doctrine demanding congruence between cultural (nation) and political (state) units through a specific political imaginary. an identity-​maintenance project at the intersection of nationalism, populism, and radicalism, propelled by political parties, leaders, and movements; a societal protective reaction against the rise of the capital-​state. a set of market-​marking social, economic, and political policies, such as privatization (transfer of ownership from the public to the private sector), deregulation or liberalization (relaxation of government restrictions in economy and trade), and marketization (conversion to a market economy); a commonsensical ideology and a hegemonic discourse of the latest phase in the development of capitalism. the gap between one’s understanding of her current status vs. perceptions about the real or imagined lost past; a socio-​ psychological mechanism that activates neo-​ nationalist voters.

political opportunity structures: supply-​side factors in explaining neo-​nationalism that describe available resources and institutional arrangements, such as political cleavages, party competition, the type of electoral system, and media. populism: a thin ideology (usually combined with a host ideology, such as nationalism, socialism, or neoliberalism) that

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Glossary

populist nationalism: radicalism: regression analysis:

relative deprivation:

right-​w ing neo-​n ationalism:

153 asserts the will of the homogenous people and vilifies the elites and the outsiders. See neo-​nationalism. a call for drastic changes in the existing governance structures. a statistical technique to estimate the relationship between an independent variable (such as the capital-​state) and a dependent one (such as neo-​nationalism). a sense of being treated unfairly compared to others; a socio-​ psychological mechanism that activates neo-​ nationalist voters.

a strengthening of ethnic-​ nationalist (socio-​ cultural) sources of collective identity. scapegoating: the process of channelling away socio-​ economic and socio-​cultural discontent toward targets that are easy to blame, such as immigrants, refugees, welfare recipients, or ethnic and religious minorities. status frustration: anxiety about one’s or one’s group perceived socio-​ economic status (perceived social position) in the hierarchy of society; a socio-​psychological mechanism that activates neo-​nationalist voters. supply-​s ide neo-​n ationalism: explanations of neo-​nationalism that focus on internal aspects of the parties and their strategies (internal supply-​ side), as well as political opportunity structures (external supply-​side). uneven convergence: the dialectic of simultaneous institutional stability and change within the capitalist political economies; a synthesis of the neoliberal homogenization and the varieties of capitalism approaches.

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178 Bibliography Stubbs, R. and Underhill G. R. D. eds. (2006). Political Economy and the Changing Global Order. Oxford University Press. Suh, C.-​S. and Kwon, S.-​H. (2014). Whither the Developmental State in South Korea? Balancing Welfare and Neoliberalism, Asian Studies Review, 38(4), 676–​692. Suzuki, T. (2012). Globalization, Finance, and Economic Nationalism: The Changing Role of the State in Japan. In: A. P. D’Costa, ed., Globalization and Economic Nationalism in Asia. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1–​38. Swank, D. and Betz, H-​G. (2003). Globalization, the Welfare State and Right-​Wing Populism in Western Europe. Socio-​Economic Review, 1(2), 215–​245. Szombati, K. (2018). The Revolt of the Provinces: Anti-​Gypsyism and Right-​Wing Politics in Hungary. New York: Berghahn Books. Taggart, P. (1995). New Populist Parties in Western Europe, West European Politics 18(1), 34–​51. Taggart, P. (2000). Populism. Buckingham, UK: Open University Press. Tamames, J. (2020). For the People: Left Populism in Spain and the US. London: Lawrence & Wishart. Tamás, G. M. (2015). Socialism and Freedom. Jacobin. Available at: https://​www.jac​ obin​mag.com/​2015/​05/​tamas-​fasc​ism- ​social​ism-​east-​eur​ope-​hung​ary/​ (accessed 22 November 2021). Tarrow, S. G. (1998). Power in Movement: Social Movements and Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. Tarrow, S. G. (2012). Strangers at the Gates: Movements and States in Contentious Politics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tavits, M. (2012). Organizing for Success: Party Organizational Strength and Electoral Performance in Postcommunist Europe. Journal of Politics, 74(1), 83–​97. Thorleifsson, C. (2018). Nationalist Responses to the Crises in Europe: Old and New Hatreds. London: Routledge. Tilly, C. (1978). From Mobilization to Revolution. Reading: Addison-​Wesley. Tilly, C. (2004). Contention and Democracy in Europe, 1650–​2000. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tilly, C. (2006). Why and How History Matters. In: R. E. Goodin and C. Tilly, eds., The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis. Oxford University Press, 417–​437. Tilly, C. (2007). Democracy. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Tóth, A. (2001). The Failure of Social-​Democratic Unionism in Hungary. In: S. Crowley and D. Ost, eds., Workers after Workers’ States: Labor and Politics in Postcommunist Eastern Europe. Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield. Tóth, A. and Grajczjár, I. (2015). The Rise of the Radical Right in Hungary. In: J. V. Til and P. Krasztev, eds., The Hungarian Patient: Social Opposition to an Illiberal Democracy (New York: Central European University Press, 2015), 133–​166.

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Endorsements 1. Oleksandr Svitych’s The Rise of the Capital State and Neo-​nationalism is an extraordinary contribution to our understanding of the current phenomena of populism and nationalism spreading across the globe. Instead of limiting his analysis to simple economic or cultural explanations, the author deftly combines both in a synthetic interpretation of the present conjuncture indebted to the insights of Karl Polanyi’s The Great Transformation. Svitych distinguishes between right-​wing neoliberalism, the response on the Right from authoritarian and neo-​nationalist populists who favor some protection from market fundamentalism, and the more cosmopolitan, democratic, and egalitarian populism on the Left. His research and results illuminate the pathologies and possibilities in the current drift toward illiberal democracy and greater authoritarianism. This book is essential reading for understanding the dangers presented by demagogues and opportunists ready to exploit the genuine discontents of those left behind by capitalist globalization and the degradation of the welfare state. Ronald Grigor Suny William H. Sewell, Jr. Distinguished University Professor of History Professor of Political Science The University of Michigan Emeritus Professor of Political Science and History The University of Chicago 2. The rise of ‘populist’ political movements is a striking feature of modern politics. This book challenges simple interpretations of populism by digging deeper into the underlying political economic influences. It astutely blends political economic theory, statistical analysis, and country-​specific case studies. It recasts conventional understandings of neoliberalism by considering the features of the ‘capital-​state’ that have led people to seek alternatives in neo-​nationalist movements. It extends Polanyi’s theory of the ‘double movement’ to show how cultural considerations have shaped these responses in different countries. Systematic, cogent and clearly written, this book has all the

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182 Endorsements hallmarks of first-​class social science. It deserves to be widely read by academics, students and citizens concerned with the future of democracy. Frank Stilwell Professor Emeritus of Political Economy The University of Sydney 3. Why have nationalist movements, of reactionary and leftist stripes, thrived in our era of market-​fundamentalist globalisation? And why have they gained traction in some countries but not others? Drawing on Polanyian theory, case study research and comparative statistical analysis, Oleksandr Svitych offers answers in this thought-​provoking book. Gareth Dale Reader in Political Economy Brunel University 4. Populism, nationalism, and radicalism have been on the rise across the world. Svitych’s book shows that the rise of all three are intimately connected to each other and that their combination in the hands of skillful political entrepreneurs amounts to a novel political project, neo-​nationalism. In particular, Svitych shows how politicians exploit the state’s retreat from regulating the market and the accompanying re-​embedding of social life in a market society. The more society revolves around the market, the more opportunities for political entrepreneurs to combine populist, nationalist, and radical rhetorics to appeal to the legitimate grievances of ordinary citizens. By combining historical case-​studies with large-​n analysis and by synthesizing political science with Polanyian political economy, Svitych’s book provides a valuable and timely explanation of how neo-​nationalist politics gained ground around the world. Kurtulus Gemici One Hundred Talent Associate Professor Department of Sociology Zhejiang University

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Index Abou-​Chadi, Tarik 103, 111 alienation  political 45, 70, 79 social 70, 79, 132 socio-​economic 45, 62, 104 alliance  class 109, 128 developmental 115n2, 118 Socialist-​Communist 41, 99 Anderson, Benedict 10–​12 anger 72, 89n3, 90, 133 anxiety 45, 49 economic 61n19, 73n16, 77n25 status 45, 76, 79, 92–​93, 107n17, 153 see also status frustration Apostolidis, Paul 134, 136 Appel, Hilary 66–​67, 69 Asia 37n21, 91, 93–​94, 121 Asian financial crisis 20, 37, 39–​41, 115–​117, 119–​120 austerity 21, 25, 67, 68n6, 73, 100, 134 Australia  capital-​state (liberal) 9, 38–​40, 63, 67, 84–​88, 99, 101n6, 117 neo-​nationalism 9, 20, 47, 63, 84, 96, 103, 123, 128, 133 see also One Nation Party nostalgic deprivation 88–​89 relative deprivation 89–​91 status frustration 91–​93 Australian Election Study (aes) 88–​91 Austria 36, 38, 69, 128 Authoritarianism  populism 4–​5, 15, 15n5, 45, 133, 135 in South Korea 39, 118, 121–​122, 124 values 4–​5 Azmanova, Albena 131, 134, 136 Bartha, Eszter 71, 74, 82 Bauman, Zygmunt 19, 77, 106 Belgium 36, 38, 68n7, 102, 129 Bernát, Anikó 74, 82 Betz, Hans-​Georg 3–​4, 10, 14, 95, 113, 130–​131 Bhattacharya, Tithi 133, 135 Bishop, Matthew L. 24. 26n7, 136 blaming 7, 75, 83, 91, 112, 129 see also scapegoating

Block, Fred 6, 22, 23n1, 24–​25 Blyth, Mark 6, 24, 50, 116n3 Bohle, Dorothee 37, 66, 66n3, 67–​69, 68n6 Bokros 66–​68 Bolsonaro, Jair 20, 133, 135 Bornschier, Simon 3, 57, 77 Brazil 1, 135 Brexit 1, 16n7, 61 Buchanan, John 87 Buchanan, Paul G. 119 Burawoy, Michael 6, 24, 32, 42, 126 business 26, 30, 33, 36, 44, 56–​58, 68, 88, 91, 94, 101n5, 134 see also capital, capital-​ state, corporate Cahill, Damien 6, 24, 87 Canada 20, 36–​38, 86, 129 capital 6, 9, 23n2 n. 2 n. –​3, 26–​29, 31–​37, 42, 44–​45, 57, 62, 67–​69, 79, 87, 100, 102, 109, 118, 121, 125, 135–​136, 151  see also business capital-​state  agents of 29–​32, 133 and neo-​nationalism 7–​9, 21, 26, 45–​47, 50–​60, 127–​129, 132 conceptualizing 8, 24, 27–​28, 28n10, 33, 42–​43 definition 5–​6, 28, 33, 151 during covid-​19 pandemic 9, 126, 133–​136 rise of 2, 6, 9, 22, 26, 28, 44, 62, 128, 152 theory 4–​8, 43–​45, 49–​50, 61–​62, 126–​ 127, 131–​132, 135 transformation 6–​9, 21–​22, 29, 44–​45, 47–​48, 61, 126, 128–​130, 152 trends 36–​37, 46, 51–​60, 127 see also Australia, France, Hungary, South Korea variations of 39–​42, 131 see also Australia, France, Hungary, South Korea  see also intrusion, collusion, extrusion capital-​state index (csi) 9, 34–​42, 46, 51, 54–​55, 59–​61, 65–​67, 69–​70, 73, 84–​87, 92, 99–​100, 102, 105n13, 105n15, 107n16, 107, 114, 116–​121, 125, 127, 130–​132, 151

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184 Index capitalism  attitudes on 70, 104, 122 crisis of 21, 75n23 features of 23, 32n17 opposition to 12, 15, 104, 126 types of 6, 22, 36n21, 99, 102, 121n5 varieties of 27, 37, 40, 42, 130–​132 welfare 31, 37n22 Carroll, Toby 16, 21, 28n11, 42n23, 57–​58 Cerny, Philip G. 26–​27, 31n15, 32, 36n21, 130132 chaebol 115, 118, 120–​121, 125 class, see also left capitalist 28n 10, 32 compromise 29, 62 see also embedded liberalism identification 7, 14, 22, 77, 101n6, 106, 109, 109n21, 123 interaction with values 19, 49, 59, 62, 94 lower 30, 45, 77, 82–​83, 123 middle 58, 82, 91, 93, 102–​103, 108–​110, 108n18, 112–​113, 128–​130 mobilization 16, 20, 62, 76, 103 upper 33, 103, 108n18, 123n6 working 5, 14, 32n18, 58, 77, 82–​83, 91, 93, 102, 104, 107–​110, 108n18, 112–​113, 123n6, 128–​130 Clift, Ben 2, 6, 28, 99–​100, 116n3, 120 collusion 29, 31, 34, 44, 55–​56, 58–​60, 130, 151 commodification  and capital-​state 6, 28–​29, 32–​34, 109, 127 and fictitious commodities 23, 31–​32, 40, 69, 76, 86, 136, 151 and Karl Polanyi 23, 24n4, 26, 29, 42, 66–​ 67, 80, 117, 119–​120, 134 resistance to 80–​81, 86, 131, 136 communism 66–​67, 70–​71, 70n9, 74n21, 83, 96, 122, 128 communist parties 57, 68, 79, 82, 98–​100, 102–​103, 103n8, 108–​109, 110n24, 128 Comparative Study of Electoral Systems (cses) 103n8, 105–​106, 108, 123n6 competition-​state 27–​28 conservative parties 68n6, 73, 80–​81, 105–​106, 123, 128

contentious politics 14, 21, 37, 50, 96, 114, 132 corporate see also business capital 28–​29, 32, 101, 118 power 30, 33, 42, 45, 87 taxation 31–​32, 34–​35, 37, 56, 67, 87, 119 cosmopolitanism 10, 74, 82, 94 Cottle, Drew 87, 94 counter-​movement  and Karl Polanyi 23, 42, 61–​62, 104, 114, 124, 127, 131, 136 neo-​nationalist 6, 9, 42, 44, 127, 131, 151 Cox, Robert 2, 6 critical juncture 9, 40, 67–​68, 115, 151 critical theory 21, 23, 62, 126 Crouch, Colin 25–​26, 32n19, 33, 132 cultural  backlash theory 4–​5, 49, 97, 132 6, 60, 60n43, 121 cleavage 4, 17, 49n8, 57, 61n19, 122, 129, 132 grievances 3–​5, 7, 10, 31, 32n18, 45, 48, 60, 62, 97, 112, 131, 151, 153 de Graaf, Nan, D. 103, 110 democracy 15n5, 22, 67n5, 80n31, 122–​ 123, 136 and populism 3, 15, 29n14, 133 liberal 14, 16n7, 83 social 6, 12, 37, 103, 107, 122–​123 Democratic Labour Party 116, 119n4, 123, 125 Denmark 20, 36, 39, 47, 128 Dent, Christopher M. 116, 121 deregulation 19, 24–​25, 28–​31, 34–​35, 67–​68, 86, 88, 91, 100–​101, 120 developmentalism 37, 39, 41, 114, 116, 120, 124, 128 see also Korea (capital-​state) Die Linke (The Left) party 12, 17, 56 Dimaggio, Anthony, R. 3, 32, 49, 60, 61n19, 75, 73n16 dirigisme 41, 99, 115, 128 see also France (capital-​state) discontent 7, 15, 21, 42, 50n9, 58, 61–​62, 69, 83, 96–​97, 100, 104, 112, 125, 127, 129, 132, 153 discourse, discursive  and populism 2, 7, 14, 12, 132

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Index construction 32n18, 49, 59, 80–​82, 93–​94, 112n27, 124, 133, 135 neoliberal 20, 25 opportunity structure 96–​97, 112, 122, 124, 128, 130 rightist, mainstreaming 18, 59, 65, 83, 96, 111n26, 112 disembeddedness  and Karl Polanyi 23n1 n. 1 n. –​2, 29, 61, 90 of state 8, 24n3, 59, 136, 151 double-​movement  and Karl, Polanyi 5–​8, 26, 45, 63, 125 neo-​nationalist 17, 26, 45, 64, 127, 151  see also counter-​movement Douglas, Tom 19, 77 economic  cleavage 4, 102–​103, 122, 151 crisis 23, 80, 96, 110, 131 grievances 3, 5, 7, 10, 22, 49n8, 82, 97, 110, 112 insecurity 10, 30–​31, 44–​45, 49, 58–​59, 74n21, 90–​91, 91n7, 104, 106, 119, 130, 134 liberalism 23–​24, 75, 116, 120–​121, 152 platform 16, 80, 112, 140 rationalism 40, 84, 128 system 2, 6, 15, 31, 29, 88, 122 Eger, Maureen 12–​13, 57, 132 electoral  breakthrough 11, 77, 80, 88, 94, 97 competition 103, 122–​123, 125 performance 16, 18, 108, 122 persistence 11, 64, 88, 95, 97, 114n1, 126 support 3, 18–​20, 46, 51, 55, 61 success 3, 63, 70n10, 114n1 system 11, 112, 152 embedded liberalism 6, 23n2, 29, 151 embeddedness 23, 23n1, 24n4, 26n8, 30, 66n3, 79, 86, 115, 118, 136, 151 Erdoğan, Recep Tayyip 20, 58, 133 Essletzbichler, Jürgen 3, 60 European Union (EU) 37n21, 54–​56, 66–​67, 69, 75n22, 78, 112n27, 127, 130 Evans, Geoffrey 103, 110 Evans, Peter 6, 24, 31n15, 118, 132 extrusion 29, 32–​35, 38–​39, 42, 44, 54–​55, 58–​59, 61, 68–​69, 72–​74, 82, 87–​88, 90, 102, 105, 107n16, 120

185 Ferreira, Renata, R. 86, 88 Fidesz 66n2, 72–​74, 75n23, 77, 80n31, 81–​83, 128, 135 financialization 5, 28, 32–​33, 37, 40, 69, 88, 102, 105n11 Finland 36, 38, 68n7, 102, 128 Fleckenstein, Timo 118–​119, 123 flexibilization of labour 29, 31, 33, 36, 40, 54, 58, 60, 68, 82, 87, 90, 92, 101, 118–​120, 125, 129–​130, 151 see also collusion foreign direct investment 26, 32, 69 see also extrusion France  capital-​state (post-​dirigiste) 40–​41, 99, 104, 128 capital-​state index 38, 99–​102 neo-​nationalism 9, 47, 63–​64, 111 see also National Front, Unbowed France nostalgic deprivation 104–​105 relative deprivation 105n14, 105–​107 status frustration 106–​107, 108n18, 109 Fraser, Nancy 3, 20, 23, 26, 62, 79, 129, 131, 136 Freedom Party (Austria) 12, 20, 81 Frum, David 3, 133 Fukuyama, Francis 60–​61 Gross Domestic Product (gdp) 35, 47–​48, 66, 68, 85–​86, 88, 117–​118 Germany 12, 20, 36, 38, 47, 67, 71n11, 104, 129 Gidron, Noam 3, 76–​77, 79 Gill, Lesley 2, 26, 32n19, 121n5 global financial crisis 19, 23n2, 40, 61, 68, 80n31, 96, 115 globalization  and capital-​state 7, 41, 47–​48, 58, 61, 127, 130 and neo-​nationalism 3, 5, 47, 52–​54, 56–​ 57, 109, 127, 130, 135 as segyehwa (South Korea) 116, 121 index 47–​48, 51 neoliberal 6, 22, 24, 26–​28, 28n10, 33, 42, 114, 126, 130 Golder, Matt 3, 15n6, 49, 49n7, 53n13, 97, 133 Gonzalez-​Vicente, Ruben 16, 21, 44, 57 Goodliffe, Gabriel 98, 104, 107, 109, 109n21, 111n26 Grajczjár, István 75, 79

Oleksandr Svitych - 978-90-04-51622-9

186 Index great transformation 5–​6, 22–​23, 27, 29, 42, 127 Greece 20, 38, 128 Greskovits, Béla 37, 66, 66n3, 67n5, 68 Guehenno, Jean-​Marie 27, 130, 132 Gypsy 79–​82, 111n26 Halikiopoulou, Daphne 12–​13, 111 Hall, Peter 3, 27, 36, 77, 79, 116n3, 130 Halmai, Gábor 18, 29n14, 72, 74, 82 Hanson, Pauline 84, 93–​94, 133 see also One Nation Party Harvey, David 25, 44 Hawke-​Keating Government 40, 84–​86 Hawkins, Kirk, A. 3, 132 Hay, Colin 27, 50 healthcare 17, 30, 35, 66, 84–​85, 90, 99, 117, 134, 136 hegemony 14, 18, 20, 57, 62, 73, 80, 125, 128, 131, 136, 152 (hegemonic) Hellmann, Olli 122–​123 historical institutionalism 9, 65 Hochschild, Arlie, R. 58, 76 Hollande, François 100, 101n5, 105 Holmes, Christopher 6, 16n7, 23n1, 24, 26, 131 Honneth, Axel 79, 129 household  debt 35, 66, 86, 89, 92, 99 financial satisfaction, dissatisfaction 34, 71, 71–​73, 75n22, 89, 105 (in)security 30, 40, 66, 74, 105, 105n11, 117, 129  see also intrusion Howard, John 92–​93, 95n10 Hungary  capital-​state (post-​socialist) 40, 65–​69, 66n3, 67n4, 128 capital-​state index 38–​39, 63 neo-​nationalism 3, 9, 20, 47, 63, 82, 103, 128, 133, 135 see also Fidesz, Jobbik nostalgic deprivation 70–​71, 70n10, 71n11 relative deprivation 73–​75, 74n21 status frustration 76–​78, 108n18 identity  collective 7, 16, 152–​153 cultural 11n1, 59–​60, 95, 122

ethnic 11, 12n2, 14, 72 national 12, 33, 79–​80, 106, 110, 121 politics 2, 7, 20, 62, 81, 93, 106, 127 social 19, 70 threat to 3, 31, 82, 131 Ignazi, Piero 3, 7, 1 97 Immerfall, Stefan 3, 14, 77, 93 immigration 3, 10, 19–​20, 47–​49, 51–​52, 54, 57–​61, 75, 75n22, 91n7, 95, 97–​98, 110n23 n. 23 n. –​24, 111–​112, 124, 129–​130, 151 inequality 10, 12, 17, 32, 49, 119, 122, 127, 130 of income 17, 33, 52–​55, 53n12, 57–​58, 61 Inglehart, Ronald 3–​5, 4n1, 49, 49n8, 60, 113, 131 institutional  change 5, 25, 29, 40–​41, 82, 99, 115, 120–​ 121, 129, 152 continuity 40, 115, 122, 153 mechanisms of the capital-​state 31–​ 34, 42, 54 International Monetary Fund (imf) 40–​41, 48, 94, 115–​116, 119, 121 International Social Survey Programme (issp) 71, 71n12 n. 12 n. –​14, 73, 73n17, 74n20, 77–​78, 78n29, 88–​90, 91n8, 85, 92–​93, 105–​108, 105n15 Intrusion 29–​30, 33–​35, 38–​39, 42, 44, 54–​ 55, 59, 66, 69, 71–​73, 82, 84, 89, 89n4, 99, 105, 105n13, 117, 120, 152 Ireland 20, 36, 38, 47, 67, 68n7, 102, 128 Italy 3, 20, 47, 104, 128 Jaeggi, Rahel 20, 23, 136 Jang, Jin-​Ho 37, 115, 122 Japan 36–​39, 47, 124, 129 Jessop 6, 24, 31n15, 130, 132 Jobbik (Hungary) 1, 17, 20, 63–​65, 70n10, 71n13 n. 13 n. –​14, 71–​75, 73n18, 77–​83, 77n28, 80n31, 81n32, 92–​94, 95n10, 109, 111n26, 128–​129, 135 Kalb, Don 18, 29n14, 59, 74, 82 Kalinowski, Thomas 120–​121 Kaltwasser, Cristóbal, R. 3, 126 Keynesianism 27, 32, 41, 92, 116, 136 Kim, Dae-​jung 40, 115, 118–​119, 124 Kim, Youngmi 118, 120, 122–​123, 125 Kitschelt, Herbert 18, 49n7, 59, 97, 110

Oleksandr Svitych - 978-90-04-51622-9

Index Koopmans, Ruud 95–​126, 124 Korea (South)  capital-​state (developmental) 40–​41, 114–​121 capital-​state index 38–​39, 41 neo-​nationalism 9, 63–​64, 128, 133 progressivism 121–​125, 129  see also authoritarianism, developmentalism Kriesi, Hanspeter 3, 95 Kwon, Seung-​Ho 115–​116, 120 Labour 30, 32, 51, 60, 68, 115n2, 118, 122, 133 contentious nature of 37, 114, 123, 125 power of 5, 26, 31, 33, 45, 56, 62, 100, 151 see also commodification, deregulation, flexibilization of labour vote 93, 109, 128 Laclau, Ernesto 2, 14 Le Pen, Marine 1, 97, 107–​108, 111, 114n1, 133, 135 see also France (neo-​nationalism), National Front Lee Myung-​bak 40, 115, 119 Lee, Sook-​Jong 37, 115, 122 Lee, You-​Il 114–​116, 118–​119, 121 leftist shift 4, 18, 57, 103, 110, 112, 129–​130 left-​wing neo-​nationalism 2, 6–​7, 8, 12–​14, 16–​21, 46, 56, 50, 56–​57, 61, 79, 82–​83, 96–​98, 102–​103, 105–​109, 109n22, 114, 122, 127, 130–​133, 135, 152 Levy, Jonah, D. 2, 25–​27, 99–​102, 115n102, 131 Lim, Hyun-​Chin 37, 115, 122 Lindh, Arvid 85, 105 Lipset, Seymour, M. 76, 76n24, 122 Lubbers, Marcel 3, 97 Luxembourg 20, 36, 38, 47, 68n7, 102, 128 Macron, Emmanuel 4, 102n7 Manow, Philip 18, 57 March, Luke 12, 103 market  and society 1, 23, 24n4, 29, 104, 114, 136 and state 2, 6, 25, 25n6, 26, 28–​30, 34, 40–​44, 50, 63, 66, 84, 99, 114, 117, 126, 129, 151 economy 7, 22, 24n4, 25, 27, 37n21, 40, 67, 70–​72, 80, 82, 104–​105, 152 fundamentalism 25, 29, 33, 127

187 ideology 5, 17, 19, 110, 128, 152 policies 13, 21, 24, 30–​31, 37, 39–​40, 66, 67n4, 87–​88, 90–​92, 99, 101, 115, 123, 134, 136 protection against 6, 8, 17, 23, 45, 58, 62, 70n10, 79, 126, 131–​132 self-​regulation utopia 5, 22–​25, 41, 47 sovereignty of 62, 115, 131, 133 transition to 6–​7, 25, 56, 61, 70n9, 78, 81–​82, 124, 152 marketization 16, 25, 32, 40, 44–​45, 62, 66, 69, 85–​86, 99, 114, 117–​118, 120, 127, 133, 151–​152 Mayer, Nonna 57, 97, 103–​104, 108, 110–​111 Mcallister, Ian 88, 91 Mcguigan, Jim 6, 30 Mcswiney, Jordan 87, 94 Mélenchon, Jean-​Luc 14, 105, 133, 135 Mexico 1, 20, 38, 47, 120, 128 Minkenberg, Michael 3, 13, 97 Minns, John 37, 115 Mitterrand, François 41, 99, 102 Modi, Narendra 20, 58, 133, 135 Moffitt, Benjamin 3, 132 Mondon, Aurelien 95, 112 morena (Mexico) 1, 20 Mouffe, Chantal 3, 110, 129, 131 Mudde, Cas 1–​3, 5, 10–​14, 18, 57, 72, 97, 103–​ 104, 126 Mutz, Diana, C. 76–​77 National Front (France) 1, 4, 7, 12–​13, 17, 57, 75n23, 81, 97–​98, 103, 105–​109, 110n24, 112, 114n1, 128–​129, 133, 135 nationalism 6, 11, 13n3, 15, 44, 72, 106, 121, 152 populist 1, 2, 5, 78, 11, 16, 29n14, 33, 60, 62, 126, 131–​132, 153 see also neo-​nationalism nativism 11, 11n1, 12, 12n2, 33 neo-​nationalism  alternative explanations 3–​5 definition 1–​2, 12, 14–​16, 152 demand-​side 3, 10, 151 elite populist nationalism,  supply-​side 3, 11, 153 trends 1–​2, 18–​21, 46–​62, 130 typology 7–​9, 12–​13, 12n2, 16–​17

Oleksandr Svitych - 978-90-04-51622-9

188 Index neo-​nationalism (cont.)  see also Australia, counter-​movement, double-​movement, France, Hungary, Korea (South), left-​ wing neo-​nationalism, right-​wing neo-​nationalism neoliberalism 3–​4, 16n8, 17, 20, 25–​26, 36n21, 40, 42n23, 115, 124, 136, 152 see also globalization (neoliberal) Netherlands 20, 36, 38, 47, 68n7, 86, 102, 128 Norris, Pippa 3–​5, 49, 49n8, 60, 113, 131 Norway 17, 20, 36, 38, 86, 129 nostalgic deprivation 70–​71, 82, 88, 96, 152 oecd 2, 8–​9, 16, 18–​20, 27, 30, 34–​37, 40–​41, 45–​52, 55, 61–​63, 65, 68, 82, 84, 86–​88, 99–​101, 115–​121, 124, 128, 130 Ohmae, Kenichi 27, 130, 132 One Nation Party (Australia) 1, 12, 64, 84–​ 85, 93–​96, 128–​129, 135 Orbán, Viktor 17, 20, 58, 65, 68, 81, 95, 133, 135 Orenstein, Mitchell A. 66–​67, 69 Palier, Bruno 20, 96, 99 Park, Chung-​hee 118, 121 party  competition 11, 21, 80n31, 96, 102–​103, 106, 132, 152 manifesto 9, 16, 103, 110, 129 organizational strength 94–​95, 98, 112, 128, 130, 133 proletarisation 71, 108 strategy 3, 9, 45, 64, 103, 111, 127–​128, 135 Patomäki 58n17, 61, 76 Payne, Anthony 24, 26n7, 136 Perrineau, Pascal 3, 57, 103, 108 Pirie, Iain 115, 117, 120 Podemos party (Spain) 4, 17, 56, 133 Poland 4, 38, 47, 65, 66n3, 71n11 Polanyi, Karl 1–​2, 5–​6, 8, 16n7, 17, 20–​27, 29, 31, 42, 44, 61, 62, 66–​67, 76, 80, 114, 126, 134, 136, 151–​152 see also commodification, counter-​movement, disembeddedness, double-​movement, embeddedness, great transformation political economy 1, 5, 9, 24, 24n4, 26, 31, 41, 63, 131, 136

comparative 21, 27, 37 critical 1, 9, 126 global 6, 21–​22 national 9, 39, 42, 65, 69–​70, 94, 99, 102, 114–​116, 121–​122 populism  as an element of neo-​nationalism 4, 10–​ 11, 16, 72, 74, 123, 126–​127, 152 authoritarian 4–​5, 15, 15n5, 45, 133 conceptions of 2–​4, 14 conceptual stretching 14, 14n4, 17n9, 133, 135 definition 1–​2, 14, 152 neoliberal 8, 16–​17, 56–​58, 132, 135 typology of 8, 12n2, 14, 17 Portugal 21, 38, 47, 128 post-​industrialism 3, 103, 113 post-​materialism 3, 97–​98, 113, 131 Prasad, Monica 99, 103 precariatization (precariousness) 5, 21, 31, 33–​34, 54, 58, 60–​61, 83, 87, 100, 109, 120, 122, 133–​134 Prichard, Alex 26–​27 privatization 5, 24, 28, 30, 33–​34, 66–​67, 88, 92, 100, 123, 134, 152 protectionism 17, 20, 82, 140 public  expenditure 85–​86, 100, 117–​118 goods 6, 29, 30, 33, 40, 66, 82, 105n11, 112, 129, 152 opinion 70, 82, 104, 112n27, 126 sector 24, 28n12, 30, 61, 100, 118, 152 Pusey, Michael 81, 84–​85, 87, 89–​91 radicalism 2, 14–​16, 15n6, 95n10, 123, 152, 153 radical left parties, see left-​wing neo-​nationalism radical right parties, see right-​wing neo-​nationalism recognition 31, 60, 76, 79, 107–​108, 108n18, 129 redistribution 5, 18, 32, 54, 57–​59, 73, 79, 90, 94, 102, 105, 108, 110, 118, 129, 132, 151 relative deprivation 70, 72–​76, 72n15, 81–​82, 89, 90, 93, 96, 105, 105n12, 127, 130, 153 responsibilization 30, 90, 134 Revelli, Marco 129, 131

Oleksandr Svitych - 978-90-04-51622-9

189

Index right-​wing neo-​nationalism 2, 7, 10, 12, 12n2, 16–​20, 16n8, 56–​57, 59, 62, 64–​65, 72, 97–​98, 110, 124–​125, 129–​130, 132, 153 Rodrik, Dani 3, 27 Rooduijn, Matthijs 79, 129 Rovny, Jan 79, 129 Rudd, Kevin 87, 92 Ruggie, John 6, 23n2, 33 rural  support for the radical right 75, 75n23, 92 -​urban divide 74, 92, 122 Rydgren, Jens 3, 57, 97 Saar, Ellu 76–​77 Salmela, Mikko 19, 77, 106 Sanders, Bernie 8, 17, 20, 49n8, 133 Sarkozy, Nicolas 100, 103, 105, 112 scapegoating 7, 12, 19, 49, 58, 61, 61n19, 72n15, 94, 106, 110, 135, 153 see also blaming Scheepers, Peer 3, 97 Schmidt, Vivien, A. 99–​102 Simonet, Daniel 100–​102 Snegovaya, Maria 71, 75, 79, 82 social  contract 6–​7, 21, 45, 93 democracy 6, 37, 37n22, 122–​123, 136 democratic parties 103, 107, 108n20 protection 5, 8, 17, 20, 28n11, 31, 50, 56, 67n5, 69, 76, 114, 123, 130, 132–​133, 135–​136 risks 30, 66–​69, 117 socialism 12–​14, 16n8, 19, 40–​41, 65–​68, 99, 100, 122, 124 socialist parties 12, 20, 41, 66, 71, 71n14, 73, 74n18, 83, 99, 103, 105–​108 Somers, Margaret 6, 22, 23n1, 24–​25 Soskice, David 27, 36, 130–​131 Spain 4, 20, 38, 128, 133–​134, 137 Spruyt, Bram 3, 72 Standing, Guy 31 state transformation 5, 8–​9, 26–​27, 43–​44, 63–​64, 106, 112–​113, 126, 131 see also capital-​state, great transformation Statham, Paul 95–​96, 124 status frustration 70, 74, 76, 76n24, 81–​82, 91, 96, 107, 108, 108n18, 127, 130, 153

Stavrakakis, Yannis 14, 135 Stokes, Leach, G. 87, 94–​95 Streeck, Wolfgang 2, 26, 32, 32n17, 65 Suh, Chung-​Sok 115–​116, 120 Sweden 20, 36, 38, 47, 128 Switzerland 20, 36–​38, 47, 68n7, 102 syriza party (Greece) 17, 20, 56 Szombati, Kristóf 74–​76, 81, 81n32, 92 Taggart, Paul 14 Thorleifsson, Cathrine 60–​61 Tilly, Charles 29n14, 61, 110, 125 Tóth, András 68, 75, 79 trade unions 31–​32, 35, 37, 68, 68n6, 87–​88, 91–​92, 101–​103, 107, 118–​119, 123 transnationalization 29, 32, 54, 61, 67, 69, 120, 151 see also extrusion Trump, Donald 1, 8, 14, 15n5, 16n7, 17, 20, 49n8, 58, 61, 73n16, 77n25, 133–​135 Turkey 37, 39, 119, 120, 128 ukip 17, 61 United Kingdom (UK) 36, 38, 47, 68n7, 86, 102 Unbowed France party 97–​98, 135 unemployment 3, 47–​48, 51–​58, 60, 67n5, 97, 112n27, 130, 134, 151 uneven convergence 40, 42, 153 United States (US) 20, 38, 47, 67, 104, 118 Valdez, Sarah 12–​13, 57, 132 Vona, Gábor 63, 79–​80 Webster, Edward 30, 90, 93, 119n4, 125 welfare  capitalism 6, 31, 37n22 chauvinism 13, 19–​20, 57–​58, 94, 110, 129–​130, 135 cuts in 19, 34, 66–​67 state 6, 27, 30, 31n15, 34, 41, 66, 67n4, 83, 85–​86, 103, 116–​119, 123, 125, 129, 136 Whitlam, Gough 40, 84 Wodak, Ruth 12–​13, 18–​19 World Values Survey 48–​49, 72–​75, 77, 79, 86, 89, 90, 93, 105–​107, 123n6, 124n8 World War i 23, 81 World War ii 6, 23n2, 81, 111n26 Wright, Erik, O. 6, 136

Oleksandr Svitych - 978-90-04-51622-9