The Rise of Professionalism: Monopolies of Competence and Sheltered Markets [Reprint ed.] 141284777X, 9781412847773

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THE RISE O F

PROFESSIONALISM

THE RISE O F

PROFESSIONALISM Monopolies of Competence an d Sheltere d Markets

Magali Sarfatti Larson With a new introduction by the author

Routledge Taylor & Francis Group LONDON AND NE W YOR K ON AND NE W YOR K

Originally published in 1977 by the University of California Press. Published 2013 by Transaction Publisher s Published 2017 by Routledg e 2 Park Square , Milton Park, Abingdon , Oxon OX14 4RN 711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017, USA Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business New material this edition copyright © 2013 by Taylo r & Francis. A l l right s reserved. N o part o f this book ma y be reprinte d or reproduced o r utilised in an y for m o r b y an y electronic , mechanical , o r othe r means , no w know n o r hereafter invented , includin g photocopying an d recording , o r i n an y informatio n storage or retrieval system, withou t permission in writing from the publishers . Notice: Product o r corporat e name s ma y b e trademark s o r registere d trademarks , an d ar e used only for identification an d explanation without intent to infringe . Library o f Congress Catalog Number: 201105348 5 Library o f Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Larson, Magali Sarfatti. The rise of professionalism : monopolies o f competence and sheltered market s / Magali Sarfatti Larson ; with a new introductio n by the author . p. cm. "Originally published in 1977 by University of California Press." ISBN 978-1-4128-4777- 3 1. Professions-Socia l aspects-Unite d States . 2. Professiona l socialization . I . Title . HT687.L37 201 2 305.5'530973--dc23 2011053485 ISBN 13 : 978-1-4128-4777-3 (pbk )

To my parents, Amedeo and Pierangela Sarfatti

Contents Acknowledgements

ix

Introduction

x xix

Introduction to the Transaction Edition

PART I. THE ORGANIZATION OF PROFESSIONAL MARKETS 1 The Historical Matrix of Modern Professions 2 Pre-industrial Antecedent s • Th e Ris e of Moder n Professionalism 2 The Constitution of Professional Markets 9 Community-Oriented an d Market-Oriented Societ y • Th e Organizational Tas k 3 An Analysis of Medicine's Professional Success 1 The Market for Medica l Service s • A Comparative Case: Engineering • Th e Cognitive Condition s of Professiona l Monopoly

9

4 Standardization of Knowledge and Market Control 4 Dimensions o f Marke t Control • A Structura l Approac h to the Professiona l Phenomeno n

0

5 Market and Anti-Market Principles 5 Professions an d the Idea l of Communit y • Th e Service Ideal Revisite d

3

PART II. THE COLLECTIVE CONQUEST OF STATUS 6 The

Collective Mobility

Project

6

7 Uses and Limitations of the Aristocratic Model 8 Higher an d Lowe r Branche s • Th e Deferentia l Challeng e • Th e Pyrami d of Prestig e

6 0

viij

Contents 8 Professional Privilege in a Democratic Society 10 The Communal Matri x o f Professio n • Th e Distende d Society • Th e Profession s i n a Phase of Transitio n 9 The Rise of Corporate Capitalism and the Consolidation of Professionalism 13 The Ne w Contex t of Professionalizatio n • Generalizatio n of the Professiona l Project ; the Structura l Backgroun d 10 Patterns of Professional Incorporation into the New Class System 15 Medicine an d the Cohesiveness of Economi c Interes t • The Lega l Profession , Epitome of Socia l Stratificatio n 11 Profession and Bureaucracy 17 The Growth o f Organizational Profession s • Professiona l Uses of Expertis e i n Heteronomou s Organization s • Client Orientation , Publi c Service , and Technobureaucrac y • Th e Conflict betwee n Profession s an d Bureaucrac y • Bureaucracy an d the Interna l Stratificatio n o f Profession s 12 Monopolies of Competence and Bourgeois Ideology 2 0 From Historica l t o Structura l Analysi s • Genera l Components o f the Ideolog y o f Professio n • Professiona l Ideology an d the Socia l Contro l o f Educate d Labo r • Professional Privileg e an d Proletarianizatio n • Function s of the Ideolog y o f Profession ; Contributions t o the Dominant Ideolog y

Appendix Tables

24

4

6

9

8

8

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Notes 25

3

Bibliography 29

6

Index 30

0

Acknowledgments

This boo k gre w ou t o f m y doctora l dissertation ; I therefor e wis h to expres s my gratitude t o th e Nationa l Scienc e Foundatio n an d t o th e Danfort h Foundatio n fo r their suppor t whil e I wa s workin g o n m y thesis . Th e Ken t Fellowshi p whic h th e Danforth Foundatio n awarde d m e fro m 197 2 to 197 4 meant muc h more t o me tha n just financia l help. Sentimental acknowledgment s ar e extremel y gratifyin g fo r a n author , bu t th e reader seldo m find s the m interesting . Th e followin g peopl e wil l kno w wit h ho w much sentimen t I wish to thank them : they are , firs t o f all, m y teachers at th e Uni versity o f California , Berkeley : Arthu r L . Stinchcombe , Rober t Blauner , W . R. Ellis, an d Nei l Smelser . On e o f m y firs t an d fines t teachers , Kalma n H . Silvert, died a n untimel y deat h a s I wa s finishin g thi s writing . I woul d hav e anxiousl y awaited hi s respons e to this work ; now, I can onl y record m y intellectua l debt an d my admiration . Amon g th e man y friend s an d colleague s wh o endlessl y listened , read, suggested , and edited were Andrew Scull, Fred Block, and Charles D . Kaplan, whose intellectua l support wen t far beyond the writin g of this book; and also Jeffre y Escoffier, An n Beuf, Carol e Joffe , Arlen e K. Daniels , Te d Ree d an d m y student s in th e semina r o n th e sociolog y o f profession s a t th e Universit y of Pennsylvania . My deb t wit h Richar d Fitzgeral d i s greates t i n regar d t o th e America n chapters . Ronald Grele's acut e comments o n the first draf t an d his broad historical knowledge helped m e greatly , a s di d Alai n Touraine' s incisiv e reading. Las t bu t no t least , I wish t o than k m y editor s a t th e Universit y of Californi a Press, Gran t Barne s an d Gene Tanke fo r their help and support , a s wel l a s Mrs. Miranda Reinis, fo r her perfect an d patien t typing . My so n Antoni o was bor n a few month s befor e I starte d writin g thi s book. Nat urally, h e di d all that wa s i n his power to prevent m e fro m doin g so. I should there fore thank, mos t of all, the people wh o helped me with suc h devotion and good grace to hol d Antoni o in check. M y indebtedness to m y parents an d t o m y husband , fo r this as wel l as everything else, is of the kind that cannot eve n begi n to be stated here. M.S.L. University of Pennsylvania

Introduction

My interes t i n the profession s wa s initiall y awakene d b y practica l experiences . During a strike of college teachers in the sixties, the accusation was heard that these professors wer e behaving "like longshoremen. " Later, I was told b y the organizers of a union o f employed architects i n the Sa n Francisc o Ba y Area that most of their potential member s resiste d unionization , a s somethin g "unprofessional. " Some how, architectura l employees, mos t o f whom ca n b e lai d of f without prio r notic e from on e day to the next and are pai d hourly wages often lowe r than those of semiskilled laborer s i n constructio n unions , believe d tha t unionizatio n would furthe r reduce thei r dignity an d thei r prospects a s workin g people . I began askin g myself, "what's i n a name?" Wha t made professor s an d architects—not to mention physicians, lawyers , an d engineers—fee l tha t th e tactic s an d strateg y o f the industria l working clas s woul d depriv e the m o f a cherishe d identity ? What i s there , i n th e attributes o f a profession , tha t compensate s fo r subordination , individua l power lessness, an d ofte n lo w pay? In mos t cases , socia l scientist s provid e an unequivoca l answer: profession s ar e occupations wit h specia l power and prestige. Societ y grants these rewards because professions have special competence i n esoteric bodies of knowledge linked to central needs an d values o f the socia l system, an d because professions ar e devote d t o th e service o f the public , abov e an d beyon d material incentives. The lis t o f specifi c attribute s whic h compos e th e ideal-typ e o f profession ma y vary, but there is substantial agreement abou t its general dimensions. The cognitive dimension i s centered o n the bod y of knowledge and techniques whic h th e profes sionals apply in their work, an d on the training necessary to master suc h knowledge and skills ; th e normativ e dimension covers th e servic e orientation of professionals, and thei r distinctiv e ethics , whic h justif y th e privileg e o f self-regulatio n granted them b y society ; the evaluative dimension implicitly compare s profession s t o other occupations, underscorin g th e professions ' singula r characteristic s o f autonom y and prestige . Th e distinctivenes s o f the profession s appear s to b e founde d o n th e combination o f thes e genera l dimensions . Thes e uncommo n occupation s ten d t o become "real " communities, whose member s shar e a relatively permanen t affilia tion, a n identity , persona l commitment , specific interests , an d genera l loyalties. These communities are concretely identified b y typical organizations and institu tional patterns: professional associations, professional schools, and self-administered codes of ethics. I t is not clear ho w much "community " would exis t without these institutional supports; yet these supports are features tha t occupations which aspire to 1

2

Introduction

xi

the privileges of professional statu s can imitate, withou t possessing the cognitive and normative justifications of "real " professions. In fact , th e professiona l phenomeno n doe s not hav e clea r boundaries . Eithe r its dimensions ar e devoi d of a clear empirica l referent, o r its attributes ar e s o concret e that occupationa l group s tryin g t o upgrad e thei r status can cop y the m wit h relativ e ease. Fo r instance , i t i s ofte n emphasize d tha t professiona l trainin g must b e pro longed, specialized , an d hav e a theoretica l base. Yet , a s Elio t Freidso n ironicall y points out, i t is never state d how long ; how theoretical , or how specialize d training must be i n order to qualify, sinc e al l formal trainin g "takes some time," is "some what specialized," an d involves some attempt a t generalization. The service orientation is even more problematic: it is, undoubtedly, part of the ideology and one of the prescriptive norm s whic h organize d profession s explicitl y avow . Ye t th e implici t assumption tha t the behavio r of individual professional s i s more ethical, as a norm, than tha t o f individual s in lesse r occupation s ha s seldom , i f ever, bee n teste d b y empirical evidence. Finally , i t is true that most established profession s ran k high on the prestige scal e of occupations, althoug h they rank lower than positions of institutional o r d e fact o power , suc h a s Suprem e Cour t Justice o r cabine t membe r i n the federal government. Suc h rankings reflect synthetic evaluations, which fact makes it impossible to ascertain th e weigh t assigned t o the "professional " characteristic s of competence an d disinterestedness in such judgments; prestige ma y wel l be accorde d on grounds tha t have nothing to do with the professions' distinctiveness , suc h as th e high incom e an d upper-middle-clas s statu s of many professionals . 3

4

5

Profession appear s to be on e o f the man y "natura l concepts, " fraugh t wit h ide ology, that social science abstracts from everyda y life . Th e most common ideal-type of professio n combine s heterogeneou s elements an d link s the m b y implici t thoug h untested propositions—suc h a s th e propositio n tha t prestig e an d autonom y flo w "naturally" fro m th e cognitiv e and normativ e base s o f professiona l work . Man y elements o f th e definitio n reproduc e th e institutiona l means an d th e sequenc e by which th e olde r professions gaine d thei r special status . Other s d o no t see m to tak e notice of empirical evidence or even of common knowledge about the professions; fo r instance, th e notion of professions a s "communities " does not fit very well wit h the wide discrepancies o f status and rewards which we know exist within any profession. It i s also somewha t disturbin g to note tha t competence an d the servic e idea l play a s central a rol e i n th e sociologica l ideal-type a s the y d o i n th e self-justificatio n of professional privilege. The elements tha t compos e th e ideal-typ e of profession appea r to be drawn fro m the practic e an d fro m th e ideolog y of the establishe d professions ; medicine , there fore, a s the most powerful an d successful o f these, should approximate most closely the sociological criteria of what professions ar e and do. This is undoubtedly one of the reasons for the centrality of medicine in the sociology of professions. An d yet empirical studie s o f medical practic e challeng e th e validit y o f the sociologica l model a t almost ever y step : they question , fo r instance, th e effectivenes s (an d even th e existence) of colleague control; they show that "ascribed " characteristic s o f the clientele are a t least a s importan t as "universalistic " or scientifi c methods o f diagnosis an d 6

Introduction

xii

therapy; the y show that in medicine as well as in the law, a practitioner's status is as closely related to the status of his clientele as to his own skill. Historica l studie s of nineteenth-century medicine , moreover , destro y th e notio n that "regular " physi cians had , i n general, an y more competence tha n their "irregular" competitors. In brief, thes e ideal-typical constructions d o no t tel l u s wha t a profession is , but onl y what i t pretend s t o be . Th e "Chicag o School " o f sociology—represented , mos t notably, b y Everett C . Hughe s an d hi s followers—i s critical o f this approach , an d asks instead wha t professions actuall y do in everyday lif e t o negotiate an d maintain their specia l position . The salien t characteristic s o f th e professiona l phenomeno n emerge, here , fro m th e observatio n o f actual practices . In his pathbreaking analysis of medicine, Freidson does much to clarify th e natur e of professional privilege and the processes by which it is asserted. His examination of the "archetypal " professio n lead s him to argu e that " a professio n i s distinct fro m other occupations i n that it has been given the right to control its own work.'' Among other occupations, "onl y the profession has the recognized right to declare . . . 'out side' evaluatio n illegitimate an d intolerable." This distinctive autonomy is , however, onl y technical and not absolute. Profession s ultimatel y depend upo n the power of th e state , an d the y originall y emerg e b y th e grac e o f powerful protectors . Th e privileged positio n of a profession "i s thu s secure d b y th e politica l an d economi c influence o f the elit e whic h sponsor s i t . " Freidson's analysi s ha s importan t implications . First, th e cognitiv e and norma tive element s generall y use d t o defin e professio n ar e undoubtedl y significant ; but they shoul d no t b e viewe d as stabl e an d fixe d characteristics , th e accumulatio n of which gradually allows an occupation to approximate the "complete " constellatio n of professiona l features . Thes e cognitiv e an d normativ e element s ar e important , instead, becaus e they ca n b e use d (wit h greate r o r lesse r success) a s argument s i n a proces s whic h involve s both struggl e an d persuasion . I n this process , particula r groups o f people attemp t t o negotiat e th e boundarie s o f an are a i n the socia l divi sion of labor and establish thei r own control over it. Persuasio n tend s to be typicall y directed to the outside—that is , to the relevant elites, the potential public or publics, and th e politica l authorities . Conflic t an d struggl e aroun d wh o shall be include d or excluded mar k th e proces s of internal unificatio n o f a profession . Second, a n accoun t o f the proces s b y whic h profession s emerg e illuminate s the fact that professions gain autonomy: in this protected position, they can develop wit h increasing independence fro m th e ideology of the dominant social elites. The production of knowledge appears to play a more an d more strategic an d seemingl y autono mous role in the dynamics of these special occupations. I f professions obtai n extended powers of self-evaluation and self-control they can become almos t immune to external regulation. Th e fac t remains, however , tha t thei r privileges can alway s be lost . I f a profession's wor k o r actua l performanc e "come s t o hav e littl e relationshi p t o th e knowledge and values of its society, it may have difficulty surviving." Revolutionary social change should therefore hav e profound implications for professional prac tice becaus e i t affects , i n bot h relativ e an d absolut e terms , th e socia l statu s tha t established profession s ha d achieve d i n previous regimes. 7

8

9

10

1 1

12

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Introduction

xiii

In th e centra l par t o f his study , Freidso n examine s th e potentia l for producing ideology that is inheren t i n the statu s o f profession. Thi s potential exists no t onl y because cognitiv e and normativ e element s ar e use d ideologically , a s instrument s in a n occupation's path toward professional status , bu t also because, once reached , this structura l position allows a group of experts t o define an d construct particular areas of socia l reality , unde r th e guis e o f universa l validity conferre d o n the m by their expertise . Th e professio n is , i n fact, allowe d to defin e th e very standards by which it s superior competence i s judged. Professional autonom y allows the expert s to selec t almos t a t wil l th e input s they wil l receiv e fro m th e laity . Thei r autonomy thus tend s t o insulat e them : i n part , professional s liv e withi n ideologie s o f their own creation , which they present t o the outside a s the most valid definitions of specific sphere s of social reality . In a sense , th e mor e traditiona l vie w o f th e profession s start s wher e Freidso n arrives afte r a lon g proces s of analysis. Talcot t Parsons writes, for instance : The importanc e o f th e profession s t o socia l structur e may be summe d u p as follows : the professional type i s the institutiona l framework in which many of our most important social functions ar e carried on, notabl y th e pursuit of scienc e an d liberal learning and it s practical application in medicine, technology , la w and teaching. Thi s depend s on an institutional structure the maintenance of which is not an automatic consequenc e of belief in the importance of the functions a s such, but involves a complex balanc e of diverse socia l forces. 14

Yet i n most cases, the "ideal-typical " o r institutional approac h tend s to emphasiz e the functiona l relation s o f professions wit h centra l socia l needs and values, a t th e expense o f th e "comple x balanc e o f divers e socia l forces " whic h support s suc h relations. Th e functiona l importanc e of the profession s appear s to explai n the historical continuit y o f the oldes t amon g them , medicin e an d th e law . The evolutio n of thes e two , and th e professionalizatio n of other occupations , pertain s t o genera l dimensions o f "modernization"—th e advanc e o f science an d cognitiv e rationality and th e progressiv e differentiatio n an d rationalizatio n of th e divisio n o f labo r in industrial societies . While th e attribute s o f special statu s and prestig e impl y tha t th e profession s ar e linked t o th e syste m o f socia l stratification , th e emphasi s o n th e cognitiv e an d normative dimension s o f professio n tend s t o separat e thes e specia l categorie s o f the social division of labor from th e class structure in which they also are inserted. In particular , th e ethic s o f disinterestednes s claime d b y professional s appea r t o acquit the m of the capitalist profit motive . Th e ideal-typica l approach seldo m takes account o f th e concret e historica l conditions i n whic h group s o f specialist s hav e attempted t o establish a monopoly over specific area s of the divisio n o f labor. Th e class contex t i n whic h authorit y i s delegate d an d privilege s ar e grante d t o thes e particular occupations tends to be neglected. Thus, while Freidson's analysi s empha sizes tha t a profession mus t gai n suppor t fro m strategi c socia l or politica l groups , the institutiona l approac h suffer s fro m a tendenc y t o presen t profession s a s cate gories whic h emerg e fro m th e divisio n o f labo r i n unmediate d connectio n wit h society a s a whole. 15

Introduction

xiv

Both sociologica l ideal-types an d th e self-presentatio n o f professions impl y tha t the professions ar e independen t fro m o r at least neutra l vis-a-vis the class structure. Professionals ca n be viewed as themselves constitutin g a class—especially i f class is reduced to its indicators, socioeconomic status and occupation. But the emphasis o n the professions ' cognitiv e mastery an d th e implicatio n o f "class neutrality " place them, rather , i n th e stratu m o f educate d an d "sociall y unattached " intellectual s whom Kar l Mannhei m described i n these terms : Although they are too differentiate d t o be regarded as a single class, there is, however, one unifyin g sociologica l bon d betwee n al l group s o f intellectuals , namely , educa tion, whic h binds them togethe r i n a striking way. Participatio n in a common educational heritage progressivel y tend s t o suppres s differences o f birth, status , profession , and wealth, an d to unit e th e individua l educated peopl e on the basi s of th e educatio n they hav e received. . . . On e of the most impressiv e facts abou t modern life i s that in it, unlik e precedin g cultures , intellectua l activit y i s no t carrie d o n exclusivel y b y a socially rigidly defined class, such as a priesthood, but rather by a social stratum which is to a large degree unattache d to any social class and which is recruited from an increasingly inclusiv e are a of socia l life. 16

Mannheim's notio n tha t cultura l lif e i n capitalist societies wa s becomin g "increas ingly detache d fro m a give n class" contrast s sharpl y wit h th e Marxis t tradition. Marxist though t concedes t o intellectual s a measure o f autonomy an d detachmen t from an y predetermined social group, but it sees those attributes as a potential which remains withi n th e confines o f a class society. I n the same perspective, intellectual products eithe r brea k wit h th e dominan t ideolog y (b y a self-consciou s effor t o f their authors) , o r remai n withi n it s bounds. Th e socia l functio n o f intellectuals is normall y that o f consciousl y articulating , propagating, an d organizin g culture and ideology , giving the m interna l coherence an d realisti c flexibility . Fo r Antoni o Gramsci, intellectuals— a categor y tha t include s practicall y al l "intellec t work ers"—are "organically " tied t o th e clas s whos e interest s ar e actuall y uphel d by the intellectuals ' wor k an d productions . Intellectual s ar e obviousl y o f strategi c importance for the ruling class, whos e power cannot rest on coercion alone but needs to captur e th e "mora l and intellectua l direction" o f society a s a whole . A revolu tionary clas s mus t secret e an d develo p it s own "organic " intellectual s in order t o challenge th e hegemoni c powe r o f th e rulin g clas s an d strengthe n th e "counter hegemonic" consciousnes s of the masses. A complex historical formation includes , however, intellectual s whos e functio n i n th e "organizatio n o f culture " i s no t a s directly linke d t o th e maintenanc e o f ruling clas s hegemony . Gramsc i call s the m "traditional" intellectuals : their organic tie s to th e rulin g clas s have bee n lost , be cause they remaine d attache d t o a class whic h itsel f ha s los t it s central position o f power; other , mor e vita l group s o f intellectuals have supersede d the m i n the crea tion an d transmissio n o f ideology. The relativ e social superfluit y of "traditional " intellectuals enhance s thei r isolatio n within institution s that ar e relativel y autono mous fro m th e state and the predominant fractions of the ruling class. "Traditional " intellectuals thu s ten d t o constitut e closed , caste-lik e bodies , whic h ar e particu larly difficul t fo r a revolutionar y movement t o co-op t o r absorb . Defendin g cor porate veste d interests , the y spea k fo r abstrac t intellectua l freedoms , fo r th e 17

18

Introduction

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independent servic e o f disembodie d knowledg e an d "pure " ideas . Example s o f "traditional" intellectual s woul d b e th e clerg y (i n a n increasingl y secularize d society), certai n branche s o f th e professoriat , and , i n Gramsci' s analysi s o f th e Italian South , th e lega l "caste " tie d t o a landowning class whic h ha s no t risen to national power. This outrageou s oversimplificatio n o f Gramsci' s analysi s o f th e intelligentsia suggests, a t least , wh y I thin k tha t analysi s i s s o relevan t fo r understandin g th e position an d function s of professions i n a class society. Differen t professions , an d different group s within a profession , for m differen t tie s wit h a rulin g clas s whic h itself consist s o f changing coalitions. The model of profession which emerges fro m most sociologica l ideal-types appear s t o confe r upo n th e establishe d profession s the sea l o f "traditional intellectuality. " Historica l continuit y i s not only implied ; it is deliberately and activel y sough t i n the attempt s b y organized professions t o give themselves a cultur e wit h root s i n a classi c past . Th e caste-lik e appearanc e o f established professions i s reinforced by their jealously defended autonom y and their guild-like characteristics . Ye t thi s "traditional " presentatio n i s contradicte d b y the professions ' involvemen t in the everyda y lif e o f modern societie s an d als o b y the proximit y t o powe r o f many professiona l elites . Th e contradictio n is resolved if w e recall that the "organic " or "traditional " characte r o f a category of intellectual workers is not a static feature, bu t the outcome of a complex historical situation and o f ongoing social and politica l conflicts . It i s clear, a t this point, tha t Gramsci's perspectiv e o n the intelligentsi a complements Freidson's account of how a particular occupation rises to the status and power of profession . A s it rises, a n occupation must for m "organic " ties wit h significan t fractions of the ruling class (or of a rising class); persuasion an d justification depen d on ideologica l resources, th e impor t an d legitimacy of which are ultimatel y defined by th e contex t of hegemonic powe r in a class society; special bodies o f experts ar e entrusted with the task of defining a segment o f social reality, but this trust is also to be understood within the broad confines of the dominant ideology. One could say that the professions see k special institutional privileges which, onc e attained , steer them toward relativel y "traditional " intellectua l functions . But the need t o defend these privileges, an d particularl y th e professions' immersio n in the everyday lif e o f their society, counterac t thi s tendenc y toward s "traditionalism. " No t surprisingly , the appearance of detachment an d "pure " intellectua l commitments is more marked in academic circle s than i n th e consultin g professions. However , on e ma y as k wit h Freidson ho w fa r a professio n (o r a n academi c discipline ) ca n mov e towar d th e "traditional" rol e and stil l retain social support; for, indeed, "traditional " intellec tuals have little relationship to the predominant forms of knowledge and concerns of their society . These brief comments on the literature suggest how the initial focus of my researc h began t o shif t a s I looked at what contemporary sociology has t o say abou t profes sions, and as I tried to relate the problem of professions t o the more general problem of intellectual s in a class society. It appeared t o me that the very notion of profession is shape d b y the relationship s which thes e specia l occupations for m wit h a type of 19

Introduction society an d a typ e o f class structure . Profession s ar e no t exclusivel y occupationa l categories: whateve r else they are , profession s ar e situate d i n the middl e and upper middle levels of the stratificatio n system. Bot h objectively and subjectively , profes sions are outside an d above the working class, as occupations an d as social strata. In the firs t hal f o f the nineteenth century , man y professional s ma y have shared the lif e conditions of small artisans and shopkeepers ; changing wor k condition s i n our century may be drawing increasingly large numbers o f professionals close r to a proletarian condition. The fact remains that individual professional statu s is still undeniably a middle-class attribut e an d a typica l aspiratio n o f th e sociall y mobil e childre n of industrial o r clerica l workers. Th e interna l stratificatio n o f profession s canno t b e ignored; bu t th e marke t o f labor an d service s withi n whic h professional s operat e is structurally differen t fro m th e labo r marke t face d b y les s qualified workers. Thei r relative superiorit y over an d distanc e fro m th e workin g clas s is, I think, one o f the major characteristics tha t all professions an d would-be professions hav e in common. Another genera l poin t emerge s fro m th e sociologica l literatur e o n professions : most studie s implicitl y o r explicitl y presen t professionalizatio n a s a n instanc e o f the comple x proces s o f "modernization. " Fo r professions , th e mos t significan t "modern" dimension s ar e th e advanc e o f scienc e an d cognitiv e rationality , an d the related rationalizatio n and growing differentiation in the divisio n of labor. From this poin t of view, profession s ar e typica l product s o f modern industria l society. The continuit y o f olde r profession s wit h thei r "pre-industrial " pas t i s therefor e more apparen t tha n real . Modern profession s mad e themselve s int o specia l an d value d kind s o f occupa tions during the "grea t transformation " whic h change d th e structur e an d character of Europea n societie s an d thei r overseas offshoots. Thi s transformation wa s domi nated b y the reorganizatio n o f economy an d societ y aroun d the market. Th e characteristic occupationa l structur e o f industrial capitalism and it s characteristic mod e of distributin g rewards ar e therefor e base d o n th e market . Weber , i n particular , defined th e abilit y t o comman d reward s i n the marketplac e a s a functio n o f both property an d skills , an d th e possessio n o f skill s ma y b e see n as a typicall y "mod ern" for m o f property. A contemporar y sociologis t observe s that "t o character ize th e occupationa l orde r a s th e backbon e o f the rewar d structur e i s not t o ignor e the rol e o f property, bu t t o acknowledg e th e interrelatio n between th e on e an d th e other." An d he adds : "Broadl y considered, occupationa l grouping s whic h stan d high i n the scal e of material an d symboli c advantages also tend t o rank hig h in the possession o f marketable skills . . . . T o b e sure , position s whic h ran k hig h in expertise generall y attempt to maintain or enhance their scarcity, and thus their rewardpower, b y various institutiona l means . . . i t is no simpl e matte r fo r an occupatio n to restric t it s suppl y i n this w a y . " My intentio n i s t o examin e her e ho w th e occupation s tha t w e cal l profession s organized themselve s to attain market power. I see professionalizatio n a s the process by whic h producer s o f specia l service s sough t t o constitut e and control a marke t for thei r expertise. Becaus e marketable expertis e i s a crucial element i n the structur e of moder n inequality , professionalizatio n appear s also a s a collectiv e assertion o f special socia l statu s and a s a collective process of upward socia l mobility . I n other 20

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Introduction words, th e constitutio n of professional market s whic h bega n i n the nineteent h cen tury inaugurated a new form of structured inequality: it was different from th e earlier model of aristocratic patronage, an d different also from the model of social inequality based on property an d identifie d wit h capitalis t entrepreneurship. I n this sense, th e professionalization movement s o f th e nineteent h centur y prefigur e th e genera l restructuring o f socia l inequalit y i n contemporar y capitalis t societies : th e "back bone" i s th e occupationa l hierarchy , tha t is , a differentia l syste m o f competences and rewards ; th e centra l principl e of legitimac y i s founde d o n th e achievemen t of sociall y recognized expertise , or , mor e simply , on a syste m o f educatio n an d credentialing. Professionalization i s thus a n attempt to translate on e order of scarce resources— special knowledg e an d skills—int o another—socia l an d economi c rewards . T o maintain scarcit y implie s a tendenc y t o monopoly : monopoly o f expertis e i n th e market, monopol y of status in a system o f stratification. Th e focus o n the constitution o f professiona l market s lead s t o comparin g differen t profession s i n terms o f the "marketability " of their specifi c cognitiv e resources. I t determines th e exclusion o f profession s lik e th e militar y an d th e clergy , whic h d o no t transac t thei r services o n th e market. Th e focu s o n collectiv e social mobilit y accentuate s th e relations that professions for m wit h differen t systems of social stratification; in particular, i t accentuates th e rol e tha t educationa l system s play i n different structure s of socia l inequality. These ar e tw o differen t reading s o f th e sam e phenomenon : professionalizatio n and it s outcome . Th e focu s o f eac h readin g i s analyticall y distinct. I n practice , however, th e tw o dimensions—marke t contro l an d socia l mobility—ar e insep arable; the y converg e i n th e institutiona l areas o f th e marke t an d th e educationa l system, spellin g out simila r results bu t als o generatin g tension s an d contradiction s which w e find , unresolve d o r onl y partiall y reconciled , in the contemporar y mode l of profession . The imag e o r mode l o f profession whic h w e commonl y hold today , an d whic h we fin d a s wel l i n socia l science , emerge d bot h fro m socia l practic e an d fro m a n ideological representatio n o f social practice. Th e imag e bega n t o be forme d i n the liberal phas e o f capitalism , bu t i t did no t becom e "public"—tha t is , commonly understood an d widel y accepted—unti l muc h later . No t b y accident , th e mode l of professio n develope d it s mos t distinctiv e characteristics an d th e mos t clearcu t emphasis o n autonom y i n th e tw o paramoun t example s o f laissez-fair e capitalis t industrialization: Englan d an d th e Unite d States . I n th e Anglo-Saxo n societie s (and, one coul d add, i n Anglo-Saxon social science) th e image o f profession i s one which implicitl y accentuate s th e relatio n betwee n professiona l privileg e an d th e market. Professio n i s presented , fo r instance , a s th e antithesi s o f bureaucracy an d the bureaucratic mod e of work organization. The development of professions (an d of their image ) was , i n a sense, less "spontaneous " i n other Europea n societie s wit h long-standing state bureaucracies an d strong centralized governments. Fo r instance , engineering emerge d i n Napoleonic France a s a corps de Vetat, an d this model ha s informed th e aspirations o f other professions, suc h as architecture; the Prussian lega l profession wa s reforme d b y direc t an d repeate d stat e interventio n and remain s t o 25

Introduction

xvili

this da y closel y supervise d an d regulate d b y th e state ; Westernize d medicin e wa s similarly create d i n Tsarist Russi a b y th e politica l authority. Th e mode l o f profession shoul d be closer i n these cases to that of the civi l servic e tha n i t is to profes sions i n England or , especially , i n the Unite d States. Fo r thi s reason , I believ e i t should presen t it s "purer " feature s i n the Anglo-Saxo n countries . In the United States, in particular, the model of profession ha s acquire d a singular social import. It shapes, for one thing , the collective ambitions of occupational categories which in other countries could never hope to reach the status of profession. Th e extension of professionalization reflects, amon g other things, the particular openness of th e America n universit y to ne w field s o f learning an d th e widesprea d acces s to higher educatio n i n America n society. Basin g occupationa l entr y o n universit y credentials doe s not lead, i n other words, to excessive social exclusiveness. Further more, professions ar e typical occupations o f the middle class, and the vision of American societ y an d cultur e a s bein g essentiall y "middl e class " i s no t challenge d a s strongly a s i t is in Europe b y the alternativ e an d autonomou s visio n o f a politicized working class . Th e strateg y o f professionalizatio n hold s swa y o n individual s and occupational categorie s which ar e inspire d elsewhere by the politica l an d economi c strategies of the labo r movement . 26

27

To limi t m y analysi s o f professio n an d professionalizatio n t o Englan d an d th e United State s is no t entirel y a n arbitrar y choice , bu t i t is a restrictive one. M y ac count o f th e establishmen t an d th e meanin g o f professiona l privileg e ca n i n n o way b e generalized . However , becaus e it is based on societies i n which th e profes sional mode l ha s develope d th e mos t freel y ou t o f th e civi l society , an d wher e i t structures th e diffus e perception s an d aspiration s o f larg e number s o f people , i t may hel p t o illuminat e efforts an d representation s which , i n othe r societies , ar e less systematically tie d to the mode l of profession tha n they ar e i n the Unite d States and England . Finally, m y historica l accoun t o f professionalizatio n i s relevan t t o th e experi ences wit h whic h I started . Th e mode l o f professio n emerge d durin g th e "grea t transformation" an d wa s originall y shape d b y th e historica l matrix of competitive capitalism. Sinc e then , th e condition s o f professional wor k hav e changed , s o tha t the predominan t patter n i s no longe r tha t o f the fre e practitione r in a market o f services bu t that of the salarie d specialis t i n a large organization . I n this ag e o f corporate capitalism , th e mode l o f professio n nevertheles s retain s it s vigor ; i t i s stil l something t o be defende d o r somethin g t o be attaine d b y occupations i n a different historical context, i n radically different work settings , an d in radically altered form s of practice . Th e persistenc e o f profession a s a categor y o f social practic e suggest s that the mode l constituted by the firs t movement s o f professionalization ha s becom e an ideology —not onl y an image whic h consciousl y inspire s collectiv e or individua l efforts, bu t a mystification which unconsciousl y obscure s real socia l structures an d relations. Viewe d in the large r perspectiv e o f the occupationa l an d class structures , it woul d appea r that the mode l of profession passe s from a predominantly economi c function—organizing th e linkag e betwee n educatio n an d th e marketplace—t o a predominantly ideological one—justifying inequality of status and closure o f access in th e occupationa l order . Thi s boo k i s concerned wit h explorin g that passage .

Introduction to the Transaction Edition

PROFESSIONALS AND TH E MONOPOLY OF EXPERTISE It i s humblin g but als o instructiv e to loo k a t a book tha t I wrot e i n the earl y 1970s. Any book is a reflection of the politica l time s i n which i t is written; i t does not onl y respon d t o the question s tha t define d it s field bu t als o t o th e intellectual styles that were then predominant. I n the socia l sciences, moreover, it is difficult t o avoid tensions an d conflicts that emerge from th e subject s o f research themselves , and unwise t o ignor e problems tha t affec t th e subjects ' live s and practices . I n the first par t o f the 1970s , th e broad subjec t o f expert knowledge , its constitution and its uses , was fraugh t wit h anguishe d criticis m o f what appeare d a s th e misus e o f expertise i n the conduct o f the Vietnam War. Also, i n France, Miche l Foucault had been advancing for a decade the groundbreaking work that would culminat e in the indissoluble couplin g of knowledge an d powe r i n the "Discours e o n Language " (1971), i n Discipline and Punish (1975) , and i n The History of Sexuality (1976) . Experts were suspect. The authority of experts, the trust they deserved, an d their relation to democracy had been subjects o f debate since the United States was founded: the Federalist Papers and Tocqueville were concerned wit h the place of men of knowledge in the new republic. Yet, i n the 1970s , wha t power expert s actuall y commande d wa s fa r fro m clear . I n 1971, the Pentagon Papers ha d given ammunition to the anti-war movement, but not necessarily t o the critique of experts; in 1972, David Halberstam precisely accused the elite i n charge o f our foreign and militar y polic y o f ignoring the authenti c expertis e produced by professionals a t State and in the Defense Department. An d forty years later, as we marched toward another war on flimsy and often falsified publi c justifications, expert s a t the Centra l Intelligence Agency were aske d t o se t asid e what their professional knowledge stood for. Michae l Schudson wrote in 2006, "[T]he problem is not that experts hav e too much authority, but that they have too little" (Schudson , 2006: 498). In the earl y 1970s , I did not see th e proble m quite s o clearly . Yet, as I approached th e typical professional problem of writing a doctoral thesis in sociology, our trust i n expertise, th e effect s o f this trust, an d the rea l power experts ha d wer e questions tha t hovered i n the background of my work . 1

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Indeed, as critics have so frequently noted (not with praise!), this book started as a dissertation. The first steps I took toward the subject o f professions cam e from practi¬ cal experiences rathe r than political ruminations on expert power. As a lecturer at San

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Introduction to the Transaction Edition

Francisco State, I had seen the faculty strik e of 1968 greeted by other colleagues an d the press as "behavio r unbecoming" for professionals. Later , when I became inter¬ ested in the attempts to unionize employed architects in the Bay Area, the organizer s reported tha t man y architectura l employees considere d unionizatio n as somethin g unprofessional. Thi s was ver y differen t fro m wha t I knew had happene d (an d wa s still happening) in Europe. Wondering about the special status to which employed professionals wanted to cling regardless of their conditions of work, I looked for the explanations that sociologists offered. On e assumption was common: I wrote in the old introduction, "[Profession s are occupations with special power and prestige. Society grants [them ] these rewards because [they ] hav e specia l competenc e i n esoteric bodie s o f knowledge linked t o central needs and values of the social system, and because professions ar e devoted to the servic e o f the public , abov e an d beyond material incentives" (Larson, 1977: x). They are, or try to be protected from th e competition of "outsiders." The profession s also are, as I came to emphasize late r on, special communities of discourse endowe d with the authority of speaking about and for thei r field and, in so doing, constructing its meaning for the lay public. My inclinatio n was to ask how real were the rewards and protection and how they had come to be. I did not find man y inclusive or satisfactory answers . M y focus be came the process or, as I called it to mark the power of agency, the project b y which these privileged occupations had become what they were, or what the public and many sociologists assumed they were. I f th e resultin g work was taken as a general theory of professions, i t may be because it was one of the first works on professions t o come in the wake of the dominant evolutionary interpretation given by functionalism, an d thus seemed to counter it . In the early work of Talcott Parsons, both the modern professions an d the bureau¬ cratic organization s o f big business belong to the movemen t o f rationalization that characterizes capitalis t societies. The y share "elements o f the commo n institutional pattern," and both contribute to the maintenance o f the normative social order. Professional authority does not flow automatically from the social importance of a profession's duties; rather , thi s authority depends on an institutional framework sustained b y " a complex balance o f diverse social forces" (Parsons, 1954: 36 and ff, 48) . However, in the British tradition that had started in 1933 with Carr-Saunders an d Wilson, as in the important work of William J. Goode, Robert K. Merton, and, later, Harold Wilensky, the centra l social functions that professions serv e is what mainly explain s the attri ¬ butes hashed and rehashed in the multipl e definition s of professions. Th e centrality and interdependenc e o f these socia l functions determin e th e extensiv e knowledg e professionals must acquire, the specificity o f their work, the reliable uniformity o f their behavior, their privileged socia l status, and the unit y o f their organized group—the "community withi n a community" i n the words of W.J. Goode . I n the functionalist perspective, profession s ar e agent s of order because of their special knowledge and their ethics, while lesser occupations aspire to follow the path that leads, presumably, to the same desirable end point. Neither the "diverse social forces" needed to sustain the collegia l communities of profession nor the differen t course s they had followe d

Introduction to the Transaction Edition

XXi

frequently appea r i n accounts tha t ofte n seeme d to ech o th e professions ' glowin g image of themselves. This was a failure of empirically based sociological analysis that the Chicago School, following Everett Hughes, wanted to correct. As Hughes taught students lik e Howard Becker, Anselm Strauss, and Eliot Freidson, among others, t o loo k a t the substance and actual unfolding o f work eve n among occupations tha t do not enjoy th e valued title o f profession, h e showe d a way to ask the righ t question s abou t "highe r level" occupations an d about the meaning of work itself . Hughes states, I hav e com e to the conclusion that it is a fruitful thin g to start stud y of any social phenomenon at the point of least prestige. For since prestige is so much a matter of symbols, and even of pretensions .. . there goes with prestige a tendency to preserve a front which hides the inside of things .... On the other hand, in things of less prestige, the core may be more easy of access (Hughes, 1971, 341-342). Both schools looked at medicine, acknowledging its eminent status among professions. The researc h o n professional socializatio n conducted by Robert K. Merton an d his associates was a full-fledged an d probing empirical study in the training and personality formation of young physicians, quite different from the theoretical generalities on the physician-patient relation that Parsons had outline d (Parsons, 1951) . However, the title of Merton's study, The Student Physician, suggest s the difference i n tone and reverence compare d to the 196 1 Hughesian Boys in White by Howard Becker. In my view, th e mos t illuminatin g stud y o f the medica l profession came later, fro m Elio t Freidson; his landmark book, Profession of Medicine (1970 ) laid out , in a way that could transfer outsid e of medical sociology, the questions o f process and becoming, of economic power and status acquisition, that I was interested in asking. I di d not expect to be original, and I do not believe I was, except that, as I said, I may have been the first to try to do something different in the sociology of professions. I was interested in both structure and agency i n the making of modern professions. I n plainer English, since the advantages that professions a s collectivities enjoy relative to other occupations are various but long-lived, sustained, a s Parsons said, by an institutional framework that is educational, economic, intellectual, juridical, and political, I needed to clarify what that base was and how it had been assembled, by what means, by whom, and for whom. Onl y then I thought that I would be able to understand architect s and teachers and other occupations that were neither medicine nor law. Time wa s o f importance: first, because of my desire t o finish graduat e schoo l at Berkeley before the birth of my child, and secondly, shortly thereafter, becaus e of my teaching duties and my publisher's deadline. It is hard to remember now how one could write before the personal computer, depending on the goodness of hired typists for a clean manuscript, before the Internet and Google! Every piece of material, every sec¬ ondary source that I used, every citation that I followed had to be physically retrieved from the library. Furthermore, many of the most important works that either confirmed or changed m y thinking, an d that I feel hono r bound to recommend to the reader in the attache d bibliography , wer e yet to be published. To name bu t a few important authors on the subjects o f professions, highe r education, and special professions lik e 3

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medicine or law: Randal l Collins (1979), Paul Star r (1982) , John Heinz and Edward Laumann (1982) , Terence Halliday (1987), Sydney Halper n (1988), Andrew Abbott (1988), Keit h MacDonal d (1995), Steve n Brin t (1996) , Elliot t Kraus e (1999) ; an d among historians , David Noble (1977), Morris Vogel (1980), Gerald Geison (1983), Matthew Ramse y (1984) , Wilfri d Pres t (1986) , Charle s Rosenber g (1987) , Harold Perkin (1989). Except for MacDonald and Krause, the sociologists only looked at the Anglo-American world. I shoul d note at the outset that the abbreviated notio n Anglo-American i s problematic. It has been used to criticize the alleged ethnocentrism of a concept o f profession improperly transposed to other shores mainly by American social scientists (Torsten dahl, 1990) . Inevitably , the ter m Anglo-American evoke s similaritie s between tw o nations that "had in common a comparatively passive state apparatus with a strong but by n o means unambivalent laissez-faire ideology and a small civil service" (Freidson , 1994: 17) . I limited my stud y t o a woefully incomplet e compariso n of England an d the Unite d States because I could not possibly d o mor e a t the time , but, lik e Keit h MacDonald almost twenty years later, I emphasized difference s a s much as commonalities. Thus, for example, my "English" chapter is titled "Uses and Limitations of the Aristocratic Model" an d the "earl y American" chapter titled "Professiona l Privileg e in a Democratic Society " (Larson, 1977 , Ch. 7 and 8). I agre e with Freidson that the term profession a s " a distinctiv e form o f organized occupation" is restricted to a particular period in history and to a few nations i n that period. Responding to Torstendahl and others, Collin s has suggeste d a bimodal para¬ digm of professionalization: i n the continental European mode l a directive state takes the lead, creating, governing, and controlling the institutions on which professional s depend; this top-down model contrasts starkly with the institution-building process in England and the United States (Collins, 1990) . Here, professional reformers ris e out of the civi l society to found their own institutions of training and certification, not under the aegi s of the state , but nevertheless addressing t o the stat e their quest for marke t protections and guarantees. The manner and content of regulation differ as much as the actual implementation of protective rules; however, a s I would argue, i n all societie s that rely on higher-level credentials, privilege d workers put their educational advan ¬ tages to comparabl e uses . Florent Champ y remark s tha t internationa l comparison s always reveal that status advantages are no t distributed randomly; in most countries , the same "old" profession s ar e protected by law from unqualifie d competitors, while new occupations sheltere d by market closure tend to perform activities in the national interest (Champy , 2009: 175-76) . I d o not believe that there can be a general theory of professions fo r all places and all times , as Davi d Sciull i claimed (Sciulli, 2008) . The particular concept o f profes¬ sion tha t involve s association , self-governance , contro l ove r training , and mora l overtones o f superior ethics and deserved trust is reserved fo r ver y special occupation s in England and in the United States. In Durkheim's classic, The Division of Labor in Society, "profession " mean t occupation, as it normally does in French, and Durkheim addressed his hopes for the moral integration of industrial societies (produce d by the "organic solidarity" of advancing specialization) to all occupations organize d in guild-

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like corporations . I f we avoid , as w e should , the searc h for definin g attributes tha t occupied Anglo-American sociolog y in the 1950s , th e ide a of occupations base d on special expertise is so widespread i n modern societies that it has become increasingly difficult t o restric t the titl e o f "profession" t o those occupations tha t have manage d to be s o recognized. I shal l return later to the assimilation of profession and expert occupations; here, it is enough to posit that "profession" has a special acceptation in Anglo-American societies, but professionalism, and the process by which privileged occupations attain and justify their privileges, have broader connotations . When I started this book, sociologists had not yet clearly situated, or explained these phenomena i n their historical contexts. Wit h much work an d man y revisions , I put together no t a theory, but an interpretation of the moder n professional phenomenon afte r the lat e eighteenth and nineteenth century Industrial Revolution, which Karl Polanyi described in The Great Transformation. Polanyi marke d m y entir e wa y o f seein g mor e lastingl y than Marx , o n whos e framework Polany i had built his own, as he moved toward a powerful explanatio n of the triumph of the market, the socia l resistance to its destructive effects, an d the col lapse he witnessed afte r 1929. I had imagined that m y allegiance t o Polanyi would settle the accusation of economic reductionism that any evocation of Marxist concepts , no matter how distant, seems to stir up; indeed, critics complained about the Marxis t terminology I used (w e all had differen t intellectual fashions), bu t few misrea d my argument as narrowly socio-economic, or as denouncing professions fo r self-interested "conspiracies agains t th e laity " as G.B . Shaw sai d in The Doctor's Dilemma. It seemed to me that even if words persisted, ancient forms of organization and rites of passage could not stay th e same , or perform the sam e service fo r the sam e kinds of people i f their historical matrix changed profoundly . Hence, I tried to link modern professions t o the transformation of Western societies, i n a Polanyian key. Undoubt¬ edly, I exaggerated th e discontinuities between the pre-industrial past and the market society; a more attentive observation of history would have dispelled them. But even the professio n o f law, which wa s th e first t o disengag e itsel f i n fourteenth-centur y Europe fro m th e tutelage o f the church , did not develop unti l the nineteent h centur y the stabl e an d intimate connection with training and examinations (o r "objectively" verified competence ) tha t came to be the hallmark of profession. It has been noted that painting in seventeenth-century Franc e administered examinations, offered meritocratic advancement, an d enjoyed self-governance i n the Academie Royale de Peinture et Sculpture (Heinich,1993; Duro,1997; Sciulli, 2007), but given the overridin g importance o f patronage i n allowing these putative "expert services " to be rendered, I would not consider i t an antecedent of modern professions excep t in some forms. Royal corporations were also the norm in England for older profession s (medicine, law , universit y teaching, divinity , an d thei r hierarchica l subdivisions); and the earl y professional association s tha t strov e to represent the "lowe r branches" organized to obtain recognition comparable t o the corporations—at leas t in London, within the confines o f which the latter's prerogatives applied. The conditions for professional organizing ripened toward the end of the eighteenth century, and I focused o n these changes in "social technology." According to an im 6

7

8

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portant essay by my teacher, Arthur Stinchcombe , these changes provided incipient organizations with resources that not only permitted them to be conceived, but also to function effectively (Stinchcombe , 1965). Advances in literacy, urbanization, commu¬ nications, and the economy shoul d not be exaggerated; however , European countries (especially England) and later the Northern United State s moved rapidly toward the qualitative leap most visible in the second half of the nineteenth century. On the level of ideology, the idea of careers open to talent had been raised against birth and patronage since the formation o f American democracy an d the French Revolution. The idea of merit took time to develop as an ideological resource, it s progress tied to the develop¬ ment of the middle class and its political fortune in England and on the continent. What I calle d the professional project, overstating a consistency that could only be discerned ex post facto, was part of these incomplete but awesome transformations . A recognizable professional association of ample (even if not quite national) scope is a necessary tool for advancing "jurisdictional claims" in Andrew Abbott's apt ex¬ pression. I f association i s an acceptable marke r for the maturity of the professiona l project, the n professions emerge d i n England and in the Unite d State s in a wave of association: in England, civil engineers, lawyers , physicians, architects, pharmacists , veterinary surgeons, teachers , librarians, accountants, dentists , nurses, opticians (ten out of the thirteen professions liste d by Wilensky in 1964 as "established" o r "in process") acquired an association of national scope between 182 5 and 1880. In the United States, the same ten (plus social workers) were organized in forty-seven years—from 1840 to 188 7 (Larson, 1977 and this edition, Table 1). What were these associations seekin g to obtain? I t appeared fro m th e histor y of early professions tha t modern reform movement s organize d in response to both the expansion of market opportunities and the inability of the traditional warrants of moral probity t o gover n excessive competition . The olde r professions wer e powerfu l an d enjoyed the favor of rich and highly placed clienteles; they were difficult t o dislodge but als o unwillin g (an d unable) t o take advantag e o f potentially widenin g markets. They could not survive unchanged. Extractin g the needed structura l change from th e history of reform movements, I saw professionalization as aiming to translate one order of scarce resources into another. Specifically, professions, as historically specific forms of organizing work, depended o n establishing structural links between relatively high levels of formal educatio n and relatively desirabl e position s or rewards in the social division of labor. On the one hand, we have wha t we now call credentials—formal, certifiable, an d certifie d educatio n unde r professiona l control ; o n th e othe r hand , we have marke t positions that guarantee a respectable socia l status. I n other words, credentials and market shelters, for the excesses of unregulated competition were the main incentive for seeking reform. Opportunity, or threats t o what little ther e was , was on e reaso n tha t moved prac¬ titioners toward reform movements. Fo r this, trust had to be gaine d (and warranted) in transactions tha t could now take place amon g strangers i n a market driven by the "cash nexus." Professionals wer e eager to sell their services; specialized labor was, in their case, produced to be sold. Nevertheless, the knowledge on which it depended i s a fictitious commodit y i n Polanyi's sense: producers themselves hav e to be "produced" 9

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and their services mad e recognizable, no t only a s different from alternativ e forms of service but, hopefully, also as superior . Seeing professional education as "the production of producers" whose services mus t be branded as superio r in a competitive market makes it easier to see tha t said brand¬ ing cannot emerge from th e market itself. Ultimately, it is to the state as institutiona l guarantor that professional movements address their claims, justifying them by virtue of principle s that reside outside the market. Superio r learning, which had connecte d older professions t o the university since the Middle Ages, in modern reform projects was oriente d toward practice, verifie d b y objectiv e examinations , an d embodie d in credentials. Disinterestedness, seekin g the public's greater good above and beyond the "cash nexus," was a principle against the market, even though professionals transacte d their services commercially . But this "institutionalized altruism," as Merton called it, must be guaranteed structurally : indeed, a sanctioned profession's superio r competenc e is what ensures that the greate r goo d is served better tha n lesser (and unsanctioned ) rivals would serv e it. Knowledge, in other words, comes before morality . The nature o f the knowledge that had been produced and certified wa s important, but effective superiority over rival practices di d not need to be demonstrated, onl y in¬ stitutionally asserted and believed by relevant sectors of the public. Looking at how professionals wen t about obtainin g the securit y and stabilit y they desire d i n harshly competitive markets showed one thing: certified knowledge was absolutely necessary in the professionals' self-presentatio n to the public, but it was not a sufficient resource. Knowledge by itself , be i t in Latin o r vernacular, classi c o r "modern, " abstrac t (a s Abbott believes) o r empirical, restricted or created i n excess by overtraining, was in any case never sufficient to establish the superiority of trained professionals vis-a-vis their rivals, even those less trained. To recapitulate, professional projects aimed at market closure required the produc¬ tion o f the producers . Differen t project s involve d jurisdictional dispute s wit h riva l occupations tha t Andrew Abbott sees as central, but resolution could not be obtaine d just by relyin g on the cognitiv e base or invoking its superiority. In taking this posi¬ tion, I broke ranks wit h functionalist assumptions; however , I did not deny a t all the necessity o f training in a knowledge that was formal, codified , standardized , verified , and, probably as much as possible, advanced . I wa s looking at professionalization as a movement and a project, but it was wrong to proceed a s i f a profession ha d existed as a unified acto r at the onset . On the contrary, the field i n which professional refor m could advance—the modern professio n itself—had to be created. I t was an arduous job, as Elizabeth Popp Berman has s o ef¬ fectively shown in her compelling study of English medicine from 178 0 to the Medical Reform Act of 1858. She writes, "[P]rofessionalization is the project of constituting a profession as well as that of controlling a labor market. I n early-nineteenth-century England, mor e thing s divide d doctor s tha n united them. It took several attempt s t o create an organization with a strong shared identity to bind doctors together despite the partitions of rank, geography, an d tradition" (Popp Berman, 2006: 188 , italics mine). Popp Berma n finds, as I also emphasized , tha t the appearance of hospitals provided doctors wit h an identity-forming organizationa l base. However, I did not go into the 10

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real workings of a field "befor e th e project. " Too often, I gave the impressio n that professional unity was found, rather than having to be produced, and this is one more reason for my shortcomings . Nevertheless, I would defend as useful the insights I derived from an abstract comparative analysis of the resources available to medicine and to engineering in their march toward their sheltered markets. Medicine, which sociologists have so often distinguished as an archetypal profession, was nothing of the kind for most of the nineteenth century. In fact, the rivals that encircled it were at some times and in some places so powerfu l (such as homeopaths i n the U.S. or in Germany) that they competed successfully fo r the best kind of clients. In the United States, it was not until the Flexner reform of medical schools that they were defeated (Larson , Ch.10), while in Germany, the regional medical societies di d not succeed in approximating market exclusiveness unti l they engaged in forceful strik e actions, which proved much more effective than training or persuasio n (Gress et al., 2004). However, I believe that medicine entered th e professionalization project with structural resources that engineering did not replicate, despite being just as able to claim a scientific knowledge base. (Arguably, the clai m was more justified in the nineteenth century for engineering than for medicine.) By mean s of successful organizing , and with the powerful suppor t of the Flexner reform, th e medical profession attaine d its incomparable position of preeminence i n the Unite d State s in the first par t o f the twentiet h century (Larson , 1977 : 159-166) . Thereafter, i t was able to protect itself by dominating the discourse on health. However, after Worl d War II i t was no t medical research, as Paul Star r has suggested , but new sciences like epidemiology, virology, and molecular biology that led the way in apply¬ ing scientific developments t o social policy. Th e historian of science, Keit h Wailoo, writes that "th e hig h profile scientifi c developments o f [the 1940 s an d 1950s ] wer e feats o f research and engineering," lik e th e artificia l kidney , penicillin, o r the poli o vaccine; [they ] "raised suc h broad social issues that they moved the question of who controlled science outside o f the control of the physician and the medical profession" (Wailoo, 2004: 650). Yet, in an acute critique of my book, Michael Schudson echoes the view of which medicine had convinced the broad public; he writes: 11

Most critics of professions attend to the ways specific professions shape public discourse and the private lives of ordinary citizens. In this context, engineering is of negligible importance while medicine commands preeminent cultural authority. A medical model of social reality has directly influenced not only how we understand bodily ills but how we fathom the ills of the body politic ... Larson is interested only in passing in how specific

professional ideologies control the public; he r centra l concern is i n how the general

ideology of professionalism pacifie s professionals themselve s (Schudson,1980 : 220).

In part, I plead guilty : yes, I was intereste d i n showing that the hopes placed by th e "left" i n a new working class, composed o f technicians an d educated workers , were misplaced. As an extenuating circumstance, remembe r tha t I had starte d wit h col ¬ lege teachers on strike and architect s wh o would no t unionize, despite thei r lack of security an d thei r lo w wages. I shal l return to thi s exaggerated , albei t no t entirely wrong, emphasis . 12

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Something struck me as wrong in sociology's obsession wit h medicine, "the quee n of professions" (perhap s because it is the one social scientists woul d like to emulate). First of all, my abstract analysis of the resources available to medicine (though not everywhere, nor all at the same time) showed that its success, the professional dominanc e that Elio t Freidso n described, coul d not be repeated—th e mai n reason being, quite possibly, because only medicin e had in principle a limitless market for its services . Second, to say, like Schudson, tha t engineering was of negligible importance in shap¬ ing the live s of private citizens (whil e medicin e had preeminent cultura l authority) , was either misreading the history of public health in Europe and America (and passing lightly over the medical profession's consisten t sabotage of proposals for national health plans i n the United States) , o r it was taking discourse exclusivel y as words and text. Engineering—responsible fo r the water systems of cities, electricity grids, roads and railroads, trains and airplanes, plant s and nuclear plants (th e Three Mil e Islan d quasi meltdown happened i n 1979) , and the systems that made great inventions accessible to the public—had defined modern life mor e powerfully an d irreversibly than medicine could ever dream of doing. The "discourse " o f engineering di d not have to influenc e individuals o r provide metaphors fo r their understanding—and, lookin g at medicine within its own field, it is questionable ho w much the profession ha s i n fact influenced the public's under standing of health or of healthy behaviors. Engineering , on the other hand, directly determines th e lif e o f collectivities b y designin g the materia l cadre o f everyone' s existence an d also, eve n mor e silently , by helpin g set standard s and regulations a t government leve l (Freidson , 1986 : 227-229) . Cultur e i s material ; modern culture depends absolutel y o n wha t engineer s an d thos e wh o commissione d the m hav e wrought. Thus, i f people d o not grant "cultural authority" to the profession directl y responsible fo r so much of material culture, it may be because its specialties ar e s o fragmented a s to deny it perceptible unity. Above all, I believe it is because of most engineers' condition s of work, more often than not in corporations and for corporate clients, including the state. This grounded conviction led me to revise what sociology had often implicitly an d explicitly presente d a s the essence of modern professions . Not onl y wa s independen t medicin e no t a n archetype , bu t als o th e condition s of work i n engineering wer e mor e typica l an d were t o become muc h more commo n among professions afte r th e Secon d Worl d War , even transforming employment in medicine and the law. A hard distinction between profession and bureaucracy a s different forms of authority and control of work (one to which Eliot Freidson returned in Professionalism: The Third Logic, 2001 ) seems impossible to sustain when, on the one hand, professional s occupy position s o f authority in bureaucratic organizations , an d o n the othe r hand , bureaucratic official s an d managers can represent an alternative form o f professional career. It was a form embodied early on in the civil service model of continental Europe and promoted even in England by the Northcote Trevelyan Report of1854. Indeed, most occupations that professionalized i n the second half of the twentieth century came out of the concentration of management i n the bureaucratic hierarchies of either the private or the public sector (notably hospital administrators and managerial varieties). A vaster 13

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group came out of the expansion of public functions—those Foucaul t considered as the positive aspect of governance—in socia l work, cit y planning, librarianship, criminal justice and, of course, al l levels of teaching. I t is not irrelevant that the credentialin g process, which most o f these occupations sough t t o establis h i n the moder n univer¬ sity, shoul d have connected thei r future member s from th e outse t with the powerful bureaucratized center s of higher education (Larson , 1977 : Ch. 11). Certainly, despite the importance I attributed to "techno-bureaucratic" professions , I di d not intend to sa y tha t sociologist s o f professions shoul d forget abou t medicin e and take engineerin g for their only model. In the United States, the entrenchmen t o f medicine i n hospitals, whic h wer e large , extremel y advance d technologically , an d administered bureaucratically, may have eroded some aspects of dominance for lowerlevel doctors, but it did not reduce it for the profession a s a whole. Nurses have not become an alternative to doctors, despite the upgrading of their functions and increas¬ ing specialization; doctors, especially i n teaching hospitals, have steadily blurred the line between themselve s as practicin g professionals an d health syste m management (Mick, 2004: 911-912). In England, however, the National Health Service has change d the situatio n of medicine an d allie d occupation s sinc e 1948 . Th e subordinatio n of the professio n t o the NH S has place d i t "at th e forefron t o f the resistanc e to certai n aspects of the [Thatcher ] government's policie s in respect to the NHS, most notabl y those which see k to introduc e 'quasi-market ' force s t o the provisio n of health care through the introduction of cash limits for general practitioners, competitive tendering for hospita l care, and so on" (Crompton, 1990: 148). 14

The case I made about "techno-bureaucratic" profession s supporte d the idea that the search for market control in early professionalization projects wa s a necessary stage, but i t was als o provisional and temporary . Th e searc h for status, respectability, an d trust through the certificatio n of superior knowledge was a more lastin g and genera l strategy fo r other occupational groups , eve n some that might have already achieve d as muc h professional closur e a s they coul d expect. Thi s argument, however , lead s directly to the dilutio n of profession int o the broader an d even less defined categor y of experts , i n which professionalism fades into expertise . In hi s importan t stud y o f American professions, Steve n Brin t make s this a piv ¬ otal passage. In the nineteent h an d earl y twentieth centuries, h e argues , the idea l of "social trustee professionalism" joined superior expertis e t o superio r civi c morality, offering bot h as warran t to the public' s trust (Brint , 1994) . Beginning in the 1920s , the "incorporation of business training into the universities began to erode the status distinction between 'community-oriented ' professionals an d 'profit-oriented' business people" (Brint , 1994:9) . The "socia l trustee" ideal , never to o popular i n the United States, retreated fro m th e professiona l scen e after Worl d Wa r I I : th e ag e o f "expert professionalism" ha d arrived, pervading all but the public and non-profit refuges, an d exempting only peripheral professions. Wha t experts share, beside the obligatory pas¬ sage through higher education an d credentials o f variable specificity , is a status that qualifies the m as relativel y affluent denizen s of the uppe r middl e class. Even in the midst of the Great Recession, th e "professional and managerial" categories retain their relative advantages in the labor market, although we cannot distinguis h what derive s 15

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from professiona l closur e an d what simpl y accrues to the better-educated segment s of the labor force. As early as 1990, Rosemary Crompton' s observed in an influential article that professions were increasingly considered "within the more general topic of the employment of exper t labor " (Crompton , 1990 : 157) . Indeed, fe w sociologist s ar e stil l lookin g for a general theor y o f professions; mos t subsum e them within th e large r theme o f the construction, uses, and social consequences of expert knowledge. In this broader perspective, professions stil l retain their typical institutions, although their credibility has been reduced by scandals of negligence, malpractice , or fraud that cast a general pall over professional ethics. Yet, a t the sam e time that the trust in professions ha s eroded , Britis h researchers argue that the concept s o f profession an d professionalism "ar e increasingl y used a s discourses of occupational change and social control" in domains such as management , security, sales, or clerical staff (Evetts, 2006: 516; see also Grey, 1994; Fournier, 1999; Timmons, 2010). Valerie Fournier supports her thesis that "the appeal to professionalism is one of the strategies .. . deployed to control the increasing margin of indeterminacy or flexibility i n work" via her research conducted within a large British service industry (Fournier, 1999 : 281). There, the uppe r management's insistence o n a "competencie s framework" promotes "an appropriate mode of conduct" (in which the customer is king) "rather than simply a way of performing one's job" (Fournier , 1999: 296). Managerial employees ofte n accept this "technology of the self' a s a path of self-development, but most o f those i n computing reject thi s acclimatizatio n of professionalism. Fo r these highly educated workers , development is improving one's technical skills by moving between various projects; they talk in terms of "work well done," invokin g a form of moral conduct different from management's ideas. Fournier concludes, "th e meanin g of professionalism... i s not fixed but is highly contestable," whic h makes it an effec tive but imperfect disciplinary mechanism (Fournier , 1999 : 301-302). In 1977 , I was makin g a similar argument. I n "producing the producer, " profes ¬ sions constitut e his or her identity, starting with the ide a of vocation and moving on to the centra l concept o f career, o n the basis of the intrinsi c value that work ha s fo r the professional. I wrote, "[P]rofessional socialization aims . a t the internalization of specia l social controls: it takes .. . standard s defined by the profession's elite s and makes the m par t o f each individual' s subjectivity" (Larson, 1977 : 227) . I argued , without to o muc h empirical confirmation, that professionalis m coul d free manage ment from the onerous tas k of directly controlling a skilled workforce, fro m whic h it expected expertise , intelligence , and initiative . I a m no longer willing to defend the theory that professionalism spreads something akin t o fals e consciousnes s amon g th e exper t worker s upo n whic h globa l capital¬ ism increasingl y depends . Bu t th e appea l t o professionalism , whic h som e Britis h researchers i n the 1990 s considere d a "technolog y o f the self " use d fo r distanc e control, is also detecte d positivel y a s a new form o f management b y Paul Adler and others i n the Unite d States : i n knowledge-based organizations , ne w "communitie s of practice" activate ne w forms of professionalism a s a measure of self-worth and a deeply internalize d commitment to the intrinsic valu e of "work well done" (Adle r et 16

17

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al., 2008) . More recently, other British sociologists, probably studying higher levels of th e labo r force, identifie d ne w strategie s and tactics o f professionalization (suc h as membershi p i n organizations, commitmen t to clients , protection of competence , and internationalization) that compare favorabl y with the path of classic profession s (Muzio an d Kirkpatrick, 2011) . Not much is said, however, abou t what has becom e of the "institutionalized altruism" that Merton attributed to professions. The intrinsic value of work, expressed in the Weberian notion of calling, wa s cardinal in my discussion of "anti-market principles" in the professional project (Larson, 1977: Ch.5). I saw these principles in part as pre-industrial transfers incorporate d in the modern conception of profession, and forming its ethical base, they included disinterest, as an echo of the gentlemanl y notion of noblesse oblige, an aversion to purely com¬ mercial pursuits, and an insistence on high-ranking duties as well as rights. And while the market arguably upholds the notion that everyone has the right to be served (not too far from the idea of "universal service"), the classic professions als o affirmed agains t the market, and in preservation of pre-industrial notions of community responsibility, that all have needs, and that needs must be met . In this, they participate in Polanyi's "counter-movement," safeguardin g th e social fabric against th e destructive effects of the market. R. H. Tawney grounded the professions' civilizin g function in an expansive idea of needs. In his words, professionals "may , as in the case of the successful doctor , grow rich, but the meaning of their profession, both for themselves an d for the public, is not that they mak e money , but that they make health, or safety, or knowledge, or good government, or good law" (Tawney, 1948: 94, italics mine). Citing Polanyi and Tawney as I did, I can rest my case against the accusation that in my view profession s do not contribute anything of value to society. Considering the anti-market principles in the constitution of professional identities also illuminates how much we lose i n the passage to the superior, specialized, and certainly still "overtrained" knowledge base of today's ubiquitous experts. Nothin g inherent in expertise stand s for the expansio n of needs or the provision of public goods, both of which are mor e concrete form s of advocacy tha n a phantasmal "servic e ideal." 18

The "age o f the experts" acutely poses the political problem of who shall use their services an d fo r wha t ends . Bu t othe r grav e problem s ar e inheren t i n the experts ' knowledge base, which now acquires overridin g importance as the singl e distinctive feature o f expert work. I can only outline here problems that loom particularly large, raising questions abou t the experts' claim s to autonomy and unrestricted power over their work. First is the obsolescence of knowledge, which poses the problem of lifelon g learning in the midst of a permanent explosio n of knowledge. Specialized experts ar e still overtrained, the excess of training being an assurance that they could muster the "knowledge o f the whole " in the cas e of crisis; but there i s no guarante e that their training is up to date, perhaps excepting the relatively narrow areas of their practice. In consequence, a related problem is how to ensure the effective coordination of different specialties. Sociologist s of management ca n record the spontaneous emergence of lasting collaboration in "communities of practice" (Adler et al., 2008), but there is also evidence o f the large organizations' rigidity and difficulty i n responding to failures (Tucker and Edmondson, 2003).

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Secondly, there may be doubts about granting professionals an d experts too much autonomy, but who is able to supervise the m poses an almost insoluble problem. An example: sinc e 2007 , as the truth about ou r financial collapse became known, i t also became clear that top management ha d been most of the time incapable of understand ing what its "experts" were proposing. In general, at a time where expert work in every field woul d requir e the highes t integrity , the mos t humility , an d an individual ques t for transparency an d external validation, there doe s not seem to be muc h regulation that we ca n trust; therefore, w e depen d mor e than ever o n the internalize d personal virtues tha t expert s brin g t o thei r work. Lastly , the proliferatio n o f specialties cre ¬ ates a social division of labor of such growing and bewildering complexity that it is almost incomprehensibl e t o the non-initiated—tha t is, almost everyon e outsid e th e special sector considered. I f the public does not know what most experts ar e good at, what they do, or who controls them, broad-based problem s of accountability becom e insurmountable. These , i n my view , ar e som e direction s i n which th e proble m of knowledge/power is moving in the twenty-first century, beyond the direct effects ove r persons that Foucault theorized in the twentieth. 19

In thi s lon g introduction, I have tried t o explai n how the boo k developed , sug ¬ gesting what I still think is valid and what I wish I had done better. I implicitly aske d indulgence fo r no w outmode d languag e (althoug h the distinctio n between us e an d exchange value is , I think, illuminating , I could not defend th e labo r theory of value or the use o f increasingly confused "relation s of production"). I do not ask indulgence for things I got wrong, things I did not know, or things I overlooked. Most glaringly, I did not deal at all with the professions' discriminatio n against women and ethnic and racial minorities . I had som e useful thing s to sa y abou t ho w the classi c profession s de-standardize thei r necessaril y standardize d knowledg e base throug h differentia l prestige, and about the effects o f internal stratification in the alleged "community" of profession. I also discussed th e affinities between professionalism and individualism, and the resultin g aversion to seekin g collectiv e solutions to their internal problems. But I should have pointed out how the classic professions—or shoul d I say, the profes¬ sions that were classic i n the last century—were mostly male and mostly white. Much important work on the subject was to come, not only from individual authors (such as, among many others, Celi a Davies, Evelyn Fox Keller, Ann Witz, Deborah Rhode, o r recently Boulis and Jacobs), but also from institution s like the National Academy of Science o r the American Bar Association, or publications like the Journal for Women and Minorities in Science and Engineering, starte d i n 1994 . Thi s i s a preeminen t research topic; it remains t o be see n if the feminizatio n of professions wil l chang e their practices, o r only thei r social advantages, and what effects, i f any, change s in personnel ca n have on the deployment of expert work. Finally, I did not deal directly in this book with the professions' discursive function. In all I said about the necessary creation of a cognitive base, it was implicit that I saw the professions a s special communities of discourse. Perhaps what I wrote in 1977 was too implicit. As I started working on architecture, a profession that influences the cadre of our collective life far beyond the actual power that it enjoys, I placed this discursive capacity at the center, bot h in my 199 0 article and in the 199 3 book on the change of

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paradigm in American architecture. Ostensible, public discourse is an elite function i n architecture, and probabl y also in all the profession s whose practice we recognize . Th e authority to speak for the whol e field trickles down to ordinary practitioners, who apply the discours e within which they have been formed. B e the y creators of this discourse or not , the y ac t withi n it s unquestionable doxa—the agreement about what questions to as k an d no t t o as k tha t Pierre Bourdieu posited for scientifi c discipline s (Bourdieu, 1981). What we liv e with , what shapes our live s in ways that are ofte n difficul t t o se e and mor e difficult to understand, is also discourse. The power-effec t o f cultural capital is pervasive an d i t may b e harde r to discer n and perhap s more lasting than the effec t of economic capital. This is the laity' s problem with experts, one o f understanding a s much as on e o f trust. Confronting i t is a problem of democracy, not o f expertise.

NOTES 1. Davi d Halberstam, The Best and the Brightest (New York, NY: Random House, 1972). 2. Pau l R. Pillar, "Intelligence, Policy and the War in Iraq," Foreign Affairs 8 5 (March/April 2006): 15-27 . 3. Rober t K. Merton et al., The Student Physician: Introductory Studies in the Sociology of Medical Education (Cambridge , MA: Harvard University Press, 1957); Howard S. Becker et al., Boys in White: Student Culture in Medical School (Chicago , I L: University of Chicago Press, 1961). 4. Th e Internet began to become accessibl e in the late 1980s . Larry Page and Sergei Brin only started the Google research project in 1998 . 5. I did not see Jeffre y Berlant' s 197 5 University of California Press publication, Profession and Monopoly: A Study of Medicine in the United States and Great Britain, whil e I was writing my book, and I plead guilty for not having found Terence Johnson's 1972 essay. Eliot Freidson began to write on the professions i n general in 1988, with Professional Powers. 6. I n "The Professionalization of Everyone," Harold Wilensky tried to extend the professional model to the division of labor as a whole, coming closer to the Durkheimia n meaning as he looked for the normative integration of different occupations (Wilensky , 1964). 7. Fre d Block has convincingl y shown that, in the 1940s , Polanyi was forming th e idea of an "always embedded marke t economy" roote d in social relations an d cultural constructions (Block , 2003). Block puts the difference succinctly, basing it on Polanyi's concept of "fictitious commodities," which also informed my analysis: "Mar x analyzes a pure version of capitalism and finds it prone to crises, whil e Polanyi insists that there ca n be no pure version of market society because land, labor and money are not true commodities. In Marx, the contradictions come at the end of the analysis; for Polanyi, the system is built on top of a lie that means it can never work in the way that its proponents claim that it works" (Block, 2003: 281). 8. Th e late David Sciulli was an exception. As recently as 2008, he repeatedly accused me and other "revisionists" like Collins and Abbott of using "narrowly socio-economic" concepts instead o f the "structural" and "institutional" ones he prescribed; h e also objected to our bringing in "cultural and social psychological factors" (Sciulli, 2008: 8). In addition, Sciulli complained that I use d "terms of disparagement favore d by the left ('capitalist societies,' 'capitalist industrialization,' and 'industrial capitalism') rather than more neutral terms typically employed in the socia l sciences," of which he provided none (Sciulli , 2008: fn 10, p.13). 9. I n her path-breakin g stud y o f the medica l profession i n England "before th e professiona l project," Elizabeth Popp Berman notes that, especially after the New Poor Law of 1834 caused sub¬ stantial hardship for provincial doctors, "the most pressing legislativ e goal was [for them] to create a clearer delineatio n between regula r and irregular practitioners, to counter the constan t economi c threat o f 'quacks'....The questio n of corporate privilege s little affecte d provincia l doctors , s o [the

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association tha t succeede d in stably organizing a majority o f practitioners and became the Britis h Medical Association] did not have the antagonism toward the corporations that the London reformers did i n this era" (Pop p Berman, 2006: 179 , 186) . But she als o notes that scientific societies wer e at the origin of professionally minded groups i n the provinces (166 ff) . 10. I n the case of medicine, a profession that later claimed a scientific knowledge base, allopathic medicine was unable to demonstrate therapeuti c superiorit y well after Pasteur and others had identi¬ fied specifi c causes of disease (that is, after th e 1860s) . See Elio t Freidso n (1974 : 16 ) and Wailoo (2004). 11. Stephe n Mic k notes how, in front of a surplus of physicians, the "continued ability of medicine to define terms of debate in ways that favor its authority and autonomy" allowed it to emphasiz e a non-existent shortag e of specialists (Mick , 2004 : 910). On how the post-Worl d War II year s and new scientific developments altere d medicine's "ostensibly close" relationship with science, se e the brilliant critique of Starr's too simple narrative by Keith Wailoo (2004: 646 ff) . 12. Th e literatur e is vast, an d I quote muc h of it in my 198 0 article , "Proletarianization and Educated Labor. " I had come t o the United State s from France , an d I had been greatly influenced by Serge Mallet's 1969 book on the new working class and the always-significant thought of Andre Gorz. 13. Obviously , engineerin g did not only affect socia l life afte r the "Great Transformation," but always. Chandra Mukerj i ha s brilliantl y show n the transformativ e powe r o f seventeenth-centur y engineering o n everyday lives , as muc h in the makin g of the Cana l d u Mid i a s i n its results; sh e emphasizes the important contributions of simple people an d women (Mukerji, 2009). 14. Moreover , as Schudson late r remarked, the idea of professionalism could not have been an effective ideological support for the social order before the 1950s, when higher education credentials became the hallmark of "getting ahead" (Schudson,1980: 227). I made the same point more abstractly: "the centra l legitimations of the ne w form s of inequality...are lodge d in the educationa l system " (Larson, 1977 : 239 and 224-25). 15. Ye t their leaders stil l see k to gain professional status , as have surgery-related technician s in the British NHS, where aspiring groups elevate thei r jurisdictional ambitions and conflicts to the Health Professions Council . One author suggests that the NHS uses professionalization to increase regulation an d contro l over som e occupational categories , rathe r tha n t o increas e their autonomy (Timmons, 2010). 16. I n November 2010, wit h a national rate of unemployment o f 9.3 percent, unemploymen t among "management, professiona l and related occupations" was 4.7 percent. In "business and financial operations," the rate went up to 6.6 percent (5.6 percent men, 7.4 percent women) while it was only 4.1 percent for "professional an d related occupations" as a whole, a figure driven by "legal occupa¬ tions" with the lowest rate at 2.2 percent (1. 2 percent me n and 3.3 percent women ) and "healthcar e practitioner and technical" at 2.5 percen t (1. 9 percent men , 2.8 women) , to b e compare d wit h a n 8.1 percent unemploymen t rate in the non-professional "healt h care support." These low rates were followed b y "education, trainin g and library " wit h 3. 3 percent . I n "architecture an d engineering, " unemployment had recovered somewha t fro m 7. 0 percent i n 2009 to 5.8 percent i n 2010, to be read alongside th e staggerin g rat e of 19.0 percent i n "construction and extraction." Among professiona l occupations, "arts, design, entertainment, sports and media" came closer to the national unemployment average with 8.3 percent, while the rest hovered around the category's 4.7 percent average ("Household Data Not Seasonally Adjusted , A-30. Unemploye d persons by occupation and sex, " las t accessed December 24, 2011, http://www.bls.gov/web/empsit/cpseea30.pdf). I f we turn to the civilian population older than 25 for seasonally adjuste d unemploymen t rates by educational attainment, the rates in November 2011 were 8.8 percent fo r high-school grads, 7. 6 percent fo r workers with some college or associate degrees, and 4.4 percent fo r those with bachelor's degree s or higher ("Economic News Release. Table A-4. Employment status of the civilian population 25 years and over by educational attainment," last accessed December 24, 2011, http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t04.htm). 17. Ther e is no need to focus only on medicine's notorious lapses: the collapse of the accounting firm o f Arthur Andersen was a clamorous case in point; see Bethan y McLean and Peter Elkind, The

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Smartest Guys in the Room: The Amazing Rise andScandalous Fall of Enron (New York, NY: Portfolio Trade, 2003) . More dangerously, th e media has latched ont o the suspicion o f scientific misconduct ; see Daniele Fanelli , "How Many Scientists Fabricate and Falsify Research ? A Systematic Review and Meta-Analysi s o f Survey Data, " PLo S ON E 4(5): e5738. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0005738 . For a sharp perspective on the politics of science see Chris Mooney, The Republican War on Science (New York, NY: Basic Books , 2006). 18. Wha t Merton meant by professional altruis m still exists, o f course. For a critical account of the medical profession an d its relations wit h doctors wh o faced grea t odds to serve the specia l needs of women patients, se e Carole Joff e (1993) . 19. Th e literature is vast. I found a relatively short article by Felix Salmon impressive—"Recip e for Disaster: The Formula That Killed Wall Street," WiredMagazine 17(3) (February 2009). Gretche n Morgenson has collected her admirable serie s of2008, "Th e Reckoning," (New York Times archives) in a new book. See Gretchen Morgenso n an d Joshua Rosner, Reckless Endangerment: How Outsize Ambition, Greed and Corruption led to Economic Armageddon, (Ne w York , NY : Times Books , 2011).

REFERENCES Abbott, Andrew D. The System of Professions: An Essay on the Division of Expert Labor. Chicago, I L: University of Chicago Press, 1983. Adler, P. S., Kwon , S. , Heckscher, C . "Professional Work : The Emergence of Collaborative Community." Organization Science, 19(2 ) (2008): 359-376. Block, Fred. "Karl Polanyi and the Writing o f The Great Transformation" Theory and Society 32 (2003): 275-306. Boulis, Ann K. and Jerry A. Jacobs. The Changing Face of Medicine: Women Doctors and the Evolution of Health Care in America. Ithaca , NY: Cornell University Press, 2008. Bourdieu, Pierre. "The Specificity of the Scientific Field." In French Sociology: Rupture and Renewal since 1968, edited by Charles Lemert. New York , NY: Columbia University Press, 1981. Brint, Steven. In an Age of Experts: The Changing Role of Professionals in Politics and Public Life. Princeton , NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996. Champy, Florent . La Sociologie des Professions. Paris , France : Presses Universitaires d e France, 2009. Collins, Randall. The Credential Society: A Historical Sociology ofEducation and Stratification . New York , NY: Academic Press, 1979. . "Changin g Conception s i n the Sociolog y of the Professions." In The Formation of Professions: Knowledge, State and Strategy, edite d by Rolf Torstendahl and Michael Burrage. London, England: Sage, 1990. Crompton, Rosemary. "Profession s in the Current Context." Work, Employment and Society 4(5) (Ma y 1990): 147-166. Davies, Celia. "The Sociology of Professions and the Profession o f Gender." Sociology 30(4 ) (1996): 661-678. Duro, Paul. The Academy and the Limits of Painting in Seventeenth Century France. Cambridge , UK: Cambridg e University Press, 1997. Evetts, Julia. "Introduction: Trust and Professionalism: Challenges and Occupational Changes." Current Sociology 54(4 ) (July 2006): 515-531. Foucault, Michel . "The Discourse o n Language." I n The Archeology of Knowledge and the Discourse on Language, translate d b y A. M. Sheridan Smith . New York, NY: Pantheon, 1972. . Discipline and Punish: Birth of the Prison. Ne w York, NY: Random House, 1977 . . The History of Sexuality, Vol. I: An Introduction. Ne w York, NY: Pantheon, 1978.

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Fournier, Valerie. "The Appeal of 'Professionalism' a s a Disciplinary Mechanism." The Sociological Review 47(2 ) (1999) : 280-307.

Freidson, Eliot. Sociology of Medicine: A Study in the Sociology of Applied Knowledge. Ne w

York, NY: Dodd, Mead and Company, 1974.

. Professional Powers: A Study of the Institutionalization of Formal Knowledge. Chicago ,

IL: University of Chicago Press, 1986.

. Professionalism Reborn: Theory, Prophecy and Policy. Chicago , IL: University o f

Chicago Press, 1994.

. Professionalism: the Third Logic. Chicago , IL: University o f Chicago Press, 2001. Geison, Gerald L., ed. Professions and Professional Ideologies in America. Chape l Hill, NC:

University of North Carolina Press, 1983. Gress, Stefan, Stefan Gildemeister and Jurgen Wasem. "The Social Transformation of American Medicine: A Comparative View from Germany." Journal ofHealth Politics, Policy and Law

29 (4/5) (August 2004): 679-699. Grey, Christopher. "Career as a Project o f the Self and Labour Process Discipline." Sociology 28(2) (May 1994): 479-497.

Halliday, Terence. Beyond Monopoly: Lawyers, State Crises and Professional Empowerment.

Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1987.

Halpern, Sydney. American Pediatrics: The Social Dynamics of Professionalism 1880-1980.

Berkeley, CA: University of California Press, 1988. . "Dynamics of Professional Control : Internal Coalitions and Crossprofessional Bound aries." American Journal of Sociology 97(4 ) (1992): 994-1021 .

Heinich, Nathalie. Du peintre a l'artiste: artisans et academiciens a l'dge classique. Paris ,

France: Minuit, 1993.

Heinz, Joh n P. and Edwar d O. Laumann. Chicago Lawyers: The Social Structure of the Bar.

New York, NY: Russell Sage Foundation, 1982.

Hughes, Everett. The Sociological Eye: Selected Papers. Chicago , IL: Aldine Atherton, 1971 . Joffe, Carole. Doctors of Conscience: The Struggle to Provide Abortion before and after Roe

v. Wade. Boston , MA: Beacon Press, 1993 . Johnson, Terence J. Professions and Power. London , England: Macmillan, 1972 . Keller, Evely n Fox . Reflections on Gender and Science. Ne w Haven , CT: Yal e Universit y

Press, 1985.

Krause, Elliott. Death of the Guilds: Professions, States, and the Advance of Capitalism, 1930

to the Present. Ne w Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1999.

Larson, Magali Sarfatti . The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis. Berkeley , CA:

University of California Press, 1977.

. "Proletarianization and Educated Labor." Theory and Society 9(1 ) (1980): 131-17 5

. "In the Matter of Experts and Professionals, o r How Impossible it is to Leave Nothing

Unsaid." In The Formation of Professions: Knowledge, State and Strategy, edite d by Rol f

Torstendahl and Michael Burrage. London, England: Sage, 1990.

. Behind the Postmodern Faqade: Architectural Change in Late Twentieth Century

America. Berkeley , CA: University of California Press, 1993.

Macdonald, Keith. The Sociology of the Professions. London , England: Sage, 1995 . Marshall, T . H. Class, Citizenship and Social Development. Garde n City, NY: Doubleday

Anchor, 1965. Mick, Stephen S. "The Physician 'Surplus' and the Decline of Professional Dominance." Journal ofHealth Politics, Policy and Law 29 (4/5) (August 2004): 907-924.

Mukerji, Chandra. Impossible Engineering: Technology and Territoriality on the Canal du Midi.

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Muzio, Daniel and Ia n Kirkpatrick , eds. Reconnecting Professional Occupations and Pro-

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Noble, David F. America by Design: Science, Technology and the Rise of Corporate Capitalism.

New York , NY: Knopf, 1977. Parsons, Talcott. "Illness and the Role of the Physician: A Sociological Perspective." American Journal of Orthopsychiatry 21(3 ) (Jul y 1951): 452—160 . . Essays in Sociological Theory, Ne w York , NY: Free Press, 1954.

Perkin, Harold. The Rise of Professional Society, England since 1880. New York , NY: Rout-

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Oxford, England: Clarendon Press, 1986. Ramsey, Matthew. "The Politics of Professional Monopol y i n Nineteenth Century Medicine: The French Model and Its Rivals." In Professions and the French State 1700-1900, edite d by Geral d L. Geison. Philadelphia, PA: Universit y of Pennsylvania Press, 1984. Rhode, Deborah L. Justice and Gender: Sex Discrimination and the Law. Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press, 1991 .

Rosenberg, Charles E. The Care of Strangers: The Rise of America's Hospital System. New

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PART I

THE ORGANIZATION OF PROFESSIONAL MARKETS

Chapter 1

THE HISTORICA L MATRIX OF MODERN PROFESSION S PRE-INDUSTRIAL ANTECEDENT S Before th e industria l revolution, th e profil e o f the fre e practitione r was define d for lawyer s an d physicians , and , t o a lesse r degree , fo r architect s a s well. Bu t even th e professio n o f law—whic h wa s th e firs t t o disengag e itself , i n the four teenth century , fro m th e tutelag e o f the Church—ha d no t yet developed th e stabl e and intimat e connection wit h trainin g an d examinations that came to be associate d with th e professiona l mode l durin g th e nineteent h century . Thi s dependenc e o n "objectively" legitimize d competenc e i s characteristic o f the moder n professions ; it date s fro m th e "grea t transformation " whic h becam e visible i n England toward the en d o f the eighteent h century . Th e ethica l concept o f work whic h profession s inherited fro m th e Reformatio n is not much older. Profession s are , therefore , rela tively recen t socia l products . However , a fe w element s fro m thei r pre-industrial past ar e importan t to recall , for the y sugges t wh y the post-revolutionar y societie s became a fertile groun d for the professions ' developmen t an d multiplication . Specialization o f function an d th e creatio n o f special bodie s o f practical or the oretical knowledg e ar e a functio n o f the accumulatio n of resources. I n preliterate societies, accordin g t o Wilber t Moore , the specialize d service s tha t ar e performe d outside o f kinship structures ar e thos e clearl y connected wit h th e "salienc e o f the knowledge o r skill s fo r individua l o r collectiv e welfare." But , eve n befor e th e appearance of writing, "salience " canno t be understood outside of the limit s whic h the preservation of a given social order imposes o n the possible definitions of "indi vidual an d collectiv e welfare." Therefore , a s soo n a s w e conside r clas s societies , the developmen t o f specialize d role s an d function s i s broadl y determine d b y th e structure o f inequalit y from whic h i t i s inseparable : dependen t upo n th e unequa l distribution o f wealth , power , an d knowledge , th e institutionalizatio n o f special ized function s itsel f contribute s t o th e unequa l distributio n o f competenc e an d rewards. The emergence o f the stat e differentiates th e adviser s o f the rulers from th e mass of the ruled. Writing, whic h allows the accumulation and transmission of knowledge on an unprecedented scale , i s monopolized by a caste of scribes wit h specia l power. In general , al l the specia l bodies o f knowledge that appear in a class society can b e 1

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Historical Matri x o f Moder n Profession s

monopolized b y thei r creators-possessors. Moreover , the fruit s o f their application are als o a monopoly: in effect, th e service s tha t res t on cognitive specialization ar e almost exclusively reserved t o the small literate elites on whom the specialists depen d for their existence. Thei r association wit h elite groups is obvious for the law profession, and also for architecture in the great empires: although architects i n Rome were often draw n fro m th e clas s of slaves, architecture , whethe r privat e or official , wa s considered by Cicero and Vitruviu s as "one o f the learned professions fo r which men of goo d birth an d good education ar e best suited." A s for medicine, given the uni versal need for healing and the ineffectiveness o f most therapies, i t was more sharply stratified an d divided by the social position of the practitioners' clienteles than by the origins o f the technique s tha t wer e applied. The distinction between "specialist s fo r the elite " and "practitioners " fo r more popular clienteles became far clearer with the rise of institutionalized centers of learning, tha t is , wit h th e ris e o f the universitie s in medieval Europe. Wit h som e excep tions, th e medieva l origin s o f th e olde r profession s sho w a bifurcatio n betwee n university an d guild . Th e universitie s ha d starte d a s association s o f student s an d teachers, or "guilds of learning," but they soon came under the dominating influence of the Church. Secularization gradually emancipated la w and medicine from this tutelage. Bu t the association wit h the university and, especially, the knowledge of Latin, distinguished th e "learned " profession s fro m th e craf t guild s that developed i n the towns betwee n th e elevent h an d th e thirteent h century. Th e link s wit h th e Church , presumably, increase d th e aur a o f myster y surroundin g th e professions ' esoteri c knowledge, whil e Lati n clearl y associated the m wit h th e worl d o f the elites . Their specialized counterpart s i n the guilds—scriveners , commo n lawyers, apothecaries , barber-surgeons, master-masons , millwrights—ha d relativel y more democrati c ori gins an d clienteles . Som e o f these specialist s appear , muc h later , i n noble o r ric h households i n a master-servant relationshi p with their aristocratic patrons. A s a rule, however, th e commo n practitioner s o f the craf t guild s appeare d togethe r wit h th e urban market s o f medieval Europe a s fre e artisan s and tradesmen. Thei r orientation was primarily commercial—that is, geared t o a market of services. I n England, these pre-professional specialist s survive d the decline of the craft guilds and, as the "lower branches" of medicine and the law, played a dynamic part in the nineteenth-centur y constitution o f the moder n professions. Two aspect s o f th e professions ' pre-industria l pas t deserv e t o b e emphasized , for the y illustrat e well th e continuit y of for m an d discontinuitie s of substance be tween traditiona l and moder n professions . First s from thei r pre-industrial days, th e professions wer e closel y boun d to the stratificatio n system. Fo r the learne d profes sions, establishmen t an d socia l standin g wer e equivalen t t o thei r associatio n wit h the elite s an d wit h th e state. Bu t unti l almos t th e nineteent h century , w e canno t speak of an internal stratification of the professions, fo r "common" an d "learned " practitioners inhabited different social worlds. Even though they practiced in related fields, th e rigidit y o f the stratificatio n system prevente d th e constitutio n of unifie d areas within th e socia l division o f labor. Thus , ther e wer e limitation s t o what their association wit h th e dominan t clas s coul d ensure fo r th e learne d professions : en sconced i n the worl d o f elites, the y di d not compet e wit h thei r plebeian rival s and 3

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could have only wea k claims against them . As Eliot Freidson remarks fo r medicine, passage through a universit y or membershi p i n a guil d gav e physicians th e mean s to distinguis h themselve s fro m othe r kind s o f healers . Thes e institutiona l links, however, di d not establish thei r superiority in the eye s of a broad public ; by themselves, thes e mark s o f distinctio n were no t sufficien t t o monopoliz e th e healin g function. Th e favor of an elite did not necessarily brin g with i t wide public support. To equip themselves fo r the conquest o f public confidence wa s one of the main tasks of th e profession s durin g th e "grea t transformation. " Bot h logi c an d historica l evidence indicat e tha t th e heir s o f th e pre-industria l professiona l elite s wer e no t the mai n actor s i n this effort: secur e i n their privileges, they ha d n o urgen t reaso n to becom e th e vanguar d o f the moder n proces s of professionalization. A secon d point , intimately related t o the first , concern s th e medieva l associatio n of th e learne d professions wit h th e Church and the university : fro m thi s association , the established professiona l elites derived a clear notion that what distinguished them from trader s an d artisans was, chiefly , a "liberal education"—that i s to say, a n education fit for a gentleman, based more on classical culture than on practical skills. The latter had always been acquired through varied forms of apprenticeship, traditionall y viewed a s a n extensio n o f the educatio n conducted withi n th e family. Th e socia l position and contacts o f the family fro m whic h a youth set forth to be apprenticed to a father-like maste r defined th e kin d o f master, an d therefor e th e kin d o f training, h e got. General culture was a further statement abou t rank, a way of acceding to the cultural provinc e of an elite. This conceptio n o f liberal educatio n als o affecte d th e democrati c Unite d States , through it s British heritage , an d especially throug h the clergy's enormous influenc e on higher education: sinc e educatio n bor e a clearly religious stamp, th e stud y of the classics seemed useful an d practical for the perpetuatio n o f what was th e mora l and intellectual cor e o f colonia l communit y l i f e . Highe r educatio n wa s essentiall y classic, aime d at the formation of clergymen and gentlemen wh o would later acquir e a trade, despit e th e efforts o f men such as Frankli n an d Jefferson t o give education a more practica l and mor e secula r imprint . Thus, althoug h forma l educatio n appear s early i n the professiona l constellation , its import changes radically with th e assertion o f a modern form o f professionalism. The established professiona l elite s could indeed secur e their social position through their gentlemanly education, whic h symbolized their claims on social status; to claim superior competence wa s based on a different use of education and certification. Th e rise of a system o f formal educatio n whic h include s basic pre-professional instruction and practical training was crucial: it reorganized an d superseded apprenticeship, thu s signaling the triumph of a new conception of professionalism over the old one. From dependence upon the powe r and prestig e o f elite patrons o r upo n the judgment of a tightly knit community, the modern professions cam e to depend upo n specific forma l training an d anonymou s certificates. 9

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THE RIS E OF MODER N PROFESSIONALIS M In th e Anglo-Saxo n world a t th e beginnin g of the nineteent h century , th e recog nized gentlemanl y profession s were , i n practice, onl y three : divinity , an d it s recen t

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offshoot universit y teaching; th e law , which filled , wit h th e exceptio n of architecture, most of the relatively prestigious specializations that could be considered "pro fessional" befor e th e industria l revolution; an d th e professio n o f medicine. I n England, th e thre e traditiona l profession s wer e hierarchicall y divided int o highe r and lowe r branches. Th e hegemoni c socia l positio n of the lande d gentr y reserve d the careers in government an d the militar y t o those with famil y connections . I n the professions, connection s wit h eminen t practitioners were more usefu l tha n connec tions wit h th e Court , th e Parliament , an d th e ecclesiasti c hierarchy ; but the y sim ilarly restricte d the mobilit y o f the middl e orders an d reinforced the predominanc e of patronage. The Frenc h Revolutio n had sharpl y signified , fo r France an d fo r the world , tha t careers were to be open to talent. But even in France, excep t fo r the military i n wartime an d th e government , th e openin g wa s mor e ideologica l than rea l unti l 183 0 and th e industria l take-off. Bot h th e ris e o f the moder n profession s an d th e re form o f the civi l servic e (whic h i n Britain becam e a fact onl y afte r th e Medica l Act of 185 8 and the 185 5 report of the Civi l Servic e Commission) were crucially linke d to the us e o f the competitiv e examination system. Thi s move by merit against birt h and patronag e wa s closel y connected t o the politica l fortune s o f the middl e classes and, i n England, t o th e electora l refor m o f 1832 . Th e democratizatio n should not be overestimated ; however , th e constitutio n of moder n profession s an d th e emer gence of a pattern o f professional caree r represented fo r the middl e classes a novel possibility o f gaining status through work. The moder n mode l o f professio n undoubtedl y incorporate s pre-industria l cri teria o f statu s an d pre-industria l ideological orientations. An y concrete historica l process, suc h a s th e firs t phas e o f moder n professionalization , inextricabl y binds together element s which , analytically , pertai n to different and even antitheti c structural complexes . Th e collectiv e projec t o f professionalization , furthermore , ha s its roots in a time of radical and rapid change: th e men involved i n this project were the "carrier s of social structure" an d they carried the imprin t of changing historical circumstances. Thei r product , however , wa s a n innovation—i f nothin g else, be cause i t reorganize d an d transferre d int o a ne w socia l worl d part s an d pattern s of th e old. The genera l circumstance s whic h imprinte d th e firs t phas e o f professionaliza tion wer e roughl y the sam e for all the professions. Lik e mos t other forms of social organization, profession s emerge d togethe r i n a spur t whic h Carr-Saunder s call s "a wav e of association." Thi s can be show n by considering the dates at whic h na tional professiona l association s wer e founded—no t becaus e the professiona l asso ciation i s a n equivalen t o f profession, bu t becaus e i t indicates th e maturit y of the professional project . I n England an d i n the Unite d States , t o whic h I a m limitin g my analysis , th e principa l professiona l association s wer e formed in the spa n of two generations. I n England, of the thirtee n contemporary profession s liste d b y Harol d Wilensky a s "established " o r " in process," ten acquired an association o f national scope betwee n 182 5 t o 1880— a fifty-fiv e yea r span . I n the Unite d States , eleve n of th e sam e thirtee n wer e similarl y organize d int o nationa l association s i n forty seven years , fro m 184 0 to 188 7 (se e Appendi x Table 1) . The professions tha t were formed in America were clearly inspired by their Euro14

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pean models—especially th e British , i n the beginning—but , obviously, there wer e structural differences betwee n th e Ne w World an d the old which accoun t fo r many differences i n the professiona l proces s an d i n the emergen t pattern . Nevertheless , both i n England an d i n the Unite d States , moder n professionalizatio n i s connecte d with th e same general historica l circumstances: i t coincides, that is, wit h th e rise of industrial capitalism , wit h it s earl y crise s an d consolidatio n and , towar d th e en d of th e nineteent h centur y an d th e beginnin g of the twentieth , with th e evolutio n o f capitalism towar d its corporate form . In a semina l essa y o n organization s an d socia l structure , Arthu r Stinchcomb e elaborates the propositio n that a given society determine s th e "socia l technology " available fo r th e inventio n of new organizationa l forms . Organization s wit h thes e new form s ten d t o appear , therefore , a t th e tim e whe n i t i s precisel y possibl e t o found the m and whe n they can functio n effectivel y with thei r new structure . Effec tiveness reinforce s th e tendenc y t o institutionaliz e an organizationa l form ; hence , organizational structure s whic h wer e invente d "a t th e righ t time " ten d t o becom e relatively stable . Fo r Stinchcombe , th e "socia l technology " availabl e include s preeminently th e "economi c an d technica l conditions, " whic h determin e wha t resources wil l b e availabl e t o the creator s o f new organizations . T o these factors I would ad d ideologica l conditions, which , amon g othe r things , limi t th e alterna tives available or imaginable and are a most important determinant of the motivatio n to organize . Ideologica l conditions ar e particularl y relevant i n th e cas e o f thos e organizations which , lik e th e professions , ai m at "increasin g th e amoun t o f trustworthiness amon g strangers " i n order t o marke t exper t advice. The typ e o f resources mobilize d by th e professiona l project * ha d a determining impact o n th e resultin g organizationa l an d ideologica l structure. Thes e resource s were heterogeneous , fo r th e availabl e "socia l technology " mixe d element s per taining to the social division of labor with elements pertainin g to status stratification in a time of rapid and fundamental socia l change . Stinchcombe's analysi s relate s organizationa l capacity a t a given time wit h cer tain basi c societa l variable s whic h hav e a positiv e effect o n bot h th e "motivation to found organizations" an d the "chances of success of new organizational forms." As a consequence, th e rat e a t whic h ne w organizationa l forms appea r tends to increase. These basic societal variables ar e "literacy , urbanization, money economy , political revolution , and previousl y existin g organizational density." Tha t mos t of these general condition s greatly improved in England after 1830 , and in America some decades later, hardl y needs to b e belabored . It i s true that education i n England was hardl y something t o boast about, despit e the surviva l of the parish schools an d the livelines s of the Scottis h universities. Eric Hobsbawm call s Englis h higher educatio n befor e 184 8 a "joke i n poor taste" an d 18

19

* According t o Webster , "project " mean s " a planne d undertaking. " A s th e ter m is currently used in sociological analysis , it does not mean that the goals and strategie s pursued b y a give n grou p ar e entirel y clea r o r deliberat e fo r al l th e members , no r even fo r th e mos t determine d an d articulat e amon g them . Applie d t o th e historica l results o f a give n cours e o f action , th e ter m "project " emphasize s th e coherenc e and consistenc e tha t ca n b e discovere d e x pos t fact o i n a variet y o f apparentl y unconnected acts .

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adds that "specia l fear s discourage d th e educatio n of the p o o r . " Bu t literacy, at least, mus t hav e bee n commo n in the coars e busines s circles painted b y Dickens. The conditions of the workin g poo r were tragic, both before an d after th e repea l of the Poo r Act ; however, th e politica l an d cultura l vitalit y o f the workin g class , s o admirably documente d b y E . P. Thompson , indirectl y attest s t o th e sprea d o f lit eracy. Th e Charter o f 183 9 wa s signe d b y 2,283,00 0 persons , an d tha t o f 184 2 by 3,317,702. Th e self-serving efforts of the middle classes to discipline the poor also affor d indirec t evidence o f th e sprea d o f literacy : in 1787 , "Rober t Raike s estimated tha t a quarter o f a millio n childre n were attendin g Sunda y schools . . . . By 1833 , th e numbe r . . . ha d increase d t o a millio n an d a h a l f . " I n 1851 , the year in which the urban population first outnumbered the rural, there were in England about 76,00 0 me n an d women , bot h layme n an d religious , who describe d them selves a s schoolteachers. Primar y educatio n di d no t becom e compulsor y unti l 1880, fo r children up t o th e ag e o f ten. In America , the publi c system o f education bega n t o take shap e afte r 1860 . By 1880, however , ther e wer e onl y 8. 7 percen t illiterate s among nativ e white s older than te n years— a fac t whic h undoubtedl y attest s t o th e unreliabilit y o f statistics , but als o probabl y to som e progress i n the sprea d o f literacy in previous years. Besides literacy , the fantasti c developmen t o f road networks, railways, the telegraph, the organization of a postal system, the multiplication of newspapers and periodicals, attest tha t the industrialized countries were accomplishing in the second hal f of th e nineteenth century a qualitative leap in actual and potential communications. Some fact s ar e to o well-known t o bear much elaboration: the nineteenth-centur y industrial revolution s were precede d an d the n accompanie d b y a n unprecedente d acceleration i n the annua l rate s of population growth. Th e shif t i n the distributio n of labo r fro m agricultur e to manufacturin g contributed to th e sustaine d growt h of towns an d cities . The revolutionar y transformation of the mod e o f production entailed an increase i n the rate of growth of the gross national product that had no historical precedent . I n othe r words , th e ter m "industria l revolution" presuppose s the transformatio n o f agricultur e an d a revolutionar y increase i n agricultura l pro ductivity; i t implies a correlation with a demographic revolution , wit h urbanization and wit h th e sustaine d growt h o f aggregate measures of national wealth. Politically, th e Anglo-Saxon countries had not experienced an d would not experience (if we grant th e America n Civil Wa r the statu s of a special politica l phenom enon) the revolutionary intensity that France had known and that the major European states would kno w as wel l i n 184 8 an d thereafter. Bu t the middl e classes had won extended politica l right s i n England i n 1832 , an d b y 184 0 th e Unite d State s ha d already experience d th e disruption s of independence an d th e impac t of Jacksonia n democracy, whic h achieved , i n most states , fre e suffrag e fo r white males. In Franc e an d i n the Unite d State s outside th e South , befor e th e middl e of the nineteenth centur y th e large r concentrations o f wealth were n o longe r in the hands of landowners. In Britain, despite th e lingering economic predominance of the peerage, th e incom e of peers depended mor e an d mor e on the economi c enterprise s o f the bourgeoisie . Hobsbaw m warns, however , tha t th e socia l transformation should not be exaggerated. Th e ranks of the middle classes were stil l quite thin: fro m 180 1 to 1851 , the numbe r o f people earnin g mor e tha n 15 0 pounds annuall y passe d in 20

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Britain fro m abou t 100,00 0 to about 340,000 . Give n the larg e families of the time , this means that approximately a million an d a half persons, o r about 7 percent of the total population , enjoyed thi s status . "Naturally, " say s Hobsbawm, "th e numbe r of thos e wh o sough t t o follo w middle-clas s standard s an d way s o f lif e wa s ver y much larger. " Bu t th e ric h amon g the m wer e few . Hobsbaw m think s tha t thos e with income s abov e 500 0 pound s pe r yea r coul d no t hav e numbere d muc h mor e than 4,000, includin g the peerage, and he adds: "the proportio n of 'middle-classes ' in othe r countries wa s not notably higher than this, and indeed was generall y rather lower." The moder n profession s wer e spawned , thus , b y incomplet e bu t nonetheles s awesome developments . Th e possibilit y o f organizationa l creation ha d arise n fo r them, a s wel l a s fo r the industria l bourgeoisie tha t wa s "shapin g th e worl d i n its image." Bu t the resources for the professional project were stil l limited , a s atteste d by th e narrownes s o f thei r potentia l middle-clas s clientele—whic h was th e onl y imaginable one, beside s the traditiona l elites . I n England, the workin g masses , for the mos t par t livin g clos e t o abjec t poverty , inhabited the "othe r nation, " outsid e the ke n of bourgeois "civilization. " An d although the marke t for professional services was potentially larger in the Unite d States , it was i n fact limite d b y other fac tors: the newnes s and dispersio n of Western settlements , th e ideologica l resistance everywhere, th e modest y o f the averag e standard s of living. Emergin g themselve s with a n emergent socia l order, th e profession s firs t ha d to create a market for their services. Next , and this was inseparabl e fro m th e first task , the y had to gain special status fo r their members an d giv e them respectability . The organizationa l device s they used reflected both the new and the traditional social order, drawn as they were from tw o different worlds. 27

Chapter 2

THE CONSTITUTIO N OF PROFESSIONA L MARKET S

The emergenc e o f professiona l market s i n th e competitiv e phase o f capitalism was a n accessory development i n a much more formidable transformation. In structure and ideology, the emerging modern professions foreshadowe d muc h that could be realize d i n practice onl y i n our century , whe n capitalis m entered it s corporat e phase. In the firs t hal f o f the nineteent h century , however, whe n professions bega n to organiz e an d refor m themselves, the y wer e par t o f a worl d tha t wa s bein g sub verted an d reshape d b y "th e Utopia n endeavor o f economic liberalis m to se t u p a self-regulating market system." Thes e words, as well as the very expression "grea t transformation," ar e Kar l Polanyi's ; the general thrus t of his brilliant interpretation is wel l known: 1

For a century, th e dynamic s of moder n societ y wa s governe d b y a double movement : the market expanded continuousl y bu t this movement wa s met by a countermovemen t checking th e expansio n i n definite directions . Vita l thoug h suc h a countermovemen t was fo r th e protectio n o f society , i n th e las t analysis , i t wa s incompatibl e wit h th e self-regulation o f th e market , an d thus wit h th e marke t system itself. 2

Now it is customary to say that professions ar e "those occupations in which caveaf emptor canno t be allowed to prevail and which, while they are not pursued for gain, must brin g t o thei r practitioners incom e o f such a leve l that the y wil l b e respecte d and suc h a manner o f living tha t the y ma y pursu e th e lif e o f the m i n d . " I t would be tempting , then, t o conside r th e profession s a s expression s o f Polanyi's "coun termovement" an d thus accoun t fo r their paradoxical position: for they are , i n fact, one of the distinctive features o f industrial capitalism, even though they claim to renounce th e profi t motiv e and appea r t o som e a s " a mer e surviva l of the medieva l guild. " Bu t such an account woul d not only be too simple; it would also incorporate uncritically muc h of the professions ' appearance s and ideological self-conceptions. A firs t ste p to rende r moder n profession s sociologicall y intelligible i s t o reflec t on their historical origins: professions wer e an d are means of earning a n income on the basi s of transacted services ; i n a society tha t wa s bein g reorganized aroun d th e centrality o f the market , th e profession s coul d hardly escape the effect s o f this reorganization. Th e moder n mode l o f professio n emerge s a s a consequenc e o f th e necessary respons e o f professiona l producer s t o ne w opportunitie s fo r earnin g a n 3

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Constitution o f Professiona l Market s

10

income. A collective effort wa s neede d on the par t o f the actua l or potential seller s of service s t o capture an d control expanded markets . Fo r this, new forms of eliciting and guaranteeing th e buyers' preferenc e an d trust had to be devised and implemented. From thi s poin t of view, th e constitutio n of modern professiona l market s repre sents one mor e instanc e o f social reorganization around th e "cas h nexus, " sinc e a market societ y mean s tha t th e mone y bon d ha s becom e a predominan t principl e of socia l cohesion. Th e motor of the transformation was the revolutionary affirma tion an d extension of the capitalist mode of production: after it s first step s had been duly protecte d b y state an d monopol y privileges, capitalism—that is , it s entrepre neurial leader s an d intellectua l spokesmen—rejected al l traditional restrictions t o the indispensabl e developmen t o f competitive markets . The profession s wer e i n a specia l position : unlike the earl y capitalis t industries , they were not exploiting already existing markets bu t were instead workin g to create them. Th e most lucrative markets wer e smal l and monopolized: through patronag e and froze n corporat e privileges , caste s o f traditiona l professionals controlle d th e access to universities and guilds, and thereby to elite clienteles. Below these guarded grounds, competitio n was keen . Th e tas k o f professional organizer s wa s twofold : to open th e rank s o f traditional professiona l elite s by direc t or indirect attack upo n their gatekeepin g institutions ; an d t o organiz e th e expande d market s opene d b y urbanization an d b y th e relativ e enrichment o f certain publics. Ancien regime privilege s had hindered , thoug h neve r stopped , th e ris e o f a new class an d th e disintegratio n o f th e ol d socia l order . Wher e politica l revolutio n smashed the privileg e of guilds and corporations, a s i t did in France, ne w warrant s of professiona l wort h ha d t o be devise d swiftly . Wher e chang e was mor e gradual , as i n England, th e traditiona l professional elite s ha d mor e tim e to respond an d ad just; nevertheless , thei r insufficien t arrangement s fo r controllin g a n expandin g profession an d a n expandin g marke t ha d t o b e replaced . Eve n i f the institutional mechanisms tha t emerge d seeme d les s ne w tha n i n post-revolutionar y societies , or les s effectiv e tha n thos e impose d fro m abov e b y a centralize d state , the y stil l served analogou s function s wit h regar d t o th e widene d marke t fo r professiona l services. Th e secula r processe s that prepare d bourgeoi s hegemon y ha d als o altere d the pre-industria l social matri x of the professions : fo r one thing , urbanizatio n ha d already begu n to dissolve in the eighteenth centur y the "interfusin g of family, com munity, an d professio n whic h fo r lon g remained typica l o f nineteenth-century vil lages, smal l towns, and even urba n neighborhoods." Elit e clienteles coul d always confer specia l statu s to their favored practitioners , a s the y stil l d o i n our day ; the y could not , however , serv e a s guarantor s fo r ever y profession , no r delive r to thei r proteges the mean s to conque r wid e and anonymou s publics . 5

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COMMUNITY-ORIENTED A N D MARKET-ORIENTED SOCIETY In the United States and England, as in most other European societies , th e profes sional modernizatio n tha t starte d i n the nineteent h centur y wa s oriente d towar d a society i n which communit y and aristocrati c traditio n wer e n o longe r sufficien t to

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Constitution o f Professiona l Market s

guarantee credit and credibility. The ideal-typical passage from community-oriente d to market-oriente d societ y give s simila r contour s t o the tas k face d b y professiona l reformers. Concret e historica l contexts i n turn, determin e wha t resources are avail able fo r such a n effort , sharpenin g th e contour s o f the genera l mode l and marking the limit s o f its usefulness . In lat e eighteenth-centur y England , economi c an d socia l transformation s ha d only begu n t o encroac h upo n th e well-guarde d bastions o f the traditiona l profes sional elites. Ye t the existenc e o f a national market an d the succes s of the English Revolution o f 168 8 had signale d the definitiv e dissolutio n of the feuda l order sinc e the seventeenth century. The advance o f bourgeois society in the wake of the structural transformation s o f the econom y coul d no t have lef t unaffecte d th e conditions of professiona l practice . The officia l professiona l elite s o f th e Roya l College o f Physician s o r th e Inn s of Court , centere d i n London , ha d monopolize d sinc e ancien t time s th e righ t t o license medica l practitioners or to call lawyer s to the bar . Th e ris e o f the "middl e orders," however , ha d multiplie d th e number s o f practitioner s wh o wer e i n th e lower branches , an d thu s exclude d fro m th e institutionalize d sanctions o f profes sional status . Medica l practitioner s o f lowe r standin g practice d chiefl y i n th e provinces, outsid e th e jurisdiction o f the traditiona l corporations , an d the y worked in expandin g thoug h bitterl y competitiv e markets. Fro m the sixteent h centur y on , there is evidence, both in England and abroad, of a growing number of medical men. By th e seventeent h century , extensiv e practice s wer e bringin g substantia l wealt h to a n elite of London physicians, whil e lowe r down in the socia l hierarchy apothe caries wer e practicin g medicin e an d settin g themselve s apar t fro m shopkeepin g druggists. I n the eighteent h century , the apothecaries ' standin g a s bon a fid e medical practitioner s was recognized , eve n thoug h their clientele as wel l a s thei r status were quite modest, compared to those of the Royal College fellows, or the licentiates, or th e increasingl y prestigious surgeons. In th e law, attorneys an d solicitors—an amalgamated class , fo r all practical purposes—were reachin g i n thi s centur y th e positio n they occup y a t presen t i n th e English legal system. The Inns of Court discouraged thei r membership and excluded them fro m th e bar , unles s they abandone d thei r practice i n the lowe r branch fo r at least tw o years befor e bein g called . However , th e alread y expandin g busines s of representing an d counsellin g th e government' s variou s department s fel l entirel y into the hands of attorneys an d solicitors. Strengthene d b y their new respectability, they had begun to organize in voluntary societie s sinc e the first decade s of the eighteenth century. "Complaint s were made", w e are told, " o f the number of attornies; and th e difficult y o f applying an y measure of discipline wa s increase d b y the existence of 'vagabon d attornies' , tha t is , attornie s wit h n o fixe d address." T o this, Parliament responde d wit h th e regulator y ac t o f 1729.Forme d i n th e 1730s , th e Society o f Gentlemen Practiser s i n the Court s o f Law and Equity, i n turn, too k up supervision an d enforcemen t o f th e act' s provision s agains t unworth y attorney s as on e o f its main tasks . Toward th e en d o f the eighteent h century , pressure s fo r professiona l organiza tion wer e mounting . The mos t significan t and longer-lastin g of these movement s 8

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came fro m outsid e th e smal l world s o f th e traditiona l professional corporations . With th e declin e o f amateu r an d clerica l practitioners , professiona l calling s ha d become full-tim e specialize d vocations . Urbanizatio n an d improve d communica tions were breakin g the isolatio n of the larg e number s o f provincial practitioners. Expressing th e genera l movemen t o f the bourgeoisi e fo r national reform, the orga nizational effort s o f the ne w professiona l societie s wer e centrall y concerne d wit h regulating competition, and therefor e wit h th e term s o f access to the mark s o f professional fitness . A s demand s fo r entr y o r recognitio n increased , th e traditiona l professional bodie s tende d t o respond b y making membership mor e exclusive. Both the Inn s o f Court an d th e Roya l College o f Physicians reasserte d th e privilege s of Oxford an d Cambridg e graduates , eve n thoug h th e tw o ancien t universitie s coul d hardly b e commende d fo r thei r standard s of legal or medica l education. Passag e through th e hallowe d English universities—fro m whic h Catholics , Dissenter s an d all bu t a fe w poo r commoner s wer e excluded , eithe r d e jure o r d e facto—was , i f nothing else, a test of social fitness. I n fact, th e elit e professionals o f the traditional corporations tende d t o reserve entry int o their ranks t o those whom they considere d social peers. Thus, despit e the existenc e o f a minority o f very successfu l middl e class practitioners, th e "first-class " mark s o f professional distinctio n were practically monopolized b y aristocrati c o r quasi-aristocrati c elites . Tha t these marks wer e significan t for th e successfu l practitioner s i n th e "lowe r branches " o f medicin e an d la w i s shown by the leadin g role they too k in the effort s t o democratize th e governmen t of the traditiona l corporations. Th e bul k o f th e risin g professional middl e clas s wa s even mor e seriousl y damage d b y the traditiona l monopolies ove r professional titles . Beyond the loca l sphere in which reputation s wer e established , ther e were fe w rec ognized guarantee s o f competenc e an d probity . Withou t thes e visibl e signs , re spectable common practitioner s foun d themselve s helples s against th e competition of th e unscrupulou s an d th e inept , wh o proliferate d i n unregulated markets . Thei r problems wer e sometime s acknowledge d b y the traditiona l corporations bu t seldo m acted upo n wit h determination . Th e positio n of the professiona l middl e class wa s improved almost solely by the organizational efforts of their own leaders and of their own voluntar y associations , whic h move d bot h agains t traditiona l monopolie s over title s an d license s t o practice , an d agains t th e competitio n o f disreputabl e "colleagues." Such pressur e to brea k th e close d rank s o f a professiona l cast e di d not aris e in America unti l muc h later . Ther e ha d bee n grea t progres s i n higher educatio n an d the importatio n of Britis h professiona l model s i n th e eighteent h century , bu t th e colonies remaine d poor , provincial , an d sparsel y populated . I n a decentralized set ting, th e nin e America n colleges tha t existe d befor e th e Revolutio n could not hol d the sam e consecrating powe r tha t Oxfor d an d Cambridg e held , despit e thei r intel lectual an d politica l liveliness . Thes e college s gav e a gentlemanl y sea l t o thos e many graduate s wh o di d no t ente r th e professions ; th e mor e numerou s graduate s who entered th e ministry, most especially, o r the law, or lastly medicine, constituted an elit e amon g professionals . I n th e tw o secula r callings , thos e practitioner s wh o had studie d abroa d wer e a n elit e of the elite. Th e bar , i n particular, ha d rise n t o 11

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Constitution o f Professiona l Market s

great powe r an d prestig e durin g the eighteent h century : fro m bein g a n occupatio n of "mostl y pettifogger s an d mino r court officer s . . . wh o stirre d u p litigatio n fo r the sake of the petty court fees,'' i t had become in urban centers a social and political elite whic h matche d th e clerg y i n importanc e an d tende d towar d closure. Th e Revolution purge d th e ba r o f its best practitioners, democratizin g it , on the whole, but als o settin g bac k th e genera l standard s of a profession base d on apprenticeshi p and creating a wide gap between the urban legal elites, who shaped the new republic's institutions, an d th e mas s of a growin g profession. But th e existenc e o f urban an d Eastern professiona l elite s di d not mean tha t the y constituted the apex of a recognized professiona l hierarchy . Th e difference betwee n cities that looked to Europe and hinterland communities created almos t unbridgeabl e chasms in all professions an d trades . I n remote frontie r areas, geographic isolatio n assured a d e fact o monopol y t o th e lon e attorne y o r physician ; i t must, however , have bee n a short-live d advantage, sinc e isolatio n and decentralizatio n als o made self-appointment eas y an d thu s mad e competitio n keener. Moreover , professiona l practice i n eighteenth-century Americ a most ofte n wa s a part-tim e avocation , ex cept fo r clergymen, one o f whom each township was legall y required to suppor t in the old settlements, an d who often doubled as part-time lawyers or healers. But even the clergy, which enjoyed i n smaller towns the undisputed positio n of an intellectual elite, wa s prevente d b y denominationalis m an d decentralizatio n fro m formin g a united hierarchy . Th e clergy , besides , wa s unabl e t o maintai n it s lifetim e tenur e and traditiona l social standing , a s economi c developmen t an d it s sequel of regional depressions shoo k th e foundation s o f stable communit y l i f e . 14

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Thus eve n i f decentralization, socia l mobility , an d religiou s toleranc e kep t th e American professiona l hierarch y muc h mor e ope n an d flui d than i n England, th e differential sanctio n of different communities also distinguished in the United States the establishe d urba n professional s fro m th e upstarts , th e "learned " fro m th e em pirics, th e gentl e fro m th e coarse, and soon , th e nativ e sons from th e strivin g immi grants as well. Ye t in an expanding social context, restricted professional monopolie s could no t hol d fo r long . Whethe r i t was th e challeng e agains t corporat e privilege s characteristic o f professional modernizatio n in England, or the decline of community warrants whic h affecte d bot h England and the Unite d States, the breakdow n of particularistic legitimation s demande d th e organizatio n o r th e reconstructio n o f th e competitive professional market s tha t wer e emergin g i n urban centers . I n all walks of life , th e industria l revolution was separatin g wor k an d trainin g from th e house hold an d fro m th e community . Professional wor k wa s becomin g a full-time mean s of earnin g a livelihood , subjec t t o the dictate s o f capitalist competitio n for incom e and profit . T o insur e thei r livelihood, th e risin g professionals ha d t o unif y th e cor responding area s of the socia l division of labor aroun d homogeneou s guarantees of competence. Th e unifyin g principle s could be homogeneou s only to the exten t tha t they wer e universalistic—tha t is , autonomousl y define d b y th e professional s an d independent, a t least in appeajance, fro m th e traditiona l and external guarantees of status stratification . Thus , th e moder n reorganizatio n o f professiona l wor k an d professional market s tende d t o found credibility o n a different, an d much enlarged , monopolistic base—th e clai m t o sol e contro l of superior expertise .

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Constitution o f Professiona l Market s

THE ORGANIZATIONA L TAS K The "grea t transformation " presente d th e professiona l "entrepreneurs " wit h expanding an d "free " markets: despit e th e profoun d difference s i n socia l struc ture amon g th e nationa l societie s tha t underwen t th e transformation , th e genera l task o f professiona l organizatio n ha d simila r structura l requirements . I t wa s sub stantively different , however , fro m th e tas k tha t industria l entrepreneur s ha d confronted. First, fo r a professiona l marke t t o exis t i n a moder n sense , a distinctiv e "com modity" ha d to be produced. No w professional work , like any othe r for m o f labor, is only a fictitious commodity; it "cannot b e detached from th e rest of life, b e store d or mobilized, " and i t is no t produce d fo r sale. Unlik e craf t o r industria l labor , however, mos t profession s produc e intangibl e goods: thei r product, i n other words , is only formally alienabl e an d i s inextricably bound to the perso n an d the personal ity o f the producer . I t follows, therefore , tha t the producers themselves have to be produced i f their product s o r commoditie s ar e t o b e give n a distinctiv e form . I n other words , th e professional s mus t b e adequatel y traine d an d socialize d s o a s t o provide recognizabl y distinc t services for exchange on th e professiona l market . Second, i n the formative period, most of the markets fo r professional service s had to be created , fo r the existin g markets wer e unstabl e an d far fro m unified ; commo n standards o f wha t thi s uniqu e commodity—intangibl e services—meant, an d eve n of wha t needs it served, wer e lacking . For a secure market t o arise , th e superiorit y of one kind of services had to be clearly established wit h regard to competing "products." Th e various professional services , therefore , ha d to be standardized i n order to clearly differentiate thei r identity and connec t them , i n the mind s o f consumers , with stabl e criteria of evaluation. A tendency t o monopol y by elimination o f competing "products " wa s inheren t i n this process of standardization; fo r if other stan dards of evaluation wer e allowe d to prevail , the preferenc e o f the publi c could not easily b e reclaime d awa y fro m olde r "consume r loyalties. " Professiona l entre preneurs, no t unlik e their counterparts i n industry, wer e therefor e boun d t o solici t state protectio n an d state-enforce d penaltie s agains t unlicense d competitors—tha t is to say, thos e producers o f services whose trainin g and entry int o the marke t the y had not controlled. However, no amount of coercion could force a clientele to switch allegiances an d see k professional service s whic h i t did not eve n kno w i t needed— at leas t not i n the for m tha t th e leader s of professional refor m were givin g t o those professional services . T o establish i n the public at large common bases for an evaluation o f both need an d professiona l competenc e was , therefore , a n ideologica l task to whic h th e risin g professions activel y contributed ; bu t obviously , it s magnitud e was such that it could not be advanced b y their efforts alone—ideological persuasio n ultimately depended on the completion of the general socia l shift to a new "symbolic universe." I n consequence, th e roa d tha t th e professiona l reformer s ha d mappe d in th e libera l phase of capitalism could not b e travele d t o the en d wit h th e "socia l technology" the y ha d available . Third, becaus e the standardizatio n o f professional service s i s boun d t o th e pro duction o f producers—that i s to say , t o education—it depend s upon inducin g new 17

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recruits t o accep t th e economi c an d socia l sacrifice s o f training. Hence , a t leas t a moderate guarante e tha t th e recruits ' educationa l investmen t woul d b e protecte d had t o b e sough t fro m th e beginning . I n a marke t situation , th e guarante e agains t risks incurred tends to take the form o f monopoly, or at least of special protection by the publi c authorities. I n this case, th e natur e o f the product s an d th e stat e of their markets wer e suc h tha t onl y th e state , a s th e suprem e legitimizin g an d enforcin g institution, coul d sanctio n th e moder n professions ' monopolisti c claim s o f superiority fo r thei r "commodities. " Th e attitud e o f th e stat e towar d educatio n an d toward monopolie s o f competence i s thu s a crucia l variable i n the developmen t o f the professiona l project . In sum , creatin g professional market s required , a s i n every othe r case, establish ing socia l credit or, t o paraphrase Durkheim, creatin g non-contractual bases of contract. Becaus e o f th e pre-existin g competition , thi s tas k demande d stron g an d quasi-monopolistic protectiv e devices. Becaus e of the uniqu e nature o f the product s to be marketed, an d because their use value to the large public was a s uncertain as it was new , contro l had t o b e establishe d firs t "a t th e poin t of production": th e pro viders o f services had t o b e controlle d in order t o standardiz e an d thu s identif y th e "commodity" the y provided . Fo r this , a cognitiv e basis was crucial . The kind o f knowledge that each profession coul d claim a s distinctivel y it s own was therefor e a strategic facto r o f variatio n i n thei r organizationa l effort . However , a cognitiv e basis of any kin d ha d t o be a t least approximately defined befor e th e risin g modern professions coul d negotiat e cognitive exclusiveness —that is , befor e the y coul d convincingly establis h a teaching monopol y on their specific tool s an d techniques , while claimin g absolute superiorit y for them. Th e proved institutiona l mechanism s for thi s negotiatio n wer e th e license , th e qualifyin g examination , th e diploma , an d formal trainin g in a common curriculum . Th e typica l institution s that administere d these devices were , first , th e guild-lik e professiona l association , an d late r th e pro fessional school , whic h supersede d the associatio n i n effectiveness . Obviously, non e o f this wa s i n itsel f a n organizationa l invention . The guild s of merchants tha t spran g u p i n eleventh-century Europ e wer e als o voluntary associations tending toward the monopolistic control of anew for m of trade. The craft guilds, which wer e organize d everywher e b y th e thirteent h century , wer e als o devices fo r establishing socia l credit in a phase of rapid development o f small commodity production. In that historical situation, the merchant guild s moved from d e facto monopoly t o a right acknowledged b y lords and cities. The assembling o f producers alon g craft line s was encouraged b y the public authorities as a means of regulating the new urban markets . Tha t the craf t guild s later strov e t o emancipate themselve s from th e municipal tutelag e probabl y ha d mor e t o do wit h th e politic s of the medieva l cities than wit h th e dynamics o f professionalism. Nevertheless , th e surviva l of the guil d form i n the mids t of the industria l revolution no longer appears paradoxical: i t suggests, rather, tha t associations of "free" producer s backe d by public authorities an d tending towar d monopoly ar e a general featur e i n the constitutio n of new market s based o n fre e skille d labor . What wa s genuinel y ne w i n the strateg y adopte d b y professiona l reformer s fo r constituting an d controllin g thei r market s wa s neithe r th e tactica l device s the y 19

16

Constitution o f Professiona l Market s

employed, no r eve n thei r institutiona l forms , bu t th e particula r combinatio n o f these element s int o a specifi c structure . Th e kind s o f marke t warrant s tha t wer e needed b y th e moder n professiona l entrepreneur s had, i n turn, ne w an d vastl y sig nificant structura l implications . These warrant s ultimatel y rest upo n th e predomi nance of formal training over various form s o f apprenticeship. The y attai n their ful l effectiveness whe n th e productio n o f professiona l producer s i s conducte d withi n monopolistic system s of education: i n their moder n form , thes e system s appear to match reward s wit h merit by means of formally universalisti c criteria of recruitment and promotion . Thi s appearanc e legitimize s bot h monopol y an d th e hierarchica l organization o f educational systems . The establishmen t o f national system s o f public an d compulsor y educatio n wa s in som e cases led "from above " b y "enlightened" autocrati c states ; in others it was the piecemea l outcom e o f divers e ideologica l an d politica l struggles . I n th e latte r instances, i t coincide d wit h th e bourgeoisie' s conques t o f socia l hegemony. I n England, th e firs t industria l society, i t was th e middlin g professional me n wh o led the publi c negotiation o f cognitive exclusiveness, i n their effort t o unseat the traditional professional elite s an d t o separate themselves from th e trades . Their progress involved nothing less than th e creatio n o f a graded syste m o f comprehensive educa tion an d th e reorientatio n o f it s higher-leve l institutions . I t wa s hindere d b y th e peculiarities o f England' s stratificatio n syste m an d b y th e persisten t ideologica l influence o f its aristocracy. The formidable task of setting up the educational apparatu s of bourgeois hegemon y involved th e whol e structur e o f each societ y an d wa s shape d by each society's his torical development . I t necessaril y concerne d mor e numerou s an d divers e socia l forces than th e narro w professiona l secto r o f th e middl e classes . Wha t varie d na tionally an d historicall y were th e particula r balance s achieve d betwee n th e uppe r classes, the clergy, sectors of the industria l bourgeoisie, ancien regime intellectuals , and th e "organic " intellectual s o f th e capitalis t class , includin g the professiona l reformers an d organizers. However , th e structure s tha t emerge d wer e analogou s beneath the surface : insofar as they were modern, al l levels o f the ne w educationa l systems wer e spawne d b y capitalis t industrialization . Determine d b y th e specifi c class structur e o f each capitalist society , the y determine d i t in turn, functionin g a s the characteristi c instrument s o f legitimatio n o f th e matur e capitalis t order . Th e professions contribute d thei r ow n specifi c amalgam s o f ol d an d ne w ideologica l structures to th e emergin g system s of national education . The y wer e obviousl y not the only ones to do so, bu t they le d the wa y in asserting the crucial social function of credentialing systems . To recapitulate an d complete th e steps of this analysis: th e passage from restricte d monopolies o f practice t o the organizatio n an d control of expanded and competitiv e markets wa s a necessary one fo r the professional sector s of the middle class, seekin g to improve their position in the emergen t stratification systems of capitalist society . Their tas k presuppose d th e abandonment—deliberat e o r involuntary—o f the re strictive corporat e warrant s o f professional credibility . I t tended towar d th e recon struction of monopoly on the universalisti c principle s dictated b y the ne w dominan t ideology. Th e crownin g of this monopolisti c projec t appear s to b e a se t o f legally 20

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Constitution o f Professiona l Market s

17

enforced monopolie s of practice. However, the actual effectiveness o f such sanctions depends o n th e paralle l constructio n o f a "monopol y o f credibility " wit h th e larger public . The conques t of official privileg e and publi c favor was , fo r the pro fessions, a doubl e external tas k o f ideologica l persuasion, whic h ha d a n internal precondition: th e unificatio n o f th e correspondin g area s o f th e socia l divisio n o f labor unde r th e directio n of a leading grou p o f professional reformers . Th e crucial means for this unification, an d therefore th e concrete cor e of the professions' organ izational task , wa s systemati c training—or , i n m y terms , th e standardize d an d centralized productio n of professional producers . Traditional professiona l elite s ha d monopolize d th e mark s o f distinctio n conferred b y universities . Bu t the actua l conten t o f their education, i n relation to professional practice , wa s no t tha t important : protecte d b y traditiona l corporate privi leges, the old professional elite s did not need to submit their specific "commodities' ' to the test of market competition. Market competition, on the other hand, determine s the necessar y centrality of both training and th e conten t o f training in the structur e of moder n professions . Th e importanc e o f cognitive exclusivenes s i n th e contro l of expande d professiona l market s suggest s some additiona l remarks . The industrial revolution and the consolidation of capitalist social systems create d new area s o f practic e an d ne w occupationa l roles . Th e applicatio n o f scienc e t o industry an d to practically every other area of life graduall y and constantly change d the cognitiv e bases of the socia l divisio n o f labor. I t is logica l t o assume that thei r structural position in the divisio n of labor gave an advantage to certain occupations : from th e poin t of view o f cognitive exclusiveness, thos e professions o r professiona l sectors which had the opportunity of appropriating and standardizin g new bodie s of knowledge shoul d have been favore d i n the creatio n o f a distinctive "commodity" and i n th e attainmen t o f a monopol y o f competence . Ne w technique s shoul d b e susceptible o f monopolizatio n b y thei r inventor s o r firs t users : th e novelt y o f a knowledge shoul d therefor e facilitat e th e tas k o f erectin g protectiv e boundarie s around it. Professions, however , wer e no t alway s i n control of new knowledg e relevan t t o their practice , fo r the goo d reaso n that muc h o f it was produce d b y outsiders—re searchers in related scientifi c fields, an d als o practical men i n politics, i n business, and i n the arts . A profession's cognitiv e base can evolv e in complete independenc e from th e professio n itsel f an d fro m it s productio n of professional producers , until the production of knowledge and the production of producers are unified into the same structure. Or , i n other words : the lin k betwee n researc h an d trainin g institutionalized b y th e moder n mode l o f university gives t o university-base d profession s the mean s to contro l their cognitive bases. Onc e again , th e emergenc e o f moder n systems o f education—an d here , i n particular , th e transformatio n o f thei r highe r branches into centers for the production of knowledge—appears a s the central hinge of th e professiona l project . The monopolisti c an d standardize d productio n o f professiona l producer s i s a necessary step in the march toward market control, but it is by no means a sufficient one: indeed , th e structur e o f the marke t i n which a profession transact s its services does not depend o n the profession' s actio n and intentions—o r a t least not unti l th e

18

Constitution o f Professiona l Market s

profession gain s considerabl e socia l power . Th e structur e o f a particula r profes sional marke t i s determined b y the broade r socia l structur e whic h shape s the socia l need fo r a give n servic e an d therefor e define s th e actua l o r potentia l public s o f a given profession . In conclusion , t o vie w professiona l modernizatio n a s a projec t o f marke t con trol underline s th e centra l rol e of the stat e in the developmen t o f this project , mos t particularly it s functio n o f sponsorin g monopolisti c education systems . Thi s point of vie w explains the crucial importance o f two components: th e professional projec t combines the m int o one comple x structure , eve n thoug h thei r character an d evolution ca n be , unti l then , totall y independen t fro m eac h other. Thos e component s ar e the potentia l marke t fo r a professional service , o n th e on e hand , an d o n th e other , the cognitiv e basis to whic h thi s servic e i s o r ca n b e tied . In th e next chapter I will consider i n some detail the characteristic marke t situation of medicine : everywhere , i t wa s on e o f th e firs t profession s t o striv e fo r interna l unification, althoug h it could not become until much later the leading model of professional powe r an d success . Thi s analysi s wil l la y th e groun d fo r a paradigmati c view o f the constellatio n o f elements whic h ca n increas e a profession's chance s of attaining market control. A comparison of medicine with engineering wil l then allow me t o explor e th e interpla y betwee n marke t structur e an d th e cognitiv e basi s o f a profession .

Chapter 3

AN ANALYSI S OF MEDICINE'S PROFESSIONA L SUCCESS

To analyz e th e structur e o f the marke t fo r medicine we must as k ho w the natur e of th e medical "commodity" determines , a t least in part, the size, of the market, the typical mode s o f exchange, th e intensit y and variet y of competition, an d th e atti tudes of the public authorities toward regulation. Secondly, we must ask how changes in th e natur e o f the commodit y affected th e chances of success of the professiona l entrepreneurs wh o were attemptin g to unif y an d contro l th e medica l market. THE MARKE T FO R MEDICA L SERVICE S The first an d most obvious fact to consider is that the market for medicine is based on a vital an d universa l need: it s potential for expansion i s therefore unlimited , a t least in principle. Th e general ideologica l climate of Western societie s ha s favore d the function s medicin e claim s t o serve ; th e valu e o f individua l life , roote d i n th e Judaeo-Christian religiou s tradition , an d individualis m i n general , hav e forme d one o f th e stronges t ideologica l dimensions o f th e post-feuda l world . However , the actualizatio n of this potential depended, fo r medicine, on factors othe r than th e possible siz e o f the market . To begi n with , th e payin g clientele in the nineteent h centur y wa s stil l quit e nar row. Bu t with mor e people becomin g moderately affluent , an d the alread y affluen t getting richer, the perception that the practice of medicine was profitabl e to at least some physician s encourage d entr y int o th e field. Th e appearanc e o f a marke t in urban centers , and , particularl y in America, in rural area s as well, se t i n motion the mechanism s fo r th e standardize d productio n of producers outline d in the pre ceding chapter. I n England, the main problem was to tie the serious forms of training that th e "lowe r branches"—surgeons an d apothecaries—wer e organizin g in their schools an d teachin g hospital s t o a titl e o f unifor m prestige . I n America , the ab sence of restrictive corporate monopolies , such a s that of the Britis h Roya l College of Physicians , permitte d an unbridle d expansion o f the suppl y o f physicians. Pro prietary schools , wit h requirement s a s la x as thei r curricula were brief, proliferated in th e firs t two-third s of the nineteent h century , rapidl y substitutin g their diplomas for th e licens e whic h medica l societie s ha d grante d i n most state s sinc e th e eigh1

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Medicine's Professiona l Succes s

teenth century. Afte r 1825 , competition for students amon g these schools le d to a general declin e o f standard s an d requirements . Th e schools , nevertheless , ha d a powerful effec t whic h apprenticeshi p b y itsel f coul d neve r hav e attained : the y induced a rapid growt h o f the profession , whil e standardizin g medica l practice t o an exten t a s ye t unknown. However, th e stat e of medical science i n the firs t hal f o f the centur y an d it s particular lack of distinction i n the Unite d State s implied tha t standardization was conducted o n th e basi s o f mostl y ineffectiv e therapie s an d unfounde d pathologica l theories. Th e total freedom o f the market an d the ease with whic h school s coul d b e set u p institutionalized , in America , th e characteristi c sectaria n division s o f it s medicine. Th e "regular " doctor s wh o founded th e America n Medical Association in 184 7 an d controlle d most stat e societies, a s wel l a s man y exclusiv e elite groupings, wer e no t distinguishe d by an y pragmati c superiorit y of the savag e therapie s which wer e thei r trademark ; thei r advantag e wa s relative—genera l educatio n an d social rank—an d i t differed fro m tha t o f the corporat e Englis h physician only be cause i t was no t institutionalized . I n the secon d quarte r o f the nineteent h century , the rise of homeopathic medicine brought this relative superiority to an end: homeopathy, indeed , wa s a n attac k b y equally "genteel " doctor s upo n the standar d ther apies use d b y th e "regulars." Unlik e previou s sectaria n movements , suc h a s Thomson's herbalis m o r Sylveste r Graham' s healt h prescriptions , homeopath y conquered urba n middle-clas s an d upper-clas s clientele s i n the Unite d States , a s it had done i n Europe. It became, therefore , th e primary target of the "regular " medical organizers . 3

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5

American indifferenc e t o basi c scienc e appear s t o hav e playe d a larg e rol e in the lac k of medical research durin g most o f the nineteent h century. It s effects o n the medica l professional wer e compounde d b y th e repeate d assertion , o n th e par t of th e state legislatures, o f every American's "inalienabl e right to life , liberty , an d quackery." Bu t even wher e scientifi c medicine ha d arise n an d begu n it s growt h early in the century—that is, chiefly i n France an d in Germany—it did not produce valid therapeuti c result s unti l th e 1880 s an d 1890s . Medica l practitioner s were , therefore, almos t a s reticen t toward science, a s impoten t against thei r rivals in the field, an d a s disunite d as thei r American counterparts. I t would therefor e b e mis leading t o assume , a s i s ofte n done , tha t th e marke t fo r "real " medica l service s expanded gradually , b y a proces s o f cumulativ e expansio n o f it s "scientifi c nucleus." Th e universa l nee d fo r healt h service s coul d b e beneficiall y tapped if , and only if , the satisfaction of the need could be connected i n the mind of the public with one type o f service. Th e "premodern " situatio n could no t b e overcom e b y medicine s o lon g a s consumers , whe n they changed providers , also change d medical commodities : in such a situation, we cannot spea k of one marke t for medicine, but of many, and the sector controlled by the regulars was, a t that, a relatively small one. I n fact, unti l the end of the century, the fastest growin g "medical " market was that o f patent medicines , produce d outsid e o f any respectabl e medica l persuasion . Considering thi s situation , i t i s no t surprisin g tha t medica l graduates—mos t particularly i n the Unite d States , wher e i t was s o easy to overproduce them—wer e very ofte n poo r an d frustrate d u p t o th e en d o f the nineteent h century. Th e uni6

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versal nee d fo r medica l service s represent s a tremendou s asse t fo r a categor y o f professional producer s onl y after the y hav e succeeded in establishing a monopolistic hold on their market. Unti l then , th e universalit y of the need operates in reverse, breeding competition . Thus, th e secon d featur e o f the marke t fo r medical services was it s extreme com petitiveness. I n England, th e mos t significan t axis o f competition was betwee n th e "lower branches " an d th e highe r rung s o f th e profession—unti l 1858 , whe n th e Medical Ac t established a single nationa l register o f physicians. Bu t in England a s elsewhere, th e proliferatio n of medical commoditie s shows , o n th e on e hand , tha t the nee d fo r healt h service s ha d bee n activate d b y variou s forces , chie f amon g which wa s th e transformatio n i n ways o f life brough t abou t b y urbanization. O n the othe r hand , thi s proliferatio n reflects a marke t situatio n fragmented int o man y incompatible definition s of the commodit y to b e sold . Urbanization aggravate d th e economi c an d intellectua l effects o f competition: it fostered incursion s int o a rival' s practice , pric e cutting , advertising , professiona l defamation, an d the like . Th e situatio n was particularly critical in the United States: there were n o medica l school s o f wide renown, an d th e publi c authorities, perhap s as a consequence , grante d medica l societie s th e righ t t o issu e license s bu t wer e "unwilling t o enac t law s whic h woul d hav e deterre d unlicense d practitioners." The chief aim of the first medica l societies wa s to create some distinctive trademark s by means of licensure an d restriction s upo n membership. The y hoped t o limit competition b y reducin g th e suppl y o f "real " doctors , b y standardizin g medica l fees , and b y adoptin g an d enforcin g codes of professional etiquette . Fro m the 1820 s on, the multiplicatio n of proprietary medical schools no t only killed i n the bu d the societies' monopolisti c efforts ; i t als o institutionalize d the competitio n betwee n dif ferent paradigm s o f healing , thu s reducin g th e fiel d o f operatio n fo r al l graduate practitioners. The associations , nevertheless , ha d begu n th e tas k continue d b y th e schools — that is , th e separatio n i n th e public' s eye s betwee n "graduate " physician s an d "uneducated" o r unlicense d empirics . The y ha d als o begun t o provid e a focus fo r the practic e o f medicine, atomize d b y th e isolatio n or th e competitivenes s o f sol o practice. Loca l an d regiona l societie s o f al l persuasions manage d t o introduc e a modicum o f regulatio n an d intraprofessiona l courtesy , whil e position s o n th e l icensing boards gave prestige to their incumbents. Later , professorships i n the school s became real "passport s t o business, " providin g medica l facultie s wit h centra l positions i n networks o f apprentices, forme r students , an d patien t referrals . I n the United State s in particular, the foundin g of societies, licensin g boards, an d school s had effect s quit e independen t o f thes e institutions ' actua l scientifi c worth : thei r existence constructe d a n occupationa l role-imag e fo r th e "doctor " an d preserve d it in the public's eyes even when the withdrawal of public confidence i n official medicine wa s a t it s highest . Accordin g to Richar d Shryock , i n th e secon d hal f o f th e nineteenth century , mos t layme n ha d nothin g bu t contemp t fo r medica l science , while holdin g their ow n famil y docto r i n great respect. The extrem e competitivenes s o f the medica l fiel d i s importan t fro m th e poin t of view o f market organization : it has th e paradoxica l effec t o f spawning an d spurrin g 11

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constant effort s t o regulate competitio n by controlling th e suppl y of producers, th e interaction betwee n them , an d th e ver y process of production. Furthermore, i n a situatio n wher e officia l medicin e wa s n o mor e successfu l i n curing disease than it s rivals, i t could stil l rel y o n traditional mechanisms t o establish trust . Thus , th e famil y docto r could maintain his prestige, i n the fac e o f widespread disbelie f in medicine's therapeuti c soundness , because he appeared , firs t of all, a s the man to whom one went for help with private problems . His medical effectiveness wa s probabl y muc h less important than hi s parenta l attitude , hi s wisdom, his willingnes s to provide detached ye t personalize d help . Lik e th e irregula r prac titioners, h e to o wa s backe d b y the forc e o f community traditions; furthermore, t o the relianc e o f rituals of help, h e coul d add th e prestig e o f middle-class statu s and at leas t th e semblanc e o f scientific capacity . Expert advice , whe n i t i s give n i n a privat e interpersona l situation , ca n alway s readily dra w upo n extraprofessiona l source s of credibility an d legitimation . Thus , all profession s contai n element s tha t appea r mor e starkl y an d mor e coherentl y i n the rol e of the priest . I n a secularized society , th e famil y docto r of old is one o f the most direc t inheritor s of the rol e of the religiou s minister or priest . Moder n medicine, however, more than any other profession, illuminate s how functionally rational elements o f legitimation—scientifi c expertis e an d prove d technica l superiorit y in healing—blend wit h traditional , irrational , o r substantivel y rationa l supports. What i s t o b e stresse d here i s tha t medicin e i s relativel y exceptional i n this sense, because of the persistently private and purely individual basis on which professiona l services ar e provided. The privac y of the consultin g room makes the physician' s service s impenetrabl e to publi c scrutiny : i n th e actua l transactio n itself , th e patien t face s th e physicia n alone. Th e patient , therefore , mus t rel y exclusively on his own uninformed judgment since , indeed , th e informatio n h e ha s abou t th e effectivenes s o f the service s he is getting is always indirect or ex post facto: he can judge his doctor only through the subjectiv e assessment s and experience o f other patients , throug h the realization that h e i s no t gettin g any bette r (o r that h e i s no t improvin g fas t enough) , throug h non-functional factor s of confidence, o r through the judgment of other doctors. This last aspec t i s perhaps the mos t significant , for i t is here that professiona l etiquett e and th e informa l organizatio n of the medica l profession tur n agains t th e layman. The professio n i s outrage d b y malpractic e suit s an d rejects , o f course , th e mos t logical attempt s b y patient s t o hav e somethin g t o sa y abou t a doctor' s fee s o r hi s competence. Yet , as Elio t Freidso n ha s shown , th e privac y of solo practic e i s als o impenetrable t o colleagu e review . Beyon d th e requirement s o f a degree, obtaine d no matte r ho w man y year s ago , ther e i s littl e mor e tha t th e professio n expect s of its member s an d littl e mor e tha t i t controls. Moreover, th e patient' s anxiet y abou t wha t ma y be , t o him , matters o f lif e o r death lead s hi m t o mak e a n emotiona l investmen t i n th e doctor-patien t relation . Since there i s a general tendenc y t o attribute to one's doctor quasi-charismatic pow ers, uncritica l acceptance of his expertise i s frequent: a patient wants t o believe that somebody ca n help . 15

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These consideration s o n th e typica l mod e o f exchang e i n th e medica l marke t point to a third marke t characteristic: because of the permanently individua l and pri vate natur e o f the actua l transaction , th e su m o f individual consumer s ar e not , an d most probably cannot, b e organized. Thi s market situation maximizes the effectiveness of association amon g th e producers . I hav e emphasized, however , tha t the medica l market, lik e al l other professiona l markets, ultimatel y depends o n ideologica l sources o f socia l credit . O n th e on e hand, i n th e ac t o f consultation, th e docto r ca n appea l t o interpersona l factor s o f confidence i n order to bolster the individua l patient's belie f i n hi s professional competence. O n the othe r hand , genera l publi c belief i n the profession' s superio r skill s has t o b e dee p an d widesprea d enoug h t o motivat e th e su m o f individua l choice s which resul t i n consultatio n wit h a physician . Thus , medicin e appear s t o depen d more than othe r profession s o n the genera l stat e of the public' s ideolog y about th e nature an d functiona l attributes o f healing. Legall y enforced monopoly , however , can compensat e fo r lack o f widespread publi c confidence, an d a t th e leas t i t reinforces th e ideologica l bases of trust. I n this respect , medicin e i s particularl y well served b y th e natur e o f the servic e i t provides. The fourth characteristi c o f the medical market is, in effect, th e relativel y greater readiness of public authorities to facilitate monopolistic control over practice by those professional healer s wh o appea r more effective , o r a t leas t mor e convincing , than others. Th e fact that medicine operates in an area of vital concern fo r the individua l and for the community compels th e state to intervene. Onc e scientifi c medicine had offered sufficien t guarantees of its superior effectiveness i n dealing with disease, the state contributed willingly t o the creation of monopoly by means of registration and licensing. Indeed , only in a quasi-monopolistic situation can the producers b e supervised and a minimum of "professional" competenc e obtained . Thus, because of the saliency o f th e medica l function , monopolisti c tendencies receive d stat e sanctio n long befor e th e ris e o f modern medicine , a s a n expressio n o f the state' s efforts t o regulate an d standardiz e healt h practices : "Mos t Europea n government s fel t th e need, a t least by the sixteenth century, fo r some regulation of medical practice. Th e College o f Physician s i n London , th e collegium-medicum o f Germa n cities , th e tribunal de protomedicato i n Spain , wer e al l granted som e contro l over licensing practitioners, th e inspectio n o f drugs, an d th e l i k e . " Thes e premoder n associa tions became mor e concerne d wit h th e protectio n of their monopoly than wit h th e reliable productio n of professional producers ; thei r entrenchment account s i n large part for the dynamic s o f emergence of modern professions i n post-feudal societies . What i s significan t here , though , i s tha t th e vita l importanc e o f publi c healt h always kept open to the profession of medicine a privileged conduit to governmental backing fo r its monopolistic claims. The recurrenc e o f epidemics wa s a most powerful facto r i n reviving th e periodicall y faltering interest i n public health; i n order to exploit this potential, medicine, a s I have emphasized before , neede d more tha n a marke t situatio n favorable t o monopoly. It needed a dramatic demonstratio n tha t its service s wer e mor e likel y tha n thos e o f other healer s t o solv e persisten t healt h problems. Bu t even thi s wa s no t enough : scientifi c medicine, indeed , wa s no t th e 19

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patrimony o f any sect , bu t th e "produc t o f convergent influence s o f diverse ante cedents" int o a wholl y ne w school. Ofte n th e resistanc e o f regular medicin e t o bacteriology require d an interventio n of the stat e against establishe d sector s of the profession, o n the side of popular demand an d of public health movements i n which laymen ofte n outnumbere d physicians. Fo r medicin e t o appropriat e th e ne w dis coveries, th e bul k o f the professio n ha d t o be socialize d to the ne w tools . Thi s required, i n effect, tha t on e o r more generation s o f physicians b e forme d alon g ne w and homogeneou s standard s of training . Until tha t time, the state's interventions on the side of "regular" medicin e should be seen more as a political response than as a matter of encouraging th e best product in a vital market . Sinc e "regular " doctor s tende d t o be, precisely , thos e of higher social status , the y wer e naturall y heard wit h mor e favo r an d mor e ofte n appointe d to publi c positions—a fac t whic h appeare d t o giv e governmental sanctio n t o their definition o f th e medica l "commodity." Socia l movements , however , coul d elicit fro m th e stat e different politica l responses : the publi c health movement s ar e one instance , an d anothe r i s th e movemen t b y th e "lower " corporat e order s i n England agains t th e entrenche d upper-clas s physicians—thei r victor y wit h th e Medical Act of 1858 can be interpreted as a victory of the middle class against aristo cratic privilege. State sponsorship , i n short , i s no t sufficien t t o giv e a professio n autonomou s control over all its potential market. In the best of cases, state sanction can eliminate competitors, bu t i t canno t forc e consumer s t o consume , excep t i n minima l an d routinized areas , suc h a s compulsor y vaccination . Medicine' s privilege d position with relatio n to the stat e was perfunctory , therefore , unti l th e profession succeede d in unifyin g itsel f aroun d a demonstrably superio r definitio n o f the medica l "com modity" an d i n guaranteein g a reliabl e productio n o f producers . Thi s process , which I have called the negotiation of cognitive exclusiveness, wa s inseparable fro m the productio n and progres s of medical knowledge. A l l th e learne d profession s wer e tied , i n principle, t o one organizationa l base for the transmissio n o f knowledge : th e traditiona l university. Unti l it s refor m wa s achieved, th e universit y hindered rathe r tha n helpe d th e productio n of systemati c scientific an d technica l knowledge . I n this respect , medicin e ha d a further advan tage ove r th e othe r learne d professions : th e centralit y of it s functio n ha d mad e it necessary fo r the stat e to suppor t publi c hospitals. Thi s was a n alternativ e institu tion whic h coul d serve as a n integrative focus fo r the profession , an d could be use d in th e productio n and transmissio n o f medical knowledge. I t appears, i n fact, tha t the numbe r o f large hospital s wa s on e o f the mai n reasons why Pari s becam e th e world's capita l of medical science in the firs t hal f o f the nineteent h century . Over coming the ancien regime guil d barriers , thes e hospitals brough t together surgeon s and physicians , thu s allowin g th e physician s t o incorporat e th e localize d structural pathology, whic h surgeon s always ha d spontaneousl y applied , an d t o star t th e sci entific stud y o f specific diseases. No t surprisingly , countries suc h a s th e Unite d States, i n which hospital s wer e fo r a long time unfit fo r scientific research, lagge d far behin d i n medical discoveries. 20

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In sum , the market fo r medical services appears to have distinctive features whic h derive fro m th e salienc y an d universalit y o f th e nee d i t serves . Th e potentia l fo r unlimited expansion , th e extrem e competitivenes s befor e th e marke t wa s success fully monopolized , a s wel l a s th e readines s o f th e stat e t o ac t a s sponso r fo r th e dominant (o r most "trustworthy" ) sector of the profession, flo w fro m th e natur e of the need. I n turn, the individua l nature o f the need determines th e persistently inter personal characte r o f th e actual transactio n o f services . Thi s aspec t explain s th e typical, albei t no t unique , influenc e o f interpersona l factor s o f trust , an d als o th e insulation o f th e professiona l produce r fro m direct scrutin y i n hi s actua l perfor mance. Regulatio n an d control of actual professiona l practic e ar e therefor e situate d "before'' an d "after'' th e process of consultation rather than during its actual occur rence. Contro l of th e "product " i s typicall y indirect . The individualize d mode o f consumption, the vital nature of the need, as well as the influence of non-functionally rational an d subjectiv e factor s o f confidence, mak e i t unlikel y tha t th e consumer s will b e abl e t o exercise thi s control. None of these factors is , in itself, sufficient to guarantee either professional auton omy o r monopolisti c market contro l to the dominan t secto r of the profession . Eac h of them , an d all of them combined, ar e conditioned by the possibility of negotiating cognitive exclusiveness, whic h is a crucial intervening variable. Once this exclusiveness was achieved , th e structur e o f its market gav e medicine wha t I consider t o b e an exceptiona l an d unparallele d capacit y fo r monopolisti c control : characteristic s which favor a sellers' marke t controlle d by the producers wer e particularly coherent in th e case of medicine. Thi s can best be illustrated by contrast wit h anothe r profes sion which , durin g th e nineteent h century , wa s als o dealin g i n ne w an d rapidl y changing professiona l "commodities. " A COMPARATIV E CASE : ENGINEERIN G It woul d see m at firs t glanc e tha t th e professio n o f engineering shoul d hav e had few competitor s t o fight: th e industria l revolution having so transformed it s function and its cognitive base, the professio n shoul d have been able to grow smoothly along with it s market , cumulativel y producing ne w knowledg e an d controllin g its appli cation. Fro m this hypothetica l point of view, th e pressur e to articulat e a monopoly would have been lower than in medicine; on the other hand, th e lo w level of competition (i n America, fo r instance , th e deman d fo r civi l engineerin g service s largely exceeded the suppl y unti l th e 1840s) , an d th e novelt y of the are a of practice shoul d have facilitate d professiona l contro l of th e market . I n a rapidl y changin g techno logical environment, i t would b e logical to assume that the devisers of technological innovations woul d hav e "naturally " obtaine d cognitiv e exclusiveness. I f the engi neers ha d indee d bee n s o favore d wit h regar d t o thi s crucia l intervenin g variable, their autonom y i n defining the conten t o f their wor k shoul d hav e been high ; their "natural" monopol y over new knowledge should, in fact, hav e maximized the positive factors—o f whateve r nature—i n thei r professional marke t situation . This view is misleading. To show why , we must consider th e general characte r of

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the professiona l servic e involved. Th e firs t differenc e fro m medicin e is that engineering wa s not—an d emphaticall y is no t today— a functionall y homogeneou s area o f the socia l divisio n o f labor. True , al l branches of engineering (even , indi rectly, th e mos t abstrac t contemporar y specialties , suc h a s system s analysis ) fal l in a general category whic h Daniel Calhoun calls coordinators or "devisers o f physical objects. " I n this broad category , th e varieties o f engineers keep company wit h ' ' architects, buildin g tradesmen , artists , mechanics." Among th e technica l deviser s o f a pre-industria l age , th e specialize d militar y engineer, o f lon g European ancestry , an d th e architect , bor n o f th e Renaissance , carried thei r identit y int o th e industria l era. Civi l engineerin g dre w muc h o f it s manpower fro m th e specialize d militar y corps , whil e overlapping , i n some cases, with architectura l practice. However , the task of building an infrastructure of public works fo r industrial expansion transforme d th e rol e and fa r exceeded the ol d pools of skille d labor. Mechanica l engineering wa s muc h more clearly a product of the industrial revolution . Its origins , lik e thos e o f mining engineering , wer e entrepre neurial. It s elite was constituted , i n America, by creativ e an d innovativ e manufac turers wh o wer e a t th e hear t o f th e particula r socia l an d cultura l tradition o f th e machine shop. Despit e th e egalitaria n mobilit y myth s which remaine d fo r a long time attache d t o th e shop , thi s entrepreneuria l elit e mos t ofte n cam e fro m upper class Northeastern familie s and carried to its calling the social sanctions an d security of it s origins. In the 1830 s an d 1840s , railwa y shops became an extension of shop culture, a s wel l a s a principa l breedin g groun d fo r mechanica l engineer s an d th e first are a in which the very title came into general usage.Th e repair and supervision of railroa d machinery, however , blurre d the clear stereotyp e o f the combined entrepreneur an d technologica l creator produce d b y th e machin e shop : a t on e end , th e "superintendent" o f motive power had a foot int o management an d vied fo r autonomy wit h non-technica l executives ; a t th e other , engin e driver s appropriate d th e term "engineer, " thu s eroding in the public's mind it s gentlemanly connotations. There was not, therefore, one earlier type out of which the modern engineer developed, nor one single functional area, as in the case of healing, but different specializations whic h separately gav e ris e t o present-da y engineerin g specialties—a s wel l as to architecture, it s derivations, and numerous "instrument-making " crafts whic h never reache d o r even aspire d t o th e statu s of professions . The second basic difference between engineering and medicine is that the physical nature o f the engineer' s professiona l produc t immediatel y involves the possibility that th e buye r b e a different perso n fro m th e consumer : i f nothing else, a physical object or a physical arrangement ca n be transmitted to or exchanged wit h consumer s other tha n th e origina l buyer . Th e relatio n betwee n th e technica l devise r an d th e buyer of his services i s typically quite different from tha t which prevails when buyer and consume r ar e fused , an d s o i s the se t o f potential loyalties and responsibilitie s from whic h the technical deviser may have to choose. At the beginning of the industrial revolution , technical devisers wer e eithe r self-employe d a s craftsme n o r manufacturers, o r employed b y government s i n their military apparatus , b y proprietor s of economi c units , or , sometimes , b y collection s of local notables , a s i n the earl y 26

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American public works. Government service, a s wel l a s the fusio n o f entrepreneur ship wit h technica l expertise, reduce d th e chances of potential conflict betwee n re sponsibility t o the buye r or employer and responsibility to the consumer ; however , the increasin g scal e o f the project s undertake n an d th e concentratio n o f means of production progressivel y reduce d th e entrepreneuria l rol e o f engineers; th e possi bility o f conflictin g loyaltie s therefor e tende d t o becom e a norma l ingredien t of the engineer' s wor k situation. The physica l nature o f the produc t als o implie s that i t can b e seen , examined , and copied. The jealous defense of industrial secrets stands to show that these secrets could b e stole n withou t to o muc h difficulty , an d als o tha t expertis e draw n fro m empirical practice is tied to the pace o f change: a rapid rhythm of technological innovation appear s t o guarante e th e technica l deviser' s skill s agains t routinization . S o long as technical expertise did not derive from the methodical application of theory— chiefly physics—t o engineerin g problems, i t was mainl y th e complexit y and scale of a project, as well as the pace of technological change, tha t served to justify claim s of superio r competence . I n America , both forma l engineerin g educatio n an d the oretical wor k lagge d behind Europe—particularly France an d Germany—until lat e in th e nineteent h century . Apprenticeshi p was fo r generation s th e mai n sourc e o f engineering s k i l l : canal s and machin e shops , mines , railroads , and late r the ne w electric, automotive , an d radi o industries , wer e principa l supplier s o f first-rat e engineering talent. Especially in the first phase of industrialization, the gap between workmen and engineers seeme d possible to bridge, as witnessed by the flowering of mechanics institute s and correspondence courses , characterize d b y a stronger commitment t o the ideolog y of open mobilit y than to the diffusio n o f scientific knowledge. I n fact, th e lon g predominanc e o f apprenticeshi p preserve d th e contro l of gentlemanly elites—entrepreneurial , i n mechanica l an d minin g engineering , o r quasi-managerial, i n civil engineering . 32

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This dominan t empirical component i s no t wha t distinguishes engineerin g fro m other American professions. Apprenticeshi p was th e accepted patter n i n most other occupations, includin g medicine and law, during the first hal f of the nineteenth century. Wha t is distinctive is that the averag e engineer emerge d fro m thi s early phase as a salaried professional, i n Europe a s wel l a s i n the Unite d States . Independen t consultation an d entrepreneurship wer e not the typica l mode s o f practice, although elites of the profession exaggerated bot h their significance and their accessibility. In themselves , however , th e dependen t condition s of practice nee d no t hav e intro duced a principle of heteronomy a t the very core of the engineer's role . This heteronomy wa s instea d a consequence of the natur e o f the organization s fo r which th e engineer typicall y worked—tha t is, relatively large-scal e economi c enterprise s i n a capitalist society. Within this context, the function o f the engineer was dual, at once technical and economic. Cost being an inherent criterion of the'' Tightness of the technical solution, " the civi l enginee r wa s expecte d t o advise o n the practicabilit y an d profitability o f new projects, an d sometimes h e was also expected t o engage in promotional activities . In th e Unite d States , afte r th e depressio n o f 1837 , th e mai n attacks o n th e hirin g o f internal-improvement s engineers focuse d o n thei r unreli 34

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able cos t estimate s an d on their defense o f unreasonable expenditures—tha t is , on economic aspect s of their task. Obviously , the engineer s di d not ignor e the fact : in th e 1880s , th e Presiden t o f the America n Society o f Mechanical Engineers de clared: "w e mus t measure all things by the test, will it pay?"\ an d an eminent Columbia professo r candidl y defined engineerin g a s th e "scienc e o f making money for capital." The economic component of the engineer's functio n appear s as a wedge o f' 'otherdirectedness" i n his rol e whic h overrod e th e independenc e h e coul d deriv e fro m technical expertise . O n th e othe r hand , th e economi c componen t als o appear s t o have playe d an indirec t part i n the upgradin g of functions, whic h create d th e engineer's rol e an d hi s possibilitie s of career. Th e assimilatio n of the enginee r t o th e interests o f project sponsor s o r entrepreneurs—and , later , hi s promotio n to managerial or quasi-managerial function s within a bureaucratic context—wer e a crucial difference betwee n th e emergin g rol e o f the enginee r an d "les s gentle " form s of technical devising. Thus fro m th e profession' s formativ e period, even befor e th e giant corporation s became the mai n employers o f engineers, w e fin d a situatio n in which professiona l statu s appear s t o deriv e a s muc h fro m organizationa l mobilit y as fro m technica l expertise. These considerations al l point toward one overridin g characteristic o f the market for engineerin g services , whic h onl y become s mor e dominan t wit h th e standard ization and institutionalization of training; this characteristic is the inherent subordination o f the engineers ' market . In al l circumstances, th e service s o f the specialize d technica l devise r ar e mor e likely t o be mediate d than those of a profession whic h provide s intangible services; the natur e o f the servic e increase s the probabilit y tha t th e relatio n between profes sional and user or consumer (a s distinct from th e buyer or employer of professional services) wil l b e indirect. Thu s eve n whe n th e ultimat e product s o f professiona l work are, indeed, destined for every man (as is the case, in theory, for public works), they are mediated by functionally specific and organized clienteles, whic h are much more frequentl y employers (buyer s o f labor) than client s (buyers o f services). Th e modern engineer rises in the context of industrial capitalism, in which the mediation of technica l devising by specifi c bodie s become s permanent subordinatio n to organized an d increasingl y complex economic enterprises . Thu s i n the lat e nineteent h and earl y twentiet h centuries , America n civi l an d electri c engineerin g societie s developed tentativ e codes of ethics, a s bargainin g assets in potential conflicts wit h their sponsor s o r employers ; th e mechanica l engineerin g association , b y contrast , did no t se e th e nee d fo r a code o f ethics unti l muc h later. Th e intimat e ties o f the mechanical engineering elite with capitalis t entrepreneurs undoubtedl y explain this attitude. Th e reason s give n ar e interesting , however , fo r the y refe r i n fac t t o th e structural difference s betwee n engineerin g an d othe r professions . Th e firs t majo r reason wa s tha t th e buyer s o f engineering service s di d not need specia l protection: " I f ther e was one thing the average American considered himself, it was a mechanic, and as suc h he was qualified t o judge engineering design and correctness." Busi ness clients and employers, moreover , kne w quite wel l wha t they wante d an d how they wante d i t done. I t was argued, furthermore , tha t th e engineer' s work s wer e 35

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checked b y the very laws of nature: whil e "me n i n other professions ma y blunder or play fals e wit h mor e or less impunity . . . th e mistakes o f the engineer ar e quic k to find hi m out and proclaim his incompetence. H e is the one professional ma n who is obliged t o b e r i g h t . " Two factors tha t help an association o f producers maximiz e its effectiveness wer e either weak or absent in the case of engineering. First, the advantage which the seller of professiona l service s ha s ove r the ordinary individual buyer is reduced t o a minimum b y th e engineer' s dependenc e o n knowledgeabl e o r a t leas t powerfu l em ployers o r clients , eve n thoug h thi s advantag e ca n easil y b e use d agains t la y consumers. Second , th e natur e o f the produc t implie s that th e publi c really ca n obtain mor e direc t evidenc e abou t th e professional' s capacit y tha n i n th e cas e of medicine, whil e th e stat e ca n regulat e an d supervis e th e products , rathe r tha n th e producers themselves . B y their nature, th e engineer' s service s an d thei r end products are visible; what removes them from th e public eye is, in fact, the mediation of a "buyer" wh o is distinct from th e "user " an d is, in many cases, a private capitalis t enterprise. N o matte r ho w vigorousl y or successfull y th e engineerin g professio n might have organized t o secure its market an d fac e it s employers, i t could not have controlled it s professional marke t becaus e that marke t wa s inherentl y subordinate . Though strategic fo r industrial growth, the services o f the engineer wer e subordinat e to general considerations o f accounting and business profit. Thus , while the medical market depended, o f course, o n the general increase in standards of living, th e mar ket for engineering service s depende d almos t totally on industrial investment and on the business cycle. In the case of medicine, the power of the profession depended , in theory , o n th e eliminatio n of competitors: monopol y was necessar y i n order t o benefit fro m a n expandin g market . Bu t onc e monopol y o r near-monopol y wa s achieved, th e powe r o f the professio n gre w a s th e marke t secto r unde r it s control expanded. I n a subordinat e professiona l market , monopoly , thoug h important , does not play the same part: it cannot compensate for the ups and downs of the larger market, whic h ma y determin e th e contractio n of the deman d fo r professiona l ser vices. Expansion—tha t is , a balanc e o f suppl y an d deman d favorabl e t o th e pro fession—does no t give a profession lik e engineering controllin g powers, bu t only a better bargainin g position. 39

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Faced wit h a marke t structur e s o unfavorabl e t o monopolisti c claims, engineers should hav e concentrate d o n wha t the y could , afte r a point , control : namely, th e production o f producers, an d i n particular, the advantageou s adjustment o f supply to demand . Here , however , th e professio n ha s face d anothe r difficulty : a s pointe d out, th e various branches of engineering emerged fro m area s of practice whic h ha d not bee n autonomously define d b y th e profession . Th e technica l deviser s i n engineering controlle d new an d rapidl y changing cognitiv e areas; yet, i n practice, thei r fields o f action wer e create d b y processes of economic developmen t i n which th e expert technicia n intervene d eithe r a s entrepreneu r o r i n a subordinat e capacity . The specialists , a s such , di d not decid e wh o would b e take n int o training, no r did they contro l th e principa l rewards . Th e acquisitio n o f theoretica l base s an d th e methodic systematizatio n o f empirical knowledge defeated apprenticeshi p an d gave to educator s thei r usua l leadershi p i n professionalizin g efforts . Bu t eve n thoug h

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the profession ha d gained control over the production of producers, i t had not unifie d its cognitiv e basis, except a t a very general level , nor freed i t from externa l determination. Today , th e attempt s b y th e academi c sector s o f engineerin g t o creat e a common cognitiv e basi s ar e successfull y resiste d b y th e practitioner s an d thei r employers. Thu s despit e th e engineer' s rol e i n definin g ne w knowledg e o r ne w applications o f knowledge , th e essentia l elemen t o f autonom y remain s wea k i n this profession . Th e attempt s t o standardiz e th e "productio n o f producers" inde pendently o f industry' s predefinition s simpl y revea l agai n th e inescapabl e struc tural subordinatio n o f the professiona l market . The "strong " marke t characteristic s o f medicin e wer e no t sufficien t i n them selves t o ensur e monopolisti c control . Cognitive exclusiveness appeare d t o b e th e intervening facto r whic h maximize d the effectivenes s o f each market characteristi c and o f all of them combined . Th e analysi s o f engineering shows , i n turn, that au tonomy i n defining the conten t o f work—or the contro l over new cognitive areas— does no t b y itsel f compensat e fo r th e structura l subordinatio n o f th e professiona l market. Th e subordinatio n o f the engineer' s rol e submit s th e selection o f the tech nical proble m and th e criteri a that ar e brough t t o bear in its solution, at leas t parti ally, t o heteronomou s considerations . Autonom y i s chiefl y gaine d outside th e professional role , b y accedin g t o position s o f comman d o r responsibilit y i n th e dominant market . In th e concludin g words o f Daniel Calhoun's study , th e America n civil enginee r before th e Civi l Wa r appear s alread y a s th e typica l professiona l o f a transitiona l stage, "between a n earlier proprietary society an d an emerging industrial, corporat e society." Tie d t o a peculia r kin d o f business marke t an d t o persisten t entrepre neurial forms , th e elit e o f mechanical engineerin g maintaine d fo r a lon g tim e th e myths o f th e "proprietar y society. " B y th e beginnin g o f th e twentiet h century , however, th e growin g numbers o f mechanical engineers , as wel l a s their colleague s in minin g and , mos t particularly , in the newe r field s of electricity, radio , and auto mobile production, had never know n any othe r conditio n than salarie d employmen t in bureaucrati c organizations . Professionalis m mean t fo r the m tha t a salarie d an d subordinate positio n shoul d b e concede d a s muc h deferenc e an d prestig e a s th e independent professiona l whos e imag e wa s crystallize d i n th e genera l ideology . Their professionalizin g projec t wa s dominated , i n Edwi n T . Layton' s words , b y "an obsessiv e concern fo r social status," an d wa s marke d a s wel l b y specifi c ideo logical attempt s whic h exalte d th e expertise o f thi s dependen t professiona l an d made i t the bas e of a grandios e socia l role. A s th e firs t moder n professiona l t o emerge withi n a large-scal e economi c organization , th e enginee r stand s i n shar p contrast t o th e medica l doctor; hi s profil e als o anticipates late r professiona l forms , in whic h th e "model " provide d by medicin e ma y b e fading . This analysis o f engineering establishes a general an d important point: the subordination of a professional market minimizes the effects of cognitive exclusiveness. It als o suggests which condition s o f knowledge facilitat e the constitutio n of a specific are a of competence. Th e rapidity of change in the cognitive basis is important, for i t prevents th e routinizatio n of technical skills . Th e visibilit y o f a profession' s 42

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accumulated skill s an d achievements , it s "demonstratio n effect " vis-a-vi s th e public a t larg e an d it s specialize d clients , is a poten t resourc e fo r ideological persuasion. Medicine , incidentally , acquired this resource muc h later than engineering: in th e 1840 s th e popula r negative judgment abou t medicin e was influence d by th e tangible achievement s o f physica l science , a s i f the publi c tacitl y aske d "wher e were the medica l equivalents o f the stea m engin e o r the telegraph?" Finally , th e increasingly fir m tie s whic h engineerin g establishe d wit h scientifi c theory magnified th e cumulativ e aspect of engineering's achievement s b y making them a part of general scientifi c knowledge. Thi s gave som e credibilit y t o "th e engineers ' clai m to b e th e agent s of progress an d enlightenment." O n the other hand, th e monopolization o f scientifi c education b y college s an d universitie s mad e th e possessio n of scientifi c training into a crucial element of distinction between professional engineers and mer e technica l devisers . Turning no w to a more systemati c examinatio n of the cognitive basis for professional claim s to market monopoloy , I wil l tr y to sho w no t onl y tha t medicin e wa s favored b y it s market structur e bu t als o tha t i t was exceptionall y well equippe d t o establish it s claim t o cognitive exclusiveness. 44

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THE COGNITIV E CONDITION S O F PROFESSIONAL MONOPOL Y The technica l an d cognitiv e conditions fo r th e emergenc e o f professio n ar e s o abundantly treated by the sociological literature that I will indicat e only those factors which, i n my framework of analysis, facilitat e market control an d standardization . Wilensky observe s that " i f th e technica l base of an occupatio n consists o f a vocabulary that sounds familiar t o everyone (socia l science an d the arts of administration) or i f the base is scientific, bu t so narrow that it can be learned a s a set of rules by mos t people, then the occupation will have difficulty claimin g a monopoly of skill or eve n a roughl y exclusive jurisdiction." Bu t even a body o f knowledge that i s both esoteri c an d theoretical—an d therefor e difficul t t o routinize—i s stil l no t a sufficient conditio n fo r the contro l of a competitive market. Take , fo r instance, th e case of the Protestan t ministr y i n America: despite th e undeniabl e existenc e o f an esoteric body of theological knowledge , and despite th e rise of separate seminarie s from 178 4 on , th e establishe d denomination s coul d no t protec t themselve s fro m the challenge s o f th e evangelis t movement . Similarly , th e la w wa s no t protecte d from outsider s unti l th e institutionalizatio n o f forma l teachin g an d qualifyin g ba r examinations. I hav e suggeste d tha t th e "best " cognitiv e basis for a monopoly of competenc e is on e whic h reveals , o r activates , o r maximize s th e favorabl e characteristic s o f a professional market . I t must be specific enough to impart distinctiveness to the professional "commodity" ; it must be formalized or codified enoug h to allow standard ization o f th e "product"—whic h means, ultimately , standardizatio n o f th e pro ducers. An d yet it must not be s o clearly codified tha t it does not allow a principle of exclusio n t o operate : wher e everyon e ca n clai m t o b e a n expert , ther e i s n o expertise. 46

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I hav e also indicate d that change in the cognitive basis is a necessary component , for i t prevents excessiv e routinizatio n an d therefore maintain s the relativ e inaccessi bility of expertise. A t the same time, change must not be so rapid nor so fragmentar y that it forecloses th e possibility of socializing the aspirin g experts int o a unified an d unifying body o f knowledge. Furthermore , change , t o b e legitimate , must b e per ceived a s progress . Wer e i t no t so , i t coul d (an d ultimatel y would) b e perceive d simply a s th e deliberat e manufactur e o f pseudo-expertise , a devic e fo r excluding the non-initiated. These consideration s poin t i n the directio n of a type o f cognitive activity whic h is esoteric, ye t formalized and standardize d enoug h t o be, i n principle, accessibl e to all wh o woul d underg o prolonge d training . Thi s activit y i s also characterize d b y a tendency t o cognitiv e consensus amon g it s practitioners ; it s product s resul t eithe r from period s of continuous cumulative growth or from discontinuous , revolutionary changes i n the consensua l norm s tha t defin e th e goal s an d th e form s o f cognition. In an y case , bot h th e cumulativ e an d th e qualitativel y discontinuous achievement s are recognize d a s progress . This cognitive activity is science. I n Thoma s Kuhn' s words, "W e ten d t o se e a s scienc e any field in which progress is marked. . . . I f we doubt , a s man y do , tha t non-scientifi c field s mak e progress , tha t canno t b e because individual school s mak e none . Rather , i t must b e because there ar e alway s competing schools , eac h of which constantl y question s th e very foundations o f the others". The sociologica l content of Kuhn's approach t o a scientific production is relevant for the analysis of professions. A n apparent tautology , which needs to be explained, sums up a central part of his interpretation: science is inseparable fro m a perception of progres s because it is the exclusive product of specialized communitie s of scientists. Th e perceptio n o f progress presuppose s a tacit acceptanc e of what problem s are wort h solvin g or wha t goal s ar e wort h reaching . Scientifi c communities, says Kuhn, ar e characterize d b y sets of shared taci t understandings , whic h h e call s scientific paradigms . A paradigm is not an abstract syste m of explicit rules, but a practice, accessibl e throug h a lon g proces s o f socialization . Th e guideline s o f thi s practice ar e embodie d i n concrete example s o f successful scientifi c inquiry, whic h include "law , theory , application , and instrumentatio n together," an d ar e learne d by replication . These examples ar e "concret e puzzle-solutions " whic h contai n th e promise tha t al l the remainin g problems propose d withi n a paradigm can , indeed , be solved. Because their shared definition s of reality are based on relatively uniform and standardize d practices , scientist s wor k towar d an d reac h cumulativ e results : normal scienc e consists o f converging attempts t o solv e th e sam e puzzles, t o elab orate, articulate , an d adjus t th e sam e paradigm. Matur e scientific communities ar e thus distinguishe d b y a structura l tendency t o paradigmati c unification , whic h ex cludes those who engage in a different practice and therefore have different standards of wha t i s relevan t an d differen t perception s o f what constitute s progress . Because scientist s ar e th e onl y producer s o f science, th e la y public has n o othe r choice bu t t o accept , without sharing them, thei r definition s of scientifi c practic e and scientifi c progress . Scientifi c communities ca n defin e autonomousl y th e stan dards of correct practice. Their exceptional autonomy and singular degree of integra48

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tion hav e a sociologica l condition : "th e unparallele d insulatio n . . . fro m th e demands of the lait y an d of everyday life " whic h Wester n societie s hav e concede d them. A s Kuhn observes , "Jus t because he i s working onl y fo r an audienc e o f colleagues, an audienc e tha t share s his own values an d beliefs, the scientis t can tak e a single se t o f standards for granted." Thus, a t th e limit , scientifi c communitie s ar e thei r ow n market : scientist s ar e simultaneously th e producer s an d th e mai n consumer s o f their products . Becaus e their practic e i s relativel y independen t fro m al l externa l factor s excep t financia l sponsorship, i t appears t o b e solel y determined b y the stat e of each discipline and by it s internal tradition o f research. I f cognitive consensus breaks down, the auton omy and insulation of the scientific professions facilitate s the resolution of the crisis, that is , the strivin g toward reintegration of an area of work unde r ne w paradigmati c standards. Th e tas k o f persuasion i s arduous, bu t limited , nevertheless , t o a very narrow communit y which share s a life commitmen t and basic norms of interaction. For Kuhn, persuasio n canno t supplan t th e "ac t o f faith" whic h is, ultimately, a t the heart o f a "paradig m switch. " But in this too, th e scientifi c communities have an advantage: becaus e o f thei r autonom y an d insulation , they ca n afford t o convert , even i f th e new paradigm is only "a t th e start, largel y a promise of success discoverable i n selected an d stil l incomplet e examples." By definition , th e consulting professions d o not have such freedom. Thei r market is an open market , i n the sense that i t necessarily include s a lay clientele, no matte r how specialize d an d organized i t may be. Becaus e the consulting professions "sur vive by providing to a varied lay clientele services tha t are expected t o solve practical problems," eve n thei r most scientifi c sectors depend o n practical, external considerations. Th e inquirer s in the field s of applied (o r applicable) science do no t ad dress themselves t o "puzzles" pose d b y the internal evolution of a paradigm, nor do they concentrat e o n 'insoluble ' anomalies . Th e sociologis t of science Joseph BenDavid observes: "For the professional physiologist and pathologist seeking to understand bodil y functions in physical and chemical terms, the statistical inquiry of Ignaz Semmelweis int o th e etiolog y o f puerpera l feve r mad e n o theoretica l sense . And initially, th e sam e applie d t o th e discover y b y Pasteu r an d other s o f the bacteria l causation o f illness." For these fields which receive their problems fro m everyda y life , Ben-Davi d proposes the name of "quasi-disciplines." B y definition, the y cannot attai n the insulation whic h characterize s scientifi c communities . Furthermore , th e practitioner s who carry the results o f "quasi-disciplinary" research into everyday practic e tacitl y evaluate a new technology of work in terms of its market potential. The paradigmatic standards under which the research has been conducted are not important, if it s practical effects ar e demonstrabl y valid . Thu s i n his study of nineteenth-century Ameri can physicians , Willia m Rothstei n convincingl y argues tha t th e conflic t betwee n medical sect s hinge d o n th e effect s o f differen t therapies , an d no t o n theoretica l incompatibilities betwee n systems . Wher e therapie s wer e demonstrabl y valid—a s was th e cas e wit h smallpo x vaccinatio n o r th e quinin e cur e o f malaria—al l th e medical sect s adopted them. The significant differences betwee n pur e scientific disciplines and quasi-disciplines 50

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cannot b e ignored . The problem , however, i s to discer n ho w a scientific basis can be a n advantag e t o a professio n i n it s attempt s t o secur e marke t control . Leaving aside th e obvious—th e superiorit y o f th e scientifi c metho d ove r prescientifi c ap proaches for knowing and masterin g physica l aspects of reality—a scientific basis appears t o offe r th e bes t potentia l fo r th e unifie d an d standardize d productio n of professional producers. Afte r all , quasi-disciplines als o follo w scientifi c method s and tend , themselves , towar d paradigmati c unification—thei r practice and , t o a much lesser extent, th e us e o f their products, requir e a broad scientifi c basis. What professions obtai n fro m thi s basic trainin g in pure scienc e has n o immediate bear ing upo n thei r practice ; bu t th e passag e throug h broa d scientifi c trainin g puts th e future professional s throug h on e firs t phas e o f effectiv e unificatio n an d standard ization. Also , a s i n any othe r case, longer training periods complet e o r perfect thi s standardization b y selectivit y an d b y deepenin g th e effect s o f socialization . N o less importantly , basic scientifi c trainin g provides a clea r principl e of separatio n from th e exclusio n o f th e "non-standardized, " empiricall y trained professionals . For instance, i n the 1870s , whe n American engineering programs wer e not yet producing the majority o f American engineers, th e teaching of mathematics—a subjec t which the shop s could not teach—had alread y opene d a growing cleavage betwee n shop-trained professional s an d school graduates. Th e understandably heate d argu ments o f th e shop-me n an d othe r defender s o f practica l skill s agains t wha t the y saw a s a n exclusiv e an d practicall y useless emphasis o n mathematic s canno t hid e that the y ha d alread y los t th e battle . The sociologica l center o f the process of unification i s the syste m fo r the produc tion of producers. Th e broad scientific moorings of the "quasi-disciplines " require, as Abraham Flexner pointed out for medicine, affiliation wit h the modern university. At th e sam e time , thes e scientifi c base s qualify a professio n fo r affiliatio n mor e readily than an y other , i n a world wher e scienc e is the cardinal system o f cognitive validation an d legitimation . Entr y int o th e universit y give s an y professio n a cor e of educators ; becaus e o f th e university' s apparen t universalis m an d independenc e from la y demands an d privat e interests , thes e educators ar e i n the bes t position to defend the universalistic guarantees of professional competence an d to legitimize the professionals' clai m of autonomy an d monopoly. As professionals themselves , the y are intereste d i n the marke t i n which thei r products—the graduates—wil l have to secure income and status. In the modern university, which centralizes the production of knowledge as well as that of producers, scientific educator s control and produce a constantly changin g bod y o f knowledge . Th e cumulativ e change characteristi c o f normal scienc e makes the passage of aspiring professionals throug h the center s for the standardize d productio n of producers compulsory, no t only because of a legislative fia t bu t "naturally, " because these centers monopolize new knowledge . Law yers an d architects, fo r instance, produc e professionall y relevant new knowledge in their practice ; bu t th e bul k o f relevan t ne w knowledg e i n medicine , optometry , engineering, an d the lik e i s produced b y research. Changes in the cognitive basis of professional practic e n o longe r appear arbitrary, but are determine d b y the internal logic o f scientific inquir y an d ar e legitimized as progress. 56

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This effec t ca n b e graspe d b y illustratin g it s opposite— a deliberat e attemp t t o change a technology of work i n order to give an advantage , amon g other things, to the standardize d product s o f formal schooling . From the 1880 s on , American engineering educator s ha d advocate d th e adoptio n o f th e metri c system . Unlik e th e manufacturers, the y ha d nothin g to los e fro m suc h a switch ; quit e th e contrary . As th e historia n Monte Calver t remarks: "Wha t coul d b e mor e o f a boos t t o th e status of the college-traine d engineer tha n fo r him to possess a new an d arbitraril y determined syste m o f measurement? Wha t could bette r assur e his ascendancy over the bo y fro m th e shop ? Knowledge of the metri c system coul d become , lik e calculus, a badg e o f th e formall y trained." Metri c conversio n coul d mak e comple x calculations immediatel y accessible t o the averag e technica l school graduate , thu s destroying one of the few advantages that experience gave to those trained on the job. But the arbitrariness of the change denied legitimacy to the educators an d graduates ' stance, which was of course ardentl y opposed b y the engineering-entrepreneurs an d their allies. In sum , th e tendenc y towar d paradigmati c unification—inheren t i n scientifi c communities an d determine d i n large par t b y thei r insulation—i s extended t o th e consulting professions whe n they connect themselves wit h a "quasi-discipline" and with th e quasi-monopolistic center fo r the production of new knowledge—namely, the moder n university . A profession' s capacit y fo r standardizin g trainin g an d re search withi n the confines of normal science an d for excluding competing paradigms is not only greatly augmented b y its connection with science ; i t is also given the ulti mate legitimatio n o f a n objective , independent , incontrovertibl y mor e effectiv e inquiry, whic h open s u p th e possibilit y o f unlimited progress . The evolutio n o f medicine concretely an d exactly illustrates the impac t of a sci entific foundatio n on a professional field . Th e "pre-paradigmatic " situatio n lasted for mos t o f the nineteent h century . Attempt s by "regular " physician s t o unif y th e profession tende d t o tak e th e for m o f arbitrar y exclusiv e practice s agains t othe r practitioners. I n the Unite d States , wher e th e near-tota l freedo m o f the marke t had encouraged proliferation , physician s attempte d t o institutionaliz e one particula r orthodoxy by founding schools, in both the physical and the intellectual sense. "The United State s and Canada," wrot e Flexner in 1910, "have i n little more than a century produce d 45 7 medica l schools , many , o f course, short-lived , and perhap s 5 0 still-born; 15 5 surviv e today." Unti l th e foundatio n of the John s Hopkin s graduate schoo l o f medicine i n 1893 , Americ a had n o trainin g cente r tha t coul d eve n remotely b e compare d t o thos e i n Germany, o r eve n i n Paris o r Edinburgh. For a long time , externa l consideration s wer e give n mor e weigh t than unsupporte d an d unsystematic "scientific " convictions—a s shown , fo r instance , b y th e clas h be tween contagionists an d anticontagionists (the latter strenuously supporte d b y commercial interest s oppose d t o quarantine ) ove r ho w t o dea l wit h th e epidemic s o f yellow feve r an d choler a durin g the firs t decade s of the nineteent h century. This situation wa s obviousl y not unique to the Unite d States . In Europe, however , insti tutional affiliation—wit h hospitals , i n England an d France ; wit h researc h institu tions connected wit h universities , as wa s ofte n th e case in Germany; or i n conflic t 57

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with the academy , a s happene d i n France—had give n a potent weapo n to groups of scientifically oriented physicians and scientists interested in medical problems. These organizational nucle i gave both continuity and coordinatio n to the attack s o n tradi tional medicine, while providing the researchers with the situation of relative insulation necessary for autonomous scientifi c production. By the middle of the nineteenth century, write s the historia n of medicine Richar d Shryock , " a monisti c pathology and a related therapeutics wer e no longer tolerated in regular medicine . . . medicin e had com e o f scientific age." Clinical an d pathologica l studie s ha d bee n coordinated ; physiolog y ha d bee n established o n a firm scientifi c footing by Claude Bernard in Paris and by Helmholtz's group in Berlin; the numerical method inaugurated b y Pierre Louis in the 1830 s ha d laid th e ground s fo r modern medical statistics an d large-scale investigation s in matters o f public health; ne w drug s an d ne w instruments , heretofor e unused , suc h a s the achromati c microscope , ha d bee n incorporate d int o practice o r research , whil e the threa t o f epidemics ha d le d t o grea t development s i n the administrativ e infra structure concerne d wit h publi c health. Th e stag e was se t fo r the incorporatio n of the bacteriologica l discoveries begu n i n the 1870s . Th e research branch o f modem medicine was approachin g paradigmati c unificatio n b y that time, even though practice lagge d fa r behind . One significan t example o f thi s unificatio n i s th e cas e o f th e Viennes e docto r Rokitansky, wh o ha d bee n on e o f th e foremos t representative s o f the Frenc h sci entific approac h t o medica l problems . Despit e thi s background , h e ende d up , inexplicably, wit h a speculativ e theor y o f humoral pathology—a clea r regressio n t o the monisti c system s of the past . Shryoc k observes that a mere fift y year s earlier , Rokitansky's fam e woul d hav e suffice d t o foun d anothe r schoo l o n hi s theoretica l system. Bu t in the 1850s , the young Rudolf Virchow , who was stil l an obscure path ologist, examine d th e theory , foun d i t a "monstruou s anachronism " an d i t wa s abandoned, eve n b y the autho r himself . "Ther e wa s i n fact n o other choice, " say s Shryock, "unles s he wished to take bot h himself an d his theory withou t the pal e of the medica l profession." The emergence of shared criteri a of validity an d reliabilit y withi n a sector o f the medical professio n constitute d a majo r advanc e towar d control of the market . B y unifying it s cognitive basis, medicin e wa s emancipatin g itsel f fro m th e suppor t of its sponsoring elites. I t had also acquire d th e instrument s necessar y for standardiza tion o f th e service s i t provided ; an d standardizatio n tie d ever y transactio n t o th e superiority, soo n t o b e definitivel y proved , o f th e scientifi c medica l "product. " In Freidson' s words , th e accomplishment s o f moder n surger y and , i n particular, modern bacteriolog y "create d a qualitativ e brea k wit h th e past , makin g possibl e for th e firs t tim e the predictabl e an d reliabl e control of a wide spectrum o f human ills by virtually an y well-trained practitioner of the occupation, not solely by a grea t clinician." Both the internal and external preconditions for market control had been achieved. Internally, medicin e had found independent mean s to put its house in order. A s the example o f Rokitansky shows, th e charismati c clinicia n wa s n o longe r immun e t o challenge b y comparativel y obscur e colleagues : bot h leader s an d rank-and-fil e 60

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member of the profession were subjected to the tacit rule of accepted an d transcenden t cognitive norms . Externally , medicin e ha d acquire d independen t means—mean s autonomously elaborate d withi n th e profession—o f convincin g both governmen t and th e publi c o f it s superio r therapeuti c effectiveness . Th e triump h o f scientific medicine marke d th e en d o f medical sectarianism . I n the Unite d States , fro m th e mid-1870s on , the state s reinstituted licensing, entrusting it this time to those medical school s whic h wer e provin g capable o f producin g th e ne w bree d o f medical practitioners. What wa s stil l needed , i n fact , t o reac h th e powe r an d scientifi c capabilit y of today's medicin e wa s th e thoroug h modernizatio n of training in schools an d hos pitals. This process was the most rapid and complete in the United States—perhaps, as Shryoc k suggests , becaus e previou s effort s a t medica l refor m ha d faile d an d modern center s fo r the productio n of producers ha d t o be create d practicall y fro m scratch. Th e influenc e o f th e 191 0 Flexne r Repor t o n Medica l Education helpe d concentrate medica l trainin g in a fe w center s (Flexne r ha d recommende d 31 , out of th e existin g 155) , an d i t transformed mos t medica l school s i n a singl e decade. In a paralle l development, fro m 191 3 o n th e majo r hospital s bega n t o modernize , in larg e part a s a result of the America n College of Surgeons' polic y o f approval or disapproval of existing facilities. Fro m a backward an d provincia l state , American medicine, afte r th e "bacteriologica l revolution," started o n it s wa y t o practically unparalleled professiona l power . We nee d no t enter her e into the factor s tha t gav e American medicine a n amoun t of corporat e powe r apparentl y unmatche d i n other societies ; medicin e i s a n excep tionally powerfu l professio n everywhere , an d I want t o emphasize th e exceptional character of medicine's professional success. Medicin e alon e entere d a marke t which, for a long time and in most places, approache d th e ideal conditions for attainment o f monopoly , wit h a scientifi c produc t t o sell . N o othe r " o l d " professio n serving unspecialized an d unorganized clienteles had, at the same time, a potentially limitless market an d a n organic connectio n wit h scienc e and scientifi c technologie s of work . Freidson's vie w tha t medicine, because of its preeminence amon g al l other occupations, "ha s com e to be the prototype upon which occupations seekin g a privileged status today are modelling their aspirations," need s to be examined in the light of the preceding analysis. I n th e firs t place , th e mode l provide d by medicin e appear s impossible t o duplicate , becaus e th e marke t condition s facin g th e "new " profes sions ar e markedl y different fro m thos e encountered b y medicine a t th e en d o f the last century . Secondly , Freidso n himsel f suggest s a criterio n o f profession whic h adds another dimensio n t o medicine' s exceptionalism . H e argues , i n fact, tha t th e status of profession i s relative to that of other occupations an d inseparable fro m thei r subordination to professional dominanc e i n a structured work setting. He proceeds to sho w tha t physician s defin e th e content o f practice an d even the content o f training fo r a host of allied an d highl y skille d occupations , suc h a s nurses , anesthetists, therapists, laborator y technicians , radiologists , chiropractors , an d th e like . Now , all professions—and perhap s all specialized occupations—gai n wha t E. C. Hughe s calls the powe r to "delegat e dirt y w o r k . " Bu t it is difficul t t o fin d a profession , 63

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other tha n medicine , tha t dominate s a rol e se t constitute d i n large par t b y highl y skilled an d highl y prize d occupations, ofte n regarde d themselve s a s profession s b y their member s an d b y th e public . Indeed , wit h th e questionabl e exceptio n o f th e military, n o professio n excep t medicin e controls a complex organization suc h a s the modern hospital, which by virtue of its advanced bureaucrati c an d technological base continuously spawns new an d highl y skille d specializations . In othe r part s o f his work , Freidso n analyze s professional autonom y a s founde d not on dominance i n an area of the division of labor, but on control over the technical content o f work . Bu t doe s no t ever y specialize d occupatio n involvin g som e skil l command "th e exclusiv e competence t o determine th e prope r an d effective metho d of performin g some task?" Ther e i s no better supportin g evidence tha n th e help lessness most o f us fee l i n dealing wit h plumber s o r aut o mechanics . Professions , however, ar e grante d th e powe r t o determine th e scope of the service. Despit e th e increasing specializatio n of all professions, w e giv e professionals, howeve r reluctantly, muc h broade r discretionar y power s tha n w e giv e a craftsman . Wh o woul d take at his word a mechanic wh o recommends a valve job when he is asked to change the oil ? Yet , man y peopl e fin d themselve s incapabl e o f resistin g a surgeo n wh o recommends a n operation , o r a lawye r wh o advise s agains t goin g t o court. A s Freidson brilliantl y show s i n th e cas e o f medicine , a profession , " i n developing its own 'professional ' approac h . . . changes the definitio n an d shap e of problems as experience d an d interprete d b y th e laymen." This discretionar y power , whic h goe s fa r beyon d mer e technica l autonomy , derives fro m monopoly : a monopoly of competence legitimize d b y officiall y sanc tioned "expertise, " an d a monopoly of credibility wit h th e public . Of the two , the first i s mor e important : i t leaves th e publi c withou t lega l o r credibl e alternatives , and it restricts the control by outside agencie s over the actua l ethicality of the trans action o f professional services . I hav e analyze d th e emergenc e of the professiona l mode l i n the libera l phas e of capitalism as the outcome of a project tending toward market control. The autonomy of techniqu e i s a central elemen t i n the negotiatio n of cognitive exclusiveness, bu t it is only one element in a structure whic h comprise s bot h the profession' s marke t and th e profession' s resource s fo r marke t control . In order t o understan d ho w th e autonomy of technique extends into other areas and comes to function a s a principle of exclusio n an d a mark o f distinction, i t must b e see n i n the contex t o f a profes sion's effort s t o achiev e marke t monopoly . W e ar e back , therefore , t o th e uniqu e combination o f advantages which medicin e enjoye d i n this regard . This singularit y of medicine is important. For, indeed , to choose it as a n occupa tional model when neither the advantages of its market structure, no r in many cases the advantage s of its cognitive basis, ca n b e reproduced , i n an ideological choice . As such , i t suggests the genera l ideologica l functions o f the professiona l model . I can onl y argu e here tha t autonom y o f technique i s inseparabl e fro m th e privileges on whic h i t is founded an d into which i t extends; an d if it is true that medicine provides th e standar d mode l o f professionalization , i t i s becaus e o f those ver y privi leges, whic h fo r other occupation s represen t the priz e a t th e en d o f the road . There i s one fina l aspec t which makes medicine distinct: in a secularized society , medicine serves the most directly the "sacred " value of life. O f all the professions , 66

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it appear s to have the stronges t claim s to an ideal of service an d devotion to human welfare. Thi s vie w i s widespread . I t constitutes a massiv e capita l o f socia l credit on whic h medicin e draws . Thi s capital was accumulated , i n part, b y actua l result s and by the activ e participation of some sectors of the profession i n the public health movements o f thi s centur y an d th e last . However , i f such a generalize d imag e i s used i n justification o f a market monopoly, it becomes a double-edged sword : when people ar e motivate d t o see k a physician' s service s becaus e the y believ e onl y a physician can help them, and when they also believ e that they have a right to health care, th e implici t contradictio n between servic e functio n an d marke t structur e be comes very clear. A s one autho r remarks , "Doctor s have convinced the publi c that they alone are competent t o give good medical care, bu t then are unwillin g or unable to mak e goo d o n the expectation s the y create." The universality of the need i t serves gave medicine unique advantages in its quest for market monopoloy. It also made it into one of the principal diffusors of the stereotyped imag e o f professio n amon g th e public . Th e contradictio n between th e us e value and the market value of the service renders the profession o f medicine particularly vulnerable to challenge, i f ever the lay clienteles coul d overcome thei r characteristic atomizatio n an d attac k medicine' s corporat e powe r politically , wit h th e strength of a social movement. This potential for challenge is particularly significant today: th e general demystificatio n of the professiona l mode l and o f its ideological functions may, indeed, begin with the attack on the archetypal profession of medicine. 69

Chapter 4

STANDARDIZATION O F KNOWLEDGE AN D MARKE T CONTRO L

The structur e o f th e professionalizatio n proces s bind s togethe r tw o element s which can, an d usually did, evolve independently o f each other: a body of relatively abstract knowledge , susceptibl e o f practical application, and a market—the struc ture o f whic h i s determine d b y economi c an d socia l developmen t an d als o b y th e dominant ideologica l climate a t a given time. The standardizatio n o r codificatio n o f professiona l knowledg e i s th e basi s o n which a professiona l "commodity " can b e mad e distinc t an d recognizabl e t o th e potential publics. This effect i s never direct, but mediated by the process of training: cognitive standardizatio n allow s a measur e o f uniformit y an d homogeneit y i n th e "production o f producers. " Cognitiv e commonality, howeve r minimal , i s indis pensable i f professionals ar e t o coalesce int o an effectiv e group . What make s the codificatio n o f knowledge s o importan t fro m th e poin t of view of th e professiona l projec t i s tha t i t depersonalize s th e idea s hel d abou t profes sional practic e an d it s products . I t sets u p a transcenden t cognitiv e and normativ e framework withi n which , ideally , differences i n the interpretatio n o f practice an d in th e definitio n o f the "commodity " can b e reconciled . Th e formalizatio n of the cognitive bas e of a profession ha s a powerful effec t o n professional unificatio n be cause i t allow s a deepe r an d mor e thoroug h standardizatio n o f th e productio n of producers tha n woul d otherwis e b e possible . Le t m e briefl y examin e th e reason s for this . The conditio n for the unificatio n o f a professional are a is , obviously , that ther e be a group of professionals read y t o champion the propagatio n of one "paradigm, " and tha t thi s grou p hav e enoug h persuasiv e o r coerciv e powe r t o carr y th e tas k through. Th e tas k i s immensel y easie r whe n knowledg e i s depersonalize d b y for malization, fo r al l depersonalized knowledg e tend s t o becom e objectified , i f not "objective." Thi s mean s tha t th e validit y o f this knowledg e appear s t o transcen d the particula r circumstances an d subjectiv e preference s o f the group s tha t produc e it (o r reproduce it , b y use o r transmission). The more formalized the cognitive basis, the mor e th e profession' s languag e an d knowledg e appea r t o b e connotation-fre e and "objective. " Henc e th e superiorit y of a scientific basi s for professional unifi cation: a s pointe d ou t i n th e precedin g chapter , i t no t onl y produce s a mor e for -

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malized languag e bu t als o link s a professio n t o th e dominan t syste m o f cognitive legitimation. A scientifi c basis stamps the professiona l himsel f with th e legitimacy of a general bod y of knowledge an d a mode o f cognition, the epistemological superiority o f whic h i s take n fo r grante d i n our society . Th e connectio n wit h superio r cognitive rationalit y appears to establish th e superiorit y of one professiona l "com modity" independently o f the interest s an d specifi c powe r of the grou p or coalition which advocate s thi s definition . Th e monopolisti c professiona l projec t i s legiti mized, therefore , b y th e appearanc e of neutrality. The argumen t u p t o no w implie s a n assumptio n o f linea r cumulativ e advanc e toward th e objectiv e an d ideologica l advantage s whic h deriv e fro m standardize d knowledge an d cognitiv e rationalization. This assumptio n ca n b e dispelle d by considering th e interna l dynamic s o f cognitiv e unification , an d th e changin g tensio n between standardize d knowledg e an d element s of professional practic e whic h can not b e reduce d t o averag e or standar d form . From it s beginning, th e professiona l projec t o f organization fo r a market neces sarily involves attempts t o formaliz e a body o f knowledge. Howeve r standardized , knowledge is applied by individual professional producers ; i t is therefore inseparabl e from th e cognitiv e makeup an d whol e personality o f these individuals. This implies three things : first , th e socia l characteristic s whic h professional s shar e a t a give n time wil l influenc e th e exten t an d th e directio n o f standardization , fo r the y wil l be relate d t o th e criteri a of exclusion an d inclusio n articulated b y a particula r professional group . Second , th e grou p o f producer s wh o take s th e leadershi p o f th e professional projec t wil l define , a s well , th e area s tha t ar e no t amenabl e t o stan dardization; the y wil l define , tha t is , th e plac e o f unique individua l geniu s an d th e criteria o f talent "tha t canno t b e taught. " Third , th e plac e o f individual talent , o r personal charisma , i n th e practic e o f a vocation , wil l chang e durin g th e proces s of unificatio n o f a profession. Nontransferabl e skill s an d individua l geniu s appea r to b e linke d t o cognitiv e indetermination (or , i n othe r words , t o wha t canno t b e standardized i n the cognitiv e basis an d i n the practic e o f a profession) . In a brillian t analysi s o f Frenc h medicine , th e sociologist s H . Jamou s an d B . Peloille propos e a n interestin g cognitiv e definitio n o f profession . Whil e an y pro ductive activity implie s a measure of indetermination, professions ar e "occupation s . . . whos e indetermination/technicalit y ratio, intrinsic to the systems of production, is generally h i g h . " While technicalit y represents the "mean s that ca n b e mastere d and communicate d i n th e form s o f rules, " indeterminatio n cover s thos e "mean s that escape rules and , a t a given historical moment, ar e attribute d to the virtualities of th e producers." Becaus e indeterminatio n allow s secrecy, contro l over produc tive skills tends to remain in the hands of individual masters, who can therefore pic k and choos e th e apprentice s wit h who m they ar e willin g t o shar e their secrets . Co hesion amon g th e producer s comes , essentially , fro m th e corporat e defens e o f privileges rooted i n the monopol y of "secret" skill s and fro m th e cultura l traditio n generated b y th e socia l structure s o f corporate defense . Such , roughly , i s th e pat tern o f the guild. In term s o f Jamous and Peloille' s analysis , th e dialectic s o f indetermination and codification ar e a central dimensio n o f work. Inherent i n every productiv e activit y 1

2

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is a tendenc y t o codif y an d rationaliz e production . I n th e analytica l framework I have proposed , th e structura l nee d fo r suc h rationalizatio n in a professiona l are a of productio n is both revealed an d maximized by orientation to a market of services. The necessity o f rationalization an d standardizatio n is , in fact, on e o f the trait s that distinguishes th e moder n guild-lik e profession s fro m thei r ancien regime predeces sors. Bot h historicall y and logically , standardizatio n appear s to hav e a democrati c potential: because it reduces the margi n of indetermination and secrecy , standardi zation broadens the possibilities of access to a body of technical and cognitive skills. It tends, therefore , t o be advocated b y those who are excluded from th e occupational privileges based o n secrecy. Such was th e case of the Frenc h clinicians who, in the wake of the 178 9 Revolution, dethrone d th e medica l guild s and th e healin g orders fro m th e hospitals . Les s than a century later , the y wer e themselve s confronte d wit h th e ris e of bacteriology. To this , th e clinica l establishmen t responde d b y accentuatin g indeterminatio n and by equatin g professiona l excellenc e wit h virtualitie s which the y alon e claime d t o possess and the y alon e coul d recognize an d judge: to the ne w scientifi c medicine, they oppose d th e irreplaceabl e rol e o f "bedsid e experience " an d th e subjectivit y which "real " medicin e demands. Jamou s and Peloill e argue that thi s is a genera l and even recurrent pattern in the history of occupations an d that it generally involves three partiall y overlappin g phases: 4

In th e first , bot h th e professiona l ideolog y pu t out b y th e dominan t member s an d the struggles develo p aroun d th e condition s governin g th e existence , i n th e activit y i n question, o f scientifi c rationalit y o r transferable techniques . I n the second , i t i s th e role played by the latter , a s the mean s o f attainin g the results, whic h is saturate d with ideology an d which i s a t th e cente r o f eac h confrontation . Finally , i n th e third , i t i s the socia l functio n o f th e activit y an d o f productio n whic h become s primaril y the object o f conflic t an d of ideologica l rationalizations. 5

Without endorsing th e arbitrar y division int o phases, which i t may be difficul t t o generalize, th e firs t tw o appea r t o coincid e wit h Kuhn' s pre-paradigmati c stage : the dynamic s o f paradig m competitio n generate unificatio n effort s an d narro w a field b y limiting the alternative definitions that can be given of i t . I t is at this point of cognitiv e unificatio n tha t th e dialectic s o f indeterminatio n an d standardizatio n become visible , a s th e expressio n o f internal conflicts for contro l of the organiza tional projec t an d o f the professiona l market . Th e phas e of professional organiza tion i n whic h standardizatio n become s a centra l issu e obviousl y implie s tha t a measure o f cognitiv e commonalit y ha s alread y bee n achieve d withi n eac h con flicting group . I t also implie s that organizationa l bases already exist . Indeed, i f commonalit y o f cognitiv e understanding s amon g th e professiona l producers i s envisaged a s a continuum, extreme cognitiv e disunity, at one end , ca n only reinforc e itself : the appearanc e o f original talent s an d ne w interpretation s of the fiel d would , indeed , multipl y disparate personalit y cults. With a n organizational base, however , persona l following s ca n becom e institutionalize d into "schools, " while the visibility, centrality, and resources of the organization determine the influ ence o f individua l genius. Suc h appear s t o hav e bee n th e cas e o f medica l "mar ginals" suc h a s Si r Astle y Cooper a t St . Guys , Pierr e Louis , Francoi s Magendie , 6

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and Claud e Bernar d i n the Parisia n hospitals , Loui s Pasteur i n hi s laboratory , o r Johannes Muller an d Car l Ludwi g i n the Germa n researc h institutes. The cas e analyze d b y Jamou s an d Peloille , however, suggest s a n analog y wit h Kuhn's stag e of "paradigm confrontation " precisely because it is an extreme case: the rationalizatio n inheren t i n th e "bacteriologica l revolution " involve d a vie w of medicin e whic h negate d th e dominan t rol e o f th e clinicians . A s Jamou s an d Peloille poin t out, "th e affirmatio n o f an essentially clinica l definitio n o f medicine . . . ha s th e functio n o f delaying a s lon g as possibl e thi s differentiatio n [between theoretical an d practica l medicine] whic h tend s to tur n th e clinica l docto r int o on e who simpl y applies medica l knowledge." Resolution of the conflic t require d what was, i n fact, a true cou p d e forc e o f the government : th e 195 3 Debr e Reform , en acted "fro m above " wit h la y participation. Indeed, wha t mad e the conflic t s o dee p in the cas e of French medicin e wa s th e coincidence betwee n a paradigmatic chang e an d a clearcut situatio n of power: fo r a long time the clinician s controlled all the strategi c position s in the Facult y and in the hospitals, whil e the biologists were either subordinates o n their staffs, relatively marginal academics , o r researcher s "outsid e th e circuit " i n a fe w independen t institutes. In America , the effect s o f the "bacteriologica l revolution" wer e different : they could onl y be appropriated an d utilize d fo r professional superiorit y by the few medical school s whic h ha d th e means—tha t is , th e mone y fo r full-tim e faculties , lab oratories, libraries , and teaching hospitals—an d th e imag e of devotion to the public welfare whic h alon e coul d justify philanthropi c or, late r on , governmenta l invest ments. Scientifi c medicine di d not threate n a n alread y establishe d an d recognize d medical hierarchy: in fact, i t had the unintended consequence of creating a hierarchy and a n elit e withi n th e medica l profession. Not al l cases o f advancin g rationalizatio n and standardizatio n o f th e cognitiv e basis of a profession involv e conflict. I f leadershi p i n the rationalizing effort i s taken by practitioner s wh o ar e alread y recognize d a s eminen t withi n a relativel y stabl e hierarchy, th e emergen t standards , fa r fro m displacin g them , codif y element s o f their own practice and of its implicit or explicit theory. What may happen, ove r time, is tha t th e readjustmen t i n the "indetermination/technicalit y ratio" result s i n a redistribution o f functions whic h respect s the existin g hierarchy: th e elite s gradually delegate the most standardize d area s of practice and research to subordinate groups , which ma y b e adde d "a t th e bottom " of the professiona l hierarchy. A differen t resolutio n o f potentia l conflic t i s suggeste d b y th e emergenc e an d secession of specialties: thi s process can be seen as involvin g efforts o f codificatio n of a new area , or as th e articulatio n of a sub-paradigm b y a group of professionals . Because suc h group s d o no t attac k th e cor e wit h whic h th e dominan t professiona l group identifies , the y ar e no t "force d into " th e existin g hierarchy : rather , the y branch ou t an d generat e thei r own professional stratification , parallel but no t sub ordinate t o the pre-existin g system. Th e creatio n of a new fiel d o r subfiel d may b e a solutio n for newcomer s i n a crowde d fiel d controlle d by conservativ e elders. The genera l "crisi s o f legitimacy " analyzed b y Jamou s an d Peloill e may b e a very particula r case; i t illuminates, nevertheless, th e genera l dynamic s o f the pro 7

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fessional structure : element s o f cognitiv e rationalit y ar e use d i n a profession' s project o f marke t control , i n it s interna l conflict s o f power , an d i n it s collectiv e assertion o f status . Cognitiv e rationality cannot b e formall y treate d a s a n isolate d attribute o f profession, fo r i t never appear s in its pure form ; i t is alway s embodie d in th e institution s for professiona l training , selection, an d contro l and i s often evi dent i n th e mids t o f politica l struggle . Th e correspondenc e betwee n advancin g cognitive rationalit y an d th e proces s o f unificatio n an d overarchin g organizatio n of a professio n ca n b e illustrate d indirectly , by lookin g a t th e changin g contex t within whic h individua l reputation s ar e established , sinc e th e attributio n of talen t always reflect s th e stat e of organization o f a profession . A firs t ste p toward the subordinatio n o f individual talen t t o the unit y of the pro fessional fiel d come s with th e emergenc e of organizations wit h "profession-wide " significance: th e incumben t o f a high-ranking role i n such a n organizatio n ma y b e viewed a s talente d merel y becaus e of the positio n he occupies . "Amtcharisma" — the fusio n o f organizational statu s wit h persona l reputation—ha s th e effec t o f de personalizing talent . Thus , a position on a licensing board o r o n a board o f health helped th e reputatio n o f American physicians befor e th e rise of scientific medicine, despite th e persistenc e o f sectaria n disputes . Professiona l societies , i n fact , im plicitly coun t on this effect o f organizational affiliation t o attract member s and keep them unde r control. Advances i n the unificatio n an d standardizatio n o f professional knowledg e have a differen t effect , whic h th e Frenc h clinician s rightl y feared : "theoretical " an d "practical" knowledg e become distinct. The organization of centers for the produc tion o f knowledg e sharpen s thi s bifurcatio n an d tend s t o subordinat e th e practi tioners, wh o "apply " knowledge , t o thos e wh o produc e it . This subordinatio n i s magnified whe n th e center s of cognitive production become, a s well , th e principal agencies of professional training . As th e codificatio n of knowledge advances , apprenticeshi p i s superseded , o r a t least necessarily preceded , by formal training . A profession's dependenc e on forma l institutions o f training enhances the rol e of educators, wh o are increasingl y identi fied wit h th e theoretica l rather tha n th e practica l side o f the profession . A s the edu cators themselves develop a consciousness of their interests an d becom e concerne d with professiona l autonom y an d professiona l privileges , their rol e increase s i n th e profession a s a whole. A growing number o f future practitioner s i s exposed t o their influence an d formed by a body of knowledge whic h educators define an d to whic h they often contribute directly. They are the first members of the profession t o discern "budding talent " an d t o attribut e i t o n th e basi s o f "theoretical " ability . A pre sumption o f talent i n later professiona l practic e derive s fro m th e reputatio n o f th e institution wher e a professional ha s bee n trained . Educators , obviously , have mor e control ove r trainin g institution s tha n practitioner s do . Th e attributio n of talent , therefore, depend s in large par t o n the structura l positio n of educators; at th e sam e time, i t tends to increase the likelihoo d tha t educators wil l b e recognized a s spokes men fo r th e professio n a s a whole. A differen t effec t come s fro m th e concentratio n o f increasin g number s o f professionally traine d individual s in the productio n o f theoretical knowledge . O n th e 11

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one hand , suc h concentratio n accelerate s th e apparentl y autonomou s evolutio n of the cognitiv e basis. O n the othe r hand , i t increases the tendenc y towar d specializa tion. Theoretica l distinctio n tends t o overshado w practica l talent at the same time that i t tends to become mor e esoteric , grante d t o specialists b y specialist s an d full y meaningful onl y i n their circles. While specializatio n restrict s th e scop e of individual genius , th e basi c cognitive unification achieve d b y the profession a s a whole legitimizes this specialized talent : individual reputation s canno t b e dismisse d a s mer e personalit y cults , fo r the y ar e granted b y professiona l peer s whos e credential s allegedl y stam p the m a s superio r (though standardized ) talents . I n fact, al l accepted professional s increasingl y ten d to com e fro m th e center s whic h monopoliz e th e productio n an d transmissio n o f knowledge, an d als o th e productio n o f producers . Th e credential s o f th e averag e producer purpor t t o mea n tha t h e ha s achieve d a t leas t standar d master y ove r a standardized bod y o f knowledge, whic h i s no w recognize d a s mor e vali d tha n it s competitors. Whe n thes e standardize d professiona l talent s recogniz e on e o f their peers as exceptional , thei r judgment canno t b e questione d withou t questionin g th e very base s of professional privilege—or , from th e inside , without questioning the profession s internal stratification. Thus, a t th e leve l o f theoretical production, colleague sanctio n o f individual tal ents become s mor e legitimat e at the same time tha t i t becomes narrowe r an d les s accessible to general review. The closed corporat e basi s on which academi c emi nence i s achieve d appear s more autonomou s than eminenc e i n consulting practice: heteronomous, extra-professiona l element s alway s ente r th e latter . Today , beyon d a narro w loca l sphere , th e medi a interven e t o maximiz e th e heteronomy . Th e divergence betwee n th e practica l and th e theoretica l or academic sector s of a profes sion i s accentuated b y the apparen t insulatio n of the latter: they may , indeed , clai m the privileg e of making the onl y "authentic " reputation s becaus e of their superio r autonomy an d "purity " o f motives. However , whe n a profession ha s reache d th e phase in which i t can clai m standardize d cognitiv e superiority, it is hard on its unity "toward th e outsid e world " t o denounc e altogethe r a n "eminent " licensed prac titioner as a fraud or a quack. Professiona l repudiatio n of heteronomous reputations , therefore, tend s t o no t b e asserte d i n public. This discussion ha s emphasize d th e point of view that the standardization allowed by a common and clearly defined basis of training is far more important for the uni fication o f a profession tha n th e mor e diffus e subcultura l aspects, whic h ar e ofte n underscored a s majo r aspect s o f th e socializatio n proces s an d arbitraril y distin guished fro m th e cognitiv e and technica l basis. Thi s basi s define s th e commo n language an d th e taci t knowledge that distinguis h a profession a s a whole from th e laity. It is, in fact, the main support of a professional subculture. Thos e profession s that do not have such a solid suppor t tend, by contrast, t o create and emphasize pur e mannerisms (includin g cognitiv e ones, suc h a s unnecessar y jargon or unjustifiabl y esoteric technique s o r "pseudo-paradigmatic " changes) . Furthermore, a s a profession strengthen s its ties wit h forma l institution s of training, i t also obtain s a base of broader subcultura l standardization : th e professiona l school o r th e universit y spawn a subcultur e o f their own, to whic h relativel y large 12

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numbers o f apprentice s ar e exposed . Thus , cognitiv e standardizatio n appear s t o be on e crucial , i f not th e mos t crucial , variable i n th e sequenc e which , passin g through th e ris e o f monopolisti c centers o f training , lead s t o credentiale d profes sionalization an d marke t control. While cognitiv e standardizatio n i s a mos t powerfu l generato r o f deepl y share d cultural assumptions , th e revers e doe s no t appea r t o b e true : pre-existin g cultural homogeneity doe s not itsel f bree d effort s a t cognitiv e unification o f a professiona l area. Fo r instance , th e America n physicians o r lawyer s wh o me t i n exclusive so cieties (o f differen t degree s o f formality ) durin g th e firs t hal f o f th e nineteent h century did not appear to be too interested i n raising the average qualit y of the professional producer s b y standardizin g an d rationalizin g training. Th e doctors wer e more intereste d i n establishing homogeneity b y elitist exclusiveness—that i s to say , in reservin g th e benefit s o f organizational affiliatio n t o thei r socia l peers—tha n i n propagating thei r particular definitions of medical practic e an d medica l science. The historia n Danie l Calhoun suggest s tha t thes e groups ' visible attempt s t o mo nopolize mark s o f distinction lef t th e disunite d professions withou t defens e agains t the Jacksonia n ideologica l attac k o n privilege , embodied, s o i t appeared , i n th e licensing statutes. Presumably , th e cultura l and socia l uniformit y o f these very small group s o f professiona l me n wa s muc h highe r tha n i t coul d b e today . Ye t Calhoun report s severa l case s i n whic h individua l talen t (o r deviance , a s i t were ) could no t b e accommodate d b y thes e smal l societies , fo r thi s woul d hav e endan gered a unit y base d mor e o n extra-cognitiv e similaritie s than o n paradigmati c o r quasi-paradigmatic tendencies. 14

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Only wit h th e ris e o f forma l trainin g institutions and standardize d trainin g can professions—or mor e precisely , th e association s o r elite groups whic h ac t a s thei r spokesmen—begin t o assum e tha t ther e i s a commonality , however , minimal , among thei r members . Fo r on e thing , th e trainin g centers mak e a firs t selectio n among professiona l aspirants . Towar d th e en d o f a professionalizatio n process , regulation o f intraprofessional competitio n becomes "normal." It would b e tempting t o argu e tha t suc h thing s a s fe e tables , code s of etiquette, an d th e lik e transfe r competition from th e sphere of practice to that of training, in the form o f competition for grade s and recommendations i n undergraduate an d graduate training . Th e avail able evidenc e indicates , however , tha t the correlatio n between a student's academi c achievements an d hi s subsequen t succes s i n practice i s lo w and tendin g t o zero. What trainin g centers appea r t o d o fo r practicin g profession s is , amon g othe r things, t o provid e the m wit h effectivel y socialize d averag e members : members , that is , wh o recognize a profession's hierarch y and , implicitly , th e criteri a of success o n whic h i t i s founded , becaus e the y themselve s hav e ofte n alread y entere d the professiona l network s o n whic h succes s s o largel y depends. Thi s socializa tion i s fundamenta l precisel y becaus e i t touches th e averag e membe r o f a profes sion, an d no t onl y it s elites: i t could not, therefore , b e founde d o n th e capriciou s variation o f professiona l subcultures , eve n i f these corresponde d t o a n accepte d professional hierarchy . It s homogeneizin g an d unifyin g effect s depen d upo n th e standardized bod y o f knowledg e t o whic h th e averag e studen t ha s bee n expose d and whic h i s sociall y accepte d a s superio r t o th e knowledg e acquire d outside , b y 17

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experience o n th e job o r i n an avocation . I n this manner , th e averag e professiona l producer come s equipped wit h a t least a minimal sens e of the cognitive superiority which h e share s wit h al l other professiona l producer s an d whic h distinguishe s al l of the m from th e laity . Monopol y of training and credentialing establishes and insti tutionalizes thi s clea r dividin g lin e betwee n professiona l an d layman , a lin e whic h is seldo m challenge d o r eve n questione d b y th e interna l conflicts withi n a profes sion. Minima l professiona l solidarit y is founde d o n thi s sense of shared expertise : while it does not legitimize the internal hierarchy of a profession fo r its practitioners, at least it legitimizes in their eyes the social division of labor. It is only in generalized crises of legitimacy in the large r societ y tha t suc h orde r come s to b e questioned . DIMENSIONS O F MARKE T CONTRO L In th e lon g and unfinishe d proces s o f establishing an d securin g marke t control, the various professions hav e different resources available. The analysi s o f medicine and engineering ha s identifie d som e of these resources. Their importance fo r a particular profession a t a given time can onl y b e established empirically ; i t is possible , however, t o indicat e whic h condition s ar e th e mos t favorabl e t o th e professiona l project of market control for each of the structural elements whic h this project intertwines. Th e followin g lis t recapitulate s problem s tha t hav e bee n discusse d i n th e preceding pages : 1. Th e natur e o f the servic e tha t i s marketed . (Th e mor e salient , th e mor e uni versal, an d th e les s visibl e the service , th e mor e favorabl e th e situatio n i s fo r th e profession.) 2. Th e typ e of market. (Th e less competitive the market , th e mor e favorabl e th e situation; but also, th e mor e competitive the market the more the profession i s compelled t o organize alon g monopolistic lines. The more independent th e market fro m the capital and goods market , th e more favorable the situation is for the profession. ) 3. Th e typ e o f clientele. (Th e mor e "universal " an d th e les s organized th e cli entele, th e mor e favorabl e th e situatio n is fo r th e profession. ) 4. Th e cognitiv e basis. (Th e mor e standardize d an d better-define d th e cognitive basis, th e mor e i t permits th e attainmen t o f visibly "goo d results" ; th e mor e esoteric th e bod y o f knowledge an d th e mor e i t approaches a new paradigm , th e mor e favorable th e situatio n is for the profession . Today , these conditions can almos t b e summarized b y saying : th e mor e scientifi c the cognitiv e basis, th e mor e favorabl e the situatio n i s fo r the profession. ) 5. Th e "productio n o f producers. " (Th e mor e institutionalize d its forms , th e more standardize d th e process , th e mor e i t i s unde r th e profession' s control , th e more favorable the situation is for the profession. Indeed , i f th e demand fo r service s is larg e an d stable , th e professio n ca n regulat e th e suppl y throug h it s contro l of admission an d thu s maximiz e it s power positio n on th e market. ) 6. Th e powe r relations . (Th e mor e independen t th e professiona l marke t fro m other markets , th e mor e th e stat e i s compelled to protect th e publi c by eliminatin g

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the incompeten t o r les s competen t professionals, th e mor e favorabl e th e situatio n is for the profession. Althoug h a powerful sponsorin g elite appears to be a favorable condition, in itself i t can produce a secure but dependent situatio n for the profession. ) 7. Th e affinit y wit h th e dominan t ideology . (The more a profession's particula r ideology coincide s wit h th e dominan t ideologica l structures , th e mor e favorabl e the situatio n is fo r the profession. ) In th e precedin g chapter , I have attempted t o sho w that , o n al l counts, medicin e was i n a favorable positio n or gradually attained it . Because of this exceptional situation, medicine appears both a s a prototype and as an exception: it presents a complete professiona l structur e an d als o a "natural" sequenc e of attainment o f monopoly. As Freidson observes, a profession's authorit y is at its highest' when the number of it s member s i s smal l i n relatio n t o deman d an d whe n th e clientel e i s unorga n i z e d . " Suc h a monopolistic "seller's market, " furthermore , allow s a profession to artificially increas e the scarcity of the supply. But demand i s more difficult t o manipulate, an d fe w profession s ca n count , lik e medicine , o n unlimite d demand . Fo r this reason, mos t profession s attemp t t o reach a n institutiona l market , whic h func tions "no t b y the whim s of workers an d employers , bu t b y rules , bot h forma l an d informal. Thes e rule s stat e whic h worker s ar e preferre d o r eve n whic h employer s must buy in this market i f they ar e t o buy at all . Institutiona l rules take th e plac e of individual preferenc e i n setting th e boundaries." This mode l of an institutiona l marke t point s t o th e shortcu t b y whic h monopoly is sought . Th e precedin g analysi s ha s trace d th e "natural " genesi s of a monopoly in a market o f services. On e o f the centra l tenet s of this analysi s ha s bee n that , in this kind o f market, contro l must firs t b e institute d at the poin t of production of the producers; fo r this reason some degree of cognitive standardizatio n i s indispensabl e to marke t control . Once th e patter n o f professiona l monopol y i s established , an d above all , once th e academi c system s hav e rise n a s th e recognize d monopolizer s of cognitiv e legitimation, th e universit y provides th e bes t justification o f the clai m for a n institutiona l market: monopolizin g training is important , bu t monopolizing it a t the universit y level bring s a built-in legitimatio n o f monopoly in terms o f cognitive superiority . As we shal l see later , thi s is the shortcu t attempte d a t present by most professionalizin g occupations : a legitimize d cognitiv e monopol y appears , indeed, a s th e bes t protection a specialized occupatio n ca n hav e agains t challenge s from th e la y public. In a perfec t marke t situation , th e sovereignt y resides , theoretically , in the con sumer. Th e profession s ultimatel y depen d o n th e public' s willingnes s t o accep t and legitimize the superiorit y of their knowledge and skills . Th e singula r character istic o f professional powe r is , however , tha t th e professio n ha s th e exclusiv e privi lege o f defining both th e conten t o f its knowledge an d th e legitimat e conditions of access to it, while the unequal distribution of knowledge protects and enhances this power. Eve n i n the cas e of monopolies tha t ar e artificiall y establishe d b y lega l de cree becaus e th e profession' s cognitiv e exclusivenes s i s shaky , th e association s of professiona l producer s alway s striv e to define th e content o f public relation. One 4

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author remark s tha t "som e professiona l association s hav e als o develope d int o preliminary arena s of public government, i n which a large par t o f the mos t importan t law affectin g th e professio n i s firs t formulated." As i n an y exchang e situatio n i n whic h powe r i s unequall y distributed , the ris k of exploitatio n an d abus e i s extremel y hig h i n the cas e of these powerfu l occupa tions. The professions, however , clai m that transactions i n the professional market s are radicall y differen t fro m thos e i n th e laissez-fair e commodit y markets ; i n th e latter, cavea t emptor i s the rule , whil e i n the former , professiona l wor k ethic s an d the idea l of service justify th e consumer' s trust . I n fact, th e argumen t give s norma tive sanctio n t o a n objectiv e reality : the averag e la y buyer o f professional service s is compelle d t o trus t th e selle r becaus e he normall y does no t hav e an y othe r stan dards of evaluation than the judgment of competence passe d on the professiona l b y his colleagues (and , in the more or less remote past, by the academi c syste m an d by official licensin g boards , i n whic h th e professio n itsel f i s alway s influentia l an d often dominant) . I t remains t o b e examine d whethe r thes e distinctiv e markets fo r services includ e structura l aspect s whic h migh t account fo r the fac t (o r th e belief ) that professions , i n th e word s o f Willia m J . Goode , "can , bu t typicall y d o not , exploit." 21

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A STRUCTURA L APPROAC H T O THE PROFESSIONA L PHENOMENON I bega n b y proposin g a deductiv e mode l o f th e organizationa l tas k whic h th e modern profession s face d a s the y attempte d t o establish contro l over their market s in a transformed world . I n a sense, this was a guess that certai n force s an d dimensions becam e determinan t i n th e historica l context o f th e firs t professionalizatio n movement. Thi s gues s wa s necessar y t o ma p th e comple x realit y o f th e profes sional phenomenon. Wit h this model in mind, I proceeded the n to look at the market situation o f medicine, and , b y contrast , tha t o f engineering. O f all the profession s which exchange services o n a market, medicin e is, today, th e one whic h mos t peo ple ar e likel y t o encounter : th e universa l nee d tha t medicin e serve s make s i t th e principal agen t fo r diffusin g professiona l stereotype s amon g th e la y public . No t surprisingly, a sociolog y o f profession s whic h tend s t o abstrac t it s concept s fro m everyday lif e almos t inevitabl y support s it s theorie s wit h evidenc e draw n fro m medicine an d tend s to tak e i t as a parameter fo r other aspirin g occupations. At almos t ever y ste p o f th e analysis , however , w e recognize d th e exceptiona l nature o f this "archetypal " profession . Precisel y becaus e medicine was exception ally favored in its project of market control, it reveals wit h clarity the elements whic h a "complete'' professiona l structur e must combine. I do not mean by this that' 'complete" profession s shoul d exhibi t all or a numbe r o f th e disparat e attribute s tha t are visibl e i n medicine , o r tha t the y shoul d inevitabl y strive t o replicat e them . I mean tha t a successful projec t of professionalization, one that comes close t o attaining th e goal s o f market monopoly , social status, an d wor k autonomy , mus t b e abl e to combin e certai n structura l elements . Th e necessit y o f these element s wa s no t 23

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abstracted fro m th e contemporar y situatio n o f a n exceptionall y powerfu l profes sion, bu t deductivel y establishe d an d constructe d int o an analytica l framework. A provisional ma p o f the professiona l phenomeno n ha s no w begu n t o emerge. If w e view professionalization a s a collective project whic h aim s a t marke t con trol, i t appears , first , tha t thi s organizationa l effor t bring s togethe r structura l ele ments o f differen t origins , whic h follo w independen t line s o f evolution . O n th e one hand , w e hav e a specifi c bod y o f knowledge, includin g techniques an d skills ; on the other, a market o f services. Bot h elements have specific boundarie s an d specific structura l characteristics i n each profession; both vary nationally and historically (even though, today, th e conditions of production and exchange of scientific knowledge ten d t o internationaliz e th e cognitiv e conten t an d cognitiv e structur e o f professions wit h a scientific basis). Th e structure o f a professional marke t is determined by the larger social structure withi n which it is situated. The stage of economic development, th e volum e an d distributio n of nationa l income , th e clas s structur e an d ethnic composition , th e averag e standar d o f living , th e natur e o f the stat e an d it s policies, an d ideology—includin g a variety o f cultural traditions—define th e po tential, th e characteristics , an d th e dynamic s o f a profession's market . I canno t eve n begi n t o outlin e here the socia l condition s i n which knowledg e of various kind s is historically produced: thi s is the subjec t o f the sociolog y of knowledge and o f its various specialization s concerne d wit h science , wit h law , an d wit h the arts . Obviously , the condition s of practice i n a professional field , whethe r the y are institutionalize d or not, determin e wha t wil l b e considered cognitivel y and tech nically relevan t i n all the broa d spectru m o f socially available knowledge a t a given time. Relativel y diffuse philosophica l and esthetic outlooks also undoubtedly have an influence. Th e ver y breadt h an d variet y o f th e cognitive , technological , an d ideational material s whic h ma y becom e relevant t o a professional practic e indicat e that the y ca n b e produce d independentl y fro m th e professio n whic h consciousl y o r unconsciously incorporate s them . Th e moder n professiona l project , however , tends to integrat e th e productio n of knowledge wit h professiona l practice . The cor e o f the professionalizatio n projec t i s the productio n of professional pro ducers; thi s proces s tends t o b e centere d i n and allie d wit h th e moder n university . The universit y also tends to become th e majo r cente r for the productio n of profes sionally relevan t knowledge . Bot h of these processes—the producing of practitioners o r researcher s an d th e producin g o f knowledge pur e an d applied—ten d t o be come increasingl y integrate d an d coheren t withi n th e moder n university . Training and researc h increasingl y depen d o n th e sam e institutiona l structure. Thei r evolution i s a t leas t partiall y subjec t t o commo n condition s an d i s a t leas t partiall y ar ticulated wit h th e large r societ y b y th e sam e institutiona l and extra-institutiona l mediations. Withi n th e university , consideration s derive d fro m professiona l prac tice (influenced , tha t is , b y th e structur e an d condition s o f a professiona l market ) come t o bear upon professional training ; these practical considerations hav e a mor e or les s direc t influenc e upo n th e determinatio n o f wha t constitute s professionall y relevant knowledg e an d eve n upo n th e productio n o f this knowledge . Thus , i n its modern sense , professio n appear s t o b e a structur e whic h link s the productio n of 24

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knowledge to it s application in a market o f services: th e trainin g institutions are th e empirical aren a i n which thi s linkag e i s effected . Secondly, th e professiona l projec t tend s toward the monopolizatio n of opportunities for income i n a market o f services or labor and toward the monopolizatio n of status an d wor k privilege s i n a n occupationa l hierarchy . Th e necessar y mean s t o these ends is the contro l and monopolizatio n of relatively standardize d professiona l education. Th e institutionalize d productio n o f professiona l producer s mediate s and reveal s the contradiction s inheren t i n the structur e o f the professiona l project . Let u s briefl y recal l the genera l line s of this analysis: i n the context o f the "grea t transformation," elit e o r communit y patronag e wa s insufficien t t o guarante e th e position and competence of growing numbers o f practitioners in expanding markets . As these traditional warrants declined , tw o movements becam e visible. Thei r character an d respectiv e importanc e var y a s a functio n o f th e large r socia l structur e within whic h th e specifi c professiona l project s developed . On e movemen t attack s the privilege s of exclusive group s o f traditional professionals an d thei r d e fact o o r institutionalized monopolies over marks of professional distribution ; simultaneously , the othe r movemen t attempt s t o regulat e competitio n by reconstructin g monopol y on differen t an d muc h broader base s of control. Th e monopolisti c goa l of the pro fessional project , whic h demands regulation and control of access to the professiona l market o n th e suppl y side , contradicts , therefore , th e democratizatio n potentia l inherent i n the expansio n o f professional market s an d i n the challeng e t o corporat e privileges. Control of a market o f professional service s requires th e monopolizatio n of competence and the demonstratio n tha t this competence is superior t o others. I t is ideologically necessary for the legitimation of monopoly that instruction—the acquisition of competence—appear to be accessible to all who seek it and ar e abl e to assimilat e it. Thi s meritocratic legitimatio n does not become central t o the dominan t ideology until bourgeoi s hegemon y i s consolidate d an d a n "open, " thoug h hierarchical , system o f education i s set i n place; it is, however, present in the modern professiona l project fro m it s inception. The production of professional producer s canno t b e arbitrarily limite d b y standard s extraneous to a profession's functions . Closur e i s justified onl y in terms o f the specia l skill s acquire d b y professional producer s wh o have been freely admitte d to training and judged b y universalisti c criteria. These criteria refer t o virtualitie s of the perso n whic h appea r t o b e randoml y distribute d o r else are th e result o f effort an d moral virtues—such ar e intelligence , studiousness, dedication, perseverance , an d genera l cultur e a s th e resul t o f prior efforts . For this ideological legitimation t o be effective, meritocrati c access to the educational syste m mus t hav e a semblanc e of reality. Th e growt h of public investment s in education and the expansion o f enrollments at the higher levels confirm this appearance and ar e partl y sustaine d b y ideologica l necessity. Professions , a s th e occupa tional roles whic h most closel y tie educational credential s t o occupational function, bring a significan t an d realisti c reinforcemen t t o th e meritocrati c legitimatio n of social inequality . However , fro m th e monopolisti c poin t o f view whic h i s tha t o f the professiona l project , th e necessit y o f maintainin g universalisti c an d objectiv e

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appearances in the educationa l syste m involves some risks. For one thing , th e mar k can easil y b e overshot : th e overproductio n of professional producer s ma y cause th e price of professional service s or labor to fall, an d resul t i n unemployment o r under employment o f specialize d an d highl y traine d labor . Thi s recurren t possibilit y jeopardizes th e professiona l promis e o f socia l status : professiona l educatio n an d professional occupation s becom e les s certai n mean s o f securin g socia l prestig e and upper-middl e class standards of living. I n the lon g run, the attractivenes s an d the genera l socia l prestig e o f professional role s ca n b e adversel y affected . Obviously, th e ris k of overproduction o f professional producer s ca n b e handle d by makin g th e standard s o f admissio n int o trainin g increasingly stringen t an d b y manipulating licensin g examinations . Professional s wit h veste d interest s i n maintaining the price of their services or labor and the social prestige o f their calling mak e up th e standard s fo r bot h school s an d licensin g boards. Th e question , however , i s for ho w lon g this reduction of supply ca n b e publicl y justified b y th e "pur e objec tivity" o f meritocratic standards , especiall y whe n th e cos t o f training also tends to increase. A s th e monopolizatio n o f competenc e become s mor e visible , i t i s als o more likel y tha t i t will b e challenged , especiall y i f the reductio n of supply restores the privilege s o f professiona l roles . Besides , b y compariso n wit h mos t othe r job s and occupations , professiona l calling s always appea r as relativel y privileged forms of work : the socia l pressur e fo r admissio n t o professiona l trainin g does no t aris e from realisti c assessment s of the averag e condition s o f work o r th e absolut e char acteristics predominan t i n a specifi c professio n a t a give n time . I t i s influenced , rather, b y traditiona l and stereotype d image s o f th e professionals ' positio n i n th e occupational structur e a s a whole ; it responds, tha t is , t o a n ideologica l evaluation of availabl e opportunitie s i n a society . Becaus e o f th e ope n an d universalisti c ap pearance o f th e educationa l system , i t i s a t thi s leve l tha t th e monopolisti c goa l of th e professiona l projec t enter s int o visible contradiction wit h th e democratizin g and rationalizin g dimension s potentiall y define d b y th e marke t orientation . Th e exclusiveness inheren t i n an y projec t whic h tend s t o asser t an d secur e collectiv e social statu s aggravates the contradictions . Finally, i n its historica l development, th e professiona l projec t mobilize d hetero geneous ideologica l means t o justify it s claims . A s I hav e repeated, universalisti c and meritocrati c legitimation s coul d no t becom e immediatel y predominant , de pendent a s the y wer e o n th e developmen t o f apparentl y ope n nationa l system s of education. Traditiona l claim s o f disinterestednes s an d publi c service , integrate d into th e ideologica l model o f profession , contradic t th e marke t orientatio n o f th e professional projec t an d th e monopolizatio n of competence to whic h i t necessaril y tends. Ideologically , these claim s den y th e invidiou s implication s o f monopol y and ar e use d t o stav e off possible attacks . In th e nex t chapte r I shall examine th e origin s and substanc e of these traditional ideological resources . Afte r completin g th e historica l analysis o f the developmen t and evolutio n of th e professiona l mode l (i n Chapter s Seve n throug h Ten) , I wil l return, i n conclusion, to a closer analysi s o f the structure , functions , an d contradic tions o f profession an d professionalism . 26

Chapter 5

MARKET AND ANTI-MARKE T PRINCIPLE S

To evaluat e th e divergence s betwee n th e marke t towar d which th e firs t moder n professions strov e an d th e larger , self-regulatin g market tha t wa s becomin g domi nant a t th e tim e o f th e profession' s emergence , w e mus t retur n briefl y t o Kar l Polanyi's thesis . Th e ris e o f industria l capitalism is characterized , fo r Polany i a s well a s fo r Marx , b y th e generalizatio n of commodity exchange an d b y th e ideo logical appea l t o the principl e o f equivalence o f exchange. Legitimatio n o f the new social orde r i s sough t i n the ideologica l construction of reality base d o n this prin ciple o f apparen t equivalence. Polany i writes : "Th e doubl e movemen t . . . ca n be personifie d a s th e actio n of two organizing principles in society. . . . The on e was th e principl e o f economi c liberalism , aimin g a t th e establishmen t o f a self regulating market , relyin g o n th e suppor t o f the tradin g classes, an d usin g largely laissez-faire an d fre e trad e a s it s methods." 1

2

The violenc e whic h thi s functionall y rationa l principle o f organizatio n does t o all th e othe r instance s o f social practice an d t o th e immemoria l fusion o f the eco nomic functio n wit h othe r level s o f practice, suc h a s th e symbolic , the religious, and th e political , evoke s a paralle l and simultaneou s countermovement , base d o n "the principl e o f socia l protectio n aimin g a t th e conservatio n o f ma n an d natur e as wel l a s productiv e organization, relyin g o n th e varyin g suppor t o f those mos t immediately affecte d b y th e deleteriou s actio n o f th e market—primarily , bu t no t exclusively, th e workin g an d th e lande d classes—an d usin g protective legislation , restrictive associations , an d othe r instrument s o f intervention a s it s methods." One tempting objection can be immediately disposed of : the professions' relianc e on the state to control the access to their markets was and is justified i n terms of the protection o f the consumer . However , once state-backe d monopol y was obtained , it represente d th e ultimat e sanction o f marke t contro l b y a grou p o f professiona l "producers" an d a proved means , thereafter , o f protectin g themselve s agains t undue interferenc e b y th e state . Indeed , relianc e upo n th e stat e wa s no t merel y a pattern borrowe d by th e nineteenth-centur y profession s fro m th e medieva l guilds, but also the means by which the ascendin g bourgeoisi e had advanced towar d a selfregulating market. In Polanyi's words, "The road to the free market was opened and kept ope n b y a n enormou s increas e i n continuous , centrall y organized, an d con trolled interventionism . . . . There wa s nothin g natura l abou t laissez-fair e . . . laissez-faire itsel f wa s enforce d b y th e stat e . . . [it ] was no t a metho d t o achiev e a thing , i t was the thing to be achieved." 3

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But, i s no t th e persisten t corporat e natur e o f the profession s antithetica l to th e liberal ' 'Utopia"? Does i t not place th e profession s o n the sid e o f those supporting the ' 'countermovement'' ? The answer is ambiguous and it largely exceeds the bounds of th e marke t ideal-typ e whic h I have heretofor e applie d to the professions . I hav e argue d tha t the organizations of producers whic h we call professions wer e indispensable fo r th e constitutio n of new market s o f mainly intangibl e and rathe r exceptional products . Corporatis m was necessary , though not sufficient, t o impos e one "definitio n o f the product" a s th e best and to give it legal sanction. Similarly , corporate clas s action was necessar y to bring abou t stat e action in favor of laissez faire. Bu t this last course wa s no t entered int o by the English industrial bourgeoisi e until after i t had effectively use d protectionist laws to achieve the definitive subordination (o r elimination ) o f its economic rivals . A t the tim e of the Anti - Cor n Law movement, besides , th e bourgeoisi e ha d alread y bee n politicall y enfranchise d b y the electoral reform of 1832, which was a beginning acknowledgement of bourgeois economic supremacy . The industria l bourgeoisie ha d relied , i n its rise , o n stat e protectionis m and o n direct coercio n by the stat e against th e proletaria t and other categories o f the poor . Only afte r it s triumph di d the bourgeoisi e mobiliz e for the ideologica l conquest o f the proletaria t an d th e establishmen t o f hegemony. Bu t direct coercio n doe s no t make an y sens e in the conques t o f a market tha t i s essentially constitute d by ideological definitions . Nor , on the other hand , coul d professions , a s a minor sector of the risin g class , mobiliz e the necessar y coercive powers. I n other words , their rise depended mos t cruciall y o n ideologica l persuasion. Therefore , th e continuit y o f corporate contro l over the producers wa s necessary to ensure ideological uniformit y around one "definitio n o f the product" and vigilance against ever-resurgent counter definitions. 5

6

PROFESSIONS AN D TH E IDEAL O F COMMUNIT Y In th e olde r modern professions , a s w e know , corporate contro l ultimatel y suc ceeded i n regulating competition and i n establishing som e standard s o f grou p be havior. This kind of control was not stabilized, however, unti l afte r the achievemen t of cognitiv e exclusiveness, tha t i s t o say , unti l afte r th e profession s ha d unifie d their respectiv e area s of the socia l divisio n o f labor. Th e regulatio n and organiza tion o f market-oriente d practic e i n th e profession s tha t consolidate d towar d th e turn o f the centur y stoo d i n contrast t o th e anarch y o f the commodit y markets an d of capitalis t production. Therefore, Emil e Durkhei m coul d se e i n the organization of th e profession s no t onl y th e moder n expressio n o f th e medieva l corporation, but als o the socia l model that woul d produc e th e ethics an d rules needed b y a complex division of labor, and thus save modern society from th e chronic anomie rooted in it s economy. If th e professions appeare d t o Durkheim as capable o f generating organic solidarity, i t is becaus e the y possesse d som e of the characteristic s o f community which, in thei r traditional form , wer e declinin g in the large r society . Willia m Good e de scribes th e specia l communit y of profession b y th e followin g traits : 7

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(1) Its members are bound by a sense of identity. (2 ) Once in it, few leave , s o that it is a termina l o r continuin g statu s fo r th e mos t part . (3 ) It s member s shar e value s i n common. (4 ) It s role definition s vis-a-vi s both members an d non-members ar e agreed upon and are the sam e for all members. (5 ) Within the areas of communal action there is a common language , whic h is understood onl y partiall y by outsiders. (6 ) The community ha s powe r ove r it s members . (7 ) It s limits ar e reasonably clear , thoug h the y are not physical and geographical, bu t social. (8 ) Though it does not produce the nex t generation biologically , i t doe s s o socially , throug h it s contro l ove r th e selectio n o f professional trainees , an d through its training processes i t sends these recruits through an adult socializatio n process. 8

In precedin g page s I hav e emphasize d th e essentia l impor t an d importanc e o f cognitive unificatio n fo r professiona l commonality . I hav e suggeste d tha t profes sional identit y is experienced a s share d expertis e an d therefor e involve s a sense of at least cognitive superiority with regar d t o the layma n or the irregula r practitioner. Indeed, th e whol e proces s o f settin g u p a monopolisti c market o f services , base d as i t is o n articulating and enforcing principles of inclusion and exclusion, coul d be simultaneousl y envisage d a s th e settin g u p o f a partial community . As Good e implies i n hi s fourt h point , profession s ar e characterize d b y a minima l equalit y among th e member s i n precisely tha t aspec t whic h i s o f maximum concern t o th e organization: namely , th e definitio n o f an occupationa l role , wit h it s prerequisite s and prerogatives . I n matur e professions , exclusio n i s principall y centere d i n th e educational system , whic h operate s a bruta l (and continuing ) selection amon g po tential recruits; the professio n itsel f ca n thereafte r emphasiz e inclusio n and operate in the mode o f a community. Althoug h control of "community affairs" i s most fre quently veste d i n elites tha t ar e difficul t t o dislodge , th e minima l equalit y amon g members allow s the profession t o maintain solidarity. Th e ideology of participation among equal s contribute s t o legitimiz e the interna l hierarch y an d th e divisio n o f labor withi n th e profession. 9

Although Durkhei m presented th e corporatio n a s a n industry-wid e assembly o f both employers an d employees, h e was wel l awar e o f the fact that organic solidarity could no t emerge unless the "abnormal " form s o f the divisio n o f labor were elim inated. Fo r this , equalit y o f opportunities wa s a n indispensable , thoug h minimal , prerequisite. Th e association s o f free professional s coul d thu s appea r t o Durk heim a s embodyin g a necessar y "nomic " functio n an d a s authenti c occupationa l communities becaus e the y wer e base d o n minima l equalit y an d wer e therefor e minimally legitimat e i n th e eye s o f thei r members . Thi s minima l equalit y wa s grounded on the deeply inequalitaria n structure of opportunities of the larger society and was , furthermore , onl y minimal : i t coexisted wit h form s o f internal stratification an d elit e contro l whic h replicate d mor e genera l socia l conditions . Neverthe less, the y wer e association s o f producer s wit h minimall y share d attribute s an d common interest s which did not cut across class lines: the y belonged , therefore , to th e genu s "trade-union " an d no t t o th e genu s "industry-wid e corporation." Why then, shoul d we treat the association o f free professional s a s somethin g distinct from it s model, the craf t union ? The firs t an d obviou s reason is that th e craf t union always operated i n a subordinate market , wher e i t never controlle d either the socia l and economic conditions of work nor, after mechanization, its technical content. Furthermore, a t the beginnin g of the twentieth century, the craft unio n was wel l int o its 10

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decline, reflectin g the increasin g subordinatio n and alienatio n of industrial labor. What gav e th e solidarit y o f professiona l producer s it s typica l significanc e i n this earl y phase , then , wa s tha t the y wer e autonomous. I n a market societ y wher e labor i s a commodity , these association s o f fre e producer s ha d arisen , i n fact, i n order to constitute and control a new type of market. This fundamental aspec t modifies th e "anti-market " potentia l of their corporat e solidarity . The atypica l "com munity o f profession " di d not exten d it s nomi c function s beyon d th e boundarie s of it s own market position: the solidarit y of the professional producer s wa s seldom , if ever , mobilize d to advocat e o r hel p th e organizatio n o f thei r ow n consumers . Thus, o n th e consume r side , th e idea l professiona l marke t closel y approximate s the atomistic liberal model, while on the producers' side , with all due qualifications, it presents an analogy wit h the rise of corporate capitalis m against th e consequences of anarchi c competition. If it is true, besides, that "th e profession s sough t t o us e the stat e t o achiev e greate r autonom y fo r themselve s vis-a-vi s nongovernmenta l pressures, an d sometime s the y eve n use d governmen t t o protec t themselve s fro m government," the n th e goa l wa s clearl y laissez-faire fo r the producers , althoug h on the model of liberal pluralism. Thu s although the professional community, based on solidarit y and o n a share d se t o f cognitive and normativ e rules, ma y b e see n a s part o f the reactio n agains t th e market , it s aim s wer e formulate d withi n a marke t orientation: th e professions ' appea l t o non-contractua l socia l relations wa s aimed , in fact , a t promotin g certain kind s of contractual transactions . 11

12

13

Underlying the preceding arguments i s the assumption that one secto r (eve n more, a subordinate sector ) o f the risin g class does not by itself define th e dominant ideol ogy: it s ow n ideologica l constructions ar e therefor e subsume d unde r th e cove r of the dominan t ideology . Fro m th e marke t poin t o f view tha t ha s bee n to o greatl y emphasized u p to now, the rise of the professions appear s as one more phase of capitalistic rationalization. M y emphasis on the separatio n fro m traditiona l community bases, o n th e standardizatio n o f services , o n th e standardize d "productio n of producers," o n th e rationa l foundations o f knowledge, o n th e link s wit h scienc e an d technology, shoul d hav e mad e thi s poin t abundantl y clear . Thus , a s Parson s ha s noted, today' s profession s shar e wit h busines s certai n "element s o f the commo n institutional pattern" : relianc e o n functiona l rationalit y embodied i n scienc e an d in it s applications ; authority based on functiona l specificity; predominance o f uni versalistic criteri a in the relationshi p wit h client s an d i n the judgment o f occupa tional achievement. Th e "communit y o f profession " wa s bot h a n agen t an d a product o f rationalization. I t cannot b e denied , however , tha t professions , a t leas t ideologically, espouse anti-market principles. The insulation from th e larger society provided b y th e corporat e structur e contribute s t o th e surviva l of these principles, but i t does not generate them. W e mus t loo k elsewher e fo r their origins. 14

THE SERVIC E IDEAL REVISITE D Because the ris e o f the profession s depende d s o largel y on the establishmen t o f social credit, they had to appeal t o general ideologica l structures. On e was the prin ciple o f rationalizatio n itself, embodie d i n th e scientifi c ethos an d i n the rationa l authority of technical expertise. Bu t in the nineteenth century, this ideological appea l

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could no t provid e a genera l basi s o f legitimation . Th e utilitaria n etho s wa s muc h more widespread , especiall y amids t th e industria l bourgeoisie , whic h wa s th e obvious bas e fo r a n expandin g professiona l market . However , t o ban k o n it , th e professions ha d t o sho w incontrovertibl y "good results " an d thi s wa s no t alway s possible, o r did not become possible unti l late. I n any case, for results t o be judged good, criteri a commo n t o thos e use d b y th e professio n (o r dramati c demonstra tions) ha d t o become available t o th e public . Furthermore, age-ol d fear s o f profes sional abuse had t o be overcome . Fo r this, trus t i n the probit y and ethicalit y of the professional practitioner s ha d t o b e convincingl y established—ethicalit y being , in Freidson' s words , "prerequisit e fo r bein g truste d t o contro l the term s o f wor k without takin g advantage of such c o n t r o l . " The crusadin g effort s o f some professionals—both scholar s an d practitioners — attempted t o spread among the public not only a respect for knowledge but for "th e values o f science as ingredient s o f social an d economi c refor m and a s professiona l ethics." Thi s "connectio n betwee n th e scientifi c movement , socia l mission , and professionalism' ' wa s conspicuousl y absen t i n Germany an d particularl y vig orous i n Britain an d in the United States. Bu t even there, i t was stil l an embryonic theme, embodie d i n few practice s an d submerged , besides , in the continuin g social dislocations an d dreadfu l huma n cost s o f th e competitiv e phas e o f capitalism . The scientifi c legitimation still appeale d only to smal l enlightened minorities , even within th e profession s themselves. Therefore, th e onl y general ideologica l structures o n whic h professiona l ethical ity an d socia l credi t coul d b e convincingl y established wer e thos e inherite d fro m the passin g traditiona l order. The y were antithetica l to the principle s of the acquisi tive society , althoug h i t should no t be forgotte n that , ultimately , an appea l t o these ideological structure s wa s paradoxical , fo r "th e guaranteein g o f competenc e an d integrity in a laissez-faire economy , ha s an economic basis: it guarantees the continuous saleabilit y o f professiona l services." Tw o mai n ideologica l "sources " ca n be distinguished . The first , a s Polany i woul d hav e it , wa s a self-protectiv e reactio n o f a societ y subverted an d dislocate d b y industrial capitalism. The regar d o f the profession s (o r some individual s withi n them ) fo r th e publi c interes t ca n b e connecte d wit h thi s source. Before th e industria l and democrati c revolutions , a s w e know , the publi c of th e three learned professions—law , medicine , an d th e ministr y (which subsume d uni versity teaching)—was almos t exclusively composed o f the rich and the aristocracy . The industria l revolution and its sociopolitical consequences brought abou t th e pos sibility o f opening u p ne w market s fo r services . Thi s opening wa s fa r fro m repre senting a fundamenta l democratizatio n o f th e professiona l markets , eithe r o n th e producers' o r on the consumers' side . As we shall see i n the next chapter, the process of professionalizatio n wa s als o a project of collective mobility: the clienteles toward which th e leadin g professiona l reformer s naturall y looke d wer e th e happ y few , o r not quit e s o few , wh o benefite d fro m th e industria l revolution. The professiona l sector of the middl e classes aspired t o gain at least as muc h prestige a s the mos t ac ceptable commoner s (or , in America, the successfu l businessmen ) within thi s social stratum. Thi s socia l ambitio n colored th e professiona l project ; i t is likel y t o hav e 15

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inspired th e motivatio n o f most o f the professional s wh o responde d t o th e cal l of the earl y organizers , fo r it is obvious that efforts t o secure a relatively ne w marke t would hav e resulte d i n some benefit fo r the self-seekin g individual . Bu t this is not the whole picture. As I have emphasized, th e need to establish social credit for markets o f services involve d mor e tha n the alread y difficul t an d complex task o f guaranteeing t o th e public' s satisfactio n th e competenc e an d probit y o f the producers : it involve d shapin g th e nee d o f the consumers , channellin g it toward the concep tion o f service advocate d b y th e regula r profession . Th e productio n of new needs , or th e directio n of largely unrecognized need s toward new form s o f fulfillment, i s a civilizin g function , t o th e exten t tha t i t does no t obe y firs t t o th e profi t motive , but seek s first t o improve the quality o f life. I t is in this sense that the professions ' organization fo r th e marke t exceede d th e market-orientation : insofar a s the y had to promote the fulfillment o f new functions, they contributed to what Spencer called the "augmentatio n of life"; becaus e they could not secure the market without guar anteeing th e hig h qualit y o f their services , the y ha d t o maintai n certain standard s among th e producers . I n Tawney's words : [Professionals] may , a s in the case o f the successfu l doctor , gro w rich ; but the meaning of thei r profession, bot h fo r themselves an d for the public , is no t tha t they mak e money, bu t that they make health, or safety, or knowledge, or good government, or good law. . . . [Profession s uphold ] a s the criterio n of succes s th e en d for which the profession, whateve r i t ma y be , i s carrie d on , an d [subordinate ] th e inclination , appetites, an d ambitio n o f individual s to th e rule s o f a n organization whic h has a s it s object to promote the performance of function. 21

Guaranteeing competence , a s w e know, was par t o f the proces s of rationalizing and standardizing the "productio n of producers." Bu t even this rationalizing aspect contrasts, a t leas t superficially , wit h capitalis t functional rationalizatio n measured in terms of costs and output: indeed, ideology and normative conceptions o f quality are mor e visibly incorporate d in the "production " of men than in the production of real commodities. The anti-marke t component s o f professio n becom e muc h mor e distinc t i f we consider th e aspec t o f "augmentatio n o f life. " Afte r th e industria l revolution, i n fact, th e "civilizin g function " o f profession ha d t o face directl y th e consequences of unplanned , "savage, " capitalis t industrialization . These consequence s ap peared i n condensed for m i n the large industria l city, whic h was not only th e abode of th e industrial proletariat, but also that of most professionals. Th e efforts of a few professional leader s to promot e th e "performanc e o f function" necessaril y ha d t o come to grips with th e lif e condition s of the poor and the abuses of the classes wit h economic and political power. The mission of medicine was, in this respect, particularly clear . A s one historia n remarks, The nee d fo r sanitar y reform emphasized th e nee d fo r socia l refor m in general. . . . Hence the libera l movement s tha t developed i n all Western nations between 182 0 and 1848, i n opposition t o the reactionar y governments o f tha t period, wer e closely asso ciated wit h th e movemen t fo r sanitar y reform. I t was n o accident , fo r instance , tha t such a medical master as Vircho w sympathized wit h the Revolutio n of 1848 ; o r that on the other hand, Friedrich Engels prepared his endictment o f English society largel y in term s of unnecessar y diseas e an d death. 22

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Before medicine' s "bacteriologica l revolution," th e publi c health movemen t ha d to rel y more on statistical and mechanical solutions than on biological ones: lawyers and men with a taste for statistics, engineers and architects, public figures and social reformers, joined wit h physician s in the struggl e fo r the sanitatio n of cities and th e establishment o f boards of public health an d medica l facilities. I n America, at th e turn o f the century, the slum reform movemen t similarl y pooled together th e effort s of socia l reformers an d various reform-oriented professionals. I n their own area, lawyers attempte d t o refor m th e judiciary b y strivin g t o influenc e th e selectio n of judges. Teachers , i n America, struggled to pressure local schoo l boards in a direction whic h the y viewed as progressive. Th e spiri t o f "professional " probit y an d advancement o f function penetrate d th e civi l servic e i n the wak e of the various reform acts ; small clusters o f men planted this idea in the civil bureaucracies : th e best example is perhaps that of the British factory inspectors, whose reports Marx praised so vigorously. These variou s efforts , togethe r wit h th e "anti-market " practic e of graduatin g fee s accordin g t o th e client' s incom e ma y b e see n a s paternalisti c efforts fo r the protection of society: especially in the case of medicine and psychiatry, they continue d traditiona l an d declinin g forms o f communit y or stat e assistanc e to th e poor and derelict. On the other hand, inserted as these efforts were in a changing socia l order , the y foreshado w th e contemporar y notio n o f guaranteein g th e social orde r throug h publi c welfare functions—includin g the tutelar y paternalis m and th e differentia l qualit y o f service s tha t ar e essentiall y rendere d t o th e poor. This orientatio n should no t b e overrated : mor e recently , th e powerfu l profession s have had to be forced into social service while, in the past, most practitioners, caught in strenuou s competition , remained indifferen t t o th e potentia l fo r "augmentin g life" inheren t i n their calling . 23

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The professions ' "civilizin g function " coexists , b y definition , wit h a marke t orientation an d i s fused wit h it . Nevertheless, man y view th e professions' "servic e ideal" a s a detache d an d basicall y distinctiv e trait. Th e "communit y of profes sion" collectivel y hold s this ideal (partly becaus e it needs to profess i t publicly, in order t o gai n social credit and autonomy) ; the assumptio n i s that, i n subordinating its member s t o collectiv e norms an d t o a n interna l system o f reward an d punish ment which make s "virtue pay," th e profession instill s the servic e ideal in its practitioners. I n the words of one author , " [ I t ] demand s real sacrifice from practitioner s as a n idea l and fro m tim e to time , i n f a c t . " A s Freidson ha s observed , however , it i s illici t t o jump from th e verifiabl e attribute s o f occupational organizations (ex pressed in formal documents , by-laws , codes, curricula, formal definition s or malpractice, an d th e like ) t o th e attitude s o f individuals . Thes e attitude s ca n onl y b e determined empiricall y an d Freidso n remark s tha t ther e ar e n o data abou t th e proportion o f professionals wh o do, i n fact, manifestl y follo w a servic e ideal ; nor d o we kno w how intense thi s orientation is, or how predominant, relative to other professional orientations; finally, w e do not know i f the service ideal is more widespread and mor e intense , i n general, amon g professional s tha n amon g othe r workers. We know, however , tha t o f al l broa d occupationa l strat a today , professional s report most often high satisfactio n with their w o r k . A s Wilensky has shown , more refined question s tha n "ho w satisfied ar e you with you r present job?" an d a subtler 27

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survey desig n revea l that , a t times , "th e differenc e betwee n occupationa l group s within th e sam e occupational stratum is greater tha n the difference betwee n group s two strat a apart." Nevertheless , despit e th e grea t importance o f particular work settings an d th e variation s among variou s professiona l groups , al l of them declar e more often than other workers that they "woul d tr y to get into a similar type of work if the y could star t over again." I n the light of Wilensky's other data, thi s response cannot b e unambiguously tied to the objective advantages of professional wor k over other kind s o f occupations : accordin g t o Wilensky' s measures o f dissatisfaction , the highes t proportio n of "alienated" worker s was t o be foun d amon g highl y paid engineers i n an unsatisfactor y firm ; thes e same engineers, sol o lawyers, and urba n university professor s exhibite d the sam e proportions of "high attachment " t o their work a s th e two lower white-collar groups . However , those professional categorie s with th e highest proportion of respondents reportin g indifference on all the item s of the questionnaire (1 6 percent amon g solo lawyers and professors i n two universities with religious affiliation) wer e still six percentage point s below the non-professiona l categories wit h th e smalles t proportio n of work-indifferent member s (lowe r whitecollar an d uppe r blue-colla r under thirty). 31

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This ambiguity suggests that the professionals' respons e may be reflecting different levels of ideology whic h cumulatively shape their view of their relations to their work. A t on e level, identification wit h their work reveals the influence of the general ideology's positiv e evaluation of professions: Wilensky' s professional respondent s " k n o w " tha t their roles are among the most prestigious and desirable i n the society. At anothe r level , they reflect the effectiveness o f the process of "production of producers": th e sel f ha s becom e investe d i n the wor k role , at leas t t o some extent. In fact, i n Wilensky's measures of the " f i t " betwee n prize d attributes o f the sel f an d dimensions of the work role , the professions take n a s a whole show relativel y mor e attachment an d less indifference to their work tha n the non-professional categories : the differenc e i n scores between professiona l an d betwee n lowe r white-collar cate gories i s almos t everywher e large r tha n tha t betwee n whit e collar and uppe r blue collar groups . By genera l agreement , work-connecte d values ar e losin g their nineteenth-century "sacred" cas t in our society: the attitudes of individual professionals ma y be increasingly converging toward a middle zone of indifference to work: al l th e lower occupational categorie s (excep t th e lowest , whic h ar e characterize d b y a more salien t an d vigorous rejectio n of their generally detestable work ) precede d the m i n this movement toward passive adjustment . Nevertheless , th e difference i n measures of attachment and indifference suggests that professionals stil l tend to be clearly more workoriented" tha n other occupationa l groups. Thi s work orientatio n includes wha t we may call an entrepreneurial dimension: it will presumabl y be stronger among "free " professionals an d i t must hav e bee n stil l stronge r whe n the profession s emerge d i n their moder n form , a t th e tim e of the industria l countries' take-of f an d durin g the consolidation o f thei r development . A s Wilensk y remarks : wherever economi c growth is sustained, societa l values whic h acquire a sacred cast and which are favorable to economic growth wil l appear , both furthering an d reflecting that g r o w t h . " 44

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We ar e no t concerne d her e wit h th e rol e played b y th e Purita n ethic i n bringin g about th e economi c etho s o f nineteenth-century capitalism . Bu t i t i s importan t to distinguish the tw o dimensions which , i n Weber's analysis , fus e t o form th e "spe cifically bourgoi s economi c ethic" : on e i s a n entrepreneuria l dimension ; the othe r is the notio n of calling o r vocation. Together, the y provid e an ethica l justificatio n for capita l accumulation and the maximizatio n of pecuniary interests . Insofa r as th e professions' wor k orientatio n is based o n thi s ethic , i t reinforces thei r market ori entation an d no t their anti-market components. Th e entrepreneuria l orientatio n and the notio n of calling are , however , analyticall y distinct: Weber kep t them separate, as h e remarke d tha t Protestan t asceticis m ha d "legalize d th e exploitatio n of thi s specific willingnes s to work i n that it also interprete d the employer's business activity a s a c a l l i n g . " In itself , the notio n of calling i s the ethical base of the moder n divisio n o f labor. Durkheim als o ha d see n its importance: i n an individualisti c an d atomize d society , the notio n of calling appeare d a s th e necessar y lin k betwee n th e "cul t o f the indi vidual" an d th e collectiv e needs , characterize d b y increasin g economi c interde pendence. I n Durkheim' s idealisti c language , "th e categorica l imperativ e o f th e moral conscienc e i s assumin g th e followin g form : Make yourself usefully fulfill a determinate function." I n hi s approach , onl y th e fi t between individua l talent s and wor k role s coul d generate organi c solidarity . Essential t o thi s fi t was th e fre e choice o f a vocation: "as thi s specializatio n result s fro m purel y individua l efforts , it ha s neithe r th e fixit y no r th e rigidit y whic h a lon g heredity alon e ca n produce . These practices ar e very supple becaus e they ar e ver y young. As it is the individua l who engage d himsel f i n them , h e ca n disengag e himself , an d betak e himsel f t o new ones." The elements tha t explain Durkheim's interest i n the professions als o explai n the work-orientation o f professionals. Becaus e professional role s ar e privileged , desir able, reserve d t o a minority , an d today , accessibl e onl y afte r relativel y prolonged and difficul t training , thos e wh o choose the m d o so , mos t often , b y a n apparentl y free choice : a choice, tha t is , i n which th e individua l seek s to maximize the fi t between hi s talent s o r preference s an d a wor k role . I n our society , wha t Durkheim called abnorma l form s o f the divisio n o f labor—forced choice s an d anomi c func tional diversity—have never ceased to predominate; professionals , therefore , atypi cally embod y occupationa l "normality" : because thei r choic e wa s relativel y fre e and thei r wor k i s relativel y interesting an d creative , the y maintai n aliv e th e ide a that wor k ma y hav e a n intrinsic value . Thi s orientatio n toward wor k i s character istic, i n itself, o f the Renaissanc e idea l of craftsmanship. I n principle, we shoul d expect professionals t o place more intrinsic value in their work than most other occupational categories . T o the exten t tha t thi s i s true, callin g supersede s the entrepre neurial orientation . Whil e th e latter' s wor k ethi c ma y b e th e mos t vigorous , th e values i t places on work ar e extrinsic: whether the goal is profit o r salvation, God or mammon, i t is outside th e occupationa l functio n itself. The tw o dimensions—entrepreneurial an d vocational—ar e analytically distinct , but they appear fused i n the earl y modern professions . A s the condition s of profes35

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sional wor k change , th e entrepreneuria l emphasi s o n independen t employmen t may b e replace d b y mer e economi c instrumentalism . Th e vocationa l orientation, on th e othe r hand , encompasse s bot h a n emphasi s o n self-realizatio n an d creativ e self-expression, an d a concern wit h th e fiel d o f the professio n a s a whole, that is , with th e "advancemen t o f function" single d ou t b y Tawney . Th e fusio n o f vocational an d entrepreneuria l orientation s generate s tensions , bot h fo r th e individua l professional an d for the professio n a s a whole. The genera l condition s of work an d the ideolog y of the profession broadl y define, i n each case, the type of tension tha t will arise . I hav e implie d in the preceding paragraphs that the "idea l of service"—for whic h there i s scant empirical evidence—translates a t the individua l level into a work ethic which place s intrinsic valu e o n work . Whateve r els e the servic e orientatio n is i n a secularized society , it s ethical and motivationa l base must includ e a sense of work as self-realizatio n and a sense of duty to one's callin g deepe r than just complianc e with a set o f standards. C . Wrigh t Mills , commentin g on the passin g o f the crafts manship idea l in today's occupationa l world, observed : "Th e shar p focus on money is par t an d parce l o f the lac k of intrinsic meanin g tha t wor k ha s com e t o have." This declin e i s associate d wit h a variety of objective factors. I n any case , i t seems legitimate t o expec t tha t th e los s o f work' s intrinsi c value wil l resul t i n relatively greater commercializatio n for th e professio n an d greate r instrumentalis m fo r th e individual professionals . To recapitulat e thi s discussio n o f th e firs t sourc e o f "anti-market " ideologica l values: wha t Polany i calle d "th e self-protectio n o f society " immediatel y evoke s the professions ' servic e ideal , which I have treate d a s a n orientation toward the ad vancement o f the profession 's functio n and , a t the individua l level , a s a work ethi c based on a blend of calling and craftmanship ideals . The advancement o f function — which Tawney called "the principl e of purpose"—necessarily involve d th e profes sions wit h th e consequence s of savage industrialization i n the competitiv e phase of capitalism. The intrinsic value of work stoo d in contrast t o the kind of work that was becoming the norm for the industrial masses: the sale of their labor power was compulsory (insofar as it was the only alternativ e to starvation), and in the factories wor k was als o becomin g increasingly separated fro m skil l o r craft. T o the exten t tha t th e professions incorporate d th e "principl e of purpose " an d element s o f th e idea l of craftmanship, the y possesse d anti-marke t an d anti-capitalis t components . Thei r corporate exclusivenes s contribute d thereafte r t o maintainin g these components . The secon d ideologica l source on whic h th e profession s founde d thei r claims to ethicality wa s a pre-industrial conception of social bonds. Th e appea l t o communal ideals constitutes , i n fact, anothe r elemen t o f "social self-protection " in Polanyi's view. Th e Europea n pre-industria l community, however, wa s deepl y inegalitarian, while differen t but no less inegalitarian strains ra n throug h the fabri c o f the demo cratic Unite d States . Th e ideolog y of community contained, therefore , element s o f legitimation of th e class structure. These ideological legitimations were in the broader sense religions. In Hobsbawm's words , the y wer e manifes t i n "th e genera l socia l conviction that men had duties as well as rights, that virtue was not simply the equivalent o f money, an d th e lowe r orders, thoug h low , had a right t o their modest live s 39

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in the statio n to which God had called t h e m . " Thi s pre-industrial ideology carried over i n th e mode l o f th e gentleman , whic h wa s als o importan t i n th e nineteenth century Unite d States . Thi s mode l animate d th e professions ' mobilit y project . I t was incorporate d int o th e prevailin g conception o f libera l education an d passed , from there , int o the professions ' attempt s a t formalizin g an economic ethic . I n the words of one author , "Th e ne w professiona l me n brough t on e scal e of values—th e gentleman's—to bea r upon the other—the tradesman's—an d produced a specialized variety o f busines s moralit y whic h cam e t o b e know n a s 'professiona l ethics ' o r 'etiquette.'" Anti-market an d anti-capitalis t principle s wer e incorporate d i n th e professions ' task o f organizing for a market becaus e they wer e element s which supporte d socia l credit and the public' s belief i n professional ethicality . Thus , a t the cor e o f the professional project , w e fin d th e fusio n o f antithetical ideological structures an d a potential for permanent tensio n betwee n "civilizin g function" and market-orientation, between th e "protectio n of society" an d the securin g of a market, betwee n intrinsic and extrinsi c values o f work. I n the analytica l framework I proposed, th e securin g of a market wa s th e minimu m common denominator whic h bound al l kinds of professionals t o obeying their "community's" standards. Thus, the professions embod ied bot h levelin g and differentiatin g principle s o f socia l organization : whil e stan dardizing th e "productio n o f producers " an d th e condition s o f entry, o n th e on e hand, professional s sought , o n th e other , t o attai n b y thes e mean s legitimat e bu t unequal statu s positions. I t is fro m th e ideal-typica l point of view o f collective mobility tha t w e mus t no w envisag e their project . 40

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PART II

THE COLLECTIVE CONQUEST OF STATUS

Chapter 6

THE COLLECTIVE MOBILITY PROJECT

I hav e argue d tha t th e structur e o f profession s result s fro m tw o processes : th e process of organization for a market of services, an d the process of collective mobil ity b y whic h th e earl y moder n profession s attache d statu s an d socia l standin g t o their transformed occupationa l roles. The two processes are distinc t analytical constructs whic h ca n b e "read " ou t o f the sam e empirical material. I n other words , they ar e differen t way s o f organizin g o r givin g meanin g t o a unitar y historical process. The proces s o f organization for a marke t o f services , whic h I have analyze d i n the firs t par t o f this study , ha s theoretica l precedence: fo r indeed , i n order t o us e occupational roles for the conquest o f social status, i t was necessary firs t t o build a solid base in the social division of labor. Withou t a relatively secure market, the new pattern o f mobilit y inaugurate d b y th e nineteenth-centur y profession s woul d hav e been meaningless . Actually , al l the devices mobilize d fo r the construction of a professional marke t an d th e organizatio n of the correspondin g are a of the socia l divi sion o f labo r als o serve d th e professions ' driv e towar d respectabilit y an d socia l standing. I hav e attempte d t o sho w i n the las t chapte r tha t thi s relation was recip rocal: th e succes s o f the professiona l mobilit y projec t depende d o n th e existenc e of a stabl e market ; bu t also , i n the proces s o f securin g a market , th e profession s variously incorporate d ideologica l supports connecte d wit h "anti-market " struc tures of stratification. Thes e pre-industrial structures provided both models of gentility towar d whic h nineteent h centur y professiona l me n aspired , an d image s whic h legitimized statu s inequality. Because these models evoke d legitimizin g notion s of disinterestedness an d nobless e oblige , they helpe d t o guarante e o n th e marke t th e professions' ethicality . Insofa r a s th e profession s relie d o n these guarantees , the y reinforced th e ideologica l persistence o f " o l d " stratification structures . The analysi s o f mobilit y whic h I a m proposin g no w necessaril y return s t o ele ments o f the structure of profession whic h have already been analzye d fro m th e per spective o f the market . Th e incorporatio n of ideological warrant s derive d from th e pre-industrial syste m of stratification doe s not contradict my theoretical standpoint: the organizatio n of modern professiona l market s implied , i n principle, th e formal emancipation o f the ol d professions fro m thei r aristocratic o r communal supports. In th e sam e manner , w e mus t conside r no w t o wha t exten t th e persistenc e o f old stratification structure s an d imager y modifie d wha t wa s specificall y ne w i n th e

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mobility projec t o f the professions . Befor e this , however, I must clarif y th e objec tives o f thi s collectiv e project , whic h I hav e characterize d vaguel y a s "gainin g status through work. " In th e firs t place , th e professiona l projec t o f socia l mobilit y i s considere d a s a collective project , becaus e only throug h a joint organizationa l effort coul d roles b e created—or redefined—tha t woul d brin g th e desire d socia l position to thei r occupants. Thi s point connects th e professiona l projec t wit h broade r processe s of social stratification a t wor k i n the "grea t transformation. " Suffic e i t to note her e that th e aims of this collective mobility projec t are , ultimately , individualistic, althoug h the project an d it s means are collective : it is through the upgradin g of an occupation— with th e attempt s t o control the individua l members whic h this involves—that prestige is to be attache d t o the professional roles , an d by extension, t o their occupants . Although th e mean s use d i n this collective search fo r prestige ar e thos e use d i n the establishment o f the professional market , they spell , here, a different end result: that is to say, th e result envisaged fro m th e point of view of collective mobility (an d of expecte d individua l benefit s derive d fro m prestige ) i s no t intelligibl e fro m th e market poin t of view. Th e source s of prestige whic h ar e tappe d o r incorporate d a s means of social mobility i n the professional projec t can be schematicall y differenti ated alon g thre e mai n dimensions : 1. I n terms of their relation to the professional market : are they attached t o structures relativel y independent fro m th e professiona l marke t or do the y flow , instead , from a n achieve d marke t position ? In th e formativ e period , th e predominan t mean s o f th e professiona l mobilit y project ar e independent , a s yet, of the market. I shall indicate, in terms o f an idealtype, how the situation changes when the market is established an d the profession i s consolidated. 2. I n term s o f thei r moder n o r traditiona l character, implicitl y an d explicitl y defined i n the precedin g chapters . Thi s dimensio n distinguishe s th e ol d or ancien regime professionals , dependen t o n aristocrati c source s o f legitimatio n an d elit e sponsorship, fro m th e professional s wh o are attemptin g to devise thei r own criteria or exclusion-inclusion on the basi s of tested competenc e an d tested master y ove r a professionally define d body o f knowledge. Th e stat e backing which th e latte r also seek is claimed, however, on the basis of superior competence an d no longer on that of associatio n wit h a n elite. 3. I n term s o f th e "autonomous " o r "heteronomous " characte r o f th e mean s employed: "autonomous " ar e thos e means in the definitio n o r formation of which the professional (o r pre-professional) group s played a significant, if no t major, role; "heteronomous" ar e mean s chiefly define d o r formed by other socia l groups. Thi s dimension overlap s wit h th e precedin g on e ("traditional " and "modern " means ) only i n part. According t o thes e dimensions , a classificatio n o f means b y whic h prestig e i s attached t o an occupationa l rol e (together wit h th e institutiona l o r structura l source in whic h th e mean s are commonl y located) ca n b e attempted . A general analytica l approach i s implicit in such a classificatory device: when a set of means is not available at a given time in a specific society, this lack of access leads professional entre preneurs to emphasize o r t o rel y mor e exclusivel y upon anothe r se t o f means.

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The overschemati c classificatio n in Table 1 is propose d onl y a s a n orderin g de vice. I t cannot b e generalized withou t substantia l modification s to professionaliza tion processes which take plac e withi n a n already define d institutiona l context (that is, contemporary profession s spawne d b y the state and by corporate economi c orga nizations). I n particular , th e variabl e an d diffus e ideologica l mechanisms whic h recognize a profession' s function s a s "noble, " "progressive, " o r "sociall y usef u l " canno t b e locate d i n any on e cell ; rather , ideolog y colors th e effectivenes s o f every se t o f means available to a profession i n its mobility project , becaus e it ulti mately determine s th e publi c trus t an d prestig e whic h a professio n "deserves. " Nevertheless, thi s classificator y devic e distinguishe s betwee n variou s mean s b y which prestige is attached t o an occupational role. In other words, it ranks the typical means that can be mobilized i f th e members o f an occupation are t o be "normally" recognized a s "gentlemen, " a s bette r educate d tha n other s i n th e occupationa l hierarchy, as more competent tha n their rivals in the same area of the social division 1

Table 1 . MEAN S OR SOURCES OF PROFESSIONA L PRESTIG E I . INDEPENDEN T O F THE PROFESSIONAL MARKET Autonomous Means

Heteronomous Means

"Traditional" Means

Aristocratic or liberal education. (Institutionally locate d in corporate bodies like the Inns of Court, Roya l Colleges, academic bodies , or in "ancient" universities.)

Aristocratic or gentlemanly characteristics (noblesse oblige). (Structurally locate d in "aristocratic" or "old" elites.)

"Modern" Means

Systematic training and testing. (Institutionally locate d in professional schools an d "modern" university.)

Registration, licensing. (Institutionally locate d in th e state.)

I I . DEPENDEN T UPO N A N ESTABLISHED PROFESSIONA L MARKET Autonomous Means

Cognitive exclusiveness. (Institutionally locate d in professional associations, "modern" university. )

Heteronomous Means

Higher income s and prestige than most other occupations. Connections with "extraprofessional" power . (Institutionally locate d in the state, corporations, and university.)

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of labor , a s th e sol e legitimat e providers o f a valued service , a s th e sol e keeper s of a valued bod y o f knowledge, a s legitimat e claimants t o highe r economi c rewards , and th e like . This preliminar y analysis ha s attempte d t o clarif y th e outline s o f the socia l mo bility project pursued b y the old professions. Th e more extended analysi s that follow s will hav e a two-fol d purpose : first , tha t o f clarifyin g th e connection s o f thi s ne w path of middle-class mobilit y with the system of stratification that takes shape during the "grea t transformation" ; an d second , tha t o f definin g th e genera l pattern s o f individual motivation which may accoun t fo r the collectiv e character of the project . Most contemporary studie s of stratification depart fro m th e classica l sociological tradition i n that they view stratification systems as hierarchies o f ranks whos e socia l units ar e individual s or families . Differentia l reward s o r disadvantage s accru e t o these social units as a function of their rank, o r their position with regard t o the distribution of a valued attribute. Th e emphasis is on individuals (or families) and allo cation mechanisms . Th e Marxis t perspective emphasizes , instead , structura l rela tions of inequality between collectivitie s which can become real group s an d organiz e in orde r t o act upo n these structural relations. I n any case, classes and not individu als ar e th e prope r unit s of analysis o f the clas s system . Focusin g o n status , Webe r also underscore d tha t statu s derive d fro m communities , howeve r amorphous ; a n analysis o f socia l prestig e ha d t o start , therefore , wit h collectiv e units. I n a somewhat simila r vein, Stinchcombe start s by askin g wha t kin d o f social unit s typicall y serve a s guarantor s o f "credi t ratings " i n different societie s an d epochs ; h e call s "credit rating " a "particula r kin d o f reputationa l measur e o f stratificatio n whic h measures prestig e a t th e crucia l poin t wher e i t i s turne d int o th e contro l ove r re sources." An d he adds: " W i th modernizatio n . . . [the ] credit rating of the lineag e as bot h a fir m an d a famil y become s differentiate d int o a credi t ratin g o f nuclea r families an d a credi t ratin g o f specia l purpos e organizations . . . . Many of the important stratification phenomena in modern society have to do with the ranking of organizations.'' Now, althoug h a profession a s a whole is too loos e an d disparate a "community of fate " t o b e considere d a n organizatio n proper , it s raiso n d'etre , fro m th e poin t of view of stratification, i s the collective credi t rating which it passes on to its members and which is totally determined by the success of the profession's organizational efforts. Thi s collectiv e credit ratin g establishes, first , th e relativel y superior rank ing an d the comman d ove r resources of two organizations: th e professiona l associa tion an d th e professiona l school , whic h striv e i n effect t o monopoliz e th e functio n of guaranteein g th e futur e performanc e o f their members or students. Thi s monopoly, I have argued earlier , give s some guarante e to the publi c about th e behavio r of individual members, bu t it also places the profession, a s embodied in these two organizations, ahea d o f it s competitors . Fro m thi s poin t o f view , loos e occupationa l communities o f independen t producer s o f service s ar e spurre d t o organiz e b y th e competition for prestige, a resource which the y ai m at converting into monopolistic power in their markets. Th e succes s of their efforts become s visible when they col lectively outran k (o r eliminate) competitors an d whe n the y als o obtain supervisor y or controllin g authorit y over related occupations . 2

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In term s o f a n ideal-type , wha t wa s ne w i n the professiona l projec t i s tha t th e typical professiona l organization s claime d th e ran k o f sol e distributor s o f credi t ratings on a new basis—that o f competence, a s defined and measured b y a system of testing, an d later, b y the professiona l school . Elit e statu s was no longer claimed on the basis of identification wit h the extraneous stratificatio n criteria of "aristocratic" elites, bu t in new organizationa l terms: elit e status and even "gentility " wer e conferred b y th e positio n of th e professio n o n a n occupationa l ladde r an d measured , essentially, in terms of educational distance fro m other occupations. Th e new criteria of stratificatio n inaugurated b y the profession s hinged , therefore, o n the emergence of a n educational syste m oriente d toward the modern divisio n o f labor. I n the same manner, w e hav e see n tha t contro l of th e marke t ultimatel y required th e institu tionalization an d the contro l of a system fo r the standardize d productio n of producers. Th e professions' potentia l for both marke t contro l and superior rankin g largely depended, therefore , o n th e organizatio n o f a n educationa l syste m alon g moder n lines. Until a profession i s stably organized, the distinctive pattern of mobility i s collective an d consists i n the organizational effort itself . Individual mobilit y stil l tends to follow th e pattern of patronage o r competitive entrepreneurship. A n impressionistic indicator o f organizational strengt h i s th e emergenc e o f a professional associatio n recognized as representative b y the public authorities or by a significant sector of the public. Externally , this means that th e professiona l associatio n mus t b e recognize d by th e state : for, indeed , give n the ne w "objective " basi s on whic h privilege s ar e claimed, onl y th e stat e has th e appearanc e of neutrality necessary to guarante e th e "objectively" superio r competenc e o f a category o f professionals. Internally , the emergence o f a professiona l organizatio n a s "representativ e spokesman " fo r th e profession i s possibl e onl y i f the organizatio n i s no t challenge d b y anothe r on e of equal credibility . Thi s means, in turn, tha t th e "representative " associatio n shoul d have succeeded i n enlisting the suppor t o f all the relevan t professiona l elites , o r a t least obtaine d thei r neutrality. Because o f th e professiona l association' s effort s t o regulat e competition , th e entrepreneurial for m o f individual mobilit y begin s t o be considere d disreputabl e a t this point , and i s seen as harmfu l to the collectiv e effort. A much more significant indicator o f organization, however , i s th e institutionalizatio n o f the passag e fro m professional trainin g to professiona l practice : i t means that a larg e majorit y o f th e practitioners com e fro m educationa l institution s accredite d a s th e sol e legitimat e ones by the profession a s a whole. When entry int o the profession i s thus tie d t o an organized syste m fo r the production of producers, th e pattern of individual mobilit y typical o f th e organize d professio n approache s th e patter n o f career—tha t is , th e characteristic mod e o f advancement o f individuals i n organizations. I n Wilensky's words, " A career, viewed structurally, is a succession o f related jobs, arrange d i n a hierarchy of prestige, throug h which person s move in an ordered, predictabl e se quence. Corollarie s ar e tha t th e jo b patter n i s institute d (sociall y recognized an d sanctioned withi n som e social unit) and has som e stability (the system i s maintained over mor e tha n on e generatio n o f recruits)." 4

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Let us pull together the various elements o f the argument up to this point. Whether the leaders of the profession projec t wanted to be "lik e gentlemen " o r not is immaterial—although one ma y presume that the individua l motivatio n t o be a s respecte d as th e "highe r branches" i n England, o r as one's best clients in the Unite d States , must have been quite strong. Wha t is important is that attribute s o f "gentility" an d references t o older legitimizations of privilege ha d t o be incorporate d as source s of social credit and guarantee s of ethicality, so long as the professions were not sufficiently organized to substitute their own organizational rankings, base d essentiall y on th e contro l over a syste m fo r the productio n of producers . The criterio n o f education an d teste d competenc e pertain s t o a model of stratifi cation in which individual position is determined more by the cohesiveness and relative rankin g o f organize d occupation s than b y lineage . Th e ris e o f th e industria l bourgeoisie ha d already represente d a step in the direction of "organization-based " mobility. A s Stinchcomb e remarks , i n th e nineteenth-centur y mode l o f busines s entrepreneurship, "th e mai n wa y fo r a n organizationa l leade r t o ge t ahea d i s t o improve th e positio n of his organizatio n rather tha n t o mov e u p withi n i t . " The rise of the "learned " bourgeoisi e link s individua l mobility to education—a n attribute which, i n theory, i s easier to come b y than capital. In the entrepreneuria l pattern o f mobility , th e "credi t rating " o f a nuclea r famil y an d tha t o f "special purpose organizations' ' intersecte d i n the family firm . Th e consolidation o f the older professions, a s wel l a s th e ris e o f newer ones , coincide s wit h th e "organizationa l revolution," whic h extend s bureaucratic administratio n to al l sectors o f economi c and socia l life . I n the matur e professiona l pattern , th e basi c statu s o f the nuclea r family i s conferred upo n th e hea d b y a n educationa l center , whic h i s itsel f ranke d with regard to other centers, an d by the profession itself , ranked with regard to other occupations. Furthe r advancemen t take s place , then , i n a professiona l marke t i n which th e forma l an d informa l organizatio n o f the professio n ar e th e chie f deter minants o f individual career. Moreover , wit h th e declin e o f the fre e professional , both individua l "credi t ratings" an d careers tend increasingly to depend o n bureau cratic organizationa l frameworks . It i s possible t o see, i n this light, wha t binds the average (or even no t so average ) practitioner t o the organize d profession , onc e the latte r i s consolidated. Internally, consolidation mean s that cognitiv e exclusiveness i s achieved (a t least in relation to competitors) and tha t a n educational syste m i s institutionalize d an d relativel y standardized. It should also mean that the various sectors of the profession—generalists , specialists, academics , researchers , eminen t practitioners , regiona l groups an d th e like—have divide d amon g themselve s th e powe r o f governanc e an d hav e reache d the stage where a relatively stable coalitio n is possible. Thes e various groups, more over, ar e implicitl y o r explicitly ranked i n a hierarchy of power and prestige whic h is intelligible to all, i f not accepted b y all. A t this point, professional elites are clearly identifiable an d s o i s th e rankin g of professional school s an d organization s (o r the ranking of organizations in which professionals work) . The majority of the practitioners nee d not—an d i n fact d o not—participat e i n the centra l professiona l associa tions, whic h ar e almos t invariabl y controlled by well-entrenche d elites. Althoug h 5

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there i s evidenc e t o sugges t tha t involvemen t in professional associations , amon g other professiona l activities , helps advancemen t i n organizational context s no t directly controlle d by th e profession , thi s allegianc e i s mor e importan t for th e indi vidual tha n fo r the professiona l collectivity. Indeed , s o lon g a s th e non-affiliated do no t have the powe r t o for m a n effectiv e riva l association , th e forma l affiliatio n of a majorit y o f practitioner s i s no t a n indicatio n of a profession' s cohesiveness . Power withi n a profession lie s in controlling education and career facilities, because in a n organize d professio n th e practitioners , almos t withou t exception , mus t pass through th e educationa l center s an d throug h the organization s i n which caree r unfolds. Fro m the poin t of view o f socialization into the professio n an d professiona l "cohesion," contro l over member s i s therefor e a matte r o f structur e muc h mor e than a matter of obedience t o an association's cod e of ethics. I t is clear als o that this control is exercised t o the extent and in the direction favored by a profession's orga nizational elites. 9

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At thi s stage , persona l prestig e i s almos t equivalen t t o organizationa l prestige : doctors ar e identifie d wit h thei r hospitals , lawyers , architects , an d engineer s wit h their firms , an d ever y professiona l wit h hi s academi c origins . Personal an d organizational connection s fus e i n a ne w patter n o f sponsorship : th e averag e o r th e be ginning professional s wh o aspir e t o a caree r mus t ge t int o the " r i g h t " networks , that is , th e network s leadin g t o th e to p rung s o f the organizationa l hierarchy. I t is always th e cas e that organizationa l elites, a s Stinchcomb e remarks , hav e a deeper involvement an d a larger stak e in the fat e o f the organizatio n or organizations than "inferiors" o r non-elites. But , in the context of an organized profession, th e latter are bound to the elites by a shared fram e of reference an d a common system of evaluation: there are , afte r all , relatively few other criteria of personal progress and profes sional excellence tha n those sanctioned b y a profession's elites . A problem to which I shal l return later is that of the various degrees and forms of marginality: for, indeed, to orien t one's professiona l lif e outsid e th e syste m o f evaluation and reward s wit h which the elites are ideologically identified an d which others endorse, at least tacitly, is to accept marginality by force or choice. I t also involves the possibilit y of taking a critical stand , individuall y or as a group, implicitl y or explicitly, towar d the domi nant organizatio n of a profession. When a profession i s organized, then , the bonds between professional elites and non-elites are structurally supported by the overlap between individual mobility and organizational rankings: i n pursuing individua l mobility , aspirin g profession als reinforce the hierarchy of organizations upo n which elites found their status and their privileges . But wha t explain s th e convergenc e o f the mos t divers e individua l motives towar d the projec t o f professional mobilit y i n the formativ e or preconsolidation period ? A collectiv e project alway s serve s in some fashion th e self-interes t o f the partici pants: i f nothing else, because it shapes individual interest s int o an emergent form . If w e consider individua l motivation, however, i t appears that the collectivity should be abl e t o offer o r promise somewha t higher—o r more secure or more desirable — rewards tha n thos e attainabl e outsid e it s bounds. Sinc e th e professions ar e project s of organizatio n for a market at the same time that they are projects o f collective mo11

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bility, economi c reward s shoul d b e considere d first : d o th e averag e rewards o f the "regular" sector s of the professio n compensat e for the socia l control to whic h th e "regular" member s submit ? For this , le t u s tak e som e illustration s from medicin e befor e th e bacteriological revolution: the economic rewards tha t doctors coul d expect varied greatly according to country and locality . Som e o f the mai n factors o f variation hav e been discusse d above: th e size , stability , an d socioeconomi c statu s o f th e clientele ; th e persona l reputation of the physician and that of the group or school to which he was connected ; and th e sponsorshi p o f aristocratic elites , loca l notables , o r publi c authorities. By th e mid-nineteent h centur y th e moder n o r reformis t professiona l elite s i n the cities were relatively affluent and well-established; this was true even in England, where thei r parity with th e traditiona l elites wa s no t officiall y sanctione d unti l th e Medical Ac t of 1858. Althoug h th e initia l investmen t i n training varied, the costs of establishment—tha t is , som e source of income whic h coul d support th e practitioner in a respectable standin g an d keep him from th e temptation s o f purely commercial practices—mus t hav e operate d a s a shar p differentia l i n a beginner' s chances. Younge r and more marginal men appear to have found the goin g rough. The necessary respectability came from connections an d independent income . Thos e who wer e lackin g in both were particularl y threatened b y unqualifie d competition . This was all the more so since a rising tide of quackery claimed to fill the unwarranted promises tha t critical physicians wer e no longer willing t o make. Exacerbate d com petition contributed to the public's suspicion that the profession wa s mercenar y an d selfish. Thi s suspicion, furthermore , hampere d th e effort s t o raise th e uneve n stan dards o f training and cur b quackery . Th e averag e practitione r was caugh t i n a dilemma: if he should attempt to stabilize his income and demand payment, his clientele could respon d b y doubting his motives and ethicality . No t surprisingly, complaints about unpai d fee s wer e frequent , eve n amon g successfu l practitioners . W e ca n imagine ho w muc h harde r i t wa s t o mak e a livin g fo r averag e physician s an d fo r the younge r me n wh o had t o compete wit h mor e establishe d an d olde r colleagues . In th e Unite d States , despit e oppositio n by the America n Medical Association and other societies , hard-presse d physician s ofte n contracte d fo r th e annua l medica l care of a whole famil y fo r a very smal l sum. In th e Unite d States , besides , trainin g standards were ofte n abysmall y low : " In his inaugura l addres s a t th e Universit y of Nashville , in 1829 , Presiden t Lindsle y declared tha t i t was easier at the tim e in Tennessee to qualify fo r the practice of the law o r medicine than to build a dray, o r shoe a horse." Thi s situation aggravate d the discredi t wit h whic h eve n seriou s professional s ha d t o contend . Bu t eve n i n countries lik e Franc e an d Germany , wher e medica l trainin g was amon g th e ver y best available in the nineteenth century, quackery could not be effectively contained. Nor coul d th e averag e membe r o f th e medica l professio n secur e a comfortabl e income: thu s "On e hal f o f th e physician s o f Berli n received , a s lat e a s 1895 , a n annual incom e o f less tha n thre e thousan d marks ; an d tha t o f thei r colleague s i n Vienna wa s eve n les s than tha t amount." These examples fro m medicin e support a logical proposition: the process of organization fo r marke t contro l has t o b e relativel y advanced befor e a professio n ca n 13

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offer it s members substantia l an d secure enough economic reward s i n exchange for its attempt s t o regulat e professiona l behavior . Regulatio n o f competitio n tends t o favor th e alread y establishe d elite s o f th e professio n b y freezin g th e marke t i n a given configuration of advantages. Therefore, the motivation to respond to the efforts of th e organizationa l leaders canno t b e interprete d i n "pure " economi c o r marke t terms, a t least not unti l th e organized sector s of the professio n hav e attained a relatively hig h measur e o f control over th e market . Becaus e th e doubl e natur e o f th e professional projec t fuses economi c an d statu s rewards, i t is difficult t o define the oretically th e organizationa l stage at whic h i t becomes profitable t o join th e "regu lar" professio n an d submi t t o it s control . It follows tha t th e mode l o f motivation adequate t o explai n market behavior— a mode l whic h shoul d logicall y b e derive d from tha t o f classica l economics—canno t accoun t fo r th e mergin g o f individua l motives int o the collectiv e project o f profession . We nee d t o fin d a mean s o f accountin g fo r thi s convergenc e tha t goe s beyon d economic self-interest , whil e making allowances fo r it. A s I have constantly empha sized, the professional project is an organizational project: it organizes th e production of producers an d the transaction of services fo r a market; it tends to privilege organizational unit s i n the syste m o f stratification ; it works through , an d culminate s in, distinctive organizations—the professiona l schoo l and th e professiona l association . Today, professiona l role s ten d t o be organize d o r include d into bureaucratic struc tures. A model of "bureaucratic motivation, " whic h accounts fo r "the motivationa l significance o f various structura l feature s o f bureaucracies," migh t therefore b e more adequate than a market-oriented model of economic action for this later phase. Indeed, organize d professions posses s the structural means to incorporate an d regulate individua l ambitio n into a career, tha t is , a n organize d trajector y o f individual advancement. I n the formativ e period, however, w e need t o account fo r motivation in a stag e of transition towar d the organizationa l definitio n o f career. In terms o f an ideal-type, a central characteristic o f the modern professional proj ect i s that i t emancipated professio n fro m th e warrant s provide d by th e ol d syste m of stratification . Fro m the poin t of view o f the stratificatio n system, thi s amounte d to substituting new criteria of status and prestige fo r the old ones. As we know, the upgrading o f a n occupatio n int o a profession , o r th e upgradin g o f a professio n i n terms o f respectabilit y an d socia l credit , implie s th e articulatio n of principle s of inclusion an d exclusion. Which group s ma y b e attracte d or , conversely , threatene d by suc h a project ? The firs t obviou s answe r i s that th e professiona l group s entrenche d i n the tradi tional system of stratification wil l oppose the new criteria of professional legitimacy. As w e shall see i n the illustrativ e case of England, their presence colors and conditions th e mobilit y projec t o f the reformers . The secon d obviou s answe r i s tha t th e moder n elite s o f a profession hav e nothing t o los e an d nothin g to fear , sinc e the y ar e i n a position to define th e criteri a of inclusion an d exclusion . However , the y ar e alread y reapin g substantia l reward s from thei r professional work . Thes e rewards ma y see m suspect to potential follow ers: sinc e professio n i s not only a category i n an achievement-oriented occupationa l structure, but also a status category i n a stratification syste m with ineradicable ascriptive features, it s rewards can always be connected wit h particularistic and "usurped " 18

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advantages. Moreover , i n a transitiona l period , th e universalisti c legitimation s of these advantage s ar e neithe r institutionalize d nor visibl e enough t o appea r a s th e principal determinan t o f differentia l rewards. Therefore , suspicio n o f th e moder n elites wh o lea d th e organizationa l projec t ma y b e stron g amon g margina l potential followers. For instance, i n the firs t attempt s t o organize America n civil engineers , this suspicion wa s predictabl y presen t i n th e desir e t o promot e universalisti c criteri a of profession. I t was difficult t o organize scattere d and often antagonistic practitioners , the most successfu l o f which were almost necessarily connecte d wit h public authorities. I n consequence, the American Railroad Journal recommende d i n the 1840 s the "substitution o f a professiona l societ y fo r government s a s th e agenc y controlling engineer trainin g and selection. " I t also wen t o n t o lis t a s "th e gran d obstacl e t o the advancemen t o f the professio n i n the Unite d States" th e fac t that , fo r man y a successful engineer , "hi s politica l creed, an d the number of votes h e an d his friend s can command, woul d far outweigh the professional claim s of a rival who might unite in himsel f the genius o f all th e engineers of the age." Othe r writers proposed tha t younger engineer s take th e lea d i n professional organization , a fact whic h lead s the historian Calhoun to this realistic observation: "Ther e wa s a dissenting democratica l element withi n th e engineerin g profession , whos e exten t an d significanc e i t is hard to judge . . . . [However ] the successfu l engineer s against whos e leadershi p i t protested ha d th e resource s an d prestige , i f anybody did , t o overcom e th e practica l obstacles i n the wa y o f organization." 19

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These consideration s ma y b e extended : reformis t o r moder n professiona l elite s would naturall y tend to take th e leadershi p o f the organizational effort; i n fact, the y did so. Becaus e o f thei r elite position , their attempt s a t elevatin g th e professio n were obviousl y exclusive . T o b e qualifie d a s modern , thes e attempt s must hav e included a n emphasi s o n seriou s trainin g an d o n stricte r testin g o f cognitiv e an d technological proficiency . However , th e elit e statu s alread y achieve d b y th e orga nizational leader s le d the m t o als o tak e int o accoun t mor e diffus e an d ascriptiv e criteria o f professionalism, suc h a s thos e of gentlemanly standin g an d prope r con nections. Th e defense of universalistic and relativel y more "objective " educationa l differentials appears , thus , a s on e share d ideologica l basis whic h non-elit e profes sionals coul d us e t o challeng e th e interna l stratificatio n syste m o f th e emergen t profession. For professional s wh o feare d exclusio n o r resente d thei r ow n margina l status , vigilance agains t th e built-i n oligarchi c and elitis t tendencie s o f the organizationa l leaders ma y therefor e hav e bee n on e reaso n t o joi n th e movement . Th e non-elit e professional group s mos t likel y t o b e s o oriente d woul d b e thos e who , lik e th e younger civi l engineer s threatened b y the depressio n o f the 1840s , ha d autonomou s reasons to organize an d in some cases had independen t counter-projects. W e may safely assum e tha t non-elit e professional s ha d mor e intens e economi c preoccupa tions tha n th e organizationa l leaders . I t i s likely , therefore , tha t thei r economi c insecurity oriented them toward bread-and-butter considerations . O n the other hand , they wer e the mos t threatene d b y "unqualified " competition and needed to join th e upgrading project i n order t o put social distance betwee n themselve s and thei r "unprofessional" competitors . Competitio n fro m "irregulars " appears , therefore , a s 21

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perhaps the stronges t incentiv e toward the bridgin g of differences betwee n profes sional elite s an d non-elites . However , discrepancie s to o stron g t o b e reconcile d within the same organization would obviously lead to the emergence of rival profes sional associations . This , as w e know, was th e case before a modicum of cognitive unification wa s achieved . These lines of cleavage—and especiall y thos e generated b y a profession's inter nal stratification—appea r an d reappea r throughou t th e proces s of professionaliza tion. On e facto r o f unity ma y b e emphasized , however : regardless of the organiza tional conceptio n t o whic h the y responded , onl y thos e practitioner s wh o alread y could defin e themselve s a s professional s i n the mor e stringen t term s propose d b y the organizational leaders would have a stake in the corporate defense and upgrading of a n occupational category. Onl y they would have been attracted, i n one fashio n or another, b y the autonomous organization s through which the professions wer e seeking t o advanc e their goals o f mobility an d marke t control. Now, which types of practitioners would either be threatened b y the organizational project o r fin d i t irrelevant? On e typ e i s the practitione r with a purely commercial orientation an d a moderatel y profitabl e practice ; regulatio n o f competitio n an d restrictive codes of professional behavio r would interfere , rather than help, his indi vidual project . Anothe r type i s the solidl y entrenche d "local, " protecte d b y social and geographical isolation , and therefore indifferen t to the professional redefinition which preoccupie d thos e lackin g these natural protections . Anothe r yet i s th e les s educated olde r professional, unles s he could join wit h the others, an d press for placing protectiv e "grandfathe r clauses " amon g th e principle s of inclusion. This discussio n ha s attempte d t o clarif y th e diversit y of motives amon g profes sional group s o r professiona l type s i n a pre-consolidation period . I t has no t given us yet the model of motivation i n a period of transition. Th e elements o f an answer , however, hav e already bee n implicitl y assembled ; thei r point of convergence i s the historical contex t of the firs t wav e o f professionalization. Modern profession s ar e a typica l produc t o f the "grea t transformation. " The y emerge, thus , a s th e age-ol d foundation s o f status are bein g destroyed b y the twi n processes o f urbanizatio n an d industrialization . In a n apparentl y limitles s expan sion, nationa l markets ar e developin g for commodities an d fo r labor. A n impoverished an d brutall y exploited industrial proletariat i s replacin g th e peasantr y a t th e bottom of the emerging social hierarchy. At the same time, the increasingly complex social division of labor opens new role s at the to p of the ladder. Wrenche d fro m it s roots i n household an d community , work i s becoming fo r the majorit y o f men th e principal determinant o f social position and lif e chances . The unit s of the emerging stratification system , a s I pointed out before, ten d to become classes and occupationcentered organizations . This view fit s wit h th e argumen t advance d b y Kenneth Boulding abou t th e "de mand" fo r organizations: on e o f the predominan t individua l needs which organiza tions satisfy i s the need for status. H e writes: "Organization formalizes th e status of an individua l an d hence makes him more secur e in it. . . . B y formalizing a n indi vidual's position . . . th e status may be both improved and rendered mor e apparent ; uncertainty o f status is in itself a painful positio n for an individual t o be i n . " A l though th e suppl y sid e i s eve n mor e important , the socia l effect s o f the industrial 2 3

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revolution shap e th e deman d fo r status-givin g organizations : "Th e deman d fo r status is in part a n attribut e of self-consciousness. I t is likely t o increase with a rise in literac y and wit h a rise i n democratic consciousness . . . . It is in the rise of the market as a dominant instrument in the organization of society, and in the consequent disorganization of the status structure, that we may look for the reasons of a rising demand for status." * Professiona l market s ha d to be organized while , a t th e same time, ne w base s for statu s had t o b e created . Applied t o the professiona l project , Boulding' s general argumen t reveal s a powerful motivationa l base for the organizationa l effort : th e organizatio n o f professio n was mor e tha n simpl y a means for developing, in a relatively autonomous fram e of reference, ne w criteri a of status. It was als o a means for conferring status by establishing social distance betwee n th e professionals an d other groups: the as-yet socially unacceptable self-mad e me n o f the industria l bourgeoisie, i n societies whic h maintained pre-industrial criteria of stratification; an d th e occupationa l categorie s whic h were losin g their traditional status, suc h a s craftsme n o r independent farmers . Pro fession was , besides , a means for distinguishing oneself fro m th e status-les s proletariat int o whic h whol e sector s o f th e pre-industria l occupationa l hierarch y wer e being engulfed . Furthermore , th e economi c benefit s t o be expected , a t leas t i n the long run , fro m professiona l organizatio n als o contribute d t o guaranteein g status . Finally, i f literacy and "democrati c consciousness " are indee d relate d t o status demands, i t i s logica l t o thin k tha t literat e an d reform-oriente d professional s woul d have been amon g th e mos t status-consciou s sector s of the bourgeoisie . One fina l poin t must b e mad e in this connection. Amon g the general condition s under whic h peopl e ar e motivate d to foun d ne w organizations , tw o can b e single d out as particularly relevant to the collective mobility project of th e nineteenth-centur y professions. Unde r thes e conditions , (1 ) "[people ] believ e tha t th e futur e wil l b e such that the organization wil l continu e to be effective enough t o pay fo r the trouble of buildin g i t and fo r th e resource s invested"; an d (2 ) "the y o r som e socia l grou p with whic h the y ar e strongl y identifie d wil l receiv e som e o f th e benefit s o f th e better wa y o f doing things." The secon d conditio n is fulfilled b y a collective mobility project ; I have explored above its roots i n individual motives. A s for the first , despit e the disturbin g appearance of cyclical economi c crises , w e may safel y assum e that i n the secon d thir d of the nineteent h centur y optimis m abou t th e futur e wa s a sufficientl y genera l stat e of min d amon g th e middl e classes and thei r professional secto r to have animated a group of organizational leaders. Further reasons for buoyancy were , i n England, th e bourgeoisie's gain s i n politica l powe r and , i n th e Unite d States , th e exhilaratin g consciousness o f nation-building . Bu t abov e all , th e "grea t transformation " se t in motion a permanent revolutionar y process which maximized some of the preconditions o f professionalization . The formidabl e effect s o f this unfinishe d transformatio n ca n onl y be allude d to: increasing standard s o f living , structura l differentiation , industria l rationalization of work , the growing concentration of the means of production and decision-making in gian t corporation s an d i n a gian t stat e apparatus , th e correspondin g growt h of bureaucracy, th e growin g importance o f science and technology , al l contributed to the multiplication of skilled and high-level jobs. A s monopolistic capitalism super2

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78

seded the competitiv e phase, ne w occupation s develope d i n the shado w o f bureaucratic organizations an d they too aspired to increase their status. It is this contemporary wav e o f professionalizatio n tha t i s viewed a s a collectiv e mobility projec t i n the sociologica l literature. I n E.C. Hughes ' words : Work on the professions, a s on other matters, reflects this : it is in part a study of social advancement (mobility) . Th e advancement i s o f tw o kinds . The first is the ris e of th e individual by getting into a n occupation o f hig h prestige, o r by achieving specia l success i n hi s occupation . Th e secon d i s th e collectiv e effor t o f a n organize d occupa tion t o improv e it s place an d increase it s power , i n relation to others . Tha t effort, i n middle-class occupations , characteristicall y i s directe d t o achievin g professiona l status. Fo r whatever els e th e wor d "profession " ma y mean , i t i s i n modern English a symbo l o f hig h rankin g among occupations. 27

This view, however , tend s to take fo r granted th e ranking of occupations an d th e process by which i t was achieved . Unti l now , I have been concerned wit h a genera l discussion of the specific structures an d conceptions of mobility and status connected with th e rise of the modern professions. I want to explore now how pre-existing social structure s helpe d o r hindere d th e unfoldin g o f th e profession s "modern " potential. Wit h emphasi s o n th e ideal-typical , I shal l conside r tw o very differen t modes of mobility: in Britain, I shall focus on the limits which the enduring cultural influence o f the gentr y se t o n the professiona l project . I n the Unite d States , I shall single out those structural features an d processes which contribute to the thoroughly modern foundation s o f social inequality . Because of this emphasis, m y discussio n of th e Unite d State s wil l necessaril y dea l wit h transformation s stil l i n process, an d will tak e u s u p t o our own time. Before enterin g int o the compariso n o f these two ideal-typical cases , le t u s briefl y recal l the element s commo n t o bot h professiona l projects. The for m tha t th e moder n profession s tak e afte r th e industria l revolution is tha t of corporat e project s attempting , first o f all, t o organize "production " for a special type o f market an d t o gain in it quasi-monopolistic control . Given the singula r na ture o f the "commodity " to b e exchanged , th e organizatio n of production is concerned not with an inanimate product, but with the selection of producers or providers of services . Th e end-poin t o f thi s primar y aspec t o f professiona l organizatio n is , therefore, th e monopol y of relatively standardized education . Secondly, i n a world shake n b y the "grea t transformation, " the corporate projec t of professio n generate s distinctiv e structural base s fo r statu s an d ne w pattern s o f social mobility. I n their formative period, modern professions are , logically , transitional and mixed forms. While they stil l avai l themselves, i n varying degrees, of the old statu s warrants , the y pu t the m t o us e i n organizing their market s o f services . More typically , th e professions ' moder n contex t contribute s t o defin e th e relationships betwee n th e emerging occupational an d socia l hierarchies. Th e prestige rank ing attaine d b y the professional collectivit y i s the firs t determinan t o f the members ' individual status in the society. Furthermore, in articulating new principles of exclusion an d inclusio n based o n examination s an d thus , ultimatel y on education , pro fessions ten d t o subordinat e individua l statu s t o th e passag e throug h organize d education.

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In ou r century , growin g bureaucratization an d th e "organizationa l revolution" increasingly mode l th e patter n o f individua l advancemen t i n the profession s alon g the line s o f bureaucrati c career . However , th e affinit y betwee n profession s an d bureaucracy—or, i n other words , thei r common pertinenc e t o th e proces s o f cap italist rationalization—wa s already apparen t a t the inceptio n of the moder n profes sional project . Th e ne w patter n o f mobilit y opene d b y th e profession s depends , initially, o n the use s of education. A s Max Weber has shown , modern bureaucrac y similarly work s to make educatio n int o the intervening structure betwee n socia l and occupational stratification. As al l forms o f status , th e "specifi c statu s develop ments" o f bot h bureaucrac y an d professio n ten d t o b e monpolized. Give n th e structural connection s wit h allegedl y "open " educationa l systems , thi s monopoly can clai m universalisti c ideological legitimations . The double nature of the professional project intertwines market and status orientations, an d both tend toward monopoly—monopoly of opportunities for income in a market o f services, o n the on e hand , an d monopol y of status in an emerging occupational hierarchy, on the other. Th e institutional locus in which both monopolizing tendencies converge i s th e educationa l system . The analysis tha t follows wil l attemp t to explore the complex mediations betwee n stratification, education , an d occupatio n tha t characteriz e th e professiona l projec t in Britai n an d in the Unite d States . In each case, the stage, and especially th e pace, of economi c developmen t wer e certainl y principal determinant s o f the differences . So wer e th e alternativ e channels o f mobility tha t existed i n each case. S o was each society's consciousnes s o f it s clas s structure : despit e th e cultura l similarities and overlaps, eac h case illustrates, i n Ralph Turner's words , a different "fol k norm. " He writes : "Withi n a formall y ope n clas s syste m providin g mas s education , th e organizing fol k nor m that defines th e accepted mod e of upward mobility i s a crucial factor i n shaping th e schoo l system , an d ma y eve n b e mor e crucia l than th e exten t of upwar d mobility. " The Britis h idea l type o r normative model is one o f controlled selection. I n this process o f sponsored mobility,"elit e recruit s ar e chose n b y th e establishe d elit e of thei r agents and elit e statu s i s given o n the basi s of some criterion o f supposed merit. . . . Upwar d mobility i s like entry int o a private club, where eac h candidat e must b e 'sponsored ' b y on e o r mor e o f the members. " I n the Unite d States , th e predominant mode l is that of contest: " a syste m i n which elite status is the prize in an open contest an d is taken by the aspirants' ow n efforts. While the 'contest ' i s governed b y some rules of fair play , the contestants have wide latitude in the strategies they ma y employ." Professions, a s w e know, partake o f both models, althoug h in terms o f an idealtype, the y endors e th e ideolog y of contest mobility . I n the tensio n betwee n "fol k norms," however , w e can se e th e impac t of the pre-existin g class system upo n th e development o f the market-oriente d centers for the productio n of professional pro ducers. Th e collectiv e mobilit y projec t o f profession s set s limit s t o thei r marke t project an d to its rationalizing ideology. It is chiefly i n the educationa l syste m (or , more exactly, in its relations with the class structure and the labor market) that these limits becom e apparent. 28

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Chapter 7

USES AND LIMITATION S OF THE ARISTOCRATIC MODE L

The dua l revolution—industria l and bourgeois-democratic—whic h transforme d Western European societie s an d their offshoots i n the nineteenth century is the historical matrix for most of classical sociology' s concepts and ideas. Terms lik e "ascrip tion" an d "achievement, " whic h we use s o commonly today, not only evoke whole families of concepts at one end or the other of the gemeinschaft-gesellschaft typology ; they als o evok e th e ideologica l climate i n whic h th e "grea t transformation " wa s perceived an d conceptualized , th e intersectin g an d conflictin g current s o f though t which provided the firs t bindin g links between concept s and the firs t effort s a t comprehensive analysis . "Achievement, " i n thi s light , fit s int o a comple x o f idea s which wa s i n large par t shape d by the traditio n of democratic liberalism . It is ideologically inseparabl e fro m th e emphasi s o n th e individua l i n a societ y dominate d by the market. I t evokes, also , th e contractua l theor y of society wit h it s foundation s in the legal system, an d the growing pre-eminence o f economic determinants , base d on the capitalis t division of labor, i n a changing syste m o f social stratification. This word o f caution i s necessary t o war d off the read y ideologica l implications of this analysis o f collectiv e mobilit y an d t o dispe l an y implicatio n o f evolutionism . It also serves to state a feeling of discomfort: for to focu s o n one single aspec t of the "great transformation " i s necessaril y t o b e fragmentar y an d incomplete . With thes e qualifications , w e ca n no w begi n t o characterize , a s a n idea l type , the professiona l projec t i n nineteenth-century England . I t challenged, a s w e know, well-established elite s i n th e learne d professions . I n theory , therefore , Englan d should offe r a clear exampl e o f the reformis t dimensio n i n the professionalizatio n movement: i n thei r attac k agains t corporat e privileges , middle-clas s professiona l reformers wer e boun d t o accentuat e th e democrati c an d rationalizin g potential of market-oriented professionalism . Moreover , th e reformis t spiri t i n the profession s had bee n awakene d b y th e broade r movemen t fo r nationa l reform ; even durin g the years whe n th e genera l spiri t o f reform ha d bee n quenche d b y patriotis m and fea r of th e Frenc h Revolution , reformism in medicine an d th e la w did not subside . Not only di d professional s participat e i n th e large r movemen t fo r politica l an d socia l change; the y ofte n acte d a s it s spokesmen , o n behal f o f classes to whic h the y di d not themselve s belong. Th e professiona l principle s of competence an d efficienc y 1

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were shape d i n large part b y the Benthamites ' influenc e on the professiona l movement. Incorporated into the drive for administrative and educational reform i n which Benthamite an d Dissente r influenc e wa s similarl y prominent , these principle s lef t a deep mark on th e stat e apparatus of the Victoria n era. The specifi c aim s o f th e professiona l projec t were , however , incom e securit y and socia l respectability . These aim s wer e sough t i n a contex t wher e aristocrati c status models and ideologies were available and never entirely defeated b y the attack s of th e risin g bourgeoisie against idl e property and the system of patronage. Th e lin gering socia l an d politica l influenc e of the ol d ruling clas s se t upo n the projec t of professional modernizatio n limits tha t wer e bot h structura l and ideological . I wil l attempt t o delineat e the m i n this chapter . The institutiona l persistenc e o f ascription in the Britis h syste m o f socia l stratification i s almos t a commonplac e i n the sociologica l literature. Nei l Smelse r an d S. M. Lipse t write, fo r instance : 2

Great Britai n constitute s a syste m intermediat e betwee n extrem e individua l mobility and extrem e collectiv e mobility . Individua l mobilit y i s emphasized , bu t individuals carry wit h the m certai n ascribed and semi-ascribed markings—accent, habits , manners, etc.—which reflect famil y and educational background and operate a s important status symbols . Ful l mobilit y take s plac e onl y i n th e nex t generation , whe n mobil e individuals ca n giv e thei r ow n childre n th e appropriat e cultivatio n an d education . This case i s intermediat e becaus e i t is the famil y that moves collectivel y upwar d over two o r more generations. 3

The authors are ready to add that "the contrast between Britain and the United States is a relative one." Thei r comments shoul d attract ou r attention, however, t o a distinctive paradox or peculiarity: it does not lie i n the two-generation-or-more pattern o f mobility, bu t in the fact that Britain acquired an "open" clas s structure —"open," that is , in the limite d sens e that it emphasizes individual mobility base d on income, occupation, and education—during the same historical period in which the element s of statu s stratificatio n wer e ritualize d an d therefor e mad e explici t an d visibl e t o the many . The parado x disappear s if we briefl y recal l Weber's concep t o f status stratification and then apply it to nineteenth-century Britain . Weber emphasized, a s we know, the monopolistic nature of status, base d on the "specific , positive or negative, social estimation o f honor." H e wrote: 4

The developmen t o f statu s i s essentially a question o f stratificatio n resting on usurpation. Suc h usurpation is the normal origin of almost all status honor. But the road from this purel y conventiona l situatio n t o lega l privilege , positiv e o r negative , i s easil y traveled as soon as a certain stratification of the social order has in fact been "lived in'' and ha s achieve d stabilit y b y virtue of a stable distributio n of economi c power. 5

The notion of usurpation can be traced back to the hereditary appropriation of political power by force i n situations of conquest o r in the struggl e to establish domination. Bu t i n a moder n context , i t refers exclusivel y to th e conventiona l style s of life whic h identif y statu s groups an d express their negative or positive social honor. Usurpation refers , here , t o the deliberate monopolizatio n of status symbols and the deliberate restrictio n of interaction with outsider s b y whic h high-statu s group s se t 6

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themselves apar t fro m others . I t refers als o to the fact that their superiority of status is seldo m "spontaneously " grante d o r recognize d b y outsiders ; o n th e contrary , we coul d sa y tha t i t would no t exist without monopoly : the "closin g character" o f status superiorit y spurs the outsider s t o ente r th e circl e by imitatin g th e "higher " style of life. Thes e attempts by outsiders sanctio n the status superiority of the more prestigious grou p an d constitut e a status hierarchy. A corollar y of Weber's theor y of status is that " a l l groups having interests i n the status order react wit h specia l sharpnes s precisely agains t th e pretensions o f purely economic acquisition." One o f the majo r genera l consequence s is that th e development o f a statu s order an d it s legitimizatio n hinde r th e fre e developmen t o f the market, if nothing else, a t least "fo r those goods whic h statu s groups directl y with hold fro m fre e exchang e b y monopolization. " And Weber adds , "Fro m the con trariety betwee n th e statu s orde r an d th e purel y economi c orde r . . . i t follow s that . . . everywhere som e statu s groups , an d usuall y th e mos t influential , con sider almos t an y kin d o f overt participation in economic acquisitio n as absolutel y stigmatizing." Now, th e British aristocracy and gentry had faced, for many centuries, the expansion of the market and the transformation of the economy—though never, of course, on th e revolutionar y scale and pace attained afte r 1780 . Economic growt h an d political pressur e (includin g th e majo r upheava l o f Cromwell' s interregnum an d it s aftermath) ha d multiplied , a s well , th e demand s fo r acceptanc e int o elit e circle s by wealthy merchants an d business men who "were not gentlemen," eithe r by birth or by education. Legal closur e of the high-status group was not possible in eighteenthand nineteenth-century England, except indirectly, in what concerned political rights and the privilege s accorded t o the Establishe d Churc h and its members. No r was this distinctivel y Englis h landed obligarch y willing t o oppose the expansio n o f the market o r the implantatio n o f a new economi c syste m for , a t leas t i n the firs t fift y years of industrialization, i t profited to o muc h fro m both . Indeed, sinc e the seventeenth century , the gentry had been aler t in seizing opportunities fo r commercializin g its agricultura l output an d fo r investing—no t onl y in large-scal e trade , bu t als o i n mining, manufacturing , and loca l commerce . Th e political an d cultural continuity o f the gentry rested i n large part upon its solid base of economic power. It s response to change had been extremely intelligent: rapidly securing position in an expanding market, th e Britis h lande d class had protected its status monopol y by elaboratin g a conventiona l style o f lif e an d cultura l symbols . This allowed them to co-opt on clearly stated term s those parvenus wh o were, any how, too rich to be rejected. The still powerful upper class was open enough to absorb without difficult y th e minorit y o f ric h bourgeoi s wh o coul d bu y thei r wa y acros s the mai n statu s barrier s o r "wer e i n businesses whic h ha d acquire d respectability through tradition." Th e combinatio n of this openness wit h th e multiplicatio n of pressures from belo w in a changing society explains both the high degree of "stylization o f life" an d the exten t to which stylizatio n wa s imitated , even beyond the sectors mos t likel y t o be co-opted . As T . H. Marshal l notes, th e proces s of status stratificatio n gaine d ne w vigo r in the nineteent h century : 7

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When a section o f society is threatened b y invasion from below, as the English gentlemen wer e i n varying degrees from th e sixteent h centur y onwards , the y protect them selves b y constructin g barrier s out o f thos e attribute s an d symbol s o f socia l differ ences which are most difficult t o acquire . Conspicuou s expenditur e ca n be copie d b y those who ge t ric h quick , bu t correct manners, th e righ t accent, an d the "ol d schoo l tie" ar e esoteric mysterie s an d jealously guarde d monopolies. An d it was i n the nine teenth century tha t thes e symbol s gaine d thei r great ascendanc y i n English life. 13

While th e Englis h gentleman wa s acquirin g his Victoria n characteristic s a t one en d of th e status stratification, other styles of life an d characteristic cultura l elaborations were als o emergin g behin d eac h segregatin g socia l barrier . Particularl y powerful, because it was supported by an idea of the social order that was ultimately triumphant, was th e styl e of life an d though t of the industria l bourgeoisie; i t was especiall y dis tinctive wher e i t was tie d t o dissentin g religio n an d t o th e ne w industria l regions, like the Nort h or the Midlands. Also, toward the end of the century, whe n standards of living had risen sufficiently t o allow the elaboration of a style of life by the laboring poor, Englis h working-class cultur e jelled int o forms no w considered traditional— but whic h wer e then distinctiv e cultural innovations. The elaboratio n o f bot h positiv e an d negativ e statu s symbols , carrie d b y style s of life rooted in the class structure, appears as a cultural and social counterpoint to the rationalizing impact of the industrial revolution upon British society . Educatio n wa s the obviou s protectiv e barrie r fo r high status groups. However , a n uppe r class — even i f it is as influentia l an d a s flexibl e a s th e British—canno t maintain total control ove r education i n a rapidly industrializing society. Wit h a focus o n the rol e of professionals, w e mus t examin e th e relation s betwee n th e emergen t syste m o f na tional educatio n an d a status hierarchy shape d by the ideal s an d convention s o f the old rulin g class . 14

15

HIGHER A N D LOWER BRANCHE S At the beginning of the nineteenth century , all intellectual callings were becoming increasingly respectable and respected. Only the clergy, medicine, and the law were, however, firml y establishe d a s "learned " professions . Th e firs t o f the thre e olde r professions wil l no t concer n u s directly : undoubtedly, th e clerg y wa s touche d an d transformed b y th e genera l movemen t towar d moralizatio n and competenc e i n th e performance o f function. Undoubtedl y too, a s clerica l offices becam e more clearly separate fro m th e laity , thi s dependen t professio n gaine d a measur e o f autonom y from la y control . Man y clergymen , especiall y i n nonconformis t churches , wer e active an d often prominen t reformers. Th e professio n a s a whole, however, di d not have the same need for "objective" guarantees of competence as the market-oriented professions. Protecte d fro m competitio n withi n thei r church , clergyme n di d no t depend fo r thei r incom e o n th e transactio n o f personal service s o n th e market : th e " l i v i n g " whic h mos t of them enjoyed wa s a prerogative attache d t o their office an d relatively independen t o f performance . Th e securit y afforde d b y th e traditiona l corporations an d the patronage system gave to the established elite s in law and medicine somethin g comparabl e t o a " l i v i n g . " Th e situatio n was differen t fo r the lower class of practitioners, exposed t o the ful l rigor s of competition. The traditional divi-

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sion betwee n "higher " an d "lower " branche s mirrore d th e socia l an d politica l subordination o f the risin g bourgeoisi e t o th e ol d ruling class . Thi s divisio n coin cided in large part, though not entirely, wit h that between the elites and the rank and file o f the profession . Th e biographe r o f Thomas Wakley , known a s th e "battlin g surgeon" fo r his advocacy of medical reform, describe s th e situation in 1815, when Wakley joined th e rank s o f the medica l profession: Now and again, a man whose original conditions ought to have limited his aspirations would break through his trammels and become a leader, whe n in the ordinary course of events he should have remained a private; but this occurred infrequently. The almost invariable rule was that those who were specially picked out by circumstances quit e independent o f merit for promotion, receive d that promotion, less fortunate individ uals remaining in the shadow o f obscurity, whatever their claims to success. 16

The stor y o f professionalizatio n i s largel y tha t o f th e aspiration s o f rank-and-file professionals, a s interprete d an d organize d b y thei r leaders . The professiona l sector s wer e no t quit e a s smal l as on e ma y surmise . Th e firs t separate enumeration is that of the 185 1 Census: in the better-defined secular profes sions we find a t this date over 38,000 people, out of a population of almost eighteen million. Thi s figur e include d 17,50 0 physician s an d surgeons ; 2,08 8 barristers ; 11,684 solicitors ; 1,486 architects ; 4,086 surveyors ; 853 engineers; 4,41 6 account ants; an d 52 2 dentists . Surgeons an d solicitors , though stil l par t o f th e "lower " branches , ha d som e claims to social standing on the basis of their affiliation wit h the two ancient profes sions of medicine and the law. The "higher" branches, t o which they were formall y subordinate, wer e synonimou s wit h th e ancien t chartere d corporations , whic h ha d emerged i n law and medicine when they slippe d away fro m ecclesiastica l jurisdic tion. Th e 185 1 figures give s an approximat e ide a of the respective number s o f barristers and solicitors. As for doctors, a prominent member of the Society of Apothecaries, writin g i n 1834 , estimated tha t there ha d been abou t 12,00 0 practitioners in 1812-1813 an d tha t thei r numbers ha d bee n continuousl y growing. I n the 1830s , the Royal College of Physicians of London counted 11 3 fellows an d 274 licentiates, while the Royal College of Surgeons o f England, i n existence onl y sinc e 1800 , had already mor e than 8,00 0 licentiate s an d approximatel y 200 fellows. Despite th e differen t nature o f the tw o ancient libera l profession s an d thei r dif ferent relation s wit h th e university , the sociologica l implications of th e divisio n into "higher " an d "lower " branches were simila r i n both: the me n wh o were coopted by their social peers to the Inns of Court or to the fellowship of the two medical Colleges wer e fe w i n number an d monopolize d substantial socia l and professiona l privileges. A s a rule, they belonge d t o the uppe r class or, i f exceptionally successful, mad e thei r way into it . The elites amon g these elites had often passed through one o f the nine leading public schools an d had gon e fro m ther e t o Oxfor d o r Cambridge. In fact, for a long time, no physician could be admitted to the rank of Fellow of th e Royal College if he wa s not a graduate fro m on e of the two English universities or had not "incorporated'' his degree by residence i n one of them—this criterion tended t o exclud e al l Dissenters, unles s the y cam e b y wa y o f Trinit y Colleg e a t Dublin an d a n "incorporated " degree , an d als o mos t peopl e o f modest means . To 17

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understand what these criteria of selection meant in professional terms, it is necessary to conside r briefl y th e developmen t o f each profession . In continenta l Europe, th e developmen t an d the codificatio n o f the law had coin cided wit h th e multiplicatio n o f the universitie s in the fourteent h an d fifteent h cen turies. I n Ital y especially , bu t als o i n som e Frenc h universities , th e deman d fo r lawyers an d administrator s le d to notable development s i n civil an d cano n law . In England, th e civi l court s ha d resiste d th e introductio n o f the Roma n Code an d created, instead , a native common law, considered much too coarse and plebeian to be a fit subject o f university teaching. Trainin g in the law took place outside the uni versity i n collegiate residence halls which became the London Inns of Court. Sinc e the fifteenth century , the Inns had monopolized the power to confer upon their members th e righ t t o plea d i n court. Attorneys , instead, ha d develope d a s lega l agents and officer s o f various court s whic h wer e responsibl e fo r regulating them. Unlik e the futur e barristers , the y ha d neve r joined int o a guild . The y had, therefore , bee n defenseless i n face o f attempts t o subordinat e the m to th e bar : 18

In th e fifteent h century , thoug h ther e wa s alread y a functional distinction , ther e wa s no complet e professiona l separation , fo r ther e wa s nothin g t o preven t a n attorne y becoming a member of a n Inn of Cour t and eventually bein g calle d to the Bar . I n the sixteenth an d seventeenth centuries , however , th e Inns , aide d by judges an d actuated, it seems , b y motive s o f pur e exclusiveness, embarke d upon th e deliberat e polic y o f refusing admissio n to attorneys. 19

The policy of restricting the number of attorneys admitte d to each court had faile d to check , w e ar e told , thei r "multitude s an d misdemeanours. " Restriction s produced, instead, a tremendous confusion , as an irregular class of legal practitioners— the solicitors—developed , fro m th e fifteent h centur y on , ou t o f thei r origina l situation a s th e lega l servant s o f kin g an d noblemen . I n practice , attorney s an d solicitors wer e treate d a s a singl e category b y th e Ac t of 1729— a direc t response by Parliamen t t o petition s against unqualifie d attorneys b y loca l justices. Th e Act subjected th e lowe r branch of the la w to various mandatory regulation s an d t o stif f penalties in case of infraction: clerks were theretofore to be articled for five years to an attorney who could not take more than two apprentices a t a time; they had to be duly enrolled in the court where they intended to practice, and take their oath and be examined before admission by a judge. The Act did not do anything to prevent infractions, and implementatio n remained ver y lax . Nevertheless , i t provide d a bas e fo r th e work o f the firs t effectiv e professional association , founde d shortl y thereafter b y a small group of attorneys wh o practiced in London. Th e Society of Gentlemen Practices i n the Courts of Law and Equity was stil l a very small body, chiefly concerne d with th e defense of the profession's jurisdictio n an d acting as a watchdog on parliamentary regulations. It performed its task quite effectively agains t both the encroachments o f the barristers an d the monopolistic pretensions o f the Scrivener s Compan y of London. Mor e typical of the eighteenth than of the nineteenth century, the Society was only indirectl y concerned wit h training as a means for establishing control over th e professio n an d ove r it s market . A secon d association , th e La w Society , founded i n 1825 , was i n fact th e mai n protagonist of the professionalization movement i n the lowe r branch o f the law. 20

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Despite th e La w Society' s effort s t o provid e legal instructio n for article d clerks and it s pioneerin g emphasi s o n compulsor y examinations , lega l education , i n th e words o f Si r Willia m Holdsworth , "was almos t th e las t thin g t o b e reformed " i n the nineteent h century. B y the middl e of the eighteent h century , lega l educatio n and examination s ha d becom e a s perfunctor y o r nonexisten t a t Oxfor d an d Cam bridge a s the y wer e a t th e Inn s o f Court . Th e trainin g of the Englis h lawyer wa s narrow an d purel y practical—"a crabbed , barbarou s study " a s on e lawye r put it. This, i n turn , ha d le d t o th e progressiv e deterioratio n o f th e availabl e literature . Not unti l Blackston e starte d hi s Vineria n lecture s a t Oxfor d i n 175 3 wa s ther e i n England anything approaching systemati c trainin g in the common law. Blackstone' s appeal, however , wa s more speedily heeded in America, both before an d after inde pendence, tha n o n hi s sid e o f th e Atlantic . Thus , despit e it s ancien t origins , th e English lega l profession lacke d an organic connectio n wit h th e universit y at the be ginning o f the professionalizatio n movemen t o f the nineteent h century . I n this re spect, the situation of the law was comparable t o that of the newer occupations whic h were als o seekin g professiona l standing : lackin g a traditio n o f forma l theoretica l training, th e reformis t leaders had t o struggl e t o institut e one, a s the y se t abou t t o upgrade thei r profession b y ne w criteri a of competence . The developmen t o f medicine ha d bee n different. I t had alway s bee n considere d a branc h o f highe r learning . Medica l organization an d medica l scienc e ha d bee n particularly backwar d i n England , especiall y i f compare d t o lat e medieva l an d Renaissance Italy . Th e sixteenth-centur y reviva l o f th e Gree k an d Lati n medica l classics, however , gav e medicine a place o f honor in the predominantly philosophical an d theologica l English universities. As for practice, th e foundin g of the Royal College of Physicians o f London in 151 8 was a deliberate attemp t to import foreign models fo r the regulatio n of the professio n an d th e improvemen t of its art . Withi n its jurisdiction—seve n mile s aroun d London—th e Colleg e receive d power s o f licensing like those formerly grante d only to bishops, a s well as powers of discipline over it s members an d o f prosecution agains t unlicense d practitioners . For the firs t tw o centuries o f its existence, th e Colleg e applie d its powers vigor ously, thoug h no t alway s successfully : it s mai n target s wer e empirics , midwives, and physicians who practiced in London with license s othe r than its own, and, mos t especially, th e subordinat e thoug h competin g companie s o f Barber-Surgeon s an d Apothecaries. B y the mid-eighteent h century , however , th e Colleg e ha d cease d to prosecute o n it s ow n eithe r rival s or pretenders . I n fact , th e Galeni c conformis m which th e College , a s a n examinin g body , ha d impose d upo n it s candidate s ha d become a n anachronism; th e staunc h conservatis m o f the College ruling oligarchie s made i t look anachronisti c i n non-intellectual spheres a s well . The Colleg e had alway s concede d a favored statu s to the Oxfor d an d Cambridg e graduates, whethe r doctor s o r bachelors; bu t it had neve r bee n willin g t o recogniz e their right to practice without further examination within it s jurisdiction, despit e th e frequent protest s o f the university licentiates. Acces s t o the highest rank of Fellow was normall y reserved t o Oxford an d Cambridge doctors. I n the firs t decade s of the nineteenth century , thi s privilege , had becom e a means to exclud e th e Scotc h an d foreign-trained doctors , wh o were perhaps deficient in the classics , bu t often bette r 21

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trained in practical medicine than the College Fellows. It was argued that the Scotch universities were not resident universitie s and that a Scotch degree, therefore , "wa s not evidenc e o f character o r o f social education." The Royal College of London, besides, had shown little or no interest in extending its seal o f approval to doctors outsid e it s jurisdiction. Th e Fellows' interest i n the promotion an d advancemen t o f medicine appeared t o have bee n a thing o f the past already i n the eighteent h century . "Th e physicians, " observ e Carr-Saunder s an d Wilson, "ha d lon g establishe d themselve s i n the uppe r rank s o f society, an d when scientific inquir y los t it s novelty, they joined i n the ampl e lif e o f the grea t house s where eleganc e an d wi t were pursued . . . . Socia l qualifications became th e firs t requirement for membership, and it was held that the necessary 'morals and manners ' could b e learn t onl y a t th e universities." The exclusivenes s o f the Roya l College of Physicians, s o infuriatin g t o it s own licentiates, ha d ha d th e obviou s effect o f multiplying th e number s o f practitioners with othe r kinds of licenses o r no license a t all . Th e bulk of the respectable medica l men wer e clustered, i n fact, i n the companies o f surgeons and apothecaries, whos e subordination t o the chartere d compan y o f physicians ha d becom e merel y nominal by th e lat e eighteent h century . The surgeon s were th e nex t lowe r step in the medica l hierarchy. Before th e six teenth century , they ha d bee n considere d substantiall y equal to the physicians . But as th e physician s ros e to th e statu s of a learned profession , th e surgeon s san k int o that o f a trade , merge d wit h th e barbers ' guild . Thi s stigmatizin g union wa s no t broken unti l 1745 , after surger y ha d entered a phase of rapid and remarkable progress. With the incorporation of their own college in 1800, the surgeons had obtained the righ t t o give license t o practice throughout England. Elite surgeons , suc h a s Si r Astley Coope r o f Guy's Hospita l or his predecessor Henry Cline, wer e perhaps the most famou s medica l men i n England. Thei r lectures i n anatomy fa r exceede d i n fame and attendance those of the Royal College of Physicians. Despite their justified reputation, these men perpetuated themselve s a t the head of the major London hospitals b y patronag e an d nepotism : 23

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Hospital appointment s wit h al l their advantages, direc t and indirect, honourabl e and pecuniary, wer e give n t o certai n Fellows of th e Roya l Colleg e o f Physician s of Lon don, persona l influenc e countin g fo r muc h in the matter ; examinerships an d lectureships a t th e Roya l Colleg e o f Surgeon s o f Englan d wer e give n t o certai n hospita l surgeons wh o wer e electe d t o th e desirabl e appointment s whic h qualifie d the m fo r their professorial duties largel y in consequence o f their ability to pay big fees for their introductions to big men. Th e man who could not pay these fees or afford a university education wa s fate d t o remai n in the ran k an d file o f hi s profession. 26

Below the surgeons were the much more modest apothecaries . Thei r Society had been authorize d to hol d qualifyin g examination s i n the eighteent h century . It s fees were lo w an d i t jealously protecte d th e members ' monopol y of dispensing, whil e the two other corporations increasingly neglected to defend their membership agains t encroachments. Fo r al l practical purposes, th e apothecarie s represente d th e grea t majority o f famil y practitioners . Th e Ac t whic h the y obtaine d i n 181 5 increase d their power s bu t lef t the m a s a medica l order inferio r t o th e licentiate s o f the two

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Colleges or the university graduates. They had, fo r instance, n o clear right to charg e fees fo r their medical services abov e an d beyon d charges for the medicin e they dispensed. Th e Apothecarie s Act , however, ha d sanctione d thei r right t o practice an d to conduc t examination s whic h full y qualifie d th e aspiran t fo r genera l practice . The candidate s ha d t o fulfil l th e requirement s o f a five-yea r apprenticeship , "to gether wit h a sufficien t medica l educatio n an d a goo d mora l character." Th e Society pioneere d th e firs t writte n examination s an d helpe d brin g abou t a syste m of practica l medical training to prepare the candidates. Fro m the beginning, medical education was understood a s that dispensed b y recognized medical schools o r teaching hospitals. I t became customary fo r the licentiates of the Society to take a secon d examination a t the Roya l College of Surgeons; i n the 1830s , mos t o f the College' s licentiates were of this new breed o f qualified genera l practitioners in both medicine and surgery . From th e rank s o f thes e doctor s undoubtedl y cam e th e follower s o f Thoma s Wakley, th e radica l champion of medical reform, editor of The Lancet an d spokesman fo r the profession' s ran k an d file . U p to a point, they supporte d an d defende d him i n his often bitter battles agains t th e administratio n of the London hospitals an d the oligarchy of the Roya l College of Surgeons. Bu t insofar a s Wakle y attacked all forms o f traditional monopoly , many abandone d h i m . I n the chaoti c situatio n of the earl y nineteent h century , wit h eightee n differen t licensin g authoritie s i n th e United Kingdom, competitio n was bound to strengthen th e defense of narrow-base d monopolies. Thi s fragmentation limite d th e modernizin g impact of partial reform s and delaye d th e reconstructio n o f monopoly on broadene d universalisti c bases: the connection o f qualifications and monopol y of practice wit h trainin g that woul d b e both specialized an d systematic wer e stil l too tentative to overshadow th e traditional advantages of the establishe d professiona l elites . The conventional life styl e and patterns o f behavior of the gentry, acquire d i n the family o r in the educational preserve s of the old ruling class, had been the hallmark of th e successfu l eighteenth-centur y professional . Wealth , whic h som e o f thes e men amassed , wa s no t onl y a sig n o f professional excellence , bu t als o a steppin g stone toward social standing, which the purchase of an estate conferred more securely than a law firm o r a medical practice. Fo r the bulk of the middle-class challenger s in th e nineteenth century , suc h narrow gates were closed. Th e bases of prestige ha d to be reconstructed i n order to permit, at the same time, middle-class access to status and middle-clas s monopolizatio n of it s benefits . A s th e refor m movemen t gaine d power and scope , it was boun d to reach th e hallowe d halls of the elite universities. But th e educationa l ideal s embodie d i n these institutions—an d perhaps even mor e clearly i n the nin e leadin g public schools tha n i n Oxford o r Cambridge—were no t supplanted: revise d an d adapte d t o thei r ne w functions , th e ol d conceptions lef t a deep mark on the nationa l system o f education tha t wa s organize d durin g the nineteenth century . Around 1800 , th e curriculu m of Oxford an d Cambridg e include d some developments i n the directio n of mathematical an d scientifi c education. A t Oxford, chair s had bee n endowed i n anatomy, i n clinical medicine , an d i n English law. To a certain exten t thi s evolution was a response to the notio n of a modern curriculu m that 27

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had com e fort h fro m th e Dissentin g Academie s i n th e previou s century . Never theless, the chie f concer n an d business of the tw o English universities was classica l education an d no t "usefu l knowledge. " Excep t fo r th e clerg y an d higher-leve l teaching, th e olde r profession s wer e no t directl y serve d b y th e universities . Th e classics, however , serve d th e profession s i n a differen t way : a s th e intellectua l sanction whic h Oxfor d an d Cambridg e bestowe d upo n th e gentry' s hegemony , a classical education functioned as a gate-keeping mechanis m fo r the most prestigiou s professional roles. Thomas Gaisford, who had gone to Oxford i n 1800, put it clearly: "The advantage s of a classical education," h e declared, "ar e two-fold—i t enable s us t o loo k dow n wit h contemp t o n thos e wh o have not share d it s advantages , an d also fit s u s fo r places of emolument, no t onl y i n this world, bu t i n that whic h i s to come." Education at Oxford and Cambridge was not only much more expensive tha n at the Scotch universities , a t Trinit y i n Dublin , o r o n th e continent ; unti l reform s bega n in th e 1850s , i t was dominated by the Anglica n Churc h and excluded Catholics and Dissenters. Th e fac t tha t student s were recruite d fro m narro w upper-clas s circles strengthened th e symboli c lin k betwee n th e universities ' classicis m an d th e self image of a class. Later in the century, the development o f a wider network of public schools relie d on thi s fusio n betwee n th e reproductio n o f class an d th e conten t of education: th e classica l curriculu m which the y favore d becam e th e cornerston e o f a gentlemanly upbringing and a sign of successful assimilatio n into an elite life styl e for th e son s of the uppe r middl e class. The middle-clas s challeng e i n th e firs t par t o f th e nineteent h centur y relie d on a different , instrumenta l conceptio n o f education . Examinatio n wa s it s obviou s weapon. Th e traditiona l corporations use d qualifyin g examinations , an d b y 180 0 Oxford an d Cambridg e ha d begu n t o tak e thei r ow n testin g seriously . Th e issue , therefore, wa s no t examination per se , bu t its content an d conduct. Fro m the 1830 s on, officia l committees , spurre d b y the reformer s i n the "lower " branches , bega n investigating th e statu s o f medica l an d lega l qualifyin g systems . Despit e thei r at tempts t o defen d thei r privileges , the traditiona l corporations wer e n o longe r abl e to ste m th e tide. Som e o f the argument s offere d the n agains t seriou s an d mostly written examinations ar e wort h quoting, for they illustrate the traditional conception of th e makin g of a professional . Reporting to the 184 7 Select Committe e for Medical Registration, one spokesma n for th e Roya l Colleg e o f Physician s praise d "th e grea t advantage s whic h resul t to societ y fro m ther e bein g an orde r of men withi n th e professio n wh o have had a n education wit h th e member s o f the othe r learne d professions ; fro m a certain class of th e medica l profession havin g been educated wit h th e gentr y o f the countr y an d having thereby acquire d a tone o f feeling which i s very beneficial to the professio n as a w h o l e . " Or, in 1854, arguing against th e extension of examination to the bar risters, the Treasurer o f one of the Inns of Court appealed i n these words to the prin ciples of laissez-faire: " I do not think tha t Examination is really of any use . I think the advantag e of dining i n the Hal l i s associating together . . . . I f he [th e new bar rister] i s no t qualified , h e wil l ge t n o business , an d i f he i s qualified , h e wil l ge t business." Anothe r one added : " I thin k tha t anyon e o f liberal educatio n an d goo d 30

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character wh o has th e opportunit y of acquiring the knowledg e requisit e fo r a Barrister wil l d o so , i f he reall y means to practic e a s a Barrister." This referenc e t o practica l training—o n a totall y voluntar y an d a-systemati c basis—reveals the confidence whic h these elites derived more from thei r social rank than fro m th e corporat e monopol y that wa s no w bein g threatened . Th e guarantee s which the y though t the y offere d th e publi c wer e base d o n socia l privilege s wit h pre-existed th e entr y int o practice . A classica l educatio n certifie d beforehan d a s gentlemen thos e wh o wer e goin g to acquire , however , casually , specializatio n by apprenticeship wit h one of their social peers. Thus ennobled, these gentlemen could grace professional lif e wit h th e virtue s o f aristocratic disinterestedness . Thei r gentlemanly idea of profession, base d on the respect and deference du e to the traditional social hierarchy, i s stil l present, thoug h ambiguously transposed, i n Adam Smith's statement abou t th e marke t valu e o f professional services : 34

We trust our health to the physician; our fortune an d sometimes our life an d our reputation to the lawyer and attorney. Suc h confidence coul d not safely b e reposed i n people of a very lo w o r mean condition . Thei r rewar d must b e such , therefore, a s ma y give them tha t ran k i n the societ y whic h so importan t a trust requires. The long tim e an d great expense which must be lai d out i n their education, whe n combined wit h this circumstance, necessaril y enhanc e stil l further the pric e of thei r labour. 35

In Ada m Smith's words , confidenc e i n the professiona l an d th e pric e of his services ar e stil l associate d wit h socia l rank , a n "anti-market " principle , as muc h a s with th e lengt h and cos t o f training. Th e statement , however , expresse s the doubl e project of the professional reformers: on the one hand, to make their education' 'pay" on th e market ; o n th e other , t o mak e professiona l trainin g and income , i n an d of themselves, synonymou s wit h socia l statu s an d respectability . Th e project , a s w e know, involve d a conception o f professional proficienc y which establishe d a direct link between trainin g and market-oriented practice. We must determine no w to what extent th e educationa l principle s of the ol d ruling clas s and th e structure s tha t sustained them were challenged b y the new conceptions o f the middle-class reformers . THE DEFERENTIA L CHALLENG E The breakin g u p o f the ol d professional monopolie s b y th e me n o f the "lowe r branches," th e introductio n of competitive examinations i n the servic e o f the state , and the conquest o f professional statu s by relatively new or transformed occupation s such a s engineering , architecture an d surveying , dentistry , accounting , an d wit h more difficult y th e arts , journalism , and schoolteaching , ar e thre e distinc t aspects of th e sam e process of collective mobility : tha t b y whic h the Britis h middl e classes opened u p the existin g structure o f opportunities and the paths of access to "socia l honor," withou t eve r completel y erasing th e quit e tangibl e advantage s of the aris tocratic uppe r stratum . Commenting on the motive s of the reformers , W . T. Reader somewhat cynicall y notes: " I f th e gentr y wante d t o hang o n to political power , tha t i n itself th e middle classes did not very much object to, but what did annoy them was to find themselve s shut ou t of the materia l rewards o f power. The y wante d som e of the jobs fo r some of thei r boys, an d they intende d t o break int o the officia l worl d i n the sam e way a s

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they were breaking into the world of the professions, whic h also the gentry had been inclined t o regar d a s preserve s of their o w n . " The private interests o f middle-class familie s could not account, however , fo r the reshaping o f Britis h societ y tha t th e nineteent h centur y achieved . Neithe r d o th e parliamentary reform s o f 183 2 an d 186 7 explai n th e gentry' s adoptio n o f th e re formers' objectives . Durin g th e 1820s , Tor y government s ha d liberalize d custom duties an d th e interna l labor market, a s wel l a s repeale d th e law s agains t Catholic s and Dissenters. I n fact , a s Harol d Perki n point s out : "Th e radica l chang e pro duced b y th e Refor m Ac t was fro m aristocrati c rul e by prescriptio n to aristocrati c rule b y consent. I t was no t s o muc h the actua l existenc e o f a large anti-aristocrati c block vot e whic h swaye d th e politicians , as th e fea r o f creating o n e . " As th e industria l mode o f productio n asserted itself , th e genera l interes t o f th e nation increasingl y appeare d t o coincid e wit h industry' s requirements . Th e gentr y and the middle-clas s radical s wer e united , besides, by a powerful commo n fear: th e danger t o privat e propert y evoke d b y Chartism—o r mor e exactly , b y th e infusio n of socialis t ideal s int o th e workin g clas s movemen t fo r universa l suffrage . Com pared t o this threat, th e middl e class' attack s o n the syste m o f patronage an d aristocratic misgovernment seeme d reasonable indeed . While economi c interest s move d th e bul k o f eac h class ' armie s int o position, what shape d th e battle s wa s th e strivin g fo r hegemon y withi n eac h class—tha t is , the strivin g fo r an idealized and organizin g image o f itself an d the socia l order tha t each clas s bot h consciousl y an d unconsciousl y projected . T o achiev e hegemon y meant t o achiev e mor e tha n economi c an d politica l power ; i t mean t seizin g th e "moral an d intellectua l direction" of the historica l process and bein g able t o claim the allegiance of others besides the logical soldiers in each class camp. Fo r the middle class, whic h concern s u s here , th e struggl e fo r hegemony involved , o n the on e hand, th e discipling of the workin g class, the subordinatio n of the workers' origina l strivings to its own project. O n the other hand, i t involved converting the old ruling class not only t o its programs, bu t to it s principles of action, s o tha t ultimatel y the aristocracy's lingerin g grasp on state power became more a division of labor between partners than a seriou s obstacl e t o middle-class progress . In 1826 , James M i ll anticipate d i n these words the achievemen t o f hegemony b y the middl e class: 3 6

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On th e politica l an d moral importance o f thi s class , ther e ca n be bu t on e opinion . I t is th e strengt h o f th e community . I t contains , beyon d al l comparison , th e greates t portion o f th e intelligence , industry , an d wealth o f th e state . . . . Th e people o f th e class belo w ar e the instrument s wit h whic h they work ; and those of th e clas s above , though the y ma y b e calle d thei r governors , an d ma y reall y sometime s see m t o rul e them, ar e more often , mor e truly , more completely , unde r their control. 40

The centra l principle s of the middle-clas s visio n derive d from th e idealizatio n o f capitalist entrepreneurship . Capita l and activ e property , i n the hand s of the indus trious and talented, necessarily evoke d the motor principle of individual competition. This binomia l stoo d a s th e socia l an d mora l opposite o f the passiv e enjoymen t o f inherited propert y an d th e redistributio n of it s benefit s throug h patronage , whic h in th e eye s of the bourgeoisi e characterize d th e gentr y an d it s rule. Usefu l knowl edge—the core of the Benthamites' idea s about education—corresponded t o a social

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order founded on capitalist production, in which competition imposed upon the capitalist an informed an d constant vigilance for his best interests an d an overall concern with efficiency . However, a s articulate d by professional me n an d especially by professional civi l servants, th e principl e o f efficiency deviate d fro m th e entrepreneuria l imag e o f the image of the socia l order and symbolize d the differences tha t were to emerge i n the middle-class ranks. Dependen t o n the stat e for guaranteed monopol y as wel l a s for the broade r reform s they wer e tryin g t o achieve, professional s coul d no t invoke the hidden hand of the market to the same extent tha t the entrepreneurs coul d t o justif y their goals an d their actions. Th e production and the recognition of competence de manded deliberate action on the part of professional associations an d on the part of the state; it demanded, fo r one thing, the deliberate organization of a system of education on whic h recruitmen t t o desirabl e position s woul d ultimatel y depend . A s Perkin notes, th e entrepreneurial vision reduced the state to minimal functions of arbitration and policing, eve n thoug h the purel y negative conten t o f the laissez-fair e idea l was denied in practice by the interventionist and increasingly centralized Victorian state. "For th e professional ideal, on the other hand, it was the positive aspects which were important: selection of talent an d expertise , efficienc y an d econom y interprete d a s the effective solution of social problems and the abolition of waste arising from social and administrative neglect, an d the extension of government as and where necessary to mee t th e socia l demands upo n i t . " 4 1

Despite its disjunction on the issue of state intervention, the middle class projected a relatively unified ideolog y in its challenge to the moral and social order represente d by th e aristocrati c elites. Competition crowned the efforts of the ablest , reconciling the bes t interest s o f individuals t o thos e of the commonwealth . This invisibl e an d impartial judg e tempere d th e mettl e o f whic h me n wer e made , inculcatin g self respect an d self-dependence, whic h patronage an d the debilitating effects o f personal dependence coul d neve r teach . Therefore , t o le t meri t be freel y identifie d an d re warded by competition was a s much a moral imperative as a social one. Thu s spok e Macaulay, defendin g i n front o f Commons th e introductio n o f competitive exami nations i n the India n Civi l Service : "th e intellectua l test whic h i s about to be established," h e said , " w i l l b e foun d i n practice t o be th e best moral test tha t coul d b e devised." The examination embodied principles that were dear to both sectors of the middle class: a s a symbo l of competition, i t appeared t o ope n channel s o f upward social mobility to the ablest and most industrious; as a test of competence, i t matched merit to functio n o n the basis of expertise, define d and assessed by juries themselves composed o f experts. Thus , whil e examination appeared t o subject socia l position to an impersonal test , analogou s i n this to the tes t o f the marke t fo r the entrepreneur , i t also appeare d t o emancipat e th e exper t fro m th e sponsorshi p an d th e unqualified judgment o f outsiders. Resistance wa s perhap s greate r i n th e Civi l Service , wher e patronag e an d th e prevalence o f part y consideration s wer e institutionalized , than i n th e profession s which accepted , a t leas t ritualistically , th e principl e o f examination . Macaulay' s proposals wer e incorporated into the East India Company Charter of 1853, replacing patronage altogethe r b y examination . In response, Trinit y Colleg e i n Dublin quit e 42

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early offere d specialize d preparatio n fo r th e India n Civi l Servic e tests ; university graduates moved swiftl y t o th e hea d o f the ne w system' s recruits. Despite the recommendations o f the Northcote-Trevelyan Report of 1853, directly and deepl y influence d b y Macaula y an d th e I.C.S. , refor m wa s longe r t o com e t o the permanen t Hom e Service. Som e objection s t o th e Repor t wer e definitel y inspired by the desire to defend a class prerogative: it was feare d tha t " a lowe r tone of feeling would prevail" i n a Service staffe d b y "picked clever young men from th e lower rank s o f society." A mor e justifiabl e criticis m wa s raise d b y thos e wh o thought th e Service' s salarie s could not compete wit h th e incom e tha t coul d be ex pected fro m th e marke t profession s an d tha t onl y second-rate men woul d therefor e be attracted . Anothe r voice objecte d tha t scholarshi p di d not mak e a goo d admin istrator. But a reality test came to silence public opposition and spur the reform movement on : th e appallin g disasters of the Crimea n Wa r adde d broa d popula r suppor t to th e pressur e exercised b y insiders . I n 1855 , th e Civi l Servic e Commissio n wa s established. Unti l th e lat e 1870s , however , th e variou s refor m scheme s fel l shor t of th e thoroug h reorganizatio n envisage d b y Northcot e an d Trevelyan . Thoug h recruitment b y qualifyin g examinatio n wa s instituted , promotio n perpetuate d pa tronage. Th e examination , besides , shunne d technica l specialization , inspire d a s it was b y the competitiv e academic standards that ha d been developing at Oxfor d an d Cambridge sinc e th e firs t year s of the century . A s students or administrators, man y elite civi l servant s had bee n associated wit h thi s renewal . Educators , o n their side , had bee n amon g th e mos t enthusiasti c supporter s o f civil-service reform sinc e th e days o f the Northcote-Trevelya n Report. "On e afte r anothe r stresse d th e benefi t which the change would rende r t o educational standards , and to the cause of education throughou t th e country." 43

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The first civi l servic e reforms, thus , tightene d the bonds between elit e educational institutions an d th e governin g elite . I n th e 1850s , Oxfor d an d Cambridge' s ne w emphasis o n seriou s testin g ha d suggeste d a mode l t o th e smal l an d closel y kni t group o f elite reformers . I n turn, th e nee d t o prepar e upper-clas s student s fo r th e administration's examination s sustaine d th e tren d towar d change in the elit e public schools an d universities. Th e changin g natur e o f the ineluctabl e task s whic h th e governing elit e ha d t o fac e a t hom e an d i n the empir e presse d fo r a furthe r evolution o f curricula at th e tw o leading universities . The endorsement of the examination system b y the elite schools an d by influentia l sectors of the governin g elite gave to the competitiv e system a prestige i t could not have acquire d throug h th e single effort s o f the middle-clas s radicals . I n 1862 , fo r instance, th e Presiden t o f such a gentlemanly organizatio n a s th e Roya l Institute of British Architects remarked that "the fac t of the system o f Examination for offices in all th e service s unde r th e Governmen t havin g worke d satisfactorily , seem s to have led t o a desire to introduc e a similar system int o the educatio n o f an Architect." However, unti l practicall y the en d o f the century , th e influenc e o f Civil Servic e re form di d little to institutionalize the new kind of practical learning that was the battle cry o f middle-class professionalizatio n movements . Besides Oxford an d Cambridge , Englan d had a t mid-century only two other uni versities an d on e college . Th e Universit y of London started wit h th e foundation , in 1826, o f wha t wa s chiefl y a medica l school . I n keeping wit h th e prevalen t influ 48

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ence of its Benthamite and Dissenting founders, i t was the first universit y in England that di d not administer a religious test to its students. Th e yea r after , th e Anglicans responded b y founding King's College: despite it s religious exclusiveness, i t aimed frankly a t providing preparation fo r the professions. I n 1836 , the tw o were joined by charte r int o th e Universit y of London . Bot h Durham , founde d i n 183 7 unde r religious sponsorship , an d th e secula r Owen s Colleg e at Manchester, grow n out of the earl y effort s o f th e loca l statistica l society , ha d stron g regiona l tie s an d clea r scientific an d technical vocations. Wit h th e additio n of the Royal Colleges o f Mines and of Chemistry and the Militar y Academy a t Woolwich, thi s was practicall y the whole Englis h apparatus fo r higher-leve l professional an d scientifi c training . The bul k o f professiona l educatio n wa s provide d b y apprenticeship , a for m o f training whic h clearl y favore d youn g me n wit h a famil y connectio n i n the profes sions or wit h a good deal of money t o back the m up: "For good class training, wit h all that that implied in the way of introductions and opportunities, as well as straightforward technica l competence, i t seems to have been unwise to budget fo r an outlay of les s than £ 1 0 0 0 . " To giv e an ide a of how man y familie s could have afforded first-class apprentice ships fo r their sons, in 1865-1866 , ou t of roughly twenty-four million inhabitant s in England an d Wales , onl y 200,00 0 ta x assessment s were abou t £ 3 0 0 pe r year . O f these, 42,00 0 represente d income s betwee n £100 0 an d £5,000 ; 7,50 0 wer e fo r very larg e income s ove r £ 5 , 0 0 0 . O f course, cheape r training—and much lowerstatus an d meage r opportunities—coul d b e ha d throug h second-rat e apprentice ships, o r i n the ne w technica l profession s suc h a s engineerin g i n particular. Engi neering offere d relativel y easy entr y t o ambitiou s lower-status boys , wh o could be articled quite cheaply o r could study at night in one of the Mechanics Institutes. The results, however , judgin g by Britain' s poor showin g at th e Pari s Industria l Exhibit of 186 7 an d b y the opinio n of contemporaries suc h a s Matthe w Arnold, wer e quit e below th e averag e standards of engineering educatio n o n th e continent . Given the stat e of education, ever y advance in the professional driv e for competitive examinations exacerbate d th e proble m of training. I t was beyon d the resources of th e majorit y o f practitioners t o g o t o Edinburg h or t o the continen t i n search of medical o r engineerin g education . The narro w institutiona l base o f higher-leve l training hindered standardization . For the professional reformers , unabl e on the whole to work through existing educational institutions , organization i n voluntary associations wa s doubl y necessary. In London a t least , th e effort s o f the " o l d style" corporation s o f the lowe r branches rapidly me t thei r limits : i n medicine, th e resistanc e o f the highe r branche s aime d chiefly a t maintaining the traditiona l distinction of ranks withi n th e profession . Th e modernizing project of the Societ y of Apothecaries wa s thwarted, thus, b y the physicians an d surgeons ' refusa l t o accep t the m a s peer s and wa s limited , a s well , b y the Society' s locatio n in London and b y it s own narro w conceptio n o f monopoly. Although th e apothecarie s were th e firs t t o apply compulsory writte n examination s in 1839-1840 , professiona l reorganizatio n cam e fro m othe r quarters . Much o f the vigo r o f the professiona l refor m movement wa s t o be foun d outsid e London, i n the leadershi p o f the regiona l societies whic h late r merged o r federate d 50

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into nationa l associations . No t surprisingly , the medica l societ y whic h becam e in 1856 th e Britis h Medica l Association wa s founde d i n Worcester a s th e Provincial Medical an d Surgica l Society i n 1832 . Si r George Clar k describes it in these terms: " B y abou t 184 0 his [Dr . Charle s Hastings' , founde r an d firs t president ] associatio n had becom e th e on e importan t medical associatio n o f provincial England ; hi s tas k in th e eighteen-forties wa s t o conquer London. " Sir George estimate s that a decade later, "th e futur e o f medicine an d surger y i n Great Britai n wa s . . . t o b e decide d in bargainings between the state and the profession. The profession had a dual organization, the corporations an d the voluntary associations, on e of which latte r was now predominant amon g t h e m . " The Britis h Medica l Association actively campaigned fo r the Medica l Act which was passe d b y Parliamen t i n 1858 . Th e Ac t set u p a single nationa l register fo r all practitioners wh o satisfie d certai n minima l standard s of competence. Contro l over registration wa s i n the hand s of the Genera l Medica l Council, constitute d by repre sentatives o f the state , o f the ol d corporations, o f the voluntary associations an d of the universities , though no t ye t o f the teachin g hospitals . 53

It wa s th e firs t bod y se t ove r an y Britis h professio n i n which ther e sa t member s ap pointed b y the state to take part in the regular routine of these functions. Yet , although the stat e created it , i t was no t a n instrument for carrying out th e wil l o f th e stat e . . . The official nominee s wer e in a small minority among the members. . . . Thu s the first national measures t o supersed e th e syste m o f chartered liberties i n the medica l profes sion wer e unlik e an y othe r professiona l constitutio n i n th e Britis h Isle s . . . i n no t merely permittin g bu t presupposin g th e existenc e o f stron g voluntar y association s side b y sid e wit h th e officia l machine. 54

The Act of 1858 was only a first step in professional reorganization: it did not institute uniform qualifications , as th e B . M . A . ha d advocated . T o th e grea t displeasur e o f Thomas Wakley, it did not give direct representation t o the majority o f practitioners. It did little to reform and unify th e programs of training. Yet, in Wakley's own words, it was "th e commencemen t o f a series of important changes," in which the B . M . A . was t o pla y a n increasingl y centra l role. The La w Society, thoug h simila r in type t o the Britis h Medica l Association, did not achieve th e same success. In 1836 it had petitioned the judges t o substitute writ ten examinations for informal interviews . By 1853 the examination for attorneys an d solicitors ha d bee n consolidated , an d th e lecture s provide d by th e La w Societ y i n London ha d becom e a full-fledge d cours e o f training , wit h increasin g emphasi s on genera l academi c background . Successiv e parliamentar y inquirie s force d th e Inns o f Cour t t o establis h compulsor y writte n examination s i n 1872 . Fiv e year s later, th e La w Societ y wa s give n sol e authorit y over it s examinations , a privilege which achieve d it s emancipation fro m th e forma l tutelag e o f the Inn s of Court. Yet the ba r successfull y resiste d th e radica l ide a o f a lega l university , open t o al l law students withou t distinctions . By the en d o f the nineteent h centur y th e projec t wa s definitively shelved : th e divisio n betwee n barrister s an d attorney s i n th e Englis h system o f law had become permanently institutionalized . I n fact, th e La w Society' s failure t o unif y th e professio n wa s a failure more apparen t tha n real : in the cours e of the attorneys' ris e to professional status , the association had successfully repulse d

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the barristers ' encroachment s an d establishe d a division o f labor on soli d grounds . The attorneys, i n fact, were more indispensable t o the barristers a s a referral system than th e barrister s wer e t o them a s pleaders . For all the advances that professionalization had made b y the nineteenth century, it ha d faile d t o build th e bases of a unified an d coherent educationa l system , whic h alone coul d standardiz e th e productio n of professional producer s an d establish monopoly o n universalisti c and objectiv e appearances . Par t o f the proble m lay i n the professionals' attitud e towar d th e state . Th e professiona l reformers , wheneve r possible, ha d relie d o n state action to break th e preserves of their traditional adver saries. Wher e thei r own autonomy wa s concerned , the y shared , however , th e gen eral laissez-faire rejection of state interference. Moreover, a clear notion of the state's educational function s wa s generall y lacking , o r perhap s to o controversia l t o b e endorsed. Si r George Clark's notes, fo r instance, tha t "the refor m of medical educa tion wa s no t understoo d t o mean th e provisio n o f more or better instruction. " No t even Oxfor d o r Cambridge conceived that their essential busines s was teachin g but " 't o find out , at stated seasons, in the most thorough manner possible, what a young man knows, without seeking to enquire how he knows it. Thu s it was that from 181 5 to 185 8 parliament remodelled some medical examining bodies an d created others , but neither endowed no r even investigate d medical teaching which underwen t grea t changes, bu t withou t interferenc e fro m th e state." The banne r o f stat e educatio n ha d bee n vigorousl y raised b y th e Benthamites , though chiefl y i n regard t o elementary educatio n for the workin g class . O n the on e hand, the Benthamites may have been to o radical for the rank-and-file professional, as indicate d b y th e disaffectio n o f Thoma s Wakley' s medica l followin g i n th e 1840s. O n the other hand, not the least effect of Benthamite agitation was to incite the gentr y to self-reform . As Perkin comments: " i n spite of the failur e o f the Benthamites an d thei r allie s t o creat e alternativ e system s o f education fo r th e variou s classes capabl e o f completel y replacin g thos e o f th e aristocrac y an d it s Church , they were able to stimulate the latter to reform an d extend the existing provision and to d o s o i n accordance wit h th e spiri t o f the entrepreneuria l i d e a l . " Again, th e Benthamit e reformers di d not immediately succeed i n creating a sys tem o f new gramma r school s adapte d t o middle-clas s needs . Yet , thei r methods , and especiall y th e competitio n their private school s presented , spurre d th e aristo cratic "public " school s t o reform . A s Raymond William s writes: 56

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Attendances a t the ol d schools , particularl y at the leadin g nine , ha d begun t o reviv e in th e perio d 1790-1830 , an d i n thei r differen t way s Butle r a t Shrewsbury , from 1798, an d Arnold at Rugby, from 1824 , ha d begun to change their character. Arnold's influence wa s not mainl y on the curriculum , bu t on the reestablishmen t o f socia l purpose, th e educatio n o f Christia n gentlemen . Butler' s influence i s perhap s even mor e significant, fo r his emphasis o n examination-passin g mark s the beginnin g o f a major trend. 59

Most of the proprietary schools that the middle class had set up as alternatives to the gentry's boardin g schools attaine d "public " schoo l status in the secon d hal f o f the nineteenth century. Their curricula had been different from thos e of the nine older institutions: les s devote d t o th e classica l foundation , mor e oriente d towar d mathe -

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matics, science , an d moder n languages . Th e bes t amon g them , however , rapidl y achieved the integration with the two elite universities that characterized the reformed schools of the aristocracy. By the time of the Schools Inquiry Commission, in 1868, schools suc h a s Marlboroug h an d Cheltenha m contributed more undergraduates t o Oxford an d Cambridge than all but four of the nine aristocratic "public" schools. As Brian Simon observes,' 'both old and new public schools became desirable educational institutions, increasingly well filled wit h sons of the affluent an d respectable; a s has often bee n said, they played a key part in bringing about that fusion betwee n new industrialists an d ol d aristocracy tha t gav e birt h t o th e Victoria n uppe r middl e class." Logically, thes e school s functione d as on e o f the chie f mechanism s fo r the re production of this class. " A s soon as i t is possible to make a good boarding school work ove r a wid e area, " wrot e Edward Thring, headmaste r a t Uppingham , in the early 1870s , "onl y thos e wh o have tim e to stay five , six , seven year s o r more at it have a chance. Thi s at once silentl y decides tha t none but the monied class can for m the bul k o f the school." The bes t "public " school s establishe d themselve s i n the min d o f middle-class parents a s a direc t stepping-ston e t o th e elit e universities . Thus, whil e th e uppe r middle class took a public school education as a birthright for its children, the ambition t o secur e such superio r schooling became, i n Thring's words, "th e fixe d ide a with every Englishman." This superiority was built into a system by the work of the school commission s o f the 1850 s an d 1860 s an d b y th e Act s which implemented their recommendations: the "public " school s and their emulators took the top place in a three-tiered syste m o f schooling strictly segregate d b y class; the y constituted, in the words of G. Kitson Clark,' 'the final stage of the consolidation of the caste . . . of a new typ e of aristocracy." The workin g clas s was assigned , obviously , t o a strictl y elementar y networ k o f publicly finance d schools , attendanc e a t whic h caugh t u p only slowl y wit h tha t of Anglican o r Catholi c voluntary schools. Th e examinatio n system—the result s of which conditione d the paymen t o f state grants—reinforce d the quasi-militar y dis cipline o f these schools , th e method s o f teaching by dril l an d learnin g by rote, the narrowness o f subject matter. The class divisions which the schools mirrored and reproduced were explicit in the Taunton Commissio n report o n endowe d higher-leve l schools: thre e grade s wer e strictly distinguished by leaving age (eightee n or nineteen; sixteen and fourteen), by the fees paid, and by the careers for which the pupils were prepared. Fre e places for poor or local boys were abolished and replaced by open scholarships for' 'boys of real ability i n whatever ran k the y ma y b e found. " From the first leve l sprang the system of "public" schools , which by 190 0 served some 30,00 0 students. Th e second grade wa s "to educate th e sons of smaller professionals an d businessmen , larg e shopkeepers , an d farmer s fo r th e professions , commerce, an d industr y and hav e a leavin g age o f sixteen, s o a s t o preven t them from preparin g fo r th e university." Fro m th e publicl y subsidize d thir d grad e came i n the last decades of the nineteenth century the developments i n higher-grade elementary education that were to threaten th e rigi d syste m of class education. Pro60

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moted by elective and usuall y radical school boards, th e higher grade school s wer e not only a threat to endowed and religious schools; their low fees and their technical and scientifi c vocation, which mad e the m attractive to the middle class, blurre d the class division betwee n elementar y an d secondar y levels , while thei r centers for the improvement o f student-teacher s pu t th e teachin g professio n withi n reac h o f th e working class. Thes e schools, s o ardently defended i n the ensuing battles by the trade union movemen t an d the Nationa l Union o f Teachers, incarnate d labor' s aspiration of a commo n secula r schoo l fo r al l children. Their future wa s a t th e cente r o f the intense socia l and political struggle s o f the turn of the century; but the apparent suc cess of the middl e class demand fo r state-supporte d secondar y educatio n signaled , in fact , thei r demise an d th e defea t o f the working-clas s ideal. The Educatio n Act of 190 2 rigidly define d difference s betwee n elementar y an d secondar y education . . . . I n place of the higher grade schools . . . ther e was offered a competitive syste m of scholarships t o transfe r children from on e se t o f schools , wit h a n early leavin g ag e irre vocably fixed , t o a quit e differen t syste m whic h alon e offere d th e opportunit y fo r advancement. . . . Fro m now on the pressure for secondary education for all inevitably took th e form of a continuing attemp t t o open u p the grammar schools—now th e only secondary schools—t o th e workin g class. 67

Since secondar y educatio n was planned as somethin g qualitatively differen t fro m what the school boards had provided in their higher-grade science schools , the model deliberately chose n wa s tha t o f the existin g "public" schools . Th e middl e classes had obtained , i n fact, thei r own bowdlerized version of the elite' s instrument s fo r establishing an d maintainin g social distance i n the ne w syste m o f inequality. More directl y concerne d tha n other sectors of the middle class, professiona l me n were amon g th e mos t vigorou s supporters o f state subsidie s fo r education. Tru e to their class interests, however , an d spli t withi n themselves—betwee n thos e who had access to the closed circle formed at the top by Oxford, Cambridge , and the "public' ' schools, an d thos e wh o did not—the averag e professionals coul d neithe r hav e en visaged no r supporte d radica l educational reform . In th e earl y nineteent h century , thei r choices t client s a s wel l a s thei r arrogan t colleagues o f the "highe r branches" relaye d the model of the gentleman to middleclass professionals . Mos t o f them belonge d t o a socia l worl d i n whic h university education was still , o n the whole, a thing out of reach. Thus , before th e "civi c uni versities" develope d fro m th e 1880 s on , thei r projec t o f socia l mobilit y too k distance from thos e still lower in the social hierarchy by means of traditional ideological legitimations, adapte d fro m aristocrati c models. Contemptuou s a s th e middle-clas s professionals ma y have bee n o f the idl e an d wasteful living o f the elite, thei r claims for statu s reveal a diffuse feelin g o f envy and emulation. Their project, in a sense, aimed a s muc h at enlarging the rank s o f those who could b e eventually admitted to the worl d o f high status , a s i t aimed at creating an independent scal e of prestige an d social standing . In general , i f a collective mobility project—directe d i n part agains t establishe d elites—acknowledges tha t it s own distinctive values ceas e to b e predominan t a t a given poin t of the upwar d trajectory , th e challeng e itsel f contribute s t o legitimiz e the stratificatio n system . Insofa r a s thes e deferential challengers admitte d a ceilin g 68

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to the scope of their group's upwar d mobility, a n added incentiv e existed for protecting th e group' s advantage s against challenge s fro m below—tha t is , fo r seekin g t o reproduce "downwards " th e stratificatio n barrier whic h th e professiona l middl e class itsel f ha d t o face . Thi s barrier, besides , di d not see m totall y impenetrable . When the school system too k shape in the last decades of the century, the bridge s that scholarship s provide d across it s class level s confirme d the notio n that th e to p rungs o f the statu s hierarchy wer e accessible . Th e system , moreover , wa s a n effec tive moa t agains t th e levelin g aspirations whic h th e middl e class attributed, in part accurately, t o th e workin g clas s movement. A s the uppe r middl e class had ceased to advocate an y change in the "public " schools i n the late 1870s , s o the bul k of the middle clas s considere d itsel f basicall y satisfie d wit h wha t i t ha d achieve d a t th e secondary leve l i n the earl y year s of our century. It s main target thereafte r becam e the universities. 69

THE PYRAMI D O F PRESTIGE When the Victoria n state entered th e field o f education in response to the demands of it s middl e an d uppe r middl e class constituents , i t respectfully interprete d thei r implicit direction s for a revised syste m o f status inequality. As Raymond William s puts it , educational though t an d plannin g were shape d o n th e whol e by "th e con tinued relegation of trade an d industry to lower school classes, and the desire o f successful industrialist s tha t thei r son s shoul d mov e int o th e no w largel y irrelevan t class o f gentry." It woul d b e patentl y absurd , however , t o think tha t a modern industria l state can structure it s educational syste m i n terms of the exceptional continuity of a class culture, whe n the class itself has los t its hegemony. Britain' s head star t a s an industrial power had provided her capitalists with a secure shelter fro m competition . Protecte d from foreig n rivals, constitute d predominantly by small family firms , Britis h indus try in the first hal f of the nineteenth century lacked the incentive to give scientific and technical education a decisive push. No r was th e stat e inspired by nationalistic reasons to develop scientific research and scientific education and put them at the servic e of industria l technology. However, from th e 1860 s on, the state was forced to entertain increasin g concerns , voice d firs t b y som e farsighte d industrialists , abou t th e backwardness o f English technical and scientific education. The reports of the Royal Commissions o n scientifi c an d technica l instruction , a s wel l a s th e wor k o f th e National Associatio n fo r th e Promotio n of Technical Education, wer e directl y influenced b y this grouping of industrialists and scientists. Thi s work—and the industrialists' direc t sponsorship—were i n large par t responsibl e fo r the developmen t of provincial universitie s fro m th e 1870 s on . Germa n industr y was perceive d a s par ticularly threatenin g an d it s technologica l superiorit y wa s attribute d i n larg e par t to Germany' s scientifi c excellence an d t o he r syste m o f Technische Hochschulen . The influenc e of this movement wa s limited , however , b y Britain's development as a n imperialis t power. Especiall y afte r th e depressio n tha t starte d i n the 1870s , British capita l sough t highe r profit s overseas . Sheltere d b y Britain' s dominan t trading positio n with regar d t o the underdevelope d world , Britis h industry , largely unaware o f th e dangers , continue d o n it s roa d t o technologica l obsolescence . A s 70

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Brian Simo n observes , "Thi s tendenc y toward s th e 'freezing ' o f technique ha d a clear educationa l significance . A n integrated syste m o f science an d technology — of educatio n an d industry—o n the Germa n o r Swis s mode l n o longe r seeme d s o urgent." Imperialism , moreover, mad e London into a world financia l center; th e shortage of clerks wa s fel t mor e acutel y tha n tha t o f technicians towar d the en d of the nineteent h century . Th e correctiv e tha t wa s emphasize d wa s gramma r schoo l education. Technica l an d scientifi c educatio n develope d chiefl y a t th e universit y level—that is to say, nea r the summit of a hierarchical system whic h excluded at an early ag e th e bul k o f working-class children. The provincia l colleges—seve n o f which ha d been founded i n the decade 187 1 — 1881—received thei r first stat e subsidies i n 1889 . I n 1930 , Abraha m Flexner compared the m t o th e America n state universities , whic h ha d ofte n bee n thei r avowed model. H e considered th e Britis h developmen t "a n amazin g achievemen t i n a brief period" an d commented , " I t is obviou s wh y th e provincia l universitie s coul d not have been born earlier: they had to wait upon the provision of secondary school s an d the dissolutio n of the Anglica n monopol y at Oxford , Cambridge , an d i n the sphere of politics." Bu t the Oxfor d an d Cambridg e mode l had no t been dethroned . In th e 1860 s a Governmen t Selec t Committe e ha d conclude d tha t technological and scientifi c training would b e of little us e i f provided to the lowe r classes, excep t "as enlargin g the area from whic h the managers may be drawn." It added, however , that " a l l the witnesse s . . . ar e convince d tha t a knowledg e o f th e principle s of science on the part of those who occupy th e higher industrial ranks . . . woul d tend to promot e industria l progress." The accurac y o f the conviction matters les s here than the fac t tha t th e "ne w kin d of learning" fi t int o the class mold of the educational system. Oxford an d Cambridge increasingly opene d thei r curricul a to th e "ne w learning " whil e th e civi c univer sities, i n Si r Eric Ashby' s words , "mellowed " their stron g utilitaria n bia s "b y a respect an d attachmen t t o th e ideal s fo r whic h Oxfor d an d Cambridg e stood." Since education was destined t o the co-optable middl e class, it should not be severe d from th e culture that wa s th e hallmar k of a gentleman. Couche d i n class terms, th e incorporation o f th e gentlemanl y mode l tacitl y le d th e "redbrick " universitie s t o accept a place at the base of "a 'pyrami d of prestige' o f institutions fixed i n the hierarchy accordin g t o their distance fro m th e pur e mode l of the Englis h university to which Oxfor d an d Cambridg e i n practice mos t closel y approximate." For whoever was rich enough to aspire to a gentlemanly style of life, th e new insti tutions i n London or i n the province s coul d not matc h th e grac e or th e advantage s of Oxfor d an d Cambridge . Thi s persisten t preferenc e o f th e uppe r middl e class , which stil l provide d a disproportionat e numbe r o f professionals , maintaine d th e pressure fo r academi c refor m o n th e tw o ancien t universities . Paradoxically , th e aristocratic mystiqu e tha t surrounde d the m helpe d thei r transformation : wit h in comparably greater prestige tha n the other institutions of higher learning, wit h bette r power connection s an d large r means, Oxfor d an d Cambridg e coul d attract th e best teachers and , a s academi c criteri a of selection becam e increasingl y important , th e best student s a s well . Thes e objectiv e advantage s allowe d the m t o translat e thei r earlier position as centers of elite reproduction and co-optation into twentieth-century educational superiority . Their graduates "wer e readil y give n chairs a t th e provin 71

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cial universitie s wher e the y becam e th e mos t prestigefu l an d influentia l member s of th e staff . Th e differenc e i n quality—rea l or imagined—betwee n graduate s of Oxford an d Cambridg e an d thos e o f othe r universitie s ha s bee n s o grea t tha t va cancies in subjects no t existing at the two ancient universitie s were preferably fille d by thei r own graduates trained in related fields , rathe r tha n graduate s of other uni versities possessin g specialize d training." The new universities opened u p middle-class access to higher education consider ably. Give n the enlarged poo l of educated potentia l recruits, many professions up graded thei r entry requirements b y adding general education a s a preliminary. Thus , the "redbrick " universities contributed to the professionalizatio n movement i n two ways: by providing systematic genera l education to broad sectors of the middle class, and by taking up, in most cases, the tasks of specialized professional trainin g which had heretofor e bee n fulfilled b y examination-oriented private schools o r by appren ticeship. Wit h fe w exceptions, professiona l association s relinquishe d their training functions. Th e ne w institution s provided an educational bas e for the newe r profes sions a s wel l a s fo r the bul k of professionals i n medicine and engineering. The y did not succeed , however , i n erasing th e hierarchica l cast of the educationa l system : 76

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Oxford an d Cambridg e were nationa l universitie s connecte d wit h th e nationa l elite s of politics , administration , business , an d the libera l professions. Th e res t wer e provincial, al l of them , includin g London , taking most o f thei r students fro m thei r own region an d trainin g the m i n undergraduat e professiona l school s fo r th e newe r tech nological an d professiona l occupation s create d b y industrialism , such a s chemistry , electrical engineering, stat e grammar school teaching, an d the scientific civi l service.

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In th e 1930s , i t was apparen t t o a n incisiv e observer suc h a s Abraha m Flexner that the persistenc e o f a hierarchica l order ha d greatl y hindere d th e standardizatio n o f scientific an d professional education . B y comparison wit h German y an d the Unite d States, Englan d wa s fa r behin d i n th e developmen t o f professiona l an d graduat e schools. Flexne r remarked, i n particular, that Britis h laboratorie s an d teaching hos pitals were underendowed an d that their overall structure was haphazard an d weak. The universities' response to the practical needs of their different class constituencie s had bee n flexible , bu t i t had als o bee n a-systemati c an d fragmentary . Th e unchal lenged Oxbridg e model provided the other institution s with undeniabl e standard s of excellence, a t the sam e time that i t limited thei r capacity fo r organizational innovation. A s a consequence, the newer universities competed to approximate their model more tha n the y compete d fo r research facilitie s an d specialize d facult y i n an ope n academic marketplace . Fro m one point of view, the lack of competition may accoun t for th e fac t tha t th e Britis h universitie s faile d t o "creat e new discipline s or profes sions an d di d not develo p researc h systematically." From th e poin t of view o f the professional s themselves , th e internalizatio n of the invidious statu s barriers embodie d i n the two-tie r academic structur e i s significant; it ma y partl y explain that professionalis m i n contemporary Britai n ha s no t been a s successful a n antidot e t o th e unionizatio n and th e clas s consciousness of educate d workers a s i t is i n the Unite d States. The twentieth-century continuity of Britain's hierarchical system of higher education reflect s th e persistenc e o f ol d form s o f statu s stratificatio n and legitimation , which ha d particula r affinities wit h traditiona l conceptions o f higher learning. The 79

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two-tier academi c structur e expresses , thus , th e interpla y of status an d clas s prin ciples of stratification: i t can b e see n as th e institutiona l respons e of a traditionally cast, though flexible an d open, rulin g class to needs arising from th e economy an d from th e stat e apparatus . Combinin g co-optation wit h segregation , th e academi c system reconcile d the maintenanc e o f "aristocratic" statu s and th e vested interest s of th e ol d ruling clas s wit h th e emergen t clas s structur e o f industrial capitalism . The aristocrati c aspiration s o f the Britis h middl e class ar e ofte n propose d a s a n explanation fo r the persistenc e o f the gentry' s cultura l influenc e i n education an d for th e declin e i n entrepreneurial efficienc y an d innovatio n which becam e apparen t before th e end of the nineteenth century. Attitudes , granted that they exist, cannot constitute a satisfactor y explanatio n fo r a structura l phenomenon . O n th e entre preneurial side , th e neglect o f scientific and technical education was roote d in Britain's economi c structur e an d uniqu e patter n of industrialization. I t was perpetuate d by th e illusor y shelte r whic h th e empir e buil t aroun d capitalis t profits . Th e effec t was tha t durin g the nineteent h centur y an d par t o f the twentieth , industry did not command th e developmen t o f higher education, leavin g it relatively fre e t o follo w its traditiona l model . Industry' s deman d fo r highl y traine d scientists , managers , and technicians was not vigorous enough, or came too late to overturn the "pyrami d of prestige " whic h cas t a n aur a o f social inferiorit y upo n th e ne w discipline s and the newe r universities. Paradoxically, sinc e the advance o f British industr y turned into technological and organizational conservatis m i n the las t thir d o f the nineteent h century , alternative channels o f mobilit y remaine d ope n fo r a lon g tim e t o me n wh o ha d no t passe d through highe r education. The fact that industry was relatively inhospitable to university graduates may have contributed, o n the other hand , t o the sens e of closing opportunities for high-statu s occupations conveye d a t th e tur n o f the centur y b y suc h spokesme n o f the uppe r middle clas s a s th e journalist Escott, wh o wrote: 82

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Though th e exigencie s o f moder n lif e . . . hav e multiplie d profession s i n England , they hav e no t multiplie d the m i n suc h number s a s t o provid e sufficien t occupatio n for th e son s o f Englis h parents . . . . O f the youn g me n wh o hav e gon e throug h an academic course , withou t discredi t bu t withou t lustre , th e grea t majorit y becom e curates, o r schoolmasters , o r emigrants . Th e mer e universit y degree , eve n whe n accompanied b y moderat e honors , i s becomin g a drug in the market. 84

In fact, enrollments in higher education were lower in Britain than in other industrial countries unti l afte r th e Secon d Worl d War ; unlik e Germany , France , Italy , an d even th e Unite d States , Britai n di d not hav e a n "academi c proletariat " during the depression o f the 1930s. Politics, an d th e Labou r Party i n particular, offered stil l anothe r channe l o f indi vidual mobilit y tha t di d no t pas s throug h th e university . More significant , even , than th e alternatives , wa s th e insulatio n of different classes an d system s o f social status from eac h other ; unti l 1944 , this insulation contributed to reduce th e pressure from belo w fo r opportunities in higher education. On th e professiona l side , th e refor m movemen t o f th e nineteent h centur y ulti mately contribute d to preserv e th e nor m of sponsored mobilit y an d a n ideolog y of stratification tha t wa s a t varianc e wit h th e characteristi c legitimation s of market 85

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oriented professionalization . Th e logi c o f thi s movemen t leads , i n effect , t o th e development of a nominally open, standardized, an d competitive educational system , functioning t o reproduc e an d legitimiz e social an d occupationa l stratification . The British professional reformer s faile d t o join a movement for full-fledged educationa l modernization, an d did not press the typica l organizationa l and ideologica l feature s of moder n professionalis m upo n th e highe r level s o f the schoo l system . Thi s wa s possible i n part because sources of social prestige—which were heteronomous fro m the point of view of the professional mobilit y project—remained continuousl y available. Th e reformer s withi n th e olde r profession s coul d gradually fi t their origina l drive for status into the pre-existing structures an d thus keep their distance, i n turn, from les s successfu l colleague s an d les s "gentle " professions . The Englis h case show s wit h clarit y tha t th e interna l characteristic s o f profes sionalization an d o f the professiona l mode l ar e subordinat e t o broade r socia l an d economic structures . Th e elaboratio n o f statu s criteri a and th e adjustment s i n th e educational institution s wer e no t incompatibl e response s t o th e socia l effect s o f industrialization. England' s incipien t decline, bot h a s a n industria l pioneer an d a s a worl d power , reinforce d th e "natural " tendenc y o f status barriers t o crystallize. The substitutio n o f criteri a o f statu s founde d o n moder n specialize d trainin g for those founded, howeve r remotely, on "aristocratic " cultur e and styl e of life i s not yet complete today . However , in the word s of a British sociologist , "the ris e of the university graduat e i n Britai n sinc e Worl d Wa r I I is comparabl e t o th e ris e o f the gentry i n the sixteent h century." The non-elit e syste m o f national education asserte d itsel f afte r 1944 ; it performs its essential functio n i n the reproductio n and legitimatio n of class, supplyin g industry an d administratio n no t wit h gentlemen , bu t wit h specialized , classified , an d graded manpower . In turnin g next t o th e America n case, I shal l similarl y loo k a t th e professiona l project fro m th e poin t o f view o f th e availabl e organizationa l an d ideologica l resources. The fact that the educational syste m i n the United States is less hierarchical than i n England, and that it s higher levels appear as model s o f modernity to the rest of th e capitalis t world, doe s not mean, o f course, tha t i t is less central to the repro duction an d legitimatio n o f the clas s structure . Th e profession s an d highe r education ultimatel y developed a closer relatio n to each other an d t o the econom y i n the United States than they did in England. This points to a difference i n the ideological means mobilize d by th e educationa l system , an d t o a differen t articulatio n of th e educational syste m wit h the larger social structure. It illuminates, in short, the differ ent contex t i n which professionalizatio n evolved. 87

Chapter 8

PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEG E IN A DEMOCRATI C SOCIET Y

Professions cam e of age i n America after th e Civi l War , a period in which eco nomic, administrative , an d politica l powe r wer e consolidate d an d centralized . I n the perio d betwee n 187 0 an d 1920 , th e establishmen t o f nationa l organizationa l nuclei serve d b y vast bureaucracie s wa s s o distinctiv e that many authors , followin g Kenneth Boulding , refe r t o it as th e "organizationa l revolution." The y ten d t o se e it a s th e rathe r paradoxica l culminatio n of the "grea t transformation " whic h ha d begun hal f a century earlie r unde r th e auspice s of laissez-faire . Corinne Gil b observes, fo r instance, tha t "professiona l organization s cam e relatively lat e i n th e organizationa l revolution " and suggest s tha t "t o articulat e an d sustain th e ne w an d neede d level s o f professionalism , an d t o hol d thei r ow n i n a society whos e various other member s wer e increasingl y organized, th e professions , too, formed organizations." I t is true that neither in Europe nor in the United States did professiona l organization s attai n their present for m o r create their present relationships with stat e power until this century. Th e radical changes in the larger market ha d fundamenta l consequence s fo r th e structur e o f professions , ol d an d new , as the y strov e t o establish o r maintain their own secondary market s o f services. T o these general consequence s I shall return later. W e can expect the m to be more visible, widespread , an d far-reachin g i n the Unite d State s than i n other advance d cap italist countries . Indeed , i n America' s passag e fro m loca l o r regiona l t o nationa l organizations, all th e centra l institution s were distinctivel y forme d or transformed : the structure of the federal government, th e corporate nucle i of industrial capitalism, the industria l trade unions , th e educationa l system , an d th e profession s bea r littl e resemblance t o th e institutiona l forms whic h fulfille d thei r function s befor e thi s phase, i n whic h th e Unite d State s becam e th e world' s leadin g industria l power. It woul d b e misleading , however, t o assume that ther e wa s a total discontinuit y between th e earl y attempt s a t professionalizatio n an d th e consolidate d form s o f mature an d successfu l professionalism . Th e professiona l projec t ca n b e identifie d by it s relate d objective s o f marke t monopol y an d socia l status . Thes e goal s wer e pursued a t differen t time s b y differen t group s o f professional reformers , usin g th e resources that wer e accessibl e i n their specific environments . Th e "organizationa l revolution" di d not so much alter the natur e o f the professional projec t a s i t altered 1

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the resource s availabl e fo r it s fulfillment . A s new strategie s became possible, ne w kinds of professional me n appeare d to b e th e mos t likel y o r the mos t ap t t o articulate or follow suc h strategies ; but their ways of understanding wha t they were doing do no t necessaril y impl y a consciou s brea k wit h th e past . In considerin g th e professiona l projec t a s a n adaptiv e respons e to major changes initiated elsewher e i n the society , Gil b detracts fro m it s active an d specifi c dimen sions. He r vie w implicitl y discount s th e persistenc e o f socia l structures , th e stub bornness of vested interests , th e unconsciou s rigidit y o f habits an d ideology—tha t is, the difficulty o f creating something new out of materials that are both new and old. In som e cases, the radica l changes that affecte d America n society afte r th e Civi l War were but the culmination of trends already discernibl e in the antebellum period. In th e ne w historica l context, th e professiona l projec t wa s carrie d throug h by mor e effective mean s than i n the past , bu t th e ol d ways o f securing economi c an d socia l advantages were neithe r easil y defeate d no r entirely abandoned. To ask wha t kinds of strategie s were possible a t each time, how effective they were and who could best discern an d mobiliz e th e necessar y organizationa l resources , i s th e onl y wa y o f assessing the continuit y or discontinuit y of a historical process. THE COMMUNA L MATRI X O F PROFESSIO N Oscar Handlin has observe d tha t "practicall y nothing is known about th e history of th e profession s i n th e Unite d State s . . . book s abou t th e benc h an d ba r o f a particular locality or accounts of a prominent lawyer or even analyses of changes in the conceptio n o f law only tangentially throw light upo n th e evolutio n of the orga nized structur e o f the lega l profession . Th e deficienc y i s equally prominen t i n th e case o f teachers , physicians , ministers , an d othe r groups." Recen t studie s hav e begun to fill th e gaps, at least for some professions. Ye t an attempt to draw general izations fro m th e America n past seems doomed t o failure at the outse t by the characteristic—and constantl y increasing—multiplicit y of socia l matrices . Fro m th e beginning of the colony, centrifugal forces appeare d to work against th e permanence of transplante d institutions , not only at th e leve l of the state , but a t th e muc h mor e meaningful leve l o f smal l rura l communities . Family , community , an d church , merged together , wer e th e foundatio n o f a well-ordered , stable , an d hierarchica l society: bu t the strangenes s of the ne w environment , th e levelin g effect o f free an d abundant land , th e scarcit y o f labor, an d th e heterogeneit y o f religious denomina tions encouraged th e emancipation of the young, the scattering into new settlements , the erosio n o f traditional forms o f subordination. Thu s "b y th e eighteent h centur y . . . bonde d servitude , wit h it s carefull y calibrate d degree s o f dependency , wa s rapidly bein g eliminated , draine d of f a t on e en d int o freedoo m an d independen t wage labor, an d at the other into the new, debased status of chattel slavery." I n this setting, th e ol d institution o f apprenticeship, whic h ha d smoothl y integrated famil y with community , rapidly tended t o become a limited contract , fro m whic h masters obtained th e muc h needed labor an d servant s obtained specifi c skills , bu t not much more, on their way to independence. The bases on which to found the binding restrictions an d regulation s o f a guil d syste m wer e absent : acces s to craft s an d eve n t o professions remaine d characteristicall y ope n i n the ne w world . 4

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The erosion o f traditional institutions , on the othe r hand , provoke d anxious fear s " o f a calamitous declin e i n the level of civilization," o f what Cotton Mather would call a "creolean degeneracy." In his brilliant interpretation of the past of American education, Bernar d Bailyn suggests that the perceived weakness of the family an d of secular community institutions rapidly led the colonist s t o plac e grea t emphasi s on formal education. Th e churc h wa s th e obviou s recipien t o f the cultura l role tha t family alon e coul d not fulfill . Fo r religious sects, deeply concerne d wit h th e deliberate creatio n an d maintenanc e o f grou p identit y an d socia l cohesio n throug h th e propagation o f thei r faith , thi s wa s a ferventl y assume d mission . Throug h education, the Puritans sough t t o maintain uniformity, t o remove the threat that dispersio n and diversity posed to religious unity—and hence to morality and civilization. Their strenuous efforts to transfer cultura l models (whic h had their most influential, thoug h not thei r only source in New England ) int o the "wilderness " explain s th e charac teristic scatterin g o f educational efforts , th e multiplicatio n o f denominational col leges in the nineteenth century. A s Bailyn observes, "such a uniformity coul d not be maintained beyon d the earl y period of religious enthusiasm an d past the boundarie s of th e origina l clusterin g settlements . Ther e too k place no t a n abandonmen t o f the original hig h ideals , no t a genera l regressio n o f educational an d intellectua l stan dards, but a settling into regional patterns determined by the more ordinary material requirements o f l i f e . " 7

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A differen t tren d appeare d wit h forc e i n the eighteent h century : t o giv e appren tices, bu t not only them, the basic nonvocational instruction which their masters had contracted t o provid e bu t wer e n o longe r giving , evenin g school s wer e starte d i n great numbers . Togethe r wit h the self-improvement effort s o f urban craftsmen, typi fied b y Benjami n Franklin' s group , thes e school s symbolize d th e voluntar y con cern wit h educatio n fo r socia l mobility , wit h usefu l knowledg e whic h woul d fi t youths or adults "fo r learning any business, calling, or profession." I n both cases, the suppor t fo r the school s wa s local . I n the eighteent h century , Ne w England wa s the firs t regio n t o compensat e fo r th e ever-insufficien t privat e endowment s o f it s schools b y general taxation . But long-term profitable investments wer e everywher e hard to find, an d al l the solution s reinforce d localism : everywhere, financin g came again an d again fro m direc t community contributions which bound all levels of education t o th e externa l contro l of individual o r communit y donors. Thus, th e predominanc e o f local interests an d local conditions is, in itself, a general organizin g dimensio n o f th e America n past . Befor e an d afte r independence , localism governed th e adaptation an d the creation of institutional models. Th e broad schemes fo r nationa l institution s i n educatio n an d i n th e econom y tha t ha d bee n envisaged b y th e foremos t revolutionar y leaders di d not tak e root : i n the firs t tw o decades of the nineteenth century , th e tissue of American society wa s made of scattered an d largel y autonomou s communities , onl y loosel y connecte d b y th e over arching politica l structures . Eve n a t th e leve l of th e polity , th e Jeffersonia n idea l tended t o presen t th e stat e a s a n instrumen t tha t woul d destro y th e artificia l an d inequitable law s o f the colon y and restor e a free societ y t o its spontaneity, ordere d by natural law and protected agains t inequit y by the limitless supply of land. I n the second thir d of the nineteenth century , economi c developmen t an d the beginning of 10

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massive immigration began to place unbearabl e strains upo n the structure s o f localism. Th e multiplie d effect s o f diversity and mobility , whic h th e narro w loca l insti tutions wer e n o longe r abl e t o contain , reveale d themselve s a s full-fledge d threat s to th e passin g traditiona l order. In th e lon g searc h fo r institutiona l solutions o f national scope , nostalgi a veste d the relatively uniform an d relatively insulated communities of the past with mythical virtues. O n thi s ideologica l background , th e visibl e augmentatio n o f socia l inequality acquire d particula r stridency . Ye t b y th e tim e o f th e revolutionar y war , class lines ha d bee n deep an d clearl y draw n eve n outsid e th e slave-ownin g South . In all but the areas of subsistence farming and the recently settled frontier, the unequa l distribution o f wealt h ha d le d t o th e crystallizatio n of statu s an d o f a recognize d social hierarchy . A t the to p stoo d a n "aristocracy " o f great landowner s an d mer chants, favored in the South by the existence o f a large servile class, but no less visible in the small cities and in the more "democratic" North . Buttressed b y intermarriage, this uppe r clas s ha d ha d enoug h permanenc e t o generat e distinctiv e pattern s o f monopolization o f socia l privilege . The sal e of loyalist estates afte r th e revolution did not substantially change the position or the composition of this class. I t was a n aristocracy ope n to wealth, into which a few men who started fro m th e bottom found their way. Jackson Turner Main estimates it at roughly 1 0 percent o f the whit e population: it was constituted, he says, by approximately "10 percent of the landowners , the sam e proportion of ministers an d doctors, mos t lawyers , a few artisans, an d not far fro m hal f o f the merchant s qualified as well-to-d o or wealthy." 13

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Detailed regiona l studies , however , sho w mor e concentratio n o f wealt h tha n Main suggests , perhap s because the categorie s h e list s wer e partiall y overlapping. Thus, Aubre y C . Land' s stud y o f th e norther n Chesapeak e find s tha t th e larges t estates (thos e evaluate d a t £100 0 o r more ) represente d 1. 6 percen t o f the tota l in the las t decad e of the seventeent h century, 2. 2 percen t i n the secon d decad e of the eighteenth, an d 3. 6 percen t i n 1730-1739 . He r analysi s o f inventorie s an d estat e accounts of free me n confirms the hypothesis tha t "th e me n of first fortune belonge d functionally t o a clas s whos e succes s stemme d fro m entrepreneuria l activitie s as muc h as , o r eve n mor e than , fro m thei r direc t operation s a s producer s o f to bacco. . . . The y wer e a t onc e planters , politica l leaders , an d businessmen." Chief amon g thei r non-agricultural activities were lan d speculation, moneylending , and trade—whic h include d keeping countr y store s and actin g a s liaiso n agents be tween overseas buyers an d the smal l tobacco planters . Investmen t i n manufacturing, though less frequent, provide d the best opportunities for profit. Lan d also finds that law practic e brough t t o man y lawyer s a n enviabl e income , "free d fro m direc t de pendence on returns fro m th e annua l tobacco fleet" ; to the most enterprising, it also brought considerabl e opportunitie s fo r profitabl e lan d or business deals. The poore r categorie s wer e no t entirel y excluded fro m th e genera l prosperit y of the area in the first hal f of the eighteenth century : what may be considered a respectable rura l middle class of modest mean s but stable incomes gre w fro m 21. 7 percen t in th e las t decade s of the seventeent h century t o 35. 7 percen t i n the 1730s . Belo w this stratu m o f middle estates (fro m £ 1 0 0 to 500 ) la y a botto m class of free me n with estate s o f £ 1 00 or less . Extremel y vulnerable t o marke t fluctuations , natura l 16

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calamities, o r eve n hig h level s o f taxation , these smal l planters live d a t th e leve l of subsistence . I n the 1730 s the y represente d stil l ove r half o f the tota l distributio n of estates , dow n from three-quarter s i n 1690-1699. Urban area s allegedly offered bette r opportunitie s and higher standards of livin g than the older agricultural regions. B y 1790, only 5 percent o f a population slightly larger than three millio n live d i n agglomerations of 2500 or more inhabitants. None of th e twenty-fou r towns exceede d 50,000. Boston , fo r instance , ha d les s tha n 20,000 and was growing at an annual rate of 1.68 percen t (compared to 34.7 percen t for the population as a whole) in the second hal f of the eighteenth century. Migra tion int o Bosto n bega n a dramati c increas e afte r 1765 , a s populatio n pressure on land gre w i n the surroundin g countryside. Ye t the larges t grou p of migrants came from neighborin g small towns; taken together wit h th e hig h rate of departures fro m Boston, thi s movement attest s to the paucit y of opportunities in the urba n areas. " B y 1790, " report s Alla n Kulikoff , "4 5 pe r cent o f the taxpayers i n town i n 1780 had disappeare d fro m ta x lists . Som e ha d died , the res t lef t town . . . . Thos e wh o moved out of Boston were the poorest an d least successfu l member s o f the community . . . onl y 4 2 pe r cen t o f those withou t rea l estate (rents ) i n 178 0 remained in town i n 1790." 18

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If Bosto n ma y b e take n a s a representativ e example , economi c inequalit y wa s great i n the town s and did not abate after independence . Whil e Mai n estimate s tha t an incom e of £ 50 per yea r scarcel y me t the need s of a family tha t ha d t o pay ren t and bu y al l its food, Kulikof f s analysis o f taxable wealt h in Boston in 179 0 finds that 29.8 percent o f the taxpayers wer e assessed at 0 to £ 2 5 . Tw o middle groups, assessed a t £ 2 5 t o 10 0 an d a t £ 1 0 0 to 500 , represented , respectively , 31. 4 an d 25.5 percent o f all taxpayers. A t the top, the 13. 7 percent assessed at £ 5 00 o r more held ove r 60 percent o f taxable wealth . Comparison wit h previou s decades reveal s a growing concentration of wealth in the hands of the wealthiest and a decline in the relative position of the middl e categories. A t the very bottom, the untaxe d population of poor and near poor was growing enough a t the end of the eighteenth century, especially in the economic depression that followed independence , t o alarm the city's notables. The wealthy elite at the top monopolized not only the public marks of social honor but also the importan t political office s of selectman, oversee r o f the poor, an d state legislator. Lower-leve l civi c position s wer e share d wit h th e artisa n middl e class , while poore r artisan s an d laborer s dominate d i n positions withou t politica l power , such as that of surveyor of the boards o r sealer of leather, an d especially in positions in th e fire companie s an d the constabulary. Moderat e economic gains i n one's trade or i n real estate were possibl e fo r over one-third of the economically active in late eighteenth-century Boston, while small-scale migration operated a s a safety valve for the less fortunate. I n such an economic context, the symbolic participation in civic responsibilities ope n t o th e humble r citizens acte d a s a n element o f cohesion, en suring t o th e "me n o f quality" th e deferentia l respec t o f their socia l inferiors . I n colonial days , say s Arthu r M . Schlesinger , "Me n i n every wal k o f lif e no t onl y accepted th e concep t o f a layere d societ y bu t believe d i n its Tightness. Th e clergy preached it ; all classes practiced i t . " 2 3

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After 1776 , the politica l ideolog y of the new republic further defused th e rumble s of revol t that ha d appeare d in riots and crow d actions befor e an d durin g the revolut i o n . Actio n agains t th e establishe d orde r wa s actio n agains t th e wil l o f the sov ereign, tha t is , th e people . Despit e loca l an d sectiona l readjustments , democrac y did no t fundamentall y alte r th e clas s structur e o f th e settle d communities . Thus , the eighteenth-century matri x from whic h professionals dre w sustenance and suppor t remained inegalitaria n an d hierarchical . From th e elite s ha d com e th e impuls e t o impor t and adap t foreig n institutional and socia l models. Bot h before an d afte r th e revolution , professionals wer e promi nent i n the rank s o f this elite. In architecture, i n particular, some men rose to high standing ou t o f th e skille d crafts . Thus , i n prerevolutionar y Philadelphia , a fe w master carpenters and masons "achieved bot h reputation and fortune , move d in the same circles wit h th e merchan t princes , an d were regarde d b y all as the founder s o f professions." I n the mor e establishe d profession s o f law, medicine, an d divinity , however, th e highes t mark s o f distinction appea r to have gone to those with forma l education. Becaus e America n colleges—and , a fortiori, Europea n universities — were onl y accessible to the wealthy , thi s recognition indirectly sanctioned th e pre eminence o f rank an d socia l class. Of the nine colonial colleges, onl y one, Willia m and Mary , wa s i n the South . Whil e mos t o f their graduates destined themselve s to the profession s (an d i n particular t o th e clergy , a t leas t unti l th e 1750s) , man y did not. I t is not clea r whethe r highe r education represente d fo r the latte r a natural ac companiment an d preparatio n fo r thei r gentlemanl y statu s o r a mean s o f upwar d social mobility. I n any case , th e compositio n o f the board s o f trustees, th e pre dominance i n them of wealthy local notables an d clergymen from th e "aristocratic " denominations, allo w on e t o conclud e wit h Richar d Hofstadte r tha t " i t wa s th e aristocracy tha t wa s primaril y concerne d wit h th e colonia l colleges, th e well-to-do class tha t gav e the bul k of private support , an d th e rulin g grou p tha t provide d th e trustees." 27

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As Benjami n Frankli n rapidly foun d ou t whe n h e trie d t o gai n suppor t fo r hi s Academy amon g Philadelphia' s firs t citizens , "ornamenta l training " i n the classics was mor e importan t t o the m tha n usefu l knowledge . Trainin g that woul d enabl e a young ma n t o mak e " a temperate , reasonabl e living " i n a prosperou s mercantil e community wa s advocate d fro m earl y o n b y middle-clas s parents , critica l o f what they sa w a s the aristocratic deviation of the Quaker schools. Thei r eminently practical needs continued t o be serve d b y day an d evening private schools eve n afte r th e founding o f the Philadelphi a Academ y i n 1751 . From the beginning , the Academ y favored it s Lati n Schoo l t o th e detrimen t o f the Englis h School, whos e enrollmen t rapidly declined. To Franklin's dismay, the Latin School "was take n under the win g of th e Colleg e o f Philadelphia, an d serve d a s a feeder t o i t . " Yet fo r all their aristocratic orientatio n and their imitation of English models, th e small colonial colleges ha d distinctive features, no t the least of which was their lack of autonom y i n th e medieva l traditio n of th e university . Th e governanc e b y la y boards, i n nonconformis t communitie s wher e n o denominatio n coul d clai m rea l hegemony, steere d them of necessity toward a nonsectarian course , whic h was held steady after 175 0 by the activ e competition for students. I n the eighteent h century , 32

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the mos t significan t trend was secularization , visible " i n the mor e commercial and less religious tone of newly founded colleges; in the rapidly rising number of college graduates wh o went int o occupation s othe r tha n th e ministry ; an d i n vital change s in th e curriculum , notabl y the rise of scientific studies an d the modificatio n o f theology t o includ e free r philosophica l speculation." A mor e varie d bod y o f stu dents, reflectin g the influence of the Enlightenment and the political ferment of prerevolutionary decades, prodded college faculties and presidents to curricular changes and t o a t leas t a n acknowledgmen t of the scientifi c work don e b y amateur s on th e outside. Despite the traditional timidity of their faculties, the colleges appear to have bred a majority o f the political debaters and leaders whose role was s o central in the years of agitation before independence . Some o f these colonial colleges harbore d the early attempts b y university-traine d medical elite s t o institutionaliz e professional educatio n i n America . Indeed, unti l the foundatio n o f Pennsylvani a Hospita l in 1751 , the onl y hospital s th e colonie s had wer e pest-house s fo r contagiou s disease s o r poorhouses : " I t was thu s fro m necessity a s wel l a s fro m choic e that American medical education developed i n the eighteenth centur y fro m educationa l institutions , whereas at the sam e time English medical education was deriving increasingly from institution s concerned with patient care." By mid-eighteent h century, it had becom e commo n among the ric h t o sen d their sons abroad fo r a period of study an d trave l in Europe. Th e futur e member s o f the urban medica l elites complete d thei r educatio n i n loca l college s an d commence d their apprenticeshi p a t home , wit h prominen t masters wh o wer e ofte n themselve s immigrant European physicians or trained in Europe. Those who could afford i t went then overseas to study, most frequently at Edinburgh and in the London hospitals. Naturally enough , o n returning to America , these elite physicians attempte d t o organize th e rapidl y growin g number s o f American practitioners o n Europea n stan dards, a s interprete d an d represente d b y themselves . I t was clea r tha t th e genera l characteristics o f colonial societ y and the conditions of medical practice in America would no t admi t the distinction s of branch an d functio n supporte d b y th e English guild structure . Th e distinctio n o f superior trainin g appeare d therefor e a s th e bes t means to sanction social and intellectual differences an d to introduce order into th e profession. In Philadelphia , followin g th e course s in anatomy an d midwifer y starte d b y Dr. William Shippen , Jr. , an d the beginning s of clinical teachin g at Pennsylvania Hospital, Joh n Morgan used hi s prominent social position and his impressive Europea n reputation to found the first America n medical school and place it under the auspices of th e College . Of the fiv e member s o f the faculty , al l were trained in Europe an d all bu t one ha d Edinburgh degrees. The ambitious program which Morgan outlined in 176 5 i n his Discourse upon the Institution of Medical Schools in America en visaged fo r th e America n physician wha t amounte d t o graduat e education. Th e same high requirements for admission were adopted in 1768 by the second American medical school , tha t o f King's College i n New York . Bu t these hig h standard s of entry, demandin g a college degre e or evidenc e o f equivalent education , coul d no t be maintaine d in the perio d of dislocation and reorganizatio n of the Anglica n col34

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leges that followe d independence . Th e university-base d medica l schools provided , nevertheless, wha t was fo r the tim e high-quality didactic training. Mor e important, Pennsylvania an d King's , followe d befor e th e tur n o f the centur y b y Harvar d an d Dartmouth and , soo n after , b y Yal e and b y th e Universit y of New York , provided indigenous institutiona l nuclei for the professional movemen t in medicine. Togethe r with th e developmen t o f a medica l press , thi s educationa l bas e strengthene d th e social ties of the early medical elites and reinforced the movement of association. The local medical societies, sinc e they began taking their first firm steps in the 1760s , had pressed the stat e for licensing legislation. Soo n after th e revolution , the y bega n seeking th e direc t power t o examine an d licens e medica l practitioners. During th e eighteent h century , lawyer s i n th e colonia l centers appea r t o hav e moved mor e decisivel y toward self-regulation than th e physicians . I n the firs t cen tury an d a half o f the colony , la w had seldo m bee n practice d full-time : "Th e fe w persons who acted as professional attorneys were at first mostly pettifoggers or minor court officers suc h a s deput y sheriffs , clerks , and justices, wh o stirred up litigatio n for th e sak e of the petty cour t fees. Bu t the growin g complexity of colonial lif e and governmen t necessaril y affecte d th e volume and the sophisticatio n of legal disputes. Ther e was not only enough legal work to sustain full-time practitioners in both the ba r an d th e bench ; i t was wor k comple x enoug h t o requir e knowledg e o f th e English commo n la w beyond wha t loca l custo m ha d incorporate d an d use d i n previous decades. I n the secon d hal f o f the eighteent h century , i t became increasingly frequent, especiall y amon g th e wealth y Souther n planters , t o destin e thei r sons to the ba r an d sen d the m to the Inn s of Court in London to secure admission. "Upo n their return, " say s Alfre d Z . Reed , "thes e constitute d th e socia l aristocrac y o f the profession." Although th e lega l profession i n the colonie s wa s a s heterogeneou s a s medicin e was, elite s b y socia l rank an d trainin g clearly dominated, a s the y di d in medicine, the urba n bars . I n Virginia , fo r instance , "ther e wa s suc h elitis m eve n withi n th e bar that , b y th e tim e of the revolution , there wa s th e framewor k of a divided lega l profession o n th e Englis h m o d e l . " Attorney s were, however , th e mos t commo n type o f lawyer and th e elite s o f the profession strov e to institutionalize a system of attorney apprenticeshi p wit h examinatio n b y th e courts . Judge s i n part s o f New England, the central colonies, and the South had allowed the country bars actual control upon admissions t o membership. "Th e requirement s the y exacted fo r admission to their privileges were i n some cases so sever e as t o justify th e suspicio n that the y were mor e interested i n fostering their own monopoly than in serving the state . The reaction agains t Federalis t politician s was a facto r i n inducin g the legislature s t o sweep awa y th e entir e system." The revolutio n had a paradoxical effec t upo n th e lega l profession. Whil e i t disrupted an d eve n shattere d th e uppe r bars—especiall y i n the South , wher e the y ha d been the most aristocratic—b y forcing Tor y lawyer s into exile or retirement, i t also raised th e remainin g elite to new heights . Calle d in great number s t o the benc h an d the government o f the new republic, lawyers assumed the political and social prominence tha t led Alexis de Tocqueville to consider the m the true aristocracy o f Ameri c a . Th e Inns of Court could no longer provide American lawyers wit h a mark of 38

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distinction; however , wit h th e ris e o f suprem e court s i n every stat e an d i n Washington, a graded bar—linking admissio n to the higher courts to years of apprenticeship and experience and , indirectl y t o the possession of a college degree—appears to have develope d an d sprea d i n the North , a s a n indigenous mechanism o f professional stratification. Independence bestowe d importan t new functions upon legal elites that had been , at the same time, decimated by its aftermath; it is therefore logica l to think that ordinary legal practice had to pass into the hands of lesser and humbler men. I n the economic depressio n afte r 1776 , lawyers , specializin g as the y di d in debt collection , foreclosures, an d lan d deals , becam e a n obviou s targe t o f publi c revulsion . The majority o f practitioners could not claim, t o defend themselve s agains t popula r hostility, th e deference accorde d t o gentlemanly status. No r could many of them claim the superiorit y derived fro m forma l education : th e fe w professorship s i n la w tha t emerged afte r independence i n the colleges, or the famous private law schools, suc h as tha t o f Judg e Tappin g Reev e a t Litchfield , catere d almos t exclusivel y to th e elites. The latter, protected by their less visible kinds of practice, by political offic e and by social rank, weathered out the Jacksonian attack s agains t the legal profession in th e sanctuar y o f informal urba n "inne r bars. " The importe d professional model s adde d a differen t kin d o f sanctio n t o practi tioners already stratifie d b y wealth and social standing. But one should not exagger ate th e effectivenes s o f these models. Eve n before th e repea l o f medical licensing laws an d the weakenin g of apprenticeship requirement s fo r attorneys i n the 1830s , such legislation had been particularly difficult t o enforce. I n medicine, "while legislatures wer e willing to give licensing powers to medical societies, the y were unwill ing t o enact law s which woul d hav e seriousl y deterred unlicense d practitioners." Few medical societies had, for instance, the right to revoke the licenses they awarded, and the penalties fo r unlicensed practice were most often very small, if they existed at all. The forms of professionalism that urban elites were attempting to introduce in the Eastern seaboar d faile d i n the fac e o f the dispersed an d decentralized realit y o f the country, wher e mos t practitioner s worked in rural areas , relativel y insulate d fro m the socia l control o f their peers or betters. Wha t I have calle d traditional mean s or sources o f prestige fo r the professiona l projec t wer e thus , i n America, either pre carious o r of limited scope. Autonomous traditiona l means—such a s privilege d professional corporations and hallowed upper-clas s school s wit h establishe d monopolie s over high culture—were nonexistent o r weak. Th e prestig e o f the olde r colleges wa s littl e mor e than local . Even traditional professionals di d not necessarily shar e in a systematic clas s socialization suc h a s tha t provide d i n Englan d b y th e publi c school s an d th e tw o elite universities. Heteronomous source s of prestige, rooted in the existence and legitimacy of " o l d '' elites, were themselves disunite d and provincial. The elites shared t o a certain extent general conception s o f gentlemanliness an d commo n cultura l traits . Geographica l and socia l mobility, however , increase d th e diversit y of the rulin g class . Wit h th e passing o f mercantilism and the demise of the hegemonic coalition of Southern plant44

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ers an d Norther n merchants, thi s multiplicit y wa s als o reflected a t th e leve l of na tional politics . Furthermore, i n a newborn nation where th e majorit y of the population remained rural unti l th e secon d decad e o f our century , th e difficult y o f establishing moder n status-giving institutions of national scope was compounded b y the lack of adequate communication between th e various sections of an immense an d expanding territory . This perpetuate d th e impor t of some communal o r purel y loca l sources o f profes sional prestig e lon g afte r th e appearanc e o f moder n center s fo r th e productio n of professional producers . The absenc e of a national aristocrac y an d o f centralized warrant s o f traditional status has a paradoxical effec t o n th e collectiv e project o f professionalization. Be cause the Unite d States were "bor n bourgeois, " th e professiona l modernizer s di d not appear to be a sector of a rising class, as they did in nineteenth-century England , or a sector of a victorious class, as i n revolutionary France. Th e appea l t o merit and to a meritocratic ideolog y whic h underlie s professiona l modernizatio n acquires , i n this context, a n uncertain meaning: the invocation of merit based on superior trainin g does not appea r a s on e mor e elemen t i n the progressiv e ideolog y of bourgeois de mocracy. Rather , becaus e the ideolog y of merit is not aimed at traditional preserves of th e ancien regime, i t comes into conflict wit h th e ideolog y of egalitarian democ racy an d economi c liberalism . The monopolisti c tendenc y inheren t i n al l project s of professiona l refor m becomes al l the mor e visible ; meritocratic justifications ar e still too weak to legitimize closure of access. The absence of central traditiona l structures i n the Unite d States determine d th e characteristi c fragmentatio n o f the earl y professional project , whil e depriving it of the ideologica l unity that wa s inheren t in the bourgeoi s challeng e agains t corporat e o r aristocrati c strongholds . I n America, therefore, th e ultimat e succes s o f professionalizatio n a s a collectiv e assertio n o f status depended eve n mor e closel y tha n elsewher e o n th e establishmen t o f marke t control by modern means. This task, however, wa s itself attendant o n the emergence and consolidatio n of national institution s and nationa l frame s o f reference . THE DISTENDE D SOCIETY* The entr y o f th e Unite d States int o a perio d o f extende d an d remarkabl y rapi d economic growt h coincides , roughly , wit h Jacksonia n democracy—tha t is , th e twelve years between 182 9 and 184 1 in which Andre w Jackson and his chosen successor Martin van Buren seized th e presidency "fro m th e remnant o f the republica n e l i t e . " I n the 1820s , th e Unite d States economy gre w ou t of its colonial status— not because it was less dependent on foreign markets an d foreign capital, but because growth no w hinge d o n tasks of internal development an d o n th e stead y incorpora tion o f new resources of land, labor, an d capital. In the ag e o f Jackson, the country experienced no t onl y th e wil d boo m o f the 1830 s bu t als o th e lon g depression o f 1837-1845, whic h wa s th e boom' s ineluctabl e sequel . Beyon d th e exaggeration s and distortions of both the boom and the slump , one ma y discern, a s Marvin Meyer s 48

*I borro w this term from Robert Wiebe in The Search for Order.

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has suggested , th e mai n features o f sustained growt h and o f the comin g economi c order. "Reckless banking " wa s on e o f th e mai n factor s i n the up s an d down s o f th e economy. Afte r Jackson , i n 1832 , vetoe d th e charte r renewa l o f Nicholas Biddle' s Second Ban k of the United States, inflationary expansion o f credit ran wild. I n turn, the contractio n that cam e after th e firs t yea r o f the crisi s accelerated th e downturn. Yet, considere d together , Biddle' s brillian t financia l schemes and th e expansionis t inflation whic h followe d th e Ban k wa r presaged the emergenc e of a modern credi t system. In lik e manner , th e frenz y o f interna l improvemen t o f the 1830 s di d more tha n feed th e boo m and encourage deficit spendin g b y many states . Canals, steamboats , and railroads , a s determinin g factor s o f regiona l specializatio n an d th e emergen t national divison of labor, accelerate d an d directed the movement o f a growing population toward the West an d to the cities. Finally, th e transportation enterprise s wer e focal point s o f technical an d organizationa l innovation. Land speculation , t o whic h muc h o f the capita l create d b y credi t wa s directed , was no t merel y a "bubble. " Fo r al l their recklessness , investment s i n urba n rea l estate or Western public lands reflected the directions in which the country was really moving: in the decade 1830-1840 , urba n population grew at a rate of 63.7 percent , against a rate of 28.1 percent fo r the populatio n as a whole. In 1830 , there were 9 0 urban centers of 2,500 inhabitant s o r more, of which 23 had more than 10,000 ; only New Yor k exceede d 100,000 . I n 1840 , ou t o f 13 1 urba n centers , 3 7 ha d 10,00 0 inhabitants o r more , whil e thre e cities were i n the 100,000-plu s category. Whil e major wave s o f immigration di d not begin unti l the lat e 1840s , th e rate of immigration i n the 1830 s showed a substantial increas e over previous decades. At the same time, th e populatio n of the Nort h Centra l regio n more tha n doubled . B y 1860 , de spite large scal e European immigration , th e populatio n of the Easter n seaboar d wa s down t o 5 1 percent o f the whole , from 9 7 percen t a t th e tur n of the century. B y 1840, althoug h two-third s of the labo r forc e wer e stil l engage d i n agriculture, th e non-agricultural wor k forc e wa s expandin g mor e rapidl y than th e agricultural . Mining, manufacturing , construction , an d transpor t togethe r employe d 829,00 0 people—14.6 percen t o f the whole , but almos t one-fift h o f the free labo r force. In sum , wha t wa s establishe d i n this perio d wer e th e base s of the Unite d States formidable domesti c market , an d th e pivota l axe s of their economic growth : interregional trade , linkin g th e buddin g Northeastern manufacture s t o the Centra l food basket an d t o Souther n cotton , an d internationa l trade , stil l dominate d b y cotto n exports. Thi s expanding intersectiona l trade fueled territorial expansion an d induced the redistributio n of population: migration into the Southwes t an d the Nort h Centra l plains, indeed , appear s to hav e followe d th e risin g prices of , respectively , cotto n and wheat. There ar e indication s tha t socia l inequalit y wa s widenin g a s th e econom y ex panded. Censu s count s o f wealt h ar e no t availabl e befor e 1850 . However , long term trends derived from estimate s and projections of the available evidence indicat e "that inequalit y of wealth remained th e same from 180 0 to 194 0 and then decreased a little , particularl y among middl e wealth groups. . . . A plutocratic elite emerge d 49

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at the turn of the [nineteenth ] century but it did not fundamentally alter the shar e of wealth held by the top 1 percent of persons. The main point is that there already wa s strong inequalit y in 1860 , 1870 , an d earlier." Projections bac k t o 181 0 permi t to suppor t th e hypothesi s o f consistent wealt h inequality throughou t th e nineteent h century. Wit h roughl y similar distributions in a rapidly growing economy, the amount of wealth held by the very rich obviously becomes muc h greate r an d muc h more visible . Th e mos t significan t changes concern th e sectora l an d regional concentration of the economic elite . I n 1860 , "ther e were 4 million slave s valued at perhaps $4 billion or 1 5 to 20 percent of our national assets," writes Lee Soltow. If slaves are considered a s property—and, according to som e estimates, eve n i f they ar e not—Southerner s appea r to have constituted a disproportionately larg e sectio n of the antebellu m economic elite : "Thre e o f every five me n wer e fro m th e Sout h i n 186 0 compared t o on e ever y fiv e afte r th e war . There were 70,000 Americans in 1860 with wealt h of $40,000 or more, and 40,000 of tha t number live d i n the South . There were 7,00 0 American s ( N = 0.001 ) wit h wealth o f $111,000 or more, 4,500 o f whom live d i n the South." Th e Civi l War brought t o an abrup t en d th e privilege d positio n of Southern planters . Th e destruc tion o f slave propert y by emancipation reduced inequalit y among Souther n whites, bringing i t to Norther n levels; Souther n inequalit y was obviousl y much highe r if blacks ar e counte d i n the population. 57

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Industrialization an d urbanization, coupled with th e large-scale influ x o f foreignborn immigrants , confirmed after th e Civi l Wa r a trend that ha d bee n visible sinc e the eighteenth century: the distribution of wealth became more unequal in cities than in rura l areas. In 1870, the top 2 percent o f adult men in urban areas owned 48 percent of urban wealth; in rural areas, the counterpart owned only 26 percent. Despit e the apparentl y mor e egalitaria n distributio n o f wealth among farmers , th e bottom half o f the curve was propertyles s i n both urban an d rural areas: 40 percent o f nonfarmers owne d 99 percent o f urban wealth ; the sam e percentage of farmers owne d 95 percent of property in rural areas. In fact, the differences betwee n urban and rural areas concerned onl y th e ric h an d th e well-to-do. Inequality i n some rural areas must have been more visible before th e destruction of th e Souther n slaveownin g plutocracy and the Anti-Ren t movemen t of the 1840 s against th e last quasi-feudal landlord s of the Hudson Valley . Bu t the growin g commercialization an d complexit y of agriculture was creatin g elsewher e ne w line s of social differentiation : differentia l acces s t o transportatio n an d credit , an d th e dif ferential impac t of price fluctuations and soi l erosion , wer e agent s of stratificatio n among the small wheat farmers of the North and West Central regions. More importantly, expensiv e mechanizatio n (i n a land where labo r shortag e was chronic ) was widening the spectrum of rural inequality, a s was the federal land policy, whic h encouraged speculativ e monopolizatio n by large bidders. I n agriculture as elsewhere , the numbe r o f wage-workers wa s growin g outsid e th e Sout h throughout the period 1800-1860. In citie s such a s Ne w York, th e term "millionaire"—applicable onl y t o twentyone ric h men—wa s becomin g fashionable i n the early forties. Tocqueville's prediction tha t a narrow an d harshe r "aristocracy " woul d b e spawne d b y industr y in 62

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democratic societie s ha d becom e true b y mid-centur y i n the leadin g urba n centers . Below that thin crust, cast e and class lines were hardened a s a consequence of largescale immigration . Pauperism, whic h ha d bee n a no t uncommon , thoug h perhap s unobtrusive, featur e o f America n citie s befor e th e 1830s , increase d dramaticall y during the Jacksonian period , in large part as a consequence of protracted unemploy ment afte r 1837 . Befor e th e depression, inflatio n ha d kept real wages stagnant. The economic crisi s smashed the incipien t labor movement, compose d chiefl y o f native artisan an d skille d workers . Obviously, ther e i s nothin g ne w i n the hardenin g o f structura l inequalitie s tha t accompanies a period of rapid capitalist development. No r is it surprising to find tha t caste lines based on race and ethnicity fuse wit h class domination and exacerbate the distance betwee n socia l classes and statu s groups. Bu t it is interesting that increas ing—or, a t least , increasingl y visible—socia l inequality shoul d coincid e wit h th e age o f Jackson, haile d by contemporarie s a s wel l a s recen t historian s a s th e Er a of the Commo n Ma n and th e Ag e of Egalitarianism. This ideologica l interpretation appear s to b e founde d o n th e democratizatio n o f the politica l process. The extension o f suffrage t o practically all white male citizen s had bee n achieved , i n almost ever y state , before large-scal e immigration—tha t is, before th e hardenin g o f class and status lines and before th e Protestan t Crusade and the Nativist reaction. The extension o f the franchis e precede d th e victory of Andrew Jackson, althoug h i t wa s complete d durin g hi s presidenc y an d wa s followe d b y other electoral changes of sweeping importance . No t that the nominating convention or the general ticket system actually gave "Tom, Dick, and Harry" access to political office an d contro l over th e nomination , election , an d performanc e o f thei r repre sentatives; bu t thes e procedural change s lai d th e groun d fo r the ris e o f a new kin d of politica l party . Fo r th e firs t time , partie s ha d t o mobiliz e a large electorat e i n a new system , whic h mad e presidentia l election s int o th e cornerston e o f American politics. "Th e politica l machine," say s Marvin Meyers, "reache d into every neighborhood, inducte d ordinar y citizen s o f al l sorts int o activ e service . Partie s tende d to becom e livel y two-wa y channels o f influence. Publi c opinio n was hear d wit h a new sensitivit y and addresse d wit h anxiou s respect . . . . A s never before , th e par ties spok e directly, knowingly, t o th e interest s an d feeling s o f the p u b l i c . " The mos t significan t dimension o f Jacksonian democrac y thu s appear s to b e th e rise o f a politica l marketplace , dominate d b y a ne w bran d o f full-tim e politician , working withi n th e apparatus of a party. The Jacksonians had an initial advantage in the ne w politic s which the y ha d largel y contribute d t o create. Thei r skil l an d thei r success with the new methods an d roles of electoral politics spurred their adversaries to rapid imitation. O n both the Jacksonia n an d the Whi g sides , "professional " pol iticians appea r a s th e era' s "tru e self-mad e men , movin g freely u p th e ladde r o f their political society, ideall y suited to command the great pragmatic party organiza tions o f their t i m e . " The egalitaria n an d anti-aristocrati c rhetori c o f the ag e wa s b y no means a Jacksonian prerogative. Th e Democrat s ma y hav e bee n quicke r t o seiz e it s politica l potential, especiall y sinc e egalitarianis m responde d t o the sentimen t o f at leas t on e sector, urban and radical, of their constituency. Bu t despite the role played in Demo65

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cratic politics by low-status Ne w York ethnics an d Loco Foco radicals, there is little evidence connectin g part y preference s t o clearcu t clas s differences. The historica l context o f the Jacksonia n coalitio n is define d b y rapi d economi c development, profoun d socia l dislocations , an d objectiv e democratizatio n o f elec toral politics. I n this larger framework, "th e chie f Jacksonia n policies—oppositio n to special corporate charters , hostilit y toward paper money, suspicio n of public enterprise an d publi c debt—do no t patently contribut e to the needs of a distinctive class f o l l o w i n g . " Bu t thes e policie s correspon d t o a n er a o f economi c an d territoria l expansion place d unde r th e sig n o f laissez faire. Indeed , i t is tempting to se e th e destruction of mercantilist restrictions upon the market and the emergence of a political marketplace unde r the ideology of democratic equality as the structural and the superstructural manifestation s o f the same historical process. Laissez fair e is obviously the ideologica l zone wher e politica l an d economi c liberalis m merge. I n the ag e o f Jackson, the fait h i n the progressive workin g of the market which appears to pervade all levels of society acquire s mora l and quasi-religious overtones: th e hidden hand of the market is, indeed, th e secular manifestation o f the divine providence. Thi s theme is explicitly sounde d i n the writings of the radical libertarian William Leggett : a government whic h recklessl y interfere s wit h nature , wit h "a n overrulin g Providence, " bears responsibilit y fo r th e spreadin g socia l inequalit y an d th e injustic e whic h re wards hard-working common people. Th e government o f the Whigs and the Bank has fallen prey to the ambitions of "the consumers , th e rich, the proud, the privileged"; to thi s narro w constituency , i t grant s specia l monopol y right s and , mos t specifi cally, chartere d bankin g privileges . Monopolies negate a t th e sam e time free trad e and equal rights ; they cause "the extreme s of wealth and poverty, so uniformly fata l to the liberties of mankind." For Leggett, a s for any good Jacksonian, th e Monster Bank i s the prim e agen t of destruction o f a "natural, " henc e a harmonious, socia l order; i t is the prim e source of economic insecurity , of social dislocations an d socia l changes alie n t o th e America n republic . Th e Ban k mus t b e relentlessl y oppose d "until every vestige of monopoly has disappeared from th e land, and until banking— as mos t othe r occupation s ar e now , an d a s al l ought t o be—is lef t ope n t o the fre e competition o f all who choose t o enter int o that pursuit." 68

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In typical Jacksonian fashion , Leggett is, in fact, seeking here a simple explanation for th e passin g o f an idealized social order. Despit e grea t difference s i n their articulation, les s radica l advocate s o f fre e trad e tha n Willia m Legget t soun d a simila r ideological theme : laisse z faire , fuse d wit h democracy , i s veste d wit h a functio n of mora l and social restoration. Liberalis m ideologically separates the impersonal , self-regulating marke t fro m society ; but here the market is expected t o return society to an original state of grace: stable, ordered , cohesiv e communities , whic h admit no special privilege , permit no alien aristocratic ambition . Untrammelled competition, paradoxically, wil l correc t th e il l effect s o f excessive fluidity i n a society frantically engaged i n economic expansion . Thi s contradiction has it s poignancy . A s Marvi n Meyers puts it , the Jacksonians selectively refuse t o see tha t laissez faire leads, precisely, towar d "th e city , th e factory , th e comple x marke t an d credi t economy, " constantly producing fetters t o its own working. Th e heart of the Jacksonian parado x lies, thus , i n an impossibl e reconciliation. 74

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Paradox, indeed , may be the appropriate ideological characteristic of a transitional phase. Th e tas k befor e u s no w i s t o se e ho w variou s profession s experienc e an d respond t o the paradox an d to the contradictory forces o f the age : genera l economi c growth and decline of particular areas; emergent nationa l economy and local institu tions; political egalitarianism and social inequality; old elites and new wealth; rejection o f monopoly an d need fo r expertise; defense of competition an d recognition of the corporatio n as a legitimat e economic unit ; i n short, fre e trad e alon g wit h fre e development o f the force s tha t undermin e it. THE PROFESSION S I N A PHAS E OF TRANSITIO N Professional elites—in the traditional sense of gentlemen with a liberal education who go t their specialized trainin g throug h apprenticeship—were closel y identifie d in Americ a with th e intellectua l and patrician elites that presided ove r the lif e o f the new natio n i n it s firs t decades . Thi s closenes s logicall y include d the profession s in th e deep-seated suspicion of monopolized privilege . Spokesme n fo r the incipien t trade-union movement could thus declare, a s Frederick Robinson in the early 1830s , "the capitalists , monopolists , judges , lawyers , doctors , an d priest s . . . know that the secre t of their own power and wealth consists i n the strictes t concert of action. . . . Unions among themselve s hav e alway s enable d th e fe w t o rul e and ride the people." Or , with clearer class consciousness: "The merchants ma y agree upon their prices; the lawyers upon their fees; the physicians upon their charges; the manufacturers upo n the wages given to their operatives; bu t the laborer shal l not consult his interest and fix the price of his toil and skill. I f this be the law, i t is unjust, oppres sive, an d w i c k e d . " With th e workin g clas s stil l predominantl y composed o f craftsmen an d aspiring small entrepreneurs, th e attack upon inequality could easily be translated by the Jacksonian movement into a laissez faire demand fo r equal startin g chances on the market. Oppositio n to the professions' entr y requirements, o n the other hand, woul d b e particularly attractiv e t o "upwardl y mobil e groups , includin g me n wh o wante d access to professional standing on terms less stringent than had developed in the latter part of the eighteenth century." The public appeared to support the leveling movement not only ou t of anti-aristocratic sentiment, bu t also out of mistrust and resentment of the power professionals derive d from monopolize d knowledge. In this fear , Richard Hofstadte r ha s see n th e firs t powerfu l manifestatio n o f America n anti intellectualism. H e writes: "[The Jacksonian movement's ] distrus t of expertise, it s dislike for centralization, its desire t o uproot the entrenched classes, and its doctrine that important functions were simpl e enough to be performed by anyone, amounte d to a repudiation not only of the system of government by gentlemen which the nation had inherited from the eighteenth century, but also of the special value of the educated classes in civic l i f e . " Richard Shryock , the historian of medicine, holds a similar view. Americans , he says, proclaime d thei r righ t t o "life , liberty , an d quackery. " I n hi s view , "th e masses seeme d incapabl e o f appreciatin g superio r trainin g i n an y professio n an d to the degree that they came into politica l powe r they wer e likel y t o lower training 76

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standards." On e b y one , th e state s abrogate d restriction s o n unlicense d medica l practice or repealed th e legislation that medical societies ha d painstakingly obtained before th e 1830s. Lawyers, i n their role as agents of the wealthy, were an even mor e obvious target of popula r suspicio n than regula r physicians—wit h whom, after all , few common people ha d muc h contact. ' T n 1800 , fourtee n ou t of nineteen jurisdictions required a definite period of apprenticeship. B y 1840, it was required by not more than eleven out o f thirty jurisdictions . B y 1860 , i t was require d i n only nin e ou t of thirty-nine jurisdictions." I n the 1840 s an d 1850s , Ne w Hampshire, Maine , Wisconsin, and Indiana (th e latte r i n it s constitution ) declared tha t la w practic e i n al l courts wa s open to any voter of "good moral character. " I n this climate, local bars disbanded, and effort s t o for m ne w association s wer e doome d t o failure . Since th e Grea t Reviva l of the 1790s , th e public' s espousal of "a warmer , mor e exciting, bu t les s authoritativ e ministry " ha d likewis e been challengin g th e pre eminence o f the traditionall y educate d clergy. In tun e wit h th e times , th e principle s of laissez faire an d wide-ope n access were thus apparentl y extende d t o th e narro w professiona l markets , leavin g competition as th e ultimat e judge o f skill . Th e root s an d th e consequence s of this deregulation of professiona l practic e are , however , comple x an d ambiguou s enoug h t o warran t cautious judgment . Equatin g th e Jacksonia n impac t wit h straightforwar d "anti intellectualism" seem s more questionable tha n seein g i n it the affirmatio n o f a particular conceptio n o f education : instrumenta l an d utilitarian , i t wa s suite d t o th e needs of an expanding territory , an d als o t o the anti-aristocrati c rhetoric of the age . Demands fo r free publi c education were a constant them e amon g the "commo n people" an d a particularly strong concer n o f the Workingmen' s parties . Th e popula r conception of education was then, as it had been since the eighteenth century, a "nonintellectual" one , chiefl y concerne d wit h preparatio n fo r the busines s of making a living, bu t i t was no t necessaril y oppose d t o school s a s such . As the country expanded westward s an d a s citie s continued growing, proprietary schools appeare d everywher e fo r instructio n in medicine . Thoug h the y wer e pre dominantly didacti c an d ofte n unabashedl y commercial , the y mad e som e sor t o f medical education accessible to a large number of students, providin g a focus for the crystallization of intellectual (o r sectarian) tendencie s among a population of otherwise scattered practitioners . The textbooks writte n by their faculties and the demonstration o f therapie s i n thei r fre e clinic s contribute d t o th e standardizatio n o f practice, eve n thoug h i t was base d chiefl y o n ineffectiv e therapies an d speculativ e theoretical systems. The pattern was different in the law: modeled on Judge Reeve's successful school , many private law schools appeare d on the Eastern seaboard . But their mortality rate was heavy: by 183 0 there wer e only si x law schools i n all the country, all but one — Judge Reeve's Litchfield—affiliated wit h colleges . Th e lack of success of the early private law school reflects th e decline of admission requirements i n the ag e o f Jackson, but also, in part, the rise of a related market: that of good common law textbooks, which provide d fo r ambitiou s student s th e neede d complemen t t o th e traditional system o f apprenticeship. Private , non-collegiat e la w schools di d not multipl y unti l 80

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the las t decade s of the century ; b y then lega l education ha d available , i n Harvard Law School , a leading model of reform. In medicine , mos t especially , competitio n fo r student s amon g proliferatin g schools—or competitio n between schoo l graduate s an d practitioner s license d b y medical societies—tende d t o offset th e common fight agains t empiric s and to drive down educational standards everywhere. Thu s "Harvard , where the standards were as hig h a s anywher e abou t the tim e of the Civi l War , awarde d th e medica l doctor's degree to any candidate wh o could pass five ou t of nine oral examinations al l taken on th e sam e d a y . " In a time of increasing socia l diversity, laissez fair e i n the professiona l market s multiplied th e acceptabl e definition s of professional practic e an d professiona l ser vices, dilutin g but not directly confronting the standards that had been se t earlie r by Eastern professiona l elites . Th e institutionalizatio n o f sectarianis m i n medicin e and th e lowerin g o f educational standard s i n all established profession s mus t hav e confirmed, i n turn, the common man's belief that professional education and competence wer e no t suc h tha t the y coul d justify privilege s and exclusiveness . With a few exceptions, th e multiplicatio n o f entry points into professiona l prac tice broke the ties that the professions—or, rather , thei r elites—had formed with the classical college. The latter, however, remained a center for the production of clergymen. Expansio n and ne w settlement s wer e thu s accompanie d b y a proliferation of denominationally sponsore d colleges . I n a manne r consonan t wit h th e theme s of Jacksonian laisse z faire , sectaria n competitio n between th e Protestant churche s wa s inspired b y the desir e t o maintain or reconstitute socia l homogeneity and cohesive ness. "Th e denominations, " say s Hofstadter , "no t onl y desire d t o educat e thei r ministers locall y an d inexpensively , but wishe d to keep thei r co-sectarians i n col leges of their own, lest the y b e lure d out o f the f o l d . " These colleges were , mos t often, littl e mor e than classic gramma r schools—an d not too good, either, at teaching the classical curriculum. Bu t they bore the name of college and some times that of university, thus contributin g to civic pride and to the boosting o f rea l estat e values . Sinc e travelin g costs wer e ofte n mor e prohibitiv e than tuition , loca l college s provide d local boy s wit h th e means of getting a degree , if no t alway s a n education. Th e inevitabl e devaluation of the colleg e degree that ensued fro m thi s scatterin g o f educational resource s adde d t o th e ambiguit y wit h which education was regarded—it wa s desired a s a means of social distinction, bu t disparaged a s impractica l and aristocratic , at least a s i t was give n in older college s and i n the mor e recen t stat e "universities." Many current s thu s converged , i n the Jacksonia n attac k upo n traditiona l profes sional elites an d their standards, i n the widesprea d sentimen t tha t professions wer e imperfect an d undeserving . Ther e was , first , pressur e fo r acces s fro m upwardl y mobile me n an d a n anti-aristocratic , instrumenta l conceptio n o f education ; thes e two elements di d not merge, a s they did in England, into more stringent and modern standards of training an d testin g than those of the establishe d elites . This lack is in part explaine d b y a secon d factor : th e expansio n an d diversificatio n o f American society, whic h facilitate d th e segmenta l proliferatio n o f professiona l definitions . Territorial expansion demanded geographica l dispersion of training facilities , whil e 86

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localism an d th e pluralis m of elites suspende d the nee d fo r standardization accord ing to one central set of guidelines. There is, thirdly, democracy i n politics and feel ings, whic h opens up political ways of challenging elitist preserves, whil e assertin g that reaso n an d publi c opinion are th e bes t legislator s o f professional competence , and indee d th e onl y acceptabl e one s for a free an d enlightene d people . A s Charle s Rosenberg ha s remarked , "successfu l American s no longer assumed without question th e desirability of a stable grade d society . N o longer did maintaining the status of the learned professions pla y a part—a necessary part—in maintaining the stability of societ y itself." While economi c developmen t an d societa l "distension " corrode d the traditional supports o f every " o l d " profession, thei r effects wer e perhaps strongest o n the profession that had been the most closely identified wit h community life—the Protestant clergy, o f whic h th e Ne w Englan d Congregationalist s provid e a clea r traditional example. The services o f the ministry are not transacted o n a market; for this reason, I have not included the clergy in my analysis o f professional modernization . In the present context, however , th e response of a section of the clerg y to the declin e o f its traditional bas e illustrates one solutio n to the los s o f professional status . In Ne w England, th e institutio n o f permanency o r lifetime tenur e ha d embodie d the moral, social, and legal bonds between a pastor an d his community. Permanenc y was centra l to the traditiona l conception of the ministr y amon g the New Hampshire Congregationalists studie d b y Danie l Calhoun. Sinc e th e eighteent h century , th e entry of other denominations int o New England had challenged th e Congregationalist orthodoxy, whil e the ordained itinerant ministry of Methodists and Baptists came as an alternative to the declining institution of permanency. Th e continuous opening of ne w territor y calle d for a recruitment effort which , i n turn, increasingl y brought to th e for e th e Methodis t model of the clergyman , mor e responsibl e t o th e churc h at large tha n to a concrete an d specifi c community . In fact, th e mov e westward had a more dramati c an d direc t effect upo n permanency tha n interdenominationa l competition or the new models for the ministry. The opening of the new agricultural areas of th e Midwes t signified, especiall y afte r th e grea t improvement s i n transportation of th e 1820 s an d 1830s , a general economic deca y fo r rural New England. The sup ports for the traditional way of being a minister were simply cut from underneat h th e localist clergy of all denominations i n most small towns. By the 1830s , th e collaps e of permanency i n most of New England could be read in the shorter and shorter term s served b y pastors , i n the prevalenc e o f "acting " ove r "settled " ministers , i n th e growing number of destitute parishes, decimate d by migration, which could not support thei r ministry . Calhoun's carefu l stud y show s tha t thi s collaps e wa s accompanie d b y th e slo w growth of "a differentiate d labor market among what had been a fairly homogeneou s profession, a market withi n whic h . . . there existe d routine channels fo r the movement of individuals from on e segmen t to another." B y mid-century, a career line had emerge d withi n th e urba n parishe s an d th e centra l organizatio n of the church : "Those wh o reached a large town church only toward the middle of their lives generally continued to operate in the larg e tow n circuit . Bu t those who got to the larg e 91

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town circui t while they were stil l in their thirties stood a fair chance of moving on to public career s i n cit y churche s o r i n th e religiou s bureaucracy." Whil e small town wor k wa s increasingl y relegate d t o marginality , embryonic attempt s t o ben d the organizatio n o f th e churc h t o a professionalize d conceptio n o f th e ministr y emerged i n urban an d educationa l center s fro m th e 1840 s on . Separate d fro m th e laity, clergyme n wer e t o see k a s a body, amon g themselves , ne w base s of profes sional status ; whil e revivalist s distinguishe d themselve s fro m th e lait y b y fier y preaching, th e new breed o f Congregationalist minister s would see k this distinction in a learne d an d autonomou s elaboratio n o f theology. Unlike doctor s an d lawyers , th e Ne w Englan d Congregationa l clerg y face d thi s period o f disestablishment an d transitio n within th e protectiv e framework of a central organization . Throughout the declin e an d the collaps e o f permanency, th e continued existenc e o f a central churc h allowe d at leas t som e minister s t o envisag e a solution fo r the profession' s problems . Thi s solution was bureaucrati c i n tendency : new career s emerge d alon g th e line s o f a stratifie d labor marke t whic h coincide d with th e articulate d hierarchy of the church. Toward the top of this hierarchy, leading minister s coul d the n attemp t t o constitut e themselve s int o a corporat e body , distinguished an d justifie d b y it s monopolisti c contro l o f esoteri c theologica l knowledge. If w e turn, now , from th e old profession o f divinity to the new profession o f engineering, w e fin d tha t incipientl y bureaucrati c organization s als o pla y a crucial role as source s of professional respectabilit y an d a s matrice s o f career. Th e ris e o f the first engineerin g specialties—befor e th e Civi l War , only civi l an d mechanical engineering—coincides, i n fact, wit h the emergence of large-scale enterprise s concerne d with publi c works and transportatio n i n the firs t quarte r o f the nineteent h century . Before tha t time, the best guarantees of competence a "technical deviser" coul d provide ha d bee n thos e o f proprietorship an d persona l involvemen t in the risk s of economic enterprise . Th e superio r trainin g of foreig n engineer s wa s recognized , when the y happene d t o b e available , a s wa s th e superiorit y of th e fe w engineer s trained a t West Point or, afte r th e 1820s , a t Partridge Academy in Vermont. Native engineers, however , wer e chiefl y traine d o n th e job: " I t was commonl y expecte d that an y larg e publi c works woul d becom e a 'school ' fo r engineers," a s di d the railroads fo r mechanical engineer s i n the 1830s . In th e context of the largest economi c organization s o f the time, ownership could no longer function a s a guarantee of competence. Th e warrant was sough t i n a merging o f expertise wit h organizationa l rank, itsel f certifie d b y the reputatio n and success of the organization' s undertaking . A t the beginning , expertise wa s no t easil y conceded b y th e projec t supervisors : "Th e constructio n o f canals i s a n ar t withi n the complete attainment of ordinary capacities. A l l it s rules have been fully explaine d by eminent engineers, wh o have written treatises on the subject," wrot e two commissioners o f the New York Canal System in 1816. Hidde n in this denial was the desir e to promot e Americans , rathe r tha n hirin g mor e professiona l Europeans . Bu t i t i s interesting t o compar e th e commissioners ' conceptio n wit h th e recommendation s of their counterparts fo r the Susquehanna and Delaware Canal and Railroad Company 94

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in 1832 . The latte r explained: " In the selectio n of an Engineer, th e Commissioner s sought to obtain the services o f a gentleman alread y advantageousl y known ; uncompromising i n the performanc e o f his officia l duties , an d i n whose report , calcula tions, an d estimates , a n enlightene d publi c and th e moneye d interes t migh t safel y rely." From bein g a n undifferentiate d occupationa l category , whos e respectabilit y wa s subordinated t o the ownershi p o f capital, the civi l engineer s had becom e a distinct and respecte d professiona l group . Whil e proprietorshi p used t o be th e bes t guaran tee of technical competence, technica l competence wa s now presented a s a guarantee to proprietors . On the basis of a gradually asserted competence, engineer s moved into the struc ture o f management and , finally , move d to translate thei r technical and manageria l attributes into general socia l recognition. From 1839 on, in the midst of a depressio n in whic h over-investmen t i n publi c work s ha d playe d a majo r part , w e fin d civi l engineers concerne d wit h organizin g themselves o n corporat e base s i n opposition to entrepreneurs an d financiers . Despit e th e urgenc y o f their economic plight , thei r efforts di d not succee d i n the 1840s ; the y wer e hindered , amon g othe r things , b y geographical dispersio n an d th e transienc y o f employmen t i n the lon g recession . The firs t stabl e associatio n o f America n civi l engineer s wa s no t establishe d unti l 1867, at a time when the opening of land-grant colleges an d the emergence of modern universitie s was usherin g i n a new phase in the professionalization movement . In th e earlier phase, however, th e engineer ha d completed his separation fro m th e mechanics an d engine drivers who, for some time, had appropriated his occupational name. A s his technical knowledge became firmer, th e engineer acquire d a steppingstone for scaling the ranks of management i n the large projects where he was trained. As earl y a s 1838 , "superintendent " was , i n the railroads , a salarie d managemen t position wit h technica l prerequisites . Professiona l self-consciousnes s spran g fro m these ranks. Also , th e informatio n whic h engineerin g cadre s had acquire d mad e them obvious choices fo r the role of commissioners. Fo r the chief engineers, respon sibility fo r inspections, repairs , an d maintenanc e o f the finishe d works led directly into stabl e administrativ e functions. Throug h the organization , the engineer—wh o had alway s ha d the functio n o f representing th e interest s o f capitalists an d sponsors vis-a-vis contractors an d craftsmen—found a path that led close to the owners' socia l status. This meaning was not lost upon contemporaries. Thus , in the 1830s , th e Professor o f Moral and Intellectual Philosophy and Political Economy at Union College could see i n the factory a "perfect serie s of employments ascending, regularly , from the cardin g room to the throstle-frame , fro m th e throstle-fram e t o the offic e o f Superintendent, Engineer , o r eve n Proprietor , eac h employmen t callin g fo r greate r intelligence and skill than the last, an d each proportionately more lucrative and more respectable." This wa s largel y a myth. Fo r instance , th e elit e of mechanical engineer s almos t to the end of the nineteenth century was predominantly formed by gentlemanly owners o f Easter n machin e shops , no t unresponsiv e t o talent , bu t tendin g t o recrui t their apprentices primaril y withi n their own high socia l class. This same elite, how98

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ever, defende d it s prerogatives agains t th e pretension s o f engineering teacher s an d graduates, extollin g th e machin e sho p a s a prototypica l channel o f upwar d socia l mobility. Civil engineers, on the other hand, ha d strive n from earl y days for social recognition on the basis of a distinct professional status , ideally modeled on the "free " pro fessions of medicine and the law. As Calhoun remarks, "fo r the civil engineer, eve n earlier an d eve n mor e tha n fo r th e mechanician , th e Proprieto r wa s increasingl y a body politi c o r corporation." Thi s positio n marks th e civi l enginee r a s th e firs t incarnation of the "organizatio n man." Hi s location in the larges t economi c enter prises of his tim e justifies Edwin Layton's general observation that "the scientifically trained, professional enginee r ha s characteristicall y appeared on the technica l scene at th e poin t of transition fro m smal l to larg e organizations." In th e emergenc e of the civi l engineer , hi s particula r links to th e economi c elit e fuse wit h aspiration s t o a gentlemanly professiona l status ; he thu s appear s to trans fer som e of the components o f traditional professionalism int o emergent bureaucrati c organizations. Wit h th e increasin g rationalizatio n and depersonalization o f management, th e dependenc e o f the enginee r remains , bu t graduall y lose s th e traditional aspect o f assimilatio n int o th e hig h socia l statu s o f th e owner s o r sponsors . Th e paradox o f the civi l engineer i n a transitional phase resides in his double function— technical an d managerial ; th e manageria l functio n ties hi m to the capitalists , a t th e same time that i t opens for him a clear upwar d pat h whic h lead s to socia l prestig e through the organization. Dependent an d upwardly mobile, the civi l engineer stand s perhaps as the first an d clearest model of collective social ascension through a heteronomous organization . Both engineerin g an d th e Congregationa l ministr y wer e atypica l amon g ante bellum professions , sinc e thei r members were mostl y salaried, an d no t "free " pro fessionals. The y illustrate, however, a tendency a t work i n very different contexts: a s communal support s wane , th e socia l prestig e o f thes e professional s tend s t o b e founded o r reconstitute d upo n incipientl y bureaucratic organizations . Th e ministry was losing its traditional identity, and found a bulwark of strength in an organization which i t largely controlle d and whic h gav e i t the mean s to continu e recruiting , by providing different promises o f career. Civi l engineering , whos e traditiona l identit y was uncertain in the American context, gained the means of individual career and the means o f collectiv e socia l recognitio n throug h organization s whic h i t di d not control. We mus t no w turn briefly t o the "free " profession s o f the la w and medicine , t o examine wha t trends emerge from thei r responses to the erosio n o f traditional community supports . There ca n b e n o doubt tha t th e lowerin g of admission standard s to the ba r i n the Jacksonian 1830 s made it considerably easie r to achiev e th e statu s of attorney than it had been in the early years of the republic. Yet, as Alfre d Z . Reed ha s noted , "th e precise privileg e tha t wa s widene d . . . wa s th e privileg e o f admissio n int o thi s profession, no t the immediate privilege of practicing law. Ther e remained the institution o f admitting courts wit h powe r t o pass upon th e noneducationa l qualification s that th e applican t mus t stil l satisfy." 101

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On th e on e hand , th e substanc e of the la w was no t ultimatel y determined b y th e bar, bu t by the legislatur e an d the bench . Thi s dependence of the ba r upo n externa l elements of arbitration and regulatio n prevente d disagreement s abou t th e natur e o f the la w an d lega l practic e fro m crystallizin g into sectaria n divisions . On th e othe r hand, judges coul d favor a certain kind of recruits to the bar and exclude others, thu s maintaining a measure of homogeneity. Th e evidenc e i s that the y tende d t o d o so . "Good mora l character," indeed , coul d not be effectively proved within the narrow confines o f a community, where the provision could be used to reject th e occasiona l deviant. Beyon d thos e confines , evaluatio n o f character allowe d for th e relatively free pla y of social ostracism, whic h wa s firs t directe d agains t th e Iris h lawyer s an d later, notoriously , against Jews , blacks, an d women. I t is significant that despite the multiplication of legal functions an d the decline of standards of admission, there were fewe r lawyer s a t th e en d o f the Jacksonia n perio d than ther e were physician s or clergymen. Afte r admissio n t o practice, th e professio n ha d othe r way s o f enforcing conformit y t o standards . "Fo r al l th e tal k o f Jacksonia n democrac y an d for al l the change s in formal rule, " say s Robert Stevens , "ther e seem s little doub t that i n major citie s lik e Bosto n th e leadin g members of the ba r playe d a role, le d a life, an d enjoye d a statu s littl e differen t fro m tha t o f thei r counterpart s i n 180 0 or 1 9 0 0 . " We shal l presently se e wha t new force s wer e operatin g i n the definitio n o f these urban lega l elites. I t appears, though , tha t socia l origins and forma l educatio n stil l qualified "th e bette r clas s of applicants" t o the bar : "b y th e simpl e device o f professional ostracism , directe d agains t thos e wh o insiste d upo n enterin g unde r th e statute, a 'regular ' o r inne r ba r cam e int o existence." The educatio n o f the "first-rate " applicant s t o the ba r wa s a far cry from wha t it became after the 1870 s under the influence of Langdell's Harvard Law School. Judge Story's la w schoo l a t Harvard , o r th e Ne w Have n privat e la w schoo l whic h Yal e took unde r it s wing , wer e littl e mor e tha n institutionalize d and formalize d appren ticeships, marke d b y an increasingly trade-oriented practicality . Student s who were not admitted to the liberal arts college were often allowed into its law school. Unde r the pressur e o f competition fo r students , standard s o f entry wer e lowere d an d th e aspirations t o foun d lega l training on genera l educatio n i n the classica l curriculum were al l but forgotten. Such standard s o f scholarshi p an d trainin g in th e la w a s ther e wer e flourishe d around the higher courts. The y were in evidence i n the most settled parts of the fron tier—for instance , i n Ohio or at Transylvania University in Kentucky—as muc h a s in th e East. Th e frontie r admitte d a greater variety o f forms an d style s o f legal practice tha n th e olde r citie s o f the seaboard . Ye t eve n wher e itineran t court s re mained predominant , thi s typical frontie r institution generated informa l regulation s and a measure of discipline in the circui t bars. Convivialit y amon g th e "gentle men o f the law " an d a sens e of fellowship which obviousl y excluded th e sociall y unacceptable wer e powerfu l agents of conformity and cohesion . A ric h socia l lif e revolved aroun d th e circui t court , accountin g fo r the nostalgi a wit h whic h lawyer s recalled it s days after i t passed. I n an open , publi c context, wha t single d ou t legal talent t o a lawyer's peer s and t o hi s potentia l clients wa s no t certifie d training but 105

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demonstration of forensic bravura , not unlike the fiery, romanti c powers that revivalists wer e expecte d t o manifes t i n their preaching . The circuit system appears to have successfully performe d the regulatory function s that mor e forma l ba r association s attempte d t o tak e ove r i n late r years. I n th e circumstances surroundin g th e declin e o f the itineran t court w e ma y discern , how ever, th e nee d for differen t kind s o f legal talent an d th e growin g stratification of a settled bar . The wanin g of the circui t ba r wa s no t merely a matter o f changing style s i n consolidated communities . Lookin g a t Cumberlan d Count y i n Tennessee , Calhou n finds that the circuit system, introduce d in 1809, was alread y i n decay by the 1820s . While legal practice in the stable court systems tended to be concentrated i n the hands of a few lawyers, the itineran t bar provided an alternative an d a way to reduce competition betwee n practitioners . Lawyer s wer e force d t o "g o o n th e circuit " b y th e internal stratificatio n of the professio n muc h more than by the meagerness of smalltown lega l practice: "Excep t i n very smal l or very ne w counties , a fai r amoun t o f business was availabl e i n any one place ; bu t the control that a few lawyers had ove r most of this business meant that the marginal and the middle-level practitioner had to scour widel y t o ge t enoug h fo r himself." Thus, fo r variable lapse s of time, th e circui t syste m appear s to hav e functione d as a legal market complementar y t o that of the stabl e courts. A s the volume of legal business increased, th e circuit gradually lost this function. The internal stratification of th e bar , manifeste d i n earlier years by the difference s o f status and styl e betwee n circuit an d stabl e lawyers, too k other forms . Stabl e partnership s an d specializatio n became th e principa l factors o f differentiation among lawyer s i n the centra l cour t systems. Partnership s allowe d increase d efficienc y i n handlin g lega l business ; a t the sam e time, they were means for integrating out-of-town practitioners whil e pre serving the leadership o f local lawyers. From the 1820 s on, the main line of specialization i n Tennessee wa s deb t collection . Lawyers o f middlin g prestig e appea r t o have replaced the complementary marke t and the relative security of the circuit courts by specializatio n in debt collection , whic h the y advertise d i n newspapers as fa r east as Philadelphia . Elit e practice , o n th e othe r hand , becam e increasingl y character ized b y "connections"—and , mos t significantly , by busines s retainer s an d out of-court negotiations. Deb t collectio n came t o symboliz e th e interna l cleavag e of whic h th e circui t ba r ha d onc e bee n a mor e colorfu l an d personall y gratifyin g expression. Even befor e th e Civi l Wa r an d i n a relativel y "underdeveloped " frontie r area , Calhoun's stud y uncovers th e effects o f a general trend that was shaping the evolution of lega l practice: a n external factor—namely, th e increasingl y diversified and novel legal need s o f importan t busines s clients—wa s promotin g th e specializatio n an d the stratification of the bar. Respondin g t o this external impulse, elite lawyers tende d to mov e awa y fro m litigatio n towar d out-of-cour t negotiatio n an d counseling . B y mid-century, lawyer s fo r the majo r economi c interests—tha t is , fo r the publi c an d private corporations, an d i n particular for the railroads—wer e beginnin g to replac e the brilliant courtroom pleaders at the top of the emergent professiona l hierarchies. As thei r clients' interest s cam e to rang e wide r and wide r across the nation , s o th e 112

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regional scop e of these lawyers ' wor k broadene d an d s o thei r regiona l specializa tions were coordinated. Th e role of this new legal elite was obviously far from bein g as prominen t a s i t would becom e in the 1880 s and after . Ye t the characteristi c priv ileged relationship between "bi g business" an d the top echelons of the legal profes sion wa s alread y perceptibl e towar d the en d o f the Jacksonia n period . At th e othe r en d o f th e profession' s emergin g hierarchy , routin e wor k suc h a s debt collectio n was increasingl y sloughe d of f to rank-and-file lawyers . A t the same time, there was a tendency fo r the courtroom to become the favorite arena of the nonestablished, fo r who m i t stil l provide d a means of gaining professional distinctio n and upwar d mobility. Secur e in their largely commercial practices, elit e urban lawyers n o longe r neede d thi s publi c stag e t o swel l their clientele s o r establis h thei r careers. Thus , a t th e Ne w Yor k Constitutiona l Convention i n 1846 , Calhou n find s some of these elite lawyers fro m th e bi g city lendin g a hand t o the levelin g and de centralizing moves directe d against th e bar by a political coalition with nativist overtones. O n th e on e hand , th e professiona l statu s o f th e establishe d urba n lawyer s would no t suffe r fro m th e lowerin g of educationa l qualifications , sinc e i t did no t depend o n certifie d training but o n th e prestig e an d powe r o f their clients. O n th e other hand , th e numbe r o f lawyers wa s growin g in the citie s an d centralize d cour t systems provided an aren a for the flamboyan t eloquenc e of Irish upstart s and othe r potential competitors. Forgettin g its own beginnings, th e "inne r bar" wa s no w fre e to scor n spectacula r demonstrations o f forensic talen t an d to suppor t a move for the decentralization o f the judicial system. 116

In thi s cursory examination , w e have seen different types o f external warrant s of professionalism a t work in the law: o n the one hand, the traditional elements of social rank an d communit y standing—fused , perhaps , wit h mor e uncertai n standard s related t o trainin g and competence—wer e recognize d b y th e admittin g courts an d mediated, a t leas t i n th e smalle r communities , b y informa l mechanism s o f socia l conformity. Th e hierarchy o f the judicial system , w e may assume, tended t o reproduce the large r socia l hierarchy. O n the othe r hand , a s ca n b e expected i n a rapidly developing economy, th e larger stratification system wa s changing unde r the impact of risin g business interests; thes e factors o f stratification were reflected i n the incip ient interna l hierarch y o f the lega l profession . Th e emergen t busines s corporatio n was drawin g to itsel f ne w form s o f legal talent, providin g a structural suppor t fo r a new typ e of legal elite, which had no t yet moved to translate it s de fact o advantages into educationa l superiority . The organizationa l resources which th e la w could derive fro m externa l factors — the judicial syste m an d the growing importance o f corporate busines s clients—wer e not availabl e t o medicine . Th e paucit y an d povert y o f hospitals, a s w e know , ha d concentrated medicine' s earl y organizationa l effort s o n educationa l institutions . The proliferatio n of medical schools fro m th e secon d decad e of the nineteent h cen tury on tended, i n Abraham Flexner's words, to "tear from their moorings'' the early, college-affiliated medica l centers . A s Flexne r observe d i n hi s 191 0 report , "th e United States and Canada, have, i n little more than a century, produced four hundred and fift y seve n medica l schools , many , o f course , short-lived , an d perhap s fift y still-born. On e hundre d an d fift y five surviv e t o d a y . " 117

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Even wher e the y maintaine d universit y affiliation , thes e nineteenth-centur y schools wer e all proprietary enterprises, supporte d b y student fee s and servin g their faculties wel l a s source s o f income (ofte n very handsome ) an d referra l networks. The initia l investmen t coul d b e ver y small . Hence, a s Flexne r late r noted , a spli t among the faculty abou t the merits of a student or a new therapy was rarely fatal—i t was likely , however , to lead to the foundation of one more school. The proliferatio n of medical schools in a "free medica l market'' was bound to reflect the growing sectarianism of the medica l profession a s wel l a s th e politickin g an d ambitions of professional leaders , eve n i f the y belonge d t o simila r therapeuti c an d theoretica l persuasions. This last aspect of medical dissension preceded, i n fact, the legitimation of medica l sects by various stat e legislature s i n the secon d thir d o f the nineteent h century. In Ne w Yor k City , fo r instance , eminen t physician s too k turn s i n mobilizin g support among the ranks of the county medical society and among the public authorities of the city and the state. These political maneuvers resulted , first, i n breaking up Columbia's d e fact o monopol y of medical instruction by th e incorporatio n of th e College of Physicians an d Surgeon s in 1806 . Eight years later, Davi d Hosac k cap italized o n th e resentmen t o f those wh o wer e exclude d fro m th e Colleg e an d fel t threatened b y the fact that the latter's degrees were equivalent to licenses. Hosack' s successful strateg y was to amalgamate Columbi a and the College. His group argued, quite correctly, that medical education coul d no t progress until Ne w York Cit y ha d one single medical school. Th e argumen t fo r monopoly of training reflecte d th e notion tha t unificatio n an d standardizatio n o f instruction is a prerequisit e fo r cor porate organization and professional control of a market of services. Yet , in the case of Hosac k an d hi s coterie , th e strateg y wa s premature : i n th e 1820s , th e count y society succeede d i n forcing the m ou t o f the College. A s Joseph Ket t remarks : "Teaching medicin e was a profitable calling an d a passport to an increased privat e practice. Contro l o f the city's only medica l school was too lucrative a prize for fai r competition." Given th e dynamic s of exclusion and inclusio n i n a narrow professional market , one grou p could no t muster sufficien t technica l and intellectual legitimac y to make monopolistic training acceptable; mor e importantly, no group in the profession could muster enoug h socia l powe r t o exten d th e benefit s o f monopol y to th e corporat e body o f the profession . Calhoun has interpreted these political maneuvers a s attempts t o create substitute s for a nonexisten t o r uncertai n patter n o f career: 118

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Repeatedly, me n seekin g th e advancemen t denie d the m withi n the communa l profes sion trie d to expan d thei r chances b y usin g th e whol e populatio n o f practitioner s as a base on which to erect new, mor e elaborate, mor e formal, less personalistic institutions. Jus t a s often , th e narrowe r population o f sociall y responsibl e practitioner s worked to cut any new institutions back within the scope of community life. . . . Eac h level of dispute sloughe d of f ne w faction s int o the loca l medical population, creatin g new base s fo r quarreling. 121

In circumstance s o f cognitive disunity, the shif t towar d more impersonal or more autonomous way s of professional self-definitio n wa s dangerous for the profession' s collective fortunes : especiall y afte r th e ris e o f homeopathy i n the 1820s , th e usua l

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intra-professional jockeying for control of the existing or projected institutions fused with dee p disagreements abou t therap y an d theory . Thi s became blatantl y evident in th e controversie s ove r contagionis m during the choler a epidemic s o f 183 2 an d 1849. Educate d urban physicians "stil l retaine d the patronage o f the wealthy, the educated, an d the respectable." Durin g the epidemic, however, thei r public disagreements added fuel to the attacks that medical sects with lower class followings— of whic h Thomsonianis m was th e mos t popular—ha d bee n conductin g against th e monopoly o f "doctor-craft." The case of New Yor k City illustrates a more general conflict of interests betwee n the tw o principa l organization s o f the youn g America n medical profession: sinc e most state s recognized a diploma as a license t o practice, the medica l societies fel t directly threatened b y the schools. Th e practitioners whom the societies represente d wanted to maintain licensing and apprenticeship as gatekeeping mechanisms, hoping to reduce th e growin g competition on the medical market. The societies , therefore , tended to attack the quality of teaching and training in the medical schools and to be, on th e whole , more concerne d abou t competitio n from schoo l graduates than fro m untrained empirics . The schools , o n the other hand, wante d to attract a s man y students as possible and to enlarge as much as possible the market for medical education. They coul d rightl y poin t to the fac t tha t thei r graduates were bette r traine d an d in more current medical matter than the averag e physician formed through apprenticeship. The conflict was resolved in favor of the schools: by 1830, according to William Rothstein, th e prestig e o f a diplom a far exceede d tha t o f a medica l society' s l i cense. Th e inevitabl e consequence wa s a furthe r deterioratio n o f th e medica l societies' position , which account s i n great par t fo r the genera l declin e an d aban donment of licensing laws in the 1830 s and for the corollary of this process, namely , the institutionalizatio n o f sectarian medicine . 122

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From the second decade of the nineteenth century on, the rise of patent medicine s and of health sects—among whic h the most popular were Samuel Thomson's botanic medicine, Wooste r Beach' s eclecticism , and Sylveste r Graham' s vegetarianism — undoubtedly irritate d th e orthodo x doctors an d even put them on the defensive, bu t it di d not directly challeng e th e statu s or the clientele s o f the medica l elites. What makes botani c medicin e particularly interestin g is the arden t adhesio n o f its leade r to Jacksonia n radicalism , a n identificatio n whic h perfecte d th e fusio n betwee n Thomsonianism an d democrati c ideology. It wa s indee d easy to direct the Jacksonian denunciatio n of monopoly agains t th e regular physicians' efforts to obtain legal privileges, even i f i t was a gross inaccuracy to identify th e average licensed physician with the "aristocracy " or the "idl e rich, " as the Thomsonians invariably did. The Thomsonians saw the cause of botanic medicine "a s intimatel y involve d i n a mighty reformatio n in which ther e wa s stil l much to be don e t o secure to the commo n man his rights in government a s wel l a s medic i n e . " Beside s thei r attachmen t t o democrati c reforms , th e Thomsonians , lik e most other medical sectarians, incorporate d with questionabl e logi c but compelling force "th e theme s of nature, providence , and nationalism." By comparison wit h the savag e therapie s defende d b y orthodo x medicine , th e "natural " therapies — temperance, health y diet , cleanliness , an d herba l o r natura l medicines—wer e un deniably mor e attractiv e and a t least a s effective. Sectaria n medicine' s amalga m of 125

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democratic and romantic themes, it s fusion o f physical and moral prescriptions, and its belief i n human perfectability established obviou s affinities betwee n th e popular health cults and religious millennialism. Bu t other sectors of the clergy, divested of their informa l medica l functions b y the claim s of professional medicine , also wel comed Thomson's emphatic assertion that every man should be his own physician. The defectio n o f traditional, non-revivalis t clergymen was see n a s a betrayal by the regula r profession of medicine. Bu t despite thes e inroads in what the opponent s of botani c medicin e sa w a s thei r camp, Thomsonianis m by itsel f doe s no t appea r to have carried much strength in the state legislatures; it needed othe r forces t o heed its campaig n fo r th e repea l o f licensin g l a w s . Whil e Thomsonianism , wit h it s mostly rural and lower-class following, mus t have made matter s difficul t fo r modest rural practitioners , it did not captur e th e wealth y urban bourgeoisies . Things wer e differen t wit h homeopathy . Th e doctor s wh o followe d Samue l Hahnemann's syste m i n Americ a also incorporated , i n muc h mor e sophisticate d form tha n the Thomsonians, a romantic cult of nature's curative powers and suprem e arbitration. I n some areas, homeopath y succeede d Thomsonianis m and appear s to have inherite d both its practitioners and its clienteles. Bu t the sociologica l differ ences between homeopath s an d th e earlie r sectaria n healer s were mos t significant: homeopaths, i n Europe a s i n America , were educate d regula r doctor s wh o advo cated a different kind o f therapy an d rapidl y becam e fashionable amon g th e uppe r classes. The character o f their clientele, i n turn, attracte d to their ranks a "genteel " kind of practitioner, whom American regular physicians quickly dubbed a quack ' 'of the drawing-room." Given th e stat e of pre-scientific medicine, th e milde r cures advocate d b y home opathy ha d th e grea t advantag e o f being harmless . Mor e importantly, all healers , licensed o r not , wer e equall y ineffective ; therefore , wha t chiefl y mad e th e reputa tion of the orthodox medical elites was their social position and formal educatio n a s well a s th e clas s o f thei r clienteles . Homeopathy , therefore , brok e th e monopoly that regular medicine—or, more accurately, its urban elites—had had on these traditional warrant s o f professionalism. As homeopathy advance d an d founded it s own schools an d societies i n the 1830 s and 1840s , the orthodox sect rallied against the challenge to its therapeutic practices . Homeopathy—which was often combined with eclecticism—was rapidly defined as the chief opponent of "true" medicine . In 1843 the Medical Society of Philadelphia opened th e wa y b y expellin g all homeopathic doctors . I n 1847 , a grou p o f New York regular physicians, unable to do the same in their county society, founded their own Academy o f Medicine, fro m whic h homeopath s wer e excluded . I n the sam e year, th e American Medical Associatio n was founded in Philadelphia as a voluntary society withou t licensin g powers. Wha t mad e i t possible, accordin g t o Rothstein, was the unity wrought in the ranks of the regulars by the threat of homeopathic competition: medical school faculties, who wanted to get rid of their homeopathic rivals , formed a n uneasy alliance with th e practitioners who wanted to regulate th e school s and rebuil d medica l societies . Th e A . M . A . ' s Cod e o f Ethics , adoptio n o f whic h became a mandatory conditio n fo r membership i n 1855 , did not i n itself defin e th e homeopaths a s "irregulars. " Yet , arguing that homeopath y wa s use d a s " a trade 128

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mark," th e A . M . A . physician s succeede d fo r a tim e i n ostracizin g no t onl y th e homeopaths, bu t the students and the regular practitioners who had at any time associated wit h homeopath s o r other irregulars. Inherent i n professional code s o f ethics i s a n effor t t o standardiz e professiona l behavior which, in the embattled situation of American regular medicine, was clearly aimed a t solvin g the proble m o f competin g commoditie s o n th e medica l market . The growin g number of healers, bot h "regular" an d "irregular, " had indeed made competition very intense eve n in outlying rural areas. The issue of standardization of fee s loome d larg e fo r medica l societies , a s i t ha d fo r thei r predecessor s i n th e late eighteent h an d earl y nineteent h centuries. Competitio n made undercuttin g of fees a widespread practice , whil e the difficulty o f collecting fees was undoubtedly "the mos t commonly aired grievance of American physicians during the 1840s." In a fragmente d an d harshl y competitiv e market, economi c surviva l was linke d to th e excessiv e numbe r o f practitioners. Regula r physicians , moreover , face d th e problem o f enforcing discipline within thei r own rank s i f they wante d t o maintain their precariou s distinctiveness . Th e suppl y o f medical service s ha d t o b e bot h re duced an d standardized . Wit h th e licensin g system i n total decay, th e onl y remed y was t o force th e school s t o raise thei r standards for entry an d graduation . Th e pat h chosen b y the A . M. A. wa s thus to advocate unrealisti c standards of preliminary education fo r medical schoo l entrant s o r prospectiv e apprentices , an d t o threate n wit h exclusion th e school s o r the master s that di d not follo w them . To adopt eve n much lower standards would have meant certain closure for lack of students for most medical schools. Th e A . M . A . ' s concer n wit h standard s reactivate d th e conflic t be tween school s an d apprenticeship i n the newly founded medica l society, despit e th e common oppositio n t o homeopathy . Th e questio n o f upgradin g schoo l standard s also divide d th e elit e fro m th e ran k an d fil e o f the profession . 132

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Even befor e th e foundin g o f th e A . M . A . , importan t medical journals ha d sup ported th e view s expounde d b y Marty n Paine , a professo r a t th e Medica l College of Ne w Yor k C i t y . Pain e argue d tha t th e unrealisti c raisin g of standards, given the conditions of medical practice an d general education i n the United States, would turn away from an y school, and into the ranks of empiricism, the hard-striving young men of modest financia l means who constituted, i n his view, th e bul k o f American physicians. Onl y tw o systems of medical education wer e possibl e i n America: one that woul d preserv e the decent, low-cos t instruction offered b y most schools , whil e admitting that an economic elit e would be able to buy a superior education i n a very few schools . Th e othe r syste m woul d rais e requirement s i n all schools an d thus re duce thei r number an d th e numbe r o f legitimate physicians. Becaus e th e nee d fo r medical service s wa s real an d widespread , i t would b e fulfille d b y empiric s o r by apprenticed physicians , separate d fro m th e schoo l graduate s b y a n unbridgeabl e gap. Thus , a s earl y a s 1843 , th e proble m of standardization o f the medica l practitioner—and henc e of standard training—ha d been recognized a s a central focu s of organization an d refor m i n America n medicine an d clearl y linke d t o th e issu e of social access and exclusion. The A . M . A . , however , whic h wa s not much more than another sect itself, did not have the social or intellectual power to advance uniformity. The conflic t o f interests i n its constituency condemne d i t to weaknes s and ineffec 137

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tiveness unti l it s reorganization a t th e beginnin g of our century . A t the loca l level, the voluntar y medical societie s wer e fa r more activ e tha n their national counterpar t and serve d a t leas t th e purpos e o f identifyin g th e orthodo x physicia n t o potentia l patients. Yet , the loca l societies wer e caugh t i n the inescapabl e an d seemingl y insoluble dilemma of exclusiveness: "Eithe r they kept their membership requirement s loose, i n which cas e they coul d hardl y clai m t o hav e purifie d thei r ranks , o r the y tightened requirement s an d los t an y chanc e of presenting a unifie d f r o n t . " Especially afte r th e Civi l War , thi s dilemm a resulted , i n fact , i n a n increasin g divergence o f interests betwee n th e rank-and-file and the elites of the regular profes sion. Whil e "th e younger , mos t active , an d perhap s mos t ambitiou s member s of the profession " voice d their concern wit h competitio n and a n overcrowde d marke t at th e A . M . A . meetings, th e elit e physicians sough t t o erect a clear separatio n be tween themselve s an d th e bul k o f their colleagues. Small , selec t organization s connected wit h a medical schoo l or a hospital provided them wit h a mechanism. I n the earl y association s of this type, elit e physicians pressure d for conformity: taking the Ne w Yor k Academ y o f medicine a s evidence, Calhou n argue s that elit e "regu lars" deliberatel y strov e fo r mediocrity , drivin g dow n intellectua l originality an d intellectual ambitio n as potentiall y disruptive forces. Impersonalit y an d uniformit y offered a respite fro m chaoti c individualis m in a fragmente d profession. Later , as we shall see, specialis m began to emerge as a new trademark o f the elite physician and as a new and dangerous form o f competition for the average general practitioner. 138

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Challenged b y homeopath y o n scientifi c grounds , orthodo x medicin e coul d no t muster, i n response, a demonstratio n o r therapeuti c superiority . Skepticis m abou t the curativ e virtues of the traditiona l pharmacopeia wa s no t limite d t o the public : in the 1850s , th e mos t cosmopolita n sector s of the regula r professio n bega n t o adop t the spiri t o f "medica l nihilism " tha t wa s becomin g prevalen t i n majo r Europea n centers. However , before th e rise of bacteriology in the 1890s , orthodo x medicine could no t offe r an y substitut e fo r "heroic " therapies . Th e bul k of the profession , its self-confidence undermine d fro m within , rejecte d th e discredit cast upon its technical tools . Th e emergen t orientatio n towar d scientifi c medicin e wa s therefor e a n additional facto r o f disunity, whic h compounde d th e conflic t o f interest s betwee n elite an d averag e practitioner s an d condemne d th e inclusiv e professiona l associa tions t o ineffectiveness . Thus in the two decades before th e Civil War, medical societies los t their licensing powers and voluntary associations could not unify a structurally disunited profession . Competing medical schools multiplie d the definitio n o f the medica l commodity and tended t o driv e al l educational standard s down . America n hospital s wer e neithe r teaching hospital s no r centers of scientifi c research ; ye t b y mid-centur y the y wer e providing an organizational base for urban medical elites and, i n some cases, a locus where sectaria n difference s coul d begin to be dissolved by clinical cooperation. Bu t on th e whole , th e statu s of the medica l professio n ha d neve r bee n a s l o w . In sum , th e declin e o f traditional warrants an d narrow-base d monopolie s i n th e profession o f medicine wa s me t by a variety of resources, all of them insufficient to check the disintegrating effects o f free trade on the medical market. Medical associations, deprived of their licensing powers, wer e by themselves incapable o f reorganiz141

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ing th e profession . Despit e sectaria n disunity , the medica l schoo l emerge d a s th e major resourc e fo r professiona l organization . Wher e schoo l an d societ y succeede d in establishing a coalition, as in Massachusetts, proliferation was prevented: throughout thi s period , i n fact , Harvar d maintaine d it s loca l monopol y o f instruction. Where th e professio n wa s to o recen t t o hav e produce d a recognizabl e hierarchy , as in the frontier state of Ohio, professional organizatio n came from th e state legislature, whic h retaine d contro l and limite d th e numbe r o f medical schools. I n most other situations , deliberat e standardizatio n o f behavior an d conformit y with thera peutic an d intellectua l standards was sough t b y group s to o smal l to have an overall effect o n the profession, bu t prestigious enoug h t o generate clusters o f unified med ical elites, based on the few vigorous institutions—schools or hospitals—that existe d before ou r century . Paradoxically , however , th e abandonmen t o f licensing and th e ease of access to a medical degree actually served t o maintain the occupational identity of the profession, b y conferring the title of doctor on a high proportion of medical practitioners. Immediately after the end of the Civil War, the rise of the public health movement , which ha d earlie r ha d t o figh t th e sectaria n excesse s of the organize d profession , began t o enlis t th e effort s o f urba n physician s an d t o cal l fo r professionalis m an d expertise—both specifi c response s t o th e medica l problem s o f th e moder n indus trial c i t y . I n th e change d contex t o f resource s o f th e earl y twentiet h century , these appeal s contribute d t o th e ideologica l legitimac y o f medicine' s successfu l reorganization. The paradox o f the Jacksonian period—politica l egalitarianism in a society wher e lines of stratification were hardening , despit e the fluidit y induce d b y economi c de velopment—appears t o have been reflected i n the situation of the major professions . Economic developmen t an d th e attendan t socia l changes objectively undermine d the professions ' traditiona l communal supports , bu t the effec t wa s uneven , an d less significant tha n it would appear from th e politica l attacks upon professional monop oly. Decentralizatio n and geographical mobilit y across an expanding territory multiplied th e possibilitie s of segmentation , reducin g th e impac t o f the politica l move ment. Th e traditional professional elite s of the Eastern seaboar d had never succeeded in translatin g thei r local privileges into effective an d extende d monopolies , despit e the lega l advantages which they enjoyed befor e th e 1830s . Whil e formal guarantee s of professiona l monopol y wer e abrogate d durin g th e Jacksonia n period , informa l social controls and bases of prestige coul d be maintained or reconstituted a t the local level i n both ol d and ne w communities . Insofar a s the choicest professiona l monopolie s wer e based on grounds othe r tha n the manifes t criteri a of inclusion (formal educatio n an d licensing) , the concession s to th e commo n ma n di d not establis h ope n competition , except wher e i t mattere d less: the average and the marginal practitioners suffere d fro m th e exacerbated intensity o f competition ; but thos e professional s who m th e uppe r classe s identifie d a s "their ow n k i n d" coul d maintain their advantages in the bes t sectors of the profes sional markets an d rapidly move to monopolize new opportunities as the y emerged . Thus, the enlargement o f the professions brough t about by the Jacksonian movement, and above all, by laissez-faire economi c development, di d not mean democratization. 143

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On th e contrary , i f democratic encroachment s wer e no t alway s resiste d b y th e es tablished professionals , i t was becaus e the internal stratification o f the profession s was no t threatene d b y them . Wher e th e technica l developmen t o f a professio n al lowed it , as i n the law , specialization alon g technical lines followed an d reinforce d the line s o f socia l stratification . I n th e profession s a s elsewhere , Jacksonia n de mocracy attacke d th e forms , bu t no t th e substance , o f inequality. Although elit e professional statu s an d elit e individua l career s were protecte d b y internal stratification , the increas e i n competition could not be entirel y disregarde d by th e establishe d professiona l elites . Th e powe r accorde d t o public opinion in the age o f Jackson appears to have put a prize on public demonstration s o f professiona l "competence": fier y preaching , courtroo m bravura , "heroic " therapie s o n thei r popular substitutes , paten t medicine s an d th e ideologicall y attractive panacea s of the healt h sects—thes e were muc h more significan t than anonymou s certificate s of formal training . T o expand thei r secure but perhaps stil l narrow clienteles, eve n th e established professiona l elite s ha d t o counte r th e flamboyance , th e talent , o r th e fashionable appea l o f their competitors. Moreover , in the urban centers, the increase in number s an d i n social diversity of the professiona l populatio n tended t o destro y the diffuse , extra-professiona l base s fo r agreemen t an d control . Th e resultin g increase in dissension, unethica l practices , an d unseeml y competitivenes s i n the fre e professions, mos t particularl y medicine, pose d a threa t t o th e collectiv e imag e o f these occupations. Thus , bot h the concern abou t thei r position in an expanding mar ket an d th e concer n abou t collectiv e statu s cause d professiona l leader s t o pres s toward conformit y i n thei r exclusiv e elit e group s an d associations . The y lacked , however, th e organizationa l an d institutiona l means necessary for an effective stan dardization o f professional practice ; wha t the y neede d wa s a coherent an d monop olistic syste m o f training, which alon e coul d produc e a standardize d definitio n o f the professiona l produce r an d endo w i t with meritocrati c legitimacy. In England , th e effor t t o establis h superio r competenc e o n meritocrati c claim s characterized th e movemen t o f professional reform . I n Jacksonian America , there were neithe r a visible "national " aristocrac y no r centra l status-givin g institution s such a s th e ol d English corporations o r the tw o ancient universities . The traditional bases of professional prestig e wer e loca l an d scattered . Thi s fac t weakened , para doxically, the import of meritocratic justifications o f privilege. The ideology of merit clashed i n America with th e ideologica l egalitarianism of the politica l system . Th e universalistic an d democrati c conten t o f the politica l ideolog y exposed, i n fact, th e potential fo r monopol y laten t i n the universalisti c an d rationa l appearances o f ex pertise. I n a sense , Jacksonia n politic s an d ideolog y functione d a s a n alternativ e universalistic instrumen t fo r the breakin g u p of professional monopolie s whic h ha d never bee n to o tightl y sealed . Bu t popular democrac y di d not change the realit y of the stratificatio n system : i n the smal l town s an d i n the narro w elit e circle s o f th e larger cities , th e interna l stratificatio n o f th e profession s continue d t o dra w sus tenance and legitimacy from th e structure s o f social inequality, which in this period were beginnin g to acquir e center s of national unification . The "modern " professionalizin g tendencie s tha t di d appear in this period—an d by "modern" I mean tendencies which show continuity with and appear as a prelude

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to the consolidation of professional privilege s in later years—were dependen t upon emergent organizations . Fre e market competition , in professional market s a s else where, lead s t o centralizatio n an d concentratio n amon g th e competin g units . Bureaucratic organizations , legitimize d by the authority of large-scale property , tended to undermin e th e fre e market : the y supporte d th e emergen t hierarch y o f th e lega l profession, an d the y establishe d th e identit y of younger profession s suc h a s engi neering o r accountancy . Bureaucratization , howeve r incipient , gave a framewor k of career to declining sectors of the traditional ministry. Medicine, on the other hand, lacked "heteronomous " support s an d it s ow n institutiona l framework wa s stil l too wea k t o functio n eve n a s effectivel y as th e churc h functione d fo r the clergy . In sum , th e undemocrati c dimensio n o f professiona l refor m wa s mor e readil y apparent i n America than i n societies wit h a clearly perceived aristocrati c past. Fo r meritocratic claims to function a s effective ideological legitimations, new themes — such as an ethos of efficiency an d the need to regulate anarchi c competition—ha d to be accommodated b y the dominant ideology. The social reorganization accomplished between th e years 187 0 and 192 0 provided the structura l support for this ideological shift. Th e ris e o f corporate capitalis m transformed th e large r marke t i n which pro fessions operate ; i t provide d a ne w contex t o f ideologica l and organizationa l re sources for diverse professiona l projects .

Chapter 9

THE RIS E OF CORPORATE CAPITALISM AND TH E CONSOLIDATION OF PROFESSIONALIS M

The classic , olde r professions sough t t o control thei r markets an d to gai n a priv ileged positio n in the occupationa l and socia l hierarchies. Moder n professionalization is , thus, a n attemp t t o translate on e orde r of scarce resources into another : th e possession of scarce knowledge and skill s is , indeed , th e principa l basi s on whic h modern professions clai m socia l recognition and economic rewards . A s used i n the professional project , th e notio n o f expertise incorporate s contradictor y principles. On th e on e hand , i t embodie s th e rationalizin g and universalisti c legitimatio n o f market monopoly, insofar as i t is standardized expertise , accessibl e t o all who care to be adequatel y traine d and qualified . O n the othe r hand , expertis e i s also use d t o claim superio r reward s an d t o establis h socia l distanc e fro m othe r occupationa l groups—a claim which is as much supported by the structural limitations on access to training as it is by the professions' deliberat e efforts to achieve corporate exclusiveness . The ris e o f modern educationa l system s bring s a n ideologica l resolution to th e tension betwee n universalisti c principles an d exclusiv e privileg e embodie d i n th e notion o f expertise. Mas s acces s to the lowe r echelons o f the public school syste m allows the higher levels of the educational hierarchy to claim meritocratic legitimations for their selection of entrants. Th e inegalitarian uses of acquired expertise ar e thus conceale d b y th e allege d universalis m of the schools ' criteri a of selection. The unificatio n o f training an d research i n the moder n university is a particularly significant development . A s graduat e an d professiona l school s emerge d a t th e to p of th e educational hierarchy, the professions acquire d not only a n institutional basis on which to develop and standardize knowledge and technologies; they also received, in universit y training, a most powerful legitimatio n for their claims to cognitive and technical superiorit y and t o socia l an d economi c benefits . The rise of a new type of institution o f higher education i n the Unite d State s depended, i n turn, o n the massiv e availabilit y o f surplus capital , especially afte r th e depression o f 1893. While the university represents a major factor in the advance of professionalization, i t is only on e developmen t i n the twentieth-century maturation

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of industria l capitalism. Remarkabl e economi c growth—interrupted , i t is true , b y numerous downturn s an d recession s befor e th e cataclys m o f 1929—i s th e back ground for the reorganizatio n of American society afte r th e Civi l War. The growing importance o f the grea t industria l corporations an d the transformation of production under their influence; the motor role of new industries, especially mass-consumptio n industries, i n our century ; th e centralizatio n o f power an d decision-makin g i n th e political system ; th e emergence and consolidation of functional groups whic h speak directly to the state for their constituencies; growin g governmental intervention in the economy, accelerate d b y the Firs t World Wa r and by the respons e to the Grea t De pression—these ar e som e o f th e epocha l development s tha t mar k th e wanin g of competitive capitalism. The transformation is accompanied b y the predominance o f a new type of capitalist firm an d ne w mode s of competition. Larg e productiv e units , characterized b y high ratios o f fixe d capita l pe r worke r an d hig h productivity, need t o pla n an d regulat e production, distribution , and employmen t i n orde r t o insur e profit s i n expandin g markets. Thei r new administrativ e structure s emphasiz e expert decision-makin g a s applied science and technology become increasingly integrated wit h productio n and with management. Associated wit h th e expansion o f the monopoly and state sectors of the economy , we fin d long-ter m trends towar d th e transformatio n o f the occupationa l structure : the decline of small entrepreneurs and independent worker s and the corollary bureaucratization o f most work-setting s ar e amon g th e mos t significant . An expression o f these developments i s the stead y increas e of nonmanual occupation s whic h servic e the publi c o r privat e bureaucracies , creat e o r handl e ne w technologies , provid e consumer service s i n th e "affluen t society, " an d fil l th e increasingl y specialize d slots o f the divisio n o f labor. Fro m the las t decade s of the nineteent h centur y on , the growt h of a public system o f higher education attempte d t o respond t o these new demands of the labo r market . To structura l changes corresponds a shift in ideology toward new form s o f legitimation o f power. A t the core , th e emergen t conceptio n o f authority appeals to th e rationality of science—science as a method and as a world view, more than as a body of knowledge—and t o the rationality of scientifically oriente d experts who act in the bureaucratized institution s of the ne w socia l order. These long-term trends in structure an d ideology are characteristic o f the transition toward corporat e capitalism . I n the Unite d States, the y becam e discernible durin g the decades of national reorganization that culminated, politically, in the progressiv e movement an d i n the electio n of Woodrow Wilson i n 1912 . Progressivis m i s a ge neric nam e for a variety of political an d intellectua l responses to the wanin g of " a community-centered society " an d t o th e inadequac y o f old explanations o f socia l cohesion an d socia l change. Fo r one o f the mos t perceptiv e student s of the period, "the hear t o f progressivism wa s th e ambitio n of the ne w middl e class to fulfil l it s destiny b y bureaucratic means." Howeve r significant, this component wa s but on e element i n a movement characterize d b y it s diversity. When progressivism becam e visible a s a nationa l forc e towar d th e tur n o f th e century , i t apparentl y unifie d a wide arra y o f forces, som e of them connected t o movements which , i n the previou s 1

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decades, ha d attempte d a "respons e t o industrialism. " Oppositio n t o corporat e business an d agreemen t o n th e necessit y o f electora l reform s an d administrativ e action create "th e fals e pictur e of a revolt against a common enemy fo r a common purpose." . . . [But ] th e onl y unifyin g facto r . . . i s that each group was tryin g t o cope wit h change s brough t abou t b y industrialism." As Samue l Hay s observes : "Almost ever y movemen t o f the Progressiv e Er a subscribe d t o th e concep t o f th e 'people' an d believed that it s demands sprang fro m them . Bu t the 'people, ' i n fact, often oppose d reform s . . . Suppor t for change . . . stemme d fro m a more complex source than th e 'people ' an d oppositio n to i t came fro m a wider variety of group s than th e corporation." It i s impossibl e her e t o giv e eve n a cursor y historica l account o f th e comple x decades that precede progressivism and to describe th e Progressive Er a itself, which in ou r century lead s practically to the door of the Ne w Deal. 1 will focus , instead , on thos e features o f it which best explain the new structura l and ideological context of professionalization . 7

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THE NE W CONTEXT O F PROFESSIONALIZATIO N Some urba n sector s o f progressivism—i n particular , thos e associate d wit h th e women's movemen t an d th e settlemen t movement—ma y hav e unwittingl y trans ferred t o the industria l city a n individualisti c fundamentalis m o f rural stamp. Bu t progressivism, i n fact , symbolize s th e poin t o f n o retur n fo r refor m movement s which had framed their protest i n terms o f the modes and values o f a passing order . From there on , efficiency in the servic e o f "moral uplift" become s more an d mor e the predominan t theme , openin g a n are a of reconciliation betwee n leadin g sectors of progressivis m an d th e larg e industria l corporation. The emergence of a national rulin g clas s was on e o f the cor e structura l developments t o which progressivis m reacted an d which , i n turn, made possible th e shif t in dominant ideology . Fo r man y contemporary historians , th e Progressiv e Er a is , in fact, on e ac t i n the proces s by whic h thi s ne w an d relativel y coherent rulin g clas s came to presid e ove r th e reorganizatio n of both civi l an d politica l society. I n the Age o f Jackson, a new kin d o f entrepreneur ha d "struggle d t o free busines s enterprise o f the outmode d restriction s of special incorporatio n and banking laws an d to end what was an overcentralized control of credit." The rapid industrial expansion after th e Civi l War , th e completio n of the railroa d network, an d therefor e th e ris e of nationa l markets o f commodities and labor, spawne d a new breed of capitalists. The downturns of the seventies and the eighties, capped b y the major economic crisis of 1893 , accelerate d th e merge r movemen t an d th e driv e for industrial rationaliza tion i n terms o f efficiency and economies o f scale. However, the stronges t stimulu s behind th e rapi d "combinatio n movement " o f th e year s 1897-190 4 wa s no t th e desire fo r efficient productio n but the fear of anarchy an d the risks of competition. As th e risin g corporation s expande d thei r capacit y fo r self-financing , investmen t bankers als o broadene d thei r role. B y the earl y 1890 s th e Unite d State s n o longe r needed to depend o n foreign capital; finance capitalism emerged fro m th e depressio n of th e 1890 s a s the principa l allocato r of investment funds an d an important coordinator o f further growth . As investment banker s assume d a role of comparable im portance to that of national political leaders and industrial magnates, a joint financial 10

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industrial leadershi p cam e int o being. It s ris e bot h depended o n an d calle d fort h a new, activ e rol e o f the state . Fearful o f antibusiness regulation , business leaders had a t firs t trie d t o prevent it by getting increasingly involved in politics. Bu t the exacerbation o f class conflict in the 1880 s an d the depression o f the early 1890 s showe d to the most advanced secto r of busines s that regulatio n and coordinatio n of economic activit y depende d largel y on "politica l capitalism"—that is, "the utilizatio n of political outlets to attain conditions o f stability , predictability , and security—t o attai n rationalizatio n i n th e economy." Governmen t regulatio n was welcome d b y th e enlightene d sector s of corporate business , s o lon g as the y coul d maintain a decisive influenc e ove r it . In the firs t decade s of the twentiet h century, organization s suc h a s th e Nationa l Civic Federation, whil e pavin g the roa d toward s a n entent e wit h busines s unionism , influenced regulator y an d legislativ e commissions, insurin g that industr y woul d b e allowed a voice an d a veto i n the area s that concerne d i t . Adapting th e syste m t o th e ne w need s o f corporate capitalis m required a clos e partnership betwee n top-leve l economic leader s an d th e state . Politica l centraliza tion, placin g decision-makin g i n th e hand s o f "responsible " leaders , capabl e o f reconciling sectional differences i n a broad, "national " view, was thus an axis of the institutional order envisaged b y at least some sectors of the national ruling class. In private a s wel l a s i n public affairs, decision-makin g was t o flo w fro m th e cente r t o the periphery . Politica l leadershi p i n the Progressiv e Er a foun d th e visio n neede d to unif y th e disjointe d society unde r a n ideolog y adapted t o the phas e of corporat e capitalism. Except in age and political experience, th e Progressive Part y cadres were not strikingly differen t from th e Taf t Republican s t o whom they lef t th e Gran d Old Party in 1912. Bot h group s wer e overwhelmingl y urban , uppe r middl e class, Anglo-Saxon, Protestant, an d highly educated: mor e than half of the Progressives wer e professiona l men, whil e 6 3 percen t o f the Ol d Guard Republican s ha d attende d college. Th e issue that divide d the m most clearl y was th e tactic s o f popular democracy: th e Pro gressives endorsed th e initiative , th e referendum , th e direc t primary, and th e recall of judicia l decisions , which , t o the Ol d Guard, spelle d a threat t o the Constitution and, mor e concretely , a n attac k upo n th e ver y structur e o f the party . An analysi s o f municipa l reform—a majo r battlegroun d o f th e reformer s afte r 1890—reveals, i n fact, tha t "th e ideolog y of democratization o f decision-making was negative rather than positive. . . . I t was used to destroy the political institutions of the lower and middle classes and the political power which those institutions gave rise to, rather than to provide a guide for alternative action." City wide elections— together wit h th e promotio n of stron g mayor s an d th e cit y manage r for m o f ex ecutive—displaced th e war d politician , clos e t o hi s working-clas s an d ethni c constituency. Municipal reform maximized instead the influence of "cosmopolitan'' businessmen an d professional s wh o coul d deriv e citywid e recognitio n fro m thei r involvement wit h broa d issue s an d thei r national connections. Hays observe s a n upwar d shift—analogou s t o tha t fro m th e war d to th e whol e city—between townshi p (o r county) and th e stat e level : 15

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The foca l point s o f thi s transitio n wer e school s an d roads. . . . I n each cas e profes sionals wit h cosmopolita n rathe r than loca l perspective s wer e extremel y influentia l

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A genera l proces s of political centralizatio n thus appear s to underli e the rhetori c and the tactics of "direct democracy." Th e New England town-meeting was not, in fact, th e model of decision-making pursued b y the reformers. Thei r inspiration came from th e efficien t busines s enterprise: a s on e o f the trul y nationa l institutions of the period, th e corporation , with it s centralized control of functional components, pro vided a foca l mode l fo r progressivism , fo r Tedd y Roosevelt' s Ne w Nationalism and, i n general, fo r the ne w concep t o f the state . Leaders i n the established professions , an d in the new applied specialties that were emerging withi n th e expanded structur e of government an d public services, actively promoted rationalization on the corporate model . This new type of professional wel comed th e corporat e system s of decision-making "no t onl y becaus e of their scope of coverag e bu t because of their coercive potential. The professional sough t to carry standards of life generate d b y a few to the populatio n at large. Hi s task wa s t o per suade the yet unconvinced." Fo r many of these men, the application of the corporate mode l to publi c affairs wa s a means of establishing th e independenc e o f their professions fro m th e private corporations and their "predatory wealth.'' The paradox is only apparent . Th e new styl e of expert leadershi p whic h the y sough t t o establis h could not exist without its corporate moorings ; but the ubiquitou s affirmation o f the expert i n distinct corporate systems—a n affirmatio n whic h sometime s le d to ope n conflict—reinforced scientifi c expertis e a s a transcenden t principl e and a s a po tential basi s of professional autonomy . The tendenc y appear s clearl y i n the scientifi c management win g o f mechanica l engineering and , mos t particularly , in th e ne w concep t o f professionalis m advo cated by Morris Cooke, the favorit e disciple of Frederick W. Taylor, the founder of scientific management . Cooke , i n fact, succeede d i n steering th e mechanica l engineering profession towar d reform, where Taylo r himself ha d failed. "Th e funda mental consideration in the work of an engineer—if he is ever to pull himsel f ou t of his present status of being a hired servant—is tha t h e shal l make publi c interest th e master test of his work, " wrot e Cook e i n 1921. As Director of Public Works for the city of Philadelphia from 191 4 to 1919, Cooke put the principle into practice an d advanced th e concept o f the professional enginee r as expert leader i n rational government. H e used hi s battle against th e utilitie s companies to denounce th e engineering consultants associate d with the companies' inter ests and t o demonstrate th e futilit y o f a code of ethics i n a professional associatio n controlled b y business. Although Cooke' s influenc e wa s undoubtedl y profoun d wit h th e rank-and-fil e of th e profession , hi s fait h i n public service t o solv e th e inheren t subordinatio n of the enginee r wa s no t widel y shared . Cooke' s solutio n presupposed , indeed , tha t the principle s o f scientifi c managemen t woul d triump h an d brin g abou t " a mas 21

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sive restructurin g o f industria l bureaucracies an d a reorganizatio n o f th e utilities . If thes e thing s ha d com e t o pass , the n Cooke' s proposal s woul d hav e mad e goo d sense." The corporate busines s leadership, whil e it was sympatheti c t o Taylor's rationalization an d stric t contro l of labor, wa s no t abou t t o shar e control of the enterpris e with a n independen t group , n o matte r ho w expert an d ho w scientifi c in its orienta tions. I n the firs t decade s of our century, scientifi c management, i n fact, wa s mor e attuned t o progressivism i n public affairs than to the practical needs of big business, to whom Taylor had originally addressed his program. Reinhard Bendix has shown , however, tha t th e socia l philosophy of scientific management—reinterpreted i n the 1920s an d 1930 s an d transforme d b y Elto n Mayo' s approach—wa s graduall y incorporated b y th e to p level s o f corporat e industry. Th e intervenin g facto r wa s the genera l shif t i n th e dominan t ideolog y whic h bega n wit h progressivism . A s Samuel Habe r convincingly argues in his study of Taylorism, scientifi c management provides a key t o th e emergen t ideolog y o f corporate capitalism . Haber show s tha t Taylor' s formulations integrated al l the essential meaning s tha t the core notion of efficiency took in the public mind of the time: the personal virtue s of hard and disciplined work (and, therefore, th e Yankee heritage an d the Mugwump tradition); the "energ y output-inpu t ratio of a machine"; th e relatio n between cost s and profi t i n a commercia l enterprise ; an d finally , socia l efficiency , tha t is , th e "leadership o f the competent " i n a stat e of social harmony. For a time, the more simplisti c and moralistic versions o f the gospel o f efficiency captured th e popula r imagination. In the earl y par t o f the twentiet h century, th e language of efficiency appeare d to unify the various reform campaigns int o a "reform syncretism" centere d o n th e ne w concep t o f th e state : "Conservation , scientifi c management, an d Americanizatio n expressed cognat e sentiment s . . . th e leader s of al l three suggeste d measure s whic h involve d a rejection o f laissez faire an d th e 24

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acceptance o f socia l guidanc e an d c o n t r o l . "

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The impac t o f the ideolog y of efficiency wa s profound. Th e mos t genera l an d abstract dimension which it incorporates i s the appeal to science—or, broadly speaking, t o rationa l and systematize d knowledge : scienc e appears not onl y as th e chie f instrument fo r master y an d contro l over th e physica l an d eve n th e socia l environment, but also as the ultimate legitimation for practical choices an d everyday courses of action . I n this sense , scientifi c management an d it s popula r version s accuratel y reflect—or anticipate—th e transformatio n o f the productiv e force s b y th e integra tion o f applied scienc e an d technolog y a t al l levels o f the productio n process. In th e concret e settin g o f industry , th e ideolog y o f scientifi c managemen t ex presses the demis e of the self-mad e ma n o r captai n o f industry a s th e centra l self justifying myt h of the capitalist class. The common submission o f both worker s and employers t o th e "objective " law s o f scienc e heralds , indeed , a late r ideological development: tha t which sees in corporate capitalis m and in the depersonalization o f capitalist propert y a "manageria l revolution " and th e wanin g o f class . A s Habe r observes of Brandeis' conceptio n o f industrial democracy: "Thos e aspect s of management to which the laws of science did not as yet apply were to be subject t o collective bargaining . Wher e scienc e di d apply , a unio n representativ e migh t serve a s a watchdog t o mak e sur e that i t was th e law s o f science and no t class interest whic h 29

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was obeyed. That the laws of science might serve class interest did not seem to be a possibility."™ In scientifi c management, scienc e appear s a s th e transcenden t nor m which wil l eliminate the arbitrarines s o f class power. I n Taylor's own words: "The ma n a t the head o f th e busines s unde r scientifi c managemen t i s governe d b y rules an d law s which hav e bee n develope d throug h hundred s o f experiments just as much as the workman is, an d th e standard s whic h hav e bee n develope d ar e equitable." Can didly emphasizing the ideological characte r o f the transformation, Taylor adds: " In its essence scientific management involves a complete mental revolution on the part of th e workingmen . . . . An d i t involve s a n equall y complet e menta l revolutio n on th e par t o f those on the management' s side." At a mor e concret e level , scientifi c managemen t i s a n expressio n o f th e cor e legitimation o f mature capitalism : because technology and applie d science promis e a quasi-unlimite d expansion o f output an d resources , the y eliminat e the caus e for "zero-sum-game" conflict . Continuou s economic growth an d continuous increases in productivit y ar e thu s th e mediator s throug h whic h scienc e resolves , o r a t leas t dilutes, clas s conflict. In th e appea l t o science , therefore , w e fin d th e overal l cognitiv e and normative legitimation for the rise of the manager an d the rise of the expert: ideologically, th e "carriers o f embodied science"—that i s to say, traine d and credentialed experts — are assigne d a crucial an d directiv e role, while th e ideolog y also emancipate s the m from clas s allegiance s an d clas s interests . In th e contex t o f th e factory , scientifi c managemen t project s th e technocrati c ambitions of the risin g professio n o f engineering. Bu t the contradiction s and func tions of the ideolog y are also reveale d i n this context. If , indeed, efficienc y ca n b e accurately an d directl y measure d i n the productio n of real commodities , this mea surement i s no t unequivocal . A s Habe r point s out , "Mechanica l efficiency i s a n output-input ratio of matter or energy, wherea s commercia l efficiency i s the relation between pric e an d cost . Occasionally , these efficiencies ar e opposed." The glorificatio n o f technological ingenuity had justified , muc h befor e Taylor , the exalte d position of the engineer, nex t to the master , i n the hierarchica l division of labo r of the early factory system. I t may be tha t this traditional belie f conceale d the essentia l subordinatio n of the engineerin g professio n fro m eve n suc h acut e observers o f th e late r industria l syste m a s Thornstei n Veblen. Bu t th e practica l engineers themselves , despit e som e misgivings , had les s illusion s about th e ulti mate determinatio n of efficiency: " I t was wit h a certain grimness that the engineer s who seemed to believe that engineering could be practiced without regard to money values wer e condemned. 'Thes e men may be ingenious inventors or designers, the y may b e grea t mathematicians , the y may eve n b e eminen t as scientists , bu t they ar e not engineers,' " wrot e the president of the Stevens Institute of Technology in 1907. The extensio n o f notions of efficiency t o organizations whic h produc e onl y ser vices o r fictitiou s commoditie s maximizes the ideologica l implications. Th e exten sion discloses, firs t of all, a n analogy between factory and society which symbolizes the bringin g o f the whol e social order unde r th e imperativ e creed o f limitless eco nomic growth . Efficienc y i n service industrie s canno t b e gauged , however , b y th e direct mechanical measurement o f input-output ratios of energy; it s measurement i s 31

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therefore necessaril y reduce d t o cost-benefi t evaluations . Bu t whe n efficienc y cri teria are applie d to the management of agencies outside th e marketplace (suc h a s th e government, it s administrativ e arms , nonprofi t organizations suc h a s schools , hos pitals, philanthropies, an d the like) , evaluatio n of input and output becomes increas ingly indirect . Above all, the attemp t t o measure efficiency i n the production of services or fictitious commodities implies a necessary reduction of quality to quantity. The tendenc y show s eve n wit h a n apparentl y qualitativ e indicato r o f productivity or efficiency—that is , the proportio n of "qualified" personnel a t the various level s of a n organization. The upgrading of qualifications is, indeed, equate d with growing proportions o f credentialed employees , wit h improvements i n the personnel' s average year s of formal schooling o r in the averag e scores obtained i n a variety of aptitude tests. A l l these attempts to measure and increase efficiency in the production of services involve an extension o f the rol e of the "experts. " Scientifi c management ideologie s attempted t o bestow upo n the engineer—and, later , upo n the trained business administrator—the crow n of the entrepreneur . I n the sam e manner, th e extensio n o f th e ideology o f efficiency beyon d th e real m o f real commodit y productio n gav e a de cisive impetus t o professionalizing occupation s suc h a s bureaucratic socia l workers , city planners , o r schoo l superintendents . The possibilit y o f claimin g specia l "scientific " an d organizationa l expertis e comes to most of these occupations b y virtue of their position in organizations whic h are increasingl y bureaucratic . Centralization , hierarchica l ordering , an d delegatio n of administrativ e an d manageria l function s giv e thos e i n planning o r coordinatin g positions th e possibilit y of definin g th e meanin g o f efficiency an d th e parameter s for it s measurement. Obviously , they d o no t perform thi s task of definition t o their own disadvantage . Two centra l structura l change s underli e th e ideologica l shif t symbolize d b y sci entific managemen t and, i n politics, by the Progressives: namely, th e reorganizatio n of productio n by the gian t corporation an d the quasi-simultaneous extensio n o f state power an d functions . Progressiv e reform too k th e corporat e mode l o f organizatio n from th e economy an d transferred i t to the polity, thus making political centralization concomitant t o th e centralizatio n o f economi c production . I t could b e argue d tha t the initia l locu s o f bureaucratization i n the Unite d States is no t th e state , bu t large scale industry. Fro m th e Progressiv e Er a on , bureaucratizatio n advance d simultaneously i n bot h politica l an d civi l society , providin g a structura l suppor t fo r th e diffusion o f the ideolog y o f efficiency. The chie f legitimizin g principl e of bureaucracy is , fo r Weber , it s superio r effi ciency i n the handling of large-scale problems. Bureaucrac y appear s to be the struc tural for m unde r whic h the reorganizatio n o f commodity productio n b y monopol y capital i s "relayed " ideologicall y throughout th e bod y social . I n the particula r historical developmen t o f the Unite d States, central institution s of truly nationa l scope were establishe d almos t contemporaneousl y i n the economi c an d politica l sphere s and, i f we count th e nationa l universities , i n the spher e of higher educatio n a s well . This parallel reorganization i s reflected a t the level of ideology in the unifying themes of efficiency , regulation , an d expertise . I t is during this phase of transition toward corporate capitalis m tha t America n profession s consolidate d thei r positio n i n th e 37

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occupational an d social hierarchies . Th e succes s of professionalization movement s in this phase therefore illuminate s the organic relationship of professionalism—as a n affirmation o f expertise—wit h th e tw o centra l structure s o f the ne w socia l order : namely, th e larg e busines s corporation an d th e state . In th e ligh t of the ne w ideology , the stat e acquires connotation s o f "objectivity " which are implici t in the appeal t o science as an instrument of legitimation. The three main principles of progressive politica l reform, "non-partisanship, th e strong execu tive, an d th e separatio n o f politics from th e administration" al l converge towar d the notio n o f a transpolitica l an d ultimatel y technocratic state . Non-partisan , th e state is severed from th e visible class dimensions o f political strif e and debate. This "strong executive " administers , i n fact, a socia l realit y i n whic h al l interests ca n be reconcile d b y the magi c o f science applied t o th e limitles s expansion o f output. This emergent conceptio n of the state foretells, thus, th e not-so-unrealistic Utopi a of depoliticized conformit y i n a mass consumption society . This "transpolitical, " "efficient, " an d "strong " apparatu s fo r administerin g the societ y o f consensus i s th e logica l suppor t fo r exper t adviser s an d administra tors: "Th e scientifi c expert, " write s Haber , "becam e th e prototyp e o f al l administrators. . . . The expert's authority derived from hi s science, and the range of that authority ofte n remaine d somewha t indefinite . Fo r mos t progressives , th e exper t was t o be neither on top nor on tap. H e would d o less than command bu t more tha n advise. H e woul d surel y coun t fo r something." The emergenc e o f the moder n universit y completes th e institutiona l framework within whic h expert s can becom e organically tied to the reforme d apparatu s of the state. The "Wisconsi n idea" o f the universit y hopefully proposes a symbiotic relationship between th e new national institutions of higher learning and the transpolitical state. I n thi s conception , th e professiona l exper t ca n achieve—a t leas t ideolog ically—emancipation fro m "predator y wealth " an d thu s asser t hi s altruisti c au tonomy. Th e connotation s o f classlessnes s attache d b y th e ideolog y o f scientifi c management t o expert s i n privat e organization s ar e reinforce d b y th e conceptio n of a "neutral " stat e and b y th e ris e o f the nationa l university. With it s emphasis on running the stat e a s a n industria l corporation, the ideolog y of efficienc y resolve s th e particularl y America n conflic t betwee n th e ideolog y of egalitarian democracy an d the claims of expertise. Concretely , th e notion of a transpolitical state run by "classless" experts reconciled the class interests o f at least part of th e Progressiv e leadershi p wit h th e movement' s clamo r fo r democrati c revival : "Efficiency provide d a standpoint fro m whic h progressive s wh o had declare d thei r allegiance t o democracy coul d resist the leveling tendencies of the principle of equality. The y coul d advanc e refor m an d a t th e sam e tim e provid e a safeguar d t o th e 'college-bred.' " Progressivism combine d th e directiv e powe r o f privatel y manage d corporation s with a n appearanc e of neutral regulation . Regulator y legislatio n contributed i n th e long ru n to the legitimac y of the larg e busines s corporation: apparently unde r con trol, i t could be regarde d a s one mor e responsibl e membe r o f the industria l community. Responsibl e membershi p i s implicitl y define d a s involvin g acceptanc e of two cardinal principles of the social order: th e privat e appropriation of social surplu s an d 40

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the private direction of social production. But the appeal to science and t o 'classless'' expertise appea r to subordinate th e ne w socia l syste m t o objective an d transcendent laws. No t surprisingly, the movement s tha t shape d the emergen t orde r coul d enlist the suppor t an d participatio n of cosmopolitan urba n professionals : i n a sense, these movements incorporate d th e characteristic fusio n which professional ideolog y seeks to effect betwee n th e goa l of monopolistic market contro l and antimarke t theme s of public servic e an d socia l usefulness . In sum , th e emergenc e o f a nationa l rulin g clas s an d o f a ne w syste m o f social stratification i n the perio d of transition toward monopol y capitalism i s structurally supported b y large organizations: i n the privat e as wel l a s i n the public sector, orga nizations administere d i n the bureaucrati c mod e ar e th e ne w foundation s o f powe r and property , a s wel l a s th e generator s o f "ne w middle-class " occupation s an d careers. Thei r siz e an d thei r mod e o f administratio n appear to insulat e thes e larg e organizations fro m th e direct influence of class interests. Guided—a t leas t ideally— by principles of functional rationality and applied science, these apparently classless organizations transmut e powe r into authority by invoking the legitimacy of expertise . Thus, th e reorganizatio n o f America n societ y afte r th e Civi l Wa r no t onl y established a new syste m o f social stratificatio n but also , logically , create d a new se t of ideological legitimation s for inequality. The corporation, the state, and the moder n university—al l three organized o n the bureaucratic model—ar e th e centra l status-givin g institution s whic h th e Unite d States lacked i n the ag e o f laissez faire. A national educational syste m and , i n particular, the national institutions of higher education, functio n in the new order a s the central reproducer s an d legitimator s of the clas s structure . Appeal s t o scienc e an d to limitless growth merge a s a mainstay o f the new dominant ideology . Mediated by organizations, th e class structure o f monopoly capitalism is ultimately legitimized a s a functiona l emanatio n o f the socia l divisio n o f labor and , therefore , a s th e mirro r of differentia l abilities and motivations. The monopoly , state , an d academi c sector s (th e academi c secto r bein g bot h th e producer an d th e employe r o f credentialed experts ) defin e th e organizationa l con texts withi n whic h profession s fin d ne w instrument s fo r self-organizatio n an d self assertion. Large-scal e bureaucrati c organization s transform , therefore , th e socia l matrix o f professionalization : the y provid e th e climat e o f ideologica l legitimatio n for bot h ol d an d ne w professions ; the y als o provid e models , sponsorship , equip ment, an d resources . Fa r fro m bein g i n conflict wit h th e mode l o f profession, th e "bureaucratic phenomenon " create s the structura l context of successful profession alization. Outsid e o f the centra l bureaucrati c apparatu s of the ne w socia l orde r lie s professional marginality , in both th e collectiv e and th e individua l sense. 4

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GENERALIZATION O F TH E PROFESSIONAL PROJECT; TH E STRUCTURAL BACKGROUN D After th e Civi l War , th e westwar d move , th e massiv e rate s o f immigratio n and urbanization, together wit h economi c growt h and the long-ter m increase of agricultural and industria l productivity, brough t about th e gradual restructurin g of the labo r

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force. Th e principal changes are well-known : the first , th e most significant , was th e decline o f agricultural employment. Agricultur e remaine d th e predominan t fiel d o f employment unti l 1910 , althoug h i t attracted a smaller an d smalle r proportion of all workers. Fro m 53 percen t o f the whol e in 1870 , gainfu l worker s i n agriculture de clined to 31 percent i n 1910 and 27 percent i n 1920; in this last year, employment in manufacturing an d mechanica l industrie s reache d 30. 3 percen t o f th e labo r forc e and began , i n turn, it s proportiona l decline. Th e secon d majo r tren d is , therefore , the gradua l decrease of workers engaged in the production of physical goods and the growing movemen t towar d distribution—transportation , trade , an d communica tions—as well a s towar d services of all kinds, after 1870. Th e thir d mos t obviou s change is the rise of the public sector, which overlaps i n part the enormous increase s in th e clerica l and professiona l occupations. In the rise of the cities, in the emergence of national labor markets an d in the growing tendenc y towar d concentrate d employmen t i n th e larg e industria l corporation and i n th e stat e sector , i t i s possibl e t o discer n th e structura l base s o f a nationa l class system. Everyda y reality , however, wa s different . Rober t Wieb e remarks tha t even i n the 1880 s and 1890s , 45

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The concept o f a middle clas s crumbled at the touch. Smal l business appeare d and disappeared a t a frightening rate . Th e so-calle d profession s mean t littl e a s lon g a s any one wit h a bag of pill s and bottle of syru p could pas s fo r a doctor, a few book s and a corrupt judge mad e a man a lawyer, and an unemployed literat e qualified a s a teacher. Nor did the growing numbe r of clerks, salesmen, an d secretaries of the city share much more tha n a common sens e of drift as they fell int o jobs tha t attached the m to nothin g in particular , beyond a salary, a set o f clea n clothes , an d a hope tha t someho w they would ris e i n the world. 47

In th e rapidl y growing urban centers , th e massiv e presence of foreign-born white s exaggerated th e estrangemen t fro m th e cit y o f a native populatio n which, i n 1890 , was stil l predominantl y rura l an d concentrate d i n smal l towns. Americanizatio n and the melting pot seemed hardly credible ideologies. The industrial proletariat was profoundly divide d by th e diversit y of its origins and wor k situations . Th e relativ e concentration o f foreign-born workers and , t o a lesser extent, thei r children, in certain occupations an d industries aggravate d th e fragmentatio n o f the class. Unionization wa s minimal. A t the leve l of the community , ethnic an d cultura l issues wer e much mor e vita l tha n th e nationa l question s addresse d b y th e platform s an d ideol ogies o f the majo r politica l parties. A class system ha d to come ou t of these bits and pieces. At least some sections of the industria l proletariat had show n thei r capacity fo r cohesive actio n in the intens e class struggles tha t followe d th e grea t railroa d strike of 1877 . Durin g the 1880 s and 1890s, th e "threa t fro m below " appear s to have brought som e reactive unit y to th e divided middl e strata ; i t blurred, a t leas t temporarily , the bitte r division s betwee n old an d ne w wealth : both t o "gentlemanl y reformers " an d t o urba n middl e strata, the arroganc e of the plutocrac y seeme d decidedly preferabl e t o the ris e o f the "un civilized" masses . But in the early twentieth century th e memories o f Populism an d of urba n an d industrial class struggle wer e attenuated , whil e the fea r o f Bolshevism had no t yet taken hold : a change in attitude towar d the workin g class and the urba n poor wa s possible . 48

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From th e 1880 s on , th e socia l justice movement—i n which women' s organiza tions an d settlemen t workers , besides the organized church, played an increasingly prominent role—had been outlinin g a new role for the educated urba n strata . Fro m the settlements , i n particular , cam e a mor e radica l approac h t o urba n problem s than the moral solutions of the Social Gospelers an d other Protestant humanitarians . Focusing on the environmenta l roots o f poverty and personal degradation , th e ne w secular bran d of urban reformers activel y organized campaigns fo r protective labor legislation an d minimu m livin g standards . The y were stil l inspired , however, b y a Christian ideal of universal brotherhood and individual uplift . Althoug h sympatheti c to the broader demands of the labor movement, they refused t o recognize the necessity o f class conflic t o r to accep t th e realit y o f class struggle. A refor m movemen t which appeared t o confront the power of the new ruling class without denouncin g th e clas s system—a movemen t which , furthermore , implicitl y gave a badge of moral superiorit y to middle class reformers wit h regar d t o both th e "plutocracy" an d th e lowe r classes—could indee d attrac t a wid e arra y o f social forces. A t the loca l level , progressivis m appear s t o hav e bee n a t leas t a s muc h a movement of new aggressive busines s elites, represented b y local chambers o f commerce, a s a n expressio n o f the bitternes s o f bypassed notable s an d old-fashione d entrepreneurs. Th e constant ris e in the cost of living was a possible unifyin g facto r among otherwise disparate groups . Inflatio n affected , beside s the workin g masses, "middle class and professional families . . . fo r their incomes were least responsiv e to genera l pric e changes." Another importan t factor i s th e ver y diversit y and ambiguit y of the progressiv e ideology: i t projected, a t on e level , a quasi-Populis t imag e bu t asserte d mor e an d more clearly as time went by the superiority of the competent and the role of the expert in efficient , "scientific " reform . In fact , th e centra l theme s o f progressivism—"mora l uplift " fo r th e masses , based on the forma l expansio n o f political participatio n an d on economic growth — are typica l o f a n optimisti c ideology , seekin g th e conciliatio n o f irreconcilable interests. I n a phase of transition, reformers wh o stressed individual effort an d indi vidual mobilit y coul d genuinely see mor e social fluidity an d openness than the class system actuall y permitted. Espousing the promise of economic growt h an d efficien t management, significan t fractions o f the intermediat e clas s coul d promote , i n the service o f reform, th e interest s o f the ne w industria l and financia l magnates . Fo r many reformers , th e collusio n ma y hav e bee n unwittin g an d thei r hopes of democratic refor m sincere . A s a hypothesis, I would argu e tha t "ne w middle-class " re formers occupied , a t best , ancillar y positions wit h regar d t o th e ne w rulin g class . Yet thei r ideological convergenc e aroun d the goal s o f rationalization an d economi c expansion wa s structurall y based: there i s evidence t o suggest that the mos t signifi cant fractio n o f the intermediat e class—composed o f professionals an d manageria l specialists wit h a "cosmopolitan " and nationa l outlook—was rising an d assertin g itself i n intimate connection wit h th e centra l institution s of the ne w socia l order . First among these was the bureaucratic apparatus of the state, including the system of publi c education. Th e public sector wa s important not only a s the fastest grow ing employe r an d a s a privilege d aren a o f action for the ne w "experts " i n public affairs; publi c service an d politic s wer e als o vehicles fo r the sens e of identity an d 52

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unity o f the cosmpolita n sector s o f the intermediat e class . Th e emergen t ideolog y assigned to the 'transpolitical'' stat e a central role of arbitration and social cohesion. The passage to corporate capitalis m structurally required an expansion o f the public sector. Consisten t wit h thes e trends, th e professiona l reformer s addresse d their de mands for recognition and support to the state, as did the social reformers (wh o came frequently fro m th e former group) in the fields of labor legislation, consumer protec tion, publi c health, schoo l reform , an d slu m clearance. A s th e refor m activist s increased their leverage, thei r own self-assertion a s experts tended t o merge wit h their promotional efforts o n behalf of the organizations wher e they worked. In electoral as wel l a s in social and professional reforms , th e "expert " leader s defined th e for m that institutions , policies, or services were t o take, reservin g fo r themselves, a t least in principle , the rol e a t th e helm . In the dominant centers of the economy—the larg e business corporations—"ne w middle-class" occupation s wer e mor e clearl y subordinat e t o a heteronomous hier archy than i n the publi c sector. Yet , there too, ne w specialization s o r new articulations o f the bureaucrati c mod e o f organization spawne d ne w claim s to expertise. Bureaucratization define d th e typica l patter n o f middle-clas s caree r an d a typica l source of middle-class authority . For man y professions , th e corporatio n directly or indirectly provide d a new contex t o f organizational an d ideologica l resources. Th e new approach to professionalization is typically illustrated by engineering, the larges t of th e ne w exper t occupation s calle d fort h b y large-scal e industrialization. Edwin Layto n observe s tha t engineers , "lik e th e progressive s . . . sa w them selves a s a middl e grou p betwee n capita l an d labor." Thi s perceptio n le d them , on the on e hand , t o seek governmental recognitio n for their profession. A t the Conservation Congres s of 1908 , th e leader s of the fou r majo r engineerin g association s successfully propose d a series of resolutions, callin g for the creation of a departmen t of publi c works and " o f a cabinet pos t fo r an engineer, thu s according to the profes sion nationa l recognition." Engineer s obviousl y welcomed th e rol e tha t th e pre dominant tendency withi n progressivis m assigne d to the expert: "Sinc e engineerin g was th e profession tha t applie d scientific laws to practical problems, scientifi c solutions t o socia l problem s mean t puttin g engineers i n positions o f leadership." But, o n the other hand, engineer s rejected th e fait h i n democracy an d the mistrust of the corporation that was voiced, at least rhetorically, by national progressivism. As corporation employees, th e engineers could not oppose big business without renounc ing the very base of power and socia l mobility o f their profession: "wher e progres sives favored regulatio n by government , engineer s looke d fo r reform coming fro m within th e busines s community and throug h th e agenc y o f the engineer." What Layto n calls th e engineers ' "obsessiv e concern fo r socia l status " fit s wit h the imag e o f an upwardly mobile group, largel y drawn from a declining social category—small commercia l o r far m entrepreneurs—tha t wa s dependen t o n th e larg e business corporation for its own advance. B y the end of World War I , thi s concer n with statu s had fused wit h th e conceptio n o f independent professionalis m advocate d at firs t b y onl y a smal l elite. I t had been , however , a contradictory conception : a t the sam e time that engineering leader s attempted t o exclude businessme n from thei r societies b y raising the membership requirements , the y continued to glorify th e typi 4

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cal mobilit y pat h tha t le d the corporat e enginee r from technica l t o managerial posi tions. Efficient managemen t meant, moreover, tha t business would be run accordin g to physica l laws—embodie d i n technology—and t o th e "laws " o f economics an d social evolution—embodie d i n the corporation . Professionalis m coul d thus be rec onciled wit h busines s loyalty and wit h th e publi c defense o f corporate industry . Not surprisingly , there was practicall y no oppositio n to this brand o f profession alism unti l th e 1920s . A t this time , me n suc h a s Morri s Cooke an d hi s successors, moving away fro m elitis t status concerns, sought t o channel th e economic disconten t of averag e engineers int o a direc t relatio n wit h th e stat e an d int o a broade r tech nocratic conceptio n o f th e engineer' s socia l role . Engineerin g thu s illustrate s th e alternative source s of support sough t b y a subordinate occupatio n i n its professional ization efforts . I n the contex t o f the industria l corporation, professionalis m wa s i n large par t a reactio n t o bureaucrati c subordination ; i t nevertheless borrowe d fro m the corporatio n a legitimizing ideolog y (scientifically based efficiency) and a model of individua l advancemen t (promotio n throug h th e bureaucrati c hierarchy) . Th e public secto r appeared, thus , a s a n independen t o r countervailin g sourc e o f powe r and publi c recognition. Another such sourc e was th e moder n university . The educational system wa s the third institutional area of major importance fo r the rising sectors of th e intermediat e class . Th e direc t relevanc e of the nationa l universit y to the success of professionalization justifies a brief accoun t o f its emergence on the American scene. The decad e of the 1880 s marke d a turnin g point i n American highe r education . Despite th e hig h rate o f populatio n growth , enrollments ha d remaine d stati c sinc e the Age of Jackson. Fro m 188 5 on, attendance picked up steadily a t the major col leges an d universities . B y th e earl y 1890s , Edwar d Ross , returnin g fro m Berlin , could marvel at the "boo m i n educational lines" : in the ten years from 188 5 to 1895 , the studen t bodie s ha d grow n by 2 0 percen t a t th e privat e Easter n college s an d b y 32 percent i n the stat e universities. Industria l and financia l leaders may stil l have believed, lik e Andre w Carnegie, tha t bookis h knowledge wa s "fata l t o success" in business an d tha t th e "schoo l o f experience" wa s th e bes t fo r America n youth. Yet, like Carnegie himself , they were insuring a steady flow o f money fo r the institutions of higher learning or founding new private universities, like John D. Rockefelle r at Chicago o r Leland Stanfor d i n California. Following o n the promis e o f the 186 2 Morrill Act , legislative funding was becomin g a reality in the 1890s . Th e university had attaine d a n unquestione d positio n amon g America n institutions. Lawrence Veyse y suggest s that on e majo r underlyin g reason for this change wa s the concer n o f self-made me n for the socia l status of their children. Fo r the new an d affluent Americ a of the Midwes t and th e West , th e colleg e degre e was acquirin g a new meaning : no t only because it was a distinction that coul d be achieve d wit h rel ative ease, in imitation o f the traditiona l Eastern elites; bu t also , mor e importantly, because i t establishe d socia l distanc e betwee n a n olde r an d largel y Anglo-Saxo n immigration an d th e mas s of newly arrived Central an d Souther n Europeans. Th e function tha t middle-clas s aspiration s increasingl y assigne d t o th e universit y ha d a powerful effect o n its structure an d later evolution. The emergent model of the American university , however , ha d bee n i n gestatio n sinc e th e 1860s . 64

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A firs t ac t in this process was the demise of the small sectarian college , whic h had proliferated i n the Jacksonian perio d as the typical "unfree " uni t in a "free market " of education . B y 1860 , say s Hofstadter , financia l insolvenc y wa s eliminatin g the more margina l of these institutions, while interna l disorder wa s bein g resolved b y a more secular turn and a more autonomou s rol e of the faculties. I n both establishe d Eastern college s an d outlyin g denominationa l schools , th e proportiona l decline i n the number of students preparing for the ministry reflected the advance of seculariza t i o n . Th e Jacksonia n emphasi s o n "practicality " and, afte r 1840 , th e sprea d of didactic scientifi c instructio n prefigured i n a primitiv e wa y th e educationa l model s that wer e t o compet e afte r th e Civi l War . The early conception of the college had relied on religion and, almost secondarily , on the classics, t o emphasize strict "mental discipline." It s lingering effects ma y b e traced i n th e rhetorica l piet y an d conservativ e Christianit y surprisingl y voiced b y presidents an d demande d o f faculties a t ne w institution s like John s Hopkins or th e University o f Chicago. Greatl y transformed , th e classica l emphasi s ma y hav e sub sisted i n the idea l of well-rounded cultivation of mind that came to be chiefly associ ated, i n our century, wit h th e privat e liberal arts college an d wit h th e Iv y League. Yet, a s a n institutiona l model, "menta l discipline " was o n it s wa y ou t b y 1865 . In the decade that followed, th e major trend of reform wa s undoubtedly utilitarian , in th e sense of a voluntary adaptation b y academic sectors to what they perceive d t o be the demands o f' 'real life' ' i n an industrial and democratic society. Wha t is generally see n as th e typica l America n contribution to the moder n universit y model derives from thi s tradition. If, as Veyse y believes, unpopularit y and public indifference explain th e freedo m o f institutional experimentatio n enjoye d b y the universit y unti l the 1890s , then w e shoul d conside r th e utilitaria n mode l o f reform a s a deliberat e effort t o integrate th e college into the mainstream o f American life. No t surprisingly, the model found its chief advocate s among th e ne w facult y in the applie d and socia l sciences an d amon g administrators—especiall y th e stron g president s who , i n th e manner o f captains o f industry, wer e fashionin g th e institution s of the future. The utilitaria n desir e fo r a n "adaptatio n t o reality " was concretel y expresse d in a number o f "democratic" belief s an d programmatic changes . First of all, a broadened notio n o f "calling " contribute d t o dignif y a grea t numbe r o f technica l an d specialized pursuits , whic h wer e hencefort h abl e t o clai m a place i n the America n university, while the European institution s almost uniforml y relegate d the m to vocational schools . Th e Morril l Acts—establishin g lan d grant s fo r college s tha t woul d provide agricultura l an d mechanica l instruction—deliberatel y promote d th e voca tional orientatio n of the university . This typica l emphasi s explains i n part th e wid e diffusion o f professionalization a s a model for the collectiv e improvement of social status. It also merges with th e centra l role that th e America n university would com e to pla y a s a n agenc y o f individua l socia l mobility , democraticall y dispensin g it s badges of status superiorit y t o broa d segment s of the public. The openness to multiple vocations i s intimately linked, on the one hand, wit h th e democratic belie f i n th e equality of all field s of learning—a belie f whic h guided th e founding o f Cornell in 1868 , an d directly inspired the elective curriculum. O n the other hand , vocationa l openness merges with th e hope for a "classless" institution : 68

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a university , that is , i n which all students should b e treate d equally , and , goin g on e step further, on e tha t shoul d admi t all students regardless of sex, race , religion, an d even previou s educationa l attainments . A s President Andrew Drape r o f Illinois de clared i n 1907 : "Th e universitie s tha t woul d thrive must pu t awa y al l exclusiveness and dedicate themselves to universal public service. The y must not try to keep people out; the y mus t hel p al l who ar e worth y to ge t i n . " "Universal publi c service" meant , therefore, socia l an d intellectua l openness. In a developin g countr y i t also mean t tha t th e universit y wa s a logica l center fo r th e diffusion t o the outsid e o f all kind s of knowledge. I n the 1890s , thi s last conceptio n crystallized i n th e typicall y Midwestern movemen t o f universit y extension . Wit h the comin g o f progressivism , however , publi c servic e becam e a divisiv e issue , pitting a smal l minorit y of radica l socia l scientist s agains t equall y utilitaria n bu t more conservativ e presidents . Whil e me n lik e Richar d Ely , Edwar d Bemis , an d Edward Ros s raised th e issu e of academic freedo m i n political an d socia l term s a t Wisconsin, Chicago , an d Stanford , th e colleg e president s tended t o lin e up behin d the progressiv e ideolog y of efficiency an d expertise. Fe w went as fa r in presentin g the universit y a s a n apparatu s o f the stat e a s Presiden t Charle s K . Adam s o f Wis consin, wh o declare d i n 1896 : "Th e universit y i s no t a part y separat e fro m th e State. . . . It s relations t o the Stat e are fa r mor e intimat e and organi c than thos e of a child to a parent; for a child has a n individuality and rights apart from th e wil l of the parent, while the Universit y has n o individualit y an d no rights apart from th e wil l of the State." Yet , th e fadin g o f th e utilit y idea l int o th e genera l ideolog y o f effi ciency—strongly influence d b y scientifi c managemen t afte r 1910—accelerate d the integratio n o f the universit y wit h th e centra l structure s o f corporate capitalism . The institutionalizatio n of an alternativ e model—tha t whic h advocated th e primac y of pur e research—contribute d t o thi s institutiona l assimilation. 7 4

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The conceptio n o f th e universit y a s a researc h institutio n was a n adaptatio n t o the America n scen e of wha t a larg e numbe r o f America n scholars , scientists , an d educators chos e t o se e an d admir e i n the Germa n university. Th e Germa n influ ence was les s a direct impor t than somethin g mediate d an d radiated , afte r 1876 , b y Johns Hopkins , th e firs t America n graduat e school . Th e Hopkins—an d it s eve n "purer" imitation , Clar k University—faile d to maintai n themselve s a s pur e grad uate and research institutions; the main difficulty wa s financial , combined, a t Clark, with oppositio n fro m th e sponsors . Th e Hopkin s ha d los t it s leadin g rol e b y th e 1890s: th e graduat e school s a t Harvard , Columbia , Chicago , an d late r Wisconsi n were promoting a different an d more viable version of what the Hopkins had started . Every universit y of some significanc e wa s beginnin g it s own graduate program, i n imitation o f the leadin g nationa l institutions . Ye t th e influenc e o f the Hopkin s ha d been enormous: smal l groups of its graduate s had spread the spirit of scientific inquiry at othe r institutions , pressin g "fro m below " fo r th e advancemen t o f th e researc h function. Throug h th e influenc e o f the Flexne r repor t o f 1910 , th e John s Hopkin s medical schoo l ha d becom e the unquestionabl e mode l o f medical education . Fro m the Hopkins had come the concept o f the Ph.D. a s a research degree and the decisiv e impulse fo r th e emergenc e o f a full-tim e an d relativel y well-pai d academi c pro fession. B y 1893, says Veysey, " i t could be said that some amount of graduate work 77

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was require d to win a permanent appointmen t a t nearly every prominent institution. At th e tur n o f the century , th e Ph.D . degre e wa s usuall y mandatory." In a sense , i t was contradictor y that th e making s o f an academi c caree r patter n should ow e s o muc h to the promotiona l efforts o f "pure" researcher s on behalf of research. Most of these men, indeed, shunned th e utilitarians' concer n with practical professions an d vocational pursuits; most of them were only diml y awar e o f the fac t that thei r conception o f the university , to sa y nothin g of their own livelihood , de pended o n th e professionalizatio n o f teaching . Th e researc h functio n wa s institu tionalized, however , b y administrator s wh o coul d not be , an d almos t neve r were , advocates of "pure" research . I n their hands, evidence o f original research became an important condition for hiring and promoting faculty, as well as a result that could be show n to legislators, o r an enticement fo r powerful busines s donors, themselve s increasingly interested i n the application of science not only to industry but to a wide range of human problems. Fro m the phase of competing ideals emerged a n eclectic institutional mode l i n whic h tw o conception s o f researc h coexisted , separate d b y a blurre d and imprecis e boundary : th e graduat e schoo l produced scholarl y an d scientific researc h as well as academic professional s fo r institutions of the same type or colleges of lower rank. Despite temptations to become mor e scholarly and academic , "the department s o f commerce, th e school s o f engineering, the school s o f business administration, tende d t o perfec t th e skill s require d b y th e industria l and busines s community. I n this secon d view , researc h wa s a public service tha t originate d in a client's nee d an d ende d i n a client's satisfaction." 78

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The reconciliatio n of different ideal s wa s facilitate d by a feature whic h th e Ger man model, as understood i n America, shared wit h the utilitaria n emphasis on vocational training : thi s wa s thei r common insistenc e o n specialization , whic h "scien tific Americans , unlik e mos t scientifi c Germans , identifie d . . . wit h th e entir e purpose o f the university." From the 1890 s on, the fact that the national university had become a n integral part of the new social order manifested itsel f i n the tendency towar d increasing standard ization of its basic features. Undoubtedly , regional and institutional differences per sisted, fusing with differences i n social environment, class image, and preferred educational orientation. Around 1910 , the differences betwee n th e Ivy League an d the Big Ten or, mor e broadly, between privat e and public universities, had crystallized. Yet, fo r all the differences , institutiona l competitio n for place i n the nationa l hierarchy o f highe r educatio n spurre d imitatio n an d increase d uniformity . Reputatio n was concretely expressed in size: size of the student bodies, siz e and "completeness " of th e faculty , size of the installations , size o f the endowments. A s Walter Metzger has pu t it , " i n a vast societ y strew n acros s a vast continent, " Bi g Education wa s bound t o ris e alongsid e Bi g Business, Bi g Government and , later , Bi g Labor. The increase in size promoted the alignment of the university with the bureaucrati c managerial mode l taken chiefl y fro m th e industria l corporation. In the period 1880 1910, busines s leader s became almos t everywher e th e predominan t grou p o n uni versity board s of trustees. Mor e directly important, the foundation s tha t emerge d in the first year s of the twentieth century—in particular the Rockefeller Institute and the Carnegi e Foundatio n fo r th e Advancemen t o f Teaching—playe d pivota l role s 81

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in th e modernizatio n of higher educatio n an d professiona l trainin g along line s tha t replicated concentration and centralization in the economy. Critic s such as Thornstein Veblen or John Jay Chapman bitterl y denounced th e subordination of higher learning to big business: The men who stand for education and scholarship have the ideals of business men," declare d Chapma n i n 1909 . "Th e me n wh o control Harvard today are ver y littl e els e tha n busines s men, runnin g a large departmen t stor e whic h dis penses education t o the millions . Thei r endeavor i s to make i t the largest establish ment o f the kin d i n A m e r i c a . " Chapman exaggerated . Bureaucratizatio n wa s largel y an inevitabl e consequence of th e increas e in size, bu t it was als o fostered b y the desire fo r security of the aver age facult y member, wh o could not avail himsel f o f the competitive advantages the academic marketplac e wa s bringin g to a minority o f his colleagues. O n the othe r hand, th e universit y appeared t o offe r t o a rapidl y growing number o f teachers a refuge, an d a n alternativ e t o the busines s world . Increas e i n numbers mean t a n increase i n autonom y an d independence , an d busines s pressure s fo r conformit y responded i n part t o th e ne w measur e o f power acquire d b y faculties. Th e notion that the university was 'different" persisted, despit e th e relative convergence o f the institutional mode l wit h th e corporatio n and th e stat e apparatus. This i s not the plac e t o assess what this convergence di d to intellectual life, ho w much stifling o f originality, repression o f creative deviance, an d sheer academic dull ness resulted fro m standardization . A s Veyse y remarks , "th e basi c patter n o f th e university, as it clearly revealed itsel f soon after 1890 , was that of a success-oriente d enterprise whos e les s popula r possibilitie s were deliberatel y blurre d i n the word s and action s o f its leading spokesmen . A s more American s began t o accept the ne w institution, occasion s fo r a measured appraisa l o f the mov e towards standardizatio n grew fewe r an d fewer." Wha t matters her e is the effect tha t the emergence of the national universit y ha d o n th e 'cosmopolitan" sector s o f th e intermediat e clas s and o n th e movemen t o f professionalization. To the elites of the new middle class, the university provided a common socialization, whic h preceded , i n fact , thei r ris e an d assertio n i n the ne w socia l order . A s Wiebe remarks, "sinc e th e emergence of the modern graduate schoo l in the seventies , the best universities had been serving as outposts o f professional self-consciousness , frankly preparin g young men for professions tha t as yet did not e x i s t . " Th e model of universit y that emerged i n the nineties wa s characterized, amon g other things, by its openness to new fields of learning and to "professional trainin g . . . i n fields that had a genuin e bu t stil l onl y potentia l and undevelope d scientifi c or scholarl y content." Th e early institutionalization of research careers merged, i n America, with the pragmati c an d utilitaria n orientation s impose d upo n eve n th e mos t traditional universities b y outsid e financing ; both factors helpe d th e rapi d development o f applied science s or "quasi-disciplines." Th e American university acquired, therefore , centralized an d quasi-monopolisti c powe r t o sanctio n man y differen t specialtie s a s legitimate form s o f knowledge an d expertise . More concretely, the link s that professions, ol d and new, coul d establish wit h th e university i n tim e gav e al l o f the m a n academi c wing . Teacher s i n professiona l schools, relativel y insulate d fro m th e pressure s o f th e clien t o r th e marketplace , 44

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could promote a "purer" bran d of professionalism tha n their practicing colleagues , while workin g a t the sam e time to develop th e cognitiv e and technical basis of their disciplines. I t was i n the academi c sectors of medicine and , i n particular, th e law , that no t only professionalism bu t als o progressivism foun d their leading advocates. Since academic s normall y publis h mor e tha n practitioners , th e academics ' view s also tended t o color the literature of reform and the literatur e of professionalization, projecting a misleading image o f the mood and orientations of the professional rank and-file. But , despite this discrepancy, th e vocational openness of the American university reinforce d th e tendenc y towar d professionalization . First , thi s wa s tru e be cause aspirin g occupation s o r les s "genteel " profession s coul d realisticall y strive for universit y affiliation an d hop e to emulate th e successfu l path followe d b y medicine an d the law . Second , i t was tru e because "academicization " rapidl y increase d the influenc e o f university graduates in a field; and , simultaneously , becaus e it gave academic professional s a n increasin g influenc e ove r growin g numbers o f profes sional aspirants. At th e beginning of the twentieth century, onl y a minority o f the professional an d managerial middl e class had passe d through the university ; but i t was a particularly active, cohesive, an d significant minority. Concerne d wit h the present, while asserting thei r confidenc e i n a futur e o f whic h the y ha d n o tota l image , thes e me n an d women forme d i n the citie s nuclei of "cosmopolitanism"—an d fro m thes e spran g the cadres of modernization. Journalist s an d editors of newspapers and periodical s played a n important role in spreading an d unifyin g thei r views. Taking advantage of a system o f communications whic h no w physically integrated th e country , these modern representative s o f th e intermediat e clas s sough t link s i n othe r citie s an d regions wit h peers of like mind . Indeed , thei r support fo r progressive refor m carried on, a t different levels of the society , th e ordering function that state and corporation were performin g a t th e center : th e reformers ' sectiona l organizing , a s wel l a s th e modernization o f local institutions which the y undertook , wer e powerfu l forces o f national integration , for they sprea d the centra l ideologica l themes of the ne w cor porate orde r an d establishe d organizationa l relay s betwee n th e loca l an d nationa l levels. In th e Progressiv e Era , sector s o f th e intermediat e clas s whos e self-definitio n and self-estee m wer e increasingl y base d o n occupation , an d increasingl y oriente d toward national frames o f reference, acquire d something akin to class consciousness. Professionalism wa s on e expressio n o f this consciousness. The strategies of professionalization ha d been clear fo r a long time. National professional associations , an d often training schools, ha d been in existence i n dentistry, pharmacy, schoolteaching , an d architecture sinc e th e 1840 s an d 1850s—tha t is , before th e reviva l o f organizatio n effort s i n th e olde r profession s towar d th e las t decades of the century . Wha t i s interestin g i s the generalizatio n o f these strategies in th e 1880 s and 1890s , an d thei r us e b y specialize d occupation s whic h i n no wa y shared th e marke t situatio n of the ol d "free " professions . I hav e argue d tha t th e activ e an d "cosmopolitan " sector s o f th e "ne w middl e class" foun d bot h structura l an d ideologica l unity i n national institutions . Higher education, politics , publi c service , an d concentrate d employmen t i n th e busines s 91

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corporation an d i n the stat e heightened th e visibilit y o f these groups. I t is unlikel y that urban professionals—either i n established profession s o r in the emerging organizational specialties—woul d have taken th e wealt h of the Morgans , Vanderbilts , or Rockefeller s a s thei r parameter; but , instead , the y compare d themselve s t o each other. Incom e remaine d th e on e trul y nationa l an d unifyin g criterio n o f status; ye t in th e ne w contex t o f professionalism, incom e increasingl y cam e t o stan d fo r th e public recognition granted t o special badges of competence—namely, th e diploma s and license s tha t universitie s an d examinatio n boards wer e dispensin g t o th e mos t established professions . Professions concerne d wit h the administration of the business corporations—suc h as engineers , accountants , marke t analysts , an d th e like—emerge d i n subordinat e markets, subsume d d e jure o r de fact o unde r bureaucrati c an d hierarchica l organizations. Th e ideology o f independent practice , "fee-for-service " consultation , an d professional autonom y (a s a substitute fo r the forme r two) playe d an important role in th e professionalization of these occupations. Ye t market control—in th e sense of an autonomou s monopol y i n the provisio n of expert services—wa s clearl y beyond their reach. Thi s was eve n mor e s o i n "public-service" occupations suc h a s socia l work, schoo l an d colleg e teaching , o r schoo l administration : these occupations d o not exchange service s a t all with their users, but instead fin d themselve s i n situations of preestablishe d monopoly , entirely determined b y the monopolisti c expansion o f the stat e int o new functiona l areas. Market organizatio n and contro l was therefor e a weak dimensio n of these "ne w style" professiona l projects . B y the logi c of my theoretical interpretation, then, the dominant, and almost the unique, meaning of these professional movements was the conquest and assertion of social status. Th e emergenc e o f a n occupation-and education-centered middl e class mean t tha t comparison s tende d t o b e mad e "up wards" rathe r than "downwards " b y less prestigious o r less fortunate occupations : the prizes won by medicine and the law (or by their elites) inspired others. A s Wiebe observes, "th e exceptiona l vitalit y o f th e ne w middl e class derive d i n larg e mea sure from th e very personal benefit s it s membership bestowed." No t all sectors of the intermediat e clas s coul d tak e thes e benefit s fo r granted . Thi s wa s th e turning point, however , a t whic h th e materia l an d mora l benefits include d in professiona l status becam e a "normal " par t o f the professions ' imag e an d o f the expectation s surrounding professiona l careers . Adopting—an d adapting—the strategie s o f professionalization fruitfull y use d b y medicine an d the law, occupations i n structurall y different situations sought th e rewards o f professional status : prestige, a s public recognition o f collective worth ; income , t o be translate d int o respectable middle-clas s styles o f life; and , t o defen d thes e rewards, monopolisti c closure o f access. The quest for professional statu s spread a s a typical concern o f educated middle class occupations , promisin g individua l advancemen t throug h collectiv e efforts . Bureaucratization an d educational mobilit y extende d thi s individualistic promis e t o the middl e class a s a whol e an d eve n beyon d it , to th e workin g class . Progressiv e reform, indeed , ofte n assumed that the foundation for the moral and economic "up l i f t " o f the masses, as well as for the Americanization of the immigrant, la y in some form o f education. Thi s emphasis on education a s a social panacea reflects th e per 94

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sistent strengt h of individualism, state d no w in terms of maximizing individual abil ities—and individua l gains—through collective efforts. At another level , thi s belief ideologically denies th e effect o f class and ethnic barriers, and thus plays a cohesive role for the heterogeneous middle class itself: access to education, or rather the hop e of individua l mobilit y throug h education , appear s a s on e commo n characteristi c shared b y large sectors of the intermediat e class. A t a time when middle strata, old and new, were being clearly divided into "central" and "marginal" sectors by their differential acces s to national centers of power and resources, the y maintained certain common element s o f consciousness . A composit e ideology , combinin g old an d new component s o f bourgeoi s an d pett y bourgeoi s status , ol d an d ne w legitima tions, contributed for a time to conceal the structural fractures withi n the intermediate class. In capitalis t society, th e centra l functio n o f ideology is to concea l th e existenc e of clas s and th e basi c structur e o f exploitation. I n the Unite d States , th e bourgeoi s society par excellence, th e concealment o f class emphasizes individualism an d indi vidual solutions ; it typically take s one secto r o f the intermediat e class a s exempla r and a s propagator. I n the Progressiv e Era , a ne w secto r o r stratu m becam e th e focus o f the ideolog y of classlessness, as a relay to the bypassed farmer s an d small entrepreneurs: no t coincidentally , thi s stratu m foun d it s mai n opportunities of advancement i n apparently classless organizations, in an apparently neutra l State, an d in apparentl y classles s knowledge. The "quantitativ e ethic" typica l o f a capitalist society bot h expresses an d rein forces th e rol e of money a s th e centra l indicato r of success and socia l status . Th e inflationary period that followed the depression of 1893 exacerbated th e concern with money amon g wage-earner s an d status-consciou s middl e strata . Th e lo w leve l of emoluments constituted , thus, a major spu r t o organize, no t only amon g industrial workers or salaried occupations suc h as socia l work an d schoolteaching, but for the "learned professions " a s well . Th e choice of professionalization over unionization as a strategy o f collective mobility , a t least i n this early phase, is of general signifi cance: professionalism, indeed , make s a n importan t contribution t o the ideological denial o f structural inequality . The tactic s o f organization adopted b y would-b e professionals ar e i n man y re spects simila r t o thos e o f th e craf t union . Th e overal l strategy , however , reveal s the professionals ' distinctiv e approach t o socia l stratification . Discussin g th e con temporary difference s betwee n unionizatio n an d professionalization , tw o sociol ogists remark : 95

Instead of engaging i n a power contest betwee n have s and have-nots, th e [professional ] association undertake s t o protec t an d expand th e knowledg e base , enforc e standard s of learning , entry , an d performance , an d engag e i n simila r activitie s designe d t o enhance th e positio n o f th e practitione r whil e simultaneousl y purportin g t o protec t the welfar e o f the publi c in the perso n of th e client . Indeed , professional claim s concerning th e primac y o f th e publi c goo d ove r th e practitioner' s ow n privat e benefi t might be viewed as a critical difference betwee n th e professionalizing an d the unionizing mode s o f mobility , wer e i t no t fo r th e considerabl e evidenc e tha t th e claim s are watered down wit h rhetoric. 96

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The unio n perspectiv e approache s th e determinatio n of th e pric e o f labo r a s a conflict betwee n antagonisti c and opposing class interests; this, indeed, is one of the dimensions o f clas s consciousness . Th e institutionalizatio n o f busines s unionism depoliticizes this conflict approac h an d narrows it down to limited goal s and limite d institutional settings. Th e ideologica l connotations, however , remai n differen t from thos e involved i n the professional project. Appeal s to the publi c interest ca n be used by unions as well as professional associations; busines s unionism can justif y internal stratificatio n b y emphasizing collectiv e identity an d solidarity , a s muc h a s or more than professional organizations . O n the job, however, goal s and strategie s focus exclusivel y on collectiv e benefits, eve n i f the unio n members ma y translat e economic incentive s into purely individualistic terms . Whe n the ideolog y that link s individual wort h t o individua l "merit " expressed i n "badges o f competence" be comes dominant—when th e dominated classes to some extent accept it , consciousl y and unconsciously—collective gains do not bring a sense of personal empowermen t to th e individua l worker . If , in bourgeois ideology , "the consciousnes s o f human worth i s a consciousness of self as individual, standing out from a mass who seem pretty much the same,'' collectiv e victories do not satisfy th e individualisti c compulsion t o prov e oneself "worthy " b y one's ow n means. 97

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As professionalizing occupations mov e to create and affir m collectiv e worth , on e of the incentives for participation, as well as one of the major goals of the movement, is t o secur e the support s fo r individual dignit y an d individual careers . Incom e an d other indicators of status are important not only in themselves bu t also in comparison to the statu s indicators possessed by other socia l groups an d individuals . Likewise , for mos t professionals, th e covete d autonom y over the condition s and the technical content o f work i s also a n elemen t o f qualitative distinction betwee n professiona l work and subordinate o r proletarian occupations. The expertise i n terms of which all this i s claimed is also a basis on whic h t o exact deferenc e an d complianc e i n personal interaction . Individual differentiation , eve n thoug h it must b e attaine d withi n a collectivit y an d b y collectiv e means, i s therefor e a major promis e o f the profes sional project . Moreover, althoug h professionalization may b e see n as " a powe r struggle, o n a societal level," it is a struggle waged within the same class, against rival occupations, rather than across class lines. The struggle on the societal level is largely an ideological battl e fo r recognition , fo r onl y throug h socia l recognitio n ca n persona l superiority b e securel y affirmed . Professionalization , a s a movement fo r status advancement, must appea l t o general values o f the dominan t ideology if it is to mak e its ow n values acceptable ; unions , i n their hours o f glory, asserte d th e mora l and functional superiorit y of the working class in terms that necessarily implie d the rejection of the social hierarchy and basic values of capitalist society. The socialist movement explicitly asserted collective class identity i n terms of the totality of a superior social order; but professions deriv e an ideology of neutrality fro m thei r generalized, "societal" appeal—tha t is , a n ideolog y which implicitl y stresse s the classlessness of professional s and , explicitly , th e servic e o f the publi c as a whole. It ha s bee n show n many times , however , tha t profession s an d professionalizing 100

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occupations addres s the "publi c a s a whole " onl y i n ideology: traditional professions sough t sponsorshi p fro m th e uppe r class , an d emergin g profession s see k i t today fro m particula r groups i n the legislative or executive branches of government. The claim s o f expertise an d altruis m made b y profession s d o no t hav e t o b e sub stantiated fo r an "undifferentiate d mass," bu t for "segmenta l public s . . . suc h a s clients utilizin g service s o r colleague s employe d i n related task s an d fields , [who ] are i n a position to recognize th e skill s o f the professiona l an d gran t th e necessar y autonomy." Needles s to say, thes e publics vary from eac h profession o r segment of profession , an d ar e themselve s stratifie d i n term s o f class , race , gender , an d culture. 101

Chapter 10

PATTERNS OF PROFESSIONA L INCORPORATION INT O THE NEW CLASS SYSTEM

Professionalization generall y implies that status is chosen ove r class as a mode of approaching socia l reality and acting upon it. This choice is one of the principal roots of the professions' overal l conformism with the social order, though by no means the only one. Going from th e general background to specific examples, w e must consider now ho w the "model " profession s o f medicine an d th e la w sough t t o inser t themselves i n the uppe r rung s o f the statu s system . MEDICINE A N D THE COHESIVENESS OF ECONOMI C INTEREST In th e ag e o f laisse z faire , America n medicin e ha d bee n particularl y weak i n organizational resources, by comparison wit h other professions. Incipientl y bureau cratic organization s di d not confe r upo n i t the legitimac y of capitalist property, a s they did for engineering an d the commanding sectors of the law . Nor was medicin e unified b y a n autonomou s bureaucrati c hierarchy , a s wer e certai n branche s o f the clergy. Th e elit e o f physicians—those connecte d wit h urba n hospitals , publi c office, o r the most reputable medica l schools—led th e attempts t o unify th e professio n and rais e it s very lo w standards i n the earl y par t o f the nineteent h century , a s the y did later . Bu t the professional societie s di d not yet have sufficient power to enforc e cognitive unification , whic h wa s indispensabl e i n an extremely competitive market. Thus th e professio n tha t woul d on e da y com e t o symboliz e unparalleled profes sional powe r had , o n th e average , lo w standards, lo w status, lo w income, an d low social credibility a s lat e as the turn of the century. I n 1896 , "On e doctor , writin g in the Pittsburgh Medical Review, lamente d tha t i t was 'humiliatin g t o mak e a comparison of the economic an d socia l positions of our leading physicians an d surgeons . . . wit h leading lawyers and other professional men. ' Whil e the official Journal of the American Medical Association declare d i n 1905 that "th e standin g an d influ ence of the medica l professio n depen d o n th e materia l success and financia l inde-

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pendence of its members," th e average annual income for a general practitioner was in thos e year s between $75 0 an d $1000. Wha t appear s to hav e bee n mor e irkin g than th e absolut e leve l o f income wa s th e relativ e status it afforded t o th e averag e physician. A 190 3 articl e in Cosmopolitan observed , fo r instance, tha t th e incom e " o f man y a medical man wh o has spen t year s i n acquiring a medical education i s often les s than that of an ordinary mechanic." Th e average practitioner also looked toward his most favored colleagues, bitterl y complaining about the unequal distribution o f income and clienteles in the medical profession. Fro m the 1860 s on , the ap pearance o f specialist s an d o f specialt y societie s ha d preoccupie d th e ordinar y physician. Th e A . M . A . ' s cod e o f ethics sternl y discouraged advertisin g by specialists, ye t b y th e 1880 s ther e wa s a recognizabl e grou p o f specialist s i n the large r cities: "Shrewd , practical , and ofte n well-educated , these me n too k up specialtie s because of the easie r work an d th e mor e constan t hours . Suc h specialism , entere d into fro m self-interes t a s muc h as [for ] scientifi c reasons, posed a threat t o genera l practice bot h i n financia l term s an d i n term s o f relativ e socia l an d professiona l standing." 2

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At th e tur n o f the century , competitio n between generalist s an d specialist s i n an overcrowded fiel d centere d aroun d the rising specialty of surgery. The technical and therapeutical progress i n surgery was particularly threatening for a profession whic h had barel y begu n t o incorporat e scientifi c advances i n its averag e dail y practice. In the absence of a formal syste m of referral an d consultation, a purely financial sub stitute was developing : the practic e of splitting fee s between surgeon s and the doc tors who sent them patients spread afte r 1900 , despite officia l condemnation. While the practic e acknowledge d the growin g divisio n o f labor withi n medicine , i t could neither address the general problems of the relation between specialist s an d ordinary doctors no r solve the overridin g an d acute problem of competition fo r patients. Th e rapid developmen t o f hospita l clinic s and , afte r 1900 , o f outpatien t department s affected bot h kinds of doctors and aggravated competition . The number of hospitals in Americ a grew from les s than 200 in 1873 to 4,359, wit h mor e than 421,000 beds in 1909 . The major hospitals had begun to recognize specialtie s sinc e the 1870s ; by 1910, they were adopting a departmental organization. The development of hospitals added to the centrality and importance of the surgeons' role , while giving an increasingly importan t base o f operations t o affiliate d doctor s an d "hous e staff. " Bu t it represented a grave threat for the nonaffiliated: a s hospital standards improved, large numbers o f middle-class patient s bega n fo r the firs t tim e to see k hospital care, at tracted, i n particular, by the availabilit y o f specialty clinics. Outsid e doctors vocif erously argued agains t thi s "abuse" whic h robbed them of paying patients; in many places, the y demande d th e introductio n o f a mean s test fo r both inmate s an d out patients. Thei r intention was to recapture th e middle-class patients wh o were avail ing themselves o f the cheaper and better medical services provided by modern public hospitals. Parallel t o th e developmen t o f hospitals, th e numbe r o f trained nurses had bee n growing rapidly since the 1870s . "Untrained " nurses and midwives were even more numerous. T o this, one shoul d add th e permanen t competitio n that chiropractors, health cultists, and empirics offered from outsid e the regular profession. The average 6

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physician had , besides , anothe r reaso n t o worry : wit h bette r nutrition , sanitar y re forms, publi c healt h campaigns , and , afte r th e mid-nineties , th e firs t antitoxins , death rate s wer e steadil y declining . Th e bul k o f the professio n tende d t o interpret its mediocre status and income as a sign that its services were becoming dispensable . In thi s fragmented situation , the "overcrowding " of the medica l profession wa s a general concer n shared , fo r different reasons, b y al l physicians. As Abraham Flexner was to point out in 1910, the United States at the end of the nineteenth centur y ha d on e o f the highes t doctor-to-populatio n ratios i n the world : while German y ha d on e docto r fo r 2000 inhabitant s an d on e fo r 100 0 i n the larg e cities, th e averag e ratio was on e fo r 568 i n America and one fo r 400 or less in the major urba n centers. Yet , before 1906 , the production of doctors did not show any clear sign s o f abating. On the contrary, the therapeutic successe s scored b y surger y and bacteriology seemed to attract mor e and more students t o a growing number of schools. Yet , as mos t doctor s understood , overcrowdin g went hand i n hand wit h the growin g stratificatio n o f schools an d physicians . In 1871 , Harvard Medical Schoo l had begu n t o separat e itsel f fro m th e pac k b y instituting a mandatory, graded , three-yea r lon g course o f study and written examinations; i t soon followe d thes e reforms b y entry requirements whic h mad e i t practically int o a graduate school. Harvard' s exampl e wa s followed , thoug h slowly , by the best and richest schools in the 1870 s and 1880s . A t the same time, the leading schools wer e strengthenin g thei r ties wit h hospitals an d improvin g clinica l instruc tion. I n 1893 , thi s tendenc y foun d a mode l i n th e ne w Medica l Schoo l o f Johns Hopkins, planne d aroun d it s own teaching hospital. William Rothstein observes that "the best schools were able to raise their standards because they wer e not competing directly wit h th e less prestigious ones." Rising entry requirement s an d risin g fee s (o r tuition) mean t tha t onl y a sociall y exclusive body of students woul d be sought , admitted , and trained at the leading schools. Th e majority o f the medica l schools , o n th e othe r hand , followe d th e upgradin g move only whe n force d b y stat e licensin g boards, a s i t began t o happe n i n the nineties : serving lower middle class and working-class students i n an increasingly competitive educational market , th e averag e proprietar y schoo l coul d no t possibl y affor d th e full-time faculty , th e expensiv e laborator y equipment, o r the clinica l facilitie s tha t were slowl y becomin g the idea l norm in the uppe r track. Thus, wit h th e advanc e of scientific medicine, differences i n medical training tended to become mor e and more closely associate d wit h th e clas s origins of the trainees . The development s i n th e bes t school s brough t twenty-tw o of the m togethe r a s early a s 187 6 int o th e Associatio n of American Medical Colleges . But , unabl e t o enforce th e three-year grade d curriculu m amon g it s own members, th e Association suspended its activities six years later; when it reappeared i n the 1890s , wit h much greater strengt h an d bette r representation , leadershi p i n medical reform wa s firml y seated in the state medical societies and in the A . M . A. Th e societies addresse d most of thei r efforts t o the stat e licensing boards, coordinate d sinc e 189 1 into a national organism. Th e strateg y recommende d b y Flexne r year s late r wa s alread y wel l de lineated in the nineties. As Flexner was to declare, th e state boards were "the instru ments throug h whic h th e reconstructio n o f medica l educatio n wil l b e largel y ef 10

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fected. . . . They should go beyond rejection of individuals and close unfi t schools. " For this task, however , it was indispensabl e tha t their membership be "draw n fro m the bes t element s o f the professio n including—no t as no w prohibiting—thos e engaged i n teaching." In th e nineties, the ascendant of these "best elements"—the largel y Eastern elite of well-traine d specialists an d full-time scientifi c faculties—was predominant in the A . M . A. an d growing throughout the country. The isolation of the typical physician of th e 1860s—th e privat e practitioner in a smal l town o r rural area—ha d bee n increasingly reduced b y the developmen t o f proprietary schools an d especially by the growth of county medical societies an d medical journals. The Journal of the A.M. A., first publishe d in 1883 , provide d a lin k fo r the minorit y wh o subscribed o r read it; numerous othe r periodicals, however, contribute d to organize th e professio n an d to diffuse th e advance s of scientific medicine. The reorganization of the A . M . A. i n 1901 and 190 3 took notice of these changes: the count y societ y becam e th e organizationa l nucleu s o f th e profession.Member ship was ope n b y right t o all "reputable license d physicians"; for all practical purposes, th e invidiou s distinctio n betwee n "regular " an d homeopathi c doctors wa s being dropped , a s i t had increasingl y been droppe d b y th e physician s themselves . The county societies and their members belonged automatically to their state society. The stat e societ y sen t delegate s wit h votin g right s t o th e legislativ e body o f th e A . M . A . Membershi p in the nationa l association wa s thu s automaticall y granted to all members of county societies, and only to them. After an initial period in which the A . M . A. wa s weakened i n membership and power by the reforms, its constituent parts adjusted rapidl y t o th e new , nonsectarian , an d vertica l organization . Specialists , initially excluded because they did not normally join county societies, came back into the fold, needin g as they did the political base and the referrals provided by the mass of genera l practitioners. By 1910 , the A . M . A. membershi p wa s ove r hal f o f the nation's physicians . With thi s new organizational instrument, the elite of scientific doctors rapidly se t itself t o the task of educational reform. I n 190 4 the A . M . A . ' s committe e on education becam e the permanen t Counci l o n Medica l Education : "Every membe r wa s a researcher an d al l had appointment s a t medica l school s whic h ha d eithe r recentl y adopted o r wer e i n the proces s of changing t o the scientifi c m o d e l . " In 1906 , the Council surveyed all the medical schools i n the country, ranking them according to diverse criteria: the performance o f their graduates in state board examinations; thei r entr y requirement s an d curriculum ; thei r proprietar y "fo r profit " status; and th e presence or absence of instructional facilities—full-tim e facult y fo r the preliminary scientific courses, laboratory, dispensary, hospital , library, museum , and divers e equipment . Th e effect s wer e immediate : rathe r than fac e publication of the rankings, many commercial schools closed, and others consolidated or sought university affiliation ; homeopathi c an d eclecti c school s wer e eve n mor e adversel y affected than the regula r commercial schools. Betwee n 190 6 and 1910 , the dat e of the second inspectio n by Flexner, the total number of medical schools fel l fro m 16 2 to 131 , a net los s o f about 2 0 percent. Th e unificatio n o f medicine was, therefore , well advance d befor e th e refor m movemen t culminate d in the Flexne r report. In 14

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the latter' s ow n words: "Nothin g has perhap s done mor e t o complete th e discredi t of commercialis m than th e fac t tha t i t has cease d to p a y . " I t was paying , in fact, to b e a scientificall y traine d an d up-to-dat e specialist . From the cognitive and technical point of view, it could be said properly that "scientific medicin e was not a triumph for any sect; it was the death o f all sects." Bu t medical refor m wa s mor e tha n th e triump h o f scientifi c medicine . Fro m a large r perspective, i t was marke d b y th e sam e general principle s that guide d th e genera l movement of reform in the nineties an d in the firs t decade s of the twentieth century: "centralization, consolidation into larger units, efficient managemen t b y experts, an d the inevitable accent on technology were visible in the reorganization of the A . M . A. as wel l a s i n the recommendation s o f the Flexne r report . While Flexne r followe d th e line s lai d ou t b y th e A . M . A . ' s Counci l on Medical Education i n 1906 , h e brough t the m t o a drastic conclusion . A s he declared , "th e privileges o f the medica l schoo l ca n n o longe r b e ope n t o casual stroller s fro m th e highway." A preliminar y requirement o f two years of college was , i n his view , indispensable. Medica l education proper should consist of a four-year course, closely combined wit h clinica l an d laborator y instruction. The "norma l and correc t form " could onl y b e a "complete school, " based on the universit y and integrated wit h th e latter's scientifi c departments. Th e 13 1 schools i n the Unite d State s (155, counting Canada) should be cut down to the 3 1 which were wel l equipped to teach on modern scientific bases ; following populatio n criteria, they wer e to admit a greatly reduce d number o f students. Th e professio n face d a twofold problem : to strengthen , o n th e one hand , th e viable institutions and, o n the other , "wit h al l the forc e tha t la w and public opinion can wield, t o crush out the mercenary concern s tha t trade in ignorance and disease." 20

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Flexner's tone , however, was less frequently that of moral indignation than that o f dispassionate prescriptio n an d rationality . In the languag e o f economics , h e con cluded "[that ] ou r methods o f carrying on medical education have resulted i n enormous overproductio n a t lo w level, an d that , whateve r th e justificatio n i n the past , the presen t situatio n i n tow n an d countr y alik e ca n b e mor e effectivel y me t b y a reduced outpu t o f well traine d me n tha n b y furthe r inflatio n wit h a n inferio r prod u c t . " Buildin g on precedent, th e Flexner report made it eminently clear that medical refor m wa s bu t on e ac t i n the large r proces s o f rationalization of production which had arisen to meet the anarchy of competition and the excesses of laissez faire. With th e declin e o f apprenticeship, th e medica l schoo l ha d becom e th e sol e cente r for th e productio n of physicians. Th e goal of educational refor m was, thus , t o stan dardize thi s productio n according t o th e ne w scientifi c norms . Flexner's prescription—"fewe r and better doctors"—becam e th e rallyin g cry of the profession. It s different wings, however, had divergent goals. Th e scientific elite worried that American medicine, unless it reorganized teachin g an d practice, woul d be incapabl e o f keepin g u p wit h th e scientifi c standard s o f Europea n medicine . Centralization o f investment wa s indispensabl e t o acquir e moder n equipment , per manent faculties, and research teams. Concentration was dictated by technological— and ultimatel y financial—imperatives, an d als o b y th e scarcit y o f competen t re searchers. Fo r these reasons, th e scientifi c doctors ha d sough t th e suppor t o f the 24

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state an d o f th e powerfu l foundations—suc h a s th e Rockefelle r Institute , estab lished in 1901 and interested i n the modernization of medicine and research, and th e Carnegie Foundatio n fo r the Advancemen t o f Teaching, whic h wa s concerne d wit h the reform of higher education a s a whole and the ' 'moralization'' of the professions . It was , i n fact, t o the Carnegi e Foundatio n (untainte d by the Rockefelle r name) tha t the A . M . A . ' s Counci l addressed itsel f fo r it s 191 0 stud y o f medical schools . Th e choice o f Flexner, wh o wa s no t a physician bu t a n educator , an d whos e view s ha d been forme d chiefl y a t Johns Hopkin s an d i n Germany, contribute d t o th e study' s air o f impartialit y an d nonsectarianism . Wit h th e implici t leverag e o f th e founda tion's subsidy , Flexne r obtaine d informatio n tha t ha d neve r befor e bee n mad e available. Much mor e tha n officia l sanctio n an d punitiv e measures , foundatio n mone y brought about the implementation of Flexner's recommendations . Th e leading foundations clearl y favore d th e Northeaster n medica l establishment : betwee n 191 1 an d 1936, the Johns Hopkins Medical School got about $ 10 million of Rockefeller money and $ 2 fro m th e Carnegi e Corporation . Betwee n 191 0 an d 1938 , th e nin e leadin g foundations gav e mor e tha n $15 4 millio n t o medica l schools , mos t o f i t goin g t o the bes t privat e schools . Th e Rockefelle r Genera l Educatio n Boar d gav e slightl y under $6 6 millio n t o onl y nine schools. The larg e bul k o f medica l practitioner s wer e neithe r entirel y convince d o f th e merits o f scientifi c medicin e no r reassure d b y th e scientifi c elit e an d it s powerful allies. However , "the y wer e eve n mor e concerne d abou t wha t they perceive d t o b e the depresse d stat e o f th e profession , an d thu s mos t o f the m cooperate d wit h th e university-based physicia n i n the effor t t o refor m medicin e an d improv e their cond i t i o n . " Th e "qualitative " argument o f the refor m leaders—get better doctors — fused, therefore , wit h th e "quantitative " an d practica l concern s o f th e rank-and file—permit fewe r doctor s an d provid e more secur e incomes. Thi s fusion explain s that a professio n increasingl y stratifie d b y differentia l acces s t o reward s an d re sources, an d increasingl y compartmentalize d b y specialization , coul d fo r a tim e act i n unison behin d it s elit e leadership . Whil e black s an d women , a s wel l a s th e lower middle class and the sons of workers, found themselves increasingly excluded from th e reforme d profession , th e statu s of the averag e physician was considerabl y improved, a s wa s hi s income , b y th e rapidl y attained reductio n i n numbers. Th e A . M . A. maintaine d it s leadership an d increase d th e institutiona l unification o f th e profession: i n 1920, 60 percent o f American doctors wer e members. Th e excellenc e of th e leadin g school s an d research centers put the Unite d States ahead of German y in medica l discoverie s i n th e decad e immediatel y followin g th e Flexne r report. The refor m movemen t ha d indee d bee n a n unparallelle d success. Yet, eve n a s undergraduat e medical education wa s bein g radicall y standardized , it was becomin g insufficient. In 1913, the A . M . A . ' s Counci l on Medical Education appointed th e dea n of Harvard's Graduat e Medical School to chair a committee o n graduate teaching: "Thi s committee, a mere four years after th e Flexner report, conceded the inadequac y o f a four-year medica l course in giving th e studen t an y mor e than th e elementar y fundamental s i n medicine." Th e proble m o f how t o control graduate education—that is , th e educatio n o f specialists—was becomin g a centra l 26

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one in the profession. The A . M . A . 's Council, faithful t o Flexner, favored universitybased standardization . Specialis t training , however , wa s centere d i n hospital s as , indeed, wa s the internship , which wa s rapidl y becoming the necessary complement to basi c trainin g before th e licensure . A fe w nationa l centers , suc h a s th e May o Clinic, offere d seriou s residencie s fo r training in a specialty ; these centers alway s were university-affiliate d hospitals . But , on the larg e majorit y o f hospitals, neithe r the A . M . A . no r th e universitie s ha d muc h leverage . In fact , a voluntary organization o f specialists—th e America n College o f Sur geons, formed in 1913—had swiftl y move d to the leading position in the program of hospital standardization . Th e College , togethe r wit h th e specialis t organization s i n ophthalmology, offered a n alternative qualification t o the licensure or the university degree fo r specialists : voluntar y examinations (o r grandfathe r clauses ) woul d lea d the aspirin g specialis t t o a certificat e an d t o membershi p i n a selec t professiona l body. Th e nucleu s o f th e futur e specialt y board s la y i n this approach . Eac h phy sician, however , wa s sol e maste r of deciding how much specialization or certification h e neede d o r wante d t o get . B y 1920 , say s Rosemar y Stevens , "neithe r th e A . M . A ., no r the American College of Surgeons, no r the National Board of Medical Examiners nor any other group, had a central, unifying role " with regard to specialist regulation. Professional endorsemen t b y specialist boards or other groups spread i n the 1920s . The specialist s insiste d that their certificates wer e not degrees, but marks of distinction which separated the more reputable specialist s fro m th e others, fo r the benefit of the public, as th e licenses issue d b y the medical societies ha d done befor e th e Jacksonian era . Ye t "by attemptin g to influence hospital trustees only t o appoint diplo mates to hospita l appointments, an d b y cutting off access to the majo r societie s t o those without th e certificate , the specialis t group s involve d wer e on the wa y to creating the type of professionally controlled specialist monopoly which already existed in England and other parts o f Europe." Thes e attempts correctl y assessed the cen trality o f the hospita l for modern medical practice an d its potential as regulato r an d coordinator o f medical services. The general practitioner, however, contemplated even the milder forms of specialist exclusiveness wit h dismay . For , indeed , i f the basic instruction in general medicine wa s th e sam e for all physicians, specialis m relegated hi m to an unredeemabl y lower rank . Furthermore , Steven s point s ou t tha t th e genera l practitioner , b y th e late 1920s , wa s seldo m "general, " havin g given up major surgery an d often obstet rics, otorhinolaryngology , and venerea l disease s a s w e l l . H e wa s als o directl y threatened b y th e ris e o f the hospital , whic h ofte n reserve d it s facilitie s t o it s own staff. H e was seldo m included in the cooperative grou p practices whic h sprea d afte r World Wa r I . I n sum, th e genera l practitioner—th e smal l entrepreneur o f medicine—was becomin g increasingl y marginal . The interna l stratification of the pro fession wa s reemergin g a s a sourc e of unresolved tensions . Yet, somethin g very importan t had bee n achieved throug h educational standard ization: a s Charle s Ree d declare d i n hi s A . M . A . presidentia l addres s o f 1901 , a new school of medicine had come into being, "the produc t of convergent influence s and diverse antecedents." The scientific basis of medicine and the scientific model 31

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of medica l training anchored medica l practice, fo r all its diverse an d divergent patterns, t o a valid cognitiv e system whic h appear s to transcend huma n wil l o r whim . In principle , ever y scientifi c doctor derived his expertise fro m th e scientifi c method and founde d hi s practice o n universally valid technique s an d results. Thi s cognitive frame o f reference guarantee d a t least a modicum of unity an d a partial principle of reconciliation, despit e th e divisiv e an d contradictor y forces emergin g fro m profes sional practice . Besides th e unified intellectua l basis which scientific medicine had attained, ther e were other factors whic h worked in favor of the unit y of interests tha t had been contrived durin g the phase of educational reform , between 190 4 an d 1918 . On e facto r was th e numerica l predominance o f the generalist s an d part-time specialists, whic h lasted unti l th e 1960s : i t allowe d the m t o pla y a n inordinatel y importan t rol e i n shaping th e politic s of organized medicin e an d thu s reduce d th e effect s o f profes sional marginality. Another factor wa s th e increasin g detachmen t fro m th e problems o f medical practic e o f the secto r whic h concentrate d o n researc h an d teach ing. A thir d facto r wa s th e commo n oppositio n o f mos t privat e practitioners , b e they generalists o r specialists, to compulsory health insurance an d to anything which, in their eyes, would threaten privat e practice. Finally, there were the substantial eco nomic benefit s whic h artificia l scarcit y o n th e sid e o f supply insure d t o most phy sicians, despit e th e notable differences o f income between specialists , betwee n spe cialists an d generalists , an d betwee n geographi c areas. In sum , th e particula r marke t structur e o f medicin e enable d thi s professio n t o incorporate the interests o f the large majority o f general practitioners and blend them with th e differen t interest s o f th e refor m leaders . Th e attainmen t o f professiona l monopoly an d o f cognitiv e unificatio n depende d o n thi s uniqu e combination ; the benefits o f monopoly outlived the de facto breakdown of the alliance. The free enterprise ideology of the most retrograde sector s of the profession could be channeled by the leadin g specialis t group s an d th e universit y or hospital-base d elite s towar d the defense o f corporat e power : appealin g t o ol d libera l principle s o f legitimacy , the profession a s a whole was able to resist governmenta l or public encroachments upo n its power and to oppose, i n general, those attempts t o rationalize medical care which it coul d not directl y control . 37

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THE LEGA L PROFESSION , EPITOM E O F SOCIAL STRATIFICATIO N Medicine wa s uniqu e i n deriving intellectual unity an d economi c advantage s for all its members throug h educational standardizatio n an d qualitative upgrading. Even today, interna l problem s o f stratification , specialization , an d marginalit y do no t break u p the organizational front o f the profession. Th e common defense of monopolistic advantages in a seller's market and the scientific basis of professional expertis e contribute to contain the divisive influences. I n the law, the next largest of the marketoriented professions, professionalizatio n replicated some of the features o f the medical movement : elit e practitioner s wit h importan t corporat e clientele s too k th e

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leading rol e i n voluntar y professiona l organizations . " I t wa s thes e men, " say s Wiebe, "partl y to honor themselves, partl y to work for higher standards, who in the seventies bega n organizin g city an d stat e ba r associations , cappe d i n 187 8 b y th e American Ba r Association." Their goal wa s t o institut e stricter standard s of admission to the bar and to curb what they saw as unprofessional behavior. Law teachers in elit e lega l school s gav e to th e refor m movement it s necessary educational base . Yet elit e practitioners an d elit e educators did not constitute , a s i n medicine, a uni fied leadership . Becaus e these two wings of the lega l profession neede d each other to achiev e thei r objectives , the y reache d temporar y alliances ; the y di d not merge , however, bu t remained distinc t in style and goals an d often bitterly opposed t o each other. Fears of overcrowding and complaints that the profession did not provide a decent livelihood ra n rampan t i n the law , a s the y di d i n medicin e befor e th e 1920s ; ye t corporate economi c defens e coul d no t b e persuasivel y use d a s a unifyin g factor , for th e types of legal practice were too divergent to admit even a common economic interest. Standardizatio n o f curriculum was attempted i n the law, and the success of this move was no t too far behind that of medicine; yet standardization coul d not b e used a s a weapon to run the poorer schools out of the field of legal education, nor did it provid e a commonly accepted cognitiv e anchorage. Thi s is i n part explaine d b y some general characteristic s o f the legal profession an d of its cognitive base, whic h I wil l mentio n briefly , a s a preliminary to th e discussio n o f professionalization in the America n case. In th e firs t place , th e cleavage s whic h divid e the professio n o f la w ar e a direct expression o f it s uniqu e political functions. The judicial system is, o f course, a branch of th e state . Th e privat e practitioners of the law , wit h who m I wil l b e chiefl y con cerned, ar e formall y "officer s o f the court " and , i n practice the y ar e muc h mor e directly an d intimatel y integrated wit h th e functionin g of the stat e apparatu s (or , at least, it s judiciary system ) tha n an y other professional experts . Thi s special char acter obviously affects th e cognitiv e basis of the profession . Th e hig h value place d on justic e an d o n the maintenanc e o f the socia l order i n most societie s give s t o th e law a n appearanc e o f transcendence; bu t th e la w i s nevertheles s a socia l product , visibly subjec t t o change and open to interpretation, even wher e i t is the mos t codi fied. Problem s o f interpretation of the law represent, in a sense, an institutionalize d measure o f cognitiv e dissensus. The y constitut e th e cor e o f professiona l practic e and ar e ultimatel y resolve d b y publi c officials , b e the y judge s o r legislators . Political authorit y therefor e permeate s th e cognitiv e bas e o f th e profession . A s Talcott Parsons has noted , thi s immediately differentiates authorit y in the la w fro m the presumptio n of certainty that surround s scientifi c authority or the dogmatic pronouncements o f "infallible " institution s such as , mos t conspicuously , th e Catholic Church. Moreover, substantiv e conception s o f justice diffe r an d ofte n clash ; the y canno t always b e directl y identified wit h th e interest s o f particular social group s o r orga nizations, but their distribution is obviously not random: most social conflicts, laten t or overt , revolve around issues of substantive justice. Conversely , whe n a system of 39

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law i s relativel y unifie d an d generall y accepted , conflic t betwee n individuals , groups, an d organizations i s routinely handled an d absorbe d b y the judicial system . Formal rationalizatio n of the law , i n all its various forms , alway s tend s t o reduc e the visibl e arbitrariness o f adjudication an d t o relegate issues of substantive justic e to a n extralega l domai n o f social life . Weber ha s show n th e determinan t influenc e o f the for m o f political authorit y on legal rationalization. Althoug h the process of legal rationalization differs in centralized bureaucrati c state s an d i n societie s whic h emphasiz e indirec t governmenta l regulation an d contractua l relationships , bot h bureaucratizatio n an d modernizatio n on a laissez-faire mode l accelerate the forma l rationalizatio n of the l a w . Different strata of jurists play, i n each case, th e centra l role : "Dependin g upo n wh o ar e th e leaders of a particular movement," say s Weber, "th e result s favo r either th e pres tige o f 'science, ' i.e. o f the lega l scholar s or tha t o f the practitioners." But i n al l cases, rationalizatio n increases th e powe r an d prestig e o f a n elit e of jurists an d adds to the appearanc e of autonomy an d impartialit y o f the lega l profes sion a s a whole. The movement towar d formal justice—that is , abstract and universalistic principle s of legal adjudication—i s supported , o n one hand , b y thos e wh o oppose authoritaria n contro l in the nam e o f freedom an d individua l right s and , o n the othe r hand , "b y thos e wh o wiel d th e economi c powe r a t an y give n tim e an d who ar e therefor e intereste d i n its unhampere d operation." I n modern capitalis t societies, lega l formalization appears to establish a n affinit y o f orientation betwee n those who direct th e econom y accordin g t o principle s of functional rationality and the class of lawmen. A t the sam e time, the lawyers ' emphasi s on a procedural con ception o f justice tends to separat e them fro m th e substantiv e definition s implicitl y held b y othe r segment s of the public. Because the lega l profession mediate s the institutionalize d resolution of conflict , its expertis e an d it s livelihoo d directl y depend o n th e stabilit y and legitimac y of a given institutiona l and lega l framework . I n the wide r sense of the word , th e lega l mind i s therefor e inherentl y conservative . A s Tocquevill e remarked, th e predomi nance o f customar y la w add s t o thi s conservatis m " a tast e an d a reverenc e fo r what i s ol d . . . almos t alway s unite d wit h a lov e o f regular an d lawfu l proceed ings." Th e complexit y o f a legislatio n founde d o n preceden t accentuated , fo r Tocqueville, th e nonrationa l aspect s o f lega l knowledge , whil e makin g th e ex pertise o f the lawye r more indispensabl e t o the layma n than i n legal systems based on codifie d statutes: 41

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The absolut e nee d o f lega l ai d that is felt i n England and in the United States, an d the high opinio n tha t i s entertained o f th e abilit y o f th e lega l profession , ten d t o separat e it mor e an d mor e fro m th e peopl e an d t o erec t i t int o a distinc t class . Th e Frenc h lawyer i s simpl y a ma n extensivel y acquainte d wit h th e statute s o f hi s country : bu t the Englis h or America n lawyer resemble s th e hyerophant s o f Egypt , fo r lik e the m he i s th e sol e interprete r of a n occult science. 44

This socia l an d intellectua l ascendancy explaine d th e politica l rol e o f lawyer s i n American society : th e visible and invisibl e influence o f this "aristocrati c element " balanced "democrati c instincts " wit h it s ow n conservatism , shapin g th e whol e of social an d politica l l i f e . 45

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Tocqueville attributed to the American legal profession a unity and prestige whic h only its elites enjoyed. Regardles s of the system of law, it appears true that the democratic form of government, th e extension of contractual relations, and the acceptance of litigatio n a s a normal part of life increase d th e private demand fo r legal expertis e and th e emphasi s place d o n th e partisa n loyalt y o f counsel t o clien t i n American society. B y compariso n wit h othe r countries , thes e factor s i n part accoun t fo r th e predominance o f private practitioner s i n the America n legal profession. Partisa n legal expertise was , an d stil l is, chiefly neede d by the propertied classes and chiefl y available to them. Closel y involved in the defense of economic interests , th e lawyer naturally became the subjec t o f public opprobrium, especially i n times o f economic crisis. In sum , th e cognitiv e basi s o f th e lega l professio n articulate s "transcendent " values whic h are, i n fact, backe d b y the force of the state. But despite its connection with a "transcendent " zon e o f the dominan t ideology , thi s cognitive basis canno t appear t o b e a s immun e t o clas s interest s as , fo r instance , th e scientifi c basi s of medicine or engineering. Thi s is precisely because the law in bourgeois democracie s is made and change d a s a result o f institutionalized conflict s of interest, eve n i f the class connotations an d origin s of these conflicts ar e no t readil y perceptible . I t fol lows tha t th e cognitiv e basis o f the lega l professio n i s onl y a s "objective " a s th e state itself appear s to be "neutral, " tha t i s to say , abov e all classes . A s Weber ha s shown, "th e formalis m and the rule-bound an d cool 'matter-of-factness' o f bureaucratic administration " an d "expertness " suppor t rationalizatio n i n th e la w an d increase it s appearanc e of objectivity. It i s therefor e no t coincidenta l tha t th e America n lega l professio n shoul d hav e decisively move d towar d professionalizatio n i n th e Progressiv e Era . Th e bureau cratization o f the stat e apparatus , th e movement s fo r civi l servic e reform , an d th e articulation of legitimacy principles which emphasized th e role of expertise al l contributed to establish the state's ' 'neutrality. " This, in turn, created a favorable ideological climat e fo r th e lega l profession's assertio n o f neutrality an d independence . Parsons note s tha t th e dependenc e o f lawyer s o n politica l authorit y i s balance d by thei r dependenc e o n clients , an d tha t bot h ar e checke d b y independen t profes sional institutions. It is tru e tha t mos t officer s o f the court , a t leas t i n civi l law , do no t directl y depend o n the stat e for their income; bu t th e fac t tha t thei r fees ar e paid b y privat e partie s make s the m suspiciousl y dependen t o n thei r clientele . W e need t o examin e her e ho w eac h o f these factor s o f professiona l "independence " from th e state—clients , ba r associations , an d la w schools—have evolved since th e 1870s and what resources each has contribute d to the professionalization movement . The organic connection of the legal profession wit h the propertied class, and in particular wit h organizationa l clients, ha d bee n a source of internal differentiation and specialization in the profession sinc e the days of Jackson. The rise and consolidation of a national economic elit e placed mor e an d mor e powe r i n the hand s of the lawyers' corporat e clients . Paralle l t o th e proces s o f concentratio n an d centralizatio n of capita l wer e change s i n the mod e o f practice o f the bes t business lawyers . Th e shift fro m litigatio n i n court to counseling an d negotiatio n was on e o f the mos t important changes. Today, this move away from the trial court affects t o a certain extent 46

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all lawyers , dependin g o n th e siz e of their fir m an d o n that o f the cit y wher e the y practice; th e tendenc y ca n b e observe d eve n i n criminal law , where ple a bargainin g now heavil y predominates ove r jury trials. The preventiv e us e o f counsel becam e firs t visibl e in the larges t busines s firms : after 1870 , say s James W. Hurst , th e genera l counse l fo r the railroad s becam e th e paramount symbo l of professional success. Th e ne w typ e of lawyer did not limi t himself t o technical counseling. Firs t of all, elit e lawyers used their skills to articulate the legal framework needed by the new business system. T o the corporate econ omy, lawyer s contribute d specific tool s (suc h a s th e equipmen t trus t certificate an d the trus t receipt) , institutiona l models (suc h a s th e corporation) , an d pattern s o f action fo r adapting financia l and pric e structure s t o a national market. B y comparison, othe r area s of the la w remained relativel y undeveloped. Secondly , hi s master y of largel y uncharted field s and his clients' respec t for his opinions gradually led the business lawyer int o extralegal decision-makin g an d economi c planning . Railroad general counsel , followe d b y th e counse l fo r investmen t bankers , inaugurate d th e role of the lawyer as corporate director ; from th e 1880 s on, lawyers became a permanent fixtur e o n corporat e boards . Following th e need s of their business client s an d th e mode l the y set , la w firm s themselves gre w large r and , a t th e top , fewer . Partnership s ha d tende d t o replac e solo practice sinc e th e 1820s , bu t the metropolita n firm wit h a large staf f develope d in ou r century. Th e practic e o f these firms i s as wid e in geographic scop e as their clients' business ; their regional concentration , mainl y in Wall Stree t an d Chicago , was an d remains extreme . Mos t of their work occur s ou t of court and i s highly specialized. What had been only incipient trends toward specialization before th e Civi l War becam e i n the 1870 s and 1880 s well-defined specialties i n patents, industrial consolidations, rea l estate, insurance, taxation , and the like . Specializatio n accentu ates today, a s i t did then, th e fragmentatio n an d disunit y of the profession . The rise of corporate client s was the major factor i n the ris e an d affirmation o f an elite o f busines s lawyers . Th e expandin g rol e o f governmen t an d th e growt h of legislation affectin g th e corporatio n meant , i n turn, that on e majo r functio n of th e legal elit e becam e tha t o f guidin g their client s throug h regulation s an d o f repre senting the m befor e governmen t throug h lobbying or negotiation. I n sum, th e elit e of the profession provide d services that were not strictly (and often not even remotely) legal services for a class of particularly powerful and wealthy clients. That this elite of lawyer s should act a s broker for the corporation in dealing with government com promised the image of the profession—not onl y directly, but also indirectly, because influence brokerag e i s boun d t o rais e diffus e doubt s abou t th e "neutrality " of th e state an d therefor e jeopardiz e th e "objective " an d universalisti c appearanc e o f the law . Elite busines s lawyers, joined in some cases by prominen t la w teachers, le d th e movement o f professiona l organization , startin g i n 187 0 wit h th e ba r associatio n of Ne w Yor k City , whic h wa s primaril y aime d agains t th e corruptio n of the Twee d city machine . Seventy-fiv e lawyers , meetin g a t th e fashionabl e resor t o f Saratoga in Ne w Yor k State , founde d th e America n Bar Associatio n eigh t year s later . Th e avowed ai m of these successful lawyer s wa s t o mak e th e professio n mor e respect 50

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able, an d we shall see presentl y wha t this meant i n their eyes. But the imag e of autonomous competenc e an d impartialit y sough t b y professionalizatio n movement s was boun d t o improv e the corporat e lawyers ' ow n image , b y strengthenin g thei r claim tha t the y coul d maintai n a n independen t positio n vis-a-vis thei r powerfu l clients. The leadin g practitioners i n the exclusiv e bar associations— a mer e 1. 3 percen t of lawyer s belonged to the A . B . A. i n 1900, and not many over 9 percent i n 1920— could no t carr y o n th e tas k o f professionalizatio n b y themselves. Nationa l law schools ha d developed sinc e the Civi l War, parallel to the development of corporate law practice. Fro m 187 0 t o 1895 , th e deanshi p o f Christopher Langdel l turned Harvard Law School into a model of legal education: the course o f training was immediately lengthene d fro m on e an d a half t o two years, an d the n to three i n 1899 . Strict examination s wer e institute d on admissio n an d durin g training. I n 189 6 a n undergraduate degre e became a requisite for entering the law school, a requirement which did not become effectiv e until 190 9 and did not begin to be followed b y other leading law schools unti l 1916 . The curriculum of Harvard Law School was revised in th e Langdel l period and mad e strictl y professional ; th e hour s o f instruction in creased bu t th e numbe r o f subject s taugh t wa s drasticall y cut. Las t bu t no t least , Langdell developed the scientific approach to the law and the case method for teaching the new "science. " I n his eyes, law belonged in the university because it was a science, otherwis e it s teachin g coul d wel l b e lef t t o apprenticeship . A s Langdell declared, " a l l the available materials'' of the science of law "are containe d in printed books." It s principles, mor e general than the law of each of the states, were to be found i n the study of appellate court opinions. The "Socratic method" used i n Harvard la w classes aimed at discovering the core elements o f the common law and the judicial deviations from these relatively few principles. In sum, the Harvard approach laid th e basi s fo r standardization o f legal training . 53

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By 1890 , th e cas e method penetrate d Columbi a University's law school, a n en croachment whic h le d to the resignatio n of its dean, Theodor e Dwight , Langdell' s rival i n intellectual distinction. A l l th e leadin g school s soone r o r later adopte d th e case method. B y 1900 , "Langdel l and [hi s successor, James Barr] Ame s had seen the emergenc e o f a remarkable uniformit y i n curricula" and we may add , i n pedagogic approach. Th e cas e metho d ha d sever e limitations , whic h I canno t ente r into here . A s i t evolved i n differen t la w schools , i t admitte d mor e an d mor e th e variety an d complexit y of the law , leadin g teachers t o stres s "th e powe r o f legal reasoning" mor e than the discover y of core "scientific " principle s in the law . By the firs t decad e of our century , wit h th e modifie d cas e approach, "orthodox y had finally bee n established " i n the national law schools. A s Alfred Z . Reed prepare d his 192 1 report o n lega l education, th e cas e method ha d extende d fa r beyon d this elite circle , t o th e proprietar y law school s an d eve n t o the part-tim e night school s where, Ree d believed , th e student s ha d neithe r sufficien t previou s training , no r time t o prepar e th e cases , no r guidanc e fro m competen t teachers . Deplorin g thi s pseudo-homogeneization, Ree d remarke d o n th e patter n i t had followed : "On e o r two leadin g schools develope d a curriculum which , i n more or less modified form , is copied by other schools throughout the country. The bar examiners recogniz e this 56

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as orthodox , an d buil d thei r ow n examination s upo n it . Subsequentl y establishe d schools ca n d o nothing else than confor m to this m o d e l . " B y analogy wit h Flex ner's recommendation s fo r medicine , thi s shoul d hav e been al l to th e good . Ree d showed, however , wh y this standardization wa s neithe r practical nor even desirabl e in the law. But let us return for the moment to the elite law schools and examine what they contributed to legal professionalization, besides a model for the standardizatio n of training . In 1873 , James B. Ames, without any experience i n legal practice, was appointe d assistant professo r a t Harvar d La w School . A s Presiden t Elio t o f Harvar d wa s t o remark twent y year s later , " i t was a n absolutel y ne w departur e i n our countr y in the teaching of l a w . " A new vocation—academic la w teaching—had, i n fact, been created. A t the tur n o f the century , n o more tha n a quarter o f law professors i n the rapidly expandin g fiel d o f lega l educatio n wer e full-tim e teachers. The y were , however, a most significan t minority: the y provided , in fact, a counter-elite t o th e professionalization movement . Th e ol d enmity between theorist s an d practitioners, each trying to shape the production of professionals accordin g to its own educational conceptions, becam e more clearcu t wit h th e developmen t o f the Harvar d approac h and th e growt h of a new kin d o f professional consciousnes s among th e teacher s at national la w schools . Jerold Auerbac h suggests that th e double marginalit y of the academi c lawyers — both within the profession an d within the university, where they had "transacademi c responsibilities no t share d b y thei r libera l art s colleagues"—ma y hav e incline d a larg e numbe r o f the m t o embrac e th e caus e o f Progressiv e reform : " I t seems evident," h e writes, "that th e conjunction of two developments—the professionali zation o f law teaching an d th e nationalizatio n of public issues withi n a reform setting—provided la w teacher s wit h thei r distinctiv e identity." Afte r 1910 , say s Hurst, origina l contribution s t o th e fiel d o f publi c administratio n starte d comin g forth, especiall y fro m th e academi c branc h o f the lega l profession. A t the sam e time, a new imag e o f the professio n ha d bee n articulate d by eminent la w teachers: the succes s of a lawyer could not b e measure d b y ho w muc h money h e made ; th e real duty of the ba r wa s towar d the community ; its real mission was publi c service, and th e adaptatio n o f the la w to socia l reform . Louis Brandeis coul d see academi c law teachin g "a s a fulcrum i n efforts t o improve the law and through it—society." Coherently with his position, he required to be " satisfied of the justness'' of a client's case befor e acceptin g i t . Rosco e Pound , i n turn, calle d fo r " a tru e sociological jurisprudence" whic h woul d foun d legal doctrine o n " a scientifi c apprehension o f the relation s of law to societ y an d o f the needs and interes t an d opinion s of society of today." The period from 189 5 to 191 5 was a formative one fo r the new profession o f law teaching. Withi n it , ideologica l leadershi p wa s seize d b y th e mos t voca l group , that is , th e reformer s wh o appointed themselve s "keeper s o f the professiona l con science," responsibl e fo r th e prope r socializatio n of the profession' s bes t recruit s and futur e leaders . Progressivis m calle d thes e me n int o publi c service , an d i t insulated the m fro m th e compromisin g connections o f the lega l marketplace . Man y law student s an d man y lawyer s welcome d thes e alternativ e career s " w i t h a sense of release." 58

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This new sense of responsibility could not be entirely welcome to the elite of corporate lawyer s who, since the nineties, had successfully challenge d the constitutionality o f th e Federa l incom e ta x an d vehementl y opposed , amon g othe r things , th e Progressive campaig n for judicial recall, the first workmen' s compensation ac t and, in 1916 , the nomination of Brandeis to the Supreme Court. In the first two decades of our century, this undercurrent of deep political disagreement increasingl y colored the relationship s betwee n elit e la w teachers an d elit e practitioners both inside an d outside professiona l organizations , complicatin g the divergen t conceptions o f professional upgradin g whic h ha d becom e apparen t sinc e earlie r years . The A . B . A. ha d initiated the move for higher standards of admission to the bar in the early eighties, at a time when only a few jurisdictions prescribed a formal period of study , either in law office o r in law school, before admissio n to the bar examinat i o n . Whil e the A . B . A. require d only high school graduation of its members (unti l 1921), i t consistentl y presse d fo r equivalenc e betwee n offic e apprenticeshi p an d law schoo l trainin g an d fo r longer courses of instruction in the schools . Sinc e th e late seventies, furthermore , examination boards had replaced the state supreme courts as the gatekeepers of the bar. These boards were controlled by local or state bar associations, which fought for strong requirements, written examinations, and centralized boards. B y 1917 , th e board s o f bar examiner s wer e centralize d in thirty-seven out of forty-nine jurisdictions; thirty-six of the latter required a formal period of training; attendance a t a law school , however , wa s no t ye t required in any state. During thi s time , th e A . B . A . ha d entertaine d ambivalen t relationships wit h th e law schools : sinc e the nineties, it had opposed the m on the issue of "diploma privilege," whic h gav e t o th e graduate s o f certain school s automati c accessio n t o th e bar. An d it had watche d wit h grea t misgiving s the increasin g independence o f its own creature , th e Associatio n of American La w Schools, organize d in 190 0 by the A . B . A . sectio n on Legal Education, under the prodding of the law teachers' lobby. The A . A . L . S . soo n asserte d it s educational elitism : afte r 1907 , onl y school s wit h three-year program s wer e admitte d a s members ; afte r 1912 , onl y thos e wit h pre dominantly da y programs; by 1916 , barely 40 percent o f all America n law student s were in A . A . L . S. schools . I n 1914, feeling slighte d by the A . B . A. an d miffed b y its uncooperative attitude , the A.A.L.S . starte d meetin g separately; th e two bodies did not com e bac k togethe r unti l 1920. B y then, Worl d Wa r I and it s aftermath ha d placed th e issu e of qualifications for the ba r i n a clearer focus . In th e effort s t o upgrade th e profession , ther e ha d alway s been presen t a nativist and racist bias whic h coul d becom e quit e explicit—as, for instance, i n 1909, when the A . B . A . "approve d a rule excluding aliens from th e bar." Th e fight fo r higher standards was aime d i n principle agains t incompetence , cras s commercialism, and unethical behavior; but it was clear in the language o f the leaders of the bar that' 'the poorly-educated, the ill-prepared , and the morall y wea k candidates" mean t chiefl y those growing number s o f the metropolita n bars who were foreign-born, of foreign parentage, and , mos t pointedly , Jews. Before th e war , small-tow n lawyers ha d oppose d th e professionalizatio n movement, seein g i t as anothe r plo y o f the corporatio n and it s lega l servant s t o "pus h them to the wall.'' Thi s kind of lawyer, says Hofstadter, saw that'' much of his work was taken fro m hi m by real-estate, trus t an d insurance companies , collectio n agen 66

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cies an d banks , whic h too k upon themselves large r and larger amounts o f what had once bee n entirel y legal business." Afte r 1918 , xenophobia , heightene d b y th e patriotic fervo r of the wa r years , reconcile d the small-tow n lawyer of unreproach ably Anglo-Saxo n origins with th e ide a o f professional upgrading . Elite corporat e lawyers , i n turn, ha d gaine d i n public stature fro m thei r unques tioning cooperation with the war effort. The y were now in a better position to lead the attac k o n th e "enem y within. " I n Auerbach' s words , "patrioti c nationalism, xenophobia, reinforce d b y postwa r nativis m and anti-radicalism , washed awa y th e stain o f social obloquy fro m corporatio n lawyers an d transferre d th e tain t to attor neys from ethni c minorit y groups." I n a profession whic h i s part of the stat e and traditionally serve s a s a stepping-ston e int o politics , highe r educationa l standard s could be used no t only to restrict access to the bar by blacks, immigrants, Jews, and radicals bu t also to limit thei r political participation . Th e A . B . A . leader s were now ready t o join th e academics ' battle ; i n 1920 , furthermore , commo n oppositio n to Alfred Z . Reed's controversial report on legal training solidified their alliance against "the nigh t law schools an d th e immigrant s who crowded int o t h e m . " This outcom e o f Reed' s investigatio n wa s unintende d an d ironic . Whe n th e A . B . A . requeste d i t from th e Carnegie Foundatio n in 1913, it had hoped to emulat e the impressive success of the Flexner report and to obtain the means for running the poorer school s ou t o f legal education. Ree d full y acknowledge d tha t ther e wa s a n obvious hierarchy amon g th e la w schools; but , fa r fro m recommendin g th e elimi nation of the part-time schools, h e urge d the leaders of the profession t o help them. His argument was cogent and clear: because the law was a public and eminently political profession, it s doors coul d not be restrictively closed in a democracy. Fro m that point of view, the night law schools were, indeed, coal to the fire under the American "melting pot " an d a necessary democratic institution . Bu t it was a fiction t o maintain that there was , o r could be, a unitary bar: "Unde r the notion that there i s such a thing a s 'a ' standar d lawyer , radically different educational ideal s ar e brough t into conflict wit h one another, t o their mutual injury; thi s in face of the fact that they produce radically different types o f practitioners. To begin with , th e nigh t schools ar e damaged b y th e obligatio n placed upo n the m t o cove r th e sam e curriculum as th e day schools." Th e da y schools , especiall y th e leadin g ones , wer e understand ably reluctan t "t o ente r int o what , fro m a scholarl y poin t o f view , i s low-grad e work." Th e answe r was , i n his eyes, to acknowledge realisticall y both the require ments o f science and the requirement s o f democracy, an d to accept a differentiated bar: " I f la w school graduates enjoyed differen t privileges in the practice of the law, corresponding t o th e difference s i n educational effor t betwee n full-tim e an d part time work , th e tw o types instea d o f rivaling coul d supplemen t on e another." I n other words , Ree d propose d t o institutionaliz e what actuall y existed . A . B . A . an d A.A.L.S. leader s persisted, instead , i n their efforts t o drive the night schools ou t an d t o preven t thei r graduate s fro m eve n takin g the ba r examination . After Reed' s recommendations , the y coul d ad d t o thei r argument s th e rhetori c of egalitarianism: for , indeed , wha t coul d b e mor e odiou s t o th e America n traditio n than a divided bar, suggestiv e o f the long-abolished English model? The democrati c way t o upgrade an d dignif y a profession wa s b y homogeneization an d standardiza 73

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tion, a s i t had bee n similarl y argue d i n medicine. A special committee , chaire d by Elihu Root, had come out of the A . B . A . - A . A . L . S. join t meeting in 1920; it offered its recommendations on e yea r later, a t the Washington Conference o n Legal Education, i n the mids t o f the furo r provoke d by Reed' s report. Th e compromis e tha t resulted established th e undispute d educational leadershi p an d controlling influenc e of th e universit y schools: tw o years of college were to be required for admission t o law school ; the night school would b e tolerated, provided that it offered a four-year program; th e A . B . A . ' s Counci l on Legal Education woul d hav e accrediting power with regar d t o th e schools ; al l graduates shoul d tak e th e ba r examination , bu t thi s privilege shoul d hencefort h b e reserve d t o thos e wh o ha d attende d la w school . I t was repeatedl y argue d durin g the proceeding s tha t ever y energeti c an d perseveran t young man could struggle his way through college and fulfil l th e A . B . A . ' s require ments, wit h the clea r implicatio n that only the shiftles s an d lazy would no t do so. The immediat e result s fel l shor t o f the A.B.A.' s intentions . Th e long-ter m outcome o f th e professionalizatio n effor t was , however , irreversible : the la w schoo l had become th e center fo r the production of lawyers. In the decisive year of 1921, the organize d lega l profession had , i n fact, lef t t o the highl y accessibl e an d highl y stratified America n educational syste m th e tas k o f reconciling the insolubl e problem o f interna l stratificatio n i n th e professio n wit h th e ideolog y o f democrati c egalitarianism. 80

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Production an d transmissio n o f legal knowledge do no t require th e expenditure s which, i n medicine, justified th e concentratio n an d consolidatio n of training facil ities. Also , practica l experience i s mor e importan t in legal teaching, especiall y i n the Anglo-Saxo n law, than it is in professions base d on scientific paradigms: i t was therefore har d t o exclud e practitioner s an d impos e full-tim e facultie s o n th e la w schools. Ye t standardization of requirements continued apace, extending A . A . L . S . standards to 'middle-grade schools," bringin g new schools into the' 'national" category, an d graduall y drivin g out , i n mos t places , th e school s unaccredite d b y th e A.B.A.-A.A.L.S. The apparen t succes s o f standardizatio n doe s no t mak e th e professio n an y les s fragmented: lega l specialties ar e closel y related to the status of a lawyer's clientele; both specializatio n an d stratificatio n appear to be associate d wit h th e prestig e o f a lawyer's school. These segments are separate and often impenetrable to each other. Access t o particula r clienteles an d t o thei r particular legal problems i s a condition for acces s to whole areas of legal knowledge; in consequence, "stratified " profes sional experience project s interna l stratification (which closely replicates tha t of the society a t large) upon the profession's cognitiv e basis, in a manner tha t no standard ization of schools o r requirements ca n modify . Th e field o f recruitment is wide; but the educationa l syste m reproduce s it s hierarchica l an d heterogeneou s characte r a t every step. Today, a handful of large lega l firms i n Wall Stree t se t th e mode l throughout the country fo r the la w firms tha t dea l wit h corporat e business. Thes e firms compet e for th e graduate s fro m th e to p national law schools an d i n ordinary times, a t least, they ge t their pick: the expandin g form s of publicly supporte d lega l aid may attrac t some of the most socially conscious graduate s from thi s elite; service in one of these 83

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top national firms does not appear to hinder, however, access to high-level appointive office. I t considerably helps , o n the othe r hand , furthe r careers in the bi g corporations' ow n legal departments o r in other top-level corporate firms . Competitio n for the "bes t men" amon g these firms "help s perpetuat e a n imbalance i n the distribu tion o f lawyers throughout th e country , a t th e sam e time that thi s concentration of lawyers help s recrui t and retai n bi g business clients." The quality of the law school attended i s the best predictor of the type of practice a lawyer will have. Becaus e this is also th e principa l criterion of selection applied by th e top-leve l la w firms , the y hav e sinc e th e Secon d Worl d Wa r le t i n som e Catholic and Jewish graduates from th e best and most exclusive law schools. I n their selection of associates and partners, however , the top firms seek more secure methods of perpetuating the style which their powerful clients expect and trust in their lawyers: they apply , ordinarily , combine d criteri a of academi c achievement , lineage , an d personality. The compositio n of the lowe r rungs o f the lega l profession i s a corollary of the class an d statu s criteri a applied i n recruitment t o th e highe r echelons . Sol o prac titioners predominate, representin g stil l about 60 percent of all lawyers. Typically , these independent practitioner s appear to seek in a law career a substitute fo r the old entrepreneurial dream : th e la w is , indeed , on e o f the fe w "independent " avenue s of socia l mobilit y whic h on e ca n hop e t o follo w withou t muc h initia l capita l o r investment. A stud y o f sol o lawyers , whic h compare s the m wit h thei r counterparts i n large firms, find s that the former come predominantly from smal l entrepreneurial families, of Southern , Central , o r Easter n Europea n origins ; most hav e studie d i n part-time schools. I n metropolitan areas, thes e lawyer s ten d t o constitut e a n "ethni c bar, " "centered aroun d ethni c lega l associations , th e loca l courts , an d loca l politics , and . . . characterize d b y many mediocre performers competin g for the same breadand-butter cases." Most solo lawyers—about 9 0 percent—tended t o find i n the law the "orderl y job pattern" an d th e securit y the y ha d presumabl y sought . But , i n fact, th e entrepre neurial drea m o f the ethni c sol o lawyer s di d not tak e the m very far : th e differen t careers of solo and large firm lawyer s appear, in fact, as the clear consequence of the segregated an d stratifie d areas which th e clientele' s socia l position defines i n legal practice. A t the bottom—an d eve n a t th e middl e levels—of private lega l practice, competition fo r client s i s severe . I n the thirties , when "overcrowding " became a matter o f acute concern i n the profession , a study foun d that the lega l needs of the vast majorit y o f th e populatio n ar e seldom , i f ever, served . No t surprisingly , th e experiments providin g lower-cos t lega l services tha t starte d i n the thirtie s met wit h resounding success. Competition an d partisa n loyalt y t o the clien t tend t o generate the kin d o f violation of ethics that i s publicly deplore d by the organized profession. Th e stereotypes of th e "ambulanc e chaser " an d o f the lawye r who espouses the unethica l business practices o f his client s contain no referenc e t o th e subtl e or , a t least , hidde n viola tions o f law an d publi c interest tha t occu r i n corporate lega l practice. Wher e th e volume o f lega l practic e an d th e amoun t o f fee s ar e bot h substantia l an d secure , 88

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professional solidarit y and at least the appearance of professional behavior are easier to maintain. At the to p levels of the bar , traditiona l criteri a of lineage an d "style " are deliberatel y added t o the bruta l selectivity of the stratifie d educationa l system , keeping thes e choice s preserve s socially, ethnically, and politicall y homogeneous . "Overdiscrimination" b y race , religion , an d se x perpetuate s the traditiona l mech anisms of professional exclusiveness, superimposin g them on the meritocratic mystifications o f the educationa l system. In conclusion , we may sa y tha t the tw o largest an d oldest professions , medicin e and the law, show two different resolutions of the internal stratification proble m and two differen t modes o f insertion into th e clas s system . I n each case , structur e an d function determine d strategy: medicin e found a principle for reconciling its internal cleavages because it was capabl e o f spreading substantia l economic benefit s acros s its fragmente d an d stratifie d market . I n return, th e interest s o f the smal l medical "entrepreneurs" hav e to be respected, a t least apparently , by the profession's elites . The law, lacking effective means for claiming the global solidarity of its membership, segregated fro m eac h othe r it s most differen t area s of practice. I n both cases, th e average independent professional' 'entrepreneur'' i s relegated to a marginal position: power and influence flow, i n these professions a s in society at large, fro m th e state, the corporation , and th e nationa l university. These two powerful profession s ar e among the mos t attractive to the stubbor n believers in the receding bourgeois ideol ogy o f independence. On e o f thei r accessor y contribution s t o th e dominan t ideology may well be that of maintaining, withou t too much actual encouragement , the flickerin g flam e o f the entrepreneuria l dream . 95

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Chapter 11

PROFESSION AN D BUREAUCRAC Y

The generalize d tendenc y towar d professionalizatio n i s commonl y see n a s on e of th e characteristi c feature s o f th e occupationa l structur e i n advance d industria l societies. Thi s tendency i s part of a complex transformation which i s typically seen to involve : (1) . . . decreasing occupationa l specializatio n with a n increasing proportion of professionals an d technicians i n the labo r force, (2 ) . .. a status-assignment system in which contribution in one's field i s a major statu s criterion an d gaining professional recognition an increasingly important mobility pattern, (3 ) . . . a system of power in which the professional is increasingly dominant, and (4) . . . a class structure in which there i s decreasin g clas s cleavag e wit h clas s distinction s base d upo n acces s t o education. 1

This descriptio n is imbue d wit h a questionable optimis m about th e evolutio n o f work—that is , about th e autonom y an d responsibilit y actually attached t o formall y upgraded jobs—an d abou t th e socia l effects o f mass education. However , it s most general implication s ca n hardl y b e questioned : th e multiplicatio n an d apparen t generalization o f professiona l role s ar e relate d t o dee p changes i n class structur e and i n ideology. With oversimplification , tw o mai n tendencies ca n b e mad e accountabl e fo r th e structural change s i n the stratificatio n system: on e i s th e tendenc y o f the organi c composition of capital to change, wit h the consequence that science and technology are eve r mor e closel y integrate d wit h th e productiv e process an d labo r i s release d from industria l production. The other tendency, related to the former but analytically distinct, i s the diffusio n o f the bureaucrati c mod e o f organization. THE GROWT H O F ORGANIZATIONA L PROFESSION S The predominan t rol e o f applie d scienc e an d technolog y generate s new profes sions or, rather, ne w specialties, a s well as new demands for the application o f' 'old' ' knowledge and skills. These skilled and highly specialized functions tend to emerge in the monopoly and in the state sectors of the economy, whil e the relatively autono mous evolutio n of basic research generates new field s and ne w discipline s that ar e essentially containe d i n the university. 2

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The intimat e relatio n o f bot h ne w specialtie s an d ol d profession s wit h centra l organizations doe s not brin g them , however , int o the categor y o f "organizationa l professions." Bureaucrati c o r large-scale organizatio n appears to be a prerequisit e for th e varietie s o f engineerin g o r chemistry , o r fo r medica l auxiliar y specialist s such a s laboratory , anaesthetic, an d radiolog y technicians; th e appearanc e of these kinds of specialized occupations , however , ca n ultimatel y be explaine d in terms of the growin g differentiation of knowledge an d functions , eve n i f they ar e containe d by an d inherentl y subordinate t o large-scale heteronomou s organizations . A l l professions depen d to a certain extent on large organizations and on the state— if nothin g else, because all have a teaching arm . A l l profession s are , today , bureau cratized to a greater o r lesser extent. Organizationa l professions shoul d not be seen, therefore, a s sharpl y distinc t from olde r an d mor e independen t professions , bu t a s clearer manifestation s o f tendencies als o containe d withi n them . Organizational professions prope r are generated b y heteronomous bureaucracies , and primarily b y the expansion o f the bureaucratic apparatu s of the state . Given the difference betwee n th e stat e bureaucrac y an d th e genera l phenomeno n o f bureau cratization, tw o categorie s ca n b e analyticall y distinguished. Th e firs t categor y i s generated b y th e concentratio n o f administrativ e an d manageria l function s unde r corporate capitalism . Hospital administrators, "professional " busines s administrators, managemen t analysts , schoo l superintendents , colleg e presidents an d th e lik e illustrate thi s type . Here , th e clai m o f specialize d o r "professional " expertis e fo r technobureaucratic function s whic h ar e unspecifi c an d polyvalen t does no t ai m a t asserting independen t professiona l status ; rather, i t borrows from th e genera l ideol ogy of professionalism to justify technobureaucrati c power. Significantly , subordi nate professional s ar e include d amon g th e relevan t public s t o whic h thi s clai m i s addressed. The secon d categor y derive s directl y from th e expansio n o f the state' s function s and attributions . Teaching a t al l levels, counselin g o f different type s i n public or semipublic agencies , socia l work , librarianship , city planning , an d museu m cura torship ar e essentiall y connecte d wit h education , welfare , an d regulator y mechan isms " i n th e servic e o f th e public, " eve n i f these function s ma y b e fulfille d b y private institution s of charity or culture . Fo r these aspirin g occupations, th e clai m of expertise—sanctione d b y externa l source s of credentialing—represents a possibility o f acquiring countervailing power vis-a-vis the bureaucrati c hierarch y o f the organizations withi n whic h the y ar e contained . The tw o categories o f organizational profession ar e therefor e distinguishe d fro m one anothe r b y their different use o f expertise. Anothe r major kind of differentiatio n derives fro m th e presence or absence of a client orientation. Different kind s of client orientation typically distinguish different professions an d different professional types within th e "publi c service " category . Individual career s withi n thi s categor y ma y lead to technobureaucratic positions : teachers may become principal s and pass, fro m there, t o positions in the district-wide administration; academics may become deans or even colleg e presidents; socia l workers may becom e departmen t head s in a welfare bureaucracy . Th e accessibilit y of technobureaucratic statuse s in the hierarchy , 3

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combined wit h th e difference s o r similaritie s in client orientation, define th e legiti macy o f administrative professionals vis-a-vis thei r rank-and-fil e professiona l sub ordinates. Conversely , thes e two factors als o play an importan t part i n determining the potentia l fo r conflic t betwee n th e tw o professional categorie s i n public-service bureaucracies. Two organizationa l profession s wil l provid e illustration s for the brie f discussio n that follows . On e o f these—social work—i s "purely" relate d t o public service, a t first i n privat e philanthropies , no w predominantl y i n stat e agencies . Th e other — school superintendency—i s a mixe d case. O n th e on e hand , i t is generated b y th e state's expanding functions ; it s members often too k the leadershi p i n promoting the monopoly of a given organizational form—the bureaucratize d urba n schoo l system . Their professiona l advancement , o n th e othe r hand , appear s less a s a functio n of negotiated cognitiv e exclusiveness tha n a s a function o f their hierarchical position in a bureaucracy . Fo r thi s reason , schoo l superintendenc y exhibit s technobureau cratic traits; it is astride o f the tw o categories—"techno-bureaucratic" an d "publi c service"—which obviousl y shar e man y characteristics . I n conclusion , I shal l at tempt to set out, by contrast, th e "purer'' trait s of technobureaucratic "professions.' ' PROFESSIONAL USE S O F EXPERTISE IN HETERONOMOU S ORGANIZATION S The mai n instrumen t o f professiona l advancement , muc h mor e than th e profes sion of altruism, is the capacit y t o claim esoteric an d identifiabl e skills—that is, to create an d contro l a cognitiv e an d technica l basis . Th e clai m o f expertise aim s a t gaining social recognition and collective prestige which , i n turn, are implicitl y used by the individua l to assert his authorit y and deman d respec t in the contex t o f everyday transaction s withi n specifi c role-sets. "Regular " medicin e claime d superio r expertise—as did its rivals—when, in fact, ther e was littl e in its cognitive basis that was mor e effective , mor e scientific , o r mor e identifiabl e than i n competing "art s of healing. " Thus , th e observatio n i s inaccurate : " I n the recen t histor y o f profes sionalism, th e organizatio n pus h come s ofte n befor e a soli d technica l an d institu tional bas e is formed; the professiona l association , fo r instance, typicall y precede s university-based trainin g schools, an d the whol e effort seem s more a n opportunistic struggle fo r th e reward s o f monopoly tha n a natura l histor y o f professionalism." In fact , professiona l association s emerge d i n th e older profession s befor e univer sity trainin g could hav e mean t effectiv e an d specifi c instruction—before , tha t is , the successfu l movement s fo r curricular reform in the secon d hal f o f the nineteent h century. Moreover , the "reward s o f monopoly" ar e a n integral part of every profes sional project; to imply that they wer e not important in the "natura l history" of professionalism" i s t o equat e th e latte r wit h th e ideologica l self-presentatio n o f th e older learne d professions . I have argue d instea d tha t th e cognitiv e basis i s both a n element o f the structure o f profession an d one crucial resource which affects th e outcome o f professionalization a s wel l a s th e choic e o f compensatory strategies . Their cognitive resource s gav e engineers a measure o f independence, despit e thei r clos e subordination t o large-scale organization s an d t o th e busines s cycle. Th e sam e ca 4

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pacity allegedl y gav e accountants th e possibilit y of asserting thei r "neutrality " o r "objectivity" o n the mode l o f the olde r learne d profession s an d o f gaining for th e Certified Publi c Accountan t a degree o f professional emancipatio n fro m th e larg e corporation. To comman d a cognitive basis i s just a s importan t for profession s whic h d o no t move a t al l in a fre e marke t o f services , bu t ar e circumscribe d b y th e institution s in whic h the y practice . Thus , i f we disregard fo r one momen t th e significan t differ ences in the status of their respective clienteles , socia l workers and university teachers ca n b e considere d t o b e i n analogou s structura l situations : bot h functio n i n institutional setting s whic h guarantee , a s i t were, a demand fo r their services. Bot h receive thei r income (o r the larges t par t of it) fro m th e organization . Authorit y ove r the clients depends in both cases on organizational power as much as it depends on the power o f expertise . Bu t th e universit y has a genera l monopol y ove r cognitiv e re sources tha t ca n clai m legitimat e superiorit y in the societ y a t large : thi s give s academics a n obvious advantage in the assertio n o f autonomy an d in the justification of their authorit y vis-a-vis "student-clients " an d administrators . According to its principal historian, the professionalization o f social work hinged on the assertio n o f cognitive exclusiveness: "Mor e than any other category o f social workers, caseworker s believe d tha t the y ha d a t leas t th e beginning s o f a scientifi c knowledge base as wel l as a specialized skill , technique , an d function, which differ entiated the m from th e layman or the volunteer." A s could be expected, caseworker s became th e spokesme n an d leader s fo r socia l work' s aspiration s t o professiona l status. In the major cities, groups o f practitioners moved toward the establishment o f formal trainin g programs tha t alread y existed . Eve n though social workers were no t required to graduate from th e new schools, thes e schools, "lik e the associations . . . helped shap e social work a s a profession i n the imag e of casework, an d at least provided an alternative mode o f entry into the professional group—a n alternativ e whic h social work leaders stressed as the swiftest, mos t direct, and most opportune channe l of advance for those who chose social work as a career. " Wit h this institutional basis for the standardized ' 'production of producers," social-wor k leaders could then press for a n upgrading of membership requirement s i n the American Association of Social Workers an d us e th e Associatio n of Professional School s o f Social Wor k t o obtain further standardization. The assertion o f cognitive exclusiveness wa s a distinctive and prototypical expres sion of the professionalization movement , bu t in social work the onset of this movement wa s no t entirely autonomous: th e firs t stirring s of professionalization came , in fact, fro m th e reorganizatio n o f charitabl e societie s alon g th e line s o f "scientifi c philanthropy." Thus , "Th e ke y wor d o f thi s reorganizatio n wa s efficiency ; effi ciency appeare d to be th e corollar y of those techniques o f functional specialization and centralize d coordinatio n an d administratio n tha t characterize d th e busines s w o r l d . " Th e emergenc e o f paid full-tim e socia l workers , a s wel l a s thei r subsequent ques t fo r expertise , wer e originall y th e outcom e o f a largel y heteronomou s move towar d th e bureaucratizatio n o f welfare work . In pursuing thei r ow n strate gies, however , th e caseworker s helpe d t o accelerat e th e transformatio n o f welfar e work fro m "voluntar y service imbue d wit h semi-religiou s sanctity " int o a for m of 6

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urban socia l contro l base d o n formalize d method s an d justifie d b y professiona l expertise. While the professionalism o f social work was asserted—b y means of association , training, and , ultimately , university affiliation—vis-a-vis welfar e administrators an d groups o f colleagues, professionalizatio n als o involved the defense of the new form s of organize d charit y before publi c authorities an d financia l sponsors. This , in turn, presupposed a chang e i n the ideologica l images an d treatmen t o f poverty. "Th e unrelenting emphasi s of the charit y organizatio n societie s upo n investigatio n and a full understandin g o f the fact s surroundin g eac h case evoked sever e criticism fro m more sentimenta l an d reform-minde d contemporaries." Bu t i t was , a t th e sam e time, th e foundatio n o f cas e work—th e profession' s nuclea r skill . Similarly , th e reorganization o f philanthropic societie s involve d "a n increasin g interes t i n socia l agency administratio n an d community-wid e coordination." Thi s las t feature , i n turn, create d ne w possibilitie s fo r professionalizatio n alon g technobureaucrati c channels. In sum , th e emergence of a subculture an d of an identity on which a professional ization movement could be founded clearly revolved around the definition o f a defen sible cognitiv e basis. However , "th e growin g conviction among socia l worker s i n the early twentieth century that they possessed a skill to be acquired by formal education an d experience " wa s a secondary or derived phenomenon. Th e basis and th e initial impuls e fo r th e movemen t wer e generate d b y a redefinition of the organizational form which was to render the service. Th e searc h fo r efficienc y i n mainly private philanthropi c agencie s le d t o bureaucratization . Thereafter , bureaucratiza tion an d professionalization effort s wer e conjugated. Th e bureaucratic tendenc y wa s prolonged an d confirme d b y th e state' s appropriatio n o f th e relie f function . No t coincidentally, th e professiona l goa l o f makin g entr y dependen t o n forma l education wa s considerabl y advance d i n the 1930s—tha t i s t o say , a t th e tim e whe n th e state's welfar e functio n wa s finall y institutionalized. In th e cas e o f schoo l superintendency , bureaucrati c origin s simila r t o thos e of social work can be observed: th e bureaucratization, here , affected th e growing urban school systems . B y the 1880s , accordin g t o Michae l Katz, thi s proces s of bureau cratization wa s practicall y completed : "Th e proces s o f bureaucratizatio n withi n education," h e writes , "wa s s o thoroug h an d s o rapi d becaus e of th e enthusias m of th e schoolme n themselves , who saw i n the ne w organizationa l form s th e openin g up of careers and a partial solution to the proble m of regulating behavior withi n th e occupation." School superintendent s als o availe d themselve s o f ideologica l resources simila r to those utilize d b y caseworkers. Th e caseworke r create d a cognitive basis by gen eralizing empirica l methods an d experienc e an d b y incorporatin g knowledg e an d techniques fro m relate d field s (principall y medicine, psychiatry , an d sociology) . School superintendents , after bureaucratization had clearly differentiated them from teachers, move d t o create a distinctive program o f training based on systematized experience and o n methods borrowed fro m busines s and economics. I t then became possible fo r them t o prove an d legitimiz e expertise b y the typica l means of university course s of study an d degrees . 11

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The fortunes o f the school superintendents' effort s "t o seek security through professional 'expertness' " depende d t o a large exten t o n the introductio n o f scientific management ideologie s in the bureaucratized schoo l systems. While bureaucratiza tion ha d define d fo r school superintendent s role s wit h a measure of power attache d to them, "scientifi c management" enable d the m to use this power to define the sub stance of the sought-afte r efficiency . Echoing the aspiration s o f the schoo l superin tendents, Elwoo d Cubberley , on e o f th e mos t influentia l educator s i n the Unite d States, declare d i n 191 5 befor e th e Nationa l Educational Association: "The recen t attempts t o surve y an d measur e schoo l system s an d t o determin e th e efficienc y of instruction along scientific lines have alike served t o develop a scientific method for attacking administrativ e problems. . . . A l l o f these developments poin t unmistakably i n th e directio n of th e evolutio n of a professio n o f schoo l administratio n a s distinct fro m th e wor k o f teaching o n th e on e han d an d politic s on th e other." Finding themselve s unde r th e fir e o f Progressiv e criticism , schoo l superinten dents an d educators took the leadershi p o f the movemen t t o reorganize th e school s along scientifi c management principles . In pushing this organizational reform, they were consolidatin g th e powe r inheren t i n thei r ow n hierarchica l position . "Wha t they d i d , " says Raymond Callahan, "wa s t o use th e business-industria l analog y t o strengthen thei r positio n an d defen d themselve s b y arguin g that , t o operat e th e schools efficiently , they , th e experts , neede d t o hav e authorit y comparable t o tha t of a manager of a corporation." This case illustrates a dialectic between bureaucrati c caree r patterns an d claims of expertise whic h is different from tha t which prevailed in social work. I n social work, new conception s o f philanthropy accelerated bureaucratizatio n whil e being , a t th e same time , reinforce d b y it . On e o f bureaucratization' s principa l effect s wa s th e emergence of paid full-tim e caseworker s wh o soo n foun d a basis for assertin g ex pertise an d pushing the volunteer out of the increasingly organized practice of public relief. Denyin g t o th e untraine d voluntee r anythin g bu t a n auxiliar y rol e wa s a n obvious corollar y of the collectiv e drive for cognitiv e exclusiveness. Caseworker s appear t o hav e directe d thi s driv e mainl y agains t outsider s wh o wer e thei r direc t competitors. Thei r aim s wer e t o defin e a permanent occupationa l rol e withi n a bureaucratic organization , t o giv e it some expert statu s by creatin g mor e stringen t criteria o f access and t o translat e thes e statu s gain s int o economic rewards . I n the same general category o f state-related publi c services, schoolteacher s offe r a n interesting parallel . Thei r cas e help s t o se t ou t th e technobureaucrati c componen t o f school superintendency . At leas t in the most developed states , school reform aiming at graded an d coordinated schoo l systems was wel l advanced befor e th e Civi l War. It continued apace in the 1870 s an d 1880s , impelle d by the ever-growing number o f children wh o had to be taken i n charge b y the public schools. Th e teachers' early efforts to upgrade thei r wages an d thei r statu s include d a n ideologica l defense o f bot h teacher s an d th e schools: teacher s self-consciousl y sough t t o displac e th e community' s blame "fo r educational failur e from th e schoo l to the home." Bu t the larg e bul k o f teachers did no t succeed in taking advantage of the reorganization: one major reason that th e early school reform could be conducted a t all, despit e th e constant scarcit y of funds, 18

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was the availabilit y o f an abundant suppl y of cheap female labor . Th e reform based on the feminizatio n of schoolteaching logicall y reserve d th e better-paid an d higher level position s i n the syste m t o males . Withi n th e emergen t schoo l bureaucracies , male administrator s wer e i n a favorable positio n to capture mos t o f the benefit s o f reform, whil e seekin g th e legitimatio n o f expertise. Cubberle y recognize d th e ad vantageous amalgamatio n o f two principles of "superiority. " In 1916 , h e recom mended " a goo d colleg e education " fo r the schoo l superintendent , observin g tha t "at leas t a year of graduate wor k i s practically a necessity now. " In addition, those men " o f large grasp and ability . . . shoul d go and obtain their Ph.D. degree" afte r a few years of experience. Teachers , o n the other hand, di d not need anythin g more than " a hig h school education and a two year normal school program for elementary teaching, an d a college educatio n fo r hig h schoo l teaching." The advancemen t o f schoolteachin g a s a professio n parallele d th e growt h an d expansion o f its "highe r branches"—namely , hig h school s i n the firs t decade s of this century . Th e movemen t receive d a decisive pus h fro m th e Progressiv e interes t in schoo l reform and a new ideolog y of education. Th e Progressiv e Era , therefore , provided schoolteachers wit h a new basis on which to push professionalization along the path o f expertise. However , becaus e o f the teachers ' totall y subordinat e posi tion i n the bureaucratized schoo l systems, more solidarity and cohesion wer e necessary than could be obtained through an as yet uncertain "science of pedagogy.'' Thi s is undoubtedl y on e importan t reaso n wh y th e collectiv e advancemen t o f school teaching as an aspiring occupation has alway s depended mor e closely on unions and unionist tactic s tha n i n almost an y othe r "semi-profession." For both schoolteachers an d social workers, the professional projec t was mediated by the bureaucrati c organization s which , i n fact, wer e the matrices o f their occupa tional specializations. A protective institutional barrier is erected aroun d occupation s of this kind when the organization itself asserts its monopoly over a given functional area—over the formal education of children in the case of schools and , in particular, public schools ; an d over public relief i n the case of philanthropic an d welfare agen cies. The professional project depends first on the organization; but within these general boundaries, particula r categories o f specialized worker s upgrade thei r status by creating and claiming areas of expertise. Now , the forms in which expertise o r technical competenc e ar e normall y sought an d asserted (through formal training , teste d competence, an d degrees ) coincide , i n theory, wit h th e universalisti c standards of bureaucracy. Bu t these aspiring occupations loo k outside their bureaucratic context s of practic e fo r certification an d training , a s the y als o see k to control the conten t of training an d it s access. I n so doing , they are , i n fact, attemptin g to define autono mously the boundaries o f a market of services whic h i s subject t o the overall control of a heteronomous organization . Thus, o n th e on e hand , bureaucratizatio n stimulate s claim s o f expertise: o n th e other hand, the quest of externally sanctioned expertis e by aspiring professions tend s to subtrac t fro m th e discretionar y powe r inheren t i n a bureaucrati c hierarchy . I n other words , a s specialist s generate d b y bureaucrati c organization s see k to profes sionalize, they introduce into the career patterns o f one organization checks tha t ar e administered b y othe r organizations—namely , professiona l an d graduat e schools , 21

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professional associations, and , when licensing is attained, state boards. Thes e checks are stronger i n "autonomous professiona l organizations'' suc h as hospitals, large law firms, clinics , an d graduate school s (i f w e consider the m as employers independen t to som e degree fro m th e universit y administration); they ar e give n more automati c recognition than in "heteronomous organizations " suc h as those that depend o n the state's bureaucrati c apparatus. However , a contemporar y researc h i n a heter onomous organization— a social-wor k agency i n a medium-size d city—als o finds "some evidence t o support the hypothesis tha t the less well trained supervisors gav e differential treatmen t t o thei r traine d an d untraine d workers." Supervisor s wh o did no t hav e forma l degrees—tha t i s to say , th e proo f o f "externall y sanctioned " expertise—exhibited som e insecurity in their use o f bureaucratic power : they hesi tated t o enforce thei r hierarchical superiority over subordinate s wh o had a t least a s much trainin g as the y did. The hierarchical distance betwee n socia l workers and their supervisors wa s not so great that it could not be abridged by the workers' possession of an externally valued attribute suc h a s a graduat e degree . Schoolteachers , however , wer e subordinat e to administrators who had themselves sough t to expand and justify thei r bureaucrati c power b y claimin g expertis e an d reachin g fo r th e university' s legitimation. A t the primary levels , th e larg e poo l of potential candidates and th e relativel y low educational requirement s denie d schoolteacher s th e kin d o f individualized countervailing power inherent i n the possession of "superior" credentials . Th e need fo r collective bargaining and collective organization was, therefore, no t diminished by the progressive raisin g of educational standard s of entry. It ca n b e hypothesize d tha t th e structura l predispositio n towar d collectiv e bar gaining powe r wil l b e greate r whereve r a n aspirin g professio n i s subordinat e t o a hierarchy o f authority , which itsel f include s categorie s wit h "superior " claim s of expertise. Th e case of hospital nurses and hospital technicians appears to warrant the hypothesis: sinc e n o amoun t o f externally sanctioned expertis e ca n compensat e for the subordinatio n o f auxiliar y medica l profession s t o th e physician , unionization remains a choice a t leas t a s effectiv e a s furthe r professionalization . Now, th e physicians' superiorit y over other occupational roles in the medical division of labor has been construed by Freidson as a central characteristic of profession. Could no t on e assume , then , tha t th e professiona l statu s of school superintendent s flows logicall y from thei r possession of this essential quality—namely , their authority over an occupation which itself has professional aspirations? Buil t in such simplistic terms , a paralle l between doctor s an d schoo l superintendent s woul d b e totall y misleading. Th e latter's authorit y over teachers—as well a s thei r relative autonomy vis-a-vis electe d schoo l boards—d o no t depen d o n thei r possession o f a n "exper t knowledge" but on th e bureaucratization of the school systems. Turning the parallel around, it is almost more fitting to argue that the doctors did not secure their command over nurse s an d othe r auxiliar y medica l occupation s unti l th e larg e hospital—an d especially th e universit y teaching hospital—ha d becom e th e institutiona l cente r of modern medicine. Up to a point, the physicians' relatively easy access to the top positions i n the hospital' s administrativ e hierarchy coul d be justified i n terms o f their superior knowledg e o f wha t th e hospita l wa s suppose d t o do . Bu t th e increasin g 23

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bureaucratization o f the hospita l reduces the doctors ' acceptabilit y a s to p administrators; it generates, in fact, th e specialized role of hospital administrator, which is a more precise structura l counterpart o f the school superintendent tha n the physician' s role. School superintendents sough t to acquire the trappings of professionalism by associating thei r rol e wit h program s o f trainin g and colleg e degrees . Thei r ques t fo r externally sanctioned expertise di d not typically aim at creating individualized coun tervailing powers withi n th e schoo l bureaucracy (excep t indirectly , a s educated me n command mor e respect in everyday interactions) . Nor did it aim at excluding competitors from acces s to a set of specialized functions, for these were well-guarded by the patterns o f promotion through bureaucratic hierarchies . Th e actual foundation of the superintendents ' powe r hinged , i n fact, o n th e promotio n of an organizationa l form, bureaucracy , an d o f a n organizationa l ideology , "scientifi c management. " The public' s genera l acceptanc e o f th e principl e of rul e b y expert s increase d th e superintendents' capacit y t o defin e th e criteri a of administrativ e efficiency: in this manner the y could expand th e measure of autonomous powe r inherent i n their hierarchical position. Like teachers and social workers, school superintendents functio n withi n heterono mous organizations : thei r autonomy , however , i s limite d b y externa l constraint s and conditions placed o n the functionin g of school systems, whil e th e schoolteach ers' autonom y i s limite d b y the superintendenc y itself . The superintendents ' effor t to acquire valued attributes (graduat e credentials ) does not create the heteronomy of the teachers ' role : it merely seek s to legitimiz e it in terms tha t ar e comprehensibl e to all . The superintendent s relie d on the sam e acceptable term s o f credentialed ex pertise t o justify th e autonomy they were trying to establish vis-a-vis elective school boards. To see k the symbol s o f professional expertis e a s legitimation s for role s tha t ar e actually lodge d i n a bureaucratic hierarch y i s typical o f technobureaucratic profes sions. Th e "purer " cas e is that of the various specializations of business administration, spawne d b y th e doubl e proces s of concentration o f administrative power an d differentiation o f functions at (relatively) high ranks. Other professions dependen t on the big corporation, such a s engineering an d accountancy , ar e closer t o the "publi c service organizationa l professions, " i n tha t externall y sanctione d expertis e repre sents, for them as fo r social workers, a potential of countervailing power within th e organization. However, non e o f the profession s (o r "professionalizing " specializations ) con nected wit h th e administratio n of the corporatio n engages in organization-buildin g efforts a s par t o f a collectiv e mobility project . Organizationa l profession s suc h a s schoolteaching an d socia l work , a s wel l a s th e mixe d category o f schoo l superin tendency, typicall y promot e thei r own collective status by promoting the monopoly of a specifi c organizationa l form : bureaucratize d schoo l system s an d "scientifi c philanthropy" thu s deriv e muc h o f thei r ideologica l legitimac y fro m collectiv e efforts o f their personnel . Th e corporation' s ideologica l legitimacy i s tha t o f pri vately appropriate d capital : it i s grounded , therefore , i n general dimension s o f the dominant ideology . Th e technobureaucrati c specialization s whic h depen d o n th e

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corporation shar e i n these general ideologica l legitimations: the clai m o f expertis e based on special knowledge neither modifies the patterns o f career within the bureau cratic hierarchy nor adds to the organization's overall credibility. The difference may seem a pure matter of nuance. I t becomes more perceptible, however, i f the important dimension o f client-orientation i s take n int o consideration. CLIENT ORIENTATION , PUBLI C SERVICE, AND TECHNOBUREAUCRAC Y In 1939 , T. H. Marshall welcomed a trend which h e thought was associated wit h the welfare state: "The professions, " h e wrote, "are bein g socialized and the social and publi c service s ar e bein g professionalized . Th e profession s ar e learning , no t merely to recognize their obligations to society as a whole as well as those to individual clients , bu t als o t o brea k dow n th e traditiona l isolation which separate d the m from on e another . The y are ready t o work a s a team." I n his view, th e administrative professions wer e not only a most representativ e secto r o f the ne w middle class: they were als o a natural reservoir of leadership fo r the intermediate classes, weane d by thei r for m o f employment fro m th e competitiv e "motives an d incentive s whic h are repute d t o mak e capitalis m work. " T o thi s "socialized " professionalism , Marshall assigne d th e functio n o f defining and workin g fo r "socia l efficiency , a s distinct fro m bot h business efficiency an d mechanica l efficiency." 26

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We need not enter here into a discussion of the ideological conceptions tha t would inform thi s socia l efficiency . Ther e i s ampl e evidenc e tha t administrativ e profes sionals, as much as the others, often expect their clients to conform with the standards of th e dominan t culture, marke d a s the y ar e b y class inequality and racism . A fre quent correlat e o f this bias i s that professionals ten d to conceive of their services a s means o f bringing nonconforming client s close r t o thes e standards. Despit e hi s unwarranted optimism , T. H. Marshal l is i n fact suggestin g tha t th e ne w form s of public deliver y of professional o r paraprofessional service s operat e to free th e ideal of servic e to the collectivity fro m th e market pressures of the old professional model (though not from th e pressures of collective status defense). Fro m my point of view, organizational professions contribute d at their inception to the definition o f the for m that th e deliver y of public services woul d take ; an d the y may, i n the sam e manner , redefine it . Suc h definition—or redefinition—o f functio n mus t take into account th e profession's actua l o r potentia l publics , a s wel l a s it s subordinat e an d auxiliar y occupations. Client participation aims at the direct involvement of the public. This can be a deliberate policy used by bureaucratic agencie s to manipulate their clients. There is evidence, fo r instance, tha t citizen-participatio n policie s on the par t o f urban renewa l agencies hav e led " i n most case s to th e acknowledgmen t an d approva l of bureau cratic activitie s whic h ma y hav e benefite d th e urba n renewa l program' s cliental group—central cit y businessmen—bu t no t th e program' s target —the poo r livin g in th e central c i t y . " Insofa r a s suc h policie s involved th e professiona l staf f o f the bureaucracy (i n additio n t o technobureaucrati c administrators) , thi s woul d b e a n example o f totally manipulativ e client-orientation . 28

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Attempts to involve their clients on the par t o f bureaucratic organization s alway s need t o b e examine d i n their genera l politica l context. However , organizationa l professions i n th e servic e o f th e publi c ar e directl y an d structurall y tie d t o thei r clients. Therefore , redefinitio n of the organizationa l function and assertions of professional autonom y vis-a-vi s th e organizationa l hierarch y alway s touc h upo n th e client orientation . Thi s orientation may tak e variou s forms . First, i t may be manipulative, i n a less conscious an d more benign form than tha t suggested in the urban renewal case. Thus, in a marginal and recently emergent are a of professionalization , child-car e specialist s ar e ofte n compelle d by federa l regula tions to incorporat e th e parents of their wards a s auxiliaries . There i s a tendency t o maintain these auxiliaries in hierarchical subordination, whil e seekin g amon g the m and amon g othe r parent s suppor t fo r the professionalizatio n efforts. Second, indifference t o the client may be the norm in large bureaucratic contexts , or among professional s wh o do not define themselve s as client-oriented . Doctors in bureaucratized healt h plans an d large hospitals illustrat e the first case. Academics— especially i n elite institutions where "publis h or perish " i s the rule—ar e th e mos t typical illustratio n of the secon d example . Professiona l indifferenc e ma y b e broke n from th e outside—b y a n organized movemen t o f the client s themselves, o r even b y administrations ben t o n improving the "huma n aspect " or on increasing "teachin g efficiency." Suc h external impositio n may force the professional t o analyze an d reexamine his status and his function; or it may indeed change indifference into unqualified hostilit y t o th e client. Third, hostility towar d th e clien t ma y b e th e norm . Thi s manifest s itself , ordi narily, i n interpersona l contacts : th e professiona l demand s deferenc e an d compli ance, denies any active participation in the process to the client, and enforces maxi mum social distance. Suc h hostility appears to be common among professionals wh o are themselve s subordinate , an d therefor e insecur e o f their status , whe n force d t o deal wit h lower-clas s clienteles . I n recen t years , urba n racia l conflic t ha s trans formed thi s kind of interpersonal expressio n o f hostility into overt political struggle . In th e centra l cities, man y sector s of professionalizing occupation s an d profession s seek political strengt h an d appl y ope n politica l pressur e to exclude minoritie s fro m participating i n the definitio n o f servic e organizations . Thi s conflic t wa s probabl y never illustrate d more dramaticall y than i n the Ne w Yor k Cit y teachers' strik e over decentralization an d contro l of the schools. Fourth an d finally , eve n i n such extrem e situation s a s these , som e professional s side wit h thei r clients agains t thei r own colleagues. Crise s nee d not be s o acut e for professionals t o redefin e th e idea l o f servic e a s on e whic h demand s partisanship. What partisanshi p ideall y means i s advocating organizationa l change—an d socia l change—in orde r to better serv e the clients' needs; it means breaking down the barriers between professional s an d laymen, at least enough fo r the client to express and define hi s need as he sees it; i t means an attempt t o seek and elicit the client's activ e comprehension an d even hi s participation in the renderin g of services; i t means that professionals ca n neither expect nor demand trust from lower-clas s clients whom professions hav e systematically neglecte d o r failed t o respect; it means that thi s sor t of trust must, i n fact, b e earned; it means, finally, attemptin g to organize th e clients for collective action so that they ca n become their own advocates. In short, thes e forms 31

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of reprofessionalization, even i f they may sometimes result in excesses of zeal which misread the clients' real needs, challenge the division between professions and laity. In revitalizin g th e notio n o f professional vocation or calling, advocac y throw s considerable doub t on the compatibilit y o f a profession's marke t orientation an d status project wit h it s servic e ideal. Members of public-service organizational professions hav e often bee n i n the vanguard of these reprofessionalization efforts, togethe r wit h public-spirite d dissenters in the older professions. Whil e the public service professionals can also provide conspicuous examples of the other types of client-orientation, the typical technobureaucratic professions canno t even be considered indifferen t t o their clients: they simply do not have any autonomous orientation toward the clients, except indirectly. Th e corporation whic h the y serv e mediates , i n fact , th e professionals ' relatio n t o th e clients, a s buyer s o r user s of corporate service s o r products. It i s a distinctive characteristic of the technobureaurcratic ideolog y that it should make depoliticizatio n o f the citizenr y int o a major connotation of the "rul e by experts." Ideologica l appeal s to the safeguar d o f professional judgments an d profes sional integrit y ca n b e use d b y all professions whe n they are threatene d wit h clien t revolt or , mor e mildly , wit h clien t demand s fo r some rights of review. Technobureaucratic profession s participat e fully i n this ideological practice . I t is unthink able, however , tha t professional s whos e powe r depends o n hierarch y an d o n th e bureaucratic uses of secrecy shoul d ever invite clients to share in this organizational power, i f not for the manipulativ e purposes whic h I mentioned above. The absenc e of client orientatio n can b e construe d a s a characteristic dimension of technobureaucratic professionalism: its presence in different professiona l contexts alerts us, then, to the possible onset of other technobureaucratic characteristics . The fortunes o f technobureaucrati c profession s depen d o n th e heteronomou s bureau cratic organization s fo r whic h the y work . Bu t the "professionalism " o f business administrators, managemen t analysts , an d eve n engineer s an d accountant s i n th e service of corporations, i s not concerned wit h th e organizational forms that mediate the production of professional services. Service to the public can hardly be considered a goal of the private corporation. Onl y a general crisis of legitimacy could seriously question th e motive s tha t gover n profit-makin g i n larg e privat e organizations. S o long as this does not occur, neither the professionalization nor the reprofessionalization effort s o f technobureaucratic specialtie s wil l typicall y includ e redefinitions o f the organization which take clients' needs into account. A t most, such redefinitions can preoccup y single professionals, i n the privac y of a crisis of conscience . It ca n b e submitte d tha t typica l technobureaucrati c profession s incorporate , a t best, onl y on e dimensio n of true profession: namely, the possession of specialized skills. Thei r professionalization efforts do not mean, i n my view, tha t big business and bureaucratic hierarchies migh t b e transformed by the grace of altruistic service, or even by the professional devotion to work fo r work's intrinsic rewards . These efforts ar e best analyzed a s a n extension and an illustratio n o f the ideologica l use s o f expertise. Professions an d professionalizing occupations generated by heteronomous bureaucratic organization s can b e situate d along a continuum that goe s from pur e public service expert roles to pure technobureaucratic roles . Today, however, all professions 35

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have some connection with bureaucratic organizations. These relationships constitute a most important dimension of the incorporation of professions int o the structures of contemporary capitalism . THE CONFLIC T BETWEE N PROFESSIONS AN D BUREAUCRACY Recent sociologica l analysis ha s considerabl y modifie d earlie r approaches, whic h postulated a n inherent conflict betwee n th e bureaucratic an d the professional mode s of wor k organization. Tw o sets of assumptions underlie d this perceived conflict : the one concerne d a n idealized notion of "free" profession , th e other derived fro m having taken the Weberian model of bureaucracy a s a totality. These premises le d to an inescapabl e paradox , fo r indeed th e contemporar y increas e i n the proportio n of professionals i n the labo r forc e i s almost entirel y constituted b y professional s wh o work withi n larg e organization s o r hav e organi c wor k connection s wit h them. Skirting th e parado x le d t o furthe r unexamine d analytica l premises . Fo r som e authors, th e genera l tren d towar d increasing professionalizatio n appeare d illusory , for i t depended o n bureaucracy—that i s to say , th e ver y forc e tha t wa s subvertin g the true structur e o f profession. Anothe r approach, no t incompatible with th e for mer, centere d th e assume d conflic t betwee n professiona l socializatio n an d moda l work experience a t the level of individuals: a s the carriers of the true norms and ideals of profession , individua l professional s i n bureaucratic wor k setting s wer e boun d to experience threat s an d contradictions . 37

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In bot h cases, th e conflic t betwee n th e professiona l an d th e bureaucrati c mode s of authorit y and organization revolved around the ambiguou s notio n of professional autonomy: structurally , autonomy wa s implicitl y equate d wit h th e largel y mythical past of the "free" professions , i n particular medicine and the law; this mythical condition wa s the n contraste d wit h th e structura l realitie s o f professional wor k unde r corporate capitalism . At the leve l of the individual , professiona l expectation s o f autonomy an d professiona l frame s o f reference lea d som e analyst s t o predic t socio psychological tensions: the y ar e see n to derive fro m th e contradiction s between th e "personality" o f the exper t o r professional, reinforce d by hi s background an d ori entations, an d tha t o f th e bureaucra t o r manager. Thes e tension s derive , i n th e second place , fro m th e contradiction s betwee n th e self-regulatio n and pee r control characteristic o f professional wor k an d th e externalize d control s o f a bureaucrati c hierarchy. I n these contradiction s lie s th e potentia l conflict betwee n loyalt y t o th e organization and loyalty to the professiona l community . Freidson an d Rhea su m up in thes e word s th e assumption s beneat h thi s postulat e o f conflict: "Th e consensu s seems to be that [professional] workers require a kind of autonomy that is antithetical to Weber's mode l of rational-legal bureaucracy. . . . The proper way for such men to wor k i s a s member s o f a self-regulatin g 'compan y o f equals'." One mai n current o f empirical studies ha s contribute d to demystifyin g the idea l connotations o f profession and , therefore , thei r unwarranted extensio n to individua l professionals. Researc h int o actual processe s o f professional socialization , actual mechanisms o f pee r control , an d actua l professiona l practic e ha s shown , amon g other things, the variety of motives that guid e the choice of a professional caree r or 40

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careers; th e reluctanc e t o sanctio n one' s colleagues , an d th e structura l difficultie s of doin g s o effectively ; and th e divers e "personalities " tha t emerg e fro m profes sional trainin g an d th e processe s o f educationa l stratificatio n an d self-selectio n which distribut e graduates amon g differen t professiona l niches. With a different focus , othe r studie s hav e questioned th e secon d premis e o f the "inherent conflict " approach : reexaminin g the Weberian ideal type of bureaucracy , the systematic comparativ e study of organizations has shown , first of all, that "some of the components o f the ideal type are relatively uncorrelated, while some are highly correlated." Differen t types o f bureaucrac y ca n b e distinguished : the y exhibi t some but not all th e feature s o f the Weberian mode. Particularl y significant among these types are the "professional bureaucracies " o r "autonomous professiona l organizations" whic h one autho r defines a s "thos e i n which professionals pla y the cen tral role in the achievement o f the primary organizational objectives.' ' The medical clinic, th e graduat e school , th e larg e lega l o r accountin g firm , larg e architectura l offices, an d research institutes, are typical examples: fo r the individual professional s on their staffs, these institutions become th e locus of strains and conflicts that are dif ferent fro m thos e encountere d i n othe r type s o f bureaucracies . Furthermore , th e analysis o f the potential conflict betwee n professional s an d heteronomous organiza tions could be specifie d accordin g to different dimensions o f the bureaucrati c mod e and t o differen t type s o f experts an d expertise. 42

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The empirica l studies whic h decompos e the Weberia n model into its constituen t dimensions als o ten d t o trea t professionalis m a s a constellatio n o f variables wit h attitudinal referents, som e of which can be scaled. Th e evidence to which these studies arriv e challenge s th e notio n o f a global conflic t betwee n professionalizatio n and bureaucratization. Thus, Richard Hall finds a strong positive associatio n betwee n bureaucracy's relianc e o n technical competence i n selection an d advancemen t pro cesses and all th e dimension s o f professionalism. Hasting s an d Hinings' study of British accountant s i n large industria l organizations find s a simila r congruence be tween the professionals' value s of quantification and rationality, on one hand, and the organization's emphasi s o n "analyzing , planning , an d controllin g action " o n th e other. Thes e predictable findings indirectly confirm th e largely common historical origins o f both modes of work organization ; they reinforce , tha t is , Stinchcombe' s hypothesis tha t bureaucrac y an d professionalis m ar e tw o subtypes o f a larger category—that o f rational administration. Richard Hall finds, moreover, tha t two other bureaucratic dimensions—hierarch y of authorit y and the presence of rules—have onl y weak negative relations with mos t professional variables , an d positive, thoug h weak, relation s wit h th e professional' s sense of calling. I n fact, onl y th e professiona l feelin g of autonomy show s a stron g inverse relationshi p with al l the dimensions o f bureaucracy excep t technica l competence. Thi s leads him to th e followin g conclusion : 46

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In som e cases a n equilibrium may exist betwee n the level s o f professionalizatio n an d bureaucratization in the sens e that a particular level of professionalization ma y require a certain level of bureaucratization to maintain social control. Too little bureaucratization may lead to to o man y undefine d operationa l area s if the professio n itsel f ha s not developed operationa l standard s fo r thes e areas . B y th e sam e token , conflic t ma y ensue i f the equilibriu m is upset. 49

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The interdependenc e pointe d ou t b y Hal l i s coheren t wit h th e origin s of organizational professions , which , a s w e hav e seen, emerge i n symbiosis wit h th e bureau cratization o f their functions an d wor k settings . Most empirical studies o f the postulated conflic t betwee n profession s an d bureau cracies stress , lik e Hall's , interdependenc e an d specificity . A fe w finding s should be briefl y mentioned , a s necessar y evidenc e fo r a genera l assessment . A stud y of organizational professional s i n socia l welfar e agencie s examine s th e relatio n be tween differen t dimension s o f bureaucracy an d two kind s of work satisfaction : th e satisfaction o f specific expectations abou t work , o n the one hand, and , on the other , satisfaction wit h socia l relations on the j o b . I n this case, participation in decisionmaking appears to be the stronges t determinan t o f specific wor k satisfaction , whil e the single best predictor of unsatisfactory wor k relations is the bureaucratic codification and enforcement o f rules. The study implicitly suggests that the two dimensions of wor k satisfactio n ma y compensate each other: sinc e individua l professionals pre sumably respon d i n terms o f pre-existing expectations an d caree r goals, the y have different risk s o f dissatisfaction i n the sam e bureaucratic wor k setting . Several studie s cente r o n the professionals ' previou s socialization , thus implyin g that self-selectio n ma y be , amon g thes e relativel y privilege d workers , a majo r factor o f adjustment t o work. Studyin g the differen t orientations of engineers, law yers, an d professors i n unequally bureaucratized wor k settings , Wilensk y finds that "mixed type s o f orientation—mixtures, that is , of pure professionalism an d careerism—are typical , consisten t wit h th e ide a o f th e interpenetratio n o f bureaucrati c and professional cultures." Th e findings that "bureaucrac y i s not a necessary bar to professional commitment,' ' and that role orientation is more influenced by occupational training than by socialization on the job, lea d Wilensky to deemphasize the threat t o professionalis m inheren t i n bureaucracies . Consistent wit h Wilensky's results, G. A. Miller finds that Ph.D. scientists in aero space industries are , o n th e on e hand , relativel y indifferent to th e opportunitie s of participating i n decision-making whic h s o preoccupie d th e socia l workers ; o n th e other hand they are, o n the whole, less "alienated" b y their work context than engineers or scientist s wit h onl y M . A . o r M.S . degrees. Scientist s wit h Ph.D.' s ar e concentrated i n special unit s and receive a variety of advantages from th e company . The detaile d analysi s suggests , however , tha t aerospac e professional s respon d t o different element s o f their work situation in the context of different personal motives. For the majority o f professional personnel, "researc h freedom'' an d the opportunities of obtaining professional recognitio n outside the company matte r more than bureau cratic variables such as the type of supervision or the presence of specific professiona l incentives. The stud y implies , on the other hand , tha t the higher alienation of engineers may be related to the frustration of their managerial aspirations, whil e scientist s with lowe r degrees may be reacting, instead, t o the fact that they have less research autonomy tha n thei r colleague s wit h Ph.D.'s . Earlie r finding s document , i n fact , the lack of professional commitmen t of engineers and even of engineering graduat e students, wh o lac k a definit e imag e o f their professiona l tasks , se e themselve s i n "any technica l capacity," an d characterize succes s in technobureaucratic terms , a s "getting int o management." 50

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In professions lik e engineering and accountancy, which depend on the large corporation an d ar e ofte n imbedde d i n it, the member s frequentl y appear to hav e man agerial o r technobureaucrati c caree r aspirations . Th e sam e shoul d b e tru e o f th e many professionalizing specialties—from information to sales—which emerge fro m the differentiatio n o f functions in the corporate structure. Thes e "professionals " pose a different kin d of problem for corporate management fro m thos e who take their discipline or their organized profession as a primary frame of reference—in industry, these ar e mostl y synonymous wit h researc h scientists . Encouragement o f professiona l activitie s an d professiona l incentive s ar e no t always conciliatory managemen t response s to pressures from professionals: revers ing th e usua l approach , a stud y of the professiona l ladde r of advancement i n large bureaucratic organization s find s tha t i t also ha s anothe r function . Fo r profession s and specialtie s wit h technobureaucrati c aspiration s or origins, professionalis m may be impose d fro m above . Management , sa y th e authors , "attempt s t o impos e professionalism a s a definition o f success within th e organizatio n in order to maintain commitment o n th e par t o f those specialist s wh o woul d ordinaril y b e considere d failures fo r not having moved up int o management . . . . I t is not just a process of cooling out those wh o do not reach a goal, but an attempt to make alternative goals viable." For a large category of professionals whos e concept of career i s inseparable fro m technobureaucratic advancement , "professionalism " represent s a n ambiguou s alternative: a "professiona l career" within th e organizatio n is a sign of career immobility. I t can b e perceive d a s such , o r not . Professional s lik e engineer s an d ac countants already hav e a stabl e statu s i n th e wide r society : thei r credential s an d degrees, guaranteed b y professional institutions , i n theory give them relative assurance of their "status continuit y i n a labor market." Wha t they expect t o gain in the organizationa l contex t is , precisely , technobureaucrati c power : th e "profes sional ladder, " however , provide s neithe r contro l o f resource s no r participatio n in centra l decision-making . On th e othe r hand , specialist s wh o find the y cannot clim b th e rank s o f manage ment may assist management i n the creation o f "professionalism." Thus one company ha s create d a n elaborate "professiona l ladder " fo r its experienced salesmen , in an attempt "to create enough differences betwee n these salesmen an d the younger ones to reduc e th e stigm a of failure t o become a manager." Viewe d fro m below , the attempt to professionalize a specialty is "one o f the reactions to blocked mobility eve n amon g thos e alread y i n management." Highe r u p i n th e bureaucrati c hierarchy, "professionalization " can be a strategy b y successful technobureaucrat s who see k to justify thei r power in terms of expertise. Bu t at lowe r levels , or in the dual ladde r system , "professionalism " may b e a n attemp t by management t o coo l out, o r to compensate fo r the blocke d mobility of individuals. The "dua l ladder"—one exampl e of multiple career lines—i s one o f the means by whic h organization s seek to incorporate their professional staf f an d to avoi d th e conflicts tha t coul d aris e i f the staff s technica l competence an d performanc e did not receive any rewards. As shown in one of the most studied cases of professionals in organizations, industry needs, precisely, the creativity of its research scientists. 54

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The organizationa l structure , therefore , reflect s management' s dilemm a betwee n the nee d t o ensure the autonom y o f its "discipline-oriented " professional s an d th e need t o integrat e thei r production into th e structur e o f the industria l organization . While divers e "professiona l incentives " attemp t t o kee p individuals satisfied , mechanisms o f organizational segregation ar e use d whic h allo w a great dea l o f autonomy an d informalit y t o whol e researc h departments . A s Richar d Hal l notes : "The head of the department may be in conflict situation s with the rest of the organization, but this is not necessarily passe d down to the individua l professionals, sinc e the departmenta l organizatio n may no t vary much from tha t i n a professional orga nization, a s i n the cas e of legal departments an d la w f i r m s . " Segregation mechanisms , however , ma y increas e th e othe r departments ' resis tance to utilizing research. Kornhause r identifie s three mai n classes of mechanism s which attemp t t o dea l wit h thi s typ e o f resistance. (1 ) The "institutionalizatio n of the teachin g function, " whic h "attempt s t o increase th e authorit y of the scientist s and experts." I t is, I think, th e onl y mechanis m whic h attempt s a direct reconcilia tion betwee n tw o mode s o f authority—expertis e an d administrativ e power . Th e others ten d to resolve the conflict a t the level of individuals. Thus, (2) "the strategi c deployment o f scientist s an d engineer s throughou t a n enterpris e tend s t o reduc e resistance t o researc h resultin g fro m conflictin g perspective s o n innovation" ; it depends on "mobil e individuals" t o perform these integrativ e functions. (3 ) "Re strictions o n th e autonom y o f research hel p t o kee p ope n channel s o f contact an d communication and to increase th e influence of the users of research o n the researc h unit's activities and policies." Like th e secon d mechanism , th e thir d on e tends to displace some experts from staf f to line functions (or from production to the organization an d coordination of research): i t reduces the scop e of potential conflict b y lim iting it to the heads of research unit s or professional departments. Thes e mechanism s also ten d t o multipl y non-supervisor y manageria l roles , o f whic h severa l studie s find evidenc e i n organizations wit h a high ratio of experts amon g their personnel. The emergenc e o f intra-organizationa l "consultan t patterns " i s a n interestin g articulation o f thes e adaptiv e mechanisms . On e stud y o f informatio n specialist s observes: " I f high-status manager s ac t a s consultant s t o other s ove r who m the y do no t hav e forma l jurisdiction , situation s i n which low-statu s staf f specialist s at tempt t o giv e authoritativ e advice t o high-statu s non-specialist s ar e avoided . Thi s new hierarch y modele d o n th e consultan t patter n help s non-hierarchica l forms of cooperation between divisional and departmental heads and the head of the informatio n department." Th e ne w structure , moreover , make s i t unlikel y tha t "high-statu s but non-specialist managers can make requests directly fro m low-statu s informatio n specialists, [thu s averting ] anothe r sourc e o f managerial-professiona l conflict." The consultant patter n incorporate s an d adapts a form o f exchange o f services — consultation—which i s commonly practiced on a fee-for-service basi s with outsid e experts. Togethe r wit h th e segregatio n mechanism s an d th e us e o f "semi-expert " administrators fo r th e researc h departments , th e consultan t patter n show s tha t industries whic h us e o r produce knowledg e are structurall y compelled to incorporate or adap t organizationa l patterns typica l o f the universit y model and of the "organization o f the labo r market i n higher education." 59

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This brie f surve y suggest s a systematic approac h t o the potentia l sources of conflict betwee n administrativ e hierarchie s an d professiona l staff . I hav e discusse d earlier th e significan t variations of the typica l orientatio n toward the clien t amon g organizational professions . I f thes e variation s ar e combine d wit h th e principa l dimensions o f personal wor k satisfaction , w e obtain a typology o f professionals i n heteronomous organizations . (Se e Tabl e 2. ) I wil l outlin e it, as a firs t ste p i n the discussion that follows. (I t is assumed in all cases that professionals, b y comparison with worker s i n other occupations , typicall y exhibi t a hig h degre e o f interest an d high expectation s i n relation to their work. ) Assuming tha t managemen t i n heteronomou s organization s alway s face s th e problem o f integrating the professiona l staf f (an d in the las t resort, disciplinin g it) , while a t th e sam e tim e elicitin g it s adequat e performance , w e ca n advanc e som e educated guesse s on th e potentia l elements o f conflict i n each case . In cel l A o f Table 2 , i f we assum e a minima l uniformit y amon g publi c servic e organizations, the stage of professionalization reached b y a particular group of specialists wil l determin e differen t type s o f managerial responses . I f the occupational specialty ha s already obtaine d externa l sanctio n fo r it s claims o f expertise (i n the form o f specific training and credentials administere d by outside institutions) , management's desir e t o elici t th e "best " performanc e ma y b e reflected—howeve r Table 2. TYPE S OF PROFESSIONA L ORIENTATION I N HETERONOMOUS ORGANIZATIONS Professional expectations emphasize

Participation in organizational decision making

Work autonomy vis-a-vis organizational bureaucracy

Positive Client orientation (dominant, manipulative, o r partisan)

(A) Public-service, "new " professions (including "marginal" professions)

(B) From solo practice, which use s the orga nization as service, to advocacy (partisan involvement with clients). Academics with teaching emphasis may belong to this category

Negative Client orientation (absent, indifferent)

(D) Technobureaucratic specialties an d professions

(C) "Enclave" profession s (scientists in industry or academics with research emphasis)

Professional practice presupposes

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ideologically—in th e preferentia l hirin g o f the personne l wit h th e highes t degree s or the best credentials. Thi s would be the case for social workers and schoolteachers, among others : th e possessio n o f externally sanctione d expertis e give s them , a s w e have seen , a measur e o f countervailin g power wit h regar d t o supervision . I t ma y also tend t o push som e of these public service professional s towar d cell B . The ac cessibility o f managerial roles , i n turn, ma y mov e som e of them towar d cel l D . If, however , th e specialist s ar e onl y very marginally engaged on this path t o professionalization, administrator s wil l probabl y discourag e (o r a t leas t no t welcome ) the efforts by a subordinate grou p to increase its potential for "legitimate'' resistance to supervision . Thi s appears to be th e case in the emergin g professio n o f child-care specialist. Fo r on e thing , upgrade d statu s is a goo d basi s on whic h t o deman d a raise. Manageria l opposition , i n turn, ma y lea d th e margina l professionals t o seek the active support of their clients and, thus, t o move toward the varieties of advocac y in cel l B . In cel l B, the technology, structure , an d goals of a specific organization will determine to a large exten t th e orientation s o f management, an d therefor e determin e th e potential fo r conflict wit h th e professiona l staff . Wher e th e natur e o f the organiza tion allow s pattern s o f servic e deliver y typica l o f sol o practice , conflic t ma y b e centered aroun d "re d tape " interference s an d th e nonprofessiona l dutie s aske d of the professiona l staff . Fo r a n individual , thes e conflicts can als o emerge in autonomous organizations , wher e individua l professionals ma y feel torn between thei r professional dutie s an d th e administrativ e or manageria l task s demanded o f them. If the tensio n betwee n professiona l an d nonprofessiona l dutie s i s fel t b y mos t profes sionals mos t of the time, they ar e likel y t o invoke their clients' best interests agains t the demand s o f th e organizatio n itself . I n th e les s establishe d professions , wher e there i s les s insistenc e o n professiona l dominanc e ove r th e client , th e client s ma y become activel y an d directl y involve d wit h th e professionals ' positio n (eithe r i n favor of it or against it) . I n the case of a potential alliance, the professionals' attitud e can range from manipulatio n of the clients to advocacy, wit h varying degrees of each element i n between. Th e forc e o f administrative opposition depends on th e degre e of externa l suppor t th e administratio n itsel f ma y receiv e o r expec t fro m th e publi c authorities or the public, and on the degree to which the professional staf f i s replaceable. Replaceabilit y depends , i n turn , o n th e profession' s monopol y o f acces s t o practice, on the scarcity of supply, and on the professionals' securit y of tenur e withi n the organization—tha t i s t o say , o n th e profession' s power. The mor e professiona l task s involv e the processin g o r transformatio n o f thing s or symbols (rather than people), the more the relations with management will approx imate those in cell C . Fo r this reason, academics "straddle th e fence," dependin g on whethe r th e organizationa l (o r personal ) emphasi s i s client-oriente d (teaching ) or no t (research) . The situations i n cells C an d D are o f the kin d frequentl y analyze d b y studie s of professionals i n industry. I n cell C , managemen t responds to th e creativity-versus integration dilemm a wit h th e arra y o f strategies that hav e been discussed , mos t of which ten d towar d th e tw o line s o f authority—manageria l o r administrative , an d professional—that ar e typica l o f large an d autonomou s professiona l organizations . 65

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The passage from cel l C to cell D is determined by the extent to which the profession or th e individua l professiona l hav e technobureaucrati c aspiration s o f manageria l mobility. Th e problems faced b y the administrative hierarchy in cell D are closer to the problem s pose d b y manageria l an d executiv e personne l than b y a professiona l staff. This rudimentary classification was centered on the individual professional and his typical orientations. To analyze the potential sources of conflict wit h the administrative hierarchy we need to clarify th e determinants of management's orientations ; this requires goin g beyond individual s an d groups , int o a comparative analysis o f organizations. Thi s can obviously not be attempted here , bu t we may briefl y conside r a particularly usefu l analytica l framework : Charle s Perrow' s "technology-based " approach t o organization s subordinate s th e conten t o f specific relation s of production t o th e mod e o f production—that is, th e wor k tha t organization s d o " i n order to make som e change in a raw material" which "ma y b e a living being , human or otherwise, a symbol , or a n inanimat e object." Two aspect s of technology, writ large , ar e particularl y relevant to organizational structure, whic h i s an "arrangemen t amon g peopl e fo r getting work done. " Thes e aspects o f technolog y sugges t wha t kind s o f organization s ar e structurall y mos t dependent o n autonomou s performance s b y exper t workers ; the y are , firs t "th e number of exceptional cases encountered i n the work' ' (whic h vary on a scale fro m high t o low), an d second , "th e natur e o f the searc h proces s undertaken b y the indi vidual whe n exception s occur. " Whil e al l search processe s ar e non-routine , "w e can conceiv e o f a scal e fro m analyzabl e t o unanalyzabl e problems " whic h call , respectively, o n " l o g i c " an d "systemati c an d analytical " searc h procedures , o r on "unanalyze d experienc e an d intuition , chanc e or guesswork." With thes e two bivariate dimensions, a typology of both industrial and "people changing" organization s ca n b e constructed . Eve n wher e technolog y i s th e mos t standardized an d routinized, experts ma y intervene at a given point of the productive process to formalize or devise technology , or to increase th e knowledge of the raw material. Thei r integration into th e on-goin g ocess of production, however, tend s to null , sinc e thei r typical intervention s are one-time-onl y affairs. The less unifor m or th e les s analyzabl e th e ra w material , th e mor e regula r an d continuou s wil l b e the interventio n of the expert or technician. The task structur e corresponding to this technology shoul d therefore allo w hi m a high degre e of discretion, o r autonomou s choice of means and autonomous judgments abou t th e priorit y an d interdependenc e of tasks . Discretio n and powe r ar e th e tw o components o f control, whic h i s itsel f one of the central dimensions of the task structure (the other is coordination,' 'which can b e achieve d throug h planning or feedback"). "Power " choose s autonomously among goal s an d strategies . From a global point of view, Bendi x had pointed out that "tw o antithetical principles . . . result fro m th e divisio n o f labor" i n bureaucratic enterprises : 68

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As organization s increas e i n siz e an d complexity, effort s ar e made t o routiniz e their operations b y job classifications, produc t standardization, budgetary regulations , and other measure s designe d t o simplif y procedure s an d simultaneousl y increas e central control. Th e tendency o f thes e effort s i s to reduce the exercise of discretion by sub-

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Perrow's approac h t o organizational theory locates th e point s at which th e exercis e of discretion b y subordinate s i s inevitable (namely , i n area s o f hig h uncertaint y where th e "ra w materials " o r the technologie s admi t many exceptions an d where , therefore, searc h processes—bot h analytica l and intuitive—become indispensable). His distinction between power and discretion clarifies the difference betwee n exper t and managerial autonomy. Control of the discretionary areas can be pursued i n two ways: i t can b e sough t throug h the developmen t o f morale an d organizationa l loyalty, th e optio n favore d by the "huma n relations " approach , o r it can b e entruste d to outsid e source s o f socialization , whic h i n ou r societ y ten d t o b e professiona l institutions. Professionalization, in other words, makes the use of discretion predictable. I t relieves bureaucratic organization s o f responsibility fo r devising their own mechanism s o f control i n the discretionar y area s of work . Ther e nee d b e n o basic conflic t betwee n th e professiona l expectatio n of autonomy a t work an d largescale bureaucrati c organization s whic h create , b y thei r technology , area s o f discretion—unless, o f course , professional s ar e mor e intereste d i n power tha n i n autonomy of technique. Power , i n an organization, coincides with the higher autonomy o f management . Perrow's focu s o n endogenous variable s an d interna l structure provide s economical an d genera l criteri a for locatin g the organization s whic h shoul d b e th e mos t capable o f usin g an d accommodatin g exper t an d professiona l staf f workers . His torically, thi s capacity seem s to have bee n highes t i n the industria l firms whic h w e identify wit h th e monopolisti c sector. I n his stud y o f the fift y larges t Unite d State s industrial corporations , Alfre d Chandler , Jr. , show s tha t th e mos t dynami c an d administratively flexibl e amon g the m arrive d independently a t th e sam e organizational innovation. Th e multidivisional structure, h e argues, was the organizational strategy b y which these firms had to respond t o the emergence o f multiple markets . Their scal e and their resources—both financia l an d administrative—appear t o have been condition s for the successfu l establishmen t o f the new structure, whic h i n turn compensated fo r th e disadvantage s o f scale . Th e financia l an d administrativ e capacity of these gigantic firms wa s necessary to support a structural adaptation whic h rested o n internal diversification an d on a measure of decentralization, expressed i n the day-to-day operationa l autonom y o f the various departments . These dynamic industries, which wer e bot h the mos t flexibl e an d the most capable of augmenting and institutionalizing flexibilit y i n their time, logicall y depende d on experts fo r their new managerial functions. Experts were needed t o develop adequate informatio n o n bot h th e "produc t environment " an d th e interna l system of production; experts wer e needed t o interpret this information an d guid e the policy making instrument s tha t wer e t o act o n it ; experts wer e neede d i n research an d de velopment an d i n market research , whic h became , i n these firms , integra l parts of 71

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production an d th e mai n factor s fo r increasin g th e adjustmen t betwee n productio n and th e market . Th e institutionalizatio n of th e divisio n o f labor betwee n staf f an d line—which was also an achievement o f the multidivisional strategy—shows tha t the industries whic h depende d th e mos t o n experts wer e als o th e firs t t o fin d structura l means for integrating their educated manpower . I t is legitimate to assume, therefore , that th e decentralizatio n an d delegatio n o f authorit y inherent i n the multidivisiona l structure compelled the monopolistic corporations to rely on professionalism as a preexisting means of limiting th e potentia l abuse of discretion. No t surprisingly, these giant corporations wer e the mos t hospitabl e t o the standardize d professionals—tha t is, the university graduates who could safely b e placed in discretionary, though subordinate an d increasingl y specialized , capacities. Whether th e monopolisti c market tendencie s of the mai n industrial corporations led them , later , t o interna l problems o f structural overcentralization and hardenin g of th e organizationa l arteries i s an empirical problem. The point to be emphasize d here is that, historically , the core units of monopoly capital show strong structural affinities with experts, o n whom their management largel y depends, and with professionalism, whic h tend s t o b e substitute d fo r bureaucrati c contro l i n th e multidi visional structure . Dependen t o n experts , th e gian t corporation s contribute d to th e diffusion o f th e genera l ideolog y o f expertis e an d t o it s materia l sanctio n b y th e apparent efficienc y whic h the y brough t t o th e productio n process. Internally , expertise i s implicitl y propose d a s a legitimatio n fo r th e hierarchica l structur e o f authority o f the moder n organization ; professionalism, i n turn, function s a s a n internalized mechanis m fo r the contro l of the subordinat e expert . 73

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BUREAUCRACY A N D THE INTERNA L STRATIFICATION O F PROFESSION S In a bureaucratized world , profession s ca n n o longe r be interprete d a s inherently antibureaucratic. Bot h profession s an d bureaucrac y belon g t o th e sam e historical matrix: the y consolidat e i n the earl y twentiet h century a s distinc t but nevertheles s complementary mode s of work organization. The analysi s conducte d u p to now ha s attempted to establish underlyin g structural affinities betwee n profession an d bureaucracy, affinitie s whic h go beyond the patterns o f reconciliation and interdependenc e stressed b y contemporar y sociologica l studies . In th e Unite d States , i n particular , wher e traditiona l status-givin g institution s had bee n fragmente d o r weak , th e ris e o f larg e bureaucrati c organization s i n th e private an d publi c sector s towar d th e en d o f th e nineteent h centur y constitute d a new context of resources. Within it , professions ol d and new, established an d aspir ing, foun d new means of self-assertion. Fro m its inception, the modern professiona l project ha d typicall y claime d market control , work autonomy , an d statu s preroga tives on the basis of specialized training and scarce expertise. Fo r a long time, however, th e professions ' claim s wer e neithe r supporte d b y obvious results no r attune d to the mai n structures o f the dominan t ideology . Gaining widespread legitimac y i n the eye s o f th e publi c remained , therefore , a mor e difficul t an d improbabl e tas k than obtainin g state sanctio n fo r market monopoly.

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As capitalis m move d int o it s monopolisti c phase , however , th e shif t t o a ne w dominant ideolog y accompanie d th e structura l transformatio n o f th e economic , social, an d politica l domains . Economi c growt h an d productivity—du e in larg e part to applied science—began to be felt a t the level of the average standard o f living; in thi s manner, the y gav e concrete suppor t t o the decisiv e affirmatio n o f science a s the predominan t an d undisputabl e syste m o f cognitiv e and ideologica l validation . Expressed i n the emergenc e of scientific management ideologie s an d i n the notion of a transpolitical state, the shif t i n dominant ideolog y legitimized th e statu s of the expert an d exalte d hi s role. In itself , th e reorganizatio n o f th e system s o f productio n an d governmen t no t only generate d ne w specialtie s whic h aspire d t o professiona l status ; i t als o mad e possible, mor e broadly, the rise of a new system of social stratification. Professiona l aspirations wer e hencefort h supported , an d t o a large exten t shared , b y expandin g urban middl e classes whose identit y was founde d o n the educational syste m an d on their occupatio n i n modern an d typicall y bureaucratize d wor k settings . Noting th e fusio n betwee n professiona l an d broade r middle-clas s identities , on e author observes : "Man y features tha t ar e considere d specifi c characteristic s o f the professions see m to be i n fact aspects of upper class and upper middl e class life an d subculture. Thus , autonom y a t wor k an d man y facet s o f professional ethic s see m buttressed no t only b y professional norm s an d grante d claims , but also b y the class status of the practitioner , hi s socia l origi n an d th e clas s position of his client s an d other rol e partners." In th e profession s whic h typicall y rende r service s t o individuals, th e stat e or nonprofit organization s sponso r the service , actin g a s employer s o r "buyers"—other wise, th e cost of professional service s tend s to restrict them to the middle and uppe r middle classes. Sinc e th e uppe r middl e classes increasingly depend o n bureaucrati c employment, i t is plausible t o assume that whateve r change s this mode o f employment effect s i n styles o f life an d expectations wil l b e subtl y relayed to "free " pro fessionals throug h the influenc e o f their clientele. Much mor e importantly , the majorit y o f practitioners i n all professions ar e con nected wit h bureaucrati c organization s a s employees , a s provider s o f services , a s users of equipment o r facilities, o r as creditors—fo r this is, in a sense, the position of physicia n an d othe r healt h professional s vis-a-vi s federa l an d stat e medica l aid plans. Moreover, all the professions whic h have successfully establishe d thei r claims to expertis e an d thei r contro l over trainin g and acces s ar e affiliate d o r connecte d with th e university . Professional socializatio n begins, therefore , i n a bureaucratize d institution, whos e specifi c pattern s o f work organizatio n influence, outsid e it s own bounds, th e knowledge-producin g and knowledge-usin g industries—tha t i s to say , in practice , al l of the economy, excep t fo r the most backward industries of the competitive sector. The university, as the main center fo r the "productio n of professional producers " is, i n fact, th e locu s wher e bot h a bureaucratic notio n of career and th e traditional professional patter n o f "fe e fo r service " consultatio n coexis t a s models—th e lat ter a s a n "entrepreneurial " optio n ope n alongsid e th e otherwis e bureaucratize d 75

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academic caree r pattern . Beginnin g their own professional career s i n this context , the apprentice s underg o a peculia r proces s o f socialization : they lear n th e tactic s and absorb the ideolog y by which professionals i n heteronomous bureaucrati c orga nizations perpetuate professional autonom y or, perhaps more often, the professiona l illusion o f autonomy . Having discusse d th e commo n historica l origins of professions an d bureaucrac y and emphasize d th e root s o f most profession s i n the bureaucratize d contex t o f the modern university, I shall attempt to summarize th e multiple relations of profession s and bureaucrac y i n a synoptic for m i n Table 3 . Thi s synoptic description generates the propositio n tha t th e relation s betwee n profession s an d specifi c bureaucrati c organizations ar e a most powerfu l determinan t o f stratificatio n among profession s and within professions . First o f all , distinction s between establishe d an d aspirin g professions ar e base d in larg e par t o n each profession's relationshi p wit h th e university . The mos t developed an d reputabl e professiona l school s i n medicine, law , an d engineerin g added to th e prestig e o f the universitie s wit h whic h the y affiliate d durin g the "academi c revolution." Th e relationshi p i s inverte d i n the cas e of newer profession s suc h a s social work , librarianship , and cit y planning . However , eve n fo r th e younge r an d less establishe d professions , reachin g th e universit y means tha t the y ca n develo p their ow n distinctiveness : the y are , indeed , unde r taci t comman d t o develo p thei r specific body of "theoretical knowledge'' from a firm institutiona l base, which gives them academi c contro l of a captive audience . Second, a t th e societa l level , th e universit y operates a s th e mos t powerfu l pre selector fo r the consultin g professions—and whethe r o r not the profession s contro l the process of selection is immaterial. Th e various units in the system of higher education hav e themselve s bee n relativel y standardized an d arrange d i n a recognize d system o f hierarchical prestige. Thi s system operate s as a switchboard to the worl d of work , bu t as a switchboard that would , a t the sam e time, determine th e distanc e and th e spee d of the trains . Th e train s ar e th e differen t classes of colleges, univer sities, an d professional school s a t whic h the passengers arrive after havin g been fil tered b y a numbe r o f other switchboards . A s show n b y Willia m Sewell , "Socia l selection i s most vividl y apparen t i n the transitio n from hig h schoo l to college, bu t it is operative at every other transition point as well . Thos e wh o overcome th e handicap o f origin statu s or of sex a t on e leve l o f the syste m fin d themselve s agai n dis advantaged i n moving on t o th e nex t l e v e l . " The educationa l syste m a s a whole, as wel l a s th e prestig e hierarch y o f college s and universities , functions t o guarantee the appropriat e socializatio n of each cohort that i s sent out into the worl d o f work. Acces s t o higher education an d professiona l schools locate s eac h cohort, as a whole, in the broade r socia l hierarchy. The essential importanc e o f attending the "best " school s fo r entry into professional lif e can not b e reduce d t o cognitiv e aspects , especiall y i n thos e profession s whic h hav e successfully standardize d thei r basic training (and even their specialties). I t appears, indeed, tha t th e selection proces s bears littl e relatio n to late r professiona l success , i f on e consider s th e purel y individua l leve l o f grade s an d academi c achievement . 78

Table 3 . STRUCTURA L CONNECTIONS BETWEEN PROFESSION S AND BUREAUCRATI C ORGANIZATIONS, B Y TYPE OF PROFESSIONAL PRACTIC E AND TYP E OF PROFESSIONAL EMPLOYMENT

Consulting Professions

Type of Employment

Typical Client

Typical Connections with Bureaucracy

Plausible Effects on Profession

1. Sol o practice

Individuals

Indirect (ideologica l climate , styl e of life)

Diffuse (no t substantiall y different than effects on same socio-economic category) .

Buyer or user of services provided b y bureaucratic organizations (hospitals, research institutes, libraries, universities, government agencies).

Stratifies professionals in terms of differential

(a) Individ uals

As above

As above

(b) Corporate & stat e bureaucracies

Direct: ma y be subordinate to powerful bureaucratic clients (corporate la w firms, CPA firms, architectural offices working for stat e or federal government , etc.).

greater interna l differentiatio n and bureaucratization (corporat e la w firms, large engineering and architectural offices).

2. Autono mous professional organizations (medical partnerships, large la w and CPA firms, large engineering and architectural offices)

access to strategi c resources.

May compe l professiona l organizations to

Stratifies professionals and professiona l organizations in terms of major clients' power.

3. Heterono mous organizations (social-work agencies, schools)

(a) Direc t contact with client

Formally subordinate; professiona l and bureaucratic mode s of work organizatio n are interdependent ; th e forme r ar e limited by bureaucratic regulations.

Typical problem s of client-oriente d professionals in bureaucracies.

(scientists in industry )

(b) N o direc t contact with client

Incorporation: th e whole bureaucrati c structure takes into account the professional mode of work organizatio n (segregation , professional incentives , etc.).

Tendency to "tw o line s of authority. " Generation o f technobureaucratic professional ambitions ; professionalis m may appear a s legitimation of blocke d mobility or of technobureaucratic power . Stratifies individual career s (in bot h 3a and 3b); i s affected also by the ranking of organizations.

Organizational Professions

4. Heterono mous organizations (managerial specialties)

Individuals or collectivities

Generated b y bureaucracy . Subordinatio n as (3) above

As (3) above

Academic Professions

5. Formall y heteronomous organizations (universities)

Individuals or collectivities (abstract publics); i.e . students or "scientific communities"

Formal subordination analogou s to (3b ) in work organizatio n

Stratifies careers, also in terms of organizations' rankings , as in (3) and i n terms of access to strategi c resources , as in (1)

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Educational selection , however , ha s a n aggregate effec t o n professiona l stratifica tion: in terms of social connections, an d especially in terms of ideology, elite schools socialize thei r graduate s int o a n elite . Th e stratificatio n of th e trainin g centers i s obviously no t independen t fro m th e broade r structure s o f social inequalit y which , on th e contrary , ar e reproduced b y ever y leve l o f the educationa l system. A s a study o f engineers' caree r mobility indicates , "th e combinatio n of high grade s and attendance a t a highl y selectiv e schoo l migh t be expecte d t o eliminat e o r a t leas t minimize the influence of ascriptive factors on post-college success, [but] it is apparent fro m thes e dat a tha t hig h selectivit y does not mitigat e the influenc e o f socia l origins; rather, differentia l caree r success according to social origins is magnified in such settings." At th e gate s o f the professiona l world , th e professiona l minoritie s who control a field do not receive an undifferentiated mass of entrants, bu t a super-filtered, superclassified, specialized , and hierarchicized cohort. In the world of work, their connections wit h an d dependenc e upo n heteronomou s bureaucrati c organization s stratif y the profession s internally i n term s o f acces s t o work-relate d resources , income , prestige, an d vicarious power. There ar e clea r indication s that thi s "externall y produced " stratificatio n affect s the cognitive makeu p o f highly stratifie d professions. I n the law , wher e a handfu l of firm s dominate s corporat e lega l business and selects the best talent, corporation s have better legal protection than average private citizens; and not only that, but areas of th e la w unrelated t o the corporat e secto r o f the econom y ar e relativel y underdeveloped b y comparison . Externa l force s o f stratificatio n determine elit e position s in mos t professions ; indirectly , b y the agenc y o f these elites, these external factor s affect th e balanc e betwee n indeterminatio n and codificatio n o f professional skills . The larg e an d autonomou s professiona l firm s bureaucratize , thereb y tendin g t o stress specializatio n and contributin g to the routinizatio n o f techniques. The y als o appear to be pioneer s i n opening u p ne w area s of practice: i n accountancy, fo r instance, th e "bi g eight" whic h dominat e th e fiel d compensat e fo r routinizatio n b y "moving int o ne w area s of uncertainty" suc h a s managemen t analysis. At th e leve l o f individuals, w e hav e see n that professionals , eve n i f they ar e no t directly employe d by heteronomou s bureaucracies , increasingl y take thei r concep tion of career from th e bureaucratic model : because this tends to be the predominan t middle-class conception , becaus e professional s assimilat e it , howeve r uncon sciously, i n th e universit y setting , becaus e the y wor k withi n organization s tha t express individua l advancemen t i n terms o f hierarchical steps. Th e bureaucratiza tion o f work-settings adds, furthermore , anothe r importan t factor o f internal stratification: th e overspecializatio n of individual professional s i n a given firm become s a factor of "trained incapacity'' that ties them to the firm an d compels them to accept blocked mobility, by reducing their value on the broader professional labor market. Overspecialization of the individual is, in this sense, an element of proletarianization and it should not be confused wit h the differentiation an d carving of new specialties out of a profession's commo n trunk. These specialties are , i n turn, themselve s roughly ranked in terms of salience of the service, scarcity of the skill, length of train79

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ing, and extrinsic factors such as the status of a specialty's majority o f members or the status of its typical clientel e (for instance, i n Europe, a large proportio n of women appears to lowe r the collectiv e status of a medical specialt y suc h a s pediatrics) . It ca n b e sai d tha t dependenc e upo n heteronomou s organization s stratifie s th e professions fro m th e outside , pullin g chose n professiona l institution s an d chose n professionals towar d the centers that control power and resources, whil e relegatin g others t o marginality. Bureaucratization, however , ca n b e a n internal phenomeno n which add s to th e inequalit y between individuals , but i t also tend s t o homogeniz e the terms of internal stratification: a hierarchical rank is clear and so, for the initiated, is the ranking of the organizations wher e they work , eve n though graduate schools , hospitals, an d aerospac e industries ar e no t ranked b y th e sam e criteria. The ranking of an organization among others o f the same kind and the position of an individual withi n i t (including his personal talen t and "charisma" ) combin e int o a dialectic which determine s i n part th e patter n o f individual careers as wel l a s th e particular composition of professional elites . Th e terms o f this dialectical interpla y are typicall y differen t i n differen t professions. Th e mor e incorporate d int o het eronomous organization s a profession is , th e mor e it s members' prestig e i s determined b y the organization: thus, th e patter n of academic mobility—b y "horizonta l upward displacement " fro m campu s t o mor e prestigiou s campus—appear s prima facie to replicate the pattern of the careers of executives i n the private or public sector, or acros s both. However, the individualization of organizational prestige i s different in consulting or academic profession s fro m wha t it is in technobureaucratic careers . The fact that achievements i n the former are highly personalized seem s to allow for an ideological blending o f persona l an d organizationa l prestige: thu s a professo r ma y appea r t o carry wit h hi m some of the aura of Harvard as he moves to a state university, just a s a physician "keeps" som e of the prestige o f Stanford Medica l Center an d transfer s it to a lesser teaching hospital or to private practice. I t is harder t o think of a General Motors executive appropriating in this manner som e of G.M.'s power and prestige , in additio n to th e hierarchica l rank h e ha s reached , befor e movin g elsewhere: al though the power and scop e of the corporation he is leaving may guarantee a man's soundness and managerial capacity to other corporate employers , he does not confer any o f the firs t corporation' s powe r and prestige o n the one he is joining. However , managerial achievement s appea r t o b e highl y personalize d i f an executiv e enter s the spher e of technocratic polyvalence , lik e Charle s Wilso n o r Rober t McNamara: the mark the man has lef t o n the organization appears to effect, thi s time, an ideological blendin g of personal an d organizationa l power. In sum , t o consider th e relation s between profession s an d heteronomou s bureau cratic organization s implies , necessarily , a n analysi s o f th e professions ' interna l stratification. Th e precedin g remark s ar e intende d t o sugges t tha t th e conceptio n of professions a s ' 'communities'' or as ' 'companies o f equals'' whic h democratically exercise mutua l supervisio n ove r deepl y internalize d common standards , i s essentially a n ideologica l conception. Professiona l apprentice s absor b thi s ideolog y during thei r socialization , together wit h othe r ideologica l components whic h jus84

85

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tify interna l stratification as a product of "natural" talen t an d trained skill . Lik e all power elites, th e professiona l oligarchie s whic h contro l each specialized fiel d actu ally depen d o n ideolog y fo r thei r legitimacy . For les s intangibl e means o f power and control, these oligarchies largely depend o n privileged connections wit h bureau cratic organizations . As complementar y mode s of organizing and controllin g work , bot h profession s and bureaucracy res t on a certain measure of cognitive standardization, fo r both pretend to allocate people to work roles on the "rational " basis of "objectively" teste d competence: "objectivity " require s tha t the content o f such tests be specific , speci fied, an d homogeneous, a s wel l as accessibl e in principle to " a ll who would care to learn." I n both cases, the determinatio n of the criteri a of competence i s ultimately monopolized by professional or bureaucratic oligarchies . In both cases, the appeal to "objective" an d universalisti c legitimation s is ideological : facts abou t th e perso n which have nothing to do wit h competenc e interven e i n bureaucratic a s wel l a s professional pattern s o f selection an d career. Ther e are , however , man y importan t dif ferences betwee n th e typica l structur e o f bureaucrac y an d tha t o f profession , an d here I want to single out just one, whic h concerns th e transfer o f power or authority from organization s t o individuals . Bureaucratic organizations—an d thei r person nel—are separate d as a whole fro m outsider s b y th e use s of bureaucratic secrec y and b y impersonal organizational power. Veste d i n some roles, thi s organizational power becomes that of a real person onl y fo r as lon g as he or she occupie s tha t role. There i s a built-i n limi t t o wha t ca n b e don e wit h it : were tha t powe r t o be turne d against th e organizatio n by the incumben t o f the role , he woul d b e fire d a s soo n a s discovered, thereb y losin g hi s positio n o f power . Th e powe r tha t a bureaucrati c structure i s forced to let individuals manage cannot becom e a property of the perso n because it is not separable from th e organization. The secret or " g u i l t y " knowledg e which individual s can accumulate throug h their roles in organizations i s more trans ferable tha n power , becaus e knowledge can b e usefu l o n the outside , provide d that somebody i s interested i n the working s of a particular organization. Now, professions ar e collectivel y separate d from th e lait y b y inaccessible o r "tacit" knowledge as muc h as by testable an d explicit expertise. Typically , profession s maintai n indeterminate an d untestabl e cognitiv e areas in order t o assert, collectively, th e unique ness of individual capacities . Collectively , they solicit trust in individual professional s and individual freedo m fro m externa l controls, except fo r the ritua l entr y examina tions administere d b y peers . Th e fac t tha t th e safeguard s offere d t o th e publi c in exchange for its trust—knowledge an d internalize d ethical norms—are inalienabl e from th e perso n o f the produce r emphasize s th e producer' s individualit y an d illu minates th e essentia l individualis m o f the professiona l ideology . This individualism is, I believe, one of the powerful factor s tha t make profession s continue t o appear , i n the eye s o f the publi c an d o f most socia l scientists , a s th e "anti-bureaucracy." I t also explain s i n part wh y profession s hav e been relatively successful i n translating their "servic e ideal " int o an ideologica l assertion o f indi vidual disinterestedness , an d thei r indeterminat e an d taci t knowledg e int o a n ap pearance of individual talent an d "unique " interventions . These appearances alleg86

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edly distinguis h professions fro m bureaucracie s an d professional s fro m business men. A s Talcott Parsons noted i n his 193 9 essay: "Th e fac t tha t profession s hav e reached a uniquely high level of development in the same society whic h is also char acterized b y a business economy, suggest s that th e contras t betwee n busines s an d professions, whic h ha s bee n mainly stated i n terms o f the proble m of self-interest, is no t th e whol e s t o r y . " I hav e intende d t o mak e th e stor y mor e complete . Variou s elements o f the professional ideolog y have appeare d i n this analysis . I t is time now t o brin g the m together an d attemp t t o define thei r structural bases, their origins, an d their function . 87

Chapter 12

MONOPOLIES O F COMPETENCE AND BOURGEOI S IDEOLOG Y FROM HISTORICA L T O STRUCTURA L ANALYSI S Looking backward from th e phenomenon o f profession a s it appears in contemporary socia l life, I have attempted t o trace it s underlying unity in terms o f the doubl e movement b y whic h i t is historically constituted. Th e visible characteristics o f the professional phenomenon—professiona l association , cognitiv e base , institution alized training , licensing , work autonomy , colleagu e "control, " code o f ethics — have been considered fro m a double perspective : first , a s structura l elements o f the general for m o f the professional project , an d second, a s specifi c resource elements , whose variabl e impor t is define d b y differen t historica l matrices. As structura l elements , thes e characteristic s appea r i n various combination s i n all th e moder n professions . A s resources, however , the y ar e qualitativel y different in differen t historical contexts an d therefor e the y vary in import or "useableness. " In th e nineteent h century , fo r instance , institutionalize d training meant differen t things fo r the sam e professions i n Britain an d i n the Unite d States ; the difference s in meanin g reflecte d large r difference s i n the whol e structur e o f the socia l stratifi cation syste m i n each country , includin g th e differen t ideologica l legitimations of inequality. A cognitive base, a s th e necessar y premis e o f training, i s necessary t o every specifi c professiona l project , bu t i n each projec t i t ha d a differen t content ; therefore, i t occupied i n each a differen t plac e amon g variou s strategi c resources . The history or "genealogy" o f the elements tha t appear combined in the complex structure o f profession ca n b e trace d acros s historical time spans and contemporar y functional boundaries. Thi s has been done, fo r instance, i n histories of professional schools or professional associations , o r in histories of the cognitive corpus of various present-day profession s (suc h a s historie s o f legal thought , o f architectural styles , of engineerin g techniques, o f medical arts). I have focused m y account o n the complex mobilization and organization of these elements b y different types of professional projects. I t is time now to turn once again fro m historica l diversity to the underlying structural processes and structural effects, whic h give a unified an d broader meanin g to thi s diversity. As organization s o f producers o f relativel y scarce an d mostl y intangibl e skills , modern professions firs t emerg e from th e persona l tie s of dependence characteristi c 1

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of precapitalis t socia l formations , an d the n organize , o n the marke t model , variou s new or enlarged sphere s of social activity. That is to say, ultimately , moder n profes sions organize t o exchange their services for a price. W e have followed th e divers e manifestations o f thi s organizin g projec t an d underscore d it s inheren t tendenc y toward monopoly . From a broader analytica l perspective, th e professiona l projec t i s part o f a basic structural transformation—namely , th e extensio n o f exchange relations unde r cap italism to all areas of human activity . I t is analytically useful t o recall, very briefly , some o f th e well-know n concept s b y whic h Mar x uncover s th e essenc e o f thi s process. Marx's analysi s o f the real commodit y form reveals , first , it s dual nature: a s usevalue, a commodity's concrete utilit y i s a function of the concret e need s that i t can satisfy. Use-valu e onl y becomes a reality when the commodity "has foun d a resting place . . . [when ] it falls out of the spher e of exchange into that of consumption." That a commodity should b e capabl e of satisfying th e needs of some potential user is a necessar y aspec t o f it s twofol d existence , an d a sin e qu a no n conditio n of its exchange value. A s exchange value, o r value, a commodity "at firs t sight , presents itself a s a quantitative relation, as th e proportio n in which values i n use o f one sor t are exchange d fo r thos e o f anothe r sort , a relatio n constantly changin g wit h tim e and place." The institutionalizatio n of exchang e relations—which , obviously , presuppose s some development o f the socia l division of labor—establishes "th e distinctio n . . . between th e utilit y o f an objec t fo r the purpose s o f consumption an d it s utilit y fo r the purpose s o f exchange." Th e developmen t an d generalizatio n o f money , a s the universa l equivalen t whic h expresse s the quantitativ e relation s betwee n al l circulating commodities , complete s thei r "metamorphosis" : "Whe n the y assum e this money-shape, commoditie s stri p off every trac e of their natural use-value , an d of the particular kind of labor to which they owe their creation, in order to transform themselves int o the uniform , sociall y recognize d incarnatio n o f homogeneous hu man labor." Indeed , i n the labo r theory o f value, "th e magnitud e o f the value of a commodity represents only the quantity of labor embodied in it. " Labor , the ' 'valuecreating substance, " doe s not appea r here as concret e labor , creatin g specifi c use values, bu t under it s abstract guise: i t is labor-time, measure d by its duration, which is itsel f a function of the averag e labor-power o f society. "Th e labor-tim e socially necessary is that require d t o produce a n article under th e norma l conditions o f production, an d wit h th e averag e degree of skill an d intensit y prevalent a t the t i m e . " Thus, th e extensio n o f market relation s tends to generalize th e double abstractio n embodied i n th e commodit y form : value, a n abstrac t quantitativ e relatio n t o th e monetary equivalent , an d labor-time, a n abstrac t quantitativ e expressio n o f th e "average labor-powe r o f society, " expende d fo r purposes o f exchange. Labor-power, th e "value-creatin g substance, " itsel f appear s as a commodity on the market , inseparabl y fro m th e appearanc e o f capital : th e appearanc e an d th e combination o f these tw o structura l element s signal s " a ne w epoc h i n the histor y of socia l production. " "Th e capitalis t epoch," Mar x writes, "i s therefor e charac terized by this, that labo r power takes in the eyes of the labore r himsel f the for m of 2

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a commodit y whic h i s hi s property ; hi s labo r consequentl y become s wag e labor . On the other hand, i t is only from thi s moment tha t the produce o f labor universally becomes a commodity." Tw o central processes—relativel y independen t o f each other an d o f variable historica l form—constitut e th e "prehistory " o f capitalism: first, th e constitution of money-capital and its concentration i n the hands of potential entrepreneurs; and second , th e separatio n o f the worke r from th e means of production. Th e secon d proces s is reflected i n the juridico-political evolution which allows the individual worker to sell hi s labor—which makes him, that i s ,' 'the untrammelled owner o f his capacit y fo r labor , i.e. o f his ow n person." In sum , th e penetratio n o f market relation s int o all areas of life i s immensely ac celerated an d complete d b y capitalism . Thi s character inseparabl y link s th e exten sion of market relations to the rise of a modern class system and to a juridico-political ideology whic h ideologically make s th e isolate d individua l int o th e essentia l uni t of th e socia l an d politica l orders . This i s th e historica l matrix withi n whic h profession s organiz e th e market s fo r their services. Th e advance in the socia l division of labor and the breakdown of personal tie s o f dependence, whic h ar e crucia l in the ris e o f capitalism, ar e als o pre conditions for the formatio n of modern professions . Th e proble m is, now , to relat e the structur e o f profession t o the particula r nature o f the commodities which profes sions produc e an d sell . The ter m "fictitiou s commodity " i s used by Kar l Polany i in reference t o labor , land, an d money—entitie s whic h ar e exchange d an d organize d int o markets eve n though they d o not correspond t o the "empirica l definition o f a commodity": "Th e postulate tha t anythin g that i s bought an d sol d must hav e been produced fo r sale, " says Polanyi, "is emphatically untrue in regard t o t h e m . " A profound transforma tion in social structure an d ideology is therefore necessar y for such markets t o arise . The change is deepest, and affects mos t directly the largest numbe r of people, wher e labor i s concerned. Sinc e "labor " stand s for wage-earning huma n beings , th e mo bilization an d organizatio n o f labo r i n functio n o f marke t requirement s changes , therefore, th e ver y structur e o f socia l life . Society , Polany i asserts, become s de termined b y th e economi c system . The genera l proces s by whic h th e commodit y fictio n extende d t o practicall y all forms o f huma n labo r affecte d professional s a s well . Th e growt h and diversification o f the professiona l secto r of the middl e class changed th e characte r of profes sion: in their efforts to secure a clientele or an income, the providers of these services became increasingly exposed t o the constraints o f capitalist competition in expanded markets. Today , insofar as most professionals sel l their labor power to an employer, they represen t but a special cas e within th e genera l patter n o f labor organization in capitalist societies . Wha t complicates thi s specifi c instanc e i s the process by whic h entry int o professiona l labo r market s i s organized . Professiona l aspirant s mus t acquire specifi c skill s with a view to their sale. They normally acquire them through a relativel y long process of training in monopolistic centers for the "productio n of producers." Thi s training—or this passage—connects the sale of professional labo r power wit h th e educationa l system—tha t i s t o say , wit h th e principa l legitimator of socia l inequality in advanced industria l capitalism. This intimate connection dis8

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guises th e star k characteristic s o f wage labo r b y coverin g i t wit h al l the structura l and ideologica l advantages derived fro m statu s stratificatio n and fro m th e specifi c ideology o f professionalism . This ideology derives fro m th e model of profession tha t emerged i n the firs t wav e of professionalization : founde d o n th e importanc e o f trainin g an d teste d compe tence, this model, however, did not correspond t o the generalized sal e of labor power. The firs t moder n professions—essentiall y medicin e an d th e law—typicall y pro vided intangibl e good s unde r th e for m o f service s sol d directl y to consumers . I n my analysis , I have emphasized th e requirement s impose d upo n this project b y th e market orientation : th e necessar y homogenizatio n o f thes e intangibl e good s ac cording t o relativel y universalistic standard s could only be achieve d a t th e leve l of training. Th e necessit y t o standardiz e trainin g introduces int o the mode l o f profes sion a principl e o f equivalenc e betwee n qualit y an d quantity : excellence , i t i s implied, ca n b e measure d b y "unit s o f training" an d b y series of objective examinations. I n our century , th e generalizatio n o f bureaucrati c pattern s o f recruitmen t reinforces th e apparen t equivalenc e betwee n competenc e an d lengt h o f training: while the use o f IQ and other tests spreads at the lower and middle levels of the occupational hierarchy , expertis e a t th e technical , professiona l an d manageria l level s tends to b e equate d wit h year s of schooling an d number s o f credentials. The difference s tha t exist between th e direc t sale of professional service s and th e sale of professional labo r powe r d o no t preven t th e resort , i n both situations , t o a model of profession whic h corresponds only to the first . Befor e returnin g to the implications of this usage, I will attemp t t o state these differences wit h mor e structura l precision, followin g th e term s o f Marx's analysi s o f the commodit y form . The labo r whic h i s standardize d i n the cas e of professional "commodities " is , first an d above all, tha t which goes into training. Training—considered a s the coop erative activit y o f instructors an d students—appear s indee d a s th e productio n of a marketable commodity , namely , th e specia l skill s o f th e professiona l producer . These skill s ca n therefor e b e considere d a s exchang e value created , i n fact, befor e professional service s ar e actuall y transacte d betwee n th e provide r an d th e user . Homogenized year s of schooling and standardize d credential s provid e a "universa l equivalent" int o which thes e exchange values ca n b e translate d an d b y whic h the y can b e measured . Th e monopol y o f instruction and credentialin g appears , thus , a s the structura l conditio n for th e creatio n o f "professiona l exchang e value. " The achievement o f this monopoly of instruction depends on two related historical processes: the firs t i s the process by which an organization of professional producer s agrees upon a cognitive base and imposes a predominant definitio n o f a professiona l commodity. Th e secon d i s the ris e an d consolidatio n of national systems of education—the institutiona l infrastructur e withi n whic h an d b y mean s o f whic h suc h unified definition s o f professiona l commoditie s ca n becom e predominant . I n thi s sense, th e creatio n o f professiona l exchang e valu e ultimatel y depend s upo n th e state—or, mor e precisely , upo n th e state' s monopolisti c appropriatio n an d orga nization o f a socia l syste m o f education an d credentialing . It is , however , inherentl y contradictory—a s wel l a s a departur e fro m th e stric t commodity form—tha t the exchang e value o f professional skill s shoul d depen d o n 11

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cognitive an d educationa l monopoly . Thi s monopol y mean s tha t lengt h o f train ing ca n b e arbitraril y determined . Take n togethe r wit h th e unquantifiabl e nature of intangible skills , th e monopol y condition destroys th e equivalenc e betwee n lengt h of professiona l trainin g and a notion of the average labor time that is socially necessary fo r th e productio n of a professional . Monopol y of training means, therefore , that the price of professional service s i s not the market expression o f socially necessary lengt h of training o r averag e (educational ) labo r time. Despite th e distortin g effects o f monopoly, the productio n of special skill s wit h a view t o thei r sale creates exchange value. Thi s value i s vested i n the individual . The socia l characte r o f production is perhaps mor e visibl e in this case than i n any other, fo r most education is subsidized by the state out of public funds; the products, however, ar e privatel y appropriated. Indeed , i n the juridico-political framewor k of bourgeois society , th e individua l i s the sol e owne r o f his person and , therefore , o f his sociall y produced specia l competences. Professiona l trainin g appears, there fore, a s a lengthy process of production which, under special institutional conditions, creates exchange values an d make s them the sol e propert y of individuals. Th e general contradictio n between th e social nature o f production and the private appropriation o f its products i s especially visible in the case of specialized training . W e shall see late r o n ho w th e ideolog y o f professio n addresse s itsel f specificall y t o thi s contradiction. 12

In sum , th e attemp t t o appl y Marx's structural category o f value t o the "profes sional commodity " indicates, i n this firs t phas e of analysis, thre e things . First, professiona l trainin g creates o r preserve s value (b y transmittin g the skill s of th e instructo r t o th e student ) i n the perso n o f the apprentic e professional . Th e professional himsel f appears , therefore, a s the product of congealed o r materialized labor, a s "th e use-valu e tha t ha s bee n produced fo r exchange." Fro m this point of view, professiona l trainin g is, i n Marxist terms , productive labor . Second, whe n professional skill s ar e viewe d as commoditie s unde r th e aspec t of exchange value, thei r distinctiveness appear s t o b e lodge d i n the professiona l mo nopoly ove r training. Fro m this point of view, th e monopol y over training contains an inherent contradiction : i t appears to be a central condition for the effectiv e crea tion of "professional exchang e value," an d yet it tends to place th e price of professional "commodities " outsid e th e real m of market determination . Third, throug h standardize d an d monopolize d education , professiona l skill s acquire an appearance o f measurabilit y an d comparabilit y i n term s o f year s o f schooling. Lengt h o f trainin g an d teste d competenc e clearl y appea r a s mean s t o "objectify" professiona l skills , i n th e doubl e sens e tha t th e skill s acquir e bot h a tangible, quantifiabl e expressio n and a "universalistic " legitimation . Whil e bot h years of schooling and credentialing are relate d to the marke t value of specific professional services , th e relatio n appears to be ideological : indeed, i t functions mor e as a n implici t justification fo r the pric e of the professiona l commodit y and fo r th e privileges associate d wit h professiona l work , tha n a s th e actua l quantitativ e trans lation o f "averag e sociall y necessary labo r time " int o market value . The firs t market-oriente d phas e o f professionalizatio n introduce d a principl e of objectification a t the core of the professional commodity . Standards of value derived

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from thi s principl e tended t o displace (thoug h neve r entirel y to replace ) precapital ist standard s base d o n narro w monopolie s o f status , o n th e socia l positio n o f th e clientele, o r on the personalit y an d idiosyncratic biography of the professional . Th e particular aspect s o f use-valu e i n th e professiona l commoditie s limite d th e scop e of thi s transformation . Historically, th e firs t profession s t o organiz e o n a market basi s were th e classi c "personal" professions—mos t conspicuously , medicin e an d the law . The essentia l feature o f these profession's produc t i s that it tends to be immediately used or consumed (as advice or ministration) by the client or consumer. Thi s mean s that th e realization o f use-valu e (it s consumption ) i s immediate—tha t is , independent of capitalist relations of production. In term s o f Marx' s theor y o f exploitation , this implie s tha t professiona l labo r sold on a market under the form o f direct services—independently, tha t is, of capitalist relation s o f production—does no t contribut e t o capitalis t accumulatio n b y pro ducing surplu s value . Sinc e onl y labor whic h produce s surplus valu e i s productive, professional service s sold directly on a market are, strictl y speaking, unproductive. " I t i s labor whic h i s not exchanged with capital, but directly with revenue, tha t i s wages o r profit s (including , of course , th e variou s categorie s o f those wh o shar e as co-partner s i n capitalist profit , suc h a s interes t an d r e n t ) . " Mar x adds: "Th e laborer himself can buy labor, that is commodities which are provided in the form of services. . . . A s buyer—tha t i s a representativ e o f mone y confrontin g commod ity—the labore r i s in absolutely th e sam e category a s th e capitalis t wher e th e latte r appears only as buyer." I f we look at the "classic " persona l profession s fro m th e point o f vie w o f th e use-valu e o f thei r labo r (historicall y organized int o market s during th e nineteent h centur y an d late r on) , thei r typica l ideolog y appear s t o b e based on structura l properties o f the commodity or services they sell : any buye r ca n acquire thei r "professiona l labo r power" a s a commodity for immediate consump tion; and this kind of professional labo r power does not enter directly int o the process of capitalis t reproductio n an d accumulation . The idea l of universal service t o " a l l of mankind" appears, in fact, t o reflect th e equalizing an d democratizin g effect s o f th e marke t (equalizin g i f compared, fo r instance, t o aristocrati c patronag e whic h reserve s professional labo r powe r fo r th e use o f an elite) : unproductive labo r ca n potentiall y be purchase d an d consume d b y all, whethe r the y ow n capital o r not . Th e clai m o f disinterestedness conceals, i t is true, th e potentia l venality of the transactio n o f services; i t does nevertheless reflect the fac t tha t thi s kin d o f professional labo r remain s outsid e (o r removed from ) th e capitalist mod e o f production . A s unproductiv e labor , i t i s therefor e differen t i n nature fro m th e specifi c for m tha t productiv e labor assumes under capitalism—tha t is, the form o f wage-labor "which , exchanged agains t th e variable part of capital . . . reproduces not only this part of capital (or the value of its own labor-power), but in addition produce s surplus-valu e fo r th e capitalist." It ca n b e noted , furthermore , tha t th e unproductiv e characte r o f th e labo r sol d by th e persona l profession s no t onl y bestows upo n the m a n appearanc e of "class lessness" (becaus e thei r service s can , i n principle, be universall y used) , bu t als o explains tha t clos e tie s ca n b e maintaine d wit h noncapitalis t elites , a t leas t i n th e

13

14

15

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transitional phas e (i.e. "th e variou s categorie s o f those wh o shar e a s co-partner s in th e capitalis t profit, suc h a s interes t an d rent"). Let u s conside r no w whethe r thes e structura l connection s betwee n professiona l ideology an d th e sal e of professional labo r power can b e extende d beyon d th e per sonal professions . I n the practic e o f the classi c persona l professions , th e exchang e of service s typicall y tend s t o tak e plac e betwee n th e "free " professiona l an d hi s individual client . Th e immediat e realizatio n o f use-value—accessible , i n theory , to everyone—appear s t o b e a predominan t characteristi c o f thi s kin d o f marke t transaction. Because professional labo r is not, here, exchanged wit h capital and does not participat e directl y in the productio n of surplus value , i t is, i n strict terms, un productive. Th e fre e professiona l escapes , therefore , capitalis t exploitation . This point immediatel y suggests a corollary : if a professional work s i n the servic e o f a capitalist firm, "the same kind of labor may be productive (tha t was) unproductive" in a "free " professiona l market . Mar x writes : " I f w e ma y tak e a n exampl e fro m outside th e spher e of production of material objects, a schoolmaster i s a productive laborer, when , i n addition to belaborin g the head s of his scholars , h e work s lik e a horse to enrich the school proprietor. That the latter has lai d out his capital in a teaching factory, instead of a sausage factory, does not alter the relation." And he adds: " A n acto r for example, or even a clown, accordin g to this definition, i s a productive laborer i f h e works in the service of a capitalist (an entrepreneur) t o whom he return s more labo r tha n h e receive s fro m hi m in the for m o f wages." Professional labo r which i s performed fo r the benefit of a capitalist firm i s therefore no t structurall y different fro m an y othe r kin d o f labor whic h i s subjec t t o cap italist relation s o f production . Fro m th e poin t o f vie w o f exploitation , therefore , any kin d o f labor can becom e productive . From the point of view of capitalist accumulation—that is , the productio n and appropriatio n of surplus value—professiona l labor appear s a t firs t sigh t t o hav e a relativel y indirect connection wit h th e actua l production o f commodities. Even the wor k o f engineers consists typicall y o f devising, planning, and supervising—tasks tha t are preliminary, parallel, or supraordinat e in th e physica l process of production. Thi s vague similarit y amon g al l the occupa tions generally regarded a s professions merel y indicates that the work in which these occupations engag e is relatively removed fro m an d "superior " t o the manua l wor k typically performe d b y the industria l proletariat. Thi s general trai t cannot compen sate for the crucia l differences betwee n thes e occupations . Engineers an d othe r "technica l devisers " emerged , typically , a s salarie d em ployees o f eithe r capitalis t firm s o r publi c corporation s i n charg e o f buildin g th e infrastructure fo r economic growth . Accountants, a s wel l a s lawyer s specialize d in corporate affairs , typicall y reserv e the use-valu e o f their labor for capitalist clients, despite th e appearances of professional "freedom. " Furthermore , a s changes in the organic compositio n of capital ten d t o brin g abou t "th e massiv e reintroductio n o f intellectual labo r into the process of production," exper t labo r becomes an integral part of production. Expertise i s either drawn from occupation s alread y dependen t on th e capitalis t fir m o r tends to b e qualifie d a s "professional" : th e worker s ten d to see k professiona l status , o r ar e grante d "professional " privileges , fo r reason s internal t o th e organization. Finally , th e kind s o f professional service s delivere d 17

18

19

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within th e bureaucrati c framewor k o f the welfar e stat e seem to b e i n an altogethe r different category. Salaried expert s o r professional s shar e on e characteristic : the products o f their activity do not normally reach a n open market. What engineers , accountants, employe d architects , busines s administrators, socia l workers, teachers at all levels, and salaried physician s an d lawyers all exchange for income on specifi c labor markets i s their labor power and the skill s inherent i n their persons. The products o f thei r activity , however , remai n withi n th e purchasin g organization , wher e they ar e use d directl y by employer s o r b y client s o f the organization . Two relativel y independent dimension s see m to be involve d i n the determinatio n of thes e differences : th e degre e t o whic h a n exper t occupatio n i s subordinate d t o capitalist relations of production, an d the degree to which its relation to the produc tion o f surplu s valu e i s direc t o r indirect. A classificatio n o f professional situa tions o n thi s basi s i s attempte d i n Table 4 . One importan t point must be made: the farther one move s fro m th e classic marke t 21

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situation o f th e "free " persona l professions , th e mor e purel y ideologica l d o th e professional claim s o f disinterestednes s an d universalit y o f servic e become . W e have seen , indeed , tha t thes e claims , typica l o f th e legitimizin g ideolog y o f profession, reflec t th e structura l characteristics o f unproductive labor and o f a singula r market situation . Suc h structura l connection s d o no t exis t fo r profession s whic h contribute t o capitalist reproductio n an d accumulatio n mor e directl y than d o medicine or the law . Neither do the connection s hol d fo r salaried professionals—i n par Table 4. RELATIO N OF PROFESSIONAL (OR EXPERT) SERVICE S TO CAPITALIST PRODUCTION Use-value of services

Services Exchanged for Capital

Services Exchanged for Revenue

Directly incorporated into production of surplus value

Expert services included within the corporation: professional and manageria l (including freelance consulting)

Expert or professional services which contribute to th e production of constant capital (in non-profit researc h an d development)

Incorporated only indirectly (contribute to the reproduction of the labor force)

Contribute to the reproduction of the work force within the corporation or (rarely) in privately owned service firms (e.g., healt h professions, instruction of different kinds).

(a) Market situation: classic personal professions

Not incorporated

Supervisory or controlling services

(b) Non-market situation: "welfare" profession s in th e service of the state Services related to "law an d order/' containment , an d ideological production (including "free" professions)

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ticular, no t fo r th e organizationa l professions , eithe r pur e o r technobureaucratic . Insofar a s th e ter m "profession " incorporate s th e connotation s o f universal service an d o f an exchange of labor power radically different fro m tha t typica l o f capitalism, th e ver y extensio n o f th e ter m beyon d th e classi c professiona l situatio n of "free " an d unproductiv e work i s ideological. Th e sociologica l definitions which include thes e element s are , therefore , contributin g to th e ideologica l assimilation of structurall y different kinds of labor. Thi s ideological extension o f the ter m "pro fession" applie s t o nonmarke t an d nonpersona l exchange s o f skille d service s th e expectations an d legitimation s derive d fro m th e classi c situatio n o f unproductiv e professional labor . Historically , th e forc e promotin g both th e ideologica l use an d its ideological effects i s the status project i n which aspiring occupations ar e engaged. Before turnin g to an analysis o f the ideolog y of profession pe r se , I shall sum u p the result s o f this attempt t o apply Marx's structura l categories to the "professiona l commodity." Tabl e 5 presents the summar y i n diagrammatic form . This tentative analysis ha s locate d the points of departure o f the professional com modity fro m real commodities : th e service s that profession s historicall y organized to sel l are , i n fact, skille d labor-power , th e pric e o f which tend s to b e justified i n terms o f expertis e an d lengt h o f training . Th e condition s o f monopol y i n whic h these skill s ar e produced , however , invalidat e th e apparen t equivalenc e betwee n market pric e and specia l training . Finally , i n the practice o f many professions , use value predominates ove r exchange value: this appears to be the structura l foundation of th e ideology of profession a s it is formulated, first, b y the classic personal profes sions which initiat e the movemen t towar d organization of their markets i n the competitive phase cf capitalism. The particular structure of the "commodity" exchange d on these markets indicate s tha t the professional projec t of market organization is not ^direct extensio n of capitalist relations of production: it represents, rather, a n extension of exchange relations into new areas of life, a s an effect of the generalized break down o f the precapitalis t social structure . The origin s of professions othe r tha n th e classi c ones (law, medicine, dentistry , and, wit h certain qualifications, architecture) ar e no t typically found in "free" mar kets of services. An d the practice of the classic professions themselve s is changed b y the ris e o f organizations. I n general, profession s d o no t consolidate thei r privileges until th e "organizationa l revolution. " What this term stands for is, i n fact, th e en d of libera l capitalism. I n the transitio n toward th e monopolisti c phase, th e occupa tions whic h attai n o r aspire to th e statu s of the classi c professions , an d whic h con tribute to spread the latter' s self-justifyin g ideology , do not typically depen d o n the extension o f exchange relations; thei r origins are located , rather , i n the transforma tion o f the force s an d relation s o f production in the capitalis t enterprise, i n the ne w functions o f the capitalist state, and in the elaboration of new forms of the dominan t ideology. The radica l difference s betwee n wor k situation s whic h ar e usuall y regarde d a s professions sugges t on e lin e o f thought: th e marke t projec t o f the classi c persona l profession represente d a necessar y bu t nevertheles s provisiona l an d temporar y stage i n th e statu s projec t tha t i s generall y calle d "professionalization. " Despit e the apparen t independenc e o f th e professiona l providers , thes e specia l market s required institutional guarantees which tied them closely to the state—i n particular ,

Table 5 . PRODUCTIO N OF PROFESSIONA L COMMODITIES AN D IDEOLOGICA L PRODUCTIO N Professional services considered under the aspect of Exchange Value Principal characteristics

Use-Value Market Situation (personal professions)

Non-Market Situation (organizational professions)

Main locu s o f production

Training centers

Practice

Practice

Product characteristics

Skilled labor power, inheren t to the perso n of the professional; sociall y produced, privately appropriated .

Advice or ministratio n

Advice or ministratio n Research

Realization

Deferred t o entry int o labor market, afte r training

Immediate: produc t consumed as use-valu e (potentially accessible to all consumers)

Immediate: produc t consumed (or incorporate d int o other products ) by specifi c clients or specific employer s

Typical conditions of production

Monopoly of training and credentialing

Interpersonal exchange on a free marke t o f services

Interpersonal service s not purchased b y client bu t provided b y "welfare-state" institutions; technical or sci entific products consumed or incorporated within organization

Table 5 . (continued) Professional services considered under the aspect of Exchange Value Principal characteristics

Use-Value Market Situation (personal professions)

Non-Market Situation (organizational professions)

Predominant appearance of product

Abstract, susceptible of being measured (quantitative expression: analogy betwee n standardized educatio n and homogenized labor-time )

Concrete, qualitative, relate d to client's needs, susceptibl e of differentiation i n terms of status and style of lif e of clientele

Concrete, qualitative, eithe r related to client or employer's needs or defined b y bureaucratic regulation s

Main ideologi cal effec t

False equivalence betwee n credentials, lengt h o f training, and price of professional labor powe r

Universality o f service, radical difference betwee n professional mode of production and capitalist mod e

Extension of the ideolog y o f profession to structurall y different kind s of work situation and conditions of production

General ideological

Individualism; skill s a s personal propert y

Individualism; equalit y among individua l consumers or individua l citizen s

Ideology o f expertise a s the new foundation o f inequalit y in the educationa l an d occupational structur e

premises

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to a state-controlle d syste m o f educatio n an d credentialing . Th e consolidatio n of large organizations i n the privat e sector an d the expansion o f state functions signal , in our century, a general retreat fro m th e "pure " marke t principle: in the large organizational units of the private or the public sector, greater predictabilit y of operations tends to g o han d i n hand wit h th e bureaucratizatio n o f functions an d control. In thi s phase , professionalizatio n represent s a collectiv e attempt t o protec t an d upgrade relativel y specialize d an d differentiate d activities : the privilege s tha t ar e sought ar e justified b y resorting to a model of profession whic h correspond s t o th e project an d the practice of the market professions durin g the liberal phase of capitalism. I n the firs t place , thi s ideological reference aim s at legitimizing socia l inequality: it does so, on the one hand, by stressing th e apparent fusio n between educationa l and occupationa l hierarchies , an d o n th e other , b y tacitl y assimilatin g the marke t professions' relativ e independence fro m th e class structure an d thei r ethical claims. Secondly, on e o f th e goal s o f professionalizing occupations—one o f the privi leges they pursue—i s a measure of work autonomy . Autonom y in the organization of fre e market s o f services wen t together wit h autonom y i n determining the conditions of work i n the firs t phas e (or the firs t type ) of professionalization. Suc h autonomy wa s obviousl y never concede d t o th e seller s o f the typica l labor-commodity, namely, th e industria l proletariat. Bu t i t wa s no t attained , either , b y occupation s which ar e ofte n regarde d a s professions : th e establishe d clerg y an d th e military , necessary though they were to the maintenance o f the bourgeois state , never entere d a market sphere . Nor did a "free " professio n lik e engineering , directl y relevant t o capitalist production , attain th e contro l over it s own work whic h characterize s th e classic marke t professions ; th e projec t o f th e "personal " profession s wa s onl y a brief episod e i n the stor y o f professionalization. Thi s indicates that , today , th e alleged conflic t betwee n bureaucrac y an d professio n a s mode s of work organizatio n is not so much a conflict betwee n tw o different structures a s i t is a contrast betwee n the structur e o f bureaucratic organization s an d a n ideolog y promote d b y som e of their members . Th e case of engineering suggest s something else: that autonom y i s more easil y concede d whe n i t concerns transaction s betwee n privat e persons than when i t would imping e on the basi c structur e o f decision-making in capitalist production. Fo r occupations whic h are encapsulated withi n (o r dependent upon) large heteronomous organizations , th e ideologica l appeal t o the model of profession ma y represent a n attemp t t o establish a last-ditch defense agains t subordination . I hav e emphasized throughou t this analysis that, today, the disparate occupationa l categories whic h we call "professions" ar e essentially brought together Zry ideology. It i s a n ideolog y use d b y th e leader s of professionalization project s an d share d b y the member s o f various occupations . I t is als o share d an d sustaine d b y th e whol e society, no t excludin g its socia l scientists . W e mus t examine , now , th e affinitie s between th e ideolog y of profession an d th e dominan t ideolog y of bourgeois soci eties. First , I shall look briefl y a t the ideologica l trunk from whic h the professiona l branch derives . Second , I wil l conside r wha t function s th e ideolog y of professio n performs withi n th e socia l divisio n o f labor, wit h regar d t o th e specifi c group s o f workers who claim professiona l status . Finally , w e must ask , howeve r tentatively, what th e ideolog y of profession contributes , today , t o th e dominan t ideology. 23

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GENERAL COMPONENT S O F THE IDEOLOG Y O F PROFESSIO N During the nineteenth-century phas e of professionalization, th e emergent ideology of professio n incorporate d severa l traditiona l or precapitalist component s which can be viewed as residues. W e have discussed these elements at an earlier stage as "antimarket" principles. Thre e o f them ar e importan t here . Th e firs t i s a wor k ethi c derived fro m ideal s o f craftsmanship, whic h finds intrinsic valu e i n work and i s expressed in the notion of vocation or calling. Thi s ethical notion is to be distinguishe d from th e bourgeoi s entrepreneuria l wor k ethic , i n whic h work i s a mean s toward capitalist accumulation , o r i n Weber' s interpretation , a mean s towar d salvation ; in eithe r case , the valu e o f work is extrinsic t o wor k itself. Th e secon d i s the idea l of universa l service ; connecte d wit h th e "protectio n o f th e socia l fabric " agains t the subversiv e effect s o f the market, i t tends to respect and define, i n the transitional phase, pre-industria l ideal s o f community bond s and communit y responsibility. In this sense , it incorporates precapitalis t legitimation s of social inequality , which are reflected i n the mode l of gentlemanly disinterestedness . Third, it s ideological status model appears as a secularized versio n of the feudal notion of noblesse oblige, which embodied th e nobility' s ideological aversion t o commercia l pursuit s an d it s belief , anchored i n a religiou s view o f the socia l world , tha t hig h rank impose s duties a s well a s conferrin g rights . 24

These elements can now be linked with more precision to the structure o f the ' 'professional commodity. " Th e visibilit y o r predominanc e o f "realized " use-valu e in the transactio n o f professional service s emphasizes the concrete , qualitativ e aspects of th e labo r powe r expended ; i t appears, thus , a s a direct suppor t fo r th e intrinsi c value place d o n wor k by th e ideolog y o f profession. Th e relativ e independenc e of the classi c persona l profession s fro m capitalis t productio n ca n b e related , i n turn, to th e professions ' particula r affinit y wit h status . Thei r detachmen t fro m th e pre dominant relation s o f productio n gav e th e classi c profession s a measur e o f inde pendence from th e capitalist class structure an d th e possibilit y of maintaining social and ideologica l ties wit h precapitalis t elites ; th e gentlemanl y ideal , transferre d b y the nineteenth-centur y profession s t o their market project , i s a manifestation o f this apparent independenc e fro m clas s relations . A shor t digression is necessary here to explore a particular aspect of the penetratio n of status into the nineteenth-century projec t of market organization. The market give s professional service s an appearance o f universality b y levelin g the difference s be tween potential consumers; this equalization, however , i s purely formal. The quantitative aspec t of "professiona l exchang e value" canno t equaliz e th e qualitativ e dif ferences inherent i n use-values. The differential capacity t o consume, determined b y social inequality, mediates the quantitative and the qualitative aspects of market consumption. Specific style s of life which express "status honor" crystalliz e into modes and patterns of consumption. Use-values , realized in consumption, ar e thus shaped and determine d b y status . In fact , th e us e o f professiona l service s (includin g those mos t "universal " i n kind, suc h a s medica l service s o r elementar y education ) wa s no t extende d t o th e mass public by extension o f the market ; thes e services were generalized , rather , b y 25

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the extension of social-welfare functions. However, even after the development o f the welfare state , professional service s o f a personal kin d eithe r continue to be reserve d to those who are rich enough to pay, or they tend to be qualitatively different according to the clientele's capacity to pay. The socioeconomic statu s of the client not only influences the quality of the service, or the nature of the use-value, tha t a professional provides; it also influences the professional'sown statu s and ranking, most especially in th e persona l professions . The deploymen t o f professiona l wor k withi n organizations , o r i n relatio n wit h them, substantiall y modifie s the traditiona l threefold relation between statu s of the client, statu s of the professional , an d qualit y of the product ; i t does not, however , entirely supersed e it . One importan t sector o f the service s provide d by th e marke t professions i s luxury services —that is , specia l use-value s enjoyed b y th e ric h an d by th e rulin g class . Withi n th e categor y o f luxury services , som e professional use values ar e stil l almos t exclusivel y reserve d t o th e ric h (architect-designe d resi dences, fo r example), whil e som e others, suc h a s th e privat e an d speed y attentio n of eminen t doctors , expres s the infinit e variet y of status gradations . The permanence of these traditional effects o f status is residual; and the reason for this may be found in the temporary nature of the professional project of market organization an d i n the structura l difference s betwee n th e classi c persona l profession s and those professions o f later an d differen t origins . The statu s of all contemporary professions i s typically based on organizations an d is legitimized b y the thoroughly modern ideolog y o f expertise . Th e rankin g o f organization s is , today , th e mai n determinant o f professional statu s differentials. Of some rankings, only "th e happ y few" ar e aware ; bu t I am interested i n those intuitive prestige scale s which ar e relatively publi c knowledge, i n particular when they concer n trainin g institutions. The public ranking of organizations syncretizes intrinsi c and extrinsic criteria of prestige: standards o f professiona l an d intellectua l excellence merg e wit h traditiona l forms of evaluatio n derived from th e syste m o f social stratification; th e fam e o r the powe r of clienteles , th e socia l origins of the studen t body , the styl e of life an d socia l position o f th e graduates , ar e fuse d wit h th e "objective " element s base d o n knowl edgeable evaluations o f expert performances . Th e publi c existence o f such prestig e rankings helps maintain the potency of traditional and ascribed determinants o f status within th e ver y stronghold s o f rational expertise . Whatever it s bases, the effect s o f prestige ar e clear : they destandardize th e same values tha t the rationalizing effects o f labor and commodity markets ten d to homogenize an d quantify. For professionals, th e prestige of the training centers from wher e they com e operate s a firs t destandardizatio n o f degrees an d skills . I t blends wit h unmeasurable persona l factor s t o stam p th e individua l produce r wit h a n aur a o f uniqueness. Statu s and personalit y effects, whic h ar e inseparabl e fro m th e transaction of services, limi t and counteract th e ideological reduction to abstract an d quantifiable value . Despite the complexity and heterogeneity o f its components, th e ideolog y of profession canno t b e considere d independentl y o f th e dominan t bourgeoi s ideolog y within whic h it is formed. At the center of the ideology of profession w e find, necessarily, th e genera l postulate s o f bourgeois ideology . The notion that "th e individua l is essentially th e proprietor of his own person an d

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capacities, fo r which he owe s nothin g to society" i s a cornerstone o f the bourgeoi s theory o f democrati c liberalism. The mode l o f societ y tha t emerge s durin g th e seventeenth-century crisi s o f th e ancien regime i s a marke t model , i n whic h fre e individuals consent o f their own will t o the contrivances o f political societ y i n order to protect thei r own natural rights—an d firs t an d foremost , thei r right t o property. In the foundations of liberal theory, the force that binds atomized individuals to each other i s the marke t itself. A marke t societ y whic h i s ideologically founde d o n the equa l right s of free indi viduals but whic h equates freedom wit h possessio n involve s an inescapabl e contra diction: i t "generate s clas s differential s i n effective right s an d rationality , yet re quires for its justification a postulate of equal natural rights and rationality.' ' Thus , at the core of all libera l theories w e find th e impossibilit y of individual equality in a class society. Unabl e to achieve th e impossible, ideology escapes the issue either by denying the centrality of class or by justifying i t as part of the "state of nature.'' Th e possessive market mode l created b y libera l theor y i s described b y it s contradictory foundations: individualism , property , egalitarianism , and class. The possession s appropriated b y th e professiona l consist , typically , o f practical and theoretica l knowledge , unde r th e for m o f a specia l competence. Thi s for m o f property ha s tw o distinctive characteristics: o n the on e hand , i t is inseparable fro m mind an d self ; o n th e other , i t constitutes a resource tha t canno t b e depleted . Be cause i t cannot b e depleted , th e for m o f property characteristi c o f the professiona l escapes the dictate s o f scarcity. Insofa r a s hig h price s on a market ar e a function of supply and demand, the y can be attained in a market of competent service s b y acting either upo n deman d (whic h i s difficult , a s w e know ) or upo n supply . Relatively scarce supply ca n b e obtaine d i n two principal ways , bot h of which ar e predicate d upon monopol y o f training and a restrictive definition o f what constitute s compe tence: th e firs t i s the implici t o r explicit refusa l t o produce a s man y competen t pro viders o f service s a s deman d call s for ; th e secon d i s b y conspiracy , amon g th e competent provider s o f services, t o withhol d thes e service s fro m th e market . A professional conspiracy to withhold services, althoug h not impossible in theory, would be highly improbable , however. Lik e all forms of personal property , "cognitive property " ca n b e hoarde d instea d o f being invested : onl y b y it s investmen t o r application doe s cognitiv e property augmen t th e availabl e knowledg e capita l o f a society or improve the lives of people who lack such knowledge. But historically, the class situation of the modernizing bourgeois professionals exclude d the possibility of such hoarding : they no t onl y had t o mak e a living , the y ha d t o mak e i t through a market for their services. Unlik e the traditional professionals, the y could not depen d on their elite patrons (o r on their family fortunes ) for subsistence. The disintegration of precapitalist ties of dependence, as well as the limitations inherent in the ownership of lan d an d capital , forced th e professiona l fractio n o f the bourgeoisi e t o see k an d ensure alternative means of subsistence on the market . Thi s was the essential struc tural factor in the mobilization of their cognitive property. It was complemented b y a traditional ideological one: men who claim to have better than average competence — especially wher e th e competence concern s vita l collectiv e needs—would b e immoral if they did not apply it in the service of the community. Thus, the dictates o f the capi26

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talist division of labor combine with the dictates o f traditional moral law to mobilize the competenc e appropriate d b y th e individua l professional . This aspec t largely accounts fo r the "residual " persistenc e of a traditional ideal of servic e i n the contemporary ideolog y of profession: th e ideal of moral obligation to the collectivit y i s the main ideological response of profession t o the contradiction between sociall y produced knowledg e an d it s privat e appropriation . I t appears, a t the sam e time, a s a justification an d a s a guarantee that suc h competenc e will , in deed, b e "returne d t o society." Suc h an idealistic guarantee is not necessary, however, i n a society wher e th e larg e majorit y o f people mus t sel l their labor power in order to survive, and where special competences are sough t wit h a view to their sale. The idea l o f servic e canno t solv e th e contradictio n betwee n th e monopol y of training, whic h i s the goa l of professionalization projects, an d the marke t situation, in whic h service s ar e sol d (i n th e classi c persona l professions ) o r skille d labo r power i s bough t (i n the cas e o f salarie d professionals) . Monopol y of training can give a relatively high exchang e value to the competenc e i t produces, independentl y of th e market ; i t allows, moreover, th e creatio n o f artificia l scarcity , b y mean s of which th e theoreticall y inexhaustible knowledg e resourc e becomes sociall y finite . The revelatio n tha t sociall y produce d knowledg e i s privatel y monopolize d (an d artificially limited ) challenge s th e egalitaria n an d democrati c legitimation s buil t into the dominan t ideology. If, however, i t can b e convincingl y establishe d tha t th e springs of knowledge flow fo r all who care to learn and are mentally capable o f learning, th e revelatio n is no longe r a s trenchant . Th e "natural " law s o f the marke t d o not suffic e t o justify th e hig h exchang e value o f the specia l competence s produce d by monopolisti c training centers. Bu t if those centers appear to be ope n t o all who "deserve" education , th e individua l appropriatio n of specially valued skill s ca n b e justified b y anothe r "natural " law : namely, th e unequa l distributio n o f "natural " intelligence an d resolve , whic h maintains a n inevitabl e selectio n proces s amon g individuals wit h equa l right s an d equa l opportunities . The generalizatio n an d apparen t equalizatio n o f access to educationa l opportu nities solv e ye t anothe r ideologica l problem raise d b y professiona l monopolie s of competence. Th e postulate s o f classica l libera l theor y wer e carrie d severa l step s further b y nineteenth-centur y Utilitarianism , whic h wa s closel y tie d t o th e profes sional movements an d to professionalism a s an ideology. A ll appeal s to traditional moral la w progressivel y disappeare d fro m th e Utilitaria n mode l o f society , a s did the principl e of an artificia l identit y of interests base d on fear o f the sovereign . A s befits a society where generalized commodity production tends to subvert all organic bonds, th e Utilitarian s founded thei r view o f th e socia l orde r o n th e principl e according t o whic h individua l "egoism s harmonis e o f themselves i n a societ y whic h is in conformity wit h nature." Seekin g for their doctrines the status of science, the y made eve n mor e abstrac t th e abstrac t individua l wh o wa s th e uni t o f analysi s o f classical libera l theory . I n the word s of Elie Halevy , "the whol e effort o f the associationist psycholog y wa s t o prove that egoism i s the primitiv e motiv e of which all the affection s o f the sou l are th e successiv e complications." This radical psychological reductionis m accentuates th e egalitaria n dimensio n o f libera l theory . I t increases, therefore, th e contradictions which egalitarianism generates in the dominant 29

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ideology. For, indeed, "accordin g to the principle of the natural identity of interests , every individua l i s the infallibl e judge o f his own interest, o r is at least less fallibl e than anyon e else , an d ca n pursu e i t freely an d withou t restraint." Can thi s position be reconciled wit h th e professional' s clai m t o be th e bes t judge of his client's interest? Ca n it be reconciled with the reality of class society an d class government, o r with the principles of hierarchical voting admitted by the Utilitarians? The answe r lie s i n education . That individuals were not always the best judges o f their own interests wa s proved by Malthus' theories. Therefore , th e majority should be taught where their best interests lie: the stat e must interven e "no t i n order tha t the libert y of individuals may b e limited, bu t i n order tha t individual s may becom e free." I t is not difficul t t o se e that the sam e reasoning applies , mutati s mutandi, to the state's intervention in favor of professiona l monopolies . I n the mos t genera l case , however, th e state' s intervention, promote d an d welcome d b y th e Utilitarians , consists precisel y i n organizing national systems of education. Embryoni c in the firs t hal f of the nineteent h century , these systems tended mor e o r less rapidly toward the "universal " stag e of free an d compulsory schooling . The interventio n of the stat e in favor of "the greates t happiness of the greater number'' solve d the contradictions implicit in ideological egalitarianism: on the one hand, men are not all equally the best judges o f their own interests , but they ar e al l given, in theory, th e means to become the best judges. O n the othe r hand, th e natura l inequality of intelligence makes itself manifes t i n educational an d occupational achievements. Elitis m and elite rule can, therefore, b e legitimized with out renouncing the essential postulate s of the egalitarian ideology: it is sufficient that the average person shoul d appear to have stood at least a chance of proving his or her gifts. In short , th e apparen t equalization of educational opportunit y transforms th e impact of ideological egalitarianism: from bein g a source of contradiction and potential demystification, th e principl e of equality among atomized individuals become s a central sourc e of legitimacy for the clas s system . For , indeed , " i f al l men star t o n some basis of equal potentia l ability , the n th e inequalitie s the y experienc e i n their lives ar e not arbitrary , they ar e th e logica l consequence of different persona l drive s to use those powers—in other words, social differences ca n now appear as question s of character , o f moral resolve, wil l an d competence." The libera l and Utilitaria n constructio n o f the individua l a s a " a natura l uni t of measurement in social science," an d a s the basic unit of the socia l order, appear s to b e th e cornerston e o f the ne w syste m o f inequality. Because the interventio n of the stat e a s universa l educato r appear s to reestablis h equalit y o f opportunity at th e outstart, specia l categorie s o f individual s who monopolize competenc e appea r t o have ipso facto prove d their ability. The y may , thus , legitimately clai m specia l pre rogatives, bot h juridical an d social. More generally , individualis m appear s to be a central ideologica l process, whic h runs acros s the whole social structure, it s meaning an d import differently articulated and modulate d a t each level of the structure. It s essential effec t i s to produc e th e "subjective illusion' ' b y which the individua l believes h e acts as a free agen t in identifying wit h th e politica l an d ideologica l structures o f his society . Becaus e actions , 32

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meanings, an d words , appea r to emanate solel y fro m hi s subjectivity , the individ ual canno t gras p the shapin g o f his sel f b y ideology , nor the relation s between hi s free action s an d thoughts an d the socia l structure withi n whic h h e i s inserted. This subjective illusion , whic h ca n b e see n a s a characteristic effec t o f all ideology, is magnified b y bourgeoi s individualism. Becaus e ever y perso n ca n b e convince d that he or she i s a free an d responsible agent , endowed with equal rights, individualism appears as a crucial mechanism by which the ideology of the ruling class becomes dominant—that is, shared alik e by the rulers and by the ruled and invested with th e appearance of universality. The particular relation that professionalism bears to individualism an d to the sub jective illusio n deserve s to b e noted . Thei r special competenc e empower s profes sionals and experts t o act in situations where laymen feel incompeten t or baffled. I n fact, th e assumption by the public that the expert is competent creates a sort of pragmatic compulsion for the expert: to certify hi s worth in the eyes of the laity, he must act. Deferentiall y requested t o interven e b y hi s clients , th e exper t practitione r is compelled to do something; from thi s point of view, anythin g is better than nothing. As Freidso n remarks : "Indeed , s o impresse d i s h e b y th e perplexit y of his clients and b y hi s apparen t capacit y t o dea l wit h thos e perplexities , that th e practitioner comes to consider himself an expert not only in the problems he is trained to deal with but i n al l human problems." Mos t particularly in the persona l professions , th e behavior of the expert asserts, ideologically, that a variety of ills—and, in particular, those that can most affect the person—have individual remedies. Thi s reinforces the optimistic illusio n o f ideological individualism : persona l problem s o f all kinds ar e purely private and admit, as such, individual and ad hoc solutions. In the predominant ideological way of addressing socia l issues and social relations experienced by indi viduals, therefore , structura l causes, as wel l a s collective action upon those causes, are relegated t o a vaguely Utopian realm. At the same time, the practitioner's "compulsion to act'' reiterate s t o the layman that education confers superio r powers upon the individua l an d superio r master y ove r physica l an d socia l environments . Th e social worth of the educated individual , his greater socia l productivity, and the value of his time are asserted in relative and hierarchical terms: in a fusion of practical ability and moral superiority, the expert appears to be freer an d more of a person than most others. Himsel f a choice victim of the subjective illusion, h e is also, b y his very existence an d actions , a n effectiv e propagator o f bourgeois individualism . I t is along this crucia l dimensio n that th e ideolog y of profession an d th e "possessiv e individ ualism" o f expertise wor k t o sustai n th e dominan t ideology . We mus t attemp t t o discern th e specifi c way s i n which thi s is done . 38

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PROFESSIONAL IDEOLOG Y A N D TH E SOCIAL CONTRO L O F EDUCATE D LABO R The notion that organized professions ar e self-governing and self-disciplined communities of intellectual workers, bound by shared knowledg e and shared norms , ha s a long tradition in sociology. Durkheim, for one, placed hopes for the regulation and moralization of economic life in a revived version of the medieval corporation. The 40

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rules generate d b y professiona l "communities " hav e a s thei r avowe d objec t "t o impose on the profession itself the obligation of maintaining the quality of the service, and t o prevent it s common purpose bein g frustrated throug h the undu e influenc e of the motiv e of pecuniary gai n upo n th e necessitie s or cupidity o f the individual." The service ideal and the intrinsi c value placed on work are, a s we know, the ethical foundations o f these rules. So , a t least , goe s the mor e genera l justification , no t of Durkheim's hopes alone, bu t of the public's trust. Communit y and ethicality are indissolubly related. I n fact, professio n i s more often defined a s an occupation which tends to be colleague-oriented, rathe r tha n client-oriented. A curious paradox i s involved here for occupations whic h claim to live by a service ideal, an d yet tend to label as a quack an y member "wh o stakes all upon his reputa tion wit h hi s clients—patients , students , 'cases'." Indeed , th e paradox , t o b e solved, require s th e notion of an autonomous, voluntary , and organized community of peers: its standards of quality and probity embody the collective wisdom that ulti mately protect s th e collectivity' s livelihood—b y keepin g the product "good, " the y guarantee it s saleability . I n th e classi c persona l professions , associatio n an d col league control emerged i n relation with marke t organization; they no w appear to be warrants agains t th e temptation s o f th e market . Colleagu e control , furthermore , protects the public against it s own undue or excessive influenc e on the professionals . I shal l not examine her e its questionable, an d ofte n questioned , efficacy . I want to ask, instead , wha t th e normativ e syste m o f profession mean s for its members. I n order to grasp the ideological impac t of notions such as "communit y of profession" or "company o f equals" w e must look, first, a t the social reality to which they refer . Throughout this study, we have encountered variou s forces that stratify the alleged community of profession. W e paid particular attention to factors lodge d in the organizations o n whic h profession s depend . Th e hierarch y o f ranks availabl e to profes sionals withi n bureaucrati c organization s i s a n obviou s determinan t o f differentia l standing fo r individuals. Les s obvious and more importan t are th e structura l effect s that the powe r and resources of organizations hav e on the interna l hierarchy of professions. Th e power of the organizational client, the connections wit h th e state, and the prestig e o f universities are externa l forces translate d int o dimensions o f centrality an d marginalit y among profession s an d within them . Insofa r a s a profession i s itself a n organization , howeve r loose , it s elite s are , precisely , th e connectin g lin k with other elites in powerful organizations . Indeed , even medicine, the most powerful o f the corporat e occupations , doe s not wiel d a measur e of independen t powe r comparable t o that o f the industria l corporation or the state . Therefore , th e genera l measures of success and powe r within a profession ten d t o flow , ultimately , fro m outside, fro m th e centra l powe r structur e o f the society. Hierarchies of success measured b y general societa l criteria such as income, influ ence, and power tend to merge within a given profession wit h hierarchies o f prestige measured i n "pee r esteem." Thes e interna l prestige evaluation s ar e diffuse d t o the wider public, especially by the personal professions, bu t their origins and their use are primaril y internal. I t is within a profession o r discipline that excellence tend s to be transmuted into power and, vice versa, that power tends to be legitimized by fusing with excellence . 41

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These tw o hierarchies—the on e o f power, wit h externa l origin s and visibl e "t o the outside," an d the other of excellence an d prestige, define d internall y and trans lated int o influence—tend t o coincide. T o the exten t tha t the y d o not , th e internal hierarchy becomes more esoteric, restricte d t o the initiate d member s o f the profes sion o r specialty . Bu t in any case , a profession is always defined by its elites: th e elites tha t wiel d interna l power may no t be th e sam e that ar e visibl e to the outside , espeically whe n the medi a become th e mai n agents of visibility; bu t i t is always a n elite tha t speak s to the relevan t outsider s fo r the "whol e profession," maintainin g the imag e o f a unified an d solidar y community, or projecting the achievement s an d identity o f a specialty . Obviously , the mor e organize d a profession is , th e les s its elites ar e challenged , an d th e mor e th e professio n wil l b e identifie d b y outsider s with it s oligarchic spokesmen . The questio n t o pos e no w is : wha t factor s maintai n overall ideological solidarity within a profession? Certainly , no on e woul d den y th e proverbia l professiona l hatreds and bickering. Bu t is there somethin g besides the binding force of economic interest that allows professionals lo w dow n in the internal hierarchy to consider themselves professionals an d thus, a t least minimally, the peers of the profession's elites ? A genera l startin g point is the fact that a profession i s by definition organized. A s Stinchcombe remarks : Organizations ar e amon g th e group s wher e th e communit y o f fat e i s share d among unequals. . . . I n general, th e fat e o f th e organizationa l elit e i s mor e closel y tie d t o the fat e o f th e organizatio n tha n i s tha t of thei r "inferiors. " . . . Th e more th e sub ordinate's need s and wants are met by the organization, th e more the superio r controls the flo w o f thes e satisfactions , an d the les s th e subordinat e coul d mee t thes e need s elsewhere, th e les s th e uppe r classe s hav e t o cour t th e subordinate' s consen t an d compliance. 45

The "courting of consen t an d compliance'' occurs, i n the professions, throug h initial recruitment an d durin g training. Professiona l socializatio n aims, i n fact, a t th e internalization o f specia l socia l controls : i t takes , tha t is , standard s define d b y th e profession's elite s an d make s the m par t o f each individual' s subjectivity. Insofa r as thi s socializatio n is successful , th e elite s wil l b e i n control not onl y o f material rewards but also of the kind of esteem that counts—the estee m granted by a referenc e group o f majo r importanc e fo r th e individual . Whil e estee m is , ultimately , easier and cheaper to dispense than powe r or income, i t holds fo r the recipien t somethin g more tha n th e promis e o f influence; i t is intimatel y bound u p wit h a sense of self , precisely becaus e professions ar e ideologically constructe d a s occupation s tha t on e enters by calling, o r at least by choice. A s such, the y appear to express an essentia l dimension o f the self . The less this is so, th e more purely instrumental the choice becomes, and the less important the moral reward of colleague esteem appears in comparison with material rewards, whic h may or may not be controlled by colleagues. The erosion of the ideological notion of calling tends, therefore, to undermine a powerful element of social control within a profession. Obviously , the existenc e o f alternativ e profes sional elites also diminishes the control over the self-esteem o f "inferiors'' exercise d by an y one of these elites, but it does not necessarily diminis h the overall contro l of

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the profession over its members; th e multiple elites may, indeed, share the same basic standards of "professionalism"—as i s true, fo r example, o f the various specialtie s within th e fiel d o f medicine. Alternative standards an d alternativ e definition s o f professiona l moralit y an d worth do , i n fact, loose n th e gri p that th e taci t and explici t norm s o f a discipline or profession hav e on the self . Thi s is the significanc e o f dissenting group s o r movements withi n a profession: while the entrenched elite s always tend to rule them out as "unprofessional," thes e groups generat e their own norms an d solidarity . They may arise ou t of an effor t t o gain recognition for a new specialty , o r out of full-fledge d "paradigmatic battles, " o r out of the challenge t o a profession's notio n of its social function. Th e ofte n profoun d impac t of the studen t movement s o f the ninetee n six ties wa s based , i n large part , o n th e alternativ e source s o f moralit y an d solidarity they offere d t o professional apprentices . Despit e th e transienc y o f their personnel , student movement s aris e i n situations tha t d o brin g peopl e together : unlik e school s and universities , many professiona l wor k situation s maintai n isolation amon g indi viduals. Thi s is one o f the importan t reasons why dissent withi n a profession tend s to originat e i n its studen t wing . But let us return to the average case of "successful" professionalization : the concrete referenc e grou p o f the individua l professiona l i s mor e likel y t o b e a specifi c group of colleagues tha n th e professio n a t large . However , unles s it is a dissenting group, i t relays standard s an d norm s whic h ar e compatibl e wit h thos e o f the pro fession's elites . Compliance with these norms, we have said, is elicited by more than work-extrinsic materia l rewards . I n fact , i n almos t al l professions excep t perhap s medicine, th e interes t i n material rewards i s more likel y t o direct an individua l outside hi s profession, t o the centers of power where suc h rewards ar e mor e plentifull y distributed. Wha t typically bind s a professional t o hi s profession , an d therefor e t o its elites , ha s t o d o with the character of work itself. Many of the structural factors tha t tie an individua l professional's self-estee m an d sense of self to his work are common to all forms of work. Th e fact that most professions generat e a subcultur e i s ofte n presente d a s a characteristi c elemen t o f these communities o f workers. I t i s obvious , however , tha t occupationa l subculture s are no t confined to professions; i n fact, the y are particularl y distinctive in relatively humble occupations , especiall y thos e tha t ar e geographicall y o r sociall y isolated , such a s seamen , lumberjacks , miners , railroaders , o r circu s an d carniva l people . All occupation s whic h involv e specia l skill s an d specia l world s o f wor k shap e t o some extent th e worker's personality of self-presentation; initiatio n int o techniques , languages o r jargons , way s o f dressing , an d mannerisms , identif y th e individua l with his occupation for himself and for outsiders. Th e pleasure of' 'talking shop'' i s not restricted to the professions , no r is the anticipator y socialization which prepares an individua l t o loo k an d ac t lik e peopl e i n his chosen fiel d ar e suppose d to. Whil e the choic e o f a vocatio n reinforce s th e strengt h o f anticipator y socialization , th e result of all occupational socializatio n is the same ; it tends to create conformity and to identif y peopl e wit h wor k roles , an d als o wit h th e stereotype s of those roles tha t are hel d i n the large r society . Occupationa l socialization , therefore, no t onl y gen erates subcultura l enclaves, marke d b y initiatio n an d secrecy ; i t also reinforce s th e 46

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overall correspondenc e betwee n th e public' s stereotype d expectation s o f people i n special roles , an d th e aspec t an d behavio r o f the rol e players . The particula r strengt h o f professiona l socializatio n is roote d i n th e lengt h an d the institutiona l character o f training. A vocation is , b y definition , somethin g on e follows full-time , an d changes of vocation are psychologicall y as wel l a s financiall y difficult i n fields protected by monopoly of practice and lengthy training. Th e heav y investment o f time , energy , an d mone y tha t mos t profession s requir e insures , fo r one thing , th e stabilit y of a recruit within th e field . Unles s th e benefit s ar e to o low, or th e cost s too high , th e investmen t alread y incurre d reinforces commitment—b y inertia, i f nothing else. Thi s stability—which i s distinctiv e in highly mobil e so cieties—effects a particulary strong identificatio n o f the perso n wit h th e role , both subjectively an d fo r others ; popula r novels , films , an d T V serial s emphasiz e thi s permanence—you canno t really unfroc k a priest, unmak e a doctor, o r disbar a lawyer. Occupationa l stabilit y immediatel y evokes career, o f which i t is both a condition an d a n effect . While biograph y i s lookin g backwar d o n one' s life , a n after-the-fac t searc h fo r order and meaning, career is looking forward , wit h a sense of order to come, whic h depends crucially o n the stabilit y of institutions. Thus , career closely binds the projected sel f to organizations or to the professional institution s which insure "continuity i n status in a labor market." Th e expectatio n o f career is therefore a powerfu l factor of conformity wit h the existing social order and a source of basic conservatism. Careers, Wilensk y remarks, 49

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give continuit y t o th e persona l experienc e o f th e mos t abl e an d skille d segment s o f the population—me n wh o woul d otherwise produc e a level of rebellion or withdrawal which woul d threate n th e maintenanc e o f th e system . B y holdin g ou t th e prospec t o f continuous, predictabl e rewards , career s foste r a willingnes s t o trai n an d achieve , to adopt a long view an d defer immediat e gratification s fo r the later pay-off. I n Mannheim's phrase , the y lea d t o th e gradua l creation o f a "life plan." 51

This life-pla n i s a privilege, enjoye d onl y b y a minority withi n th e labo r force. Or derly careers , i t has bee n emphasized, ma y wel l b e on e o f the mos t significan t expressions o f inequalit y betwee n differen t individual s an d differen t categorie s o f workers. Career expectations ar e a n essentia l componen t o f profession, t o suc h a n exten t that askin g wha t i s happening t o professionals toda y i s almost equivalen t t o asking what is happening to their modal patterns o f career. Stability and orderly progression through a work-lif e wer e th e goal s o f th e professionalizatio n movement . Today , they mak e profession s int o prestigiou s an d desirabl e occupations . Subjectively , career i s a pattern o f organization of the self . I t epitomizes, therefore , th e profes sional's self-involvemen t wit h hi s wor k a s wel l a s th e legitimac y he confer s t o th e elites—professional o r organizational—o n who m hi s futur e depends , bot h mate rially an d psychologically. For mos t recognize d professions , a n orderl y career begin s wit h trainin g in professional school s o r universities . Th e authoritativ e an d authoritaria n framewor k of relations between teacher s and students is a fundamental elemen t o f institutionalized professional socialization . Th e hierarch y o f excellenc e an d prestig e b y mean s of 52

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which a profession legitimize s its internal stratification is produced i n the university; professional recruit s internaliz e it , first , i n tha t context . Th e student' s inevitabl e subordination and acceptance of his teachers' supervision are immediately and tacitly justified i n terms o f the teachers ' greate r expertise. Th e interrelation s betwee n th e context o f training an d th e context s o f practice ar e personalized ; th e teachin g elite s of a profession ar e ofte n elit e practitioners i n the field . I n any case , their persona l sponsorship guarantee s the prope r socializatio n o f the student s t o th e professiona l world outsid e th e school . A s Freidson an d Rhea remark: "Successfu l completio n of a professiona l educatio n i s a n objectiv e measur e o f . . . technical an d normativ e socialization, bu t it s inadequacy seem s to be implie d b y the characteristi c tendenc y of professional s t o rel y on persona l testimonial s an d recommendations." These personalized warrant s d o mor e tha n simpl y insure th e adequat e socializa tion o f the ne w professional , guaranteein g tha t hi s "complianc e an d consent " wil l not b e to o difficul t t o obtain ; they reinforc e th e contro l by a n elit e an d th e latter' s legitimacy. Prestige filters down, from th e "grea t men " i n a field t o those who study or wor k unde r them , throug h ideologica l mechanisms; th e formatio n o f cult s an d the vicarious enjoyment o f the grea t man' s prestige b y his underlings ar e character istic of the training situation, but they als o extend to the worl d of work. The y insur e the ne w professional' s willin g an d eve n happ y acceptanc e of the hierarchica l orde r of hi s professio n an d o f the elite-define d ideolog y tha t underlie s it . Vicariousnes s gives him , indeed, a sense of belonging to a society o f peers, i n which differential prestige ca n b e ideologicall y redistributed. Finally, th e ideolog y of equality withi n a stratifie d professio n depend s crucially on th e conten t an d o n the socia l meanin g o f training and expertise . Th e conten t o f professional educatio n is , i n part, a functio n o f its length . On e autho r remarks : 53

Practitioners ar e typicall y overtrained. . . . Admissio n t o an y skille d occupatio n i s so hedge d about wit h rules tha t th e entran t mus t lear n far more tha n he wil l typicall y apply i n the cours e o f hi s practice—wit h a consequent overlap i n the abstrac t knowledge bas e o f adjacen t occupations . . . . A physicia n stil l know s muc h mor e tha n an electrician, althoug h bot h may have the sam e rati o of use d knowledge to learnt knowledge. . . . Th e social pressure s withi n th e majo r professions a s wel l a s i n the large r society deman d tha t all th e availabl e knowledg e b e mustere d fo r crises , o r a t leas t be o n call. 54

It i s almost impossibl e t o distinguish the rea l fro m th e ideologica l effects o f this overtraining. Firs t o f all , there i s n o effectiv e guarante e tha t th e individua l prac titioners on e deal s wit h will , i n fact , mobiliz e suc h comprehensiv e competence s " i n a crisis" fo r there i s no guarantee that the y hav e been keeping u p wit h th e ad vance of knowledge in their respective field s and that their training is not obsolete i n all bu t a relatively narrow are a of practice. Overtraining , however, aim s a t creatin g complete skill s an d a t elicitin g th e layman' s trust . Becaus e o f suc h overtraining , specialization is not seen by the publi c (or by the professional) a s a narrowing down of competence , bu t a s a deepenin g o f knowledge, a n added skill . In mos t occupations, routinize d specialties ten d to become equivalent to the "dirt y work" whic h professions delegat e to ancillary occupations. Withou t a previous comprehensive training , specialization—eve n i f it is not pure routine—tend s t o become

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both a factor i n and a n expression o f subordination. Th e specializatio n of function s inherent i n organizationa l role s give s t o th e incumbent s a specialize d knowledg e which is fragmentary an d rapidly exhausted. This kind of subordinate specializatio n ties a n individua l t o a particular organizatio n an d a particular job, thu s destroyin g the polyvalenc e o f skill an d it s market value . Fo r professionals too , i t is a factor of potential proletarianization. On the contrary , specializatio n whic h i s independentl y and autonomousl y acquire d i s a marke t asset . There i s another aspec t t o overtrainin g that occur s befor e specialization ; i t gives to th e specialty , a s noted , th e characte r of an advanc e i n esoteric knowleg e whic h confers mor e powe r o n th e individua l possesso r o f suc h knowledge . A t the sam e time, overtrainin g appears to protec t "th e intelligenc e of the whole, " th e potentia l for understandin g a whole fiel d an d it s evolutionary dynamics. Whe n the mechani zation of labor robbed the skille d worker of his capacity t o comprehend a whole process of production, hi s subordination to capital was, i n fact, completed. Insofa r a s increasingly specialize d professional s maintain , throug h overtraining , the "intelli gence of the whole, " the y escape the fat e o f most othe r specialize d worker s i n our society. Overtrainin g appears, thus, a s a specific attribut e ofprivileged work , which confers specia l wort h o n it s recipients an d establishe s a minima l parit y betwee n them; i n a hierarch y o f increasingl y monopolize d competences , al l professional s have a t leas t a n initia l share . This shar e i n monopolize d knowledg e bring s the m dividend s o f anothe r kind ; every profession , becaus e of the monopol y o f competence whic h i t has o r claims , "considers itsel f th e prope r bod y t o se t th e term s i n which som e aspect of society , life, o r natur e i s t o b e though t o f . " Sharin g i n thi s genera l functio n o f reality construction give s ever y professiona l a minimum of social authority . In this sense, " a l l professional s ar e priests ; the y interpret mysteries whic h affect th e live s of those who d o no t understand." Narro w specializatio n canno t achiev e thi s mystica l effect. Fo r instance , th e secre t knowledg e attache d t o certai n role s withi n bureau cratic organizations seldo m has general socia l significance; its specialized possessors do no t contribut e t o definin g an d constructin g fo r th e publi c a usabl e segmen t of social reality. It is doubtful, therefore, tha t specialties whos e function s ar e no t really understood b y an y significan t secto r o f th e public , whos e plac e o n th e "genera l cognitive map " i s vaguely traced , ca n sustai n th e ful l ideolog y o f profession. The visibl e professions whic h hav e a clea r monopol y o f competence—an d no t only a monopoly of practice—have authority ove r a kind of knowledge that is important for every man's life. Th e gap in competence between professional s an d laymen, institutionalized by the monopolies of training and certification, ips o facto sets every professional apart : he belongs t o a privileged society of "knowers," whic h the public tends to identify wit h it s elite spokesmen. The "mysteries " interprete d b y the indi vidual professiona l hav e been name d an d partiall y revealed t o th e publi c before h e comes in. It is a rare individual wh o can challeng e b y himself the whol e image o f a field an d th e socia l constructio n o f an aspect of reality in which professiona l elite s are particularl y active an d influential . We began by asking what elements bind professionals t o their work an d maintain a sense of "community" and basic "equality" i n stratified professions. Individual 55

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ism and a sense of privilege and importance vis-a-vis the laity and other occupations emerged a s general dimensions of professional consciousness. O n the one hand, vocation, career , training , expertise , an d authorit y ar e individualize d attribute s o f privileged work. O n th e othe r hand , th e unconsciou s (o r conscious) comparison s with other kinds of work, made by professionals themselves an d by the larger public, ultimately set professions ou t as communities of "superior" workers . These general elements o f consciousness elicit "consen t an d compliance" from educate d workers and underplay the realities of professional stratification. Th e minimal internal equality of professions is only relative and relational. The question is whether the ideological effect s o f professiona l consciousnes s ca n resis t th e force s whic h objectivel y undermine th e privilege s of professional work . PROFESSIONAL PRIVILEG E AND PROLETARIANIZATIO N When th e field s o f action of the medieva l guilds began t o close, thei r expansion took capitalis t forms: divisio n o f labor and specializatio n were accentuate d locall y and regionally , an d th e mastershi p becam e increasingl y difficul t t o achieve . A s Weber describe s thi s process : From th e fifteent h centur y on , strictl y economic specification s wer e attache d t o th e masterpiece . . . th e requirement signified merel y a compulsory period of wor k with out remuneratio n to exclud e person s withou t means . I n addition t o th e requirement of the masterpiece, the masters who had achieved the position of price workers strove for a monopolistic positio n b y prescribing a certain minimum capital for the prospective master. . . . With the closing of the guild was associated a tendency t o hereditary appropriation o f th e positio n o f master . . . . Wit h thi s developmen t th e characte r of certain parts of medieval craft work as small capitalism is determined, and corresponding t o thi s characte r a permanent class of journeymen originates.^

That parallel can guide us through the present situation . Le t us for a moment as sume tha t "mastership " ca n b e equate d wit h self-employment . The firs t observa tion i s that the efforts a t corporate closur e of the mos t established profession s hav e been successful , despit e th e fac t tha t "universalistic " educational system s canno t limit apprenticeshi p a s muc h o r i n th e sam e wa y a s th e ancien t guild s could. William Kornhause r writes : 60

The increas e in the proportio n of tota l professional s i n the labo r force hide s th e fac t that several major professions have declined in membership relative to the labor force. With the exceptio n o f teachers , journalists, an d clergymen, the mai n salaried professions increase d more tha n te n time s betwee n 190 0 an d 1950 , whil e th e labo r force only doubled and the total professions quadrupled . Durin g the same period, those professions in which many or most practitioners are self-employed increased less than the labor force in the case of lawyers, musicians, pharmacists, and physicians, or less than the total professions in the case of architects, artists, and dentists.^ 1

While th e absolut e number s o f self-employe d professional s hav e obviousl y increased, thei r proportion i n the tota l labo r force ha s remaine d stable. Moreover , self-employment constitutes a diminishing category even among the established pro62

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fessions: i n the decade 1940-1950 , onl y 5 percent o f respondents in the establishe d professions ha d manage d t o "mov e upward " int o self-employment—a proportion identical t o that i n the other professional categorie s ("new, " "semi-professional, " "would-be," an d "marginal") . Furthermore , self-employe d professional s repre sented only 25 percent of all these professional categorie s take n together: bu t even in the established professions , th e muc h highe r proportio n of self-employe d person s (43 percent ) wa s toppe d b y the 4 5 percen t wh o worked for private employers, an d there wer e 1 2 percent wh o were pai d b y th e government. Self-employed professionals had , in 1962, the highest median income of all occupational categories , althoug h the y represente d les s tha n 1. 3 percen t o f th e labo r force. Entr y int o thi s categor y show s a marke d tendenc y towar d occupationa l inheritance an d self-recruitment. I n 1962 , 14. 5 percen t o f me n i n this categor y had fathers wh o also wer e self-employe d professionals (a n observed frequenc y 11. 7 times greater tha n what would be expected o n the assumptio n o f independence, an d by fa r th e larges t discrepanc y o f this kin d registere d i n the table , whic h consider s all occupational categories). I f th e "mastership," i n the sense of self-employment, is increasingly reserved t o a minority of professionals (an d to a hereditary minority , at that!), then the most significan t difference amon g the majority o f professionals i s not whether they are self-employed or salaried workers, but for whom the y work and in what conditions. Thes e data only reiterat e th e well-know n fac t tha t professiona l status, even in the most exclusive categories, n o longer insures the incumbent agains t the predominan t relation s o f production in our society/Th e endurin g attractio n of such statu s must therefor e b e base d o n othe r kind s of privileges. The closure o f the "mastership " render s obsolete a traditional and still-cherished conception o f the professiona l career : tha t "independence " ca n b e achieve d afte r apprenticeship. Professiona l live s either tend to be increasingly organized by bureaucratic caree r patterns, o r the y "progress"—i n smaller , les s bureaucratized profes sional firms—up to a point, beyond which almost nobody goes. In this latter situation, the arbitrarines s an d personalism o f management ar e likel y t o be great ; recognizing this, subordinat e professiona l worker s ma y organiz e t o deman d mor e bureaucrat ization, i n the for m o f specifie d criteri a of advancemen t an d institutionalize d and predictable promotions. Thes e attempt s t o sto p th e erosio n o f caree r hing e o n "universalistic" bureaucrati c standard s which are—o r shoul d be—binding for both management an d professiona l employees . Thes e standard s are , nevertheless , a n expression of alienated work, of the employees' lac k of control over their whole work setting. As such, they make manifest the general subordination of work to a preestablished division of labor, to a synthesis achieve d at the top. Writing about the ' 'malaise of technicians " i n industry, a n Italia n politica l collectiv e observes: 63

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One explanation o f these difficulties, clos e to the technicans' heart , invokes th e insuf ficient rationalizatio n o f th e company—th e persistenc e o f archai c organizationa l forms, th e inadequac y o f channel s o f information , th e manager' s lac k o f training— in contrast wit h the superio r organization o f America n firms . W e argue tha t the tech nicians' malais e i s rooted i n the capitalist division of labor and that further rationalization will intensif y rathe r than alleviate it . . . . Eve n wher e personal arbitrariness plays

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Technicians i n large organizations ma y even appear to constitute a "new workin g class," precisel y becaus e of the specializatio n of their training and work , the threa t of skil l obsolescence , an d th e consequen t greate r subordinatio n t o management. However, a t th e lowe r level s o f th e hierarchy , "professional " wor k i n al l field s (except perhaps medicine , scientifi c research , an d academi c work ) exhibit s th e same trends to specializatio n an d fragmentation . The tendencie s t o proletarianizatio n o f educate d labo r have , potentially , grea t political consequences. The phenomeno n ha s preoccupie d th e theorist s o f the "ne w working class," bot h in Europe an d in the Unite d States, especially sinc e th e events of May 196 8 in France and 1968-197 0 i n Italy. Describin g conditions of increasing specialization, blocked mobility, skil l obsolescence, and erosion of the market value of educate d labor , thes e studies emphasize a double se t o f contradictions: betwee n ideological expectations an d wor k conditions , on the one hand ; an d between educa tion an d othe r area s of socia l experience , includin g work, on th e other . In hi s classi c stud y o f industrial work, Robert Blaune r noted : 69

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Self-estranged worker s are dissatisfied onl y whe n they have developed needs for control, initiative, an d meanin g i n work . Th e averag e manua l worke r and man y white-colla r employees may be satisfie d wit h fairly steady job s whic h are largely instrumenta l and non-involving, becaus e the y have not the nee d fo r responsibility an d self-expresison i n work. . . . On e factor which is most important in influencing a man's aspirations in the work proces s i s education. Th e more educatio n a person ha s received, th e greate r th e need fo r contro l an d creativity. 71

Blauner's observations , however , n o longer appear to accurately depic t a new generation of workers. Th e traditional legitimations of alienated labo r are no w in crisis, and the y contradic t th e "searc h fo r self, " howeve r individualisti c an d alienate d it s forms, tha t i s abroa d i n the genera l culture . The growin g importance o f "educate d labor, " i n both productive role an d num bers, exacerbates the crisis and the contradictions: the amount of critical information available o n societ y a s a whol e t o a n increasingl y educate d labo r forc e contrast s with the narrow defintion of functions and rank in most work situations. For educated labor within larg e organizations, thi s broader contras t take s the for m o f a contradiction betwee n th e powerlessnes s and apath y whic h ar e th e lo t of the averag e citizen and the discretionary power granted t o the worker , who is expected t o exercise tech nical skill s and theoretical intelligence , if only in limited functions . Manageria l an d technobureaucratic functions , moreover , ar e i n sharp contrast wit h th e tendenc y t o overspecialization i n many area s of technical an d professiona l education . I t can b e said tha t "Th e technician , th e employee , an d th e cadr e have not been trained t o b e stupid, bu t t o b e intelligent : and thi s practica l an d theoretica l intelligenc e canno t always be sufficientl y controlle d by the system , becaus e the very kind of know-how that i s demande d i s already , i n itself, contradictory." 72

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The political potential of this "new workin g class" is still undocumented b y clear evidence, an d is much too broad a subject t o be considered her e even speculatively ; but we may suggest how the ideology of profession counteract s th e structural contradictions o f educated labor. First o f all , a roug h distinctio n should b e mad e betwee n thos e professional s o r technicians wh o wor k fo r other experts i n their field , an d those who work i n large heteronomous organizations . In the first case, the professional hierarchy, internalized and legitimize d durin g training, wil l b e ideologicall y mos t effective . I n the secon d case, o n th e contrary , th e differen t educationa l backgroun d o f managemen t ma y play a mystifyin g role : the subordinat e "expert " ma y think , i n fact, tha t man y of his wor k problem s woul d disappea r " i f only hi s superior s understoo d hi s wor k better (o r were better trained).'' We shall consider here only the general aspects that apply i n both cases. Blauner's stud y o f industrial worker s shows tha t th e lac k of control ove r the immediate wor k situation—i n particular th e rhyth m and pac e o f work—i s a funda mental determinan t o f thei r sens e of powerlessness. Heteronomou s contro l of the worker s time completes , unde r capitalism , th e worker' s expropriatio n fro m th e means of production and fro m th e "intelligence " of production. Now , the centra l characteristic o f expert intellectual work is that it cannot be established fro m th e outside that a given result should be obtained in a given time. Thi s characteristic i s tied to the experts' monopol y of knowledge, which makes it even more difficult fo r nonexperts t o "see " o r t o replicat e th e productiv e proces s i n whic h expert s actuall y engage. Th e secrec y an d myster y whic h surroun d th e creativ e proces s maximiz e the self-governanc e concede d t o experts . Thus th e rea l an d th e ideologica l aspects of expert intellectua l work combin e t o protect thes e privilege d workers fro m th e "tyrann y o f th e clock. " Eve n i f their products an d the organization of their work live s escape their control, the y are masters of their time; thi s freedo m extend s fro m apparentl y trivia l bu t nevertheles s fundamental aspect s of the wor k situatio n all the wa y to the discretion whic h the y enjoy i n the productiv e activit y itself . Expert s ar e no t usuall y aske d t o punc h time cards, the y take their coffee breaks when they like, they arrange their work schedules and vacations wit h relativ e freedom, the y hav e free acces s to telephones, an d ofte n have their own private lines and offices as well. I n their work, they tend to have absolute discretion , even thoug h their own decisions ar e inserte d withi n th e framewor k of goal s an d strategie s chose n b y others . Many o f th e mos t visibl e symbol s o f occupationa l statu s amon g non-manua l workers—private office, comman d over secretaries, reserved parkin g space, a waiting room , an d th e like—ar e "protecting " their time and thei r work , thu s creatin g deferential respec t fo r both. A s Richard Sennett an d Jonatha n Cob b remark : 74

Deference i n America n society ha s thi s a t it s root : a calculation tha t someon e else's time i s more valuable than your own, whic h seems to give the person the right to command you r time i n accordanc e wit h hi s needs . Th e most obviou s exampl e occur s in offices, wher e i t seems right for secretaries t o perform services fo r their superior, not because the y respec t hi m as self-sufficien t o r because the y ar e awed b y hi s abilities , but because th e superior' s wor k i s considere d mor e valuable tha n her typing, an d s o his tim e mor e valuable tha n hers. 75

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The symbols signif y tha t some kinds of work an d some kinds of people ar e worthier of respect than others. Bu t the respect has real roots in the discretion and the freedo m from immediat e supervisio n tha t exper t worker s enjoy, n o matter ho w limite d thei r actual power . We have seen earlier how management manipulates bot h the real and the symbolic dimensions o f freedom a t wor k an d socia l prestige, i n order t o conceal th e fac t tha t "professional ladders " do not lea d t o increasin g powe r an d contro l i n decision making. Becaus e i t shapes th e expectation s o f professionals , th e ideolog y o f profession contribute s t o the succes s of these strategies: it confuses, tha t is , discretion at th e leve l of execution wit h rea l powe r an d freedo m o f choice . There is , first, th e archetypical professional concer n with status. I n the newer professions, th e creation , expression , an d protectio n o f specia l statu s ten d t o b e th e most centra l dimensio n o f th e professionalizatio n project . Relative prestig e an d privilege, tacitl y base d o n th e invidiou s compariso n wit h othe r occupation s an d other workers , influence , howeve r unconsciously , a professional's assessmen t of a specific wor k situation. Wh o h e implicitl y compare s himsel f with i s significant : it shoul d be noted, i n this respect, that the frequen t isolation o f professional depart ments and "enclave " professiona l worker s i n large organization s focuse s comparisons o n simila r occupationa l categories . I n theory , th e ver y sens e o f ideological community fostere d b y professionalism shoul d have the same effect, an d keep comparisons fro m deflectin g upward toward managerial rank s an d their different kind of work an d responsibilities . The concer n wit h statu s no t onl y prevent s alliances wit h othe r worker s o r wit h clients. I t also works as a preventive agains t th e unity—an d the unionization—of professional worker s themselves. Union s are, i n fact, a n instrument o f power of the working class , an d a s suc h ar e symboli c o f a los s i n general socia l status ; fo r an alogous reasons , even whe n ther e ar e unions , professional s ar e mor e reluctan t tha n other worker s to engage in militant tactics. Thi s ideological effect, i n which con cern with status can become a trap for subordinate professionals , i s maximized by the second archetypica l feature : professiona l individualism wit h al l its facets . Professional wor k conditions (and not only the general ideology ) foster individual ism. Th e professional's sens e of power and authorit y flows no t only from hi s actua l command ove r special knowledge but also from hi s control over interpersonal situa tions. Th e firs t establishe d professions—medicine , law , the ministry , and architec ture—were typicall y concerne d wit h th e problem s o f individuals . Only indirectly did the y defin e societ y a s thei r client . Today , individualize d service become s a n ideological remedy fo r the ill s of a social situation , a screen for the socia l problem s caused b y th e bureaucrati c system s throug h whic h service s ar e delivered—mos t notably i n the medica l an d teachin g professions . The ideologica l insistence o n individual aspects, the neglect o f the whole, merges with specializatio n t o confin e th e professiona l i n a n ideologica l conception o f hi s role: th e importanc e o f narro w responsibilitie s i s consciousl y an d unconsciousl y emphasized, exaggeratin g th e "dignity " o f the functions . Th e dominan t ideolog y attributes t o professional s an d expert s specia l prestig e a s wel l a s "mora l and intel lectual superiority" : sharin g i n thi s ideology , professional s ca n easil y mystif y t o themselves their actual power . Moreover , the y ar e locke d into conformity with th e 76

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role societ y offer s the m t o play—locked in by thei r vocational choice, b y th e par ticular mystiqu e o f each profession , an d b y thei r whol e sense of social identity. Finally, th e technocrati c ideology o f scienc e an d objectivit y excludes fro m th e specialist's concer n th e social and political consequences of his acts. Nowhere is this truer than in the technical and scientific fields. Robert Merton notes that "engineers , not unlike scientists, com e to be indoctrinated with an ethical sense of limited respon sibilities." A s the technica l auxiliarie s of capitalist production, engineers, in particular, coul d neve r gai n th e powe r t o defin e th e socia l aim s o f technology , th e overall purpose of their work. I n this sense, they are a typical example o f powerless discretion. Scientists, engage d i n th e loftie r an d apparentl y mor e autonomou s functio n of advancing knowledge for the whole of society, ar e similarly socialized into corporate irresponsibility, beyond the immediat e and circumscribed area of their specific task. For the positivisti c ideology on which mos t technical and scientifi c training tends to be based , "scienc e an d ethic s ar e rigidl y separate d domain s wit h distinc t method ologies an d subjec t matter . A s a result, th e purpose s of science ar e shape d b y th e dominant class , whil e ethics i s understoo d a s personal , vague , an d increasingl y without foundation." A s "th e citizen-sel f threatens to become submerge d i n the occupational self, " th e narro w conceptio n o f autonomou s an d responsibl e func tion become s a suppor t fo r th e technocrati c ideolog y an d it s premise s o f genera l privatization and depoliticization: "Paradoxically, the same ideology of the 'expert, ' which give s th e technicia n a certain autonom y withi n hi s o r he r ow n specialty , si multaneously prepare s the technicia n t o execute blindl y th e design s of others." In sum , th e expert' s and the professional' s outloo k on their work live s tend to b e shaped, today, b y individualis m an d narro w specialism . Thus , th e "need s for control, initiative , an d meanin g i n work" of which Blaune r speak s tend t o be defined , by education itself, i n a way that i s compatible wit h th e requirement s o f production in advance d industria l capitalism. Flexibility, autonomy , an d circumscribed respon sibility ar e precisel y th e qualities expected fro m exper t labor : as lon g as the protests of subordinat e professiona l worker s as k fo r mor e o f these individual privileges , a s long a s tha t i s the mai n purpose of their corporate associations , thei r potential disloyalty can easily be managed. Within the ideological constellation of contemporary professionalism, th e ideolog y o f expertis e an d o f partia l irresponsibilit y coexist s with traditional components an d with profession's ow n emphasis on individual career and individua l solutions . Wit h it s persistent antibureaucrati c appearances , the ideol ogy o f professionalis m deflect s th e comprehensiv e an d critica l visio n o f societ y which is necessary to reassess the social functions of profession. I n this sense, professionalism function s a s a mean s for controllin g larg e sector s of educated labo r an d for co-optin g it s elites . 79

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FUNCTIONS O F TH E IDEOLOGY O F PROFESSION ; CONTRIBUTIONS T O TH E DOMINANT IDEOLOG Y The perspectiv e o f th e politica l radicalizatio n o f th e intelligentsi a has haunte d bourgeois societie s (an d others as well ) fo r at least as lon g as th e "specte r of Communism." Th e threat o f communism was mor e potent an d more total, but the threa t

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of elit e disaffection ha s ofte n seeme d a dangerous and perhaps likely prelud e t o it. Against thi s threa t o f disaffection, professionalizatio n ha s functione d a s a n effec tive for m o f social an d ideologica l control. Speaking o f th e transitio n towar d full-fledge d capitalis t production , Mar x observed: Since handicraf t skil l i s th e foundatio n o f manufacture , an d sinc e th e mechanis m o f manufacture a s a whole possesse s no framework , apar t from the laborer s themselves , capital i s constantl y compelle d t o wrestl e wit h th e insubordinatio n o f th e workmen . . . . [Machines ] swee p awa y th e handicraftsman' s wor k a s th e regulatin g principl e of socia l production . Thus , o n th e on e hand , th e technica l reaso n fo r th e lifelon g annexation o f th e workma n t o a detail functio n i s removed . O n the othe r hand , th e fetters tha t thi s sam e principl e lai d on th e dominio n o f capital , fal l away. 82

The mechanizatio n o f production robbe d th e workin g clas s of it s las t hol d o n th e means of production—its crafts an d its skills. I n the historical context of proletarianization, "th e fetter s tha t [th e principl e of craftsmanship] lai d o n th e dominio n of capital" becam e symbol s o f statu s superiorit y an d instrument s o f divisio n withi n the workin g class . A t the othe r extrem e o f the occupationa l hierarchy , par t o f th e traditions an d ideal s o f craftsmanship wer e transpose d int o the ideolog y of profes sion by a sector of the bourgeoisie wh o did not primarily view themselves as workers. As capitalis m matured , th e ideolog y o f professio n coul d b e incorporate d int o generalized form s of social control, extended no w to the growing class of nonmanual and "unproductive " workers . Dependence on capitalist relations o f production and on bureaucracy i s a generalized featur e o f work in the monopolistic phase of capitalism. Th e bureaucratizatio n o f wor k generate s a "hierarchica l imag e o f society " and spread s some of the typica l component s o f the ideolog y of profession t o everincreasing strat a of the labor force. Compartmentalizatio n and differentiation within the divisio n o f labo r creat e (mainl y bureaucratic ) position s o f relativ e privilege, which thei r incumbents striv e t o "dignify " an d monopoliz e b y claimin g expertis e and b y professionalizing . Ralf Dahrendor f call s thi s ne w middl e class a Dienstklass e o r "servic e class. " He observes their concern with status and status symbols, in and out of work:'' Status, for th e servic e class , i s not a static notion . Hierarchy always implie s the possibility of promotion: social mobility an d the servic e class belong inseparably together . . . . It i s also of more general socia l significance tha t mobility withi n th e rank s o f public or privat e bureaucracie s i s greatly facilitated by education. Experienc e help s on e move ahea d to th e nex t barrier , bu t thi s ca n a s a rule b e overcom e onl y by forma l education." H e adds : "Clas s involve s a certai n amoun t o f clas s consciousnes s and politica l solidarity . . . . Th e member s o f th e servic e class , however , ar e i n Crazier's words , a 'class e san s conscience' . Instea d o f feelin g cohesive , the y al l stand i n a relatio n o f individua l competitio n t o eac h other . O f course , no t ever y bureaucrat compete s wit h ever y othe r one . . . . Bu t for the bureaucrat , advancing his status is essentially an individual achievement." W e ca n recogniz e i n thi s description elements that th e ideolog y of profession carried , fro m a traditional past and fro m th e libera l phase of capitalism, int o the divisio n o f labor of the monopo listic phase : individualism, expertise , an d status-seeking . Adapted , reduced , trans 83

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posed, an d changin g i n content , thes e becom e centra l element s o f th e dominant ideology. The ideolog y o f th e risin g o r rulin g clas s i s dominan t precisel y becaus e i t i s shared b y th e dominated . Workin g throug h th e "subjectiv e illusion, " i t find s material existenc e i n the institutions , relations, an d symbol s o f social practice. It s origins ar e composite , reflectin g style s o f lif e an d value s othe r tha n thos e o f th e ruling class. Its essential function , however , i s to reproduce th e relations of production an d th e clas s structure b y disguising their real nature an d even thei r existence . In this sense, professionalization appears as an ideological counterpart of proletarianization. A s the labo r force tends to become totall y subsume d unde r the forma l rela tions of capitalist production, the real and the ideologica l privileges associated wit h "professionalism" legitimiz e th e class structure b y introducing status differentials, status aspirations , an d statu s mobilit y a t practicall y all levels o f th e occupationa l hierarchy. The central legitimations of the new forms of inequality, whic h are their ideological foundations , ar e lodge d in the educational system . I n Louis Althusser's formu lation: " A t the outcom e o f a violent class struggle , bot h politica l an d ideological, against th e ol d ideological apparatus o f the stat e [th e Church] , a ne w ideological apparatus has bee n placed in dominant position : in mature capitalist formations, the dominant ideological apparatus of the state is the school. "' Th e materia l an d ideological importanc e o f th e educationa l syste m fo r bot h th e consolidatio n o f professions an d th e reproductio n o f th e socia l orde r canno t b e overemphasized . Education—arbitrarily equated with years of formal schooling —appears t o b e i n our societ y a majo r determinan t o f occupatio n an d o f lifetim e income. Recen t studies o f income inequalit y invalidate the relatio n between difference s i n school s and i n cognitiv e skill—measure d chiefl y b y I Q tests—an d earnin g power : the y confirm, however , th e statisticall y significant correlation between years of schooling and late r income. Whateve r th e merit s o f measuring cognitiv e development an d ability by IQ tests, and whatever schools actuall y do to improve these scores, the undeniable fac t remain s tha t schools do something for the social system, somethin g of fundamental importance . Th e findings indicate, in the firs t place , tha t "educationa l achievement i s a more powerfu l predicto r of earnings tha n ability , whe n abilit y i s measured b y I Q score s an d clas s standin g . . . the credentials are more important determinants than naked ability, o r a t leas t . . . than genera l educationa l development." The ris e o f a "credentiale d society " canno t b e adequatel y explaine d i n terms of actual changes in the natur e o f work: "Overall , abou t 8 5 percent o f the ris e i n educational attainment ma y be attributed to increased educationa l levels within occupa tions an d onl y 1 5 percen t t o shift s i n the occupationa l structur e fro m occupation s requiring les s education t o occupation s requirin g more. . . . Onl y a t th e extreme s of th e attainment distributio n (tha t is, for college graduates and for persons with n o education) was as much as one hal f the change in educational attainment attributable to shift s betwee n occupations." Becaus e their data were to o general, th e author s were obliged to conclude, however, that "how much of the change reflects increase d skill requirement s . . . and ho w muc h i s du e t o th e availabilit y o f better-educate d 85

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persons for the sam e jobs cannot finall y b e determined." I t appears, indeed, that the growin g suppl y o f educated labor—whic h ca n itsel f b e attribute d in large par t to th e structura l distortions of production and employmen t in late capitalism—determines the upgrading of the requirements for employment, perhaps as significantl y as th e changin g content o f most jobs. The genera l attitude s o f management i n private enterprise corroborat e th e ideological impor t of credentials. Practicall y without dat a t o support their beliefs, managers ten d t o tak e "educationa l achievement s . . . a s evidenc e o f self-discipline and potentia l for promotion . Moreover , trainabilit y i s presume d t o correlat e wit h educational achievement , a s ar e productivity , personality—importan t i n man y jobs—and adaptability." Yet, even fro m th e narro w point of view o f managerial requirements, "dat a o n th e civilia n occupation s an d persona l attribute s o f larg e samples o f America n militar y personne l durin g bot h worl d war s provid e stron g circumstantial evidenc e tha t American s o f divers e educationa l achievement s per form productiv e functions adequately an d perhaps well in all but a few professional occupations " 90

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There is evidence, therefore, that the hierarchy of "ability" establishe d b y forma l schooling ha s unclea r an d uncertai n correlate s i n socia l productivity , eve n i f we accept th e terms by which ou r society defines it . In America, "educational creden tials hav e becom e th e ne w property " fo r the larg e mas s of the population. This form o f property is all the mor e difficul t t o challenge becaus e it is less determined by inheritanc e tha n othe r form s an d becaus e it s ideologica l fusion wit h th e sel f i s almost impossibl e t o brea k apar t an d demystify . Wha t ar e th e overal l ideological effects o f the ne w structur e o f inequality? The firs t effec t i s that th e us e o f credentials a s screenin g device s a t al l levels of the occupationa l hierarch y justifies the existenc e o f a growin g "industria l reserve army" an d o f a permanen t surplu s population . In Iva r Berg' s words , "Th e mos t serious consequenc e of the educational upgradin g of work opportunitie s is . . . th e displacement of a significant population at the other end of the labor force, who must compete fo r jobs once hel d by people o f modest educationa l achievemen t an d wit h people whos e educationa l achievement s hav e gon e u p . " Th e ne w for m o f property ha s th e furthe r merit (for the maintenance o f the socia l system) o f immediately justifying relegatio n or exclusion in terms tha t ar e highl y compatibl e wit h th e old liberal ideolog y of individual effor t an d rewarde d har d work . The new structure of inequality has a second effect . Becaus e everybody has gon e through som e schooling—or, at th e very least, believe s tha t h e o r sh e shoul d hav e gone—the ideologica l foundations of inequality ar e deep, intertwined wit h the roots of the subjective illusion: " I f onl y I was smart enough, I f I hadn't been too interested in making money fast, I f I hadn't foole d aroun d so much" read countless interviews with working-clas s people. Becaus e they believe, at least i n some way, "that work ing yoursel f up depends on th e people , no t o n th e chance s you have" the y blam e themselves fo r not being somethin g other tha n wha t they are. Moreover, th e schoo l teache s bot h implicitl y an d explicitl y tha t differen t tasks and skills , n o matter how important and exacting for the self, d o not have th e same social value, i n the sam e way that different kinds of useful an d honest wor k d o not 94

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have the sam e dignity. A s Sennett and Cobb put it, the chil d learn s throug h experience in school not only that doing well in physics is better than playing the banjo but also tha t th e "college-bound " ar e different , an d better, n o matte r ho w muc h th e tougher kid s pu t the m down . I n th e hierarchica l an d stratifie d schoo l system , Althusser observes , "eac h mas s tha t fall s alon g th e wa y i s practicall y provided with th e ideolog y fit for the rol e it must pla y in the clas s society," includin g "th e role o f th e exploite d (wit h al l th e 'professional, ' 'moral, ' 'civic, ' an d 'national ' components o f a highl y develope d apolitica l conscience) ; th e rol e o f agent o f exploitation . . . o f agent o f repression . . . o r o f professional ideologist." In ou r society , th e realit y of class and exploitation i s deflected an d concealed b y the contradictions of a self that is shaped by class: ideology, indeed, transforms struc ture int o personality . Th e hierarch y o f competenc e i s presente d an d lived , fro m early childhoo d on, a s coinciden t wit h a moral hierarch y o f intelligence , effort , dignity, an d freedom . Th e firs t consequenc e is that challenging the structur e o f in equality requires , t o a large extent , a n ideologica l redefinition of the self : "W e d o not mea n tha t th e me n an d wome n w e encountere d wer e ignoran t o f the fac t tha t class condition s limite d thei r freedom " writ e Sennet t an d Cob b i n their stud y o f working-class Bostonians . "Rather , th e us e o f badges of ability o r of sacrifices i s to divert men from challenging the limits on their freedom by convincing them that they must first become legitimate, must achieve dignity on a class society's terms, in order to have the right to challenge the terms themselves." I t is in this sense that ideology make s men an d wome n put the burde n o f their "failures " o n themselve s first; i t holds i n front o f them the possibilit y of purely personal an d individua l solutions, an d thus prevents the m from eve n conceiving that there ma y be collective and cooperative way s o f challenging the ver y structur e o f social inequality. 97

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Another consequence of the ideology of competence i s the formation of an image of societ y tha t unconsciousl y fuse s powe r wit h superio r abilit y an d superio r development of the self. It is here that we must address another question: what is the direct and indirect role that professions an d professionals pla y in generating an d maintaining thi s ideology ? Historically, t o foun d socia l privilege on education an d teste d abilit y was , i f not an invention, a t least the distinctiv e battle cry of the professionalization movement . We have seen how the professions obtained , wit h the organization of an educational system, th e institutiona l and ideologica l structures o n whic h t o establis h persona l and collectiv e mobility , an d later , collectiv e entrenchment . Wha t i s particularly significant i n their role is that the superior badges of ability whic h they carry do not remain hidde n withi n ruling-clas s circle s or smal l intellectual coteries; the y d o not even remain circumscribed to the "magic circle'' o f elite universities: the profession s carry th e symbol s o f the ne w meritocrati c ideolog y to th e hospitals , t o th e publi c schools, t o the factories, to the government agencies, to the everyday lif e of a majority o f men , women , an d children . Professionals d o th e helping , th e judging , th e advising. The y hav e the jobs tha t see m useful, tha t coul d be helpful , tha t allo w a n expression o f the self . In Sennet t an d Cobb' s interview s with working-clas s people, th e persisten t "at traction o f the profession s wa s divorce d from th e behavio r o f everyday profession -

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als." They say:' 'I t is the position in which the doctor or university professor i s placed relative to other people tha t make s thes e occupation s see m s o valuable." Thi s everyday visibilit y of the professionals, tremendousl y increase d b y the welfare state and mass college education, ha s ideologica l consequences. Durin g th e Depression , they seemed to possess the only insurance agains t cataclysm. Today , they seem to have, mor e importantl y than income , a clai m t o dignit y an d respect . Thi s clai m appears to be founded entirely on superior education. For mos t o f the me n an d wome n who strive to improve themselves o r their chil dren, getting some education, eve n some college degree, is seldom the door to prestigious, "sociall y productive, " an d "free " intellectua l jobs . Th e educationa l "property" whic h they striv e to acquire onl y bring s them what seem like "second rate" benefits, i f one compare s them t o the idea l privileges of professional status . Yet, the first steps on the illusory road to high status can, and indeed are, taken: since 1957, more than 40 percent o f the students who have completed the fift h grad e have gone on to college. The prestige accorded year after year to the professions i n occupa tional prestige scale s reflects th e ideologica l function whic h they perform simply by being visible: i n our society, the y kee p "open " th e roa d to freedom throug h more formal education , through more individua l effort; the y appear to be our last ideological frontier . The lin k the y visibly establish betwee n educatio n an d the labor market reinforces th e ideologica l notion that ther e is suc h a link , an d tha t rewards—bot h material an d psychological—are , afte r all , rationally distribute d to th e ables t an d the hard-striving. 99

100

Education, intelligence , persistent effort , an d socia l usefulnes s appea r t o gran t professionals dignit y an d th e possibilit y of ful l huma n development . Professional s expect an d deman d deferenc e i n th e nonpolitica l circumstances o f everyda y life ; they usually get it , mos t especially fro m working-clas s and lower-class clienteles. Is this because of their ability, becaus e of their capacity t o help a person i n need, be cause of their credentials, or because of the symbols of their class and status position? It is impossible to say, and it does not really matter: the location of most professional s in middle - and upper-middl e socia l strat a infuse s th e lifestyl e an d th e etho s of the dominant clas s wit h meritocrati c an d ethica l legitimations . From th e occupationa l and educationa l systems , th e ideologica l effect spread s t o th e whol e structur e o f social inequality. The ideologica l apparatus of the schoo l standardizes the genera l structure s o f the dominant ideology , in terms tha t reinforc e th e unequa l distributio n of knowledge. Respect for science, fo r knowledge, for the professionals' 'construction of reality," grows amon g masse s of peopl e wh o shal l neve r se e a university . This respec t i s embodied i n a social hierarchy: it is not only respect for the man of superior knowl edge, i t is respect fo r those "wh o kno w better " because their position of relative power proves that they do. Persona l experience s wit h the reality of class may contradict the belief i n the untrammeled, "objective " play of meritocratic criteria. Ye t the dominant ideology constantly restates this belief i n every area of practice: in school, at work, i n the media, i n the doctor's office , i n the courts, i n the presentation o f the class structur e an d i n political life . 4

Monopolies o f Competenc e an d Bourgeoi s Ideolog y

243

If bourgeoi s politica l ideolog y i s characterize d b y democrati c elitism—which , Peter Bachrach argues , makes democracy dependen t "upo n the abilit y o f the gifte d to comman d th e deferenc e o f the man y fo r the well-bein g of a l l " — t h e n profes sionalization helps diffuse thi s ideology in the civi l societ y and reinforce its political usefulness. A dominan t ideolog y whic h tie s abilit y t o th e legitimatio n o f monopolized competenc e an d of the undemocrati c use s of expertise i s for professionalis m both a foundation and a prison: for, indeed, even th e purest an d worthiest of professional behavior s canno t hel p legitimizin g inequalit y an d elitis m b y thei r factua l demonstration tha t knowledg e i s beneficent power . As powe r become s equated wit h abilit y i n everyday circumstances , th e popula r bases o f a technocrati c ideolog y ar e strengthened . A technocrati c ideology , w e know, regard s democratic participatio n and politica l debate and accountability with impatience: superio r abilit y an d rationa l knowledge shoul d no t an d canno t b e hin dered b y a n ignoran t citizenr y and nonrationa l politica l processes . A s th e masse s unconsciously absor b technocratic vision s of polity an d society , thos e in power ar e progressively free r fro m havin g t o prov e specia l expertis e an d ability . Th e ideo logical relation is then reversed: powe r and privilege tend to become automati c warrants o f superior competence . As a heterogeneous category o f the occupationa l structure , professional s are , i n general, onl y agent s o f power . Consciousl y an d unconsciously , the y sprea d th e technocratic legitimation s of the ne w structure s o f domination and inequality , contributing t o thei r ideologica l convergence wit h othe r beliefs , aspirations , an d i llusions. Th e individua l freedom an d control which professionals enjo y i n and out of work i s in part a mask: fo r themselves a s wel l a s fo r less privileged others, i t helps to concea l collectiv e powerlessness, subordination , an d complicity . Yet, expert s an d professional s d o posses s cognitive and technica l competence s which are important, if not always essential, fo r the social development of productive forces an d th e ful l satisfactio n o f human needs . B y choice an d socialization , they are ofte n deepl y involve d wit h th e intrinsi c value o f their callings. Dissatisfaction with th e structura l limitations of one's work an d the socia l uses of one's productive activity nee d no t remai n a privat e crisi s o f conscience . Th e passag e fro m purel y personal problem s to a collective evaluation of their causes begins t o merge th e per sonal an d th e political . Today , knowledg e i s acquire d an d produce d withi n educa tional an d occupationa l hierarchie s whic h are , b y thei r structure , inegalitarian , antidemocratic, an d alienating . These structure s achiev e a fusion betwee n th e progressive conten t o f special competence s and th e requirement s o f a system o f domination. The y serve , i n this sense, a s a principal suppor t o f the dominan t ideology. To separat e th e progressiv e huma n meanin g o f one' s wor k fro m th e ideologica l functions inscribe d i n one's rol e i s a tas k o f persona l salvation . Thi s questionin g has bee n attempte d an d i t is taking place today , howeve r silently , howeve r timidly , in school s an d i n work places . Breakin g with ideology , finding ne w norm s fo r th e social production of knowledge and the social uses of competence demand s passion, vision, an d hard work. Thi s major historical task can only be sustaine d b y a solidary collectivity, awar e of its part and of its plac e i n the overall struggle for human libera101

244

Monopolies o f Competence an d Bourgeoi s Ideolog y

tion. In a historical perspective, abandonin g the "subjectiv e illusion " an d the seductions o f bourgeois individualis m become s the premis e o f personal freedom . We have followed differen t types o f professions an d different aspects of the professionalization movemen t i n thei r "lon g march " throug h capitalis t institutions: the free marke t of services, th e labor market, th e bureaucratic organization , the sys tem of higher education. Much of the contemporary sociologica l work on the profes sions participate s i n and accept s thei r ideology . Muc h o f the bes t empirica l work tends to focus exclusively on the actual processes of interaction between profession als and laymen, especially in the classic persona l professions , stressin g th e failure in communication o f these asymmetri c system s of interpersonal exchange . I hav e tried to explore in this book the structural foundations of diverse professional practices, movin g away fro m th e predominanc e whic h everda y lif e accord s to indi vidual and interactional dimensions. My central concerns hav e been these: the double movement whic h constituted , historically , th e comple x structur e o f profession; th e structural resources mobilized by professionalization; and the ideolog y that profes sions hel p generat e an d whic h mos t professional s share . T o vie w profession s an d professionalization i n their historical matrix helps u s to understand th e inherent contradictions whic h limi t an d distor t the huma n potentia l of professional wor k i n our society. I n this sense, sociologica l analysis ca n contribut e to the practica l redefini tion o f professional roles . I woul d lik e to conclude b y quoting the word s of a political collectiv e formed by professionals an d technicians, fo r they sugges t the bridg e between theoretica l analysis an d socia l practice: "Rol e contestatio n originate s wit h a refusal t o view one' s work as an isolated technical function an d an insistence o n seeing i t as part of a larger social process . Thi s begins a s a n ac t o f individual defiance . . . . [But ] the secon d phase of role contestation involves the developmen t o f new norm s an d ne w criteria which ar e alie n to th e capitalis t l o g i c . " Th e autonom y an d th e "intelligenc e of the whole " traditionall y veste d i n professional wor k appea r to be, now , uncertai n privileges. T o build o r defend monopolie s o f competence an d access does not protect thes e intrinsi c qualities. Fo r this , professiona l workers , i n solidarit y with al l workers, mus t fin d th e mean s o f claimin g an d realizin g the ful l huma n potentia l of al l work. 102

Appendix

246

Appendix

Appendix Tabl e 1 . PROFESSIONAL ASSOCIATIONS OF NATIONAL SCOPE England

United States 1897

Brit. Optical Associatio n Royal Brit . Nurse s Ass'n British Denta l Ass'n Insti. of Chartere d Accountants

1896 1895 1887

Opticians Nurses Accountants

1880 1878 1877

Lawyers Librarians Social worker s

Royal College o f Veterinary Surgeons Pharmac. Societ y of Grea t Britai n

1876 1874 1870 1867 1863 1857 1854 1852 1847 1844 1841

Royal Institut e of Britis h Architects British Medical Ass'n Law Societ y Inst, of Civil Engineers

1840 1834 1832 1825 1818

Librarians Association

National Unio n Teachers

Society of Engineers

Civil engineer s Veterinarians Teachers; Architects Pharmacists: Civil engineers (N.Y. ; fails to survive ) American Medica l Ass'n

Dentists

SOURCES: For England, Geoffrey Millerson , The Qualifying Associations (London , Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1964) pp. 246-258; for the Unite d States, Harold L. Wilensky, 'The Professionalization of Everyone?", American Journal of Sociology, 7 0 (1964): 137-158 , p. 141 , Table I.

Appendix

247

Appendix Table 2. POPULATION GROWTH DURING THE "GREAT TRANSFORMATION" (average growth rate, per thousand per year) United States Decades 1701-11 1711-21 1721-31 1731-41 1741-51 1751-61 1761-71 1771-81 1781-91 1791-1801 1801-11 1811-21 1821-31 1831-41 1841-51 1851-61 1861-71 1871-81 1881-91 1891-1901 1901-11 1911-21

England & Wales

Great Britain

Decades

Total increase

Net migration rate

1790-1800 1800-10 1810-20 1820-30 1830-40 1840-50 1850-60 1860-70 1870-80 1880-90 1890-1900 1900-10 1910-20

29.9 30.8 28.4 28.7 28.1 30.4 30.2 23.5 21.9 22.65 18.2 19.15 14.0

—

2.7 0.3 -0.9 -0.3 3.6 7.0 7.3 6.8 9.5 11.0

9.0 10.2 13.7 16.9 15.2 13.4 12.5 11.1 12.7 13.9 11.2 12.0 10.3 4.6

1. .8 1.1 3.3 7.1 9.4 5.8 5.0 7.95 3.65 6.45 3.2

SOURCES: Phyllis Deane and W. A. Cole, British Economic Growth: 1688-1959 (Cambridge : Cambridge Univ . Press , 1962), p. 288; Lanc e E. Davis et a/., American Economic Growth (Ne w York: Harper an d Row , 1972) , p. 123.

Appendix

248

Appendix Table 3. URBANIZATION AND INDUSTRIAL EMPLOYMENT DURING THE "GREAT TRANSFORMATION" A. Urbanization : Urba n populatio n (i n Grea t Britai n al l principa l town s includin g London, i n U.S . all town s of 250 0 o r more ) a s percentage o f total population Great Britain United Year Percent urban Year 1801 1851 1891 1921

States Percent urban

18.82 33.02 44.44 57.32

1800 1850 1880 1900 1920

6.1 15.3 28.2 39.7 51.2

B. Industrialization : Distributio n o f the labo r force as percentage of the total working population i n selected years 1801 Agric. Manuf., minin g All others Total

35.9 29.7 34.5 100

1831 1851

Great Britain 1871

24.6 21. 40.8 42. 34.5 35. 100 10

7 9 5 0

15.1 43.1 41.7 100

1891

1911

10.5 43.9 45.5

8.3 46.4 45.5

100

100

1839-59

1869-79

United States 1889-99

1919-40

1950-55

Agric. Manuf., mining All others

56.9 14.1 29.0

51.9 20.7 27.4

41.5 21.8 36.7

21.5 24.7 53.8

10.5 24.4 65.1

Total

100

100

100

100

100

SOURCES: Par t A: B . R. Mitchell and Phyllis Deane , Abstract of British Historical Statistics (London: Cambridge Univ. Press, 1962), pp. 19 and 24-26; Lance E. Davis eta/., Economi c Growth, p. 601. Part B: Deane and Cole, British Economic Growth, p . 142; Davis et a/., Economic Growth, p . 55 .

Appendix

249

Appendix Table 4 . GROWTH OF PER CAPITA PRODUCT IN LONG PERIODS; COEFFICIENT OF MULTIPLICATION IN A CENTURY (average centennial rates) Years Great

Britain

Years

United States

1 7 0 0 - 80 1.

2

1700-1840

1 7 8 0 - 1 8 8 1 3.

5

1 8 3 4 - 43 t o )

7

1894-1903)

1855-59t o) 1957-59|

1894-1903) 3.

to 1 9 5 7

I

\A-\.7 4.1

5.2

1 8 3 4 - 43 t o \ 1957

I

4.6

NOTE: Th e coefficien t o f multiplicatio n give s a clear imag e o f difference s i n growt h rates : i f the average annual growt h rat e had persisted for one hundre d years, the value of the per capita G NP would have been as many times as large (as the coefficient of multiplication) compared to the value at the beginnin g of th e period. SOURCE: Lanc e E . Davis et al., Economic Growth, pp . 4 1 ff.

Appendix

250

Appendix Table 5. EVOLUTION OF THE OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE UNITED STATES, 1900-1970 (both sexes; in thousands & in percentages of total labor force) 7 900

7 920

7 940

7 950

7960

7 970

7,460 25.6%

9,245 21.9%

9,132 17.7%

9,530 16.1%

10,400 15.5%

9,998 12.7%

1,234

2,283 5.4%

3,379

5,081 8.6%

7,475

7.5%

11.1%

11,322 14.4%

Managers, Officials, Proprietors, Farm Owners & Manager s Professional an d Technical

4.3%

Independent Professional & Technical

1.1%

420 1.0%

570 1.1%

654 1.1%

873 1.3%

1,200 1.5%

Professional & Technical Workers

910 3.1%

1,860 4.4%

3,310 6.4%

4,427

6,602

7.5%

9.9%

10,100 12.9%

Clerical & Sales Workers

2,184

5,443 12.9%

8,432 16.3%

11,365 19.3%

14,184

7.5%

21.2%

18,548 23.6%

Service Workers

2,626 9.1%

3,313 7.9%

6,069 11.8%

6,180 10.5%

8,349 12.5%

9,724 12.4%

Manual Workers

10,401 35.8%

16,974 40.2%

20,597 39.8%

24,266 41.1%

24,211 36.1%

27,452 34.9%

Craftsmen & Foremen

3,062 10.5%

5,482 13.0%

6,203 12.0%

8,350 14.2%

8,560 12.8%

10,027 12.8%

Operatives

3,720 12.8%

6,587 15.6%

9,518 18.4%

12,030 20.4%

11,986 17.9%

13,811 17.6%

Non-Farm Laborers

3,620 12.5%

4,905 11.6%

4,875 9.4%

3,885 6.6%

3,665 5.5%

3,614 4.6%

Farm Worker s

5,125 17.7%

4,948 11.7%

3,632 7.0%

2,578 4.3%

2,057 3.1%

1,400 1.8%

29,030

42,206

51,742

58,999

66,681

78,408

TOTAL

320

SOURCES: U.S . Burea u of the Census, Historical Statistics of the United States; Colonial Times to 1957, Washington, D.C., 1960 ; U.S. Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract of the United States: 1970, 91st edition, Washington, D.C. , 1970 ; Albert Szymanski , "Trends i n the American Workin g Class," Socialist Revolution, 2 (1972): 101-122.

Appendix

251

Appendix Table 6. GROWTH IN EMPLOYMENT OF PROFESSIONAL AND TEGHNIGAL WORKERS, 1960-1970 Number Increase, 1970 No.

Occupation Employed Total Teachers Elementary & Secondary Schoo l College & University

3

Natural Scientists Chemists Physicists Mathematicians Life Scientist s Other

1960-1970 Percent

11,140

3,670

49

2,690

930

53

2,310

710

44

380

220

144

500

200

68

140

40

39

50

20

66

70

40

123

180

80

83

70

30

87

Engineers

1,100

300

37

Health Workers

1,740

440

34

Physicians

310

60

24

Dentists

100

10

11

Professional Nurse s

700

200

39

Technicians

260

120

86

Other

380

50

16

Social Scientists

130

70

128

Accountants an d Auditors

490

180

57

Lawyers

280

80

37

4,210

1,470

54

All Other s

Full-time instructor s only . NOTE: Number s are rounded to the nearest 10,000 . However, percentages have been calculated on the bases of unrounded data, and may not add to total. In addition, about 6 percent of all scientists an d engineer s ar e full-tim e colleg e teachers . Adjustment s wer e no t mad e t o eliminat e duplications. SOURCE: Michael F . Crowley, "Professiona l Manpower : Th e Job Market Turnaround. " Monthly Labor Review, Octobe r 1972 , p. 12. a

252

Appendix

Appendix Table 7. PROFESSIONALS IN THE ENGLISH OCCUPATIONAL STRUCTURE

Year (in

Total working labor force thousands)

Professional occupations and subord. services (in thousands)

Professionals as percent of total

A. Base d on 1911 Censu s Categories 1841 6,90

8

162

2.3

1861 10,52

0

305

2.9

1881 12,73

9

457

3.6

1901 16,29

9

674

4.1

1921 19,35

5

856

4.4

B. Base d on 1921 Censu s Categories 1921 19,35

7

786

4.0

1931 21,05

5

933

4.4

1951 22,61

0

1,376

6.1

SOURCE: Mitchel l an d Deane, Abstract of British Historical Statistics, pp. 60-61 .

Notes

INTRODUCTION 1. Fo r a classification of the attributes of profession, se e Geoffrey Millerson , The Qualifying Associations (London: Routledg e & Kegan Paul, 1964) , p. 5 ; and M . L . Cogan , "Towar d a Definition o f Profession," Harvard Educational Review, 2 3 (1953): 33-50. 2. Th e focu s o n communit y an d th e functionalis t perspectiv e ar e wel l represente d b y Willia m J . Goode, "Communit y within a Community; the Professions, " Amer. Soc. Rev., 22 (1957): 194-200 ; and Bernar d Barber , "Som e Problem s i n the Sociolog y o f the Professions, " Daedalus (Fal l 1963) : 669-688. 3. Suc h i s the argumen t presente d by Harold Wilensky in "The Professionalizatio n o f Everyone," Amer. Jour. Soc, 7 0 (1964): 137-158 . 4. Elio t Freidson, Profession of Medicine (Ne w York: Dodd & Mead, 1970), p. 78. On the characteristics o f professional training , see, fo r instance , Willia m J . Goode , "Th e Theoretica l Limit s o f Professionalization," i n The Semi-Professions, Amita i Etzioni , ed., pp . 266-313 (Ne w York: Free Press, 1963). 5. Se e Rober t W. Hodge et al., "Occupationa l Prestige in the United States: 1925-1963," i n Class, Status and Power, Reinhar d Bendix and S. M. Lipset , eds., pp . 322-334 (New York: Free Press, 1966). 6. Se e Elio t Freidson and Buford Rhea , "Processes of Control in a Company of Equals," i n Medical Men and their Work, Eliot Freidso n an d Judith Lorber, eds., pp . 185-19 9 (Chicago : Aldine-Atherton, 1972). 7. Se e Eliot Freidson, "Client Control and Medical Practice," Amer. Jour. Soc, 6 5 (1960): 374-382. 8. Se e Davi d Solomon, "Ethnic and Class Differences amon g Hospitals as Contingencies i n Medical Careers," i n Medical Men, Freidso n and Lorber, eds. (1972) , pp. 163-173 ; and Dietrich Rueschmeyer, "Doctors an d Lawyers : A Comment o n the Theory of the Professions, " i n Medical Men, pp . 5-19 . 9. Se e Willia m Rothstein , American Physicians in the Nineteenth Century (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins Univ . Press, 1972) . 10. Freidson , Profession, pp . 71-72 . 11. Ibid., p . 73 . 12. Ibid.

13. Th e case of medicine i n the People' s Republic o f China illustrate s thi s point . Firs t of all, the corpus o f knowledge has been redefined accordin g to social needs, with emphasis placed on prevention rather tha n o n cure . Second , becaus e specializatio n o f functions ha s bee n broke n dow n considerabl y within the medical team, th e physician tends to lose a t least some of his "inherent" superiority . Third, the effort t o develop paramedical personnel—th e famou s "barefoo t doctors"—substantiall y dilute s the physicians' monopol y of expertise. Se e Victo r and Ruth Sidel, Serve the People; Observations on Medicine in the People's Republic of China (Boston : Beacon Press , 1973) . 14. Talcot t Parsons , "Th e Profession s an d Socia l Structure, " i n Essays in Sociological Theory, pp. 34-4 9 (Ne w York: Free Press, 1954) . 15. Parson s speaks, for example, o f the lega l profession occupyin g an "interstitial " positio n in the social structure; see Talcot t Parsons, "A Sociologist Looks at the Legal Profession," in Essays, p . 375. 16. Kar l Mannheim, Ideology and Utopia (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1936) , pp. 155 156. 17. Mannheim , Ideology, p . 156 .

254

Notes t o Chapte r 1 , page s 2- 8

18. O n the Marxist approach t o ideology, see Kar l Marx and Frederick Engels, The German Ideology, Parts I and I I (Ne w York: International Publishers, 1947) ; and Louis Althusser, "Ideologi c et Appareils Ideologiques d'Etat, " La Pensee (Jun e 1970) : 3-38 . 19. Fo r Gramsci's idea s on the intellectuals and hegemony, se e Antoni o Gramsci, Prison Notebooks, Quintin Hoar e an d Geoffrey Nowel l Smith , eds. (Ne w York: International Publishers, 1971) . 20. Fo r a clear statement of this view, see Willia m J. Goode, "Encroachment , Charlatanis m an d the Emerging Profession: Psychology , Sociolog y an d Medicine," Am. Soc. Rev., 25 (1960): 902-914 . 21. Se e Kar l Polanyi , The Great Transformation (Boston: Beacon Press , 1957) . 22. Se e Ma x Weber, "Class , Status , Party, " i n From Max Weber, Han s Gerth an d C . W. Mills , eds., pp . 180-195 , (Ne w York: Oxford Univ . Press , 1954) . 23. Fran k Parkin , Class Inequality and Political Order (Ne w York: Praeger, 1974) , p. 24. 24. Parkin , Class, pp . 21-22 . 25. Bot h the militar y an d th e clerg y illuminat e the problem s face d b y othe r "professions " within organizations an d the uses of professionalism i n this setting. I think, however, tha t the authorit y of the military doe s not depend on thei r specia l expertise , bu t on thei r control of the mean s of coercion. A s for the clergy, I think that their influence, again, depends more on a factor other than theological or doctrinal competence—namely , o n the public' s religiosity . Nevertheless, th e authorit y of professionals i n secular callings also depends on the public's "faith"; therefore , th e line is more blurred in the case of the clergy an d the profession s tha n i t is in the case of the military . 26. Fo r France, se e Raymond e Mouli n et al., Les Architectes (Paris : Calmann-Levy , 1973) ; fo r a comparison o f the Germa n an d America n bars, se e Dietric h Rueschmeyer, Lawyers and their Society (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1973); see Roderic k McGrew, Russia and the Cholera: 18231832 (Madison: Univ. o f Wisconsin Press, 1965) , on Russian medicine . 27. Bla u and Duncan report that 37 percent of all professionals an d 22 percent of self-employed pro fessionals in the U.S.A. had fathers i n manual occupations a t the time of their study; see Peter Blau and Otis Dudle y Duncan , The American Occupational Structure (Ne w York : Joh n Wile y & Sons, 1967) , pp. 39 , 496.

CHAPTER 1 . THE HISTORICAL MATRI X O F MODER N PROFESSION S 1. O n the pre-industrial "professions " i n England, se e A . M. Carr-Saunder s and P. A. Wilson , The Professions (Oxford : Clarendo n Press , 1933) , pp. 289-294 . 2. Wilber t E. Moore, The Professions: Roles and Rules (Ne w York: Russell Sage , 1970) , p. 36 . 3. Se e Carr-Saunder s an d Wilson , The Professions; Moore , Roles and Rules, chap . 2 ; Freidson , Profession, chap . 1 ; Henri Pirenne, "Europea n Guilds, " in Man, Work and Society, Sigmun d Nosow and Willia m H . Form, eds., pp . 160-16 9 (Ne w York: Basic Books , 1962) . 4. Marti n S . Briggs , The Architect in History (Oxford : Clarendo n Press , 1927) , p. 35 . 5. Bleedin g and purgin g may hav e been related b y "learned " physician s t o speculative theorie s of pathology; as therapies, they wer e no more scientifically based than those derived from traditiona l lore. See Richar d Shryock , Medicine in American History (Baltimore : Johns Hopkins Univ . Press , 1966) , pp. 315-321. 6. Fo r instance, i n Beaumarchais' The Barber of Seville, Figar o typifies both the traditional masterservant relationship an d the tensions that beset it in the passing of the old regime. 7. Se e Carr-Saunder s and Wilson , The Professions; an d W . J. Reader , Professional Men (London : Weidenfeld an d Nicolson, 1966) , chap. 2. 8. A s Reader points ou t i n relation to the clergy , the Dissenter s were tolerated, no t "established" : "The socia l standin g o f any occupatio n wa s closel y relate d t o it s position i n the state. " Professional Men, p . 15 . 9. Freidson , Profession, p . 19 . 10. Pirenn e suggest s tha t a simila r successio n o f "innovativ e groups " characterize s th e differen t stages of merchant capitalism ; see Henri Pirenne, "Stage s in the Social History of Capitalism," i n Class, Status, and Power, Bendi x and Lipset , eds., pp . 97-107 . 11. O n apprenticeship, se e Philipp e Aries, Centuries of Childhood (Ne w York: Vintage , 1962) , Part II; Bernar d Bailyn, Education in the Forming of American Society (Ne w York : Vintage , 1960) , pp . 17ff., an d Reader, Professional Men.

Notes t o Chapte r 2 , pages 9-1 8

255

12. Se e Bailyn, Education, pp . 18-21 . 13. Fo r an interesting account of this passage, see Willia m R. Johnson, "Educatio n and Professiona l Life Styles ; Law and Medicine in the Nineteenth Century," History of Education Quarterly (Summe r 1974): 185-207 . 14. Carr-Saunder s an d Wilso n quote the followin g passag e from Trollope' s The Vicar of Bullhampton: Miss Marrable "always addressed an attorney by letter as Mister, raising up her eyebrows when appealed to on the matter and explaining that an attorney is not an esquire. She had an idea that the son of a gentleman, if he intended to maintain his rank as a gentleman, should earn his income as a clergyman, or as a barrister, o r as a soldier, or as a sailor . . . She woul d no t absolutely sa y tha t a physician was not a gentleman, o r even a surgeon; bu t she woul d neve r allo w physi c the same absolute privileg e which in her eyes belonged to law and the church." Carr-Saunders an d Wilson, The Professions, p . 295 , fn 1. 15. Se e Reader, Professional Men, chap . 1 . For evidence on the still uncertain profession of architecture, see Briggs ' discussion of architecture in France unde r Louis XIV an d Louis XV an d in eighteenthcentury England. Briggs, Architect. 16. Se e Eri c Hobsbawm, The Age of Revolutions (New York: Mentor, 1962) , pp. 227-233 . 17. Hobsbaw m points out that both in business and in education, "withou t some resources, however minimal, i t was difficul t t o get starte d o n the highway to success." Se e Hobsbawm , Revolutions, pp . 227 and 232. The considerable differences betwee n England, on the one hand, and France and Germany, on the other, canno t b e reviewed here. Reform s "fro m above " i n the Prussian ba r attempted t o reduce aristocratic influence , whil e accommodatin g th e aspirin g bourgeoisi e int o a ne w orde r o f congeale d status privileges. See Rueschmeyer , Lawyers, pp . 148-153 , an d Hans Rosenberg, Bureaucracy, Aristocracy and Autocracy; the Prussian Experience, 1660-1815 (Cambridge , Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1958), chap. 9 . 18. Arthu r Stinchcombe , "Socia l Structur e an d Organizations, " i n Handbook of Organizations, James G. March, ed. (Ne w York: Rand McNally, 1965) , chap. 4 , pp. 15 3 and 160 . 19. Stinchcombe , "Organizations, " p . 153 . 20. Hobsbawm , Revolutions, pp . 47-48 . 21. Se e Polanyi , Transformation, chaps. 7 and 8; see als o Reinhard Bendix, Work and Authority in Industry (Ne w York : Harpe r an d Row , 1956) , pp . 94-99 ; an d E . P. Thompson , The Making of the English Working Class (Ne w York: Vintage , 1963). 22. Bendix , Work, p. 45. 23. Bendix , Work, p. 67. 24. Hobsbawm , Revolutions, p . 232. 25. Historical Statistics of the U.S.; Colonial Times to 1957, U.S . Dept . o f Commerce , Burea u of

the Census (Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1960) . The 188 0 illiteracy rate for the total population older than ten was 1 7 percent; i t was 9.4 percent fo r the total white population, 1 2 percent for foreign-bor n whites, and 70 percent fo r non-whites. 26. Se e Appendi x Tables 2 to 4. 27. Hobsbawm , Revolutions, p . 353.

CHAPTER 2 . TH E CONSTITUTION O F PROFESSIONA L MARKETS 1. Polanyi , Transformation, p . 29. 2. Polanyi , Transformation, p . 130 . 3. Everet t C Hughes , The Sociological Eye, 2 vols. (Chicago : Aldine-Atherton, 1971) , vol. I, p. 364; italics mine . 4. Parsons , "Social Structure," p . 35. 5. Se e Marx' s analysis in The Grundrisse, trans , and ed. by David McLellan (New York: Harper and Row, 1971) , pp. 59-64 . 6. Divinit y is an exception, since the newer denominations may be considered as working on the wide market for religion which existed before th e foundation of the later sects. However, the clergy does not sell its services, an d for this reason it does not illuminate the relations between market and the stratification syste m whic h the professions wer e forming i n the libera l phase of capitalism. 7. Danie l Calhoun, Professional Lives in America; Structure and Aspirations, 1750-1850 (Cambridge ,

Mass.; Harvar d Univ. Press, 1965) , p. 55.

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8. Se e Eri c Hobsbawm, "Th e Crisi s of the Seventeenth Century," Past and Present, 1 (1954), nos. 5 and 6 ; and Polanyi , Transformation, chaps. 9 and 10 . 9. Se e Si r Georg e Clark, A History of the Royal College of Physicians of London, 2 vols. (Oxford :

clarendon Press , 1966) , pp. 436f f an d chap. 24. 10. Se e Si r Willia m Holdsworth , A History of English Law, 1 2 vols. (London : Methuen, 1938) , vol. 12 , p. 53. 11. Th e first Medical Register appeared anonymously i n 1779; the Law List began in 1839 and Crockford's Clerica l Directory only i n 1870 . Th e earl y medica l register s indicat e tha t ther e wa s abou t on e physician (counting all branches) for 2,000 inhabitants, an d that London physicians wer e only about on e sixth of the whole . Se e Clark , Royal College, pp . 60 1 and 603 . 12. Blackstone' s lecture s in English law at Oxford i n the 1750 s were the first suc h lectures ever given at an English university. They failed to produce a switch to the systematic teaching of the law for another century. I n medicine, th e Roya l Colleg e o f Physician s obtaine d curricula r reform s fro m Oxfor d an d Cambridge, bu t th e curriculum , as wel l a s th e College' s ow n examinations, wer e stil l essentiall y cen tered on the Greek an d Latin medical classics. Full academic recognition was not secured by physiology until 1883 . In 1910, Flexner found the teaching o f anatomy backwar d and routinized. Clinical medicin e had not yet reached university status anywhere i n England. See Abraha m Flexner, Medical Education in Europe (Ne w York : Carnegie Foundatio n fo r the Advancemen t o f Teaching, Bull . no . 6 , 1912) . 13. Se e Abraha m Flexner, Medical Education in the United States and Canada (Ne w York : Carnegie

Foundation, Bull . no . 4 , 1910) , p. 4, hereafte r referre d t o as Report; Alfre d Z . Reed, Training for the Public Profession of the Law (New York : Carnegi e Foundation , Bull . no . 15 , 1921) , pp . 36ff ; an d William Rothstein , American Physicians, chap . 2. 14. Charle s Warren, A History of the American Bar (Boston: Little, Brown , 1911), pp. 4ff; see also Louis B . Wright , The First Gentlemen of Virginia; Intellectual Qualities of the Early Colonial Ruling

Class (Charlottesville , Va. : Univ. o f Virgini a Press , 1964) . 15. Se e Rueschmeyer , Lawyers, pp . 154-160 ; and , o f course, Alexis de Tocqueville, Democracy in America, 2 vols., Phillip s Bradley, ed. (Ne w York : Vintag e an d Alfre d A . Knopf, 1945) , vol. 1 , pp. 281-290. 16. Se e Calhoun , Lives, chap . 4. 17. Polanyi , Transformation, p. 7 2 and f n 6. 18. O n the notion of symbolic universe, se e Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, The Social Construction of Reality (Garden City , N.Y. : Doubleday , Ancho r Books, 1967) . 19. Th e references to the medieval guilds are based on Pirenne, "Guilds " and Max Weber, General Economic History (Ne w York: Collier Books, 1961) , pp. 110-148 . 20. Fo r a developmen t o f thi s approac h t o educationa l systems , se e Althusser , "Ideologic, " an d Gramsci, Notebooks. 21. Paradoxically , th e economic succes s of the Britis h bourgeoisi e helpe d maintai n aristocratic con trol over the machinery o f the state and over central nationa l institutions such as the ancient universities . See Chapte r Seven an d als o two cogent presentation s of the argument s about Englis h exceptionalism : Perry Anderson, "Origins of the Present Crisis," mTowards Socialism, Perr y Anderson and Robin Blackburn, eds. (London : Fontana, 1965) ; and E. P. Thompson, "Th e Peculiaritie s of the English," in Socialist Register, Ralp h Miliband , ed . (London : Merlin, 1964) . 22. O n the notio n of "organic intellectuals, " se e Gramsci , Notebooks.

CHAPTER 3 . A N ANALYSIS O F MEDICINE' S PROFESSIONA L SUCCES S 1. Fo r professiona l income s i n mid-centur y England , se e Eri c Hobsbawm , Industry and Empire (Baltimore: Penguin, 1969) , pp. 156-157 ; an d Renter, Professional Men, pp . 199-202 . Fo r the United States, se e Danie l Calhoun, The American Civil Engineer; Origins and Conflict (Cambridge , Mass. : MIT Press , 1960) , pp . 167-173 ; an d Richar d Shryock , The Development of Modern Medicine (Ne w York: Alfre d A . Knopf, 1947) , p . 266 ; and Shryock , Medicine, pp . 158-159 . 2. Se e Shryock , Medicine, p . 155 . 3. Se e Flexner , Report, p . 7 ; an d Rothstein , American Physicians, p . 93 . 4. Se e Rothstein , American Physicians, p . 100 .

Notes t o Chapte r 3 , page s 19-3 9

257

5. O n homeopathy i n the Unite d States, se e Rothstein , American Physicians, chap . 6 , an d Joseph Kett, The Formation of the American Medical Profession (Ne w Haven: Yale Univ. Press , 1968) . 6. Se e Richar d Shryock, "America n Indifference t o Basic Science during the Nineteenth Century," in Medicine, chap . 3 . 7. Shryock , Medicine, p . 172 . 8. Consider , fo r instance , th e connotation s o f the followin g statement : "A s patient s gre w richer , moreover, th e practic e o f medicin e becam e increasingl y profitable . Thi s ha d severa l consequences . First, a number of young men with scientific interests decided that the easiest way to support themselves would b e to practice medicine . Second , th e number o f doctors i n major cities became quite large, and medical societies spran g up." ; Christopher Jencks and David Riesman, The Academic Revolution (Garden City , N.Y. : Doubleday , 1968) , p . 213 . Applie d t o the earl y nineteent h century , thi s observation gives th e fals e ide a tha t ther e was, fro m th e beginning , a solid scientifi c core i n American medicine. This retrospective projectio n is typical o f most historie s o f medicine, America n and European . 9. No t surprisingly, American "regular" physician s justified th e exclusion of homeopaths from th e A.M.A. not because they espouse d a n exclusive dogm a bu t because they adopte d " a distinctiv e title as a trademark." Rothstein , American Physicians, p . 172 , italic s mine. 10. Shryoc k mentions a study made toward the end of the nineteenth century , according to which 75 percent of American graduate physicians "turne d within five years to nonmedical work, chiefly t o secure a better income. " Shryock, Development, p. 266. By 1910, when Flexner published his report on medical education, overcrowdin g was a major concern of the profession. Flexne r expressed it candidly: "S o enormous a n overcrowding with low-grad e materia l bot h relatively and absolutel y decrease s the number of well-trained men who can coun t o n the professio n fo r a livelihood." Flexner , Report, p . 14 . 11. Th e influence of epidemics o n attracting public attention to the state of medicine and to the lack of sanitatio n i n the cities was obviously very great. See Charle s E . Rosenberg, The Cholera Years; the United States in 1832, 1849, and 1866 (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 1962) . 12. Rothstein , American Physicians, p . 76 .

13. Shryoc k reports that in 1858 some medical leaders in the societies advocated, a s a measure against the schools , tha t the meaningless M.D. titl e be replaced, fo r the qualified physicians, b y a title such as "Member, A.M.A. " Se e Shryock , Medicine, p . 155 . The exclusionary policie s of the A.M.A . wer e chiefly directe d agains t th e mos t reputabl e o f the riva l schools , namely , homeopathy . 14. Se e Shryock , Development, pp. 267-269 . 15. Thi s blend is characteristic o f the clinical mentalit y analyzed b y Freidson, Profession, pp . 158 172. See als o Parsons' penetrating comments , whic h also deal wit h th e impossibilit y of organizing the sick into a collectivity; in Talcott Parsons, The Social System (Glencoe, 111. : Free Press, 1951), chap. 10 , pp. 477f f i n particular. 16. O n the benefits derived by doctors from the insulation of their work setting, see Freidson and Rhea, "Processes o f Control" ; on psychiatrists , se e Rache l Kahn-Hut , "Confidentiality : Protection o f the Professional," unpublishe d paper, San Francisco, 1972 . Included in "Psychiatric Theory as Professiona l Ideology" (Ph.D . Dissertation, Brandei s University , 1974). 17. Se e th e studie s b y Freidson , "Clien t Control " an d Profession; an d b y Freidso n an d Rhea , "Processes of Control." Se e also Oswald Hall, "The Informal Organization of the Medical Profession, " Canad. Jour. ofEco. and

Polit. Sci., 1 2 (1946) : 30-44 .

18. Se e not e 17 . I n 1974 , th e Californi a Medical Association wa s oblige d to organize pee r review boards, fo r fea r o f having them impose d "fro m above " wit h layme n included . I n the sam e year, the A.M.A. threatene d wit h expulsio n the physicians wh o had collaborated wit h Ralp h Nader's Consume r Advocates report on the medical profession i n Prince George County, Maryland. The report made public the differen t fee s charge d b y differen t doctors , thei r prescriptio n preferences , etc . Thes e example s show tha t th e professio n reject s la y control, not because it wants to police itself, but because, in fact, it does not. 19. Shryock , Development, p. 82. 20. Charle s Reed' s Presidential Addres s t o the A.M.A . i n 1901 , quoted b y Rothstein i n American Physicians, p . 325 .

21. Such wa s th e case with th e diphtheria antitoxin; whil e the profession wa s divided about it s use , public health authorities dispensed it free t o the poor in New York, Philadelphia , and California during

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the epidemic of 1895. In Illinois, the State Health Department had it administered by its staff, whil e the physicians refused to use it; ultimately, the public health officers taught private physicians how to administer the immunization, since the public demanded it . See Rothstein, American Physicians, pp . 277-278. 22. Thi s is not entirely true: in the U.S., for instance, publi c authorities refused t o endorse the "regular" physicians wherever "irregulars" practiced in even modest numbers. In 33 of the 45 states which had licensin g laws in 1900 , non-regular physician s participate d in the licensin g process; they als o sa t on the public health boards in many larg e cities. See Rothstein , American Physicians, pp . 305ff. 23. Se e C.H . Haskins, The Rise of the Universities (Ithaca, N.Y. : Cornel l Univ. Press, 195 7 ed.) 24. Se e Shryock , Development, pp. 153ff , and Medicine, pp . 322ff. 25. Flexne r in his Report deplored the state of American hospitals and argued that the only way out of this condition for American medicine wa s throug h university hospitals, i n which physicians woul d be appointed fro m th e school's facult y and not from th e general populatio n of practitioners. 26. Thi s analysis is focused mainl y on private engineers, fo r they illustrate the market situation of the profession mor e typicall y tha n arm y o r nav y engineers . Unti l th e 1850s , onl y civi l engineerin g ha d emerged i n America as a distinct profession, probably because of its gentlemanly tradition, derived from affiliation wit h the corps of military engineers and from the overlap of functions with architecture. Calhoun suggests that i f eve r the profession o f engineering shared th e characteristics o f the other "free" profes sions, it was before the Civil War, that is, before engineering became increasingly fragmented into specialties and dependent on large employers. My analysis is based chiefly on Daniel Calhoun, Civil Engineer; Monte Calvert , The Mechanical Engineer in America; 1830-1910 (Baltimore : Johns Hopkin s Univ. Press, 1967); Edwin T. Layton, Jr., The Revolt of the Engineers (Cleveland : Case Western Reserve Univ. Press, 1971) ; and on the sociological inquiry by Robert Perrucci and Joel E. Gerstl, Profession without Community; Engineers in American Society (New York: Random House, 1969) . 27. Calhoun , Civil Engineer, p . 6 .

28. Befor e the industria l revolution, the role of the civi l enginee r wa s not completely differentiated from tha t o f the architect ; architectur e an d militar y engineerin g overlappe d i n Europe. Se e Calhoun , Civil Engineer, chap . 1 .

29. Se e Calvert , Mechanical Engineer, chap . 1 . 30. Ibid., p . 12ff . 31. Ibid., p . 14 .

32. Fo r the statu s of apprenticeship i n mechanical engineering , se e Calvert , Mechanical Engineer, Table 2, p. 73, and also Calhoun, Civil Engineer. 33. O n mechanic s institute s an d correspondenc e courses , se e Calvert , Mechanical Engineer, pp . 36ff, 85 , and 112 . 34. Calver t emphasizes that even i n civil engineering , independen t consultation s coul d not have in volved more than one thir d o f the profession b y 1890 . Calvert, Mechanical Engineer, p . 204. 35. Se e Calhoun , Civil Engineer, pp . 65-67 . 36. Quote d by Calvert, Mechanical Engineer, p . 225. 37. O n engineers in management, se e Layton , Revolt, p . 13 ; and Perrucc i and Gerstl , Engineers, pp. 132-137 . 38. Calvert , Mechanical Engineer, p . 266 and pp. 265ff, for the engineering competence o f the typical client. 39. Quote d by Calvert, Mechanical Engineer, p . 265. 40. A n interesting illustratio n i s the bia s i n favor of the publi c utilitie s companie s show n b y most engineering experts durin g the Progressive campaig n agains t th e utilities . A s Director of Public Works in Philadelphia, Morris Cooke had a hard time finding an independent expert; this experience greatly reinforced hi s argument that the low social status of the engineer came from hi s association wit h "predator y wealth" an d his refusal o f public service. Se e Layton , Revolt, chap . 7 . 41. Excep t for the chief engineers, th e employment of engineers in the second third of the nineteenth century was unstable: at different times in the period from 183 7 to 1844, "the total number of engineers on the five of those projects [variou s railroads and canal projects i n the East and Midwest] for which an initial figur e is available dropped fro m 11 6 to 3." Calhoun , Civil Engineer, p . 142 . 42. Calhoun , Civil Engineer, p . 199 .

43. Layton , Revolt, p . 6. Se e als o his chaps. 3 and 10 .

Notes t o Chapte r 4 , page s 40-5 2

259

44. Shryock , Medicine, p . 171. 45. La y ton, Revolt, p . 58 .

46. Wilensky , "Professionalization," p . 148 . 47. Th e adaman t resistance of the court s an d the lega l practitioners to the practic e o f self-counsel , together wit h the competence demonstrated b y "jailhouse lawyers " i n recent trials , indirectly sho w the vulnerability of the lega l profession t o lay competition. 48. Thoma s Kuhn , The Structure of Scientific Revolutions (Chicago : Univ. o f Chicago Press , 197 0 ed.), pp . 162-163 , italic s mine. 49. Obviously , I cannot do justice to the epistemological problems posed by Kuhn, nor to the empirical questions h e raises for the sociology of science. For a sociological study whic h adds to Kuhn's analysis, se e Dian a Crane, Invisible Colleges (Chicago : Univ. o f Chicago Press, 1972). 50. Kuhn , Structure, p . 164 . 51. I n Kuhn's analysis, th e tendency t o paradigmatic unificatio n diffuse s throughou t a community of scientists the effects o f paradigmatic crisis—that is, the experienced impossibilit y of resolving an anomalous proble m withi n th e confine s o f an insufficien t paradigm . Th e resultin g breakdown o f consensus destroys th e perceptio n o f scientifi c activit y a s a cumulative , progressiv e undertaking . Paradigmati c crises are ultimatel y resolved b y reintegration around a new definitio n o f scientific practice an d scien tific realit y which can dea l wit h th e anomal y an d reconstruct consensus. 52. Kuhn , Structure, pp . 23-24 . 53. Th e quotation is from Freidson , Profession, p . 22. 54. Josep h Ben-David, The Scientist's Role in Society (Englewood Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1971), p. 143 . 55. Se e Rothstein , American Physicians.

56. Calvert , Mechanical Engineering, pp . 54-55 . 57. Becaus e of the predominance o f practical interests i n the profession, all sectors of the membership of th e America n Society of Mechanical Engineers wer e against adoptio n of the metric system ( a ballot was sent to all members in 1903) . Entrepreneurs oppose d adoptio n by 5 to 1 , teachers and junior engineers by 2 to 1 , and draftsmen b y less than that. Se e Calvert , Mechanical Engineer, pp . 178f f an d the table of results fro m th e ballot, p. 184 . 58. Flexner , Report, p . 6. At the end of the nineteenth century , the U.S. had almost as many school s as there were in all the rest of the world, says Morris Fishbein, A History of the American Medical Association: 1847-1947 (Philadelphia : Saunders, 1947) , pp. 888-889 . 59. Se e Rosenberg , Cholera; se e als o Calhoun, Lives, pp . 45-46 . 60. Shryock, Development, p . 164 .

61. Ibid., pp . 190-191 . 62. Freidson , Profession, p . 16 . 63. Ibid., p . xviii . 64. Ibid., pp . 48ff . 65. O n the delegation o f "dirty work, " see Hughes , Sociological Eye, pp . 345-346 . 66. Freidson , Profession, p . 10 . 67. A number of studies suggest that the surgeon shoul d inspire as much mistrust as most plumbers. A Columbia study of 6,248 hysterectomies show s tha t 3 0 percent o f the patients ha d no disease whatsoever. Despite (o r because of?) the cost of medicine to the patient, the U.S. has twice as much surgery per capita as England. See Bosto n Women's Health Collective, Our Bodies, Our Selves (Boston: Private Printing, 1971) , p. 125 . 68. Freidson , Profession, p . xvii . Fo r an analysis o f the discretionary powers of the legal profession and its potential for social control, see Parsons , "Legal Profession. " 69. Rober t Bazell , " I a m sorry , th e Docto r is Busy Makin g Money," New York Review of Books (November 2, 1972) , p. 41.

CHAPTER 4 . STANDARDIZATIO N A N D MARKET CONTROL l. Startin g wit h a different theoretica l focus , Harou n Jamous and B . Peloille arrive at conclusion s which reinforc e m y analysis o f professionalization, bot h as a project of market organization and a s an

260

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attempt t o increas e collectiv e social mobility . Se e Harou n Jamous and B . Peloille , "Changes i n the French University-Hospital System," i n Professions and Professionalization, J. A. Jackson , ed . (Cambridge: Cambridge Univ . Press, 1970) , pp. 111-152 . Quotatio n on p. 113 . 2. Jamou s and Peloille, "Changes," p . 112 . 3. Fo r an analysis of the genesis of guilds, their internal and external conflicts, and their disintegration unde r th e advance of merchant capitalism , see Weber , Economic History, chaps . 9-13 . 4. Jamou s and Peloille, "Changes," pp . 139-142 . 5. Ibid., p . 120 .

6. Se e Kuhn , Structure, an d the reference t o this thesis in my Chapter Three. 7. Jamou s and Peloille, "Changes," pp . 139-140 . 8. O n this subject, nothin g can be more illuminating than the Flexner report: the emerging hierarchy is recognized precisel y a s a function o f the capacit y whic h onl y fe w school s ha d o f "appropriating" scientific teachin g and research. 9. Ther e are indications that this may be happening, for instance, i n architecture (the pattern is classic in the medical field). A s drafting becomes more standardized, ther e appears to be a growing reluctance to delegate it, as was generally done i n the past, to fully traine d junior architects, wh o also accept such tasks with reluctance. Concer n can be noted in the professional journals with the problem of supplying the profession wit h architectural technicians more briefly an d cheaply trained than the graduates of professional schools ; i t is emphasized tha t the two kinds of training should be kept thoroughly distinct. A similar concer n wit h formin g "second-class " professional s or , rather , technician s fo r jobs tha t have been standardized may be observed in most major professions. Se e "Wh o is going to sit at all those drafting boards?" Progressive Architecture (Apri l 1973) : 107-109 . 10. O n the emergence of specialties withi n th e medical profession, se e Ru e Bucher, "Pathology : A Study o f Socia l Movement s withi n a Profession, " i n Medical Men, Freidso n an d Lorber , eds. , pp . 113-127; Ru e Buche r an d Ansel m Strauss, "Profession s i n Process," Amer. Jour. Soc, 6 6 (1961): 325-334. Fo r engineering, se e Layton , Revolt, pp . 40ff . O n scientific specialization, see Josep h BenDavid and Randall Collins, "Social Factors in the Origins of a New Science: the Case of Psychology," Amer. Soc Rev., 3 1 (1966): 451-465. 11. Th e evolutio n of the criteri a for the attributio n of talent ca n b e illustrate d by referenc e t o the American legal profession. Whe n apprenticeship wa s the dominant mode of professional socialization, the reputatio n of private practitioners (and also , therefore , thei r influence a s teachers) was establishe d on the demonstration of forensic bravura. The appointment to judicial office provide d a different "demonstration effect," bu t the power of the role admitted a measure of forensic ability . Elective office ma y have introduced different criteria of ability, whic h carrie d over, late r on, into private practice; but if a lawyer was inept in the courtroom, his electoral success in the past could not have helped him too much. As economic development and the growing siz e of economic unit s led to a large increase in the volume and importance of legal disputes, private legal practice moved to out-of-court negotiations. In such private circumstances, th e badges of professional talen t were intimately tie d to the influence and power of the clientele. At the end of the nineteenth century, the formalization of legal training and the rise of universitybased law schools once again instituted publicly visible criteria of talent, which merged wit h the reputation o f the law school. Legal educators became a most influential secto r o f the profession, a s they had always been in Germany, for instance, whic h had a long tradition of formal legal training. On the above, see Jerold S. Auerbach, "Enmity and Amity: Law Teachers and Practitioners, 1900-21," i n Perspectives in American History, 5 (1971): 551-601. See also Calhoun, Lives; Johnson , "Lif e Styles" ; and Rueschmeyer, Lawyers. 12. O n the mediatio n of social rewards b y specialized group s o f colleagues i n science, se e Randall Collins, "Competitio n and Control in Science," Sociology of Education, 4 1 (1968): 123-140. Collins has a n excellent discussion of the effects o f competition on the contents o f scientific activity. 13. See , fo r instance , Ernes t Greenwood , "Attribute s o f a Profession, " i n Professionalization, Howard M . Vollme r an d Donal d L. Mills , eds . (Englewoo d Cliffs, N.J. : Prentice-Hall, 1966) , pp. 10-19; see als o Goode, "Community." 14. Se e Rothstein , American Physicians, pp . 65ff . 15. Calhoun , Lives, pp . 191-192 . 16. Ibid., chap . 2 .

Notes t o Chapte r 5 , page s 53-6 3

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17. Se e Jenck s and Riesman, Academic, pp . 205-206. Th e authors ar e le d to suggest that "th e pri mary role of the professiona l schoo l ma y thus b e socialization , not training" (p. 206). 18. Fo r evidence on professional networks, see Hall, "Informal Organization," pp. 48-49, and Edwin Smigel, The Wall Street Lawyer (Ne w York: Free Press, 1964) . 19. Elio t Freidson , "Th e Impurit y o f Professiona l Authority, " i n Institutions and the Person, Howard Becke r et al. (Chicago : Aldine, 1968) , p. 29. 20. Clar k Kerr, "Th e Balkanizatio n of Labor Markets," i n Labor Mobility and Economic Opportunity, E. Wight Bakk e et al, eds . (Ne w York: MI T Press and John Wile y an d Sons, 1954) , p. 93. 21. Corinn e Lathrop Gilb, Hidden Hierarchies; The Professions and Government (New York: Harper and Row, 1967) , p. 109 . 22. Goode , "Community, " p. 196 . On this point, see a n economist's approac h t o the profession a s a solution to "market failure " in Kenneth Arrow, "Th e Organization of Economic Activity: Issues Pertinent to the Choice of Market vs. Nonmarket Allocation," i n The Analysis and Evaluation of Public Expenditures, Vol . 1, Joint Economic Committee, U.S. Congress (1969), pp. 47-64 . 23. See , fo r instance, th e functionalist approach, a s represented at its best by Parsons, Social System, chap. 10 ; and Freidson's interactionis t approach i n Profession, Introductio n and pp. 3-6 . 24. Fo r instance, Flexne r recommended i n 1910 that every entrant to a medical school should have at least a competent knowledg e of physics, chemistry , an d biology. Scientifi c training in these fields had been available for a long time, but it only became relevant for the average medical practitioner when the achievements o f scientific medicine revolutionized medical practice. Or, again, the physical properties of iron an d stee l ha d been known for a long time before i t became indispensable fo r trained architects t o know them—that is , when steel constructio n became a normal part of architectural practice i n the firs t decades of our century. 25. Familiarit y wit h th e classica l building s of Greece, Rome, an d the Renaissanc e is considered t o this day a n essential ingredien t of architectural training . This conception reflect s th e historica l origins of th e professio n an d the surviva l of traditional canons of architectural excellence. Also , i n Germany, most particularly, the diffusion o f Naturphilosophie after 181 5 and until 184 0 was connected t o the revival of speculativ e system s in pathology. Se e Shryock , Medicine, p . 325 . Positivis m had undoubtedl y en couraged th e scientifi c development o f medical research in the Paris school i n the 1820 s and after . 26. O n the unemploymen t o f professionals, se e Walte r Kotschnig, Unemployment in the Learned Professions (London : Oxford Univ . Press , 1937).

CHAPTER 5 . MARKE T A N D ANTI-MARKET PRINCIPLE S 1. O n the apparent equivalence o f exchange, see Karl Marx, Capital, 3 vols. (New York: International Publishers, 1967) , Vol . 1, pp. 71-83 . 2. Polanyi , Transformation, p . 132 . 3. Ibid.

4. Ibid., pp . 139-140 , italic s mine. 5. Se e Bendix , Work, chap. 2 . Hegemony i s used in the conception of Gramsci. See his Notebooks, and, i n Italian, Antoni o Gramsci, // Risorgimento (Roma: Editori Riuniti , 1971) . 6. Th e law administered coercion, of course, bu t not, in principle, for the advancement of its members' professional status . 7. Se e Emil e Durkheim, The Division of Labor in Society (New York: Free Press, 1964) , pp. 1-31 . 8. Goode , "Community, " p. 194 . 9. Th e general proposition on political participation advanced b y Alessandro Pizzorno, "Introduzione alio Studi o della Partecipazione Politica, " Quaderni di Sociologia, 1 5 (1966): 235-287, ca n b e fruit fully applie d to a historical study o f the interna l dynamics o f professional associations . I n Pizzorno' s approach, on e participates activel y only among those with whom one feels a parity of conditions. Modern political parties, a t their inception, are attempts t o constitute ideological "areas of equality" which are conduciv e t o politica l participation ; as equalit y visibl y declines , s o doe s participation. Factional fights, reorganizations , schism s and even purges , a s wel l a s conflicts with th e "outside, " ar e see n by Pizzorno a s processe s which ten d t o reconstitute area s of equality, and hence may reactivat e politica l participation.

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Notes t o Chapte r 5 , page s 53-6 3

10. Durkheim , Division, p . 25 , fn 3 4 and p . 30. 11. Se e i n this respect the illuminatin g analysi s b y Alain Touraine , LEvolution du Travail Ouvrier aux Usines Renault (Paris: C.N.R.S., 1955) , and Sociologie de /'Action, (Paris : Seuil, 1965) , chap. 5. 12. Gil b observes that professiona l organization s cam e late i n the "organizationa l revolution, " as a response or a defensive reactio n against the organization of other social groups. Her argument is applicable to the late r professions, bu t it does not accoun t fo r the formativ e years of the "classic " professions . 13. Gilb , Hierarchies, p . 45 14. Parsons , "Socia l Structure, " pp . 36ff . 15. Shryoc k points out that the therapeutic nihilis m which preceded the "bacteriological revolution" brought abou t publi c discredit fo r regular medicine , despit e the considerabl e advance s which had been made before th e 1890 s in combating infan t mortality and death in childbirth. To the public , it appeared "only a s i f tha t little which the patient ha d had been taken away, " say s Shryock of the popular reaction to growing medical skepticism . Se e Shryock , Development, pp. 249ff . 16. Freidson , Profession, p . 360 . 17. Ben-David , Scientist, p. 134 . 18. Ibid., f n 46. In fact, the social thinkers or activists concerned wit h the professions, thei r functions, their ethicality, and their future, wer e often socia l reformer s (o r in sympathy wit h socia l reform)—th e Webbs an d R . H. Tawne y i n England; Flexner, Brandeis , an d Roscoe Pound i n the Unite d States; and Durkheim i n France. 19. Presumably , profession s lik e engineerin g coul d have banked o n th e enthusias m fo r technolog y that is often mentioned as a characteristic o f the age (see Hobsbawm , Industry, p. 186) ; but it was a pragmatic enthusiasm, embodie d i n inventors' societie s and mechani c institutes , mos t often "suspiciou s o f anything in the nature of theoretical knowledge" (Reader , Professional Men, p . 70). Reader argues that this climate hindered rathe r tha n helpe d th e professionalizatio n effort s b y engineers. 20. Barringto n Kaye, The Development of the Architectural Profession (London : Allen an d Unwin , 1960), p. 16 . 21. R . H. Tawney, The Acquisitive Society (New York: Harcourt, Brace and World, 1948) , pp. 94-95, italics mine. 22. Shryock , Development, p. 221. 23. Fo r efforts in medicine, see Shryock , Development, chaps. 5, 12 , 18, and 19 . For the slum reform movement i n the Unite d States, see Alle n F . Davis , Spearheads for Reform (New York: Oxford Univ . Press, 1967) , and Roy Lubove, The Progressives and the Slums (Pittsburgh: Univ. of Pittsburgh Press, 1963); for schools, se e Michae l Katz, The Irony of Early School Reform (Boston: Beacon Press , 1968). 24. Se e Gilb , Hierarchies, pp . 38ff ; and Katz , Irony. 25. Marx , Capital, Vol . 1, pp. 278-297 . 26. O n the rise of psychiatry i n the institutional area left ope n by the withdrawal of community forms of assistance and penetrated by the state, see Davi d J. Rothman , The Discovery of the Asylum (Boston: Little, Brown , 1971), and Andrew T. Scull, "From Madness to Mental Illness," Arch. Europ. Sociol. 16 (1975): 218-251. 27. Fo r a n interesting elaboration o f the notio n of "service," se e Goode , "Limits. " 28. Goode , "Limits, " p . 278. 29. Se e Freidson , Profession, p . 81. 30. Hig h job satisfaction wa s related as follows to occupational status among employed males in 1960 (percentage in each category wh o were very satisfied wit h their jobs): professional an d technical, 42 percent; manageria l an d proprietary , 3 8 percent ; clerica l white-collar, 2 2 percent; sales white-collar, 24 percent; skille d blue-collar , 2 2 percent; semi-skille d blue-collar, 2 7 percent; unskilled blue-collar, 1 3 percent; farm, 22 percent. Quoted by Victor Vroom, Work and Motivation (New York: John Wile y and Sons, 1964) , p. 131. 31. Harol d Wilensky, "Varieties of Work Experience," in Man in a World of Work, Henry Borow, ed. (Boston : Houghton-Mifflin, 1964) , pp. 125-154 , pp . 14 3 and 146 . 32. Ibid., Tabl e 1 . 33. Ibid., Tabl e 3 . ;

34. Ibid., p . 148 .

35. Ma x Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (New York: Scribner, 1958) , p. 178, italics mine.

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36. Durkheim , Division, p . 43. 37. Ibid., p . 331 .

38. Reflectin g the tension between entrepreneurial and vocational orientations, the American surgeon Harvey Gushin g mused i n 1933 : "wh y [the doctor] should refrain fro m forcibl e collectio n of unpaid bills, why he does not patent some of his prescriptions, inventions, and discoveries and makes a fortune; why h e shoul d continue t o counteract th e sprea d o f diseases he has painfull y an d at great educationa l expense learnt to diagnose an d treat; why he should so strenuously oppose year after year the efforts of anti-vivisectionists and anti-vaccinationists with thei r Christian Science allie s to cripple research . . . , knowing how [house] calls would increase did they have their way; and why at the same time he should continue to work longer hours for less pay during a shorter life of activity than most people, is an enigma to the hardheaded businessmen. " Quote d by Shryock, Development, p. 418. 39. C . Wrigh t Mills , White Collar (Ne w York: Oxford Univ . Press, 1956) , p. 230. 40. Hobsbawm , Revolutions, p . 237. 41. Reader , Professional Men, pp . 158-159 .

CHAPTER 6 . TH E COLLECTIVE MOBILIT Y PROJEC T 1. Apar t from th e deficiencies signale d i n the text , the abstrac t characte r o f the classificatio n does violence to the historically specifi c genesis of the social structures tha t bound the professional project . For instance , th e America n model of the universit y was consolidate d durin g a period of bureaucrati c reorganization of productive and governing functions. Althoug h bot h consulting and academic profes sionals have large areas of autonomy within the university, they do not control it. The university, therefore, canno t be adequately locate d at one or the other pole of the autonomy-heteronomy dimension. The same applies t o th e professiona l market , whic h depend s upo n th e comple x structura l interrelation s I analyzed abov e i n the cases of medicine and engineering. The classification, moreover, does not apply to contemporary professionalizin g occupations suc h a s busines s management o r cit y planning , whose professional markets are contained within organizational settings; therefore, th e means for upgrading the occupation and attaching prestige t o the role are locate d i n a circumscribed, heteronomous an d purely "modern" context . Finally , sinc e a professional marke t i s constituted b y interlockin g organizations, prestige flow s fro m th e whole structural complex—that is, from institution s that are controlled by professionals, a s wel l as from other s that are not. The institutional location is, therefore, extremel y imprecise, sinc e th e complexity of the professional marke t does not readily lend itself t o classification along a few dimensions. 2. Stinchcombe , "Organizations, " p . 171. 3. Ibid., p . 172 , italics mine . 4. Harol d Wilensky , "Work, Careers , and Socia l Integration," International Social Science Jour., 12 (1960), p. 554. 5. Stinchcombe , "Organizations, " p . 173 . 6. Considerin g that th e costs of a "good" an d "recognized " educatio n wer e higher than the costs of getting oneself up in business in the early part of the nineteenth century, the proposition that hierarchies based on education are more open than those based on money should not be generalized without caution. See Hobsbawm , Revolutions, pp . 231-233 . 7. See , i n this respect, Freidson, Profession, chap . 9 , an d Hall , "Informa l Organization." 8. Fo r a discussion o f the American Medical Association's elites and the mechanisms b y which they become entrenched , se e Olive r Garceau, The Political Life of the American Medical Association (Cambridge, Mass. : Harvar d Univ. Press , 1941) ; see als o Auerbach , "Enmity, " fo r the law ; and Calvert, Mechanical Engineer, fo r the politics of the various engineering societies, i n particular chaps. 6 and 11; and Lay ton, Revolt, chap . 4 . For the proportions of practitioners who are members o f the main professional association i n their field, se e Gilb , Hierarchies, pp . 119-127 . Th e A.M.A . passe d the 5 0 percent mar k i n 1912 ; 66.8 percen t o f American physicians wer e member s i n 1940 . Th e proportio n o f lawyers who were members of the American Bar Association was 17. 6 percent i n 1940 and 46.2 percent in 1960 . Some 42 percent o f classroom teachers belonged to the National Education Association in 1960; 44.5 percent o f architects wer e members o f the American Institute of Architects in 1961. 9. Caree r patterns among a sample of engineering graduates indicate that "involvement in professional activities precedes movemen t int o uppe r supervisor y positions , suggestin g th e existenc e o f a clos e

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association betwee n professiona l an d societa l success. " Se e C.C . Perrucc i an d R. Perrucci , "Socia l Origins, Educational Contexts an d Career Mobility," Amer. Soc. Rev., 35 (1970), p. 453, fn. 10. Se e Freidson' s discussio n o f elite control and its limitations i n the profession o f medicine: Profession, pp . 188-200 . 11. A s I suggested above, the organization of profession is based on the assumption of minimal equality amon g professionals ; thi s adds a strong ideological bond to the organization, despite th e very high degree of internal stratification. See Stinchcombe , "Organizations, " p . 181. 12. Oswal d Hall, "Type s of Medical Careers," Amer. Jour. Soc, 5 5 (1949): 243-253, proposes an interesting analysis of professional types : the successful specialist s ar e most likely t o be closely identified wit h a community's medical institutions. Their careers are based on formal an d informal organiza tional networks . The individualist , althoug h he may be financiall y ver y successful, i s marginal to the professional establishment. Th e "friendly career " seems typical of a more old-fashioned kind of doctor, with strong personal loyaltie s to both his clientele and a small group of friendly colleagues—t o on e of whom he may transfer his practice upon retiring. Of these three types, the second and third are marginal; the third may generate a disposition to criticize the professional establishment. W e may add a fourth type: the advocate, wh o is actively critical of the delivery of medical services an d of the kind of practice with which the establishment i s identified. The advocate tends to seek a base among reform groups in the community or among his clients, in which case he is very close t o the "friendl y career " type, with a more political connotation. 13. Abou t 1850, it is estimated tha t a successful physicia n could make between