The Rise of Confucian Citizens in China: Theoretical Reflections and Empirical Explorations 9781032380926, 9781032380940, 9781003343455

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THE RISE OF CONFUCIAN CITIZENS IN CHINA

This book explores the relationship between Confucianism and citizenship and the rise of Confucian citizens in contemporary China. Combining theoretical and empirical approaches to the topic, the book constructs new frameworks to examine the nuances and complexities of Confucianism and citizenship, exploring the process of citizen-making through Confucian education. By re-evaluating the concept of citizenship as a Western construct and therefore challenging the popular characterization of Confucianism and citizenship as incompatible, this book posits that a new type of citizen, the Confucian citizen, is on the rise in 21st-century China. The book’s clear, accessible style makes it essential reading for students and scholars interested in citizenship, Confucianism and Chinese studies, and those with an interest in religion and philosophy more generally. Canglong Wang is a Lecturer in Chinese Studies at the University of Hull. He received his Ph.D. in Sociology from the University of Edinburgh in 2019. His research extensively explores the cultural, social, and political implications of the revival of Confucian education in contemporary China. He has a persistent research interest in the topic of Confucianism and citizenship in China. His work has appeared in many leading journals and edited volumes. He is the author of Cultivating the Confucian Individual: The Confucian Education Revival in China (2023). He can be contacted via email at [email protected] or [email protected].

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The Rise of Confucian Citizens in China Theoretical Reflections and Empirical Explorations Canglong Wang

First published 2024 by Routledge 4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN and by Routledge 605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158 Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business © 2024 Canglong Wang The right of Canglong Wang to be identified as author of this work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers. Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe. British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library ISBN: 978-1-032-38092-6 (hbk) ISBN: 978-1-032-38094-0 (pbk) ISBN: 978-1-003-34345-5 (ebk) DOI: 10.4324/9781003343455 Typeset in Times New Roman by codeMantra

This book is dedicated to my wife, Dr WANG Shuo, and my son, Yunhe (Kieran). You are the everlasting warm sunshine in my life.

Contents

List of figures List of tables Acknowledgements Introduction: Chinese citizenship, Confucianism, and the Confucian education revival

ix xi xiii 1

PART I

Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections19 1 Confucianism and citizenship: a review of opposing conceptualizations21 2 Civic politics and moral cultivation: comparing Confucian junzi with modern citizens

47

3 Towards the junzi-style citizen: moralizing citizens through Confucianism74 PART II

Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations87 4 Confucian identity, rights, righteousness, and acts of citizenship: examining civic elements in Confucian activists’ engagement in dujing (classics reading) education

89

5 Discursive, practical, and institutional paradoxes: cultivating students to become Confucian cultural citizens through reading the classics

113

6 Between nationalism and cosmopolitanism: educating the cosmopolitan citizen in Confucian education

140

Index

161

Figures

2.1 Subjective Classifications of Junzi and Citizens 3.1 Classifications of Civic Junzi and Junzi-style Citizens

56 75

Tables

1.1 Three Models of Confucianism and Citizenship 3.1 Classifications of Civic Junzi and Junzi-style Citizens 4.1 Two Discourses Shaping Confucian Identity in Dujing (classics reading) Education

22 75 94

Acknowledgements

I have been working on the topic of Confucianism and citizenship for nearly ten years. In 2012, while studying my master’s degree in sociology at Xiamen University, I chose Confucianism and citizenship as my thesis topic under Professor YI Lin’s supervision. A more significant event happened in summer 2013, when a research paper based on my master’s thesis was accepted for presentation at an international conference on ‘Citizenship in Oriental Societies’ organized by Sun Yat-sen University. Attending this conference allowed me to meet Professor GUO Zhonghua, who was then working in the Department of Political Science at Sun Yat-sen University and now works at Nanjing University. Since then, I have maintained a long-standing academic collaboration with Professor Guo and have participated in the creation of various journal special issues, books, and workshops convened and led by Professor Guo on the theme of Chinese citizenship. Looking back, ten years have passed in a hurry. Over this decade, with Professor Guo’s encouragement, I have diligently developed the research theme of Confucianism and citizenship. I have published a number of academic papers in both English and Chinese. I have also taken opportunities to share the fruits of my scholarship with international colleagues and have continued to experience the joy of intellectual life. This book is both a summary and a new development of my research results from the last decade. Accordingly, I want to extend my sincere gratitude and respect to Professor Guo! Without his ongoing support, the publication of this book would not have been possible. I would also like to thank all those who have helped me in the last ten years while I have been working on this relatively new area of Confucianism and citizenship. The long list of people deserving of thanks must include YI Lin from Xiamen University, ZHAO Zhenzhou from the Hong Kong University of Education, GUO Taihui from Yunnan University, and XIA Ying from Sun Yat-sen University. The research receives a grant from the Open Project for International Cooperation Research, funded by the State Key Laboratory of Subtropical Building Science (Yaredai jianzhu kexue guojia zhongdian shiyanshi) at South China University of Technology (grant number: 2020ZA01). I am very grateful to the members of the research team, including Professor TANG Xiaoxiang from South China University of Technology, Dr. GUO Huanyu from South China Agricultural University,

xiv Acknowledgements Dr SUN Ziwen from Beijing Institute of Technology, and Dr. NIE Youping from the Chinese University of Hong Kong. My sincere thanks also go to my editors at Routledge, Andrew Leach and Stephanie Rogers, who have provided professional and effective support for this project from day one. I would like to give special thanks to my wife, Dr. WANG Shuo. As a Lecturer in Strategy at the University of Bedfordshire, she is not only committed to her work but also shares with me the responsibility of looking after our seven-year-old son Yunhe (Kieran). Finally, some parts of this book have previously appeared elsewhere. I would like to thank the following publishers that permitted me to use them again in this book: 1 Wang, Canglong. (2015) “Confucianism and Citizenship: A Review of Opposing Conceptualizations,” in Guo, Z. and Guo, S. (eds) Theorizing Chinese Citizenship. New York: Lexington Books, pp. 49–81. Copyright © 2015 Lexington Books. Published by Rowman & Littlefield. 2 Wang, Canglong. (2016) “Individuality, Hierarchy, and Dilemma: The Making of Confucian Cultural Citizenship in a Contemporary Chinese Classical School,” Journal of Chinese Political Science, 21, pp. 435–52. Published by Springer Link. This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 International License (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/). Some editing and changes were made. 3 Wang, Canglong. (2020) “Educating the Cosmopolitan Citizen in Confucian Classical Education in Contemporary China,” Chinese Education and Society, 53(1–2), pp. 36–46. Copyright © 2020 The Author(s). Reprinted by permission of Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. 4 Wang, Canglong. (2022) “Right, Righteousness, and Act: Why should Confucian Activists Be Regarded as Citizens in the Revival of Confucian Education in Contemporary China?” Citizenship Studies, 26(2), pp. 146–66. Copyright © 2022 The Author(s). Published by Informa UK Limited, trading as Taylor & Francis Group. 5 Wang, Canglong. (2022) “Individual Self, Sage Discourse, and Parental Authority: Why Do Confucian Students Reject Further Confucian Studies as Their Educational Future?” Religions, 13(2), pp. 154–71. Copyright © 2022 The Author. Licensee MDPI, Basel, Switzerland. This article is an open-access article distributed under the terms and conditions of the Creative Commons Attribution (CC BY) license (https://creativecommons.org/ licenses/by/4.0/).

Introduction Chinese citizenship, Confucianism, and the Confucian education revival

Chinese citizenship from a post-orientalist perspective Ever since scholars initially translated the term ‘citizen’ into Chinese at the end of the 19th century, they have presented multiple translations, such as gongmin (public ­ people), guomin (national people), and shimin (city people) (Goldman and Perry 2002). In his review of the emergence of the concept of citizen in modern China, Guo (2014) clarified two perspectives with which to translate ‘citizen’: statism introduces the citizen as an instrument with which to build a powerful nation-state by disrupting Chinese people’s servility and encouraging their civic consciousness, whereas individualism aims to establish a more liberal nation-state by cultivating Chinese people’s individualistic and utilitarian mentalities. These two views have evolved unevenly in China’s modern era. While the state has largely repressed individualism and distanced it from Chinese citizenship, it has overwhelmingly emphasized statism since the founding of the Chinese socialist regime. While post-Mao China has experienced an emerging process of individualization and a consequent rise in individual consciousness of citizenship rights since the implementation of reform in the late 1970s, the dynamics of individualization still serve as a developmental strategy of the party-state to pursue modernization (Yan 2010). Differing from the Western rights-based citizenship, Chinese citizenship prioritizes the dimension of civic responsibility/obligation over individual rights (Guo 2014). Scholars have formulated two extremes in Chinese citizenship studies (Chen 2020): one model oversimplifies citizenship as membership in a political community but overlooks its modern normative implications; the other essentializes citizenship as a Western concept, but ignores the situational effects of non-Western conditions. How to disrupt the normalization of the two extremes? First, to address the oversimplification of Chinese citizenship, one should examine commonly accepted cores of citizenship, such as rights and responsibilities, and their implications for the Chinese context. Second, to challenge the essentialization of Chinese citizenship, one should pay attention to local Chinese traditions and values, such as the principles of Confucianism, and combine them with the fundamental values of citizenship.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003343455-1

2  Introduction: Chinese citizenship and Confucianism Adopting the above points as a framework, the present book aims to explore the nexus between citizenship and Confucianism in China. Scholarship on the association of Confucianism with citizenship has recently gained momentum (Guo 2021; Janoski 2015; Wang 2015, 2021; Yu 2020). In a broad sense, these studies of Confucianism and citizenship in China can be seen as part of an emerging body of literature on Chinese citizenship (Guo 2021; Guo and Guo 2015), which can, in turn, be categorized within the general project of examining citizenship after orientalism (Isin 2002, 2012). According to Isin (2012), it is no longer appropriate to conceive of citizenship as merely the membership or nationality of an individual in a nation-state on account of the converging forces of anti-colonial struggles, globalization, and the dynamics of post-modernity since the 1990s. In this situation, ‘the project of reimagining citizenship (as political subjectivity) after orientalism’ has become imperative (Isin 2012: 567). One key theoretical move in placing the accent on after in the proposal for ‘citizenship after orientalism’ is to consider how to rethink and transform the juridico-legal systems of citizenship and explain their orientalist origins (Isin 2012). In particular, the reorientation from juridico-legal systems to political subjectivity is a breakthrough for citizenship studies insofar as it incorporates the formation of political subjects as a necessary element of the citizenship regime and thus widens the lens to capture the dynamic claims of citizens to rights, civic self-cultivation, public participation, and acts of citizenship (Isin 2008, 2009; Isin and Nielsen 2008). Similarly, Guo (2022: 480) insightfully pointed out that the modern concept of citizenship has been dominated by an orthodox consensus that regards ‘individuals from a Christian, white, male, propertied, adult, and heterosexual background as ideal figures’. In contrast, [S]ocial groups from Eastern societies, females, homosexuals, and those from non-white races are regarded as inherently unfit for citizenship. From this perspective, citizenship development is seen as a gradual expansion from West to East, centre to periphery, male to female, white to non-white, and humans to other species. (Guo 2022: 480) Guo (2022) further argued bluntly that the nature of modern citizenship is Westerncentric, being characterized by Weberianism and the Marshallian paradigm. The Weberianist ideology views citizenship as a uniquely Western creation that emerged from the medieval European urban communities, in which such institutions as city councils and courts were established to exercise civic self-government and the values of citizenship, such as freedom, rights, equality, and participation, and its cultural elements, including churches, religious rituals, and brotherhoods, were nurtured (Weber 1958). Weberianism is considered as a typical example of an ideological system that later developed into orientalism (Said 1994) because of the assumption that cities in ancient Eastern societies (e.g., Chinese societies) failed to brew the institutional, cultural, and ethical elements of citizenship in the same way as their European counterparts (Guo 2021, 2022).

Introduction: Chinese citizenship and Confucianism  3 Meanwhile, the Marshallian paradigm of citizenship describes a liberal approach to citizenship configured by the British sociologist T. H. Marshall ([1949] 1963). This citizenship pattern takes citizenship rights as the main axis and summarizes the evolution of these rights from civil rights to political rights to social rights. The influence of the Marshallian paradigm on citizenship studies has been so profound and widespread that it has somewhat obscured the contextual particularities of non-Western citizenship institutions, ideas, and practices (Guo 2022; Wang 2016, 2022). In short, both Weberianism and the Marshallian paradigm highlight the centrality and dominance of the West in the conceptualization and evolution of citizenship, implying an orientalist ideology that exaggerates the ontological distinctions between East and West, presents a binary hierarchical structure of Western superiority and Eastern inferiority and blurs the diversities and complexities of citizenship in Eastern societies. Given this intellectual background, the post-orientalist perspective is of great significance in overcoming the Western centrism in citizenship studies and presenting diverse citizenship modalities in different contexts. As part of this spectrum of knowledge, the study of Chinese citizenship has developed remarkably over the past two decades (Chang 2020; Guo 2021; Woodman and Guo 2017; Zhao and Wang 2023). In addressing the theoretical implications of the experience of China’s citizenship for de-Westernization, Guo (2022) emphasized the importance of contextualism by arguing for the need to take full account of China’s indigenous political, cultural, and social resources and their potential influence when seeking to understand the meaning, formation, and history of Chinese citizenship. Moreover, it is imperative to avoid oversimplifying the fundamental values of liberty and equality as the common core of citizenship by integrating them with contextualized local experiences (Chen 2020). This book takes a post-orientalist perspective to discuss the implications of incorporating core elements of citizenship into the revived Confucianism, particularly Confucian education in 21st-century China. In examining the relationship between Confucianism and citizenship, it combines two complementary approaches: theoretical reflection and empirical exploration. Theoretical and philosophical reflection helps to unveil the complexities, contradictions, and multifaceted nature of the intellectual debate on Confucianism and citizenship, in general. It also opens up the possibility of integrating these two ideas and lays a theoretical foundation for the empirical exploration that follows. The key strength of the empirical perspective is that it helps to transcend the limitations of conceptual deliberation. Empirical results can reveal the dynamics of how Confucianism is connected with citizenship under contemporary China’s political, cultural, and social conditions. The book’s empirical exploration of Confucianism and citizenship is embedded primarily in the context of the contemporary revival of Confucian education. That is, it examines the relational complexities between some of the core elements of citizenship—identity, rights, responsibilities, acts, virtues, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism—and the discourses and practices of Confucian pedagogy.

4  Introduction: Chinese citizenship and Confucianism Both the theoretical and empirical perspectives contribute to exploring the guiding research questions of this book—Is Confucianism compatible with citizenship? If so, how? Is it theoretically and empirically possible to have a ‘Confucian citizen’ characterized by the integration of Confucianism and citizenship? How, if at all, has the idea of the ‘Confucian citizen’ been shaped in the contemporary Chinese context? How do Confucian actors make sense of core conceptions of citizenship and thus present themselves as citizens through their engagement in Confucian education? In line with the logical connection between theoretical reflection and empirical exploration, the remainder of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. The next section briefly presents the theoretical and philosophical discussions around the question of the compatibility of Confucianism and citizenship. This section is designed to assist readers in quickly and effectively grasping the book’s themes from a general perspective. But detailed investigations of the intricate nexus of Confucianism and citizenship are presented later in Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of this book. Then the following section introduces the context of the contemporary revival of Confucian education, describing relevant studies and clarifying the research setting and methods associated with the empirical exploration to follow. This section lays the foundation for Chapters 4, 5, and 6, which focus on the empirical study. I then summarize the book’s implications according to the theoretical and empirical findings and clarify the limitations of the research. The final section concludes with an outline of the entire book. The question of the compatibility of Confucianism and citizenship The relationship between citizenship and Confucianism is a perplexing topic in existing scholarship. One popularly accepted proposition is that citizenship and Confucianism are incompatible with each other (Wang 2015; Yu 2020), but this is not always the case. Two questionable assumptions define this perspective. First, scholars assumed that liberal citizenship, which emphasizes civil, political, and social rights (Marshall 1962), is the predominant paradigm, and they neglected other meaningful models of citizenship, such as civic republicanism, communitarianism, and multi-culturalism (Kukathas 1996; Kymlicka 1995). Second, scholars elevated the authoritarian aspects of Confucianism that prioritize hierarchy, obedience, and obligations but depreciated other Confucian values that may contribute to the development of human rights, individual freedom, and social equality (Angle 2002; Kim 2015). Both Confucianism and citizenship can be perceived as concepts of essential contestability (Gallie 1955), being variously describable, internally complex, and open to modification, accommodating different or even controversial ideas and narratives. Given this, it is reasonable to imagine multiple types of relationships beyond the predominant assumption of incompatibility. Over the past two decades, scholars have explored new types of relationships between Confucianism and citizenship beyond incompatibility. These studies have presented two main arguments. First, they have gradually invalidated the claim that Confucianism and citizenship are incompatible and replaced it with an understanding of Confucianism as having the potential to contribute in some ways to citizenship and citizenship education in China. Second, they have argued that the

Introduction: Chinese citizenship and Confucianism  5 combination of Confucianism and citizenship in present-day China can lead to new forms of political subjectivity that differ from Western styles of citizenship. On the first of these two arguments, Nuyen (2002) noted that Confucianism had the potential to contribute to a critique of the liberal conception of citizenship, which is incapable of reconciling its emphasis on individuality and individual rights with the pursuit of equality and democratic values. Confucianism holds a reciprocal and relational understanding of the individual and of individual rights and duties, which prevents it from accommodating the thin idea of citizenship that opposes the protection of individual rights to communal interests but might be compatible with a thick notion of citizenship that highlights the interdependence of personal interests and the common good. In the same vein, Yu (2020) pointed out the need to better understand the potential compatibility of Confucianism with democracy and to seek the necessary conditions for their peaceful coexistence, as they are not always directly at odds. Furthermore, Kim (2010) argued that a notion of active citizenship is implied in Confucius’ designation of self-disclosing and honorific individualism as ‘kuang’ (undisciplined), and that Confucius’ account of rational and self-controlling individualism as ‘juan’ (over-scrupulous) relates to a chastened citizenship (Kim 2010). Echoing these academic endeavours, this book goes further to summarize various types of relationships between Confucianism and citizenship through a systematic review of the literature (in particular, in Chapters 1, 2, and 3), indicating that although a thin, liberal citizenship is incompatible with the authoritarian values espoused by illiberal Confucianism, it might be consistent with a liberal style of Confucianism that affirms liberty and individualistic values. On the second argument, some scholars (Nuyen 2002; Wang 2015, 2021, 2022d) have proposed reconfiguring a new Confucian citizen in contemporary China by integrating Confucian values with a thick and deep notion of citizenship. Kim (2010) suggested a flexible citizenship based on the concept of ‘junzi’ (virtuous person), which would place particular attention on ‘the space of uncoerced human association and also the set of relational networks, including the family, neighbourhood, church, and school’ (p. 453). Moreover, the new Confucian citizen must deal with turning the Confucian preference for ritual-based civility and social harmony into a viable political vision by striking a balance with ‘Confucian incivility’, which refers to ‘a set of Confucian social practices that temporarily “upset” the existing social relations’ with the defining characteristics of being ‘deferentially remonstrative and respectfully corrective (usually in the familial relations)’ and ‘sometimes uncompromising and even intractable (especially in the political relations)’ (Kim 2011: 27). This book aims to contribute fresh understandings to how the new type of Confucian citizen is constructed in contemporary China’s political, social, and cultural conditions. Confucian education revival in the 21st century: background and relevant studies This book adopts an empirical approach (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) in addition to the theoretical to investigate the entanglement of Confucianism and citizenship by focusing on one specific domain of the general revival of Confucianism in

6  Introduction: Chinese citizenship and Confucianism contemporary China: Confucian education. In this section, I first offer an introduction of the background of Confucian education revival in the 21st century, and then move on to review relevant studies that comprise an emerging research area (Wang and Billioud 2022). Background

The current revival of Confucian education, as part of the overall return of Confucianism in China, dates back to the late 1980s, when the socialist Chinese government began supporting the teaching of traditional Chinese culture at public schools (Yu 2008). It was not until the early 2000s that Confucian education initiatives experienced rapid growth and popularity across the country. Generally, this wide-ranging revival in Confucian education moves in two directions: from the top down, driven by the government and cultural elites, and from the bottom up, with grassroots forces as the main impetus (Billioud 2010, 2021). Although it is almost impossible to distinguish these two movements, the grassroots Confucian education movement has attracted great attention. Scholars (Billioud and Thoraval 2015) described this trend as part of the broad reappearance of ‘popular Confucianism’ (minjian rujia, literally ‘Confucianism in the space of the people’), referring to Confucian-related activities instigated by ordinary people and ‘carried on outside the party-state apparatus’ (p. 8). Moreover, some studies (Dutournier and Wang 2018; Wang 2018) have observed a diversification of Confucian teaching and learning practices in sishu (old-style private schools) established by individual Confucian actors over the past two decades, where parents send their children for either full-time or part-time study of Confucianism. This development can be evidenced by a wide range of pedagogical ideas and methods having been reactivated and implemented while bearing the name of Confucianism, in both formal and informal educational settings (Wang and Billioud 2022). Among the various forms of Confucian education, the most influential type, and perhaps the most controversial (Wang 2018), is dujing (classics reading) education, where children are required to spend their full day reading and reciting classics. This book sets its Chapters 4, 5, and 6 to focus on Confucian dujing education. Dujing education was initiated in Taiwan in the mid-1990s by Wang Caigui,1 a Confucian educator and philosopher, and began to grow rapidly in Chinese mainland in the early 2000s. Although official statistics are lacking, scholarly estimates (Billioud 2021; Gilgan 2022a, 2022b; Wang 2022b) suggest that there are now at least one thousand established private dujing academies or schools and hundreds of thousands of full-time students involved in the extensive study of Confucian classics. The influence of dujing education is so widespread that it has extended beyond the school system to government agencies and companies (Billioud and Thoraval 2015; Jiang Fu 2022). Wang Caigui has played a leading role in the development of dujing education. He even proposed a comprehensive pedagogical system for dujing education that has influenced a large number of Confucian education practitioners, including

Introduction: Chinese citizenship and Confucianism  7 sishu founders, teachers, parents, and pupils. In his theory of dujing education, Wang (2014) emphasized three key points (pp. 41–66). First, he proposed that all teaching content must include the great classics that had been published throughout human history because he deemed these ‘most valuable books’ to represent ‘the crystallization of the profound wisdom of mankind’ (Wang 2009: 5–6). Second, he proposed that students would primarily learn through the extensive and mechanical memorization of the classics, without having to comprehend the literal meanings of the texts or their hidden principles. This proposition relates to Wang’s third point that children were considered to possess strong memories but weak comprehension abilities. In accordance with such a perception of human development, dujing education requires its learners to read and memorize a large number of classics, which are supposed to lay the foundations for their character development and moral cultivation (Wang 2014: 6–15). Wang’s dujing education pedagogy has substantially shaped the landscape of teaching and learning classics in present-day China. Learners (mainly children but also adults) are encouraged to read and recite a large number of classics—primarily Confucian classics, such as the Four Books (i.e., The Great Learning, The Doctrine of the Mean, The Analects of Confucius, and Mencius), but also texts from the Taoist, Buddhist, and Western canons.2 Wang (2014) argued that such a pedagogy would help learners grasp the essence of Chinese and Western civilizations and access the common wisdom of humanity, thus effectively enhancing their moral cultivation and nurturing their fine personalities. Relevant studies

A relatively small but growing number of empirical studies on grassroots Confucian education have appeared recently. Billioud and Thoraval have contributed pioneering and impactful research on the rediscovery of Confucianism in mainland China in the field of education. They have examined how the Confucian education revival has taken form and become institutionalized (Billioud and Thoraval 2007; Billioud 2010, 2016); how this phenomenon exhibits a paradoxical feature of anti-intellectualism (Billioud and Thoraval 2007, 2015); the religious motivation for individual engagement in the learning of Confucian classics (Billioud and Thoraval 2008); and why certain Confucian educational institutions should be regarded as ‘jiaohua (literally “to transform the self and others through teaching”) organizations’ (Billioud 2011) or ‘redemptive societies’ (Billioud 2016). Other researchers have explored how Buddhism is playing an important role in the nationwide success of the classics reading and national studies movements through its well-developed networks and organizations (Dutournier and Ji 2009; Ji 2018); the tensions and vagaries of Confucian education as a ‘holistic’ educational experience (Dutournier and Wang 2018); the practice of education through music, from an initiation into classical music for children to Confucian self-cultivation for university students (Ji 2008); and the ongoing debates about classics reading and the widening disparities in practising Confucian education (Wang 2018). Moreover, some other studies have investigated how moral anxiety has affected these parents’

8  Introduction: Chinese citizenship and Confucianism engagement in Confucian education and their preference for a memorization-based pedagogy (Wang 2022c), and the tension between students’ personal aspirations for independence and autonomy and the authoritarian expectations of their teachers and parents (Wang 2022a). Besides these descriptive studies, some scholars have attempted to provide theoretical explanations for the empirical findings on the revival of Confucian education. For example, Wang (2022a) used the theory of Chinese individualization to understand parents’ engagement in their children’s study of Confucian classics. Billioud (Forthcoming) referred to Hartmut Rosa’s concept of resonance to explain why many people are reading Confucian classics and voluntarily reappropriating them today. Gilgan (2022a, 2022b) drew on the grounded utopian movement theory to assess the underlying utopianism of the capacity for change in the classics reading movement and the civil sphere theory to explain specific sociopolitical conditions for bringing change into society. In summary, empirical studies on a variety of relevant aspects and dimensions of Confucian education have burgeoned over the past few years. But these studies have not properly dealt with Confucian education from the perspective of citizenship studies; neither do they investigate the possible relations between Confucianism and citizenship from the empirical view of Confucian education practitioners. The present book aims to contribute to filling this literature gap. In the next section, I move to describe the research setting, data sources, and research methods to lay the methodological foundation for the empirical chapters (i.e., Chapters 4, 5, and 6) of this book. Research setting and methods

Focusing on dujing education, this book empirically explores the relationship between Confucianism and citizenship by examining two sets of resources: (1) written materials by Wang Caigui and (2) fieldwork data with founders, teachers, parents, and students at Yiqian School (a pseudonym), a Confucian classical school strongly influenced by Wang’s pedagogy. Placing Yiqian School in the grander field of Confucian education revival as clarified above, I choose it for this study first because it is one of China’s earliest established Confucian private schools in contemporary and has undergone changes and shifts throughout; second because of its officially recognized compulsory school status but featuring Confucian education (details below). In the empirical Chapters 4, 5, and 6, I merge the two types of materials. One advantage of combining the data in this way is to present more straightforwardly the consistencies and inconsistencies between purported educational ideals and everyday schooling practices. First, given Wang Caigui’s profound influence on dujing education, this study uses his written materials to uncover the theoretical discourses on cultivating learners’ citizenship through the extensive study of classics. In particular, I examine one of Wang’s collections of public speeches, entitled Dujing ershi nian (Two Decades of Reading the Classics). Published in 2014, this book includes six speeches about dujing education, which Wang carefully selected and believed to

Introduction: Chinese citizenship and Confucianism  9 be most representative of his main ideas on dujing education. The book also has an Introduction and Conversation section, where Wang summarized the achievements and inadequacies of dujing education over the past two decades and directly responded to challenging questions. Furthermore, I collected and analysed some of Wang’s other speech texts, in which he referred to key elements of citizenship when advising Confucian education practitioners on how to address the strict regulations of local government. Second, Yiqian School is located in a small, mountainous town in a developed province on the Southeast coast of China. The history of Yiqian School can be traced back to 2002, when the school’s founder, Mr Chen, gathered a few preschool children to read The Analects of Confucius at home. In 2010, Yiqian School was endowed with the official status of a private school (minban xuexiao, ‘school run by the people’) by the local government. Despite its approval as a nine-year compulsory school, Yiqian School does not routinely offer the comprehensive statestipulated curriculum; instead, it requires students to read and memorize Confucian classics such as The Analects and Mencius, in addition to some Taoist classics such as Daodejing and Zhuangzi and Western English classics throughout the school day. This paradoxical situation results in Yiqian School struggling between teaching Confucian classics and delivering the national curriculum. I visited the Yiqian School for two months in 2012, one month in 2013, and six months in 2015, during which periods I collected data through interviews with school administrators, teaching staff, and students, and participant observations of the routine teaching and learning activities and teacher–student interactions inside and outside the classrooms. The student population at Yiqian School varied greatly across these three visits. The school catered for approximately 300 students in 2012 and 2013 but had only about 120 students divided into 6 classes in 2015. Most students were at the age of compulsory primary and middle school education (6–15 years old). In theory, students could study at the school from Year 1 to Year 9; in practice, very few students did so because of the national curriculum incompatibility mentioned above. Consequently, many students ultimately transfer to state schools or other Confucian schools. In 2015, Yiqian School had 20 staff members for teaching and administration. Most of the teaching staff had some knowledge of traditional Chinese culture, and a few had previously worked in other Confucian schools. I incorporate interviews with the school’s founder, headteacher, and 17 parents of students (6 fathers and 11 mothers) in the analysis for the empirical chapters of this book. I recruited the parental participants by snowball sampling. Most of the parents lived in urban areas, and they had educational backgrounds ranging from high school to Master’s degree level. They held a variety of occupations: for example, white-collar employees at private companies, low- and mid-ranking civil servants, self-employed entrepreneurs, full-time mothers, and engineers. The parents were affluent enough to pay the high tuition fee of RMB30,000 (equivalent to $5,000) per year charged by the Confucian school in 2015. The background information indicates that the parental informants were at an advanced socio-economic status.

10  Introduction: Chinese citizenship and Confucianism All interviews and oral communications during the fieldwork were conducted in Mandarin Chinese, which is the common native language of the researcher and the informants. The school founder and headteacher were interviewed on multiple occasions from 2012, and phone interviews with parents were held mainly from May to August 2015. Each interview with a parent lasted one to two hours and was audio-recorded with the consent of the informants. I personally transcribed the interview recordings verbatim. All participants are anonymized in this article. The holistic coding method was applied to the analysis of Wang Caigui’s textual materials and of the observation and interview data, out of a desire ‘to grasp basic themes or issues in the data by absorbing them as a whole rather than by analysing them line by line’ (Dey 1993: 104). Through holistic coding, the content of the collected data was analysed, and some meaningful themes were determined. Specifically, I did three phases of coding with the assistance of NVivo: ‘developing categories of information (open coding), interconnecting the categories (axial coding), [and] building a “story” that connects the categories (selective coding)’ (Creswell 2007: 160). In addition, critical discourse analysis was used to interpret how the participants spoke and understood their feelings and actions. In doing so, I aim to unpack how their narratives are associated with the cores of citizenship. The rise of the Confucian citizen in China: implications and limitations By combining theoretical reflections and empirical explorations, this book provides solid evidence to complement existing scholarship that challenges the oversimplified interpretation of the controversial relationship between Confucianism and citizenship. The consistency between Confucianism and citizenship, as exhibited in Confucian education activists’ narratives and actions, is understandable under modern conditions, as the government of China constantly seeks to cultivate modern citizens to contribute to the building of a powerful state (Yan 2010). The current revival of Confucian education reflects the transformation of contemporary China: a rapid process of individualization has resulted in increasing awareness of individual rights and the development of multiple channels through which to assert one’s rights (Yan 2009). Against this background, the story of Confucian education offers a chance to investigate how Confucianism may inspire the creation of a new type of citizen—the Confucian citizen. This book offers various descriptions of the Confucian citizen in dispersed chapters throughout. Overall, I understand the Confucian citizen to bear a resemblance to the ‘gentle citizen’ (Wang 2021). The latter is proposed as a synthesized, thick subject who makes ‘the civic attributes the subjective underpinning’ and is inspired by and supplemented with Confucian virtues (ibid: 295). In light of this, I argue that the formation of the Confucian citizen stems from a process wherein individual actors extend and integrate Confucian moral values into their civic awareness of identity, rights, responsibilities, action, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism.

Introduction: Chinese citizenship and Confucianism  11 I emphasize that the appearance of the Confucian citizen contributes new theoretical implications for citizenship studies. First, it provides an embodied example to Chen (2020), who suggested that scholars should rethink citizenship by integrating its fundamental values with local Chinese traditions and experiences. Second, I go further in indicating that the Confucian citizen, embodying the compatibility of Confucianism with modern citizen elements, serves as a perfect window to exhibit the shifting moral and civic ethics of Chinese individuals and the emerging varieties of moral life and civic subjectivity in China. Furthermore, this book joins other studies to affirm Confucianism’s commitment to certain core elements of citizenship, such as rights and responsibilities (Wang 2022d), equality and social justice (Nuyen 2001), human rights (Tiwald 2012), and public participation (Guo and Chen 2009). These existing contributions from Confucian philosophers have nourished and opened up novel directions for the ongoing discussion of Chinese citizenship and citizenship education. On this basis, I agree with Chen’s (2020) proposal to problematize and challenge the essentializing tendencies of current citizenship education, which limit the conceptualization of citizenship to the Western experience only. I further argue that this can be done by rethinking citizenship from a post-orientalist perspective and uncovering and critiquing the Western-centrism of the dominant citizenship paradigm (Guo 2022; Zhao and Wang 2023). Accordingly, there is a need to explore the peculiarities of citizenship in non-Western contexts by integrating the shared, basic values of citizenship (e.g., liberty, equality, rights, and global awareness) with a variety of local experiences (Chen 2020). However, the findings of this book should not be extended to the whole body of Confucian education participants in contemporary China. The present study relies on a relatively small sample of Confucian education participants and does not imply that the participants’ perceptions and understandings of citizenship elements necessarily represent the masses. The research findings are indicative, not representative, not only because Confucian education, in general, is now experiencing a palpable diversification in teaching and learning methods but also because of the increasingly diverse socio-economic status of Confucian activists. I acknowledge that most of the parental informants in this study came from the recently emerging middle class (Rocca 2017), and their socio-economically advantaged background entails idiosyncrasies in their perceptions of the civic elements embedded in concrete social class conditions. Nonetheless, I emphasize that the demonstration of the participants’ Chinese citizenship features of identity, rights, responsibilities, action, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism in this book is indicative of the fashioning of Confucian citizen. Further studies are needed to adopt a social class lens to explore the implications for the Confucian activists’ conceptions of Chinese citizenship in contemporary China. Additionally, this book reveals the Confucian activism in the formation of Confucian citizen. It discovers that the acts by Confucian citizens are presented as disruptive and creative when they challenge the hegemonic state system and carve out new options for education. These acts of citizenship, however, are performed privately by individuals rather than collectively. The foundation of Confucian

12  Introduction: Chinese citizenship and Confucianism activism relies on the individual, who acts separately rather than collectively and who reflects on the truth of education in solitude. As the rise in consciousness of individual rights is subject to the power of the state in contemporary China, individuals may only act within the boundaries defined by the regime (Yan 2009). Some scholars argue that Chinese citizens are expected to prioritize the partystate interests and submit to the absolute ideological authority (Chen 2020; Chia 2011; Kennedy et al. 2014). For the time being, Confucian citizens and grassroots Confucian education remain under the management of the party-state, as reflected by the Chinese Ministry of Education’s recent designation of full-time classical schools as ‘illegal’ and subsequent order for a full-scale investigation. In future research, scholars could explore the implications of state management of grassroots Confucian education on the formation of citizenship in the revival of Confucianism. Outline of the book This book emerges from the junction of Confucian philosophy, citizenship studies, ethnographic research, educational studies, Chinese politics, and religious studies. In the following chapters, I combine theoretical and empirical approaches to investigate the relationships between Confucianism and citizenship in the context of China. The theoretical approach, covered in Chapters 1, 2, and 3, is used to construct new frameworks through which we can examine the nuances and complexities of the relationship between Confucianism and citizenship. The empirical approach, applied in Chapters 4, 5, and 6, is used to explore the process of citizenmaking through Confucian education and contributes robust arguments based on first-hand fieldwork materials. Considered together, this work disrupts the conceptualization of citizenship as a Western concept and draws attention to Chinese traditions and values that encourage us to rethink the localization of Chinese citizenship. The book’s overall achievement is to provide solid evidence from theoretical and empirical perspectives for the rise of the Confucian citizen, a new type of citizen emerging in contemporary China, and to offer an explanation of how this rise challenges the popular characterization of Confucianism as a contradiction to citizenship. The book is divided into two parts: theoretical reflections and empirical explorations. The first half—Chapters 1, 2, and 3—presents theoretical reflections. Chapter 1 is a review of opposing conceptualizations of Confucianism and citizenship. In this chapter, based on a comprehensive review of the literature, I differentiate ‘liberal Confucianism’ from ‘illiberal Confucianism’ and contrast ‘thin citizenship’ with ‘thick citizenship’. Based on these four categories, I establish three models to represent scholarly discussions of Confucianism and citizenship: (1) the incompatibility interpretation, which assumes citizenship to be thin and Confucianism to be illiberal; (2) the compatibility interpretation, in which citizenship is seen as thin and Confucianism as liberal; and (3) the reconstruction interpretation, which accommodates the concepts of thick citizenship and both liberal and illiberal Confucianism. I argue that the reconstruction model holds the most

Introduction: Chinese citizenship and Confucianism  13 potential to generate novel types of the Confucian citizen in contemporary China, exemplified by the concepts of the ‘junzi (virtuous person) citizen’ and ‘tianxia (all-under-heaven) citizenship’. In Chapter 2, I develop the concepts introduced in Chapter 1 and go further to compare junzi, the idealized figure of Confucianism, with citizens, as understood through modern politics. I also construct an analytical framework using ‘politico– legal’ and ‘moral–ethical’ classification criteria. I divide junzi into ‘governing’ and ‘moral’ subjects and citizens into ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ citizens. I then compare these four categories to come to two conclusions: in terms of the moral–ethical dimension, junzi is broadly compatible with the idea of the citizen. In terms of the politico-legal dimension, junzi is largely incompatible with the idea of the citizen. In Chapter 3, I build on the discussions in Chapter 2 to identify potential ways in which the concepts of junzi and citizen can be combined. I propose two pathways towards such a combination. One pathway involves cultivating civic junzi; that is, junzi characteristics form the subjective underpinning and are supplemented with civic properties to transform the traditional Confucian junzi into a modern junzi characterized by civic ethics and equal status. The other pathway involves cultivating the junzi-style citizen; that is, civic qualities, as the subjective underpinning, are supplemented with Confucian junzi traits to transform an individual into a new type of citizen. This new type of citizen possesses Confucian morality and ethics and pursues the integration of sageliness within and kingliness without. Of these two approaches, I propose that the approach towards the junzi-style citizen is most practical, considering modern China’s political, social, and cultural circumstances. The second half of the book—Chapters 4, 5, and 6—focuses on empirical explorations. In Chapter 4, I investigate four dimensions of citizenship—identity, rights/entitlements, responsibilities, and actions—by examining how Confucian education activists (teachers and parents) engage in full-time classical education at a Confucian school. I begin by presenting the shaping of the activists’ Confucian identity, which involves discourses around Chinese culturalism and criticism of state education. I then identify the widespread circulation of the discourse of rights (quanli) within Confucian education. Following this, I discuss the emerging discourse around righteousness (yi), revealing how this particular Confucian ideology, articulated through local terms such as ‘humanity’ (renxing), ‘the Way’ (Dao), ‘principle’ (li), and ‘rationality’ (lixing), generates a sense of civic responsibility and obligation. The final section of Chapter 4 examines the Confucian idea of ‘extending innate knowledge’ (zhi liangzhi) and the contribution of this idea to the conversion of internal, individual ethical reflection into creative civic acts. Based on these findings, I emphasize the previously understudied civic dynamics underlying the Confucian classical education movement and the general Confucian revival. In Chapter 5, I shift the focus away from the teachers and parents who feature in Chapter 4 to students at the same Confucian school. Using interviews with and observations of these students, along with those with their parents and teachers,

14  Introduction: Chinese citizenship and Confucianism I explore the moral, institutional, discursive, and practical paradoxes inherent in educating students to become Confucian cultural citizens through reading the classics. I begin by presenting students’ use of a type of moral discourse to differentiate state education from Confucian education and based on this separation, to cultivate four typical Confucian-inspired civic virtues—spirit of learning, ethical reflection, awareness of cultural rights, and sense of cultural responsibility. I then discuss the practical and discursive contradictions between individualistic and authoritarian ideologies in students’ reading the classics to transform themselves into Confucian cultural citizens. In the final section, I uncover the institutional dilemmas that students and their parents face when striving to ensure that the Confucian study experience is recognized by the state and society. To conclude, I argue that the empirical findings of Chapter 5 provide fresh evidence that Confucianism is compatible with modern citizenship and that a new type of citizen, the Confucian citizen, is being constructed in today’s China. However, it is important to acknowledge that despite this compatibility, the practical implementation of Confucianism within modern citizenship faces numerous challenges and difficulties. In Chapter 6, I examine the nationalist and cosmopolitan orientations in creating the Confucian citizen through dujing education. I first investigate the nationalism and cosmopolitanism by critically analysing the relevant discourses in the dujing theory. Then I unpack the conceptualization of ‘cosmopolitan citizen’ in the discourse context of the Confucian school, describing how students’ national identity and cosmopolitan awareness are cultivated through the school’s teaching and learning processes. This chapter concludes with the main argument that the revival of Confucian education involves an interweaving of nationalism and cosmopolitanism and faces pedagogical challenges in cultivating students as Confucian cosmopolitan citizens with a Chinese national identity. Notes 1 A detailed introduction to Wang Caigui (born in 1949) can be found in Billioud and Thoraval (2015, Chapter 2). 2 Western classics include the works of ancient Greek philosophers, such as The Death of Socrates, as well as Shakespeare’s plays, such as A Midsummer Night’s Dream. It is noteworthy that the list of classic books is from Wang Caigui.

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Part I

Confucianism and citizenship revisited Theoretical reflections

1

Confucianism and citizenship A review of opposing conceptualizations

Confucianism has not been sufficiently valued in citizenship studies to date. I propose the following explanation for this omission. Liberal citizenship has been the mainstream paradigm since T. H. Marshall introduced his seminal citizenship framework, which equates citizenship with the evolutionary achievement of civil, political, and social rights (Marshall 1992). Confucianism has long been considered an ideology of authoritarianism rather than liberalism (Park and Shin 2006), elitism rather than egalitarianism (Bell 2008; Dallmayr et al. 2009; Kim 2009a), collectivism rather than individualism (Fukuyama 1995), an obligation orientation rather than a rights orientation (Huntington 1991), and particularism rather than universalism (Chan 2004; Liu 2004b, 2007). Consequently, the general academic consensus is that Confucianism contributes little to the idea of liberal citizenship. However, these interpretations of citizenship and Confucianism are limited. Other traditions beyond liberalism contain conceptualizations of citizenship. For example, civic republicanism prioritizes civic virtues and public participation over individual rights (Guo 2007; Pocock 1995). Communitarianism ontologically regards the self as embedded in a community and underscores communitarian goods (Bell 1993; Etzioni 1995, 1996; Hirsch 1986; Sandel 1983; Taylor 1989). Multi-culturalism holds that minor ethnic groups have the same citizenship rights as mainstream groups and criticizes the liberal assumption of cultural homogenization (Delanty 2002; Kukathas 1997; Kymlicka 1995; Rosaldo 1997; Stevenson 2001). Beyond liberalism, many academics have suggested that Confucianism may be sufficiently compatible with classical capitalism (Clarke 1997; Nuyen 1999, 2002) to promote capitalist development in East Asian societies (Tu 1989, 1998). Other scholars have proposed that Confucianism is aligned with the concepts of human rights (Angle 2002; Kim 2015; Twiss 1998) and social equality (Bloom 1998; Nuyen 2001, 2002), and that it could contribute to modern democracy and constitutionalism (Du 2008; Kim 2011a; Ren 2013; Yao 2013a, 2013b, 2013c). Janoski (2014) argued that Confucianism is key to understanding contemporary conceptualizations of Chinese citizenship. Given these varying views on Confucianism, questions remain. What is the relationship between Confucianism and citizenship DOI: 10.4324/9781003343455-3

22  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections Table 1.1 Three Models of Confucianism and Citizenship

Illiberal Confucianism Liberal Confucianism

Thin citizenship

Thick citizenship

Incompatible Compatible

Reconstruction

From: The Routledge Handbook of Chinese Citizenship, Edition by Guo, Z., p. 289. Copyright (2021) by Imprint. Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Group.

today? Can Confucianism contribute to citizenship studies? If so, how? This chapter attempts to answer these questions by reviewing the relevant literature and constructing an innovative framework for analysis and comparison of Confucianism and citizenship. I construct this theoretical framework by classifying citizenship into two types, thin citizenship and thick citizenship, and Confucianism into two types, liberal Confucianism and illiberal Confucianism. Thin citizenship is rights based, exemplified by liberal citizenship, whereas thick citizenship emphasizes civic virtues and communitarian participation, such as republican and communitarian citizenship (Kennedy et al. 2008; Tilly 1995; Walzer 1994). Liberal Confucianism is comparable to liberal values in terms of benevolence, reciprocity, and other humanistic values, whereas illiberal Confucianism is conceptualized as authoritarian, hierarchical, or communitarian (Spina et al. 2011). Based on these four categories, I identify three theoretical models of the relationship between Confucianism and citizenship: incompatibility, compatibility, and reconstruction (see Table 1.1). The first model interprets the principles of illiberal Confucianism as incompatible with the liberal values of thin citizenship. The second model argues that the principles of liberal Confucianism are compatible with values of thin citizenship. Finally, the third model suggests that Confucianism (both illiberal and liberal) and thick citizenship can be reconstructed to form a new concept of Confucian citizenship. The next five sections delve into these three conceptualizations in detail. Section 1 discusses the ideas of thin and thick citizenship and liberal and illiberal Confucianism. The following three sections review the divergent theoretical and philosophical interpretations of the relationship between Confucianism and citizenship from the perspectives of incompatibility, compatibility, and reconstruction. The final section summarizes the main arguments. Conceptualizations of citizenship and Confucianism In this section, I outline the differing conceptualizations of citizenship and Confucianism by dividing each into two types: thin and thick citizenship and liberal and illiberal Confucianism. In so doing, I lay a foundation for comparing the three proposed interpretations of the relationship between citizenship and Confucianism.

Confucianism and citizenship: a review  23 Two types of citizenship

Citizenship is widely regarded as a modern concept that originated in the West following the collapse of feudal societies and small-scale peasant economies and the subsequent development of capitalist market economies (Guo 2007; Heater 1999; Turner 1993). According to Turner (1993: vii), the concept of citizenship is based on modern conditions such as ‘a city culture, secularization, the decline of particularistic values, the emergence of the idea of a public realm, the erosion of particularistic commitments and the administrative framework of the nation-state’. Liberal citizenship highlights the supremacy of individual rights over responsibilities to the state (Faulks 2000) and was defined by T. H. Marshall (1963: 68) as ‘a status bestowed on those who are full members of a community. All who possess the status are equal with respect to the rights and duties with which the status is endowed’. Liberal citizenship assumes that citizens are rational and autonomous individuals who ‘separate from the nation-state, […] [and] from whatever community he or she chooses to be associated with’ (Nuyen 2002: 128). Here, Nuyen referred to what we call thin citizenship. In Tilly’s view (1995), thin citizenship is a conceptualization of citizenship in which citizens’ main concern is the protection of their individual rights. The state functions as a legal apparatus that facilitates this protection and citizens have minimal responsibility for the state. Thin citizenship presumes the duality of public and private spheres and is only concerned with the public dimension of an individual, who is assumed to be independent of the community (Nuyen 2002). In contrast with thin citizenship, thick citizenship does not assume the binary opposition of public and private spheres; it instead refers to a conception of citizenship in which citizens actively participate in both public and communal affairs, in which citizens’ rights and responsibilities are mutually supportive, and in which citizens and communities are interdependent (Clarke 1996; Faulks 2000; Kennedy et al. 2008; Tilly 1995). The civic republican citizenship that originated in ancient Greece is a form of thick citizenship, which posits that to live a good and moral life, every citizen should cultivate his virtues and morals and actively participate in the life of the polis (Guo 2007). The core elements of thick citizenship include civic morals and virtues, active participation in political affairs, and contribution to the welfare of the community (Clarke 1994). Communitarian citizenship is another type of thick citizenship; it criticizes liberalism for reducing individuals to atomized beings and for failing to clarify why independent and autonomous individuals should take on responsibilities in their communities (Bell 1993; Kukathas 1996; Sandel 1983). The basic ideas of communitarianism can be presented both ontologically and evaluatively (Kukathas 1996). Ontologically, the communitarian self is situated, embodied, or constituted by society, rather than being separated from the community. Evaluatively, communitarianism prioritizes the need for public goods over the liberal emphasis on individual rights and freedom, and thus supports norms of reciprocity, solidarity, and fraternity. In brief, the main concerns of communitarian citizenship include common goods, the association of individuals with the state

24  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections and society, and the social and political responsibilities shared by all citizens (Bell 1993). Two types of Confucianism

Scholars have disagreed on how to interpret Confucianism. Two types of Confucianism have been identified—liberal and illiberal. Proponents of liberal Confucianism hold that Confucianism contains liberal values or can transform itself into a liberal system of thought. According to Nuyen (2005: 171), Confucianism is ‘geared towards separate identifiable individuals, thus presupposing individuality. It does see the self as an individual, or an entity distinct from others in the society’. Confucian thought therefore embraces the spirit of freedom and can play a meaningful role in a liberal society (Fukuyama 1995). Liberal Confucianism has the potential to endorse social equality and human rights through the tenet that every person has the internal moral and intellectual motivation to become a shengren (saint or sage) (Angle 2010; Bloom 1998; Kim 2015; Sim 2013). This point is exemplified by modern neo-Confucianism, which reinterprets Confucianism by introducing modern values such as democracy and entitlement or rights. Neo-Confucianism argues that the conventional Confucian moral subject can be transformed into a modern intellectual subject through the process of self-negation of the conscience (liangzhi kanxian), connecting traditional Confucian virtues with modern political rationality (Mou 1991). In contrast, illiberal Confucianism holds that Confucianism is an anti-liberal system of values. Illiberal Confucianism assumes the self to be communitarian and obligation-oriented rather than independent and rights-oriented. As the Confucian self is an ethical being embedded in multiple social relations and role ethics, one’s rights are therefore derived from one’s membership in particular communities (Ames 2011). Illiberal Confucianism can be further divided into authoritarian Confucianism and communitarian Confucianism. Through the lens of authoritarian Confucianism, Confucian moral idealism presupposes a ‘kingdom of the superior’ (junziguo) in support of hierarchy and meritocracy (Bai 2008; Bell 2006; Chan 2007). There is no position for entitlement to or discourse surrounding individual rights in the Confucian value system (Chen 2013; Qian 1995; Xiao 1998). Social inequality is also legitimized by hierarchical ideologies. One could therefore contend that communitarian Confucianism does not possess the concepts of human rights and equality (Young 1998). However, scholars argued that communitarian Confucianism merely approaches these concepts differently from Western liberalism. For example, Confucianism rarely uses the term quanli (right or entitlement), but the salience of li (ritual or propriety) may represent culture-centred values of human rights, establish an interpersonal model of mutual respect in a ritual-governed community, and promote social equality (Ames 2013). In summary, illiberal Confucianism either places Confucianism in opposition to liberal values (i.e., authoritarian Confucianism) or essentializes the distinctions between Confucianism and liberalism (i.e., communitarian Confucianism).

Confucianism and citizenship: a review  25 According to the above conceptualizations of citizenship and Confucianism, those who define Confucianism as illiberal and citizenship as thin tend to regard them as incompatible. However, those who conceptualize Confucianism as liberal and citizenship as thin may support the compatibility interpretation. Finally, those who understand Confucianism to be either liberal or illiberal and citizenship to be thick are likely to subscribe to the reconstruction interpretation. In the following sections, I expand on these three interpretations of the relationship between Confucianism and citizenship. The incompatibility interpretation One academic consensus is that Confucianism is incompatible with liberal citizenship and thus hinders China’s development of modern values. Concepts such as ‘citizen’ and ‘citizenship’ rarely appeared in Confucian doctrines in imperial China (Nuyen 2002); they only began to appear in modern China since the early 20th century.1 Max Weber offered a seminal explanation of the incompatibility of citizenship with Confucianism. He indicated that the original form of modern citizenship appeared in autonomous medieval cities in the West, where city residents were endowed with political rights and the freedom to pursue their own economic interests (Weber [1927] 1981: 313). Weber also regarded Confucian ethics as a cultural hindrance to capitalist development in imperial China (Weber 2004). Given this, many modern Chinese scholars have assumed that Confucianism fails to produce the liberal citizenship of Western kind. In the 1980s, the rise of the ‘Four Asian Tigers’ (Hong Kong, Singapore, South Korea, and Taiwan) led to the proposal of ‘Asian Values’, which set Confucian values in direct opposition to Western values, essentializing East Asian societies as patriarchal, authoritarian regimes and Western societies as rights-oriented and democratic (Dalton and Ong 2005; Fukuyama 1995; Lau and Kuan 1988; Rozman 1991; Tu 2011; Wang 2008). Englehart (2000) argued that Asian Values represent a political strategy that employs Confucian culture to endorse political authoritarianism and directly contradicts civil and political citizenship rights. Scholars have commonly agreed that modern Chinese citizenship is collectivist and obligation-oriented, while Western citizenship is individualist and rights-oriented (Guo 2007; Janoski 2014; Lee 2004). Scholars have also stated that prioritizing civic responsibilities over individual rights may have resulted in a relatively passive form of citizenship in China (Tu 2011). In general, Confucianism is viewed as incompatible with liberal citizenship in the following three parts: rights versus obligations, social hierarchy versus social equality, and democratic regime versus authoritarian regime. Rights versus obligations

The incompatibility of Confucianism with citizenship can be first examined through the lens of rights versus obligations. Confucianism is thought to be obligation-oriented and in opposition to the rights-based concept of thin citizenship. This

26  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections perceived incompatibility is reflected in the conflict between Confucian values and individual rights and freedom, the repression of human rights, and the violation of women’s rights. Confucianism has been understood by a number of scholars to hold a weak conception of rights but a strong consciousness of responsibility and obligation. Analysing the legal implications of The Analects of Confucius, Gong (1993) suggested that the concept of rights in a Confucian system is relatively weak because Confucius was concerned with people’s ontologically patriarchal obligations and liabilities, which are discordant with a modern legal system. Echoing this point of view, Xiao (1998) indicated that there is a weak conceptualization of rights in Confucianism and that Confucian teachings are infused with obligation-oriented virtues such as loyalty and filial piety, which are inconsistent with the modern standard of a rights-based rule of law. As Li (1999) clarified, Confucianism values responsibilities and obligations; its undervaluation of rights and entitlements aligns with the view that illiberal Confucianism contains internal barriers that cannot accommodate the liberal values of thin citizenship (see also Peerenboom 1998). For example, Confucianism is often blamed for hindering the development of civil citizenship rights due to its deep-rooted tradition of not involving the law in disputes (wusong). Influenced by this notion, Confucian individuals tend to resolve social conflicts through civil mediation instead of litigation, relying on rites rather than laws (Chen 2003; Cui and Long 2003; Wang and Solum 2011). Additionally, the illiberal values and particularism of Confucianism have been assumed to hinder universal human rights, particularly women’s rights (Ames 2013). Chan (1999) summarized four ways in which Confucianism may oppose the concept of human rights. (1) The concept of human rights assumes an unsocial individual independent from culture and society, whereas Confucianism proposes a contextualized individual and role ethics. (2) Confucian society is understood as an expansion of the family, where individual rights may be repressed. (3) Confucianism supports hierarchy, meritocracy, and paternalism. (4) If human rights are introduced, Confucian social relations may fall into disorder, and litigious conflicts may result. Moreover, illiberal Confucianism may impair women’s rights, as it internalizes the idea that women are by nature inferior to men. As Tu (1985) argued, ancient China, where Confucianism was largely dominant, was a male-dominated society in which a son was valued more highly than a daughter, a husband enjoyed more privileges than a wife, and a father held more authority than a mother. This point is exemplified by the ethical codes that Chinese women had to follow, notably the Three Obediences (sancong): a daughter’s obedience to her father, a wife’s obedience to her husband, and a mother’s obedience to her son (Xu 1995). Due to the Three Obediences, women had insufficient capacity to claim rights and take action, especially concerning family property and civil issues (A-Feng 2000; Tao and Ming 1994). The negative influence of Confucianism on women’s rights in China is still seen today. For example, women are expected to assume more childcare duties than men, consistent with the influence of Confucianism (Leung 2014).

Confucianism and citizenship: a review  27 Social hierarchy versus social equality

Social hierarchy versus social equality is the second part of the perceived incompatibility between illiberal Confucianism and thin citizenship. Confucianism endorses meritocracy, a social and political system that generates gradational differences in moral consciousness between ordinary people and elites. Confucian family-based ethics may impair public morality (gongde) due to their overemphasis on private morality (side), which may damage social equality, hinder the growth of civil society, and prevent the development of civic virtues. Confucianism tends to downplay individual rights because it promotes a hierarchical vision of society (Murthy 2000), which is, by nature, meritocratic. As Kim (2012a) stated, the core of Confucian meritocracy lies in the belief that optimal governance occurs when a minority of virtuous and knowledgeable elites hold the power to govern the majority of ordinary people, who are merely concerned with their own private interests. This relies on the implicit assumption that there are insurmountable disparities in morality and education between Confucian junzi (superior people) and xiaoren (ordinary people). The former, due to their moral authority and political merits, deserve a higher social status and enjoy more educational privileges than the latter, who are considered to lack morality and focus solely on their own interests (Nuyen 2002). The fundamental differences between Confucian junzi and xiaoren are rooted in the opposition between yi (righteousness) and li (interest). The junzi demonstrate benevolence by exercising self-restraint and propriety (keji fuli), whereas the xiaoren care only for their own profits (Kim 2012a). In a criticism of Confucian people-oriented thought (minben), Liu (2009b: 56) argued that ordinary people are regarded only as instruments by Confucian ruling elites, who ‘always praise the ethical character of rulers highly on the one hand while depreciating the moral level of the ordinary people dismissively on the other hand’. In other words, Confucianism serves to endow the civilized ruling elites with the moral power to manage and control the uncivilized ordinary people (Liu 2009c: 34). The Confucian meritocracy therefore legitimizes social inequalities, contradicting the idea that citizenship seeks to promote social equality (Nuyen 2002). The Confucian notion of li (ritual or propriety) serves as primary mechanism for justifying social inequalities. Li defines ‘the correct, stylized behaviour which was attached to social roles’ and forestalls ‘the idiosyncrasies of individual expression’; it is through li that society is ordered ‘into a hierarchy of superior and subordinate roles’ (Young 1998: 138–39). According to Xie and Jiang (1993), the rules for sagehood proposed by Confucianism served as the standard rules to which ordinary people should conform, including the five constant virtues of ren (benevolence), yi (righteousness), li (ritual or propriety), zhi (wisdom), and xin (trustworthiness). Furthermore, there exists an intrinsic paradox in Confucian family ethics (Liu 2004b, 2005a, 2007). On the one hand, Confucian family ethics emphasize familybased moral codes and regard these codes as the basis for broader public relations. On the other hand, family-based morality is normally private and seen as possibly

28  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections damaging to public interests. Liu (2004a, 2004b, 2005b) summarized Confucian familial ethics as a private value system based on the principles of filial piety and fraternal duty. Scholars applied the Confucian familial ethics to defend the mutual harbouring of father and son (fuzi huyin) in The Analects of Confucius, which, from a modern perspective, is deemed to corrupt the course of justice, violate the law, and dismantle the basic rules of social equality and public morality (Liu 2002, 2004c, 2009a). The Confucian familial ethics may also hinder the growth of liberal civil 2 ­ Fukuyama (1995: 27–28) pointed out that the weakness of civil society society. in China ‘is due not to a statist ideology, but rather to the strong familism that is basic to Chinese culture, and the consequent reluctance of the Chinese to trust people outside of their kinship groups’. Given that Confucian teachings aim to cultivate superior persons whose moral authority is respected and accepted by ordinary people, this meritocratic system stands in opposition to ‘the notion of gongmin shehui, a “citizens’ society”, in which each citizen has an equal right to participate in the polity’ (Madsen 2008: 13). Moreover, scholars have indicated that Confucian virtues play a crucial role in adjusting social relations in an acquaintance society but fail to serve a similar role in a modern society composed of strangers and based on the universal values of equality, voluntariness, and prior consent (Liao 2008; Xiao 2013). Therefore, a Confucian society internalizing the familial ethics is a hierarchical society based on moral authority and differs from the Western concept of civil society, which emphasizes individual rights and social equality (Kim 2012b; Nuyen 2002). In a Confucian society, morality is the backbone of social relations (Hu 2006; Ren 2004; Yu 2001), and a codified legal system serves merely as a fallback apparatus (Chan 1999). Democratic regime versus authoritarian regime

The third and final part of the incompatibility interpretation is the opposition between democratic and authoritarian regimes. Given that thin citizenship relies on liberal democracy, Confucianism, regarded as an authoritarian system of values, is therefore at odds with thin citizenship and hinders the development of political rights and civic participation. Confucianism has been seen as incompatible with democracy since Huntington proposed his ‘clash of civilizations’ thesis. In Huntington’s view (1991), the socalled Confucian democracy is an oxymoron because ‘traditional Confucianism was either undemocratic or antidemocratic’ and ‘emphasized the group over the individual, authority over liberty, and responsibilities over rights’ (p. 24). Chan (2007) called attention to the distinction between the constituents in a democracy and the conditions that make a democracy function satisfactorily, arguing that conditions such as consultation, tolerance, civility, and a participatory community ‘are still far from being able to show that Confucianism endorses democracy as a political system’ (p. 182). In this interpretation, Confucianism works to sustain authoritarian regimes. As Liu (2013) stated, the crux of Confucian democratic ideology, ‘the whole world as one community’ (tianxia weigong), was denied by the dominant patriarchy in

Confucianism and citizenship: a review  29 the pre-Qin period. Additionally, the people-centred doctrine of Confucianism is insufficient to support a modern democratic institution because it merely clarifies that a government is ‘for the people’ but ignores whether such a government is ‘of the people’ or ‘by the people’ (Li 1999: 170). Mencius was never a democrat (Tiwald 2008), as he did not challenge the existing social distinctions between the aristocratic class and lay people. Neither did he question the moral legitimacy of the monarchical system (Kim 2012b). The purpose of the Confucian authoritarian regime was to maintain the monarch as the provider of governance and the people as governed objects (Xiao 1998). Consequently, the people-centred doctrine of Confucianism affirms an authoritarian, hierarchical regime in which rulers are responsible for people’s livelihoods, just as parents look after their children, and people are indebted to their rulers and subordinate themselves to their governance (Liu 2009b). In summary, two assumptions underlie the incompatibility interpretation of Confucian democracy. First, Confucianism is assumed to be inherently inclined to endorse authoritarian politics (Kim 2009a). Second, democracy is presumed to be a procedural system based on values associated with liberal citizenship (Huntington 1996). A society governed by authoritarian Confucianism, which stresses obedience to social hierarchy, would therefore find it challenging to produce democratic norms or stimulate political participation (Spina et al. 2011). To institutionalize democracy in a Confucian society, authoritarian Confucianism should be curtailed, and public civic virtues should be aligned with the ethics of the family (Fukuyama 1995). The compatibility interpretation The Asian Values thesis (Dalton and Ong 2005; Englehart 2000; Fukuyama 1995; Wang 2008) and the clash of civilizations thesis (Huntington 1991, 1996) hold Confucianism as incompatible with liberal citizenship. However, scholarship has also illustrated an opposing interpretation of Confucianism that accommodates liberal values and aligns with the concept of thin citizenship. According to the compatibility interpretation, Confucianism can align with ideas such as citizenship rights, social equality, and the rule of law, all of which originated in the West and have become universal values (Tu and Huang 2005). Moreover, as Berger (1986) stated, Confucianism has ‘a highly developed sense of practicality or pragmatism, an active rather than contemplative orientation to life, great interest in material things […] and, last but not least, a great capacity for delayed gratification and discipline’ (p. 163), all of which can be adapted to promote modern democracy. In general, liberal Confucianism and thin citizenship are compatible across three aspects: citizenship rights, individualism and equality, and democracy and constitutionalism. Citizenship rights

As Twiss (1998) clarified, the term quanli (right or entitlement) does not explicitly appear in Confucian classics. However, there are many examples of civic practices

30  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections in Confucianism. To survive and develop in the modern age, Confucian societies must embrace modern values such as political participation, the rule of law, citizenship, and democracy, and take action to reduce attributes that may contribute to social oppression (Angle 2012). For example, Xiong Shili reinterpreted li (ritual or propriety) as conducive to the growth of modern democracy and citizenship rights through its accommodation of values such as independence, freedom, and equality (Xiong 2007). Mou Zongsan argued that through self-negation, inner cultivation can complete exterior actions, moral subjects can transform into intellectual subjects, and moral individuals can become conscious of rights and rule obedience (Mou 1991). In brief, it is theoretically possible to connect Confucian values with various citizenship rights and modern human rights (Sim 2013). Civil and political rights are significant under Confucian liberal values (Kim 2015). Mencius was the first Confucian philosopher to discuss political liberty; he transvaluated realpolitik in terms of tyranny and held that political liberty was a moral weapon against it (Kim 2008b). He endorsed the view that people are more than helpless victims of bad governments and instead can serve as active political agents. All people, not just a small number of aristocrats, have the right to rebel or revolt against a despot (Kim 2015).3 However, for Mencius, the people possess and exercise the right to rebellion only, not the right to regicide, and a well-considered civil process should be used to avoid the use of violence (De Bary 1998b; Kim 2015). The right to free speech, through which people may complain, appeal, or protest under the reign of an inhumane ruler, is another political right supported by Mencius (Kim 2015). Under the compatibility interpretation, consciousness of civil and political rights is closely related to the people-centred doctrine of Confucianism. Although not synonymous with democracy, this doctrine may promote a regime in which citizens are politically and economically empowered (Murthy 2000). In addition to civil and political rights, educational rights are also vital in Confucian politics. In the Confucian view, providing education for all people without discrimination (youjiao wulei) is a necessary precondition for the selection of competent and virtuous officials. Historically, this meant that people of lower status had opportunities to participate in politics through the competitive imperial civil service examination (Guo and Chen 2009). Furthermore, Confucian scholars have argued that good nature is promoted through constant moral cultivation and that everyone is therefore entitled to education (Kim 2015; Sim 2013). Through the principle of yi (righteousness), Confucianism tends to restrict governmental power and support people’s social rights (Guo 2007). According to Confucian doctrines, a ruler is responsible for fulfilling people’s basic material needs and conditions for survival, which are necessary for the development of people’s social virtues. If these needs are not met, the people have the right to revolt against the ruler (Kim 2012b; Tiwald 2012). In other words, the idea that a ruler has a duty to guarantee people’s livelihoods means that people have an inalienable right to subsistence, which may serve as the foundation for the Confucian idea of citizenship rights (Kim 2015; Murthy 2000; Peerenboom 1993; Rosemont 2004; Tiwald 2012).

Confucianism and citizenship: a review  31 Confucianism may also contribute ideological value to the concept of human rights. Many Confucian scholars have indicated that Confucianism maintains a human rights perspective (Bell 1996; Du and Song 1995; Steffen 2012; Kim 2015), exemplified by its people-centred doctrine and emphasis on benevolence, love, and virtue, attributes that embody the spirit of humanitarianism and harmony (Chai 2008; Xia 1997). One typical debate4 has involved a judicial case in The Analects of Confucius regarding the practice of father and son’s mutual harbouring. Some Confucian scholars have defended this practice, arguing that it respects and protects human rights (Guo 2005), because legal principles should be based on actual human feelings and relationships, and because the law should function to maintain and protect human rights, privacy, and social coherence (Guo 2007). In this vein, Kim (2015) indicated that Confucianism could therefore define the aforementioned civil, political, educational, and subsistence rights as human rights. Additionally, women’s rights are crucial to the alignment of Confucianism with human rights. In contrast with the incompatibility interpretation, which posits that Confucianism is male-dominated and impairs women’s rights (Tu 1985; Xu 1995), the compatibility interpretation suggests that liberal Confucian values can play a meaningful role in empowering women in modern society and that Confucianism and feminism can find areas for adaptation and alignment (Li 1994). Notably, by striving to perfect oneself under Confucianism, women and men enjoy an equal right to moral cultivation towards becoming sages (Kim 2014, 2015). Moreover, women as mothers were entitled to elder rights (zunzhang quan) under laws dealing with land and properties in Ming and Qing dynasties (A-Feng 2000). Individualism and equality

The second key aspects of the compatibility between liberal Confucianism and thin citizenship are individualism and social equality. Moral individualism, implicit in self-cultivation, serves as the core principle of universal humanism and basis of the achievement of social equality. Liberal Confucianism also embraces the differentiation of private and public relationships and recognizes the extension of personal ethics to public morality. Moral individualism and self-cultivation

In contrast to an authoritarian understanding of Confucianism, a liberal understanding of Confucianism internalizes a spirit of moral individualism. As De Bary (1983) noted, Confucian moral individualism, understood as personalism, implies that individuals have the potential to sustainably develop themselves through ethical practices and moral interactions (pp. 23–25). At its core, Confucian individualism regards humans as an end in itself rather than an instrument and prioritizes individuals’ moral values (He 2001). According to Nuyen (2005), Confucian philosophy is ‘geared towards separate identifiable individuals, thus presupposing individuality. It does see the self as an individual, or an entity distinct from others

32  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections in the society’ (p. 171). Xu (2005) indicated that based on the theory of original goodness, pre-Qin Confucianism does not deprive the individual of dignity and free will. Individuals do not have to succumb to political authority, can autonomously decide their words and deeds, and are responsible for their own moral behaviours and social obligations. In this sense, Confucian individualism can be interpreted as a ‘spiritual humanism’ that encompasses humans’ intrinsic values, improves people’s capability to deal with extrinsic public affairs (Tu 2014), and cultivates moral personality and public spirit (Guo and Chen 2009). Through Confucian moral optimism, Confucian individualism emphasizes the practice of self-cultivation (jiaohua), which holds that everyone, from elites to ordinary people, is capable of self-transformability and self-perfection that enable an individual to become a sage (Kim 2012b). ‘Self-transformability’ refers to Confucian intellectuals’ ability to use practical reasoning to confront the world of realpolitik and transform it from inside (Tu 1993), implying that it is a moral practice to fulfil political liberty outside (Kim 2008b). By reading Confucian classics and practising rituals, Confucian individuals develop themselves into moral subjects (Wang 2016). Confucian self-cultivation in a modern context necessitates individualistic values (Kim 2010b) as well as civic awareness of political participation (Tu 2011) and is conducive to constructing a modern civil society (Fukuyama 1995; Kim 2010b). Equality and private–public relationships

As discussed in relation to the incompatibility interpretation, Confucianism has often been blamed for endorsing meritocracy at the expense of social equality. However, under the compatibility interpretation, Confucianism regards all people, commoners or elites, as equal in nature and morality (Bloom 1998; Nuyen 2002). Confucianism argues that everyone, regardless of his or her current status, has the moral potential to achieve sagehood through self-cultivation (Angle 2012; Kim 2015; Schwartz 1985). Confucian equality is aligned with the ideology of universal humanism, as universal moral equality and human dignity form the moral foundation for the idea of human rights in Confucianism (Kim 2015). Nonetheless, there exists an internal contradiction: particular family-based reason and hierarchical love versus universal benevolent reason and equal love. For example, as Kim (2008a) indicated, ren (benevolence) ‘is often explained on two different accounts: on the one hand, filiality, a uniquely Confucian social-relational virtue; on the other hand, commiseration innate in human nature’ (p. 279). Influenced by the binary opposition between particularism and universalism, Confucian thought implies a division of private and public spheres, which echoes the differentiation between private love, ‘inside the door’, and public righteousness, ‘outside the door’ (Guo 2005; Guo and Xiao 2014). The debate surrounding the legality of the mutual harbouring of father and son implies a recognition that the private sphere differs from the public sphere and supports a resistance of state interference in private concerns (Guo 2007). However, Confucianism does not sever the interconnection between particular family-based

Confucianism and citizenship: a review  33 reason and universal benevolent reason, which reflects a combination of private and public morals. According to Kim (2012b), in the Confucian universalist ethics ‘that fus[e] politics/civics and ethics/morals and def[y] the stark distinction between private and public’, public civic virtues are ‘thought to be a natural extension from one’s personal morality, namely one’s relationship with the Dao’ (p. 593). Accordingly, private morality is viewed as a starting point for education on public morality (Guo and Chen 2009). In brief, liberal Confucianism emphasizes the protection of civic privacy and encourages public participation—factors that are conducive to achieving social equality. Democracy and constitutionalism

Democracy and constitutionalism are the third key aspects of the compatibility interpretation of Confucianism and citizenship. In this interpretation, Confucian democracy is possible, and Confucianism is compatible with democratic citizenship. Confucian constitutionalism is also theoretically valid, as Confucian thought is believed to align with constitutional ideas. Since Samuel Huntington (1996) stated that ‘Confucian democracy’ is an oxymoron, many Confucian scholars have attempted to challenge this statement ‘by forcefully demonstrating the compatibility of Confucian and democratic values’ and by drawing attention ‘to the construction of Confucian democracy as a culturally relevant and politically viable normative vision and practice in East Asia’ (Kim 2012b: 579; original italic). According to Spina et al. (2011), the compatibility interpretation assumes that democracy is substantive and Confucian traditions are liberal, both of which align with the democratic concepts of the accountability of elites, equality of citizens, formation of civic groups, and dissent. According to Murthy (2000: 46), ‘the hope for Confucian democracy lies in synthesizing the resources in Confucian philosophy, such as concern for the welfare of the people, with a more egalitarian conception of the masses and participation’. The core of Confucian democracy is a democratic conception of citizenship that regards civic virtue, participatory culture, and robust civil society as constitutive conditions and operative powers (Kim 2012b). The correlation between economic development and political democratization under modernization theory was empirically verified by Lipset (1959), who concluded that ‘economic development is not only the requisite of democracy, it could well bring about democracy’ (Nuyen 2000: 144). Further evidence was provided by Berger (1986: 161; original italics), who found ‘weak support for the thesis that successful capitalist development generates pressures toward democracy’, and by Fukuyama (1995: 21), who indicated that modernization theory ‘is more valid today than it was when it was first enunciated’. In the same vein, Wang (2007) found that economic development and the resulting social changes have been pushing people in Confucian societies to become more pro-equality, more tolerant of different ideas and styles, more politically active, more assertive in demanding individual and political rights, and more emphatic in their preference for a democratic government. Given that material wellbeing is a precondition for democracy,

34  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections Confucian values that stress that a government should meet people’s basic needs (Murthy 2000) are thereby consistent with capitalist development (Nuyen 1999) and do not necessarily oppose democracy (Dalton and Ong 2005; Nuyen 2000). In addition, scholars have argued that Confucianism can align with constitutionalism, a term that refers to norms that restrain and legitimately enable the political power of the state or the ruler (Kim 2011a). Scholars such as Du (2008) have argued that traditional Confucianism has a strong constitutional consciousness, exemplified by the value placed on unifying states, differentiating good and evil, and enacting laws. Confucian constitutionalism uses a unique lexicon (Kim 2011a) that contains concepts such as dezhi (rule of virtue) and minben (peopleoriented) government, which imply restrictions on despotic regimes (Liu and Liu 2014). Recent years have witnessed continuous efforts by some Confucian scholars to develop Confucian constitutionalism. Du (2008), a representative Confucian constitutionalist in contemporary mainland China, coined the term ‘Confucian benevolent constitutionalism’ to encompass five Confucian constitutional principles: benevolent constitutionalism, righteous constitutionalism, ritual constitutionalism, intellectual constitutionalism, and fiduciary constitutionalism. Kang (2011), another representative Confucian social scientist, proposed to legitimize the Chinese government through its inheritance of Confucian orthodoxy and integration of modern democratic politics. Furthermore, Kim (2011a) re-examined Mencius’ and Xunzi’s political theories to reconstruct dezhi (rule of virtue) constitutionalism and lizhi (rule of ritual) constitutionalism. Yao (2013b) further detailed three theoretical implications of Confucian constitutionalism: principally, a Confucian political system is constitutional; historically, Confucian scholars devoted themselves to establishing constitutional institutions; and feasibly, Confucian constitutionalism is a practical pattern. These arguments directly relate to the shaping of Confucian citizenship in present-day China. As Ren (2013) pointed out, the open, rational, and public conversations advocated by Confucian constitutionalism depend on the formation of a civic personality with Confucian characteristics. The reconstruction interpretation In the incompatibility and compatibility interpretations, citizenship is assumed to be thin and either incompatible with an illiberal Confucian value system or compatible with a liberal Confucian value system. Scholarship, however, has outlined a third model, which views citizenship as a thick concept that shares multiple elements with Confucianism, and which proposes that Confucianism and thick citizen should be reconstructed in modern China. The convergence of Confucianism and thick citizen emphasizes that rights correspond to responsibilities, that individuals and communities are interdependent (Kim 2011b; Nuyen 2000, 2002), and that the Confucian self is embedded in social relations and is defined by the doctrines of benevolence, righteousness, ritual, humanitarian spirit, and responsible ethics (H. Lin 2011; Nuyen 2002). This section reviews the literature regarding how thick citizen and Confucian traditions interact with each other. In general,

Confucianism and citizenship: a review  35 the reconstructed thick Confucian citizen is illustrated by two concepts: ‘junzi (virtuous person) citizen’ and ‘tianxia (all-under-heaven) citizenship’. Junzi citizen

I coin the term ‘junzi citizen’ to demonstrate how thick citizen can be combined with Confucianism to create a new civic subject. In Confucian thought, junzi refers to a virtuous or superior person who cultivates and practises Confucian virtues such as benevolence, ritual, righteousness, loyalty, and a sense of harmony. When viewed through the lens of thick citizen, the junzi citizen may hold a modern consciousness of civic rights and obligations. I describe the concept of the junzi citizen as follows: first, the junzi citizen internalizes an ethical self; and second, the junzi citizen is an active citizen who both has social duties and is motivated to participate in public life. Ethical self

Unlike liberalism, which prioritizes citizenship rights over responsibilities, and communitarianism, which emphasizes community interests over individual rights, a Confucian junzi citizen is embedded in multiple social relations (Ching 1998), where ‘rights, duties and responsibilities are not defined in terms of the individual, but in terms of the relationship between the individual and his or her community’ (Nuyen 2002: 132). In this sense, a junzi citizen has an ethical self that demonstrates how ‘particular kind[s] of obligations and entitlements by which we live var[y] largely according to the social roles that one plays’ (Tiwald 2012: 245). The social network of a junzi citizen can therefore be viewed as a continuum extending outwards from the individual to the family, the society, the nation, and ultimately the world or tianxia (Nuyen 2002). The outward expansion of the ethical self is based on the Confucian core values of ren (benevolence) and li (ritual or propriety). Ren, often seen as a moral property of communities (Mcleod 2012), encompasses both emotion (ren as love) and moral virtue (ren as filiality) (Kim 2012c). Due to the very nature of the Confucian ethical self, Kim (2010a: 476) argued that Confucian self-cultivation ‘involves a double transformation of individuality and relationality, [and] engenders a responsible moral person that is at once filial and civil’. Confucian civility, generated by Confucian filial and fraternal responsibility, is what Kim argued to be ‘relational strangership’ (ibid: 489). This concept may be understood as the addition of a further, more impersonal relation to the traditional five relations (wulun), ‘that [is] between citizen and citizen in a shared public sphere and under a common rule of law’ (Dallmayr 2003: 207). Li, the core of private virtue and public civility, is a critical element that connects the self, the family, and civil/public relations (Kim 2009b). The Confucian li serves as ‘a bridging social capital that helps to bond individual citizens horizontally, thereby bringing them to one common public world where they encounter one another as free and equal citizens’ (Kim 2012b: 593–94; original italic). In this

36  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections sense, the Confucian ethical self is a social one, in which ‘the tensions between self and society dissolve, but through the practice of ritual propriety, they are “aesthetically” intertwined’ (Kim 2011b: 115). Confucian active citizens

A Confucian thick citizen is an active citizen. First, in this conceptualization, Confucian junzi citizens are active persons with strong moral agency and public spirit. As Kim (2011c: 25) argued, they internalize the virtue of Confucian incivility, presented ‘as both deferentially remonstrative and respectfully corrective (in the familial relations) and uncompromising and even intractable (in the political relations)’ (Kim 2011c). This virtue of incivility shapes Confucian citizens as assertive and socially critical rather than complacent and docile. Through the concept of incivility, Confucian citizens reject the traditional conservativeness of Confucianism or transform it into a viable political vision of civil Confucianism that supports citizens in expressing their discontent towards the existing social and political order (Kim 2011c). Confucian incivility is key in connecting individual agency with citizenship (Kim 2010a) and empowering Confucian citizens to achieve an active form of citizenship where ‘citizens are governors: selfgovernors, communal governors, [and] masters of their own fates’ (Barber 2003: xxix). Confucian junzi citizens are also members of communities with a strong sense of obligation and responsibility for communal interests and welfare. They work to maximize voluntary cooperation, as opposed to the state’s tendency to appropriate community organizations for its own authoritarian purpose (De Bary 1998a). As Kim (2008c) argued, Confucian citizens embrace transcendental collectivism, which is associated with familial bonds and love and emphasizes citizen-empowerment, thus promoting Confucian civic political practices. In summary, the thick citizen as defined by Confucianism produces active citizens who embrace the virtue of incivility and legally express discontent, demonstrate a strong sense of citizenship rights, and take responsibility for their communities. Tianxia citizenship

The second key concept under the reconstruction interpretation of Confucianism and thick citizenship is tianxia citizenship, a novel type of Confucian citizenship that refers to one’s membership in an imagined world community. This membership is formulated by expanding the ethical self to the family, the state, and finally, the tianxia (Nuyen 2002). Tianxia citizenship encompasses four interrelated gradational levels: local citizenship, national citizenship, global citizenship, and cosmopolitan citizenship. First, the local level of tianxia citizenship refers to one’s membership in and sense of belonging to a local political community. Second, in the context of a modern nation-state, Confucianism-originating familial sentiments are appropriated to construct concepts of Chinese national citizenship and civic culture (Kim 2007). Tianxia citizenship then extends to the global level, because

Confucianism and citizenship: a review  37 Confucian values such as ren (benevolence) and yi (righteousness) are widely shared by people around the world, regardless of ethnicity or nationality (Nuyen 2002). Finally, cosmopolitan Confucian citizenship indicates the harmonious ­coexistence of tian (heaven), di (earth), and ren (human), which stands in opposition to an anthropocentric conquest of nature (Tu and Huang 2005). Additionally, tianxia citizenship is closely related to the previously discussed Confucian tradition of constitutionalism. In Confucian political thought, tian represents not merely a natural or physical being but a symbol of constitutional spirit. Yao (2013a) defended the idea of a constitutional tiandao (way of heaven), arguing that this particular concept establishes and maintains imperial China’s political system in a Confucian manner, that the heavenly principles can function effectively to restrict the political power, that the name tian is frequently applied to renew the national spirit throughout Chinese dynasties, and that constitutional tiandao sustains and reinvigorates the governance capabilities of Confucian intellectual officials. Moreover, Nuyen (2000) indicated that the name tianming (mandate of heaven) implies that people have the right to choose their ruler. Under the idea of tianming, the Confucian junzi citizen consolidates their identity with the concept of tianxia citizenship through persistent and active moral cultivation, beginning by moralizing oneself as an extension to the family or clan, then the local community, then the state, until a self-governing order under heaven is established (Yao 2013c). The Confucian junzi citizen must therefore learn the civic ethics of mutual obligation and public participation and commit to establishing a connection between private and public affairs (Lee 2007). Summary This chapter reviews a wide range of opposing conceptualizations of Confucianism and citizenship and proposes a framework for comparison to clarify the nuances and complexities of these varying conceptualizations. Through classifying citizenship into thin and thick forms and Confucianism into liberal and illiberal forms, I establish three interpretations of the scholarly discussions of Confucianism and citizenship. First, the incompatibility interpretation assumes citizenship to be thin and Confucianism to be illiberal. This interpretation argues that obligation-oriented, hierarchical, and authoritarian Confucianism directly opposes rights-oriented, equal, and democratic citizenship. Second, the compatibility interpretation views citizenship as thin and Confucianism as a liberal school of thought. It argues that the values of citizenship rights, individualism and equality, and democracy and constitutionalism are compatible with a liberal version of Confucianism. Lastly, the reconstruction interpretation accommodates the concept of thick citizen and both liberal and illiberal Confucianism, suggesting that these combinations can generate novel types of Confucian citizenship, exemplified by the concepts of ‘junzi citizen’ and ‘tianxia citizenship’. The next chapter continues to explore the varieties and complexities of the reconstructed Confucian citizen. It shifts the focus from the relationship between Confucianism and citizenship to the comparison of two concrete subjects—junzi,

38  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections the idealized figure of Confucian personhood, and citizen, the subject of modern politics. Notes 1 The term ‘citizen’ in modern China has various translations, which reflect the complex implications of the application of this particular term in different historical and cultural contexts. According to Goldman and Perry (2002), Chinese terms for citizen include guomin (national people), which implies a primary commitment to national concerns; gongmin (public people), which emphasizes public spirit and civil rights; and shimin (people of the municipality), which stresses urban rights and responsibilities. An additional term related to the local understanding of citizen in modern China is renmin (people), which highlights class conflicts. Readers may also refer to Culp (2007), Guo (2014), Harris (2002), Nuyen (2002), and Yu (2002) for further discussions of the translation of ‘citizen(ship)’ in Chinese. 2 The concept of civil society varies depending on the cultural and social contexts (see Kang et al 2010). However, ‘civil society’ here refers to the concept under Western liberal democracy, which is closely related to the idea of democratic citizenship in Western cultural tradition (Xiao 2010). 3 However, Angle and Svensson held the opposite opinion, arguing that Mencius never endows people with the right of rebellion or revolution (see Tiwald 2012). 4 This debate was triggered by Liu’s paper (2002), in which he argued that under a modern rule of law, the case in The Analects of Confucius wherein a son harbours the illegal acts of his father constitutes moral corruption. This argument incurred fierce criticism, particularly from Confucian philosophers (Guo 2002, 2005; Yang 2004).

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2

Civic politics and moral cultivation Comparing Confucian junzi with modern citizens

Comparing junzi (virtuous persons) with modern citizens involves more than comparing a specific pair of subjects. To directly compare junzi and modern citizens—that is, Chinese Confucian political culture, with the junzi as the main subject, and Western democratic political culture, with the citizen as the primary subject—is one of the most challenging issues in modern Chinese thought. On the one hand, the junzi, as the embodiment of the idealized moral personality and the subject of governance in ancient China, reflects Confucian intellectuals’ quest for the holy king (shengwang) and benevolent government (renzheng). On the other hand, the citizen has been the active subject in Western political life since ancient Greek times. Moreover, the concept of citizen gained new vitality during the modern Enlightenment based on the theoretical foundation of peoples’ innate human rights and sovereignty. The key questions addressed in this chapter are—Is it possible to compare junzi and modern citizens? If so, what approaches should be taken to compare them? Cross-cultural comparative studies must confront the problem of cultural boundaries; that is, the existence of cultural boundaries is based on the relativity of words or concepts that are rooted in distinct politico-cultural backgrounds. Conceptual relativity poses direct challenges for cross-cultural comparisons. However, I argue that the comparison between junzi and modern citizens is not only feasible but also meaningful. Following its introduction into the Chinese politico-cultural context, the term ‘citizen’ has experienced a constant process of integration with traditional Chinese cultural understanding and conceptual clusters, which facilitates a practical comparative analysis. Citizenship has traditionally been regarded as a Western concept that originated in the ancient Greek polis and has gained its modern implications in the autonomous medieval cities in the West (Wang 2007; Weber 1981). In contrast, scholars agree that ancient China did not have a version of the Western concept of citizenship, which was imported into China by Chinese intellectuals in the early 20th century (Guo 2016). Nevertheless, as soon as the Western concept of citizenship was introduced to China, Chinese intellectuals combined it with traditional Chinese political, social, cultural, and ideological resources, which endowed it with Chinese connotations and thus distinguished it from its Western counterparts. Confucianism plays a crucial role among these traditional Chinese cultural DOI: 10.4324/9781003343455-4

48  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections resources, as Robert Culp (2007) explicitly pointed out; that is, modern Chinese citizenship is imbued with the influence of Confucian thought in terms of national identity, political participation, citizenship rights, and social membership. I argue that it is precisely these characteristics that provide potential approaches to the comparison of Chinese and Western concepts of citizenship. Another illustration of the conceptual indigenization of citizenship is shown in Liang Qichao’s translation of ‘citizen’ as guomin (national people) rather than gongmin (public people, which is the commonly accepted translation of citizen in China today) in his New People’s Sayings (Xinmin shuo). Liang’s translation was meant to highlight the relevance of the individual citizen in state building and national rejuvenation. In particular, guomin emphasized the significance of cultural elites in the construction of a powerful nation–state, which referred to Chinese intellectuals’ persistent desire to extend ‘sageliness within’ (neisheng) to ‘kingliness without’ (waiwang). The debate around the localization of citizenship in the Chinese context has continued after the economic reform and opening-up in post-Mao China. Over the past 20 years, scholars have examined the fitness and interaction of the concept of citizenship with the structure of Chinese society and have reconfigured the idea of citizenship based on Chinese cultural resources (e.g., Guo 2014; Guo and Guo 2015; Woodman and Guo 2017; Wang 2022). One of the central issues is the relationship between citizenship and Confucianism. How to adapt and transform the Western concept of citizenship into one suitable for the Chinese context? Can Confucianism contribute to the subject as a citizen with Chinese characteristics? If so, how? In the preceding Chapter 1, I systematically compared Confucianism and citizenship by reviewing the complex and diverse conceptualizations. In this chapter, I continue to develop the relevant discussions by focusing on the comparison of two specific subjects: Confucian junzi and modern citizens. Challenging two popular arguments for the relationship between Confucian junzi and modern citizens Considering the relationship between Confucian junzi and modern citizens, two popular arguments deserve attention as the starting point of this discussion. The first argument treats junzi and citizens as contrasting concepts, which I call a dualist approach. According to Zhonghua Guo, there are five characteristics of the traditional image of junzi in Confucian culture (Yao et al. 2015): namely, ren (benevolence) as the foundation, common people (xiaoren) as the contrast, the heaven-human as the boundary, accumulation of knowledge and wisdom as the approach, and the pursuit of sagacity. However, the traditional image of the citizen in Western liberal democracy is in direct contrast to the five junzi dimensions (Yao et al. 2015): namely, legal principles as the foundation, slavery as the contrast, the state as the boundary, striving for rights and fulfilment of responsibilities as the approach, and the pursuit of freedom. In the following passage, Guo (see Yao et al. 2015: 51) explains the differences between junzi and citizens: The junzi’s emphasis on ren (benevolence) and the citizen’s focus on legal principles imply the distinctions between ethics-based and jurisprudence-based

Civic politics and moral cultivation: comparing junzi and citizens  49 standards, between inner pursuit and outer pursuit. The junzi’s contrast to the common people (xiaoren) and the citizen’s contrast to the slave imply the differences in emphasizing ethical virtues or political status, with the common people being of poor virtue and the slave being of low political status. The junzi tends to think according to the heaven-human-based boundary, which implies the civilizational differential mode of association, centred on the Central Plains and extending to the whole land under heaven. However, the citizen tends to think in terms of the state-based boundary, which implies the equal status of all nation-states. The junzi achieves the sage realm through persistent hard work of learning, whereas the citizen achieves the freedom realm through fighting for rights and undertaking the corresponding responsibilities. I agree with Guo’s explicit description of the fundamental differences between junzi and citizens, which reminds us to consider these differences when comparing them. However, can we infer that junzi and citizens are opposing concepts and thus incompatible? Guo’s elaboration does not seem to clearly answer this question. Nevertheless, I would like to suggest that while we must acknowledge the basic differences between junzi and citizens, they can still be compatible. I will elaborate on this point in the following sections. The second argument regards junzi and citizens as identical subjects, which I call an equivalence approach. According to Zhongqiu Yao, junzi in ancient China were the citizens, or even better than Western citizens, because they were the ideal group for constructing political order and governing society (Yao et al. 2015). Yao (2014) asserts that ancient China had already established a polycentric, multilevel system of public life and social governance. Ancient Chinese were not all subjects (chenmin) because there was always a group of citizens who were junzi (Yao et al. 2015). These junzi were active citizens with high moral cultivation who participated in public life, governed society, and reshaped the societal order at different levels of the public sphere (Yao 2014), which implicitly affirmed the political meritocracy. That is, Yao (2012a; 2012b) regards junzi as meritorious elites who deserved to wield political power and govern the state and society because of their moral integrity and administrative leadership. From my perspective, the uniqueness of the above discussion of junzi is that it goes beyond the realm of morality and ethics by no longer considering junzi as merely a moral subject, but emphasizes their agency in socio-political governance in ancient China. I acknowledge this shift and elaborate the Confucian political subject further in later sections. However, I disagree with Yao’s tendency to oversimplify the conceptualization of citizens. For example, he separates citizens from the related category of the state, redefining them instead as individuals who actively participate in public affairs (Yao 2014).1 Yao then uses this revised definition of citizens to investigate public practices in ancient China and discovers numerous consistencies. Based on these findings, Yao concludes that the junzi already existed in ancient China as a group of citizens who participated in public affairs. However, his argument is circular and reduces the modern concept of citizens with multiple characteristics, such as identity, rights and responsibilities, virtue, participation, and membership in a political community, to a new term with only a single

50  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections characteristic, that is, public participation. Therefore, Yao equates what he defines as ‘citizen’ with junzi.2 Furthermore, he argues for the need to reconstruct Chinese citizenship and public life based on the idiosyncrasies of historical Chinese experiences, in particular, the Confucian perspective, rather than Western theories (Yao 2014; Yao et al. 2015). In this case, I point out that this Chinese theory of citizens, as claimed by Yao, seems to be barely tenable. Yao’s redefinition of the citizen is a reductionist approach, and his treatment of the relationship between citizens and junzi is an equivalence approach. Yao overlooks the fundamental differences between junzi and citizens, as clarified by Guo in the earlier quote. In essence, junzi are embedded in ancient Chinese traditions of Confucianism and imperial autocracy. In contrast, the citizen is based on Western liberal democratic and republican politics. Clarifying the difference between the two is crucial to the comparison of junzi with citizens. In summary, I have presented two popular arguments about the relationship between junzi and citizens. One argument over-emphasizes the difference between the two, which leads to a dualistic approach. While the dualistic approach reminds us of the obvious fundamental differences between the two subjects, it does not show whether or how they are compatible. The other argument reduces the multiple characteristics of modern citizens into a single dimension and thus equates it with junzi. This reductionist approach obscures the differences between citizens and junzi. In addition, it ignores the historical contexts in which the two concepts developed. Therefore, this chapter attempts to address how these differing subjects of citizens (originating from Western politico-cultural traditions) and junzi (originating from Confucian Chinese politico-cultural traditions) are compatible. In the following sections, I first give an overview of the conceptualizations of Confucian junzi and modern citizens, then propose a framework for comparative analysis, and conclude with a summary of the main points. Conceptualizations of junzi and citizens What is junzi?

To understand the conceptualization of junzi, I first examine the meanings of the two Chinese characters that constitute the term: jun and zi. In this regard, Li (2010) provides an insightful analysis below: The original meaning of jun refers to the ruler who gives orders, for example, the king of a country (guojun) and the ruler of a family (jiajun). Zi was an honorific term for a man in ancient times. Its original meaning is ‘first born’, and […] later, it refers to the offspring in general, including sons, daughters, and grandchildren. Jun and zi are combined to constitute the concept junzi, which initially refers to the descendants of the ruler. Junzi was an honorific title in the pre-Qin period, meaning a member of the noble class who lived in the upper class of society. At that time, junzi was the common term for the reigning members of the ruling class, highlighting their status.

Civic politics and moral cultivation: comparing junzi and citizens  51 In a far-reaching conceptual adaptation of the term junzi, Confucius crucially redefined junzi from a merely political subject based on ruling power and patriarchal relations to a subject with high social status and moral cultivation. First, junzi referred to individuals with high social status and a strong capability for governing states. Unlike earlier aristocratic junzi, who had a natural monopoly on ruling power by virtue of their birth, Confucius’ junzi became a governing subject in the state and society who could achieve upward social mobility and wield political power through the persistent study of classics and ritual practices to enhance moral cultivation. In particular, private education for the general public was essential to train individuals to govern the country and realize their political ideals. For this reason, Confucius opened private schools and recruited a wide range of disciples to educate them on statecraft and improve their moral character. His The Analects includes much discussion on this idea. For example, in one conversation with his students, Confucius stressed that those who serve as officials should set an example by doing their duty faithfully and upholding propriety and righteousness. He said, When a ruler loves ritual propriety, then none among his people will dare to be disrespectful. When a ruler loves rightness, then none among his people will dare not to obey. When a ruler loves trustworthiness, then none of his people will dare to not be honest.3 Another aspect of Confucius’ redefinition of junzi is the salience of moral cultivation. In Confucius’ view, it is not enough for the junzi to grasp statecraft; they should also have the moral quality to cultivate themselves to match their virtue with their position. Therefore, Confucius emphasized that ‘One who rules through the power of Virtue is analogous to the Pole Star: it simply remains in its place and receives the homage of the myriad lesser stars’.4 In addition, Confucius highly praised a state minister for displaying the four virtues of junzi: [I]n the way he conducted himself, he displayed reverence; in the way he served his superiors, he displayed respect; in the way he cared for the common people, he displayed benevolence; and in the way he employed the people, he displayed rightness.5 Therefore, Confucius’ fundamental adaptation of the concept of junzi is that he does not regard junzi as incumbents who enjoy high privileges and an authoritarian status in power; rather, junzi may also be individuals who do not hold official positions but have high moral integrity and cultivation. In this sense, Confucius’ reconceptualization of junzi represents a true evolution from a political subject of governance into a moral and ethical subject. This conceptual shift has had a profound impact on the meaning and image of the junzi in later Chinese generations. That is, an individual’s ability to become junzi does not depend on whether or not they hold political power or ruling authority but on their virtuous merit and moral personality. Confucius greatly emphasized the cultivation of moral character and aimed to enable his students to develop an upright personality by acquiring

52  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections virtues such as ren (benevolence), yi (righteousness), li (propriety), zhi (wisdom), and xin (trustworthiness). I argue that this emphasis is crucial to understanding the implications of junzi throughout this chapter. ­ There are numerous references in The Analects to junzi as moral subjects. For example, Confucius did not begrudge his praise of his most favoured disciple, Yan Hui, who held no public office: What a worthy man was Yan Hui! Living in a narrow alley, subsisting on a basket of grain and gourd full of water—other people could not have born such hardship, yet it never spoiled Hui’s joy. What a worthy man was Hui!6 On another occasion, Confucius commented on Yan Hui’s moral practice, ‘Alas! I watched his advance, and never once saw him stop.’7 Additionally, Confucius also used moral cultivation as the primary criterion for comparing the contrasting concepts of junzi (gentleman) and xiaoren (petty person). For example, Confucius said, ‘The gentleman understands rightness, whereas the petty person understands profit’8; ‘The Virtue of a gentleman is like the wind, and the Virtue of a petty person is like the grass—when the wind moves over the grass, the grass is sure to bend’9; ‘The gentleman harmonizes, and does not merely agree. The petty person agrees, but he does not harmonize’10; ‘The gentleman understands higher things, whereas the petty person understands only the low’11; and ‘The gentleman seeks it in himself; the petty person seeks it in others’.12 In summary, the concept of junzi evolved from a generic title for the nobility to describe rulers of the state and governors of society with matching virtues (which is junzi’s first attribute). In this conceptual transformation, junzi were increasingly given a moral, virtuous dimension (which is junzi’s second attribute). Junzi eventually became ideal embodiments of moral personality. Throughout Chinese history, the second attribute has been gradually strengthened to become the predominant connotation for the subject of junzi (Li 2010). In Confucianism, therefore, political attributes were progressively stripped away from junzi to accentuate their moral characteristics. However, some recent discussions of Confucian junzi have begun to refocus on their political nature and present them as governing subjects for socio-political governance (Ren 2013; Wu et al. 2015; Yao 2011, 2012b, 2013a, 2013b, 2014; Yao et al. 2015). I will discuss this point later in this chapter. Who are the citizens?

In contrast to the junzi as moral and ethical subjects, citizens are usually regarded as politico-legal subjects in the Western political tradition. In the modern political history of the West, citizenship has its origins in the late medieval cities (Wang 2007; Weber 1981) and refers to the membership of a particular political community, where individuals with citizenship (i.e., citizens) have a certain social status and the right to participate equally in public affairs (Bellamy 2008). In view of this, traditional citizenship refers to politico-legal citizenship, which reflects the political status and legal qualifications of individual citizens in relation to their

Civic politics and moral cultivation: comparing junzi and citizens  53 political community. Guo (2016) defined citizenship as ‘the formal membership of an individual in a political community and the consequent and associated rights, obligations, emotions, and behaviours’ (p. 3). Citizenship has three interrelated elements—membership, rights, and participation, which lay the foundation for civic equality politics (Bellamy 2008: 12–16). The first element of membership refers to individuals’ eligibility for and identification with a political community and is concerned with the question of ‘who are the citizens?’ In Western politics, groups such as women, people of colour and ethnic minorities were initially excluded from the citizenship regime and did not enjoy the right to be recognized by the mainstream political culture. Following the expansion of affirmative actions, these groups have gradually won politico-legal recognition and developed identities within their political communities. The history of modern Western politics can be described as a process of expanding the citizenship regime to include those previously excluded. The essence of citizenship is exclusion and inclusion; that is, the fundamental issue of citizenship is whether some individuals or groups within a particular political community have a legal membership and corresponding citizenship rights (Guo 2016). The second element, rights, is normally associated with membership and refers to the legally granted or recognized entitlements of individuals or groups who have a legitimate qualification as members of a political community. Rights are commonly considered the fundamental criterion for defining citizenship. According to T. H. Marshall (1963: 74), three types of citizenship rights exist in Western politics: (1) civil rights, such as personal freedom, freedom of expression, religious freedom, property rights, and judicial rights; (2) political rights, such as the right to vote and to be elected; and (3) social rights, such as the right to economic welfare and security. Marshall (1963) argued that these three categories of rights were fought for in chronological order in the 18th, 19th, and 20th centuries, respectively, as a result of modern nation-building, the industrial revolution, the commercial boom, and the shaping of national identity in the West. Participation is the third core element of citizenship, concerning citizens’ involvement in their political community’s political, economic, and social affairs. This element provides a dynamic and practical perspective to understand citizenship, which no longer restricts citizens to a static framework comprising membership and rights. Civic participation refers to the actions and practices taken by citizens in political affairs within the public sphere in accordance with their relevant rights and entitlements recognized by law. Thus, civic participation should be distinguished from citizens’ activities within the private sphere. In addition to these three elements mentioned above, some scholars have also included obligation, virtue, and identity as citizenship elements (Guo 2016: 59). Citizenship is a multidimensional and multifaceted concept; therefore, we should not look at only one dimension without considering the others. The numerous elements of citizenship are closely related; hence, any discussion of one element would inevitably involve the other elements. For example, membership can only be substantiated when translated into and actualized by specific rights and participation in public affairs. Therefore, citizenship rights should be associated with

54  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections the membership of individuals or groups, thus being understood as the recognized rights of members belonging to a particular political community. Civic participation can also be understood as the right to practice citizenship, which implies that it must be authorized by law and that the actors must be individuals or groups entitled to citizenship. All in all, the interrelated elements of citizenship constitute modern Western politics, which is grounded in democratic political institutions and a political form of civic equality. In summary, the concept of citizens refers to political subjects that enjoy equal politico-legal status and rights within a political community. This concept differs from the concept of junzi, which are primarily moral subjects with ethical attributes. In the first half of this section, however, I showed that junzi have political characteristics in addition to their moral ones. What is the relationship between the political attributes of junzi (i.e., as governing subjects of the state and society) and the political characteristics of citizens (i.e., as entitled members of a political community with the right to participate in public affairs)? In addition, as I will argue later, citizens also have moral attributes. In this case, what is the relationship between citizens with ethical virtues and junzi as moral subjects? Are these two subjects compatible? If so, how? These issues are explored in the next section. Rethinking junzi and citizens: a comparative analysis framework Politico-legal and moral–ethical dimensions

My investigation in the previous section has contributed a core set of dimensions that lay the foundation for further comparative analyses of junzi and citizens, specifically their politico-legal and moral–ethical dimensions. In general, citizens are politico-legal subjects, whereas junzi are moral–ethical subjects. However, does this mean that citizens are purely politico-legal subjects and not moral–ethical subjects? Or are junzi solely moral–ethical subjects and not politico-legal subjects? The above analysis shows that junzi once referred primarily to political subjects but slowly transformed into moral subjects after Confucius redefined the term. However, some Confucian scholars have recently begun to refocus on the political characteristics of junzi by emphasizing its role as a political subject in state administration and social governance. Despite the difficulty in separating the political and moral attributes of junzi, the discussions presented here suggest that a thorough understanding of junzi could be achieved by combining the two dimensions. Is an analogous situation also present for the concept of citizen? That is, apart from being a politico-legal subject, does the citizen also have moral characteristics? Guo offers a clear affirmative answer to this question. In his monograph on citizenship, he not only considers virtue as one element of citizenship but also ‘the most important glue of modern society’ (Guo 2016: 28–29). He notes that while liberal citizenship tends not to discuss civic virtue, republicanism, which is another essential tradition shaping Western citizenship, places civic virtue at the core of citizenship. Republicanism emphasizes the significance of creating friendship, harmony, and fraternal love among citizens; values citizens’

Civic politics and moral cultivation: comparing junzi and citizens  55 collective spirit, patriotism, and the ethics of responsibility and duty to the political communities they belong to; encourages citizens to participate in public affairs actively; and advocates the development of civic virtues through education (ibid: 76–77). The discussion of civic virtue reminds us that there are also co-existing politico-legal and moral–ethical dimensions in the conceptualization of citizenship,13 where liberalism emphasizes the former dimension and republicanism emphasizes the latter. The conventional citizenship studies underestimate the issue of virtue because of the predominantly liberal pattern of citizenship. Consequently, the citizen has become a subject that appears to have nothing to do with virtue or morality. However, the opposite is true. That is, civic virtues are not only expressed in terms of national or political identities but also in terms of concrete virtues that individual citizens possess towards the state, such as public spirit, courage, responsibility, selflessness, active participation, and patriotism (Guo 2016: 56–57). In particular, citizenship studies in the West since the 1970s have begun to embrace a cultural perspective that includes cultural citizenship, following the revival of neo-republicanism (Vega 2010). In the emerging studies on cultural citizenship, the concept of citizenship has increasingly moved beyond a state-centric framework to emphasize civic subjectivity, moral reflection, cultural practice, and cultural empowerment (Hensbroek 2010; Stevenson 2010).14 I will return to the topic of civic virtue later when discussing the distinction between thin and thick citizens. In summary, there are politico-legal and moral–ethical dimensions in both concepts of junzi and citizens. Although junzi are presented as being more in the moral–ethical dimension and citizens more in the politico-legal dimension, these two dimensions are by no means separate. Hence, I construct a comparative analysis framework for junzi and citizens (Figure 2.1), where I distinguish four types of junzi and citizens according to four categories, with ‘junzi’ and ‘citizens’ on the horizontal axis, and ‘politico-legal’ and ‘moral–ethical’ on the vertical axis. First, ‘citizens’ are combined with ‘politico-legal’ to constitute citizens as politico-legal subjects (see quadrant 1), which refers specifically to ‘thin citizens’; that is, liberal citizens who prioritize the politico-legal dimension over the moral–ethical dimension. Second, ‘citizens’ are combined with ‘moral–ethical’ to constitute citizens who integrate both politico-legal and moral–ethical attributes (see quadrant 4), which refers to ‘thick citizens’ who emphasize both political participation and ethical virtue, such as the republican or communitarian version of citizens. Third, ‘junzi’ are combined with ‘politico-legal’ to constitute junzi as governing subjects for state and social governance (see quadrant 2), which refers specifically to Confucian scholar-officials (shidafu) who actively participated in political, legal, and social affairs in ancient China. Finally, ‘junzi’ are combined with ‘moral–ethical’ to constitute junzi as moral subjects (see quadrant 3), which refers specifically to the Confucian ideal moral personality that has had the most profound influence on traditional Chinese culture. In the following sections, I will analyse and compare these four types of junzi and citizens in detail.

56  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections Politico–legal

Junzi as governing subjects

Junzi

Junzi as moral subjects

Thin citizens (political, non-moral citizens)

2

1

3

4

Citizens

Thick citizens (political, moral citizens)

Figure 2.1 Subjective Classifications of Junzi and Citizens From: The Routledge Handbook of Chinese Citizenship, Edition by Guo, Z., p. 293. Copyright (2021) by Imprint. Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Group.

Thin and thick citizens

In the first quadrant (Figure 2.1), thin citizens are the most far-reaching liberal citizenship pattern in modern Western politics. According to Tilly (1995), the term ‘thin citizen’ refers to a type of citizen whose primary focus is on defending one’s rights with minimal responsibility and who perceives the state as merely a legal device for protecting the rights of citizens. Thin, liberal citizenship is based on individualism and emphasizes the priority of individual rights over social responsibilities and obligations. It assumes that the private sphere is separated from and takes precedence over the public sphere, and that the public sphere exists only to guarantee individuals’ freedoms in the private sphere. This perception presupposes that citizens, who are rational and autonomous individuals, can be independent of the community and have the right to demand that the private sphere be free from interference from public power, and that their individual legal rights and interests have priority over the public good (Faulks 2000; Guo 2016; Nuyen 2002). In the fourth quadrant, the fundamental characteristic of thick citizens is to break away from the conventional liberal pattern of citizens (i.e., thin citizens) as purely political subjects unrelated to moral ethics in private life. By contrast, thick citizens instead seek to combine political participation with individualist morality

Civic politics and moral cultivation: comparing junzi and citizens  57 and public issues with personal responsibility, which deepens the conceptualization of citizenship and reconstructs a fresh version. Thick citizens tend to integrate private, individual, and moral dimensions with the public, communal, and political dimensions to reshape civic subjects in which individuals and society interact in an intertwined way (Clarke 1996: 121–25). The basic conditions for the rise of thick citizens lie in some currently substantial changes in Western states and societies, where the boundaries between public and private spheres are increasingly blurred, state polity and civil society are no longer distinctly dichotomous, and Western states are generally in flux (Clarke 1996: 4). Under these circumstances, the citizenship regime can no longer cling to the traditional liberal framework because the dichotomies between public and private and between state and society that are presupposed by the thin citizenship pattern have been subject to fundamental changes. As a result, a thicker conception of citizens has appeared, which rejects the separation between the public and private spheres and tends to regard these spheres as interrelated by asserting that citizens’ rights and responsibilities are mutually supportive rather than exclusive, and that citizens and their communities are interdependent rather than independent (Faulks 2000). Thick citizens combine civic autonomy with political participation, which affirms that autonomous actions by citizens contribute to the practice of civic virtue and enhance the public good (Clarke 1996: 2–3). The concept of thick citizens indicates that their individual moral reflections are not only private but also directed towards the interests of other people and the whole society. Therefore, the emerging pattern of thick citizens suggests that the confines of the public and private spheres can be broken by their focus on actions. That is, individual actions, whether occurring in private or public spheres, should not be considered ‘civic actions’ if they are oriented towards illegitimate personal interests. Otherwise, these actions should be considered public if they are oriented towards the interests of others and their community (ibid: 82). In summary, the term ‘thick citizen’ identifies politico-moral citizens who inherit some crucial attributes of liberal citizenship, such as individual rights and civic independence. Thick citizens also embrace the republican tradition of citizenship by affirming values such as civic virtue, public spirit, and social participation. Thick citizens differ from the concept of thin citizens by breaking away from the latter’s focus on solely politico-legal aspects, and instead, combine private moral reflections with public political actions. Thus, thick citizens contribute to constructing a new kind of subject by achieving some compatibility between the politico-legal and moral–ethical dimensions. It is important to note that the term ‘thick citizens’ should not be interpreted as anti-liberal, but rather as affirming the values of individual freedom, empowerment, and self-responsibility, with the aim of restoring these values to vitality (Clarke 1996: 1–2). Junzi as moral and governing subjects

I have already discussed the two classifications of junzi in the third section of this chapter and addressed the meanings of this typical Confucian term. Now, I will go further to elaborate on junzi as moral and governing subjects. According to Yu

58  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections Yingshi’s analysis (1987: 150–51), junzi in ancient China were either officials (li) or teachers (shi). As officials, the Confucian junzi governed authorities, and their primary duty was to maintain the politico-social order based on the rule of propriety (lizhi) by first enriching and then educating the people. As teachers, the Confucian junzi were practitioners of classical morals and ethics and bearers of cultural traditions, and their primary task was to create a cultural order where ‘[the rulers] guide them [the people] with Virtue, and keep them in line by means of ritual’,15 through constant moral self-cultivation, and by ‘using benevolence to appease others and righteousness to correct oneself’.16 Of these two identities, the Confucian junzi focused more on their role as teachers than as officials; that is, they prioritized the moral–cultural order over the politico-social order. The former order transcended but also included the latter order (Yu 1987: 145). Therefore, Confucian junzi prioritized sageliness within (neisheng) over kingliness without (waiwang) by seeing the former as a prerequisite for the latter and the latter as a necessary consequence of the former. Confucian junzi were both governing and moral subjects, but moral subjectivity took precedence. As moral subjects on the one hand, junzi considered themselves as upholding the Confucian cultural orthodoxy by educating the general public to constantly improve inner moral cultivation. As governing subjects on the other hand, junzi maintained the political orthodoxy of China, which required them to become good scholar-officials, join administrative organizations, and participate in the political affairs of the state. In particular, Confucian junzi’s political achievements served their aspiration to transmit orthodox Confucian teachings. However, junzi were often unable to gain access to state administrative positions; therefore, they could use their aspiration to political authority to fulfil their cultural and educational obligations. Consequently, politico-cultural orthodoxies often presented contradictory results in the case of the Confucian junzi (Yu 1987: 168). In response, junzi prioritized their moral–cultural mission and devoted themselves to education, thus continuing the Confucian orthodoxy (daotong). Coherence of junzi and citizens in the moral–ethical dimension The discussion of the classifications of junzi and citizens in the previous sections opens up a potential space for comparing the two subjects. The main argument in this section is that, when using the moral–ethical dimension as the comparison baseline, there are many commonalities between citizens and junzi. These similarities are mostly reflected in the compatibility of civic virtues with Confucian ethics. In terms of their historical evolution, civic and Confucian ethics have different origins and emerged from distinct politico-cultural conditions. In general, modern civic ethics have their roots in the rebellion against and transformation of Western medieval Christian theology based on the development of the capitalist economy, the rise of the bourgeoisie, and the formation of urban civil society. In contrast, Confucian ethics are typically regarded as a moral system based on a self-subsistence peasant economy and small communities of rural families or clans

Civic politics and moral cultivation: comparing junzi and citizens  59 (Qin 1998). Nevertheless, I maintain that the coherence of citizens and junzi at the moral–ethical level is valid due to the following two reasons. First, in terms of the concrete virtues exhibited by citizens and junzi, when strategically disregarding the historical and structural conditions under which they were generated, I argue that the two subjects share several common characteristics. For example, thick citizens’ emphasis on the intrinsic connections between private moral reflections and actions for the public good could be consistent with Confucian junzi’s self-development, which involves cultivating one’s moral character, rehabilitating the family, ruling the state, and ultimately pacifying the world. Furthermore, thick citizens cultivate both private civic virtues, such as courage, perseverance, boldness, and trust in other citizens, and public civic virtues, such as selflessness, collective spirit, love for the political community, and participation in public affairs (Guo 2016: 56–57). In the same vein, Confucian junzi attach great importance to the moral practice of self-cultivation. Confucian junzi are committed to developing private ethics at the individual level, such as the virtues of ren (benevolence), yi (righteousness), li (propriety), zhi (wisdom), xin (trust), yong (courage), shu (forgiveness), zhong (loyalty), xiao (filial piety), ti (fraternity), gong (respect), kuan (generosity), min (sensitivity), and hui (beneficence).17 Junzi also extend private virtues by actively participating in public affairs to develop public ethics at the societal level. According to Guo and Chen (2009), Confucianism is concerned with social public interests such as the care of elderly people, relief of the poor, and disaster management. Second, even if we consider the historical background, namely that modern civic ethics originated from Christian theology and Confucian ethics originated from traditional Chinese rural society, we cannot conclude that civic ethics are inconsistent with Confucian ethics. Here, I illustrate this point by comparing the core concept of modern civic ethics—compassion—with the cardinal virtue of Confucianism—ren. In his Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith shows that compassion is a feeling originating from human nature. Two kinds of virtues can be established based on compassion: the virtues of gentleness, courtesy, amiability, justice, humility, and forgiveness; and the virtues of nobility, dignity, respectability, self-restraint, and self-control (Smith 1997: 28). However, Smith’s elaboration of the ethics of compassion, while appearing to acknowledge the existence of God, denies that religious principles are the only expedient motive for human behaviour and instead emphasizes that the pursuit of self-interest predominates in human behaviour. Smith (1997: 254) considers that it is human nature to sympathize with oneself (i.e., self-interest and self-love) and others (i.e., altruism and love). However, sympathy for others plays a more fundamental role in human life because emotional concern for others guides other virtues and puts them into practice. Therefore, the ethic of compassion shows moral sentiment: the self-centred awareness to restrain selfish tendencies. Moreover, one can find a similar point in David Hume’s empiricism. Hume abandoned the traditional metaphysical view of rational truth and based his standards of judging right and wrong on human emotions, compassion, and

60  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections passions to replace his earlier individualistic theological metaphysics. Through his ethical emotivism, Hume illustrates a pathway to virtue ethics (Huang 2015). Correspondingly, compassion also occupies a central place in the Confucian virtues of junzi. In his seminal Confucian exposition on the ethic of compassion, Mencius argues that all people naturally have compassion and cannot bear to see the sufferings of others. He illustrates this point by giving an example: [E]ven now-a-days, if men suddenly see a child about to fall into a well, they will without exception experience a feeling of alarm and distress. They will feel so, not as a ground on which they may gain the favour of the child’s parents, nor as a ground on which they may seek the praise of their neighbours and friends, nor from a dislike to the reputation of having been unmoved by such a thing.18 In Mencius’ perspective, humans have a good nature. If humans act according to their nature, they can develop four moral tendencies: feelings of commiseration, shame and dislike, modesty and complaisance, and right and wrong. These correspond to the four cardinal virtues of ren (benevolence), yi (righteousness), li (propriety), and zhi (wisdom), respectively. Moreover, the ethic of compassion in Confucianism has multiple dimensions, which refer to both empirical moral emotions and norms, and the abstract nature of the mind or the universe. For example, in the Instructions for Practical Living (Chuanxilu) by Wang Yangming (1472–1529), a Neo-Confucian philosopher who lived during the Ming dynasty, one sees the explicit coexistence of these two dimensions in the idea of ren’ai (benevolent love), which is both a perceptible everyday experience and a reflection of the transcendent essence of the mind (Chen 2013). Further more, as a natural and genuine human emotion, ren’ai has two different but interconnected aspects—one is the differential pattern of love (chadeng zhiai), and the other is the oneness of benevolence (yiti zhiren). On the one hand, according to Yushun Huang (2017), a contemporary Chinese Confucian philosopher, the differential pattern of love leads to the problem of conflicting interests but can serve as the logical starting point of Confucian moral practice. That is, the extension of self to others (tuiji jiren) starts with the love of self (ziai). Thus, the benevolent one loves oneself, which benefits other people. On the other hand, the oneness of benevolence has the potential to resolve the conflicting interests caused by the differential pattern of love. Summarizing these two aspects, Huang (2017: 40) observes that to be concerned with ‘only the differential pattern of love would inevitably lead to Yang Zhu’s doctrine of selfishness; to concern only the oneness of benevolence would necessarily lead to Mozi’s doctrine of universal love. But neither of these is Confucianism’. The Confucian-inspired concept of ren’ai (benevolent love) has a considerable degree of consistency with the Western ethic of compassion. First, while Confucianism’s differential love is unlike Christian theology’s universal love, its affirmation of self-love is in line with Smith’s presupposition of self-interested human nature. The Confucian junzi’s development of self-love leads to their

Civic politics and moral cultivation: comparing junzi and citizens  61 self-disciplined character (Sun 2017) by always restraining their inappropriate desires and improper actions, sharpening their will, and nurturing their noble spirit. This accords with Smith’s ethic of self-control, which is a virtue through which individual citizens develop the qualities of fortitude, temperance, and prudence (Smith 1997: 233). Second, Confucian junzi aim to transcend themselves to achieve the realm of ‘all things as one as benevolence’ (wanwu yiti weiren) by seeking universal connections with other people and the universe. In the same vein, Hume argues that compassion constitutes benevolence in a broader sense and that the two virtues, that is, compassion and ren (benevolence), have a natural affinity that can be combined to form a general humane sentiment (Sun 2015). When comparing the Confucian junzi with thin and thick citizens, respectively, in terms of the moral–ethical axis, the congruence between them becomes more explicit. First, the consistency between Confucian junzi and thick citizens, according to the moral–ethical dimension, is reflected in the fact that neither recognizes the private and public spheres as distinct and separate, but rather sees them as interacting and interrelated. Confucianism always emphasizes the continuum between sageliness within (neisheng) and kingliness without (waiwang). According to the classical exposition in The Great Learning, which is a seminal classic work of Confucianism, moral cultivation in private, that is, gewu (investigation of things), zhizhi (extension of knowledge), chengyi (sincere thought), zhengxin (rectification of mind), xiushen (cultivation of person), and qijie (regulation of family), functions as the prerequisite and foundation for engaging in public affairs, that is, zhiguo (governing the state) and pingtianxia (ruling the world) (see Yu 2012: 259–60). By adhering to the basic idea of sageliness within and kingliness without, Confucian junzi pay particular attention to self-cultivation in their personal lives and regard it as an ethical guarantee for participating in public affairs to promote the Dao (Way). Therefore, the political actions of junzi are often motivated by their moral reflection and ethical awareness, which are somewhat private. Simultaneously, their political action is directed beyond self-interest to the benefits of the community, which is public in nature. In summary, Confucian junzi treat private virtues as the starting point for cultivating public virtues. Guo and Chen (2009) observe that ‘private virtues and family ethics are only the foundation for acquiring communal, professional, and national ethics’ (p. 63). Therefore, the personality of Confucian junzi should be understood as ‘a moral personality with a public character. […] Its basic concern lies in the public world’ (ibid). Second, there are also commonalities between Confucian junzi and thin citizens. The thin citizen greatly emphases values such as individuality, autonomy, and independence, which are compatible with Confucian junzi’s appreciation for freedom of will. For example, in his The Analects, Confucius says, ‘The three armies can have their general taken from them by force, but even a commoner cannot be deprived of his will in this fashion’.19 This precept shows the Confucian recognition of independent will and autonomous personality. Mencius also attaches importance to moral self-motivation: ‘All men may be Yaos and Shuns’20 and ‘What kind of man was Shun? What kind of man am I? He who exerts himself will also

62  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections become such as he was.’21 In his philosophy of mind, Wang Yangming advocates the principles of ‘extension of innate knowledge’ (zhi liangzhi), ‘mind as reason’ (xinjili), and ‘unity of knowledge and action’ (zhixing heyi), all of which significantly affirm and strengthen the freedom of the human will and moral initiative (Chen 2013). Therefore, Confucianism recommends that people should act according to the moral consciousness that exists in the mind (i.e., conscience) rather than rely on external forces. In this way, Confucian morality highly praises the freedom of the human will and personal independence. In terms of the moral–ethical dimension, scholars have contributed two accounts for the congruence between junzi and thin or thick citizens. The first account pertains to the thickening process, which involves the integration of politico-legal and moral–ethical aspects of citizenship. This point is discussed in earlier sections of this chapter and will not be reiterated here. The second account is associated with the complexity and diversity of Confucian moral and ethical thought. According to Minghui Li (2005), Confucian ethics are both immanent and transcendent, that is, they both affirm the independence of the personality and emphasize the connection between individuals and society—‘the individual is, on the one hand, immanent in society and, on the other hand, transcendent over society’ (p. 8). Drawing from the terminology of liberalism and communitarianism in Western political philosophy, Li (2005: 157) outlines the characteristics of Confucian ethics below: Traditional Confucianism is compatible with liberalism in terms of ethical foundations and view of the self and with communitarianism in terms of the relationship between the individual and the community and the attitude towards tradition. Liberalism focuses on the transcendence of the individual in relation to society and history, while communitarianism emphasizes that the formation of the self must be embedded in the social and historical context; both seem to contrast ‘transcendence’ with ‘immanence’. However, the Confucian idea of ‘immanent transcendence’ suggests a possible solution to the debate between liberalism and communitarianism. That is, perhaps the dispute between the two sides is a resolvable antinomy rather than a contradiction that cannot be reconciled. This argument echoes William Theodore de Bary’s notion of Confucian personalism, where Confucianism’s emphasis on individuality, personal independence, and freedom of will cannot be equated with Western individualism but rather with distinctive Confucian personalism. That is, the moral Confucian individual achieves self-development through constant ethical practices and moral interactions (De Bary 1983: 23–25). On the one hand, Confucianism considers that human beings derive their nature from their natural endowments, thus preserving their individuality and autonomy. On the other hand, Confucianism stresses that humans also have a social nature and must participate in socio–political life. Thus, Confucian personalism integrates individuals with their community, which differs from Western individualism or communitarianism but incorporates their characteristics (Zhang 1989: 33–34).

Civic politics and moral cultivation: comparing junzi and citizens  63 In summary, the main argument in this section is that Confucian junzi and citizens have much in common regarding the moral–ethical axis. Two specific points support this argument. First, the emergence of the thick citizen, which links the moral–ethical dimension with the politico-legal dimension, offers the possibility of combining junzi as moral subjects. Second, Confucian ethical thought shares similarities with Western liberalism and communitarianism, which results in consistencies between junzi and citizens. In this light, the view that junzi and citizens are dichotomous and incompatible is untenable. The incoherence of junzi and citizens in the politico-legal dimension When shifting the perspective from the moral–ethical axis to the politico-legal axis and comparing junzi as governing subjects with citizens (thin or thick), I argue that there are explicit differences between the two subjects. To this end, I focus on two relevant aspects—equality and inequality, and rights and power—to clarify these differences. Equality and inequality

As discussed earlier, the term ‘citizens’ in modern Western politics refers to individuals or a group of people who have a specific membership in a political community, enjoy certain inalienable rights or entitlements, and participate in politico-social affairs. It is important to note that the range of citizens includes most common people in the context of modern Western societies. While it is true that Western politics historically excluded women, people of colour, and ethnic minorities from the citizenship regime, the basic trend in modern citizenship development has shifted towards including these previously excluded groups by endowing them with equal citizenship rights and status and respecting their distinctive civic identities and cultures. The equal status of individuals within a political community is the fundamental implication of citizenship, whether for the liberal or republican versions. Guo (2016: 21) observes that the essence of citizenship lies in its persistent pursuit of civil, political, social, and cultural equalities, and that the developmental tendency of the modern world is to increase equalities among citizens by removing inequalities. Regarding the indicator of (in)equality, junzi present a contrasting image to that of citizens. The characteristics of Confucian junzi suggest two intertwined inequalities—moral and political inequalities.22 Confucianism embraces the meritocratic notion based on a moral hierarchy. That is, Confucianism distinguishes merited elites (i.e., junzi as governing subjects) from the common people according to their moral levels and administrative skills and places these groups in different positions within the system of state rule by endowing the elites with the political power to rule the common people (Wang 2015). This moral hierarchy legitimatizes the rule of the Confucian junzi. According to Kim (2012b), the core concept of Confucian meritocracy lies in the belief that the maximum degree of good governance can only be possible when a small number of people with moral authority and ethical

64  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections integrity have the power to govern. Therefore, the political subjectivity of junzi, as political subjects who wield power and authority to govern in ancient Chinese politics, was influenced by and associated with moral and ethical agency, which is consistent with the basic Confucian ideal of sageliness within and kingliness without. However, moral and political inequalities are entwined, placing junzi on a moral and political pedestal above the common people. When examined from the politico-legal perspective, Confucian junzi are the officials or gentry who were in the minority in ancient China, in contrast to the common people who were in the majority. As governing subjects, junzi were on an unequal political footing compared with the governed common people. From the perspective of civic politics, having ruling power and holding citizenship rights are not contradictory; thus, officials should also share equal status and entitlements. However, ancient China did not establish a civic politics. Therefore, officials held power imbued with Confucian moral teachings, practised Confucian ethical virtues, were restrained by society’s ethical norms, and did not have a similar sense of civic duty or equality to modern democracy.23 In this respect, ancient Chinese politics can be called ‘junzi politics’, compared with modern civic politics. The characteristics of junzi politics include the established hierarchical priority of the junzi as governing subjects and the emphasized ethical virtues based on the Confucian doctrines of the goodness of nature and benevolent government. In contrast, civic politics focuses on politico-legal status and the membership of individual citizens, their citizenship rights, and public participation. Rights and power

The second aspect to distinguish junzi as governing subjects from citizens as political subjects is that the former is a subject of power, whereas the latter is a subject of rights. The rights and entitlements of citizens are their main element, without which they would not be citizens. In Marshall’s liberal pattern, citizenship is almost equated with civil, political, and social rights, which shows the prominence of citizenship rights in becoming a citizen. The rights element is still a central dimension even in the republican concept of citizens, except that republicanism emphasizes citizens’ responsibilities and duties.24 According to Isin (2009), citizenship rights reflect the relationship between civic actors and the sites in which they are located, with different sites producing different actors who, in turn, fight for diverse citizenship rights. Citizens are thus political subjects who act according to specific rights that are either already stipulated in the constitution and the law and must be practiced routinely, or are overlooked by the current law; the latter concept indicates that citizens must act creatively to fight for their rights (ibid). Human rights flesh out the concept of the citizen. Thus, it is impossible to talk about citizens in isolation from their rights because of the difficulty of imagining citizens who do not require rights. Further more, democratic regimes that effectively protect the right to citizenship should also continually expand the list of rights. In contemporary Western

Civic politics and moral cultivation: comparing junzi and citizens  65 societies, for example, along with the advent of globalization and post-industrialization, the emergence of mass migration has highlighted the urgency of citizenship for minority groups. Concomitantly, the conventional civil society based on fixed entitlements to social welfare is no longer adequate to accommodate the changing reality. Consequently, the ‘right to non-discrimination’ and the ‘right to multicultural recognition’ have been put on the agenda of citizenship politics (Joppke 2007). Take contemporary China as another example. The wave of migrant workers into China since the 1980s has exposed the shortcomings of China’s old citizenship system. The question of how to recognize and protect the rights of these migrant workers has become a hot topic in the transformation of Chinese society. The list of citizenship rights has been extended dramatically in the contemporary world and China, leading to a refreshed, diversified landscape of citizenship. For example, new citizenship types include female citizenship with an emphasis on women’s rights, eco-citizenship with an emphasis on ecological rights, and digital citizenship with an emphasis on the right to use the Internet and digital technologies (Guo 2016: 26). In short, citizens are political subjects who enjoy equal politico-legal status, with citizenship rights as their substance. Notably, citizenship rights no longer remain only in the realm of ‘to have rights’ but increasingly are moving towards ‘the right to have rights’ (Isin 2009). Unlike the citizen as a subject of rights, the junzi as governing subjects are essentially subjects of power who focus on what kinds of people should wield power and how those in power should use it (Xu 2012). Historically, the junzi referred to the lowest group of nobilities in ancient times, that is, the shi (scholars), a group between senior officials and common people under the feudal system. Following the rapid increase in social mobility during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods, especially the decline of the upper aristocracy and the rise of the lower commoners, the junzi class (i.e., the shi) expanded dramatically, and a large number of learned and knowledgeable junzi who did not hold fixed official positions emerged (Yu 1987: 10–20). Nevertheless, by virtue of their scholarship and cultivation, junzi still had the opportunity to seek government posts and gain power to administer the state. From the Han dynasty onwards, the junzi gradually evolved into Confucian scholar-officials, who presented themselves as the inheritors of Confucian orthodoxy and claimed to have higher moral authority than the supreme monarch. Accordingly, they regarded it as their mission and responsibility to criticize the emperor and express their opinions on political affairs based on Confucian orthodoxy (Yu 1987: 107). The notions that Confucian scholar-officials (i.e., junzi as governing subjects of power) held themselves accountable to the Dao and that Confucian orthodoxy was superior to political power were further elaborated by some contemporary Confucian scholars, who argued that they laid the historical foundation for the Chinese constitutional tradition. From their perspective (Yao 2013b), Confucian scholar-officials gained access to power as interpreters of Confucian orthodoxy or successors of the Dao. Junzi were not the tools of the emperor; instead, the emperor was a vehicle for Confucian scholar-officials to realize their political ideals. Thus, a co-governance system constituted by Confucian scholar-officials

66  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections and the emperor was established, which lasted from the Han dynasty until the end of the Qing dynasty. In addition to participating in political affairs, Confucian scholar-officials, as subjects of power who ruled together with the emperor, also actively participated in public affairs at the societal level, promoting social self-governance and shaping the order of public life in imperial China. Yao (2014) argues that the public life order conceived by the Confucian junzi began with family life and its emphasis on the ethical norms of filial piety and fraternal duty, and then extended from the family to the clan, which Yao regarded as the most important institution for social governance in imperial China. The function of the clan was to enable people to participate in community-wide public affairs and also extended to other non-clan public organizations such as guilds and charities. Moreover, Confucian scholars formed local and national groups and communities by giving lectures across the country. Regarding the co-governance system composed of Confucian scholarofficials and imperial power in Chinese history, Yao (2011: 34) describes it as follows: The philosophical expression of the co-governance system [made up of Confucian scholar-officials and imperial power] is the primacy of Confucian orthodoxy over political power. In terms of the governance structure, such a system is manifested in at least the following three interrelated facets. First, thanks to the institutional arrangements based on the exclusive respect for Confucianism, a bunch of educated Confucian scholars were able to enter the government and secure official positions. […] These Confucian scholar-officials […] were not willing to merely serve as the instruments of imperial power. As a result, a subtle division emerged between the governing body constituted by the scholar-officials and the emperor’s power, […] leading to frequent disagreements and even violent conflicts between them. […] Secondly, with the cultural authority of Confucianism and the gained political power to manipulate resources, the Confucian scholar-officials also began to establish their moral and political authority at the societal level. […] Thirdly, after the middle of the Western Han Dynasty, a pattern of joint governance emerged featuring the combination of the rule of punishment and the rule of virtue. Nevertheless, it is undeniable that Confucian junzi, that is, scholar-officials, presented themselves as the inheritors of Confucian orthodoxy, wished to rule the state together with imperial power, and worked to maintain social stability. However, they did not have the civic subjectivity of rights or entitlements and only displayed the subjectivity of power. Thus, Chen (2016) argues that the ethics promoted by Confucianism belong to unilateral deontology and feature a one-sided emphasis on obligations, which prevents Confucianism from generating contractual ideas and developing the notion of citizenship rights. Further, Chen (2016) indicates that the lack of rights-based ethics constitutes a fundamental flaw in Confucian morality. In the absence of equal citizenship rights and status, the personal safety and security

Civic politics and moral cultivation: comparing junzi and citizens  67 of Confucian junzi could not be protected in their political struggles against the imperial power. Concomitantly, Xu (2012: 50) states that: The co-governance pattern involving the emperor and the scholar-officials was not a contractual model based on legal power, over which there should be a written or unwritten constitution, but a ritual-based pattern formed by Confucian ethics and the dynasty’s respect for heaven and ancestors. Under such a co-ruling system, the ruler and his ministers each kept their roles and did their duties and responsibilities. Whether or not the roles were adhered to or the duties were assumed depended on the personal virtues of the ruler and the ministers. In this sense, the co-governance pattern implemented a kind of soft ethical constraints rather than hard institutional controls. In his analysis of the relationship between the Dao and the power (shi) embodied by the scholar-officials in ancient China, Yu (1987: 126) proposes a similar point by arguing that the Dao, with which the scholar-officials identified themselves, did not possess any objective external form or institutional crystallization. Therefore, the burden of promoting the Dao fell entirely on individual scholar-officials or junzi. As a result, when the imperial power increased political pressure on the scholar-officials, they turned inward to seek sageliness within and relied on their personal moral cultivation to guarantee the truth of the Dao.25 In addition, Yao (2011) argues that the co-governance system was per se a system dominated by the imperial power, which internalized a deep-rooted tendency towards irrationality and degradation. Under such a system, while the involvement of Confucian scholar-officials could inject rational force into the governance structure, the general operation of political power largely and ultimately depended on the society’s trust in the emperor and his virtues. The emperor’s power was above the minister’s power, being more active and aggressive, and the minister’s power had no institutional entitled safeguards. Eventually, the power of the Confucian scholar-officials could barely balance against the emperor’s power (see Xu 2012). According to Mou Zongsan (1991), ancient Chinese politics had only the way of governance (zhidao), that is, the practice of how to achieve good governance, but not the way of government (zhengdao), that is, the objective institutional structure to implement good government.26 As the subject of power, therefore, Confucian junzi practised the way of governance in imperial China but contributed little to the way of government. Confucian virtues and ethics directly and profoundly influenced the junzi’s governing practice. However, in the absence of democratic institutions to safeguard the junzi’s status and rights, these personal virtues and ethics ultimately led them to an inward path of seeking sageliness within. That is, junzi devoted themselves to moral cultivation to ensure the continuation of the Dao, particularly when encountering tremendous external political oppression. The citizens’ situation is different. As an integral device of Western democracy, citizenship is an institution wherein every citizen enjoys equal rights, status, and membership. As with junzi, citizens have the right to criticize political power and take civic actions to participate in politico-social affairs. However, unlike junzi, citizens’ rights and

68  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections actions are protected by the constitutional democracy in which they are politically and legally equal to those in power. Junzi in ancient China were privileged subjects of power with higher politico-moral authority than the common people but lacked institutional protection of their rights and status. In summary, the above comparative analysis shows that citizens are political subjects who enjoy equal rights and status protected by the constitution and law. In contrast, junzi are governing subjects who occupy a higher position than the common people due to their politico-moral power but are on an unequal footing with both the emperor and the common people. This comparative analysis demonstrates the historical considerations of junzi as governing subjects under the imperial power in ancient China and citizens in modern democratic politics, leading to the main argument: when examined through the politico-legal dimension, junzi as subjects of power and citizens as subjects of rights are barely compatible. Based on this finding, I argue against the view that citizens existed in ancient China (Yao 2014; Yao et al. 2015); this view is flawed because it reduces the concept of citizens to a single dimension, that is, public participation, but ignores other equally essential elements, such as their rights, entitlements, and membership in a political community. As clarified earlier, citizens’ public participation is always associated with their rights and membership and is directed towards political equality. Hence, discussing public participation in isolation from other civic elements leads to sweeping generalizations—while some superficial similarities may be discerned, the substance of the comparison is not touched upon. This problematic view exaggerates the role of junzi as governing subjects in Chinese history in terms of curbing imperial power, governing society, and constructing the so-called Confucian constitutionalism.27 Also, this view does not pay sufficient attention to the inherent limitations of the co-governance system of Confucian scholar-officials and the emperor; rather, it idealizes junzi’s functions in politicosocial governance. Summary The subjects of junzi and citizens are compatible in some ways, but divergent in others. The key to distinguishing between junzi and citizens is to examine the dimensions used to compare them. The analytical approach proposed in this chapter attempts to identify these dimensions and integrate them into a comparative framework. In comparing junzi and citizens, I avoid the dualist approach, which treats them as distinct concepts, and the reductionist approach, which considers them to be equivalent. The comparative framework constructed in this chapter is based on the ‘politico-legal’ and ‘moral–ethical’ classification criteria. In this framework, junzi are divided into ‘junzi as governing subjects’ and ‘junzi as moral subjects’, and citizens are categorized into ‘thin’ and ‘thick’ citizens. This chapter draws two main arguments by describing and comparing each of these four categories. From the politico-legal perspective, junzi and citizens are presented as distinct subjects. As governing subjects, junzi are per se subjects of power based on the politico-moral hierarchy but do not have equal political status and citizenship

Civic politics and moral cultivation: comparing junzi and citizens  69 rights. However, citizens are subjects of rights or entitlements with equal politicolegal status. Given these descriptions, the two concepts of junzi and citizens are barely compatible. From the moral–ethical perspective, junzi and citizens are presented as two subjects that could be compatible. As moral subjects, junzi share several aspects of moral ethics with thin and thick citizens. In terms of virtues, junzi are consistent with citizens in many aspects, and moral ethics can be transformed into civic ethics in modern politics. However, I emphasize the intricate associations within each of the junzi and citizen categories. On the one hand, it is difficult to completely disassociate junzi as governing subjects from their moral and ethical attributes. As the Confucian quest for personal realization of sageliness within and kingliness without suggests, junzi’s political authority is inextricably linked to their moral authority. On the other hand, thin citizens, with their emphasis on rights and individual autonomy, are not entirely distinct from thick citizens, with their emphasis on duty and responsibility, participation, and virtue. For example, thick citizens are not anti-liberal and also stress the protection of individual citizens’ rights (Clarke 1996: 1–2). In addition, thin citizens clearly define their role as a passive liberal defender of rights and an active participant in society (Ren 2014). Therefore, contemporary China can expect to cultivate Confucian or junzi-style citizens, who combine the Confucian characteristics of junzi with modern civic ethics. In the next chapter, I discuss the potential pathways to integrating the attributes of junzi with those of citizens. Notes 1 A key trend in the contemporary citizenship studies literature is the increasing separation of citizenship from the constraints of the state (Isin 2012). However, this trend differs from Yao’s conceptual oversimplification. That is, although the concept of modern citizens tends to break away from the state, some core elements cannot be ignored, such as membership, identity, rights and responsibilities, and virtue. 2 Taihui Guo (see Yao et al. 2015) criticizes Yao’s redefinition of citizens because it reduces the Western conceptual and institutional tradition of citizenship to a republican form and underestimates the civic tradition in traditional Chinese culture. Guo also indicates that Yao intentionally or unintentionally filtered out some of the meanings of citizenship to semantically conform the concept towards the term of junzi. 3 The Analects, Book 13, Chapter 4, translation by Slingerland (2003: 140). 4 The Analects, Book 2, Chapter 1, translation by Slingerland (2003: 8). 5 The Analects, Book 5, Chapter 16, translation by Slingerland (2003: 46). 6 The Analects, Book 6, Chapter 11, translation by Slingerland (2003: 56). 7 The Analects, Book 9, Chapter 21, translation by Slingerland (2003: 94). 8 The Analects, Book 4, Chapter 16, translation by Slingerland (2003: 35). 9 The Analects, Book 12, Chapter 19, translation by Slingerland (2003: 134). 10 The Analects, Book 13, Chapter 23, translation by Slingerland (2003: 149). 11 The Analects, Book 14, Chapter 23, translation by Slingerland (2003: 164). 12 The Analects, Book 15, Chapter 21, translation by Slingerland (2003: 182). 13 Xiao (2010) distinguishes two types of citizenship: politico-legal citizenship, which is oriented towards rights and duties; and cultural–psychological citizenship, which is oriented towards cultural identities and the sense of belonging to a political community (e.g., the state).

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72  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections Kim, Sungmoon. 2012. “A Pluralist Reconstruction of Confucian Democracy.” Dao: A Journal of Comparative Philosophy 11 (3): 315–36. https://doi.org/10.1007/ s11712-012-9289-7. Legge, James. 1970. The Works of Mencius. New York: Dover Publications. Li, Honglei. 2010. “On Confucius’ ‘Junziology’ (Kongzi ‘Junzi Xue’ Fawei).” Chinanews (Zhongxinwang). 2010. https://www.chinanews.com.cn/cul/2010/10-25/2610983.shtml. Li, Minghui. 2005. Political Thought from the Perspective of Confucianism (Rujia Shiye Xiade Zhengzhi Sixiang). Beijing: Peking University Press. Marshall, Thomas Humphrey. 1963. Sociology at the Crossroads and Other Essays. London: Heinemann. Mou, Zongsan. 1991. The Way of Government and the Way of Governance (Zhengdao Yu Zhidao). Taipei: Student Bookstore. Nuyen, Anh Tuan. 2002. “Confucianism and the Idea of Citizenship.” Asian Philosophy: An International Journal of the Philosophical Traditions of the East 12 (2): 127–39. https:// doi.org/10.1080/0955236022000043865. Qin, Hui. 1998. “The Great Community and Traditional Chinese Society (Da Gongtongti Benwei Yu Chuantong Zhongguo Shehui).” Sociological Studies (Shehuixue Yanjiu), no. 5: 14–23. Ren, Feng. 2013. “Rujia Xianzheng de Chuantong Yu Zhanwang (Traditions and Expectations of Confucian Constitutionalism).” Tianfu Xinlun (Tian Fu New Idea), no. 4: 24–30. Ren, Jiantao. 2014. “On the Active Citizenship (Lun Jiji Gongmin).” Wuhan University Journal (Philosophy & Social Sciences) (Wuhan Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban)) 67 (1): 5–16. Slingerland, Edward. 2003. Confucius Analects. Journal of Chinese Philosophy. Vol. 32. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2005.00195_2.x. Smith, Adam. 1997. The Theory of Moral Sentiments (Daode Qingcaolun). Edited by Ziqiang Jiang, Beiyu Qin, Zhongdi Zhu, and Kaizhang Shen. Beijing: The Commercial Press. Stevenson, Nick. 2010. “Cultural Citizenship, Education and Democracy: Redefining the Good Society.” Citizenship Studies 14 (3): 275–91. Sun, Xiangchen. 2017. “Xiandai Geti Quanli Yu Rujia Chuantong Zhong de Geti (Individual Rights in Modern Time and ‘Individual’ in Confucian Tradition).” Wenshizhe (Journal of Literature, History and Philosophy), no. 3: 90–106. Sun, Xiaoling. 2015. “Sympathy and Moral Judgment—Hume’s Ethics by the Changing Concept of Sympathy (Tongqing Yu Daode Panduan—You Tongqing Gainian de Bianhua Kan Xiumo de Lunlixue).” World Philosophy (Shijie Zhexue), no. 4: 125–33. Tilly, Charles. 1995. “The Emergence of Citizenship in France and Elsewhere.” International Review of Social History 40 (suppl. 3): 223–36. Vega, Judith. 2010. “A Neorepublican Cultural Citizenship: Beyond Marxism and Liberalism.” Citizenship Studies 14 (3): 259–74. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621021003731781. Wang, Canglong. 2015. “Confucianism and Citizenship: A Review of Opposing Conceptualizations.” In Theorizing Chinese Citizenship, edited by Zhonghua Guo and Sujian Guo, 49–81. New York: Lexington Books. ———. 2022. “Right, Righteousness, and Act: Why Should Confucian Activists Be Regarded as Citizens in the Revival of Confucian Education in Contemporary China?” Citizenship Studies 26 (2): 146–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2022.2042674. Wang, Xiaozhang. 2007. “The Medieval Cities and the Origin of Modern Citizenship: The Heritage of Weber’s Sociological Study on City (Zhonggu Chengshi Yu Jindai

Civic politics and moral cultivation: comparing junzi and citizens  73 Gongminquan de Qiyuan: Weibo Chengshi Shehuixue de Yichan).” Sociological Studies (Shehuixue Yanjiu), no. 3: 99–120. Weber, Max. 1981. General Economic History. Edited by F. H. Knight. London: Transaction Publishers. Woodman, Sophia, and Zhonghua Guo. 2017. “Introduction: Practicing Citizenship in Contemporary China.” Citizenship Studies 21 (7): 737–54. https://doi.org/10.1080/136 21025.2017.1353740. Wu, Chongqing, Zhongqiu Yao, and Ning Wu. 2015. “Confucianism and the Reconstruction of Chinese Grassroots Society (Ruxue Yu Zhongguo Jiceng Shehui Chongjian).” Tianfu Xinlun (Tian Fu New Idea), no. 3: 152–60. Xiao, Bin. 2010. “Two Types of Citizenship and the Dualistic Structure of National Identity (Liangzhong Gongmin Shenfen Yu Guojia Rentong de Shuangyuan Jiegou).” Wuhan University Journal (Philosophy & Social Sciences) (Wuhan Daxue Xuebao (Zhexue Shehui Kexue Ban)) 63 (1): 76–83. Xu, Jilin. 2012. “The Reality and History of Confucian Constitutionalism (Rujia Xianzheng de Xianshi Yu Lishi).” Kaifang Shidai (Open Times), no. 1: 44–59. Yao, Zhongqiu. 2011. “Confucian Constitutionalism and Livelihoodism (Rujia Xianzheng Minsheng Zhuyi).” Kaifang Shidai (Open Times), no. 6: 26–41. ———. 2012a. Rediscovering Confucianism (Chongxin Faxian Rujia). Changsha: Hunan People’s Press. ———. 2012b. Virtue, Gentleman, and Custom (Meide, Junzi, Fengsu). Hangzhou: Zhejiang University Press. ———. 2013a. Outline of National History (Guoshi Gangmu). Haikou: Hainan Publishing Ltd. ———. 2013b. Rujia Xianzheng Zhuyi Chuantong (Tradition of Confucian Constitutionalism). Beijing: China University of Political Science and Law Press. ———. 2014. “Chongxin Sikao Gongmin Yu Gonggong Shenghuo: Jiyu Rujia Lichang He Zhongguo Lishi Jingyan (Citizenship and Public Life Revisited: Based on the Confucian Views and Chinese Historical Experience).” Shehui (Society), no. 3: 145–62. Yao, Zhongqiu, Zhonghua Guo, Taihui Guo, and Canglong Wang. 2015. “Junzi Yu Gongmin: Xunzhao Zhongguo Wenming Mailuo Zhongde Zhixu Zhuti (Junzi and Citizens: The Subjects in Chinese Civilization).” Tianfu Xinlun (Tianfu New Ideas), no. 6: 48–54. Yi, Lin. 2015. “Relations, Actions, and Ethics: The Cultural Turn in Contemporary Citizenship Studies (Guanxi, Xingdong Yu Lunli: Dangdai Gongmin Shenfen Yanjiu Zhongde Wenhua Zhuanxiang).” In Citizenship Studies: Volume 1 (Gongmin Shenfen Yanjiu: Diyijuan), edited by Bin Xiao and Zhonghua Guo, 98–123. Shanghai: Gezhi Press. Yu, Yingshi. 1987. Shi and Chinese Culture. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House. ———. 2012. Xiandai Ruxue de Huigu Yu Zhanwang (Review and Prospect of Modern Confucianism). Beijing: SDX Joint Publishing Company. Zhang, Dainian. 2005. Studies in Chinese Ethical Thought (Zhongguo Lunli Sixiang Yanjiu). Nanjing: Jiangsu Education Press. Zhang, Hao. 1989. Dim Consciousness and Democratic Tradition. Taipei: Taiwan Lianjing Publishing Company.

3

Towards the junzi-style citizen Moralizing citizens through Confucianism

Two pathways to combining junzi with citizens In Chapter 2, I developed an analytical framework to compare junzi and citizens, finding them to be a pair of subjects that are both congruent and divergent, as well as homogeneous and heterogeneous. This argument is based on a synthesis of politico-legal and moral–ethical dimensions. On the one hand, there is a distinction between citizens in the salience of politico-legal subjectivity (i.e., thin citizens) and citizens characterized by moral–ethical subjectivity (i.e., thick citizens). On the other hand, junzi who favour political power (i.e., junzi as governing subjects) and junzi who favour moral authority (i.e., junzi as moral subjects) can be differentiated. This subdivision breaks down the limitations of one-dimensional views of citizens and junzi and provides an opportunity to compare the nuances of the two subjects. As seen from the politico-legal dimension, junzi are subjects of power based on fixed politico-moral hierarchies, whereas citizens are subjects of rights with equal status. Thus, the two subjects are barely compatible. As seen from the moral–ethical dimension, however, junzi and citizens are presented as two concepts with a high degree of inherent compatibility, sharing numerous virtues and ethics. While the consistencies between junzi and citizens imply the potential to integrate their attributes, their heterogeneities remind us to distinguish certain aspects between them. This chapter explores a further question following the findings in Chapter 2: how can the combination of junzi and citizens be achieved? In this regard, I propose two theoretically possible pathways for the integration of junzi and citizens (see Figure 3.1) according to four classification indicators: ‘thin citizens’ and ‘thick citizens’, and ‘junzi as governing subjects’ and ‘junzi as moral subjects’, all of which are clarified in Chapter 2. By combining these four specific categories, I obtain two integration pathways. The first integration pathway involves making junzi characteristics the subjective underpinning, supplemented with civic properties. This is a path towards the ‘civicization of junzi’, aiming to transform the traditional Confucian junzi into modern junzi with a sense of rights and responsibilities, politico-legal equality, awareness of public participation, membership in a political community, and civic virtues. In other words, it aims to create a new type of subject: the civic junzi. DOI: 10.4324/9781003343455-5

Towards the junzi-style citizen  75 Cultivating civic junzi

Thin citizens Junzi as moral subjects

Junzi as governing subjects Thick citizens

Cultivating junzi-style citizens

Figure 3.1  Classifications of Civic Junzi and Junzi-style Citizens From: The Routledge Handbook of Chinese Citizenship, Edition by Guo, Z., p. 296. Copyright (2021) by Imprint. Reproduced by permission of Taylor & Francis Group.

Table 3.1  Classifications of Civic Junzi and Junzi-style Citizens Civic junzi

Junzi-style citizens

Thin citizens + Junzi as governing subjects Junzi as governing subjects + Thin citizens (A1) (A2) Thin citizens + Junzi as moral subjects (B1) Junzi as moral subjects + Thin citizens (B2) Thick citizens + Junzi as governing subjects Junzi as governing subjects + Thick citizens (C1) (C2) Thick citizens + Junzi as moral subjects (D1) Junzi as moral subjects + Thick citizens (D2) From: The author.

The second integration pathway involves making civic virtues the subjective underpinning, complemented with the Confucian qualities of junzi. This is a path towards the ‘junzi-zation of citizens’, which aims to transform individuals into a new type of citizen who internalizes the cardinal Confucian virtues of ren (benevolence), yi (righteousness), li (propriety), zhi (wisdom), and xin (trustworthiness); who pursues the integration of sageliness within and kingliness without; and who upholds the ideology of Confucian orthodoxy prevailing over political power. In other words, it aims to create a new type of subject, the junzi-style citizen. These two combination approaches result in eight specific types (see Table 3.1). As shown in Table 3.1, the first column includes four types of civic junzi based on Confucian junzi characteristics supplemented with civic attributes. I clarify them one by one below. 1 The combination of ‘thin citizens’ and ‘junzi as governing subjects’ creates the Confucian junzi, who emphasize citizenship rights and rule the state and society (type ‘A1’).

76  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections 2 The combination of ‘thin citizens’ and ‘junzi as moral subjects’ creates the Confucian junzi, who emphasize citizenship rights and cultivate morality according to Confucian doctrines (type ‘B1’). 3 The combination of ‘thick citizens’ and ‘junzi as governing subjects’ constitutes the Confucian junzi as rulers of the state and society, with an emphasis on the cultivation of civic virtues and ethics (type ‘C1’). 4 The combination of ‘thick citizens’ and ‘junzi as moral subjects’ forms the Confucian junzi who prioritize civic virtues and ethics through moral cultivation (type ‘D1’). The other column in Table 3.1 is a cluster combining the same four categories, which are interchanged to form ‘junzi-style citizens’ based on their civic characteristics, complemented with Confucian junzi attributes. The details of these four types are indicated below. 1 The combination of ‘junzi as governing subjects’ and ‘thin citizens’ creates citizens who hold power to govern the state and society, and who are concerned with citizenship rights (type ‘A2’). 2 The combination of ‘junzi as moral subjects’ and ‘thin citizens’ creates citizens who emphasize the ethical virtues of Confucianism and citizenship rights (type ‘B2’). 3 The combination of ‘junzi as governing subjects’ and ‘thick citizens’ creates citizens who rule the state and society, and who emphasize civic virtues through moral cultivation (type ‘C2’). 4 The combination of ‘junzi as moral subjects’ and ‘thick citizens’ creates citizens who focus on Confucian ethics and civic virtues (type ‘D2’). The purpose of the above somewhat cumbersome classifications is to emphasize that the key distinction between the two groups of eight types is whether citizens or junzi have primary or secondary status. Although types A1 and A2, B1 and B2, C1 and C2, and D1 and D2 share commonalities, the fundamental difference between these types is whether the subjects are citizens or junzi. More importantly, this differentiation implies two distinct ideologies. In this regard, Guo (2014) indicates: Given that the concept of citizen is based on Confucianism and is accompanied by individual rights, it is likely to emphasize the primacy of the group and community over personal interests, complemented by a particular form of citizenship rights. In Western terms, such a concept of citizen is more akin to a communitarian version of the citizen. However, one may conceptualize civic culture as the essence and Confucianism as the supplement. In this case, it would result in a version of the citizen in which the individual rights are paramount, accompanied by the ideas of communal goods, duties and obligations, and public virtues. Such a concept of citizen is closer to the modern liberal style. I feel that the Confucian citizen oscillates between these two

Towards the junzi-style citizen  77 civic traditions of communitarianism and liberalism, depending on which elements are prioritized. The above exposition is based on one-sided understandings of Confucian culture and civic culture, which tend to simplify Confucian culture as a collective or family-based cultural system and civic culture as a system based on atomized individuals, thus emphasizing the significant ontological differences between the two. However, as argued in Chapters 1 and 2, Confucianism is not only compatible with communitarianism but also has the potential to connect with liberalism (Li 2005). In addition, civic culture not only emphasizes individual rights and independence but also underlines individuals’ obligations to the community and the relevance and permeability of the private and public spheres (Clarke 1996; Guo 2016). Nonetheless, the illumination of the above passage is that it roughly maps out two pathways for integrating Confucianism with citizenship. That is, as I have outlined, the civicization of junzi and the junzi-zation of citizens. However, these two pathways and the associated eight categories in two groups are only idealized, theoretical conceptualizations. When viewed in the actual context of contemporary China, these categories should be adapted as appropriate. In general, the following sections show that compared with the civicization of junzi, which aims to cultivate the civic junzi, the junzi-zation of citizens, which aims to cultivate junzi-style citizens, seems to be more feasible according to China’s politico-social realities. Civicization of junzi towards civic junzi Civic junzi is not an ideal subject for contemporary China; however, its value cannot be denied. It is not the most ideal subject because this type of subject, while not denying civility, still refers to junzi. Neither ‘junzi as governing subjects’ (A1 and C1) nor ‘junzi as moral subjects’ (B1 and D1) are consistent with the fact that modern Chinese have generally become citizens. Moreover, since junzi do not accept the division between the public and private spheres as presupposed by the concept of thin citizens, nor do junzi ignore civic virtues and ethics as thin citizens do, one can thus eliminate A1 and B1 from the four categories of A1, B1, C1, and D1, leaving only C1 and D1. As for the C1 and D1 categories, one can further distinguish them through the following two aspects. First, junzi (i.e., Confucian scholar-officials), the main subjects of state power and governing authority in imperial China, have disintegrated in the modern era. However, the re-cultivation of this group still plays an imperative role in grassroots social governance. Second, junzi remain present as a symbol of noble character in Chinese cultural beliefs. These two aspects are why the ‘civic junzi’ has value in today’s China. Moreover, ‘junzi as governing subjects’ could be thickened (i.e., integrated with the attributes of thick citizens) to become the C1 type, whereas ‘junzi as moral subjects’ could be thickened to become the D1 type.

78  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections Furthermore, contemporary China is undergoing a vast social transformation featuring a compressed modernization (Yan 2010). That is, China is experiencing both first modernity (i.e., the modernity that originated in Western Europe more than 150 years ago, which extends to the present day) and second modernity (e.g., the process of individualization, risk proliferation, and globalization), which have coincided in the last three decades (Beck and Grande 2010). As a result, presentday China has emerged into a structural space that compresses and integrates premodernity, modernity, and late modernity under the same temporal system (Yan 2010). This process of compressed modernization suggests that some cultural, social, and political conditions that might help to cultivate the characteristics of junzi are still present in today’s China. These conditions play a substantial role in constructing Chinese people’s self, cultural, and national identities. For example, as the basic unit of grassroots governance in traditional society, the clan and its leader, the xiangxian (virtuous persons in a village), still occupy an influential position in contemporary Chinese rural society and continue to function in groundlevel democratic political activities. Therefore, cultivating a new xiangxian culture, promoting the construction of xiangxian organizations, and playing the xiangxian’s role in social governance and democratic supervision are compelling topics (Lv 2016). Confucian ethics may have a crucial function in shaping the order of Chinese people’s moral lives and nurturing their minds and spirituality. The conventional conceptualizations of junzi—whether as governing or moral subjects—imply political inequality and moral hierarchy, which should be treated cautiously regarding the process of cultivating the civic junzi. A distinction should be made between the two types of inequality: political inequality refers to the unequal politico-legal statuses of individuals, while moral inequality refers to their hierarchical levels of moral cultivation. For the newly constructed civic junzi, political inequality in terms of their statuses could be counterbalanced by the notion of civic equality. However, moral inequality is barely eliminated. Moreover, Confucianism affirms the moral idealism that all people may be Yaos and Shuns; therefore, the recognition of moral inequality is not necessarily negative but may help to promote individuals’ pursuit of lifelong moral improvement. In short, when introducing civic attributes to combine with junzi characteristics, the political inequality in the conceptualization of junzi should be removed, whereas the moral inequality could be retained as appropriate. Junzi-zation of citizens towards junzi-style citizens The cultivation of junzi-style citizens is more in line with contemporary China’s political, social, and cultural realities because China has established a citizenship regime wherein civil and politico-social rights are enshrined in the constitution and protected by law, and civic moral education is incorporated into the compulsory education system. Nowadays, China promotes the development of conceptual and institutional improvements in the rule of law and has created a core socialist value system that comprises democracy, civility, freedom, equality, and justice, among others. Contemporary Chinese people have indisputably become citizens both

Towards the junzi-style citizen  79 legally and politically. Their membership is recognized by the political community (i.e., the state). They enjoy citizenship rights protected by the Chinese constitution and are entitled to participate in politico-social affairs. From this perspective, it should be appropriate to regard modern Chinese people as citizens in priority, complemented by the moral perfection of junzi. We should therefore adopt the junzi-zation of citizens with the aim of cultivating junzi-style citizens. Having clarified this principle, one may further consider how to shape citizens with Chinese characteristics in line with China’s national conditions through the integration of traditional Chinese culture (in particular, Confucianism). Therefore, the four types of junzi-style citizens shown in Table 3.1 (i.e., A2, B2, C2, and D2) should be considered. The common factor between these four types is that the subjects are all citizens. However, ‘thin citizens’ (A2 and B2) and ‘thick citizens’ (C2 and D2) are differentiated. Considering that Confucian junzi do not accept the public–private binary structure presupposed by thin citizens, we may put aside A2 and B2 and focus only on C2 and D2. Specifically, the new type of thick citizens (C2) incorporates the Confucian characteristics of junzi as governing subjects and refers to those who wield power to govern the state or society (i.e., the subject of power). These citizens have equal citizenship status and enjoy the same citizenship rights as do the other non-rulers or non-governors (i.e., the common people). Hence, this new type of thick citizens are both the subjects of power and of rights. In this respect, junzi-style citizens fundamentally differ from Confucian scholar-officials, who were merely subjects of power. The other new type of thick citizens (D2) integrates the Confucian characteristics of junzi as moral subjects and refers to all citizens, not just those who hold power. In addition, citizens of this type possess Confucian junzi’s moral cultivation and ethical virtues and are equipped with the awareness of citizenship rights and responsibilities, the spirit of public participation, and the pursuit of civic ethics. Whether in public or private spheres, these citizens’ actions are associated closely with their personal moral attitudes. As represented by the C2 and D2 types, junzi-style citizens are worth pursuing in the civic cultivation of contemporary Chinese society, which is undergoing an enormous transformation process of individualization. This being said, a direct consequence of this transformation is the rise of the individual as the basic unit of discourse, action, and identity. According to Yan (2010), the individualization of Chinese society since the reform and opening-up has five characteristics: (1) the privatization of labour and economy; (2) state-sponsored institutionalization and de-embedding; (3) the awakening of rights awareness and the growth of rights movements; (4) the emergence of lifestyle politics; and (5) the self as the subjective area of individualization. Given these characteristics, the process of individualization has further nurtured Chinese people’s sense of citizenship rights and individual autonomy. Concurrent with this process, however, the subjective domain of Chinese citizens is experiencing a critical moral shift. In Yan’s (2011) perspective, the moral landscape of post-Mao China is shifting from a value system with an emphasis on collectivism, responsibility, and self-sacrifice to a system that focuses more on individualism, personal autonomy, citizenship rights, and

80  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections self-development. Furthermore, Yan (2011) shows that the significant contradiction between collectivistic and individualistic values has caused a perceived crisis in Chinese individuals’ moral lives. The subsequent political–moral dilemma confronting Chinese citizens focuses on how they can regain new civic virtues and live good lives during their moral transformation subject to the dynamics of individualization in Chinese society. In their search for solutions, some Chinese citizens have rediscovered the significance of Confucian ethics. For example, the educational movement of children reading the classics (ertong dujing jiaoyu yundong), which features the extensive memorization of Confucian classics, was initiated in the mid-1990s and has since been developed across the country (Billioud and Thoraval 2007, 2015; Wang 2018, 2022; Wang and Billioud 2022). Concurrently, newly established sishu (old-style private schools), where children study Confucianism, have sprung up nationwide (Dutournier and Wang 2018).1 These developments suggest that reading Confucian classics, educating children about junzi virtues, and practising proprieties and rituals in everyday life in the quest for peace of mind are gaining momentum in contemporary Chinese citizens addressing moral anxieties (Billioud 2021; Wang 2016; Zhao and Wang 2023). In summary, the process of individualization in Chinese society has led to a growing sense of civic consciousness among Chinese people. However, the ongoing moral shift has generated perceived ethical anxieties. To resolve these challenges, combining the Confucian junzi ethics with modern civic virtues and reconstructing public life and civic politics are significant issues in contemporary China. Therefore, I suggest a solution to create junzi-style citizens by taking civic characteristics (in particular, those of thick citizens) as the central basis, supplemented by Confucian politico-moral ethics. The introduction of Confucian junzi ethics does not necessarily contradict the individualistic values and politics of citizenship rights. Instead, the individual-oriented side of Confucianism (De Bary 1970; Wang 2022) may contribute to the development of this new type of citizen. Hence, civic education that incorporates Confucian ethics is essential in contemporary China. It is imperative to encourage the growth of Confucian education, either by supporting the autonomous operation of private Confucian classical schools according to the law or by integrating Confucianism studies into the statestipulated curriculum in compulsory schools. In this way, Confucian virtues can take root in learners’ shaping of civic consciousness (Xiong and Li 2015; Wang 2017). More importantly, Confucian education should be combined with citizenship education to educate learners about their citizenship rights and responsibilities, in addition to combining Confucian virtues with civic literacy and ethics and constructing a vibrant civic culture and citizenship politics in China. Conclusion and further reflections This chapter presents two ways to combine junzi and citizens: the civicization of junzi, which creates the civic junzi; and the junzi-zation of citizens, which creates

Towards the junzi-style citizen  81 junzi-style citizens. Of these two pathways, the junzi-zation of citizens seems to be more in line with the realities of present-day China; therefore, it is a more practical approach to integrating junzi and citizens than the civicization of junzi. In addition, contemporary China should continue to develop civic values and virtues, such as equality, contractual spirit, rights and entitlements, and public participation. China should also complement citizenship education with education about Confucian virtue ethics to construct a vibrant civic culture with Chinese characteristics. The junzi-zation of citizens is practical because its approach to addressing politics and ethics conforms to the basic structure of modern political ethics, which is primarily an institutionalized ethical construction that relies on public morality rather than individual virtue. In contrast, the classical view of political ethics is that they are merely personal virtues (Ren 2005). According to Confucian doctrines, the ethical role model of junzi as governing subjects was undeniably important for maintaining political life in imperial China. In Western societies, the primary trend of political ethics is that they have evolved from individual virtues to public morals. This evolution means that the modern political order and public life increasingly rely on public morality, where politicians and ordinary citizens must likewise abide by basic public morals (Ren 2005). However, this situation leads to a question about whether Chinese political ethics would follow the same evolutionary path as in the West. I would give an affirmative answer to this question. With the further implementation of the rule of law and improvement of the modern state’s governance practices, the role of public morality as a means of maintaining order in public life will become increasingly prominent. These developments can be understood as the continuation of China’s persistent pursuit of modernization since the early 20th century. They do not suggest that the personal virtues of the rulers and citizens would be invalidated completely. In contrast, I argue that Confucian virtues should not be underestimated in the modern development of civic politics and ethics in China. These Confucian virtues would have to become civicized by abandoning the politico-legal hierarchy implicit in the subjectification of junzi and replacing them with civic equality and rights. Nowadays, all citizens should follow basic political and ethical norms and have their rights inscribed in the constitution and protected by law. Therefore, the combination of civic and junzi virtues is of vital importance in improving the civic morality of modern Chinese people and cultivating their capability to become political subjects with public morality and personal virtue. This transformation is also essential for constructing democratic politics in China and enabling Chinese citizens’ civil, political, social, and cultural rights. Finally, I reflect on the power relationship between China and the West, which is implicit in Chinese studies when drawing on the comparative framework of junzi and citizens, as articulated in this chapter and Chapter 2. Junzi are idealized personalities in traditional Chinese culture and are intertwined with the subject of governance in ancient China, whereas citizens are politico-legal subjects

82  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections in Western public life. Therefore, we must inevitably consider the relationship between Chinese and Western cultures when discussing these two subjects. In Chapter 2, I criticize two arguments about the connections between junzi and citizens: the dualist approach and the equivalence (or reductionist) approach. I point out that neither of the two approaches properly deals with the China–West relationship. Here, I would like to provide some further reflections on this issue. First, the dualistic approach embraces cultural relativism, which is reflected by its over-emphasis on the ontological differences between junzi and citizens. When such a dualistic stance grounded in cultural relativism is applied to the comparison of Chinese and Western cultures, it leads to a one-sided focus on idiosyncrasies and incompatibilities. This dualistic approach accords with the epistemological perspective of nativism, which recognizes that Chinese and Western cultures emerged from their unique local conditions and resources. However, the nativistic perspective hardly considers how Chinese and Western cultures can be bridged or even whether such bridging is possible. In short, the dualistic approach presents junzi and citizens as two distinct subjects, preventing us from seeing the possibility of connecting them. Second, the equivalence approach is the opposite of the dualistic approach because it does not contrast junzi with citizens but rather equates them, claiming bluntly that junzi are citizens. In this respect, the resemblance between junzi and citizens is highlighted, and they are treated as identical subjects. However, a closer examination shows that this approach is still established covertly using the China– West dualism. A fundamental justification for this argument is that the concept of citizens held by the equivalence approach has been simplified and reconstructed strategically by its proponents, and it is not the commonly accepted definition derived from Western politics. Although the equivalence thesis ostensibly compares junzi and citizens, its conceptualization of citizens is no more than a façade that has been reduced to a term with a rather vague meaning. Hence, I consider the equivalence approach as also a reductionist approach. Its logic is as such: the simplification of citizens in the equivalence approach first defines citizens as individuals who are able to participate in public affairs, whereas the so-called public affairs refer to affairs occurring not only in the public sphere but also in the private sphere (Yao 2014). In other words, the term ‘public affairs’ is extended to include all affairs; concomitantly, citizens are conceptually adapted as those participating in all affairs. In this way, theorists manipulate the concept of the citizen, which originally has complicated meanings and various elements, into an oversimplified and sweeping terminology. Therefore, while the equivalence approach discusses citizens, the definition used no longer refers to citizens as commonly accepted. Having demonstrated the ontological flaws of the equivalence approach in comparison, I further argue that this approach does not identify the substantive similarities between junzi and citizens but rather plays a conceptual trick. The equivalence thesis also implies a dualistic China–West position. As scholars have indicated, China has been a mega-community since ancient times, unlike the polis in ancient Greece; thus, Chinese studies require ‘a reflexive attitude towards Western theories and experiences that are actually a local knowledge system’ (Yao 2014: 162). In

Towards the junzi-style citizen  83 other words, the equivalence thesis adopts a nativist perspective on the relationship between China and the West and proposes to understand both in recognition of their uniqueness. However, unlike the dualist approach to nativism, which lacks a bridge between China and the West, the equivalence approach to nativism claims to construct a ‘general theory of citizen, public life, and public organization’ through the ‘importation of Chinese facts and theories’ (Yao 2014: 161). Nevertheless, this assertion would fail because of its ontological mistake, namely its reductive manipulation of the concept of citizens. In addressing the relationship between China and the West, the critical issue is the handling of the connection between the local and global perspectives.2 On the one hand, the concept of the citizen is not a native Chinese term but was introduced from the West during the early 20th century in response to the imperative to build a strong modern China. Therefore, the local conceptualization of Chinese citizens would inevitably take root in China’s political, social, cultural, and ideological conditions. The differences between the traditional Chinese concept of junzi and the Western concept of citizens would be acknowledged through this local perspective because these differences stem from the distinct structural and historical conditions of China and the West. However, even if we recognize the conceptual differences, we may still fall into the trap of cultural relativism and fail to find a solution for integrating junzi and citizens in the Chinese context. On the other hand, while acknowledging the localities and differences between China and the West in the concepts of junzi and citizens, a global perspective should be used to correct the deficiencies of local perspectives. Such a global perspective requires people to remain open to Western knowledge and theories, reflect on Chinese society from the viewpoint of global modernity, and consider the possibility of combining the concepts of junzi and citizens. In this way, the global perspective helps to relate China to the West and discover commonalities, rather than merely emphasizing their differences and falling into West-centric or Sino-centric prejudices. In summary, by balancing local and global perspectives, one can maintain their cultural awareness and remain open to Western and Chinese knowledge, thus transcending the nativism bias and gaining a perspective of global modernity (Dirlik 2011) from which to reflect on the relationship between China and the West. Notes 1 Chapters 4, 5, and 6 include in-depth empirical studies on the revival of Confucian ­classical education. 2 My reflections on this issue are inspired by Arif Dirlik (2011). In arguing for the modern revival of ‘national learning’ (guoxue) from the perspective of global modernity, Dirlik mentions that the emergence and development of ‘national learning’ are the result of interactions between the paradigms of nativism and cosmopolitanism. On the one hand, the nativist paradigm does not consider Chinese traditional culture to be an obstacle to modernity and therefore demands the preservation of the ‘national essence’ and the construction of Chinese national identity through reviving Chinese traditional culture. On the other hand, the cosmopolitan paradigm implies that research on ‘national learning’ must remain open to Western knowledge, actively incorporate Western studies, and explore Chinese society and scholarship from a supranational perspective.

84  Confucianism and citizenship revisited: theoretical reflections References Bary, William Theodore De. 1970. “Individualism and Humanitarianism in Late Ming Thought.” In Self and Society in Ming Thought, edited by William Theodore De Bary and The Conference on Ming Thought, 145–247. New York: Columbia University Press. Beck, Ulrich, and Edgar Grande. 2010. “Varieties of Second Modernity: The Cosmopolitan Turn in Social and Political Theory and Research.” British Journal of Sociology 61 (3): 409–43. Billioud, Sébastien. 2021. “Confucianism in Chinese Society in the First Two Decades of the 21st Century.” In The Cambridge History of Confucianism, edited by Kiri Paramore, 1–16. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Billioud, Sébastien, and Joël Thoraval. 2007. “Jiaohua: The Confucian Revival in China as an Educative Project.” China Perspectives, no. 4: 4–20. ———. 2015. The Sage and The People. New York: Oxford University Press. https://doi. org/10.1093/acprof. Clarke, Paul Barry. 1996. Deep Citizenship. London: Pluto Press. Dirlik, Arif. 2011. “Guoxue/National Learning in the Age of Global Modernity.” China Perspectives, no. 1: 4–13. Dutournier, Guillaume, and Yuchen Wang. 2018. “An Adventure Called ‘Sishu’: The Tensions and Vagries of a ‘Holistic’ Educational Experience (Zhengti Jiaoyu) in Today’s Rural China.” In The Varieties of Confucian Experience: Documenting a Grassroots Revival of Tradition, edited by Sebastien Billioud, 262–301. Leiden: Brill. https://doi. org/10.1163/9789004374966. Guo, Zhonghua. 2014. “The Road to Citizenship: From Subjects, Nationals, Masses, People to Citizens (Gongmin Zhilu: Cong Chenmin, Guomin, Qunzhong, Renmin Dao Gongmin).” The Papers, December 30, 2014. https://www.thepaper.cn/newsDetail_forward_1289670. ———. 2016. Core Issues of Citizenship (Gongmin Shenfen de Hexin Wenti). Beijing: Central Compilation & Translation Press. Li, Minghui. 2005. Political Thought from the Perspective of Confucianism (Rujia Shiye Xiade Zhengzhi Sixiang). Beijing: Peking University Press. Lv, Fuxin. 2016. “Constructing a Culture of Rural Gengleman in the New Era (Jiangou Xinshidai de Xiangxiang Wenhua).” People’s Daily (Renmin Ribao), December 26, 2016. Ren, Jiantao. 2005. “Political Ethics: Personal Virtue, or Public Morality (Zhengzhi Lunli: Geren Meide, Huoshi Gonggong Daode).” Studies in Ethics (Lunlixue Yanjiu), no. 1: 16–19. Wang, Canglong. 2016. “Individuality, Hierarchy, and Dilemma: The Making of Confucian Cultural Citizenship in a Contemporary Chinese Classical School.” Journal of Chinese Political Science 21: 435–52. https://doi.org/10.1007/s11366-016-9436-9. ———. 2017. “Modern Sishu: Change, Legitimacy and Policy (Xiandai Sishu: Bianqian, Hefaxing Yu Duice).” China References (Zhongguo Cankao), no. 1: 78–86. ———. 2018. “Debatable ‘Chineseness’: Diversification of Confucian Classical Education in Contemporary China.” China Perspectives, no. 4: 53–64. https://doi.org/10.4000/ chinaperspectives.8482. ———. 2022. “Individual Self, Sage Discourse, and Parental Authority: Why Do Confucian Students Reject Further Confucian Studies as Their Educational Future?” Religions 13 (2): 154–71. https://doi.org/10.3390/rel13020154. Wang, Canglong, and Sébastien Billioud. 2022. “Reinventing Confucian Education in Contemporary China: New Ethnographic Explorations.” China Perspectives, no. 2: 3–6. https://www.cefc.com.hk/article/editorial-reinventing-confucian-education-incontemporary-china-new-ethnographic-explorations/.

Towards the junzi-style citizen  85 Xiong, Jiangning, and Yonggang Li. 2015. “Research on the Legitimacy and Government Regulation of Contemporary Sishu (Dangdai Sishu de Hefaxing Yu Zhengfu Jianguan Yanjiu).” China Administration (Zhongguo Xingzheng Guanli), no. 4: 113–17. Yan, Yunxiang. 2010. “The Chinese Path to Individualization.” The British Journal of Sociology 61 (3): 489–512. ———. 2011. “Chapter One: The Changing Moral Landscape.” In Deep China: The Moral Life of the Person, edited by Arthur Kleinman, Yunxiang Yan, Jun Jing, Sing Lee, Everett Zhang, Tianshu Pan, Fei Wu, and Jinhua Guo, 36–77. Berkeley: University of California Press. Yao, Zhongqiu. 2014. “Chongxin Sikao Gongmin Yu Gonggong Shenghuo: Jiyu Rujia Lichang He Zhongguo Lishi Jingyan (Citizenship and Public Life Revisited: Based on the Confucian Views and Chinese Historical Experience).” Shehui (Society), no. 3: 145–62. Yao, Zhongqiu, Zhonghua Guo, Taihui Guo, and Canglong Wang. 2015. “Junzi Yu Gongmin: Xunzhao Zhongguo Wenming Mailuo Zhongde Zhixu Zhuti (Junzi and Citizens: The Subjects in Chinese Civilization).” Tianfu Xinlun (Tianfu New Ideas), no. 6: 48–54. Zhao, Zhenzhou, and Canglong Wang. 2023. “Beyond the State’s Reach? Education and Citizen Making in China.” Social Transformations in Chinese Societies, no. 1. Forthcoming.

Part II

Cultivating the Confucian citizen Empirical explorations

4

Confucian identity, rights, righteousness, and acts of citizenship Examining civic elements in Confucian activists’ engagement in dujing (classics reading) education

In this chapter and Chapters 5 and 6, I take an empirical approach to explore the complexities of the relationship between Confucianism and citizenship under contemporary China’s political, cultural, and social conditions. Some of the core elements of citizenship—identity, rights, responsibilities, acts, virtues, nationalism, and cosmopolitanism—are investigated in conjunction with the discourse and practice surrounding the revival of Confucian classical or dujing (classics reading) education, which contributes to the rise of a new civic type, ‘Confucian citizens’, in present-day China.1 To clarify, this book does not aim to exhaust all of the elements of citizenship and probe their respective associations with Confucianism. Rather, by empirically examining some of the significant civic elements in the context of Confucian education, this book addresses the basic research questions as follows: how are the emerging Confucian citizens in contemporary China being shaped? What are their characteristics? What impact do Confucian-inspired individuals’ civic actions have on the revival of Confucian education? What difficulties or challenges do they encounter? How can we interpret these individual experiences from the perspective of citizenship? To explore these guiding questions, I focus on three groups of participants in Confucian education: teachers (both managers and academic staff), parents, and students. Participants may have varying levels of engagement in Confucian education, but they all demonstrate some degree of activism in that they challenge, question, or disrupt the dominant state education track and open new space for Confucian education.2 In this sense, I regard the participants as Confucian activists who actively facilitate Confucianism-related activities, such as those of Confucian education (see Billioud and Thoraval 2015: 45). Notably, Wang Caigui and those who support him do not represent the whole population of Confucian activists, particularly on account of the diversity of Confucian education in today’s China, including some controversial approaches (Wang 2018; Wang and Billioud 2022), and the particular socio-economic status of the participants (Wang 2022a, 2022b; Zhao and Wang 2023). However, the revelation of the elements of citizenship in Wang and his followers is indicative of the new varieties of Confucian citizen (re) fashioning in flux.

DOI: 10.4324/9781003343455-7

90  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations Two sets of empirical data resources are employed to explore the relationship between Confucianism and citizenship: (1) public speeches and other related written materials from Wang Caigui, a Confucian educator and philosopher and a leading figure in Confucian dujing education; (2) fieldwork data I collected since 2012 at Yiqian School, a full-time Confucian classical school strongly influenced by Wang’s pedagogy.3 The present Chapter 4 investigates four citizenship dimensions—identity, right, righteousness, and act—by examining how Confucian education activists (teachers and parents) engage in full-time classical education at a Confucian school. Identity as a cardinal dimension of citizenship is important for understanding the self-formation of modern citizens (e.g., Joppke 2007; Leuchter 2014; Piper and Garratt 2004; Shotter 1993). Also, scholars commonly consider ‘rights and responsibilities’ as the primary tenets of citizenship (Isin and Turner 2002: 2). Rights, as a fundamental aspect of liberal citizenship (Marshall 1962), have expanded in scope from civil, political, and social rights to minority rights (Joppke 2007) and cultural rights (Hensbroek 2010). Responsibility, another key aspect of citizenship, has played a crucial role in understanding public participation (Stevenson 2010). In addition, scholars recently have introduced the concept of ‘acts of citizenship’ as an alternative way to discuss citizenship, a way that ‘is irreducible to either status or practice’, ‘requires a focus on those acts when, regardless of status and substance, subjects constitute themselves as citizens or, better still, as those to whom the right to have rights is due’ (Isin and Nielsen 2008: 2). While the concept of citizenship may encompass far more than these four indicated elements, I focus on them because of their relevance in the ongoing revival of Confucian education in contemporary China. I do not mean to imply that these four elements represent the entirety of the values or tenets of citizenship; neither do I mean to suggest that they represent all of Confucian culture. As a complex body of thought, Confucianism encompasses many more elements and principles than those indicated here. Nonetheless, I emphasize these four elements as of special significance to Confucianism. Recently, there has been a burgeoning literature on the study of Confucian philosophy, in which Confucian scholars explore liberal elements of Confucianism, such as civic rights (Chen 2021) and individual rights (Sun 2017), the corresponding responsibilities (Chen 2016), and appropriate acts to achieve social equality (Angle 2012). These discussions signal the significance of these four elements to the new developments in Confucian thought in contemporary China. In the following sections, this chapter first presents the shaping of the activists’ Confucian identity, which involves the discourses of Chinese culturalism and criticizing state education. Then it moves to analyse the circulating discourses of right and responsibility within the field of Confucian dujing education and their relevance to the Confucian terminologies. The final section explores how Confucian morality contributes to the acts of citizenship taken by the Confucian activists to promote this particular form of education within the state-regulated education system.

Confucian identity, rights, righteousness, and acts of citizenship  91 Two discourses shaping Confucian identity in dujing education This section investigates the shaping of Confucian identity among Confucian education activists via their engagement in dujing education at Yiqian School. Joppke (2007) distinguished two possible meanings of citizenship as identity: the official views disseminated by the state and the actual views possessed by ordinary people. In the case of the official view, Western democratic societies have witnessed a structural decoupling of state membership and identity due to the problem of unity and integration arising from liberalized access to citizenship and the rise of minority rights (Joppke 2007: 44). However, the situation in China is different, where the strong political power and a dominant ideology of national rejuvenation enable the state to continue to redefine civic identity (Guo 2014). My particular concern here is with the second meaning of citizenship as identity (i.e., the actual views of ordinary people), which has been significantly underestimated in the literature. To be specific, the shaping of the Confucian identity among ordinary individuals in contemporary Confucian education involves two key discourses—the Chinese culturalist discourse and the critical discourse surrounding state education. First, I discuss the notion that Chinese culturalism is involved in the formation of Confucian education activists. Chinese culturalism endows them with a strong Confucian identity and a sense of cultural superiority, guiding them to embrace the idea that Chinese classical texts are the optimal means of cultivating the self and others. I then discuss the critical attitude that Confucian education activists exhibit towards state education, which, in turn, reinforces their motivation to engage in dujing education as an alternative form outside the state system. This engagement may occur either by establishing private Confucian schools as minban (literally ‘run by people’) schools or by sending their children to pursue fulltime Confucian studies. Finally, I elaborate on the logic underlying the discourses around Chinese culturalism and criticizing state education, unpacking how they affect the formation of individuals’ Confucian identity. The discourse of Chinese culturalism

Chinese culturalism is a crucial ideology in constructing individuals’ Confucian identity and contributes to the revival of Confucian classical education. Generally, Chinese culturalism appeared in a more purely cultural form in pre-modern imperial China. Since China entered the modern period in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, culturalism has gradually combined with the emerging trend of nationalism and has manifested as a form of cultural nationalism. Chinese culturalism can be defined as a cultural belief that has evolved over a long period of Chinese history, has Confucianism at its core, and includes and excludes certain cultural or ethnic groups by identifying symbolic boundaries (see Billioud and Thoraval 2015; Yi 2011). According to Lin (2000: 443), Chinese culturalism is a historically rooted conviction that Chinese culture comes from heaven and has absolute intellectual and cultural superiority. Believers assert that Chinese culture adheres

92  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations to the teachings of the sages, which are derived from conscious humanity, and that humanity works in concert with heaven. They imagine China to be the centre of the world and to have supreme and eternal power in politics and education. Harrison (1969) encapsulated the core view of Chinese culturalism in two points: first, China is the only true civilization, and second, Han and non-Han rulers must be educated in Confucian universal values, and they should exercise their rule in accordance with Confucian doctrines and educate non-Han or non-Chinese people in Confucian culture. In ancient China, culture played a fundamental role in distinguishing between ethnic groups and defining their boundaries. By strategically delineating symbolic boundaries, cultural differences between Han and non-Han groups were deliberately maintained in such areas as culinary habits, clothing styles, and wedding and funeral traditions, among others (Yi 2011). Qian (1994: 41) pointed out that [T]here was a real criterion in ancient ideologies that distinguished the four barbarians from the Chinese, and this criterion was not ‘descent’ but ‘culture’. [...] The so-called culture here, in concrete terms, is simply ‘a way of life and politics’. I summarize three key features of Chinese culturalism. The first is the belief in universal values. This feature is expressed in the assertion that the Confucian classics encompass constant, universal truths. Advocates therefore, aim to ‘understand the scriptures and see the way’ and ‘apply the classics’ (Lin 2000: 458). The second feature is the idea of tianxia (all-under-heaven), which takes universal concern about all humanity as the means for Chinese civilization to evaluate itself, instead of fixing this evaluation to a particular nation-state (Xu 2014: 4). The third feature is the notion of politico-cultural hierarchy. This assumes that Chinese culture is superior to non-Chinese cultures and that it should be bestowed upon non-Chinese groups in the form of moral education and correct upbringing. In response, non-Chinese groups should learn from, pay tribute to, and go on pilgrimages to China (Ge 2011: 45). In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the culturalist ideology evolved into cultural nationalism, which was directed against foreign invaders4 and characterized by two intertwined yet contradictory national mindsets of cultural inferiority and superiority. That is, while acknowledging the vulnerability of Chinese culture when in competition with Western culture, people with a cultural nationalist mentality maintained confidence that Chinese culture would once again outperform foreign cultures (Yi 2011). Cultural nationalism intensified modern Chinese cultural consciousness and national identity, but it also led to a fundamental dilemma in the form of a constant struggle between survival and superiority (Kipnis 2006; Nyíri and Breidenbach 2005; Townsend 1992). The specific implications of this struggle can be interpreted as follows (see also Lin 2000: 460): the sanctity of the Confucian classics was challenged; the utopian imagining of tianxia and its associated universal values were replaced by state-building and nationalist ideas; the original idea of national superiority, based on the politico-cultural hierarchy, was inverted to yield a sense of national humiliation and cultural inferiority; and a holistic anti-traditionalist movement, represented by the May Four Movement, was formed.

Confucian identity, rights, righteousness, and acts of citizenship  93 However, since the 1980s, the economic rise of the four Asian tigers (Singapore, South Korea, Hong Kong, and Taiwan) and mainland China, all of which are considered to belong to the Confucian cultural circle, has been attributed in part to the positive contribution of Confucian values (Tu 1996). This rekindled the Chinese population’s long-suppressed sense of cultural superiority and national pride, replacing the inferiority complex that had been caused by holistic antitraditionalist ideology in the modern period. The flourishing of the Confucian education movement is a typical recent example of this trend of ideological change. Consistent with Chinese culturalism and its variant, cultural nationalism, Confucian education practitioners accommodate the notion that traditional Chinese culture, and Confucianism in particular, holds universal values and profound wisdom, regarding it as a panacea to liberate humanity and solve social problems. Advocates take Confucian education as a righteous cause that they are obligated to support so that the nation’s cultural confidence can be rebuilt. What, therefore, is the basic logic of Chinese culturalism in shaping these activists’ Confucian identity in the context of Confucian dujing education? Referring to Table 4.1, I demonstrate the underlying logic of Chinese culturalism in shaping Confucian identity in dujing education. First, I present an interview passage below from Mr Chen, the founder of Yiqian School, in which he expressed a seemingly contradictory view of culture while also embodying an implicit notion of Chinese culturalism, that is, the struggle between survival and superiority. If China had been given a hundred years, Chinese intellectuals would all be able to absorb Western science gracefully, calmly, and fully. This is because science is simple. Look how easy it is for Chinese people to learn geometry, but imagine how difficult it would be for a Westerner to learn the Daodejing and The Analects of Confucius. Which culture is superior? Chinese culture! Chinese people can learn two things together [Western science and Chinese classics], but Westerners cannot.5 Further, Mr Chen argued for the superiority of Chinese culture over Western culture by dividing cultures into subjective and objective types. The logic of the subjective/objective division of cultures he advocated is as follows: as ‘Western science is considered objective, step-by-step, without leaps’, it is ‘very easy to learn’; in contrast, ‘Chinese classical culture is non-objective’ and is therefore difficult to study (quotes from interviews conducted in 2012). By this logic, he claimed that Chinese people can easily acquire Western science, but Westerners find it difficult to absorb Chinese classics. Moreover, the distinction between subjective and objective cultures is anchored in the dichotomy between Chinese and Western cultures, serving the belief that ‘Chinese culture outperforms Western culture’. Somewhat paradoxically, in his interview, Mr Chen also attacked the present compulsory education system in China and praised the American system (a point I discuss in detail in the section on criticizing state education below). In other words, although he believed that Chinese classical culture is superior to Western scientific culture, he also acknowledged that the Chinese education system lags behind

94  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations Table 4.1 Two Discourses Shaping Confucian Identity in Dujing (classics reading) Education Chinese culturalism

Criticism of state education

Subjective and objective cultures Wisdom and knowledge Universal humanity Moral quality Elite benchmark Time effect

From: The author.

its Western counterparts. This point reflects the complexities and ambivalence in shaping his cultural identity. The idea that Chinese culture is superior to Western culture is also reinforced by the distinction between wisdom and knowledge. This distinction is applied to substantiate the dualistic conception of Chinese classical and modern Western cultures. The central point is that Chinese classical culture is considered a wisdomoriented culture, one that contains universal and eternal truths; in contrast, modern Western culture is a knowledge-based culture that lacks absolute truth in scientific and philosophical thought. In this regard, Mr Chen said: All Western knowledge can be questioned; even God can be challenged. However, it is precisely Confucianism that is unquestionable. […] [This is because] you cannot doubt your conscience; you cannot doubt your humanity.6 Why did Mr Chen argue that Confucianism was unquestionable? With reference to Wang Caigui (2014), he claimed that dujing education would maximize the respect for and development of humanity, which is the fundamental tenet of education. He emphasized that among the various types of education in human history, dujing education is one of only a few with the potential to set the direction of the learner’s life by arranging the teaching and learning content, sequence, and methods in exact accordance with the laws of human development. Given this, Mr Chen concluded that Confucian culture is superior and unquestionable because it is linked to universal human nature. He also believed that because dujing education precisely captures human nature, it is the optimal approach for nurturing talents. How does Chinese culturalism unfold in the context of dujing education? The dichotomous conceptions of wisdom and knowledge, rooted in the opposition between China and the West, categorize Chinese classical culture as a subjective, wisdom-oriented style and Western scientific culture as an objective, knowledgeoriented style. Wisdom is seen to be concerned with universal humanity and to be comprised of eternal and absolute truths, whereas knowledge is seen as distant from humanity and lacking universality and eternality. According to this logic, Confucian culture is considered superior to Western science. Therefore, despite the deficiencies in the modern Chinese educational system, Chinese classical culture always outperforms Western culture in terms of wisdom and humanity. I return to this point

Confucian identity, rights, righteousness, and acts of citizenship  95 in Chapter 6. Suffice it to emphasize here that such a culturalist framework for Confucian education lays the foundation for the shaping of a Confucian identity among dujing activists. For example, Mrs Guo, a middle-aged woman who had been engaged in dujing education for nearly a decade at the time of the interview and led the teaching staff at Yiqian School, saw her involvement in Confucian classical education as ‘a matter of course’ (lizhi dangran). She explained that this notion was grounded in her firm belief that dujing education correctly understands and supports human nature. I argue that on this basis, Mrs Guo’s interpretation of the legitimacy of dujing education shows a certain degree of transcendence and obligation. Mrs Guo said: We read the classics because we should do it, not just because the state school system educates students poorly. […] Reading the classics is something that is done as a matter of course, out of respect for the classics themselves. The classical texts have power in themselves. China used this method of reading the classics for thousands of years to cultivate students’ talents.7 The culturalist beliefs of dujing education activists are relatively inclusive and open to the diversity of human cultures or civilizations, given that they view culture and education as springing from moral righteousness and the naturalness of humanity. For this reason, I regard these beliefs as a ‘reflective culturalism’ that distinguishes itself from an unreflective, close-minded culturalism. I continue to elaborate on this point in Chapter 6 by exploring the Confucian school’s pedagogical discourse and its cultivation of the cosmopolitan citizen by interweaving nationalism and cosmopolitanism. The discourse criticizing state education

The critical discourse directed at state education is another key discursive strategy used by dujing education activists to construct the Confucian identity. From a sociological perspective, this discursive strategy emerges from the complex state– society relationship in China. Specifically, Yiqian School, a private classical school run by grassroots social forces, faces constant pressure from the state. A full-time school that offers nine years of compulsory education, Yiqian School adopts a pedagogical system based on the study of Confucian classics, which contrasts with the state-stipulated curriculum. This fact adds to the tension between the Confucian school and the state education system, which is manifested in the school management’s construction of a Confucian cultural identity. These Confucian activists tactically use a discourse that is critical of state education to justify the promotion of dujing education. The administrators of Yiqian School appeared to be more radical in their critical attitude towards state education than Wang Caigui. Wang (2009) pointed out that he does not oppose state education; he only spells out its inadequacies. He also clarified that the aim of promoting dujing education is not to replace state education but to facilitate the return of state education to its older and superior form.

96  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations However, this mild criticism of state education by Wang Caigui was exaggerated by Mr Chen, who completely denied the validity of state education and even asserted that modern China’s education system was an utter failure. Mr Chen also criticized the examination orientation of Chinese education as being too focused on quick success, violating the laws of human cognitive development, and ultimately training people to become test-taking machines and depriving them of the ability to think independently. In later sections, I present interview data from teachers at Yiqian School to further illustrate these criticisms of state education, which circulate widely in dujing education. Suffice it to say here that the critical discourse directed at state education, leveraged and reproduced to justify Confucian classical education, has significantly shaped dujing activists’ Confucian identity. Table 4.1 displays the complex logic by which the critical discourse directed at state education shapes individuals’ Confucian identity. First, practitioners of dujing education demonstrated a strong desire for moral quality and, on this basis, criticized the failure of state education to cultivate students’ morality. They argued that the state education system in modern China underestimates, and even denies, the role of traditional culture in nurturing students’ ethical development. In their view, the newly established scientific and knowledge-centred curriculum is inadequate in imparting a moral education. As a result, state schooling has become the source of a plethora of social problems. These Confucian activists also judged the merits and successes of modern state education according to whether it cultivated elites, stating cynically that modern schools ‘have not produced any great philosophers, great thinkers, or great writers’ (Mr Chen’s words). They even contended that unlike state education, which is focused on short-term goals such as test scores and advancement to higher education, dujing education takes a considerable amount of time to develop students’ moral qualities. Therefore, even if students do not understand the classics well within a short period, teachers and parents should not lose their confidence in dujing education and should persist in having their children read the classics. In summary, the practitioners of dujing education that I interviewed bolstered their acceptance of Confucian classical education by criticizing state education. They asserted that state education is incompetent in building morality and cultivating elite individuals, arguing that this incompetence should be attributed to the rejection of Confucianism in modern China. That is, state education is established on the premise of abandoning the Confucian classics and the memorization-based method and replacing them with modern Western pedagogies. It is worth pointing out that the criticism of state education is always entangled with Chinese culturalist discourse in shaping individuals’ Confucian identity. These two discourses dovetail as follows: Chinese culturalism guides dujing activists to view Confucian education as superior to Western education because of Confucianism’s conformance to wisdom and universal humanity. This idea is consolidated by the criticism of state education due to the focus on Western scientific education and the teaching of knowledge in state schooling, which is argued to come at the expense of the transmission of eternal wisdom and cultivation of moral principles. In short, the dujing activists simultaneously used the discourse of

Confucian identity, rights, righteousness, and acts of citizenship  97 Chinese culturalism and the critical discourse directed at state education to shape their Confucian identity and to generate their interpretations of citizenship rights, responsibilities, and acts, which are the topics of the following sections. ‘My right to do Confucian education’: discourse of right (quanli) to education When examining the entanglement of citizenship with Confucian education, I consider the emerging discourse on the ‘right (quanli) to education’, which circulates widely among Confucian activists. Based on my follow-up observations of Confucian education since 2012, I note that the discourse on a citizen’s right to education continues to spread within Confucian education. The same discourse on the right to education can also be found in the recent appearance of home schooling. Parents with students who have unique educational needs may adopt this alternative education of home schooling as a means of expressing their discontent with the hegemonic examination-oriented state system while safeguarding the legitimacy of their child’s education (Wang et al. 2017). One may understand the increasing awareness of citizenship rights as an outcome of the process of individualization in China since the late 1970s, which has empowered Chinese individuals to ‘link the self with a set of rights or entitlements’ and to take ‘various forms of rights assertion behaviour’ (Yan 2010: 500). Individualization is also part of the shifting moral landscape of China, ‘from responsibilities to rights, from self-sacrifice to self-realization, and ultimately from collectivity to individuality’ (Yan 2011: 46). In this section, I analyse Wang Caigui’s writing and speeches and the narratives of educators and parents at Yiqian School to showcase the existence of a strong claim to the ‘right to education’. In Wang Caigui’s myriad of articles and speeches, the term ‘citizen’ (gongmin) rarely appears. One explanation for the absence is that Wang, as a Confucian scholar, primarily relies on Confucian jargon to justify his teaching theory. This lack of reference could also signify an absence of direct connection between ancient Confucianism and the Western idea of citizenship (Chen 2020; Wang 2015, 2021). Nonetheless, Wang does reference rights or entitlements in his appeals to parents to exercise their right to their children’s education. In a gathering of Confucian education activists in 2015, Wang explicitly argued that receiving education is a fundamental right of a child and that endowing education to children is a natural entitlement of parents.8 Wang traced the history of sishu (old-style private schools) in ancient China and asserted that the secret to the duration and sustainability of the practice lay in the human desire to actualize the right of education. Education as a right, however, has been transformed into an obligation as a result of the established state-sponsored compulsory education system in modern China. Wang affirmed the values of the compulsory education system, indicating that it is a benevolent policy of the state and has generally benefited people. However, he noted that if compulsory education becomes ‘unjust’, meaning that it may infringe upon the nature of education as a right rather than an obligation, parents should reflect on whether it diverges from the Dao (Way). He suggested that a true educational system should

98  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations always be in accordance with the Dao and claimed that the mushrooming of private Confucian schools affirms its validity and effectiveness. He urged the state to allow people with educational ideals to launch their own schooling initiatives instead of asserting full control over the educational space and resources. Finally, he called for the state to return the right to education to citizens. Over a series of interviews, Mr Chen, a loyal follower of Wang and the founder of Yiqian School, echoed Wang’s call to break the state monopoly over education. His narratives align with the discourse of criticizing state education described in the previous section. Arguing that state power did not extend to primary education in ancient China and that ordinary people enjoyed sufficient liberty to pursue their preferred form of education by way of sishu, Mr Chen proposed that China’s contemporary educational reform follow the same approach by allowing parents to select the way of education for their children, essentially curbing the power of the state. He said: The government should no longer control everything but instead allow social forces to engage in public welfare undertakings. It can purchase services from society. […] China’s educational reform entails open competition between maintained schools and private educative institutions. This is an appropriate time to run Confucian schools, as what we are doing now.9 He expressed his satisfaction with the market-oriented reform of Chinese education, arguing that it created more opportunities for students and parents to actualize the right of selecting preferred methods of schooling. He even asserted that the state education system could not represent the ‘truth of education’, as it is incapable of developing ‘common humanity’ (gongtongde renxing) and fails to cultivate students’ morality. In this sense, he suggested that the state should allow citizens to experiment with their own ideal forms of education. Mrs Zheng, the headteacher of Yiqian School, held the same stance as Mr Chen. She stated that the authorities should relax state control of the education system and endow people with the freedom to run their own educational institutions outside the state apparatus. ‘As long as people are not constrained by the state system,’ she said, ‘they will do their own things very well, just as they have done in the economic reforms. It is the same in the educational reforms.’10 Many parents of Yiqian School, despite not using the term ‘right’ (quanli) directly, argued that parents should be allowed to choose alternative options beyond the standardized state system when their children require a more personalized education, and that they are doing the ‘right’ (zhengquede) thing to transfer their children from state schools to Confucian schools (see also Wang 2020, 2024). This notion of education is consistent with the widespread discourse of suzhi (quality), which is argued to justify all sorts of social and political hierarchies (Kipnis 2006). Given that many of the parent informants were from socio-economically advantaged families, their claim to the right for their children to engage in the alternative Confucian education can be understood to reflect the overall anxiety of China’s emerging middle class (Rocca 2017) about how to maintain their social status by

Confucian identity, rights, righteousness, and acts of citizenship  99 seeking a more quality-oriented, individualized education for their children (see also Kipnis 2011). Additionally, the discourse of right could hardly be heard from pupils. This was understandable as students were often arranged by their parents to engage in the study of Confucianism. But many students shared with me their unpleasant experiences with the state education, expressing their dissatisfaction and even resentment towards it. Some older students also used terms such as ‘common humanity’ and ‘truth of education’, as mentioned above by teachers and parents, to argue for the advantages of dujing education. Another point I would like to make is that the regular civic education curriculum offered in state schools was missing in Yiqian School. This may be one reason why the discourse of right disappeared in the day-to-day schooling that was filled with Confucian classics, virtues, and terminologies. In summary, the revealed ‘right’ to Confucian education discussed in this section overlaps the broad sense of citizenship rights in that both refer to certain official, fixed entitlements secured by legal provisions. However, Confucian activists (teachers and parents) take the further step of claiming not only the right to an education in a general sense but also the right to have the right to access Confucian education as an alternative to the state system. Thus, I argue that the discourse of right by Confucian activists opens new spaces for educational practices and actions and demonstrates the shifting landscape of citizenship in China. ‘Right to do Confucian education’: discourse of righteousness (yi) and civic responsibility In this section, I explore the implications of the discourse of righteousness (yi) for the development of civic responsibility among Confucian activists. Confucian activists claim that they have both a ‘right’ to education and a right to the ‘righteous’ type of education, that is, dujing education. As Isin and Nielsen (2008: 1) noted, ‘If people invest themselves in claiming rights, they are producing not only new ways of being subjects with rights but also new ways of becoming subjects with responsibilities, since claiming rights certainly involves “responsibilizing” selves.’ Examining the narratives of Confucian education, I find that the discourse of righteousness contributes to generating Confucian activists’ strong sense of responsibility and obligation for engaging in Confucian education. Righteousness, one of the five constant virtues of Confucianism, refers to an attribute of both an action and an actor (Yu 2006). Righteousness is ‘a characteristic of acts’, and the righteousness of acts ‘depends upon their being morally fitting in the circumstances’ (Lau 1984: 23). It mediates ‘the universal principle of humanity and the particular situations in which the principle is concretely manifested’ (Tu 1989: 52). Righteousness is also an actor’s intellectual ability to judge, choose, and do what is righteous. According to Cheng (1972: 272), ‘a man of yi must be a man of creative insights who is able to make appropriate ethical judgements in particular situation.’ I find both interpretations of righteousness in the narratives of Confucian education activists. Wang Caigui used the discourse of righteousness to encourage civic responsibility for Confucian education. In a number of open speeches over the past two

100  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations decades for a variety of educational and social institutions, he emphasized that his own continual perseverance to promote dujing education comes from the call of the Dao, which provides him with a firm will to shoulder the responsibility to pursue the righteousness of education. He encouraged Confucian education activists to cultivate independent, rational thinking, obey what is righteous, and do what aligns with the Dao. In a passage taken from one public speech in 2015, he emphasized the righteousness of sticking with the daoli or ‘truth’ (dao translated as ‘way’ and li translated as ‘principle/reason’): I often state that what someone says is not necessarily right. What the expert says is not necessarily right; what is modern is not necessarily right; what is American is not necessarily right; what is Chinese is not necessarily right; what is traditional is not necessarily right; and what I say is not necessarily right. So, what is right? Only what is right is right! Therefore, one cannot use any excuse to support his opinion. Opinion is not the daoli. We only obey the daoli.11 Wang further argued that only a few people with profound wisdom of what is right are capable of acting, speaking, and judging in line with the daoli, whereas the majority of ordinary people’s agency and rationality may be impaired by their stubborn human habits (xixing). ‘Only a few who have clear minds are able to step out of their habits and follow the truth,’ Wang claimed, ‘but many others are merely subject to their strong habits, and their minds are obscured’. He went on to suggest that ‘the real self should be a rational self, whereas the habitual self is a false self! But an ordinary person tends to believe in falsehood as truth’. Building from the binary of the rational/true self and the habitual/false self, Wang called on Confucian activists to practice honest self-reflection to manipulate their intellectual faculty to ‘do the right thing’ in accordance with the truth. What, then, is the ‘right thing’? He claimed that as long as people are lucid and autonomous, they will inevitably identify the momentousness of dujing education and devote themselves to promoting it, regardless of difficulties or oppositions. As Wang (2014: 4) asserted, dujing education is always consistent with the common truth of human nature and ‘is bound to be accepted by all humans and will be expanding widely’. I summarize two aspects of Wang’s articulation of human nature in his framing of the dujing education theory, which is also consistent with the discourse of Chinese culturalism as clarified before. First, he argued that classics are the crystallization of eternal human wisdom, beyond the limits of time and space, in accordance with universal humanity, and thus can help establish a positive outlook on life, cultivate a virtuous character, and stimulate a passion for knowledge. Dujing education upholds these ideals by incorporating classics and related practice into daily life. Second, Wang suggested that mechanical memorization is the golden method for children to study Confucian classics because it best aligns with natural human development. According to Wang, children under the age of 13 are endowed with a strong faculty for memorization but a relatively weak capability for comprehension. Therefore, Wang believed that requiring children to read

Confucian identity, rights, righteousness, and acts of citizenship  101 and recite classics is the best way to exploit their natural strengths, awaken their humanity to the greatest extent, and nurture their disposition efficiently and effectively. Building from this logic, he encouraged people to actively participate in this righteous education by reading the classics themselves, sending their children to learn the classics, or establishing a private sishu. Using the same discourse of righteousness in reference to humanity and truth as Wang Caigui, Mr Chen explicitly argued that Confucian education is the perfect example of teaching and the inevitable path for returning to human nature. According to Mr Chen, Confucian education guides learners to pursue the knowledge of life, the rooted morality, and the transcendental truth of mind, which he judged as more righteous than the state education system. Confucian education explicitly tends to students’ hearts and spirituality, inspires them to diligently study the profound wisdom, instructs them on how to maintain interpersonal relationships, and disciplines them in a rational way of living, doing, and thinking. Similarly, Mrs Zheng explained that the revival of Confucian education is tantamount to the return of humanity because it embodies what education should originally be, implying that Confucian education best conforms with human nature. In contrast, she criticized state education for distorting human nature and distancing itself from the truth of education. She felt that she had the responsibility as an educator and a human to correct the state education system, or at least to creatively implement a humane alternative for people who hold the same ideals. She even asserted that state education should integrate with Confucian education rather than shape Confucian education in line with the state system. She clarified that her confidence came from the fact that the socialist regime is increasingly open to supporting the revival of Confucian culture (Wang 2018; Yu 2008) and that more and more people identify with the values of Chinese classics and take part in reading the classics in various forms (Billioud and Thoraval 2015). Despite the inevitability of ‘returning to common humanity’, as Confucian activists have claimed, individuals must take action to realize this goal. Mr Chen used the term kailu (‘carving out a trail’), implying that Confucian education grows in response to the direct engagement and commitment of individual actors or participants. He called for parents to assert their responsibility for kailu by involving their children in classical education as much as possible. His personal story is tied closely to his understanding of kailu. As a member of the earliest groups involved in Confucian education since the early 2000s, Mr Chen began teaching his four-year-old son, who did not attend a public school until late adolescence, to read Confucian classics at home by using the method recommended by Wang Caigui. Initially, Mr Chen ran a nursery to gather young children of similar ages to read the classics alongside his son. Later, as the number of children increased, he established the current Yiqian School, which reached a total of nearly 300 students at its peak. Discussing his decision to establish Confucian education specifically, he said: If you truly understand that classical education is in line with the Dao, [it is] impossible not to teach your own children to read the classics. If you do

102  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations classical education but do not instruct your children to learn the classics, this is absolutely not right.12 The parents of the Yiqian School students reiterated similar opinions during their interviews, echoing the discourse of righteousness. The parents disclosed that they were not afraid of people challenging their decision to send their children to read the classics because they firmly believed that dujing was the right way to approach education. One father of a student from Yiqian School, Mr Lan, who himself is devoted to the promotion of Confucian education, stated: If you are on the right path to education, the farther you go, the brighter the future seems to be, and the fewer difficulties you have. […] There must be difficulties in everything. […] But we only ask whether the thing is right or not. If it is right, we just do what we ought to do. […] Keep promoting what you believe is right. Make other people know what they do not know. Examine yourself and put your heart in the right place.13 His words resemble those of Mrs Zheng, who referred to one verse from The Analects of Confucius to articulate her determination to engage in Confucian education. Mrs Zheng said: There is a saying in The Analects, ‘With regard to the world, the gentleman has no predispositions for or against any person. He merely associates with those he considers right’.14 What does it mean? When a junzi (virtuous person) wants to act and do something in the world, what should he do? I want to promote classical education, but what exactly should I do? This verse implies that there is nothing that I ought to do or ought not to do. Why? It is because I must act appropriately according to the proper timing and actual conditions. On the other hand, ‘He merely associates with those he considers right’. That is to say, a junzi always stands with righteousness. If I stick with the right education, I will never waver with external circumstances. I only keep asking myself: is what I am doing right?15 However, it is worth pointing out that teachers and parents had a variety of ideas about how to actualize the responsibility of carrying out Confucian education. For example, Mr Chen and Mrs Zheng initially agreed with Wang Caigui on the method of mechanical, extensive memorization for Confucian study and dutifully experimented with it in the early years. Later, they realized that students seemed to dislike rote learning and often forgot the memorized classic texts after a period of time. Students’ negative reactions to Confucian education prompted them to reform the pedagogy in 2013 by mixing memorization with the principle of individualized teaching. In so doing, they encouraged students to learn classics autonomously and flexibly. A few of the interviewed parents also expressed their concerns about the mechanical memorization approach. For instance, Mrs Hua worried that students would be marginalized in education and society if they spent all day

Confucian identity, rights, righteousness, and acts of citizenship  103 memorizing classics in an isolated school environment and were thus disengaged from public life. In addition, students’ aversion to rote memorization was evident according to the interviews with them and observations of their daily learning process. Nonetheless, they also demonstrated an awareness of cultural responsibility. That is, they seemed to have internalized a disciplinary discourse that constantly required them to become ‘great cultural talents’ (wenhua dacai) through extensive memorization of the classics. Thus, in the view of many students, the arduous process of putting in tremendous effort and time to recite the classics was exactly a manifestation of undertaking one’s own responsibility for the revival of Confucian culture and education.16 In this section, I demonstrate the circulation of the discourse of righteousness among Confucian activists and its contribution to generating their sense of civic responsibility and obligation for promoting the revival of Confucian education. Although the ‘righteousness’ of Confucianism is not synonymous with the ‘responsibility’ of citizenship, by claiming the ‘right’ to pursue a ‘righteous’ education, individual activists are stimulated by a sense of civic responsibility and obligation and take various forms of action to engage in Confucian education initiatives, with the belief that dujing education best conforms with the ideal of common humanity and reflects the truth of teaching. ‘Extending innate knowledge’: from ethical reflection to civic action The preceding sections have investigated the shaping of the Confucian identity in terms of discourses of Chinese culturalism and criticizing state education, as well as the emerging discourses of right and righteousness and how they contribute to Confucian activists’ rising awareness of civic entitlement to and responsibility for dujing education. In this section, I explore the fourth and last aspect of citizenship: ethical reflection on creative acts of citizenship. Previously, I suggested that the discourses of Chinese culturalism and righteousness, laden with such terms as humanity, the Dao, and rationality, all of which are underexplored in the existing scholarship of citizenship studies, ignite Confucian activists’ moral call to action to disrupt the conventional, ‘normal’ path of state education and turn instead to alternative forms of education. Delving into the underpinnings of ethical reflection, I unpack how these ethical acts may provide valuable context for understanding civic acts (Isin 2008). In examining how individually held ethics are converted into public civic actions in the context of Confucian education, I focus on the Neo-Confucian concept of ‘extending innate knowledge’ (zhi liangzhi) that Wang Caigui frequently reappropriated to inspire Confucian activists. Wang urged people to return to their innate knowledge and extend it honestly to the external act of teaching and promoting Confucian education. The Confucian philosophical term liangzhi17 has a variety of English translations, such as ‘innate knowledge’, ‘intuitive knowledge’, or ‘pure knowing’. Liangzhi is described as something truly real and something necessary to be conscious of and to be affirmed immediately (Billioud 2012: 7). It describes an ability to know, to differentiate good from evil, and to investigate

104  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations the meaning of things and deeds. Once an individual’s innate moral knowledge is unlocked and extended, things are rectified (zheng) (ibid: 149). In the context of Confucian education, this implies that through the extension of innate knowledge, education can return to an alignment with common humanity, and people can teach and learn according to human nature. A moral subject should always be vigilant of their liangzhi and devote themselves to the unity of knowledge and action (zhixing heyi) through constant self-cultivation of introspection. Examining the philosophical sophistication of liangzhi goes beyond the scope of this study, but the philosophical revelation of liangzhi implies a personal ethical drive to realize one’s actions and autonomously form an inward decision (ibid: 172). In the following passage, Wang Caigui (2014: 66) emphasized the immediate action upon the awakening of one’s innate knowledge: When you feel something inside your heart and know something within your mind, this is called liangzhi. Once liangzhi is present, it cannot help but ask to be realized in actual life. Liangzhi is always there and will always be there, so the action cannot be interrupted for a minute. Wang urged all Confucian activists to promptly and directly ‘act from innate knowledge’ (cong liangzhi erxing) following the manifestation of one’s innate knowledge. A person who always ‘acts from innate knowledge’ in public affairs would become both a virtuous, wise human and a responsible, conscientious citizen. For this reason, Confucian activists argue that reading Confucian classics is a ‘natural’ choice consistent with the Dao and a cultural and moral obligation that a conscientious citizen must embrace. As Wang (2014: 82) stated: To act from innate knowledge, we are in line with the Dao of the sages. Close to classics, let the sages inspire us and awaken our innate knowledge. This is called ‘the ancients got my heart first’. […] If Chinese culture is about conscience and humanity, it is an eternal culture. To carry forward this eternal culture is not only for the sake of our nation and ancestors but also for ourselves. Make it your own responsibility to promote Chinese culture. It should not be a burden but something that you are sincerely delighted with. If so, you will have become a virtuous, conscientious person. More importantly, the approach of associating ethical reflection from innate knowledge with the civic responsibility for Confucian revival is laden with creative and disruptive potential. Some scholars of citizenship studies (Isin 2008; Isin and Nielsen 2008) have challenged the traditional understanding of citizenship by arguing that it depends on habitual practices, which ‘engender reasonably durable, resilient and predicable ethical-political relations with others’ (White 2008: 44) but neglect the creativity of an act that breaks the routine obligatory practices through an appeal to disruptive and transformative actions. A creative act of citizenship is derived from the aspiration to ‘overcome the force of habit by provoking a genuine encounter that poses the problem of how to act’ (ibid: 46). The civic actors must

Confucian identity, rights, righteousness, and acts of citizenship  105 face the unforeseeable and contingent circumstances and aspire to ‘transcend the limits imposed by habits (even if momentarily) in order to disrupt the static and sedimented dimensions of human action’ (ibid: 46). The conceptual insight of creative acts of citizenship offers a useful tool to understand Mr Chen’s disruptive act of insisting his son to read the classics for years at home, or his act of establishing a Confucian school outside the state apparatus. This creative approach to developing and supporting an alternative form of education confronts the hegemony of mainstream education and presents parents and students with a new method for learning. In his discussion on why to give up state education, Mr Chen pointed out that ‘state schools go against human nature, […] and are complete failures’.18 He criticized the state system as nothing but a ‘utilitarian’ (gongli) education that fails to cultivate students’ virtues, further arguing that ‘its examination orientation goes against the law of children’s cognitive-psychological development and trains students to become test machines’.19 Labelling the state education system as a ‘one size fits all’ type, he also attacked it for ignoring students’ distinct interests, needs, and personalities. Parents who sent their children to read the classics at Mr Chen’s school reiterated similar critiques. By reflecting on their own experience with the state education system and the experience of their children, most of the parents condemned the state education system as a ‘moral deficit education’ (quede jiaoyu) (one parent’s term) that unduly focuses on students’ academic achievements and skills at the expense of character development. They expressed concern for students being overburdened with excessive schoolwork, which they claimed endangered physical and mental health. They criticized the educational system for oppressing children’s creative and critical thinking skills, for impairing their passion for study, and for damaging their autonomous exploration of knowledge. The negative evaluation of state education was also evident in the interviews with the students. Many pupils confessed that they were labelled as ‘backward students’ (houjinsheng) or ‘weak students’ (chasheng) because of their poor academic performance in state schools and were discriminated against by teachers and classmates (more discussions in Chapter 5). In summary, the dissatisfaction with state education directly drove Mr Chen and the parents to enrol their children in Confucian dujing education. It is also noted that these narratives accord with the discourse of criticizing state education as revealed before. Borrowing Bergson’s (1991: 45) terminology, one can understand the revival of Confucian education as a response to an ‘encounter’, that is, a meeting or confrontation between people and things, between the state education system and Confucian activists. Deleuze (1986: 61–63) further noted that the encounter raised a series of questions on what it means ‘to act’, including: ‘should I act’, ‘to what extent am I capable of acting’, and ‘how should I act’. In the encounter with state education, parents considered exercising a degree of choice over whether to act one way or another (White 2008). They experienced a constant ‘ethical restlessness’, which functions as an ‘affective stirring of the soul’ or an ‘upheaval of the depth’ (ibid: 52). This uneasiness influenced an aspiration towards openness, change, and rupture, provoking parents ‘to dispense with habitual modes of thinking and to embrace profoundly new insights and ideas’ (ibid: 52). All of the parents reported

106  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations having experienced a strong sense of moral anxiety about the corrupting influence of society on their children’s ethical performance. These feelings confirmed their belief in the potential of Confucian education to enhance students’ moral cultivation through extensive study of classics. The emotions of ethical uneasiness and anxiety surrounding education are closely related to the conscience and call on a person to extend the intuitive knowledge outward and take prompt actions. Parents were thus motivated to transfer their children from the state education system to Confucian education. Despite the disruptive actions associated with their claim for this educational right, many parental informants acknowledged that they would have to consider returning their children to state schools after a couple of years of dujing education due to the lack of institutional channels for further Confucian studies. Although parents were outspoken in their criticism of state schooling, they worried that their children would not be able to attain a university degree if they continued with their Confucian education and, therefore, would be at a disadvantage in the job market (see also Dutournier and Wang 2018). Also, parents’ concerns were related to the incompatibility of the curriculum provision at Yiqian School with the state-mandated curriculum. On the one hand, as a school known for teaching the classics, Yiqian School was highly regarded by the local government and given a considerable degree of autonomy to offer major courses in Confucian classics. On the other hand, as a state-approved private school, it was sometimes required by the local education bureau to teach the national curriculum, but these classes only played a marginal role. Due to lacking a systematic arrangement for teaching the state-stipulated courses, students were unable to keep up with them and instead spent most of their time memorizing the classics. In summary, the claim for the right to Confucian education presents one case for understanding modern citizenship from the Chinese perspective. By analysing this case, I show that the Confucian term ‘extending innate knowledge’ endows the act of citizenship with novel meanings embedded in the local context, just as the notion of ‘act of citizenship’ expands the application of the Confucian term to Chinese citizenship practice. Summary In this chapter, I explored the relationship between the revival of Confucian education and citizenship by addressing four civic dimensions—identity, right, responsibility, and act. First, I discussed the shaping of the Confucian identity of ordinary individuals in Confucian classical education by revealing two key discourses of Chinese culturalism and criticizing state education. On the one hand, the ideology of Chinese culturalism endowed Confucian education activists with a sense of cultural privilege by enabling them to embrace a belief in the superiority of classical Chinese culture over modern Western culture. On the other hand, their critical attitude towards state education reinforced the moral legitimacy in arguing for their involvement in Confucian classical education. They employed both discourses to fashion their Confucian identity and associated them with other

Confucian identity, rights, righteousness, and acts of citizenship  107 discourses of citizenship rights, responsibilities, and acts in their engagement in Confucian education as an alternative form of schooling. Second, I drew attention to the widespread circulation of the discourse on the right to education within Confucian education. Claiming the right to run a private Confucian school and the right to choose Confucian education, Confucian activists appealed to the socialist state to create more space for individual citizens to experiment with diversified, alternative forms of education outside the state apparatus. Third, focusing on the emerging discourse of righteousness, I revealed how this particular Confucian ideology contributed to Confucian education activists’ sense of civic responsibility. Articulated through local terminologies, such as common humanity, the Dao, and rationality, which scholars rarely discuss in current citizenship studies, Confucian activists relied on the discourse of righteousness to convince the state that Confucian education embodies a return to human nature, aligns with the natural law of human development, and is thus able to maximize children’s moral development through extensive memorization of seminal classics. Through this discourse, activists called upon all individuals to take actions to realize Confucian education as the righteous type of education by requiring children to study the classics, establishing private Confucian schools, or engaging in the promotion of classical education in any form as a means of taking responsibility for the revival of Confucianism. Finally, the call to individuals to engage in the revival of Confucian education relates to the fourth aspect of civic acts, the Confucian idea of ‘extending innate knowledge’, and its contribution to translating private ethical reflection into creative acts of citizenship. I argue that one’s motivation for civic action is closely associated with moral introspection. Driven by a strong sense of Confucian morality, parental activists criticized the deviation of state education from common humanity. Their ethical restlessness directly drove them to creatively disrupt the conventional state education pathway and transfer their children to the less mainstream option, Confucian education. Their acts were creative in the sense that they posed a challenge to the authority of the state and created new possible forms of schooling by disrupting the status quo of education in China. In addition, this study reveals the incongruence or contradictions in the application of the purported Confucian education ideal put forward by Wang Caigui in the everyday practices of teachers, parents, and students. There are many tensions and complexities among the parties involved in Confucian education. The appearance of these four significant elements of citizenship in Confucian education and their crucial role in the revival of Confucian education advocacy challenge the stereotype that Confucianism contradicts contemporary Chinese citizenship, as also revealed in Chapters 1, 2, and 3 of this book. While the Confucian approach does emphasize relational hierarchy, social responsibility, and loyalty to authority (Yu 2020), Confucianism and citizenship share complementary ideas that are more likely to yield coexistence rather than incompatibility (Wang 2015, 2021). Moreover, this compatibility is intensified by the recent academic discussions among Confucian scholars on how Confucianism is able to contribute to

108  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations the development of civic rights (Chen 2021), individual entitlements (Sun 2017), a sense of responsibility (Chen 2016), and social equality (Angle 2012). In this sense, this chapter offers a more nuanced understanding of the implications of Confucianism on the formation of the modern Chinese citizen. In the previous theoretical reflection chapters, I have justified the theoretical possibility of the rise of a new type of citizen—the Confucian citizen. In the present chapter, I go further with empirical evidence to bolster the idea that the Confucian citizen is emerging and developing under contemporary China’s cultural, political, and social conditions. However, the focus of this chapter is on the groups of teachers and parents involved in Confucian classical education, but it does not sufficiently present students’ voices and how these voices may influence the cultivation of Confucian citizens in everyday schooling. This scholarly lacuna is to be addressed in the next chapter. Notes 1 For more details on the background of the revival of Confucian classical or dujing education, please refer to the Introduction of this book. 2 It is worth noting that the re-emerging Confucian education institutions do not necessarily operate in opposition to the state education system. As Billioud and Thoraval (2015: 35) indicated, some Confucian-inspired educational practices may also develop within and be complementary to existing academic institutions. Nonetheless, regardless of the extent of institutional complementarity or competition, the individual practitioners of Confucian education demonstrate to some degree a common dissatisfaction with state education. 3 For more details on the methodological issues, please refer to the Introduction of this book. 4 Chinese culturalism was prone to evolve into cultural nationalism when subjected to foreign invasion, which scholars believe occurred as early as the Song dynasty. With the fall of the Song dynasty, the original international order centred on the Chinese dynasty began to collapse. The imagination of tianxia (all-under-heaven) held by the scholarbureaucrat class was thus forced to transform into a more realistic notion of nationalism. As a result, the borders of China as a nation-state gradually began to become apparent, the world shrank to become ‘China’, and the four barbarians turned into adversaries (Ge 2011: 47–51). Since then, an anxious nationalist sentiment has prevailed among the Chinese intellectual community in response to the danger of foreign oppression. In particular, modern China’s encounter with Western powers has reinforced this nationalist view rooted in and derived from the ideology of Chinese culturalism. 5 Interview in June 2012. 6 Interview in June 2012. 7 Interview in July 2012, italics added by the author. 8 Regarding Wang’s 2015 speech, see https://www.rujiazg.com/article/5494 (May 2015), accessed on 28 August 2022. 9 Interview in 2015. 10 Interview in 2015. 11 For the whole speech text, see https://mp.weixin.qq.com/s/f__OHFcZxQHpm 465mDt5sQ (October 2015), accessed on 28 August 2022. 12 Interview in 2012. 13 Interview in 2015. 14 The Analects 4.10, translation by Slingerland (2003: 32). 15 Interview in 2015.

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110  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations Isin, Engin F., and Greg M. Nielsen. 2008. “Introduction.” In Acts of Citizenship, edited by Engin F. Isin and Greg M. Nielsen, 1–12. London: Zed Books Ltd. Isin, Engin F., and Bryan S. Turner. 2002. “Citizenship Studies: An Introduction.” In Handbook of Citizenship Studies, edited by Engin F. Isin and Bryan S. Turner, 1–10. London: Sage Publications. Joppke, Christian. 2007. “Transformation of Citizenship: Status, Rights, Identity.” Citizenship Studies 11 (1): 37–48. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621020601099831. Kipnis, Andrew. 2006. “Suzhi: A Keyword Approach.” The China Quarterly 186 (July): 295–313. https://doi.org/10.1017/S0305741006000166. ———. 2011. Governing Educational Desire: Culture, Politics, and Schooling in China. Chicago, IL and London: University of Chicago Press. Lau, Din-cheuk. 1984. “Introduction.” In Analects, edited by Din-cheuk Lau, 1–11. Hong Kong: The Chinese University Press. Leuchter, Noa. 2014. “Creating Other Options: Negotiating the Meanings of Citizenships.” Citizenship Studies 18 (6–7): 776–90. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2014.944780. Lin, Yusheng. 2000. “Ershi Shiji Zhongguo de Fanchuantong Sichao Yu Zhongshi Wutuobang Zhuyi (Anti-Traditional Trend of Thought in Twentieth Century China and Chinese Utopianism).” In Ershi Shiji Zhongguo Sixiang Shilun: Shang (Collected Works of Twentieth Century Chinese Thought History: Volume One), edited by Jilin Xu, 441–79. Shanghai: Oriental Press. Marshall, Thomas Humphrey. 1962. “Sociology: The Road Ahead.” In Citizenship and Social Class, edited by Thomas Humphrey Marshall. London: Heinemann. Nyíri, Pál, and Joana Breidenbach. 2005. China inside out: Contemporary Chinese Nationalism & Transnationalism. Edited by Pál Nyíri and Joana Breidenbach. Budapest: Central European University Press. Piper, Heather, and Dean Garratt. 2004. “Identity and Citizenship: Some Contradictions in Practice.” British Journal of Educational Studies 52 (3): 276–92. Qian, Mu. 1994. Zhongguo Wenhuashi Daolun (Introduction to Chinese Cultural History). Beijing: Commercial Press. Rocca, Jean-Louis. 2017. The Making of the Chinese Middle Class: Small Comfort and Great Expectations. New York: Palgrave Macmillan. Shotter, John. 1993. “Psychology and Citizenship: Identity and Belonging.” In Citizenship and Social Theory, edited by Bryan S. Turner, 115–38. London: Sage Publications. Slingerland, Edward. 2003. Confucius Analects. Journal of Chinese Philosophy. Vol. 32. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing Company. https://doi. org/10.1111/j.1540-6253.2005.00195_2.x. Stevenson, Nick. 2010. “Cultural Citizenship, Education and Democracy: Redefining the Good Society.” Citizenship Studies 14 (3): 275–91. Sun, Xiangchen. 2017. “Xiandai Geti Quanli Yu Rujia Chuantong Zhong de Geti (Individual Rights in Modern Time and ‘Individual’ in Confucian Tradition).” Wenshizhe (Journal of Literature, History and Philosophy), no. 3: 90–106. Townsend, James. 1992. “Chinese Nationalism.” The Australian Journal of Chinese Affairs 27: 97–130. Tu, Wei-ming. 1989. Centrality and Commonality. Albany, NY: SUNY Press. Tu, Weiming, ed. 1996. Confucian Traditions in East Asian Modernity: Moral Education and Economic Culture in Japan and the Four Mini-Dragons. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. https://books.google.com/books?hl=en&lr=&id=4GakOLRfgREC& pgis=1.

Confucian identity, rights, righteousness, and acts of citizenship  111 Wang, Caigui. 2009. Jiaoyu de Zhihuixue (Wisdom of Education). Nanjing: Nanjing University Press. (In Chinese). ———. 2014. Dujing Ershi Nian (Two Decades of Classics Reading Education). Beijing: Zhonghua Book Company. (In Chinese). Wang, Canglong. 2015. “Confucianism and Citizenship: A Review of Opposing Conceptualizations.” In Theorizing Chinese Citizenship, edited by Zhonghua Guo and Sujian Guo, 49–81. New York: Lexington Books. ———. 2018. “Debatable ‘Chineseness’: Diversification of Confucian Classical Education in Contemporary China.” China Perspectives, no. 4: 53–64. https://doi.org/10.4000/ chinaperspectives.8482. ———. 2020. “Educating the Cosmopolitan Citizen in Confucian Classical Education in Contemporary China.” Chinese Education and Society 53 (1–2): 36–46. https://doi.org/ 10.1080/10611932.2020.1716613. ———. 2021. “Confucianism and Citizenship Revisited.” In Routledge Handbook of Chinese Citizenship, edited by Zhonghua Guo, 287–300. London: Routledge. https://doi. org/10.4324/9781003225843-26. ———. 2022a. “Parents as Critical Individuals: Revival of Confucian Education from the Perspective of Chinese Individualisation.” China Perspectives, no. 2: 7–16. ———. 2022b. “Right, Righteousness, and Act: Why Should Confucian Activists Be Regarded as Citizens in the Revival of Confucian Education in Contemporary China?” Citizenship Studies 26 (2): 146–66. https://doi.org/10.1080/13621025.2022.2042674. ———. 2024. “Interweaving Nationalism and Cosmopolitanism in the Cultivation of Confucian Citizens through Classics Reading in Contemporary China.” Citizenship Teaching and Learning, no. 1. Forthcoming. Wang, Canglong, and Sébastien Billioud. 2022. “Reinventing Confucian Education in Contemporary China: New Ethnographic Explorations.” China Perspectives, no. 2: 3–6. https://www.cefc.com.hk/article/editorial-reinventing-confucian-education-in-­ contemporary-china-new-ethnographic-explorations/. Wang, Jiajia, Bin Wang, and Cuihong Wu. 2017. “Survey Report on ‘Home Schooling’ in China (2017) (Zhongguo ‘Zaijia Shangxue’ Diaocha Baogao (2017)).” Beijing. http:// www.21cedu.org/. White, Melanie. 2008. “Can an Act of Citizenship Be Creative?” In Acts of Citizenship, edited by Engin F. Isin and Greg M. Nielsen, 44–56. London: Zed Books Ltd. Xu, Jilin. 2014. “Xin Tianxia Zhuyi Yu Zhongguo de Neiwai Zhixu (New Tianxiaism and Internal and External Orders in China).” In Zhishi Fenzi Luncong: Di 13 Ji (Forum of Intellectuals: Volume 13), edited by Jilin Xu and Qing Liu, 3–25. Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House. Yan, Yunxiang. 2010. “The Chinese Path to Individualization.” The British Journal of Sociology 61 (3): 489–512. ———. 2011. “Chapter One: The Changing Moral Landscape.” In Deep China: The Moral Life of the Person, edited by Arthur Kleinman, Yunxiang Yan, Jun Jing, Sing Lee, Everett Zhang, Tianshu Pan, Fei Wu, and Jinhua Guo, 36–77. Berkeley: University of California Press. Yi, Lin. 2011. “‘Wenhua, Quanli Yu Kunjing: Zhongguo de Wenhua Zhuyi Yu Zuqun Bianjie’ (Culture, Power and Predicaments: Chinese Culturalism and Ethnic Boundaries).” Guojia Yu Shehui (Journal of State and Society), no. 10: 207–38. Yu, Jiyuan. 2006. “Yi: Practical Wisdom in Confucius’s Analects.” Journal of Chinese Philosophy 33 (3): 335–48.

112  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations Yu, Tianlong. 2008. “The Revival of Confucianism in Chinese Schools: A HistoricalPolitical Review.” Asia Pacific Journal of Education 28 (2): 113–29. https://doi. org/10.1080/02188790802036653. ———. 2020. “Does Democracy Still Have a Chance? Contextualizing Citizenship Education in China.” Chinese Education and Society 53 (1–2): 14–24. https://doi.org/10. 1080/10611932.2020.1716609. Zhao, Zhenzhou, and Canglong Wang. 2023. “Beyond the State’s Reach? Education and Citizen Making in China.” Social Transformations in Chinese Societies, no. 1. Forthcoming.

5

Discursive, practical, and institutional paradoxes Cultivating students to become Confucian cultural citizens through reading the classics

Cultural citizenship and Confucian education In this chapter, I explore the making of Confucian citizens from the lens of cultural citizenship. The chapter focuses on students who engage in classical or dujing (classics reading) education at a Confucian school, Yiqian School. Studies on Western citizenship have experienced a pivotal cultural transformation since the 1970s that has involved the unpacking of the legal and political aspects of citizenship and increased interest in their relevant cultural implications (Delanty 2002; Isin and Turner 2002; Turner 2001). Traditionally defined, the formal elements of citizenship have always had cultural underpinnings. Turner (2001: 11–12) argued that one’s formal legal status ‘is closely associated with the particular cultural forms of law in a given society’. Additionally, Kalberg (1993: 91) indicated that cultural forces ‘play a central part in the rise of modern citizenship’. Concomitantly, individuals’ cultural rights have been proposed as the fourth type of citizenship rights (i.e., in addition to their civil, political, and social rights; Roche 1992; Turner 1993). Nonetheless, these early formulations of the emerging concept of ‘cultural citizenship’ merely reflect an extension of the legal and political framework of citizenship to the cultural sphere. They are established on an overly simplistic assumption that citizenship exclusively involves an individual’s membership in ‘an administratively centralized, culturally homogeneous form of political community’ (Carens 2000: 161). Such narrow views of citizenship assume citizens of nation-states to be individuals who live in unified, homogeneous, and integrated national cultures, while excluding minority cultural groups to varying extents (Stevenson 2001). As a result of decolonization and increasing globalization, the binding of citizenship and the nation-state—which was once taken for granted—has begun to unravel. The division of public opinions and diversification of lifestyles have also disproved assumptions of cultural homogeneity (Stevenson 2001; Turner 1994, 2001). Consequently, in areas such as social media, education, consumption, and daily life, there have been growing claims of cultural citizenship, whereby heterogeneous cultural groups have sought to demonstrate their unique cultural identities and preferences, defend the rights or legitimacies of their own cultures, and make public life more inclusive (Rosaldo 1994a, 1994b, 2003; Stevenson 2001, 2003; Yi 2015). Moreover, post-modern scholars view cultural citizenship as a fluid, DOI: 10.4324/9781003343455-8

114  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations open, less denotational, multidimensional, and multi-layered concept (Delanty 2002; Ong et al. 1996; Turner 2001). This perspective assumes an individual who is deprived of cultural citizenship to be excluded entirely from social and political memberships (Stevenson 2001: 3). According to Delanty (2002), there are two compelling approaches for establishing cultural citizenship. The first embraces liberal communitarianism and emphasizes the necessity of creating an established state that accommodates a diversity of cultural identities, respects and tolerates cultural differences, and recognizes the rights of excluded or marginalized cultural groups (Kymlicka and Norman 2000). The second adopts the perspective of cultural sociology and emphasizes citizenship based on the sharing of common experiences, the learning process, and empowerment (Stevenson 2001). Notably, cultural sociology focuses on cultural discourses in daily activities as well as routine practices, which allow individual citizens to conflate the personal and political dimensions of citizenship and make new demands for cultural rights in informal communicative situations and ordinary life experiences (Delanty 2002). The changing academic paradigm on cultural citizenship presents a fitting opportunity to investigate the potential compatibilities between Confucianism and citizenship, and to deepen the understanding of the rise of Confucian citizens from a cultural perspective. In particular, cultural sociology may provide an effective conceptual framework for explaining the complexities of Confucianism and citizenship in Chinese society. As an example, consider the learning process, which is crucial for the development of cultural citizens. From the perspective of cultural citizenship, the learning process is important because it allows citizens to embed themselves into various social relationships, and to acquire knowledge about the ethical ways of living—both on their own and with others (Delanty 2002; Stevenson 2001). Likewise, centring on the ethical self, Confucianism emphasizes the importance of the learning process for cultivating an individual’s morality, where ‘particular kinds of obligations and entitlements by which one lives vary largely according to the social roles that one plays’ (Tiwald 2012: 245). Moreover, cultural citizenship adopts a subjective view of citizen making; it values individual citizens’ reflexivity and cognition. In the same vein, Confucianism attaches great importance to the practice of self-cultivation in the nurturing of junzi (virtuous persons), who maintain introspective and deliberative behaviours in both their private and social lives through their constant practice of ritual activities and study of Confucian classics. In addition, cultural citizenship emphasizes the importance of shared experiences in helping individuals to develop mutual understanding and learning to respect one another. This emphasis on shared experiences is also found in traditional Confucian virtues, such as ren (benevolence), shu (forgiveness), and zhong (loyalty). In this chapter, I investigate the complex and at times contradictory discourses and practices of students of Confucian dujing education. From interviews and observations of dujing students and their parents and teachers at Yiqian School, this chapter aims to reveal the discursive, practical, and institutional paradoxes in dujing students’ paths to become Confucian cultural citizens. Adopting the

Discursive, practical, and institutional paradoxes  115 perspective of cultural sociology, I define cultural citizenship as the process by which agents interpret their social, cultural, and political conditions to create social and symbolic boundaries (Lamont and Molnár 2002),1 and which, adhering to those boundaries, acts to generate an identity or position and a reflexive understanding of it. In this light, Confucian cultural citizenship can be described as a process by which agents reflexively construct their ethical and political relations in everyday discourse and practice by identifying socio-symbolic boundaries to differentiate themselves from other groups. In the specific context of the Confucian school, dujing students construct their identities as Confucian cultural citizens by identifying symbolic and social distinctions between their Confucian classical education and state education. In the following sections, I first present dujing students’ use of moral discourse to symbolically differentiate their Confucian education from state education and— in line with these distinctions—cultivate four typical Confucian-inspired civic virtues: the spirit of learning, ethical reflection, the awareness of cultural rights, and the sense of cultural responsibility. Next, I reveal the practical and discursive contradictions that the students encounter between individualistic and authoritarian ideologies when developing their identities as Confucian cultural citizens. Finally, I clarify the institutional dilemmas encountered by dujing students and their parents when attempting to get their Confucian education recognized by the state and society. Moral boundaries and Confucian civic virtues that students encounter in their reading of the classics Many of the students at Yiqian School had previously attended state schools but encountered academic difficulties in these environments; some were even discriminated against by their teachers for being ‘weak students’ (chasheng). Indeed, a failure to adapt to the teaching environment and to grasp the academic content in a state school was one of the most common reasons for the students to enrol in Confucian dujing education. They criticized the state education system for being examination-oriented and emphasizing the pursuit of high test scores and promotion rates (Dello-Iacovo 2009; Thogerson 2000). Furthermore, they argued that undertaking an extensive study of the classics would allow them to develop and benefit from a high level of cultural competence. Therefore, many dujing students felt that their dujing education would effectively compensate for the shortcomings of an examination-oriented state education (see also Wang 2014). As will be clarified throughout this section, this symbolic distinction between state education and Confucian classical education generates a discourse along moral boundaries. This ‘moral boundary discourse’ not only differentiates the two forms of education, but it also places them into a cultural hierarchy based on their potential to cultivate students’ moral qualities and cultural competencies. The main argument is that the moral boundary discourse profoundly influences the ways that dujing students shape their self-identities and civic awareness. Below, I first describe the moral boundary discourse that dujing students generate and apply. Next, I analyse

116  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations how the moral boundary discourse influences the ways that students perceive four Confucian-inspired civic virtues. Moral boundaries between state education and Confucian education

When I asked the students at Yiqian School about the new experiences that the Confucian classical education has introduced to their lives, many of them responded by comparing their learning process of Confucian classics with their education in state schools. This was expected, given that many dujing students previously attended state schools, and many had similar unhappy experiences while at those schools. Notably, when recalling their experiences at state schools, many students applied a moral discourse to identify symbolic boundaries between state education and dujing education. Specifically, they saw state education as an immoral form of education, which went against the basic law of human nature, and which suppressed their moral development. In contrast, they described dujing education as a moral education system, which aimed to cultivate their characters and teach them to behave appropriately in society. This moral boundary discourse is exemplified in the following excerpt from a conversation between two students, Meimei and Junjun. Meimei (girl, 15 years old): I think that state education of today does not adequately develop students’ moral characters. Actually, it prevents students from speaking the truth and teaches them to be concerned only with their personal interests and external performance, while failing to guide them to pursue spiritual richness. Therefore, I would say that the state education system has become an inhuman institution. Junjun (boy, 14 years old): The state school teaches students to deceive people and themselves! Picture the following scene. You do not know the answer to a question that a teacher asks the class and thus do not raise your hand to volunteer an answer. Yet, the teacher criticizes or punishes you for not making an attempt to answer their question. Consequently, in the following classes, you will raise your hand to answer a question even if you do not know the answer.2 Many dujing students that I interviewed held a similar opinion, especially those who had engaged in classics reading for over three years. Notably, the students’ moral critique of state education demonstrated that they had consciously reflected upon their personal education experiences. They argued that state education produced merely ‘inferior products’, where ‘products’ referred to students and ‘inferior’ could be understood as immoral. They also criticized the headteachers and regular teaching staff of China’s primary and secondary schools for their incapability to decide on academic curricula and their contents. One student shared that the teachers in state schools could not ‘make decisions by themselves’ and consequently, ‘even if the teachers were eager to improve the state education system, they would still have to accept it as it was’.3 Another student doubted that the teachers in state schools knew of the true objectives of state education because they appeared to be too preoccupied with more trivial issues, such as meeting the

Discursive, practical, and institutional paradoxes  117 demands of officials from the local education bureau and pressuring students to achieve high scores in examinations.4 Overall, the dujing students believed that the teaching in state schools failed to enhance their moral qualities. Many of the students I interviewed attributed the failure of state education to cultivate their moral qualities to the negative effects of an examination-orientated education (yingshi jiaoyu) system, which they associated with stress and excessive workloads. They complained that an overloading of tests and examinations had left them feeling somewhat depressed, frustrated, and tired of studying. Some of the students confessed to defying the highly disciplined academic environment at state schools, such as by ignoring their homework, skipping classes, fighting with their classmates, and arguing with their teachers. Moreover, the students expressed that the examination-orientated state education system resulted in a school-wide hierarchy that distinguished and discriminated students based on their academic performance. An 11-year-old boy shed tears when sharing his experience at a state school. He told me that students in his class were classified into ‘good’ and ‘bad’ according to their academic performance, and that the teachers showed preferential treatment towards the ‘good students’ who had obtained higher scores, while treating the ‘bad students’ who had obtained lower scores far more poorly. As he had the poorest academic performance in the class, the boy was often despised, neglected, and even cursed at by his homeroom teacher (banzhuren) at the state school. He had no friends because no one would play with a bad student. I was shocked when he disclosed that he had intended to commit a crime or even suicide if he could not escape from the state education system.5 In contrast to their criticism of state education for being an immoral system, the students praised Confucian dujing education as a moral form of teaching and learning, which they considered to effectively and efficiently cultivate their moral characters. A quote from a 14-year-old male student who had begun reading the classics at the early age of six illustrated this point: Most students will more or less improve in their moral and intellectual capabilities after reading the classics for some time. Of course, a couple of pupils may not benefit much from classics reading. But I would say that most students are on the right track of self-development, and that this is in sharp contrast to the state-educated students, who have stagnated in their moral development. I have a good friend who studied in the same class as me at the state school. When I returned home to visit him last year, I was surprised to see his hair covering one eye, pretending to be cool.6 To many of the students, dujing education provided a way out of the highly disciplined and oppressive state school system and an opportunity to re formulate themselves and nurture their civic consciousness. Through extensive study of the classics, the students strengthened their self-awareness. Consequently, this allowed them to develop a sense of citizenship, which involved them embracing rather than rejecting the tradition of Confucianism. In other words, traditional cultural recourses served as constitutive norms of the students’ civic subjectivities. Next, I focus on four typical Confucian-inspired civic virtues that the students developed

118  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations through their reading of the classics: the spirit of learning, ethical reflection, the awareness of cultural rights, and the sense of cultural responsibility. I do not mean that dujing students merely develop and exhibit these four virtues. Rather I use them as examples to show how these students cultivate subjective perspectives as citizens of Confucian culture through their classical education. Learning as a Confucian civic virtue

Xue (learning) is a key concept in Confucian teaching. For example, the first sentence in the opening chapter of The Analects begins on the topic of xue: ‘To learn and subsequently to have the occasion to practice what you have learned—is this not satisfying?’7 In Confucianism, xue does not only entail the accumulation of knowledge but also the acquisition of appropriate behaviours in private and public life, as well as the integration of academic knowledge and moral character into a comprehensive framework (Gardner 2014). In particular, Confucianism emphasizes the necessity of learning to better oneself as compared to learning to impress others. In contemporary Confucian classical education, the spirit of learning is promoted by educators and internalized by students as a core virtue. To become qualified Confucian citizens, students are expected to develop civic virtues and public ethics through their persistent study of the classics and the practice of rituals in daily life. The moral boundary that is drawn between state education and dujing education plays a significant role in this process. Jianjian, a 15-year-old boy who had studied classics at Yiqian School for three years at the time of the interview, reported that his attitude towards learning had changed after reading the classics. Describing his learning experience at the state school, Jianjian said, ‘I just didn’t want to study anything. I was feeling unhappy and annoyed about studying.’ However, since reading the classics, Jianjian had gradually realized the value of an education, developed good learning habits, and acquired the capabilities of selfreflection and self-discipline. In a regular conversation that I had with Jianjian one day, he reflected on the various skills that he had learned: In terms of reading the classics, I am already a student who enjoys the course. In terms of studying philosophy, I am now a student who loves the course and has surpassed the level of knowing it. But in terms of practising martial arts, I am the one who knows it but does not love it. I must exercise much willpower to overcome laziness every morning when I get up. Well, it may be because I still know little about it [martial arts].8 In the excerpt above, Jianjian applied the three progressive levels of ‘knowing’, ‘loving’, and ‘enjoying’ from The Analects to summarize the differences between his experiences in, respectively, practising the martial arts, studying philosophy, and reading the classics.9 Such introspective practice is regarded a valuable form of learning in Confucian education, which emphasizes the actualization of the principles of the learned classics in ritual practice and the creation of personal interpretations of the classical scripts through integrating them with one’s life experience (Chen 2012). Accordingly, the students at Yiqian School were expected to study the

Discursive, practical, and institutional paradoxes  119 classics to develop their competencies in introspection and to apply the Confucian spiritual tradition when developing their subjectivity. More importantly, the students practised the study of the classics as a process of moral self-transformation to rectify their bad manners, correct their uncivilized behaviours, internalize ethical virtues, and cultivate a pleasant disposition. Among the various moral merits, willpower (dingli) represents a core merit that the students aimed to cultivate through their practice of reading the classics. They admitted that rote learning of the classics was a boring process. Some students even tore up their textbooks when they could no longer endure the boredom. Nonetheless, with guidance and encouragement from their teachers, the students gradually learned to bear the boredom of reading the classics and eventually saw the task as an exercise to improve their willpower and develop their capabilities of self-control and self-discipline. Hence, persevering in memorizing the classics became a practice of self-cultivation to overcome bad qualities such as laziness, impatience, fickleness, and a lack of concentration. This point is reflected in the quote below from a 13-year-old female student who said: Well, reading the classics is boring in the beginning. You cannot help asking yourself a hundred times ‘why do I have to read the classics?’ and ‘what is the value of doing this?’ However, the more texts you memorize, and the longer you sit in the chair, the more you become used to the boredom. In the end, you will strengthen your willpower and boost your resilience by overcoming the tedium of reading the classics.10 In their journey to become Confucian cultural citizens through the constant practice of xue (i.e., classics reading), the dujing students also acquired and displayed the virtue of self-motivation. The intrinsic motivation to learn is considered a core attribute of a Confucian learner. By strengthening their self-motivation to engage in reading the classics, the students could better manage their studies and control their ‘evil desires and emotional impulses’ (in the words of one student) so as to become active and autonomous learners. They realized that the study of Confucianism benefited themselves rather than others. For instance, one student, a 12-year-old boy, said the following: I feel that reading the classics does not just allow one to learn the texts but also transforms one’s personality and develops their moral character. Frankly speaking, I initially did not want to sit in the classroom to read the classics. However, in the two years since, I seem to have gradually increased my inner self-motivation and realized the meaning behind learning the classics. What matters is not to do what people demand of you but what you truly aspire to do and what helps you to make progress.11 In the same vein, another girl of a similar age confessed to feeling anxious when she did not finish the required daily tasks of reading the classics. This feeling was in contrast to her academic performance at a state school, where, as she said, ‘I was just tired of studying, especially when the marking was poorly done’, and where she had almost ‘hopelessly given up on [herself]’.12

120  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations Developing an ethical self through studying Confucianism

As explained above, the practice of learning in Confucianism concerns the acquisition of academic knowledge and emphasizes the cultivation of a moral self that is embedded in one’s ethical relations (Chen 2016). Accordingly, contemporary Confucian classical education places much importance on the ethical dimension of students’ path to moralization into cultural citizens through continuous study of the classics. A Confucian cultural citizen should exemplify relational virtues because followers of Confucianism are always adept at maintaining appropriate relationships with themselves and other people. This issue relates to how the dujing students develop their ethical selves. As Nuyen (2002: 132) explains, in Confucianism, a person possesses an ethical self when he or she is ‘not defined in terms of the individual, but in terms of the relationship between the individual and his or her community’. The students’ ethical selves are exemplified by their ability to control their emotions and to behave rationally and appropriately in social settings. Zhuangzhuang, a 16-year-old male student who had read the classics at Yiqian School for six years when interviewed, shared his experience: I used to be rather capricious, feeling that I could do anything I wanted when I was upset. But nowadays I have grown up and read a lot of classics. I realize that such behaviours are inappropriate and will cause problems for others. Thus, I have gradually changed my personality and can now control my temper better. Being a junzi (virtuous person) means being always prudent and correcting improper conduct. Before reading the classics, I was like an angular rock. Since I started studying Confucianism, the rock’s edges and irregularities have been smoothed out.13 To develop their ethical selves, the dujing students studied family ethics and reflected on how they could better manage their relationships with their family members. Xinxin, a 14-year-old male student, shared that his relationship with his parents had greatly improved since he started reading the classics. He also said that he had recognized the necessity of communicating with his parents and putting himself in their position. He admitted that before studying the classics, he had a poor relationship with his parents; he rarely spoke to them at home and even had bitter quarrels with them at times. Xinxin believed that it was through reading the classics that he had learned how to behave appropriately towards his family and improved his relationship with his parents.14 Similarly, another male student of the same age emphasized the importance of filial piety (xiaoshun), a crucial virtue in Confucianism. By critically reflecting on the disobedient behaviours that he had previously engaged in, this student had become aware of the importance of patiently listening to his parents, seeing things from their perspective, and helping them out with the housework.15 In developing their ethical selves, the students learned to take responsibility for family matters. For example, by applying the Confucian self-cultivation technique

Discursive, practical, and institutional paradoxes  121 of ‘seeking the cause in oneself’ (fanqiu zhuji), a 16-year-old student held himself responsible for his failure to facilitate communication between his parents after their divorce, which he regarded as his duty as a son. He shared that during the time of his parents’ divorce, he was mainly occupied with escaping from reality by frequenting Internet cafes. Reflecting on his experience, the student criticized himself for lacking the courage to face the real problem and not taking on his share of the responsibility in the family.16 More generally, the students’ increased awareness of their responsibilities was not restricted to family affairs but also extended to their lives at school. One 14-year-old girl shared that she believed that studying the classics had taught her to help classmates who were in need and to get along well with them, saying: In the past, when someone hit me, I would fight back. But now, if a person were to do the same thing, I would first ask him why he did that and then persuade him not to do it again. […] When I see someone unhappy, I will sit beside her, have a chat with her, and help her to find out the reason for her unhappiness. I used to make a small effort to help others, but I never took this seriously. However, I have now changed to have the courage to face reality head-on. I am not only able to address my own problems but am also willing to help others. I can’t express how happy I am when someone gets out of trouble because of the help that I have offered!17 Students at Yiqian School also learned to care for their teachers. One teacher interviewed in 2012 recounted two heart-warming cases in which the students expressed their concern for him. ‘One morning,’ the teacher said, ‘I was lying in bed and feeling uncomfortable. I did not have my breakfast. Surprisingly, a student knocked on my door and came in to bring me breakfast!’ The same teacher shared that on another occasion, he had just arrived at Yiqian School to work as a new teacher but was feeling unwell, and a student kindly and politely asked him to return to the staff residence to rest. Moreover, several students identified with the hierarchical teacher–student relationship and respected the authority of their teachers. They admired their teachers and considered them to possess profound wisdom. They recognized their need to obey the instructions of their teachers, whom they regarded as occupying higher positions in terms of their cultural and moral sophistication. The students believed that offending a teacher was considered improper conduct, even if the teacher had indeed made a mistake. It is worth noting that the students remained reflexive in recognizing the value of respecting their teachers’ authority. That is, they offered their respect in accordance with the standards of appropriate behaviour. This point is evidenced by the following excerpt from an interview with one 16-year-old female student. She said: In my opinion, a student who deliberately embarrasses the teacher in front of others does not understand the truth of the Dao (Way). We usually say ‘wo

122  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations bu zhi dao’ (‘I don’t know’). This line literally means that a person does not know the Dao. Therefore, going against the teacher in public is a behaviour that is inconsistent with the principle of the Dao.18 Cultural rights associated with humanity

The dujing students demonstrated an awareness of cultural rights, a concept that is associated with the idea of renxing (humanity) and which has been used as the basis for justifying Confucian classical education, as clarified in the previous Chapter 4. A quote from Qianqian, a 14-year-old girl, illustrated this point: ‘My understanding of Confucian classical education is that it aligns with humanity and gives you a genuine knowledge about the reasons for living.’ Concomitantly, Qianqian criticized state education for going against basic human nature: ‘At state schools, students don’t study to understand something but merely to pass their exams. This practice does not accord with human nature.’19 I argue that it was this idea of humanity upon which Qianqian reflected that led her to determine the kind of education that she had selected for herself. In another conversation, she expressed that experiencing an alternative form of education beyond the state system, that is, dujing education, was considered one’s inalienable entitlement. She stated: I felt that I didn’t fit in the state school, so I told my parents that I wanted a new schooling environment. They disagreed initially but soon changed their minds when they realized that I could not stay in the state education system for one more minute. […] In my opinion, if you don’t want to stay in the state school, you definitely have the right to leave it.20 I have pointed out in other studies (Wang 2020, 2022c, 2024; Zhao and Wang 2023) that the widely circulating discourse on the right to education in the contemporary revival of Confucian education has often been articulated through indigenous concepts such as renxing and the Dao, which have opened up new spaces for the development of Confucian education as an alternative to the state system. I emphasize that students’ affirmation of their right to Confucian education based on humanity indicates that they recognize their right to citizenship. This presents them with the potential to pursue freedom and equality in a broader sense. In other words, the students’ cultural reflection on their right to education may go beyond that which is entitled to them legally, and result in their engagement of human rights, freedom, and equality from a broader, universal perspective. Cultural responsibility for the revival of Confucian education

The dujing students’ sense of cultural responsibility was expressed in their aspirations to promote the revival of Confucian education. Confucianism places great emphasis on the significance of establishing aspirations (Chen 2014). This was reflected in the students’ engagements in the reading of the classics. For example,

Discursive, practical, and institutional paradoxes  123 Xiaobing, a 15-year-old boy, described himself as being a person who had no aspirations when he was in state school. However, it was through reading the classics that he had gradually confirmed his ambition. He said, ‘I want to devote myself to the cause of promoting Confucian education in the future. This is the first time that I have made such a big decision independently.’21 Similarly, a 17-year-old girl disclosed that she had made it her life’s mission to revive Confucian classical education. Acknowledging that opting to read the classics was a turning point in her life, she confessed to becoming aware of her life’s meaning and obtaining a sense of direction in life.22 Qingqing, a 17-year-old male student, was determined to attend a Confucian academy upon completing the reading of the classics at Yiqian School. With regard to the ongoing construction of the Confucian academy, Qingqing said, ‘If the academy were not established soon, I would be willing to spend my whole life striving to build it up.’23 Qingqing’s statement indicated a Confucian subjectivity that links chengji (achieving something for oneself) with chengwu (achieving something for everything outside oneself), which generates an ideal state that Confucian intellectuals pursue and refers to combining one’s personal aspiration for studying the classics with the public affair of running the Confucian academy. In Qingqing’s view, the attainment of ambition should begin with enhancing self-cultivation— this is in line with the Confucian ideal of sageliness within and kingliness without (neisheng waiwang). The students’ sense of civic responsibility to revive Confucianism was also related to their strong self-motivation to study the classics. Several students that I interviewed shared their life ambitions, such as becoming a Confucian philosopher, a physical scientist, a businessman in the IT industry, and many others. Regardless of their idealized occupations, the students considered memorizing classical texts to provide the solid foundation for achieving their life goals. Evidencing this point, a female student quoted a sentence from The Analects: ‘The Master said, “At fifteen, I set my mind upon learning”.’24 She stated, ‘Although I set my mind upon learning later than Confucius, I have finally become aware of my life goal. […] Thus, I have no confusion in my life.’25 To sum up, the dujing students saw themselves as the bearers of a grand cultural mission—that is, the revival of Confucian education—and connected the progress they made in their education with the fulfilment of that mission. Given that an individual’s personal character is intrinsically linked to social conditions, their practice of moral cultivation may have a public nature and is associated with citizenship (Turner 1993). Accordingly, in reading the classics, the students also took on a public role that could help to reinforce their civic responsibility to revive Confucian education. Integrating the individual into the whole: two techniques for reading the classics to cultivate Confucian cultural citizens This section explores a practical dilemma that dujing students encountered in their efforts to forge their identities as Confucian cultural citizens. That is, although

124  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations the students learned the classics by rote memory and were encouraged to become self-motivated, autonomous learners, they simultaneously had to adhere to the collective schooling framework and the uniform pedagogic procedures that would, in turn, impede their autonomous learning. Drawing from the conceptual toolkit of Foucault, I regard the making of Confucian cultural citizens to be done by the interplay between the techniques by which individuals dominate one another and the techniques by which an individual acts upon himself (Foucault 1993: 203–4). From this perspective, the dujing students applied a series of self-techniques to develop their individual qualities but were also restricted by the collective means by which the classics were taught at school. In this section, I investigate this specific practical paradox by focusing on two particular techniques that the dujing students at Yiqian School used to read the classics. It is not my intention to present an exhaustive list of dujing techniques by the Confucian school; neither do I imply that other Confucian classical schools apply the same methods. However, the investigation of the two popular dujing techniques would illustrate the internal conflict that has emerged at this Confucian school over decisions on the precise methods used to educate the students. The self-study schedule was a standard learning technique that Yiqian School implemented with the aim of helping its students to become autonomous learners. This technique was already applied in 2012 but only within a small group of older students who had studied the classics for several years. The technique became a common practice in 2015 and was used as a means for improving all students’ independent learning skills. Notes from my fieldwork in 2015 indicate that the students drew up the self-study schedule every workday, usually during their first class in the morning. Each student had one notebook dedicated to their self-study plans. A self-study plan was divided into three sections: the time of day (i.e., the morning, afternoon, and evening), the date and the day of the week, and finally the weather. Together, the three elements made the self-study plan resemble a diary. Reading and memorizing the original classics was deemed a high-priority task in the schedule; the range of classics to be learned was explicitly marked from one sentence to another, specified with the character numbers. In accordance with their teacher’s instructions, the students would read a given passage at least 100 times before reciting it. The first step of reading was regarded as the precondition that allowed the students to achieve the following step of recitation naturally. Thus, the students were discouraged from reciting the passage if they had not read it a sufficient number of times. When a student succeeded in reciting all of the required tasks, that student would ask the teacher to present them with a stamp at the end of their study plan; the stamp would read ‘excellent’, ‘work harder’, ‘recitation done’, ‘you are great’, ‘first-rate’, ‘reading over’, or ‘100 points’. The teacher could also leave comments about the student’s academic performance or provide study advice. The self-study schedule functioned as a systematic technique for making the process of learning quantifiable and standardized based on the number of characters and pages in the text, and the number of repetitions for reading and reciting. By

Discursive, practical, and institutional paradoxes  125 making these study components quantifiable, students could play the roles of the maker, implementer, and regulator of their own learning processes. In addition, the standardized self-study schedule provided the teacher with an accessible checklist of each student’s study tasks that reflected the student’s progress. This made it easy for the teacher to monitor each student’s learning process and academic performance. As an interesting example to illustrate this point, the teacher placed a check mark within the pair of brackets that was found at the end of each task; this was effectively a means by which the teacher regulated and monitored their students’ learning of the classics. The improvement in autonomous learning was a means to collectively integrate the students into the reading of the classics. This was linked to another practical learning technique—the recitation of the entire book or baoben. Although the students were expected to develop their skills in autonomous learning by making their own study schedules, they had to submit their individual learning processes to the teaching schedule of the entire class, and to view their self-studying as a means to achieve the ultimate goal of the baoben. As a primary method for reading and memorizing the classics, the baoben was strongly advocated for and implemented at Yiqian School; it was even regarded as the touchstone of the moralizing effects of reading the classics. The school required each of its students to recite an entire classical book within a set period of time. It used this practice to test and improve its students’ memory as well as to hone their qualities of endurance, patience, and willpower. To help students achieve the goal of reciting an entire book, Yiqian School invented a systematic memorization method known as ‘seven sections, five rounds’ (qijie wulun). The so-called seven sections referred to the even division of a classical book into seven sections of equal length. Each day, the school held seven classes for memorizing the classics, one class corresponding to one section. The ‘five rounds’ referred to the full procedures that split the process of reading the classics into five parts. In the first round, the teacher led the whole class in reading sections of a classical book. In the second round, the students read those same sections by themselves. In the third round, the students had to recite the text in their respective sections. In the fourth round, the students put all of their sections together into a chapter. In the fifth and final round, the students recited the whole book. As a collective approach to classics reading, the ‘seven sections, five rounds’ method aimed to create an academic atmosphere in which all students in the class read classical texts together at similar rates of progress. I argue that the abovementioned techniques for reading the classics demonstrate the practical contradictions that emerge from Yiqian School’s efforts to simultaneously nurture its students’ autonomy and conformity. The individualized method, exemplified by the self-study schedule, and the totalized method, exemplified by the baoben, were both used to guide students to become Confucian cultural citizens. These methods instilled in the students a paradoxical set of individual and collective values. Nonetheless, the classical school appeared to place greater emphasis on the collective approach to reading the classics, that is, the baoben, regarding

126  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations it as the optimal method for developing the moral and intellectual qualities of its students. This was mainly due to the school’s aim to cultivate the wenhua dacai (great cultural talents), a concept to be addressed in the next section. Mrs Zheng, the headteacher of Yiqian School, claimed that the baoben method would enhance the students’ willpower and help them cultivate good habits. However, the students confessed that they often got upset over forgetting the classical texts they had memorized and felt frustrated in their efforts to become independent learners. Many admitted to having no interest in reading the classics after class had ended. One 13-year-old girl that I interviewed said that some of her classmates did not appear to have formed good study habits and were often absentminded when the teacher left the classroom, despite having studied the classics for a long time. Notably, many of the dujing students showed a tendency for inward attribution, that is, they ascribed their negative experiences of reading the classics to the weakness of their personalities. For instance, some students considered themselves to possess ‘selfish minds’ or ‘inappropriate desires’ (both terms by the student informants). They blamed themselves for not investing sufficient time and effort into reading the classics, and often forced themselves to spend extra time memorizing the texts. An example of this sort of behaviour was the practice of counting the number of times one had read a text. As the teacher advised the students to avoid rushing to recite the text before they had read it a sufficient number of times, the students meticulously counted the number of times they had read the text until they had reached the stipulated number. The following excerpt of a conversation that I had with a student illustrates this point. RESEARCHER:

Does the method of counting the number of times that you have read the text help you to learn? STUDENT (boy, 14 years old): Yes, it does. Even if you can recite a text after only reading it fifty times, you will still have to read it two hundred times. RESEARCHER: Why do you insist on this practice? STUDENT: Well, you must work very hard and not be opportunistic. You would forget the texts that you memorize very quickly if you only read them fifty times. But reading them two hundred times will help you to memorize them more firmly.26 Another issue that the dujing students often felt embarrassed about was their lack of understanding of the classical texts that they had learned by rote memory, despite reading them all day long. Yiqian School’s pedagogy, which was influenced directly by Wang Caigui’s educational thought, prohibited its students from reading translations or interpretations of the texts that they were meant to memorize. To gain insight into the issue, I investigated how the students reconciled their inability to understand the classical texts. Many of the students confessed to being confused about the texts. Some could merely understand a couple of sentences in the

Discursive, practical, and institutional paradoxes  127 whole book after reading the classics for a long time. Pengpeng, a 12-year-old boy, described such an experience below: I don’t really understand the texts that I am reading. I feel somewhat confused and anxious. […] I spend all day reading Confucian books and have memorized many of them. However, I still cannot understand their implications; neither can I explain the contents of the books to others. I don’t understand the books. I just keep reading them over and over again.27 Nevertheless, the same students believed that the wisdom hidden in the classical texts would exert a subtle influence on their way of thinking and their behaviours in the long term. They stated that as they accumulated life experiences, they would gradually come to understand the authentic principles that lay hidden between the lines of the classical texts that they had memorized. They also acknowledged that in the journey to achieve spiritual refinement and moral self-transformation, they could not be satisfied with the literal interpretations of the texts but should practise the acquired wisdom in their daily lives, such as by tempering their willpower to overcome the challenges of learning the classics by rote memory. Authoritarianism versus individualism in the cultivation of wenhua dacai (great cultural talents) Through an examination of the dujing techniques at Yiqian School, the preceding section sheds light on the practical contradictions that have emerged from efforts to simultaneously cultivate students’ autonomous learning and conformity. This section goes further with the aim to uncover the ideological ambivalence by focusing on the conflicting discourses of authoritarianism and individualism among students and their teachers and parents. The dujing techniques applied at Yiqian School are meant to develop its students into wenhua dacai (great cultural talents), which constitutes a core goal of the ongoing Confucian classical education in general. Wenhua dacai can be understood as a specific manifestation of the Confucian cultural citizen, one that the contemporary dujing education aims to achieve with its students. Yiqian School defines a wenhua dacai as a person who is profoundly learned and capable (manfu jinglun) through the extensive study of classics. This definition is consistent with that used generally throughout the Confucian classical education movement. To be specific, Wang Caigui clearly defined a fundamental requirement for any students who are to become wenhua dacai. This requirement is reflected in the essential criteria for admission to the Wenli Academy (Wenli shuyuan).28 That is, students must complete the memorization of Chinese classical texts (which include texts from Confucianism, Buddhism, and Taoism) that are at least 200,000 characters in length, as well as Western classical texts (in English or other languages) that are at least 100,000 words in length. Wang Caigui argued that only by achieving this requirement can students realize their potential in terms of virtue and wisdom,

128  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations prepare themselves for an integration of the ancient and modern worlds, and effectively connect Eastern and Western philosophies. Nonetheless, the dujing students expressed different views on the conceptualization of wenhua dacai and the teaching methods to foster such Confucian cultural citizens. When asked whether they aspired to become the wenhua dacai that Wang Caigui has promoted and defined, most of the students that I interviewed expressed reservations (see also Wang 2022a). First, they did not understand why Wenli Academy had made the recitation of 300,000 characters and words an essential admission criterion, nor did they agree that students who had memorized 300,000 characters and words would necessarily become cultural masters. Second and more importantly, the students perceived becoming wenhua dacai as a sacred, lofty, and unattainable ideal; one in which they had no interest. Instead, they were more concerned about their individual ambitions and self-development. I regard the discourse on the idealization of wenhua dacai as part of the sage discourse (Wang 2022a) that has been circulating widely throughout the recent revival of Confucian classical education. I define the ‘sage discourse’ as a Confucian style of authoritarian rhetoric by which individuals achieve moral cultivation, arrange their life goals according to the model of Confucian sages and saints, and devote themselves to being part of collective grand causes. Below, I examine the rise of the sage discourse within the academic environment at Yiqian School, paying particular attention to the roles that teaching staff and parents have played in the production of the sage discourse. First, the members of the teaching staff, especially those who identified with Wang Caigui’s principles of dujing education, were driven by a sense of being on a cultural mission to cultivate wenhua dacai. As explained by the headteacher, Mrs Zheng, in multiple interviews, the interruption of Confucian culture in China throughout the 20th century caused modern Chinese people to become alienated from the Confucian classics. Therefore, to compensate for these past disruptions to China’s cultural development, it was necessary to nurture the great cultural talents who had profound moral characters and were steeped in Confucian knowledge. I argue that the authoritarian sage discourse is embedded in the ethos of an emerging cultural nationalism held by Confucian education activists (Wang 2022a).29 Evidencing this is Wang Caigui’s speech from 2015, in which he declared his expectation for all students to follow the exemplary models of the ancient Confucian sages, such as by viewing the memorization of Confucian classics as an essential means for achieving moral improvement, cultivating a Confucian junzihood (i.e., the selfhood of becoming a virtuous person), and making preparations to contribute to the great mission of Confucian revival. Furthermore, I clarify the sage discourse from the logic of exemplarity, which according to Bakken (2000) implies that a human cultivates virtuous ethics and proper conduct through recitation, repetition, and imitation of the sages’ wisdom, as embodied by the classical texts (p. 169). However, a different picture emerges when one considers the perspectives of the dujing students, who appeared to defy the authoritarian form of sage discourse

Discursive, practical, and institutional paradoxes  129 and even challenge its legitimacy. I propose that the students’ objections to the authoritarian sage discourse intensified their identification with the values of soft individualism. By soft individualism, I refer to values such as self-pursuit, selfreliance, autonomy, personal interest, and individual ambition, which stand in contrast to hard individualism, which emphasizes strict rules, disciplined learning habits, and an explicit authoritarian hierarchy between adults and children (Kim et al. 2017). Both girls and boys at the Confucian school displayed the propensity for soft individualism in their experiences of reading the classics. For example, Yingying, a 13-year-old female student, did not consider reading the classics to constitute a great cause as was often stated by the activists of dujing education but merely viewed the practice from a realistic perspective. She said: It is said that reading the classics is equivalent to inheriting the sage’s knowledge and initiating peace and security for all ages. Well, if I believe this point, I am just deceiving myself because I am a nobody, and I don’t want to be a great or superior person either. I am honestly not sure how long it will take to revive Confucianism through reading the classics. Social development will not cease just for a small number of people like us. […] I don’t think reading the classics is something great or special; nor is it an education that promises a bright future.30 The above passage showcases dujing students’ feelings of self-deprecation due to their perceived failure to measure up to the high standards imposed by the Confucian school. Interestingly, this practice of retreating inwards enhanced the students’ sense of utilitarian individualism (Liu 2011), as it offered them a practical but individualistic means to deal with what they perceived to be the impossibility of the task set before them as part of a collective national project. The male students at Yiqian School also disclosed their resistance to the authoritarian sage discourse, as well as the salience of their individual awareness. The opinions of Ge Ren were perhaps the most unexpected among the students. For context, this 13-year-old boy studied extremely hard and achieved excellent performance in memorizing the classics. He was the only student in the school who had succeeded in reciting three entire classic books in one semester. Yiqian School even identified Ge Ren as a role model for other pupils. However, Ge Ren informed me that he had no interest in studying at Wenli Academy, confessing that he did not want to dedicate his life to lofty pursuits. Rather, Ge Ren aspired to do things that he personally liked, pursue his own ambitions, and create his unique life journey. He shared that he would be willing to partake in the cause of promoting Confucian education and strive to raise people’s awareness of reading Confucian classics at some point in the future, but he was not ready to make this his lifelong career.31 In the same vein, Chenchen, a 14-year-old boy, explicitly stated that pursuing advanced Confucian study at Wenli Academy was incompatible with his life plan. He explained that his life goal was to become a musician or a writer. He hoped to attend university to study a major that he was interested in, pursue his career ambition, and participate in activities that he genuinely enjoyed.32

130  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations In addition to the teaching staff, parents also played a crucial role in perpetuating the authoritarian sage discourse that was imposed upon their children. For instance, when discussing his expectations for his son, Mr Li, a staunch supporter of dujing education, used the term ‘mission’ (shiming). He said: I believe that my son was born into this world for a certain great mission. Can he achieve the realm of setting the mind for heaven and earth? I don’t know. But if you were to ask me whether I maintain such an expectation for him, I would say yes! […] It may be true that 90% of people in this world do not believe that they have life missions. But there are still 10% who take on their life missions. Perhaps my son is one of these people in the 10%. I believe he has a mission.33 Mr Li conveyed his hope for his son to pursue further Confucian studies at Wenli Academy because he regarded it as the optimal place for his son to fulfil his life mission of becoming a great cultural talent. It is noted that many of the parents interviewed acknowledged the advantages of enrolling in further Confucian studies at the Academy; a few strongly yearned for their children to attend the Academy someday. Nonetheless, there was apparent tension between the students’ individual aspirations and their parents’ expectations for their engagement in further Confucian studies. This conflict is reflected in the case of Mrs Fan and her 14-year-old daughter Keke. Ever since Keke left a state school to take up the Confucian education, Mrs Fan had been determined to send Keke to Wenli Academy. However, Keke did not fully agree with the educational blueprint that her mother had laid out for her. Mrs Fan had attempted to change Keke’s mind about Wenli Academy but ended up having numerous arguments with her. ‘I often talked with my daughter about the Academy,’ Mrs Fan recalled, ‘but every time I tried to speak of it, she would become slightly angry, saying, “I don’t want to go there at all!”’ Nevertheless, Mrs Fan refused to give up. She believed that if she held a firm faith in dujing education, she would surely and ultimately convince her daughter to attend the Academy. Mrs Fan told Keke that she would not make any concessions in insisting on her daughter’s learning of the Confucian classics. Faced with her mother’s unyielding position, Keke had no choice but to follow her demands. However, this placed Keke in a difficult situation. Although she had no intention to attend the Academy, she had to obediently remain in her Confucian school and memorize the classics daily to avoid disappointing her mother. In a group discussion, Keke confessed that she had no plans for herself except to complete the recitation of 300,000-character classics as soon as possible and to subsequently enrol in the Academy. This was because her mother had promised her that as long as she was admitted to the Academy and studied there for two years, she would be rewarded with the freedom to choose a career of her own and would be allowed to do whatever she wanted. ‘I don’t want to let my parents down’ was a common sentiment shared by the dujing students, who attempted to rationalize the embarrassing situation that they faced—that is, to continue reading the classics at Yiqian School while having

Discursive, practical, and institutional paradoxes  131 no interest in pursuing further study of Confucianism at Wenli Academy and harbouring no ambition to become the great cultural talents that Wang Caigui had advocated. I contend that the students’ obedience to parental authority reflected their internalization of hard individualism, which clashed with the soft individualism that defined their aspirations. In struggling to live up to their parents’ expectations, the students displayed hard individualism as well as the Confucian virtue of filial piety. Being filial in the Chinese context refers to a child’s obligation to follow their parents’ orders and to uphold their parents’ honour or ‘face’ (mianzi; Kipnis 2009: 215; Zhang 2016). However, for some of the students at Yiqian School, prioritizing their parents’ expectations came into conflict with their own pursuits. Consequently, the students shared that they often quarrelled with their parents in attempts to resist parental authority. In summary, I argue that the dujing students’ scepticism about the educational ideal of wenhua dacai and the related authoritarian sage discourse reveals an ideological contradiction in the Confucian school. That is, the students preferred the ethics of soft individualism that were characterized by autonomy and independence over those of hard individualism that called for them to become wenhua dacai. To clarify, I do not mean that the students rejected hard individualism completely. However, they resisted their school’s idealization of wenhua dacai and the authoritarian sage discourse and were inspired to embrace an individualistic ideology rooted in personal autonomy and freedom (see also Wang 2022a). Institutional dilemmas in the making of Confucian cultural citizens This section contextualizes the discursive and practical contradictions that emerge from efforts to shape Confucian cultural citizens through the reading of the classics (as discussed above) in broader social conditions. Particular attention is paid to the power of the state in shaping the domain of Confucian education. The main argument is that dujing students, along with their parents, have encountered institutional dilemmas in their engagement in Confucian classical education (see also Wang 2016, 2022b). The students acknowledged the cultural legitimacy of dujing education, claimed to prefer a Confucian education over that provided by the state system, and justified this preference through applying the moral boundary discourse between state education and dujing education (Wang 2016). However, they were anxious and unsure about whether their country and the job market would recognize their Confucian education. For context, although Yiqian School had officially been granted a legal license by its local government to conduct a nine-year compulsory educational programme, it did not offer the state-stipulated curriculum in its regular classes and excluded subjects such as mathematics, English language, and science. Consequently, students (as well as their parents) were concerned about their potential for integrating into the state educational system. Most of the students and parents that I interviewed expressed such concerns; they considered state education to be an institutional pathway that afforded the security of an officially accredited educational degree (xueli). This sort of anxiety was even worse among the

132  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations older students, who were directly faced with the choice of either continuing their Confucian education or returning to the state schools to prepare for the gaokao (national college entrance examination). This point is illustrated in the following excerpt from an interview with Mingming, a 16-year-old male student. He said: You have to face the problem of going to university. I have to consider this issue and many other things about my future education and life after Confucian education. One cannot be too idealistic. He should have an ideal but cannot be idealistic. Otherwise, he will become completely lost. He may indulge in flights of fancy every day. But this is of no actual use.34 Mingming was not the only student who shared such sentiments. Many of the other older students were likewise worried about their lack of a university degree and concerned that they would undermine their future prospects by continuing to pursue a Confucian classical education. In one class discussion, a boy stood up to refute the idea that a company would hire a person with sufficient knowledge and moral character, even if the person did not hold a university degree, saying: Today’s high-level companies recruit people with a strong educational background. They do not regard your knowledge, experience, or morality when they are recruiting. Instead, you have to meet the essential requirement of holding a university degree. Otherwise, you will have no chance of being shortlisted for an interview, regardless of your knowledge or moral character.35 Research has shown that young people tend to envisage well-planned rather than adventurous futures (Carabelli and Lyon 2016). In line with this, the students at Yiqian School adopted a realistic and pragmatic view of their future education; they planned to return to the state school system and subsequently attend university. They expressed that a state-recognized university degree was an indispensable ‘steppingstone’ (qiaomen zhuan) for their career development in the future. The students’ concern about acquiring a university degree was linked to their uncertainty about their social status after completing their studies in Confucianism (see also Wang 2022b). Tengteng, a 17-year-old male student, expressed his anxiety by sharing the account of another student whom teachers and parents had recognized as a model student in Confucian classical education. This model student had insisted on reading the classics for a decade until 2012 (in my experience, this was the longest duration for which a student had studied the classics by then). However, the model student eventually gave up studying the Confucian classics and left the classical school before finding work in a menial job. This story of the model student caused Tengteng great anxiety over dujing students’ social status, as evidenced by the following statement. Tengteng indicated: He [the model student] is an excellent student, whether in the state or Confucian schools. He is very smart and learns everything quickly. But even

Discursive, practical, and institutional paradoxes  133 such an excellent student is now doing a very humble job at a low social status. In fact, his story has generated some negative feedback from the dujing students and their parents at the Confucian school.36 Besides the students, the parents whom I interviewed shared similar concern about their children’s opportunities for future education after the completion of their dujing education. The parents were worried that their children would not be able to obtain a university degree if they continued with their Confucian education, and consequently, would be at a disadvantage in the job market. For example, Mrs Yan, a parent of a student, stated the following: I hope that my child will at least get a job to support herself after going to university. […] If I restrict her to the track of Confucian education and prevent her from going to university, how will she find a job when she grows up? Nowadays, Chinese society places great value on university degrees, and holding a university degree has become a precondition to embarking on a career and competing in the job market.37 Such concerns about their children’s academic degrees reflected the parents’ worries about educational and social marginalization. The parents I interviewed felt that sending their children back to state schools would prevent them from being excluded from society. When I interviewed Mrs Hua, she had already transferred her child back to a regular school. Mrs Hua confessed that she would never consider re-enrolling her son in the Confucian school if its teaching contents and methods continued to exclude the mainstream compulsory curriculum, as this would result in students feeling marginalized.38 To sum up, the dujing students were trapped in institutional dilemmas in their journey to become Confucian cultural citizens. Despite recognizing the moral benefits of learning the Confucian classics, the students eventually had to return to state schools because their education and career prospects following the completion of their Confucian studies continued to be uncertain. The students were concerned that there were limited chances to go to university and were unsure as to how they would achieve a relatively high social status after studying Confucianism. They were also anxious about whether their Confucian education experience would be recognized by the state and job market. Facing these institutional uncertainties, many of the dujing students expressed doubts over the practical value of learning the Confucian classics. For context, the realistic purpose of studying the Confucian classics in ancient China was to attend the imperial examination (keju), through which a Confucian intellectual had the opportunity to acquire a relatively high social status if he succeeded in the examination. However, this system of imperial examination was abolished in 1905, and since then studying the Confucian classics has become more challenging. Bearing this history in mind, it becomes clear that the dujing students could not persuade themselves to undertake the huge risks associated with a Confucian classical education because there was a lack of institutional channels for them to re integrate into the state system. Consequently, multiple

134  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations students admitted to having no plans to continue their Confucian education in the future, but rather hoped to return to the state schools and subsequently attend university (see also Wang 2016, 2022b). Summary In this chapter, I adopt an empirical perspective to investigate the making of Confucian cultural citizens among dujing students at a Confucian classical school. I show that the students marked moral boundaries between state education and Confucian education and considered the former to provide a weak education overall and the latter to be morally acceptable. It is noted that this moral discourse resembles the one discussed in Chapter 4, which was applied by the Confucian education activists (i.e., teachers and parents) to justify their acts of citizenship in their involvement in Confucian classical education. I clarify that such discourse on moral distinctions—commonly used by the students, teachers, and parents at Yiqian School—ultimately reflects Wang Caigui’s influential dujing education philosophy. Moreover, I also demonstrate how the dujing students used the moral boundary discourse to construct their self-identity and civic awareness. Four typical Confucian-inspired civic virtues are examined in the students’ journey to become Confucian cultural citizens: the spirit of learning, the ethical self, the awareness of cultural rights as originating from humanity, and the cultural responsibility for Confucian revival. The students becoming Confucian cultural citizens encountered practical and discursive paradoxes. In practice, they were encouraged to become autonomous, self-motivated learners; however, at the same time they were instructed to discipline their learning style and process according to the collective pedagogic framework of reading the classics. To illustrate the practical ambivalence within the Confucian school, I explore two paradoxical dujing techniques that the students at Yiqian School applied: the self-study schedule—an individualized method designed to develop students’ capabilities in autonomous learning, and the baoben (recitation of an entire book)—a totalized technique used to motivate the students to memorize the classics in large numbers. I further emphasize that the practical contradictions exemplified by the two dujing techniques suggest that the students maintained ideological ambivalence towards becoming Confucian cultural citizens. This topic is discussed with respect to the sage discourse and the idealization of wenhua dacai (great cultural talents). I demonstrate that students held contrasting opinions from their teachers and parents on the conceptualization of wenhua dacai and the relevant teaching approaches. The teachers and parents of the Yiqian School students generated and used the authoritarian sage discourse in instructing the students to read and memorize the classics in hopes of laying down the foundations for qualified wenhua dacai. However, the students exhibited a defiant attitude towards the sage discourse as well as the educational expectation to become wenhua dacai. The students’ resistance, in turn, stimulated them to embrace individualistic

Discursive, practical, and institutional paradoxes  135 values such as self-pursuit, individual aspiration, and personal ambition. The final section of this chapter explores the institutional constraints faced by the students and their parents in their journey to become Confucian cultural citizens; for example, the availability of academic degrees, the opportunity to attend university, and the concern about their social status after graduating from their study of Confucianism. The empirical findings of this chapter prove once again that Confucianism is compatible with modern citizenship and can contribute to constructing a new type of citizen—the Confucian citizen. In line with the evidence and facts discussed in this book, it is worth noting that the Confucian citizen is more of a cultural and moral concept than a legal and political one. Furthermore, the Confucian cultural citizenship exhibited by the dujing students is private in nature, being constrained by the cultural structures and institutional contexts of civic action. This point differs from the findings in Chapter 4, where the actors involved in Confucian classical education (e.g., the founders, teachers, and parents of Yiqian School) were found to embody civic activism and a public spirit. In contrast, no instances in which dujing students actualized their knowledge to engage in public civic actions were observed. This was certainly related to the fact that the students were at the schooling stage and lacked the capacity and opportunity for public action. Nevertheless, I emphasize that the students showed a willingness to take public actions in the future, as reflected in several students’ sense of responsibility for the revival of Confucian education, as well as in others’ determination to pursue their personal career ambitions. Nonetheless, the distinction between state education and Confucian education in accordance with the moral boundary discourse, and the lack of institutional channels to integrate Confucian education with the state system, may serve to limit students’ future engagement in civic actions. I suggest that this limitation is associated with the Chinese government’s regulation and management of the development of Confucian education. This is exemplified by the government’s designation of several full-time classical schools as ‘illegal organizations’ and subsequent order for a full-scale investigation in 2019. Turner (1993) posited that citizenship manifests itself as passive and private when political space is restricted. Accordingly, as Confucian cultural citizens, the students will probably develop their civic consciousness in the private sphere and restrict their actions to private matters, such as their reading of the classics and practice of family ethics. Nevertheless, Confucianism suggests that private practices are always linked with and conducive to the nurturing of public virtues. Thus, citizenship formed in the private sphere may still harbour the potential to develop public civic ethics and may result in external public actions when social and political conditions are ripe. One issue that I have not yet explored in depth is the cultural nationalism associated with the cultivation of Confucian citizens. This topic is briefly discussed in reference to the discourse on wenhua dacai in this chapter; it will be expanded on in the next chapter.

136  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations Notes 1 Lamont and Molnár (2002) clarified the differences between symbolic and social boundaries. According to these authors, symbolic boundaries are ‘tools by which individuals and groups struggle over and come to agree upon definitions of reality’, whereas social boundaries ‘are objectified forms of social differences manifested in unequal access to and unequal distribution of resources (material and nonmaterial) and social opportunities’ (p. 168). 2 Interview in 2012. 3 Interview in 2012. 4 Interview in 2012. 5 Interview in 2012. 6 Interview in 2012. 7 The Analects 1.1, translation by Slingerland (2003: 1). 8 Interview in 2012. 9 The original text is: ‘The Master said, “the one who knows it is not the equal of the one who loves it, and the one who loves it is not the equal of the one who takes joy in it”’ (The Analects 6.20). This translation is taken from Slingerland (2003: 59). 10 Interview in 2012. 11 Interview in 2012. 12 Interview in 2012. 13 Interview in 2012. 14 Interview in 2012. 15 Interview in 2012. 16 Interview in 2012. 17 Interview in 2012. 18 Interview in 2012. 19 Interview in 2012. 20 Interview in 2012. 21 Interview in 2012. 22 Interview in 2012. 23 Interview in 2012. 24 Book II Chapter 4, translation by Slingerland (2003: 9). 25 Interview in 2012. 26 Interview in 2012. 27 Interview in 2012. 28 Wenli Academy is an advanced Confucian institution established in 2012 and has since been regarded as the best avenue for further Confucian studies by activists involved in Confucian classical education. The Academy was founded by Wang Caigui, who Confucian education activists widely recognized as the most influential promoter of grassroots Confucian education in contemporary China. 29 More detailed discussions on the cultural nationalism of dujing education in contemporary China can be found in Chapters 4 and 6. 30 Interview in 2015. 31 Fieldwork data in 2015. 32 Fieldwork data in 2015. 33 Interview in 2015. 34 Interview in 2012. 35 Interview in 2015. 36 Interview in 2012. 37 Interview in 2015. 38 Fieldwork data in 2015.

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6

Between nationalism and cosmopolitanism Educating the cosmopolitan citizen in Confucian education

This chapter focuses on the nationalist and cosmopolitan orientations in the making of the Confucian citizen through classical education. Studies that have addressed the relevance of Confucianism in education to national identity and cosmopolitan consciousness have adopted either an external or internal perspective. Studies from the external perspective have situated Confucianism in education in a macro context and examined the intersection of nationalism and cosmopolitanism with a focus on the intricacies of the relations between the revival of Confucianism and various exogenous influences. For example, Cheung (2012) associated the revival of Confucianism with the Chinese socialist regime’s efforts to recast a new form of nationalism, noting that Confucianism was being rejuvenated as a new nationalist discourse to provide fresh discursive resources for sustaining authoritarianism in mainland China and legitimizing the rule of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) with reinvented symbols of traditional culture. Similarly, Ford (2015) examined how the CCP had appropriated quasi-Confucian political thinking to justify its authoritarian governance and discredit Western ideals of democratic pluralism. In addition, the Confucian concept of harmony was strategically co-opted by China to support the idea of building harmonious relations between China and other countries, and thus a harmonious world in global affairs (Wang 2014). On the other hand, studies from the internal perspective have delved deeper into Confucianism in education to explore the implications of its discourses, practices, actions, and concepts for shaping individuals’ national and cosmopolitan identities. For example, according to Bell (2014), politically-minded Confucian revivalists considered Confucianism as central to national identity, concluding that the ancient tradition of Confucianism was compatible with the modern tradition of nationalism and that it was therefore possible to defend a morally appealing form of Confucian nationalism. Billioud and Thoraval (2015) suggested that the revival of Confucian rituals across China in the first two decades of the 21st century were heralding the emergence of a cultural brand of Chinese nationalism, using the power of the state to reprocess Confucian ethics into social morals and apply educational and cultural practices to discipline the nation as a whole and shape the national identity of ­individual citizens. Furthermore, Xu (2018) demonstrated the significance of the CCP-led state’s provision of traditional Chinese culture education (with Confucianism at the core) for cultivating national identity in schools. In contrast, DOI: 10.4324/9781003343455-9

Between nationalism and cosmopolitanism  141 Wang’s (2020) study of revived Confucian education revealed its cosmopolitan orientation through an examination of the role of pedagogical discourses and practices in shaping cosmopolitan citizens who acquire Confucian virtues and a global awareness. That study, however, did not adequately address the complexities of the tensions between the cosmopolitan orientation of citizen cultivation and the nationalist emotions and identities embedded in Confucian education. From the above literature review, two interrelated research questions are raised. First, how are the intertwined nationalist and cosmopolitan orientations and their civic significance conceptualized in the theoretical discourses of revived Confucian education in contemporary China? Second, what pedagogical discourses and practices are used in Confucian schooling to nurture in students a civic subjectivity that combines national identity and global awareness? Before presenting the findings in response to these questions, some conceptual clarifications of cosmopolitanism and its relevance to Confucianism will be shown in the next section. Cosmopolitanism, Confucianism, and citizen-making This section aims to clarify the relationship between cosmopolitanism and Confucianism in citizen-making through a review of existing scholarship. While the present chapter deals with both cosmopolitanism and nationalism in the context of Confucian education, it strategically downplays the historical relevance of nationalism to Confucianism because this topic is already elucidated in Chapter 4 when discussing Chinese culturalism and its modern variant, cultural nationalism. The focus of this section, therefore, is on the association of cosmopolitanism with Confucianism, a theme that has not yet been spelled out. Cosmopolitanism is a conceptualization that can be traced back to ancient Greek and Roman philosophies and is widely discussed in Stoicism and Cynicism works. Nowadays, the dynamics of globalization and the resulting cross-border flows of capital, people, and information have re-engineered the idea of cosmopolitanism to signify an interrelated political community beyond nation-states (Hull et al. 2010). As Appiah (2006) and other scholars (e.g., Hansen 2010) conceived it, cosmopolitanism has expanded the notion of citizenship and created a new space of community, whether digital or material, where the subject practices novel forms of civic engagement. Cosmopolitan citizenship breaks through the boundaries among nation-states and blurs the relationship between private and public domains (Stevenson 2003; Turner 2006). It highlights the cultural dimension of citizenship and the critical imaginations about the relationship between self and others (Hermes 2006). In this sense, the concept of cosmopolitan citizenship requires nurturing habits of mind (Hull et al. 2010) and refers to an aesthetic, ethical, and moral subject (Hansen 2010). It can be said that the idea of cosmopolitan citizenship magnifies the formulation of cultural identity, decouples it from nation-states, national cultures, and national societies, and opens the space for accommodating universal values (Stevenson 2003). Education plays a pivotal role in cultivating cosmopolitan citizens. Hayden (2017: 254) differentiates two types of cosmopolitan education: the results-oriented

142  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations form ‘that consists of strong cosmopolitanism, empirical morality and structural cosmopolitanism’, and the process-centric kind ‘that consists of moderate cosmopolitanism, deliberative morality and dispositional cosmopolitanism’. Using Socrates and the Stoics for reference, Nussbaum (2017) proposed three core capacities for cosmopolitan education: (1) to examine one’s self, history, and world in a critical way; (2) to develop narrative imagination that facilitates the improvement of one’s empathy, tolerance, and acceptance of otherness; and (3) to see oneself as a cosmopolitan, thereby bridging the cognitive (self-examination) and affective (narrative imagination) elements. Following this framework, Nussbaum argued for an other-oriented curriculum in educating cosmopolitans, one that, in terms of Papastephanou (2003: 71), ‘regards the teaching of other civilizations not as concession and charity but as simultaneously duty and benefit for the local culture’. Nussbaum’s justification of teaching about cosmopolitanism is actualized by two ways: one is to identify cosmopolitan morality as a time-honoured ideal that reminds us of our human commonality; the other is to discern cosmopolitanism as an empirical and experiential fact associated with contemporary temporary and spatial shortcuts (Nussbaum 1996). The implicit assumption of what Nussbaum termed ‘cosmopolitan education’ is that ‘patriotism is ethically neutral whereas cosmopolitanism is ethically charged, and hence education ought to make the most of this positive ethical relevance’ (Papastephanou 2003: 73). Confucianism supports cosmopolitanism as both celebrate ‘the idea of intermingling: cultural exchanges, economic integration, and political sharing between ethnic and cultural groups’ (He 2004: 114). However, Confucianism embraces a different version of cosmopolitanism from its ancient Greek counterparts. Cosmopolitanism, as Socrates or the Stoics argued, is largely individualistic, elitist, and polis-centric. Nussbaum (1996: 15) encapsulated this orientation as ‘strong universalism’, which acknowledges the worldwide nature and universality of moral obligations and requires ‘a kind of exile—from the comfort of local truths, from the warm, nestling feeling of patriotism, from the absorbing drama of pride in oneself and one’s own’. The Confucian interpretation of cosmopolitanism, in contrast, is aligned with ‘rooted cosmopolitanism’ (Appiah 2005), which ‘takes into account localized and cultural contexts that underpin, determine and give value to social practices’ (Tan 2019: 70). For example, in her unpacking of Mencius’ extension of moral feelings, Charlene Tan (2019) indicated that Confucian cosmopolitanism is featured with an expansion of family love to the world community to achieve universal harmony. The reappearance of Confucian classical education, as one essential component of the overall Confucian revival, is a striking occurrence in contemporary China. It is true that the revival of Confucian education is intertwined with complex nationalist sentiments, such as national superiority and inferiority (Wang 2016), as already clarified in Chapter 4. However, the Confucian revival also presents a distinct orientation of cosmopolitanism beyond national concerns. Not much research has been done to explore cosmopolitanism and its intertwining with nationalism in Confucian education. Aiming to fill this literature gap, this chapter focuses on cosmopolitanism and nationalism as elements influencing the discourse and practice of citizen-making and discusses how they are construed and implemented by

Between nationalism and cosmopolitanism  143 contemporary Confucian educational practitioners. In the following sections, I first investigate the nationalist and cosmopolitan orientations by critically analysing the theoretical discourse of Confucian classical or dujing (classics reading) education. Then, I unpack the conceptualization of the ‘cosmopolitan citizen’ in the discourse context of Yiqian School and describe how students’ national identity and cosmopolitan awareness are cultivated in this Confucian school’s teaching and learning practices. This chapter concludes with the main argument that the revival of Confucian education involves an interweaving of nationalism and cosmopolitanism and faces pedagogical challenges in cultivating students as Confucian cosmopolitan citizens with a Chinese national identity. Nationalist orientation in the theoretical discourse of dujing education The theoretical discourse of Confucian dujing education embraces a combination of two orientations—nationalist and cosmopolitan. This section addresses the nationalist orientation in reference to Wang Caigui’s dujing theory, whereas the cosmopolitan orientation is to be elaborated on in the next section. Generally speaking, the nationalistic tone of contemporary Confucian dujing education is reflected in its accommodation of cultural nationalism. I have briefed the idea of Chinese culturalism in Chapter 4, a notion that evolved into cultural nationalism through integration with the rising nationalist awareness in the modern period of China. Dujing education maintains an ideology of the absolute cultural superiority of Confucianism due to the sage teaching being inherited from heaven and connected to humanity (Lin 2000). Therefore, it claims that learners should enhance their moral cultivation by reading the classics and practising rituals, thus solidifying their national identity. Specific to the context of dujing education are two manifestations of cultural nationalism: the cultural hierarchy associated with the classics and an urgent cultural mentality. I elaborate on each of them below. Wang Caigui explained the connotation of cultural hierarchy associated with the classics in a number of speeches that were later collected and widely circulated in the field of Confucian classical education. The cultural hierarchy associated with the classics categorizes ancient Chinese canonical works into ranks of cultural value. According to Wang, the Confucian classics are at the top of this cultural hierarchy, and priority should therefore be given to their study. He divided the classics into four levels as follows: The highest level comprises The Analects of Confucius, Mencius, The Great Learning, and The Doctrine of the Mean, all of which are considered the best of the classics. The second level includes The Book of Changes, The Book of Song, Daodejing, and Zhuangzi, all being of high value. The third level consists of ancient texts, Tang and Song poems, and Yuan verses. The essence of these literary works should also be selected for reading to nourish our lives. The fourth level involves the so-called enlightened reading materials, such as the Three Character Primer, The Book of

144  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations Family Names, Thousand Character Classic, Disciple Rules, and The Children’s Knowledge Treasury. (Wang 2014: 26) Of these four levels of classics, Wang (2014: 26) added, ‘Strictly speaking, only the first and second levels are considered genuine canonical texts. The others are sub-classics or preparatory classics, all of which are merely supplementary materials for teaching and learning.’ Furthermore, the classical hierarchy has been extended to the assessment of writings in classical Chinese and vernacular Chinese. Specifically, texts written in vernacular Chinese are judged to be less culturally valuable than those written in the classical style (Wang 2014: 28). A tacit assumption behind this idea of cultural hierarchy is that those cultural forms identified as being of higher value (e.g., Confucian classics and writings in classical Chinese) are deemed to encompass those identified as being of lower value (e.g., other Chinese classics and writings in vernacular Chinese), but not the reverse. This idea of cultural hierarchy associated with the classics is also reflected in the binary structure of Chinese culture as superior and Western culture as inferior in dujing education. In this regard, Wang stated: Westerners may be generous, objective, and studious, but it is difficult for them to learn Chinese culture! [In contrast,] it is easy for the Chinese to learn Western culture! So, the responsibility for global cultural integration lies with Chinese people, not Westerners. There are deep and shallow cultures. There are hard and easy ways to learn. The core of Western culture is knowledge, and logic is the key to learning knowledge. Logic is clear to understand, and knowledge can be verified. Thus, Western culture is much easier to learn. Chinese people do not have to be too anxious because the science originating in the West is not that difficult to learn. (Wang 2014: 201) The view of Chinese and Western cultures as being in a hierarchical relationship does not mean that Western culture, despite being considered of lower value, should be rejected. Rather, Wang (2014) argued that one should actively study Western cultures and integrate them with Chinese culture. Although I return to this point later, it is worth emphasizing here that the notion of cultural hierarchy exhibited by dujing education is rooted in identification with Chinese culture and accompanied by strongly nationalistic feelings and perceptions. This is typified by Wang Caigui’s argument for the ‘total transformation of the West’ (quanpan huaxi). He indicated: ‘Transformation of the West’ (huaxi) is different from ‘westernization’ (xihua). ‘Westernization’ means forgetting and denying oneself and turning oneself to be like the West. However, ‘transformation of the West’ is to achieve a robust self and, through one’s efforts, to digest the West to enrich one’s life. ‘To westernize oneself’ is nothing more than irresponsible

Between nationalism and cosmopolitanism  145 and servile attachment, whereas ‘to transform the West’ is a courageous commitment to self-determination. (Wang 2009) In discussing how to achieve a Confucian revival to transform the West, Wang Caigui displayed an urgent cultural mentality, which is the second manifestation of the cultural nationalism of Confucian education. He pointed out that the radical criticism of the Confucian tradition in modern China has led Chinese people to alienate themselves from classical Chinese culture, creating a sense of a national identity crisis. Wang (2014) suggested that solving this problem required encouraging children to extensively read classical works of high cultural value to cultivate their literacy and moral character. Moreover, based on his belief that memory is at its strongest before the age of 13, Wang urged parents and teachers to take immediate action to enable children to seize this crucial time to recite the classics extensively (Wang 2014). He stressed that reading the classics is something that cannot wait, reminding educators to engage children in memorizing the classics as early as possible but not to rush to demand children to understand the textual meanings (Wang 2014). A quintessential development in the practice of the urgent cultural mentality in dujing education is the invention of the ‘pure classics reading’ (chun dujing) model, which establishes quantitative standards for children’s memorization of the classics (Wang 2014: 114–118): at least 300,000 words (200,000 characters in Chinese and 100,000 words in foreign languages) should be recited; each classic text must be read a minimum of one hundred times; and the classics are to be read for no less than eight hours per day for ten years. Such pure classics reading model has had a direct impact on the practice of reading the classics, with some dujing schools considering only the courses of classics as their fundamental teaching content. Other aspects seen as peripheral, such as literacy, mathematics, and exegesis, are therefore put aside. Consequently, many dujing schools have set an explicit teaching objective of having students memorize 300,000 words of the classics as quickly as possible and then progress to advanced Confucian educational institutions for further studies. Cosmopolitanism and its civic significance in the theory of dujing education The idea of cultural nationalism espoused by Confucian classical education is not closed or parochial but rather an open concept that accommodates diverse cultures beyond China and can be described as ‘cultural cosmopolitanism’ (Wang 2020, 2024). Cultural cosmopolitanism in the context of dujing education refers to an ideology that embraces other cultures and integrates them with one’s own to form a shared human civilization with a universal outlook. For Wang Caigui, the development of a holistic mind entails the attainment of wisdom and life-learning rooted in Confucianism and science, as well as practical knowledge from the West,

146  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations because the latter can ‘develop human’s speculative reason’ and allow people ‘to use thinking to study nature and achieve science’ (Wang 2014: 197–99). Cultural cosmopolitanism is associated with a belief in Confucian classical education that the classics, regardless of ethnicity or nationality, originate from universal humanity and shared values and point to the ultimate concerns of individual minds (Wang 2014). This idea is rooted in the ancient Chinese culturalism ideology introduced in Chapter 4, which holds an orientation to go beyond the boundaries of certain political communities towards the tianxia (all-under-heaven) (Wang 2015, 2021; Zhao 2012). Moreover, I have clarified in Chapter 4 that the term ‘citizen’ rarely appears in Wang Caigui’s theoretical discourse; however, some civic elements such as responsibility, ethical virtue, and action (Guo 2016) frequently come to the force and are addressed from cultural and historical perspectives. Using these civic elements in his theoretical presentation, Wang emphasized that contemporary Chinese citizens should not cast off their responsibility to revitalize or carry forward Chinese traditional culture, arguing that the sense of national and cultural responsibility is derived from the common humanity that transcends racial, ethnic, and national boundaries. A person, regardless of their nationality, would generate aspirations for eternal and universal wisdom and take actions to absorb it as long as they sincerely follow their conscience (liangzhi) and investigate their inner heartmind (xin). Thus, while the motivated responsibility does involve the national culture, it also remains open to cultural essentialities of all nations in the world and aims at promoting cultural communication since the presupposed common humanity goes beyond the nation-states. On the basis of universal humanity, Wang Caigui argued that the classics hold constant human wisdom and common rules for life guidance and embody the enduring and immortal way of the sages (Wang 2014). He stated that classics, no matter which ethnic or national groups they come from, are the crystallization of universal human wisdom. Consistent with the law of human nature, they enjoy the privilege to cultivate one’s sound attitude towards life and to achieve one’s personality with cultural capability and political integrity (Wang 2014). Thus, Wang (2014) stressed that any culture in the world, regardless of which nation-state it belongs to, is worth learning as they conform to human nature. Accordingly, he (Wang 2014) claimed that the cause of reviving the dujing education should not be limited to China but is also applicable to all ethnic groups, given that different ethnic groups may have their own canonical texts to prepare people properly for life and instruct them to get on with their pursuits. Thus, the purpose of revitalizing the dujing education is not ‘for China to rise to lead the world’, but rather to promote the integration of diverse cultures around the world so that they complement each other (Wang 2014: 175). Cosmopolitanism, associated with the thesis of human commonality and cultural universalism, as clarified above, is extensively distributed in the theoretical discourse on Confucian classical education. As classics are conceived to contain universal truth or eternal wisdom (changli) that surpasses national boundaries, all nationalities should comply with the classic doctrines of their own and others. The eternality of classical wisdom is believed to originate from common

Between nationalism and cosmopolitanism  147 humanity, based on the premise that all humans feel and reason alike. In tandem with this, engaging in classics learning calls on human nature, and reading classics is proposed to be the most reasonable way to perfect humanity. Wang Caigui advocated an inclusive stance for cultural pluralism and an individualized manner of learning that associates individual learners with the entire world and all human beings. The cosmopolitanism espoused by Confucian classical education has had profound influences on teaching and learning practices. Firstly, in terms of teaching content, Wang Caigui strongly advised that students should not only read Chinese classics but also engage in learning Western great works, including English, German, and Sanskrit classics. Additionally, he suggested that children listen to world-famous music and view world-famous paintings as early as three years old. Secondly, regarding the teaching method, mechanical memorization of Western classics is recommended as the principal way to cultivate cosmopolitan cultural talents in Wang Caigui’s theory. This is the same as the memorization-based approach to the study of Chinese classics in cultivating students’ national identity (Wang 2022, 2024; Zhao and Wang 2023). I note here that the proposal of such teaching method is deeply embedded in the scientific discourse that clarifies human nature. According to Wang Caigui, the natural law of human development is to prioritize the development of memory, and then the capacity for comprehension. Before the age of 13, a person has the most power to memorize, whereas their ability to understand is relatively weak. Thus, the most appropriate way of education is to comprehensively develop their memory first, instead of forcing them to understand. This method involves repetitive reading and the memorization of the content of classic literature. Wang Caigui proposed a criterion for cultivating cosmopolitan citizens, that is, to recite at least 300,000 words of classics, of which 200,000 are Chinese, inclusive of Confucianism, Taoism, and Buddhism, and 100,000 that are non-Chinese. Once a student, ideally before the age of 13, completes the required memorization, they will become eligible for further training in a Confucian academy, Wenli Academy (Wenli shuyuan), where they will first systematically interpret the Chinese classics they have memorized and then read extensively the great books that have profound impacts on Western culture. Given that a student completes the two stages of training, they are assumed to have grasped a comprehensive understanding of human civilization and have developed a solid foundation to contribute to the bridging of Chinese and Western cultures (Wang 2014). Additionally, the concept of wenhua dacai, or great cultural talent, which is already mentioned in Chapter 5, as the ideal outcome of dujing education, serves as a typical example to further the understanding of cultural cosmopolitanism in the context of Confucian classical teaching and learning. On the official website of Wenli Academy, the term ‘great cultural talent’ is defined as follows: In this era of both worry and hope, we uphold the ideals of Confucianism and aspire to achieve eternal aspirations, hoping that a group of great cultural

148  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations talents will eventually emerge who are able ‘to set the mind for heaven and earth; to set life for ordinary people; to inherit the sage’s knowledge; to initiate peace and security for all ages’. These great cultural talents assume the responsibility to transmit the constant wisdom of the East and the West and recast a new generation of human civilization. Given this, the Chinese nation will look up to heaven and earth without shame.1 This conceptualization of the great cultural talent by Wenli Academy has both classical and modern implications. First, the specific descriptions of the great cultural talent come from the Four Sentences of Zhang Zai, a Confucian philosopher who lived during the Northern Song Dynasty (1020–1077). These four lines perfectly illustrate the sagehood and great character that Confucian intellectuals have persistently pursued throughout Chinese history. They call on Confucians to spend their lives learning the Confucian orthodoxy, developing a mind that embraces the world, serving the interests of others, and setting an example for future generations. Second, a great cultural talent has a modern connotation: one must not only carry forward the Confucian tradition but also integrate Chinese and Western cultures; not only build on the wisdom of the East but also achieve mastery through a comprehensive study of Western learning. The great cultural talent, which combines a Confucian nationalist identity with a cosmopolitan consciousness based on universal humanity, was further used by Wang Caigui to redefine the term ‘Confucian’ (rujia): There is a kind of learning that comes from everyone’s heart. It is both subjectively conscious and objectively consensual. It always aspires to the ideal and is concerned with reality at any time. It is strict with oneself and tolerant of others. It is willing to accomplish others as well as oneself. It believes all knowledge has its value and should be given due respect. And it hopes everything under heaven is in its proper place. Such learning is called ‘Confucianism’, and those who pursue this kind of learning and life are called ‘Confucians’.2 As Confucians, the great cultural talents are expected to courageously undertake the ‘Confucian aspirations’ (rujia de zhiye), as clarified by Wang Caigui: Confucianism is a philosophy of learning, doing, and keeping up with the times. Faced with different people and events, a Confucian great cultural talent is willing to make reasonable reflections and judgements and give the most appropriate settlement. In the face of various cultural systems and historical changes, a Confucian great cultural talent is willing to observe and participate, innovate and reform, and open up new horizons, believing that human wisdom can converge and integrate, and that global civilization can be shared and rejuvenated. Such Confucian aspirations have blessed the Chinese nation throughout history and have kept it alive. Such Confucian aspirations

Between nationalism and cosmopolitanism  149 are still vibrant in the contemporary era. Those who follow these aspirations are called ‘contemporary Neo-Confucians’ (dangdai xinrujia).3 Through the above rhetorical strategy, the great cultural talent defined by Wang Caigui still uses the terms ‘Confucians’ or ‘contemporary Neo-Confucians’, but its core connotation has moved away from the traditional reference to Confucianism as a specific school and its ideas in the context of Chinese culture. Instead, it implies an association with the notion of the cosmopolitan citizen who embraces cultural diversity and is committed to integrating human civilization. This notion was developed in Yiqian School’s educational philosophy (details in the next section). In this sense, the Confucian great cultural talent should possess a sense of national and cultural responsibility deriving from common humanity that transcends racial and ethnic boundaries. Furthermore, the great cultural talent aspires to pursue the eternal and universal wisdom of humanity, follows his or her conscience, and advances the global cultural exchange through persistent study. In summary, I conclude this section by summarizing three points of cosmopolitan civility according to Wang Caigui’s dujing theory. The first relates to the cultural dimension. The Confucian-inspired form of cosmopolitan citizen is essentially a cultural subject, rather than a civil or political subject, whose fundamental quality is the sophistication in both Chinese and Western classics. The second point relates to civic responsibility. The type of cosmopolitan citizen in Confucian education is endowed with dual cultural missions—they are responsible to carry forward Chinese traditional culture and also assume the obligation to grasp Western culture and promote global cultural integration. The sense of cultural responsibility derives from their examination and interrogation upon the self, whereby they involve themselves with the wellbeing of the common world and humankind. This further corresponds with the Confucian unremitting pursuit of sageliness within and kingliness without (neisheng waiwang). The third point relates to action. Learning classics, both Chinese and Western, can be understood as a cultural and civic action that is associated with the broad revival of Chinese nation and the imagined integration of Chinese and Western cultures. This cultural and civic action manifests itself in a private and individual form but is also intimately connected to national and cosmopolitan concerns. Classical study generally occurs in a private space, where the learner exerts power upon themselves and guides the learning performance on their own. The self-directing process not only aims to improve one’s moral cultivation and ethical quality but also works to rejuvenate the national culture and promote the global civilization. This echoes the works on Asian citizenship by Lee et al. (2004), who argued that the primary distinction between East (Chinese) citizenship and West citizenship is that the former stands for a person to develop a moral personality in becoming a good citizen, suggesting that the public and private virtues are difficult to divide. In a nutshell, the cosmopolitan citizen in contemporary Confucian classical education is theoretically imagined to be a subject of culture, responsibility, and action,

150  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations requiring one to substantiate their civic identity through reading both Chinese and Western classics. Cultivating national identity and cosmopolitan awareness in schooling practices In the preceding section, I presented that the theoretical discourse of dujing education embraces two intertwined orientations of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, characterizing a Confucian citizen with a national cultural identity and an open, inclusive attitude towards various human civilizations. Also, I suggest that there is coherence and tension between nationalism and cosmopolitanism in citizenmaking through Confucian dujing education, with tension particularly evident in the binary structure of Chinese culture as superior and Western culture as inferior. In this section, I draw on fieldwork data collected at Yiqian School to reveal the cultivation of students’ national identity and cosmopolitan awareness in actual teaching and learning discourses and practices. Three parts make up this section. The first part identifies the interweaving of nationalist and cosmopolitan ideas in Yiqian School’s educational philosophy, and in particular, its conceptualization of ‘cosmopolitan citizen’. The second and third parts demonstrate how this Confucian school cultivates students’ national identity and cosmopolitan awareness in everyday classroom teaching and learning processes. Unpacking ‘cosmopolitan citizen’ at the Confucian school

As clarified above, Confucian classical education demonstrates an interweaving of nationalist and cosmopolitan orientations in its educational theories and teaching and learning methods. This feature is typically reflected in Yiqian School’s mission statement. For example, this Confucian school articulated the following three objectives as integrating China with the world: 1. Build a premier global base for learning Chinese culture. 2. Carry out pedagogical experiments in teaching traditional Chinese culture and learning Western classical culture to nurture cosmopolitan citizens with a thorough knowledge of both Chinese and Western cultures. 3. Become a cultural calling card for the region to go global.4 Yiqian School is distinguished from many other Confucian schools in explicitly including the cultivation of cosmopolitan citizens as one of its objectives as shown above. The term ‘cosmopolitan citizen’ frequently appeared in the school’s official syllabus, being defined as someone ‘who accomplishes virtues and wisdom and is learned in both western and traditional Chinese cultures’.5 I stress that the so-called cosmopolitan citizen refers primarily to a subject not of politics or jurisdiction but of culture and morality in the context of Confucian schooling and is internally consistent with the idea of the great cultural talent proposed by Wang Caigui and

Between nationalism and cosmopolitanism  151 described above. Guided by the goal of cultivating cosmopolitan citizens, Yiqian School set out a series of learning norms requiring students to ‘love their families, their teachers and friends, their country, their nation, and humanity’.6 Students were also expected to ‘evaluate your studies and personalities to contribute to your beloved country and nation, to your beloved humanity and culture’.7 The contextualized interpretation of the cosmopolitan citizen in Yiqian School, though influenced by Wang Caigui, was not directly taken from him. While Wang rarely used this particular term, he repeated similar ideas in his writings and speeches as shown before. Virtues, wisdom, or knowledge of Western and Chinese cultures must be seen as the essential qualities for a person to become both a citizen and a human. It is on this point that the conception of a citizen is bound with universal humanity and moral cosmopolitanism in Confucian education. The term ‘cosmopolitan citizen’ was proposed by Mr Jintao Liu, a teacher who once worked at Yiqian School and creatively encapsulated what Wang Caigui elaborated into this particular notion. The following passage exhibits Mr Liu’s reading of ‘citizen’, which offers a key to unlock the conceptual complexities. He first explained the necessity of introducing the term ‘citizen’ to contemporary Confucian classical education, saying: I think the positioning of the classical education is too high to reach. ‘To set life for people’, ‘to initiate peace and security for all ages’, these are too far away. […] I think the term ‘citizen’ can work as a transitional idea to improve human nature. Professor Wang Caigui said education should set the aim to enhance human nature, but this is too abstract.8 Mr Liu clarified that the notion of citizen refers to someone who has a sense of social rules, civic consciousness, and public spirit and who assumes the responsibility to obey social rules and engage in public affairs. He encapsulated all these features into the redefined terminology ‘civic qualities’ (gongmin suzhi), indicating: To promote civic consciousness is strikingly important to society. Chinese culture is weak on the thinking of social morality but pays much attention to self-cultivation. We see that Chinese people are often criticized for their low qualities when they travel abroad. This is because our traditional culture does not emphasize civic qualities. A person living in modern society is obligated to abide by social rules. He must have civic qualities. In today’s China, a person should at first be a citizen who is a member of society and state.9 Moreover, Mr Liu suggested that the notion of a citizen should work as the foundation to become a human and the origin to cultivate students into a junzi (virtuous person): A citizen is the basic personalized unit in modern society. Anyone who lives in modern society should learn the essential civic qualities. However, a junzi (virtuous person) goes beyond this. He is not only endowed with

152  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations civic qualities but is also full of the glory of humanity and glamour of moral idealism.10 Mr Liu’s understanding of the citizen shared commonality with Yiqian School’s idea of the cosmopolitan citizen and the conceptualization of the citizenship (Guo 2016). Yet, while Mr Liu drew attention to public virtues, Yiqian School emphasized ethical virtues into the proposal of the cosmopolitan citizen. Looking at the two types of virtues, Mr Liu’s conceptions are more similar to the public qualities as stated in citizenship education textbooks widely applied in today’s Chinese compulsory schools (Zhao 2014) as well as in mass media discourses (Yang 2015). On the other hand, ideas in favour of morality and character are pervasive in work on Confucianism (Wang 2015, 2016). What is worth noting is the holistic approach of memorization through which students are expected to become moral and cultural cosmopolitan citizens. I will go back to this point later. The conception of a cosmopolitan citizen as primarily a moral and cultural subject in the Confucian school scheme is echoed in current scholarly discussions (see, e.g., Hansen 2010; Stevenson 2003; Tan 2019). As Hansen and other researchers argued, moral cosmopolitanism ‘addresses questions such as whether and how human obligations extend to people outside one’s immediate circle’ (Hansen et al. 2009: 588). Acknowledging a deliberative mode of communication in cosmopolitan education, Roth (2010) argued that the teaching of cosmopolitanism must centre students’ character or disposition and develop their competence of acting upon the motive of duty beyond national interests. Similarly, a person with civic qualities, as Mr Liu indicated, has the capacity to overcome his selfishness and selfconfinement to bridge himself with other people in society and the holistic human community. The cosmopolitan citizen conceptualized by Yiqian School included the ethical aspect insofar as it flagged up the competence to continuously control one’s conduct, accommodate the attitude with reflexivity, hone the will in daily life, and cultivate one’s temperament through self-examination. This is reflected in the Student Rules of Yiqian School which read, ‘Steel yourself in everyday life—this is the enterprise. Reflect on yourself in emotional experience—this is the study’.11 This educational idea corresponds with the Confucian notion of jiaohua, which means to transform the self (hua) by education (jiao) (Billioud and Thoraval 2015). This point also echoes a key challenge in contemporary cosmopolitan education, which, as Tan (2019) indicated, is how to encourage students to expand their existing affection and obligations towards their family, community, and the rest of the world. Confucianism is argued to have the potential to address this issue by offering a Confucian form of cosmopolitan education that emphasizes students’ moral imagination, instinctual responses, self-reflection, and rational deliberation (Tan 2019). Cultivating national identity by reading Chinese classics

The pedagogical practices integrating national identity and global consciousness into the subject making of the cosmopolitan citizen are apparent in Yiqian School’s

Between nationalism and cosmopolitanism  153 routine teaching and learning activities. In this regard, I present the relevant data in this and the next parts: this part covers the pedagogical practices related to the reading of Chinese classics, which are aimed at nurturing a sense of Chinese national cultural identity in students; the next part covers the pedagogical practices related to the reading of English classics, which are aimed at developing a cosmopolitan outlook in students. Yiqian School adopted the method of ‘reading the classics honestly and extensively’ (laoshi daliang dujing) to encourage or even force students to memorize canonical texts of Confucianism. This method was highly recommended by Wang Caigui and was faithfully applied by Yiqian School in its teaching practices. According to my observations at this Confucian school in 2015, the students were typically required to spend four to five hours each day on Chinese classical studies: usually, this comprised three morning sessions and one afternoon session, sometimes with an additional evening session, with each session lasting for one hour. The texts studied in these periods were the Confucian canonical textbooks edited by Wang Caigui, which were characteristically written in traditional Chinese characters and aligned vertically from right to left.12 The books featured no commentaries on the words and phrases, and there was no study of modern vernacular translations of the texts. In the first morning study session of each day, the students were required to create a study plan for the number of words and the amount of content to be memorized on that day, which varied from student to student.13 According to the teachers at Yiqian School, this individualized approach to study planning was assumed to best suit children’s distinct learning abilities, maximize their academic self-efficacy, and increase their efficiency and competence in memorizing the classics. The students were expected to complete the planned recitation tasks on the same day and were subjected to a verbal test by the teacher. The students were advised to take the initiative to ask the teacher to check their recitation for every finished part (approximately 100 words). If they passed the check successfully, the teacher would sign the study plan book to indicate completion. Once a classic book had been memorized from beginning to end, section by section, the students were required to spend a few weeks reviewing the whole book and then recite it in its entirety—this method was known as baoben (reciting an entire book), as already clarified in Chapter 5. Yiqian School was a great advocate of the baoben approach and believed that only when a classical book was fluently recited in its entirety could a student be considered to have truly mastered it. The school also produced video CDs of students reciting classic books to demonstrate and record their academic achievements and sent these to the students’ parents. However, not all of the students and teachers at Yiqian School agreed with this extensive and mechanical method of reading and reciting the classics. Some students admitted that they felt bored with this approach to learning the classics, which impaired their academic motivation. I found that there were some students who could not concentrate on their classics reading and would often sit in the classroom staring blankly for a long time or wander around the classroom speaking into other students’ ears. Some students also suffered damage to their eyesight and

154  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations voices because of the long hours spent reading the classics. Furthermore, several teachers had reservations about adopting this method of reading the classics in Yiqian School, as they did not think it was pedagogically proper to spend much time merely reciting the classics at the expense of ritual practice. They also proposed that attention should be given to students’ personal interests and developing their unique talents to the fullest rather than suppressing their individuality in the name of nurturing cultural excellence. Nevertheless, these dissenting voices were marginalized in Yiqian School, the goal of which was to train pupils to become cosmopolitan citizens who were well-educated in Chinese and Western cultures. Cultivating cosmopolitan awareness by reading English classics

Yiqian School adopted a more lenient approach towards the study of English classics for its students. Unlike the strict emphasis on extensive memorization of Chinese classics, this Confucian school did not place much pressure on students to recite a large number of English classics. Consequently, the students’ progress in reading and memorizing English classics was remarkably slow. On the other hand, the Confucian school still adhered to the mechanical memorization approach to the study of English classics. Actually, mechanical memorization worked as a holistic and predominant method of teaching and learning at Yiqian School. This Confucian school did not offer specific courses on citizenship education. Rather, following Wang Caigui, it arranged four sessions for Chinese classics and one session for English classics every day, expecting students to cultivate Chinese classical virtues through familiarization with Chinese classics while also broadening their horizons and acquiring the ability to communicate with people from Western countries. The teaching session of English classics, often timetabled in the afternoon for each class, was the primary arena for cultivating cosmopolitan citizens at Yiqian School. There were six classes and approximately 120 students in total when I conducted fieldwork in 2015, but only one teacher, Mr Meng, was responsible for the course of English classics. Arranged with a full teaching schedule, Mr Meng, a middle-aged gentleman in his forties, was usually busy with teaching every day. He was not a professional English teacher and did not hold a degree in English language from a university or college. However, Mr Meng gained extensive experience in English learning and teaching through diligent self-study over the years. I had the opportunity to observe Mr Meng’s teaching of English classics in Qishun Class, one of the six classes, throughout the whole semester during my fieldwork. I summarize the teaching observations into two aspects: teaching content and instructional process. First, the teaching content was mainly based on the English Masterpiece Selection,14 compiled by Wang Caigui, as the textbook. The class, as well as the Confucian school, refused to teach the state-stipulated English language materials that were popular in public schools. This practice reflected the influence of Wang Caigui’s (2014) philosophy of dujing education, which suggests that popular English textbooks lack cultural value and do not help foster children’s moral education. In contrast, studying Western masterpieces of high cultural value handed down through human history would not only improve children’s English

Between nationalism and cosmopolitanism  155 language skills but also promote their cultural and moral qualities. Accordingly, Mr Meng and Yiqian School believed that children should spend their time learning high-level English classics and mocked the current compulsory schools as merely teaching ‘kid English’, a term referring to simple, superficial, and trivial English with low-level cultural value. Moreover, Mr Meng repeatedly explained to students the significance of learning English and encouraged them to develop an open and tolerant attitude towards cultural pluralism, emphasizing that a person must not only familiarize themselves with Chinese classics to be an authentic Chinese but also learn English to connect with the world. ‘That we learn English is to shoulder the responsibility for the world!’ He stated, Only when the world becomes better can China be better, and vice versa. English language serves as a cultural bridge to communicate with people from other countries. Many foreigners do not understand Chinese language, so we can speak English to promote their acquaintance with Chinese culture.15 The second aspect I would like to present regarding classroom observations of teaching English classics is the instructional process. Mr Meng worked hard to teach students English classics, but the process was extremely slow. For example, he once taught one sentence over the course of two months. The teaching process was like this: he played back the sentence on an audio player, and students read after it over and over again. This sentence was divided into five smaller parts, each containing two or three words. Students first repeated each part and then followed with the whole sentence. Mr Meng required all students to read the sentence a hundred times, even if they had memorized it because this practice was thought to strengthen the memorization effect. In the process, although Chinese translations were provided for the Western classics, students were not allowed to refer to them until they had memorized the English passages fluently. Mr Meng never explained the English chapters to the students. The rationale behind this practice, according to the headmaster of Yiqian School, was that students were expected to learn English in a ‘pure’ linguistic context free of Chinese language distractions. The mechanical approach of memorization encountered contradictions in the actual instructional process. First, even if students were able to fluently recite the entire English texts, it was difficult for them to learn standard English pronunciation. Some students in the Qishun Class were able to speak out the entire passage speedily, but the tone was monotonous, with no alteration of rhythm, accentual rising, falling, or stress. The students were encouraged to use an audio player to listen to every English sentence, imitating the phonetic intonation until they memorized it. However, due to insufficient tutoring from the teacher and a lack of well-designed supplementary exercises, few of the students learned standard English pronunciation through this method. Instead, many students adopted a similar approach to the one they took in reading Chinese classics in the quest for memorization fluency; that is, they read the English passages in a monotonous, slurred voice and at such a fast pace that the listener could barely distinguish which word or sentence was being read.

156  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations Second, the method of mechanical memorization resulted in many students not understanding the philosophical ideas of the Western classics and being unable to give an account of the meanings of the words, phrases, or sentences, even if they were proficient in reciting some pieces. They were able to recite the passage fluently, presumably as a result of repeating after the audio player mechanically. Moreover, Mr Meng never offered literary explanations or Chinese translations, and this caused students to lack desire to understand the English. In a nutshell, there existed a distance between the actual teaching practice of mechanical memorization and the theoretical optimism in the learning of English classics. To summarize, Yiqian School does not offer a specific civic education programme; instead, it mainly uses the recitation of Chinese and English classics to foster a sense of national identity and cosmopolitan awareness among students. However, implementing the Confucian classical approach has placed the school in a pedagogical dilemma in cultivating students into cosmopolitan citizens on the model of great cultural talents. I argue that this pedagogy is intrinsically linked to the urgent cultural mentality elaborated on earlier in this chapter, which has prompted Confucian education practitioners to cultivate in students a cultural subjectivity that is both nationalistic and cosmopolitan through the memorizationbased pedagogy of reading the classics (Wang 2022). Summary Drawing on the theoretical discourses and pedagogical practices of the revived Confucian classical education in contemporary China, this chapter has revealed the interweaving of nationalism and cosmopolitanism and the challenges in educating students to become cosmopolitan citizens with the national identity of Confucianism. The nationalist and cosmopolitan orientations of the cultural subject of citizen constructed in the theory of dujing education are embedded in the presupposition of common humanity and universal wisdom. In light of this, Confucian classical education claims to be based on national culture and simultaneously transcends the boundaries among nation-states. Cultural universalism and humane commonality are used by the dujing education practitioners as the prevalent yardstick for measuring the reasonability of all types of education. That is to say, the moral function of awakening and enhancing humanity is crucial to reviving classical education, whether in China or Western countries, as illuminated in the dujing theory. In this sense, Confucian classical education gains the potential to associate the nationalist ideology with the cosmopolitan preference, aiming to nurture talents not only as Chinese citizens who take the renewal of Chinese culture upon themselves but also as cosmopolitan citizens who assume the mission of promoting the integration of Chinese and Western cultures. I argue that both the nation-state and the world/human aspects constitute the theoretical core of dujing education. How the interweaving of nationalism and cosmopolitanism has influenced the educational discourse and practice is reflected not only in the designated teaching content that covers Chinese and Western classics but also in the prominent adherence to the memorization-based pedagogy.

Between nationalism and cosmopolitanism  157 All the above is reflected in Yiqian School’s pedagogical discourse and practice. First of all, the school claims to cultivate cosmopolitan citizens through learning both Chinese and Western classics and emphasizes the dimension of ethical virtue. The image of the cosmopolitan citizen drawn by this Confucian school refers to a moral subject with civic qualities, such as obedience to social order and spirituality of public participation, all of which are respected as the foundation to become a true human. Second, this classical school adopts the memorization-based pedagogy recommended by Wang Caigui and regards it as the fundamental approach to transform students into cosmopolitan citizens. While Wang Caigui asserts that memorization is in line with the law of human development, the actual teaching practices encounter difficulties. The international literature on cosmopolitan education highlights a moral imperative upon educators and educational institutions to promote students a cosmopolitan attitude, an ‘other-oriented’ character, a disposition of tolerating and respecting different cultures, and the moral obligation for the word community (Stevenson 2003; Turner 2006). To a large extent, what lies at the centre of cosmopolitan education is the moral and cultural form of cosmopolitanism, rather than the political or legal. Owing to the moral inclination of cosmopolitan education, the international implications of the Confucian school case can be identified. Confucian education regards one’s moral endeavour and cultural competence as essential to creating national and cosmopolitan identities and becoming global citizens. Confucian virtues, such as spontaneous reactions to everyday life and affective connections, share commonality with those derived from ancient Greek, such as self-examination and narrative imagination (Nussbaum 2017). Mechanical memorization serves as a holistic approach to impart comprehensive knowledge of Chinese and Western classics, insofar as to intensify learners’ moral awareness and cultural identities of nationalism and cosmopolitanism. Although these findings echo the emerging rhetoric of global citizenship and cosmopolitan awareness (Nussbaum 2017; Stevenson 2010), national citizenship continues to dominate the citizenship and citizenship education literature (Zhao 2013). Accordingly, citizenship education ‘remains primarily a national project, situated in a given nation-state context and framed by particular institutional structures and cultural narratives within that context’ (Yu 2020: 14). In particular, against the historical context of China’s rise and national rejuvenation, the renewal of Confucian education is often intertwined with national emotions and the pursuit of rebuilding national identities (Billioud and Thoraval 2015). In addition to national concerns, the cosmopolitan, humanistic, and universalistic aspects should also be recognized. In view of this, by exposing the notion of cultural nationalism hidden within the theoretical discourses and pedagogical practices of dujing education, as manifested in the cultural hierarchy associated with the classics, the urgent cultural mentality, and the aggressive memorization-based pedagogy, this chapter does not challenge these points but rather adds new evidence for them from Confucian education. Moreover, the cosmopolitan citizen formulated in contemporary Confucian classical education is not a subject that negates the validity of the nation-state. Rather, it accommodates national identity and simultaneously goes beyond it

158  Cultivating the Confucian citizen: empirical explorations by committing to the cultural communication and integration between China and Western countries. Nonetheless, by showing the complexities of the interweaving of nationalism and cosmopolitanism, this chapter offers a fresh perspective from which to understand the cultivation of individuals’ civic subjectivity in the Chinese Confucian education context. Notes 1 See ‘Introduction to the Academy’ (Shuyuan jianjie) on the official website of Wenli Academy: https://www.wenli.ac.cn/h-col-175.html (accessed on 25 August 2022). 2 See ‘Message from the Dean’ (Yuanzhang jiyu) on the official website of Wenli Academy: https://www.wenli.ac.cn/h-col-184.html (accessed 25 August 2022). 3 See ‘Message from the Dean’ (Yuanzhang jiyu) on Wenli Academy’s official website: https://www.wenli.ac.cn/h-col-184.html (accessed on 25 August 2022). 4 School observation in March 2015, italics added by the author. 5 School document in March 2015. 6 School document in March 2015. 7 School document in March 2015. 8 Interview in April 2015. 9 Interview in April 2015. 10 Interview in April 2015. 11 School document in March 2015. 12 In contrast, modern Chinese writings are mostly in vernacular and aligned horizontally from left to right. 13 Details about the learning technique of self-study plans can be found in Chapter 5. 14 The selection book contains various types of work, including written literature, speeches, poems, and philosophical essays, which have remarkably influenced the Western world, for example, Shakespeare’s plays and English translations of ancient Greek philosophy. 15 Class teaching observation in 2015.

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Index

active citizen 5, 35–36, 49 acts of citizenship 2, 11, 89–90, 103, 105, 107, 134 authoritarian regime 25, 28–29 authoritarianism 21, 25, 127, 140 Chinese citizenship 1–3, 11–12, 21, 25, 48, 50, 106–7, 149 Chinese culturalism 13, 90–97, 100, 103, 106, 108, 141, 143, 146 Chinese individualization 8 civic action 57, 67, 89, 103, 107, 135, 149 civic education 80, 99, 156 civic ethics 11, 13, 37, 58–59, 69, 79, 135 civic junzi 13, 74–75, 77–78, 80 civic politics 47, 64, 80–81 civic responsibility 1, 13, 99, 103–4, 107, 123, 149 civic virtue 14, 21–22, 27, 29, 33, 54–55, 57–59, 74–77, 80, 115–18, 134 civicization 74, 77, 80–81 civil society 27–28, 32–33, 38, 57–58, 65 civility 5, 28, 35–36, 77–78, 149 communitarianism 4, 21, 23, 35, 62–63, 77, 114 Confucian activist 11, 89–90, 95–97, 99–101, 103–5, 107 Confucian citizen 4–5, 10–14, 22, 34–37, 76, 87, 89, 108, 113–14, 118, 135, 140, 150 Confucian classical education 13, 83, 91, 95–96, 106, 108, 115–16, 118, 120, 122–23, 127–28, 131–36, 142–43, 145–47, 149–51, 156–57 Confucian classics 6–9, 29, 32, 80, 92, 95–96, 99–101, 104, 106, 114, 116, 128–30, 132–33, 143–44 Confucian cultural citizen 14, 70, 113–15, 119–20, 123–25, 127–28, 131, 133–35

Confucian education revival 1, 5–8 Confucian identity 13, 89–91, 93–97, 103, 106 constitutionalism 21, 29, 33–34, 37, 68, 71 cosmopolitan citizen 14, 36, 95, 140–41, 143, 147, 149–52, 154, 156–57 cultural citizenship 55, 113–15, 135 cultural nationalism 91–93, 108, 128, 135–36, 141, 143, 145, 157 cultural responsibility 14, 103, 115, 118, 122, 134, 146, 149 cultural right 14, 81, 90, 113–15, 118, 122, 134 democratic regime 25, 28, 64 dilemma 14, 80, 92, 115, 123, 131, 133, 156 dujing education 6–9, 14, 90–91, 93–96, 99–100, 103, 105–6, 108, 114–18, 122, 127–31, 133–34, 136, 143–47, 150, 154, 156–57 ethical reflection 13–14, 103–4, 107, 115, 117 ethical self 35–36, 114, 120, 134 ethical virtue 49, 54–55, 64, 76, 79, 119, 146, 152, 157 extending innate knowledge 13, 103, 106–7 hierarchy 4, 24–27, 29, 63, 68, 78, 92, 107, 115, 117, 129, 143–44, 157, 160 human right 4, 11, 21, 24, 26, 30–32, 47, 64, 122 humanity 7, 13, 92–96, 98–101, 103–4, 107, 122, 134, 143, 146–49, 151–52, 156 individualism 1, 5, 21, 29, 31–32, 37, 56, 62, 79, 127, 129, 131 individuality 5, 24, 31, 35, 61–62, 97, 154 individualization 1, 8, 10, 78–80, 97

162 Index junzi citizen 35–37, 56, 67 junzi politics 64 junzi-style citizen 13, 69, 74–81 junzi-zation 75, 77–81 justice 11, 28, 59, 78 liberal citizenship 4–5, 21–23, 25, 29, 54, 56–57, 70, 90 liberal Confucianism 5, 12, 22, 24, 26–27, 29, 31, 33, 37 memorization 7–8, 80, 96, 100, 102–3, 107, 125, 127–28, 145, 147, 152, 154–57 memorization-based pedagogy 8, 156–57 meritocracy 24, 26–27, 32, 49, 63 modernity 2, 78, 83 moral boundary 115–16, 118, 131, 134–35 moral cultivation 7, 30–31, 37, 47, 49, 51–52, 58, 61, 67, 70, 76, 78–79, 106, 123, 128, 143, 149 moral individualism 31 national identity 14, 48, 53, 83, 92, 140–41, 143, 145, 147, 150, 152, 156–57 obligation 1, 4, 13, 21, 24–26, 32, 35–37, 53, 56, 58, 66, 76–77, 95, 97, 99, 103–4, 114, 131, 142, 149, 152, 157 orientalism 2 orientalist 1–3, 11

personalism 31, 62 political community 1, 36, 49, 52–54, 59, 63, 68–69, 74, 79, 113, 141 popular Confucianism 6 post-orientalist 1, 3, 11 public participation 2, 11, 21, 33, 37, 50, 64, 68, 74, 79, 81, 90, 157 right to education 97–99, 107, 122 righteousness 13, 27, 30, 32, 34–35, 37, 51–52, 58–60, 70, 75, 89–90, 95, 99–103, 107 sage discourse 128–31, 134 scholar-official 55, 58, 65–68, 70–71, 77, 79 self-cultivation 2, 7, 31–32, 35, 58–59, 61, 70, 104, 114, 119–20, 123, 151 self-motivation 61, 119, 123 self-transformation 119, 127 subjectivity 2, 5, 11, 55, 58, 64, 66, 74, 119, 123, 141, 156, 158 thick citizen 12–13, 22–23, 34–37, 55–57, 59, 61–63, 68–69, 74–77, 79–80 thin citizen 12, 22–23, 25–29, 31, 55–57, 61, 69, 74–77, 79 tianxia citizenship 36–37 wenhua dacai 103, 126–28, 131, 134–35, 147 willpower 118–19, 125–27