The Rise and Fall of a Muslim Regiment: The Manṣūriyya in the First Mamluk Sultanate, 678/1279–741/1341 9783737004244, 9783847104247, 9783847004240

Citation preview

Mamluk Studies

Volume 10

Edited by Stephan Conermann

Editorial Board: Thomas Bauer (Münster, Germany), Albrecht Fuess (Marburg, Germany), Thomas Herzog (Bern, Switzerland), Konrad Hirschler (London, Great Britain), Anna Paulina Lewicka (Warsaw, Poland), Linda Northrup (Toronto, Canada), Jo van Steenbergen (Gent, Belgium)

Amir Mazor

The Rise and Fall of a Muslim Regiment The Mansu¯riyya in the First Mamluk Sultanate, ˙ 678/1279–741/1341

With 2 figures

V&R unipress Bonn University Press

®

MIX Papier aus verantwortungsvollen Quellen

www.fsc.org

FSC® C083411

Bibliographic information published by the Deutsche Nationalbibliothek The Deutsche Nationalbibliothek lists this publication in the Deutsche Nationalbibliografie; detailed bibliographic data are available online: http://dnb.d-nb.de. ISSN 2198-5375 ISBN 978-3-8471-0424-7 ISBN 978-3-8470-0424-0 (E-Book) ISBN 978-3-7370-0424-4 (V&R eLibrary) You can find alternative editions of this book and additional material on our website: www.v-r.de Publications of Bonn University Press are published by V&R unipress GmbH. Sponsored by the Annemarie Schimmel College. © 2015, V&R unipress GmbH, Robert-Bosch-Breite 6, 37079 Göttingen, Germany / www.v-r.de All rights reserved. No part of this work may be reproduced or utilized in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical, including photocopying, recording, or any information storage and retrieval system, without prior written permission from the publisher. Printed in Germany. Cover image: © David Silverman Printed and bound by CPI buchbuecher.de GmbH, Zum Alten Berg 24, 96158 Birkach, Germany. Printed on aging-resistant paper.

To my parents, Dalia and Yaacov.

Contents

Preface and acknowledgements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

13

Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1. The origins of the Mamluk sultanate and historical background 2. The Mamluk system: basic principles and terminology . . . . . 3. The study and its historical sources . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . .

. . . .

15 15 20 23

Chapter One: The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n . . . . . . ˙ 1. Size and ethnic origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. The training period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1. Relations among the mamluks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 The nature of training . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3. Discipline in the barracks (tiba¯q) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ˙ 2.4. The ages of the mamluk novices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.5. The duration of the novices’ training period . . . . . . . . . . 3. The mamluk’s seniority and his promotion . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1. Mamluks purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate . . . . . . . . . 3.2. Mamluks purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s sultanate or shortly before it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3. The duration of the mamluks’ training period and service until receiving their amirate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4. The criteria for the Mansu¯rı¯ mamluk’s promotion . . . . . . . ˙ 4. Summary and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . . . .

33 33 40 40 41 49 52 55 56 56

.

61

. . .

65 68 73

Chapter Two: The Mansu¯riyya from Qala¯wu¯n’s death to the third reign ˙ of al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n (689/1290–709/1310) . . . . . . . . ˙ ˙ 1. The Mansu¯riyya during al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s reign (689/1290–709/1310) ˙ 1.1. Al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s policy toward the Mansu¯riyya . . . . . . . . . ˙ 1.2. The Mansu¯riyya during military activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . ˙ 1.3. Al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s murder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

75 75 75 79 81

. . . .

8

Contents

2. Al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s first reign (693/1293–694/1294) . ˙ ˙ 2.1. The conflict between Baydara¯ and Kitbugha¯ . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2. The conflict between Kitbugha¯ and Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ . . . . . . . 2.3. The Ashrafiyya uprising . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3. Kitbugha¯’s reign (694/1294–696/1296) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1. Kitbugha¯’s domestic policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2. Kitbugha¯’s visit to Syria and the end of his reign . . . . . . . . . 4. La¯jı¯n’s reign (696/1296–698/1299) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1. La¯jı¯n’s coronation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2. La¯jı¯n’s moves for establishing his rule . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3. The turn in La¯jı¯n’s policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.4. The expedition against the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia . . . . 4.5. The desertion of Qibjaq and the amirs to the ¯Ilkha¯nate . . . . . 4.6. La¯jı¯n’s murder . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5. The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s second ˙ ˙ ˙ reign (698/1299–708/1309) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1. The second coronation of al-Na¯sir Muhammad . . . . . . . . . . ˙ ˙ 5.2. The joint rule of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r . . . . . . . . . 5.3. Al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s attempted revolt and his departure to ˙ ˙ Kerak . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4. Military events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.1. Military confrontations with the Mongols . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.2. Expeditions against the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia and the Franks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4.3. Expeditions against the Nusayrı¯s of Kasrawa¯n and the ˙ Bedouin in Egypt . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6. Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s reign (708/1309–709/1310) . . . . . . . . . . . 7. Summary and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Chapter Three: The change in the military-political principles . . . 1. Loyalty between mamluks and their master . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1. The mamluk’s loyalty to his first master . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2. Aspects of loyalty between mamluks and their master . . . 1.3. Erosion in the master’s position . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.4. Cases of treachery between mamluks and their masters . . 2. Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya . . . . . . . 2.1. The meaning of the term khushda¯shiyya . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2. The weakening of solidarity among mamluks of the same master (khushda¯shi groups) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3. Loyalty determinants of and among the Mansu¯riyya amirs ˙

83 83 86 89 90 91 93 95 95 97 99 102 103 106 107 107 108 111 113 113 128 131 134 144

. . . . . . . .

147 147 147 149 152 155 157 157

. . . . . .

158 164

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

9

Contents

. . . . . . . .

164 166 171 175 185 190 191 193

Chapter Four: The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙ 1. The Mansu¯riyya amirs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ˙ 1.1. The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were arrested or executed . . . . . . ˙ 1.1.1. The moves made by al-Na¯sir Muhammad against the ˙ ˙ Mansu¯riyya . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ˙ 1.1.2. The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were arrested . . . . . . . . . . ˙ 1.2. The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were neither arrested nor put to ˙ death . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.3. Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2. The mamluks and descendants of the Mansu¯riyya amirs . . . . . . . ˙ 2.1. The mamluks of the Mansu¯riyya amirs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ˙ 2.2 The descendants of the Mansu¯riyya amirs . . . . . . . . . . . . . ˙ 3. Summary and conclusions: the Mansu¯riyya period as an ˙ intermediate stage toward al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign . . . . . ˙ ˙

195 196 196

Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

219

Appendices . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 1: The names of the Mansu¯riyya amirs . . . . . . . . . . . . . ˙ Appendix 2: The Mansu¯riyya amirs who died up to 710/1310 . . . . . . ˙ Appendix 3: Office holders during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign and the Mansu¯riyya period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ˙ Appendix 4: Mamluks purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate . . . . . . Appendix 5: Prominent mamluks purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s sultanate or shortly before it . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 6: The Mansu¯riyya amirs during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third ˙ ˙ ˙ reign . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Appendix 7: The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were arrested by al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ Muhammad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ˙ Appendix 8: The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were neither arrested nor put ˙ to death by al-Na¯sir Muhammad . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ˙ ˙

223 223 230

2.3.1 Sub-factional solidarity: the Burjiyya . . . . . . . 2.3.2. Common ethnic origin . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.3. Marriage ties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.4. Strong friendship relations: ukhu¯wwa and sada¯qa ˙ 2.3.5. Kinship . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3.6. Loyalty based on material grants . . . . . . . . . 2.3.7. Combination of several loyalty factors . . . . . . 3. Summary and conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

. . . . . . . .

196 203 205 207 208 208 210 211

231 239 249 254 257 265

Appendix 9: The mamluks of the Mansu¯riyya amirs during al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ Muhammad’s third reign and after . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ˙ Appendix 10: The descendants of the Mansu¯riyya amirs during ˙ al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign and after . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ˙ ˙

271 282

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

289

Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

301

11

Palestine and its environs

12

The Fertile Crescent, ca. 13th century AD

Preface and acknowledgements

This book is a revised version of my Ph.D. dissertation, submitted to the Hebrew University of Jerusalem in 2012. I would like to thank, first and foremost, to Prof. Reuven Amitai, my usta¯dh in both the Mamluk and the academic senses, who gave me the inspiration for this project and accompanied it from its very beginning until its last stage. I am grateful for his meticulous reading of the final manuscript and his important comments and corrections. I would like to thank Prof. Mark Cohen of Princeton University, who gave me the opportunity to conduct the final stages of this research at Princeton University as a one year Visiting Student Research Collaborator in the Department of Near Eastern Studies. I am grateful to Prof. Stephan Conermann of Bonn University, who encouraged me to publish my dissertation as a book as a research fellow at the Annemarie-Schimmel-Kolleg “History and Society during the Mamluk Era (1250–1517)”, in Bonn (2014–2015). I pay special thanks to Dr. Leigh Chipman, who edited the English manuscript, but was much more than an editor. Her important comments and suggestions contributed to this book being much more accurate, readable and coherent. I would also like to thank to Dr. Katia Cytryn for the cover photo of this book, showing the joint mausoleums in Cairo of two of the heroes of this book – the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs Sala¯r and Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯. I would like to ˙ thank Juliette Fichtl for her assistance in creating the cover image and the maps. I would like to thank to Cambridge University Press for permission to reproduce maps from: Reuven Amitai-Preiss. Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-I¯lkha¯nid War, 1260–1281 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). I would like to note that the last stages of work on this book were carried out while I was a postdoctoral fellow at the ERC-sponsored project “Mobility, Empire and CrossCultural Contacts in Mongol Eurasia”, directed by Prof. Michal Biran at the Institute of Asian and African Studies in the Hebrew University of Jerusalem. Finally, I would like to thank my friends and colleagues for their intellectual and moral support during the long years of my doctorate and post doctorate studies. These included my “khushda¯shiyya” and “wa¯fidiyya” co-fellows Or Amir, Na’ama O. Arom, Sariel Birenbaum, Amir Ga’ash, Shira Golani, Juliette

14

Preface and acknowledgements

Fichtl, Kate Raphael, Yaron Schneider, Shai Shir, Nissim Sofer, Sharon Weisser, Koby Yosef and Jenia Yudkevich. Without all these people this book would have never been written and published. A few final notes concerning the transliteration. In the present study I used a modified version of the Encyclopedia of Islam (2nd edition) system. Common Arabic terms, such as mamluk, amir and sultan, are written without diacritical points. “Mamluk” with a capital letter refers to the Mamluk Sultanate, whereas “mamluk” without a capital letter refers to military slaves in general.

Introduction

1.

The origins of the Mamluk sultanate and historical background

The origins of the Mamluk sultanate in Egypt and Syria lie among the nomadic tribes of the Eurasian Steppe, a territory that stretches from the borders of China to the Danube River. The Eurasian nomadic tribes included a variety of ethnic groups that were generally known as “Turks”. The steppe-dwelling Turks developed excellent military abilities and weapons. Of special importance was their composite bow, which was more efficient on the battlefield than the medieval European longbow.1 The Arabs became acquainted with the Turkish warriors during the mid 2nd/8th century, as Arab forces approached Transoxania (modern Uzbekistan) and the Caucasian mountains, approximately one hundred years after the birth of Islam and the major Muslim conquests. Impressed by the Turkish mounted archers’ unique fighting qualities on the battlefield, the Arabs started to import these warriors into the heart of the Muslim world. The idea behind their recruitment was to create a better and more loyal army within the Muslim Caliphate. The first ruler to develop an army of Turkish slaves who originated on the margins of the Muslim world, or outside it, was the Abbasid caliph al-Muʿtasim bi-Alla¯h (r. 218/ ˙ 833–227/842).2 The Arabic term for this type of slave-soldier is “mamluk”, which means “owned”. However, it by no means suggests that the mamluks were of low 1 Robert Irwin, The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate 1250–1382 (London: Croom Helm/Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986), 1–2; David Ayalon, “Aspects of the Mamluk phenomenon. Part I: The Importance of the Mamluk Institution”, Der Islam 53, 2 (1976), 218–222; W.F. Paterson, “The Archers of Islam”, JESHO 9 (1966), 69–87. 2 C.E. Bosworth, “Al-Muʿtasim bi ʾlla¯h”, EI2, 7:776; Hugh Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: the Islamic˙ Near East from the Sixth to the Eleventh Century (London: Longman, 1986), 158–161; Bernard Lewis, The Arabs in History (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 159–160; Irwin, Middle East, 6.

16

Introduction

and humble status, since they usually occupied high military, administrative and political positions. Following al-Muʿtasim’s reform, in the course of the 3rd/9th, 4th/10th and 5th/11th ˙ centuries, several rulers of Muslim principalities in the Middle East based their armies on mamluks, mainly of Turkish origin.3 Consequently, Turkish people soon found their way to high military and administrative positions. Already in 254/868 a Turkish officer named Ahmad ibn Tu¯lu¯n, who was sent to Egypt by the ˙ ˙ Abbasid caliph in Baghdad, established himself as independent ruler of Egypt and Syria. In 327/939, another Turkish officer, Muhammad ibn Tughj al-Ikhshı¯d, ˙ ˙ became the ruler of Egypt and Syria. He and his successors ruled Egypt until 358/ 4 969. In the 5th/11th century, a massive migration of Turks from the steppe areas to the Islamic lands started. As opposed to the Turks who were imported as slavesoldiers during the preceding centuries, this time the Turkish people entered the civilized Islamic world with their families, animals and tents, and brought about an ethnic change in Middle Eastern society. These Turkish invaders came from the Ghuzz or Oghuz (modern Turkish: Og˘uz) tribes, and their leading family was known as Seljuqs. The Seljuq family, who were new converts to Islam, entered Baghdad in 447/1055, put an end to the reign of the Shı¯ʿı¯-Persian Buyid dynasty and had their right to rule over the Islamic world legitimated by the Abbasid caliphs. The Seljuqs managed to establish a huge empire in the whole eastern part of the Islamic world, stretching from Transoxania in the east to Anatolia in the north-west and the borders of Egypt in the south-west. It was in the Seljuq empire that the Muslim ruler for the first time bore the title of sultan.5 The Ayyu¯bid sultanate that Saladin established in Egypt in 567/1171 included Turkish horsemen in its army as well. In fact, the elite troops and officers of the Ayyu¯bid army were mainly Turkish mamluks. During the reign of the last important Ayyu¯bid ruler, Najm al-Dı¯n al-Sa¯lih Ayyu¯b (r. 637/1240–646/1249), the ˙ ˙ reliance on Turkish mamluks increased. Most of the mamluks purchased by alSa¯lih Ayyu¯b belonged to the Qipchaq tribes, who were probably not recruited in ˙ ˙ significant amounts before then.6 Most of the sultans of the first Mamluk period (648/125–784/1382) belonged to this ethnic group of Qipchaq Turks. 3 For instance, the Samanid rulers of Transoxania (203/819–395/1005); the Hamdanid rulers of ˙ the Jazı¯ra (Mesopotamia) and Syria in the 4th/10th century; the Buyids in Baghdad (333/945– 446/1055); the Ghaznawids in Afghanistan, eastern Iran and India (384/994–431/1040) and the Fatimids in Egypt (358/969–567/1171), See: Irwin, Middle East, 5; Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 207–211. 4 Zaky M. Hassan, “Ahmad b. Tu¯lu¯n”, EI2, 1:278–279; J.L. Bacharach, “Muhammad b. Tughdj”, ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ EI2, 7:411. 5 Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates, 346–349; Lewis, The Arabs in History, 160–161. 6 Irwin, Middle East, 12.

The origins of the Mamluk sultanate and historical background

17

The Qipchaqs formed a loose tribal confederation that had settled in the area presently known as southern Russia and the Ukraine, during the 5th/11th century. This region was known as Dasht-i Qipchaq (“the plain of the Qipchaq”). They ruled these territories up until the invasions of Chinggis Khan’s successors in the first half of the 7th/13th century. These invasions eventually brought about the conquest of Baghdad and the fall of the Abbasid Caliphate in 656/1258. However, the Mongol conquests indirectly contributed to the establishment of Mamluk rule in Egypt and Syria, since they created a cheap and plentiful supply of slaves that was cleverly utilized by al-Sa¯lih Ayyu¯b. Moreover, even during the second ˙ ˙ half of the 7th/13th century and most of the 8th/14th century, Dasht-i Qipchaq continued to constitute the most important recruitment ground for mamluks, since this area formed the greater part of the Mongol Khanate of the Golden Horde, which was an ally of the Mamluk sultanate.7 The Qipchaq mamluks of al-Sa¯lih Ayyu¯b were in fact the establishers of the ˙ ˙ Mamluk sultanate. Al-Sa¯lih Ayyu¯b built up a force of mamluks as protection ˙ ˙ against his rivals from within the Ayyu¯bid family, namely his brothers and his father. The Sa¯lihiyya regiments (as they called, after their master’s regnal title) ˙ ˙ included an elite corps, were also named the Bahriyya because they were gar˙ risoned on Rawda Island in the Nile River (Bahr al-Nı¯l), outside Cairo. The ˙ ˙ Bahriyya numbered between eight hundred to one thousand mamluks, and was ˙ composed mainly of Qipchaq Turks. Al-Sa¯lih Ayyu¯b, who ruled Egypt from 637/ ˙ ˙ 1240, died during the seventh crusade of Louis IX of France in 647/1249. This was shortly after the Crusaders managed to take Damietta and advance southward through the Delta toward Cairo. The excellent warriors of the Qipchaq Bahriyya ˙ defeated the French army in a battle that took place at the town of Mansu¯ra, ˙ about 120 km north of Cairo. During this crisis, al-Sa¯lih Ayyu¯b’s son, al˙ ˙ Muʿazzam Tu¯ra¯nsha¯h, was invited to Cairo to succeed his father as sultan and to ˙˙ lead the Egyptian army against the Crusaders. However, Tu¯ra¯nsha¯h’s rule did not last for long. Tu¯ra¯nsha¯h promoted his own mamluks and appointed them to key positions at the expense of the Sa¯lihiyya-Bahriyya mamluks. This conduct ˙ ˙ ˙ brought about his assassination in Muharram 648/May 1250.8 ˙ The murder of Tu¯ra¯nsha¯h marked, in retrospect, the beginning of Mamluk rule in Egypt, and a decade later in Syria (i. e. al-Sha¯m, Greater Syria). This rule would last for more than two hundred and fifty years, until the Ottoman conquest 7 Irwin, Middle East, 17–18; G. Hazai, “Kipcˇak”, EI2, 5:126; David Ayalon, “Mamlukiyya¯t: (A) A ˙ System; (B) Ibn Khaldun’s View of the Mamluk First Attempt to Evaluate the Mamluk ˙Military ¯ Phenomenon”, JSAI 2 (1980), 323–324. For more on the Qipchaqs before the Mongol conquest, see Peter B. Golden, An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples: Ethnogenesis and State-Formation in Medieval and Early Modern Eurasia and the Middle East (Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1992), 270–282. 8 Irwin, Middle East, 18–22.

18

Introduction

in 923/1517. Following Tu¯ra¯nsha¯h’s murder, strife broke out between the Bahrı¯ ˙ mamluks of al-Sa¯lih Ayyu¯b and the other Sa¯lih¯ı mamluks. In the end of the ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ conflict, Qutuz, who was the senior amir (officer, see below) of the leader of the ˙ anti-Bahriyya coalition, al-Malik al-Muʿizz Aybak, killed Aqta¯y, the leader of the ˙ ˙ Bahriyya. As a result, most of the Bahriyya mamluks fled to Syria. In Syria, ˙ ˙ headed by the future sultan Baybars al-Bunduqda¯rı¯, the Bahriyya served the ˙ Ayyu¯bid prince of Damascus, al-Na¯sir Yu¯suf, and afterwards the Ayyu¯bid ruler of ˙ Kerak, al-Malik al-Mughı¯th. However, when the Mongols, under the command of Chinggis Khan’s grandson Hülegü, conquered Aleppo and approached Damascus, the Sa¯lihiyya realized that they must join forces against the threat. Qutuz, ˙ ˙ ˙ who meanwhile had managed to take the throne in Egypt and was proclaimed sultan, came to terms with his former enemy Baybars al-Bunduqda¯rı¯. The two amirs lead the Mamluk army of Egypt to a brilliant victory over the Mongols, in a battle that took place at ʿAyn Ja¯lu¯t, in northern Palestine, on 25 Ramada¯n 658/3 ˙ September 1260. Thus, the hitherto invincible Mongol army, which had advanced westwards almost without interruptions since the days of Chinggis Khan, was forced to halt and retreat for the first time.9 However, Qutuz was murdered shortly after the battle of ʿAyn Ja¯lu¯t and was ˙ succeeded by Baybars al-Bunduqda¯rı¯, who took the regnal title al-Malik al-Za¯hir. ˙ During al-Za¯hir Baybars’ reign (658/1260–676/1277), the territories of the ˙ Mamluk sultanate expanded constantly within Syria. First, Baybars defeated the governor of Damascus, the Sa¯lih¯ı amir Sanjar al-Halabı¯, who had proclaimed ˙ ˙ ˙ himself autonomous ruler of Syria. As a result, Damascus and most of southern Syria, including Palestine, was annexed to the Mamluk sultanate. Afterwards, Baybars took over the districts that were governed by the Ayyu¯bid princes and annexed them to his sultanate as well. Aleppo was taken after its ruler, one of the amirs of al-Na¯sir Yu¯suf, was deposed. Kerak was taken from al-Malik al-Mughı¯th ˙ in 661/1263. Similarly, Homs was incorporated to Egypt following the death of its prince al-Ashraf Khalı¯l Mu¯sa¯. In 671/1272, the lordship of Sahyu¯n fortress in ˙ Northern Syria passed into the sultan’s hands. The Ayyu¯bid princes of Hama became vassals of the Mamluks and the army of the district formed part of the armies of the Mamluk sultanate.10 Additional lands were annexed to the sultanate due to al-Za¯hir Baybars’s ˙ offensive against the Crusaders. The remnants of Frankish principalities in Syria and Palestine interrupted the Mamluks’ continuous war against the ¯Ilkha¯nid Mongols, who ruled in Iraq and Iran. Moreover, some Frankish rulers collabo9 See on these events in depth: Irwin, Middle East, 26–36. 10 Irwin, Middle East, 45–46. See in depth on the taking of Kerak: Peter Thorau, The Lion of Egypt: Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the Thirteenth Century, tr. P.M. Holt (London and New York: Longman, 1992), 134–141.

The origins of the Mamluk sultanate and historical background

19

rated with the Mongols and assisted them in attacking Syria. The Frankish strongholds fell to al-Za¯hir Baybars one by one: Caesarea, Arsu¯f, Jaffa, Beaufort, ˙ Tripoli, Safed, Montfort, Antioch and Hisn al-Akra¯d (Crac de Chevaliers).11 After ˙ ˙ a short period in which two sons of al-Za¯hir Baybars succeeded him as sultans, ˙ another Sa¯lihi amir took the throne. This was Qala¯wu¯n, who took the title al˙ ˙ Malik al-Mansu¯r. Under the reign of sultan Qala¯wu¯n (678/1279–689/1290), the ˙ Mamluk sultanate further expanded.12 Al-Mansu¯r Qala¯wu¯n acquired thousands of mamluks prior to his ascendancy ˙ to the sultanate and during his reign as sultan. This large body of mamluks was known as the Mansu¯riyya, taking their name from his royal title (al-Mansu¯r). ˙ ˙ After Qala¯wu¯n’s death, they became the largest and most powerful faction in the Mamluk sultanate for twenty years (689/1290–709/1310). In this study, this period will be called the Mansu¯riyya period.13 During this period two of Qala¯wu¯n’s ˙ sons and three of his mamluks ruled as sultans. The first to reign after his death was al-Ashraf Khalı¯l b. Qala¯wu¯n, who remained in power for three years (689/ 1290–693/1293). Next came his younger brother al-Na¯sir Muhammad b. Qala¯˙ ˙ wu¯n, who reigned twice as a minor, before he managed to establish and secure his reign (first reign 693/1293–694/1294 and second reign 698/1298–708/1309). AlNa¯sir Muhammad’s rule during both these short periods was nominal, and in ˙ ˙ practice the sultanate was governed by the amirs of the Mansu¯riyya. Three ˙ members of the Mansu¯riyya gained formal power and served as sultans during ˙ ¯ dil Kitbugha¯ (694/1294–696/1296), al-Mansu¯r La¯jı¯n the Mansu¯riyya period: al-ʿA ˙ ˙ (696/1296–698/1299) and al-Muzaffar Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r (708/1309–709/1310). ˙ It was only during his third reign as a mature adult (709/1310–741/1341) that alNa¯sir Muhammad became the sole ruler for a long period. ˙ ˙

11 Irwin, Middle East, 47–49; see in depth on all the fortresses that were conquered by al-Za¯hir ˙ Baybars: Kate Raphael, Muslim Fortresses in the Levant (Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011), 91–99. On the conquest of Caesarea and Arsu¯f: Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, 158–161; Reuven Amitai, “The Conquest of Arsu¯f by Baybars: Political and Military Aspects”, MSR 9, 1 (2005), 61–83. On the conquests of the other Frankish strongholds: Thorau, The Lion of Egypt, 169– 171 (Safed); 187–192, 204–206. 12 See in depth: Raphael, 99–103; Linda S. Northrup, From Slave to Sultan: The Career of alMansu¯r Qala¯wu¯n and the Consolidation of Mamluk Rule in Egypt and Syria (678–689 A.H./ ˙ 1279–1290 A.D.) (Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998), 130–132, 151–155. 13 Mamluk Arabic sources sometimes denote the reign of sultan al-Mansu¯r Qala¯wu¯n as al-dawla ˙ sultan’s regnal title. al-Mansu¯riyya (the Mansu¯riyya “state” or dynasty), referring to this ˙ in my study, as stated, ˙ However, the term “the Mansu¯riyya period” will refer to the reign of the ˙ Mansu¯riyya amirs only. ˙

20

2.

Introduction

The Mamluk system: basic principles and terminology

The Mamluk period is usually divided into two halves: the first Mamluk period, also called the Turkish or the Bahrı¯ period (648/1250–784/1382) and the second ˙ Mamluk period, called the Circassian or the Burjı¯ period (784/1382–922/1517). The division of the Mamluk period into two sub-periods, as been done by both medieval Muslim historians and modern scholars, is reasonable and justified, since there are several significant changes between the two.14 However, the terms “Bahrı¯” and “Burjı¯” for the two periods is incorrect, as pointed out already by ˙ Ayalon.15 It is more appropriate to denote these periods as the “Turkish” and “Circassian” periods respectively, since most of the sultans of the first period were of Turkish origin (such as al-Za¯hir Baybars and Qala¯wu¯n and their de˙ scendants) and in the second one, sultans of Circassian ethnic origin ruled. In any case, since in the first Mamluk period – and especially in the Mansu¯riyya ˙ period – there were also Mongol and Circassian sultans and prominent amirs who ruled the sultanate, I prefer in the present study to refer to these periods as the first and second Mamluk periods. One of the main characteristics of the Mamluk system is what David Ayalon terms a “one generation aristocracy”. The system was based on the constant importation of manpower from the steppe lands outside the Muslim world. As first pointed out already by the famous medieval Muslim historian Ibn Khaldu¯n (d. 808/1406), thanks to this system the mamluks managed to protect the Islamic lands and to defeat its enemies. The main reason for this is the fact that the mamluks, as “uncivilized” steppe people, preserved their nomadic qualities as great warriors, and on the other hand, as new converts to Islam they were full of religious fervor. Thus, as Ibn Khaldu¯n puts it, the mamluks “embrace Islam with the determination of true believers, while retaining their nomadic virtues which are undefiled by vile nature, unmixed with the filth of lustful pleasures, unmarred by the habits of civilization, with their youthful strength unshattered by excesses of luxury”. As recently-arrived young boys in the lands of Islam, cut off from their biological families, the mamluks became dependent on their patron and were very loyal to him. As a result, the sons of the mamluks, who were born in 14 See on these changes: Irwin, Middle East, 157–159; Koby Yosef, “Mamluks and Their Relatives in the Period of the Mamluk Sultanate (1250–1517)”, MSR 17 (2012), 55–69, esp. 55–56, 60–63; Yosef, “Dawlat al-Atra¯k or Dawlat al-Mama¯lı¯k? Ethnic Origin or Slave Origin as the Defining Characteristic of the Ruling Elite in the Mamluk Sultanate”, JSAI 39 (2012), 387–410, esp. 402. 15 The term “Bahrı¯”, as discussed above, refers to the Bahrı¯ mamluks of al-Sa¯lih Ayyu¯b. The ˙ to the mamluks who were garrisoned˙by Qala¯wun in the˙ towers ˙ term Burjı¯ refers (burj, pl. ¯ abra¯j) of the Cairo citadel. However, contemporary historians do not use these terms. Moreover, Barqu¯q, the first sultan in the so called “Circassian period”, had no relation to the Burjiyya, see: David Ayalon, “Bahrı¯ Mamluks, Burjı¯ Mamluks – Inadequate Names for the ˙ Two Reigns of the Mamluk Sultanate”, Ta¯rı¯h 1 (1990), 22–23, 39. ˘

The Mamluk system: basic principles and terminology

21

the sultanate and termed awla¯d al-na¯s (“the sons of the important people”), did not, in most cases, inherit the positions of their fathers. Hence, the Mamluk sultanate survived and flourished, thanks to a constant supply of these sturdy young mamluks.16 The young mamluks were brought to the Mamluk sultanate by three routes. The main route was by sea via the Bosporus and the Dardanelles, which were under the control of Byzantium. The other two routes went over land, through Eastern Anatolia and through the northwestern part of the ¯Ilkha¯nid empire, i. e., the Caucasus and Azerbaijan, and then across the Euphrates.17 Slave merchants brought the mamluks to the lands of the sultanate. We do not have a lot of information about them, except that the slave merchants were called khawa¯ja (sing.) and were usually Muslims who originated outside the Mamluk sultanate. However, the slave merchant was considered the mamluk’s first master, the first to replace the mamluk’s real parents and a link with the mamluk’s family.18 Once on the soil of the Mamluk sultanate, the mamluk started his training period, which lasted for several years. During this period, the mamluk received 16 The quotation above is David Ayalon’s free translation of Ibn Khaldu¯n’s observations, see the original text: ʿAbd al-Rahma¯n Ibn Khaldu¯n, Kita¯b al-ʿIbar wa-Diwa¯n al-Mubtada’ wa-l¯ sarahum min dhawı¯ al-Sulta¯n Khabar fı¯ Ayya¯m al-ʿArab˙ wa-l-ʿAjam wa-l-Barbar wa-man ʿA ˙ ˙ ¯ t: al-Akbar (Egypt: Bulaq, 1867), 5:371. See Ayalon’s translation: David Ayalon, “Mamlukiyya (B) Ibn Khaldu¯n’s View of the Mamluk Phenomenon”, JSAI 1 (1980), 345; Ayalon, “The Great Ya¯sa of Chingiz Kha¯n: A Re-examination (C1)”, Studia Islamica 36 (1972), 119. See also: David Ayalon, “The Mamluks and Ibn Xaldu¯n”, Israel Oriental Studies 10 (1980), 1, 1–13; Ayalon, “Mamlukiyya¯t, 328–330; Ayalon, “Mamluk Military Aristocracy: A Non-Hereditary Nobility”, JSAI 10 (1987), 205–210. Later studies show that it is by no means accurate that awla¯d al-na¯s had no share in the Mamluk political and military elite. This is true, as will be discussed also in the present study, especially from al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. See Amalia Levanoni, A Turning Point in Mamluk History: The˙ Third˙ Reign of al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n (1310–1341) (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 42–52; Levanoni, “Awla¯d˙ al-Na¯˙s in the Mamluk Army during the Bahri Period”, in Mamluks and Ottomans: Studies in Honour of Michael Winter, eds. David J. Wasserstein and Ami Ayalon (London and New York: Routledge, 2006), 96–105; D.S. Richards, “Mamluk Amirs and their Families and Households”, in The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society, eds. Thomas Philipp and Ulrich Haarmann (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 32–54; Ulrich Haarmann, “The Sons of Mamluks as Fiefholders in Late Medieval Egypt”, in Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East, ed. Tarif Khalidi (Beirut: American University in Beirut, 1984), 141–145, 162–163; Haarmann, “Joseph’s Law – The Careers and Activities of Mamluk Descendants before the Ottoman Conquest of Egypt,” in The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society, 55–84. However, as Donald Richards asserts, it “would be nonsense” to claim that awla¯d al-na¯s “inevitably had brilliant careers and were overwhelmingly important in the conduct of affairs of state” (Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 32). 17 David Ayalon, “Mamluk: Military Slavery in Egypt and Syria”, in Islam and the Abode of War (Aldershot: Variorum, 1994), 4–6. 18 David Ayalon, L’esclavage du Mamelouk ( Jerusalem: Israel Oriental Society, 1951, 1), 1; Ayalon, “Names, Titles, and ‘Nisbas’ of the Mamluks,” Israel Oriental Studies 5 (1975), 215– 217.

22

Introduction

both religious and military training. When he had finished his training period, the mamluk was manumitted and started his military career as a jundı¯ (soldier), who might have the chance to advance to higher ranks as amir (officer, commander). There were several ranks of amir. The main ones, from highest to lowest, were amir of one hundred, amir tablkha¯na¯h (amir of forty) and amir of ˙ ten. An amir of one hundred (the full title is “amir of one hundred and a muqaddam of one thousand”) was entitled to keep one hundred and ten to one hundred and twenty horsemen in his service and to command one thousand soldiers of the halqa (see below). In fact, the senior amirs in the Mansu¯riyya ˙ ˙ period often kept many more mamluks in their service.19 The highest positions in the sultanate were occupied by the amirs of one hundred. Their number in the Mansu¯riyya period was probably between twenty-two and twenty-four.20 An amir ˙ tablkha¯na¯h was entitled to keep forty horsemen in his service; this number ˙ sometimes increased to seventy or eighty horsemen. They were so-called since holders of this and higher ranks were entitled to keep a band (tablkha¯na¯h) of ˙ drums, trumpets and flutes in front of their houses. An amir of ten was entitled to keep ten, and maybe twenty, horsemen in his service. In 715/1315–16, shortly after the Mansu¯riyya period, there were two hundred amirs of tablkha¯na¯h and ˙ ˙ the same number of amirs of ten.21 The amirs received a land allocation (iqta¯ʿ or ˙ khubz, hereafter: iqta¯ʿ) for their service, i. e. the right to collect tax revenues in ˙ money or kind from agricultural land or other revenue sources. A considerable part of the collected tax was used to cover the costs of troops that were under the amir’s command, as well other expenses related to the cultivation of the iqta¯ʿ ˙ land. Other parts passed, of course, to the sultan’s treasury. The iqta¯ʿ, it should be ˙ stressed, was allocated only for a limited period. Iqta¯ʿs were taken from the amirs, ˙ for instance, when the amir was deposed from his current position, or when the 22 sultan decided to confiscate the amirs’ iqta¯ʿs. ˙ The Mamluk army in Egypt was composed of three main parts: The royal mamluks, i. e. the mamluks of the sultan (al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya); the mam˙ luks of the amirs and the halqa unit.23 The halqa was composed of non-mamluk ˙ ˙ 19 David Ayalon, “Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army II”, BSOAS 15 (1953), 467–469, 462–463. 20 Reuven Amitai, “The Remaking of the Military Elite of Mamluk Egypt by al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad b. Qala¯wu¯n”, Studia Islamica 72 (1990), 148; Ayalon, “Studies II”, 468–469; Ayalon, ˙“Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army III”, BSOAS 16 (1954), 70–71. 21 Ayalon, “Studies II”, 469–471; Ayalon, “Studies III”, 70–71. 22 Irwin, Middle East, 11. On the iqta¯ʿ system see Hasanayn Muhammad Rabie, The Financial ˙ ˙ University Press, 1972), 26– ˙ 1169–1341 (London: System of Egypt, A.H. 564–741/A.D. Oxford 72. 23 David Ayalon, “Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army I”, BSOAS 15 (1953), 204. The royal mamluks were composed of the mamluks of the ruling sultan and mamluks who passed into the sultan’s service from other masters, such as former sultans or dismissed amirs.

The study and its historical sources

23

soldiers. It included a unit of awla¯d al-na¯s (sons of amirs) and mamluks. Theoretically, an amir of one hundred was to command one thousand halqa soldiers. ˙ Other amirs, denoted as ba¯sh and naqı¯b, were to command one hundred halqa ˙ soldiers, and a muqaddam al-halqa would command forty halqa soldiers. The ˙ ˙ halqa was considered an elite unit during the Ayyu¯bid period. It maintained its ˙ high status also at the beginning of the Mamluk period. From al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad’s third reign (709/1310), and possibly a little before, it started to decline. ˙ During the Mansu¯riyya period, hence, the halqa was still an important and high˙ ˙ quality military unit.24

3.

The study and its historical sources

The present study focuses on the period in which the Mansu¯riyya faction ruled ˙ the Mamluk sultanate, i. e. from the death of their master Qala¯wu¯n in 689/1290 until al-Na¯sir Muhammad b. Qala¯wu¯n firmly established his rule in 709/1310 ˙ ˙ (henceforth: the Mansu¯riyya period). Most studies on the Mamluk period, and ˙ especially those conducted by David Ayalon which constitute the basis for the whole field of Mamluk studies, discuss various aspects of the entire Mamluk period. At most they focus on the first or the second Mamluk period. In the last two decades, however, several studies that concentrate on sub-periods of the first Mamluk period have been published. These studies, in fact, demarcate the subperiodization of the first Mamluk period. Reuven Amitai’s study discusses mainly military aspects of the Mamluk army during a period that covers mostly the reigns of sultan al-Za¯hir Baybars’ and his descendants (658/1260–680/1281).25 ˙ Linda Northrup’s monograph deals with the reign of sultan al-Mansu¯r Qala¯wu¯n ˙ (678/1279–689/1290).26 Amalia Levanoni and Hayat Nasser al-Hajji’s studies focus on the third reign of al-Na¯sir Muhammad b. Qala¯wu¯n (709/1310–741/ ˙ ˙ 1341),27 and finally, Jo van Steenbergen’s study focuses on socio-political aspects of the Mamluk sultanate from the end of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign until ˙ ˙ the end of the first Mamluk period (741/1341–784/1382).28 However, a monograph dedicated to the turbulent Mansu¯riyya period, i. e. the two decades between ˙ 24 Ayalon, “Studies II”, 448–459; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 197. 25 Reuven Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-I¯lkha¯nid War, 1260–1281 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995). 26 Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n. 27 See Levanoni, Turning Point; Hayat Nasser Al-Hajji, The Internal Affairs in Egypt during the Third Reign of Sultan al-Na¯sir Muhammad B. Qala¯wu¯n, 709–741 (Kuwait: Kuwait University ˙ ˙ Press, 2000). 28 Jo van Steenbergen, Order Out of Chaos: Patronage, Conflict and Mamluk Socio-Political Culture, 1341–1382 (Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006).

24

Introduction

Qala¯wu¯n’s death and his son al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign, has not been ˙ ˙ written hitherto. This study aims to fill the missing link between the studies on the first Mamluk period. The first chapter surveys the mamluks of the Mansu¯riyya during the period in ˙ which Qala¯wu¯n served as a high-ranking amir and later during his rule as sultan. It examines aspects relevant to the Mamluk elite military society as a whole, such as the training, education and promotion of the mamluk and the amirs. The chapter suggests a more nuanced understanding of some of these issues, based on several specific case studies. The second chapter describes and analyzes the political and military events that took place during the Mansu¯riyya period, when ˙ the sultanate suffered from both internal instability and external threats, mainly from the ¯Ilkha¯nid Mongols. The third chapter analyzes more deeply the militarypolitical principles of the Mamluk sultanate during the Mansu¯riyya period, i. e. ˙ the loyalty between the master (usta¯dh) and his personal mamluks, and the solidarity between the mamluks raised and manumitted by the same master (khushda¯shiyya). The chapter suggests an examination of political factionalism among mamluks in light of determinants of loyalty, that, in many cases, strengthened the loose feelings of “brotherhood” between khushda¯shs. These developments contribute to the understanding of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s political ˙ ˙ conduct toward the Mansu¯riyya, discussed in depth in the following chapter. The ˙ fourth and last chapter examines the careers of the Mansu¯riyya amirs, their ˙ mamluks and their descendants during the third reign of al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ ibn Qala¯wu¯n (709/1310–741/1341). The methodology of this study is mainly prosopographical. The biographical data that this study is based upon refers to about one hundred and seventy mamluks of the Mansu¯riyya.29 This data is drawn from Arabic literary sources, ˙ which mainly comprise biographical dictionaries and chronicles. While the biographical dictionaries include short entries (tarjama, pl. tara¯jim) on the Mansu¯riyya officers, the chronicles add information about these amirs and place ˙ them within a broader historical context. These historical sources, as known to every student of Mamluk historiography, have their own drawbacks, which pose difficulties in extracting reliable historical information about individual mamluks, especially regarding their personalities.30 Despite this, the rich literary sources supply valuable information about, for instance, a particular mamluk’s master/s, his career, the offices he occupied, his relations with other persons, 29 See a list of the Mansu¯riyya amirs in appendix 1. ˙ 30 See, for instance: Donald P. Little, An Introduction to Mamluk Historiography: An Analysis of Arabic Annalistic and Biographical Sources for the Reign of an-Malik al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ ʿAbd ibn Qala¯ʾu¯n (Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1970), 112; Stephan Conermann, “Tankiz ibn Alla¯h al-Husa¯mı¯ al-Na¯sirı¯ (d. 740/1340) as Seen by his Contemporary al-Safadı¯ (d. 764/1363)”, ˙ MSR 12, 2˙ (2008), 1–24,˙ especially, 20–21.

The study and its historical sources

25

periods of arrest and his death. It is these historical details that form the backbone of the databases for the present study. The most valuable biographical dictionaries for this study are those of the contemporary Khalı¯l b. Aybak al-Safadı¯ (696/1297–764/1363). As the son of a ˙ mamluk amir who held various administrative offices in several towns, such as his hometown Safed, Aleppo, Damascus and Cairo, al-Safadı¯ includes in his ˙ works entries about persons whom he knew personally, such as amirs, ʿulama¯’, state officials and merchants. Al-Safadı¯ was particularly interested in mentioning ˙ the tarjamas of his acquaintances from the elite, in order to boast of his friendly relations with them.31 He is known mainly for his two great biographical dictionaries. The first, al-Wa¯fı¯ bi-l-Wafaya¯t,32 contains thousands of biographical entries, detailing notables who lived from the time of the prophet Muhammad to ˙ al-Safadı¯’s own era. The second, Aʿya¯n al-ʿAsr fı¯ Aʿwa¯n al-Nasr,33 includes about ˙ ˙ ˙ one thousand and nine hundred entries, only on persons who lived in al-Safadı¯’s ˙ own time. In many cases, the shorter work, Aʿya¯n, contains more detailed information regarding Mansu¯rı¯ amirs than Wa¯fı¯, and even contains entries on ˙ Mansu¯rı¯s who are not mentioned in Wa¯fı¯.34 However, in some cases Wa¯fı¯ men˙ tions, or adds important data on, Mansu¯rı¯ amirs that are not mentioned in ˙ Aʿya¯n.35 Other important biographical dictionaries are those of Ahmad ibn Hajar al˙ ˙ ʿAsqala¯nı¯ (d. 852/1449), al-Durar al-Ka¯mina fı¯ Aʿya¯n al-Miʾah al-Tha¯mina36 and of Abu¯ al-Maha¯sin Yu¯suf Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ (d. 874/1470), al-Manhal al-Sa¯fı¯ wa-l– ˙ ˙

31 Donald P. Little, “Safadı¯ as Biographer of his Contemporaries”, in Essays on Islamic Civilization Presented to˙Niyazi Berkes, ed. Donald P. Little (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976), 206–210; Franz Rosenthal, “Al-Safadi, Sala¯h al-Dı¯n Khalı¯l b. Aybak”, EI2, 8:759–760; Amir Mazor and Keren ˙ ˙ ˙ Abbou Hershkovitz, “Spectacles in the Muslim World: New Evidence from the Mid-Fourteenth Century”, Early Science and Medicine 18, 3 (2013), 299–300. 32 Khalı¯l b. Aybak al-Safadı¯, al-Wa¯fı¯ bi-l-Wafaya¯t (Istanbul, Damascus, Wiesbaden and Stuttgart: ˙ Franz Steiner, 1931–1993), vols. 1–2, 4–5, 8–10, 14–16, 24. 33 Khalı¯l b. Aybak al-Safadı¯, Aʿya¯n al-ʿAsr wa-Aʿwa¯n al-Nasr, ed. ʿAlı¯ Abu¯ Zayd et al. (Beirut: ˙ 6 vols. Da¯r al-Fikr al-Muʿa¯˙sir/Damascus: Da¯r˙al-Fikr, 1418/1998), ˙ 34 See, for instance, the entries on the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs Ka¯wazka¯ (Aʿya¯n, 4:143); Baktu¯t al-Qar˙ ¯ rsı¯ (Aʿya¯n, 1:699–700). ma¯nı¯ (Aʿya¯n, 1:716–717); Bakta¯sh al-Manku 35 Wa¯fı¯ contains entries on the prominent Mansu¯rı¯ amirs Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ (Wa¯fı¯, 15:475–478) ˙ and Baydara¯ (10:360–361), who are not mentioned in Aʿya¯n. See additions and clarifications mentioned in Wa¯fı¯ regarding Aʿya¯n, for instance: Wa¯fı¯, 9:329 cf. Aʿya¯n, 1:564; Wa¯fı¯, 10:75–76 cf. Aʿya¯n, 1:678–679; Wa¯fı¯, 15:499 cf. Aʿya¯n, 2:482; Wa¯fı¯, 24:215 cf. Aʿya¯n, 4:91. In addition, Wa¯fı¯ sometimes mentions the sources of its information, see for instance, Wa¯fı¯, 9:327, 328; 15:477; 16:430; 24:178, 213, 215, 260. 36 Ahmad Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯, al-Durar al-Ka¯mina fı¯ Aʿya¯n al-Miʾah al-Tha¯mina (Hyde˙ rabad: Da¯ʾirat˙ al-Maʿa¯rif al-ʿUthma¯nı¯yya, 1348/1929–1932/1350), 4 vols. In addition I used another edition of this work: ed. Muhammad Sayyid Ja¯d al-Haqq. Cairo: Da¯r al-Kutub al˙ ˙ Hadı¯tha, 1966. 5 vols. ˙

26

Introduction

Mustawfa¯ baʿd al-Wa¯fı¯.37 Durar, which is dedicated to the deceased persons of the 8th/14th century, and Manhal, which contains entries on the deceased dating between the years 650/1252–862/1458, were written about a century after alSafadı¯’s dictionaries. Despite that, they contain data that is not found in al˙ Safadı¯’s works. Ibn Hajar used on a variety of sources in addition to al-Safadı¯. ˙ ˙ ˙ Hence, in many cases his entries clarify the courses of the careers of Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ amirs by mentioning details and dates that al-Safadı¯ does not refer to.38 Ibn ˙ Taghrı¯ Birdı¯’s dictionary, which aimed to complete al-Safadı¯’s Wa¯fı¯ (as its full title ˙ implies), is based mainly on this work of al-Safadı¯ but also on other sources.39 ˙ Sometimes Manhal contains important data regarding the origin of a mamluk amir or valuable subjective notes by the author.40 Especially important is the biographical dictionary by Taqı¯ al-Dı¯n Ahmad b. ˙ ʿAlı¯ al-Maqrı¯zı¯ (766/1364–845/1442), who is mainly famous for his chronicle of the Mamluk period discussed below. Oddly enough, al-Maqrı¯zı¯’s dictionary Kita¯b al-Muqaffa¯ al-Kabı¯r41 has received almost no attention in historiographical or historical research. However, this work contains important biographical data regarding the ethnic origin and the early life of several Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, which is ˙ not mentioned anywhere else, including al-Maqrı¯zı¯’s own works.42 Other biographical dictionaries used in this study completed and added biographical data regarding the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs.43 ˙ 37 Abu¯ al-Maha¯sin Yu¯suf Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯, al-Manhal al-Sa¯fı¯ wa-l–Mustawfa¯ baʿda al-Wa¯fı¯, ed. ˙ Muhammad Amı¯n (Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-Mis˙ riyya al-ʿA ¯ mma, 1984–2009). 13 vols. Muhammad ˙ 38 Donald P. Little, ˙“Historiography of the Ayyubid and ˙Mamluk Epochs”, in The Cambridge History of Egypt. Vol. 1: Islamic Egypt, 640–1517, ed. Carl F. Petry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 442. See (only few examples) for information mentioned by Ibn Hajar ˙ ¯ n, compared to al-Safadı¯ regarding Mansu¯rı¯ amirs: Qibjaq: Durar (Cairo), 3:325–326 cf. Aʿya ˙ ˙ (Hyderabad), 2:180 cf. Aʿya¯n, 2:490, Wa¯fı¯, 16:55–56; 4:65–72, Wa¯fı¯, 24:178–181; Sala¯r: Durar Kitbugha¯: Durar (Hyderabad), 3:262–264 cf. Aʿya¯n, 4:144ff., Wa¯fı¯, 24:318ff. Durar is the only dictionary to mention the tarjama of Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯ (Durar, [Cairo] 1:451). However, sometimes Ibn Hajar carelessly summarizes al-Safadı¯’s entries, see for example that of Qa˙¯ n, 4:87–100. ra¯sunqur: Durar˙ (Hyderabad), 3:246–247 cf. Aʿya 39 See, for instance, Manhal, 6:386–387; 9:117. 40 Little, “Historiography”, 442; Little, Introduction, 108. See chapter one, nn. 58, 89; appendix 1, n. 7. Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ often mentions the Arabic meanings of some of the mamluks’ Turkish names, see for instance: Manhal, 3:421, 502; 6:320, 379; 9:121. 41 Taqı¯ al-Dı¯n Ahmad b. ʿAlı¯ al-Maqrı¯zı¯, Kita¯b al-Muqaffa¯ al-Kabı¯r, ed. Muhammad al-Yaʿla¯wı¯ ˙ ˙ (Beirut: n.p., 1991). 8 vols. 42 For instance, important details are mentioned on the ethnic origin of Baydara¯ (Muqaffa¯, 2:562); Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj (Muqaffa¯, 2:504); Asandamur Kurjı¯ (Muqaffa¯, 2:190); on the early life ˙¯ , 2:562) and Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ (Muqaffa¯, 2:485). of Baydara¯ (Muqaffa 43 Fadl Alla¯h b. Abı¯ al-Fakhr Ibn al-Suqa¯ʿı¯. Ta¯lı¯ ˙Kita¯b Wafaya¯t al-Aʿya¯n, ed. and tr. Jacqueline ˙ (Damascus: IDEO, 1974); Muh ˙ ammad b. Ahmad al-Dhahabı¯, al-ʿIbar fı¯ Khabar man Sublet ˙ Ghabar, ed. Sala¯h al-Dı¯n al-Munajjid˙ and Fuwa¯d Sayyid (Kuwait: Da¯ʾirat al-Matbu¯ʿa¯t wa-l˙ vol. 5; al-Dhahabı¯, Min Dhuyu¯l al-ʿIbar, ed. Muhammad Rashsha ˙ ¯ d ʿAbd Nashr, 1960–1966), ˙ al-Muttalib (Kuwait: Matbaʿat Huku¯mat al-Kuwayt); Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n al-Hanbalı¯ al-Dimashqı¯ ˙ ˙ ˙˙ ˙

The study and its historical sources

27

As for chronicles, of especial importance are the works of Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ (d. 725/1325), who was a mamluk of Qala¯wu¯n from a very young age and filled important offices in the sultanate, including being the viceroy of al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad. Baybars al-Mansurı¯’s self-testimonies about his career as a Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ mamluk and amir are unique and highly valuable for this study. The most important work of this historian-amir is Zubdat al-Fikra fı¯ Ta’rı¯kh al-Hijra, which covers events from the beginning of the Mamluk sultanate in Egypt (650/1252) up to the end of the Mansu¯riyya period (709/1310).44 Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ is the ˙ ˙ author of another chronicle, al-Tuhfa al-Mulu¯kiyya fı¯ al-Dawla al-Turkı¯yya.45 ˙ This chronicle covers more or less the same years as Zubda, which caused some scholars to assume that this work is no more than a summary, in rhymed prose (sajʿ), of Zubda. Tuhfa, however, is another original work that sometimes in˙ cludes important and valuable data that is not mentioned in Zubda.46 In any case, we should be wary of the information described in this work, since it aimed, perhaps more than any other contemporary historical literary source, to glorify the house of Qala¯wu¯n.47 Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n Ahmad al-Nuwayrı¯ (677/1279–733/1333), who was a clerk in the ˙ Mamluk bureaucracy, includes an important chronicle in his multi-volume encyclopedia Niha¯yat al-Arab fı¯ Funu¯n al-Adab.48 This universal chronicle begins with the Creation and ends close to al-Nuwayrı¯’s death. Alongside al-Nuwayrı¯’s reliance on other contemporary historians, his chronicle contains a lot of original

44

45 46 47

48

Ibn al-ʿIma¯d, Shadhara¯t al-Dhahab fı¯ Akhba¯r man Dhahab, ed. ʿAbd al-Qa¯dir Arna¯ʾu¯t and ˙ Muhammad Arna¯ʾu¯t (Damascus: Da¯r Ibn Kathı¯r, 1413/1992), vol. 8. ˙ ˙ Rukn al-Dı¯n Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, Zubdat al-Fikra fı¯ Ta’rı¯kh al-Hijra, ed. D.S. Richards (Beirut and Berlin: al-Kita¯b al-ʿArabı˙¯, 1998. On this chronicle, see D.S. Richards, “A Mamluk Amir’s Mamluk History: Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ and the Zubdat al-Fikra”, in The Historiography of ˙ Kennedy (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 37–44. Islamic Egypt (c. 950–1800), ed. Hugh Rukn al-Dı¯n Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, Kita¯b al-Tuhfa al-Mulu¯kiyya fı¯ al-Dawla al-Turkı¯yya, ed. ˙ ʿAbd al-Hamı¯d Sa¯lih Hamda¯n˙ (Cairo: al-Da¯r al-Mis riyya al-Lubna¯niyya), 1407/1987. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Li Guo, “Mamluk Historiographic Studies: The State˙ of the Art”, MSR 1 (1997), 16–17; Little, Introduction, 5–10. P.M. Holt and Robert Irwin see Tuhfa as belonging to a genre of “offering books” that were presented to the sultan and meant ˙to glorify him and his dynasty, see: P.M. Holt, “Literary Offerings: A Genre of Courtly Literature”, in The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society, 3– 6; Robert Irwin, “Mamluk History and Historians”, in Arabic Literature in the Post-Classical Period, eds. Roger Allen and D.S. Richards (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 163. Indeed, Tuhfa’s descriptions of the events are clearly biased in favor of the sultans from ˙ ¯wu¯n (see, for instance: Tuhfa, 142–143; 187–191). See more on Baybars althe house of Qala ˙ Mansu¯rı¯’s works: Little, Introduction, 4–10; Eliyahu Ashtor, “Some Unpublished Sources for ˙ the Bahrı¯ Period”, Scripta Hierosolymitana 9 (1961), 12–13; Ashtor, “Étude sur quelques ˙ chroniques, mamlouks”, Israel Oriental Studies 1 (1971), 272–277; Ashtor, “Baybars alMansu¯rı¯”, EI2, 1:1128. ˙ b. ʿAbd al-Wahha¯b Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n al-Nuwayrı¯, Niha¯yat al-Arab fı¯ Funu¯n al-Adab, ed. Ahmad ˙ ¯m Muhammad ʿAlawı¯ Shaltut (Cairo: al-Mu’assasa al-Misriyya al-ʿA ¯ mma li–l-Taʾlı¯f waFahı ¯ ˙ l-Tarjama wa-1-T iba¯ʿa wa-1-Nashr (1412/1992–1998). Vols. 31,˙ 32. ˙

28

Introduction

material, derived from high official informants as well as his own experience. In addition, al-Nuwayrı¯’s historical writing is known for its coherence and good integration of sources.49 The chronicle of Na¯sir al-Dı¯n Muhammad Ibn al-Fura¯t (735/1334–807/1405), ˙ ˙ Ta’rı¯kh al-Duwal wa-l–Mulu¯k,50 is perhaps the most comprehensive and detailed historical source, as noted by several scholars.51 Unfortunately, however, this universal history has survived only in fragments, so we do not have at our disposal the parts that cover the years between 697/1297 to 789/1387. Hence, only about the first eight years of the Mansu¯riyya period are covered by this source.52 An˙ other two important sources for the present study are the chronicles of the abovementioned Egyptian historians: Kita¯b al-Sulu¯k li–Maʿrifa Duwal al-Mulu¯k by al-Maqrı¯zı¯,53 and al-Nuju¯m al-Za¯hira fı¯ Mulu¯k Misr wa-l-Qa¯hira by Ibn Taghrı¯ ˙ Birdı¯.54 Unlike the historical sources of the first Mamluk period, which might be more accurate than Sulu¯k, al-Maqrı¯zı¯ reports – based on earlier sources – a continuous narrative of Qala¯wu¯n’s reign, the Mansu¯riyya period and al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ Muhammad’s third reign from an Egyptian perspective.55 Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ relied ˙ on al-Maqrı¯zı¯’s reports regarding the Mansu¯riyya, but still adds information ˙ from many other sources. Similarly to his biographical dictionary (Manhal), in his chronicle, too, Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ occasionally mentions his own views and observations regarding the Mansu¯riyya period.56 ˙ 49 Reuven Amitai, “Al-Nuwayrı¯ as a Historian of the Mongols”, in The Historiography of Islamic Egypt, 23–36; Little, “Historiography”, 430; Little, Introduction, 32; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 46– 47; Irwin, “Mamluk History”, 165–166. An example of a highly important comment by alNuwayrı¯ regarding the position of the Mansu¯riyya during the third reign of al-Na¯sir Mu˙ on al-Nuwayrı¯ and his career in p. 207. ˙ hammad is discussed in pp. 207–208. See more ˙ 50 Muhammad b. ʿAbd al-Rah¯ım Ibn al-Fura¯t, Taʾrı¯kh Ibn al-Fura¯t [=Taʾrı¯kh al-Duwal wa-l– ˙¯ k], ed. Q. Zurayq (Beirut: ˙ Mulu al-Matbaʿa al-Amrı¯ka¯nı¯yya, 1936–1942), vols. 7, 8. ˙ Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 5; Reuven 51 Ashtor, “Unpublished Sources”, 13–24; Amitai, “In the Aftermath of ʿAyn Ja¯lu¯t: The Beginnings of the Mamluk-I¯lkha¯nid Cold War”, Al-Masa¯q 3 (1990), 12–13; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 51; Irwin, “Mamluk History”, 166; Little, Introduction, 73–75; Little, “Historiography”, 433. 52 C. Cahen, “Ibn al-Fura¯t”, EI2, 3:768–769. 53 Ahmad b. ʿAlı¯ al-Maqrı¯zı¯, Kita¯b al-Sulu¯k li–Maʿrifa Duwal al-Mulu¯k, eds. Mustafa¯ Ziya¯da and ˙ ¯d ʿAbd al-Fatta¯h ʿA ˙ ˙ 1934–1973). 4 ¯ shu¯r (Cairo: Lajnat al-Taʾlı¯f wa-l-tarjama wa-l-Nashr, Saʿı ˙ vols. 54 Yu¯suf Abu¯ al-Maha¯sin Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯, al-Nuju¯m al-Za¯hira fı¯ Mulu¯k Misr wa-l-Qa¯hira, ed. ˙ Shaltut et al. (Cairo: Da¯r al-Kutub al-Misriyya, 1348/1929–1392/1972). ˙ Fahı¯m Muhammad 16 ¯ ˙ ˙ vols. 55 For al-Maqrı¯zı¯ as a historian, see: Reuven Amitai, “Al-Maqrı¯zı¯ as a Historian of the Early Mamluk Sultanate (or: Is al-Maqrı¯zı¯ an Unrecognized Historiographical Villain?)”, MSR 7, 2 (2003), 99–118; David Ayalon, “The Great Ya¯sa of Chingiz Kha¯n: A Re-examination (C2)”, Studia Islamica 38 (1973), 121–123; Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 5; Little, “Historiography”, 436–437; Irwin, “Mamluk History”, 166–167. On al-Maqrı¯zı¯’s inaccuracy regarding the ethnic composition of the Burjiyya regiment, see p. 36. 56 See, for instance, chapter one, nn. 14, 126, 155; chapter three, n. 32; Nuju¯m, 8:69. See on Ibn

The study and its historical sources

29

The universal chronicle of Badr al-Dı¯n al-ʿAynı¯ (762/1361–855/1451), ʿIqd alJuma¯n fı¯ Taʾrı¯kh Ahl al-Zama¯n,57 is a valuable source for the period discussed in this work. Based on Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯’s Zubda, this chronicle not only helps ˙ reconstruct lost parts of the Zubda, but also mentions extensive passages from the work of another contemporary historian, Mu¯sa¯ ibn ʿAlı¯ al-Yu¯sufı¯ (676/127– 759/1357), of which only a small fragment is extant.58 Indeed, highly important and unique information regarding the Mansu¯riyya is quoted by al-ʿAynı¯ from al˙ Yu¯sufı¯’s work.59 The edited part of al al-Yu¯sufı¯’s work, that covers the years 733/ 1333–738/1337,60 adds valuable data regarding the mamluks of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs ˙ and their careers during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. With regard to this ˙ ˙ topic, the works of another two contemporary historians, Shams al-Dı¯n al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ and Mufaddal b. Abı¯ al-Fada¯ʾil, are also useful.61 ˙˙ ˙ Another chronicle of importance to this study was compiled by Sayf al-Dı¯n Abu¯ Bakr b. ‘Abdalla¯h b. Aybak al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯, who died after 736/1335, the year in which his chronicle ends. Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯ was the son of a halqa commander ˙ during the Mansu¯riyya period and a grandson of Turkish amirs on both his ˙ father’s and mother’s side. He himself filled several relatively low administrative offices. Most studies point out that Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯’s chronicle, Kanz al-Durar,62

57 58 59 60 61

62

Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ and Nuju¯m: Little, Introduction, 87–92; Little, “Historiography”, 439; Irwin, “Mamluk History”, 168. Badr al-Dı¯n Mahmu¯d b. Ahmad al-ʿAynı¯, ʿIqd al-Juma¯n fı¯ Ta’rı¯kh Ahl al-Zama¯n. ʿAsr Sala¯t¯ın ˙ Muhammad Amı¯n (Cairo: al-Hay’a al-Misriyya al-ʿA ¯˙mma ˙lilal-Mama¯lı¯k, ed.˙ Muhammad ˙ ˙ ˙ Kita¯b, 1407/1987–1412/1992), vols. 2–4. Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 6; Little, “Historiography”, 426; Little, Introduction, 80–87; Little, “The Recovery of a Lost Source for Bahrı¯ Mamluk History: al-Yu¯sufı¯’s Nuzhat alNa¯zir fı¯ Sı¯rat al-Malik al-Na¯sir”, JAOS 94 (1974), 42–54. ˙ ¯ wu¯n, 53. See more on al-ʿAynı¯ and his chronicle: Donald P. See˙ p. 46 below; Northrup, Qala Little, “An Analysis of the Relationship between Four Mamluk Chronicles for 737–45”, Journal of Semitic Studies 19 (1974), 259–261. Mu¯sa¯ b. Muhammad b. Yahya¯ al-Yu¯sufı¯, Nuzhat al-Na¯zir fı¯ Sirat al-Malik al-Na¯sir, ed. Ahmad ˙ ʿᾹlim al-Kutub, ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Hat¯ıt (Beirut: 1986). ˙ ˙ ˙ al-Dı¯n al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, Taʾrı¯kh al-Malik al-Na¯sir Muhammad b. Qala¯wu¯n al-Sa¯lih¯ı waShams ˙ ˙(Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner ˙ Verlag, ˙ Awla¯dihi. (Die Chronik Asˇ-sˇug˘a¯ʿı¯s), ed. Barbara Schäfer 1977). Two editions of the chronicle of Mufaddal Ibn Abı¯ al-Fada¯ʾil are used. The first covers ˙ ˙ des sultans mamlouks, ed. the years 658/1260–716/1316: Moufazzal Ibn˙Abil-Fazail, Histoire and tr. E. Blochet. Patrologia Orientalis 12/3; 14/3; 20/1, (1919; 1920; 1929): 343–550; 373–672; 1–270 (Paris, 1919–1928). The second edition covers the years 717/1317–741/1341: Ägypten und Syrien zwischen 1317 und 1341 in der Chronik des Mufaddal b. Abı¯ l-Fada¯ʾil. Al-Nahj al˙ and tr. Samira ˙ Kortantamer Sadı¯d wa-al-Durr al-Farı¯d fı¯ ma¯ baʿd Taʾrı¯kh Ibn al-ʿAmı¯d, ˙ed. (Freiburg im Breisgau: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1973). Al-Shuja¯ʿı¯’s (d. after 756/1355) chronicle is based mainly on al-Yu¯sufı¯. Ibn Abı¯ Fada¯᾿il was a Copt. His work is not highly estimated by modern scholars, see the opinion of Blochet, his editor and translator: Mufaddal (Blochet), ˙˙ 351–352; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 49; Little, “Historiography”, 427; Little, Introduction, 32–38. Abu¯ Bakr b. ʿAbd Alla¯h b. Aybak Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯, Kanz al-Durar wa-Ja¯miʿ al-Ghurar, 7 (ed. ʿAbd al-Fatta¯h ʿAshu¯r), 8 (ed. Ulrich Haarmann), 9 (ed. Hans Robert Roemer). (Cairo: al˙ ¯nı¯ li–l-Ᾱtha¯r, 1379/1960–1410/1996). Maʿhad al-Alma

30

Introduction

is somewhat unreliable, since he attributes to his father information that he copied from other historians. In addition, his inclination to report anecdotes and “Turkish folklore” is obvious.63 However, one can still find unique documents and information that is not available from other sources in this chronicle.64 The importance of Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯’s chronicle, as well as another anonymous chronicle that was edited by Karl Zetterstéen,65 is their supply of valuable data on offices that were occupied by the Mansu¯riyya.66 ˙ The late chronicle by Ibn Iya¯s (d. 930/1523–4), Bada¯ʾiʿ al-Zuhu¯r fı¯ Waqa¯ʾiʿ alDhuhu¯r,67 briefly and carelessly summarizes the events of the Mansu¯riyya period. ˙ It contains chronological inaccuracies and literary embellishments. Despite this, 68 it still mentions some unique and valuable details. The Syrian historians Qutb al-Dı¯n Mu¯sa¯ al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯ (640/1242–726/1326) 69 and ˙ Shams al-Dı¯n Muhammad al-Jazarı¯ (658/1260–739/1338),70 and their younger ˙ colleagues Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Dhahabı¯ (673/1274–748/1348) 71 and Isma¯ʿı¯l ˙ ˙ b. ʿUmar Ibn Kathı¯r (700/1300–774/1373),72 generally mention valuable in63 Ulrich Haarmann, Quellenstudien zur frühen Mamlukenzeit (Freiburg i. Br.: D. Robischon, 1969), 111; Haarmann, “Altun Ha¯n und Cingiz Ha¯n bei den Ӓgyptischen Mamluke”, Der ˙ 17; Little, “Historiography”, ˘ Islam 51 (1974), 1–36, esp. 6–9, 424–425; Little, Introduction, 11– 12; Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 5–6; Irwin, “Mamluk History”, 164. 64 Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 47–48; Little, Introduction, 118–125. See, for instance, chapter two, n. 218. 65 Karl Wilhelm Zetterstéen (ed.), Beiträge zur Geschichte der Mamlukensultane in den Jahren 690–741 der Higra nach arabischen Handschriften (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1919); Little, Introduction, 18–19. 66 This information, however, is not always consistent with all the other sources, and sometimes it is clear that it is wrong. For instance, Kitbugha¯ is mentioned as the governor of Hama¯ after ˙ his death in 702/1303 (Zetterstéen, 130, 131, 133). 67 Muhammad ibn Ahmad Ibn Iya¯s, Bada¯ʾiʿ al-Zuhu¯r fı¯ Waqa¯ʾiʿ al-Dhuhu¯r (Die Chronik des Ibn ˙ Ija¯s)˙ (Weisbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1975). 68 Little, “Historiography”, 440; Northrup points out Ibn Iya¯s’ chronological inaccuracies regarding Qala¯wu¯n’s reign (Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 54). This conclusion is valid also for the Mansu¯riyya period. For example, Ibn Iya¯s places the attempt to execute La¯jı¯n in the year 690/ 1291 ˙instead of the end of 691 or 692/1292 (see in Ibn Iya¯s, 1:369); the expedition to alBuhayra in 699/1299–1300 instead of 700/1300–1301 (Ibn Iya¯s, 1:407). For unique data ˙ mentioned by Ibn Iya¯s see chapter one, nn. 53, 133; chapter two, n. 236; appendix 4, n. 105. 69 Li Guo edited and translated to English al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯’s chronicle of the events during 697/1297– 701/1302. The second volume contains the English translation of the edited Arabic text in the first one. See: Qutb al-Dı¯n Mu¯sa¯ b. Muhammad al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, Early Mamluk Syrian Historio˙ ¯ n, ed. and tr. Li Guo (Leiden: Brill, 1998), 2 vols. graphy: Al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯˙’s Dhayl Mirʾat al-Zama 70 Shams al-Dı¯n Muhammad al-Jazarı¯, Hawa¯dith al-Zama¯n wa-Anba¯᾿uhu wa-Wafaya¯t al˙ al-Maktaba al-ʿAsriyya, 1426/2006), 3 vols. Aka¯bir wa-l-Aʿya¯n ˙min Abna¯ʾihi (Beirut: ˙ ¯ t al-Masha¯hı¯r wa-l-Aʿlam, ed. 71 Muhammad b. Ahmad al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh al-Isla¯m wa-Wafaya ˙ al-Sala¯m Tadmurı ˙ ʿAbd ¯ (Beirut: Da¯r al-Kita¯b al-ʿArabı¯, 2000, 2003), vol. 59 (years 681/1282– 690/1291); vol. 60 (years 690/1291–700/1301). 72 Isma¯ʿı¯l b. ʿUmar Ibn Kathı¯r, al-Bida¯ya wa-l-Niha¯ya (Beirut: Da¯r al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1413/ 1993), vols. 13, 14.

The study and its historical sources

31

formation regarding the Syrian provinces, but provide relatively thin information regarding the Mansu¯riyya amirs.73 Al-Jazarı¯, however, contributes ˙ valuable data about Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, their mamluks or their descendants who ˙ lived in Damascus. Similarly, the chronicle of the Ayyu¯bid prince Abu¯ al-Fida¯ʾ,74 the autonomous ruler of Hama¯ during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign, does ˙ ˙ ˙ not mention the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs very much. This chronicle, however, does include ˙ original information, especially regarding the expeditions against Armenian Cilicia, in which Abu¯ al-Fida¯ʾ took part.75 Al-Maqrı¯zı¯’s topographical work on Cairo, known for short as al-Khitat,76 ˙ ˙ contains, alongside a geographical and architectural description of medieval Cairo, unique information on urban life in the city, including very rare details about the training and education of mamluk novices.77 Finally, the scribal manuals of Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n Ahmad al-Qalqashandı¯ (756/1355–821/1418) and Ibn ˙ Fadl Alla¯h al-ʿUmarı¯ should be mentioned.78 These sources supply valuable ˙ administrative information, especially about the nature of the various offices that were occupied by the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs.79 ˙ Most of the sources for the present study are pro-Mamluk. In order to give a more balanced picture of military events, some “anti-Mamluk” translated primary sources and studies are used. As for the Mongol perspective, I relied on the world history of Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n (645/1247–718/1318), who was the vizier of the Mongol ¯Ilkha¯nate during the Mansu¯riyya period.80 I also used some references ˙ from the contemporary chronicle by Qa¯sha¯nı¯ and the studies of Anne F. 73 Little, “Historiography”, 427–429; Irwin, “Mamluk History”, 159–162. 74 Isma¯ʿı¯l b. ʿAlı¯ Abu¯ al-Fida¯ʾ, al-Mukhtasar fı¯ Akhba¯r al-Bashar (Beirut: Da¯r al-Maʿrifa li–l˙ Tiba¯ʿa wa-l-Nashr, 1972). ˙ 75 Little, Introduction, 42–46; Irwin, “Mamluk History”, 163–164. ¯ tha¯r fı¯ Misr wa-l-Qa¯hira 76 Al-Maqrı¯zı¯, al-Mawa¯ʿiz wa-l–Iʿtiba¯r bi-Dhikr al-Khitat wa-l-A ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ (Cairo: Bulaq, 1854), 2 vols. 77 See chapter one, n. 66. 78 Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n Ahmad b. ʿAlı¯ al-Qalqashandı¯, Subh al-Aʿsha¯ fı¯ Sina¯ʿat al-Insha¯ʾ, ed. Mu˙ ˙ al-ʿIlmiyya, 1987), ˙ hammad Husayn˙Shams al-Din (Beirut: Da¯r al-Kutub 14 vols. In addition I ¯ mma li–l-Taʾlı¯f wa-lused another edition of this work: Cairo: al-Muʾassasa al-Misriyya al-ʿA ˙¯ b al-Dı¯n. Ahmad b. Yahya¯ alTarjama wa-1-Tiba¯ʿa wa-1-Nashr, 1963; Ibn Fadl Alla¯h Shiha ˙ al-Absa¯r fı¯ Mama¯lik al-Amsa¯r,˙ ed. Ka¯mil Salma¯n al-Jabu¯˙ rı¯ (Beirut: Da ˙ ¯ r alʿUmarı¯, Masa¯lik ˙ ˙ Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2010), 27 vols.; al-ʿUmarı¯, al-Taʿrı¯f bi-l–Mustalah al-Sharı¯f (Cairo: Mat˙˙ ˙ ˙ ¯ sima, 1312/1894). baʿa al-͑A ˙ 79 See on these manuals: Little, “Historiography”, 431, 444. 80 Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n Fadl Alla¯h, Rashı¯duddin Fazlullah’s Jamiʾuʾt-Tawarikh: a History of the Mongols, tr. W.M. ˙Thackston (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. On Rashı¯d alDı¯n, see D.O. Morgan, “Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n Tabı¯b”, EI2, 8:443–444; Morgan, “Persian Historians and the Mongols”, in Medieval Historical˙ Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds, ed. D. O. Morgan (London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1982), 119–121. On pro-Mongol sources, see Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 6–7; Morgan, “Persian Historians”, 109– 124.

32

Introduction

Broadbridge and John A. Boyle. For the description of Mamluk military actions against the Armenians and the Crusaders, I used Angus Donal Stewart’s and Sylvia Schein’s studies.81

81 For Qa¯sha¯nı¯’s history book, see: Abu¯ al-Qa¯sim ʿAbd Alla¯h b. Muhammad Qa¯sha¯nı¯, Ta¯rı¯kh-i ˙ ¯b, 1970). I thank Daniel Ulja¯ytu¯, ed. Mahı¯n Hambalı¯ (Tehran: Bunga¯h-i tarjama wa nashr-i kita Zakrzewski for the references to this book. For the studies see mainly chapter two, section 5.4.

Chapter One: The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

1.

Size and ethnic origin

Al-Mansu¯r Qala¯wu¯n acquired thousands of mamluks prior to his ascendance to ˙ the throne and during his sultanate. He owned more mamluks than any of the sultans who preceded him, and more than most or all of the sultans who succeeded him, also. The historians Ibn al-Fura¯t, Ibn Iya¯s, Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯, alMaqrı¯zı¯ and al-Nuwayrı¯ mention that Qala¯wu¯n’s mamluks numbered twelve thousand.1 However, this estimate is probably much too high. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, a Mansu¯rı¯ mamluk himself, mentions in his chronicle that at the end of ˙ ˙ Qala¯wu¯n’s reign the number of the Mansu¯riyya mamluks of all regiments and ˙ ranks was more than six thousand.2 This estimate is accepted by later historians. Al-ʿAynı¯, based not only on Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ but also on al-Yu¯sufı¯, mentions ˙ the same number of Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks.3 Al-Maqrı¯zı¯, in both is Khitat and Sulu¯k, ˙ ˙ ˙ mentions two estimates, seven thousand or twelve thousand. However, in the last work he notes that seven thousand “is the accurate number”.4 Hence, the number of the Mansu¯riyya mamluks probably ranged between six and seven thousand.5 ˙ About half of the Mansu¯riyya mamluks were members of the Burjiyya regiment. ˙ The name of this group was derived from their place of residence, the towers (burj, plural: abra¯j) of the Cairo citadel. According to al-Maqrı¯zı¯ and Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯, who relied on Ibn Kathı¯r, the Burjiyya numbered three thousand and seven hundred mamluks.6

1 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:97; Ibn Iya¯s, 1:361; Nuju¯m, 7:327; Khitat, 1:95 (line 5); Niha¯ya, 31:176. ˙ 2 Zubda, 177. Similarly, in another place in his chronicle˙ (Zubda, 269) Baybars mentions that the number of the Mansu¯riyya was about six thousand. 3 ʿIqd, 2:230, 3:208. On˙ al-ʿAynı¯’s reliance on al-Yu¯sufı¯, see Little, Introduction, 81. 4 Sulu¯k, 1:755; Khitat, 1:195 line 5. ˙ ˙ 5 Scholars tend to accept the lowest estimate: Ayalon, “Studies I”, 223; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 189; Irwin, Middle East, 69. 6 Sulu¯k, 1:756; Khitat, 2:214; Nuju¯m, 7:330; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 191; Ayalon, ”Studies I”, 223. ˙ ˙

34

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

Qala¯wu¯n purchased mamluks from many different ethnic groups. Unlike his predecessors, al-Sa¯lih Ayyu¯b and al-Za¯hir Baybars, who based their mamluk ˙ ˙ ˙ corps mainly on Qipchaq Turks, Qala¯wu¯n acquired, in addition to Turks, also Mongols, Circassians, Ru¯mı¯s (from Anatolia), Khita¯ʾı¯s,7 Armenians, Georgians, ˙ Abkhazians, Greeks, Russians and other European mamluks.8 Qala¯wu¯n probably had a preference for mamluks from certain ethnic groups, especially Mongols, Turks and Circassians. Ibn al-Fura¯t mentions that royal mamluks were composed from “Mongols, Turks and others”, which might imply their geater quantity or quality.9 Al-ʿAynı¯ notes that Qala¯wu¯n was especially concerned with increasing the numbers of his mamluks of Turk and Mongol origin, and he used to pay a lot of money to the slave merchants who brought these mamluks to his sultanate.10 Similarly, Qala¯wu¯n warmly accepted members of the Mongol wa¯fidiyya, i. e. refugees who looked for shelter in the Mamluk sultanate.11 Finally, all of Qala¯wu¯n’s wives and those of his sons were of Mongol origin, and were selected for their ethnicity.12 In addition to Mongols and Turks, Qala¯wu¯n also purchased Circassians in large quantities.13 Though ethnic origin was a factor in a mamluk’s promotion, its role should not be overestimated. As discussed below in this chapter, Qala¯wu¯n promoted his mamluks mainly based on their seniority, abilities and qualifications, whereas ethnic affiliation was only a secondary factor. Indeed, among the most senior amirs of the Mansu¯riyya during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign we find not only Mongols or ˙ Turks, but also Circassians like La¯jı¯n and Qara¯sunqur. In this regard, Ibn Taghrı¯ 7 The Chinese Khita¯ʾı¯ kingdom ruled Mongolia and north China in the 4th/10th century. During ˙ one of the Khita¯ʾı¯ princes established the Qara¯-Khita¯ʾı¯ kingdom in central the 5th/11th century, ˙ ˙ Asia, which existed until the Mongolian conquests. See more on this kingdom: David Morgan, nd The Mongols (2 ed. Malden: Blackwell, 2007), 41–43; C.E. Bosworth, “Kara¯khita¯y”, EI2, ˙ ˙ 4:580–583. 8 Irwin, Middle East, 70. See more below. 9 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:97; David Ayalon, “The Wafidiya in the Mamluk Kingdom”, Islamic Culture 25 (1951), 103; Reuven Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin and Their Role in Early Mamluk Political Life”, MSR 12, 1 (2008), 120; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n,191. 10 ʿIqd, 2:385. 11 Ayalon, “Wafidiya”, 89–90. See on the wa¯fidiyyas during the first Mamluk period: Nobutaka Nakamachi, “The Rank and Status of Military Refugees in the Mamluk Army: A Reconsideration of the Wa¯fidı¯yah”, MSR 10, 1 (2006), 57–62. 12 Qala¯wu¯n married the daughter of the Mongol wa¯fidı¯ amir Sayf al-Dı¯n Karmu¯n. After her death, Qala¯wu¯n married her sister. He also married the daughter of a high-ranking Mongol amir, Sikta¯y b. Qara¯jı¯n, who claimed to be a descendant of the sila¯hda¯r (arms-bearer) of ˙ Chinggiz Kha¯n. Qala¯wu¯n’s son, al-Sa¯lih ʿAlı¯, married in 681/1282 a daughter of a Mongol amir ˙ ˙ who was in the former’s service. Another son, al-Ashraf Khalı¯l, married the sister of this woman. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ notes that Qala¯wu¯n’s second wife selected these Mongol women for his sons due to ethnic˙ solidarity ( jinsiyya). See Zubda, 102, 228–229; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 7:279– 280; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 116–117. 13 David Ayalon, “The Circassians in the Mamlu¯k Kingdom”, JAOS, 69 (1949), 137–138; Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin”, 120–121.

Size and ethnic origin

35

Birdı¯’s remark should be mentioned, according to which “one of Qala¯wu¯n’s virtues was that he never preferred anyone due to his affiliation to a certain ethnic origin but he preferred only those in whom he discerned exellency”.14 This remarkable note clearly testifies that discrimination on ethnic grounds, which probably did exist to a certain extent in the Mamluk sultanate, was considered immoral conduct and also politically (and militarily) unwise. According to historians of the Mamluk period, however, ethnicity played an important role in the Mamluk sultanate. Al-Maqrı¯zı¯ mentions that Qala¯wu¯n separated the different ethnicity.15 Already in their training period he housed his mamluks in different barracks (tiba¯q), according to their ethnic groups.16 The ˙ ethnic separation continued, according to al-Maqrı¯zı¯, even when the Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ mamluks were manumitted and joined the different army regiments. The Bur¯ s (Alans).17 The mamluks jiyya were composed of Circassians, Armenians and A ˙ of this regiment were appointed to the following offices: silahda¯riyya (the sul˙ tan’s arms-bearers); jumaqda¯riyya (mace bearers);18 ja¯shnakı¯riyya (food tast19 ers); and usha¯qiyya (pages of the stables). The kha¯ssakiyya, i. e. the selected ˙˙ mamluks who were bodyguards and servants of the sultan, were composed from Khita¯ʾı¯s and Qipchaqs.20 The Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks of the kha¯ssakiyya were ap˙ ˙ ˙˙ pointed as jamda¯riyya (masters of the robes) and suqa¯t (cup bearers, sin. sa¯qı¯).21

14 Wa-ka¯na min maha¯sin al-Malik al-Mansu¯r Qala¯wu¯n annahu la yamı¯l ila¯ jins bi-ʿaynihi bal ˙ ka¯na mayluhu li–man yatakhayyalu fı¯hi˙ al-naja¯ba ka¯ʾinan man ka¯na (Nuju¯m, 7:327). 15 Al-Maqrı¯zı¯’s report might give the impression that it was al-Ashraf Khalı¯l b. Qala¯wu¯n who created the seperation between the ethnic groups according to different corps. However, as pointed out by Northrup, it was Qala¯wu¯n to whom al-Maqrı¯zı¯ referred, see: Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 192 n. 230 (Khitat, 2:214). ˙ ˙ 16 Khitat, 2:214. ˙ ˙ 17 Circassians were part of the Burjiyya according to all sources (Khitat, 2:214; Sulu¯k, 1:756; ˙ ˙ “The Circassians”, Nuju¯m, 7:330). See on the Circassians in the Mamluk sultanate: Ayalon, ¯ 136–137. The As are the Alans, as shown by extensive evidence: Agusti Alemany, Sources on ˙ the Alans: A Critical Compilation (Leiden: Brill, 2000), 6–7, 244, 249; on the Alans in the ¯ s belong to the Tatar Mamluk sultanate: 275–276. Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ mentions that the A ˙ contemporary hi(Manhal, 3:430). This is an opinion that was probably common among storians, see also: Koby Yosef, Ethnic Groups, Social Relationships and Dynasty in the Mamluk Period (1250–1517) (unpublished Ph.D. diss., Tel Aviv University, 2010), 1:130–131 [in Hebrew]. 18 The jumaqda¯riyya marched beside the sultan during the royal processions and bore maces, see: R.P.A. Dozy, Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes (Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1881), 1:217. 19 The ja¯shnakı¯r (taster in Persian) would taste the sultan’s or the amir’s food and drink, for fear it might be poisioned. See: al-Qalqashandı¯ (Cairo), 5:460. 20 The kha¯ssakiyya during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign probably numbered a few dozen mamluks, between ˙˙ to forty (see: Ayalon, “Studies I”, 213–216). twenty-four 21 The jamda¯riyya (or jamada¯riyya) is a Persian term meaning “the robe holder”. The jamda¯r used to bear the official robe of the sultan or the amir and to march behind him in royal processions (al-Qalqashandı¯ [Cairo], 5:459). The jamada¯riyya were among the royal mam-

36

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

This ethnic separation of the different corps was meant, according to Linda Northrup, to impart cohesion and efficiency and to insure the sultan’s security.22 It seems, though, that the Muslim historians of the Mamluk period exaggerated the importance that they attributed to ethnicity. A prosopographical examination of the Mansu¯riyya mamluks reveals that al-Maqrı¯zı¯’s description of ˙ separation in the army units is not accurate. In the Burjiyya, that was not supposed to include any mamluks of Mongol or Georgian origin, we find, for example, the Mongol Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯ and the Georgian Aqqu¯sh Kurjı¯ alMatru¯h¯ı.23 Similarly, Kira¯y, who is not mentioned as a Burjı¯, served as silahda¯r, ˙ ˙ ˙ supposedly an office reserved for the Burjiyya only.24 As discussed in chapter three below (section 2.3.2.), ethnicity did not play a prominent role in most of the political struggles during the Mansu¯riyya period. ˙ The sources do not supply us a great deal of information regarding the ethnic origin of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs. It is impossible, therefore, to show the ethnic dis˙ tribution of all or most of the one hundred and seventy Mansu¯ris discussed in ˙ 25 this book. Tracing the ethnic origin of a mamluk is complicated even when he is denoted as a “Turk” (al-Turkı¯). This attribution does not necessarily refer to a mamluk of Turkish origin, but can mean a Mongol or another ethnos. For instance, Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ denotes the Mongol-origin Sala¯r as Turkish (turkı¯ aljins), and Kitbugha¯ as “Turkish Mongol” (al-turkı¯ al-mughulı¯).26 Other ethnic ¯ s (Alans), are also referred to as “Turks”.27 As for the Circassians, groups, like A ˙ they are usually mentioned in the sources as a dichotomous opposition to the “Turks”. Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯, for instance, mentions that Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r was a Circassian, “but some say he was Turkish”.28 Similarly, the epithet “Qipchaqı¯” (alQifja¯qı¯/al-Qibja¯qı¯) does not necessarily indicate a mamluk of Turkish Qipchaq origin, but might refer to one of Mongol origin. For instance, Aruqta¯y al-Ha¯jj and ˙ ˙ his brother Aytamish al-Muhammadı¯, who were of Mongol origin, are described ˙ luks and the kha¯ssakiyya. At the head of the jamada¯riyya stood raʾı¯s nawbat al- jamda¯riyya (Ayalon, “Studies˙˙I”, 214). 22 Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 192. 23 See below for the ethnic origin of Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯. On Aqqu¯sh Kurjı¯ al-Matru¯h¯ı, see: ˙ ˙ Muqaffa¯, 2:234. 24 ʿIqd, 4:129. See similar conclusions: Yosef, Ethnic Groups, 1:36–38. 25 Ayalon already pointed out that the data on the ethnic origin of the mamluks is scant (Ayalon, “Mamlu¯k”, 7–8). My findings regarding the Mansu¯riyya are consistent with those of Ayalon ˙ (see below). 26 Sala¯r: Manhal, 5:6; Kitbugha¯: Manhal, 9:115; Nuju¯m, 8:55. See also: al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 60:34; Ayalon, “Mamlu¯k: Military Slavery”, 8–9. 27 Alemany, Alans, 249; Yosef, Ethnic Groups, 1:130. 28 Manhal, 3:473; Nuju¯m, 8:276. Ibn Khaldu¯n notes an exceptional view according to which the Circassians are of Turkish origin. Usually, however, Circassians are mentioned in the contemporary sources as Turks “only as far as this term is synonymous to Mamluk” (Ayalon, “The Circassians”, 136, n. 12).

Size and ethnic origin

37

as being articulate in the “Qipchaq language”.29 Nu¯gha¯y al-Jamda¯r is mentioned as a “Qipchaqı¯”, though his name is Mongolian, meaning “dog”. The reason for the confusion between the Mongols and the Qipchaqs is probably because of resemblance in appearance. In addition, during the Mansu¯riyya period, most of ˙ the mamluks were imported to the sultanate from the Golden Horde, that included the Qipchaq steppe (Dasht-i Qipchaq) where the Qipchaqs assimilated with the Mongol rulers.30 The epithet “al-Ru¯mı¯” (from bila¯d al-Ru¯m, Anatolia and Europe) is vague as well. It might refer to a Turkman, Greek, or some other origin.31 As discussed above, it would be very problematic to infer a mamluk’s ethnic origin from his office or his unit’s affiliation. Another problem in identifying the ethnic origin of mamluks according to their attribution (nisba) is that the nisba might refer to the origin of the mamluk’s master. For example, the sultan Aybak al-Turkma¯nı¯ (648/125–655/1257) was of Qipchaq origin but was called “al-Turkma¯nı¯” since he had belonged to the family of al-Turkma¯nı¯ before he was bought by al-Sa¯lih Ayyu¯b. Yalbugha¯ al-Jarkası¯ was a ˙ ˙ Qipchaq but received his nisba because he was a mamluk of Jarkas al-Qa¯simı¯. The eunuch Jawhar al-Turkma¯nı¯ was an Indian but received his nisba since he was manumitted by the sister of Aqbugha¯ al-Turkma¯nı¯.32 Hence, the data regarding the ethnic origin of the Mansu¯riyya mamluks is ˙ limited and problematic. In few cases, mostly concerning the most senior amirs or sultans, the ethnic origin of a certain Mansu¯rı¯ is mentioned explicitly. In most ˙ of the cases, his origin might be inferred from his nisba, though it might be deceptive. In any case, the following data was gathered regarding some Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ amirs:

29 Aʿya¯n, 4:177. The confusion between the Qipchaq and the Mongolian languages in this case is clear, since al-Yu¯sufı¯ mentions that Aytamish was knowledgable in the Mongolian language (lisa¯n al-mughul) (al-Yu¯sufı¯, 330). 30 Ayalon, “Ya¯sa, C1”, 117–127, esp. 127. 31 In addition to the Mansu¯rı¯ La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯ discussed below, who was of Turkman origin, ˙ other mamluks who were called “Ru¯mis” were of Turkman origin Ayalon mentions that a few (Ayalon, “Mamluk”, 9). See more on the nisba al-Ru¯mı¯: Yosef, Ethnic Groups, 141–144. 32 Ayalon, “Names”, 219–223.

38 Mongols:

Qipchaqs: Circassians:

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

Kitbugha¯ (Oirat),33 Sala¯r (Oirat),34 Baydara¯;35 Baha¯dur al¯ qsunqur Kirta¯y,39 ʿAbHa¯jj,36 Qibjaq,37 Balaba¯n al-Tatarı¯,38 A ˙ 40 dalla¯h al-Silahda¯r, Aytamish al-Muhammadı¯,41 and his ˙ ˙ brother Aruqta¯y al-Ha¯jj,42 Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯ al-Tatarı¯ and ˙ ˙ 43 ¯ lmalik, Qutlu¯bak al-Mansu¯rı¯ al-Kabı¯r.44 A ˙ ˙ (Turks or Mongols): Nu¯gha¯y al-Qibja¯qı¯,45 Aslam al-Qibja¯qı¯.46 ˙ 47 Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, Aqqu¯sh al-Afram,48 Qara¯sunqur,49 La¯jı¯n,50 Baybars al-Ahmadı¯,51 Sunqur Jarkas. ˙

33 Most of the sources mention that Kitbugha¯ was Mongol (Mughulı¯). Ibn Kathı¯r adds that Kitbugha¯ was an Oirat Mongol (Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:282, 285). See also: Ayalon, “Wafidiya”, 92. 34 Aʿya¯n, 2:491; Sulu¯k, 2:97; Qa¯sha¯nı¯, 137. 35 ʿIqd, 3:216; Muqaffa¯, 2:562. 36 Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj was taken prisoner from the Mongols at the battle of ʿAyn Ja¯lu¯t (Muqaffa¯, 2:504; Durar ˙[Hyderabad], 1:500). He belonged to the “anti-Circassian” coalition (see chapter three, n. 136). 37 Qibjaq was a scribe (ka¯tib) of a high-ranking Mongol amir (noyan) before he was taken captive and became a mamluk. His father and brothers held high positions at the ¯Ilkha¯nid court (Wa¯fı¯, 24:178; Durar (Cairo), 3:326; Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol origin”, 123–124). Qibjaq was eloquent in the Mongol language (Aʿya¯n, 4:62). 38 Balaba¯n is called “al-Tatarı¯” by al-Safadı¯ (Aʿya¯n, 2:49) and al-Maqrı¯zı¯ (Sulu¯k, 2:270). Ibn ˙ Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯, probably erroneously, called him al-Tustarı¯ (Durar [Hyderabad], 1:493). ˙ ¯ qsunqur Kirta¯y was of Mongol ethnic origin (tatarı¯ al-jins). See: ʿIqd, 3:486. 39 A 40 Al-ʿAynı¯ mentioned ʿAbdalla¯h among the Mongol-origin mamluks who were arrested (ʿIqd, 3:242). 41 Donald Little, “Notes on Aitamisˇ, a Mongol Mamlu¯k”, in Die Islamische Welt zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit: Festschrift für Hans Robert Roemer zum 65. Geburtstag, eds. Ulrich Haarmann and Peter Bachmann (Beirut: Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morganlandischen Gesellschaft/Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1979), 391; Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin”, 124–125. 42 Muqaffa¯, 2:342; Aʿya¯n, 1:477. Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin”, 125. 43 Burlughay was taken captive from the Tatars (Nuju¯m, 9:16; Sulu¯k, 2:87–88; Durar, [Hydera¯ lbad], 1:476). He is mentioned by Ibn Hajar as “al-Tatarı¯” (Durar [Hyderabad], 1:476). A malik was taken captive at the battle of˙ Abulustayn in 675/1277, hence he was probably of Mongol origin, though he could have been Turkish as well (Nuju¯m, 10:175; Sulu¯k, 2:723; Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin”, 125–126). 44 Qutlu¯bak was probably also of Mongol origin, since his brother arrived in the Mongol ˙ wa¯fidiyya of 703/1304 (Kanz, 9:113). Qutlu¯bak also joined Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj’s “anti-Circassian ˙ ˙ coalition” (see p. 168 below). 45 Nuju¯m, 9:217. 46 Muqaffa¯, 2:218. 47 Manhal, 3:473; Nuju¯m, 8:232. 48 Muqaffa¯, 2:236; Aʿya¯n, 1:561. 49 Al-Safadı¯ notes that Qara¯sunqur is of Circassian origin and not a Christian from the town of ˙¯ al-Nabak (in the vicinity of Homs), as many people think (Aʿya¯n, 4:89; Wa¯fı¯, 24:213; cf. Qa¯ra Levanoni, Turning Point, 17). Qara¯sunqur himself is said to testify that he is of Circassian origin (Kanz, 9:224). 50 Manhal, 3:10. La¯jı¯n was a maternal cousin of the Circassian Mansu¯rı¯ amir Aqqu¯sh al-Afram ˙ 131–132; Irwin, Middle (Aʿya¯n, 1:562; Wa¯fı¯, 9:328). Cf. Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin”, East, 70.

Size and ethnic origin

39

La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯, who was of Turkman Muslim origin,52 Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ and Sanjar al-Jumaqda¯r.53 54 “Ru¯s” (Russians): Sayf al-Dı¯n Taybugha¯ al-Ru¯sı¯; Balaba¯n al-Ru¯sı¯.55 ˙ Georgians: Asandamur Kurjı¯,56 Aqqu¯sh Kurjı¯ al-Matru¯h¯ı. ˙ ˙ Khita¯ʾı¯: Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ is mentioned as “al-Khita¯ʾı¯.” It is pos˙ ˙ ˙ 57 sible that he was a Qara¯-Khita¯ʾı¯. ˙ ¯ s (Alans): ¯ s. A Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ ¯ mid Kurdish: Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯, who was born in the Kurdish city of A (Diyarbakir), is mentioned by Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ as Kurdish.58 Another Mansu¯rı¯ amir of Kurdish origin was Aqqu¯sh al˙ Rahbı¯. Aqqu¯sh was born in a village near the Kurdish city of ˙ Irbil in northern Iraq. He was, however, of Christian origin.59

“Ru¯mı¯s”:

As mentioned above, it is hard to know the ethnic origin of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who ˙ were given the epithet “al-Turkı¯”, such as Qutuz al-Mansu¯rı¯ al-Turkı¯ or Uzdamur ˙ ˙ 60 al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ al-Turkı¯. Thus, out of one hundred and seventy Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks, there is some ethnic ˙ information concerning thirty, most of whom were the highest-ranking amirs during the Mansu¯riyya period and after. Even this limited data is sometimes ˙ problematic. However, the prominent position of mamluks of Mongol, Turkish and Circassian origin is definitely discernable. Among these amirs, it should be

51 Nuju¯m, 10:143; Sulu¯k, 2:698. 52 ʿIqd, 4:293. 53 Ibn Iya¯s mentions that Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʾı¯ was of Ru¯mı¯ origin (ru¯mı¯ al-jins). See Ibn Iya¯s, 1:384. Cf. P. M. Holt, The Age of the Crusades: The Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1517 (London: Longman, 1986), 107. The historian al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ mentions that Sanjar al-Jumaqda¯r was ru¯mı¯ al-jins as well (al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, 276). 54 The Ru¯s are Russians, possibly Slavs, who were taken as captives by the Mongols and were scattered in different areas of Asia. This ethnic group preserved its distinctive identity also in China, see: T. T. Allsen, “Population Movements in Mongol Eurasia,” in R. Amitai and M. Biran eds. Nomads as Agents of Cultural Change (Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 2015), 120–122. Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ mentions that al-Ru¯s are an ethnic group that belong to the Tatars, ¯ s (Alans). See Manhal, 3:489; Yosef, Ethnic similar to what he mentioned regarding the A ˙ groups, 1:131. 55 Zubda, 176. 56 Muqaffa¯, 2:190. 57 Durar (Cairo), 2:43; Zubda, XV. Donald Richards suggests that Baybars’ origin might be from the east of the Islamic world and perhaps he was of Mongol descent (Richards, “Baybars alMansu¯rı¯”, 37). ˙ ¯ t, 8:247; Manhal, 6:74. 58 Shadhara 59 Ta¯lı¯, 186; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:76; Aʿya¯n, 1:577. 60 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:133; al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 60:295.

40

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

noted, were at least two Muslims by birth (the Kurdish and Turkman amirs) and several eastern Christians.61

2.

The training period

Arabic literary sources provide relatively rich data regarding the careers of the Mansu¯riyya amirs. However, information regarding the period that preceded ˙ their amirates is scant. Nothing is said about their early childhood in their native lands or about the ways they arrived in the lands of the sultanate. More information, though still very little, is available regarding the training period of the young mamluks. In what follows, I will describe the main stages and features of the Mansu¯rı¯ amir’s training period, based on David Ayalon’s studies on this ˙ topic.

2.1.

Relations among the mamluks

The training period in the military school was of great significance for the young mamluk. It formed his personality more than any other period of his life. According to Ayalon, during this time the mamluk transformed from a pagan to a faithful Muslim, from novice to soldier, and from child to adult. This period also had significant influence on the years that followed the mamluk’s manumission, since it was then that the young mamluk created the most important relationships for the rest of his life. He developed strong feelings of loyalty to his master (usta¯dh) – the one who bought him, brought him up and manumitted him him – on the one hand, and to his fellow mamluks of the same master (khushda¯sh), on the other hand.62 Hence, whenever an amir rose to a senior position, including to the sultanate, his favourite personal mamluks and his closest khushda¯shs were subsequently promoted. As discussed in the present chapter, senior Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ mamluks indeed enjoyed substantial promotion following Qala¯wu¯n’s ascendance to the sultanate. Similarly, Mansu¯rı¯ amirs were promoted to higher posi˙ tions following the ascendance of one of their khushda¯shs to the sultanate. However, khushda¯shiyya-based loyalty was much weaker than mamluk-master loyalty, as we will see. ¯ s, as an Alan, might be 61 On mamluks of Muslim origin, see: Ayalon, “Mamluk”, 9. Baha¯dur A ˙ either Muslim or Christian by birth. 62 Ayalon, L’esclavage, 27–30; Ayalon, “Mamluk”, 14. The term khushda¯sh (sometimes written as khu¯shdash or khujda¯sh) is made up of the words khuwa¯ja (master) and ta¯sh (fellow), see Gerhard Doerfer, Tu¨rkische und Mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen (Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1963), 3:184–185, 191; Dozy, Supplément, 1:352; Ayalon, L’esclavage, 29.

The training period

41

During the training period, a stronger loyalty was formed between an older mamluk (agha¯) and a younger one (ı¯nı¯). These two Turkish terms were taken from Turco-Mongolian culture and they literally mean elder and younger (biological) brothers. The model was that of an older mamluk (agha¯) assuming responsibility for a younger one (ı¯nı¯) and acting as his educator and protector during his training period. The ¯ını¯, in response, was loyal to his agha¯. The close relationships that emerged between the agha¯ and his ¯ını¯ during the training period continued to play a major role in Mamluk politics long after the military school. They had an impact on the ¯ını¯’s promotion.63 It seems, however, that this kind of brotherhood relationship became common only from the later years of the first Mamluk period.64 Evidence of tutoring during the Mansu¯riyya period is ˙ nevertheless mentioned by the historian al-Yu¯sufı¯. Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯, a mamluk of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, was known as mamlu¯k Qirma¯n, i. e. of an older mamluk of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r [=Qirma¯n]. According to al-Yu¯sufı¯, it was accepted “among the earlier amirs” that an older mamluk educated a new younger one. The older mamluk taught his younger khushda¯sh the etiquette of service and military excercises (adab, khidma and furu¯siyya). This practice prevailed in the periods of al-Za¯hir Baybars, Qala¯wu¯n and the Mansu¯riyya, but stopped during al˙ ˙ Yu¯sufı¯’s adult life, i. e. shortly after the Mansu¯riyya period. It seems that this ˙ practice is not identical to the agha¯-ı¯nı¯ customs.65 The sources mention another kind of brotherhood relationship between the Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks, termed ˙ ukhu¯wa or muwa¯kha¯h. As discussed in chapter three (section 2.3.4.), this kind of relationship was probably created at a later stage, after the training period in the military school.

2.2

The nature of training

The only data at our disposal regarding the nature of the mamluk novice’s training is provided by al-Maqrı¯zı¯ and Ibn Khaldu¯n. Both historians divided the mamluk novice’s training period into two parts, first a long period of Islamic education and only later, as a second phase, military training. It seems that eunuchs were responsible for both stages of training. However, in the first phase a 63 Ayalon, L’esclavage, 31–32. See on agha¯ and ¯ını¯ in the Turco-Mongolian tradition: Doerfer, 1:133–135. 64 Agha¯-ı¯nı¯ relations are not mentioned regarding any of the Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks. Indeed, Koby ˙ Yosef recently pointed out that the agha¯-ı¯nı¯ practices are mentioned in the sources only toward the end of the first Mamluk period, and especially in the second period; see Koby Yosef, “Ikhwa, Muwa¯khu¯n and Khushda¯shiyya in the Mamlu¯k Sultanate”, JSAI 40 (2013), 352–355. 65 Al-Yu¯sufı¯, 148; Yosef, Ethnic Groups, 1:213–214.

42

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

jurist (faqı¯h) or a teacher (muʿallim) would teach the young mamluk the Qurʾa¯n, Islamic law, prayers and Arabic writing. When the mamluk grew up a little more, the faqı¯h taught him Islamic jurisprudence (fiqh). When the mamluk reached puberty (sinn al-bulu¯gh) the second phase of his training started and he was taught the arts of warfare, including archery, handling the lance, riding a horse, etc.66 This division appears rather irrational in light of the importance attributed to the mamluk’s military skills as a young boy. One may wonder why the unique warlike qualities that the young mamluk managed to absorb in his homeland were not developed from the very beginning of his training period. It is more plausible to assume, hence, that Islamic education was conducted alongside military training. The scant information available about the mamluk novice’s training mainly refers to his literary and Islamic education. It was mentioned above that the young mamluk was taught Qurʾa¯n, Arabic writing, the principles of the sharı¯ʿa, prayers, and some Islamic jurisprudence. This is the most detailed description of the curriculum in the military schools. Some additional evidence of the mamluks’ literary studies appear in biographical notes. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, for instance, ˙ testifies that during his training period he was taught (Arabic) writing and Qurʾa¯n.67 Another mamluk during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign is also said to have been taught writing and Qurʾa¯n.68 Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ learned Arabic writing and literature (adab).69 It seems that court service was also taught to the young mamluk. It was mentioned above that the agha¯ used to teach his ¯ını¯ “service” (khidma). Similarly, Ibn Khaldu¯n mentions that amir Yalbugha¯ taught his mamluk Barqu¯q, who was purchased toward the end of the first Mamluk period, the manners of royalty (a¯da¯b al-mulk), in addition to archery (rima¯ya) and wielding a lance (thaqa¯fa).70 The nature of the Arabic studies in the barracks and the level of knowledge of Arabic among the Mansu¯riyya is a highly important issue. Did the amirs who ˙ ruled the sultanate during the Mansu¯riyya period receive an intense Arabic ˙ education as part of their training, to the level that they would be able to speak and write Arabic in their daily life? The answer to this question, as far as we can deduce from the litrary sources, is negative. Kitbugha¯ and Turunta¯y, for example, ˙ ˙ 66 Khitat, 2:213, lines 33–37, and Ayalon’s resumé of this passage in L’esclavage, 13. Similarly to ˙ ˙ ¯zı¯, Ibn Khaldu¯n mentions that “[the trainers] give them [the mamluk novices] a al-Maqrı careful upbringing, including the study of the Qurʾa¯n and other subjects of instruction, until they become proficient in these things. Then they train them in the use of the bow and the sword, in riding in the hippodromes, in fighting with the lance…”. See Ibn Khaldu¯n, 5:371, and Ayalon’s translation in: “Mamlukiyya¯t”, 346. 67 Zubda, 71. 68 Aʿya¯n, 2:625–626; Durar (Hyderabad), 2:228–229. 69 Wa¯fı¯, 15:478; Ta¯lı¯, 90. 70 Ibn Khaldu¯n, 5:472.

The training period

43

who were sultan and vice-sultan, had poor knowledge of Arabic.71 Even other high-ranking amirs, who received an excellent education as royal mamluks of the Burjiyya regiment, did not master Arabic. The Mansu¯rı¯-Burjı¯ Baktamur al-Abu¯ ˙ Bakrı¯ testified that he did not know Arabic and could not express himelf clearly in this language. Sanjar al-Jumaqda¯r, another Burjı¯ amir, could not speak Arabic clearly, either.72 Sultan Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, who was a Burjı¯ and was probably educated in the barracks of Cairo citadel during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign, started to learn Arabic only as an adult, when he was under arrest following the murder of alAshraf Khalı¯l.73 Aruqta¯y al-Ha¯jj, who also seems to have been educated in his first ˙ ˙ years by Qala¯wu¯n under the direct supervision of the stern eunuch Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n al-Fakhrı¯, spoke broken Arabic.74 It should be noted that Qala¯wu¯n himself had a very poor knowledge of Arabic.75 One might find a reference to the difficulties of learning Arabic by the mamluks in the remark of an amir of the Mansu¯riyya ˙ period, Bashqird al-Na¯sirı¯ (d. 702/1302). This amir is said to have claimed that he ˙ refrained from speaking Turkish for twenty years in order to master Arabic.76 Hence, the Arabic teaching in the military schools during the Mansu¯riyya period ˙ seems to have been basic and superficial. There were, however, some mamluks who mastered Arabic, the dawa¯da¯rs in particular.77 However, these were the exceptions. Altunbugha¯ al-Ja¯wulı¯ (d. 744/ ˙ 1343), the dawa¯da¯r of Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯, was very knowledgable in Arabic. He is described by his colleague al-Safadı¯ as a “rare member of his people” (na¯dir fı¯ ˙ 71 See on Kitbugha¯: Ulrich Haarmann, “Arabic in Speech, Turkish in Lineage: Mamluks and Their Sons in the Intellectual Life of Fourteenth-Century Egypt and Syria”, Journal of Semitic Studies 33, 1 (1988), 92; Turunta¯y could not write or read Arabic well (Zubda, 178). ˙ said˙ to testify of himself that he cannot speak Arabic (ghutmı¯ la 72 Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯ is yaʿraf bi-l-ʿarabı¯), see: Muqaffa¯, 2:458; Nasser O. Rabbat, “Representing the Mamluks in Mamluk Historical Writing”, in The Historiography of Islamic Egypt (c. 950–1800), 70–71. See on the term ghutmı¯: Edward William Lane, An Arabic-English Lexicon (London: Williams and Norgate, 1863–1893) 2228–2229. Sanjar al-Jumaqda¯r, according to al-Safadı¯, could not speak ˙ Arabic or spoke it so poorly that he could not answer a question (aʿjamı ¯ al-lisa¯n la yujı¯b suʾa¯lan. Aʿya¯n, 2:465). 73 Abu¯ Bakr ibn ʿAbdalla¯h Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯, Muntakhaba¯t min kita¯b Durar al-Tı¯ja¯n li–Ibn alDawa¯da¯rı¯. Die Epitome der Universalchronik Ibn ad-Dawa¯da¯rı¯s im Verhältnis zur Langfassung: Eine Quellenkritische Studie zur Geschichte der Ӓgyptischen Mamluken, ed. Gunhild Graf (Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1990), 88–89; Haarmann, “Altun Ha¯n und Cingiz Ha¯n”, 5; ˙ ˘ Haarmann, “Arabic in Speech”, 103. 74 Aʿya¯n, 1:479 (maʿa ʿujma fı¯ lisa¯nihi). See: Haarmann, “Arabic in Speech”, 103. See on Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n below. 75 Sulu¯k, 1:673, 756; Nuju¯m, 7:325; Ibn Iya¯s, 1:361. 76 Aʿya¯n, 1:676; Haarmann, “Arabic in Speech”, 95. 77 The basic function of the dawa¯da¯r was bearing the inkwell. During the very early Mamluk period, this office included several important duties such as supervising the work of the chancery scribes, issuing official documents and letters, and being in charge of the barı¯d (sultanic postal service), foreign affairs and espionage (Irwin, Middle East, 39; Ayalon, “Studies III”, 62–63).

44

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

abna¯ʾ jinsihi). Altunbugha¯ al-Ja¯wulı¯ refers to his uniqueness among his mamluk ˙ friends by labelling himself as being “arabized in his language though being of Turkish descent” (mustaʿrab al-lafz li–l-atra¯k nisbatuhu).78 The dawa¯da¯rs of the ˙ Mansu¯riyya period, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, Arsala¯n al-Dawa¯da¯r and Arghu¯n al˙ ˙ Dawa¯da¯r, were knowledgable in Arabic as well. However, their proficiency in Arabic was probably not achieved in the ordinary military schools. Baybars alMansu¯rı¯ and Arghu¯n were trained in a special “private” school together with the ˙ sons of the sultans, and Arsala¯n achieved his mastery in Arabic thanks to special tutoring by a qa¯d¯ı.79 ˙ It is not surprising, then, that the spoken language among the sultans and amirs was mainly a Turkish dialect.80 Some anecdotes in the sources indeed indicate this. Al-Safadı¯ notes, for example, an incident in which Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ ˙ talked to his mamluks in Turkish (as usual), since he did not notice that a local ʿa¯lim was present.81 Another indication of the daily use of the Turkish language among the amirs is the fact that local qa¯d¯ıs, ʿulama¯ʾ and bureaucrats studied ˙ Turkish in order to communicate better with the amirs and to increase their 82 influence on them. Finally, we have Arabic-Turkish glossaries and grammars, written in Qipchaq Turkish, as early as the beginning of the 7th/14th century. These manuals were intended to facilitate the communication between the Turkishspeaking mamluks and their local bureaucrats and subjects.83 Alongside Turkish, it should be noted, Mongolian too was spoken by the mamluks of Mongol origin. Qibjaq, as a member of a high-level Mongolian scribal family, excelled in

78 Wa¯fı¯, 9:367; Haarmann, “Arabic in Speech”, 96. 79 On Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯’s and Arghu¯n al-Dawa¯da¯r’s elementary education, see below. On Arsala¯n al-Dawa¯da¯r:˙ Aʿya¯n, 1:450. 80 Most modern scholars assert that the average mamluk’s knowledge of Arabic was relatively poor and that the prevailing spoken language among the mamluks was Turkish. See, for instance: David Ayalon, “The Muslim City and the Mamluk Military Aristocracy”, Proceedings of the Israel, Academy of Sciences and Humanities 2, 14 (1968), 323; Ayalon, “Mamluk”, 17; Annemarie Schimmel, “Some Glimpses of the Religious Life in Egypt during the Later Mamluk Period”, Islamic Studies 4 (1965), 356; Haarmann, “Arabic in Speech”, 84, 91, 92; Rabbat, “Representing the Mamluks”, 69; Barbara Flemming, “Literary Activities in Mamluk Halls and Barracks”, in Studies in Memory of Gaston Wiet, ed. Myriam RosenAyalon ( Jerusalem: Institute of Asian and African Studies, 1977), 251; Jonathan P. Berkey, The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo: A Social History of Islamic Education (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992), 11; R. Stephen Humphreys, “The Expressive Intent of the Mamluk Architecture of Cairo: A Preliminary Essay”, Studia Islamica 35 (1972), 118, 119. 81 Aʿya¯n, 4:197. 82 Aʿya¯n, 5:266; Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:290; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:228; Zetterstéen, 42–43; Haarmann, “Arabic in Speech”, 92; Sulu¯k, 2:28. Several other local ʿulama¯ʾ and bureaucrats are mentioned as knowledgable in Turkish during the first Mamluk period. 83 Haarmann, “Arabic in Speech”, 90; Haarmann, “Altun Ha¯n und Cingiz Ha¯n”, 2. ˙ ˘

The training period

45

speaking and writing the Mongol language.84 Similarly, the brothers Aytamish alMuhammadı¯ and Aruqta¯y al-Ha¯jj used to speak this language between ˙ ˙ ˙ themselves.85 The abundant Arabic dialogues and poetry attributed to the Mansu¯rı¯ and other amirs and mentioned in the literary sources should not be ˙ understood as their own writings. Most or all of this material was written or edited, so it seems, by native authors.86 The simple Arabic language that the young mamluk absorbed in his early studies was meant to assist him in the performance of basic Islamic practices, such as prayers and Qurʾa¯n reading. In the end, the main target of the mamluk educational system was to create the Mansu¯rı¯ mamluk’s complete identification ˙ with his new religion. Only a strong belief in Islam would enable him to fight and to die for that cause. The Mansu¯rı¯ mamluk’s elementary education was an im˙ portant milestone in the development of a “Mamluk identity”, discussed in the next chapter. The military training of the young mamluks, according to al-Maqrı¯zı¯ and Ibn Khaldu¯n, included archery, handling the lance and the sword and riding horses in the hippodrome.87 These and other military exercises, such as playing polo, wrestling and hunting, are known as furu¯siyya. Ayalon defines furu¯siyya as “embrac[ing] all that the horseman had to master by systematic training, in order to become an accomplished knight”.88 Sultan al-Za¯hir Baybars introduced fur˙ u¯siyya on a large scale in the Mamluk sultanate. However, the furu¯siyya was developed especially by the Mansu¯riyya mamluks. The Mansu¯riyya mamluks, ˙ ˙ according to Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯, were the real creators of the lance exercises, as they were performed in the sultanate up to his time. Before the Mansu¯riyya, these ˙ exercises had been performed in a different manner.89 The Mansu¯riyya mamluks, ˙ indeed, used to practice different branches of the furu¯siyya. The data on this 84 Little, “Aitamisˇ”, 392; Aʿya¯n, 4:62; Haarmann, “Arabic in Speech”, 101. 85 Aytamish was responsible for the correspondance with the ¯Ilkha¯ns. He was sent as a diplomatic envoy by al-Na¯sir Muhammad to the ¯Ilkha¯ns several times. See on these two mamluk ˙ “Aitamisˇ”, 390–392, 396–397; Ayalon, “Ya¯sa, C2”, 136–138; ˙ Little, brothers of Mongol origin: Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin”, 124–125; Amitai, “A Mongol Governor of al-Karak in Jordan? A Re-examination of an Old Document in Mongolian and Arabic”, Zentralasiatische Studien 36 (2007), 270–274; Haarmann, “Arabic in Speech”, 101–102; al-Yu¯sufı¯, 329–330; Aʿya¯n, 1:477, 634; Wa¯fı¯, 9:440; Muqaffa¯, 2:342. 86 Rabbat, “Representing the Mamluks”, 71–74; Conermann, “Tankiz”, 19; Irwin, “Mamluk History”, 164–165. Haarmann, however, asserted that some of these dialogues do indicate some mamluks’ genuine knowledge of vernacular Arabic, see: Haarmann, “Arabic in Speech”, 91. 87 See n. 66 above. 88 David Ayalon, “Notes on the Furu¯siyya Exercises and Games in the Mamluk Sultanate”, Scripta Hierosolymitana 9 (1961), 34. See in-depth on the furu¯siyya and its literature: Shiha¯b Al-Sarra¯f, “Mamluk Furu¯sı¯yah Literature and Its Antecedents”, MSR 8, 1 (2004), 141–200. ˙ 89 Ayalon, “Furu¯siyya”, 47–53.

46

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

topic, however, refers mainly to their amirate period, and not to their training period. The most prominent Mansu¯rı¯s who excelled in furu¯siyya were Aqqu¯sh al˙ Afram, Qibjaq and Sala¯r. Aqqu¯sh al-Afram used to practice many different branches of the furu¯siyya: archery, wrestling (sira¯ʿ), boxing (lika¯m), lance games ˙ (thika¯f) and hunting.90 Qibjaq excelled in archery, lance games and hunting.91 Sala¯r was so proficient in horse riding that his body did not move when he rode, and he did not sweat when he played polo.92 Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r (polo master) 93 and especially his son Muhammad excelled at polo.94 Qutlu¯bak even ˙ ˙ established a polo field.95 Sunqursha¯h al-Mansu¯rı¯, the governor of Safed, espe˙ cially used to go on hunting expeditions. He was said to annihilate “all the lions 96 from the forests”. Kujkun al-Mansu¯rı¯ is also said to have had good knowledge ˙ and experience of hunting.97 Other Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who are mentioned as hunting ˙ enthusiasts are Baha¯dur Samiz and Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj.98 The Mansu¯riyya mamluks ˙ ˙ also used to practice wrestling.99 A rare description of the furu¯siyya training of the Mansu¯riyya novices is ˙ brought by al-ʿAynı¯. This historian notes that Qala¯wu¯n used to supervise the military training of his mamluks personally. He used to move all his mamluks out of the tiba¯q and situate them in the citadel yard. Then he used to sit on a chair that ˙ was brought to him and to watch them. The mamluks used to handle lances under the guideance of instructors (muʿallimu¯n). Then they wrestled (yatasa¯raʿu¯n) ˙ until noon. After the noon prayer (sala¯t al-zuhr), the eunuch (kha¯dim) took them ˙ ˙ to practice archery (ramy al-nushsha¯b). “That was their routine”, al-ʿAynı¯ concludes.100 This evidence indicates that the Mansu¯riyya mamluks were under ˙ the direct supervision of their master, and that special instructors and eunuchs were responsible for their military training. Most of the Mansu¯riyya mamluks were purchased at a young age and un˙ derwent a period of training in the military schools for the mamluk novices. Very few details are known about these schools, and all references are to those of the royal mamluks, i. e. the mamluks of the sultan. The royal mamluks were gar90 91 92 93

Aʿya¯n, 1:561, 569; Wa¯fı¯, 9:327. Aʿya¯n, 4:62, 68–69; Wa¯fı¯, 24:178; 182–183. Durar (Cairo), 2:278. The ju¯kanda¯r used to bear the sultan’s (or the amir’s) polo stick, see: al-Qalqashandı¯ (Cairo), 5:458. 94 Wa¯fı¯, 10:199; Aʿya¯n, 1:707; Ayalon, “Furu¯siyya”, 59. 95 Aʿya¯n, 4:123; Wa¯fı¯, 24:261; Durar (Cairo), 3:337. 96 Aʿya¯n, 2:483; Wa¯fı¯, 15:499. 97 Aʿya¯n, 4:149. 98 Manhal, 3:433; Aʿya¯n, 2:55. 99 See Qara¯sunqur’s testimony about the Mansu¯riyya mamluks’ wrestling: Aʿya¯n, 4:93; Wa¯fı¯, ˙ 24:217. 100 ʿIqd, 3:19.

The training period

47

risoned in the barracks of Cairo citadel (tabaqa, pl. tiba¯q or atba¯q). The tiba¯q, ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ however, may refer to both the military school of the citadel and to the residence places of the royal mamluks, including those who had already graduated the military school.101 Ayalon asserts that the mamluks of the amirs were probably trained in tiba¯q as well, though these tiba¯q were inferior to those of the royal ˙ ˙ mamluks with regard to education and military training.102 There is no evidence for tiba¯q of amirs during the Mansu¯riyya period. While there is little evidence for ˙ ˙ the training and education of young mamluks by their amir masters, one testimonial from the Mansu¯riyya period is extant.103 ˙ It seems that the amir was, in fact, “a little sultan”. His home was a small-scale model of the sultanic court.104 It is hard to know, however, exactly how the amirs educated and trained their mamluks. The sources usually describe the process of a mamluk’s education by his master with the verbs rabba¯ (or rubbiya as passive), meaning “to foster”, or anshaʾa, meaning “to rear” or even “to build up.”105 La¯jı¯n, as an amir, reared his mamluk Baha¯dur al-Sayfı¯ from early childhood.106 Interestingly enough, we know about a case in which an amir, who was himself the mamluk of an amir, educated and manumitted one of his own mamluks. This amir was Turunta¯y al-Mansu¯rı¯, a mamluk of amir Qala¯wu¯n, who brought up his ˙ ˙ ˙ mamluk Baktamur al-Ha¯jib.107 ˙ Another similarity between the mamluks of the sultan and the mamluks of the amirs is that in both cases, there was a very small group of privileged youths who were not educated together with the other mamluks but in the palace of the sultan or the amir, sometimes together with the sultan’s or amir’s children. Among the Mansu¯riyya, we know that Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ was educated in the house of amir ˙ ˙ Qala¯wu¯n together with the latter’s sons.108 Baybars testifies that when he arrived 101 Ayalon, L’esclavage, 44, n. 75. 102 Ayalon, “Studies II”, 460; Ayalon, L’esclavage, 25. Ayalon found only one case in which a mamluk (Barqu¯q) was said to be educated in the atba¯q of his master, who was an amir (Ibn ˙ Khaldu¯n, 5:472). 103 A mamluk who was born around 680/1280 and arrived in al-Bı¯ra from his homeland, was purchased by a local amir who taught him writing (khatt) and Qurʾa¯n, see: Aʿya¯n, 2:625–626; ˙˙ late first Mamluk period, see n. 70 Durar (Hyderabad), 2:228–229. Another case is from the above. 104 Ayalon, “Studies II”, 461. Al-Qalqashandı¯ notes that each amir of one hundred or amir tablkha¯na¯h was in fact “a little sultan”, served by most of the office holders of the sultan’s ˙court (al-Qalqashandı¯ [Beirut], 4:61–64). 105 See, for instance, Sulu¯k, 1:821, 836; Aʿya¯n, 1:636; Nuju¯m, 8:85, 10:244; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:496; Wa¯fı¯, 15:478; Manhal, 3:477; Zubda, 269; Niha¯ya, 31:150; Levanoni, Turning Point, 16. 106 Durar (Hyderabad), 1:496. 107 Baktamur al-Ha¯jib (al-Husa¯mı¯) joined the ranks of Turunta¯y’s mamluks as a young slave in ˙ a¯y, who ˙ was probably an amir at that ˙ time ˙ and served as the ustada¯r of his 675/1277. Turunt ˙ ˙ master Qala¯wu¯n, fostered and manumitted Baktamur (rabba¯hu wa-aʿtaqahu), when Tur˙ unta¯y was still a mamluk of amir Qala¯wu¯n. See: Sulu¯k, 2:314; Nuju¯m, 9:278. ˙ 108 Manhal, 3:477.

48

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

in Egypt as a child in 659/1261, his new master, the amir Qala¯wu¯n, put him in the maktab where he was taught (Arabic) writing and Qurʾa¯n.109 We know, too, that Ku¯nduk (more properly Küvendik) al-Sa¯qı¯, a favourite mamluk of Sultan alZa¯hir Baybars, was educated in a maktab together with the sultan’s son, Berke ˙ Kha¯n, the future sultan al-Malik al-Saʿı¯d.110 Another privileged mamluk was Arghu¯n al-Dawa¯da¯r. He was educated in the house of Qala¯wu¯n when the latter was sultan, about twenty years after Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯.111 Hence, it seems that ˙ the elite school where privileged mamluks of sultans or amirs were educated might have been a special maktab, which is a term that usually signifies an elementary school for Qurʾa¯n studies.112 Indeed, Nasser Rabbat claims that the term kutta¯biyya – that according to Ayalon refers to the mamluk novices of a sultan (or amir) in general – refers only to the privileged mamluks who studied in the maktab with the sultan’s (or the amir’s) sons. The other mamluks were simply called mama¯lı¯k al-tiba¯q.113 In any case, the mamluks who were educated in this ˙ exclusive school received a better education than in the tiba¯q. As mentioned ˙ above, the knowledge of Arabic (as well as Islamic studies) of the maktab graduates, such as Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ and Arghu¯n al-Dawa¯da¯r, was higher than ˙ that of the ordinary novices. Ayalon claims that these privileged mamluks had a better chance of rapid promotion compared to the other novices.114 However, the career of Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ (discussed below) indicates that, at least in his case, ˙ upbringing as a “palace novice” did not bring about rapid promotion. Anyhow, it seems that Ayalon’s assumption that “the Mamluks of the great amirs were brought up according to principles resembling those which were applied in the case of the sultan’s Mamluks” is corroborated by the data discussed above regarding the mamluks’ training period.115 It is hard to know the exact number of tiba¯q during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign. Ac˙ cording to Ayalon, there were about fourteen tiba¯q, some of which were built ˙ after Qala¯wu¯n’s reign. During Qala¯wu¯n’s reign, the tiba¯q of the citadel estab˙ lished by al-Za¯hir Baybars in 676/1277 were in use. These tiba¯q were situated in ˙ ˙ the court of the citadel between the mosque and the ¯ıwa¯n, and near the Burj alZa¯wiyya.116 It seems that these tiba¯q are the ones referred to by al-Maqrı¯zı¯ as ˙ those in the ¯ıwa¯n square (al-tiba¯q bi-sa¯hat al-ı¯wa¯n), in which Qala¯wu¯n quartered ˙ ˙ 109 110 111 112 113 114 115 116

Zubda, 71. Zubda, 163; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 7:95. Muqaffa¯, 2:19. George Makdisi, The Rise of the Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West (Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981), 19; J.M. Landau, “Maktab”, EI2, 6:196–197. Nasser O. Rabbat, The Citadel of Cairo: A New Interpretation of Royal Mamluk Architecture (Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995), 291; Ayalon, “Mamluk”, 10. Ayalon, L’esclavage, 22. Ayalon, “Mamluk”, 13. Rabbat, Citadel, 287; Ayalon, L’esclavage, 9–12; Levanoni, Turning point, 12.

The training period

49

his Mansu¯riyya mamluks.117 Some one thousand mamluks were quartered in ˙ each tabaqa.118 According to al-Maqrı¯zı¯, Qala¯wu¯n divided his mamluks between ˙ different tiba¯q according to their ethnic origin.119 However, it should be noted ˙ that many of the high-ranking amirs of the Mansu¯riyya, such as Kitbugha¯, La¯jı¯n, ˙ Baydara¯, Turunta¯y, Qara¯sunqur and Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, were trained while Qala¯˙ ˙ wu¯n was still an amir (see appendix 4). Hence, they were probably not educated in the tiba¯q of the citadel nor separated according to their ethnic origin. ˙ 2.3.

Discipline in the barracks (tiba¯q) ˙

The Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks received religious education and military training in the ˙ tiba¯q over a period that lasted for several years. When the novices completed ˙ their training period they were manumitted as young adults. During the early first Mamluk period, i. e. the reigns of al-Za¯hir Baybars and Qala¯wu¯n, young ˙ mamluks during their long training period were under strict discipline from their educators. Qala¯wu¯n was especially concerned about severely disciplining his mamluks. On the other hand, he is said to have taken care of his mamluks as if they were his own sons and even more so.120 In this early period, no jundı¯ or amir was allowed to talk to the mamluk novices or to come near them. The novices were punished harshly for the slightest violation of the rules by the educators, i. e. the eunuchs or ruʾu¯s al-nawba. During Qala¯wu¯n’s period, the mamluks were not allowed to leave the barracks.121 The eunuchs (tawa¯shiyya or khudda¯m, sing. kha¯dim) were responsible for the ˙ education of the young mamluks at all levels of the “training pyramid”: At the base were the simple eunuchs who served in the different barracks. At the head of each barrack was a eunuch called muqaddam al-tabaqa (commander of the ˙ tabaqa) and at the top of the pyramid stood the muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k al˙ sulta¯niyya (head of the royal mamluks), who had a deputy called na¯ʾib mu˙ 117 Khitat, 2:213. Rabbat, Citadel, 126–127; Masa¯lik, 3:331. ˙ ˙ L’esclavage, 11. 118 Ayalon, 119 Khitat, 2:213. This assumption was strengthened by Chapoutot-Remadi, see: Mounira ˙ ˙ Chapoutot-Remadi, “Liens propres et identités séparées chez les Mamelouks bahrides”, in Valeur et distance: Identités et sociétés en Égypt, ed. Christian Décobert (Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2000), 183. 120 On Qala¯wu¯n’s severity towards, and power over, his mamluks see chapter three, nn. 30–32. On the other hand, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ mentions Qala¯wu¯n’s extreme care for his mamluks ˙ (Zubda, 269). Al-Maqrı¯zı¯ adds that whenever Qala¯wu¯n found that the meat and food that was served to his mamluks was not of sufficient quality, he used to punish those responsible (Khitat, 2:213). ˙ ,˙ 2:213, 214; Ayalon, L’esclavage, 13–14. Raʾs al-nawba was responsible for the be121 Khitat ˙ ˙ of the royal mamluks and carried out the orders of the sultan and the amirs haviour regarding them. See: Ayalon, “Studies III”, 60–61; Ayalon, L’esclavage, 47–48 n. 110a.

50

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

qaddam al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya, also a eunuch. The main reason for the use of ˙ eunuchs in the schools was to function as a buffer between young mamluks and adult ones, in order to prevent pederasty.122 In fact, pederasty appears to have been common among the mamluks, and without the eunuchs, the discipline in the military schools would have deteriorated greatly due to this medieval form of what today would be considered sexual harassment.123 However, soon after Baybars’ and Qala¯wu¯n’s reigns, deterioration in discipline and education started. The first signs of loosening discipline among the royal mamluks are clearly discerned from the third reign of al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad.124 For instance, already during al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s reign, the mam˙ luks were allowed to leave the barracks during the day but were obliged to sleep there at night. Al-Na¯sir Muhammad let the mamluks leave the barracks and go to ˙ ˙ the bath house once a week. However, it was already during his reign that some of the mamluks moved from the barracks and lived in houses in Cairo.125 Loose discipline escalated during the second Mamluk period. Indeed, al-Maqrı¯zı¯ and Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ testify that the royal mamluks of their time, as opposed to those of Qala¯wu¯n, were unrestrained, arrogant and corrupt due to the deterioration of the educational system.126 The deterioration in discipline and educational methods was related to the decline in the position of the eunuchs, the educators of the royal mamluks in the 122 Ayalon describes this phenomenon as “homosexuality” (L’esclavage, 14). Similarly, Chapoutot-Remadi refers to this phenomenon as relations between mamluks of the same gender (Chapoutot-Remadi, “Liens”, 179). Anne Broadbridge terms this kind of relations “homosexuality” as well (Anne F. Broadbridge. Kingship and Ideology in Islamic and Mongol Worlds (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 89). However, it seems that this widespread custom in Mamluk society should be seen as pederasty, i. e. sexual relationships between men (grown mamluks, including amirs) and young boys (mamluks). The Arabic sources make implicit reference, here and there, to this kind of relationship. See, for example, sultan al-Ashraf Khalı¯l, who used to commit “sins with young boys” (Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:170, and see also: ʿIqd, 3:168; Kanz, 9:74, Broadbridge, Ideology); the senior amir Aqqu¯sh al-Afram who “loved” his beautiful fellow-amir’s son (Aʿya¯n, 2:44; Wa¯fı¯, 10:283; Manhal, 3:421) and had a sexual relationship with another amir’s son (Sulu¯k, 1:869). For more examples, see Aʿya¯n 4:99–100; 2:337; Sulu¯k, 1:837, 2:366, 387, 416, 467, 574–575; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:411; al-Yu¯sufı¯, 169. 123 Ayalon, L’esclavage, 14–15. According to al-Qalqashandı¯, only eunuchs occupied the office of muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya (al-Qalqashandı¯ [Beirut], 4:22. See also on this office: al-Taʿrı¯f, 98–99). However,˙as discussed below, during the Mansu¯riyya period there ˙ were prominant Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who occupied this office. ˙ 60–63. 124 Levanoni, Turning Point, 125 Khitat, 2:213; Ayalon, L’esclavage, 15. ˙¯ m, ˙ 8:328; Khitat, 2:214 lines 18–19. It should be noted that the first sultan of the second 126 Nuju ˙ ˙ ¯ q, attempted to restore strict discipline and educational methods as Mamluk period, Barqu they were during the reigns of al-Za¯hir Baybars and Qala¯wu¯n (Khitat, 2:214, line 11). Ho˙ ˙ ˙ areas occurred once wever, when his reign ended (in 791/1388), a significant decline in these more (Ayalon, L’esclavage, 16–17).

The training period

51

barracks. During the reigns of al-Za¯hir Baybars and Qala¯wu¯n, muqaddam al˙ mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya had a strong position and was held in high esteem by the ˙ mamluks in the barracks. Sharaf al-Dı¯n Mukhtass al-Za¯hirı¯ (d. 689/1290), the ˙ ˙˙ muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya during the reigns of al-Za¯hir Baybars, his ˙ ˙ son Saʿı¯d and Qala¯wu¯n, intimidated the mamluks and had clear authorithy over them. The mamluks respected and feared him, since he “struck or cursed almost every one of them”. Qala¯wu¯n enhanced Mukhtass’ position even more by en˙˙ dowing him with an iqta¯ʿ of sixty horsemen.127 Another muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k ˙ al-sulta¯niyya during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign, tawa¯shı¯ Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n al-Fa¯khir (d. 707/ ˙ ˙ 1307), is also said have been awe-inspiring, whom the mamluks highly respected on the one hand, and feared on the other. Al-Ha¯jj Aruqta¯y, a Mansu¯rı¯ mamluk ˙ ˙ ˙ who moved at a young age to the ranks of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l and then to al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad, received “the best education” from al-Fa¯khir.128 However, a gradual ˙ decline in the position of the muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k is discerned after the reigns of al-Za¯hir Baybars and Qala¯wu¯n. During the first Mamluk period, this office was ˙ still held by an amir tablkha¯na¯h. In the second Mamluk period, the office was ˙ occupied by an amir of ten and lost its prestige.129 In fact, problematic appointments to the office of muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k alsulta¯niyya started shortly after Qala¯wu¯n’s reign. The office was given to high˙ ranking amirs. Unlike the eunuchs, who were restricted to the ranks of amir tablkha¯na¯h, the high-ranking amirs had strong political ambitions. Seeing ˙ themselves as legitimate candidates for the sultanate, they took advantage of their office and used the royal mamluks to strengthen their political position. Ayalon mentions that in only one case “in the history of the Mamluk sultanate” was an amir who was not a eunuch appointed as muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya. ˙ This amir was Aqbugha¯ ʿAbd al-Wa¯hid, who was appointed by al-Na¯sir Mu˙ ˙ hammad in 732/1331 in order to restore discipline to the royal mamluks.130 ˙ However, in 691/1292 al-Ashraf Khalı¯l appointed the high-ranking Mansu¯rı¯ amir ˙ Qara¯sunqur, the governor of Aleppo, to this office.131 This unprecedented appointment caused resentment of Qara¯sunqur and it forms part of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s irrational policy, to be discussed in the next chapter.132 It is plausible that Qara¯sunqur filled this office until al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s murder in 693/1293. Indeed, it is also plausible that Qara¯sunqur used this office for his conspiracy against the

127 128 129 130

Niha¯ya, 31:172; al-Jazarı¯, 1:14; Levanoni, Turning Point, 18–19. Nuju¯m, 8:228, 10:244; Sulu¯k, 2:41, 2:812; Niha¯ya, 32:137; Levanoni, Turning Point, 19. Ayalon, L’esclavage, 15. Ayalon, L’esclavage, 15; Sulu¯k, 2:342. This appointment did not achieve its goal. See: Levanoni, Turning Point, 60–61. 131 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:145; Sulu¯k, 1:780; Niha¯ya, 32:245. 132 See chapter two, section 1.1.

52

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

sultan: royal mamluks are mentioned among the sultan’s murderers.133 The Mansu¯rı¯ sultan La¯jı¯n (696/1296–698/1299) also appointed an amir who was his ˙ future murderer – Sayf al-Dı¯n Kurjı¯. Al-Nuwayrı¯ implies that La¯jı¯n’s appointment was a continuation of Qara¯sunqur’s unprecedented appointment to this office.134 Kurjı¯, who was originally a mamluk of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l, moved to the ranks of La¯jı¯n’s royal mamluks. He managed to create unofficial close relations with the royal mamluks that brought about their disobedience to the sultan. AlNuwayrı¯, indeed, notes that “Kurjı¯ became the mediator in the matters of the royal mamluks and the one who took care of their interests. They joined him and came under his authorithy. His might strengthened thanks to them, and their might strengthened thanks to him”.135 Kurjı¯ murdered the sultan al-Ashraf Khalı¯l in collaboration with these royal mamluks.136 The appointment of amirs who were not eunuchs to the office of muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya was an innovation of the Mansu¯riyya period. In fact, in ˙ ˙ addition to Qara¯sunqur and Kurjı¯, another amir was appointed to this office 137 during the Mansu¯riyya period, one Aydamur al-ʿIzzı¯. The implications of these ˙ appointments brought about the first cracks in the distance between the senior amirs and the royal mamluks. This trend, which contributed to the involvement of the royal mamluks in political strife, is one of the main characteristics of the third reign of al-Na¯sir Muhammad.138 ˙ ˙ 2.4.

The ages of the mamluk novices

During the Mansu¯riyya period, and, in fact, during the entire first Mamluk ˙ period, most if not all of the mamluks bought by slave traders were young boys. Later, in the second Mamluk period, adult slaves were also bought.139 It seems, however, that in the second period most of the imported mamluks were still 133 Ibn Iya¯s, 1:374. 134 Niha¯ya, 31:357. Al-Nuwayrı¯ notes that La¯jı¯n appointed Kurjı¯ as muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k alsulta¯niyya, similarly to the appointment of Qara¯sunqur during al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s reign (wa˙ jaʿalahu muqaddaman ʿala¯ al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya ʿala¯ ma¯ ka¯na ʿalayhi al-amı¯r Shams ˙ al-Dı¯n Qara¯sunqur al-Mansu¯rı¯ fı¯ al-dawla al-Ashrafiyya). ˙ 135 Fa-baqiya Kurjı¯ huwa al-sa¯ʿı¯ fı¯ masa¯lih al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya wa-l–multaqa¯ li–masa¯˙ ¯ ˙tahta ta¯ʿatihi wa-qawiyat ˙ ˙ lihihim fa-indamu¯ ilayhi wa-dakhalu shawkatuhu bihim wa˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ shawkatuhum bihi (Niha¯ya, 31:357–358). On Kurjı¯’s affiliation to the Ashrafiyya, see chapter three, n. 7. 136 See chapter three, n. 54. 137 Sulu¯k, 1:946; Nuju¯m, 8:204. 138 Amalia Levanoni, “Rank-and-File Mamluks versus Amirs: New Norms in the Mamluk Military Institutions”, in The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society, 22–25; Levanoni, Turning Point, 61–63, 102–106, 118–132. 139 Khitat, 2:213 line 5 from below. ˙ ˙

The training period

53

young boys, since, as Ayalon indicated, it was impractical to transport adult mamluks.140 According to Ayalon, the best age for buying future mamluks from their parents on the Eurasian steppe was puberty (ihtila¯m). At this stage, on the ˙ one hand, the ties between fathers and sons began to loosen and sons started to fend for themselves. On the other hand, it was the ideal age for the formation of a mamluk. The mamluk, in other words, was both young enough still to be shaped mentally and militarily, and old enough to have absorbed the basic warlike qualities of a steppe archer and horseman.141 This ideal age for starting training would have been around twelve or thirteen. However, al-Maqrı¯zı¯ relates that the mamluks already began the second stage of their education, i. e. military training, during puberty (sinn al-bulu¯gh).142 On this basis one could assume that the mamluks started their training period one or two years earlier, when they were ten to eleven years old. This assumption is supported by other evidence in the sources: The Arabic sources very rarely mention the specific chronological age of a “newly arrived” mamluk, and most of the relevant passages date to the beginning of the second Mamluk period or the end of the first one. For example, Sultan al-Muʾayyad Shaykh (d. 824/1421) was bought by amir Barqu¯q in 781/1380 when he was twelve years old.143 Sultan Khushqadam (d. 871/1467) was around ten when he was bought by sultan al-Muʾayyad Shaykh in 815–6/1412.144 Taghrı¯ Birmish al-Na¯sirı¯ ˙ (d. 852/1448) was sold into slavery at the age of “seven or more than that”.145 The ages of several of the Mansu¯riyya mamluks can be estimated according to ˙ data mentioned in the sources. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ testifies that he was brought ˙ to Egypt in 659/1261 by a eunuch of Badr al-Dı¯n Luʾluʾ, the ruler of Mosul, and was bought by amir Qala¯wu¯n. In that year, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ was among the ˙

140 David Ayalon, “The Mamlu¯k Novice: On His Youthfulness and on His Original Religion”, Revue des études islamiques 54 (1986), 7–8. 141 Ayalon, “The Mamluk Novice”, 3–4. 142 Khitat, 2:213. ˙ ˙ b. ʿAlı¯ Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯, Inba¯ʾ al-Ghumr bi-Abna¯ʾ al-ʿUmr (Hyderabad: 143 Ahmad ˙ ˙ Da¯ʾirat al-Maʿa¯rif al-ʿUthamaniyya, 1967; reprinted: Beirut: Da¯r al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1406/ 1986), 9 vols. 7:435; Ayalon, “The Mamluk Novice”, 3–4. 144 Yu¯suf Abu¯ al-Maha¯sin Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯, Muntakhaba¯t min Hawa¯dith al-Duhu¯r fı¯ Mada¯ al˙¯ r, ed. William Popper (Berkeley: University ˙ Ayya¯m wa-l-Shuhu of California Press, 1930– 1942), 657; Muhammad ʿAbd al-Rahma¯n al-Sakha¯wı¯, al-Dawʾ al-La¯miʿ li-Ahl al-Qarn al˙ ˙ ˙ Ta¯siʿ (Cairo: Maktabat al-Qudsı¯, 1354/1935–1936), 3:175; Ayalon, L’esclavage, 52 n. 135. 145 Manhal, 4:68; Jonathan P. Berkey, “Mamluks and the World of Higher Islamic Education in Medieval Cairo, 1250–1517”, in Modes de Transmission de la Culture Religieuse en Islam, ed. Hassan Elboudrari (Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie orientale, 1993), 109–110. On the other hand, Jaqmaq (executed in 824/1421) was brought to Egypt when he was three years old, together with his mother (Nuju¯m, 14:240). Amir Bija¯s was bought by Barqu¯q when he was already “an adult” (kabı¯r), see: al-Sakha¯wı¯ (Cairo), 3:2.

54

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

young boys (al-sibya¯n al-sigha¯r).146 Four years later, he says, he was in his ado˙ lescence or close to that (sinn al-mura¯hiq aw qarı¯b).147 It is thus reasonable to assume that Baybars was bought by Qala¯wu¯n and started his training period when he was ten to twelve years old.148 This age-range is compatible both with Ayalon’s view and with the few references to age that we found in the sources. As for other Mansu¯rı¯s, we may assume that La¯jı¯n was purchased by Qala¯wu¯n ˙ approximately at the same age. La¯jı¯n was murdered in Rabı¯ʿ I 698/15 January 1299 when he was fifty or somewhat beyond that.149 Hence, he was born around 648/1249–1250. Since he was bought by Qala¯wu¯n in 658/1260, it is plausible that he was about ten or a little older.150 Kitbugha¯ was taken as captive in his early youth when he was “a lad, or possibly an adolescent or close to this age” (sinn bulu¯gh al-hilm).151 Sala¯r died in 710/1310 when he was fifty or younger, i. e. ˙ between forty-five and fifty.152 When he was taken captive in the battle of Abulustayn, in 675/1277, he was between ten and fifteen. Baydara¯, on the other hand, arrived in the sultanate as a baby or a small child, on his mother’s back, as captives from the battle of ʿAyn Ja¯lu¯t in 658/1260. He was not brought by a slave trader at such a tender age.153

146 Zubda, 71. 147 Zubda, 96. 148 According to the Arabic sources, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ died in 725/1325 when he was eighty or in his eighties (Aʿya¯n, 2:80; Wa¯fı¯, 10:352; Manhal, 3:477; Durar [Cairo], 2:43). This data brought Donald Richards, the editor of Baybars’s work, to conclude that Baybars “was probably born not later than 645/1247”, so that in 659/1261, when he arrived in Egypt, he was “about fourteen years old’ (Zubda, XV). However, if Baybars had been fourteen years old in 659/1261, it is not reasonable to assume that four years later, when he was eighteen, he would have testified that he was in his “adolescence or close to that”. 149 See on his death date: Aʿya¯n, 4:166, Zubda, 323; Sulu¯k, 1:856. See on his age at death: Sulu¯k, 1:859; Wa¯fı¯, 24:386; Manhal, 9:168; Nuju¯m, 8:145; Aʿya¯n, 4:169; al-ʿIbar, 5:390. 150 La¯jı¯n was purchased by Qala¯wu¯n when La¯jı¯n’s first master, the second Mamluk sultan Nu¯r al-Dı¯n ʿAlı¯ Aybak, was deported to Byzantium (Niha¯ya, 31:313; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:222; Sulu¯k, 1:820–821). This took place after al-Za¯hir Baybars’ accession to the sultanate in 658/1260 ˙ (Nuju¯m, 7:103). 151 wa-huwa sha¯bb wa-laʿallahu ka¯na fi sinn bulu¯gh al-hilm aw nahwahu (Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:192; Levanoni, Turning Point, 16). Other sources mention˙the term mura¯hiq, i. e. “near puberty” (Muqaffa¯, 2:562) or hadath, i. e. “young man” (Aʿya¯n, 4:145; Wa¯fı¯, 24:318; Manhal, 9:115). 152 Durar (Cairo), 2:277.˙Al-Safadı¯ mentions that Sala¯r died at the beginning of his kuhu¯la, i. e. ˙ middle age, see Aʿya¯n, 2:491. 153 Muqaffa¯, 2:562 ʿIqd, 3:217. Another indication for the average age of a mamluk in this period is Qara¯sunqur al-ʿAlamı¯ al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯’s testimony that he was born in 643/1245–6 and in the year of the battle of ʿAyn Ja¯lu¯t (658/1259–60), he reached puberty (balagha al-hilm), i. e. ˙ when he was about thirteen. However, the famous Sa¯lih¯ı amir Sanjar al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯ purchased ˙ ˙ him when he was an adult (kabı¯r), in 663/1264–5, when he was nineteen. We might deduce from this testimony that the ordinary age for purchasing a mamluk was around puberty, but in his exceptional case he was purchased as an adult. See al-Jazarı¯, 3:905–906.

The training period

55

To sum up, it is reasonable to assume that the average age at which the young mamluk arrived in the sultanate and started his training period was ten. However, this is only an estimate. The difficulty in tracing the average age of the young mamluk derives from the fact that in most cases the mamluks themselves were not aware of their exact age. It seems that all aspects of the mamluk system relating to the early stages of mamluk life – i. e. the process of purchase, selection by the sultan or an amir, and even the duration of the training period and the date of manumission – were based on physiological rather than chronological age.154 It is clear, however, that the mamluk novices had their training period in early and late adolescence.

2.5.

The duration of the novices’ training period

The sources give us no clear data regarding the duration of the training period. We know, generally, that – at least during the first decades of the Mamluk sultanate – this period lasted several years. As mentioned above, the mamluks started their training period as children and were manumitted only as young adults. This rule was followed especially during the reigns of the great sultans alZa¯hir Baybars and Qala¯wu¯n. It seems that later in the first Mamluk period – and ˙ probably during most of the second one – the training period became shorter. According to Ayalon’s calculations, at the end of the second Mamluk period, between the years 916/1510 and 922/1516, the training period lasted fourteen to fifteen months or even less.155 The autobiographical notes of Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, again, can give us some ˙ indication of the duration of training. As mentioned above, Baybars arrived in Egypt and was purchased by Qala¯wu¯n, the future sultan but then an amir, in 659/ 1261. He was included in the corps of the young pages.156 About four years later, in 663/March 1265, Baybars took part in the conquest of Arsu¯f (Apollonia). He was then in one of the units supporting the troops and, as it seems, still in his training period.157 One year later, in 664/May 1266, Baybars was present at the siege of Safed, again in the supporting units of amir Qala¯wu¯n’s troops.158 In the 154 The sources use general terms like “puberty” (sinn al-bulu¯gh or ihtila¯m) or “adolescence” ˙ (sinn al-mura¯hiq) to describe the age of a mamluk. 155 Ayalon, L’esclavage, 19; Nuju¯m, 14:199; Levanoni, Turning Point, 99. According to Levanoni, the training period became much shorter from al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign (1310– ˙ ˙ 1341), see: Levanoni, Turning Point, 34–40. 156 Zubda, 71, XV. 157 Zubda, 96. 158 Zubda, 103; Tuhfa, 56–57; Levanoni, Turning Point, 17–18. In both expeditions (of 663/1265 ˙ and 664/1266) Baybars testifies that he was leading a spare horse.

56

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

same year, Baybars testifies, he participated as a warrior in the battle against the kingdom of Lesser Armenia (Cilicia).159 It is possible that at the time of this battle he was already a manumitted soldier. About two years later, in 666/1267–8, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ took part in the conquest of Antioch. He testifies that he and ˙ his friends who fought in the unit of amir Qala¯wu¯n “attacked [the enemy] night 160 and day”. It is thus certain that by this time Baybars was a manumitted soldier, a jundı¯. In 671/1272–3 he was transferred by his master Qala¯wu¯n from the ranks of the salaried mamluks to that of iqta¯ʿ holders.161 His salaried status before 671/ ˙ 1272–3 confirms that he was already a manumitted soldier. So, even though Bayabrs al-Mansu¯rı¯ does not explicitly mention the year he was manumitted by the sultan, it seems that it happened between 663/1265 and 666/1267–8, i. e. probably four to seven years after his training began, and definitely not more than ten years after.

3.

The mamluk’s seniority and his promotion

3.1.

Mamluks purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate162

The number of mamluks purchased by Qala¯wu¯n during his amirate is not known. It is clear, however, that most of his mamluks were purchased during his reign.163 Only as sultan did Qala¯wu¯n have at his disposal the best facilities and conditions for the upbringing and training of a large number of mamluks.164 About seventy out of one hundred and seventy Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks discussed in the sources could ˙ be classified as senior mamluks, who were purchased while Qala¯wu¯n was an amir. This number is based on two lists of names of Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks. The first list is ˙ mentioned by Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯. It includes about forty names of his col˙ leagues who were mamluks of Qala¯wu¯n during his amirate. All these mamluks received amirates, as we can also deduce from their titles (laqab). Immediately after these names, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ mentions another ten mamluks and eu˙ nuchs of Qala¯wu¯n who were promoted to the rank of amir tablkha¯na¯h.165 The ˙ second list is reported by al-Maqrı¯zı¯. It mentions seventeen out of forty Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ mamluks upon whom amirates were conferred immediately upon Qala¯wu¯n’s 159 160 161 162 163 164 165

Tuhfa, 58; Zubda, 105. ˙ Zubda, 111. Zubda, 136. The mamluks mentioned in this section are discussed in greater depth in appendix 4. Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 189. Ayalon, L’esclavage, 25; Ayalon, “Mamluk”, 12–13. Zubda, 176–177.

The mamluk’s seniority and his promotion

57

accession to the sultanate.166 A further ten names of relatively high-ranking Mansu¯rı¯ amirs during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign should be added. They were all, it seems, ˙ senior mamluks of Qala¯wu¯n. It should be noted that information on the Mansu¯riyya mamluks during ˙ Qala¯wu¯n’s reign is significantly less than that available for the period after his death, when the Mansu¯riyya amirs were the exclusive ruling elite. Even less data ˙ can be found regarding the Mansu¯riyya during Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate, when the ˙ mamluks filled offices in his household as ajna¯d or as low-ranking amirs. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, however, mentions the following names:167 1. Husa¯m al-Dı¯n ˙ ˙ Turunta¯y; 2. Badr al-Dı¯n Baydara¯; 3. ʿAlam al-Dı¯n Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯; 4. Zayn al˙ ˙ Dı¯n Kitbugha¯; 5. Husa¯m al-Dı¯n La¯jı¯n; 6. Shams al-Dı¯n Qara¯sunqur; 7. Sayf al-Dı¯n ˙ Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯; 8. Rukn al-Dı¯n Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯; 9. ʿIzz al-Dı¯n Aybak al˙ ˙ Mawsilı¯; 10. ʿIzz al-Dı¯n Aybak al-Khaznada¯r; 11. Sayf al-Dı¯n Qijqa¯r; 12. ʿAlam al˙ Dı¯n Sanjar Arjuwa¯sh; 13. La¯jı¯n al-Kabı¯r; 14. Sayf al-Dı¯n Qutuz al-Mansu¯rı¯; 15. ˙ ˙ Sayf al-Dı¯n Ka¯wazka¯; 16.ʿIzz al-Dı¯n Aybak al-Tawı¯l; 17. Sayf al-Dı¯n Baha¯dur Raʾs ˙ Nawba; 18. ʿAla¯ʿ al-Dı¯n Altabars (al-Majnu¯n); 19. Badr al-Dı¯n Kı¯kaldı¯ al-Shihna; ˙ ˙ 20. Jama¯l al-Dı¯n Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯; 21. ʿIzz al-Dı¯n Aydamur al-Zaradka¯sh; 22. ʿAlam al-Dı¯n Sanjar amı¯r akhu¯r;168 23. Badr al-Dı¯n Bı¯lı¯k (or: Bikta¯sh) al-Tayya¯r; ˙ 24. Sayf al-Dı¯n Ba¯zı¯; 25. Sayf al-Dı¯n Balaba¯n al-Ju¯kanda¯r. In addition, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ mentions the following Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks, ˙ ˙ who were in Qala¯wu¯n’s service before his sultanate. However, there is no information about them in the sources: 26. ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Manku¯rs; 27. Badr al-Dı¯n Aybak al-Ata¯bakı¯ al-Mushrif; 28. Rukn al-Dı¯n al-Sayrafı¯; 29. ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n ʿAlaq; ˙ 30. ʿIzz al-Dı¯n al-Jaladkı¯; 31. ʿAlam al-Dı¯n Sanjar al-Misrı¯; 32. Sayf al-Dı¯n Tughrı¯l ˙ ˙ al-Mushrif; 33. Sayf al-Dı¯n Taybugha¯ al-Ru¯sı¯; 34. Sayf al-Dı¯n Ta¯ja¯r; 35. Sayf al-Dı¯n ˙ ˙ Balaba¯n al-Ru¯sı¯; 36. Jama¯l al-Dı¯n Aqqu¯sh Barna¯q; 37. Badr al-Dı¯n Baktu¯t al169 Bahla¯q; 38. ‘Ala¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Taybars; 39. Badr al-Dı¯n Bı¯lı¯k al-Shihna; 40. ʿAla¯ʾ al˙ ˙ ˙ Dı¯n Aydughdı¯ al-Sa¯qı¯. The names of the Mansu¯rı¯ ajna¯d and eunuchs who were promoted to the rank ˙ of amir tablkha¯na¯h, as mentioned by Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ are as follows: 41. ˙ ˙ Aydamur al-Jana¯h¯ı; 42. ʿIzz al-Dı¯n al-Ku¯ra¯nı¯; 43. Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n Murshid; 44. Sayf ˙ al-Dı¯n Alladaq (or: Aldiq) al-Khwa¯rizmı¯; 45. ʿAlam al-Dı¯n Al-Isbaha¯nı¯; 46. Shams ˙ 166 Sulu¯k, 1:671–672. 167 The following list comprises thirty-nine names. I added Bayabrs al-Mansu¯rı¯ and omitted three names, Qibjaq, Sala¯r and Ja¯warshı¯, who were purchased close to Qala˙¯ wu¯n’s accession to the sultanate, and therefore are discussed in section 3.2. below and appendix 5. Al-ʿAynı¯ mentions this list as well, based on Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, see ʿIqd, 2:227–229. 168 See on the office of amı¯r akhu¯r, supervisor of the˙ stables: Ayalon, “Studies III”, 63; alQalqashandı¯ (Cairo), 5:461; al-Taʿrı¯f, 99–101. 169 This mamluk is probably identical to the mamluk named Baktu¯t Yakha, mentioned in al˙ Maqrı¯zı¯’s list of the Mansu¯rı¯s who received amirates upon Qala¯wu¯n’s accession (see n. 166 ˙ above).

58

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

al-Dı¯n Aldukuz amı¯r akhu¯r; 47. ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n al-Naqı¯b; 48. Sayf al-Dı¯n Butkha¯s al˙ Aqraʿı¯; 49. Sayf al-Dı¯n Kabak al-Aqraʿı¯; 50. Rukn al-Dı¯n Baybars al-Baha¯durnı¯. To these names we should add those mentioned by al-Maqrı¯zı¯ that do not also appear in Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯’s list:170 51. Kira¯y; 52. Uzdamur al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯; 53. Aq˙ qu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ (Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ); 54. Sunqur Jarkas; 55. Taqsu¯;171 56. Sunqur al˙ ˙ ˙ Silahda¯r; 57. Kashkal. ˙ Finally, another ten men should be added to this list of senior Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ mamluks based on the evidence of Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ and al-Maqrı¯zı¯, since they ˙ are mentioned as relatively prominent amirs and office holders soon after Qala¯wu¯n’s reign. Though it is clear that all of them were in Qala¯wu¯n’s service during his amirate, this is noted explicitly only regarding some of them: 58. Aqqu¯sh alMawsilı¯ al-Ha¯jib (Numayla); 59. Sanjar al-Mansu¯rı¯; 60. La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯; 61. ˙ ¯ ˙ ˙ Kashtaghdı¯; 62. A qsunqur Kirta¯y; 63. Sunqur al-Tawı¯l al-Mansu¯rı¯; 64. Sanjar al˙ ˙ Kha¯zin (al-Ashrafı¯); 65. Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r; 66. Ba¯sit¯ı al-Mansu¯rı¯; 67. Ayda˙ ˙ mur al-Rafa¯. Thus, we may count sixty-seven mamluks who were purchased by Qala¯wu¯n during his amirate. Nine of these mamluks came to Qala¯wu¯n from other masters (La¯jı¯n, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, Aybak al-Mawsilı¯, Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ, ˙ ˙ ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ al-Ha¯jib, Turunta¯y, Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯, Kurt al-Ha¯jib, ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Baybars al-Muwaffaqı¯, Aydamur al-Rafa¯ and probably Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯), and one was a prisoner of war (Kitbugha¯). All these mamluks (perhaps excepting Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯) joined the Mansu¯riyya when they were young. They were ˙ trained and educated under Qala¯wu¯n’s supervision and manumitted by him, and therefore must come under the definition of “original” Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks, ˙ similar to those who were bought directly from slave traders. Most or all of these sixty-seven Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks were senior mamluks, who ˙ served their master for many years before his accession to the sultanate. All of them received amirates and most of them filled important offices during his reign. The sources provide some information regarding forty-five out of these sixty-seven Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks. In fact, nineteen of them occupied the highest ˙ positions in the sultanate during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign: Turunta¯y viceroy in Egypt or the vice-sultan (na¯ʾib al-saltana fı¯ ˙ ˙ ˙ misr),172 ata¯bak al-ʿasa¯kir (commander-in–chief of the ˙ Egyptian army).173 170 One name that is mentioned in this list, Tughrı¯l al-Silahda¯r, is to be identified, insofar as we ˙ ˙ can assume, with Tughrı¯l al-I¯gha¯nı¯, discussed below among the Burjı¯ mamluks purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s ˙sultanate or shortly before it. 171 This Taqsu¯ is probably not identical to Baybars Taqsu¯ al-Na¯sirı¯, the father-in-law of La¯jı¯n, ˙ ˙executed by al-Ashraf Khalı¯l, since he is˙ mentioned ˙ ˙ among the Sa¯lihiyya and the who was ˙ ˙ Za¯hiriyya amirs before the accession of Qala¯wu¯n (Zubda, 170). ˙ 172 Sulu¯k, 1:665; Niha¯ya, 31:9. This office was the highest position in the sultanate after the

The mamluk’s seniority and his promotion

Baydara¯ Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ Kitbugha¯ Aybak al-Khaznada¯r Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ ˙ al-Ha¯jib (Numayla) ˙ La¯jı¯n

173 174

175

176

177 178 179

180

181

59

wazir,174 amı¯r majlis,175 ustada¯r.176 wazir, shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n.177 na¯ʾib al-ghayba (deputy of absence).178 amı¯r janda¯r.179 ha¯jib.180 ˙ governor of Damascus (na¯ʾib al-saltana fı¯ Dimashq),181 ˙ governor of Damascus citadel (na¯ʾib qalʿat Dimashq).182

sultan. The sultan’s viceroy, inter alia, signed applications for iqta¯ʿs in the sultan’s name and was authorized to give iqta¯ʿs without consulting the sultan and˙to appoint amirs and office ˙ holders. See Ayalon, “Studies III”, 57; Masa¯lik, 3:306–307; al-Taʿrı¯f, 65–66; 92–93. See on Turunta¯y as viceroy in Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 205–208. ˙ on˙ ata¯bak al-ʿasa¯kir: Ayalon, “Studies III”, 58–59; al-Qalqashandı¯ (Beirut), 5:18. See The office of the wazir was one of the most important offices in the early Mamluk period. Similarly to the viceroy, the wazir was authorized to distribute small iqta¯ʿs and even to appoint amirs of ten and tablkha¯na¯h in Syria (Ayalon, “Studies III”, 61). ˙The wazir was in ˙ charge of the financial administration; see: Rabie, 138–144; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 217–221; alTaʿrı¯f, 93–94, 149–150. The amı¯r majlis was responsible for the physicians and for the weekly khidma assembly, see Ayalon, “Studies III”, 59; Levanoni, Turning Point, 201; Van Steenbergen, Order, 40 n. 65; alQalqashandı¯ (Beirut), 5:91–92; P. M. Holt, “The Structure of Government in the Mamluk Sultanate,” in The Eastern Mediterranean Lands in the Period of the Crusades, ed. P. M. Holt (Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1977), 48–49. The ustada¯r (or: usta¯dh al-da¯r) was responsible for the administration of the sultan’s or the amir’s house. See: Ayalon, “Studies III”, 61–62; Van Steenbergen, Order, 40, n. 66; Amalia Levanoni, “Usta¯da¯r”, EI2, 10:925; al-Qalqashandı¯ (Beirut), 4:21; Masa¯lik, 3:308; al-Taʿrı¯f, 96– 98. Shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n was the supervisor of the financial system. He assisted the wazir in tax collection. He was responsible for the investigation of officials in order to confiscate their property, often by torture (Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 22; Irwin, Middle East, 114; Rabie, 150–153). Na¯ʾib al-ghayba was the amir who took the sultan’s place while the latter was abroad. Amı¯r janda¯r (or: ja¯nda¯r) was one of the highest positions in the early Mamluk period, held by an amir of one hundred. The amı¯r janda¯r was in charge of the arsenal, which was also a house of detention (zardkha¯na), and of executions. On the other responsibilities of the holder of this office, see Ayalon, “Studies III”, 63–64; al-Qalqashandı¯ (Cairo), 5:461; Masa¯lik, 3:308; Van Steenbergen, Order, 40, n. 65. The ha¯jib was the administrator of justice among the mamluks. He also presented guests and ˙ to the sultan and was in charge of organizing royal processions. It was customary to envoys appoint five hujja¯b, one of whom was the chief ha¯jib, or ha¯jib al-hujja¯b (Ayalon, “Studies ˙ ˙ 39). ˙ III”, 60; Van Steenbergen, Order, 40 n. 65; Irwin, ˙Middle East, Damascus was the biggest and the most important district of greater Syria (al-Sha¯m). AlSha¯m in the Mamluk period included six administrative districts, each headed by a governor (na¯’ib al-saltana). These districts were Damascus, Aleppo, Tripoli, Hama, Safed and Kerak ˙ ¯ [Beirut], 1:186–187, 223, 239, 243,246, 247). Gaza was sometimes an inde(al-Qalqashandı pendent district, see: D. Sourdel, “Ghazza”, EI2, 2:1056. The governor of Damascus was responsible for the appointment of officials, distribution of iqta¯ʿs, enforcement of religious and criminal law, etc. See on this office: Van Steenbergen, “The˙ Office of Na¯ʾib al-Saltana of ˙ ¯ bid Damascus: 741–784/1341–1382, a Case Study”, in Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyu

60

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

Qara¯sunqur governor of Hama, governor of Aleppo.183 La¯jı¯n al-Kabı¯r, Kı¯kaldı¯ governors of Homs. al-Shihna, Qutuz ˙ ˙ al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ governor of Tripoli and the coastal fortresses, governor ˙ of Hisn al-Akra¯d. ˙ ˙ Balaba¯n al-Ju¯kanda¯r governor of Safed.184 Aybak al- Mawsilı¯ governor of Safed citadel,185 governor of Gaza, gover˙ nor of al-Shawbak. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ governor of Kerak. ˙ Qijqa¯r governor of Damascus citadel, governor of Safed citadel and possibly governor of Safed. Sanjar Arjuwa¯sh governor of Damascus citadel. Bı¯lı¯k al-Tayya¯r governor of Safed citadel. ˙ Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n Murshid muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya. ˙ Indeed, a comment by al-Jazarı¯ strengthens the impression that seniority was a very significant factor in the promotion of a Mansu¯rı¯ mamluk. Interestingly ˙ enough, al-Jazarı¯ first says, probably on the basis of his informant, that the ¯ s (see below) was a mamluk of Qala¯wu¯n before his Mansu¯rı¯ amir Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ sultanate. However, al-Jazarı¯, apparently based on his personal knowledge, corrects this mistaken statement in the margins of the manuscript, and states that while Baha¯dur was not among the Mansu¯riyya mamluks during Qala¯wu¯n’s ˙ amirate, nevertheless, he became prominent during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign.186 This statement implies that Baha¯dur’s prominence during Qala¯wu¯n’s sultanate was quite exceptional for a mamluk who was purchased only during his reign and not before.

182 183 184 185 186

and Mamluk Eras III, Proceedings of the 6th, 7th and 8th International Colloquiums, eds. Urbain Vermeulen and Jo Van Steenbergen (Leuven: Peeters, 2001), 429–432, 434, 455; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 212. On the office of the governor of the citadel, see: Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 215–216; al-Taʿrı¯f, 148– ¯ fa¯q al149; Taha Thaljı¯ al-Tara¯una, Mamlakat Safad fı¯ ‘Ahd al-Mama¯lı¯k (Beirut: Da¯r al-A ˙ 1402/1982), 271–272, ˙ Jadı¯da, 234–235. ˙ The governorship of Aleppo was the second most important one in Syria, after Damascus. The governor of Aleppo was authorized to appoint officials in his district and to distribute iqta¯ʿs, see: Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 213. ˙ on the office of the governor (na¯ʾib) of Safed: Joseph Drory, “Founding a new Mamlaka: See Some Remarks Concerning Safed and the Organization of the Region in the Mamluk Period”, in The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society, esp. 169–175. See on the office of the commander of the citadel of Safed: Drory, “Founding a new Mamlaka”, 176. Al-madhku¯r lam yakun min al-mama¯lı¯k al-Mansu¯riyya fı¯ zaman al-ima¯ra wa-lakinnahu ishtahara fı¯ saltanat al-sulta¯n al-Malik al-Mansu¯˙r. See: al-Jazarı¯, 2:410. ˙ ˙ ˙

The mamluk’s seniority and his promotion

61

In any case, twenty-two out of these sixty-seven Mansu¯rı¯ senior mamluks are ˙ not mentioned in the sources any further. Another four amirs (Aybak al-Tawı¯l, ˙ Aydamur al-Zaradka¯sh, Aydamur al-Rafa¯ and Kira¯y) are mentioned only after Qala¯wu¯n’s death. These were probably low- and middle-ranking amirs during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign and their positions were not important enough to be mentioned in the historical sources. These findings give the impression that a mamluk’s seniority was a major factor in his promotion, though not the only one. An examination of the less senior mamluks, i. e. those who were purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign or shortly before, as discussed below, might strengthen this notion.

3.2.

Mamluks purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s sultanate or shortly before it187

Qala¯wu¯n purchased most of his mamluks during his reign as sultan. As testified by Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, Qala¯wu¯n invested a great deal of effort and money in ˙ order to increase the number and quality of his mamluks, including maintaining amicable relations with the Golden Horde, the Byzantine empire and Georgia, in order to protect the sources supplying slaves and the trade routes over which they were imported to the Mamluk sultanate. In order to create the highest-quality military unit, Qala¯wu¯n took steps to guarantee that the best mamluks would not be sold to the amirs but only to him. He warned the merchants against the sale of quality slaves to amirs and managed to monopolize the market by paying the highest prices for his mamluks.188 Despite the fact that Qala¯wu¯n purchased most of his mamluks during his sultanate, only few of them are known from the sources, which are not inclined to mention cases in which mamluks were purchased from slave merchants.189 Since sixty-seven senior mamluks were discussed above, we can assume that most of the rest of the Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks discussed in the sources, about one hundred ˙ and ten mamluks, were purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign or shortly before. Interestingly enough, none of the thirty-four Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who we can ˙ identify as belonging to the Burjiyya is mentioned among the senior mamluks of the Mansu¯riyya discussed above.190 Hence, it seems that most or all of the Burjı¯ ˙ mamluks were purchased by Qala¯wu¯n during his sultanate or shortly before. 187 The mamluks mentioned in this section are discussed in more depth in appendix 5. 188 Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 190; Zubda, 269. 189 The only exceptional case with regard to the Mansu¯riyya mamluks is La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯. La¯jı¯n is recorded as testifying that a slave merchant bought˙ him in al-Ru¯m and brought him to Egypt, where Qala¯wu¯n purchased him, see:ʿIqd, 4:292. 190 That is, except Tughrı¯l al-Silahda¯r, whom we identify with Tughrı¯l al-I¯gha¯nı¯ (al-Silahda¯r), see ˙ list of the Burjı ˙ ¯ amirs is mentioned in appendix ˙ ˙ n.170 above. The 5.

62

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

Indeed, the Burjı¯ amirs are mentioned in the sources only after Qala¯wu¯n’s death. Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯ is the only one to be mentioned earlier, as an amir who received the amirate of tablkha¯na¯h from his master Qala¯wu¯n on the eve of the ˙ latter’s death. However, Baktamur’s promotion from jundı¯ to the rank of amir tablkha¯na¯h was exceptional and unprecedented.191 Tughrı¯l al-I¯gha¯nı¯, who was ˙ ˙ purchased close to Qala¯wu¯n’s accession, was appointed governor of Tripoli and 192 the coastal fortresses in 691/1291. Soon after, Aybak al-Ru¯mı¯ al-Silahda¯r ˙ (armsbearer) was appointed governor of Qalʿat al-Ru¯m after its conquest.193 Another five amirs of the Burjiyya (Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯, Mughulta¯y al-Masʿu¯dı¯, Aldukuz al-Silahda¯r and al-Luqma¯nı¯) are mentioned in ˙ ˙ 693/1294 in the strife after the murder of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l.194 Aqqu¯sh al-Afram is mentioned, shortly after, as the ha¯jib during La¯jı¯n’s reign and Butkha¯s al˙ ˙ Mansu¯rı¯ as the governor of Safed.195 It seems that these amirs were still in their ˙ training period at Qala¯wu¯n’s accession and were manumitted during the first years of his reign. Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, for instance, was probably close to manumission since he was manumitted by Qala¯wu¯n and received an amirate of tablkha¯na¯h in his master’s lifetime.196 Another three Burjı¯s (Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯; ˙ ˙ Tashtamur al-Jumaqda¯r and Sanjar al-Jumaqda¯r) received amirates for the first ˙ time only in 690/1291.197 Yet another two (Aydamur al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ and Baybars alShuja¯ʿı¯) received amirates for the first time only during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ reign, i. e. from 693/1293 onward.198 Aqqu¯sh Kurjı¯ al-Matru¯h¯ı is mentioned ˙ ˙ among the amirs who died in the battle of Wa¯dı¯ al-Khaznada¯r in 699/1299.199 Another two Burjı¯s (Ta¯kiz/Balaba¯n al-Tughrı¯lı¯ and La¯jı¯n Zı¯rba¯j) are mentioned ˙ as amirs of tablkha¯na¯h only in 700/1300–1.200 Two are mentioned from the battle ˙ 191 See n. 213 below. Muqaffa¯ is the only source that mentions the date of this appointment, the middle of Dhu¯ al-Hijja 689/ December 1290. This date is probably inaccurate, since according to most of the ˙sources Qala¯wu¯n died on 6 Dhu¯ al-Hijja 689/9 November 1290 (Northrup, ˙ Baktamur an amir tablkha¯na¯h on Qala¯wu¯n, 158). In any case, Qala¯wu¯n probably appointed ˙ the eve of his death. 192 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:144–145; al-Jazarı¯, 1:112; Sulu¯k, 1:780. Tughrı¯l is mentioned shortly before in ˙ the siege of Acre (see chapter two, n. 40). Tughrı¯l was among the mamluks of amir ¯Igha¯n al˙ Sa¯lih¯ı, known as samm al-mawt (“the Elixir of Death”). He joined Qala¯wu¯n’s mamluks ˙ ˙ probably after his master’s arrest and death in 675/1276 (Ibn al-Fura¯t, 7:70; Durar (Cairo), 2:323, mentioned as “al-Itqa¯nı¯”). 193 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:155; Sulu¯k, 1:783. 194 See chapter two, section 2. 195 See on Aqqu¯sh al-Afram chapter two, n. 108; See on Butkha¯s al-Mansu¯rı¯: Aʿya¯n, 1:678; ˙ ˙ chapter two, n. 204. 196 Durar (Cairo), 2:36. 197 Sulu¯k, 2:193; Nuju¯m, 9:57. 198 Zubda, 216–217. 199 See chapter two, n. 177. 200 Zubda, 349; See on Ta¯kiz or Balaba¯n al-Tughrı¯lı¯ in Appendix 1 n. 56. ˙

The mamluk’s seniority and his promotion

63

of Marj al-Suffar in 702/1303 onward (Qullı¯ al-Silahda¯r and Sunqur al-ʿAla¯’ı¯).201 ˙ ˙ Six are mentioned from the joint rule of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r (Aybak al-Baghdadı¯; Baybars al-Ta¯jı¯; Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h; Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯ and Sanjar al˙ Barwa¯nı¯) and no less than eight Burjı¯s are mentioned only from Baybars alJa¯shnakı¯r’s reign (708/1309) (Aydamur al-Yu¯nusı¯; Baybars al-ʿAlamı¯; Bala¯t al˙ Ju¯kanda¯r; Qijma¯s al-Ju¯kanda¯r; Mughulta¯y al-Baʿlı¯; Baybars al-Ahmadı¯; al˙ ˙ 202 203 Shaykhı¯). Tughjı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ died in prison in 738/1338. ˙ ˙ The data analysed above indicates that the Burjiyya was a new, young Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ regiment. Qala¯wu¯n built this unit, it seems, mainly from novices he trained in his late amirate and from mamluks he purchased during his sultanate. It seems that Qala¯wu¯n did not include amirs in his new regiment.204 The Burjı¯ mamluks spent most of their childhood and youth in the military schools during the last few years of Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate and into his reign. Since, as will be discussed below (section 3.4.), their promotion was much more rapid than that of their khushda¯shs who trained during Qala¯wu¯n’s long amirate, they started to occupy relatively high positions toward the end of Qala¯wu¯n’s reign and especially afterwards. In addition to these thirty-four Burjı¯ amirs, thirteen Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks who ˙ were purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign or shortly before are known. Most of them were originally prisoners of war or originally belonged to other masters. Sala¯r, Qibjaq and Ja¯warshı¯ were taken captive in the battle of Abulustayn and Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj was captured at the battle of ʿAyn Ja¯lu¯t. Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯, Bak˙ tamur al-Silahda¯r, Kujkun, Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj, Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯, Sunqur al˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Aʿsar, Baybars al-Muwaffaqı¯ and Kurt (Kurd) al-Mansu¯rı¯ were originally ˙ mamluks of other masters. Most of them (except for the last two) were manu¯ lmalik and mitted by their first masters.205 Three prominent mamluks, Sala¯r, A 201 202 203 204

See p. 125 below. See chapter two, sections 5 and 6. See chapter four, n. 39. Some sources mention that the Burjiyya also included amirs. Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯, based on Ibn Kathı¯r, mentions that Qala¯wu¯n “set aside three thousand and seven hundred from among his mamluks, both amirs and Circassians […] and called them al-Burjiyya” (Nuju¯m, 7:330; Ayalon, “Bahrı¯ Mamluks”, 35). However, Ibn Kathı¯r does not mention this detail in his discussion of˙ Qala¯wu¯n’s reign or in Qala¯wu¯n’s biographical entry (Ayalon, “Bahrı¯ Mam˙ upon luks”, 35; Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:264). Al-ʿAynı¯ mentions that Qala¯wu¯n conferred the amirate all three thousand and seven hundred Burjı¯ mamluks, which seems to be totally implausible (ʿIqd, 3:16). Robert Irwin mentions that the Burjiyya was composed of three hundred amirs and three thousand mamluks. However, the sources from which he derived this data are not mentioned (Irwin, Middle East, 69). 205 Another mamluk who was purchased from another master, probably during or shortly before Qala¯wu¯n’s sultanate, is Aqqu¯sh al-Rahbı¯. Aqqu¯sh was a prisoner of war taken by the ˙ in al-Rahba and remained there for a while Bedouin after a raid on the Mongols. He was sold ˙ n, who raised and manumitted with the ruler of the city until he was purchased by Qala¯wu ¯ him, see Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:76; Ta¯lı¯, 186.

64

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯, passed to Qala¯wu¯n after the death of his son al-Sa¯lih ʿAlı¯ in ˙ ˙ 687/1288.206 However, these mamluks probably lived and trained together with the Mansu¯riyya mamluks. Indeed, the sources refer to mamluks purchased by ˙ Qala¯wu¯n for his sons as Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks.207 ˙ Finally, another five mamluks who were purchased by Qala¯wu¯n during his reign should be mentioned. These mamluks, however, are not considered in this book as part of the Mansu¯riyya, since they moved from Qala¯wu¯n to other masters ˙ at a tender age. Four of them, it seems, were given by Qala¯wu¯n to his son al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad when they were very young, thus they are considered Na¯sirı¯ mam˙ ˙ luks (Arghu¯n al-Dawa¯da¯r, Aruqta¯y al-Ha¯jj, Aytamish al-Muhammadı¯ and Al˙ ˙ ˙ tunbugha¯ al-Sa¯lih¯ı). Aslam al-Qibja¯qı¯ eventually joined the mamluks of Sala¯r and ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ he is considered as his mamluk.208 The biographical data regarding the mamluks who were purchased by Qala¯wu¯n during his sultanate or shortly before it reveals that these mamluks, including even those who were educated by other masters, could serve as amirs and some of them could even occupy relatively high positions in Syria. The most instructive examples are Sunqur al-Aʿsar, who served Qala¯wu¯n as ustada¯r, shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n, shadd (supervisor) of the fortresses of Syria and of diwa¯n al-jaysh (bureau of the army); and Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯, who served as wa¯lı¯ al-barr of ˙ ˙ Damascus (governor of the dependencies of Damascus) and wa¯lı¯ of Damascus (“chief of police”). These two mamluks are discussed further below and in appendix 5. Another four are known as amirs, mainly in Syria (Sala¯r, Qibjaq, Kujkun, and Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj). These findings indicate that seniority was not the only factor in promotion, if the promoted mamluks were exceptionally talented and experienced.

¯ lmalik, according to Ibn Hajar 206 See on Sala¯r: Aʿya¯n, 2:489; Nuju¯m, 9:19; Zubda, 155. As for A al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯ he was taken captive at the battle of Abulustayn by al-Za¯hir Baybars who˙gave ˙ [Hyderabad], 1:411). him to Qala¯wu¯n, who himself gave him to his son al-Sa¯lih ʿAlı¯ (Durar ˙ ˙ ¯ Al-Maqrı¯zı¯ mentions that amir Qala¯wu¯n purchased Almalik and Sala¯r. He gave Sala¯r to his ¯ lmalik was given to Qala¯wu¯n’s son-in-law Barka, the son of al-Za¯hir son ʿAlı¯, whereas A ˙ a¯lih Baybars. Barka gave him to Ku¯nduk, and only then did he pass to the mamluks of al-S ˙ ˙ ¯ lmalik also in: Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol ʿAlı¯ (Sulu¯k, 2:723; Nuju¯m, 10:725). See on A Origin”, 125–126. On Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯, see Durar (Hyderabad), 1:489. 207 Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯, for instance, is referred to as a Burjı¯. Hence, though he was officialy a mamluk of al-Sa¯lih ʿAlı¯, he inhabited the burj and trained with Qala¯wu¯n’s Burjı¯ mamluks. ˙ ˙ discussed 208 These mamluks in more depth in appendix 5.

The mamluk’s seniority and his promotion

3.3.

65

The duration of the mamluks’ training period and service until receiving their amirate

Upon his succession, Qala¯wu¯n conferred amirates of three ranks on his senior mamluks: the amirates of forty; amirates of twenty and fifteen, and amirates of ten.209 We also know that several Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, such as Qara¯sunqur and Kit˙ bugha¯, were even promoted during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign to the rank of amir of one hundred.210 It seems that other senior Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, such as the viceroy Tur˙ ˙ unta¯y or the wazirs Baydara¯ and Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, were appointed by Qala¯wu¯n to ˙ an amirate of one hundred. A Mansu¯rı¯ mamluk’s promotion was slow and gradual. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ testifies that Qala¯wu¯n “gradually transferred them [his mamluks] from the ranks of the salaried mamluks [al-ja¯makiyya¯t] to that of iqta¯ʿ holders and from the ˙ ranks of mamluks who were not amirs [mafa¯rida] 211 to that of amirs of ten, and then to amirates of tablkha¯na¯h. Some of them were raised to the rank of ˙ commanders of one thousand and amirs of one hundred”.212 Indeed, Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯ is mentioned as an exceptional example of a mamluk who was promoted rapidly from jundı¯ to amir tablkha¯na¯h.213 ˙ However, a distinction should be made between the mamluks who were trained during Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate and those who were trained during his reign as sultan. Analysis of the biographical details of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs reveals that the ˙ period from a Mansu¯rı¯ mamluk’s purchase to his promotion to a relatively ˙ significant amirate was shorter during Qala¯wu¯n’s sultanate than during his amirate. This finding is understandable, since as sultan, Qala¯wu¯n had the political power to promote his mamluks more rapidly. In what follows, I will try to estimate the duration of the promotion period of prominent senior Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ amirs who were purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate. 209 Zubda, 173; Levanoni, Turning Point, 26. Those who were appointed to the rank of amir of forty were not promoted directly and rapidly from the rank of jundı¯, but from a lower amirate. The first (and only) Mansu¯rı¯ mamluk who was promoted from the rank of jundı¯ to ˙ amir tablkha¯na¯h was Baktamur al-Abu ¯ Bakrı¯, see n. 213 below. ˙ 210 See on Kitbugha¯: appendix 4, n. 105; Qara¯sunqur: appendix 4, n. 120. Cf. Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 193, n. 238. 211 The mafa¯rida was an elite unit of the royal mamluks. This term may also denote a unit of the halqa. In the discussed context, the mafa¯rida referred to mamluks who were not amirs. ˙ Whereas Northrup asserts that these mafa¯rida mamluks perhaps received ja¯makiyyas (salaries) rather than iqta¯ʿs, according to Levanoni, these amirs held iqta¯ʿs. See on the mafa¯rida ˙ ˙ in depth: Amalia Levanoni, “The Mafa¯rida in the Mamluk Army Reconsidered”, Arabica 53, 3 (2006), 331–352, especially 451; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 198 n. 275. 212 Wa-lam yazul […] na¯qilan lahum ʿala¯ ʾl-tadrı¯j min al-ja¯makiyya¯t ila¯ ʾl–iqta¯ʿa¯t wa-min al˙ intaqala ila¯ mafa¯rida ila¯ ima¯rat al-ʿashara¯t thumma ila¯ ʾl–tablkha¯na¯t wa-minhum man ˙ taqdimat al-ulu¯f wa ima¯rat al-miʾı¯n (Zubda, 269). 213 Muqaffa¯, 2:457; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:482; Ayalon, “Studies II”, 475.

66

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, in this case too, supplies us the most detailed data. As ˙ discussed (section 2.5.), Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ was promoted gradually according ˙ to the method that he himself mentions. Baybars was manumitted, according to the estimates, about 665/1266–7. About six years after his manumission he was promoted from the ranks of the salaried mamluks to that of the ajna¯d who received iqta¯ʿ. Three years later he was appointed to a relatively high office in ˙ Qala¯wu¯n’s household, as the head of Qala¯wu¯n’s beverages pantry, and six years after that, he received a rank of amir of fifteen horsemen. From then on, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯’s promotion was much faster. Only eighteen months later, in Shawwa¯l ˙ 683/December 1284, Qala¯wu¯n appointed Baybars amir tablkha¯na¯h and com˙ mander of fifty horsemen. Qala¯wu¯n also gave him the iqta¯ʿ of the Sa¯lih¯ı amir ˙ ˙ ˙ Aybak al-Afram, who was promoted to amir of one hundred.214 Less than two years after that, in Shaʿba¯n 685/October 1286, Qala¯wu¯n appointed Baybars governor of Kerak. He gave him the rank of amir of eighty horsemen and the iqta¯ʿ ˙ of the senior Sa¯lih¯ı amir Sanjar al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯.215 Baybars held this office for five ˙ ˙ years. In 693/1293 Baybars received an amirate of one hundred and was appointed as the head of the chancery (diwa¯n al-insha¯ʾ), or the chief dawa¯da¯r.216 It is clear that during Qala¯wu¯n’s tenure as sultan, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ was pro˙ moted rapidly. We might estimate Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯’s age when he became amir. Twenty˙ three years passed from the begining of his training until he received an amirate of fifteen horsemen. If we assume, as discussed below, that Baybars was between ten to twelve when he was purchased by Qala¯wu¯n, then, ten years later, when he was between twenty-two to twenty-four, he received an iqta¯ʿ, and only when he ˙ was about thirty-five did he become an amir for the first time. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, however, was promoted slowly compared to some of his ˙ prominent khushda¯shs. Less than twenty-five years passed until he was appointed amir tablkha¯na¯h, and less than twenty-seven years until he received an amirate of ˙ eighty horsemen. The details provided regarding the promotion of Kitbugha¯, La¯jı¯n and Turunta¯y, as will be discussed below, create the impression that the ˙ ˙ period from a mamluk’s purchase until his appointment as amir of tablkha¯na¯h ˙ was shorter. Of course, the rate of promotion of these amirs is related to the fact that their master became sultan. It is plausible that had Qala¯wu¯n’s ascendancy to the sultanate been earlier, so would their promotion have been faster. In what follows, however, I will try to estimate the duration of the promotion period and the ages at which several prominent Mansu¯rı¯ amirs received their amirates. ˙

214 Zubda, 250. 215 Zubda, 255–257. 216 See chapter two, n. 63.

The mamluk’s seniority and his promotion

67

Kitbugha¯ joined the ranks of Qala¯wu¯n’s mamluks in 659/1260 and received an amirate, probably of tablkha¯na¯h, upon Qala¯wu¯n’s accession in 678/1279.217 ˙ Kitbugha¯ was taken captive in his early youth and became sultan in 694/1294 when he was in his forties.218 It is plausible that he was born around 645/1247–8 and was an amir of tablkha¯na¯h when he was about thirty-three, about twenty ˙ years after he started his training. Similarly, La¯jı¯n was purchased by Qala¯wu¯n in 658/1260. He also received an amirate, probably of tablkha¯na¯h, twenty years ˙ later, upon Qala¯wu¯n’s accession. La¯jı¯n died when he was about fifty or somewhat beyond that.219 Hence, La¯jı¯n was born around 648/1250, and recieved an amirate of tablkha¯na¯h when he was about thirty. Turunta¯y was purchased by Qala¯wu¯n in ˙ ˙ ˙ 659/1261.220 He too was appointed an amir (tablkha¯na¯h) upon Qala¯wu¯n’s ac˙ cession about twenty years afterwards. Based on the assumption, discussed above, that Turunta¯y was between ten to twelve when he started his training, he ˙ ˙ was in his early thirties when he became amir of tablkha¯na¯h. Qara¯sunqur and ˙ Baydara¯ were probably in their mid-twenties when they received their amirates upon Qala¯wu¯n’s accession. Qara¯sunqur was born around 654/1256, since he died, when he was over seventy, in Shawwa¯l 728/September 1328.221 Baydara¯ arrived in the sultanate as a little child in 658/1260, i. e. he was born around 655/1257.222 Based on the minuscule data regarding the mamluks who were purchased shortly before Qala¯wu¯n’s accession, it is clear that the length of the period from their purchase until their amirate was shortened substantially, compared to that of the senior mamluks. Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r was purchased, it seems, close to Qala¯wu¯n’s accession. As suggested above, he was probably a novice when Qala¯wu¯n became sultan, but he received an amirate of tablkha¯na¯h during Qala¯˙ wu¯n’s reign. Assuming he joined Qala¯wu¯n’s mamluks three years at the most before his accession, and recieived his amirate about the end of Qala¯wu¯n’s reign, the period from his purchase until his amirate lasted between ten to thirteen years. Sala¯r joined the ranks of Qala¯wu¯n’s mamluks after he was taken captive in 675/1277, when he was, as suggested above, between ten to fifteen years old.223 He spent most of his training period as novice and jundı¯ as a mamluk of sulta¯n ˙ Qala¯wu¯n (or his son al-Sa¯lih ʿAlı¯). However, less than ten years after his purchase, ˙ ˙ in Shaʿba¯n 687/September 1288 he was already an amir of ten and had joined

217 218 219 220 221 222

See appendix 4, nn. 101, 105. See nn. 151, 152 above; Manhal, 9:115; al-ʿIbar, 5:380. See nn. 149, 150 above. See appendix 4, n. 81. Manhal, 9:48. See n. 153 above. There are some reports that Baydara¯ was over thirty (al-ʿIbar, 5:379) or forty-one (ʿIqd, 3:219) when he died, in 689/1290. 223 See n. 152 above; appendix 5, n. 183.

68

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

Qala¯wu¯n’s favorite mamluks (khawa¯ss).224 Qibjaq is an exceptional example of ˙˙ the rapid promotion of a Mansu¯rı¯ mamluk. Qala¯wu¯n gave him an amirate already ˙ upon his accession, about three years after Qibjaq was taken captive and joined the Mansu¯riyya. The main reason for this rapid promotion was the fact that ˙ Qibjaq was taken captive at a relatively advanced age, when he was probably in his mid- or late twenties.225 Hence, when he was taken captive in the battle of Abulustayn (675/1277), he was not only an adult, but also had military experience and possibly was an amir in the Mongol army. It is also known that he was a secretary of a Mongol general (noyan).226 Thus, whereas a senior Mansu¯rı¯ mamluk passed a ˙ period of about twenty years from his purchase until he received an amirate of tablkha¯na¯h, a mamluk who was purchased close to or during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign ˙ could receive his amirate after about ten years.

3.4.

The criteria for the Mansu¯rı¯ mamluk’s promotion ˙

The criteria for a mamluk’s promotion, according to Ayalon, were “beauty, ethnic origin, family relations, connections with high officials, qualifications and training”. The last two criteria, Ayalon emphasized, were the most important.227 This statement divides the criteria for promotion into “objective” and “subjective” factors. The first category includes criteria such as qualifications, seniority and experience. The second category includes criteria such as beauty, the “right” connections/relations and ethnic origin. A combination between these two categories characterizes the promotion of the mamluks from the beginning of the Mamluk period. For instance, the ascendancy of sultan Qutuz in 657/1259 ˙ was, on the one hand, due to his affiliation to the prominent amirs of the “ruling” khushda¯shiyya of the Sa¯lihiyya, and on the other hand, due to his objective ˙ ˙ qualifications such as his bravery and leadership, excellence in furu¯siyya excercises, and his wise political conduct that brought the amirs to accept him as the supreme leader.228 Similarly, al-Za¯hir Baybars advanced in his military career ˙ thanks to his good fortune (saʿa¯da) and affiliation to the ruling khushda¯shiyya (or: khushda¯shi group), alongside his wise political conduct (siya¯sa), prudence and bravery.229

224 See appendix 5, n. 184. 225 Qibjaq died a natural death in 710/1310 (Aʿya¯n, 4:62; Nuju¯m, 2:96). Assuming he was at least sixty at his death, he was born at the latest in 650/1252–3. 226 Wa¯fı¯, 24:178. 227 Ayalon, L’eclavage, 26. 228 Zubda, 46. 229 Zubda, 59.

The mamluk’s seniority and his promotion

69

Indeed, among the most prominent characteristics of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs ˙ bravery (shaja¯ʿa, iqda¯m, baʾs, butu¯la) and excellence in furu¯siyya exercises are ˙ mentioned. Bravery might be seen as a sterotypical characteristic that native Arab historians and ʿulama¯ʾ attributed to the Turkish mamluks. However, it is clear that the prominent Mansu¯rı¯ amirs advanced mainly thanks to their bravery in the ˙ battlefield and to their furu¯siyya skills.230 Alongside bravery, other characteristics such as intelligence, daring, ambition and wise political conduct or management of affairs (siya¯sa and tadbı¯r), were important criteria for a mamluk’s promotion. However, there was a much greater chance to be promoted to the highest ranks if one was affiliated to the royal mamluks. For instance, a jundı¯ of a Sa¯lih¯ı amir ˙ ˙ who managed to take a Crusader prince captive during the conquest of Antioch (666/1268), received as a reward from sultan al-Za¯hir Baybars the command of ˙ ten horsemen.231 Similarly, a Mansu¯rı¯ jundı¯, who evinced exceptional bravery in ˙ 663/1265 after he dismounted his horse and killed a Crusader, was rewarded by the same sultan with five thousand dirhams.232 In another case, a jundı¯ of one of the amirs who was dispatched to sultan al-Za¯hir Baybars to announce the ˙ Mamluk army’s victory in Cilicia in 664/1266 received an amirate of tablkha¯na¯h ˙ from the sultan. This exceptional promotion was thanks to the gallantry (shaha¯ma), activeness (himma) and harshness (sara¯ma) of this mamluk. However, he ˙ remained amir of tablkha¯na¯h for thirty years, until his death.233 Also, the other ˙ jundı¯s are no longer mentioned in the sources. It seems that their promotion to the highest levels was interrupted since they were not among the sultan’s mamluks. Qala¯wu¯n promoted his mamluks according to their bravery and other characteristics. We may infer this policy from an incident mentioned by al-Maqrı¯zı¯, in which Qala¯wu¯n refused Kitbugha¯ and Turunta¯y’s request to grant their sons ˙ ˙ iqta¯ʿs. He is said to have told them that even if he had seen them beating the ˙ enemy with their sword or crawling toward him on the battlefield – he would not 230 Bravery is attributed to many prominent Mansu¯rı¯ amirs. In several cases, physical injuries ˙ ¯’s and Sala¯r’s wounds are mentioned as are brought as proof of extreme bravery. Baydara signs of their great bravery (Wa¯fı¯, 10:361–362; Nuju¯m, 9:20). Sanjar Arjuwa¯sh’s loss of one of his eyes is another example of his bravery (Muqaffa¯, 2:14–15; Nuju¯m, 8:194). See other examples: Muqaffa¯, 2:237, 351. As for excellence in furu¯siyya, see, inter alia, La¯jı¯n (Sulu¯k, 1:865); Qibjaq (Durar [Hyderabad], 3:247); Sala¯r (Durar [Hyderabad], 2:182); Baktamur alAbu¯ Bakrı¯ (Aʿya¯n, 1:701–702); Baktamur al-Silahda¯r (Aʿya¯n, 1:702; Muqaffa¯, 2:463–464); ˙ Sometimes, the general attribution of Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ (al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh 60:479). ˙ bravery is backed up by reports of bravery in the battlefield. For instance, Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯’s bravery in the conquest of Qalʿat al-Ru¯m (see p. 80 below), Sanjar Arjuwa¯sh during the Mongol conquest of Syria (see pp. 118–120 below) or Qibjaq during the battle of Marj alSuffar (see p. 124 below). ˙ 231 Zubda, 111. 232 Tuhfa, 54. ˙ 233 Zubda, 105.

70

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

have given them such an iqta¯ʿ. This statement aimed to convey the message that ˙ even an exceptional revelation of bravery that usually resulted in significant promotion, would not be of any help in this case, because of the young ages of these awla¯d al-na¯s.234 Indeed, it seems that the Mansu¯riyya mamluks who revealed exceptional ˙ bravery on the battlefield were promoted more rapidly by their master. Kitbugha¯, who is mentioned as an exceptionally brave warrior, was appointed, as mentioned above, over the beverages pantry of amir Qala¯wu¯n in 675/1275–6. It might be that Kitbugha¯’s killing of the Mongol commander Durbai in the battle of alBı¯ra in 671/1272 contributed to this appointment. Kitbugha¯ was replaced in this office by Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, about a year after he participated in the raid on ˙ Cilicia as a warrior in the centre vanguard. In the battle of Homs in 680/1281 Baybars is mentioned among Qala¯wu¯n’s trusted mamluks. He fought next to the sultan, defended him personally, and carried a portion of the campaign treasury. These acts appearantly contributed to Baybars’ appointment as a commander of fifteen horsemen about twenty months later. Other cases also indicate the correlation between bravery and the promotion of the Mansu¯riyya mamluks. Bak˙ tamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯, who was the first mamluk to be promoted by Qala¯wu¯n from jundı¯ to amir tablkha¯na¯h, was especially known for his bravery, his excellence in ˙ furu¯siyya and his intelligence.235 Qutuz al-Mansu¯rı¯, who became one of the ˙ ˙ greatest amirs of the Mansu¯riyya already during Qala¯wu¯n’s lifetime, is men˙ tioned in his short tarjamas almost solely as an exceptionally brave warrior.236 Bravery might be the most important characteristic for promotion of a Mansu¯rı¯ mamluk, but it was definitely not the only one. The historians relate ˙ explicitly between certain characteristics of a mamluk and his promotion. Tur˙ unta¯y was promoted until he became the viceroy, since his master Qala¯wu¯n ˙ noticed that he is “gifted with intelligence and excellence” (labı¯b najı¯b) and capabilities or talent (kifa¯ya). Turunta¯y is also mentioned as resolute, sharp, ˙ ˙ brave and powerful. He was unique in his acuity (fitna), sagacity (dhaka¯ʾ) and his ˙ political conduct (tadbı¯r and siya¯sa).237 These qualifications are mentioned by Turunta¯y’s khushda¯sh Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, too, who testifies that Turunta¯y was ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ sharp-minded and brave, ambitious and talented. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ adds that ˙ despite Turunta¯y’s poor knowledge of reading and writing Arabic, he excelled in ˙ ˙ his office as the viceroy of Egypt and managed to run political affairs thanks to

234 Khitat, 2:216; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 194. See on Qala¯wu¯n’s authority also: Northrup, Qala¯˙ ˙207–208; Ayalon, “Studies II”, 456. wu¯n, 235 Aʿya¯n, 1:701–702. See on his unprecedented promotion: n. 213 above. 236 Wa¯fı¯, 24:254; al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 59:432; see also Niha¯ya, 31:224; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:133; ʿIqd, 3:103. 237 Wa¯fı¯, 16:429; Manhal, 6:386–387.

The mamluk’s seniority and his promotion

71

his sagacity.238 As discussed above, Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ and Sunqur al-Aʿsar, who ˙ ˙ were Mansu¯rı¯s who joined Qala¯wu¯n’s service after they served other masters, ˙ were appointed to high positions imediately after their purchase due to their qualifications and experience. Tu¯gha¯n was appointed amir in Damascus thanks ˙ to his energetic personality and gallantry (shaha¯ma).239 Sunqur al-Aʿsar was promoted by Qala¯wu¯n and was appointed to several high administrative positions thanks to his ambition and energy (himma) and his wise conduct (tasarruf).240 Al-Nuwayrı¯ explicitly asserts this idea when he quotes Qala¯wu¯n as ˙ saying to Sunqur al-Aʿsar: “You should know that I did not purchase you, give you an amirate and appoint you as shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Syria were it not that I believed that you would wisely advise me, collect my money and act for the benefit of my rule.”241 Thus, Sunqur al-Aʿsar’s qualifications as a great administrator, together with his experience as the dawa¯da¯r of his former master, caused Qala¯wu¯n to appoint him to high positions at the expense of more senior Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ mamluks. Qara¯sunqur is perhaps the most illustrative instance for a mamluk whose various qualifications and characteristics enabled him to advance in his career and to remain in the political-military elite for dozens of years. He was gifted with a brilliant sense for political conduct (siya¯sa), cleverness, cunning and suspicion.242 These qualifications enabled him to survive all the political upheavals until his natural death of old age in the lands of the ¯Ilkha¯nid Mongols. Already as a young mamluk, Qara¯sunqur was known for his moderation, equanimity and cunning aimed to achieve his goals. Al-Safadı¯, for instance, ˙ describes how Qara¯sunqur managed, thanks to his political wit, to gain great favour in the eyes of the sultan al-Ashraf Khalı¯l despite all his enemies’ efforts to cause him to fail.243 As elaborated in the following chapter, thanks to his sharp political senses, Qara¯sunqur was the only one to manage to escape any punishment after his involvement in the assassination of the sultan al-Ashraf Khalı¯l. His status was high and prestigious during most of the Mansu¯riyya period. As the ˙ governor of Aleppo during the second reign of al-Na¯sir Muhammad, he cleverly ˙ ˙ chose to support al-Na¯sir Muhammad and not his Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯sh Baybars ˙ ˙ ˙ al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. Even then, Qara¯sunqur was never complacent. He continued with his policy of flattery, giving presents to the confidants of the sultan and even to 238 239 240 241

Zubda, 178. Ta¯lı¯, 192; p. 251 below. Ta¯lı¯, 88; p. 251 below. Iʿlam annanı¯ ma¯ ishtaraytuka wa-ammartuka wa-wallaytuka sha¯dd al-dawa¯wı¯n bi-l-Sha¯m illa¯ zannan minı¯ annaka tansihnı¯ wa-tahsul amwa¯lı¯ wa-tanhad fı¯ masa¯lih dawlatı¯ (Niha¯ya, ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 31:167). 242 Aʿya¯n, 4:187–189; Manhal, 9:48; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:247. 243 Aʿya¯n, 4:89; Wa¯fı¯, 24:213.

72

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

officials and servants.244 As will be discussed in chapter four (section 1.1.1.), Qara¯sunqur managed to survive all al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s attemps to arrest or ˙ ˙ assassinate him, both in the sultanate and in the Mongol Ilkhanate where he found shelter. Most of the Mansu¯riyya mamluks who occupied the highest positions in the ˙ sultanate during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign and after are indeed mentioned as excelling in all qualities, and this was the main reason for their promotion. La¯jı¯n is mentioned as intelligent (ʿa¯rif ʿa¯qil) and as a good administrator (mudabbir).245 Sanjar alShuja¯ʿı¯ was known for his keen political conduct (siya¯sa) and sagacity (fitna ˙ qawiyya).246 Qibjaq and Qutlu¯bak are said to have been especially witty and ˙ 247 248 sharp. Sala¯r, as well, is mentioned as a sharp and excellent politician. Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ is characterized as having excellent siya¯sa and bravery.249 Aqqu¯sh al˙ Afram and Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ are mentioned as excellent politicians with good judgment (raʾy wa-tadbı¯r, hasan al-siya¯sa).250 Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ is noted as ˙ ˙ intelligent and with siya¯sa.251 Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯ is mentioned as exceptionally ˙ 252 energetic and intelligent. Of course, in addition to these objective qualifications, subjective ones also played a role in a Mansu¯rı¯ mamluk’s promotion. Beauty was an important factor, ˙ at least for the initial promotion of a mamluk. Qala¯wu¯n’s two greatest favourites, Baydara¯ and Turunta¯y, are explicitly noted as handsome.253 Qutuz al-Mansu¯rı¯, ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ who was promoted significantly during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign, is described as one of 254 the most beautiful of his mamluks. It should be mentioned, however, that ¯ s are Qutuz was also an exceptionally brave warrior.255 Qutlu¯bak and Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ ˙ mentioned as handsome, too, but we cannot know if this fact contributed to their promotion by Qala¯wu¯n since they are mentioned only after his death. However, the rest of the high-ranking Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, such as La¯jı¯n, Qara¯sunqur, Kitbugha¯ ˙ and others, are not mentioned as especially good-looking. Ethnic origin also contributed, to a certain extent. As discussed at the beginning of the present 244 Qara¯sunqur is said to explain his cautious policy by saying: “No one knows how the wheel turns. A day might come in which one word of one of these people [to whom he gave presents] would build one thousand houses and destroy one thousand houses” (Wa¯fı¯, 24:221). 245 Manhal, 9:169. 246 Al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 60:184; Wa¯fı¯, 15:475–476; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:182. 247 Aʿya¯n, 4:62, 121; Durar (Cairo), 3:326. 248 Aʿya¯n, 2:489; Manhal, 6–7. 249 Al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 60:479. 250 Manhal, 3:13; Zubda, 284. 251 Manhal, 3:478. 252 Sulu¯k, 2:426. 253 See on Baydara¯: Wa¯fı¯, 10:361; Manhal, 3:494; on Turunta¯y: Wa¯fı¯, 16:429. ˙ ˙ 254 Al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 59:432. 255 See above n. 236, appendix 4, n. 150.

Summary and conclusions

73

chapter, it seems that mamluks of Mongol origin were considered especially prestigious during the early Mamluk period. However, as we saw, the Mansu¯riyya ˙ was composed of a variety of ethnic groups.

4.

Summary and conclusions

The biographical data available regarding about one hundred and seventy Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks indicates that most of the Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks who were pro˙ ˙ moted during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign and who manned important offices in the army, politics and administration came from the ranks of Qala¯wu¯n’s veteran mamluks. These mamluks were purchased as children by amir Qala¯wu¯n, were educated and trained by him for a long period and were manumitted as adults when he was still amir. In contrast, most of the mamluks who were purchased by Qala¯wu¯n while he was sultan, or shortly before, did not attain prominent positions during his reign. Whereas about twenty (out of sixty-seven) senior mamluks occupied high positions during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign, only two (out of approxinately one hundred) non-senior mamluks are mentioned as holders of relatively high administrative offices. Similarly, the thirty-four Burjiyya mamluks, who began their training period when Qala¯wu¯n came to power or shortly before, were not incorporated into high-ranking military or administrative positions during his reign. Their lack of seniority, insufficient experience and relatively young age caused Qala¯wu¯n to prefer promoting his senior mamluks.256 Qala¯wu¯n clearly preferred the older, more experienced and senior mamluks. Promotion, however, did not depend solely on seniority. About half of the senior mamluks, who were manumitted probably while Qala¯wu¯n was still amir, are not mentioned in the historical sources for his reign. Most of them are not mentioned at all. On the other hand, there are several examples of mamluks who were given relatively high rank and important positions during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign soon after he bought them, despite the fact that they were not trained by Qala¯wu¯n himself. There were thus other criteria for promotion, first and foremost a mamluk’s personality and qualifications. It seems that age and origin (preferably Mongol) were important factors on the promotion ladder as well. The length of the Mansu¯riyya mamluks’ training period was cut substantially ˙ when Qala¯wu¯n became sultan. While Qala¯wu¯n was still an amir, a talented and successful Mansu¯rı¯ amir could receive the rank of tablkha¯na¯h some twenty years ˙ ˙ after he was bought, when he was, in most cases, in his early thirties. When Qala¯wu¯n became sultan, a Mansu¯rı¯ amir received the rank of tablkha¯na¯h ten to ˙ ˙ 256 For a view correlating these findings regarding the Mansu¯riyya mamluks and their pro˙ motion, see: Levanoni, Turning Point, 26.

74

The Mansu¯riyya during the period of Qala¯wu¯n ˙

thirteen years after he was bought, i.e in his mid-twenties. As the training period of mamluk novices during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign lasted, still, several years, we may assume that after Qala¯wu¯n’s death, many were of the right age and had the proper qualifications for holding important positions in the sultanate. In fact, we should note that the vast majority are mentioned in the sources only after Qala¯wu¯n’s death. The average age at which the young mamluk started his training was, it seems, between ten and twelve. While Qala¯wu¯n was an amir, his mamluks’ education and military training lasted at least four to seven years. During the years of training, the young novices were subject to tough disciplinary measures on the part of their eunuch educators. The purpose of their religious education was to instil the values and principles of their new religion in the mamluks. In most cases, it seems that at the end of the training period, the mamluks lacked adequate proficiency in the Arabic language – even the royal mamluks who were educated in the barracks of the Cairo citadel. It is discernable, hence, that during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign his mamluks started to occupy more and more high positions in the sultanate. Still, they were always subject to the severe supervision of their master, the sultan Qala¯wu¯n. They were also had to accept the high position of amirs from other khushda¯shi groups, especially the Za¯hiriyya and the Sa¯lihiyya. However, the number, position and ˙ ˙ ˙ influence of the Mansu¯riyya amirs, which was already great during Qala¯wu¯n’s ˙ reign, would grow immeasurably after his death. As we will see in the next chapter, the khushda¯shiyya of the Mansu¯riyya would stand at the centre of all ˙ political and military events and its members would be the rulers of the Mamluk sultanate, de-facto and, sometimes, de-jure as well.

Chapter Two: The Mansu¯riyya from Qala¯wu¯n’s death to the ˙ ammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n (689/1290– third reign of al-Na¯sir Muh ˙ ˙ 709/1310)

1.

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s reign (689/1290– ˙ 709/1310)

1.1.

Al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s policy toward the Mansu¯riyya ˙

With Qala¯wu¯n’s death, the Mansu¯riyya regiment, that comprised about six ˙ thousand mamluks, was the largest and strongest unit in the Mamluk sultanate. Al-Ashraf Khalı¯l b. Qala¯wu¯n succeeded his father as sultan and annexed his father’s mamluks to his own Ashrafiyya mamluks, numbering only about one thousand two-hundred mamluks.1 Hence, at least officially, the Mansu¯rı¯ mam˙ luks joined the service of the new sultan. Al-Ashraf Khalı¯l based his rule on the Mansu¯riyya. Though he occasionally used to change offices between various ˙ office holders, to depose or arrest Mansu¯rı¯ amirs (as discussed below), in almost ˙ all cases he appointed another Mansu¯rı¯ instead. Thus, al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s policy ˙ was not directed against the Mansu¯riyya as a faction.2 ˙ Al-Ashraf Khalı¯l, however, could not tolerate the powerful position of Tur˙ unta¯y. Turunta¯y strongly supported Khalı¯l’s brother, al-Malik al-Sa¯lih, who was ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ intendeded to succeed his father Qala¯wu¯n but died untimely, in 687/1288. Tur˙ unta¯y used to humiliate al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s associates and incited Qala¯wu¯n ˙ against Ibn al-Salʿu¯s, al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s closest confidant and his na¯zir al-diwa¯n. ˙ As a result, Qala¯wu¯n punished Ibn al-Salʿu¯s and removed him from his office.3 Turunta¯y, however, felt quite secure after al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s ascendancy. Ac˙ ˙ cording to several sources, Turunta¯y believed that the new sultan would retain ˙ ˙ him in his strong position as viceroy. It was only after Turunta¯y realized that al˙ ˙ 1 ʿIqd, 3:208. 2 This view is shared also by W. Clifford, see: Winslow Williams Clifford, State Formation and the Structure of Politics in Mamluk Syro-Egypt, 648/741 A.H./1250–1340 C.E., ed. Stephan Conermann (Bonn: Bonn University Press, Mamluk Studies Series, 2013), 149. 3 Zubda, 276; Niha¯ya, 31:180–181.

76

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

Ashraf Khalı¯l bore a grudge against him, that he decided to kill him.4 However, the assassination attempt that took place during al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s royal procession failed.5 Turunta¯y was arrested in Cairo citadel. He was severely tortured ˙ ˙ for three days in Dhu¯ al-Qaʿda 689/November 1290 and finally executed.6 Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ succeeded Turunta¯y as viceroy, but only for a few days. Afterwards, al˙ ˙ Shuja¯ʿı¯ was dispatched to Damascus to act as its governor. Al-Ashraf Khalı¯l officially appointed Baydara¯ as his deputy and as ata¯bak, giving him the iqta¯ʿs ˙ that had belonged to Turunta¯y.7 ˙ ˙ This exchange between two Mansu¯rı¯ amirs became a common pattern in al˙ Ashraf Khalı¯l’s rule. Indeed, it was Baydara¯ who replaced Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ as viceroy, and afterwards it was Aybak al-Khaznada¯r who replaced Tughrı¯l al¯Igha¯nı¯ in this office.8 Qara¯sunqur was moved from the governorship of˙Aleppo to the office of muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯nı¯ya.9 Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ replaced ˙ ˙ Qara¯sunqur as the governor of Aleppo,10 and Tughrı¯l al-I¯gha¯nı¯ replaced Balaba¯n ˙ al-Tabba¯khı¯ as the governor of Tripoli and the coastal fortresses.11 Tu¯gha¯n al˙ ˙ Mansu¯rı¯, wa¯lı¯ al-barr of Damascus, replaced Sunqur al-Aʿsar as shadd al-da˙ wa¯wı¯n in Damascus, but soon after they both returned to their former offices.12 Later, Tu¯gha¯n was appointed as the governor of Qalʿat al-Ru¯m instead of Aybak ˙ al-Mawsilı¯, and Asandamur Kurjı¯ replaced Tu¯gha¯n as wa¯lı¯ al-barr of Damascus.13 ˙ ˙ Aybak al-Mawsilı¯ served as the ustada¯r in Egypt before his appointment as shadd ˙ 14 al-dawa¯wı¯n in Aleppo and Qalʿat al-Ru¯m. Later, it was Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ who was probably appointed as the ustada¯r, after his deposition from the governorship of Damascus.15 Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ was moved from the governorship of ˙ Kerak to an amirate in Egypt and Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ was appointed over Kerak instead.16 Among the ha¯jibs during the reign of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l were the Man˙ su¯rı¯s Baktamur al-Silahda¯r, Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ al-Ha¯jib, and Kurt.17Aqqu¯sh al˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Zubda, 274; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:99–100; Sulu¯k, 1:757. Niha¯ya, 31:179–180. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:100–101; Zubda, 274–275; Sulu¯k, 1:757; al-ʿIbar, 5:361. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:102; Zubda, 275; Wa¯fı¯, 10:360; al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 60:178. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:153. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:145; Sulu¯k, 1:780; Tuhfa, 132. Ibn Kathı¯r mentions that Qara¯sunqur received an ˙ iqta¯ʿ of an amir of one hundred in Egypt (Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:274). It seems that Qara¯sunqur served ˙ also as amı¯r janda¯r during al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s reign (Aʿya¯n, 4:89–90; Wa¯fı¯, 24:213–214). Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:142; Zubda, 289–290. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:144–145; Zetterstéen, 23; Sulu¯k, 1:780. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:102. According to al-Dhahabı¯, Asandamur was appointed wa¯lı¯ al-barı¯d in Rajab 692/June 1293. See: al-Dhahabı¯, Ta’rı¯kh, 60:23. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:157. Zubda, 287, 289–290; Sulu¯k, 1:778. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:144. Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ is mentioned as ustada¯r in 293/1294, see: Zetterstéen, 24. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:119; Zubda, 274; Sulu¯k, 1:767–768. Zetterstéen, 24.

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s reign (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

77

Mawsilı¯ Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ served as amı¯r ʿalam (amir of the banner).18 Except the ˙ office of wazir, filled by Ibn al-Salʿu¯s,19 and the office of the governor of Damascus, occupied by Aybak al-Hamawı¯ al-Za¯hirı¯,20 most high-level positions ˙ ˙ were occupied by the Mansu¯riyya during al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s reign. ˙ Alongside the occasional inter-Mansu¯rı¯ exchanges in offices, al-Ashraf Kha˙ lı¯l’s policy was characterized by arrests and releases of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs. In fact, the ˙ one and only Mansu¯rı¯ amir to be arrested and executed by al-Ashraf Khalı¯l was ˙ Turunta¯y. In the all other cases, Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who were arrested by this sultan ˙ ˙ ˙ were not put to death and almost all of them were released and even regained their high positions. The most instructive instance of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s policy is La¯jı¯n. After his ascendancy, al-Ashraf Khalı¯l gave La¯jı¯n back his position as the governor of Damascus and even enlarged his iqta¯ʿ.21 However, in Juma¯da¯ I 690/ ˙ May 1291, during the siege of Acre (see below), al-Ashraf Khalı¯l arrested La¯jı¯n and imprisoned him in Cairo citadel.22 About a month after La¯jı¯n’s arrest, alAshraf Khalı¯l officially deposed him from the governorship of Damascus and appointed Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ instead.23 However, about three months later, alAshraf released La¯jı¯n and conferred upon him an amirate of one hundred.24 Soon after, La¯jı¯n was arrested again by the sultan, together with other amirs whom he decided to execute. However, once again al-Ashraf released La¯jı¯n, gave him robes of honour, and conferred upon him an amirate of one hundred. Al-Ashraf appointed La¯jı¯n silahda¯r of the sultan (an office he had held during Qala¯wu¯n’s ˙ reign), and gave him a big iqta¯ʿ.25 ˙ La¯jı¯n’s uneven career was not different from that of other prominent Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ amirs. Kitbugha¯ was arrested together with Turunta¯y, but was released less than ˙ ˙ two months after. He regained his high-ranking amirate and received gifts.26 Sunqur al-Tawı¯l was also captured following Turunta¯y’s arrest, but he was re˙ ˙ ˙ leased less than a year later and again received his amirate.27 Sanjar Arjuwa¯sh, the governor of Damascus citadel, was deposed, humiliated and tortured, but soon

18 Muqaffa¯, 2:234–235. The amı¯r ʿalam was the supervisor of the banners and the military band of the tablkha¯na¯h, see: al-Qalqashandı¯ (Cairo), 5:456. 19 Shams˙al-Dı¯n Muhammad ibn al-Salʿu¯s, al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s confidant, was appointed as wazir ˙ al-Ashraf ’s ascendancy (Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:109, Sulu¯k, 1:761–762). about a month after 20 Aybak al-Hamawı¯ was appointed to this office in Shawwa¯l 691/Septemeber 1292 (Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:144). ˙ 21 Niha¯ya, 31:184. 22 Zubda, 283; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:119; Sulu¯k, 1:767; al-Dhahabı¯, Ta’rı¯kh, 59:45. 23 Sulu¯k, 1:767. 24 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:123; Zubda, 288; Nuju¯m, 8:11; al-Dhahabı¯, Ta’rı¯kh, 60:17. 25 This incident occurred at the end of 691/1292 or the beginning of 692/the end of 1292, see: Ibn Fura¯t, 8:145–146; Nuju¯m, 8:13; Zubda, 291; Niha¯ya, 31:245; Sulu¯k, 1:781,782. 26 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:102, 110. 27 ʿIqd, 3:31; Nuju¯m, 8:11; 9:57; Sulu¯k, 2:193.

78

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

after was returned to his office and received an iqta¯ʿ and robes of honour.28 ˙ Similarly, Sunqur al-Aʿsar was arrested by al-Ashraf ’s wazir, Ibn al-Salʿu¯s, flogged and released.29 Aybak al-Mawsilı¯ was arrested for a few days until he was ˙ released and appointed over Qalʿat al-Ru¯m, recently captured.30 Qara¯rsala¯n and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram were arrested in Shawwa¯l 690/October 1291, though it is not clear when they were released.31 The sultan gave the iqta¯ʿ of Aqqu¯sh al-Afram to ˙ Uzdamur al-ʿAla¯’ı¯, who himself would be arrested a year and a half later.32 AlAshraf Khalı¯l’s policy toward non-Mansu¯rı¯ amirs was the same. The Sa¯lih¯ı Sanjar ˙ ˙ ˙ al-Hamawı¯ and Sanjar al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯ were arrested, but soon after the latter was ˙ released and regained his amirate of one hundred.33 Aybak al-Afram, the senior Sa¯lih¯ı amir, was arrested too.34 ˙ ˙ Al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s policy toward the Mansu¯riyya, hence, was totally arbitrary, ˙ haphazard and lacked long-term political vision. After he arrested the amirs, humiliated them and confiscated their wealth, he released them and gave them political and financial power again. He deposed La¯jı¯n and Qara¯sunqur, the strong governors of Damascus and Aleppo, without any justification, and in that way raised their anger against him. Strangely enough, Qara¯sunqur was appointed, much to his resentment, muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯nı¯ya, an office that had ˙ never before been occupied by an amir who was not a eunuch. Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ was bitter as well following his deposition as the governor of Damascus.35 Another of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s mistake was to subjugate La¯jı¯n, after his release, to Baydara¯, since this amir also developed a grudge against the sultan.36 In addition, the reasons for the Mansu¯rı¯s’ arrests were usually capricious and emotional. For ˙ instance, Sanjar Arjuwa¯sh was arrested only due to his response to a joke about al-Ashraf.37 Similarly, La¯jı¯n was arrested because of slander that came to the sultan’s ears. Al-Ashraf decided to arrest La¯jı¯n in the middle of the siege of Acre, when La¯jı¯n’s presence was so crucial.38 It seems that a more resolute and cruel policy on al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s part would have extended his rule and life. This notion is even implied by contemporary historians.39 These reasons, in addition 28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39

Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:119–120; al-Dhahabı¯, Ta’rı¯kh, 59:54; Sulu¯k, 1:768; Nuju¯m, 8:11; Clifford, 151. Aʿya¯n, 2:479. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:142. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:128; al-Dhahabı¯, Ta’rı¯kh, 59:58; al-Jazarı¯, 1:60; Sulu¯k, 1:774. Niha¯ya, 31:247; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:128. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:123, 143; Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:274. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:157. Sulu¯k, 1:780. Kanz, 8:244; Irwin, Middle East, 81. See n. 28 above. Zubda, 283; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:119; Sulu¯k, 1:767; Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:266. Al-Safadı¯ mentions an anecdote according to which Qala¯wu¯n warned his son al-Ashraf Khalı¯l that˙ he should never arrest La¯jı¯n. If he did that, however, he should never leave him alive, since

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s reign (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

79

to other wrong moves that al-Ashraf Khalı¯l made (see section 1.3. below), brought about his bitter end.

1.2.

The Mansu¯riyya during military activities ˙

Despite the political instability during al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s reign, the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs ˙ proved themselves excellent warriors on the battle field. The role of the Mansu¯riyya in the conquest of Acre and the final elimination of the Crusader pres˙ ence in Syria was significant. Tughrı¯l al-I¯gha¯nı¯ was responsible for urging the ˙ preparation of the siege equipment. Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ headed the armies of ˙ Tripoli and the coastal fortresses.40 Later, he was among the commanders of the expeditions to Tortosa and the island of Ruad, whence the crusaders of Tortosa fled.41 As the governor of Damascus, La¯jı¯n was one of the main commanders during the siege of Acre (until his arrest by the sultan). Kitbugha¯ was the one who guaranteed for the protection (ama¯n) of the lives of the Crusaders and Armenians who were entrenched in the Hospitaller’s Tower in Acre. Aqbugha¯ alMansu¯rı¯, one of the amirs in Damascus, was killed by the Crusaders in Acre.42 ˙ Immediately after the fall of Acre, Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ commanded the conquest of all the other Frankish strongholds, in Tyre, Sidon, Tortosa, Beirut, Athlith, and Jubail.43 The role of Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ in the occupation and reconstruction of the Armenian fortress of Qalʿat al-Ru¯m was especially significant. This stronghold, located on the Euphrates about forty km north of al-Bı¯ra, was probably the most exposed Armenian outpost in the northern frontier zone between the sultanate and territories under the control of the Ilkhanids or their vassals. Angus Donal Stewart maintains that al-Ashraf Khalı¯l decided to capture this fortress in order to continue the conquests in the region, especially when the Armenians could not have received military assistance from the Crusaders. In his opinion, Qalʿat alRu¯m was not of great military importance. Its capture was mainly for propaganda needs and meant to strengthen the position of the sultan.44 Kate Raphael, on the

40 41 42 43 44

La¯jı¯n would bear a grudge against him and would kill him. Al-Ashraf Khalı¯l did not act according this advice, and it brought about his death. See: Aʿya¯n, 4:167; Wa¯fı¯, 24:386. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:111. Al-Dhahabı¯, Ta’rı¯kh, 59:52; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:121; Nuju¯m, 8:10–11. Nuju¯m, 8:7,10; Wa¯fı¯, 9:304. Niha¯ya, 31:212; al-ʿIbar, 5:365; al-Dhahabı¯, Ta’rı¯kh, 59:50–52; al-Jazarı¯, 1:54–55; Nuju¯m, 8:10; Irwin, Middle East, 78. Angus Donal Stewart, “Qalʿat al-Ru¯m / Hromgla / Rumkale and the Mamluk Siege of 691 AH/ 1292 CE.”, in Muslim Military Architecture in Greater Syria: From the Coming of Islam to the Ottoman Period, ed. Hugh Kennedy (Leiden: Brill, 2006), 279–280; Stewart, The Armenian Kingdom and the Mamluks: War and Diplomacy during the Reigns of Hetʿum II (1289–1307)

80

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

other hand, emphasizes the important strategic considerations that stood behind the decision to conquer this fortress, related to its location. Situated on a shallow ford close to the ¯Ilkha¯nid-Mamluk border and in close vicinity to the important Mamluk stronghold of al-Bı¯ra, it constituted a clear threat to the Mamluks. The capture of this stronghold, on the other hand, would be a key to future Mamluk conquests of the east, Iraq and Anatolia.45 In Juma¯da¯ II 691/May 1292 the Mamluks started beseiging Qalʿat al-Ru¯m. It seems that the most important commanders in this campaign belonged to the Sa¯lihiyya, including Aybak al-Afram, Baysarı¯ al-Shamsı¯, Sunqur al-Ashqar and ˙ ˙ Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯. However, the Mansu¯riyya also played a prominent role in this ˙ expedition. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, for example, mentions that he participated in ˙ the siege and conquest of this fortress.46 It was Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, however, the newly-appointed governor of Damascus, who revealed great courage and resourcefulness. He made a chain that connected between the ground and the battlement of the fortress, so the mamluks were able to climb up it and take the fortress. The inhabitants of Qalʿat al-Ru¯m surrendered and were taken prisoner. Al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ was also in charge of the extensive refortification works of the fortress, which had been severely damaged by Mamluk artillery. Al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ excelled in the building and fortification of Qalʿat al-Ru¯m.47 Al-Ashraf Khalı¯l appointed Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ to this mission, not only due to his important role in the conquest of the fortress, but also thanks to his reputation as an excellent construction supervisor, during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign and after.48 Unlike Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ʾs military success, Baydara¯’s campaign against the Nusayrı¯s in the Kasrawa¯n mountains in Lebanon failed.49 In Shaʿba¯n 691/July ˙

45 46 47 48

49

(Leiden: Brill, 2001), 73–75. For a brief history of this fortress, see Stewart, “Qalʿat al-Ru¯m”, 271–272. Raphael, 104. Zubda, 289; Tuhfa, 131. ˙ See on the conquest of Qalʿat al-Ru¯m: Zubda, 288–289; Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:272; Abu al-Fida¯’, 4:27; Sulu¯k, 1:778. For analysis of this campaign according to Armenian and Arab sources see: Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 73–83; Stewart, “Qalʿat al-Ru¯m”, 276–279; Raphael, 103–104. Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ was the construction supervisor of the mausoleum of Qala¯wu¯n’s wife, Fa¯tima Kha¯tu¯n, as well as the complex in Bayn al-Qasrayn, containing an hospital (bı¯ma¯ri˙ sta¯˙n), madrasa and the mausoleum of Qala¯wu¯n (qubbat al-Mansu¯riyya). See: Zubda, 236– 237, 247; Wa¯fı¯, 15:477; Niha¯ya, 31:105–106; Rabbat, Citadel 148. As˙the governor of Damascus during al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s reign, al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ built several decorated structures inside the citadel of the city, and enlarged the mayda¯n. He was also in charge of building projects in and around the citadel of Cairo (Rabbat, Citadel, 148–149; al-Dhahabı¯, Ta’rı¯kh, 59:53–54). Al-Shuja¯ʿı¯’s reconstruction of Qalʿat al-Ru¯m should be seen as a part of the Mamluk policy regarding inland fortresses, such as Marqab and Hisn al-Akra¯d (Crac des Chevaliers). These fortresses ˙ were restored and occupied in order to˙maintain the Mamluk hold in Syria. In contrast, the coastal strongholds were totally demolished, in order to prevent their recapture by the Franks, establishing them as bridgeheads. See: Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 82–83. The Nusayrı¯-ʿAlawı¯ sect originated in extreme Shiʿism and venerates the cousin and son-in˙

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s reign (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

81

1292, Baydara¯, Qara¯sunqur and several Sa¯lih¯ı amirs led this expedition in order ˙ ˙ to take revenge on the hillsmen of Kasrawa¯n for their support of the Crusaders. However, the Mamluk force was ambushed and was obliged to negotiate with the Nusayrı¯s in order to withdraw from the area. In the negotiations the mamluks ˙ had to release Kasrawa¯nı¯ prisoners arrested in Damascus. The amirs accused Baydara¯ of conducting the campaign poorly, and spread rumors that he had been bribed by the people of Kasrawa¯n.50 However, in the more northern frontier Baydara¯ succeeded against the Armenians. Unwilling to suffer another devastating Mamluk raid, and with no hope of any assistance from the (expelled) Crusaders and the Mongols, the Armenians decided to turn to diplomacy. They sent an honourable delegation with precious gifts to Cairo. After short negotiations, the Armenians handed over the fortresses of Bahasna¯, Marʿash and Tall Hamdu¯n in Rajab 692/June 1293.51 Tu¯gha¯n al˙ ˙ Mansu¯rı¯, wa¯lı¯ al-barr of Damascus, accompanied the messengers of the Arme˙ nian king back to their homeland. According to al-ʿAynı¯, Tu¯gha¯n was also ap˙ pointed over Bahasna¯, and probably also over the other two fortresses. He was also ordered to fortify the three new acquisitions. According to other sources, it was another Mansu¯rı¯ amir, Bakta¯sh al-Zaradka¯sh, who was appointed over ˙ Bahasna¯.52

1.3.

Al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s murder

Al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s murder was a result of two major tense incidents between him and his viceroy Baydara¯. The first event that brought about enmity between the sultan and Baydara¯ occurred at the beginning of 692/the end of 1292. During a hunting expedition of the sultan to Upper Egypt (the Saʿı¯d), the wazir Ibn al˙ Salʿu¯s revealed that Baydara¯’s revenues from these territories was much higher than those of the sultan’s, and while Baydara¯’s warehouses were full of crops, the law of the prophet Muhammad, ʿAlı¯ b. Abi Ta¯lib, as God. This sect was never accepted as ˙ Baybars and Qala¯wu ˙ n tried unsuccessfully to impose Sunni Islam legitimate by Sunni Islam. ¯ on the Nusayrı¯s, see: H. Halm, “Nusayriyya”, EI2, 8:145–148; Yaron Friedman, “Ibn Tay˙¯ wa¯ against the Nusayrı¯-ʿAlawı ˙ ¯ Sect”, Der Islam 82, 2 (2005) 349–363. See more on miyya’s Fata ˙ the history and dogmas of this sect: René Dussaud, Histoire et Religion des Nosairı¯s (Paris: É. ˙ ¯ Religion: An Bouillion, 1900); Meir Michael Bar Asher and Aryeh Kofsky. The Nusayrı¯-ʽAlawı ˙ Enquiry into its Theology and Liturgy (Leiden: Brill, 2002). 50 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:142–143; Sulu¯k, 1:779; Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:272; al-Dhahabı¯, Ta’rı¯kh, 60:14. Irwin, Middle East, 79; Muqaffa¯, 2:563. 51 Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 84–92; Raphael, 114; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:156; Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:276; Zetterstéen, 22. These fortresses, however, returned to Armenian control during the next years, since in 697/1298, Tall Hamdu¯n fell to the Mamluks once again (see section 4.4. below ˙ and Raphael, 114, 194). 52 Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 84, 90–92; ʿIqd 3:151; al-Jazarı¯, 1:151; Sulu¯k, 784; Zetterstéen, 23.

82

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

sultan’s barns were empty. When the sultan heard this, he was furious at his deputy, Baydara¯, despite the latter’s attempts to appease him with valuable gifts. When al-Ashraf Khalı¯l returned to Cairo, he immediately took back to his personal treasury (kha¯ss) some of the districts that were enrolled under Baydara¯’s ˙˙ name.53 A similar case occurred about a year later, during the sultan’s hunting expedition in the Buhayra district, in the western Delta. Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ was ap˙ pointed as the sultan’s deputy in Cairo, while Baydara¯ and Ibn al-Salʿu¯s (whose rivalry had increased by this time), accompanied the sultan. In the city of Tara¯na, ˙ located on the Delta about eighty km north-west of Cairo, Ibn al-Salʿu¯s left for Alexandria. He revealed again that Baydara¯’s agents had taken over the city’s commercial revenues at the expense of the sultans’ treasury. This time, the sultan was even more enraged. He rebuked Baydara¯ severely, cursed him and threatened to torture him at the hands of Ibn al-Salʿu¯s. According to some historians, alAshraf Khalı¯l even struck Baydara¯ on his face, in the presence of the amirs. In any case, this time too al-Ashraf Khalı¯l acted according his irrational policy, and released Baydara¯ after this humiliation. Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯ mentions that this incident was the main reason for the sultan’s murder. Indeed, immediately after his release, Baydara¯ began to organize a coalition against the sultan.54 Baydara¯ gathered La¯jı¯n, Qara¯sunqur and other Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯shs and in˙ cited them against the sultan. It was not a hard task, since La¯jı¯n and Qara¯sunqur had already developed grudges against al-Ashraf Khalı¯l following their arrest or deposition. Baydara¯ managed to pull other senior amirs to his side. In addition, the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs were full of resentment toward al-Ashraf Khalı¯l, since they felt ˙ he degraded them while promoting his own mamluks at their expense.55 Among the other reasons for the sultan’s murder, mentioned by the Muslim historians, were the appointment of the arrogant Ibn al-Salʿu¯s as wazir, the execution of the senior amirs Sunqur al-Ashqar, Taqsu¯ and others. Religious and moral issues are ˙ ˙ mentioned as well. Al-Ashraf Khalı¯l was accused of neglecting the matters of the Muslims, having low religious sentiments, drinking wine during Ramada¯n and ˙ sexual harassment of young boys.56 Baydara¯’s coalition consisted of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs La¯jı¯n, Qara¯sunqur, Ba˙ ha¯dur Raʾs Nawba, Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ al-Ha¯jib and Altunbugha¯ al-Jamda¯r, as ˙ ˙ ˙ 53 Niha¯ya, 31:248–249; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:153–154; Zubda, 292; Kanz, 8:346; Clifford, 150–151. 54 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:166; Zubda, 295. 55 Zubda, 295; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:170; Zetterstéen, 26. However, compared to his father Qala¯wu¯n and the Mansu¯rı¯ sultans that would rule after him, al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s promotion of his own mamluks˙ was quite minor. In fact, no key position during his (short) reign was occupied by an Ashrafı¯. It was mainly the Mansu¯riyya and, to a smaller extent, the Sa¯lihiyya amirs who ˙ ˙ occupied the highest positions. ˙ 56 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:170–171.

Al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s first reign (693/1293–694/1294) ˙ ˙

83

well as amirs from other khushda¯shi groups. Another Mansu¯rı¯ who took part in ˙ the murder was Balaba¯n (or: Turunta¯y) al-Muhammadı¯, who was probably a ˙ ˙ ˙ junior amir at that time.57 The amirs saw a good opportunity to kill al-Ashraf Khalı¯l during a hunting expedition in which the sultan left with a very small number of his kha¯ssakiyya confidants for Taru¯ja, in the Buhayra district. They ˙ ˙˙ rode toward him and killed him, when “Baydara¯ struck first and La¯jı¯n hit the last deathblow”. Afterwards they left the sultan wallowing in his blood. This murder was in Muharram 693/December 1293.58 ˙

2.

Al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s first reign (693/1293– ˙ ˙ 694/1294)

2.1.

The conflict between Baydara¯ and Kitbugha¯

The Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who killed the sultan al-Ashraf Khalı¯l hurried to the sultan’s ˙ dihlı¯z (royal tent) in Taru¯ja in order to settle the new regime between them. They decided that Baydara¯ would be the new sultan, bearing the regnal title (laqab) alMalik al-Qa¯hir, or, according to other versions, al-Malik al-Awhad or al-Malik al˙ Muʿazzam. They hastened to Cairo citadel in order to crown Baydara¯ as soon as ˙˙ possible and to prevent any opposition. They captured Baysarı¯ al-Shamsı¯ (Sa¯lih¯ı) ˙ ˙ and Baktamur al-Silahada¯r (Za¯hirı¯-Mansu¯rı¯), and intended to kill them. How˙ ˙ ˙ ever, the latter were saved thanks to the shafa¯ʿa (mediation) of one of the amirs.59 At the same time, the other amirs who were in the dihlı¯z in Taru¯ja, the Mansu¯rı¯s ˙ 57 Balaba¯n/Turunta¯y al-Muhammadı¯ is mentioned only in biographical entries among the amirs ˙ ˙ the murder who took˙part in of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l. Since exactly the same biographical details are mentioned for both Balaba¯n al-Muhammadı¯ and Turunta¯y al-Muhammadı¯, it seems ˙ See: Durar (Cairo), ˙ ˙ 2:28, 319;˙ Sulu¯k, 2:418, 675; plausible that they refer to the same amir. Nuju¯m, 10:115. 58 Zubda, 296. See on the members of the coalition who killed the sultan: Durar (Cairo), 2:28, 319; Niha¯ya, 31:261; Aʿya¯n, 5:76; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:173; Kanz, 8:347. The sources describe the murder of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l in detail, according to testimony of the sultan’s amı¯r shika¯r (master of the hunt), who was beside his master when he died. According to this testimony, the following Mansu¯rı¯s struck al-Ashraf Khalı¯l with their sword: Baydara¯, La¯jı¯n, Baha¯dur Raʾs ˙ ¯ qsunqur al-Husa¯mı¯, Nu¯gha¯y, Nawba and Qara¯sunqur. The others were La¯jı¯n’s mamluk A Muhammad Khawa¯ja, Turunta¯y al-Sa¯qı¯ and Altunbugha¯ Raʾs Nawba, see:˙ Niha¯ya, 31:260– ˙ ˙ ¯ k, 1:790; Nuju¯m, ˙ 8:17–19. Ibn Kathı¯r (13:278) also mentions 262;˙ Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:167–168; Sulu Baysarı¯ among the murderers. 59 Shafa¯ʿa was an accepted, perhaps “official”, practice in the Mamluk sultanate. It may be defined as a mediation effort made in front of a higher authority (usually the sultan or his deputy) on behalf of someone who is in danger. In most cases shafa¯ʿa aims to bring about pardon for execution or arrest, but also for other punishments such as flogging or confiscation. See more on the shafa¯ʿa practice: Van Steenbergen, Order, 67–72.

84

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯, Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯, the Sa¯lih¯ı Baktu¯t al˙ ˙ ʿAla¯’ı¯ and the royal mamluks, rode toward Cairo in order to capture Baydara¯ and the amirs who killed the sultan. This group was joined by a group of kha¯ssakiyya ˙˙ amirs headed by Kitbugha¯ who were hunting in another nearby area, and by mamluks who were returned to the citadel in Cairo by al-Ashraf Khalı¯l before his murder. Kitbugha¯’s coalition consisted of about two thousand horseman of the royal mamluks, the army and the halqa. The battle between the camp of al-Ashraf ˙ Khalı¯l’s murderes headed by Baydara¯, and the camp of the sultan’s avengers headed by Kitbugha¯, took place in Tara¯na in mid–Muharram 693/December ˙ ˙ 1293.60 It was probably from the early stages of the battle that Kitbugha¯’s upper hand was discernable, following significant defection from Baydara¯’s camp to that of Kitbugha¯. First, it was Baktamur al-Silahda¯r and Baysarı¯ al-Shamsı¯ who defected ˙ to Kitbugha¯. As mentioned above, these amirs were almost executed by Baydara¯, but were untied from their ropes in order to fight with his camp. In addition, the Za¯hirı¯-Mansu¯rı¯ Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj with another group defected to Kitbugha¯’s side, ˙ ˙ ˙ too. When the Bedouins saw this movement, they also defected to Kitbugha¯, until Baydara¯ remained with very few warriors by his side. When the two forces started their fighting, Kitbugha¯ and his amirs severely attacked Baydara¯. Kitbugha¯ is said to have raised his bow toward Baydara¯ and cried: “Baydara¯! Where is the sultan?” Then he shot an arrow toward Baydara¯, and so did all the other warriors of his camp. Baydara¯ and his people still managed to run away, but Kitbugha¯ and the amirs caught up with him and killed him similarly to the way he killed al-Ashraf Khalı¯l. They first tore his arm, then his shoulder and then his head, which was carried on a spear all the way to Cairo, where it was paraded through the streets. The remains of Baydara¯’s body were buried in Tara¯na, and only later was moved ˙ to Cairo.61 Thus, the first significant split in the Mansu¯riyya occurred after the murder of ˙ al-Ashraf Khalı¯l. At the head of the coalition that killed the sultan were Baydara¯, La¯jı¯n, Qara¯sunqur, Baha¯dur Raʾs Nawba and Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ al-Ha¯jib. ˙ ˙ Against them was the coalition who demanded the blood of the murdered sultan, headed by Kitbugha¯, Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Baktamur alSilahda¯r. It is hard to know if there were any “ideological” motives for this split. It ˙ is more reasonable to assume that this split reflected inter-Mansu¯riyya rivalry, ˙ and the murder of the sultan constituted only a trigger for a violent conflict. Following the murder of Baydara¯, the members of his coalition fled in all directions. La¯jı¯n and Qara¯sunqur entered Cairo secretly and hid there. Meanwhile, the news of the murders of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l and Baydara¯ reached Sanjar al60 Zubda, 296–297; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:169–170; Niha¯ya, 31:263; Sulu¯k, 1:791–792; Kanz, 8:348–350. 61 Zubda, 297; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:170.

Al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s first reign (693/1293–694/1294) ˙ ˙

85

Shuja¯ʿı¯, who had remained in Cairo as deputy of the sultan. Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ temporarily prohibited the passage of ships with troops from the al-Jı¯za bank of the Nile bank to the Cairo one. Hence, when Kitbugha¯ and the amirs La¯jı¯n alRu¯mı¯, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯ arrived at the al-Jı¯za bank, they could not cross to the opposite side where the citadel was located. Only after a series of negotiations through letters and messengers between al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ and Kitbugha¯, was it agreed that Qala¯wu¯n’s son, al-Malik al-Na¯sir Muhammad, would ˙ ˙ be crowned sultan. Only then did al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ send ships that transferred the amirs from al-Jı¯za to Cairo. With this move al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ succeeded in calming the turbulent atmosphere and in preventing, for a while, possible bloody conflicts between the amirs.62 After the identity of the sultan was agreed upon by all the amirs, they decided on the establishment of a Mansu¯rı¯ triumvirate in which Kitbugha¯ would be the ˙ viceroy, Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ would be the wazir and Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r the ustada¯r. It was also agreed that La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯ would be appointed as ata¯bak alʿasa¯kir and Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ as the head of chancery (dı¯wa¯n al-Insha¯’), or the ˙ chief dawa¯da¯r.63 From that moment, the Mamluk sultanate moved, de facto, to the hands of the Mansu¯riyya. Kitbugha¯, it seems, kept most power in his hands. ˙ The sultan al-Na¯sir Muhammad governed only de jure and had no authority.64 ˙ ˙ Following the rise of the new government, all the senior amirs who were part of Baydara¯’s coalition were executed. The Mansu¯rı¯ amirs Baha¯dur Raʾs Nawba and ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ al-Ha¯jib were decapitated and their bodies were burned. The ˙ ˙ fate of the other members of this group was even bitterer. They were in captivity for two weeks, during which they were tortured by Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, so that they would admit to their share in the murder of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l. Their arms and legs were then cut off and hung about their necks, while their body was crucified and nailed to wooden frames attached to camels’ backs. They were paraded throughout Cairo in that way, with Baydara¯’s head borne on a spear before them.65 It is possible that Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ was also among Baydara¯’s supporters. 62 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:171; Zubda, 297–298. 63 Zubda, 298–299; Tuhfa, 138; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:172. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ received also an amirate ˙ of one hundred. It seems that he had vast responsibilities as sa¯h˙ib diwa¯n al-insha¯’, that had ˙ Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 239– been in the hands of the chief dawa¯da¯r before Qala¯wu¯n’s reign˙ (see 242). Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ was in charge, inter alia, of issuing of all official documents and ˙ postal service). letters of the barı¯d (royal 64 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:172. According to Ibn al-Fura¯t, Kitbugha¯ was “in charge” (al-mutahaddith) of all matters. As for al-Malik al-Na¯sir Muhammad, “he had nothing but his regnal˙ name…” ˙The names of these amirs were as follows: Turunta¯y ˙ 65 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:173–174; Zubda, 299–300. ˙ ˙¯r, al-Sa¯qı¯, Alna¯q al-Sa¯qı¯ (or ʿI¯na¯q al-Silahda¯r), Nu¯gha¯y al-Silahda¯r, Aru¯s al-Husa¯mı¯ al-Silah da ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ¯ qsunqur al-Husa¯mı¯ (a mamluk of La¯jı¯n), and Muhammad Khawa¯ja, Altunbugha¯ al-Jamda¯r, A ˙ ˙ da¯r (Zubda, 299–300; Tuhfa, 138; ˙Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:187; Nuju¯m, 8:22; possibly Qushqara¯ al-Silah ˙ ˙ Kanz, 8:351).

86

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

According to some historians, when al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ heard about Baydara¯’s death he immediately moved to Kitbugha¯’s side.66 This assumption is plausible, considering al-Shuja¯ʿı¯’s rage at al-Ashraf Khalı¯l after his deposition from the governorship of Damascus. Ibn al-Salʿu¯s, al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s hated wazir, came back from Alexandria to Cairo after he was informed about the murder of the sultan. He returned to his home and stayed there, thanks to a mediation effort (shafa¯ʿa) made by al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s women. However, the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs decided that Ibn al-Salʿu¯s had to be ˙ punished for his behavior. They did not forget his arrogance toward them and how he created enmity between the amirs and the sultan, which in the end brought to his murder. Ibn al-Salʿu¯s was summoned to Cairo citadel. His property was confiscated by Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, and then he was tortured for several days, until his death, by the shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n, Badr al-Dı¯n Luʾluʾ alMasʿu¯dı¯.67

2.2.

The conflict between Kitbugha¯ and Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯

The new “Mansu¯rı¯ government” did not last for long before a new dispute ˙ surfaced and new coalitions were formed, thus causing further divisions amongst the Mansu¯riyya mamluks. The main power struggle occurred between the wazir ˙ Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, who demanded sole control over the sultanate, and Kitbugha¯, the viceroy. Al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ managed to attract to his side the amirs of the Burjiyya, the royal mamluks, and some of the kha¯ssakiyya, by material grants that he gave ˙˙ them. Al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ even declared that anyone who brought him the head of one of Kitbugha¯’s supporters would received the iqta¯ʿ of that amir. He secretly ordered ˙ the capture of Kitbugha¯ and several of his supporters, among them the Mansu¯rı¯s ˙ Qibjaq and ʿAbdalla¯h al-Silahda¯r. However, al-Shuja¯ʿı¯’s plan was disrupted due ˙ to the treachery of one of his confidants, who reported al-Shuja¯ʿı¯’s intentions to Kitbugha¯. Kitbugha¯ hastened to inform the other amirs about al-Shuja¯ʿı¯’s conspiracy, which enhanced their resentment of al-Shuja¯ʿı¯.68 Kitbugha¯ hurried to arrest Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯ in fear that they would support Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯. It seems that the Burjı¯s Mughulta¯y al-Masʿu¯dı¯, Aldukuz ˙ al-Silahda¯r and al-Luqma¯nı¯ were caught together with them. The arrested amirs ˙ were jailed in Alexandria and released when their innocence was proved.69 66 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:173; Kanz, 8:350. 67 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:175–177; Sulu¯k, 1:797–798. 68 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:179–180; Zubda, 301; Sulu¯k, 1:798–799; Nuju¯m, 8:42. The ethnic solidarity that lay behind this conflict is discussed in pp. 167–168 below. 69 It is hard to know for how long Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Burlughay were in jail together with other Burjı¯ amirs. The reports about their release are contradictory. According to Ibn Hajar ˙

Al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s first reign (693/1293–694/1294) ˙ ˙

87

Kitbugha¯ and his confidants hastened to the citadel where Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ was entrenched. The Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who were in Kitbugha¯’s faction were Aybak ˙ ¯ al-Mawsilı¯, Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj, A qsunqur Kirta¯y, Balaba¯n al-Husaynı¯, and, at least ˙ ˙ ˙ at a later stage, La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯, the ata¯bak. In addition, the Sa¯lih¯ı amirs Baysarı¯, ˙ ˙ Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯ and Baktu¯t al-ʿAla¯’ı¯, the Kuridsh wa¯fidiyya of the Shahra70 zu¯riyya headed by Yaʿqu¯ba¯ al-Shahrazu¯rı¯, “all the Tatars” (mamluks of Mongol origin and maybe wa¯fidiyya), the halqa commanders and soldiers, also inclined ˙ to Kitbugha¯. When al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ discovered that Kitbugha¯’s coalition was larger than his, he tried, unsuccessfully, to attract more amirs and halqa officers or ˙ soldiers to his side, again by offering money.71 It is hard to trace the motives behind this faction within the Mansu¯riyya and mamluk elite. It is clear, however, ˙ that in this conflict ethnic solidarity played a certain role. Ayalon’s view, according to which this conflict reflects a rivalry between the deprived elements in the army (Kitbugha¯’s coalition) and the more privileged ones (al-Shuja¯ʿı¯’s supporters), is also plausible.72 Kitbugha¯, at that stage, sent a message to the sultan al-Na¯sir Muhammad (who ˙ ˙ was in the citadel too), according to which Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ had acted by himself and according to his own ideas when he decided to arrest the amirs, hence, there was no choice but to summon him for investigation of his deeds. Al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ refused this demand. Kitbugha¯ besieged the citadel and cut off its water supply. Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ made the opening attack and, at first, had the upper hand. The Burjiyya attacked from the citadel and defeated Kitbugha¯’s force, which had to retreat to the area of Bilbays. However, when the Sa¯lih¯ıs Baysarı¯ and Bakta¯sh, as ˙ ˙ al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯ and al-Maqrı¯zı¯, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Burlughay were arrested by Sanjar alShuja¯ʿı¯ and released by La¯jı¯n (i. e., in his reign, between 696/1296–698/1299), see: Durar (Cairo), 2:36–37; Muqaffa¯, 2:535. On their release by La¯jı¯n, see also Manhal, 9:171; Ibn alFura¯t, 8:229; Sulu¯k, 1:826. On the other hand, Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ mentions that Baybars alJa¯shnakı¯r and Burlughay were released by Kitbugha¯ after Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯’s murder (Nuju¯m, 8:47). In another source, the same author mentions that Kitbugha¯ arrested Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r during the first’s reign, but he also released him and gave him an amirate of one hundred (Nuju¯m, 8:232). According to Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Burlughay were among the supporters of Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ and that was the reason for their arrest, together with other Burjı¯s (Kanz, 8:356). Similarly, al-ʿAynı¯ and Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ mention ˙ as having that the two Burjı¯ amirs were caught by Kitbugha¯ since they were wrongly suspected collaborated with Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ against Kitbugha¯ (ʿIqd, 3:235, 243; Zubda, 301). Since Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Burlughay are not mentioned among the amirs who were intended to be arrested by al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, it seems that they were captured by Kitbugha¯, who was afraid of their joining Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯. This suspicion was plausible, since some of the Burjiyya supported al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ in this conflict. 70 The Shahrazu¯riyya wa¯fidiyya originated in three thousand Kurds that arrived in Damascus in 656/1256, escaping from the Mongols, see: Ayalon, “Wafidiya”, 97; David Ayalon, “The Auxiliary Forces of the Mamluk Sultanate”, Der Islam 65 (1988), 22. 71 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:180; Zubda, 302; Sulu¯k, 1:800; Nuju¯m, 8:44. 72 Ayalon, “Wafidiya”, 97.

88

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

well as other amirs who belonged to Kitbugha¯’s coalition, heard about this, they immediately rode to the battlefield and managed to push the Burjiyya and the royal mamluks back to the citadel. At that point, the sultan appeared on one of the citadel’s towers. Kitbugha¯ and the amirs told him that they have no intention to revolt against him but only to maintain the right order and to remove corruption from the sultanate. Kitbugha¯ now besieged fiercely the citadel for seven days. During this time, al-Shuja¯ʿı¯’s supporters, including Baktamur al-Silahda¯r, ˙ Tughjı¯ al-Ashrafı¯ and some royal mamluks, gradually defected to Kitbugha¯’s side. ˙ At some point, the sultan’s mother appeared on the walls of the citadel and asked the amirs about the goal of their conflict. They replied that their whole desire was to capture Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ and to stop the violent conflict (fitna), on behalf of the sultan, who was the son of their master. The sultan’s mother, according to al-Maqrı¯zı¯, “was fooled by their words”, and together with La¯jı¯n alRu¯mı¯ locked one of the gates of the citadel (ba¯b al-qulla), a move that restricted al-Shuja¯ʿı¯’s movement in the citadel even more, and actually caused him to be isolated in his residence in the citadel. At that point, after more and more of his supporters left him and moved to Kitbugha¯’s side, al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ saw no choice but to give up. The amirs refused to give him ama¯n. While he was taken to his gaol in one of the citadel’s internal towers by the amirs Aqqu¯sh al-Mansu¯rı¯ and Simgha¯r, he ˙ ˙ was killed by these amirs or by one of their mamluks.73 Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯’s head was put on a spear and paraded in the streets of Cairo. The citizens beat him with their sandals, slapped him and cursed him, due to his evil exploitation and cruelty toward the people.74 After the conflict was ended, several means were taken in order to calm the political turbulence. The oaths of allegiance between the amirs and the sultan, and between the sultan and his viceroy Kitbugha¯, were restored. Kitbugha¯ gave material grants and iqta¯ʿs to the amirs in order to appease them. According to ˙ some of the sources, Kitbugha¯ also released several amirs that were arrested at the beginning of the conflict, such as the Burjı¯s Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Burlughay, 73 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:180–181; Zubda, 302; Sulu¯k, 1:799–802. There are several versions regarding the murderers of Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯. According to Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, it was the mamluks of ˙ the two amirs who lead al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ to his arrest (i. e. Aqqu¯sh al-Silah da¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ and ˙ Simgha¯r), who attacked and killed him (Zubda, 302). According to al-Nuwayrı ¯ and˙ Ibn al˙ ¯ t, it was a mamluk of Aqqu¯sh al-Mansu¯rı¯ who killed al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ (Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:182; Fura ˙ ¯zı¯ refer to Aqqu¯sh al-Mansu¯rı¯ himself as the Niha¯ya, 31:276). Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ and al-Maqrı murderer of al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ (Nuju¯m, 8:46; Sulu¯k, 2:78). Ibn al-Fura¯t mentions ˙another story, according to which Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ was brought to a consultation with the sultan. A reconcilaltion agreement was made, according to which al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ would stay in the citadel for a few days and later would be exiled to a fortress in Syria. However, when al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ left the sultan, Aqqu¯sh al-Mansu¯rı¯ killed him and put his head and arm in a bread bag. In that way, he ˙ managed to bring the head of al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ to the other amirs (Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:182). 74 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:183; Sulu¯k, 1:802.

Al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s first reign (693/1293–694/1294) ˙ ˙

89

and the Mongol Qibjaq and ʿAbdalla¯h al-Silahda¯r.75 On the other hand, Kitbugha¯ ˙ took care of “security arrangements” aimed to prevent another revolt. He arrested some of the amirs from the Burjiyya and the kha¯ssakiyya who were in ˙˙ Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯’s coalition and scattered the royal mamluks by moving them from the abra¯j and the tiba¯q of the citadel to different locations in Cairo, in order ˙ to prevent their gathering. Some of them were put in the kabsh palace, in da¯r alwiza¯ra, the Sa¯lih¯ı hippodrome and other places. Others were arrested or dis˙ ˙ tributed between the amirs.76 After the turbulent situation abated, La¯jı¯n and Qara¯sunqur came out from their hiding places, where they had stayed for about eight months since the murder of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l. According to Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, it seems that they ˙ were hiding in the citadel. Al-Safadı¯, on the other hand, states that they were ˙ hiding in Kitbugha¯’s home. It might be that the two amirs stayed in Kitbugha¯’s home after the conflict between Kitbugha¯ and Baydara¯ or just before their public appearance. Other hiding locations mentioned are the minaret of the Tulu¯nid ˙ mosque in Cairo and the house of the bureaucrat ʿAbdalla¯h Ghabriya¯l Ibn al77 Sanı¯ʿa. Kitbugha¯ took measures to raise the status of his two Mansu¯rı¯ khush˙ ˙ da¯shs. He managed to reconcile them and the other amirs, and even brought the Ashrafiyya to pardon the two murderers of their master.78 La¯jı¯n and Qara¯sunqur showed themselves in public at the sultan’s banquet in ʿI¯d al-Fitr 693/August ˙ 1294. The puppet sultan restored their ranks and formal positions and the other amirs gave them gifts, all according to Kitbugha¯’s orders. These efforts of Kitbugha¯ were soon to be revealed as a mistake.79

2.3.

The Ashrafiyya uprising

In Muharram 694/November 1294 a revolt of the Ashrafiyya mamluks broke out. ˙ The Ashrafiyya could not accept the situation in which La¯jı¯n, their master’s murderer, was pardoned and not killed. They also felt humiliated and deprived, especially after Kitbugha¯ split them up, dividing them among the amirs or arresting them. The Ashrafiyya mamluks who inhabited the kabsh palace, the hippodrome and other places, rode toward da¯r al-wiza¯ra and invited their khushda¯shs to join them but they refused. The rebels plundered the arms market (su¯q al-sila¯h), then broke into khiza¯nat al-bunu¯d jail,80 where their khushda¯shs ˙ 75 76 77 78 79 80

Nuju¯m, 8:47. See also n. 69 above. Zubda, 302–303; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:183, 191; Sulu¯k, 1:802; ʿIqd, 3:237–238. Zubda, 303; Aʿya¯n, 4:90–91; Wa¯fı¯, 24:215; al-Jazarı¯, 3:736. Nuju¯m, 8:48. Zubda, 303; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:184–185; Niha¯ya, 31:278; Sulu¯k, 1:803. Aʿya¯n, 4:167. Khiza¯nat al-bunu¯d (“the storehouse of banners”) was used as a store for banners and wea-

90

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

were imprisoned, and released them. The rebels also took over the sultan’s stable and burned one of Cairo’s gates. However, in the morning the revolt was suppressed by the ha¯jib Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj. More than three hundred Ashrafı¯ rebels ˙ ˙ were captured and were brought before Kitbugha¯. Many of them were severely tortured and killed by cutting off their heads, arms, legs, eyes or tongues, drowning or crucification. Others were exiled or distributed among the amirs. After this revolt Kitbugha¯ was determined to remove the puppet sultan and to take the throne himself, de facto and de jure.81

3.

Kitbugha¯’s reign (694/1294–696/1296)

During the first reign of al-Na¯sir Muhammad b. Qala¯wu¯n, which lasted for one ˙ ˙ year less three days, the sultan had no real authority. Though his name was mentioned in the Friday sermon (khutba) and on the coinage, the real power was ˙ in the hands of Kitbugha¯, the sultan’s viceroy. Kitbugha¯ was in charge of appointments and dismissals, the distribution of iqta¯ʿs, conferring amirates, etc. ˙ During this period, Kitbugha¯ planned his official appointment as sultan and strove to gain the support of the amirs to this end. La¯jı¯n also urged Kitbugha¯ to depose al-Na¯sir Muhammad and to take the throne for himself, in order to ˙ ˙ prevent violent disturbances against him by the Ashrafiyya. The Ashrafiyya uprising only strengthen this fear of Kitbugha¯’s. Hence, in Muharram 694/De˙ cember 1294, Kitbugha¯ agreed with the amirs to depose al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ from the sultanate “due to his young age” (he was about ten), and to declare himself sultan instead. The amirs who agreed on Kitbugha¯’s sultanate included ¯ qsunqur Kirta¯y, Kurt, Baktamur al-Silahda¯r the Mansu¯rı¯s Qibjaq, Qara¯sunqur, A ˙ ˙ and Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj, as well as the Sa¯lih¯ı Baysarı¯ and the Mongol wa¯fidı¯s Qun˙ ˙ ˙ ghur and his son Ja¯ru¯shı¯. Kitbugha¯ shut al-Na¯sir Muhammad away in a room in ˙ ˙ the citadel together with his mother and forbade him from riding or showing himself in public.82

pons during the early Fa¯timid period. Since 461/1068–9 and until al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third ˙ a prison for amirs and dignities, see: Khitat,˙2:188; ˙1:423–424; Carl reign (711/1311) it became ˙ ˙ of Jails in the Khitat”, F. Petry, “Al-Maqrı¯zı¯’s Discussion of Imprisonment and Description ˙ ˙ MSR 7, 2 (2003), 141. 81 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:191–192; Zubda, 304; Sulu¯k, 1:805–806; Nuju¯m, 8:49. 82 Niha¯ya, 31:282; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:192–193; Nuju¯m, 8:49–50; Sulu¯k, 1:806; Tuhfa, 144. ˙

Kitbugha¯’s reign (694/1294–696/1296)

3.1.

91

Kitbugha¯’s domestic policy

Appointments and promotions Upon his coronation, in Muharram 694/December 1294, Kitbugha¯ made a ban˙ quet for the amirs, in which he gave them robes of honour. On this occasion Kitbugha¯ made new appointments, most of them related to the administration and household. Among his khushda¯shs, he appointed La¯jı¯n as his viceroy, confirmed the positions of the ha¯jibs – his confidant Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj as the main ˙ ˙ ha¯jib, and the other two ha¯jibs Baktamur al-Silahda¯r and Kurt. Aybak al-Hamawı¯ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ al-Za¯hirı¯ was confirmed as the governor of Damascus and the Sa¯lih¯ı Aybak al˙ ˙ ˙ Afram was appointed as amı¯r janda¯r. Kitbugha¯ appointed Fakhr al-Dı¯n al-Khalı¯lı¯ al-Da¯rı¯ as wazir, and as his na¯zir al-dawa¯wı¯n (a financial administrator who ˙ assisted the wazir). Toward the end of his reign Kitbugha¯ dismissed Sunqur alAʿsar from the office of shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Damascus, replacing him with the amir Fath al-Dı¯n ʿUmar b. Muhammad b. Sabra. He also dismissed and arrested ˙ ˙ ˙ the Mansu¯rı¯ Asandamur Kurjı¯, wa¯lı¯ al-barr, in favor of ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Ibn al-Ja¯kı¯.83 ˙ Alongside the apoointments of Mansu¯rı¯, Za¯hirı¯ and Sa¯lih¯ı amirs, Kitbugha¯ strove ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ to promote his own mamluks. At his coronation he conferred amirates upon his favourite mamluks, four of whom are mentioned by name – Sayf al-Dı¯n Butkha¯s, ˙ Badr al-Dı¯n Baktu¯t al-Azraq, Sayf al-Dı¯n Ughurlu¯ and Sayf al-Dı¯n Qutlu¯bak. The ˙ 84 first one, Butkha¯s, was appointed ustada¯r. Ughurlu¯ was appointed governor of ˙ Damascus instead of Aybak al-Hamawı¯ toward the end of Kitbugha¯’s reign. ˙ Aybak was rebuked and his wealth confiscated but he received the iqta¯ʿ of ˙ Ughurlu¯.85 Kitbugha¯ arrested his khushda¯sh Aybak al-Khaznada¯r, the governor of Tripoli, but appointed another Mansu¯rı¯, Aybak al-Mawsilı¯, instead of him. The ˙ ˙ rest of the governors of the districts and fortresses, as it seems, remained in their 86 offices during Kitbugha¯’s reign. It seems that Kitbugha¯ tried, at least at the begining of his reign, to maneuver between his Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯shs, the Za¯hir˙ ˙ iyya, Sa¯lihiyya, civilian bureaucrats and his personal mamluks. During his reign, ˙ ˙ however, the position of his personal mamluks increased at the expense of the senior amirs, and in the end, their behavior brought about their master’s fall, as will be discussed below.87 Another wrong move by Kitbugha¯ that undermined his rule was the preference he gave to the Mongol Oirat wa¯fidiyya that arrived in Egypt in Rabı¯ʿ I 695/January 1296. At the head of this group was Taragha¯y, who was married to the daughter of ˙ 83 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:193–194, 216, 220; Sulu¯k, 1:818; Nuju¯m, 8:56, 62; al-Dhahabı¯, Ta’rı¯kh, 60:44. See on the office of na¯zir al-dawa¯wı¯n: Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 225–226. ˙ ¯ t, 8:195–196; Tuhfa, 144. 84 Zubda, 305; Ibn al-Fura ˙ 85 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 214; Zubda, 310. 86 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 194, 198–199. 87 See section 3.2 below and chapter three, section 1.3; Clifford, 160–162.

92

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

Manku¯tamur, a son of Hülegü. Taragha¯y and his Oirat followers, numbering ˙ about ten thousand or even eighteen thousand households, defected to the Mamluk Sultanate mainly as a result of disorders in the ¯Ilkha¯nate, purges carried out by the ¯Ilkha¯ns and Gha¯za¯n’s ascension to the throne. However, it could be, as explictly noted by Ibn Kathı¯r, that the Oirats decided to defect to the Mamluk sultanate also because they were informed that Kitbugha¯, who belonged to their ethnic group, had taken the throne. Kitbugha¯, indeed, received them with great pomp, and “totally inclined to them”.88 He sent several high-ranking amirs to receive the Oirats and to escort them from Syria to Egypt, including Sanjar alDawa¯da¯rı¯, Sunqur al-Aʿsar, Qara¯sunqur and Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj. Kitbugha¯ ex˙ aggerated with the honour he gave to the Oirats, who were, after all, non-Muslim “pagans”. He even conferred amirates of tablkha¯na¯h upon the notables among ˙ them. This attitude was severely criticized by contemporary Muslim historians.89 Kitbugha¯’s policy regarding natural disasters Kitbugha¯’s attitude toward the Oiratiyya caused the amirs to be revulsed by his rule. However, the populace also disliked Kitbugha¯. Unluckily for him, during Kitbugha¯’s reign a series of severe natural disasters afflicted Egypt and Syria. In 694/1294–5 the Nile level was very low and Egypt suffered from extreme drought. Prices increased drastically and many people died from hunger and thirst. In addition, a widespread epidemic broke out that took many victims. According to Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯’s testimony, in Fustat and Cairo about two thousand people ˙ died every day. The dead bodies were thrown into big pits since there was no one to wash and burry them.90 The situation did not improve during the second year of Kitbugha¯’s reign, either. The famine was relentless, food prices increased even more and many people died. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ testified that he was astonished ˙ by the death and disease in Cairo when he came back from Alexandria at the beginning of 695/November 1295. Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯ even described cases of cannibalism that he saw.91 The people of Egypt and Kitbugha¯ himself saw in these

88 Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:285. Cf. Nakamachi, 61. On the reasons for the Oirat defection, see also: J.A. Boyle, “Dynastic and Political History of the ¯Il-Kha¯ns”, in The Cambridge History of Iran, ed. J.A. Boyle (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968), vol. 5: The Saljuq and Mongol Periods, 381; Irwin, Middle East, 91; Nakamachi, 61. 89 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:204–205; Sulu¯k, 1:812; Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:285; Tuhfa, 146; Amitai, “Mamluks of ˙ that Kitbugha¯ should have Mongol Origin”, 130; Clifford, 161. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ notes promoted the Oirat slowly before their conversion.˙ The moment they became true and faithful Muslims, the qualified among them should have received amirates and iqta¯ʿs (Zubda, ˙ 310). 90 Zubda, 305–306; Tuhfa, 144–145; Nuju¯m, 8:57. ˙ 91 Zubda, 309; Kanz, 8:364.

Kitbugha¯’s reign (694/1294–696/1296)

93

disasters a sign of God’s displeasure. Thus, Kitbugha¯ is said to have wept each time he was informed about the low level of the Nile.92 Kitbugha¯, however, invested a lot of efforts in order to ease the suffering of the people of Egypt. In 694/1295 he ordered the distribution of food to the people of Cairo through the soldiers and the amirs. Similarly, in Alexandria, a port town whence many of the citizens of Cairo had fled, the wealthy supplied food for the needy. The amirs were responsible for this aid, it would appear, on Kitbugha¯’s orders. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ testifies that in that year he stayed in Alexandria and ˙ was in charge of the distribution of food to the needy, until provisions arrived from Sicily and Constantinople.93

3.2.

Kitbugha¯’s visit to Syria and the end of his reign

On 17 Shawwa¯l 695/18 August 1296 Kitbugha¯ left Cairo for a visit to Syria, that would last until the end of his reign, in the beginning of 696/November 1296. According to Ibn Abı¯ al-Fada¯ʾil, Kitbugha¯ went to Syria in order to dismiss Aybak ˙ al-Hamawı¯ from the governorship of Damascus and to appoint his mamluk ˙ Ughurlu¯ al-Zaynı¯ instead. He also intended to regulate the matters of the Oirat ¯ qsunqur Kirta¯y and his own son wa¯fidiyya. Kitbugha¯ appointed the Mansu¯rı¯ A ˙ 94 Anas as his deputies in Egypt. Two weeks after arrival, he prayed in the ˙ Umayyad Mosque of Damascus, and a month later he prayed there again. In October he left Damascus toward Homs for a big hunting expedition. He stayed in the valley beneath Hisn al-Akra¯d (Crac des Chevaliers), together with most of ˙ ˙ the army of Egypt and Syria, and the governors of Hama and Aleppo.95 On his way back to Cairo, however, the amirs revolted against him since they were afraid to be arrested by him upon arrival in Cairo. Their fear was due to a conspiracy by Kitbugha¯’s mamluks. They wrote letters to the Mongols in the name of Baysarı¯, the senior Sa¯lih¯ı amir, in which he allegedly asked for their collaboration. These ˙ ˙ letters were meant to cause the arrest of Baysarı¯, La¯jı¯n and the other senior amirs, and thus to strengthen the positions of Kitbugha¯’s mamluks. When the sultan was in Palestine, staying in al-ʿAwja¯ or in Laju¯n,96 he learned about the deeds 92 93 94 95 96

Aʿya¯n, 4:144; Wa¯fı¯, 24:319. Zubda, 305–306; Tuhfa, 145. Mufaddal (Blochet),˙ 14/3:592–593; Sulu¯k, 1:816. ˙ ˙ 8:61–62; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:213–214, 220; Zubda, 311. Nuju¯m, The sources are in disagreement regarding the location where the revolt against Kitbugha¯ took place, see: P.M. Holt, “The Sultanate of al-Mansu¯r La¯chı¯n 696–8/1296–9”, BSOAS 36 (1973)”, 525, n. 8. Alongside al-ʿAwja¯, i. e. the Yarkon˙ river in present-day Tel Aviv and its vicinity, it is also possible that the revolt occurred in Laju¯n, about thirty km south-east of Haifa, which was a station on the main road from Damascus to Cairo in the district of Safed, where the sultans used to encamp, see: M.A. Bakhit, “Ladjdju¯n”, EI2, 5:593–594.

94

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

attributed to Baysarı¯. He summoned Baysarı¯ and rebuked him. After La¯jı¯n informed Baysarı¯ about the reason for this rebuke, i. e. the conspiracy of Kitbugha¯’s mamluks, the amirs decided to depose Kitbugha¯. At the head of the usurpers were Baysarı¯ and the Mansu¯rı¯s La¯jı¯n, Qara¯sunqur, Qibjaq and Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj. At the ˙ ˙ end of Muharram 696/November 1296 they broke out in an armed revolt against ˙ Kitbugha¯ and his mamluks. They killed Kitbugha¯’s favourite mamluks Baktu¯t alAzraq and Butkha¯s al-Zaynı¯ and injured other mamluks, among them Tikla¯n al¯ dilı¯, whom La¯jı¯n˙ struck with his sword. However, Kitbugha¯ managed to flee ʿA from the dihlı¯z in Palestine to Damascus, accompanied by only five or six of his mamluks.97 Kitbugha¯ found asylum in Damascus, where his mamluk Ughurlu¯ has just been appointed as governor. Kitbugha¯ initiated moves in order to strengthen his position. The amirs, muqaddams and ajna¯d were gathered in the citadel of Damascus and their oath to Kitbugha¯ was taken by the qa¯d¯ıs. Kitbugha¯ also ˙ conferred amirates on some of his confidants. In order to weaken La¯jı¯n’s power, he ordered that the property found in La¯jı¯n’s and his confidants’ warehouses be confiscated. In order to gain the sympathy and support of the people of Damascus, Kitbugha¯ abolished some of the taxes.98 However, Kitbugha¯’s efforts to re-establish his position as sultan were all in vain. After La¯jı¯n was crowned as sultan in Cairo, he dispatched Sunqur al-Aʿsar to Damascus. Al-Aʿsar arrived in the city on 14 Safar 696/11 December 1296. He and ˙ Kujkun remained outside the city, from where they sent letters secretly to the amirs in the city, in which they were informed about the amirs of Egypt’s support for La¯jı¯n. Thus, they succeeded in transferring the allegiance of some of the Damascus amirs to the new sultan. Sunqur al-Aʿsar turned now to Qa¯ra¯ (between Homs and Damascus), in order 1) to gain the allegiance of another group of amirs that was camped there, 2) to guard the roads and 3) to prevent any reinforcements from the north coming to Kitbugha¯’s aid. Realizing that Kitbugha¯ had no chance against La¯jı¯n, the amirs in Damascus abandoned him one by one, until Kitbugha¯ had to give up. He declared that he would be obedient to the new sultan and under his authority, and was arrested in the citadel of Damascus by Ja¯gha¯n, La¯jı¯n’s mamluk.99 About three weeks later, it was agreed that Kitbugha¯ would be appointed over the fortress of Sarkhad. Before ˙ this appointment, however, Kitbugha¯ swore a firm oath to La¯jı¯n, in which he committed himself to obeying La¯jı¯n and to agreeing with him. In addition, Kitbugha¯ swore that he was satisfied with his appointment and that he would 97 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:221; Sulu¯k, 819–820; Zubda, 312; Tuhfa, 147–148. ˙ a common practice of sultans, meant to 98 Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:289; Nuju¯m, 8:64. Abolishing taxes was strengthen their rule, see Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 84–85, 297. 99 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:224–226; Sulu¯k, 1:823–825.

La¯jı¯n’s reign (696/1296–698/1299)

95

never collaborate against the sultan with anyone.100 On 19 Rabı¯ʿ I 696/15 January 1297 Kitbugha¯ made his way to Sarkhad, after the safety of himself, his family and ˙ his mamluks and relatives were guaranteed.101 Thus, rule moved to the hands of La¯jı¯n in a fairly calm and quiet way, in contrast to the former violent conflicts among the military elite of the Mamluk sultanate. It seems that Kitbugha¯ fell due to his policy of appointments. Despite his attempts to maneuver between the various factions, the position he gave to his mamluks was too high and he did not manage to restrain their greed. He also advanced the members of the Mongol wa¯fidiyya too rapidly. These moves were unprecedented in their intensity and extent and thus invoked strong opposition on the part of the amirs. In addition to his political conduct, the series of natural disasters that occurred in Egypt during his reign brought about severe demoralization among the populatce and hence contributed to his fall.

4.

La¯jı¯n’s reign (696/1296–698/1299)

4.1.

La¯jı¯n’s coronation

In the dihlı¯z at al-ʿAwja¯, Palestine, La¯jı¯n’s coronation as sultan had been agreed upon. About fifteen amirs headed the group that decided on La¯jı¯n’s coronation and made the accession-compact with him. Most of them were Mansu¯rı¯s (Qar˙ a¯sunqur, Qibjaq, Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj, La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯, Aybak al-Khaznada¯r, Aqqu¯sh ˙ al-Mawsilı¯ Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ, Sala¯r, Baktamur al-Silahda¯r and Kurt) and the rest ˙ ˙ were Ashrafı¯s (Tughjı¯, Kurjı¯, Tuqta¯y and Burluta¯y) and Sa¯lih¯ıs (Baysarı¯ and ˙ 102 ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯). Before the amirs agreed upon La¯jı¯n’s sultanate, however, they stipulated three demands: that La¯jı¯n remain primus inter pares, that he would not act contrary to their opinion, and that he would not prefer his own mamluks or grant them strong positions. Only after La¯jı¯n agreed to these demands, the amirs gave him their oath. In order to strengthen the validity of the pact, the amirs took a mutual oath or a sworn convenant to support the ruler personally (hilf) before they took ˙ the traditional Islamic and unilateral vow of allegiance to the ruler as sovereign (bayʿa). As pointed out by P.M. Holt, this “double oath” innovation constituted a precedent in Mamluk politics, aimed to compel the sultan to keep his promises. This new practice was derived from the problematic nature of Mamluk politics, in 100 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:228; Nuju¯m, 8:67. 101 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:229; Sulu¯k, 1:826; Zubda, 314. 102 Zubda, 313; Sulu¯k, 1:821–822. Another amir mentioned in this group was the Ru¯mı¯ wa¯fidı¯ Muba¯riz al-Dı¯n Sawwa¯r.

96

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

which the tension between the senior amirs and the young mamluks of the new sultan recurred again and again.103 La¯jı¯n made sure that his coronation would be accompanied by a series of ceremonies and symbolic practices. The reasons for that, it seems, are related to the problem of the legitimacy of Mamluk rule. The mamluks, after all, were slaves in origin, non-Muslim by birth and lacking in any aristocratical lineage.104 Already al-Ashraf Khalı¯l, despite being a Muslim by birth and a member of the Qala¯wu¯nid dynasty, took several measures to strengthen his legitimacy as a ruler. He ordered the Abbasid caliph al-Ha¯kim bi-Amr Alla¯h to mention in his sermon ˙ that he had appointed “al-Ashraf Khalı¯l the son of Qala¯wu¯n” as sultan. Al-Ashraf Khalı¯l also made sure that the caliph’s sermon would be in precisely the same formula as the sermon that was given at the coronation of the establisher of the Mamluk sultanate, al-Za¯hir Baybars. Thus, he tried to relate his rule to the young ˙ Mamluk political tradition, and to strengthen his legitimacy as a ruler by presenting his reign as the continuation of a familial, Mamluk-sultanic and Islamic tradition.105 La¯jı¯n, however, suffered from a more severe problem of legitimacy for his rule. He did not continue royal tradition and was not a free-born Muslim. It is possible that the short reign of Kitbugha¯ increased his need for stronger foundations of legitimacy for his rule. Given this background, his efforts to establish his rule are understandable. Upon his arrival in Gaza, La¯jı¯n made sure that his name would be mentioned in the Friday sermons of the main cities of southern Syria (Gaza, Jerusalem, Safed, Kerak and Nablus) and that drums would be beaten to announce the good news. He dispatched Sala¯r to Cairo via the barı¯d route in order to take the oaths of the amirs in Cairo citadel on his behalf, to safeguard the 103 Holt, “La¯jı¯n”, 526, 531–532; Holt, “The Structure”, 46–47; Holt, “The Position and Power of the Mamlu¯k Sultan”, BSOAS, 38 (1975), 241–242. The sources mention that even after these oaths, Qibjaq, La¯jı¯n’s close associate, worried that La¯jı¯n would act like Kitbugha¯ and give preference to his own mamluks, and especially Manku¯tamur, at the expense of the senior amirs. La¯jı¯n swore again that he would not break his promises to the amirs. Only then did the amirs swear again to La¯jı¯n, see: Sulu¯k, 1:822; Nuju¯m, 8:99; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:223; Zubda, 313. 104 See Anne F. Broadbridge, “Mamluk Legitimacy and the Mongols: The Reigns of Baybars and Qala¯wu¯n”, MSR 5 (2001), 93–94. 105 Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:267; al-Jazarı¯, 1:57. It should be stressed that the establishment of the Abbasid Caliphate in Egypt was from the beginning a purely syimbolic move that aimed to legitimate Mamluk rule, by presenting it as continuation of the Caliphate since the days of the Prophet. See, for instance, Stefan Heidemann, Das Aleppiner Kalifat (A.D. 1261): Vom Ende des Kalifates in Baghdad über Aleppo zu den Restaurationen in Kairo (Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994), 91–107; Jonathan P. Berkey, “Mamluk Religious Policy”, MSR 13, 2 (2009), 11–12; Donald P. Little, “Religion under the Mamluks”, The Muslim World 73 (1983), 172–173; P. M. Holt, “Some Observations on the ʿAbba¯sid Caliphate of Cairo”, BSOAS 47 (1984), 501–502; Irwin, Middle East, 43–44; Reuven Amitai-Preiss, “The Fall and Rise of the ʿAbba¯sid Caliphate”, JAOS 116, 3 (1996), 487; Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 56ff.

La¯jı¯n’s reign (696/1296–698/1299)

97

treasury, and to make sure that his name would be mentioned in the Friday sermons in Egypt. In order to gain the support of the people, La¯jı¯n, still in Gaza, ordered to renounce the remaining debts of the people of Egypt and Syria. Fortune had smiled on him, and with his ascendancy the epidemics and droughts passed away from Egypt. With La¯jı¯n’s arrival in Egypt, on 8 Safar 696/5 December ˙ 1296, he stayed outside Bilbays, where the amirs of Cairo attended him and gave him their oaths. In the next days he entered Cairo and sat on the throne of the sultan. After a few days, La¯jı¯n rode, according to the accepted custom, in the royal procession from the citadel to the sultanic hippodrome. La¯jı¯n released the Abbasid caliph al-Ha¯kim bi-Amr Alla¯h from his house arrest in the citadel and ˙ allowed him to dwell in the kabsh palace. He gave the caliph and his children gifts and money and allowed them to perform the hajj. By subjecting the caliph to his ˙ authority, La¯jı¯n utilized the caliph’s symbolic religious position to enhance the legitimacy of his rule. He swore the traditional Islamic allegiance to the caliph, crossed Cairo in precession with the caliph sitting by his side, and made sure that the caliph would preach the sermons in the central mosque.106 Thus, La¯jı¯n’s activities during the first days of his sultanate aimed to safeguard his rule and to legitimate it from religious, formal and pragmatic aspects. From the religious aspect, not only did he perform the Islamic bayʿa but he demonstrated his extreme honour for the caliph, who constituted a prime symbol of Islamic religion and political legitimacy. From the formal aspect, La¯jı¯n performed in Syria and Egypt the coronation ceremonies according to the customs that were known in the Seljuq and Ayyu¯bid sultanates. La¯jı¯n also made sure that his name would be mentioned in the Friday sermons as the new sultan. As for the pragmatic measures, La¯jı¯n renounced the debts of the people, who suffered severely during Kitbugha¯’s reign. The termination of the droughts and the epidemic coinciding with La¯jı¯n’s ascendancy to power caused the people to believe that God was pleased with the end of Kitbugha¯’s rule and the beginning of La¯jı¯n’s.107

4.2.

La¯jı¯n’s moves for establishing his rule

With La¯jı¯n’s ascendancy, he appointed his khushada¯shs to the highest positions and thus kept his promise to them. Qara¯sunqur, with whom La¯jı¯n hid after the murder of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l, was appointed as the sultan’s viceroy. Sala¯r, another confidant of La¯jı¯n, was appointed as ustada¯r. Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj returned to the ˙ office of the chief ha¯jib, alongside Kurt al-Ha¯jib and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram. Baktamur ˙ ˙ 106 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:223–224, 230; Zubda, 315; Sulu¯k, 1:822–823. 107 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:228.

98

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

al-Ju¯kanda¯r was appointed as amı¯r janda¯r. As for the wazirate, La¯jı¯n left Fakhr alDı¯n al-Khalı¯lı¯ in his office for a while, but after few months replaced him with Sunqur al-Aʿsar. Al-Aʿsar also held the office of shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Egypt and enjoyed a great deal of political power. Thus, in the first months of La¯jı¯n’s rule, the Mansu¯riyya occupied the highest positions in the sultanate.108 About two ˙ weeks after La¯jı¯n consolidated his rule in Egypt, he began a series of moves to safeguard his rule in Syria. The drums were beaten at the gates of the amirs’ houses, and the gates of Damascus were adorned. The qa¯d¯ıs took the oaths of the ˙ amirs and the army to La¯jı¯n. La¯jı¯n’s name was mentioned in the Friday sermons in the mosques of Damascus. La¯jı¯n deposed Ughurlu¯, the mamluk of Kitbugha¯, from the governorship of Damascus and appointed Qibjaq instead.109 La¯jı¯n hastened now to strengthen the positions of his other khushda¯shs. He conferred an amirate of tablkha¯na¯h in Cairo upon Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and an ˙ amirate in Damascus on Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯. Other amirs were released from jail and received amirates in Egypt, robes of honour and gifts.110 Alongside these appointments of his khushda¯shs, La¯jı¯n started to promote his own mamluks. He gave amirates of ten and of tablkha¯na¯h to several of his mamluks, of whom eight ˙ are mentioned by name: Manku¯tamur, Aydughdı¯ Shuqayr, Sayf al-Dı¯n Baydu¯, Sayf al-Dı¯n Ba¯lu¯j, Ja¯gha¯n, Baha¯dur al-Muʿizzı¯, Baha¯dur al-Ju¯kanda¯r and Aqqu¯sh al-Ru¯mı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯.111 About six months after his ascendancy, La¯jı¯n deposed ˙ Fath al-Dı¯n Sabra, the shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n of Damascus, and appointed his ˙ ˙ mamluk Ja¯gha¯n instead.112 La¯jı¯n thus conducted a sagacious policy during the first months of his reign, that was similar to that of his master Qala¯wu¯n. He made sure that his Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯shs would be satisified, on the one hand, while ˙ gradually promoting his own mamluks, on the other.113 La¯jı¯n’s demonstration of religious piety helped to strengthen the legitimacy of his rule. It seems that his religious activities and practices derived from a combination between sincere beliefs and political interests. La¯jı¯n endowed a huge amount of money, twenty thousand dinars, for the restoration of the Tulu¯nid ˙ mosque in Cairo and the establishment of religious activities in it.114 He was 108 Zubda, 313; Niha¯ya, 31:324–325; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:224, 231–232; Sulu¯k, 1:823; Nuju¯m, 8:100; alDhahabı¯, Ta’rı¯kh, 60:54; Aʿya¯n, 4:156, 1:562. 109 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:227–228; Nuju¯m, 8:67. 110 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:229; Sulu¯k, 1:826; Zubda, 314; Tuhfa, 149. According to other sources, the ˙ abovementioned amirs were released already by Kitbugha ¯ , see n. 69 above. 111 ʿIqd, 3:353. 112 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:231. 113 Irwin, Middle East, 70–71. 114 La¯jı¯n appointed the Sa¯lih¯ı amir Sanjar al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯ in charge of the restoration of the ˙ ˙ there religious activities such as lessons in Qur’an commentary mosque. Sanjar established (tafsı¯r), hadı¯th, Islamic law (fiqh) according to the four Sunni rites, and prayers. According ˙ to the sources, pure religious motives stood behind this initiative. La¯jı¯n had hidden in this

La¯jı¯n’s reign (696/1296–698/1299)

99

known for the outstanding honour that he gave to the ʿulama¯ʾ and he himself is described several times as a pious and Sufi-inclined Muslim.115 Interestingly enough, during his first year of reign La¯jı¯n strove to base the legitimacy of his rule also by demonstrating his respect for the descendants of al-Za¯hir Baybars, the ˙ “establisher” of the Mamluk sultanate. La¯jı¯n brought al-Za¯hir Baybars’ relatives ˙ back to Egypt from Constantinople, whence they were exiled six years before by al-Ashraf Khalı¯l. At La¯jı¯n’s request, the Byzantine emperor sent to him al-Za¯hir ˙ Baybars’ son, al-Malik al-Masʿu¯d Khidr, his mother, brothers and sisters, as well ˙ as the mother of another son of al-Za¯hir Baybars, the deceased Sülemish, with her ˙ son’s coffin. Khidr received a warm and honourable reception by La¯jı¯n, who also ˙ allowed him to perform the hajj and to dwell in Cairo.116 These moves of La¯jı¯n ˙ show an attitude that is discernable already in his coronation ceremonies, which aimed to present his rule as a continuation of an old Islamic heritage on the one hand, and of a young Mamluk sultanic tradition on the other.

4.3.

The turn in La¯jı¯n’s policy

La¯jı¯n’s calculated policy of not depriving his khushda¯shs or other senior amirs changed only about nine months after his rise to power. Toward the end of 696/ 1297 La¯jı¯n initiated an aggressive policy against the senior amirs, strongly contradicting his promises and comittments to them. In Dhu¯ al-Qaʿda 696/September 1297 La¯jı¯n arrested Qara¯sunqur together with other amirs. According to Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, the reason for this was slanders about Qara¯sunqur that were ˙ reported to La¯jı¯n by his mamluk, Manku¯tamur al-Husa¯mı¯, who wanted to inherit ˙ Qara¯sunqur’s office as the sultan’s viceroy. Qara¯sunqur’s property was conmosque after the murder of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l. He pledged to God that if he survived he would restore the mosque (Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:230; Sulu¯k, 1:827; Aʿya¯n, 4:167, 171; Wa¯fı¯, 24:385, 387; Manhal, 9:169). On the waqf deed of this mosque, see Amı¯n, 87, 135, 142, 146, 171, 191, 238, 246, 255, 260, 263, 283. 115 On La¯jı¯n’s honourable attitude toward the ʿulama¯’ and his close relationship with them see, for instance: Aʿya¯n, 4:165, 168; 170–171, 5:207; Niha¯ya, 31:359; Sulu¯k, 1:857; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:230; Little, “Al-Safadı¯ as Biographer”, 204–205. La¯jı¯n is mentioned several times as pious ˙ and devout (mutadayyin, dayyin) and a genuine believer (fı¯hı¯ diya¯na/dı¯n; Manhal, 9:173; Nuju¯m, 8:109; Aʿya¯n, 4:166); he is said to perform the five prayers on a regular basis and to give a lot of charity (Sulu¯k, 1:857; Sulu¯k, 1:830; Muqaffa¯, 2:533); he used to fast, especially in the months of Rajab and Shaʿba¯n. Even on his death day, in Rabı¯ʿ II, he is said to have been fasting. He is said to have refrained from wearing expensive and golden clothes and to have stayed awake at nights to pray (Sulu¯k, 1:830, 865). 116 Zubda, 315; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:230. It should be mentioned that already Qala¯wu¯n demonstrated his respectful trteatment of al-Za¯hir Baybars’ sons. It is plausible that political considerations of ruling legitimacy were ˙behind his policy as well, see: Kanz, 8:277; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 134–136.

100

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

fiscated and his confidants had their property confiscated as well and were severely tortured, as a result of which Qara¯sunqur’s personal secretary died. Immediately after La¯jı¯n arrested Qara¯sunqur, he appointed Manku¯tamur as his viceroy. The opposition to La¯jı¯n’s move by some of the senior amirs brought about their scattering to the northern districts of Egypt. The Mansu¯rı¯ Tughrı¯l al-I¯gha¯nı¯ ˙ ˙ was appointed governor of the Sharqiyya administrative district, and the Sa¯lih¯ıs ˙ ˙ Sunqur al-Massa¯h and Baysarı¯ al-Shamsı¯ were appointed over the Gharbiyya and ˙ 117 al-Jı¯za respectively. Soon after, La¯jı¯n deposed, arrested and confiscated the property of his wazir, the Mansu¯rı¯ Sunqur al-Aʿsar.118 About three months later, ˙ in Rabı¯ʿII 697/January 1298, La¯jı¯n arrested Baysarı¯, together with the Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj and the Za¯hirı¯s Aybak al-Hamawı¯ and Sunqursha¯h. Man˙ ˙ ˙ ku¯tamur stood behind these arrests, too, since he wanted to prevent any opposition to his appointment as viceroy. The arrest of the Sa¯lihı¯ Baysarı¯ was espe˙ cially infuriating, since this amir had stood at the head of Mamluk political and military events for almost forty years. Baysarı¯, however, remained in respectable house arrest until his death.119 In fact, in his imprisonment policy La¯jı¯n deposed senior amirs from different khushda¯shi groups, generational and ethnic groups. From among his khushda¯shs, the Mansu¯riyya, he removed Qara¯sunqur, Sunqur ˙ al-Aʿsar, Tughrı¯l al-I¯gha¯nı¯ and Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj; from among the Za¯hiriyya – ˙ ˙ ˙ Aybak al-Hamawı¯ and Sunqursha¯h and from the Sa¯lihiyya – Baysarı¯ and Sunqur ˙ ˙ ˙ al-Massa¯h. Of the sixteen amirs who supported him at his coronation, he deposed ˙ three – the Mansu¯rı¯s Qara¯sunqur and Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj and the Sa¯lih¯ı Baysarı¯. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Alongside the arrests of the amirs, La¯jı¯n continued with the promotion of his own mamluks. After he gave an amirate to eight of his mamluks and appointed Ja¯gha¯n as shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n of Damascus, in Muharram 698/October 1298 he ˙ appointed his mamluk La¯jı¯n al-Husa¯mı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ as wa¯lı¯ al-barr in ˙ ˙ 120 Damascus. His favourite mamluk Manku¯tamur, who was appointed as La¯jı¯n’s viceroy, accumulated more and more power. In fact, Manku¯tamur is said to be the sultan de facto, since he approved La¯jı¯n’s decrees. Manku¯tamur’s arrogant behavior aroused hatred among the amirs, which in the end brought about La¯jı¯n’s deposition.121

117 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:232; Sulu¯k, 1:829; Zubda, 315: See on al-Sharqiyya, al-Gharbiyya and al-Jı¯za, districts of the northern part of Egypt (al-wajh al-Bahrı¯) in: al-Qalqashandı¯ (Cairo), 4:66; ˙ Masa¯lik, 3:345. 118 Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:291; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:232–233. 119 Niha¯ya, 31:331–332; Sulu¯k, 1:833–835; Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:291; Sulu¯k, 1:836. 120 Al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:50. 121 Nuju¯m, 8:98; Zubda, 316, 323. See in depth about Manku¯tamur’s position in chapter three, section 1.3.

La¯jı¯n’s reign (696/1296–698/1299)

101

Alongside La¯jı¯n’s deposition of the amirs and promotion of his own mamluks, he strove to expel al-Na¯sir Muhammad b. Qala¯wu¯n, out of the fear that the ˙ ˙ youthful prince would manage to gain support that would pose a threat to his rule. With his glib tongue and the assistance of the ʿulama¯’, La¯jı¯n succeeded in reaching an agreement according to which al-Na¯sir Muhammad would leave ˙ ˙ Cairo for Kerak. La¯jı¯n explained this move with the excuse that he was concerned about al-Na¯sir Muhammad, hence it would be better if he, La¯jı¯n, would act as the ˙ ˙ deputy of the young sultan in Egypt and “keep the rule” for him until he was an adult. However, La¯jı¯n made al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s future rule conditional upon ˙ ˙ the promise to give him Damascus as an independent principality. In response, al-Na¯sir Muhammad demanded that La¯jı¯n swear to him that he would not kill ˙ ˙ him. After the two swore oaths to each other, Muhammad left for Kerak and ˙ arrived there in Rabı¯ʿ I 697/ December 1297. Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯, who was appointed governor of Kerak in the same year, obeyed al-Na¯sir Muhammad and ˙ ˙ placed himself completely under his authority.122 La¯jı¯n now turned to building an economic-political infrastructure that would enable his rule to last for a long time. Under the supervision of Manku¯tamur, a new cadastral survey of lands and their yields was undertaken, resulting in a redistribution of the iqta¯ʿs. The rawk al-Husa¯mı¯, as it is called, aimed to increase ˙ ˙ the sultan’s revenues and power at the expense of the halqa and the amirs. Egypt ˙ was divided into twenty-four portions (qira¯t), four of which were to be assigned ˙ to the sultan’s personal treasury, ten to both the amirs and the troopers (ajna¯d) of the halqa, one qira¯t to satisfy the complainants, and the nine remaining qira¯ts ˙ ˙ ˙ were to be conferred as iqta¯ʿs upon new troops, that were intended to be the ˙ sultan’s new power base. In other words, La¯jı¯n planned to create a new loyal army at the expense of the amirs and the old guard halqa troops. It might be, as Robert ˙ Irwin suggests, that La¯jı¯n’s intention was to recruit new halqa troops from among ˙ his supporters. Indeed, as a result of the rawk al-Husa¯mı¯ the shares of the amirs ˙ and the old halqa troops drastically declined, whereas the sultan’s share re˙ mained unchanged. The rawk, hence, caused the amirs and the halqa to resent ˙ the sultan, and especially his viceroy Manku¯tamur, very strongly. In any case, the rawk failed to yield any fruitful results for the sultan and his deputy. It was completed hastily in less than eight months, from Juma¯da¯ I 697/March 1298 to Dhu¯ al-Hijja 697/October 1298. Since La¯jı¯n urged the rawk staff to bring it to a ˙ rapid conclusion, only a part of the land was surveyed. This contributed to the rebellion of the halqa troops, who could not even cover their expenses from their ˙ new small iqta¯ʿ. In the long run, the rawk al-Husa¯mı¯ brought about a severe ˙ ˙ deterioration of the halqa since the amirs took over all nine qira¯ts that were ˙ ˙ 122 Zubda, 314; Sulu¯k, 1:832–833.

102

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

assigned to them and the halqa.123 The sources place the blame for the rawk fiasco ˙ on Manku¯tamur. Al-Maqrı¯zı¯, for example, mentions that when La¯jı¯n noticed the great bitterness of the amirs, he wanted to increase their iqta¯ʿs but Manku¯tamur ˙ prevented him from doing so by convincing him that this move would only weaken his position. Moreover, Manku¯tamur beat, imprisoned and threathened the ajna¯d and amirs who dared to complain. Hence, as al-Maqrı¯zı¯ concludes, the rawk was the main reason for the fall of La¯jı¯n’s reign.124

4.4.

The expedition against the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia

In 697/1298 a Mamluk force was dispatched to attack the Armenian fortresses of Cilicia (bila¯d Sı¯s). According to some Arabic sources, it was the internal conflicts among the Mongol rulers that caused the Mamluks to set out on this expedition. The Mamluks’ assumption was that as long as the Mongols were occupied with their own problems, they would not give any military aid to the Armenians. According to Armenian sources, quarrels between the sons of the Armenian king brought about the Mamluk attack.125 According to Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ and other ˙ Arabic sources, Manku¯tamur stood behind this expedition, since he wished to distance the amirs from Cairo.126 Most of the amirs of this expedition belonged to the Mansu¯riyya. Except for the ˙ Sa¯lih¯ı Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯, who was the leader of the expedition, the forces that were ˙ ˙ ¯ qsunqur dispatched from Egypt were headed by the Mansu¯rı¯s La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯, A ˙ 127 Kirta¯y, Baktamur al-Silahda¯r, Bu¯zla¯r and Sayf al-Dı¯n ʿIza¯z al-Tatarı¯. The Egyp˙ tian army arrived in Damascus on 5 Juma¯da¯ II 697/20 March 1298. It was joined by the Syrian armies. The army of Damascus was headed by Qibjaq and the Sa¯lih¯ı ˙ ¯ s˙ and Baybars al-ʿAjamı¯ al-Ja¯liq, as well as the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs Kujkun, Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ Qara¯rsala¯n. The armies of the Syrian districts of Safed, Homs, the coastal fortresses, Tripoli and Hama joined too. When these armies arrived at Aleppo they were joined by the army of that district, headed by Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯. Another force ˙

123 Rabie, 52–53; Holt, “La¯jı¯n”, 527–529; Clifford, 164–165; Irwin, Middle East, 93–94; H. Halm, “Rawk”, EI2, 8:468; Sulu¯k, 1:841–846; Ayalon, “Studies II”, 451; A. N. Poliak, Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and the Lebanon, 1250–1900 (London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1939), 23–25. 124 Sulu¯k, 1:845–846. 125 ʿIqd, 3:386; Sulu¯k, 1:837; Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 106–107. 126 Zubda, 316; Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 107–108; Holt, “La¯jı¯n”, 527. 127 ʿIza¯z was among the mamluks of al-Sa¯lih ʿAlı¯ b. Qala¯wu¯n and a khushda¯sh of Sala¯r (Zubda, ˙ 318; Tuhfa, 150–151). Unlike Sala¯r,˙ however, it is not clear whether he had ever been a ˙ mamluk of Qala¯wu¯n.

La¯jı¯n’s reign (696/1296–698/1299)

103

that was sent from Egypt was headed by the Sa¯lih¯ı Sanjar al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯. The com˙ ˙ bined forces of the Mamluk army made their way to Cilicia.128 During the expedition a dispute broke out between the two Sa¯lih¯ı ˙ ˙ commanders. Whereas Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯ intended to besiege the fortresses until they were completely taken, Sanjar al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯ opposed him and saw fit only to raid the region. Sanjar al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯’s opinion won and the forces planned to return to Cairo after a short raid. However, after Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ informed ˙ La¯jı¯n about the dispute, the sultan condemned Sanjar al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯’s rejection of Bakta¯sh’s strategy and ordered the armies to capture Tall Hamdu¯n fortress, ˙ otherwise they should not return to Egypt, and they would lose their iqta¯ʿs there. ˙ At first, a force headed by Kujkun and Qara¯rsala¯n was defeated, after they were ambushed by the Armenians in Aya¯s. However, soon after, in Ramada¯n 697/June ˙ 1298 the fortress of Tall Hamdu¯n fell to the mamluks without any fight, since the ˙ Armenians within fled to the neighboring fortress of Nujayma or Hamu¯s ˙ ˙ (Humays).129 This fortress (Nujayma/Hamu¯s) was taken by the command of ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ¯ qsunqur Kirta¯y, Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯, not least due to the bravery of the Mansu¯rı¯ A ˙ who crawled to the fortress’ walls, dug beneath it and took out its stones. After the capture of this fortress, eleven other Armenian strongholds were given to the Mamluks. The Mansu¯rı¯ Asandamur Kurjı¯, one of the amirs in Damascus, re˙ ceived the command over these fortresses. However, not long after, when the Mongols arrived close to this area, for the battle of Wa¯dı¯ al-Khaznada¯r (see below), Asandamur hastened to flee from these fortresses. Hence, all the fortresses that were conquered during this expedition returned to the Armenians about two years later.130

4.5.

The desertion of Qibjaq and the amirs to the ¯Ilkha¯nate

At the beginning of 698/October 1298 La¯jı¯n’s policy against the senior amirs escalated, due to the influence of his viceroy Manku¯tamur. Manku¯tamur urged La¯jı¯n to arrest some of the amirs who commanded the expedition to Cilicia, in order to remove any opposition to his policy. La¯jı¯n acted according to his viceroy’s will. He sent his khushda¯sh and confidant Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, his mamluk 128 Niha¯ya, 31:337; Zubda, 316–317; Sulu¯k, 1:838. 129 Stewart suggests that the fortress of Nujayma that is mentioned by al-Nuwayrı¯ and alMaqrı¯zı¯ refers to the fortress of Hamu¯s or Humays, as mentioned by other Muslim his˙ ˙ ˙ 118–120. ˙ torians, see: Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 130 Abu¯ al-Fida¯’, who participated in this expedition, described the events as an eye witness, see: ˙ a¯’, 4:35–36. See also: Niha¯ya, 31:339–343; Sulu¯k, 1:836–840. For in-depth desAbu¯ al-Fid ˙ analysis of this expedition, see Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 106–128; Raphael, cription and 114–115.

104

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

Aydughdı¯ Shuqayr and an amir named Hamda¯n b. Salgha¯y to Syria, in order to ˙ ˙ arrest Baktamur al-Silahda¯r and Bu¯zla¯r (Mansu¯rı¯s), Albakı¯ (Za¯hirı¯, the governor ˙ ˙ ˙ of Safed), Tuqta¯y (Ashrafı¯) and ʿI¯za¯z al-Tatarı¯ (a mamluk of al-Sa¯lih ʿAlı¯ b. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Qala¯wu¯n). In addition, La¯jı¯n’s envoys ordered to move Qibjaq and his army from Damascus to Aleppo, with the excuse that the Mongols intend to penetrate Syria. In fact, La¯jı¯n’s real intention was to appoint his mamluk Ja¯gha¯n over Damascus instead of Qibjaq.131 La¯jı¯n’s envoys urged the governor of Aleppo, Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯, to arrest ˙ the aforementioned amirs. However, when al-Tabba¯khı¯ discovered that he ˙ himself was going to be removed from his office for La¯jı¯n’s mamluk Aydughdı¯ Shuqayr, he secretly informed the amirs about the intention to imprison them. Similarly, Baktamur al-Silahda¯r realized that his appointment over Tripoli was ˙ no more than a bait to capture him and he acted with necessary caution. The other amirs conducted themselves very carefully as well and managed to evade capture. The only amir who did not manage to escape was Tuqta¯y, who was ˙ ˙ poisoned by La¯jı¯n’s envoys. The amirs escaped to Homs, where they met with Qibjaq, who revealed too that his move from Damscus was a trick meant to depose him from the governorship of the city. The persecuted amirs now planned to defect together to the Mongol ¯Ilkha¯n Gha¯za¯n and find asylum in his territories.132 Still, in Homs, Qibjaq made efforts to make his defection unnecessary. He sent La¯jı¯n a request for ama¯n for the amirs, but La¯jı¯n delayed his answer. Then Qibjaq sent an envoy to Ja¯gha¯n in Damascus, asking him to bring property and robes of honour to the amirs in order to appease them. Ja¯gha¯n refused and threatened Qibjaq that if he would not arrest the amirs, he himself would be imprisoned together with them. When the army of Damascus learned that Qibjaq acted in opposition to the sultan’s orders, they deserted him and returned from Homs to Damascus. Qibjaq remained with very few people and little money, whereas the army of Aleppo was approaching. He and the persecuted amirs, hence, had no choice but to defect to the Mongol ¯Ilkha¯nate. On 8 Rabı¯ʿ II 698/13 January 1299 Qibjaq left Homs together with Baktamur al-Silahda¯r, Albakı¯, Bu¯zla¯r, ʿIza¯z al˙ Tatarı¯ and, according to some sources, another amir named Bingha¯r or Tibgha¯z. About five hundred (according to Arabic sources) or three hundred (according to Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n) horsemen joined them. They made their way to the Euphrates, declaring that they were moving toward Salamiyya, south of Hama.133 When Qibjaq already started his flight toward the Mongols, he received the news of the 131 Niha¯ya, 31:351; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:3. 132 Niha¯ya, 31:351–354; Zubda, 317; Sulu¯k, 1:849, 852–854; al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:52–53; Zetterstéen, 47. 133 Zetterstéen, 47–48; al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:53; Niha¯ya, 31:354; Sulu¯k, 1:871; Zubda, 329; ʿIqd, 3:471; Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n, 3:643. One of the defectors, ʿIza¯z al-Tatarı¯ or Bu¯zla¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯, died in Sinja¯r ˙ during the flight.

La¯jı¯n’s reign (696/1296–698/1299)

105

murder of La¯jı¯n and Manku¯tamur. Qibjaq, however, suspected that this news was fabricated and meant to trap him, so he continued on his way to Gha¯za¯n. When La¯jı¯n’s confidants Kujkun and Aydughdı¯ Shuqayr arrived at the Euphrates, they learned that Qibjaq and the amirs had already crossed the river.134 Qibjaq and the amirs who defected with him met the commander of the Mongol army in Ma¯rdı¯n. They went with him to Gha¯za¯n’s residence in sawa¯d Kufa in southern Iraq. Gha¯za¯n accepted Qibjaq and the amirs very warmly and made celebrations for them lasted for several days. Qibjaq received Hamadha¯n and its districts as iqta¯ʿ in addition to a lot of money that was given to him and ˙ Baktamur al-Silahda¯r. Qibjaq, as said, wept from sorrow and regret at leaving the ˙ sultanate, but on the other hand he was very happy to meet his family and relatives in his new place.135 One may receive the impression that Qibjaq defected only after he had no other choice. Even the pro-Mongol Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n mentions that when Qibjaq and the amirs heard about La¯jı¯n’s death they regretted their hasty leaving of Syria. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ and Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n also mention that several of the defecting ˙ amirs even tried to make their way back to the sultanate. Some of them, including Bu¯zla¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯, were killed during this attempt and others were caught by the ˙ Mongols. When Qibjaq and the amirs returned to the sultanate, they explained their defection by their ( justified) fear of La¯jı¯n’s persecution of the amirs; this excuse seems to have been accepted by the Mamluk leadership. From all these we may get the impression that a kind of “Mamluk solidarity” had already developed by this time, even if one had gone over to the Mongol enemy.136

134 Some of the sources mention that news about La¯jı¯n’s murder reached Qibjaq when he was in Raʾs al-ʿAyn, before he crossed the Euphrates (Niha¯ya, 31:354–356; Zetterstéen, 48–49; Sulu¯k, 1:855; al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:53–55). According to Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, Qibjaq received the news about La¯jı¯n from his khushda¯sh Qara¯rsala¯n, when Qibjaq was˙ close to the Euphrates. This was after Qara¯rsala¯n managed to capture Ja¯gha¯n (the governor of Damascus on behalf of La¯jı¯n) and sent an envoy to Qibjaq to inform him of the news. Qibjaq did not believe him (Zubda, 317). Al-Safadı¯ mentions that the news reached Qibjaq “two or three days” after he left Damascus. He˙ did not believe the messanger and even wanted to kill him (Aʿya¯n, 4:68). According to other versions, the news reached Qibjaq when he was already in the ¯Ilkha¯nate (Nuju¯m, 8:98; Sulu¯k, 1:871). 135 Sulu¯k, 1:871; Nuju¯m, 8:97–98. 136 Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n, 3:643; Zubda, 329; ʿIqd, 3:471; Nuju¯m, 8:129–130; Reuven Amitai, “The Mongol Occupation of Damascus in 1300: A Study of Mamluk Loyalties”, in The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society, eds. Amalia Levanoni and Michael Winter (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 23.

106 4.6.

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

La¯jı¯n’s murder

Manku¯tamur’s condescending behavior directly caused his and La¯jı¯n’s murder. He did not only create havoc between La¯jı¯n and his Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯shs (Qibjaq, ˙ Baktamur al-Silahda¯r, Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯) and the other senior amirs who had ˙ ˙ to escape to the Mongols, but was obsessively occupied with exiling or arresting amirs. An amir named Tamurbugha¯, for instance, was exiled by Manku¯tamur to Kerak and then to Tripoli, where he found his death. Even Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, ˙ who tried to stay out of political conflicts, testified that he was among the amirs who were exiled by Manku¯tamur, probably to Ashmu¯n in Upper Egypt.137 However, Manku¯tamur’s behavior toward some amirs was the trigger for his bitter end. Manku¯tamur was not pleased with the high position of the Ashrafı¯ amir Kurjı¯, who was one of La¯jı¯n’s strongest supporters and muqaddam almama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya. Hence, Manku¯tamur convinced La¯jı¯n to exile Kurjı¯ to the ˙ recently conquered Cilicia fortresses. Though Kurjı¯ managed to avoid this fate, he greatly resented Manku¯tamur. At the same time, the powerful amir Tughjı¯ de˙ veloped a strong grudge toward Manku¯tamur, because Manku¯tamur severely rebuked Tughjı¯’s relative, a kha¯ssakı¯ amir named Tugha¯y (or Tuqta¯y). As a result, ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙˙ these three amirs, Kurjı¯, Tughjı¯ and Tugha¯y, realized that the only way to stop ˙ ˙ Manku¯tamur’s increasing tyranny was by killing him. The amirs also realized that in order to do so they had to kill La¯jı¯n first.138 La¯jı¯n was murdered in the night of 10 Rabı¯ʿ II 698/15 January 1299. The sources describe this murder in depth, according to eye witnesses. According to this description, La¯jı¯n was struck by the swords of his silahda¯r Nu¯gha¯y, Kurjı¯ and ˙ others, until he became a “lump of flesh”.139 Immediately after that, Kurjı¯ and Tughjı¯ hastened to the house of the governor in the citadel in order to kill ˙ Manku¯tamur. Manku¯tamur requested from Tughjı¯ protection for his life, and the ˙ former accepted this and swore to him. Manku¯tamur then went out and the two amirs took him to the pit jail (al-jubb) in the citadel. However, Kurjı¯ utilized a short absence of Tughjı¯ to execute Mnaku¯timur and some of his confidants.140 ˙

137 Niha¯ya, 31:358; Tuhfa, 155. ˙ ¯ ya, 31:358. According to al-Maqrı¯zı¯, Manku¯tamur suggested the sultan 138 Zubda, 323–324; Niha exile Tughjı¯ (and not Kurjı¯) to Tripoli. Tughjı¯ managed to avoid this, with the help of Kurjı¯ ˙ ˙ and Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. However, Manku ¯ tamur was very angry because of that, and refused to fill his office until Tughjı¯ was exiled from Egypt and Kurjı¯ was arrested or exiled as ˙ well (Sulu¯k, 1:856). 139 Al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:56–57 (tr. 1:114); Sulu¯k, 1:857; Kanz, 8:378. 140 Aʿya¯n, 4:168; al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:57–58 (tr. 1:114–115); Zubda, 324.

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s second reign ˙ ˙ ˙

107

5.

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s ˙ ˙ ˙ second reign (698/1299–708/1309)

5.1.

The second coronation of al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙

The decision to crown al-Na¯sir Muhammad b. Qala¯wu¯n for a second time was ˙ ˙ taken already during the night of La¯jı¯n’s murder. It was also agreed that Tughjı¯ ˙ would be the sultan’s viceroy. Except for Tughjı¯ and Kurjı¯, all the amirs who ˙ decided on the coronation were Mansu¯rı¯s. They included Aybak al-Khaznada¯r, ˙ Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, Sala¯r, La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯, Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, Badr al-Dı¯n ʿAbdalla¯h al-Silahda¯r and Kurt al-Ha¯jib.141 However, the peaceful atmosphere of the ˙ ˙ change in government did not last for long. The Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who had just ˙ sworn allegiance to the new viceroy Tughjı¯ hastened to inform the amirs who ˙ ¯ qsunqur returned from Cilicia (headed by Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯ and the Mansu¯rı¯s A ˙ Kirta¯y and Sunqursha¯h) about La¯jı¯n’s and Manku¯tamur’s murder. All these amirs secretly agreed upon the murder of Tughjı¯ and Kurjı¯. Their revulsion ˙ increased even more after Tughjı¯ declared his intention to become the sultan de ˙ jure and to appoint Kurjı¯ as his viceroy. In addition, Tughjı¯ behaved arrogantly ˙ when he refused to receive the amirs who returned from the victorious expedition in Cilicia. When he finally received them, they immediately killed him. Soon after Kurjı¯ was also killed, after he escaped outside Cairo together with his supporters among the royal mamluks and the Ashrafiyya. The third murderer of La¯jı¯n, Nu¯gha¯y al-Silahda¯r, was also killed.142 ˙ The final defeat of La¯jı¯n’s murderers’ faction brought about a relatively peaceful situation in Mamluk politics. Now, there were eight amirs, “all of them Mansu¯rı¯s”, as the historians stress, who stood at the head of the Mamluk sul˙ tanate. These were Sala¯r, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, Kurt, Aybak al-Khaznada¯r, Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯, Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r, and ʿAbdalla¯h al-Silahda¯r. ˙ Most of these amirs were released from jail after La¯jı¯n’s murder.143Al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad was summoned to Cairo, but the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs had no intention of ˙ ˙ giving the boy sultan any real authority. The rule de facto was in the hands of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r. Al-Maqrı¯zı¯ describes the situation clearly: “They [Baybars and Sala¯r] used to make him [al-Na¯sir Muhammad] sit down on ˙ ˙ Mondays and Thursdays while the senior amirs and the high officials were attending. The viceroy, amir Sala¯r, and the ustada¯r Baybars [al-Ja¯shnakı¯r] used to stand [next to him]. Sala¯r presented to him [al-Na¯sir Muhammad] whatever he ˙ ˙ wanted, consulted about it with the amirs and said: ‘the sultan ordered so and so’ 141 Zubda, 324; Sulu¯k, 1:865. 142 Zubda, 325; Kanz, 8:381–382; Niha¯ya, 31:363–366; Nuju¯m, 104–105; Sulu¯k, 1:868. 143 Al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:59; Zetterstéen, 52; Niha¯ya, 31:367; Nuju¯m, 8:105.

108

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

and he [al-Na¯sir Muhammad] signed it. Then everyone went out and Sala¯r and ˙ ˙ Baybars ran all the matters of the sultanate, and agreed upon a small amount of money for the sultan”.144

5.2.

The joint rule of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r

During the ten years of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s nominal second reign, occasional ˙ ˙ changes in high offices took place. However, these offices were occupied almost exclusively by the Mansu¯riyya, as detailed in appendix 3. As mentioned above, ˙ Sala¯r the na¯ʾib al-saltana (viceroy) and Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r the ustada¯r were the ˙ rulers de facto of the Mamluk sultanate. In addition, La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯ the ata¯bak alʿasa¯kir, Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r the amı¯r janda¯r and Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯ the ha¯jib ˙ held the most of the effective political power. During the ten years of their joint rule, Sala¯r and Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r tried to divide authority between themselves equally and to manouevre between their own wishes and the demands of their supporters. The two amirs made a serious effort to refrain from any severe conflict between them, since they knew that it might bring about the end of their rule or life. The young sultan, al-Na¯sir Muhammad b. Qala¯wu¯n, tried whenever ˙ ˙ he could to create enmity between the two Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, in order to take the ˙ actual rule away from them.145 However, the supporters of Baybars and Sala¯r did not refrain from inciting each amir against the other, either. From the very beginning of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r’s joint rule, clear coalitions were formed around each one of them. The amirs of the Burjiyya gathered around Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r whereas the rest of the Mansu¯riyya and the ˙ diminishing group of the Sa¯lihiyya senior amirs gathered around Sala¯r.146 Each of ˙ ˙ the two rulers promoted amirs who were connected to him. Sala¯r gave amirates to his friend Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯, his biological brothers, his son-in-law, and the son of his master Mu¯sa¯ b. ʿAlı¯ b. Qala¯wu¯n. Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r promoted his Burjı¯ confidants Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯, Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h and Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯ by ˙ ˙ granting them high-ranking amirates. Other Mansu¯rı¯s who were promoted were ˙ Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯ and Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r.147 During this period, however, the power of the Burjiyya became more prominent. Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r managed the matters of this group and conferred amirates upon more and more members of this group. Sala¯r tried as well to promote his supporters, but the Burjiyya were bigger and stronger. Between the 144 145 146 147

Sulu¯k, 1:879. Nuju¯m, 8:221, 222. Sulu¯k, 1:869. Sulu¯k, 1:873–874. See on these promotions in chapter three, section 2.3.

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s second reign ˙ ˙ ˙

109

two coalitions, as al-Maqrı¯zı¯ notes, a strong rivalry and jelousy had developed, in which “whenever Baybars gave an amirate to someone from the Burjiyya, the confidants of Sala¯r requested from him to give an amirate to one of them”.148 The internal Mansu¯rı¯ conflicts did not include only the coalitions of Sala¯r and ˙ Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, but also the Mongolian group that supported Kitbugha¯. In the beginning of 699/September 1299, when the sultan and the army left for Syria as Gha¯za¯n approached, an attempt to murder both Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r was made by the Mongol Oirat wa¯fidiyya. The Oirats were angry at the killing of some of their amirs during La¯jı¯n’s reign, at Kitbugha¯’s deposition and his exile to Sarkhad, and at the strong position of the Burjiyya. In order to kill the ˙ two de facto rulers and to restore Kitbugha¯ as sultan, they conspired with Burluta¯y, one of the amirs of the royal mamluks, probably of Ashrafı¯ origin.149 ˙ Similarly to La¯jı¯n’s usurpation, the attempt to assasinate Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r was made in Palestine, this time in the region of Tall al-ʿAju¯l, near Gaza. This attempt, however, did not succeed. When it was found out that the conspirators were Oirats and some of the royal mamluks headed by Burluta¯y, the ˙ latter was killed immediately and about fifty Oirats were executed by strangling.150 The incidence, however, did not bring about unity among the ruling amirs. On the contrary, it only worsened the tension between the supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and those of Sala¯r, since the Burjiyya accused Sala¯r of collaboration with the royal mamluks. Sala¯r, however, decided to act in a more peaceful manner with Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, and the two leaders agreed to imprison the royal mamluks who collaborated with the Oirats in Kerak.151 The conflicts between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r broke out again in 704/ 1304–5. Sala¯r managed to depose Muhammad b. al-Shaykhı¯ (Dhubya¯n), one of ˙ Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s confidants, from the wazirate and to appoint one of his own supporters, Muhammad b. ʿAta¯ya¯ instead.152 This incident would have its ˙ ˙ own implications for the conflicts yet to come between the two rulers. In 706/1306–7 the two de facto Mansu¯rı¯ rulers were dragged again into a ˙ conflict that was especially severe. The reason for this conflict was a dispute that broke out between two amirs who were among their associates. On the one side was Sanjar al-Barwa¯nı¯, who was among the khawa¯ss of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, and ˙˙ on the other side was Sayf al-Dı¯n al-Tashla¯qı¯, who was a khushda¯sh of Sala¯r, a ˙ mamluk of al-Sa¯lih ʿAlı¯ b. Qala¯wu¯n. Al-Barwa¯nı¯ complained about al-Tashla¯qı¯ to ˙ ˙ ˙ Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, and talked rudely to Baybars. As a result, a violent conflict broke out between these two amirs in which they almost killed each other. Al148 149 150 151 152

Sulu¯k, 1:875–876. Zubda, 330; Sulu¯k, 1:883. Sulu¯k, 1:883–884. Sulu¯k, 1:885. Zubda, 380; Sulu¯k, 2:9–11.

110

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

Ja¯shnakı¯r was furious and demanded al-Tashla¯qı¯’s immediate expulsion from ˙ Cairo. He flatly refused any compromise in this matter. This time it was Sala¯r who swallowed his pride and al-Tashla¯qı¯ was exiled to Damascus. Sala¯r conquered his ˙ anger against Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and refrained from demonstrating it. It might be that the sultan al-Na¯sir Muhammad was involved in this incident, since Ibn ˙ ˙ Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ notes that in this instance, al-Na¯sir Muhammad failed again to create ˙ ˙ violent enmity (fitna) between the two Mansu¯rı¯ rulers.153 ˙ In the same year another severe conflict broke out between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r. Again, it was against the background of enmity between confidants of each one of the two rulers. On the one side was Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯, Sala¯r’s friend, and on the other side two native scribes, Ibn Saʿı¯d and his relative Akram b. Bashı¯r, who were associates of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. The severe enmity between Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ and Ibn Saʿı¯d worsened the tension between Sala¯r and Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, since each one of them strongly defended his associate. The situation escalated so much that Sala¯r and Baybars rode separately and refrained from meeting each other. Moreover, the Burjiyya, who were supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, rode while bearing weapons beneath their clothes, fearing that a fitna would break out at any moment. In the end, after intensive intermediation by the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs Aqqu¯sh Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, Aybak al˙ ˙ Khaznada¯r, Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯, Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h and Burlughay, an agreement ˙ 154 was settled, in which Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r won the upper hand. In 707/1307–8 the rift between the two rulers was widened. Sala¯r was afraid of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s growing power, since he completely controlled his khushda¯shs from the Burjiyya, who were the most influential amirs. Moreover, the powerful Burjiyya decided to crown Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and to exile al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad to Kerak. In the end, however, Sala¯r managed to foil this attempt, but ˙ despite this, he was terrified by its consequences. He planned, therefore, to escape to Yemen with his supporters after performing the hajj, to take it over and to ˙ entrench himself there. From Yemen, perhaps, he intended to conduct his struggle against Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. When Baybars learned about that, he secretely sent envoys to Sala¯r who managed to prevent him from carrying out his plan.155

153 Sulu¯k, 2:22–23; Nuju¯m, 8:221–222. 154 See on this incident in depth: Sulu¯k, 2:23–26; Nuju¯m, 8:223. 155 Sulu¯k, 2:37–38; Nuju¯m, 8:227.

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s second reign ˙ ˙ ˙

5.3.

111

Al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s attempted revolt and his departure to Kerak ˙ ˙

The constant mutual suspicion between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r did not bring about the end of their joint rule, mainly due to their common fear of the plots of al-Na¯sir Muhammad. They were aware to his continous efforts to depose ˙ ˙ them in order to get real power into his hands. After a few failed attempts to achieve real authority by utilizing the conflicts between the two amirs, he actively tried to depose the two rulers in 707/1307–8. To this end, al-Na¯sir collaborated ˙ with his confidants – some of the royal mamluks and mainly with Baktamur alJu¯kanda¯r, the amı¯r janda¯r. Al-Na¯sir Muhammad agreed with Baktamur al-Ju¯˙ ˙ kanda¯r that during the night Baktamur would attack the homes of Baybars and Sala¯r in the citadel and capture them. However, agents of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r who were in the sultan’s household hastened to inform them about the plot. The two rulers managed to turn Baktamur to their side. Thus, at the intended hour of the attack, al-Na¯sir Muhammad and his soldiers found out that ˙ ˙ not only had Baktamur not accomplished his mission but he had joined the side of the amirs. The supporters (alza¯m) of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r, under the command of Samu¯k, Sala¯r’s brother, besieged the stable where the sultan’s mamluks were. They also made sure that the sultan would not be able to escape from the citadel. The royal mamluks planned to try to rescue the sultan, but the sultan prevented this hopeless fight against the amirs. Nevertheless, a short incident of arrow shooting occurred between the royal mamluks and Samu¯k, during which an arrow shot by Samu¯k found its way to the window of the house where the sultan was staying. The growing tension almost brought about a comprehensive violent conflict in the citadel. However, in the afternoon negotiations between the two sides started with the mediation of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ, Kira¯y, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, Aybak al-Khaz˙ ˙ nada¯r, Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯ and the wa¯fidı¯ Yaʿqu¯ba¯ al-Shahrazu¯rı¯. The agreement, according to the sources, was definitely in favour of al-Na¯sir Muhammad. ˙ ˙ Three of his kha¯ssakiyya mamluks were exiled to Jerusalem, but soon after ˙˙ returned to Cairo and received amirates of ten. In contrast, Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r, who was considered a traitor by al-Na¯sir Muhammad, was expelled from ˙ ˙ Cairo to al-Subayba in the Golan, at the latter’s demand.156 ˙ In 708/1309 al-Na¯sir Muhammad felt that he could not remain in Cairo any˙ ˙ more. Baybars and Sala¯r restricted his freedom and money to such a degree that he decided to depart for Kerak. Al-Na¯sir used a trick in order to safeguard his ˙ 156 See about the whole incident: Sulu¯k, 2:33–36; Nuju¯m, 8:170–174; Zubda, 392–393; Niha¯ya, 32:127–129. The biographical dictionaries mention that it was Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r, and not the sultan, who initiated the banishment of Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r since he was the one who conspired with the sultan to depose them, see: Durar (Cairo), 2:18; Aʿya¯n, 1:707; Wa¯fı¯, 10:198; Manhal, 3:398.

112

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

departure. He asked permission of the two rulers to leave for the hajj. When he ˙ arrived in Kerak, on 10 Shawwa¯l 708/23 March 1309, he informed the amirs of his intention to remain there and not to continue to Mecca and that he renounced his position as sultan.157 Following al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s departure, a consultation among the amirs ˙ ˙ regarding the new sultan took place. The two “natural” candidates were, of course, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r. Sala¯r was the more favoured candidate, since he had filled, at least officially, the office of viceroy for the last decade. Indeed, the senior amirs advocated Sala¯r for the sultanate. However, the influential Burjı¯ amirs strongly opposed this decision and even prepared themselves for a violent fight with Sala¯r’s supporters. Due to that, Sala¯r backed down. He declared that he was not appropriate to act as the sultan, but his “brother” Baybars was. The Burjiyya amirs enthusiastically approved Sala¯r’s announcement and crowned Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r as the new sultan. Sala¯r was appointed as his viceroy. With this move, al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s second reign, whch lasted ten ˙ ˙ years, five months and seventeen days, came to its end.158 In Kerak, al-Na¯sir Muhammad initiated several moves in order to strengthen ˙ ˙ his power. He moved Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ out of the citadel and brought in his confidants and supporters. He dispatched back to Egypt all the Mansu¯rı¯ and ˙ other amirs who accompanied him to Kerak as well as all the persons who were not his confidants. He did this so they would not be able to “sell him with their property” as had been done to al-Malik al-Saʿı¯d Bereke Kha¯n, the son of al-Za¯hir ˙ Baybars.159 The amirs in Cairo now realized that al-Na¯sir Muhammad was ˙ ˙ planning to imitate the good old “hijra strategy” of the Prophet Muhammad. His ˙ stay in Kerak aimed to strengthen his power gradually until he was able to march to Cairo and to take over from the amirs. In order to prevent this and to subjugate him to them, they wrote him to return immediately to Cairo. Al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad, with cunning diplomacy, replied that he had no intention to take over ˙ from the amirs but his only wish was to live peacefully in Kerak until his death.160 Finally, al-Na¯sir Muhammad took care of his privy purse. He discovered that the ˙ ˙ value of all the property in the warehouses of the citadel was many times more than the sum that he knew of. When he found out that it was Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ who wrote this low sum, out of fear that al-Na¯sir Muhammad would take the ˙ ˙ whole property in Kerak for himself, he expelled Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ from Kerak.161 157 Sulu¯k, 2:43–45; Nuju¯m, 8:175–176, 181; Zubda, 403–404; Tuhfa, 188–190; Qa¯sha¯nı¯, 137. ˙ Durar (Cairo), 2:39. 158 Muqaffa¯, 2:543; Sulu¯k, 2:45–46; Nuju¯m, 8:234–235; Zubda, 406; 159 Nuju¯m, 8:179; Tuhfa, 190. Bereke Kha¯n, the son of al-Za¯hir Baybars, renounced his rule and ˙ Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 88–90. ˙ a fortune that was given to him, see: stayed in Kerak for 160 Nuju¯m, 8:180–181. 161 Niha¯ya, 32:139; Manhal, 3:469.

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s second reign ˙ ˙ ˙

5.4.

113

Military events

Alongside the political instability within the Mamluk political elite, during the joint rule of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r the Mansu¯riyya had to cope with ˙ serious military challenges. First and foremost was the ¯Ilkha¯nid Mongol state. However, the Mamluks also conducted expeditions against the Armenian Kingdom of Cilicia and had to deal with disorder among both the Bedouins in Egypt and the Nusayrı¯s in Kasrawa¯n, Lebanon. In addition, there was the con˙ stant fear of the restoration of the Crusader Kingdom, especially when Crusader forces still existed on an island in the vicinity of Tripoli. In what follows, the important military events during the ten-year rule of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r are discussed, with a special emphasis on the Mansu¯riyya’s role in them. ˙ 5.4.1. Military confrontations with the Mongols Confrontations avoided in 698/1298–9 Following reports about the approaching Mongol army at the beginning of 698/ October 1298, a Damascene force was organized, headed by the governor Qibjaq and the viceroy of the citadel Sanjar Arjuwa¯sh. When the army was about to leave, the secret couriers (qussa¯d) arrived and informed that the Mongols had stopped ˙˙ their march toward Syria and turned back, due to thunderstorms that hit many of them.162 Six months later the Mamluk and the Mongol armies were about to clash again. The Mongol army, headed by Gha¯za¯n, included the defecting Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ amirs Qibjaq, Baktamur al-Siliahda¯r and Albakı¯. The Mamluk army was sup˙ posed to aid the force of a Mongol rebel general named Sülemish b. Ba¯ku¯. Sülemish had been sent at the head of twenty-five thousand horsemen to Anatolia in order to defeat the Anatolian troops and to advance to Syria through Cilicia. Gha¯za¯n, at the same time, was supposed to adavance from Diya¯r Bakr. Both forces aimed to attack al-Bı¯ra, al-Rahba and Qalʿat al-Ru¯m and to meet each ˙ other in Aleppo. However, Sülemish rebelled against Gha¯za¯n and claimed to be the sovereign of Anatolia. He asked the sultan La¯jı¯n for military aid against Gha¯za¯n. La¯jı¯n agreed and acknowledged him as the ruler of Anatolia. At the beginning of Rajab 698/April 1299, a battle between the armies of Gha¯za¯n and Sülemish took place. After most of Sülemish’s army abandoned him, the Mamluks prepared a force headed by fifteen amirs from the districts of Syria to be dispatched to his aid. Meanwhile, Sülemish fled to Cilicia, arrived in Bahasna¯ and from there went to Damascus and Cairo, where he was received warmly by the 162 Al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:49–50.

114

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

Mamluk leadrship. However, when Sülemish tried to return to Anatolia, he was caught and executed by Gha¯za¯n and the decision to dispatch a Mamluk aid force was cancelled. Hence, a conflict between two rival armies in both of which Mansu¯rı¯ amirs were found was prevented.163 ˙ In Ramada¯n 698/June-July 1299, the Mamluks raided around Ma¯rdı¯n, a region ˙ that had been under the rule of the Turkman Artuqid dynasty, Muslim vassals of the ¯Ilkha¯nids. The Mamluks spread much destruction in the area and took a lot of booty, especially riding animals. Strangely enough, this raid, which was one of the main motives for Gha¯za¯n’s penetration into Syria and the battle of Wa¯dı¯ alKhaznada¯r, is barely mentioned in Mamluk historical sources.164 The battle of Wa¯dı¯ al-Khaznada¯r and the Mongol rule in Syria In 695/1295–6, the new Mongol ¯Ilkha¯n, Gha¯za¯n, came to the decision that he must subjugate the Mamluk sultanate to his authority by force, after the Mamluks refused to acknowledge Gha¯za¯n’s conversion and to submit to him.165 It was only three years later, however, that the conditions for an attempt to penetrate Syria were ripe, due to the political circumstances that emerged in that year. First, the Mamluks’ support for the rebel Sülemish b. Ba¯ku¯, and their destructive raid on Ma¯rdı¯n that followed, aroused a desire for revenge.166 Second, the chaos in the Mamluk sultanate following the persecution of the amirs by La¯jı¯n and Manku¯tamur, the defection of Qibjaq and his friends and the murder of La¯jı¯n, encouraged Gha¯za¯n to attack Syria especially at that time.167 Al-Maqrı¯zı¯, in fact, directly related Gha¯za¯n’s campaign and the Mongol occupation of Syria to La¯jı¯n’s and Manku¯tamur’s murder.168 The condition of the Mamluk army on the eve of the confrontation with the Mongols was very poor. On its way to Syria, the army had to cope with a revolt of the Oirat wa¯fidiyya, who took adavantage of the political instability at that time. The Oirats, as mentioned above, tried to murder Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r and to put Kitbugha¯ back on the throne. The revolt was suppressed immediately. However, the attempt indicated the lack of unity in the ranks of the Mamluk army 163 Al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:63–66; Zetterstéen, 55–56; Broadbridge, Ideology, 71. See on Sülemish’s revolt also in: Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n, 3:642–644; Reuven Amitai, “Whither the ¯Ilkha¯nid Army? Gha¯za¯n’s First Campaign into Syria (1299–1300)”, in Warfare in Inner Asian History (500–1800), ed. Nicola Di Cosmo (Leiden: Brill, 2002), 225–226; Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 128–136; Broadbridge, Ideology, 70–72; Boyle, “I¯l-Kha¯ns”, 386–387. 164 The only Mamluk historians who mention this raid are Abu¯ al-Fida¯ʾ (Abu¯ al-Fida¯ʾ, 4:42) and Ibn al-Fuwat¯ı. See on them and the pro-Mongol sources that mention it: Broadbridge, Ideology, 72,˙n. 30; Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n, 3:644. 165 Broadbridge, Ideology, 65–66, 73. 166 Broadbridge, Ideology, 72–73. 167 Amitai, “Gha¯za¯n’s First Campaign”, 221–222; Boyle, “I¯l-Kha¯ns”, 386. 168 Sulu¯k, 1:859.

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s second reign ˙ ˙ ˙

115

as well as the lack of a single and undisputed leader. In addition, the mamluk army suffered from bad management, lack of provisions and corruption.169 The sultan and most of the army had camped in the area of Ascalon. When news about the Mongols’ crossing of the Euphrates arrived, the Mamluk army continued marching northward and encamped in the plains to the north of Homs. The Mongol army, headed by Gha¯za¯n, crossed the Euphrates on 12 Rabı¯ʿ I 699/7 December 1299 at Qalʿat Jaʿbar and arrived in the suroundings of Aleppo five days later. They did not raid the town but went southward, passed Hama from the east and encamped at Salamiyya, on the border of the Syrian desert. On 27 Rabı¯ʿ I/22 December 1299 Gha¯za¯n made his way to an area north of Homs, named Wa¯dı¯ al-Khaznada¯r, in order to get water. The Mamluks, who were camped around Homs, noticed the Mongol army and decided to bring their attack forward, thinking that the Mongols intended to retreat. Gha¯za¯n, still unprepared for the battle, hastened to arrange his forces so that Qutlu¯sha¯h, his ˙ deputy, commanded the right wing (maymana) of the army whereas Gha¯za¯n 170 himself commanded the centre (qalb). Most of the commanders of the Mamluk forces belonged to the Mansu¯riyya. ˙ Sala¯r, Qutlu¯bak al-Ha¯jib, Aybak al-Khaznada¯r and Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r as well ˙ ˙ as Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯ and other amirs of the Burjiyya were the commanders of the centre. Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, however, had to quit due to his illness at that time.171 At the head of the extreme right wing was ʿI¯sa¯ b. Muhanna¯, leading the Bedouin tribes of north Syria, and at the head of the right wing proper stood the governor of Aleppo, Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯, with the armies of Aleppo and Hama. ˙ Five amirs of one hundred commanded the left wing (maysara): the Mansu¯rı¯s ˙ Aqqu¯sh Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ, Tughrı¯l al-Igha¯nı¯ and Kurt the governor of Tripoli with ˙ his army, in addition to the two senior Sa¯lih¯ı amirs Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯ and Sanjar ˙ ˙ al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯. In this wing also fought the squadron (tulb) of La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯ (the ˙ ustada¯r), and the amirs of the Za¯hiriyya. La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯ himself stayed with the ˙ sultan a little bit away from the battlefield, so that the sultan would not be hurt. Despite the prominence of the Mansu¯riyya in the command of this battle, several ˙ amirs of one hundreds are not mentioned among the warriors. The absence of the name of Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, the governor of Damascus, is especially crucial, though he probably did participate in the battle, since he is mentioned among the amirs who fled from the battlefield (see below). The Mamluks concentrated their forces mainly in the centre and in the left wing, whereas the right wing was quite 169 Amitai, “Gha¯za¯n’s First Campaign”, 227, 229, 241–242. 170 Amitai, “Gha¯za¯n’s First Campaign”, 227, 229–233, 238; Boyle, “I¯l-Kha¯ns”, 387. Amitai suggests that the battle took place in the plains of southern Salamiyya, possibly in today’s Wa¯dı¯ al-Mayda¯nı¯ (Amitai, “Gha¯za¯n’s First Campaign”, 235–236). 171 See: Muqaffa¯, 2:536. Amitai is of the opinion that Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s “convenient illness” might have been feigned (Amitai, “Gha¯za¯n’s First Campaign”, 241).

116

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

weak. The Mongols enjoyed a considerable advantage in the number of their troops, as many as three times more than the Mamluks: whereas the Mongol forces ranged between sixty to a hundred thousand horsemen, the Mamluks numbered a mere twenty, or at maximum thirty, thousand.172 In the beginning, the Mamluk left wing successfully attacked the Mongol right wing, which was still not prepared for fighting. According the pro-Mongol Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n, the commander of the Mongol right wing, Qutlu¯sha¯h, ordered that the ˙ drums be beaten, which made the Mamluks to believe that Gha¯za¯n was positioned in this division.173 However, the centre, where Gha¯za¯n really was, counterattacked fiercely. The Mongol attack strengthened with the reinforcement of the defeated troops from the right wing (under the command of Qutlu¯sha¯h). As a ˙ result, the Mamluks’ right wing and centre fled from the battlefield.174 The senior Mansu¯rı¯ amirs – Aqqu¯sh al-Afram the governor of Damascus, ˙ Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ the governor of Aleppo, Kira¯y the governor of Safed, Kit˙ bugha¯ the governor of Sarkhad and Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r ˙ and Sala¯r – had no choice but to flee towards Egypt. According to the Mamluk sources, the losses of the Mamluk army were about one thousand horsemen and eight amirs who died. According to pro-Mongol sources, about five thousand warriors from the Mamluk army died. It seems, however, that the lower estimates, as mentioned in the Arabic sources (especially by Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯), are more ˙ reliable.175 Among the amirs who died were the senior Mansu¯rı¯s Kurt al-Ha¯jib, the ˙ ˙ governor of Tripoli, and Bı¯lı¯k (Bakta¯sh) al-Tayya¯r, one of the amirs in ˙ Damascus.176 Another Mansu¯rı¯ (Burjı¯) amir who is mentioned among the deaths ˙ of this battle is Aqqu¯sh Kurjı¯ al-Matru¯h¯ı, the ha¯jib of Damascus.177 As for the ˙ ˙ ˙ 172 Sulu¯k, 1:886; See in-depth: Amitai, “Gha¯za¯n’s First Campaign”, 239–241. About the troops’ number, see: Amitai, “Gha¯za¯n’s First Campaign”, 236–237; Sulu¯k, 1:886. Al-Dhahabı¯ mentions that in his opinion the Mongols numbered sixty thousand, though most of the sources mention that they numbered a hundred thousnad (al-Dhahabı¯, Ta’rı¯kh, 60:70). 173 Amitai, however, argues that “it is unlikely that the mamluks had any doubts that he [Gha¯za¯n] was anywhere but in the center”. Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n, according to Amitai, offeres “a post facto explanation” for the opening moves of the battle in which the Mongols were defeated (Amitai, “Gha¯za¯n’s First Campaign”, 246). 174 See on this battle: Amitai, “Gha¯za¯n’s First Campaign”, 245–252; Boyle, “I¯l-Kha¯ns”, 387–388. 175 Amitai, “Gha¯za¯n’s First Campaign”, 252. 176 ʿIqd, 4:18, 20. Al-ʿAynı¯ describes the brave death of the Mansu¯rı¯ Bı¯lı¯k al-Tayya¯r while he tried ˙ ¯ k, 1:905) and al˙ to rescue his wives from the Mongols (ʿIqd, 4:18, 20). Al-Maqrı ¯zı¯ (Sulu Dhahabı¯ (Ta’rı¯kh, 60:414) mention the same amir by the name Bakta¯sh al-Tayya¯r. The other ˙ amirs who died in this battle were: Balaba¯n al-Taqwı¯, an amir in Tripoli; Baybars al-Ghutmı¯ (in Zubda: al-ʿAlamı¯), the governor of the foretress of Marqab; Azinbak (in Zubda: alTughrı¯lı¯), the governor of Bala¯tnus; Aqqu¯sh Kurjı¯ al-Ha¯jib (see on him in the following ˙ ˙ note); Nuka¯y (al-Silahda¯r) al-Tatarı ¯, the father-in-law˙ of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l. Baybars al˙ Mansu¯rı¯ mentions also the name of Muhammad the son of amir ʿIzz al-Dı¯n (Aydamur) al˙ 157; Niha¯ya, 31:385–386. Hillı¯.˙ See: Sulu¯k, 1:888; Zubda, 332; Tuhfa, ˙ ˙ 177 Most of the sources mention that Aqqu¯sh al-Matru¯h¯ı died at Wa¯dı¯ al-Khaznada¯r (Muqaffa¯, ˙ ˙

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s second reign ˙ ˙ ˙

117

sultan, he was abandoned on a hill, together with La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯ and a small number of mamluks, weeping and beseeching God to save him. La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯ managed to take command of the situation and to bring the young sultan safely to Egypt.178 The Mongols took over Syria quickly. On Friday, 14 Rabı¯ʿ II 699/8 January 1300, the name of Gha¯za¯n was mentioned in the khutba of the Damascus mos˙ ques. Gha¯za¯n appointed the amirs who defected from the Mamluk sultanate as governors of the districts in Syria. Qibjaq was appointed as the governor of the district of Damascus, i. e. the whole region from al-ʿArı¯sh in the south to Salamiyya in the north, including Baalbek, Homs, ʿAjlu¯n, al-Rahba and the coastal ˙ and mountain areas. Baktamur al-Silahda¯r was appointed the governor of Aleppo ˙ district, including Hama, the fortresses of Shayzar, Antioch, and Baghras, as well as other fortresses on the Euphrates, Qalʿat al-Ru¯m, Bahasna¯ and other outlying areas. Albakı¯ was appointed over the districts of Safed and Tripoli and the coast. Alongside each of these Mamluk amirs, Gha¯za¯n appointed several Mongol officials, with whom the Mamluk amirs had to work in agreement. Qutlu¯sha¯h was ˙ appointed the supreme commander of Syria. These moves of Gha¯za¯n imply that he probably did not trust the defector Mamluk amirs completely.179 The Mongols wreaked havoc in Syria. Imediately after the Mamluks’ retreat, Gha¯za¯n dispatched thousands of his soldiers, headed by Mu¯la¯y (or: Bu¯la¯y) to raid Southern Syria and Palestine. The Mongols plundered and killed whoever they found along their way to Jerusalem, Hebron and Gaza.180 Even after a guarantee of peace (ama¯n) was given to the citizens of Damascus, the Mongols continued killing and plundering, and took heavy taxes from the people.181

178 179 180

181

2:234; Sulu¯k, 1:888, 905; Nuju¯m, 8:190; Niha¯ya, 31:386). However, al-Safadı¯, based on his teacher al-Dhahabı¯, mentions that Aqqu¯sh al-Matru¯h¯ı and the Hanafı¯˙ chief qa¯dı¯ Hasan b. ˙ Anu¯shru¯wa¯n, were not killed but were captured by˙the˙people of Kasrawa ¯ n who sold˙them to the Franks, and thus they found their way to Cyprus. The wazir Ibn Saʿd al-Dawla ransomed Aqqu¯sh from the Franks and he received an amirate of tablkha¯na¯h. However, he died soon after, in 699/1300, see: Aʿya¯n, 1:560–561; 2:187–188. ˙ The report on the sultan is mentioned by al-Yu¯sufı¯, who was a mamluk in the halqa and one ˙ ¯ za¯n’s First of the only mamluks who had been with the sultan on that hill (Amitai, “Gha Campaign”, 250–251). Boyle, “I¯l-Kha¯ns”, 388; Zubda, 341, 342; Broadbridge, Ideology, 78–79; Sulu¯k, 1:894. Zubda, 343–344; Niha¯ya, 31:400–401; Sulu¯k, 1:893–894. See in-depth on this raid according to Mamluk, pro-Mongol, Armenian, Georgian and even Jewish sources: Reuven Amitai, “Mongol Raids into Palestine (A.D. 1260–1300)”, JRAS (1987), 244–248. The different sources mention that the number of the Mongol raiders was ten, twenty or even forty thousand. These numbers should be taken with a grain of salt (Amitai, “Mongol Raids”, 245, 254 n. 78). Al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯ gives the most detailed account of the Mongols’ rule in Syria, see: al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:101– 126 (tr. 1:137–164). See also: Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:8–9; Zetterstéen, 66–74; Kanz, 9:23–29; al-Dhahabı¯, Ta’rı¯kh, 60:83–84, 86–88. See an English translation of al-Dhahabı¯’s testimony: Joseph Somogyi, “Adh-Dhahabı¯’s Record of the Destruction of Damascus by the Mongols in 699–

118

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

However, Mongol rule in Syria did not last for long. About a month and a half after Gha¯za¯n arrived in Syria (in mid-Juma¯da¯ I 699/5 February 1300), he left eastward for his kingdom. The reason for his early departure is not clear. It might be related to the attacks of Mongol groups known as the Qaraunas on Southern Iran.182 John Masson Smith and David Morgan are of the opinion that Gha¯za¯n’s retreat from Syria, and following him the Mongol army, is related to the climatic conditions in Syria and its lack of pasture and water. Syrian natural resources could not supply the needs of tens of thousands of Mongol warriors and their animals. Hence, logistic problems did not permit the Mongol army to stay long in Syria. This theory might be consistent with Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n’s explanation, according to which Gha¯za¯n left Damascus due to the approach of the hot season.183 Qutlu¯sha¯h left Syria as well shortly after Gha¯za¯n, right after he received the ˙ heavy taxes that were collected from the people of Damascus from Qibjaq. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ implies that the brave entrenchment of his khushda¯sh Sanjar ˙ Arjuwa¯sh (the governor of Damascus citadel) and his continuous refusal to hand over the citadel to Qutlu¯sha¯h, hastened his early retreat.184 Al-Nuwayrı¯ adds that ˙ Arjuwa¯sh’s steadfast defence of the citadel encouraged the other citadel governors of Syria not to surrender to the Mongols and to wait for the aid of the Mamluk army from Egypt. Hence, Gha¯za¯n’s decrees, demanding the Mamluk amirs and the people submit to ¯Ilkha¯nid rule and warning them of the consequences of failing to do so, were turned down.185 Arjuwa¯sh’s steadfast resistence, the retreat of most of the Mongol army and the news about the approaching Egyptian army brought about the departure of Mu¯la¯y and the last Mongol officers that were still in Damascus, in Rajab 699/March 1300. At the same time, the huge Mamluk army, headed by the sultan and the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, ˙

182 183

184 185

700/1299–1301”, Ignace Goldziher Memorial Volume, eds. Samuel Löwinger and Joseph Somogyi (Budapest: Globus Nyomdai Müintézet, 1948), 360–381. See on the ama¯n: Denise Aigle, “The Mongol Invasions of Bila¯d al-Sha¯m by Gha¯za¯n Kha¯n and Ibn Taymı¯yah’s Three ‘Anti-Mongol’ Fatwas”, MSR 11, 2 (2007), 107–111. See an analysis of the documents that were issued by Gha¯za¯n during his short rule of Damascus: Broadbridge, Ideology, 74–80. Boyle, “I¯l-Kha¯ns”, 388; Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n, 3:643. See on the Qarauna: Morgan, Mongols, 82–83. See Smith’s arguments: John Masson Smith, “ʿAyn Ja¯lu¯t: Mamlu¯k Success or Mongol Failure?”, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 44, 2 (1984), 307–345, esp. 329–331, 344. Cf. Reuven Amitai, Holy War and Rapprochement: Studies in the Relations between the Mamluk Sultanate and the Mongol Ilkhanate (1260–1335) (Turnhout: Brepols, 2013), pp. 32–36, esp. 34. See Morgan’s view: David Morgan, “The Mongols in Syria, 1260–1300”, in Crusade and Settlement: Papers Read at the First Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East and Presented to R. C. Smail, ed. Peter W. Edbury (Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, 1985), 233–234. See Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n’s view, which is rejected by Boyle: “I¯l-Kha¯ns”, 388. Zubda, 345. Niha¯ya, 31:401. See the texts of these decrees (firma¯ns): Zubda, 333–340.

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s second reign ˙ ˙ ˙

119

made its way toward Syria and encamped in al-Sa¯lihiyya, the staging post about ˙ ˙ one hundred and twenty km north-east of Cairo.186 The behavior of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs Sanjar Arjuwa¯sh on the one hand, and ˙ Qibjaq and Baktamur al-Silahda¯r on the other, during the Mongol occupation, ˙ deserves further discussion. Arjuwa¯sh’s exceptional bravery should not be taken for granted. He maintained uncompromising resistence to the Mongol attempts to capture the citadel and rejected the calls to hand over the citadel, though he would have enjoyed an honourable life in the ¯Ilkha¯nate if he had done this.187 This behaviour gives the impression that some form of ideological motive was behind his deeds. As suggested by Reuven Amitai, it might be “Mamluk identity” that caused him to act as he did. This identity was composed of loyalty to the sultan and to the “Mamluk state” and the need to fight the enemy in the name of Islam.188 Similarly, it seems that the defecting Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, Qibjaq and Baktamur al˙ Silahda¯r, still had an inclination to the Mamluk side, thus they tried to man˙ ouevre between the necessity to demonstrate their loyalty to the Mongols and their genuine will to assist the Mamluk state and to ameliorate the suffering of the people of Damascus. For instance, Qibjaq hastened to collect the taxes for Qutlu¯sha¯h and together with Baktamur al-Silahda¯r urged him to leave for Aleppo ˙ ˙ with his Mongol officers. This move was meant to improve the situation of the people of Damascus by leaving Qibjaq as the sole governor of the city. Indeed, the people of Damascus are said to have been happy when Gha¯za¯n left and Qibjaq was appointed as their governor.189 Furthermore, according to al-Safadı¯, Qibjaq ˙ made efforts to deceive the Mongols and to defend the Muslims by secretly collaborating with Arjuwa¯sh. This notion is mentioned also by Baybars alMansu¯rı¯, who was not only a contemporary but also a Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯sh of ˙ ˙ Qibjaq and Baktamur al-Silahda¯r.190 The pro-Mongol historian Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n ˙ mentions that Qibjaq and his associates “forgot their commitment” to the ¯Ilkha¯n and spread rumours that brought about Mu¯la¯y’s retreat from Syria.191 In fact, Qibjaq’s “pro-Mamluk” behavior could be seen already during the battle of Wa¯dı¯ al-Khaznada¯r, in which he tried to diminish the losses of the Mamluk army as much as possible.192 186 Zubda, 345; Zetterstéen, 80; Nuju¯m, 8:129. 187 See on Arjuwa¯sh’s behaviour in-depth in: Reuven Amitai, “The Mongol Occupation of Damascus”, 32–35; al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:105–106, 125–126; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:8–10; Zubda, 322–323; Zetterstéen, 64–65; Nuju¯m, 8:125; Kanz, 9:24; Muqaffa¯, 2:16. 188 Amitai, “The Mongol Occupation of Damascus”, 35–36. 189 Durar (Hyderabad), 3:242–243; Sulu¯k, 1:895–896, 899. 190 Aʿya¯n, 4:69; 2:466; Wa¯fı¯, 24:183; Tuhfa, 158. ˙ 191 Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n, 3:647. 192 Amitai, “The Mongol Occupation of Damascus”, 24–25; Sulu¯k, 1:887; Niha¯ya, 31:385. See also al-Safadı¯’s quotations of Qibjaq’s testimony: Aʿya¯n, 4:69; Wa¯fı¯, 24:183. ˙

120

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

Indeed, with the withdrawal of the Mongols from Syria, the defecting amirs made their way back to the Mamluk fold in Egypt. This move was a result of continuous contacts between the defecting Mansu¯rı¯ amirs and their khushda¯shs ˙ in Egypt. According to al-Safadı¯, Qibjaq sent letters to his khushda¯shs already ˙ before they set out to Syria, when they were still in Egypt. According to Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, the correspondence between the two sides took place when the ˙ Mansu¯rı¯ amirs arrived at Sukrayr, south-west of Ramla.193 The Mansu¯rı¯ amirs ˙ ˙ decided to pardon Qibjaq and the other defector amirs and to let them to return to the Mamluk sultanate.194 Sala¯r and Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r met with Qibjaq between Gaza and Ascalon on 22 Rajab 699/13 April 1300. During the meeting the two Mansu¯rı¯ leaders rebuked Qibjaq and his friends for their assistance to ˙ Gha¯za¯n’s invasion of Syria. The defector amirs apologized and explained that their defection to the ¯Ilkha¯n was due to their fear of La¯jı¯n and their resentment of his viceroy Manku¯tamur. They explained that when they learned about La¯jı¯n’s murder it was too late, since they had already talked to Gha¯za¯n about the invasion of Syria. The amirs accepted their apology. Sala¯r and Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r continued their way to Damascus, whereas Qibjaq, Baktamur al-Silahda¯r and Albakı¯ ˙ with their associates made their way in the other direction toward al-Sa¯lihiyya. In ˙ ˙ this place they met with the sultan al-Na¯sir Muhammad, who pardoned them, ˙ ˙ received them with honour and escorted them to Cairo citadel.195 After Qibjaq, Baktamur al-Silahda¯r and Albakı¯ left Damascus, the city re˙ mained without an official command, Mongol or otherwise, and thus the population were very apprehensive. Again, it was Sanjar Arjuwa¯sh who revealed his leadership skills and took command. He forcibly obliged all citizens to take part in the protection of the city by situating them on the walls of the city during the nights. Ibn Taymiyya encouraged the defenders with religious inspiration. He reenforced Islamic law in Damascus again by spilling wine, breaking jars and smashing containers. Soon after, the name of the Mamluk sultan and the Egyptian Abba¯sid caliph were mentioned in the khutbas, and thus rule in Syria ˙ officially returned to the Mamluk sultanate.196 In Shaʿba¯n 699/May 1300, the Mamluk armies arrived in Damascus one after another. First it was Aqqu¯sh al-Afram with the army of Damascus. After him 193 Zubda, 345. It could be, as suggested by Muhammad Mustafa¯ Ziya¯da (Sulu¯k, 1:822 n. 4), that ˙ a station on ˙ ˙ the Mamluk Gaza-Hebron barı¯d this place was Sukkariyya. Sukkariyya became route, see: Katia Cytryn-Silverman and Jefrrey A. Blakely, “The Khan at al-Sukkariyya: A station on the Gaza-Hebron Route”, BASOR 369 (2013), 201–229, esp. 202 n. 1; 214 n. 8. See also: Guy Le Strange, Palestine under the Moslems: A Description of Syria and the Holy Land from A.D. 650 to 1500 (Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1890), 527. 194 Aʿya¯n, 4:70; Wa¯fı¯, 24:184; Durar (Cairo), 3:326. 195 Nuju¯m, 8:129–130; Sulu¯k, 1:900. 196 Al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:125–126; Zetterstéen, 79.

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s second reign ˙ ˙ ˙

121

came Qara¯sunqur with the army of Aleppo and Hama, Asandamur Kurjı¯ with the army of Tripoli, the Sa¯lih¯ı Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯ with the left wing of the Egyptian ˙ ˙ army, La¯jı¯n with the right wing of this army and Sala¯r with the centre of the army. The other senior amirs who arrived with these armies were Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, Sunqursha¯h al-Mansu¯rı¯, Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ and Kitbugha¯. Hence, with the ˙ ˙ exception of Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯, the Mamluk military elite was composed exclusively of the Mansu¯riyya. At the beginning of Shawwa¯l 699/June 1300, when it ˙ was clear that the Mongol retreat was final, the Egyptian army made its way back to Cairo.197 Confrontations that were cancelled due to weather conditions It was only about three months later that news of another approach of Gha¯za¯n toward Syria arrived in Cairo. The Mansu¯rı¯ amirs were prepared well in advance ˙ for the coming confrontation. They collected heavy taxes from the people for the financing of the expedition. The sultan set out from Egypt at the head of the army on 13 Safar 700/28 October 1300 and encamped in Gaza. When the news about ˙ Gha¯za¯n’s crossing of the Euphrates arrived, people from Damascus, Aleppo and other districts of Syria fled in panic southward toward Gaza, trying to find shelter in the fortresses or in the desert (many of them, especially the religious elite, found shelter in Egypt). Qara¯sunqur, the governor of Aleppo, retreated to Hama. Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, with the army of Damascus, placed himself in the ʿumq, probably the valley between Antioch and Aleppo.198 However, the heavy rains, snow and mud caused the roads to become impassable, thus the provisions for the troops and their horses could not arrive. Most of the equipment was ruined and many soldiers died. Under these circumstances, the Mamluk army had to return to Cairo. The sultan, who had camped in Budda ʿArsh near Gaza, as well as the main Egyptian army, which was then in southern Palestine, came back to Cairo in Juma¯da¯ I or Rabı¯ʿ II/December 1300-January 1301. Before returning to Cairo, the sultan (in fact, the amirs), dispatched northwards two thousand horsemen, headed by Baktamur al-Silahda¯r and Yaʿqu¯ba¯ al-Shahrazurı¯.199 Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n mentions that the Mongol ˙ army encamped around Qinnasrı¯n, about forty km south of Aleppo. According to this pro-Mongol historian, since no news about the Mamluk army arrived and the Mamluk sultan “had been too afraid to come out”, the Kha¯n had mercy on the Mamluk lands and ordered his troops to stop at Sarmı¯n, in southern-western Aleppo. However, Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n also mentions that the heavy rains and the cold severely damaged the Mongol army. Two generals of the Mongol army, Sӧʾätäi 197 Kanz, 9:39; al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:127–128. 198 Le Strange, 391. 199 Niha¯ya, 31:413–414; al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:205–206; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:13–14. Nuju¯m, 8:131.

122

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

and Shibaʾuchi, could not join each other and Mu¯la¯y had to rescue them with much effort, after many of their horses died. Thus, after a short raid on Antioch, Gha¯za¯n too had to retreat. He crossed the Euphrates on 11 Juma¯da¯ 1 700/22 January 1301 and returned to his land.200 The battle of Marj al-Suffar (Shaqhab) ˙ ˙ In 702/1303 Gha¯za¯n invaded Syria for the third time. In Rajab/March a Mamluk force headed by senior Mansu¯rı¯ amirs set out from Egypt as reinforcement for the ˙ Syrian army. The amirs of this force were Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯, Tughrı¯l al-I¯gha¯nı¯, Kira¯y, Sunqursha¯h and Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯. Baybars al-Man˙ ˙ su¯rı¯ testifies that the Mamluk force arrived at Qa¯qu¯n in central Palestine, where ˙ they learned that the rumours about Gha¯za¯n’s advance to Syria were true and that he had already crossed the Euphrates with his army. Gha¯za¯n arrived in al-Rahba ˙ and from this place secretly sent letters to Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, the governor of Damascus, and to the other leaders of Syria and its citizens. As in his earlier letters and decrees, Gha¯za¯n called upon the amirs and the people of Syria not to assist the Egyptian army and to submit to his rule, whose legitimacy derived from both Islamic and divine imperial rights.201 The armies of Egypt and Syria gathered in Damascus, and later encamped in Hama. All the leaders of the armies were Mansu¯rı¯s. At the head of the Egyptian ˙ army were Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r. At the head of the army of Aleppo stood Qara¯sunqur. Kitbugha¯ lead the army of Hama and Asandamur Kurjı¯ headed the army of Tripoli. The Damascene army was under the command of ¯ s and Anas al-Jamda¯r.202 Around this time there took place a battle Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ between relatively small forces. The big battle was preceded by a smaller one, which took place at a place named ʿUrd, between Tadmur and al-Rusa¯fa. This ˙ ˙ battle came after the Mongol force raided Qaryatayn in the vicinity of Hama and took much booty and prisioners from among the Turkmans of this place. The Mongol force ranged between four to five thousand (according to Baybars alMansu¯rı¯, al-Maqrı¯zı¯ and Ibn Hajar) to the probably exaggerated numbers of ˙ ˙ seven thousand (according to Ibn Kathı¯r) or ten thousand (according to alNuwayrı¯) troops. The Mamluks numbered about one thousand and five hundred ¯ s, Kujkun, Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯, horsemen, headed by Asandamur Kurjı¯, Baha¯dur A ˙ ¯ Anas al-Jamda¯r, Ughrlu¯ al-ʿAdilı¯ the mamluk of Kitbugha¯ and Muhammad b. ˙ ˙ Qara¯sunqur. The only commander in this battle who was not connected to the Mansu¯riyya was Muhammad, the son of the Sa¯lih¯ı amir Bashqard. Despite the ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 200 Zubda, 350; Niha¯ya, 31:415; Zetterstéen, 83–84; Sulu¯k, 1:908–909; al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:206; Kanz, 9:46; Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n, 3:649; Boyle, “I¯l-Kha¯ns”, 389. 201 Zubda, 367–368; Tuhfa, 163. See Gha¯za¯n’s letter: Zubda, 368–372, and its analysis by ˙ 90–93. Broadbridge: Ideology, 202 Zubda, 373; Tuhfa, 164; Niha¯ya, 32:25. ˙

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s second reign ˙ ˙ ˙

123

Mongols’ clear advantage in numbers, the Mamluk force managed to defeat their enemies completely. The Mamluk victory was achieved mainly thanks to the leadership skills and strategic thinking of Asandamur Kurjı¯. The Mongols, who were surprised by the Mamluk attack, left their huge booty in the area, in the hope that the Mamluks would be occupied in looting it. Asandamur realized the Mongols’ intention and prevented from his soldiers from doing so. He divided the army into four groups. One occupied the Mongols in fighting whereas the other three encircled the Mongol force. Asandamur himself stood at the head of the first group at the forefront of the fighting. The losses in the Mongol camp were heavy. Many of them were killed, about one hundred and eighty of them were taken as captives and a lot of booty was taken by the Mamluks. The Mamluks’ losses were much smaller. However, among the amirs who were killed were the Mansu¯rı¯ Anas al-Jamda¯r and Muhammad b. Bashqard, as well as fifty˙ ˙ ˙ six troopers.203 After this skirmish, with the arrival of the sultan and the caliph on the battlefield, the two rival armies prepared for the main battle. On 2 Ramada¯n 702/20 April 1303 the big battle between the Mamluks and the ˙ Mongols took place in Shaqhab, or Marj al-Suffar, south of Damascus. In the ˙ ˙ centre, near the sultan and the caliph, were the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs Sala¯r, Baybars al˙ Ja¯shnakı¯r, Aybak al-Khaznada¯r, Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r, Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯, Qutlu¯bak, Aqqu¯sh al-Afram and Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯. Alongside them fought ˙ Aybak al-Hamawı¯ (Za¯hirı¯), Muba¯riz al-Dı¯n Sawwa¯r (a Ru¯mı¯ wa¯fidı¯) and Nu¯gha¯y ˙ ˙ al-Silahda¯r. Qibjaq commanded the right wing at the head of the army of Hama ˙ together with other amirs, among them the Mansu¯rı¯s La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯ and Aqqu¯sh ˙ al-Mawsilı¯ Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ. Other prominent amirs in this wing were Yaʿqu¯ba¯ al˙ ¯ liya¯ b. Qarma¯n, a Mongol wa¯fidı¯. The Bedouins Shahrazurı¯ (wa¯fidı¯ Kurdi) and U also fought in this wing. At the head of the left wing were the Mansu¯rı¯s Qara¯˙ sunqur and the army of Aleppo, Butkha¯s (Burjı¯) and the army of Safed, Tughrı¯l ˙ ˙ al-I¯gha¯nı¯, Baktamur al-Silahda¯r, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, Asandamur Kurjı¯ and ˙ ˙ Baybars al-Muwaffaqı¯. The prominent commander of this wing was the Sa¯lih¯ı ˙ ˙ Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯, who was at a very advanced age at that time. According to John Masson Smith’s estimation, the Mamluk force numbered about eighteen thousand troops, whereas the Mongols, headed by the deputy of Gha¯za¯n, Qutlu¯sha¯h, ˙ numbered fewer than thirty thousand troops in the first day of the fighting, and fewer than twenty thousand afterwards.204 203 Zubda, 373–374; Tuhfa, 164; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:19; Niha¯ya, 32:26. Al-Maqrı¯zı¯ and Ibn Hajar ˙ especially stress the ˙role of Asandamur Kurjı¯ in this victory, see: Muqaffa¯, 2:187; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:388. 204 Zubda, 375–376; Niha¯ya, 32:29; Nuju¯m, 8:159–160, 162. On the size of the forces, see: Smith, 341. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ and al-Nuwayrı¯ mention the exaggerated number of one hundred ˙ thousand Mongol troops, including Armenians, Kurds and others (Zubda, 376; Niha¯ya, 32:29).

124

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

The battle began with a successful attack by the Mongols’ left wing on the Mamluks’ right wing. Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n reports that in this attack thirteen highranking Mamluk amirs were killed, among them La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯, and many others were killed or injured. However, the centre of the Mamluk army attacked Qut˙ lu¯sha¯h, who came to aid the left wing from the centre. Qutlu¯sha¯h had to retreat to ˙ a neighbouring hill, where other Mongol forces also gathered. The Mongols spent the night on this hill cut off from water sources. On the next day, the Mamluks let the Mongols go down to the nearby river and thus attacked them more effectively. The defeated Mongols fled, being chased by the Mamluks until Qaryatayn.205 The main two leaders of the Mamluk army, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r, revealed great bravery in the battle, and following them, so did the rest of the amirs. It seems, however, that it was Qibjaq, who only recently returned to the Mamluk sultanate after serving Gha¯za¯n, who made the most significant contribution to the Mamluk victory. Thanks to his brave fighting, he managed to cause the Mongols to flee from the water sources, so that they had to spend the night “burning from thirst”, whereas the Mamluks drank their fill.206 The importance of the water sources in this battle, as pointed out by John Masson Smith, was crucial. Since each Mongol warrior had from six or eight up to as many as eighteen horses with him, the Mongol army had to supply water for about one hundred thousand horses, and it was the severe lack of water that brought about its flight and defeat.207 The casualties on the Mamluk side, however, were great. About one thousand horsemen died, among them the high-ranking Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ amirs La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯, Aydamur al-Rafa¯ and Aybak al-Ustada¯r.208 After the successful battle, the sultan and the amirs held a royal procession in Cairo. Alongside the Sa¯lih¯ı Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯ marched Muba¯riz al-Dı¯n Sawwa¯r ˙ ˙ 205 See on this battle in more details: Boyle, “I¯l-Kha¯ns”, 394–395; Zubda, 375–378; Nuju¯m, 8:159–160; Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n, 4:657. 206 Aʿya¯n, 4:70–71; Wa¯fı¯, 24:184; Durar (Cairo), 3:327. On the bravery of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r: Nuju¯m, 8:160. 207 See: Smith, 314, 343–344. 208 Three of the amirs who were killed did not belong to the Mansu¯riyya: Sunqursha¯h who was ˙ the ustada¯r of the Sa¯lih¯ı amir Baybars al-Ja¯liq; Aydamur al-ʿIzzı ¯ naqı¯b al-mama¯lı¯k al˙ reign, who was a mamluk of Aydamur al-Za¯hirı¯ the governor of sulta¯niyya during La¯˙jı¯n’s ˙ died, the sources do ˙ ¯ liya¯ b. Qarma¯n. As for the other amirs who Damascus, and the wa¯fidı¯ U not give a clear indication of their origins. It is plausible that some of them belonged to the Mansu¯riyya. The following names are mentioned: Aydamur al-Shamsı¯ al-Qashsha¯sh, Aqqu¯sh˙(also mentioned as Sunqur) al-Shamsı¯ al-Ha¯jib; Sunqur al-Ka¯firı¯ (or al-Kafu¯rı¯), Husa¯m ˙ al-Dı¯n ʿAlı¯ b. Ba¯khil amir of ten and Baha¯dur˙ (or Balaba¯n) al-Daka¯jki who was amir in Hama. See: Nuju¯m, 8:204–206; Sulu¯k, 1:946–947; Zubda, 376–377; Niha¯ya, 32:30; Tuhfa, 167. ˙ Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯ mentions also the names of Aqqu¯sh amı¯r akhu¯r and La¯jı¯n al-Mawsilı¯ al˙ ¯ ] alKhatta¯bı¯ (Kanz, 9:88). Ibn Iya¯s mentions among the dead ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n [ʿAlı¯] b. [Duda ˙˙ ¯ nı¯. He adds that about one thousand five hundred royal mamluks, as well as others Turkma from the auxiliary forces, died. See: Ibn Iya¯s, 1:414.

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s second reign ˙ ˙ ˙

125

(Ru¯mı¯ wa¯fidı¯) and the Mansu¯rı¯s Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r and Sanjar al-Jumaqda¯r. ˙ As part of the celebrations in Cairo, the amirs built wooden fortresses in the street that leads to the citadel. The sources mention the order of these fortresses that were erected by the highest amirs and office-holders in Cairo.209 This information may give us a clue about the hegemony of the Mansu¯riyya and its associates in the ˙ military-political realm at that time. Among the forty mentioned amirs, at least twenty-four belonged to the Mansu¯riyya. These were: Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯, Tughrı¯l al˙ ˙ ¯Igha¯nı¯, Aybak al-Khaznada¯r, Sunqur al-Aʿsar, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, Sunqur al˙ ¯ lmalik, Sala¯r, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, Murshid al-Khaznada¯r, Baktamur Kama¯lı¯, A al-Ju¯kanda¯r, Aybak al-Baghdadı¯, Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h, La¯jı¯n Zı¯rba¯j, Sunqur al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯, ˙ Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯, Ku¯ka¯y, Qara¯la¯jı¯n, Kira¯y, Aqqu¯sh Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ, Balaba¯n Turna¯, Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯, Qullı¯ al-Silahda¯r, Ta¯kiz (Balaba¯n) al-Tughrı¯lı¯. ˙ ˙ ˙ Three of the forty amirs were mamluks of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs (Taybars al-Khaz˙ ˙ nada¯rı¯ was a mamluk of Baydara¯ and after his death became an associate of La¯jı¯n, Baha¯dur al-Muʿizzı¯ was a mamluk of La¯jı¯n and Bı¯lı¯k al-Khat¯ırı¯ was ˙ probably a mamluk of Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯).210 Another three amirs were in ˙ friendly or family relations with Sala¯r. Mu¯sa¯ b. al-Sa¯lih ʿAlı¯ b. Qala¯wu¯n was ˙ ˙ married to Sala¯r’s daughter; Jama¯l al-Dı¯n al-Tashla¯qı¯ was a khushda¯sh and as˙ ¯ dam was Sala¯r’s brother. Another two amirs sociate of Sala¯r, and Sayf al-Dı¯n A were among the associates of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r: Muhammad b. al-Shaykhı¯ the ˙ wa¯lı¯ of Cairo and Yaʿqu¯ba¯ al-Shahrazu¯rı¯.211 Only eight amirs, probably, neither belonged nor were closely related to the Mansu¯riyya: the Sa¯lih¯ı Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯, ˙ ˙ ˙ his son, the son of the Za¯hirı¯ Aytamish al-Saʿdı¯, the Na¯sirı¯ Su¯day, the wa¯fidı¯ ˙ ˙ Muba¯riz al-Dı¯n Sawwa¯r, Mughlta¯y b. amı¯r majlis, Baha¯dur al-Yu¯sufı¯ and Sanjar ˙ al-Sawa¯bı¯. ˙ It is noteworthy that the above list of amirs does not include the names of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who were in Syria and played significant roles in the battle, such as ˙ ¯ s, Kujkun, Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯, Qutlu¯bak, AqQibjaq, Asandamur Kurjı¯, Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ qu¯sh al-Afram, Qara¯sunqur, Butkha¯s the Burjı¯, and Baktamur al-Silahda¯r. Kit˙ ˙ bugha¯ is mentioned among the commanders who arrived in the battle area with the army of Hama. However, he is not mentioned afterwards. Since he died of disease about three months after the battle, it seems that he was already sick at the time of the fighting and hence did not take a significant part in it.212 In the battle ¯ dilı¯, of ʿUrd that preceded the main fighting, the commanders were Ughrlu¯ al-ʿA ˙ 209 Sulu¯k, 1:938–940; Nuju¯m, 8:165–168. 210 See on Taybars al-Khaznada¯r: Durar (Cairo) 2:330–331; On Baha¯dur al-Muʿizzı¯ see: Durar (Cairo),˙ 2:29. On Bı¯lı¯k: Wa¯fı¯, 10:17. 211 On Muhammad b. al-Shaykhı¯, see section 5.2 below; on Yaʿqu¯ba¯ al-Shahrazu¯rı¯ see Nuju¯m, 8:225. ˙ 212 Kitbugha¯’s illness began already in 701/1302, when he returned from the raid on Cilicia (Sulu¯k, 1:923).

126

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

the mamluk of Kitbugha¯ and Muhammad the son of Qara¯sunqur. Hence, out of ˙ fifty-three commanders and amirs mentioned in relation to the battle of Marj alSuffar, thirty-five belonged to the Mansu¯riyya and ten others were mamluks, ˙ ˙ sons, relatives or close associates of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs. At least three of the dead in ˙ the battle were high-ranking Mansu¯rı¯ amirs. All this data indicates the indis˙ putable dominance of the Mansu¯riyya during the first decade of the 8th/14th ˙ century. After the battle of Marj al-Suffar few quite minor military events between the ˙ Mamluks and the Mongols are recorded. Ibn Kathı¯r mentions that in the beginning of 705/July 1305 the army of Aleppo fell into an ambush by a group of Mongols that brought about the death of some of the prominent amirs of the army and others.213 In 708/1308 news arrived of the Mongols’ approach to Syria. A Mamluk force, headed by the Mansu¯rı¯s Aqqu¯sh Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ and Shams al-Dı¯n ˙ Aldukuz al-Silahda¯r, prepared to set out toward the enemy, but soon after news ˙ arrived according to which the first reports about a Mongol advance were not 214 true. Also during the short reign of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r no serious events with the Mongols had occurred. In Juma¯da¯ I 709/October 1309, Aqqu¯sh Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ and La¯jı¯n Zı¯rba¯j set out together with some other amirs at the head of two thousand horsemen toward Aleppo. According to al-Maqrı¯zı¯, it was due to news about the Mongols’ intention to reach Aleppo. According to Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, ˙ however, it was because of the Mongols’ raids on the frontier zones and the blow they inflicted on the Turkmans in ʿAynta¯b. The aftermath of this event, however, is not recorded.215 In the same year, a Mamluk army headed by Butkha¯s the ˙ mamluk of Qara¯sunqur defeated a Mongol force that raided Karkar, in the northern district of Kakhta¯. The Mamluks took many prisoners and horses.216 Diplomatic contacts Alongside the military conflicts that occurred during post-Mongol rule in Syria, diplomatic contacts were initiated. During the end of 700/summer 1301, messengers of Gha¯za¯n arrived in the Mamluk sultanate with a letter full of accusations and wranglings with the Mamluks. The letter included a call for peace, that actually meant total surrender by the Mamluks to Gha¯za¯n, with threats in case the Mamluk refuse to accept it. Several weeks later, the Mamluks sent back an official response, in which they replied to the accusations, doubted Gha¯za¯n’s status as a Muslim and stressed that they, the Mamluks, and not Gha¯za¯n and the Mongols, were the ones who enjoyed divine support. The letter, however, ended on a more 213 214 215 216

Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:29. Zubda, 402. Zubda, 410; Sulu¯k, 2:55–56. Zubda, 402–403; Niha¯ya, 32:138.

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s second reign ˙ ˙ ˙

127

conciliatory tone, with an offer of peace. The Mongol envoys were sent back to Gha¯za¯n with a lot of money and gifts.217 In Dhu¯ al-Hijja 701/August 1302, another embassy on behalf of Gha¯za¯n that ˙ included two qa¯d¯ıs arrived in Cairo. They demanded, again, that al-Na¯sir Mu˙ ˙ hammad acknowledge the overlordship of the ¯Ilkha¯n by sending tribute to ˙ Gha¯za¯n and mentioning his name on coinage and in the Friday sermons. The two ambassadors were sent back with the response of the ruling Mansu¯rı¯ amirs. Two ˙ representatives of the Mamluks followed the Mongol messengers, the Na¯sirı¯ ˙ Uzdamur al-Mujı¯rı¯ and the qa¯d¯ı ʿIma¯d al-Dı¯n al-Sukkarı¯, and they met with ˙ Gha¯za¯n in Juma¯da¯ I 702/December 1302-January 1303. Mamluk sources do not mention these envoys’ message. However, according to pro-Mongol sources, the letter on behalf of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs declined Gha¯za¯n’s offer by stressing the ˙ Mamluks’ role as the guardians of Islam. The Mansu¯rı¯ amirs rejected the demand ˙ to include Gha¯za¯n’s name on their coinage, and suggested, instead, that Gha¯za¯n’s coinage should bear the name of the sultan al-Na¯sir Muhammad and the name of ˙ ˙ the Egyptian caliph alongside his own. Moreover, the two Mamluk embassadors brought with them from Cairo a box full of weapons, implying Mamluk readiness for a battle. Gha¯za¯n was furious and imprisoned the two messengers in an unused madrasa, where they stayed for two years.218 After Gha¯za¯n’s death in Shawwa¯l 703/May 1304, he was succeeded by his brother, who took the regnal title of Öljeitü and who is mentioned in the Arabic sources as Kharbanda¯ or Khuda¯banda¯. The new ¯Ilkha¯n released the two Mamluk ambassadors and sent them back to Cairo with several of his own envoys, who carried gifts and a message of peace. For the first time, an agreement that did not mean total submission to the Mongols but a cessation of war was offered. The ¯Ilkha¯n also expressed his desire for free passage of merchants. In addition, he asked for the release of several Mongol commanders who were captured at the battle of Marj al-Suffar. The Mamluks sent in response two envoys with gifts in ˙ order to confirm the agreement.219 However, it seems that the motives for the 217 See the versions of Gha¯za¯n’s letter to the Mamluks: Al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:212–214 (tr. 1:181–184); Zubda, 352–353; Niha¯ya, 31:426–430; Kanz, 9:53–56; Zetterstéen, 93–94; See also: Sulu¯k, 1:915–916. See the version of the Mamluks’ letter to Gha¯za¯n: Al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:243–247 (trans. 1:194–198); Zubda, 356–361; Kanz, 9:66–70; Niha¯ya, 31:430–442 ; Zetterstéen, 98–101. See more on these letters: Broadbridge, Ideology, 81–85; Boyle, “I¯l-Kha¯ns”, 390. 218 Broadbridge, Ideology, 87–88; al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:55. Several Mamluk sources mention the dialogue between Gha¯za¯n and the two envoys of the Mamluks, see: Kanz, 9:71–76; Zetterstéen, 101– 104; ʿIqd, 4:168–172. See summary and analysis of this dialogue: Broadbridge, Ideology, 88– 90. There is also an English translation of the dialogue in Amitai, Holy War, 109–115. See a German translation of this dialogue: Heribert Horst, “Eine Gesandtschaft des Mamlu¯ken alMalik an-Na¯sir am ¯Ilha¯n-Hof in Persien”, in Der Orient in der Forschung: Festschrift für Otto ˙ ˘ Spies. ed. Wilhelm Hoenerbach (Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1967), 355–362. 219 Sulu¯k, 2:6; Niha¯ya, 32:86–87; Tuhfa, 176; Broadbridge, Ideology, 95. ˙

128

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

¯Ilkha¯n’s policy were not derived from genuine intentions for peace with the Mamluks. They aimed to achieve a temporary respite from the conflict, until the Mongol army would become strong again. Indeed, alongside these diplomatic contacts with the Mamluks, Öljeitü sent messengers to Europe in order to get support for a new military attack on the Mamluks.220 5.4.2. Expeditions against the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia and the Franks During the joint rule of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r, the Armenian kingdom of Cilicia, a protectorate of the Mongols, continued to suffer from occasional Mamluk attacks. Already in Shaʿba¯n 701/April 1302 a Mamluk force was dispatched against Cilicia. The Arabic sources mention that the reason for this attack was related to the Armenian king’s detaining the tribute to the Mamluks and disobedience to the sultan while collaborating with Gha¯za¯n. It might be, however, that this raid was planned some time before and aimed to punish the Armenians and their king Hetʿum for their aid to Gha¯za¯n’s expedition about a year and a half before. The Mamluk force that was dispatched from Cairo was headed by the Mansu¯rı¯ Aybak al-Khaznada¯r and the Sa¯lih¯ı Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯. In ˙ ˙ ˙ ¯ Damascus this force was joined by the Mansu¯rı¯s Baha¯dur A s and Qutlu¯bak and ˙ ˙ ˙ the Sa¯lih¯ı Baybars al-Ja¯liq. The whole force advanced now to Hama, where the ˙ ˙ army of this district joined it, under the command of Kitbugha¯ and the Ayyu¯bid prince and historian Abu¯ al-Fida¯ʾ. This Mamluk army arrived in Aleppo on 1 Dhu¯ al-Qaʿda/28 June 1302 and from there it set out on an expedition of destruction and looting in the Armenian Kingdom that lasted about two weeks. It seems that this attack was intended to be restricted and short.221 However, in 703/1304 the Mamluks initiated a much larger attack on the Armenians. Al-Nuwayrı¯ mentions that the expedition was a response to a Mongol attack on the army of Aleppo when it raided on the Armenian lands.222 At the head of the army were (again) the Sa¯lih¯ı Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯, the Mansu¯rı¯ Sun˙ ˙ ˙ qursha¯h and an amir named Sanjar al-Sawa¯bı¯, with three thousand horsemen. ˙ When the force arrived in Damascus, in Ramada¯n 703/April 1304, the armies of ˙ ¯ s at the Syrian districts, all headed by senior Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, joined it: Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ the head of two thousand horsemen of the army of Damascus; Qibjaq at the head of the army of Hama; Asandamur Kurjı¯ at the head of the army of Tripoli and the coastal fortresses; Balaba¯n al-Ju¯kanda¯r at the head of the army of Homs; and Qara¯sunqur at the head of the army of Aleppo. Aybak al-Khaznada¯r is also 220 Broadbridge, Ideology, 95–96; Boyle, “I¯l-Kha¯ns”, 399–340; Reuven Amitai, “The Resolution of the Mongol-Mamluk War”, in Mongols, Turks, and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World, eds. Reuven Amitai and Michal Biran (Leiden: Brill, 2005), 361. 221 Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 153–158, Abu¯ al-Fida¯ʾ, 4:46–47; Sulu¯k, 1:922–923. 222 Niha¯ya, 32:75; see also: Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 159.

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s second reign ˙ ˙ ˙

129

mentioned as one of the commanders. Since Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯ fell ill and remained in Aleppo, the army was headed only by the Mansu¯riyya. The Mamluk ˙ army attacked from Aleppo in two directions with two detachments, headed by Qibjaq and Qara¯sunqur. The Mamluks laid waste to Cilicia, burning crops, destroying villages and taking plunder and captives. After a long siege of Tall Hamdu¯n fortress, they took it at the beginning of Dhu¯ al-Qaʿda 703/June 1304 by ˙ ama¯n agreement. The agreement defined the exact borders of Aleppo disctrict, i. e. the Mamluk territories, and the Armenian territories. In addition, it obliged the Armenians to pay two years’ tribute to the Mamluks. Furthermore, the Mamluks captured at Tall Hamdu¯n six or eight Armenian governors of the ˙ fortresses of the region. Qara¯sunqur ordered their execution and they were behaeaded, except for the governor of Nujayma fortress who converted to Islam.223 Another attack on Cilicia was carried out in 705/1305. The main reason was that the Armenian king had delayed in sending the customary tribute to the Sultanate. According to Armenian sources, however, the motive for the Mamluk attack was related to Gha¯za¯n’s death. This time, the army was not dispatched from Egypt but only from Aleppo. Qara¯sunqur, the governor of the city, sent his ustada¯r Qashtamur al-Shamsı¯ at the head of an army consisting of halqa soldiers ˙ and ajna¯d. The sources mention different information regarding the size of the Mamluk force. According to al-Maqrı¯zı¯, it numbered about two thousand strong. Al-ʿAynı¯ mentions four thousand horsemen and Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯ notes no less than about ten thousand horsemen. According to Armenian sources, the Mamluks numbered seven thousand soldiers.224 At first, the Mamluk force conducted a successful raid on Cilicia, as usual taking plunder and captives and burning villages. However, unluckily for the Mamluks, a large Mongol force was in the area. According to one version, it was a Mongol force that had come to Cilicia in order to collect the Armenian tribute to the ¯Ilkha¯n. Another version notes that it was a detachment of three thousand horsemen headed by Qutlu¯sha¯h. ˙ Interestingly enough, Mufaddal Ibn Abı¯ al-Fada¯ʾil mentions that this force was ˙˙ ˙ pursuing Sala¯r’s mother, who was on her way to Syria. However, the Mongol force decided to fight for the Armenians, after the Armenian king offered them a large sum of money to do so. A group of Franks who happened to be with the king joined the force that numbered altogether six thousand horsemen. This force managed to ambush the Mamluks on their way back to the sultanate, near Aya¯s. The Mamluks fell into an ambush in which they were shot at with arrows and 223 Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 159–163; Niha¯ya, 32:75–76; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:24; ʿIqd, 4:300–303; Kanz, 9:110–112; Zetterstéen, 129. 224 Sulu¯k, 2:16; ʿIqd, 4:382; Kanz, 9:131; Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 164–165. Mufaddal Ibn ˙ ˙ 20/ Abı¯ al-Fada¯ʾil mentions the same number as Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯, see: Mufaddal (Blochet), ˙ ˙˙ 1:111, probably since he copied from him (Little, Introduction, 35–36; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 49) and not for other reasons (Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 165, n. 439).

130

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

stones. Some of the Mamluks were killed and many others were taken captive. Small group of amirs managed to flee, among them Qashtamur al-Shamsı¯, the commander of the Mamluk force. According to almost all the sources, Qashtamur, Qara¯sunqur’s mamluk, was responsible for the failure due to his bad management of the expedition. It should be noted that the combined MongolArmenian force significantly outnumbered the Mamluks.225 Following the fiasco in Cilicia, a Mamluk force was dispatched from Egypt. In Shaʿba¯n 705/March 1306 an army of four thousand horsemen set out from Egypt headed by the Sa¯lih¯ı Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯ and the Mansu¯rı¯s Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ and Aldukuz al-Silahda¯r. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ ˙ notes that he was ordered to assist Bakta¯sh in commanding the force since Bakta¯sh, who at that time was over eighty, was deaf and nearly blind. Baybars alMansu¯rı¯, hence, effectively held the command.226 When the army was in Gaza, ˙ Qara¯sunqur informed the Armenian king about the approaching army and warned him that if he did not immediately offer obedience and pay the tribute to the sultan, the army would wreak havoc in his lands. The Armenian king, who was afraid of the Mamluk response, immediately offered his submission and dispatched the tribute. He even excused his actions in the battle saying that it was the Mongols who fought against the Mamluks and not him. He also promised to bring about the release of the amirs who were captured by the Mongols. As a result, Bakta¯sh and the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs left Gaza and returned to Cairo without ˙ any military action against the Armenians.227 Examination of the military events between the Mamluks and the Armenians during the Mansu¯riyya period gives about the impression that the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs ˙ ˙ did not have the intention to “efface the Armenians from the map”. The Mamluk expedition to Cilicia aimed to punish the Armenians, to lay waste their lands and to insure the delivery of the huge tribute to the sultanate. The Armenian kingdom of Cilicia was easy prey for the Mamluks, but still was able from time to time to resist these invasions thanks to limited aid from the ¯Ilkha¯n Mongols. After the Mansu¯riyya period, the Amenians would cease to seek to mount any defence for ˙ their territories from Mamluk assaults. Several punitive expeditions would be launched against the Armenians in order to insure the tax income, until the final conquest of Cilicia and its annexation to the Mamluk sultanate in 776/1375.228 225 Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 164–168; Niha¯ya, 32:95–96; Sulu¯k, 2:16–17; ʿIqd, 4:381–384; Abu¯ al-Fida¯ʾ, 4:52; Zubda, 383; Mufaddal (Blochet), 20/1:110. ˙ ˙ u¯rı¯”, 42; On Bakta¯sh’s age: Sulu¯k, 2:18–19. 226 Zubda, 384; Richards, “Baybars al-Mans ˙ 227 Zubda, 384; Sulu¯k, 2:17; Tuhfa, 177; Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 169–170. In Rabı¯ʿ I 706/ ˙ king’s messangers reached the sultan with the tribute, and September 1306 the Armenian two hundred and seventy Muslim captives were released (Niha¯ya, 32:121). In 708/1309 another delegation from Cilicia arrived with tribute and gifts for the sultan (Niha¯ya, 32:137). 228 Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 190–191; Irwin, Middle East, 120.

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s second reign ˙ ˙ ˙

131

Although the Crusaders were expelled from Mamluk territories during alAshraf Khalı¯l’s reign, they still remained a threat to the Mamluks. Crusader forces still existed in Ruad island, in the vicinity of Tarsus, and posed a threat to Tripoli. These Franks belonged to the Templar order, and were forced to reatreat to this island after they failed to take several cities of the Syrian coast in 699/ 1300.229 At the beginning of 702/September 1302, a Mamlu¯k naval force, headed by Kaharda¯sh al-Zarra¯q al-Mansu¯rı¯, sailed with several ships toward the island.230 ˙ Kaharda¯sh arrived with the Mamluk ships in Tripoli, where Asandamur Kurjı¯, the Mansu¯rı¯ governor of the city, joined him with a group of his soldiers. The ˙ Mamluk army landed on the island of Ruad and proceeded to conduct a harsh and intense siege of the Crusaders. The Muslims enjoyed a significant military advantage, since according to Christian sources, the Crusaders in the island had no naval force to hold back the Mamluk assault. The Crusaders, indeed, suffered great losses. According to Muslim sources, most of the Franks in the island were killed, about two thousand in number. The rest, about five hundred, were taken captive after they surrenderd and asked for ama¯n. Crusaders sources mention eight hundred people who were killed, and two hundred and eighty who were taken captive by the Muslims. The Mamluk army returned to Cairo with a lot of booty and prisoners, who were distributed among the Syrian fortresses. By eradicating the Crusader presence on Ruad, the Mamluk leadership eliminated the possibility that the island would be used as a bridgehead for another crusade, and in fact, “put the last nail in the coffin of the Crusader kingdom”.231 5.4.3. Expeditions against the Nusayrı¯s of Kasrawa¯n and the Bedouin in Egypt ˙ Alongside external enemies, the Mansu¯riyya amirs had to cope with domestic ˙ disorder among both the Bedouin in Egypt and the Nusayrı¯s in Lebanon. In 20 ˙ Shawwa¯l 699/9 July 1300, shortly after his arrival to recently liberated Damascus, Aqqu¯sh al-Afram set out for Lebanon. He aimed to punish the Nusayrı¯ hillsmen ˙ of Kasrawa¯n following their attacks on the Mamluk army when it retreated from the battlefield of Wa¯dı¯ al-Khaznada¯r. For this purpose, Aqqu¯sh al-Afram united all the district armies of Syria and their Mansu¯rı¯ commanders: Safed headed by ˙ 229 In Dhu¯ al-Qaʿda 699/July 1300 a fleet commanded by the king of Cyprus embarked in order to retake the Holy Land. At the head of the Crusader forces stood also the heads of the Templars and Hospitallers in Cyprus. They were based in the island of Ruad and managed to capture Tortosa but were forced to retreat to Ruad, since their allies, the ¯Ilkha¯nid Mongols, failed to come to their aid. Most of the Crusaders withdrew to Cyprus, but Templars forces remained in Ruad. See: Sylvia Schein, “Gesta Dei per Mongolos 1300. The Genesis of a NonEvent”, English Historical Review 94:373 (1979), 811. 230 Sulu¯k, 1:923, 928–929; Zubda, 366. For this naval assault four new ships were constructed. 231 Niha¯ya, 32:19; Sulu¯k, 1:928–929; Zubda, 366; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:18; Schein, “Gesta Dei per Mongolos”, 811.

132

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

Kira¯y, Hama headed by Kitbugha¯ and Homs and Tripoli headed by Asandamur Kurjı¯. This big Mamluk Syrian army brought about a decisive victory after a few days of fighting. The Nusayrı¯s were forced to pay a heavy tribute to the Mamluk ˙ sultanate and to bring back the weapons and the fabrics they looted during the previous attacks on the Mamluks. The lands of the Nusayrı¯s were distributed as ˙ iqta¯ʿs to the amirs.232 ˙ Five years later, on 2 Muharram 705/25 July 1305, Aqqu¯sh al-Afram was ˙ compelled to set out on another expedition against the Nusayrı¯s. The havoc that ˙ the Nusayrı¯s had wreaked on the Mamluk army during the battle of Wa¯dı¯ al˙ Khaznada¯r and was “worse than that of the Mongols”, as Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ notes, was not forgotten. Al-Nuwayrı¯ adds that since the Mamluk were deafeated in this battle, the Nusayrı¯s’ revolts against Mamluk central rule became stronger ˙ and stronger. From Abu¯ al-Fida¯ʾ one might deduce that the motives for the attack were derived from religious and security reasons. The hillsmen were considered to be heretics who deviated from the right Islamic path, and in addition they used to kidnap Muslims and sell them to non-Muslims, a situation that necessitated the safeguarding of the roads in the region. Aqqu¯sh al-Afram headed several forces including also the army of Tripoli lead by Asandamur Kurjı¯. According to Muslim sources, the Mamluks gathered a huge force, numbering about fifty thousand horsemen. This number, however, is exaggerated. It seems that it was closer to fifteen thousand warriors. The Mamluk army encircled the mountain from all sides. Abu¯ al-Fida¯ʾ notes that due to the difficult terrain the Mamluks had to dismount from their horses and climbed to the top of the mountain on foot. The Syrian army demolished the villages of the Nusayrı¯s, taking hundreds of ˙ prisoners and a huge amount of booty until it returned to Damascus in 14 Safar/5 ˙ September.233 It seems that the Mansu¯riyya policy toward the Nusayrı¯s closely followed ˙ ˙ Qala¯wu¯n’s previous line and was similar to the policy toward the Armenians. The idea of converting this heretic sect was replaced by punitive expeditions each time the Nusayrı¯s revolted or posed a threat to the central rule.234 ˙ Three expeditions were also conducted against the Bedouin in Egypt. The Bedouin tribes in south and western Egypt were hostile to the Mamluk regime from its inception and refused to subject themselves to the “slave rule” of Mamluks. The Mamluks had to intervene in Bedouin affairs also due to the constant tribal conflicts.235 In 700/1300–1, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ was sent in ˙ 232 Sulu¯k, 1:902–903; Muqaffa¯, 2:237; Kanz, 9:40; al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:130; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:11; al-Dhahabı¯, Ta’rı¯kh, 60:97. 233 Zubda, 386; Niha¯ya, 32:97; Abu¯ al-Fida¯ʾ, 4:52; Kanz, 9:17, 131; Sulu¯k, 2:14–15. 234 Henri Laoust, “Remarques sur les expéditions du Kasrawa¯n sous les premiers Mamluks”, Bulletin du Musée de Beyrouth 4 (1940), 112–115. 235 Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 97–98; Irwin, Middle East, 27, 44–45.

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n’s second reign ˙ ˙ ˙

133

command of twenty tablkha¯na¯h amirs to suppress an internal conflict between ˙ two tribes in al-Buhayra district. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ mentions the names of ˙ ˙ eighteen of the twenty tablkha¯na¯h amirs who accompanied him, from whence it ˙ is clear that the role of the Mansu¯rı¯-Burjı¯ amirs and awla¯d al-na¯s was the most ˙ prominent in this expedition. Except for Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, all the other ˙ Mansu¯rı¯ amirs mentioned probably belonged to the Burjiyya, including Tash˙ ˙ tamur al-Jumaqda¯r, Aldukuz al-Silahda¯r, Mughulta¯y al-Masʿu¯dı¯, La¯jı¯n Zı¯rba¯j ˙ ˙ and Ta¯kiz (Balaba¯n) al-Tughrı¯lı¯. Six of the amirs were awla¯d al-na¯s, among them ˙ Muhammad b. Turunta¯y al-Mansu¯rı¯. Baybars mentions that he and the amirs ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ arrived at Taru¯ja and defeated the Bedouin. They managed to bring about a sulh ˙ ˙ agreement between the rival tribes. They returned to Cairo with many camels and 236 sheep that they took as booty. Later in the same year, it was Sunqur al-Aʿsar who set out to defeat the Bedouin in Egypt, this time in Upper Egypt following the Bedouin revolt and their refusal to pay the khara¯j taxes to the central government in Cairo. Other amirs accompanied Sunqur al-Aʿsar, of whom we know only about Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, ˙ according to his own report. The Mansu¯rı¯ amirs commanded about one hundred ˙ royal mamluks. They wreaked havoc in the Bedouin lands, looting, taking prisoners and cruelly killing many of the Bedouin. As a result, the Bedouin were compelled to pay the taxes. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ mentioned that he and the amirs ˙ met the leaders of the Bedouin in Manfalu¯t, and imposed a heavy tribute of ˙ money, property, animals and weapons on them. The Mamluks carried thousands of horses, camels and sheep, as well as different kinds of weapons, back to Cairo.237 Another expedition took place in 701/1301–2 following a similar Bedouin revolt in Upper Egypt. The Bedouin rebelled against the central government and acted independently in their regions. They were not obedient to the Mamluk local governors, did not pay the khara¯j taxes to the central government and even took their own taxes from the merchants in Asyu¯t and Manfalu¯t. Interestingly enough, ˙ ˙ perhaps in order to demonstrate their independance from the Mamluk sultanate and to mock it, the Bedouin leaders took for themselves names of the amirs and their two main leaders were named Baybars and Sala¯r. The Mamluks, however, decided to put an end to these revolts. It seems that special efforts were made in this expedition to supress the Bedouin revolts “once and for all” and to subjugate them to the Mamluk central government. The Mamluks decided to have “no mercy” on the local population. A strong and big army set out from Cairo, headed by no less than twenty-four of the most senior 236 Zubda, 348–349. According to the less reliable Ibn Iya¯s, the Mamluk force included twenty amirs of ten and five hundred royal mamluks (Ibn Iya¯s 1:407). 237 Zubda, 351; Sulu¯k, 1:914.

134

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

amirs, including Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r as well as the sultan himself. Most of the other commanders belonged to the Mansu¯riyya as well. Among them ˙ were Sunqur al-Aʿsar, Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r, Aqqu¯sh Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ, Baybars alMansu¯rı¯, Qibjaq La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯, Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯ and Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h. The ˙ ˙ Mansu¯rı¯ amirs planned their attack carefully. They spread the news that they ˙ were leaving for Syria, whereas in fact they were divided into four groups headed to Upper Egypt. Each one arrived in Upper Egypt from a different direction: one from the west, the second from the east, the third from the Nile by ship, and the fourth through the main road. The Mamluks managed to take the Bedoiun by surprise and caused heavy losses. Many Bedouin were killed, others were captured and a tremendous booty of horses, camels and cattle, as well as other property and weapons, was taken.238 However, the Mamluk triumph did not mark a “watershed” in MamlukBedouin relations. Unlike the Armenians and the Nusayrı¯s, that stopped posing a ˙ serious challenge to the post-Mansu¯riyya Mamluk sultanate, the Bedouin of ˙ Upper Egypt never accepted Mamluk authority. They continued to cause serious problems to the central government in Cairo during the whole Mamluk period.239

6.

Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s reign (708/1309–709/1310)

Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r was crowned as sultan after al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s retire˙ ˙ ment to Kerak. In order to legitimate Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s rule, the usual ceremonies were performed. The caliph al-Mustakfı¯ bi-Alla¯h Abu¯ al-Rabı¯ʿ Sulayma¯n officially appointed Baybars as sultan, and the new sultan performed the royal procession, wearing the black garments of the Abbasid Caliphate. The new sultan sat on the throne on 23 Shawwa¯l 708/5 April 1309 and took the regnal title al-Malik al-Muzaffar. The Burjı¯ confidants of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r – Butkha¯s, ˙ ˙ La¯jı¯n Zı¯rba¯j and Qullı¯ al-Silahda¯r – took the amirs’ oath of allegiance to new ˙ sultan. Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯ was sent to Damascus for the same purpose.240 Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r appointed Sala¯r as his viceroy. He did not make any changes in the appointments of the governors, except for the removal of the governor of

238 ʿIqd, 4:173–177; Sulu¯k, 1:920–922; Zubda, 363–364; Zetterstéen, 107; Niha¯ya, 32:14; al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:254. The only non-Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who are mentioned as commanders in this expedition ˙ were the Sa¯lih¯ı Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı ¯, Balaba¯n al-Ghulmushı¯, and Taqsuba¯ al-Za¯hirı¯, who was ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙of Qu¯s. the governor ˙ 239 See, for example, their revolts in the 750s/1350s (Irwin, Middle East, 141–142) and during the second Mamluk period: Jean-Claude Garcin, “The regime of the Circassian Mamluks”, in The Cambridge History of Egypt, vol. 1: Islamic Egypt, 640–1517, 292, 294, 295, 296, 297, 314. 240 Zubda, 406; Nuju¯m, 8:233; Kanz, 9:160; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:39; Sulu¯k, 2:45.

Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s reign (708/1309–709/1310)

135

Gaza, the Mansu¯rı¯ Baybars al-ʿAla¯’ı¯, to the position of amir in Damascus and the ˙ appointment of Balaba¯n al-Badrı¯ instead of him.241 It was from the inception of Baybars’ rule that strife among the Mansu¯riyya ˙ escalated. The Mansu¯riyya was divided between the zealous supporters of Bay˙ bars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, his opponents, and those who vacillated until the power balance between the expelled sultan and Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r became clearer. The supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r included mainly the members of the Burjiyya elite, namely Aqqu¯sh al-Afram the governor of Damascus, Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯, ˙ Baybars al-Ahmadı¯, Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯, Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h, Tughrı¯l al-I¯gha¯nı¯, ˙ ˙ ˙ Aldukuz al-Silahda¯r, Qijma¯s al-Ju¯kanda¯r, Ta¯kiz (Balaba¯n) al-Tughrı¯lı¯, Bala¯t al˙ ˙ ˙ Ju¯kanda¯r, Qullı¯ al-Silahda¯r and Aydamur al-Yu¯nusı¯, as well as Aqqu¯sh al-Ru¯mı¯, ˙ 242 Sa¯rim al-Dı¯n [Uzbek] al-Jarmakı¯, Sa¯t¯ı and Taybars al-Jamda¯r. In addition, ˙ ˙ ˙ Baybars’ supporters included his close associates (khawa¯ss) – his son in-law ˙˙ Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯ and Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ the governor of Kerak. It seems that most of the other Mansu¯rı¯ amirs did not truly support Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. ˙ Indeed, as al-Na¯sir Muhammad became stronger, more and more Mansu¯rı¯ amirs ˙ ˙ ˙ defected to his side. The opposition to Baybars’ rule started immediately after his coronation with the refusal of several Syrian amirs to give their oath to the new sultan. These were Baybars al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ (who was deposed from the governorship of Gaza by the new ¯ s, the Za¯hirı¯ Aqjuba¯, and Baktamur al-Ha¯jib, a sultan), the Mansu¯rı¯ Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ mamluk of the deceased Mansu¯rı¯ amir Turunta¯y. They agreed to swear allegiance ˙ ˙ ˙ to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r only after they were persuaded to do so by Aqqu¯sh alAfram.243 Even stronger opposition to Baybars’ rule came from the Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ governors of the three major districts of Syria, i. e. Qara¯sunqur the governor of Aleppo; Qibjaq the governor of Hama; and Asandamur Kurjı¯ the governor of Tripoli. These three amirs were furious at not being consulted before Baybars alJa¯shnakı¯r’s coronation. In response, the three amirs met secretly in Aleppo. They decided to oppose the rule of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram strongly. Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s envoys reached Qara¯sunqur in Aleppo and discovered that he and his two Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯shs Qibjaq and Asandamur ˙ refused to give their oath of allegiance to Baybars. At the same time, Qara¯sunqur sent his son, amir Muhammad, to al-Na¯sir Muhammad in Kerak with a letter ˙ ˙ ˙ from his father. In these letters the three amirs expressed their sorrow at al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad’s decision to abdicate from the sultanate. They stressed that they ˙ had not given their oath of allegiance to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, that their loyalty was only to al-Na¯sir Muhammad and that they would make every effort to assist ˙ ˙ 241 Niha¯ya, 32:140; Sulu¯k, 2:45. 242 Sulu¯k, 2:46–47; Kanz, 9:158–159; Zubda, 406; Nuju¯m, 8:235–236. 243 Nuju¯m, 8:236–237.

136

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

him to take the sultanate again. As much as he was encouraged by this initiative, al-Na¯sir Muhammad realized that a rebellion of three districts in Syria, at that ˙ ˙ phase, would not have any success, when the amirs of Egypt and Damascus supported Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. Al-Na¯sir Muhammad, therefore, wrote to the ˙ ˙ three governors that for now they should submit to the new sultan and be patient. He asked them, however, to inform him about any political development. Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r decided to cope with the situation in moderation and with flattery, thanks to Sala¯r’s advice. He sent to each of the three amirs an appointment decree that entitled them to act almost as independent rulers of their districts, so they would not have to transfer any taxes to the central treasury in Cairo. The intention behind this move was to satisfy the amirs and to purchase their support only for the short term, until the sultan’s political power of the sultan strengthened and he was able to bring them to heal. In addition, Baybars gave each of these amirs a robe of honour worth one thousand dinars, fabrics and horses. Only after these moves did the three governors agree to give their allegiance to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. However, they continued to oppose Baybars’ rule and to recruit additional opponents among the other governors of Syria.244 Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s rule, thus, did not last for long. It was undermined due to three main factors: the suspicions that prevailed among Baybars and his viceroy Sala¯r; the populace’s enmity toward Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and their sympathy toward al-Na¯sir Muhammad; and the continuous conflicts between ˙ ˙ Baybars and al-Na¯sir Muhammad, who managed to gain the support of a great ˙ ˙ majority of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs. In what follows, these three factors will be dis˙ cussed. Continuous enmity prevailed between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r. As discussed above, during the ten years of their joint rule the tension between the two amirs never ceased. This tension continued also when Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r was crowned as the de jure and de facto sultan. The Burjiyya did not cease inciting Baybars against Sala¯r and urging him to act against his viceroy. Baybars refused these demands and did not arrest Sala¯r, but the enmity between the two leading amirs probably brought about the first defection of amirs to al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad’s side, as discussed below. This first defection was followed by many ˙ others and caused the undermining of Baybars’ rule and eventually its fall. During the conflicts between the two factions, Sala¯r’s associates even tried to assassinate Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r.245

244 Nuju¯m, 8:238–242. 245 See on the conflicts between Baybars and the Burjiyya and Sala¯r and his supporters: Sulu¯k, 2:53, 58, 70, 258; Nuju¯m, 8:244, 247, 270. On the attempt to assassinate Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r: Sulu¯k, 2:59. See also: Aʿya¯n, 2:490; Muqaffa¯, 2:548.

Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s reign (708/1309–709/1310)

137

The sympathy of the people (al-ʿa¯mma) for al-Na¯sir Muhammad and their ˙ ˙ revulsion from Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r contributed to the latter’s fall, as well. The Arabic sources contain abundant expressions of the people’s sympathy toward al-Na¯sir Muhammad. Though the “pro-Na¯sirite” attitude of contemporary ˙ ˙ ˙ Muslim historians is definitely discernable, it seems that their description of the people’s sympathy for al-Na¯sir Muhammad reflected reality, to a large extent. As ˙ ˙ opposed to the Mansu¯rı¯ sultans, the people saw in al-Na¯sir Muhammad a le˙ ˙ ˙ gitimate ruler, a free-born Muslim and a scion of the Qala¯wu¯nid dynasty.246 It was already when al-Na¯sir Muhammad returned to Cairo from his first exile ˙ ˙ in Kerak as a youth, that the people of Cairo are said to have been extremely 247 happy at his arrival. During the crisis of 707/1307–8, when the people were afraid that the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs would kill or exile the sultan, they actively resisted ˙ them. They did not open the markets and gathered under the citadel, chanting slogans in favour of al-Na¯sir Muhammad and cursing the amirs. The mamluks ˙ ˙ who were sent to disperse the crowd, headed by the Burjı¯ Butkha¯s al-Mansu¯rı¯, ˙ ˙ refrained from attacking it and tried to appease the protesters. Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ mentions explicitly that the reason for these riots were because of the people’s strong affection for al-Na¯sir Muhammad and their reluctance to accept the rule ˙ ˙ of any mamluk amir but only of a decendant of Qala¯wu¯n.248 One year later, when al-Na¯sir Muhammad left Cairo for Kerak, the people are said to have felt sorrow ˙ ˙ at his departure. They gathered around him, wept and blessed him.249 Baybars alMansu¯rı¯ mentions that Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r decided that the caliph al-Mustakfı¯ ˙ bi-Alla¯h would renew his appointment as sultan (see below), in direct response to the protests of the people, who gathered around the citadel and chanted slogans against him. However, after the renewal of Baybars’ coronation, the people continued to express their revulsion from Baybars’ rule and their love for al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad. They protested violently against the mention of Baybars’ name in ˙ the Friday sermons and demanded the reinstatement of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ rule.250 The people of Cairo and Damascus could not hide their enthusiasm and happiness when al-Na¯sir Muhammad made his way from Kerak to Damascus and ˙ ˙ Cairo, in order to retake the sultanate, either. They chanted slogans in favour of al-Na¯sir’s rule and slept on the night before his arrival to Damascus on the roofs ˙ of the houses, in order to watch him.251 In Cairo, the people gathered around 246 On the inclination to glorify the Qala¯wu¯nid dynasty, see introduction, n. 47. See also Ibn alDawa¯da¯rı¯’s observations, for instance: Kanz, 9:155–160. 247 Nuju¯m, 8:116. 248 Nuju¯m, 8:172–173; Sulu¯k, 2:34–36; Boaz Shoshan, Popular Culture in Medieval Cairo (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993), 52. 249 Sulu¯k, 2:43. 250 Tuhfa, 199–200; Durar (Cairo), 2:39; Nuju¯m, 8:264; Niha¯ya, 32:146; Shoshan, 52–53. ˙¯ k, 2:67; Nuju¯m, 8:264–265. 251 Sulu

138

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r just before his escape from the city. They cursed him and threw stones at him.252 The people of Cairo disliked Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and his rule not only because he was not considered a legitimate ruler. It was also because of the droughts and epidemics that broke out in his reign. Similarly to the reign of Kitbugha¯, the people saw in these disasters a sign of God’s dissatisfaction with Baybars’ rule. An indication of the people of Cairo’s revulsion from Baybars and Sala¯r’s rule and their sympathy for al-Na¯sir Muhammad can be found in a popular song that the ˙ ˙ masses used to sing at that time.253 The relatively significant part that the people in Cairo took in the deposition of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and the restoration of alNa¯sir Muhammad’s reign, raises questions regarding the role of the populace in ˙ ˙ Mamluk politics, a role usually regarded as marginal by modern scholars. The enmity between Bayabrs al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r, together with the demonstrations of the people, exacerbated the biggest problem that Baybars had to face, namely the strengthening position of al-Na¯sir Muhammad in Kerak. ˙ ˙ During the four months preceding the restoration of his sultanate, al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad managed to increase his political power significantly vis-à-vis ˙ Baybars and Sala¯r. To end this chapter, a chronological description of the main stages in this crucial conflict between Baybars and Sala¯r to al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ should be discussed in more detail. The first serious incident between the two rivals occurred when Baybars demanded that al-Na¯sir Muhammad send back to Cairo the mamluks, horses and ˙ ˙ property that he took with him to Kerak. Al-Na¯sir Muhammad not only refused ˙ ˙ to do that, but flogged and arrested Baybars’ envoy.254 Al-Na¯sir Muhammad, ˙ ˙ however, returned soon to his strategy, according to which he demonstrated his submission to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, while strengthening his ties with the Mansu¯rı¯ governors of the Syrian districts (Qara¯sunqur, Qibjaq and Asandamur ˙ Kurjı¯), in order to remove Baybars from the sultanate.255 Qara¯sunqur, indeed, promised al-Na¯sir Muhammad that he would accompany him in his march to ˙ ˙ Damascus at the beginning of Shaʿba¯n 709/January 1310. Qara¯sunqur even tried to persuade Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, the confidant of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and the governor of Damascus, to transfer his support to al-Na¯sir Muhammad. In ad˙ ˙ dition, Qara¯sunqur also helped al-Na¯sir Muhammad to attract the other Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ ˙ 252 Sulu¯k, 2:71. 253 Nuju¯m, 8:243–244, 8:282; Ibn Iya¯s, 1:425. The lyrics of the popular song are as follows: “Our sultan is only partly firm (rukayn, implying to Baybar’s regnal title – Rukn al-Dı¯n)/ While his viceroy [Sala¯r] is beardless (referring to Sala¯r’s Mongolian features)/ Where shall we get water from?/ Bring us the lame! [al-Na¯sir Muhammad]/ The water will then come” (Nuju¯m, ˙ 8:244, translated by Boaz Shoshan, see:˙ Shoshan, 53). 254 Nuju¯m, 8:244–245; Sulu¯k, 2:56; Niha¯ya, 32:149; Zubda, 415. 255 Nuju¯m, 8:245–247; Sulu¯k, 2:56–57.

Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s reign (708/1309–709/1310)

139

governors of Syria, Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r the governor of Safed and Kira¯y the governor of Jerusalem, to his side. Al-Na¯sir Muhammad acted according to ˙ ˙ Qara¯sunqur’s advice and via the embassy of his mamluk Aytamish al-Muhammadı¯, he managed to gain the support of Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r, despite his ˙ involvement in the revolt against al-Na¯sir Muhammad.256 ˙ ˙ Gaining the support of the governors of Syria was the first step in al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad’s struggle against Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, Sala¯r and their Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ confidants. The second phase came with the defection of dozens of amirs and mamluks to his side in Juma¯da¯ II/November 1309. This was, in fact, the first significant development that undermined Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s rule. At the head of the defectors was a Mansu¯rı¯ amir named Nu¯gha¯y al-Jamda¯r, who was a ˙ royal mamluk. Together with him, another two amirs and many royal mamluks, numbering between sixty and one hundred and thirty-six, defected.257 The main reason for Nu¯gha¯y’s crucial defection was directly related to the enmity between Baybars and Sala¯r. Nu¯gha¯y, who was among Sala¯r’s supporters, tried to assassinate Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r (Sala¯r was informed about this plan). After the attempt failed, Sala¯r tried to convince Baybars not to hurt Nu¯gha¯y, whereas the Burjiyya urjed Baybars to arrest him. Nu¯gha¯y was afraid to be arrested and decided to defect to al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s side.258 Another reason ˙ ˙ mentioned is related to the increasing greed among the mamluks. According to this, Nu¯gha¯y was unsatisfied after Baybars and Sala¯r refused to his and his friends’ request to enlarge their iqta¯ʿ.259 However, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r hastened ˙ to dispatch about five thousand horsesmen to pursue Nu¯gha¯y and the defectors. This force was under the command of Samu¯k the brother of Sala¯r and included mainly Burjı¯ amirs. It did not manage to catch the defectors and returned to Cairo.260 The defection significantly undermined Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s power. Fearing that this defection would open a rebellion in the Egyptian army in favour of alNa¯sir Muhammad, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r arrested about three hundred royal ˙ ˙ mamluks among the khushda¯shs of the defectors. Baybars also confiscated their 256 Nuju¯m, 8:258–259; Sulu¯k, 2:61. 257 Sulu¯k, 2:59; Muqaffa¯, 2:547; Nuju¯m, 8:248; Niha¯ya, 32:144; Zubda, 414; Tuhfa, 194. According ˙ to al-Maqrı¯zı¯ and Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯, the defectors numbered sixty mamluks. Al-Nuwayrı¯ mentions ninety mamluks (see also: Niha¯ya, 32:149); Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ mentions one ˙ hundred and thirty-six defectors. 258 Sulu¯k, 2:59; Muqaffa¯, 2:547; Nuju¯m, 8:248. 259 Nuju¯m, 8:249–250. 260 Nuju¯m, 8:250–253; Zubda, 414; Tuhfa, 194; Niha¯ya, 32:144. The amirs who were sent by ˙ Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r were: Ta¯kiz (Balaba ¯ n) al-Tughrı¯lı¯; Qijma¯s al-Ju¯kanda¯r, Aybak al˙ Baghdadı¯, Bala¯t al-Ju¯kanda¯r, Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯, Kaharda ¯ sh al-Zarra¯q, Sa¯ru¯ja¯ and the wa¯fidı¯ ˙ 177; Nakamachi, Jankalı¯ b. al-Ba¯˙ba¯ (see about Jankalı¯: Nuju¯m, 10:143–144; Sulu¯k, 2:146–147, 74; Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin”, 135).

140

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

iqta¯ʿs and those of their defector friends and transferred them to other mamluks, ˙ who belonged to his own ones. In addition, Baybars demanded that al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad immediately send Nu¯gha¯y and his mamluks back to Cairo and ˙ would keep with him only the fifty mamluks that he purhased from bayt al-ma¯l (the public treasury). Al-Na¯sir Muhammad, however, continued with his strategy ˙ ˙ of flattery toward Baybars. On the advice of Asandamur Kurjı¯, he replied to the sultan in a “sweet talking” and glib letter, in which he expressed again his subordination to the sultan and mentioned that he intended to send the mamluks back to Cairo, an act that he, of course, never did.261 Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s efforts to prevent al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s growing power, however, were to no avail. ˙ ˙ Nu¯gha¯y’s defection began waves of defections in which more and more senior amirs gradually moved to al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s side, together with their en˙ ˙ tourages. Shortly after Nu¯gha¯y’s defection, another one hundred and twenty amirs from the Mansu¯riyya, Ashrafiyya and the Oirats moved to Kerak.262 ˙ Strengthened by hundreds of amirs and mamluks that moved to his side and supported by the Mansu¯rı¯ governors of Syria, al-Na¯sir was ready to leave Kerak ˙ ˙ and to march toward Damascus. According to al-Nuwayrı¯, al-Na¯sir left Kerak on ˙ 27 Juma¯da¯ II 709/1 December 1309. He arrived at al-Khama¯n, in the north of present-day Jordan (about one hundred km from Damascus), but was forced to retreat due to his fear that the amirs, in the end, would not stand beside him. He returned to Kerak on 8 Rajab/11 December.263 Indeed, the governor of Damascus, ¯ s and Baktamur al-Ha¯jib to inform al-Na¯sir Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, sent Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ ˙ Muhammad that it would better for him to retreat, since the amirs of Damascus ˙ would not stand by him. However, they found that al-Na¯sir had already turned ˙ back toward Kerak.264 The Egyptian army that was dispatched by Baybars al-

261 Nuju¯m, 8:253–257. 262 Sulu¯k, 2:61; Nuju¯m, 8:257–258. 263 The Muslim historians report different information regarding al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s first ˙ that˙brought about march toward Damascus. Al-Nuwayrı¯ mentions that it was a false report al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s retreat, according to which Qara¯sunqur would not be able to ac˙ due to his son’s death. According to al-Nuwayrı¯, Qara¯sunqur was willing to ˙ him, company join al-Na¯sir Muhammad but it was Aqqu¯sh al-Afram who changed the version of the letter ˙ ¯ ya, 32:150). According to the anonymous chronicle published by ˙ of Qara¯sunqur (Niha Zetterstéen, al-Na¯sir retruned to Kerak since he was informed that there was no agreement among the amirs ˙of Damascus to support him (Zetterstéen, 141–142). According to Ibn Dawa¯da¯rı¯, al-Na¯sir rightly suspected that Nu¯gha¯y and another amir would betray him (Kanz, ˙ 9:171). The anonymous chronicler mentions that al-Na¯sir Muhammad arrived at a place ˙ ˙ to return called al-Burj al-Abyad in al-Balqa¯ region before he decided to Kerak (Zetterstéen, ˙ 141). Al-Maqrı¯zı¯ mentions that al-Na¯sir Muhammad arrived at Zayza¯’ in the Balqa¯ and from there at Zurʿ in the Hawra¯n, whence˙he was˙ forced to return to Kerak (Sulu¯k, 2:60). 264 Zetterstéen, 139; Ibn˙ Kathı¯r, 14:141–142.

Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s reign (708/1309–709/1310)

141

Ja¯shnakı¯r toward al-Na¯sir Muhammad returned to Cairo as well, following the ˙ ˙ news about al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s retreat.265 ˙ ˙ A second attempt by al-Na¯sir Muhammad to approach Damascus was not late ˙ ˙ to come. The reports about al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s approach to Damascus raised ˙ ˙ fears among Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r in Cairo and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram in Damascus. Al-Afram, therefore, sent eight amirs from Damascus to block the roads to the city, among them the Mansu¯rı¯s Qutlu¯bak, Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj, Ju¯ba¯n, Kujkun and ˙ ˙ ˙ Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯. At the same time, al-Afram urged Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r to dispatch the Egyptian army to Syria, in order to fight against al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ together with the Syrian army. However, al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s march toward ˙ ˙ Damascus increased the waves of defections to his side. Aydughdı¯ Shuqayr alHusa¯mı¯ and Ju¯ba¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯, who were sent by Aqqu¯sh al-Afram to al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ ˙ Muhammad in order to report intelligence information, reported to Aqqu¯sh al˙ Afram false information and secretly moved to al-Na¯sir’s side. Soon after, the ˙ mamluks of Aqqu¯sh al-Ru¯mı¯ (a mamluk of La¯jı¯n), who was sent by Baybars alJa¯shnakı¯r to fight al-Na¯sir Muhammad, killed their master and defected to al˙ ˙ Na¯sir’s side with their master’s treasure. Several amirs of tablkha¯na¯h and ˙ ˙ mamluks of amirs joined them. Aqqu¯sh al-Afram tried to stop the amirs’ defections by making them swear to be loyal to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, while Baybars sent another force from Egypt, headed by Qijma¯s, Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h and many of ˙ the Burjı¯ amirs. However, these efforts were to no avail. At that point, about half of 266 the Egyptian army had moved to al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s side. ˙ ˙ As a last resort, Baybars turned to the puppet caliph in order to strengthen his position as the legitimate sultan of the Muslims. The caliph entrusted Baybars with a second promulgation of his diploma, aimed to confirm Baybars’ authority against al-Na¯sir Muhammad. However, this symbolic act had no impact on ˙ ˙ events. All the tablkha¯na¯h amirs who were sent from Egypt moved to al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ Muhammad’s side, together with their soldiers. The last amirs who were still ˙ stayed by Baybars’ side were his close associates from the Burjiyya: his son-in-law Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯, Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯, Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯, Ta¯kiz (Balaba¯n) alTughrı¯lı¯ and Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h.267 ˙ ˙ At the same time, Aqqu¯sh al-Afram’s situation in Damascus was deteriorating. More and more mamluks, including the senior amirs, defected from the army of Damascus to al-Na¯sir Muhammad. After Aydughdı¯ Shuqayr and Ju¯ba¯n al˙ ˙ Mansu¯rı¯ secretly collaborated with al-Na¯sir Muhammad, the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 265 In command of this army were the Burjı¯ amirs Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯, Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯, Tughrı¯l al-I¯gha¯nı¯ and Aldukuz al-Silahda¯r as well as Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯, together with four ˙ thousand horsemen and thirty amirs of˙ tablkha¯na¯h. See: Zetterstéen, 141; Nuju¯m, 8:259–260; Sulu¯k, 2:62–63; Niha¯ya, 32:144; Zubda, ˙414–415. 266 Nuju¯m, 8:260–261; Sulu¯k, 2:63–64. 267 Nuju¯m, 8:262–264; Sulu¯k, 2:64–66; Holt, “Some Observations”, 505–506.

142

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

Baybars al-ʿAla¯’ı¯ and Baybars al-Majnu¯n plotted to attack al-Afram and to arrest him. Aqqu¯sh al-Afram managed to escape from Damascus and to find shelter in the fortress of Shaqı¯f Arnu¯n in southern Lebanon. When Qutlu¯bak and Baha¯dur ˙ al-Ha¯jj learned of al-Afram’s departure, they also defected to al-Na¯sir Mu˙ ˙ hammad’s side. The last Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who were sent by Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, ˙ ˙ headed by Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯, moved at that point to al-Na¯sir Muhammad too. ˙ ˙ When al-Na¯sir arrived at Kiswa, to the south of Damascus, the remaining amirs ˙ and ajna¯d of Damascus moved to his side.268 Al-Na¯sir Muhammad entered Damascus in Shaʿba¯n 709/January 1310. The ˙ ˙ city was decorated in his honour and people from all classes received him. Qutlu¯bak and Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj, who only few days before had commanded the ˙ ˙ army that aimed to fight against al-Na¯sir Muhammad, carried the symbols of the ˙ ˙ sultanate in front of the future sultan – the saddle cover (ghashiyyah) and the parasol ( jatr). Soon after, the Friday sermons were given in the name of the sultan, al-Na¯sir Muhammad, instead of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. The governors of ˙ ˙ the Syrian districts, Qara¯sunqur of Aleppo, Qibjaq of Hama, Asandamur Kurjı¯ of Tripoli, Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯ of Homs, Kira¯y of Jerusalem and Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r of Safed, carrying gifts for the new sultan, started to gather in Damascus with their armies. Al-Na¯sir Muhammad granted an ama¯n to Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, “the right hand” ˙ ˙ of his rival Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. Al-Afram, however, was still afraid of the new sultan’s possible actions against him. He demanded, in addition to ama¯n, also the new sultan’s oath for his safety. Only when the oath letter was sent to him, did he come to Damascus, meet with al-Na¯sir Muhammad and gave him precious gifts. ˙ ˙ The new sultan received Aqqu¯sh al-Afram with honour and confirmed his appointment as the governor of Damascus. This appointment, however, was only for a few days.269 The news of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s entrance to Damascus reached Cairo to˙ ˙ ward the end of the same month. At that stage, Baybars’ closest associates, mainly from among the Burjı¯ amirs, were still by his side, including Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯, Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯, Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯, Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯, Baktu¯t al-Fat˙ ta¯h, Aldukuz al-Silahda¯r and Ta¯kiz (Balaba¯n) al-Tughrı¯lı¯, in addition to Baybars’ ˙ ˙ ˙ personal mamluks. As a last ditch effort, Baybars conferred amirates of tabl˙ kha¯na¯h and ten upon twenty-seven of his young mamluks and other loyal

268 Niha¯ya, 32:151–152; Nuju¯m, 8:264–265; Sulu¯k, 2:67; Zetterstéen, 140. According to al-Nuwayrı¯, the entrustment of the diploma by the caliph, as well as some of the defections, took place in a latter phase, when al-Na¯sir Muhammad stayed in Damascus; see: Niha¯ya, 32:145– ˙ ˙ 146. 269 Niha¯ya, 32:151–153; Nuju¯m, 8:265–268; Sulu¯k, 2:67–69.

Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s reign (708/1309–709/1310)

143

mamluks (alza¯m) whereas he exiled many other mamluks, probably those of alNa¯sir Muhammad, to Upper Egypt and took their iqta¯ʿs.270 ˙ ˙ ˙ However, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s moves were too little and too late. On 16 Ramada¯n 709/17 February 1310 Baybars summoned some of his Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ khushda¯shs for consultation, including Sala¯r, Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h, Qijma¯s, Butkha¯s ˙ ¯ s. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ and Ba-˙ al-Mansu¯rı¯, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ and Baha¯dur A ˙¯ ˙ ˙ ˙ ha¯dur As suggested that Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r renounce his rule, hand it over to ˙ al-Na¯sir Muhammad and request that the latter appoint him over some fortress. ˙ ˙ Meanwhile, they recommended that Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r leave Cairo for Itfı¯h, ˙ ˙ south of the city. Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r realized his desperate situation and adopted their suggestion. He sent Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ to al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ ˙ with a message that he renounced his rule and asked to be appointed as the governor of Kerak, Hama or the fortress of Sahyu¯n, in the vicinity of Latakia. Al˙ Na¯sir Muhammad accepted Baybars’ request and appointed him over the remote ˙ ˙ fortress of Sahyu¯n. On the same day Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r left Cairo hastily, ˙ together with seven hundred of his personal mamluks and his loyal amirs of the 271 Burjiyya. After two days in Itfı¯h, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and the Burjı¯s Aydamur ˙ ˙ al-Khat¯ırı¯ and Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h decided to head toward Barqa in western Egypt ˙ ˙ (today’s eastern Libya) or Aswa¯n in Upper Egypt. In response, his mamluks deserted him and returned to Cairo. When Baybars arrived at Ikhmı¯m, most of his companions had already left him. At this stage, Baybars changed his mind and did not intend to head toward Barqa. Following this decision, his last supporters, Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯ and Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h, left him as well, together with many ˙ ˙ mamluks. Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s defeat was now final.272 At the same time al-Na¯sir Muhammad made preparations for his royal en˙ ˙ trance to Cairo. It was after about a month’s stay in Damascus. First, he sent a vanguard to Gaza, headed by the Mansu¯rı¯ governors Asandamur Kurjı¯, Tamur al˙ Sa¯qı¯ and Kira¯y, to prepare the ground for his arrival.273 When al-Na¯sir Mu¯ s arrived at ˙the city hammad reached Gaza, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ and Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ ˙ with Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s announcement of his renunciation of his rule and his 270 Sulu¯k, 2:69–70. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ mentions that Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r conferred amirates ˙ young ones (subya¯n) receiving amirates of ten, and the on his own mamluks, with the very others receiving amirates of tablkha¯na¯h (Tuhfa, ˙200). According to Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯, Bay˙ of his mamluks (Kanz, 9:180). Ibn Iya¯s bars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r conferred ˙amirates to forty mentions that the mamluks who were exiled were Na¯sirı¯ mamluks who numbered about ˙ received amirates were alza¯m of three hundred (Ibn Iya¯s, 1:426). Others mamluks who Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. It is hard to know exactly what this term means. Donald Richards suggests that it might refer to Burjı¯ amirs who bounded themselves in service to Baybars alJa¯shnakı¯r by a contract, see: Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 36. 271 Sulu¯k, 2:70–71; Nuju¯m, 8:270–272; Niha¯ya, 32:147; Tuhfa, 202. ˙ 272 Sulu¯k, 2:78; Nuju¯m, 8:272; Niha¯ya, 32:156. 273 Niha¯ya, 32:153; Tuhfa, 201. ˙

144

The Mansu¯riyya (689/1290–709/1310) ˙

departure from Cairo. Many amirs who moved to al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s side ˙ ˙ started now to gather in Gaza, including the most loyal amirs of Baybars alJa¯shnakı¯r, namely his son-in-law Burlughay, Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯, Aybak alBaghda¯dı¯, Butkha¯s al-Mansu¯rı¯ and Aybak al-Ru¯mı¯.274 In mid-Ramada¯n 709/ ˙ ˙ ˙ February 1310, the name of the sultan al-Na¯sir Muhammad b. Qala¯wu¯n was ˙ ˙ announced in the citadel of Cairo. Two days later, al-Na¯sir Muhammad was ˙ ˙ mentioned as the sultan in the Friday sermons in the mosques of Cairo. On 2 Shawwa¯l 709/5 March 1310, the district governors and the army gave their oath to al-Na¯sir Muhammad.275 ˙ ˙

7.

Summary and conclusions

The Mansu¯riyya period was characterized by serial violent conflicts among its ˙ members. In the absence of the authority figure of their master Qala¯wu¯n, frequent power struggles between the amirs broke out and brought about the death of several of the most senior amirs, such as Turunta¯y, Baydara¯, Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ ˙ ˙ and La¯jı¯n. As he grew up, al-Na¯sir Muhammad, the child (and then a very young ˙ ˙ man) puppet sultan, succeeded in utilizing these internal conflicts for his own cause. He managed to pull to his side the Mansu¯rı¯ governors of Syria, namely ˙ Qara¯sunqur, Qibjaq, Asandamur Kurjı¯, Kira¯y and Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r, and it was especially during the short reign of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r that his power strengthened. The intensified conflicts between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and his viceroy Sala¯r contributed as well to al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s growing power. They ˙ ˙ prompted waves of defection to his side among the amirs in Cairo and Damascus that in the end moved the political centre of gravity totally to al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad’s side. ˙ Analysis of the turbulent political scene of the Mansu¯riyya period reveals that ˙ there was no moral cause behind the continuous conflicts of the amirs. It is true that Islamic ideology was instilled in the hearts of the mamluks and in times of existential threat for the Mamluk sultanate united all the amirs in the face of infidel enemies. However, violent conflicts broke out again and again among the amirs, resulting from mere lust of power and the desire for a redistribution of state resources. Amirs changed patrons and coalitions according to the winning factions. The internal political turmoil during the Mansu¯riyya period contributed ˙ significantly also to external military assaults. The policy of sultan La¯jı¯n and his viceroy Manku¯tamur against the senior amirs brought about chaos at the highest 274 Sulu¯k, 2:72; Nuju¯m, 9:4–5; (Niha¯ya, 32:154; Tuhfa, 203; Zetterstéen, 145. ˙ 275 Tuhfa, 203, 206; Niha¯ya, 32:147, 155; Nuju¯m, 8:271. ˙

Summary and conclusions

145

levels of the Mamluk sultanate, to the defection of Qibjaq and his confidants to the ¯Ilkha¯nids and to the murder of La¯jı¯n and Manku¯tamur. These developments encouraged Gha¯za¯n to attack Syria and to defeat the Mamluks in the battle of Wa¯dı¯ al-Khaznada¯r. The revolt of the Oirat wa¯fidiyya that broke out in the divided Mamluk army on the eve of this decisive battle contributed to the Mamluk failure and to the conquest of Syria, too. The Mamluk defeat brought about attempts at domestic revolts by the Bedouin in Egypt and the Nusayris in ˙ Lebanon. Despite the continuous internal struggles, however, the Mansu¯riyya coped ˙ successfully with the military challenges that faced them. It seems that true belief in Islam, that perhaps constituted a part of a broader “Mamluk identity”, played an important role in the Mansu¯riyya military achievements. Syria, that was oc˙ cupied by the ¯Ilkha¯nid Mongols following the battle of Wa¯dı¯ al-Khaznada¯r, was deserted by its conquerors shortly after, mainly due to the firm resistance of the governors of the citadels of Syria and the Mongols’ fear of the Egyptian army’s advance. Two years later, the Mamluks inflicted a crushing defeat on the Mongols in the Battle of Marj al-Suffar (Shaqhab) and since then no serious military events ˙ ˙ between the two armies occurred until the end of the Mansu¯riyya period. The ˙ Armenian kingdom of Cilicia was obliged again and again to surrender to the Mamluks and to pay tribute to the sultanate. The punitive expeditions against the Bedouin in Egypt and the Nusayrı¯s in Lebanon brought a lot of money and ˙ property to the state treasury, as well. The eradication of the Crusader presence on Ruad island, in the vicinity of Tarsus, eliminated the possibility that the island would be used as a bridgehead for another crusade. The Mansu¯riyya period, hence, marks not only the end of the Crusaders’ ˙ kingdom but also the beginning of the perception among the Mongols that they would not be able to subjugate Egypt – and even not Syria for any length of time – and add it to their empire. This growing consciousness among the ¯Ilkha¯nid leadership would lead to a peace treaty between the ¯Ilkha¯nid Mongols and the Mamluks a decade after the Mansu¯riyya period. ˙

Chapter Three: The change in the military-political principles

In chapter one the two basic principles that underlie Mamluk politics were discussed. Noted first by David Ayalon, the founder of Mamluk studies, these principles state that (a) there was strong loyalty between the master (usta¯dh) and the mamluks he purchased, educated and manumitted; and (b) there was strong solidarity between the mamluks that were raised and manumitted by the same master (khushda¯shiyya).1 As later studies point out, this view of Ayalon’s, and especially with regard to the solidarity of the khushda¯shiyya, is perhaps oversimplified. However, the following section will argue that the turbulent Mansu¯riyya period and the significant changes in the patterns of promotion had an ˙ impact on these very basic military-political priniciples. The detailed data regarding the Mansu¯riyya regiment allows us to depict – based on Ayalon’s model – ˙ a more precise paradigm of the military-political principles of the early Mamluk sultanate.

1.

Loyalty between mamluks and their master

1.1.

The mamluk’s loyalty to his first master

Ayalon points out that the loyalty between mamluks and their master is stronger than the loyalty among khushda¯sh mamluks. The mamluk had strong feelings of gratitude and loyalty to his first master, the one who purchased, educated and manumitted him. When a mamluk moved to a new patron (usually termed makhdu¯m), due to the death, arrest or dismissal of his master, his loyalty toward his new master was much weaker.2 The information discussed in chapter one regarding about one hundred and seventy Mansu¯rı¯ amirs generally correlates Ayalon’s view, as far as Qala¯wu¯n’s ˙ 1 See: chapter one, n. 62. 2 Ayalon, “Studies” I, 209; Ayalon, L’esclavage, 27; Ayalon, “Mamluk”, 14.

148

The change in the military-political principles

reign is concerned. As we saw, Qala¯wu¯n promoted very few mamluks that were not originally raised by him to very high positions, and even these were mainly appointed to offices in Syria, far away from the political centre of Cairo.3 In contrast, most of the key positions in Qala¯wu¯n’s reign were occupied by his senior mamluks. Ayalon’s basic assumption corresponds, to a large extent, the situation in the Mansu¯riyya period as well. Al-Ashraf Khalı¯l paid with his life for ˙ the high positions he gave to his father’s Mansu¯riyya mamluks. As discussed in ˙ chapter two, al-Ashraf appointed Baydara¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ as viceroy, Qara¯sunqur as ˙ muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya and La¯jı¯n as amir of one hundred and the ˙ governor of Damascus. The three Mansu¯rı¯ amirs did not express any loyalty to ˙ their new master. Rather, they decided to kill him since they found his attitude toward them dismissive. Baydara¯ initiated the murder of his new master because he was insulted when al-Ashraf rebuked and humiliated him. Qara¯sunqur was angry with al-Ashraf as he had dismissed him from the governorship of Aleppo, and La¯jı¯n resented al-Ashraf for having nearly executed him.4 Contrariwise, the sources do not mention any case in which a Mansu¯rı¯ mamluk expressed any kind ˙ of bitterness, anger or dissatisfaction toward his master, even when Qala¯wu¯n refused to his requests, slowed down his promotion, rebuked him or dismissed him from office.5 Another instance of the loyalty of mamluks to their first – but not their second – master we may find among the other murderer of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l, i. e. ¯ qsunqur, a mamluk of this sultan who was originally one of La¯jı¯n’s mamluks. A ¯ qsunqur al-Husa¯mı¯ to his When al-Ashraf Khalı¯l arrested La¯jı¯n, he took A ˙ service, added him to his royal mamluks and conferred upon him an amirate of ¯ qsunqur remained loyal to his first master, La¯jı¯n, and tablkha¯na¯h. However, A ˙ took part in the murder of his new one.6 Similarly, La¯jı¯n was murdered by two of his mamluks, who were originally mamluks of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l but were moved to La¯jı¯n’s service and received high positions from the latter.7 However, in order to discern the change in this principle, a more detailed examination of mamluk-master relations is required. In the present section,

3 For instance, Sunqur al-Aʿsar was appointed as ustada¯r and shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Damascus and Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ was appointed as wa¯lı¯ al-barr in Damascus and wa¯lı¯ Damascus. ˙ 3:494; Zubda, 295. See also in chapter two. 4 Wa¯fı¯,˙10:361; Manhal, 5 For instance, Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ was dismissed by Qala¯wu¯n from the office of wazir and his fortune was confiscated (Zubda, 262–263); Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ was severely rebuked by Qala¯wu¯n after his unsuccessful raid against the Crusaders˙(Zubda, 190 see also appendix 4, n. 125); Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, whose promotion by Qala¯wu¯n was relatively slow (see chapter one, ˙ his master decades after Qala¯wu¯n’s death, see for instance: Zubda, sections 2.5, 3.3), praises 175–176. 6 Zubda, 288, 296. 7 Sulu¯k, 1:866; Muqaffa¯, 4:21; Nuju¯m, 8:183; Kanz, 8:348–349.

Loyalty between mamluks and their master

149

therefore, aspects of loyalty and disloyalty between mamluks and their patrons are discussed.

1.2.

Aspects of loyalty between mamluks and their master

Mamluks as bodyguards The personal mamluks served as their master’s bodyguards. They protected their master’s life and prevented his enemies from any attempt at violence against him. In dangerous situations, they used to encircle their master and prevent any access to him by his enemies. By doing so, they risked their own lives on behalf of their master. This kind of tactical movement was made on the battlefield, as well as in internal conflicts. An example of the first was in the battle against the Mongols at Homs (680/1281), when Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ and his khushda¯shs defended Qa˙ la¯wu¯n and killed whoever attempted to hurt their master.8 More cases are mentioned regarding internal conflicts. During La¯jı¯n’s persecutions of the senior amirs, they made sure that they would be encompassed by their mamluks while riding in the royal processions.9 An especially crucial role was played by personal mamluks during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s persecutions of the Mansu¯riyya amirs. ˙ ˙ ˙ The mamluks of Butkha¯s al-Mansu¯rı¯, who entrenched himself in Cairo citadel, ˙ ˙ defended their master by standing on the roof of the citadel with their bows drawn.10 The young mamluks (subya¯n) of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r tried to attack the ˙ ¯ s) who messengers of al-Na¯sir Muhammad (Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ and Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 11 were sent to capture their master. When Qara¯sunqur made his way to Aleppo in 711/1311, accompanied by Arghu¯n al-Dawa¯da¯r, the personal mamluks of Qara¯sunqur encompassed him along the whole journey, out of the justified fear that Arghu¯n would capture their master.12 The personal mamluks were primed and ready to protect their master also against sudden attacks. During the conflict between Kitbugha¯ and Sanjar alShuja¯ʿı¯, it was Baktu¯t al-Azraq, a mamluk of Kitbugha¯, who pushed back and killed the assassin sent by al-Shuja¯ʿı¯.13 Later, during the conflict between La¯jı¯n and Kitbugha¯, Kitbugha¯’s mamluks prevented La¯jı¯n’s envoys from capturing their master, and Kitbugha¯ managed to escape from al-ʿAwja¯ʾ to Damascus.14 After Qara¯sunqur and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram found refuge in the Mongol ¯Ilkha¯nate, 8 9 10 11 12 13 14

Zubda, 198; Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 192–193. Sulu¯k, 1:854. Niha¯ya, 32:169. See Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯’s own testimony about it: Tuhfa, 207. ˙ ˙ Aʿya¯n, 4:94. Zubda, 301; Sulu¯k, 1:799. Nuju¯m, 8:63; Zubda, 312; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:221.

150

The change in the military-political principles

their mamluks managed again and again to kill the assassins who were sent by alNa¯sir Muhammad from Cairo.15 ˙ ˙ The ways in which the mamluks protected their master’s life are instructively illustrated by the activities of Qara¯sunqur’s mamluks. When Qara¯sunqur was sent to Syria at the beginning of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign, his mamluks ˙ ˙ reported him intelligence regarding anyone who arrived from Cairo to 16 Damascus. When the messengers from Egypt arrived in Damascus, Qara¯sunqur’s mamluks delayed them until the information about their coming reached their master’s ears. The mamluks stayed with the messengers constantly and kept them away from other amirs, so they would not be able to transmit to them the sultanic decrees ordering Qara¯sunqur’s capture. When Arghu¯n, the messenger of al-Na¯sir Muhammad, arrived in Damascus, his mamluks were ˙ ˙ watched by Qara¯sunqur’s mamluks and Qara¯sunqur’s life was saved.17 Promotion of personal mamluks by their master Personal mamluks were meant to be the most loyal element of a sultan’s or an amir’s entourage. In chapter one, the promotion of dozens of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs to ˙ high-level positions during the reign of their master Qala¯wu¯n is discussed. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ testifies that many other Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks were appointed ˙ ˙ to honourable positions.18 It is noteworthy that Qala¯wu¯n used to appoint his mamluks also to be in charge of big projects or other missions that required loyalty. Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ was appointed the main manager of the construction of Qala¯wu¯n’s hospital (bı¯ma¯rista¯n), as well as the building around it that included a madrasa and a qubba (mausoleum). Al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ was also in charge of the construction of the mausoleum of Qala¯wu¯n’s wife, the mother of al-Malik al-Sa¯lih ˙ ˙ ʿAlı¯.19 Qala¯wu¯n used al-Shuja¯ʿı¯’s house as a holding place for people he 20 dismissed. Turunta¯y, another favorite mamluk of Qala¯wu¯n, was a mediator in ˙ ˙ the marriage between Qala¯wu¯n’s son al-Sa¯lih ʿAlı¯ and the daughter of the Mongol ˙ ˙ amir Nu¯ka¯y b. Baya¯n, in 681/1282.21 Later, when Qala¯wu¯n became sultan, Tur˙ unta¯y conducted the negotiations regarding the building in which Qala¯wu¯n ˙ would establish his bı¯ma¯rista¯n and madrasa.22 During the battle of Homs (680/

15 See on Qara¯sunqur: Aʿya¯n, 4:96; on Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, 1:569; Wa¯fı¯, 9:334. 16 See other examples for personal mamluks as transmitters of intelligence: Aʿya¯n, 1:566–567; Wa¯fı¯, 9:331–332. 17 Aʿya¯n, 4:92–93; Wa¯fı¯, 24:216. 18 Zubda, 176–177. 19 See chapter two, n., 48. 20 Sulu¯k, 1:666. 21 Zubda, 229; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 207. 22 Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 207; Zubda, 236–237.

Loyalty between mamluks and their master

151

1281), amir Qala¯wu¯n used two hundred of his mamluks to carry the campaign treasury to a safe place.23 In contrast to his father, sultan al-Ashraf Khalı¯l did not succeed in the delicate mission of promoting his own mamluks. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, indeed, mentions ˙ that al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s attempts to promote his own mamluks at the expense of 24 the Mansu¯riyya was one of the reasons for his murder. Kitbugha¯ and La¯jı¯n, ˙ however, strove hard to promote their own mamluks. We saw that after Kitbugha¯ was crowned sultan, he gave amirates to his senior mamluks and appointed them to high positions, including ustada¯r and governor of Damascus. Several of these mamluks, it seems, received amirates of one hundred.25 La¯jı¯n acted even more strongly. He violated his pledge to the amirs by removing them from key positions and appointing his own mamluks to high-ranking amirates and to high positions, usually at the expense of his khushda¯shs. Manku¯tamur was appointed as viceroy instead of Qara¯sunqur. Qibjaq and Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯, the governors ˙ of Damascus and Aleppo respectively, were removed from their positions for Ja¯gha¯n, Aydughdı¯ Shuqayr and La¯jı¯n al-Husa¯mı¯. Finally, Bayabrs al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, ˙ hoping to strengthen his power vis-à-vis al-Na¯sir Muhammad as quickly as ˙ ˙ possible, granted amirates of tablkha¯na¯h or ten to dozens of his mamluks, some ˙ of whom were too young for this appointment and others were awla¯d al-na¯s.26 The reliance of the Mansu¯rı¯ sultans on their mamluks, however, turned out to be ˙ disastrous, as discussed below. The treatment of personal mamluks by their master’s enemies The strong loyalty of the senior and favourite mamluks to their master is indicated also by the way that they were treated by the latter’s enemies. The destiny of the senior mamluks was related to that of their master. When a master’s position rises, the status of his mamluks increases accordingly. Similarly, when an amir or sultan is killed or captured, his senior mamluks are also arrested, exiled or even killed. His younger mamluks are usually moved to the service of the sultan or distributed among the amirs. As a result, the sultan or amir loses his main basis of support, and the political threat that might come from his greatest supporters is neutralized. These practices were common during the Mansu¯riyya ˙ period. When Turunta¯y was caught and executed in 690/1290, his mamluk Badr ˙ ˙ 23 Zubda, 199. 24 Zubda, 295. 25 Clifford mentions that four of Kitbugha¯’s mamluks were commissioned as amirs of one hundred (Clifford, 161). This kind of amirate is mentioned explicitly by Ibn Abı¯ al-Fada¯ʾil regarding Butkha¯s (Mufaddal (Blochet), 14/3:588). ˙˙ 26 See: chapter two, ˙n. 270. Jaraktamur b. Baha¯dur Raʾs Nawba, one of the awla¯d al-na¯s who received an amirate, affiliated himself to Baybars after his father’s death (Durar [Hyderabad], 1:534).

152

The change in the military-political principles

al-Dı¯n Luʾluʾ al-Masʿu¯dı¯ was captured immediately after.27 When Kitbugha¯ was deposed from the sultanate, his two senior mamluks, Baktu¯t al-Azraq and Butkha¯s, were killed. When La¯jı¯n was murdered, his mamluk Manku¯tamur was killed ˙ shortly after, and other of La¯jı¯n’s senior mamluks, like Ja¯gha¯n and La¯jı¯n alHusa¯mı¯, were arrested.28 Before al-Na¯sir Muhammad captured Sala¯r, he arrested ˙ ˙ ˙ his three senior mamluks.29 A more honourable way to remove the danger of a rival amir or sultan’s personal mamluks was to exile them from Cairo. As discussed in chapter two, after al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s attempt to depose Sala¯r and ˙ ˙ Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r in 707/1307, his senior mamluks were exiled to Jerusalem. Two years later, during the struggle between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad, al-Ja¯shnakı¯r exiled a large number of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ ˙ mamluks to Upper Egypt and took over their iqta¯ʿs. ˙

1.3.

Erosion in the master’s position

Despite the clear evidence for master-mamluk loyalties, one may find significant signs for erosion in the master’s authoritative position. The Arabic (originally Persian) term for master, usta¯dh, also denotes a biological father, indicating the nature of the relationship that is supposed to develope between the mamluks and their master.30 The master, like a father, was considered as the moral educator of his mamluks, to whom they should listen and obey. Indeed, Qala¯wu¯n treated his mamluks with authority and sometimes with toughness. According to Ibn alDawa¯da¯rı¯, Qala¯wu¯n achieved severity (satwa) and strength (baʾs) over his ˙ mamluks, and he never turned a blind eye to any violation by one of them.31 Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ mentions that Qala¯wu¯n’s mamluks were in awe of their master to the extent that they never spoke rudely to their servants in his presence.32 These emotions of awe were kept in their hearts even as senior amirs, a long time after their manumission. In many cases Qala¯wu¯n refused their requests, and by doing so he retained his authoritative position and his role as a moral educator. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ implies this by describing his master as the one who “endowed his ˙ mamluks with righteous opinions and healed their desires”.33 27 Manhal, 6:387–388. 28 On the arrest of Ja¯gha¯n and La¯jı¯n al-Husa¯mı¯: al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:60–61; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:4. ˙ of these three mamluks is not known. The third, 29 Nuju¯m, 9:15; Sulu¯k, 2:87. The fate of two Shaykh ʿAlı¯, was released only in 735/1335, twenty-five years after his arrest, see: Aʿya¯n, 2:108. 30 Ayalon, L’esclavage, 35; Ayalon, “Mamluk”, 14. 31 Kanz, 8:303. Amalia Levanoni translates the phrase “dhu¯ satwa wa-ba’s” as “put terror in their ˙ hearts”, see: Levanoni, Turning Point, 19. 32 Nuju¯m, 7:327–328; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 192. 33 Wa-a¯ta¯hum min sada¯d al-a¯ra¯ʾ wa-’ltiʾa¯m al-ahwa¯ʾ (Zubda, 176).

Loyalty between mamluks and their master

153

Several instances of Qala¯wu¯n’s authoritative and resolute attitude towards his mamluks may be mentioned. Qala¯wu¯n refused Aqqu¯sh al-Afram’s request to leave for Syria and possibly restricted Qibjaq’s promotion.34 He refused the requests of Turunta¯y and Kitbugha¯ to give their sons iqta¯ʿs, and restrained Tur˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ unta¯y’s ambitions;35 he rebuked Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ following his failure in the ˙ ˙ 36 battle against the Crusaders at the fortress of al-Marqab; he dismissed Sanjar alShuja¯ʿı¯ from the wazirate and confiscated his fortune due to the latter’s corruption and exploitation.37 Qala¯wu¯n’s role as a moral educator of his mamluks is reflected in his attitude to La¯jı¯n during his tenure as governor of Damascus. Qala¯wu¯n demanded that La¯jı¯n stop his wild behavior and excessive drinking of wine.38 In contrast, the Mansu¯rı¯ sultans Kitbugha¯, La¯jı¯n and Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r ˙ were strongly influenced by their mamluks. The influence of Kitbugha¯’s mamluks on their master could be seen even before he became sultan. It was a mamluk of Kitbugha¯, named Butkha¯s al-Zaynı¯, who influenced his master to mediate ˙ between the murderers of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l, Qara¯sunqur and La¯jı¯n, and the sultan and the amirs. As a result of these efforts, the two Mansu¯rı¯ amirs were pardoned ˙ and regained their high amirate and status.39 This grace of Kitbugha¯ brought about his downfall, since La¯jı¯n turned out to be the head of the usurpers against Kitbugha¯’s rule. The power of Kitbugha¯’s mamluks and their influence on him became stronger after he took the throne. They became corrupt and arrogant. According to Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, Kitbugha¯ did not make any effort to intimidate ˙ or restrain them. Hence, they took over the iqta¯ʿs, took bribes and dealt arro˙ gantly with the senior amirs. Moreover, their opinion counted more than that of

34 On Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, see: Durar (Hyderabad), 1:396–397. As for Qibjaq, the sources mention that his promotion was delayed during the reign of his master Qala¯wu¯n, out of fear that Qibjaq would flee to the Mongols (Aʿya¯n, 4:63,64; Wa¯fı¯, 24:179,180; Sulu¯k, 1:871–872). Reuven Amitai argues that this anecdote does not reflect historical reality but circulated only because Qibjaq, in the end, did flee to the Mongols (Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin”, 133). It is true that Muslim historiography, especially in the Mamluk period was abundant with anecdotes, some of them related to the ability of sultans, amirs and other to foretell events that are yet to happen. This historiographical notion has already been pointed out by Haarmann, see: Ulrich Haarmann, “Auflösung und Bewahrung der klassischen Formen Arabischer Geschichtsschreibung in der Zeit der Mamluken”, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 121 (1971), 53–60. However, Qibjaq indeed is not mentioned in high positions during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign. He received an amirate when Qala¯wu¯n became sultan, but only toward the end of his master’s rule is he mentioned as one of the commanders who were dispatched to raid Nubia (see appendix 5, n. 186). 35 See chapter one, n. 234. 36 Zubda, 190. 37 Zubda, 262–263. 38 Sulu¯k, 1:861. 39 Zubda, 303; Sulu¯k, 1:803.

154

The change in the military-political principles

their master, until “they put him behind a veil”.40 This erosion of Kitbugha¯’s authority over his mamluks could explain, for example, the treacherous behavior of Ughurlu¯ al-Zaynı¯. Ughurlu¯ was one of Kitbugha¯’s favourite mamluks. He received an amirate from his master when the latter became sultan, and was appointed the governor of Damascus.41 However, immediately after La¯jı¯n’s usurpation, Ughurlu¯ demonstrated his happiness with this move, gave his pledge to La¯jı¯n, blessed him, and spoke ill of his master Kitbugha¯.42 Kitbugha¯’s loss of authority over his mamluks forced him to strengthen their loyalty to him by marriage contracts. Hence, Kitbugha¯ married his daughter to his mamluk Baydara¯.43 It should be noted that marriage contracts between the sultan and his mamluks were not known in Mamluk politics until then. Al-Za¯hir ˙ Baybars and Qala¯wu¯n married their daughters to members of the Mongol wa¯fidiyya, due to the Mongols’ prestige in the eyes of the Mamluks.44 However, the greed of Kitbugha¯’s mamluks brought about the fall of his rule. As discussed in chapter two, it was a result of their conspiracy that meant to improve their position at the expense of senior amirs. Kitbugha¯ “fell into the trap” of his mamluks, lost his rule and almost his life. Sultan La¯jı¯n, who came after, did not do any better regarding imposing authority and discipline over his mamluks. Ja¯gha¯n, who was appointed by La¯jı¯n as shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Damascus, “acted impertinently to his master” and caused enmity between his master and Qibjaq, the governor of Syria.45 However, it was mainly Manku¯tamur who brought about dissension between his master La¯jı¯n and the senior amirs. The historical sources emphasize Manku¯tamur’s enormous influence on his master. As discussed in chapter two, La¯jı¯n appointed Manku¯tamur as his viceroy and gave him a free hand in the management of the political issues of the sultanate. Manku¯tamur, in the end, ruled over his master and became the de facto sultan. He acted rudely and arrogantly toward the amirs and against his master’s orders. Finally, Manku¯tamur urged his master to arrest or to murder the senior amirs, most of whom belonged to his Mansu¯rı¯ khush˙ da¯shi group. The amirs realized that in order to get rid of Manku¯tamur, they must kill La¯jı¯n too.46 The Muslim historians connect unequivocally between

40 Wa-tawaththabat mama¯lı¯kihi ʿala¯ al-iqtaʿa¯t wa-l-himaya¯t wa-imtaddat aydı¯him ila¯ al-rusha¯ ˙ ¯ ʾ wa-taqaddamu ˙ wa-l-jiba¯ya¯t wa-takabbaru¯ ʿala¯ al-kubara ¯ ʿala¯ qudama¯ʾ al-umara¯ʾ waghalabu¯hu [=Kitbugha¯] ʿala¯ raʾyihi wa-hajjabu¯hu bi-hija¯b wa-jaʿalu¯hu min wara¯ʾihi wa-lam ˙ yantabih li-radʾihim wa-la¯ tayaqqaza li–manʿihim (Zubda, 310; Tuhfa, 143–144). ˙ ˙ 41 Zubda, 305, 310; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:195,214; Nuju¯m, 8:61. 42 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:227; Zetterstéen, 42. 43 Aʿya¯n, 2:97. 44 Irwin, Middle East, 108; chapter one, n. 12. 45 Aʿya¯n, 4:64–65. 46 Kurjı¯, the murderer of Manku¯tamur and one of the murderers of La¯jı¯n, is cited as saying: “We

Loyalty between mamluks and their master

155

La¯jı¯n’s fall and his mamluk Manku¯tamur’s unrestrained behaviour and influence over his master. Al-Maqrı¯zı¯ notes that La¯jı¯n’s only drawback was that “he was led by his mamluk and deputy Manku¯tamur, consulted him, agreed with him and followed all his desires, since he loved him so much. In the end, this brought about the murder of the two of them”.47 Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ remarks that Manku¯tamur’s behaviour brought about the amirs’ hatred of him. They decided to conspire against La¯jı¯n, since they knew that he would never listen to their complaints about Manku¯tamur.48 Similarly, Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯ notes that La¯jı¯n was killed though he did not do any harm. It was only because of his viceroy Manku¯tamur.49 Even Ibn Kathı¯r, who usually reports about political events briefly and from a Syrian perspective, mentions that the amirs knew that La¯jı¯n would not do anything in contradiction to Manku¯tamur’s opinion.50 The erosion in La¯jı¯n’s authority is discernable also regarding his young mamluks, as discussed in the following section.

1.4.

Cases of treachery between mamluks and their masters

The tendency of erosion in the authority of the masters during the Mansu¯riyya ˙ period brought about severe cases of treachery between mamluks and masters. The most serious case of treachery is, of course, the murder of a master by his own mamluks. Three such cases are mentioned in the Mansu¯riyya period. One ˙ concerned Baybars al-Muwaffaqı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯, one of the amirs of Damascus. ˙ Baybars was strangled in his sleep by his own mamluks, in 704/1304.51 The second was Aqqu¯sh al-Ru¯mı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯, originally a mamluk of La¯jı¯n and later among ˙ the confidants of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. Aqqu¯sh’s mamluks killed their master in the course of the conflict between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and al-Na¯sir Muhammad, ˙ ˙ and defected to al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s side with their master’s fortune and his ˙ ˙ decapitated head.52 A third case of a murder of a master by his mamluks is mentioned at the beginning of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. The murdered ˙ ˙ man was amir Balaba¯n al-Baydagha¯nı¯, the governor of the fortress of Baghras.53

47 48 49 50 51 52 53

killed his [=Manku¯tamur’s] usta¯dh only in order to kill him [=Manku¯tamur]” (Aʿya¯n, 4:168; Kanz, 8:380). Sulu¯k, 1:859. Nuju¯m, 8:98. Kanz, 8:376. Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:3. See more on Manku¯tamur’s influence on La¯jı¯n: Sulu¯k, 1:848–849; Aʿya¯n, 4:65–66; Wa¯fı¯, 24:180–181; Manhal, 9:172–173; Clifford, 165–167. Durar (Hyderabad), 1:511; Manhal, 3:481. Kanz, 9:196; Nuju¯m, 8:261; Sulu¯k, 2:63–64. According to Qa¯sha¯nı¯, the mamluks brought their master’s head to al-Na¯sir Muhammad as a present, see: Qa¯sha¯nı¯, 139. ˙ ˙ Sulu¯k, 2:96.

156

The change in the military-political principles

More surprising are the cases in which royal mamluks intended to murder and betray the sultan their master. The novice mamluks of sultan La¯jı¯n collaborated with his murderers Kurjı¯ and Tughjı¯. These mamluks were loyal to Kurjı¯, who was ˙ appointed as their direct commander (muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya), ˙ 54 and not to their master La¯jı¯n. Treachery is apparent also among the mamluks of sultan Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. After Baybars was forced to leave Cairo and renounce his rule, some of his mamluks planned to kill him and to take his property. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, who was sent to escort Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r to the ˙ fortress of Sahyu¯n, realized the intentions of these disloyal mamluks and man˙ aged to take this property with him secretly and bring it to Cairo. When Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s mamluks realized this, they renounced their intention to kill their master.55 In any case, in the climax of the conflict between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and al-Na¯sir Muhammad, the mamluks of the first started to desert him one after ˙ ˙ another. One of them even tried to steal his master’s gold.56 When Baybars alJa¯shnakı¯r’s desperate situation was clear to all, almost all of his mamluks deserted him.57 Treachery between the mamluks and their masters was also indicated by the collaboration of the personal mamluks with their masters’ enemies. Arghu¯n, one of La¯jı¯n’s senior amirs, informed Baysarı¯ of the time and place in which his master planned to capture him. This treachery was due to the fact that La¯jı¯n did not promote this mamluk to the rank of amir of tablkha¯na¯h but only to amir of ˙ ten. On the other hand, Arsala¯n, who was educated by Baysarı¯ and was appointed as his ustada¯r, brought about his master’s arrest, after Manku¯tamur promised to give this trator mamluk an amirate of tablkha¯na¯h.58 After al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ ˙ arrived in Cairo, a mamluk of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r named Baybars al-Muzaffarı¯, ˙ who also received an amirate from his master, informed al-Na¯sir about a con˙ 59 spiracy to depose him by several of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s amirs. Finally, it 54 On Kurjı¯’s appointment as muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya, see: Zubda, 323 and p. 52 ˙ above. The mamluks who collaborated with La¯jı¯n’s murderers are called by al-Nuwayrı¯ as subya¯n, i. e., young mamluks. In parallel sources they are mentioned as royal mamluks (al˙mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya) or the mamluks of the Burjiyya, since they apparently dwelled in the ˙ the citadel. According to al-Nuwayrı¯, Kurjı¯ distributed some of the subya¯n towers (abra¯j) of ˙ their who dwelled in the citadel in its halls, but said to La¯jı¯n that he made sure that they were in beds (Niha¯ya, 31:359). Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯ terms these mamluks mama¯lı¯k al-Burjiyya and calls Kurjı¯ the muqaddam al- mama¯lı¯k al-Burjiyya (Kanz, 8:378). Al-Maqrı¯zı¯ mentions that these mamluks were “Burjı¯s and other mamluks” (Sulu¯k, 1:856). These descriptions indicate that it was La¯jı¯n’s personal young mamluks who collaborated with Kurjı¯. Clifford argues the same, see: Clifford, 166. 55 Kanz, 9:197–198. 56 Al-Yu¯sufı¯, 148. 57 Nuju¯m, 8:272; Sulu¯k, 2:78. 58 Niha¯ya, 31:332, 334; Sulu¯k, 1:835–836. 59 Durar (Hyderabad), 1:509.

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

157

should be noted that Qara¯sunqur, fearing the possibility that his mamluks would desert him during his escape from Damascus in 710/1309, had to give them gold in order to make them accompany him.60 All these incidences of lack of loyalty and treachery between mamluks and their masters are characteristics of the Mansu¯riyya period. During the reigns of al-Za¯hir Baybars and Qala¯wu¯n, one can ˙ ˙ hardly find cases of this kind. The analysis of different aspects of loyalty between mamluks and their master reveals that during the Mansu¯riyya period the authority of the master vis-à-vis ˙ his mamluks had definitely eroded. The Mansu¯rı¯ sultans Kitbugha¯, La¯jı¯n and ˙ Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r considered their mamluks to be the most loyal political element and promoted them significantly during their reigns. However, unlike Qala¯wu¯n, who managed to impose his authority on his mamluks and to gain their full loyalty to him, the mamluks of the Mansu¯rı¯ sultans were greedy and arrogant ˙ and had strong influence on their master’s conduct. In the end, their political and material desires led to their master’s deposition or assassination. It was also during the Mansu¯riyya period that significant cases of treachery by mamluks ˙ toward their masters are discerned.

2.

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

2.1.

The meaning of the term khushda¯shiyya

According to Ayalon, the term khushda¯shiyya denotes a group of mamluks that were “colleagues in servitude and manumission”, i. e., they belonged to the same master (usta¯dh) and were brought up, educated and manumitted at the same time.61 However, there is no contemporary source that mentions this, or any other, definition of this term. Irwin argues that this term “sometimes only mean [s] generation peer”.62 A closer examination of this term regarding the Mansu¯riyya may bring about a more definitive understanding. ˙ The Arabic sources mention several cases in which a certain mamluk acted kindly toward the other “since they were khushda¯shs”. This expression is mentioned, for example, regarding La¯jı¯n and Qibjaq. When La¯jı¯n became sultan, he appointed Qibjaq as the governor of Damascus since he was his khushda¯sh.63 However, it is impossible that these two mamluks really were educated and manumitted during the same period. La¯jı¯n was purchased by Qala¯wu¯n as a young 60 61 62 63

Niha¯ya, 32:168. Ayalon, L’esclavage, 29. Irwin, Middle East, 90. Aʿyan, 4:168; Wa¯fı¯, 24:385.

158

The change in the military-political principles

boy in 659/1260, whereas Qibjaq was taken prisoner as an adult about seventeen years later. Moreover, Qibjaq received his amirate three years after he joined the mamluks of Qala¯wu¯n, hence his training period was short (if it ever took place).64 However, a “brotherhood pact” (see below) was made between the two mamluks, and they were close friends. Similarly, Aytamish al-Muhammadı¯ is mentioned as ˙ the “khushda¯sh and brother” of Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r (khushda¯shihi wa-mu65 wa¯khiyan lahu). However, these two mamluks were from different generations. Whereas Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r was a senior mamluk who served Qala¯wu¯n before his sultanate, Aytamish was purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign.66 They are mentioned as khushda¯shs, since they maintained strong friendship and brotherhood relations, as discussed below. This is not to say, however, that the term khushda¯sh could not also denote mamluks who were trained at the same period. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ mentions that ˙ Aybak al-Mawsilı¯ was his khushda¯sh. Aybak was purchased by Qala¯wu¯n together ˙ with Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ in 659/1261.67 It is clear that these two mamluks un˙ derwent training in the same period. Similarly, Kitbugha¯ is cited as calling La¯jı¯n “my khushda¯sh”. The two mamluks were purchased by Qala¯wu¯n more or less in the same year (658–9/1260).68 It seems, hence, that the term khushda¯sh does not necessarily refer to mamluks who were trained and manumitted together in the same period. Rather, it is meant to denote more generally mamluks who belonged to the same master, and in many cases indicates close friendship relations between two mamluks of the same master.69

2.2.

The weakening of solidarity among mamluks of the same master (khushda¯shi groups)

The idea of basic loyalty or solidarity among khushda¯shs, discussed for the first time by David Ayalon, has been revised during the last decades by several scholars. It should be mentioned that already Ayalon points out that when ambitious khushda¯shs struggled for power among themselves, solidarity based on khushda¯shiyya was limited.70 Later scholars, such as Winslow W. Clifford and Jo Van Steenbergen, seem to deny any political role to this kind of loyalty. 64 65 66 67 68 69

See on La¯jı¯n and Qibjaq: chapter one, nn. 150, p. 68 above. Muqaffa¯, 2:337. See: appendix 4, n. 179; appendix 5, n. 215. Zubda, 71. See appendix 4, n. 101; chapter one, n. 150. Koby Yosef came to a similar conclusion, according to which the term “khushda¯sh” means friend, rather than a brother; see: Yosef, Ethnic Groups, 208. 70 Ayalon, L’esclavage, 31.

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

159

Clifford argued that “if the Mamluks were socialized as youth to engage in altruistic collective behavior […] as adults they became much more individualistic and opportunistic in relationships with their khushda¯shiyya”. Clifford sees in the khushda¯shiyya solidarity a “moral guise” which has no political significance as long as is based on horizontal ties and not on vertical clientpatron ties.71 Similarly, Jo Van Steenbergen claims that solidarity based on khushda¯shiyya was not a historical reality but rather a “moral ideal which never actually managed to defeat individual interests”.72 Robert Irwin and Amalia Levanoni downplay the political significance of khushda¯shiyya loyalty as well, but without totally dismissing it. Irwin is of the opinion that khushda¯shiyya loyalties were “cut and cross-cut by other forms of loyalty”.73 Levanoni elaborates this notion by arguing that it would be superficial to consider a whole khushda¯shiyya as a unified collective, but rather one has to trace “different levels in the khushda¯shiyya”.74 In what follows, hence, these “different levels in the khushda¯shiyya” are discussed. First, however, a brief assessment of the significance of the khushda¯shiyya bonds during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign and the Mansu¯riyya period ˙ should be provided. Tension among the senior Mansu¯riyya amirs could be discerned already ˙ during the reign of their master Qala¯wu¯n. These struggles, it should be stressed, never spread to large- scale violent conflicts, since the Mansu¯riyya were under the ˙ strict supervision of their master Qala¯wu¯n. Turunta¯y, however, used to lay snares ˙ ˙ for Qara¯sunqur, the governor of Aleppo (nasaba lahu al-haba¯ʾil) and incited the ˙ ˙ people of Aleppo against him, until Qara¯sunqur was almost fired by Qala¯wu¯n.75 A greater enmity prevailed between Turunta¯y and Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯. Turunta¯y in˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ formed Qala¯wu¯n about al-Shuja¯ʿı¯’s harsh and corrupt behavior toward the people and this brought about the latter’s punishment and dismissal from his office of wazir.76 During al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s reign, the beginning of violence among the Mansu¯riyya is discernable. It may be seen mainly in the escalation of ˙ the enmity between Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ and Turunta¯y, when the former confiscated ˙ ˙ Turunta¯y’s fortune and was responsible for his brutal torture.77 ˙ ˙ 71 Clifford, 49–53, 211. 72 Van Steenberegen, Order, 86. 73 Irwin, Middle East, 90; Irwin presents similar conclusions also regarding the second Mamluk period. However, he nevertheless argues that “the bond of khushda¯shiyya was quitet strong”, see: “Factions in Medieval Egypt”, JRAS (1986), 237. 74 Amalia Levanoni, “The Sultan’s Laqab – A Sign of a New Order in Mamluk Factionalism?”, in The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society, eds. Amalia Levanoni and Michael Winter, (Leiden: Brill, 2004), 93–94. 75 Aʿya¯n, 4:89; Wa¯fı¯, 24:213. 76 Al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 59:23–24; Zubda, 262–263. 77 Zubda, 274–275; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:101; Wa¯fı¯, 16:430; al-Dhahabı¯, Ta’rı¯kh, 59:370. See on the fortune that was taken from Turunta¯y: Manhal, 6:387. ˙ ˙

160

The change in the military-political principles

The internal conflicts within the Mansu¯riyya became much more intense after ˙ the death of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l. These struggles continued during the whole Mansu¯riyya period and brought about significant erosion in “khushda¯shiyya ˙ solidarity”. A prominent example of strife that brought about deadly results are the violent conflicts between Baydara¯ and Kitbugha¯, and Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ and Kitbugha¯, discussed in chapter two. In many other cases, Mansu¯rı¯ amirs arrested ˙ each other. Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ captured Qara¯rsala¯n and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram on behalf of sultan al-Ashraf Khalı¯l.78 Kitbugha¯ arrested Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r during his struggle over the sultanate.79 Kitbugha¯ arrested several others of his khushda¯shs, such as Aybak al-Khaznada¯r the governor of Tripoli, Asandamur Kurjı¯ and Sunqur al-Aʿsar.80 La¯jı¯n, as already discussed, arrested many of his Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ khushda¯shs during his sultanate. The weakness of the khushda¯shiyya as a basis for loyalty compared to usta¯dhmamluk loyalty is especially visible during the reigns of Kitbugha¯ and La¯jı¯n. As we saw, these two sultans promoted their own mamluks and appointed them to the highest positions, at the expense of their Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯shs. It was La¯jı¯n ˙ especially that persecuted his khushda¯shs. During his struggle for the sultanate he killed in cold blood two senior and most favourite mamluks of Kitbugha¯, after the latter protected La¯jı¯n and appointed him viceroy. As sultan, La¯jı¯n did not keep his word to his khushda¯shs. He deposed the Mansu¯ris from key positions ˙ and promoted his mamlu¯ks and especially his favourite Manku¯tamur. Moreover, La¯jı¯n severely persecuted his khushda¯shs. Qara¯sunqur was arrested, Qibjaq escaped to the Mongols, and Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯, Baktamur al-Silahda¯r, Baha¯dur ˙ ˙ al-Ha¯jj and Sunqur al-Aʿsar were dismissed or arrested. Finally, we should ˙ mention the strong enmity between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r during their joint rule. The two amirs promoted their confidants, who did not necessarily belong to the Mansu¯riyya khushda¯shiyya.81 ˙ During the joint rule of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r, the Mansu¯riyya was ˙ divided between the advocates of these two leaders and those who stood by alNa¯sir Muhammad. The stronger al-Na¯sir Muhammad became, the more Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ amirs defected from Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r to his side. However, already in the earliest stages of the conflict, the three most prominent Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, namely ˙ Qara¯sunqur the governor of Aleppo, Qibjaq the governor of Hama and Asandamur the governor of Tripoli, were on al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s side. They col˙ ˙ 78 Niha¯ya, 31:222. 79 See chapter two, n. 69. 80 See on Aybak al-Khaznada¯r: Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:199, Muqaffa¯, 2:327; on Asandamur Kurjı¯: Ibn alFura¯t, 8:213; Aʿya¯n, 1:534; Durar (Cairo), 1:388; on Sunqur al-Aʿsar: Aʿya¯n, 2:479; Wa¯fı¯, 15:497. 81 See al-Safadı¯’s poetic description of Sala¯r’s devious behaviour toward Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r: Aʿya¯n, ˙2:490.

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

161

laborated with al-Na¯sir Muhammad against their Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯shs Baybars ˙ ˙ ˙ al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r and their advocates.82 The cases of treachery among the Mansu¯riyya became more frequent as al˙ Na¯sir Muhammad’s power increased. At the beginning of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ third reign, it was the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs that captured their khushda¯shs, according to ˙ 83 the sultan’s orders. One instructive case of khushda¯shiyya treachery related to the capture of Butkha¯s al-Mansu¯rı¯. Butkha¯s entrenched himself in the citadel ˙ ˙ ˙ and refused to submit to al-Na¯sir Muhammad. The sultan sent Baybars al˙ ˙ Mansu¯rı¯ to him, who convinced him to surrender by untruthfully claiming that ˙ the sultan had summoned other amirs in addition to him and that he did not intend to arrest him. Butkha¯s believed the words of his Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯sh, ˙ ˙ presented himself at the sultan’s palace and was immediately captured and executed.84 Did khushda¯shiyya-based solidarity within the Mansu¯riyya, therefore, have ˙ any political significance? It is hard to decide. One might find evidence for somewhat limited loyalty between three Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who belonged to the ˙ same generation, namely, La¯jı¯n, Qara¯sunqur and Kitbugha¯. Qara¯sunqur convinced al-Ashraf Khalı¯l not to execute La¯jı¯n, until mediation (shafa¯ʿa) was made on La¯jı¯n’s behalf by his Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯shs Baydara¯, Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ and ˙ others, and he was released.85 This collaboration, however, might be seen as part of an intra-Mansu¯riyya collaboration against the sultan al-Ashraf Khalı¯l. More ˙ instructive cases of solidarity toward Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯shs might be seen in ˙ Kitbugha¯’s conduct. During al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s first reign, Kitbugha¯ the ˙ ˙ viceroy protected Qara¯sunqur and La¯jı¯n. The two escaped and hid for a long time after they murdered al-Ashraf Khalı¯l. According to al-Safadı¯, they hid in Kit˙ 82 Nuju¯m, 8:238–242; Sulu¯k, 2:56–57. See in detail: chapter two, section 6. 83 This is discussed at the beginning of the following chapter. Here, the following main arrests of Mansu¯rı¯s by their khushda¯shs should be mentioned: Qara¯sunqur and Asandamur Kurjı¯ ˙ captured Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r (Aʿya¯n, 4:92. Wa¯fı¯, 24:216; Durar [Cairo] 2:39–40); several Mansu¯rı¯ amirs were sent to capture Qara¯sunqur the governor of Damascus: Qara¯la¯jı¯n al˙ ¯ r, Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯, La¯jı¯n Zı¯rba¯j, Mughulta¯y al-Masʿu¯dı¯, Aldukuz al-Ashrafı¯, La¯jı¯n Ustada ˙ ˙ command of Qullı¯ al-Silahda¯r, A ¯ lmalik al-ʿUmarı¯, and a another group of mamluks under the and Kujkun (Sulu¯k, 2:109, Aʿya¯n, 4:93, Wa¯fı¯, 24:216–217; Kanz, 9:218). Arghu¯n˙ al-Dawa¯da¯r (Na¯sirı¯) captured Kira¯y, the governor of Damascus, with the assistance of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs ˙ ˙ Durar ¯ s and Baybars al-Majnu¯n (Niha¯ya, 32:180–181; Aʿya¯n, 4:153; Kujkun, Baha¯dur A ˙ [Cairo], 3:353); the Mans u¯rı¯ amirs Kira¯y, Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯, Aybak al-Ru¯mı¯, Baynaja¯r, Kuj˙ ¯ s captured kun and Baha¯dur A Asandamur Kurjı¯, the governor of Aleppo (Muqaffa¯, 2:188; Nuju¯m, 9:23–24, 27; ˙Sulu¯k, 2:90–91; Aʿya¯n, 2:484); Sanjar al-Jumaqda¯r captured Qutlu¯bak ˙ ¯ m, (Tuhfa, 228); Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ and Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ were sent to capture Sala¯r (Nuju ˙ ˙ 9:15–16); Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯, Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯ and Kujkun captured Baybars al-ʿAla¯’ı¯ (Niha¯ya, 32:196). 84 Niha¯ya, 32:169. 85 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:145–146; Nuju¯m, 8:13, 85; al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 60:18; Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:274; alJazarı¯, 1:121.

162

The change in the military-political principles

bugha¯’s home.86 It is even said that a mamluk of Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ threatened to kill Kitbugha¯ unless he handed over La¯jı¯n.87 Kitbugha¯ managed to convince the senior amirs, especially the Ashrafiyya, to pardon their patron’s murderers. Thanks to this move, La¯jı¯n and Qara¯sunqur could came out from their hiding place and they even received back their high-ranking amirates. As sultan, Kitbugha¯ appointed La¯jı¯n as his viceroy and conferred a high position on Qara¯sunqur until the two “ran the sultanate together with him”.88 La¯jı¯n, however, deposed Kitbugha¯ and killed two of the latter’s senior mamluks. Nevertheless, he did not kill Kitbugha¯ but exiled him to Sarkhad, together with his mamluks, ˙ women and servants.89 Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ remarks that Kitbugha¯ has not been ˙ killed, thanks to the solidarity of La¯jı¯n, Qibjaq, Qara¯sunqur and Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj ˙ toward him.90 In any case, La¯jı¯n arrested Qara¯sunqur and exilled Kitbugha¯. In the end, it is hard to know to what extent khushda¯shiyya-based solidarity played a role in these political upheavals. Evidence of solidarity among the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs ˙ who struggled for power is so rare that it is hard to know if there were not any other motives behind them. A quick look on the political conduct of other khushda¯shyyas in the Mansu¯riyya period does not change the impression of the general weakness of ˙ khushda¯shiyya-based solidarity in real politics. The Ashrafiyya mamluks, who were dispersed by Kitbugha¯ to different places in Cairo managed to unite and revolt against the murderers of their master, Qara¯sunqur and La¯jı¯n. However, the Ashrafiyya unity was not perfect, since a part of this group refused to participate in this revolt.91 The khushda¯shiyya of the mamluks of La¯jı¯n, the Husa¯miyya, ˙ collaborated in order to capture the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs according to the orders of ˙ their master La¯jı¯n, and after their master’s murder, the amirs of the Husa¯miyya ˙ were under a common danger of arrest.92 However, their political inclinations were not homogeneous. Whereas Aydughdı¯ Shuqayr and Tugha¯y advocated al˙ Na¯sir Muhammad, Aqqu¯sh al-Ru¯mı¯ was a prominent supporter of Baybars al˙93 ˙ Ja¯shnakı¯r. Similarily, a group of mamluks of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, the Muzaffariyya, collaborated in order to depose the sultan, their master’s killer, al˙

86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93

Aʿya¯n, 4:90–91; Wa¯fı¯, 24:213–214. Sulu¯k, 1:799. Aʿya¯n, 4:91,145; Wa¯fı¯, 24:213, 319; Manhal, 9:167; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:262. Aʿya¯n, 4:146; Wa¯fı¯, 24:319; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:263. According to al-Safadı¯, La¯jı¯n even called ˙ Kitbugha¯ to escape in order to save his life, see: Aʿya¯n, 4:146. Tuhfa, 148. See˙ chapter two, section 2.3. Sulu¯k, 1:866. See on Aydughdı¯ Shuqayr and Tugha¯y: p. 274 below; on Aqqu¯sh al-Ru¯mı¯: Sulu¯k, 2:47; Kanz, ˙ 9:158; Zubda, 406; Nuju¯m, 8:235–236.

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

163

Na¯sir Muhammad.94 However, one of the Muzaffariyya informed al-Na¯sir Mu˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ hammad about his khushda¯shs’ intentions.95 ˙ It seems that kushda¯shiyya-based solidarity was a moral ideal to which the mamluks themselves were, theoretically, obliged. This ideal was used as an excuse for defeated amirs to appease their rivals and to safeguard their own life. When Sunqur al-Ashqar revolted against Qala¯wu¯n and took over Damascus, the sultan and the Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯shs rebuked Sunqur for breaking the friendship that ˙ should exist among khushda¯shs.96 When Kitbugha¯ renounced his rule in La¯jı¯n’s favour, he promised to obey La¯jı¯n since he was his khushda¯sh (huwa khushda¯shı¯).97 Similarly, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r wrote to Qara¯sunqur that “he is his khushda¯sh” in order to gain his support against al-Na¯sir Muhammad.98 When the ˙ ˙ amirs tried to prevent the arrest of Aybak al-Khaznada¯r by Kitbugha¯, they reminded him that Aybak was his khushda¯sh. Later, the amirs again told Kitbugha¯ that Aybak was “his best khushda¯sh” (akbar khushda¯shiyat al-sulta¯n) in order to ˙ get him released.99 When the amirs interceded on Kitbugha¯’s behalf before sultan La¯jı¯n, they mentioned that Kitbugha¯, after all, was the sultan’s khushda¯sh.100 We can deduce from all the above that solidarity based on the principle of khushda¯shiyya brotherhood was a theoretical “ethical code of conduct” in Mamluk politics. In reality, its implementation was limited. Khushda¯shiyyabased solidarity in itself had political significance as long as the members of the khushda¯shiyya collaborated as a faction, usually against a common rival or during the life of their master. After his death, self-interests always won over the moral ideal of khushda¯shiyya brotherhood. However, in several cases a stronger loyalty between two khushda¯shs is definitely discerned. Within the Mansu¯riyya, ˙ the relations between La¯jı¯n and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, La¯jı¯n and Sala¯r, Baybars alJa¯shnakı¯r and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, and Turunta¯y and Kitbugha¯ were especially ˙ ˙ close. Since khushda¯shiyya itself, i. e., their affiliation to the same master, cannot explain the strong solidarity among these Mansu¯rı¯s, there must be other factors ˙ in play. In order to trace the origins of stronger solidarity among khushda¯shs, other determinants of loyalty have to be examined.

94 Tuhfa, 224; Nuju¯m, 9:24–25; Sulu¯k, 2:92. ˙¯ n, 5:480; Durar (Cairo), 5:148. 95 Aʿya 96 Zubda, 181. 97 Aʿya¯n, 4:146; Wa¯fı¯, 24:319. 98 Nuju¯m, 8:242. 99 ʿIqd, 3:274, 315. 100 ʿIqd, 3:352.

164 2.3.

The change in the military-political principles

Loyalty determinants of and among the Mansu¯riyya amirs ˙

2.3.1 Sub-factional solidarity: the Burjiyya The Burjiyya regiment constituted about a half of the total Mansu¯riyya.101 A ˙ stronger solidarity prevailed among the senior amirs of the Burjiyya. Already after the murder of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l, when Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r became among the most prominent amirs, two political coalitions were formed: the Burjiyya inclined to the side of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, whereas the other Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ amirs, together with the senior Sa¯lih¯ı amirs, supported the non-Burjı¯ Sala¯r.102 ˙ ˙ During the joint rule of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r a constant tension prevailed between the Burjiyya and the rest of the Mansu¯riyya.103 Baybars appointed ˙ his Burjı¯ confidants as district governors in Syria and his rule strengthened thanks to his other Burjı¯ supporters. Aqqu¯sh al-Afram was appointed as governor of Damascus, Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯ as wazir, Butkha¯s al-Mansu¯rı¯ al-Burjı¯ as amir in ˙ ˙ Cairo and Baybars al-Ta¯jı¯ as the wa¯lı¯ of Cairo.104 Sala¯r’s non-Burjı¯ confidants, who had been promoted to keys position as well, such as Qutlu¯bak who was ˙ appointed as ha¯jib, caused concern among the Burjı¯s.105 Whereas the Burjı¯ amirs ˙ urged Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r against Sala¯r, the other Mansu¯rı¯ amirs incited Sala¯r ˙ against Bayabrs al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. Finally, Baybars was crowned sultan thanks to efforts of the Burjı¯ amirs who strongly objected to Sala¯r’s appointment as sultan and threatened to fight against him.106 As sultan, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r conferred amirates upon many of his Burjı¯ friends, while refusing them to Sala¯r’s confidants.107 During the sultanate of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, the Burjı¯ amirs continued to incite Baybars to arrest Sala¯r.108 The response of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s sultanate reflects ˙ the enmity among the Mansu¯riyya elite. On the one hand, the coronation of ˙ Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r pleased the Burjı¯ amirs, especially Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, the governor of Syria. On the other hand, the non-Burjı¯ Mansu¯rı¯ amirs of Syria, ˙ 101 102 103 104

105 106 107 108

See chapter one, section 1. Sulu¯k, 1:869. Sulu¯k, 1:885, 2:25, 37–38. Sulu¯k, 1:918; Durar (Cairo), 2:5; Aʿya¯n 2:72; Wa¯fı¯, 10:439; Manhal, 3:468. The main role of the wa¯lı¯ of Cairo was to ensure internal security and order, see: D.S. Richards. “The Office of Wila¯yat al-Qa¯hira in Mamluk Times”, in Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk Eras IV, Proceedings of the 6th, 7th and 8th International Colloquium, ed. Urbain Vermeulen and Jo Van Steenbergen (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, May 1997, 1998 and 1999). Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 2001, 441–457. Aʿya¯n, 4:122; Wa¯fı¯, 24:260; Manhal, 9:86–87. See on the brotherhood pact between Sala¯r and Qutlu¯bak below. ˙¯ k, 2:45, 46; Nuju¯m, 8:181, 234–235. Sulu Sulu¯k, 2:53. Nuju¯m, 8:247,270; Sulu¯k, 2:58, 70. See also chapter two, n. 245.

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

165

¯ s, Aqjuba¯ al-Za¯hirı¯ and Baktamur al-Ha¯jib, namely Baybars al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯, Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ ¯ s suggested˙ that refused to swear allegiance to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. Baha¯dur A ˙ before they gave their oath to the new sultan, they should consult with the district governors of Syria: Qara¯sunqur the governor of Aleppo, Qibjaq the governor of Hama and Asandamur the governor of Tripoli. Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯, Baybars al¯ s. Ja¯shnakı¯r’s Burjı¯ confidant, urged Aqqu¯sh al-Afram to capture Baha¯dur A ˙ Aqqu¯sh, however, tried hard to convince the four non-Burjı¯ amirs to swear allegiance to the new sultan. The four amirs eventually agreed to give their oath to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. However, when the three non-Burjı¯ Mansu¯rı¯ governors in ˙ Syria heard about Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s coronation without being involved in 109 this decision, they decided to rebel against him. The intra-Mansu¯rı¯ tension between the Burjı¯ amirs and the rest of the Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ amirs escalated during the conflict between sultan Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and alNa¯sir Muhammad. The coalition supporting Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r included his ˙ ˙ Burjı¯ fellows, headed by Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯, Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h, ˙ Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯ and others. The pro-Na¯sir coalition was headed by the non˙ ˙ 110 ¯ s. Burjı¯ amirs, such as Qara¯sunqur, Qibjaq, Asandamur Kurjı¯ and Baha¯dur A ˙ The greatest supporter of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r was Aqqu¯sh al-Afram. The fact that these two amirs were affiliated to the Burjiyya is mentioned as one of the reasons for their strong solidarity.111 Another prominent confidant of Baybars alJa¯shnakı¯r was the Burjı¯ amir Mughulta¯y al-Baʿlı¯.112 ˙ When al-Na¯sir Muhammad arrived in Damascus in 709/1310, the Burjı¯s’ ˙ ˙ loyalty to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r was still very strong. Whereas the non-Burjı¯ Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ joined al-Na¯sir Muhammad, the Burjı¯ amirs headed by Aybak ˙ ˙ al-Baghda¯dı¯, Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h and Qijma¯s refused to defect to al-Na¯sir Mu˙ ˙ hammad’s ranks and came back to Cairo.113 When Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r had to ˙ escape from Cairo, he was accompanied by his Burjı¯ confidants Aydamur alKhat¯ırı¯, Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h and others.114 With the entrance of al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ to Cairo, the Burjı¯ amirs, together with Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s mamluks, planned to murder the new sultan.115 It is hard to estimate the loyalty of the Burjı¯ amirs in this late stage of the conflict. On the one hand, Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯ and Baktu¯t al˙ Fatta¯h deserted al-Ja¯shnakı¯r in Itfı¯h. On the other hand, they met with Baybars al˙ ˙ ˙

109 110 111 112

Nuju¯m, 8:236–237. See chapter two, section 6. Aʿya¯n, 1:563; Wa¯fı¯, 9:328–329. Mughulta¯y was dispatched by Baybars to Kerak in order to take back the fortune and ˙ that al-Na¯sir Muhammad took with him from Cairo (Durar [Hyderabad], 4:355). mamluks ˙ ˙ 113 Nuju¯m, 8:269. 114 Nuju¯m, 8:271; Sulu¯k, 2:71. 115 Sulu¯k, 2:73.

166

The change in the military-political principles

Ja¯shnakı¯r and received robes of honour from him. Soon after, however, they were arrested by al-Na¯sir Muhammad.116 ˙ ˙ It seems, hence, that quite a strong solidarity prevailed amongst the elite of the Burjiyya. It is hard to know if there were not any additional loyalty factors among the Burjı¯ amirs. The sources mention that Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s confidants were from his Burjı¯ alza¯m, which might indicate a patron-client relationship.117 We also know about a marriage contract between Baybars and his Burjı¯ confidant Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯, as well as other loyalty determinants among Burjı¯s (to be discussed below). In any case, solidarity based on affiliation to the Burjiyya should not be seen as related to solidarity that is based on a common ethnic origin. As we have already seen, the Burjiyya was not an ethnically-homogenous unit. 2.3.2. Common ethnic origin The significance of solidarity based on common ethnic origin is controversial among scholars. Ayalon points out the paucity and problematical nature of the data regarding the ethnic origins of the mamluks. Due to this situation, Ayalon claims, it is impossible to evaluate precisely the respective weights of the different ethnic groups.118 Elswhere, however, Ayalon, asserts that “ethnic affinity played a central role in Mamluk society from its very inception”.119 Following Ayalon, scholars have focused mainly on the role of ethnic solidarity in relation to the tension between Circassian and Qipchaq-Turk mamluks during the 8th/14th century.120 Irwin, similarly to Ayalon, attributes significance to ethnicity during the Mansu¯riyya period and asserts that “sentiments of racial solidarity were ˙ inextricably involved in the struggle for political power between what may be termed the inner and the outer elites of the Mamluk armies”.121 Recently, Yosef argued that ethnicity played a crucial role in the Mamluk sultanate.122 Against that, Levanoni raised doubts about the importance of solidarity among Circas116 Sulu¯k, 2:77–78; Nuju¯m, 8:272, 9:14. 117 Sulu¯k, 2:70, 71, see chapter two, n. 270. 118 Ayalon, “Mamluk“, 7–8. On the problematic nature of the data in the sources regarding ethnic origin see chapter one, section 1. 119 Ayalon, “Bahrı¯ Mamluks”, 44. ˙ 120 Ayalon, “Mamluk”, 8; Ayalon, “Bahrı¯ Mamluks“, 45; Ayalon, “The Circassians”, 135–147; ˙ Amalia Levanoni, “Al-Maqrı¯zı¯’s Account of the Transition from Turkish to Circassian Mamluk Sultanate: History in the Service of Faith”, in The Historiography of Islamic Egypt (c. 950–1800), ed. Hugh Kennedy (Leiden: Brill, 2001), 100–101; Chapoutot-Remadi, “Liens”, 93, 182–185; Irwin, Middle East, 91–92. 121 Irwin, Middle East, 92. 122 Yosef, Ethnic Groups, 87–94. According to Yosef, even the names of the mamluks were given according to their ethnic origin (Yosef, Ethnic Groups, 171–172). See also his “Dawlat alAtra¯k”.

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

167

sian mamluks in Barqu¯q’s rise to power in 783/1382.123 Similarly, Van Steenbergen showed that after al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign (741/1341–783/1382), ˙ ˙ the role of solidarity based on Circassian ethnicity was quite small.124 Northrup came to the conclusion that despite a certain importance of ethnic-based solidarity, the fundamental loyalties were based on master-mamluk and khushda¯shiyya ties that “helped to shape and strengthen the Mamluk political structure”.125 Clifford denied the role of ethnicity during the early Mamluk period.126 Amitai reconciles the contradictory views. Based on a case study of mamluks of Mongol origin, he concludes that though ethnicity did play a role in political conflicts, “we should be careful about seeing Mongol ethnic solidarity being a determinant factor every time the paths of two Mongol-Mamluks crossed”. Amitai, however, suggests that “we need more case studies of possible expressions of ethnic solidarity among other groups in the military society of the sultanate.”127 The historical sources published during the last decades contribute more data regarding the ethnic origin of some mamluks. As discussed in chapter one, some data, though problematic, could be derived regarding the ethnic origin of about thirty out of the one hundred and eighty mamluks discussed in this study. This data, limited though it is, refers to the most prominent amirs, the ones who took part in political conflicts and pacts. This situation enables us to examine more closely the role of ethnic origin in Mamluk politics during the Mansu¯riyya period. ˙ The significance of solidarity based on ethnic origin is mostly discerned in the conflict between Kitbugha¯ and Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ and in Kitbugha¯’s reign afterwards. During this period, the mamluks of Mongol origin inclined to Kitbugha¯’s side due, as the sources emphasize, to their common ethnic origin. During the conflict between Kitbugha¯ and Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, “all the Tatars” inclined to Kitbugha¯’s side.128 Al-ʿAynı¯ mentions that the amirs imprisoned by Sanjar alShuja¯ʿı¯ during this conflict all belonged to the same ethnic group, i. e. were of Mongol origin, as Kitbugha¯ was. This historian explicitly notes that the reason for the emergence of Kitbugha¯’s faction was solidarity based on common ethnic origin ( jinsiyya).129 In a later phase of this conflict, a Mongol wa¯fidı¯ named Qunghur al-Tatarı¯, who was among the supporters (alza¯m) of Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, 123 Levanoni, “Al-Maqrı¯zı¯’s Account”, 100–101, 105. 124 Van Steenbergen, Order, 92–94. 125 Linda Northrup, “The Bahrı¯ Mamlu¯k Sultanate, 1250–1390”, in The Cambridge History of ˙ 640–1517, ed. Carl F. Petry (Cambridge: Cambridge University Egypt. Vol. 1: Islamic Egypt, Press, 1998), 259. 126 Clifford, 54; 211–212. 127 Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin”, 133–134. 128 Nuju¯m, 8:44; Sulu¯k, 1:800. 129 Wa-ka¯na ha¯ula¯ʾi yamı¯lu¯na ila¯ Kitbugha¯ li-anna al-jinsiyya ʿillat al-damm (ʿIqd, 3:242). ˙

168

The change in the military-political principles

informed Kitbugha¯ about al-Shuja¯ʿı¯’s intention to capture him and his people.130 Al-Maqrı¯zı¯ mentions that Qunghur betrayed al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ since Qunghur belonged to the same ethnic group ( jins) as Kitbugha¯.131 Not surprisingly, Qunghur and his son Ja¯warshı¯ were among the supporters of Kitbugha¯’s sultanate.132 Kitbugha¯ showed solidarity with his Mongol fellows also as sultan. As mentioned in the previous chapter, the thousands of wa¯fidı¯ Oirats that arrived in Egypt during his sultanate were warmly welcomed and their senior commanders received amirates of tablkha¯na¯h despite the fact that they were still non-Muslims.133 Indeed, one of ˙ the reasons for Kitbugha¯’s deposition was that he inclined too much to his ethnic group, to the senior amirs’ chagrin.134 In 698/1299, the Oirat wa¯fidiyya even tried to murder Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r in order to put Kitbugha¯ back on the throne.135 Besides these cases, there is another instance of enmity between amirs, originating in ethnicity. When the Circassian Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r rose to power, the Mongol Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj – who was a confidant of the Circassian governor of ˙ Syria, Aqqu¯sh al-Afram – deserted him and organized a coalition against “the Circassians” together with the Mongol Qutlu¯bak.136 Another case that might ˙ imply solidarity between two Mongol-origin mamluks is that of Qibjaq and Sala¯r. When Qibjaq asked the amirs in Cairo to return to the lands of the sultanate, Sala¯r’s view toward Qibjaq was positive, whereas Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s view was negative. Sala¯r’s view won over that of al-Ja¯shnakı¯r.137 However, the aforementioned cases do not necessarily indicate the strength of loyalty based on a common ethnic origin. The rise and fall of Kitbugha¯, indeed, has some relation to solidarity among the mamluks and wa¯fidiyya of Mongol origin. Nevertheless, it is a single case that should not be overestimated. Sala¯r, also an Oirat-Mongol, was not supported by the Mongol wa¯fidiyya, who even tried to murder him during their coup d’etat attempt.138 The Mongol wa¯fidiyya 130 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:179–180; Sulu¯k, 1:799. Qunghur (or: Qunqugh) migrated from the ¯Ilkha¯nate to Egypt in al-Za¯hir Baybars’ reign. He received an iqta¯ʿ in the halqa and a high position in ˙ to Baybars ˙ al-Mansu¯rı¯, Qunghur was Sanjar al-Shuja¯˙ʿı¯’s household (Nuju¯m, 8:42). According ˙ released from his imprisonment thanks to shafa¯ʿa (mediation) on his behalf by Sanjar alShuja¯ʿı¯ (Zubda, 301). The six sons of Qunghur were also in Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯’s service (Ibn alFura¯t, 8:179). 131 Wa-huwa min jins Kitbugha¯ fa-aʿlamahu al-khabar (Sulu¯k, 1:798). See also: Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin”, 130. 132 Tuhfa, 144. 133 See˙ also pp. 91–92 above. 134 Durar (Hyderabad), 3:263–264; Ayalon, “Wafidiya”, 91. 135 Sulu¯k, 1:883–884; Zubda, 330; Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin”, 131; Amitai, “Ghazan’s First Campaign”, 227; Ayalon, “Wafidiya“, 100; Irwin, Middle East, 100. 136 Aʿya¯n, 2:55; Wa¯fı¯, 10:296. 137 Aʿya¯n, 4:70; Wa¯fı¯, 24:184; Durar (Cairo), 3:326. 138 See p. 109 above; Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin”, 132.

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

169

also acted against the Mongol Qutlu¯bak when he served as ha¯jib in Cairo at the ˙ ˙ beginning of the joint rule of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r. Qutlu¯bak tried to ˙ appease the wa¯fidiyya members by gifts, but in the end was forced to give up his office and to leave for Tripoli.139 It seems that the Muslim historians overestimated the role of ethnicity in mamluk political solidarity. If, for instance, the Mongol Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj was so angered by the Circassian Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, why ˙ was he among al-Afram’s close friends for so many years, until Baybars alJa¯shnakı¯r came to power? In fact, Aqqu¯sh al-Afram managed to appease Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj.140 The solidarity between the Mongols Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj and Qutlu¯bak was ˙ ˙ ˙ apparently derived from the friendship that they shared and not necessarily from their common ethnic origin. Similarly, the solidarity between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram is derived from several loyalty factors, and not only from their common Circassian origin, as discussed below. Sala¯r’s advocation of Qibjaq’s return to the sultanate might be explained by the fact that the two amirs fought and were taken prisoner by the mamluks together at the battle of Abulustayn. No other indications for solidarity among these two Mongol origin amirs are mentioned. The historical sources mention many more cases of enmity between Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ amirs who belonged to the same ethnic group, as well as pacts between amirs from different ethnic origins. The most instructive instance of enmity between Mansu¯rı¯ amirs from the same ethnic origin is the bloody conflict between Kit˙ bugha¯ and Baydara¯, both of Mongol origin. As we saw, during this conflict, Kitbugha¯ headed the coalition that killed Baydara¯. Similarily, there was no solidarity between Kitbugha¯ and Sala¯r, both of Mongol-Oirat origin.141 Between Kitbugha¯ and Qibjaq enmity prevailed. Kitbugha¯, as viceroy, strove against Qibjaq, since he was a close confidant of La¯jı¯n.142 The weakness of a solidarity based on a common ethnic origin can definitely be seen in the relations between Kitbugha¯ and Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj. These two amirs ˙ were taken prisoner from the Mongol army when they were young boys, more or less at the same time.143 Kitbugha¯ made Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj his confidant and as ˙ sultan appointed Baha¯dur as ha¯jib. However, when the Circassian La¯jı¯n revolted ˙ against Kitbugha¯, Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj unhesitatingly joined La¯jı¯n’s side. Baha¯dur al˙ Ha¯jj’s treachery brought about Kitbugha¯’s escape and La¯jı¯n’s usurpation.144 The ˙ 139 140 141 142 143

Aʿya¯n, 4:122; Wa¯fı¯, 24:260; Manhal, 9:86. Aʿya¯n, 2:55; Wa¯fı¯, 10:296. Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin”, 131–132. Durar (Cairo), 3:326; Aʿya¯n, 4:64; Wa¯fı¯, 24:180. Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj was taken prisoner at the battle of ʿAyn Ja¯lu¯t and Kitbugha¯ at the battle of ˙ Homs that followed it, see chapter one, n. 36, appendix 4, n. 101. 144 Al-Maqrı¯zı¯ mentions that despite Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj’s support, La¯jı¯n immediately arrested ˙

170

The change in the military-political principles

lack of solidarity among the amirs of Mongol origin is noticeable also in the conflict between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and al-Na¯sir Muhammad. When (the ˙ ˙ Mongol-origin) Aytamish al-Muhammadı¯ was sent to Qutlu¯bak in order to ˙ ˙ persuade him to join al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s coalition, Qutlu¯bak meant to hand ˙ ˙ ˙ Aytamish to the Circassian Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s confidant. ¯ s who was not a Mongol and received him Aytamish escaped to Baha¯dur A ˙ 145 warmly. Examination of the relations between mamluks of Circassian origin also reveals lack of loyalty among them. For instance, despite the fact that Qara¯sunqur and Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r were both of Circassian origin, Qara¯sunqur was alNa¯sir Muhammad’s main supporter and Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s most bitter op˙ ˙ ponent. As discussed in chapter two, Qara¯sunqur opposed Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s rule from its inception. When al-Na¯sir Muhammad regained the sultanate, ˙ ˙ Qara¯sunqur captured Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r at al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s command. ˙ ˙ This capture brought about Baybars’ execution.146 Mistrust prevailed also between the Circassians Qara¯sunqur and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram. It was not only the strong enmity between them during the conflict between Baybars Ja¯shnakı¯r and al-Na¯sir Muhammad. Even when they were both in danger of execution by al˙ ˙ Na¯sir Muhammad, strong mutual suspicion prevailed between them. When they ˙ ˙ decided to join forces and flee together to the ¯Ilkha¯ns, al-Afram delayed his personal meeting with Qara¯sunqur. He met him only after a long procedure of correspondences and oaths, all aimed to ensure that Qara¯sunqur has no intention to capture him.147 In contrast, deep trust prevailed among other amirs who fled to the Mongols, such as Aqqu¯sh al-Afram and his father-in-law Aydamur al-Zaradka¯sh. Strong solidarity also existed between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and his Mongol son-in-law Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯. These cases point to the weakness of solidarity based on a common ethnic origin compared to that based on marriage contracts, as discussed in the following section. Finally, it is noteworthy that in contrast to the strong enmity among amirs of the same ethnic origin, there are several instructive cases of very close relations between amirs of different ethnic origins, such as the Circassian La¯jı¯n and the Mongol Qibjaq, La¯jı¯n and the Mongol Sala¯r, and the Kurdish Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ and the Mongol Sala¯r. These relationships are discussed below.

Baha¯dur since he noticed his treachery to Kitbugha¯, who was so kind to him (Muqaffa¯, 2:506–507). 145 Nuju¯m, 8:245–246. 146 Aʿya¯n, 4:91–92; Wa¯fı¯, 24:216; Durar (Cairo), 2:39–40. 147 Aʿya¯n, 1:567–568; Wa¯fı¯, 9:333.

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

171

2.3.3. Marriage ties Marriage patterns among the Mansu¯riyya ˙ Modern scholars hold different views regarding the marriage patterns of the mamluks. Whereas Ira Lapidus and, following him, Jonathan Berkey assert that mamluks routinely married into families of the local religious, judicial, bureaucratic and commercial elites, Ayalon noted that the members of the mamluk elite married among themselves and only in rare cases married local women.148 Examination of the marriage patterns among the Mansu¯riyya reveals that Aya˙ lon’s view is the more valid. Indeed, for the Mansu¯riyya, only one case in which an ˙ amir married a local woman is known. Sunqur al-Aʿsar was forced to marry the daughter of the wazir Ibn al-Salʿu¯s in order to keep his position.149 In all other cases, marriage occurred within the mamluk military elite. Most of the marriage contracts of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs were within the khush˙ da¯shiyya of the Mansu¯riyya.150 A common pattern of marriage contract was ˙ between a Mansu¯rı¯ amir and the daughter of another Mansu¯rı¯ amir, e. g., the ˙ ˙ marriage contracts between Aqqu¯sh al-Afram and Aydamur al-Zaradka¯sh, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Burlughay, Kira¯y and Qibjaq. Another type of marriage contract was between children of two Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, like the one between Kit˙ bugha¯ and Turunta¯y, in which each of these amirs married his son to the daughter ˙ ˙ of the other. The marriage between the children of Qara¯sunqur and Baha¯dur Raʾs Nawba, as well as those between Turunta¯y and Qibjaq, are other instances of this ˙ ˙ kind of marriage contract.151 In other cases an amir married his daughter to a senior mamluk of another Mansu¯rı¯ amir. This was the case of Aqqu¯sh al-Afram’s daughter, who was mar˙ ried to Baktamur al-Ha¯jib, a mamluk of Turunta¯y. Similarly, Sayf al-Dı¯n al˙ ˙ ˙ Ju¯kanda¯r (Balaba¯n or Baktamur) married his daughter to Baha¯dur al-Ju¯kanda¯r, a 152 mamluk of La¯jı¯n. A case in which an amir married one of his children to his own mamluk is reported only regarding Kitbugha¯ and his mamluk Baydara¯.153 Another unique case is marriage between a Mansu¯rı¯ amir and the mother of ˙ 148 Lapidus, 69, 109; Berkey, “Education”, 94, 108; Ayalon, “Mamluk”, 16; Ayalon, “Muslim City”, 323. 149 Wa¯fı¯, 15:497; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:136; Irwin, Middle East, 80. 150 Clifford came to similar conclusions, see: Clifford, 189. The instances for marriage patterns are discussed in depth in the following section. Footnotes are mentioned in the following paragraphs only regarding data that is not discussed below. 151 Qibjaq’s daughter was married first to Kira¯y al-Mansu¯rı¯, when Qibjaq was the governor of ˙ Damascus. After Qibjaq’s death (in 710/1310) and apparently following Kira¯y’s arrest, she was married to Turunta¯y’s son (Aʿya¯n, 4:154; 4:480). It seems that the women of the notable ˙ Qibjaq ˙ were especially desireable for marriage among the mamluks. Mongol family of 152 Aʿya¯n, 2:54. 153 Aʿya¯n, 2:97.

172

The change in the military-political principles

another Mansu¯rı¯. Qala¯wu¯n married Baydara¯’s mother, who arrived in the sul˙ tanate as a prisoner of war with her baby son Baydara¯, with Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, who was at that time one of his mature mamluks.154 During al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ third reign, Mansu¯rı¯ amirs married their daughters to amirs who occupied high ˙ positions and were considered Na¯sirı¯s, but originally belonged to the Mansu¯riyya ˙ ˙ or the mamluks of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs. Ku¯ka¯y al-Mansu¯rı¯ married his daughter to ˙ ˙ 155 Tankiz, who was originally a mamluk of La¯jı¯n. The daughters of Sunqursha¯h alMansu¯rı¯ and Qutlu¯bak were married to Aruqta¯y, who was originally a Mansu¯rı¯, ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ but moved to the ranks of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s mamluks as a young boy.156 ˙ ˙ Significantly fewer cases are mentioned of marriage contracts between Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ amirs and amirs from other khushda¯shiyya groups. La¯jı¯n was married to the daughter of Taqsu¯, who was a mamluk of al-Sa¯lih Ayyu¯b or al-Za¯hir Baybars. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Qibjaq’s sister was married to Albakı¯ al-Za¯hirı¯ (see on these cases in the following ˙ section). The Mansu¯rı¯ amirs also married women who were related to royal families. ˙ La¯jı¯n married the daughter of al-Za¯hir Baybars and the daughter of the Byzantine ˙ 157 emperor. Aybak al-Khaznada¯r married the daughter of al-Za¯hir Baybars.158 ˙ Sala¯r married his daughter to Mu¯sa¯ b. al-Sa¯lih ʿAlı¯ b. Qala¯wu¯n, his first master’s ˙ ˙ son.159 Of course, in addition to the above cases that were due to political considerations, Mansu¯rı¯ amirs married (mostly Turkish) slave girls who were im˙ ported to the Mamluk sultanate. Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ notes that Qala¯wu¯n married all his mamluks with his slave girls.160 Kira¯y, for instance, had no less than thirty concubines, in addition to his four wives.161 Solidarity among in-laws Marriage ties played an important role in state affairs. The relatively abundant data on the marriage contracts of Mamluk sultans and amirs enables us to evaluate the strength of this determinant of loyalty, especially during political conflicts among the Mansu¯riyya. ˙ The most prominent example of a marriage contract between two Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ amirs is the case of Turunta¯y and Kitbugha¯ in which each of them married his son ˙ ˙ to the other’s daughter.162 The expressions of loyalty between these two in-laws 154 Muqaffa¯, 2:562. 155 Wa¯fı¯, 24:376; Durar (Cairo), 3:356. 156 Aʿya¯n, 1:477, 2:483. 157 See respectively: Manhal, 9:173; Sulu¯k, 1:831. 158 Sulu¯k, 2:11. 159 ʿIqd, 4:358. 160 Nuju¯m, 7:328. 161 Aʿya¯n, 4:154; Wa¯fı¯, 24:332. 162 Khitat, 2:216; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 194. ˙ ˙

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

173

are indeed very clear. Kitbugha¯ is said to have been especially afraid for Tur˙ unta¯y’s life, when the latter was invited to a personal meeting with sultan al˙ Ashraf Khalı¯l. Kitbugha¯ urged Turunta¯y to avoid meeting the sultan on his own, ˙ ˙ fearing that the sultan would hurt him. When Turunta¯y refused to listen to ˙ ˙ Kitbugha¯’s warnings, Kitbugha¯ himself accompanied Turunta¯y to his meeting. ˙ ˙ However, al-Ashraf Khalı¯l imprisoned Turunta¯y and arrested Kitbugha¯ as well, ˙ 163 ˙ since he was Turunta¯y’s close confidant. When Kitbugha¯ became sultan, he ˙ ˙ ordered the transfer of Turunta¯y’s body from its temporary burial place to a ˙ ˙ distinguished tomb in Turunta¯y’s mausoleum in the Husa¯mı¯yya madrasa.164 ˙ ˙ ˙ Another marriage was made between Aqqu¯sh al-Afram and the daughter of 165 Aydamur al-Zaradka¯sh. According to al-Safadı¯, the marriage contract between ˙ the two amirs was the reason for their joint defection to the Mongols.166 When Aqqu¯sh al-Afram escaped from al-Na¯sir Muhammad , it was al-Zaradka¯sh who ˙ ˙ informed his son-in-law about al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s intention to capture him, ˙ ˙ and encouraged him to defect to the ¯Ilkha¯ns.167 The sources do not mention any suspicion between these two in-laws, as opposed to the great suspicion that prevailed between Aqqu¯sh al-Afram and Qara¯sunqur (both Circassians), as mentioned above.168 The nature of the marriage contracts between Qara¯sunqur and Baha¯dur Raʾs Nawba are not exactly clear. According to al-Maqrı¯zı¯, Qara¯sunqur’s daughter was married to Baha¯dur Raʾs Nawba’s son, Jaraktamur. Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ mentions that it was Qara¯sunqur’s sister who was married to Jaraktamur.169 However, the loyalty between these two in-laws is more clear. Qara¯sunqur gave shelter to Jaraktamur and interceded on his behalf (shafaʿa), when al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ attempted to capture him.170 Baha¯dur Raʾs Nawba is mentioned immediately after Qara¯sunqur in the list of the amirs who gathered in order to murder alAshraf Khalı¯l.171 Very strong loyalty prevailed between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Burlughay alAshrafı¯, who was married to the former’s daughter. Burlughay was considered one of the most prominent confidants and supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r.172 Though Burlughay married Baybars’ daughter only in 709/1309, with Baybars’

163 164 165 166 167 168 169 170 171 172

Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:100; Sulu¯k, 1:757. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:100; Manhal, 6:387. Manhal, 3:13. Aʿya¯n, 1:656. Aʿya¯n, 1:566; Wa¯fı¯, 9:331. See on the trust between Aqqu¯sh al-Afram and al-Zaradka¯sh, for instace, Sulu¯k, 2:109–110. Sulu¯k, 2:76; Nuju¯m, 9:13 Nuju¯m, 9:13; Sulu¯k, 2:76; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:534. Zubda, 296. Nuju¯m, 8:269–270, 9:216.

174

The change in the military-political principles

coronation as sultan,173 the two amirs were arrested together already during the conflicts that followed the murder of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l in 693/1294.174 Burlughay was among the last confidants of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r to desert him. When alNa¯sir Muhammad arrived in Cairo, Burlughay headed the coalition that aimed to ˙ ˙ murder the new sultan.175 Not surprisingly, al-Na¯sir Muhammad captured Bur˙ ˙ lughay and executed him, soon after he executed Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r.176 An indication of solidarity between in-laws could be seen in the arrest policy. In many cases, the arrest of a certain amir was followed by the imprisonment of his in-law. For instance, when al-Na¯sir Muhammad arrested Qutlu¯bak, he im˙ ˙ ˙ prisoned also Qutlu¯bak’s in-law Asandamur Kurjı¯.177 When the same sultan ˙ arrested Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r, he arrested his two in-laws, Alaktamur al-Jamda¯r and Aydughdı¯ al-ʿUthmanı¯, both amirs of tablkha¯na¯h, together with him.178 ˙ Alaktamur died in prison in 717/1317, one year after the execution of Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r.179 Strong solidarity between in-laws is discernable also when one of the amirs was not affiliated to the Mansu¯riyya khushda¯shiyya. For instance, when al-Ashraf ˙ Khalı¯l captured La¯jı¯n, Baydara¯ suggested that al-Ashraf also arrest Baybars Taqsu¯, since his daughter was married to La¯jı¯n.180 Taqsu¯ was a Sa¯lih¯ı or Za¯hirı¯ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ amir. Nevertheless, his marriage contract with La¯jı¯n was considered a reasonable justification for his arrest.181 Strong loyalty is noticeable also between Qibjaq and the Za¯hirı¯ amir Fa¯ris al-Dı¯n Albakı¯, who was married to Qibjaq’s sister. The two ˙ amirs defected together to the Mongols and later returned together to the sultanate and received high positions.182 Strong solidarity is shown also between Sala¯r and his son-in-laws. The most prominent of them was the son of his first master, Mu¯sa¯ b. ʿAlı¯ b. Qala¯wu¯n. Sala¯r 173 Sulu¯k, 2:52; Zubda, 410. 174 Kanz, 8:356; ʿIqd, 3:243. See chapter two, n. 69. Later, sultan La¯jı¯n, who was probably aware of the strong relations between the two amirs, sent Burlughay to Damascus and left Baybars alJa¯shnakı¯r in Cairo, see chapter two, n. 110. 175 Durar (Cairo), 2:39; Sulu¯k, 2:73. 176 Nuju¯m, 9:17; Sulu¯k, 2:88, 96. 177 Aʿya¯n, 4:122; Wa¯fı¯, 24:260. 178 Nuju¯m, 9:28–29; Tuhfa, 227–228; Sulu¯k, 2:102. It is not known if these two in-laws were also ˙ among the Mansu¯riyya. 179 Sulu¯k, 2:180. ˙ 180 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:143–144. 181 Aʿya¯n, 4:167; Wa¯fı¯, 24:385. Rukn al-Dı¯n Baybars Taqsu¯ received an amirate in 678/1279, when ˙ not ˙ among Qala¯wu¯n’s mamluks, since he Qala¯wu¯n became sultan. However, he was probably is mentioned as an amir earlier in this year, in a list of Sa¯lih¯ı and Za¯hirı¯ amirs, see: Zubda, ˙ ˙ ˙ 170; ʿIqd, 2:218. 182 Aʿya¯n, 4:65–66, 168; Nuju¯m, 8:96; Sulu¯k, 1:900–902. See on Albakı¯’s affiliation to the mamluks of al-Za¯hir Baybars: Nuju¯m, 8:204; Sulu¯k, 1:946. Al-Nuwayrı¯ is the only historian ˙ Albakı¯ the nisba “al-Mansurı¯” (see: Niha¯ya, 32:59). who attributes to ¯ ˙

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

175

married his daughter to Mu¯sa¯ in 704/1304, when Sala¯r was de facto co-sultan. He then promoted Mu¯sa¯ and conferred an amirate upon him. At that time, Mu¯sa¯ was probably a youth.183 When Sala¯r was captured and his fortune was confiscated, the confiscators hurried to Mu¯sa¯’s home and found there much additional property.184 The fact that Sala¯r was aided by Mu¯sa¯ in a sensitive mission such as hiding his fortune definitely indicates the trust between the two. A high-level amir named Sa¯t¯ı or Sa¯lim al-Silahda¯r was another in-law (sihr) of Sala¯r’s. When al˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Na¯sir rose to power, he exiled Sa¯lim from Cairo to Damascus, probably for fear of ˙ this amir or a desire to punish him. Before al-Na¯sir arrested Sala¯r, he captured ˙ this relative by marriage, among other confidants of Sala¯r.185 The cases discussed above indicate that marriage contracts strengthened the solidarity among amirs of the same khushda¯shiyya significantly, and even among amirs of different groups. However, this loyalty was also limited whenever one of the in-laws died and the life of the other was in danger. Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, who was the husband of Baydara¯’s mother, was among the supporters of Baydara¯ the murderer of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l. However, when it was clear that the pro-Ashrafı¯ coalition was stronger and Baydara¯ was killed, al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ defected to the winning side.186 Similarly, after al-Ashraf Khalı¯l executed Taqsu¯, La¯jı¯n denied his relations ˙ ˙ with his father-in-law and promised to divorce Taqsu¯’s daughter.187 Finally, ˙ ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Afram murdered one of the wives of Baktamur al-Ha¯jib in order to ˙ insure the inheritance of his daughter, who was also married to Baktamur.188 This move implies that solidarity based on kinship won over that of marriage contracts.

2.3.4. Strong friendship relations: ukhu¯wwa and sada¯qa ˙ The brotherhood pact (ukhu¯wwa or muwa¯kha¯h) Several cases in which two khushda¯shs maintained relations of “brotherhood” (ukhu¯wwa or muwa¯kha¯h) are mentioned in the sources. As for the Mansu¯riyya, ˙ this kind of relationship is mentioned regarding Qibjaq and La¯jı¯n,189 Qutlu¯bak ˙ and Sala¯r,190 Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯ and Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯,191 Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r and 183 Zubda, 382; Sulu¯k, 2:9. Mu¯sa¯ b. ʿAlı¯ was born around 690/1291, see: Durar (Hyderabad), 4:377. 184 Aʿya¯n, 2:493. 185 Aʿya¯n, 2:393; Durar (Hyderabad), 2:123; al-Jazarı¯, 2:565. See also chapter four, n. 18. 186 See chapter two, n. 66 above. 187 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:146. 188 Aʿya¯n, 1:581; Wa¯fı¯, 9:338–339; Manhal, 3:30. 189 Ka¯na [Qibjaq] muwa¯khiyan li–l-amı¯r Husa¯m al-Dı¯n La¯jı¯n (Aʿya¯n, 4:62). ˙ ¯ khiyan li-Sala¯r (Aʿya¯n, 4:122). 190 Ka¯na al-amı¯r Qutlu¯bak al-Kabı¯r […] muwa ˙ 191 Sulu¯k, 2:25.

176

The change in the military-political principles

Aytamish al-Muhammadı¯,192 and Aytamish al-Muhammadı¯ and Aruqta¯y al˙ ˙ ˙ Ha¯jj.193 In many other cases, a certain mamluk is called “the brother” (akh) of ˙ another mamluk. These terms are confusing, since it is hard to know if they meant to denote biological brotherhood or a strong friendship between two brothers. Richards maintains that the term ukhu¯wwa meant to denote both strong friendship and biological brotherhood.194 Ayalon, however, argues that the term akh indicates relations of brotherhood among the khushda¯shs, as a substitute for family ties.195 Yosef distinguishes between the terms akh (pl. ikhwa) and ukhu¯wwa or muwa¯kha¯h. He argues that during most of the first Mamluk period the term akh denotes a biological brother, as opposed to ukhu¯wwa, which denotes relations of khushda¯shiyya brotherhood.196 In the following section, khushda¯shiyya brotherhood relations will be discussed. Biological brotherhood will be discussed later. Ukhu¯wwa relations between two mamluks were probably based on an agreement. The historical sources, however, do not supply clear information about this pact. Modern scholars raise several assumptions regarding the nature of these relations. Chapoutot-Remadi suggests that the origin of the ukhu¯wwa relationship is in the nomadic Turkic concept of brotherhood, aimed at strengthening one’s social status and resulting from a mutual oath.197 It might be linked to a social practice that prevailed among the Mongol tribes, in which a person could become the sworn brother of another person (anda) or the comrade or follower of another person (nöker).198 Van Steenbergen argues that ukhu¯wwa relations were maintained among amirs (and not young mamluks), whereas Yosef asserts that the ukhu¯wwa pact might have started already in the tiba¯q, but maintained ˙ also later, by mutual oath.199 The few details that are mentioned in the sources regarding ukhu¯wwa relationships among Mansu¯rı¯ amirs strengthen the views of Chapoutot-Remadi and ˙ Van Steenbergen, according to which this pact was made between two amirs from different social statuses. The most detailed description of ukhu¯wwa appears regarding Tankiz, the governor of Syria, and Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯, during al-Na¯sir ˙ 192 Ka¯na [Baktamur] khushda¯shihi [=Aytamish] wa-muwa¯khiyan lahu (Muqaffa¯, 2:337). 193 Wa- ka¯na huwa [Aruqta¯y] wa-l-amı¯r Sayf al-Dı¯n Aytamish na¯’ib al-Karak baynahuma ˙ ukhu¯wwa (Aʿya¯n, 1:477). 194 Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 37. 195 Ayalon, L’esclavage, 36. 196 Yosef, “Ikhwa”, esp. 337. 197 Mounira Chapoutot-Remadi, Liens et Relations au sein de l’Élite Mamluke sous les Premiers Sultans Bahrides, 648/1250–741/1341 (unpublished Ph.D. diss., Université de Provence. AixMarseille I, 1993), 486–487. 198 David Morgan, Medieval Persia, 1040–1797 (London; New York: Longman, 1988), 52–53; Morgan, Mongols, 34–35. 199 Van Steenbergen, Order, 86; Yosef, “Ikhwa”, 341–342.

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

177

Muhammad’s third reign. This pact was made after Tugha¯y al-Kabı¯r al-Husa¯mı¯ ˙ ˙ ˙ al-Na¯sirı¯, the amir with whom Tankiz had maintained ukhu¯wwa relations, was ˙ arrested by al-Na¯sir Muhammad.200 Al-Na¯sir Muhammad suggested that Tankiz ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ take Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯ as a brother instead of Tugha¯y. Due to the importance of ˙ this description for a better understanding of the ukhu¯wwa pact, I will now provide a translation of the references to this pact in the various historical sources: Al-Wa¯fı¯, 10:193; Muqaffa¯, 2:469: “When Tugha¯y al-Kabı¯r died, Tankiz, the governor of ˙ Syria was among his [Tugha¯y’s] confidants. The sultan then said to Tankiz: “Let Bak˙ tamur be your brother instead of Tugha¯y. Write to him whatever orders you like”.201 ˙ Aʿya¯n, 1:709: “When the sultan captured amir Sayf al-Dı¯n Tugha¯y al-Kabı¯r – and Tankiz ˙ in Damascus used to fall down at his feet and to stick to him – the sultan sent [a message] to him [Tankiz]: Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯ will be [a brother] for you instead of Tugha¯y. Write to ˙ him whatever you wish”.202 Al-Wa¯fı¯, 16:444: “It was said that he [Tugha¯y] belonged to the mamluks of Husa¯m al-Dı¯n ˙ ˙ La¯jı¯n al-Mansu¯r, hence an agreement was made between him and amir Sayf al-Dı¯n ˙ Tankiz. When [the sultan] captured amir Sayf al-Dı¯n Tugha¯y, the sultan created a ˙ brotherhood between Tankiz and Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯ and said to him: He [Baktamur] will 203 be [a brother to you] instead of Tugha¯y”. ˙ Durar (Cairo, 2:19): “When [the sultan] captured Tugha¯y al-Kabı¯r – and Tankiz used to ˙ rely upon him [in his matters] with al-Na¯sir – al-Na¯sir sent him [the following message]: ˙ ˙ Baktamur will be [a brother] to you instead of Tugha¯y”.204 ˙

We may deduce from the evidence above that the ukhu¯wwa was a hierarchical pact between higher- and lower-status amirs; the amirs were affiliated to the same khushda¯shi group; the low-ranking amir relied on the higher-ranking one in order to strengthen his position. In the discussed case, the high-level amir acted as mediator between the lower-ranking one and the sultan. In the pact between 200 Tugha¯y al-Kabı¯r gained the sultan’s high favour. He was arrested in 718/1318, see: Aʿya¯n, ˙ 2:595; Levanoni, Turning Point, 57–58. 201 Wa-lamma ma¯ta Tugha¯y al-Kabı¯r ka¯na Tankiz na¯’ib al-Sha¯m muntamiyyan ilayhi fa-qa¯la al-sulta¯n li-Tankiz:˙ khalli Baktamur yaku¯n akha¯ka ʿiwad Tugha¯y wa-kun ʾuktub ilayhi bi˙ ¯du. ˙ ˙ ma¯ turı 202 Wa-lamma amsaka al-sulta¯n al-amı¯r Sayf al-Dı¯n Tugha¯y al-Kabı¯r – wa-ka¯na Tankiz fı¯ Dimashq yatara¯ma¯ ilayhi˙wa-yataʿallaqa ʿalayhi –˙ jahhaza al-sulta¯n yaqu¯l lahu: ha¯dha ˙ Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯ yaku¯n laka badalan min Tugha¯y wa-ʾuktub ilayhi bi-ma¯ turı¯du min ˙ hawa¯ʾijika. ˙ ¯ l innahu min mama¯lı¯k Husa¯m al-Dı¯n La¯jı¯n al-Mansu¯r wa-lidha¯lika ka¯na al-ittifa¯q 203 Yuqa ˙ al-Dı¯n Tankiz. wa-lamma ˙ amsaka al-amı¯r Sayf al-Dı¯n baynahu wa-bayna al-amı¯r Sayf Tugha¯y, a¯kha¯ al-sulta¯n bayna Tankiz and Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯ wa-qa¯la lahu: ha¯dha yaku¯n ˙ ˙ badal Tugha¯y. ˙ 204 Wa-lamma amsaka [al-sulta¯n] Tugha¯y al-Kabı¯r – wa-ka¯na Tankiz yaʿtamidu ʿalayhi ʿinda ˙ Baktamur yaku¯n badalan laka min Tugha¯y. ˙ ¯ sir: al-sulta¯n – arsala ilayhi al-Na ˙ ˙ ˙

178

The change in the military-political principles

Tugha¯y al-Kabı¯r and Tankiz, who were both mamluks of La¯jı¯n, Tankiz was in a ˙ lower status compared to Tugha¯y. Later, when Tankiz made his ukhu¯wwa pact ˙ with Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯ when both of them were mamluks of al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad, Tankiz became the high-level amir, as after Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯ joined the ˙ ranks of the Na¯siriyya his social status was low, since he had no khushda¯shs, i. e. ˙ friends whom he knew for a long period.205 Examination of the identity of amirs who maintained an ukhu¯wwa pact during the Mansu¯riyya period and afterwards strengthens the opinion that it was a pact ˙ between amirs with different social statuses, though not necessarily from different generations. La¯jı¯n and Qibjaq made an ukhu¯wwa pact between them, probably when La¯jı¯n had a higher position than Qibjaq, since La¯jı¯n was purchased by Qala¯wu¯n in 659/1260 and Qibjaq joined the ranks of the Mansu¯riyya ˙ sixteen years later, as an adult.206 Despite the fact that Qibjaq received an amirate only two years after he joined the Mansu¯riyya, his status was probably lower that ˙ that of La¯jı¯n. Qibjaq at that time had been a mamluk of Qala¯wu¯n for only about three years and he is not mentioned as holding any high position at that time, whereas La¯jı¯n was the governor of Damascus.207 Similarily, an ukhu¯wwa agreement was made between Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r and Aytamish al-Muhammadı¯. ˙ Whereas Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r was a senior mamluk of Qala¯wu¯n, Aytamish alMuhammadı¯ was purchased by Qala¯wu¯n during his reign.208 The ukhu¯wwa pact ˙ between Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯ and Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ also seems to have been made between higher- and lower-status amirs, when al-Ja¯wulı¯ joined the ranks of sultan Qala¯wu¯n’s mamluks after serving other masters, and al-Kama¯lı¯ was already a senior Mansu¯rı¯ amir by that time.209 ˙ Examination of the nature of the relationship between amirs who maintained an ukhu¯wwa pact reveals the strength of this loyalty determinant among khushda¯shs. Most details are available regarding the relations between La¯jı¯n and Qibjaq. The two amirs, as mentioned above, made their pact during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign when they were both amirs. According to al-Safadı¯, the two amirs “almost ˙

205 Wa¯fı¯, 10:193. 206 See n. 64 above. 207 See on the careers of La¯jı¯n and Qibjaq during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign in chapter one, section, 3; pp. 241–242, 250 below. 208 See n. 66 above. This brotherhood pact, however, could have been contracted either when the two were among the Mansu¯riyya mamluks, or in a later stage, when they belonged to the royal Na¯siriyya mamluks. ˙In this work I consider Aytamish as a Na¯sirı¯ mamluk. However, ˙ was manumitted by since he ˙is Aruqta¯y’s older biological brother it is possible that he ˙ Qala¯wu¯n. 209 See on Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ in appendix 5, n. 190; on Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯: appendix 1, n. 54. More on the ukhu¯wwa between Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯ and Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ is discussed below in this section.

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

179

could not endure staying one without the other”.210 When Kitbugha¯ ruled as sultan, his confidants attempted to hurt La¯jı¯n (the viceroy) and Qibjaq. The two “brothers”, however, collaborated in order to depose Kitbugha¯.211 This is not only evidence for the strong solidarity of the two “brothers”, but also indicates that solidarity based on an ukhu¯wwa pact was stronger than solidarity based on mere khushada¯shiyya (Kitbugha¯ and La¯jı¯n) or solidarity based on common ethnic origin (the Mongols Kitbugha¯ and Qibjaq). When La¯jı¯n came to power, he let Qibjaq choose between the highest positions of the sultanate: the viceroy or the governor of Damascus. Qibjaq chose the second option.212 Solidarity between the two amirs is discernable even after La¯jı¯n’s loyal mamluk Ja¯gha¯n, and La¯jı¯n’s cousin, Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, tried to create enmity between the two “brothers”.213 In the end, however, with the strong pressure of Ja¯gha¯n and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, Qibjaq became a victim of La¯jı¯n’s persecutionary policy. Still, it seems that La¯jı¯n did not explicitly order to capture Qibjaq, but it was Mnaku¯tamur and Ja¯gha¯n that strove to capture him after he refused to hand over the amirs.214 The Mansu¯rı¯ amirs Sala¯r and Qutlu¯bak maintained ukhu¯wwa relations as ˙ ˙ well.215 Similarly to the case of La¯jı¯n and Qibjaq, when one of the “brothers” came to power, the position of his “brother” rose as well, to the resent of his rivals. During the joint rule of Sala¯r and Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, Qutlu¯bak was appointed ˙ as the sultan’s ha¯jib.216 This appointment raised concerns among Baybars al˙ Ja¯shnakı¯r’s confidants that Sala¯r would strengthen his power.217 Qutlu¯bak re˙ mained loyal to Sala¯r (and Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r) during the conflict with al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad until a very late stage. Even when al-Na¯sir Muhammad sent Qut˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ lu¯bak a secret message in which he invited him to defect to his side, Qutlu¯bak ˙ 218 refused and intended to hand over al-Na¯sir’s messanger to Aqqu¯sh al-Afram. ˙ Later Qutlu¯bak was dispatched at the head of several amirs of Damascus in order ˙ to prevent al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s entrance to that city. He defected to al-Na¯sir’s ˙ ˙ ˙ side only when he realized that even Aqqu¯sh al-Afram had escaped from Dam210 La¯ yaka¯d ahaduhuma¯ yasbir ʿan al-a¯khar (Aʿya¯n, 4:62; Wa¯fı¯, 24:178–179; Durar [Cairo], ˙ ˙ 3:325). 211 Durar (Cairo), 3:326; Aʿya¯n, 4:64; Wa¯fı¯, 24:180. 212 Aʿya¯n, 4:64; Wa¯fı¯, 24:180. See on the significance of the position of na¯ʾib Dimashq in: Van Steenbergen, “The Office of Na¯ʾib al-Saltana of Damascus”, especially, 433, 434–455. 213 Al-Safadı¯ mentions that Ja¯gha¯n, who was˙ shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Damascus, did not comply with˙ orders of Qibjaq, the governor of Damascus and did everything in order to annoy him. Ja¯gha¯n’s attempts to depose Qibjaq from his office were even backed up by Aqqu¯sh alAfram. However, La¯jı¯n did not depose Qibjaq but rather ordered Ja¯gha¯n to comply with Qibjaq’s orders. See: Aʿya¯n, 4:64–65; Wa¯fı¯, 14:180. 214 Aʿya¯n, 4:65–66; Sulu¯k, 1:852. 215 Aʿya¯n, 4:122; Wa¯fı¯, 24:260; Manhal, 9:86. 216 Aʿya¯n, 4:122, Durar (Cairo), 3:337; Sulu¯k, 1:873. 217 Aʿya¯n, 4:122; Wa¯fı¯, 24:260; Manhal, 9:86–87. 218 Nuju¯m, 8:245–246.

180

The change in the military-political principles

ascus and that the struggle against al-Na¯sir Muhammad was hopeless. Qutlu¯bak ˙ ˙ ˙ turned immediately to al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s side, in order to protect his own ˙ ˙ life. He let al-Na¯sir enter Damascus and he served as his ustada¯r in Damascus.219 ˙ Another couple of amirs who made an ukhu¯wwa pact were Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯ and Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯. Their close relationship is expressed by the fact that each of them appointed his “brother” as the guardian (was¯ı) of the other’s children after ˙ his death. During the conflict between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r in 706/ 1306, Baybars demanded that Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯, who was a close friend of Sala¯r, be severely punished. Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯ mediated on behalf of his “brother” alJa¯wulı¯. He succeeded in softening Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s heart so that al-Ja¯wulı¯’s punishment was ameliorated.220 Another indication of the close relation between the two amirs is that their names follow one another in the name list of the hajj ˙ pilgrims of the year 703/1303.221 As mentiond above, a brotherhood pact was also made between Aytamish alMuhammadı¯ and Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r. When al-Na¯sir Muhammad captured ˙ ˙ ˙ Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r and arrested him in Kerak, he was afraid that Aytamish, the governor of Kerak at that time, would act together with his “brother” Baktamur against him. Hence, al-Na¯sir Muhammad removed Aytamish from his ˙ ˙ office in Kerak and brought him to Cairo.222 The discussed cases of ukhu¯wwa relations reveal that in the Mansu¯riyya period ˙ this brotherhood pact was a significant loyalty factor among amirs. It created solidarity that was stronger than that based on ethnicity. Van Steenbergen mentions similar conclusions concerning the period after al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ reign. However, he also notes that “even this [ukhu¯wwa’s] reliability occasionally seems to have been limited by personal interests.”223

Friendship-based relations (sada¯qa) ˙ Khushda¯shs could create strong solidarity bonds among themselves based on emotional inclinations that brought about friendships. Of course, it is impossible to trace the psychological factors that brought two khushda¯shs to bond themselves in a strong friendship. These factors related to the components of their personality structure, which generally cannot be inferred from our sources. However, it seems to be natural that two khushda¯shs, who trained together from a young age or were affiliated to the same master even in later stages, would tend to become close friends more than two mamluks that did not belong to the same 219 220 221 222 223

Nuju¯m, 8:264–265; Wa¯fı¯, 24:261; Manhal, 9:87. Sulu¯k, 2:25–26. Sulu¯k, 1:954. Muqaffa¯, 2:337. Aytamish, however, continued to enjoy the sultan’s highest confidence. Van Steenbergen, Order, 86–88.

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

181

khushda¯shi groups. The sources usually mention friendship with the terms sa˙ da¯qa or suhba, sadı¯q or rafı¯q.224 ˙ ˙ ˙ Tracing the friendship relationship among several Mansu¯rı¯ couples might ˙ enable us to assess the strength of this loyalty factor. Sala¯r is mentioned as La¯jı¯n’s 225 sadı¯q. The friendship between them was expressed during La¯jı¯n’s reign. When ˙ La¯jı¯n was crowned as sultan at al-ʿAwja¯, he dispatched Sala¯r to take the oath of allegiance from the amirs in Cairo, to take care of the treasury and to make sure that the name of sultan La¯jı¯n would be mentioned in the Friday sermon all over Egypt.226 Sala¯r’s position improved during La¯jı¯n’s reign and he was appointed to the office of the ustada¯r in Egypt. The sources mention explicitly that the rise in Sala¯r’s status was due to the affection and friendship (mawadda) between him and La¯jı¯n.227 Prominent evidence for the strong loyalty between La¯jı¯n and Sala¯r was the fact that Sala¯r, alongside Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, were the only senior amirs who were not persecuted by La¯jı¯n. However, Sala¯r, in the end, took part in the conspiracy that brought about the end of La¯jı¯n’s rule and his murder. This indicated the limits of the friendship relationship between the two amirs.228 Sala¯r is mentioned as a friend (sadı¯q) also of Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯, toward whom he ˙ felt affection (mahabba) for a long time. The affection between the two was ˙ expressed, for instance, by the fact that they both established madrasas next to each other’s, and built their mausolea one in front of the other.229 Al-Ja¯wulı¯ even used to wear Sala¯r’s heraldic symbol (rank) on his clothes.230 In the conflict between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r in 706/1306, Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ was exiled from Cairo, at Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s demand.231 However, in the final stages of the conflict between al-Na¯sir Muhammad and Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r, al˙ ˙ Ja¯wulı¯ revealed his disloyalty to Sala¯r. Al-Ja¯wulı¯ was dispatched to prevent alNa¯sir’s entrance to Damascus, but when he learned that Aqqu¯sh al-Afram had ˙ left Damascus, he moved to al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s side.232 Soon after, Sanjar al˙ ˙ Ja¯wulı¯ helped al-Na¯sir to capture Sala¯r. Al-Na¯sir dispatched Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯, ˙ ˙ together with Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, to Sala¯r. The two Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks succeeded ˙ ˙ in convincing Sala¯r to come to Cairo in order “to consult with the sultan”.233 After Sala¯r was arrested, al-Ja¯wulı¯ was sent to Sala¯r’s home in order to take the fortune 224 See for instance: Durar (Cairo), 1:425, 2:38; Durar (Hyderabad), 2:180; Aʿya¯n, 2:489; Sulu¯k, 2:24; Nuju¯m, 9:30; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:226. 225 Aʿya¯n, 2:489; Wa¯fı¯, 16:55. 226 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:224; Durar (Hyderabad), 2:80. 227 Sulu¯k, 2:97; Zubda, 313. 228 Sulu¯k, 1:856, 863; Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin”, 132. 229 Al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, 276; Sulu¯k, 2:24. 230 Aʿya¯n, 2:470. 231 Sulu¯k, 2:25–26. 232 Nuju¯m, 8:265. 233 Nuju¯m, 9:15–16.

182

The change in the military-political principles

that Sala¯r had hidden there from it.234 Al-Na¯sir probably sent Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ on ˙ this mission since Sanjar, as a close friend of Sala¯r, knew exactly where Sala¯r had hidden his enormous fortune.235 It seems that Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ acted against his friend Sala¯r in order to demonstrate his true loyalty to al-Na¯sir Muhammad and ˙ ˙ thus to protect his own life and career. Indeed, Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ had an honourable career during most of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. However, after ˙ ˙ Sala¯r’s death, Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ asked the sultan’s permission to wash Sala¯r’s body and to bury him in the mausoleum (turba) that Sala¯r had built for himself. Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ mentions that Sala¯r did all that “due to the long friendship (sada¯qa) ˙ between him and Sala¯r”.236 A strong solidarity prevailed between Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r and Kira¯y. The sources mention that the reason for their close relations was that they were khushda¯shs which, in this context, also means friends. Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯, indeed, clarifies the nature of the relationship between the two amirs by noting that Kira¯y was Baktamur’s khushda¯sh and friend (rafı¯q).237 The strong friendship between the two Mansu¯rı¯ amirs made their careers dependent on each other. When Sala¯r ˙ and Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r decided to exile Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r to Safed in 707/ 1307, Kira¯y was exiled to Upper Egypt.238 When al-Na¯sir Muhammad arrested ˙ ˙ Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r, he captured Kira¯y as well, only because he was a close friend of the former.239 Another indication of the trust between these two amirs is expressed by the fact that Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r informed Kira¯y about his secret plan to depose al-Na¯sir Muhammad in 710/1310.240 ˙ ˙ It seems that friendship prevailed also between La¯jı¯n and Sunqur al-Aʿsar. AlAʿsar is mentioned as one of La¯jı¯n’s friends.241 Hence, it is understandable why Kitbugha¯, when he came to power, dismissed Sunqur al-Aʿsar from the office of shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Damascus and confiscated his property. Later, when La¯jı¯n became sultan, he appointed Sunqur al-Aʿsar to the office of wazir.242 However, at the end of his first year as sultan, La¯jı¯n removed al-Aʿsar from this office.243 Another pair of Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯shs who maintained friendly relations are ˙

234 Nuju¯m, 9:17. 235 As mentioned above (n.184), al-Na¯sir Muhammad used another confidant of Sala¯r, his son˙ ˙ mission. in-law Mu¯sa¯ b. ʿAlı¯, on the very same 236 Nuju¯m, 9:18–19. 237 Nuju¯m, 9:30. The other cases in which these two amirs are mentioned as khushda¯shs are: Nuju¯m, 9:25; Aʿya¯n, 4:155; Wa¯fı¯, 24:332,333; Manhal, 3:124. 238 Sulu¯k, 2:36; Nuju¯m, 8:174. 239 Nuju¯m, 9:30; Niha¯ya, 32:181; Aʿya¯n, 4:155; Wa¯fı¯, 24:133; Manhal, 3:124. 240 Nuju¯m, 9:25. 241 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:226. 242 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:226. 243 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:226, 8:232–233.

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

183

Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram. Since this relationship was a result of several other determinants of loyalty, it is discussed below. Friendship-based relations might also be found between members of different khushda¯shi groups, though these cases are very few. Solidarity is discerned between the Mansu¯rı¯ Bakta¯sh al-Manku¯rsı¯ and Tankiz, who was a Husa¯mi (one of ˙ ˙ La¯jı¯n’s mamluks) and afterward a Na¯sirı¯ mamluk. When Tankiz was captured, ˙ Bakta¯sh was captured as well. However, after the confiscation of Bakta¯sh’s fortune, he was released and continued his long career, in which he was the governor of Tripoli and amı¯r al-hajj.244 Also the Mansu¯rı¯ Turunta¯y and the Sa¯lih¯ı Sunqur ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ al-Ashqar maintained close relations. When al-Ashraf Khalı¯l arrested Turunta¯y, ˙ ˙ he also captured Sunqur al-Ashqar, after al-Ashraf was told that al-Ashqar 245 praised Turunta¯y because he protected him from Qala¯wu¯n. The fact that there ˙ ˙ are so few (and so vague) cases of close relations between amirs from different khushda¯shi groups gives the impression that khushda¯shiyya, i. e. the affiliation to the same master, formed a matrix for stronger relations, based on other loyalty factors.

Loyalty based on short-term friendship An interesting phenomenon that became noticeable during the Mansu¯riyya ˙ period was the promotion of mamluk and even non-mamluk elements based on short-term relations with a patron. This kind of promotion could occur among Mansu¯rı¯ amirs. Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, for instance, raised the position of his ˙ khushda¯sh Balaba¯n al-Ju¯kanda¯r only because he “loved” (i. e. had an intimate relationship with) Balaba¯n’s son, amir Qutlı¯ja¯. Thus, Balaba¯n was appointed as ˙ shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n and received so many responsibilities that he acted as if he 246 were the governor of Damascus. Other amirs in Damascus were promoted during Aqqu¯sh al-Afram’s tenure as governor, since they used to participate in the gatherings for entertainment (majlis) that Aqqu¯sh used to organize on a regular basis. Husayn b. Janda¯rbak, ˙ who arrived in the sultanate in the Ru¯mı¯ wa¯fidiyya of 675/1276–7, and received an amirate of tablkha¯na¯h in Damascus, is one prominent example.247 Another ˙ amir who was promoted by Aqqu¯sh al-Afram was a prominent halqa member in ˙ Damascus, named Sunqur al-Nu¯rı¯. Sunqur managed to enter of al-Afram’s service and received an amirate of ten from him. Later al-Afram appointed him amir in Tripoli.248 244 245 246 247 248

Durar (Cairo), 2:15; Aʿya¯n, 1:699–700. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:110. Aʿya¯n, 2:44; Wa¯fı¯, 10:283; Manhal, 3:420–421. Sulu¯k, 2:313–314; Aʿya¯n, 2:260. Al-Jazarı¯, 3:921.

184

The change in the military-political principles

Interestingly enough, local civilians also managed to receive amirates and to enter the military-political system, based on short-term acquaintance with mamluk patrons. An instructive instance is Muhammad b. al-Shaykhı¯, known as ˙ Dhubya¯n. According to Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, Dhubya¯n was a native of Cairo who ˙ worked in sewing head-shawls and skull-caps. He moved to Ma¯rdı¯n as a Sufi and later came back to the Mamluk sultanate together with an ¯Ilkha¯nid envoy. After he managed to connect himself to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, he received an amirate of tablkha¯na¯h and held the offices of shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n, wa¯lı¯ of Cairo, na¯zir al˙ ˙ kha¯ss (controller of the privy purse) and and even the wazirate in Egypt.249 A ˙˙ certain Ibra¯hı¯m b. Kha¯lid b. ʿAbba¯s al-Ansa¯rı¯ who worked in the copper market ˙ of Damascus received an amirate and was appointed over wila¯yat al-harb, i. e. as ˙ the perfect of police in Damascus. This appointment was only because he manged to endear himself to Aqqu¯sh al-Afram.250 Another native Syrian, a goldsmith named Hasan b. ʿAlı¯ b. Muhammad b. al-Nashsha¯bı¯ (d. 699/1300), became a ˙ ˙ jundı¯ and advanced until he became an amir of tablkha¯na¯h. He was appointed ˙ wa¯lı¯ of Damascus and wa¯lı¯ al-barr.251 Finally, it should be mentioned that casual relations between Mansurı¯s and local rulers brought the former to confer relatively high amirates upon the latter. Sultan Kitbugha¯ was the first to confer amirates of tablkha¯na¯h upon the Ayyu¯bid ˙ princes of Homs.252 Similarly, the local chiefs of the Gharb region in Lebanon received, for the first time, amirates of tablkha¯na¯h thanks to the mediation of ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Afram.253

249 The details about Dhubya¯n in the different sources are vauge and sometime contradictory. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, for instance, mentions that Dhubya¯n was a native of Cairo who worked ˙ in sewing head shawls, whereas according other sources, he was born in Ma¯rdı¯n, arrived to Damascus where he worked as mentioned, and then arrived to Cairo and became a jundı¯ in the army. See: Zubda, 379–380; Sulu¯k, 2:14; Kanz, 9:125; Ta¯lı¯, 73; Niha¯ya, 32:87; Manhal, 5:334–335; Richards, “The office of Wila¯yat al-Qa¯hira”, 447–448; Richards, “Baybars alMansu¯rı¯”, 43. 250 Aʿya¯˙n, 1:71–72. The office of wa¯lı¯ al-harb is known also as wa¯lı¯ al-shurta, see: al-Qalqa˙ ˙ shandı¯ (Beirut), 4:23. 251 Aʿya¯n, 2:205; Wa¯fı¯, 12:159–160. 252 An amirate of tablkha¯na¯h was first conferred in 695/1295–6 upon the governor of Homs, al˙ b. al-Malik al-Za¯hir Asad al-Dı¯n Shirku¯h al-Ayyu¯bı¯. In the beginning of 696/ Malik al-Awhad ˙ Kitbugha¯ conferred ˙ November 1296 an amirate of tablkha¯na¯h also upon al-Malik al-Ka¯mil ¯ dil b. Najm alMuhammad b. al-Malik al-Saʿı¯d b. al-Malik al-Sa¯lih˙ Isma¯ʿı¯l b. al-Malik al-ʿA ˙ ¯ t, 8:197, 220). Dı¯n˙Ayyu¯b b. Sha¯dı¯ b. Marwa¯n al-Ayyu¯bı¯ (Ibn ˙al-Fura 253 It was in 700/1300, see: Sa¯lih b. Yahya¯, Taʾrı¯kh Bayru¯t ed. F. Hours and K. Salibi (Beirut: Da¯r ˙ I˙thank ˙Dr. Anne Troadec for this reference. al-Mashriq, 1969), 77–79.

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

185

2.3.5. Kinship Mamluk scholarship usually does not tend to refer to blood ties between the mamluks. The reason for that is probably related to one of the main conventional principles of the Mamluk system, noted already by Ibn Khaldu¯n, and developed by David Ayalon. This principle maintains that biological family ties did not have a real significance in the Mamluk sultanate. The mamluks, as argued, were a “one generation” ruling society. They were torn from their biological family at a young age and the mamluk developed in his new environment a substitute family, in which his master was his father and his brothers were his khushda¯shs. Moreover, this “anti-family” trend continued in the sultanate, when the mamluk’s children, generally, could not inherit their fathers’ position and join the military elite.254 However, more recent studies show that family ties in the Mamluk sultanate were more important than used to be thought. Anne Broadbridge showed the importance of kinship in Mamluk politics, especially relations between brothers, nephews and fathers and sons. Broadbridge pointed out that the relatives of amirs who were imported to the sultanate by their kin gained amirates and highlevel positions, since they were considered very loyal.255 Koby Yosef, similarly, pointed out that kinship and marriage ties had crucial significance in Mamluk politics, especially in the first Mamluk period.256 In what follows, the role of kinship as a loyalty determinant between amirs is discussed. Biological brothers Three cases of amirs who were also biological brothers are mentioned during the Mansu¯riyya period. The most prominent case is that of Sala¯r. The sources ˙ mention no less than six of his brothers: Muguhlta¯y, La¯jı¯n, Samu¯k (or: Samu¯l), ˙ ¯ dam and Daʾu¯d. Another brother is Asandamur Juba¯, A al-Silahda¯r, who is not ˙ mentioned in historical literary sources but only on an epitaph on a tomb in a cemetery in Jerusalem.257 Two of these brothers, Daʾu¯d and Juba¯, arrived in the sultanate in 704–5/1305 together with their (and Sala¯r’s) mother.258 Hence, it is clear that they were Sala¯r’s biological brothers. There is no reason not to consider the others as Sala¯r’s biological brothers also, since Sala¯r’s “brother” by ukhu¯wwa pact was Qutlu¯bak. ˙

254 Ayalon, L’esclavage, 35–36; pp. 20–21 above. 255 Anne F. Broadbridge, “Sending Home for Mom and Dad: The Extended Family Impulse in Mamluk Politics”, MSR 15 (2011), 1–18. 256 Yosef, Ethnic Groups; Yosef, “Ikhwa”. 257 Tawfiq Daʿadli, “Mamluk Epitaphs from Mamilla Cemetery”, Levant 43, 1 (2011), 84–86. 258 Zubda, 385; ʿIqd, 4:348; Zetterstéen, 132; Sulu¯k, 2:5; Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin”, 123, 132.

186

The change in the military-political principles

Sala¯r’s trust in his biological brothers was probably the highest of all. First, he conferred amirates, probably of tablkha¯na¯h or more, upon all of his brothers.259 ˙ In his conflict against Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, Sala¯r is said to rely most of all upon his “brother amirs”.260 During al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s revolt in 707/1307, it was ˙ ˙ Sala¯r’s brother Samu¯k who commanded the forces who besieged the stable where al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s mamluks were gathered.261 Two years later, Samu¯k was ˙ ˙ dispached at the head of the force that aimed to capture the amirs who defected to al-Na¯sir Muhammad in Kerak.262 After al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s arrival in Cairo, ˙ ˙ ˙ ¯˙dam.263 Finally, just before Sala¯r left for al-Shawbak together with his brother A arresting Sala¯r, al-Na¯sir Muhammad captured Sala¯r’s main supporters, first and ˙ ˙ foremost his brothers Samu¯k, Juba¯ and Daʾu¯d.264 All these cases definitely indicate the strong loyalty and trust between Sala¯r and his biological brothers. The next biological brothers who are mentioned in the Mansu¯riyya period are ˙ Aytamish al-Muhammadı¯ and Aruqta¯y al-Ha¯jj.265 They were purchased by Qa˙ ˙ ˙ la¯wu¯n during his reign, and later moved to the ranks of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l and 259 Sala¯r conferred amirates of tablkha¯na¯h upon his brothers Juba¯ and Daʾu¯d when they arrived ˙ in the Mamluk territories (Zubda, 385; Sulu¯k, 2:5–6). His brother La¯jı¯n received an amirate earlier, when Sala¯r started his de facto reign as co-sultan (Sulu¯k, 1:874). The other brothers were also amirs, as we can infer from their titles (laqab): Niza¯m al-Dı¯n Ᾱdam (Nuju¯m, 9:11); ˙ ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Samu¯k (Sulu¯k, 2:86). Sala¯h al-Dı¯n Uzdamur (Daʿadli, “Mamluk Epitaphs”, 84– ˙ ˙ 86). 260 Sulu¯k, 2:45. 261 Nuju¯m, 8:172; Sulu¯k, 2:34–35. 262 Nuju¯m, 8:250. 263 Nuju¯m, 9:11. 264 Sulu¯k, 9:86–87; Durar (Cairo), 2:278. 265 Aytamish and Aruqta¯y are mentioned several times as brothers (see for instance: Aʿya¯n, ˙ 1:477; Sulu¯k, 2:45). Most of the scholars are of the opinion that Aytamish and Aruqta¯y were ˙ not biological brothers but rather maintained strong friendship relations, see: Donald P. Little, “Aitamisˇ”, 395–396; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 37; Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin”, 125; Haarmann, “Arabic in Speech”, 102. Ayalon discusses the brotherhood relations between Aruqta¯y and Aytamish but does not come to firm conclusions about this issue. ˙ would appear that al-Safadı¯ was not sure whether our two amirs were He mentions that “it blood brothers or not” (Ayalon, “Ya¯sa, C2”,˙138). Richards and Little based their view on alYu¯sufı¯, who mentions that no one has seen a stronger ukhu¯wwa than that of Aytamish and Aruqta¯y. However, it seems that these two amirs were biological brothers. Aytamish is ˙ mentioned as the biological brother (shaqı¯q) of Aruqta¯y (al-Yu¯sufı¯, 287, n. 1). In addition, ˙ Aytamish inherited Aruqta¯y’s fortune (see below). Inheritance was a common practice among biological brothers,˙ as discussed below. The two mamluks are mentioned as brothers from a very young age. They even moved together to al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ranks as bro˙ ˙ contracted thers (Muqaffa¯, 2:30). Brotherhood based on a pact was usually between a senior and a junior amir, as discussed above. The fact that these two amirs were both experts in the Mongol language and heritage strengthens the view that they were biological brothers. Finally, the amir whom Aytamish contracted a brotherhood pact was Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r (see below). Koby Yosef came to the same conclusion regarding these two amirs, so pointed out that Aytamish and Aruqta¯y were biological brothers, see: Yosef, Ethnic Groups, 204; ˙ Yosef, “Ikhwa”, 337, 340.

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

187

finaly to al-Na¯sir Muhammad, since they were probably still young. Their career ˙ ˙ flourished during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. They are considered among ˙ ˙ the sultan’s most favourite amirs. It seems that Aytamish was older than Aruqta¯y.266 The two brothers maintained close relations with each other. After ˙ Aytamish died, Aruqta¯y inherited his brother’s property, since Aytamish did not ˙ have any children.267 Finally, the biological brothers Baha¯dur Samiz al-Mansu¯rı¯ and Baha¯dur the ˙ mamluk of Aqqu¯sh al-Afram should be mentioned. When Baha¯dur Samiz died in 704/1304, Baha¯dur the mamluk of Aqqu¯sh al-Afram inherited his brother’s fortune, after Baha¯dur Samiz acknowledged that he was the brother of the other Baha¯dur from the same mother and father (a¯kh sahqı¯q).268 It is reasonable to assume that this biological brotherhood is related to the close relations between Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, the governor of Damascus, and his Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯sh Ba˙ ha¯dur Samiz, who was one of Aqush’s closest amirs in Damascus. Indeed, Baha¯dur Samiz found his death in the valley of Damascus during a hunting expedition with Aqqu¯sh al-Afram.269 Fathers and sons (awla¯d al-na¯s) The principle of “one generation aristocracy” always brought about a certain extent of discontentment among the amirs, who naturally strove to promote their sons. During Qala¯wu¯n’s reign, “Mamluk practices” were strictly observed by the sultan. Qala¯wu¯n did not accept any of the amirs’ requests for the benefit of their children, even if these amirs were among his most favourite mamluks, like Kitbugha¯ and Turunta¯y.270 After Qala¯wu¯n’s death, however, the intervention of ˙ ˙ amirs for the promotion of their sons was much more successful. An instructive instance for the preference of his biological son over his own mamluks by an amir is the case of Muhammad b. Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯. Following the exceptional bravery ˙ that one of Bakta¯sh‘s mamluks showed in the conquest of Qalʿat al-Ru¯m, sultan al-Ashraf Khalı¯l ordered an amirate conferred upon him. Bakta¯sh, however, requested the amirate be transferred to his son Muhammad and not to his brave ˙ mamluk. The sultan accepted this request and gave Muhammad b. Bakta¯sh an ˙ 271 amirate of tablkha¯na¯h and an iqta¯ʿ. Several other cases from the Mansu¯riyya ˙ ˙ ˙ period could be mentioned. Muhammad b. Makkı¯ received an amirate of tabl˙ ˙ 266 Aytamish died in 736/1335–6 as a result of a disease (Muqaffa¯, 2:341–342), whereas Aruqta¯y ˙ a died in 750/1359–50 (Muqaffa¯, 2:32). Aruqta¯y moved to al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s service at ˙ ˙ ˙ very young age (Muqaffa¯, 2:30). 267 Muqaffa¯, 2:342; Al-Yu¯sufı¯, 333. 268 Durar (Hyderabad), 1:497. 269 Aʿya¯n, 2:60. 270 See pp. 69–70 above. 271 Zubda, 288–289; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:136.

188

The change in the military-political principles

kha¯na¯h due to his father’s efforts.272 Muhammad b. Qara¯sunqur and ʿAlı¯ b. ˙ Aybak al-Khaznada¯r reached their positions because of their fathers’ influence.273 Amir Muhammad b. Masʿu¯d b. Awhad al-Khat¯ırı¯, himself the son of an amir, ˙ ˙ ˙ managed to take good iqta¯ʿs for his sons from those that were allocated to the ˙ 274 halqa soldiers of Damascus. ˙ The Mansu¯riyya period, indeed, witnessed a dramatic increase in the number ˙ of amirs from awla¯d al-na¯s. According to Amalia Levanoni, during the reigns of al-Za¯hir Baybars and Qala¯wu¯n eleven amirs who were awla¯d al-na¯s are men˙ tioned, whereas from the death of Qala¯wu¯n up until al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third ˙ ˙ reign. i. e. during the Mansu¯riyya period, the number of amirs who were sons of ˙ 275 mamluks increases to thirty-nine. According to my findings, we may count more than thirty amirs who were awla¯d al-na¯s during this period. Most of them, it seems, were amirs of tablkha¯na¯h and a few were amirs of one hundred.276 It also ˙ seems that in several cases awla¯d al-na¯s received their amirates at a younger age than in previous periods. Muhammad b. Makkı¯, for instance, received an amirate ˙ 272 273 274 275 276

Aʿya¯n, 5:279–280. Levanoni, Turning Point, 44. Aʿya¯n, 5:259. Levanoni, Turning Point, 42–44; Levanoni, “Awla¯d al-Na¯s in the Mamluk Army”, 97. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ mentions (Zubda, 349) six amirs of tablkha¯na¯h who were among awla¯d ˙ him in the expedition against the Bedouin ˙ al-na¯s and joined in the Buhayra district in 700/ ˙ 3. Muhammad b. 1300: 1. Muhammad b. Turunta¯y; 2. ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Mughulta¯y b. amı¯r majlis; ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ [Taybars] al-Wazı¯rı¯; 4. Muhammad b. Aytamish al-Saʿdı¯ al-Za¯hirı¯ (who received ˙an amirate ˙ from La¯jı¯n in 697/1297–8, ˙see: Sulu¯k, 1:847); 5. ʿAlı¯ b. Duda¯˙ al-Turkma¯nı¯ (who died at the battle of Marj al-Suffar, see: Zubda, 377); 6. Qutuz b. al-Fa¯riqa¯nı¯. Other awla¯d al-na¯s who are ˙ in the Mansu¯riyya period:˙7. Muhammad b. Qara¯sunqur (Sulu¯k, 1:931); mentioned as amirs ˙ 9. Na¯sir b. Sala¯r (Richards, “Mamluk ˙ ¯ (Zubda, 288–289); 8. Muhammad b. Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı ˙ 51); 10. Anas b. Kitbugha¯; 11. Qutlı¯ja¯ b. Balaba¯n al-Ju˙ kanda¯r (Aʿya¯n, 4:128–129); 12. amirs”, ¯ ˙ Jaraktamur b. Baha¯˙dur Raʾs Nawba (Durar [Hyderabad], 1:534; Sulu¯k, 2:70); 13. Muhammad b. Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r (Aʿya¯n, 4:348–349); 14. Qutlu¯bak b. Qara¯sunqur al˙¯ shnakı¯r (Aʿya¯n, 4:153); 15. Muhammad b. Butkha¯s al-Mansurı¯ al-ʿA Ja ¯ ˙ ¯ dilı¯ (Aʿya¯n, 4:345); 16. ˙ ˙ ammad˙ b. Aydamur al-Hillı¯ al-Sa¯lih¯ı Muhammad b. Makkı¯ (Aʿya¯n, 5:279–280); 17. Muh ˙ ˙ ˙¯ n b. (Zubda, 332; Sulu¯k, 1:888, 905. He died at the battle ˙of Wa¯dı¯ al-Khaznada¯r); 18.˙ ʿUthma Ismaʿı¯l (his grandfather was a mamluk, see: Aʿya¯n, 3:215–216); 19. Muhammad b. Bashqard ˙ 21. Sayf al-Dı¯n b. (see p. 123 above); 20. Asad al-Dı¯n b. Aybak al-Afram (al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:215); Kirta¯y (al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:243); 22. Mu¯sa¯ b. al-Sa¯lih ʿAlı¯ b. Qala¯wu¯n; 23. Ughulbak b. Rumta¯sh al˙ ˙ ¯ Bakr Ru¯mı¯ (Aʿya¯n, 1:545–546); 24. Mu¯sa¯ b. Abı b. al-Azkashı¯ (Aʿya¯n, 5:476; Durar [Hyderabad], 4:384); 25. Aslam b. Tamurta¯sh (Durar [Hyderabad], 1:389); 26. Simgha¯r (or: ˙ Ta¯mgha¯r) b. Sunqur al-Ashqar (Aʿya¯n, 2:572; he received an amirate from La¯jı¯n ˙in 697/1297– ˙ see: Sulu¯k, 1:847); 27. ʿAlı¯ b. Ibrahı¯m al-Ja¯kı¯ (al-Yunı¯nı¯, 2:50; Kanz, 9:34); 28. ʿAlı¯ b. Ba¯khil 8, ¯ (died in the battle of Marj al-Suffar as amir of ten, see: Sulu¯k, 1:947; Nuju¯m, 8:206); 29. Abu¯ ˙ ¯ t, 8:169); 30. Bulgha¯q b. Badr al-Dı¯n Ku¯njuk al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ Bakr b. al-Jumaqda¯r (Ibn al-Fura (Niha¯ya, 32:161); 31. Hasan b. al-Radda¯dı¯ (Nuju¯m, 8:269). Other amirs who might be added are the two sons of the˙ Ru¯mı¯-wa¯fidı¯ amir Janda¯rbak, Sharaf al-Dı¯n Husayn and Muzaffar al˙ confiDı¯n (Sulu¯k, 2:313–314; Aʿya¯n, 2:260). Amir Sayf al-Dı¯n Hamda¯n b.˙ Salgha¯y, La¯jı¯n’s ˙ ˙ dant, might be among awla¯d al-na¯s as well.

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

189

of tablkha¯na¯h when he was about twenty and already amir of ten.277 Amir Na¯sir ˙ ˙ ¯ dilı¯ died in 699/1300 when he was al-Dı¯n Muhammad b. Butkha¯s al-Mansu¯rı¯ al-ʿA ˙ ˙ ˙ only twenty-two.278 The impression, hence, is that the promotion of awla¯d al-na¯s was highly preferred by amirs. This promotion was dependent on the extent of the enforcement of the accepted practices and unwritten rules of the Mamluk system, according to which promotion of awla¯d al-na¯s should be strictly limited, and depend on objective factors and appropriate age.

Second-degree kinship Two of the most prominent amirs among the Mansu¯riyya were, in fact, related by ˙ second-degree kinship. These were La¯jı¯n and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram. Aqqu¯sh was a cousin of La¯jı¯n on his mother’s side. Hence, when La¯jı¯n became the viceroy of Egypt in Kitbugha¯’s reign, he relied on the strong support of Aqqu¯sh al-Afram. Al-Safadı¯ mentions that “the support of al-Afram for him (La¯jı¯n) became ˙ stronger because they are cousins on the mother’s side”.279 Afterwards, when La¯jı¯n became sultan he brought Aqqu¯sh al-Afram from Damascus to Cairo and appointed him as chief ha¯jib. Aqqu¯sh al-Afram was one of the last confidants of ˙ La¯jı¯n, and when most of the other amirs were persecuted by La¯jı¯n and Manku¯tamur, Aqqu¯sh al-Afram was never in danger. When Ja¯gha¯n, La¯jı¯n’s mamluk, tried to create enmity between Qibjaq (the governor of Damascus) and La¯jı¯n, La¯jı¯n dispatched Aqqu¯sh al-Afram to Damascus in order to inform the sultan whether there was any truth in Ja¯gha¯n’s claims.280 Though La¯jı¯n at first did not accept Ja¯gha¯n’s claims and ordered that Qibjaq, his “brother”, should stay in his position, La¯jı¯n later changed his attitude to Qibjaq. It is possible, as mentioned by Ibn Hajar, that it was Aqqu¯sh al-Afram who caused La¯jı¯n to change his policy ˙ toward Qibjaq.281 In 698/1298 La¯jı¯n was helped by Aqqu¯sh al-Afram to capture the senior amirs and appoint his mamluk Ja¯gha¯n as the governor of Damascus instead of Qibjaq.282 After La¯jı¯n was murdered, his murderers came immediately to Aqqu¯sh al-Afram in order to kill him too. Aqqu¯sh managed to escape and gathered his own mamluks with La¯jı¯n’s.283 277 Aʿya¯n, 5:279–280. 278 Aʿya¯n, 4:345. 279 Ishtadda ʿadd al-Afram bihi liʾannahuma¯ ka¯na¯ bnay kha¯la (Aʿya¯n, 1:562). See also: Aʿya¯n, ˙ ¯ , 2:236; Wa¯fı¯, 24:180; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:396; Manhal, 3:10. 4:65; Muqaffa 280 Aʿya¯n, 4:64–65; Wa¯fı¯, 24:180. 281 Durar (Hyderabad), 3:241. 282 Aqqu¯sh al-Afram was sent by La¯jı¯n to capture the commanders of the raid on Cilicia. The decrees that he carried with him ordered to Qibjaq to leave Damascus, in order to replace him with Ja¯gha¯n. See: Nuju¯m, 8:95–96 and chapter two, n. 131. 283 Aʿya¯n, 1:562–563; Wa¯fı¯, 9:328; Muqaffa¯, 2:236.

190

The change in the military-political principles

2.3.6. Loyalty based on material grants In many cases amirs tried to attract other amirs and mamluks, especially their Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯shs, by offering them material grants. This factor of loyalty is ˙ different than all the other loyalty types mentioned above, since it is not based on any emotional factor. First, Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, during his attempt to usurp the throne, tried to strengthen his power by offering material grants. Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ managed to attract the Burjiyya and the royal mamluks to his side by giving them material grants to a total sum of eight thousand dinars. Al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ also promised that whoever brought him the head of one of Kitbugha¯’s supporters would receive the iqta¯ʿ of that amir. When his situation deteriorated al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ tried to attract ˙ amirs and halqa soldiers to his side by distributing bags of gold. However, only a ˙ few soldiers that were not of significant help joined him.284 Another instance of the weakness of loyalty based on material grants can be seen in the relations between sultan Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and the district governors of Syria, Qara¯sunqur, Qibjaq and Asandamur. Baybars tried to attract his three khushda¯shs to his side, by granting them robes of honour and cloths in addition to the right to keep the taxes from their districts to themselves. The three amirs, as a result, agreed to give their oath of allegiance to the sultan. However, both sides saw this move only as a temporary stratagem. Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r made this move on Sala¯r’s advice, aiming only to save time and strengthen his power until he was able to act forcibly against his three opponents in Syria. Qara¯sunqur, Qibjaq and Asandamur Kurjı¯, similarly, gave their oath to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r on the advice of al-Na¯sir Muhammad, but in fact they saw it as no ˙ ˙ more than a temporary political move.285 Later, when Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r gave large amounts of money to the commanders and soldiers that he dispatched against al-Na¯sir Muhammad, all thirty tablkha¯na¯h amirs defected to al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Muhammad’s side, together with the halqa soldiers. The other (ten) amirs of one ˙ ˙ hundred who stayed by Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s side were related to Baybars alJa¯shnakı¯r by emotional determinants of loyalty. They were his comrades in the Burjiyya elite or tied to him by marriage.286 All other attempts to buy the support of political rivals through material grants did not achieve their aims. Sala¯r’s attempts to apease the Burjiyya by giving them

284 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:180; Sulu¯k, 798, 800. 285 Nuju¯m, 8:238, 242; See chapter two, n. 244. 286 Sulu¯k, 2:62–64; Nuju¯m, 8:264. Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r endowed each amir of one hundred with two thousand dinars and his son-in-law Burlughay with ten thousand dinars. Each of the tablkha¯na¯h amirs received a thousand dinars, the commanders of the halqa received a ˙thousand dirhams, and the ajna¯d received five hundred dirhams each. See:˙ Muqaffa¯, 2:551, 548.

Solidarity among the mamluks: the khushda¯shiyya

191

money, crops and gifts were in vain, since the Burjiyya elite continued to urge Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r to act against him.287 Qutlu¯bak gave many gifts to the Oirats ˙ and the wa¯fidiyya members who acted against him when he was ha¯jib.288 How˙ ever, soon after he was obliged to leave Cairo and was appointed against his will as 289 the governor of Tripoli. Finally, al-Na¯sir Muhammad gave ten thousand dir˙ ˙ hams to Qutlu¯bak and Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj after they joined his forces, but only in ˙ ˙ order to appease then for a while. Al-Na¯sir was very afraid of them, since they ˙ defected to his side only at a very late phase of the conflict.290 Indeed, soon after Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj found his death in Tripoli, apparently due to poisoning. Qut˙ ˙ lu¯bak was captured not too long after, and executed after several years in jail.291 From the cases discussed in this section, it seems that attempts to buy loyalty by material grants were made only in crisis situations. Material-based solidarity, that lacked any other emotional or contractual determinant of loyalty, never lasted for long.292 2.3.7. Combination of several loyalty factors In certain cases, relations between two amirs were characterized by several loyalty determinants that were combined, and hence the loyalty between them was very strong. The best example is the strong loyalty between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram. They were both Burjı¯s, Circassians, and maintained friendship and probably kinship relations between them. Al-Safadı¯ mentions that the two ˙ amirs supported each other because they were affiliated to the Burjiyya.293 Ibn Hajar implies that it was the friendship (sada¯qa) between them that brought ˙ ˙ about their mutual assistance.294 Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ notes that it was their common Circassian origin, their friendship (khushda¯shiyya), and possibly their kinship, that caused the strong solidarity between them.295 Indeed, the close relations between the two amirs are discerned throughout Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s rule. When Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r started his reign alongside Sala¯r, it was thanks to his efforts that Aqqu¯sh al-Afram was appointed governor of Damascus.296 During Aqqu¯sh al-Afram’s tenure as the governor of 287 288 289 290 291 292 293 294 295 296

Nuju¯m, 8:247; Sulu¯k, 2:58. Aʿya¯n, 4:122; Wa¯fı¯, 24:260; Manhal, 9:86. Zubda, 345; Aʿya¯n, 4:122. Nuju¯m, 8:265; Sulu¯k, 2:67. See chapter four, n. 20, 22, 24. Similar conclusions are reached regarding the period after al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third ˙ ˙ reign. See: Van Steenbergen, Order, 65–67. Aʿya¯n, 1:563; Wa¯fı¯, 9:328–329. Durar (Hyderabad), 1:397. Manhal, 3:473; Nuju¯m, 8:236, 280. Durar (Hyderabad), 1:397.

192

The change in the military-political principles

Damascus, he totally inclined to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s side.297 When Baybars alJa¯shnakı¯r was crowned sultan in 708/1309 Aqqu¯sh al-Afram is said to “fly from joy” when he heard this news.298 The strong solidarity between the governor of Damascus Aqqu¯sh al-Afram and the sultan Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r caused anxiety among the other amirs in Damascus.299 Al-Afram enjoyed the total support of the sultan, who gave him a free hand in his political appointments.300 Moreover, alAfram even became “responsible for most of the Egyptian affairs”.301 Al-Afram’s loyalty to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r was unequivocal during the entire conflict with alNa¯sir Muhammad. He refused al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s request for assistance and ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ gave Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r intelligence about al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s movements ˙ ˙ from Kerak. He tried to prevent the defection of Syrian amirs to al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad’s side, and he made the amirs of Damascus swear not to betray him and ˙ defect to al-Na¯sir. Al-Afram managed to force al-Na¯sir Muhammad to return to ˙ ˙ ˙ Kerak, after the latter’s first attempt to enter Damascus. Later, he tried as much as he could to prevent another attempt of al-Na¯sir Muhammad to enter ˙ ˙ Damascus.302 When it became clear that al-Na¯sir Muhammad was going to enter ˙ ˙ Cairo and that Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r was defeated, two amirs attacked al-Afram and he had no choice but to flee Damascus. Only after he demanded al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad’s oath that he would not hurt him, in addition to a guarantee for the ˙ protection of his life, Aqqu¯sh returned to Damascus and met with al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad.303 However, as one of the closest supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shna˙ kı¯r, al-Na¯sir continued to persecute Aqqu¯sh al-Afram. First he exiled him to ˙ Sarkhad, than he imprisoned his confidants, until al-Afram had no choice but but ˙ to flee to the ¯Ilkha¯ns together with Qara¯sunqur.304 The strong relations between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and his son-in-law Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯ is another instance of multi-determinant loyalty. Both amirs belonged to the Burjiyya elite, maintaining marriage ties and apparently a strong

297 Aʿya¯n, 1:563,564; Wa¯fı¯, 9:329; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:397. 298 Nuju¯m, 8:236. According to al-Maqrı¯zı¯, al-Afram refused to give his allegiance to the new sultan until he was totally convinced that al-Na¯sir Muhammad had abdicated. Afterwards, however, Aqqu¯sh supported Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı˙¯r with˙ all his heart and “stood strongly by his side” (wa-qa¯ma bi-ʾamr al-Malik al-Muzaffar qiya¯ma ʿaz¯ıma), see: Muqaffa¯, 2:238–239. ˙ ˙ 299 See n. 136 above. 300 Aʿya¯n, 1:565; Wa¯fı¯, 9:330–331; Manhal, 3:11. 301 Wa-ka¯na al-Afram sa¯ra yudabbir gha¯lib umu¯r al-diya¯r al-misriyya wa-huwa bi-Dimashq li˙ ¯ sh al-Muzaffar Baybars wa-khas¯ısan bihi ˙ (Nuju¯m, 8:280). annahu ka¯na khushda ˙ 260–261; 266–267; Sulu ˙ ˙ ¯ k, 2:63; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:141–142; 302 Zetterstéen, 139; Nuju¯m, 8: 257, Niha¯ya, 32:151. 303 Nuju¯m, 8:265–266; Sulu¯k, 2:67–68; Niha¯ya, 32:152. See also pp. 141–142 above. 304 Sulu¯k, 2:75, 84. See on Aqqu¯sh al-Afram’s defection to the ¯Ilkha¯ns in the next chapter.

Summary and conclusions

193

friendship, perhaps even a brotherhood pact. The strong solidarity between the two amirs has been discussed in several sections of this book.305

3.

Summary and conclusions

The turbulent Mansu¯riyya period in which amirs struggled intensively among ˙ themselves for political power, brought about an erosion in the basic principles of solidarity in Mamluk politics, i. e. the total loyalty of mamluks to their master, the master’s authority over his mamluks, and the loyalty among the mamluks of the same master, the khushda¯shs. On the one hand, this crucial change increased the significance of other determinants of loyalty among Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯shs, such as ˙ affiliation to the Burjiyya elite, common ethnic origin, marriage ties, firm friendship, “brotherhood pacts” and kinship. On the other hand, this change encouraged the introduction of non-mamluk elements into Mamluk politics, or increased their political significance. These elements included wa¯fidiyya members, sons of amirs (awla¯d al-na¯s) or biological brothers of amirs, and even native civilians. As for the first consequence of the change in Mamluk political principles, i. e. the creation of different loyalty determinants among the Mansu¯riyya, it is hard to ˙ sketch the accurate “hierarchy of loyalties”, but they certainly appear to be “stronger” and “weaker” factors. Interestingly enough, loyalty based on common ethnic origins stood at the bottom of the pyramid. This kind of loyalty factor had some importance, especially among low-ranking amirs, but it was weaker than loyalty based on marriage contracts or on affiliation to the Burjiyya elite. The most prominent evidence for the weakness of loyalty based on common ethnic origins are the bloody conflicts that occurred between the two Mongol amirs Kitbugha¯ and Baydara¯, as opposed to the strong loyalty between the Circassian Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and his Burjı¯ son-in-law, the Mongol Burlughay; the mutual suspicion between the two Circassians Qara¯sunqur and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, as opposed to the strong loyalty between Aqqu¯sh al-Afram and his father-in-law Aydamur al-Zaradka¯sh; and the alliance among the Circassian Qara¯sunqur, the Mongol Qibjaq and the Georgian Asandamur Kurjı¯ against the Circassian sultan Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. It is difficult to ascertain whether solidarity among in-laws was weaker than that which was based on friendship and brotherhood pacts. It is much clearer, however, that friendship- and “brotherhood”-based loyalty was stronger than loyalty based on a common ethnic origin. For instance, Qibjaq and La¯jı¯n, who belonged to different ethnic groups, had a brotherhood pact between 305 See chapter two, section 6; pp. 173–174 above; chapter four, n. 13. On the brotherhood relationship between Burlughay and Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, see: Qa¯sha¯nı¯, 139.

194

The change in the military-political principles

them, whereas Kitbugha¯ and the same Qibjaq, who were both Mongols, maintained very cold relations. Kinship, it seems, was the strongest loyalty factor. The best evidence comes from the examination of the strong solidarity between La¯jı¯n and his cousin Aqqu¯sh al-Afram. In cases where several loyalty factors were joined together, the relations between two amirs became stronger. The best example is the strong loyalty between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, who were both Circassians and Burjı¯s, and had friendship and apparently kinship ties between them. Solidarity that was based only on material grants proved itself temporary and actually played a negligible part in the Mamluk political milieu. The second consequence of the change in the basic principles of Mamluk politics, i. e. the increasing role of non-Mamluk elements in Mamluk politics, is related to a crucial development in the patterns of promotion. High-ranking Mansu¯rı¯ amirs’ constant need to enlarge the circle of their supporters brought ˙ about the promotion of mamluk and non-mamluk elements, which in many cases, were too young and lacked adequate experience for the rank or office they were appointed to. These and other cases of promotions were based on temporary and short-term relationships between a patron and his client. The crucial changes in the military-political principles and promotion patterns during the Mansu¯riyya period might provide an explanation, though ˙ partial, for the enigmatic policy of al-Na¯sir Muhammad and the role of the ˙ ˙ Mansu¯riyya during his third reign. This issue is discussed in the next and final ˙ chapter.

Chapter Four: The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ ˙ third reign

The long third reign of al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯wu¯n (709/1310–741/1341) ˙ ˙ put an end to the turbulent Mansu¯riyya period. But does the end of the Man˙ su¯riyya period actually mean the end of the influence of Mansu¯riyya amirs in ˙ ˙ Mamluk politics? Scholars, indeed, incline to downplay the role of the Mansu¯riyya in al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. Robert Irwin, Peter Holt and ˙ ˙ ˙ Amalia Levanoni argue that the Mansu¯riyya played almost no part in al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ Muhammad’s rule. Basing their views on Ayalon’s political model, they claim ˙ that al-Na¯sir Muhammad succeeded in the tough mission of eliminating the ˙ ˙ Mansu¯riyya, while advancing his own personally mamluks, the Na¯sirı¯yya.1 Other ˙ ˙ studies, conducted by Reuven Amitai, Jo Van Steenbergen and Winslow Clifford, indicate that the Mansu¯riyya, alongside the Na¯sirı¯yya and several other groups, ˙ ˙ had some share in the political-military elite during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third ˙ ˙ reign.2 The general impression, however, is that the role of the Mansu¯riyya during ˙ al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign was minor, if it existed at all. ˙ ˙ A thorough examination of the careers of the Mansu¯riyya amirs, their ˙ mamluks, and descendants, after 709/1310, challenges this impression. It enables us to evaluate more precisely the Mansu¯riyya’s position during al-Na¯sir Mu˙ ˙ hammad’s third reign and after. This final chapter, thus, discusses the following ˙ issues: the moves made by al-Na¯sir Muhammad against the Mansu¯riyya in his ˙ ˙ ˙ first years as an autonomous sultan; the Mansu¯riyya amirs who were arrested or ˙ executed, and those who were not arrested at all; and the mamluks and descendants of the Mansu¯riyya amirs, who became amirs during al-Na¯sir Mu˙ ˙ hammad’s third reign and after. ˙

1 Irwin, Middle East, 106; P. M. Holt, The Age of the Crusades, 112; Levanoni, Turning Point, 28– 29. 2 Reuven Amitai, “The Remaking of the Military Elite”, 149–150; Jo Van Steenbergen, “The Mamluk Elite on the Eve of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s Death (1341): A Look behind the Scenes of ˙ ˙ 173–198, Mamluk Politics”, MSR 9, 2 (2005): esp. 194; Clifford, 189–204.

196

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

1.

The Mansu¯riyya amirs ˙

1.1.

The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were arrested or executed ˙

1.1.1. The moves made by al-Na¯sir Muhammad against the Mansu¯riyya ˙ ˙ ˙ When al-Na¯sir Muhammad was crowned as sultan for the third time in 709/1310, ˙ ˙ the Mansu¯riyya amirs held the highest positions in the political-military elite. ˙ About forty-two prominent Mansu¯rı¯ amirs had died by this time, as a result of ˙ internal conflicts among the mamluk amirs, military confrontations with external enemies like the Mongols or the Crusaders, or natural deaths.3 The senior amirs’ ages were around their sixties, whereas the youngest ones, those who were purchased by Qala¯wu¯n during his sultanate, were in their thirties or forties. After about twenty years in which al-Na¯sir Muhammad was forced to accept the ˙ ˙ Mansu¯riyya amirs’ de facto, and sometimes also de jure, rule, he must have been ˙ full of anger against many of them and seen their current positions as a significant risk to his rule. The young sultan, hence, took steps gradually to reduce the power of these amirs. The first blow against the Mansu¯riyya occurred on 16 Shawwa¯l 709/19 March ˙ 1310, only two weeks after al-Na¯sir Muhammad entered Cairo and was crowned ˙ ˙ sultan. About twenty or thirty amirs, the supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, the former sultan and al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s greatest enemy, were arrested. Ibn al˙ ˙ Dawa¯da¯rı¯ mentions that all of them belonged to the Burjiyya. According to Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯, however, the arrested amirs were those who were made amirs ˙ by Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r.4 Examination of the identities of the twenty-two arrested amirs mentioned by al-Maqrı¯zı¯ reveals that not all of them belonged to the Mansu¯riyya-Burjiyya. Most of the names are not mentioned in the sources before ˙ that, so there are only four who can be classified as Burjı¯ amirs with certainty: Ta¯kiz (or: Balaba¯n) al-Tughrı¯lı¯, Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯, Qijma¯s al-Ju¯kanda¯r and Bala¯t ˙ ˙ al-Ju¯kanda¯r. Another Mansu¯rı¯ amir mentioned among them is Mankubars (or: ˙ Baybars) al-Mansu¯rı¯. Among the arrested amirs were supporters of Baybars al˙ Ja¯shnakı¯r who did not belong to the Mansu¯riyya-Burjiyya, like Sa¯ru¯ja¯ and ˙ ˙ Jaraktamur b. Baha¯dur Raʾs Nawba.5 Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯ died in prison in Cairo 6 citadel in 722/1322. It seems that Ta¯kiz too died in prison, since he is not mentioned in the sources afterward.

3 4 5 6

See appendix 2. Kanz, 9:196; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:534; Sulu¯k, 2:76; Aʿya¯n, 5:92. Sulu¯k, 2:76; Nuju¯m, 9:12–13; Niha¯yah, 32:155. Sulu¯k, 2:240.

The Mansu¯riyya amirs ˙

197

Three weeks later, al-Na¯sir Muhammad took measures to promote the Man˙ ˙ su¯rı¯ amirs who seemed to be more loyal to him at the expense of those Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ amirs who were among his opponents during his confrontation with sultan Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r (708/1309–709/1310). Among the former were the three governors of the Syrian districts of Aleppo, Hama and Tripoli – Qara¯sunqur, Qibjaq and Asandamur Kurjı¯ – whereas among the latter were the deposed sultan Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, his close friend and the governor of Damascus Aqqu¯sh alAfram, and the former vice-sultan, na¯ʾib al-saltana, Sala¯r. Qara¯sunqur was ap˙ pointed governor of Damascus while Aqqu¯sh al-Afram was exiled to the remote fortress of Sarkhad as its governor; Qibjaq was appointed governor of Aleppo, ˙ while Asandamur Kurjı¯ took Qibjaq’s position as the governor of Hama. Qut˙ lu¯bak al-Kabı¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯, another of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s opponents, was ˙ ˙ ˙ exiled from Cairo and appointed governor of Safed. Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r, who joined the “pro-Nasir” Mansu¯riyya coalition headed by Qara¯sunqur, arrived in ˙ ˙ Cairo from Safed and was appointed na¯ʾib al-saltana instead of Sala¯r. Other ˙ Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, who are not mentioned as opponents of al-Na¯sir Muhammad, ˙ ˙ ˙ remained in their offices: Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯ as chief ha¯jib in Egypt, Qara¯la¯jı¯n as ˙ amı¯r majlis and later as ustada¯r, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ as dawa¯da¯r, and Balaba¯n ˙ (or: Turunta¯y) al-Muhammadı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ as amı¯r janda¯r.7 ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Al-Na¯sir Muhammad turned now to deal with his greatest enemies among the ˙ ˙ Mansu¯riyya: Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, Sala¯r and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram. From his place of ˙ refuge in Akhmı¯m, Upper Egypt, deserted by almost all of his allies and mamluks, Baybars asked for ama¯n from the sultan. Al-Na¯sir Muhammad agreed and dis˙ ˙ ¯s patched al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯shs Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ and Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ ˙ to receive his allegiance to the new sultan and to escort him to the remote fortress of Sahyu¯n in northern Syria. However, shortly after that, al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ ˙ ordered al-Ja¯shnakı¯r be brought to Cairo immediately. It may well be that this was al-Na¯sir’s plan from the beginning, and he wanted to lull Baybars into leaving his ˙ place of refuge. For that purpose, al-Na¯sir Muhammad dispatched another group ˙ ˙ of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, namely Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj, Asandamur Kurjı¯, Qara¯sunqur and ˙ Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r. Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r surrended to Qara¯sunqur near Gaza, and the next day, when they arrived in the vicinity of Cairo, Qara¯sunqur handed al-Ja¯shnakı¯r over to Asandamur Kurjı¯, who brought him to Cairo. After al-Na¯sir Muhammad repeated to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r all the evils that the latter ˙ ˙ had done to him, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r was executed, probably by strangling, on 15 Dhu¯ al-Qaʿda 709/16 April 1310.8 7 Sulu¯k, 2:75, 77; Nuju¯m, 9:11; Tuhfa, 209–210; Niha¯ya, 32:156–157. ˙ 8 Nuju¯m, 8:80–81, 272–75; Sulu¯k, 2:78–80; Niha¯ya, 32:156, 158; Qa¯sha¯nı¯, 140. See on the military capture of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r by Qara¯sunqur: Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:45. According to al-Safadı¯, it ˙ Wa¯fı¯, was also said that Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r was executed by drinking poison, see: Aʿya¯n, 2:73; 10:350.

198

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

At the same time, al-Na¯sir Muhammad arrested Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s most ˙ ˙ loyal amirs, the most prominent members of the Burjiyya. At the end of 709/ spring 1310, the Burjı¯s Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯ and Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h were arrested.9 ˙ ˙ Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h was executed in his prison in Alexandria not long after.10 An˙ other Burjı¯ amir who was arrested at the same time was Mughulta¯y al-Baʿlı¯.11 ˙ Qara¯sunqur, the governor of Damascus, was ordered to arrest the Burjı¯ amirs Baybars al-ʿAlamı¯ and Nu¯gha¯y al-Jamda¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯. The two amirs were ar˙ rested in the Damascus citadel, and Nu¯gha¯y died there in Juma¯da¯ II 710/October 1310.12 At the end of 709/May 1310 al-Na¯sir Muhammad arrested also the ˙ ˙ prominent Burjı¯ amir and son-in-law of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, Burlughay alAshrafı¯, together with other amirs related to him. This was after Burlughay tried to murder al-Na¯sir Muhammad together with Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ and the ˙ ˙ Burjiyya.13 Burlughay starved to death in Rajab 710/November 1310. A short time after that, al-Na¯sir Muhammad arrested three of the closest ˙ ˙ associates of Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, took their iqta¯ʿs, and imprisoned them in ˙ 14 Alexandria. In 710/1310 al-Na¯sir Muhammad also arrested the Burjı¯ Tashtamur ˙ ˙ ˙ al-Jumaqda¯r and the Mansu¯rı¯ Balaba¯n (or: Turunta¯y) al-Muhammadı¯.15 ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ In the same year, al-Na¯sir Muhammad succeeded in eliminating Sala¯r. As ˙ ˙ sultan Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s deputy, Sala¯r changed his “political tendencies” immediately after the former was forced to leave Cairo. Sala¯r safeguarded the Cairo citadel, expressed his rejection of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and demonstrated his support for al-Na¯sir Muhammad unambiguously. When al-Na¯sir Mu˙ ˙ ˙ hammad arrived in Cairo, Sala¯r gave him precious gifts, including slaves, horses ˙ and expensive fabrics. Still feeling unsecure in Cairo, Sala¯r asked to be appointed governor of al-Shawbak and he made his way there in Shawwa¯l 709/March 1310.16 For a short time, al-Na¯sir Muhammad was satisfied with Sala¯r, and made him an ˙ ˙ amir of one hundred.17 However, after Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s execution and the arrest of his associates, the sultan felt strong enough to arrest about twenty of Sala¯r’s close associates, mamluks and brothers, as a preliminary to his own 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17

Sulu¯k, 2:77; Nuju¯m, 9:14. Durar (Hyderabad), 1:490. Aʿya¯n, 5:125; Durar (Hyderabad), 4:355. Sulu¯k, 2:84; Nuju¯m, 9:14; Niha¯ya, 32:159. On the death of Nu¯gha¯y, see: Aʿya¯n, 5:525; Nuju¯m, 9:217. Baybars al-ʿAlamı¯ was probably released a short time after his arrest, since he was arrested again in 712/1312, see below. Nuju¯m, 9:16–17, 216; Sulu¯k, 2:88. ¯ sha¯qı¯, Altunqush (or: Altunfush) the usta¯da¯r of alSulu¯k, 2:84; these three were Qutlu¯bak al-U ˙ was released only ˙ in 735/1334 (Sulu ˙ ¯ k, 2:378; Kanz, 9:393); Afram and ʿAlı¯ b. Sabı¯h. Qutlu¯bak ˙ ˙ ˙ on Altunqush see below. ˙ Zetterstéen, 152; Niha¯ya, 32:162. On Balaba¯n (or: Turunta¯y) al-Muhammadı¯: Niha¯ya, 32:162; ˙ ˙ ˙ Sulu¯k, 2:418, 675; Nuju¯m, 10:115. Sulu¯k, 2:75; Nuju¯m, 9:11; Niha¯ya, 32:155. Niha¯ya, 32:159.

The Mansu¯riyya amirs ˙

199

arrest.18 Then, al-Na¯sir Muhammad dispatched his envoys in order to bring Sala¯r ˙ ˙ to Cairo. At first, Muhammad b. Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯ was sent, but Sala¯r was cau˙ tious and refused to come to Cairo. Hence, al-Na¯sir Muhammad used the more ˙ ˙ effective tactic in which Mansu¯rı¯ amirs caught their khushda¯shs for him once ˙ more. The sultan dispatched Sala¯r’s close friends, Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ and Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, to al-Shawbak. These two amirs succeeded in convincing their ˙ khushda¯sh to travel to Cairo for “consultation with the sultan”. At the same time, the sultan ordered another two Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, the governors of Damascus and ˙ Hama Qara¯sunqur and Asandamur Kurjı¯, to block the roads from Syria to the Mongol ¯Ilkha¯nate in order to prevent Sala¯r’s defection. Immediately after his arrival in Cairo, Sala¯r was arrested in the citadel and was starved to death, not before all his innumerable monies and properties, hidden in many places, were brought to the royal treasury. Sala¯r died on 24 Rabı¯ʿ II/19 September 1310 or about a month later, in 20 Juma¯da¯ I 710/14 October 1310.19 Approximately at the same time, in Rabı¯ʿ II 710/August 1310, another Mansurı¯ ˙ amir, Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj, found his death. Al-Na¯sir Muhammad feared his arrival in ˙ ˙ Cairo, and appointed him governor of Tripoli. The tension between the two only escalated. Baha¯dur was probably murdered by envoys of the sultan who poisoned him.20 In 710/1310 al-Na¯sir Muhammad managed to capture Asandamur Kurjı¯, again ˙ ˙ by using his Mansu¯rı¯ khushda¯shs. Asandamur was the governor of Tripoli and ˙ one of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s main supporters during his struggle with Baybars ˙ ˙ al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. After his arrival in Cairo, al-Na¯sir Muhammad appointed Asan˙ ˙ damur governor of Hama. However, a few months later the sultan ordered Asandamur to give up his office to the Ayyu¯bid prince Abu¯ al-Fida¯ʾ. Asandamur refused, and after the death of Qibjaq, the governor of Aleppo, Asandamur took over this city. Asandamur was captured in Aleppo by many of his Mansurı¯ ˙ khushda¯shs, and was taken by them to Cairo, where he was put in prison. He died, probably in the prison of Kerak, in Dhu¯ al-Qaʿda 710/March 1312.21 Several other prominent Mansu¯rı¯ amirs were arrested during the end of 710 ˙ and the beginning of 711/1311, after an unsuccessful attempt to depose the sultan and to crown his nephew Mu¯sa¯ b. ʿAlı¯ b. Qala¯wu¯n. The leaders of the conspirators 18 Nuju¯m, 9:15; Sulu¯k, 2:86–87. Only three brothers are mentioned among Sala¯r’s associates who were arrested (Samu¯k, Juba¯ and Da¯ʾu¯d). The last two brothers were released in Rabı¯ʿ II 715/ July 1315, see: Sulu¯k, 2:144. 19 Nuju¯m, 9:16–18; Sulu¯k, 2:88; Tuhfa, 215; Qa¯sha¯nı¯, 140. ˙ Sulu¯k, 90, 96. 20 Muqaffa¯, 2:507; Nuju¯m, 9: 24,216; 21 Nuju¯m, 9:23–24, 26–27; Sulu¯k, 2:89–91, 93; Niha¯ya, 32:167–168; Muqaffa¯, 2:188; Kanz, 9:208– 209. On his death, see: Aʿya¯n, 1:535, 679; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:52. However, al-Maqrı¯zı¯ mentions Asandamur Kurjı¯ among the amirs who were executed by strangling in 716/1316, see: Sulu¯k, 2:168. According to Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯, Asandamur died in 721/1321, see: Durar (Hy˙ derabad), 1:377–388.

200

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

were na¯ʾib al-saltana Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r and Butkha¯s al-Mansu¯rı¯. Al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Muhammad captured not only these two Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, but also their associates ˙ ˙ – Kira¯y the governor of Damascus, Qutlu¯bak the governor of Safed and Qutlu¯˙ ˙ qatmur the governor of Gaza.22 Butkha¯s was executed in Dhu¯ al-Qaʿda 711/March ˙ 23 1312. Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r and Qutlu¯bak stayed in prison until they were ˙ executed in 716/1316.24 Kira¯y died in al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s prison, too, but of ˙ ˙ 25 natural causes, in 719/1319. At the end of 711/spring 1312, three prominent senior Mansu¯rı¯ amirs – ˙ Qara¯sunqur, Aqqu¯sh al-Afram and his father-in-law Aydamur al-Zaradka¯sh – defected to the ¯Ilkha¯nid Mongols, after al-Na¯sir Muhammad made every possible ˙ ˙ effort to capture them. Despite the fact that Qara¯sunqur had been the head of the “pro-Na¯sir” coalition during the conflict between al-Na¯sir Muhammad and ˙ ˙ ˙ Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, the new sultan was intimidated by Qara¯sunqur. Qara¯sunqur, who had sharp political instincts and managed to escape danger again and again, succeeded to avoid being captured this time, too. Unlike Sala¯r who was tempted to go to Cairo, or Asandamur Kurjı¯ who was not suspicious enough, Qara¯sunqur, who served now as the governor of Damascus, requested that the sultan appoint him governor of Aleppo. This request was not only in order to move even farther from Cairo, but also to feel more secure in the company of his loyal associates that he had managed to acquire during his long period as governor of this district. The sultan agreed and appointed him governor of Aleppo at the end of 710 or the beginning of 711/May 1311.26 However, al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad dispatched his loyal mamluk Arghu¯n al-Dawa¯da¯r, ostensibly in order to ˙ escort him to Aleppo, but actually in order to capture Qara¯sunqur.27 Qara¯sunqur managed to avoid capture again, but still felt very unsafe in Aleppo. In Shawwa¯l 711/February 1312, while Qara¯sunqur made his way to Mecca for the hajj pil˙ grimage, he managed to escape once more from another capture attempt by alNa¯sir Muhammad, and received asylum from the Syrian Bedouin chieftain, ʿI¯sa¯ ˙ ˙ b. Muhanna¯.28 Qara¯sunqur now contacted Aqqu¯sh al-Afram so that the latter would join him and defect to the Mongols together with him. Aqqu¯sh, who was appointed governor of Tripoli after Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj’s death, realized that if he did not act in ˙ 22 Sulu¯k, 2:91–93,104; Nuju¯m, 9:24–28, 30; Tuhfa, 224. 23 Aʿya¯n, 1:679; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:473. ˙ 24 Sulu¯k, 2:168; Nuju¯m, 9:30; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:485. On the arrest of Qutlu¯bak, see: Sulu¯k, ˙ 2:105; Nuju¯m, 9:30; Tuhfa, 228. ˙ 25 Sulu¯k, 2:199; Nuju¯m, 9:245; Wa¯fı¯, 24:332–333; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:267; Manhal, 9:123. According to Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯, Kira¯y was released in 717/1317 but arrested again until his ˙ see: Durar (Hyderabad), 3:267. death in 719/1319, 26 Nuju¯m, 9: 27; Sulu¯k, 2:93; Aʿya¯n, 4:94; Wa¯fı¯, 24:217–218. 27 Sulu¯k, 2:94. 28 Sulu¯k, 2:108–109; Nuju¯m, 9:30–31; Aʿya¯n, 4:94; Wa¯fı¯, 24:218; Tuhfa, 235; Kanz, 9:219. ˙

The Mansu¯riyya amirs ˙

201

time his end would be like that of most of the other Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who lead the ˙ “anti-Na¯sir” coalition, such as Sala¯r and his close friend Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. ˙ Therefore, Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, together with his father-in-law Aydamur al-Zaradka¯sh, hastened to flee to ʿI¯sa¯ b. Muhanna¯, too, and to join Qara¯sunqur on his way to the Mongols. The Mansu¯rı¯ amirs received a warm and honourable welcome ˙ from ¯Ilkha¯n Öljeitü, who – according to the Mamluk and Persian sources – gave Qara¯sunqur the district of al-Mara¯gha in Azerbaijan as an iqta¯ʿ, Hamadha¯n ˙ district to Aqqu¯sh al-Afram and Naha¯wand to Aydamur al-Zaradka¯sh.29 Over the next few years, al-Na¯sir Muhammad made several attempts to have Qara¯sunqur ˙ ˙ and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram murdered. He dispatched assassins who failed in their mission again and again, and the two Mansu¯rı¯ amirs died of old age in the ˙ ¯Ilkha¯nid territories.30 The defection of Qara¯sunqur and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram caused al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad to launch an unprecedented wave of arrests: no less than fifteen high˙ ranking Mansu¯rı¯ amirs were imprisoned in Rabı¯ʿ II 712/August 1312, due to the ˙ sultan’s suspecting them of collaboration with the defectors. These Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ amirs were Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯, La¯jı¯n ˙ Zı¯rba¯j, Baynaja¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯, Aldukuz al-Ashrafı¯, Mughulta¯y al-Masʿu¯dı¯, Baybars ˙ ˙ al-ʿAlamı¯, Baybars al-Majnu¯n, Sanjar al-Barwa¯nı¯, Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯, Baybars al˙ ˙ Ta¯jı¯, Baybars al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯, Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯ and Kashlı¯.31 These captured amirs 29 See on Qara¯sunqur and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram: Sulu¯k, 2:110, 115; Nuju¯m, 9:31–33; Niha¯ya, 32:185. Qa¯sha¯nı¯, 137, 141–142. Qa¯sha¯nı¯ mentions the names of another two defector amirs (Balaba¯n al-Dimashqı¯ and ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n) and notes that Öljeitü gave al-Mara¯gha and Hamadha¯n to the defectors as an iqta¯ʿ.On Aydamur al-Zaradka¯sh, see: Aʿya¯n, 4:95. On the warm welcome and the high position˙ they received from the ¯Ilkha¯n, see: Kanz, 9:230, 233, 268–270. On the protection they received from the Bedouin chieftain before their defection, see: Joseph Drory, “The Role of Banu¯ Fadl in Fourteenth Century Northern Syria”, in Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyu¯bid and ˙Mamluk Eras V, Proceedings of the 11th, 12th and 13th International Colloquium, eds. Urbain Vermeulen and Kristof D’Hulster (Leuven: Peeters, 2007), 479–480. 30 Qara¯sunqur died, according to most of the sources, in al-Mara¯ghah in 728/1328, see: Aʿya¯n, 4:89; al-Jazarı¯, 2:272, 310; Manhal, 9:48; Nuju¯m, 9:273–274; Sulu¯k, 2:305. However, Qara¯sunqur is also mentioned among the people who died in 741/1340–1, see: Sulu¯k, 2:554; Nuju¯m, 9:326. Qara¯sunqur is said to have captured and killed no less than one hundred and twenty-four assassins sent by al-Na¯sir Muhammad, see: Sulu¯k, 2:143, 207, 554–558; Nuju¯m, 9:326; Manhal, ˙ ˙ ¯r, 14:59. 9:48; Wa¯fı¯, 24:220; Ibn Kathı The data concerning Aqqu¯sh al-Afram are also confusing, since he too found his death far away from the territories of the sultanate. Al-Safadı¯ mentions ˙ his death after that Aqqu¯sh had a stroke in 714/1314 but lived on (albeit in a limited way) until the year 720/1320 (Aʿya¯n, 1:571, 569; Wa¯fı¯, 9:334). According to Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯, ˙ ¯ Birdı¯ mentions Aqqu¯sh had a stroke after 720/1320 (Durar [Hyderabad], 1:398). Ibn Taghrı that Aqqu¯sh died as a result of his stroke, in 720/1320 or 716/1316–7 (Manhal, 3:13). According to al-Suqa¯ʿı¯, the news of Aqqu¯sh’s death reached the sultanate in 717/1317, see: Ta¯lı¯, 180. Al-Maqrı¯˙zı¯ mentions that Aqqu¯sh died in Muharram 716/April 1316 in Hamadha¯n ˙ (Sulu¯k, 2:167) and that his stroke and death was in 714/1314–5 (Muqaffa¯, 2:236, 245); Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ mentions too that Aqqu¯sh died in this year, but in al-Mara¯ghah (Nuju¯m, 9:237). 31 Nuju¯m, 9:33–34; Sulu¯k, 2:117, 118–119; Niha¯ya, 32:196, 197; Aʿya¯n, 2:77–78; Kanz, 9:243.

202

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

were imprisoned in several jails, mainly in Cairo, Kerak and Alexandria. Six of them died in prison: Baybars al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯, Baybars al-Ta¯jı¯, Baynaja¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯, ˙ Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯, Aldukuz al-Silahda¯r al-Ashrafı¯ and Baybars al-Majnu¯n.32 ˙ The year of 712/1312, hence, may be considered as the watershed after which the Mansu¯riyya’s power was significantly weakened.33 Six to nine Mansu¯rı¯ amirs ˙ ˙ were arrested after 712/1312 and it seems that this was due to minor political disagreements, especially with the governor of Syria, Tankiz. In Ramada¯n 713/ ˙ December 1313 al-Na¯sir Muhammad imprisoned Aybak al-Ru¯mı¯ due to a dis˙ ˙ agreement between the latter and Aydughdı¯ Shuqayr, al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ confidant. Aybak is not mentioned in the sources anymore, so it is probable that he died in prison. In 714/1314 Balaba¯n al-Shamsı¯ was arrested because of his misconduct as the amı¯r al-hajj.34 In the same year the governor of Safed, Balaba¯n ˙ Turna¯, was arrested, after demonstrating his dissatisfaction with the fact that the ˙ sultan had empowered Tankiz as the supreme governor of all the districts of Syria.35 In 715/1315–6 al-Na¯sir Muhammad arrested another two high-ranking ˙ ˙ ¯ s and Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, Baha¯dur A Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯, the governor of Tripoli. The first ˙ ˙ was arrested due to a disagreement with Tankiz.36 In 720/1320 Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯, the governor of Gaza, was arrested too, also as a result of a disagreement with Tankiz.37 In Ramada¯n 722/September 1322 Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯ was arrested ˙ after refusing to leave Cairo for Safed. He died in prison in Shaʿba¯n 728/June 38 1328. Another three Mansu¯rı¯ amirs were arrested by al-Na¯sir Muhammad during his ˙ ˙ ˙ third reign: Tughjı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯, who was one of the prominent Burjı¯ amirs, died in ˙ ˙ prison in 738/1337–8,39 Balaba¯n al-ʿAnqa¯wı¯ al-Zarra¯q, an amir tablkha¯na¯h in ˙ 32 Baybars al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯, who served as governor of Homs, died in Kerak in 712/1312 (Durar [Hyderabad], 1:509); Baynaja¯r died in 716/1316 (Durar [Hyderabad], 1:471; Sulu¯k, 2:168); Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯ and Aldukuz al-Ashrafı¯ died in Cairo citadel in 718/1318 (Sulu¯k, 2:189); Baybars alMajnu¯n died in 715/1315, 716/1316 or after 718/1318. Al-Maqrı¯zı¯ mentions Baybars al-Majnu¯n among the amirs who were executed by strangling by order of al-Na¯sir Muhammad in ˙ amir was 716/1316 (Sulu¯k, 2:168. However, the same historian mentions, shortly after,˙ that this among the amirs whose prison conditions in the citadel tower worsened, see: Sulu¯k, 2:183). According to al-Safadı¯, that Baybars al-Majnu¯n died in Rabı¯ʿ I 715/June 1315 (Aʿya¯n, 2:76). ˙ Baybars al-Ta¯jı¯ probably died in prison, too, since he is not mentioned in the sources anymore. All the other amirs were released after shorter or longer jail periods, as discussed in appendix 7. 33 See also the opinion of Amitai, “Military Elite”, 156, 159. 34 Niha¯ya, 32:212; Sulu¯k, 2:136. 35 Sulu¯k, 2:137. 36 Sulu¯k, 2:144; Nuju¯m, 9:41; Aʿya¯n, 2:107–108; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:497. On Baha¯dur’s disagreement with Tankiz, see: Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:166. 37 Aʿya¯n, 2:469; Wa¯fı¯, 15:483. 38 Aʿya¯n, 1:701–702; Sulu¯k, 2:238. 39 Nuju¯m, 9:317; Sulu¯k, 2:457.

The Mansu¯riyya amirs ˙

203

Damascus who died in 732/1332 after his release from prison, when he was over seventy;40 and Aydamur al-Yu¯nusı¯ who was released in 735/1335.41 To sum up: forty-six prominent Mansu¯rı¯ amirs were arrested during al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ Muhammad’s third reign, about forty of them during the first three years of rule. ˙ However, during these three years, only nineteen amirs were executed after their arrest or died in jail. Of the nine amirs who were arrested between 712/1312–722/ 1322, only three died in al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s prison. Thus, we may conclude ˙ ˙ that out of the forty-six amirs who were arrested, twenty-two were executed or died in prison. The other twenty-four amirs were released after jail periods (discussed below). Three other amirs defected to the ¯Ilkha¯nid Mongols. 1.1.2. The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were arrested ˙ The jail periods of the twenty-four prominent Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who were arrested ˙ during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign stretched from a few months to twenty˙ ˙ six years. In Appendices 6 (2) and 7, the jail periods and careers of the arrested Mansu¯rı¯ amirs are briefly discussed, in addition to their attitude to al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ Muhammad. The main conclusions from these data, though not complete, can be ˙ summarized as follows: 1. Jail periods. Twelve out of the twenty-four Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who were arrested ˙ and not executed, were released after relatively short periods that did not exceed eight years. The Burjı¯s Tashtamur al-Jumaqda¯r and Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯ ˙ were arrested at the beginning of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign for no ˙ ˙ more than several months. Baktu¯t, however, was arrested again only in 726/ 1326 as a result of a disagreement with Tankiz, and was released about seven years later. Similarly, the Burjı¯ Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯ was arrested during the ˙ wave of arrests in Shawwa¯l 709/March 1310, but was released less than two ¯ s was imprisoned for two years, again, as a result of a years later. Baha¯dur A ˙ disagreement with Tankiz. Aqqu¯sh al-Mansu¯rı¯ and Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ were ˙ imprisoned for about three years. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ and the Burjı¯ Qijma¯s al˙ Ju¯kanda¯r were incarcerated for about five years. Mankubars (or Baybars) alMansu¯rı¯ was arrested together with Qijma¯s and was released probably several ˙ years after his arrest. Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ and Sanjar al-Barwa¯nı¯ were arrested ˙ ˙ in the big wave of arrests in Rabı¯ʿ II 712/August 1312 and both were released less than eight years later. Finally, Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ was arrested only in 720/ 1320 for about eight years as a result of a disagreement with Tankiz. Most of the other twelve amirs stayed in jail for longer periods, that might last for twenty years and more. The Burjı¯ Aydamur al-Yu¯nusı¯ was imprisoned for a 40 Aʿya¯n, 2:49–50; al-Jazarı¯, 2:569–570; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:494. See appendix 7, n. 306. 41 Sulu¯k, 2:387; Kanz, 9:393.

204

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

long period that probably exceeded eight years; another Burjı¯, Mughulta¯y al˙ Baʿlı¯ was in jail for about ten years; Balaba¯n al-Shamsı¯ was incarcerated for eleven years; and Balaba¯n Turna¯ was in prison for twelve years. La¯jı¯n Zı¯rba¯j al˙ Ja¯shnakı¯r and Mughulta¯y al-Masʿu¯dı¯ were arrested during the wave of arrests ˙ in Rabı¯ʿ II 712/August 1312. The former was released after more than sixteen years and the latter after twenty years. Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯ was imprisoned for twenty years. The senior Burjı¯ amirs Baybars al-ʿAlamı¯ and Kashlı¯ were in captivity for about twenty-three years. Bala¯t al-Ju¯kanda¯r and Balaba¯n (or: ˙ Turunta¯y) al-Muhammadı¯ were imprisoned for about twenty-five years, Ba˙ ˙ ˙ laba¯n (or: Baybars) al-ʿAnqa¯wı¯ was in jail probably for a similar period. 2. Status, ranks and positions of the arrested amirs. Interestingly enough, after the release of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, most – if not all – of them were promoted by ˙ al-Na¯sir Muhammad. About half of them became amirs of hundreds or amirs ˙ ˙ tablkha¯na¯h. Actually, seven of them became amirs of one hundred: the Burjı¯ ˙ ¯ s, Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯, Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ ˙ Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯, Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ and Balaba¯n Turna¯. At least five of the ˙ Mansu¯rı¯ amirs were amirs tablkha¯na¯h: the two Burjı¯s Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯ and ˙ ˙ Qijma¯s al-Ju¯kanda¯r, Aqqu¯sh al-Mansu¯rı¯, Sanjar al-Barwa¯nı¯ and Balaba¯n al˙ ʿAnqa¯wı¯. It seems that most of the amirs served in Syria after their release. They mainly filled positions such as amirs in Damascus, Tripoli, or Aleppo and governors of Syrian districts like Homs, Tripoli, or Gaza. However, several prominent amirs served also in Cairo. For instance, Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯ and ˙ Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ were amirs of hundred and among the consultant amirs (mashu¯ra) of the sultan. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ was an amir of one hundred and ˙ ra¯ʾs al-maysara and Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯, another amir of hundred in Cairo, gained a very high status. Aqqu¯sh al-Mansu¯rı¯ and Sanjar al-Barwa¯nı¯ also ˙ served in Cairo, but as amirs tablkha¯na¯h. ˙ 3. Nine of the arrested amirs were belonged to the elite of the Burjiyya. These were Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯, Aydamur al-Yu¯nusı¯, Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯, Bala¯t al˙ ˙ Ju¯kanda¯r, Baybars al-ʿAlamı¯, Mughulta¯y al-Baʿlı¯, Mughulta¯y al-Masʿu¯dı¯, ˙ ˙ Qijma¯s al-Ju¯kanda¯r and Tashtamur al-Jumaqda¯r. ˙ 4. Interestingly enough, in several cases, it is difficult to find a correlation between al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s attitude toward the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs and their ˙ ˙ ˙ loyalty to him during his conflict with Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. Although al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad hastened to eliminate his most bitter enemies – mainly the ˙ former sultan and his viceroy, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r – other amirs who were close associates of these two continued to serve as high-ranking amirs. We cannot say, for example, that all the nine Burjı¯ high-ranking amirs who were arrested, and who were the biggest supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, stayed in jail for long periods. Burjı¯ amirs who fought against al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad, like Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯, Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯ and Qijma¯s, in ˙ ˙

The Mansu¯riyya amirs ˙

205

addition to Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ and – to a certain extent – also Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯, were arrested for relatively short periods, and after their release were made amirs tablkha¯na¯h and amirs of one hundred, gaining a very high status in the ˙ sultanate. On the other hand, a Burjı¯ amir like Baybars al-ʿAlamı¯, who moved to al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s side at an early stage, was imprisoned for more than ˙ ˙ twenty years. Other Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who supported al-Na¯sir Muhammad, like ˙ ˙ ˙ Baybars al-Majnu¯n and Baybars al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯, died in prison.42 Similarly, al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad persecuted Qara¯sunqur who led the coalition that resisted sultan ˙ Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. 5. At least four amirs (of those who were arrested) continued their militarypolitical careers after al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s death. These were Baktu¯t al˙ ˙ Qarma¯nı¯, Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯, Balaba¯n al-Shamsı¯ and Balaba¯n al-Muhammadı¯. ˙

1.2.

The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were neither arrested nor put to death ˙

Along side with the amirs who were executed and arrested, eventually released or dying in prison, other Mansu¯rı¯ amirs were not imprisoned at all during al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ Muhammad’s third reign. At least thirty of them are mentioned:43 Qibjaq, Aq˙ ¯ lmalik al-Ha¯jj, qu¯sh Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ, Aqjuba¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯, Qara¯la¯jı¯n al-Ustada¯r, A ˙ ˙ Sanjar al-Jumaqda¯r (Burjı¯), Qullı¯ al-Silahda¯r (Burjı¯), Baybars al-Ahmadı¯ (Burjı¯), ˙ ˙ Ku¯ka¯y al-Silahda¯r, Ju¯ba¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯, Kundughdı¯ al-Zarra¯q, Kujkun al-Mansu¯rı¯, ˙ ˙ ˙ Kaharda¯sh al-Zarra¯q, Sanjar al-Kha¯zin, Balaba¯n al-Tatarı¯, Aqqu¯sh al-Rahbı¯, ˙ Baybars al-Awhadı¯, Balaba¯n al-Husaynı¯ (or: al-Hasanı¯), Nukba¯y al-Barı¯dı¯, ˙ ˙ ˙ ¯ dilı¯), BaBaktamur al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯, Bakta¯sh al-Manku¯rsı¯, Kitbugha¯ Raʾs Nawba (al-ʿA ha¯dur al-Sanjarı¯ (Burjı¯), Baybars al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ (Burjı¯), Aydamur al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ (Burjı¯), al-Shaykhı¯ (Burjı¯), Bı¯lı¯k al-ʿUthma¯nı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯, Muba¯rak al-Mansu¯rı¯, Murshid ˙ ˙ al-Khaznada¯r (eunuch), Mukhta¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ al-Bakansı¯ al-Bilbaysı¯ (eunuch). ˙ Based on the data on these amirs appearing in appendix 8, we may conclude as follows: Three senior Mansu¯rı¯ amirs – Qibjaq, Aqqu¯sh Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ and Aqjuba¯ ˙ ˙˙ al-Mansu¯rı¯ – died of natural causes in the first year of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ ˙ third reign. Of the remaining twenty-seven amirs, about twenty were known as amirs before al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign, most of them as prominent ˙ ˙ 42 Baybars al-Majnu¯n and Baybars al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ (or Baybars al-ʿAlamı¯) joined al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ranks during his first attempt to go from Kerak to Damascus, see: Niha¯ya,˙ 32:150; ˙ Zetterstéen, 140. Later, Baybars al-Majnu¯n and Baybars al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ planned to attack Aqqu¯sh alAfram, and this plan forced al-Afram to leave Damascus for al-Na¯sir Muhammad (Nuju¯m, ˙ ˙ 2:265; Sulu¯k, 2:67). 43 The amirs Altunbugha¯ al-Sa¯lih¯ı al-Na¯sirı¯, Aruqta¯y al-Ha¯jj, Aytamish al-Muhammadı¯ and ˙ ˙ of al-Na¯sir ˙ ¯ da¯r are not˙ discussed ˙here since˙ they are considered mamluks Arghu¯n al-Dawa ˙ Muhammad (see appendix 5). ˙

206

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

amirs. These amirs included the Burjı¯s Qullı¯ al-Silahda¯r, Baybars al-Ahmadı¯, ˙ ˙ Sanjar al-Jumaqda¯r, Baha¯dur al-Sanjarı¯, Baybars al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, Aydamur al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ ¯ lmalik, Balaba¯n al-Husaynı¯, and al-Shaykhı¯; the other Mansu¯ris are Qara¯la¯jı¯n, A ˙ ˙ Kitbugha¯ Raʾs Nawba, Sanjar al-Kha¯zin, Aqqu¯sh al-Rahbı¯, Kujkun, Ku¯ka¯y, Ka˙ harda¯sh, Ju¯ba¯n; and the eunuchs Mukhta¯r and Murshid al-Khaznada¯r. Ten out of these twenty-seven amirs were high-ranking amirs, i. e. probably all amirs of one hundred, during different periods of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third ˙ ˙ ¯ lmalik, Sanjar al-Jumaqda reign. These amirs were Qara¯la¯jı¯n, A ¯ r, Qullı¯ al-Silahda¯r, Baybars al-Ahmadı¯, Ku¯ka¯y al-Silahda¯r, Kujkun, Kitbugha¯ Raʾs Nawba, ˙ ˙ ˙ Ju¯ba¯n and Kundughdı¯ al-Zarra¯q. Most of these amirs served in Cairo. Most of the remaining seventeen were probably amirs of tablkha¯na¯h. ˙ About a half of these twenty-seven amirs served in Cairo, and the other half in Syria. Seven amirs belonged to the Burjiyya elite: Sanjar al-Jumaqda¯r, Qullı¯ alSilahda¯r, Baybars al-Ahmadı¯, Baha¯dur al-Sanjarı¯, Baybars al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, Aydamur ˙ ˙ al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ and al-Shaykhı¯. Ten Mansu¯rı¯ amirs continued their military-political careers even after al˙ ¯ lmalik, Sanjar alNa¯sir Muhammad’s death, i. e. after 741/1341. These were: A ˙ ˙ Jumaqda¯r, Baybars al-Ahmadı¯, Ku¯ka¯y al-Silahda¯r, Kujkun, Balaba¯n al-Husaynı¯, ˙ ˙ ˙ Nukba¯y al-Barı¯dı¯, Baktamur al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯, Bakta¯sh al-Manku¯rsı¯, Kundughdı¯ alZarra¯q. The Mansu¯rı¯ amirs held a variety of military-political posts in Egypt and Syria. ˙ In Egypt they filled positions such as ustada¯r, amı¯r janda¯r, mihma¯nda¯r44 and Khazanda¯r (treasurer) in Cairo, and wa¯lı¯ of Cairo, as well as governors of other areas such as al-Jı¯za, Damietta, Alexandria and Qatya¯. In Syria, they filled offices like wa¯lı¯ of Damascus, shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Damascus as well as governors of Gaza, Homs, and al-Bı¯ra. As for the Mansu¯rı¯ attitude toward al-Na¯sir Muhammad during his struggle ˙ ˙ ˙ with Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, four amirs inclined to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r during that time. The Burjı¯ amirs Qullı¯ al-Silahda¯r and Baybars al-Ahmadı¯, together with ˙ ˙ Ju¯ba¯n and Kaharda¯sh, were generally supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shankı¯r. However, they gained high status and position in the service of al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad. The first two were amirs of one hundred in Cairo, the third was a high˙ ranking amir in Damascus, and the fourth was an amir of fifty in Damascus. Hence, similar to the analysis of the data concerning the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who were ˙ arrested, al-Na¯sir Muhammad appears to have no consistent or “rational” policy ˙ ˙ toward all of the veteran and senior Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, or even toward his enemies ˙ among them and from the Burjiyya. 44 The mihmanda¯r, or protocol officer, was in charge of ceremonies and organized receptions for missions or honorable guests. See: al-Qalqashandı¯ (Beirut), 3:559–560; Drory, “Founding a new Mamlaka”, 179.

The Mansu¯riyya amirs ˙

1.3.

207

Conclusions

The prosopographical data regarding seventy-nine Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, most of ˙ whom held the most important positions in the sultanate on the eve of al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad’s third reign, reveal that twenty-two of them were executed by al˙ Na¯sir Muhammad or died in his prison, twenty-four were arrested (twelve of ˙ ˙ them for relatively short periods of less than eight years), three escaped to the Mongols, and thirty were not arrested at all. Thus, whereas thirty-seven amirs were “purged” by al-Na¯sir Muhammad by execution, imprisonment for long ˙ ˙ periods or defection from the sultanate, forty-two continued their politicalmilitary careers, since they were not arrested at all or were released after a few years in prison. About seventeen of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs were high-ranking amirs, ˙ probably all of them amirs of one hundred, during different periods of al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad’s third reign. Though al-Na¯sir Muhammad eliminated many of his ˙ ˙ ˙ Mansu¯rı¯ opponents, there are several Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, and especially Burjı¯˙ ˙ Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, who gained positions of honour during his reign, despite the fact ˙ that they had belonged to the circle of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s supporters. Four Mansu¯rı¯ amirs are still mentioned among the twenty-five amirs of one hundred ˙ in 741/1341, on the eve of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s death.45 About ten Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ ˙ amirs continued their political-military careers even after al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ death. The prosopographical data and its analysis, as discussed above, is partial. There are probably additional prominent Mansu¯rı¯ amirs that are not discussed ˙ here since the Muslim historians did not explicitly mention their affiliation to the Mansu¯riyya, or the required data regarding their career. However, the impression ˙ that arises from this analysis and its conclusions is that the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs played ˙ an important role, if not a central one, in al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. This ˙ ˙ impression is definitely strengthened by the testimony of their contemporary alNuwayrı¯ (677/1279–733/1333), who served as an official in dı¯wa¯n al-kha¯ss (the ˙˙ sultan’s treasury), dı¯wa¯n al-insha¯ʾ (the chancery) and as na¯zir in dı¯wa¯n al-jaysh ˙ (in charge of the iqta¯ʿs) and had a close relationship with al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ ˙ 46 and several Mansu¯rı¯ amirs. In the last volume of his encyclopedia, Niha¯yat al˙ Arab fı¯ Funu¯n al-Adab, composed between the years 725/1325–730/1330, alNuwayrı¯ testified that the Mansu¯riyya mamluks are “the most honourable amirs ˙ ¯ lmalik. See: Van 45 These four amirs were Baybars al-Ahmadı¯, Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯, Ku¯ka¯y and A ˙ Steenbergen, “Mamluk Elite”, 174, 177. 46 See: Little, “Historiography”, 430; Mounira Chapoutot-Remadi, “Al-Nuwayrı¯, Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n Ahmad b. ʿAbd al-Wahha¯b al-Bakrı¯ al-Tamı¯mı¯ al-Kurashı¯ al-Sha¯fiʿı¯”, EI2, 8:156–157; Amı¯na ˙ ammad Jama¯l al-Dı¯n, Al-Nuwayrı¯ wa-Kita¯buhu ˙ Muh Niha¯yat al-Arab fı¯ Funu¯n al-Adab: ˙ ¯ ra¯ʾuhu al-Naqdiyya (Cairo: Da¯r Tha¯bit, 1404/1984), 27–79. Masa¯diruhu al-Adabiyya wa-A ˙

208

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

in our time”.47 Ibn al-Fura¯t (733/1334–807/1405), much of whose chronicle for these years is based on al-Nuwayrı¯, mentions several decades later that “the Mansu¯riyya mamluks were the most honourable amirs during most of the reign ˙ of al-Malik al-Na¯sir”.48 Hence, according to both the biographical data con˙ cerning the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs and general observations of the Muslim historians, ˙ the Mansu¯riyya still held a prominent position in the Mamluk sultanate about ˙ twenty years after their alleged “elimination”.

2.

The mamluks and descendants of the Mansu¯riyya amirs ˙

The number of the mamluks and descendants of prominent Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, who ˙ became part of the political-military elite during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third ˙ ˙ reign and after, is more than twice that of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs themselves. The ˙ careers of these mamluks are discussed in greater depth in appendices 9 and 10. In what follows a summary and general conclusions regarding the role of these amirs appear.

2.1.

The mamluks of the Mansu¯riyya amirs ˙

At least forty-two mamluks, who originally belonged to Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, served as ˙ amirs during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. Most of these mamluks, who ˙ ˙ became important amirs, originally belonged to the Mansu¯rı¯ sultans and the ˙ most prominent amirs. The largest number of mamluks of a Mansu¯rı¯ amir who ˙ became prominent amirs are, surprisingly, the mamluks of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. Al-Yu¯sufı¯ mentions that a “large group” ( jama¯ʿa kabı¯ra) of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s mamluks moved to the ranks of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s mamluks after ˙ ˙ Baybars was captured. Among them were Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯, Bı¯lı¯k al-Sa¯qı¯, Tu¯gha¯n ˙ 49 al-Sa¯qı¯ and Quba¯tamur (or: Quya¯tamur). It would appear that most, if not all, of these mamluks were manumitted by Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and some of them were amirs. Another four amirs who were originally among Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s mamluks are mentioned in the sources (Safanjı¯ al-Ruknı¯, Baybars al-Muzaffarı¯ ˙ ˙ al-Ruknı¯, Sawa¯b al-Ruknı¯ and Sanjar), so in total eight amirs are known. As for ˙ 47 Wa-baqa¯ya¯ al-mama¯lı¯k al-Mansu¯riyya ila¯ al-a¯n hum aʿya¯n al-umara¯ʾ fı¯ waqtina¯ ha¯dha¯ (Niha¯ya, 31:176). See about the˙ years in which al-Nuwayrı¯ wrote the last volume of his encyclopedia: Jamal al-Dı¯n, Al-Nuwayrı¯ wa-kita¯buhu, 112; Chapoutot-Remadi, “Al-Nuwayrı¯”, 158. 48 Wa-baqa¯ya¯ al-mama¯lı¯k al-Mansu¯riyya ka¯nu¯ aʿya¯n al-umara¯ʾ fı¯ gha¯lib dawla al-Malik alNa¯sir (Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:97–98). ˙ ˙ ¯ sufı¯, 149. 49 Al-Yu

The mamluks and descendants of the Mansu¯riyya amirs ˙

209

the mamluks of other prominent Mansu¯ris who became important amirs during ˙ al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign, the data in the sources is as follows: five ˙ ˙ ¯ qsunqur al-Sala¯rı¯, Baybars al-Sala¯rı¯, Qı¯ra¯n mamluks of Sala¯r (Aslam al-Qibja¯qı¯, A ˙ al-Sala¯rı¯ and Bı¯lı¯k Abu¯ Ghudda), six mamluks of La¯jı¯n (Tankiz, Tugha¯y al-Kabı¯r, ˙ Aydughdı¯ Shuqayr, Baha¯dur al-Muʿizzı¯, La¯jı¯n al-Husa¯mı¯ (al-Saghı¯r), Baha¯dur al˙ ¯ ˙ Ju¯kanda¯r), five mamluks of Kitbugha¯ (Ughurlu¯ al-ʿAdilı¯, Ughulbak, Uljaybugha¯ ¯ dilı¯, Baydara¯ al-ʿA ¯ dilı¯, Turunta¯y al-Zaynı¯ al-ʿA ¯ dilı¯), three mamluks of al-ʿA ˙ ˙ Aqush al-Afram (Altunqush, Sunqur al-Jama¯lı¯, Tulak al-Hasanı¯ al-Arghu¯nı¯), ˙ ˙ three mamluks of Turunta¯y (Baktamur al-Ha¯jib, Balaba¯n al-Husa¯mı¯, Baktamur ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ al-Ghutmı¯ al-Husa¯mı¯) and two mamluks of Baydara¯ (Asandamur al-Qalı¯jı¯, ˙ Taybars al-Khaznada¯rı¯). ˙ Many of Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯’s mamluks also became amirs. Al-Safadı¯ ˙ ˙ mentions that most of Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯’s mamluks became the greatest ˙ amirs of the sultanate in the reign of al-Na¯sir Muhammad, among them Ay˙ ˙ dughmish amı¯r akhu¯r, Tughra¯y al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, Manku¯tamur al-Tabba¯khı¯ and ˙ ˙ 50 others. As for Qara¯sunqur, several of his mamluks became amirs. The sources mentioned the names of some of them and add data regarding only few of them. Some of them were made tablkha¯na¯h amirs like Baykha¯n, Mughulta¯y and Ba˙ ˙ laba¯n. Others became amirs of ten, like Baha¯dur and ʿAbdu¯n.51 Amir Butkha¯s, ˙ who was one of Qara¯sunqur’s mamluks, commanded a Mamluk force that de52 feated Mongols raiding in Karkar in 708/1308–9. It is very likely that most of Qara¯sunqur’s mamluks who were amirs continued to serve as such during alNa¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. However, the sources mention only Balaba¯n ˙ ˙ Jarkas (d. 745/1344–5), who served as the governor of Qalʿat al-Ru¯m.53 More than ten amirs served for certain periods as amirs of one hundred during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. Most of them (eight) served in Cairo. Three ˙ ˙ amirs continued to serve as amirs of one hundred after al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ death, and two others became amirs of one hundred after the sultan’s death. Interestingly enough, most of the amirs who served as amirs of one hundred originated as the mamluks of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s greatest enemies: one of ˙ ˙ Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s mamluks, two of Sala¯r’s, two of Kitbugha¯’s and three of 54 La¯jı¯n’s. For instance, Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯, who became one of the most senior and favourite amirs of al-Na¯sir Muhammad, was raised by Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r from ˙ ˙ 50 51 52 53 54

Aʿya¯n, 2:43. Aʿya¯n, 4:98; Wa¯fı¯, 24:221. See chapter two, n. 216. As for mamluks of the other Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, see appendix 9. ˙ third reign of al-Na¯sir Muahammad’s third reign, the Though the last two died before the ˙ ˙ his sultanate sultan greatly resented them since they deposed him from (see, for instance, Aʿya¯n, 4:146). It seems plausible that Kitbugha¯ and La¯jı¯n, had they lived longer, would have met a similar fate as the other Mansu¯rı¯ rulers, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r. ˙

210

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

early childhood and was made an amir by him; Aydughdı¯ Shuqayr, who was one of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s closest associates (khawa¯ss) and advisors, was origi˙ ˙ ˙˙ nally one of La¯jı¯n’s favorite mamluks whom the latter made amir and planned to appoint as governor of Aleppo; Altunqush al-Jama¯lı¯, who was appointed ustada¯r ¯˙nu¯k, and later ustada¯r of al-Na¯sir himself, of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s son, A ˙ ˙ ˙ originally served his master Aqqu¯sh al-Afram in that role. In addition to the amirs of hundred, at least twelve men who were originally among the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs’ mamluks served as amirs tablkha¯na¯h during al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ ˙ Muhammad’s third reign. About half of them served in Cairo and about half in ˙ Syria. The general division of the forty-two mamluks of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs ˙ between Egypt and Syria was also more or less equal. Fourteen amirs continued to serve as amirs after al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s death. Twenty-three sons of these ˙ ˙ forty two amirs, five of their grandsons and three of their great-grandsons are also mentioned as amirs. Among these descendants of the mamluks of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, four were amirs of one hundred. ˙ It should be noted that there were dozens of amirs, originally mamluks of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, who became amirs tablkha¯na¯h or amirs of ten, about whom the ˙ ˙ sources do not discuss or we cannot connect them explicitly to Mansu¯rı¯ amirs. As ˙ mentioned above, it is noted that “most” of Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯’s mamluks ˙ became prominent amirs in al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s reign. Similarly, most of ˙ ˙ 55 Sunqur al-Aʿsar’s mamluks became amirs after his death.

2.2

The descendants of the Mansu¯riyya amirs ˙

Historical sources mention at least forty-one sons of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, and ten of ˙ their grandsons, who became amirs during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s reign and ˙ ˙ after. Four of them were amirs of one hundred mainly during al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad’s third reign (the sons of Qara¯sunqur, Turunta¯y, Tughrı¯l al-Igha¯nı¯ and ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯); another three became amirs of one hundred after al¯ s, A ¯ lmalik and Tu¯gha¯n alNa¯sir Muhammad’s death (the sons of Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Mansu¯rı¯). About fifteen were amirs tablkha¯na¯h during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ third reign and at least twenty of the amirs continued or started to serve after alNa¯sir Muhammad’s death. Among the amirs who were sons of prominent ˙ ˙ ¯ s and three sons of each of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs were five sons of Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ following Mansu¯ris: Qara¯sunqur, Sala¯r, Kitbugha¯, Turunta¯y, and the Burjı¯s Ay˙ ˙ ˙ damur al-Khat¯ırı¯ and Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯. ˙ Similarly to the cases of some Mansu¯rı¯ amirs and their mamluks, the rela˙ tionships of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs with al-Na¯sir Muhammad did not necessarily in˙ ˙ ˙ 55 Aʿya¯n, 2:480.

Summary and conclusions

211

fluence their sons’ careers during al-Na¯sir’s reign. Thus, among the amirs of one ˙ hundred and tablkha¯na¯h one may find sons of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s enemies ˙ ˙ ˙ from among the Burjiyya elite. For instance, Asanbugha¯ b. Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯ was an amir of one hundred and became a close associate of al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad, despite the fact that his father Baktamur was arrested and executed ˙ by the latter. Similarly, ʿAlı¯, the son of Tughrı¯l al-Igha¯nı¯ who was among the most ˙ prominent supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, became an amir of one hundred in Cairo. Another amir of one hundred was Muhammad b. Qara¯sunqur. This high ˙ status of his seems somewhat strange, since at the same time al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad was investing great efforts to assassinate Muhammad’s father, who had ˙ ˙ found refuge with the Mongols in Azerbaijan. Among the amirs who received an amirate of tablkha¯na¯h during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s reign we may count other ˙ ˙ ˙ sons of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s enemies such as the sons and the grandsons of ˙ ˙ Sala¯r and Qara¯sunqur, as well as the sons of the Burjı¯s Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯, ˙ Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯ and Baybars al-Ahmadı¯. Jaraktamur, the son of Baha¯dur ˙ Raʾs Nawba, was made an amir by Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and was Qara¯sunqur’s son-in-law. However, he and his two sons served as amirs of tablkha¯na¯h. ˙

3.

Summary and conclusions: the Mansu¯riyya period as an ˙ intermediate stage toward al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙

During the first three years of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign, dozens of ˙ ˙ Mansu¯rı¯ amirs – and others who were related to them – were imprisoned or ˙ executed by the young sultan. These moves might give the impression that the Mansu¯riyya were eliminated by al-Na¯sir Muhammad. However, a closer look at ˙ ˙ ˙ the careers of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs reveals that many of them, including al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ Muhammad’s former enemies, continued to play an important role in the po˙ litical-military life of the sultanate during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. This ˙ ˙ conclusion is strengthened by the observations of Mamluk historians. Moreover, many of the mamluks and descendants of these Mansu¯rı¯ amirs gained very high ˙ positions as amirs in the sultanate during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign and ˙ ˙ after. The conclusive findings are as follows: Forty-two Mansu¯rı¯ amirs conducted ˙ honourable careers during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. About seventeen ˙ ˙ of them served as high-ranking amirs, probably all of them amirs of one hundred; at least forty-two mamluks of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs became amirs as well, fifteen of ˙ them – amirs of one hundred. Twenty-three of the sons of these mamluks of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs and eight of their descendants are also mentioned as amirs; forty˙ one sons of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs and ten of their grandsons became amirs during and ˙

212

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

after al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. Seven of them were amirs of one hun˙ ˙ dred. The “Mansu¯riyya heritage”, thus, consisted of at least one hundred and ˙ sixty-six amirs who continued to play an important part in the military and political Mamluk elite from al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign, up to the begin˙ ˙ ning of the 9th/15th century. Among these amirs, about forty served as amirs of one hundred for certain periods. The studies of Amitai, Van Steenbergen and Clifford, mentioned at the beginning of this chapter, already pointed out that the military elite during al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad’s third reign was not based purely on the Na¯sirı¯yya mamluks. ˙ ˙ However, the data discussed in this chapter reveals that the Mansu¯riyya’s position ˙ was much more dominant than previously assumed. In his analysis of the military elite in 712/1312, Amitai classified four out of twenty-two amirs of one hundred as belonging to the Mansu¯riyya, though at least thirteen of them were ˙ Mansu¯rı¯ amirs or related to them.56 Van Steenbergen, who examined the identity ˙ of the members of the military elite about thirty years later, on the eve of al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad’s death, correctly identified four out of the twenty-five amirs of one ˙ hundred as Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, but another four amirs that were related to the ˙ Mansu¯riyya should be added.57 Clifford mentions only sixteen Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks ˙ ˙ (really only eleven), seven of their sons and three of their grandsons, who served as amirs during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign.58 Ayalon, it should be noted, ˙ ˙ 56 The four amirs who are classified as Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks are Sanjar al-Jumaqda¯r, Qara¯la¯jı¯n, ˙ Aybak al-Ru¯mı¯ and Baybars al-Ahmadı¯. However, another three amirs, who are mentioned as ˙ ¯ lmalik. Other amirs of “non-affiliated”, should be added: Ayadamur al-Khat¯ırı¯, Qullı¯ and A one hundred mentioned in this list who were related to˙ the Mansu¯riyya are the wa¯fidı¯ Jankalı¯ b. al-Ba¯ba¯, who is mentioned together with Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯˙r’s Burjı¯ supporters (Nuju¯m, 8:251) and Husayn b. Janda¯r (or: Janda¯rbak), a wa¯fidı¯’s son, who was a close associate of ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Afram (Sulu¯k, 2:313–314). Others amirs of one hundred originated in the mamluks of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs: Baha¯dur al-Muʿizzı¯ and Aydughdı¯ Shuqayr were mamluks of La¯jı¯n, Aslam ˙ ˙ was a mamluk of Sala¯r and Baktamur al-Ha¯jib a mamluk of Turunta¯y, see: Amitai, “Military ˙ ˙ ˙ Elite”, 149. ¯ lmalik, Baybars al-Ahmadı¯, Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ and Ku¯ka¯y. Two other 57 The Mansu¯rı¯ amirs are A ˙ amirs of ˙one hundred are the mamluks of Balaba ¯ n al-Tabba¯khı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯, Aydughmish ˙ ¯ was a supporter ˙ of Baybars alamı¯r akhu¯r and Turgha¯y al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. Jankalı¯ b. al-Ba¯ba Ja¯shnakı¯r and Quma¯rı¯ al-Kabı¯r was the brother of Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯, Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s loyal mamluk. See: Van Steenbergen, “Mamluk Elite”, 174, 177. 58 Clifford, 197–204. Clifford mentions only these eleven Mansu¯rı¯ amirs: Baybars al-Ahmadı¯, ˙ A ˙ ¯ s, Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯, Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯, Sanjar al-Jumaqda¯r, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, Baha¯dur ˙ ¯ t al-Qarma¯nı¯, Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ and ˙ Baktamur al˙ Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯, Balaba¯n Turna¯, Baktu ˙ ¯ Ju¯kanda¯r. In addition, he classified as Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks another five amirs: Aqsunqur alSala¯rı¯ (whom I considered a mamluk of Sala¯˙r); Alaqtamur or Araqtamur al-Sa¯qı¯ (who is not mentioned as Mansu¯rı¯ in any of the sources I have checked); Baybars al-Ha¯jib (who is ˙ ¯ m, 10:100– mentioned as Mansu¯˙ rı¯ only in Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯’s Manhal, 3:475, as opposed to Nuju ˙ 101; Durar [Hyderabad], 1:508); Qirta¯y (al-Ashrafı¯, see: Mufaddal [Kortantamer] 9, 21; Durar ˙ ˙ ˙ a¯y, whom I considered as [Hyderabad], 3:248; Aʿya¯n, 4:101–102; Sulu¯k, 2:376) and Aruqt ˙

Summary and conclusions

213

discusses only four Burjı¯ amirs who continued their careers during al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad’s third reign.59 ˙ The high positions of Mansu¯riyya amirs who were among al-Na¯sir Mu˙ ˙ hammad’s enemies, as well as their mamluks or their descendants, is especially ˙ surprising. Among the amirs during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign we may ˙ ˙ find several Burjı¯ amirs who were among al-Na¯sir’s greatest enemies as well as ˙ mamluks of his enemies. We may count at least five prominent Burjı¯ supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r who were either not arrested at all or only for short periods (Qullı¯ al-Silahda¯r, Baybars al-Ahmadı¯, Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯, Baktu¯t al˙ ˙ ˙ Qarma¯nı¯ and Qijma¯s). We may add to them eight of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s mamluks and four of their sons; four of Sala¯r’s mamluks and four of their sons; three of the mamluks of Aqqu¯sh al-Afram and one son; a mamluk of Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯ and several mamluks of Qara¯sunqur; six of La¯jı¯n’s mamluks and four of Kitbugha¯’s. Similarly, some of the descendants of these bitter enemies of alNa¯sir Muhammad filled important offices as well, such as the sons and grandsons ˙ ˙ of Sala¯r and Qara¯sunqur, and the sons of the Burjı¯ amirs Tughrı¯l al-I¯gha¯nı¯, ˙ Mughulta¯y al-Masʿu¯dı¯ and Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯. ˙ ˙ Thus, al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s policy seems even more enigmatic, given the ˙ ˙ prominent position of his former opponents, their mamluks and sons, alongside members of khushda¯shiyyas, wa¯fidiyya and awla¯d al-na¯s. Scholars hold different views with regard this policy. Amalia Levanoni considers that al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad lost his authority over his personal mamluks, so one cannot see the ˙ Na¯sirı¯yya mamluks as a more loyal factor than any other political faction.60 Jo ˙ Van Steenbergen, on the other hand, asserts that “it was his [al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad’s] solid, engaged, and independent position at the very top of the ˙ military hierarchy and of the government’s administration that accounts for the continuous subordination of this elite.”61 Reuven Amitai suggests that al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad promoted non-Na¯sirı¯ amirs in order to create a counter-balance to ˙ ˙ 62 the power of his own mamluks. Winslow Clifford argues that al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad’s policy managed to continue the constitutional order, the niza¯m, in ˙ ˙ which resources were distributed in an orderly and agreed-upon way among the 63 members of the Mamluk elite. In an attempt to understand al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s policy and the prominent ˙ ˙ role of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, their sons and their mamluks, in the military-political ˙

59 60 61 62 63

Na¯sirı¯. Clifford discusses only three mamluks of the Mansu¯riyya amirs, those of Balaba¯n al˙ ¯khı¯, and Altunqush, the mamluk of Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, ˙ see: Clifford, 198–199. Tabba ˙ ˙ Ayalon, “Bahrı¯ Mamluks”, 38. ˙ Levanoni, Turning Point, 60–72. Van Steenbergen, “Mamluk Elite”, 195. Amitai, “Military Elite”, 160. Clifford, 204–206.

214

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

system in al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign, one should bear in mind two points. ˙ ˙ First, the developments that occurred in the military-political system during the Mansu¯riyya period. As argued in this book and especially in chapter three, it was ˙ during this turbulent period that loyalties between fellows of the same khushda¯shi group and even between mamluks and their master were much eroded. The fact that al-Na¯sir Muhammad used Mansu¯rı¯ amirs to arrest their own khush˙ ˙ ˙ da¯shs, as mentioned in the beginning of the present chapter, is only one example of the weakness of the solidarity among the members of the Mansu¯riyya. Al˙ Na¯sir Muhammad, hence, could not rely on the loyalty of his Na¯siriyya mamluks, ˙ ˙ ˙ much more than any other mamluk or non-mamluk element. The second point is this sultan’s young age. Al-Na¯sir Muhammad was only ˙ ˙ twenty-four at the beginning of his third reign. He could not achieve real authority over his own mamluks, since, in contrast to his father Qala¯wu¯n who fostered his Mansu¯riyya mamluks for many years before becoming sultan, most ˙ of his mamluks were more or less his age or even older than him. He did not have the possibility to educate his mamluks “as a father” for many years and thus to achieve seniority over them. Subsequently, the Na¯sirı¯yya mamluks never felt ˙ emotions of awe toward their master, unlike the feelings of the Mansu¯riyya ˙ mamluks toward their master Qala¯wu¯n.64 Indeed, al-Na¯sir Muhammad lost his authority over his mamluks. The rela˙ ˙ tions between al-Na¯sir Muhammad and his mamluks was an extreme case of ˙ ˙ usta¯dh-mamluk relations as they developed during the Mansu¯riyya period, es˙ pecially regarding Kitbugha¯ and La¯jı¯n and their mamluks. Similarly to the activities of of Kitbugha¯’s mamluks, the Na¯siriyya mamluks strove to cause enmity ˙ between the sultan and the amirs. They even tried to murder their master. On the other hand, the high position that was given to Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯ by al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad is reminiscent of the position given to Manku¯tamur by La¯jı¯n.65 ˙ Thus, in order to deal with the deterioration of his authorithy and the escalation in the erosion of the basic principles of political loyalties, al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad adopted ever more forcefully the socio-political practices and promo˙ tion patterns that were created during the Mansu¯riyya period. For instance, in ˙ order to strengthen the loyalty of his and other mamluks and amirs, al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad created marriage ties with these amirs, and offered them material ˙ grants or high level positions.66 The promotion patterns during al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad’s reign were based, much more than before, on short-term, temporary ˙

64 See pp. 152–153 above. 65 Levanoni, Turning Point, 64–65, 68–71. 66 Levanoni, Turning Point, 48–49; Ahmad Abd al-Raziq, La femme au temps des Mamlukes en ˙ Égypte (Cairo: Institut Français d’Archéologie Orientale, 1973), 126.

Summary and conclusions

215

and haphazard relations between client and patron.67 The clients, in many cases, were non-mamluk elements, and especially awla¯d al-na¯s. The tendency of an increasing number of awla¯d al-na¯s becoming involved in Mamluk politics, as we saw in the Mansu¯riyya period, continued, more or less at ˙ the same rate, during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. If in al-Za¯hir Baybars’ ˙ ˙ ˙ and Qala¯wu¯n’s periods we count eleven awla¯d al-na¯s amirs, and during the Mansu¯riyya period more than thirty, in al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign the ˙ ˙ ˙ number of amirs who were awla¯d al-na¯s jumps to ninety-three.68 In the period from al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s death to the end of the first Mamluk period (741/ ˙ ˙ 1341–784/1382) the number of awla¯d al-na¯s increased to two hundred and fiftyseven or even to two hundred and eighty-three, out of a total of eight hundred and twenty-five amirs.69 The promotion of these awla¯d al-na¯s, as well as other non-mamluk elements, was not based, in many cases, on objective factors, such as seniority, qualifications or military experience. In this sense, al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s reign ˙ ˙ marks another escalation relative to the Mansu¯riyya period. For instance, the ˙ three sons of Aydughmish amı¯r akhu¯r, who was a mamluk of the Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯, received amirates only due to their father’s high position in ˙ al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s favour.70 In many other cases, awla¯d al-na¯s received high˙ ˙ ranking amirates at a very young age, even as children.71 Other non-mamluk elements, such as relatives and in-laws of the sultan and of the amirs, were significantly promoted and received amirates.72 A prominent non-objective criterion in promotion was a mamluk’s beauty. Though this factor played a role already at the beginning of the Mamluk period, in al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign, it seems to have become crucial. Al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ ˙ Muhammad invested a lot of effort and money in order to purchase good-looking ˙ mamluks. We may count about a dozen mamluks who received an amirate of one hundred in a young age, only because of their beauty.73 Handsomeness played a significant role also in the promotion of mamluks who had belonged to Mansu¯rı¯ amirs. Al-Na¯sir Muhammad took into his service a ˙ ˙ ˙ ¯ s’s mamluks group of Baha¯dur A after the latter’s death and put them in the ˙ 67 This issue was discussed in depth by Amalia Levanoni. See especially: Levanoni, Turning Point, 28–80, and below. 68 See p. 188 above; Levanoni, Turning Point, 44. 69 Levanoni, Turning Point, 49; Van Steenbergen, Order, 21, n. 14. 70 Muqaffa¯, 2:346. 71 Levanoni, Turning Point, 40–52. 72 Levanoni, Turning Point, 37–39. 73 Levanoni, Turning Point, 38–39, 34. See, for instance: Sulu¯k, 2:635; Aʿya¯n, 5:446; Durar (Hyderabad), 4:358; Van Steenbergen, “Mamluk Elite”, 179; Levanoni, Turning Point, 40–41. The promotion of non-mamluk elements was also influenced by their appearance, see for example the case of the na¯zir al-kha¯ss known as al-Nashw: Nuju¯m, 9:143, 323–324. ˙ ˙˙

216

The Mansu¯riyya during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

prestigious silahda¯riyya unit “because of their excellent figures and beauty”.74 ˙ Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯ is an instructive example of the importance of physical beauty for promotion. Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ explicitly points this out by noting that despite the fact that Baktamur was manumitted and received an amirate from Baybars alJa¯shnakı¯r, he was elevated to a high position by al-Na¯sir Muhammad because of ˙ ˙ his good looks.75 It seems that the handsomeness of Tankiz, who was originally La¯jı¯n’s mamluk, contributed much to his promotion until he became the virtually undisputed ruler of Syria for almost thirty years.76 Tankiz himself adopted al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s patterns of promotion. The ˙ ˙ mamluks and descendants of the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs may constitute a good case ˙ ¯ dilı¯, who was a mamluk of Kitstudy for this development. Uljaybugha¯ al-ʿA bugha¯, became one of the amirs of one hundred in Damascus after he managed to create a close relationship with Tankiz.77 Similarily, Arghu¯n, a mamluk of Baha¯dur Samiz, was appointed by Tankiz as shadd al-zakka¯t (overseer of the spice traders) and shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Damascus and as the governor of Baalbek after he managed to endear himself to Tankiz.78 ʿAlı¯ b. Qara¯sunqur gained a high position in Damascus and served as amir of hundred due to the “love” that Tankiz felt toward him. ʿAlı¯’s son, Muhammad, received an amirate as well.79 These ˙ haphazard promotions were not reserved only for mamluks or awla¯d al-na¯s. A local musician named Ibra¯hı¯m received an amirate and an iqta¯ʿ, since Tankiz ˙ “loved” him.80 As we saw, the introduction of local civilians to the Mamluk military elite was an innovation of the Mansu¯riyya period. ˙ The “love” that Tankiz felt for the mamluks he promoted resulted from to their physical appearance. Indeed, the mamluks connected to Tankiz who were exceptionally good- looking were promoted and became amirs. Al-Safadı¯ men˙ tions, for example, that Tankiz loved and desired Khalı¯l, the son of Aytamish al81 Muhammadı¯, but he restrained himself and only looked at him. The same ˙ statement is made regarding ʿAlı¯, the son of Aruqta¯y al-Ha¯jj. Tankiz’s love and ˙ ˙ desire for ʿAlı¯ and his beautiful brother Ibra¯hı¯m caused him to confer an amirate of tablkha¯na¯h upon ʿAlı¯, and an amirate of ten upon his brother.82 Another amir ˙ who was promoted by Tankiz was Khalı¯fa b. ʿAlı¯ Sha¯h, the son of the ¯Ilkha¯nid wazir. Tankiz liked his appearance and made sure that he would stay in Damascus 74 75 76 77 78 79 80 81 82

Aʿya¯n, 2:56. Nuju¯m, 9:300. Nuju¯m, 9:152. Aʿya¯n, 1:598–599; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:406. Aʿya¯n, 1:462–463. Aʿya¯n, 3:473–474; Durar (Cairo), 3:169; Sulu¯k, 2:754. Aʿya¯n, 1:81–82. Aʿya¯n, 2:337. Aʿya¯n, 3:282–283.

Summary and conclusions

217

as an amir.83 Al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s and Tankiz’s patterns of promotion were ˙ ˙ adopted, it seems, by other amirs in this period. Baha¯dur al-Muʿizzı¯, for instance, who was a mamluk of La¯jı¯n and moved to al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s service, used to ˙ ˙ purchase only handsome mamluks and to give them material and monetary 84 gifts. It is clear, thus, that in al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign the significance of ˙ ˙ the non-objective and non-Mamluk criteria for promotion increased drastically, as a continuation of the situation in the Mansu¯riyya period. The peace that ˙ prevailed during most of this period, definitely contributed to this trend by reducing the importance of purely militaristic factors, such as furu¯siyya qualifications and bravery.

83 Aʿya¯n, 2:325. 84 Wa¯fı¯, 10:299.

Conclusions

The Mansu¯riyya period, which began with the death of sultan Qala¯wu¯n, was filled ˙ with endless power struggles among the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs over effective political ˙ power. The amirs’ continuous efforts that aimed to enlarge the circle of their supporters soon brought about crucial consequences, in which the usta¯dhs’s authority over their mamluks was eroded and resulted in cases of treachery between mamluks and their masters. Similarly, a sharp escalation in the tense relations among khushda¯shs developed and frequent incidents of severe violence between the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs are evident, alongside lack of solidarity among other ˙ khushda¯shiyyas. These rapid and decisive developments in the basic principles of solidarity in Mamluk politics brought about an increase in the significance of various kinds of personal relations in the political game, which were not necessarily usta¯dhmamluk or khushda¯sh-khushda¯sh relations and which resulted in changes in the patterns of promotion. Alongside mamluks, non-mamluk and non-military elements, such as wa¯fidiyya members, awla¯d al-na¯s, family members, in-laws and local civilians, were introduced to the Mamluk elite and promoted in the militarypolitical hierarchy. These promotions were often too quick, based on a short and haphazard acquaintance between patron and client. Subsequently, the criteria for promotion in the Mansu¯riyya period became less objective, in sharp contrast to ˙ the periods of al-Za¯hir Baybars and al-Mansu¯r Qala¯wu¯n, in which mamluks were ˙ ˙ promoted, first and foremost, according to their seniority, experience, and military skills. The changes in the military-political principles during the Mansu¯riyya period ˙ were witnessed by the young al-Na¯sir Muhammad. His somewhat puzzling po˙ ˙ litical conduct and especially his attitude toward the Mansu¯riyya amirs and their ˙ associates can be explained by these new developments. Surprisingly enough, the Mansu¯riyya was far from being wiped out during the third and longest reign of ˙ this sultan. Despite the arrests and executions of prominent Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, ˙ many other Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, their mamluks and their descendants, continued to ˙ play a significant role in Mamluk politics during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third ˙ ˙

220

Conclusions

reign and after. The fall of the Mansu¯riyya was a long and gradual process. The ˙ reason for al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s reliance on Mansu¯rı¯ amirs derived from the ˙ ˙ ˙ fact that he attributed less importance to the loyalty of his own mamluks, or, correspondingly, to the enmity of the Mansu¯riyya amirs, as a result of the ˙ changes that had occurred in the Mansu¯riyya period. A threat to his rule might ˙ come from any political actor or coalition, regardless of affiliation to a certain khushda¯shi group. Thus, during his reign the new practices that were introduced into Mamluk politics during the Mansu¯riyya period played more significant role ˙ and constituted the main basis for his regime. Al-Na¯sir Muhammad, as well as ˙ ˙ other amirs, based their position increasingly on marriage ties, the giving of material grants or positions, and rapid promotions of mamluk and non-mamluk elements based on short-term relations and subjective criteria. These political dynamics, alongside frequent arrests and executions (and, it should be noted, a large dose of luck), allowed al-Na¯sir Muhammad to keep his throne for so long. ˙ ˙ An overall perspective of the Mamluk period, hence, indicates the Mansu¯riyya ˙ period as the beginning of a process usually thought to begin during al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad’s third reign and termed by scholars the politicization, demilitar˙ isation or de-mamlukization of the Mamluk sultanate.1 During the majority of the Mansu¯riyya period, the political system that effectively ruled the sultanate ˙ was the Mansu¯riyya amirs, as opposed to the “official” system, i. e. the sultanate, ˙ which had no real authority. This situation brought about the exceeding of executive authority by the Mansu¯riyya amirs, who conferred amirates upon their ˙ supporters above and beyond the accepted limit and took upon themselves responsibilities that exceeded the insititutionalized limits of their offices. The equal division of authority between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r, who theoretically served as the ustada¯r and the viceroy of the sultan respectively, is an instructive expression of this phenomenon. Manku¯tamur’s unrestricted power as vice-sultan; Aqqu¯sh al-Afram’s management of Egyptian affairs, while he was the governor of Damascus; and Balaba¯n al-Ju¯kanda¯r’s acting as the governor of Damascus while officially holding the office of shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n, are other instances. The process of politicization and demilitarization of the Mamluk sultanate only continued, though more intensively, during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third ˙ ˙ reign, despite the existence of sultanic authority. This was due to the external peace in the sultanate and the changes in the basic principles of the Mamluk system that were adopted and fostered by al-Na¯sir Muhammad. From al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ ˙ Muhammad’s death until the end of the first Mamluk period, the politicization ˙ would escalate even more, due to the lack of powerful sultanic authority, the continuous struggles of the amirs and the external peace. 1 See: Van Steenbergen, Order, esp. 6–8, 20–23; Northrup, “The Bahrı¯ Mamluk Sultanate”, 262; ˙ Levanoni, Turning Point, 28–80.

Conclusions

221

It seems, hence, that one should accept Peter Thorau’s view, according to which the one and only time in the whole history of the Mamluk period in which Mamluk political rule was conducted in a settled and accepted manner was during the reigns of the first two great sultans, al-Za¯hir Baybars and al-Mansu¯r ˙ ˙ Qala¯wu¯n. This was due to the external existential threats to the Islamic Mamluk sultanate, which necessitated unification among the ranks of the Mamluks.2 During that period, a Heerkönig (sultan and supreme military commander) stood at the head of the Mamluk sultanate, and he was the one who lead the system according to hierarchical principles and to objective and militaristic criteria for promotion. This period also suits David Ayalon’s model of the Mamluk military institution ideally. After this period, these basic principles began to erode. However, they definitely did not disappear. In order to scrutinize the process of Mamluk politicization more precisely, a more comprehensive study is needed, that would trace the changes in Mamluk military-political principles through the entire first Mamluk period and after.

2 Peter Thorau, “Einige Kritische Bemerkungen zum Sogenannten ‘Mamlu¯k phenomenon’”, in Die Mamlu¯ken: Studien zu ihrer Geschichte und Kultur. Zum Gedenken an Ulrich Haarmann (1942–1999), eds. Stephan Conermann and Anja Pistor-Hatam (Hamburg: EB-Verlag, 2003), 367–378.

Appendices

Appendix 1: The names of the Mansu¯riyya amirs1 ˙

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

ʿAbdalla¯h al-Silahda¯r – Badr al-Dı¯n ˙ ʿAlaq – ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Aldukuz amı¯r akhu¯r Aldukuz al-Silahda¯r (al-Ashrafı¯) (718/1318). Burjı¯2 ˙ Alladaq (or: Aldiq) al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ – Sayf al-Dı¯n ¯ lmalik al-Ha¯jj (747/1346–7) A ˙ Altabars al-Majnu¯n – ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n al-Majnu¯n (708/1308) 3 ˙ Altunbugha¯ al-Jamda¯r (693/1293) ˙ Altunbugha¯ al-Sa¯lih¯ı al-Na¯sirı¯ (742/1342) (Na¯sirı¯) ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Anas al-Jamda¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ (702/1303) ˙ ˙ Arghu¯n al-Dawa¯da¯r al-Na¯sirı¯ (731/1331) (Na¯sirı¯) ˙ ˙ Aruqta¯y al-Ha¯jj al-Mansu¯rı¯ (750/1349) (Na¯sirı¯) ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Asandamur Kurjı¯ (711/1312) Aqbugha¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (690/1291) ˙ Aqjuba¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (710/1310) ¯ qsunqur Kirta¯˙y (698/1298) 4 A ¯ qsunqur al-Sala¯rı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (744/1343–4) (Sala¯rı¯) A ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Afram (716/1316, or 720/1320). Burjı¯5

1 Death year is mentioned in parentheses; affiliation to the Burjiyya or, in several cases to the Mansu¯riyya, is mentioned in footnote; biographical details that are not discussed in the work ˙ are mentioned in footnotes as well; amirs who originally belonged to Qala¯wu¯n but were considered as mamluks of other masters are included in the list as well. 2 Aldukuz al-Silahda¯r is mentioned in the company of the Burjı¯ amirs who were the supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯˙shnakı¯r. He was imprisoned during Kitbugha¯’s reign and released together with the Burjı¯ amirs (Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:229; Sulu¯k, 1:826). He is probably identical to Aldukuz alAshrafı¯ (Sulu¯k, 2:180; Kanz, 9:243). 3 Nuju¯m, 8:230; Sulu¯k, 2:51; Zubda, 408–409; Manhal, 9:359; Muqaffa¯, 2:282–283. 4 This amir is usually mentioned in the sources as Kirta¯y (sometimes written as: Kirta¯yh) only. 5 Aʿya¯n, 1:561.

224 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42. 43. 44. 45. 46. 47. 48. 49.

Appendices

Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ (736/1335) Aqqu¯sh Barna¯q Aqqu¯sh Kurjı¯ al-Matru¯h¯ı (699/1299–1300). Burjı¯6 ˙ ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Mansu¯rı¯ (727/1327) ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ (Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ) (710/1310) ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ al-Ha¯jib (Numayla) (693/1293) ˙ ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Rahbı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (719/1319) ˙ ˙ Aslam al-Qibja¯qı¯ (747/1347) (Sala¯rı¯) ˙ Aslam al-Radda¯dı¯ (706/1307) 7 ˙ Aybak al-Ata¯bakı¯ al-Mushrif Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (722/1322). Burjı¯8 ˙ Aybak al-Khaznada¯r (709/1310) 9 Aybak al-Mawsilı¯ (698/1298) ˙ Aybak al-Ru¯mı¯ al-Silahda¯r (after 713/1313). Burjı¯10 ˙ Aybak al-Tawı¯l (706/1306) ˙ Aybak al-Ustada¯r (702/1303) Aydamur al-Jana¯h¯ı (698/1298) ˙ Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯ (737/1337). Burjı¯11 ˙ Aydamur al-Rafa¯ (702/1303) Aydamur al-Shuja¯ʿı¯. Burjı¯12 Aydamur al-Yu¯nusı¯ (after 735/1335). Burjı¯13 Aydamur al-Zaradka¯sh (after 712/1312) Aydughdı¯ al-Sa¯qı¯ Aytamish al-Muhammadı¯ (736/1336) (Na¯sirı¯) ˙ ˙ ¯ s (730/1329) Baha¯dur A ˙ Baha¯dur al-ʿAjamı¯ (696/1297) Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj (710/1310) ˙ Baha¯dur Raʾs Nawba (693/1293) Baha¯dur Samiz (704/1304) Baha¯dur al-Sanjarı¯ (733/1333). Burjı¯14 Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (728/1328). Burjı¯15 ˙

6 Muqaffa¯, 2:234. 7 Aslam al-Radda¯dı¯ was educated by Qala¯wu¯n. He held several offices as an amir in Egypt ˙ (Manhal, 2:455; Nuju¯m, 8:225). 8 Nuju¯m, 8:140. 9 See p. 244 below. 10 Aybak al-Ru¯mı¯ is mentioned as khushda¯sh of the Burjı¯ Baybars al-Ahmadı¯ (Sulu¯k, 2:128). ˙ 11 Sulu¯k, 2:426. 12 Zubda, 216–217. 13 Sulu¯k, 2:286. 14 Al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, 2:249. 15 Muqaffa¯, 2:457.

The names of the Mansu¯riyya amirs ˙

50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67. 68. 69. 70. 71. 16 17 18 19 20 21 22

23

24 25 26

225

Baktamur al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ (745/1334–5) Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r (=Baktamur amı¯r janda¯r, Baktamur al-Silahda¯r) ˙ (716/1316) Baktamur al-Silahda¯r al-Za¯hirı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (703/1303) 16 ˙ ˙ ˙ Baktu¯t al-Bahla¯q17 ˙ 18 Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h (710/1310). Burjı¯ ˙ Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯ (710/1310). Burjı¯19 Balaba¯n al-ʿAnqa¯wı¯ al-Zarra¯q al-Mansu¯rı¯ (732/1332) ˙ Balaba¯n al-Husaynı¯ (749/1348–9) ˙ Balaba¯n al-Ju¯kanda¯r (706/1307) Balaba¯n (or: Turunta¯y) al-Muhammadı¯ (745/1345) ˙ ˙ ˙ Balaba¯n al-Ru¯sı¯ Balaba¯n al-Shamsı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (745/1345) 20 ˙ Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ (700/1300) 21 ˙ Balaba¯n al-Tatarı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (725/1325) ˙ Balaba¯n Turna¯ (734/1333) 22 ˙ Bala¯t al-Ju¯kanda¯r (after 735/1335). Burjı¯23 ˙ Ba¯sit¯ı al-Mansu¯rı¯ – Sayf al-Dı¯n (695/1296) ˙ ˙ Baybars al-Ahmadı¯ (746/1345). Burjı¯24 ˙ Baybars al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ al-Ha¯jib (712/1312) 25 ˙ Baybars al-ʿAlamı¯ (after 735/1335). Burjı¯26 Baybars al-Awhadı¯ (740/1339) ˙ Baybars al-Baha¯durnı¯ Durar (Hyderabad), 1:483; Manhal, 3:402. See chapter one, n. 169. Nuju¯m, 8:260–261, 271. Nuju¯m, 10:237. He is not identical to Balaba¯n al-Shamsı¯ who was an older senior amir (see on him: Zubda, 65, 240). Zubda, 350. He is not mentioned explicitly as a Mansu¯rı¯, but he is mentioned together with the Mansu¯˙ riyya amirs in political and military events and in the arrests of al-Na¯sir Muhammad.˙ In ˙ together contrast to all other sources, al-Maqrı¯zı¯ mentions that Balaba¯n Turna¯ was˙ executed ˙ with Mansu¯rı¯ amirs in 716/1316 (Sulu¯k, 2:168). ˙ Bala¯t is mentioned in the company of the Burjı¯ amirs who were the supporters of Baybars al˙ ¯r. Another amir named Bala¯t was among the supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, but Ja¯hsnakı ˙ was not imprisoned by al-Na¯sir Muhammad but was is not noted explicitly as a Mansu¯rı¯. He ˙ (Aʿya¯n, 2:41; moved from Cairo to Damascus˙ and later to Tripoli, where he died in˙ 718/1318 Durar [Hyderabad], 1:491). Sulu¯k, 2:698. He is not mentioned explicitly as a Mansu¯rı¯ but he is mentioned together with the Mansu¯riyya ˙ 712/ amirs in political and military events and˙ was arrested with them in the wave of arrests of 1312. Sulu¯k, 2:84.

226 72. 73. 74. 75. 76. 77. 78. 79. 80. 81. 82. 83. 84. 85. 86. 87. 88. 89. 90. 91. 92. 93. 94. 95. 96. 97. 98. 99. 100. 101. 27 28 29 30 31

Appendices

Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r (709/1310). Burjı¯27 Baybars al-Majnu¯n (al-Sharafı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯) (715–6/1315–7) ˙ Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ (al-Dawa¯da¯r al-Khita¯ʾı¯) (725/1325) ˙ ˙ Baybars al-Muwaffaqı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (704/1304) ˙ 28 Baybars al-Shuja¯ʿı¯. Burjı¯ Baybars al-Ta¯jı¯ (712/1312 or after). Burjı¯29 Baydara¯ (693/1293) Baynaja¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ (716/1316) ˙ Ba¯zı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯30 ˙ Bakta¯sh al-Manku¯rsı¯ (757/1356) Bakta¯sh al-Zaradka¯sh al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ Bı¯lı¯k al-Shihna ˙ Bı¯lı¯k (or: Bakta¯sh) al-Tayya¯r (or: al-Tayya¯rı¯) (699/1299) ˙ ˙ Bı¯lı¯k al-ʿUthma¯nı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯ (710/1310). Burjı¯31 Butkha¯s al-Aqraʿı¯ ˙ Butkha¯s al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ Butkha¯s al-Mansu¯rı¯ (711/1312). Burjı¯32 ˙ ˙ Bu¯zla¯r (or: Buzla¯r) al-Mansu¯rı¯ (698/1299) ˙ Al-Fa¯khir – Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ al-Tawa¯shı¯ (eunuch) (707/1307) ˙ ˙ Ja¯warshı¯ (697/1298) Ju¯ba¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ (728/1327) ˙ Al-Isbaha¯nı¯ – ʿAlam al-Dı¯n ˙ Al-Jaladkı¯ – ʿIzz al-Dı¯n Kabak al-Aqraʿı¯ Kaharda¯sh al-Zarra¯q al-Mansu¯rı¯ (714/1314). (Burji?) ˙ Kashkal Kashlı¯ – Sayf al-Dı¯n (after 735/1335) Kashtaghdı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ Ka¯wazka¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (706/1307) 33 ˙

Aʿya¯n, 2:71–72. Zubda, 216–217. Sulu¯k, 1:918. This amir is mentioned as Ta¯zı¯ by al-ʿAynı¯ (ʿIqd, 2:228). This name is mentioned in different variations such as Bulrughay, Bulghuray, Burlughay or Burghulay. Two amirs named Burlughay. Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯ and Burlughay al-Saghı¯r, are mentioned as supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and each one was married to ˙one of his daughters. However, Burlughay al-Saghı¯r b. Tu¯ma¯n was not a Mansu¯rı¯ but a wa¯fidı¯ who ˙ ˙ arrived in Cairo in 704/1304 (Nuju¯m,˙ 10:236; Kanz, 9:393; Sulu¯k, 2:378). 32 Aʿya¯n, 1:678. 33 Aʿya¯n, 4:143. This name appears as Ka¯warka¯ in Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ and al-ʿAynı¯’s chronicles. However, they seem to refer to the Mansu¯rı¯ amir Ka¯wazka¯. ˙ ˙

The names of the Mansu¯riyya amirs ˙

102. 103. 104. 105. 106. 107. 108. 109. 110. 111. 112. 113. 114. 115. 116. 117. 118. 119. 120. 121. 122. 123. 124. 125. 126. 127.

227

Kı¯kaldı¯ al-Shihna – Badr al-Dı¯n ˙ Kira¯y al-Mansu¯rı¯ (719/1319) ˙ ¯ dil) (702/1303) Kitbugha¯ (sultan al-Malik al-ʿA ¯ Kitbugha¯ Raʾs Nawba (al-ʿAdilı¯) al-Mansu¯rı¯ (721/1321) 34 ˙ Kujkun al-Mansu¯rı¯ (749/1349) ˙ Al-Ku¯kandı¯ (or: al-Karkand) al-Zarra¯q – ʿIzz al-Dı¯n35 Ku¯ka¯y al-Silahda¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ (749/1349) ˙ ˙ Kundughdı¯ al-Zarra¯q al-Mansu¯rı¯ (745/1345) ˙ Al-Ku¯ra¯nı¯ – ʿIzz al-Dı¯n Kurt (or: Kurd) al-Ha¯jib al-Mansu¯rı¯ (699/1299) ˙ ˙ La¯jı¯n al-Kabı¯r (ca. 680/1281) La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯ (or: Husa¯m al-Dı¯n al-Ustada¯r, La¯jı¯n al-Silahda¯r al-Ru¯mı¯) ˙ ˙ (702/1303) La¯jı¯n al-Silahda¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ (sultan al-Malik al-Mansu¯r) (698/1299) ˙ ˙ ˙ La¯jı¯n Zı¯rba¯j al-ʿUmarı¯ al-Ja¯shnakı¯r (731/1330). Burjı¯36 37 Al-Luqma¯nı¯ – Sayf al-Dı¯n. Burjı¯ Mankubars (or: Baybars) al-Mansu¯rı¯ (718/1318) 38 ˙ Manku¯rs – ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Muba¯rak al-Mansu¯rı¯ – Zayn al-Dı¯n (717/1317) 39 ˙ Mughulta¯y al-Baʿlı¯ (after 720/1320). Burjı¯40 ˙ Mughulta¯y al-Masʿu¯dı¯ (732/1332). Burjı¯41 ˙ Mughulta¯y al-Taqwı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (701/1301) 42 ˙ ˙ Mukhta¯r – Zahı¯r al-Dı¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ (known as al-Bilbı¯sı¯ al-Bakansı¯ al˙ ˙ Tawa¯shı¯ (eunuch) (716/1316) 43 ˙ Murshid al-Khaznada¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ al-Tawa¯shı¯ (eunuch) – Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n ˙ ˙ (710/1311) Al-Naqı¯b – ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Nu¯gha¯y al-Jamda¯r al-Qibjaqı¯ (710/1310) Nukba¯y al-Barı¯dı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (749/1349) ˙

¯ dilı¯, since the same biographical 34 Kitbugha¯ Raʾs Nawba is probably identical to Kitbugha¯ al-ʿA details are mentioned concerning both men, though Ibn Hajar cites them as two different ˙ amirs, see: Durar (Hyderabad), 3:264. 35 Nuju¯m, 8:246; Sulu¯k, 2:57. 36 La¯jı¯n Zı¯rba¯j is mentioned together with the Burjı¯ supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r (Nuju¯m, 8:233). 37 Kanz, 8:353; ʿIqd, 3:243; Sulu¯k, 1:826. 38 He is mentioned as the governor of ʿAjlu¯n (Sulu¯k, 2:189; Nuju¯m, 9:243). 39 Aʿya¯n, 4:190; Durar (Cairo), 3:362. 40 Durar (Hyderabad), 4:355. 41 Sulu¯k, 2:54. 42 One of the amirs in Damascus (Sulu¯k, 1: 9 23, 927; Niha¯ya, 32:16). 43 Sulu¯k, 2:169; Nuju¯m, 9:237; Niha¯ya, 32:244; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:63.

228 128. 129. 130. 131. 132. 133. 134. 135. 136. 137. 138. 139. 140. 141. 142. 143. 144. 145. 146. 147. 148. 149. 150. 151. 152. 153. 154.

Appendices

Qalı¯j al-Malakı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯44 ˙ Qara¯la¯jı¯n al-Ustada¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ (715/1315) ˙ Qara¯rsala¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ – Sayf al-Dı¯n /Baha¯ʾ al-Dı¯n (698/1299) 45 ˙ Qara¯sunqur al-Ju¯kanda¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ (728/1328 or 741/1341) ˙ Qibjaq (710/1310) Qijma¯s (Bashsha¯sh) al-Ju¯kanda¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ (734/1334). Burjı¯46 ˙ Qijqa¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ (686/1287) ˙ Qullı¯ al-Silahda¯r (717/1317). Burjı¯ ˙ Qutlu¯bak al-Kabı¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ (716/1316) ˙ ˙ Qutuz al-Mansu¯rı¯ (690/1291) ˙ ˙ Sala¯r al-Tatarı¯ al-Sa¯lih¯ı al-Mansu¯rı¯ (710/1310) ˙ ˙ ˙ Sanjar Arjuwa¯sh al-Mansu¯rı¯ (701/1302) 47 ˙ Sanjar amı¯r akhu¯r Sanjar al-Barwa¯nı¯ (731/1331). Burjı¯ (?) 48 Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ (745/1345) Sanjar al-Jumaqda¯r (al-Bashmaqda¯r) (745/1345). Burjı¯49 Sanjar al-Kha¯zin al-Saru¯rı¯ al-Ashrafı¯ (735/1335) Sanjar al-Mansu¯rı¯ al-Muqrı¯ (707/1307) 50 ˙ Sanjar al-Misrı¯ ˙ Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ (693/1294) Sa¯tilmish al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ Al-Sayrafı¯ – Rukn al-Dı¯n ˙ (Aydamur?) al-Shaykhı¯ – Sayf al-Dı¯n. Burjı¯51 Sunqur al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯. Burjı¯52 Sunqur al-Aʿsar (709/1309) 53 Sunqur Jarkas Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯ al-Ha¯jib (718/1318) 54 ˙

44 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:95–96. 45 Aʿya¯n, 4:87; Sulu¯k, 1:774, 881; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:128. 46 This name is mentioned in different variations (Qijma¯s, Qijma¯z, Qijma¯r, Qijqa¯r, Qima¯r, Bija¯s or Qihma¯sh). See: Sulu¯k, 2:144, 371, 377; Nuju¯m, 9:41; al-Jazarı¯, 3:750. 47 Sulu¯k,˙ 1:924; Nuju¯m, 8:199; Aʿya¯n, 2:466. 48 Sanjar al-Barwa¯nı¯ is mentioned among the supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and the amirs who were arrested in 712/1312. 49 Sulu¯k, 2:193; Nuju¯m, 9:57. 50 Sanjar al-Muqrı¯ was one of the amirs in Tripoli (Aʿya¯n, 2:473; Durar [Hyderabad], 2:173). 51 Sulu¯k, 2:53. This amir might be identical to Aydamur al-Shaykhı¯ who was released in 720/1320 (Sulu¯k, 2:202). 52 ʿIqd, 4:230. 53 Nuju¯m, 8:278; Sulu¯k, 2:84. 54 Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯ is not mentioned explicitly as a Mansu¯rı¯ amir, but he had ukhu¯wwa ˙ associate of Kira¯y al-Mansu¯rı¯ relations with the Mansu¯rı¯ Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯. He was also a close ˙ ˙ (Durar [Cairo], 3:353).

The names of the Mansu¯riyya amirs ˙

155. 156. 157. 158. 159. 160. 161. 162. 163. 164. 165. 166. 167. 168. 169. 170.

229

Sunqur al-Silahda¯r ˙ Sunqur al-Tawı¯l al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ Sunqursha¯h al-Mansu¯rı¯ (d. 707/1307) 55 ˙ Ta¯ja¯r – Sayf al-Dı¯n ˙ Ta¯kiz (or: Balaba¯n) al-Tughrı¯lı¯ (after 709/1310). Burjı¯56 ˙ Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯ (743/1343) 57 Taqsu¯ ˙ ˙ Tashtamur al-Jumaqda¯r (711/1311). Burjı¯58 ˙ Taybugha¯ al-Ru¯sı¯ ˙ Taybars – ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n ˙ Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ (724/1324) ˙ ˙ Tughjı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (738/1338). Burjı¯59 ˙ ˙ Tughrı¯l al-I¯gha¯nı¯ al-Silahda¯r (709/1310). Burjı¯ (?) 60 ˙ ˙ Tughrı¯l al-Mushrif ˙ Turunta¯y al-Mansu¯rı¯ (689/1290) ˙ ˙ ˙ Uzdamur al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ (696/1297) 61

Amirs who might have belonged to the Mansu¯riyya ˙ 1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Aya¯z – Fakhr al-Dı¯n62 Baktu¯t al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ (716/1316) 63 Balaba¯n al-Badrı¯ (727/1327) 64 Baybars ʿAbdalla¯h (Burjı¯?) 65 Baybars al-Ha¯jib al-Mansu¯rı¯ (or: al-Na¯sirı¯) (743/1343) 66 ˙ ˙ ˙

55 He is not identical to Sunqursha¯h al-Za¯hirı¯ who died in 711/1311 (See: Aʿya¯n, 2:483). ˙ 56 This name is mentioned in different variations, such as Ta¯kiz, Daba¯ku¯z, Tana¯kur, Taba¯kur, Bata¯kuz (Niha¯ya, 32:155) or Ba¯kı¯r (Nuju¯m, 9:13). This amir is mentioned also by the name Balaba¯n al-Tughrı¯lı¯ (Nuju¯m, 8:168, n. 4). He was one of the zealous supporters of Baybars al˙ Nuju¯m, 8:271; Sulu¯k, 2:71; Muqaffa¯, 2:552; Tuhfa, 200. Ja¯shnakı¯r. See: ˙ 57 See chapter one, n. 171. 58 Sulu¯k, 2:193. 59 Nuju¯m, 9:317. 60 Nuju¯m, 8:279; Sulu¯k, 2:84. Tughrı¯l is mentioned together with the Burjı¯ amirs who were among the supporters of Baybars˙al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. 61 Niha¯ya, 31:327. 62 Aya¯z, the governor of Qalʿat al-Ru¯m, was arrested by al-Na¯sir Muhammad in 710/1310 and ˙ ˙ was released in 727/1327 (Sulu¯k, 2:87, 183, 286). 63 Baktu¯t al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ was executed together with Mansu¯rı¯ amirs in 716/1316 (Sulu¯k, 2:168). ˙ the Mansu¯riyya period. Al-Maqrı¯zı¯, ho64 Balaba¯n al-Badrı¯ was an amir of one hundred during ˙ ammad (Muqaffa¯, 2:487–488). wever, mentions that he was one of the mamluks of al-Na¯sir Muh ˙ ¯r who were arrested by al˙ 65 Baybars ʿAbdalla¯h was one of the supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı Na¯sir Muhammad in 709/1310 (Sulu¯k, 2:76). 66 Ibn˙ Taghrı¯˙ Birdı¯ mentions in the Manhal that this amir was among the mamluks of Qala¯wu¯n

230 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11.

Appendices

Ikba¯r (Burjı¯?) 67 Mughulta¯y al-Sı¯wa¯sı¯ (Burjı¯?) 68 ˙ Qirta¯y al-Mansu¯rı¯ (or: al-Ashrafı¯) – Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n (734/1334) 69 ˙ ˙ Qutlu¯bak al-Shaykhı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (712/1312) 70 ˙ ˙ Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯ al-Saghı¯r71 ˙ Tashtamur, the brother of Butkha¯s al-Mansu¯rı¯ (Burjı¯?) 72 ˙ ˙ ˙

Appendix 2: The Mansu¯riyya amirs who died up to 710/131073 ˙

1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16.

67 68 69 70 71 72 73

Qijqa¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ (686/1287) ˙ Turunta¯y (689/1290, I) ˙ ˙ Qutuz al-Mansu¯rı¯ (690/1291) ˙ ˙ Aqbugha¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (690/1291, E) ˙ Baydara¯ (693/1293, I) Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ al-Ha¯jib (693/1293, I) ˙ ˙ Altunbugha¯ al-Jamda¯r (693/1293, I) ˙ Baha¯dur Raʾs Nawba (693/1293, I) Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ (693/1294, I) Ba¯sit¯ı (695/1296) ˙ Uzdamur al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ (696/1297) Baha¯dur al-ʿAjamı¯ (696/1297) Aybak al-Mawsilı¯ (698/1298) ˙ Aydamur al-Jana¯h¯ı (698/1298) ¯ qsunqur Kirta¯y ˙(698/1298) A La¯jı¯n (698/1298, I)

(Manhal, 3:475). In the Nuju¯m, however, the same author refers to this amir as al-Na¯sirı¯ and ˙ ¯ nı¯ mentions that his master is al-Na¯sir Muhammad (Nuju¯m, 10:100–101). Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala ˙ ˙ ˙ refers to this amir as al-Ahmadı¯ (Durar [Cairo], 2:41). Ikba¯r is mentioned among˙ the amirs who received amirates from Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and among his supporters who were arrested by al-Na¯sir Muhammad in 709/1310 (Sulu¯k, 2:70, 76). ˙ Mughulta¯y was arrested in 709/1310 together with˙ the supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and ˙ was released in 720/1320 with Burjı¯ amirs (Sulu¯k, 2:76, 202). Sulu¯k, 1:666; Aʿya¯n, 1:101; al-Wa¯fı¯, 24:266. Only al-Nuwayrı¯ attributed the laqab al-Mansu¯rı¯ to him. He was among the tablkha¯na¯h amirs ˙ ʿUmar b. al-Shaykh Ja¯h (Ibn ˙ Kathı¯r, 14:68; in Damascus. His nisba refers to the shaykh Niha¯ya, 32:202; Nuju¯m, 9:224). He was arrested in 709/1310 together with the supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and was released in 720/1320 with Burjı¯ amirs (Sulu¯k, 2:67, 202). He might be affiliated to the Burjı¯yya, since he was released together with Burjı¯ amirs in 735/ 1335 and received an amirate in Damascus (Sulu¯k, 2:378). The amirs in this list were not killed by al-Na¯sir Muhammad. The letter E indicates death as a ˙ letter I indicates death as a result of ˙ result of military clashes with external enemies; the internal violent conflicts.

Office holders during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign and the Mansu¯riyya period ˙

17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30. 31. 32. 33. 34. 35. 36. 37. 38. 39. 40. 41. 42.

231

Qara¯rsala¯n (698/1299) Bu¯zla¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ (698/1299, I) ˙ Aqqu¯sh Kurjı¯ al-Matru¯h¯ı (699/1299, E) ˙ ˙ Bı¯lı¯k al-Tayya¯r (699/1299, E) ˙ Kurt (699/1299, E) Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ (700/1300) ˙ Mughulta¯y al-Taqwı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (701/1301) ˙ ˙ Sanjar Arjuwa¯sh (701/1302) Kitbugha¯ (702/1303) Anas al-Jamda¯r (702/1303, E) ˙ Aybak al-Ustada¯r (702/1303, E) Aydamur al-Rafa¯ (702/1303, E) La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯ (702/1303, E) Baktamur al-Silahda¯r al-Za¯hirı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (703/1303) ˙ ˙ ˙ Baha¯dur Samiz (704/1304, E) Baybars al-Muwaffaqı¯ (704/1304, I) Aybak al-Tawı¯l (706/1306) ˙ Balaba¯n al-Ju¯kanda¯r (706/1307) Ka¯wazka¯ (706/1307) Sanjar al-Muqrı¯ (707/1307) Sunqursha¯h al-Mansu¯rı¯ (707/1307) ˙ Al-Fa¯khir (eunuch) (707/1307) Altubars (708/1308) ˙ Sunqur al-Aʿsar (709/1309) Tughrı¯l al-I¯gha¯nı¯ (709/1310) ˙ Aybak al-Khaznada¯r (709/1310)

Appendix 3: Office holders during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign and the Mansu¯riyya period74 ˙ Sultans 678/1279–689/1290: al-Mansu¯r Qala¯wu¯n ˙ 689/1290–693/1293: al-Ashraf Khalı¯l

74 The reconstruction of the officeholders is based on the details mentioned in the Arabic literary sources. Sometimes the different sources contradict each other regarding a certain individual and the office he held. In these cases I based myself on the details that most of the sources agree upon. Estimated years are indicated by a question mark. The names of Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ amirs are written in bold. Mamluks of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs are written in italic and bold. ˙

232

Appendices

693/1293–694/1294: al-Na¯sir Muhammad b. Qala¯wu¯n (de facto: Kitbugha¯ and the ˙ ˙ Mansu¯rı¯yya) ˙ 694/1294–696/1296: Kitbugha¯ 696/1296–698/1299: La¯jı¯n 698/1299–708/1309: al-Na¯sir Muhammad b. Qala¯wu¯n (de facto: Baybars al˙ ˙ Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r) 708/1309–709/1310: Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r The viceroy of the sultan in Egypt (Na¯ʾib al-saltana) ˙ 678/1280–689/1290: Turunta¯y ˙ ˙ 689/1290–693/1293: Baydara¯ 693/1293–694/1294: Kitbugha¯ 694/1294–696/1296: La¯jı¯n 696/1297: Qara¯sunqur 696/1297–698/1299: Manku¯tamur (mamluk of La¯jı¯n) 698/1299–709/1309: Sala¯r Ustada¯r in Egypt circa 681/1281–687/1288: Baydara¯ 687/1288(?) – 690/1290: Aybak al-Mawsilı¯ ˙ 691/1292–693/1294: Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ 693/1294: Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r 694/1294–696/1296: Butkha¯s al-Zaynı¯ (mamluk of Kitbugha¯) ˙ 696/1296–698/1299: Sala¯r 698/1299–708/1309: Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r Ata¯bak al-ʿasa¯kir 678/1280–689/1290(?): Turunta¯y ˙ ˙ 689/1290–693/1293: Baydara¯ 693/1293–702/1303: La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯ The chief ha¯jib75 (Ha¯jib al-hujja¯b) ˙ ˙ ˙ 678/1279(?) – 689/1289: Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ ˙ 690/1290–696/1296: Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj ˙ 696/1296–698/1299: Baha¯dur al- Ha¯jj; Aqqu¯sh al-Afram ˙ 698/1299–699/1300: Qutlu¯bak al-Kabı¯r ˙ 699/1300–711/1311: Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯

75 Between the years 690/1290–706/1307 the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs Baktamur al-Silahda¯r and Kurt were ˙ ˙ 24, 43, 57, 81, 130, 131, 134). among the ha¯jibs of the sultanate (Zetterstéen, ˙

Office holders during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign and the Mansu¯riyya period ˙

233

Wazir 678/1279–680/1281: al-Khidr al-Sinja¯rı¯; Ibra¯hı¯m b. Luqma¯n; Hamza b. Mu˙ ˙ hammad al-Asfu¯nı¯ ˙ ˙ 680/1281–687/1288: Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ 687/1288: Baydara¯; Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ 689/1290: Baydara¯ 689/1290–693/1293: Muhammad Ibn al-Salʿu¯s ˙ 693/1293–693/1294: Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ 694/1294–696/1296: Fakhr al-Dı¯n al-Khalı¯lı¯ 696/1296–696/1297: Sunqur al-Aʿsar 698/1299–701/1301: Sunqur al-Aʿsar 701/1301–703/1303(?): Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯ 703/1303–704/1305: Muhammad (Dhubya¯n) b. al-Shaykhı¯ ˙ 704/1305–706/1306: Saʿd al-Dı¯n Muhammad b. ʿAta¯ya¯ ˙ ˙ 706/1306–709/1310: Diya¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Abu¯ Bakr b. ʿAbdalla¯h al-Nisha¯ʾı¯ ˙ Shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Egypt 678/1279–689/1290(?): Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯; Zayn al-Dı¯n Ahmad al-Sawa¯bı¯ ˙ ˙ 696/1296: Sunqur al-Aʿsar 696/1296(?) – 708/1308: Aybak al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ (mamluk of Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯) 76 Amı¯r janda¯r 678/1279–690/1291: Aybak al-Khaznada¯r; Balaba¯n al-Husaynı¯; Balaba¯n Turna¯ ˙ ˙ (?) 691/1292–693/1293: Qara¯sunqur 694/1294–695/1296: Aybak al-Afram 696/1296–707/1307: Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r 707/1307–711/1311: Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h; Balaba¯n al-Muhammadı¯ ˙ ˙ Deputy of absence (Na¯ʾib al-ghayba in Egypt) 680/1280(?) – 689/1290: Kitbugha¯ 689/1290–693/1293: Aybak al-Khaznada¯r 693/1293: Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ ¯ qsunqur Kirta¯y 695/1296: A 701/1301–703/1304: Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯

76 Al-Safadı¯ believes that Aybak al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ was a mamluk of Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ (al-Wa¯fı¯, 15:478). ˙ is mentioned as shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in 704/1304 (Sulu¯k, 2:10) but it is possible that he Aybak held this office also before this year. He is also mentioned as shadd in 707/1307 (Sulu¯k, 2:33). He died in 708/1308 (Nuju¯m, 8:229; Sulu¯k, 2:51).

234

Appendices

Dawa¯da¯r 690/1291–704/1304: Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ 704/1304–707/1308: Baha¯ʿ al-Dı¯n Rasla¯n77 Amı¯r majlis 678/1279–689/1290(?): Baydara¯ circa 690/1290 – after 693/1294: Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯ … – 709/1310: Qara¯la¯jı¯n Na¯ʾib Qalʿat al-Jabal (the governor of Cairo citadel) ¯ qsunqur Kirta¯y 696/1296–698/1298(?): A The castellan of Cairo citadel (Wa¯lı¯ ba¯b Qalʿat al-Jabal) … – 689/1290: Sunqur al-Tawı¯l al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ … – 708/1308–9: Altabars al-Majnu¯n ˙ Wa¯lı¯ of Cairo … – 701/1301: Muhammad (Dhubya¯n) b. al-Shaykhı¯ ˙ 701/1310- …: Baybars al-Ta¯jı¯; Sanjar al-Kha¯zin The governor of Damascus 679/1280–690/1291: La¯jı¯n 690/1291–691/1292: Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ 691/1292–695/1296: Aybak al-Hamawı¯ (Za¯hirı¯) ˙ ˙ 695/1296: Ughurlu¯ (mamluk of Kitbugha¯) 696/1297–698/1298: Qibjaq 698/1299: Qara¯rsala¯n 698/1299–709/1310: Aqqu¯sh al-Afram78 Shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Damascus 680/1281–683/1284: Sanjar al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯ 683/1284–685/1286: Sunqur al-Aʿsa¯r 685/1286–688/1289: Fath al-Dı¯n b. Sabra ˙ ˙ 688/1289: Sunqur al-Aʿsa¯r 690/1291: Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ 690/1291–696/1296: Sunqur al-Aʿsa¯r 77 Zetterstéen, 131, 133, 134. This amir might be identical to Baha¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Arsala¯n al-Dawa¯da¯r alNa¯sirı¯ (Khitat, 2:87). Another amir, mentioned only by the name Aydamur, is said to replace ˙ ˙ ˙ u¯rı¯ (Sulu¯k, 2:8). Baybars al-Mans ˙ 78 During the few months of the Mongol occupation of Syria in 699/1299–1300, Qibjaq governed Syria on behalf of the Mongols.

Office holders during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign and the Mansu¯riyya period ˙

696/1297: Fath al-Dı¯n b. Sabra ˙ ˙ 696/1297–698/1299: Jagha¯n (mamluk of La¯jı¯n) 698/1299: Qutlu¯bak al-Kabı¯r; Aqjuba¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ 700/1300–702/1303: Balaba¯n al-Ju¯kanda¯r 703/1303–705/1305: Qı¯ra¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ (mamluk of Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯) ˙ ˙ 705/1305–707/1307(?): Baktamur al-Ha¯jib (mamluk of Turunta¯y) ˙ ˙ ˙ 707/1307–709/1310: Aqjuba¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ The governor of the citadel of Damascus 678/1279–679/1280: La¯jı¯n 679/1280–683/1284: Qijqa¯r circa 683/1284–701/1302: Sanjar Arjuwa¯sh 702/1303–703/1304: Balaba¯n al-Ju¯kanda¯r 703/1304–711/1311: Baha¯dur al-Sanjarı¯ Wa¯lı¯ of Damascus 678/1279(?) – 683/1284: Muhammad b. Aya¯z al-Hara¯nı¯ ˙ ˙ 683/1284–684/1285: Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ 684/1285 – …: ʿIzz al-Dı¯n Muhammad b. Abı¯ al-Hı¯ja¯ʾ ˙ 693/1294 – …: ʿIma¯d al-Dı¯n b. al-Nashsha¯bı¯ 707/1307–719/1319: Aqqu¯sh al-Rahbı¯ ˙ Wa¯lı¯ al-barr of Damascus 682/1283–692/1293: Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ 692/1293–695/1296: Asandamur Kurjı¯ 695/1296–698/1298: ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Ibn al-Ja¯kı¯ 698/1298–698/1299: La¯jı¯n al-Husa¯mı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (mamluk of La¯jı¯n) ˙ ˙ 702/1303–711/1312(?):La¯jı¯n al-Husa¯mı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (mamluk of La¯jı¯n) ˙ ˙ Ha¯jib in Damascus ˙ 699/700–1300: Balaba¯n al-Ju¯kanda¯r 704/1304: Baybars al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯; Baktamur al-Ha¯jib (mamluk of Turunta¯y) ˙ ˙ ˙ 705/1305: Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj ˙ The governor of Aleppo 678/1279–679/1280: Aqqu¯sh al-Shamsı¯ 679/1280–681/1282: Sanjar al-Bashqardı¯ 681/1282–691/1292: Qara¯sunqur 691/1292–699/1299: Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ ˙ 699/1300–709/1310: Qara¯sunqur

235

236

Appendices

Ustada¯r in Syria 678/1279–689/1290: Sunqur al-Aʿsar Na¯ʾib al-Ghayba in Damascus Baha¯dur al-Sanjarı¯ Shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Aleppo 691/1292: Aybak al-Mawsilı¯ ˙ The governor of Safed 678/1279–678/1280: ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Aydughdı¯ al-Kabakı¯ al-Za¯hirı¯ ˙ 678/1280–683/1284(?): Bı¯lı¯k (or: Bakta¯sh) al-Tayya¯rı¯ ˙ 683/1284–685/1286: Qijqa¯r 685/1286–689/1291: Aydughdı¯ Alaldukuzı¯;79 Aybak al-Mawsilı¯; Balaba¯n al-Ju¯˙ kanda¯r 689/1290–689/1291: Aydughdı¯ Aladukuzı¯. 690/1291: Aydakin al-Sa¯lih¯ı ˙ ˙ 690/1291–698/1299: Fa¯ris al-Dı¯n al-Bakı¯ 698/1299–700/1300: Kira¯y al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ 700/1300–704/1304: Butkha¯s (al-Burjı¯) ˙ 704/1304–707/1307: Sunqursha¯h al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ 707/1307–709/1310: Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r The governor of Tripoli and the coastal fortresses 688/1289–691/1291: Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ ˙ 691/1291–692/1292: Tughrı¯l al-I¯gha¯nı¯ ˙ 692/1292–694/1295: Aybak al-Khaznada¯r 694/1295–698/1298: Aybak al-Mawsilı¯ ˙ 698/1299: Kurt al-Ha¯jib ˙ 699/1300: Qutlu¯bak al-Kabı¯r ˙ 700/1301–709/1310: Asandamur Kurjı¯ The governor of Hama 678/1280–683/1284–5: al-Malik al-Mansu¯r Na¯sir al-Dı¯n Muhammad b. Mahmu¯d ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ (Ayyu¯bid) 683/1284–5–698/1299(?): al-Malik al-Muzaffar b. al-Malik al- Mansu¯r (Ayyu¯bid) ˙ ˙ 698/1299–699/1300: Qara¯sunqur 699/1300–702/1303: Kitbugha¯ 702/1303–709/1310: Qibjaq 79 Nuju¯m, 8:9; al-Tara¯una, 271–272. ˙

Office holders during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign and the Mansu¯riyya period ˙

The governor of Homs 678/1279–680/1281(?): La¯jı¯n al-Kabı¯r 681/1281: Ba¯zı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯80 ˙ 682/1283–683/1284(?): Badr al-Dı¯n Baktu¯t al-Saʿdı¯ 683/1284–684/1285–6: Muhammad b. Aya¯z al-Hara¯nı¯ ˙ ˙ 684/1285–6(?) – 689/1290: Baktu¯t al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯(?) 694/1295–703/1304(?): al-Malik al-Awhad b. al-Malik al-Za¯hir (Ayyu¯bid) ˙ 703/1304–706/1307: Balaba¯n al-Ju¯kanda¯r 706/1307–711/1312: Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯ The governor of Gaza 680/1281–685/1286(?): Aydughdı¯ al-Sarhadı¯ ˙ ˙ 685/1286–686/1287: Aybak al-Mawsilı¯ ˙ ¯ qsunqur Kirta¯y 686/1287–689/1290: A 689/1290 – …: Aybak al-Mawsilı¯ ˙ … – 698/1298(?): Aydamur al-Jana¯h¯ı ˙ 698/1298(?) – 701/1301: Baybars al-Muwaffaqı¯ 701/1301–707/1307: Aqjuba¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ 707/1307–709/1309: Baybars al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ 709/1309–711/1311: Balaba¯n al-Badrı¯ The governor of Kerak 678/1279: al-Malik al-Saʿı¯d b. al-Za¯hir Baybars ˙ 678/1279–685/1286: al-Malik al-Masʿu¯d Khidr b. al-Za¯hir Baybars ˙ ˙ 685/1286: Aybak al-Mawsilı¯ ˙ 685/1286–690/1291: Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ 690/1291–708/1309: Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ The governor of Shawbak 678/1280–685/1286: Aybak al-Mawsilı¯ ˙ 685/1286–689/1290 (or after): Kashtaghdı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ 696/1296(?) – 698/1299(?): Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯(?) 699/1300–702/1303: Qibjaq The governor of Jerusalem and Hebron 707/1307–711/1311: Kira¯y al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ The governor of Baalbek Aqjuba¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ 80 Together with Sa¯rim al-Dı¯n al-Hims¯ı. ˙ ˙ ˙

237

238

Appendices

Governors of fortresses in Syria and the kingdom of Lesser Armenia of Cilicia Qalʿat al-Ru¯m 691/1292: Aybak al-Mawsilı¯; Aybak al-Ru¯mı¯ ˙ 692/1293–698/1299: Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ 698/1299(?) – 710/1310: Fakhr al-Dı¯n Aya¯z Hisn al-Akra¯d (Crac des Chevaliers) ˙ ˙ 678/1280–691/1291: Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ ˙ Balatnus ˙ 678/1280 – …: Sanjar al-Mansu¯rı¯ (=Sanjar Arjuwa¯sh or Sanjar al-Muqrı¯) ˙ … – 698/1299: Sarim al-Dı¯n Uzbek ˙ Shayzar 680/1281–689/1290: Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ ˙ 689/1290–696/1296: Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯ al-Ha¯jib ˙ Sarkhad ˙ 679/1280: Ba¯sit¯ı al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ 697/1296–699/1300: Kitbugha¯ Marqab … – 698/1299: Baybars al-Ghutmı¯ Subayba ˙ …. – 692/1293: Bakta¯sh al-Zaradka¯sh 698/1299: Qara¯sunqur 707/1307: Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r Al-Rahba ˙ … – 701/1301: Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯ Al-Bı¯ra 698/1299–710/1311: Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ Bahasna¯ 692/1293–701/1301: Bakta¯sh al-Zaradka¯sh/Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ 701/1301–706/1307(?): Ka¯wazka¯

Mamluks purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate

239

Appendix 4: Mamluks purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate 1.

Husa¯m al-Dı¯n Turunta¯y. Turunta¯y, it seems, was originally a mamluk of one ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ of the sons of the governor of Mosul, Badr al-Dı¯n Luʾluʾ. Several prominent Mansu¯rı¯ mamluks were purchased from this ruler in 658–9/1260–1 after the ˙ battle of ʿAyn Ja¯lu¯t.81 It is clear that Turunta¯y was also purchased at this time. ˙ ˙ Turunta¯y was the mamluk closest to Qala¯wu¯n, and together with Baydara¯ – ˙ ˙ his favourite. He was probably made amir during Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate, since he was appointed viceroy immediately after Qala¯wu¯n’s accession, and two years later he was one of the highest commanders of the army. Moreover, during Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate Turunta¯y was promoted to the office of Qala¯wu¯n’s ˙ ˙ ustada¯r.82 In Ramada¯n 678/January 1280, only two months after Qala¯wu¯n’s ˙ accession, Turunta¯y was appointed viceroy in Egypt, or the vice-sultan (na¯ʾib ˙ ˙ 83 al-saltana fı¯ misr). Turunta¯y was appointed as the ata¯bak al-ʿasa¯kir ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ (commander-in–chief of the Egyptian army) as well.84 He occupied this office, with strong authority and relative independence, until Qala¯wu¯n’s death. During this period Turunta¯y was sent by Qala¯wu¯n on several missions in ˙ ˙ which he proved his qualifications and loyalty to his master. He was sent to Damascus as the head of the Egyptian army against the rebel Sunqur alAshqar.85 In the battle of Homs against the Mongols in 680/1281, Turunta¯y ˙ ˙ fought as the head of the ja¯lı¯sh (centre vanguard) and had a significant role in the Mamluk victory.86 In 685/1286 he was dispatched at the head of a large army to Kerak against the rebellious grandsons of al-Za¯hir Baybars. He ˙ managed to defeat them thanks to his diplomatic skills.87 At the end of the same year, he was dispatched to al-Rahba, following reports about Mongol ˙ activity in this area.88 Turunta¯y was sent to the fortress of Sahyu¯n in northern ˙ ˙ ˙ Syria in order to defeat Sunqur al-Ashqar once and for all. He succeeded in

81 Al-Safadı¯ mentions that Qala¯wu¯n bought Turunta¯y “from the sons of al-Mawsilı¯” (min awla¯d ˙ 6:387; ˙ ˙ al-ʿIbar, 5:361. The sons ˙of Badr al-Dı¯n al-Maws ilı¯, Wa¯fı¯, 16:429). See also Manhal, ˙ Luʾluʾ were forced to flee from the Mongols. They visited Cairo to seek al-Za¯hir Baybars’s help ˙ to restore their power in Mosul, See: Cl. Cahen, “Luʾluʾ, Badr al-Dı¯n Abu¯ ʾl-Fada ¯ʾil al-Malik al2 Rah¯ım”, EI , 5:821; Zubda, XV. ˙¯, 16:429. The office of ustada¯r for the houses of high-ranking amirs was probably oc82 Wa¯fı cupied only by amirs of lower rank. For instance, when Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ was appointed as al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s ustada¯r in 685/1286–7, he received an amirate of ten (Sulu¯k, 2:193). 83 Sulu¯k, 1:665; Niha¯ya, 31:9. 84 ʿIqd, 3:21. 85 Ta¯lı¯, 130; Wa¯fı¯, 16:429. 86 Zubda, 197; Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:245; Wa¯fı¯, 16:429; Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 191. 87 Zubda, 254; Kanz, 8:277. 88 Muhyı¯ al-Dı¯n Ibn ʿAbd al-Za¯hir, Tashrı¯f al-Ayya¯m wa-l-ʿUsu¯r fı¯ Sı¯rat al-Malik al-Mansu¯r ˙ Wiza¯rat al-Thaqa¯fa wa-l–Irsha ˙ ˙ ˙ (Cairo: ¯d al-Qawmı¯, 1961), 146–147; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 111– 112.

240

2.

3.

89 90 91 92 93 94 95

96 97 98 99

Appendices

this mission as well.89 In 689/1290 he successfully repressed the revolts of the Bedouin in Upper Egypt (Saʿı¯d).90 In addition to his military missions, ˙ Turunta¯y accomplished other missions out of loyalty to his master.91 ˙ ˙ Badr al-Dı¯n Baydara¯. Baydara¯ is said to be the mamluk dearest to Qala¯wu¯n (aʿazz al-na¯s ʿinda usta¯dhihi Qala¯wu¯n).92 Baydara¯ arrived in the sultanate as a little child or as a baby together with his mother, after the battle of ʿAyn Ja¯lu¯t in 658/1260.93 He is not mentioned explicitly as an amir during Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate, but like Turunta¯y, it is almost certain that he was an amir of ˙ ˙ Qala¯wu¯n, since he was a senior and favourite mamluk of his, and occupied important positions soon after Qala¯wu¯n’s accession. In 681/1281 he is mentioned as amı¯r majlis,94 afterwards as ustada¯r and finally, in Rabı¯ʿ I 687/ April 1288 as wazir. He was dismissed after a month, but returned to this office and held it when Qala¯wu¯n died and during al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s reign.95 In Shawwa¯l 688/October-November 1289 Baydara¯ was one of the commanders sent on an expedition to Nubia in southern Egypt.96 ʿAlam al-Dı¯n Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯. Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ spent some of his childhood years in Damascus, in the house of a woman named Sitt Qujja¯. Later he moved to Cairo, where he entered the ranks of Qala¯wu¯n’s mamluks.97 AlShuja¯ʿı¯ managed to gain a high position in Qala¯wu¯n’s eyes. He received an amirate in the year of Qala¯wu¯n’s accession, probably of tablkha¯na¯h, and he ˙ was appointed as shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n and to other financial administrative 98 offices. Soon after, in 680/1281 he was appointed wazir. Sanjar occupied this office for many years, possibly until Qala¯wu¯n’s death, though he was dismissed twice for short periods, in 680/1281 and 687/1288.99 Qala¯wu¯n apZubda, 257–259; Kanz, 8:280; al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 59:329. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:90. See p. 150 above. Wa¯fı¯, 10:360; Manhal, 3:494; al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 60:178. See chapter one, n. 153. Sulu¯k, 1:699. Muqaffa¯, 2:562; Niha¯ya, 31:155,176. Most of the sources mention that Baydara¯ held the office of wazir when Qala¯wu¯n died, see: Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:96; Sulu¯k, 1:755. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ mentions, on the one hand, that Baydara¯ was the wazir until the end of Qala¯wu¯n’s reign (Zubda, 263) but on the other hand that in 689/1290 Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ returned to this office (Zubda, 270) and Baydara¯ was the ustada¯r when Qala¯wu¯n died (Zubda, 273). Niha¯ya, 31:42. See on this expedition: Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 148–149. Wa¯fı¯, 15:478; Ta¯lı¯, 90. Zubda, 180, 190; Niha¯ya, 31:9. See n. 95 above; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 106; Zubda, 262–263. Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯, surprisingly enough, is the only source that mentions that Sanjar was the viceroy of Egypt in 684/1285 (Kanz, 8:270). Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ was dismissed in 687/1288 after being sent to Syria in order to confiscate property from the wealthy people of Damascus. However, he was too aggressive in his methods (Kanz, 8:281; Ta¯lı¯, 130; Niha¯ya, 31:164; Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:260; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 140–141, 220).

Mamluks purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate

4.

5.

100 101 102 103 104 105

106 107 108 109 110 111

241

pointed Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ as supervisor of the construction of the Mansur˙ iyya complex of a hospital (bima¯rista¯n), a madrasa and the mausoleums of Qala¯wu¯n and his wife.100 Zayn al-Dı¯n Kitbugha¯. Kitbugha¯, who was originally taken captive in the battle following ʿAyn Ja¯lu¯t, was purchased by amir Qala¯wu¯n in 659/1260.101 In 671/1272 he participated in a battle against the Mongols in the vicinity of alBı¯ra and killed the Mongol commander Durbai.102 Kitbugha¯ became one of the mamluks closest to Qala¯wu¯n (khawa¯ss) and was appointed to the shar˙˙ a¯bkha¯na¯h (beverages pantry). He was replaced in this office by Baybars alMansu¯rı¯ in 674/1275–6.103 It seems that in this year Kitbugha¯ was already an ˙ amir.104 Kitbugha¯ received a promotion with Qala¯wu¯n’s accession in 678/ 1279. According to al-Dhahabı¯, Kitbugha¯ received an amirate of one hundred. However, it is more plausible that he was then appointed amir tabl˙ kha¯na¯h and that only later did Qala¯wu¯n confer upon him an amirate of one hundred.105 In 679/1281, when Qala¯wu¯n, and probably Turunta¯y too, left for ˙ ˙ Syria, Qala¯wu¯n appointed Kitbugha¯ as his deputy (na¯ʾib al-ghayba).106 Kitbugha¯ was one of the commander amirs at the battle of Homs in 681/1281.107 In Shawwa¯l 688/October-November 1289 he was one of the commanders sent on the second expedition to Nubia.108 At some point, possibly toward the end of Qala¯wu¯n’s reign, Kitbugha¯ was appointed again as na¯ʾib al-ghayba (deputy of absence). Kitbugha¯ held this office when Qala¯wu¯n died.109 Husa¯m al-Dı¯n La¯jı¯n. La¯jı¯n was purchased by Qala¯wu¯n as a child in 658/ ˙ 1260.110 During Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate La¯jı¯n served in his house as a stable page (u¯sha¯qı¯ or u¯ja¯qı¯) or as a supervisor of the stables (amı¯r akhu¯r) and later a silahda¯r (armsbearer).111 When Qala¯wu¯n ascended to the sultanate, he gave ˙ See chapter two, n. 48. Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 51; Ibn Iya¯s, 1:386; Nuju¯m, 8:55. Zubda, 137; Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 130–131. Zubda, 152; al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 60:34. The shara¯bkha¯na¯h included all the beverages and drinking vessels of the sultan (or the amir), see al-Qalqashandı¯ (Beirut), 4:9. He is mentioned by his laqab (Zayn al-Dı¯n) by Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ (Zubda, 152). In addition, it was about fifteen years after he started his training period,˙ and after he revealed exceptional bravery on the battlefield against the Mongols. Al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 60:34; Aʿya¯n, 4:145; Wa¯fı¯, 24:139; Manhal, 9:115; Nuju¯m, 8:55. Ibn Iya¯s notes that Kitbugha¯’s promotion was gradual. First he was one of the royal mamluks, then one of the kha¯ssakiyya, then amir of ten, of tablkha¯na¯h, and finally, amir of one hundred ˙˙ ˙ (Ibn Iya¯s, 1:386). Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 209–211. Al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 60:34. Niha¯ya, 31:42; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 148–149. Zubda, 273. See chapter one, n. 150. Niha¯ya, 31:314; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:222, 223; Sulu¯k, 1:82. See on the office of the u¯sha¯qı¯: alQalqashandı¯ (Cairo), 5:45.

242

6.

Appendices

La¯jı¯n an amirate, probably of tablkha¯na¯h. He sent him to Damascus as the ˙ governor of the citadel of the city. He took office in Dhu¯ al-Hijja 678/April ˙ 1280.112 La¯jı¯n, it seems, was sent against the rebel Sunqur al-Ashqar who took over Damascus, and was imprisoned by al-Ashqar in the citadel for fifty days.113 After al-Ashqar was defeated, La¯jı¯n was released and appointed governor of Damascus. La¯jı¯n held this office for eleven years, until the reign of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l.114 In the battle of Homs in 680/1281, La¯jı¯n was one of the commanders of the right wing (maymana), whereas most of the other commanders at that time were still Sa¯lih¯ı or Za¯hirı¯ amirs (i. e., mamluks of al˙ ˙ ˙ Sa¯lih Ayyu¯b or al-Za¯hir Baybars).115 At the beginning of 686/1287, La¯jı¯n ˙ ˙ ˙ headed the Syrian armies in the sieges of the fortresses of Sahyu¯n and ˙ Baraziyya and returned them to the authority of the sultan in Cairo.116 La¯jı¯n received an amirate of one hundred from sultan al-Ashraf Khalı¯l, although this is not to say that he was not an amir of one hundred beforehand.117 Shams al-Dı¯n Qara¯sunqur. Qara¯sunqur served as u¯sha¯qı¯ or sa¯qı¯ (cup bearer) during the amirate of his master Qala¯wu¯n.118 Afterward, he probably served as ju¯kanda¯r (polo master).119 Qala¯wu¯n promoted Qara¯sunqur until he appointed him an amir of one hundred in Egypt.120 Qara¯sunqur, who was an unusually talented and sharp mamluk, was appointed governor of Hama shortly after Qala¯wu¯n’s accession, and in 681/1282 or 682/1283 he was appointed governor of Aleppo.121 Qara¯sunqur held this office until he was dismissed by al-Ashraf Khalı¯l in 691/1292. Similarly to other senior Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ amirs, Qara¯sunqur performed military and other missions on behalf of Qala¯wu¯n. In 681/1281 Qara¯sunqur was sent, together with the senior Sa¯lih¯ı ˙ ˙

112 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 7:162; Niha¯ya, 31:13; Zubda, 182; Aʿya¯n, 4:166; Manhal, 9:166; Sulu¯k, 1:670; Ta¯lı¯, 132; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 195. 113 Ta¯lı¯, 130, 132. 114 Aʿya¯n, 4:165–167; Zubda, 182, 184; Kanz, 8:238. See La¯jı¯n’s decree of appointment, as mentioned by Ibn al-Fura¯t: Ibn al-Fura¯t, 7:175–176. 115 Zubda, 196; Ibn Kathı¯r mentions among the “brave amirs” of this battle the Mansu¯rı¯ amirs ˙ La¯jı¯n and Turunta¯y (Ibn Kathı¯r, 13:245). ˙ As mentioned above, Turunta¯y also took an important part in this 116 Ibn Kathı¯r,˙ 13:257. ˙ ˙ expedition. 117 Zubda, 288; Nuju¯m, 8:13, 85. 118 Aʿya¯n, 4:89; Wa¯fı¯, 24:213; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:246. 119 Qara¯sunqur is mentioned by the epithet al-ju¯kanda¯r in the sources (for instance: Aʿya¯n, 4:87, Durar (Hyderabad), 3:246. According to al-Maqrı¯zı¯, Qara¯sunqur served as ju¯kanda¯r until his appointment as governor of Aleppo (Sulu¯k, 2:558). 120 Manhal, 9:47. Al-Ashraf Khalı¯l is said to have appointed Qara¯sunqur an amir of one hundred in Egypt in Dhu¯ al-Qaʿda 690/October 1291 (Nuju¯m, 8:12). Qara¯sunqur, however, was an amir of hundred already during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign. 121 Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ mentions that Qara¯sunqur was appointed over Aleppo in 681/1282 (Zubda, 217). Ibn˙ al-Fura¯t mentions that it was in Shaʿba¯n 682/October 1283 (Ibn al-Fura¯t, 7:276).

Mamluks purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate

7.

8.

122 123 124 125 126 127 128 129 130

243

amir Fakhr al-Dı¯n Aya¯z, to receive the rebel Sunqur al-Ashqar’s oath of allegiance to Qala¯wu¯n. In 682/1283 Qara¯sunqur successfully raided Armenian Cilicia twice. Qara¯sunqur also sent amirs to the Armenian fortress of Kakhta¯ to accept its allegiance to Qala¯wu¯n.122 Sayf al-Dı¯n Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯. Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ was originally one of ˙ ˙ the mamluks of al-Ha¯jj Ibra¯hı¯m, who was the khawa¯n sala¯r (superintendent ˙ of the kitchen) of amir Qala¯wu¯n. Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯, who was raised by al˙ Ha¯jj Ibra¯hı¯m from a tender age, used to serve food to Qala¯wu¯n. Qala¯wu¯n ˙ decided to purchase him from his master for three thousand dirhams.123 With Qala¯wu¯n’s accession, Balaba¯n received an amirate, probably of tabl˙ kha¯na¯h. In the end of 678/March 1280 he was appointed commander of Hisn ˙ ˙ al-Akra¯d (Crac des Chevaliers), and, it seems, also of some other fortresses in the region.124 In 679/1280 Qala¯wu¯n agreed to al-Tabba¯khı¯’s request to raid ˙ the Crusader areas, following their devastation of the vicinity of al-Marqab. Al-Tabba¯khı¯’s expedition failed, and he was severely rebuked by Qala¯wu¯n.125 ˙ In the battle of Homs in 680/1281 Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ fought as the ˙ commander of the army of Hisn al-Akra¯d in the extreme left wing of the ˙ ˙ Mamluk army.126 In 688/1289 after the capture of Tripoli, this area was incorporated to the lands that were under al-Tabba¯khı¯’s governorship. He ˙ was also the governor of the coastal fortresses, until he was appointed governor of Aleppo by al-Ashraf Khalı¯l in 691/1291.127 Rukn al-Dı¯n Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯. The information on the career of Baybars ˙ al-Mansu¯rı¯ during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign is relatively rich, thanks to the auto˙ biographical notes that appear in his chronicles. Baybars was purchased by Qala¯wu¯n in 659/1261 and only in 671/1272–3 did he receive his first iqta¯ʿ. In ˙ 673/1274–5 he took part in sultan Baybars’s expedition against Cilicia, as a 128 warrior in the vanguard. In the next year, Baybars was in charge of amir Qala¯wu¯n’s shara¯bkha¯na¯h.129 Three years later, in 677/1278–9, he took part in another expedition against Cilicia.130 In 680/1281, he was present at the battle of Homs against the Mongols. Baybars fought in the vanguard or in the centre next to sultan Qala¯wu¯n, among whose trusted mamluks and staunch defenders he was. After the battle he carried a portion of the campaign Zubda, 193–194, 231, 240, 245. Muqaffa¯, 2:485. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 7:161; Sulu¯k, 1:670; Zubda, 193. Zubda, 189–190; Kanz, 8:239; Niha¯ya, 31:69–70. See: Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 191, 192. Niha¯ya, 31:57; Ta¯lı¯, 56; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 214; Sulu¯k, 3:755; Zubda, 273. Zubda, 144. See on this expedition: Stewart, Armenian Kingdom, 50–51. See n. 103 above. Zubda, 166–167.

244

Appendices

treasury.131 One year and eight months later, in Rabı¯ʿ I 682/ 11 June 1283, Baybars was awarded the rank of amir by sultan Qala¯wu¯n and put in command of fifteen horsemen.132 In 683/1284 he was appointed an amir tabl˙ kha¯na¯h with command of fifty horsemen. He received the iqta¯ʿ of the Sa¯lih¯ı ˙ ˙133 ˙ Aybak al-Afram, who was promoted to the rank of amir of one hundred. In Safar 685/ March 1286 he was sent to Kerak with Qala¯wu¯n’s ama¯n letter to the sons of al-Za¯hir Baybars.134 In Shaʿba¯n 685/October 1286 he was appointed ˙ governor of Kerak and received command over eighty horsemen, together with the iqta¯ʿ of the Sa¯lih¯ı amir Sanjar al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯.135 Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ received an amirate of one hundred in 693/1293.136 9. ʿIzz al-Dı¯n Aybak al-Mawsilı¯. Aybak al-Mawsilı¯ was purchased together with ˙ ˙ Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ from the eunuch of the ruler of Mosul, Badr al-Dı¯n ˙ 137 Luʾluʾ, in 659/1261. It is reasonable to assume that Aybak was an amir before Qala¯wu¯n’s accession, since he was appointed governor of Shawbak in that year.138 In 685/1286 the governorship of Kerak also came under his authority, and after few months he was replaced by Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯. ˙ Aybak was then appointed governor of Gaza for a short period and in 686/ 1287 Qala¯wu¯n appointed him governor of the citadel of Safed.139 In Rajab 689/July 1290 he was appointed governor of Gaza again.140 10. ʿIzz al-Dı¯n Aybak al-Khaznada¯r.141 Aybak al-Khaznada¯r received an amirate with Qala¯wu¯n’s accession. He served as amı¯r janda¯r in Egypt during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign, up to the latter’s death. His epithet implies that he served as khazanda¯r (treasurer) beforehand.142 11. Sayf al-Dı¯n Qijqa¯r. Qala¯wu¯n is said to have raised Qijqa¯r “like a father” from a young age.143 In 679/1280 Qijqa¯r was appointed viceroy of the citadel of

131 132 133 134 135 136 137 138 139 140 141

Zubda, 197–198, 199. Zubda, 247. Zubda, 250. Zubda, 254; Niha¯ya, 31:29. Zubda, 256–257. Zubda, 298; Tuhfa, 138. ˙ Zubda, 71. Zubda, 179. Zubda, 255–256; Levanoni, Turning Point, 16. Niha¯ya, 31:170; al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 59:39. Two senior Mansu¯rı¯ amirs with similar names are mentioned in Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯’s list: ˙ ¯ r (d. 709/1310) and Aybak al-Tawı¯l al-Khaznada¯r (d. 706/1306, ˙ Aybak al-Khaznada see ˙ the two since he brings the biobelow). Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯ seems to have confused ˙ graphical details of the first Aybak (except for his death year), under the name of the second. See: Durar (Cairo), 1:452. 142 Zubda, 273; Durar (Cairo), 1:452. 143 Niha¯ya, 31:150; Zubda, 176.

Mamluks purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate

12.

13.

14.

15. 16. 17.

245

Damascus, and afterwards became governor of Safed.144 In 685/1286 he is mentioned as the viceroy of the citadel of Safed. He was moved to Cairo due to his illness, and died there in the same year. Qijqa¯r is the first Mansu¯rı¯ amir ˙ to be mentioned as having died.145 ʿAlam al-Dı¯n Sanjar Arjuwa¯sh. Sanjar Arjuwa¯sh was the viceroy of the citadel of Damascus when Qala¯wu¯n died.146 He held this office for many years afterwards, through La¯jı¯n’s reign and the Mongol occupation of Damascus (699/1300). Arjuwa¯sh showed exceptional bravery and leadership in his stubborn resistance to the Mongols during their occupation of Damascus.147 La¯jı¯n al-Kabı¯r. La¯jı¯n al-Kabı¯r was a senior mamluk of the Mansu¯riyya. At the ˙ beginning of Qala¯wu¯n’s reign, he was appointed as the governor of Homs but he died shortly after. He was called La¯jı¯n al-Kabı¯r, and hence another mamluk that was named La¯jı¯n, he who would became sultan, was called La¯jı¯n al-Saghı¯r.148 ˙ Sayf al-Dı¯n Qutuz al-Mansu¯rı¯. Qutuz was one of the high-ranking amirs of ˙ ˙ ˙ the Mansu¯riyya (min aka¯bir al-Mansu¯riyya wa-kabı¯r al-umara¯ʾ). In Rajab ˙ ˙ 680/October 1281 he was released from prison and about a month later he received an amirate. Qala¯wu¯n appointed him governor of Homs, where he died in 690/1291.149 Since Qutuz died only one year after Qala¯wu¯n, it is clear ˙ that he became a high-ranking amir during his master’s lifetime. Al-Safadı¯ ˙ notes that Qutuz al-Mansu¯rı¯ was sent on military missions because of his ˙ ˙ 150 exceptional bravery. Sayf al-Dı¯n Ka¯wazka¯. Ka¯wazka¯ is mentioned as one of the highest-ranking amirs of sultan Qala¯wu¯n.151 ʿIzz al-Dı¯n Aybak al-Tawı¯l. Aybak al-Tawı¯l died a senior amir (kabı¯r al-qadr) ˙ ˙ in Damascus in 706/1306.152 Sayf al-Dı¯n Baha¯dur Raʾs Nawba. Baha¯dur Raʾs Nawba served as raʾs nawbat al-jamda¯riyya, i. e. master of the sultan’s robes.153 In Shawwa¯l 698/October-

144 Zubda, 184. 145 Zubda, 255–256; Niha¯ya, 31:150. 146 Zubda, 273. 147 Aʿya¯n, 4:146, 69; Wa¯fı¯, 24:319, 183. 148 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:222; Niha¯ya, 31:314. 149 ʿIqd, 3:103; Niha¯ya, 31:224; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:133. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ mentions that it was ˙ ¯wu¯n died (see n. 156 Kı¯kaldı¯, and not Qutuz, who was the governor of Homs when Qala ˙ from prison: Sulu¯k, 1:700, 702. below). On his release 150 Wa¯fı¯, 24:254. 151 Aʿya¯n, 4:143; Niha¯ya, 32:136. 152 See n. 141 above. 153 Niha¯ya, 31:42.

246

18.

19.

20.

21.

22.

23.

24. 25. 26.

Appendices

November 1289 he was one of the commanders who were sent on the second expedition to Nubia.154 ʿAla¯ʿ al-Dı¯n Altabars (al-Majnu¯n). A senior mamluk of Qala¯wu¯n who be˙ came amir tablkha¯na¯h and was appointed governor of the Cairo citadel, ˙ perhaps still during Qalawun’s reign. An amir named Tabars, probably to be ˙ identified with him, is mentioned as one of the senior Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who ˙ 155 were sent on the second expedition to Nubia. Badr al-Dı¯n Kı¯kaldı¯ al-Shihna. Kı¯kaldı¯ is mentioned as the governor of ˙ Homs when Qala¯wu¯n died. His epithet implies that he served as shihna ˙ (perfect of police).156 Jama¯l al-Dı¯n Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯. Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ received in 685/1286 an amirate of ten from Qala¯wu¯n, who also appointed him as the ustada¯r of his son, al-Ashraf Khalı¯l.157 In 690/1291, shortly before Qala¯wu¯n’s death, Aqqu¯sh was appointed governor of Kerak, an office he held for twenty years. ʿIzz al-Dı¯n Aydamur al-Zaradka¯sh. He is mentioned only after Qala¯wu¯n’s death, when he defected, together with his son-in–low Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, to the ¯Ilkha¯nid Mongols in 711/1312.158 ʿAlam al-Dı¯n Sanjar amı¯r akhu¯r. This amir is mentioned as the messenger who was sent to Fayyu¯m to announce the victory of the battle of Homs in 680/1281.159 Badr al-Dı¯n Bı¯lı¯k (or: Bakta¯sh) al-Tayya¯r was appointed viceroy of Safed ˙ citadel in Shawwa¯l 678/February 1280. After a while he was appointed amir in Damascus. According to some sources, Bı¯lı¯k al-Tayya¯r was the governor of ˙ Safed during the first years of Qala¯wu¯n’s reign.160 Sayf al-Dı¯n Ba¯zı¯ was appointed governor of Homs in Rajab 680/October 1281.161 Sayf al-Dı¯n Balaba¯n al-Ju¯kanda¯r is mentioned as the governor of Safed when Qala¯wu¯n died.162 Aydamur al-Jana¯h¯ı was the governor of Gaza. He died in Aleppo in 698/1298. ˙ He received an amirate upon Qala¯wu¯n’s accession and it seems that he

154 Niha¯ya, 31:42; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 148–149. 155 Zubda, 408; Sulu¯k, 2:51; Niha¯ya, 31:42; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 148. 156 Zubda, 273; ʿIqd, 2:229. The shihna was the prefect of police, in charge of security in the cities ˙ (Dozy, Supplément, 1:733). 157 Sulu¯k, 2:193. 158 See p. 201 above. 159 Sulu¯k, 1:699. 160 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 7:158; Sulu¯k, 1:667; Zubda, 184 (according to Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ Bı¯lı¯k al˙ Tayya¯r’s appointment to the citadel of Safed was in 679/1280–1); al-Tara¯una, 271. ˙ ˙ 161 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 7:226. 162 Zubda, 273. This name, as well as ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Manku¯rs and Badr al-Dı¯n Aybak al-Ata¯bakı¯ alMushrif, are taken from another manuscript of Zubda, see: Zubda, 177, n. 1.

Mamluks purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate

27. 28. 29. 30.

31.

32.

33. 34.

247

became amir tablkha¯na¯h during his master’s reign. He managed to acquire a ˙ lot of property.163 ʿIzz al-Dı¯n al-Ku¯ra¯nı¯ is mentioned as one of the commanders who were sent by Qala¯wu¯n on the first expedition in Nubia in 686/1287.164 Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n Murshid (eunuch). He was muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯˙ niyya during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign and held this office when Qala¯wu¯n died.165 Kira¯y is mentioned as a prominent amir only after Qala¯wu¯n’s death. Uzdamur al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ is mentioned as a prominent amir one year after Qala¯wu¯n’s death. It is plausible, therefore, that he was promoted significantly during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign.166 Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ (Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ). Aqqu¯sh Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ was among the ˙ group of mamluk children, included Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ and Aybak al˙ Mawsilı¯, who were purchased by Qala¯wu¯n in 658–9/1260–1 from Badr al-Dı¯n ˙ Luʾluʾ, the governor of Mosul. Qala¯wu¯n appointed Aqqu¯sh as amı¯r ʿalam.167 Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ al-Ha¯jib (Numayla). Aqqu¯sh Numayla was among the ˙ ˙ child mamluks of Badr al-Dı¯n Luʾluʾ purchased by Qala¯wu¯n around 658/ 1260. During Qala¯wu¯n’s reign, he was an amir of tablkha¯na¯h, amı¯r ʿalam and ˙ the ha¯jib (chamberlain).168 In 682/1283–4, with the death of the Ayyu¯bid ˙ ruler of Hama al-Malik al-Mansu¯r, Qala¯wu¯n sent Aqqu¯sh to Hama with ˙ condolence letters and appointment decrees for al-Mansu¯r’s son.169 ˙ Sanjar al-Mansu¯rı¯. Qala¯wu¯n appointed Sanjar al-Mansu¯rı¯ governor of Ba˙ ˙ 170 la¯tnus in the year of his accession, 678/1279. ˙ La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯ (also: La¯jı¯n al-Ustada¯r, La¯jı¯n al-Silahda¯r). La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯ was ˙ purchased by Qala¯wu¯n at a young age and he was educated by him. From his epithet, we can infer that he was an ustada¯r at the beginning of his career. Later, he was appointed Qala¯wu¯n’s silahda¯r.171 In 680/1281, as an amir, he ˙ was sent to Cairo to announce the victory in the battle of Homs.172 After Qala¯wu¯n’s death he is mentioned as one of the highest-ranking amirs in Mamluk Egypt.

163 Aʿya¯n, 1:655–656; ʿIqd, 3:485–486. 164 Niha¯ya, 31:40. See on this expedition: Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 147–148. 165 ʿIqd, 3:14. 166 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:128; Sulu¯k, 1:774. 167 Muqaffa¯, 2:234–235. 168 Muqaffa¯, 2:247–248. 169 Zubda, 246; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 181. 170 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 7:154; Sulu¯k, 1:665. This amir might be identical to Sanjar al-Muqrı¯ or Sanjar Arjuwa¯sh, who are both sometimes called Sanjar al-Mansu¯rı¯. ˙ 171 ʿIqd, 4:292; Sulu¯k, 1:947. 172 Sulu¯k, 1:699.

248

Appendices

35. Kashtaghdı¯ was the governor of al-Shawbak and its districts when Qala¯wu¯n died. He was probably appointed to this office in 685/1286.173 ¯ qsunqur Kirta¯y was the governor of Gaza and the Palestinian coast during 36. A Qala¯wu¯n’s reign. He held this office in the year of Qala¯wu¯n’s death, and was probably replaced by Aybak al-Mawsilı¯.174 ˙ 37. Sunqur al-Tawı¯l al-Mansu¯rı¯. Sunqur was arrested during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign ˙ ˙ 175 when he was amir tablkha¯na¯h. He was released during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign as ˙ well. He was probably the castellan (lit. in charge of the gate of Cairo’s citadel, wa¯lı¯ ba¯b al-qalʿa) during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign, since he is mentioned in this office when al-Ashraf Khalı¯l ascended to the sultanate.176 In Shawwa¯l 688/ October-November 1289 he was among the commanders who were sent on the expedition to Nubia.177 38. Sanjar al-Kha¯zin (al-Ashrafı¯). A mamluk of Qala¯wu¯n who was born around 645/1247–8. During Qala¯wu¯n’s life, he served, it seems, as his master’s kha¯zin (treasurer). Afterwards he occupied higher political positions.178 39. Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r was one of the commanders of the expedition to Nubia in 688/1289.179 40. Ba¯sit¯ı al-Mansu¯rı¯ was appointed governor of the fortress of Sarkhad in 679/ ˙ ˙ ˙ 1280. He is mentioned as a high-ranking amir in Damascus, who died in 695/ 1296.180 41. Aydamur al-Rafa¯ was originally among the young mamluks of the Ayyu¯bid ruler of Hama, al-Malik al-Na¯sir, who died in 656/1258. Hence, it is plausible ˙ that Aydamur joined the Mansu¯riyya mamluks when Qala¯wu¯n was still an ˙ amir. Since Aydamur fought and died in the battle of Marj al-Suffar, about ˙ forty-five years after his first master’s death, it seems that he joined to the ranks of the Mansu¯riyya as a young boy.181 ˙ 42. Sunqur Jarkas 43. Taqsu¯ ˙ ˙ 44. Sunqur al-Silahda¯r ˙ 45. Kashkal 173 Zubda, 255, 273. 174 Niha¯ya, 31:170; Zubda, 274. 175 Muqaffa¯, 2:457. 176 ʿIqd, 3:31. 177 Niha¯ya, 31:42; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 148–149. 178 Sanjar al-Kha¯zin died in 735/1335 when he was about ninety, See: Sulu¯k, 2:387; Nuju¯m, 9:305; and see more on him below. Ibn Hajar mentions, probably mistakenly, that he was among the commanders who participated˙ in the expedition to Nubia in 686/1287. It seems that Ibn Hajar confused him with Sanjar al-Masru¯rı¯ al-Sa¯lih¯ı (Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 147). ˙ ¯ ya, 31:42. ˙ ˙ 179 Niha 180 Al-Qalqashandı¯ (Beirut), 13:106; al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 60:250. 181 ʿIqd, 4:293.

Prominent mamluks purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s sultanate or shortly before it

46. 47. 48. 49. 50. 51. 52. 53. 54. 55. 56. 57. 58. 59. 60. 61. 62. 63. 64. 65. 66. 67.

249

Sayf al-Dı¯n Alladaq (or: Aldiq) al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ ʿAlam al-Dı¯n al-Isbaha¯nı¯ ˙ Shams al-Dı¯n Aldukuz amı¯r akhu¯r ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n al-Naqı¯b Sayf al-Dı¯n Butkha¯s al-Aqraʿı¯ ˙ Sayf al-Dı¯n Kabak al-Aqraʿı¯ Rukn al-Dı¯n Baybars al-Baha¯durnı¯ ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Manku¯rs Badr al-Dı¯n Aybak al-Ata¯bakı¯ al-Mushrif Rukn al-Dı¯n al-Sayrafı¯ ˙ ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n ʿAlaq ʿIzz al-Dı¯n al-Jaladkı¯ ʿAlam al-Dı¯n Sanjar al-Misrı¯ ˙ Sayf al-Dı¯n Tughrı¯l al-Mushrif ˙ Sayf al-Dı¯n Taybugha¯ al-Ru¯sı¯ ˙ Sayf al-Dı¯n Ta¯ja¯r ˙ Sayf al-Dı¯n Balaba¯n al-Ru¯sı¯ Jama¯l al-Dı¯n Aqqu¯sh Barna¯q Badr al-Dı¯n Baktu¯t al-Bahla¯q ˙ ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Taybars ˙ Badr al-Dı¯n Bı¯lı¯k al-Shihna ˙ ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Aydughdı¯ al-Sa¯qı¯

Appendix 5: Prominent mamluks purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s sultanate or shortly before it182 Non-Burjı¯ Mamluks 1.

Sayf al-Dı¯n Sala¯r was taken captive in the battle of Abulustayn in 675/1277.183 He is considered a Mansu¯rı¯ mamluk, though his master was Qala¯wu¯n’s son ˙ al-Sa¯lih ʿAlı¯. In Shaʿba¯n 687/September 1288, with his master’s death, he ˙ ˙ “officially” joined the privileged mamluks (khawa¯ss) of Qala¯wu¯n, as an amir ˙˙ of ten.184

182 The data appearing in this appendix refer only for Qala¯wu¯n’s amirate and sultanate. 183 Zubda, 155; Manhal, 6:5–6. 184 Durar (Hyderabad), 2:179–180; Manhal, 5:6. See on al-Sa¯lih ʿAlı¯’s death: Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:69– ˙ ˙ 70.

250 2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

7.

8.

185 186 187 188 189

190 191 192 193 194

Appendices

Sayf al-Dı¯n Qibjaq. Similarly to Sala¯r, Qibjaq was purchased by Qala¯wu¯n in 675/1277 after he was taken captive in the battle of Abulustayn.185 Qibjaq was at that time in his twenties and with military experience. Hence, he did not go through the ordinary training path. He received an amirate upon Qala¯wu¯n’s accession, only three years after he joined the ranks of the Mansu¯riyya. In ˙ Shawwa¯l 688/November 1289 Qibjaq was appointed one of the commanders 186 of the successful expedition to Nubia. The sources mention that Qala¯wu¯n delayed Qibjaq’s promotion.187 Sayf al-Dı¯n Ja¯warshı¯ was another captive of the battle of Abulustayn that Qala¯wu¯n took into his service. Ja¯warshı¯ served as one of the amirs of Damascus and died in Aleppo during one of the raids in this area, in Dhu¯ alQaʿda 697/August 1298.188 Baybars al-Muwaffaqı¯ was a mamluk of al-Muwaffaq, the governor of alRahba. He was sent as a gift to Qala¯wu¯n in 679/1280. It was said that he was ˙ manumitted by al-Ashraf Khalı¯l (690/1289–693/1293).189 Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ was originally a mamluk of a Za¯hirı¯ amir named Ja¯wul, ˙ during the reign of al-Za¯hir Baybars. After his master’s death he joined the ˙ 190 ranks of the Mansu¯riyya. ˙ Baktamur al-Silahda¯r served Qala¯wu¯n after he was a mamluk of al-Za¯hir ˙ ˙ Baybars. It seems that Baktamur joined Qala¯wu¯n’s service after al-Za¯hir ˙ 191 Baybars’ death (676/1277). Kujkun joined the ranks of the Mansu¯riyya, it seems, after the death of his ˙ master Sanjar al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯ in 686/1287.192 Kujkun is mentioned already in 687/1288 as an amir in Damascus.193 He was at that time in his thirties.194 Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj was a mamluk of an amir named Rukn al-Dı¯n al-Halabı¯ ˙ ˙ Alaktamur, who took him captive in the battle of ʿAyn Ja¯lu¯t. When al-Za¯hir ˙ Baybars arrested this amir, he took Baha¯dur into his service, and later Ba-

Zubda, 155; Durar (Cairo), 3:325. Niha¯ya, 31:41–43. See chapter three, n. 34. Zubda, 155; al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 60:324–325. Baybars’ first master was probably the governor of al-Rahba fortress, Muwaffaq al-Dı¯n Khidr ˙ al-Rahbı¯. It seems that Baybars al-Muwaffaqı¯ later joined˙ the service of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l and al-Na¯s˙ ir Muhammad. If he indeed was manumitted during the reign of the former sultan ˙ ˙ (689/1290–693/1293), then his training period lasted longer than the average, about ten years or more. See Durar (Hyderabad), 1:510–511; Manhal, 3:481; Aʿya¯n, 2:77. Shadhara¯t, 8:247; Durar (Cairo), 2:266; Sulu¯k, 2:674; Nuju¯m, 10:10. Durar (Cairo), 2:16; Aʿya¯n, 1:701. This amir is not the famous Sa¯lih¯ı amir Sanjar al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯ (d.699/1300) but another one of ˙ the same name who died in ˙686/1287. See Wa¯fı¯, 15:473. Niha¯ya, 31:159. Kujkun died in 749/1338–9 when he was about ninety (Dhuyu¯l al-ʿIbar, 207); Aʿya¯n, 1:149.

Prominent mamluks purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s sultanate or shortly before it

251

ha¯dur joined Qala¯wu¯n’s service.195 Baha¯dur was probably manumitted by alZa¯hir Baybars, since he is mentioned among the Za¯hirı¯ mamluks that re˙ ˙ ceived amirates from Qala¯wu¯n when he ascended to the sultanate in 678/ 1279.196 Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj, however, is often mentioned by the epithet “al˙ Mansu¯rı¯” and he played an integral part in the socio-political struggles of the ˙ 197 Mansu¯riyya. ˙ 9. Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ was educated in al-Bı¯ra by the amir Jama¯l al-Dı¯n Aqqu¯sh ˙ ˙ al-Mughı¯tı¯, the governor of that city. Tu¯gha¯n joined the Mansu¯riyya probably ˙ ˙ when Qala¯wu¯n was sultan. He received an amirate in Damascus and was appointed wa¯lı¯ al-barr of Damascus (governor of the dependencies of Damascus) in 682/1283. In Shaʿba¯n 683/October 1284 he was appointed also wa¯lı¯ of Damascus. A year later he was dismissed from his office of wa¯lı¯ of Damascus but kept the office of wa¯lı¯ al-barr.198 10. Sunqur al-Aʿsar was among the mamluks of Aydamur al-Za¯hirı¯, the gov˙ ernor of Damascus. He served his master as dawa¯da¯r. After Aydamur alZa¯hirı¯ was arrested in 678/1278, his mamluks were presented to Qala¯wu¯n and ˙ he chose Sunqur al-Aʿsar and a few others.199 Despite being an “outsider” to the Mansu¯riyya khushda¯shs, thanks to his talents he was appointed by Qa˙ la¯wu¯n as ustada¯r in Damascus already from the beginning of his reign. In 683/1284 Qala¯wu¯n added the office of shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Damascus to alAʿsar’s responsibilities.200 In 685/1286 he was dismissed from his office as shadd, but he returned to it in Rabı¯ʿ I/April 1289. Qala¯wu¯n gave him even more responsibilities, such as the shadd (supervisor) of the fortresses of Syria and of diwa¯n al-jaysh (bureau of the army).201 In the same year he was dispatched by Qala¯wu¯n to wa¯dı¯ Marı¯n near Baalbek in order to use the timber that was abundant in this place for building mangonels for the siege of Acre.202 After Qala¯wu¯n’s death, Sunqur served as wazir and headed important military expeditions.

195 Muqaffa¯, 2:504; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:500. 196 Sulu¯k, 1:672; Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 188. 197 See for example Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj’s mediation in the conflicts between Qutlu¯bak and Aqqu¯sh al-Afram (Aʿya¯n, 4:123). Ibn˙ Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ mentions that Baha¯dur al-Ha¯˙jj was “among the ˙ ¯ m, 9:216. greatest amirs of the Mansu¯riyya” (min kiba¯r al-Mansu¯riyya), see: Nuju ˙ ¯kh, 59:12; Niha¯ya, 31:119; ˙ Sulu¯k, 1:728. See on wa¯lı¯ Damascus: 198 Ta¯lı¯, 192–193; al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 228. 199 Aʿya¯n, 2:478; Wa¯fı¯, 15:497; Ta¯lı¯, 88. See on the arrest of Aydamur al-Za¯hirı¯: Sulu¯k, 1:657. 200 Niha¯ya, 31:119; al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh, 59:13. Shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Syria˙ had the same responsibilities as the shadd in Egypt, see: Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n, 222–224. 201 Wa¯fı¯, 15:497; Aʿya¯n, 2:479; Ibn al-Fura¯t, 8:90; Niha¯ya, 31:129. 202 Niha¯ya, 31:169.

252

Appendices

11. Kurt (Kurd) al-Mansu¯rı¯ was among the mamluks of Diya¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Mahmu¯d b. ˙ ˙ ˙ al-Khat¯ır, who was one of the amirs of al-Ru¯m who joined the Mamluk ˙ forces. Mahmu¯d b. al-Khat¯ır died in the battle of Abulustayn.203 ˙ ˙ 12. Balaba¯n al-Husaynı¯ (or: al-Hasanı¯) was an amı¯r janda¯r of sultan Qala¯wu¯n. ˙ ˙ Since he died in the plague of 749/1348–9 when he was about eighty, it is reasonable to assume that he was purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign or shortly before.204 ¯ s was purchased by Qala¯wu¯n during his sultanate. Baha¯dur A ¯s 13. Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ gained a relatively high position in Damascus during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign, though he is mentioned in the chronicles only after Qala¯wu¯n’s death.205

The Burjı¯ amirs206 1.

2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9.

Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯ was taken captive in one of the raids on the Mongols by Muhanna¯ b. ʿI¯sa¯, the leader of the Bedouin in Syria. Burlughay was given as a present to Qala¯wu¯n by Muhanna¯.207 Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯ was a mamluk of the wa¯fidı¯ Sharaf al-Dı¯n Awhad b. al˙ ˙ Khat¯ır. He was raised by Qala¯wu¯n as a child.208 ˙ Aydamur al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ was sent to Qala¯wu¯n as part of a gift of thirteen mamluks by the mother of the ruler of Amasya in al-Ru¯m (Anatolia) in 681/1282.209 Baybars al-Shuja¯ʿı¯210 Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯ Aybak al-Ru¯mı¯ al-Silahda¯r ˙ Aydamur al-Yu¯nusı¯ Aqqu¯sh al-Afram Baha¯dur al-Sanjarı¯

203 Aʿya¯n, 4:156; Sulu¯k, 1:629. Diya¯ʾ al-Dı¯n Mahmu¯d b. al-Khat¯ır and his brother Sharaf al-Dı¯n ˙ in al-Za¯hir ˙Baybars’ service and asked his were among the amirs of ˙al-Ru¯m who were ˙ assistance against the Mongols. They defected to the Mamluk army on the eve of the battle of Abulustayn, in 675/1276, see: Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks, 164–167. The Burjı¯ Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯ was originally a mamluk of Sharaf al-Dı¯n b. al-Khat¯ır (see n. 208 below). ˙ ¯ k, 2:793. ˙ 204 Muqaffa¯, 2:483; Sulu ¯ s was purchased by 205 Al-Jazarı¯, 2:410. Al-Jazarı¯ is the only historian to mention that Baha¯dur A ˙ Qala¯wu¯n during his sultanate. See p. 60 above. 206 Information about the Burjı¯ amirs appears in chapter one, section 3.2. The data above is only that which is not discussed in the body of the book. About the amirs’ affiliation to the Burjiyya, see appendix 1. 207 Nuju¯m, 9:16, Sulu¯k, 2:87–88, Kanz, 9:221. 208 See al-Yu¯sufı¯, 384; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:458; Aʿya¯n, 1:660; Sulu¯k, 1:193, 426. On Sharaf alDı¯n Awhad Ibn al-Khat¯ır al-Ru¯mı¯, see n. 203 above. ˙ ˙ 209 Zubda, 216–217. 210 Zubda, 216–217.

Prominent mamluks purchased during Qala¯wu¯n’s sultanate or shortly before it

10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

253

Baybars al-Ahmadı¯ ˙ Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r Baybars al-ʿAlamı¯ Baybars al-Ta¯jı¯ Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h ˙ Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯ Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯ Bala¯t al-Ju¯kanda¯r ˙ Butkha¯s al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ ˙ Tughjı¯ ˙ Tashtamur al-Jumaqda¯r ˙ Mughulta¯y al-Baʿlı¯ ˙ Mughulta¯y al-Masʿu¯dı¯ ˙ Sanjar al-Jumaqda¯r Sunqur al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ Qijma¯s al-Ju¯kanda¯r Qullı¯ al-Silahda¯r ˙ (Aydamur?) Al-Shaykhı¯ Ta¯kiz (Balaba¯n) al-Tughrı¯lı¯ ˙ Aqqu¯sh Kurjı¯ al-Matru¯h¯ı ˙ ˙ Sayf al-Dı¯n al-Luqma¯nı¯

The following four amirs were probably also affiliated to the Burjiyya, since they are always mentioned in the sources together as part of a group of Burjı¯ amirs: 31. Aldukuz al-Silahda¯r ˙ 32. La¯jı¯n Zı¯rba¯j 33. Sanjar al-Barwa¯nı¯ 34. Tughrı¯l al-I¯gha¯nı¯ ˙ Mamluks who moved from Qala¯wu¯n to other masters at a young age 1. Arghu¯n al-Dawa¯da¯r was purchased by Qala¯wu¯n for al-Na¯sir Muhammad and ˙ ˙ was educated with him.211 He is mentioned as sharing al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ exile in Kerak in 708/1309.212

211 Muqaffa¯, 2:19. 212 Zubda, 2:336.

254

Appendices

2. Aruqta¯y al-Ha¯jj was educated at the end of Qala¯wu¯n’s reign, and moved to al˙ ˙ Ashraf Khalı¯l and then to al-Na¯sir Muhammad, when he was still young.213 He ˙ ˙ is mentioned as sharing al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s exile in Kerak in 708/1309.214 ˙ ˙ 3. Aytamish al-Muhammadı¯, the brother of Aruqta¯y, it seems, was also given by ˙ ˙ Qala¯wu¯n to al-Ashraf Khalı¯l and then to al-Na¯sir Muhammad, though he ˙ ˙ might have moved directly from Qala¯wu¯n to al-Na¯sir Muhammad.215 He is ˙ ˙ mentioned as sharing al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s exile in Kerak in 708/1309.216 ˙ ˙ 4. Altunbugha¯ al-Sa¯lih¯ı al-Na¯sirı¯ was among the mamluks of sultan Qala¯wu¯n ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ and joined the mamluks of al-Na¯sir Muhammad, probably after Qala¯wu¯n’s ˙ ˙ death. He was most likely very young at that time and al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ (who could have been only a few years older than him) is said to have educated 217 him. 5. Aslam al-Qibja¯qı¯ was purchased by Qala¯wu¯n at the end of his reign, since he ˙ continued his training period as a novice in the citadel until al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s death, in 693/1293. With the death of this sultan, his mamluks were distributed among the amirs, and Aslam, who possibly did not complete his training ˙ period, joined a certain Sayf al-Dı¯n al-Aqqu¯shı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯. Soon after, ˙ probably, Aslam was transferred to the mamluks of Sala¯r, who appointed him ˙ silahda¯r.218 ˙

Appendix 6: The Mansu¯riyya amirs during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ ˙ third reign 1.

The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were executed ˙

1. 2. 3. 4. 5.

Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r (Burjı¯) (709/1310) Ta¯kiz (Balaba¯n) al-Tughrı¯lı¯ (Burjı¯) (ca. 709/1310) ˙ Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj (710/1310) Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h (Burjı¯) (710/1310) ˙ Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯ (Burjı¯) (710/1310)

213 Zubda, 2:30. 214 Zubda, 2:336. 215 Al-Maqrı¯zı¯ and al-Yu¯sufı¯ mention that Aytamish moved directly from Qala¯wu¯n to al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad (Muqaffa¯, 2:335; al-Yu¯sufı¯, 329. See also: Little, “Aitamisˇ”, 388). According to al˙ ¯, however, Aytamish was among the mamluks of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l (Aʿya¯n, 1:624). Safadı ˙ 216 Muqaffa ¯ , 2:336. 217 Altunbugha¯ died in 742/1341–2, when he was over fifty. Hence, it seems that he was pur˙ chased by Qala¯wu¯n towards the end of his reign. See: Nuju¯m, 10:73–74, 8:179; Sulu¯k, 2:614. 218 Muqaffa¯, 2:218.

The Mansu¯riyya amirs during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

2. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18.

Nu¯gha¯y al-Jamda¯r (710/1310) Sala¯r (710/1310) Asandamur Kurjı¯ (711/1312) Butkha¯s al-Mansu¯rı¯ (Burjı¯) (711/1312) ˙ ˙ Baybars al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ (712/1312) Baybars al-Ta¯jı¯ (712/1312 or after) Baybars al-Majnu¯n (715–6/1315–6, after four years in prison) Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r (716/1316, after five years in prison) Baynaja¯r (716/1316, after four years in prison) Qutlu¯bak (716/1316, after five years in prison) ˙ Aldukuz al-Ashrafı¯ (Burjı¯) (718/1318, after six years in prison) Kira¯y (718/1318, after eight years in prison. Natural death) Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯ (718/1318, after six years in prison) Aybak al-Ru¯mı¯ (Burjı¯) (after 713/1313) Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯ (Burjı¯) (722/1322 after thirteen years in prison) Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯ (Burjı¯) (728/1328) Tughjı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (Burjı¯) (738/1338) ˙ ˙ The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were arrested219 ˙ Tashtamur al-Jumaqda¯r (Burjı¯) 710/1310–711/1311 ˙ Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯ (Burjı¯) 709/1310–711/1311 ˙ ¯ s 715/1315–717/1317 Baha¯dur A ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Mansu¯rı¯ 710/1310–713/1313 ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ 712/1312–715/1315 Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ 712/1312–717/1317 ˙ Qijma¯s (Burjı¯) 709/1310–715/1315 Mankubars 709/1310 – … Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯ (Burjı¯) 712–3/1313; 726/1326–734/1333–4 Sanjar al-Barwa¯nı¯ (Burjı¯?) 712/1312–720/1320 Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ 720/1320–728/1328 Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ 712/1312–720/1320 ˙ ˙ Mughulta¯y al-Baʿlı¯ (Burjı¯) 709/1310–720/1320 ˙ Balaba¯n al-Shamsı¯ 714/1314–725/1325 Balaba¯n Turna¯ 714/1314–726/1326 ˙ La¯jı¯n Zı¯rba¯j (Burjı¯?) 712/1312–728/1328 Mughulta¯y al-Masʿu¯dı¯ (Burjı¯) 712/1312–732/1332 ˙ Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯ 715/1315–735/1335

219 The list is ordered according to the length of the periods of imprisonment.

255

256 19. 20. 21. 22. 23. 24.

3. 1. 2. 3.

4. 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. 13. 14. 15. 16. 17. 18. 19. 20. 21. 22.

Appendices

Baybars al-ʿAlamı¯ (Burjı¯) 712/1312–735/1335 Kashlı¯ 712/1312–735/1335 Balaba¯n al-Muhammadı¯ 711/1311–737/1337 ˙ Bala¯t al-Ju¯kanda¯r (Burjı¯) 709/1310–735/1335 ˙ Aydamur al-Yu¯nusı¯ (Burjı¯) … – 735/1335 Balaba¯n al-ʿAnqa¯wı¯ … – 732/1332(?)

The Mansu¯riyya amirs who defected to the Mongols ˙ Qara¯sunqur Aqqu¯sh al-Afram (Burjı¯) Aydamur al-Zaradka¯sh

The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were not arrested ˙ Qibjaq (710/1310) Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ (Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ) (710/1310) ˙ Aqjuba¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (710/1310) ˙ Murshid al-Khaznada¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ al-Tawa¯shı¯ (eunuch) – Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n ˙ ˙ (710/1311) Kaharda¯sh al-Zarra¯q al-Mansu¯rı¯ (714/1314) ˙ Qara¯la¯jı¯n al-Ustada¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ (715/1315) ˙ Mukhta¯r – Zahı¯r al-Dı¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ (known as al-Bilbı¯sı¯ al-Bakansı¯ al-Ta˙ ˙ ˙ wa¯shı¯) (eunuch) (716/1316) Muba¯rak al-Mansu¯rı¯ – Zayn al-Dı¯n (717/1317) ˙ Qullı¯ al-Silahda¯r. Burjı¯ (717/1317) ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Rahbı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (719/1319) ˙ ˙¯ Kitbugha¯ Raʾs Nawba al-ʿA dilı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (721/1321) ˙ Balaba¯n al-Tatarı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (725/1325) ˙ Ju¯ba¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ (728/1327) ˙ Baha¯dur al-Sanjarı¯. Burjı¯ (733/1333) Sanjar al-Kha¯zin al-Saru¯rı¯ al-Ashrafı¯ (735/1335) Baybars al-Awhadı¯ (740/1339) ˙ Kundughdı¯ al-Zarra¯q al-Mansu¯rı¯ (745/1345) ˙ Sanjar al-Jumaqda¯r (al-Bashmaqda¯r). Burjı¯ (745/1345) Baktamur al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ (745/1334–5) Baybars al-Ahmadı¯. Burjı¯ (746/1345) ¯ lmalik al-Ha¯˙ jj (747/1346–7) A ˙ Balaba¯n al-Husaynı¯ (or: al-Hasanı¯) (749/1348–9) ˙ ˙

The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were arrested by al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ ˙

23. 24. 25. 26. 27. 28. 29. 30.

257

Nukba¯y al-Barı¯dı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (749/1349) ˙ Ku¯ka¯y al-Silahda¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ (749/1349) ˙ ˙ Kujkun al-Mansu¯rı¯ (749/1349) ˙ Bakta¯sh al-Mansu¯rı¯ (757/1356) ˙ Baybars al-Shuja¯ʿı¯. Burjı¯ Aydamur al-Shuja¯ʿı¯. Burjı¯ (Aydamur?) al-Shaykhı¯. Burjı¯ Bı¯lı¯k al-ʿUthma¯nı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙

Appendix 7: The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were arrested by al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ Muhammad ˙ 1.

2.

220 221 222 223

Tashtamur al-Jumaqda¯r (Burjı¯) was imprisoned in Rabı¯ʿ I 710/August 1310 ˙ but released together with other Burjı¯ amirs already in 711/1311.220 Tashta˙ mur is not mentioned in the sources after his release, so it is reasonable to assume that he continued as an amir, like Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯ who was ˙ released together with him (see below). Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯ (Burjı¯) was arrested for the first time in Rabı¯ʿ II 712/ August 1312, but probably stayed in jail for a short period since already at the beginning of 713/May 1313 he was dispatched to al-Rahba as governor, after ˙ serving as shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Damascus.221 Baktu¯t was arrested again only in 726/1326 as a result of a disagreement with Tankiz, and was released in 734/1333.222 Until his second imprisonment he held several important offices, like ka¯shif al-qila¯ʿ al-shamı¯yya (supervisor of the fortresses in Syria), shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n and ustada¯r in Damascus, governor of Homs, amir in Damascus and shadd in Tripoli. After his release in 734/1333, Baktu¯t again became amir tablkha¯na¯h in Damascus, probably until his death as a result of ˙ the epidemic of 749/1348–9.223 Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯ served in all these positions despite being an associate of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r.224 Baktu¯t received an amirate at the beginning of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and Sala¯r’s joint rule, and during the conflict between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad he was sent by the former to capture Nu¯gha¯y al-Jamda¯r, who ˙ started the wave of defection to al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s side. ˙ ˙

Zetterstéen, 152; Kanz, 9:211. Sulu¯k, 2:123. Al-Yu¯sufı¯, 191; Sulu¯k, 2:272, 371; al-Jazarı¯, 3:607. Sulu¯k, 2:87, 105, 183, 192, 793; Niha¯ya, 32:182; Aʿya¯n, 1:717, 3:720; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:489–490; Nuju¯m, 10:237; Ayalon, “Bahrı¯ Mamlu¯ks”, 38. ˙ 224 Sulu¯k, 1:873; Nuju¯m, 8:251.

258 3.

4.

5.

Appendices

Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯ (Burjı¯) was arrested during the wave of arrests in ˙ Shawwa¯l 709/March 1310. However, he was released less than two years later and became one of the most prominent amirs in the Mamluk sultanate. He became an amir of one hundred and twenty mamluks, and one of the consultant (mashu¯ra) amirs of the sultan.225 In 715/1315 Aydamur was among the amirs who took part in al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s rawk reform.226 In 732/ ˙ ˙ 1332 he was amı¯r al-hajj and he died five years later in 737/1337.227 Aydamur ˙ al-Khat¯ırı¯ was one of the main supporters of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and only ˙ in the last stages of the conflict was he forced to move to al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad’s side.228 ˙ ¯ s was the governor of Safed and in 712/1312 became amir in Baha¯dur A ˙ Damascus.229 He was imprisoned in 715/1315 as a result of a disagreement with Tankiz. However, he was released two years later, and was immediately made amir tablkha¯na¯h in Damascus by the sultan.230 Later he became an ˙ amir of one hundred until his natural death in Damascus in 730/1329.231 Baha¯dur was one of the most senior amirs in Damascus and the head of the right wing of the army of Damascus.232 He is usually mentioned as one of alNa¯sir Muhammad’s supporters. When Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r was crowned ˙ ˙ sultan, Baha¯dur refused, at first, to swear allegiance to him.233 Later he assisted al-Na¯sir Muhammad to enlarge the circle of his supporters, by secretly ˙ ˙ ¯ s, together with Baybars alswearing the amirs to the latter.234 Baha¯dur A ˙ Mansu¯rı¯, suggested to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r that he leave Cairo and renounce ˙ his rule as sultan in favour of al-Na¯sir Muhammad.235 Later, these two ˙ ˙ Mansu¯rı¯ amirs captured Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r for al-Na¯sir Muhammad.236 ˙ ˙ ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Mansu¯rı¯ was imprisoned by al-Na¯sir Muhammad for three years, ˙ ˙ ˙ between 710/1310 and 713/1313, and after his release he was made an amir. In 719/1319 al-Na¯sir Muhammad made him amir tablkha¯na¯h and he was dis˙ ˙ ˙

225 Aʿya¯n, 1:660; Manhal, 3:181; Nuju¯m, 9:312. On the mashu¯ra amirs see: Holt, “The Structure” 48–49; Van Steenbergen, “Mamluk Elite”, 187, n. 65. 226 Sulu¯k, 2:146. 227 Sulu¯k, 2:351, 426; Kanz, 9:366; Nuju¯m, 9:312; Ayalon, “Bahrı¯ Mamlu¯ks”, 38; Clifford, 191. ˙ in 712/1312, but I did not find Clifford mentions that Aydamur was governor of Damascus this in the sources. 228 Sulu¯k, 2:78, Nuju¯m, 8:272. 229 Niha¯ya, 32:199. 230 Sulu¯k, 2:172, Nuju¯m, 9:41. 231 Aʿya¯n, 2:56; Sulu¯k, 2:326. 232 Al-Jazarı¯, 2:410; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:120. 233 Nuju¯m, 8:236. 234 Wa¯fı¯, 10:297; Aʿya¯n, 2:56–57; Nuju¯m, 8:245–246. 235 Nuju¯m, 2:270; Sulu¯k, 2:70. 236 See p. 197 above.

The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were arrested by al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ ˙

6.

237 238 239 240 241 242 243 244 245 246 247 248 249 250 251

259

patched together with other amirs to defeat the Bedouins in ʿAydha¯b.237 In 724/1324 he was sent out, probably from Cairo, to serve as amir in Damascus or Aleppo. He died three years later.238 Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ was in prison from Rabı¯ʿ II 712/August 1312 until Rajab 715/October 1315.239 Before and after his imprisonment, he gained a high and honourable position in the sultanate. He is mentioned as the only amir for whom al-Na¯sir Muhammad stood up out of respect.240 From Juma¯da¯ II 711/ ˙ ˙ October 1311 until his arrest he was governor of Damascus.241 Immediately after his release he was made an amir of one hundred and twenty.242 In 721/ 1321 he was the commander of the Mamluk force that defeated the Armenians in Aya¯s. He is mentioned as a commander also in the following year.243 In 723/1323 he was appointed as the manager of the hospital (bı¯ma¯rista¯n) in Cairo.244 In 727/1327 he was the amı¯r al-hajj of Egypt.245 In Muharram 734/ ˙ ˙ September 1333, however, he was exiled from Cairo and appointed governor of Tripoli.246 Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ was arrested in Juma¯da¯ II 735/January 1335 and died in prison less than a year later, in Juma¯da¯ I 736/December 1335.247 He was not executed but died as the result of an accident.248 Aqqu¯sh was one of the most loyal amirs (khawa¯ss) of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. When al-Na¯sir ˙˙ ˙ Muhammad arrived in Kerak in 708/1309 he exiled Aqqu¯sh since the latter ˙ tried to restrict the property of the former.249 Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r relied on Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ during his conflict with al-Na¯sir Muhammad, and it was ˙ ˙ only in the last stage, when al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s defeat was clear, that Aqqu¯sh alAshrafı¯ was forced to leave him and to join the supporters of al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad.250 Later, when al-Na¯sir Muhammad made his way to Cairo as ˙ ˙ ˙ the new sultan, Aqqu¯sh, together with other Burjı¯ amirs, planned to murder him.251 However, Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ is also mentioned as the one who ful-

Zetterstéen, 160. Durar (Hyderabad), 1:400; Zetterstéen, 174; Sulu¯k, 2:257; Muqaffa¯, 2:274. Aʿya¯n, 1:578; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:395. Kanz, 9:378; Wa¯fı¯, 9:336; Aʿya¯n, 1:578. Nuju¯m, 9:30; Sulu¯k, 2:105; Aʿya¯n, 1:578. Sulu¯k, 2:144, 159; Aʿya¯n, 1:578. Sulu¯k, 2:229, 236. Sulu¯k, 2:247. Sulu¯k, 2:290. Sulu¯k, 2:371; Kanz, 9:378. Sulu¯k, 2:405; Nuju¯m, 9:310. Manhal, 3:30; Aʿya¯n, 1:581. Niha¯ya, 32:139; Manhal, 3:469. Nuju¯m, 8:264, 9:4; Sulu¯k, 2:66. Sulu¯k, 2:73.

260

Appendices

filled all the orders of al-Na¯sir Muhammad already when the latter was exiled ˙ ˙ to Kerak in 697/1297.252 7. Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ was imprisoned in Alexandria for five years, from Rabı¯ʿ ˙ II 712/August 1312 to Juma¯da¯ I 717/July 1317. After his release he gained a high position in the sultanate until his death in Ramada¯n 725/August 1325. ˙ Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ became amir of one hundred and ra¯ʾs al-maysara.253 ˙ Before his arrestment he served as dawa¯da¯r and as na¯ʾib al-saltana for about ˙ a year.254 Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ tried to stay away from political conflicts. ˙ During the conflict between Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and al-Na¯sir Muhammad, ˙ ˙ he was –it seems – neutral at the beginning. Later he inclined to al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad’s side, when the latter’s power increased. When it became clear ˙ that Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r was going to lose, Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ advised the ˙ sultan to abdicate in favour of al-Na¯sir Muhammad. Afterward Baybars al˙ ˙ Mansu¯rı¯ captured Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, Sala¯r, and others, according to the ˙ orders of al-Na¯sir Muhammad. ˙ ˙ 8. Qijma¯s al-Ju¯kanda¯r (Burjı¯) was among the amirs who were arrested right after al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s arrival in Cairo, in Shawwa¯l 709/March 1310. He ˙ ˙ was released five and a half years later, in Rabı¯ʿ II 715/July 1315 and made amir tablkha¯na¯h.255 In 734/1334 he was appointed governor of Homs and ˙ died in the same year.256 Qijma¯s was one of the greatest supporters and associates of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and was loyal to him until the last stages of his conflict with al-Na¯sir Muhammad.257 ˙ ˙ 9. Mankubars (or: Baybars) al-Mansu¯rı¯ was arrested together with Qijma¯s and ˙ other confidants of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. It is not mentioned when he was released, but he died in 718/1318, probably as the governor of ʿAjlu¯n. He is mentioned as one of the veteran Mansu¯rı¯ amirs who gained a high position in ˙ the sultanate.258 10. Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ was arrested in the big wave of arrests in Rabı¯ʿ II 712/ ˙ ˙ August 1312. He was released in Safar 720/March 1320.259 Al-Na¯sir Mu˙ ˙ hammad made him an amir of ten and sent him to Safed, where he held the ˙ office of na¯ʾib al-qalʿa, until his death in 724/1324. Before his arrest he was shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n and ustada¯r in Damascus.260 252 253 254 255 256 257 258 259 260

Sulu¯k, 1:832–833; Zubda, 314; Niha¯ya, 31:331. Durar (Hyderabad), 1:509–510; Niha¯ya, 32:252; Sulu¯k, 2:172. Sulu¯k, 2:103; Nuju¯m, 9:30. See Baybars’ self-testimony: Tuhfa, 228. ˙ Niha¯ya, 32:222; Sulu¯k, 2:144; Nuju¯m, 9:41. Sulu¯k, 2:371, 377; Ayalon, “Bahrı¯ Mamlu¯ks”, 38. Nuju¯m, 8:261,271; Sulu¯k, 2:64, ˙71. Nuju¯m, 9:243; Sulu¯k, 76, 189. Sulu¯k, 2:202; Aʿya¯n, 2:623. Ta¯lı¯, 193; Aʿya¯n, 2:623; Nuju¯m, 9:27; Sulu¯k, 2:94, 100. According to Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯, ˙ Tu¯gha¯n stayed in his prison in Kerak until his death after 720/1320, see: Durar (Hyderabad), ˙

The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were arrested by al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ ˙

261

11. Sanjar al-Barwa¯nı¯ was arrested, according to most of the sources, from Rabı¯ʿ II 712/August 1312 to Safar 720/March 1320, like Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯.261 Ac˙ ˙ ˙ cording to Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯, however, he was released only in 727/1327 ˙ and served as an amir tablkha¯na¯h in Cairo until his death in 731/1331.262 ˙ 12. Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ was arrested only in 720/1320 as a result of a disagreement with Tankiz, the governor of Damascus. In 726/1326 he was transferred to prison in Alexandria and a year later to a more comfortable incarceration in one of the burjs of Cairo citadel.263 In Dhu¯ al-Hijja 728/September 1328 he ˙ was released after eight years and three months.264 Al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ appointed him governor of Gaza from Juma¯da¯ I 711/October 1311 until his arrest nine years later. The sultan placed several other places in Palestine under his supervision and gave him a vast iqta¯ʿ.265 In 713/1313 he was sent to ˙ Syria to assist the sultan in his rawk reform.266 Four years later al-Ja¯wulı¯ is mentioned as a commander of a Mamluk force that besieged a Bedouin force near Jerusalem.267 After his release at the end of 728/1328, he gained an even higher position than he had had before his arrestment. At first he was an amir tablkha¯na¯h, but soon he became an amir of one hundred and one of the ˙ consultant amirs (mashu¯ra) of the sultan.268 In 732/1332 he was among the amirs who performed the hajj pilgrimage together with the sultan. According ˙ to al-Maqrı¯zı¯, he was then an amir tablkha¯na¯h. Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯, however, ˙ mentions him among the amirs of one hundred.269 During this decade Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ was appointed as the na¯zir of the hospital in Cairo.270 In 741/1341, ˙ the year of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s death, Sanjar is still mentioned as one of ˙ 271 ˙ the senior mashu¯ra amirs. Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ continued his career also after al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s death. In 743/1343 he was appointed governor of ˙ ˙ Homs for three months, later was the governor of Gaza for a similar period and then he returned to his senior amirate in Cairo.272 Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ held

261 262 263 264 265 266 267 268 269 270 271 272

2:228. Tu¯gha¯n was arrested for a very short time before 712/1312, see: Tuhfa, 223–224; Durar ˙ ˙ (Hyderabad), 2:228. Sulu¯k, 2:202; Niha¯ya, 32:318; Zetterstéen, 170. Durar (Hyderabad), 2:173; Sulu¯k, 2:338. Sulu¯k, 2:274, 286. Sulu¯k, 2:209, 299, 304; Nuju¯m, 9:90; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:78. Sulu¯k, 2:101; Tuhfa, 227. Al-Safadı¯ mentions that Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ was also the governor of ˙ Nablus, ˙Qaqun, Lod and Ramla, see: Wa¯fı¯, 15:483. Jerusalem, Hebron, Sulu¯k, 2:127; Nuju¯m, 9:36. Sulu¯k, 2:176. Aʿya¯n, 2:469; Wa¯fı¯, 15:483; Sulu¯k, 2:274. Sulu¯k, 2:352; Kanz, 9:366. Sulu¯k, 2:420. Nuju¯m, 9:164. Sulu¯k, 2:620; Aʿya¯n, 2:469; Wa¯fı¯, 15:483.

262

Appendices

other offices until he was murdered in Ramada¯n 745/January 1345.273 ˙ The political inclination of Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ is puzzling. On the one hand, he is mentioned as a close associate of al-Na¯sir Muhammad. He served al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ ˙ Muhammad as his ustada¯r during his second reign and took care of all his ˙ 274 interests. As described above, Sanjar also was sent by al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ in order to persuade Sala¯r to come to Cairo, where he was executed. Sanjar alJa¯wulı¯ even brought Sala¯r’s extensive property from his house to the sultan’s treasury.275 On the other hand, there are several testimonies that Sanjar alJa¯wulı¯ was an opponent of al-Na¯sir Muhammad. Sanjar served Kitbugha¯ and ˙ ˙ Butkha¯s, the latter’s mamluk; he was Sala¯r’s closest friend; he was sent by ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Afram, the governor of Damascus, in order to prevent al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad from entering Damascus and he joined al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ ˙ coalition only at a late stage, when Aqqu¯sh al-Afram escaped from Damascus.276 It seems that Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ was an associate of both al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad and Sala¯r, maneuvered between the two, and inclined in the end ˙ to al-Na¯sir Muhammad in order to protect his life and position. Sanjar is ˙ ˙ mentioned as the one who washed the dead bodies of both al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad and Sala¯r.277 ˙ 13. Aydamur al-Yu¯nusı¯ (Burjı¯) was probably imprisoned for a long period that exceeded eight years, though it is not mentioned when he was arrested. In 727/1327 he was transferred with other amirs from Alexandria to Cairo, where he was imprisoned in al-Jubb (lit.: the pit) jail.278 Aydamur was released in Rajab 735/March 1335 together with other amirs and was made amir in Tripoli.279 His death year is not mentioned. Aydamur was a supporter of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r and one of his associates from the Burjiyya.280 14. Mughulta¯y al-Baʿlı¯ (Burjı¯) was arrested for about ten years, from 709/1310 to ˙ 720/1320. His death year is not mentioned. He was a confidant of Baybars alJa¯shnakı¯r. When the latter became sultan, he sent Mughulta¯y to Kerak in ˙ order to confiscate the property that al-Na¯sir Muhammad took with him.281 ˙ ˙

273 274 275 276 277 278 279 280 281

Aʿya¯n, 2:468; Sulu¯k, 2:674. Manhal, 6:75; Wa¯fı¯, 15:472; Aʿya¯n, 2:468. Nuju¯m, 9:17. Nuju¯m, 8:261, 265. About Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯’s service to Kitbugha¯ and his mamluk, see: Sulu¯k, 2:674. Nuju¯m, 9:18–19; Durar (Hyderabad), 2:171. Sulu¯k, 2:286. Sulu¯k, 2:387; Kanz, 9:393. Zubda, 406; Nuju¯m, 8:235–236. Aʿya¯n, 5:125; Durar (Hyderabad), 4:355.

The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were arrested by al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ ˙

263

15. Balaba¯n al-Shamsı¯ was arrested only in 714/1314. He was released in 725/ 1325 and served as amir in Damascus and Aleppo until his death in 745/ 1345.282 16. Balaba¯n Turna¯ was arrested also in 714/1314, as a result of a dispute with ˙ Tankiz. He was released in Shaʿba¯n 726/July 1326, made an amir tablkha¯na¯h ˙ in Damascus and later an amir of one hundred. He was one of Tankiz’s associates, and died in Damascus in Rabı¯ʿ I 734/November 1333.283 17. La¯jı¯n Zı¯rba¯j al-Ja¯shnakı¯r al-ʿUmarı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ was arrested during the wave ˙ of arrests in Rabı¯ʿ II 712/August 1312 and released at the end of 728/October 1328, after more than sixteen years.284 He died three years later, in Safar 731/ ˙ November 1330 as a result of the plague in Cairo.285 La¯jı¯n Zı¯rba¯j was one of the loyal associates of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. He took the army’s allegiance to the sultan after the caliph crowned Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r as sultan for the second time, during the conflict with al-Na¯sir Muhammad.286 Until his arrest ˙ ˙ he was one of the senior amirs.287 18. Mughulta¯y al-Masʿu¯dı¯ (Burjı¯) was imprisoned for twenty years, from Rabı¯ʿ II ˙ 712/August 1312 to 732/1332. He died two months after his release.288 Before his arrest he was an amir of one hundred and one of the senior amirs in the sultanate.289 Mughulta¯y was probably one of the Burjı¯ amirs who were loyal ˙ to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. However, according to Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, ˙ Mughulta¯y deliberately delayed pursuing Nu¯gha¯y al-Jamda¯r and the other ˙ amirs who defected to Kerak, in order to save the sultanate of al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad.290 ˙ 19. Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯ was also imprisoned for twenty years, from Rabı¯ʿ II 715/July 1315 to 735/1335.291 After his release he was batta¯l in Damascus, and later he ˙˙ was made amir tablkha¯na¯h and amir of one hundred. He was among the ˙ honourable kha¯ssakiyya amirs of al-Na¯sir Muhammad. He died in Cairo in ˙ ˙˙ ˙ 282 Sulu¯k, 2:264, 269, 675; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:494; Nuju¯m, 10:115. 283 Durar (Hyderabad), 1:494; Aʿya¯n, 2:45; Sulu¯k, 2:377; Nuju¯m, 9:304. According to Ibn alDawa¯da¯rı¯, after his release, Balaba¯n Turna¯ was sent to Aleppo as an amir (Kanz, 9:320). Al˙ including himself (Sulu¯k, 2:377), mentions Balaba¯n Maqrı¯zı¯, contradicting all other sources Turna¯ among the amirs who were executed in 716/1316 (Sulu¯k, 2:168). ˙ ¯ k, 2:298; Aʿya¯n, 4:180; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:271. While al-Maqrı¯zı¯ mentions that in 284 Sulu Rajab 727/ May 1327 La¯jı¯n Zı¯rba¯j was transferred to al-Jubb prison in the Cairo citadel (Sulu¯k, 2:286), according to al-Yu¯sufı¯, La¯jı¯n was released in this year, see: Al-Yu¯sufı¯, 234. 285 Kanz, 9:358; Durar (Hyderabad),3 :271; Sulu¯k, 2:338. 286 Zubda, 406; Nuju¯m, 8:223. 287 Tuhfa, 231, 235. ˙¯ k, 2:351, 355. 288 Sulu 289 Sulu¯k, 2:54; Tuhfa, 231. ˙ ¯ m, 8:250. 290 Zubda, 414; Nuju 291 Sulu¯k, 2:378; Aʿya¯n, 2:108; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:519. According to Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯, Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯ was arrested in 714/1314 (Kanz, 9:283, 293).

264

20.

21.

22.

23.

Appendices

743/1343.292 Before his arrest he was governor of Homs and in 711/1311 he is mentioned as one of the senior amirs in the sultanate.293 In Rabı¯ʿ I 712/July 1312 he was appointed governor of Tripoli.294 Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯ is not mentioned as supporting either al-Na¯sir Muhammad or Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. ˙ ˙ However, when al-Na¯sir Muhammad entered Damascus, Tamur arrived ˙ ˙ there with the army of Homs to welcome him.295 He was the head of the muqaddama that marched in front of al-Na¯sir Muhammad on his way to ˙ ˙ Cairo.296 Baybars al-ʿAlamı¯ was one of the senior Burjı¯ amirs. He was arrested already in 709/1310.297 However, he was released shortly after and was arrested again during the big wave of arrests in Rabı¯ʿ 712/August 1312. This time he stayed in prison for about twenty-three years until his release in 735/1335.298 Baybars al-ʿAlamı¯ moved to al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s side during the latter’s first ˙ ˙ attempt to enter Damascus.299 Kashlı¯ was imprisoned from 712/1312 to 735/1335.300 Though he is not mentioned explicitly as a mamluk of Qala¯wu¯n, he was arrested together with several other Mansu¯rı¯ amirs in 712/1312.301 It is reasonable to assume that ˙ Kashlı¯ was made amir again after his release, like all of his friends. Indeed, he might be identified with the amir named Kashlı¯ (which is not a common name) who is mentioned as the wa¯lı¯ of Qu¯s who died there in 740/1339.302 ˙ Bala¯t al-Ju¯kanda¯r (Burjı¯) was imprisoned for about twenty-five years, from ˙ Shawwa¯l 709/March 1310 to Rajab 735/June 1335. After his release he became amir in Tripoli.303 Bala¯t was one of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s greatest ˙ supporters.304 Balaba¯n (or: Turunta¯y) al-Muhammadı¯ was arrested for a similar period to ˙ ˙ ˙ Bala¯t, from 711/1311 to 737/1337, and after his release also became an amir ˙

292 Aʿya¯n, 2:108; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:519; Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ and al-Maqrı¯zı¯ mention that Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯ died at the end of 742/May 1342 (Nuju¯m, 10:77; Sulu¯k, 2:616). 293 Tuhfa, 231. ˙¯ k, 2:118; Nuju¯m, 9:34; Kanz, 9:243; Niha¯ya, 32:195. 294 Sulu 295 Nuju¯m, 8:268; Sulu¯k, 2:68–69; Niha¯ya, 32:152. 296 Tuhfa, 201. ˙¯ k, 2:84. 297 Sulu 298 Aʿya¯n, 2:108; Kanz, 9:393; Sulu¯k, 2:84, 378. Al-Maqrı¯zı¯ mentions Baybars al-ʿAlamı¯’s name among the amirs who were executed in 716/1316 (Sulu¯k, 2:168), though the same author mentions in the same source that in 727/1327 Baybars al-ʿAlamı¯ was among the amirs who were moved later to al-Jubb prison in Cairo citadel (Sulu¯k, 2:286). 299 Niha¯ya, 32:150. 300 Aʿya¯n, 2:108; Kanz, 9:393. 301 Aʿya¯n, 2:77–78. 302 al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, 90. 303 Sulu¯k, 2:378; Kanz, 9:393. 304 Zubda, 406; Sulu¯k, 2:46; Nuju¯m, 8:235, 251.

The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were neither arrested nor put to death ˙

265

(of ten) in Tripoli. Later he served as amir in Damascus until his death in 745/ 1345.305 24. Balaba¯n (or: Baybars) al-ʿAnqa¯wı¯ was arrested by al-Na¯sir Muhammad and ˙ ˙ released, probably close to his death, in Ramada¯n 732/May 1332. He was an ˙ 306 amir tablkha¯na¯h in Damascus. ˙

Appendix 8: The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were neither arrested nor ˙ put to death by al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ 1.

2. 3.

4.

5.

6.

305 306 307 308 309 310

Qibjaq served one year as the governor of Aleppo, until his death from a disease in Juma¯da¯ I 710/September 1310.307 Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ (Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ) died in Rajab 710/November 1310 as an ˙ amir of one hundred.308 Aqjuba¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ died in Rabı¯ʿ II 710/September 1310. He served as gov˙ ernor of Damascus and Gaza, shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n and ustada¯r in Damascus. It seems that he continued to serve as shadd in Damascus until his death.309 Murshid al-Khaznada¯r (eunuch) served as muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya during Qala¯wu¯n’s reign. He died in Dhu¯ al-Qaʿda 710/March 1311 in ˙ Cairo, or according to Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯, six years later. He served as ˙ zama¯m al-da¯r and khazanda¯r.310 Kaharda¯sh al-Zarra¯q al-Mansu¯rı¯ served as an amir of fifty in Damascus from ˙ the beginning of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign until his death at home in ˙ 311 ˙ Shaʿba¯n 714/November 1314. In 712/1312 he was among the amirs who accompanied the sultan on the hajj pilgrimage.312 Kaharda¯sh was one of the ˙ amirs who were sent by Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r to prevent Nu¯gha¯y al-Jamda¯r’s defection to al-Na¯sir Muhammad in Kerak. Hence, he was definitely not one ˙ ˙ of the confidants of al-Na¯sir Muhammad.313 ˙ ˙ Qara¯la¯jı¯n was amir of one hundred in Egypt. In Dhu¯ al-Hijja 709/April 710, ˙ al-Na¯sir Muhammad continued his appointment as amı¯r majlis. Later, ˙ ˙ Qara¯la¯jı¯n was appointed ustada¯r until his death in Shaʿba¯n 715/November

Sulu¯k, 2:418, 675; Nuju¯m, 10:115. See pp. 202–203 above. Nuju¯m, 9:216. Niha¯ya, 32:172; Wa¯fı¯, 9:335; Sulu¯k, 2:96; Amitai, “Military Elite”, 153. Niha¯ya, 32:173. Zetterstéen, 154; Sulu¯k, 2:96; Durar (Hyderabad), 4:245. The zama¯m al-da¯r was in charge of the door that separated the sultan or the amir and his servants and eunuchs, see: al-Qalqashandı¯ (Cairo), 5:459–460. 311 Nuju¯m, 9:228; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:269–270; Aʿya¯n, 4:162; Niha¯ya, 32:216. 312 Sulu¯k, 2:77; Nuju¯m, 9:228. 313 Nuju¯m, 8:251.

266

Appendices

1315. In 711/1311 he is mentioned among the most senior amirs in Egypt. In the same year he was one of the amirs of one hundred who were sent to fight against the Mongols who planned to attack Syria. In his death year he held the iqta¯ʿ of an amir of one hundred and twenty horsemen.314 ˙ 7. Mukhta¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ al-Bakansı¯ al-Bilbaysı¯ (eunuch) served as amir tabl˙ ˙ kha¯na¯h and khazanda¯r in the Damascus citadel. He died in 716/1316.315 8. Muba¯rak al-Mansu¯rı¯, though not identified with certainty as a mamluk of ˙ Qala¯wu¯n, is mentioned as an amir of fifty in Damascus. He moved to Tripoli and became blind, but later his sight was restored. He died in 717/1317.316 9. Qullı¯ al-Silahda¯r (Burjı¯) was an amir of one hundred from the beginning of ˙ al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign and probably until his death. He was one ˙ ˙ of the high-ranking amirs in the sultanate in the year 711/1311.317 In 712/1312 and 714/1314 he is mentioned as one of the amirs of one hundred.318 He died in Cairo in 717/1317.319 Qullı¯ was one of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s main supporters. He is mentioned several times together with the Burjı¯ amirs who were loyal to him, and was among the amirs who received the army’s allegiance on behalf of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r.320 Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ mentions, ˙ however, that when Qullı¯ was sent together with Mughulta¯y al-Masʿu¯dı¯ to ˙ stop Nu¯gha¯y al-Jamda¯r, who was on his way to al-Na¯sir Muhammad in ˙ ˙ Kerak, they deliberately delayed their pursuit of the defectors in order to save 321 al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s sultanate. Unlike his friend Mughulta¯y, who was ˙ ˙ ˙ imprisoned for twenty years as mentioned above, Qullı¯ was not arrested at all and became one of the senior amirs of the sultanate. 10. Aqqu¯sh al-Rahbı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ served as wa¯lı¯ of Damascus for more than ˙ ˙ eleven years, from 707/1307 to 719/1319. Tankiz captured him in Dhu¯ al-Hijja ˙ 714/March 1315, but only confiscated his property. From Safar 719/March ˙ 1319 until his death, four months later, Aqqu¯sh served as shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Damascus.322 ¯ dilı¯) al-Mansu¯rı¯ was invited from Aleppo to 11. Kitbugha¯ Raʾs Nawba (al-ʿA ˙ Damascus when al-Na¯sir Muhammad arrived in Cairo in 709/1310, and was ˙ ˙ appointed shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n and ustada¯r there.323 In the next year he was

314 315 316 317 318 319 320 321 322 323

Sulu¯k, 2:159; Nuju¯m, 9:232; Zetterstéen, 148, 152; Tuhfa, 235. ˙ Sulu¯k, 2:198; Nuju¯m, 9:237; Niha¯ya, 32:244; Bida¯ya, 14:63. Aʿya¯n, 4:190; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:275–276. Tuhfa, 231. ˙ Amitai, “Military Elite”, 149; Sulu¯k, 2:139; Kanz, 9:284. See also: Nuju¯m, 9:39–40; Sulu¯k, 2:138. Nuju¯m, 9:241; Sulu¯k, 2:180. Nuju¯m, 8:233. Zubda, 414; Nuju¯m, 8:250. Aʿya¯n, 1:576–577; Bida¯ya, 14:74, 76. Bida¯ya, 14:43; Ta¯lı¯, 188.

The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were neither arrested nor put to death ˙

12.

13.

14.

15.

324 325 326 327 328 329 330 331 332 333 334 335 336

267

amı¯r al-hajj of Damascus.324 Later he became amir of one hundred and the ˙ chief ha¯jib in Damascus. He died in Shawwa¯l 721/November 1321.325 ˙ Balaba¯n al-Tatarı¯ was one of the senior amirs of Qala¯wu¯n, as al-Safadı¯ and ˙ Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ note. However, he is mentioned in the sources only during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. In 713/1313 he was amı¯r al-hajj. He died ˙ ˙ ˙ in Dhu¯ al-Qaʿda 725/October 1325.326 Ju¯ba¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ is mentioned as a mamluk of al-Ashraf Khalı¯l who made ˙ him an amir.327 It seems, then, that he moved to al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s mamluks at a relatively early stage of his education. Ju¯ba¯n, on the one hand, secretly swore allegiance to al-Na¯sir Muhammad and promised to assist him in his ˙ ˙ conflict with Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r.328 On the other hand, Ju¯ba¯n was sent to block the roads to Damascus in order to prevent al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ entrance to the city.329 He moved to al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s side only when ˙330 ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Afram was forced to leave Damascus. However, al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad appointed him a high-ranking amir in Damascus until his death ˙ there, in Safar 728/December 1327. As a result of a dispute with Tankiz, he ˙ moved to Cairo for one and half years in 721/1321, but after that returned to Syria. In 726/1326 he was the amı¯r al-hajj of Syria.331 ˙ Baha¯dur al-Sanjarı¯ (Burjı¯) served during the first decade of the 8th/14th century as the governor of Damascus citadel, na¯ʾib al-ghayba, manager of the hospital of Damascus and other offices.332 In Ramada¯n 711/January 1312 ˙ he became governor of al-Bı¯ra.333 Twenty years later he was appointed governor of Gaza, and after few months, in 733/1732 he was appointed governor of Homs where he died shortly after, in 733/1333.334 Sanjar al-Kha¯zin served about one year as shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Egypt at the beginning of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign.335 Later he was the wa¯lı¯ of ˙ ˙ Bahnasa¯ district in southern Egypt. In 712/1312 he was appointed the wa¯lı¯ of Cairo and an amir of fifty horsemen, an office he held, continuously or alternately, until 724/1324.336 He kept his rank as amir of fifty until his death. Durar (Hyderabad), 3:264. Ta¯lı¯, 188; Bida¯ya, 14:81; Sulu¯k, 2:234. Aʿya¯n, 2:48; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:493; Nuju¯m, 9:266; Sulu¯k, 2:270. Durar (Hyderabad), 1:542; Aʿya¯n, 2:172. Nuju¯m, 8:260; Sulu¯k, 2:63. Nuju¯m, 8:261; Sulu¯k, 2:63. Nuju¯m, 8:265. Aʿya¯n, 2:172; Sulu¯k, 2:304; Nuju¯m, 9:62. Bida¯ya, 14:15; Aʿya¯n, 2:61; Sulu¯k, 1:949. Sulu¯k, 2:106; Aʿya¯n, 2:61–62. Sulu¯k, 2:371; Zetterstéen, 187; al-Jazarı¯, 3:593. Zetterstéen, 153. Zetterstéen, 175; al-Jazarı¯, 3:807.

268

16. 17.

18.

19.

20.

Appendices

Indeed, he is mentioned among the amirs of Egypt in 732/1332.337 He died in Juma¯da¯ II 735/February 1335 when he was about ninety.338 Baybars al-Awhadı¯ served as wa¯lı¯ of Cairo citadel from 720/1320 until 736/ ˙ 1336. He died in 740/1339.339 Kundughdı¯ al-Zarra¯q al-Mansu¯rı¯ was one of the senior amirs in Egypt. He ˙ was ra¯ʾs al-maysara and commanded the Mamluk forces that were dispatched to Cilicia. He died in 745/1345 in Aleppo.340 Sanjar al-Jumaqda¯r (or al-Bashmaqda¯r) (Burjı¯) served as an amir of one hundred and was one of the consultant amirs (mashu¯ra) of the sultan. He is mentioned as one of the amirs of one hundred who commanded the Mamluk ¯ s’s death in 730/ raids on Cilicia in 714/1314 and in 722/1322. After Baha¯dur A ˙ 1329, Sanjar was transferred from Cairo to Damascus and received Baha¯dur’s iqta¯ʿ, the iqta¯ʿ of an amir of one hundred. Sanjar continued to serve as amir ˙ ˙ in Damascus until his death of old age in 745/1345.341 Baktamur al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ is not mentioned as a prominent amir before al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad’s third reign. Since he also died quite late, he probably belonged ˙ to the younger generations of the Mansu¯riyya mamluks. From Shaʿba¯n 715/ ˙ November 1315 to 723/1323 he served as the sultan’s ustada¯r, and then he moved to Damascus.342 In 730/1329 he was appointed governor of Gaza.343 In 735/1335 he moved to serve as governor of Homs.344 In 739/1338 he was, probably, again appointed governor of Homs, where he remained until his death in 745/1344–5.345 Baybars al-Ahmadı¯ (Burjı¯) was a khushda¯sh and a close associate of Aybak ˙ al-Ru¯mı¯, one of the most loyal Burjı¯ amirs of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. However, whereas Aybak was captured and probably died in prison, Baybars al-Ah˙ madı¯, who was captured together with his friend in 713/1313, was released immediately after and continued to serve as amir of one hundred during all

337 Kanz, 9:368; al-Jazarı¯, 3:807. 338 Durar (Hyderabad), 2:172; Aʿya¯n, 2:471; Sulu¯k, 2:120, 387–388; Nuju¯m, 9:305. Al-Safadı¯ ˙ (Aʿya¯n, 2:471) mentions that he thinks that Sanjar al-Kha¯zin was imprisoned in 715/1315. However, if he was imprisoned he was released in the same year, since he is mentioned as the wa¯lı¯ of Cairo in the same year. 339 Zetterstéen, 170; Sulu¯k, 2:399, 504–505; Kanz, 9:368. Al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ mentions this amir as Balaba¯n al-Awhadı¯, who served as wa¯lı¯ of the citadel’s gate (al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, 89). ˙ Sulu¯k, 2:675. 340 Nuju¯m, 10:115; 341 Aʿya¯n, 2:465; Durar (Hyderabad), 2:173–174; Sulu¯k, 2:236, 675; Nuju¯m, 10:115; al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, 276. On the expeditions to Cilicia see: Sulu¯k, 2:139, 234; Kanz, 9:284, 309. Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ mentions Sanjar as “al-Bashmaqda¯r” (Nuju¯m, 10:115). 342 Zetterstéen, 148; Sulu¯k, 2:246. 343 Sulu¯k, 2:317. 344 Sulu¯k, 2:379. 345 Sulu¯k, 2:459, 675.

The Mansu¯riyya amirs who were neither arrested nor put to death ˙

21.

22.

23.

24.

346 347 348 349 350 351 352 353 354 355 356 357 358 359

269

of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign.346 In 709/1310 he was appointed as amı¯r ˙ ˙ janda¯r.347 In 732/1332 he is still mentioned as one of the most honoured amirs of the sultanate, and among the amirs of one hundred who performed the hajj pilgrimage together with the sultan.348 After al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ ˙ death he kept his high position and was one of the main decision makers in the sultanate. Later he was the governor of Safed (742–3/1342) and Tripoli (1342–5/743–6) and then returned to serve as amı¯r janda¯r in Cairo. He died in Muharram 746/May 1345 when he was in his eighties or over seventy.349 ˙ ¯ lmalik A managed to recommend himself to al-Na¯sir Muhammad already ˙ ˙ when he served as a messenger between al-Na¯sir Muhammad in Kerak and ˙ ˙ ¯ lmalik became an amir of one hunsultan Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r in Cairo. A dred and a member of the sultan’s kha¯ssakiyya during al-Na¯sir Mu˙˙ ˙ ¯ lmalik hammad’s third reign.350 In 732/1332 A was one of the amirs who ˙ accompanied the sultan on the hajj pilgrimage.351 In 741/1341, the year of al˙ ¯ lmalik Na¯sir Muhammad’s death, A was one of the senior consultant amirs.352 ˙ ˙ ¯ lmalik was appointed as After al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s death, in 744/1343, A ˙ ˙ na¯ʾib al-saltana. He died in 747/1346–7.353 ˙ Balaba¯n al-Husaynı¯ (or: al-Hasanı¯), who was Qala¯wu¯n’s amı¯r janda¯r,354 ˙ ˙ served as governor of al-Jı¯za district and in 729/1329 was appointed as wa¯lı¯ of Damietta.355 During the 730s/1330s, he was one of the jamda¯riyya amirs in Egypt and a wazir.356 He died in the plague of 749/1348–9 when he was over eighty.357 Nukba¯y al-Barı¯dı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ is mentioned only in the later years of al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ Muhammad’s third reign. In 737/1337 he was appointed as wa¯lı¯ of Qatya¯ and ˙ ˙ three years later moved to serve as wa¯lı¯ of Alexandria. Later he became an amir tablkha¯na¯h and mihma¯nda¯r in Cairo. He died in 749/1349.358 ˙ Ku¯ka¯y al-Silahda¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ was an amir of one hundred who owned a lot ˙ ˙ of property during the entire third reign of al-Na¯sir Muhammad. He died in ˙ ˙ the plague of 749/1348–9.359 Sulu¯k, 2:81. Zetterstéen, 149. Kanz, 9:365–366. Sulu¯k, 2:698; Nuju¯m, 10:143. Durar (Cairo), 1:439; Manhal, 3:85. Sulu¯k, 2:351. Nuju¯m, 9:164. Nuju¯m, 10:87; Sulu¯k, 2:640, 723. Muqaffa¯, 2:483. Sulu¯k, 2:310. Kanz, 9:368, 374, 380. Sulu¯k, 2:793; Nuju¯m, 10:237. Sulu¯k, 2:410, 491, 797; Nuju¯m, 10:242. Aʿya¯n, 4:162–163; Wa¯fı¯, 24:376; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:270; Nuju¯m, 10:24; Sulu¯k, 2:796.

270

Appendices

25. Kujkun al-Mansu¯rı¯ served as an amir in Damascus until his death of old age ˙ in 749/1349. According to several historians, al-Na¯sir Muhammad lowered ˙ ˙ his rank to amir of ten and wished for his death. However, according to alShuja¯ʿı¯, Kujkun was an amir of one hundred in Damascus. Indeed, in 722/ 1322 Kujkun commanded the expedition to Aya¯s, together with Aqqu¯sh alAshrafı¯, who held the rank of amir of one hundred and twenty. Two years earlier, Kujkun was the commander of a Mamluk force that aimed to attack the Mongols around the area of Sinja¯r. It is reasonable to assume, then, that Kujkun was a high-ranking amir during most, if not all, of al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad’s third reign.360 ˙ 26. Bakta¯sh al-Manku¯rsı¯ was a veteran Mansu¯rı¯ amir, though he is not men˙ tioned before al-Na¯sir Muhammad third’s reign. He was appointed shadd al˙ ˙ awqa¯f (supervisor of the endowments) of Damascus in 712/1312 according to al-Safadı¯, or ten years later according to Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯. Bakta¯sh ˙ ˙ was a close associate of Tankiz. When Tankiz was arrested, Bakta¯sh was also, and his property was confiscated. However, he was released and served several times as governor of Baalbek. In 754/1353, in his old age, he still acted as amı¯r al-hajj. Bakta¯sh died in Shaʿba¯n 757/July 1365 when he was over a ˙ hundred years old.361 27. Baybars al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ (Burjı¯) was made an amir during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ first or second reign (693/1293–694/1294; 698/1299–708/1309). He is men362 tioned as one of the tablkha¯na¯h amirs of Egypt in 709/1310. He is not ˙ mentioned among the amirs who were arrested. 28. Aydamur al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ (Burjı¯), like the above-mentioned Baybars al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, was made amir before al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign.363 He is mentioned ˙ ˙ later as na¯ʾib qalʿat Safed, governor of al-Bı¯ra and na¯zir al-Haramayn in ˙ ˙ 364 Jerusalem. 29. Al-Shaykhı¯ (Burjı¯) was appointed by Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r in 709/1310 to oversee the eradication of alcohol in Cairo.365 He is not mentioned among the amirs who were arrested or executed by al-Na¯sir Muhammad. ˙ ˙ 360 Manhal, 9:121; Aʿya¯n, 1:149–150. According to al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, Kujkun died in 739/1439, see: alShuja¯ʿı¯, 56. See on his command of the mamluk forces in 720/1320 and 722/1322: Mufaddal ˙˙ (Kortantamer), 10, 17; on his amirate of one hundred: al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, 56. 361 Durar (Hyderabad), 1:481–182; Aʿya¯n, 1:699–700. 362 Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ mentions that Baybars al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ and Aydamur al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ became amirs during al-Na¯sir ˙Muhammad’s reign (fı¯ al-dawla al-Na¯siriyya), see: Zubda, 217. Since Bay˙ ˙ (Sulu¯k, 2:77), it is clear that he bars al-Shuja¯˙ʿı¯ is mentioned as amir already in 709/1310 became amir several years earlier. 363 See n. 362 above. 364 Aʿya¯n, 3:530. 365 Sulu¯k, 2:53.

The mamluks of the Mansu¯riyya amirs during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

271

30. Bı¯lı¯k al-ʿUthma¯nı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ is mentioned as an amir in Tripoli who was ˙ sent in 717/1317 as a commander of a thousand horsemen to fight against a local Syrian Shiʿite leader.366

Appendix 9: The mamluks of the Mansu¯riyya amirs during al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ Muhammad’s third reign and after ˙ The mamluks of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r 1. Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯ was raised by Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r from early childhood.367 When Baybars became sultan he appointed Baktamur as jamda¯r and later as sa¯qı¯. In 709/1309 Baybars made Baktamur an amir.368 Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ claims that since Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r conferred an amirate of ten upon Baktamur, he must have been the master who manumitted him as well.369 Baktamur’s loyalty to his master is clear. When Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s mamluks started to abandon him one by one, Baktamur was the only one who defended his master with his body and caught a mamluk who tried to escape with Baybars’ gold.370 Despite all that, Baktamur became one of the most senior amirs in alNa¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. After al-Na¯sir Muhammad arrived in Cairo, ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ he appointed Baktamur his sa¯qı¯.371 Baktamur’s promotion by al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad was very quick and before too long Baktamur became the sultan’s ˙ closest confidant.372 However, like many of the high-ranking amirs, at some point Baktamur aroused the sultan’s suspicions. Baktamur was murdered in 733/1333, after al-Na¯sir Muhammad feared that he was planning to murder ˙ ˙ him.373 The descendants of Baktamur were also amirs: three of his sons, two of his grandsons, and one great-grandson. Ahmad b. Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯ was an ˙ amir of one hundred already in 726/1325 when he was about thirteen. He was very close to al-Na¯sir Muhammad and married a daughter of Tankiz. How˙ ˙ ever, he was executed with his father seven years later.374 ʿUmar b. Ahmad was ˙ an amir as well375 and his son Khidr b. ʿUmar also received an amirate of ten, ˙ 366 367 368 369 370 371 372 373 374 375

Sulu¯k, 2:175. Al-Yu¯sufı¯, 148. Al-Yu¯sufı¯, 148; Muqaffa¯, 2:468. Nuju¯m, 9:300. Al-Yu¯sufı¯, 148. Nuju¯m, 9:300. Aʿya¯n, 1:709–710; al-Yu¯sufı¯, 149–150. Sulu¯k, 2:364. Durar (Hyderabad), 1:486–487; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 41. Aʿya¯n, 2:534.

272

2.

3.

4.

5.

6.

376 377 378 379 380 381 382

383 384 385 386

Appendices

from 764/1363 until his imprisonment in 802/1399.376 Another son of Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯, Muhammad, was promoted from amir of ten to tablkha¯na¯h in ˙ ˙ 742/1341.377 The third son, ʿUmar b. Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯, was an amir, and his son, Khidr, is mentioned as amir of ten in 791/1389, 801/1398–99 and 802/ ˙ 1399.378 Quba¯tamur (or: Quya¯tamur) al-Muzaffarı¯ was promoted by al-Na¯sir Mu˙ ˙ hammad until he became jamda¯r. He was among the amirs of tablkha¯na¯h who ˙ ˙ were sent to capture Tankiz in 740/1340.379 He is mentioned as an amir of one hundred in 742/1342.380 In Muharram 743/June 1342 Quba¯tamur was released ˙ from jail and sent to Syria as amir.381 Bı¯lı¯k al-Jamda¯r (al-Muzaffarı¯) al-Na¯sirı¯382 was an amir tablkha¯na¯h during al˙ ˙ ˙ Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. In 732/1332 he was among the amirs who ˙ ˙ accompanied the sultan on his hajj pilgrimage. He is mentioned with Quba¯˙ tamur as one of the amirs who were sent to Damascus in order to confiscate Tankiz’ property in 740/1340. After al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s death he served as ˙ ˙ the governor of Safed and an amir of one hundred in Cairo until his death in 383 the plague of 749/1348. Tu¯gha¯n al-Sa¯qı¯ al-Muzaffarı¯ is also mentioned among the tablkha¯na¯h amirs ˙ ˙ ˙ who accompanied the sultan on the hajj of 732/1332.384 His son Husayn was an ˙ ˙ amir too.385 Safanjı¯ al-Ruknı¯, who gained high status in the service of his master Baybars ˙ al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, was transferred to Damascus and served there as an amir until his death in 734/1334.386 Baybars al-Muzaffarı¯ al-Ruknı¯ was a mamluk of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r ac˙ cording to Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ and the anonymous chronicle published by K.V. Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 50. Sulu¯k, 2:563; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 47. Sulu¯k, 3:593, 654, 876, 987; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 50. Sulu¯k, 2:498. Nuju¯m, 10:51. Nuju¯m, 10:79. This amir is probably to be identified with Bı¯lı¯k al-Sa¯qı¯, who is mentioned by al-Yu¯sufı¯ among the amirs who were taken by al-Na¯sir Muhammad from the ranks of Baybars al˙ him as Bı¯lı¯k (Bilik) al-Muzaffirı¯ al˙ Ja¯shnakı¯r’s mamluks. Al-Maqrı¯zı¯, indeed, mentions ˙ al-Sa¯qı¯ Jamda¯r (Sulu¯k, 2:355, 498, 793). The editor of Nuzhat al-na¯zir also identifies Bulak ˙ with Biliq al-Jamda¯r al-Na¯sirı¯ (al-Yu¯sufı¯, 149, n. 2). Al-Muqaffa¯ is the only source that ˙ named Bilik (Bilik al-Muzaffarı¯ and Bilik al-Jamda¯r al-Na¯sirı¯), mentions two different amirs both became amirs of one hundred and died in the ˙same year. In my opinion, this˙ is a mistake by al-Maqrı¯zı¯, who actually refers the same amir: see: Muqaffa¯, 2:495. Aʿya¯n, 2:52; Wa¯fı¯, 10:388; Muqaffa¯, 2:495; Sulu¯k, 2:352, 498, 793. Sulu¯k, 2:352. Sulu¯k, 3:117. Aʿya¯n, 2:553.

The mamluks of the Mansu¯riyya amirs during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

273

Zetterstéen. According to Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯, al-Maqrı¯zı¯ and al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, ˙ this person was originally a mamluk of Baktamur al-Silahda¯r (Za¯hirı¯-Man˙ ˙ su¯rı¯), and later transferred to the mamluks of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. However, ˙ Baybars al-Muzaffarı¯ was transferred to the ranks of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r’s ˙ mamluks before the latter became sultan, and became an amir during his master’s reign. When al-Na¯sir Muhammad arrived in Cairo, Baybars al-Mu˙ ˙ zaffarı¯ moved to his service and informed him of the sultan’s nephew Mu¯sa¯ b. ˙ ʿAlı¯. b. Qala¯wu¯n’s intention to depose him. During al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ reign Baybars served as the governor of al-Buhayra district in the western ˙ Delta, and later as the governor of Alexandria. He died in 740/1339–40.387 7. Sawa¯b al-Ruknı¯ (eunuch) served as muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya of ˙ ˙ his master Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. Al-Na¯sir Muhammad deposed him when he ˙ ˙ reached Cairo, but in 721/1321 returned him to his position.388 Sawa¯b was ˙ deposed again in 728/1328.389 8. Sanjar, the ustada¯r of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, was an amir of ten. He died in 738/ 1337 on his way back to Cairo from a raid on Cilicia.390

The mamluks of La¯jı¯n 1. Tankiz al-Husa¯mı¯ al-Na¯sirı¯ served as the powerful governor of Damascus, and ˙ ˙ actually of Syria, during almost all of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. La¯jı¯n ˙ ˙ purchased Tankiz from the slave trader al-Sı¯wa¯sı¯, when Tankiz was brought to Egypt as a young boy. After La¯jı¯n’s murder in 698/1299, Tankiz joined the ranks of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s kha¯ssakiyya. Tankiz was beside the young ˙ ˙ ˙˙ sultan at the battle of Wa¯dı¯ al-Khaznada¯r (699/1299) and about ten years later, he accompanied the sultan to his exile in Kerak. Already before that al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad had made Tankiz an amir of ten.391 Tankiz, hence, was al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ Muhammad’s mamluk for about ten years before the latter’s third reign. ˙ However, Tankiz was La¯jı¯n’s young novice mamluk for several years before he moved to al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ranks. It seems that he was also manumitted ˙ ˙ by La¯jı¯n, since his nisba is al-Husa¯mı¯, after La¯jı¯n’s laqab, Husa¯m al-Dı¯n.392 ˙ ˙

387 Durar (Hyderabad), 1:509; Zetterstéen, 205; Muqaffa¯, 2:527–528; Sulu¯k, 2:505; Nuju¯m, 9:325; al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, 89–90. 388 Durar (Hyderabad), 2:208. 389 Sulu¯k, 2:296. 390 Al-Jazarı¯, 3:1040. 391 Nuju¯m, 9:152–153, 327; Aʿya¯n, 2:118. 392 Ayalon, “Names”, 213.

274

Appendices

Three of Tankiz’s sons – ʿAlı¯, Muhammad and Ahmad – became amirs.393 ˙ ˙ Tankiz’s grandson, Sala¯h al-Dı¯n Muhammad b. Muhammad b. Tankiz, was ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ also an amir tablkha¯na¯h and a member of the kha¯ssakiyya.394 The latter’s son, ˙ ˙˙ i. e. Tankiz’s great-grandson, also called Muhammad, was probably an amir ˙ since he bore the laqab Na¯sir al-Dı¯n. He died young in 802/1399.395 ˙ 2. Tugha¯y al-Kabı¯r al-Husa¯mı¯ al-Na¯sirı¯ was made an amir by al-Na¯sir Mu˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ hammad in 709/1309 and gained high rank. Tugha¯y, however, was arrested ˙ ˙ and executed by al-Na¯sir Muhammad in 718/1318 since the latter feared his ˙ ˙ ambitions. Tugha¯y had an ukhu¯wwa pact with Tankiz, since they were both ˙ originally mamluks of La¯jı¯n.396 3. Aydughdı¯ Shuqayr was one of La¯jı¯n’s favourite mamluks. In 696/1296, immediately after La¯jı¯n was crowned sultan, he made Aydughdı¯ an amir and less than two years later, La¯jı¯n planned to appoint Aydughdı¯ governor of Aleppo.397 After La¯jı¯n’s murder, Aydughdı¯ became a close friend of La¯jı¯n’s cousin and governor of Damascus, Aqqu¯sh al-Afram. However, when the political power of al-Na¯sir Muhammad in Kerak increased, Aydughdı¯ aban˙ ˙ doned al-Afram, became closer to al-Na¯sir Muhammad and even incited him ˙ ˙ against al-Afram. At the beginning of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign, ˙ ˙ Aydughdı¯ became one of his closest associates (khawa¯ss), with the help of his ˙˙ Husa¯mı¯ khushda¯sh Tugha¯y. He became an amir of one hundred and one of the ˙ ˙ sultan’s main advisers. However, al-Na¯sir feared Aydughdı¯’s intentions to ˙ murder him, so he arrested him in 715/1315 and executed him.398 4. Baha¯dur al-Muʿizzı¯ al-Turkma¯nı¯ was raised by La¯jı¯n from childhood. In 696/ 1296, after La¯jı¯n was crowned sultan, he made Baha¯dur an amir together with others of his favourite mamluks. Baha¯dur al-Muʿizzı¯ remained an amir until al-Na¯sir Muhammad arrested him together with his khushda¯sh Aydughdı¯ ˙ ˙ Shuqayr and Baktamur al-Ha¯jib in 715/1315. He remained in prison for fifteen ˙ years, until he was released due to the mediation (shafa¯ʿa) of his khushda¯sh Tankiz. After his release he became an amir of one hundred in Cairo until his death in 739/1339.399

393 Levanoni, Turning Point, 48. See on ʿAlı¯ b. Tankiz: Aʿya¯n, 3:320–322; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:35. See on Muhammad: Nuju¯m, 10:152. 394 Sulu¯k, 3:605, 827,˙ 832; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 48. 395 Abu¯ Bakr b. Ahmad Ibn Qa¯d¯ı Shuhba, Ta¯rı¯kh Ibn Qa¯d¯ı Shuhba, ed. Adnan Darwish (Da˙ ˙ ˙ mascus, 1977–1997), 3 vols. 4:136. 396 Durar (Hyderabad), 3:221–222; Wa¯fı¯, 16:444–446; Aʿya¯n, 2:595–597; Sulu¯k, 2:77. 397 Zubda, 315; Sulu¯k, 1:853. 398 Muqaffa¯, 3:343; Sulu¯k, 2:144; Aʿya¯n, 1:650–651; Nuju¯m, 8:260; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:425– 426. 399 Zubda, 315; Muqaffa¯, 2:501; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:496; Aʿya¯n, 2:59–60; Kanz, 9:354; alShuja¯ʿı¯, 54–55.

The mamluks of the Mansu¯riyya amirs during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

275

5. La¯jı¯n al-Husa¯mı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (La¯jı¯n al-Saghı¯r) 400 was appointed as wa¯lı¯ al-barr ˙ ˙ ˙ of Damascus by sultan La¯jı¯n, in Muharram 698/October 1298. After this ˙ sultan’s murder he was arrested for several months.401 In 702/1303, after the battle of Marj al-Suffar, he was again appointed wa¯lı¯ al-barr.402 In 711/1312 he ˙ was appointed as wa¯lı¯ al-wula¯h of al-Qibliyya (governor of the southern districts of Egypt).403 He is mentioned again as wa¯lı¯ al-barr of Damascus one year later.404 In 712/1312 he was appointed amı¯r al-hajj and in 720/1320 – ˙ governor of Gaza. Later he served as governor of al-Bı¯ra until his death in Dhu¯ al-Qaʿda 729/September 1329.405 His son received an amirate of ten in the army of Damascus.406 6. Baha¯dur al-Ju¯kanda¯r was made an amir by his master the sultan La¯jı¯n in 696/ 1296.407 He served as an amir of fifty in Damascus and died in 723/1323.408 Three other prominent amirs who originally belonged to La¯jı¯n’s mamluks died before al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign or they are not mentioned in the ˙ ˙ sources during his reign.409 It should be mentioned that the grandson of La¯jı¯n’s most famous mamluk, Manku¯tamur, was an amir tablkha¯na¯h in Tripoli.410 ˙ The mamluks of Sala¯r 1. Aslam al-Qibja¯qı¯ al-Silahda¯r was probably a mamluk of Qala¯wu¯n, but moved ˙ ˙ to Sala¯r when he was young and is considered his mamluk.411 Aslam is ˙ 400 La¯jı¯n al-Husa¯mı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ al-Saghı¯r belonged to the mamluks of La¯jı¯n, since he bore the ˙ as Jagha¯n, who ˙ was˙another of La¯jı¯n’s mamluks and died before al-Na¯sir Musame nisba ˙ and hammad’s third reign. This nisba, i. e. “al-Husa¯mı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯”, refers both to the laqab ˙the nisba of Husa¯m al-Dı¯n La¯jı¯n al-Mansu˙ rı¯. La¯jı¯n al-Saghı ˙ ¯r appointed Tankiz, his khush¯ ˙ of his will (Aʿya¯n, 4:179).˙ ˙ da¯sh, in charge 401 ʿIqd, 4:244; Aʿya¯n, 4:179. 402 Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:22. 403 Nuju¯m, 9:216. 404 Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:54. 405 Aʿya¯n, 4:179; Sulu¯k, 2:316. According to Ibn Kathı¯r he died one year later, see: Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:118. 406 Al-Jazarı¯, 2:376. See more on La¯jı¯n from al-Jazarı¯, who knew him personally, al-Jazarı¯, 2:376. 407 Zubda, 315; ʿIqd, 3:353. 408 Aʿya¯n, 2:54. 409 These amirs are: Aqqu¯sh al-Ru¯mı¯ al-Husa¯mı¯, who was killed by his own mamluks (ʿIqd, ˙ ¯ n, who died in 699/1300 (Aʿya¯n, 2:150); and Ba¯luj 3:353; Nuju¯m, 8:261; Sulu¯k, 2:63–64); Jagha ¯ al-Husa¯mı¯ (Zubda, 315; Sulu¯k, 2:3; Niha¯ya, 32:92). ˙ 410 This amir was named Mu¯sa¯ b. ʿAlı¯ b. Manku¯tamur (d. 757/1356), see: Aʿya¯n, 5:485; Durar (Hyderabad), 4:378; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 48. 411 Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯ mentions that Aslam served Sala¯r at first (Durar [Hyderabad], 1:389). ˙ According to al-Safadı¯, Aslam was a ˙khushda¯sh of Baybars al-Sala¯rı¯ (Aʿya¯n, 2:81). Ibn ˙ ˙

276

Appendices

mentioned as an amir of one hundred already in 712/1312.412 He was among the amirs who were commanders during the conquest of Aya¯s in 722/1322.413 Al-Na¯sir Muhammad exiled him to Yemen in 725/1325, and when he came ˙ ˙ back to Egypt he was imprisoned in Alexandria for seven years due to the sultan’s suspicion that Aslam was going to murder him.414 After his release he ˙ served as an amir again, probably in Cairo, and in 741/1340–1 he was appointed governor of Safed. He received (again) an amirate of one hundred in Cairo until his death in 747/1346.415 Three of his sons were amirs too.416 One of them, Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n or Baha¯ʿ al-Dı¯n, became an amir tablkha¯na¯h in 742/ ˙ 1341.417 Another son, Amir Ahmad, died in 749/1348–9.418 ˙ ¯ qsunqur al-Sala¯rı¯, like Aslam, probably belonged to Qala¯wu¯n’s mamluks 2. A ˙ but moved to Sala¯r when he was young and is considered Sala¯r’s mamluk. Al¯ qsunqur was originally a mamluk of Maqrı¯zı¯ in his Sulu¯k mentions that A 419 Sala¯r. However, in his Muqaffa¯ and Khitat the same author mentions, like ˙ ˙¯ Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯ and al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, that A qsunqur originally belonged to ˙ Qala¯wu¯n’s mamluks but moved to Sala¯r after al-Ashraf Khalı¯l’s murder in ¯ qsunqur 693/1293.420 At the beginning of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign A ˙ ˙ was made an amir and was promoted to the rank of amir of one hundred. AlNa¯sir Muhammad also married his daughter to him. In 738/1337–8 he was ˙ ˙ appointed amı¯r al-hajj. In 741/1341 he was appointed governor of Safed and in ˙ the same year, governor of Gaza. In 743/1343 he became na¯ʾib al-saltana until ˙ his imprisonment and death in 744/1344.421 3. Baybars al-Sala¯rı¯ was exiled (probably from Cairo) to Safed in 727/1327, where he served as amir and later as ha¯jib. Five years later he served as amir in ˙ Damascus. After al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s death he returned to Safed and served ˙ ˙ as ha¯jib until his death in 743/1342.422 ˙

412 413 414 415 416 417 418 419 420 421 422

Taghrı¯birdı¯ mentions that Aslam was a mamluk of al-Na¯sir Muhammad who also manu˙ he was originally Qala¯mitted him (Manhal, 2:455). ˙According to other sources, ˙however, wu¯n’s mamluk (Sulu¯k, 2:722; Muqaffa¯, 2:218; Nuju¯m, 10:175) but moved to Sala¯r (Muqaffa¯, 2:218). Amitai, “Military Elite”, 149–150. Kanz, 9:309. Muqaffa¯, 2:218. Durar (Hyderabad), 1:389; Muqaffa¯, 2:318–319; Sulu¯k, 2:722. Muqaffa¯, 2:319. Richards, “Mamluk amirs”, 44. Sulu¯k, 2:792. Sulu¯k, 2:620. Muqaffa¯, 2:265; Khitat, 2:310; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:394; al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, 274. ˙ ˙ ¯ ʿı¯, 274; Sulu¯k, 2:508, 517, 568; Nuju¯m, 10:105; Manhal, 2:499–500; Al-Yu¯sufı¯, 393; al-Shuja Muqaffa¯, 2:265–266; Khitat, 2:310. ˙ Aʿya¯n, 2:81; Wa¯fı¯, 10:353;˙ Manhal, 3:478.

The mamluks of the Mansu¯riyya amirs during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

277

4. Qı¯ra¯n al-Sala¯rı¯ served as an amir tablkha¯na¯h and naqı¯b al-mama¯lı¯k al-sul˙ ta¯niyya until after al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s death.423 His son Arghu¯n (d. 772/ ˙ ˙ ˙ 1370) inherited his father’s office and later served as naqı¯b al-jaysh, during the reign of sultan Hasan b. al-Na¯sir Muhammad b. Qala¯wu¯n (748/1347–752/ ˙ ˙ ˙ 1351; 755/1354–762/1361). He gained a high and honoured position in the 424 sultanate. 5. Bı¯lı¯k Abu¯ Ghudda, who served as Sala¯r’s ustada¯r, became an amir tablkha¯na¯h ˙ and one of the ustada¯rs of al-Na¯sir Muhammad. He died in 734/1334.425 ˙ ˙

The mamluks of Kitbugha¯ ¯ dilı¯ was raised from childhood by Kitbugha¯, and when Kitbugha¯ 1. Ughurlu¯ al-ʿA became sultan he appointed him an amir in Cairo.426 Later Kitbugha¯ appointed Ughurlu¯ governor of Damascus for three months, in 695–6/1296–7. Ughurlu¯ served as an amir in Damascus after his master’s deposition. He became an amir of one hundred until his death in his home in Damascus in 719/1319.427 Ughurlu¯’s son, ʿAlı¯ (d. 749/1348), was an amir tablkha¯na¯h in ˙ Damascus.428 ¯ dil Kitbugha¯ was appointed as wa¯lı¯ al-barr of 2. Ughulbak, a mamluk of al-ʿA Damascus in 713/1313–4 and died in 722/1322.429 ¯ dilı¯ was an amir of one hundred in Damascus during al3. Uljaybugha¯ al-ʿA Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. He was one of Tankiz’s associates and was ˙ ˙ arrested together with him. After al-Na¯sir Muhammad died, he was released ˙ ˙ and returned to serve as an amir of one hundred. He served as na¯ʾib al-ghayba in Damascus and died in 754/1353.430 His son Muhammad (d. 781/1379–80) ˙ was an amir of one hundred as well. He served for a long time as an amir 431 tablkha¯na¯h, governor of Gaza and ha¯jib. ˙ ¯ dilı¯ was married to the daughter of his master Kitbugha¯. He was 4. Baydara¯ al-ʿA an amir tablkha¯na¯h in Damascus, probably until his death in 714/1314.432 ˙ 423 Durar (Hyderabad), 3:259. 424 Durar (Hyderabad), 1:350–351; Sulu¯k, 3:192; Nuju¯m, 11:117. On naqı¯b al-jaysh and naqı¯b almama¯lı¯k see: Ayalon, “Studies III”, 64–65. 425 Al-Yu¯sufı¯, 215; Sulu¯k, 2:376. 426 Muqaffa¯, 2:224. 427 Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:76; Nuju¯m, 9:245; Niha¯ya, 32:305; Sulu¯k, 2:199; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:390–391; Ta¯lı¯, 185. 428 Durar (Hyderabad), 3:30; Aʿya¯n, 3:303; Richards, “Mamluk amirs”, 45. 429 Aʿya¯n, 1:546–547. 430 Aʿya¯n, 1:598–599; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:406; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:247–248. 431 Richards, “Mamluk amirs”, 43. 432 Durar (Hyderabad), 1:513.

278

Appendices

¯ dilı¯ who served as Kitbugha¯’s dawa¯da¯r, became an 5. Turunta¯y al-Zaynı¯ al-ʿA ˙ ˙ amir and a hadı¯th scholar. He died in 731/1331.433 ˙ The mamluks of Aqqu¯sh al-Afram 1. Altunqush (or: Altunfush) al-Jama¯lı¯ served as the ustada¯r of his master Aq˙ ˙ qu¯sh al-Afram. When Aqqu¯sh al-Afram defected to the Mongols, al-Na¯sir ˙ Muhammad arrested Altunqush, but after a while released him and made him ˙ ˙ an amir tablkha¯na¯h. Altunqush was appointed governor of al-Sharqiyya ˙ ˙ district in northern Egypt and in 732/1333 was appointed the ustada¯r of al¯ nu¯k. Later he became the ustada¯r of the sultan Na¯sir Muhammad’s son, A ˙ ˙ himself. Altunqush was among the amirs who accompanied the sultan’s royal ˙ hajj pilgrimage in 732/1332. He continued to serve as an amir in Cairo also ˙ after al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s death, until his own death in 745/1345.434 ˙ ˙ 2. Sunqur al-Jama¯lı¯ served as a member of the barı¯diyya of Tankiz and later as an amir tablkha¯na¯h and the governor of Baalbek. He died in 749/1349.435 His ˙ son Abu¯ Bakr (d. 803/1401) served as an amir tablkha¯na¯h and later as an amir ˙ of one hundred in Cairo, as ha¯jib and as amı¯r al-hajj for several years.436 ˙ ˙ 3. Tulak al-Hasanı¯ al-Arghu¯nı¯, who was originally a mamluk of Aqqu¯sh al˙ Afram and later moved to Arghu¯n al-Dawa¯da¯r, is mentioned as an amir tablkha¯na¯h in Damascus in 748/1347–8, so it is reasonable to assume that he ˙ was an amir also during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. In 750/1349 he was ˙ ˙ ha¯jib saghı¯r in Damascus and in 752/1351 ha¯jib saghı¯r and amı¯r akhu¯r in ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Cairo. He died in 753/1352.437 Muhammad b. Tulak (d. 799/1397) was an amir ˙ 438 tablkha¯na¯h and held several offices. ˙ The mamluks of Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ ˙ 1. Aydughmish amı¯r akhu¯r was transferred to al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s kha¯ssa˙ ˙ ˙˙ kiyya, probably after the death of his master Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ in 700/1300. ˙ 433 Wa¯fı¯, 16:432; Durar (Hyderabad), 2:217; Turunta¯y’s son, Khalı¯l, was also a prominent hadı¯th ˙ ˙¯ wı¯, al-Dawʾ al-La¯miʿ li-Ahl al-Qarn al-Ta ˙ ¯ siʿ scholar, see: Durar (Hyderabad), 2:89; al-Sakha ˙ (Beirut: Dar Maktaba al-Haya¯h. n.d.), 2:47. Another mamluk of Kitbugha¯ who was called ˙ an interest in hadı¯th but is not mentioned explicitly as an amir, Turunta¯y al-Zaynı¯ and had ˙died in˙ 728/1328, see: Durar (Hyderabad),˙ 2:218. 434 Aʿya¯n, 2:352, 674–675; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:410; al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, 276; Sulu¯k, 2:352, 674–675. 435 Aʿya¯n, 2:477–478; Durar (Hyderabad), 2:176. 436 Ibn Qa¯d¯ı Shuhba, 4:198–199; Richards, “Mamluk amirs”, 41. ˙¯ , 2:604; Wa¯fı¯, 10:387. 437 Muqaffa 438 See more about him: Ibn Qa¯d¯ı Shuhba, 3:639; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 47. ˙

The mamluks of the Mansu¯riyya amirs during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

279

Aydughmish became an amir of one hundred and was appointed as amı¯r akhu¯r kabı¯r (grand master of the stable) in 712/1312. Aydughmish served in this office for about thirty years, until al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s death. Later, he ˙ ˙ served as governor of Aleppo and governor of Damascus until his death in 439 743/1343. Due to Aydughmish’s high status in the sultanate, al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad made his four sons amirs, among them ʿAlı¯, Ha¯jj Malik and Ahmad ˙ ˙ ˙ 440 are mentioned. ʿAlı¯ is mentioned among the amirs tablkha¯na¯h and his ˙ brother Ahmad among the amirs of ten who accompanied the sultan on the ˙ hajj pilgrimage of 732/1332.441 Ahmad was made an amir tablkha¯na¯h by al˙ ˙ ˙ Na¯sir Muhammad in 741/1340.442 Ha¯jj Malik was an amir tablkha¯na¯h at the ˙ ˙443 ˙ ˙ end of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s reign. He is mentioned as an amir of ten about ˙ ˙ fifty years later, in 791/1389.444 2. Tugha¯y al-Ja¯shnakı¯r al-Na¯sirı¯ was transferred to the mamluks of al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ ˙ Muhammad from Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯‘s mamluks after the latter’s death in ˙ ˙ 700/1300. Al-Na¯sir Muhammad made him an amir and appointed him ja¯sh˙ ˙ nakı¯r. Tugha¯y gained very high status during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s reign. In ˙ ˙ ˙ 729/1329 he held the iqta¯ʿ of an amir of one hundred.445 In 739/1339 he was ˙ appointed governor of Aleppo. About one year later, when Tankiz was captured, Tugha¯y was returned to Cairo. In 743/1343 he was appointed governor ˙ of Tripoli until his death one year later.446 His son, Muhammad, was also an ˙ 447 amir. 3. Manku¯tamur al-Tabba¯khı¯ became a high-ranking amir during al-Na¯sir Mu˙ ˙ hammad’s third reign. He died in 718/1318.448 ˙

The mamluks of Turunta¯y (d. 689/1290) ˙ ˙ 1. Baktamur al-Ha¯jib was a mamluk of Turunta¯y while the latter was still a ˙ ˙ ˙ mamluk of amir Qala¯wu¯n. Turunta¯y raised and manumitted Baktamur.449 ˙ ˙ 439 Nuju¯m, 10:99, 100; Aʿya¯n, 1:653; Ibn Qa¯d¯ı Shuhba, 1:320–322; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:426– ˙ 428; al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, 250–251. 440 Muqaffa¯, 2:346; Nuju¯m, 10:100; according to al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, four of Aydughmish’s sons were amirs, see: al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, 251. 441 Sulu¯k, 2:352. 442 Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 45. 443 Sulu¯k, 2:559. 444 Ibn al-Fura¯t, 9:99; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 49. 445 Sulu¯k, 2:314. 446 Aʿya¯n, 2:578; Wa¯fı¯, 16:425; Durar (Hyderabad), 2:216; Nuju¯m, 10:107; Sulu¯k, 2:659. 447 Khitat, 2:51. ˙¯ n,˙ 2:43; Sulu¯k, 2:189. 448 Aʿya 449 Sulu¯k, 2:314; Nuju¯m, 9:278; Niha¯ya, 33:292–293.

280

Appendices

During Aqqu¯sh al-Afram’s tenure as governor of Damascus (698/1299–709/ 1310), Baktamur served as shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n of Damascus and later as ha¯jib.450 Baktamur al-Ha¯jib is mentioned among the amirs of Syria who re˙ ˙ fused to swear allegiance to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r. In Muharram 710/June 1310 ˙ he was appointed governor of Gaza.451 Eight months later Baktamur became 452 an amir of one hundred and was appointed wazir. Shortly after, in 711/1311, he was removed from the wazirate to the office of al-ha¯jib al-kabı¯r in Egypt.453 ˙ After four years in this office, Baktamur was arrested, but released one and half years later. He was appointed governor of Safed and received a lot of money from the sultan.454 After three months, in Safar 717/April 1317, Bak˙ tamur was returned to Cairo as an amir of one hundred. In 725/1325 al-Na¯sir ˙ 455 Muhammad arrested Baktamur again, but he was probably released shortly ˙ after, since he died in his home in Cairo in 728–9/1328–9, or 738/1337–8.456 Two of Baktamur’s sons were amirs, and at least one of his grandsons and great-grandsons. ʿAbdalla¯h b. Baktamur al-Ha¯jib (d. 786/1384), who was also ˙ the grandson of Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ on his mother’s side, served as an amir of one hundred and ha¯jib in Cairo and continued to hold his father’s property.457 ˙ Muhammad b. Baktamur al-Ha¯jib was an amir of ten when he was only ˙ ˙ thirteen. He was arrested together with his father in 742/1342 and his iqta¯ʿ was ˙ transferred to his brother ʿAbdalla¯h.458 Muhammad b. ʿAbdalla¯h was an amir ˙ 459 of ten. ʿAlı¯ b. Muhammad b. ʿAbdalla¯h b. Baktamur al-Ha¯jib is mentioned ˙ ˙ as an amir, too. Even the great-grandsons of Baktamur were amirs and their sons are mentioned in the sources. Among Baktamur’s great-grandsons Amir ʿAlı¯ is mentioned.460

450 451 452 453 454 455 456

Manhal, 3:287. Niha¯ya, 32:161. Sulu¯k, 2:89; Nuju¯m, 9:24. Nuju¯m, 9:28; Sulu¯k, 2:100–101. Sulu¯k, 2:144, 162–163; Nuju¯m, 9:55; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:62; Kanz, 9:288. Sulu¯k, 2:260. Al-Safadı¯ mentions in Aʿya¯n that Baktamur al-Ha¯jib died in 727/1327, or, according to ˙ According to Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯, ˙ another manuscript, in 728/1327–8 (Aʿya¯n, 1:704). ˙ Baktamur died in 728/1327–8 (Durar [Hyderabad], 1:484). Other sources mention that Baktamur died in 729/1328–9 (Sulu¯k, 2:214; Nuju¯m, 9:277; Ibn Kathı¯r, 14:116). Al-Safadı¯ mentions in his Wa¯fı¯ (and based on that also Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ notes in Manhal) that˙ Baktamur died ten years later, in 738/1337–8 (Wa¯fı¯, 10:192; Manhal, 3:289). 457 ʿAbdalla¯h held other offices as amir tablkha¯na¯h, see: Ibn Qa¯d¯ı Shuhba, 3:144–45; Manhal, ˙ 7:83; Khitat, 2:64; Richards, “Mamluk˙ Amirs”, 40–41. ˙ 458 Richards,˙ “Mamluk Amirs”, 50; Niha¯ya, 33:294; Sulu¯k 2:314; Nuju¯m, 9:277. 459 Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 50; Ibn Qa¯d¯ı Shuhba, 4:133. ˙ 77. The last honourable descendant of Baktamur 460 Al-Sakha¯wı¯ (Beirut), 11:242; Khitat, 2:64, ˙ ˙ Muhammad b. ʿUmar b Muhammad b. ʿAbdalla¯h b. al-Ha¯jib was his great-great-grandson, ˙ ˙ ¯ wı¯ (Beirut), 8:257. ˙ Baktamur al-Ha¯jib (d. 895/1490!), see: al-Sakha ˙

The mamluks of the Mansu¯riyya amirs during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

281

2. Balaba¯n al-Husa¯mı¯ was appointed by al-Na¯sir Muhammad as shihna, then as ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ barı¯dı¯, later in 735/1335 as wa¯lı¯ of Cairo and after five months as wa¯lı¯ of Damietta, until his death in 736/1336.461 3. Baktamur al-Ghutmı¯ al-Husa¯mı¯ was an amir of ten in Cairo. He was the oldest ˙ living amir among the mamluks of Turunta¯y during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 462 third reign.

The mamluks of Baydara¯ 1. Asandamur al-Qalı¯jı¯ was a mamluk of Baydara¯ who was transferred to Tur˙ unta¯y’s mamluks. During al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign he served as wa¯lı¯ ˙ ˙ ˙ of al-Buhayra district. Before his death in the plague of 749/1348–9 he served ˙ for several days as wa¯lı¯ of Cairo.463 2. Taybars al-Khaznada¯rı¯ was originally a mamluk of Bı¯lı¯k al-Khaznada¯rı¯ al˙ Za¯hirı¯ and later was transferred to Baydara¯’s mamluks. After his master’s ˙ death he became a close associate of sultan La¯jı¯n, who appointed him naqı¯b al-jaysh. Taybars held this office as an amir tablkha¯na¯h until his death in 719/ ˙ ˙ 1319.464

Other mamluks of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs ˙ Balaba¯n Jarkas, a mamluk of Qara¯sunqur, served as the governor of Qalʿat alRu¯m, and died in 745/1344–5.465 Arghu¯n, the mamluk of Baha¯dur Samiz al-Mansu¯rı¯, was an associate of Tankiz ˙ and served as mushidd al-zakka¯t and later in 728/1328 as shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Damascus. In 729/1329 the sultan conferred upon him an amirate of ten in Damascus. In 732/1331 he was appointed governor of Baalbek. Later he served as amir in Tripoli.466 Qada¯da¯r the mamluk of Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯ was appointed governor of alGharbiyya district in 723/1323, and a few months later, governor of al-Buhayra ˙ district. One year later, he was appointed wa¯lı¯ of Cairo, in order to restore order

461 462 463 464 465 466

Muqaffa¯, 2:491; al-Yu¯sufı¯, 231; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:493; Sulu¯k, 2:377. Al-Jazarı¯, 3:783. Durar (Hyderabad), 1:387. Nuju¯m, 9:246; Zetterstéen, 128–129; Durar (Hyderabad), 2:229. Abu¯ al-Fida¯᾿, 4:143. Aʿya¯n, 1:462–463; al-Jazarı¯, 2:322, 377. See on Baha¯dur Samiz: Manhal, 3:433; Nuju¯m, 8:217; Aʿya¯n, 2:60. On shadd al-zakka¯t see: al-Qalqashandı¯ (Beirut), 4:193.

282

Appendices

and morality to the city. In 729/1329 he left his office and a few months later he died.467 Aya¯s al-Shamsı¯ the mamluk of Sunqur al-Aʿsar al-Mansu¯rı¯ served as the gov˙ ernor of Qalʿat al-Ru¯m before al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. Later he moved ˙ ˙ to Hama and from Ramada¯n 710/January 1311 he served as shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in ˙ Damascus. In Dhu¯ al-Hijja 711/April 1312 he was transferred to Tripoli where he ˙ served as an amir. He died in 722/1322.468 Tu¯gha¯n al-Shamsı¯ the mamluk of Sunqur al-Tawı¯l al-Mansu¯rı¯ served as wa¯lı¯ of ˙ ˙ ˙ Ashmu¯nı¯n and shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Cairo. In 740/1340–1 he was appointed shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Damascus until his death in the same year.469 Aqjuba¯ the mamluk of Baybars al-Ta¯jı¯ served as an amir in Damascus. He was executed in 720/1320 when he claimed to be a prophet.470 Altunbugha¯ al-Ja¯wulı¯ mamluk of Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ moved to the service of Sanjar ˙ al-Ja¯wulı¯ from the mamluks of an amir named Ibn Ba¯khil. Sanjar appointed Altunbugha¯ as his dawa¯da¯r. Altunbugha¯ served as an amir in Damascus until his ˙ ˙ death in 744/1343.471

Appendix 10: The descendants of the Mansu¯riyya amirs during ˙ al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign and after ˙ ˙ ¯ s. The five sons of Baha¯dur A ¯ s became amirs: Muhammad, ʿUmar, Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ ˙ 472 ʿAlı¯, Abu¯ Bakr and Ahmad. The sources add information only about three of ˙ them: ¯ s was appointed an amir of one hundred by sultan 1. Muhammad b. Baha¯dur A ˙ ˙ Hasan b. al-Na¯sir Muhammad (748/1347–752/1351; 755/1354–762/1361).473 ˙ ˙ ˙ He was deposed from the governorship of Homs in 754/1353.474 In 776/1374 he was appointed governor of Bahnasa¯ district in southern Egypt.475 It is reasonable to assume that he was an amir already during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ reign. Muhammad’s son, Jama¯l al-Dı¯n ʿAbdalla¯h, had an iqta¯ʿ in Syria. ˙ ˙ ʿAbdalla¯h died in 761/1360.476 467 468 469 470 471 472 473 474 475 476

Sulu¯k, 2:250, 256, 312, 327; Khitat, 2:148–149; Nuju¯m, 9:283–284. ˙ ˙ Aʿya¯n, 1:641–642; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:420; Zetterstéen, 153. Durar (Hyderabad), 2:227–228; Muqaffa¯, 4:38; al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, 121. Niha¯ya, 32:321; Nuju¯m, 9:250. Durar (Hyderabad), 1:407; Nuju¯m, 10:105. Aʿya¯n, 2:57; Wa¯fı¯, 10:297; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:497. Sulu¯k, 3:61. Aʿya¯n, 2:53. Sulu¯k, 3:232. Aʿya¯n, 2:732–733.

The descendants of the Mansu¯riyya amirs during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

283

2. ʿUmar was an amir tablkha¯na¯h. He died in 731/1331 in Damascus.477 ˙ 3. ʿAlı¯ was an amir of ten in Damascus and died in 744/1343.478 Qara¯sunqur. Three of Qara¯sunqur’s sons were amirs during their father’s lifetime, i. e. during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign. Muhammad was an amir of ˙ ˙ ˙ one hundred, ʿAlı¯ was an amir of forty and later an amir of one hundred, and 479 Faraj was an amir of ten. 1. Muhammad b. Qara¯sunqur was an amir even before al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ ˙ third reign. He is mentioned as a commander already at the battle of ʿUrd, that ˙ preceded the battle of Marj al-Suffar in 702/1303.480 According to al-Safadı¯, ˙ ˙ Muhammad caused his father to support al-Na¯sir Muhammad and not Bay˙ ˙ ˙ bars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r.481 Muhammad continued to serve as an amir during al˙ Na¯sir Muhammad’s reign, and as an amir of one hundred. In 761/1360 he is ˙ ˙ still mentioned as an amir.482 2. ʿAlı¯ b. Qara¯sunqur served as an amir tablkha¯na¯h in Cairo. He is mentioned ˙ among the commanders who were sent in 716/1316 against the Bedouin revolts in southern Egypt, and in 723/1323 on the expedition to Nubia. After the arrival of the news of Qara¯sunqur’s death in 728/1328, al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ sent ʿAlı¯ to serve as an amir tablkha¯na¯h in Damascus. In Damascus he became ˙ a close associate of Tankiz and was made an amir of one hundred, until his death in 748/1347. ʿAlı¯’s son, Muhammad, was an amir too.483 ˙ 3. Faraj b. Qara¯sunqur received an amirate of ten from al-Na¯sir Muhammad in ˙ ˙ 711/1311. In 723/1323 he was jailed in al-Jubb prison in the Cairo citadel, and was released five years later. After the arrival of the news of Qara¯sunqur’s death in 728/1328, al-Na¯sir Muhammad sent Faraj to Damascus as an amir of ˙ ˙ ten (according to al-Maqrı¯zı¯) or as an amir tablkha¯na¯h (according to Ibn ˙ Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯). Faraj died in Damascus in 734/1333. His son, who also ˙ 484 bore the name Faraj, was an amir too. Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯ (Burjı¯). Three of Aydamur’s sons were amirs. Two of them, ˙ ʿAlı¯ and Muhammad, received their amirate during their father’s lifetime (he ˙ 477 478 479 480 481 482 483

Sulu¯k, 2:341; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 48. Aʿya¯n, 3:315–316; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 49. Aʿya¯n, 4:98; Wa¯fı¯, 24:222; Kanz, 9:251–252. Sulu¯k, 1:931. Aʿya¯n, 4:91–92; Wa¯fı¯, 24:216. Aʿya¯n, 2:148. Niha¯ya, 32:238; Sulu¯k, 2:250, 305, 754; Aʿya¯n, 3:473–474; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:95–96; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 41, 45. 484 Sulu¯k, 2:109, 249, 305; Nuju¯m, 9:31; Aʿya¯n, 4:35; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:230; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 45.

284

Appendices

died in 737/1337) and were amirs tablkha¯na¯h. After his death, another son, Mu¯sa¯, ˙ became an amir.485 1. ʿAlı¯ is mentioned among the amirs tablkha¯na¯h who accompanied the sultan ˙ on the hajj pilgrimage in 732/1332. He was an amir in Damascus in the last ˙ years before his death, in 762/1360–1.486 2. Muhammad b. Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯ is mentioned among the amirs of ten who ˙ ˙ accompanied al-Na¯sir Muhammad on the hajj pilgrimage in 732/1332.487 He ˙ ˙ ˙ probably received an amirate of tablkha¯na¯h soon after, since al-Jazarı¯ men˙ tions that two of Ayadmur’s sons were amirs tablkha¯na¯h. He died in 740/ ˙ 1339.488 3. Mu¯sa¯ b. Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯ became an amir after his father’s death in 737/ ˙ 1337. He was an amir of ten and died in 776/1374–5.489 Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯ (Burjı¯). Three of Baktamur’s sons were amirs. Asanbugha¯ was an amir of one hundred, ʿAlı¯ and Ahmad were amirs tablkha¯na¯h.490 ˙ ˙ 1. Asanbugha¯491 was an amir of one hundred during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s ˙ ˙ th th reign. He was born in the first decade of the 8 /14 century, so when his father was captured by al-Na¯sir Muhammad in 722/1322 (and six years later was ˙ ˙ executed), Asanbugha¯ was probably in his twenties. This fact did not prevent him from being a close associate of al-Na¯sir Muhammad and to conduct an ˙ ˙ honourable career during the latter’s reign. Asanbugha¯ was arrested after alNa¯sir Muhammad’s death (741/1341), and was released at the beginning of al˙ ˙ Sa¯lih Isma¯ʿı¯l’s reign (743/1342). He became the amı¯r akhu¯r kabı¯r of sultan al˙ ˙ Na¯sir Hasan (748/1347–752/1351 and 755/1354–762/1361) and of al-Ashraf ˙ ˙ Shaʿba¯n (764/1363–778/1377). Later he served as governor of Alexandria, governor of Aleppo, and as chief ha¯jib of Egypt. He died in 777/1375 when he was over seventy.492 2. ʿAlı¯ b. Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯ served as amir tablkha¯na¯h in Cairo, and after ˙ his father’s death in 728/1328 he moved to Damascus. Later he was twice appointed governor of al-Rahba. He died in 762/1361.493 ˙ 485 Nuju¯m, 9:312; Aʿya¯n, 1:661. 486 Sulu¯k, 2:352; Nuju¯m, 9:103; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:30; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 45. According to al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, ʿAlı¯ died in 740/1339 (al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ , 89). 487 Nuju¯m, 9:103; Kanz, 9:367. 488 Sulu¯k, 2:505; al-Jazarı¯, 3:976. 489 Sulu¯k, 3:247. 490 Durar (Hyderabad), 1:482. 491 Al-Maqrı¯zı¯ (al-Muqaffa¯, 2:186) is the only source that mentions the name Isma¯ʿı¯l instead of Asanbugha¯. 492 Durar (Hyderabad), 1:386; Muqaffa¯, 2:186; Sulu¯k, 3:75, 258; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 42. 493 Durar (Hyderabad), 3:32; Aʿya¯n, 3:309–310.

The descendants of the Mansu¯riyya amirs during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

285

3. Ahmad b. Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯ was an amir tablkha¯na¯h, and he was also ˙ ˙ exiled to Damascus after his father’s death.494

Sala¯r 1. ʿAlı¯ b. Sala¯r was made an amir of ten in Cairo by al-Na¯sir Muhammad at the ˙ ˙ beginning of the latter’s third reign.495 Later he became an amir tablkha¯na¯h. ˙ He is mentioned as an amir in Egypt in 732/1332.496 ʿAlı¯ died in 742/1341–2 and the sultan transferred his amirate of tablkha¯na¯h to his son Khalı¯l.497 Khalı¯l ˙ b. ʿAlı¯ b. Sala¯r (d. 770/1368–9) served as an amir tablkha¯na¯h in Cairo and was ˙ na¯zir al-awqa¯f (supervisor of the endowments) of his grandfather Sala¯r.498 ˙ 2. Abu¯ Bakr b. Sala¯r bore the amir’s laqab “Sayf al-Dı¯n”. His son, Mu¯sa¯ (d. 797/ 1395) was an amir of ten and served as amı¯r tabar (in charge of the axe ˙ bearers).499 3. Na¯sir b. Sala¯r served as an amir of ten in Cairo when al-Na¯sir Muhammad ˙ ˙ ˙ began his third reign.500 The name Na¯sir might refer to the laqab Na¯sir al-Dı¯n ˙ ˙ [Muhammad?]. Indeed, Ibn Qa¯d¯ı Shuhbah mentions the amir “Na¯sir al-Dı¯n ˙ ˙ ˙ b. Sala¯r” who served as the governor of Aleppo citadel.501 It should be noted that two brothers of Sala¯r, Daʾu¯d and Ju¯ba¯, who were his greatest supporters during his conflict against al-Na¯sir Muhammad, were re˙ ˙ leased by the latter already in 715/1315, after five years of imprisonment.502 Kitbugha¯ 1. Anas b. Kitbugha¯ was appointed by his father, sultan Kitbugha¯, as his deputy ˙ when he left Cairo for Damascus in 695/1296.503 Al-Na¯sir Muhammad hon˙ ˙ oured and promoted not only Anas but also his children.504 ˙ 505 2. ʿAlı¯ b. Kitbugha¯ was made an amir tablkha¯na¯h in 742/1341. It is reasonable ˙ to assume, then, that he was an amir during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s reign as ˙ ˙ well. 494 495 496 497 498 499 500 501 502 503 504 505

Aʿya¯n, 3:309. Nuju¯m, 9:11; Sulu¯k, 2:75; Tuhfa, 206; Durar (Hyderabad), 2:281–282. ˙ Kanz, 9:368. Al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, 220; Sulu¯k, 2:615. Durar (Hyderabad), 2:90; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 46. Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 51; Sulu¯k, 3:626, 848; Inba¯ʾ al-Ghumr, 3:280. Richards, “Mamluk amirs”, 51. Ibn Qa¯d¯ı Shuhbah, 3:363. ˙ Sulu¯k, 2:144. Sulu¯k, 1:816. Durar (Hyderabad), 1:417; Aʿya¯n, 1:628–629. Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 45.

286

Appendices

¯ dil Kitbugha¯ died as an amir of ten in Cairo in 744/ 3. ʿAbdalla¯h b. al-Malik al-ʿA 1344. His son Ahmad inherited his father’s amirate.506 ˙ Turunta¯y ˙ ˙ 1. Muhammad b. Turunta¯y is mentioned among the amirs tablkha¯na¯h who ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ accompanied Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ when he was dispatched to put down the ˙ Bedouin revolt in southern Egypt in 700/1300.507 Despite his blindness, he became an amir of one hundred during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s reign. He died ˙ ˙ in 731/1331.508 His son, ʿAbdalla¯h, who was also the son of Qibjaq’s daughter, was an amir of ten and died in 741/1341 when he was only eighteen.509 2. ʿAlı¯ b. Turunta¯y was an amir of ten in Egypt. He died in 726/1326.510 ˙ ˙ 3. Shihab al-Dı¯n Ahmad b. Turunta¯y (d. 727/1327) was the oldest brother. Like ˙ ˙ ˙ his brother Muhammad, he was blind.511 ˙ Kujkun 1. Muhammad b. Kujkun was an amir tablkha¯na¯h and amı¯r shika¯r in Damascus. ˙ ˙ In 752/1351–2 he was appointed wa¯lı¯ al-wula¯h (head of the northern or southern districts of Egypt). In 754/1353 he was appointed governor of Homs and died a few months later, when he was sixty.512 2. Ahmad b. Kujkun is mentioned among the amirs of ten who accompanied the ˙ sultan on the hajj pilgrimage in 732/1332.513 ˙ Aybak al-Tawı¯l ˙ 1. Muhammad b. Aybak al-Tawı¯l served as shadd al-sa¯hil and wa¯lı¯ al-wu¯la¯h bi-l˙ ˙ ˙ safaqah al-qibliyya (in charge of the southern districts of Damascus). Later he ˙ was in charge of the fortresses of al-Rahba and al-Jaʿbar. Toward the end of his ˙ life he served for about a half year as an amir in Safed, until his death in the plague in 749/1348.514 506 507 508 509 510 511 512 513 514

Al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, 266. Zubda, 349. Aʿya¯n, 4:480; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:459; Sulu¯k, 2:338; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 43. Zetterstéen, 317; al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, 121. Aʿya¯n, 3:384; Mufaddal (Kortantamer), 36; Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯ mentions erroneously ˙ ˙˙ that ʿAlı¯ died in 766/1364–5, see: Durar (Hyderabad), 3:56. See also: Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 49. Al-Jazarı¯, 2:246. Aʿya¯n, 5:104; Durar (Hyderabad), 4:151. Sulu¯k, 2:352. Aʿya¯n, 4:341–342; Wa¯fı¯, 2:233; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:393.

The descendants of the Mansu¯riyya amirs during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s third reign ˙ ˙ ˙

287

2. ʿAlı¯ b. Aybak al-Tawı¯l served as an amir tablkha¯na¯h in Damascus, probably ˙ ˙ during al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s reign. Later he served as an amir tablkha¯na¯h in ˙ ˙ ˙ Tripoli. In 760/1359 or 761/1360 he became amı¯r ha¯jib in Tripoli and in 763/ ˙ 1362 – an amir in Damascus, where he died in 764/1363.515

Other sons of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs ˙ ʿUmar b. Qibjaq al-Mansu¯rı¯ was an amir tablkha¯na¯h in Aleppo. He died there in ˙ ˙ 736/1336.516 Jaraktamur b. Baha¯dur Raʾs Nawba presented himself to Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r after his father’s death in 693/1293, and he was made an amir by him in 708/1309. When al-Na¯sir Muhammad arrived in Cairo, he wanted to arrest Jaraktamur but ˙ ˙ the latter received a pardon, thanks to the efforts of his father-in-law, Qara¯sunqur.517 Jaraktamur continued to serve as an amir, and in 722/1322 he is mentioned among the amirs tablkha¯na¯h who accompanied the sultan on his ˙ hajj.518 In 735/1334 he was appointed governor of Gaza, and in 736/1336 – gov˙ ernor of Homs. In 740/1340 he is mentioned again among the amirs tablkha¯na¯h.519 His two sons were amirs tablkha¯na¯h.520 ˙ ˙ ʿAlı¯ b. Tughrı¯l al-Igha¯nı¯ is mentioned as amir tablkha¯na¯h in 725/1325. Later he ˙ ˙ became an amir of one hundred in Cairo. He is mentioned as one of the greatest amirs in 740/1339–40. In 748/1347 he served for a few months as the chief ha¯jib of ˙ Damascus. He died in Cairo in the plague of 749/1348–9.521 Muhammad b. Baybars al-Ahmadı¯ (Burjı¯) served as one of the amirs tablkha¯na¯h ˙ ˙ ˙ in Egypt. He died in 752/1351 in southern Egypt.522 His son, Ahmad, is mentioned ˙ as an amir of ten in 778/1377 who accompanied the sultan on hajj.523 ˙ Qutlı¯ja¯ b. Balaba¯n al-Ju¯kanda¯r was an amir tablkha¯na¯h in Damascus. Al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ ˙ Muhammad appointed him one of the silahda¯riyya. He died in 720/1320.524 ˙ ˙ Muhammad b. Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯ was an amir who died in Damascus in 728/1328 ˙ when he was thirty-five.525 515 516 517 518 519 520 521 522 523 524 525

Aʿya¯n, 3:304. Al-Jazarı¯, 3:920. See chapter three, n. 170. Sulu¯k, 2:352; Kanz, 9:366. Sulu¯k, 2:379, 403, 499, 571, 579–580, 615; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 45–46. Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 45–46. Sulu¯k, 2:260, 498, 738, 795; Aʿya¯n, 3:385; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:56; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 41–42. Nuju¯m, 10:253; Sulu¯k, 2:857. Nuju¯m, 11:71. Aʿya¯n, 4:128–129; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:255; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 48. Aʿya¯n, 4:374; Durar (Hyderabad), 3:412.

288

Appendices

Khalı¯l b. Balaba¯n Turna¯ is mentioned as an amir tablkha¯na¯h in Syria at the end of ˙ ˙ al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s reign.526 ˙ ˙ Baktamur b. Kira¯y was an amir who died in 731/1331.527 Muhammad b. Aqqu¯sh al-Matru¯hı¯ was an amir and a hadı¯th scholar. He died in ˙ ˙ ˙ 735/1335.528 ¯ lmalik al-Ju¯kanda¯r was made an amir tablkha¯na¯h by al-Na¯sir MuAhmad b. A ˙ ˙ ˙ hammad and amir of one hundred in the reign of sultan Hasan b. al-Na¯sir ˙ ˙ ˙ Muhammad (748/1347–752/1351; 744/1354–762/1361). In 775/1373–4 he served ˙ as governor of Gaza and later as the governor of Jerusalem and Hebron. In the same year he came back to Cairo and served as a ha¯jib there. In 779/1377–8 he left ˙ his military-political career and became a devout Sufi. He died in 793/1391.529 ¯ lmalik (d. Another amir of one hundred was Ahmad’s cousion, Albakı¯ b. akhı¯ A ˙ 530 756/1355) who served before him as governor of Gaza. Muhammad b. Mughulta¯y al-Masʿu¯dı¯ served as the wa¯lı¯ of Cairo. He became an ˙ ˙ amir of twenty in 791/1389 and died one year later.531 ʿAbd al-Rahma¯n b. Bakta¯sh al-Manku¯rsı¯ was appointed by his father as amı¯r al˙ hajj in 754/1353. Before his death in 757/1356 Bakta¯sh gave his iqta¯ʿ to his son.532 ˙ ˙ Muhammad b. Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ is mentioned among the awla¯d al-na¯s who ˙ ˙ ˙ were made amirs of one hundred by sultan Hasan b. al-Na¯sir Muhammad.533 It is ˙ ˙ ˙ reasonable to assume, then, that he served as an amir also during al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad’s reign. ˙ 534 Ahmad b. Baktamur al-ʿAla¯’ı¯ was an amir. ˙

526 527 528 529 530 531 532 533

Al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, 95. Sulu¯k, 2:337. Aʿya¯n, 4:340; al-Jazarı¯, 3:802–803. Inba¯ʾ al-Ghumr, 3:84; Durar (Hyderabad), 1:108; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 41. Durar (Hyderabad), 1:405; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 41. Ibn al-Fura¯t, 9:135, 214; Sulu¯k, 3:653; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 48 Aʿya¯n, 1:699–700; Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 51. Manhal, 5:127. Most of the other recipients of this amirate of one hundred were sons of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs so it is reasonable to assume that he is the son of Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯, though ˙ ˙ only ˙the name Tu¯gha¯n is mentioned. ˙ 534 Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”, 51.

Bibliography

Primary sources Abu¯ al-Fida¯ʾ. Al-Malik al-Muʾayyad ʿIma¯d al-Dı¯n Isma¯ʿı¯l b. ʿAlı¯. Al-Mukhtasar fı¯ Akhba¯r ˙ al-Bashar. Beirut: Da¯r al-Maʿrifa li-l-Tiba¯ʿa wa-l-Nashr, 1972. (Abu¯ al-Fida¯ʾ). ˙ Al-ʿAynı¯, Badr al-Dı¯n Mahmu¯d b. Ahmad. ʿIqd al-Juma¯n fı¯ Ta’rı¯kh Ahl al-Zama¯n. ʿAsr ˙ ˙ ˙ Sala¯t¯ın al-Mama¯lı¯k, ed. Muhammad Muhammad Amı¯n. Cairo: al-Hay’a al-Misriyya al˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ¯ ʿAmma lil-Kita¯b, 1407/1987–1412/1992. Vols. 2–4. (ʿIqd). Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯, Rukn al-Dı¯n. Kita¯b al-Tuhfa al-Mulu¯kiyya fı¯ al-Dawla al-Turkiyya, ed. ˙ ˙ ʿAbd al-Hamı¯d Sa¯lih Hamda¯n. Cairo: al-Da¯r al-Misriyya al-Lubna¯niyya, 1407/1987. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ (Tuhfa). ˙ _____ Zubdat al-Fikra fı¯ Ta’rı¯kh al-Hijra, ed. D.S. Richards. Beirut and Berlin: al-Kita¯b alʿArabı¯, 1998. (Zubda). al-Dhahabı¯, Muhammad b. Ahmad. Al-ʿIbar fı¯ Khabar man Ghabar, ed. Sala¯h al-Dı¯n al˙ ˙ ˙ Munajjid and Fuwa¯d Sayyid. Kuwait: Da¯ʾirat al-Matbu¯ʿa¯t wa-l-Nashr, 1960–1966, vol. 5. ˙ (al-ʿIbar). _____ Min Dhuyu¯l al-ʿIbar, ed. Muhammad Rashsha¯d ʿAbd al-Muttalib. Kuwait: Matbaʿat ˙ ˙˙ ˙ Huku¯mat al-Kuwayt. (Dhuyu¯l al-ʿIbar). ˙ _____ Taʾrı¯kh al-Isla¯m wa-Wafaya¯t al-Masha¯hı¯r wa-l-Aʿlam, ed. ʿAbd al-Sala¯m Tadmurı¯. Beirut: Da¯r al-Kita¯b al-ʿArabı¯, 2000, 2003. vol. 59 (years 681/1282–690/1291); vol. 60 (years 690/1291–700/1301). (al-Dhahabı¯, Taʾrı¯kh). Ibn ʿAbd al-Za¯hir, Muhyı¯ al-Dı¯n. Tashrı¯f al-Ayya¯m wa-l-ʿUsu¯r fı¯ Sı¯rat al-Malik al-Mansu¯r. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Cairo: Wiza¯rat al-Thaqa¯fa wa-l-Irsha¯d al-Qawmı¯, 1961, 146–147. Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯, Abu¯ Bakr b. ʿAbd Alla¯h b. Aybak. Kanz al-Durar wa-Ja¯miʿ al-Ghurar, 7 (ed. ʿAbd al-Fatta¯h ʿAshu¯r), 8 (ed. Ulrich Haarmann), 9 (ed. Hans Robert Roemer). ˙ Cairo: al-Maʿhad al-Alma¯nı¯ li-l-Ᾱtha¯r, 1379/1960–1410/1996. (Kanz). _____ Muntakhaba¯t min Kita¯b Durar al-Tı¯ja¯n li-Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯. Die Epitome der Universalchronik Ibn ad-Dawa¯da¯rı¯s im Verhältnis zur Langfassung: Eine Quellenkritische Studie zur Geschichte der Ӓgyptischen Mamluken, ed. Gunhild Graf. Berlin: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1990. Ibn al-Fura¯t, Muhammad b. ʿAbd al-Rah¯ım. Taʾrı¯kh Ibn al-Fura¯t [=Taʾrı¯kh al-Duwal wa-l˙ ˙ Mulu¯k], ed. Q. Zurayq. Beirut: al-Matbaʿa al-Amrı¯ka¯nı¯yya, 1936–1942, vols. 7, 8. (Ibn al˙ Fura¯t).

290

Bibliography

Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯, Ahmad. Al-Durar al-Ka¯mina fı¯ Aʿya¯n al-Miʾah al-Tha¯mina. Hy˙ ˙ derabad: Da¯ʾirat al-Maʿa¯rif al-ʿUthma¯nı¯yya, 1348/1929–1932/1350. 4 vols. (Durar [Hyderabad]). Ed. Muhammad Sayyid Ja¯d al-Haqq. Cairo: Da¯r al-Kutub al-Hadı¯tha 1966. 5 vols. (Durar, ˙ ˙ ˙ [Cairo]). _____ Inba¯ʾ al-Ghumr bi-Abna¯ʾ al-ʿUmr. Hyderabad: Da¯ʾirat al-Maʿa¯rif al-ʿUthamaniyya, 1967. Reprinted: Beirut: Da¯r al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1406/1986, 9 vols. (Inba¯ʾ al-Ghumr). Ibn al-ʿIma¯d, Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n al-Hanbalı¯ al-Dimashqı¯. Shadhara¯t al-Dhahab fı¯ Akhba¯r man ˙ Dhahab, ed. ʿAbd al-Qa¯dir Arna¯ʾu¯t and Muhammad Arna¯ʾu¯t. Damascus: Da¯r Ibn Ka˙ ˙ ˙ thı¯r, 1413/1992, vol 8. (Shadhara¯t). Ibn Iya¯s, Muhammad ibn Ahmad. Bada¯ʾiʿ al-Zuhu¯r fı¯ Waqa¯ʾiʿ al-Dhuhu¯r (Die Chronik des ˙ ˙ Ibn Ija¯s) Weisbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1975. Vol. 1. (Ibn Iya¯s). Ibn Kathı¯r, Isma¯ʿı¯l b. ʿUmar. Al-Bida¯ya wa-l-Niha¯ya. Beirut: Da¯r al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1413/1993. vols. 13, 14. (Ibn Kathı¯r). Ibn Khaldu¯n, ʿAbd al-Rahma¯n. Kita¯b al-ʿIbar wa-Diwa¯n al-Mubtada’ wa-l-Khabar fı¯ ˙ ¯ sarahum min dhawı¯ al-Sulta¯n alAyya¯m al-ʿArab wa-l-ʿAjam wa-l-Barbar wa-man ʿA ˙ ˙ Akbar. Egypt: Bulaq, 1867. Vol. 5. (Ibn Khaldu¯n). Ibn Qa¯d¯ı Shuhba, Abu¯ Bakr b. Ahmad. Ta¯ʾrı¯kh Ibn Qa¯d¯ı Shuhba, ed. Adnan Darwish. ˙ ˙ ˙ Damascus, 1977–1997. 3 vols. (Ibn Qa¯d¯ı Shuhba). ˙ Ibn al-Suqa¯ʿı¯, Fadl Alla¯h b. Abı¯ al-Fakhr. Ta¯lı¯ Kita¯b Wafaya¯t al-Aʿya¯n, ed. and tr. Jacqueline ˙ ˙ Sublet. Damascus: IDEO, 1974. (Ta¯lı¯). Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯, Abu¯ al-Maha¯sin Yu¯suf. Al-Manhal al-Sa¯fı¯ wa-l-Mustawfa¯ baʿda al-Wa¯fı¯, ˙ ˙ ¯ mma, 1984–2009. ed. Muhammad Muhammad Amı¯n. Cairo: al-Hayʾa al-Misriyya al-ʿA ˙ ˙ ˙ 13 vols. (Manhal). _____ Muntakhaba¯t min Hawa¯dith al-Duhu¯r fı¯ Mada¯ al-Ayya¯m wa-l-Shuhu¯r, ed. William ˙ Popper. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1930–1942. _____ Al-Nuju¯m al-Za¯hira fı¯ Mulu¯k Misr wa-l-Qa¯hira, ed. Fahı¯m Muhammad Shaltu¯t et al. ˙ ˙ Cairo: Da¯r al-Kutub al-Misriyya, 1348/1929–1392/1972. 16 vols. (Nuju¯m). ˙ Al-Jazarı¯, Shams al-Dı¯n Muhammad. Hawa¯dith al-Zama¯n wa-Anba¯᾿uhu wa-Wafaya¯t al˙ ˙ Aka¯bir wa-l-Aʿya¯n min Abna¯ʾihi. Beirut: al-Maktaba al-ʿAsriyya, 1426/2006. 3 vols. (al˙ Jazarı¯). Al-Maqrı¯zı¯, Taqı¯ al-Dı¯n Ahmad b. ʿAlı¯. Al-Mawa¯ʿiz wa-l-Iʿtiba¯r bi-Dhikr al-Khitat wa-l˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ ¯ tha¯r fı¯ Misr wa-l-Qa¯hira. A Cairo: Bulaq, 1854. 2 vols. (Khitat). ˙ ˙ ˙ _____ Kita¯b al-Muqaffa¯ al-Kabı¯r, ed. Muhammad al-Yaʿla¯wı¯. Beirut: n.p., 1991. 8 vols. ˙ (Muqaffa¯). _____ Kita¯b al-Sulu¯k li-Maʿrifa Duwal al-Mulu¯k, eds. Mustafa¯ Ziya¯da and Saʿı¯d ʿAbd al˙˙ ¯ shu¯r. Cairo: Lajnat al-Taʾlı¯f wa-l-tarjama wa-l-Nashr, Fatta¯h ʿA 1934–1973. 4 vols. ˙ (Sulu¯k). Mufaddal Ibn Abı¯ al-Fada¯ʾil. Al-Nahj al-Sadı¯d wa-al-Durr al-Farı¯d fı¯ ma¯ baʿd Taʾrı¯kh Ibn ˙˙ ˙ al-ʿAmı¯d (Histoire des sultans mamlouks), ed. and tr. E. Blochet. Patrologia Orientalis 12/3; 14/3; 20/1, (1919; 1920; 1929): 343–550; 373–672; 1–270 (Paris, 1919–1928). (Mufaddal [Blochet]). ˙˙ _____ Ägypten und Syrien zwischen 1317 und 1341 in der Chronik des Mufaddal b. Abı¯ l˙˙ Fada¯ʾil. Al-Nahj al-Sadı¯d wa-al-Durr al-Farı¯d fı¯ ma¯ baʿd Taʾrı¯kh Ibn al-ʿAmı¯d, ed. and ˙ tr. Samira Kortantamer. Freiburg im Breisgau: Klaus Schwarz Verlag, 1973. (Mufaddal ˙˙ [Kortantamer]).

Primary sources

291

Al-Nuwayrı¯, Ahmad b. ʿAbd al-Wahha¯b Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n. Niha¯yat al-Arab fı¯ Funu¯n al-Adab, ˙ ¯ mma li–led. Fahı¯m Muhammad ʿAlawı¯ Shaltu¯t. Cairo: al-Mu’assasa al-Misriyya al-ʿA ˙ ˙ Taʾlı¯f wa-l-Tarjama wa-1-Tiba¯ʿa wa-1-Nashr, 1412/1992–1998. Vols. 31, 32. (Niha¯ya). ˙ Al-Qalqashandı¯, Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n Ahmad b. ʿAlı¯. Subh al-Aʿsha¯ fı¯ Sina¯ʿat al-Insha¯ʾ, ed. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Muhammad Husayn Shams al-Dı¯n. Beirut: Da¯r al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 1987, 14 vols. (al˙ ˙ Qalqashandı¯, [Beirut]). ¯ mma li-l-Taʾlı¯f wa-l-Tarjama wa-1-Tiba¯ʿa wa-1– Cairo: al-Muʾassasa al-Misriyya al-ʿA ˙ ˙ Nashr, 1963. (al-Qalqashandı¯, [Cairo]). Qa¯sha¯nı¯, Abu¯ al-Qa¯sim ʿAbd Alla¯h b. Muhammad. Ta¯rı¯kh-i Ulja¯ytu¯, ed. Mahı¯n Hambalı¯. ˙ Tehran: Bunga¯h-i tarjama wa nashr-i kita¯b, 1970. (Qa¯sha¯nı¯). Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n Fadl Alla¯h, Rashı¯duddin Fazlullah’s Jamiʾuʾt-Tawarikh: a History of the ˙ Mongols, tr. W.M. Thackston. Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1999. (Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n). Al-Safadı¯, Khalı¯l b. Aybak. Aʿya¯n al-ʿAsr wa-Aʿwa¯n al-Nasr, ed. ʿAlı¯ Abu¯ Zayd et al. Beirut: ˙ ˙ ˙ Da¯r al-Fikr al-Muʿa¯sir/Damascus: Da¯r al-Fikr, 1418/1998. 6 vols. (Aʿya¯n). ˙ _____ Al-Wa¯fı¯ bi-l-Wafaya¯t. Istanbul, Damascus, Wiesbaden and Stuttgart: Franz Steiner, 1931–1993, vols. 1–2, 4–5, 8–10, 14–16, 24. (Wa¯fı¯). Al-Sakha¯wı¯, Muhammad b. ʿAbd al-Rahma¯n. Al-Dawʾ al-La¯miʿ li-Ahl al-Qarn al-Ta¯siʿ. ˙ ˙ ˙ Cairo: Maktabat al-Qudsı¯, 1354/1935–1936, vol. 3. (al-Sakha¯wı¯ [Cairo]); – Beirut: Dar Maktaba al-Haya¯h. n.d, vols. 2, 8, 11 (al-Sakha¯wı¯ [Beirut]). ˙ Sa¯lih b. Yahya¯. Taʾrı¯kh Bayru¯t, ed. F. Hours and K. Salibi. Beirut: Da¯r al-Mashriq, 1969. ˙ ˙ ˙ Al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, Shams al-Dı¯n. Taʾrı¯kh al-Malik al-Na¯sir Muhammad b. Qala¯wu¯n al-Sa¯lih¯ı wa˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Awla¯dihi. (Die Chronik Asˇ-sˇug˘a¯ʿı¯s), ed. Barbara Schäfer. Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1977. (al-Shuja¯ʿı¯). Al-ʿUmarı¯, Ibn Fadl Alla¯h Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n Ahmad b. Yahya¯. Masa¯lik al-Absa¯r fı¯ Mama¯lik al˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Amsa¯r, ed. Ka¯mil Salma¯n al-Jabu¯rı¯. Beirut: Da¯r al-Kutub al-ʿIlmiyya, 2010, 27 vols. ˙ (Masa¯lik). ¯ sima, 1312/1894. (al-Taʿrı¯f). _____ Al-Taʿrı¯f bi-l-Mustalah al-Sharı¯f. Cairo: Matbaʿa al-͑A ˙˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, Qutb al-Dı¯n Mu¯sa¯ b. Muhammad. Early Mamluk Syrian Historiography: Al˙ ˙ Yu¯nı¯nı¯’s Dhayl Mirʾat al-Zama¯n, ed. and tr. Li Guo. Leiden: Brill, 1998. 2 vols. (alYu¯nı¯nı¯). Al-Yu¯sufı¯, Mu¯sa¯ b. Muhammad b. Yahya¯. Nuzhat al-Na¯zir fı¯ Sirat al-Malik al-Na¯sir, ed. ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ Ahmad Hat¯ıt. Beirut: ʿᾹlim al-Kutub, 1986. (al-Yu¯sufı¯). ˙ ˙ ˙˙ Zetterstéen, Karl Wilhelm (ed.). Beiträge zur Geschichte der Mamlukensultane in den Jahren 690–741 der Higra nach arabischen Handschriften. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1919. (Zetterstéen).

292

Bibliography

Secondary sources Abbreviations BASOR The Bulletin of the American Schools of Oriental Research BSOAS Bulletin of the School of Oriental and African Studies JAOS Journal of the American Oriental Society JESHO Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient JRAS Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society JSAI Jerusalem Studies in Arabic and Islam EI2 The Encyclopedia of Islam, Second edition, Leiden: Brill, 1960–2005 Abd al-Raziq, Ahmad. La femme au temps des Mamlukes en Égypte. Cairo: Institut Français ˙ d’Archéologie Orientale, 1973. Aigle, Denise. “The Mongol Invasions of Bila¯d al-Sha¯m by Gha¯za¯n Kha¯n and Ibn Taymı¯yah’s Three ‘Anti-Mongol’ Fatwas”, MSR 11, 2 (2007), 89–120. Alemany, Agusti. Sources on the Alans: A Critical Compilation. Leiden: Brill, 2000. Allsen, T.T. “Population Movements in Mongol Eurasia”, in R. Amitai and M. Biran eds., Nomads as Agents of Cultural Change. Honolulu: Hawaii University Press, 2015. 119–151. Amitai, Reuven. “The Conquest of Arsu¯f by Baybars: Political and Military Aspects”, MSR 9, 1 (2005), 61–83. _____ Holy War and Rapprochement: Studies in the Relations between the Mamluk Sultanate and the Mongol Ilkhanate (1260–1335). Turnhout: Brepols, 2013. _____ “In the Aftermath of ʿAyn Ja¯lu¯t: The Beginnings of the Mamluk-I¯lkha¯nid Cold War”, Al-Masa¯q 3 (1990), 1–21. _____ “Mamluks of Mongol Origin and Their Role in Early Mamluk Political Life”, MSR 12, 1 (2008), 119–137. (Amitai, “Mamluks of Mongol Origin”). _____ “Al-Maqrı¯zı¯ as a Historian of the Early Mamluk Sultanate (or: Is al-Maqrı¯zı¯ an Unrecognized Historiographical Villain?)”, MSR 7, 2 (2003), 99–118. _____ “A Mongol Governor of al-Karak in Jordan? A Re-examination of an Old Document in Mongolian and Arabic”, Zentralasiatische Studien 36 (2007), 263–276. _____ “The Mongol Occupation of Damascus in 1300: A Study of Mamluk Loyalties”, in The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society, eds. Amalia Levanoni and Michael Winter. Leiden: Brill, 2004. 21–41. (Amitai, “The Mongol Occupation of Damascus”). _____ “Mongol Raids into Palestine (A.D. 1260–1300)”, JRAS (1987), 236–255. (Amitai, “Mongol Raids”). _____ “Al-Nuwayrı¯ as a Historian of the Mongols”, in The Historiography of Islamic Egypt (c. 950–1800), ed. Hugh Kennedy. Leiden: Brill, 2001. 23–26. _____ “The Remaking of the Military Elite of Mamluk Egypt by al-Na¯sir Muhammad b. ˙ ˙ Qala¯wu¯n”, Studia Islamica 72 (1990), 145–163. (Amitai, “Military Elite”). _____ “The Resolution of the Mongol-Mamluk War”, in Mongols, Turks, and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary World, eds. Reuven Amitai and Michal Biran. Leiden: Brill, 2005. 359–390.

Secondary sources

293

_____ “Whither the ¯Ilkha¯nid Army? Gha¯za¯n’s First Campaign into Syria (1299–1300)”, in Warfare in Inner Asian History (500–1800), ed. Nicola Di Cosmo. Leiden: Brill, 2002. 221–264. (Amitai, “Gha¯za¯n’s First Campaign”). Amitai-Preiss, Reuven. “The Fall and Rise of the ʿAbba¯sid Caliphate”, JAOS 116, 3 (1996), 487–494. _____ Mongols and Mamluks: The Mamluk-I¯lkha¯nid War, 1260–1281. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995. (Amitai-Preiss, Mongols and Mamluks). Ashtor, Eliyahu. “Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯”, EI2, 1:1127–1128. ˙ _____ “Étude sur quelques chroniques, mamlouks”, Israel Oriental Studies 1 (1971), 272– 297. _____ “Some Unpublished Sources for the Bahrı¯ Period”, Scripta Hierosolymitana 9 ˙ (1961), 15–30. Ayalon, David. “Aspects of the Mamluk phenomenon. Part I: The Importance of the Mamluk Institution”, Der Islam 53, 2 (1976), 196–225. Reprinted in Ayalon, The Mamlu¯k Military Society. London: Variorum Reprints, 1979. _____ “The Auxiliary Forces of the Mamluk Sultanate”, Der Islam 65 (1988), 13–37. Reprinted in Ayalon, Islam and the Abode of War. Aldershot: Variorum, 1994. _____ “Bahrı¯ Mamluks, Burjı¯ Mamluks – Inadequate Names for the Two Reigns of the ˙ Mamluk Sultanate”, Ta¯rı¯h 1 (1990), 3–53. Reprinted in Ayalon, Islam and the Abode of ˘ War. Aldershot: Variorum, 1994. (Ayalon, “Bahrı¯ Mamluks”). ˙ _____ “The Circassians in the Mamlu¯k Kingdom”, JAOS, 69 (1949), 135–147. Reprinted in Ayalon, Studies on the Mamlu¯ks of Egypt (1250–1517). London: Variorum Reprints, 1977. (Ayalon, “The Circassians”). _____ L’esclavage du Mamelouk. Jerusalem: Israel Oriental Society, 1951, 1. Reprinted in Ayalon, The Mamlu¯k Military Society. London: Variorum Reprints, 1979. (Ayalon, L’esclavage). _____ “The Great Ya¯sa of Chingiz Kha¯n: A Re-examination”. (C1): Studia Islamica 36 (1972), 113–158; (Ayalon, “Ya¯sa, C1”); (C2): Studia Islamica 38 (1973), 107–156. Reprinted in Ayalon, Outsiders in the Lands of Islam: Mamluks, Mongols and Eunuchs. London: Variorum, 1988. (Ayalon, “Ya¯sa, C2”). _____ “Mamluk Military Aristocracy: A Non-Hereditary Nobility”, JSAI 10 (1987), 205– 210. _____ “Mamluk: Military Slavery in Egypt and Syria”, in Islam and the Abode of War. Aldershot: Variorum, 1994. 1–19. (Ayalon, “Mamluk”). _____ The Mamlu¯k Novice: On His Youthfulness and on His Original Religion”, Revue des études islamiques 54 (1986). 1–8. Reprinted in Ayalon, Islam and the Abode of War. Aldershot: Variorum, 1994. (Ayalon, “The Mamluk Novice”). _____ “Mamlukiyya¯t: (A) A First Attempt to Evaluate the Mamluk Military System; (B) Ibn Khaldu¯n’s View of the Mamluk Phenomenon”, JSAI 1 (1980), 321–349. Reprinted in Ayalon, Outsiders in the Lands of Islam: Mamluks, Mongols and Eunuchs. London: Variorum, 1988. (Ayalon, “Mamlukiyya¯t”). _____ “The Mamluks and Ibn Xaldu¯n”, Israel Oriental Studies 10 (1980), 1, 1–13. _____ “The Muslim City and the Mamluk Military Aristocracy”. Proceedings of the Israel Academy of Sciences and Humanities 2, 14 (1968), 311–329. Reprinted in Ayalon, Studies on the Mamlu¯ks of Egypt (1250–1517). London: Variorum Reprints, 1977. (Ayalon, “Muslim City”).

294

Bibliography

_____ “Names, Titles, and ‘Nisbas’ of the Mamluks,” Israel Oriental Studies 5 (1975), 189– 232. Reprinted in Ayalon, The Mamlu¯k Military Society. London: Variorum Reprints, 1979. (Ayalon, “Names”). _____ “Notes on the Furu¯siyya Exercises and Games in the Mamluk Sultanate”, Scripta Hierosolymitana 9 (1961), 31–62. Reprinted in Ayalon, The Mamlu¯k Military Society. London: Variorum Reprints, 1979. (Ayalon, “Furu¯siyya”). _____ “Studies on the Structure of the Mamluk Army”, BSOAS 15 (1953): I: 203–228; II: 448–476; III: 16 (1954), 57–90 Reprinted in Ayalon, Studies on the Mamluks of Egypt (1250–1517). London: Variorum Reprints, 1977. (Ayalon, “Studies I”; “Studies II”; Studies III”). _____ “The Wafidiya in the Mamluk Kingdom”, Islamic Culture 25 (1951), 89–104. Reprinted in Ayalon, Studies on the Mamlu¯ks of Egypt (1250–1517). London: Variorum Reprints, 1977. (Ayalon, “Wafidiya”). Bacharach, J.L. “Muhammad b. Tughdj”, EI2, 7:411. ˙ ˙ Bakhit, M.A. “Ladjdju¯n”, EI2, 5:593–594. Bar Asher Meir Michael and Aryeh Kofsky. The Nusayrı¯-ʽAlawı¯ Religion: An Enquiry into ˙ its Theology and Liturgy Leiden: Brill, 2002. Berkey, Jonathan P. “Mamluks and the World of Higher Islamic Education in Medieval Cairo, 1250–1517”, in Modes de Transmission de la Culture Religieuse en Islam, ed. Hassan Elboudrari. Cairo: Institut français d’archéologie orientale, 1993. 93–116. (Berkey, “Education”). _____ “Mamluk Religious Policy”, MSR 13, 2 (2009), 7–22. _____ The Transmission of Knowledge in Medieval Cairo: A Social History of Islamic Education. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1992. Bosworth, C.E. “Kara¯khita¯y”, EI2, 4:580–583. ˙ ˙ _____ “Al-Muʿtasim bi ʾlla¯h”, EI2, 7:776. ˙ Boyle, J.A. “Dynastic and Political History of the ¯Il-Kha¯ns”, in The Cambridge History of Iran, ed. J.A. Boyle. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968, vol. 5: The Saljuq and Mongol Periods. 303–421. (Boyle, “I¯l-Kha¯ns”). Broadbridge, Anne F. Kingship and Ideology in Islamic and Mongol Worlds. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2008. (Broadbridge, Ideology). _____ “Mamluk Legitimacy and the Mongols: The Reigns of Baybars and Qala¯wu¯n”, MSR 5 (2001), 91–118. _____ “Sending Home for Mom and Dad: The Extended Family Impulse in Mamluk Politics”, MSR 15 (2011), 1–18. Cahen, Cl. “Ibn al-Fura¯t”, EI2, 3:768–769. ____ “Luʾluʾ, Badr al-Dı¯n Abu¯ ʾl-Fada¯ʾil al-Malik al-Rah¯ım”, EI2, 5:821. ˙ Chapoutot-Remadi, Mounira. Liens et Relations au sein de l’Élite Mamluke sous les Premiers Sultans Bahrides, 648/1250–741/1341. Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Université de Provence. Aix-Marseille I, 1993. _____ “Liens propres et identités séparées chez les Mamelouks bahrides”, in Valeur et distance: Identités et sociétés en Égypt, ed. Christian Décobert. Paris: Maisonneuve et Larose, 2000. 175–188. (Chapoutot-Remadi, “Liens”). _____ “Al-Nuwayrı¯, Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n Ahmad b. ʿAbd al-Wahha¯b al-Bakrı¯ al-Tamı¯mı¯ al˙ Kurashı¯ al-Sha¯fiʿı¯”, EI2, 8:156–160. ˙

Secondary sources

295

Clifford, Winslow Williams. State Formation and the Structure of Politics in Mamluk SyroEgypt, 648/741 A.H./1250–1340 C.E., ed. Stephan Conermann. Bonn: Bonn University Press, Mamluk Studies Series, 2013. (Clifford). Conermann, Stephan. “Tankiz ibn ʿAbd Alla¯h al-Husa¯mı¯ al-Na¯sirı¯ (d. 740/1340) as Seen by ˙ ˙ his Contemporary al-Safadı¯ (d. 764/1363)”, MSR 12, 2 (2008), 1–24. (Conermann, ˙ “Tankiz”). Cytryn-Silverman Katia and Jefrrey A. Blakely. “The Khan at al-Sukkariyya: A station on the Gaza-Hebron Route”. BASOR 369 (2013), 201–229. Da‘adli, Tawfiq. “Mamluk Epitaphs from Mamilla Cemetery”. Levant 43, 1 (2011), 80–99. Doerfer, Gerhard. Tu¨rkische und Mongolische Elemente im Neupersischen. Wiesbaden: F. Steiner, 1963. (Doerfer). Dozy, R.P.A. Supplément aux dictionnaires arabes. Leiden : E.J. Brill, 1881. (Dozy, Supplément). Drory, Joseph. “Founding a new Mamlaka: Some Remarks Concerning Safed and the Organization of the Region in the Mamluk Period”, in The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society, eds. Amalia Levanoni and Michael Winter. Leiden: Brill, 2004. 163–187. (Drory, “Founding a new Mamlaka”). _____ “The Role of Banu¯ Fadl in Fourteenth Century Northern Syria”, in Egypt and Syria in ˙ the Fatimid, Ayyu¯bid and Mamluk Eras V, Proceedings of the 11th, 12th and 13th International Colloquium, eds. Urbain Vermeulen and Kristof D’Hulster. Leuven: Peeters, 2007. 471–485. Dussaud, René. Histoire et Religion des Nosairı¯s. Paris: É. Bouillion, 1900. ˙ Flemming, Barbara. “Literary Activities in Mamluk Halls and Barracks”, in Studies in Memory of Gaston Wiet, ed. Myriam Rosen-Ayalon. Jerusalem: Institute of Asian and African Studies, 1977. 249–260. Friedman, Yaron. “Ibn Taymiyya’s Fata¯wa¯ against the Nusayrı¯-ʿAlawı¯ Sect”, Der Islam 82, 2 ˙ (2005) 349–363. Garcin, Jean-Claude. “The regime of the Circassian Mamluks”, in The Cambridge History of Egypt. Vol. 1: Islamic Egypt, 640–1517, ed. Carl F. Petry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 290–317. Guo, Li. “Mamluk Historiographic Studies: The State of the Art”, MSR 1 (1997), 15–43. Golden, Peter B. An Introduction to the History of the Turkic Peoples: Ethnogenesis and State-Formation in Medieval and Early Modern Eurasia and the Middle East. Wiesbaden: O. Harrassowitz, 1992. Haarmann, Ulrich. “Altun Ha¯n und Cingiz Ha¯n bei den Ӓgyptischen Mamluke”, Der Islam ˙ ˘ 51 (1974), 1–36. (Haarmann, “Altun Ha¯n und Cingiz Ha¯n”). ˙ ˘ _____ “Arabic in Speech, Turkish in Lineage: Mamluks and Their Sons in the Intellectual Life of Fourteenth-Century Egypt and Syria”, Journal of Semitic Studies 33, 1 (1988), 81– 114. (Haarmann, “Arabic in Speech”). _____ “Auflösung und Bewahrung der klassischen Formen Arabischer Geschichtsschreibung in der Zeit der Mamluken“, Zeitschrift der Deutschen Morgenländischen Gesellschaft 121 (1971), 46–60. _____ “Joseph’s Law – The Careers and Activities of Mamluk Descendants before the Ottoman Conquest of Egypt,” in The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society, eds. Thomas Philipp and Ulrich Haarmann. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 55–84.

296

Bibliography

_____ Quellenstudien zur frühen Mamlukenzeit. Freiburg i. Br.: D. Robischon, 1969. _____ “The Sons of Mamluks as Fief-holders in Late Medieval Egypt”, in Land Tenure and Social Transformation in the Middle East, ed. Tarif Khalidi. Beirut: American University in Beirut, 1984. 141–168. _____ Heidemann, Stefan. Das Aleppiner Kalifat (A.D. 1261): Vom Ende des Kalifates in Baghdad über Aleppo zu den Restaurationen in Kairo. Leiden: E. J. Brill, 1994. Al-Hajji, Hayat Nasser. The Internal Affairs in Egypt during the Third Reign of Sultan alNa¯sir Muhammad B. Qala¯wu¯n, 709–741. Kuwait: Kuwait University Press, 2000. ˙ ˙ Halm, H. “Nusayriyya”, EI2, 8:145–148. ˙ _____ “Rawk”, EI2, 8:467–468. Hassan, Zaky M. “Ahmad b. Tu¯lu¯n”, EI2, 1:278–279. ˙ ˙ Hazai, G. “Kipcˇak”, EI2, 5:125–126. ˙ ˙ Holt, P.M. The Age of the Crusades: The Near East from the Eleventh Century to 1517. London: Longman, 1986. (Holt, The Age of the Crusades). _____ “Literary Offerings: A Genre of Courtly Literature”, in The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society, eds. Thomas Philipp and Ulrich Haarmann. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 3–16. _____ “The Position and Power of the Mamlu¯k Sultan”, BSOAS, 38 (1975), 237–249. _____ “Some Observations on the ʿAbba¯sid Caliphate of Cairo”, BSOAS 47 (1984), 501–507. (Holt, “Some obdervations”). _____ “The Structure of Government in the Mamluk Sultanate,” in The Eastern Mediterranean Lands in the Period of the Crusades, ed. P. M. Holt. Warminster: Aris and Phillips, 1977. 44–61. (Holt, “The structure”). _____ “The Sultanate of al-Mansu¯r La¯chı¯n 696–8/1296–9”, BSOAS 36 (1973), 521–532. ˙ (Holt, “La¯jı¯n”). Horst, Heribert. “Eine Gesandtschaft des Mamlu¯ken al-Malik an-Na¯sir am ¯Ilha¯n-Hof in ˙ ˘ Persien”, in Der Orient in der Forschung: Festschrift für Otto Spies. ed. Wilhelm Hoenerbach. Wiesbaden: Otto Harrassowitz, 1967. 348–370. Humphreys, R. Stephen. “The Expressive Intent of the Mamluk Architecture of Cairo: A Preliminary Essay”, Studia Islamica 35 (1972), 69–119. Irwin, Robert. “Factions in Medieval Egypt”, JRAS (1986), 228–246. _____ “Mamluk History and Historians”, in Arabic Literature in the Post-Classical Period, eds. Roger Allen and D.S. Richards. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006. 159– 170, 435–437. (Irwin, “Mamluk History”). _____ The Middle East in the Middle Ages: The Early Mamluk Sultanate 1250–1382. London: Croom Helm/Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, 1986. (Irwin, Middle East). Jama¯l al-Dı¯n, Amı¯na Muhammad. Al-Nuwayrı¯ wa-Kita¯buhu Niha¯yat al-Arab fı¯ Funu¯n al˙ ¯ ra¯ʾuhu al-Naqdiyya. Cairo: Da¯r Tha¯bit, 1404/1984. Adab: Masa¯diruhu al-Adabiyya wa-A ˙ Kennedy, Hugh. The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates: the Islamic Near East from the Sixth to the Eleventh Century. London: Longman, 1986. (Kennedy, The Prophet and the Age of the Caliphates). Landau, J.M. “Maktab”, EI2, 6:196–197. Lane, Edward William. An Arabic-English Lexicon. London: Williams and Norgate, 1863– 1893.

Secondary sources

297

Laoust, Henri. “Remarques sur les expéditions du Kasrawa¯n sous les premiers Mamluks”, Bulletin du Musée de Beyrouth 4 (1940). 93–115. Lapidus, Ira M., Muslim Cities in the Later Middle Ages. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1967. (Lapidus). Le Strange, Guy. Palestine under the Moslems: A Description of Syria and the Holy Land from A.D. 650 to 1500. Boston and New York: Houghton, Mifflin and Company, 1890. Levanoni, Amalia. “Awla¯d al-Na¯s in the Mamluk Army during the Bahri Period”, in Mamluks and Ottomans: Studies in Honour of Michael Winter, eds. David J. Wasserstein and Ami Ayalon. London and New York: Routledge, 2006. 96–105. (Levanoni, “Awla¯d al-Na¯s in the Mamluk Army”). _____ “The Mafa¯rida in the Mamluk Army Reconsidered”, Arabica 53, 3 (2006), 331–352. _____ “Al-Maqrı¯zı¯’s Account of the Transition from Turkish to Circassian Mamluk Sultanate: History in the Service of Faith”, in The Historiography of Islamic Egypt (c. 950– 1800), ed. Hugh Kennedy. Leiden: Brill, 2001. 93–105. (Levanoni, “al-Maqrı¯zı¯’s account”). _____ “Rank-and-File Mamluks versus Amirs: New Norms in the Mamluk Military Institutions”, in The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society, eds. Thomas Philipp and Ulrich Haarmann. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 17–31. _____ “The Sultan’s Laqab – A Sign of a New Order in Mamluk Factionalism?”, in The Mamluks in Egyptian and Syrian Politics and Society, eds. Amalia Levanoni and Michael Winter. Leiden: Brill, 2004. 79–115. _____ A Turning Point in Mamluk History: The Third Reign of al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn ˙ ˙ Qala¯wu¯n (1310–1341). Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995. (Levanoni, Turning Point). Lewis, Bernard. The Arabs in History. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993. (Lewis, The Arabs in History). Little, Donald P. “An Analysis of the Relationship between Four Mamluk Chronicles for 737–45”, Journal of Semitic Studies 19 (1974), 252–268. _____ “Historiography of the Ayyubid and Mamluk Epochs”, in The Cambridge History of Egypt. Vol. 1: Islamic Egypt, 640–1517, ed. Carl F. Petry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. (Little, “Historiography”). _____ An Introduction to Mamluk Historiography: An Analysis of Arabic Annalistic and Biographical Sources for the Reign of an-Malik al-Na¯sir Muhammad ibn Qala¯ʾu¯n. ˙ ˙ Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1970. (Little, Introduction). _____ “Notes on Aitamisˇ, a Mongol Mamlu¯k”, in Die Islamische Welt zwischen Mittelalter und Neuzeit: Festschrift für Hans Robert Roemer zum 65. Geburtstag, eds. Ulrich Haarmann and Peter Bachmann. Beirut: Orient-Institut der Deutschen Morganlandischen Gesellschaft/Wiesbaden: Franz Steiner, 1979. 387–401. (Little, “Aitamisˇ”). _____ “Religion under the Mamluks”, The Muslim World 73 (1983), 165–181. _____ “Safadı¯ as Biographer of his Contemporaries”, in Essays on Islamic Civilization ˙ Presented to Niyazi Berkes, ed. Donald P. Little. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1976. 190–211. Makdisi, George. The Rise of the Colleges: Institutions of Learning in Islam and the West. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 1981. Mazor Amir and Keren Abbou Hershkovitz, “Spectacles in the Muslim World: New Evidence from the Mid-Fourteenth Century”, Early Science and Medicine 18, 3 (2013), 291– 305. Morgan, David O. Medieval Persia, 1040–1797. London; New York: Longman, 1988.

298

Bibliography

_____ The Mongols. 2nd ed. Malden: Blackwell, 2007. (Morgan, Mongols). _____ “The Mongols in Syria, 1260–1300”, in Crusade and Settlement: Papers Read at the First Conference of the Society for the Study of the Crusades and the Latin East and Presented to R. C. Smail, ed. Peter W. Edbury. Cardiff: University College Cardiff Press, 1985. 233–234. _____ “Persian Historians and the Mongols”, in Medieval Historical Writing in the Christian and Islamic Worlds, ed. D.O. Morgan. London: School of Oriental and African Studies, 1982. _____ “Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n Tabı¯b”, EI2, 8:443–444. ˙ Nakamachi, Nobutaka. “The Rank and Status of Military Refugees in the Mamluk Army: A Reconsideration of the Wa¯fidı¯yah”, MSR 10, 1 (2006), 55–81. (Nakamachi). Northrup, Linda S. “The Bahrı¯ Mamlu¯k Sultanate, 1250–1390”, in The Cambridge History of ˙ Egypt. Vol. 1: Islamic Egypt, 640–1517, ed. Carl F. Petry. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 242–289. (Northrup, “The Bahrı¯ Mamlu¯k Sultanate”). ˙ _____ From Slave to Sultan: The Career of al-Mansu¯r Qala¯wu¯n and the Consolidation of ˙ Mamluk Rule in Egypt and Syria, 678–689 A.H./1279–1290 A.D. Stuttgart: Franz Steiner Verlag, 1998. (Northrup, Qala¯wu¯n). Paterson, W.F. “The Archers of Islam”, JESHO 9 (1966), 69–87. Petry, Carl F. “Al-Maqrı¯zı¯’s Discussion of Imprisonment and Description of Jails in the Khitat”, MSR 7, 2 (2003), 137–143. ˙ ˙ Poliak, A. N. Feudalism in Egypt, Syria, Palestine and the Lebanon, 1250–1900. London: The Royal Asiatic Society, 1939. Rabbat, Nasser O. The Citadel of Cairo: A New Interpretation of Royal Mamluk Architecture. Leiden: E.J. Brill, 1995. (Rabbat, Citadel). _____ “Representing the Mamluks in Mamluk Historical Writing”, in The Historiography of Islamic Egypt (c. 950–1800), ed. Hugh Kennedy. Leiden: Brill, 2001, 59–75. (Rabbat, “Representing the Mamluks”). Rabie, Hasanayn Muhammad. The Financial System of Egypt, A.H. 564–741/A.D. 1169– ˙ ˙ 1341. London: Oxford University Press, 1972. (Rabie). Raphael, Kate. Muslim Fortresses in the Levant. Abingdon, Oxon: Routledge, 2011. (Raphael). Richards, Donald S. “Mamluk Amirs and their Families and Households”, in The Mamluks in Egyptian Politics and Society, eds. Thomas Philipp and Ulrich Haarmann. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998. 32–54. (Richards, “Mamluk Amirs”). _____ A Mamluk Amir’s Mamluk History: Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ and the Zubdat al-Fikra”, in ˙ The Historiography of Islamic Egypt (c. 950–1800), ed. Hugh Kennedy. Leiden: Brill, 2001. 37–44. (Richards, “Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯”). ˙ Rosenthal, Franz. “Al-Safadi, Sala¯h al-Dı¯n Khalı¯l b. Aybak”, EI2, 8:759–760. ˙ ˙ ˙ Al-Sarra¯f, Shiha¯b. “Mamluk Furu¯sı¯yah Literature and Its Antecedents”, MSR 8, 1 (2004), ˙ 141–200. Schein, Sylvia. “Gesta Dei per Mongolos 1300. The Genesis of a Non-Event”. English Historical Review 94:373 (1979), 805–819. (Schein, “Gesta Dei per Mongolos”). Schimmel, Annemarie. “Some Glimpses of the Religious Life in Egypt during the Later Mamluk Period”, Islamic Studies 4 (1965), 353–392. Shoshan, Boaz. Popular Culture in Medieval Cairo. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1993. (Shoshan).

Secondary sources

299

Somogyi, Joseph. “Adh-Dhahabı¯’s Record of the Destruction of Damascus by the Mongols in 699–700/1299–1301”, in Ignace Goldziher Memorial Volume, eds. Samuel Löwinger and Joseph Somogyi. Budapest: Globus Nyomdai Müintézet, 1948. 353–386. Smith, John Masson. “ʿAyn Ja¯lu¯t: Mamlu¯k Success or Mongol Failure?”, Harvard Journal of Asiatic Studies 44, 2 (1984), 307–345. (Smith). Sourdel D. “Ghazza”, EI2, 2:1056–1057. Stewart, Angus Donal. The Armenian Kingdom and the Mamluks: War and Diplomacy during the Reigns of Hetʿum II (1289–1307). Leiden: Brill, 2001. (Stewart, Armenian Kingdom). _____ “Qalʿat al-Ru¯m / Hromgla / Rumkale and the Mamluk Siege of 691 AH/1292 CE.”, in Muslim Military Architecture in Greater Syria: From the Coming of Islam to the Ottoman Period, ed. Hugh Kennedy. Leiden: Brill, 2006. (Stewart, “Qalʿat al-Ru¯m”). Richards, D.S. “The Office of Wila¯yat al-Qa¯hira in Mamluk Times”, in Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyubid and Mamluk Eras IV, Proceedings of the 6th, 7th and 8th International Colloquium, ed. Urbain Vermeulen and Jo Van Steenbergen. Katholieke Universiteit Leuven, May 1997, 1998 and 1999. Leuven: Uitgeverij Peeters, 2001, 441–457. (Richards, “The office of Wila¯yat al-Qa¯hira”). ¯ fa¯q alAl-Tara¯una, Taha Thaljı¯. Mamlakat Safad fı¯ ʿAhd al-Mama¯lı¯k. Beirut: Da¯r al-A ˙ ˙ ˙ Jadı¯da, 1402/1982. (al-Tara¯una). ˙ Thorau, Peter. “Einige Kritische Bemerkungen zum Sogenannten ‘Mamlu¯k phenomenon’”, in Die Mamlu¯ken: Studien zu ihrer Geschichte und Kultur. Zum Gedenken an Ulrich Haarmann (1942–1999), eds. Stephan Conermann and Anja Pistor-Hatam. Hamburg: EB-Verlag, 2003. 367–378. _____ The Lion of Egypt: Sultan Baybars I and the Near East in the Thirteenth Century, tr. P. M. Holt London and New York: Longman, 1992. Van Steenbergen, Jo. “The Mamluk Elite on the Eve of al-Na¯sir Muhammad’s Death (1341): ˙ ˙ A Look behind the Scenes of Mamluk Politics”, MSR 9, 2 (2005): 173–199. (Van Steenbergen, “Mamluk Elite”). _____ “The Office of Na¯ʾib al-Saltana of Damascus: 741–784/1341–1382, a Case Study”, in ˙ Egypt and Syria in the Fatimid, Ayyu¯bid and Mamluk Eras III, Proceedings of the 6th, 7th and 8th International Colloquiums, eds. Urbain Vermeulen and Jo Van Steenbergen. Leuven: Peeters, 2001, 429–448. (Van Steenbergen, “The Office of Na¯ʾib al-Saltana of ˙ Damascus”). _____ Order Out of Chaos: Patronage, Conflict and Mamluk Socio-Political Culture, 1341– 1382. Leiden and Boston: Brill, 2006. (Van Steenbergen, Order). Yosef, Koby. “Dawlat al-Atra¯k or Dawlat al-Mama¯lı¯k? Ethnic Origin or Slave Origin as the Defining Characteristic of the Ruling Elite in the Mamluk Sultanate”, JSAI 39 (2012), 387–410. (Yosef, “Dawlat al-Atra¯k”). _____ Ethnic Groups, Social Relationships and Dynasty in the Mamluk Period (1250–1517). Unpublished Ph.D. diss., Tel Aviv University, 2010. [in Hebrew]. (Yosef, Ethnic Groups). _____ “Ikhwa, Muwa¯khu¯n and Khushda¯shiyya in the Mamlu¯k Sultanate”, JSAI 40 (2013). _____ “Mamluks and Their Relatives in the Period of the Mamluk Sultanate (1250–1517)”, MSR 17 (2012), 335–362. (Yosef, “Ikhwa”).

Index

ʿAbdalla¯h al-Silahda¯r 38, 86, 89, 107, 223 ˙ Abu¯ al-Fida¯ʿ 31, 103n, 114n, 128, 132, 199 Abulustayn (battle) 38n, 54, 63, 64n, 68, 169, 249–250, 252 Acre 62, 77–79, 251 Ᾱdam (brother of Sala¯r) 125, 185 ʿAjlu¯n 117, 227n, 260 Albakı¯ al-Za¯hirı¯ 104, 113, 117, 120, 172, ˙ 174 Aldukuz amı¯r akhu¯r 58, 223, 249 Aldukuz al-Silahda¯r/al-Ashrafı¯ 62, 86, ˙ 126, 130, 133, 135, 141n, 142, 161n, 201– 202, 223, 253, 255 Aleppo 18, 25, 51, 59n, 60, 71, 76, 78, 93, 102, 104 113, 115–117, 119, 121–123, 126, 128–129, 135, 142, 148–149, 151, 159– 160, 161n, 165, 197, 199–200, 204, 210, 235–236, 242–243, 246, 250, 259, 263, 265–266, 268, 274, 279, 284–285, 287 Alexandria 82, 86, 92–93, 198, 202, 206, 260–262, 269, 273, 276, 284 Alladaq/Aldiq al-Khwa¯rizmı¯ 57, 223, 249 ¯ lmalik al-Ha¯jj 38, 63, 64n, 125, 161n, A ˙ 205–206, 207n, 210, 212n, 223, 256, 269, 288 Altabars al-Majnu¯n 57, 223–234, 246 ˙ Altunbugha¯ al-Ja¯wulı¯ 43–44, 282 ˙ Altunbugha¯ al-Jamda¯r 82, 85n, 223, 230 ˙ Altunbugha¯ al-Ja¯wulı¯ 282 ˙ Altunbugha¯ al-Sa¯lih¯ı 64, 205n, 223, 254 ˙ ˙ ˙ Altunqush/Altunfush al-Jama¯lı¯ 198n, ˙ ˙ 209–210, 213n, 278 alza¯m 111, 143, 166, 167

ʿAlı¯ b. Qala¯wu¯n, see al-Sa¯lih ʿAlı¯ b. Qala¯˙ ˙ wu¯n amı¯r akhu¯r 57, 124n, 209, 212n, 215, 223, 228, 241, 246, 249, 278–279, 284 amı¯r janda¯r 59, 76, 91, 98, 108, 111, 197, 206, 233, 244, 252, 269 amı¯r majlis 59, 197, 234, 240, 265 amir of fifty 206, 244, 265–267, 275 amir of forty, see amir tablkha¯na¯h ˙ amir of one hundred 22–23, 47n, 59n, 65– 66, 73, 76n, 77–78, 85n, 87n, 115, 148, 151, 188, 190, 198, 204–207, 209–212, 215–216, 229n, 241–242, 244, 258–261, 263, 265–272, 274, 276–280, 282–284, 286–288 amir tablkha¯na¯h 22, 47n, 51, 56–57, 59n, ˙ 62, 65–70, 73, 77n, 92, 98, 117n, 133, 141– 142, 143n, 148, 151, 156, 168, 174, 183– 184, 186–190, 202, 204–206, 209–211, 216, 230n, 240–244, 246–248, 257–258, 260–261, 263, 265–266, 269–270, 272, 274–281, 283–288 amir of ten 22, 51, 59n, 65, 67, 69, 98, 111, 118, 124, 133n, 143n, 183, 188n, 189, 209–210, 216, 239n, 241n, 246, 249, 260, 265, 270–273, 275, 279–281, 283–287 Amitai, Reuven 23, 115n, 116n, 119, 153n, 167, 195, 212–213 Anas b. Kitbugha¯ 93, 188n, 285 ˙ Anas al-Jamda¯r 122–123, 223, 231 ˙ Anatolia 16, 21, 34, 37, 80, 113–114, 252 see also Ru¯m Antioch 19, 56, 69, 117, 121–122 ¯ qbugha¯ ʿAbd al-Wa¯hid 51 A ˙

302 ¯ qbugha¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ 79, 223, 230 A ˙ Aqjuba¯ (a mamluk of Baybars al-Ta¯jı¯) 282 Aqjuba¯ al-Za¯hirı¯ 135 ˙ ¯ qsunqur alA al-Husa¯mı¯ 83n, 85n, 148 ˙ Aqqu¯sh al-Afram 38, 46, 50n, 62, 72, 78, 97, 103, 107, 115–116, 120–123, 125, 131– 132, 135–136, 138, 140–142, 149, 150n, 153, 160, 163–165, 168–171, 173, 175, 179, 181, 183–184, 187, 189, 191–194, 197–198, 220–201, 205n, 210, 212n, 213, 220, 223, 232, 234, 246, 251n, 252, 256, 262, 267, 274, 278, 280 Aqqu¯sh al-Ashrafı¯ 57, 72, 76, 101, 112, 135, 141–142, 144, 165, 198, 201, 203–205, 212n, 224, 237, 239n, 246, 255, 259–260, 270, 280 Aqqu¯sh Kurjı¯ al-Matru¯h¯ı 36, 39, 62, 116– ˙ ˙ 117, 224, 231, 253, 288 Aqqu¯sh al-Mansu¯rı¯ 88, 203–204, 224, 255, ˙ 258–259 Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ (Qatta¯l al-Sabʿ) 58, ˙ 76–77, 95, 110–111, 115, 123, 125–126, 130, 134, 205, 224, 247, 256, 265 Aqqu¯sh al-Mawsilı¯ al-Ha¯jib (Numayla) ˙ ˙ 58–59, 76, 82, 84–85, 224, 230, 232, 247 Aqqu¯sh al-Rahbı¯ 39, 63n, 205–206, 224, ˙ 235, 256, 266 Aqqu¯sh al-Ru¯mı¯ 98, 135, 141, 155, 162, 275n ¯ qsunqur Kirta¯y 38, 58, 87, 90, 93, 102– A 103, 107, 223, 230, 233–234, 237, 248 ¯ qsunqur al-Sala¯rı¯ 209, 212n, 223, 276 A Arabic language 42–45, 48, 70, 74 Arghu¯n al-Dawa¯da¯r 44, 48, 64, 149–150, 161n, 200, 205n, 223, 278 Arghu¯n (a mamluk of Baha¯dur Samiz) 216, 281 Armenian/s 79–81, 117n, 123n, 132, 134, 259 see also Cilicia – ethnic origin of mamluks 34–35 Arsala¯n al-Dawa¯da¯r 44 Arsu¯f (Apollonia) 19, 55 Aruqta¯y al- al-Ha¯jj 36, 38, 43, 45, 51, 64, ˙ ˙ 172, 176, 178n, 186–187, 205n, 212n, 216, 223, 254

Index

¯ s (Alans) 35–36, 39 A ˙ Asanbugha¯ b. Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯ 211, 284 Asandamur Kurjı¯ 26n, 39, 76, 91, 103, 121– 123, 125, 128, 131–132, 135, 138, 140, 142–144, 160, 161n, 165, 174, 190, 193, 197, 199–200, 223, 235–236, 255 Asandamur al-Qalı¯jı¯ 209, 281 Ascalon 115, 120 al-Ashraf Khalı¯l (sultan) 19, 34n, 35, 43, 50–52, 58n, 62, 71, 75–86, 89, 96–97, 99, 116n, 131, 148, 151, 153, 159–161, 164, 173–175, 183, 186–187, 231, 239n, 240, 242–243, 248, 250, 254, 267, 276 Ashrafiyya (the mamluks of al-Ashraf khalı¯l) 52n, 75, 82, 89–90, 95, 107, 140, 162 Aslam al-Qibja¯qı¯ 38, 64, 224, 254, 275–276 ˙ Aslam al-Radda¯dı¯ 224 ˙ ata¯bak al-ʿasa¯kir 58, 76, 85, 87, 108, 232, 239 awla¯d al-na¯s 21, 23, 70, 133, 151, 187–189, 193, 213, 215–216, 219, 288 Ayalon, David 20, 21n, 23, 36n, 37n, 40, 42n, 45, 47–48, 50n, 51, 53–55, 68, 87, 147–148, 157–158, 166, 171, 176, 185, 186n, 195, 212–213, 221 Aya¯s al-Shamsı¯ 282 Aya¯z, Fakhr al-Dı¯n 229, 238 Aybak al-Afram 66, 78, 80, 91, 188n, 233, 244 Aybak al-Baghda¯dı¯ 26n, 63, 125, 134–135, 139n, 141–142, 144, 164–165, 196, 224, 233, 238, 252, 255 Aybak al-Hamawı¯ al-Za¯hirı¯ 77, 91, 93, 100, ˙ ˙ 123, 234 Aybak al-Khaznada¯r 57, 59, 76, 91, 95, 107, 110–111, 115, 123, 125, 128, 160, 163, 172, 188, 224, 231, 233, 236, 244 Aybak al-Mawsilı¯ 57–58, 60, 76, 78, 87, 91, ˙ 158, 224, 230, 232, 236–238, 244, 247–248 Aybak al-Ru¯mı¯ 62, 144, 161n, 202, 212n, 224, 238, 252, 255 Aybak al-Tawı¯l 57, 61, 224, 231, 244n, 245, ˙ 286–287

Index

Aybak al-Ustada¯r 124, 224, 231 Aydamur al-ʿIzzı¯ 152 Aydamur al-Jana¯h¯ı 57, 224, 230, 237, 246– ˙ 247 Aydamur al-Khat¯ırı¯ 62, 72, 108, 125, 135, ˙ 142–143, 161n, 165, 198, 203–204, 210– 213, 224, 252, 255, 257–258, 283–284 Aydamur al-Rafa¯ 58, 61, 124, 224, 231, 248 Aydamur al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ 62, 205–206, 224, 252, 257, 270 Aydamur al-Yu¯nusı¯ 63, 135, 203–204, 224, 252, 256, 262 Aydamur al-Zaradka¯sh 57, 61, 170–171, 173, 193, 200–201, 224, 246, 256 Aydughdı¯ Shuqayr 98, 104–105, 141, 151, 162–163, 202, 209–210, 212n, 274 Aydughmish amı¯r akhu¯r 212n, 215, 278– 279 Aytamish al-Muhammadı¯ 36–38, 45, 64, ˙ 139, 158, 170, 176, 178, 180, 186–187, 205n, 216, 224, 254 Aytamish al-Saʿdı¯ 125, 188n ʿAyn Ja¯lu¯t 18, 38n, 54, 63, 143, 169n, 239– 241, 250 al-ʿAynı¯, Badr al-Dı¯n 29, 33–34, 38n, 46, 57n, 63, 81, 87n, 116, 129, 167, 226n Ayyu¯bids 16, 17, 18, 23, 31, 97, 128, 184, 199, 236, 237, 247, 248 Azerbaijan 21, 201, 211 Baalbek 117, 216, 237, 251, 270, 278, 281 Badr al-Dı¯n Luʾluʾ (the governor of Mosul) 53, 239, 244, 247 ¯ s 39, 40n, 60, 72, 102, 122, 125, Baha¯dur A ˙ 128, 135, 140, 143, 149, 161n, 165, 170, 197, 202–203, 210, 212n, 215, 224, 252, 255, 258, 268, 282–283 Baha¯dur al-Ha¯jj 26n, 38, 46, 63–64, 84, 87, ˙ 90–92, 94–95, 97, 100, 141–142, 162, 168– 169, 171, 191, 197, 199–200, 224, 232, 235, 250–251, 254 Baha¯dur al-Ju¯kanda¯r 98, 171, 209, 275 Baha¯dur al-Muʿizzı¯ 98, 125, 209, 212n, 217, 274

303 Baha¯dur Raʾs Nawba 57, 82–85, 151n, 171, 173, 188n, 196, 224, 230, 245–246, 287 Baha¯dur Samiz 46, 187, 216, 224, 231, 281 Baha¯dur al-Sanjarı¯ 205–206, 224, 235–236, 252, 256, 267 Baha¯dur al-Yu¯sufı¯ 125 Bahasna¯ 81, 113, 131–132, 145 Bahriyya 17, 18, 20 ˙ Baktamur al-Abu¯ Bakrı¯ 43, 62, 65, 69n, 70, 123, 125, 202, 210–211, 224, 253, 255, 284–285 Baktamur al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ 205–206, 225, 256, 268, 288 Baktamur al-Ghutmı¯ al-Husa¯mı¯ 209, 281 ˙ Baktamur al-Ha¯jib (al-Husa¯mı¯) 47, 135, ˙ ˙ 140, 165, 171, 175, 209, 212n, 235, 274, 279–280 Baktamur al-Ju¯kanda¯r 46, 58, 97–98, 107– 108, 111, 115–116, 119–121, 123, 125, 134, 139, 142, 158, 171, 174–175, 178, 180, 182, 186n, 188n, 197, 200, 212n, 225, 233, 236, 238, 248, 255 Baktamur al-Sa¯qı¯ 41, 176–178, 208–209, 212n, 214, 216, 271–272 Baktamur al-Silahda¯r (al- Za¯hirı¯ al-Man˙ ˙ su¯rı¯) 63, 69n, 76, 83–84, 88, 90–91, 95, ˙ 102, 104–106, 113, 117, 119, 123, 125, 160, 225, 231, 232n, 250, 273 Bakta¯sh al-Fakhrı¯ 80, 87 95, 102–103, 107, 115, 121, 123–125, 128, 130, 134n, 187, 188n, 199 Bakta¯sh al-Manku¯rsı¯ 25n, 183, 205–206, 226, 257, 270, 288 Bakta¯sh al-Zaradka¯sh 81, 226, 238 Baktu¯t al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ 84, 87, 237 Baktu¯t al-Azraq 91, 94, 149, 152 Baktu¯t al-Fatta¯h 63, 108, 110, 125, 134– ˙ 135, 141–143, 165, 198, 225, 233, 253–254 Baktu¯t al-Qarma¯nı¯ 25n, 63–64, 108, 139n, 161n, 201, 203–205, 212n, 213, 225, 253, 255, 257 Baktu¯t al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ 229 Balaba¯n/Baybars al-ʿAnqa¯wı¯ al-Zarra¯q 202, 204, 225, 256, 265 Balaba¯n al-Badrı¯ 135, 229, 237

304 Balaba¯n al-Husa¯mı¯ 209, 281 ˙ Balaba¯n al-Husaynı¯/al-Hasanı¯ 87, 205– ˙ ˙ 206, 225, 233, 252, 256, 269 Balaba¯n Jarkas 209, 281 Balaba¯n al-Ju¯kanda¯r 57, 60, 128, 171, 183, 188, 220, 225, 231, 235–237, 246 Balaba¯n/Turunta¯y al-Muhammadı¯ 83, ˙ ˙ ˙ 197–198, 204, 225, 264–265 Balaba¯n al-Ru¯sı¯ 39, 57, 225, 249 Balaba¯n al-Shamsı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ 202, 205, ˙ 225, 255, 263 Balaba¯n al-Tabba¯khı¯ 26n, 57–58, 60, 69n, ˙ 72, 76, 79, 102–104, 106, 115–116, 121, 148n, 151, 153, 160, 209–210, 212n, 213n, 215, 225, 231, 235–236, 238, 243, 278–279 Balaba¯n al-Tatarı¯ 38, 205, 225, 256, 267 Balaba¯n al-Tughrı¯lı¯, see Ta¯kiz ˙ Balaba¯n Turna¯ 125, 202, 204, 212n, 225, ˙ 233, 255, 263, 288 Bala¯t al-Ju¯kanda¯r 63, 135, 139n, 196, 204, ˙ 225, 253, 256, 264 Balatnus 238 ˙ Ba¯lu¯j al-Husa¯mı¯ 98, 275n ˙ barı¯d 43, 76n, 85n, 96, 120n, 278n, 281 Barqu¯q (sultan) 20n, 42, 47, 50n, 53, 167 barracks, see tiba¯q ˙ Ba¯sit¯ı 58, 225, 230, 238, 248 ˙ Baybars (al-Za¯hir, sultan) 18–20, 23, 34, ˙ 41, 45, 48–51, 54n, 55, 64n, 68–69, 96, 154, 157, 168n, 172, 174n, 188, 215, 219, 221, 239n, 250–251, 252n – descendants of, 23, 99, 112, 237, 239, 244 Baybars ʿAbdalla¯h 229 Baybars al-Ahmadı¯ 38, 63, 135, 205–206, ˙ 207n, 211–213, 224n, 225, 253, 256, 268– 269 Baybars al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ 135, 165, 201–202, 205, 225, 235, 237, 255 Baybars al-ʿAlamı¯ 63, 198, 201, 204–205, 225, 253, 256, 264 Baybars al-Awhadı¯ 205, 225, 256, 268 ˙ Baybars al-Baha¯durnı¯ 58, 225, 249 Baybars al-Ha¯jib al-Mansu¯rı¯/al-Na¯sirı¯ ˙ ˙ ˙ 212n, 229–230

Index

Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r (al-Muzaffar, sultan) ˙ 19, 36, 38, 41, 43, 62–63, 67, 84–88, 98, 106n, 107–110, 112, 114–116, 120–126, 149, 153, 156–157, 160, 168–171, 173– 174, 179–184, 186, 191–194, 196–201, 208–213, 216, 220, 223n, 225n, 226, 227n, 228n, 229n, 230n, 232, 253–254, 268–273, 280, 283, 287 see also al-Na¯sir Mu˙ hammad b. Qala¯wu¯n ˙ Baybars al-Majnu¯n (al-Sharafı¯ al-Mansu¯˙ rı¯) 142, 161n, 201–202, 205, 226, 255 Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ (al-Dawa¯wda¯r al-Khi˙ ta¯ʾı¯) 27, 29, 33, 34n, 39, 42, 44, 47–48, ˙ 49n, 53–58, 60–61, 65–66, 70–72, 76, 80, 85, 87n, 88n, 89, 92–93, 99, 102, 105–106, 110–111, 116, 118–120, 122–123, 125– 126, 130, 132–134, 137, 139n, 143, 148n, 149–153, 156, 158, 161–162, 168n, 181, 184, 188n, 197, 199, 201, 203–204, 212n, 226, 234–235, 237, 240n, 241, 242n, 243– 244, 245n, 246n, 247, 255, 258, 260–263, 266, 270n, 286 Baybars al-Muwaffaqı¯ 58, 63, 123, 155, 226, 231, 237, 250 Baybars al-Muzaffarı¯ 156, 208, 272–273 ˙ Baybars al-Sala¯rı¯ 209, 275n, 276 Baybars al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ 62, 205–206, 226, 252, 257, 270 Baybars al-Ta¯jı¯ 63, 164, 201–202, 226, 234, 253, 255, 282 Baydara¯ al-ʿᾹdilı¯ 154, 171, 209, 277 Baydara¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ 25n, 26n, 38, 49, 54, ˙ 57, 59, 65, 67, 69n, 72, 76, 78, 80–86, 89, 125, 144, 148, 160–161, 169, 172, 174– 175, 193, 209, 226, 230, 232–234, 239– 240, 281 Baydu¯ (a mamluk of La¯jı¯n) 98 Baysarı¯ al-Shamsı¯ al-Sa¯lih¯ı 80, 83–84, 87, ˙ ˙ 90, 93–95, 100, 156 Ba¯zı¯ 57, 226, 237, 246 Bedouin 63n, 84, 113, 115, 131–134, 145, 188n, 200, 201n, 240, 252, 259, 261, 283, 286 Berkey, Jonathan 171 Bı¯lı¯k Abu¯ Ghudda 209, 277

Index

Bı¯lı¯k al-Jamda¯r/al-Sa¯qı¯ al-Muzaffarı¯ 208, ˙ 272 Bı¯lı¯k al-Khat¯ırı¯ 125 ˙ Bı¯lı¯k/Bakta¯sh al-Tayya¯r/ı¯ 57, 60, 116, 226, ˙ 231, 236, 246 Bı¯lı¯k alʿUthma¯nı¯ 205, 226, 257, 271 al-Bı¯ra 47n, 70, 79–80, 113, 206, 238, 241, 251, 267, 270, 275 bravery 68–70, 72, 103, 116n, 118–119, 124, 187, 217, 241n, 242, 245 brother/brotherhood (akh/ukhu¯wa) 24, 36, 38, 41, 45, 108, 111–112, 125, 139, 158, 163, 164n, 175–180, 185–187, 189, 193, 198, 199n, 212n, 216, 230, 252n, 254 Buhayra 30n, 82–83, 188n, 273, 281 ˙ Burjiyya 20, 28n, 33, 35–36, 43, 61–63, 64n, 73, 86–89, 108–110, 112, 115, 133–136, 139, 141–143, 156n, 164–166, 190–193, 196, 198, 204–207, 211–213, 223n, 230n, 252–253 Burlughay al-Ashrafı¯ 36, 38, 62, 84–88, 98, 110–111, 115, 123, 125, 134–135, 141– 142, 144, 166, 170–171, 173–174, 190n, 192–193, 198, 213, 226, 234, 252, 254, 281 Butkha¯s al-Aqraʿı¯ 58, 226, 249 ˙ Butkha¯s al-Mansu¯rı¯ 62, 123, 125, 134, 137, ˙ ˙ 143–144, 149, 161, 164, 200, 226, 230, 236, 253, 255 Butkha¯s al-Zaynı¯ 91, 94, 151n, 153, 232, ˙ 262 Bu¯zla¯r 102, 104–105, 226, 231 Byzantine empire/emperor 21, 54n, 61, 99, 172 Cairo 13, 17, 25, 31, 50, 81–86, 88–90, 92– 94, 96–99, 101, 103, 107, 111–113, 119, 121, 124–125, 127–128, 130–131, 133– 134, 136–144, 148, 150, 156, 162, 165, 174, 180–181, 184, 186, 189, 192, 196– 200, 202, 226n, 239n, 240, 242, 245, 247, 259, 261–267, 270, 273, 279–280, 285, 287 – amir/s in, 96–98, 112, 144, 164, 168– 169, 181, 204, 206, 209–211, 261, 269, 272, 274, 276–278, 280–282, 284–288

305 – citadel of, 20n, 33, 43, 47, 74, 76–77, 80n, 83–84, 86, 89, 120, 144, 149, 196, 198, 202n, 234, 246, 248, 261, 263n, 268, 283 – exile from, 102, 110–112, 137, 143–144, 152, 175, 181, 191, 197, 200, 202, 225n, 258–259, 268, 276, 284 – wa¯lı¯ of, 125, 164, 184, 206, 234, 267, 268n, 281, 288 Caliphs/Caliphate 15–17, 96–97, 120, 123, 127, 134, 137, 141, 142n, 163 Cilicia (Lesser Armenia) 31, 56, 69–70, 102–103, 106–107, 113, 125n, 128–130, 145, 189n, 238, 243, 268, 273 Circassians 20, 34–36, 38–39, 63n, 166– 170, 173, 191, 193–194 Clifford, Winslow 151n, 156n, 158–159, 167, 171n, 195, 212–213, 258n common people (al-ʿa¯mma) 88, 92–94, 97, 117–119, 121–122, 137–138, 142, 159 Crusaders (Franks) 17–19, 32, 69, 79, 80n, 81, 113, 117n, 128–129, 131, 145, 148n, 153, 196, 243 Da¯ʾu¯d (brother of Sala¯r) 185–186, 199n, 285 Damascus (city/district) 18, 25, 31, 59n, 81, 87, 93–94, 98, 101–102, 104–105, 110, 113, 117–123, 128, 131–132, 134, 137– 138, 140–143, 149–150, 157, 163, 165, 174–175, 177, 180–181, 183–184, 187– 189, 192, 198, 205n, 225n, 239–240, 245, 262–264, 267, 272, 285–286 – amir/s in, 71, 79, 94, 98, 103, 116, 135– 136, 140, 144, 155, 179, 183–184, 187, 192, 202–204, 206, 216–217, 227n, 230, 245–246, 248, 250, 251–252, 257–259, 263, 265–268, 270, 272, 275–278, 281– 284, 286–287 – citadel of, 59, 60, 77, 235, 242, 244–245, 267 – governor of, 18, 59, 60n, 76–80, 86, 91, 93, 98, 104–105, 117, 124n, 148, 151, 153– 154, 157, 161n, 171, 178–179, 183, 189, 197–200, 220, 234, 236, 242, 251, 258n,

306

Index

259, 265, 267, 273, 277, 279 see also Aqqu¯sh al-Afram – wa¯lı¯ of, 64, 148n, 184, 206, 235, 251, 266 – wa¯lı¯ al-barr of, 64, 76, 81, 100, 148n, 184, 235, 251, 275, 277 Damietta 17, 206, 269, 281 dawa¯da¯r 43–44, 66, 71, 85, 197, 234, 251, 260, 278, 282 al-Dhahabı¯, Muhammad b. Ahmad 30–31, ˙ ˙ 76n, 116n, 117n, 241

Holt, P.M. 27n, 95, 195 “homosexuality”/pederasty 50, 82 Hisn al-Akra¯d (Crac de Chevaliers) 19, 60, ˙ ˙ 80n, 93, 238, 243 Homs 18, 38n, 60, 70, 93–94, 102, 104, 115, 117, 128, 132, 142, 184, 202n, 204, 206, 237, 245–246, 257, 260, 261, 264, 267– 268, 282, 286–287 – Battle of Homs (680/1281) 149–151, 169n, 239, 241–243, 246–247

epidemic, see plague, natural disasters ethnicity 16, 20, 26, 28n, 33–40, 49, 68, 72– 73, 86n, 87, 92, 100, 166–170, 179–180, 193 eunuchs 37, 41, 43, 46, 49–53, 56–57, 74, 78, 205–206, 226–227, 231, 244, 247, 256, 265n, 266, 273

Ibn al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯ 29–30, 82, 87n, 92, 124n, 129, 143n, 156n, 240n, 261 Ibn al-Fura¯t 28, 33–34, 85n, 88n, 208, 242n Ibn Hajar al-ʿAsqala¯nı¯ 25–26, 38n, 64n, ˙ 122, 123n, 189, 191, 196, 199n, 200n, 202n, 227n, 230n, 244n, 248n, 260n, 261, 265, 270, 273, 275n, 276, 280n, 283, 286n Ibn Iya¯s 30, 33, 39n, 124n, 133n, 143n, 241n Ibn Kathı¯r 30–31, 38n, 63n, 83n, 92, 122, 126, 155, 242n, 275n Ibn Khaldu¯n 20, 21n, 36n, 41–42, 45, 185 Ibn al-Salʿu¯s, Muhammad 75, 77–78, 82, ˙ 86, 171, 233 Ibn Taghrı¯ Birdı¯ 25–26, 28, 33–35, 38, 50, 63n, 87n, 88n, 110, 137, 139n, 152, 155, 172–173, 182, 191, 201n, 216, 229n, 251n, 264n, 267, 268n, 271–272, 280n Ikba¯r 230 iqta¯ʿ 22, 51, 56, 59n, 60n, 65–66, 69–70, 76– ˙ 78, 86, 88, 90–91, 92n, 101–103, 105, 132, 139–140, 143, 152–153, 154n, 168n, 187– 188, 190, 198, 201, 207, 216, 243–244, 261, 266, 268, 279–280, 282, 288 Irwin, Robert 27n, 63n, 101, 157, 159, 166, 195 al-Isbaha¯nı¯, ʿAlam al-Dı¯n 57, 226, 249 ˙ ʿIza¯z al-Tatarı¯ 102, 104

al-Fa¯khir, Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n 51, 226, 231 Fakhr al-Dı¯n al-Khalı¯lı¯ 91, 98, 233 Fath al-Dı¯n Sabra 91, 98, 234–235 ˙ ˙ furu¯siyya 41, 45–46, 68–70, 217 Georgians 34, 36, 117n, 193 Gharbiyya 100, 281 Gha¯za¯n (Mongol ¯Ilkha¯n) 92, 104–105, 109, 113–124, 126–129, 145 Golden Horde 17, 37, 61 ha¯jib 59, 62, 76, 90–91, 97, 108, 116, 164, ˙ 169, 179, 189, 191, 197, 232, 235, 247, 267, 276–278, 280, 284, 287–288 hajj (pilgrimage) 97, 99, 110, 112, 180, 183, ˙ 200, 202, 258–259, 261, 265, 267, 269– 270, 272, 275–276, 278–279, 284, 286– 288 Al-Hajji, Hayat Nasser 23 halqa 22–23, 29, 65n, 84, 87, 101–102, ˙ 117n, 129, 168n, 183, 188, 190 Hama 18, 59n, 60, 93, 102, 104, 115, 117, 121–125, 128, 132, 135, 142–143, 160, 165, 197, 199, 236, 242, 247–248, 282 Hamadha¯n 105, 201 Hamda¯n b. Salgha¯y 104, 188n ˙ ˙

Ja¯gha¯n (a mamluk of La¯jı¯n) 94, 98, 100, 104, 105n, 151–152, 154, 179, 189, 275n jamda¯r/jamda¯riyya 35, 245, 269, 271–272 Jankalı¯ b. al-Ba¯ba¯ 139n, 212n

Index

Jaraktamur b. Baha¯dur Raʾs Nawba 151n, 173, 188n, 196, 211, 287 ja¯shnakı¯r 35, 279 Ja¯warshı¯ 57n, 63, 226, 250 al-Jazarı¯, Shams al-Dı¯n Muhammad 30– ˙ 31, 60, 252n, 275n, 284 Jerusalem 96, 111, 117, 139, 142, 152, 185, 237, 261, 261n, 270, 288 al-Jı¯za 85, 100, 206, 269 Juba¯ (brother of Sala¯r) 185–186, 199n, 285 Ju¯ba¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ 141, 205–206, 226, 256, ˙ 267 jundı¯/ajna¯d 22, 49, 56–57, 62, 65–67, 69– 70, 94, 101–102, 129, 142, 184, 190n Kabak Aqraʿı¯ 58, 226, 249 Kaharda¯sh al-Zarra¯q al-Mansu¯rı¯ 131, ˙ 139n, 205–206, 226, 256, 265 Kakhta¯ 126, 243 Kashlı¯ 201, 204, 226, 256, 264 Kashtaghdı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ 58, 226, 237, 248 ˙ Ka¯wazka¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ 25n, 57, 226, 231, 238, ˙ 245 Kerak 18, 59n, 60, 66, 76, 96, 101, 106, 109– 112, 134–135, 137–138, 140, 143, 165n, 180, 186, 192, 199, 202, 205n, 237, 239, 244, 246, 253–254, 259–260, 262–263, 265–266, 269, 273–274 Khalı¯fa b.ʿAı¯ Sha¯h 216 kha¯ssakiyya 35, 83–84, 86, 89, 106, 111, ˙˙ 241n, 263, 269, 273–274, 278 Khita¯ʾı¯, see Qara¯-Khita¯ʾı¯ ˙ ˙ khushda¯sh/khushda¯shiyya 24, 40–41, 63, 68, 70–71, 74, 82–83, 89, 91, 97–100, 102n, 103, 105n, 106, 109–110, 118–120, 125, 135, 139, 143, 147, 149, 151, 154, 157–163, 167, 171–172, 174–183, 185, 187, 190–193, 197, 199, 213–214, 219– 220, 224n, 251, 268, 274, 275n Khushqadam (sultan) 53 Kı¯kaldı¯ al-Shihna 57, 60, 227, 245n, 246 ˙ Kira¯y al-Mansu¯rı¯ 36, 58, 61, 111, 116, 122, ˙ 125, 132, 139, 142–144, 161n, 171–172, 182, 200, 227, 228n, 236–237, 247, 255, 288

307 ¯ dil) 19, 26n, 30n, Kitbugha¯ (sultan al-ʿA 36, 38, 42, 49, 54, 57–59, 65–66, 69–70, 72, 77, 79, 83–98, 109, 114, 116, 121–122, 125–126, 128, 132, 138, 149, 151–154, 157–158, 160–163, 167–173, 179, 182, 184, 187–190, 193–194, 209–210, 213– 214, 216, 223, 227, 231–234, 236, 238, 241, 262, 277–278, 285–286 ¯ dilı¯ 205–206, Kitbugha¯ Raʾs Nawba al-ʿA 227, 256, 266–267 Kujkun al-Mansu¯rı¯ 46, 63–64, 94, 102–103, ˙ 105, 122, 125, 141, 161n, 205–206, 227, 250, 257, 270, 286 Ku¯ka¯y al-Silahda¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ 125, 172, ˙ ˙ 205–206, 207n, 212n, 227, 257, 269 Kundughdı¯ al-Zarra¯q 205–206, 227, 256, 268 al-Ku¯ra¯nı¯, ʿIzz al-Dı¯n 57, 227, 247 Kurds 39–40, 87n, 123, 123n, 170 Kurjı¯ al-Ashrafı¯ 52, 95, 106–107, 154n, 156 Kurt al-Ha¯jib 58, 63, 76, 90–91, 95, 97, 107, ˙ 115–116, 227, 231, 232n, 236, 252 La¯jı¯n (brother of Sala¯r) 185, 186n La¯jı¯n (al-Mansu¯r, sultan) 19, 30n, 34, 38, ˙ 47, 49, 52, 54, 57–59, 62, 66–67, 69n, 72, 77–79, 82–84, 85n, 87n, 89–107, 109, 113–114, 120–121, 125, 141, 144–145, 148–149, 151–158, 160–163, 169–172, 174–175, 177–179, 181–183, 188n, 189, 193–194, 209–210, 212n, 213–214, 216– 217, 227, 230, 232, 234–235, 241–242, 245, 273–275, 281 La¯jı¯n al-Husa¯mı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ (al-Saghı¯r) ˙ ˙ 100, 151–152, 209, 235, 275 La¯jı¯n al-Kabı¯r 57, 60, 227, 237, 245 La¯jı¯n al-Ru¯mı¯ (al-ustada¯r, al-Silahda¯r) ˙ 37n, 39, 58, 61n, 84–85, 87–88, 95, 102, 107–108, 115, 117, 122–124, 134, 227, 231–232, 247 La¯jı¯n Zı¯rba¯j (al-ʿUmarı¯ al-Ja¯shnakı¯r) 62, 125–126, 133–134, 161n, 201, 204, 227, 253, 255, 263 Lapidus, Ira 171

308 Levanoni, Amalia 23, 55n, 65n, 152n, 159, 166, 188, 195, 213, 220n al-Luqma¯nı¯ 62, 86, 227, 253 al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya, see royal mam˙ luks Mankubars/Baybars al-Mansu¯rı¯ 196, 203, ˙ 227, 255, 260 Manku¯tamur al-Husa¯mı¯ 96, 98–103, 105– ˙ 107, 114, 120, 144–145, 151–152, 154– 156, 160, 189, 214, 220, 232, 275 Manku¯tamur al-Tabba¯khı¯ 209, 279 ˙ al-Maqrı¯zı¯, Taqı¯ al-Dı¯n Ahmad b. ʿAlı¯ 26, ˙ 28, 31, 33, 35–36, 38n, 41, 42n, 45, 48–50, 53, 56–58, 64n, 69, 87n, 88, 102, 103n, 106n, 107, 109, 114, 116n, 122, 123n, 126, 129, 139n, 140n, 155, 156n, 168, 169n, 173, 192n, 196, 199n, 201n, 202n, 225n, 229n, 242n, 254n, 261, 263n, 264n, 272n, 273, 276, 283, 284n Ma¯rdı¯n 105 114, 184 Marj al-Suffar (Shaqhab, battle) 63, 69n, ˙ ˙ 122–127, 145, 188n, 248, 275, 283 Marqab 80n, 116, 153, 238, 243 Mongols 17–18, 34n, 39n, 41, 118, 176 – ¯Ilkha¯nid Mongols, 18–19, 21, 24, 31, 38n, 45n, 63n, 68, 70–72, 81, 87n, 92–93, 102–106, 113–124, 126–132, 145, 149, 153n, 160, 169–170, 173–174, 196, 199– 201, 203, 207, 209, 211, 234n, 239, 241, 243, 245–246, 252, 256, 266, 270, 278 – Mongol ethnic origin, 20, 34, 36–39, 44, 73, 87, 89, 109, 138n, 150, 154, 167–170, 171n, 179, 193–194 – Mongolian language, 37n, 38n, 44–45, 186n – Oirat Mongols, 38, 91–93, 109, 114, 140, 145, 168–169, 191 see also Golden Horde Muʾayyad Shaykh (sultan) 53 Muba¯rak al-Mansu¯rı¯ 205, 227, 256, 266 ˙ Muba¯riz al-Dı¯n Sawwa¯r 95n, 123–125 Mufaddal Ibn Abı¯ al-Fada¯ʾil 29, 129 ˙˙ ˙ Mughulta¯y amı¯r majlis 125, 188n ˙

Index

Mughulta¯y al-Baʿlı¯ 63, 165, 198, 204, 227, ˙ 253, 255, 262 Mughulta¯y al-Masʿu¯dı¯ 62, 86, 133, 161n, ˙ 201, 204, 213, 227, 253, 255, 263, 266, 288 Mughulta¯y al-Sı¯wa¯sı¯ 230 ˙ Muhammad b. Bashqard 122–123, 188n ˙ Muhammad b. Qara¯sunqur 122, 188, 283 ˙ Muhammad b. al-Shaykhı¯ (Dhubya¯n) ˙ 109, 125, 184, 228, 233–234, 253 Muhammad b. Turunta¯y 133, 188n, 286 ˙ ˙ ˙ Mukhta¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ (al-Tawa¯shı¯) 205– ˙ ˙ 206, 227, 256, 266 Mu¯la¯y (Mongol general) 117–119, 122 muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya 49– ˙ 52, 60, 76, 78, 106, 148, 156, 247, 265, 273 Murshid al-Khaznada¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ (al-Ta˙ ˙ wa¯shı¯) 57, 60, 125, 205–206, 227, 247, 256, 265 Mu¯sa¯ b. ʿAlı¯ b. Qala¯wu¯n 108, 125, 172, 174, 188n, 199, 273 na¯ʿib al-ghayba (deputy of absence) 59, 233, 236, 241, 267, 277 na¯ʾib al-saltana fı¯ misr (viceroy, vice-sul˙ ˙ tan) 27, 43, 58–59, 65, 70, 75–76, 81, 85– 86, 88, 90–91, 99–101, 103, 107–108, 112, 120, 134, 136, 138n, 144, 148, 151, 154– 155, 160–162, 169, 179, 189, 197, 204, 220, 232, 239, 240n, 269, 276 Nablus 96, 261n Al-Naqı¯b, ʿAla¯ʾ al-Dı¯n 58, 227, 249 al-Na¯sir Muhammad b. Qala¯wu¯n 19, 21n, ˙ ˙ 23–24, 27, 28n, 29, 31, 45n, 50–52, 55n, 62, 64, 83, 85, 87, 90, 101, 107–108, 120, 127, 172, 177–178, 186–187, 194–195, 205–217, 219–220, 229n, 230n, 232, 250n, 253–254, 265–288 – and his conflict with Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r, 71, 108, 110–112, 134–144, 151– 152, 155–156, 160–166, 170, 179–181, 186, 190–192, 204–207, 211, 219, 257– 260, 262–267, 273, 283 – and his persecutions of Mansu¯rı¯ amirs, ˙ 72, 149–150, 152, 161, 165–166, 170, 173–

309

Index

174, 180–182, 186, 191–192, 196–205, 207, 211, 225n, 229n, 230n, 254–265, 284 Na¯siriyya (mamluks of al-Na¯sir Mu˙ ˙ hammad) 178, 212–214 see also al˙ Na¯sir Muhammad b. Qala¯wu¯n ˙ ˙ natural disasters 92–93, 95, 97, 138, 196 see also plague Nile 17, 85, 92, 93, 134 Nu¯gha¯y al-Jamda¯r al-Qibjaqı¯ 37–38, 139– 140, 198, 227, 255, 257, 263, 265–266 Nukba¯y al-Barı¯dı¯ 205–206, 227, 257, 269 Nusayrı¯s 80–81, 113, 131–132, 145 ˙ al-Nuwayrı¯, Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n Ahmad 27–28, ˙ 33, 52, 71, 88n, 103, 118, 122, 123n, 128, 132, 139n, 140, 156n, 174n, 207–208, 230n Öljeitü (Kharbanda¯)

127–128, 201

Palestine 11, 18, 19, 93–95, 109, 117, 120n, 121, 122, 248, 261 plague 252, 257, 263, 269, 272, 281, 286– 287 Qada¯da¯r (a mamluk of Burlughay alAshrafı¯) 281–282 Qala¯wu¯n (al-Mansu¯r, sultan) 19–20, 23– ˙ 24, 27–28, 30n, 33–35, 40–51, 53–58, 60– 75, 78n, 80n, 81n, 82n, 96, 98, 99n, 132, 137, 144, 147–154, 157–159, 163, 172, 174n, 178, 183, 186–188, 196, 214–215, 219, 221, 223n, 224n, 231, 239–254, 264– 267, 269, 275–276, 279 Qalʿat Jaʿbar 115, 286 Qalʿat al-Ru¯m 62, 69n, 76, 78–80, 113, 117, 187, 209, 229n, 238, 281–282 al-Qalqashandı¯, Shiha¯b al-Dı¯n Ahmad 31, ˙ 47n, 50n Qara¯la¯jı¯n al-Ustada¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ 125, 161, ˙ 197, 205–206, 212n, 228, 234, 256, 265– 266 Qara¯rsala¯n 78, 102–103, 105n, 160, 228, 231, 234 Qara¯sunqur al-Ju¯kanda¯r al-Mansu¯rı¯ 26n, ˙ 34, 38, 46n, 49, 51–52, 57, 60, 65, 67, 71–

72, 76, 78, 81–84, 89–90, 92, 94–95, 97, 99–100, 121–123, 125–126, 128–130, 135, 138–139, 140n, 142, 144, 148–151, 153, 157, 159–163, 165, 170–171, 173, 188, 190, 192–193, 197–201, 205, 209–211, 213, 216, 228, 232–233, 235–236, 238, 242–243, 256, 281, 283, 287 Qara¯-Khita¯ʾı¯/Khita¯ʾı¯ 34–35, 39, 226 ˙ ˙ Qa¯sha¯nı¯, Abu¯ al-Qa¯sim 31, 155n, 201n Qashtamur al-Shamsı¯ 129–130 Qibjaq al-Mansu¯rı¯ 26n, 38, 44, 46, 57n, 63– ˙ 64, 68, 69n, 72, 86, 89–90, 94–95, 96n, 98, 102–106, 113–114, 117–120, 123–125, 128–129, 134–135, 138, 142, 144–145, 151, 153–154, 157–158, 160, 162, 165, 168–172, 174–175, 178–179, 189–190, 193–194, 197, 199, 205, 228, 234, 236– 237, 250, 256, 265, 286–287 Qijma¯s/Bashsha¯sh al-Ju¯kanda¯r 63, 135, 139n, 141, 143, 165, 196, 203–204, 213, 228, 253, 255, 260 Qijqa¯r 57, 60, 228, 230, 235–236, 244–245 Qinnasrı¯n 121 Qipchaq, see Turks Qı¯ra¯n al-Sala¯rı¯ 277 Qı¯ra¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ ˙ Qirta¯y al-Mansu¯rı¯/al-Ashrafı¯ 212n, 230 ˙ ˙ Quba¯tamur al-Muzaffarı¯ 208, 272 ˙ Qullı¯ al-Silahda¯r 63, 125, 134–135, 161n, ˙ 205n, 206, 212n, 213, 228, 253, 256, 266 Qutlı¯ja¯ b. Balaba¯n al-Ju¯kanda¯r 183, 188n, ˙ 287 Qutlu¯bak al-Kabı¯r 38, 46, 72, 115, 123, 125, ˙ 128, 141–142, 161n, 164, 168–170, 172, 174–175, 179–180, 185, 191, 197, 200, 228, 232, 235–236, 251n, 255 Qutlu¯bak al-Shaykhı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ 230 ˙ ˙ Qutlu¯sha¯h (Gha¯za¯n’s deputy) 115–119, ˙ 123–124, 129 Qutuz (sultan) 18, 68 ˙ Qutuz al-Mansu¯rı¯ 39, 57, 60, 70, 72, 228, ˙ ˙ 30, 245 Rabbat, Nasser

48

310 al-Rahba 63n, 113, 117, 122, 238–239, 250, ˙ 257, 284, 286 Ramla 120, 261n Raphael, Kate 79–80 Rashı¯d al-Dı¯n 31, 104–105, 116, 118–119, 121–122, 124 al-rawk al-Husa¯mı¯ 101–102, 258, 261 ˙ royal mamluks (al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯˙ niyya) 22, 34, 35n, 43, 46–47, 49–52, 65n, 69, 74, 84, 86, 88–89, 107, 109, 111, 124n, 133, 139, 148, 156, 178n, 190, 241n see also muqaddam al-mama¯lı¯k al-sulta¯niyya ˙ Ruad island 79, 131, 145 Ru¯m 34, 37, 39, 252 see also Anatolia Saʿı¯d (Upper Egypt) 81, 106, 133–134, 143, ˙ 152, 182, 197, 240 al-Safadı¯, Khalı¯l b. Aybak 25–26, 38n, 43– ˙ 44, 54n, 71, 78n, 89, 105n, 117n, 119–120, 160n, 161, 162n, 173, 178, 179n, 186n, 189, 191, 197n, 201n, 202n, 209, 216, 233n, 239n, 245, 254n, 261n, 267, 268n, 270, 275n, 280n, 283 Safanjı¯ al-Ruknı¯ 208, 272 ˙ Safed 19, 25, 55, 59n, 60, 93n, 96, 102, 123, 131, 182, 197, 202, 276, 286 – citadel of, 60, 244–246, 260, 270 – governor of, 46, 62, 104, 116–117, 139, 142, 197, 200, 202, 236, 245–246, 258, 269, 272, 276, 280 Sahyu¯n 18, 143, 156, 197, 239, 242 ˙ Salamiyya 104, 115, 117 Sala¯r 13, 26n, 36, 38, 46, 54, 57, 63–64, 67, 69n, 72, 95–97, 102n, 107–108, 111, 113– 116, 120–125, 129, 134, 136, 138–139, 143, 152, 161, 163, 168–170, 172, 174– 175, 179–182, 185–186, 188n, 190, 197– 201, 204, 209–213, 220, 228, 232, 249– 250, 254–255, 260, 262, 275–277, 285 – and his conflict with Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r 107–110, 112, 135–136, 139, 144, 160, 164, 180, 181, 186, 190–191

Index

al-Sa¯lih ʿAlı¯ b. Qala¯wu¯n 34n, 64, 67, 102n, ˙ ˙ 104, 109, 150, 249 see also Mu¯sa¯ b. ʿAlı¯ b. Qala¯wu¯n al-Sa¯lih Ayyu¯b (Najm al-Dı¯n) 16, 17, 18, ˙ ˙ 20n, 34, 37, 172, 242 Sa¯lihiyya (mamluks of al-Sa¯lih Ayyu¯b) ˙ ˙ ˙ ˙ 17–18, 58n, 100, 108, 242 Samu¯k (brother of Sala¯r) 111, 139, 185– 186, 199n Sanjar (ustada¯r of Baybars al-Ja¯shnakı¯r) 208, 273 Sanjar amı¯r akhu¯r 57, 228 Sanjar Arjuwa¯sh 57, 60, 69n, 77–78, 113, 118–120, 228, 231, 235, 238, 245, 247n Sanjar al-Barwa¯nı¯ 63, 109, 201, 203–204, 228, 253, 255, 261 Sanjar al-Dawa¯da¯rı¯ 54n, 66, 92, 98n, 103, 115, 234, 244, 250 Sanjar al-Hamawı¯ 78 ˙ Sanjar al-Ja¯wulı¯ 13, 39, 43, 63, 108, 110, 125, 141–142, 161n, 170, 175, 178, 180– 182, 189, 202–205, 207n, 212n, 228, 237, 250, 255, 261–262, 282 Sanjar al-Jumaqda¯r 39, 43, 62, 125, 161n, 205–206, 212n, 228, 253, 256, 268 Sanjar al-Kha¯zin 58, 205–206, 228, 234, 248, 256, 267, 268n Sanjar al-Mansu¯rı¯ al-Muqrı¯ 228, 231, 238, ˙ 247n Sanjar al-Sawa¯bı¯ 125, 128 ˙ Sanjar al-Shuja¯ʿı¯ 25n, 39, 42, 44, 49, 57–59, 65, 69n, 72, 76–80, 82, 84–89, 144, 148n, 149–150, 153, 159–162, 167–168, 172, 175, 190, 228, 230, 232–234, 240–241 sa¯qı¯ 35, 242, 271 Sa¯rim al-Dı¯n Uzbek al-Jarmakı¯ 135, 238 ˙ Sarkhad 94–95, 109, 116, 162, 192, 197, 238, ˙ 248 Sa¯t¯ı 135 ˙ Sawa¯b al-Ruknı¯ 208, 272–273 ˙ Seljuqs 16, 97 shadd al-dawa¯wı¯n in Cairo 59, 86, 98, 184, 223, 240, 251n, 266–267, 282

Index

– in Damascus 64, 71, 76, 91, 98, 100, 148n, 154, 179n, 182–183, 206, 216, 220, 234, 251, 257, 260, 265–266, 280–282 shafa¯ʿa (mediation) 83, 86, 161, 163, 168n, 173, 274 Sharqiyya 100, 278 Shawbak 60, 186, 198–199, 237, 244, 248 al-Shaykhı¯ (Aydamur?) 63, 205–206, 253, 257, 270 al-Shaykhı¯ Qutlu¯bak 230 ˙ Shayzar 117, 238 al-Shuja¯ʿı¯, Shams al-Dı¯n 29, 39n, 268n, 270n, 273, 279n, 284n silahda¯r 35–36, 106, 216, 241, 247, 254, 287 ˙ Smith, John Masson 118, 123–124 Stewart, Angus Donal 79, 103n Subayba 111, 238 ˙ Su¯da¯y al-Na¯sirı¯ 125 ˙ Sülemish b. Ba¯ku¯ 113–114, 123 Sunqur al-Aʿsar 63–64, 71, 76, 78, 91–92, 98, 100, 125, 133–134, 148n, 160, 171, 182, 210, 228, 231, 233–234, 236, 251, 282 Sunqur al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ 63, 125, 228, 253 Sunqur al-ʿAlamı¯ 54n Sunqur al-Ashqar 80, 163, 183, 239, 243 Sunqur al-Jama¯lı¯ 209, 278 Sunqur Jarkas 38, 58, 228, 248 Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯ al-Ha¯jib 108, 110, 125, ˙ 161n, 178, 180, 197, 201–202, 228, 232, 238, 255 Sunqur al-Kama¯lı¯ al-Saghı¯r 230 ˙ Sunqur al-Massa¯h 100 ˙ Sunqur al-Nu¯rı¯ 183 Sunqur al-Silahda¯r 58, 229, 248 ˙ Sunqur al-Tawı¯l 58, 77, 229, 234, 248, 282 ˙ Sunqursha¯h al-Mansu¯rı¯ 46, 100, 107, 121– ˙ 122, 172, 229, 231, 236 Sunqursha¯h al-Za¯hirı¯ 100, 229n ˙ Taghrı¯ Birmish al-Na¯s¯ırı¯ 53 ˙ Ta¯kiz/Balaba¯n al-Tughrı¯lı¯ 62, 125, 133, 135, ˙ 139n, 141–142, 196, 229, 253–254 Tamur al-Sa¯qı¯ 108, 122, 125, 142–143, 161n, 202, 204, 212n, 229, 237, 255, 263– 264, 287

311 Tankiz 172, 176–178, 183, 202–203, 209, 216–217, 257–258, 261, 263, 266–267, 270–274, 275n, 277–279, 281, 283 Taqsu¯ (Baybars) 82, 172, 174–175 ˙ ˙ Taqsu¯ (al-Mansu¯rı¯) 58, 229, 248 ˙ ˙ ˙ Tashla¯qı¯ Sayf al-Dı¯n/Jama¯l al-Dı¯n 109– ˙ 110, 125 Tashtamur al-Jumaqda¯r 62, 133, 198, 203– ˙ 204, 229, 253, 255, 257 Tashtamur (brother of Butkha¯s) 230 ˙ ˙ Taybars al-Jamda¯r 135 ˙ Taybars al-Khaznada¯rı¯ 125, 209, 281 ˙ ¯ dilı¯ 94 Tikla¯n al-ʿA training and education (of mamluks) 21– 22, 24, 31, 35, 40–56, 65–68, 73–74, 158, 241n, 250, 254, 267 Thurau, Peter 221 tiba¯q (barracks) 35, 42–43, 46–51, 74, 89, ˙ 176 Tripoli 19, 59n, 79, 102, 106, 113, 121–122, 128, 131–132, 169, 243 – governor of, 60, 62, 76, 91,104, 115–117, 135, 142, 160, 165, 183, 191, 197, 199, 200, 202, 204, 236, 259, 264, 269, 279 – amir/s in, 116n, 183, 204, 225n, 228n, 257, 262, 264, 265–266, 271, 275, 281– 282, 287 Tu¯gha¯n al-Mansu¯rı¯ 63–64, 71, 76, 81, 148n, ˙ ˙ 203, 210, 229, 234–235, 238, 251, 255, 260, 288 Tu¯gha¯n al-Sa¯qı¯ al-Muzaffarı¯ 208, 272 ˙ ˙ Tu¯gha¯n al-Shamsı¯ 282 ˙ Tugha¯y al-Kabı¯r al-Husa¯mı¯ 162–163, 177– ˙ ˙ 178, 209, 274 Tugha¯y al-Ja¯shnakı¯r al-Na¯sirı¯ 278 ˙ ˙ Tughjı¯ al-Ashrafı¯ 88, 95, 106–107, 156, 202 ˙ Tughjı¯ al-Mansu¯rı¯ 63, 202, 229, 255 ˙ ˙ Tughrı¯l al-I¯gha¯nı¯ 58n, 62, 76, 79, 100, 115, ˙ 122–123, 125, 135, 141n, 210–211, 213, 229, 232, 236, 253, 287 Tulak al-Hasanı¯ al-Arghu¯nı¯ 209, 278 ˙ Turks/Turkish (ethnic origin, language) 15, 16, 20, 26n, 29–30, 34, 36, 38–41, 43– 44, 69, 166, 172, 176 – Qipchaq Turks 16–17, 34–38, 44, 166

312 – Turkmans 37, 39–40, 114, 122, 124n, 126, 188, 274 Turunta¯y al-Mansu¯rı¯ 42, 43n, 47, 49, 57– ˙ ˙ ˙ 58, 59n, 65–67, 69–70, 72, 75–77, 133, 135, 144, 150–151, 153, 159, 163, 171– 173, 183, 187, 188n, 209–210, 212n, 229– 230, 232, 235, 239–241, 242n, 279, 281, 286 Turunta¯y al-Sa¯qı¯ 83n, 85n ˙ ˙ Turunta¯y al-Zaynı¯ al-ʿᾹdilı¯ 209, 278 ˙ ˙ Turunta¯y al-Muhammadı¯, see Balaba¯n al˙ ˙ ˙ Muhammadı¯ ˙ Ughulbak (a mamluk of Kitbugha¯) 209, 277 ¯ dilı¯/al-Zaynı¯ 91, 93–94, 98, Ughurlu¯ al-ʿA 125–126, 154, 209, 234, 277 ¯ liya¯ b. Qarma¯n 123, 124n U ¯ dilı¯ 209, 216, 277 Uljaybugha¯ al-ʿA al-ʿUmarı¯, Ibn Fadl Alla¯h 31 ˙ ʿUrd (battle) 122–123, 125, 283 ˙ u¯sha¯qı¯ 35, 241–242 usta¯dh (master) 22n, 23–24, 37, 40, 46–48, 58, 62–64, 66, 70–71, 74, 83n, 88–89, 91, 98, 108, 141, 147–160, 162–163, 167, 172, 174, 178, 180, 183, 185, 193, 210, 214, 219, 223n, 230n, 239–240, 242–243, 245, 247– 251, 253, 271–273, 275, 277–278, 281 ustada¯r 47n, 59, 64, 76, 85, 91, 97, 107–108, 115, 124n, 129, 148n, 151, 156, 180–181, 206, 210, 220, 232, 236, 239–240, 246–

Index

247, 251, 257, 260, 262, 265–266, 268, 273, 277–278 Uzdamur al-ʿAla¯ʾı¯ 39, 58, 78, 229–230, 247 Van Steenbergen, Jo 23,158–159, 167, 176, 180, 195, 212–213, 220n Wa¯dı¯ al-Khaznada¯r (battle) 62, 103, 114– 117, 119, 131–132, 145, 188n, 273 wa¯fidiyya 34, 38n, 87, 90–91, 95, 109, 111, 114, 123–125, 139, 145, 154, 167–169, 183, 188n, 191, 193, 212n, 213, 219, 226n, 252 see also Mongols, Oirats wa¯lı¯, see Cairo, Damascus wazir 59, 65, 77–78, 82, 85–86, 91, 98, 100, 109, 117n, 148, 153, 159, 164, 182, 184, 233, 240, 251, 269, 280 Yaʿqu¯ba¯ al-Shahrazu¯rı¯ 87, 111, 121, 123, 125 Yemen 110, 276 Yosef, Koby 41n, 158n, 166, 176, 185, 186n al-Yu¯nı¯nı¯, Qutb al-Dı¯n Mu¯sa¯ 30–31, 117n ˙ al-Yu¯sufı¯, Mu¯sa¯ b. ʿAlı¯ 29, 33, 37n, 41, 117, 186n, 208, 254, 263n, 272n Za¯hiriyya (mamluks of al-Za¯hir Baybars) ˙ ˙ 58n, 74, 91, 100, 115, 242 see also al-Za¯hir ˙ Baybars Zetterstéen, K.V. 30, 140n, 272–273