The Rise and Decline of the Scholastic Quaestio Disputata: With Special Emphasis on Its Use in the Teaching of Medicine and Science [2, 1 ed.] 9004097406, 9789004097407

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THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE SCHOLASTIC 'QUAESTIO DISPUTATA'

EDUCATION AND SOCIETY IN THE MIDDLE AGES AND RENAISSANCE Editors

jtJRGEN MIETHKE (Heidelberg) WILLIAM]. CouRTENAY (Madison) jEREMY CATTO (Oxford)

VOLUME 2

THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE SCHOLASTIC 'QUAESTIO DISPUTAT A' With Special Emphasis on its Use in the Teaching of Medicine and Science

BY

BRIAN LAWN

EJ. BRILL LEIDEN • NEW YORK • KOLN 1993

The paper in this book meets the guidelines for permanence and durability of the Committee on Production Guidelines for Book Longevity of the Council on Library Resources.

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Lawn, Brian. The Rise and decline of the scholastic Quaestio disputata: with special emphasis on its use in the teaching of medicine and science I by Brian Lawn. p. cm.-(Education and society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance, ISSN 0926-6070; v. 2) Includes bibliographical references and index. ISBN 9004097406 (cloth) I. Learning and scholarship-History-Medieval, 500-1500. 2. Learning and scholarship-History. 3. Scholasticism. 4. EuropeIntellectual life. I. Title. II. Series. AZ32l.L38 1993 00 1.209'02-dc20

92-42729 CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek-CIP-Einheitsaufnahme Lawn, Brian: The Rise and decline of the scholastic Quaestio disputata: with special emphasis on its use in the teaching of medicine and science I by Brian Lawn.-Leiden; New York; Kiiln: Brill, 1993 (Education and society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance; Vol. 2)

ISBN 90-04-09740-6 NE: GT

ISSN ISBN

0926-6070 90 04 09740 6

© Copyright 1993 by E.]. Brill, Leiden, The Netherlands All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval .rystem, or transmitted in any form or by a'!)' means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission of the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted by E.]. Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid directly to Copyright Clearance Center, 27 Congress Street, SALEM MA 01970, USA. Fees are subject to change. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

In memoriam Charles B. Schmitt

CONTENTS Preface ............................................................................. Introduction .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . . .... .. . ... . . . . ..... ... . ... . .. . .. . ... . ..

1x

1

I. The use of the quaestio disputata in legal circles . . . . . . . . 3 II. The development of the quaestio disputata in the teaching of theology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 l. The disputatio ordinaria . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 ........... 2. The disputatio de quolibet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .15 .......... III. The use of the quaestio disputata in the teaching of physica ...................................................................... 18 l. Disputations in physic a c.1150-1300 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21. IV. The disputatio de sophismatibus . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 ......... V. The Merton tradition .............................................. 45 VI. The diffusion of Mertonian ideas 1300-1450 .. . .. . . . . . . 53 1. In Paris . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 53 ............... 2. In Italy ............................................................. 54 3. In Germany and Eastern Europe .. . .. . ... . .. . .. . ... . ... 63 VII. Medical quaestiones disputatae c.l250-1450 ................ 66 VIII. Quaestiones disputatae in physica during the late 15th and 16th centuries ................................................... 85 1. In Italy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85 ............... 2. In Paris and the Iberian Peninsula .................... 97 IX. The reaction against dialectic . . ... . .. . .... .. . ... . . . ... .. .. . ... 101 l. The reaction against its use in any form by theologians . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 101 ................ 2. The reaction against sophismata ........................... 103 a. By ancient authors ........................................ 103 b. By 12th and 13th-century theologians .. . ... . . . . . 104 c. By the humanists . ... . .. . . . . . . . . . . . . ... .. .. .. .... .. ... . .. . 107 3. The reaction against quodlibeta ............................ 126 X. The decline of the quaestio disputata in the 17th century .. . . . . . ... . . . . . . . . .... .......... ... .. .. . . . . . .... .. .. . ... .. . . . . . . . . 129 Conclusions . ... . . . . . . . . . . . ... . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . .... .. .. .. .... .. . . ... .. . . . . .

145

Appendix. Examples of the use of the quaestio disputata . . . . . l. Simon de Tournai ................................................... 2. Roger Bacon............................................................

150 150 150

3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8.

Petrus His pan us . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 151 ................ Siger of Brabant ....................................................... 151 Pietro d'Abano ......................................................... 152 Gaetano da Thiene . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .153 .............. Pietro Pomponazzi .................................................... 153 The Coimbra commentaries .................................... 153

Abbreviations . ... . . . . . ... . ... . .. . ... . . . ... .. .. . . . . . . . . ... . . . . ... . ... . . . . . . . 155 Bibliography . .. . . .... . ... . .. . . . ... .. .. . . . ... .. . . ... .. .. . ... . ... . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 . 7 Index nominum . . . . ... . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .70 ..............

PREFACE The seed for this work was first sown in 1984 when Dr Charles B. Schmitt, on one of his visits to my house, suggested I enlarge and bring up to date an earlier draft I had made some years before. I agreed to do this and he and other members of the Warburg Institute then gave me valuable help and advice. After the tragic death of Charles Schmitt in 1987 the project languished until enthusiasm was again kindled by Prof. Paul Oskar Kristeller who was kind enough to read the manuscript in 1990 and make several very helpful suggestions for improvement. Other scholars to whom I am greatly indebted are Prof. John Monfasani ofthe University of Albany, New York, and especially Prof. William J. Courtenay of the University of Wisconsin, Madison who accepted the book for publication in the series "Education and Society in the Middle Ages and Renaissance", and gave me invaluable advice and encouragement. Finally I should like to thank Mr Julian Deahl, senior editor of Brill, for his patience in dealing with my numerous queries and expertise in guiding a difficult text through the press with such unerring skill. Brian Lawn Barnes, 1992.

INTRODUCTION It should first be clearly stated that this study is not in any sense of the word, a history of philosophical or scientific thought, or of medicine, but simply an account of the gradual development of a particular method used in the teaching of all the disciplines in the schools from the early medieval period onwards, with special emphasis on its use in science and medicine. The Scholastic Quaestio or Disputation, based on the use of logic, was a method of teaching which during the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries gradually supplanted the older, more traditional, non-logical forms of question technique and came to be as F. Pelster puts it, "the very kernel and apex of the whole scientific instruction" . 1 It is proposed to trace the history and development of this type of question from its beginnings in the early twelfth century to its decline in the seventeenth and final demise towards the end of the eighteenth century. Since its whole structure depends on the increased use of logic this involves giving, in effect, an account of how this discipline, from being a subordinate part of the trivium, came to play an ever-increasing roll in teaching methods. It is inevitable, of course, that in following this course certain philosophical, scientific, medical and perhaps even metaphysical ideas and theories will be briefly mentioned, but it will be in their epistemological context rather

than from an ideological point of view. Now, although Stephen Kuttner has recently said, "the old controversy on priority-were the lawyers or the theologians the first to apply these devises of logic and argumentation to their auctoritates?-has been quietly put to rest", 2 certainly the use of the quaestio disputata began at a very early date in legal circles and so, whatever may be the priority, a brief account of its development in the teaching of law cannot be omitted in any discussion of its origin. It goes without saying that its development in theology, where it underwent the greatest

A.G. Little and F. Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians, Oxford, 1959, p. 29. Stephan Kuttner, "The Revival of jurisprudence", in Renaissance and Renewal ( 1982), p. 310. Kuttner's article is excellent for the brief survey it supplies of the more recent work on the early history of jurisprudence. 1

2

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INTRODUCTION

changes and had the greatest effect on other disciplines, must be studied in greater detail before we proceed much further. On the other hand its development in the Arts Faculty in connection with grammar and logic (disputatio de sophismaiibus) came much later in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, so that it will be best to postpone a discussion of these aspects of the quaestio disputata until we come to describe its use in the teaching of natural philosophy (physica). It might be asked why is it necessary to spend so much time on what is purely and simply an outdated method of teaching which has long been obsolete? The answer is that it was this very method which helped to lay the foundations of what has recently been called the Scientific Revolution of the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, and in any case a study of the historical aspects of medicine and science, to be complete, must include some account of the methods by which these subjects have been taught at various periods.

CHAPTER ONE

THE USE OF THE QUAESTIO DISPUTATA IN LEGAL CIRCLES In the case of civil or Roman law dialectic had formed part of its procedure from an early period. From the last years of the Republic, the age of Cicero, there had been a penetration of Greek dialectic into Roman jurisprudence. 1 The writings of the famous Roman jurists, Papinian and Ulpian, who both flourished in the early part of the third century, contained quaestiones and responsa many of which found their way into the Digest of Justinian (533), the most important source book for legal science in Western Europe. 2 But this book drops out of sight between 603 and 1076 when it was cited in a court in Tuscany, and from the whole intervening period only two manuscripts are known. As Haskins picturesquely says, "Its life hung by a slender thread and until it came forth into the light once more there could be no rebirth of jurisprudence." 3 In the interim there was, properly speaking, no legal science. The revival began, by general consent, with the founding of the law school at Bologna at the end of the eleventh or beginning of the twelfth century by Guanerius, or Irnerius, as he was commonly called ( c.l 055-c.ll30) ,4 and with the discovery c.l 070 of a complete version of the Digest, the so-called Florentine codex, which became the very centre and apex round which revolved the entire labours of the Bolognese glossa tors. In this connection it is interesting to note that Juan Miguel has advanced convincing arguments which link the Pandektenauszug with the circle of the Reform Papacy and with the discovery and copying of the Florentine codex in the library of the great Benedictine abbey of F. Schulz, History of Roman Legal Srience, Oxford, 1946, pp. 66 ff. The still earlier Digesta et Responsa of Scaevola (fi.95 B.C) also formed part of the Digest. Hermann Kantorowicz, "The quaestiones disputatae of the Glossators", Revue d'histoire du Droit, XVI (1939), p. 56. This pioneering study remains fundamental. 3 The Renaissance of the Twelfth Century, New York, 1957, p. 198. 4 S. Stelling-Michaud, L'Universite de Bologne et La penetration des Droits Romain et Canonique en Suisse, Geneva, 1955, pp. 15 ff. and H. Kantorowicz and W.W. Buckland, Studies in the Glossators of the Roman Law, Cambridge, 1938, p. 33. 1

2

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CHAPTER ONE

Montecassino under abbot Desiderius; 5 that same centre of studies which, at about the same time sheltered the monk Constantinus who was so influential in introducing Arabic medicine to the Latin West. Already, even in the earliest glosses on the Digest originating in the school of Pavia, the only true precursor ofBologna, we find a quite respectable use of the formal precepts of rhetoric combined with the dialectic process of distinctio in expounding the texts. 6 A little later under Irnerius and his school at Bologna the glosses were chiefly directed towards harmonizing conflicting references, constituting the so-called solutiones contrariorum embodied in the earliest decretal questions, a method of enquiry used by Ivo of Chartres in the preface to his Panormia written in 1095. 7 Recent scholarship has thrown much light on these quaestiones decretales and although the boundary line between the different forms of these questions, which were not always dialectical, and the definitely dialectical quaestio disputata is not always easy to draw, there is little doubt that the latter had its origin in the practical exercises of disputation in the classroom. From the time of the second generation of Roman law glossators these supplemented the lectio and took place under the master's direction. 8 These disputations thus became the only practical complement to the purely theoretical lectures and glosses, in the words of Kantorowicz they became, "the chief link between the written law of justinian and its application in the contemporary courts of justice". 9 The earliest known collection of these quaestiones disputatae, the so-called Stemma Bulgaricum, seems to have been formed at Bologna in the time of the glossa tor Bulgarus ( c.lll5-c.l165) who began his teaching there about 1125. These bear the hallmark of the true quaestiones disputatae, being written reports of disputations held, generally once a week, before a presiding master who in each case gave a final solution or determinatio. 10 Later still other forms of the quaestiones decretales, or legitimae as they were sometimes called, came into use. Thus the glossator Rogerius (fl.c.ll58) instituted in the study of civil law the discursive dialogue form containing questions, in 5 Kuttner, op.cit., p. 304. See also H.E.J. Cowdrey, The Age of Abbot Desiderius, Oxford, 1986, pp. 26-27 & 95-103. 6 Kuttner, ibid., p. 302. 7 Ibid., p. 310. 8 Ibid., p. 314. Also see the section dealing with quaestiones disputatae in the Faculty of Law by Gerard Fransen in Les Questions Disputies ( 1985). This gives a useful, up to date bibliography. 9 Kantorowicz, "Quaestiones disputatae" (1939), p. 5. 1° Kantorowicz, Studies (1938), pp. 81 ff., Quaestiones disputatae (1939), passim, G. Fransen, Les Questions Disputies, ( 1985), pp. 243 ff.

THE QUAESTIODISPUTATA IN LEGAL CIRCLES

5

which the speakers often had allegorical names. 11 Some of the dialogues were pure exposition, the Ciceronian form, others contained controversial arguments and were dialectical, thus resembling the Socratic dialogues. Later still, c.l200 we find in civil law the expository quare-sammlung corresponding exactly to the concise Aristotelian quaestiones et responsiones or problemata from which, indeed, Schulz considered them to be derived. 12

11 Perhaps the most famous example is the Quaestiones de iuris subtilitatibus of Placentinus who was a pupil ofRogerius. See Kantorowicz, Studies (1938), Chp. 7, Quaestiones disputatae ( 1939), p. 3. 12 F. Schulz, "Die Quare-Sammlung der Bologneser Glossatoren und die Problemata des Aristoteles", Atti del Congresso Internazionale di Diritto Romano e di Storia del Diritto. I. Milano, 1953, pp. 297-306.

CHAPTER TWO

THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE QUAESTIO DISPUTATA IN THE TEACHING OF THEOLOGY The same intellectual climate that gave rise to the quaestio disputata in the law schools had a similar effect in the faculties of theology where it had much more influence on those who studied physica and medicine and where it achieved the high-water mark of its perfection. Its use by the theologians, therefore, must be studied in some detail before going on to discuss its later development in connection with the scientific disciplines, which is the main topic of this study. As regards theology dialectic did not arise as the result of an immediate, practical, necessity as was the case in law, but was slowly introduced as a method of exegesis. As early as 397 St. Augustine had established a dictum of the highest authoritative value favouring the introduction of dialectic into theological studies, "The discipline of disputation is of great use for investigating and solving all kinds of questions which are found in the holy scriptures". 1 In his dialogue De ordine he calls dialectic, "The discipline of disciplines which they call dialectic. This teaches how to teach and how to learn, in this reason shows itself and demonstrates what it is, what it is good for and what its purpose is". 2 While in the Contra academicos he states that he had studied this part of philosophy more than any other, and details the sort of knowledge that he had gained from it-facts that are true whatever may be the state of our senses. 3 Elsewhere in this dialogue and also in the De trinitate, being influenced by the doctrines of Plato and especially Plotinus, he emphasizes the great value of this discipline in exercising, training, and, as it were, purifying minds (exercitatio animi) so that they could mount ab inferioribus ad superiora, and so, after a 1 Disputationis disciplina ad omnia genera quaestionum quae in litteris sanctis sunt penetranda et dissolvenda plurimum valet. De doctrina christiana, II, 31. See also G. Pare, A. Brunet, P. Tremblay, La Renaissance du XII-siecle, Paris, 1933, pp. 281 ff, and M.D. Chenu, Le Thiologie comme Science au XIII-siecle, Paris, 1957, Chp. I. 2 Disciplinam disciplinarum quam dialecticam vocant. Haec docet docere, haec docet discere; in hac sc ipsa ratio demonstrat atque aperit quae sit, quid velit, quid valeat. Oeuvres de Saint Augustin, IV, Paris, 1948, p. 430. 3 Ibid., p. 168.

THE QUAESTIO DISPUTATA IN THEOLOGY

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species of spiritual gymnastics, come at last to understand supernal and ineffable things-a preparative use in theology quite different from its methodological application. 4 Boethius also stressed the great importance of logic for the study of philosophy, which included metaphysics or theology, calling it both a part and an instrument of philosophy, 5 while his translation of various parts of the Organon, commentaries, and other logical writings, forming the so-called logica vetus, were to be the main sources of Aristotelian logic during the whole of the early middle ages up to the first half of the twelfth century. To look for the earliest traces of the use of dialectic in the service of theology we have to go back as far as the eighth century, the period of Alcuin (c. 730--800). In the words of Marenbon, "The circle of pupils which Alcuin gathered round him at the court of Charlemagne provided the setting for the first attempts in the medieval West to assimilate the techniques oflogic and apply them to theology". 6 The same scholar in his penetrating study on Alcuin and his circle has convincingly shown that the rather low estimate of Alcuin's abilities previously held by scholars, is misleading. Although he did not produce much original work, he was responsible for disseminating amongst his contemporaries ideas on logic and philosophy, expressed by Augustine and Boethius, in an exceptionally clear way. Thus he put the Categoriae decem into general circulation, and in his De dialectica provided a very useful compendium of logical doctrine. Also a close examination of the so-called Munich passages by Alcuin and his pupil Candidus, and of the rather later work by Fredegisus, has revealed quite a high level of philosophical and logical discussion at the court of Charlemagne. At this early stage the syllogistic question-form had not yet evolved, but problems, logical in origin, about essence, the Categories, and Universals, always with reference to Christian dogma, were discussed in great detail and with considerable ability. In the next century the Socratic dialogue was fully developed by John Scotus Eriugena (c.800--70) in his masterpiece, the Periphyseon in which he brought to a climax the discussion of the Categories in relation to

4 On Augustine's use of dialectic as an exercitatio animi see H-I. Marrou, Saint Augustin et la Fin de la Culture Antique, Paris, 1958, pp. 308 ff. 5 In lsagogen Porphyrii Commenta, ed. S. Brandt, I, 3 (CSEL, 48, 142), and seej .A. Weisheipl, "Classification of the Sciences in Medieval Thought", Medieval Studies, XXVII (1965), pp. 58-62. 6 J. Marenbon, From the Circle of Alcuin to the School of Auxerre, Cambridge, 1981, p. 30.

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Christian belief begun in the school of Alcuin. 7 From this time forward the progress of dialectic in the service of theology was assured. In the tenth century Gerbert (c.940-1003) whose chief concern, apart from mathematics, was logic, recommended the use of this discipline for resolving apparent contradictions in the writings of the Fathers. 8 He thus anticipated, it seems to me, the solutiones contrariorum of the Bolognese glossa tors, which, as we have seen, did not come into use until after 1070, the year of the rediscovery of the Digest. With Lanfranc's pupil, St. Anselm ofCanterbury (c.1033-l109), one of the most profound metaphysicians of the early middle ages, dialectic entered fully and completely into the domain of theology. He wrote two secular works, the De grammatico, composed before 1078 while he was still at Bee, and an incomplete work known as the Lambeth fragments. The former is an exercise of pure grammatical form and discusses the exact meaning of sentences (usus loquendi), using the method of syllogistic disputation in connection with the Aristotelian Categories. He takes as his starting point a dictum of Priscian, the late antique grammarian, who had said that every noun signifies both a substance and a quality. Like all adjectives in Latin and Greek, grammaticus, for example, can be used as a substantive. Thus we can say grammaticus est homo "a literate is a man", and certainly he is a substance. But to say homo est grammaticus "the man is literate" is to ascribe a quality to a certain man. Anselm's solution to this problem is to say that grammaticus has two significations, its per se or proper signification and its per aliud or indirect signification. The former signifies the quality "literacy", the latter indirectly signifies the substance, man, which is linked by Anselm to the usus loquendi whereas the per se or proper signification is something belonging to the term itself prior to its use. 9 The Lambeth fragments discuss the meaning of modal words like 7 Ibid., Chp. 4, The Circle of john Scottus Eriugena. He has also been called, "The Father of Scholasticism", on which see Grabmann, Die Geschichte der Scholastischen Methode, Berlin, 1956, I, pp. 202 If. 8 De corpore et sanguine Domini, P.L. 139, col. l85B, "hanc supra dictorum sanctorum discrepantiam alicuius dialectici argumenti sede absolvere meditabamur". 9 See D.P. Henry, The logic of St. Anselm, Oxford, 1967; ibid., Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, London, 1972; ibid., "Predicables and Categories", C.H.L.M.P. (1984), pp. 128-42; J. Marenbon, "Logic and Theology in the Age of Anselm", Early Medieval Philosophy, London, 1983, pp. 94-104; M.M. Tweedale, "Logic from the late eleventh century to the time of Abelard", History of Twelfth-Century Philosophy, ed. P. Dronke, Cambridge, 1988, pp. 196--210; S. Gersh, "Anselm of Canterbury", ibid., pp. 255-78.

THE QUAESTIO DISPUTATA IN THEOLOGY

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"can" and in this work Anselm attempts to systematize the ambiguities that occur in the use of such words. First, he analyses all verbs into the one word ''jacere", meaning "bring about" or "do" plus a phrase which indicates what it is that is brought about. Then he distinguishes for ''jacere", as for many other words, between its proper sense which it receives from its usus loquendi, and its improper sense. Discussions of other verbs follow, such as debere, posse, esse, habere velle etc. This discovery that grammatical form might be positively misleading as to what a sentence really asserts, was not really exploited to the full again until Ockham in the fourteenth century. 10 The above ideas of Anselm on grammatical usage, which I have only very briefly sketched, are found scattered throughout his remaining theological works. He had no qualms about the applicability of logical techniques to religious dogmas. He believed in order to understand, (fides quaerens intellectum) and wished to demonstrate by rational argument a religious truth which is already known and believed. Thus in the Cur Deus Homo an argument is required which shows the necessity of God becoming incarnate. Necessity not in the sense of compulsion but of how the Incarnation follows as a logical consequence of what is self evidently true. In Chp. 2 of the Proslogion Anselm advances what has become known as the "ontological argument" for the existence of God. He chooses as his starting point a definition of God which seems self-evident to people of all faiths, ie. "that than which nothing greater can be thought". He then proves that something corresponds to this definition in reality, and it must as a matter oflogical consequence have characteristics of the Christian God. This concept exists in the mind, but it is greater to exist both in reality and in the mind than in the mind alone. If then the concept were to exist only in the mind, something could be conceived greater than it, namely something existing in reality and in thought. By definition, therefore the concept is not only a product of thought, but must also apply to something in reality, which Anselm logically proves to be God. Chp. 3 of the Proslogion deals with the nature and characteristics of God and the object of this chapter is to prove that God, whose existence has already been proved in Chp. 2, cannot be thought not to exist ("so truly is he that he cannot even be thought not to exist") . 11 In the next place Peter Abelard (1079-1142), the most brilliant 10 11

Tweedale, op.cit., pp. 206-08. Henry, Medieval Logic and Metaphysics, pp. 101 ff.

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dialectician of his time and probably the most influential teacher, not only wrote commentaries on the logica vetus' and composed original works on dialectic, but with his famous treatise, the Sic et non, written soon after the Council of Soissons between 1122 and 1126, he brought to perfection the syllogistic method of enquiry resulting in solutiones contrariorum which had been recommended by Gerbert over a century before. Not only did Abelard in this treatise stress the great value of a correct use of the logic of grammar and language which henceforth was to be of tremendous importance not only in theology, but also in philosophy and the sciences, but he also showed a clear understanding of the nature and value of the type of question raised in the Sic et non, the question originating from doubt. Thus in the prologue to this work we read, "Moreover, these things having been examined, it seems right that we should begin to collect divers sayings of the holy Fathers which we remember, some from the discrepancy which they seem to have which causes a question. This is a great stimulus to young students in their search after the truth and the enquiry itself sharpens their intellect ... By doubting, indeed, we come to enquiry, and by enquiry we arrive at the truth" . 12 Further on he quotes the commentary of Boethius on the Topics of Cicero, "Argument is the procedure which brings a doubtful matter to a satisfactory conclusion", 13 the locus classicus in the early middle ages for the definition of this type of question. Boethius goes on to define it as follows, "A question is a proposition which is open to doubt ... for every question consists of contrary contradictions" . 14 Once firmly established further development in the use of the scholastic quaestio was fairly rapid. It took place principally in two directions, namely in technique and along the lines of autonomy. The chief factor in the elaboration of the technique was the increasing utilization of the so-called logica nova, for although Abelard apparently knew of the existence of the Prior analytics and the Sophistici elenchi, perhaps as early as c.ll20 he seems mainly to have used the old or Boethian logic in his writings. 15 In 1132, however, 12 His autem praelibatis, placet ut instituimus diversa sanctorum Patrum dicta colligere, quae nostrae occurrerint memoriae aliqua ex dissonantia quam habere videntur, quaestionem contrahentia, quae teneros lectores ad maximum inquirendae veritatis exercitium provocent et acutiores ex inquisitione reddant ... Dubitando quippe ad inquisitionem venimus; inquirendo veritatem percipimus. Sic et Non, ed. Boyer & McKeon, Univ. ofChicago Press, 1976--77, p. 103. 13 Argumentum est ratio quae rei dubiae facit fidem. Ibid., p. 121. 14 Quaestio vero est dubitabilis propositio ... omnis enim quaestio contrariis contradictionibus constat. In topica Ciceronis, P.L. 64, col. 1048B. 15 The logica uetus consisted of the Boetian commentaries and translations of the

THE QUAESTIO DISPUTATA IN THEOLOGY

11

we find the English logician Adam of Balsham, the friend and confident of John of Salisbury, elaborating doctrines from both the Topics and the Sophistici elenchi in his Ars disserendi called by its editor L. Minio-Paluello, "the first systematic treatise of the second or third discipline of the trivium not modelled on the patchwork of the Porphyrian, Aristotelian, and Boethian corpus" . 16 The famous Eptateuchon of Thierry of Chartres, written c.ll40, contained the whole of the Organon except the Posterior analytics, at once the most difficult and the most scientifically important of all the parts. Finally somewhere between c.ll45 and 1159 the latin Posterior analytics came into circulation, since it was unknown to Otto of Freising at the former date when he was writing the first recension of his Chronica, while at the latter date we find it discussed by John of Salisbury in his Metalogicon finished in that year. 17 Probably one would not be far wrong in thinking that by 1150 the whole of the latin Organon was known to the masters and scholars of Paris and Chartres, even if all of its parts were not equally understood. The result of this increased study of the logical writings of Aristotle, particularly of the Topics and Elenchi, was the formation of more detailed rules governing the nature and use of the scholastic quaestio and the gradual emergence of a complete system of argumentation-a highly artificial and sophisticated "art of dialectic". Before 114 7, for instance, we find the question arising from doubt more exactly defined by Gilbert de la Porree (c.l075-1154) who pointed out that not every contradiction establishes, in the technical meaning of the word, a quaestio. For when one of two opposing solutions seemed to have no possibility at all of truth, or when there could be no argument about the truth of one and the falsity of the other, then there was no quaestio. This only arose when each solution had an equal chance of being the correct one, in other words when real doubt existed. 18 Such was the nature of the categoriae, de interpretatione (perihermeneias), and the Porphyrian isagoge. The logica nova comprised the remaining books of the Organon, that is, the analytica priora et posteriora, the topica, and the sophistici elenchi. 16 L. Minio-Paluello, "The Ars disserendi of Adam of Balsham, Parvipontanus", M.R.S., III (1954), p. 116. The work was later edited by this scholar in the series, Twelfth Century Logic. Texts and Studies, Torno I, Roma, 1956. 17 For a discussion of the order of appearance of the components of the latin Organon, see L. Minio-Paluello, 'jacobus Veneticus Grecus", Traditio VIII (1952), especially p. 270. 18 "Non omnis contradictio questio est. Cum enim altera (pars contradictionis) nulla prorsus habere argumenta veritatis videtur ... aut cum neutra pars veritatis et falsitatis argumenta potest habere, tunc contradictio non est questio. Cuius vero utraque pars argumenta veritatis habere videtur, questio est". Comm. in Boethium de Trinitate, P.L. 64, col. 1258AB. Quoted in Pare, Brunet, Temblay, op.cit., p. 127.

12

CHAPTER TWO

questions in the Quaestiones de divina pagina ( c.ll43-4 7) of Robert de Melun, one of the masters of John of Salisbury in Paris, and later bishop of Hereford (1163). A little later, under the influence ofthe Topics and the Elenchi, we find the quaestio, especially in Paris, escaping from the narrow bounds of this definition and embracing every kind of enunciation, even statements about which no doubt at all seemed to exist. 19 In those cases only the bare form of the quaestio remained and the object of the exercise was not so much the elucidation of conflicting or obscure passages in theological or philosophical writings, as the detection and investigation of fallacies and inconsistencies in sophistical arguments, the disputatio de sophismatibus, which we shall discuss later. As regards the second line of development, the quaestio was at first indissolubly bound up with the text, scriptural, patristic, or glossarial, which gave rise to it, and thus formed an integral part of the lectio or exposition of the text by the master. If the questions were written down at all they accompanied the text, as is the case with those of Robert de Melun mentioned above. It was not long, however, before the desire to collect together and to systematize the results of such enquiries led to the publication of collections of quaestiones isolated from the texts which gave rise to them yet still ideologically dependent on the texts. Such were the quaestiones of Odo de Soissons who taught at Paris c.ll64, and such, only reduced to more order and system, were the famous Sententiae of Peter Lombard completed c.ll50 and those of his pupil, Pierre de Poi tiers ( c.ll 75). 20 The questions in these sententiae chiefly served to elucidate conflicting opinions in various theological texts and were really a literary development of classroom teaching at first little 19 Cf. the definition ofClarenbald of Arras in his Commentary on the De trinitate of Boethius, written c.ll60-70, "In eo aut em quod dixit (Aristoteles): utrosque idem utrisque opinari, illud genus quaestionum voluit intelligi quod de certis propositionibus constituitur, ut est hoc, utrum margarita sit lapis necne. Quare et in eodem Topicorum tractatu, sed alio in loco (I.3), de omni propositione problema posse fieri commemorat. Sed illae quidem quaestiones quae de certis propositionibus constituuntur nil habent quaestionis praeter formam". Ed. W. Jansen, Breslau, 1926, p. 34*. See Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, op.cit., pp. 127-8. 2 ° For this line of development, see Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, op.cit., pp. 128-31 and Les Questions Disputers ( 1985), the section by B.C. Bazan on the use of the quaestio di>putata in the Faculty of Theology, "Evolution du Genre" (pp. 25-40), which makes great use of the former work. See also Emile Lesne's remarks on quaestiones and sententiae, "Les sentences, questions, disputes ne representent pas des genres necessairement separes. La conclusion d'une quaestio, d'une disputatio, constitue une sententia. C'est Ia quaestio qui est !'objet de Ia disputatio. Dans les ouvrages qui portent le titre de Sententiae, les sentences comportent aussi souvent un quaeritur auquel il ,est donne reponse". Histoire de La Propriete Ecclesiastique en France, Tome V. Les Ecoles. Lille, 1940, p. 673.

THE QUAESTIO DISPUTATA IN THEOLOGY

13

influenced by the Topics and other components of the logica nova. 21 This influence came later when there was no limit set to the application of the quaestio and it became completely independent of the text and separate from the lectio, thus forming a disputation organized and held for itself alone-the written records of such exercises constituting a distinct literary genre, the quaestiones disputatae of the schools. These did not of course supplant the earlier questions associated with the texts, but were used concurrently with the latter. There were three main varieties of these quaestiones disputatae, the disputatio ordinaria, the disputatio de quolibet, and the disputatio de sophismatibus or sophisma. Here we shall only briefly describe the first two, leaving a discussion of the third variety, which was only used in the Arts Faculty, until later when we come to describe the development of the scholastic quaestio in relation to the teaching of natural science (physica). 1. The disputatio ordinaria

22

The disputatio ordinaria, solemnis, or publica, as it was variously called, was held at regular intervals, usually in the morning, for the benefit of bachelors and students. It was presided over by a master who announced beforehand the question that would be asked. A bachelor, the opponens, furnished arguments against the thesis, and another bachelor, the respondens, attempted to answer the objections that were raised by the former and to demonstrate their weakness. Finally the master usually gave a summing up or determinatio, but not in all cases, and sometimes not at the time of the disputation, but at a later period. The questions dealt with during any one disputation were usually all related to the same problem or type of problem, and the exercise was public in the sense that it was open to bachelors and students from different schools, in contrast to the disputatio privata which the presiding master held in his own school only for and with his own pupils. The first traces of the opponens are to be found in the Quaestiones disputatae of Simon de Tournai, master 21 On this aspect of the sententiae see Marenbon's recent Later Medieval Philosophy (1150-1350), London, 1987, pp. 11-14. 22 For greater details on the technique consult the Introductions to the two volumes of !'Abbe Glorieux's great work, La Littirature Quodlibitique de 1260 a 1320, Le Saulchoir, Kain, 1925, Paris, 1935; A.G. Little and F. Pelster, Oxford Theology and Theologians, Oxford, 1936. Introduction, pp. 29-56; B.C. Bazan, "Les Questions Disputees, principalement dans les Facultes de Theologie", in Les Questions Disputies (1985), pp. 13-149. A useful summary will be found in Marenbon, op.cit., pp. 27-34 "The form and later development of the quaestio", where he gives examples from Aquinas, Duns Scotus and William of Ockham.

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CHAPTER TWO

in Paris from c.ll65-l201, 23 whose disputations, Matthew Paris tells us, were so popular that the largest lecture hall could scarce contain the crowds of students who flocked to hear him. 24 These, indeed, are the earliest quaestiones disputatae, originating in the Theology Faculty, that have survived. The earliest references to the respondens are found in the so-called Summa Duacensis found in the Douai manuscript, Bibliotheque municipale No. 434, dated to c.l230. 25 The earliest statutes of Oxford and Paris are also very defective and sparse and so can afford us no help with regard to the structure and management of the earliest disputations. For most of the above-mentioned information, therefore, we have to rely on later collections, such as the codex 158 of the Municipal library of Assisi, dated to c.l282-90, fully described by F. Pelster in 1934, 26 and Worcester Cathedral Q 999 (1300-02), described by A.G. Little at the same time. Also later Paris and Oxford statutes, almost certainly reflect conditions at an earlier period in both universities. Neither do we know the precise time when quaestiones disputatae began to be used in the faculties of theology. The probability is that this took place at about the same time that they entered into the curriculum of legal studies. We know that Adam of Balsham took part in theological disputes which were probably of a technical nature. On the other hand, at the time of writing the Ars disserendi ( 1132) it would seem that the art of dialectic, as applied to disputation, was not in general use since Adam mentions this fact as being one of the reasons for writing his treatise, "Therefore there was not yet the custom of disputing, for then there was only the beginning, not as yet an art of disputing, for one ought to dispute before an art can be made of it, for what the art should be about comes before the art itself". 27 Even if not widespread it is certainly possible that quaes23 Ed. J. Warichez, Louvain, 1932, who sums up the matter very well in his Introduction, "Les Disputes de Simon de Tournai marquent une evolution notable du genre. Chez Odon de Soissons, qui enseignait a Paris vers 1164, Ia Dispute se rattache encore a la lec;on et se trouve provoquee par un passage du texte explique par le maitre. Chez Simon de Tournai la Dispute brise ses derniers liens avec la lec;on et forme un grand exercise scolaire, prenant la place d'une lec;on magistrale, qui occuperait une partie plus ou moins considerable de la matinee. Nous tenons deja ainsi le type de la quaestio disputata appelee a un si grand avenir dans Ia moyen age", p. xlv. Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, 1933, p. 130; Bazan, op. cit., pp. 31 and 38. See Appendix 1. 24 Warichez, op. cit. Introduction, p. xxviii. 25 Little and Pelster, op.cit., p. 32; Bazan, op.cit., p. 41. 26 Op.cit., Part I, Ms. Assisi 158. Quaestiones at Oxford and Cambridge c.l282-90. 27 Nondum igitur disserendi usus, nam adhuc tunc initium, nondum disserendi ars, prius enim disseri opportuit quam de hoc ars fieret, prius enim de quo ars

THE QUAESTIO DISPUTATA IN THEOLOGY

15

tiones disputatae began to be used earlier in England. The biographer of Thomas Becket ( c.lll8-70) tells us that in the youth of the archbishop scholars in the ecclesiastical schools of London disputed by means of dialectic, using "perfect syllogisms" .28 John of Salisbury frequently mentions them in his Metalogicon (1159) but they are not listed as a regular, scholastic exercise by Hugh of Saint- Victor in the ordo legendi set out in his Didascalicon written before 1141. However, by the end of the century Pierre Cantor ( d.ll97) had firmly established the disputation as being one of the necessary functions of a master in theology, "The study of the holy scriptures consists of three things, reading, disputation and preaching", 29 a triple distinction which was still used by the chancellor of Paris in 1350 as the basis for conferring a degree for a licentiate in theology. 30 2. The disputatio de quolibet 31 This kind of disputation de quolibet developed later than the ordinaria some time during the first half of the thirteenth century, gradually evolving from the latter kind of dispute. Again, we have no records of the earliest disputes of this kind, the Quodlibeta of Alexander of Hales disputed at Paris during the years 1231-38 being among the earliest that we possess. It, too, was held at regular intervals, but much less frequently, probably not more than twice a year at Lent and Advent. As in the case of the disputatio ordinaria the presiding master had to give a determinatio after the dispute, but the questions were entirely impromptu. The initiative lay with the audience, the master never knew beforehand what questions would be asked, and the latter were de quolibet, about anything, involving a wide variety of subjects such as theology, metaphysics, canon law, physica, and medicine. Other names for this kind of disputation were disputatio communis and disputatio generalis, since the exercise was public in a quam ipsa. L. Minio-Paluello, "The Ars Disserendi of Adam of Balsham", M.R.S., III (1954), p. ISO. 28 Disputant scolares quidam demonstrative, dialectice, alii perfectis utuntur syllogismis. Vita, P.L. 190, col. 106. See E. Lesne, op.cit., p. 633. 29 In tribus igitur consistit exercitium sacrae scripturae, circa lectionem, disputationem, et predicationem. Pierre Cantor, Verbum abbreviatum, cap. I, P.L. 205, col. 25. 30 Bazan, op.cit., p. 37. 31 On the technique and date of origin of the quodlibeta see, F. Pelster, "Literargeschichtliches zur Pariser theologischen Schule a us den J ahren 1230 bis 1256", Scholastik V (1930), pp. 63-66; Glorieux, La Litterature Quodlibitique de 1260 a 1320, 1925, 1935; ].A. Wippel, "Quodlibetal Questions Chiefly in Theology Faculties", Les Questions Disputies 1985, pp. 151-222, which includes a very useful bibliography.

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CHAPTER TWO

much wider sense than the disputatio ordinaria. Literally anyone could attend, masters and scholars from other schools, all kinds of ecclesiastics and prelates, and even civil authorities, all the "intellectuals" of the time who were always attracted by skirmishes of this kind, and all of whom had a right to ask questions and oppose arguments. These factors lent to the quodlibeta a freshness, a spontaneity, and an originality which differentiated them both from the disputatio ordinaria with its prepared formality, and from the quaestiones arising from lectures on particular texts, which made them a species of commentary. Further, if the doctrinal value of the disputatio ordinaria was perhaps greater in connection with certain important subjects, the quodlibeta undoubtedly gave a much more comprehensive view of the master's learning, which in those days was often encyclopedic and universal, and threw a searching light onto his temperament, adaptability, and resourcefulness. But apart from thus illuminating both the mind and character of the master, the quodlibeta, perhaps better than any other contemporary documents, showed the general intellectual temper of the day, what questions agitated the minds of those who moved in university circles, what subjects interested them most. Also the fact that this kind of dispute can usually be dated with great accuracy adds greatly to their historical value enabling one to trace the slow progress of ideas with more certainty, and to fix dates for works mentioned in the text, both those of the master and those of his contemporaries. 32 Finally, in connection with quodlibeta it should be mentioned that as time progressed the written records of such disputations tended to get more complicated. Glorieux has noted no less than five different plans of organization and sub-division of the subjectmatter of the questions, used by the masters of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries in Paris, in preparing their quodlibeta for publication. 33 Some prefaced their determinations with an introduction or summary of the questions disputed, as was the case with Giles of Rome and James of Viterbo, others began with a sort of prologue consisting of a scriptural or patristic quotation, a procedure followed by Duns Scotus, amongst others. All of these procedures tended to give to the originally spontaneous disputation a more literary flavour, which in the end may have contributed to its decline in popularity, as we shall see when we come to discuss the use of quodlibeta in artibus during the later middle ages. Whatever On dating see in particular, Wippel, op.cit., pp. 192-95. Glorieux, "Le Quodlibet et ses procedes redactionnels", Divus Thomas 42 (1939), pp. 61-93; Wippel, op.cit., pp. 168 ff. 32 33

THE QUAESTIO DISPUTATA IN THEOLOGY

17

may have been the reason, after about 1334 important written quodlibeta virtually disappear from theology faculties, 34 although they continued to be produced in the faculties of arts, and it is to these latter that we must now turn in our investigation of the development of the quaestio disputata.

34

Glorieux, La Litterature Quodlibitique I, p. 57.

CHAPTER THREE

THE USE OF THE QUAESTIO DISPUTATA IN THE TEACHING OF PHYSICA Having discussed the origin and early development of the quaestio disputata in legal circles and in the Theology Faculty, we are now in a better position to understand how it came to be used in artibus in connection with physica (which at an early stage included theoretical medicine), and the subjects of the trivium (grammar, rhetoric, dialectic). But first it is necessary to know exactly what we mean by the term, "physica", what did it comprise, and when was it first included in the Arts course? Physica did not always cover so wide a field as it did by the end of the twelfth century, so that medicine, in particular, was slow in gaining a foothold. Seneca and Macrobius laid much greater stress on the study of the heavenly bodies, the elements, and meteorology in their descriptions of natural philosophy, giving very little space to medicine. But Seneca, in speaking of the necessity for doctrines in connection with the liberal arts, placed medicine among the most liberal of them all. "Now in addition note that also several arts, nay even those that are most liberal such as medicine, have their decrees, not only precepts" . 1 Also, although Macrobius decried medicine in the seventh book of his Saturnalia, he did allow it a place in physica "but medicine is the lowest part or dregs of physica" , 2 and in that same book included a symposium, of the Platonic dialogue form, dealing with medicine, diet, action of the senses, anthropology, and materia medica. On the other hand, the contemporary of Macrobius, Martian us Capella in his De nuptiis Mercurii et Philologiae did not admit medicine into the company of the seven liberal arts, "but since this takes care of mortal things and its skill is in connection with things of the earth and since it has nothing to do with the ether and the parts bordering the upper regions, it is no wonder if it is rejected with disgust". 3 Boethius (c.480-524) did not mention medicine in his 1 Adice nunc, quod artes quoque plerasque, immo ex omnibus liberalissimae habent decreta sua, non tan tum precepta, sicut medicina. Epistulae morales XCV.9. 2 Medicina autem physicae partis extrema faex est. Saturnalia VII. IS. 3 Sed quoniam his mortalium rerum cura terrenorumque sollertia est nee cum

THE QUAESTIO DISPUTATA IN PHYSICA

19

division of the sciences which he divided into theoretical and practical, but in describing the third part of theoretical science he introduced a new term for the investigation of lower bodies, "The third kind of theory (theoretical science) is that which is concerned with bodies and the knowledge and cognition of them, which is physiology, which shows the natures and passions of bodies" .4 The near contemporary of Boethius, Cassiodorus (c.490-583) adopted in his Institutiones, written c.544, the same classification of the sciences as Boethius, and although medicine was not mentioned as part of philosophia natural is, yet he thought very highly of the art, as we learn from two passages. The first is in Variae VI.l9, a letter to the physicians treating Theodoric the Ostrogoth, whose minister of state Cassiodorus was. The second is in Institutiones I.31, where he sketched a course of reading in the medical classics for the monks at his monastery of Vivarium, which was to be of great influence in subsequent medical curricula. In the next place the encyclopedist, Isidore of Seville ( c.560-636), gave in his Differentiae 1!.39, the Platonic, tripartite division of the sciences into natura/is ( physica), moral is (ethica), and rational is (logica), including under physica medicine together with mechanics and the quadrivium. Also in the Etymologiae he devotes the whole of Book IV to a description of medicine, both theoretical and practical. In addition, although Isidore did not class medicine as one of the seven liberal arts, he thought that they were all a necessary preliminary to the study of medicine which he called a "second philosophy" which cured the body, the first, or moral philosophy being concerned with the cure of the soul. 5 These views did a great deal to enhance the status of medicine and encourage its entrance into the curriculum of the schools. In the eighth century Alcuin and the poet-philosopher Dungal at the court of Charlemagne, and Alcuin's pupil Hrabanus Maurus, all adopted Isidore's classification which associated medicine with the liberal arts and made it a part of physica, Dungal even referring to medicine in a sense synonymous with physica. 6 aethere quicquam habent superisque confine, non incongrue si fastidio respuuntur. Ed. Eyssenhardt, VIII, 891, p. 333. 4 Tertia theoricae species est quae circa corpora atque eorum scientiam cognitionemque versatur, quae est physiologia quae natura corporum passionesque declarat. In lsagogen Porphyrii, ed. S. Brandt, I.3 (p. 9). 5 "Hinc est quod Medicina secunda Philosophia dicitur. Utraque enim disciplina totum hominem sibi vindicat. Nam sicut per illam anima, ita per hanc corpus curatur". Etymologiae, rec. W.M. Lindsay ( 1911 ), IV.13. 6 Lucida quae cernis clarescere tecta, viator, Si medicina tibi est opus, hospes odi,

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CHAPTER THREE

At the end of the eleventh century Baudry, abbot of the Benedictine abbey of Bourgueil, in a letter to the countess Adele, daughter of William of Burgundy, gives us an allegorical description of the entire course of secular studies at the abbey. 7 The countess's bed was adorned with statues representing Philosophy and the seven liberal arts, the quadrivium at the head, the trivium at the foot. Next to Grammar were three statues representing Medicine with Galen and Hippocrates. Over the statue of Medicine was written, "This concerns physica which disputes about the art of medicine. This leading the way greatly benefits our bodies". 8 Here he says that the art of medicine disputes about physica, referring, I think, to the classical description of ps. Soranus, "The physical part of medicine is that which has knowledge of the nature and natural operations of the body". 9 This is very close to the description of physiologia given by Boethius, quoted above, "physiology which shows the natures and passions of bodies", 10 so that there seems to be rather a confusion of terms here. Instead of medicine being a part of the more comprehensive physica, the latter is now described as being a part of medicine, that part, indeed, which we should now call physiology. Further, when Baudry uses the term, "dispute", I am sure that he does not mean dialectical, scholastic disputation of the kind we have been discussing, but rather that medicine talks about, discusses, is concerned with physica, using the term in the sense in which Alcuin used it in his De rhetorica when defining physica, "Physis nature, natural physis which disputes about the nature of everything Hie quia odoriferis circumdata tympora sertis Ipsa salutifera munera tractat ovans. Quam repperit primus physicae tractor Apollo, Cum quo Scolaphius, natus hie ille pater. Dungal, De artibus liberalibus, ix (M.G.H. Poetae, I, 408. Quoted in Loren C. MacKinney, Earfy Medieval Medicine, Baltimore, 1937, pp. 187-8. As regards the use of the terms, medicus and physicus, see, L. Dubreuil-Chambardel, Les Midecins dans !'ouest de !a France, Paris, 1914. Chp. 18, "Des Appellations Medicales, I. Medicus et Physicus, and the brief remarks by P.O. Kristeller in, "The School of Salerno", B.H.M., XVII (1945), pp. 1159-60. Reprinted in his Studies in Renaissance Thought. Roma, 1956. 7 Les Oeuvres Poitiques de baudri de Bourgueil, ed. Phyllis Abrahams, Paris 1926, pp. 196-253. 8 Haec est de physica quae disputat ars medicinae, Qua praeeunte magis corpora nostra valent. Op.cit., p. 230. This portion of the poem is quoted by Dubreuil-Chambardel, op.cit., pp. 54-6. There is no evidence that Baudry himself taught medicine. 9 Physica pars medicinae est quae corporis naturam et naturales operationes cognoscit. Pseudo-Soranus, Quaestiones medicinales, ed. V. Rose in Anecdota Graeca et Graecolatina, II, Berlin, 1870, p. 251. 10 Physiologia quae naturae corporum passionesque declarat. supra, p. 19.

THE QUAESTIODISPUTATA IN PHYSICA

21

by contemplation". 11 In the same poem Baudry gives about a dozen questions as samples of the kind that were discussed in medicine at that time. 12 These, for the most part, are derived from the ancient collection of ps. Aristotelian Problemata in latin translation known as the vetustissima translatio which inspired many later collections, including those associated with Salerno. 13 They consisted of straightforward questions and answers with a minimum of debate, the so-called quaestiones et responsiones which, as we have seen, were used at an early period in legal circles, and it seems probable that this was the form the questions took in the ar~ faculties in France and elsewhere during the time we are discussmg. No syllogistic questions in physica belonging to the eleventh century seem to have survived. It is true that there are references to syllogistic disputations in medicine in the dedication to abbot Desiderius by Constantinus Africanus ofhis Latin adaptation of the Liber regalis ofHaly ibn Abbas, prefixed to the 1539 Basel edition of this work. But recently Mlle d'Alverny has suggested that this dedication has, in fact, been altered by a humanistic rewriting, so that we can no longer rely upon it with confidence as indicating procedures followed in the arts faculties or schools in the Latin West at the end of the eleventh century. 14 1. Disputations in physica c.1150-1300

In the following century we have the valuable testimony of John of Salisbury ( c.1115-80) both with regard to the use of logic in the service of physica and concerning the nature of disputations in that subject. In his Metalogicon ( 1159) he was the first to describe the whole of the Organon, including the difficult Posterior Ana?Jtics, and urge its use in all the faculties, "Therefore the three faculties, natural, moral and rational afford material because each one gives rise to its own questions". (11.13). 15 As regards physica he says, "Natural and moral philosophers can construct their principles only by proofs derived from logic. Not one of them defines 11 Physis natura, physis naturalis quae de natura omnium rerum ex contemplatione disputat. Alcuin Didascalia, De rhetorica et virtutibus, P.L. I 0 I, col. 94 7. 12 Les Oeuvres, ed. Abrahams, p. 229. 13 See my The Salernitan Questions, Oxford, 1963, pp. 12-13. 14 Marie-Therese d'Alverny, "Translations and Translators", Renaissance and Renewal (1982), p. 424, n. 12. 15 Tres itaque facultates, naturalis, moralis, et rationalis materiam praestant, quia singulae suas exponunt quaestiones. Metalogicon, ed. C.C.J. Webb, Oxford, 1929, p. 84; trans. D.G. McGarry, Univ. ofCalifornia Press, 1955, p. 103.

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or divides correctly unless logic favours them with its art. Otherwise they will succeed not by science, but by chance. (II.5). 16 Also in III .6 he stresses the use of the Topics in physic a and ethica. 17 In the same book he defines physica as both the study of cosmography and of medicine. "Physica; whether the world is eternal or perpetual, or whether it had a beginning or will have an end in time, or whether none of these is true". (II.l3), 18 • "Inphysica, to be sure, first find out the cause of the illness and then cure it. After that build up and help the patient with lenitives and restoratives until the cure is complete (II.6) ". 19 But throughout the Metalogicon he is careful to point out that only a correct use of logic and thorough knowledge of the Organon can be helpful; in the hands of the ignorant it can be very harmful, "And, indeed, it is of great benefit to one who has a good knowledge, but is oflittle use to one who is ill informed. For just as the sword of Hercules is useless in the hands of a pigmy or dwarf, but in the hands of Achilles or Hector it destroys everything like lightening, so dialectic, if it lacks the help of other disciplines, is in a way defective and useless" (II.9). 20 In II.8 he discusses the evils of immoderate disputations. 21 Amongst the chief offenders he evidently classes the physicians who dispute or argue about the theory of medicine, calling them sometimes physici, sometimes medici. In the Policraticus, also finished in 1159, he mentions some of the subjects about which the physici dispute, "But the physici, while they exalt beyond measure the power of nature, in going against the faith most attack the author of nature. I do not accuse all of error although I hear several disputing about the soul and its faculties and operations, about the increase and decrease of bodies, their resurrection and the creation of things, in a fashion contrary to the faith. But when the 16 Physicus enim et ethicus in suis assertionibus non procedunt nisi probationibus a logico mutuatis. Nemo eorum recte diffinit aut dividit nisi eis artis sue logicus gratiam faciat; alioquin successus eorum non scientia sed casus promovet. Ibid. ed. Webb, p. 67, tr. McGarry, p. 82. 17 Ibid., ed. Webb, pp. 143-45, tr. McGarry, p. 178. 18 Physica an mundus aeternus sit, aut perpetuus, aut initium habuerit et si finem habiturus in tempore, aut sit nichil horum. See, note 15. 19 In phisica vero ante omnia causam egritudinis previde: eamque cura et amove: et exinde tamdiu reparativis et conservativis egrum erige et fove, donee plenissime convalescat. Ed. Webb, p. 71, tr. McGarry, p. 87. 20 Et enim prodest plurimum qui habet notitiam plurimorum et ei qui pauca novit minimum prodest. Nam sicut gladius Herculis in manu Pigmaei aut pumilionis inefficax est; et idem in manu Achillis aut Hectoris ad modum fulminis universa prosternit; sic dialectica, si aliarum disciplinarum vigore destituatur, quodammodo manca est et inutilis fere. Ed. Webb, p. 76, tr. McGarry, p. 93. 21 Ed. Webb, pp. 74-76, tr. McGarry, pp. 90-93.

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question concerns inferior things, for example the complexion of an animal, or the cause and cure of an illness, nothing is lacking except the effect of the operation should it be needed" (II.29). 22 In another well-known passage in the same book (VII.2), he gives a long list of things about which a wise man may doubt (dubitabilia sapienti). This list includes not only philosophical questions inspired by neo-platonism and ethical ones about virtues and vices, but also questions in physica such as, "concerning the causes of things and their binding together and aversions, about the flux and reflux of the ocean, the source of the Nile, the increase and decrease of the humors in animals according to the motion of the Moon, and about various hidden secrets of nature etc." 23 Since we have no written records of these disputes in physica that presumably took place in Paris during the time that John was there, it is difficult to know the technique that was used in the proceedings. But probably at this early period they were ordinary disputations (disputatio ordinaria) and closely bound up with lectures on the classical medical texts of Hippocrates and Galen, on the Calcidius- Timaeus and on other texts containing neo-Platonic doctrines. In the last quarter of the century we have references to disputations in physica by the anonymous author of the Microcosmographia, 24 by Godfrey of Saint- Victor, 25 by Gilles of Corbeil, 26 and by 22 At physici, dum naturae nimium auctoritatis attribuunt, in auctorem naturae adversando fidei plerumque impingunt. Non enim omnes erroris arguo, licet plurimos audierim de anima, de virtutibus et operibus eius, de augmento corporais et diminutione, de resurrectione eiusdem, de creatione rerum aliter quam fides habeat, disputantes ... Cum vera de inferioribus quaeritur, puta de

complexio animalis, de causa et cura egritudinis, eis omnino nichil deest praeter

effectum operis, si is desideratur. Policraticus, ed. C.C.j. Webb, Oxford, 1909, Vol. I, p. 167. 23 De causis rerum et adiunctione earum vel repugnantia, de affiuxione et defluxione Oceani, de ortu Nili, de humorum in animalibus corporibus augmento et diminutione ad motum lunae, de variis latentis naturae secretis. Ibid., Vol. 2, pp. 98-99. 24 "Quia igitur de his quinque (sensibus) inter philosophos multe et maxime erant dubitationes et disputationes in quarum plerisque adhuc sub iudice lis est .. ", quoted by J.R. Williams, "The Microcosmographia", Isis, 22 (1934-5), p. 108. 25 In the Fons philosophiae, ed. P. Michaud-Quantin, Namur, 1956, he speaks of the abuses of dialectic: "Hinc inflantur animi, surgunt acres ire Stu! tum dialectica facit insanire". p. 40, and represents Plato and Aristotle disputing about physical matters, pp. 41-43. In the Microcosmus, ed. P. Delhaye, Lille, 1951, he links together dialectic and physica, "Similiter eadem argumentatio, f?rn;t,a dialectica, materia fisica est et cetera huismodi pro varietate matenae . p. 88. 26 De laudibus et virtutibus compositorum medicaminum", ed. L. Choulant in Aegidius Corboliensis Carmina Medica, Leipzig, 1826:

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Pierre de Poitiers, chancellor of Paris from 1193 to 1204/5, in one of his sermons, 27 but again no written records remain. At the beginning of the thirteenth century we find traces of actual dialectical disputations in physica in the De anima of John Blund, written c.l200. In this treatise Callus saw embodied, "the sum and substance of his oral teaching", and found traces of disputations as well as lectures. 28 Logical questions about the soul are discussed and, indeed, as this scholar pointed out, "the whole approach to the problem is governed by dialectical rather than by metaphysical considerations". 29 This shows, almost certainly, that when John Blund was expounding the libri naturales in Paris and Oxford c.l200 he introduced dialectical questions into his lectures in much the same way as Robert de Melun had done over fifty years before when he was lecturing on the Bible. In 1210-15 the study of Aristotelian natural science came under a cloud at Paris, from which it was not to emerge for thirty years or more, until in fact Roger Bacon began his lectures in Paris in the F acuity of Arts ( c.l245). This was due to the ban on reading the Aristotelian libri naturales inspired by the Faculty of Theology and aimed at protecting Christian beliefs and dogmas from the pagan infiltration of the "new Aristotle". 30 In Oxford, however, where there was no such ban, the development of the quaestio disputata and logic in connection with physica could proceed without interruption. The writer who was to make most progress in this field and to have the greatest influence on subsequent thinkers was Robert Grosseteste (c.ll68-l253). Here we are not so much concerned with the "Talibus in causis medicum vitare decebit Qui novus et medicae rudis est tirunculus artis, Qui crudus de doctoris fornace recedens, Verborum lites sed nullus attulit actus: Gutture qui tumidus dum ventos garrit inanes, Assuetus quosdam physicae dissolvere nodos, Tactus avaritia, multum metuenda peritis, Curandi morbos excels a negotia curat". III.549-56. Quoted infra, p. 106. D.A.,Callus, "The Treatise of John Blund on the Soul", Autour d'Aristote, Recueil d'Etudes de Philosophie Ancienne et Midiivale offert Monseigneur A. Mansion, Louvain, 1955. p. 483. 29 Ibid., p. 495. Blund's treatise has now been edited, Tractatus de Anima, edited by D.A. Callus and R.W. Hunt, Oxford, 1970. Auctores Britannici Medii Aevi, II, published for the British Academy. 30 On the ban see: F. Van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West, Louvain, 1955, pp. 6~94. 27 28

a

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broader aspects of his philosophical opinions as revealed in his numerous writings, but only with the effect that certain of these opinions had on the development of logic in the service of physica and on the nature of this discipline itself. Most scholars now agree that he taught in the Arts Faculty at Oxford during the first decade of the thirteenth century, becoming chancellor of the University at some time between 1214 and 1221, and magister regens of the Franciscans about 1229, a post he held until his elevation to the see of Lincoln in 1235. "Under him", says Thomas Eccleston, "the Franciscans made incalculable progress both in scholastic disputations and the subtle moralities suitable for preaching", 31 and although he did not leave a series of quaestiones disputatae arranged for publication, many of his writings, as Callus has pointed out, almost certainly originated from questions raised or disputed in the course of his teaching in the Faculties of Arts and Theology at Oxford before 1235. 32 He also wrote commentaries on the Sophistici elenchi and on the Posterior Analytics (1128-30), 33 the latter being one of the earliest, if not the very first, to be written on this abstruse work in the Latin West since John of Salisbury had drawn attention to it over sixty years before. It was this work which had a most profound effect on the way problems in natural philosophy were treated, an effect which lasted right up to the end of the medieval period. But exactly what these effects were and to what extent they influenced or paved the way to the later experimental science of the seventeenth century, has been a subject of controversy ever since Crombie's book, Robert Grosseteste and the Origins of Experimental Science, appeared in 1953. In this book Crombie tried to show that the demonstrative methods of resolution and composition described by Grosseteste in his Commentary were combined by 31 Eccleston, Tractatus de adventu Fratrum Minorum, ed. A.G. Little, Manchester, 1951, p. 48, quoted by D.A. Callus in: Robert Grosseteste Scholar and Bishop, ed. D.A. Callus, Oxford, 1955, p. II. 32 D.A. Callus, op.cit., p. 29. Works in which traces of disputations are particularly evident are De libero arbitrio, ( c.l225), ed. L. Baur in: Die philosophischen Werke des Robert Grosseteste, B.G.P.M, ix, Munster 1912, pp. 150-241, which ends, "hoc ideo quia diu de hac materia disputavimus", and the Dejluxu et rejluxu maris, ed. R.C. Dales, Isis 57 ( 1966) 455-74, about which Prof. McEvoy says: "The author refers to himself as "disputantes"; if we take the word at its face value we must conclude that either he brought questions of natural philosophy into his theological lectures, raising them when determining the literal sense of Scripture, or he held concurrent lectures in both domains", The Philosophy of Robert Grosseteste, Oxford, 1986, p. 510. McEvoy thought that this treatise was authentic. 33 Commentarius in Posteriorum Analyticorum Libros. ed. Pietro Rossi, Florence, 1981. Corpus philosophorum medii aevi, Testi e studi II.

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him with experiment, in the modern meaning of the term, as a means of verification of complex universal truths, applying this methodology in particular to optics and the investigation of the rainbow. He further maintained that this procedure played an important role in the development of the later experimental science of the seventeenth century. In 1957 Alexandre Koyre criticized this thesis 34 and he was followed later by B.S. Eastwood who showed beyond doubt that Grosseteste's references to experimenta really concerned "experience", and bore no relationship to the controlled experiment for the verification of data devised in the seventeenth century. 35 In recent years scholars have, on the whole, tended to follow this criticism and disagree with Cramhies's thesis. However, Steven Marrone in his recent book on William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste, while admitting that Grosseteste was no experimenter, yet thought that he advocated the use of controlled experiment for the verification of complex, universal truths, thus agreeing in substance with Crombie, 36 and R.C. Dales holds the same opinion. 37 James McEvoy, on the other hand, takes sides with Koyre, and draws attention to some other apparent weaknesses in Crombie's thesis. The first is that the latter, while adhering to Duhem's view that medieval and modern science represent an unbroken continuity, yet maintains that logical and methodological revolutions are the real initiators in scientific progress. In the second place McEvoy points out that it is not so much abstract, theoretical, methodology that leads to scientific progress, as advances in practical methods of enquiry and investigation. Finally, from a historical point of view, he asks, if this theoretical methodology was an important and even necessary factor for scientific advance, how was one to account for the relative scientific sterility of the late medieval and early Renaissance periods, since this methodology had been available from around 1240 onwards? 38 In considering this controversy it is important to realize that Grosseteste's logical theories and ideas of verification had their limits and were not universally applicable. Thus, for many scien34 A. Koyre, "Der Ursprung der modernen Wissenschaft: ein neuer Deutungsversuch", Diogenes 4 ( 195 7), 421-48. 35 Eastwood, "Medieval Empiricism. The case of Robert Grosseteste's Optics", Speculum 43 ( 1968), p. 321. See also McEvoy, op.cit., p. 208, and infra, p. 69. 36 Steven P. Marrone, William of Auvergne and Robert Grosseteste, Princeton, 1983, pp. 272 If. 37 R.C. Dales, Robert Grosseteste's Scientific Works", Isis 52 (1961), p. 382. 38 McEvoy, op.cit., p. 207.

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tific phenomena and principles, such as those explaining eclipses and the passage of light through glass, Grosseteste substituted for the induction-experiential method what he called sollertia, natural ability or astuteness, and there was no indication that he thought principles obtained in this way were any less reliable than those obtained by the former more complicated method. In fact, even in those cases where he had applied the induction-experiential method there are indications that he thought sollertia would have served just as well. 39 His commentary on the Posterior Analytics was, after all, primarily meant to explain and make more accessible a text which up till then had not been properly understood. This text, as Grosseteste himself pointed out, was by no means a guide to invention and discovery, but rather a handbook for judging demonstrations and principles already known. As Marrone so aptly puts it, "Grosseteste along with most of his contemporaries in the scholarly world was concerned more to sort out, organize, and evaluate a body of knowledge already familiar, or at least available in works newly translated from Arabic and Greek, than to extend the boundaries of science into unchartered areas of thought. Therefore only those aspects of a theory of truth having to do with the articulation of demonstrative or deductive logic were of immediate, practical significance .... Little attention was given to the problems of induction and verification or to any of the more general matters having to do with discovery and establishing new truths". 40 This concentration on deductive logic and the meaning of words and propositions, which occupied the minds of Grosseteste and his successors in the thirteenth century, may well account for the slow progress of scientific discovery during the

later medieval period to which McEvoy drew attention. Apart from logic, Grosseteste's other main interest was mathematics to which he accorded a special place in his account of the division of the sciences. He divided them into rationales and doctrinales, the former including natural science (physica), logic, metaphysics, and ethics, and the latter consisting of mathematics only, in which alone there could be a demonstration, in the strictestsenseoftheword, ofunalterabletruths. 41 Aristotle located mathematics between physics and metaphysics (Metaphysics Vl.l.l026a 13-16), where he deals with the theoretical sciences, and in Book XI of the same treatise he makes mathematics coincide with 39

40 41

Marrone, op.cit., pp. 279-81. Ibid., p. 284. Ibid., p. 231.

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geometry. (3.106la.28-106lb.3). Grosseteste's originality lay in combining the demonstrative logic of Aristotle with mathematics, which included geometry, and applying these concepts to the essentially neo- Platonic theory of the "metaphysics of light", since he considered light to be the essential cause of the generation of forms. 42 Indeed, Koyre considered that Grosseteste's chief achievement in the realm of scientific thought was in making light metaphysics the foundation of geometrical optics, and thereby taking the first step towards the establishment of a mathematical science ofnature. 43 Vescovini and McEvoy seem to agree with this view, and in his exposition of Grosseteste's scientific treatises, especially of the important De luce and Notes on the Physics, the latter shows how Grosseteste's mathematical deduction of spatial dimensions from a dimensionless simple is rooted in geometry, and how God as a mathematician established such a dimensionless point of light as the unit of all extension in the universe. He ends by saying, "It is chiefly in this nexus of ideas, imaginings, and intuitions that his (Grosseteste's) importance for the development of science resides, that is to say, his importance as a rich begetter of the metaphysical principles that bore science into light". 44 Although the contribution that Grosseteste may have made towards the development of modern science may still be a subject for debate, there is little doubt that he played an important part in the teaching of logic at Oxford, particularly as regards knowledge and understanding of the difficult Posterior Ana(ytics. Even if we believe with Beaujouan that his actual scientific discoveries were negligible, as this scholar says, "we must remember that without him there might never have been an Oxford school". 45 In Italy as well as in England, there was no ban on the reading of the libri naturales and the use of dialectic in connection with physica proceeded unhindered. At the University of Naples, for instance, founded in 1224 by Frederick II, a certain Petrus de Hibernia, the master who lectured the youthful Thomas Aquinas there between 1239 and 1244, wrote commentaries on the logica vetus and 42 On Grosseteste and the "metaphysics of light", see Marrone, op.cit., pp. 185-6; the chapter by McEvoy, op.cit., pp. 149-205, and the section by G. Federici Vescovini, "Roberto Grossatesta e Ia Perspectiva" in his Studi sulla Pers;ettiva Medievale, Torino, 1965, pp. 7-17. 4 Koyre, op.cit., p. 440, quoted by McEvoy, op.cit., p. 210. 44 Ibid., p. 180. 45 G. Beaujouan, "Medieval Science in the Christian West", in: Ancient and Medieval Science, ed. R. Taton, London, 1963, p. 491. McEvoy, op.cit., p. 208.

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the De longitudine et brevitate vitae in which, according to Grabmann, he made, "a strict and formal use of the scholastic quaestio". In 1260 he presided over a dispute in physica held before King Manfred, probably in Sicily. 46 G. Lacombe saw in the greater part of the summae of that period, "the logical and material organization of quaestiones determinatae", 47 and these remarks could certainly apply to the Summa adversus Catharos et Waldenses by the Dominican Moneta of Cremona written c.1244. This work consists entirely of formal, scholastic quaestiones and syllogistic arguments against various heretical beliefs. Large sections are devoted to subjects of natural philosophy, especially V. 4 .De perpetuitate anima rum, and V .1l.De no vi tate mundi in which he makes abundant use of all the libri naturales then available as well as of Arabic writings such as those of Avicenna, Algazel, and Albumazar. 48 Still keeping to the first half of the thirteenth century, it is necessary to examine briefly what effect the ban on the libri naturales had on the study of physica in Paris. No original developments took place like those in Oxford under Robert Grosseteste, but Aristotelian doctrines, enriched by the addition of newly translated Arabic texts, continued to be privately studied along wellestablished, conventional lines by such masters as William of Auxerre (Summa aurea, c.l220), Philipp the Chancellor (Summa de bono 1233-36), and William of Auvergne, bishop of Paris, who all composed voluminous summae containing numerous scholastic quaestiones in physica. William of Auvergne's De universo written c.l231-36, is especially rich in questions of this kind, such as the nature of first matter, light, motion, infinity, vacuum, the creation

of the heavens, the sublunar world and the elements, the plurality of worlds, the eternity of the world, the nature of the soul, the properties of animals, plants, and minerals, with the addition of a good deal of anthropology and medicine, with reference to the 46 On Petrus de Hibernia see, M. Grabmann, iv!ittelalterliches Geistesleben, II (1936), 120-123, the same scholar's "Magister Petrus von Hibernia der Jugendlehrer des Heil. Thomas von Aquin., seine Disputation vor Konig Manfred und seine Aristoteleskommentare", in ibid.: I (1926), pp. 249-65, and more recently M.B. Crowe, "Peter of Ireland, Aquinas's Teacher of the Artes liberates, Arts Lzberaux. Actes du quatrieme Congres Internationale de Philosophie Mediivale. Montreal, 1969, pp. 617-626. 47 G. Lacombe, "La Summa Abendonensis", Melanges Mandonnet, Paris, 1930, II, pp. 163-81. 48 See: Grabmann, Forschungen iiber die lateinischen Aristotelesiiberset::.ungen des XIII. Jahrhunderts, B.G.P.M., xvii, Hft. 5-6 ( 1916), pp. 48-9; S.D.Wingate, The Medieval Latin Versions of the Aristotelian Scientific Corpus London, 1931, p. 71. The Summa was edited by T.A. Ricchinio and published at Rome in 1743.

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opinions of the medici and physici. 49 In short we have roughly the same range of subjects that we found mentioned over seventy years before by John of Salisbury in connection with the theorizing physici. 50 The difference was that whereas before the inspiration was mainly neo-Platonic, now new questions and ideas occur through the newly translated scientific texts of Aristotle and his Arabian commentators recently introduced into the schools of Paris. Further important evidence is afforded by the Summa theologica of Roland of Cremona, written c.l234. 51 This, as Birkenmajer and others have pointed out, 52 contains a great many references to the libri naturales, as well as to the writings of Hippocrates and Galen, and to other writings of the Constantinian corpus, 53 and is, like the De universo, written in the form of the scholastic quaestio. 54 E. Filthaut, in his exhaustive study of the life and work of Roland, has maintained that the Summa was largely the fruit of his studies in Paris, not of his early sojourn in Bologna, nor of his subsequent stay of only two years in Toulouse as Birkenmajer had thought. 5 5 There are two passages which refer to disputations, the first being, "This is enough about the external senses as far as a 49 William of Auvergne, De universo, m Opera omnia, I. Orleans-Paris, 1674 (repr. Frankfurt a. M. 1963), pp. 593-1074. For William's attitude towards magic and astrology, see Thorndike, H.M.E.S., II, Chp. 52, for his cosmology and philosophy, A. Masnovo, Da Guglielmo d'Auvergne a S. Tommaso d'Aquino, 3 vols. Milano, 1945, and S.P. Marrone's book quoted above, n. 84. 50 Supra, p. 23. 51 Extant in only one manuscript, Bib!. Mazarine 795, still not fully edited, though a start has been made by Aloys Cortesi. 52 A. Birkenmajer, "Le Role joue par les medecins et 1es naturalistes dans Ia reception d' Arist6te au XII- et XIII- siecles", La Pologne au VI- congres international des sciences historiques, Oslo, 1928 (Warsaw 1930), p. 14; Francesco Ehrle, "San Domenico, le origini del prima studio generale del suo ordine a Parigi e Ia Somma teologica del prima maestro, Rolando da Cremona", Miscellanea Dominicana, Roma, 1923, pp. 85-134; E. Filthaut, Roland von Cremona, O.P. und die Anfiinge der Scholastik im Predigerorden, Vechta, 1936; E. Preto, "Un testa inedito, La Summa theologica di Rolando da Cremona", R.F.N.S., Fasc. I, 1948, pp. 45-72; D.A. Callus, Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford, from the P.B.A., vol. 29, London, 1946, p. 5. 53 There are no less than 672 citations of Aristotle, of Hippocrates, more than 13, Galen, more than 42, Constantinus, 2, loannitius, at least I, Isaac Israeli, 8. Medicine, including anatomy, is discussed to a much greater extent than in William's De universo, and in addition there is discussion of zoology, astronomy, geo_praphy, and law. See E. Preto, op.cit., p. 54. 5 The work is not so finished as the De universo, parts seem to be reportationes of lectures not elaborated by the author. Preto, op.cit., p. 53. 55 Filthaut, op.cit., pp. 14-21. Preto agrees with Filthaut, see op.cit. "tanto e vivo nelle sue pagine l"eco dei Maestri e delle dottrina dell"Universita di Parigi". p. 52.

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theologian is concerned. Very subtle disputations are held by the philosophers about these senses, but this does not concern us" .56 The second is, "Ifwe wish to dispute now in order to prove this, it would be said that we were physici". 57 There is little doubt that by physici he meant the students of medicine, whom he also calls medici, and by philosophi the followers of the artes. He often couples physica and medicina together, 58 and the opinions of physici and medici always agree. On the other hand he frequently refers to the entirely separate and divergent opinions of the philosophi, of the medici and of the theologi. 59 Other evidence is afforded by the early statutes of the university. In those of 1215 we read in connection with the deaths of masters in arts and theology, "On the day when the master is buried, no one shall lecture or dispute in singulis facultatibus", 60 and in yet another statute of 1245 which refers to the times of cursory lectures in artibus, it is made quite clear that these may not be held on die disputabile or die quo magistri disputant. 61 These cursory lectures corresponded to the "extraordinary" lectures usually given in the afternoon by bachelors, and on certain occasions by masters, as compared with the "ordinary" lectures (disputatio ordinaria) given in the morning always by a master. It seems that such lectures were more rapid and less formal than the ordinary lectures, and that, at any rate in the beginning, they also differed in the nature of the subjects discussed, logic in the ordinary, grammar, rhetoric, ethics, metaphysics, and natural philosophy in the cursory lectures. The statement in the Paris Statute of 1215, "And they shall lecture on the books of Aristotle on dialectic old and new in the schools ordinarily, and not ad cursum", would seem to confirm this. 62 Later 56 Haec sufficit de sensibus exterioribus quantum ad theologum, subtilissime disputationes sunt apud philosophos de istis sensibus, sed nihil ad nos. Mazarine 7957 f.33. Quoted Filthaut, ibid., p. 92, n. I. 5 Si vellemus disputare iam ad hoc probandum, diceretur quod essemus ph.?;sici. Mazarine 795, f.82v. Filthaut, loc.cit. 8 "quicumque expertus est in scientia naturali et in medicina ... exercitatus in medicina et naturalibus". Filthaut, op.cit., p. 17, n. 44. 59 "Apud medicos idem est vis et virtus, sed theologi vim dicunt potenciam naturalem ... et nota quod secundum philosophos quando non elicit actum, diciturpotencia". Filthaut, ibid., p. 101, n. 56. 60 Denifle-Chatelain, Chartularium Universitatis Parisiensis, I. Paris, 1889. No. 20. Trans. L. Thorndike, University Records, New York, 1949, pp. 27 ff. 61 Chart. Univ. Paris. I, No. 137. 62 See H. Rashdall, The Universities of Europe in the Middle Ages, ed. F.M. Powicke and A.B. Emden, Vol. I, 1951, pp. 433-34; J.A. Weisheipl, "Curriculum of the Faculty of Arts at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century", M.S., 26 (1964), pp. 150-54.

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on it appears that logic could also be taught in cursory lectures, as the Statutes of the English Nation in Paris for 1252 inform us. 63 Scholars have hitherto been of the opinion that the gap in the curriculum of the Arts course in Paris, caused by the ban, was filled solely by an increased study of logic and ethics. 5 4 This was almost certainly the case in connection with lectures on particular books, but is it not possible that some of the gaps could have been filled by increased independent disputations in natural philosophy (physica) which did not embrace controversial and delicate subjects? This seems to be a more logical and natural procedure than cutting plrysica out of the curriculum altogether. From early times p!rysica had been taught in conjunction with the seven liberal arts in the monastic and cathedral schools, and it never ceased to be so taught, only its character changed as the years progressed. It is possible that, for a time when the ban was most in force, the physica taught in the Arts Faculty reverted to its former state and became less exclusively Aristotelian and more eclectic and universal. There is, in fact, an interesting list of questions in physica which has exactly this character, is probably of Parisian origin, and belongs to the period we are discussing. It is found in the De disciplina scholarium, a little work formerly attributed to Boethius and frequently printed with his works, but whose real author is still unknown. 65 In this tract, written c.l230-40, the author gives an account of his experiences as a student in Paris where he attended the Arts Faculty, and as examples of the kinds of questions with which students might occupy themselves before going on to something else, he affords a list of thirty-seven questions. These embrace theology, astronomy, astrology, element lore, meteorology, optics, mineralogy, anthropology, and zoology. The bulk stem from old-established Latin sources or from astrological works translated from Arabic before the twelfth century. Many had been discussed before by Seneca, Macrobius, Adelard of Bath, William of Conches, the Salernitan masters and Alexander Nequam. In only three questions about the number of the heavens, the manner of their juxtaposition, and their move63 Chart. Univ. Paris., I, No. 201. Weisheipl, op.cit., pp. 154-55; Thorndike, op.cit., pp. 52-56; Astrik Gabriel, "Metaphysics in the Curriculum of Studies of the Medieval Universities", Die Metaphysik im Mittelalter: Miscellanea Mediaevalia, Band 2, Berlin, 1963, pp. 92-102. 64 F. van Steenberghen, Aristotle in the West, Lou vain, 1955, Chp. 5, and pp. I00--08. es~ecially 5 See my The Salernitan Questions, 1963, pp. 81-83. The work has now been edited by Olga Weijers, Pseudo-Boece, De Disciplina Scolarium, Leiden-Koln, 1976.

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ments, is there any indication of influence by the new Aristotle, and these did not at any time give rise to bitter controversy. Olga Weijers, who has recently edited these questions, agrees with me in thinking that they probably formed the basis of a course in physica in the Arts Faculty in Paris during the period of the ban which, instead of dealing with the forbidden libri naturales, was based on less controversial texts. 66 As the late Mlle d' Alverny pointed out in a recent paper, it is also very probable that, during the ban, scholars continued to study the doctrines contained in the libri naturales and in their Arabic commentaries in books of small format, like the "quaternuli" of David of Dinant, the two Avranches manuscripts, Nos 221 and 232, and the Bodleian Ms. Selden supra 24, to mention only a few. 67 These small volumes could be carried in the pocket and easily concealed, so that scholars could study them in private without so much fear of detection. Other evidence of disputations in physica during the first half of the thirteenth century is afforded by the quaestiones disputatae and quodlibeta of the theologians which, although held in the Theology Faculty, probably reflected to some extent conditions in the Arts Faculty through which the students had to pass earlier on in their career. Among the quodlibeta disputed during the period 123~0 will be found several which, although instigated by theological motives, yet come within the sphere of physica in its most comprehensive sense. Among these are cosmological questions about the heavens, and questions about the elements and lower world, including those about the motion of the planets and angels, the conjunction and dissolution of the elements particularly in respect of the final conflagration and renewal of the world. 68 The sort of question, in fact, which had formed a part of physica since the days of Seneca and Macrobius and which had been regarded by the early Fathers as legitimate and praiseworthy objects of Les Questions de Craton et leurs Commentaires, Leiden-Koln, 1981, pp. 22-25. 'Les Nouveaux Apports dans les Domaines de Ia Science et de Ia Pensee au temps de Philippe Auguste: La Philosophie', Actes du Colloque international organise par le Centre National de la Recherche Scientifique, Paris, 1980, pp. 870-73. 68 One of the most important witnesses for the quaestiones disputed at Paris during the period under discussion is the famous manuscript Douai 434 which contains 572 questions disputed between 1231 and 1236. See 0. Lattin R.T.A.M., V (1933) (940) pp. 79-95; P. Glorieux, ibid., X (1938) pp. 123-52, 225-67; XII ( 1940), pp. 104-35; Glorieux, La Summa Duacensis, Paris, 1955. Douai 434, question 331 De innovatione mundi. I. utrum sit naturalis. 2. quorum sit ilia innovatio, an omnium elementorum vel aliquorum tantum. 3. an in ilia innovatione omnia elementa reduci debeant ad duo extrema, et utrum in igne sint calor et ardor et lux quando seperabuntur. 66

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study. With regard to the human body, a fruitful source of enquiry was the nature and attributes of the resurrected body and the meaning of Tertullian's phrase "veritas humanae naturae" which came to typify that part of man which would rise again. This invariably involved a prior discussion of the composition of the living body and of its generation, growth and nourishment. 69 About this time too, especially in Paris, a great deal of interest was being shown in the nature of the soul which was reflected in numerous treatises and summae such as the anonymous De potentiis animae et objectis ( 1220-30) and the influential Summa de creaturis of Albertus Magnus composed c.l240-41 while he was lecturing as a bachelor in the Faculty of Theology at Paris. 70 Not only abstract, metaphysical problems were discussed but also the soul's relation to the body, physiology, psychology of sensation and other functions of the mind. 71 It is scarcely surprising therefore that the quaestiones disputatae and quodlibeta of theologians belonging to this period teemed with questions of this sort. It was not long before all opposition to the study of the banned Aristotelian texts collapsed in Paris, and c.l245 Roger Bacon began lecturing in the Arts Faculty there on the libri naturales. 72 He may have been preceded by Robert Kilwardby who, according to Callus, was probably magister reg ens in artibus from c.l23 7 to c.l245/3 but none of Kilwardby's questions seem to have sur69 Cf. Douai 434, questions 184-86, De veritate humanae naturae. Question 156, Circa ea que ad corpus pertinent. 1. De principiis corporis. 2. De mediis in corpore. 3. De extremis et de unguibus et capillis. Question 382, Actus elementorum quatuor in corpore humano. Question 408, Objicitur de elementis, utrum erunt in ipsis cor-

paribus quatuor. Questio de humoribus, utrum resurgent. 70 De potentiis animae et objectis ( 1220-30) ed. D.A. Callus R. T.A.M., XIX (1952), pp. 131-70. Albertus Magnus, Summa de creaturis, II (De homine) 124041, ed. Borgnet, Opera, vol. 35, and see N.H. Steneck, "Albert on the Psychology of Sense Perception", Albertus Magnus and the Sciences, Commemorative Essays. Toronto, 1980, pp. 265-278. 71 Detailed studies of these subjects discussed in works belonging to the first half of the thirteenth century will be found in 0. Lattin, "L'identite de !'arne et de ses facultes pendant Ia premiere moitie du XIII- siecle", Hommage aM. de Wulf, Louvain, 1934, pp. 191-210, and the same author's Psychologie et Morale au XIF"' et XIIF"' siecles, Louvain-Gembloux, 1942, I, pp. 399 ff. 72 D.C. Lindberg, Roger Bacon's Philosophy of Nature, Oxford, 1983, p. xvii; S.C. Easton, Roger Bacon and his Search for a Universal Science, Oxford, 1952, p. 26. 73 Callus saw no reason to doubt the evidence of the Starns Tabula (catalogue of early Dominican writers, early 14th. cent.) which attributes to Kilwardby Commentaries not only on logical works, but also on the libri naturales, although none of the latter have as yet been identified. D.A. Callus, "The Tabulae super Originalia Patrum" of Robert Kilwardby O.P., Studia Mediaevalia in honorem RJ. Martin. O.P., S.T.M., Bruges, 1948, pp. 245-47.

THE QUAESTIO DISPUTATA IN PHYSICA

35

vived. On the other hand we have a large number of Bacon's reported disputations in the now famous codex, Amiens 406. In these one gets the impression that students were actively participating, and Bacon himself does not always get the best of the argument. It was S.C. Easton's opinion that they were reportationes of actual disputations with a good deal of matter added by Bacon when he edited them, to increase their value for students. 74 Not much is known about the nature of the teaching in the Arts Faculty at Paris during the period immediately following the lectures of Roger Bacon.We may suppose, however, that lectures on the libri naturales continued since in 1252 the statutes of the English nation included the De anima in the curriculum, 75 and in 1255 an act of the entire faculty added all the remaining scientific books then known. 76 Since few quodlibeta originating during this period in the Arts Faculty in Paris have survived it is again instructive to turn to the quaestiones disputatae and quodlibeta of the theologians to discover trends in the teaching of physica. 77 If we examine the titles of both these kinds of disputation held during this period, we shall find a far greater proportion dealing with physica than was the case with those belonging to the first half of the century. Those questions dealing with the non-medical parts of physica are chiefly Aristotelian, but here and there we notice other tendencies such as a preoccupation with the nature of light and the science of optics, the multiplication of species and mathematics, and an interest in alchemy shown by the long quodlibetal disputation on this subject held by Giles ofRomes in Paris between 1286 and 1291. 78 Similarly most of the medical and anthropological questions are inspired by the libri naturales particularly the De anima, De animalibus, Parva naturalia, and De generatione et corruptione. The interest in the nature of the soul and mind and in the physiology and psychology of the senses continued unabated. But there is a tendency here, much more noticeable than in the questions dealing with other branches of physica, to make use of the older, traditional questions preserved in the Salernitan and other collections. 79 This desire on the part of eng uirers in physic a S.C. Easton, op.cit., pp. 62-63; See Appendix 2. Denifle, H. and A. Chatelain, Chart. Univ. Paris., (1889-97), I, No. 201. 76 Ibid., I, No. 246. 77 There are very good subject indexes to the two volumes of Glorieux's, La Littirature Quodlibitique de 1260-1320 ( 1925-1935). For quaestiones disputatae in England, consult Little and Pelster's, Oxford Theology and Theologians 1282-1302, Oxford, 1936, pp. 104-32 and 287-334. 78 Quodlibet III, No.8. 79 See my Salernitan Questions (1963), p. 87. 74

7"

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to look for literary sources other than those found in the texts of the Stagirite and his commentators, was aptly described by Roger Bacon in the first part of his Communia naturalium, written c.126067, "But some men ... seeing that they could not understand natural philosophy through the texts of Aristotle and his commentator, turned to the other seven natural sciences, to mathematics, and to other authors of natural philosophy such as the books of Pliny and Seneca, and many others. Thus they gained a knowledge of natural things concerning which Aristotle in his commonly known works and his expositor could not satisfy them in their study of natural philosophy" .80 Bacon is probably referring to the school of thought represented by Robert Grosseteste which he is contrasting with the narrower, Aristotelian outlook of Albertus Magnus and his followers. 81 But it is equally possible that he is referring to disputations in the Paris Faculty of Arts. Whether these corresponded to the quodlibetal disputations held in the faculty of Theology, as Grabmann thought, is rather doubtful, 82 but in any case thirteenth century records of such disputations are very rare, as Wippel has noted. 83 With the dawning of the fourteenth century, however, the picture begins to change. Numerous quodlibeta dealing with different aspects of physica and originating in the Paris Arts Faculty are found in the important manuscript Bibl. Nat. Lat.16089, and the famous Paris Master, Nicole Oresme, has left a series of quodlibeta, also belonging to this Faculty. We shall discuss the quodlibeta of Oresme later, but must now say something about the Paris manuscript to which I drew attention in 1963 in my Salernitan Questions. 84 First described by Haureau in 1896 and more recently, though much more briefly, by Duhem, 85 this codex, which formerly belonged to the Sorbonne and was written c.1300, contains several series of questions in 80 Sed aliqui viri ... videntes quod per textum Aristotelis et commentatorem suum non potuerunt scire naturalem philosophiam, convertunt se ad alias sciencias naturales septem et ad mathematicas, et ad alios autores naturalis philosophie, ut ad Iibras Plinii et Senece et multorum aliorum, et sic pervenerunt ad noticiam naturalium de quibus Aristoteles in libris vulgatis et eius expositor non possunt satisfacere studio naturali. Communia Naturalium, I, 3. Ed. R. Steele, Opera hactenus inedita, II, pp. 12-13. 81 See J.M.G. Hackett, "The Attitude of Roger Bacon to the Scientia of Albertus Magnus", Albertus Magnus and the Sciences (!980), p. 71. 82 On this see Weisheipl, "Curriculum" ( 1964), p. 182. 83 Wippel, "Quodlibetal Questions" in Les Questions Disputees ( 1985), p. 203. 84 See my Salernian Questions (1963), pp. 88-90, and the notice by Wippel, op.cit., p. 204. 85 Haureau, Notices et Extraits des Manuscrits de la Bibl. Nationale, 35, I ( 1896), 209-39. Duhem, Le Systeme du Monde, 6, Paris, 1954,536--42.

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37

natural philosophy, some with only the brief determinations of the master, others disputed de quolibet at greater length. The names of four of the masters who determined are mentioned; they are Henri de Bruxelles, Henri Allemand, Jean Vate, and a certain Ulricus, all of whom taught in the Arts Faculty in Paris at the end of the thirteenth or beginning of the fourteenth century. Out of about 293 questions not more than ten deal with Aristotelian physics, metaphysics and cosmology, and only two deal with the soul or intellect. Thus the questions, as a whole, are almost entirely confined to mundane subjects such as medicine, anthropology, zoology, botany, mineralogy, alchemy, meteorology, and geography, and many of them are Salernitan in origin. The specifically Aristotelian questions are nearly all connected with the Problemata, which had been translated by Bartholomew of Messina c.l258-66, and the De animalibus. Most of the last or fifth series of thirty-six anonymous questions have references to these works, so that this particular series cannot be called independent. But the first series of ninety questions disputed by Henri de Bruxelles and Henri Allemand, and the second anonymous series of seventy-six questions are both disputations de quolibet, as we learn from the explicit and the title respectively. The third and fourth series of questions by Jean Vate and magister Ulricus seem to be of the same nature. We learn from this manuscript that much less time was being spent on abstract physics, metaphysics and psychology, and much more on the subjects covered by the more practical Problemata and De animalibus, reinforced by still more Salernitan physica. A fragment of the extremely practical Quaestiones Nicolai Peripatetici is contained in this codex (f.153v), 86 and one question in the series by Ulricus comes from the Quaestiones Nicolai (the question concerning the growing of roses at Christmas time). 87 Other questions of a practical nature are; whether a bladder full of air weighs more than an empty one; 88 a question concerning the making of gold "per artem", 89 and one which describes how to test new wine by putting an egg into it, which is also found in the Prose Salernitan Questions. 90 Without discussing in greater detail the causes for this shift in 86 This work has now been edited by Stanislaw Wielgus in Mediaevalia Philosophica Polonorum XVII ( 1974), pp. 57-155. 87 f. 76, Quaest. Nicolai, p. 87. 88 f.62. 89 f.62'. 90 f.75. Quaest. Nicolai, p. Ill; Lawn, Prose Salernita Questions, 1979, P 52, (p. 225).

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emphasis, we can briefly say that the change may have been due partly to the increasing influence of the more practical, scientific, Aristotelian texts, which were by that time becoming more widely known, and perhaps more significantly, to the gradual realization that many metaphysical and theological problems could not be solved by purely rational methods, and that in such cases faith was likely to be of greater use than dialectic. As a result of these two factors it may be that the tendency was to concentrate on problems in physica which could be investigated with reference to natural principles and causes, and through evidence supplied by the senses. One of the reasons for the scarcity of quodlibetal disputations in artibus before 1300 may have been that the lectures and disputations were mainly concerned with the Aristotelian libri naturales, as was the case with those of Roger Bacon. Another reason may have been the preoccupation of the younger students with sophismata.

CHAPTER FOUR

THE DISPUTAT/0DE SOPHISMATIBUS' This type of disputation originated from the study of the Aristotelian Sophistici elenchi, part of the logica nova which had been introduced to the Latin West in the early twelfth century. As we have seen, Abelard referred to it but did not use it, and it is not known to what translation he was referring. 2 At about the same time we find Adam of Balsham devoting a large part of his Ars disserendi (1132) to a discussion of sophisms, a form of exercise which he highly praises, "It is the characteristic of those with a more active intellect, of those more skilfull, of a higher standard than others and more experienced, to abound in sophisms. Therefore first of all we must discuss sophisms". 3 This treatise undoubtedly stimulated very great interest in this part of the Organon in the schools of Oxford and Paris during the twelfth and following centuries. 4 On the authority of Roger Bacon St. Edmund of Canterbury was the first to read the Elenchi at Oxford, and according to Callus this must have been between 1202 and 1209, 5 in other words at about the same time that Robert Grosseteste was master of arts at Oxford. The latter's commentary on the Elenchi, which is still unprinted, is also assigned to this period. We learn from the statutes of the English Nation in Paris that in 1252 the Disputatio de sophismatibus was made a compulsory part of the curriculum in the 1 A good introduction to this subject will be found in P. Boehner's Medieval Logic. An Outline of its Development from 1250 to 1400, Manchester, 1952, and a bibliography of later literature in E.J. Ashworth, The Tradition of Medieval Logic and Speculative Grammar from Anselm to the end of the Seventeenth Century: A Bibliography from 1836 Onwards, Toronto, 1978; G. Wallerand, Les Oeuvres de Siger de Courtrai, Les Philosophes Belges, tome 8, Louvain 1913, "Le Procede Pedagogique du sophisma", pp. 27-33; N. Kretzmann, "Syncategoremata, Exponibilia, Sophismata", C.H.L.M.P. (1984), pp. 212-45; P.V. Spade, "Insolubilia",

ibid., pp. 246-69. 2 Supra, p. 10. 3 Est autem sophisticis habundare mobilioris ingenii et magis exercendi, ceteris altioris et magis exercitati. Quare de sophisticis prius dicendum. L. MinioPa1uello, "The Ars disserendi of Adam ofBalsham" M.R.S., III ( 1954) p. 153. 4 Ibid., p. 116. 5 D.A. Callus, Introduction of Aristotelian Learning to Oxford, from the P.B.A., vol. 29, (1946), pp. 12-14.

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Arts Faculty, 6 a witness to the degree of importance which this form of disputation then held in the eyes of the Paris masters. It formed part of the public or solemn disputations which were held once a week by the masters in the afternoon. These could be either de sophismatibus (de problemate) or de quaestione, the former embracing logic, the latter mathematics, natural philosophy, rhetoric, and metaphysics. 7 But, as we learn from the remarks, quoted earlier, of John of Salisbury in his Metalogicon and Policraticus, both finished in 1159, there were evidently masters and scholars who were either abusing the system or did not know how to use it properly. 8 Some of his condemnations were undoubtedly directed against medical students, but there is evidence, as L. Minio-Paluello pointed out, of a connection between the teachers of "Cornificius", the logician whom John derides in the Metalogicon, and the school of Adam of Balsham, though exactly what that connection was has, I believe, not yet been determined. 9 Others besides John spoke against the use of sophisms, thus we find Etienne de Tournai speaking of the masters of Paris, "catching empty words with their sophisms, like flies in a spider's web". 10 Also, like John of Salisbury a century before, Roger Bacon in his De erroribus medicorum, written c.l255, speaks very harshly against medical students, "The third defect is that the generality of doctors give themselves to the disputing of an infinite number of questions and useless arguments, and they do not devote themselves to experience, as they should do. Thirty years ago they only applied themselves to experience which alone mattered. But now by means of the Topics and Elenchi they multiply infinite non-essential questions, and even a greater number of dialectical and sophistical arguments in which they are so totally immersed that they are always seeking the truth, but never find it". 11 In this passage Bacon actually refers to sophistical arguments, whereas John of Salisbury in his castigation of the 6 "Item det fidem quod per duos annos diligenter disputaciones magistrorum in studio solempni frequentaverit et per idem tempus de sophismatibus in scolis reqisitus responderit", Chart. Univ. Paris. I. No. 201. 7 See,J.A. Weisheipl, op.cit., pp. 153-54. 8 Supra, pp. 22-3. 9 L Minio-Paluello, op.cit., p. 146. 10 Iv1uscas inanium verbulorum sophismatibus suis tanquam areneorum tendiculis includunt. Quoted by Mandonnet," Siger de Brabant et l'Auerroism Latin, Lou vain, vol. 1 ( 1911 ), p. 123. 11 Tertius defectus est quod vulgus medicorum dat se disputationibus questionum infinitarum et argumentorum inuti1ium, et non vacat experientie ut oportet. Ante 30 annos non vacabant nisi experientie, que sola certificat; sed

DISPUTAT/0DE SOPHISMATIBUS

41

Paris medical students seemed more concerned with the subjects of the disputations which were more about useless matters instead of about the causes and cures of diseases. He says nothing about sophistical arguments being used. The probability is that in the time of John of Salisbury disputations in physica and medicine were of the ordinary type (disputata ordinaria) and that sophismata were not used to any great extent in these disciplines until around 1250. Later in the century, in 1270, Albertus Magnus declared that the masters in Paris were ignorant of both theology and philosophy and studied how to be proficient in sophismata rather than in philosophy, "Therefore what they say is false, not only according to theology, but also according to philosophy. The cause of this is ignorance, because many Parisians are followers of sophismata not of philosophy" . 12 But exactly what form these sophismata took about the midcentury and to what extent they were concerned with physica is again a matter for conjecture since no records remain. Later on in the century we have the lmpossibilia of the Paris master Siger of Brabant composed 1271-72. These contain three quaestiones inphysica, one concerning the uncertain appearances of things, another on instant time, and one on the motion of a falling body. 13 The impossibilia were a type of sophism which stated what appeared to be an impossible thesis, the role of the opponent being to prove that the thesis was indemonstrable. Thus the first of Siger's impossibilia was "Deum non esse", a manifest impossibility in those days since its opposite was "primum necessarium". As time went on important developments in the technique and structure of the sophismata took place. As defined by Aristotle in the Sophistici elenchi a sophism could be described as a proposition which, from a logical point of view, presents certain difficulties by virtue of its ambiguous or faulty formulation, thus presenting a real or apparent fallacy in argument. 14 Originally these exercises were meant to instruct pupils in how to recognize faulty syllogisms in their disputations. In the Summulae logicales of Peter of Spain, nunc per artem topicorum et elencorum multiplicant questiones accidentales infinitas, et argumenta dialectica et sophistica infinitiora, in quibus absorbentur et semper querant et nunquam inveniant veritatem. De erroribus medicorum, ed. A. G. Little, Opera hactenus inedita, fasc. IX, Oxford, 1928, p. 154.3. 12 De quindecim problematibus, ed. Mandonnet, op.cit., II (1908), p. 35. 13 The Impossibilia were edited by P. Mandonnet in op.cit., vol. II, pp. 73-94. See Appendix No.4. 14 Boehner, op.cit., p. 8.

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written probably before 1245 and which for the whole of the medieval period and beyond was the classical malmal for the teaching of this newer logic, we find numerous examples of these kinds of sophismata. 15 The fallacies and paradoxes depended for their solution on the meaning of words, on the analysis of the terminology involved, and ultimately on the supposition of terms in the various statements, that is on what a particular term represents in a statement. When scholars extended the notion of "supposition" to every term in a statement they began to discuss a whole range of problems that properly belong to physica, such as incipit, desinit, maximum, and minimum, since logical fallacies can beget just as many erroneous solutions in physica as they can in grammar or in the study of logic itself. 16 This development in the use of sophismata took place mainly at Oxford during the first half of the fourteenth century. Why this should be so has been the subject of much speculation. One reason may have been the presence there of the famous Franciscan philosopher and logician William of Ockham ( c.l285-134 7) from c.l310 to 1320. During this time he composed his main work, a commentary on the Sentences of Peter Lombard. His belief that only substances and qualities were res absolutae, and that concepts such as quantity, motion, time and place have no real existence apart from the res absolutae, meant that he reduced all problems involving these concepts to ones of grammar and logic-to a consideration of them as mere words. This nominalistic approach may well have stimulated interest in logical problems in Oxford during the early fourteenth century as Weisheipl thought. 17 Also Ockham's approach may have encouraged the exploration of possibilities secundum imaginationem by examining the effects of what is logically possible in a given situation and comparing them with what is logically impossible in the same situation. In this way avenues of exploration were opened up beyond the limits of Aristotelian physics and natural philosophy. 18 But there were undoubtedly other factors at work. One of these may have been the 15 Ibid. pp. 32-36. Petri Hispani Summulae Logicales, ed. I.M. Bochenski, Turin, 1947. 16 J.A. Weisheipl. "Developments in the Arts Curriculum at Oxford in the Early Fourteenth Century", M.S., XXVIII (1966), p. 167. 17 Weisheipl, Op.cit. p. 180, see also his remarks concerning Ockham in "The Place ofjohn Dumbleton in the Merton School, Isis, vol. 50, part 4, no. 162, 1959, pp. 442-45. 18 See W.J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth-Century England, Princeton Univ. Press, 1987, Chp. 7, "Ockham and English Nominalism", p. 209.

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43

fact that the Augustinian tradition, represented by such men as Alexander of Hales and Bonaventura, prevailed at Oxford, whereas the Aristotelian tradition, represented by Albertus Magnus and Thomas Aquinas, held sway in Paris. This, as N.W. Gilbert has pointed out in a recent paper, may be one of the reasons why logical subtleties were more cultivated at the former university, since the Augustinian tradition, he thought, was more receptive to the resolving of sophismata than the Aristotelian. 19 Augustine himself, as we have seen, had a very favourable attitude towards the use of logic in the teaching of theology. Whatever may have been the reason, this logica moderna, as it has been called, and in particular the sophismata, flourished and developed at Oxford, whereas in Paris, which still remained the centre of theological education, this type of logic was not so much encouraged and so was not used to such advantage. Witnesses to this state of affairs are the edict of the Paris Faculty of Arts made in 1339 discouraging the study of Ockhamist logic, 20 and the letter of rebuke addressed by Pope Clement VI to the masters of Paris in 1346, blaming them for turning away from Aristotle and the ancient expositors and leaning towards sophistical doctrines and opinions that are useless and superficial. 21 Further confirmation of the superiority of logical studies in Oxford during this period is afforded by a famous passage in the Philobiblon of Richard de Bury (1287-1345). Complaining about the scandalous way in which young students were hurried through their university courses in order to qualify for preferments, he singled out Paris for particular condemnation, saying that books are no longer produ.ced there and that "they wrap up their doctrines in unskilled discourse and are losing all propriety of logic, except that Anglican subtleties, which they denounce in public, are the subject of their furtive vigils". Gilbert gives good reasons for thinking that Richard was referring, not to the logical works of Ockham, but to the quaternuli, or small volumes of notes on sophismata, compiled by the Oxford students in artibus which he himself collected and knew well. 22 This would agree with the practice observed in Paris a century before, when

19

N.W. Gilbert, "Richard de Bury and the Quires ofYesterday's Sophisms",

Philosophy and Humanism. ( 1976), p. 24 7. 2 ° Chart. Univ. Paris., II, No. 1042. See E.A. Moody, "Ockham, Buridan, and Nicholas of Autrecourt: The Parisian Statutes of 1399 and 1340", Studies in Medieval Philosophy, Science, and Logic, Univ. of California Press, 1975, pp. 127-160. 21 Chart. Univ. Paris., p. 588, See N.W. Gilbert, op.cit., pp. 239 If. 22

Gilbert, op.cit., pp. 234 If.

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forbidden Aristotelian books of small format (quatemuli) were studied clandestinely by students and masters alike. 23 The above described developments in the use of sophismata are generally associated with Merton college, though by no means confined to that institution.

23

See supra, p. 33.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE MERTON TRADITION In recent years much new work has been done in this field by such scholars as the late J.A. Weisheipl, E.A. Moody, W.A. Wallace, Curtis Wilson, J.E. Murdoch, E.D. Sylla, P.V. Spade, John Longway, and C. Lewis. 1 These scholars payed particular attention to what effect, if any, this tradition had on the subsequent development of the so-called Scientific Revolution of the seventeenth century, and in particular on the early studies in kinematics pursued by Galileo. For the intricate details of the logico-mathematical structures of the sophismata, therefore, I would refer the reader to the writings of the above scholars. Here there is only space to give a broad outline of the main innovations that took place in the use of this type of disputation, especially in so far as they affected the study of physica, and to summarize the most recent conclusions regarding their influence. Merton college was founded in 1274 specifically to house Oxford scholars who, after completing their necessary regency in artibus, wanted to proceed to the higher faculties ofTheology and Canon Law. In the fourteenth century several prominent members of the college distinguished themselves in the pursuit of the mathematical and physical sciences, though the reason why this particular college should have specialized in such studies are still obscure. The masters who were particularly influential in this field were Thomas Bradwardine ( c.l295-1349), William Heytesbury (c.l313-72), John Dumbleton (c.l310-49), and Richard Swineshead (fl.l344---55). Bradwardine was a mathematician as well as a logician, and it was while he was a student of theology in 1328 that he wrote his highly influential Tractatus de proportione velocitatum in motibus. 2 Ever since the libri naturales had been available in translation in the Latin West the study of motion had played a large part in medieval natural philosophy, probably due to that dictum of Aristotle which maintained that "nature is the immediate, material substratum of things which have in See Bibliography for works by these scholars. Edited by H.L. Crosby, jun., Thomas of Bradwardine his Tractatus de Proportionibus. Its significance for the Development of Mathematical Physics, Madison, 1961. 1

2

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CHAPTER FIVE

themselves a principle of motion or change" (Physics, II.1.193a.29). But the Stagirite himself, in his investigation of motion and allied subjects, had concentrated more on a method of classification and analysis, rather than on one which involved mathematical solutions. In the early thirteenth century, as we have seen, Grosseteste had combined mathematics with demonstrative, Aristotelian logic, but he had not applied this combination to the solving of mathematical problems in physics, but rather to the expounding of a mystical, neo-Platonic, "metaphysics of light". 3 It was Bradwardine's great contribution to the history of science that, in his De proportione, he was the first to attempt a purely mathematical solution to problems of motion, thus laying the foundations of the quantitative measurements of modern physics. Not satisfied with the law of dynamics proposed by Aristotle in Physics VII.5, namely that twice the velocity follows from doubling the moving power or from halving the resistance, Bradwardine evolved a system of geometrical proportions that would be universally valid for all cases, his socalled "exponential function". This relates arithmetical increases or decreases in velocities to geometric increases or decreases in the force-resistance proportiones functioning as their cause. But he clearly stated that this law applied only to velocities in the differential or instantaneous sense (velocitas instantanea) which he called the "quality" or "intensity" of the motion at any given time. This he distinguishes from the "quantity" of the whole motion, that is the total velocity (velocitas totalis) which depends on the distance covered uniformly in a given time. 4 The idea itself of a mathematical analysis of qualities was by no means new. Arnald of Villanova in his Aphorismi de gradibus, written c.l290 at Montpellier, had described a method that linked a geometric increase in the number of degrees of a Galenic quality (hot, cold, moist, dry) to an arithmetical increase in its observed effect on an illness of a known degree of quality. Arnald in his turn was probably inspired by similar ideas found in a work by the Arabian philosopher Alkindi. 5 Bradwardine may well have known of these procedures in "mathematical See supra, p. 28. For a good account of Bradwardine's theory and its subsequent influence on the Mertonians and Paris masters see Anneliese Maier's "Der Funktionsbegrilf in der Physik des 14. J ahrhunderts", Die Vorliiufer Galileis im 14. Jahrhundert, Roma 1949, pp. 81-110. See also Weisheipl, "The Place of John Dumbleton in the Merton School", Isis, vol. 50, part 4, No. 162 (1959), p. 447, and more recently, Courtenay, op.cit., p. 243. 5 See M.R. McVaugh, "Quantified Medical Theory and Practice at fourteenthcentury Montpellier", B.H.M., xliii, No.5 (1969), 397-413. 3 4

THE MERTON TRADITION

47

pharmacy", but if so he greatly improved upon them, reduced them to an exact law, and was unique in applying them to a physical problem in kinematics. It was only a short step forwards to apply this "exponential function" to other qualities and attributes which could also be intensified and remitted, such as colour, heat, and density. This, in fact, is just what later Mertonians and their followers did, using, moreover, the disputatio de sophismatibus to work out their problems. Bradwardine himself did compose insolubilia, extant in several manuscripts, but still, I believe, unedited. 6 These were mainly concerned with problems in logic and with the definitions of insolubilia, and in these exercises he did not make use of his "exponential function" to resolve questions in physics. One of the first to do this was William Heytesbury in his influential Regulae sol vendi sophismata written in 1335. 7 This work contains six chapters each dealing with a particular species of sophism, the last three being concerned with physical problems discussed entirely from a logico-mathematical point of view. They are entitled De incipit et desinit, De maximo et minima, and De tribus predicamentis. The last being concerned with concepts of velocity and acceleration has a closer affinity with the De proportione of Bradwardine. Heytesbury also composed a collection of thirty-two separate Sophismata, printed in three incunabula, 8 but only the last two can, in any sense of the word, be termed sophismata physicalia. They are Necesse est aliquid condensari si aliquid rarefiat, and lmpossibile est aliquid calefieri nisi aliquid frigefiat. Recent scholarship has shown that Heytesbury's work on sophismata is not as original as it was first thought to be by Wilson, Clagett and others, since much of it was preceded by the work of Roger Rosetus, Richard Kilvington, Ockham and Bradwardine. 9 But in the last chapter of his Regulae he formulated what has been called "one of the most important kinematical rules to come out of the fourteenth century". 10 Known as the "mean speed theorem" this equates, with respect to space traversed in a given time, a Spade, The Medieval Liar, (1975), item 64, p. 105. See Curtis Wilson, William Heytesbury, Medieval Logic, and the Rise of Mathematical Physics, Madison, 1956; Spade, William Heytesbury on "Insoluble" Sentences. Chapter one of his Rules for Solving Sophisms, Toronto, 1979; J. Longeway, William Heytesbury on Maxima and Minima. Chapter five of Rules for Solving Sophismata, Dordrecht, 1984; Courtenay, op.cit., p. 245. 8 Pavia, 1481; Venice, 1491; Venice, 1494. The sophismata are listed in Curtis Wilson, op.cit., pp. 153-63. 9 Courtenay, op.cit., p. 245. 10 W.A. Wallace, Prelude to Galileo, Dordrecht, 1981, p. 39. 6

7

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CHAPTER FIVE

uniformly accelerated movement to a uniform movement where the velocity is equal throughout to the instantaneous velocity of the uniformly accelerating body at the middle instant of the period of its acceleration. 11 John Dumbleton was another Mertonian, slightly younger than Heytesbury, and his vast, still unedited, Summa logicae et philosophiae naturalis in ten books written before his death in 1349, is to be placed chronologically between the writings of Heytesbury and those of Richard Swineshead. 12 The earlier portion of this work, up to about the middle of Book VI, seems to be reportationes of actual classroom disputationes de sophismatibus, although throughout the entire work he employs the technique of the scholastic quaestio, the questions being mostly inspired by the libri naturales. The summa shows certain developments both in the technique and content of the sophismata. In the first Dumbleton employs a species of wordalgebra or letter-calculus, as it is variously called, in which letters represent ideas (not magnitudes), and in the latter he enlarges the field of enquiry by applying Bradwardine's function to such widely divergent concepts as certitude and doubt, light and darkness, condensation and rarefaction, all considered as "qualities". He even applies this logico-mathematical technique in the first book of his Summa, which is concerned with logic, when he discusses the intension and remission, and latitudes and degrees of such abstract concepts as scientia, credulitas, evidentia, and hesitatio. But Dumbleton's solutions, particularly of physical problems, when he has any, are in general disappointing, and perhaps the best that can be said of much of his work is that it prepared the way for the more profound sophismata of Richard Swineshead, the next Mertonian we have to consider. Richard Swineshead, or Suiseth, whom Clagett called "the subtlest and most able of the four logicians", wrote his Liber calcula11 M. Clagett, The Science of Mechanics in the Middle Ages, Madison, 1959, p. 205. Text ibid. pp. 255-329; E. Grant, A Source Book in Medieval Science, Cambridge, Mass., 1974, pp. 237-43; Wallace op.cit., pp. 39-40. 12 See Weisheipl, "The Place ofjohn Dumbleton in the Merton School" (1959), pp. 449-54 and the same author's, "Developments in the Arts Curriculum" (1966), pp. 168-73, where he gives an analytical division of the chapters in Parts II and III, which correspond to Aristotle's Physics; Clagett, op.cit. pp. 305-25 gives a translation and commentary of Part III, chp. 10. See C.H.L.M.P. (1984), p. 866 for later literature. 13 See Anneliese Maier, "Die Calculationes des 14.Jahrhunderts und die Wissenschaft von den Formlatituden", An der Grenze von Scholastik und Naturwissenschajt, Roma, 1952, pp. 268ff.; Clagett, op.cit., p. 201, and on pp. 29G-304 he gives extracts. See also E.D. Sylla, "The Oxford Calculators", C.H.L.M.P., p. 560.

THE MERTON TRADITION

49

tionum c.l350. 13 Like his predecessors he formulated all his problems secundum imaginationem, dealing exhaustively in a logico-mathematical way with all aspects of latitudes of forms and degrees, without any reference to the real world of sense experience. His main purpose was to demonstrate the efficacy of his techniques and to show how a multiplicity of consequences could be elicited from any given theory. Another Mertonian who was influential in spreading abroad the newer Oxford logic was Walter Burley (c.l275-after 1344). He was regent master in artibus at Merton college from c.l300-1307 before going soon after to the university of Paris to study for a doctorate in theology. Still later, after 1334, he became a member of the household of Richard de Bury, Bishop of Durham, which also included Thomas Bradwardine and the logician, Richard Kilvington. Burley wrote voluminous commentaries and questions on the Aristotelian corpus, on the logica vetus, and other works on logic including sophismata. But perhaps his most influential work was his De puritate artis logicae which attacked certain theories ofOckham and was well known in Italy in the 14th century . 14 Another very influential Oxford logician was Ralph Strode who was a fellow of Merton 1359-60 and held in great repute both in England and on the continent, especially in Italy. He wrote De arte logicae and on Consequences, Suppositions, and Obligations. 15 Richard Billingham was also a fellow of Merton, 1344-61 who wrote a Speculum puerorum c.l350 and Conclusiones, both of which had considerable vogue on the continent during the second half of the 14th century. 16 Not all Oxford logicians studied or lectured at Merton. Richard Kilvington, already mentioned as a member of Richard de Bury's household, was a fellow of Oriel college and wrote important physico-mathematical sophismata closely related to the Regulae of There is a summary and analysis of the work by Murdoch and Sylla in the D.S.B., vol. 13 (1976), pp. 184-213. There is no modern critical edition; early editions are those of Padua, 1477, 1489; Pavia, 1498; Venice, 1505, 1520; Salamanca, 1520, 1524. 14 See C. Martin, "Walter Burley", Oxford Studies presented to Daniel Callus, Oxford, 1964, pp. 194-230; W.J. Courtenay, Schools and Scholars in Fourteenth Century England, Princeton, 1987, passim. De Puritate Artis Logicae has been edited by Ph. Boehner, Franciscan Inst. Publications, No.9, St Bonaventure, N.Y., 1955. 15 See Chp. VI, note 15. 16 See Emden, B.R.U.O., I, p. 188; Courtenay, op.cit., p. 234, n. 25; L.M. de Rijk, "Richard Billingham's Works on Logic', Vivarium 14 (1976), 121-138. The Speculum puerorum has been edited by A. Maieru, Studi Medievali X ( 1970), pp. 297-393.

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CHAPTER FIVE

logicians Heytesbury, and a commentary on the Sentences. 17 O~her who were not, as far as we know, connected with Merton college, but who helped to spread abroad the newer Oxford logic, were Roger Roseth or Rosetus and Richard Feribrigge. The former was active at Oxford or Cambridge 1334. He wrote De maximo et minimo and a commentary on the Sentences. 18 The latter flourished about 1360, but nothing is known about his life. He wrote Logica seu de veritate propositionum and Consequentiae printed at Venice in 1493. 19 These Mertonian concepts were by no means only used in the faculties of arts but, especially during the fourteenth century, were employed to an ever increasing degree in the faculties of theology. In these faculties lectures and disputations on the Sentences of Peter Lombard were obligatory for bachelors wishing to incept as masters in Theology. The results of these lectures were later incorporated into commentaries on the Sentences which, partly because of the decline in popularity of Quodlibeta, soon became the chief source for philosophical and theological ideas held in the faculties of theology during the fourteenth century, both in England and on the continent. As in the case of earlier quaestiones disputate these commentaries with their quaestiones gradually became less dependent on the text which gave rise to them and more concerned with specific problems, often quite unconnected with the Sentences, which interested the author and his contemporaries. These were often in the sphere of natural philosophy (physica) derived from the Aristotelian libri naturales, as was the case with the thirteenth century quodlibeta. But this time scholars made use of the new, terminist logic and concepts found in the sophismata such as analyses of motion, time, relation, quantity, maximum and minimum, incipit and desinit, de primo et ultimo instanti etc. These methods were used to enable students to analyse ambiguities and apparent fallacies and so determine the truth or falsehood of propositions both in theology and physica. The commentaries on the Sentences by Robert Holcot, active in Oxford 1330-32, and of Adam Wodeham, whose commentary belongs to the same period, are of this nature. They

17 See Emden, B.R.U.O., II, p. 1050; Courtenay, op.cit., pp. 243-45; P.V. Spade, The Medieval Liar, Toronto, 1975, pp. 92-93. His sophismata are listed in Curtis Wilson, William Heytesbury, Medieval Logic, and the Rise of Mathematical Physics, Madison, 1956, pp. 163-68. 18 See Courtenay, ibid., pp. 272-73; Spade, ibid., pp. 101-102. 19 See Emden, B.R. U. 0., II, p. 678; Del Punta, "La Logica di Feribrigge nella tradizione manoscritta I taliana", in A. Maieru, English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th Centuries, Naples, 1982, pp. 53-85.

THE MERTON TRADITION

51

were followed by many others during the fourteenth century, such as those mentioned above by Kilvington and Roseth. 20 To conclude this necessarily brief account of the Merton scholars and of their influence on the commentaries on the Sentences originating in the Faculty ofTheology, it must be said that in spite of their combination oflogic, mathematics and physics pointing the way, as it were, to the quantitative calculations ofmodern physics, it would be a mistake to regard these exercises as moving very directly towards early modern science. The goal of the Mertonians, when they discussed motion for instance, was to give as exhaustive an account as they could of the proportions or latitudes of motions, and they were completely indifferent to any empirical interpretations which might follow. In other words they concentrated on kinematics which dealt with the effects of motion and its spatiatemporal characteristics, and paid no attention to dynamics which is more concerned with the cause of motion and which is essential to the outlook of the experimenter. The philosophical reasons for this attitude of the Mertonians are beyond the scope of this study. As Courtenay says "It is difficult to say whether the exploration of these problems was a development of logic, as would be suggested by Kilvington's Sophismata and by the structure and content of Heytesbury's Regulae solvendi sophismata, or whether the interest of the new physics determined the content and direction of logic. In any event, what we find by 1335 is a logic particularly suited to the analysis of problems in physics and mathematics, and a mathematical physics that depends heavily upon language analysis". 21 Perhaps also it should be mentioned that following the nominalist views ofOckham the Mertonians denied the independent, physical, reality of motion and failed to distinguish between natural motion, proceeding from a source within a body, and applied or violent motion caused by an external force. This method of procedure was quite different from that followed by Galileo and his associates when they were investigating, for example, the acceleration of a body in free fall in relation to the dynamics of the occurrence. Anneliese Maier was the first to draw attention to this when she was discussing views about impetus held by Aristotle and the fourteenth-century scholastics. In one of her final essays she came 20 On the relation between logic, science and theology in commentaries on the Sentences see J.E. Murdoch, "The Unitary Character of Late Medieval Learning", and E.D. Sylla, "Autonymous and Handmaiden Science", both in The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning ed. by Murdoch and Sylla, Dordrecht, 1975, and Courtenay, op.cit., Chp. 9 "Theologia Anglicana", pp. 250-306. 21 Courtenay, op.cit., p. 240.

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to the conclusion that Galileo's account of impetus was quite different from that of the fourteenth-century scholastics. In more recent times these views have been confirmed by Wallace and his associates. 22 On the other hand, as this scholar says, it cannot be denied that the fourteenth-century Mertonians were definitely contributors to the mathematical component that made classical mechanics possible.

22 Anneliese Maier, "Galilei und die scholastische Impetustheorie", Ausgehendes Mittelalter II Edizioni di Storia e Letteratura, Roma 1967; William A. Wallace, "Anneliese Maier, Galileo and Theories oflmpetus" Prelude to Galileo ( 1981), pp. 320-40, and the same author's "Aristotelian Influencies on Galileo's Thought", Aristotelismo Veneto I ( 1983), p. 366.

CHAPTER SIX

THE DIFFUSION OF MERTONIAN IDEAS 1300--1450 1. Mertonian ideas in Paris No more important, original sophismata physicalia seem to have been composed in Oxford after about 1360. To find further important advances in technique and content we have to go to Paris, where we find calculatory enthusiasm in the work of Jean Buridan ( d.l358) and his pupils and successors, Nicole Ores me ( c.l320--82), Albert of Saxony ( c.l316--90) and Marsili us oflnghen ( c.l340--96). All of these except Oresme have left collections of sophismata which deal mainly with definitions and problems in logic. But their main contributions to the development of physica are found in their scholastic quaestiones inspired by the Aristotelian libri naturales. In the Questions on the Physics and De caelo et mundo, for instance, Buridan developed his famous "impetus theory", applying it to an analysis of the uniformly accelerated motion of freely falling bodies. 1 Although he gave no formal, mathematical explanation of this theory, he was evidently well aware of the logico-mathematical method of approach to kinematics so much favoured by the Mertonians. He thus developed ideas and concepts found in the sophismata of the Oxford school but did not make innovations in the technique and method of presentation of these ideas. Similar remarks could apply to the numerous Quaestiones of Albert of Saxony and Marsilius oflnghen. For such innovations, therefore, we have to go to the writings of Buridan's successor Nicole Oresme, described by Wallace as "perhaps the most original thinker of the Paris school". 2 In his Tractatus de conjigurationibus qualitatum et motuum, written during the period 1356--62, Oresme developed and greatly improved upon a two-dimensional, geometric method of representing calculatory problems. This had been first described by Giovanni di Casale in

1 See Clagett, op.cit., "John Buridan and the Impetus Theory of Projectile Motion", pp. 505-25, and his translation with commentary of Buridan's Questions on the Physics. viii, qu. 12, pp. 532-40. 2 Wallace, op.cit., p. 42.

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his De velocitate malus alterationis written in 1346 at Bologna. 3 Both Casale and Oresme were very much influenced by the Merton tradition, and the method described by them made use of a twodimensional figure to plot a distribution ofthe intensity of a quality in a subject or of the variation of a velocity with time. Using this method Oresme was able to give a geometric proof of the abovementioned "mean speed theorem" of Heytesbury. This addition of geometry to the working out of ideas contained in the sophismata physicalia was the last major development in this particulat sphere. After this only variations on the same theme could take place, in the way of methodology, until the decline of calculatory interest which took place about the middle of the sixteenth century. There is also a series of quodlibeta ascribed to Oresme, some of which have been recently edited by Bert Hansen. 4 These are evidently questions which were debated in the Arts Faculty by Oresme and his pupils, which he edited, reworked and revised at a later period, c.l370, probably to make them more accessible for reading. In two cases he reduced them to the form of treatises, the Quaestio contra divinatores and the De causis mirabilium, others he left in question form, the Tabula problematum, consisting of 216 questions, of which 172 are unanswered and 44 debated at considerable length. 5 As a whole these questions resemble those found in the Paris codex Bibl. Nat. Lat. 16089, discussed above. 6 They embrace every aspect of physica, many being inspired by the libri naturales, including the Problems and De animalibus, and many being Salernitan in origin. But Oresme shows a greater interest in occult phenomena, magic, incantations, miracles and astrology. 2. Mertonian ideas in Italy Other important centres for the diffusion of the ideas of the Mertonians were in Italy, and chief among these centres were Padua, 3 Ibid., pp. 43-44. See also Murdoch and Sylla, "The Science of Motion", Science in the Middle Ages, ed. D.C. Lindberg, Chicago, 1978, pp. 237-41; Clagett, op.cit., "The Application of Two-Dimensional Geometry to Kinematics", pp. 331-46 with translations of parts of Oresme's De configurationibus and Casale's De velocitate, pp. 347-91. It is possible that the interaction between motion, time, and distance had been rendered even earlier by the use of line segments that visually graph the ratios and proportions. Manuscripts of Kilvington, Rimini, and Ceffons contain line segment drawings, and Courtenay has suggested that such graphs may have been introduced into Paris from English sources c.l340.0p.cit., p. 248. 4 Bert Hansen, Nicole Oresme and the Marvels of Nature, Toronto, 1985. 5 Unfortunately these 44 questions have not yet, as far as I know, been fully edited, see Hansen, op.cit., p. 43. 6 Supra, pp. 36-7.

DIFFUSION OF MERTONIAN IDEAS

55

renowned for its medical teaching, and Bologna, famous for its legal instruction and the teaching of logic. It used to be thought that one of the earliest to introduce Mertonian concepts to Padua was the logician, Paolo Nicoletti de Udine (Paul ofVenice, c.1370l429), but recent scholarship has shown that long before this Oxford logic had entered Italy and that Padua was not necessarily the first to receive it. 7 As we shall see below, the fulminations of Petrarch against the English logicians ( 1335) antedate by more than fifty years the arrival of Paul of Venice at Oxford in 1390 and his return to Padua three years later. There were several channels through which the logica nova from Oxford could enter Italy. By the second quarter of the fourteenth century Italian mendicant students began to enroll in ever increasing numbers in the Theology Faculty at Oxford, most of them Franciscans but some Augustinian Hermits and Dominicans. Most came from central Italy, from Assisi, Florence, Lucca, Perugia and Milan. Through these students there was, after about 1320, an exchange of information regarding theology and philosophy between Oxford and the central Italian towns, since most returned from Oxford to their native regwns. Another fruitful source for the exchange of ideas was the migration of English masters and bachelors to Italy to take up teaching posts. Ockham fled to Italy from Avignon in 1328, and Walter Burley was active in Bologna in 1341. Teaching assignments and diplomatic missions brought other English scholars to Italy, particularly to Bologna, during the fourteenth century. Among the mendicant orders the studia generalia provided equivalent training in philosophy and theology to that obtained in a university, so that there was a constant interchange of information between the studia generalia and the universities ofBo1ogna, Paris and Oxford. Bologna was the most important in this respect since it was a studium generate for the four major mendicant orders and had a university as well. As it happens this city provides us with our earliest evidence for the introduction of English logic into Italy. This took the form of familiarity with the writings of the Oxford logician and theologian, Walter Burley. John of Parma disputing in Bologna in 1337 attacked a thesis of Burley contained in his Sentences commentary, and Burley himself was in Bologna in 1341 defending another of his theses. Later Burley visited the university of Toulouse and 7 See W.J. Courtenay, "The Early Stages in the Introduction of Oxford Logic into Italy" in A. Maieru, op.cit., pp. 13-32. This has been my main source for the following paragraphs.

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attended a quodlibetal disputation there which discussed the problem of continuity in change, De prima et ultimo instanti. Burley's contribution to this discussion subsequently attracted much attention in Italy. 8 In 1346 John of Casale, having just vacated his position as magister regens of theology in Cambridge, came to Bologna and in the Franciscan convent there composed his influential De velocitate motus alterationis. This work is thoroughly dependent on Merton texts such as those by Bradwardine, Heytesbury, Dumbleton and possibly Swineshead. 9 In about 1368 the Franciscans William of Cremona and Frederick of Regensburg, who had both studied at Oxford, were together at Bologna. Both of them were familiar with the works of Oxford logicians such as Richard Brinckley, Bradwardine, Ockham, and Burley. 10 The Franciscan convent at Assisi could also have been a centre for the study of Oxford logic. John of Casale was lector there in 1335 before he went to Cambridge. In 1337 Nicholas Comparini of Assisi, a student of law and theology, was resident at the Franciscan convent in Norwich. There he copied the Sentences commentary of Roger Roseth (Rosetus) who had a strong interest in the logica nova and physics, and he knew well the writings of Adam Wodeham and Bradwardine. While Comparini was at Oxford he copied the Sentences commentary of John Went ( c.l340-48) who was lecturing there 1336-37, and acquired many other philosophical and theological works. All these codices of Comparini eventually found there way to the convent at Assisi, either during his life time or after his death. Peter Ceccarelli, custos of the Assisi convent in 1354-55, visited Oxford and returned to Assisi bringing commentaries on the Sentences and a knowledge of the lectures of Adam Wodeham. The 1381 catalogue of the Franciscan convent at Assisi shows the library to be one of the largest and best catalogued mendicant libraries in Europe at that time. Although it does not contain any books of specifically English logic, it does contain many commentaries on the Sentences and theological texts which make abundant use of the newer English logic available before 1335. 11 As regards Padua, scholars were certainly aware of the newer Engl.ish physics and logic by 1350, possibly by way of Bologna. The 8 See Courtenay, op.cit., pp. 21-22 & 24; Anneliese Maier, Metaphysische Hintergrunde (1955), p. 379, n. 6. 9 See note 3. 1° Courtenay, ibid., p. 22. 11 Ibid., pp. 24-27.

DIFFUSION OF MERTONIAN IDEAS

57

codices Vat. lat. 3066 and Vat. lat. 3124 were originally one codex copied at Padua between 134 7 and 1352 from quaternuli for the most part originating in Bologna between 1337 and 1346. Vat. lat. 3066 contains works criticizing theses of Burley, Kilvington's sophismata, Burley's De puritate artis logicae and his quodlibetal quaestio de primo et ultimo instanti. Vat. lat. 3144 contains the disputation of John of Casale on motion and part of Heytesbury's Regulae. At the University of Padua in 1352 Franciscus de Ferraria used Bradwardine's De proportione in motibus in his quaestio on the same subject. Ockham's Summa logica was known around Padua in the 1370s, a copy being given to the library of the Dominicans at Treviso in 13 71 and another copy belonged to the Augustinians at Padua in 1377. 12 The Sentences commentary of the Augustinian, Gregory of Rimini (c.l300-58) abound in citations from Ockham, Adam Wodeham, Bradwardine, Kilvington, Heytesbury, and other Oxford logicians. As Courtenay has pointed out, it is quite possible that he acquired his knowledge of these writings in Italy, probably in Bologna, before he returned to Paris in 1342. Between 1330 and 1341 he taught at Bologna, Padua, and Perugia. 13 All this evidence suggests that much of the newer English logic was known in Italy by the mid fourteenth century, two generations before Peter of Mantua and Paul of Venice. But it is difficult to assess to what extent this knowledge affected the teaching oflogic in the Italian studia at this period. By the end of the century, however, one can say that a full-scale invasion of English logic had taken place, and it is interesting to note that apart from the writings of well-known authors, such as Burley and Ockham, those of lesser known logicians had become very popular in Italy. This is well exemplified in the case of the Mertonian, Ralph Strode. Nearly all the codices containing his logical works have originated in Italy, certainly all the English codices have come from there. In particular the Bodleian manuscript, Canonici Misc. 219, the only manuscript to contain all six parts of his Logica, was copied in 1391-93 by Almerico da Serravalle, a Paduan student in artibus et medicinae. Later this manuscript passed to Antonio da Monte who in 1395 added numerous other texts of English logic, including the De sensu composito et diviso of Heytesbury, and lnsolubilia of Walter

12

13

Ibid., pp. 27-29. Ibid., p. 31.

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Sexgrave, John Venator, Henry Anglicus, and Bradwardine. 14 It is strange that no Strode manuscripts of English origin are known. A clue may be found in the old catalogue of Merton Fellows in which a later hand has made a marginal note against the name of Strode. "He was a notable poet and wrote an elegaic poem called Fantasma Radulphi." This leads one to suspect that his logical works were not appreciated in England, and that he was more renowned as a poet, perhaps, as Maieru suggests, because of his association with Chaucer. The latter dedicated his Troylus and Cryseyde to him and they both lodged over Aldgate when Strode was Common Serjeant and Pleader of the City of London. 15 After the Canonici manuscript, the one to contain the most of Strode's logical works is the Paduan codex Antoniana 407 which contains four of his tracts. This was copied at Ferrara in 1468 by the Franciscan, Francesco Ingegnerati. In addition this scribe copied, at Padua this time, several other texts of English logic by Heytesbury and Richard Billingham and Obligationes and Consequentiae secundum modum Oxonie. 16 The logical works of another Mertonian, Richard Feribrigge, also seem to have been more popular in north Italy than in England. Four manuscripts are extant, one in Padua, Bibl. U niv. 1123 ( 1396), two in the Vatican, Bibl. Vat. Lat. 2136 and 2189 (both 15th c.), and one in Rome, Bibl. Casanatense 85 (15th c.). In England there seem to be records of only two manuscripts, one formerly in the library of the Austin Friars, York, and another in the library of Leicester Abbey. 17 By the beginning of the 15th century, then, the newer English logic was firmly established in Italy and was being used, commented upon and taught by several famous philosophers and logicians. One of these was Biagio Pelacani (Blasius of Parma). Called by Vescovini one of the most mature thinkers in philosophy of the middle ages, 18 he had a long and varied life, lecturing on logic, 14 See, A. Maieru, "Le manuscrit Oxford, Canonici Misc. 219 et Ia Logica de Strode" in his English Logic in Italy ( 1982), pp. 87-110. 15 See Emden, B.R.U.O., III, pp. 1807-08.

Oh moral Gower, this booke I directe To thee and to the philosophical Strode. See also the remarks by Leland in Commentarii de Scriptoribus Britannicis, Oxford, 1709, II, p. 376: Coluit enim flagrantissimo amore eloquentiam et musas canores ... Yates autem tantis donatus muneribus, cantionem elegiacum voce sonora, liquida arguta cecinit ... cui et Phantasma nomen a re inditum. 16 See Maieru, English Logic in Italy, p. 92. 17 See Chp. 5 note 19 18 G.F. Vescovini, Studi sulla Prospettiva Medievale, Torino, 1945, p. 241. For biographical notices see the same author's "Problemi di fisica aristotelica in un

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natural philosophy, mathematics and astrology at the universities of Pavia, Bologna, and Padua until 1411, when he was discharged from the latter place, perhaps due to his old age. Retiring to his native Parma, he died there in 1416. He left many writings, including scholastic quaestiones on the Aistotelian libri naturales and Quaestiones super tractatum de proportionibus (before 1391) in which he disagreed with the theories of Bradwardine. He also wrote De intensione et remissione formarum which supplies a proof of Heytesbury's mean speed theorem and is influenced by Swineshead. But it was in the field of mathematics that Blasius achieved the height of his fame, and, as Vescovini has so clearly demonstrated, it was his conception of the preeminence of mathematics in the hierarchy of the sciences that helped to lay the foundations of the logicomathematical outlook of the later Paduan philosopher-physicians, such as Jacopo da Forli, as we shall see. 19 He placed mathematics higher than logic, natural philosophy, astrology, moral philosophy, and even theology, because, as he said in a lecture given at Padua in 1383, "mathematical conclusions are deduced from first principles, and once these terms are known, the intellect must agree with them. But in natural philosophy this is not the case because the matter of natural things is not subject to demonstration, and less so are the conclusions of the theologians". 20 Other contemporaries of Paulus V enetus who may have introduced Mertonian ideas before him, towards the end of the fourteenth century, were Angelo da Fossembrone and Peter of Mantua. The former, having received his doctorate in artibus at Bologna in 1395, taught logic and natural philosophy there until 1400 when he came to Padua and lectured on the latter subject at least until 1402. Although he also obtained a doctorate in medicine, he does not seem to have practised in that subject and is chiefly known for his logical writings, a Recollecta super Heniisberi de tribus predicamentis. This is a commentary on the first two parts of De reactione, the sixth maestro del xiv secolo: Biagio Pelacani da Parma", Rivista di Filosofia, 51 ( 1960), pp. 179-85. 19 Vescovini, "L'importanza della Matematica tra Aristotelismo e Scienze moderne in alcuni Filosofi Padovani della fine del Secolo xiv", in Aristotelismo Veneto (1983), II. pp. 666 If. 20 "quia conclusiones mathematicorum deducta sunt ex prinC!pns pnm1s, qui bus notis terminis, intellectus non potest deassentire. Sed in philosophia naturali hoc non reperitur, quia materia rerum naturalium non patitur demonstrationes, et minus conclusiones theologorum". Quaestiones physicorum, I, qu. 3, quoted by Vescovini, op.cit. p. 669. On the influence of Bradwardine on Blasius, see A. Harrison, "Blasius of Parma's critique of Bradwardine's Tractatus de proportionibus, in Scienza e Filosofia (1983), pp. 19-69.

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chapter of Heytesbury's Regulae, in which he quotes Swineshead, calling him, "Calculator" and thus being the first among his contemporaries to use this sobriquet. He also wrote a collection of Insolubilia, a Quaestio de inductione forma rum and De maxima seu minima materia. 21 The writings of Peter (Alboini) of Mantua have received a good deal of attention in recent years, Alain de Libera going so far as to call him "the only great logician who truly belongs to the Italian trecento". 22 He was a student at Padua up to 1392 and lecturer in philosophy at Bologna from 1392 to 1400, the year of his death. He wrote a Logica which was first printed at Padua 14 77/80 followed by at least four more incunabula ending with the Venice edition of 1492. He also wrote a De primo et ultimo instanti printed with the Logica, which was very popular in Italy, and again in the words of de Libera was "certainly one of the most remarkable witnesses to the diffusion of English logic into 14th century Italy". 23 He was referred to by such influential masters as Gaetano da Thiene in his Recollectae super de incipit et desinit of Heytesbury, (Venice, 1494, f.27rb), Alessandro Achillini, Opera, (Venice, 1551, f. 74vb) and Pomponazzi, De intensionne et remissione Jormarum (Venice, 1525, f.l2ra), who greatly praised him. 24 An important criticism of Peter's De primo et ultimo instanti was written about 1450 by the Cremonese physician Apollinaire Offredi and printed with the incunabula editions of the Logica. His object was to defend the opinions of Heytesbury and other Mertonians against the sometimes opposite and independent views of Peter. 25 Finally it is worth recording that the latter corresponded with the humanist Coluccio Salutati. 26 At about the same time (c.l390) that Peter of Mantua was at Padua, a certain Messinus magister artium et medicinae, wrote a series 21 See Clagett, op.cit., pp. 648-49; Curtis Wilson, op.cit., pp. 106-07, 116; Spade, Medieval Liar (1975), item xxv, p. 49; G.F. Vescovini, 'II commento di Angelo di Fossombrone a! "De tribus predicamentis di Guglielmo Heytesbury" in Maieru, English Logic in Italy, pp. 359-74. 22 A. de Libera, "Apollinaire Offredi, critique de Pierre de Mantoue", Maieru, ibid., p. 254. 23 Ibid., p. 253. The de primo et ultimo instanti was edited by T.E. James in an unpublished thesis in 1968. See also James, "Peter Alboini of Mantua: Philosopher Humanist",j.H.P., 12 (1974), pp. 161-70. The manuscript in the 1381 catalogue of the Franciscan library at Assisi entitled "1oyica Ferebrich" was at one time attributed to Peter, but it has now been identified as a work by Wycliffe. 24 Curtis Wilson, William Heytesbury (1956), pp. 36-37 & p. 177, n. 20. 25 See note 22. 26 See C. Vasoli, "Pietro Alboini da Mantova, scolastica della fine del trecento e un'epistola di Coluccio Salutati", Rinascimento, secunda serie, 3 (1963), pp. 3-21.

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of questions concerning the treatise of john of Casale on motion (De velocitate motus alterationis) mentioned above. He also wrote Sententia super de tribus predicamentis Hentisberi which is a commentary on Heytesbury's three categories of movement described in the sixth chapter of his Regulae. The fact that he left this work unfinished and that it was later completed by Gaetano de Thiene led Curtis Wilson to believe that Messinus was connected with the university of Padua. 27 But probably much more influential than any of the above masters because of the widespread diffusion of his writings, both in manuscript and print, was the Augustinian friar, Paolo Nicoletti da Udine (Paul of Venice), a man of vast learning who obtained degress in all three faculties and was "doctor artis, medicinae, et theologiae". In 1390 Paul was sent by his order to Oxford where he remained for three years. He then taught at Paris for two years and in 1408 we find him lecturing at Padua. In 1409 he became Rector of his order in Venice, and the following year received the title of doctor of medicine at Padua where he taught philosophy for a year or so. After many vicissitudes and sojourns in other universities he returned to Padua in 1428, only to die the following year. 28 He wrote many works on logic including a Logica magna and an epitome of this, the Summulae Logicae which was officially named a standard text in the university in 1496 and remained in use for many years. 29 He also wrote on sophisms, the Sophismata aurea. In these works he is very much influenced by Bradwardine, Heytesbury, and Swineshead among the Mertonians, and by Pierre d' Ailly ( 1350-1420) and Albert of Saxony ( 1316-90) among the Parisians. Besides works on logic, Paul wrote a vast, encyclopedic Summa totius philosophiae or Summa naturalium as it is sometimes called, which also became very popular and was reprinted many times, and many commentaries on the Aristotelian libri naturales which contained scholastic quaestiones. In general these questions were of two types. 27 Curtis Wilson, ibid., p. 27; Vescovini, op.cit., pp. 366-72; Clagett, Science of Mechanics ( 1959), pp. 646-48. 28 See A.R. Perreiah, "A Biographical Introduction to Paul of Venice", Augustiniana, xvii (1967), pp. 450-61; Bruno Nardi, "Paolo Veneto", Enciclopedia Italiana di Scien,ze, Lettere, ed Arti, XXVI, p. 242; Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries", Traditio, XXVIII (1972), pp. 314-20. 29 "Deputati ad sophistariam teneantur Iegere Logicam Pauli Veneti et Quaestiones Strodi cum Dubiis Pauli Pergulensis et pro tertia lectione Regulas seu Sophysmata Tisberi (Heytesbury)", F. Facciolati, Fasti Gymnasii Patavini, Padua, 1757, II, p. 118. The Logica Magna has been recently edited by N. Kretzmann and his associates, Oxford University Press, 1978, 1979--. Perreiah has recently cast doubts on its authenticity in his Paul of Venice. A Bibliographical Guide. Bowling Green, Ohio, 1986.

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The first type consisted of questions which were raised with the object of determining the true meaning of certain Aristotelian propositions, and sometimes the determinations were against the opinions of Averroes. The second type of question presented views contrary to those of Aristotle and Averroes-and these seemed to express the opinions of Paul himself.3° Duhem is far from flattering in his account of Paul, stressing his frequent borrowings from the works of his contemporaries, 31 but Haureau called him "the most subtle of the logicians of the Renaissance", 32 and recent scholarship has shown that his influence on his pupils and contemporaries, particularly in Padua, was considerable. 33 Randall long ago drew attention to his defence of the double, resolution and composition, method of physical demonstration against the charge of being what Aristotle called a circular proof.3 4 Paul's pupil, Gaetano da Thiene (1387-1465), was, if anything, still more active in spreading Mertonian ideas in Padua. Licensed in artibus there in 1418, he received his doctorate in medicine in 1428. But in between, in 1422, he accepted the chair of Logic which he held untill430. In this year he began to lecture in natural philosophy, continuing to do so until the year of his death in 1465. 35 In 1436 he was offered the chair of theoretical medicine, but he refused it, saying that he wished to remain among the philosophers. While he was lecturing on logic he wrote five works on that discipline, two of which dealt with the Regulae and Sophismata of Heytesbury, whilst another two were commentaries on the works oftwo more Mertonians, the Recollectae super Consequentias Strodi (Ralph Strode), and the Expositio super Consequentias Ricardi de Ferabrich (Richard Feribrigge). Later he composed numerous commentaries containing scholastic quaestiones on the libri naturales and a tract entitled De intensione et remissione formarum. Salient features of his lectures and quaestiones were, according to his biographer Valsanzibio, "clearness of exposition, an organized method of argumentation, precision in refer30 See Z. Kuksewicz, "Paul de Venise et sa Theorie de !'arne", Aristotelismo Veneto (1983) I, p. 299. Duhem, Le Systeme du Monde, IV (1954), pp. 283 ff. 31 Duhem, Le Systeme du Monde, IV (1954), pp. 283 ff. 32 C'est le plus delie des logiciens de Ia Renaissance". Dictionnaire des Sciences Philosophiques, IV, Paris, 1849, p. 604. 33 See the articles by F. Bottin, M. Cristiani, G. dell' Anna, and L. Pozzi in the two volumes of Aristotelismo Veneto (1983) and the excellent account of Paul's logical and philosophical works by F. Bottin, 'Logica e Filosofia Naturale nella opere di Paolo Veneto', Scienz:a e Filosofia (1983), pp. 85-124. 34 J.H. Randall, The School of Padua (1961), p. 40. 35 On Gaetano see P.S. da Valsanzibio, Vita e Dottrina di Gaetano di Thiene, Pad ova, 1949, and F. Bottin, Gaetano da Thiene e i "Calculatores", Scien::.a e Filosofia (1983), pp. 125-34.

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ring to the opinions of other philosophers with economy of words, respect towards the Faith and for the opinions of others, even when he dissented from them and was preparing to confute them, and a nobility and superiority in disputation". 36 As regards the technique of his quaestiones, according to the same author he did not follow the old, established methods of disputation, starting with negation of the proposition followed by affirmation and solution (videtur quod non, at contra est, ad(!) dicendum). But on the other hand he adopted almost a dialogue form with negation of the proposition, followed by affirmation, presuppositions and affirmations of the terms, conclusions, propositions of the negative position against the affirmative, solutions of these difficulties, a brief historical summary of the different solutions, and solutions of the principal arguments placed at the start of the negative position. 37 All of this was a pleasing innovation, since it gave to the opponents an opportunity to clarify their positions, furnished a convincing conclusion, and lent to the whole proceeding the character of a lively debate. Randall goes so far as to call Gaetano "the outstanding natural philosopher of the middle of the century", 38 referring of course to the fifteenth, and says that he repeats what Paul ofVenice has to say about the double procedure in physical demonstration. Even if one does not agree with Randall's eulogy, there can be little doubt that Gaetano had great influence through his numerous writings and publications, particularly in making more widely known and clarifying the difficult and obscure theorems of the Mertonians. 3. Mertonian ideas in Germany and Eastern Europe

Scholastic quaestiones were used in commentaries and expositions on the Aristotelian corpus, and of course in the fields of Theology, in German universities from the time of their foundations in the fourteenth century onwards, just as they were in western Europe. But the Merton tradition was slow in penetrating to these more remote regions, no innovations in method and technique were made, and the texts originating there had not the widespread influence of those coming from Oxford, Paris, and Italy. It is as well to remember, however, that in 1369 John of Holland, a professor at the University of Prague, wrote a treatise, De primo et ultimo

36 37 38

Op.cit., p. 19. Ibid., pp. 20-21. See Appendix 6. Randall, op.cit., p. 41.

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instanti, in which he quotes one of the rules from the fifth chapter of Heytesbury's Regulae. He also wrote a De motu, which is essentially an abstract from the sixth chapter on the Regulae and from parts of Swineshead 's Liber calculationum. 39 Jean Buridan's pupil, Albert of Saxony, brought logicomathematical concepts, derived from the Mertonians, from Paris to Vienna in 1366, when he became rector of the newly founded university there. 40 Marsilius oflnghen also left Paris to become first rector of the University of Heidelberg in 1386, bringing with him the new logic of the Paris schools and ideas on motion and impetus derived from Buridan. 41 At Cologne University, founded two years after that of Heidelberg, the study of the "latitude of forms", a favourite Mertonian theme, was made obligatory in 1398. 42 Yet another Paris master, Lawrence of Scotland, active in 1393, composed quaestiones on the Aristotelian Physics which had a very wide diffusion in eastern Europe during the fifteenth century, that is in Prague, Cracow, Erfurt and Leipzig. 43 Erfurt in particular became a well-known centre for the study of medieval physica, medicine, and philosophy, as the vast Amplonian collection of manuscripts dealing with these subjects witnesses to this day. 44 Heytesbury was read in Leipzig up to 1494, when he was withdrawn from the curriculum on the grounds that his logic was of little value. 45 As regards quodlibetal disputations in these more Eastern universities in the later middle ages, it is a curious fact that they seem to have been more popular in the arts faculties there than they were in the same faculties in Paris and Oxford. The roles in fact seem to have been reversed, and it is in the Theology Faculty that we find a dearth of quodlibeta during this period. Thus in Erfurt, Prague, and Vienna no provision was originally made in the statutes for quodlibeta in faculties other than Arts, and it was only in 1449 that it was determined to hold quodlibetal disputations in the Theology Faculty ofVienna. 46 The structure, too, of these quodlibeta Curtis Wilson, op.cit., p. 26. op.cit., p. 641. The acts of the Faculty of Arts at Vienna show that John ofHolland, Marsilius oflnghen, Billingham and Heytesbury were read there from about 1389, E.J. Ashworth, "Traditional Logic", C.H.R.P., p. 150. 41 Clagett, op.cit., p. 642, and Ashworth, ibid. 42 Clagett, ibid. 43 Clagett, ibid., p. 63 7. .... 44 Erfurt statutes of 1420 and 1449 mention Billingham, Heytesbury, Albert of Saxony, Buridan and Marsilius. Ashworth, ibid. 45 Quia parum fructus in se habeat, quoted by Ashworth, ibid. 46 See J.F. Wippel, "Quodlibetal Questions", Les Questions Disputees (1985), p. 206. 39

4

° Clagett,

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in Arts was quite different from that of similar exercises held in the Theology Faculties of Paris and Oxford at an earlier period. 47 Thus the presiding master, or Quodlibetarius as he was called, was selected far in advance, and it was his task to set a quaestio principalis to which a Bachelor would reply in the role of respondens. Other masters from the Faculty of Arts and invited doctors from higher faculties could attend, but ultimately it was the Quodlibetarius who had to make the final determination. It was also his duty to set questions not only for all the masters in the Arts Faculty, some two or three weeks before they were to be disputed, but also for the invited doctors from the higher faculties who would also be expected to dispute them during the quodlibetal session. The participants in these debates, therefore, would all know long beforehand what questions they were going to propound, and would have plenty of time to prepare their arguments. The elements of spontaneity and originality that were such features of the earlier quodlibeta were thus lacking in these later varieties. Also the task of the Quodlibetarius became increasingly onerous. Thus in 1490 at Erfurt it was only after seven masters had refused to accept the task, that one could be found to undertake it 48 -a sure indication of the decline in popularity of this form of disputation. So much, then, for the development and spread of the quaestio disputata in connection with physica up to about the mid fifteenth century.

47 48

Wippel, ibid., pp. 205 ff. Ibid., p. 209.

CHAPTER SEVEN

MEDICAL QUAESTIONESDISPUTATAE C. 1250-1450 With the rise of the university system, the spread of Salernitan medicine, and the influence of the Latin medical translations of Constantin us, the study of medicine assumed so much importance that it finally resulted in the formation of a separate faculty for this subject. But exactly when this occurred in Paris is still a matter for speculation. We have seen that c.l230 Roland of Cremona and William of Auvergne referred to physici and medici in contrast to the philosophi who were students or professors in artibus. It is possible that about this time some sort of separate body involving medical students had been or was about to be formed. But the earliest reference to a medical faculty in the Paris Statutes does not occur until 1270-74. In these Statutes the requirements for obtaining a licence to lecture in medicine are given in great detail. Among these it is stated that "they shall swear that they have responded twice concerning a question in the classes of two masters, understanding thereby a formal disputation (disputatio ordinaria or sollempnis) and not a lecture, or at least once in a general disputation (quodlibet). 1 Later other northern universities such as Oxford and those in Germany and Spain, followed the example of Paris. On the other hand in the Italian universities, such as Bologna, Padua and Pavia, there was no separate faculty for medicine, and this subject, together with logic and natural philosophy, which were necessary preliminaries for the study of medicine, continued to be taught in the arts faculties from the thirteenth century onwards. By the late 14th century in Padua the Faculty of Arts was referred to as "Collegia philosophorum et medicorum", which certainly suggests that medicine was taught on an equal footing with the subjects of the arts. 2 In these universities there was no separate faculty for theology

1 L. Thorndike, University Records and Life in the Middle Ages, New York, 1949, p. 81. 2 On this aspect of university teaching see Kristeller, "Philosophy and Medicine in Medieval and Renaissance Italy", Organism, Medicine, and Metaphysics, ed.

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either, so that students wishing to take up this subject usually had to proceed to one of the northern universities, where separate theology faculties existed, in order to complete their studies. 3 These factors, as Kristeller has pointed out, may have contributed to the reason why we find in Italy a closer connection between medicine, logic, and natural philosophy, and more physicians concentrating on the last two disciplines than we find in the north. 4 In Paris, for example, the tendency was for students, after completing the arts course, to proceed to theology rather than to medicine, whereas in Italy the opposite was the case during the period under discussion. There were, of course, exceptions to this; numerous physicians trained in Paris, and some even took degrees in both medicine and theology. 5 Purely medical quaestiones disputatae and quodlibeta are very rare in the first half of the thirteenth century. I described one such collection in my Salernitan Questions ( 1963, pp. 83-4), the Questiones naturales arti physici competentes, contained in two manuscripts of English provenance and almost certainly written during this period. 6 Thirty one out of forty-eight questions deal with medicine and anthropology, and its association with other purely medical tracts indicate that the disputations were probably copied or reported by a student in medicine, though it is not certain at which university. Frederick's decree, making three years study in logic a necessary preliminary to the study of medicine in Salerno, came into force about 1241/ but it is rather strange that not until 1280 do we have any definite evidence of disputations in that subject at Salerno. 8

S.F. Spieker, Dordrecht, 1978, pp. 29--40; C. Schmitt, "Philosophy and Science in Sixteenth Century Universities", Studies in Renaissance Philosophy and Science (1981), V, p. 488, and P. Kibre and N.G. Siraisi, "The Institutional Setting: the Universities", Science in the Middle Ages, ed. D.C. Lindberg, Chicago, 1978, pp. 120-44. 3 Kristeller, "Humanism and Scholasticism in the Italian Renaissance", Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters, Roma, 1956, pp. 275-76, and "Philosophy and Medicine" (1978), pp. 33-34. 4 Kristeller, "Philosophy and Medicine", ibid. For a comparison between the quaestiones disputatae in the medical faculties of Paris, Montpellier, and Bologna, see D: J acquart, "Les Disputes dans les Facultes de Medecine", Les Questions D1sputees (1985), pp. 239--99. 5 Kristeller, ibid; D. Jacquart, Le milieu medical en France du Xlle au XVe siecle, Geneve, 1981. 6 Lawn, Salemi tan Questions ( 1963), pp. 83-84. 7 Kristeller, "The School of Salerno", Studies (1956), p. 531. 8 Ibid., pp. 534--35, where he describes a document of 1280 concerning a magister Marencius who, having completed his studies in logic and medicine, and havin&" held disputations and given lectures, is now applying for a degree in med!cme.

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We do not find any large and important collections of medical quaestiones disputatae until around 1246-50 when Peter of Spain, the author of the influential Summulae logicales composed his voluminous commentaries on the Constantinian corpus of medical texts. 9 These were probably based on his lectures at Siena during this period. In his commentary on Isaac Israeli's De dietis Peter has a long discussion in the form of a scholastic disputation on the relation between the via experimenti and the via rationis or syllogistica. 10 After many pros and cons he concludes that the latter is the more certain because it is more universal and confirms the former. But he concedes that both procedures are necessary for investigating branches of medicine, such as diet, "As regards diet, the procedure to be followed by the doctor is twofold. One procedure concerns the effects of the diet on the body, and in pursuing this course experiment is more certain. The other is concerned with the causes of the effects, and proceeding in this way reasoning is more certain" . 11 At one stage of the debate it is asked how the via experimenti, described by Aristotle in the Posterior Ana[ytics, differs from that determined by medicine. To this question it is answered that "There is a certain kind of experiment which tells us those things which are enquired about in a (particular) science, such as medicine. There is another kind of experiment which tells us the principles from which a science is constructed. This is common to all sciences and is described by Aristotle in tiber posteriorum". 12 Elsewhere it is stated that both the via experimenti and the via rationis proceed from reason, for experience does not lack its reason, and as Galen says in the beginning of the Megategni, just as experiment without reason is weak, so is reason without the addition of experiment. 13 In this See Lawn, ibid., pp. 76-77. This disputation is printed in P. Manuel Alonso's edition of Peter's Scientia Libri de Anima, Madrid, 1941, pp. 33-38 using the text found in Opera Omnia lsaaci, Lyon, 1515, fol. XXXV and the manuscript version, Madrid, Bib!. Naz. 1877, fol. 239r. See Appendix 3. 11 Via rationis est certior quia universalior et certificans viam experimenti ... processus medici circa dietam est duplex. Quidam est circa impressiones quas derelinquit in corpore, et sic via experimenti certior est. Ali us est qui consistit circa causas impressionum, et sic via rationis certior est. Scientia libri, p. 38. 12 Est quedam via experimenti que notificat ea que in scientia inquiruntur et hec est medicina. Alia est via experimenti que notificat principia ex quibus scientia conficitur et hec est communis ad omnes scientias et hec assignatur ab Aristotele in libro posteriorum. Ibid., p. 37. 13 Sed via experimenti et rationis procedunt ratione, experientia enim non sua caret ratione sicut dicitur in littera. Dicit etiam Galenus in principia megategni quod sicut experimentum sine ratione debile est, ita ratio non iuncto sibi experimento. Ibid., p. 34. 9

10

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passage Peter actually equates experiment with experience, and there is little doubt that throughout the debate when he mentions experiment he means experience, thus following in the footsteps of Galen and of his contemporary in the Arts Faculty, Roger Bacon. Much has been written in recent years on the relation between "experiment" and "experience" in medieval and Renaissance times, notably by such scholars as the late Charles Schmitt and Brian Stock, and it is now generally agreed that there was no clear distinction between these two concepts in western medieval thought. 14 Certainly Peter's disputation on the subject would seem to confirm this and indicate the greater value he placed on logic in the investigation of phenomena, in this case medical. Another conclusion reached by modern scholars is that the experiment, or experience, or observation referred to by medieval writers such as Grosseteste, Roger Bacon, and one might add, Peter of Spain, bears no relation to the modern meaning of the term which signifies a preconceived experiment or observational procedure devised especially to test a particular theory or hypothesis. 15 As far as I know, no trace has yet been found of such experiments having been carried out in the medieval period, although, as we have seen, Grosseteste did point out the way to them with his universalia complexa experimentalia. 16 But what is most significant, I think, in Peter's disputation is the fact that, in the one place mentioned, he does, in fact differentiate between two kinds of experimentum. One is applicable to a particular science, such as medicine, which gives information through observing the effects of, say, a drug or a certain diet on a patient and which corresponds to experience or observation. The other is a more general via experimenti used for arriving at principles "from which a science is constructed", applicable to all sciences and described in the Posterior analytics. He must surely be referring to Analytica Post.l.31 (87b-88a), where it is said that "perception must be of a particular, whereas scientific knowledge involves the recognition of the commensurate universal. ... Hence it is clear that knowledge of things demonstrable 14 Schmitt, "Experience and Experiment: a Comparison of Zabarella's View with Galileo's in De Motu", Studies (1981) VIII, pp. 80--138; Brian Stock, "Experience, Praxis, Work and Planning in Bernard of Clairvaux", The Cultural Context of Medieval Learning, ed. J.E. Murdoch and E.D. Sylla, Dordrecht, 1975, pp. 223 ff and pp. 265--68 which contain the remarks of H. Oberman, C. Schmitt, and A. Sabra on this subject. 15 Schmitt, op.cit., VIII, p. 105; B.P. Copenhaver "Translation, Terminology, and Style in Philosophical Discourse", C.H.R.P., p. 110. 16 See supra, p. 26.

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cannot be acquired by perception, unless the term perception is applied to the possession of scientific knowledge through demonstration". It is clear, however, that Peter did not follow Grosseteste in developing this theory still further. Even though he knew the difference between experience or observation and the via experimenti based on the demonstrative knowledge described by Aristotle, he still continued to be confused in the definition of "experimentum" like so many other medieval writers. Like Peter of Spain, the Florentine physician, Taddeo Alderotti ( c.l2l 0-95) progressed towards medicine by way of logic. 17 His commentaries on Avicenna and the Galenic and Hippocratic works are full of scholastic quaestiones, doubtless the fruit of his lectures on medicine in Bologna, which started c.l260, and where he also lectured on logic. He also had a very lucrative medical practice, as his numerous consilia testify. One of his most important works was his Commentary in scholastic question form on the Tegni or Ars parva of Galen which he had begun early in his career ( c.l270) but did not finish until after 1285. His use of the Colliget of Averroes testifies to this, since the Latin translation of this work was not available before this date. In his Commentary on the Tegni Taddeo states the views of Galen, as interpreted by Haly ibn Ridwan (c.998-l061), regarding the method of resolution and composition. These identified doctrina resolutiva with demonstration a posteriori from observed sensible effects to a series of proximate causes until a final or principal cause is reached, and this process was termed demonstration quia and was a method of investigation and analysis which was used in the natural sciences (physica) and medicine. The second process was called doctrina compositiva and this began with the principal causes which are prior both in nature and to us (as in mathematics) and returned through intermediate causes until the immediate cause was reached, ending in the observed effect. This was called demonstration a priori or demonstration propter quid, and it was a method of synthesis. This process yields knowledge which is more perfect than that afforded by the former since it is more important and better to know an effect through its causes than to know a cause through its effect. It was used in the rational sciences and mathematics. 18 17 On Taddeo see Nancy Siraisi, Taddeo Alderotti and his Pupils: Two Generations of Italian Medical Learning, Princeton, 1981, Per-Gunnar Ottosson, Scholastic Medicine and Philosophy, Naples 1984, pp. 36-40, and Edocere Medicos (1988), pp. 59 ff. 18 See Ottosson, op.cit., pp. 101-07.

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All sorts of difficulties arose when writers tried to reconcile and harmonize these Galenic doctrines of method with seemingly conflicting views of Averroes. The latter in the Prohemium to his commentary on the Pfrysics of Aristotle had specified three kinds of doctrine used in all disciplines: l. Demonstration ofbeing (esse) or sign (signus) in which we start with effects which are known to us and proceed to a cause, and this can be related to demonstration quia. 2. Demonstration propter quid or of cause in which, as in physica, we start with what is first in nature but not for us. 3. Demonstration simpliciter of cause and being in which, as in mathematics, the causes are first both for us and in nature and cause and effect are both exactly known. 19 But Haly ibn Ridwan had related the Galenian doctrina resolutiva to the Aristotelian demonstration quia and then went on to say that it is the same as the "resolution of the geometers and the writers on the sciences". 20 This did not seem to agree with the views of Averroes and, in fact, gave rise to a difficulty which was to occupy the minds of philosophers for many years to come. Taddeo agreed in principle with the Galenian definition, but the fact that it equated doctrina resolutiva with mathematics and the rational arts worried him since it was clear that the latter only used demonstration propter quid which he wrongly identified with the demonstration simpliciter of Averroes. Taddeo got over this difficulty by a compromise, saying that there is a double action in the doctrina resolutiva, first a resolution from the effect to its principal cause, constituting a demonstration quia, and then a regressus or return from the discovered final or principal cause back to the effect, constituting demonstration propter quid. In other words he made the doctrina compositiva part of the doctrina resolutiva and, as it were, conflated the demonstration quia with the demonstration propter quid, calling the process a regressus. 21 This was an important concept which gave rise to much controversy during the following three centuries and had far-reaching results. I shall discuss some of these 19 Vie doctrine huius libri sunt species doctrine usitate in hac scientia et sunt modi omnium disciplinarum, scilicet signus, demonstratio cause et demonstratio simpliciter, quamvis signum et causa sint plus usitata in hac scientia, et aliquando est usitata demonstratio simpliciter. Averroes, Prohemium in Plrysica,'Venice, 1520, f. 10. See Ottosson, ibid., p. 104. 20 Et geometrae quidem et authores scientiarum sciunt hunc modum doctrinae, et Aristoteles quidem iam posuit ipsum in Ana{yticis, id est in libra Posteriorum. Hali in Parvam Galeni artem commentatio, Venice, 1557, f. 175v. See W.F. Edwards, "Niccolo Leoniceno and the origins of humanist discussion of method", Philosophy and Humanism (1976), p, 288. 21 See Ottosson, ibid., p. 122.

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results later on, after finishing my account of the Paduan philosopher-physicians. It should be noted that both Peter of Spain and Taddeo Alderotti also composed non-scholastic problemata consisting of simple quaestiones et responsiones. Those of the former have the title, 128 quaestiones secundum magistrum de Yspania, extant in several manuscripts. 22 Those of the latter were added to his commentary on the lsagoge of Ioannitius, the result of lectures and disputations held at Bologna c.l277. 23 This practice of combining the problem technique with the scholastic quaestio was probably more widespread than has been realised. Many of these problemata were Salernitan, like those added to the Quaestiones super de animalibus of Albertus Magnus based on his lectures at Cologne, given in 1258. 24 This is evidence of both the continuing influence of the Salernitan questions and the survival of the non-scholastic "problem" technique which continued to be used right through the medieval period up to the end of the seventeenth century. But there is also the possibility that in some cases where the answer only is given, without any argumentation, this represents the final determination of a master after a scholastic disputation has been held. In one manuscript of the Prose Salernitan Questions, Peter house 178 (13th c.), the title is Questiones sollempnes Salernitane where the word "sollempnes" probably indicates that the questions were debated in a disputatio ordinaria held in a medical faculty. 25 In the absence of any such indication it is sometimes difficult to determine the exact origin of the questions. Pupils of Taddeo Alderotti, such as Gulielmo Corvi of Brescia ( 1250-1326) and Bartolomeo de Varignana ( d.l318), carried on the dialectical procedures of the quaestio disputata of their master in their medical lectures at Bologna and in the writings which resulted from them. But these showed little originality and were not very influential. These words, however, do not apply to the writings of another pupil, Pietro Torrigiano de Torrigiani (Turisanus, d., c.l320) who taught theoretical medicine in Paris about 1305-19. 26 There is no evidence that he ever actually practised medicine, and after a time

See Lawn, Salernitan Questions ( 1963), pp. 77-78. Ibid., p. 86. Edition used, Venice 1527. The questions are listed in the Index, fol. 402r, but the work contains several other Salernitan questions besides those listed. 24 Lawn, ibid., pp. 85--86. 25 Ibid., p. 36. 26 Ottosson, op.cit., pp. 45 If. and Edocere medicos, pp. 56 If. 22

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he gave it up altogether to become a monk, probably entering the Carthusian order, hence the sobriquet, "monachus" often used by contemporary and subsequent writers when referring to his opinions. He appears to have left only two works, a long scholastic commentary on the Tegni of Galen, and a shorter De hypostasi urine. The former was one of the most elaborate and influential commentaries on this difficult text written during this period, and because of this it was known as, "Plusquam commentum". Gentile da Foligno, for instance, wrote a collection of quaestiones solely in order to criticise Torrigiano's views on certain problems, 27 and many other writers discussed his theories. Among the most controversial of these was the one which reversed the generally accepted views concerning the method of resolution and composition. Like Alderotti, Torrigiano did not agree with Galen's definitions, and for similar reasons, namely because he thought that the mathematical sciences use the doctrina resolutiva and a priori demonstration from principal causes (principia) to effects (principiata), and therefore they should be associated with demonstratio propter quid. But in natural philosophy (pfrysica) we use doctrina compositiva or demonstration a posteriori from observable effects to causes and principles, which is demonstratio quia. Therefore, in effect, he simply switched around or reversed the Galenic association of quia and propter quid with the respective doctrines of resolution and composition. Another factor which determined him to make this change was the fact that Aristotle's Posterior analytics dealt mostly with demonstratio propter quid, and analytica corresponded to resolutiva, hence he thought that doctrina resolutiva should be associated with demonstratio propter quid and not with demonstratio quia, as Galen had maintained. 28 Torrigiano illustrated his theories with examples taken from medicine, in the first place applying the doctrines of resolution and composition to show the successive causes of fever. In the second place he shows how, since in pfrysica what is a priori or the principal cause in nature is often unknown to us, we must therefore begin our investigations with a posteriori demonstration or demonstratio quia from effects more known to us. Especially is this the case, he says, in medicine where it is much easier to demonstrate from the observed signs or effects of a disease to the principal cause, than it is to demonstrate from the less obvious, or unknown cause, to the signs or effects. 29 27 28 29

Ottosson, ibid., p. 49. Ibid., pp. 109-10; 115-20. Ibid., p. 119.

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Another contemporary Paris master was the Paduan physician Pietro d' Abano ( c.l250-1316), whose vast Conciliator differentiarum philosophorum, was based on his lectures in the Medical Faculty at Paris during the period c.l290--1305. It was probably prepared and edited by Peter at a later date and was not published until 1310. Even if not quodlibetal in the strictest sense, the questions embrace almost every aspect of plrysica and are not dependent on particular books of the Aristotelian corpus. 30 Many of the questions are those which had already been disputed in the quodlibeta of such theologians as Giles of Rome, James of Viterbo, and Richard of Middleton, while there is also a fair sprinkling of older, Salernitan questions. Six questions about the elements are related to Aristotelian physics and there are a few questions about the soul and cosmology, but none dealing with zoology or meteorology. Thus the questions are, as we should expect, much more exclusively medical and anthropological than was the case in the earlier Salernitan collections and in the quodlibeta debated in the theology and arts faculties. Several questions deal with the action of magical images, incantations, fascination, numerology and astrology, reflecting Peter's interest in these occult subjects. As in the Paris codex mentioned earlier (Bibl. Nat. lat. 16089) which describes conditions in the Arts Faculty at about the same time that Peter was lecturing, we find in the Conciliator several references to mineralogy and alchemy, as well as many quotations from the ps. Aristotelian Problemata and De animalibus. By 1310 Peter had completed both a translation and a commentary on the Problemata, showing his continued interest in that work. 31 This commentary is also written in scholastic question form and here Peter discusses at length subjects to which he had given little or no attention in the Conciliator, such as arithmetic, geometry, music, geography, ethnology, and botany. Like Peter of Spain, Peter of Abano laid great stress on the use oflogic by the physician, saying that it was impossible to understand the art of medicine without the use of dialectic, unless one was a man of a quite extraordinary nature, like Hippocrates. 32 In addition, a physician must understand natural philosophy and astrology. "Those things however which are more necessary to medicine are these: logic since it acts in all sciences like the relish of salt in foods, natural 30 Lawn, ibid., p. 90; D. Jacquart, "Le Conciliator de Pierre d'Abano et son Influence", Les Questions Disputees, pp. 305-07. See Appendix 5. 31 Ibid., Chp. VII. 32 Edition used, Venice 1548. "lmpossibile sit comprehendere artem medicinae sine arte dialectica nisi fuerit homo excellentis naturae velut Hippocrates", Differentia I, fol. 3v N.

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science which exhibits its principles, and astrology which directs its judgements". 33 The whole of Differentia 2 is taken up with the praise of logic and the necessity of its use in all the sciences, including medicine, quoting Aristotle, Galen, and Arab authors, such as Haly ibn Abbas. Like Peter of Spain, he concludes that experience must be combined with reason in order to have a perfect knowledge of an illness or of the matter of its cure, and especially is this the case with regard to the rarer diseases. 34 Like Taddeo Alderotti and Torrigiano, Pietro shows a thorough understanding of the Galenic method of resolution and composition as modified by Haly and Averroes. 35 Thus he discusses the theory of a regressus as defined by Taddeo, but does not elaborate upon it or advocate it as a third method or procedure in order to arrive at scientific knowledge, as Taddeo does. Similarly he mentions all the arguments used by Torrigiano to reverse the Galenic associations of demonstratio quia and demonstratio propter quid but rejects them, thus keeping to the original definitions. Like Torrigiano, too, he uses the causes offever as an illustration of the application of this syllogistic method to medicine, but of course with an opposite terminology. 36 Thus there is clearly a very close relation between the views of these two men, but, as G. Ottosson has pointed out, there is no evidence that the one was influenced by the other, and both may have been repeating arguments which were well known at the time in university circles. 3 7 Throughout the fourteenth century there followed a succession of scholastic quaestiones on the constituents of the Constantinian corpus of translations, as well as on the more recently translated works of Avicenna and Galen. These were by such famous physicians as Gentile de Foligno (d.l348), Dina del Garbo (d.l327), and his son Tommaso (d.l370), and many more, some ofwhom have also left medical quodlibeta. 38 The tendency was for these questions to deal with the more practical aspects of medicine, as was the case with Dilf. I, fol. 4r D. Dilf. II, fol. 4v N, "Cum cognitio sola non sufficiat sensitiva, et maxime deficiunt circa raro contingentia". 35 Detailed in Dilf. VIII, fol. llv-14v, and see Randall, School of Padua (1961), pp. 28-35; Ottosson, op.cit., pp. 113-15, G. Papuli, "La Teoria del Regressus", Aristotelismo Veneto (1983), I, pp. 225-29, and Edocere medicos, pp. 65 If. 36 Dilf. VIII, fol. 12v L. Ottosson, op.cit., pp. 114-15. 37 Ottosson, op.cit., p. 116. Siraisi, thinks that "there are signs that they were aware of each other's opinion on the subject" Taddeo Alderotti (1981), p. 128. 38 For lists of these quodlibeta see, Thorndike, "Vatican medieval medical manuscripts", J.H.M., VIII ( 1953), pp. 263-83. All the manuscripts he discusses are 14th century or later. 33

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the quaestiones of Peter of Spain. Indeed, in the Conciliator at least half the number of questions dealt with pharmacology, dietetics, and the nature and cure of diseases. But towards the end of the century another very famous physician introduced new concepts into his medical quaestiones. This was Jacopo da Forli who, after teaching natural philosophy at Bologna from c.l385, went to Padua c.l400 where he lectured on the same subject until 1404. In this year he had to leave the city because of the war between the Carrara family and the Venetian Republic. But in 1407, the city being safely in Venetian hands, he was asked to return to lecture in medicine, and he remained there until his death in 1414. 39 As Clagett has said, there can be little doubt that Padua was at that time "the real heart of the study of English and French natural philosophy in Italy, followed closely by Bologna and later Pavia". 40 It is not surprising, therefore, that Jacopo had some knowledge of the Merton tradition with its logicomathematical outlook which, as we have seen, had been introduced there by the mid fourteenth century. Following Blasius of Parma, he was, in fact, convinced of the absolute certainty of mathematics as compared with the relative certainty of natural philosophy and metaphysics. 41 Through this belief he sought to justify the scientific standing of medicine which he conceived as a mathematical discipline. This discipline, he thought, could be used to calculate the equilibrium or middle state of a given complexio necessary to keep a person in perfect health-a theory which he developed in his Expositio et quaestiones on the fourth book of the Canon of Avicenna. 42 He also wrote a lengthy work entitled, De intensione et remissione formarum which again betrays his knowledge of the works of the Oxford logicians. In his commentary on the Tegni of Galen he examines in detail the attitudes of both Pietro d' Abano and Torrigiano towards the two demonstrations, quia and propter quid, refuting those arguments of the latter in favour of a reversal of the associations. Thus he finally adopts the usual procedures in methodology of Galen and Haly, without really adding any new concepts in this field. 43 39 On Jacopo see, Clagett, Science of Mechanics (1959), pp. 649-51; Ottosson, op.cit., pp. 53-58. 4 ° Clagett, op.cit., p. 650. 41 See supra, p. 59. 42 See Vescovini, "L'importanza della Matematica tra Aristotelismo e Scienze mod erne in alcuni filosofi Padovani della fine del secolo XV", Aristotelismo Veneto (1983), II, pp. 666-67. 43 On this aspect of J acopo's beliefs see, Randall, op.cit., pp. 35-36, and Ottosson, op.cit., pp. 110-13.

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Another very famous physician, a contemporary of Jacopo da Forli, was Ugo Benzi or Ugo da Siena (d.l439). 44 After lecturing in natural philosophy at several Italian universities, including Pavia, (where he also lectured on logic), Piacenza, Siena, Florence, Bologna, and Parma, he came to Padua in 1429, where he taught medicine for two years. In 1438 he was in Parma where he presided over a disputation between famous Greek and Latin philosophers about the respective merits of Plato and Aristotle. Taking the side of the Latins he vanquished the Greeks, thereby maintaining the supremacy of Aristotle. In the following year, being still at Parma, he died full of honour and renown. Ugo has left many Consilia and commentaries in the form of the scholastic quaestio on the works of Galen and Avicenna, and a work on logic, De logica artis ratione, written at Pavia in 1399. He often found himself in conflict with the opinions of his contemporaries, particularly with those ofjacopo da Forli whom he contradicts in his Expositio of Fen I of the Canon of Avicenna. This fact is stressed by Antonius Cittadinus in his prefatory material to the editio princeps of 1498. Addressing the scholarly reader, he says "Here you will find an outstanding authority on whom you can abundantly exercise your wits especially if you ever care to assail or withstand jacobus ofForli, a most subtle man and deservedly famous" .45 In fact a particular feature of the quaestiones of U go is that he compares the views of so many of his colleagues before giving his own, thus affording a good general view of contemporary thought on any given subject. In debating the question whether a young man is more temperate than a boy, for instance, he gives the opinions of Marsilius (Marsiglia da Santa Sofia, d. 1403-ll),Jacopo da Forli, and Conciliator (Pietro d'Abano). 46 Elsewhere in his Expositio on Avicenna we often find quoted Dino and Tommaso del Garbo, Gentile da Foligno, Antonius de Parma, and Torrigiano whom he sometimes refers to as monachus, and sometimes by the title of his principal work, Plusquam commentum. It is instructive to note how these Paduan physicians, because of their love of logic and natural philosophy, were seduced into debating problems in physica which had interested the Mertonians, although the question which had started the debate was a purely medical 44 On Ugo Benzi see, D.P. Lockwood, Ugo Benzi Medieval Philosopher and Physician, Chicago, 1951; Randall, op.cit., pp. 37-39. 45 "Habebitis scholastici praecipuum Auctorem quo ad exercendam animi sollertiam abunde uti possitis, maxime si quando Jacobum Forliviensem virum certe subtilem nee immerito celebratum impugnare vel contrastare placuerit". 46 Edition used, Expositio Ugonis Senensis in primam Fen primi Canonis Avicennae cum Quaestionibus eiusdem, Venice, 1518. Fen I, Doc. 3, fol. 20v.

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one. Thus, for example, Ugo in his Expositio on Avicenna, in a question about the two-fold motion of the pulse, enters a long debate about contrary motions and a quies media, quoting Marsiglia da Santa Sofia, Jacopo da Forli, Dino del Garbo, and the Mertonian, Walter Burley. 47 But it must be confessed that at the end of this particular debate he says that he will not enlarge upon this subject any further because it is a long way from that ofmedicine. 48 In another question in the same book about complexions, "Whether in qualities there is a middle one equidistant in degrees between the extreme of the human complexion towards warmth and the extreme towards cold, and similarly with regard to moist and dry", he talks about latitudes of temperaments and latitudes of health, and even of life itself, in a way very reminiscent of the Mertonian nomenclature. 49 It is also noteworthy that, although he quotes Tommaso del Garbo in this question, he does not quote Jacopo da Forli whose mathematical bias towards a similar question we have already noted, 50 a bias towards which Ugo did not, perhaps, feel quite so sympathetic. U go also wrote an Expositio of the Tegni of Galen in which he gives a very full account of the three doctrinae ordinariae, two demonstrative, resolutiva and compositiva, and the doctrina dijfinitiva, contrasting the opinions of Pietro d'Abano and Torrigiano on these topics. 5 1 As Randall pointed out long ago, Ugo stressed the fact that to arrive at a complete knowledge of a science like natural philosophy (physica) or medicine, it is impossible to arrive at true conclusions by using only one of these demonstrative doctrines, both must be used that is demonstratio quia and demonstratio propter quid. 52 Thus he was among the first to recognize a double procedure in which the cause became the middle term of a syllogism. EFFECT (quia)-CAUSE (propter quid)-EFFECT One part of the procedure is the discovery of the middle term or cause through resolution, the other part is the notification of its effects through composition. As an example of the use of this method in medicine, U go traces the causes and effects of fever, an illustration which had proved very popular with the Paduan physiFen II, Doc. 3, fol. 79v. Ibid. 49 Fen I, Doc. 3, fol. lOr. 50 See supra, p. 76. 51 Edition used, Expositio Ugonis Senensis super libros Tegni Galeni, Venice 1518. 52 Randall, op.cit., pp. 37-38, quoting the Commentary on Lib. primus, fol. 2v. See also, Edocere medicosi, p. 71. 47

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cians, since it had been used before by Pietro d'Abano, Jacopo da Forli, Torrigiano and others. 53 But it should be noted that this syllogistic procedure was never used as a method of diagnosis or for the discovery of new knowledge, but solely for the organization and analysis of established knowledge and things already known. These views of U go Benzi, first noted by Randall, are the ones which have been stated by nearly all scholars who have mentioned him in recent years, such as W.A. Wallace, P.L. Drew, and G. Ottosson. 54 But as long ago as 1951 Dean P. Lockwood, in his exhaustive study ofBenzi had drawn attention to the fact that Ugo had revised his earlier opinions, and had quoted a passage at the end of the Expositio of Book I of the Tegni. 55 In this passage Ugo says that, having studied Galen's De compositione artis medicinae, he had come to the conclusion that what he had previously stated, namely that in doctrina compositiva only one kind of demonstration should be used, and in doctrina resolutiva again only one kind, was not true. He points out that in the De compositione Galen teaches first, the method of finding out the end or goal of the particular science being studied and then, by demonstrations quia and propter quid, how to break the science down into its parts so that we can arrive at a universal knowledge of that science, viewing it as a whole. As examples he gives first, that of the builder who, with the object of building a house, by doctrina resolutiva breaks the house down into its parts, roof, walls, foundations, even the smallest parts, and then that of the physician whose goal is to cause and maintain health. In order to perform this task the physician should know beforehand in which parts health consists, and according to what natures in the human body, both in complexion, composition, and unity. This knowledge is obtained by knowing the organic and simple members from which the body is formed, the operations and uses of the aforesaid members, and also the humors and elements which compose them. Again, in order to arrive at this kind of knowledge, demonstration is needed, whether it be quia or propter quid. Also, if a particular thing is only known by using the senses,

Ugo, op.cit., fol. 3r, and see supra pp. 73, 75. Wallace, Causality and Scientific Explanation, Ann Arbor, 1972, p. 127; Drew, "Some notes on Zabarella's and Cremonini's interpretation of Aristotle's philosoph_{, of nature", Aristotelismo Veneto (1983), II, p. 649; Ottosson, op.cit., p. 123. 5 Lockwood, op.cit., pp. 223-24. Ugo, op.cit., Commentary on Liber primus, fol. 12'. Papuli's interpretation of Ugo's theories of "regressus" in his, "La teoria del'regressus" Aristotelismo Veneto 1983, I, pp. 230-31, does not seem to me to be compatible with either U go's original theory or his later, revised one. 53

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Galen teaches us how we should examine it through the senses, and similarly if it is known by other means, we should examine it in different ways so that we can arrive at a knowledge of particular principles ( cognitionem particularium principiorum). U go interprets this to mean that in doctrina resolutiva we should not only employ one kind of demonstration, but different kinds, both of demonstrations and definitions, different ways of searching for them, and different positions, divisions, and other suitable parts which logic teaches us. We must act in this way in order to complete the doctrina resolutiva which in the first place came about through a knowledge of the goal of that particular science. Applying this to medicine, he goes on to say that in order to perfect one's knowledge of medicine, taken as a whole, it is necessary to proceed from the composite in the members of the body, and in health, to simpler things by a process of dissolution, not of the whole into its integral parts, but of the genus into its species. Thus, from the methods of preserving health and protection from disease which show us the parts of the science of medicine, we are taught to arrive at demonstrations and other matters which are useful for arriving at a sure knowledge of the complete science of medicine. U go ends by saying that Galen is here speaking of a universal order and is considering the science of medicine in its totality. But this knowledge cannot be acquired by only one method of demonstration, because through demonstration quia we cannot know through what particular cause a thing exists and in medicine we cannot always proceed by demonstration propter quid. Therefore through neither of these two doctrines, taken by themselves, can we arrive at a universal knowledge of medicine. U go, therefore, does seem to have revised his earlier opinion involving a double procedure and the discovery of a middle term in order to arrive at a conclusion, and to be advocating the use of other methods of investigation. The important thing is that, although some of these methods may be logical, others such as those dealing with sensory material, are not. This, I think, foreshadows methods of investigation which developed much later in the sixteenth century. It is now necessary to say something, however briefly, about the fate of the concept of regressus which played such a large part in the controversies of the 15th, 16th and 17th centuries which were usually published in the form of the quaestio disputata or embedded in commentaries. W.F. Edwards has said that Taddeo Aldarotti was the first to have introduced this concept into scientific demonstration in an attempt to provide medicine with the same reliability

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as that found in the mathematical sciences, and we have seen how he tackled this problem. 56 Rather exaggerated claims were made for the regressus concept by Cassirer, J.H. Randall, and A.C. Crombie who were among the first to draw attention to it, so that it suffered a partial eclipse in the eyes of the learned world. But in recent years it has received fresh impetus through the studies of such scholars as W.F. Edwards, N.W. Gilbert, G. Papuli, A. Crescini, E. Berti, and G. Ottosson. 57 It now seems clear that the concept of regressus and the controversies that surrounded it, even if not leading directly to the experimental methods of Galileo, as Crombie thought, had considerable influence on the methodology of important later seventeenth-century thinkers, such as Hobbes, Descartes and Harvey. The concept achieved its greatest and most clear elaboration at the hands of the Paduan philosopher Giacomo Zabarella (1533--89), and it was chiefly through his writings, not in the form of the quaestio disputata, that regressus influenced later writers on method. 58 The clearest statement of Hobbes on this subject occurs in his Elements of Philosophy ( 1655). There he describes a method of "invention" and a method of "teaching" or demonstration. In the former he distinguishes between a method of "division" or "resolution" which he calls "analysis", and a method of "composition" which he calls "synthesis". He explains the analytical method as a way of proceeding from a knowledge of sensible objects to the invention of principles, which corresponds to the Aristotelian and Galenian doctrina resolutiva. The synthetical method, on the other hand, is one which proceeds from primary causes to the observed 56 W.F. Edwards, "Randall on the Development of Scientific Method in the School of Padua: a continuing Reappraisal", Naturalism and Historical Understanding: Essays on the Philosophy ofjohn Hermann Randall Jr. ed. J.P. Anton, Buffalo, 1976, pp. 56 & 63, quoted by Ottosson, ibid., p. 121. 57 E. Cassirer, Das Erkentnisproblem in der Philosophie und Wissenschaft, New York, 1966; Randall, School of Padua (1961); A.C. Crombie, Robert Grosseteste (1963). Besides the already mentioned works of Edwards, Ottosson and Edocere medicos, there are N.W. Gilbert, "Galileo and the School ofPadua",j.H.P., I (1963), pp. 223-31 and his Renaissance Concepts of Method, New York, 1960; Giovanni Papuli, "La teoria del regressus come metodo scientifico negli autori della Scuola di Padova", Aristotelismo Veneto (1983) I, pp. 221-77; A. Crescini, "La teoria del regressus di fronte all' epistemologia moderna", Aristotelismo Veneto, II, pp. 575-90; E. Berti, "Differenza tra il metodo resolutivo degli Aristotelici e Ia 'resolutio' dei matematici", Aristotelismo Veneto, I, pp. 435-57; N. Jardine, "Epistemology of the Sciences", C.H.R.P., pp. 686 if. 58 See W.F. Edwards, "Paduan Aristotelianism and the Origins of Modern Theories of Method", Aristotelismo Veneto, I, pp. 208 if.

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effect, and this corresponds to doctrina compositiva. 59 These doctrines were elaborated in great detail by Zabarella in his De regressu who, however, avoided the use of Greek terminology and instead of "analysis" and "synthesis" used "resolutiva" and "compositiva". We find the same general theory of method in Descartes as in Hobbes. He too refers to analytic and synthetic methods and stresses that the latter was the one exclusively used by the ancient geometers. Descartes himself, on the other hand, thought very highly of the analytic method, saying that it was "the best and truest method of teaching and the one he employed in his Meditations". 50 As regards Harvey (1578-1637), in the words ofCharles Schmitt "the general tone of the preface to his Exercitationes de generatione animalium (1650) is a mixture of radical Aristotelian empiricism ... mixed with the recommendations on method made in Zabarella's Opera logica (1578). 61 Thus he insists that the only true road to scientific knowledge consists in our proceeding from the more known to the less known and from a knowledge of the obvious to that of the obscure, statements resembling the oft-repeated assertions of the Paduan philosopher-physicians. But he transformed these concepts into a radically empirical way of thinking which bore fruitful results in later seventeenth-century methodology. 62 Thus, although the concept of regressus made important contributions in this limited field, it did not lay the foundations of the experimental science of the seventeenth century which relied much more heavily on mathematics. Real progress in this field did not come until scholars had access to sources of Greek mathematics, and this did not happen until about 1589 when Commandino translated into Latin the Quaestiones mathematicae of Pappus. Only then was Galileo able to take the final steps in integrating the mathematical analyses of the Greek geometers and mathematicians with his own empirical observation and experimentation. 63 There is really no need to pursue further the fortunes of the Edwards, ibid., pp. 211-215. Ibid., pp. 215-218. 61 C. Schmitt, "Aristotelianism in the Veneto and the Origins of Modern Science", The Aristotelian Tradition and Renaissance Universities, London. 1984, I, pp. 118 ff. 62 Ibid., p. 121. 63 On Galileo and regressus see John H. Randall Jr., "Paduan Aristotelianism Reconsidered", Philosophy and Humanism (1976), pp. 275-82; G. Papuli, op.cit., pp. 268-72; Wallace, "Aristotelian lnftuencies on Galileo's Thought", Aristotelismo Veneto (1983) I, pp. 349-78. On Galileo's use of Pappus and classical Greek mathematics see E. Berti, "Differenza trail metodo resolutivo degli Aristotelici e Ia 'resolutio' dei matematici" ibid., I, pp. 449-57; L. Olivieri, "La Problematica del 59 60

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quaestio disputata as used by the physicians in the fourteenth century. Enough has been said to show that it was very widely used, both in commentaries, expositions, quaestiones and quodlibeta, always in combination with logical methods stemming from Galen and the Arabs. Also, if the physicians did not actually use the disputatio de sophismatibus, it seems likely that at least some of them were acquainted with the work done by the Mertonians who used this form of disputation. Students generally had to be proficient in artibus before taking a degree in medicine and so would already have had instruction in disputing de sophismatibus. To conclude this brief account, one might say, with some justice, that just as the quaestio disputata reached the height of its perfection in the field of theology in the thirteenth century, so it reached its apogee in the field of medicine in the fourteenth. In the next century, however, this form of exposition began to decline in popularity in medical circles. Thus Antonio Guaineri ( d.l448), one of Jacopo da Forli's pupils, wrote a Practica and a Commentary on the Almansor of Rhazes both entirely devoid of scholastic disputations. Another pupil, Michael Savonarola ( d.l462) favoured practice more than theory. 64 A little later the statutes of the University of Padua specified that students were, "to practice medicine for at least a year with a famous physician and to visit the sick", before being granted the degree. 65 In the sixteenth-century commentaries and explanations of the medical works of Avicenna and Galen continued to be written, mainly by Italian physicians. 66 But for the most part these did not include scholastic quaestiones disputatae. If questions were discussed they were answered without argument, by giving the opinions of earlier writers, contrasting them with those of Avicenna and Galen, and finally with those of the author himself. Thus the commentary on the Canon of Avicenna by the Paduan humanistphysician Giambatista da Monte (Montanus, 1498-1551), a pupil of Leoniceno and a skilled translator from the Greek, is very much Rap porto senso-discorso tra Aristotele, Aristotelismo e Galilei", ibid., II, p. 775; Kristeller, "Aristotelismo e sincretismo nel pensiero di Pietro Pomponazzi", ibid., 109c 4 ' H T lb II,6 p·see . " , 1n . Sczence .. ..a ot, "M ed'ICine zn the M'ddl z e Ages, ed. L.1n db erg, Chicago, 1978, p. 419. 65 Statuta Dominorum Artistarum Universitatis Patavinae, Venice, c.l496,28v; and see Schmitt, "Philosophy and Science in Sixteenth-Century Universities", Studies (1981), pp. 504 & 527. 66 On these numerous commentaries see Nancy G. Siraisi's Avicenna in Renaissance Italy. The Canon and Medical Teaching in Italian Universities after 1500. Princeton University Press, 1987.

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in the form of a treatise, divided into chapters and entirely without scholastic disputations. 67 Also in his book of Problemata on medical and physical subjects he adopts the simple ps.-Aristotelian questionand-answer technique followed by so many sixteenth-century humanists. 5 8 It thus came about that, although the printing presses continued to pour out edition after edition of older medical texts containing scholastic quaestiones throughout the later fifteenth and first half of the sixteenth century, fewer original texts of this kind were produced during this period, and no important innovations in the technique of the medical quaestiones were made. The era of "scholastic medicine" was drawing to a close.

Siraisi, op.cit., pp. 194-96. Problematum partim physicorum partim medicorum . .. tiber unus. Witerbergae 1590. Copy in National Library of Medicine, Bethesda, Maryland. Durling, Catalogue No. 3246. Not mentioned in my Salernitan Questions, Oxford 1963 or in the Italian translation, I Quesiti Salernitani, Di Mauro editore, 1969. 67

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QUAESTIONESDISPUTATAE IN PHYSICA DURING THE LATE FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH CENTURIES 1. Disputations in Italy With the advance of the fifteenth century and the rise of humanism various new factors began to influence the use of the scholastic quaestio. Among the most important were the increased knowledge of Greek texts, especially those of Aristotle and his Greek commentators and of Plato and the neo-Platonists, the humanist tendency to use the dialogue, the treatise, oration or letter to expound ideas, and the radical changes in the very nature of these ideas, and of the kinds of questions which they asked. In Padua the Merton tradition was still studied during most of this period, but with increasing adverse criticism. Thus the Venetian Senate decreed in 1487 that no other work than Heytesbury's Sophismata should be assigned in logic without consultation of the Senate, 1 and the Statute of 1496 named Heytesbury's work and the Logica of Paul ofVenice among the standard texts for the School of Logic, 2 whilst in Padua the Schola sophisticae was not discontinued until 1560. 3 These tendencies are well illustrated in the case of Nicoletta Vernia ( 1426-99), who was taught natural philosophy by Gaetano da Thiene and logic by Paul of Venice. 4 He held the first chair of philosophy in Padua and taught there for thirty years. During this time he had as pupils such famous scholars as Pietro Pomponazzi ( 1462-1525), Giovanni Pi co della Mirandola ( 1463-94), and Agostino Nifo (14 70-1538). He also maintained a friendship with the

J.

F acciolati, F asti gymnasii patavini, Padua 1 757, II, p. 114. Ibid., p. 118. 3 Ibid., III, pp. 309-12, and see Curtis Wilson, op.cit., p. 27. 4 On Vernia see, C.H. Lohr, "Medieval Latin Aristotle Commentaries", Traditio 28 (1972), pp. 308-11, and especially, the two articles by Bruno Nardi in his Saggi sull' Aristotelismo Padovano del secolo xiv al xvi, Florence, 1958, "La miscredenza e il carattere morale di Nicoletto Vernia", pp. 95-114, and "Ancora qualche notizia e aneddoto su Nicoletto Vernia", pp. 115-26; E.P. Mahoney, "Philosophy and Science in Nicoletto Vernia and Agostino Nifo", Scien::.a e Filosofia (1983), pp. 135-202, and the same author's "Nicoletto Vernia on the Soul and Immortality", Philosophy and Humanism" (1976), pp. 144--63. 1

2

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humanist Ermolao Barbaro ( 1454-93). He used the scholastic question-form for most of his writings, and reportationes of many of his lectures and disputations still remain in manuscript, but some were printed during his life-time. Among these is the Quaestio de gravibus et levibus ( 14 74) in which he disagrees with the "terminists" such as Albert of Saxony, Walter Burley and his master, Gaetano da Thiene, and shows his adherence to the doctrines of A verroes and Albertus Magnus. In 1480 he finished his question on the subject of natural philosophy (an ens mobile sit totius naturalis philosophie subiectum), in which he again rejects the opinions of Gaetano and this time of Paul of Venice as well. During this period he also wrote a Questio de unitate intellectus, still only in manuscript. 5 In this, although his main concern is to refute the Averroistic doctrine of the unity of the intellect, he also discusses problems relating to infinity and velocity, quoting Swineshead, whom he calls "Calculator", and Heytesbury, referred to as, "Prince of Sophists". 6 Early in his career Nicoletta had visited Pavia to study the works of Swineshead under Giovanni Marliani. 7 His own manuscript copy of the Liber calculationum still exists in the Bibl. Nazionale at Rome. 8 Another manuscript containing works by Heytesbury and notes in the hand ofVernia, is to be found in the Bodleian library, Oxford. 9 In 1482 Vernia wrote a short treatise on the division of the sciences and a scholastic question on whether medicine is more excellent than civil law, both appended to the 1482 Venice edition of Walter Burley's Super octo libros physicorum which he had agreed to edit. 10 In these Vernia uses for the first time the work of a Greek commentator on Aristotle, namely the paraphrase of Aristotle by Themistius in the translation of his friend Ermolao Barbaro. It is not surprising that Vernia tries to show the superiority of medicine, basing his belief, among other arguments, on the superiority of the demonstrative method used in medicine which employs both demonstrations, quia and propter quid, with full knowledge of the consequences. On the other hand he maintained that the study of civil law rests on authority, and although lawyers may sometimes demonstrate, they are unaware that they are doing so, and so never attain true "scientia". 5 Bib!. Naz. Marciana, cod. Lat. vi, 105 (2656), ff. 156'-160v. For a discussion of this treatise see, Mahoney, "Philosophy and Science in Vernia and Nifo", pp. 145--51. 6 See Mahoney, op.cit., p. 151. 7 See Clagett, Giovanni Marliani and late medieval physics, New York, 1941. 8 Bib!. Naz. Centrale Vittorio Emanuele II, fondo Vittorio Emanuele, cod. 250. 9 Bodleian library, Canonici Misc. Lat. 409. 10 See Mahoney, op.cit., pp. 155--59.

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One of the favourite methods of exposition used by Vernia was to contrast the opinions of the Arabs, the Greeks and the Latins, and this he does in a question about universals written in 1492 (An dentur universalia realia). First he lists opinions against those of Aristotle and Averroes, secondly he explains exactly what these two philosophers said, and in the third place he replies to the objections brought against them. Here he refers again to the Greek commentators, calling them the "true Peripatetics" (ad mentem virorum veriorum peripateticorum), quoting Alexander of Aphrodisias, Themistius and Simplicius.ll An interesting glimpse of Vernia's views on the uses of disputation as a teaching method is afforded by his remarks in the treatise he wrote in answer to the accusation by Pietro Barozzi, the bishop of Padua, that he had spread the Averroistic doctrine of the unity of the intellect throughout almost all Italy. In this work, (Contra perversam Averrois opinionem de unitate intellectus et de animae felicitate), published in 1504 but probably finished in 1494, Vernia strongly denies that he ever believed in this doctrine, "though", he says, "he occasionally lectured on it for the sake of disputation and in order to sharpen the intellectual abilities of his students" . 12 Much more favourable to the ideas of the Mertonians was Vernia's contemporary, Alessandro Achillini (1463-1512). 13 He too was a staunch Averroist and in 1494 presided over a quodlibetal dispute at Bologna which was published there in the same year with the title, De intelligentiis quolibeta in quibus quid Commentator et Aristoteles senserint et in quo a veritate deviaverint continetur. In this he defends ten theorems propounded by Siger of Brabant in his De intellectu. The first quolibet discussed was "whether the latitude of Ibid., pp. 161-65. Ibid., pp. 168-73; Nardi, "La miscredenza e il carattere morale di Nicoletto Vernia", Saggi (1958), pp. 108-09. Vernia's treatise was printed with the Quaestiones supra libros de physica of Albert of Saxony, Venice, 1516, and this is the edition which I have used. The passage under discussion is found in the dedicatory epistle to Cardinal Domenico Grimani, fol. 83', and reads as follows, "Nam cum in gymnasio, ut crebro fieri consuevit disputandi ac acuendi ingenii gratia, falsam illam et ab omni veri tate alienam opinionem Averrois de unico intellectu nonnunquam argumentis confirmare tentaverim". 13 On Achillini see, Bruno Nardi, "I Quolibeta de intelligentiis di Alessandro Achillini", Saggi sull' Aristotelismo Padovano (1958), pp. 179-223, and the same author's "Appunti sull' Averroista Bolognese Alessandro Achillini", ibid., pp. 225-79; H.S. Matsen, Alessandro Achillini (1463-1612) and his Doctrine of "Universals" and "Transcendentals", Lewisburg, Pa. 1974; Ibid., "Student's 'Arts' disputations at Bologna around 1500 illustrated from the career of Alessandro Achillini", History of Education 6 ( 1977), pp. 169-81. On Achillini's works on Anatomy, Physiognomy and Chiromancy, see L. Thorndike, H.M.E.S., V. (1941), chp. 3 "Achillini Aristotelian and Anatomist". 11

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intellects is uniformly difform", and he attempts to measure the grades of intensity of intelligence in much the same way as the Mertonians tried to measure the intensities of material qualities, such as velocity, temperature, and colour. 14 Also, in his De proportione motuurn, written during his last years and published posthumously in 1515 at Bologna, he tries to reconcile the rules of proportion found in Aristotle, Physica, VII, concerning force, resistance and velocity, with the theories of the Calculators. In this tract he shows a thorough knowledge of the writings of Mertonians such as Bradwardine, Heytesbury, and Swineshead, and of those of their Parisian followers, Oresme and Albert of Saxony. 15 In contrast to Vernia, Achillini never learnt Greek and relied completely on medieval Latin translations of Aristotle. Also, although he lectured on the libri naturales, he never published any commentaries on them, because he considered that the numerous commentaries by Greek, Arab, and Latin authors that were in everybody's hands were quite sufficient. 16 He graduated in medicine in 1494 and lectured on theoretical medicine in Bologna soon afterwards and again during his last years, after 1500, but, as far as it is known, never practised and left few writings on this subject. A commentary on Avicenna Canon, lib. IV, fen l, still exists only in manuscript, and his Annotationes anatomicae were published after his death by his brother in 1520, but his De subiecto physionomiae et chiromanticae and his De subiecto medicinae have little to do with the practice of medicine. From 1505 to 1508 he was in Padua, teaching natural philosophy, where it was the custom for the masters to have an adversary or "concurrens" who held opposite views, lecturing at the same time. During this period his concurrens was Pietro Pomponazzi ( 1462-1525). As is well known, a bitter rivalry and animosity arose between them, not only with respect to the Averroistic doctrines of the unity 14 On this question see Nardi, "I quolibeta", pp. 182-93. The fourth quolibet is "quarti quolibet conclusio est, intellectus agens est extremum intensissimum latitudinis intellectuum. Opera omnia, Venice, 1545, f. 16'. The fifth quolibet has "conclusio responsiva ad quaesitum, latitudo intellectuum non est uniformiter difformis quia si sic, una intelligentia aliam indivisibiliter excederet". Ibid., f. 20vA. 15 Hae regulae modernis fere omnibus quo legerim de proportione proportionum loquentibus contrariae sunt. Ideo advertendae ut Thomae Badvardino (Bradwardine) et consequenter Suiset, Calculator, Nicolao Orem etc. Ibid., f.I8YA. Et in hoc vide modernos, Paulum Venetum, Albertutium (Albert of Saxony), Thomam Badvardinum etc. f.l8T A. Further on Achillini quotes Calculator (Swineshead), De motu localis and explains how his own views on the subject differ from those of the Mertonian, ff.l90vA-191 'A. See Nardi, "Appunti", p. 262. 16 See Nardi, ibid., p. 261.

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of the intellect, but also concerning the theories of the Mertonians and "Calculators" whom Pomponazzi strongly opposed. Probably the first evidence of Pomponazzi's aversion to the doctrines of the Mertonians (Swineshead and Heytesbury) is to be found in his De maximo et minima written between 1490 and 1496 while he was staying at the palace of Girolamo Donato in Padua, and based on private discussions held between himself, Donato and Lorenzo da Molino. 17 In 1496 Pomponazzi left Padua to join the court of Prince Alberto Pia at Carpi and Ferrara, and while he was there he presided over a course of logic in which he again discussed the doctrines of the Mertonians and lectured on the Peri hermeneias and Posterior analytics, his lecture notes still remaining in manuscript at Bologna. 18 He also wrote during this period a Questio de motu gravium et levium in connection with lectures on the Physica. But perhaps his most severe criticism of the Mertonians occurs in his De intensione et remissione formarum written in 1514. 19 In this he says that, "the calculationes of Calculator scarcely merit the name of science, but constitute an illegitimate cross between physica and mathematics which is more mathematical than physical. The wonder is that his followers who claim to be natural philosophers, metaphysicians, and physicians, have failed to see his many errors, for there are many more errors than words". 2° Further disagreement and criticism is to be found in his Quaestio de reactione written in the following year. 21 In spite of this adverse criticism, however, Pomponazzi discussed the theories of Swineshead in great detail in the above-mentioned works, and, as Christopher Lewis has pointed out, the latter work in particular was a main source for Mertonian ideas concerning action and reaction during the later sixteenth century. It was extensively used by such writers as Francesco Piccolomini, Zabarella, Toledo, Buonamici, and Scipione Chiaramonte. 22 Nardi, Studi su Pietro Pompona::;zi, Florence 1965, pp. 61-63; See Appendix 7. Bib!. Univ. di Bologna, cod. 301 (cod. lat. 213 in the Frati catalogue). See Nardi, op.cit., pp. 63-64. 19 See Curtis Wilson, "Pomponazzi's criticism of Calculator", Isis, vol. 44 (1953), pp. 355-62. 20 Sunt etenim huiusmodi scientie (si nomen scientie merentur) medie inter physicas et mathematicas, et magis appellantur mathematice quam physice. Quare non est mirandum de isto Calculatore quod erraverit, cum non fuerit cuiuslibet scientie expertus. Sed mirum est de suis imitatoribus qui profitentur se physicos, metaphysicos, et medicos, et non viderint tantos errores in homine, nam multo plura sunt errata quam verba'. Curtis Wilson, op.cit., pp. 360--61. 21 See Christopher Lewis, The Merton Tradition, (1980), pp. 31-32. 22 Lewis, ibid., pp. 75, 136, 178, 227, 230. 17

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Pomponazzi also had a good deal to say about regressus as a form of scientific investigation in his quaestio, "Utrum detur regressus", which formed part of the reportationes of his lectures on the De anima given at Padua in the autumn of 1503. This question was described and analysed by A. Poppi in 1970 and edited by him in the same yearY Randall says little about this aspect of Pomponazzi's activity, perhaps because he had not then examined the manuscript, but in a recent work Giovanni Papuli discusses in detail Pomponazzi's views on regressus as well as those of several other Paduan philosopher-physicians on the same subject. 24 From this account it would seem that Pomponazzi favoured the union of the two demonstrations, quia and propter quid, in order to form a regressus demonstrativus, but also advocated their separate use in certain cases. The former demonstration, he maintained, should be used for the investigation of things unknown, and the latter for the systemization of knowledge already gained. He also firmly believed, because of his leaning towards naturalism, that demonstratio propter quid could not claim to reduce all scientific knowledge to an a priori procedure based entirely on the intelligible, completely rejecting the sensible or distorting the information supplied by the senses. In other words, following the Thomist dictum of, "nihil est in intellectu quod prius non fuerit in sensu", he thought that all logical proceedings must primarily make an appeal to the "sensatum" in all cases where the enquiry is about natural phenomena. As for mathematics, it is not surprising to learn, considering his hostility to Calculator, that Pomponazzi took little interest in the developments in that line that were taking place at Padua during the early part of the sixteenth century. In fact he often referred to the "speculative inferiority" of the mathematical sciences as compared with physics and metaphysics, and held that the science of the soul, psychology, was in a middle position between metaphysics and mathematics. 25 Unlike his teacher Vernia, Pomponazzi never learnt Greek and did not seem to share the humanist's desire to obtain a better text of Aristotle, philologically more correct and closer to the original. But 23 A. Poppi, Saggi sul Pensiero inedito di Pietro Pomponazzi Padua, 1970, pp. 121 If.; Corsi inediti di Pietro Pomponazzi dell'Insegnamento Padovano, ed. A. Poppi, II, Padova, 1970, "Quaestiones physicae et animasticae decem ( 1499--1504). 24 Papuli, "La teoria del' regressus", Aristotelismo Veneto, ( 1983) I, pp. 233-35, and see also, A. Poppi, Saggi (1970), "Pietro Pomponazzi tra Averroismo e Galenismo sui Problema del regressus", pp. 117-37. 25 On this aspect of Pomponazzi's thought, see L. Olivieri, "La scientificita della teoria dell'anima nell'insegnamento Padovano di Pietro Pomponazzi", Scienza e Filosofia, (1983), p. 210.

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it is important to remember that he used a great deal the new translations of Alexander of Aphrodisias, and that on one occasion at Ferrara he asked for a passage of Philoponus to be translated for him. 26 Although the bulk of Pomponazzi's writings, lecture notes and reportationes on the Aristotelian corpus are in scholastic question-form, he does not always follow this rigid, syllogistic pattern. In the De immortalitate animae ( 1516) and the De naturalium elfectuum causis sive de incantationibus ( 1520), he adopts the more discursive form of the learned treatise used by so many of the humanists. He betrays humanist tendencies too in his choice of subjects for discussion, the nature of the soul, the cause of happiness, the dignity of man, fate and free will, occult phenomena, magic and incantations. Also, even in the midst of scholastic reasoning and argument in a treatise such as the De jato, we find the famous passage likening the philosopher to Prometheus written in true humanist style. 27 He was familiar with the works of Cicero and Epictetus, Plato and Plotinus, all dearly loved by the humanists, and knew well the writings of Ficino and Pico, so that he may truly be said to be typical of that transitional period between scholasticism and humanism, "the last of the Scholastics and the first man of the Enlightenment", as he has been called. 28 Another pupil ofVernia was Agostino Nifo of Sessa (1470--1538) who, although he may have been considered by some to be loquacious, confused, and variable in his opinions, 29 yet was a man of vast learning, held in very high esteem in his day, and whose writings had considerable influence in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. 30 He shows to an even greater extent than 26 P.O. Kristeller, "Aristotelismo e Sincretismo nel Pensinero di Pietro Pomponazzi", Aristotelismo Veneto (1983) II, p. 1084. 27 Petri Pomponati Mantuani Libri Quinque de Fato, De Libera Arbitrio et de Praedestinatione, ed. Richard Lemay, Lugano, 1957, p. 262; Kristeller, op.cit., p. 1085. 28 The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. E. Cassirer, P.O. Kristeller, and J.H. Randalljr., Chicago, 1948, pp. 267-68. See also O.P. Kristeller, Eight Philosophers of the Renaissance, London, 1965, 5 "Pomponazzi", pp. 72-90 for Pomponazzi's relations with Ficino and Pico. 29 A.H. Douglas, The Philosophy and Psychology of Pietro Pomponaz;:.i, Cambridge, 1910, p. 60, "Niphus was a frivolous and probably insincere writer". Eugenio Garin, Italian Humanism, Philosophy, and Civic Life in the Renaissance, tr. P. Munz, Oxford, 1965, p. 142, "It has been known for a long time that Nifo was both confused and loquacious". 3 ° For a general view of his life and thought see the article on him by E.P. Mahoney in the D.S.B., vol. 10 (1974), pp. 122-24. See further articles by Mahoney in C.H.R.P. ( 1988), p. 902, and the still valuable article by Pasquale Tuozzi "Agostino Nifo e le sue Opere", Attie Memorie della R. Accademia di Scienze Lettere ed Arti in Padova, N.S. xx (1903-04), pp. 63-80; C.H. Lohr, "Renaissance Latin Aristotle Commentaries", Renaissance Quarterly, xxxii, No. 4 ( 1979), pp. 532-39.

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Pomponazzi the increasing effects of humanism on a sp1nt nourished on scholastic methods of instruction and ways of thought. Thus, although he wrote many vast commentaries and scholastic quaestiones on the works of Aristotle, he also wrote several treatises in non-scholastic form. In connection with moral philosophy, for instance, he discussed such humanist subjects as the liberty of living (de vera vivendi libertate), riches, the solitary life, sanctity, compassion, beauty and love (Liber de pulchro et amore, 1531). In the field ofpolitical philosophy he wrote about the duties of a prince and the life of courtiers, both male and female, subjects dear to the humanists. 31 He was very friendly too with humanists, such as Galeazzo Florimonte, Bishop of Sessa ( 14 78-156 7), the poet Torquato Tasso (1493-1569), who gave him a place in his dialogue about pleasure, 32 and Mario Equicola (1470-1525) author of one of the best and earliest prose treatises on the nature of love (Di natura d'amore, 1525), whom he quotes in his own work on the same subject. Early in his career he knew no Greek, but later he learnt it, and after about 1500 he made great use of the Greek commentators in his Aristotelian commentaries and in his commentary on the Destructio destructionum of Averroes, begun in 1494 but not finished until three years later. He also became enamoured of neo-Platonic doctrines, quoting Ficino's commentary on the Timaeus and attempting to reconcile Plato with Avicenna. Like Vernia, he was fond of comparing the opinions of the Greeks, the Arabs, and the Latins, and like Pomponazzi he was unsympathetic towards the theories of the Mertonians, maintaining that the mathematical principles of the Calculators were very different from natural principles (principia naturalia) and inferior to them. 33 In this instance he agreed entirely with Pomponazzi with whom he had argued so bitterly about the immortality of the soul. Nifo devotes much space in his commentaries, particularly those on the Physics and De anima, to a discussion of scientific demonstration and regressus which again follows very closely along the lines laid down by Pomponazzi. 34 A recent discussion of this aspect of the work of Nifo will be found in the article by

31 These works are found in the collected edition of Nifo's moral and political writings, Opuscula Moralia et Politica, Paris, 1645, which also contains a valuable account of the life of Nifo and a judgment of his writings by Gabriel Naude. 32 E. Garin, op.cit., pp. 143 & 177. 33 See E.P. Mahoney, "Philosophy and Science in Nicoletta Vernia and Agostino Nifo", Scien;::a e Filosofia (1983), pp. 182-83. 34 Randall, School of Padua, ( 1961), pp. 42-4 7.

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Giovanni Papuli in Aristotelismo Veneto e Scien;:;a Moderna ( 1983), to which I refer the reader. 35 Unlike Vernia and Pomponazzi Nifo practised medicine and was for a short time, during the year 1504/5, physician to Gonzalo Fernandez of Cordoba. He also left a few medical writings, not in scholastic form, such as De diebus criticis ( 1504), dealing with astrological medicine, and a De arte medendi ( 1528), published posthumously in 1551 at Naples. In his above-mentioned De amore he quotes Rhazes, Avicenna and Galen and discusses the physical aspects oflove in a completely uninhibited, medical fashion. Chapter 71 of this treatise is entitled Quaestiones amatoriae, and these questions are not dealt with in the scholastic manner, but Nifo uses the form of the simple quaestiones et responsiones used in the twelfth century by the Salernitan masters, several of whose questions will be found in this treatise. To conclude our account of this interesting and, I think, rather underestimated author, listen to the words of the poet and canon regular of Saint Augustine, Joannes Latomus Berganus (c.l523-78) appended to the account of Nifo given by Paulo Giovio in his Elogia virorum literis illustrium (1577): Begone all ye who think Philosophy is harsh, severe and without the sweet pleasures of drunken Venus. What! oh charming Nifo, are ye not wont amidst thy intricate enthymemes and cold syllogisms to tell us pleasant tales after the Attic fashion and spread laughter all around? But what a delightful septuagenarian is here! whom ye behold dancing in front of us with wavering steps, now to a Dorian tune, now to a Phrygian or a Lydian, and with head bent in thought, wounded by cruel love. In this way, I believe, did the greatest of philosophers deal with hateful philosophy. 36 35 "La teo ria del regressus", vol. I, pp. 235-36. Nicholas Jardine also discusses Nifo's attitude to "regressus" in C.H.R.P. (1988), pp. 688--89. 36 Apagete vos, Phi1osophiam qui tetricam Putatis:et bani indigam Leporis,ebriae horridamque Cypridis. Quid?Niphus annan melleus, Perplexa suetus inter enthymemata, Et syllogismos frigidos Narrare suaves,Atticasque fabulas: Multumque risum spargere? At quam venustum hoc:septuagenarium Quod undulatis passibus, Et curioso,ftexuosoque capite Saltare coram cerneres, Modo Dorium,modo Phrygium,vel Lydium: Amore saucium gravi? Tractare sic Philosophiam invisam,arbitror Summi fuisse philosophi." pp. 172-73.

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We are now approaching the period after which the scholastic quaestio and disputation ceased to have much real influence on the development of scientific thought in Italy. Subjects such as the regressus demonstrativus in scientific methodology continued to be discussed, but not so much in scholastic form, either by logicians such as Zabarella (1533-89) who crystallized and developed in a particularly clear manner all that had previously been said on this subject, 37 or by humanists such as the physician Nicolo Leoniceno (1428-1524) who translated Galen from the Greek. In his De tribus doctrinis ordinatis he attempted to relate the Galenic theories of method to geometrical and mathematical analyses. 38 These works were written in the form of the learned treatise without syllogistic argumentation, and this applies not only to Zabarella's De rebus naturalibus and Opera logica, but also to his Aristotelian commentaries which seek to explain the text in a non-scholastic manner. As Randall has said, talking about this scholar, "the scholastic temper remaining in Pomponazzi has disappeared". 39 But before this happened and scholasticism had been entirely submerged by the rising tide of humanism, there is one more I tali an scholar to whom I would like to draw the reader's attention, namely Marcantonio Zimara (1475-c.l537). 40 He came from Galatina in Terra d'Otranto, a region in Italy where the Greek tongue was spoken by everyone, whether cultured or not, so he was able to read from an early date texts of Aristotle and Galen and of their commentators in the All of his life Nifo was inordinately fond of the fair sex, as he himself confesses, "In me testor a iuventute usque ad praesens tempus semper mihi fuisse puellas charas ... " Liber de re aulica, cap. 7, and in his old age he fell madly in love with a younger woman and made himself ridiculous by his antics, "Philosophum sen em atque podagricum, ad tibiae modos saltantem, miserabili cum pudore conspexerint", Paulusjovius, Elogium, loc.cit., and see Naude,Judicium, ed.cit., sig. aa 1r-v. 37 In recent years much has been written about Zabarella, in particular see, A. Poppi, La dottrina della Scienza in Giacomo Zabarella, Padua, 1972, the articles by W. Risse, G. Papuli, M. Campanini, and P.L. Drew in the two volumes of Aristotelismo Veneto (1983), C. Lewis, The Merton Tradition (1980), pp. 224---32 and 241-52, and Nicholas Jardine in C.H.R.P. ( 1988), pp. 689-93. 38 See W.F. Edwards, "Niccolo Leoniceno and the Origins of Humanist Discussion of Method", Philosophy and Humanism ( 1976), pp. 283-305;] ardine, op.cit., pp. 704---5, Edocere medicos, pp. 71 ff. 39 Randall, The School of Padua (1961), p. 106. 40 On Zimara see Lohr, "Renaissance Latin Aristotle Commentaries", Renaissance Quarterly xxxv, No. 2 (1982), pp. 245-54; Bruno Nardi, "Marcantonio e Teofilo Zimara", Saggi (1958), pp. 321-63; A. Antonaci, "La posizione filosofica e scientifica di Marcantonio Zimara negli anni del suo primo insegnamento a Padova (1501-09)", Scienza e Filosofia (1983), pp. 315-28, and the same author's, "Aristotelismo e scienza medica a Padova nel primo Cinquecento: il pensiero medico di Marcantonio Zimara", Aristotelismo Veneto, (1983) I, pp. 415-34.

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original language. At Padua he studied under both Pomponazzi and Nifo, and by 1505 was doctor in artibus and in medicine, and while he was still at Padua he became the antagonist of both Achillini and the Mantuan. In 1519-22 he taught natural philosophy and theoretical medicine at Salerno. Unlike Vernia and Nifo he does not seem to have been very friendly with the humanists, attacking them as "Ciceronians who occupied themselves more with the skin rather than with the substance or marrow of the texts of Aristotle", with special reference to the translation ofThemistius by Ermolao Barbaro. 41 He wrote several commentaries and quaestiones on the works of Aristotle and Jean de J andun, and a Contradictiones et solutiones in dictis Aristotelis et Averrois (1508), in which he defends these philosophers from contradictions attributed to them, all these writings being in syllogistic, scholastic form. At the end of his life he wrote a Tabula dilucidationum in dictis Aristotelis et Averrois ( 1537) which was a kind of glossary of philosophical terms. In this treatise he discusses the subject of medicine and stresses the necessity for a strong union between theoretical and practical medicine. He thus helped to establish the superiority of the latter which occurred during the first thirty years of the sixteenth century when practising physicians received a greater salary than those only teaching the theory, and were, besides, held in much higher esteem than the latter. 42 Adopting the attitude of Vernia and Nifo towards the texts of Aristotle and the Greek commentators, Zimara advocated going back to the original Greek of Galen and liberating him from the Latin and Arab glossators, such as Albertus Magnus, Averroes, and Avicenna. In his commentary on the Posterior Ana{ytics ( 1521), still only in manuscript, and Theoremeta (1523) he expresses some very original ideas regarding the long-standing controversy about scientific methodology and regressus which have been noted by Papuli. 43 But the work through which he is chiefly known was a book of Problemata dedicated to Giovanni Castrioto, Duke of Ferrandina, written sometime between 1509 and 1514. The earlier editions may have perished, at any rate the earliest that Bruno Nardi could find was that of 1536. 44 This work was written throughout in simple, nonscholastic, question-and-answer form, and it became exceedingly 41

42 43

44

See Antonaci, op.cit., Scien::.a e Filosofia (1983), p. 320. Antonaci, op.cit., Aristotelismo Veneto, ( 1983) I, p. 476. "La teoria del regressus", Aristotelismo Veneto, ( 1983) I, pp. 236-38. Saggi (1958), p. 334.

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popular over a period of three hundred years or more. It was published in a great number of editions, including translations, always in the company of the ps.Aristotelian "omnes homines" problems and the Problemata ofps.Alexander Aphrodisias, (see my Saternilan Questions, p. 129). Zimara's Problemata resemble the ps.Aristotelian ones and deal with similar subjects, anthropology, moral philosophy, medicine, including gynaecology, and zoology. This represents a return to the old ps.Aristotelian method of dealing with questions in natural and moral philosophy which had been used by the Salernitans in the twelfth century, and which, as we have seen, preceded the scholastic quaestio disputata in the schools. The humanists themselves were quick to adopt this less cumbersome and pleasanter form of exposition, first in Italy, then in other regions ofWestern Europe, and we find collections of non-scholastic quaestiones naturales being produced by such humanists as Giorgio Valla (De physicis questionibus, 1501), Ambrogio Leone of Nola (Novum opus questionum, 1523), Niccolo Leonico Tomeo (Questiones quedam naturales, 1525) and many others in France, Germany, Spain and Portugal. 45 If, after about 1560, the Merton tradition was losing popularity in Padua, it still continued to flourish, though probably in a derivative manner, in other parts of Italy. Thus in the Jesuit Collegia Romano in Rome the professors were more sympathetic towards mathematical approaches to physical problems, and more inclined to use scholastic methods than were the secular masters in Padua. 46 This mathematical bias may have been partly due to the presence there of the mathematician Christopher Clavi us ( 153 7-1612), and the Spaniard Franciscus Toledo (Toletus, 1532-96). The latter, who had been a pupil of Domingo de Soto at Paris, taught Mertonian theories largely derived, as Lewis has pointed out, from Pomponazzi's De reactione. He included these theories in his commentaries and questions on the Aristotelian Physics ( 15 73) and De generatione et corruptione ( 15 7 5) .47 In recent years these works of Toledo, and other treatises emanating from the Collegia Romano, have received a good deal of attention from scholars such as Lewis, Wallace and Crombie, because it is thought that they contributed to the early stages of To these must now be added the Problemata by da Monte. See supra, p. 84. Oa the Collegia Romano see, W .A. Wallace, Prelude to Galileo, 1981, chp. 7, "Causes and Forces at the Collegia Romano", and C. Lewis, The Merton Tradition, 1980, chp. 3, "The Collegia Romano". 47 Lewis, op.cit., p. 75. 45

46

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Galileo's scientific development evinced in his Juvenilia ( 1584) and early notebooks. Other professors at this College who showed interest in Mertonian theories were the metaphysician, Francisco Suarez ( 1548-1617), who taught there from 1580 to 1585, and Benito Pereira (1535--1610), author of the frequently reprinted Physicorum, sive de principiis rerum naturalium libri XV ( 1562), not in scholastic form. Yet other professors whose scholastic disputations have survived in manuscript reportationes, are listed by Wallace who advances strong arguments to show that Galileo probably had access to these lecture notes when writing his De motu antiquiora c.1590-92 and other early works. 48 In Pisa too, where Galileo was a student from 1581 to 1585 and lecturer from 1589 to 1592, Mertonian ideas continued to be studied, though with less enthusiasm and not by means of the quaestio disputata. Thus one of Galileo's teachers, Francesco Buonamici (d.1603), wrote an influential treatise, De motu libri X (1591), in which he shows, according to Lewis, a fairly detached knowledge of the Bradwardine "proportions" tradition but only a vestigial knowledge of Merton kinematics in general. 49 He is also very scathing of the "Latin sophists, more convoluted indeed than potter's wheels", who, "relying on the powers of the intellect, have thrown almost everything into confusion concerning Aristotle's teaching on the mutual affection of things, or repassion". 50 Elsewhere he attacks the arithmetical methods of the calculators and sophists and, like Pomponazzi, tends to favour a more naturalistic approach to physical problems. 5 1 In the mean time, while the Merton tradition had been losing ground in Italy, It had shown a revival in Paris, Spain and Portugal. 2. Disputations in Paris and the Iberian Peninsula After a century of indifference, interest in the Mertonian tradition was, for a time, revived in Paris at the beginning of the sixteenth 48 Wallace, op.cit., pp. 179-82. Two of the tracts in the early notebooks have now been edited, G. Galilei, Tractatio de precognitionibus et precognitis and Tractatio de demonstratione. Transcribed from the Latin autograph by W.F. Edwards. With an introduction, notes, and commentary by W.A. Wallace. Antenore, Padova, 1988. 49 Lewis, op.cit., pp. 127 If. 50 "Nam propterea quae decrevit Aristoteles de mutua rerum alfectione, sive repassione, quam Graeci vocant Latini sophistae versutiores plane quam rotae figulares, viribus ingenii freti, parum a best quum omnia conturbarint", De motu, 1591, p. 795, quoted by Lewis, op.cit., p. 136. 51 Ibid., p. 138.

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century, at the college of Montaigu, by the Scottish nominalist, logician and theologian, John Major (1467-1550). He composed Insolubilia ( 1500), a commentary on Peter of Spain's Summulae, and a number of scholastic quaestiones on the logical works of Aristotle. He also wrote commentaries on the libri naturales, including the Physics in which he has a good deal to say about local motion. 5 2 His Flemish pupil, John Dullaert ofGhent (1471-1513) was even more influenced by the doctrines of such men as Heytesbury, Paul of Venice, Buridan, and Albert of Saxony, especially in his commentary on De caelo et mundo where he discusses the problem of maxima et minima. 5 3 Especial emphasis was laid on the mathematical aspects of the work of the "calculators" as studied in Paris at that time by such men as the two Portugese professors, the mathematician Gaspar Lax ( 1487-1560), author of Arithmetica speculativa, and Proportiones (1515), and Alvaro Thomaz of Lisbon. The latter was an encyclopedist who in his Liber de triplici motu ( 1509) attempted to provide a mathematical background to Swineshead's Calculationes, and showed a quite remarkable knowledge of the works of the Mertonians and their Paduan followers. 54 He thus became, in the words ofWallace, "the Calculator par excellence at Paris at the end of the first decade of the sixteenth century". 55 Juan de Celaya (1490-1558), a pupil of Gaspar Lax and John Dullaert, was another Spanish theologian and logician who also taught physics at Paris and Valencia. His commentary on the Physics contained lengthy excerpts from the works of the Mertonians and their followers based on the survey of their doctrines by Thomaz. Like Jacopo da Forli he thought that mathematics could be applied to medicine and even to theology, but was opposed to the logical subtleties and quibbling contained in the sophismata. 56 His most brilliant pupil was the Spanish Dominican, Domingo deSoto (1494-1560), to whom he transmitted his enthusiasm for the logico-mathematical treatment of physical problems. Domingo composed both a commentary and scholastic quaestiones on the Physics in 1551 which became very popular and were published in several editions up to 1665. He appears to have been the first to

52 See Clagett, Mechanics ( 1959), p. 653; Wallace, Prelude ( 1981), pp. 68-71; Lohr, op.cit., Renaissance Quarterly, xxxi, No.4 (1978), pp. 558-60. 53 Clagett, op.cit., pp. 653-55; Wallace, op.cit., pp. 69-70. 54 Clagett, ibid., pp. 657-58; Wallace, ibid., pp. 79-81. 55 Ibid., p. 80. 56 Clagett, op.cit., pp. 655-57; Wallace, op.cit., p. 81.

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recognize that freely falling bodies accelerate uniformly, and that the distance of fall was a function of the time of travel. He applied Heytesbury's "mean speed theory" to this problem, a conclusion that no one else was to reach before Galileo. 57 But it should be noted that this Dominican never performed experiments to test the truth of his theories, he only showed the way, as it were, to those who came after him. Like Celaya, he had no patience with what he called the fruitless, logical quibbling of the sophismata. 58 An edition ofhis Quaestiones on the Physics was published at Venice in 1582, the year after Galileo began his studies at Pisa, and in fact Soto is mentioned by Galileo in his early notebooks. 59 As we have seen, Soto's pupil Franciscus Toledo, after leaving Paris, introduced Mertonian ideas to the Collegio Romano where they received fresh impetus from the mathematical studies carried on there by the Jesuit professors. 60 But in Paris and the Iberian peninsula the Merton tradition and the syllogistic arguments of the sophismata became increasingly less popular, so that by about the mid-sixteenth century they ceased to have any substantial influence on the development of scientific thought. One of the reasons for this may have been the fact that most of the professors involved in the teaching of logic, natural philosophy and mathematics were primarily theologians. Realizing what a waste of time many of the sophismata were, they then tended to devote their energies to what they considered were more important metaphysical, philosophical, and theological problems. 61 Also, as Ashworth has pointed out, speaking about insolubilia, "it may well be that medieval logicians themselves had tended to see them only as interesting puzzles, rather than as paradoxes which strike at the very heart of our semantic assumptions". 62 Another reason was probably the reac57 Clagett, ibid., pp. 555 & 658; Wallace, ibid., pp. 47,85-86, and chp. 6, "The Enigma of Domingo de Soto"; Lohr, op.cit., Renaissance Quarterly, xxxv, No. 2 (1982), pp. 167-70. 58 See Soto's remarks in his Summulae (1554), "Sed moderni praeter rei dignitatem dilataverunt istam materiam in qua tamen revera parum est utilitatis, et ideo nos earn breviter transcurremus", f. I 51', quoted by Ashworth in C.H.R.P. (1988), p. 165. 59 Wallace, ibid., pp. 86, 178, 309. 60 See supra, p. 96 . 61 Wallace, ibid., p. 83, where he quotes the remarks of another Dominican, • Dwgo de Astudillo, in his Quaestiones on the Physics, "Calculatorias au tern disputationes reliqui, ne confunderem incipientium indicia, qui communiter mathematicam nesciunt. Potissimum autem ne scriptura mea causa sit legentibus ut in talib':ls inutilibus. questionibus tempus vane consumant, specialiter theologi qui debent ammarum consulere. Ad quod melius faciendum, ilia phisicalia sal~u dumtaxat que ad theologalia utili a esse videri possunt", p. 89, n. 33. sc~1psi, Ashworth, op.cit., p. 165.

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tion against sophismata by humanists which we shall discuss further on. However, the writings of the more influential professors which I have mentioned, continued to be printed for a long time, often well into the next century, and so helped to lay the foundations on which men like Galileo could erect the structure of modern science. It is not the purpose of this study to analyse what use was made of this background material. This is still a subject for discussion and controversy, and I must refer the reader to the work of such scholars as Wallace, Lewis, and Crombie, who have dealt in great detail with this side of the picture. It is now necessary to discuss briefly the reaction against the scholastic quaestio by theologians, scientists, and finally by the humanists themselves. This will help us to understand better how its decline as a method of teaching in the schools came about in the seventeenth century.

CHAPTER NINE

THE REACTION AGAINST DIALECTIC 1. The reaction against the use of dialectic in any form by theologians Already in the tenth century there was opposition towards the use of dialectic in theology by the more orthodox theologians who were inclined towards mysticism and believed that dialectic would raise doubts regarding important dogmas of the Catholic faith. This attitude manifested itself either by comparative silence regarding dialectic, as in the case of the cultured Ratherius, bishop of Verona ( d.974) who scarcely mentions it except to excuse himself from using it in sacred matters, or by outright condemnation, as in the case of Ratherius's contemporary, Abbot Einold who sternly forbade his young pupil, John of Gorze, to make use of Boethian logic in order to arrive at a better understanding of Augustine. 1 It used to be thought that certain lOth-century thinkers such as Manegold of Lautenbach, Peter Damian, and Lanfranc ofBec were entirely against the use of logic and the liberal arts for any purpose. But recent scholarship has somewhat modified these views and it is now realised that, so far from being enemies oflogic, these thinkers valued it as a discipline and only objected to its use in the elucidation of the Scriptures. Lanfranc ( 1005-80), a pupil of Fulbert, who became abbot of Bee and later archbishop of Canterbury, wrote a work on logic which has not survived. But in his controversy with Berengar over the Eucharist he felt that he had to apologise and make excuses for using logic by referring to Augustine. The latter, it will be remembered, had greatly praised this discipline for investigating the Scriptures. 2 Berengar, on the other hand, a teacher at Tours, who had 1 J. de Ghellinck, "Dialectique et dogme aux x - xiie siecles, Festgabe ::.um 60. Geburtstag Clemens Baeumkers, B.G.P.M., Supplementband, I. Munster i. W., 1913, p. 86. 2 See R.W. Southern, "Lanfranc of Bee and Berengar of Tours", Studies in Medieval History presented to F.M. Powicke, Oxford, 1948; J. Marenbon, "Logic and Theology in the age of Anselm", Early Medieval Philosophy ( 1983), pp. 90--91.

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questioned the belief that consecrated bread and wine really became the body and blood of Christ because he refused to believe in something that went so decidedly against the evidence of the senses, stoutly defended his use of logic in the argument. He also brings in Augustine as his ally but makes no apologies for using logic. On the contrary he maintains that to take refuge in logic is to take refuge in reason, and whoever does not do this loses his honourable status as a creature made according to reason in the image of God. 3 Another thinker who used to be considered an enemy oflogic and the liberal arts is Peter Damian (1007-72). However, on a closer examination his principal work, De divina omnipotentia turns out to be a subtle examination of the extent to which human logic can be used to talk about an all powerful God, anticipating in fact 13thand 14th-century discussions of divine omnipotence. For instance he discusses the question of whether God could bring it about that "what has already happened did not happen", or in discussing time still further, "whatever is now, whilst it is, without doubt by necessity must be", and, as regards the future, "if it is going to rain, then it is necessary that it will rain". Damian argues that necessity is not absolute regarding future events. To say that if it is the case that it will happen, then necessarily it will happen is to insist on a necessity according to the "consequence of words" (consequentia verborum). He applies this concept to statements about time past, present and future which all depend on the "consequence of words". But, says Damian, it is quite wrong to think that God's power is limited by a necessity which merely depends on a consequence of words. God should not be thought of as if he were in time. In the ever-presentness of his eternity he sees past, present, and future in a single glimpse. Thus the whole question of his ability to alter the past, the present, or the future is inapposite-a case of using human terms to discuss what is divine. 4 Speaking further of logic, Damian repeatedly maintains that it should be the slave of theology, like a servant following her mistress, and should never go ahead. If it does it will lose the way and "whilst it follows the consequences of the outer meaning of words it loses the inner light ofvirtue and the straight path oftruth". 5 Marenbon, ibid., p. 91. Petrus Damian us, Lettre sur La toute puissance divine, trans. et comm. par Andre Cantin, Sources chretiennes, 191 ( 1972), pp. 187-214 (La dialectique et Ia parole sacree). Marenbon, ibid., pp. 91-94. 5 Quae tamen artis humanae peritia, si quando tractandis sacris eloquiis adhibetur, non debet jus magisterii sibimet arroganter arripere, sed velut ancilla 3

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However, in spite of the reluctance of some thinkers to use logic in the service of theology, as the twelfth century advanced, the position of dialectic in theology became more and more established as we have seen. Henceforth the reaction against this discipline was not so much against the use of dialectic as a whole, in any form, but against various components of it and against the ways in which these components were used. 2. The reaction against sophismata

a. By ancient authors This reaction has a very long history and later medieval and Renaissance writers furnished their arsenal of ammunition in the fight against sophisms from ancient authors, such as Cicero, Seneca, Prudentius and the Church Fathers. The Stoics gave a central place to the resolving of sophismata in their logical training, and although much of their work in this field has perished, we get a good idea of their views from the mainly derogatory account given by the Sceptic, Sextus Empiricus ( c.200), in his Outline of Pyrrhonism, II. cap. 22, which deals with sophisms. 6 But as this work was not widely available in the Latin West until 1562, the date of the first edition of the Latin translation by Henri Estienne, it had little influence on medieval writers. Cicero, too, was antagonistic towards the use ofthe sophisms, as we learn from his Academica, 11.75 where he speaks of "contorted and prickly sophisms". 7 But the most numerous quotations against sophisms are to be found in the letters ofSeneca (4 B.C-65 A.D.) to his friend Lucilius. Thus in Epistola III he says that if a man has surrendered himself to this kind of exercise he "weaves many a tricky subtlety, but makes no progress towards real living". In Epistola 48, which deals with quibbling, he pours scorn on what he calls the childish nonsense of the dialecticians, giving as an example the famous "mouse" sophism, "A mouse is a syllable, but a mouse eats cheese, therefore a syllable eats cheese". This sophism was repeated in medieval times by Robert Holcot ( c.l290-l340) in his Super lib rum dominae quodam famulatus obsequio subservire, ne si praecedit oberret, et dum exteriorum verborum sequitur consequentias, intimae virtutis lumen et rectum veritatis tramitem perdat. Damianus, D_e divina omnipotentia, c. V, quoted by E. Gilson, "La servante de Ia Theologie", Etudes de Philosophie Midiivale, Strasbourg, 1921, p. 36. See also, Cantin, ibid., p. 231. 6 See N .W. Gilbert, "Richard de Bury and the Quires of Yesterday's Sophisms", Philosophy and Humanism ( 1976), p. 248. 7 Gilbert, Joe. cit.

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sapientiae, Lectio XCV, who echoes the sentiments of Seneca. 8 Seneca's contemporary, the Apostle Paul, also speaks in his Epistles against subtleties in philosophy and worthless fallacies (inanemfallaciam), Colossians II.4&8, warning Christians to beware of these things-a warning which was to be repeated by several of the Greek and Latin Church Fathers. 9 The Christian poet, Prudentius (fl.404), speaking against the enemies ofthe Faith in his Apotheosis, also heaps invective on their syllogisms: They assail the being of almighty God with false disputings and cut the faith in pieces with dark, finical reasonings in proportion to the wickedness of their tongues. Using intricate arguments they play fast and loose with the issues they discuss. 10

All this material was later used by medieval and Renaissance opponents of sophismata.

b. The reaction against sophismata by 12th and 13th-century theologians At the very beginning of the twelfth century one of the writers of the "sentences" originating in the school of Anselm of Laon (fl.l080lll 7), while recognizing the usefulness of logic in theology, condemned in particular the use of sophismata and the asking of puerile questions, "He who speaks with sophisms is hateful to God" . 11 We have already seen how, later in the century,John of Salisbury spoke very harshly against the habit of medical students in Paris asking useless questions, 12 and how at the end of the century Etienne de Tournai strongly condemned the use of sophismata by the Paris " Gilbert, op.cit., pp. 249-50. Inn. 54 the reference to Holcot should be Lect. XCV. 9 Gilbert, op.cit., pp. 250-51. 10 statum lacessunt omnipollentis Dei calumniosis litibus, fidem minutis dissecant ambagibus ut quisque lingua est nequior; solvunt ligantque quaestionum vincula per syllogismos plectiles. Prudentius, Apotheosis, Pref. 11.19-24, Loeb Lib. edition, vol. I (1949), p. ll8. Quoted by Adam Tribbechovius, De doctoribus scholasticis et corrupta per eos divinarum humanarumque scientia, lena, I 719, p. 70. 11 Cf. Bazan, Les Questions Disputees (1985), p. 37, "Disputationis disciplina ad omnia genera questionum que in litteris sanctis penetranda et dissolvenda sunt plurimum valet. Tamen ibi cavendum est libido rixandi et puerilis quedam ostentatio decipiendi adversarium. Sunt enim multa que appellantur sophismata false conclusiones, et plerumque ita veras imitantes ut etiam ingeniosos minus diligenter attentos decipiant ... Quod genus questionum Scriptura, quantum estimo, detestatur dicens, qui sohpistice loquitur odibilis est Deo". 12 See supra, pp. 22-3.

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masters. 13 To these twelfth-century condemnations may be added those of Pierre de Blois (fU l53-c.l204), contained in several ofhis letters, 14 and Hugh of Saint Victor even blames those who introduce syllogisms into the study of grammar. 15 Giraud de Barri, too, in his Speculum ecclesiae, castigates the students in Paris who, passing over more necessary studies, embrace that of logic with unseemly haste simply in order to gain a reputation for cleverness and astuteness. 16 It should also be remembered that Abelard himself, in his Theologia christiana, was among the first to condemn an improper use of dialectic. Speaking against those professors of dialectic in Paris, whom he calls worse than the enemies of Christ, he accuses them of subtly enquiring into and arguing against the faith of the Holy Trinity, and refers to the unsuitableness of the sophists ( importunitas sophistarum). Such as these, he says "do not use the art of logic but abuse it." He condemned, not the use of dialectic itself or indeed of any of the liberal arts, but only "the stratagem of sophistical argument". 17 This aversion to sophismata even became popularized in an ofttold tale or exemplum, much quoted by medieval preachers. It concerned the Englishman, Serlo of Wilton, whose dissolute youth, spent in the schools of Paris, is mirrored in his goliardic poetry. He seems to have taught logic in the Arts Faculty at Paris during the mid twelfth century, and to have been particularly enamoured of sophismata. The legend has it that the ghost of one of his dead pupils appeared to him, weighed down with a huge cope of parchment covered with sophismata which, he said, was heavier than a church tower, moreover he was consumed with inward fires. When Serlo asked the reason for this punishment, the ghost replied that it was Supra, p. 40, and Gilbert, op.cit., p. 245, n. 38. Gilbert, op.cit., p. 244, n. 38, and Lesne, op.cit., p. 315, who quotes a letter from Pierre to master Raoul, "Vos autem tumultuoso strepitu et clamore nautico de nugis assidue disputantes, inutiliter aerem verberatis; vos circa litteram et syllabam et circa huiusmodi elementares doctrinae primitias vestrum adhuc ingenium exercetis et, si dicere fas est, vos puer centum annorum et elementarius senex, docetis sapientiam, Epist., 6, P.L. 107, col. 188. 15 Lesne, op.cit., p. 607. 16 Pare, Brunet, Tremblay, op.cit., p. 204, "Scholares diebus istis in trivio studentes, praetermissis omnino fere duabus facultatibus pernecessariis, quarum prima recte, secunda vera lepide loqui docet et ornate, ad studium logices et garrulae loquacitatis apparentiam, quatinus acuti videantur et diserti, se cursu veloci transferre deproperant". Speculum ecclesiae, ed. Brewer, IV, p. 7. 17 Neque enim scientiam dialecticae, aut cuiuslibet liberalis artis, sed fallaciam sophisticae condemnamus. Theologia christiana, III, P.L. 178, col. 1212; Lesne, op.cit., pp. 653-54. 13 14

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because he had been too fond of sophistical arguments when he was a student. Serlo then tried to make light of his punishment, whereupon the ghost asked him to extend his hand, and letting fall a drop of sweat, quicker than an arrow it pierced through the hand of the master and caused such intolerable agony that Serlo then and there decided to cease being a Master in the schools, to abandon his dissolute way of living, and to embrace a religious life. This he did, and ended up by joining the Cistercian order, becoming abbot of the abbey of 1' Aumone in 1171. 18 At the end of the century we find further confirmation of this attitude towards sophismata in the words uttered by Pierre de Poitiers, chancellor of Paris from 1193 to 1204/5, in one of his sermons, "There is another kind of wisdom, that of certain people who search out the complexions of arguments, the deceptions of sophisms, the secrets of the heavens, the motion of the stars, and the course of the planets. However, I do not find the priests so reprehensible in these matters, but there are some who consume their lives in such things and whose wits are entirely taken up with them. Such people are always learning and never come to a knowledge of the truth". 19 In the thirteenth century we found Roger Bacon and Albertus Magnus equally critical of the Paris masters, as regards their use of logic. 20 There seems little doubt, therefore, that even though the disputation in other forms achieved great success in Paris during the twelfth and thirteenth centuries, there were a considerable number of masters and scholars who were making an improper use of the disputatio de sophismatibus, either through ignorance or through design. This was probably caused by their overwhelming infatuation for a comparatively novel and fascinating branch of dialectica state of affairs which brought about the sometimes violent reactions of the more zealous theologians. In the next two centuries, however, owing to the radical changes which had taken place both in the nature and application of the 18 See Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'Averroisme Latin, I, Lou vain, 1911, p. 262; Haskins, Studies in Medieval Culture, New York, 1929, p. 50, and the literature there quoted; Raby, Christian Latin Poetry, Oxford, 1953, p. 340. Serlon's poems have now been edited by Jan Oberg, Serlon de Wilton, Poemes latins, Stockholm, 1965. 19 Est alia quorundum sapientia qui scire complexiones argumentationum, deceptiones sophismatum, secreta celi rimantur, motus astrorum, cursus planetarum. In his tamen non adeo reprehensibiles invenio sacerdotes sed quosdam qui etatem suam in his consumunt, quorum ingenium in talibus desudant; semper discunt et nunquam ad scientiam veritatis proveniunt. Quoted by Haskins, op.cit., p. 46, n. 8. 20 See supra, pp. 40-41.

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sophismata, chiefly at Oxford, it was not only the theologians who attacked this form of disputation, but we also find scientists, philosophers, historians, men of letters, poets, the lay members of the professions-in short humanists from all walks of life, raising their voices in protest. c. The humanist reaction One of the earliest of these voices was that of Francesco Petrarch (1304-74), in the words of Garin, "the true father of the new devotion to humanitas". 21 His aversion to scholasticism in any form and in particular to sophismata is well known and clearly expressed in many of his writings. Thus, in his letter to Tommaso Caloria, written c.l335, he speaks very scathingly against the dialecticians and especially against one who dwelt in Sicily. It is noteworthy, too, that he particularly singles out the British dialecticians in his attack, comparing Britain with Sicily and saying that, after the Cyclops and ferocious tyrants, a new kind of monster had arrived in that island from Britain, armed "with double-edged enthymemes (enthymemeta bisacuta) more insolent than the wild breakers on the shore ofTaormina". 22 He was also one of the first of the humanists to mention the hostility of Cicero and Seneca towards sophisms. He ends his letter by saying that, although dialectic may be useful in the study of philosophy, for teaching us how to avoid fallacies, and for sharpening the intellect, yet one should not spend too much time on it, but should quickly pass on to better and more useful disciplines, such as the investigation of human life and of the human soul, in short towards a philosophy which aimed at moral reform. Coluccio Salutati (1331-1406), the famous chancellor of Florence, whom Ullman did not hesitate to call "the undisputed leader of the humanistic movement for thirty-two years, from the death of Petrarch in 13 7 4 to his own demise in 1406", 23 was, like Petrarch, a true follower of Cicero and a voluminous letter-writer who greatly influenced other humanists of his generation. Like Petrarch, Coluccio was averse to scholasticism, but for different reasons since his main objections were based on the belief that the medieval commentators did not understand the true Aristotle because they did 21 Eugenio Garin, Italian Humanism, Philosophy, and Civic Life in the Renaissance, trans. P. Munz, Oxford, 1965, p. 19. 22 A translation of this letter will be found in The Renaissance Philosophy of Man, ed. by E. Cassirer, P.O. Kristeller &J.H. Randalljr., Chicago, 1948, pp. 134-39. 23 B.L. Ullman, The Humanism of Coluccio Salutati, Padova, 1963, p. 39.

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not have access to the original Greek texts. He also attacked the empty dialectic of the schools, contrasting it with that moral philosophy so much praised by Petrarch which, he says "is far removed from all subtle dialectics which modern sophists frivolously praise". 24 Also, if we are to accept that the words put into the mouth ofColuccio by his pupil Leonardo Bruni (1369-1444), in his Dialogi addressed to V ergerio, represent the true opinions of Coluccio, then it appears that the latter too thought very highly of the art of disputing if properly used and greatly regretted that young students of his day neglected this custom. Bruni then goes on to make the person to whom Coluccio was speaking, Niccolo Niccoli, mount a devastating attack on modern dialectics, "ruined by Oxford logicians whose very names I dread, Ferabrich (Feribrigge), Buser, Occam, Suisset (Swineshead) and others of the same sort who seem to me to have derived their names from the cohort of Rhadamanthus". Then he continues, "What is there, Coluccio, to stop jesting, what is there, I ask, in dialectic that has not been disturbed by British sophisms? What is there that has not been separated from that old and true method of disputation and dragged down to trivial nonsense?". 25 So here again Bruni is echoing the sentiments of Petrarch and his master, Coluccio, and he follows them, too, in his condemnation of the natural sciences and praise of the studia humanitatis. The humanist, Lorenzo Valla ( 1407-5 7), after being secretary to King Alfonso of Aragon, returned to Rome in 1448 and became papal secretary as well as teaching grammar and rhetoric in the University, until his death in 1457. More than any of his predecessors he strove to restore the Latin language to the glory and purity 24 "Non dico in hac quam moderni sophiste ventosa iactatione inani et impudente garrulitate mirantur in scolis, sed in ea que animos excolit, virtutes edificat, vitiorum sordes eluit, rerumque omnium, omissis disputationum ambagibus, veritatem elucidat". Epist., ed. F. Novati, I. Roma 1891, p. 179, quoted by Ullman, op.cit., p. 85. See also, Garin, op.cit., pp. 26-27. 25 Printed by E. Garin in Prosatori Latini del quattrocento, Milan/Naples, 1952; a partial translation by L. Thorndike is in his University Records and Life in the Middle Ages, New York, 1949, pp. 266-69. Like Coluccio, Niccoli also praises a correct use of disputation, "Neque enim facile reperiri posset, ut credo, quod ad studia nostra plus quam disputatio conferat", Garin, op.cit., p. 52. Vergerio taught logic at the university of Bologna, 1388-89, and taught that ratio disputandi could be of great use in all sorts of doctrines, that is, to the orator, the physicist, and even the moralist. See further, N.W. Gilbert, "The early Italian Humanists and disputation", in Renaissance Studies in honor of Hans Baron, Firenze, 1971, p. 206. On "Buser" see C.H. Kneepkens, "The Mysterious Buser again: William Buser of Heusden and the Obligationes tract, ob rogatum", English Logic in Italy ( 1982), ed. A. Maieru, pp. 147-166.

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that marked it before its corruption by the "barbarians", 26 his efforts resulting in his Elegentiae linguae latinae ( 1444), easily his most influential and popular work. But he also wrote Dialecticae disputationes (Dialectica) (1439), in which he attempts a complete reconstruction of Aristotelian logic, substituting for the "barbaric" terminology of the scholastic philosophers words and phrases derived from classical Latin. In place of the thorny and intricate sophisms and tautology of the modern terminists and Aristotelians he sought to introduce a simpler, more rhetorical form of reasoning derived from Quintilian, one of his favourite authors. As Monfasani has pointed out, he even went so far as to call scholastic logic mere child's play (res brevis prorsus etfacilis) and a part of invention which, in turn, was one of the five parts of rhetoric-in fact the argumentative section of rhetorical invention. He then went on to say that this section was far larger, more complex, and more pleasing to the hearer than the scientific logic of the schools. It followed from this that, whereas the orator could both teach (instruct), give pleasure to his hearers, and sway or influence them, the logician could only instruct and provide a proof of a proposition. But sometimes victory in an argument depends more on a pleasing delivery and the power to sway than on the actual, scientific proofY Thus Valla, by using typically humanistic weapons of philology, grammar, and rhetoric, attacked and sought to change the very foundations upon which the whole, complicated structure of scholastic logic and disputation was erected. Although his efforts were too revolutionary and did not meet with much success during his lifetime, his ideas were taken up in the later Renaissance by such men as Mario Nizzolio (1498-1566) and especially Peter Ramus ( 1515-72) who constructed a completely new system of logic which 26 A good definition of Latin "barbarisms" will be found in the letter of Eneas Silvius Piccolomini to King Ladislaus, No. 40 in Der Briefwechsel des Eneas Silvius Piccolomini, hrsg. von RudolfWolkan, II, Wien 1912, pp. 130-31, and in the same letter he complains bitterly about the sophistical disputations of the Viennese logicians, "non tamen hac in re quosdam Viennenses imitatione dignos dixerim; nimis enim multum tempus in sophisticis et cavillosis exponunt argumentis ut apud eos logicae studium non utili tate sed morte terminetur", p. 152. "' Valla's work on Dialectic has been edited by Zippel, Repastinatio dialecticae et philosophiae, ed. G. Zippel, 2 vols. Padua, 1982. On this aspect of Valla's thought see, Kristeller, Eight Philosophers of the Italian Renaissance, London, 1965, pp. 34-35. See also Hanna-Barbara Gerl, Rhetorik als Philosophie: Lorenzo Valla, Munich 1974; Salvatore Camporeale, Lorenzo Valla: Umanismo e Teologia, Florence, 1976; R. Waswo, "The ordinary language philosophy of Lorenzo Valla", Bibliotheque d'Humanisme et Renaissance, 41 (1979), pp. 255-71 and the more recent papers by John Monfasani, "Lorenzo Valla and Rudolph Agricola",J.H.P., vol. XXVIII, No.2 (1990) pp. 181-200, and "Was Lorenzo Valla an ordinary Language Philosopher?", ].H.!., vol. 50 ( 1989), pp. 309-336.

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supplanted the old, Aristotelian logic and did much to hasten the end of the scholastic quaestio disputata. We have already encountered the Venetian humanist Ermolao Barbaro ( 1453-93) in his role as a friend ofNicoletto Vernia and as translator of the paraphrases of Aristotle by Themistius which Vernia used and greatly praised. 28 Like Vernia, Barbaro had studied in Pavia, then the stronghold of the followers of the calculatory theories of Swineshead, and had apparently at first fallen under the spell oftheir "subtleties", as we learn from a letter he wrote in 1488 to a so far unidentified person, "I delight in subtlety, and just now the hateful name begins to please me". However in a second letter of about the same date and also to an unknown person, he exhibits the typically humanistic aversion and dislike of sophismata and calculationes suiseticae. 29 No trace remains of Barbaro's studies in this field, but as Dionisetti points out, it was probably Barbaro's aim to demonstrate that all philosophy, including dialectic and sophismata, could be humanistically explained and made more intelligible if, "clothed in a decent Latin dress". 30 Thus, as with Petrarch and Valla before him, it was not so much the intellectual content of the disputations that bothered him as the barbaric and uncultured Latin in which the ideas were expressed. This is confirmed by a letter which he wrote in 1485 to Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1465-94), castigating him for spending so much time on the barbarous and uncultured medieval philosophers. This letter elicited a long reply from Pico which is of the greatest importance for the history of the relations between scholasticism and humanism at that periodY Giovanni Pico represents a rather rare phenomenon in those days, since he was equally at home with the classical and cultured style of the humanists, which he used in his letters, orations, and treatises, and with the scholastic stylus Parisiensis which he used for his Conclusiones ( 1486) and De astrologia disputationes ( 1495). Part of his education had been acquired in Padua as a pupil of Vernia, See supra, p. 86. Delectavit me subtilitas et fastiditum mihi ad hoc aevi nomen placere coepit. See Carlo Dionisotti, "Ermolao Barbaro e Ia Fortuna di Suiseth", Medioevo e Rinascimento (1955), I, pp. 219-53. 30 Dionisotti, ibid., p. 231. 31 For the Latin text of Pica's letter, see E. Garin, Prosatori Latini del Quattrocento, pp. 804-23. See also Kristeller, op.cit., p. 58; Garin, Italian Humanism (1965), p. 102. English translations of the letter are in W.P. Creswell, Memoirs of Angelus Politianus,Janus Picus ofMirandula, and others, Manchester, 1805, pp. 194-208, and Q. Breen, "Giovanni Pica della Mirandola on the Conflict of Philosophy and Rhetoric" ,}.H.!., XIII ( 1952), pp. 384-426. 28

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where he doubtless obtained his knowledge of Aristotelian and Averroistic scholasticism and learnt the intricacies of the quaestio disputata. In 1485 he visited Paris, then the centre of scholasticism in the Latin West. In his reply to Barbaro, defending the scholastic authors on which he had spent so much time, he praises in rhetorical fashion their sagacity and wisdom and brevity of style "pregnant with multifarious and weighty matters, and their most out of the way opinions full of questions and answers freely expressed". He contrasts this style with the rhetorical art of the orator which often masks and conceals the truth and the real nature of things. His concluding remarks, however, make one wonder whether Pica was indulging in a sort of intellectual tournament, and was just stimulating his friend to praise rhetoric all the more rather than expressing his true feelings. These are his words, "I do not fully agree with these sentiments, neither do I think that every honourable gentleman should do so. But I have freely exercised myself, as it were, in this base matter just as those who praise a quartan fever in order to make a trial of their skill. I have also praised scholasticism for this reason, for just as Glauco in Plato praises injustice, not because it was his own opinion but in order to stimulate Socrates into praising justice, so have I, inclination and nature striving against each other for a while, attacked the cause of eloquence that I might hear you deal with the subject without restraint". 32 As Kristeller has pointed out long ago, the attacks of the humanists on the scholastics were often departmental rivalry, personal feuds, intellectual tournaments, or rhetorical exercises, rather than a clash of opposite ideas and philosophies. 33 On the other hand, there does seem to have been a genuine reaction against the English, and especially the Mertonian, logicians, as we have seen, and ifwe are to believe Pica's nephew, Gianfrancesco Pica (1470-1533), this distaste was also shared by his uncle, whose life he wrote in 32 "Quorum sententiae nee ego plane accedo nee ingenuo cuique et liberali accedendum puto. Sed exercui me libenter in hac materia tanquam infami, ut qui quartanam laudant, cum ut ingenium periclitarer, tum hoc consilio ut veluti Glauco ille apud Platonem iniusticiam laudat non ex iudicio, sed ut ad laudes iusticiae Socratem exstimulet, ita ego et eloquentiae causam a te agi audiam in earn licentius, repugnante paulisper sensu atque natura, invectus sum". 33 "Humanism and Scholasticism in the Italian Renaissance", Studies in Renaissance Thought and Letters, Rome, 1956, p. 577. N.W. Gilbert advances the interesting theory that the rather sketchy knowledge ofOckhamist and Oxford logic shown by the humanists may have been obtained from theologians such as the Austin friar Dionigi da Borgo San Sepolcro who gave Petrarch his favourite manuscript of Augustine's Confessions, who was familiar with the Oxford logic which they both disliked, and came into contact with Petrarch at Avignon, op.cit., pp. 225-26.

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1494. 34 After mentioning that his uncle liked best private disputations for the purpose of investigating and searching out the truth, he goes on to say that "he knew all about the fallacies and raillery of the sophists and the trifles ofSuiseth (Swineshead) which are called calculationes, but hated and despised them". He then expresses his own opinion of these sophismata and calculationes, saying that they were used in the more subtle and capricious investigations of natural phenomena. But he then says that such sophismata are only useful for causing the disgrace of an associate, and for upsetting the memory by repetition, but that they are of little or no use for finding out the truth. 35 In other words Gianfrancesco is complaining not so much about the barbaric Latinity of the sophismata as about the immoral aim of the exercise, directed towards the discomfort and even disgrace of an opponent rather than towards the attainment of the truth which, as he had already stressed was the sole aim of his uncle in his disputations. This, it will be remembered, is rather similar to what Pierre de Poitiers had said three centuries before, and so it was by no means a new conception of the humanists. 36 Another of Giovanni Pica's friends, the poet, grammarian and philologist, Angelo Poliziano ( 1454-94), was, like Valla and Barbaro, more concerned with the purity of the language than with the philosophical content of the disputations. He bitterly attacked modern Aristotelians such as Burley, Herveus Natalis (1260--1323), Occam, Tisberus (Heytesbury), and Strodus (Ralph Strode), and others who, he says, so defiled the purity of the Aristotelian books with a sort of frightful inundation of pedantry (dira quadam morositatis illuvie) that sometimes he was moved to laughter, sometimes to vomit. 37 A little later a certain professor of natural philosophy, Anselm us Meianus, about whom little is known, composed an Enchiridion naturale ( 1500) containing sixty scholastic quaestiones on all aspects of natural philosophy, including medicine. In the prefatory letter addressed to his pupil, Rostanus, he says how delighted he is to " Latuit eum nihil omnino quod pertineret ad captiunculas, cavillasque sophistarum et suiseticas quisquilias quae calculationes vocantur ... verum si in eis esset eruditus ac eiusmodi scriptiones legisset . . odisse tamen et detestari videbatur. I have used the text found in the Strassburg 1507 edition containing the De rerum praenotione and other works of G.F. Pico, sig. i2-k3. 35 Ad sociorum parandam infamiam labefactandamque in replicando memoriam. ibid., sig. 16'. 36 See supra, p. 106. 37 Praelectio de Dialectica, in Opera, III, Lyons, 1537, p. 187.

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know that the latter wishes to become a natural philosopher, but, he says, "not one of those called sophists, for although they believe themselves to be philosophers, they have been proved to be utterly ignorant, for, as is well known, a kind of inactivity (inertia) which is called the art of insolubilia, of obligations, of sophismata, and of exponibles has nowadays taken root, so that those skilled in this art, or rather poisoned by it, despise good disciplines. Therefore I advice you, dearest and most noble Rostanus, to avoid that art, nay to speak more truly, inactivity, as if it were the poison of vipers and asps, and to embrace true philosophy. For this inactivity alienates the soul from the contemplation of true philosophy and the sacred letters". 38 Here we have expressed in no uncertain terms the opposition to sophismata based on their philosophical content, or rather lack of it, thus echoing the sentiments of Giovanni Pi co, and indeed it was on these grounds that northern humanists, such as Faber Stapulensis, Erasmus, Agrippa, Pirckheimer and Vives, objected to this form of disputation. Jacques Lefevre d'Etaples (Faber Stapulensis, c.l450-1530), the famous French humanist, Greek scholar and friend of Giovanni Pico and Ermoleo Barbaro, did much to facilitate the understanding of purer Aristotelian texts both by his paraphrases of those texts and by his dialogues which contain questions with simple answers, in the form of the ps. Aristotelian Problemata, not of the scholastic quaestio disputata. In the preface to his edition of the Organon, published in 1503, he attacked without mercy the terminist logicians and the futile and miserable sophisms, the very dregs of sophismata, into which the purer logic, as taught by Aristotle, had degenerated. 39 In a letter to Germain de Ganay, dated 1501, he accused the scholastics of causing, in their lessons, a disgust for the very sciences they were supposed to teach. 40 Like Petrarch, Erasmus ( 1466-1536), while allowing that dialectic had its uses, thought that students should not spend too much time on it, and should confine themselves to the purer Aristotelian logic and not learn the very loquacious kind of the sophists or grow 38 Quoted by Dionisotti in op.cit., p. 221, n. l. I have also used the Paris 1500 edition of the Enchiridion naturale. Dionisotti shows that the dedicatee of the first of Barbaro'.s letters (mentioned supra, p. 110), Anselmus Meia Mantuanus, could not possibly be the Anselm us Meianus of the Enchiridion. 39 Demum vero sub nostris temporibus non in sophismata sed in sophismatum fecem vilissimamque propemodum algam. Libri logicorum, Paris, 1503, f.lv, quoted by A. Renaudet, Pririforme et Humanisme a Paris pendant les premieres querres d'Italie, Par~, 1953, p.415. 40 Renaudet, op.cit., p. 416.

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old in its service, "As regards this matter, if anyone should decide to take on dialectic I will not greatly oppose him provided that he learns it from Aristotle and not from that loquacious tribe of sophists. Again let him not remain too long with it and grow old, as it were, on the rocks of the Sirens (as Gellius says)". 41 Also in his Moriae encomium (1509) he refers again to the babbling of the sophists and their incessant fighting and wrangling. 42 The diatribe ofCornelius Agrippa (1486-1535) against the sophists in chapter eight of his De vanitate scientiarum, written in 1526, is well known. After detailing all the barbarous terms to be found in the smalllogicals (in parvis logicalibus), he says "they try to make all those things to appear truths which are in themselves false and impossible, and those things which are really true, like Furies breaking out of the Trojan horse, they seek to ruin and destroy with the flames of their barbarous words", 43 with much more to the same purpose. He ends by saying, like Petrarch and Pico, that although dialectic may be of some use in scholastic exercises, it is of no use at all in theology whose greatest dialectic is to be found in prayer (cuius summa dialectica est in oratione constituta). 44 Willi bald Pirckheimer ( 14 70-1530), the wealthy patron and friend of so many famous artists and writers was, besides being a reformer, one of the initiators of the Greek renaissance in Germany, as his numerous translations from the Greek testify. At his magnificent house in the centre of Nuremberg, then the foremost city in the Empire for learning and the studia humanitatis, he entertained artists, like Durer, and both Italian and German humanists and reformers, such as Gianfrancesco Pico, Luther, Melanchthon, Celtis, Rutten, Regiomontanus, and many others whose names we find in the long list of his correspondents. 45 He was, therefore, a man of 41 Ad haec si quis Dialecticen addendam statuet, non admodum refragabor, modo ab Aristotele earn discat, non ab isto loquacissimo Sophistarum genere, neque rursum ibi desideat, et velut and scopulos (ut inquit Gellius) Sirenaeos consenescat. Opera I (1703), col. 522, De ratione studii. See also L.W. Spitz, The Religious Renaissance ofthe German Humanists, Cambridge, Mass., 1963, pp. 206, 337, n. 33. 42 Adiungamus his dialecticos ac sophistas hominum genus quovis aere Dodonaeo loquacius ... etiam rixosi adeo ut de lana caprina pertinacissime digladientur. Opera IV (1703), col. 461. 43 Quibus omnia quaecunque re ipsa falsa sunt et impossibilia vera esse facile convincent, et contra quaecunque vera sunt velut ex equo Troiano erumpentes iis machinis subito verborum incendio et ruina vastabunt. De incertitudine et vanitate scientiarum et artium atque exellentia verbi Dei declamatio, Antwerp, 1531, p. 28'. English translation, London, 1676, chp. 8, "OfSophistry". 44 De incertitudine, p. 29'. 45 On him see Spitz, op.cit., chp. 8, and Willibald Pirckheimers Briefwechsel, ed. Emil Reiche, 2 vols., Munchen, 1940/1956.

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considerable influence in the northern humanist movement. In a letter to Vincent Lang (?1502), the intimate friend and colleague of Celtis in Vienna, he viciously attacked the scholastics and their sophismata, calling the former philopompi, rather than true philosophers, deceivers ofyouth, ignorant of all good letters, and spoilers of the most eloquent Aristotle with their barbaric language. He ends by saying, "let them go to the devil and, like Ajax, kill themselves with their own hands, since they well know their sophistical arguments and inane quibblings are utterly worthless". 46 In 1517 Pirckheimer published at Nuremberg his translation of Lucian's dialogue, Piscator, with a magnificent title designed by Durer. This work was prefaced by an Epistola apologetica in defence of his friend Reuchlin, in which he again attacked the scholastics who, he says, "care about words more than things and victory more than truth" .47 Again, like Petrarch and the Italian humanists, he thought that a knowledge of Dialectic could be of use to Theologians and to the very learned and be a great embellishment to both, provided that such knowledge was pure and not corrupt, and provided that, as regards time and method, it was kept within bounds and not mixed up with the scriptures, "since there is no alliance between Christ and Belial, or between light and darkness". 48 Thus we see in Pirckheimer a combination of all the stock objections against the sophists, and a reaction both against the barbarity of the language defiling the pure stream of Aristotelianism, the terminist attitude of the scholastics, their bitter wrangling, and the inanity of the sophismata themselves, all of which did great harm to the true religion. This, indeed, was the attitude which was to be adopted by most of the northern humanists and reformers, including Melanchthon, the Preceptor of Germany (1497-1560), the poet Conrad Celtis (1459-1508), the militant critic Ulrich Hutten (1488-1523), and the satirist Sebastian Brant ( 1480-1520). At about the same time in 46 Abeant ergo in malam crucem ... et Ajacis quandoque exemplo cum nullius esse momenti sophisticas suas argumentationes ac inanes cavillationes intelligant, propriis se iugulent manibus. Briefw., I, ep. 52, p. 173. He repeats these sentiments in almost the same words in another letter to Killian Leib ( c.l502), Briefw., I, ep. 53, pp. 175 If. 47 De verbis magis quam de rebus deque victora magis quam de veritate sollicitum teneat. Ed. 1517, sig. Biiv. 48 Proinde dialectices cognitionem et Theologis non indignam et doctissimo ac optimo cuique ornamento esse existimo, dummodo sincera et non depravata tradatur, dummodo tempore et modo intra suos terminos coherceatur, et non cum litteris confundatur sacris, quoniam nullum consortium Christi et Belial, lucis et tenebrarum. Ibid., sig. Biii'.

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Italy the young Benedictine priest Teofilo Folengo (1491-1544) ridiculed with biting sarcasm, in his extraordinary macaronic poem Baldus, not only the vices of the clergy, but also the practices of astrologers, magicians, physicians, and philosophers among whom he included the logicians. The passage concerning the latter occurs near the end of the early version of the poem published by A. Paganini at Tusculanum in 1521. Baldus and his companions, wandering in the underworld, are met by a buffoon who leads them to a giant pumpkin. Entering through a hole in its side they find "souls wearing gowns who were once reputed to be profound logicians, but they have lost their brains through acting a thousand fooleries. They say men are either assess or horses, and to slake their thirst make use of salted meats. Among them stood a man with two bodies supported by only two legs. His name was 'utrum', and he inculcates doubtful propositions, creates heretics, denies one thing, proves another, and maintains a third. With terrible blows of his fists he continually chastises himself". Then the fool led them to a door which opened into a school of wise philosophers, astronomers, magicians, and skilled physicians. Folengo gives a list of twenty-seven names, mixing up in extraordinary fashion Greek, Arabic, and Western names which include those of five English logicians, namely, Entisber (Heytesbury), Ferabrich (Feribrigge), Ockham, Burleus, and Strodus (Ralph Strode). 49 The first three, it will be remembered, had been mentioned by Leonardo Bruni in his 49

"lsta quidem zucca est animabus plena togatis Quas quondam Logicos reputarunt esse profundos, Ast ammiserunt cerebrum per mille baianas. Aut homines asinos dicunt aut esse cavallos, Extinguique sitim iactarunt carne salata. Inter eos stabat vir quidam corpore duplex, Qui sustentatus binis tantum modo gambis. Dicitur hie Utrum, dubiosis sensibus implens Hereticosque facit, negat hanc, probat hunc, tenet illam Et sibimet diris semper dat verbera pugnis. Post haec mattus eos portam conduxit in unam, Introeuntque scolam sapientum philosophorum. Illic astronomi, magici, medicique periti. Illic Entisber, Ferabrich, Averois, Ocham, Illic Burleus, Strodus, Simplicius, Hermes.

1521 ed. pp. 248'-49. This passage is not found in the final redaction of the poem published posthumously in 1552 under the name ofVigaso Cocaio, extracts from which were recently published in the Opere di Teofilo Folengo a cura di Carlo Cordie, Milan [1977], La Letteratura Italiana storia e testiu, Vol. 26, Torno I. It is found, however, in most of the sixteenth and seventeenth century editions which generally follow that of 1521. It is interesting to note that the two-bodied monster called

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lampooning of the English logicians, 50 and all of them except Ferabrich by Angelo Poliziano. 51 But the most virulent, detailed, and well organized attack on sophismata came from the great Spanish humanist, Juan Luis Vives (1492-1540). After receiving an early education in grammar and rhetoric at Valencia, where he was born, he went to Paris in 1509 and entered the College ofMontaigu where he learnt the intricacies of the disputatio de sophismatibus under the Flemish logician, Jean Dullaert, and the mathematician, Gaspar Lax, whom we have already met with as the teachers ofCelaya. 52 Disillusioned by this form of dialectic he left Paris three years later in 1512, and after short stays in Brussels, Louvain, and London, he eventually settled in Bruges, where he remained for the rest of his life. In 1519, while he was at Louvain, he wrote his first diatribe against the modern dialecticians, the In pseudodialecticos, dedicated to his friend, Juan Fort. 53 This book was an immediate success, and a copy having been sent to Thomas More in England, the latter wrote to Erasmus greatly praising the work, to which Erasmus replied "No other man is more fitted to put to rout the battalions of the dialecticians in whose camp he served for a long time". 54 This is, indeed, true ifwe consider the Italian and other northern humanists already mentioned, but it must be remembered that others who were not humanists, such as the two compatriots of Vives, Celaya and de Soto who had also been taught at the College of Montaigu, were also staunch opponents of sophismata. 55 The attacks of Vives followed the pattern of those of Valla and other Italian grammarians and humanists, and were mainly directed against the corruption of the Latin language found in the

sophismata which resulted in a perversion of the pure logic as taught by Aristotle. His main target was the popular text book of Peter of "Utrum", satirizing the scholastics whose quaestiones disputatae usually began with utrum, is also found in Folengo's Chaos del Triperuno (1527), Venice 1546 ed. f.3Y. He is not there called Utrum, but is represented as a protean monster who changes his shape, and eventually, in the form of a beauteous damsel, attempts to lead the hero into the paths of temptation. 50 See supra, p. 108. 51 See supra, p. 112. 52 See supra, p. 98. 53 Juan Luis Vives, In pseudodialecticos. A critical edition introduction, translation and commentary, Charles Fantazzi, Leiden, 1979; C. Vasoli, "G.L. Vives e Ia polemica anti-scolastica nelle In pseudodialecticos", Miscelanea de Estudos a Joachim de Carvalho, 7 (1961), pp. 679-87. 54 Fantazzi, op.cit., introduction, p. 7. Erasmus, Opus epistolarum, ed. P.S. Allen, IV, 1107, pp. 12-13. 55 See supra, pp. 98-99.

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Spain, the Summulae logicales from which students learnt the rudiments ofthis newer way of disputing. But like Petrarch and Salutati he firmly believed in the propaedeutic function of Aristotelian logic and in its value as a preparatory study for the higher disciplines, and was never tired of pointing out how useless the newer logic was for this purpose, "The first thing we teach a boy is that logic is the road to the other disciplines, but in what discipline does anyone in his right mind use such nonsensical and unpleasant trifles". 56 Vives then gives examples of several of the sophismata then current in the Paris schools. He also accuses the sophists of verbal quibbling and of using words either of their own invention which nobody except themselves and their pupils can understand, or old, well-known, words to which they give new meanings quite different from the usual ones. Almost in the very words which Agrippa was to use later in his De vanitate scientiarum he quotes the Trojan horse simile "For I see that it is uncertain who devised these suppositions, amplifications, restrictions, appellations, and exponibles from which issued, as it were from the Trojan horse, the destruction and ruin of all discourse and good disciplines". 57 After the success of the In pseudodialecticos, Vives returned to the attack in book three of his De causis corruptarum artium which formed part of his monumental De disciplinis, published in 1531. In this he uses similar arguments, quotes more sophismata, and mentions more sophists, such as Peter of Mantua, Paul of Venice, Strode, Feribrigge, Thiene, Buridan, Dullaert, Heytesbury, and Ockham. Whether these attacks of Vives, and possibly of other humanists, were gradually having an effect on the Paris masters, or a general dissatisfaction with the sophismata was beginning to arise for other reasons, we hear Vives saying in his In pseudodialecticos that both his former teachers, Dullaert and Lax, had complained to him bitterly that they had spent so many years in such futile studies. 58 Also in a letter to Erasmus dated June 4, 1520, Vives was pleased to report that on a short return visit to Paris he was entertained with great

56 Hoc igitur primum docemus in dialectica puerum, esse hanc viam ad reliquas disciplinas, at qua in disciplina utitur quisquam sana mente istis tam insuavibus et fatuis ineptiis. In pseudodialecticos, p. 33. 57 Nam de hoc parum video constare qui confinxit eis supposJtiOnes, ampliationes, restrictiones, appellationes, exponibilia. Ex quibus rebus tamquam ex equo Troiano totius sermonis et omnium bonarum artium incendium atque ruina exorta sunt. Ibid., p. 57. 58 Dullardum ego et Gasparem Laxem, praeceptores olim meos quas honoris gratia nomino, querentes saepe summo cum dolore audivi se tam multos annos rei tam futili atque inani impendisse. Ibid., p. 91.

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civility by those very sophists whom he had attacked so harshly the year before. 59 In book five of the De causis corruptarum artium, which deals with mathematics and medicine, Vives attacks the foolish subtleties of the calculationes "which the Englishman, Rogerus Suicetus (Swineshead) greatly promoted, and which Joannes Picus called by the most apt name of quisquilias Suiceticas and which are utterly useless for acquiring knowledge or indeed for any purpose whatsoever" .60 Further on in speaking about the scholastic physicians, he says "They also carry into this art, as it were, huge wagon loads of material for disputation, concerning the intension and remission of forms, rarity and density, proportional parts, instants, and things which neither are nor ever will be, airing their dreams and meanwhile forsaking their fight with the diseases in the locality, which afflict and kill people ... One sees the foolish quibblings ofJ acob of Forli which are just as tricky and useless as the suiceticae and no less prolix and boring, and which John Dullaert was often wont to quote in his lectures on natural philosophy. These things", he continues, "can be studied without a knowledge of letters and they are useful for tricking out disputations, for wrangling has no less plagued this art than all the others" .61 Finally he deplores the fact that "so many young students, instructed in these subtleties and quibbles (spinis et captiunculis) but without any knowledge of herbs, zoology or element lore, with no

Erasmus, Epist, ed. Allen, IV, 1108, 5-15. Fantazzi, ibid., p. 7. Invectae sunt cavillationes stultarum subtilitatum quas ipsi calculationes vacant, quibus maxime dedit incrementum Rogerus Suicetus Anglus, quas idcirco loan. Picus quisquilias suiceticas solitus erat aptissimo nomine nuncupare, quas nihil penitus vel ad sciendum conferunt, vel ad usum aliquem. J.L. Vives, De disciplinis libri, septem de corruptis artibus, quinque de tradendis disciplinis, Naples, 1764, pp. 169--70. It is likely that Vives is here confusing Roger Swineshead (Suicetus) with Richard who wrote the influential Liber calculationum. On Roger see J .A. Weisheipl, "Roger Swyneshed O.S.B. Logician, Natural Philosopher, and Theologian", Oxford Studies presented to Daniel Callus, Oxford, 1964, pp. 231-52. 61 Medicis rerum veterum ignaris, et earum quae potissimum ad salutem humani corporis conducerent, aliquid tamen fuit agendum ex scholastica ilia physicae exercitatione. Ingentem et copiosissimam disputandi materiam in hanc quoque artem tanquam plaustris invexerunt, de intentione et remissione formarum, de raritate et densitate, de partibus proportionalibus, de instantibus, ea quae nee sunt nee unquam evenient, ventilantes sua somnia, deserta pugna cum morbis interea loci prementibus atque occidentibus ... Videre est cavillationes, tricas Jacobi Forliviensis, nee minus spinosas, nee minus inutiles quam Suiceticas, nee prolixitate et molestia cedentes, quae nobis Ioannes Dullardus non raro solebat citare in exercitatione physica. Poterant haec coli sine literis, faciebant ad ostentationem disputationum: nam altercationes non minus artem hanc quam reliquas omnes vexaverunt. Ibid., p. 175. 59

60

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experience at all and without wisdom or judgement, are given degrees by an extremely incompetent assembly, and continually sent from the Academy into the nearest towns and villages to practice the rudiments of their art, as if they were a gang of savage butchers". 62 It is clear that Vives had no time for the scholastics, and in book five of his De tradendis disciplinis he even condemns Giovanni Pico, with whom he agrees in so many other matters, for defending them in his letter to Barbaro, saying "There are many words spoken in vain by Johannes Picus in that noble letter to Ermolao. For there are no opinions of A verroes and Scotus, although he himself has chosen them, which I do not condemn both as vile and worthless". 63 So, even if Pico was indulging in a kind of "intellectual tournament", it appears that Vives, in this instance, took him seriously, and that his words fell on deaf ears. In the De tradendis disciplinis, which is the second part of the De disciplinis, Vives adopted the teaching of the famous Frisian humanist, Rudolph Agricola ( 1444-1485). This remarkable man, who has been called, "the Father of German humanism", was a great admirer ofPetrarch, whose life he wrote, and had spent ten years in Italy from 1469 onwards, where he learnt Greek from the famous masters, Battista Guarino and Theodore Gaza, at Ferrara. 64 Returning to the north in 14 79, after a period in Holland, he finally, after much persuasion, entered the household of Bishop von Dalberg at Heidelberg in 1484. Unfortunately his short life was abruptly ended the following year when he contracted a fever on the return journey from a visit to Rome. Probably it was at Ferrara that Agricola commenced his influential De inventione dialectica, although it was not published until after his death, the first edition appearing at Louvain in 1515. In this work Agricola severely criticized scholasticism and vain disputations, and sought to prove that the true function of logic was to be an aid to rhetoric and the art of persuasion, rather than to be simply a demonstrative science in the Aristotelian tradition. Unlike 62 Continuo emittuntur ex Academia in proxima oppida et vicos, ad ponenda rudimenta artis, tanquam manus immitium carnificum. Ibid., p. 175. 63 Quo apparet multa esse verba nequiquam Johanni Pico profusa in ilia ad Hermolaum epistola nobili: non enim res sunt apud Averroem et Scotum, quod ipse sibi sumit, qui a nobis non tam ut sperci quam ut inanes culpantur. Ibid., p. 398. 64 See Spitz, op. cit., chp. 2, and Rodolphus Agricola Phrysius 1444-1485, Proceedings of the International Conference at the University of Groningen, 28-30 October 1985. Ed. F. Akkerman and A.J. Vanderjagt. Leiden, 1988.

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Valla who had subordinated logic to an inferior position in rhetoric, Agricola maintained that logic created and shaped the substance of a speech and persuaded the minds of the hearers. Rhetoric only made the words more pleasing. He thus reduced rhetoric to mere verbal ornament and restored logic to its medieval status of dux directrixque omnium artium. But this type oflogic, unlike the scholastic variety, was argumentation which brought about persuasion through probable arguments, the basis ofwhich was topical invention (ratio locorum) as described by Quintilian and Cicero. Agricola thus succeeded in adapting this humanist logic to the needs of the orator and preacher, and his extremely practical treatise, became much more useful for solving everyday problems concerned with morality, politics and religion, than were the scholastic sophismata. In other words the way to what has been called a more "natural" logic of discovery was opened up, that is to a logic that conformed to the way people think which was later to be developed in greater detail by Ramus. 65 The De inventione dialectica became immensely popular throughout Europe and went through many editions, at least fifteen appearing in Paris alone between 1538 and 1543. In England in 1535 Henry VIII, in his Royal Injunction to Cambridge, directed that students in Arts should read Agricola together with Aristotle, George of Trebizond, and Melanchthon, instead of "the frivolous questions and obscure glosses of Scotus and other scholastics" .66 Before this, in 1509, Alexander Barclay (1475-1552) had translated Brant's satirical Ship of Fools using mainly the Latin version of Locher and adding much material of his own. Thus in chapter 27, "On useless study", his additions form a diatribe against the abuse of logic in the schools, stressing the absurdity of the syllogisms used by students who waste their time on these useless exercises to the neglect of other disciplines. But, like Erasmus and other humanists, he admitted that sometimes logic was of use in discovering the truth and for sharpening the wits of studentsY Further light is thrown on 65 See R.H. Popkin, "Theories of Knowledge", C.H.R.P. (1988), pp. 672-73 and John Monfasani, "Lorenzo Valla and Rudolph Agricola", J.H.P., vol. XXVIII, No.2 (1990), pp. 181-200, who produces convincing arguments to show that Agricola was not so much influenced by Valla as scholars had previously thought. 66 See Spitz, op.cit., p. 30. 67 "One with his speach round turning like a wheale, Of Logike the knottes doth louse and undo, In hande with his sylogisimes, and yet doth he feele Nothing what it meaneth and what longeth thereto: Nowe sortes currit, nowe is in hande Plato

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the state of logic in the schools at a little later date by the remarks of the Eton schoolmaster, Nicholas Udall ( 1505-56) translator from the Latin and author of the first English comic play, Ralph Roister Doister. In his translation of the Apophthegms of Erasmus (1542), when expounding No. 32, "The saying of Socrates unto Euclides beeyng veraye studious of contencious conclusions and cavillacions of subtile reasonyng, he saied: Euclides ye maye percase matche with Sophistes but with men ye cannot have to doo''. Udall offers the following explanation that Sophistrie dooeth no helpe, use, ne service to dooynges in publique affaires or bearyng offices in a common weale. Whiche publique offices whoso is a suiter to have, it behoveth the same not to Another commeth in with Bocarde and Pherison, And out goeth agayne a foole in conclusion, There is nought else but est and non est, Blabering and chiding, as it were Beawles wise They argue nought ells but to prove a man a beast, Homo est asinus is cause of muche strife: Thus passe forth these Fooles the dayes of their life In two syllables, not geving advertence To other cunning, doctrine, or science. I will not say that it is expedient Thee to knowe of Logike the crafte and cunning, For by argument it maketh evident Muche obscurenes, somtime enlumining The minde and sharping the wit in many a thing; But oft yet by it a thing playne, bright and pure Is made diffuse, unknowen, harde and obscure. It is ynough thereof to knowe the grounde And not therin to waste all thy life wholy, Still grutching like unto the frogges sounde, Or like the chattering of the foolishe pye, Ifone affirme, the other will denye: Sophistrie nor Logike with their arte talcatife Shewe not the way unto the booke of life. Leave of suche studie as is unprofitable Without eyther fruite or godly discipline, And give your mindes to sciences lawdable, Where ye may your heart set and encline To Aristotles or Platoes doctrine, And not alway on Logike or Sophistrie. I will not say but that it is a thing divine and muche worth to know Philosophie. Sebastian Brant, Stultifera navis. The Ship of Fooles, translated by Alexander Barclay, London, 1570, ff.52v-54v. "Of unprofitable study". See Aurelius Pornpen, The English Versions of the Ship of Fools, London, 1925, pp. 211-15.

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playe hicke skomer with insolubles and with idle knackes of sophisticacions, but rather to frame and facion hymself to the maners and condicions of menne, and to bee of suche sorte as other menne bee. Udall adds a further note to explain the term "Sophistes", "Sophistes at the fyrst begynnyng were men that professed to bee teachers of wisdome and eloquence, and the name of Sophistes was had in honoure and price, and they wer of the same estimacion and of the veraye same ordre, facultee and science that afterwarde wer called Rhetores, that is Rhetoricians, yea and also Logicians. For when the Sophistes fell to cavillyng, brableyng, and triftyng, by lytle and lytle their estimacion decayed, so that ere the tyme that Socrates lived in, a Sophiste was a name of contempte and hatered, and so is it yet styli unto this day. 68

When, in 1551 Thomas Wilson wrote the first book on logic to be published in England in the vernacular, The Rule ofReason, conteining the Art of Logique, dedicated to the young King Edward VI, it was Agricola's bipart division of logic into invention and judgement, with special emphasis on invention as described in the Topics of Aristotle and Cicero, that he followed. 69 He also has a chapter on the difference between Logic and Sophistry in which he firmly recommends the former, but bitterly attacks the latter in words reminiscent of those used by Agrippa, Sophistrie is ever occupied either in provyng the truthe alwaies to bee false, or els that whiche is false to bee true, so that evermore one part of the argument is either false by usyng some ambiguous word or by not wel applying it to the purpose, or els not framyng it accordyng to the rules: so that a skilful! artificer maie sone putte the vain Sophister to silence by openyng the fraude and declaryng the crafte of his invention. Whereas otherwise an argument made by the rules of Logique cannot be avoyded, but must nedes bee true whosoever saie naie ... And even as a Grammarian is better liked that speketh true and good Latine than he is that speaketh false, even so Logique of itself is good, when Sophistry on the other side is naught. And well may we saie that Sophisters are like those which plaie with false Dice and would make other beleve that thei are true, or els properly to terme them, thei bee like those that go for honest men and are none. 70 68 The Apophthegms of Erasmus translated into English by Nicolas Udall. Literally reprinted from the scarce edition of 1564. Boston, Lincolnshire, 1877, p. 15. I have used the first edition of 1542, p. l4r-v, with its more authentic spelling. Udall's explanation of this apophthegm is quoted by J .0. Halliwell in his, Some account of the popular tracts formerly in the library of Captain Cox, A.D., 1575. London, 1849, p. 20. Hick Scorner is a comical play printed without date by Wynkyn de Worde. It satirizes some of the vices and follies of the age. See Halliwell, Joe. cit. 69 See W.S. Howell, Logic and Rhetoric in England, 1500-1700, New York, 1961, pp. 12-31 for a good account of Wilson's Rule of Reason. 70 I have used the second edition, London, 1552. Sig. B4v- B5r. There is now a modern edition by R.S. Sprague, Northridge, California, San Fernando Valley State College, 1972.

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Four years after Wilson's book Pierre de la Ramee (Petrus Ramus, 1515-72) published in Paris the first edition of his epochmaking Dialectique ( 1555) in which he undertook a complete reform of logic, making it even more remote from scholastic, Aristotelian logic than was Agricola's De inventione. 71 The Dialectique was first translated into English in 1574 by the Scot, Roland Macllmaine at the University of Aberdeen, which then became the first centre of Ramism in the British Isles, soon to be followed by Cambridge, and then, rather later, by Oxford. 72 During the second half of the sixteenth century the scholastic sophismata became less and less popular, and were replaced by the disputatio ordinaria, which continued for a long time to be obligatory, while the logic taught in the schools tended to be less exclusively Aristotelian, more practical and directed towards the needs of the rhetorician and orator, along the lines laid down by Agricola and Ramus. But these changes did not take place without opposition, as the studies of Howell and others have amply shown. Here there is only space to describe briefly what effect these changes had on the disputations, and in this connection the state of affairs in Oxford during the fifteen-eighties is of particular interest. As early as 1550 Edward VI's commissioners had visited Oxford and had destroyed all the books of the scholastic philosophers which they could find, including works of the Mertonians seized from Merton college. 73 This was done in an effort to stamp out all books hostile to the Reformed religion, or which could be considered harmful in any way. But there were undoubtedly other factors at work, and amongst these was almost certainly the humanist reaction against the barbarous and incomprehensible language in which the sophismata were written, a reaction which was typified in Richard Wilson's Rule of Reason quoted above, and dedicated to the King only the year before. By the last quarter of the century there seems to have been a return to a more orthodox Aristotelianism as we learn from a Statute of the University dated March 12, 1585/6, in which it was decreed that "all Bachelaurs and Undergraduats in their Disputations should lay aside their various Authors, such that caused many dissensions and strifes in the Schools, and only follow Aristotle and On Ramus see Howell, ibid., chp. 4. Howell, ibid., pp. 179 ff. 73 Anthony a Wood, The History and Antiquities of the University of Oxford, II, pt. 1, p. 108, quoted by F.A. Yates, "Giordano Bruno's Conflict with Oxford",j.W./., II (1939), pp. 228-29. 71

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those that defend him, and take their Questions from him, and that they exclude from the Schools all steril and inane Questions disagreeing from the antient and true Philosophy". 74 In the same year, 1585, John Case published his Speculum moralium questionum, the first book to issue from the newly formed Oxford press. We gather from this that there was dissension among the students as to the merits of Aristotle and Ramus, Case himself rather favouring the former. 75 Thus there was at this period in Oxford a genuine reaction against medieval scholasticism and especially the sophismata, although it was debatable which form the new Aristotle, or newer logic, was to take. It seems fairly certain that the humanist approach to the language of the disputations was adopted, with its emphasis on grammar and syntax and references to such authorities as Cicero and Quintilian. This is born out by Giordano Bruno's attack on the Oxford masters contained in his Gena de le ceneri, published in England in 1584. In this book, and in his De la causa, principia e uno, also published in England in the same year, Bruno pours scorn on the pedantic learning and too much attention to grammar, as well as on the boorish manners, of the Oxford masters. Exactly like Giovanni Pica della Mirandola before him, he stands up for the scholastics and even for the sophismata, which had been banished from the University, as the late Frances Yates has pointed out. 76 His words are these: But what has disquieted me and and caused me both annoyance and amusement is that, although I have found no purer Latin and Greek than here, for the rest (I speak of the generality) they make a boast of

being totally different from their predecessors, who, caring little for

eloquence and the niceties of grammar, were all intent on those kinds of speculations which these men call Sophisms. But I esteem much more highly the metaphysics of those bygone students, in which respect they went far beyond their lord and master Aristotle (although their work is of uneven value and tainted here and there with vain conclusions and theorems which are neither philosophical nor theological, but merely the fancies of idle wits) than anything that these of the present age have to show, for all their Ciceronian eloquence and rhetorical art. 77

74 Statuta Antiqua Universitatis Oxoniensis, ed. Strickland Gibson, 1931, p. 437, quoted by Yates, op.cit., p. 230. 75 Howell, ibid., pp. 190 ff. 76 Yates, ibid., pp. 231 ff. 77 Giordano Bruno, Opere italiane, ed. G. Gentile, 1925, I, pp. 162-63. Translated by Yates, ibid., p. 233.

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Unlike Pico, Bruno's own writings were not imbued with scholasticism, he was in fact a rabid anti-Aristotelian and he never used the scholastic question technique. He preferred other methods beloved by the humanists, such as the dialogue, the treatise, and the poem, for expressing his ideas. But few voices were raised in the defence of sophismata at this late period, and no important additions were made to this type of literature after the mid sixteenth century. As we have seen, even scientists and philosophers, like Pomponazzi, Nita, Buonamici, Celaya and de Soto, although interested in Mertonian ideas, were against the use of sophismata, so that one can say with reasonable certainty that by the end of the century this form of exercise had virtually disappeared from the curricula of schools and universities. 3. The reaction against quodlibeta

It will be sufficient to recall the reader's attention to what has already been said on this subject, as far as the earlier years are concerned. We have seen that in the theology faculties the quodlibeta tended to lose their original, spontaneous character, to get more and more elaborate as time progressed, and to assume a more literary form. 78 Not long after c.l334 quodlibeta tended to get less numerous and important from the point of view of philosophical content. As early as 1317 Pope John XXII had complained in a letter written from Avignon that things had started to deteriorate in

the Paris Faculty of Theology. He speaks bitterly of theologians who "neglecting useful and necessary doctrines, spent their time on curious, useless and vain questions and subtleties of philosophy by which the discipline itself of study is destroyed, the splendour of its light dimmed, and the subsequent usefulness of the students impeded in a number of ways". 79 Quodlibeta are not specifically mentioned, so they may not have been included in this condemnation which in the preceding paragraph refers to disputationes solemnes et determinationes, in other words the ordinary disputations. A factor which led to the decline of quodlibeta in the second half of the fourteenth century, was that masters gradually ceased to take an active part in such disputations, whereas the role of the 78

See supra, p. 16.

Chart. Univ. Paris, II, p. 200, quoted by Glorieux, La Littirature Quodlibitique, I (1925), p. 57, see alsop. 60. "On ne peut s'empecher de constater que tout cet etalage de raisons est provoque par des questions d'une frivolite incroyable, ou bien au contraire par des abstractions d'une telle subtilite qu'on a peine a en saisir le sens". 79

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bachelors became increasingly greater. As Wippel has suggested, this may well be the reason why, after about 1366, written quodlibeta are often found attributed to the responding bachelor rather than to the presiding master. 80 The Paris Statutes for 1366--1389 for the Faculty of Theology suggest that quodlibetal disputations were still being held there even at that late date. While it is true that a few important quodlibeta were still being composed after about 1330, such as those of Robert Holcot (c.l290-1349) written in Oxford in 1334, it is probable that after about this time this form of disputation ceased to be a significant vehicle for important philosophical and theological ideas. As mentioned earlier, during the fourteenth century commentaries on the Sentences began to supplant the quodlibeta in these particular fields. 81 In the Arts Faculties conditions may well have been worse. As early as around 1300 the questions contained in the Paris manuscript Bibl. Nat. Lat. 16089, discussed earlier, 82 were often of a frivolous nature, such as "whether monks ought to be fatter than other people (f.54v), whether nobles should have pendulous ears (57r), whether one ought to blow into a cap before putting it on (8Y), whether lovers get more pleasure by sight than by touch (55r), which causes most grief to a woman, the death of her lover or that of her husband? (55r), which is the most pleasing time for a woman to converse with her lover, day or night?(58v)," and other similar questions inspired by the ars amandi. This tendency obviously persisted and spread to other universities since in 1518 the dean of the Arts Faculty at Heidelberg thought fit to issue a decree forbidding shameful, lascivious and impudent questions to be disputed de quolibet. 83 Certainly, quodlibetal disputations persisted for much longer in the arts faculties of north-eastern universities than they did in Paris and Oxford, so presumably did the less serious side of the questions. In addition, the very nature of the exercise changed to a remarkable degree, which resulted in masters becoming extremely reluctant to preside over this kind of disputation, for the reasons discussed above. 84 In Italy, on the other hand, where the original technique of the quodlibeta persisted, important texts in this field were being composed as late as 1494, in which year it will be 80 81 82

83 84

Wippel, "Quodlibetal Questions", Les Questions Disputies (1985), p. 181. Supra, p. 50. Supra, p. 37. Quoted by Thorndike, University Records (1949), p. 372. Supra, p. 65.

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remembered, Alessandro Achillini presided over a quodlibetal disputation at Bologna. 85 Information is sadly lacking for quodlibeta composed after this date, and one must await the results of further research before making any dogmatic assertions. But in the present state of our knowledge it certainly looks as though quodlibeta in artibus ceased to be popular during the latter half of the sixteenth century, partly for the same reasons as the decline in popularity of the sophismata which took place during the same period, and partly because masters were expressing their views in other, more individual ways, such as through the dialogue, treatises, orations, letters, and commentaries. It is also probable that masters were spending more time on the obligatory disputationes ordinariae connected with separate parts of the Aristotelian corpus. It is now abundantly clear, through the researches of the late Dr. Charles Schmitt and others, that Aristotelianism did not die with the decline of scholasticism, but rather formed the basis of the curriculum in the arts faculties in most western universities down to the end of the seventeenth century, and even later.

85

Supra, p. 87.

CHAPTER TEN

THE DECLINE OF THE QUAESTIO DISPUTATA IN THE SEVENTEENTH CENTURY Here again it is necessary to warn the reader that very little work has been done on seventeenth-century disputations chiefly because scholars have tended to concentrate on the more important earlier ones, which are exceedingly numerous, and also because the later disputations were thought to be merely student exercises, repetitive, and so of little importance. It is also true that most of the important works by well-known seventeenth century authors were not in scholastic question form, so that it was these non-scholastic treatises, commentaries etc. which received most attention. Large numbers of these seventeenth-century disputations still exist however, most in manuscript, but some in print, as a glance at Lohr's Renaissance Latin Aristotle Commentaries will reveal. This survey only covers the late sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries, for the period after this, up to the end of the eighteenth century, there is a dearth of information. Before discussing the fate of the scholastic quaestio in the seventeenth century in any detail, it is necessary to mention that while the popularity of scholasticism had been declining in most European universities, there were regions, particularly in the Iberian peninsula and Italy, where it continued to flourish. Thus in the Jesuit College ofCoimbra important commentaries on the Aristotelian corpus, in scholastic question form, were produced between 1592 and 1605 which were frequently reprinted throughout the seventeenth century. 1 Much influenced by humanism, these questions were based on Greek texts, rather than on Latin translations, and were meant to be used by scholars who knew Greek, so that they exhibit an interesting combination of scholastic and humanist views in the interpretation of the Stagirite. Also as regards technique, the commentaries employ not only the quaestio 1 See Schmitt, "Towards a reassessment of Renaissance Aristotelianism", Studies (1981), VI, p. 169, and "Philosophy and Science in sixteenth century universities", Ibid., V, p. 309, and the literature there quoted. For examples ofCoimbrian disputations, see Appendix 8.

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disputata but also the quaestiones et responsiones without argument, and the literary form of the treatise. In the College of St. Thomas at Alcala scholastic questions on the libri naturales were being printed as late as 1719, but based on the teaching of Thomas Aquinas, not containing the Greek text or influenced by humanism, simply continuing the, by then, rather old-fashioned tradition of medieval scholasticism. 2 The Scotist tradition, too, was followed both in Italy and Spain during the seventeenth century. The Franciscan, Gaspar de Fontis (Fuentes), wrote scholastic Quaestiones dialecticae et physicae ad mentem Scoti, published at Lyon in 1631, and based on disputations held at Rome before he became professor of theology at Alcala. Another Franciscan, Philip Faber of Faenza published scholastic disputations, based on Scotus, at Venice in 1613 and 1619, and at Paris in 1620. Bartholomaeus Mastris of Meldola and Bonaventura Bellutus of Catania, jointly published a collection of scholastic disputations on the Aristotelian Physics, inspired by Scotus, at Venice in 1644. 3 It is also important to remember that the highly influential scholastic, Aristotelian, commentaries and the Disputationes metaphysicae ( 1597) of the Jesuit philosopher, Francisco Suarez ( 15481617) were frequently published during the seventeenth century in many parts ofEurope. 4 Meanwhile, elsewhere in Germany, France, and Italy, commentaries and epitomes were being written in question form, not syllogistic, but rather in the form of the simple question and answer used in the ps. Aristotelian Problema/a. The answers were often long and discursive, as in the Summa Philosophiae quadripartita ( 1609) of the Cistercian, Eustachius a Sancto Paulo, reprinted at Cologne in 1616, the earlier Aristotelis Ethicorum libri decem in gratiam et usum studiosorum breviter et perspicue per Quaestiones expositi of Samuel Heiland published at Leipzig in [1578], and the Quaestiones physicae, of Joannes Freigius, first published at Basel in 1579, and several times later, to mention only three out ofmany. 5 A similar procedure was adopted by seventeenth-century physicians who included these non-scholastic questions in their comz Cf. Collegii Sancti Thomae Complutensis in octo Libras Physicorum Aristotelis Quaestiones, secunda editio, Compluti, 1719. First edition was in 1712. See C.H. Lohr, "Metaphysics", C.H.R.P. (1988), p. 619. 3 On all these Scotists see, Thorndike, H.M.E.S., VII (1958), chp. 15, "The Scotist Revival" and E. Kessler, "The Intellective Soul", C.H.R.P., pp. 509 ff. 4 On Suarez see John A. Trentman, "Scholasticism in the seventeenth century", The C.H.L.M.P. (1984), pp. 822 ff. 5 On Freigius and S. Paulo see C.B. Schmitt. "The Rise of the Philosophical Outlook", C.H.R.P., pp. 800 & 802. For Heiland, see jill Kraye, "Moral Philosophy", ibid., pp. 306 & 329.

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mentaries on Avicenna and Galen. A typical example is the commentary on the Canon of Avicenna by Santorio Santorio, professor of medicine at Padua 1611-24. 6 He was an experienced practitioner of medicine and inventor of numerous medical instruments, several of which he describes in his commentary. He thus typifies the tendency of physicians since the mid sixteenth century to discuss more and more the practical side of medicine and subjects connected with anatomy, the heart, and blood vessels. 7 In England the fight against scholasticism was continued into the seventeenth century. Francis Bacon spoke eloquently against it in his Advancement of learning ( 1605) in these words "Surely, like as many substances in nature which are solid do putrefy and corrupt into worms, so it is the property of good and sound knowledge to putrefy and dissolve into a number of subtile, idle, unwholesome, and (as I may term them) vermiculate questions, which have indeed a kind of quickness and life of spirit, but no soundness of matter or goodness of quality. This kind of degenerate learning did chiefly reign amongst the schoolmen ... who did out of no great quantity of matter, and infinite agitation of wit, spin out unto us those laborious webs of learning which are extant in their books. For the wit and mind of man, if it work upon matter which is the contemplation of the creatures of God, worketh according to the stuff and is limited thereby; but if it work upon itself, as the spider worketh his web then it is endless and brings forth indeed cobwebs of learning admirable for the fineness of thread and work, but of no substance or profit". 8 One is reminded of the words of the twelfth-century Etienne de Tournai, quoted earlier, concerning the Paris masters, "catching empty words with their sophisms, like flies in a spider's web" .9 In this same book and in other works, such as the Novum organum (1620), and the posthumous Sylva sylvarum (1627), he advocates the use of experiments for testing theories, a procedure which tended to concentrate on things more than on words, and to discredit pure Commentaria in primam Fen primi libri Canonis Avicennae, Venice, 1625. On Santorio see Siraisi, Avicenna in Renaissance !tal)' ( 1987), pp. 206-09. 8 The Philosophical Works of Francis Bacon, ed. J.M. Robertson, London, 1905, p. 55. 9 Supra, p. 40. It is interesting to see this spider web motif being used by Schoonhovius in his popular book of emblems, Emblemata partim moralia, partim etiam civilia, first edition Gouda, 1618, and numerous subsequent editions, Emblem 64, "In Sophistas", with an engraving of a woman poking a spiders web with a stick, over the following verses: Ingenti studio componit Arenea telam, Et tamen a cunctis spernitur illud opus. Sic magnas magno promis molimine nugas Dum vigilas studiis vane Sophista tuis. 6

7

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Aristotelianism as it was taught in the universities. These institutions, in fact, were not the nurseries of the new, experimental philosophy, progress in this field taking place rather in private Societies not subject to university rules and procedures, the most important being the Royal Society, founded in 1661. Also in 1605 there was published in London a textbook on logic by the Christ Church scholar, John Argall, called Ad artem dialecticam introductio, in which he discourages the reading of the books of the scholastics "entangled with thorny and intricate questions" (libros spinosis et intricatis quaestionibus et quidditatibus involutos). The authors which are to be avoided are "Dorbellus, Scotus, Hispanus, J avellus, Egideus, Lambertus, Tartaretus, et eius fermenti similes". Instead, he recommends the reading of the classical logicians such as Aristotle, Porphyry, Boethius, Ammonius, and Gilbertus Porretanus, and more modern ones such as Agricola, Mathesius, Melanchthon, Erythraeus, and Keckermann. 10 This shows that conditions which prevailed in the 1580s, described above, were still present in the early seventeenth century. It is indeed probable that they continued for much longer since in 1653 John Webster was complaining in his Academiarum ex amen of similar defects in the curricula of universities. In this book he deplores the slavish following of Aristotle and the adherence to scholastic disputations and recommends, amongst other things, that the professors should follow the advice of Francis Bacon and spend more time on experiment and practical affairs. 11 The following year he was answered by Seth Ward, Lord Bishop of Salisbury, in his Vindiciae academiarum (1654), who tried to show that things were not so bad as Webster had thought. He maintained that there was often disagreement with Aristotelian theories and that experiment was by no means neglected in the universities. This was, in fact, true and Seth Ward himself became one of the founder members of the Royal Society. Webster had recommended the reading of Plato and modern authors such as Bodin, Descartes, Comenius, instead of Aristotle, but Seth Ward defended the readThis is followed by a commentary which heaps scorn on the sophists, beginning, "Apposite Aranearum telis vani Sophistarum Elenchi, et captiones aequiparantur, licet enim magna Iabore construantur, nihil aliud tamen sunt quam quisquiliae volantes, et venti spolia", and quoting Origen, Gregory Nazianzenus, Tertullian, Plutarch and Seneca. An earlier emblematist, Barthelemy Aneau, also lampooned the sophists in his Piela poesis, Lyon, 1552 which depicts animals battling for sup,remacy, see R.J. Clements, Piela Poesis, Roma, 1960, p. 97. 0 On Argall and his book, see I. Thomas, "Medieval Aftermath: Oxford Logic and Logicians of the seventeenth century", Oxford Studies Presented to Daniel Callus, Oxford, 1964, pp. 297-311.

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ing of the latter, on the grounds of the "universallity of his Enquiries, the brevity and Method of them, fitting them for Institutions, and not the truth or infallibility of his Workes'. 12 It is clear that Ward was not referring to the medieval, scholastic Aristotle, but to the more orthodox, purer, Aristotle recommended by the Oxford statute of 1585. But even if in some colleges the yoke of scholasticism had been cast off, in others it probably still persisted. At any rate in some quarters scholastic quaestiones were still being studied, if we take into account Oxford publications of the seventeeth century. Among these is the vast Logica compiled by the Polish Jesuit, Martin Smiglecki, first published in Ingolstadt in 1618 and later at Oxford in 1634 and 1638. This work was full oflengthy scholastic disputations mostly dealing with logic and metaphysics. 13 An edition of Buridan's Quaestiones on the Nicomachian Ethics was published at the same place in 1637, and one of Ockham's influential Summa totius logicae as late as 1675. But, as Trentman says, "it is very hard to find any evidence that the book found perceptive readers who made use of its contents". He further asks "who reads these books?", referring to the numerous reprintings, chiefly on the continent, of the works of medieval, scholastic authors during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. 14 They were certainly present in university libraries and in the private libraries of contemporary scholars, as their catalogues reveal. Trentman seems to think that they had little impact, but I am of the opinion that not enough work has been done in this field, and that further research may well show that such books had considerably more influence than has been suspected. It is also worth mentioning that interest in sophismata was still present in Germany during the whole of the second half of the seventeenth century, a fact witnessed by the popular De modo solvendi sophismata of Fridemann Bechmann (1628-1703) first published at Leipzig in 1648, followed by at least another eight editions up to that of 1711. 15 If the character of the disputations changed during the period under discussion, the disputations themselves continued to be used 11 See R.K. Merton, "Science in Seventeenth Century England". Osiris, IV (1938), pp. 381 & 390. 12 Vindiciae Academiarum, Oxford, 1654, p. 39. 13 I. Thomas, op.cit., pp. 304-05. 14 Op.cit., p. 834. 15 See Wilhelm Risse, Bibliographia Logica, Band I 1472-1800, Hildesheim 1965, which gives a list of the editions.

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in universities, as necessary preliminaries to obtaining a degree or a professorship, up to at least the end of the 18th century. For Oxford we are fortunate in having a list of the Quaestiones debated by students incepting for the M.A. in Arts, between the years 1576 and 1622, edited by A. Clark in 1887, 16 and the Notebook of John Day, written in 1586, preserved in the Bodleian manuscript, Rawlinson D 274, which also lists disputations. 17 These collections, as we should expect, exhibit a mixture of scholasticism and humanism, both in the nature of the questions asked, in the use of Greek, and in the choice of authorities quoted. Thus in the first series we find typical Renaissance themes such as "Should women be taught letters?" (An foeminae sint literis instruendae?). We also find questions dealing with various forms of occultism, astrology, and alchemy, and sceptical questions such as "Is contradiction the height of learning?" (An contradicere sit summa scientiae?), and "Is there any certain knowledge of things?" (An sit ceria rerum scientia?). The older, scholastic type of question is represented by enquiries concerning vision, "Is vision by extramission?" (An visus sit extramittendo?), and discussions about the plurality of worlds. In the second series (1586) we find such scholastic questions as "Is the natural body a subject of physical" (An corpus naturale sit subiectum physicae?), and questions about motion, such as "Is motion in the movable or the moving object?" (An motus sit in mobili vel in movente?), and "Are mixed things moved by the motion of the predominant element?" (An mixta moveantur ad motum elementi predominantis?). Some humanistic questions are "Is friendship a virtue?" (An amicitia sit virtus?), with a quotation from Plato in Greek, and "Is the power of reasoning in brutes?" (An ratio insit brutis?). The authorities quoted include Galen, Thomas Aquinas, the Cairnbra Commentators, Toledo, Fonseca, Javellus, Piccolomini, Zanchius, and Zabarella. Various other collections of academical theses for disputation have been printed, such as those of William Craig(Cragius) who lists thirty-three theses for scholars incepting at Edinburgh U niversity in 1599 (Theses philosophicae et ex iis illatae conclusiones quas propugnaturi sunt adolescentes Magistri candidati e scholis Edinburgi philosophicis triginta tres. Edinburgi 1599), and the Thesium philosophicarum 16 Listed in Register of the University of Oxford, ed. A. Clark, II (1887) (Oxford Historical Society, vol. 10, pp. 170-217), and see Schmitt, "Philosophy and Science in sixteenth century Universities", Studies (1981), V, pp. 498,500-01, 525, ns. 95 & 98. 17 See Schmitt, ibid., V, p. 524, n. 79; H. Kearney, Scholars and Gentlemen: Universities and Society in Pre-Industrial Britain 1500-1700, London 1970, p. 82.

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libri tres in Academia Parmensi propositi, Brixiae, 1616, of the Jesuit, Octavius Turricellius. The latter consists of disquisitions on Aristotelian Logic (7 chps.), Physics (20 chps.), and Metaphysics (7 chps.), from which, it is to be supposed, the candidates were to choose or be given the material for their disputations. As regards medical disputations of this nature, we have the invaluable pioneer work 9f A. Germain who, in 1886, published his Les Anciennes Theses de !'Ecole de Medicine de Montpellier, in which he examines the theses disputed by both students incepting and professors applying for a chair, from c.l567 to c.l792, at which time all the faculties were suppressed. As regards theses for inception, the earliest printed collection he describes is that of Stephen Geiger published at Montpellier in 1606 (Quaestiones medicae ex consensu illustrissimi regii medicorum Collegii pro singulis ordine gradibus in alma Monspeliensium Universitate consequendis, in maiori aula disputatae, propugnante Stephana Geiger Noribergensi. Monspelii, 1606). As was to be expected, all the questions in this first group dealt with theoretical and practical medicine, including surgical procedures, anatomy, dietetics, and pharmacology. Similar disputations were necessary preliminaries to obtaining professorships in medicine and chemistry, and Germain devoted considerable space to a discussion of these. Among the earliest were those disputed by the French physician, Laurent Joubert (1529-85) at Montpellier in 1567. One notices in these disputations the persistence, particularly in the earlier ones, of medieval questions, often Salernitan, such as whether vision is due to extramission or intramission (1567), whether wounds bleed in the presence of the murderer ( 1618, 1659, 1668), whether conception can occur without pleasure (1618) and whether the imagination of the mother can affect the foetus ( 1732). But these are comparatively few, and on the whole Renaissance themes dominate, or practical questions dealing with anatomy, surgery, and chemistry. In the former group may be mentioned, whether women are more perfect than men (1617), questions dealing with astrology (1638, 1659, 1674, 1790), demonology, (1638, 1668), magic cures (1668), lycanthropy (1618, 1638, 1697), fascination, incantation, and spells (1659, 1673), love philters and quaestiones amatoriae ( 1618, 1659), nourishment by poison ( 1668), prophecy (1658), alchemy (1697), cure of incubus by the Elixir of Paracelsus (1697), power of music to cure diseases of the mind and body and the bite of the Tarantula ( 1732, 1790), whether the seat of the soul is in the brain ( 1776), physiognomy ( 1769), and questions concerning the origin and cure of venereal disease ( 1658, 1659, 1731, 1732).

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More modern themes are represented by questions about the circulation of the blood and Harvey's theory (1761, 1776), blood transfusion ( 1732), effects of coffee ( 1731), animal magnetism and sleep-walking ( 1790), and anatomical, surgical and chemical questions which are very numerous. In this last group it is interesting to see the increasing interest in the use of chemical medicines. This includes the question whether it is possible to prepare a universal panacea by the chemical art ( 1698), and a question as to whether the powers of chemical medicines are best found out by chemical analysis or by experiment ( experientia) in the field ( 17 48), the latter method being preferred. Although Germain describes in great detail the formalities of inception and the steps towards gaining a professorship, such as the Oration, Inauguration, laudatory and congratulatory poems, and the various Acts etc. he says little about the actual, technical procedure followed at these later, academical disputations. However, from the titles of the printed results of these disputations it would seem that they resembled a modern oral examination in medicine rather than the genuine intellectual debate of the medieval quaestio disputata. Thus candidates for a vacant chair of medicine, having submitted their names two months before, were given a list of questions, usually twelve, to be disputed at a given time and on a given date, before a jury consisting of the Chancellor of the School of Medicine and three regent professors. In addition Church dignatories were also present to preside over the proceedings, such as the bishop of Montpellier and his vicar general. The jury then fired questions at the candidate, presumably relating to the questions which had already been submitted, which he has to argue with them as best he can by means of "skilled and vigorous disputation" (per sollertem et strenuam disputationem). The printed results of these disputations recorded by Germain contain the names of the contestants, those of the professors who for some reason have left vacant chairs, and those of the jurors. Then a list of the questions discussed is given, with the final solutions. The actual debates which the contestants had with the members of the jury are not recorded, so it is difficult to know exactly how the whole exercise was conducted. One would like to know, for instance, exactly how these later academical disputations differed from the 13th-century medical disputatio ordinaria or sollempnes of Peter house 178. Similar academical disputations took place in the Paris Faculty of Medicine during the 17th and 18th centuries, but in Germany the inaugural dissertation seems to have been preferred by students incepting for a doctoral degree. Although this was dedicated to a

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president (praeses), usually a professor of the faculty, and sometimes contained questions, it bore no resemblance whatsoever to the quaestio disputata. There was no syllogistic argumentation and the dissertation was usually divided up into numbered paragraphs or chapters in which were presented the views of the student on the subject of the dissertation. Quite apart from the academical disputations mentioned above were the disputations held by students in logic as preparatory exercises. The technique of these has been described in numerous treatises. One of the earliest is the De arte opponendi et respondendi, discovered by Grabmann in a Paris manuscript. This was formerly thought to date from the thirteenth century, but is now considered to belong to the fifteenth. 18 Their origin seems to lie in the logical treatises dealing with Obligations which date from at least as early as the first half of the thirteenth century. By the early fourteenth century they began to proliferate, one of the earliest being the De Obligationibus of the Mertonian, Walter Burley composed in 1302. 19 They were designed as ingenious exercises of varying complexity, a sort of game to be played by beginners in the art of logic which would teach them how to dispute, following certain strict rules. The role of the "opponent" was to force the "respondent" to admit a self-contradictory or impossible conclusion following from the original premise. The role of the "respondent" was to uphold his original premise so that nothing impossible could be drawn from it. Although these exercises were not designed specifically for detecting fallacies or ambiguities like the sophismata, E. Stump has pointed out that one species of disputation for investigating fallacies belonging to the first half of the thirteenth century has as its goal redargutio, the forced denial of something previously granted or the granting of something previously denied. This is very similar to the goal of Obligations, as for example in 18 M. Grabmann, Handschriftliche Forschungen und Mitteilungen ;:um Schrifttum des Wilhelm von Conches. Sit;:ungsberichte der Bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. Phi los. Hist. Abteilung, 1935, Heft 10, pp. 38-40; Weisheipl, "Developments in the Arts Curriculum" ( 1966), p. 164; Angelelli, "The techniques of disputation in the history oflogic",j.P., 67 (1970), p. 802. 19 On Obligations see Weisheipl, ibid., pp. 163-65; L.M. De Rijk, "Some thirteenth century tracts on the game of Obligations", Vivarium, 12. No. 2, pp. 94-123, No. 13, pp. 22-54, No. 14, pp. 26-49 (1974-1976); E. Stump, "A. Obligations from the beginning to the early fourteenth century; B.P.V. Spade, Obligations: Developments in the fourteenth century", C.H.L.M.P. ( 1982), pp. 335-41; C.H. Kneepkens, "The Mysterious Buser Again: William Buser of Heusden and the Obligations tract Ob rogatum", A. Maieru, English Logic in Italy (1982), pp. 147-66.

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the De Obligationibus of Burley. 2 ° Called by Angelelli the modern or "argument" method, he thought that this technique achieved its greatest success during the seventeenth and early eighteenth centuries. In describing it he largely follows the earlier work ofFrideric Heine, the Methodus disputandi hodierna ex variis autoribus collecta (Helmstedt, 1710), but also quotes several other seventeenth and eighteenth century works dealing with the same subject. 21 As Heine says "the modern opponens does not ask, but argues". Definite rules are laid down as to the ways the two disputants should reply to each other's arguments, and these rules tend to get fewer in number and less complicated as time progressed. In Cambridge such exercises were used up to as late as 1838, and it would appear from the researches of G. Chawner and others that the senior Soph, called the Respondens had to maintain before inception three questions against three other Sophs called Opponentes. As a rule the first two questions were mathematical and the third moral or metaphysical, though this was not always the case. 22 A manuscript in my possession also gives us some interesting details. It has the title Methodus instituendae disputationis philosophicae, and occupies pp. 114--22 of a volume containing commentaries and scholastic quaestiones on Aristotelian logic. It was written in 1670--71 by a certain Robert McDonald from the dictation of Magister Jacobus Pilanus (James Pilan), one of the regent masters at Edinburg University during the latter part of the seventeenth century. 23 Pilan starts by comparing the art of disputation with the art of oratory. He who pronounces well is esteemed to be a good orator, so he who is good at disputation is held to be a good "all-rounder" (utramque, ut dicunt, paginamfecisse) in scholastic exercises. Amongst the benefits of disputation he says that by far the most valuable asset is that it sharpens (or polishes) the wits (Ionge praestantissimus

Stump, ibid., p. 116. Angelelli, op.cit. pp. 806-07. 22 For details of the method ofprocedure see G. Chawner, "The Thesis in the Disputations of the Senior Sophs at Cambridge 1770-1838", in Fasciculus loanni Willis Clark dicatus, Cambridge, 1909, 277-88. 23 Later Mss. No. 16. In Edinburgh University Library there are printed editions of five disputations presided over by James Pilan, dating from 1660 to 1681, and see Kearney, Scholars and Gentlemen (1970), p. 155. The librarian ofEdinburgh University Library, J.V. Howard, informs me that there are three Dictates on Philosophy by James Pilan in the Department of Manuscripts, dated 1662 (De. 6.6), 1672-73 (De. 6.4-5), and 1672-73 (Gen. 2028). Pilan is also referred to by Jonquil Bevan, "Seventeenth Century Students and their Books", Four Centuries, Edinburgh University Life, 1583-1983, edited by Gordon Donaldson, Edinburg, 1983. 22-23. 20

21

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est ingeniorum quasi lima, et ea omnium fortis sima), 24 thus echoing the sentiments of the humanists from Petrarch onwards. He then goes on to say how much the modern way of disputing differs from the old, Aristotelian way in which they employed a long series of questions and ambiguities (ambages), diligently noting down the replies to each question before finally coming to syllogisms. But nowadays, he says it is not expedient to recall, as it were from the depths, that ancient method of disputing now long since discarded and buried, because of its tediousness and vexation. 25 He then proceeds to give in detail the duties of both the proponens and respondens. In the first place, he points out that it is customary amongst all scholars and academics everywhere that the disputants should agree about one particular thesis for disputation, or about several supplementary ones deduced from it. He who proposes the thesis is bound to defend it, and therefore to reply to objections brought against it, hence he is usually called the defendens or respondens. He, however, who advances objections and arguments against the thesis is called the proponens or impugnans. If the thesis should be ambiguous or obscure, the respondens should, in the beginning, explain to the proponens the meaning and exact sense of the thesis, it being his duty to see that the disputants should not seem to be, as it were, contending with ghosts (quasi cum larvis luctari) because of the ambiguity of the thesis, or to fight like thieves. 26 This agrees with one of the conditions mentioned by Angelelli (following Heine). Pilan then enters into the technicalities of the ways the two disputants should argue, starting with the proponens who has two chief methods of overthrowing the thesis. The first is for him to advance an argument which leads the repondens into trouble, and the second is for him to propose an argument which clearly concludes against the pronouncement of the thesis. He elaborates further on these two methods, and then discusses in detail the ways in which the respondens should reply. He ends by saying, "While the disputation is proceeding in this way, it will continue until either the proponens agrees with a particular distinctio or the respondens is reduced to some manifest disadvantage, with the result that through natural laws p. 115. Tempore Aristotelis et ante eum Ionge alia fuit disputandi ratio quam que meliora studiosorum fata nunc obtinet. Tunc enim disputationem instituebant per longam quaestionum seriem et ambages, responsiones vera ad singulas diligenter annotaverunt, deinde tandem accedebatur ad syllogismum ... Verum nunc non expedit veterem illam disputandi rationem ob ipsius taedium ac molestiam iam olim explosam et sepultam quasi ab inferis revocare. p. 115. 26 P· 116. 24

25

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(insitis constitutis), at least by his silence, he confesses that he is beaten. And it also sometimes happens that the proponens being, as it were, reduced to silence, becomes exhausted and is unable to devise a medium promptly, in order to advance a fresh syllogism or argument. Then, surely, it will be fitting for the respondens to exult and be elated, and to allow modestly that he carries the day, without insult or clamour, which ill becomes noble youths". 27 On the whole the rules detailed by Pilan do not differ greatly from those described by Angelelli in his account of the "argument method". We learn from Pilan's account that in the later seventeenth century vanquishing an opponent in argument seemed to be the main object of this kind of exercise, as indeed it was in medieval times, and we are reminded of the words ofGianfranceso Pico when discussing sophismata in the life of his Uncle, 28 and those of Pirckheimer in his Epistola apologetica of 1517. 29 It is true that at one point Pilan does mention the necessity for disputing in order to discover the truth. 30 But he is then probably referring to the ultimate aim of the more advanced quaestiones disputatae rather than to these preparatory exercises. Pilan's treatment of the Organon follows the older, scholastic method of expositio una cum quaestionibus with objections and responses, showing that this method of dealing with the Aristotelian corpus was still used in 1670-71. Even if the actual technique of the disputations had changed, masters themselves continued to follow in the footsteps of the schoolmen in their own writings, that is in the outward form of the exercise. Pilan's lectures, it must be emphasized, were dictated and taken down by a pupil. One gathers from this that there was no disputation in the medieval sense of the word, and that the many objections and responses were all worked out in detail by the master himself with a definite teaching end in view-rather like the carefully edited and revised quaestiones disputa27 Dum hoc modo disputatio procedit erit eo usque continuando donee vel proponens in distinctione aliqua acquieverit vel repondens fuerit ad manifestum aliquod incommodum reductus, ex quo insitis constitutis silentio saltern fateatur se victum. Et contingit etiam interdum ut proponens ad silentium quasi reductus, fatiscat nee possit medium prompte excogitare ad novum syllogismum siYe argumentum proponendum, nempe tunc decebat respondentem insultare et insolescere, sed modeste permittere ut scenam deferat sine contumeliis aut conYitiis que minime decent ingenuos adolescentes. p. 122. 28 Supra, p. 112. 29 supra, p. 115. 3 ° Cum igitur ad veritatem et facilius et certius indagandam magnus sit usus et necessitas disputandi ut et veritas confirmetur et obiectiones contra earn diluantur, operae pretium erit melioris illius disputandi formulae quae iam diu invaluit hyptyposin sive deliniationem quandam proponere. p. 115.

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tae of the later medieval scholastics. In his choice of authorities Pilan shows familiarity with medieval authors such as Thomas Aquinas and Duns Scotus, as well as with more recent authorities such as Ramus and Suarez. Throughout the disputation he shows a good knowledge of Greek. Thus here again we find that mixture of scholasticism and humanism which was to be a feature of the later quaestiones disputatae until their final demise sometime in the next century. McDonald was probably a scholar of limited means and so had to write out himself the dictated lectures or disputations of the master. But in the case of the more wealthy pupils the commentaries and disputations of masters were taken down or copied by professional scribes. A very good example is again in my collection. Written in France c.1643 in a very neat chancery hand, the manuscript is in three volumes and consists of commentaries and quaestiones disputatae on the Physica, De Caelo, De generatione et corruptione, Meteora, De anima, Metaphysica, and EthicaY Stamped in gilt on the covers of each volume, within a finely decorated, arabesque cartouche, is the name of the owner-scholar, IOANNES DE CHABONS, perhaps a member of the family ofJean-Pierre de Gallien de Chabons, Bishop of Amiens (1756-1838). As in the case ofPilan's Commentary and Quaestiones on the Organon, it is probable that these questions on the Aristotelian corpus were also carefully edited and dictated. It is unfortunate that there is no indication of the author, and the only clue to the date, apart from the calligraphy, is found in Vol I (Physica) f.284" in the section dealing with De duratione mundi. There he states "A creatione mundi ad hunc usque annum millesimum sexcentesimum quadragesimum tertium (1643) ejfiuxerunt anni". Certainly the calligraphy and ownership would point to a French origin. The technique is similar to that used by Pilan later, except that instead of Theses we have Conclusiones, with several objections and replies. Often there is a formula such as prior conclusio, altera pars conclusionis, altera conclusio, followed by inquies, obiicies, or instabis, each objection being followed by a respondeo. An interesting feature is that incorporated into the text of the scholastic questions on the Meteora is an Appendix de rebus metallicis et Jossilibus (Vol. I, ff.406v44'). This includes an account of gemstones, quoting Georgius Agricola (De re metallica, 1556) and Franciscus Rueus (De gemmis, 1547) and is in the form of a short treatise. Thus, although the author uses the old, scholastic question-form for the bulk of his 31

Later Mss, foreign, No. 5.

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Commentary, he is obviously not averse to using the later, Renaissance technique of the treatise for some of his more scientific material, a combination which we also found in the Coimbra commentaries. The choice of subjects discussed and authorities quoted also shows this combination of scholastic and Renaissance learning, with Aristotle forming, as it were, the backbone of all the discussions. For example, in the Comm. in physica, disputatio proemialis, vol. I, ff.6v-9v, De ingenio et libris Aristotelis et divisione, he quotes, besides ancient authors such as Theophrastus, Epicurus, Plato, Pythagoras, Renaissance scholars such as Franciscus Patricius ( 1529-97), and Celius Rhodiginus ( c.l450-1525). In the disputation An materia sit pura potentia (vol. I, ff. 44v-54v) he contrasts the views of Avicenna and the Thomists with those of Aristotle. In discussing Antiperistasis (1, ff. 342r-45r he refers to the ancient, Salernitan question which asks "why are wells warmer in winter than in summer?". 32 In answering this question he gives the opinions not only of ancient authors, such as Galen, and late scholastics like Paul of Venice and Marsili us of lnghen, but also of moderns, such as the two Spaniards, Franciscus Vallesius ( 1524-92) and Caramuel Lobkowitz ( 1606-82) and the Italian, Girolamo Cardano (1501-76). In a long disputation De intensione et remissione qualitatis (1, 347v351 r), the author upholds the "addition theory" of qualitative augmentation favoured by Duns Scotus, whom he quotes, and by what he calls the, "vulgus philosophorum', and argues against the Thomists among whom he includes Durandus (Durandus de Sainct Pourc;ain d.1334). His arguments are based partly on "quarto physico rum textu 84". It is interesting to note that there seems to be no influence by Heytesbury and the Merton school with their logico-mathematical approach to the problem, but rather a return to the more physical and philosophical approach of Aristotle. This of course bears out the observations of the late Charles Schmitt who maintained that there was a revival of purer Aristotelianism during the first half of the seventeenth century producing an even stronger tendency towards this kind of philosophy than that which prevailed in the first half of the previous century. 33 Other Renaissance characteristics are the author's use of Greek Lawn, Prose Salernitan Questions ( 1979), p. 54 (B. 11 7). "Philosophy and Science in sixteenth century Universities", Studies ( 1981), V, p. 513. 32

33

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143

words and reference to Greek authors, such as Plato, Plotinus, Plutarch, Origen, ps. Dionysius (De celesti hierarchia) and Hermes Trismegistus. He is also familiar with the works of Paracelsus, quoting his De hominis spiritu in a disputation about angels (vol. 11, f. 16lv), with the Elegantiae linguae latinae of the humanist Lorenzo Valla when discussing such words as hypostasis and persona (II, f.l40'), and with at least some of the writings of Galileo whom he mentions in connection with the naming of a star near Jupiter. 34 There is not the space here to discuss in any further detail the philosophical and scientific content of this most interesting manuscript, neither is it the object of this investigation to trace the history of ideas, its main purpose being, as it was stated in the beginning, to follow through the centuries the fortunes of a particular method used in teaching in the schools and universities, i.e. the quaestio disputata. But I think enough has been said to show that this manuscript demonstrates very clearly that in some quarters, probably the older universities, this method was still being used in the mid seventeenth century for teaching a very broad spectrum of knowledge, based it is true, on a foundation of Aristotelianism, but incorporating much early and late scholastic philosophy, Renaissance ideas, and contemporary scientific knowledge. It would, indeed, be hard to find a better example of the continuity of both methodology and ideology, and yet I am sure many such manuscripts must exist in the larger libraries of Europe which have not yet received the attention they deserve. It is clear, even now, that there was no sudden break in teaching methods, but that changes took place very gradually over a long period of time. It will be noticed that I have said little about the mathematical content of my manuscript, and in fact that is a feature which is lacking, or very poorly represented. It is true that there is a long disputation De distinctione quantitatis a materia, but this is entirely philosophical, discussing the views of Ockham and the vulgi philosophi. There are also several references to the geometrae and mathematici in connexion with such subjects as divisibilia and indivisibilia, but nowhere does the author attempt a purely mathematical explanation of phenomena. What eventually led to the disappearance of the quaestio disputata from the curriculum was the rise of the experimental method, the realization of the inadequacy of Aristotelianism and scholasticism to explain phenomena in the physical world, and the substitution of reasoning 34 "quae circa Iovem sunt Galileus ducis hetruriae mathematicus a nomine principis sui astra medicea vocavit". Vol. I, f.308'.

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based on measurement and mathematics for the old logic of the schools? 35 Once these changes had taken place the methods of teaching also changed. The essentially Aristotelian disputation was displaced by the straightforward question-and-answer technique without argument, by the classroom lecture, and in the written field, by learned essays, dissertations, and treatises.

35 See Schmitt, "Towards a Reassessment of Renaissance Aristotelianism", Studies (1981), VI, p. 179.

CONCLUSIONS We have now reached the end of our account ofthe development of the scholastic quaestio or disputation from its beginning in the twelfth century to its decline at the end of the seventeenth. For at least three centuries, in one form or another, it was the chief method of instruction in all the disciplines in the schools and universities and through it the keenest minds in the Latin West expressed their ideas, often controversial, innovative, and productive of far reaching results. We saw how in legal circles it arose as a practical necessity, how in theology it was an invaluable tool for exegesis, combatting heresies, and resolving conflicting opinions. From an early period this method was seen to be of more use than any other for sharpening the wits of students and teaching them to think clearly and logically. In natural philosophy (physica), which at first included medicine, it opened up vast areas of new investigations, some of which led in the direction of modern science. But it must be admitted that in this field much work still remains to be done especially in connection with the seventeenth-century quaestiones disputatae. Even with regard to the earlier, medieval quaestiones many important texts still remain unedited while a vast number of texts by lesser-known masters have scarcely been examined. It is therefore quite impossible at this stage of our investigations to give anything like a full evaluation of the influence of the quaestiones on modern thought in all the disciplines. However in the spheres of natural science and medicine, which in this study have received special emphasis, it is possible to arrive at some general conclusions from work so far done. Thus in the case of physica one of the fields in which the disputation had a very important part to play was scientific methodology, developed from a study of the Aristotelian Posterior Ana(ytics, Haly's interpretation of the Tegni of Galen, and the Averroistic commentaries by the philosopher-physicians of the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries. These men attempted by more and more complicated arguments and analyses to integrate the logical and philosophical elements in the theories of Aristotle and Galen with the mathematical concepts of Averroes. In the case of the physicians this was simply with the object of trying to bring about some degree of mathematical certainty in the practice of medicine. Hence arose the concept of regressus with all its ramifica-

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tions and increasing variety of applications, culminating in the non-scholastic work of Zabarella in the late sixteenth century. This method of investigation undoubtedly influenced the biological studies of Harvey and his followers and the theories of method developed by Hobbes and Descartes, but to what extent it influenced Galileo is still a matter for debate. However, most scholars now think its influence was minimal and Wallace and his associates have conclusively shown that in his earlier years Galileo's sources were mathematical, derived from lectures given by professors at the Collegio Romano in Rome, rather than philosophical and logical derived from the fourteenth-century philosopher-physicians and their followers. In later life Galileo had access to sources of classical, Greek mathematics, that is after about 1589, the year in which Commandino translated the Mathematical Collectiones of Pappus. This enabled him to integrate mathematical analyses as, described by Pappus, with his own empirical observations and practical experiments. The resulting Galilean brand of scientific methodology may be said to herald the so-called Scientific Revolution in a much more positive way than was the case with the fourteenthcentury philosopher-physicians who were hampered by their ignorance of classical, Greek mathematics. Thus it can be said that, in the case of Galileo, the influence of the quaestio disputata on the formation of his methodology was relatively small, though perhaps rather more than has been recognized up to now. On the other hand the logico-mathematical concepts found in the Mertonian disputations de sophismatibus, because of their mathematical content, certainly foreshadowed and showed the way, as it were, to what has been called "the mathematical content" of the Scientific Revolution long before the Latin translations of Pappus had become available. As we have seen, Mertonian ideas were influential in scholastic commentaries in question form by such men as Buridan, Oresme, and Albert of Saxony. Thus Buridan's impetus theory showed the way to the modern principle of inertia, and it may even be the case that Galileo was, to some extent, influenced by Mertonian theories. Certainly Oresme's geometrical proof of Heytesbury's mean speed theorem is very close to Galileo's later proof of the same theorem. Also the typically Mertonian concept of velocity as the intensity of motion allowed Galileo, as the Mertonians before him, to describe continuous variations in velocity. Christopher Lewis, who has recently examined the influence of the Merton tradition in Italy, thought that this was incontrovertible evidence of the influence of the Merton tradition upon the

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articulation of Galileo's kinematics, though he admitted that the exact source of that influence was still obscure.' In the practice of medicine itself the quaestio disputata seems to have had less influence and little progress was made in the scholastic quaestiones of Peter of Spain, Pietro d' Abano and their Paduan followers beyond the die try, pharmacology, and semiotics of Hippocrates, Galen, Averroes, Avicenna and other classical authors. There were practical questions it is true, but after all the pros and cons, with the quotation of numerous authorities, one is left at the end with very little guidance as to how to treat a particular ailment, let alone how to make a diagnosis. The disputation only obscured the issue. Similar remarks apply to the use of the regressus method of investigation used by the Paduan philosopherphysicians. Because of their training they were primarily logicians and sought to arrive at the cause of a disease through a combination of logic ( doctrina resolutiva, demonstratio quia, or conjectural syllogism), with experience ( experimentum) of the visible effects of the disease, laying greater stress on the logic than on the experience. Although this procedure had fruitful results in the sphere of scientific methodology, it contributed little to the actual practice of medicine. Dissatisfaction with this method was already being shown by U go Benzi in the early fifteenth century, and he was one of the first to advocate other methods of investigation in the practice of medicine, some of them logical, but others not and relying more on sense experience. It is also doubtful whether the attempts of J acopo da Forli to bring mathematical certainty into the practice of medicine had any far-reaching results. Not until about the end of the fifteenth century, when the Paduan statutes specified that students were to practice medicine for at least a year before being granted a degree, was much progress being made along more practical lines, and studies in anatomy heralded the new approach. It was not until towards the end of the life of the scholastic disputation that we found evidence of the more practical aspects of medicine such as anatomical and surgical procedures, discussion about the circulation of the blood etc., being debated by students at Montpellier in their academical disputations. These by then rather resembled oral examinations for degrees and professorships in medicine. They bore little resemblance to the expositional and 1

Lewis, op.cit., p. 283.

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investigative debates of the medieval quaestiones disputatae which served either to elucidate texts or to solve difficult problems in the various disciplines. Following the footsteps of Vesalius and Harvey the practice of medicine entered a new era, Aristotelianism declined, and with it many of the old ideas were swept away, and new methods of teaching and exposition were introduced. On the other hand, in the spheres of natural science Aristotelianism continued to flourish until well into the 17th century, and professors still continued to dictate carefully prepared quaestiones disputatae, dealing with Aristotelian concepts, for the instruction of students. But it is doubtful whether in most cases these reflected disputations which had actually taken place. These remarks could also apply to some late medieval disputations, so these characteristics were by no means only symptomatic of the degeneration of the 17th-century quaestio. In the teaching oflogic the "art of opposing and responding" ( ars opponendi et respondendi), called by Angelelli the "argument" method, continued to be used up to the 18th century, but this again had little to do with the quaestio disputata of the schools. This time the dispute was used solely for "sharpening the wits of students" and for training them in the use of logic. It mustbe admitted, however, that the form of the dispute, with opponens and respondens, did not differ greatly from the medieval Obligation tracts. Also the objects of "sharpening the wits of students" and causing the defeat and even discomfort of an adversary still persisted, only the rules got simpler. One can say, then, with perfect justice, that the demise of the quaestio disputata did not finally take place until towards the end of the 18th century. Only its use became more and more restricted to the examination and training of students. In conclusion it seems to me quite extraordinary not that the quaestio disputata and Aristotelianism lasted for such a long time, but that they did not last even longer, considering the immense influence they had on the thoughts and actions of mankind during what some may consider the brightest period of its intellectual history. Their demise occurred only very gradually and with the greatest difficulty, and was brought about by a number of factors which I have attempted to outline. Chief among these were the abuse of the system by unskilled operators, the barbarous and cumbersome language in which many of the ideas were expressed, and above all the increased use of mathematics and the experimental method-in other words the resurgence of a more materialistic outlook. Whether this was inevitable is a matter for

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debate. We are now going through a period of immense technical activity which seems to be leading mankind into a dark tunnel at the end of which, so far, no glimmer oflight appears. But that it will eventually appear I have no doubt, and may be it will be kindled by a return to some of the more spiritual questions that were disputed during the most flourishing periods of scholasticism and the early Renaissance.

APPENDIX

EXAMPLES OF THE USE OF THE QUAESTIO DISPUTATA 1. Simon de Tournai (c. 1165-1201), in his Disputationes states the question and the reasons for affirming it, then gives the opposite point of view, and finally one or more solutions. Utrum anima creata sit munda. Quod docetur. Deus enim nichil nisi bonum facit vel creat, ergo animam bonam creat. E contra doceri videtur. Anima enim dum creatur corpori infunditur; dum infunditur contactu corporis maculatur; ergo dum creatur immunda est, non ergo videtur creari munda. Solutio. Anima creatur munda, tamen dum creatur est immunda, id est ex creatione non est nisi bona, tamen dum creatur maculam habet ex contactu corporis. Verbi gratia, pronomen significat substantiam sine qualitate, tamen substantia, dum significatur sine qualitate, est cum qualitate; nulla enim substantia est informis. (Ed. Warichez 1932, p. 94).

2. Roger Bacon, Questiones supra libros octo physicorum Aristotelis,

(c. 1250), follows a similar method with affirmation, negation and solution to more than one difficulty. Queritur postea utrum contingat scire per causam. Et videtur quod sic; quia dicit quod tunc dicimur scire quando causas cognoscimus etc. et in libro Posteriorum similiter. Preterea, ilia scientia est nobilissima; set nobilis scitur per causam; ergo multo fortius nobilissima, cum non sit abire in infinitum in causam. Item, scientia est habitus principiorum et conclusionum, intellectus principiorum, et magis scita sunt principia conclusionibus, et conclusiones sunt scita et principia, ut dicit. CONTRA: scientia est conclusionum et intellectus principiorum; ergo etc. SOLUTIO: scientia est uno modo comprehensio veritatis rei cuiuslibet qualiscumque sit res, sive sit necessarium sive contingens; alia est scientia comprehensio veritatis rei necessarie, set hoc dupliciter: aut per causam, aut sine causa, ut principiorum et conclusionum; hie loquitur de scientia que est habitus conclusionum proprie, que habetur per causam. Et tamen potest dici quod large principia cognoscuntur per causam, quia cognoscuntur per sui species apud animam sunt causa principiorum effectiva et ita omnia cognoscuntur per causam. Set non loquitur hie de causa tali, set secundum quod principia sunt causa conclusionum, ut in libro Posteriorum. Ad argumenta: nobilissima cognitio non est per causam, nisi sumatur causa prop simplici veri tate rei sicut pro diffinitione formali principiorum que precedit cognitionem omnem. Ad

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aliud: principia habent causas, non tamen in illo genere, set in genere incomplexorum. (Opera hactenus inedita Rogeri Baconi, Fasc. XIII, ed. Delorme, p. 4). 3. Petrus Hispanus, Commentarium in librum de Anima (c. 1260) follows a similar method, with affirmation, negation, and solution. Queritur que sit illa virtus per quam adamas attrahit ferrum, utrum illa sit virtus alicuius quatuor qualitatum. Et ostenditur quod sic: Sicut habetur in libro de generatione actio et passio debentur elementis per naturam elementorum. Set metalla mixta sunt elementata vel elementa et habent naturam elementorum. Ergo eis debetur actio et passio per naturam elementorum. Set adamas est mistum. Ergo virtus illa per quam adamas agit in ferrum attrahendo ipsum est virtus elementorum. Ergo cum elementa comparentur ad suas qualitates et per illam virtutem fiat operatio, necesse est ut illa virtus sit alicuius quatuor qualitatum. Ad oppositum. Sicut dicit Avicenna adamas attrahit ferrum a tota specie, illa autem species non est aliqua quatuor qualitatum set illam adquisivit materia per mixtionem quatuor qualitatum et per virtutem consequentem illam formam attrahit ferrum. Ergo illa virtus per quam adamas attrahit ferrum non est virtus alicuius qualitatum. Ad rationem in contrarium dicendum est quod actio debetur alicui duobus modis: Uno modo tanquam primo principio a quo principaliter exit actio ymaginationis rei et hoc modo debetur actio forme complete. Alio modo debetur actio alicui tamquam instrumento ymaginationis et contrarietatis et hoc modo debetur corpori a parte qualitatum in quibus primo et principaliter radicatur contrarietas. Corpora autem omnia ultra istam actionem habent speciales operationes et sibi proprias quas non exercent mediantibus qualitatibus set mediante sua forma completiva et virtute consequente illam. Sic autem est in adamante. Hec enim operatio que est attrahere ferrum est ei propria et ideo competit ei gratia sue forme completive et virtutis illius forme per quam differt adamas ab aliis corporibus. Hec autem actio non est actio in via generationis corporum et contrarietatis set est ei appropriata per propriam naturam et formam suam specificam que est propria. (Pedro Hispano, Comm. de Anima, ed. P. Manuel Alonso. Madrid, 1944. pp. 443-44). 4. Siger of Brabant, lmpossibilia (c. 1271), No. 3 Proponebatur quod bellum Troianum esset in hoc instanti. He gives three arguments supporting the proposition and then the solutio in which he demolishes the arguments. Quod sic arguitur. lnstans praesens non est aliud ab instanti in quo fuit verum dicere quod erat bellum Troianum; non quod intelligamus quod esse belli Troiani agonis vel motus esset in instanti; sed quia de tempore non est nisi instans, in quolibet instanti temporis alicuius est tempus illud, et illud quod habet esse in illo tempore. Si ergo instans in quo fuit verum dicere quod erat bellum Troianum non est aliud ab instanti praesenti, nunc est igitur bellum Troianum. Quod autem

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instans praesens non sit aliud ab illo probatur quia instantia plura non possunt simul esse, sicut neque mutatum in diversis ubi, quorum unum non continet alterum; et instans in quo fuit bellum Troianum etiam non est corruptum. Ergo manet idem cum instante praesenti. Quod autem non sit corruptum probatur sic. Omni corrupto per se vel per accidens est assignare quando primo non est, ut in termino suae corruptionis, quae est eius corruptio per se, si per se corrumpitur vel corruptio per accidens si per accidens corrumpitur. Omni enim corruptioni est aliquis terminus cum nihil semper corrumpatur. Sed non est assignare quando instans primo non est; tunc enim cum est, non primo non est. Neque posterius immediate, cum non sit instans instanti immediatum, quia termini non est terminus. Neque primo non est in instanti mediato; simul enim esset cum instantibus multis, quod est impossibile. Non est igitur dare quando primo non est instans. Ergo neque quando primo corruptum est. Solutio. Bellum Troianum non est in hoc instanti quia hoc instans est aliud ab instanti in quo verum erat dicere quod erat bellum Troianum. Illud enim iamdudum corruptum est; et non quaerit ratio nisi qualiter instans corrumpitur. De quo est intelligendum quod non est assignare quando instans primo non est, quia primo non esse est in aliquo termino temporis in quo tempore habuit esse, et in principia temporis in quo est suum non esse; ita quod cum terminus non intelligatur nisi respectu continui et divisibilis, non est assignare primo non esse nisi in eis quae permanent toto aliquo tempore. lnstans autem non est tale. Et ad rationem dicendum quod corrupto per se est assignare quando primo non est, quia in termino suae corruptionis. Et corruptum per accidens est duobus modis, uno modo ita quod sit transmutatio ad non esse alicuius per se, ad cuius non esse sequitur non esse alterius, quod ideo corrumpitur per accidens illo corrupto; et in tali corrupto per accidens est assignare quando primo non est, quia in termino suae corruptionis. lnstans autem non sic corrumpitur per accidens, neque esse mutati quod continue mutatur. Tunc enim oporteret quod esse mutati quod continue mutatur et instantis illud esse consequentis toto aliquo tempore permaneret. Et ideo alio modo corrumpitur esse instantis et esse mutati quod continue mutatur, per hoc videlicet quod mutatum continue mutatur. Ex hoc enim accidit quod nullum esse in spatia retinet; quiescere enim accideret. Et ad corrumpi sic per accidens, sicut corrumpitur esse ipsius mutati per hoc, quod mutabile continue mutatur, non sequitur quod sit assignare sic corrupto per accidens quando primo non est, cum nee corrumpatur toto tempore alicuius corruptionis seu transmutationis permanens. Quamquam tamen esse mutati toto motu non maneat, neque esse instantis toto tempore, mutabile tamen in substantia sua toto tempore mutationis est unum, aut mutatio non esset una et continua; et instans, mensura substantia eius quod fertur, toto tempore in substantia sua est unum aut tempus non esset unum et continuum. (Mandonnet, Siger de Brabant et l'Avirroisme latin, II (1908), pp. 80--31).

5. Pietro d'Abano, Conciliator (c. 1310). Differentia I. An necessarium sit medico ceteras scire speculationis scientias. He first gives three reasons

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why it is not necessary for physicians to know other sciences, he then states a general argument against this view, in oppositum, and goes on to refute each of the three arguments advanced in the beginning, propter primum, propter secundum, propter tertium. Finally he gives a summing up and determination, his itaque visis dicendum ad argumenta quarto. (Ed. Venice, 1548, ff. 3-4). 6. Gaetano da Thiene, Questio de sensu agente ( 1436). Queritur utrum intellectus humanus sit perpetuus. He first states five arguments against the perpetuity of the intellect, Arguitur quod non, primo; Secunda, principaliter arguitur etc. He then gives a general argument in favour of the proposition in oppositum, followed by two premisses, pro hac questione premittendum primo, secunda, in which he discusses the three degrees of forms, and the various kinds of intellect, premittendo secunda quod intellectus multipliciter sumiter. He then gives three conclusions based on the premisses, his premissis sit hec prima conclusio etc. Finally he argues against the five principal arguments set forth at the beginning of the question. Ad rationes principales. Ad primam dicitur quod etc. Et sic est finis questionis de perpetuitate intellectus in qua difficultates multe theologie et philosophie sub til iter disputantur. ( Gaitanus super libros de anima, eiusdem questiones de sensu agente et de sensibilibus communibus ac de intellectu etc. Venice, 1514, f. l04r-vAR). 7. Pietro Porn ponazzi, Questio de immortalitate ani mae ( 1504). In this question belonging to his earlier years as a lecturer in Padua, Pomponazzi follows the usual pattern of the quaestio disputata, starting with arguments for and ending with arguments against, but does not give a final solution. Queritur an virtus intellectiva sit immortalis. He first gives four principal arguments of philosophers in favour of its immortality, then, at considerable length, refutes these arguments. He next gives ten arguments of the Christians and theologians in favour of immortality, which he again refutes. (P.O. Kristeller, "Two unpublished questions on the soul of Pietro Pomponazzi", Medievalia et Humanistica, Fasc. 9 (1955), 76--101). In his later Libri quinque de Jato, de libero arbitrio et de praedestinatione ( 1520) he combines the style of the treatise with that of the scholastic method, the work being divided up into books and chapters wherein the views of a large number of authors are expressed and objections answered rather in the manner of the quaestio disputata. (Libri quinque etc. ed. R. Lemay, Lugano, 1957). 8. The Coimbra Commentaries (1592-1605). These are interesting from the point of view of methodology, as they show a combination of the use of the quaestio disputata, the thesis, and the Aristotelian

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quaestiones et responsiones, without argument. Commentarii Collegii Conimbricensis in Quatuor Libros De Coelo, Meteorologicos, Parva Naturalia, et Ethica Aristotelis. (Lyons, 1608). De coelo. Each chapter of this work is dealt with in turn. First an explanation of the chapter is given, followed by one or more questions (quaestiones disputatae). Arguments for and against are dealt with in articles. Quaestio I. Sitne universum perfectum an non? Articulus l. Quibus argumentis ostendi videatur non esse perfectum. - - 2. Varia mundi sive universi acceptio, eiusque definitio. - - 3. Comprobatur universi perfectio: tum aliter, tum ex absolutione singularum rerum quae in ea continentur. - - 4. Astruitur perfectio universi ex naturarum varietate et distinctione .... Quaeri autem solet utrum mista pertineant ad essentialem universi perfectionem. Ad bane dubitationem respondemus. - - 5. Concluditur perfectio universi ex ordine partium, tam inter se mutuo, quam ad Deum sub triplicis causae genere. - - 6. Diluuntur duo priora argumenta primi articuli. - - 7. Explicantur caetera primi articuli argumenta.

At the end of the Commentary on the De Coelo there are Solutiones aliquot problematum de rebus ad quatuor mundi elementa pertinentibus, and these are answered without argument. Problem 1. Est ne terra purum elementum an non? Responsio.

Commentarii in libros Meteororum. This consists of 13 Tractates divided into chapters which deal with meteorological subjects, and give the opinions of Aristotle and other writers. It contains no quaestiones disputatae and resembles a treatise of the kind which was to become increasingly popular. Commentarii in libros Aristotelis qui Parva Naturalia appelantur. The various sections of this work are divided into chapters which in most cases contain questions, scholastic in form, with arguments for and against, and the quotation of many authorities. At the end of each section is a list of problems with simple answers, quaestiones et responsiones. In librum de memoria et reminiscentia. Caput 5. Quaeri solet num memoria piscibus insit an non. Ratio dubitandi in eo est. .Secunda idem confirmatur quia. .Hisce argumentis adducti fuere ad tuendam partem negativam nonnulli, quos refert refellitque D. Augustinus. Sed huius sententiae falsitas ex indiciis memoriae quae in piscibus deprehensa sunt palam convincitur. . Argumenta vero quae in contrariam partem adduximus, sic erant explicanda. . Ad secundum argumentum dicito ... Caput 10. Solutio aliquorum problematum ad memoriam spectantium, 14 quaestiones et responsiones without argument.

In libros ethicorum Aristotelis Disputationes. These are written throughout in the form of the quaestiones disputatae.

ABBREVIATIONS Albertus Magnus and the Sciences. Commemorative Essays, 1980, ed. James A. Weisheipl, O.P., Toronto, 1980. Aristotelismo Veneto. Aristotelismo Veneto e Scienza Moderna. Atti del 25 Anno Accademico del Centro per Ia Storia della Tradizione Aristotelica nel Veneto, a cura di Luigi Olivieri. 2 vols., Padova, 1983. B.G.P.M. Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophic des Mittelalters. Munster. B.H.M. Bulletin of the History of Medicine. Baltimore. B.H.R. British Historical Review. B.R.U.O. A Biographical Register of the University of Oxford, to A.D. 1500. By A.B. Emden, 3 vols., Oxford, 1957-59. C.H.L.M.P. Cambridge History of Later Medieval Philosophy. Editors, Norman Kretzmann, Anthony Kenny, Jan Pinborg. Associate editor, Eleonore Stump. Cambridge, 1984. C.H.R.P. Cambridge History ofRenaissance Philosophy. General editor, Charles B. Schmitt. Editors, Quentin Skinner, Eckhard Kessler. Associate editor, Jill Kraye. Cambridge, 1988. C.S.E.L. Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum. D.S.B. Dictionary of Scientific Biography. 16 vols., New York. Edocere Medicos. Agrimi,J. and Crisciani, C., Edocere Medicos. Medicina Scolastica nel secoli XII-XIV, Napoli, 1988. English Logic in Italy. English Logic in Italy in the 14th and 15th centuries, ed. Alfonso Maieru. Naples 1982. H.M.E.S. History of Magic and Experimental Science, by Lynn Thorndike, 8 vols. New York, 1923-58. J .H.I. Journal of the History of Ideas. New York. J.H.M. Journal of the History of Medicine. New Haven, Conn. J .H.P. journal of the History of Philosophy. J.P. journal of Philosophy. New York. J.W.I. Journal of the Warburg Institute. London. Medioevo e Rinascimento. Studi in onore di Bruno Nardi, 2 vols., Florence, 1955. M.G.H. Monumenta Germaniae Historica. (Poetae Latini Aevi Carolini, vol. I, 1881, repr. 1978). M.R.S. Medieval and Renaissance Studies, 6 vols. Edited by Richard Hunt and Raymond Klibansky, with the addition of Lotte Labowsky for the last 3 vols. Warburg Institute, London, 1943-68. M.S. Medieval Studies. Toronto. Pare, Brunet, Tremblay. La Renaissance du XII siecle. Les Ecoles et L'Enseignement. par G. Pare, A. Brunet, P. Tremblay. Paris, 1933. P.L. Patrologia Latina, accurante J.P. Migne, Paris, 1933. Philosophy and Humanism. Renaissance Essays in Honor of Paul Oskar Kristeller, ed. Edward P. Mahoney. Leiden, 1976. P.I.M.S. Pontifical Institute of Medieval Studies, Toronto. P.B.A. Proceedings of the British Academy, London. Les Questions Disputees. Les Questions Disputees et les Questions Quodlibetiques dans les Facultes de Thiologie, de Droit, et de Medecine, par Bernardo C. Bazan, J .W. Wippel, G. Fransen, et Danielle J acquart. Brepolis, 1985. R.T.A.M. Recherches de Thiologie Ancienne et Midiivale, Louvain. Renaissance and Renewal. Renaissance and Renewal in the Twelfth Century, ed. Robert

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L. Benson and Giles Constable, with Carol D. Lanham. Oxford, 1982. R.F.N.S. Rivista di Filosofia Neo-Scolastica, Milan. Sit::.ungsberichte der bayerischen Akademie der Wissenschaften. S.B.A.W. Scienza e Filosofia. Scien::.a e Filosofia all'Universita di Padova nel Quattrocento, a cura di Antonino Poppi, Padova, 1983.

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INDEX NOMINUM Abelard, Peter 8, 9, l 0, 39, l 05 Abrahams, Phyllis 20 Achilles 22 Achillini, Alessandro 60, 87-88, 95, 128 Ackermann, F. 120 Adam ofBalsham ll, 14, 15, 39, 40 Adelard of Bath 32 Adele, countess 20 Agricola, Georgius 141 Agricola, Rudolph l 09, 120-21, 123, 124, 132 Agrippa, Cornelius 114, 118, 123 Ajax 115 Alain de Libera 60 Albertus Magnus 34, 36, 41, 43, 72, 86, 95 Albert of Saxony 53, 61, 64, 86, 87, 88, 98, 146 Albumazar 29 Alcuin 7, 8, 19, 20, 21 Alderotti, Taddeo 70-72, 80 Alexander of Aphrodisias 87, 91 Alexander of Hales 15, 43 Alfonso, King l 08 Algazel 29A Alkindi 46 Almerico da Serra valle 57 Alonso, P. Manuel 68, 151 d'Alverney, Marie-Therese 21, 33 Ammonius 132 Aneau, Barthelemy 132 Angelelli, Ignacio 137, 138, 139, 148 Angelo da Fossembrone 59 Anglicus, Henry 58 Anna, G. dell' 62 Anselm of Canterbury 8-9, 39 Anselm of Laon I04 Anton, J.P. 81 Antonaci, A. 94, 95 Antonio da Monte 57 Antonius de Parma 77 Argall,John 132 Aristotle 23, 24, 27, 30, 33, 36, 41, 43, 45, 48, 51, 62 et passim Arnold of Villanova 46 Ashworth, EJ. 39, 64, 99 Astudillo, Diego de 99 Augustine 6, 7, 43, 101, 102, Ill

Averroes 70, 71, 75, 86, 87, 92, 95, 116, 120, 145, 147 Avicenna 29, 70, 75, 76, 77, 78, 83, 88, 92, 93, 95, 131, 142, 147, 151 Bacon, Francis 131-32 Bacon, Roger 24, 34, 35, 36, 39, 40, 69, I06, 150-51 Barbaro, Ermolao 86, 95, 110, 112, 113, 120 Barozzi, Pierro 87 Barclay, Alexander 121-22 Bartholomew of Messina 37 Baudry of Bourgueil 20, 21 Baur, L. 25 104 Bazan, B.C. 12, 13, 14, 15, Beaujouan, G. 28 Bechmann, Fridemann 133 Becket, Thomas 15 Bellutus, Bonaventura 130 Benzi, Ugo (Hugo· Senensis) 77-80, 147 Berengar of Tours I0 1-1 02 Bergan us, Joannes Latomus 93 Bernard of Clairvaux 69 Berti, E. 81, 82 Bevan, Honquil 138 Billingham, Richard 49, 58, 64 Birkenmajer, Alexandre 30 Blasius of Parma (Biagio Pelacani) 5859, 76, 80, 83, 93, 94, 95, 131' 134, 142, 145, 147 Blund, John 24 Bochenski, I.M. 42 Bodin,Jean 132 Boehner, P. 39, 41, 49 Boethius, 7, 10, 12, 18, 19, 20, 32, 132 Bonaventura 43 Battin, F. 62 Bradwardine, Thomas 45-47, 48, 49, 56, 57, 58, 59, 61, 88 Brandt, S. 7, 19 Brant, Sebastian 121-22 Breen, Q 110 Brewer, J.S. I 05 Brinckley, Richard 56 Brunet, A. 6, ll, 12, 104 Bruni, Leonardo I 08, 116

INDEX NOMINUM

Bruno, Giordano 125 Buckland, W.W. 3 Buonamici, Francesco 89, 97, 126 Bulgarus 4 Buridan, Jean 43, 53, 64, 98-118, 133, 146 Burley, Walter 49, 55, 56, 57, 78, 86, 112, 116, 137, 138 Buser, William 108, 137 Calcidius 23 Callus, D.A. 24, 25, 30, 34, 39, 119, 132 Caloria, Tommaso, 107 Campanini, M. 94 Camporeale, Salvatore l 09 Candidus 7 Cantin, Andre 102, 103 Cardano, Girolamo 142 Casale, Giovanni de 53, 54 Case,John 125 Cassiodorus, 19 Cassircr, E. 81, 91, 107 Castrioto, Giovanni 95 Ceccarelli, Peter 56 Ceffons 54 Celaya, Juan de 98, 117, 126 Celtis, Conrad 114, 115 Chabons, Jean-Pierre de Gallien de 141 Chabons, Joannes de 141 Charlemagne 7, 19 Chatelain, A. 31, 35 Chaucer, Geoffrey 58 Chawner, G. 138 Chenu, M.D. 6 Chiaramonte, Scipione 89 Choulant, L. 23 Cicero 3, 10, 91, 103, 107., 121, 123, 125 Cittadinus, Antonius 77 Clagett, M. 48, 52, 54, 60, 61, 64, 76, 86, 98, 99 Clarenbald of Arras 12 Clark, A. 134 Clark,John Willis 138 Clavius, Christopher 96 Clement VI, Pope 43 Clements, Rj. 132 Cocaio, Vigaso 116 Coimbra Commentaries 129-130, 134, 153-154 Comenius, Johann Amos 132 Commandino, Federico 82, 146 Comparini, Nicholas 56 Constantin us African us 4, 21, 30 Copenhaver, B.P. 69

l71

Cordie, Carlo 116 Corvi, Gulielmo 72 Cowdrey, H.Ej. 6 Courtenay, W J. 42, 46, 4 7, 49-51, 5457 Craig, William 134 Cremonini, Cesare 79 Crescini, A. 81 Cristiani, M. 62 Crombie, A.C. 81, 96, 100 Crosby, H.L. jun. 45 Crowe, M.B. 29 Dalberg, Bishop von 120 Dales, R.C. 25, 26 Damian, Peter, 101-102 David of Dinant 33 Day,John 134 Delhaye, P. 23 Delorme, F.M. 151 Denifle, H. 31, 35 Descartes, Rene 81-82, 132, 146 Desiderius, Abbot 4, 21 Dionigi da Borgo San Sepolcro Ill Dionisotti, Carlo 110, 113 ps. Dionysius the Aeropagite 143 Donaldson, Gordon 138 Donato, Girolamo 89 Dorbellus 132 Douglas, A.H. 91 Drew, P.L. 79, 94 Dronke, P. 8 Dubreuil-Chambardel, L. 20 Duhem, Pierre 26, 36, 62 Dullaert, John 98, 117, 118, 119 Dumbleton, John, 45, 46, 48, 56 Dungal 19 20 Duns Scotus 13, 16, 120, 121, 130, 132, 141, 142 Durandus de Sainct Pourcain 142 Durer, Albrecht 114, 115 Easton, S.C. 34, 35 Eastwood, B.S. 26 Eccleston, Thomas 25 Edmund St of Canterbury 39 Edocere medicos 70, 72, 75, 81 Edward VI 123, 124 Edwards, W.F. 71, 80, 81, 82, 94, 97 Ehrle, Francesco 30 Einold, Abbot l 0 l Emden, A.B. 31, 49, 50, 58 Epictetus 91 Epicurus 142 Equicola, Mario 92 Erasmus, Desiderius 113, 117, 118, 119, 121, 122

1n

INDEX NOMINUM

Eriugena, John Scotus 7 Erythraeus 132 Estienne, Henri 103 Etienne de Tournai 40, 104, 131 d'Etaples, Jacques Lefevre (Faber Stapulensis) 113 Euclid 122 Eyssenhardt, Franciscus 19 Faber, Philip 130 Facciolati, F. 61, 85 Fantazzi, Charles 117, 119 Feribrigge, Richard 50, 58, 62, I 08, 116, 117, 118 Fernandez, Gonzalo 93 Ficino, Marsilio 91, 92 Filthaut, E. 30, 31 F1orimonte, Galeazzo 92 Folengo, Teofilo 116-117 Fonseca, Pedro da 134 Fontis (Fuentes), Gaspar de 130 Fort, Juan 117 Franciscus de Ferraria 57 Fransen, Gerard 4 Fredegisus 7 Frederick II 28, 67 Frederick of Regensberg 56 Freigius, Joannes 130 Fulbert 101 Gabriel, Astrik 32 Gaetano da Thiene 60, 62, 63, 85, 86, 118, 153 Galen 23, 30, 68, 69, 70, 71, 73, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, Galileo 45, 51, 52, 69 81, 82, 83, 97, 99, 100, 143, 146, 147 Ganay, Germain de 113 Garbo, Dino del 75, 77, 78 Garbo, Tommaso del 75, 77, 78 Garin, Eugenio 91, 92, I 07, I08, II 0 Gaza, Theodore 120 Geiger, Stephen 135 Gellius, Aulus 114 Gentile, G. 125 Gentile da Foligno 73, 75, 77 George of Trebizond 121 Gerbert d'Aurillac 8 Gerl, Hanna-Barbara 109 Germain, A. 134, 135 Gersh, S. 8 Ghellinck, J. de I0 I Gibson, Strickland 125 Gilbert, N.W. 43, 31, 103, 104, 105, 108, til Gilbert de Ia Porree II, 13 2

Giles of Rome (Egidius Romanus) 16, 35, 74, 132 Gilles of Corbeil 23 Gilson, E. I 03 Giovio, Paulo (Jovius, Paulus) 93, 94 Giraud de Barri I 05 Glorieux, !'Abbe 13, 15, 16, I 7, 33, 35, 126 Godfrey of Saint- Victor 23 Gower, John 58 Grabmann, Martin 9, 29, 137 Grant, E. 48 Gregory Nazianzenus 132 Gregory of Rimini 54, 57 Greswell, W.P. 110 Grimani, Domenico 87 Grosseteste, Robert 24-28, 29, 36, 39, 46, 69 Guaineri, Antonio 83 Guanerius 3 Guarino, Battista 120 Hacket, J.M.G. 36 Haly ibn Abbas 21, 7 5 Haly ibn Ridwan 70, 71, 76, 145 Halliwell, J.O. 123 Hansen, Bert 54 Harrison, A. 59 Harvey, William 136, 146, 148, Haskins, C.H. 3, 106 Haureau, B. 36, 62 Hector 22 Heiland, Samuel 130 Heine, Frideric 138, 139 Henri Allemand 37 Henri de Bruxelles 37 Henry VIII 121 Henry, D.P. 8, 9 Hercules 22 Hermes Trismegistus 116, 143 Heytesbury, William 45, 4 7, 48, 51, 56, 57, 59, 60, 61,62, 64, 85, 86, 88, 89, 98, 99, 112, 116, 118, 142, 146 Hippocrates 23, 30, 74, 147 Hobbes, Thomas 81, 146 Holcot, Robert 50, 103, 104, 127 Howard, J.V. 138 Howell, W.S. 123, 124 Hrabanus Maurus 19 Hugh of Saint- Victor 15, I05 Hunt, R.W. 24 Hutten, Ulrich 114, 115 lngegnerati, Francesco 58 lrnerius 3, 4 Isaac Israeli 30, 68

INDEX NOMINUM

Isidore of Seville 19 Ioannitius 30, 72 Ivo of Chartres 4 Jacopo da Forli 59, 76, 77, 78, 79, 83, 98, 119, 147 Jacquart, D. 67, 74 James, T.E. 60 James ofViterbo 16, 74 Jansen, W. 12 Jardine, N. 81, 93, 94 Javellus, Crisostomus 132, 134 Jean de Jandun 95 John XXII, Pope 126 John of Casale 56, 57, 61 John of Gorze 101 John of Holland 63 John of Parma 55 John of Salisbury II, 12, 15, 21-23, 25, 30, 39, 40, I 04 Joubert, Laurent 135 Justinian 3, 4 Kantorowicz, H. 3, 4, 5 Kearney, H. 134, 138 Keckermann, B. 132 Kessler, E. 130 Kibre, P. 67 Kilvington, Richard 47, 49, 51, 54, 57 Kilwardby, Robert 34 Kneepkens, C.H. 108, 137 Koyre, Alexander 26, 28 Kraye, Jill 130 Kretzmann, N. 39, 61 Kristeller, P.O. 20, 66, 67, 83, 91, 107, 109, 110, Ill, 153 Kuksewicz, Z. 62 Kuttner, Stephen I, 4 Lacombe, G. 29 Ladislaus, King I09 Lambert of Auxerre 132 Lanfranc of Bee I0 I Lang, Vincent 115 Lawn, Brian 32, 35, 36, 37, 67,.68, 72, 84, 96, 142 Lawrence of Scotland 64 Lax, Gaspar 98, 117-118 Leib, Killian 115 Leland, John 58 Lemay, Richard 91, 153 Leone, Ambrogio 96 Leoniceno, Nicolo 83, 94 Lesne, Emil 12, 15, 105 Lewis, C. 45, 89, 94, 96, 97, 100, 146 Lindberg, D.C. 34, 54, 67, 83 Lindsay, W.M. 19

Little, A.G. 7, 13, 14, 25, 35, 41 Lobkowitz, Caramuel 142 Locher,Jacob 121 Lockwood, D.P. 77, 79 Lohr, C.H. 61, 85, 91, 94, 98, 129, 130 Longway,John 45, 47 Lorenzo da Molino 89 Lottin, 0, 33, 34 Lucian 115 Lucilius I03 Luther, Martin 114

lTJ

99,

Me Donald, Robert 138, 141 McEvoy, James 25, 26, 28 McGarry, D.G. 21, 22 Macilmane, Roland 124 Mackinney, Loren C. 20 McVaugh, M.R. 46 Macrobius 18, 32, 33 Mahoney, E.P. 85, 86, 91, 92 Maier, Anneliese 46, 48, 51, 52, 56 Maien1, A. 49, 55, 58, 60, 108, 137 Major, John 98 Mandonnet, P. 29, 40, 41, 106, 152 Manegold of Lautenbach I0 I Manfred, King 29 Marenbon,J. 7, 8, 13, 101, 102 Marencius 67 Marliani, Giovanni 86 Marrone, Steven P. 26, 27, 28, 30 Marrou, H. I, 7 Marsiglia da Santa Sofia 77, 78 Marsili us of Inghen 53, 64, 142 Martianus Capella 18 Martin, C. 49 Martin, RJ. 34 Masnovo A, 30 Mastris, Bartholomaeus 130 Mathesius 132 Matsen, H.S. 87 Meia, Anselmus 113 Meianus, Anselmus 112-113 Merton, R.K. 133 Melanchthon, Philipp 114, 115, 121, 132 Messinus 60-61 Michaud-Quantin, P. 23 Miguel, Juan 3 Minio-Paluello, L. 11, 15, 39, 40 Moneta of Cremona 29 Monfasani,John 109, 121 Monte, Giambaptista da 83 Moody, E.A. 43, 45 More, Thomas 117 Munz, P. 91 Murdoch,j.E. 45, 49, 51, 54, 69

174

INDEX NOMINUM

Nardi, Bruno 61, 85, 87, 88, 89, 94, 95 Natalis, Herveus 112 Naude, Gabriel 92, 94 Niccoli, Niccolo I08 Nicholas of Autrecourt 43 Nicolaus Peripateticus 37 Nifo, Agostino 85, 91-93, 95, 126 Nizzolio, Mario I09 Novati, F. 108 Oberg, Jan 106 Oberman, H. 69 Odo de Soissons 12 Offredi, Appolinaire 60 Olivieri, L. 82, 90 Oresme, Nicole 36, 53, 54, 88, 146 Origen 132, 143 Otto of Freising II Ottosson, Per-Gunnar 70-73, 75, 76, 79, 81 Paganini, A. 116 Papinian 3 Pappus 82,146 Papuli, G. 75, 79, 81, 82, 90, 93, 94, 95 Paracelsus, Theophrastus 135, 143 Pare, G. 6, II, 12, 14, 105 Paris, Matthew 14 Patricius, Franciscus 142 Paul, the Apostle I04 Paul of Venice 55, 57, 59, 61, 62, 85, 86, 88, 98, 118, 142 Pelster, F. I, 13, 14, 15, 35 Pereira, Benito 97 Perreiah, A.R. 61 Peter Lombard 12, 42, 50 Peter of Mantua 57, 59, 60, 118 Peter of Spain (Petrus Hispanus) 41, 68-70, 74, 76, 98, 118, 132, 147, !51 Petrarch, Francesco 55, I 07, II 0, Ill, 114, 115, 118, 120, 139 Petrus de Hibernia 28 Philoponus 91 Piccolomini,Eneas Silvius (Pope Paul II) 109 Piccolomini, Francesco 89, 134 Pi co, Gianfrancesco 111-112, 114, 140 Pi co della Mirandola, Giovanni 85, 91 , 110, Ill, 113, 114, 119, 120, 126 Pierre d' Ailly 61 Pierre de Blois 105 Pierre Cantor 15 Pierre de Poi tiers 12, 24, l 06, 112

Pietro d'Abano 74-75, 77, 78, 79, 147, 152-53 Pilan (Pilanus), James 138-40 Pio, Alberto 89 Pirckheimer, Willibald 114-15, 140 Placentinus 5 Plato 6, 23, 77, 85, 91, 92, Ill, 121, 122, 134, 142, 143, Pliny the elder 36 Plotinus 6, 91, 143 Plutarch 132, 143 Poliziano, Angelo 112, 116, II 7 Pompen, Aurelius 122 Pomponazzi, Pietro 60, 83, 88-91, 92, 95, 96, 97, 126, 153 Popkin, R.H. 121 Poppi, A. 90, 94 Porphyry 132 Powicke, F.M. 31 Pozzi, L. 62 Preto, E. 30 Priscian 8 Prometheus 91 Prudentius l 03, I04 Pythagoras 142 Quintilian 109, 121, 125 Raby, FJ.E. 106 Ramus, Peter (Pierre de Ia Ramee) 109, 121, 124, 125, 141 Randall, JH. 62, 75, 76, 77, 78, 79, 81, 82, 90, 91, 92, 94, 107 Rashdall, H. 31 Ratherius I0 I Regiomontanus 114 Renaudet, A. 113 Reiche, Emil 114 Reuchlin, Johannes 115 Rhadamanthus l 08 Rhazes 83, 93 Rhodiginus, Ludovicus Caelius 142 Ricchinio, T.A. 29 Richard de Bury 'l3, 49 Richard of Middleton 7 4 Rijk, L.M. de 49, 137 Risse, W. 94, 133 Robert de Melun 12, 24 Robertson, JM. 131 Rogerius 4 Roland of Cremona 30, 66 Rose, Valentin 20 Rosetus, Roger (Roseth) 4 7, 51, 56 Rossi, Pietro 25 Rostanus 113 Rueus, Franciscus 141

INDEX NOMINUM

Sabra, A. 69 Salutati, Coluccio 60, 107-108, 118 Sancto Paulo, Eustachius a 130 Santorio, Santorio 131 Savonarola, Michael 83 Scaevola 3 Schmitt, C.B. 67, 69, 82, 83, 128, 129, 130, 134, 142, 144 Schoonhovius, Florentius 131 Schulz, F. 3, 5 Seneca 18, 32, 33, 36, 103, 194, 107, 132 Serlo of Wilton I05-1 06 Sexgrave, Walter 58 Sextus Empiricus I03 Siger de Brabant 41, 87, 151-52 Siger de Courtrai 39 Simon de Tournai 13, 14, 150 Simplicius 87, 116 Siraisi, N.G. 67, 70, 75, 83, 84, 131 Smiglecki, Martin 133 Socrates, Ill, 122, 123 ps Soranus 20 Soto Domingo de 96, 98-99, 117, 126 Southern, R.W. 101 Spade, P. van 39, 45, 47, 137 Spieker, S.F. 67 Spitz, L.W. 114, 120, 121 Sprague, R.S. 123 Steele, R. 36 Steenberghen, F. van 24, 32 Stelling-Michaud, S. 3 Steneck, N.H. 34 Stock, Brian 69 Strode, Ralph 49, 57, 58, 62, 112, 116, 118 Stump, E. 137 Suarez, Francisco 97, 130, 141 Swineshead, Richard 45, 48, 49, 56, 59, 60, 61, 64, 86, 88, 89, 98, I 08, 110,112,119 Swineshead, Roger 119 Sylla, E.D. 45, 48, 49, 51, 54, 69 Talbot, C.H. 83 Tartaretus, Petrus 132 Tasso, Torquato 92 Tertullian 34, 132 Themistius 86, 87, 95, 110 Theodoric the Ostrogoth 19 Theophrastus 142 Thierry of Chartres II Thomas, I. 132 Thomas Aquinas 13, 28, 29, 43, 130, 134, 141 Thomaz, Alvaro 98 Thorndike, Lynn 30, 31, 32, 66, 75, 87, 108, 127, 130

175

Toledo (Toletus), Francisco 89, 96, 99, 134 Tomeo, Niccolo Leonico 96 Torrigiano de Torrigiani (Turisanus Monachus)72, 73, 76-78, 79 Tremblay, P. 6, II, 12, 105 Trentman, J.A. 130, 133 Tribbechovius, Adam 104 Tuozzi, Pascale 91 Turricellius, Octavius 135 Tweedale, M.M. 8, 9 Udall, Nicholas 122-23 Ullman, B.L. 107, 108 Ulpian 3 Ulricus 37 Valla, Giorgio 96 Valla, Lorenzo I 08-1 09, I 12, I I7, 121 , 143 Vallesius, Franciscus 142 Valsanzibio, P.S. da 62 Vandeijagt, AJ. 120 Varignana, Bartholomeo de 72 Vasoli, C. 60, 117 Vate, Jean 37 Venator, John 58 Vergerio, Pietro Paolo I08 Vernia, Nicoletta 85-87, 92-95, II 0 Vesalius, Andreas 148 Vescovini, G.F. 28, 58-59, 60, 76 Vives,Juan Luis 117-120 Wallace, W.A. 45, 47, 48, 52, 53, 79, 82, 9~ 97, 98, 9~ 100 Wallerand, G. 39 Ward, Seth 132 Warichez,J. 14, 150 Wasco, R. 109 Webb, C.CJ. 21-23 Webster, John 132 Weijers, Olga 32, 33 Weisheipl, J.A. 7, 31, 32, 36, 39, 42, 45, 46, 48, 199, 137 Went,John 56 Wielgus, Stanislaw 37 William of Auvergne 26, 29, 30, 66 William of Auxerre 29 William of Burgundy 20 William of Conches 32 William of Cremona 56 William of Ockham 9, 14, 42, 43, 47, 49, 51, 55, 56, 57, 108, 112, 116, 118, 133, 143 Williams, JR. 23 Wilson, Curtis 45, 47, 60, 61, 64, 85, 89 Wingate, S.D. 29

176

INDEX NOMINUM

Wippel,J.A. 15, 16, 36, 64, 65, 127 Wodeham, Adam 50. 56, 57 Wolkan, Rudolf 109 Wood, Anthony a 124 Wynkyn de Worde 123 Yates, F.A. 124, 125

Zabarella, Giacomo 69, 79, 81, 82, 89, 94, 134, 146 Zanchi, Girolamo 134 Zimara, Marcantonio 94-96 Zippel, G. 109