The Return of Eurasia: Continuity and Change 9811621780, 9789811621789

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The Return of Eurasia Continuity and Change Edited by Glenn Diesen · Alexander Lukin

The Return of Eurasia

Glenn Diesen · Alexander Lukin Editors

The Return of Eurasia Continuity and Change

Editors Glenn Diesen University of South-Eastern Norway Borre, Norway

Alexander Lukin Department of International Relations National Research University Higher School of Economics Moscow, Russia

ISBN 978-981-16-2178-9 ISBN 978-981-16-2179-6 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2179-6 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore 189721, Singapore

Introduction

Eurasia is transforming and making a forceful return. Eurasia is frequently depicted as a ‘third continent’ with a geographical and historical space distinctively different from both Europe and Asia. Yet, Eurasia is also a bridge between the East and West, making it a central component of the wider concept of Greater Eurasia that envisions the integration of Europe and Asia into a super-continent. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, Eurasia region has undergone a profound socio-economic and political transformation. In the unipolar era, changes in the Eurasian region were characterized by the advancements of the West and the gradual retreat of Russia. Yet, Russia has been able to reclaim some of its economic and political power in the region. Western observers commonly expected that China’s growing influence in Central Asia would result in a Sino-Russian conflict. Instead, Russia and China have coordinated their approaches to Eurasia. While the West advances zero-sum policies with the explicit purpose to peel away Russia’s neighbors from Moscow’s orbit, China has made great efforts to accommodate Russia’s interests in the region by harmonizing competing Eurasian integration initiatives. Eurasia offers the restoration of political subjectivity for Russia, China, and other states. The return of Eurasia to the forefront of international politics represents a socio-economic and political challenge to the Western-centric world order of oceanic powers that has dominated for the past 500 years. Eurasia had a great strategic function under the nomadic rule of the v

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Scythians, Huns, and Mongols. The collapse of Eurasian land corridors that connected great civilizations was seemingly made permanent with the rise of global maritime travel from the early sixteenth century. Yet, the emergence of railways on continental Europe in the nineteenth century created aspirations to connect Europe and Asia by land and thus create new centers of power. Eurasianism is difficult to conceptualize as it encompasses several disciplines and, at times, rival assumptions. In Russia, Eurasianism emerged in the early 1920s and included historians, philosophers, economists, writers, linguists and other strands of intellectuals. The Eurasian idea did not develop into a cohesive political movement due to internal divisions. Furthermore, Eurasianism can be conceptualized as a political philosophy or a political economy, and the fundamental ideas of Eurasianism differs between nations. Eurasianism in Russia developed as a conservative idea in response to the Bolshevik Revolution. Nikolai Trubetskoi, Pyotr Savitsky, Andrei Lieven, Georgy Florovsky, Lev Karsavin, Ivan Ilyin, and other émigrés recognised that the revolution had inherently altered Russia, and the clock could not be turned back after the communist experiment would fail. Bolshevism was deemed to be a radical political Left version of Eurasianism, while they advocated for Eurasianism as a conservative alternative. Russian conservatives had since the 1830s organised themselves primarily around the Slavophile ideas to identify the collective, although the Eurasianist conservatives departed from these ideas as the Russian national identity also had to incorporate Turkic, Ugro-Finnic, and other non-Slavic elements into the collective historical consciousness of Russia. The fundamental idea was that Russia’s historical DNA had changed following the invasion of the Mongols in the thirteenth century and Russia’s conquest of Tatar kingdoms on the Volga River in the midsixteenth century. Russia’s struggles and failures are believed to emanate from the three-century long occidental era since Peter the Great’s Cultural Revolution that sought to modernise by becoming ‘more European’ and perpetually catching up. Eurasianist conservatives instead argue that organic growth and modernisation must build on Russia’s natural and distinctive geostrategic position. Russia’s ability to balance tradition with modernity requires adopting an Eurasianist position. Eurasianism can also be conceptualised in terms of political economy. Russia’s civilizational birthplace in Kievan Rus was similar to other European powers as the Russians prospered with trade, located on the Dnieper

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River. The fragmentation of Kievan Rus in the Twelfth century made Russians settle along less economically viable regions. Expansions tended to push into regions disconnected from the arteries of international trade to avoid conflicts with other powers. In a world of maritime trade, Russia’s Eurasian region positioned Russia at the dual periphery of Europe and Asia. Following defeat in the Crimean War, Russia began rapidly expanding railways across Eurasia. The plan by Tsar Paul to reach conquer British India until his death in 1801 appeared to be revived from 1879 as the Trans-Caspian railway began to be built towards Herat in Afghanistan during the Great Game. By the 1890s, the political economy of Sergei Witte’s infrastructure projects to the Pacific Ocean and industrial expansion had created a pending Eurasian challenge to maritime power. Global power appeared to be defined by the political economy of Russia as a Eurasian land-power in competition with Britain as the leading maritime until the disruption of the Bolshevik Revolution. Russia’s cooperation with China to establish land corridors to connect Eurasia marks a forceful return to a political economy aiming to rewire the arteries of international trade. Furthermore, Russia’s ambitions of advancing an Arctic corridor in concert with China for cheaper and faster transit creates further impetus for Eurasianism as a political economy. The concept of Eurasianism has also evolved in terms of how it defined Russia’s role in the world. For both the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union, Eurasianism had both implicit and explicit claims for Russian hegemony in Eurasia. The Russian federation has neither the capabilities nor the intention to pursue hegemony. Eurasianism instead becomes a project for multipolarity. As the prospect of an emerging hegemon arises from Europe or Asia, Russian Eurasianism relies on a balance of dependence by accommodating a variety of large powers. This marks a break from Russian history, which has since the sixteenth century obsessed about controlling the periphery to maintain security, and subsequently expanded to defend itself. Eurasianism also has a great influence on Russia’s historical struggle to define the ‘nation’ as a core task of nation-building. Russia was Eurasian long before Eurasianism emerged. The Russian Empire emerged out of Europe, however, unlike its European counterparts was land-based and the conquered peoples of Eurasia were absorbed into a melting pot as the Russian identity changed as well. Subsequently, Russia did not separate its position as a nation-state and empire as the Europeans did. Eurasianism

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as a concept assists in advancing Russia as a civilizational state as opposed to a nation-state or empire. Gumilev’s second-generation concept of Eurasianism presented the nomadic spirit of Eurasia with nationalism and universalism, a balance Russia has historically worked towards establishing. Beyond Russia, the concept of Eurasianism is growing in Hungary, Kazakhstan, Turkey, China, India, and other states. While Russia traces its Eurasian origin to the Mongols in the thirteenth century, Hungarian Turanism builds on the national idea of its people being descendants of the Huns who emerged from the Eurasian steppes in the fifth century and brought havoc to the Roman Empire. These ideas are seeing a revival in Hungary, and Primie Minister Viktor Orban opined: ‘Hungarians see themselves as the late descendants of Attila the Hun’. Eurasianism encapsulates more than international relations as it also addresses philosophy, history, linguistics, culture, economics, modernization, and other issues related to human development. As the Westerncentric order appears to continue its decline and the crisis in liberalism reveals deep-seated contradictions, there is evidently a growing appetite for alternatives that have been neglected during the past centuries. The main idea of this book is to bring to light the most influencial approaches to Eurasia existing in the major Eurasian countries and regions and directing the developments on that vast continent. At the same time, the authors representing the views from their respective locations do not limit their research to issues in contemporary foreign policy, but rather provide a much broader outlook on the evolution of attitudes towards Eurasia from the historical, philosophical, geographical perspective, and that of the theories of international relations. Such an approach ensures a much more profound understanding of the multitude of processes unfolding in contemporary Eursia compared to the currently predominant abstract geopolitical or pragmatic diplomatic discussions around this topic. This idea appeared at the International Laboratory on World Order Studies and the New Regionalism at HSE University, and the work was conducted as part of a project ‘Alternative Modernity: Regional Models and Their Feasibility’. It was supported by a grant from the Faculty of World Economy and International Affairs of National Research University Higher School of Economics in 2021.

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The Roadmap to ‘The Return of Eurasia’ The book is divided into four main themes. First, an introduction to the principal theme behind the book. The second part presents the ideas around Eurasia. The third part explores perspectives from Eurasian states. The fourth and last section of the book addresses the approach to Eurasia by non-Eurasian states. The part of the book consists of one chapter, by Richard Sakwa, which introduces the tectonic shift in regions as Russia transitions from Greater Europe to Greater Eurasia. The end of the Cold War was accompanied by the idea that the fall of the Berlin Wall represented the beginning of the unification of Europe. Mikhail Gorbachev talked in terms of a ‘Common European Home’, an idea that continues in the guise of the project for a ‘Greater Europe’. However, right from the start the transformative idea of Greater Europe was countered by the notion of ‘Europe whole and free’, whose fundamental dynamic was the enlargement of the existing West European order to encompass the rest of the continent. This was a programme for the enlargement of the Atlantic system. After some prevarication, the enlargement agenda proved unacceptable to Moscow, and while it continues to argue in favour of transformation its main efforts are now devoted to creating some sort of ‘greater Eurasia’. There remains a fundamental tension between Atlanticist and pan-continental version of the post-Cold War international order in the region. This tension gave rise to conflict and war, in 2008 (the Russo-Georgian War) and again from 2014 (Ukraine), and to what some call the Second Cold War. The continent is once again divided. However, pan-continentalism is far from dead, and although Greater Eurasian ideas have thrived, some sort of Greater European continentalism remains on the agenda. Is this, though, no more than a ‘sad delusion’ or a genuine possibility? The second part of the book consists of three chapters to explore the ideas of Eurasianism. Alexander Lukin and Dmitry Novikov analyses the development of Greater Eurasia transitioning from merely an alternative pole of power to a transformative initiative creating a new international society. David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye explores Russia’s historical engagement with Asia and Eurasia before the 1917 revolution. The Slavophile effort to assert Russian cultural distinctiveness in opposition to Petrine reforms occurred within the format of a European identity. Yet, the views of the East gradually began to change to incorporate nonSlavic elements of a wider Eastern identity. In the next chapter, Glenn

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Diesen argues that contemporary Russian conservatism is developing in the context of restoring political subjectivity to Eurasia and adjusting to a post-Western world. Eurasianism becomes a natural conservative strand to unify the fragmented Russian history, including accommodating the Soviet legacy in the national consciousness. The rise of Asia has created strong incentives for reviving Eurasian conservatism and establish what Russia has always lacked—an organic path to development. The third section of the book includes five chapters on the various national perspectives on Eurasianism from Eurasian states. First, Sultan Akimbekov provides a thorough historical account of the role of Central Asia. While Central Asia is often neglected as the inner land-locked region of Greater Eurasia, this part of Eurasia is of growing importance as a central node between the major Eurasian powers. In the following chapter, Fei Gao and Li Li explore China’s ideas of Eurasia that are expressed in its contemporary Silk Road projects. China is driving the main economic initiatives to integrate Eurasia, which is influences by its historical perspectives and philosophical views of Eurasia. In the next chapter, Göktürk Tüysüzo˘glu analyses Eurasianism as a Turkish concept, which is positioned between Europe and Asia. The Turkish approach to Eurasia builds on a distinvtive history, yet it is also intrinsically linked to Russian Eurasianism. Balázs Ablonczy provides insight into the revival of Hungarian turanism as a Eurasianist strand that depicts the Hungarian nation as a successor of the Huns. Ablonczy explores how the ideas of turanism has experienced a recent revival, influencing how Hungary imagines its role in the world. The following chapter by P. S. Raghavan addresses the unique position by India as a major Eurasian power. The revival of Eurasia presents a great challenge of India, which seeks to find a balance between the Greater Eurasian partnership and the rival Indo-Pacific region. The fourth and final section of the book includes two chapters on nonEurasian perspectives on Eurasian integration. Bilahari Kausikan explores the extent to which South-East Asia can be considered to be part of Eurasia. By geography alone, South-East Asia is divided between continental states and island states, and with its economies equally divided. In the final chapter, Thomas Graham explores the central and durable role of Eurasia in US foreign policy. The US has throughout history defined its foreign policy interest as ensuring an organic balance of power in Europe and Asia. After defeating Germany and Japan in their efforts to assert regional hegemony in Europe and Asia, the severely skewed balance of

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power left the Soviet Union as a possible Eurasian hegemon. The US subsequently establish a presence on the Eurasian continent to actively restore a balance of power. As the post-Cold War unipolar fades away, the US is confronted with an entirely new power distribution emerging in Eurasia.

Contents

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Sad Delusions: From Greater Europe to Greater Eurasia Richard Sakwa

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Greater Eurasia: From Geopolitical Pole to International Society? Alexander Lukin and Dmitry Novikov

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Asia Before Eurasianism: The Pre-Revolutionary Roots of a Russian Emigré Ideology David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye

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Greater Eurasia as a Conservative Initiative Glenn Diesen

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Central Asia in Eurasia: Its Role in History Sultan Akimbekov

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China’s Eurasian Ideas and the Silk Road Projects Fei Gao and Li Li

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Turkey’s Return to Eurasianism: Is It Real or Just a Pragmatic Discourse? Göktürk Tüysüzo˘glu

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Hungarian Turanism: Eurasianism à la hongroise? Balázs Ablonczy

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Finding Compatibility Between Eurasian Partnership and Indo-Pacific Security: And Indian Perspective P. S. Raghavan

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Is Southeast Asia ‘Eurasian’? Bilahari Kausikan

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The United States and Eurasia in Historical Perspective Thomas Graham

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Notes on Contributors

Balázs Ablonczy is an Associated Professor at Loránd Eötvös University in Budapest, and Research Fellow at the Center for Humanities, Institute of History, Budapest. Sultan Akimbekov is the Director of the Institute of Asian Studies in Almaty, Kazakhstan and Editor of The Center of Asia magazine. His previous appointments include advisor to the President of the Republic of Kazakhstan, Director of the Center for Political Analisys, and Director of the Institute of World Economy and Politics under the Foundation of the First President of the Republic of Kazakhstan—the Leader of the Nation. Glenn Diesen is a Professor at the University of South-Eastern Norway, and an Associate Editor at the Russia in Global Affairs journal. Fei Gao is Vice President and Academic Dean of China Foreign Affairs University. Thomas Graham is managing director at Kissinger Associates, Inc. He was Special Assistant to the President and Senior Director for Russia on the National Security Council staff from 2004 to 2007 and Director for Russian Affairs on that staff from 2002 to 2004. From 2001 to 2002, he served as the Associate Director of the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State. From 1984 to1998, he was a Foreign Service Officer. His assignments included two tours of duty at the US Embassy in Moscow, xv

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where he served as head of the political/internal unit and acting political counselor. Between tours in Moscow, he worked on Russian and Soviet affairs on the Policy Planning Staff of the Department of State and as a policy assistant in the Office of the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy. Bilahari Kausikan is a retired Singaporean diplomat who served as Singapore’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs Second Permanent Secretary from 2001 to 2010 and subsequently as Permanent Secretary until 2013 and Ambassador-at-Large until May 2018. His earlier appointments at the Ministry include Deputy Secretary for South-east Asia, Permanent Representative to the United Nations in New York, and Ambassador to the Russian Federation. He is currently Chairman of the Middle East Institute, an autonomous institute of the National University of Singapore. Li Li is Associate Professor at the College of International Development and Global Agriculture of China Agricultural University. Alexander Lukin is Head of Department of International Relations and International Laboratory on World Order Studies and the New Regionalism at National Research University Higher School of Economics, Director of the Center for East Asian and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies at MGIMO University, Moscow, Russia and Chair Professor at the Department of Public Administration of Zhejian University, Hangzhou, China. Dmitry Novikov is a Deputy Head of the Department of International Relations and the International Laboratory on World Order Studies and the New Regionalism at HSE University, Moscow, Russia. David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye is Professor of Russian History at Brock University, Ontario, Canada. P. S. Raghavan is a former career Indian diplomat. From 2018 to 2020 he was Chairman of the National Security Advisory Board of India’s National Security Council (2016–2020). In a diplomatic career of over 36 years, he has served as India’s Ambassador to Russia (2014–2016), Czech Republic and Ireland. He has also held other diplomatic positions in the USSR, Poland, UK, Vietnam, and South Africa.

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Richard Sakwa is Professor of Russian and European Politics at the University of Kent at Canterbury, a Senior Research Fellow at the International Laboratory on World Order Studies and the New Regionalism at HSE University and an Honorary Professor in the Faculty of Political Science at Moscow State University. Göktürk Tüysüzo˘glu is Associate Professor at the Department of International Relations at Giresun University in Turkey.

CHAPTER 1

Sad Delusions: From Greater Europe to Greater Eurasia Richard Sakwa

In recent years there has been much talk of the return of a bipolar structure to international order, with the dominance of the United States challenged by the emergence of a peer competitor in the form of China.1 At the same time, Russia argues that the world is becoming increasingly 1 I am grateful to the extremely helpful comments by Andrej Krickovic on an earlier version of this paper. The faults, of course, remain my own.

This Chapter was originally published in the Journal of Eurasian Studies, 2021, Vol. 12, Issue 1, pp. 5–18 under the title “Sad Delusions: The Rise and Decline of Greater Europe”, © 2018 by the author. This open access article is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution License, which allows unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, providing the original author and source are credited. R. Sakwa (B) University of Kent, Canterburry, UK e-mail: [email protected] HSE University, Moscow, Russia © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Diesen and A. Lukin (eds.), The Return of Eurasia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2179-6_1

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multipolar, with a number of centres of global power but none capable of hegemonic dominance. These discussions reflect two important points. The first is the relative decline of Europe as an independent actor in international politics. The second is Russia’s attempt to provide a conceptual framework for its own assertion of great power status and independence from the emerging elements of bipolarity. To achieve this independence Russia pursues a threefold strategy. The first in chronological terms is the programme outlined in the last Soviet period and enunciated by Mikhail Gorbachev in the formulation of a ‘Common European Home’. After the relative quiescence of this notion in the 1990s, it was revived by President Vladimir Putin in the form of the idea of ‘Greater Europe’. This reprised classical Gaullist-Mitterandist ideas about some sort of European political community stretching from Lisbon to Vladivostok. The second is the development of Eurasian integration in post-Soviet Eurasia (PSE). This includes fostering the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and the Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) as part of what can be called Putin’s ‘heartland’ strategy, to avoid PSE becoming a zone of contestation between stronger outside powers. This is in keeping with the pragmatic Eurasianism advanced above all by Nursultan Nazarbayev, the president of Kazakhstan between 1991 and 2019, who can claim to be the progenitor of Eurasian integration through his famous speech at Moscow State University in 1994.2 Nazarabayev did not favour the restoration of anything approximating the USSR, since ‘Far from promoting the restoration of the USSR, Eurasianism stands in active opposition.… For segments of the elite in many post-Soviet countries, Eurasianism has a coherence that neither overpowers nor assimilates distinctive ethnic groups’.3 The third approach is to tie both of these into a larger Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP), reinforced by a number of post-Western global institutions, notably the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) and the BRICS grouping (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa). The parameters and geographical scope

2 Nazarbayev, N. (1994) ‘Meeting with Staff and Students of M. V. Lomonosov Moscow State University’, 29 March, in Nursultan Nazarbayev, Kazakhstani-Russian Relations. Moscow, Russky Raritet, pp. 64–86. 3 Podberezkin, A. and Podberezkina O. (2015) ‘Eurasianism as an Idea, Civilizational Concept and Integration Challenge’, in Piotr Dutkiewicz and Richard Sakwa (eds), Eurasian Integration: The View from Within. London and New York, Routledge, pp. 48–49.

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of GEP remain vague, yet the ambition is clear: to ensure that Russia remains the centre of global politics, and to move beyond a West-centric political imaginary to sustain a new geopolitics of diversity and sovereign internationalism. At the same time, a potential return to pan-European continentalism cannot be precluded. Atlantic unity frayed in the Donald Trump era, but his actions reflected long-term trends. This renewed the idea of some sort of pan-continental project, no longer couched in terms of an alternative to Russia’s Eurasian and Asian ambitions but as a complement. The continued commitment to some sort of Greater European idea returns to earlier Gorbachevian themes, but is it little more than a revival of the ‘sad delusions’ of that era—the belief that European international politics could be so transformed as to allow a genuine post-Cold War system of indivisible and mutual security based on the joint interests of a common European destiny? The paper will argue that a more modest conception of this ‘Greater Europe’ is not delusional but in fact represents a sensible policy strategy for all concerned in conditions of renewed great power rivalry, but it will only be viable if couched in terms of something more sustainable than multivectorism and balancing but on a common commitment to sovereign internationalism to allow competitive but creative competition with Atlantic and Asian powers.

From Common European Home to Greater Europe At the end of the Cold War in 1989 Europe was faced with two potential pathways into the post-communist era.4 The first was outlined by Gorbachev for a continent in which a plurality of social systems coexisted without necessarily coming into conflict. In his speech to the United Nations on 7 December 1988 Gorbachev effectively declared the Cold War over. He argued that ‘Further world progress is now possible only through the search for a consensus of all mankind, in movement toward a new world order’.5 In his speech to the Council of Europe (CoE) in Strasbourg on 6 July 1989 Gorbachev spoke of a ‘common European

4 Sakwa, R. (2017) Russia against the Rest. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press. 5 Gorbachev, M. (1988) ‘Gorbachev’s Speech to the UN’, 7 December, https://astro.

temple.edu/~rimmerma/gorbachev_speech_to_UN.htm.

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home’ stretching from the Atlantic to the Pacific,6 thus giving voice to the aspiration for pan-European unity that remains to this day in the guise of ‘Greater Europe’. The tumultuous events of 1989 were a consequence of this fundamental policy shift. Two Paths Out of the Cold War The New Political Thinking (NPT) was a type of ‘universal ideology’ for a global world, with the potential to revive the United Nations, for so long overshadowed by Cold War bloc politics. Gorbachev’s grand project was to integrate ‘the Soviet Union as an equal partner of the Western powers in the world’s political family’.7 Even as he dismantled the Cold War, Gorbachev remained committed to creating a ‘humane, democratic socialism’ in the Soviet Union. For him, the transcendence of the Cold War did not mean that the Soviet Union would automatically copy the political system of the West.8 Equally, for him and his successors, Russia would remain an independent sovereign power in international affairs, but now acting in a more cooperative spirit. This would mean joining a new and transformed Greater West, the global counterpart of Greater Europe. At the core of the transformational politics outlined at this time was a new peace order based on the reunification of the European continent. Despite Russia’s travails in the 1990s, this vision of a united but plural Europe remains, even though relations between Russia and the European Union (EU) after 2014 entered an impasse from which there is no clear exit. It is worth recalling the pluralistic vision at the heart of policy during perestroika. Gorbachev’s common European home speech warned that ‘the states of Europe belong to different social systems’ and admitted that there was uncertainty about the new ‘architecture of our “common

6 Gorbachev, M. (1989) ‘Europe as a Common Home’, Address to the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 6 July, http://polsci.colorado.edu/sites/default/files/1A_Gorbachev. pdf. 7 Grachev, A. (2008) Gorbachev’s Gamble: Soviet Foreign Policy & the End of the Cold War. Cambridge, Polity, pp. 78, 194–4, 204. 8 Gooding, J. (1990) ‘Gorbachev and Democracy’, Soviet Studies, 42 (2), pp. 195–231; Robinson, N. (1995) Ideology and the Collapse of the Soviet System: A Critical History of the Soviet Ideological Discourse. Aldershot, Edward Elgar.

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home”’, but insisted that it would have many rooms.9 This was a model for an ideationally plural Europe comprised of several sovereign entities. This was a classic Gaullist idea, taken up by François Mitterrand in his plan for a ‘European confederation’, and by many others and above all the Russian ambition (it would be going too far to call it a plan) for a Greater Europe. However, on the other side, President George H. W. Bush sought to regain the ideological initiative by advancing the idea of a ‘new world order’ based on enlargement rather than transformation, first enunciated in his September 1990 address to Congress. In practice, both sides in the early post-Cold War years were committed to a middle position, the policy of adaptation of the European political and security architecture to a Russia that itself was committed to adaptation. The Charter of Paris for a New Europe was adopted on 21 November 1990 and heralded ‘a new era of democracy, peace and unity’, stressing that ‘Europe is liberating itself from its past’.10 The focus was on the temporal challenge—overcoming the past; but the contours of the new spatial order were unclear. Although idealistic, Gorbachev’s ideas were responses to real challenges that remain unresolved to this day. Putin’s foreign policy later was formulated in more pragmatic terms, but it retained the idealistic streak inherited from the perestroika years. The end of the Cold War was but part of the transformation of the international system. Equally, 1989 was not just about achieving a counter-revolution against the ossified dogmas and social practices of Soviet-style socialism, but the underlying aspiration was to achieve an emancipation from axiological politics in their entirety though ‘anti-revolutions’.11 This represented the positive transcendence of the Cold War through a transformation of international 9 Gorbachev, M. (1989) ‘Europe as a Common Home’, Address to the Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 6 July, http://polsci.colorado.edu/sites/default/files/1A_Gorbachev. pdf. 10 Charter of Paris for a New Europe. (1990) Paris, CSCE, https://www.oscepa.org/ documents/all-documents/documents-1/historical-documents-1/673-1990-charter-ofparis-for-a-new-europe/file. 11 Sakwa, R. (1998) ‘Konets epokhi revolyutsii: antirevolyutsionnye revolyutsii 1989–

1991 godov’ (‘The End of the Age of Revolutions: The Anti-Revolutions of 1989–1991’), Politicheskie Issledovaniya—Polis (Moscow, in Russian), 5, pp. 23–38; Sakwa, R. (2001) ‘The Age of Paradox: The Anti-revolutionary Revolutions of 1989–91’, in Moira Donald and Tim Rees (eds), Reinterpreting Revolution in Twentieth-Century Europe. London, Macmillan, pp. 159–176.

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politics. Instead, one form of axiology was replaced by another, and the philosophical closure represented by the ‘end of history’ (the view that the dissolution of communist system represented the end of the ideological evolution of humanity) was accompanied by the inadvertent ‘end of politics’. Certain issues were considered closed and not susceptible to revision. The fundamental process in the Russian view was to be mutual transformation, whereas the Western view envisaged a straightforward process of enlargement.12 The end of the Cold War saw no fundamental institutional innovation when it came to European security and development, and instead the Atlantic power system (the EU and NATO) enlarged. Institutional enlargement was accompanied by a complex process of norm advancement in which a strengthened monistic system claimed the title to virtue and values. This is how, according to Andrew Bacevich, ‘America squandered its Cold War victory’.13 Russia was offered not a Greater West but membership of the Historical West, and even that apparently on subordinate terms. Russia in one way or another has been striving to be recognised as founder member of the Historical West since at least the early modern era, but always as a shaper rather than a simple taker of norms, provoking endless conflicts that endure to this day.14 There appeared to be ‘no place for Russia’ in the triumphant Atlantic system, certainly not as an equal.15 Given the enormous disparity in power and resources, Russia’s effective exclusion from the existing security arrangements did not at first appear to be a problem, but in the end Russia was once again ‘lost’.16 Jack Matlock, the US ambassador to the USSR between 1987 and 1991, notes, ‘too many American politicians looked at the end of the Cold War as if it

12 Sakwa, R. (2017) Russia against the Rest. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, pp. 12–19. 13 Bacevich, A. (2020) The Age of Illusions: How America Squandered its Cold War Victory. New York, Metropolitan Books. 14 Neumann, I. B. (2016) Russia and the Idea of Europe: A Study in Identity and International Relations. London: Routledge. 15 Hill, W. H. (2018) No Place for Russia: European Security Institutions since 1989. New York, Columbia University Press. 16 Conradi, P. (2017) Who Lost Russia? How the World Entered a New Cold War. London, Oneworld.

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were a quasi-military victory rather than a negotiated outcome that benefited both sides’.17 He notes that ‘mythmaking began almost as soon as the Soviet Union fell’; ‘Since 1991, these distortions have created a set of beliefs as widespread as they are unfounded’.18 He argues that the Cold War ended at least two years before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and that it was Gorbachev’s initiatives and not western military pressure that ‘defeated communism’. Thus he rejects the increasingly prevalent view that it was the US President, Ronald Reagan, who put an end to the Cold War by standing firm and who through the Strategic Defence Initiative (SDI, more commonly known as Star Wars) who forced the Soviet Union to surrender. This is the fundamental point about Russia’s claim to be a co-founder of the post-Cold War European and global order. Russia (as the continuer state of the Soviet Union) argues that it was not defeated in the Cold War but that it was a common victory.19 The point is confirmed by Stephen Cohen, who argues that ‘the Cold War would have continued unabated, possibly grown worse, had it not been for Gorbachev’s initiatives’. He also notes that the Cold War ended well before the disintegration of the Soviet Union, and as Bush had originally argued, it was negotiated so that ‘there were no losers, only winners’.20 However, ‘the Cold War ended in Moscow, but not in Washington’,21 creating a unipolar peace order against which Moscow chafed from the start. The post-Soviet peace was ‘lost’, and contrary to much Western commentary, ‘The new Cold War and the squandering of the post-Soviet peace began not in Moscow but in Washington’.22 NATO enlargement meant that most of the ‘follies’ of the [George W.] Bush administration had their roots in the mistakes of the [Bill] Clinton presidency in the 1990s.23 Cohen believes that the new

17 Matlock, J. (2010) Super-Power Illusions: How Myths and False Ideologies Led America Astray—and How to Return to Reality. New Haven and London, Yale University Press, p. x. 18 Ibid, p. 3. 19 Ibid, pp. 4–6. 20 Cohen, S. F. (2009) Soviet Fates and Lost Alternatives: From Stalinism to the New Cold War. New York, Columbia University Press, p. 160. 21 Ibid, p. 171. 22 Ibid, p. 167. 23 Ibid, p. 172.

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Cold War is largely the responsibility of the Western powers, who failed to overcome the entrenched patterns of the original conflict.24 On the other side, leaders of the Atlantic community feared that premature Russian membership of the Historical West would lead to normative dilution, institutional incoherence, and the loss of American leadership. Offensive realists argue that one of the main priorities for a regional hegemon (in this case the United States) is not to allow any potential rival to emerge elsewhere.25 Mearsheimer takes it as a given that Russia is a great power, although one today with a relatively low power capacity.26 In his view, the cycle of violence will continue, ‘because the great powers that shape the international system fear each other and compete for power as a result’. In an anarchic international system (that is, one without some sort of supreme authority), security competition and war between the great powers remain constants, although the intensity of competition varies. States seek to maximise their share of world power, and aim to become the hegemon—‘the only great power in the system’.27 Regime type (today either self-styled democracies or ‘autocracies’) has little to do with it, since ‘democracies care about security as much as non-democracies do’.28 The structure of the international system shapes the behaviour of states. This is in sharp contrast to the liberal view, which believes that the domestic characteristics of states shape their foreign policy. Defensive (or structural) realists also believe that states are concerned about the balance of power as they struggle to survive, but unlike offensive realists, states behave defensively to maintain rather than to challenge the balance of power, and form balancing coalitions to counter a potential hegemon.29 It is from this perspective that Wohlforth and Zubok argue that the idea of any transformational politics at the end

24 Cohen, S. F. (2017) Why Cold War Again? How America Lost Post-Soviet Russia. London and New York, I. B. Tauris. 25 Mearsheimer, J. (2014) Tragedy of Great Power Politics, updated edition. New York, W. W. Norton., pp. 21, 141 and passim. 26 Ibid, p. xv. 27 Ibid, p. 2. 28 Ibid, p. 4. 29 Waltz, K. N. (1979) Theory of International Politics. New York, Random House.

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of the Cold War is hopelessly delusional.30 However, their perspective is global, whereas post-war European regional politics are based precisely on the possibility of transformation—how else could France and Germany today be such close allies? Greater Europe Greater Europe is a riposte to such hard-line realist thinking. It is based on repeating on a larger scale the success of what became the EU in making war almost inconceivable between its member states. It also has a geopolitical dimension, based on a continental vision in which Europe would emerge from the superpower overlay of the Cold War to become an independent pole in world politics.31 Not surprisingly, such a view is anathema to those who believe in the enduring hegemony of the Atlantic power system. With its roots in various interwar plans for ‘pan-Europa’, and then in Gaullist aspirations for a more autonomous voice for Europe in the postwar Atlantic system, the idea was reinvigorated by Gorbachev’s plans for a common European home. In the 1990s the idea was eclipsed by more immediate concerns, but even convinced Atlanticists such as the Russian foreign minister, Andrei Kozyrev,32 argued that Russia would become part not only of the Atlantic security system but also that its great power ambitions would be fulfilled in the larger European context. The president at the time, Boris Yeltsin, never failed to argue that ‘Europe without Russia is not Europe at all. Only with Russia can it be a Greater Europe, with no possible equal anywhere on the globe’.33 The two complemented each other: Russia was a vast and relatively under-developed country rich in natural endowments, while Western Europe had advanced technologies but needed energy and other resources.

30 Wohlforth, W. C. and V. Zubok (2017) ‘An Abiding Antagonism: Realism, Idealism, and the Mirage of Western-Russian Partnership after the Cold War’, International Politics, 54 (4), pp. 405–419. 31 Gromyko, A. A. and V. P. Fëdorova (eds) (2014) Bol’shaya Evropa: Idei, real’nost’, perspektivy. Moscow, Ves’ mir. 32 Kozyrev, A. (2019) Firebird: A Memoir. The Elusive Fate of Russian Democracy. Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, pp. 217–222. 33 Bershidsky, L. (2014) ‘No Illusions Left, I’m Leaving Russia’, Moscow Times, 19 June.

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Continentalist ideas were in abeyance in the 1990s as Russia signed a Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with the EU and focused on its domestic transformation, but with President Vladimir Putin’s consolidation of power after 2000, the Greater Europe idea was revived. The Russian foreign minister since 2004, Sergei Lavrov, argued that the end of the Cold War offered a unique opportunity to change the European architecture on the principles of indivisible and equal security and broad cooperation without dividing lines. We had a practical chance to mend Europe’s divide and implement the dream of a common European home, which many European thinkers and politicians, including President Charles de Gaulle of France, wholeheartedly embraced. Russia was fully open to this option and advanced many proposals and initiatives in this connection.34 In the event, the end of the Cold War was marked by a remarkable dearth of new ideas or institutional innovation. Russia favoured strengthening the military and political components of the Organisation for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), but instead NATO became the pre-eminent security organisation. No political form could be found to encompass the two halves of the continent. The Russian leadership expended considerable effort to devise a new ‘architecture’ for a united Europe to give organisational form to Russia’s continental aspirations. A major initiative in this respect was President Dmitry Medvedev’s call, in a speech in Berlin on 5 June 2008, for a new European Security Treaty (EST).35 Medvedev argued for the creation of a genuinely inclusive security system to avoid new dividing lines. The initiative reflected the long-standing tension between two models of European security. The strictly Atlanticist view focused on US security guarantees for its NATO allies, a view staunchly supported by the UK, the Netherlands, Denmark, and Norway. The Euro-Atlantic approach recognised US leadership but sought to complement it with continental security initiatives, a

34 Lavrov, S. (2016) ‘Russia’s Foreign Policy: Historical Background’, Russia in Global Affairs, 3 March, https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/articles/russias-foreign-policy-in-ahistorical-perspective/. 35 ‘Draft of the European Security Treaty’. (2009) 29 November, http://en.kremlin. ru/events/president/news/6152.

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view traditionally supported by France and Germany.36 Medvedev’s initiative was not intended to drive a wedge between the United States and its European NATO allies, but to strengthen the Euro-Atlanticist perspective, primarily through the OSCE. Medvedev argued for ‘the necessity of ensuring the unity of the entire Euro-Atlantic space’. It reiterated Moscow’s long-standing concern about ‘NATO-centrism’ in Europe and sought to ‘transform the OSCE into a fully-fledged regional organisation’. However, even Medvedev’s mild Euro-Atlanticism was too much for Atlanticists.37 They feared that it represented the potential for a shift to full-bodied Europeanism, with a greater security role for the EU and perhaps even a deeper security relationship with Russia. By November 2009 a draft EST was published, calling on signatories to ‘cooperate with each other on the basis of the principles of indivisible, equal and undiminished security. Any security measures taken by a Party to the Treaty individually or together with other Parties, including in the framework of any international organisation military alliance [read NATO] or coalition, shall be implemented with due regard to security interests of all other Parties’. Apart from this fundamental assertion, allowing Russia to block further NATO enlargement, the draft was rather thin. The OSCE launched the ‘Corfu process’ in June 2009 ‘to restore confidence and take forward dialogue on wider European security’, but in the end nothing was achieved.38 The Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative (2011),39 a commission seeking to lay the ‘intellectual foundations for an inclusive Euro-Atlantic security system for the twenty-first century’,was yet another attempt to reform the system of European security, but it too ultimately was unable to prevail against hermetic Atlanticism. Lavrov reflected on the dilemmas of building Greater Europe in an important speech at the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe

36 Fenenko, A. (2015) ‘The Myth of a “Hybrid War” in Ukraine’, Russia Direct, 16 June. 37 Diesen, G. and Wood S. (2012) ‘Russia’s Proposal for a New Security System: Confirming Diverse Perspectives’, Australian Journal of International Affairs, 66 (4), pp. 450–467. 38 OSCE (2009) ‘The Corfu Process’, http://www.osce.org/cio/108343. 39 Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative. (2011) http://www.nti.org/about/projects/euro-

atlantic-security-initiative-easi/.

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(PACE).40 He stressed the importance of the CoE as a soft security structure and the OSCE as the framework for legally binding agreements, but insisted that the EST was essential to compensate for the failure to create a ‘European architecture that would unite each and every state without exception in the Euro-Atlantic region into a single organization based on clear and legally binding principles and providing equal security for all’. The main problem for him was that ‘the principle of indivisible security proclaimed in the Euro-Atlantic Security Initiative at the highest level in the 1990s was not embodied in international law’. In keeping with his original strong European leanings, in a speech in Berlin Putin called for the geopolitical unification of ‘Greater Europe’ from Lisbon to Vladivostok to create a genuine ‘strategic partnership.41 Europe and Russia were to be united into a common strategic and economic area in which resources were pooled. A shared developmental strategy would allow the industrial and military-strategic potential of the region from the Atlantic to the Pacific to be exploited to the maximum. This continental project would lay the foundations for Europe to emerge as a distinctive pole, comparable to China and the United States. Medvedev reprised some of these themes at NATO’s summit in Lisbon in November 2010.42 It was in this spirit that Sergei Karaganov, the head of the influential Council for Foreign and Security Policy (SVOP), argued that the EU and Russia should establish not only a partnership but a strategic union or alliance, which would counteract the relative decline of Europe’s global status and economic weight.43 He acknowledged that

40 Lavrov, S. (2010) ‘Transcript of Address of Sergey V. Lavrov’, Council of Europe, Strasbourg, 29 April, http://en.interaffairs.ru/exclusive/14-transcript-of-address-by-ser gey-lavrov-minister-for-foreign-affairs-of-the-russian-federation-at-the-spring-part-of-the61st-parliamentary-assembly-session-strasbourg-29-april-2010.html. 41 Putin, V. (2010) Speech delivered to the Fourth Berlin Economic Leadership meeting organised by the Süddeutsche Zeitung on 26 November, which the day before was presented as an article in that paper. A summary of the speech is at http://premier.gov. ru/events/news/13120/; the article is Wladimir Putin ‘Von Lissabon bis Wladiwostok. Handelspakt zwischen Russland und Europa: Moskau will als Lehre aus der größten Krise der Weltwirtschaft seit acht Jahrzehnten wesentlich enger mit der Europäischen Union zusammenarbeiten’, Süddeutsche Zeitung, 25 November 2010; www.sueddeutsche.de. 42 Medvedev, D. (2010) ‘Press-konferentsiya po itogam zasedaniya Soveta RossiyaNATO’, Lisbon, 20 November, http://kremlin.ru/transcripts/9570. 43 Karaganov, S. (2009) ‘To Conclude the Unfinished War’, in Sergei Karaganov et al., Rossiya vs Evropa: Protivostoyane ili Soyuz. Moscow, Astrel, p. 29.

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this would be hard to achieve because of the ‘unfinished character of the “Cold War” in both institutional and intellectual terms’. In his view, the roots of the Cold War were not removed, hence ‘some re-growth appeared, because no Europe-wide peace agreement was made to end the Cold War’. This ‘unfinished character’ in the end allowed Cold War-style politics to return. Russia’s Greater European initiatives were typically seen in the West as being little more than a cover for the establishment of a ‘Greater Russia’ by stealth. These concerns were exacerbated by Western perceptions of Russian ‘democratic backsliding’ and the rise of ‘kleptocratic authoritarianism’,44 as well as the view that Russia was sowing divisions in Europe.45 Russia’s more assertive energy policies, such as the gas supply disruptions with Ukraine in early 2006 and again in early 2009, reinforced these fears. In the end relations between Russia and the EU deteriorated to the point that Lavrov even talked about the possibility of a total rupture.46 Western Europe itself is torn between continental and Atlanticist impulses. The two are not necessarily opposed, but a formula for their combination has not yet been found. Gaullism is one of the most coherent expressions of continental sovereign internationalism. During his presidency between 1958 and 1969 Charles de Gaulle sought to restore French sovereignty in international affairs. Even though France was a founder member of the European Economic Community (EEC) in 1957, de Gaulle resisted moves towards supranationalism, and insisted that what would one day become the European Union should remain a ‘union of nations’ based on respect for national traditions. He was particularly critical of Anglo-Saxon claims to hegemony, and in March 1966 expelled NATO headquarters from France, withdrew from its integrated military command and closed all NATO bases in the country and removed all

44 Dawisha, K. (2011) ‘Is Russia’s Foreign Policy That of a Corporatist-Kleptocratic Regime?’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 27 (4), pp. 331–365; Dawisha, K. (2014) Putin’s Kleptocracy: Who Owns Russia? New York, Simon & Schuster. 45 Leonard, M., and N. Popescu (2007) A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations. European Council in Foreign Relations, Policy Paper, https://www.ecfr.eu/page/-/ECFR-02_ A_POWER_AUDIT_OF_EU-RUSSIA_RELATIONS.pdf. 46 Lavrov, S. (2021) ‘“If you Want Peace, Prepare for War”: Lavrov Says Russia Ready to Break Off Relations With EU if Navalny Sanctions Target the Economy’, RT.com, 12 February, https://www.rt.com/russia/515345-lavrov-breaking-off-relations-eu-borrell/.

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United States forces.47 De Gaulle espoused a vision of pan-European continentalism, and in his famous speech of November 1959 in Strasbourg he spoke of a Europe ‘from the Atlantic to the Urals’, arguing that ‘it is the whole of Europe, that would decide the destiny of the world’. He considered Atlanticism a project for the subjugation of Europe, and argued that the continent should act as the third pole between the United States and the Soviet Union (although he insisted on calling the country ‘Russia’ rather than the USSR). He believed that Russia’s place was in Europe. He refused to accept the Cold War definition of the political West, which in his view subordinated Europe to American interests.48 Thirty years later Gorbachev also delivered his common European home speech in Strasbourg, and this Gaullist conception of a larger panEuropean, comprising a variety of states and social orders, became ‘greater Europe’, the idea that Europe should manage its own affairs while acting autonomously in global matters. Germany is the best exemplar of contemporary Western Europe’s Atlantic orientation. The crisis in Russia’s relations with the Atlantic community coincided with the emergence of Germany as the pre-eminent power in the EU, becoming in effect a ‘reluctant hegemon’ (as much scholarly and journalistic commentary put it). Germany began to eclipse the EU institutions in managing various crises besetting the community, from the fate of the eurozone, the Cyprus financial crisis, Greek debt, and refugees. Moscow misunderstood the nature of its ties with Berlin. Although trade and economic relations were important for both partners, ultimately modern Germany is a child of the Atlantic system, and relations with Atlantic institutions would take priority over those with Moscow as long as those institutions remained the core of the liberal international order. Since the time of Konrad Adenauer, the country’s first post-war chancellor, Westbindung (‘binding to the West’) has been the heart of West German politics, focused on keeping America in Europe. There has been a persistent strain of anti-Americanism, from both left and right, but this has not been enough to re-orient German politics towards a fully fledged independent Europeanism. Not surprisingly, Moscow’s espousal of a greater Europe was viewed as not only dividing Germany from 47 Howard, R. T. (2016) France’s Secret Wars with Britain and America, 1945–2016. London, Biteback. 48 Anceau, É. (2020) ‘De Gaulle and Europe’, Encyclopédie pour une histoire nouvelle de l’Europe [online], 22 June, https://ehne.fr/en/node/12243.

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America, but as an attack on Germany’s democratic identity.49 Nevertheless, Moscow never quite gave up its hope that Germany would return ‘to the role of Mitteleuropäische balancer of East and West’, the tradition dating back to Germany’s unification in 1870 and associated in particular with Otto von Bismarck.50 The Atlantic community’s intense vigilance against attempts to drive a wedge between its two wings has been mentioned, and it has been so since various Soviet plans for European security were advanced by Nikita Khrushchev in the 1950s. This Cold War hermetic view prevails to this day, accompanied by the enduring fear that any idea emanating outside of the NATO system is potentially divisive and dangerous. Russia’s proposals to resolve the numerous conflicts in Europe were treated with scepticism when not dismissed as self-serving and partisan. This was case throughout the various Balkan crises in the 1990s, and with Russian proposals to resolve the frozen conflict in Transnistria, notably with the Kozak Memorandum in 2003. William Hill (2012), who served two spells as head of the OSCE Mission to Moldova in 1999–2006, reveals how Russia was systemically shut out from the resolution of the Transnistria issue.51 Russia’s effective exclusion from such processes generated the neo-revisionism that has predominated in Russian foreign policy since Putin’s return to the presidency in 2012. From Moscow’s perspective, it was the Atlantic alliance that was driving a wedge between Russia and Europe, isolating it from the larger process of continental unification. By denying the logic of transcendence, the Atlanticists precipitated the result that they sought to avert. Europe could not be ‘whole and free’ if Russia was effectively excluded. It was offered associate membership of an existing enterprise (the Historical West), but Russia’s enduring aspiration was to become a founder member of a transformed Greater West. An analogous process was at work in Europe, where Russia was offered

49 Hawes, J. (2017) ‘What Britain Needs to Understand about the Profound and Ancient Divisions in Germany’, New Statesman, 19 September, https://www.newstates man.com/world/europe/2017/09/what-britain-needs-understand-about-profound-andancient-divisions-germany. 50 Rynning, S. (2015) ‘The False Promise of Continental Concert: Russia, the West and the Necessary Balance of Power’, International Affairs, 91 (3)3, p. 545. 51 Hill, W. H. (2012) Russia, the Near Abroad and the West: Lessons from the MoldovaTransdniestria Conflict. Washington, DC, Woodrow Wilson Center Press & Baltimore, MD, The Johns Hopkins University Press.

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a ‘strategic partnership’ with the smaller or core Europe, as institutionalised in the EU, but it always favoured the transformative and pluralistic creation of a Greater Europe, in which it would be at its origins a founder and core member. The idea of Greater Europe displaces the monist idea of the EU as the sole representative of Europe in favour of a more plural model, in which the EU would be part of a broader pan-European community. Both the Greater West and Greater Europe ideas are based on a dialogical approach to politics—the view that engagement transforms both subjects. Instead, the West tried to stay the same and enlarge; while Russia was to change to reflect the assumed new power and normative realities.52 For a genuine dialogical process to take place, both sides would have to be prepared to change, but this would be a process in which small first steps could establish a platform for a broader agenda. Neither side would be expected to trade away normative standards or principles as they see them. The gulf in approaches to world order means that there is no ‘grand bargain’ in prospect, hence the only way out of the impasse are modest and pragmatic trust-building small steps. In the context of the Second Cold War, these will be even more difficult than in the original conflict.

From Greater Europe to Greater Eurasia In recent years flux has returned to international politics, replacing the relative stasis of the ‘cold peace’ years between 1989 and 2014. The expansion of the Atlantic power system accompanied by the universalising practices of the liberal international order provoked a confrontation over Ukraine in 2014 and the onset of the Second Cold War.53 The Ukraine conflict signalled the onset of a new era, intensified by the Brexit vote and Trump’s election in 2016. Two powerful competing trends are at work. The first is the intensification of Cold War practices, accompanied by reinforced solidarity of the Atlantic powers and a solid front against Russia. One manifestation of this is the maintenance of the sanctions regime imposed in 2014, and sporadically reinforced since then. Every six months, the EU renews its sanctions regime, and even though renewal 52 Sakwa, R. (2017) ‘Europe and the Political: From Axiological Monism to Pluralistic Dialogism’, East European Politics, 33 (3), pp. 406–425. 53 Mastanduno, M. (2019) ‘Partner Politics: Russia, China, and the Challenge of Extending US Hegemony after the Cold War’, Security Studies, 28 (3), pp. 479–504.

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requires unanimity, all members maintained bloc discipline into the new decade, a remarkable (if possibly self-defeating) feat by any standard. Another indicator is the gradual remilitarisation of European politics, with rising defence expenditures up to the two per cent of GDP level mandated by the Wales NATO summit in September 2014, as well as the stationing of NATO forces in the Baltic republics and Poland. The second recognises the changing dynamics in international politics, and interprets Russian actions in Ukraine through more of a realist than a normative lens. From this perspective, Russian intervention was a consequence rather than the cause of the breakdown in the European security order. While this second perspective is still a minority view, it was incorporated into President Trump’s thinking, albeit in an inconsistent and contradictory way. The Russiagate scandal and the consolidation of the power of the military traditionalists in his administration following the ouster of the first insurgent generation (notably Stephen Bannon and Michael Flynn) stymied the development of this trend, and instead the ‘bipartisan’ foreign policy of American primacy was maintained, although not quite in its traditional forms. Nevertheless, the perceived more benign Trumpian line in US foreign policy encouraged some in Russia to believe that the internal division, as well as the growing differences with the EU, could be exploited for new diplomatic initiatives, focused on Trump personally, American civil society, and European leaders.54 This second line fanned the embers of the ‘sad delusion’ that positive relations could be reforged with Europe in particular and the West in general. It is in this context that Putin pursued what can be called his ‘heartland’ strategy, the attempt to ensure that Eurasia did not become an arena for an extended ‘great game’ of contestation between the two superpowers of the twenty-first century, the United States and China. The heartland strategy challenges the peripherality implicit in the EU’s wider Europe approach. To this end Putin pursued three interlocking policies. Eurasian Integration The first was Eurasian integration. In his landmark article on the subject in October 2011, Putin emphasised the success of the Customs Union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, which was completed on 1 July 2011, and 54 Kortunov, A. (2018) ‘How Should Russia Respond to an Adversarial West?’, Moscow Times, 1 February.

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the imminent creation on 1 January 2012 of the Common Economic Space (CES) with the three countries. Already in 2001, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) Customs Union was transformed into the Eurasian Economic Community (EurAsEC). He now talked of a future Eurasian Union that would be comparable and compatible with the EU and based on similar principles of trade liberalisation and regulatory convergence. After a period of intense bargaining against the background of the Ukraine crisis, the Astana Treaty signed on 29 May 2014 created the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU). The agreement systematised the provisions already contained in the Customs Union and the CES, including free movement of goods, capital, and labour and harmonisation of regulation in nineteen areas. The main innovation was the establishment of a common market for services, starting with less important sectors and gradually expanding to cover areas like telecommunications, transportation, and financial services. By the mid-2020s the EAEU planned to establish a common financial and banking regulatory and monitoring authority. The most ambitious proposals were postponed, including provision for a common currency, common social policy, and pension system. Plans for the liberalisation of markets in a number of sensitive goods, including pharmaceuticals, and the creation of a common oil, gas, and electricity market were dropped,55 as well as ideas for political cooperation, common citizenship, foreign policy, inter-parliamentary cooperation, passports and visas, common border protection, as well as the idea of creating a common customs authority. Despite these caveats, the establishment of the EAEU represents the most ambitious attempt since the collapse of the Soviet Union for regional integration in post-Soviet Eurasia and signalled that Russia was no longer afraid to challenge the EU’s implicit monopoly on integration efforts in the Greater European space. It signalled the definitive end of the logic of ‘Wider Europe’, announced in 2002 by Romani Prodi and later institutionalised in the form of the European Neighbourhood Project (ENP). Wider Europe was premised on the formation of Brussels-centred concentric circles, in which Russia, by definition, would be a periphery. This ran counter to everything Russia had hoped to achieve since Gorbachev formulated the idea of a pluralistic Common European Home. The 55 Furman, E. and A. Libman (2015) ‘Europeanisation and the Eurasian Economic Union’, in Piotr Dutkiewicz and Richard Sakwa (eds), Eurasian Integration: The View From Within. London and New York, Routledge, pp. 173–192.

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concentric model was reinforced with an overtly geopolitical tone in the creation of the Eastern Partnership (EaP) in May 2009. This was intended to forge Association Agreements with six partner countries: Belarus, Moldova, and Ukraine, and the South Caucasian republics of Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia. A battle of integrations was in the making, reflecting the broader failure to devise and sustain creative pan-European strategies at the end of the Cold War. This is why the EAEU became important for Russia, even though many are sceptical about the need for such an organisation. The EAEU formally came into existence on 1 January 2015 and the three core members of Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia were joined by Armenia on 2 January and Kyrgyzstan in August of that year. The EAEU is a far more serious attempt at integration than its predecessors, with its norms and rules embedded in a relatively thick institutional framework. It has a much stronger supranational component than earlier bodies, although not as deep as those of the EU. The EAEU is based on liberal economic principles and conforms to WTO rules, thus rendering it compatible with comparable regional economic organisations. The EAEU covers threequarters of the post-Soviet region and has a single market of 180 million people and a combined nominal GDP of around $5 trillion, compared to the EU’s GDP of $18.8 trillion. It was initially anticipated that the two other members of EurAsEc (Uzbekistan and Tajikistan) would join, but their membership remains on hold. The EAEU was launched in the least propitious of circumstances, with Russia entering a period of recession as a result of the exhaustion of the old growth model, the drop in oil prices, and the imposition of sanctions. None of the other members are willing to come into confrontation with the West in the same manner as Russia, and refuse to follow its lead on Ukraine. Russia’s partners insist that the EAEU remain a strictly functional economic integration project, and resist plans for supranational political integration that would infringe their sovereignty. While labour mobility has been greatly facilitated, and trade in good and services eased, various meat and dairy and other conflicts with Belarus suggest that there is a long way to go before a fully functioning single market is established. Russia’s partners resent having to buy Russian goods rather than more competitive international items, such as automobiles. In fact, intra-EAEU trade fell as a proportion of the total, and in 2018 represented only 13.5% of turnover. Members inherited a visa-free regime (with some restrictions) from EurAsEC and this remains in place.

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Eurasian integration is posed as a mode of reconciliation, not just for its member states but also to give greater gravity and weight to the ‘missing middle’ between the Atlantic community and greater Asia. Rather than the core Eurasian states joining the EU-centred Wider Europe and the Atlantic community individually, Eurasian integration allows its member states to bargain as a bloc.56 Of course, far from all the core former Soviet states see this as a necessity, and some, particularly Ukraine, have been notably allergic to the very idea. At the time of joining the EAEU in May 2015, Kyrgyzstan was worried about losing its unique entrepôt status between China and Central Asia. Uzbekistan has traditionally been the Ukraine of the East, only reluctantly participating in Russian-driven integration projects, although under the new president, Shavkat Mirziyoyev, from 2016 this began to change. There are some similar challenges at both ends of core Eurasia, but they are far from symmetrical. Above all, while the EU and the EAEU are effectively competing in the same market, China offers a rather different package of goods. The focus is on bilateral trade and investment, and eschews institution building or regulatory and normative transformation and instead focuses on connectivity, trade, and infrastructure development. Russia tried to get the EAEU states to negotiate economic agreements as a bloc, whereas the smaller states sought to do so bilaterally, hoping to play China off against Russia to get a better deal. Eurasian integration and greater Eurasia idea in general owe less to the ideologist of geopolitical Eurasianism, Alexander Dugin, than to Russia’s foreign and then prime minister in the late 1990s, Evgeny Primakov, the exponent of the eponymous Primakov Doctrine of a SinoRussian alliance ‘against Western unilateralism’.57 Lavrov stressed that in conditions of Western sanctions the importance of Euro-Asian and EAEU integration increased.58 He argued that the EAEU ‘is based on equality, economic interest and mutual respect. The Union maintains each members’ sovereignty and identity, taking integration and 56 Krickovic, A. (2014) ‘Imperial Nostalgia or Prudent Geopolitics? Russia’s Efforts to

Reintegrate the Post-Soviet Space in Geopolitical Perspective’, Post-Soviet Affairs, 30 (6), pp. 503–528. 57 Levin, M. L. (2008) The Next Great Clash: China and Russia vs. the United States. Westport and London, Praeger, p. 130. 58 Lavrov, S. (2014) ‘Lavrov’s Big Interview: Russia-NATO Relations, Arms Race and Ukraine’, Sputnik/RIA Novosti, 9 December.

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cooperation to a new level. It is destined to play a significant role in improving the competitiveness of the national economies of Russia, Belarus and Kazakhstan, as well as stabilizing the whole region’. Nevertheless, Eurasian integration came in for considerable criticism. The perception that Eurasian integration is little more than a fall-back option, a second-best plan given Russia’s failure to integrate effectively with wider Europe, shadows the whole endeavour. While Putin and his colleagues stress that Eurasian integration is a positive and progressive manifestation of regional cooperation, emulating the Monnet moment of shared sovereignty, the smaller states fear that pooled sovereignty means the loss of independence. Euro-scepticism has its counterpart in Eurasiascepticism. The problem is made all the worse by the gross internal asymmetries. Russia’s dominance permeates the fabric of the EAEU.59 The EAEU’s place in the broader context of European politics remains fundamentally contested, and its internal development is also disputed. Member states seek to retain maximum room for manoeuvre, while gaining maximum benefit. As in the EU, there will always be tension between the powers of the member states and supranational bodies, but in this case the balance between the perceived benefits participants receive in exchange for the loss of sovereignty is far from clear. Britain’s withdrawal from the EU in 2020 sharpened the fundamental question about the necessity of Eurasian integration. It raises the question of ‘Ruxit’ from the integration institutions that it had earlier sponsored. If the circumstances become propitious, some of the smaller states may also be tempted to cut and run. This would cause far less upheaval than exit from the EU, since so far there has not been the degree of state transformation that in the EU turned countries into member states.60 The global trend towards integration appears to have stalled, but the circumstances of post-Soviet Eurasia are unique. In his programmatic article ‘Russia, Forward!’ Medvedev argued that Russia was economically backward and distorted by dependence on extractive industries: ‘Should a primitive economy based on raw materials and endemic corruption

59 Krickovic, A. and Bratersky M. (2016) ‘Benevolent Hegemon, Neighbourhood Bully, or Regional Security Provider? Russia’s Efforts to Promote Regional Integration after the 2013–2014 Ukraine Crisis’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, 57 (2), pp. 180–202. 60 Bickerton, C. (2012) European Integration: From Nation-States to Member States. Oxford, Oxford University Press.

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accompany us into the future?’.61 This relates to the broader question of whether Eurasian integration can be seen as a progressive project. There remains the fundamentally normative question of the values on which Eurasian integration takes place. At present, a negative norm is advanced based on non-interference in the internal affairs of other states. Russia’s definition of a great power entails a negative dimension based on a type of order enshrining sovereignty, non-interventionism, and a pluralism of regime types.62 Integration restrains Russia’s sovereignty and freedom of action as a great power, and contradicts the commonly held perception of Eurasian integration as a Russian imperial or hegemonic project. From a free market perspective, liberals also question the need for integration, further fostering the idea of Ruxit. Eurasian integration is based on normative criteria that undermine integration, a contradiction that will sooner or later have to be resolved. The classic Western view that Eurasian integration is little more than a project for the imperial restoration of a ‘greater Russia’ in the guise of a multilateral regional organisation is now giving way to a more sober appreciation of its value as a forum for regional engagement. Russian aspirations for a broader revival of Soviet-era relationships have encountered firm resistance from national states, while the elites themselves have to come to terms with the realities of multi-level governance in which sovereignty is both shared and enhanced by membership in a putative supranational association. The reality of the EAEU is that of a complex set of relationships in a rapidly evolving global environment permeated by threats but also by opportunities. The Russian Far East (RFE) The second leg of Putin’s heartland strategy is greater emphasis on the development of Siberia and above all the Russian Far East (RFE). To this end Russia hosted the Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) forum in Vladivostok in 2012, and in preparation developed significant infrastructure including the construction of two major bridges. A modern new campus was built for the newly established Far Eastern Federal 61 Medvedev, D. (2009) ‘Rossiya, vpered!’, 10 September, http://www.gazeta.ru/com ments/2009/09/10_a_3258568.shtml. 62 Kokoshin, A. (2006) Real’nyi suverenitet v sovremennoi miropoliticheskoi sistemy, 3rd edn, Moscow, Evropa.

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University, which since 2015 serves as the venue for the annual Eastern Economic Forum. Special economic zones have also been created, as well as creating a free port with special customs and taxation regulations in Vladivostok. In a move reminiscent of Pyotr Stolypin’s measures a century earlier to encourage settlement in Russia’s east, land is granted to people ready to put it to productive use. However, the development of the region is not always helped by Moscow’s centralised approach to the region’s development. Changes to the 1994 production sharing agreement saw 75% of oil and gas revenues from the lucrative Sakhalin-2 project go to Moscow, whereas hitherto only 25% went to the centre. In the January 2020 cabinet reshuffle Yuri Trutnev remained the minister responsible for the RFE and presidential envoy to the region. He was also promoted to become a deputy prime minister, indicating the importance Mikhail Mishustin’s administration gave to the region. At the same time, instead of focusing on social needs and the modernisation of the health, education, and urban services, grand infrastructure projects are envisaged such as the construction of an ‘energy bridge’ from Sakhalin to Japan’s northern-most region of Hokkaido. There is even talk of building a combined road and rail route from Hokkaido to Sakhalin, and another bridge from Sakhalin to the Russian mainland, thus linking Japan physically for the first time with the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Eurasian mainland as a whole.63 The Putin system is better geared to invest in mega-projects than patiently developing the municipal services, sports facilities and health systems required by citizens in their daily lives. China and the Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP) Third, Russia forged stronger links with China and a range of Asian multilateral bodies, notably the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN). The launch in 2013 of what was to become China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) has the potential to transform Eurasia’s geopolitics and economics. The plan to invest tens of billions of dollars in the vast Eurasian region and Africa on infrastructure and other forms of connectivity marks China’s coming of age as a global power. The Greater Eurasian Partnership is one of Russia’s responses. Although vague on 63 Brown, J. and Kozinets, A. (2017) ‘Protests in Russia’s Far East Reveal the Dangers of Overcentralization’, Carnegie Moscow Centre, 18 October, http://carnegie.ru/com mentary/73456.

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detail and institutionally confusing, the basic idea of GEP is for Russia and its allies to retain autonomy in the new construct and not be swallowed up by the Chinese giant on the one side or the Historical West on the other. This could only be achieved by enhancing the collective weight of post-Soviet Eurasia, Putin’s heartland strategy. Russia was marginalised in the Atlantic system, but by repositioning itself as a Eurasian power it sought to regain centrality. It rejects the idea of Russia as a periphery of Europe or Asia. The GEP is more than a way of compensating for failures in the West but represents what many in Moscow consider is a longdelayed rebalancing of policy. Russia emerged as the main proponent of the creation of a parallel set of global institutions to those dominated by the Historical West and potentially by the reborn East. The plan is to work with the new East while not closing the door to good relations with the Historical West. Russia became a key partner for China’s BRI. In May 2015 Russia and China agreed to ‘conjugate’ (sopryazhenie) their various initiatives as part of a single strategy. Putin first publicly talked of a ‘Greater Eurasia Partnership’ in his annual address to parliament on 3 December 2015. He called for discussions to establish an economic partnership between the EAEU, ASEAN, and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO). His speech drew on the ideas outlined in a Valdai Club report (2015) on how to link the EAEU and Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) within a larger Eurasian framework.64 The aim was to maintain stability in Central Asia and to avoid Russo-Chinese rivalry. The project was then mentioned on several occasions in 2016. At the St Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF) on 17 June 2016 Putin outlined grandiose plans for ‘greater Eurasia’. The details were vague, but the basic thrust was clear: Russia would encourage the ‘integration of integrations’ across a range of institutions encompassing all of Eurasia. Russia seeks to take advantage of the billions that China plans to invest in Eurasia to its benefit by tying Russia’s economic development more closely to China’s rapidly growing economy. Moscow wants to be more than a source of natural resource but seeks to become part of cross-national production and value chains that are centred in China.65 It also represents recognition that Russia on

64 Valdai Discussion Club. (2015) Towards the Great Ocean—3: Creating Central Eurasia, Valdai Report No. 3, June. 65 Diesen, G. (2019) Russia’s Geoeconomic Strategy for Eurasia. London, Routledge.

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its own cannot develop Eurasia, but needs China and other emerging powers’ economic clout to do so. Formalising relations between EAEU and BRI (the conjugation) also helps Russia preserve its importance as an economic stakeholder even as its economic dominance in the region is diminished. This is far more than ‘Russia’s Asian fantasy’.66 The geographical limits of Greater Eurasia are unclear, and in some versions it includes just post-Soviet Eurasia and China while in others it encompasses all of Western Europe and the whole ASEAN region. Nevertheless, instead of the much-vaunted but still-born Greater Europe, Putin announced ‘As early as June we, along with our Chinese colleagues, are planning to start official talks on the formation of comprehensive trade and economic partnership in Eurasia with the participation of the European Union states and China. I expect that this will be one of the first steps towards the formation of a major Eurasian partnership’.67 He was at pains to stress that this did not mean rejecting Europe: ‘Despite all the well-known problems in our relations’, the EU remained Russia’s ‘key trade and economic partner’. He thus invited Europeans to join the project for the Eurasian partnership, and welcomed the initiative by Nazarbayev to hold consultations between the EAEU and the EU. Contrary to those who argue that Putin sought to weaken the EU and to exacerbate its internal divisions, the ambitious plan for a trading bloc from the Atlantic to the Pacific sought to make the EU a full partner, with the support of the Chinese leadership. Russia refused to choose between Europe and Asia, and instead the greater Eurasia idea seeks to unite the two as well as filling in the middle with the EAEU. The GEP and allied projects is part of the more profound strategy of developing a model of world order based on sovereign internationalism. Russia’s long-term rebalancing to the East focused on the ‘strategic partnership’ with China but this was accompanied by improved trading and political engagement with India, Japan, and the ASEAN bloc as a whole. Russia and China encouraged the development of post-western associations, ranging from the SCO, BRICS, and a whole set of antihegemonic actors as well as the G20. These were not anti-western, but represented a framework for an anti-hegemonic alignment to structure 66 Starr, S. F. (2020) Greater Eurasia: Russia’s Asian Fantasy. Washington, DC, Kennan Cable No. 46, January. 67 Putin, V. (2016) ‘Plenary Session of St Petersburg International Economic Forum’, 17 June, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/.

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what the Russia’s call a polycentric (multipolar) world. All of this represents a long-term shift in global politics. The scholar and commentator Sergei Karaganov calls this an ‘end to the Petrine period in Russian history’, in which Russia for 500 years looked to Europe for innovation and development.68 Russia would maintain good-neighbourly relations with Europe, but its horizons and model of the future would no longer be located there. In other words, the West’s sanctions regime, and the abuse of the open trading regime and the rules-based order that it claimed to represent, was perceived in Moscow as only accelerating its own marginalisation. The rest of the world had more positive agendas to pursue. The Astana SCO meeting in June 2017 was attended by the new UN Secretary-General António Guterres, and the final communiqué reaffirmed the fundamental normative principles of sovereign internationalism: The heads of state called for strict adherence to the goals and principles of the UN Charter, above all the equality and sovereignty of states, non-interference in internal affairs, mutual respect of territorial integrity, inviolability of borders, non-aggression, peaceful settlement of disputes, non-use of force or threat of force as well as other generally recognised norms of international law aimed at maintaining peace and security, developing cooperation between states, strengthening independence, ensuring the right of countries to determine their own future and their own path of political, socioeconomic, and cultural development.69 There was no need here for the ‘liberal international order’ to teach these states how to manage their domestic affairs or international relations. However, while Russia dominates the EAEU, in greater Eurasia it is in danger of being eclipsed by China. Predictions of the decline of the West may be exaggerated, and some sort of path towards rapprochement between Russia and the West would make sense.70

68 Karaganov, S. (2018) ‘Svoboda v vybore puti’, Rossiiskaya gazeta, 7 June, p. 8. 69 ‘Press Release on the Results of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation Heads of

State Council Meeting’. (2017) Astana, 9 June, http://eng.sectsco.org/news/20170609/ 289274.html. 70 Ferrari, A. (2020) ‘Greater Eurasia: Opportunity or Downsizing for Russia?’, in Aldo Ferrari and Eleonora Tafuro Ambrosetti (eds), Forward to the Past? New/Old Theatres of Russia’s International Projection. Milan, ISPI/Ledizioni Ledi Publishing, p. 47.

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Return to Greater Europe Given the crisis in Ukraine and the souring of relations, Putin rather surprisingly returned to the idea of creating a free-trade zone from the Atlantic to the Pacific at the Russo-EU summit in Brussels on 28 January 2014 (the last to be held in that format).71 Despite the breakdown in relations, Russia refused to relinquish the Greater European cooperative path of development.72 At various points the Russian leadership signalled that the door to Russo-EU rapprochement remained open. The reason for this is clear. Despite the breakdown in relations with the Historical West, Russia under Putin retains elements of its earlier commitment to pan-continental unity. Russia is not a full-scale revisionist power but pursues a neo-revisionist strategy.73 Its neo-revisionism is tempered by a continued commitment to the institutions of the international system established in the wake of the Second World War. This is complemented by an enduring idealism founded on the belief that ultimately the Historical West could still become a Greater West with Russian participation, and pan-continental initiatives would make Russia a comfortable member of Greater Europe. In other words, despite the withering criticism to which the NPT has been subjected by domestic critics, elements of Gorbachev’s idealism endure. The argument is not accepted by mainstream Atlanticists in the West, who dismiss the normative basis of Moscow’s politics of resistance and instead argue that it is based on no more than the traditional Soviet attempt to sow confusion and discord in the Atlantic community, and to drive a wedge between the two wings of the alliance. Russia of course uses all the means at its disposal to break out of the various neo-containment strategies deployed against it, but one of them is the idealist vision of a transformed Greater Europe. If the viability of a pluralist Greater Europe project is questioned, let alone its potential evolution into a more solidaristic community, then

71 Putin, V. (2014) ‘Russia-EU Summit’, 28 January, http://eng.kremlin.ru/transc ripts/6575. 72 Gromyko, A. (2015) ‘Russia, the US, and Smaller Europe (the EU): Competition for Leadership in a Polycentric World’, Institute of Europe, Russian Academy of Sciences, Working Paper, No. 14. The Russian version is published as Aleksei Gromyko, ‘Rossiya, SShA, Malaya Evropa (ES): Konkurentsiya za liderstvo v mire politsentrichnosti’, Sovremennaya Evropa, No. 4, 2015, pp. 5–14. 73 Sakwa, R. (2019) ‘Russian Neo-Revisionism’, Russian Politics, 4 (1), pp. 1–21.

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the continent faces three alternatives. First, there is the continued consolidation and enlargement of the Atlantic community, accompanied by increased militarisation and conditionality towards its neighbours, and a tutelary relationship with Russia. This is the model from which Moscow, for reasons discussed above, felt excluded and provoked the breakdown epitomised by the conflict in and over Ukraine. The second is the ‘promise of a continental concert’, reprising the Concert of Europe. Many in Russia are attracted to this option, especially since it echoes the Yalta-Potsdam settlement at the end of the Second World War, which legitimated the USSR’s status as one of the arbiters of the fate of Europe. This includes the ‘balance of power’, which can entail restraint (when practised by a Metternich or a Bismarck), as well as unbridled power maximisation. The third option is unrestrained great power rivalry accompanied by extreme geopolitical rivalry, the path that NATO’s continued existence was designed to foreclose. This was the system that collapsed with devastating effect in 1914 and which was revived in 2014. This raises the fundamental and still unresolved question: is Russia still interested in joining a transformed West today? Or has it realised that the only way to retain great power status and sovereign decision-making is to remain outside the West? Joining the transformed West meant the attempt to create Greater Europe, Gorbachev’s Common European Home in an updated guise. For defenders of the existing West, this is perceived as threatening its existing values, norms and freedoms, and perhaps more importantly, also the existing hierarchy of international power. But for Russia, it is a way out of the perceived geopolitical impasse and offers a common developmental strategy. This is why Putin at SPIEF in June 2019 talked about the failure of the ‘Euro-Atlantic’ economic system. He argued that ‘the existing model of economic relations is still in crisis and this crisis is of a comprehensive nature. Problems in this respect have been piling up throughout the past few decades. They are more serious and larger than it seemed before’.74 Here and on other occasions he condemned the Atlantic powers’ use of sanctions as a form of economic warfare. On the eve of SPIEF on 5 June, Putin and Chinese president Xi Jinping announced the upgrade of their relationship to a ‘Comprehensive Partnership of Coordination for a New Era’, accompanied by a 74 Putin, V. (2019) ‘President Putin’s at the St. Petersburg International Economic Forum (SPIEF)’, 7 June, https://nepal.mid.ru/en/press-centre/news/president_putin_ s_speech_at_the_spief_2019/.

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Joint Statement on strategic cooperation and global strategic stability.75 By then China had been Russia’s largest trading partner for nine consecutive years, and in 2018 surpassed the $100bn mark for the first time. The agreement on trade and economic cooperation signed between the EAEU and China on 17 May 2018, and which came into effect on 25 October 2019, remains the cornerstone for coordination between the EAEU and BRI. The goal was the ‘comprehensive coordination of integration initiatives’, the ‘integration of integrations’, as Lavrov put it.76 He argued that ‘The Greater Eurasian Partnership is being established objectively on the continent in the form of a wide network of free-trade zones’, and he mentioned those agreed with Singapore, Serbia, and Iran. Russia has returned as an international conservative power, but it is not a revisionist one, and even less is it out to subvert the West.77 Russia certainly looks for allies where it can find them, especially if they advocate the lifting of sanctions. When President Emmanuel Macron (2019) argued that it was time to bring Russia out of the cold, arguing that ‘We cannot rebuild Europe without rebuilding a connection with Russia’,78 his comments were welcomed in Moscow, although tempered by justifiable scepticism. The Putin elite had earlier welcomed Trump’s election, but in practice relations deteriorated further. The foreign policy establishment is deeply sceptical that the EU will be able to act with ‘strategic autonomy’. Above all, Russo-Western relations have entered into a dangerous version of the security dilemma in which each side has lost confidence in their statecraft, what Troitsky calls a statecraft ‘security dilemma’:

75 Xinhua. (2019) ‘China, Russia Agree to Upgrade Relations for New Era’, 6 June, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/06/c_138119879.htm. 76 Lavrov, S. (2020) ‘Foreign Ministry’s Answers to Media Questions for a News Conference on Russia’s Diplomatic Performance in 2019’, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 17 January, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE0 2Bw/content/id/3995958. 77 Sakwa, R. (2020) ‘Greater Russia: Is Moscow out to Subvert the West?’, International Politics, published online 15 July 2020, https://doi.org/10.1057/s41311-020-002 58-0. 78 Macron, E. (2019) ‘Ambassador’s Conference—Speech by M. Emmanuel Macron, President of the Republic’, Paris, 27 August, https://lv.ambafrance.org/Ambassadors-con ference-Speech-by-M-Emmanuel-Macron-President-of-the-Republic. Video of the speech available on YouTube: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=QOFCvf1AGvE&feature=you tu.be.

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Currently, we are again faced with a situation in which mutual intentions are assessed by Washington and Moscow as subversive, while each side considers the statecraft employed by the other side as effective enough to achieve its malign goals. At the same time, each side is more sceptical about its own statecraft and appears (or pretends) to be scrambling to catch up.79 In the nineteenth-century Russia became the ‘gendarme’ of Europe, and while Putin explicitly repudiates Russia assuming such a role again, it is undoubtedly a status quo conservative power. This is the essence of its neo-revisionism: a defence of traditional ideas of state sovereignty and of an internationalism structured by commitment to the structures of the international system as it took shape after 1945. Russia resents its perceived exclusion from the institutions of Atlantic hegemony (NATO and the EU); but is not out to subvert the larger society in which this competition is waged. In other words, Atlanticism is challenged to the degree that it is perceived to violate the norms of the larger international system and the primary and secondary institutions of international society, but this does not entail subverting, let alone destroying, the Atlantic institutions as a whole. Thus Anton Shekhovtsov is mistaken to argue that Russia’s links to right-wing national populist movements is rooted in philosophical anti-Westernism and an instinct to subvert the liberaldemocratic consensus in the West.80 In fact, the alignment is situational and contingent on the impasse in Russo-Western relations, and thus is susceptible to modification if the situation changes. Moscow’s readiness to embrace Trump in 2016 when he repeatedly argued that it made sense to ‘get on’ with Russia indicates that Western overtures for improved relations would find the Kremlin ready to reciprocate. In 2017 the Kremlin sent Washington various ideas on how to move out of the impasse in US–Russian relations, but given the ‘Russiagate’ allegations, the White House was in no position to respond. The same applies when in 2019 Russia was invited to resume full voting rights in the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe (PACE), which 79 Troitskiy, M. (2019) ‘Statecraft Overachievement: Sources of Scares in US-Russian Relations’, PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo No. 619, October, https://www.researchgate. net/publication/336739392_Statecraft_Overachievement_Sources_of_Scares_in_US-Rus sian_Relations_PONARS_Eurasia_Policy_Memo_619. 80 Shekhovtsov, A. (2017) Russia and the Western Far Right: Tango Noir. London, Routledge.

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the Kremlin embraced even though powerful domestic neo-traditionalist and Eurasianist voices counselled against. In short, the Greater European project remains one of Russia’s options, but its fulfilment would take the concerted actions of all the European great and middling powers. The present impasse is relatively stable, and given all the impediments (structural, ideational, institutional, and coordinative) of transcending the Atlantic power system, it may be considered the only realistic option. However, this is a far from optimal outcome, and it threatens to condemn both Russia and Europe to marginalisation and peripherality. This is why the Greater Europe remains a perennial aspiration. What for one generation is a sad delusion, for another becomes a realistic and necessary project.

Conclusion For Russian critics, joining the Historical West (the existing liberal order) would deprive Russia of its great power status, hence the attempts to create a transformed greater West in which Russia would be a founding member and a great power in a more endogenously pluralist order. In the end, even the exogenous pluralism represented by association in the Wider West was foreclosed, and the hermetic and closed character of the Historic West prevailed. In response, Russia developed its heartland strategy, which included a deep partnership with China as part of an anti-hegemonic alignment and Greater Eurasian aspirations. At the same time, the heartland is intended to prove Russia and its allies with greater room for manoeuvre in the emerging bipolar structure to international politics. This also means not closing the door to the revival of Greater European ideas. France under Macron took the lead in recognising that European international politics need to resist what he termed the ‘deep state’ (by which he meant the defenders of traditional Atlanticism) and shift from the ideological framework of values and identity in relations with Russia towards policy-focused engagement with real issues of important to all sides. This would allow a move away from confrontation to diplomacy. As flux replaces stasis in global affairs, the past becomes less of an effective guide to the future. Some ideas endure, and one of these is pan-continental European unity.

CHAPTER 2

Greater Eurasia: From Geopolitical Pole to International Society? Alexander Lukin and Dmitry Novikov

This is a revised and expanded version of an article that was originally published in the Journal of Eurasian Studies, Volume 12 (1), pp. 28–45, under the title “Sino-Russian rapprochement and Greater Eurasia: From geopolitical pole to international society?” https://doi.org/10.1177/18793665211000057, © 2021 by the authors. This open access article is distributed under a Creative Commons Attribution License, which allows unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, providing the original author and source are credited. A. Lukin (B) Center for East Asian and Shanghai Cooperation Organization Studies, MGIMO-University and International Laboratory on World Order Studies and the New Regionalism, HSE University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] D. Novikov Department of International Relations and International Laboratory on World Order Studies and the New Regionalism, HSE University, Moscow, Russia e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Diesen and A. Lukin (eds.), The Return of Eurasia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2179-6_2

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Introduction The last few years have seen a radical shift that could change the entire structure of international relations. In general terms, it is the transition from bipolarity to multipolarity. An important aspect of this process is the formation of alternative systems of international governance, especially on the regional level. This allows some scholars to speak about the phenomena of the new, non-Western, regionalism, which tends to alter and compete with the Western and Western-like formats of regional integration and institution-building.1 Russia and China could be considered as the key drivers of this trend. In the past few years, these two powers have put forward several major initiatives for developing transport and logistics, as well as economic and institutional ties between different parts of the continent, including Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union and China’s Belt and Road Initiative. While some scholars argue that China and Russia have different visions of regionalism and distinct views on how a regional order should be arranged,2 in the last years these two powers have put a lot of effort into synchronizing their regional projects. In 2015, Russian and Chinese leaders signed a Joint Declaration on cooperation in coordinating the development of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Silk Road Economic Belt,3 which gave a start to numerous initiatives aiming at strengthening and coordinating regional projects of the two powers. Probably the most ambitious part of this process might very well be the formation of a Greater Eurasian community. This initiative and its ancillary concept call for the formation of a single geoeconomic and institutional space, one that would span if not the entire continent, then at least most of its territory.4 In Russia’s official foreign policy rhetoric, the idea of creating an international community of Greater Eurasia became the Comprehensive Eurasian Partnership initiative that Russian President 1 Kaczmarski, Marcin, “Non-Western Visions of Regionalism: China’s New Silk Road and Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union.” International Affairs 2017, Vol. 93, No. 6: 1357–1376. 2 Ibid. 3 “Russian-Chinese Talks.” Kremlin.ru, May 8, 2015. At: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/

president/news/49430. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 4 Karaganov, Sergei, “From the Pivot to the East to greater Eurasia.” Embassy of the Russian Federation to the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, April 24, 2017. At https://www.rusemb.org.uk/opinion/50. (Accessed February 18, 2021).

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Vladimir Putin put forward in 2016.5 In 2019, the Chinese leader Xi Jinping stressed that China supports the concept of Greater Eurasia and is ready to put effort into developing it.6 The geographic contours of this newly established political and economic community are very broad. According to theoreticians of Greater Eurasia, “It will encompass East, Southeast and South Asian countries, central Eurasia, Russia, and apparently the greater part of the European subcontinent, its countries and their organizations to the extent to which they may be able to develop constructive cooperation”.7 This constructive cooperation should be based on common institutions, informal cooperation frameworks, and values, what characterizes this “geo-economic and geopolitical consolidation” as the formation of a new international community—the Community of Greater Eurasia.8 The establishment of a stable international community within this geographic space is bound to solve several problems: to smooth out the contradictions between Russia and China, as well as China and other neighboring states; stabilize the international system in the central part of Eurasia; speed up economic growth and insure security in the region.9 Scholars and experts debate the sustainability of such an ambitious initiative and its prospects for development. Optimists argue that it is natural for various states and regions of the Eurasian continent to deepen their ties and that Russia and China should coordinate this process.10

5 “Putin prizval sozdat’ Bol’shoe Evraziyskoe partnerstvo” (Putin called for a big Eurasian partnership). TASS. June 17, 2016. https://tass.ru/pmef-2016/article/337 6295. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 6 “Press Statements Following Russian-Chinese Talks.” Kremlin.ru, June 5, 2019. At: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/60672. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 7 Karaganov, Sergei, “From the Pivot to the East to Greater Eurasia”. 8 Karaganov, Sergey, and Timofei Bordachev, Toward the Great Ocean—5: From The

Turn To The East To Greater Eurasia (Moscow: Valdai Discussion Club, 2017); Karaganov, Sergei, “From the Pivot to the East to Greater Eurasia”; Lukin, Alexander, “Eurasia— From Confrontation to Partnership.” Journal of Eurasian Studies 2018, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 83–84; Bordachev, Timofei, “Greater Eurasia and Russia’s Foreign Policy Priorities.” Asian Politics & Policy 2018, Vol. 10, No. 4: 597–613. 9 Karaganov, Sergey. Toward the Great Ocean—3: Creating Central Eurasia (Moscow: Valdai Discussion Club, 2015). 10 Karaganov, Sergey, and Timofei Bordachev, Toward the Great Ocean—5: From the Turn to the East to Greater Eurasia.

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At its heart lies the growing cooperation between the EU and China— Eurasia’s two largest centers of economic development—as well as efforts to involve other countries in this dynamic process.11 This has led to a new phenomenon—a trans-regionalism characterized by the linkage and synergy between several regional projects within one larger, common space. According to this view, Eurasia’s rise and consolidation is an inevitable historical trend that would have occurred regardless of external geopolitical factors.12 Another, more pessimistic (or realistic) point of view considers the very concept of a Greater Eurasia as an outgrowth of and attempt to formalize the Russian–Chinese rapprochement with an informal union. Ever since the 1990s, realist evaluations and geopolitical considerations have looked at the possibility of a Russian–Chinese bloc appearing as a counterweight to the U.S.13 The concept of a Greater Eurasia and its related initiatives is also seen through the same lens. In this view, Russia seeks to enhance its status through a union with China while Beijing sees the development of Eurasian initiatives and formats as creating a positive political and conceptual framework that allows it to expand its economic presence over practically the entire continent. It is an “axis of convenience,” which could not be a long-term solution.14 The authors of this article believe that the phenomenon of a Greater Eurasia is best explained by a combination of these two opinions, which do not contradict each other. On the one hand, despite the deepening of economic ties between the European and Asian extremities of the Eurasian continent, the formulation and development of the initiatives giving shape to Greater Eurasia are driven primarily by political and strategic considerations rather than economic interests. This can be seen by the fact that the formulation of the very concept of a Greater 11 Dent, Christopher M., “The Eurasian Economic Axis: Its Present and Prospective Significance for East Asia.” The Journal of Asian Studies 2001, Vol. 60, No. 3, pp. 731– 759. 12 Diesen, Glenn, The Decay of Western Civilisation and Resurgence of Russia: Between Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft (Abingdon: Routledge, 2018). 13 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives (New York: Basic Books, 1997), p. 29. 14 Lo, Bobo, Axis of Convenience: Moscow, Beijing, and the New Geopolitics (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2008); Lo, Bobo, “Introduction”, in: Jo Inge Bekkevold, Bobo Lo (eds). Sino-Russian Relations in the 21st Century (Cham, Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019).

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Eurasia, as well as many of the initiatives on which it is based, arose in 2014–2015, with the start of Russia’s confrontation with the West and against the backdrop of deepening tensions between Beijing and Washington. However, this does not mean that the Russian–Chinese partnership is fragile or that the formation of a Greater Eurasian Community is impossible or lacking an economic and political raison d’être. Based on these considerations, the authors of this chapter attempt to answer two key questions: (1) Why did the Russian–Chinese rapprochement spawn so many large-scale initiatives? (2) Can Greater Eurasia be transformed from a geopolitical project into a full-scale international society?

The Greater Eurasian Community: Theoretical Interpretations The scholars who most consistently argue that the consolidation of Greater Eurasia is sustainable usually refer to it as an international community.15 In general terms, they describe a state of international relations that theorists of the English school defined as an international community—that is, “a group of states (or, more generally, a group of independent political communities) which not merely form a system, in the sense that the behaviour of each is a necessary factor in the calculations of the others, but also have established by dialogue and consent common rules and institutions for the conduct of their relations, and recognize their common interest in maintaining these arrangements ”.16 The model and inspiration for this concept was and continues to be the unique relations that have developed in the North-Atlantic between the U.S. and its European allies in which all these criteria—dialogue, common rules, and institutions—are present and play a decisive role in the development of political relations between states.17 Thus, most of 15 Karaganov, Sergei, “From the Pivot to the East to Greater Eurasia”; Bordachev, Timofei, “Eurasia: Doomed to Division?” Russia in Global Affairs, September 8, 2017. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/book/Eurasia-Doomed-to-Division-18979. (Accessed February December 18, 2021). 16 Bull, Hedley, and Adam Watson, The Expansion of International Society (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1885), p. 1. 17 Buzan, Barry, From International to World Society? (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2004), p. 7.

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the researchers who use the English school terminology maintain that in any emerging community the level of relationships and trust among the members should reach the level of the current transatlantic strategic partnership.18 Although many researchers argue that the development of the international system in Eurasia is moving in this direction—referring, for example, to the unprecedented progress in the Russian–Chinese partnership19 —whether this trend will continue remains uncertain and is one of the key questions this article examines. Traditional theories describing the formation and development of international societies contain several assumptions that, if not deny the possibility that such entities could emerge outside the Western world, then assume it would hardly be possible.20 A durable international society can be formed by improving social structures and developing domestic and international institutions. This process may take hundreds of years, as it did in the case of Europe.21 Most of the scholars point out this factor as a common culture to be critical for international society to emerge. Martin Wight indicated that “We must assume, that a state-system will not come into being without a degree of cultural unity among its members ”.22 Finally, following the Kantian idea of “eternal peace”, many scholars argue that democratic political systems are making the modern international society within the North-Atlantic region stable and well-regulated.23 Therefore, most theorists see no other way to form such a community on a global scale other than by steadily expanding the international community that took shape within the framework of the West.24 As a result, research that referred to the terms and concerns of the English school and similar concepts focused in recent decades on how to expand 18 Ibid. 19 Bordachev, Timofei, “Greater Eurasia and Russia’s Foreign Policy Priorities”. 20 Buzan, Barry, “The English School: An Underexploited Resource in IR.” Review of

International Studies 2001, Vol. 27, No. 3, p. 477; Buzan, Barry, From International to World Society?; Neumann, Iver B., “The English School and the Practices of World Society.” Review of International Studies 2001, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 503–507. 21 Watson, Adam, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative, Historical Analysis (Abingdon: Routledge, 1992). 22 Wight, Martin, System of States (Leicester: Leicester University Press, 1977), p. 33. 23 Mayal, James, “Democracy and International Society.” International Affairs 2000,

Vol. 6, No. 1, pp. 61–75. 24 Ibid.

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the Euro-Atlantic institutions as a means for gradually transforming the Euro-Atlantic international community into a global community—rather than looking at how such communities could form in other regions of the world.25 This largely explains certain scepticism with which scholars view the possibility of forming such international communities outside the confines of the West—and without adopting Western institutions. However, a more careful analysis of some theoretical assumptions of the English school indicates that a system of non-democratic states may also form an international society. Such a system does not necessarily have to be based on cultural unity, common values, and other non-institutional components. Hedley Bull argued that “A society of states (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions ”.26 Thus, it is the common interests that play a decisive role in forming an international society, not similarities in political systems, values, or cultural and linguistic affinity. If we approach the concept of international society from this perspective, relevant historical examples may prove useful. Adam Watson also suggests that “in the ancient world a strategic and economic system could reach sophisticated levels of organization even when the leading communities belonged to very different cultures ”.27 Moreover, most international societies we know—in fact, all of them, except for the European—consisted of states with different political systems, sometimes representing a mix of democratic and non-democratic regimes, as in the case of Ancient Greece. What are the driving forces behind the emergence of an international society then? Bull emphasizes the role of great powers in providing the international system with certain rules and institutions. The necessity to co-exist, he argues, makes hegemons stabilize it in a way that allows them

25 Gilbert, Mark, European Integration: A Concise History (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2012); Ginsberg, Roy, Demystifying the European Union: The Enduring Logic of Regional Integration (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2010); Zimmerman, Hubert, and Andreas Dur, Key Controversies in European Integration (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2012). 26 Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics (London: Macmillan, 1977), p. 13. 27 Watson, Adam, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative, Historical Analysis, pp. 120–121.

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to avoid pointless conflicts which could challenge their higher status in the international hierarchy. To some extent, it formalizes and therefore secures a certain status for minor powers as well. “In the same way, international society, at least in the perspective of the great powers which see themselves as its guardians, treats the independence of particular states as subordinate to the preservation of the system as a whole when it tolerates or encourages limitation of the sovereignty or independence of small states through such devices as spheres-of -influence agreements, or agreements to create buffer or neutralized states ”.28 Therefore, while classical realists remain sceptical about the long-term effects of institution-building,29 the English school argues that institutions can transform an international system fundamentally, changing the basic patterns of states’ behavior and interactions.30 Institutionalization of the Great Powers’ leadership, combined with their will to protect their spheres of influence and the need for coexistence serves as drivers for the interstate relations to be regulated not just through the balance of power mechanisms, but rather through norms and platforms of international cooperation. We also argue that external geopolitical pressure as well as having a certain hegemonic state/states inside international communities serve as a clear leader are the standard mechanisms of fostering the emergence of international society. Many such examples can be observed throughout history. The Macedonian domination over Greek city-states could be considered the most classical example of this trend: the hegemonic rule of king Philip was strengthened and structured by the Persian threat.31 The historical formation of the Euro-Atlantic community also occurred not as an isolated phenomenon, but in response to external pressure from the Soviet Union and increasing role of the U.S. in Europe. Both of these factors—the Soviet threat and the growing post-World War II dominance of the U.S.—have played a significant role in the emergence and development

28 Bull, Hedley, The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics, p. 17. 29 Mearsheimer, John, “The False Promise of International Institutions.” International

Security 1995, Vol. 19, No. 3, pp. 5–49. 30 Buzan, Barry, “The English School: An Underexploited Resource in IR.” Review of International Studies 2001, Vol. 27, No. 3, pp. 471–488. 31 Watson, Adam, The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative, Historical Analysis.

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of European integration as well as Euro-Atlantic security structures and political cooperation.32 The same logic could be employed to explain the emergence of an international community in Greater Eurasia. Analysis of international relations in non-Western Eurasia was usually conducted from the standpoint of realism and geopolitics. Scholars and experts saw Eurasia as a zone marked by anarchy and significant disagreements between various forces, centers of power, and nations, rather than as a sphere for potential cooperation. This is probably why the representatives of geopolitical thinking made the most frequent use of the term “Eurasia” as a political and geographic designation. The geopolitical understanding of international processes on the Eurasian continent, and especially those in its non-European part, has its roots in the works of Halford Mackinder and Nicholas Spykman.33 Both authors believed that Eurasia could only be united through military and political expansion by one of the continent’s major powers. That would have meant the defeat of the West and that power’s rise to global domination. In his works, Spykman considered and even recommended that Western powers cooperate with the continental powers (the so-called “Rimland”) that were not part of the Heartland to contain the latter, as well as with the Heartland states as a counterweight to the Rimland if those states became too powerful.34 These geopolitical constructs influenced modern strategic and academic thinking with regard to U.S. and Western policies in Eurasia. Accordingly, the main imperative of U.S.—and, in a broader sense, Western policy was to prevent the appearance of a single state or an entire alliance of states that could unite non-European Eurasia against the U.S. “Potentially, the most dangerous scenario would be a grand coalition of China, Russia, and perhaps Iran, an “antihegemonic” coalition united not by ideology but by complementary grievances. It would be reminiscent in scale and scope of the challenge once posed by the Sino-Soviet bloc, though this

32 Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994). 33 Mackinder, John H., “The Geographical Pivot of History.” The Geographical Journal

1904, Vol. 23, No. 4, pp. 422–444; Spykman, Nicholas J., America’s Strategy in World Politics (New York, NY: Harcourt, Brace & Co., 1942). 34 Gerace, Michael P, “Between Mackinder and Spykman: Geopolitics, Containment, and After.” Comparative Strategy 1991, Vol. 10, No. 4, pp. 347–364.

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time China would likely be the leader and Russia the follower”.35 From the realist perspective, even a friendly Eurasian power could not be allowed to gain too much strength in Eurasia: the influence of any major power other than the U.S. had to be limited. Kissinger spoke openly about this, writing: “The domination by a single power of either of Eurasia’s two principal spheres —Europe and Asia—remains a good definition of strategic danger for America… That danger would have to be resisted even were the dominant power apparently benevolent, for if the intentions ever changed, America would find itself with a grossly diminished capacity for effective resistance and a growing inability to shape events ”.36 Following the same logic, most analysts argue that the two countries are joining forces not so much from a desire to cooperate and advance regional integration as from a dissatisfaction with their own place in the world order and a shared opposition to U.S. domination.37 Much of it adheres to the thesis that the imbalance in Russian–Chinese relations will grow, leading Russia to assume the role of a junior partner and satellite state—and to conflict if Moscow rejects this status. We argue, that the assumption that Moscow and Beijing have deep contradiction is wrong. Although their interests do differ in several areas, they are not contradictory overall. Moreover, not only have they achieved a rapprochement in the strategic and foreign policy spheres in recent years, but their values and the character of their political regimes have become more similar as well.38 This, however, has not prevented the balance of power from clearly shifting toward Beijing. Consider the significant imbalance in political and economic might exist between Western allies as well, but their deep mutual trust and shared basic values prevent this disparity from leading to serious political disagreements that could threaten their unity. This suggests that the Russian–Chinese rapprochement is more durable than commonly suggested—particularly by Western observers. 35 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives. 36 Kissinger, Henry, Diplomacy, p. 813. 37 Brzezinski, Zbigniew, “A Geostrategy for Eurasia.” Foreign Affairs 1997, Vol. 76,

No. 5, pp. 50–64; Bolt, Paul J., “Sino-Russian Relations in a Changing World Order.” Strategic Studies Quarterly 2014, Vol. 8, No. 4, pp. 47–69. 38 Lukin, Alexander, China and Russia: New Rapprochement (Cambridge: Polity, 2018).

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In a structural sense, the international and political situation in nonEuropean Eurasia today resembles the conditions accompanying the formation of the Euro-Atlantic community in the 1940s–1950s. Just as Europe had to respond to growing U.S. power after World War II, Eurasia must now adapt to a much stronger China. Under ordinary circumstances, such a response could provide a counterweight to the rising power in the region. Western pressure on Eurasia, however, has prompted Russia, China, and other Eurasian powers to search for new ways to link their interests in a more complex political organization. Some analysts contend that this opposition to Western policy has already led to the formation of a Eurasian “bloc” in the confrontation that the U.S. and its Western allies have with several non-Western powers.39 If this confrontation continues, and if the institutional environment in Greater Eurasia develops consistently, it could lead to the emergence of a Eurasian community similar to how the Euro-Atlantic community arose out of the Cold War. In what were essentially two political and geographic areas, U.S. policy encountered problems that laid the foundation for the current confrontation. The first is its policy on Eurasia’s flanks, in Europe and Asia, where the U.S. had to build relationships simultaneously with old Cold War-era allies as well as with new partners—Russia and China. The second is Washington’s policy in central Eurasia, where the U.S. found itself involved in military conflicts that were largely of its own making. Washington’s failure on all the three fronts—on Eurasia’s flanks and central part—determined the nature of strategic disagreements between the great powers and, ultimately, led to the geopolitical consolidation of Eurasia we see today.

Crisis on the Flanks of Eurasia From a geopolitical standpoint, U.S. policy toward the flanks of Eurasia seems tailored not to containing Russia and China, but to creating optimal conditions for a Russian–Chinese rapprochement. The U.S. policy shifted to a confrontational model with Moscow in the spring of 39 Karaganov, Sergey, “The New Cold War and the Emerging Greater Eurasia.” Journal of Eurasian Studies 2018, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 85–93; Suslov, Dmitrii, “For a Good Long While.” Russia in Global Affairs, December 18, 2014. https://eng.globalaffairs.ru/num ber/For-a-Good-Long-While-17211. (Accessed February 18, 2021).

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2014 due to events in Ukraine. This was expressed through Western economic sanctions against Russia that have only increased in severity over time. Relations between the U.S. and China transformed into confrontation much more smoothly. However, signs emerged as early as 2015–2016 during the second term of Barack Obama and got transformed into a full-scale trade war under the Trump administration. As a result, the security situation on the flanks of Eurasia—Europe and Asia— got much worse than in the 1990s. As Stephen Blank put it, “If the classic purpose of U.S. force deployments in Europe and Asia is to deter and reassure allies, this policy ranks as a stupendous strategic failure”.40 In practice, Russia and China were in no hurry to form an alliance, even though they shared similar views on many issues and were openly dissatisfied with the unipolar order that emerged after the end of the Cold War. Although continental Eurasia is now a key zone of cooperation between Moscow and Beijing, Russia had earlier placed greater importance on the Euro-Atlantic countries and China had focused more on the Pacific region—a fact that is reflected by the priorities enshrined in the two countries’ foreign policy documents.41 In the 1990s and 2000s, the trade, economic, technological, and political partnerships with Western countries were many times greater than those with Russia and China, forcing the two to strive to develop relations on the “flanks” of the Eurasian continent rather than pursue geopolitical consolidation in its central region. Although many joint Russian–Chinese initiatives today—such as the creation of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the settlement of border disputes, and so on—have become the basis for an unprecedented strategic partnership, in preceding decades, many Western analysts preferred viewing Russian– Chinese rapprochement as an attempt by the two countries to improve their negotiating position concerning the West.42 On the whole, the

40 Blank, Stephen J., “From Eurasia with Love: Russian Security Threats and Western Challenges.” Strategic Studies Quarterly 2014, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 42–73. 41 “Kontseptsiya vneshney politiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii” [The Foreign Policy Concept of The Russian Federation]. Garant.ru, February 12, 2013. http://www.garant.ru/pro ducts/ipo/prime/doc/70218094/. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 42 Manuel, Anja, “It’s Not Too Late to Prevent a Russia-China Axis.” The Atlantic, September 14, 2018. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/ 09/china-russia-alliance-military-exercises/570202/. (Accessed December 19, 2019).

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foreign policy priorities of Russia and China during this period corresponded to the liberal understanding of the evolution of the post-bipolar international system: both looked for ways to integrate into the new international order in search of benefits and to augment their political “weight”.43 The key problem was the inability of the U.S. and its allies to find a way for proper integration of Russia and China into regional security and political orders on the flanks of Eurasia. Washington’s policy generally suffered from three problems. First, it underestimated how quickly Russia and China would rise and, accordingly, demand corresponding status in a world that the U.S. considered strictly unipolar after the end of the Cold War. Second, the institutional legacy of the Cold War and the need to preserve old alliances gave U.S. policy too little flexibility to alter relations with Moscow and Beijing and bring them into line with the new realities. Third, at least until Donald Trump became president, the increasingly ideological nature of U.S. foreign policy identified Russia and China as “insufficiently democratic,” creating an obstacle to the further development of mutual relations. These problems have made U.S–China relations in the Asia-Pacific and U.S.–Russia relations in Europe into a series of under-appreciated mutual semi-concessions by all sides in hopes of establishing a new balance—a goal they have been unable to reach. China’s rise—that is now considered a major challenge to the international order and the U.S. position—was seen as only a distant challenge by the Democratic administration of Bill Clinton and, largely, by the Republican administration of George W. Bush. China’s efforts to begin introducing market reforms and its desire to integrate into the global economy gave rise to high hopes in Washington that the country would manage to integrate into the liberal international order as a “responsible partner” that played by the rules the U.S. had established.44 Relations with another leading Eurasian power—Russia—also suffered from a strategic underestimation of its growing capabilities and the breadth of its interests—especially as it gradually restored its economic and military potential after making the difficult transition to a market 43 Ikenberry, John G., America Unrivaled: The Future of the Balance of Power (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2002). 44 Zoellick, Robert, “Whither China: From Membership to Responsibility.” Remarks to the National Committee on US–China Relations, September 21, 2005. http://www. ncusr.org/articlesandspeeches/Zoellick.htm.

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economy.45 Instead, Russia was seen in the 1990s and, to a lesser extent in the first half of the 2000s as a very weak international player that had lost its former significance if not forever, then at least for a very long time. As a result, Washington saw the model of relations with Russia as a limited partnership within the framework of special relations with NATO and the EU, while Moscow wanted to become an equal member of the Western community and hoped that its interests would receive full consideration. This underestimation of Russia’s role led to a series of controversial decisions that continue to cause disagreements between Russia and the West. As early as 1993–1994, the Clinton administration decided to expand NATO to include the former Warsaw Pact countries—a move that official Moscow found very troubling and saw as a threat to Russia’s security.46 The issue of European security architecture has been one of the main sources of tension in Russia’s relations with the U.S. and the West as a whole ever since the mid-1990s.47 These tensions intensified the widespread sense of disappointment in Russia after the end of the Cold War: despite the relative democratization of the country following the collapse of the Soviet Union and its rapprochement with the West, Russia did not become a part of the West, either economically or politically.48 As the then Belarus’ Ambassador to the U.S. Valery Tsepkalo pointed out in the late 1990s: “If current trends continue, Russia’s clout in Eurasia will further dwindle and that of Western powers and Westerndominated international organizations will grow. The U.S., however, will be unable to control this process”.49 Even from the start, the Obama administration’s initiatives to renew relations with rising powers were hindered by the inertia of old alliances 45 Rivera, David W., “Engagement, Containment, and the International Politics of Eurasia.” Political Science Quarterly 2003, Vol. 118, No. 1, pp. 81–106. 46 Stent, Angela E., The Limits of Partnership: U.S.-Russian Relations in the TwentyFirst Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2015). 47 Trenin, Dmitri, European Security: From Managing Adversity to a New Equilibrium (Moscow, Russia: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2018); “NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement.” NATO, May 17, 2010. At https://www.nato.int/strategic-con cept/expertsreport.pdf. (Accessed December 21, 2019). 48 Sakwa, Richard, Russia Against the Rest: The Post-Cold War Crisis of World Order (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017); Legvold, Robert, Return to Cold War (Cambridge, UK: Polity, 2016). 49 Tsepkalo, Valery V., “The Remaking of Eurasia.” Foreign Affairs 1998, Vol. 77, No. 2, pp. 107–108.

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and unions inherited from the Cold War. Even the Obama administration’s proposed “reset” with Russia never envisioned a basic restructuring of the European security architecture that was still based on old Cold War alliances. For example, the U.S. rejected a proposal in 2010 by then President Dmitry Medvedev to sign an agreement on European security.50 Washington’s fear of devaluing NATO and its desire to retain the opportunity to expand the Alliance into the post-Soviet space contributed to Moscow’s deepening disappointment and the gradual erosion of the “reset”.51 In this context, the Ukrainian crisis of 2014 served as the conclusive disappointment for Russia’s leaders, who then set out to make a deliberate change in the paradigm of Russian-Western relations.52 The web of U.S. alliances in Asia also limited Washington’s ability to find a new approach to the Asian giant. As in Europe, the Obama administration was forced to balance between consolidating its network of alliances with the desire to involve China more closely in a U.S.-led global and regional order. In practice, these two objectives turned out to be mutually contradictory. If Washington strengthened ties with its allies, Beijing felt it was being surrounded. And if the U.S. strengthened its bilateral dialogue with China, the allies became concerned that the two countries would make key regional and global decisions independently of them. These tensions in the Asia Pacific only deepened as China’s political and economic weight grew, setting the stage for a confrontation between the two countries. Thus, by the end of Obama’s term, the strategy of involving both major Eurasian powers led to the opposite result on both flanks of the continent—that is, in Europe and Asia. Washington’s relations with both Russia and China became a “zero-sum game” and these states’ involvement in the U.S.-led order was interpreted not as a mutually beneficial process, but as a unilateral victory for Washington—one that some experts 50 Lomagin, Nikita, “Medvedev’s “Fourteen Points”: Russia’s Proposal for a New European Security Architecture.” ResearchGate, January 2011. https://www.researchg ate.net/publication/304636387_Medvedev%27s_Fourteen_Points_Russia%27s_Proposal_ for_a_New_European_Security_Architecture. (Accessed February 18, 2021); Clinton, Hillary, “Remarks on the Future of European Security.” U.S. Department of State, January 29, 2010. https://2009-2017.state.gov/secretary/20092013clinton/rm/2010/ 01/136273.htm. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 51 Karaganov, Sergey, and Dmitry Suslov, The U.S.–Russia Relations after the «Reset»: Building a New Agenda. A View from Russia (Moscow: Valdai Discussion Club, 2011). 52 Suslov, Dmitrii, “For a Good Long While”.

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suggested was even aimed at achieving regime change in those countries. This paved the way for more radical approaches to external threats. By the 2016 presidential election race, almost all of the candidates advocated taking a firmer line against Russia and China. The victory of Donald Trump—the candidate least involved politically in the construction of the liberal international order and, accordingly, the least inclined to exercise caution in preserving that fragile design—apparently only accelerated the transformation of U.S. policy and the deepening of the confrontation on Eurasia’s flanks.

The Center of Eurasia: From Collapse to Prominence By the early 2010s, disagreements between the U.S. and the two major Eurasian powers—located at the European and East Asian extremes of the Eurasian continent—were smoldering and on the verge of flaring up at any moment. And, although those differences drove Moscow and Beijing toward a rapprochement based on their mutual criticism of the “U.S. hegemony,” they did not provide those countries with a concrete agenda for strategic cooperation. Except limited cooperation within the framework of the UN Security Council and such institutions as BRICS and the SCO—that are themselves in search of a concrete agenda for their activities—Russian–Chinese cooperation on the transformation of the international order has largely remained confined to political declarations rather than substantive initiatives. Had Washington offered a positive agenda for the development of central Eurasia under U.S. auspices, one that provided for a worthy role by Russia and/or China, it might have neutralized the potential of the Russian–Chinese rapprochement and the subsequent involvement of other countries of the region in that process. U.S. leadership in the Greater Middle East and Central Asia would have deprived the Russian– Chinese rapprochement of a concrete geographic sphere of operations and would have surrounded the Eurasian centers with an international host that would probably not have allowed Moscow and Beijing to consolidate Eurasia on an anti-U.S. basis. The combat operations by an international coalition of troops in Afghanistan in 2001 initially created a limited, though concrete agenda of cooperation in the region. Because the country is located in the heart of Eurasia, the U.S. and other countries of the coalition had to establish

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close contacts with all of the states of the region. However, Washington’s decision to shift its focus from Afghanistan to Iraq and to start a military campaign there in March 2003 as part of its global war on terror—as well as its pressure on Iran—weakened support for U.S. policy in the region and became the subject of constant criticism from Beijing and especially Moscow.53 This U.S. policy in central Eurasia has had a number of negative consequences, both for Washington’s relations with Moscow and Beijing and for its relations with other regional players. The legacy of previous administrations and, particularly, the large-scale military campaigns initiated by George W. Bush, put constraints on how much U.S. policy could maneuver on the flanks of the continent and in its central part. During his election campaign, Barak Obama promised to speed up the withdrawal of U.S. troops first from Iraq, and then from Afghanistan. In practice, however, it became clear that a rapid withdrawal of the U.S. military presence would prove impossible and could destabilize all of the Greater Middle East.54 To avoid those negative consequences, the Obama administration had to offer an agenda for developing the region that would include economic development and an expansion of inter-and intra-regional trade and economic ties and institutions of cooperation and security. These measures were discussed in the expert community and included in a general sense in the National Security Strategy adopted by the Obama administration, where they were declared as foundational measures for providing security in the Greater Middle East.55 This required, however, large-scale diplomatic and economic investments that the U.S. could hardly afford amid a growing financial crisis. As a result, the Obama administration concentrated on maintaining the infrastructure necessary to achieve a quick military victory and to withdraw from the region. The only major regional economic initiative was the New Silk Road that became a component of the new administration’s Afghan strategy. This was connected with the need to create transport and logistics infrastructure for the sale of goods made in Afghanistan. 53 Kuchins, Andrew C., “What is Eurasia to US (the U.S.)?” Journal of Eurasian Studies 2018, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 125–133. 54 Gates, Robert, Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War (New York: Vintage, 2015). 55 National Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: The White House 2010); National

Security Strategy (Washington, D.C.: The White House, 2015).

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This, in turn, should have spurred the growth of domestic production and ultimately contributed to the long-term political stabilization of the country. For a number of reasons, this initiative did not gain enough momentum to become a coherent road map for regional development or a mega-project by which the U.S. could strengthen its position in the region: given its budget constraints, Washington did not want to spend significant resources on a “Marshall Plan” for central Eurasia. The initiative itself was left to the U.S. Armed Forces Central Command (CENTCOM), a body that is more focused on military and strategic questions than economic issues. The project had effectively lost all of its political and financial support by the time the Obama administration announced the withdrawal of U.S. troops from Afghanistan in 2014.56 Beijing’s larger and more ambitious Silk Road Economic Belt (SREB) project—that was aimed at achieving the same objectives—essentially replaced it in 2013. The consequences of the “Arab Spring” further complicated the situation and further destabilized the Greater Middle East, affecting many other countries on the Eurasian continent and increasing the threat of terrorism in the EU, Russia, China, and the countries of Central Asia. The Obama administration welcomed movements opposing authoritarian regimes in many countries of the Maghreb and the Middle East, viewing them as the process of the region’s democratic transformation.57 Washington began providing political and military support to anti-government movements in Libya and Syria. This elicited negative reactions in Beijing and, particularly, in Moscow. For example, then Prime Minister Vladimir Putin called the 2011 UN Security Council resolution on Libya “a medieval call for a crusade”.58 56 Rosenberger, Leif, “The Rise and Fall of America’s New Silk Road Strategy.” EcoMonitor, May 12, 2017. https://moneymaven.io/economonitor/emerging-mar kets/the-rise-and-fall-of-america-s-new-silk-road-strategy-wQgq4kkev06cGDycTSlNiQ. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 57 Hamid, Shadi, “Islamism, the Arab Spring, and the Failure of America’s do-Nothing Policy in the Middle East”. The Atlantic, October 9, 2015. https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/10/middle-east-egyptus-policy/409537/. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 58 “Putin called UN Security Council resolution on Libya “Call for a Crusade””. RIA Novosti, March 21, 2011. At https://ria.ru/20110321/356272787.html. (Accessed December 12, 2019).

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The situation deteriorated significantly in 2014, when militant ISIS terrorists gained control over large parts of Iraq and Syria, vividly demonstrating the inability of the U.S. to build a sustainable system of regional security. Moreover, given the fact that the rise of Islamist movements was largely the result of the “Arab Spring” that had enjoyed U.S. support from the start, many countries, including Russia and China, viewed the growth of extremism and the destabilization of the region as a consequence of Washington’s misguided policy. Of course, the history of the events we analyze here is more complex than this. Nevertheless, the “collapse” of central Eurasia and the difficult condition in which that macro-region found itself in the mid-2010s is connected with the fact that the U.S. first forced its way unceremoniously into the region, breaking the old political and social structures or throwing them into disrepair. It then, like the legions of the declining Roman Empire, abandoned the now unwanted lands, leaving numerous countries and peoples to face the chaos and rise of extremism alone. Under these conditions, Washington’s strategy for the region could perhaps be more effective if it relied more on regional allies and partners, and particularly China and Russia, by considering their interests or, at least, supporting the acceptable elements of their economic and integration initiatives and cooperating actively with them in such areas as the fight against terrorism and other threats. However, not having formulated an attractive agenda for cooperation in central Eurasia, the U.S. remains very sceptical and critical of all efforts by non-U.S. players to promote Eurasian integration. For example, Washington continues to view projects that Russia has promoted such as the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO) and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) as thinly veiled means for strengthening Russia’s influence in the region.59 For more than 15 years, the U.S. and NATO have refused to cooperate with the CSTO in an effort to deny it legitimacy. The CSTO played an important role, however, in providing security for Central Asia. What’s more, since the early 2000s, it has mainly helped to stem threats from a destabilized Afghanistan—and without pursuing an anti-U.S. agenda. In addition, the administrations of both George W. Bush and Barack Obama ignored and downplayed the significance of the SCO from the 59 “Clinton Vows to Thwart New Soviet Union.” The Financial Times, December 6, 2012. https://www.ft.com/content/a5b15b14-3fcf-11e2-9f71-00144feabdc0.

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moment of its founding in 2001. The Obama administration also took a largely negative view of China’s SREB and Maritime Silk Road— announced in 2013 and subsequently combined as the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI)—viewing it primarily as a competitor to the effectively discontinued U.S. New Silk Road plan. The Trump administration, with its characteristic economic nationalism and narrow realist approach to solving foreign policy objectives, did even less to ensure that the U.S. played a leading role in Eurasia rather than the role of an external player conducting a geopolitical chess game. Now, the U.S. confrontation with Russia and China was institutionalized and was given not only a political, but even a legal basis. Moreover, the simultaneous pressure on both countries has helped turn what had been two separate confrontations into a single dispute with the Russian–Chinese bloc. Washington’s lack of a clear strategy for Iraq and Afghanistan and its undermining of the “nuclear deal” with Iran has contributed to the further destabilization of central Eurasia. As a result, the trends put in motion by previous U.S. administrations have only become more radical under Trump, contributing to growing confrontation on the flanks of the continent and the deterioration of the security situation at its center. This only drives Eurasia to consolidate against the U.S. and to form a new geopolitical pole. Admittedly, this pole is very diverse and consists of numerous states whose various groupings frequently disagree and often lack sufficient coordination or shared ideological underpinnings. However, this conglomerate of Eurasian powers is united by common interests that have largely arisen through the negative consequences of U.S. policies: the need to balance the growing geopolitical pressure from the West and to restore political stability and economic viability in the central part of the continent.

Greater Eurasia and the Formation of the “Eurasian Pole” The strategic connection between Russia and China is the structural basis of this association and the source of its geopolitical potential. The Russian–Chinese rapprochement is the fundamental feature of the transformation that the Eurasian international system is now undergoing. Over the last few years, the nature of their relationship is increasingly described as a strategic partnership, as something close to a union but without

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the formal mutual defence obligations. It is cast as entente—as a nonformalized but deepening strategic alliance based on the recognition of common threats and the need to coordinate joint actions.60 According to its strongest supporters, this union would ideally see Russia—as the geographically largest and possessing one of the world’ most powerful militaries—serving as a source of “hard power” and “hard security,” while China, with its economic might, would serve as the source of economic growth.61 In addition to being important in its own right, the Russian– Chinese rapprochement also laid the groundwork for the emergence and development of several multilateral institutions: the SCO, BRICS, and partner initiatives between the SREB and EAEU that play an important regional and global role. Finally, the Greater Eurasian Community marks the pinnacle of cooperation in institutional development. The main political basis for the Russian–Chinese rapprochement is the similarity of their approaches to what they both see as the many defects of the post-Cold War global order, as well as their similar visions of the ideal future.62 Gilbert Rozman points to the similarity of the two countries’ political rhetoric and their common criticism of the world order dominated by the U.S. and the West as the basis for their rapprochement.63 Jacob Stokes expresses a similar opinion.64 This common approach was demonstrated as early as the 1990s when Russia and China signed a Joint Declaration on a Multipolar World and the Establishment of a New International Order.65 Subsequently, the two countries repeatedly pointed to the need to reform the existing order and 60 Trenin, Dmitri, From Greater Europe to Greater Asia (Moscow, Russia: Carnegie Moscow Center, 2015). 61 Graham, Alison, China and Russia: A Strategic Alliance in the Making. The National Interest, December 14, 2018. https://nationalinterest.org/feature/china-and-russia-strate gic-alliance-making-38727. 62 Lukin, Alexander, “A Russian Perspective on the Sino-Russian Rapprochement.” Asia Policy 2018, Vol. 13, No. 1, pp. 19–25. 63 Rozman, Gilbert, The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order: National Identities, Bilateral Relations, and East versus West in the 2010s (Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2014). 64 Stokes, Jacob, and Alexander Sullivan, “The Sino-Russo Rundown.” Foreign Affairs, August 16, 2015. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/2015-08-16/ sino-russo-rundown. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 65 “Rossiysko-kitayskaya sovmestnaya deklaratsiya o mnogopolyarnom mire i formirovanii novogo mezhdunarodnogo poryadka” [Russian-Chinese Joint Declaration on

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the similarity of their approaches to this issue—for example, in a similar bilateral declaration in 2006.66 Not only has this commonality of their views regarding the development of the world order remained in place, but it has also strengthened to form the core of their strategic partnership. Thus, the official Russian point of view on global order is based on the idea that “[i]nternational relations are in the process of transition, the essence of which is the creation of a polycentric system of international relations”.67 Speaking before the UN General Assembly on September 28, 2015, Chinese leader Xi Jinping noted: “The movement toward a multi-polar world, and the rise of emerging markets and developing countries have become an irresistible trend of history”.68 This common position is enshrined in many bilateral documents and the two countries’ leaders have repeatedly confirmed it in their statements and speeches. There are two aspects to the two countries’ common approach to the transformation of the international order. On the one hand, they share a kind of common foreign policy ideology of multipolarity whose ideal model of the international order is based on what Rozman called “parallel identities”.69 On the other hand, the interest of Russia and China in the multipolar world is based on their desire to break free from the unipolar system. This is because Moscow and Beijing see no possibility of achieving their political or economic goals in a world dominated by the U.S. and its Western allies. As major countries with independent views of the international agenda and ambitious strategic goals, Russia and China believe

a Multipolar World and the Formation of a New International Order]. April 23, 1997. At http://docs.cntd.ru/document/1902155. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 66 “Sovmestnaya deklaratsiya Rossiyskoy Federatsii i Kitayskoy Narodnoy Respubliki o

mezhdunarodnom poryadke v XXI veke” [Joint Declaration of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China on the international order in the XXI century]. Ministerstvo inostrannykh del Rossiyskoy Federatsii, February 27, 2006. http://www.mid.ru/ru/ maps/cn/-/asset_publisher/WhKWb5DVBqKA/content/id/412066. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 67 “Kontseptsiya vneshney poliyiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii”. 68 “Statement by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China at the

General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly.” United Nations, September 25, 2015. https://gadebate.un.org/sites/default/files/gastatements/70/70_ ZH_en.pdf. (Accessed December 21, 2019). 69 Rozman, Gilbert, The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order: National Identities, Bilateral Relations, and East versus West in the 2010s.

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they could work more effectively in a multipolar environment managed by several centers of power that will primarily interact with each other on global issues through the platform of the UN. Both Moscow and Beijing hold that relations between these centers of power should be well-defined but non-confrontational. In this way, each can retain its unique economic model, ideology, and political structure. A similar approach appears to some extent in the Chinese concept of “a new type of major powers relations” that Beijing first proposed for Sino-U.S. interactions, but that Chinese theorists argue could be applied to China’s relations with all G20 countries.70 At the same time, the similarity of the two countries’ views did not take any concrete geopolitical form because Moscow and Beijing, on the one hand, had no incentive toward greater activity and, on the other hand, there was no specific area to which such cooperation could be applied. To a large extent, the foundation of such cooperation became the destabilization and socio-economic breakdown in the center of Eurasia, where both Russia and China hold common goals and interests, primarily the need to ensure their own security. With the start of the military campaigns in Afghanistan and Iraq, the SCO—created in 2001 as a regional platform for a general political dialogue with a wide-reaching agenda—made the fight against terrorism and extremism a focus of its activities. At the same time, the SCO agenda for economic development tended to stagnate, in no small part due to concerns from Russia and several other member countries over China’s growing economic potential. By the early 2010s, however, it became clear to both powers that an agenda for regional development was necessary. Russia began actively developing its own integration project in the post-Soviet space, launching its Customs Union in 2010. By 2015, that Union had transformed into the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) that now includes Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Armenia, and Kyrgyzstan. In combination with the CSTO and SCO, these organizations provided the institutional basis for ensuring the security and economic development of the post-Soviet republics of Central Asia and several other countries in the post-Soviet space. From Moscow’s point of view, they also clearly institutionalized Russia’s leadership as a source of security and economic growth in the near abroad. 70 “Statement by H.E. Xi Jinping President of the People’s Republic of China at the General Debate of the 70th Session of the UN General Assembly”.

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China launched its main geo-economic initiative, the Silk Road Economic Belt, in 2013. From the very beginning, the initiative included several different dimensions: in addition to the officially declared goals of developing transport and logistical infrastructure along the land and sea routes linking China with Europe and developing western Chinese provinces through which the land component of the SREB passed, this mega-initiative has several political objectives. The main such goal is to forge a friendly and safe environment on the continent, a dependable and non-hostile neighborhood—of particular importance given the deepening geopolitical conflict with the U.S. It seems that the SREB will remain a major economic factor determining the integration process across the vast territory of continental Eurasia.71 The Russian–Western confrontation that began in 2014 made it necessary to systematize Russian–Chinese cooperation and their existing initiatives in some sort of unified strategy or concept. Russian foreign policy experts developed the concept of a “Greater Eurasia”—a term that entered the official foreign policy discourse on June 17, 2016, when President Vladimir Putin declared the need to form a Greater Eurasian Partnership (GEP).72

Russia as a Eurasian Power The path toward turning Russia into an independent Eurasian center of power and world influence has become the official policy of the Kremlin and the primary focus of most Russian foreign policy strategy experts. Upon reassuming the presidency in May 2012, Putin—who, in 2000, had discussed with Bill Clinton the possibility of Russia joining NATO73 —declared: “We must all understand that the life of our future generations and our prospects as a country and nation depend on us

71 Miller, Tom, China’s Asian Century (London: Zedbooks, 2017); Rollande, Nadege, China’s Eurasian Century? Political and Strategic Implications of the Belt and Road Initiative (Washington, D.C.: National Bureau of Asian Research, 2017). 72 “Plenary session of St. Petersburg International Economic Forum.” Kremlin.ru, June 17, 2016. http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/52178. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 73 Sysoev, Gennady, “Putin ne vozrazhaet protiv vstupleniya Rossii v NATO” [Putin does not object Russia’ entering NATO]. Kommersant, March 7, 2000. https://www. kommersant.ru/doc/142046. (Accessed February 18, 2021).

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today and… on our determination in developing our vast expanses from the Baltic to the Pacific, and on our ability to become a leader and centre of gravity for the whole of Eurasia.”74 In September 2013, during a conference of the Valdai international discussion club, he remarked that “Eurasian integration is a chance for the entire post-Soviet expanse to become an independent centre of global development, rather than remaining on the outskirts of Europe and Asia.”75 The pivot to Eurasia and anti-Westernism—policies that were essentially marginal about 10 years ago—are now part of the mainstream foreign policy thinking in Russia. A decade ago, Vladislav Surkov—the main intellectual of the presidential administration—said that the need to “remain part of Europe and the West”76 was an essential element in building Russia. Today, however, he calls for ending the “repeated and fruitless attempts to become part of Western civilization” and predicts that Russia will take an independent path for the next 100–300 years.77 The former pro-Western scholar Sergey Karaganov writes that Russia has exhausted its “European storehouse.” He has developed an entire intellectual line of thought based on the concept of a “Greater Eurasia”—in which Russia will play a central role.78 This evolution indicates that the disappointment Russia experienced over its decision to focus on Europe and the liberal world order in the 1980s and its subsequent pivot toward Eurasia was the result of a long and painful process. It was a reaction to the changing international situation and not the outcome of any pre-existing anti-European conviction on the part of Putin or the Russian elite as a whole.

74 Putin, Vladimir, “Vladimir Putin Inaugurated as President of Russia.” Kremlin.ru, May 7, 2012. At http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/15224. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 75 “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club.” Kremlin.ru, September 19, 2013. At http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/19243. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 76 Surkov, Vladislav, “Natsionalizatsiya budushchego” [Nationalization of the Future].

Expert online, November 20, 2006. https://expert.ru/expert/2006/43/nacionalizaciya_ buduschego/. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 77 Surkov, Vladislav, 2018. “Odinochastvo polukrovki” [The Loneliness of the HalfBreed]. Russia in Global Affairs, April 11, 2018. https://globalaffairs.ru/number/-19490. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 78 Karaganov, Sergei, “From the Pivot to the East to Greater Eurasia”.

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After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the West’s policies put Moscow in a no-win situation: either submit completely to the geopolitical goals of the U.S. and its allies—and thereby abandon its own approach to security—or else reorient itself away from pro-Western policy toward some other course. This contradicted Russia’s perception of itself as a world power in global affairs and prompted it to abandon gradually the proWestern orientation it had pursued in the 1990s in favor of becoming an “independent center of power.” As Putin noted in his speech to the Federal Assembly in February 2019, “Without sovereignty, Russia cannot be a state. Some countries can do this, but not Russia”.79 It remains unclear whether Russia can achieve this. Its military might is mostly consistent with this desire, but its economic development continues to lag behind significantly.80 To become an independent center of power in Eurasia, Russia’s leaders and the ruling elite must change their traditional approaches significantly in at least four areas. First, it is necessary to understand the significance of this region and to think about it strategically, and not to pursue non-Western foreign policy and foreign economic policy on a situational basis—for example, to put pressure on the West by demonstrating alternative approaches. Eurasia’s importance to Russia should be self-evident. A major shift occurred along these lines after 2014. It appears that a major portion of the political and economic elite now understand that the breakdown in relations with Europe is both serious and long-term and that is necessary to reorient and shift at least some of those ties to the non-Western world. Not only do statements by Russian leaders—who increasingly refer to the country as part of Eurasia rather than Europe81 —bear witness to this, but also the change in the conceptual foundations of foreign policy in recent years.82 Second, it is necessary to formulate and actively pursue an economic policy that accelerates economic growth, thus reinforcing Russia’s claim to be a center of global politics. Progress in this area has been not just modest, but practically non-existent. The Russian government claims 79 “Presidential Address to Federal Assembly.” Kremlin.ru, February 20, 2019. http:// en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/59863. (Accessed January 12, 2020). 80 Entin, Mark, and Ekaterina Entina, 2016. “Russia’s Role in Promoting Great Eurasia Geopolitical Project.” Rivista di Studi Politici Internazionali, Vol. 83, No. 3, pp. 331–351. 81 “Address to the Federal Assembly.” Kremlin.ru, December 12, 2012. At: http://en. kremlin.ru/events/president/news/17118. (Accessed January 12, 2020). 82 “Kontseptsiya vneshney poliyiki Rossiyskoy Federatsii”.

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to have decisively overcome a serious crisis and bounced back from a recession, achieving an annual growth rate of approximately 2%.83 The cause of that crisis, however, remains unclear, unless it was the government’s own policies. After all, Moscow leaders affirm that the anti-Russian sanctions are having no substantial effect on the economy. Nonetheless, Russia’s economic growth indicators are significantly lower than the global average, other countries such as India and China that also claim to be global centers of power, and many of its neighbors in the region. The question of economic efficiency consists not only of how to develop trade and economic cooperation with European countries under the current difficult circumstances but also of how to strengthen Russia’s relatively weak economic ties with most Asian states—ties that would facilitate more rapid economic growth at home. For the past two decades, Russia has been discussing ways to achieve more balanced cooperation with China. Moscow now pins many of its hopes on the EAEU. That organization cooperates with China as part of the linkage to the SREB. However, individual EAEU member countries also pursue ever-expanding bilateral cooperation with China while the Agreement on Trade and Economic Cooperation that the EAEU and China signed in 2018 is more of a statement of intentions carrying no clearly defined obligations.84 Third, to become a center of influence independent of China, Moscow must pursue a skillfully balanced policy toward Beijing that neither alienates this critically important partner nor allows Russia to become dependent upon it. Russia’s current diplomatic efforts along these lines are appropriate, but they receive insufficient support from the country’s economic achievements. Russia continues to export primarily raw materials to China, prompting some domestic experts to worry that the

83 “Effektivnost’ Rossiyskoy Ekonomiki” [The Effectiveness of the Russian Economy].

Russian Federal State Statistics Service, December 27, 2018. http://www.gks.ru/wps/ wcm/connect/rosstat_main/rosstat/ru/statistics/efficiency/. (Accessed December 21, 2019). 84 “Agreement on Economic and Trade Cooperation between the Eurasian Economic Union and its Member States, of the One Part, and the People’s Republic of China, of the Other Part.” Eurasian Economic Commission, May 17, 2018. http://www.eurasianc ommission.org/ru/act/trade/dotp/sogl_torg/Documents/%d0%a1%d0%be%d0%b3%d0% bb%d0%b0%d1%88%d0%b5%d0%bd%d0%b8%d0%b5%20%d1%81%20%d0%9a%d0%b8%d1% 82%d0%b0%d0%b5%d0%bc/%d0%a2%d0%b5%d0%ba%d1%81%d1%82%20%d0%b0%d0%bd% d0%b3%d0%b8%d0%b9%d1%81%d0%ba%d0%b8%d0%b9%20%28EAEU%20alternate%29% 20final.pdf. (Accessed February 18, 2021).

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country could become a raw materials appendage of China—but if Russia has nothing else to export, there is little chance of correcting the problem. Fourth and last, for Russia to be a leader of Eurasia, the other states in the region would have to recognize it as such. Russia has some potential in this regard. Most states in Central Asia and the Caucasus hold a clear understanding that Russia is the only guarantor of security in the region. In the case of a serious terrorist attack or attempt by Islamists to seize power, it is unlikely that anyone other than Moscow would extend assistance to the local secular regimes. This is why, for example, such countries as Armenia and Azerbaijan—despite their mutual conflict and their numerous complaints directed at Moscow—vie with each other to cooperate with Russia militarily and strategically. Russia’s support in the fight against terrorism is felt even more keenly in Central Asia, where Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan are members of the CSTO. Russia’s cultural influence in the region remains very strong, having carried over from Soviet and even tsarist times. From an economic standpoint, the fact that China has already become the main trading partner for most of the countries in the region tends to marginalize Russia. Although this in no way poses a threat to Russia’s security, it might call its status as a separate economic center of Eurasia into question. Historically speaking, Russia has little experience in this area. The very idea that Russia had a special path of development arose relatively recently, in the first half of the nineteenth century as a reaction to revolutionary events in Europe. Before the reign of Peter the Great, there was practically no discussion of whether this state with its capital in Moscow was Asian or European. From the time that it accepted Christianity, Rus considered itself part of Christian civilization, Catherine the Great officially established the European status of the renewed Russia in 1768 with the “Order of the Commission on the Drafting of a New Code,” that stated directly that “Russia is a European power”.85 It was only under Nicholas I, who feared the revolutionary influence of Europe, that the triad of “Orthodoxy-autocracy-nationality” was formulated, emphasizing Russia’s distinctive social and political structure. In this arrangement, the

85 Tomsinov, Vladimir A. 2007. “Imperatritsa Ekaterina II (1729–1796)” [Empress Catherine II (1729–1796)]. In: Rossiyskie pravovedy XVIII–XX vekov. Ocherki zhizni i tvorchestva [Russian Jurists of the XVIII–XX Centuries: Essays on Life and Work]. vol. 1. (Moscow: Zertsalo, 2007), p. 672.

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all-powerful autocrat communicated with the people directly and took care of them based on a fundamentally different spirituality. Overall, the Bolsheviks’ rise to power marked a victory for Westernism: according to Marxism, the world is following the same path and revolutionary Russia should not be an exception. Vladimir Lenin and his successors did not view Soviet society as differing from Western society in the civilizational sense: they only believed that they had pulled ahead on the ladder of social development. Moreover, the Soviet Union forbade or at least discouraged all sorts of ideas of how Russian society differed from that of the West—in particular, the concept of “Eurasianism” that appeared among 1920s emigrants or the Marxist theory of the “Asiatic means of production.” In condemning the capitalist West, the Soviet leadership—like Western liberals—believed in a single historical movement toward a common ideal. They did not see the Soviet Union as a special civilization with its own path of development that differed from that of Europe or the U.S. In principle, the collapse of the Soviet Union and the victory of the “democratic movement” in Russia did not indicate a departure from its Western orientation or from its belief that Russia was part of a single, worldwide historical process. The difference lay in something else: Russia was now considered not a leading, but a backward country. It was located on a lower rung of global progress than the “civilized world” of the West and was ready to become a subordinate student. This position was a reaction to the failure of the Soviet experiment but did not signify a fundamental shift to a different ideological paradigm. A policy based on ideological subordination could not long continue. Russia’s very size, its history and political culture demanded greater independence. The fact that the West ignored Russia’s obvious security interests prompted Moscow to take a more active position. The West itself also changed: it was overcome by a secular ideology emphasizing minority rights and giving preference to unusual social forms and a restriction of free speech under the pretext of “political correctness.” All of this was increasingly at variance with the traditional approach to social issues that had become very popular in Russia. This divergence also became an important factor in rethinking Russian foreign policy. And finally, the geopolitical situation in the world changed: the political and economic center of the international system began to shift toward the Asia-Pacific region. Many countries began pivoting toward Asia such as the U.S.,

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EU states, and Australia. It was only a matter of time before the nonWestern world began to embrace the ideas of multipolarity and diversity of civilizational paths toward world development. As part of this trend, the theory of Eurasianism that first gained popularity in the 1920s enjoyed a revival in Russia, its modern version gaining momentum as relations with the West worsened. The fact that the economic ideal of Eurasianism is not completely a Western-type market economy—but one regulated from above by the state and allowing private initiative in agriculture and small industry—also played an important role. This ideal emerged among Russian emigrants in connection with the need to justify the NEP (New Economic Policy)—an effective policy of the Bolsheviks that the Eurasians hoped would continue and lead to the rejection of communism. This model corresponded to the economic policy of Putin—who created large state corporations—as well as the economic models of most Central Asian states. The theme of Eurasianism spread very quickly among Russian intellectual circles as far back as the 1990s. Far more time was needed, however, to understand the practical rather than the romantic and mythological importance of Eurasia for a resurgent Russia and its role in the region given the deterioration of relations with the West. However, the structural situation in the world changed: the political and economic center of the international system began to shift toward the Asia-Pacific region. Many countries began pivoting toward Asia such as the U.S., EU states, and Australia. It was only a matter of time before the non-Western world began to embrace the ideas of multipolarity and diversity of civilizational paths toward world development. Russia’s idea of Eurasia holds several advantages. The desire to become an independent pole in world politics aligns with Russia’s historically based view of its role and status in international affairs. The Russian leadership under Putin has repeatedly stressed that Russia has always been an independent state and never submitted to outside political dictates, even when it considered itself part of Europe. This truly accords with the history and tradition of Russian foreign policy. The Soviet experience also accustomed Russians to superpower status, which is why the country’s subordination to the West in the 1990s seemed unnatural to most of them and much of the elite. Today’s Russian economic system is also generally consistent with the Eurasian ideal. Historically, the state has helped implement all breakthrough reforms and played a central role in the economy. This was true under Catherine the Great and Alexander

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II, during the reforms of Sergei Witte and Pyotr Stolypin, and during the period of the NEP. As Nikolay Milyutin, one of the main reformers under Alexander II wrote in 1883: “There is no greater misfortune for Russia than to issue an initiative from the hands of the government.”86 By focusing on its own region of the world and giving more attention to Asia, Russia might achieve the strategic objectives of developing its Siberian and Far Eastern regions—goals it has repeatedly proclaimed but fallen far short of accomplishing. From the geopolitical standpoint, Russia’s transformation into a center for the consolidation and integration of Eurasia would help ensure its security and create a friendly external environment, thus contributing to peaceful political relations and its effective economic development. The further development and possible expansion of the EAEU, its linkage to the SREB, the growing effectiveness of the SCO, and the introduction of the GEP in cooperation with China are destined to play a major role in this process. The shift toward creating an independent Eurasian pole of world politics is a long-term trend in Russian foreign policy. The Russian foreign policy establishment and expert community believe that such a pivot is not only necessary, but that it should have happened as long ago as the second half of the 1990s—or at least after NATO bombed Yugoslavia. By that action, the West demonstrated that it perceived the collapse of the Soviet Union not as an opportunity to fashion a new world order acceptable to all, but as a fortuitous opportunity to position itself as the undisputed world hegemon.87 The pro-Western inertia in Russia, however, was too great to change course then. It took another two crises—the RussiaGeorgia War in 2008 and the Ukrainian crisis in 2014—for Russia’s leadership to recognize the inevitability of shifting away from the West. And during those years, Europe and the U.S. largely ceded their role as ideological and technological leaders. They began squeezing out China and other non-Western states and so it is very likely that, if he were alive today, Peter the Great would have cut open a window not into Europe, but into Asia—and would have done so far more decisively and roughly, as was his style. 86 As quoted in: Zakharova, L.G. Samoderzhavie i otmena krepostnogo prava v Rossii, 1856–1861 [Autocracy and the Abolition of Serfdom in Russia, 1856–1861]. (Moscow: Izdatel’stvo Moskovskogo universiteta, 1984), p. 231. 87 “Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club.” Kremlin.ru, October 24, 2014. http://kremlin.ru/events/president/news/46860. (Accessed February 18, 2021).

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This does not mean, of course, that Russia will stop up its window into Europe. More likely, Russia is moving toward balancing the two areas of focus, turning from a poor cousin of Europe into an intermediary between Europe and Asia that combines the advantages of both and serves as something of a melding of civilizations and cultures. This process represents a rethinking of Russia’s historical role.

China and Greater Eurasia The above-mentioned rethinking and transformation of Russia’s foreign policy strategy coupled with the mistakes the West made in its Eurasia policy laid a firm foundation for Russian–Chinese rapprochement. The task of turning Russia into an independent power center of Eurasia led to the appearance of such initiatives as the EAEU and the GEP and made it necessary for Moscow to intensify its political and economic contacts with the states of the continent—primarily China. It was inevitable that those initiatives would come into either competitive or cooperative interaction with the projects China is implementing as part of its pivot toward Eurasia. Western policy in Eurasia has provided the structural prerequisites for Russia and China to link their initiatives in the region, starting with the EAEU and SREB, and extending to a linkage between the latter and the broader initiative to create a Greater Eurasia. Similarly to Russia though starting a little later, China has been rethinking its relationship with the West, and primarily with the U.S. The trade war Trump unleashed against Beijing was the trigger. Of course, China, unlike Russia, never strove to become part of the Western international system, the so-called “liberal world order”.88 The idea of including China in that order and the expectation that after implementing reforms it would become a democracy and switch to a market economy system existed only in the ideologized thinking of Western political scientists and experts. Beijing, however, was not opposed to becoming part of the established global governance and economic system and hoped only that China would occupy a place in it that was worthy of its economic might. Chinese leaders felt that the country’s economic success would naturally

88 Rozman, Gilbert, The Sino-Russian Challenge to the World Order.

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cement the position of the ruling regime, and not undermine it.89 For this reason, Moscow’s harsh reaction to Western actions in, for example, Ukraine prompted veiled criticism from Beijing.90 When events unfolded largely as China had expected—meaning that the country gained in strength but without moving toward the Western model—U.S. leaders concluded that Beijing had deceived them. As U.S. Secretary of State Michael Pompeo stated in April 2018: “They (Chinese) have most certainly not embraced democracy. They’ve actually gotten more autocratic and they have embraced the definition of a world economic order that basically means ‘we will take all the benefits of global trade and global economics.’ But we do not intend to live by any of its obligations”.91 As a result, the U.S. declared China an enemy and applied economic measures against it not only with the goal of “restoring economic justice,” but also of forcing a change in the country’s political path. Then-National Security Advisor John Bolton openly said as much in September 2018: “This is not just an economic issue. This is not just talking about tariffs and the terms of trade. This is a question of power. The intellectual-property theft that you mentioned has a major impact on China’s economic capacity, and, therefore, on its military capacity … I think all of this goes to what will be the major theme of the twenty-first century, which is how China and the United States get along”.92 This turn of events led Beijing to begin rethinking its policy of coexistence with the U.S.. Chinese leaders increasingly understand that this confrontation will continue for a long time, that its true cause is not so much economic as geopolitical: the unwillingness of the U.S. to

89 “Xi Calls for Reforms on Global Governance.” China Daily, September 29, 2016. https://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2016-09/29/content_26931697.htm. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 90 Fu, Ying, “How China Sees Russia: Beijing and Moscow Are Close, But Not Allies.” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2016. https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/ 2015-12-14/how-china-sees-russia. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 91 “China Poses Strategic Challenge to US: CIA Director Tells Senators.” The Economic Times, April 13, 2018. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/news/intern ational/world-news/china-poses-strategic-challenge-to-us-cia-director-tells-senators/art icleshow/63748402.cms?utm_source=contentofinterest&utm_medium=text&utm_cam paign=cppst. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 92 Friedman, Uri, 2018. “Trump Calls Out Election Meddling by China.” The Atlantic, September 26. At https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2018/09/trumpsecurity-council/571351/. (Accessed February 18, 2021).

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accept China’s independence and the fact that it represents a different and successful model of development. For this reason, Beijing is increasingly preparing for long-term defense and is building an economy that is less subject to U.S. influence.93 In this situation, China urgently needs partners—primarily Russia, but also other states of Eurasia and the nonWestern world. Russia’s concept of a Greater Eurasia could not have come at a better time. Support for the idea of a Greater (or Comprehensive) Eurasian Partnership is enshrined in several official Russian–Chinese documents, including their Joint Declaration of 2016.94 During the visit to Russia by Chinese premier Li Keqiang in November 2016, Russian Prime Minister Dmitry Medvedev said that Russia was continuing to work with China on forming a Comprehensive Eurasian Partnership that would include the EAEU and SCO member states. According to Medvedev, Russia and China had conducted a joint study on what should serve as the basis of that partnership. He and Li Keqiang discussed and approved the results of that study during their meeting and instructed experts from the two countries to formulate the economic basis of the project.95 At a meeting with President Putin in Moscow on May 25, 2017, Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi said that China welcomed and supported “Mr. President’s personal initiative on creating a Eurasian partnership.” According to Wang, the Chinese Commerce Ministry and the Russian Economic Development Ministry are currently examining possibilities for developing a Eurasian trade partnership and are preparing a relevant agreement.96

93 Sullivan, Jake, and Brands Hal, 2020. “China Has Two Paths To Global Domination.” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. https://carnegieendowment.org/ 2020/05/22/china-has-two-paths-to-global-domination-pub-81908. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 94 “Joint statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China.” Kremlin.ru, June 25, 2016. http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5100. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 95 “Medvedev: Rossiya formiruet evraziyskoe prostranstvo s Kitaem” [Medvedev: Russia forms the Eurasian space with China]. RIA Novosti, November 16, 2016. https://ria. ru/east/20161116/1481497327.html. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 96 “Meeting with Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi.” Kremlin.ru, May 25, 2017. At: http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/54576. (Accessed February 18, 2021).

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On July 4, 2017, during Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia, Chinese Minister of Commerce Zhong Shan and Russian Minister of Economic Development Maksim Oreshkin signed the Joint Declaration of Feasible Study on Eurasian Economic Partnership Agreement. According to an official Chinese comment, the signing of the declaration “is a significant trade and economic achievement of President Xi Jinping’s visit to Russia, showing the steadfast determination of China and Russia to deepen their mutual beneficial cooperation and promote trade liberalization and regional economic integration. It also shows the common willingness for a comprehensive and high-level trade and investment liberalization arrangement which opens to other economics in the future. It will inject new strength for the comprehensive strategic partnership of the two countries”.97 Most Chinese experts are also supportive of the project, or at least the idea of closer cooperation with Russia in Eurasia. An article on the website of China’s State Information Center argues that the practical implementation of the idea of a “Comprehensive Eurasian Partnership” proposed by President Putin “has great strategic importance for the reconstruction of world structures, harmony on the Eurasian continent, as well as for China to enter more deeply into the world economy”.98 Executive vice president of the China Institute of International Studies, a Chinese Foreign Ministry think tank, Ruan Zongze, commented: “Promotion of the ‘One Belt, One Road’ initiative has had a significant impact on Russia. In Russia, they are also thinking about how to achieve linkage. There is some overlap between the ‘One Belt, One Road’ and Putin’s recent proposal to establish a partnership in Greater Eurasia. In effect, they create an opportunity for cooperation between China and Russia on the Eurasian mainland region, to expand the reach of Sino-Russian cooperation. According to Ruan, the concept of a ‘Greater Eurasian Partnership’ ‘is the result of the ongoing Russian effort to improve its strategic environment by constantly adjusting its general strategy—a course that at 97 “China and Russia Sign the Joint Declaration of Feasible Study on Eurasian Economic Partnership Agreement.” The Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, July 6, 2017. http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/newsrelease/significantn ews/201707/20170702605903.shtml. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 98 Zhang, Xiaolan, “Goujian ‘Ouya quanmian huoban guanxi’ de yiyi ji cuoshi” [Significance and Measures of Constructing “Eurasian Comprehensive Partnership”]. State Information Center of China, January 26, 2018. http://www.sic.gov.cn/News/456/ 8816.htm. (Accessed February 18, 2021).

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various times has led it to promote such projects as the ‘North-South Transport Corridor’ and the Eurasian Economic Union”.99 Head of the SCO department of the same institute Li Ziguo, explaining Russia’s motives, basically agrees with the mainstream Russian view. Li shows that ever since 1960 leaders of the Soviet Union and Russia envisaged fostering a “greater European family,” and as late as in 2010 the then-president Dmitry Medvedev put forward a draft of a new European Security Treaty and prime-minister Vladimir Putin proposed a new European economic system “from Lisbon to Vladivostok” as moves toward realizing the Greater Europe ideal. But “Western countries perceive themselves to be the victors of the Cold War and have constantly imposed strategic pressures on Russia, forcing it to accept its total defeat in the geopolitical confrontation with the West. Russia eventually realized that it would be impossible to integrate into the Western world”.100 This became the reason for Russia to turn to Eurasia. According to Li Ziguo, “The Greater Eurasian Partnership is an initiative by Russia for pan-regional economic cooperation in the context of new economic situation. The initiative, while mainly focusing on promoting the Eurasian Economic Union (EEU101 ) and with certain geopolitical flavour, takes China as an important partner by way of synergy with the China-proposed Silk Road Economic Belt. The GEP may, to a certain extent, overlap with China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), but its concept of openness, inclusiveness and coordinated development is in line with the spirit of the BRI. Therefore, the GEP could go hand-inhand with the Chinese initiative and ensure development and stability in the Eurasian region while also serving as a lever for reshaping future global order”.102

99 “Xi Jinping yu Eluosi zongtong Pujing juxing huitan dazao Daouya huoban guanxi” [Xi Jinping and Russian President Putin Formulated Partnerships in Greater Eurasia During Negotiations.” IFeng News, June 27, 2016. At: http://news.ifeng.com/a/201 60627/49247845_0.shtml. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 100 Li, Ziguo, “The Greater Eurasian Partnership: Remodeling the Eurasian Order?” China International Studies, March 20, 2017. https://www.pressreader.com/china/ china-international-studies-english/20170320/281809988743240. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 101 EAEU. 102 Ibid.

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Recognizing that the “process of building the Eurasian Economic Partnership cannot progress smoothly at all times”, Chinese Association for East European, Russian and Central Asian Studies Chairman Li Yongquan nevertheless believes that linking the Russian and Chinese development strategies “is crucial not only to building the Eurasian Economic Partnership, but also, in some ways, to that organization’s future prospects”. He also is confident that ASEAN can be part of the new entity. He believes that “In the future, aligning the development strategies of China and the Russian-led EAEU will drive the construction of the Eurasian Economic Partnership”.103 An influential Chinese expert on Russia and Central Asia Zhao Huasheng in a 2017 article is a bit more cautious about the Russian initiative as such since it “is not clear whether the Greater Eurasian Partnership will be a long-term strategy or merely a transitional policy for Russia.” He is also doubtful “that Russia has strong enough power to advance the Greater Eurasian Partnership, therefore it remains unclear just how far the Greater Eurasian Partnership can go.” However, according to Zhao, “rationality and necessity still exist in advancing the economic, diplomatic, and security cooperation in the greater Eurasian region.” He concludes: “Greater Eurasian cooperation coincides with China’s national interests, especially in that it is conducive to the construction of the Belt and Road Initiative. China should, together with Russia and other countries concerned, push forward greater Eurasian cooperation”.104 In a more recent article, Zhao is more positive, arguing that in Greater Eurasia, China is a participant and a driving force and there is no question of a political choice.105 He makes the following recommendation: “China and Russia must translate the process of linking the SREB [with EAEU] at the stage of its practical implementation, think seriously about the start of negotiations on a free trade zone between China and the EAEU, practically advance regional economic integration within the SCO, implement projects of practical cooperation, and respond jointly 103 Li, Yonquan, “The Greater Eurasian Partnership and the Belt and Road Initiative:

Can the Two be Linked?” Journal of Eurasian Studies, 2018, Vol. 9, No. 2, pp. 94–99. 104 Zhao, Huasheng, “Greater Eurasian Partnership: China’s Perspective.” China International Studies 2018, No. 68, p. 84. 105 Zhao, Huasheng, “Yintai zhanlue yu Daouya: renzhi yuyingdui” [Indo-Pacific Strategy and Greater Eurasia: Cognition and Response]. Guoji wenti yanjiu 2019, No. 2, p. 44.

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to regional economic and development issues. China, Russia and India have extremely important special interests with regard to the process of creating a Greater Eurasia. China must use the RIC (Russia, India, China) mechanism even more creatively, expand its substantive framework, ease the disagreements between China and India and strengthen mutual trust, and strengthen interaction between China, Russia, and India on regional issues”.106 Thus, it is now possible to state with full confidence that Beijing supports the Russian idea of closer cooperation on a Greater Eurasia, has committed officially to the Greater Eurasian Partnership project, and is considering various ways to implement it. Therefore, it is not so much a Russian as it is a Russian–Chinese project.

Other Eurasian Partners The other countries of the region view the project very positively, but not all have taken an official position on it and some still need more information. Kazakhstan—primarily in the person of its first president Nursultan Nazarbayev—is one of the originators and active proponents of the idea. Naturally, Kazakhstan takes a specific approach to the project, focuses more on the question of its economic effectiveness and benefits, and opposes any attempt to politicize Eurasian programs. In an interview with Rossiiskaya Gazeta on April 2, 2019, President of Kazakhstan, Kassym-Jomart Tokaev, noted: “We believe that the idea of a Greater Eurasia—in the broad sense of that term—opens new horizons for activating economic ties between Asia and Europe and has become a foundation for forming a new system of international relations in the Eurasian space. In my view, the processes taking place on our megacontinent form a new geopolitical reality…”107 The fact that the new leader spoke positively of a Greater Eurasia indicates that Kazakhstan will carry on its policy and is ready to become one of the important partners in this process.

106 Ibid., p. 40. 107 Dolgopolov, Nikolai, and Vladislav Fronin, “My Vsegda budem vmeste” [We’ll

Always be Together]. Rossiyskaya Gazeta, April 2, 2019. https://rg.ru/2019/04/02/nak anune-vizita-v-moskvu-novyj-prezident-kazahstana-otvetil-na-voprosy-rg.html. (Accessed February 18, 2021).

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Speaking about Central Asia, Tokaev noted: “The close cooperation of the countries of the region, connected with Russia by ties of strategic partnership, are a serious factor for ensuring peace, stability, and security in Eurasia. In other words, achieving these goals is impossible without Russia.” He concluded: “The idea of a Greater Eurasia opens horizons for activating economic ties with Asia and Europe and could become the foundation for forming a new system of international relations on the Eurasian continent…On the whole, the main element in the future architecture of cooperation should become the unfolding of the integration potential of our countries and associations within the framework of forming a Greater Eurasia that we would like to see as a unified Eurasian space of security and prosperity”.108 Like Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan—as a member of the EAEU—is naturally part of the process of creating a Greater Eurasia through the mechanism of linking the EAEU and SREB. Tajikistan will also participate as a member of the SCO and an active partner of the SREB. The same is true of other SCO and EAEU members and partners to the SREB. Uzbekistan has recently become more actively open to the outside world and broad international integration initiatives. Former high-ranking Uzbek diplomats Abdusamat Khaydarov and Surat Mirkasymov referring to the idea of a Greater Eurasia proposed by Russian experts as well as the idea of a Greater Eurasian Partnership—that they, for some reason, attribute to China—as the basic concepts for Eurasia’s development. The authors point out that Uzbekistan has always been central to the development of this region.109 Despite certain political contradictions all these countries, being a part of what one historian called “inner Eurasia”110 share very similar historic experience and strategic culture, what simplify their involvement in the construction of Greater Eurasia. India, as one of the larger countries in the region, has yet to formulate an official position concerning the Greater Eurasian Partnership. Indian experts, however, hold a generally positive attitude toward the idea of actively cooperating with Russia in Eurasia—not least for the sake of counterbalancing China’s growing influence. 108 Ibid. 109 Khaydarov, Abdusamat A., and Mirkasymov, Surat M., “Uzbek Perspectives on

Eurasia.” India Quarterly 2019, Vol. 75, No. 1, p. 95. 110 Christian, David, “Inner Eurasia as a Unit of World History.” Journal of World History1994, Vol. 5, No. 2 (Fall), pp. 173–211.

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Thus, Raj Kumar from Indira Gandhi National Open University, just like his Chinese colleagues, accepts that the GEP “signifies Russia’s disillusion with its efforts to integrate with Europe and prompting Moscow’s pivot to East.” He argues: “Since the Chinese economic resources could influence the region more than the Russians, there is ample scope for Russia to cooperate with India at regional level in order to avoid too much dependence on China. This will also strengthen India–Russia economic ties which have been weak ever since Soviet Union disintegrated. The two countries could cooperate in areas like Central Asia, South East Asia, Afghanistan, Russia’s Far East and Arctic to further boost their relationship under the GEP initiative. A weakened Russia is not in India’s favour and New Delhi must help its strategic partner’s initiative to find feet in the region at a time when India has been a vocal critic of China’s BRI.”111 Nandan Unnikrishnan, a distinguished fellow and head of Eurasian Studies Programme at Observer Research Foundation, an influential Indian think tank, and Uma Purushothaman of Central University of Kerala even suggest that India should join Eurasian Economic Union since this “will give it access to its goods to entire geographic space through a single tariff. Joining it would also allow India to use and contribute to the internal rail and road networks, which link the members of the EEU.”112,113 One of the key reasons why a number of countries in the region either support or at least look positively at the Greater Eurasia concept is its umbrella-like character that leaves it open for discussion without making it a tool for imposing a regional hegemony. On the contrary, Russian and Chinese experts and promoters of the initiative suggest that small and medium-sized powers of the continent might see consolidation around such an umbrella-like initiative as a soft means of counterbalancing a rising China and for dissipating its growing might into the regional community of nations—into the Greater Eurasian Community.

111 Kumar, Raj Sh. “Russia’s Greater Eurasian Partnership is an Opportunity for India.” The Economic Times, October 6, 2018. https://economictimes.indiatimes.com/ blogs/et-commentary/russias-greater-eurasian-partnership-is-an-opportunity-for-india/. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 112 EAEU. 113 Purushothaman, Uma, and Nandan Unnikrishnan, “A Tale of Many Roads: India’s

Approach to Connectivity Projects in Eurasia,” India Quarterly 2019, Vol. 5, No. 1, p. 81.

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The Greater Eurasia Project Today The idea of a Greater Eurasia has developed further, taken on a substantial agenda, and gradually become part of the narratives of Russia and China.114 Speaking at a meeting of the foreign ministers of Russia and ASEAN on August 2, 2018, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov said, “The Greater Eurasia Partnership is not something that you join… It is not a previously prepared project that is coordinated by a narrow circle of original participants who tell others that there are terms on which we will interact with you.” He confirmed that the idea “is based on the fact that the EAEU and SCO, that partially overlap the EAEU and ASEAN, are already present in that region.” The foreign minister emphasized the role of the SCO, ASEAN, and China and called on all countries situated in that enormous geopolitical space to pool their resources and find a way to achieve such a partnership.115 These ideas took shape as the Russian–Chinese initiative for the linkage of the EAEU and SREB, the Comprehensive Economic Agreement between the EAEU and China, and the generally unprecedented intensification and institutionalization of Russia’s economic relations with China. They also find expression in the creation of a Eurasian community, the expansion of the SCO to include India and Pakistan, as well as the granting of observer status to Iran. Many other countries and organizations besides Russia and China also put forward projects for the development of infrastructure and trade on the Eurasian continent. These include Japan, South Korea, India, and the European Union. The primary objective now is to formulate relations between all of these regional players that would prevent competition between the various geo-economic projects and formulate rules and norms of economic and political interaction in this space. This contradicts the strategic goals of the U.S. For this reason, many scholars interpret the formation of a Greater 114 “Joint Statement of the Russian Federation and the People’s Republic of China.” Kremlin.ru, June 25, 2016. http://www.kremlin.ru/supplement/5100. (Accessed February 18, 2021). 115 “Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Media Questions

at the News Conference Following the Russia-ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting, Singapore, August 2, 2018.” MFA Russia. August 2, 2018. https://www.mid.ru/ru/ foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE02Bw/content/id/3313736?p_p_id= 101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw&_101_INSTANCE_cKNonkJE02Bw_languageId= en_GB. (Accessed February 18, 2021).

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Eurasia as a process of forming the Eurasian pole of a new Cold War— that would, on the one hand, provide a counterweight to the U.S.-led Western pole and, on the other, seek a development model independent of Western institutions and resources.116 The building of a Eurasian community, however, is still at an early stage. It is a long and laborious process to develop the institutional architecture for a Greater Eurasia out of the numerous existing initiatives that often overlap and, at times, conflict. In particular, Russia and the Eurasian Economic Union are not yet a part of most Asiatic institutional platforms. Although it is interested in creating a favorable external environment in which to develop, apart from its own integrative initiatives, Russia remains only minimally involved in multilateral economic formats, and it has yet to realize the full potential of the EAEU as a means for becoming involved in those processes. Because the EAEU is largely focused on its own members, it has only a limited ability to become one of the institutional bases of a Greater Eurasia—just as it limits Moscow’s chances for promoting trade and investment norms and standards that would benefit Russia. Two main factors influence the dynamics of the integrative processes in Greater Eurasia: (1) economic—the regionalization of trade, investment, and logistical ties around new points of growth and the integrative initiatives that sprout up around them and (2) political—growing competition between various institutional formats, spurring the development of old projects and the emergence of new ones. The result of the rapid institution-building associated with various integration tracks and interstate organizations has been the emergence in Eurasia of the so-called “bowl of noodles” phenomenon: a conglomeration of interconnected and intersecting projects. The abundance of such institutional formats—without a unifying logic—diminishes their effectiveness, potential for further development, and political significance. Given this situation, it becomes especially important to develop a unified logic of institutional development within the framework of the Greater Eurasian Partnership and other multilateral initiatives. The initiative to form a Greater Eurasia as a geopolitical and geo-economic reality is not intended to create a unified institution for regulation and cooperation—after all, every attempt to create such an institution in the Asia

116 Karaganov, Sergey. “The New Cold War and the Emerging Greater Eurasia.”

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Pacific based on APEC and other initiatives has failed. Instead, it is designed to form a unified logic of coexistence and development for existing and possible new formats, making it possible to raise the efficiency and sustainability of the institutional architecture of Greater Eurasia. Russia and China will play a significant, if not leading role in this process. Russian–Chinese cooperation and the process of forming a Greater Eurasia are complex and challenging. It is difficult not to agree that geopolitical pressure by the West has been a key motivating factor behind the consolidation of a number of non-Western powers in Greater Eurasia and their decision to put forward numerous economic initiatives. This does not mean, however, that if such pressure disappeared, the phenomena it caused would also quickly vanish. In the same way that the Cold War led to the formation of a stable international community in the Euro-Atlantic region, the West’s current policies are largely creating the political conditions for a somewhat similar security space and economic cooperation in Greater Eurasia.

Conclusion: From a Eurasian Pole to a Eurasian Community? Can the concept of a Greater Eurasia be viewed as a roadmap for the sustainable development of non-Western Eurasia—and perhaps, one day, of the whole continent? And, can the Russian and Chinese initiatives in the region serve as the basis for a stable Eurasian international society that would ensure economic prosperity and peace for its residents in the same way that the Euro-Atlantic community has for those countries? There is probably no simple answer to these questions: it is too early to talk about long-term consequences considering that the Greater Eurasia project and its component initiatives have existed for only a few years. Criticism of the fragility of the Russian–Chinese partnership and the initiatives it has engendered is out of place. As this analysis has shown, there are a number of counterarguments to the notion that the geopolitical nature of Russian–Chinese rapprochement and the development of a Greater Eurasia necessarily make that process unsustainable and fragile. First, the geopolitical pressure that the U.S. is exerting on Russia and China cannot disappear overnight: it is advancing according to its own logic and has acquired obvious inertia. Overcoming it will require considerable and sustained effort from all parties involved. Considering that the Biden administration and Congress continued labeling Russia

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and China as the country’s main strategic opponents, it would take a major act of political willpower to overcome this—something that seems very unlikely in the near future. For Beijing and Moscow, the main problem will be overcoming the distrust and outright anti-U.S. sentiment embedded in their foreign policies. This stems from the extremely critical view of U.S. policy that Eurasia has held for the last two decades. Thus, if it is even possible to transform the new geopolitical configuration of “bipolarity” that has taken shape in Eurasia, it would have to be at the initiative of the U.S. A change in Washington’s strategic approach to Eurasia, the departure from the concept of a “chessboard” to greater U.S. involvement in building a space of co-development and security for the entire Eurasian continent is an idealistic vision. It remains only a hypothetical possibility, but one that could produce the very results the U.S. has sought: a change in the foreign policy behavior of China and Russia and their willingness to assume greater responsibility for maintaining a stable international order—perhaps even including a reversal of the authoritarian tendencies in both countries. The Obama administration advocated such an approach, at least rhetorically. Due to institutional and ideological restrictions, however, it never implemented that policy. The political situation in both the center and flanks of Eurasia worsened and the geopolitical position of the U.S. grew weaker. The political course that the Trump administration pursued was antithetical to this approach. From the perspective of China and Russia, in an ideal multipolar world—that both Moscow and Beijing envisage as a fair world order— where everyone recognizes the rights of each center of power, Russia and China would be equidistant, figuratively speaking, not only from each other, but also from all other such centers, including the U.S. The Russian—Chinese rapprochement would lead only to a normalization of relations, withut the need to support each other in countering the West. However, the policy of the West aimed at preserving its monopolistic position in the world has had the effect of accelerating the rapprochement between Moscow and Beijing. U.S. actions in Yugoslavia, Iraq, Syria, Ukraine, and the South China Sea—viewed by both Moscow and Beijing as aggressive—have consistently led to a deepening of Russian– Chinese strategic cooperation. This trend gained particular momentum following the outbreak of the conflict in Ukraine in 2014 and U.S. attempts to counter Chinese influence in the South China Sea. The trend toward rapid Russian–Chinese rapprochement might slow if the U.S. were to pursue less aggressive policies. However, their rapprochement

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will proceed regardless because, as the weaker centers of power in the emerging multipolar world, strategically they need each other more than the West needs either of them. It remains unlikely, however, that the U.S. will fully abandon any attempt to dominate the global international system. In addition, even if the policies of the U.S., as well as those of Russia and China, were to change simultaneously, it apparently would not put an end to the idea of a Eurasian community and the initiatives that are bringing it into being. These projects address the basic need for security, political stability, and economic growth in the central part of the Eurasian continent. Given that they were born out of adverse geopolitical circumstances, it seems that such mega-projects will continue to arise in the future. At the same time, the need to overcome the confrontation between the nominal poles of this new confrontation could lead European countries and the U.S. to become more actively involved. Eurasia’s current geopolitical and geo-economic consolidation on an anti-U.S. or even antiWestern basis and the formation of “Eurasian” and “Western” poles could give way to a convergence of the “poles” and their joint development. Many present the example of European integration and the building of the Euro-Atlantic community—that inspires so many integration theorists—as a unique case and proof that a similar undertaking somewhere else would not produce the same result. Having survived two World Wars and the loss of countless lives and treasure, the countries of Europe resolved to avoid a new conflict. They sought to unify around a common development agenda and to establish a collective defense against outside threats that, for the first time in history, outweighed their internal disagreements. European intellectuals had dreamed for centuries of unifying Europe, and its ultimate realization was based on deep cultural, historic, and political commonality among its peoples as well as their obvious economic interdependence. At the same time, the example of the Euro-Atlantic community provides grounds for guarded optimism that a similar community could arise in Eurasia. The structural conditions for the formation of the EuroAtlantic community and the planned community of Greater Eurasia are, to some extent, similar. The Euro-Atlantic community also developed under conditions of geopolitical pressure—from the Soviet Union and the socialist camp that was emerging at that time. This created a need for the geopolitical and geo-economic consolidation of the West and found expression in the formation of a large-scale system of security (NATO)

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and the emergence of a number of integration initiatives that led to the signing of the Maastricht Treaty in 1992. Another important challenge that the European and Euro-Atlantic institutions faced was the need to diffuse the enormous might of the U.S. throughout the international community and to avoid any association driven by fear and the desire to counterbalance U.S. hegemony. Such coalitions repeatedly led to wars in Europe—including the two world wars that arose over fears of Germany. The formation of a Eurasian community is a mega-trend that might solve similar structural challenges in Eurasia. The Eurasian continent, so full of disagreements and smoldering conflicts—many of which arose from the destabilization of the central part of the continent in the 2000s— requires a similar shared agenda and a common idea of development like the one that served as the basis of European integration. The geopolitical confrontation between the U.S. and two key Eurasian powers is the political driving force behind this idea. However, in the same way that European integration acquired its own raison d’être and continues after the end of the Cold War, the Eurasian community—if it takes shape and acquires a substantive agenda—has a chance to become a new, selfsustaining reality. It could contribute to the security of a vast part of the Eurasian continent and improve the lives of billions of people who live there.

CHAPTER 3

Asia Before Eurasianism: The Pre-Revolutionary Roots of a Russian Emigré Ideology David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye

…Pocci ne v odno tolko Evpope, No i v Azii…pyccki ne tolko evpopeec, No i aziat.1 —Dostoevskii

1 Russia is not only in Europe, but also in Asia… A Russian is not only a European but also an Asian. F. M. Dostoevskii, Dnevnik pisatelia. 1880 i 1881 [Diary of a Writer. 1880 and 1881] (Moscow and Berlin, DirectMedia, 2015), 120.

Portions of this chapter appeared in an earlier essay, “The East,” in William Letherbarrow and Derrek Offord, eds., A History of Russian Thought. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010, 217–240. D. S. van der Oye (B) Brock University, St. Catharines, ON, Canada e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Diesen and A. Lukin (eds.), The Return of Eurasia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2179-6_3

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In 1821 a junior officer in the Russian Imperial Guard inexplicably abandoned a promising military career.2 Born just before the end of the eighteenth century into a noble family of distinguished lineage, Petr Chaadaev began studying at Moscow University in 1809, where his friends included the writer Aleksandr Griboedov as well as the future Decembrists Nikolai Turgenev and Ivan Iakushkin. However, as Napoleon’s Grande Armée was advancing towards the Russian border in spring 1812, he forsook his professors to take a commission in the elite Semenovskii Regiment. Over the next three years, the subaltern saw action at Borodino and at a number of other battles all the way to Paris, earning decorations from both the tsar and the Prussian king for gallantry in action. Back in Russia, Chaadaev was posted to Tsarskoe Selo, near St Petersburg. The next four years would be his happiest. Brilliant, erudite and good looking, he stood out in the imperial capital’s beau monde and befriended, among others, the young poet Aleksandr Pushkin (whom he may have inspired as the model of the unhappy hero of his prose poem Evgenii Onegin 3 ) as well as the historian Nikolai Karamzin. Emperor Alexander I also thought well of the officer, and in 1820 decided to appoint him as an aide-de-camp. But before the tsar could sign the necessary order, Chaadaev was tasked to investigate a revolt in his former regiment. The circumstances remain murky, but on 21 February the following year, he suddenly resigned his commission and retired from the military without the customary promotion to the next rank. At first exiling himself to his aunt’s estate in the country, Chaadaev eventually left for an extensive stay in Europe. Chaadaev only came back to his homeland in 1826. This proved fortuitous in hindsight since he had thereby entirely missed the Decembrist revolt, an attempted coup the previous year against the accession of Nicholas I to the throne. Having associated with a number of the conspirators before he had left the country, Chaadaev might well have been caught up in the rising had he still been in Russia. Nevertheless, authorities arrested him on the Polish border upon his return and interrogated him for more than a month before clearing him of any involvement 2 M. O. Gershenzon, Chaadaev: Zhizn’ i myshlenie (St. Petersburg: Tip. M. M. Stasulevich, 1908); Gordon Cook: “Peter Chaadaev: The Making of a Cultural Critic, 1826–1818,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas, Neue Folge 21:4 (1973), 560–572. 3 N. L. Brodskii, Evgenii Onegin: Roman Pushkina (Moscow: Prosveshchenie, 1964),

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with the plot. The coming years proved difficult. Perennially in debt and depressed by the increasingly stifling post-coup political reaction, Chaadaev moved back and forth between Moscow and the estates of various family members. During his stays in the countryside, Chaadaev befriended Ekaterina Panova, the unhappily childless wife of a neighbouring nobleman, and when back in the former capital he began a correspondence with her about “the miserable state of affairs, which oppresses all our hearts and spirits.”4 Although completed in 1829, the first of his letters proved a succès de scandale seven years later when the literary critic and future ethnographer Nikolai Nadezhdin published it in his new journal Teleskop. Sergei Uvarov, the tsar’s minister of education, recalled, “All authorities and especially the highest one were staggered by this incident.”5 The periodical was ordered to cease publication, its editor exiled, and the emperor declared the author insane. Meanwhile, patriotic students indignantly wrote Moscow University’s trustee, Count Sergei Stroganov, to declare that they were “ready, with firearm in hand, to rise up against this affront against Russia.”6 Chaadaev began what would come to be known as “The First Philosophical Letter” innocently, with a discussion of his correspondent’s religious qualms.7 But it soon turned into a harsh criticism of their country’s cultural backwardness: “We belong to none of humanity’s great families,” He declared. “We are neither of the West nor the East, and we have neither the heritage of one nor the other. Situated as if outside of time, the universal education of humankind has not reached us.”8 Chaadaev attributed Russia’s arrested development to the absence of a Roman heritage, having adopted Christianity from Orthodox Byzantium rather than the Catholic Church, and the centuries of Mongol rule, which cut it off from the Renaissance in the rest of Europe. Peter the 4 Pierre Tchadaïef, Œuvres choisis de Pierre Tchadaïef (Paris-Leipzig: Librarie A. Franck, 1862), 10. 5 In Paul Werth, 1837: Russia’s Quiet Revolution (New York: Oxford University Press, 2021), 45. 6 In V. R. Kantor, “‘Imia rokovoe’ (Dukhovnoe nasledie P.Ia. Chaadaeva i russkaia kul’tura, in Voprosy Literatury 3 (1988)), https://voplit.ru/article/imya-rokovoe-duhovnoenasledie-p-ya-chaadaeva-i-russkaya-kultura/. 7 Tchadaïef, Œuvres choisis, 9–43. 8 Tchadaïef, Œuvres choisis, 15.

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Great’s efforts to modernise his realm had been fruitless: “He tossed the mantle of civilisation to us; we picked up the mantle but hardly touched civilisation.”9 If Uvarov had argued that Russia should benefit from its geography as an intermediary between Asia and Europe, “resting one elbow on China and the other on Germany,” Chaadaev despaired that his country “seems to have ignored its destiny.” In short, “Alone in the world, we have given it nothing, we have taught it nothing…we live only to teach some important lesson to our heirs in the distant future, who will be wise enough to learn it.”10 He grimly signed the missive “Necropolis [the city of the dead], 1829, 1 December.”11 Chaadaev would go on to write at least eight more letters, none of which were published during his lifetime. However, it was the first one that would have such a profound influence on Russian thought during the nineteenth century. By dismissing his country as some immature orphan in the family of nations, he set off the famous debate between the Slavophiles, who championed its distinctive nature and those who looked to Europe, the Westernisers. As another literary critic, Apollon Grigor’ev, put it, this letter “for the first time raised the unanswered question about our national identity, about our self, about our character, which until now no one had asked.”12 Even the Slavophiles never suggested that their country had an Asian identity; they championed Europe’s Orthodox, Slavic east. Nevertheless, already in the nineteenth century, there were those who believed that Russia had Asian roots. Not only did most of the empire lie beyond the Ural Mountains, technically Europe’s eastern border, but, as they argued, two and a half centuries of Mongol rule and frequent intermarriage with Tatars and other peoples of the Orient gave Russians a very distinct character. Therefore, when after the Bolsheviks seized power in 1917, a group of émigrés in Prague developed their notions of Eurasianism, they did not tread on entirely new ground. This chapter will trace its intellectual roots in Russia before the Revolution.

9 Tchadaïef, Œuvres choisis, 28. 10 Tchadaïef, Œuvres choisis, 26, 27. 11 Tchadaïef, Œuvres choisis, 43. 12 Kantor, “‘Imia rokovoe’”.

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∗ ∗ ∗ Well before Europe taught Russians to think of the world as divided into continents, they already had very distinct notions of East and West. The Eastern Slavs who coalesced into Kievan Rus sometime in the ninth century had been frequently attacked by marauding Turkic tribes from Asia’s steppes. According to the chronicles that have come down to us, to them the East represented danger and destruction. Conquest by the Golden Horde in the early thirteenth century only reinforced this notion, and well into the sixteenth century Moscow’s tsars battled their Tatar remnants in what the Orthodox Church characterised as a millennial struggle with Godless pagans. The Orient still evoked negative connotations in the popular mind in the nineteenth century. According to the 1895 dictionary of the Imperial Academy of Sciences, the second definition for the adjective “Asian” (aziatskii) was “savage, coarse” (dikii, grubyi).13 Attitudes towards Tatars weren’t much better, as folk sayings like “An unexpected guest is worse than a Tatar” suggest.14 While not entirely free of conflict, commerce and culture initially made links with Europe less hostile. As a conduit for trade between Scandinavia and Byzantium, Kievan Rus was integrated into northern Europe’s Hanseatic League, and its princes had dynastic relationships with western monarchies. Although Mongol overlordship did much to cut these ties for several centuries, as Moscow gradually cast off its “yoke,” it renewed its intercourse with the kingdoms to the west. Nevertheless, Emperor Peter the Great is largely credited with beginning to reintegrate Russia with Europe at the turn of the eighteenth century. There was some resistance to Peter’s efforts to westernise his realm, but by the end of the century, educated Russians tended to regard themselves as fully European.15 Empress Catherine the Great could confidently proclaim that “Russia is a European state” in the first chapter of 13 Ia. K. Grot, ed., Slovar’ russkogo iazyka (St. Petersburg: Tip. Akademii nauk, 1891– 1895), s.v. “aziatskii”. 14 For a selection of proverbs about Tatars collected by the nineteenth century lexicographer Vladimir Dal, see Byltyr. “Russkie narodnye pogovorki a poslovitsy o tatarax”, https://tatar-rulit.livejournal.com/64469.html. See also Jeffrey Brooks, When Russia Learned to Read: Literacy and Popular Culture 1861–1917 (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1985), 214–245. 15 Andreas Schönle and Andrei Zorin, On the Periphery of Europe 1762–1825: The Self-Invention of the Russian Elite (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2018).

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the Nakaz (instruction) she issued in 1767 to solicit the opinions of her subjects for a new law code.16 Along with adopting western fashions and manners, the empress and her more privileged subjects also looked at Asia through European eyes. Thus, they shared the vogue for a benign and playful Orient of porcelain, pagodas and A Thousand and One Nights. Even as Catherine nearly went to war with the Qing, kitaishchina (chinoiserie) was all the rage at her court, and she even built an entire Chinese village at Tsarskoe Selo.17 Literate Russians never identified themselves more closely with Europe than during Catherine the Great’s reign.18 But towards the end of her rule, even the empress’ enthusiasm for western ways began to sour as she learned of the Bourbon monarchy’s sanguinary end. The revolutionary turmoil that gripped France, followed by Napoleon’s invasion in 1812, also led many others to question their ties to Europe. A conservative, Nikolai Karamzin, remarked, “Once upon a time we used to call all other Europeans infidels; now we call them brothers. For whom was it easier to conquer Russia – for infidels or for brothers ? That is, whom was she likely to resist better?”.19 As Russia’s first important historian, Karamzin also had some very intriguing thoughts about the traumatic conquest from the East six hundred years earlier. In the multi-volume History of the Russian State, which he completed in 1826, he speculated about how the Mongol Yoke had influenced his fatherland’s political development. Like most subsequent historians, Karamzin pointed out that the invasion had been very destructive, “Of course, Batu’s assault, with its heaps of ashes and corpses, its bondage, and its lengthy slavery, was one of the greatest catastrophes.” Compounding the calamity, by being cut off from the West, Russia entirely missed the Renaissance. “However,” Karamzin added, “[Mongol 16 W. F. Reddaway, ed., Documents of Catherine the Great: The Correspondence with Voltaire and the Instruction of 1767 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1931), 216. 17 Barbara Widenor Maggs, Russia and ‘le rêve chinois’: China in Eighteenth-Century Russian Literature (Oxford: The Voltaire Foundation, 1984); David Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Russian Orientalism: Asia in the Russian Mind (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2010), 44–59. 18 Isabel de Madariaga, Russia in the Age of Catherine the Great (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1981), 588. 19 Nikolai Karamzin, Karamzin’s Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia, ed. Richard Pipes (New York: Atheneum, 1974), 123–124.

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rule] had some undeniable benefits.”20 For one thing, Russia’s fate could have been far worse. Had Russia’s Catholic enemies to the west, such as Poland, Hungary, Sweden or the Teutonic Knights, taken Russia instead in the thirteenth century, “We would have lost our statehood and [our Orthodox faith].”21 Mongol rule had another, more positive effect. Karamzin argued, “Moscow owes it greatness to the khans” (Moskva zhe obiazen svoim velichiem Khanam).22 What he meant was that Russia had adopted its autocratic regimentation of society—the strong centralised rule that had enabled it to achieve its pre-eminence—from the political tradition of its Mongol overlords. Karamzin reasoned that Kievan Rus had so easily fallen to Batu Khan because of the disunity and fractiousness of its princes. By contrast, Muscovy’s rulers had been able successfully to re-gather the Russian lands and develop into a great empire by assimilating the Golden Horde’s tradition of autocratic discipline. There was a distinctive political subtext to Karamzin’s suggestion that “Moscow owes its greatness to the khans.” The historian was no liberal, and he strongly opposed the calls for political reforms by Alexander I’s more progressive officials, such as Mikhail Speranskii. He was not the last conservative to argue that Russia’s true political heritage lay in the despotic Orient. At the turn of the twentieth century, the editor of the daily newspaper Sankt-Peterburgskie Vedomosti, Prince Esper Ukhtomskii, argued, The East believes no less than we do … [in] the most precious of our national traditions—autocracy. Without it, Asia would be incapable of sincere liking for Russia and of painless identification with her.23 Unlike Karamzin, most pre-Revolutionary historians were distinctly uncomfortable with the idea that any good had come from the Mongol Yoke.24 They tended to agree with Alexander Pushkin’s quip, “The Tatars were unlike the Moors: Having conquered Russia, they brought her 20 N. M. Karamzin, Istoriia gosudarstva rossiiskogo, 12 vols. (Moscow: Kniga, 1989), vol. 5, 222. 21 Karamzin, Istoriia, 5, 223. 22 Karamzin, Istoriia, 5, 223. 23 Hesper Ookhtomsky [Ukhtomskii], Travels in the East of Nicholas II when

Cesarewitch, 2 vols. (Westminster: Constable, 1900), vol. 2, 143. 24 One exception was Karamzin’s more obscure contemporary, Aleksandr Rikhter. A midlevel government official who published on a variety of historical topics, he elaborated

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neither algebra nor Aristotle.”25 Like many academics in the late imperial era, Sergei Solov’ev, Vasilii Kliuchevskii and Sergei Platonov confidently saw themselves as part of a broader European intellectual community.26 Nor did many twentieth-century historians both in the Soviet Union and the West believe that the Golden Horde had left a positive legacy. The only significant exception was a professor at Yale University who had been active in Eurasianist circles before coming to America in 1927, George Vernadsky.27 The growing influence of German Romanticism in the early decades of the nineteenth century further encouraged speculation among Russians about their place in the world, a discussion that Chaadaev’s First Philosophical letter launched upon its controversial publication in 1836. However, even if he proclaimed his country to be an orphan among the nations, there was no doubt in the author’s mind about its continental affiliation. In his “Apologia of a Madman,” which he wrote the following year, Chaadaev elaborated: “We live in Europe’s East, but this fact does not make us eastern.”28 His aversion to the Orient was clear: “In the East, docile minds that submitted to tradition spent themselves slavishly obeying some sacred principle and in the end… fell into a deep slumber, entirely ignorant of their destiny.”29 Although a man of conservative inclination, Chaadaev’s views largely coincided with those who would come to be known as the Westernisers, Russians who believed that their country should develop along western European lines towards an order based on rationalism, the rule of law and the primacy of the individual. They tended not to have a favourable

his views about the Golden Horde’s positive legacy in A. F. Rikhter, Issledovaniia o vlianii Mongolo-tatar na Rossiiu (St. Petersburg, 1825). 25 A. S. Pushkin, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii (Leningrad: Nauka, 1978), vol. 7, 10. 26 On Solov’ev’s wordview, see Ana Siljak, “Christianity, Science and Progress in Sergei

M. Solov’ev’s History of Russia,” in Thomas Sanders, ed., Historiography of Imperial Russia: The Profession and Writing of History in a Multinational State (Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe, 1999), 215–234. For that of Kliuchevskii, see Robert F. Byrnes, V. O. Kliuchevskii, Historian of Russia (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1995), 139–210. 27 George Vernadsky, The Mongols and Russia (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1953), 333–390. See also Charles J. Halperin, “Russia and the Steppe: George Vernadsky and Eurasianism,” Forschungen zur Geschichte Osteuropas 36 (1985), 55–194. 28 Tchadaïef, Œuvres choisis, 141. 29 Tchadaïef, Œuvres choisis, 138.

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view of Asia, and often invoked it as a warning or even a metaphor for tsarist reaction in their polemics. In any case, the East was hard to be emulated. If in Catherine’s day kitaishchina had evoked a playfully exotic Orient, during the nineteenth century it often became associated with antediluvian tyranny, corruption and immobility, its people nothing more than robotic ants utterly devoid of free will or imagination.30 Meanwhile, Dal’s dictionary defined the noun “Asian” as, among other, a “rude, uneducated person,” while the adjective “Asian” meant “savage, crude.”31 By the same token, aziatchina (Asianism) signified all of the continent’s defects. In Anton Chekhov’s play The Cherry Orchard, the haughty student Trofimov dismissed his country as “nothing but filth, vulgarity, aziatchina.”32 The early nineteenth century literary critic Vissarion Belinskii had nothing but contempt for the continent. As he saw it, only the Asian’s ability to think and talk separated him from animals, but his intellect was primitive at best. “Is something good or is it bad, reasonable or unreasonable – such questions don’t enter into his head; they are far too weighty, too indigestible for his brain.” Even were he to be endowed with more sophisticated intelligence, the Oriental’s fatalism renders him inert. “Why is everything the way it is, and not otherwise, and should it be thus rather than another way – he has never asked himself such things. Things have been like this for a long time, and they are so with everyone. It is Allah’s will!” he would have reasoned, according to Belinkskii.33 If the Westernisers advocated adopting European modernity, their Slavophile opponents rejected Peter the Great’s occidental turn and sought to return to what they saw as their nation’s traditional spiritual

30 For the views of Westernisers during the early nineteenth century, see A. V. Lukin, Medved’ nabliudaet za drakonom: Obraz Kitaia v Rossii v XVII –XXI vekakh (Moscow: Vostok-Zapad, 2007), 65–71. 31 in Kalpana Sahni, Crucifying the Orient: Russian Orientalism and the Colonization of the Caucasus and Central Asia (Bangkok: White Orchid Press, 1997), 72. 32 in Dani Savelli, “L’asiatisme dans la littérature et la pensée russe de la fin du XIXème siècle au début du XXème siècle,” (Unpublished PhD Dissertation: Université de Lille III, 1994), 9. 33 V. G. Belinskii, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 13 vols. (Moscow: Izd-vo Akademii nauk, 1953–1959), vol. 5, 99.

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and paternalist course.34 But this did not mean looking to the Orient. Like Chaadaev, they saw Russia as fully European. Yet if the Slavophiles did not consider Asia a model to be emulated, there were some Russians who did. Influenced by Friedrich von Schlegel, whom he had met in Vienna, Sergei Uvarov had already advocated studying the thought of ancient India in 1810. In his “Project for an Asian Academy” that year, he argued that returning to the asiant wisdom of the East would be the best way for his compatriots to avoid succumbing to the West’s odious revolutionary beliefs: “Here we can find the knowledge most capable of destroying modern philosophies.” According to Uvarov’s conservative logic, Exhausted by the sanguinary excesses committed in the name of the human spirit, we yearn for one of those shocks that might renew it. We are called upon to preserve the enormous debris [of European civilisation], to rebuild it, and not construct some new edifice.35 A quarter of a century later, a Russian diplomat posted to Constantinople went much further.36 Like a number of his colleagues at the Foreign Ministry, Vladimir Titov had also been active in St Petersburg’s literary life. Having been a member of Prince Vladimir Odoevskii’s Liubomudry (society of Wisdom-Lovers) in the 1820s, he wrote the prince a remarkable letter upon his arrival in the Ottoman capital in 1836. “Looking back at Italy and Germany, I became much more of a Turk and an Asian,” Titov announced. He went on to suggest that “in its decadence, Asia may teach us more than in the days of its splendour and glory,” adding, “We must orientalise (ovostochit’sia) ourselves.” The diplomat explained that the East had three advantages over the West: its strong religious convictions, its paternal government, and kaif

34 Andrzej Walicki, The Slavophile Controversy, trans. Hilda Andrews-Rusiecka (Notre Dame: Notre Dame University Press, 1989), 445–455. 35 S. S. Uvarov, “Projet d’une académie asiatique,” in Etudes de philosophie et de critique (St. Petersburg: Académie impériale des sciences, 1843), 11, 22–23. See also Cynthia Whittaker, “The Impact of the Oriental Renaissance in Russia: The Case of Sergeij Uvarov,” Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas 26:4 (1978), 503–524. 36 Olga Maiorova, “Intelligentsia Views of Asia in the Nineteenth Century”, paper presented at the Annual Meeting of the American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, Philadelphia, 2008. I am grateful to Prof. Maiorova for sharing her paper with me.

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(sensual pleasures).37 These were all impossible for Europeans to achieve because of their feudal traditions and the Catholic Church. Fortunately, “in Russia we did not suffer from these two ailments, nor their… consequences; nevertheless, we were afflicted by another condition – imitating Europeans…However,” he proclaimed, “the time has come for us gradually to go back to our own ways and those of the East.”38 Even if his politics were very different from those of Uvarov and Titov, the radical émigré Aleksandr Herzen also saw salvation in the East. At first, he had largely shared Belinskii’s negative view of Asia as the epitome of stagnation and tyranny, a metaphor for the harsh autocracy of Nicholas I.39 However, shortly after his emigration to Western Europe, Herzen witnessed the revolutions of 1848 first-hand, and was deeply disillusioned by their failure to sweep away the old order. There was also an aesthetic distaste for the philistinism of the West’s bourgeois culture, which grated on the émigré’s aristocratic sensibilities. Herzen now broke with the Westernisers and began to look eastward, to Russia’s peasant commune, as his ideal society. As his political ideals evolved, Asia came to acquire both a negative and a positive meaning. If before Herzen’s exile, Russia’s autocracy had been synonymous with Oriental despotism, he now detected similarities between Western Europe and East Asia. Chaadaev and Belinskii had always evoked immobile China as Europe’s antithesis. But in the wake of the events of 1848, Herzen began to see the latter’s bourgeois philistinism and passivity as the Occidental incarnation of kitaishchina.40 Turning Westernist thinking on its head, he invoked a favourite metaphor for the crippling conformity of Confucianism to deride Peter the Great’s reforms: “The Chinese shoes of German make, which Russia has been forced to wear for a hundred 37 Not to be confused with the contemporary Russian colloquialism meaning “to get high”. 38 P. N. Sakulin, Iz istorii russkogo idealizma: Kniaz’ V. F. Odoevskii, myslitel’, pisatel’ (Moscow: Izd-vo M. i S. Sabashnikovykh, 1913), 336. 39 Olga Maiorova, “A Revolutionary and the Empire: Alexander Herzen and Russian Discourse on Asia,” in Between Russia & Asia: The Origins, Theories and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism, edited by Mark Bassin, Sergey Glebov and Marlene Laruelle (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015), 13–26; T. V. Evteeva, “‘Rossiia’ i ‘Zapad’ v kontsepstii A. I. Gertsena,” (Unpublished Candidate’s Dissertation: Tambovskii gos. Universitet, 2011). 40 Susanna Soojong Lim, “Chinese Europe: Aleksandr Herzen and the Russian Image of China,” Intertexts 10 (2006), 56–59.

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and fifty years, have caused many painful corns.” But the damage was not permanent, “since whenever [Russia] has had a chance of stretching out its limbs it has exuded a fresh, young energy.”41 This “fresh, young energy” came from another Orient: not the stagnant Far East but its nomadic interior, the Turanian Asia of the Scythians and the Mongols. They provided the élan vital that kept Russia young. Like Karamzin, Herzen saw the centuries of rule by the latter as something of a salvation. “Without them,” he speculated, perhaps instead of paying a tribute to the Golden Horde, we might somehow have been saved à la Jean Sobieski from the Viennese Horde; Catholicism and Roman law would likely have tied us to the [European] ship, which is sinking now, and drag everything along with it into the abyss.42 Herzen took no offence when Europeans derided his compatriots as Asian. Indeed, he revelled in such opprobrium: “We are happy to have Finnic and Mongol blood in our veins; this joins us to those pariah races, which the humanitarian democracy of Europe cannot evoke without disdain and insult. Nor can we complain about our Turanian element.”43 Anticipating the poet Aleksandr Blok, he once declared: “Being a veritable Scythian, I delight in seeing the old world meet its doom.”44 However, this did not mean that his country was entirely of the East: “Seen from Europe, Russia seems Asian, whereas Asians consider it European; and this dualism perfectly suits its character and destiny, which consists, among others, of becoming the great caravanserai between Europe and Asia.”45 Some Russian academics also began to look at their Asian roots. In her Notes about Russian History, Catherine had already written about the Scythians, among the first peoples to have lived on the country’s territory. Her description was so positive that one literary scholar suggested that the

41 In Lim, “Chinese Europe,” 58. 42 Italics in the original. A. I. Gertsena, Sobranie sochinenii, 30 vols. (Moscow_Izd-vo

Akademii nauk SSSR, 1954–1965), vol. 14, 57. 43 Gertsen, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 20, 25. 44 Gertsen, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 13, 175. 45 Gertsen, Sobranie sochinenii, vol. 7, 27.

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empress might have been the first to claim the nomadic nation’s ancestry for her adoptive compatriots.46 From the start, one of the driving forces of the discipline of Orientology had been studying the eastern element of Russian history. At first, the scholars who pursued such interests were German—like Catherine herself. However, by the nineteenth century’s second half, native Russian orientologists increasingly also became intrigued by the question. They included prominent men such as Vasilii Grigor’ev, Nikolai Veselovskii and Baron Roman Rosen.47 Meanwhile, the spectacular finds at Scythian burial mounds along the empire’s southern periphery of remarkably intricate gold artefacts that blended entirely alien Oriental styles with Classical Greek motifs further encouraged many to think about their Inner Asian ancestry, whether real or imagined.48 One influential figure who saw significant element of the East in his nation’s heritage was Vladimir Stasov. Historian, archaeologist, librarian, art critic, and the tireless champion of the national school of Russian music, Stasov scandalised many of his compatriots when he suggested in a series of articles in 1868 that the byliny (medieval epics) were nothing more than imitations of tales that had originated in India and Persia, and “emasculated” ones at that. “Our bogatyrs [knights] merely convey various myths, legends and fairy tales of the ancient East,” he concluded.49 Stasov dutifully acknowledged that he had adopted the basic thesis about the Oriental foundations of European epics from such scholars as the German Sanskritist Theodor Benfey. However, what distinguished the byliny was that they were much closer to their Oriental originals than the “Iliad,” “Nibelungenlied,” or even the Finnish “Kalevala.” In other works, most notably his book Russian Folk Ornament of 1872, Stasov likewise stressed the similarities between Russian and Asian

46 Andrei Zorin, Kormia dvuglavnogo orla (Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2001), 110n1. 47 A. I. Kononov, Istoriia izucheniia tiurkskikh iazykov v Rossii (Leningrad: Nauka, 1972), 39n82. 48 I. Tolstoi and N. Kondakov, Russkie drevnosti v pamiatnikakh iskusstva (St Petersburg: A. Benke, 1889), vol. 2; Véronique Schiltz, La redécouverte de l’or des Scythes (Paris: Gallimard, 1991), 56–99. 49 V. V. Stasov, “Proiskhozhdenie russkikh bylin,” Vestnik Evropy 3:2 (1868), 597.

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culture.50 Despite the storm of controversy it initially aroused, his “On the Origins of Russian Byliny” earned the author the Imperial Academy of Sciences’ prestigious Demidov prize and eventually gained many adherents, as did his related ideas.51 One of his friends, the composer Aleksandr Borodin (possibly inspired by his Tatar forefathers), stressed Russia’s East–West duality in his operatic interpretation of the medieval Igor Tale.52 Meanwhile, the prominent French architectural historian Eugène Viollet-le-Duc based his book about Russian art on the notion, as he put it, that “Russia has been one of the laboratories where the arts, having come from throughout all of Asia, joined to create an intermediary form between the Oriental and Occidental worlds.”53 Stasov was a man of relatively progressive views. Although fervently patriotic, his approach to Russia’s cultural past tended to be scholarly. But there were others who looked to the East with more partisan motives. Just as Russian liberals saw western Europe’s constitutional democracies as their political ideal, some conservatives advocated greater kinship with Asian autocracy. One of the most unique proponents of the latter was the mystical reactionary Konstantin Leont’ev.54 As with Titov some three decades earlier, diplomatic service in the Ottoman Empire had awoken a passion for the Orient in Leont’ev. The attraction was mostly aesthetic at first. As he explained in a letter to a friend: “Only the life of Constantinople… only this multifaceted existence could satisfy my intolerably refined tastes.”55 A spiritual crisis in the early 1870s led to a profound change of heart. Resigning from the foreign ministry, Leont’ev went on a lengthy retreat in the Orthodox monastic 50 V. V. Stasov, Sobranie sochinenii, 3 vols. (St. Petersburg: Tipografiia M. M. Stasiulevicha, 1894), vol. 1, 197–212. See also Stasov, Slavianskii i vostochnyi ornament po rukopisiam drevnego i novogo vremeni (St. Petersburg: Kartograficheskoe zavedenie A. A. Il’ina, 1887). 51 Vladimir Karenin, Vladimir Stasov: Ocherk ego zhizni i deiatel’nosti (Leningrad: Mysl’,

1927), 315–318. One notable exception was Alfred Rambaud, La Russie épique: Étude sur les chansons héroïques de la Russie (Paris: Maisonneuve, 1876), 163–193. 52 Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, Russian Orientalism, 204–210. 53 E. Viollet-le-Duc, L’art russe: Ses origines, ses ciments constitutifs, son apogée, son

avenir (Paris: A. Morel, 1877), 58. 54 Nicolas Berdiaev, Constantin Leontiev, trans. Hélène Iswolski (Paris: Berg International, 1993); Savelli, “L’asiatisme,” 23–51; Paul Robinson, Russian Conservatism (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press, 2019), 85–88. 55 Italics in the original. In Berdiaev, Constantin Leontiev, 49.

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republic of Mt Athos. Eventually returning to Russia, he lived mostly on his estate until the final years of his life when he was tonsured as Brother Kliment in the venerable Optina Pustyn Monastery. In an age when many Russians subscribed to Pan-Slavism, a doctrine that advocated uniting all of eastern Europe’s Slavs under the tsar’s sceptre, he advocated a different course. For one thing, his nation had little in common with many of its Slavic cousins, who had already been deeply contaminated by Europe’s poisonous liberalism: Russia has long ago ceased to be a purely Slavic power…The very character of the Russian people has very strong and important traits, which are more similar to those of Turks, Tatars and other Asian nations, or perhaps no one at all, than the southern and western Slavs. We are more indolent, fatalistic, much more submissive to our ruler, more dissolute, good-natured, insanely brave, unstable, and so much more inclined to religious mysticism than the Serbs, Bulgarians, Czechs and Croats.56 On another occasion, Leont’ev referred to himself and his compatriots as “we mysterious Slavic-Turanians.”57 Leont’ev’s credo was straightforward: “More oriental mysticism and less European enlightened reason.”58 Thus, rather than joining with its purported Slavic brethren, Russia’s true destiny lay in restoring the Byzantine ideal of an empire that combined East and West, although its firmly autocratic political order would be distinctly more Oriental. After all, Leont’ev cautioned, “no Polish rising, no Pugachev revolt can bring more harm to Russia than a most orderly and legal democratic constitution.”59 With its capital in Tsargrad (Constantinople) rather than St. Petersburg, the greater Russia Leont’ev envisioned “would be more cultured, that is, more true to itself; it would be less rational and less utilitarian, that is, less revolutionary.”60 This new realm might well incorporate the other Slavs, but it would also join with it many Asian peoples, including Turks, Indians and Tibetans, thereby preserving its fundamentally eastern character. But even now, Leont’ev averred, with both European and Asian elements, his country lay in neither continent, but was a different entity 56 Leont’ev, Vostok, Rossiia i Slavianstvo (Moscow: Eksmo, 2007), 606–607. 57 Leont’ev, Vostok, 385. 58 Leont’ev, Vostok, 811. 59 Leont’ev, Vostok, 147. 60 Leont’ev, Vostok, 636.

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altogether: “Russia is not just a state; Russia taken together with all of its Asian possessions is – an entire world.”61 For many Russians, the turn of the twentieth century was a time of even greater unease about their relationship with the West. Outwardly, especially in the great cities, it seemed that the empire was becoming increasingly more European. Railways, factories, telegraphs and masscirculation newspapers all heralded the coming of a new age. This occidentalisation was troubling, not just in the way it challenged the old order, but also because it seemed to emphasise Russia’s inherent inferiority with respect to its more modern, industrialised rivals, like Great Britain and Germany. Yet if Russia looked to the West from a position of relative weakness, it could still face the East with confidence and strength. The novelist Fedor Dostoevskii famously proclaimed, “In Europe we were parasites and slaves, but in Asia we are masters.”62 As the nineteenth century drew to a close, Russia’s new tsar, Nicholas II, became increasingly preoccupied with his empire’s frontier on the Pacific. In the early 1890s, his father, Alexander III, had already decreed that a railway be built across Siberia to link St Petersburg with his distant Far Eastern territories. By the decade’s end, Nicholas’ diplomats had negotiated a secret treaty of alliance with China, in addition to a leasehold and extensive economic privileges in Manchuria. As the twentieth century dawned, it appeared to many Russians that the empire’s destiny lay in the Orient. Echoing Leont’ev, some influential political writers, the vostochniki (Asianists), even began to argue that Russia was fundamentally eastern rather than western in character. One of the more prominent advocates of Asianism was Prince Esper Ukhtomskii, a newspaper publisher and poet. Close to Nicholas II—the prince had accompanied him on his Oriental grand tour when he was still the tsarevich—Ukhtomskii exercised considerable influence on the emperor during the early years of his reign. On the pages of his daily, Ukhtomskii tirelessly advocated the Asianist cause.63

61 Leont’ev, Vostok, 603. 62 F. M. Dostoevskii, Polnoe sobranie sochinenii, 30 vols. (Leningrad: Nauka, 1984),

vol. 27, 36–37. 63 For more details about Prince Ukhtomskii, see the relevant chapter in my Toward the Rising Sun: Russian Ideologies of Empire and the Path to War with Japan (DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press 2001), 42–60.

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Even more than Leont’ev, the prince was convinced about Russia’s kinship with Asia. “The West,” he wrote, “is but dimly reflected in our intellectual life. The depths below the surface have their being in an atmosphere of deeply Oriental views and beliefs.”64 Like Asians, Russians relied more on faith than on reason. Ukhtomskii explained: “We feel our spiritual and political isolation from the Romano-Germanic countries overburdened by a too-exacting civilization. For us… [as] for Asia, the basis of life is religious belief.”65 At the same time, both Russians and Asians were repelled by materialism. But above all, the two were bound by a yearning for the ruler’s firm, paternal hand, “The East believes no less than we do… [in] the most precious of our national traditions – autocracy. Without it, Asia would be incapable of sincere liking for Russia and of painless identification with her.”66 As an element of tsarist foreign policy, Asianism did not survive defeat during the war with Japan in 1905. But similar ideas about Russia’s Oriental nature flourished among the poets of the Silver Age, culminating with the Scythians, a literary movement in the Revolution’s immediate aftermath.67 To these versifiers, the Scythians came to represent the untamed vitality of their nation’s soul, and verses lauding their putative ancestors proliferated. Among the first was Balmont, who praised the nomads’ free spirit and martial prowess in “The Scythians” (1899): We blessed hordes of freely roaming Scythians, Prize freedom above all else. Flying from Olvia’s castle with its griffin statues, Hidden from the foe, we overtake him everywhere.68

According to the late University of Padua Slavist, Ettore Lo Gatto, Silver Age authors had adopted an eastern identity to flout the West: “In 64 Ookhtomsky, Travels in the East of Nicholas II , vol. II, 65 Ookhtomsky, Travels in the East of Nicholas II , vol. II, 66 Ookhtomsky, Travels in the East of Nicholas II , vol. II, 67 The most detailed study in English is Stefani Hope

287. 32. 446.

Hoffman, “Scythianism: A Cultural Vision in Revolutionary Russia” (Unpublished PhD dissertation: Columbia University, 1957). See also N. V. Kuzina, “Ideologiia skifstva v russkoi obshchestvennoi mysli i literatury” in Gosudarstvenno-patrioticheskaia ideologiia i problemy ee formirovaniia (Smolensk: Izdatel’stvo Voennoi akademii, 1997), 95–97. 68 K. D. Balmont, Stikhotvoreniia (Leningrad: Sovetskii pisatel’, 1969), 150.

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Russian poetry, the terms Mongolian, Scythian and Hun are ideological concepts with Slavophile connotations, and they were similarly brandished to proclaim Russia’s distinct, so to speak Eurasian, character to the western world...”69 No one expressed this better than Blok in his defiant verse, also titled “The Scythians.” Blok wrote the poem in early 1918 as a warning to the West not to interfere in the Bolsheviks’ negotiations for a separate peace with the Central Powers at Brest-Litovsk: You have your millions. We are hordes, and hordes, and hordes. Just try it! Take us on! Yes, we are Scythians! Yes, we’re Asians too! With slanting eyes bespeaking greed!70

One White Army general endeavoured to put Asianist ideas into practice when in February 1921 he briefly seized power in Urga (now Ulan Bator).71 Without a drop of Turanian blood in his veins, the fair-haired Baltic German noble, Baron Roman von Ungern-Sternberg, hoped to use the Mongolian capital as a base to recreate the vast Chinggisid empire that had ruled over much of Eurasia six centuries earlier. He duly had himself proclaimed khan by the Jibzundamba Khutuktu, Mongolia’s spiritual and secular leader, whom he had just freed from Chinese captivity. Meanwhile, to express the fusion of East and West in his persona, the baron wore a long golden orange Mongolian deel (silk robe), topped by tsarist general’s epaulettes, and a George’s Cross proudly pinned to his chest. Ungern’s reign was short-lived. While he managed to repair some of Urga’s infrastructure, his troops also carried out a murderous pogrom. Ever restless, in May Ungern marched his Asiatic Division out of the city back into Siberia to take on the Reds. Vastly outnumbered, he was captured three months later and sent to Novonikolaevsk (now Novosibirsk) to be tried and shot by a Bolshevik revolutionary tribunal.

69 Ettore Lo Gatto, “Panmongolismo di V. Solovëv, i venienti unni di V. Brjusov e Gli Sciti di A. Blok” in For Roman Jakobson, edited by Morris Halle, et al. (The Hague: Mouton & Co., 1956), 300. 70 Aleksandr Blok, Stikhotvoreniia i poemy (Moscow: Khudozhestvennaia literatura 1968), 231. 71 Willard Sunderland, The Baron’s Cloak: A History of the Russian Empire in War and Revolution (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 2014); S. L. Kuzmin, Istoriia barona Ungerna: opyt rekonstruktsii (Moscow: Tov. Nauchnykh izdanii KMK, 2011).

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Ungern never elaborated his Asianist credo on paper. As he told his captors, he did not feel himself up to the task.72 Nevertheless, he expressed them with remarkable frankness under interrogation. Repeating a familiar trope, the baron condemned the wickedness of the West “under the influence of socialist and anarchist teaching.”73 Debauched by science and revolution, Europe was doomed, he believed. Salvation could only come from Asia: “The light comes from the East,74 where the West has not yet corrupted everyone, where the holy and unchanging order still guards the sources of good and honour, sent to humankind from Heaven itself.”75 Ungern had not entirely given up on his own country: Russia might yet be saved by the Mongol Middle Kingdom. But only if the population allowed it to restore the monarchy. “If not,” he added, “[Russia] will have to be conquered.”76 It is unlikely that Ungern had read any verse of the Silver Age poets while fighting under Ataman Semenov in Eastern Siberia before his Mongolian adventure, but he did share their fascination with the nomadic world. Rather than serving with the guards or even the cavalry, as befitted member of his class, the baron had joined the Cossacks, a group with deep roots in the Inner Asian steppe. Meanwhile, his political ideal was to unite all nomads, “related to us by blood,”77 into a “middle kingdom” under Manchu leadership to battle communism. While he described such a realm as a federation, there was nothing democratic about it. Much like Leont’ev and Ukhtomskii, Ungern was a convinced reactionary who believed in the monarch’s despotic power. “I am an advocate of discipline by the rod (Frederick the Great, Paul I, Nicholas I),” he explained to his captors. By the same token, only the upper class was to

72 S. L. Kuzmin, ed., Baron Ungern v dokumentakh i memuarakh (Moscow: Tov. Nauchnykh izdanii KMK, 2004), 201. 73 Kuzmin, Baron Ungern, 388. 74 Perhaps recalling Vladimir Solov’ev’s poem of 1890, “Ex Oriente Lux,” in idem„

Chteniia o Bogochelovechestve; Stati; Stikhotovreniia i poema; Iz trekh razgovorov (St. Petersburg: Khudozhestvennaia literatura,1994), p. 385. 75 Kuzmin, Baron Ungern, 388. 76 Kuzmin, Istoriia barona, 391. 77 Kuzmin, Baron Ungern, 162.

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have any say in politics, while “workers must work.”78 As for the bourgeoisie, “it is only capable of sucking at the government’s teat…The tsar must rely only on the aristocracy and the peasantry.”79 ∗ ∗ ∗ Asianism lost its appeal among St Petersburg’s policy-makers after the catastrophic war with Japan, and the Scythians succumbed to tighter Bolshevik controls on literature in the early 1920s. However, there was something in the way Lenin’s party looked to the East to rouse the world’s revolutionary masses in the wake of the failed communist rebellions elsewhere in Europe right after the end of the Great War.80 And the Soviets never lost their hostility for the Western bourgeoisie’s capitalist materialism. But the Eurasianists revived many of their beliefs, even if in a slightly different key. Thus, instead of stressing Russia’s Oriental character, they argued that their country was a world unto itself. For the Eurasianists, Russia was neither European nor Asian, but instead it combined elements of both. Nevertheless, many of their ideology’s facets, such as its hostility to materialism, its autocratic politics and its emphasis on spirituality, much more explicitly rejected the West. The small circle of émigré intellectuals who gathered in Prague in the 1920s did not begin with a blank slate.

78 Kuzmin, Baron Ungern, 202. 79 Kuzmin, Baron Ungern, 218. 80 For a well written account, see Peter Hopkirk, Setting the East Ablaze: Lenin’s

Dream of an Empire in Asia (New York: W. W. Norton, 1985).

CHAPTER 4

Greater Eurasia as a Conservative Initiative Glenn Diesen

Introduction Conservatism is a political philosophy about managing change. Conservatism stipulates that the modern must be developed on the foundation of the tradition as societies thrive when they are positioned between continuity and change. Russian conservatism has always struggled with the absence of gradual and organic change—its distinctive path to modernity that builds on its unique character. Subsequently, Russian history is largely defined by periods of stagnation followed by disruptive periods of disruptive change to catch up with the west. Russia’s Eurasian schism has continuously shaped its conservatism as tradition and spirituality were linked to Russia’s eastern identity, while modernity was associated with the European identity. The invasion by the Mongols in the thirteenth century decoupled Russia from the main arteries of international trade. The low economic connectivity and development in the eastern regions contributed to preserving traditional culture and spirituality, while the need to modernise has been equated to make Russia more European.

G. Diesen (B) University of South-Eastern Norway, Borre, Norway e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Diesen and A. Lukin (eds.), The Return of Eurasia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2179-6_4

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The dichotomy between the traditional east and the modern west culminated in the Enlightenment manifesting itself as a geographical phenomenon. Peter the Great’s modernisation of Russia included a Cultural Revolution to eradicate the Muscovite past and remake Russia as a European nation. A Eurasian political economy began to take shape towards the end of the nineteenth century that conceptualised Russia as a continental nation. The Bolshevik Revolution eventually disrupted the organic path to development in the form of a Eurasian political economy. However, following the revolution, Russian conservative emigres in the 1920s developed the intellectual framework of a Eurasian strand of conservatism. Following the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Russian Federation returned to neo-Petrine policies with the aspiration of creating a Greater Europe. Although, Russia’s exclusion from post-Cold War Europe and the crisis in liberalism revived the concept of Eurasian conservatism. The rise of Asia, which ends 500 years of Western dominance, contributes to mitigating the Eurasian schism as Russia no longer needs to look to Europe for modernity. For the first time in Russian history, an organic path to development is possible in the format of Greater Eurasia.

The Eurasian Schism in Russian Conservatism Conservatism was born out of the Enlightenment as a movement for restoring cultural autonomy and began taking the shape of a political ideology after the French Revolution. The effort to develop a modern society based on human reason generated a counter-reaction as human beings remain influenced by primordial instincts, such as the need for belonging to and reproducing social groups as a source of meaning and security. The conservative effort to manage change entails facilitating organic development as it “unites the future with the past”.1 Konstantin Pobedonostsev compared societal development to the biology of a flower: A flower develops from a bud, and the makeup of the bud fully defines its development. If we want to give the latter a different character, which

1 Berdyaev, N., 1923. Filosofiya neravenstva: Pisma k nedrugam po sotsialnoi filosofii [Philosophy of Inequality: Letters to the Enemies of Social Philosophy]. Obelisk, Berlin, p. 23.

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contradicts the constitution of the bud—then we will achieve nothing but death.2 Nikolai Berdyaev, similarly argued: “the conservative principle is not by itself opposed to development, it merely demands that development be organic, that the future does not destroy the past but continue to develop it”.3 A central feature of philosophy in the nineteenth century was therefore the need to navigate between tradition and modernity; the instinctive and the rational; the collective and the individual; the distinctive and the universal; the spiritual and the material; nature and industrial society; the past and the future. The Eurasian schism in Russia added another component to the challenge of conservatives. The Enlightenment manifested itself geographically as a modern European identity versus a traditional and spiritual Eastern identity. The great plight for Russian conservatives has been the difficulty to manage change by positioning society between continuity and change. Russia did not sufficiently develop its own path to development as the modern was equated to reinventing Russia as a more European state. Nikolay Danilevsky cautioned against the notion of a single universal path towards modernity: “The principles of civilisation for one culturalhistorical type are not transferable to the peoples of another type”.4 The assumption of universalism conflated modernisation with Westernisation, yet “The West has its own errors, ailments, weakness, and dangers… Out salvation does not lie in Westernism. We have our own path and our own tasks”.5 Societies as a social group thrive when they are positioned between continuity and change. In contrast, revolutionary change entails uprooting the past in the belief it contaminates the present and obstruct

2 Gusev, V., 2001. Russian Conservatism: Main Directions and Stages of Development [Russkii Konservatizm: Osnovnye Napravleniya i Etapy Razvitiya]. Tverskoi Gosudarstvennii Universitet, Tver, p. 55. 3 Berdyaev, N., 1923. Filosofiya neravenstva: Pisma k nedrugam po sotsialnoi filosofii

[Philosophy of Inequality: Letters to the Enemies of Social Philosophy]. Obelisk, Berlin, p. 100. 4 Danilevsky, N., 2013. Russia and Europe: The Slavic World’s Political and Cultural Relations with the Germanic-Roman West. Slavica Publishers, Bloomington, p. 76. 5 Ilyin, I., 1956. Our Tasks: Articles 1948–1954 [Nashi Zadachi: Statii 1948–1954], vol. 1, Izdatelstvo Obshche-Voennogo Soyuza, Paris, pp. 317–318.

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modernisation. Russian history has therefore been defined by periods of stagnation, followed by disruptive efforts and revolutionary change to catch up with the West. Russian conservatives have through history denounced the obsession with the West, yet failed to establish a gradual and organic path to development. Russia’s Eurasian schism originated with the fragmentation of Kievan Rus and the invasion of the Mongols in the thirteenth century. Russia lost its access to maritime transportation corridors as the arteries of international trade, while the Mongol Yoke made Russia disappear from the European political map for the next 250 years.6 After defeating the Mongols, the conquest of absorption of Tatar kingdoms along the Volga River from the mid-sixteenth century cemented the Eurasian character of Russia. Peter the Great successfully returned Russia to Europe as a modern maritime power. Victory in the Great Northern War (1700–1721) against Sweden endowed Russia with a leading position in the Baltic Sea and great power status.7 From a conservative perspective, the socio-economic disruptions from rapid modernisation demand strengthening the tradition and spiritual as the foundation of society. Peter the Great did the opposite by launching a cultural revolution to liberate Russians from their Muscovite past and become more European. Revolutionary change entails uprooting the tradition to give way to the modern, which became especially destructive as the rationality and modernity of Europe were contrasted with Russian customs and culture that were deemed to be ignorant, backwards and barbaric.8 Conflating the Enlightenment with the Europeanisation of Russia represented a paradox as Cultural Revolution was not based on scientific principles: “The Russian dress, food, and beards did not interfere with the founding of schools. Two states may stand on the same level of civil enlightenment although their customs differ”.9 6 Hosking, G.A., 2001. Russia and the Russians: A History. Harvard University Press, Cambridge. 7 Hamburg, G.M., 2016. Russia’s Path Toward Enlightenment: Faith, Politics, and Reason, 1500–1801. Yale University Press, New Haven. 8 Zhivov, V., 2009. Language and Culture in Eighteenth Century Russia. Academic Studies Press, Boston, p. 49. 9 Karamzin, N.M., 2005. Karamzin’s Memoir on Ancient and Modern Russia: A Translation and Analysis. University of Michigan Press, Michigan, p. 122.

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The Cultural Revolution lacked “independent thought” by borrowing a foreign culture, which only disconnected the identity of the aristocracy from the people.10 The cosmopolitan elites embraced modernity and European identity, while the peasantry remained committed to an identity closely linked to the land, distinctive Russian culture and traditions.11 The communes were largely insulated from the Cultural Revolution, which made them an important institution for conservatives to preserve a link with the past.12 The Slavophiles emerged as a conservative movement in the 1830s and 1840s, which repudiated both the Cultural Revolution of Peter the Great and the intrusive influence of the French Revolution.13 Slavophiles believed that the divisions in society caused by Petrine reforms could be mitigated by strengthening a collective identity based on the Orthodox Church, the monarchy, the traditional communities of the peasantry and the cultural distinctiveness of Russia.14 While remaining deeply critical of the intrusive influence of European culture and traditions, the Slavophiles built heavily on the conservative ideas of Johann Gottfried Herder and Friedrich von Schelling.15 Conservatives became aware of contradictions and divisiveness of the Slavophiles. The Slavophiles advocated organic development as the source of conservatism, yet undoing Peter the Great’s reforms was a revolutionary act as it entailed uprooting more than a century of Russian history. Berdyaev believed the Westernisers were misguided, although he believed

10 Berdyaev, N., 1947. The Russian Idea. Geoffrey Bles Ltd., London, p. 17. 11 Lieven, D., 1998. Russian, Imperial and Soviet Identities, Transactions of the Royal

Historical Society, vol. 8, pp. 253–269, p. 258. 12 Khomyakov, A., 1895. Russia and the English Church During the Last Fifty Years. Rivington, London. 13 Riasanovsky, N.V., 1956. Russia and the West in the Teachings of the Slavophiles: A Study of Romantic Ideology. Harvard University Press, Cambridge, p. 79. 14 Lieven, D., 1998. Russian, imperial and Soviet identities, Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, vol. 8, pp. 253–269, p. 258. 15 Szvák, G., 2011. ‘The Golden Age of Russian Historical Writing: The Nineteenth Century. In Macintyre, S., Maiguashca, J. and Pok, A. (eds.), The Oxford History of Historical Writing—Volume 4: 1800–1945. Oxford University Press, Oxford, pp. 303–325, p. 308.

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it was a mistake and divisive to denounce them as treasonous as “the Westernizers were just as much Russians as the Slavophils; they loved Russia and were passionately desirous of its highest good”.16 In the 1840s, Nikolai Gogol had cautioned against the polarisation between the Slavophiles and Westernisers, and made the case for a compromise that would give Russia what it needed most of all, a shared national narrative and unity.17 The next generation of conservatives, such as Fyodor Dostoyevsky and Apollon Grigoryev, also distanced themselves from the Slavophiles by recognising that Peter the Great’s Russia was also part of the enduring historical experience and national narrative. Dostoyevsky recognised the struggle between Slavophiles and Westernisers was misguided as “Our era is completely indifferent to their domestic quarrels. We are talking about the reconciliation of civilisation with the national principle”.18 It was the harmonisation of the Western and Eastern identity of Russia that would unite the country and ensure a prominent role in the world: “The inconsistency and complexity of the Russian soul may be due to the fact that in Russia two streams of world history—East and West— jostle and influence one another. The Russian people is not purely European and it is not purely Asiatic. Russia is a complete section of the world—a colossal EastWest. It unites two worlds, and within the Russian soul, two principles are always engaged in strife—the Eastern and the Western”.19

Western Rejection of Russia’s Europeaness After casting the Mongol Yoke, Russia insisted on its European character as Moscow had functioned as a Third Rome following the fall of Constantinople (Neumann and Pouliot).20 However, Russia did not 16 Berdyaev, N., 1947. The Russian Idea. Geoffrey Bles Ltd., London, p. 56. 17 Gogol, N.V., 2009. Selected Passages from Correspondence with Friends. Vanderbilt

University Press, Tennessee. 18 Steiner, L., 2011. For Humanity’s Sake: The Bildungsroman in Russian Culture. University of Toronto Press, Toronto, p. 136. 19 Berdyaev, N., 1947. The Russian Idea. Geoffrey Bles Ltd., London, p. 1. 20 Neumann, I.B. and Pouliot, V., 2011. Untimely Russia: Hysteresis in Russian-

Western Relations over the Past Millennium, Security Studies, vol. 20, no. 1, pp. 105–137, p. 135.

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obtain the recognition as a bulwark of a shared European civilisation. Russia’s return to Europe as a maritime power was also detested and balanced. Advocating that the US should take over the historical responsibility of the British of containing Russia, Spykman argued that “since the time of Peter the Great, Russia has attempted to break through the encircling ring of border states and the reach the ocean. Geography and sea power have persistently thwarted her”.21 The British and French alliance with the Ottoman Empire in the Crimean War was largely motivated by the desire to push Russia back into Asia.22 Russia, who had aspired to eventually retake Constantinople from the Ottoman Empire, believed it would be a victory for the Christian European world and also further cement Russia’s status as a European maritime power. The betrayal by Britain and France resembled that of the Fourth Crusade, with the intended purpose of liberating Jerusalem from Muslim rule, which instead ended up targeting and bringing permanent damage to Constantinople—the greatest Christian city in the world. Instead of an artificial return to Europe, Dostoyevsky advocated a wider Eurasian character for Russia had to be embraced that incorporated both its European and Asian character: Russians are as much Asiatics as Europeans. The mistake of our policy for the past two centuries has been to make the people of Europe believe that we are true Europeans. We have served Europe too well, we have taken too great a part in her domestic quarrels. As the first cry for help, we have sent our armies, and our poor soldiers have died for causes that meant nothing to them, and have been immediately forgotten by those they had served. We have bowed ourselves like slaves before the Europeans and have only gained their hatred and contempt. It is time to turn away from ungrateful Europe.23 The Western depiction of Russians as an inferior and barbaric people due to their Asiatic history and ethnicity continued into the Cold War. US General Patton argued: 21 Spykman, N.J., 1942. America’s Strategy in World Politics: The United States and the

Balance of Power. Transaction Publishers, New Brunswick, p. 182. 22 Kipp, J.W. and Lincoln, W.B., 1979. Autocracy and Reform Bureaucratic Absolutism and Political Modernization in Nineteenth-Century Russia. Russian History, vol. 6, no. 1, pp. 1–21, p. 4. 23 Dostoyevsky, A., 2001. Fyodor Dostoyevsky: A Study. University Press of the Pacific Honolulu, Hawaii, p. 260.

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“The difficulty in understanding the Russian is that we do not take cognizance of the fact that he is not a European but an Asiatic and therefore thinks deviously. We can no more understand a Russian than a Chinaman or a Japanese and, from what I have seen of them, I have no particular desire to understand them except to ascertain how much lead or iron it takes to kill them”.24

Towards a Greater Eurasian Political Economy A Eurasian political economy began to take form after the humiliating defeat in the Crimean War. Railways emulated the nomadic character of the three former great Eurasian land powers—the Scythians, Huns and Mongols. The economically backward land-locked regions of Eurasia could again become competitive, especially if Russia would reach and control the maritime periphery of the Eurasian continent. By 1879, Russia had made railways a central feature of its expansion strategy into Central Asia, which revealed aspirations to reach the southern maritime periphery of the Eurasian continent.25 The development of the trans-Siberian Railroad in the 1890s similarly connected Russia’s territory along the Pacific Ocean with European Russia. Russia developed a broader conservative political economy by linking industrialisation to nation-building. Previous fears among Russian conservatives that industrialisation would undermine the customs and spirituality of traditional society resembled that of Thomas Jefferson’s aspirations to develop an agrarian democracy to avoid the moral decadence of manufacturing societies in Western Europe. In the US, Alexander Hamilton convinced Thomas Jefferson that industrialisation was necessary to assert political sovereignty as a conservative principle. Under Sergei Witte, the Russian Finance Minister in 1892, Russia similarly embraced the policies of Alexander Hamilton and Friedrich List, which linked nation-building to industrial policies. Consistent with the policies of Hamilton and List, Witte advocated for the Russian state to take on an entrepreneurial role. Witte cautioned that Russia had become dependent on the Europeans for exporting raw

24 Province, C.M., 1983. The Unknown Patton. Hippocrene Books, New York, p. 99. 25 Cheshire, H.T., 1934. The Expansion of Imperial Russia to the Indian Border, The

Slavonic and East European Review, pp. 85–97, p. 96.

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materials and importing manufactured goods: “the economic relations of Russia with western Europe are fully comparable to the relations of colonial countries with their metropolises”.26 The entrepreneurial role of the state entailed developing industrial power, constructing transportation infrastructure, and build financial instruments of power. Pobedonostsev believed that a state-led development that linked economic development with nation-building would ensure material modernisation without abandoning the distinctive characteristics of Russia.27 The Eurasian geography of Russia was central to its political economy as Witte sought to balance out Russia’s unfavourable financial position in Europe by establishing an Asian vector in the economy. The reliance on foreign capital was to be reduced by accruing profits from trading with Asia.28 The emergence of Russia’s Eurasian political economy inspired Halford Mackinder’s Heartland Theory, a geostrategic theory that juxtaposed maritime power and land power. Mackinder cautioned that Britain’s control over the maritime corridors of the world, as the source of global power, was undermined by Russia’s efforts to construct and control the land-corridors of the Eurasian landmass: Steam and the Suez Canal appeared to have increased the mobility of sea power relatively to land power. Railways acted chiefly as feeders to ocean-going commerce. But transcontinental railways are now transmuting the conditions of land power and nowhere can they have such effect as in the closed heartland of Euro-Asia.29

26 Witte, S., 1954. ‘Report of the Minister of Finance to His Majesty on the Necessity of Formulating and Thereafter Steadfastly Adhering to a Definite Program of a Commercial and Industrial Policy of the Empire. Extremely Secret’, In Von Laue, T.H., 1954. A Secret Memorandum of Sergei Witte on the Industrialization of Imperial Russia, The Journal of Modern History, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 60–74, p. 66. 27 Byrnes, R.F., 1968. Pobedonostsev: His Life and Thought. Indiana University Press, Bloomington. 28 Witte, S., 1954. ‘Report of the Minister of Finance to his Majesty on the Necessity of Formulating and Thereafter Steadfastly Adhering to a Definite Program of a Commercial and Industrial Policy of the Empire. Extremely Secret’, In Von Laue, T.H., 1954. A Secret Memorandum of Sergei Witte on the Industrialization of Imperial Russia, The Journal of Modern History, vol. 26, no. 1, pp. 60–74, p. 71. 29 Mackinder, H.J., 1904. The Geographical Pivot of History, The Geographical Journal, vol. 170, no. 4, pp. 421–444, p. 434.

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The concept of a Eurasian political economy also drew attention among the Europeans. Initially, Napoleon had conspired with Tsar Paul I to circumvent British control over the seas by sending a Cossack army to march through Central Asia and conquer British India. In 1846, Friedrich List, the German economic nationalist, proposed a German-British alliance to control Eurasia with a railroad from Ostend to Bombay. List argued that a German-British alliance was needed to assert control over for Eurasia to counteract the rise of the US as a naval power and future control over the Pacific.30 The British rejected the proposal, yet Germany revived the ideas of Friedrich List in the 1890s by commencing with the construction of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway. Before Hitler invaded the Soviet Union, General Karl Haushofer had advocated strongly for a transcontinental Eurasian partnership with Russia, China and other Asian states to circumvent the dominance of maritime powers. Haushofer argued that Germany had to join the East as “the geopolitical future will belong to the Russian-Chinese bloc”.31

Eurasian Conservatism from the 1920s The Bolshevik Revolution represented a devastating defeat to the conservative cause. Initially, the Bolshevik revolutionaries sought to dismantle all social institutions that upheld the capitalist system and competed against the communist party for loyalty. This entailed everything that was sacred to the conservatives—the nation, the family unit, the Orthodox Church and the monarchy. Yet, the loss of common social institutions ignites conservative impulses as “all conservatism begins with loss… If we never knew loss, we would never feel the need to conserve”.32 In the 1920s, Eurasian conservatism emerged as a response to the revolution. Conservative emigres, who had fled the revolution, recognised

30 List, F. 1846. Über den Wert und die Bedingungen einer Allianz zwischen Großbritannien und Deutschland (On the Value and Conditions of an Alliance between Great Britain and Germany), Werke 7, 267–298. Presented to the governments of England and Prussia, in Friedrich List’s Gesammelte Schriften. Ed Ludwig Haeuffer, Stuttgart and Tübingen, JG Cottascher Verlag, 1850, vol.2, 435–468. 31 Weigert, H.W., 1942. Haushofer and the Pacific, Foreign Affairs, vol. 20, no. 4 (July, 1942), pp. 732–742, p.741. 32 Sullivan, A., 2007. The Conservative Soul: Fundamentalism, Freedom, and the Future of the Right. Harper Perennial, New York, p. 9.

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that the Soviet experience had permanently changed Russia. Subsequently, Russian conservatism also had to change as Slavophile conservatism that romanticised the Byzantine era and pre-Petrine Russia had always been contradictory due to desire to turn back the clock, and now it had become outdated as well. Attempting to eliminate the Soviet experiment from the national consciousness would be a revolutionary effort to uproot the past, thus repeating the mistakes of the Slavophiles. The Soviet Union was conceptualised as a far-left Eurasian experiment, and when inherent contradictions of Marxism would eventually unravel the communist government, Russia would ideally transition to a conservative Eurasian state. Leading conservatives defined themselves as Eurasianist, such as Nikolai Trubetskoi, Pyotr Savitsky, Andrei Lieven, Georgy Florovsky, Lev Karsavin, Ivan Ilyin and other émigrés that had fled to Europe following the Bolshevik Revolution. The Eurasianists included Turkic, Ugro-Finnic and other non-Slavic elements into the collective historical consciousness and identity of Russia. The cradle of Russian civilisation was a Slavic origin in Europe, although Russia had since evolved and taken on distinctive Eurasian characteristics, which thus had to be incorporated by conservatives. Instead of denouncing the Mongol history as an aberration from Russian history, it was incorporated into the national narrative. Eurasian conservatives acknowledged that the Mongols had protected the Orthodox Church from the spiritual decadence of the Roman-Germanic world.33 Trubetskoi opined that Russia developed spiritual maturity and unity under the Mongol Yoke: “A miracle happened and the Mongolian state idea was transformed into the Russian Orthodox state idea”.34 The concept of a Eurasian political economy emerged among the Eurasian conservatives, which could offer an organic path to development and modernity. The Eurasianism of Trubetskoi and Savitsky in the 1920s builds heavily on the key ideas from Mackinder’s Heartland Theory, which addressed the geostrategic rivalry between maritime powers and Eurasian land powers. The curse for Russian conservatives had been to emulate the political economy of Western European maritime 33 Mirsky, D.S., 1927. The Eurasian Movement, The Slavonic Review, vol. 6, no. 17, pp. 311–320. 34 Badmaev, V., 2015. Eurasianism as a ‘Philosophy of Nation’, in Dutkiewicz, P. and Sakwa, R. (eds), Eurasian Integration: The View From Within. Routledge, London, pp. 31–45, p. 36.

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powers, which made Russia’s Eurasian geography a burden instead of a competitive advantage. Savitsky argued in Exodus to the East that the primacy of maritime transportation corridors had provided Britain with a natural competitive advantage in economic development and the potential for managing change.35 The British strategy of denying Russia the status as a maritime power had undermined its ability to develop. Land-locked regions become the perpetual economic backwater in a core-periphery global economy. The mistake by Russia, since Peter the Great, had for a Eurasian land power to compete on the terms of Britain as an Oceanic economy.36 Russia was thus destined to be at a disadvantage and always struggling to catch up. Instead, Russia should develop strategic autonomy as a selfsufficient continental economy, which would deprive the maritime power of its competitive advantage. Land powers could reverse the competitive advantage of oceanic powers by developing railways to revive the nomadic impulse of former Eurasian civilisations.37 From a conservative perspective, this would enable organic growth, as Russia’s Eurasian geography would be harmonised with its development path. The vast Eurasian expanse offered both a path to economic development and a source to replenish the tradition. Dostoyevsky argued already in 1881 that Eurasia offered meaning along the frontier: “With our push towards Asia, we will have a renewed upsurge of spirit and strength. Just as soon as we become more independent we’ll at once find out what we have to do, but living with Europe for two centuries we’ve become unaccustomed to any kind of activity and have become windbags and idlers”.38 Oceanic powers were considered inherently imperialistic as dominating the Eurasian continent from the periphery made it necessary to sow divisions among Eurasian land powers.39 In contrast, Eurasian 35 Savitsky, P., 1996. Exodus to the East, Charles Schlacks, Jr. Publisher, Bakersfield. 36 Savitsky, P., 1996. Exodus to the East, Charles Schlacks, Jr. Publisher, Bakersfield. 37 Savitsky, P., 1997. Geographical and Geopolitical Foundations of Eurasianism.

Continent EM, Agraf. 38 Dostoevsky, F., 1997. A Writer’s Diary—Volume 2: 1877–1881. Northwestern University Press, IL, p. 1373. 39 Savitsky, P., 1921. Kontinent-Okean: Rossiia i Mirovoi Rynok. Iskhod k Vostoku. Sofia.

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powers were required to cooperate and harmonise interests to enhance economic competitiveness. The next generation of Eurasianists, such as Lev Gumilev, argued that the nomadic ability to engage and find a common cause with distinctive civilisations had become a Russian feature following its history on the great steppe.40 While Peter the Great had made Russia a Slavic Empire by emulating Western maritime powers, the Eurasian path would convert Russia into a civilisation state by incorporating the non-Slavic peoples. The enduring relevance of Gumilev’s ideas is signified by Putin’s reference to him as “the great Eurasian of our time”.41

The Liberal Revolution of the 1990s The end of communism did not result in the transition to conservative Eurasianism. The Soviet Union collapsed with Marxism, a liberal revolution yet again caused immense socio-economic disruptions. Yeltsin pursued neo-Petrine policies by embracing liberal ideology and Russia’s return to Europe. The liberal policies failed to restore societal institutions ravaged under communism, while Russia was still excluded from Europe. Liberalism shared a weakness with communism—the assumption that development entails transcending the traditional and spiritual. Thus, Russian liberals resembled the Marxist’s belief and the Leninist idea of an ideological solution for “transcending classes” and “transcending the nation”.42 Solzhenitsyn cautioned in the 1970s against the artificial dualism between capitalism and communism as they both failed to uphold conservative principles: We have placed too much hope in political and social reforms, only to find that we were being deprived of our most precious possession: our spiritual life. In the East, it is destroyed by the dealings and machinations of the ruling party. In the West, commercial interests tend to suffocate

40 Gumilev, L., 1989. Drevniaia Rus’ i Velikaia Step. Ast, Moscow. 41 Podberezkin, A. and Pedberezkina, O., 2015. ‘Eurasianism as an Idea, Civilizational

Concept and Integration Challenge’, in Dutkiewicz, P. and Sakwa, R. (eds), Eurasian Integration: The View From Within, Routledge, London, pp. 46–60, p. 47. 42 Lukin, A., 2000. Political Culture of the Russian “Democrats”. Oxford University Press, Oxford, p. 194.

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it. This is the real crisis. The split in the world is less terrible than the similarity of the disease plaguing its main sections.43 Furthermore, the new Europe would eventually include the entire continent, except for Russia. The efforts to create a Europe without Russia inevitably became a Europe against Russia as the Cold War dividing lines were merely moved to the East. The West’s historical continuity of severing Russia from maritime corridors, since the Treaty of Stolbovo in 1617, continued as NATO incrementally expands its control over the Baltic Sea and the Black Sea under the guise of “European integration”. The EU, initially deemed by Moscow to represent the “good West”, relies primarily on geoeconomic instruments of power to peel away Russian neighbours. Yeltsin’s leaning-to-one side foreign policy at the expense of relations with states in the East had the opposite effect, as Russia’s excessive reliance on an asymmetrical partnership with the West deprived Moscow of bargaining power.44 Zbigniew Brzezinski, a foreign policy advisor to Jimmy Carter and Barack Obama, argued that the West should take advantage of Russia’s excessive reliance on the West. The West was “Russia’s only choice – even if tactical – thus provided the West with a strategic opportunity. It created the preconditions for the progressive geopolitical expansion of the Western community deeper and deeper into Eurasia”.45 Once Yeltsin’s neo-Petrine political platform of liberalism and Western integration had collapsed, the first indications of a return to Eurasianism emerged. Yeltsin stated the need to diversify foreign relations and establish an Eastern vector: “After all, we are a Eurasian state”.46 In 1996, the liberal foreign minister, Andrey Kozyrev, was replaced with the Eurasianist-oriented Yevgeny Primakov. Russia defined itself as a “European and Asian power” in the National Security Concept of 1997. Even liberals such as Vladimir Lukin, the co-founder of the Yabloko Party,

43 Solzhenitsyn, A., 1978. The Exhausted West, Harvard Magazine. July–August 1978, p. 26. 44 Cheng, J.Y.S., 2009. Chinese Perceptions of Russian Foreign Policy During the Putin

Administration: U.S.-Russia Relations and “Strategic Triangle” Considerations, Journal of Current Chinese Affairs, vol .8, no. 2, pp. 145–168, p. 127. 45 Brzezinski, Z., 2009. The Choice: Global Domination or Global Leadership. Basic Books, New York, p. 102. 46 Tsygankov, A., 2016. Russia’s Foreign Policy: Change and Continuity in National Identity. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, New York, p. 66.

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scaled back the Western ambitions and recognised the distinct Eurasian character of Russia: Any attempts to force Russia solely into either Asia or Europe are ultimately futile and dangerous. Not only would they cause a serious geopolitical imbalance, but they would also undermine the historically established social and political equilibrium within Russian itself.47 Yet, the new aspirations of a Greater Eurasian partnership with China and India were premature due to the unipolar international distribution of power. Neither China nor India had the capability or willingness to challenge the US-centric geoeconomic system. Subsequently, Putin continued the aspirations of creating Greater Europe as an extension of Gorbachev’s initiative for a Common European Home.48 The rise of Asia, with China at the centre, rapidly changed the international distribution of power. The defining moment for Moscow came in 2014, when the US and the EU supported the coup in Ukraine, making Ukraine a bulwark instead of a bridge. With the remaining illusions of a gradual integration with Europe shattered, Moscow swiftly replaced its project for Greater Europe with the Greater Eurasia initiative.

The Conservativism of the Greater Eurasian Partnership The Greater Eurasian initiative is a geoeconomic strategy to restore the political subjectivity of Eurasia by repositioning Russia from the dual periphery of Europe and Asia to the centre of a larger Eurasian construct. Eurasianism in the past was primarily a philosophical and geopolitical project, which is now converted into a geoeconomic project based on rational cooperation for common gain.49 The geoeconomic primacy of the US was structured by asserting leadership over the two other geoeconomic regions of the world, Europe and Asia, in the inter-regional format of the trans-Atlantic region and the Indo-Pacific region. This “system-dominance” entailed Washington’s 47 Mankoff, J., 2009. Russian Foreign Policy: The Return of Great Power Politics. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, New York, p. 72. 48 Diesen, G., 2016. EU and NATO relations with Russia: After the Collapse of the Soviet Union. Routledge, London. 49 Bordachev, T., 2018. Greater Eurasia and Russian foreign policy priorities. Asian Politics & Policy, vol. 10, no. 4, pp. 597–613.

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support for Germany and Japan as the main nodes in these regions to establish collective hegemony in Europe and Asia.50 The unipolar system had restrained the ability of Russia to restore its political subjectivity in Europe and it necessitated China’s commitment to a “peaceful rise” that diminished its political subjectivity in Asia. The geoeconomic integration of Europe and Asia represents a Eurasian balance to the Oceanic system dominance of the US. The three-pillared economic nationalist policies that linked industrialisation to nationbuilding in the nineteenth century, as outlined in Hamilton’s American System and corresponding policy recommendations by List, are also applied to region-building.51 Geoeconomic integration encompasses strategic industries such as technology and energy, transportation corridors and financial instruments such as banks, currencies and payment systems. China is the principal geoeconomic partner of Russia due to its ability and willingness to challenge US geoeconomic primacy. China’s tech industry is already rivalling its US counterpart in both Europe and Asia, the Belt and Road Initiative have become a trillion-dollar project to develop new Eurasian transportation corridors by land and sea, and the establishment of new financial instruments such as development banks, local trade currencies and post-SWIFT payment system. Russia and China initially sought to harmonise their Eurasian integration initiatives by establishing a partnership between China’s Belt and Road Initiative with the Russian-led Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) under the guise of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation—endowed with growing economic competencies.52 A Russian-Chinese partnership has since developed within the tech industry, infrastructure projects and financial cooperation.

50 Katzenstein, P.J., 2005. A World of Regions: Asia and Europe in Imperium. Cornell University Press, London, p. 57; Buzan, B., 2005. Dynamics of a 1 + 4 World’, in Aydinli, E. and Rosenau, J.N., (eds), Security, and the Nation State: Paradigms in Transition. State University Press, Albany, pp. 177–198.

the American ‘The Security Globalization, of New York

51 Diesen, G., 2017. Russia’s Geoeconomic Strategy for a Greater Eurasia. London, Routledge. 52 Gatev, I. and Diesen, G., 2016. Eurasian Encounters: The Eurasian Economic Union and the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation. European Politics and Society, vol. 17, no. supp1, pp. 133–150.

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However, Russia seeks to diversify its partnerships within Greater Eurasia due to the risk of becoming excessively reliant on an asymmetrical partnership with China if the pivot to Asia merely becomes a pivot to China. The EU is an important partner and source of diversification as Moscow seeks to establish an EU–EAEU inter-regional partnership. Russia’s Greater Eurasia can be considered a conservative initiative by conceptualising it as a Greater Eurasian Home. Gorbachev envisioned capitalist states and socialist states living together in a Common European Home that allowed for ideological diversity. Yet, the initiative was eventually defeated by Washington preferred “Europe whole and free” based on universalist assumptions where the uniform development towards liberal democracy and human rights entailed remaking the world in the image of the US. The Common Eurasian Home is a fitting term as it allows for and encourages the preservation of civilizational distinctiveness. China and other states in Asia have shared the historical frustration of Russia as modernisation was equated to the westernisation of culture. Aleksandr Panarin argues that Moscow must advance a conservative Eurasia and “propose to the peoples of Eurasia a new, powerful, superenergetic synthesis” based on “civilizational diversity”.53 This conservative proposition is also linked to the geostrategic concept of Mackinder’s Eurasia as Panarin suggests Russia establish a strategic partnership with China in the Eurasian heartland.54 A key priority for conservatives has been to incorporate the Soviet era into the national consciousness and historical narrative. Conservatives resent the Bolshevik revolutionaries for their destructive effort to uproot the nation, Orthodox Church, traditional culture, the family unity and other indispensable features of a conservative society. Yet, conservatives also recognise that the Soviet period must be incorporated into the national narrative as eliminating this period would be a revolutionary act by disconnecting people from their past. The solution has been to selectively salvage the valuable history from the Soviet era, such as the victory against fascism. Furthermore, the disruptive Soviet period is placed in the

53 Hahn, G.M., 2018. Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War”. McFarland, North Carolina, p. 17. 54 Hahn, G.M., 2018. Ukraine Over the Edge: Russia, the West and the “New Cold War”. McFarland, NC, p. 17.

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wider context of Russia’s 1000-year-long history as Russian civilisation did not originate in 1917 or 1991.55 Salvaging part of the revolutionary history for conservative purposes has been fiercely opposed by the West, which has sought a blanket repudiation of the Soviet era from Moscow. Russian efforts to salvage some of Soviet history for a cohesive millennia-long national narrative has been denounced by Western observers as efforts to rehabilitate Stalin, irrespective of the efforts by the Kremlin to rehabilitate the White Russians and restore unity with an inclusive national narrative. The attempts by Western powers to blame the Soviet Union for the Second World War indicates a historical revisionist effort to cement the liberal hegemony. Case in point, the EU’s efforts to blame both the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany for the Second World War is reasoned with the aim of “rooting democracy more firmly and reinforcing peace and stability in our continent”.56 In contrast, there is more that can be salvaged from the Soviet legacy in Asia, besides the endurance of the Communist Party in China. The Soviet Union was a key actor towards decolonising Asia by depriving the West of its military supremacy, which it had enjoyed since the sixteenth century, and was instrumental for centuries to impose its diktats on the world through coercion.57 The Chinese population continues to have a very favourable view of Russia due to its enduring ability to balance Western expansionism.58 The crisis in Western liberalism suggests that the project for Eurasian conservatism is not anti-Western. President Putin has reprimanded Western states for self-destructive behaviour as “many Euro-Atlantic states have taken the way where they deny or reject their own roots, including their Christian roots which form the basis of Western civilization”.59 55 Diesen, G., 2020. Russian Conservatism: Managing Change under Permanent Revolution. Rowman and Littlefield, London. 56 European Parliament 2008. Written declaration on the proclamation of 23 August as European Day of Remembrance for Victims of Stalinism and Nazism, European Parliament, 7 May 2008. 57 Karaganov, S., 2020. ‘The Military Underpinning of the Geopolitical Revolution’,

in Diesen, G. and Lukin, A. (eds), Russia in a Changing World. Palgrave Macmillan, London, pp. 1–22. 58 Lukin, A., 2020. Pivot to Asia: Russia’s Foreign Policy Enters the 21st Century. Vij Books India, New Dehli. 59 Putin, V., 2013. Meeting of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Government of the Russian Federation, 19 September 2013.

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By ending its three-centuries-long Western-centric foreign policy and liberal pretences, Russia also enhances its appeal to Western conservatives for a common cause of preserving cultural distinctiveness.60 At the G20 meeting in June 2019, Putin announced a shared benefit from the collapsing liberal international order: The liberal idea has become obsolete. It has come into conflict with the interests of the overwhelming majority of the population… Deep inside, there must be some fundamental human rules and moral values. In this sense, traditional values are more stable and more important for millions of people than this liberal idea, which, in my opinion, is really ceasing to exist.

Conclusion The historical challenge for Russian conservatives has been to advance organic development that builds on the past and reflects the distinctiveness of Russia. Managing change, by positioning society between continuity and change, has been absent and replaced with periods of stagnation followed by rapid and revolutionary change. The consequence has been a deep division and pendulum swings between the rule of Westernisers seeking to reinvent Russia as solely a European state and various strands of conservatives romanticising a bygone era. The rise of Asia presents an opportunity for Russia to resolve its Eurasian schism of Western modernity versus Eastern tradition and spirituality. Russia is reviving the political economy of the late nineteenth century and the Eurasianist ideas of the early twentieth century to create the political economy for Greater Eurasia that corresponds with Russia’s unique history and geography. The rise of Asia signifies 500 years of Western dominance coming to an end, which also enables Eurasian conservatism to become a viable geoeconomic initiative. Eurasianism is also the optimal conservative strand to link together vastly different historical periods into a unifying cohesive narrative and the national consciousness—from Kievan Rus, the Mongol Yoke, Peter the Great’s Cultural Revolution, the economic nationalist policies in Asia

60 Diesen, G., 2019. Russia as an International Conservative Power: The Rise of the Right-Wing Populists and Their Affinity Towards Russia, Journal of Contemporary European Studies, pp. 1–15.

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at the end of the nineteenth century, the turbulent Soviet era, the neoPetrine reforms of Yeltsin, and the contemporary rise of a post-Western world.

CHAPTER 5

Central Asia in Eurasia: Its Role in History Sultan Akimbekov

Traditionally, Eurasia’s inner areas have remained almost unnoticed in the huge continent’s complex and multi-faceted history, when compared, of course, with the great civilisations of Western and Eastern Europe, China, India and the Middle East. Nevertheless, Eurasia’s inner areas have been of huge significance, because there has been an important link between them all, and, as such, they have made a large contribution to the history of Eurasia. This chapter discusses the central part of Eurasia, which, in historical terms, consists of more than the five countries that have commonly been labelled the “Central Asian states” since the fall of the Soviet Union, i.e. Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan. In essence, we are referring to inner areas of the continent that include not only the expanses of the steppe at its very centre, but also neighbouring territories with settled populations. In that context, as Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse put it, “Central Eurasia - defined as the immense area that spans from Siberia to Russia’s Pacific coast, the three South Caucasus countries (Armenia, Georgia, Azerbaijan), the

S. Akimbekov (B) Institute of Asian Studies, Almaty, Kazakhstan © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Diesen and A. Lukin (eds.), The Return of Eurasia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2179-6_5

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five Central Asian countries (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan), Mongolia, Afghanistan, Xinjiang and Kashmir – is one of the world’s persistent peripheries”.1 Of course, this is a very broad definition of the region’s geographical scope, even if one were referring to Central Eurasia, let alone Central Asia: the South Caucasus and Russia’s Far East lie clearly beyond the region’s boundaries. Nevertheless, the very centre of the continent, where the five Central Asian states are located, as well as adjacent territories such as Afghanistan, Xinjiang in China, the southern areas of Russian Siberia and, possibly, Mongolia, can be considered a relatively cohesive region. Taken as a whole, this vast region is an area of interaction between various peoples and cultures. The extensive human contact within the continent developed steadily into the interaction between great civilisations, a process that took place through Eurasia’s interior lands over a very long period. In many ways, this engagement shaped the face of the continent’s central part. Broadly speaking, it was a bridge between East and West, and North and South. For a long time, the most important trade route between China and Europe passed through this region. It was known for most of history as the Great Silk Road. At the same time, there had historically been a complex system of intracontinental trade in the region, carried out on the expanses of modern-day India, Iran, Afghanistan, the countries of Central Asia, and incorporating the neighbouring territories of China and Russia. Without a doubt, the development of this trade owed much to the Great Silk Road but also had its own significant dynamic. On the whole, intracontinental trade facilitated the economic development of a large region, resulting in energetic nation-building and very significant intellectual development. S. Frederick Starr wrote that “this was truly an Age of Enlightenment, several centuries of cultural flowering during which Central Asia was the intellectual hub of the world. India, China, the Middle East and Europe all boasted rich traditions in the realm of ideas, but during four or five centuries around 1000 AD, it was Central Asia, the one world region that touched all these other centres, that surged to the fore. It bridged time as well as geography, in

1 Laruelle M., Peyrouse S., Globalizing Central Asia. Geopolitics and the Challenges of Economic Development, NY, M.E. Sharpe, 2013, p. XIV.

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the process becoming the great link between antiquity and the modern world”.2 Undoubtedly, all of this defines the historical significance of Central Asia, both in the modern, narrower sense of the definition and in a broader sense. Furthermore, it is important to stress that this is the very reason why so many countries show great interest in the continent’s inner regions. This is true not only for neighbouring countries, but also for certain countries beyond the region’s borders, particularly, Great Britain in the nineteenth century and the USA in the twentieth century. The latter development was linked with the overall processes of globalisation: in the nineteenth century, it was a matter of colonial expansion by European powers; and, in the twentieth century, the world as a whole became more globalised, and Central Asia became relevant to the interests of states intent on exercising their influence on a global scale. It is no coincidence that Central Asia has been a place where the interests of world powers have converged at least three times in the last two hundred years. This is where the main developments of the “Great Game” between Great Britain and Russia took place, a term coined first by Arthur Connolly and, then, by Rudyard Kipling. It was also one of the “hot parts” of the Cold War between the USSR and the USA; and it was the place where the interests of three great powers—China, Russia and the USA—converged after the collapse of the USSR. Moreover, many more regional powers are taking part in the modern version of the Great Game in this region, most notably India, Iran, Saudi Arabia, Turkey and Pakistan. In historical terms, the region, to which we refer today as Central Asia, but which is actually the interior part of the great continent of Eurasia, has always been the continent’s would-be “nerve centre”: “there is no other place on earth where so many countries’ interests clash – from the superpowers to the regional players”.3 Important developments have taken place here and continue to take place. This is where the fates of great empires have been decided and continue to be decided. This is due

2 Starr S. F., Utrachennoe Prosveshchenie: Zolotoi vek Tsentral’noi Azii ot arabskogo zavoevaniia do vremen Tamerlana, Translation from English, Moscow, Intellektual’naia literature, 2019, p. 39. 3 Eurasia at a Crossroads: A Megacontinent’s Future in a Globalized World, IWEP, Astana, 2016, p. 8.

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in large part to the region’s strategically important location and, as such, shall always be of interest to researchers.

Central Eurasia from a Historical Perspective One historical feature of the central part of the Eurasian continent is that, in addition to being the very centre of a broad belt of steppe stretching from Manchuria in the East to the Danube in the West, the steppes experienced large-scale movement of a wide variety of nomadic peoples, who exerted considerable influence on the lives of the various settled peoples from Europe in the West, to China in the East, as well as from India, Iran and the Middle East in the South. This was a very longterm process of constant change throughout history, influencing the life of Eurasia over several thousands of years. At the same time, it was one of the most debated moments in history, because the constant changes were associated mainly with the movement of nomadic peoples, whilst their history was related by members of the settled peoples, for whom the constant pressure from increasing numbers of nomads was usually a problem. Consequently, a typical historical account does not provide a very positive impression of the nomadic peoples, since it would have been written by the nomads’ historical rivals. The nomadic peoples not only sought to travel through the steppe areas of Central Eurasia on their way to Europe, the Middle East and India, but also tried periodically to create empire-style states which could occupy a strategic position between the main trading markets. This was undertaken in order to gain an advantageous position and generate a growth in revenue through the control of transit trade. The first such state was the Turkic Khaganate: in the sixth century, the ancient Turks crossed from Mongolia to the North Caucasus and Crimea, creating their state in the Eurasian steppes. Its economic might was based on trading silk between China and the Byzantine Empire, the main trading area for this most strategically important medieval product. Under the Turks, the central steppe area of Eurasia was still just a transit zone, whilst a second empire created by nomads—that of Genghis Khan—and its successor empires, did more than just control the trade routes from China to Europe: under the descendants of Ghengis Khan’s son, Jochi, whose state was called the Ulus of Jochi (named the Golden Horde in Russian chronicles), city-building was prolific in the steppes between Altai and Dniester from the middle of the thirteenth century to

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the end of the fifteenth century. This was practically the only instance in the history of central Eurasia when a built-up urban development existed in the steppes. At the very end of the fifteenth century, Tamerlane, the ruler of Central Asia’s territory of oasis settlements, defeated the Jochid state. Justin Marozzi wrote of this that “the last time Tokhtamish had been defeated [in 1395 at the Battle of Kondurcha River – author’s comment], within three years he had rebounded strongly. If it was not possible for Temur to lay hands on his troublesome adversary, than it least his kingdom must be brought to ruin to ensure that this could never happen again”.4 However, the most important consequences of this defeat were those connected with Tamerlane’s destruction of the main cities in the steppe area. The Turkish explorer, Evliya Çelebi, wrote that “during the time of Genghis Khan, there were 170 large cities all over Desht-i Qipchaq. All of the aforementioned cities were destroyed by the mighty Timur Khan”.5 It is worth noting at this point that the main reason why Tamerlane committed such deeds was not so much political, as economic. Under the Jochids, all trade between Europe and Asia was conducted exclusively through their territory. Consequently, the historical trade route along the Great Silk Road, which passed traditionally through the oases of Central Asia, leading to Iran and, then, to Syria, ceased to exist for almost one hundred years. By destroying the cities in the steppe area of Eurasia, not only did Tamerlane defeat his political opponents, the Jochid state, but also he destroyed his main trade competitor. After this development, trade along the Great Silk Road returned to its former route through the oasis settlements of Central Asia to Iran and Syria. This is where Tamerlane’s state and that of his heirs were located: “Henceforth, the northern trade route that bypassed Temur’s empire was forced into disuse. The caravans, diverted south instead, through Persia and Afghanistan into

4 Marozzi J., Tamerlane: Sword of Islam, Conqueror of the World, London, Harper Collins, 2004, p. 198. 5 Chelebi E., Kniga puteshestviia (izvlecheniia iz sochineniia turetskogo puteshestvennika XVII veka) [Book of Travel: Extracts from a Work of a 17th Century Turkish Traveller], translation and commentary, 2nd ed., Zemli Severnogo Kavkaza, Povolzh’ia i Podon’ia, Moscow, 1979, p. 143.

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Mawarannahr, thereby transferring the wealth that once accumulated by Tokhtamish directly to Temur. It was masterstroke of brutal efficacy”.6 It is significant that the busiest interaction between settled and nomadic peoples occurred on the very border between the oasis settlements and the steppes of what is known today as Central Asia. Whilst the peoples of Europe met nomads only occasionally and the Chinese attempted to cut themselves off periodically from the nomads by means of the Great Wall of China, the people of the oasis settlements of Central Asia had contact with them on a regular basis. A symbiosis of sorts developed between the nomads and the settled people in this region, mostly because there were no uninterrupted agricultural lands there. The numerous oases were interspersed with strips of the steppe, where nomads still lived up until the twentieth century. This geographic zone stretched approximately from the Syr Darya River, extending westwards to the territory of Iran. There were also oasis settlements along the Great Silk Road in the modern Chinese province of Xinjiang, otherwise known as East Turkestan, but there was a fundamental difference between this area and the situation in Central Asia: the territories around the oases were less suited to a nomadic lifestyle. In the course of the interaction between the settled population and the nomads, both of whom relied upon the economic opportunities provided by the trade routes along the Great Silk Road, strong states sprang up in the region. Then, they spread broadly within various parts of Asia, from Egypt to India. We should note here that, despite the fact that members of the settled peoples were critical of the nomads, business never stopped in the region’s oasis settlements whilst they were under the political rule of the nomads. Furthermore, in creating empire states, including those centred in this region, the nomads contributed a great deal to statebuilding and the development of trade. The states, created by the nomads, connected the numerous oases of the Central Asia region with the steppe areas to form a single state system, thus significantly strengthening their military, economic and, inter alia, cultural potential. For example, the Khwarezmid state, which was centred in Khwarezm, a region in the lower reaches of the Amu Darya River in the second half of the twelfth and early thirteenth centuries, maintained military dominance over areas of Transcaucasia, Iran, Iraq, modern-day Afghanistan 6 Marozzi J., Tamerlane: Sword of Islam, Conqueror of the World, London, HarperCollins, 2004, p. 200.

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and Northern India. Nomads formed its military and political power, whilst the settled oasis areas and trading cities formed the basis of its imperial statehood. Writing about the Khwarezmid state, Sibt. ibn al-Jawzi commented that “the state’s administrative apparatus was distinguished by rigidity and discipline. Its army, consisting of select Turkic warriors from the Kankali, Kipchak, Uranite and other nomadic tribes, proved its strength time and again”.7 People from the populated oasis areas, including Khwarezm itself, ensured the running of the political and administrative apparatus, whilst the military forces were manned by nomads. Given that there were always many nomadic tribes in the steppes of Central Eurasia, the military power of the states in Central Asia’s settled oasis areas was assured. States in this part of Eurasia have always competed to host the transit of trade routes. As the main route in global trade for a sustained period in history, the Great Silk Road was responsible for the economic and cultural development of the region. Christopher Beckwith wrote that “the Silk Road was not a network of trade routes, or even a system of cultural exchange. It was the entire local political-economiccultural system of Central Eurasia, in which commerce, whether internal or external, was very highly valued and energetically pursued – in that sense, the ‘Silk Road’ and ‘Central Eurasia’ are essentially two terms for the same thing. In its more restricted economic sense, the Silk Road was the Central Eurasian economy”.8 Active state-building and the creation of powerful states were also a consequence of the region’s strategically beneficial geographical position vis-à-vis trade between Europe and Asia. For example, the Saka, the Kushans, the Hephthalites and numerous other Turkic peoples travelled through Central Asia to India for centuries. At first, the Turkic peoples were slaves and mercenaries; but, later, they were builders of huge empires. It is interesting to note that the creator of the Grand Mughal Empire, Babur, was the last empire builder to come to India from Central Asia. It is important that the nomadic Saka, Kushans, Hephthalites, Turkic Ghaznavids and Timur, as well as Babur’s Mughals and Chagatai, went to India from Central Asia, for this is the very place where they interacted with the local settled population, a new identity developed, and 7 Cited in Buniiatov Z., Gosudarstvo Khorezmshakhov-Anushteginidov, 1097–1231 [The State of Khwarazmian Shahs]. Moscow, Nauka, 1986, p. 62. 8 Beckwith C., Empires of the Silk Road. A History of Central Eurasian from Bronze Age to the Present, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 2009, p. 328.

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the foundations for new state formations were established. We should note that the Turkic soldiers were no longer arriving in India as part of a nomadic tribe, but along with Persian academics and bureaucrats from the settled oasis areas of Central Asia. Consequently, Persian was used as the administrative language of the Great Mughal state in India. This represented a genuine political and cultural symbiosis between the nomads and the settled oasis population, which was a distinctive feature of the region known today as Central Asia. On a related note, the urban life of the Jochid state was rooted in the traditions of the settled oasis areas of Central Asia, particularly regarding architecture, literature, administration and way of life. In the meantime, the region was something of a starting point for the movement of nomads, not just south, towards India, but also west to Iran and beyond, to Asia Minor. For example, the Turkic-speaking nomadic tribes of the Oghuz people changed the face of Iran, the Caucasus and Asia Minor radically. Their expansion was due not only to the temporary conquest of the settled peoples of this vast area, but also to mutual interaction with them. This engagement brought about a symbiosis between the cultures of the Oghuz and the former settlers, which resulted in the emergence of new peoples: modern-day Turks and Azeris. We should note here that the Oghuz engaged with the settlers and gained their expertise in state-building whilst they were in the area of the Syr Darya River. This system of engagement between nomadic and settled peoples on the borders of Central Asia’s oasis areas and the northern expanses of the steppe lasted for a very long time. Even isolated exceptions, such as the hostilities between descendants of Genghis Khan following the fall of the Mongol Empire, served only to prove the rule. In the mid- thirteenth century, the region was practically destroyed during a long, violent conflict between the states ruled by Genghis Khan’s great-grandchildren, involving the Jochids from the steppes of modern Kazakhstan, the Hulaguids from Iran, the Mongols from the Chinese empire of Kubilai Khan and the local Mongol dynasties of the descendants of Chagatai Khan and Ögedei Khan. For its time, the conflict constituted a large-scale intracontinental war to control the strategically important region of Central Asia, but it was as much about controlling the main trade routes. Although the region was destroyed to a significant degree during the war, the conflict served only to underline its huge political and economic importance once again. It was only then that the Jochid state managed to transfer trade along

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the Great Silk Road from its previously traditional route via Samarkand, Bukhara, Merv, Herat and onwards to Iran, to a new, northern route via Syr Darya, Khwarezm, the Lower Volga and the Black Sea. This ensured that the urban culture of the Golden Horde was able to flourish. After Tamerlane’s victories, trade routes returned to the oasis areas of Central Asia, which revived economic activity in the region; however, this situation lasted relatively briefly. With the advent of the Age of Discovery, global trade began to undergo great changes. In the mid-sixteenth century, the Portuguese were the first Europeans to create a maritime and trade empire in Asia. For a short time, they established a monopoly on trade in Asia, not only concerning trade with Europe, but also trade within the vast region of Asia, itself. China was the final geographical point of their expansion to the East. The Portuguese reached China in the 1540s, and built the city of Macau there. In the words of Frederic Mote, “the lively carrying trade within Eastern Asian waters brought rich returns and helped pay for the new mercantile empires”.9 The creation of a trading post in Macau by the Portuguese was a symbolic step marking a shift to European control of maritime trade between Europe and Asia. Meanwhile, one of the consequences of this development was that, during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, there was initially a reduction and, then, almost a complete cessation of the previous broad-scale intracontinental trade conducted through the centre of Eurasia. This signalled an end to the means to which the region of Central Asia had owed its economic and political significance for more than a thousand years. Without global trade along the Great Silk Road, the region lacked sufficient local resources either for the type of economy required to fund large-scale state-building, or to sustain cultural development at the same level it enjoyed during its time of prosperity. Consequently, the region of Central Asia lost its former economic and political significance, and stopped playing an active role in politics. After the sixteenth century, it found itself on the periphery of major developments in Eurasian geopolitics. Instead of large state formations, which, historically, had tried to control as much of the Great Silk Road as possible, small states began to predominate in the region, with their

9 Mote F., Imperial China, 900–1800. Harvard University Press, 3rd ed., 2003, p. 722.

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influence often limited to the territory of a few oases or several nomadic tribes.

Agrarian Empires Advance to the Centre of Eurasia Whilst the near cessation of trade along the Great Silk Road led to the division of the settled regions of Central Asia, south of the Syr Darya River, into a number of small states during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the changes were even more significant for the nomads of the Eurasian steppes. The nomads no longer enjoyed their erstwhile possibilities of organising themselves politically. Consequently, this led to a weakening of the large nomadic states that had previously existed in the steppes. This process was accompanied by a decrease in centralised power, the strengthening of certain tribal groups and a growth in internal political competition. This affected the Kazakh Khanate, the Nogai Horde and Moghulistan in, what would be, modern-day Kazakhstan and its adjacent steppe areas. The strengthening of large agrarian empires within Eurasia began in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, with the empires moving deeper into steppe territory for the first time in history and gradually taking it over. Hélène Carrère d’Encausse wrote that, “the expansion of Russian territory, stemming from the growing power of the tsars, brought them into constant contact with the steppe and created a mirror-image of the prevailing situation: from this point forward, the settled peoples constituted a threat to the nomads. After centuries of domination by nomads, peasant Russia moved into the steppe, conquering and colonising it over the course of almost three hundred years”.10 In the mid-sixteenth century, the Muscovite State occupied all the territory along the River Volga as far as the Caspian Sea. Consequently, it bisected the Eurasian steppe, reducing the possibilities for nomadic tribes to maintain ties with each other. This was another reason why statehood was weakened in the steppe area, and the Nogai Horde lost its former military and political significance.

10 Carrère d’Encausse H., Evraziiskaia imperiia. Istoriia Rossiiskoi imperii s 1552 do nashikh dnei, Moscow, ROSSPEN, 2007, p. 66.

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In the early half of the seventeenth century, a new agrarian empire, that of the Qing dynasty, created by the Manchu people, established control over Outer Mongolia for the first time in Chinese history. The territory was located beyond the Gobi Desert to the north of China. As with the eastern nomadic tribes on the Volga, the Mongolian nomads were unable to oppose the Qing Empire. “By the middle of the seventeenth century, the Qing had achieved the kind of success that was unimaginable for any Chinese state, from the Qin and Han Empires onwards. They took control of the territory of Mongolia located beyond the Gobi Desert. With the odd exception, this was where nomadic imperial states, geared towards relations with China, were traditionally centred”.11 As a result of the above, the situation in the Eurasian steppe changed dramatically. When the agrarian empires of Russia and China took control of the Volga region and Mongolia, there was a sharp reduction in the area within which nomadic empires could develop. One of the last attempts to create a nomadic state was undertaken by the Mongolian-speaking Oirats. In the seventeenth century, part of the Oirats conquered the Nogais on the Lower Volga and establishing the Kalmyk Khanate. At the same time, the eastern Oirats created Dzungar Khanate in West Mongolia, which started a series of wars, to the west, against the Qin Empire in China, and to the east, against Kazakh Khanate, and the settled oasis areas of Central Asia. This war on two fronts led to the fall of the Dzungar Khanate, and never again did Eurasia’s nomads attempt to create an imperial state. This occurred, because, among other matters, they did not have a suitable action plan. The powerful agrarian empires to the east and west limited the nomads’ power to act, whilst the settled oasis areas of Central Asia lost their former importance. The agrarian empires’ advancement deep into the Eurasian steppes reduced the nomadic peoples’ political space. In the sixteenth to eighteenth centuries, there was a battle for territory in the central part of Eurasia’s steppe lands, which provided essential pasture for nomadic livestock breeding, as well as control of the few settled oasis areas and trade routes of local importance. Such conflict diminished Central Asia’s economic importance even further. Most notably, economic activity in the region’s largest cities of 11 Akimbekov S. M., Kazakhstan v Rossiiskoi imperii [Kazakhstan in the Russian Empire], Alamaty, IAI, 2018, p. 139.

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Bukhara and Samarkand decreased sharply for a while at the beginning of the eighteenth century during the heated war between the Dzungars and the Kazakhs, as well as the internecine conflict between the settled areas of Central Asia. At the same time, we should note that both the Manchurian Qing Empire and the Muscovite State in Eurasia’s steppe in the sixteenth to early eighteenth centuries still focussed more on controlling Mongolia and the Volga region, respectively. Their main task at this time was to subdue the nomads and the potential threat they posed, and hamper their opportunities to create large states capable of expanding. The agrarian empires had neither the resources, nor the appropriate behavioural strategy at the time to pursue larger endeavours. The Muscovite State experienced large-scale changes at the beginning of the eighteenth century. Tsar Peter the Great introduced reforms, based on the experience of Europeans. As a result of the reforms, the Muscovite State was transformed into the Russian Empire, and increased its military and political power considerably. This enabled Russia, inter alia, to move beyond the lines of fortresses on the border with the steppe and to advance deeper into steppe territory. In the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, the Russian Empire took control of practically all of the Eurasian steppe. The territory encompassed all the remaining nomadic peoples, including the Kazakhs and the Kalmyks of the central Eurasian steppe areas. With the annexation of the Kazakhs, which continued through the latter half of the eighteenth century and most of the nineteenth century, the last remnants of Kazakh statehood disappeared. Even though it was severely weakened, the Kazakh Khanate was the last nomadic state in the central part of the Eurasian steppe. The historical tradition of the nomadic state disappeared with the downfall of the Kazakh Khanate. We need to stress here again that one of the main reasons for the weakening of the nomadic state in central Eurasia was the overall reduction in the region’s economic importance, as a consequence of the closure of the Great Silk Road. This, in turn, became feasible after overall trade between Europe and Asia fell under European control and, consequently, was conducted mostly via maritime routes. It is worth noting here that, whereas the Russian Empire expanded into the Eurasian steppe relatively quickly after the introduction of Peter the Great’s reforms, the other agrarian empire—the Qing Empire in China— remained in the same areas that it had occupied from the beginning of the

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seventeenth century to the middle of the eighteenth century. It controlled Mongolia and maintained foreign relations with the last of the Kazakh khans. That was all the Qing Empire required, in order to repel any threat from the nomadic states. The Manchurian authorities’ main assets in the Qing Empire were the agricultural districts of inner China, whilst the value of the Chinese economy to the Manchu dynasty, and its selfsufficient nature, were among the reasons that led to China’s isolation from the outside world. This resulted in its state and economic system growing increasingly outdated, which was all the more noticeable against a background of deepening European expansion in Asia. Since the eighteenth century, one of China’s main foreign trade objectives had been to engage in trade with Europeans, even when the trade relations were of a limited nature. In the nineteenth century, this engagement resulted in pressure from European countries to open the Chinese economy to foreign trade; whilst, in the mid-nineteenth century, there was a series of so-called “opium wars”, which opened China more to foreign influence and, ultimately, led to a weakening of its outdated system. It should be noted that the Chinese presence in the central areas of Eurasia was very limited. This was partly due to the outdated nature of the Chinese political and economic systems, as well as China’s attempts to isolate itself; and partly because the main trajectory of Chinese politics between the seventeenth and the nineteenth centuries developed in accordance with the increasing presence of Europeans in South-East Asia and growing pressure on China. The inner central part of Eurasia became nothing but part of China’s periphery. Furthermore, China needed to worry no longer about pressure from nomads. Together with the cessation of intracontinental trade, this reduced Central Asia’s importance. The region became isolated from the main political and economic developments in Eurasia, which were prominent in places where Eurasian states had access to the sea. This is where they had to contend with large-scale European expansion. In the mid-nineteenth century, the Russian Empire lost the Crimean War to a coalition of Great Britain, France and Turkey. Following its defeat, Russia became more active to the east and the south. In the south, Russia tried to take over the settled oasis areas of Central Asia, whose borders she reached in the early 1860s. This caused serious concern to Great Britain, which believed that Russian policy might be targeting

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British India. Russian General Andrei Snesarev wrote that “the Crimean War brought to light the sense of our future Indian campaigns, that is, it revealed the essence of the Central Asia problem”.12 In the course of the Crimean War, as well as directly after its unsuccessful conclusion, several projects were proposed regarding a military campaign against British India. Larger ones included those of Generals Khrulov, Chikhachev and Diugamel, as well as one by Russia’s military attaché in London, Nikolay Ignatyev.13 The last project was drafted in 1857, around the time of Sepoy Mutiny, which was one of the most serious challenges to British rule in India. The great importance of India to the British Empire and the threat of Russian retaliation laid the foundations for the start of the “Great Game”; and the intense competition between Great Britain and the Russian Empire in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century was the main feature of geopolitics in Eurasia. The Great Game affected many aspects of international politics, given the size of the two empires and their interests in different strategic areas; however, regardless of this, Central Asia found itself at the very centre of the confrontation between them.

The Great Game in Central Eurasia In the mid-nineteenth century, the conflict between the British and Russian Empires led to Central Asia gradually becoming the focal point of their geopolitical competition. After defeat in the Crimean War of 1853– 1856, Russia attempted to restore its position in international politics. In this regard, her advances into Central Asia were of significance primarily in the context of general European colonial politics. The acquisition of new colonies was of great importance to European countries as a whole in the nineteenth century. It served as a good indicator of military, political and economic power during the period. The colonies had value as market outlets for goods from the metropolis and as a source for raw materials; but, also, they satisfied the prestige factor and 12 Snesarev A. E., Afganistan [Afghanistan], Moscow, Russkaia panorama, 2002, pp. 211–212. 13 Sergeev E. Iu., Bol’shaia igra, 1856–1907: mify i realii rossiisko-britanskikh otnoshenii v Tsenral’noi i Vostochnoi Azii [The Great Game, 1856–1907: Myths and Reality of Russo-British Relations in Central and East Asia], Moscow, KMK, 2012, pp. 68 and 73.

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granted an advantageous position in the geopolitical stand-off between the European countries themselves. Consequently, it is logical that, after an unsuccessful Crimean War, the Russian Empire should, on the one hand, wish to restore its geopolitical prestige, and, on the other hand, acquire new colonies in Central Asia. At the same time, Russia’s advance southwards into Central Asia brought her into a region that was as close as possible to British India. This caused considerable concern in Great Britain, regardless of whether the Russian authorities had plans to invade Britain’s most important colony. The Russian Empire’s greatest progress in advancing into Central Asia coincided with the American Civil War in 1861–1865, when American cotton exports stopped. This led automatically to the increased importance of India to Great Britain as a major exporter of cotton. Likewise, the value to London of owning the otherwise strategically important colony increased significantly. An opinion expressed in House of Lords by Edward Law, 1st Earl of Ellenborough, the former Governor-General of India, in May 1861, illustrates this: “To a very large portion of the population of this country cotton is food—it can be regarded in no other light—and if the supply were Seriously reduced, the reduction would affect, not one, but every interest in the country. It would affect our commerce all over the world; it would greatly diminish Our exports; it would greatly diminish our facilities of obtaining the means of support, and altogether impair the strength of our resources… But there can be no doubt… that under favourable circumstances India can produce, though not in very large quantities, cotton equal to the best cotton from America”.14 These words reflected concerns about taking measures to protect British interests in India. In the 1860s, the only party which could, in theory, threaten London’s interests was the Russian Empire, which had just taken control of the settled oasis areas of Central Asia. There is no doubt that, as with Britain, Russia’s interest in Central Asia was also connected with her economic interests. The emergence of a cotton shortage on world markets due to the American Civil War provoked increased interest in other sources of this strategically important commodity. Consequently, this made the idea of controlling the settled 14 Lords Sitting, Cultivation of Cotton in India, Observations. HL Deb., 31 May 1861 vol. 163. pp. 350–373, https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1861/ may/31/observations.

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oasis areas of Central Asia more attractive to Russia, since it was one of the most important cotton-growing regions. After Russia annexed the region, she was able to influence where the cotton was sold, as well as increase the scale of production. Hélène Carrère d’Encausse wrote that the “Russian merchants and manufacturers, who used cotton as a raw material, started urging the imperial government to adopt a policy of force against cotton-producing Central Asian states and put pressure on those states which served as transit zones for trade: they should provide favourable conditions for Russia, and Russia alone”.15 One of the aims of Russian policy in Central Asia was to establish a cotton monopoly in the region. At the same time, the Russian military and political elite could not but view controlling Central Asia as an opportunity to put pressure on its competitor in the Great Game. In the tense situation of the 1860s, Russia’s swift advance into the territory of the settled oases of Central Asia could only raise serious British concerns over the security of its lands in India. Given the temporary reduction in cotton supplies on the world market due to the American Civil War, the situation led to a more intense strategic confrontation between the British and Russian Empires in the region of Central Asia. Russian forces occupied Tashkent in 1865 and Samarkand in 1868, when Russia annexed the Emirate of Bukhara. Then, in 1869, Russia and Great Britain reached an agreement to divide Central Asia into spheres of influence. The most important outcome of the agreement was the decision by both states to avoid any direct contact between their lands in the region. To fulfil this objective, they agreed that Iran and Afghanistan would enjoy neutral status. “Russia’s readiness to accept the neutrality of Iran and Afghanistan, and guarantee the immutability of their northern borders, resulted, no doubt, from a compromise between the interests of London and St. Petersburg. Russia could justify such a compromise, because it allowed her to consolidate her position in Central Asia without opposition and, thus, ensure an advantageous strategic position, which could be used later on, depending on how the situation developed. At

15 Carrère d’Encausse H., Evraziiskaia imperiia. Istoriia Rossiiskoi imperii s 1552 do nashikh dnei [Eurasian empire: The History of Russian empire from 1552 to the current ], Moscow, ROSSPEN, 2007, p. 64.

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the same time, the terms of the agreement suited Britain, because they formalised the limits to which Russia could advance to the south”.16 The principle of regulating relations between the two empires, as laid down in the agreement of 1869, ultimately established Afghanistan’s northern borders with territories controlled by Russia. “Afghanistan owes the current line of its northern borders entirely to the acute interest that Britain had invested in the matter at that particular moment. In an attempt to prevent Russia from advancing further to the south, the English defended Afghanistan’s interests as effectively as possible”.17 The borders that were established then, and exist today, separate the areas we refer to as Central Asia and Afghanistan. Although debates over the ownership of particular territories continued for some time, the buffer status of Afghanistan and Iran served both to separate the lands of the British Empire and Russian Empire, and to preserve the two countries’ independence. Daniel Burkhard believes that “given the competition between Russia and Great Britain, Central Asia became the buffer, with each nation vying for the type of influence that would give it an advantage over the other”.18 If we consider the Central Asia region in the broader sense, then, of course, it formed a buffer between the two empires; however, in a narrower sense, the area to which we refer today as Central Asia fell entirely within Russia’s zone of influence. Consequently, in effect, the border between the Russian and British zones of influence divided a region, which had historically constituted a whole; and, this development continues to influence what happens in the region today. Relations between the Russian and British Empires escalated in 1877– 1878, during the Russo-Turkish War. Great Britain forced Russia to sign the Treaty of Berlin, a peace agreement unfavourable to Russia. On 25 April 1878, Russian Minister of War Dmitry Miliutin sent a directive to Governor-General of Turkestan Konstatntin Kaufman bearing the order to hasten preparations for a campaign against India. Earlier, at a meeting in the presence of Emperor Alexander II, Miliutin had argued 16 Akimbekov S. M., Istoriia Afganistana [The History of Afghanistan], Astana-Almaty, IMEP, 2015, p. 89. 17 Ibid., p. 90. 18 Burkhard D., “In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia’s Path to the 21th Century”

in In the Tracks of Tamerlane: Central Asia’s Path to the 21th Century, ed. Burkhard D., Sabonis-Helf T., Washington, National Defence University, 2004, p. 6.

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that “directing Russian forces to India shall force the English to send a significant part of its military forces to defend its territory, thus weakening its power in Europe”.19 However, on 27 October 1878, Miliutin informed Kaufman about a change in plan: “Having taken into account the considerable distance of Afghanistan from our borders; the impossibility of gathering intervention forces quickly in Turkestan; the huge financial expense required to prepare the dispatch of a serious expeditionary force to Afghanistan; the fact that the hope, shared by the emir and General Stoletov, that there would be an uprising against the English in India, remains only a possibility, which could also end with a completely different outcome; and finally, our current difficulties in Europe - the meeting concluded that we should not go directly to war with England because of its current conflict with Afghanistan”.20 On 2 November 1878, the Second AngloAfghan War started after the Emir of Afghanistan, Sher Ali Khan, rejected Britain’s ultimatum, resulting in Britain taking control of Afghanistan’s foreign policy after Emir Abdur Rahman Khan came to power in 1881. Meanwhile, Russian forces were advancing southwards. In 1881, they captured Goek Tepe fortress; and, in 1884, they captured the city of Merv on the territory of present-day Turkmenistan. In 1885, there was a confrontation between Russian and Afghan forces at Pende oasis, which brought Russia and Britain to the verge of war again. In 1886, Russia concluded an agreement with the Emirate of Bukhara, making it a dependency of Russia, similar to the way Afghanistan was a dependency of Great Britain. Consequently, borders were drawn, which still exist in the region today. Overall, the Russian and British Empires built a complex system of relations in the Central Asia region during the geopolitical rivalry of the Great Game. Although the situation teetered more than once on the verge of war, the two empires were of such significant size that any conflict in Central Asia would have led to a global confrontation, the cost of which

19 Sergeev E. Iu., Bol’shaia igra, 1856–1907: mify i realii rossiisko-britanskikh otnoshenii v Tsenral’noi i Vostochnoi Azii, p. 160. 20 “Bol’shaia igra” v Tsentral’noi Azii: “Indiiskii pokhod” russkoi armii [“The Great Game” in Central Asia: “Indian Campaign” of the Russian Army]. A collection of archive documents, compiled (with preface and commentary) by Zagorodinkovaia T. N., Moscow, Novyi khronograf, 2014, p. 222.

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would have been too high. At the same time, the protracted confrontation in Central Asia shaped to a great extent the geopolitical map of the region that exists today. Whilst Great Britain has long ceased to play any significant role in India and the Middle East, Russia’s influence has also decreased since the days of the Great Game; nevertheless, the geopolitical legacy of this period still shapes the content of relations in the region. The Great Game ended in 1907 with the signing of peace agreements between the Russian Empire and Great Britain, based mainly on common interests in European politics. Likewise, relations between the two states over Central Asia ceased to assume the nature of a geopolitical confrontation; however, this situation changed ten years later, when the revolution occurred in Russia in 1917, and radical socialists from the Bolshevik Party came to power.

The Soviet Union The revolution in Russia in 1917 and the formation of the USSR in 1922 led to significant changes in global geopolitics. For the first time in history, ideology started to exert a significant influence on international relations. This was related to the Bolsheviks’ rise to power, which brought change to the nature of developments in global geopolitics. From this point onwards, when assessing geopolitical risks and possibilities, one would have to take into account not only the state interests of the main political players, but also ideological considerations. At the start of their rule, the Bolsheviks were wrapped up in revolutionary romanticism. They were intent on world revolution. In this context, they regarded European colonies, primarily those in Asia, as a weak link, and believed that they could rely on the anti-colonial activism of subjugated peoples against the leading European colonial powers. Minister of Foreign Affairs Georgii Chicherin wrote to Vladimir Lenin “our policy in the East is being governed not with the direct assistance of armed forces against the Entente Powers, but with the help of weapons and gold”.21 Great Britain was of particular importance to the Bolsheviks in this context, since it represented the very essence of colonial imperialism.

21 Genis V., Krasnaia Persiia. Bol’sheviki v Giliane. 1920–1921 [The Red Persia: Bolsheviks in Gilan], Moscow, MNPI, 2000, p. 144.

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Furthermore, Great Britain had been the Bolsheviks’ staunch opponent throughout the Civil War years. Due to these circumstances, the Bolsheviks attached great importance to their Eastern policy in general and to the policy regarding the Turkestan Autonomous Soviet Socialist Republic (initially Turkestan Socialist Federative Republic), in particular. The Turkestan Republic had been created in place of Russia’s former colony in Central Asia. The policy of creating state entities loyal to the Bolsheviks was carried out not just in areas that had been dependencies of the former Russian Empire. In addition to the Republics of Bukhara, Turkestan and Khorezm, the Persian (Gilan) Soviet Socialist Republic was created in 1920 in northern Iran. This was part of an aggressive policy aimed at spreading the ideology of revolution to the countries of the East. Nevertheless, with time, revolutionary romanticism gave way to state pragmatism, since the new Soviet state had interests, which were primarily economic. After a while, rather than spreading revolution, Soviet Russia’s main priority was to sign peace agreements with capitalist countries including, first and foremost, Great Britain. Consequently, the revolutionary movement in the East was used little by little as a means of applying pressure on Britain, in order to achieve more favourable terms in negotiations. Vladimir Genis wrote in this regard that “whilst calling for the British imperialists to be blackmailed with the threat of ‘red expansion’ throughout Asia, Leon Trotsky proposed, in fact, that, firstly, Soviet Russia should limit itself to ‘political and educational work, whilst cautioning in every way possible against any steps that are aimed at or would lead to us providing military support’; and, secondly, to ‘continue to emphasise in every possible way our readiness to come to an agreement with Great Britain regarding the East’. Although Lenin did not agree with Trotsky, the so-called ‘Gilan Revolution’ turned out ultimately to be nothing but an insignificant bargaining chip for Moscow in the greater diplomatic haggling process”.22 The end of revolutionary romanticism and the shift towards state pragmatism was marked by the signing of a trade agreement between Soviet Russia and Great Britain on 16 March 1921. In geopolitical terms, a new balance of interests formed between Soviet Russia and Great Britain over Central Asia, whilst Afghanistan maintained its status as a buffer zone

22 Ibid., p. 83.

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separating the interests of the two countries. There was a sense that the state of relations, which had existed previously in the region during developments between the Russian and British empires, had actually been restored. Nevertheless, the new situation had some fundamental differences. The USSR, which was formed as such in 1922, underwent significant structural changes in comparison with the Russian Empire. First and foremost, we are talking about the ideology regarding the idea of nation-building, which was based on the right of nations to self-determination, as declared by the Bolsheviks. In 1924, the Republic of Turkestan was divided into national-territorial units, resulting in the creation of a number of national republics, which initially enjoyed different statuses. The Uzbek and Turkmen Republics were immediately made union republics and were admitted directly into the USSR. The Kirgiz and Tadzhik republics were, at first, made autonomous oblasts, and received union republic status only later: the Tadzhik Republic became a union republic in 1929, whilst the Kirgiz Republic received union republic status in 1936. The Kazakh Republic also became a union republic in 1936. Consequently, there was an institutional framework, which enabled the emergence of new independent states after the collapse of the USSR. In this sense, Bolshevik ideology played a key role in the shaping of present-day political reality in Central Asia. Terry Martin has written that “the national division of Central Asia fulfilled its designers’ goal to spur national self-consciousness”.23 It is significant that members of local political elites in Turkestan proposed an alternative form of development. From the very start of the revolution in Russia, the Jadid movement had been very active in the Turkestan region. By analogy with the Young Turks of the Ottoman Empire, the Jadids were known as the Young Buhkarans and Young Khivans. The Jadids were geared towards modernising the traditional Muslim way of life and banked on education to help Muslim people narrow the gap with Europe. Against a background of liberalisation in Russia, they tried to compete against the traditional, conservative ulemas in elections to the Tashkent City Council in the summer of 1917, but lost; and they 23 Martin T., An Affirmative Action Empire: Nations and Nationalism in the Soviet Union, 1923–1939. Ithaca and London: Coenell University Press, 2017, p. 72.

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were persecuted by local authorities in the Emirate of Bukhara and the Khanate of Khiva. Consequently, they took sides with the Bolsheviks, with whom they shared the idea of modernising a traditional society. Installed within the ranks of the Bolsheviks, the Jadids tried to instigate the idea of creating an all-Turkic republic. Their ideas were championed by the Chairman of the Central Executive Committee (the government) of the Republic of Turkestan, Turar Ryskulov. At the 3rd regional Muslim party conference in early February 1920, he declared that the existing constitution should be abolished; that the republic was under the tight control of the central government in Moscow; and that regional interests should be taken into consideration. The conference resolved that it was necessary “to carry out the idea, through active communist campaigning, of quashing efforts by Turkic peoples to split in effect and name into Tatars, Kirgiz, Bashkirs and Uzbeks, etc., creating separate small-sized republics, and to unite them for the sake of cohesion and encouraging other Turkic peoples, not within the RSFSR, to unite around a Turkic Soviet Republic”.24 Theoretically, the idea of a Turkic republic could be regarded as a way of spreading Moscow’s ideological and political influence to other Turkicspeaking peoples beyond the territory of the former Russian Empire, especially in the context of fighting colonialism. It should be noted that, from the middle of 1919, there were tumultuous events in Turkey, where General Mustafa Kemal organised a number of congresses in the country’s eastern regions, amid the break-up of the Ottoman Empire. The congresses adopted resolutions opposing the Entente powers’ policies towards Turkey. Needless to say, the Turkish nationalists’ declaration against the Entente powers automatically made them potential allies of Soviet Russia, a development which occurred later. On 26 April 1920, Mustafa Kemal sent Moscow a request for assistance. However, despite the appeal of this idea in terms of geopolitics in the Muslim East, Moscow preferred not to put its interests in the Russian part of Asia at risk. Moreover, the very concept of a single Turkic republic could pose a problem in that it stretched beyond the boundaries of the former Turkestan Province. 24 Cited in Abdullaev R., Agzamkhodzhaev S., Alimov I., Turkestan v nachale XX veka: K istorii istokov natsional’noi nezavisimosti [Turkestan at the Beginning of the 20th Century: On the History of the Sources of National Independence], Tashkent, Shark, 2000, p. 154.

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In addition, there were many other Turkic-speaking peoples in Russia, such as the Bashkirs, the Kazakhs, the Kyrgyz and the Azeris, otherwise known in the Russian Empire as the Caucasian Tatars. Even the hypothetical possibility of these people uniting to form an autonomous entity, particularly one led by an independent Turkic communist party, could not fail to raise serious concerns in Moscow. On 13 June 1920, Vladimir Lenin wrote in the margins of a draft document by the Turkestan Commission that it should be “instructed to draw up a map of Turkestan (ethnographic map, etc.), showing subdivisions for Uzbekistan, Kirgizia and Turkmenia; and explain in more detail the terms for the merger or division of these three parts”.25 On 16 July 1920, whilst preparing papers for a session of the plenum of the Central Committee of the Russian Communist Party (Bolsheviks) on national policy in Turkestan, Georgii Safarov proposed that it be divided into national regions, with the Kazakh population being incorporated into the rest of Kazakhstan.26 It was no surprise that the idea of a Turkic republic was defeated. This development was due not only to the fact that the central leadership in Moscow could not agree in principle to the emergence of such a large autonomous entity in Turkestan with possible demands that other Turkic peoples be incorporated into the entity, but also, more importantly, that the very concept of supranational unification on the basis of language still seemed utopian in 1920. The tumultuous events following Russia’s revolution in 1917, and the fall of the Habsburg, Hohenzollern and Ottoman monarchies in 1918, which resulted in the emergence of nation-states in Europe and Turkey, sparked the rise of national movements. This rise was related to the new trend of nation-building, even though the formation of nationalterritorial units might have been largely nominal, as was the case with the autonomous entities of the Bashkirs and the Kazakhs in 1920. We should note here that, following the Second World War, the ideas of a common Indian identity and a common Muslim identity were introduced in India and Pakistan. At the same time, there was no nation-state 25 Lenin V. I. Polnoe sobranie sochinenii [Complete Works], Vol .41. Moscow, Izdatel’stvo politicheckoi literatury, 1981, p. 436. 26 Rossiia i Tsentral’naia Aziia. Konets XIX—nachalo XX veka. [Russia in Central Asia in Late 19th—Early 20th Centuries]. A Collection of Documents and Materials, ed. D. A. Amanzholov, Moscow, Novyi khronograf, 2017, p. 393.

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building in these countries, even though there were many ethnic groups with their own specific identities in both India and Pakistan: for example, Pashtuns, Punjabis and Sindhis in Pakistan; and Marathas, Tamils and Bengalis in India. Consequently, the question arises as to why there were no attempts to create nation-states in India when the British Empire collapsed. The key factor in this instance was the existence of British institutions, which had been introduced to the way communities were organised in British India during the years of colonial rule. The institutions in question included not only the education system, but also market mechanisms, laws and regulations and a British-style system of self-government. Collectively, they created a new type of social and political framework. Drawing on such institutions, which included both the army and the police force, the educated elite of former British India created new states based on a common Muslim identity (in Pakistan) and a common Indian identity. Although the resultant system has repeatedly faced considerable challenges, it has lasted to this day. In contrast, the Russian Empire employed different management principles, both within its regions and in its dependencies. In 1917, Russian liberals attempted to implement the idea of Western European-style local self-government based on the zemstvos, but it ended in failure with the Bolsheviks’ seizure of power in October 1917. Regardless of this, it was the Bolsheviks who re-drew the national-state boundaries in Russian Asia, resulting in the formation of five states, to which we refer today as the states of Central Asia. During the Soviet years, the authorities carried out large-scale modernisation of the traditional way of life of local communities; and, quite often, extremely harsh measures were employed to achieve this modernisation. For instance, there was a terrible famine in Kazakhstan at the start of the 1930s, resulting in a large number of victims. On the other hand, the USSR succeeded in achieving universal literacy of its population and conducted major construction of its infrastructure. In broad terms, it created the institutional framework upon which future independent statehood in Central Asia would be based. That having been said, the Central Asia region, referred to as Central Asia and Kazakhstan at the time, was on the periphery of the USSR. The region’s external borders with China and the Islamic world were closed, accompanied by an almost complete cessation of historically conducted trade and personal contacts. On the whole, the region was isolated from

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the outside world to which it had been attached for thousands of years. This led to significant differences in development, which became evident after the collapse of the USSR. Without doubt, intracontinental trade, even beyond the limits of the Great Silk Road, lost its former importance. Central Asia’s peripheral nature within the context of the entire historical area of land-locked Eurasia was one of its main defining features just before the collapse of the USSR. Nevertheless, the region remained relevant in terms of the Cold War waged between the USSR and the USA after the Second World War. Significantly, Afghanistan continued on the whole to play the role of buffer state up until 1979. In that year, the balance was disturbed by a military coup carried out by the far-left People’s Democratic Party, an organisation ideologically close to the USSR. As a result, Afghanistan became a battleground between the main antagonists of the Cold War— the USSR and the USA—as well as a large number of regional powers, from China to Saudi Arabia. It is widely thought that this very war precipitated the collapse of the USSR. It is telling that, once again, the Central Asia region emphasised its strategic importance to the outcome of a geopolitical confrontation of global significance. After the Great Game, the Cold War became the second-largest clash between two world powers with contradictory interests centred in Central Asia.

The New Geopolitical Reality in Central Asia The collapse of the USSR led to the end of the Cold War and, inter alia, contributed to a change in the overall geopolitical situation in the inner areas of the Eurasian continent. Essentially, the main change was that, as the former Soviet Asian republics of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan gained independence, independent actors in international politics also emerged. At the same time, the economic policy of the newly independent states stimulated international business across the former borders of the USSR, which sparked the gradual development of regional trade. Similarly, the rejection of a planned socialist economy by certain countries in the region led to the development of market relations, an increase in the level of trade and the appearance of domestic demand. This was mainly true for Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, whereas Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan chose to maintain the system of state capitalism that had marked the latter

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years of the USSR. The state remained the main economic actor in these two republics, and, without doubt, this had a bearing on their economic development. Regardless of this, the independence of the five states of Soviet Asia signified a change in the overall situation in Eurasia’s inland areas. From this point forward, the states in the region became independent actors, which automatically changed the region’s geopolitics and geo-economics. This was related to the development of intracontinental trade. To some extent, the significance of the resultant geopolitical changes was reflected by the fact that the term “Central Asian states” was applied to just five former Soviet states, even though it is evident that these states constitute only part of the larger space of inner Central Asia, and it would be more logical to use such a term in a broader geographical sense; however, no doubt, the reason why the term “Central Asia” was applied to these states alone was due to the region’s strategic importance within the new reality which emerged after the collapse of the USSR. Moreover, following the collapse of the USSR, the Russian authorities did not give any consideration to the geopolitical element in Central Asia’s importance to Russian interests. The dismantling of the Soviet state also meant the abandonment of USSR-style foreign policy in the far- and near-abroad, which was perceived as an encumbrance on the interests of the new Russian republic. Consequently, geopolitical matters were generally not one of Russia’s priorities, and this was pertinent, in particular, to the area of Central Asia. In the meantime, the precarious situation in Afghanistan, with the fall of Najibullah’s government in April 1992, and the start of a civil war in Tajikistan, led to the security situation in the region deteriorating dramatically. In May 1992, the Collective Security Treaty was signed in Uzbekistan’s capital, Tashkent. This agreement was a direct response by Russia and other countries of the region, excluding Turkmenistan, to the overall deterioration of the situation and its associated risks. Given that all the newly independent states had to create their security structures from scratch, the new agreement provided them with an opportunity to rely not so much on their neighbours, as on the security structures of the USSR, which were undergoing a very painful transformation at the time. “At first glance, it appeared that there was simply no urgent need to maintain a Russian presence in Central Asia. It could be said that Russia’s actual political presence in the Central Asia region would have come to an end by 1992, had it not been for events in Tajikistan.

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The civil war there in 1991–1992 acted as an anchor that kept Russia in Central Asia. Russia’s presence in the region was maintained not as a result of the Russian state leadership’s policy at the time, but due to the inability of Tajikistan’s traditional political elite to start the process of state-building”.27 The crisis in Tajikistan brought about the appearance of the first Russian military base in Central Asia, based on the facilities and personnel of the former Soviet 201 Division. This military base was of great significance in terms of maintaining a Russian presence in the region. Moreover, it played an important role in the events of the late 1990s, when, effectively, it acted as a logistical foothold in supporting the forces of Afghan commander Ahmad Shah Massoud against the Taliban. Nevertheless, the main events in the region did not take place in Central Asia, itself, but in neighbouring Afghanistan. This is where the Taliban appeared in 1994, sponsored by Pakistan. In the early stages of its existence, it had been supported by Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates. In 1995, the American company, Unocal, was planning to build a gas pipeline from Turkmenistan to Pakistan, which was due to pass through Taliban-controlled territory. In the summer of 2000, the US Senate’s Committee on Foreign Relations discussed the possibility of representatives of the Bill Clinton administration engaging with the Taliban, whilst Congressman Dana Rohrabacher had been accusing the administration of covertly supporting the Taliban since its inception.28 At this point, we should pay attention to the main geopolitical contradictions that started developing in the vicinity of Central Asia from about the mid-1990s. The USA’s main task concerned the opening of transport corridors, which would not pass through the territories of Russia, Iran and China. This was supposed to help overcome Central Asia’s isolation from global markets and, at the same time, reduce its level of dependence on the three aforementioned countries. Therefore, to some degree, and ever since 1991, the USA has supported projects, which pass through the territories of the Caucasus and Afghanistan. On the whole, US policy in the region is geared towards supporting the independence of the Central Asian states, regardless of their political 27 Akimbekov S. M., Afganskii uzel i problemy bezopasnosti Tsentral’noi Azii, Alamaty, 2003, p. 164. 28 Congressional Record, V. 148, PT. 1, January 23, 2002 to February 13, 2002, Washington, D.C. Government Printing Office, 2006, p. 143.

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set-up. For example, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan are clearly undemocratic countries, which is at odds with the West’s stated ideological values. In the words of Laruelle and Peyrouse, “the United States has struggled to establish its position with respect to each of the Central Asian states”.29 This stems from the USA’s desire to limit the possibility of Russia regaining its former status in the region. From this point of view, the identity gained by the newly independent states since 1991 matters, as do the multi-vector politics they pursue. The politics of the Central Asian states provides grounds for the USA and its European allies to exercise influence in this strategically important region; but, at the same time, Russia, China and Iran regard this influence as a challenge and a problem. They consider US policy an attempt to establish the USA’s presence in Central Asia and to use this against them. The Central Asia region is of strategic importance to Russia: firstly, due to the fact that Central Asia is a corridor for Russia to South Asia. By maintaining its influence in Central Asia, Moscow remains an important player in Asian affairs. Secondly, the region is important to Russia in terms of security matters, and is often referred to as Russia’s “soft underbelly”. Such a definition implies that the area has vulnerabilities and Russia needs to protect its interests there. Consequently, Moscow has been critical of the trend for third countries to increase their influence in the region since at least the 1990s. This concerns primarily the USA, which, following a brief change at the beginning of the 1990s, is once again considered to be Russia’s main geopolitical competitor. It also explains Russia’s frequently expressed criticism of the multi-vector policies of the Central Asian states. For instance, the opinion of the Russian author, Gennadii Chufrin, is very telling: “While recognising the right of its partners to conduct a sovereign foreign policy, Moscow cannot at the same time ignore the fact that, when these partners implement policies of a ‘multi-vector nature’, not only do they often fail in practice to take into account the national interests of the Russian Federation, but also they act directly contrary to such interests”.30 29 Laruelle M., Peyrouse S., Globalizing Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Challenges of Economic Development, p. 50. 30 Chufrin G., “Vneshnepoliticheskaia strategiia postsovetskikh stran: teoreticheskie aspekty” [Foreign Policy Strategy of Post-Soviet States: Theoretical Aspects], Rossiia i novye gosudarstva Evrazii, No. 1, IMEMO RAN, Moscow, 2018, p. 22.

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Without question, China was also quite restrained in its attitude to the prospects of third countries increasing their influence in the Central Asia region. What Beijing worried about most was the radicalisation of political Islam, which appeared at the beginning of the 1990s in both Afghanistan, especially against a backdrop of the fall of the Najibullah government and the rise to power of the Taliban, and in Central Asia, itself. After 70 years under the Soviet policy of atheism, society embraced a brisk growth in religion in the region. In certain cases, such as in Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, this led to the politicisation of Islam and the emergence of religious political parties. This issue was particularly sensitive for China due to the situation in the western Chinese region of Xinjiang, which had a mainly Muslim population. Consequently, Beijing was interested in finding a solution to any security problems in the region. That said, China showed restraint in the 1990s: firstly, because Beijing generally agreed with Russia’s prevailing influence in the Central Asia region, especially on security issues; and, secondly, because China had been carrying out a major economic modernisation programme since the 1980s, based on the idea of creating an export-orientated economy, which required foreign target markets, most notably the US market. Basically, it was this policy that, ultimately, led to a huge US trade deficit with China, which, in turn, became the reason for the US-China trade war during Donald Trump’s presidency. Then, in 1989, China experienced the tragic events of Tiananmen Square. When they were over, the Chinese leadership held an overarching interest in rebuilding its relations with the USA, in order to continue its reforms. This is one of the reasons why Beijing adopted a fairly cautious position in its foreign policy. Since the beginning of the 1990s, the economy has been one of China’s top policy priorities. Meanwhile, the Chinese leadership was compelled to show an interest in what was happening in Central Asia. On the one hand, this stemmed from the desire of the region’s states to pursue multi-vector politics, thus opening up new opportunities for Beijing. On the other hand, security issues in the region became highly relevant in the mid-1990s, particularly in light of the Taliban’s capture of Kabul in 1996 and the commencement of the movement’s extremely outdated religious politics. Consequently, Central Asia or Russia could not raise any particular objection to China’s participation in solving security issues.

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In 1996, the so-called “Shanghai Five” grouping was created, which was transformed into the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO) in June 2001. Subsequently, the SCO became a highly influential regional organisation, especially after India and Pakistan became members in 2017. Nevertheless, it all started with the “Shanghai Five”, whose creation marked the beginning of China’s active involvement in the internal affairs of the Central Asia region. As China’s economic power grew, providing it with political and military capabilities, the influence of the SCO grew, too, although some believe that this influence is still just formal. For instance, Paul Stronski has written that “the SCO is neither a formal alliance nor a security organisation, but rather a discussion and training forum, focussing primarily on counter-terrorism, counter-narcotics and cyber issues”.31 An alternative view, expressed by Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse, holds that “for Russia, the organisation obliged China to play the card of multilateralism and allow Moscow to curb Beijing’s ambitions without directly confronting its growing influence in the Central Asia region. For China, the SCO has made it possible to institutionalise its legitimacy in the region. With this done, it can set about playing on the contradictions between member states and lobby groups without risk of being accused of expansionism. For the Central Asians? The organisation serves as a buffer, it can mediate disagreements and peacefully channel competition between the two dominant powers for a more advantageous solution”.32 One way or another, it is apparent that China is being dragged increasingly into competition with Russia over Central Asian geopolitics. Moreover, China’s involvement provides countries in the region with additional opportunities to pursue multi-vector politics. “Even if, economically, China has emerged as the region’s number one trading partner and investor, Russia will try to remain as the pre-eminent political

31 Stronski P., “Cooperation and Competition: Russia and China in Central Asia, the Russian Far East and the Arctic”, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/28/coo peration-and-competition-russia-and-china-in-central-asia-russian-far-east-and-arctic-pub75673. 32 Laruelle M., Peyrouse S, The Chinese Question in Central Asia. Domestic Order, Social Change and the Chinese Factor, Columbia University Press, NY, 2012, p. 33.

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force in Central Asia. Beijing and Moscow always had increased competition for their influence and pre-eminence in the developing world”.33 Regardless of the fact that China and Russia share common interests in wishing to prevent third countries from strengthening their influence in this strategically important region, Moscow and Beijing, nevertheless, still have their own priorities in the geopolitical rivalry around Central Asia and these priorities do not always coincide. In broad terms, China, Russia and the USA constitute a geopolitical triangle of great powers competing for influence in the Central Asia region. The complex relations in this triangle make it possible for the countries of the region to continue their multi-vector politics. Their position at the centre of the continent has left them with no other tactical option than to try, with varying degrees of success, to create a balance between China, Russia and the USA; but this requires a precarious balance of power between the competing rivals. Relations between China and the USA were described quite vividly by former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger when he said: “An explicit American project to organise Asia on the basis of containing China or creating a bloc of democratic states for an ideological crusade is unlikely to succeed—in part because China is an indispensable trading partner for most of its neighbours. By the same token, a Chinese attempt to exclude America from Asian economic and security affairs will similarly meet serious resistance from almost all other Asian states, which fear the consequences of a region dominated by a single power”.34 Kissinger’s assessment of Sino-American relations is entirely in line with the geopolitics of Central Asia. The geopolitical balance in the region is still based on everyone trying to avoid a scenario in which one of the great powers is dominant because such a development would involve a much tougher form of competition. With the Central Asian states remaining independent actors and, on the whole, pursuing multi-vector politics, the competition between the great powers concerns political influence. If the Central Asian states were to become involved in a geopolitical conflict, the rivalling great powers would have no choice but to play a greater role there. 33 Aruuke Uran Kyzy, The “Great Game”: Russia and China in Central Asia, IstanbulLondon-Washington, TRT World, 2019, p. 12. 34 Henry Kissinger, “The China Challenge,” The Wall Street Journal, May 14, 2011, https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748703864204576315223305697158

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Clearly, this would create further opportunities for the region’s states to manoeuvre between the interests of the great powers and regional powers, and act in their own interests. Marlène Laruelle and Sébastien Peyrouse have written “most importantly, despite a power differential that is not in their favour, they are able to deploy strategies to force regional actors and global powers to compete with one another, and have the capacity to limit the impact of outsiders. Neither Russia nor China not the United States can impose their rules of the game on Central Asia in a unilateral manner, and any of them may experience sudden losses of influence”.35 Naturally, the price of losing influence is too high in a strategically important region, where the interests of so many influential actors and, simultaneously, clear competitors have come together. Generally speaking, a certain instability surrounding the position of the great powers in the region is a feature specific to Central Asia. This stems from the fact that the situation there can change according to changes in the political state of affairs, which might depend on both external and internal factors. For example, in 2001, following the tragic events of 11 September in the USA, the Americans launched a military operation in Afghanistan. One of the consequences of the changes that occurred was a noticeable strengthening of America’s presence within Central Asia. A specific example was the opening of US military bases in Uzbekistan (Khanabad) and Kyrgyzstan (Manas). For its part, Russia opened a military base in Kyrgyzstan (Kant). The Khanabad base was closed in 2005, and Manas was closed in 2014. Russia was very critical of the US military presence in Central Asia, although Russia supported US policy in Afghanistan in 2001–2002. Without Russia’s support, the USA would have faced great difficulties in its operation against the Taliban at the end of 2001 and the beginning of 2002. Furthermore, all US actions in Afghanistan since 2001 have been carried out with Iran maintaining neutrality, despite all of the tensions in American-Iranian relations. Russia should be credited with at least playing an intermediary role between the USA and Iran in 2001. “The arrangements between the USA and Russia, which were mediated by China, dictated the future course of the war against the ‘Taliban’.

35 Laruelle M., Peyrouse S., Globalizing Central Asia: Geopolitics and the Challenges of Economic Development, p. 5.

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Furthermore, Russia represented Iran’s interests, while the USA represented the interests of Pakistan. These were the main actors on the Afghan political stage in autumn 2001”.36 At that moment, Russia’s decision to support the USA was a tactical consideration due to the circumstances, although Russia made considerable effort thereafter to reduce the USA’s military presence in the region. On the whole, the overall situation compels actors external to Central Asia to proceed with extreme caution to avoid mutual confrontation. In this respect, Russia is the country in the most difficult position since: firstly, Russia’s interests are particularly sensitive to developments in the region, especially as Russia considers Central Asia to be traditionally within its sphere of interests; and, secondly, it has actually had to compete for influence with new external actors in the region following the collapse of the USSR. Paul Stronski has written in this regard that “the entry into the region of actors other than Russia—most notably, China, the European Union, the United States, and Middle Eastern states—has expanded the range of options for diversifying their foreign policies. As a result of these changes, Russia’s ambitions in Eurasia far exceed its grasp”.37 Of course, the fact that a large number of external actors, other than the three great powers, are involved in the geopolitics of Central Asia, is not always very apparent; nevertheless, we have the impression that many Eurasian regional powers are involved. All told, this makes the region of Central Asia one of the most geopolitically important areas where there is a convergence of so many interests. Often, these interests are not very clearly defined; nevertheless, Central Asia is a regular item on the agenda. The European Union, in particular, is trying to play an active role in the region. There is a widespread opinion that “Central Asia is not a vital element of European foreign policy strategies and does not have any priority on the external policy agenda compared with the EU’s neighbouring countries and large growing economies such as China and India”.38 At the same time, Central Asia is on the approach route to both India and China, and transport corridors to Europe pass through 36 Akimbekov S. M., Istoriia Afganistana, Astana-Almaty, IMEP, 2015, p. 657. 37 Stronski P., There Goes the Neighborhood: The Limits of Russian Integration in

Eurasia, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, 2020, p. 3. 38 Peyrouse S., Boonstra J., Laruelle M., “Security and Development Approaches to Central Asia: The EU Compared to China and Russia”, EUCAM Working Paper No. 11, May 2012, p. 5.

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the region. Afghanistan lies to the south, and even further south lies an over-populated South Asia, where, in parts, there is a strong presence of radical religious ideologies. Consequently, it is clear that, in such a context, the EU’s interest in Central Asia is completely justified in the long term. Every regional country that shows an interest in the geopolitics of Central Asia has its own reasons for doing so. This is true for India, Iran, Pakistan, the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia and Turkey. This makes the Central Asia region the nerve centre of global geopolitics, as mentioned at the beginning of this chapter. At the same time, we should stress that developments concerning Central Asia are gradually changing. For instance, a gradual increase in the region’s economic importance is beginning to exert an ever-growing influence on matters. This is happening as the scale of intracontinental trade expands. On the other hand, this change stems from the region’s states withdrawing partially from their peripheral status and from the geographical isolation in which they found themselves before the collapse of the Soviet Union, as well as for several hundred years before the formation of the Soviet Union, following the closure of the historical Great Silk Road. This is also a result of the “Silk Road Economic Belt” programme, initiated by China and announced by President Xi Jinping in the Kazakhstani capital, Astana, in 2013. To all intents and purposes, the Chinese authorities were announcing their ambitions to restore transcontinental trade between China and Europe, meaning, in essence, the establishment of a new version of the Great Silk Road. Clearly, this involves more than China just broadening its trade opportunities and seeking new markets, but also increasing its influence in many territories, including Central Asia. To use Peter Frankopan’s phrase, “the new Silk Roads are an integral part not only of China’s economic and foreign policy, but they are also an integral part of how China sees the world – and how it is preparing for the future”.39 In this Chinese vision of the world, without doubt, Central Asia occupies a special place in terms of Beijing’s geopolitical interests, primarily due to the security of China’s

39 Frankopan P., The New Silk Roads: The Present and Future of the World, Bloomsbury, London, 2018, p. 148.

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western borders with the Muslim world. Moreover, China wishes to maintain its newly acquired great power status, which relies on economic power. To achieve this, it is important that, on the one hand, China avoids strategic encirclement from its western side, because China has difficult relations with a number of regional states in Southeast Asia—from Vietnam and Taiwan to Japan and South Korea. On the other hand, it is also important that the USA neither has excessive influence nor tries to promote a liberal agenda in the Muslim world, including Central Asia, because any weakening of the central governments in Muslim states could lead to a rise in anti-Chinese sentiment. Consequently, the Belt and Road Initiative provides economic support to strong governments to the west of China’s borders. In this regard, Eric McGlinchey has written that “China’s new activism in the region leaves little doubt that Western strategies to link aid to Central Asian political reform will continue to struggle. Now not only the Moscow option is open to Central Asian leaders – the Beijing option is open as well”.40 Undoubtedly, the strengthening of China through its Belt and Road Initiative limits opportunities for other actors, including the USA and Russia. Beijing also invests in complex infrastructure projects, which neither Moscow nor Washington is prepared to do. Significantly, China seeks to transform its economic influence gradually over time into political and military influence. To give an example of this, on 26 April 2018, China’s Ministry of Defence spokesman, Senior Colonel Wu Qing said, “We are going to organise a series of joint exercises, which shall focus on gaining hands-on experience and strengthen collaboration in the framework of multilateral co-operation between China, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tajikistan”.41 In this instance, China is actually encroaching on Russia’s traditional area of responsibility, bearing in mind that Russia maintains its influence in Central Asia through involvement in security issues there. The Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO) is of the greatest importance to Russia. In contrast to the SCO, China is not a member 40 McGlinchey E., Chaos, Violence, Dynasty: Politics and Islam in Central Asia, University of Pittsburg Press, 2011, p. 34. 41 “China, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Tajikistan to Conduct Joint Counter-Terrorism Exercise”, Chinese Defence Ministry, http://www.app.com.pk/china-pakistan-afghanistan-taj ikistan-conduct-joint-counter-terrorism-exercise-chinese-defence-ministry/.

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of the CSTO; and, although both organisations were launched with a focus on Central Asia, before spreading beyond the region’s borders (in Russia’s case, when Armenia joined the CSTO, and in China’s case, when the SCO expanded to include India and Pakistan), there were significant differences between them. The CSTO was an organisation that covered the post-Soviet space, and Russia clearly had the greatest influence; whilst the SCO signified China’s presence in Central Asia, albeit without playing a substantive role. Paul Stronski believes that China “is careful to be deferential to Moscow, refraining from projecting its own military power in the region and leaving most security issues to Moscow”.42 Meanwhile, the fact that China is conducting military exercises involving Afghanistan, Pakistan and Tajikistan is clear evidence that it is trying to move beyond its current constraints. The participation of CSTO member Tajikistan in the exercises is particularly significant. However, China is also trying to move beyond the confines of Central Asia by examining various international alliances involving states in the region, as well as other regional powers. In the abovementioned example involving military exercises, the regional power is Pakistan, which played a significant role in events around Afghanistan in the 1990s. By 1991, these two countries were on different sides of the conflict between the Taliban and the Northern Alliance. They provided strategic logistics for the two opposing forces in Afghanistan. Subsequently, China’s declared intention of uniting Pakistan and Tajikistan through the so-called Urumqi Agreement (which was signed in 2016 in the Chinese city of Urumqi and also included Afghanistan and China) reflected its desire to play a leading role in resolving the situation in Afghanistan. Of course, this is not very advantageous for Russia, for which China is becoming a competitor in several issues, including security. Given that Russia’s economy is unable to compete with China’s, Russia has very limited opportunities to implement economic projects and provide economic support to states in the region. In such circumstances, security issues are of particular importance to ensuring Russia’s interests in Central Asia.

42 Stronski P., “Cooperation and Competition: Russia and China in Central Asia, the Russian Far East and the Arctic”, https://carnegieendowment.org/2018/02/28/coo peration-and-competition-russia-and-china-in-central-asia-russian-far-east-and-arctic-pub75673.

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This is because the threat from the south is still a matter of concern to the Central Asian states. The prospect of the Taliban coming to power, which became possible after the Taliban negotiated with the US Government, only increased this concern. Such an external threat provides some legitimacy for Russia’s military presence in the region, particularly in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Furthermore, the threat allows Russia to concentrate on security issues, which makes it possible for Russia to avoid discussion of its economic involvement in the region’s affairs at a level that only China can afford. It is clear, however, that China is also restricted in the way it conducts policy in Central Asia, Afghanistan and the Muslim world. At least, it is not possible to make the case that China could become the undoubtedly dominant actor in the region’s geopolitics. Moreover, China’s economic opportunities decreased noticeably in relation to the crisis that occurred in 2020 as a result of the Covid-19 pandemic. Consequently, China might find that continuing policy at the previous level within the framework of the Belt and Road Initiative proves to be extremely difficult. Whatever the case, China remains an influential actor in Central Asia, as well as in South Asia. Clearly, the USA also retains its influence. Following Joe Biden’s victory in the 2020 presidential election, we should expect to see a reinvigoration of US policy regarding a number of areas of strategic importance to Washington, including, of course, Afghanistan and Central Asia. Perhaps, if Donald Trump had won the election in November 2020, he would have carried out his idea of a complete US military withdrawal from Afghanistan, which would have led to reduced US influence throughout the region. Such a development would only strengthen Russia’s interest in the region, and this interest would be extremely significant in any future kind of geopolitical rivalry. This produces all the conditions for continued geopolitical competition between three powers—China, Russia and the USA—as well as a number of other aforementioned regional states. That said, it is worth noting that the situation differs markedly from the one that existed in the 1990s and 2000s. Above all, the geo-economics have changed considerably. Central Asia is gradually being transformed from a peripheral territory on the edge of a former empire to a transit centre at the very heart of Eurasia. Significantly, whereas only the USA supported the idea of increasing the region’s level of transport accessibility in the past, China has adopted the same approach as part of its policy today. This development creates certain difficulties for Russian policy, which, traditionally, focusses

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on solving the region’s security issues. In this respect, Afghanistan is perceived as a source of potential threat and, consequently, requires security rather than the development of transport routes. The fact that the Central Asian states remain independent actors and continue to pursue multi-vector politics is an important geopolitical and geo-economic feature of the region. Without doubt, this, among other things, has been brought about by the geopolitical rivalry between great and regional powers; however, the fact that the largest states in Central Asia—Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan—were able to create their own agendas within their multi-vector policy approach and in difficult geopolitical conditions has played a large role. Above all, we are talking about Kazakhstan, because, until the mid2010s, Uzbekistan was isolationist in terms of both its economy and politics; whereas, since the early 1990s, Kazakhstan has promoted a policy of opening up Central Asia, for the purpose of stimulating intracontinental trade. Its ambitions in this regard stem from the fact that, in the medium term, it would be at the heart of the main traffic flow in central Eurasia. In turn, Uzbekistan has intensified its foreign policy since the mid2010s, in order to restore its position as the economic and financial centre of the region. The settled oasis areas of Central Asia played this role for most of history, at least until the closure of the Silk Road in the sixteenthseventeenth centuries. Now, trade between China and Europe via Central Asia is gradually being restored. It is also possible that routes to other destinations shall be opened. In such circumstances, it is logical that Central Asia’s strategic position in the very centre of Eurasia should be used to develop the countries of the region. Meanwhile, the geopolitical contest between such a large number of influential actors allows them to pursue multi-vector politics. In this sense, the region is justifiably called the “nerve centre” of Eurasia. The situation can change very quickly here, but the balance of power remains almost constant. One way or another, the inner regions of the Eurasian continent are now of great significance once again to global politics and the world economy.

CHAPTER 6

China’s Eurasian Ideas and the Silk Road Projects Fei Gao and Li Li

Eurasia is of great significance to China’s development and security. For China, Eurasia is not only the economic hub connecting the developed and developing countries, but also the peace and security cornerstone for regional stability. It is also a bridge for cross-cultural exchanges in Eurasia. At the end of the nineteenth century, Ferdinand Freiherrn Von Richthofen, the German geologist and geographer, in his book China: The Results of My Travels and the Studies Based Thereon, named the Western Region roadways for China-Central Asian and China-Indian silk trade (114 B.C.–127 A.D.) “the Silk Road.”1 Early in the twentieth 1 Ferdinand von Richthofen, China: The Results of My Travels and the Studies Based Thereon (Volume 1) (Beijing: China Travel & Tourism Press, 2017).

F. Gao (B) China Foreign Affairs University, Beijing, China e-mail: [email protected] L. Li China Agricultural University, Beijing, China e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Diesen and A. Lukin (eds.), The Return of Eurasia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2179-6_6

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century, Albert Hermann, the German historian, based on newly discovered archaeological work, pointed out that the Silk Road was an ancient commercial route from Central Asia to South Asia, West Asia, Europe, and North Africa.2 That statement redefined the Silk Road till the west coast of Mediterranean and Asia Minor. In the past millenniums, as an important way connecting Europe and Asia, the Silk Road has played an important role in promoting prosperous development of countries along the route, strengthening exchanges and cooperation between the East and the West, and furthering the advancement of world civilizations. It has become a historical and cultural heritage for all the nations in the world. From the ancient Silk Road to today’s “Silk Road Economic Belt,” it reflects the inheritance and evolution of China’s Eurasian ideas.

Chinese Eurasian Ideas in the Ancient History According to the plate tectonics, Eurasia is composed of several adjacent plates in Europe and Asia, thus came the generic term of Eurasia.3 According to Halford J. Mackinder, the British geographer, “Whoever rules the Eastern Europe controls the heart of the world; whoever rules the heart of the world controls the world islands; and whoever rules the world islands controls the world.”4 This fully reveals the geo-strategic significance of Eurasia. China is located in the East of Eurasia, possessing the feature of both the Core and Periphery of geo-politics. In addition, there are Qinghai Tibet Plateau in the west, Gobi Desert in the north, and oceans in the southeast. The terrain is distributed in three steps from East to West. The natural geographical barrier hindered the communications between ancient China and the outside world, making the Chinese civilization in a relatively independent state of evolution, and rarely had confrontations with other regions. In 326 B.C., when Alexander III of Macedon went on an expedition to India, Europeans did not know about China. It was not until 100 B.C. 2 Albert Hermann, Historical and Commercial Atlas of China (Harvard Yenching

Institute, Monograph Series, Vol. 1) (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1935). 3 Xinghua Ma, Zhenyu Yang, “The Collision and Suturing of the Three Major Blocks in China and the Reconstruction of the Paleo-Eurasia Continent”, ACTA Geophysica Sinica, Vol. 4, 1993, pp. 476–488. 4 Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962), p. 106.

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that the Romans (大秦, dà qín) was first recorded in Chinese history books. However, the first meeting between the two civilizations did not take place until 166 A.D. when Marcus Aurelius Antoninus Augustus, the Roman King, sent envoys to Luoyang.5 It was perceived by the ancient China, a traditional Central Kingdom, that Central Asia, as the Western Regions, was the farthest place in the world. Communication between ancient China and Eurasian inland areas, or the exchanges between agricultural and nomadic civilizations, became an important driving force for the continuous development and progress of ancient China. Therefore, the Eurasian inland areas have always been the strategic orientation of Chinese foreign exchanges.

Western Regions as the Security Shield In the pre-Qin period (before 221 B.C.), there had been communication between China and the West. Silk Road did not come into being till the diplomat of Zhang Qian in the Western Han Dynasty (202 B.C.–8 A.D.) tunneled through the Western Regions. The original purpose of tunneling was to seek for peace with Tokharians (大月氏, dà yuè zhì) who could fight against the Huns together with the Han Dynasty.6 Although that strategic goal was not realized, it started the history for China to learn about the outside world. With its powerful army, the Tang Dynasty (618–907 A.D.) first addressed the security threats of the Eastern Turks on the national frontiers, and then addressed those of the Western Turks. Protectorates (Duhu organizations) were set up to exercise jurisdiction over Anxi7 and Beiting8 areas. Jimi provincial administrative system was established in the Eurasian

5 Ian Morris, Why the West Rules–for Now: The Patterns of History, and What They Reveal About the Future, trans. Feng Qian (Beijing: China International Trust and Investment Corporation (CITIC) Publishing House, 2014), p. 164. 6 Details could be referred to in Qian Sima. “The Biography of Zhang Qian”, Chapter 63 of Ferghana (Dà W˘an) Commentary Section, Vol. 123 of Historical Records (Shˇı Jì) (Tianjin Ancient Books Publishing House, 1995). 7 Mingwei Li, “The Great Feats of Anxi Duhu Organization and the Turk’s Contribution to the Trade on the Silk Road”, N. W. Minorities Research, No. 3, 2001, pp. 134–135. https://doi.org/10.16486/j.cnki.62-1035/d.2001.03.005. 8 Fang Li, “Daluosi Battle and the Policy of Tang Dynasty”, China’s Borderland History and Geography Studies, Vol.1, 2006, pp. 62–63.

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inland areas.9 Those were important institutions maintaining national unity and border security, making the Silk Road prosperous. During the Song Dynasties (960–1279 A.D.), Western Xia (1038– 1227 A.D.), Liao (907–1125 A.D.), Jin (1115–1234 A.D.), and other regimes entered into rivalry with the Song Dynasties over the territory. Exchanges between China and the Western Regions were interrupted. Orientations of economic exchanges turned to the sea, and the maritime Silk Road began to flourish. During the Mongolian Yuan Dynasty (1271–1368 A.D.), the Eurasia was under the rule of Mongols. With the external threats lifted, the Silk Road was completely got through, and the Eurasian inland area became an important site for exchanges between the East and West.10 There have been quite a few European literature depicting that period of time. In the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644 A.D.), with the rise of the Ottoman Empire (1299–1923 A.D.), the Silk Road of Eurasia connecting the land mass from the East to the West was suspended. The flourishing of maritime trade attracted more attention from the national governments than the Western Regions did. During the Qing Dynasty (1636–1912 A.D.), Emperor Kangxi, Yongzheng, and Qianlong pacified the rebellions of Junggar Khan, Senior and Junior Khwajas, and the Hui. National jurisdiction over the Northwestern inland enabled China to be unified as a multi-ethnic nation.11 Till the end of the Qing Dynasty, Zuo Zongtang put down the separatists’ rebellion by armed forces and established the Xinjiang province. It strengthened the contact between the Northwest inland and the central government, which ensured Xinjiang as China’s integrated territory.12 The consolidation of Xinjiang’s status not only ensured the security of

9 Daokui Ma, “A Brief Discussion on Jimi Provincial Administrative System”, Journal of Suzhou Education Institute, Vol. 4, 2000, pp. 25–28. 10 Yuntao Shi, “The Silk Road in the Yuan Dynasty and Foreign Trades”, People’s Tribune, Vol. 14, 2019, pp. 142–144. 11 Huidong Xi, “The Western Regions Viewed in Qing Dynasty Map-Based on Cartographic exchanges of Qing Empire, Junggar, Russia and Europe”, Journal of Xinjiang Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), Vol. 6, 2014, p. 13. 12 Licheng Zhang, Hongwei Li, “The Borderland Crisis in Northwest China in the Late Qing Dynasty and the Related Policies”, Journal of Yunnan Normal University (Humanities and Social Sciences Edition), Vol. 1, 2011, pp. 24–25.

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West China, but also stabled China’s strategic interior for international competitions.

Western Regions as a Trade Partner Before Zhang Qian tunneled through the Western Regions, there had been informal economic exchanges between the Eurasian inland and China. That could be proved by numerous evidences: A large number of Hetian jade materials were unearthed from Tomb of Fu Hao in the Yin Ruin during the Shang Dynasty (about 1766–1122 B.C.); Silk products were found in the ancient Greek and Indian books in the fifth century B.C.13 ; Silk products were found in tombs in Altai region from the fifth century B.C. to the fourth century B.C., and China was called “Silk State (丝国, s¯ı guó)” by Greeks and Romans in the third century B.C.14 In the Western Han Dynasty, the opening up of the Silk Road promoted animal husbandry trade between China and the Eurasian inland areas. According to the historical records, the Western Han court had assigned special persons to Ferghana in central Asia (大宛, dà w˘an) to purchase fine horses.15 During the Sui (581–618 A.D.) and Tang Dynasties, a large number of horses and fur products from Eurasia inland entered the Central Plains. At the same time, merchants purchased silk, cloth, farm tools, and grain back to the Eurasian interior.16 During the Song Dynasties, the economy and trade between the Eurasian inland areas and the Central Plains were interrupted by military

13 Jianxin Yang, “From Emergence of the Silk Road to the Construction of Contemporary Economic Belt–the Road to Mutual Prosperity and Revival of Eurasia”, Journal of Yantai University (Philosophy and Social Science Edition), Vol. 5, 2016, p. 69. https:// doi.org/10.13951/j.cnki.issn1002-3194.2016.05.008. 14 Zhenjia Zhu, “Connections Between the Western Regions and China’s Interior Before Zhang Qian’s Tunneling Through”, Social Sciences in Xinjiang, Vol. 2, 1986, p. 74. 15 Xuefeng Zhou, Li Shen, “The Cause of Two Big-Yuan Wars and Their Influence to the Rule of West Region by Western Han”, Journal of Shihezi University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), Vol. 5, 2006, p. 10. See Ferghana (Dà W˘an) Commentary Section, Vol. 123 of Historical Records (Shˇı Jì) (Tianjin Ancient Books Publishing House, 1995). 16 Qing Yin, “Trade Along the Silk Road in the Western Regions in the Tang Dynasty and the Prosperity of the Commercial Economy in Xizhou”, Social Sciences in Xinjiang, Vol. 3, 2007, pp. 102–103.

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confrontations. However, the economic prosperity of the Central Plains was brought about by the maritime trade. Porcelain, coin money, and Chinese herbal medicines became the main goods.17 During the Yuan Dynasty, the Silk Road was smooth and the Eurasian economy was thriving. Les voyages de Marco Polo records: “All the most precious things in the world can be found in this city (the capital city of the Yuan Dynasty). More goods are sold here than anywhere else. In Kashgar of Xinjiang, textiles are transported by domestic merchants to all parts of the world.” highlighting the status of a Eurasian inland trade hub.18 During the Ming and Qing Dynasties, with the great geographical discovery and the development of navigation technology, trade activities of China gradually inclined to the coastal areas. After the fifteenth century, the transportation system between China and the West shifted from the land to the sea, and the Silk Route declined.

Western Regions for Cultural and Technological Exchanges During the Han and Tang Dynasties, some important inventions and know-hows were diffused to the West through Eurasia. Taking papermaking as an example, it began to be used in China during the second and third centuries. In the middle and late Tang Dynasty, it was disseminated to Samarkand (currently in Uzbekistan), where Arabs set up paper mills and spread it to the West.19 Gunpowder, the compass, movable typing and many other inventions have a similar process of transmission. According to Karl Marx, the three great inventions had spawned the birth of bourgeois society. It was the gunpowder that smashed the class of knights; it was the compass that led the Europeans to explore the global markets and colonies; and it was the movable typing that helped Protestants preach, and served as a means of Scientific Renaissance, and 17 Xuement Zheng, “The Research on the Maritime Silk Road in Tang, Song and Yuan

Dynasty and the Social Economy in Lingnan and Jiangnan Areas”, Researches in Chinese Economic History, Vol. 2, 2017, pp. 11–15. 18 Marco Polo, The Travels of Marco Polo, trans. Kaijun Chen et al. (Fuzhou: Fujian Science and Technology Press, 1981), p. 97. 19 Anlun Wan, “Chinese Papermaking on the Belt & Road”, Modern Publishing, Vol. 6, 2018, pp. 72–74.

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as the most powerful leverage to create a necessary premise for spiritual development.20 The exotic cultures also had a profound impact on China. Buddhism was introduced from the Eurasian inland into China through the Kushan Empire,21 and then gradually formed Chinese Buddhism, which had important impacts on the politics, economy, philosophy, literature, art, civil ideas, and daily lifestyles of Chinese society. In addition, the typical crops, apparels, and accessories of Eurasia were also gradually introduced and integrated with the Chinese cultures, which promoted the development of diversified Chinese civilization. During the Yuan Dynasty, the post station system was widely adopted, and key road sections were guarded by specially assigned persons. Communication efficiency between China and Eurasia were improved.22 After the road was unblocked, the migration flow was promoted, and the Eurasian residents migrated to China constantly. Furthermore, the Hui and other ethnic minorities were formed.23 During the Song Dynasties, Eurasia was also affected by China in people-to-people exchanges. Center of cultural and technological exchanges of China moved southward together with the economic and trade exchanges. However, in culture, especially in literature, the advanced culture of China was learnt by the regimes of Western Xia, Liao, and Jin.24 At the same time, the consciousness of China as one nation was also under formation, which could be reflected in the writings of Shi Jie, a well-known philosopher and thinker in the Song Dynasty, and those of Ouyang Xiu, a famous politician and literati in the Song Dynasty. During the Ming and Qing Dynasties, the map of China was gradually identified. Various ethnicities, such as Uygur, Kazakh, Mongolian, Kirgiz, 20 Karl Marx, Machine, Natural Power, and the Application of Science (Beijing: People’s Press, 1978), p. 67. 21 Hongmou Wang, “The Eastward Spread of Buddhism and Cultural Exchanges in the Period of Kushan Empire”, Chinese Culture Research, Vol. 4, 2014, p. 59. 10.15990/j. cnki.cn11-3306/g2.2014.04.007. 22 Yuntao Shi, Yuntao Shi, “The Silk Road in the Yuan Dynasty and Foreign Trades”,

p. 142. 23 Xiaojia Zhao, Studies on Friendly Exchanges between China and Central Asia, PhD Dissertation, Kazakh Language and Literature Department (Minzu University of China, March 2011), p. 115. 24 Yang Zhao, “On Implications of Literature of the Song Dynasties on Literature of Western Xia”, Lanzhou Academic Journal, Vol. 8, 2016, p. 59.

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Tajik, and Uzbek, integrated and coexisted with each other peacefully, with their former ethnic boundaries being blurred. According to Lucian W. Pye, “China is a civilization pretending to be a state.”25 Throughout history, Chinese civilization has been gradually developed with continuous exchanges between the Central Plains and Eurasia. With the deepening of such exchanges, China’s multicultural traditions with multi-dimensions were established, which laid the foundation for China to be built as a modern nation-state.

Changing Identities of the New China With the world power center shifting from the East to the West in the modern history, China had experienced the process of national strength declining, losing most of its formerly competitive edges in various sectors, moving from “Core” to “Periphery” in the international system. After the founding of People’s Republic of China (PRC), China has evolved from an isolated and backward socialist country to an open and progressive large developing country. The collective rises of China, emerging economies, and developing countries have been adding new perspectives to the “Western Centralism” geographically and culturally. A new look different from the formerly western-dominated international relations system since 1648 is taken on. In the meantime, dynamics of national strength and external environment have also reconstructed China’s national identities from a revolutionist to a reformist, and then to a constructivist. China has been committed to playing a responsible role as a major country in the regional and global governance of Eurasia.

China as a Revolutionist in the International System In the early days of PRC, faced with the international system monopolized by imperialist powers, China identified itself as the challenger and revolutionist in the system. Diplomatic views of “proletarian internationalism,” being ready for revolutions and wars, were adhered to by the Chinese decision-makers. To fulfill the fundamental aim of safeguarding

25 Lucian W. Pye, “China: Erratic State, Frustrated Society”, Foreign Affairs, Vol. 69, No. 4, 1990, p. 58.

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national sovereignty and independence, China had alienated itself from the international system. Such an identity was closely related to severe international circumstances and China’s domestic situations. Economically, the newly founded PRC was locked down and left out by the western countries. It was difficult to enter the international market and obtain the financial, technical and raw material support needed for modernization. Militarily, China’s national security was threatened by the Korean War in 1950 and the US military intervention in Taiwan. Influenced by the Western hostile policies, China was not respected politically and economically, and was not accepted by the western international system for a long time. It was not until 1964 that the first Western country France established diplomatic relations with PRC. By then, China was poor and weak, depending mainly on agriculture, lagging behind in economic development. Due to the limitation of productivity and low grain yield, Chinese people lived at the mercy of nature. In addition, China’s industrial base was quite fragile. There were only mining, textile, and simple processing in its industrial sectors, and a large number of industrial products were imported. According to statistics, in 1952, the added value of China’s primary, secondary, and tertiary industries accounted for 50.5%, 20.8%, and 28.7% of GDP, respectively. In that year, the GDP was only 67.9 billion RMB yuan, and the per capita GDP was 119 RMB yuan. Its proportion in the world GDP was almost negligible.26 With the challenging international and domestic situations, it was the only choice for China to “lean to one side” of the socialist camp led by the Soviet Union, to resist the attack from the imperialist camp led by the United States. It was related to the goal of safeguarding sovereignty and independence.

China as a Reformist in the International System After the 1970s, great changes have taken place in the international situation. Peace and development became the main themes of the times. After

26 National Bureau of Statistics of China (NBS), 70 Years of Dramatic Changes with Achievements of National Development: Report on Economic and Social Development on the 70th Anniversary of People’s Republic of China (I), Comprehensive Affairs Department of NBS, July 1, 2019, http://www.stats.gov.cn/tjsj/zxfb/201907/t20190701_1673407. html, accessed on December 15.

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the 3rd Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China (CPC) in 1978, China’s diplomatic strategy turned to serve economic construction. In the 1980s, China started to participate in the activities of the international community in an all-round way, and its self-identity changed from an introverted revolutionist to an active participant and reformist in the international system. Through reformation and opening up policies, China has been intensively involved in global economic cooperation, fully connected with the global industrial restructuring, and its economic strength has been rapidly improving. Now, China has been recognized as the “world factory.” At the same time, China’s network with the international system has also been deepened. In the past three decades, China has learned a lot of international norms and accumulated rich experience in international exchanges by signing international treaties, joining international organizations, participating in international affairs, and constructing friendly relations with other countries. China pursued to reform the unreasonable international political and economic order in a peaceful and rational way. China joined 39 multilateral international treaties from 1949 to 1979, and that number increased to about 210 from 1979 to 2004. During the Asian financial crisis in 1997, China resisted the devaluation of RMB yuan, which effectively maintained regional financial stability. In 2001, after the long negotiations on the resumption of General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), China formally joined the World Trade Organization (WTO) and began to be integrated into the process of globalization in a deeper and wider range. Besides, after experiencing a trough of bilateral relations in the 1960s and 1970s, China and the former Soviet Union realized the normalization of bilateral relations in 1989. The two sides not only realized the smooth transition from China-Soviet Union to China– Russia relations, but also gradually established a comprehensive strategic partnership of cooperation, which has set a model for the new type of major-country relations. With the evolution of national identity, China has begun to hold high the banner of peace, development, and “win-win” cooperation, actively carrying out collaborative projects with international partners.

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China as a Constructivist in the International System In the new century, the management capacities of the western developed countries in the world affairs continue to decline. Emerging economies and developing countries are collectively rising. The international power structure has been under in-depth changes. According to the statistics of the United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), from 1990 to 2017, the proportion of developed countries in global GDP dropped from 78.7 to 57.8%, while the proportion of emerging market countries in global GDP increased from 19.0 to 38.5%.27 Among them, China’s GDP in 1978 was only 6.3% of that of the United States and 14.8% of Japan. By 2018, China’s GDP has risen to 66.3% of the United States and 273.6% of Japan. The national strength has improved significantly. At present, China has become the only country in the world with all industrial categories in the United Nations Industrial Classification. Among the 500 major industrial products, over 220 kinds of industrial products produced in China ranks first in global production.28 In terms of international trade, China’s total import and export volume was 6.46 billion RMB yuan in 1952. That number increased to 45.46 billion RMB yuan in 1979 and 30.42 trillion RMB yuan in 2019, accounting for 13.2% of the total global commodity trade. The foreign exchange reserves were only 108 million US dollars at the end of 1952, which climbed to 167 million US dollars at the end of 1978. At the end of 2006, it exceeded 1 trillion US dollars, outnumbered Japan, ranking the first in the world. By the end of 2019, the balance of foreign exchange reserves was 3.1 trillion US dollars, making China the top in the world for 14 consecutive years. The growth of foreign exchange reserves has put China’s foreign investment in motion. From 2002 to 2019, China’s foreign direct investment (FDI) increased rapidly. FDI flow (2016–2019)

27 Source: https://unctadstat.unctad.org, accessed on August 10, 2019. 28 Jie Li, “China Has Become the Only Country in the World with all Industrial Cate-

gories in the United Nations Industrial Classification”, People’s Daily, September 21, 2019. http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2019-09/21/c_1125021487.htm, accessed on November 10, 2020.

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had been accounting for over 10% of the world.29 In terms of scientific and technological (S&T) innovation, China became the largest patent applicant in 2015, accounting for 46.8% of the world’s total.30 With the significant improvement of China’s strength, it’s increasingly recognized as a global major country. As the largest developing country in the world and an economy that emerged from a semi-colonial nationstate, China has always been committed to voice for the developing countries in the global multilateral and regional development mechanisms, improving the representation and voice of developing countries, and actively safeguarding the rights and interests of developing countries. At the same time, as the world’s second-largest economy, China does not evade its international responsibilities in global affairs. China contributes the ideal vision of “building a community with a shared future for mankind,” advocating collective action in a world of interdependence to cope with the common global challenges. China proposes the global governance concepts and schemes of “seeking for shared benefits through consultation and collaboration,” emphasizing the guiding principles of “sovereignty, morality, and peaceful coexistence” in Eurasian governance. China put forward its suggestions for regional actions that multilateral rules should be abided by, and decisions should be made according to the consensus reached through consultative democracy, to construct win–win partnerships. In practice, China firmly supports the international system with the United Nations as the core and upholds the international order based on international laws. In the past 30 years, the Chinese army has sent over 40,000 peacekeepers in 25 UN peacekeeping operations successively. By now, China has been the 2nd largest payment provider and membership dues contributor, and the largest troop sender in the permanent members of the UN Security Council.31 Furthermore, China’s contribution to the United Nations has constantly risen from 0.995% in 2000 to 12.01% in 29 Ministry of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China (MOFCOM), NBS, and State Administration of Foreign Exchange (SAFE), 2019 Statistical Bulletin of China’s Outward Foreign Direct Investment, China Commerce and Trade Press, September 2020, http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/hzs/202010/20201029172027652.pdf. Accessed on November 9, 2020. 30 Angang Hu, “Creating and Grasping Strategic Opportunities for China”, Journal of Xinjiang Normal University (Philosophy and Social Sciences), Vol. 3, 2019, p. 8. 31 The State Council Information Office of the People’s Republic of China, White Paper on the Three Decades of Chinese Army Joining the UN Peace-Keeping Operation,

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2021, with a 12-fold increase within two decades. That increasing speed has also been the fastest among the UN member states.32 At present, China has established diplomatic relations with 180 countries, building up partnerships with 112 countries and international organizations, joining in over 100 intergovernmental international organizations, and signed more than 500 multilateral treaties.33 Since the breaking out of the global financial crisis in 2008, China has maintained its economic growth rate and kept contributing to global economic growth at a proportion level of about 30%. That has been an important stabilizing factor for the global economic recovery. What’s more, China has always been an active advocator and energetic enabler of poverty reduction in the world. In 2015, China became the first developing country to achieve the goal of poverty reduction in the millennium development goals.34 Over the past 30 years of reform and opening up, China has lifted 850 million people out of poverty, contributing over 70% to global poverty reduction, becoming the first in the world to eradicate domestic extreme poverty in 2020, meeting the poverty eradication target 10 years before the set time in the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development.35 China has vigorously carried out foreign aid to the developing countries under the framework of SouthSouth cooperation. Over the past 60 years, China has provided assistance of 400 billion yuan to 166 countries and international organizations.36 In the area of climate governance, China has taken the initiative to plan

Xinhua News Agency, September 18, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/2020-09/18/ c_1126507977.htm, accessed on November 18, 2020. 32 Guihong Zhang, “What Does the 2nd Largest Membership Fees Contributor in the United Nations Mean?”, Global Times, January 17, 2019, http://news.china.com.cn/ 2019-01/17/content_74381686.htm, accessed on August 10, 2020. 33 Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA) of China, Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Geng Shuang’s Regular Press Conference on January 8, 2020, http://new.fmprc.gov.cn/web/ fyrbt_673021/jzhsl_673025/t1730274.shtml, accessed on September 20, 2020. 34 Wen Xin, “Xi Jinping: China Has Achieved the Millennium Development Goal of Poverty Reduction This Year”, China News Agency, October 16, 2015, http://news. china.com.cn/2015-10/16/content_36823445.htm, accessed on November 15, 2020. 35 Xia Hua, “China Focus: China Nears Poverty Reduction Goal, a Model for Global Campaign”, Xinhua News Agency, September 25, 2020, http://www.xinhuanet.com/eng lish/2020-09/25/c_139396758.htm, accessed on November 12, 2020. 36 Jinping Xi, “China Aided about 400 Billion RMB yuan to 166 Countries and International Organizations”, People’s Daily, October 16, 2016, http://politics.people.com. cn/n/2015/1016/c1001-27706166.html, accessed on October 10, 2020.

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and forge ahead, adhering to the principles of “common but differentiated responsibilities,” fairness and respective capabilities. It promoted the United Nations Conference on Climate Change in Paris (COP21) to reach a loose, flexible and more inclusive post-2020 global climate governance system. China’s efforts have made positive contributions to maintain the stable development of the world and positively promoted the improvement of global governance. With numerous developing countries, Eurasia has been marginalized in the international system for a long time, lacking representation and voices. As the world’s largest developing country and a member of Eurasia, China actively gives impetus to reduce the Eurasian deficits in development and governance. Five centuries ago, with the rise of maritime businesses, the economic impact of Eurasian geographical center was weakened. In 2013, the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), which was put forward by China, has brought hope to activate the economic vitality of Eurasia. The exchanges between China and other countries in this region provided an important reference for peaceful coexistence and common development for nationstates with different civilizations, religions, social systems, traditions, and economic development stages. Since the founding of the PRC seven decades ago, China’s national strength has been significantly improved, and China’s national identities have also changed accordingly. With great power comes great responsibility. To make China a responsible major country in Eurasia is not only the choice of China itself, but also common expectations of countries in this region.

China’s Eurasian Ideas Historically, Eurasia has been of great importance for China’s development and security, and China has a great willingness to cooperate with the Eurasian region. After the founding of PRC, every important stage of China’s development has been closely linked to Eurasia. In the view of modern China, the Eurasian region is a pivot of the “Double Circulation” of global trade, a steady rock for regional peace and security, and a unifying bond among people of diverse cultures.

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Eurasia: Pivot of the “Double Circulation” of Global Trade In the 1970s, Immanuel Wallerstein proposed in his World System Theory that in the economic system of the capitalist world based on the division of labor, the central region composed of developed countries has asymmetric competitive advantages over the peripheral regions in global economic, legal, and capital orders. At the same time, this solidified structural advantages are difficult to be challenged due to economic and political interrelationship.37 In other words, under the “core-periphery” structure, developing countries located in the peripheral and semi-peripheral regions would never have a chance to enter the circle of the central countries. In the twenty-first century, along with the transformation of the global manufacturing order and the rapid rise of China’s economy, the center of the “core-periphery” structure has been fractured. On the one hand, a massive trade circulation of technology, capital, products and services has been formed between China and the developed countries; on the other hand, this had led to another trade circulation of mainly manufactured goods and raw materials between China and the less developed countries in Asia, Africa, and Latin America. These two circulations are coupled with China as the pivot, forming a “double circulation” structure.38 The fracture of “core-periphery” structure due to the “double circulation” structure facilitates the flow of trade benefits from the center to the peripheral regions, making it possible to transform the Eurasian and world economy from a poorly ordered pattern to a higher level of equality. Eurasia is a vast continent with a large number of developed and developing countries, and the overall development level is characterized by a distribution of “high at the Eastern and Western ends and low in the central zone.” Western European countries, which were the first to develop modern state forms in modern times, have been able to take the lead in the world economic division of labor by their first-mover

37 Immanuel Wallerstein, The Modern World-System I: Capitalist Agriculture and the Origins of the European World-Economy in the Sixteenth Century (Berkeley, LA and London: University of California Press, 2011). 38 Xiangdong Yu, Zhan Shi: “Double Circulation Structure of Global Trade and the World Order: Dialogue on Diplomatic Philosophy (IV)”, Beijing Cultural Review, Vol. 5, 2013, pp. 46–55.

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advantage, and have played the economic role of exporting technology, capital, and various high-end services to other countries. In the central part of Eurasia, Southeast Asia, South Asia, and Central Asia, there are a large number of underdeveloped countries, which take on the role of exporting raw materials and so on. Since the reform and opening up, China’s economy has been rising, relying on labor cost advantages, strong industrial support and processing, and manufacturing capabilities, as well as increasing labor productivity. China has gradually become the world’s largest producer and exporter of industrial goods. The direct traders of manufactured goods and raw materials originally conducted by the developed and underdeveloped countries are now largely replaced by China businesses in China, forming an 8-shaped “double circulation” structure with China at the center hub, and the two circulation cycles are for the developed and the developing countries respectively. First, China imports a large number of technology products and services from developed countries such as Western Europe. According to statistics, the overall import scale of China’s high-tech products increased from $73.6 billion in 2001 to $621.9 billion in 2017, and the proportion of the world’s total imports of high-tech products increased from 5% in 2001 to 16.15%. From the source structure of China’s high-end equipment products imports, France, Germany, Japan, Taiwan, South Korea, Italy, Switzerland, and the United Kingdom in Eurasia became the main sources, together accounting for half of China’s total high-end equipment products imports. In recent years, the growth rate of service trade between China and the EU is higher than the growth rate of goods trade in the same period, showing great potential for development. In 2017, China imported $85.4 billion from the EU, rising 12.4% year-on-year.39 Second, countries in Eurasia, such as the Middle East and Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) countries, provide an important supply guarantee for energy and raw materials. According to the Global Mining Development Report 2019, in 2018, China produces 19% of

39 Hao Wei, China Import Development Report 2019, Yangtze Industrial Development Economy Institute (Yangtze IDEI), November 13, 2019, http://www.yangtze-idei.cn/ index.php?m=content&c=index&a=show&catid=19&id=1939, accessed on November 10, 2020.

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global energy, and consumes 24% of it.40 As the “world’s factory,” China needs a large supply of energy resources, and Eurasia is crucial to China’s economic development. China’s major oil and gas pipelines—ChinaKazakhstan oil pipeline, China-Central Asia gas pipeline, China–Russia crude oil pipeline, China–Russia gas pipeline, and China-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline—are all located in the Eurasian region. Third, China provides a large number of industrially manufactured goods to Eurasian countries. At present, China is the world’s largest producer of more than 220 industrial products.41 In 2009, China became the world’s largest exporter of goods, and in 2013 it became the world’s largest merchandise trader. According to the World Trade Organization (WTO), China’s exports of goods have reached 13.2% of the total global exports of goods in 2019. Both in the field of global industrial chain and value chain, China plays a pivotal role in the “double circulation” pattern of the world economy, while the Eurasian region plays a central platform role in the new circulation pattern of it.42

Eurasia: Steady Rock for Regional Peace and Security Mackinder once pointed out, “Who rules Eastern Europe commands the Heartland, who rules the Heartland commands the World Island, who rules the World Island commands the world.”43 Spykman from the United States, on the other hand, argued, “He who controls the rim land controls Eurasia and he who controls Eurasia controls the world.”44 No

40 International Mining Research Center of China Geological Survey, Ministry of Natural Resources, “Global Mining Development Report 2019”, China Mining Daily, October 10, 2019. 41 “China Becomes the Only Country with All Industrial Sectors”, People’s Daily, September 21, 2019. 42 Minister of Commerce, P. R. China, China Foreign Trade Report (Spring

2020), June 2020, http://images.mofcom.gov.cn/zhs/202006/20200615174035164. pdf, accessed on May 26, 2021. 43 Halford J. Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (New York: W. W. Norton, 1962), p. 106. 44 N. J. Spykman, The Geography of the Peace (New York: Harcourt Brace & Co., 1944), p. 43.

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matter the theory of the heartland or that of the rimland, the best interpretation of the important strategic position of Eurasia is that the main battlefields of both the First and the Second World War were in Eurasia. The Eurasian continent has complex contradictions, competitions between major powers, territorial disputes, ethnic conflicts, religious contradictions, and various other issues are all prominent. The United States has always seen Eurasia as the key to achieving its global strategy and national interests, and in this regard, Brzezinski makes it very clear that “and particular, whether it (the United States) prevents the emergence of a dominant and antagonistic Eurasian power—remains central to America’s capacity to exercise global primacy.”45 The US-Soviet confrontation during the Cold War was severe, and the post-Cold War period was marked by political instability in a number of countries and a succession of “color revolutions” in Eurasia, which seriously affected its socio-economic development. Eurasia is the largest continent in the world and its population accounts for more than 70% of the world population. Peace and security here is not only a regional issue but also has a decisive impact on the world. As an important country in the Eurasian region, China has 14 land neighbors, 6 sea neighbors and 22,000 km of land borders. The peace and stability of the Eurasian region directly affect China’s peaceful development. In November 2011, US President Barack Obama proposed a “Pivot to Asia” strategy, followed by the Rebalancing Strategy in the Asia Pacific. The Trump administration further proposed the “Indo-Pacific Strategy” after taking office. The essence of these policies is to increase material and energy investment in the Asia–Pacific region through economic, diplomatic, and military approaches to maintain US global hegemony and hold China’s expanding influence back in the region. Under such circumstances, China’s strengthening of cooperation with the Eurasian region would create the following positive effects. First, it could coordinate overall planning, deepen cooperation with Russia and other Eurasian countries, and ensure smooth supply channels for the abundant oil and gas resources, and other bulk commodities outside the West; Second, it could formulate and implement political, economic, and

45 Zbigniew Brzezinski, The Grand Chessboard: American Primacy and Its Geostrategic Imperatives, trans. China Institute of International Studies (Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2015 Edition, Introduction), p. 1.

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social development policies that combine internal and external mechanisms, which complement each other, and adapt to local conditions, building a strategic barrier for state security and national harmony, and accelerating the development of the Western Region. Third, it may increase the investment of diplomatic resources in Eurasian countries, strengthen social and humanistic exchanges. China is a developing country, development is its national strategy. Its development needs a peaceful and stable external environment. As the country has the longest land border in Eurasia, it is a steady rock of peace and security to strengthen security cooperation with the Eurasian region as a concrete manifestation of China’s view of Eurasia.

Eurasia: Unifying Bond Among People of Diverse Civilizations Eurasia is the cradle of world civilizations, where ancient Babylonian, Indian, Chinese, and Greek civilizations converged and grew, where the world’s major religions, such as Buddhism, Christianity, Islam, Hinduism, and Judaism, all originated, and where the world’s geography East and West, South and North, deserts and oceans, forests and grasslands all included. Eurasian natural and humanistic diversity of the world is most evident in the world, and the continent itself provides a platform for the exchange of civilizations, the development and prosperity of the Silk Road is the result of the exchange between different regions of Eurasia. In the view of contemporary China, the Eurasian continent itself is a link for the exchange of diverse civilizations in the world. First of all, China emphasizes respect for the diversity of world civilizations. Peter Katzenstein pointed out that “civilization is pluralistic, many civilizations coexist in the grand civilization system of modern civilization; civilization is also multidimensional, within each civilization there are multiple forms of civilization, each from different traditions.”46 Historically, the formation of Chinese civilization is the result of the continuous intermingling of many different cultures. The Chinese, as the descendants of the ancient Yan Emperor and Huang Emperor, who came from agriculture and grassland, respectively; the Chinese totem “dragon” and 46 Peter J. Katzenstein, ed., Civilizations in World Politics: Plural and Pluralist Perspectives, trans. Qin Yaqing et al. (Shanghai: Shanghai People’s Publishing House, 2012), p. 1.

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“phoenix” represent two different directions of North and South. In China’s view, whether it is the ancient Chinese civilization, Greek civilization, Roman civilization, Egyptian civilization, Two Rivers civilization, Indian civilization, or the current Asian civilization, African civilization, European civilization, American civilization, Oceania civilization, etc., all are the accumulation of human labor and wisdom in the long history. They have all played an irreplaceable role in the development process of human civilization. Such differences are the undertones of the world and must be respected. Second, China advocates the need for different civilizations to be treated equally. The civilizations of the world are equal, and there is no distinction between high and low. Each civilization is rooted in its own soil, with merits and strengths, and has become the common wealth of humanity. Chinese civilization advocated “harmony with difference” more than 2,000 years ago, and preached that “all things should be nurtured together without harming each other, and the way should be parallel without contradicting each other.” China opposes any form of “civilizational superiority” or “clash of civilizations,” and advocates respecting the inheritance and development of civilizations of all countries and ethnic groups, choosing their own development paths in line with their national conditions, and treating different civilizations equally to the best of each. Third, China advocates replacing the clash of civilizations by mutual learning of civilizations. There are commonalities and differences among civilizations, and there are conflicts and cooperation. The commonality of civilizations is reflected in the fact that all civilizations contain common ideas and pursuits that have been accumulated through human development and progress. The differences between civilizations stem from the differences in geographical, historical, and social factors that give birth to different civilizations, but it is precisely the differences and collisions between civilizations that become an important driving force for historical development. At present, the multipolarization of the world, economic globalization, cultural diversification, and social informatization are developing in depth. The instability and uncertainty of the international situation have become more and more prominent, and the global challenges faced by mankind have become increasingly serious, which require concerted efforts of all countries in the world to deal with them together. Only by upholding the spirit of mutual respect, openness, and tolerance, replacing civilizational estrangement by civilizational exchange, replacing

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civilizational clashes by mutual learning, replacing civilizational superiority by civilizational coexistence, and addressing common challenges, will humanity have a bright future. It is under the guidance of this view of civilization that modern China is striving to revive the ancient spirit of Silk Road to demonstrate China’s contemporary concept of cooperation—“cooperation between countries with different social systems and stages of development. Different religions and cultures are not only possible, but also entirely capable to achieve mutual benefits and common development.”

Significance of the BRI for Eurasia On September 7, 2013, Chinese President Xi Jinping delivered a keynote speech at Nazarbayev University in Kazakhstan entitled “Promoting People’s Friendship for a Better Future,” namely, he proposed that China will cooperate more closely with Eurasian countries in the future, strengthen road connectivity, trade connectivity, financial connectivity, policy connectivity and people-to-people connectivity, and “use innovative cooperation models to jointly build the ‘Silk Road Economic Belt.’”47 The Silk Road Economic Belt has become a road of commerce, culture, and friendship connecting China with Asia, Europe, and Africa. In June 2019, the World Bank released the report Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transport Corridors, stating that the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) could accelerate economic development and poverty reduction in dozens of developing countries, and its full implementation could lift 32 million people out of moderate poverty. It will be more effective in reducing border costs and generating revenue improvements if direct, indirect and potential risks are systematically addressed through improved infrastructure conditions, investment and trade business environment, further trade facilitation through policy linkages, cooperation between governments and international organizations and multiple actors, with the adoption of internationally recognized high-quality practices and risk assessment frameworks.48 47 President Xi Jinping’s speech at Kazakh, Steiner, Nazarbayev University, “Promoting People’s Friendship for a Better Future”, Xinhua News Agency, http://news.xinhuanet. com/world/201309/08/c_117273079.htm, accessed on September 7, 2013. 48 Changqing Zhao, “Background, Potential Challenges and Future Trends of the Silk Road Economic Belt”, Eurasian Economy, Vol. 4, 2014, pp. 7–10.

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In December 2020, Vinokourov, Chief Economist of the Eurasian Development Bank, attending the Almaty Investment Forum, said that part of the investment and financing flows of the BRI to the member countries of the Eurasian Economic Union and the Eurasian Development Bank, as well as to Tajikistan, is exactly what the countries of the Eurasian region need. The BRI will help the countries of the Eurasian region attract significant investments for infrastructure construction and industrial development. However, this does not completely change the dilemma of isolation of regional economies from international markets. The curse of isolation of the world markets can be lifted only by increasing the level of facilitation of transport routes, energy pipelines and communication networks.49 This old trade route will be reactivated through refined management, mechanism innovation and expansion of openness.

Enhancing Connectivity Through Refined Management President Xi Jinping once pointed out that in the past few years, the BRI has completed the overall layout and painted a “big picture.” But in the future, we should focus on the key points, and work together to refine the details, to promote the BRI to go deeper and more practical.50 Under the guidance of this idea, the Chinese government has led the project implementators to promote refined management in the area of “five connectivities.”51 In terms of policy communication, as of 2020, China has signed 201 cooperation documents of the BRI with 138 countries and 31 international organizations, initiated and set up a series of multilateral cooperation platforms for the BRI, and the South-South Cooperation Program to

49 IBRD/World Bank, Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks for Transportation Corridors, 2019 Edition, pp. 3, 23, 27, 30, 33, 119, 130, 136, worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integration/publication/belt-and-road-eco nomics-opportunities-and-risks-of-transport-corridors, accessed on December 13, 2020. 50 Kazakhstan Embassy Business Office, “Meaning of the BRI for Eurasian Countries”, People’s Republic of China Ministry of Commerce, December 4, 2020, http://www.mof com.gov.cn/article/i/jyjl/e/202012/20201203020586.shtml, accessed on December 6, 2020. 51 Xi Jinping, Xi Jinping: The Governance of China (Beijing: Foreign Language Press, 2020 Edition), pp. 486, 488.

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address climate change. The “Proposal of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of China on Formulating the 14th Five Year Plan for National Economic and Social Development and the Long-Term Goals for the Year 2035” issued in November 2020 also proposed to jointly build BRI for high-quality development.52 In terms of facility connectivity, China’s maritime connectivity index and total cargo throughput have become the first in the world during the implementation of the BRI. Since the first operation of China-European Liner in 2011, the total number of China Europe trains has reached 30,000, which has become a high-quality brand of international logistics land transport. Under the great pressure of its own epidemic prevention, China has done its best to assist the international community. Due to the segmented transportation, the China-European Liner has a special advantage under the epidemic. As of November 2020, the number of China-European Liner in 2020 has reached 10, 180, which has exceeded the yearly number of 2019.53 In terms of the smooth flow of trade, 2019, for example, China’ annual total import and export volume of goods was 31.55 trillion yuan, an increase of 3.4% over the previous year; the total import and export volume of goods of BRI countries was 9.27 trillion yuan, an increase of 10.8% over the previous year. Among them, exports were 5.26 trillion yuan, an increase of 13.2%; imports were 4 trillion yuan, an increase of 7.9%. Studies by the World Bank and other international institutions show that international cooperation under the BRI has improved global economic growth by at least 0.1% in 2019. After the completion of the transport economic corridor, the trade of the economies along the routes will increase between 2.8% and 9.7%, world trade will increase between 1.7% and 6.2%, and foreign direct investment in low-income countries is expected to increase significantly by 7.6%.54 52 Jingxin Sun, “BRI’s Excellent Transcript”, China Today, December 11, 2020. http://www.chinatoday.com.cn/zw2018/bktg/202012/t20201211_800229747. html, accessed on December 12, 2020. 53 Hui Qi, “Why China-European Liner Is Growing Against the Trend”, Economic Daily, December 7, 2020, https://politics.gmw.cn/2020-12/07/content_34435692. htm, accessed on December 8, 2020. 54 IBRD/World Bank, “Belt and Road Economics: Opportunities and Risks of Transportation Corridors”, 2019 Edition, p. ix, worldbank.org/en/topic/regional-integr ation/publication/belt-and-road-economics-opportunities-and-risks-of-transport-corridors, accessed on December 13, 2020.

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In terms of financing, as of July 2020, the number of Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) members has increased to 103,55 with more than 6 of its members becoming BRI partner countries. As of October, the Silk Road Fund, established with China’s contribution of USD 40 billion, has signed 47 projects with a committed investment amount of USD 17.8 billion.56 The international economic, trade, and financial cooperation has strongly guaranteed the economic development of the countries along the BRI and promoted the transformation and upgrading of China’s economy. In the area of people-to-people connectivity, BRI actively builds bridges for civilizations to learn from each other, carries out in-depth humanities cooperation in various fields such as education, science, culture, sports, tourism, health, archaeology, etc., strengthens exchanges among parliaments, political parties, and civil organizations. Exchanges among women, youth, people with disabilities and other groups, are promoted in the form of a diversified and interactive humanities exchange pattern. At present, Chinese provinces (autonomous regions and municipalities) have established more than 1,000 pairs of friendship cities with more than 60 countries along the “Belt and Road,” and the number of outbound tourism has increased by 77% between 2013 and 2019, with an average annual growth rate of 15.34%.57 Despite the impact of COVID-19, cross-border transportation and tourism have been affected to some extent, with many activities that could not be conducted on the ground were transferred to be held online. With the application of vaccines and various epidemic prevention initiatives, exchanges will return to prosperity after the resumption of work and production, and the richness of economic trade and development cooperation that the “five connectivities” can bring will be presented in the gradual realization of many project goals.

55 Ke Hou, Handi Zuo, “Number of ADB Member Countries Increases to 103”, Official Website of Central Commission for Discipline Inspection and State Supervision, July 28, 2020, http://www.ccdi.gov.cn/yaowen/202007/t20200728_222796.html, accessed on October 12, 2020. 56 Hang Chen, “Silk Road Fund Has Signed 47 Projects and Committed Investment of US$17.8 Billion”, China News, October 23, 2020, https://www.chinanews.com/cj/ 2020/10-23/9320948.shtml, accessed on November 1, 2020. 57 Rui Song, et al., Analysis and Forecast of China’s Tourism Development in 2018–2019 (Beijing: Social Science Literature Press, 2019 Edition).

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Building a Shared Platform Through Innovative Cooperation Mechanisms Strategic interdependence between China and Russia is firstly the cooperation between Eurasian integration led by Russia and the BRI advocated by China. In January 2015, Russia, Kazakhstan, Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, and Armenia established the Eurasian Economic Union, which all are the important partners in the construction of BRI. In May, China and Russia signed the Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Docking Cooperation on the Construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Construction of the Eurasian Economic Union,58 which opened a new model of multilateral economic cooperation and development in the Eurasian region. In 2018, representatives of the Ministry of Commerce of China and of the Eurasian Economic Commission and member states of the Eurasian Economic Union in Nur Sudan signed the Agreement on Economic and Trade Cooperation between China and the Eurasian Economic Union, which sets out a principled action program for cooperation and empowers an important role in promoting regional economic cooperation.59 Strategic docking between China and Russia is firstly the cooperation under the BRI and “Greater Eurasian partnership” framework. In 2016, President Vladimir Putin proposed to establish the “Greater Eurasian Partnership” from Lisbon to Vladivostok. The negotiations on cooperation between Russia and China within the framework of the BRI and the Greater Eurasian Partnership began.60 In October 2019, the Agreement on economic and trade cooperation between China and the Eurasian Economic Union entered into force, which will help to build a common economic development space, joining the BRI with the Eurasian Economic Union, as well as coordinating the BRI with the Greater Eurasian Partnership. In the future, the construction of the BRI and 58 “Joint Statement of the People’s Republic of China and the Russian Federation on Docking Cooperation on the Construction of the Silk Road Economic Belt and the Construction of the Eurasian Economic Union”, www.gov.cn, May 9, 2015, http://www. gov.cn/xinwen/2015-05/09/content_2859384.htm, accessed on November 20, 2020. 59 Zite Zhang, “New Achievements in the Docking Cooperation between the Construction of the BRI and the Construction of the Eurasian Economic Union”, Eurasian Economy, Vol. 5, 2018, pp. 30–37. 60 Yongquan Li, “The Geopolitical Situation in Eurasia and the Great Power Game”, Russian Studies, Vol. 4, 2020, p. 14.

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the Greater Eurasian Partnership will be combined organically with the China–Mongolia–Russia Economic Corridor, the New Eurasian Continental Bridge, and the China-Central Asia-West Asia Economic Corridor, which will help to better tap the inherent potential of Eurasia. In 2017, after President Xi Jinping and Russian President Vladimir Putin proposed to carry out cooperation on the Arctic waterway and initiative of jointly building the “Silk Road on Ice,” China published a white paper on “China’s Arctic Policy” in January 2018, clearly proposing that China is willing to rely on the development and utilization of the Arctic waterway and build the “Silk Road on Ice” together with all parties. This will drive the development of ports along the Arctic Ocean in the Far East, activate the economic potential of the hinterland, and open up new channels for the Far East to connect and cooperate with the Pacific countries and to the Atlantic countries. In the current situation of counter-globalization, although the cooperation between the BRI and the Eurasian continent still faces various challenges, its cooperation progress with the aim of mutual benefits and win–win situation will certainly set an example for the world and revive the confidence of all parties in the new globalization.

Promoting Globalization by Deepening Reform and Opening up For more than 40 years, the success of China’s economy lies mainly in its reform and opening up, this has realized the linkage between the international and domestic markets, and complimented the process of “reform and opening up” and “globalization.”61 On the one hand, the national economy has become increasingly outward oriented and internationalized; on the other hand, economic globalization has become an important external force driving China’s economic development and institutional change. The globalization process ensures China’s peaceful access to the world’s capital, technology, markets, and raw materials, which is the key to China’s sustainable development. The interconnection and interaction between China and the global market has led to the interconnection and

61 Fei Gao, “China’s National Positioning and International Responsibility System in Transition”, International Insight, Vol. 5, 2013, p. 37.

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integration of the Chinese economy and the world economy.62 The BRI is different from previous globalization in that it reduces transaction costs through connectivity (rather than simple tariff concessions) and is not only the basis for a new round of reform and opening up for China, but also a new round of development-oriented globalization. The BRI is neither China’s Marshall Plan nor unilateral foreign aid, but a market-based approach based on the principles of “Consultation, Contribution and Shared Benefits,” with the concept of righteousness first and promoting righteousness and integrating profit, which connects China’s development with the development of the countries along the routes. Unlike the Marshall Plan, China advocates cooperation and opposes confrontation. Xi Jinping emphasized that “BRI originates from China but belongs to the world, is an open and inclusive cooperation platform, and is a global public good jointly created by all parties. With a focus on Asia and Europe, it is open to all like-minded friends and does not exclude or target any party.”63 The New Silk Road Initiative proposed by the United States in 2011 could have excluded China, but China’s 2013 BRI is inclusive of the United States. Foreign Minister Wang Yi pointed out that the BRI is not a “solo” by China alone, but a “symphony” in which all countries participate.64 The BRI is connected to the Asia–Pacific economic circle in the East and the European economic circle in the West, and the countries along the routes have strong economic complementarities and great potential for mutually beneficial and win–win cooperation in the fields of transportation, finance, energy, communications, agriculture, tourism, etc. It is highly compatible with the development strategies of most neighboring countries and has been generally welcomed by them. Over the past 10 years, China’s trade volume with BRI countries has increased by

62 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Great Choice—America Stands at the Crossroads”, trans. Wang Zhenxi (Beijing: Xinhua Publishing House, 2005 Edition), pp. 161–162. 63 Yue Feng, Le Liu, and Zhe Ma, “Roundtable Summit Held at ‘Belt and Road’ International Cooperation Summit Forum: Xi Jinping Hosts Meeting and Delivers Speech”, CCTV.com, May 12, 2017, http://china.cnr.cn/news/20170516/t20170516_523756 219.shtml, accessed on August 19, 2020. 64 Yi Wang, “BRI Is Not a Chinese ‘Solo’ but a ‘Symphony’ in Which All Parties Participate”, Xinhua/China.org, March 8, 2015, http://www.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015lh/ 2015-03/08/c_127556696.htm, accessed on August 25, 2020.

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an average of 19% annually.65 At present, China has set up 16 border economic cooperation zones, 23 economic and trade cooperation zones of countries along the routes, nearly 100 Chinese industrial parks, and 16 countries with an investment stock of more than 1 billion US dollars, including Singapore, Russia, and Kazakhstan.66 Laos’ plan to turn “landlocked country” into “land-united country,” Kazakhstan’s “Avenue of Light” plan, Mongolia’s “Steppe Road” project and Russia’s “Far East Development Strategy” are all looking forward to be linked with China’s development. The BRI is to create a community of shared future, shared interests and shared responsibilities through openness and inclusiveness. In the BRI construction process, “China Threat” has become “China Opportunity.”

65 Junling Wang, “China’s Trade in Goods with Countries Along Belt and Road Exceeds $6 Trillion”, People’s Daily Online, April 19, 2019, http://finance.people.com. cn/n1/2019/0419/c1004-31037872.html, accessed March 29, 2020. 66 Xiaoliang Pan, “China Has 23 Overseas Economic and Trade Cooperation Zones along the Belt and Road”, China Economic Net, May 6, 2016, https://finance.huanqiu. com/article/9CaKrnJVcKc, accessed on October 9, 2020.

CHAPTER 7

Turkey’s Return to Eurasianism: Is It Real or Just a Pragmatic Discourse? Göktürk Tüysüzo˘glu

Introduction After the Cold War, one of the much debated issues in Turkey has been foreign policy strategy. For a country that has shaped its foreign policy in accordance with the the systemic requirements and preferences, how to construct the new understanding has been considered an important issue. During the Cold War, foreign policy has been constructed in a context that requires harmonization in general. However, adaptation to evolving multipolarity has become a necessity for Turkey that should be taken into account. Turkey is not overly concerned with neighboring regions throughout the Cold War because of the bad memories of the Ottoman past and evaluated this vast area concerning its national security concern. Turkey’s prime importance during the bipolar period was substantially related to its role at the southeastern flank of NATO. Even this qualification has provided the perception of Turkey as a bridge linking the neighboring countries to the Euro-Atlantic Alliance. Although being a secular country, predominantly Muslim population of Turkey have made

G. Tüysüzo˘glu (B) Giresun University, Giresun, Turkey © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Diesen and A. Lukin (eds.), The Return of Eurasia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2179-6_7

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it open to Washington’s grand strategy against the USSR, which is named as Green Belt. The attitude toward the change of this passive and security-oriented foreign policy strategy has been the main direction of Turkish Foreign Policy after 1991. At this point, many opinions emerged and were subject to serious discussions at certain times. Especially since the republic’s first years, we know the discussion toward different approaches to foreign policy. After eliminating bloc policies, these discussions are seated again on Turkey’s agenda. Even the starting point of these discussions can be extended to the final period of the Ottoman Empire. Eurasianism was the most important foreign policy strategy added to these approaches. It has described in the framework of Pan-Turkism, Pan-Islamism, and Westernism after the Cold War. Eurasianism is also the subject of serious debates in Turkey because of its Russophile ideological connection. Even reflections of Eurasianism on current Turkish Foreign Policy and especially the tension regarding relations with the West has become a reality that must be addressed. In this study, firstly, Classical Eurasianism and Neo-Eurasianism will be discussed briefly. Later, various versions of the Eurasian idea in Turkey will be discussed. In the last part, the connection of the foreign policy followed during the AKP period with Eurasianism will be evaluated. This study will conduct a discussion about the Turkish Foreign Policy and try to find an answer about the latest context as a pragmatic discourse change or a real Eurasianist turn.

Classical Eurasianism and Neo-Eurasianism Eurasianism was initially introduced in the early 1920s, after the Bolshevik Revolution, by a group of people who left Russia and went to Sofia, Prague, Berlin, and Paris. The linguist Trubetskoi, historian Vernadsky, geographer and economist Savitski, theologian Florovski, artist Suvchinski and philosopher Karsavin are known as the most important names at the emergence of this ideology.1 The Classical Eurasianist movement, which started in Sofia, then strengthened in Prague and finally saw Paris as the center, was ineffective after the late 1920s. The main reason for this lies 1 M. Bassin, S. Glebov and M. Laruélle, ‘What Was Eurasianism and Who Made It?’, ˙ Between Europe and Asia: The Origins, Theories and Legacies of Russian Eurasianism, M. Bassin, S. Glebov and M. Laruélle (eds.), Pittsburgh, University of Pittsburgh Press, 2015, pp. 1–12.

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in the fact that some of the names included approached to the USSR within the mentioned time frame and began to think that they can integrate communism into Eurasianism. Many names, especially Karsavin, who were at the Paris branch of the movement, approached the USSR after the Soviet administration contacted him. Trubetskoi and Savitski criticized this situation, while an important part of their colleagues return to Moscow.2 According to them, contacting the USSR and cooperating with the Bolsheviks meant suicide of the Eurasian movement. Both names saw the division within Eurasianism as a plan of NKVD.3 We see that the impact of the Eurasianists became inaudible from the 1930s onwards, and there was no serious Eurasianist activity, especially until the studies of Lev Nikolayevich Gumilyov in the 1960s.4 Eurasia and Eurasianism are known as the concepts of the Russian geopolitical school. It is even stated that the Eurasianists were the first group to evaluate the geopolitical thinking in Russia. Eurasianists, who saw the goal of developing a geopolitical model belonging to Russia, also set national priorities and duties for this model. It can be said that Eurasianism they developed was a geopolitical doctrine because they considered geography as a “fate.” Classical Eurasianists, who connect the fate of Russia to the social, cultural, economic, and political integrity of the Eurasian “mainland,” stated that Russia is a separate ethnocultural and geographical structure.5 This different geographical and ethno-cultural structure lies between Europe and Asia, or between West and East. This region, where the continents of Europe and Asia intersect, is also called the geopolitical center of the world. Classical Eurasianists essentially talked about a regional integration that sees Russia at the center. Some saw this understanding as a reflection of Russia’s imperial aspirations.

2 N. Smirnov, ‘Left-Wing Eurasianism and Pos-Colonial Theory’, Greater-Europe, February 24, 2019, http://greater-europe.org/archives/6549 (Accessed 15 July 2020). 3 T. Mileski, ‘Identifying the New Eurasian Orientation in Modern Russian Geopolitical

Thought’, Eastern Journal of European Studies, Vol. 6, No. 2, 2015, p. 178. 4 S. Glebov, From Empire to Eurasia: Politics, Scholarship and Ideology in Russian Eurasianism, 1920’s-1930’s, DeKalb, Northern Illinois University Press, 2017, pp. 9–39. 5 M. Bassin, ‘Eurasianism Classical and Neo: The Lines of Continuity’, CESRAN International, http://cesran.org/Dosyalar/MAKALELER/MARK_BASSIN_Eurasianism_Cla ssical_and_Neo_The_Lines_of_Continuity.pdf (Accessed 15 July 2020).

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Eurasianism has been heavily inspired by Halford Mackinder and Karl Haushofer’s geopolitical work on the theory of the “heartland.”6 Indeed, according to the Eurasianists, Russia is located at the center of the “heartland” and represents a continental civilization. Classical Eurasianists do not see any difference between the land controlled by the Russian Empire or the USSR, and they see Russia as the social, cultural, and political representative of Eurasian civilization.7 In fact, according to them, the task of Russia is to add all the land and people at the Eurasian mainland to itself. Thus, it will be demonstrated that the Russian identity is not expressed by a Slavophile context and is ethno-culturally inclusive. The Eurasian civilization will manifest itself through a single and common political representation by matching the Russian identity and the Eurasian identity. So, according to Classical Eurasianists, Russia and Russians will lead in representing the Eurasian identity and Eurasian civilization. However, all the people who depend on this civilization will also protect and maintain their ethnic identities, cultures, religions and also partner themselves with the Russians in terms of political representation.8 Nevertheless, there is a common understanding that expresses the Eurasianist ideology desires the fate of the people within the broad geographical scope of Eurasia be left to Russia, and thus is depicted to expand the borders and effectiveness of Russian Imperialism. Eurasianism is also said to be a crisis ideology in general. It is meaningful that the periods when this thought emerged and started to rise again coincides with the periods in which great transformations are experienced in Russia.9 Because, while the period when the Classical Eurasianist thought first emerged after the Bolshevik Revolution, the stage when it started to rise again coincides with the post-Cold War period when the USSR dissolved. At this point, it can be said that Eurasianism is a

6 T.L. Knutsen, ‘Halford J. Mackinder, Geopolitics and the Heartland Thesis’, The International History Review, Vol. 36, No. 5, 2014, pp. 835–857. 7 S.K. Voytek, ‘Eurasianist Trends in Russian Foreign Policy: A Critical Analysis’, West

Virginia University Graduate Theses, Dissertations and Problem Reports, No. 256, 2012, pp. 11–15. 8 C.J. Halperin, ‘Russia Faces East: Eurasianism Reconsidered’, Russian History, Vol. 43, 2016, pp. 69–80. 9 N. Arbatova, ‘Three Faces of Russia’s Neo-Eurasianism’, Survival, Vol. 61, No. 6, 2019, pp. 7–24.

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civilization-based geopolitical thought that protects Russia from disintegration or aims to maintain its systemic activity with its imperial capacity due to its reliance on different ethno-cultural, religious, and geographical/regional realities. Eurasianists draw attention to the multicultural character of the Russian identity, matching this identity with Eurasianism. So according to this view, there is no difference between being Eurasian and being Russian.10 In this respect, it should be noted that Eurasianism rejects Slavophile thinking based on Russian ethnic/national identity and evaluates being Russian in a more inclusive social and ethno-cultural framework. According to the Eurasianists, the Russian or Eurasian identity was formed as a result of melting the Hellenic, Byzantine, Slavic, Turkish (Turan) identities in the same pot and within the framework of the Eurasian mainland.11 In this respect, being Russian also means being Eurasian, and this identity has a multicultural character. Although Eurasiansm considers the Orthodox faith as one of the most important brackets of Eurasian civilization, it states that Islam is also a part of Eurasian culture, based on partnership between Islam and the proto-socialist and solidarist values adopted by Orthodoxy. According to classical Eurasianism, Russia will represent the Eurasian civilization in the framework of the fellowship between Orthodoxy and Islam.12 In this regard, the Eurasian Civilization will remain outside the Western Civilization, which has risen in terms of individualistic values, with the Romano-Germanic culture depicted in the framework of Catholicism and Protestantism. Gumilyov is considered the most important name that establishes the link between Classical Eurasianism and Neo-Eurasianism. Gumilyov describes Eurasian culture as an independent and dynamic civilization. According to him, with the ethnogenesis experienced in Eurasia for centuries, a Eurasian Civilization with a different cultural, historical, political, and administrative background has been constructed. Gumilyov states that the Russian identity can not be dealt with only the development of Slavic nationalism, as Slavophiles claimed, and he said 10 Glebov, ‘Politics, Scholarship…’, pp. 112–122. 11 P. Eberhardt, ‘The Russian Euro-Asian Movement and Its Geopolitical Conse-

quences’, Comparative Civilizations Review, Vol. 79, No. 6, 2018, pp. 76–96. 12 D. Shlapentokh, ‘Islam and Orthodox Russia: From Eurasianism to Islamism’, Communist and Post Communist Studies, Vol. 41, No. 1, 2008, pp. 27–46.

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it’s an ethnos created independent of Slavic identity and culture.13 In addition to Slavs, especially the Turkic/Turan tribes made a serious contribution to the construction of this ethnos, namely, the current Russian (Eurasian) identity. In line with this understanding, Gumilyov sees Russia’s sovereignty over the regions where the Turks/Turan tribes are located and instrumentalize the Eurasian identity in this context. Gumilyov claims that the Russian Civilization is also the Eurasian Civilization and that this structure, depicted in terms of Slavic and Turkic/Turan synthesis/superethnos, is a geopolitical reflection of the historical alliance between the forest and the steppe. Gumilyov stated that the Eurasian mainland is a fertile and rich piece of land for ethnogenesis, and the synthesis between the “forest” depicting the Slavic communities and the “steppe” characterizing the Turkic/Turan communities created a new and independent civilization.14 Expressing that it is possible to see the effectiveness of the Eurasian civilization when looking to the world by clearing the Western glasses and seeing the civilization of the West as superior, Gumilyov stated that Eurasian civilization will also enable the balance and communication between the Western and the Eastern civilizations. Stephan Wiederkehr, on the other hand, claims that this cultural synthesis, which was underlined by Classical Eurasianists as well as Gumilyov, was put forward in order to prevent the Pan-Turkist ideals that emerged at the beginning of the twentieth century and to protect Russia from falling apart. Wiederkehr states that Eurasianism is an integration motive aimed at consolidating Russia’s territorial integrity by underlining its multiethnic/cultural appearance.15 After the dissolution of the USSR, we see that the Eurasianist trend has started to rise again. Because Russia’s high risk of disintegration and the socio-economic problems experienced during this period, brought Eurasianism to be seen as a glue.16 Neo-Eurasianism, which was put forward by updating classic Eurasianism on the basis of certain criterias,

13 A.S. Titov, Lev Gumilev, Ethnogenesis and Eurasianism, Ann Arbor, UMI Dissertation Publishing, 2014, pp. 184–229. 14 Titov, Lev Gumilev…, pp. 185–222. 15 S. Wiederkehr, ‘Eurasianism as a Reaction to Pan-Turkism’, Russia Between East and

West, D. Shlapentokh (ed.), Brill Academic Publishing, 2007, pp. 39–60. 16 D.V. Shlapentokh, ‘Eurasianism: Past and Present’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 30, No. 2, 1997, pp. 129–151.

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started to be seen as an ideology that had a significant impact on the policies pursued by Russia especially in the second half of the 1990s. Certain sections are considered to be a part of Neo-Eurasianism. The first is the group that reflects the multidimensional nature of this ideology, especially against the liberal transformation that followed in the early 1990s and was at the opposition at that time. This group, which opposes ethnic nationalism and Russian nationalism that appeared by the Slavophile axis, excludes Western liberal values and especially individualism; also stated that Russia should be a representative of the Eurasian mainland.17 Acting in the context of the Classical Eurasianist theses depicted by Trubetskoi and Savitski, this group claims that Russia’s mission is to create an imperial power to fill the large geopolitical gap between the West and the East. This group implies that the USSR is a political creature that embraces this task that Russia should undertake and reflects the Anti-Atlantic (Western) trend. The second group that emphasizes Neo-Eurasianism is the group that advocates that the Eurasian identity will be the product of the alliance between Orthodox Christianity and Islam. According to them, especially Iran is Russia’s closest ally in a strategic sense. This group is also addressed by reference to the idea that the alliance between Orthodoxy and Islam, which is also expressed in Huntington’s Clash of Civilizations, is one of the most important problems that will confront Western Civilization. The third group, depicted in the framework of Neo-Eurasianism, emphasizes a Eurasian identity to be constructed within the framework of economic integration to be created at the former Soviet geography. It can be said that the analysis of this group is behind the idea of the Eurasian Economic Union.18 According to Morozova, victory for Neo-Eurasianists is not a historical, but a geographical issue. It addresses a region and is independent of the time factor.19 The most important name considered in the scope of Neo-Eurasianism is Aleksandr Dugin. His views are also considered revolutionary expansionism or powerful expansionist Eurasianism.20 Dugin states that the main struggle based on the international system is between the land and 17 Mileski, ‘Identifying the New…”, pp. 179–180. 18 Ibid., p. 180. 19 N. Morozova, ‘The Politics of Russian Post-Soviet Identity: Geopolitics, Eurasianism and Beyond’, Central European University Department of International Relations and European Studies, Budapest, 2011, pp. 28–59. 20 Mileski, ‘Identifying the New…”, p. 180.

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naval forces. According to Tsygankov, Dugin sees the behavior pattern that should be adopted in the axis of struggle between geopolitical actors as to consolidate its power by expanding the territory.21 Dugin considers Russia’s main mission, which represents heartland, to increase its imperial power by integrating Eurasia into itself. According to him, if Russia cannot fulfill its mission, other actors will act to control the Eurasian mainland. Dugin states that the Moscow-Berlin alliance, the alliance of the land forces that can protect Eurasia from the Atlantic influence, should be formed first. Then the Moscow-Tokyo alliance against China should be constructed. Thus, Dugin wants the formation of the Berlin-Moscow-Tokyo axis and wishes Iran to be integrated into this axis in terms of making sense of the alliance with the Islamic Civilization.22 Iran’s problems with the West, especially the US, and its critical geopolitical position, which forms the southern part of Eurasia, are the factors that make Iran important for Dugin. In other words, not only Iranians being culturally Eurasian and represent the Islamic Civilization, but also geographical/strategic reasons lie behind Iranian preference. Indeed Dugin and Neo-Eurasianists, Turkey, which can be considered within the Islamic civilization, is not included in their plans. Because Turkey has integrated itself into Western Civilization by the geopolitical choice made during the Cold War and it also acts in Eurasia by the perspective in light of this preference.23 Dugin’s view has changed drastically, especially in recent years. Especially after the “coup attempt” on July 15, 2016, Ankara’s relations with its Western allies, especially Washington have a negative appearance, and it will open the doors of a “Eurasian” cooperation between Ankara and Moscow. According to Dugin, Turkey’s presence at the Neo-Eurasian geopolitical fiction under the leadership of Russia is very important. It is a generally accepted issue that Dugin is seen as the doctrinal and ideological leader of Neo-Eurasianism and affects Russia’s foreign policy motives.

21 A.P. Tsygankov, ‘Mastering Space in Eurasia: Russia’s Geopolitical Thinking After

the Soviet Break-up’, Communist and Post-Communist Studies, Vol. 36, No. 1, 2003, pp. 101–127. 22 K. Kalinin, ‘Neo-Eurasianism and the Russian Elite: The Irrelevance of Aleksandr Dugin’s Geopolitics’, Post Soviet Affairs, Vol. 35, Nos. 5–6, 2019, pp. 461–470. 23 A. Dugin, Rus Jeopoliti˘gi: Avrasyacı Yakla¸sım, Istanbul, ˙ Küre Yayıncılık, 2018, pp. 260–261.

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Yevgeny Primakov, who served as Prime Minister during the period of 1998–1999, is also regarded as an important figure in constructing NeoEurasianism. As a matter of fact, the “near-abroad,” which he attached great importance, had a background that stated Russia should establish economic and political activities at the former Soviet geography, that is, throughout Eurasia, and wanted close cooperation with Asian countries.24 Gennady Zyuganov, who has been the leader of the Russian Communist Party for many years, is a name that wants Russia to turn toward the Eurasian option and especially puts forward the relations to be established with the Islamic World.25 It is possible to state that Zyuganov, who thinks Western Civilization (Atlanticists) is not compatible with Russia’s historical, cultural, and political codes, develops a geopoliticaloriented perspective on Eurasia, and sees the former Soviet territory as the area of influence for Russia. It is stated that the idea of Neo-Eurasianism gained a general acceptance at Kremlin especially in the post-millennium and many names influenced by the works of Dugin started to take place at the administrative levels. Vladislav Surkov is considered one of these names. Surkov served as the Deputy Prime Minister between 2011–2013 after working at the Russian Presidential Office between 1999–2011. Surkov, who put forward the idea of “sovereign democracy,” thinks that Russia should construct its own administrative approach per its socio-cultural and historical codes rather than “imported” Western values.26 Rejecting Western/Atlanticist democratic values, Surkov places the idea of social order based on a certain authoritarian form at the center of Russian democracy.27 Because, according to Surkov, the US and the EU tried to control Russia through the liberal democratic transformation program and it weakened Russia in the 1990s. Sergey Karaganov is also considered one of the Neo-Eurasianist thinkers. The doctrine named after him (Karaganov Doctrine) is considered as part of Neo-Eurasianism. Karaganov is an important name that played an important role in the creation of Primakov’s “Near Abroad 24 M. Laruélle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, Washington, Woodrow Wilson Center Press, 2008, p. 7. 25 M. Bassin, ‘Eurasianism Classical…”, pp. 279–280. 26 Mileski, Identifying the New…”, p. 182. 27 I. Krastev, ‘Sovereign Democracy: Russian Style’, Insight Turkey, Vol. 8, No. 4, 2006, pp. 113–117.

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Doctrine” and also served as a presidential advisor to both Yeltsin and Putin. Karaganov states that Russia should defend the rights of Russian minorities living in the former Soviet geography and fight against discriminatory attempts against them. Russian minorities in the former Soviet geography, although they are not citizens of Russia, should be considered as “part of the great Russian nation” because they are Russian and speak Russian, and should be treated as a normal Russian citizen.28 Karaganov Doctrine can be integrated into Neo-Eurasianism by demonstrating that Russia should be active at the former Soviet geography and in Eurasia in general, even the Slavophile aspect is perceived as strong.

The Evolution of Eurasianism in Turkey Geographic naming mechanisms are not as innocent as they seem, as underlined by Tuathail and Dalby.29 This process serves to produce and reproduce aspects such as political power and economic orientation in a social sense. It’s necessary to examine the Eurasianist actors in Turkey by looking their political agendas and foreign policy goals. Indeed, these concepts are dealt with various groups and actors in Turkey. Many concepts such as Turkish Eurasianism, Kemalist Eurasianism, Western multicultural Eurasianism, and even recently in reference to President, Erdoganist Eurasianism are taken into account about Eurasianism in Turkey.30 Vugar Imanov, thought of Eurasianism in Russia when dealing with the reflection of Turkey,31 even Marlène Laruelle focuses on the ideal of Eurasia at the Turkish political culture.32 Emre Er¸sen, on the other hand, makes sense of Eurasianism in terms of functional evaluation of the Eurasian geography in order to fill the geopolitical gap facing the

28 M. Pieper, ‘Russkiy Mir: The Geopolitcs of Russian Compatriots Abroad’, Geopolitics, Vol. 25, No. 3, 2020, pp. 756–779. 29 G. O’Tuathail and S. Dalby, ‘Introduction: Rethinking Geopolitics, Towards a Critical Geopolitics’, Rethinking Geopolitics, G. O’Tuathail and S. Dalby (eds.), London, Routledge Publishing, 1998, pp. 2–3. 30 L. Yanık, ‘Debating Eurasia Political Travels of a Geographical Concept in Turkey’, ˙ skiler, Vol. 16, No. 63, 2019, p. 34. Uluslararası Ili¸ 31 V.Imanov, Avrasyacılık: Rusya’nın Kimlik Arayı¸sı, Istanbul, ˙ Küre Yayınları, 2008. 32 Laruélle, Russian Eurasianism…

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country.33 However, the most important issues the scholars working on Eurasianism agree on Eurasianism in Turkey is the lack of conceptual and ideological background. According to them, Eurasianism in Turkey is a pragmatic approach used for geopolitical reasons. Eurasianism has begun to be discussed intensively in Turkey by the effect of the dramatic change experienced at the international system after the Cold War. The deactivation of Turkey’s security-oriented and passive attitude made the “Eurasian” preference one of the most important options in Turkish Foreign Policy. In particular, problems encountered with the Western allies (especially the EU) in the 1990s has brought the idea of Eurasianism to the fore. Eurasianism has been kept on the agenda by certain political parties and actors with certain parts of the state bureaucracy and the army. Eurasianism in Turkey, has often been raised in the framework of the problems experienced with Western actors. The period when Eurasianism was most clearly discussed was in 2002. This year, statements made by the General Secretary of the National Security Council, Gen. Tuncer Kılınç in a symposium titled “How to Create a Peace Belt at Turkey’s immediate vicinity?” organized by Military Academies Command is important.34 This symposium is arranged in a time of tense relations with the United States because of the unwillingness of Turkey to join the military operation in Iraq. Although there is an official explanation underlining these words as Kılınç’s personal opinion and specifying Turkey’s NATO membership, Kılınç’s statement has opened the door to discussions about Eurasianism. Turkey is a country that used to read out reaching to the contemporary civilization by the Western alternative. At the founding years of the republic and the interwar period, Turkey has close relations with the Soviet Union. Tellal evaluated this choice as a trump card of Turkey against the Western actors.35 During the Second World War, the issue of relations with the USSR was shaped by the pressure toward Turkey for declaring war against Germany. After the War, we see that Stalin’s demand for bases at the Turkish Straits, and especially because of the possibility of 33 E. Er¸sen, ‘The Evolution of Eurasia as a Geopolitical Concept in Post-Cold War Turkey’, Geopolitics, Vol. 18, No. 1, 2013, pp. 24–44. 34 E. Akçalı and M. Perinçek, ‘Kemalist Eurasianism: An Emerging Geopolitical Discourse in Turkey’, Geopolitics, Vol. 14, No. 3, 2009, p. 562. 35 E. Tellal, ‘Türk Dı¸s Politikasında Avrasya Seçene˘ ˙ skiler, Vol. 2, gi’, Uluslararası Ili¸ No. 5, 2005, p. 54.

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a Soviet request for land from Eastern Anatolia made Turkey join NATO in 1952. Turkey’s policies related to its east and Eurasia, in general, had been formed in the direction of not to confront the Soviet activity in this area. Since the first years of the Republic, these regions have been approached at a great distance and multilateralism has been tried to be strengthened with various cooperation initiatives where necessary.36 One of Turkey’s concerns in this direction is to show both the Western actors and even the USSR that it does not pursue an irredentist style of foreign policy with reference to the Ottoman past. If we accept Eurasia as a large area uniting the European and Asian continents, we have to say that Turkey is also an important part of this region. Turkey is a natural bridge linking Asia with Europe. But until the post-Cold War, Turkey’s Eurasian identity is not being voiced by many. The main reason for this is that since 1923 Turkey leans toward a strong Western/European tendency and prefers to keep Eastern/Asian identity at the background. In addition, the republic’s founder, Mustafa Kemal Ataturk, excluded any kind of irredentist moves referring to Ottoman past and pictured a peaceful approach by the discourse of “Peace at Home, Peace in the World” as Turkey’s main foreign policy orientation. In this respect, ties with the Turkic societies at the territory under the control of the USSR, were also cut off. Although there forged a strategic link with the USSR in the first years of the republic, Turkey is integrated into the Euro-Atlantic Alliance by becoming a member of NATO.37 This choice caused Turkey to cut the link with the Eurasian geography and degraded the USSR as a security threat. The concept of Eurasia and the idea of Eurasianism began to be seriously discussed in Turkey after the collapse of the USSR. Because the geopolitical changes in Central Asia and the emergence of opportunity to establish ties with Turkic communities have been an important issue for Turkey, who wants to fit the vacancy of a regional balancer.38 Indeed, Turkey no longer wants to be seen as a military flank. Historical, socio-cultural, and geographical advantages to influence the post-Soviet geography and the ideological/systemic preference of Turkey, could be

36 Ibid., p. 50. 37 Er¸sen, “The Evolution…”, pp. 24–25. 38 E. Balta, ‘From Geopolitical Competition to Strategic Partnership: Turkey and Russia

˙ skiler, Vol. 16, No. 63, 2019, pp. 73–76. After the Cold War’, Uluslararası Ili¸

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seen as the causes of Western Alliance to support Turkey in Eurasia. It is possible to see the support of the West behind the bilateral, multilateral, and institutional efforts toward Eurasia at the early 1990s. Western actors support the move toward the establishment of the BSEC (Black Sea Economic Cooperation) and Azerbaijan-Georgia-Turkey-oriented energy projects; showing Turkey as a country that would become a model for the Eurasian geography.39 There’s a lack of consensus on which regions/countries are at Eurasia and how to deal with the issues in this vast region systemically/ideologically. While some circles want to act in cooperation with the West regarding the approach to Eurasia, some also wish to develop an independent Eurasian strategy due to the lack of EU membership and problems with the US. While the view of the liberal and pro-EU groups toward Eurasia is foreseen to act with the West in general, it can be said that the groups inspired by Turkish nationalism are in favor of acting together with the Turkic communities. Certain groups affected by the Eurasianist movement in Russia are in favor of acting together with Russia. This group also gained serious visibility during the post-millennium period. The statement of NSC Secretary General Kılınç in 2002, which envisages cooperation with Russia and Iran, has been evaluated as a development reflecting the power of this group. So three different options assessed Turkey’s Eurasianist orientation.40 At the discussions about exactly where Eurasia is, the problematic issue was how the Ottoman heritage in the Middle East and North Africa can be integrated into Eurasia. Sener ¸ Aktürk underlines the existence of three basic approaches should be examined in the axis of identity formation and nationalism in Turkey. These are Pan-Turkism, Pan-Islamism, and Westernism. Undoubtedly, all three elements have foreign policy approaches that have certain directions and diverge from each other.41 Yusuf Akçura, who is of Kazan Tatar origin and known as one of the most important ideologues of Turkish nationalism, states that there are three approaches for the liberation of 39 P. Shlykov, ‘Russian-Turkish Relations in the Wider Black Sea Region: Cooperation

and Competition’, Perceptions, Vol. 23, No. 2, 2018, pp. 93–116. 40 Ö. Tüfekçi, ‘Turkish Eurasianism: Roots and Discourses’, Eurasian Politics and Society: Issues and Challenges, Ö.Tüfekçi, H. Tabak and E.Akıllı (eds.), Newcastle, Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2017, pp. 1–31. 41 S. ¸ Aktürk, ‘The Fourth Style of Politics: Eurasianism as a Pro-Russian Rethinking of Turkey’s Geopolitical Identity’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, 2015, pp. 54–79.

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the Ottoman Empire and these are called Pan-Turkism, Pan-Islamism and Pan-Ottomanism. Akçura discussed these three trends in his work titled “Three Styles of Politics” and evaluated Pan-Turkism as the most appropriate ideology.42 Ziya Gökalp tried to find a way out by synthesizing these insights depicted by Akçura. His work titled “Turkification, Islamification, Contemporanization” shows that Gökalp replaced the concept of “Contemporanization” as a representation of modern civilization at the time of the Ottoman collapse.43 Samuel Huntington wrote in his work “Clash of Civilizations” that Turkey got stuck in between the West and East because of its cultural and political characteristics. Huntington said that this situation could drag Turkey into a political disaster and Turkey is similar to countries such as Russia and Mexico.44 Huntington foresees that there are options such as Pan-Islamism, Pan-Turkism, and Westernism for Turkey, but he underlined that Pan-Turkism is the right choice on behalf of Ankara, just as Akçura described. Huntington underlined the option of Pan-Turkism by asking, “Having rejected Mecca, and then being rejected by Brussels, where does Turkey look? Tashkent may be the answer.”45 A group which is close to Akçura and Gökalp and saw Huntington’s response of Pan-Turkism in terms of the cooperation to be established with Moscow by referring Eurasianism as an option, emerged. Eurasianism, which has gained an important place in bureaucracy and the military since the 1990s, as well as various political movements and Turkish intelligentsia, puts forth on Eurasian integration to be built in cooperation with Russia. Turkish Eurasianism is an ideological approach that came to the agenda after the 1990s. But the roots of this approach goes back to the first days of the republic. Indeed, during this period Turkey developed cooperation with the USSR, by anti-imperialist rhetoric but Ankara also tries to develop relations with the regional and the Western actors on a secular and peaceful approach. Mustafa Kemal Ataturk has shown reaching the “level of modern civilization” as a goal, but he has not made a discourse about this to be clearly done by integrating into the West. While trying 42 Y. Akçura, Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset, Ankara, Ötüken Ne¸sriyat, 2020. 43 S. ¸ Aktürk, ‘Counter Hegemonic Visions and Reconciliation Through the Past: The

Case of Turkish Eurasianism’, AB Imperio, No. 4, 2004, p. 210. 44 S.P. Huntington, ‘The Clash of Civilizations?’, Foreign Affairs, Summer 1993, pp. 3–

28. 45 Aktürk, ‘The Fourth Style…’, p. 56.

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to construct the identity and culture within the framework of Akçura and Gökalp’s Turkic views, Pan-Islamist and Pan-Ottomanist views were excluded. Although liberal economic policies were tried to be followed in the process until the Great Depression in 1929, both the insufficiency of capital and the failure to regulate the investment in a sufficiently healthy manner limited the economic development. After the Great Depression, policies integrated into the planned economy were followed in the axis of “étatism.”46 Here, this process was also dealt with the political and administrative means by the inspiration of the Kadro (Cadre) Movement. The Kadro Movement, which was formed by names that were largely inspired by socialism and were mostly lived at the USSR before, was also supported by Atatürk. Kadro Movement, which includes many names such as Sevket ¸ Süreyya Aydemir and Vedat Nedim Tör, wanted to give the republic a management style and also to ensure development.47 It can be said that the management style envisaged by Kadro, which was inspired by the management philosophy of the USSR, was influenced by these two factors. Kadro members wanted to establish a structure shaped by an economic system that predicted economic and technical cooperation with the USSR and shaped in the axis of Soviet-style socialist planning. This structure envisages a top-down social transformation in the political sense and wanted to create a change in the public base with the efforts of the bureaucracy and political elites in general.48 In this respect, the process is read as an “elite socialization” initiative and made sense in an “authoritarian” context. But because of the protectionist trade regimes in which the Great Depression caused to grow and economical/technical conditions of Turkey made the Kadro members to be directed toward a planned economy reminiscent of socialism. Some analyzes see the Kadro Movement as the true construction of Kemalism.49 46 A. Türegün, ‘Policy Response to the Great Depression of the 1930s: Turkish Neomercantilism in the Balkan Context’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 17, No. 4, 2016, pp. 666–690. 47 B. Idriso˘ ˙ glu, ‘Left-Leaning Interpretations of Kemalism within the Scope of Three Journals: Kadro, Markopa¸sa and Yön’, Universiteit Leiden Department of Middle Eastern Studies, November 2016, pp. 12–36. 48 F. Demirci, ‘Kadro Hareketi ve Kadrocular’, Dumlupınar Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, No. 15, 2006, pp. 35–54. 49 M. Riexinger, ‘Turkey, Completely Independent! Contemporary Turkish Left-Wing Nationalism (Ulusal Sol/Ulusalcılık): Its Predecessors, Objectives and Enemies’, Oriente Moderno, Vol. 90, No. 2, 2010, pp. 353–395.

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The coveted cooperation with the USSR, emphasis on anti-imperialism and planned economy model cause this movement to be seen as the pioneer of Turkish Eurasianism. After the Second World War, Turkey integrated into the Euro-Atlantic Alliance’s bloc politics. This choice has prevented the implementation of Kadro’s ideals. However, during the Cold War, the Yön (Direction) Movement that emerged in the mid1960s also essentially adopted the Kadro’s theses. This movement, which includes names such as Do˘gan Avcıo˘glu, Mümtaz Soysal, Niyazi Berkes, ˙ and Ilhan Selçuk, has gathered many intellectuals, writers and academicians who see themselves as left-wing, social democrat, anti-imperialist or Kemalist. The objective of this movement is to detract Turkey from the bloc policies and pull Ankara to the liberationist and anti-imperialist line.50 In this framework, a socialist-based planned economy, cooperation with the USSR and the Non-Aligned Movement and a technocratic transformation under the supervision of the civilian/military bureaucracy have been the target of the Yön Movement. Although this movement expresses itself as populist, the transformation it is talking about will only be an elite socialization initiative that will spread from top to down. The failure of the military officers of the Yön Movement, who attempted a military coup on March 9, 1971, resulted in the suppression of this movement. In this respect, Yön Movement is seen as a Kemalist initiative like the Kadro and is added to Eurasianism in the axis of cooperation with the USSR.51 As we mentioned before, the period when Turkish Eurasianism started to be discussed strongly is the point where the USSR dissolved and a large geopolitical gap emerged in Eurasia. Ankara, which realized that it is necessary to change the passive and security-oriented foreign policy approach during the Cold War, set its eyes on Eurasia. Various groups, which see that being a regional hub or an element of balance in this wide geography will contribute to the power of the country, have opened up Eurasianism to discussion.52 However, it is not possible to argue that these discussions have emerged as a result of in-depth analysis. Although some elements that began with Akçura and Gökalp and made sense

50 Aktürk, ‘The Fourth Style…’, pp. 60–61. 51 Y. Kaya and R. Yücer, ‘Kadro ve Yön Hareketlerinin Ideolojik ˙ ˙ Analizi’, Insan ve

Toplum Bilimleri Ara¸stırmaları Dergisi, Vol. 7, No. 2, 2018, pp. 571–577. 52 Er¸sen, ‘The Evolution…”, pp. 24–44.

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through the Kadro and Yön were discussed in this context, these discussions were not put forward in an analytical and supportive framework. In other words, the Eurasian orientation that appeared in the early 1990s has a pragmatic content. It can even be said that it is a reflection of different ideologies/political views on Eurasia.53 In this context, four different trends emerged based on Turkish Eurasianism. The first one is Turkist/Turanist Eurasianism, which lends itself to Turkish nationalism and envisages unity or wide-ranging integration among the Turkish/Turkic societies located at Eurasia. This approach, which positions Russia as a competitor and can be said to be in an antiRussian perspective, is also sceptical about the West and idealizes the Turkish Union in Eurasia. This initiative aims to develop an alternative regional integration of Turkish/Turkic societies by the economical and technical support of Turkey. The discourse of “From the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China” is also used by this branch of Turkish Eurasianism. Turkish/ Turanist Eurasianism, which has support in political parties such as MHP (Nationalist Movement Party), BBP (Great Union Party) and as ˙ Parti (Good Party), is also processed by newspapers such as well as the Iyi Yeniça˘g and Ortado˘gu and some publishing houses, especially Ötüken.54 The Turkic Council (Turkic-Speaking Countries Cooperation CouncilTurkish Council), which has made a great effort especially in recent years, is seen as the organization that will be at the center of the Turkic/Turanist Eurasianism.55 Of course, this organization has the appearance of a forum where socio-cultural, historical, and political issues are discussed and processed with a common dimension. The biggest problem of Turkish Eurasianism is that it has two important competitors such as Russia and China in terms of integration or political activity regarding the geography it is targeting. Both actors, are much more effective than Turkey especially in Eastern Eurasia by using their economical, military, and political power. Turkey’s chance of struggle as a “medium power” could be seen

53 O. Tanrısever, ‘Discourses and Politics of Eurasianism in Turkey During the 2000s’, Turkey: Towards a Eurasian Shift?, V. Talbot (ed.), Milano, ISPI, 2018, pp. 13–35. 54 Aktürk, ‘The Fourth Style…’, p. 66. 55 E. Akıllı, ‘Turksoy, Turkic Council and Cultural Diplomacy: Transactionalism

Revisited’, Bilig, No. 91, Autumn 2019, pp. 1–25.

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as very difficult regarding the “global forces” like Russia and China.56 Another problem of Turkish/Turanist Eurasianism, is the historical and cultural distance especially between Turkey and Central Asia. A convergence and mutual harmony in these matters is an essential criterion for an identity-based integration. However, because of the social/political alienating, discriminatory policies, and the creation of territorial disputes among Central Asian societies are used by the USSR, it is not possible to melt them into a single pot. The fact these societies use Russian as “lingua franca” among themselves and even within their own territory is an issue to be taken into consideration by the Turkish/Turanist Eurasianists.57 The second trend in Turkish Eurasianism is Islamic Eurasianism. Islamic Eurasianism is affected both by the ideological trends PanIslamism and Ottomanism and wants Turkey to integrate Middle East, Northern Africa, and Eurasia to itself as the pivotal actor of Islamic World/Civilization.58 This approach, which rejects the individualistic and liberal political values of the Western Civilization and aims for political integration within the framework of an Islamic-oriented cultural and political climate, excludes Russia. This trend led by the Welfare Party in the second half of the 1990s, also embraces Abdulhamid II’s policies that are considered to be Pan-Islamist and attach great importance to the Ottoman past. The “National Vision” program depicted by the Welfare Party leader and former Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan and the D-8 alternative set out by this program can be seen as an institutional extension of Islamic Eurasianism.59 Although this organization could not show any activity after the removal of Erbakan and the Welfare Party from power, it included the countries evaluated within the “Islamic world” from different regions.

56 B. Süsler, ‘Turkey: An Emerging Middle Power in a Changing World?’, LSE Ideas, June 11, 2019, https://medium.com/@lseideas/turkey-an-emerging-middle-power-in-achanging-world-df4124a1a71f (Accessed 27 July 2020). 57 E. Efegil, ‘Rationality Question of Turkey’s Central Asia Policy’, Bilgi, No. 19, 2009,

pp. 72–92. 58 E. Ismailov and V. Papava, ‘Eurasianism and the Concept of Central CaucasoAsia’, Silkroadstudies, https://www.silkroadstudies.org/resources/pdf/Monographs/100 6Rethinking-3.pdf (Accessed 27 July 2020). 59 C. Dinç, ‘The Welfare Party, Turkish Nationalism and Its Vision of a New World Order’, Alternatives, Vol. 5, No. 3, 2006, pp. 1–17.

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The third ideological framework regarding Turkish Eurasianism is Westernist Eurasianism. This trend had remained on the foreign policy agenda in the first half of 1990s. It’s a reflection that Turkey as a proWestern “model actor” at the former Soviet geography could endorse Western economical, political, and socio-cultural values in Eurasia.60 This current of thought could be said as effective at the administrative terms of Turgut Özal and Süleyman Demirel and came into view for using Turkey as a transformer for the former Soviet geography. Regional leadership that’s compatible with the Western actors will be the reward that Turkey would benefit by achieving this role. Although there are points where it meets with the discourse such as “Turkish World from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China,” it can be stated that it is an approach especially supported by the US.61 The Westernist Eurasianism has a serious impact on the implementation of an initiative such as the BSEC on an institutional basis.62 By the Eurasianist turn of Russia in the second half of 1990s by implementing the “Near Abroad” policy and the economical and political inefficacy of Turkey to transform the former Soviet geography had made the Westernist Eurasianism useless. The fourth and most effective ideological framework regarding Turkish Eurasianism is the so-called Leftist (Kemalist) Eurasianism. Indeed, when we talked about Turkish Eurasianism, generally this trend comes into mind. Leftist Eurasianism, which sees the Kadro and Yön Movements belonging to its own history, envisages establishing a large-scale integration in Eurasia in the axis of cooperation with Russia.63 This anti-imperialist and anti-Western approach refers to the socio-cultural and political closeness between Russia and Turkey and underlines that Eurasian space is dominated by the Slavic and Turkish/Turkic peoples. So, according to Leftist Eurasianism a common future apprehension should be built by the partnership of Russia and Turkey. Suspecting Western liberal values, Western content of democracy, and individualism, Leftist Eurasianism is in close contact with Neo-Eurasianists in

60 Yanık, ‘Debating Eurasia…”, pp. 40–42. 61 E. Balta, ‘From Geopolitical…”, pp. 73–76. 62 O. Tanrısever, ‘Turkey and Russia in the Black Sea Region: Dynamics of Cooperation and Conflict’, EDAM , March 12, 2012, https://edam.org.tr/en/turkey-and-russia-inthe-black-sea-region-dynamics-of-cooperation-and-conflict/ (Accessed 27 July 2020). 63 Akçalı and Perinçek, ‘Kemalist Eurasianism…”, pp. 550–569.

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Russia and especially Dugin. Vatan (Homeland) Party and its publication, Aydınlık (newspaper) and Kaynak Publishing are the most important representatives of Leftist Eurasianism. Even the Vatan Party is part of the International Eurasian Movement led by Dugin.64 However, this trend cannot be limited to a single party, media, or newspaper. Because, there are names close to this trend in various leftist parties and groups, especially CHP and DSP. Also, Leftist (Kemalist) Eurasianism rests on serious support within the Turkish Army and bureaucracy. It is possible to see that the former Secretary General of the NSC, Kılınç, who spoke at the symposium at the Military Academy Command in 2002, had a Leftist (Kemalist) Eurasianist discourse. Although the voting rates of Vatan Party and its leader Do˘gu Perinçek have remained at a very low level, Aydınlık has a serious follower group that exceeds the votes of the party.65 This movement prioritizes being active within the state bureaucracy and being negotiable at the intellectual level rather than the aim of coming to power. Leftist Eurasianism aims to present itself as the only real alternative outside the Western choice. Mustafa Kemal Atatürk’s collaboration with the USSR at the first years of the republic is the starting point of the Leftist Eurasianists for underlining the Eurasian choice which will be constructed by the partnership of Russia and Turkey.

Strategic Depth: Turkish Eurasianism in the Context of Neo-Ottomanism? As mentioned before post-Cold War Turkey’s “quest for a role” has led to the emergence of a variety of scenarios. Among the most known of them is Neo-Ottomanism, which aims to bring Turkey with its near abroad and has been stressing on its imperial past.66 Ankara, which realized that it had to change the passive and mostly reactionary foreign policy approach based on the bloc policies followed during the Cold War years, saw Eurasia and the former Ottoman geography as an opening point. Indeed, the Western willingness of presenting Turkey as “model country” to the Eurasian space during the 1990s has made Turkey to embrace its

64 Aktürk, ‘The Fourth Style…”, pp. 65–66. 65 Ibid., pp. 65–68. 66 M.H. Yavuz, ‘Turkish Identity and Foreign Policy in Flux: The Rise of NeoOttomanism’, Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 7, No. 12, 1998, pp. 19–41.

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Ottoman agenda. The military operation in Iraq and the aim of balancing the Iranian influence, Western actors have been particularly effective in penetrating Turkey into the Middle East by using its Ottoman past. Especially Turgut Özal’s perspective on First Gulf War and his approach to the Kurdish issue returned Turkey into the Middle East at the beginning of 1990s. Again, trying to help the political/economic transformation processes in the Middle East, Balkans, and the Caucasus during the Özal and Demirel periods are closely related to Ankara’s intention to show itself as a regional leader. Especially by its growing economy and increasing volume of trade toward its near abroad, Turkey has been asked to articulate a foreign policy at this direction. Although the discourse “from the Adriatic to the Great Wall of China Turkish/Turkic World,” is seen as nationalist, it marks the period when the Neo-Ottomanist approach came to the agenda for the first time with its reference to the former Ottoman area in terms of its geographical scope.67 Moscow’s return to the Eurasian approach and Turkey’s insufficient economic capacity had made the Neo-Ottomanist approach away from the foreign policy agenda for a while. Turkey’s orientation toward EU membership, political instability brought by the short-lived coalition governments and the fight against PKK terrorism have also been effective in this regard. Furthermore, the logic of the foreign policy approach toward the Ottoman civilization, which prioritizes “Islam” and reflects multiculturalism, not even Turkish national identity, has also received serious objections from the secular nationalist bureaucracy, army, and political institutions. This caused the Neo-Ottomanist sections to remain ineffective until the early 2000s. AKP, which won the 2002 elections and expresses itself as conservative democrat, is a political movement close to Pan-Islamism and even Neo-Ottomanism.68 It has taken a different stance on foreign policy as well as causing certain issues that were previously taboo to be opened for discussion and even to enter into the field of application. In the first years of power, AKP has shown an intense reform will to start membership negotiations with the EU. Although membership negotiations have started, AKP has undergone a foreign policy change at the point where 67 T. Cavlan, ‘Yeni Osmanlıcılık: Batı’dan Kopu¸s Mu?’, YDÜ Sosyal Bilimler Dergisi, Vol. 3, No. 2, 2010, pp. 130–132. 68 C.Y. Erdem, ‘Ottomentality: Neoliberal Governance of Culture and Neo-Ottoman Management of Diversity’, Turkish Studies, Vol. 18, No. 4, 2017, pp. 710–728.

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the EU faced the pain of institutional transformation problems and some insurmountable obstacles on some issues, especially Cyprus.69 A concept called “Strategic Depth” put forward by Ahmet Davuto˘glu, who previously served as a consultant and later as a foreign minister and ultimately as prime minister, was put into practice especially after 2006.70 At the point where the deadlocked relations with the EU, just as in the 1990s, which aimed to provide a new opening without excluding the West have been directed to an alternative regionalization. Just as was in the early 1990s, it is one of the features of Strategic Depth that is evaluated with reference to Neo-Ottomanism when the country needs an alternative. Davuto˘glu never accepted that Strategic Depth has a Neo-Ottomanist content. Turkey which will bring together Islam and the West, will serve as a regional balancer. Davuto˘glu supports Turkey’s opening to Eurasia. But, according to him, this should not be limited only to the former Soviet geography. Integration logic, which he calls Afro-Eurasia and evaluates the space of Eurasia and the Ottoman civilization at the Middle East and North Africa together, extends the area of Eurasia. This approach was also evaluated as an attempt to integrate the Ottoman Empire into Turkish Eurasianism, which excludes the Ottoman, with reference to the Leftist Eurasianism. In other words, Davuto˘glu tried to offer a solution that connects Turkish Eurasianism and Neo-Ottomanism in a pragmatic manner.71 The approach which is part of the Strategic Depth doctrine and underlines “zero problems with neighbours,” mentions Turkey’s pivotal role in the Afro-Eurasian region. In this context, although the reference to the Ottoman background is clear, the emphasis on Eurasia by the Balkans, the South Caucasus, and the Caspian can be easily perceived. Davuto˘glu who wanted to change the securitized unidimensional (Western) foreign policy approach which is built by the secular political/military elites, did not dismiss the Western actors completely. Davuto˘glu wants to develop a multicultural/multiethnic citizenship like the European identity

69 B. Saatçio˘ glu, ‘Revisiting the Role of Credible EU Membership Conditionality for ˙ skiler, Vol. 8, No. 31, 2011, pp. 23– EU Compliance: The Turkish Case’, Uluslararası Ili¸ 44. 70 A. Davuto˘ ˙ glu, Stratejik Derinlik, Istanbul, Küre Yayınları, 2001. 71 G. Tüysüzo˘ glu, ‘Strategic Depth: A Neo-Ottomanist Interpretation of Turkish Eurasianism’, Vol. 25, No. 2, 2014, pp. 85–104.

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that the EU underlined and redefine Turkishness by integrating religion (Islam) and recent history (Ottoman) into that. In doing so, it prioritizes a historical/cultural structure that resembles Ottoman identity, not Western/European or Leftist Eurasian references.72 This initiative aims to put Turkey at the center, creating free trade and interdependence chains and at the long-term, a common market will be created. Indeed, the nature of the economic/commercial agreements with Syria and Lebanon before the Arab uprisings has shown this very clearly. HighLevel Strategic Cooperation agreements and even joint ministerial council meetings initiatives should also be evaluated in this context.73 Davuto˘glu’s approach changes or expands the content and geographical scope of Turkish Eurasianism. In this respect, it can be stated that there is a synthesis of other paradigms, like Islamic Eurasianism, but mainly Turkish/Turanist Eurasianism. Nevertheless, since the main emphasis is on Ottoman civilization and geography, it is evaluated within the framework of Neo-Ottomanism rather than Eurasianism. In the framework of this approach, it can easily be said that the area of interest is mostly in the Middle East and North Africa, especially considering the steps taken in the period from 2006 until the Arab Spring were dragged into a stalemate in Syria.74 In this period, relations with Russia also showed a dramatic revival and gained a strategic dimension, especially after the steps taken in the fields of trade, investments, tourism and energy. In fact, when considered within the context of Turkish–Russian history, it can be understood that the AKP period is interpreted as a “golden age” in the relations of the two countries. However, the relations between 2003–2016 and after 2016 could not be expressed in the same frame. Because, until 2016, while the relations were mostly economic/commercial and energy-oriented, it evolved into a different path after 2016. In fact, it can be said that the relations between the two

72 P. Bilgin and A. Bilgiç, ‘Turkey’s New Foreign Policy Toward Eurasia’, Eurasian Geography and Economics, Vol. 52, No. 2, 2011, pp. 173–195. 73 ‘Joint Political Declaration on the Establishment of the High Level Cooperation Council Among Turkey, Syria, Jordan and Lebanon’, Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/joint-political-declaration-on-the-esthablis hement-of-the-high-level-cooperation-council-among-turkey_-syria_-jordan-and-lebanon. en.mfa (Accessed 30 July 2020). 74 B. Özkeçeci-Taner, ‘Disintegration of the Strategic Depth Doctrine and Turkey’s Troubles in the Middle East’, Contemporary Islam, Vol. 11, 2017, pp. 201–214.

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countries have been shaped in the Eurasian context with the expression of Leftist Eurasianists after 2016.75 One of the most important reasons that make Strategic Depth to be successful until 2011 is the political legitimacy that Turkey has gained in the Middle East because of the deterioration of the relations with Israel.76 This approach has created a serious social legitimacy at the Arab streets, on behalf of Turkey, especially in Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Jordan. However, it is not easy to state that the same legitimacy or support is owned by the same scope based on the governments of these countries. In this respect, as well as the start of the Arab uprising, Turkey’s strategic depth approach which ran aground in Syria remained inconclusive. Because the strategic depth was based on “mutual commercial dependency” and “soft power” practices fed from common culture, history, or beliefs. However, the political situation in the region, which was depicted as Afro-Eurasia after the Arab uprisings, started to take shape due to the “great/global power diplomacy” with “hard power” practices. Turkey as a “middle power” has started to act in accordance with the facts by expanding the contact area by demonstrating compliance with Russia and Iran after 2016.77 Strategic Depth has not seen as a major problem by the West, although it has greatly sacrificed relations with Israel and with a certain degree of tension with Washington. In parallel with this approach, however, Turkey–Russia relations seem to be developing, there are significant problematic issues in Eurasia and the two countries have continued to take place in opposite camps. This process has changed significantly, especially after the coup attempt on July 15, 2016.

Turkish Foreign Policy After Strategic Depth: A Return to Eurasianism? The civil war in Syria has significantly harmed the relations of Turkey with its Western allies. Washington’s military and political support to 75 B. Balamir Co¸skun, ‘Turkey’s Relations with Russia After the Failed Coup: A Friend in Need of a Friend Indeed?’, New Middle Eastern Studies, Vol. 9, No. 1, 2019, pp. 36– 52. 76 S. Efron, ‘The Future of Israeli-Turkish Relations’, Rand, 2018, pp. 7–37. 77 M. Ek¸si and M.S. Erol, ‘The Rise and Fall of Turkish Soft Power and Public

Diplomacy’, Akademik Bakı¸s , Vol. 11, No. 23, 2018, pp. 15–45.

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PYD/YPG (with the participation of some other components, it began to use the name SDG) which is seen as the Syrian branch of the PKK and US opposition to the Turkish proposal to establish an extensive “safe zone” at the northern part of Syria was an important breaking point in this sense.78 Likewise, the EU’s leading countries also have not supported Turkey’s perspective on Syria and evaluated PYD/YPG in a positive sense. The process of distancing Turkey from the West started in 2006, due to the problems with the EU on accession negotiations regarding Cyprus. The deterioration of Turkey–Israel Relations has also been a catalyst in this respect. The Gezi events at the summer of 2013 were read by the Turkish Government as a movement to neutralize itself and change the political power.79 In this sense, it was associated with the Gülen Community (at that time it’s also called as Hizmet Movement and now it’s officially a terrorist organization abbreviated as FETÖ) and Gezi Events was thought to be a “colour revolution,” which was secretly supported by the West, citing the links with the US.80 Immediately after the Gezi Events, the widespread corruption allegations in December 2013 and the emergence of these allegations put forward by the Gülen Community’s appendages in the judiciary and the police, caused a large-scale reaction in the name of the government.81 As a matter of fact, after this process, many public officials were arrested, a significant part of them were removed from office, and all institutions affiliated with the Gülen Community were placed under arrest or closed. The event that completed this whole process was the military coup attempt on July 15, 2016. This initiative, which was intended to be carried out by officers who were affiliated with the Gülen Community in the army, failed.82 The Gülen Community, which was declared as a “terrorist organization” after the coup attempt and named as FETÖ, was completely transformed 78 C. Acun and B. Keskin, ‘The PKK’s Branch in Northern Syria: PYD-YPG’, SETA ˙ Report, Istanbul, 2017. 79 H. Ete, ‘Reframing the July 15 Coup Attempt: A Political and Sociological Examination’, Bilig, No. 87, 2018, pp. 188–194. 80 A. Aydınta¸sba¸s and K. Kiri¸sci, ‘The United States and Turkey: Friends, Enemies or Only Interests’, Brookings Turkey Project Policy Paper, No. 12, 2017, pp. 4–5. 81 H. Ta¸s, ‘A History of Turkey’s AKP-Gülen Conflict’, Mediterranean Politics, Vol. 23, No. 3, 2017, pp. 395–402. 82 Ibid.

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into a “security threat.” The fact that Fethullah Gülen, the leader of the organization, resides in the US and is not returned by Washington despite Turkish demand, has caused a large-scale reaction in Ankara.83 Likewise, during the coup attempt and its aftermath, Turkey faced with intense criticism by the Western countries in the context of “democracy and human rights.” This perspective of Brussels made Turkey began to make explanations that it will walk the EU accession process. Even some news that the coup attempt has been planned by some American groups made Turkey question its NATO membership. This debate, as well as arresting some Western names residing in Turkey (for instance, American priest Brunson), working for Western organizations (such as a translator at the US Consulate) Turkish citizens and Turkish descent Western journalists (DW’s Turkey representative Deniz Yücel) for allegations of spying also coincide after the coup attempt.84 Although these names have been released after a while, Turkey has shown its reaction to the West by these initiatives. It is obvious that the West, especially the US, had an impact on the economic crisis (especially the currency crisis in the summer of 2018) in Turkey. Turkey’s operations, as well as developing relations with Russia in Syria, even the harsh rhetoric on NATO membership made Trump threaten Turkey economically following the arrest of an American priest Brunson.85 Trump’s talking about residues for the Turkish economy and especially the political rows experienced with Germany and France, the EU’s leading countries, increased Turkey’s economic fragility dramatically. Certainly in this case, as shown by Turkey’s dependence, it has also consolidated the negative reaction to the West. The tension in relations with the West and the deadlock that the NeoOttomanist foreign policy has come up against when the Arab Spring started has changed the scope of the alternative debates on foreign policy in Turkey. It is important in this sense that the comments regarding the need to pursue multidimensional and multilateral foreign policy come to the fore. NATO’s internal crisis (Trump’s accusation to other members 83 ‘Turkey: US Failure to Hand Over Gulen Would Sacrifice Relations’, Voanews, August

9, 2016, https://www.voanews.com/europe/turkey-us-failure-hand-over-gulen-would-sac rifice-relations (Accessed 31 July 2020). 84 S.A. Cook, ‘Neither Friend Nor Foe: The Future of US-Turkey Relations’, CFR Council Special Report, No. 82, November 2018. 85 I.O. Lesser, ‘After the Brunson Affair: What Next For US-Turkish Relations?’, GMF Transatlantic Take, October 2018.

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for not giving enough support to defense spending) and the EU’s discussion to have its own army has made the arguments that have revealed in Turkey about NATO so meaningful.86 However, the cause of Turkey’s critical attitude toward NATO and the Western actors originates from the lack of support to Turkey against attacks originating from Syria and the military and political support that the PYD/YPG has obtained. Also, criticism directed to Turkey from the EU and the US after the July 15, 2016 coup attempt has played an integral role. EU’s attitude to criticize Turkey politically so intensely, the differentiating approaches of the EU and Turkey regarding the Eastern Mediterranean and Cyprus and also the discussions on the need to terminate the membership negotiations of Turkey, have increased the discomfort in relations.87 In particular, the US government’s unresponsive attitude toward the overthrow of the Mursi government in Egypt which is in cooperation with Turkey and its support to Abdelfattah el-Sisi, has led to frustration in Turkey. Facing France in Libya is also an important indicator that shows Turkey’s perspective is contravening with the Western actors.88 Saudi Arabia and Jordan which were allies of Turkey at the beginning of the Syrian War are turned against Ankara and this shows a situation that the Strategic Depth has become meaningless. Approaches about multidimensionality, improving relations with Russia despite the different interests, changing role of China have consolidated the alternative discussions in Turkey. A probability of becoming an independent regional actor at the Eurasian region and the possibility to work together with Russia and Iran has brought the Leftist Eurasian discussions on the foreign policy agenda.89 It is exactly after 2016 that the opinion, that was clearly described by former NSC Secretary General Tuncer Kılınç in 2002, came to the agenda. The presence of Aleksandr 86 F. Mauro and O. Jehin, ‘Why Do We Need a European Army?”, IRIS Analysis, No. 1, April 2019. 87 I. Lika, ‘Greek Security Policy in the Eastern Mediterranean’, SETA Analysis, No. 60, February 2020. 88 R. Ahmedzade, ‘The Battle for Libya: Growing French-Turkish Rivalry in the Mediterranean’, LSE, June 26, 2020, https://blogs.lse.ac.uk/mec/2020/06/26/thebattle-for-libya-growing-french-turkish-rivalry-in-the-mediterranean/ (Accessed 31 July 2020). 89 E. Er¸sen, ‘The Return of Eurasianism in Turkey’, Turkey’s Pivot to Eurasia: Geopolitics and Foreign Policy in a Changing World Order, E. Er¸sen and S. Köstem (eds.), London, Routledge Publishing, 2019, pp. 31–47.

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Dugin, just before the July 15 coup attempt in Turkey and allegations that he warned about a possible military coup via the Vatan Party and also the fact that Vladimir Putin was one of the leaders calling Turkey immediately after the coup attempt are the factors that helped to decrease the political distance between the two countries.90 Turkey–Russia Relations has passed a serious test after 2015. As a matter of fact, in November 2015, the Su-24 type aircraft belonging to the Russian Air Force was dropped by Turkish F-16s because it violated the Turkish airspace at the Syrian border.91 After this incident, both of the governments have accused each other for a long time and this problem dominated the tension between the two countries. Russia also had gone on a variety of economic and trade restrictions against Turkey for a while. Immediately after lowering of the plane, with retaliation concerns that may come from Russia, Turkey highlighted its “NATO membership” and assumed an attitude that wants military and political help from its NATO allies. This incident indicates the fragility of Turkey–Russia relations. In other words, despite the high momentum of development, which emphasizes the economic, commercial, energy, and tourism sectors, a Syrian-oriented political crisis immediately escalated and added to military tension. This point prevails in Moscow an idea that very close relations with Ankara cannot be established, while the Eurasianist actors in both countries have taken action to repair the relations between the two countries. Although Turkey’s immediate NATO membership revival for the military/political support against Moscow is disappointing for Russia, Ankara’s solitude in this respect for taking a genuine assurance of support from the West, has made the questions about the support of NATO/EU contentious. On the Turkish side, Vatan Party leader Do˘gu Perinçek, who has close ties with the Neo-Eurasianist group in Russia, has made moves to overcome the crisis and provide confidence by intensifying contacts with the Russian side.92 Analysis and news have been published that Perinçek is working

90 S. ¸ Aktürk, ‘Relations Between Russia and Turkey Before, During and After the Failed Coup of 2016’, Insight Turkey, Vol. 21, No. 4, 2019, pp. 97–113. 91 E. Er¸sen, ‘Evaluating the Fighter Jet Crisis in Turkish-Russian Relations’, Insight Turkey, Vol. 19, No. 4, 2017, pp. 85–104. 92 Er¸sen, ‘The Return of…’, pp. 31–47.

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as a mediator to restore the relations between Ankara and Moscow.93 At the end of the whole process, in June 2016, the crisis entered the stage of overcoming with the meeting of the leaders of two countries in Moscow. Of course, one of the major reasons is the increased activities of Russia, which harms Turkish interests at the Syrian field and the effect of trade restrictions imposed on Turkey. Vatan Party and Do˘gu Perinçek tend to see themselves as the architects of this process. It was stated that the negotiation traffic monitored in the axis of military and civil bureaucracy in Russia has been positive. However, the reluctance of the NATO allies to give a military and political boost to Turkey for downing the Russian aircraft should be seen as a very important factor. Another issue that once again tested the relations was the murder of Russian Ambassador Andrey Karlov by a police officer in Ankara at the opening of a photo exhibition at December 2016. This occurred immediately after the coup attempt of July 15, 2016. Turkey evaluates this event as an action of FETÖ to disrupt the Turkish–Russian Relations.94 Russia also evaluated this incident in the same direction, and tried to point out the US over FETÖ’s criminal acts.95 As the Turkish government sees this development as an extension of the coup attempt, the tensions with Western countries, especially the US, has increased and Ankara has once again voiced that it cannot trust NATO for its own security. The role played by Eurasianist Perinçek and some former members of the army, who were imprisoned by members of the judiciary and police who were stated to be members of FETÖ and released after 2013, were considered important at the political transformation. Turkey conducted a military operation at August 2016 named “Euphyrates Shield” in Northern Syria. With this operation, which is stated to be organized against ISIS and PYD/YPG, a message was sent

93 C. Kenar, ‘Turkey’s Deep State Has a Secret Back Channel to Assad’, Foreign Policy, July 12, 2016, https://foreignpolicy.com/2016/07/12/turkeys-deep-state-has-a-secretbackchannel-to-assad/ (Accessed 31 July 2020). 94 ‘Russian Envoy Killed to Sabotage Turkish Ties: Expert’, AA, December 19, 2019, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/turkey/russian-envoy-killed-to-sabotage-turkishties-expert/1678128 (Accessed 31 July 2020). 95 ‘Çavu¸so˘ glu’ndan Karlov Suikasti Açıklaması:Bu Sahıs, ¸ FETÖ’ye Ba˘glı’, Sputniknews, January 4, 2017, https://tr.sputniknews.com/politika/201701041026621964-cavusoglukarlov-feto/ (Accessed 31 July 2020).

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to both the West and to a certain extent to Russia.96 While the criticism against NATO has been continuing, Ankara talked about a possible membership to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization. This situation has no doubt welcomed by the Eurasianists both in Turkey and Russia. Even there have also been several calls from Vatan Party and other Leftist Eurasianists in Turkey for becoming a member of the Eurasian Economic Union. When a possible membership both to the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Economic Union started to be spoken in Ankara, same questions which are related to the change in the foreign policy axis of Turkey has been raised again.97 Although influenced by downing of the Russian aircraft and the developments in Syria, Turkey’s trade volume with Russia navigates between 20–25 billion dollars (in 2015, 24; 2016, 17; 2017, 22; 2018, 25 2019, 26 billion $).98 Moreover, in the framework of this relationship, Russia’s exports to Turkey is almost 4 times more than Turkey’s exports to Russia. This occurs largely from the energy exports of Russia to Turkey (especially natural gas). Indeed, as of the 2018 annual total of 50 million cubic meters of gas that Turkey imports, about 23 million has been purchased from Russia. In recent years, Turkey’s turn toward alternative sources (Azerbaijan, Iran, Algeria, US, Nigeria, Qatar, Egypt, etc.) has decreased the dependency to Russia.99 Nevertheless, natural gas imports continue to be an important factor in bilateral relations. Also, Turkey and Russia cooperate at constructing the Turkish Stream pipeline. In this respect, Russia shows that it sees Turkey both as a market and a transit country. Only 2.2% of the total export of Turkey realized as of 2019 comes from Russia and Russia’s share in total trade volume of Turkey is 7%. This proves that trade relations between Turkey and Russia have not reached their real potential. Because both countries aim to reach a trade volume

96 F. Bayezit, ‘Dengeleme Davranı¸sı Olarak Fırat Kalkanı Operasyonu: Neoklasik Realist Bakı¸s’, Barı¸s Ara¸stırmaları ve Çatı¸sma Çözümleri Dergisi, Vol. 4, No. 2, 2016, pp. 84– 112. 97 Yanık, ‘Debating Eurasia…’, pp. 44–49. 98 ‘Türkiye Ekonomisi Açısından Rusya ile Ticari Ili¸ ˙ skiler Ne Kadar Önemli?’, BBC

Türkçe, February 10, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya-51385834 (Accessed 31 July 2020). 99 ‘Do˘ ˙ galgaz Ithalatında Rusya’nın Payı Yüzde 33’e Geriledi’, Habertürk, June 5, 2020, https://www.haberturk.com/dogalgaz-ithalatinda-rusya-nin-agirligi-azaliyor-270 2737-ekonomi (Accessed 31 July 2020).

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of 100 billion dollars.100 Undoubtedly, this is a matter closely followed by the Eurasianist groups in both countries. Because a commercial dependency may force the two countries to have closer relations with each other within the framework of political issues. Turkey’s “nuclear power plant” in Mersin/Akkuyu will be built by Russia and it is significant in terms of demonstrating the strategic dimension of Ankara–Moscow Relations.101 This is seen as an important reflection of the dramatic change in Turkish–Russian Relations. Of course, such a dependency on Russia, in the field of energy (though falling recently) opens the door to serious criticism in Turkey.102 Analyzes are also made that the development of such a high dependency to a country with political problems can turn into a national security issue. Especially the Turkish Eurasianists and Westernists reveal their criticisms in this regard. Turkish Eurasianists approaching cold to deepening energy partnership with Russia on the ground that it will weaken the Azerbaijani alternative (although a strategic move was made with TANAP). In addition, according to them, it will reduce the determination for the Trans-Caspian Project (even Kazakh and Turkmen gas via Azerbaijan to Turkey for transferring to Europe).103 Because taking a step back in this direction will break the willingness to reduce dependence on Moscow, as well as increasing the energy-related pressure of Russia and even China on Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. Turkish Eurasianists who wanted Turkey to pursue a Central Asian-based Eurasianism is perturbed by deepening relations with Moscow. Westernists, on the other hand, are worried that, with the increasing dependence on Russia, the process may also affect political and military preferences and Ankara can completely break away from the EU. On the other hand, Vatan Party and the Leftist Eurasianist group, which is in favor of the expansion and deepening of cooperation with Russia in all policy areas, do not consider this situation as a threat.

100 ‘Türkiye Ekonomisi Açısından…’, https://www.bbc.com/turkce/haberler-dunya51385834 (Accessed 31 July 2020). 101 N. Gören, ‘Nuclear Energy Developments, Climate Change and Security in Turkey’,

Council on Strategic Risks Briefer, No. 7, April 2020. 102 G. Winrow, ‘Turkey and Russia: The Importance of Energy Ties’, Insight Turkey, Vol. 19, No. 1, 2017, pp. 17–32. 103 V.S. ¸ Ediger and D. Durmaz, ‘The New Geopolitical Game in the Caspian Region: Azerbaijan-Turkey Energy Relations’, Turkish Policy Quarterly, Vol. 15, No. 2, 2016, pp. 131–149.

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Turkey’s close relationship with Russia for providing air defence systems indicates a significant transformation in strategic terms. Due to the high costs for procuring the Western air defense systems and also the Patriot from the US, Turkey firstly verged toward China. Despite a certain consensus has been reached, it has given up the Chinese option because of objections from Washington and NATO in general.104 Due to the developments in Syria, Turkey once again looked for an air defense system and seen the most suitable option as the Russian-made S-400. Although the contacts with Russia in this direction have resulted positively, a long period is expected in terms of purchase. The main reason for this was the objections from the West (especially from the US) that a Russian-made air defense system cannot be integrated into NATO’s common air defense system, which is a major trump card that can be used by Russia. Washington threatened Turkey that if such a purchase is realized, the sanctions called CAATSA and defined by the Congress will be implemented against Turkey.105 This means Turkey will be sanctioned financially/economically/commercially by the US. It is also clearly stated that the system to be purchased will never be integrated into NATO’s air defense system. In addition to this, Turkey will be removed from the F-35 project, which aims to develop a fifth-generation fighter aircraft by the NATO members. Turkey stated that because the US has not sold the Patriot air defense system, Russian-made S-400’s with its superior technical feature is the best-fit one for its necessity. Following this agreement, Turkey’s participation in the F-35 program has been frozen and Turkish pilot training process in the US has also been terminated. This decision is criticized because of a loss of approximately $10 billion on behalf of Turkey. Afterwards, S-400 system is purchased and the transportation of S-400 batteries from Russia was completed. There is an expectation that CAATSA sanctions may follow this move. But Ankara has not activated the S-400’s.106 Although Turkey has completed the purchase and the training program, Ankara has not activated S-400 104 S. Egeli, ‘Making Sense of Turkey’s Air and Missile Defense Merry-go-round’, All

Azimuth, Vol. 8, No. 1, 2019, pp. 72–78. 105 C. Kasapo˘ glu, ‘Turkish-Russian Defense Cooperation: Political-Military Scope, Prospects and Limits’, EDAM Report, No. 4, 2019. 106 ‘Delayed S-400 Activation Could Offer Chance For Turkey-US Ties to Warm’, Al Monitor, April 21, 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/04/s-400delay-us-turkey-window-opportunity.html (Accessed 1.8.2020).

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missile system and wants to remain in F-35 program by implying its NATO membership. We can say that Turkey has not made a clear strategic choice. Russia, on the other hand, addresses this situation in a commercial context. Turkey needs to remain as a member of NATO and the choice to become as more autonomous in NATO could easily be seen by Russia. In this context, Turkey’s NATO orientation/connection that Neo-Eurasianists often emphasized, once again outweighs the strategic choice. However, it appears that problems in Turkey-West relations is an open space that can be used on behalf of Russia and the Neo-Eurasianists. Turkey is trying to develop a certain special rapprochement with Russia, especially in Syria since June 2016. Although Ankara pursues different goals than Moscow, it has seen that its Western allies should establish this relationship to favor the situation on the ground, since it does not support their own theses. Russia, as in the case of the main supporter of the Syrian government, is in close contact with PYD/YPG. Because Russia can contact both with the Assad regime and the PYD/YPG, Turkey decided to work with Moscow for carrying its impact on the Syrian field. This decision has integrated into Russia–Iran– Turkey trilateral by the negotiations named as Astana and also a tandem of Russia–Turkey which named as Sochi.107 Astana and Sochi negotiations have also played an important role in Turkey’s military operations toward Northern Syria. Especially the consensus reached with Russia ensured that Russia would not involve in the process within the scope of Operation Olive Branch, which was organized against PYD/YPG, for controlling Afrin and its surroundings.108 Indeed, in this region at the west of the Euphrates, Russia had close relations with the PYD/YPG. The Peace Spring Operation of Turkey which realized in October 2019 saw the negative reaction from Russia.109 Nevertheless, Russia informed the Syrian Army not to interfere a collision with the Turkish forces for avoiding a crisis with Turkey. However, Russia took the advantage of being in a positive relationship both with the Syrian regime and the 107 S. Köstem, ‘Russian-Turkish Cooperation in Syria: Geopolitical Alignment with

Limits’, Cambridge Review of International Affairs, 2020, p. 1–24. 108 C. Kasapo˘ glu and S. Ülgen, ‘Operation Olive Branch: A Political-Military Assessment’, EDAM Report, No. 2, 2018. 109 S. Salacanin, ‘What Is ˙ Next After Operation Peace Spring?’, The New Arab, January 15, 2020, https://english.alaraby.co.uk/english/indepth/2020/1/15/what-is-next-afteroperation-peace-spring (Accessed 1 August 2020).

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PYD/YPG by locating its forces to the bases and areas which are evacuated by the US forces. So, Astana and Sochi negotiations have provided an opportunity to influence developments in the field in its own favor at a time when Turkey has not received support from its Western partners. Russia also coordinated pro-Iranian militias to a certain extent in these operations. However Russian air support to the Syrian Army for its operation against the pro-Turkish militias around Idlib and the cooperation between Russia and PYD/YPG at the eastern part of the Euphrates during and after the Peace Spring Operation has proven the differentiating interests of Russia and Turkey. Killing of the Turkish soldiers at the clashes between the Syrian Army and the pro-Turkish militias around Idlib and the ineffectiveness or unwillingness of Russia for avoiding this incident shows the heterogeneous and delicate content of Russia–Turkey relations.110 According to Leftist Eurasianists, one of the most important area of cooperation between Turkey and Russia is the Eastern Mediterranean. Russia’s attempts to obtain a naval base in Latakia as well as the Tartus Base and Hmeimim Air Base have made this country one of the most important actors in the Eastern Mediterranean.111 Attempts to alienate Turkey from the Eastern Mediterranean has made Ankara take steps for protecting both its own and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)’s exclusive economic zones in this region.112 Thus, at that point its brought to mind the idea that is it possible to cooperate with Russia at the Eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, the quartet of Greece, Greek Cypriots, Israel, and Egypt, which also supported by the US and France, is directed directly to the interests of Turkey at the Eastern Mediterranean.113 Leftist Eurasianists evaluate this quartet as an initiative of the 110 ‘Syria War: Alarm After 33 Turkish Soldiers Killed in Attack in Idlib’, BBC News, February 28, 2020, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-middle-east-51667717 (Accessed 1 August 2020). 111 ‘Russia Aims to Boost Military Facilities in Syria’, Deutsche Welle, May 30, 2020, https://www.dw.com/en/russia-aims-to-boost-military-facilities-in-syria/a-536 24765 (Accessed 2 August 2020). 112 Ç. Erciyes, ‘Eastern Mediterranean Turkey’s Legal and Political Views’, MFA, February 2020, http://www.mfa.gov.tr/site_media/html/Eastern-Mediterranean-Turkeys-Legal-and-Political-Views-5-February-2020.pdf (Accessed 1 August 2020). 113 J. Krasna, ‘Israel-Greece-Cyprus Take on Turkey in the Mediterranean’, Al Monitor, January 23, 2020, https://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2020/01/israel-turkeygreece-cyprus-benjamin-netanyahu-natural-gas.html (Accessed 2 August 2020).

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EU and US to control the Eastern Mediterranean. According to them, for negating this endeavour, cooperation between Turkey and Russia is essential. Because in such a case Turkey’s geographic advantage and Russia’s military strength can be brought together. Moreover, an area that can be used in this region will be opened to Russia and it will be possible to establish a “balance” at the regional sense. However, this corresponds to the expectations of the Leftist Eurasianist group, that Turkey and Russia are supporting the opposing fronts in Libya, yet reveals that appear on the horizon of a special collaboration that can occur in the Eastern Mediterranean.114 Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also announced that there are efforts to act in Libya with the US. Both giving support to different actors in Syria and Libya and the economic and socio-cultural closeness of Russia to the Greek Cypriots make the cooperation between Russia and Turkey very difficult. In addition, Turkey is the most important naval power of NATO at the Eastern Mediterranean and in this sense, it is also clear that the military strategy of Turkey does not seem any signs of change. Turkey, starts to get the benefits of all investments made in the field of defense industry (especially drone and armed drone technology) and begins using these weapons in favor of its own interests in Syria and Libya. Leftist, Islamist, and Turkish/Turkic Eurasianists which are quite sensitive to military dependency are pleased with the development of the defense industry. The development of the defense industry especially of the navy and air elements to meet the military needs also strengthens nationalist rhetoric in Turkey. Moreover, the success achieved in the operations carried out in Syria and the fact that the Turkishmade weapons which are used to support the legitimate government in Libya were effective in changing the status quo. This situation makes the Leftist and Turkish Eurasianists come closer. Referring to an imperial idealism, also known as the “Red Apple Coalition,” has directed AKP and MHP to formally cooperate under a political alliance.115 Vatan Party, known as the representative of the Leftist Eurasianists, has turned into

114 W. Lacher, ‘The Great Carve-Up: Libya’s Internationalised Conflicts After Tripoli’, SWP Comment, No. 25, June 2020, https://www.swp-berlin.org/fileadmin/contents/pro ducts/comments/2020C25_LibyaHaftar.pdf (Accessed 2 August 2020). 115 H. Duran and H. Öztürk, ‘People’s Alliance vs. Nation Alliance:Electoral Campaigns and Strategies’, SETA, March 13, 2019, https://www.setav.org/en/peoplesalliance-vs-nation-alliance-electoral-campaigns-and-strategies/ (Accessed 2 August 2020).

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an actor that supports this coalition on many issues.116 In other words, the surging nationalist wave has been beneficial to a certain extent for the anti-Western Eurasianists. In addition to Turkey’s relations with Russia, which has gained a strategic context, increasing contacts with China is also seen as positive by the Leftist Eurasianists. However, we see that about the relations with China, Turkish Eurasianists could not be transmitted in the same denominator as the Leftist Eurasianists. The main reason for this is the comprehensive social, cultural, economic, and political coercion measures facing the Uighur Turks living in the Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region.117 The group led by Perinçek sees the development of relations with China as an action to break the hegemony of the West. Leftist Eurasianists, who see the concerted action of Russia, China, Turkey, and Iran as significant, bring the Shanghai alternative forward. An expectance of Turkey both a member of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and One Belt, One Road Initiative is important in showing the significance of China for the Leftist Eurasianists. Indeed Turkey wants to be included in the One Belt, One Road Initiative and attends to the summits regarding this project. China’s increasing impact in Turkish Economy and Beijing’s role in Turkish Foreign Trade (being third after Germany and Russia in 2018–2019 and second after Germany in January–March term of 2020) has become a vital factor for Beijing for integrating into the west of the Eurasian Region.118 While the increase in commercial dependence on China is seen as a problem for the pro-Western group and the Turkish Eurasianists, the Leftist Eurasianist group is in favor of not reflecting this as a problem.119 The market opportunities started to gain a 116 ‘Perinçek: ABD, MHP ve Vatan Partisi’nin Oldu˘ ˙ ˙ gu Bir Ittifak Istemiyor’, Sput-

niknews, April 29, 2019, https://tr.sputniknews.com/turkiye/201904291038893308perincek-abd-mhp-ve-vatan-partisinin-oldugu-bir-ittifak-istemiyor/, (Accessed 2 August 2020). 117 E. Savrun, ‘The Uyghur Turks and the Eastern Turkistan (Xinjiang Conflict): Which China? China’s Growth or Red Cruelty?’, Tarih ve Günce, Vol. 5, No. 2, 2019, pp. 399– 410. 118 ‘Turkish Exports Down 4% to 42.7 B in Jan-March’, AA, April 30, 2020, https://www.aa.com.tr/en/economy/turkish-exports-down-4-to-427b-in-janmarch/1823874# (Accessed 2 August 2020). 119 ‘Interview: Turkey Eyes Closer Trade Cooperation with China to Deal with Economic Difficulties’, Xinhuanet, May 11, 2018, http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/ 2018-11/05/c_137584327.htm (Accessed 2 August 2020).

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strategic context and this has led China to consider the problems related to Xinjiang Uighur Autonomous Region more carefully in terms of bilateral relations. Furthermore, China is aware that Turkey is the intersection point for the One Belt, One Road Initiative before reaching Europe. China’s growing interest to strategic transportation investments like highspeed railway, highway, or bridge could be read as the obvious attention of Beijing to Turkey.120 Despite the military operations toward Syria and the deteriorating relations with the US, it is hard to argue that Turkey has been integrated into Eurasianism. Although it is obvious that there is a serious crisis in the framework of the S-400 missile defense system and problems in the Eastern Mediterranean (Libya and Cyprus), Ankara as a member of NATO emphasizes the strategic relations with Washington and can also come to the point of asking for “direct” help after every dispute with Russia, especially in Syria (regarding Idlib and its surroundings). Also for overcoming the economic difficulties experienced and attracting Western capital back into Turkey, Ankara emphasized the EU membership target from time to time (the latest one came after the Covid-19 pandemic has started). This implies that Ankara, does not see cooperation with Russia and China as a real alternative and wants to act in cooperation with the West by using the Eurasian option. Turkey often uses the Eurasian option as rhetoric for persuading its Western allies to support its own regional interests. The most important factor that differentiates Ankara’s recent moves is the purchase of Russian-made S-400 missile defense system and its independent stance from the West in Syria and the Eastern Mediterranean. The integration with Russia at different interests in matters such as the Eastern Mediterranean and Syria also proves that Ankara has entered into “preferential” cooperation with Russia.

Conclusion One of the most important problems of Turkey at post-Cold War is the inhabited confusion regarding how should give direction to foreign policy. By the strategic preference which had been chosen after the Second

120 ‘Chinese Experts Point to Turkey’s Central Role in Belt and Road Initiative’, Daily Sabah, October 25, 2018, https://www.dailysabah.com/economy/2018/10/25/chineseexperts-point-to-turkeys-central-role-in-belt-and-road-initiative (Accessed 2 August 2020).

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World War, Turkey integrated itself to the bloc policies of the EuroAtlantic Alliance. Even some deviations have been seen since the Second World War (especially regarding Cyprus issue), Turkey moved in accordance with the bloc policies to the time when the bipolar world order has come to an end. The approach that’s against irredentism adopted by the founders of the Republic, when taken together in the sense of reaching contemporary civilization level by integrating into the West, caused Turkey to pursue a low profile at its near abroad. This situation evolved into a securitized and passive approach that’s integrated into bloc policies during the Cold War. The separatist initiative revealed by PKK, which have been on the rise by the terrorist acts since the 1980s, has made the Southeasten border securitized. The entry of Eurasianism into the agenda of Turkish Foreign Policy coincides with the years following the Cold War. Ankara’s willingness to prove its worth for the Western actors and Russia in general, made Turkey struggle for effectiveness at its near abroad by using economic, commercial, and socio-cultural means. The geopolitical space that appeared after the collapse of the Eastern Bloc has created an expectation in Ankara that the newly independent countries could be integrated into Turkey for increasing its regional effectiveness. This case is also concerned with the socio-cultural affinity and geographical advantages of Turkey that can be processed in the historical sense. However, it can be said that sociocultural proximity hardly lead to positive results on behalf of Turkey. Because, when this point is emphasized, Ottoman-oriented irredentism or revisionism came to mind among the countries in the mentioned geography. Eurasianist approach, has lost its capacity to influence the near abroad in the second half of the 1990s because of the economic and political problems which affected the foreign capacity. Eurasianist turn at Russian foreign policy and the EU-oriented approach of Ankara has also affected the Eurasianist expansion of Turkey negatively. Eurasianism in Turkey is articulated to various ideological backgrounds like Westernist, Islamist, Turkish/Turkic, and Leftist. The approach in the early 1990s seemed to feed mostly from Westernist and Turkic backgrounds. The Strategic Depth doctrine revealed by Davuto˘glu, was tried to be constructed by the harmony of the Ottoman past, Islam, and Westernism in general. This approach is working to prepare the background of Turkey being a center of the former Ottoman geography which is called Afro-Eurasia. It also offers a regional economic integration that will be built on a neoliberal basis. Although there is a Eurasian attribution, the

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commitment to the Ottoman past was much more prominent, and the Strategic Depth was also read as Neo-Ottomanism. This approach also envisaged close economic/trade cooperation with Russia, even the main destination is fulfilling the Afro-Eurasian leadership of Turkey in accordance with the West. Indeed, Turkey is presented as a model country for the Middle East by the West before the Arab uprisings (spring) has started. However, with the onset of the Arab Spring, this strategy became meaningless and was completely shelved after the coup attempt in Turkey at 2016. There are also analyzes that foreign policy, which Turkey has been following since 2016, is Eurasianist. Taken together with the view that completely stalled negotiations with the EU since 2006, Turkey’s area of contact with the West was weakened. In addition, the explanations focused on membership of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization and questioning of the NATO membership informally have been interpreted as a change in strategic preference at the point where it meets with the purchase of S-400 missile system. Ankara’s positive statements referring to the NATO membership and the negotiations with the EU after downing the Russian aircraft has shown that Turkey is using a pragmatist approach. Turkey addresses Eurasianism as a pragmatist discourse and uses cooperation with Russia when it is necessary, but does not change the strategic orientation. It is not a transformation that can be realized in the short term. The willingness to work with the US in Libya and the statements that the NATO membership is not officially open to discussion, proves this. Turkey’s common Eurasian ideal with Russia, which is depicted by the Leftist Eurasianists could be integrated as a pragmatic conscience. Although the rising nationalist, interventionist, and proactive regional attitude are also adopted by the Turkish (Turkic) Eurasianists, it is known that this group’s approach to Russia is also negative. In this context, Turkey will be able to use the Eurasianist background to benefit from alternative initiatives. Although strategic change is not the purpose, proving that Turkey has an alternative against the Western dimension, is the main foreign policy goal.

CHAPTER 8

Hungarian Turanism: Eurasianism à la hongroise? Balázs Ablonczy

An influential intellectual current and ferment of cultural innovation before the Great War, Hungarian Turanism evolved to become a frustrated movement after 1920, and then, after the change of regime in 1990, it gained importance in the Hungarian public thinking. To understand its history, one must keep in mind the context in which this idea was born and succeeded in seducing an important part of the Hungarian political elite and intelligentsia. In this paper, I will try to present this context, to explain the circumstances that gave birth to the powerful Turanian Society (founded in 1910), and to describe the different currents present within this organization and their motivations. Then, I will try to shed a light on its connections with Russian Eurasianism, and finally, I will sketch some components of the resurrection of Hungarian Turanism in the years 2000.

B. Ablonczy (B) Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest, Hungary e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Diesen and A. Lukin (eds.), The Return of Eurasia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2179-6_8

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Events To understand the emergence and development of the Turanian movement, it is worth mentioning several political events that took place both outside and inside Hungary, and to present some of the phenomena that marked the Hungarian cultural and scientific space in the second half of the nineteenth century.1 Hungary’s political situation within the Habsburg Monarchy provided a favourable ground for the birth of the Turanian ideas. During the antiHabsburg revolution of 1848 and the ensuing War of Independence, the Hungarian political elite and public opinion clearly showed their strength and defended their prerogatives before the Viennese Court. Although the War of Independence was crushed with the help of Nicholas I’s Russia and a period of repression followed, it was clear that in the long run, a form of political compromise was necessary to make the empire operational and save it—at least temporarily—from disintegration due to its lack of national legitimacy and internal cohesion. In the first part of the 1860s, a slow process of reconciliation and rapprochement took place between Vienna and the Hungarian political elite. This movement led to the Austro-Hungarian Compromise (Ausgleich) of 1867. This new institutional construction gave rise to a dualist state: within the Empire, the Kingdom of Hungary and the Cisleithania (Austrian part of the Empire) had a large degree of autonomy and had their own government and budget. Only a few matters, known as “commons” (defence, foreign affairs, finance) remained under the exclusive control of the Emperor (for the Austrian part) and King (for the Magyars), Francis Joseph I. In Hungary, the following decades were marked by a remarkable economic boom, a profound transformation of society and a modernization of the country. By developing the infrastructure, adopting legislation conducive to a capitalist economy, emancipating the Jews, transforming the school system and introducing some elements of separation between church and state, the nationalist liberal elite of the country worked to “westernize” Hungary, to bring it into the circle of modern countries and to confer

1 My argumentation is based on my book about the Hungarian Turanism: Balázs Ablonczy, Go East! History of Hungarian Turanism, Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2022 (forthcoming).

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upon it the status of a European power; this was the age-old dream of the Hungarian nobility.2 Three essential factors underpinned these modernizing initiatives, and it is indispensable to keep them in mind to understand certain reflexes of this elite. It was their combination that precipitated the birth of Turanism. First of all, when Johann Gottfried Herder published the fourth volume of his Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte der Menschheit (Ideas for a Philosophy of the History of Mankind) in 1792, a small, rather short sentence had the greatest effect on his Hungarian readers and would remain important for many years to come. Herder’s statement that “[todays] [Hungarians] are mixed with Slavs, Germans, Vlachs and other peoples, they are the smallest number of inhabitants, and in a few centuries their language will probably be extinct” gave a tremendous impetus to the defenders of the Hungarian language.3 Pamphlets and books discussed this thesis, and at the beginning of the twentieth century the flood of publications was still far from drying up. Herder had considered the possibility that the Hungarian language, and thus the Hungarian nation, might disappear. The fact that this language was a minority language in Hungary itself prompted intellectuals to reflect on its place and, above all, on its kinship and affinity with other idioms. The first linguistic research on the origin and kinship of the Hungarian language began in the second half of the eighteenth century, but it took time for this early work to give way to systematic research based on the principles of modern linguistics. It was not until the second third of the nineteenth century that the hypothesis of a Finno-Ugric filiation of the Hungarian language was confirmed and consolidated. Secondly, the relative geographical isolation of the Hungarian language caused a number of people to distrust the large surrounding language blocks, the Germanic and Slavic groups. Indeed, in the competitive, then social-Darwinist spirit characteristic of the time, “coexistence” was synonymous with “struggle”, and the freedom of one often implied domination over the other. In the process of Hungarian nation-building, pan-Slavism and Pan-Germanism came to be seen as deadly threats, but at the same time as models. The presence and fighting of the army of 2 Ignác Romsics, Hungary in the Twentieth Century, Budapest: Corvina, 1999, 11–28. 3 Johann Gottfried Herder, Werke, Band III/1, Ideen zur Philosophie der Geschichte

der Menschheit [1791] herausgegeben von Wolfgang Pross, München: Carl Hanser Verlag, 2002, 633.

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Tsar Nicholas I in Hungary during the War of Independence of 1848– 1849 had firmly anchored the image of “Slavic expansion” and a Russian threat. This disposition of mind allows us to understand why Hungarian public opinion and most of the political forces in the country adopted an anti-Russian stance for more than a century, whether in secondary conflicts (Crimean War, Russian-Turkish and Russian-Japanese wars) or in the great world conflagrations. In this context, it was easy to present Russia as a “cemetery of Finno-Ugric/Turanian peoples”. Moreover, the great pan-movements of the nineteenth century, if they represented a threat, also constituted an enviable model for all those who, in Hungary, dreamed of nationalism extended on a regional or even global scale.4 Third, the rise of the Hungarian state in the second half of the nineteenth century suggested that because of its central geographical location and by virtue of its political unity and—with the help of Magyarization— its strong ethnic unity, the Kingdom of Hungary was more likely to become the central core of Austria-Hungary than the politically, ethnically and confessionally divided Cisleithania. Since the Vormärz period, a large part of the Hungarian political class had been suggesting that even the imperial and royal seat could move to Buda—Budapest from 1873—and that the centre of gravity of the Monarchy would move to the Hungarian capital. The reconstruction of the Royal Palace in Buda between 1896 and 1905, conceived as a huge residence, was an eloquent example of this idea.5 Thus, three elements favoured the birth and development of Hungarian Turanism: the search for kin languages, the attraction mixed with fear felt by the Hungarian elites in the face of the “pan” political movements that embraced several countries or several continents, and the imperial dream to expand Hungarian cultural, economical or even political influence in new areas. Although we are certain that the term “Turan”, borrowed from French and English oriental studies, appeared in manuscript sources in Hungary

4 Louis L. Snyder, Macro-nationalisms: A History of the Pan-Movements, London: Praeger, 1984. 5 About the city’s rise see: John Lukacs, Budapest 1900: A Historical Portrait of a City and Its Culture, New York: Grove Press, 1994. About the construction of the Buda Castle see József Sisa (ed.), Motherland and Progress. Hungarian Architecture and Design 1800–1900, Basel: Birkhäuser, 2016, 812–820.

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as early as the beginning of the nineteenth century, it was in the mid1830s that the term first appeared in Hungary in the columns of a scientific journal.6 The notion is borrowed from the scientific literature of Western Europe, and not an ancestral notion of the Hungarian language, which is often asserted nowadays. However, in the second half of the century, the term was more and more often used in scholarly texts, generally in connection with the ancient history of the Magyars. The reception of the work of the orientalist Max Müller (1823–1900) is no doubt not unrelated to this development: elected member of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1874, this linguist, inventor of the notion of “Turanian” in the humanities. His books were translated into Hungarian three times between 1874 and 1876. This popularity was concomitant with an important scientific debate on the origin of the Magyars. The “Turko-Ugric War”, which broke out in 1869, pitted the proponents of the thesis of Turkish kinship, led by the eminent Turkologist and traveller, Ármin Vámbéry (1831–1913), professor at the University of Budapest, against the supporters of the Finno-Ugric thesis. Vámbéry’s camp was mainly composed of historians, ethnographers and intellectuals who did not belong to the cenacles of the Academy of Sciences. Vámbéry not only insisted on Hungarian words borrowed from the Turkish language, he also postulated an ethnic kinship, even a direct filiation between the Magyar tribes and the various Turkish peoples. This approach was not yet motivated by an ideological position: coming from a poor Jewish family, Vámbéry had converted to Calvinism, but kept ties with the country’s Jewish community. In his youth, he made perilous journeys to Central Asia, and was not a devotee of Islam: a son of his time and a proud patriot, a committed to the modernization of his country, he considered Islam to be incapable of facing the challenges of the modern world because it was, in his opinion, too closed in on itself; he judged it incapable of entering the enlightened age of humanity.7 A large part of the Academy and the University, mainly linguists grouped under the banner of József Budenz (1836–1892) and Pál Hunfalvy (1810–1891), led the offensive against Vámbéry’s theses. The 6 Ferencz Kállay, Szónyomozások, Tudománytár 5 (1835), 170. 7 About Vámbéry see: David Mandler, Arminius Vambéry and the British Empire:

Between East and West, Lanham, MD: Lexington Books, 2016. His autobiography: Arminius Vambery, The Story of My Struggles. The Memoirs of Arminius Vambery, vol. II, London, Fisher Unwin, 1904.

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debate quickly escalated, and public opinion took an interest in this highly intellectual debate that is difficult to imagine today. After almost a decade of bitter discussions, Vámbéry finally admitted the Finno-Ugric kinship of the Hungarian language, while insisting on the very large number of words borrowed from Turkish—a theory that remains relevant today, these observations not being completely erroneous. This debate left a legacy. Part of public opinion and intellectuals reproached the Academy for playing into the hands of the Viennese court and distorting research on the origins of the Hungarians to better mask their glorious past. It continued to proclaim the existence of a direct filiation between Magyars and Turkish peoples. In this atmosphere of discontent, it was fashionable to allude to the Germanic origins of Budenz and Hunfalvy: the first was a German, who arrived in Hungary without knowing the language of the country, and the second, who came from a Saxon family in the north of the country.8 Several political and cultural events helped to reinforce the idea that a cultural mission in the Balkans and the Middle East was Hungary’s responsibility. First of all, the Austrian part of the monarchy seemed to sink into political chaos, especially after the introduction of universal, equal and secret suffrage for all male voters in 1907. The various parties, divided politically and ethnically, were stirring up divisions, and the Imperial Parliament (Reichsrat) was unable to support an active government by providing it with a stable majority. The problems of the Empire, which were mainly related to its multi-ethnic character, were thus brought into the open. This observation gave rise to an easy conclusion: the Kingdom of Hungary, united and more or less unscathed by the internal crisis of 1906–1910, could finally become the pivot of the Monarchy and play the imperial role that was its due. Other events in domestic politics— including the reburial in 1906 of Prince Rákóczi, leader of the 1703–1711 War of Independence, who died in exile in the Ottoman Empire, and the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina (1908)—and in international politics (the Russo-Japanese war, the instability in the Balkans and the young Turkish takeover) reinforced the attention of public opinion to questions of the East.9 8 János Pusztay, Az “ugor–török háború” után, Budapest: Magvet˝ o, 1977. 9 About Rákóczi’s reburial see, Alexander Vari, The Nation in the City: Ceremonial

(Re)Burials and Patriotic Mythmaking in Turn-of-the-Century Budapest, Urban History 40, no. 2 (2013), 202–225.

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In the field of culture, various currents made a strong impression: we can mention, for example, the beginnings of “japonisme”, the fashion for oriental collections, or literary works, such as the Turanian Songs by Árpád Zempléni (1865–1919), a symbolist poet of the second order, who nevertheless met with undeniable public success with this collection published in 1910. Finally, certain artistic groups in search of a “Hungarian national style”, foremost among them architects and textile artists, played an essential role. Let us also mention the success of the Finnish pavilion at the Paris Universal Exhibition (1900), and above all the recognition enjoyed by the Finnish painter Akseli Gallen-Kallela (1865–1931): his work, largely inspired by the Finnish national epic Kalevala, aroused considerable interest in Hungary.10 His exhibitions in 1907 and 1908 drew large crowds in Budapest, and it was he who illustrated the first high-quality Hungarian translation of the Kalevala in 1908. The translator, Béla Vikár, became a regular member of the Turanian movement until his death in 1945. For—and this deserves to be emphasized—Turanism in Hungary has never favoured only Turkish relatives: Finns, Estonians and Bulgarians were also part of this imagination, not to mention the peoples of Central Asia, the Japanese, and even the peoples of China and India. As an early observer of Hungarian orientalist thought remarked: “The oriental ancestral home was the dominant idea of Hungarian orientalism”.11 This quest for identity, deeply rooted in Turanian thought, was linked to a Hungarian form of aborted imperialism and was part of a political-cultural context that favoured the infatuation with the East.

Currents The Turanian Society (Turáni Társaság ), founded on November 26, 1910, was the rallying point for all these thoughts. Its staff was made up of several networks. Apart from the aristocrats and politicians with no

10 Csáki Tamás, A finn építészet és az ‘architektúra magyar lelke’ Kultúrpolitika, építészet, publicisztika a századel˝ o Magyarországán, Múltunk 51, no. 1 (2006), 200–230. 11 Géza Staud, Orientalizmus a magyar romantikában, Budapest: Terebess, 1999, 134.

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real activity, who had been chosen to give more weight to the association, we can distinguish four groups among the two hundred founding members and the thirty members of the board of directors.12 The first group was made up of high-ranking civil servants, directors of museums or other scientific institutions, and high-ranking officials of the state administration. Among them were Jen˝ o Radisics, director of the Museum of Decorative Arts in Budapest, whose building itself is typical of Hungarian orientalism, and Lajos Lóczy of the Institute of Geology. Scientists, academics or explorers form a second group. There are university professors, turkologists, including Ármin Vámbéry and his disciples, ethnographers and, above all, a large number of geographers. The presence of the latter can easily be explained by the role that geography played in the formation of ideas of colonization and imperialism (think of the influence of the political geography of Friedrich Ratzel, or the geopolitical notions introduced by Halford Mackinder and Karl Haushofer). It is also due to the “patriotic duty” that Central European geographers had at the time: to make the country “readable” to the nation in the process of constitution.13 Finally, the expeditions in the East that had been carried out in the second half of the nineteenth century also contributed to strengthening the relative weight of geographers in Turanian society. On the other hand, certain absences are worth noting: historians proper were rare, with the exception of Sándor Márki (1853–1925), professor of history at the University of Kolozsvár/Cluj, a true ideologue of the Turanian movement. Literary historians—who were considered to be the custodians of a “national” science—were also conspicuous by their absence. A third group is made up of popularizing intellectuals. Journalists, essayists, or artists, their mission was to raise public awareness, to preach the good word in intellectual circles, or to disseminate their ideas through artistic creations. The poet Árpád Zempléni or the architect Jen˝ o Lechner (1878–1962) are good examples. Their quest for a national style, their

12 Pál Teleki, A Turáni Társaság eddigi és jövend˝ o m˝ uködése, Budapest: Fritz Ármin, 1914. Balázs Ablonczy, Keletre, magyar! A magyar turanizmus története, Budapest: Jaffa, 2016, 47–82. 13 About the interconnection of geography and imperialism, see Morag Bell, Robin Butlin, Michael Heffernan, Introduction, In: Morag Bell, Robin Butlin, Michael Heffernan (eds.), Geography and Imperialism, 1820–1940, Manchester and New York: Manchester University Press, 1995, 1–11.

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willingness to draw on oriental sources, supposedly close to the roots of the Magyars, were easily compatible with the objectives set by the new association. Finally, Turanian “activists” can be grouped into a fourth set. They were often high school teachers, translators or small civil servants. Activists in the true sense of the word, they did not always have the training or culture necessary to understand the Eastern world, but they adhered for one reason or another to the idea of an Eastern mission of the Magyars. Often marginalized during the early period of the Turanian movement because they were considered dilettantes who could compromise its ideas, they gained ground after 1920, their radicalism finding fertile ground in the turbulent post-war atmosphere. Benedek Baráthosi Balogh (1870–1945), a school teacher and traveller in his spare time, is a typical example.14 Naturally, these categories can overlap and their boundaries are far from impermeable: such an aristocrat, great bourgeois, politician, could also be an experienced traveller or a famous art collector. An important part of the intellectuals and academics gathered within the Turanian movement were of Jewish origin. This unusual alliance between early antiSemites and Jewish intellectuals came to an end after the First World War. Once a dynamic and self-confident imperialist movement, it turned into a fundamentally anti-Western and right-wing extremist frustration: Jewish members left the association. Nevertheless, the Turanian Society did not concentrate on all the activities of the Touranian tendency in its midst. Individuals or even entire groups were active outside it. Let us mention, for example, the poet Árpád Zempléni, or the Oriental Section of the Ethnographical Society (Magyar Néprajzi Társaság Keleti Szakosztálya), founded in 1900, and the journal edited by the latter, Keleti Szemle (Oriental Review). However, most of the Turanian activities took place in connection with society, which thus played a unifying role. The differences in activities became more visible after 1920, when internal divisions split the Society. The rightwing radicals left the Society and formed the Hungarian Turan Union

14 Eszter Ruttkay-Miklián, Die uralischen Forschungen des Ungarn Benedek Baráthosi Balogh. In: Cornelius Hasselblatt, Paula Jääsalmi-Krüger (Hrsg.), Europa et Sibiria. Gedenkband für Wolfgang Veenker. Veröffentlichungen der Societas Uralo-Altaica 51, Wiesbaden, 1999, 373–380.

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(Magyarországi Turán Szövetség ), echoing some grandiose ideas (Turanian Olympic games in Budapest, a huge statue of Attila, King of the Huns, erected in the capital, Turanian transformation of the public education, etc.) and claiming a deep change in the Hungarian society. The professional orientalists also left the Turanian Society after 1920 and formed the K˝ orösi Csoma Society (named after one of the leading figures of the nineteenth-century Hungarian orientalism, Sándor K˝ orösi Csoma), which still exists today. The Turanian Society, which was also called the “Hungarian Asian Society” (Magyar Ázsia Társaság), had essentially scientific goals, as did the Royal Asiatic Society. In the first years of its existence, it carried out the most classical activities for an association of this kind: it organized conferences on the Balkans and the East, as well as language courses, and it financed expedition projects with one-off grants. The publication of the magazine Turán (Turan) began at the beginning of 1913, and continued on a bimonthly basis. In the first issue, Alajos Paikert (1866– 1948), executive vice-president of the Touranian Society, set the tone in these terms: For us Hungarians, Asia is a territory to be conquered, not by the sword, not by oppressing and exploiting the peoples there, but on the contrary, by supporting them fraternally, through productive work, with the weapons of technique, science and art; we must acquire advantages and good and loyal friends. It is on this path that we will regain the glory of ancient times and realize the dream of our ancestors: the Magna Hungaria.15

Reading the review, one is struck by the disparity of points of view and the relative lack of editorial line. Being at the same time a motor in the discovery of the East, a scientific publication, an organ of popularization, a reservoir of ideas for national politics: all these contradictory imperatives ended up creating uneasiness and dissension, and gave rise to criticisms against the journal Turán and the society that published it. The members of the Society were quick to reply that some of the criticisms were due to a lack of knowledge of the East and the Society’s objectives, or were motivated by political bias. More problematically for the Society, 15 Alajos Paikert, Ázsia jöv˝ oje, Turán 1, no. 1 (1913), 14. (It should be noted that the name’Magna Hungaria’ does not only mean “Great Hungary”, but in the thirteenth century this name was used to define the mythical country of the Magyars who remained in their ancestral home in the Volga region.)

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however, some scientists, including former members, began to seriously question the concept of “turanism” as conceived by Max Müller. They pointed out that the paradigm of the Turanian languages was outdated, and that the theories used by the followers of Turanism were based on a misinterpretation. To counter these criticisms, future Prime Minister Pál Teleki (1879–1941), president of the Society during the war, took up the cause: in a long article published in the pages of Turán, he tried to give another meaning to Turanism.16 Teleki, who was at the same time General Secretary of the Hungarian Geographical Society, tried to explain that “Turan” was primarily a geographical concept, which included all the peoples of the Caspian Sea region, the Aral Sea and the Kazakh steppes under one name. According to him, it was the landscape that formed the soul of all these peoples, and this link was much more important than the common language or common origin. This article published in 1918 was one of the last attempts to give Turanism an air of scientific respectability and to maintain its links with the academic and university world. However, it did not provide an answer to this fundamental question: if there is no ethnic or linguistic kinship, what is the exact value of the notion of Turanism in a scientific and intellectual debate? Although Teleki and other members of the Turanian Society were members of the Academy of Sciences, even after 1920, there was growing resistance to the Turanian movement in academic circles. A childhood friend of Pál Teleki, one of the few art historians in the movement, noted at the beginning of the 1930s that “today, anyone who lets his name be associated with the Touranian Society, sees the doors of the University and the Hungarian Academy of Sciences closing in front of him”.17 To carry out its activities, the Society had access to increasingly important public funds during World War I. From the second half of 1915, the meetings followed one another and resulted in the re-founding of the Society under the name “Turanian Society - Hungarian Cultural Center of the East” (Turáni Társaság - Magyar Keleti Kultúrközpont ). The board of directors was reconstituted, new grants were received and the Society’s headquarters were moved to the Hungarian Parliament building and they

16 Pál Teleki, A Turán földrajzi fogalom, Turán 3, no. 2 (1918), 44–83. 17 Ferenc Hopp Museum of Asiatic Arts, Manuscript Department, Felvinczi Takács

Papers, A 3337/0-8, Manuscript not dated by Zoltán Felvinczi Takács about the Turanian movement [probably written in February 1932].

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remained there by 1945. The review Turán increased the pace of its publication to ten per year, instead of the previous six. Many new initiatives were launched. A student action was set up to encourage young people from the Balkans and the Middle East to study in Hungary, and scholarships were awarded to young Bosnians, Turks, Bulgarians and Tatars from southern Russia. In all, more than 300 people were enrolled in various Hungarian institutions until 1918 and beyond.18 At the same time, a series of studies was launched under the auspices of the Society to determine the ethnographic and even anthropological profile of Russian prisoners of war of “Turanian” origin. These studies remained at the observation phase or the collection of folk songs, but the design was already there: the most radical already dreamed of a “Turanian” legion, raised from among the Russian prisoners of war willing to cooperate with the Central Powers.19 Expeditions were also organized between 1916 and 1918; they criss-crossed the Balkans, southern Russia and Anatolia—some even left at the end of September 1918, amid the military debacle. But the most significant initiative was the creation of the first Hungarian institute abroad, in Constantinople, at the end of 1916. The project of a Hungarian institute of oriental archaeology had been maturing for some time, with the oriental institutes of the European powers serving as a model. The military alliance with Turkey, the support of the Turanian Society and government subsidies certainly facilitated the realization of the project. Although its existence was short-lived (1916–1918), the Hungarian Scientific Institute of Constantinople was vigorously supported by the Turanian Society, so much so that the journal Turán became the official place of publication for the Institute’s researchers.20 The collapse of the Austro-Hungarian Monarchy, especially that of the Kingdom of Hungary, completely changed the situation for Hungarian Turanism. The revolution, independence, the communist experience of

18 Jen˝ o Szécsi, A Turáni Társaság nevelési akciója, Turán 4, no. 1 (1921), 66–73. 19 Michael von Lenhossék, Untersuchungen an russischen Kriegsgefangenen finnisch-

ugrischer Nationalität, Turán 2 (1917), 136–151. About the Turanian Legion, see: Politisches Archiv des Auswärtigen Amtes (Berlin), Gesandtschaft Budapest, Karton 140, P 47 – Turanische Frage, Generalkonsul von Fürstenberg to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Budapest, december 31, 1915. 20 Norbert Nagy, A Konstantinápolyi Magyar Tudományos Intézet története (1916– 1918), Pécs: PTE, 2010, (Balkán-füzetek 7).

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1919, the counter-revolutionary government, the Treaty of Trianon— which took away two-thirds of the country’s territory and one-third of its ethnic Hungarian population in 1920—the rise of Admiral Horthy as regent of a country that remained a kingdom without a king for almost a quarter of a century: all these parameters had a profound influence on the future of the Turanian movement. The new authoritarian regime was not only fiercely anti-communist and anti-Semitic but also considered the pre-1920 liberal-nationalist elite responsible for the country’s collapse. The Turanian Society survived these upheavals and succeeded in making its members believe that they had been persecuted during the democratic revolution of 1918/1919 and during the short communist dictatorship of 1919. This was not the case. Although some members of the Society had participated in counter-revolutionary movements, the Society continued to receive public subsidies and benefited from the authorities goodwill. However, his action range was rather limited and his connections with the rising Eurasianism remained very loose.

The Missing Link The willingness of this conservative political and cultural elite to accept or recognize any thought coming from Russia/Soviet Union was more than problematic. First of all, because since the Vormärz period, the Magyar liberal national elite of the Hungarian Kingdom considered Russia as a threat whose geopolitical veils were destroying the crown of Saint Stephen (a metaphor often used for the Kingdom of Hungary). This perception came on the one hand from the fact that the Holy Alliance of 1815, a union of reactionary powers supposed to stifle any national liberation movement or initiatives with democratic or liberal tendencies. The crushing of the Polish uprising of 1830–1831 had served as proof for all those who looked at Russia with suspicious eyes. Miklós Wesselényi (1796– 1850), one of the leading figures of the liberal national nobility of the first half of the nineteenth century clearly formulated in his Szózat a magyar és a szláv nemzetiség ügyében (A Word on the Issue of Hungarian and Slavic Nationality, 1843) the threat that Russia meant for the Habsburg monarchy (and the Hungarian Kingdom within it): According to him, Russia’s goal was “to weaken the states and its governments in the regions inhabited by Slavs” and to this end, the empire of the tsars did not hesitate to “skillfully make use” of the ideology of pan-Slavism, in itself imbued

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with liberalism.21 By the way, the Transylvanian Hungarian politician did not invent anything new, he only summarized the already prepared forms of discourse with an appropriate vocabulary. For lack of space, it would be pointless to begin the history of russophobia or anti-Slavic sentiment in Hungary, it suffices to note that parallel to the weakening of the imagery of the Ottoman threat (and thus an increased interest in the East) the fear of pan-Slavism (justified or not) is deeply rooted in Hungarian political thought until 1945 and even beyond.22 Various political events (the crushing of the 1848–1849 revolution by Russian troops, the wars in the Balkans, and later the Great War and Russian incursions into Hungary, etc.) shaped this mistrust of the “Northern Empire”. On the other hand, Russia was suspected at first of wanting to undermine Hungary with the Pan-Slavic agitation among its Slavic nationalities (Ruthenians, Slovaks and Serbs in the first place) and then, after 1918 (and especially after the communist experience of 1919) through communism. Because of this way of thinking, which puts Communism and pan-Slavism, Russian imperial thought, in the same basket, it was relatively difficult to adapt in Hungary any idea coming from Russia/Soviet Union or the Russian emigres. This was the case with Eurasianism as well. One of the meagre signs of the relations between Eurasianism (especially the work of Trubetskoy teaching at the University of Vienna between 1922 and 1938) and Turanism is a conference that took place on November 5, 1929, in Budapest, in the Turanian Society.23 The lecturer was none other than the young Erik von Kühnelt-Leddihn (1909–1999), journalist, globetrotter, philosopher, herald of a Catholic anti-communism throughout his life. Kühnelt-Leddihn was about to begin his studies at the Faculty of Economics in Budapest under the guidance of Pál Teleki, former president of the Turanian Society. In his lecture, entitled: The Vocation of Hungarians in an Eastern Light, the young Austrian aristocrat spoke at length about the ideas of Nikolai Trubetskoy, whom he had met in Vienna and who had published his “The legacy of Genghis Khan” a few years earlier. Kühnelt-Leddihn, in his lecture, emphasized very much the cleavage between Romano-German 21 Miklós Wesselényi, Szózat a magyar és a szláv nemzetiség ügyében, Budapest: Európa, 1992, 51–53. 22 The history of Hungarian Slavophobia has not been written yet. For an introduction, see: Kálmán Rátz, A pánszlávizmus története, Budapest: Athenaeum, 1941. 23 Társasági ügyek, Turán 12, nos. 1–4 (1929), 60–61.

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and Russian culture and the disadvantages of the former; and he bluntly expanded his own conclusions to all the other nations of Central and Eastern Europe and saw the origin of all the cultural decomposition in the oppressive culture of the West. The reception was not unanimous: Alajos Paikert, as the host, discreetly pointed out his differences with the speaker, having emphasized that “the Hungarian nation”, despite its Eastern kinship, does not want to “ignore Western culture” under any circumstances.24 Kühnelt-Leddihn understood the message: though he was quite omnipresent in the Hungarian press in the first half of the 1930s, his travel diary in Russia was published in many parts in the right-wing daily Magyarság, and he regularly collaborated with the reviews of the Hungarian young catholic movement, he no longer mentioned the work of Trubetskoy (unless we expect an anonymous presentation of his book here, a few days after the lecture at the Turanian Society25 ). In a sense, Trubetskoy’s pioneering phonological, linguistic work elicited a much greater resonance in Hungarian scholarship. Another central figure of the Russian Eurasianians, Georgiy Vernadsky (1887–1973) made spectacular gestures towards the Hungarians, and even allegedly began to study the language in the 1930s, trying to make contact with Hungarian byzantinologists.26 In Hungarian scholarship, for example, Hungarian archaeologists later cited his work for some aspects of Magyar prehistory related to the Slavs—but they did not react to Eurasianism at all.27 The basic problem for Hungarian Turanists was that until 1945, Russia appeared in the Hungarian public mindset as an oppressor of the FinnoUgric peoples living in its territory, and as such, it could not expect an apology. When Hungarian Turanists contacted emigrant Russian politicians, it was usually based on the ideology of anti-communism: some of them made acquaintances in the Turanian Society and even lectured there. World War II could be interpreted by the more radical Turanists/PanFinno-Ugrists as the war of the “Turanian peoples” (Finns, Japanese,

24 Ibid., 61. 25 Európa és az emberiség. Magyarság, 1929. november 24. 16. 26 Sándor Szili, Az „eurázsiai” történeti paradigma, Aetas 18, no. 1. (2003), 43. 27 Charles J. Halperin: George Vernadsky, Eurasianism, the Mongols, and Russia, Slavic

Review 41, no. 3 (Autumn 1982), 477–493.

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Estonians, Hungarians) against the “Slavic threat” that always menaced them.28 At the same time, sporadically, especially on the radical periphery of the Turanian movement, voices emphasized the “Turanian” nature of the Russian people. In the depths of the distinction was the presupposition that communism in Russia was a “Jewish invention”, on this basis they considered that the image of communism and that of being Russian could be separable.29

Under Pressure and Relaxed The depredations of the Second World War devastated the Hungarian Turanist community. A wide range of former officers of the Turanian Society died in the battle of Budapest, 1944–1945 as civilians targeted by the armed conflicts between German and Soviet troops or because of illness, starvation. In the afterwar trials and prosecution against rightwing or extreme right-wing political personalities (in the activities of the so-called népbíróság, “popular court”) some Turanists were involved. But none of them was prosecuted for their affiliation with Turanism, but for other political activities. The movement gained such a bad reputation following the Second World War that those subjected to political screening during the post-war years almost always avoided mentioning their previous participation in Turanist organizations and activities. If they were not dead, most radicals went into exile in Germany, in the United States of America, Argentina or in Australia. That’s where some of them (re)developed the idea of the Hungarian-Sumerian kinship, as a new branch of Turanism. Among his forerunners we should mention Ida Bobula (1902–1983), Viktor Padányi (1906–1963), Tibor Baráth (1906– 1992) and Ferenc Badiny-Jós (1909–2007). Their ideas re-emerged in Hungary after the democratic transition in 1989/1990 and shaped the public mindset in the 2000s. Former members of the Turanian Society 28 An essential work: Elemér Virányi, A finnugor népek élettere, Budapest: Stádium, 1941. More committed even to a territorial dismemberment of Russia: László Kechkeméthi Pethes, A Szarmát-Alföld történelme és néprajza. Szovjet-Oroszország feldarabolása, Nagyvárad: Betnár, 1942. The author considered for some reasons the Southern Ukrainians as Turanians, ibid., 12–13. 29 Hungarian National Archives, P 2249, a Magyarországi Turán Szövetség iratai, 10. sorozat, 1. tétel, Sándor László’s letter to the Hungarian Turan Union, Gödöll˝ o, October 20, 1941. (László Sándor, a retired military officer wrote to the Hungarian Turan Union’s committee influenced by General Konstantin Sakharov’s Budapest lecture.)

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such as the architect Jen˝ o Lechner, the blood-group researcher Endre Jeney and the anthropologist Lajos Bartucz who had survived the Second World War and remained in Hungary were forced to gloss over their previous activities as part of the organization to reintegrate themselves into the post-war system. During the period of state socialism, works with Turanist thematics circulated among a small group of intellectuals in Hungary and, following the years of repression in the 1950s, Turanists who had remained in the country reconstituted their half-legal networks of connections, social circles and chains of solidarity. Proponents of Finno-Ugric kinship became irreversibly separated from eastern thought, which had become firmly fixed on national and political foundations. The linguistics, based on the idea Finno-Ugric kinship kept his positions in the academia, and by the opponents of the regime this state of affairs was inadmissible from a political point of view. The duality of supporting the cause of the Finno-Ugric peoples and at the same time kinship with Central Asian or other eastern people or with Sumerians became incompatible. (Which was not the case before 1945.) Moreover, the thinking of those who dealt with the issues of Hungarian ancient history and kinship in Hungary during the communist era reveal that the distortions of dictatorship affect the reasoning of even those who strive to retain their intellectual independence. In addition to the malevolence of informants, records kept in the Archives of the Political Police, shows a certain anti-Semitism, a receptivity to conspiracy theories and dictatorial responses to the challenges of dictatorship reflected in the letters of Turanists who remained in Hungary after the Second World War. It is also evident that end of the Stalinist reign of terror in Hungary following the 1956 revolution allowed advocates of certain Turanist/eastern ideas to reconstitute their communication networks. Furthermore, the survival of Finno-Ugric linguistics in the new postwar régime as a result of the connection between Finno-Ugric kinship and the Soviet Union/communism served to intensify the long time conflict between linguists and those who opposed their methods and conclusions.30 Following the change of régime in Hungary in 1989–1990, for a time the importance of the so-called “East” dwindled in Hungarian thinking. 30 See Michael Knüppel, Zur ungarischen Rezeption der sumerisch–turanischen Hypothese in der zweiten Hälfte des 20. Jahrhunderts, Zeitschrift für Balkanologie 42, no. 1–2 (2006), 93–107.

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The “East” referred more to the communist great powers, the fallen Soviet Union on the one hand and China (still very present) on the other, and these states represented entities and ideologies from which the Hungarian wider public and narrower political élite yearned to be free. Authors who had left Hungary and, living abroad, had cherished and nurtured the “Eastern” element of Hungarian identity soon appeared. A tiny book by Tibor Baráth, who had left Hungary for Canada, was published in Hungary before Baráth’s death.31 The first books written by Ferenc Badiny Jós, who was living in Argentina, were published in Hungary, though they met with very little response, and Badiny Jós, a retired air force officer almost 90 years of age at the time who often travelled to Hungary, complained of this.32 In 1998, the periodical Turán went into publication again. In the first issue, the journal referred to Turán, the periodical by the same name which had been in publication until 1944, and the editor’s introduction made it quite clear that the new journal regarded itself as the bearer of the legacy of its namesake, even if the profile of the Turanian Society was not narrowly focused on research concerning the origins of the Hungarians.33 The editorial board alluded to the example set by Pál Teleki, a scholar and historian who twice served as prime minister of Hungary and committed suicide in 1941, in support of its contention that “for a successful future, one must know the past”. Their goal, they claimed, was to spread knowledge of Hungarian prehistory “with no obfuscation, no false humbuggery or calculated deceit”. And they cautiously noted that they sought to offer an alternative to the canonized narratives of the academia and university scholars. Their goal, they contended was “to provide space for research on our origins that is different in its approach” in “scientific but widely comprehensible articles”. The introductory text expressed its disdain for language-based research concerning “ethnic” origins, and it lamented the fact that “the official Hungarian science of history stubbornly insists on the notion of Finno-Ugric descent”.34 In 2009, the company which 31 Tibor Baráth, Tájékoztató az újabb magyar ˝ ostörténeti kutatásokról, Veszprém-Gy˝ or: Turul, 1989. 32 For one of the first scholarly discussions of his work, see Nóra Kovács, A diaszpóra visszavándorlásának ideológiai vonatkozásai Közép-Kelet Európában: Badiny Jós Ferenc Magyarországon, Néprajzi Látóhatár 16, nos. 1–4 (2017), 284–304. 33 Beköszönt˝ o, Turán, no. 1 (1998), 1. 34 Ibid.

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published the journal began to face financial problems, and a few years later publication was suspended. In order for various interests, which came from various sources and seemed pointed in various directions, to meet and become a genuine “issue” in the first decade of the new millennium, laying the foundations for the so-called “Eastern Opening” in Hungary (a political stance announced by the government in the wake of the 2010 elections), three or four processes had to converge. The selection of new officers for the World Federation of Hungarians may initially seem to be the least significant of these processes. The World Federation of Hungarians (Magyarok Világszövetsége, or MVSZ) was founded in 1938 to represent the interests and concerns of Hungarians who had left the country for political or economic reasons. Following the communist takeover, it did not cease to function. Rather, for four decades it served as propaganda and intelligence organ of the Hungarian government in its efforts to obtain information on and spread propaganda to Hungarians living in Western Europe and the rest of the world. In 2000, much to everyone’s surprise, Miklós Patrubány, a 48-year-old Transylvanian IT entrepreneur, rose to the head of the MVSZ instead of the government’s candidate. The new president pushed the organization into the world of extreme right-wing political sects, and through his active use of the media and his assertive portrayals of certain themes. However, thanks to the organizational infrastructure (a network that stretched across continents) and Patrubány’s unquestionably skilful organizational work, a series of demands formulated by the individuals and organizations presented above became focal points for the activities of the World Federation of Hungarians. In 2004, the MVSZ organized the Sixth World Congress of Hungarians at which Patrubány opened the conference on the prehistory of Hungarians with the following statement: “The World Federation of Hungarians believes that the time has come to turn our gaze towards the ancient homeland of the Hungarian people. In the direction in which almost a billion people consider us friends, relatives, talented siblings torn westwards”.35 This statement harmonizes well with the Turanist discourse of the interwar period in Hungary. This was one of the first such declarations in Hungarian public life since the change of régime, and the 35 Európába lépve – szívünkben Ázsia minden zsongásával, Szabadság, 2004. március 15. 2, accessed Februar 27, 2021, https://www.szabadsag.ro/archivum/2004/03/4mar15.html.

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so-called Movement for a Better Hungary, or Jobbik, which began to gain prominence and political presence in 2003, presumably borrowed the “Turanian” idea from here and made it the focal point of its foreign policy platform, at least until 2014. Jobbik was founded in 1999 by radical university students, and in 2003 it became a political party. In the 2006 general election, Jobbik did not reach the threshold of votes to get into parliament, but the political scandals and economic crisis which came in the wake of the elections and the shrill anti-Roma and often anti-Semitic rhetoric embraced by the party had a strong influence on its fortunes. In 2009, the party got almost 15% of the votes in the European Parliament election, giving it three representatives in Brussels. In the national and European Parliamentary elections held since 2010, Jobbik has received between 15 and 20% of the votes, and it has regularly been in second place in public opinion surveys.36 Another circumstance that has favoured political discourses drawing on references to the “Eastern” element of Hungarian identity is the domestic political war which was fought fiercely between 2002 and 2010 and the almost permanent state of political crisis. I would like to emphasize the disappointment which followed Hungary’s accession to the European Union in 2004 (a disappointment caused largely because of financial concerns), the political crisis which broke out in 2006, and the global economic crisis of 2007–2008 gave a stronger voice and stronger public presence to people who demanded a turn away from Western political models and a political platform based at least in part on some notion of ethnic identity or belonging—but not the notion of FinnoUgric belonging. The foundations had been laid by that time for the presentation of the notion of the Finno-Ugric origins of the Hungarian people as a “Jewish-communist-Habsburg scheme and fabrication”. The third circumstance which contributed to the emergence of “Turanism” in public discourse in Hungary was the rise of Jobbik as an increasingly significant political party and its relative successes in the 2009 and 2010

36 For an overview of the rise of Jobbik and the explanations for its rise, see András Kovács, The Post-Communist Extreme Right: The Jobbik Party in Hungary, In: Ruth Wodak, Majid Khosravinik Brigitte Mral, (eds.), Right-Wing Populism in Europe: Politics and Discourse, London: Bloomsbury, 2013, 223–234. On the historical roots of this phenomenon, see Balázs Ablonczy and Bálint Ablonczy, L’extrême droite en Hongrie: racines, culture, espace. In: Béatrice Giblin (ed.), L’extrême droite en Europe, Paris: La Découverte, 2014, 49–75.

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European Parliament and national elections, after which it became a presence in both. In Jobbik’s 2010 political program (both in its foreign and domestic policy sections), in a chapter entitled “Our Ancient Roots and Historical Bonds”, the party made very clear what it meant when it spoke of a shift in the “one-sided Euro-Atlantic orientation”: We have not exploited the potentials latent in the fact that to this day the Turkic peoples of Inner Asia unquestionably consider us to be relatives. Our bond to them is an organic part of our ancient national consciousness, and the most recent findings of scholarly research convincingly prove this.

And so, should the party rise to power, it pledged “to lay the groundwork for political and economic relations in the case of the Turkic peoples of Inner Asia by building cultural relations resting on ancient kinship ties. We will develop closer economic and political cooperation, based on bonds of kinship and shared economic interests, with Turkey, which has taken a resolute diplomatic turn and shown dynamic economic growth”.37 Jobbik’s 2014 program (“We Name It, We Solve It”) was considerably more cautious in its phrasing, and while it contained a passing reference to the development of “closer foreign policy ties with the countries of Inner Asia, which are (and consider themselves) to be bound by ties of kinship to the Hungarian people based on culture and descent”, emphasis had shifted palpably to relations with Germany, Russia, and Turkey and a envisioned Polish-Croatian-Hungarian axis.38 Jobbik politicians made innumerable statements in which the overtones of Turanism were clearly audible, and they made other important gestures. While Jobbik’s rise has been the political breakthrough of the past decade, the Kurultáj event has achieved similar success in the contested terrain of the politics of ethnic origins. In 2006, a Hungarian-Kazakh 37 Radikális változás: A Jobbik országgy˝ ulési választási programja a nemzeti önrendelkezésért és a társadalmi igazságosságért, 75, accessed February 27, 2021, http:// docplayer.hu/158036-Radikalis-valtozas-a-jobbik-orszaggyulesi-valasztasi-programja-a-nem zeti-onrendelkezesert-es-a-tarsadalmi-igazsagossagert.html. The English version of the program did not use such terms; see accessed February 27, 2021, http://www.jobbik. com/sites/default/files/Jobbik-RADICALCHANGE2010.pdf. 38 For Jobbik’s 2014 program, see Kimondjuk, megoldjuk: A Jobbik országgy˝ ulési választási programja a nemzet felemelkedéséért, 85, accessed February 27, 2021, https:// de.slideshare.net/JobbikLadany/jobbik-programja. The English version avoided such phrasing: We Name It, We Solve It, accessed February 27, 2021, https://drive.google. com/file/d/0B-HgDIa59TRmTTdrX3laNVhMYms/edit.

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expedition pursued research on the Madjar tribe in the Torgaï region of northwestern Kazakhstan. Hungarian anthropologist András Zsolt Bíró, who works at the Hungarian Museum of Natural Science, was one of the people who took part in the expedition. Based on the genetic patterns found among the Madjars, Bíró, working together with other scholars, later published the findings in English-language scientific journals. According to these findings, Bíró concluded that the Hungarians and the Madjars are related.39 Thanks to his assiduous efforts, Hungary was represented (a total of 20 Hungarians took part) at the 2007 Great Kurultáj, a cultural event launched in 2007 in Kazakhstan. The Great Kurultáj is intended to strengthen the sense of unity among Hungarians and the nomadic peoples of Central Asia (the word kurultáj is based on old Turkic roots and means “meeting of the tribes”). Emboldened by what he saw at the event, Bíró, along with others who shared his views, decided to hold similar festivals in Hungary intended to serve as celebrations of prehistoric Hungarian tribal culture and Hungary’s cultural bonds to the peoples of Central Asia. The first Kurultáj held in Hungary was in 2008 in Bösztörpuszta, near Kunszentmiklós.40 The Kurultáj festivals were held once every two years, and to make the organizational background more stable, in 2009 the organizers created the Hungarian Turanian Foundation and the Hungarian Turanian Alliance, which work together in close symbiosis. In 2010, the spread in the public life of rhetorical reflexes based on notions of the Eastern elements of Hungarian identity prompted Fidesz, which had won a decisive parliamentary majority and was preparing to assume its place as the governing party, to express its views on the question. In its campaign platform, the party had already used the phrase “Eastern Opening” (“We need a new global economic opening, which includes an opening to the East, while maintaining the advantages we

39 See A.Z. Biró, A. Zalán, A. Völgyi, H. Pamjav, A Y-chromosomal comparison of the Madjars (Kazakhstan) and the Magyars (Hungary), American Journal of Physical Anthropology 139, no. 3 (2009), 305–310. 40 The website for the event: kurultaj.hu.

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enjoy as a member of the European Union”).41 The government platform had already embellished this with talk of Hungary as “the border of the East” and the “new silk road”.42 In the period between 2010 and 2014, Prime Minister Viktor Orbán and, first and foremost, Péter Szijjártó (who at the time was State Secretary of Foreign Affairs and who has since become Minister of Foreign Affairs) took frequent trips to the East and made frequent statements that helped give some sense of what the term meant and put it in a larger context. The Hungarian trade houses, positions as foreign trade attachés, and the new government scholarship program (Stipendium Hungaricum), all of which were tools in this enthusiastically promoted undertaking, were calibrated to meet the exigencies of this process of “opening”, as were the foundation of new Hungarian cultural institutes and the strengthening of a network of instructors in these countries. As part of these efforts, Hungarian cultural institutes were opened in Beijing, Belgrade and Zagreb, and a government resolution and joint declaration were issued concerning the opening of Hungarian institutes in Baku and Teheran. (They were never actually opened, and the Baku institute was dropped from the agenda.)

Conclusions It would be an oversimplification to say that Turanism is an illusion, the situation is much more complex. Turanism may be a specific response to the tension between the notion that the Hungarians come from the East but follow the example of the West, and this would make it a distinctly or specifically Hungarian phenomenon, of interest only in the Hungarian context. But it is not an isolated phenomenon in Eastern Europe. Some of its elements can also be discerned in Polish Sarmatism, Russian Eurasianism and Pan-Turkism.43 Turanism was the pillar of a vision of triumphant Hungarian imperialism before 1918, i.e. the 41 Nemzeti ügyek politikája, 46, accessed on February 27, 2021, https://www.slides hare.net/Mariabloghu/fidesz-vlasztsi-program-2010. The citation is found in the section entitled “Itt az id˝ o, hogy talpra állítsuk a magyar gazdaságot!” (Now is the time to put the Hungarian economy on its feet!). 42 A Nemzeti Együttm˝ uködés Programja, parlament.hu, 39, accessed on February 27, 2021, http://www.parlament.hu/irom39/00047/00047.pdf. 43 On “Sarmatism,” see Andrzej Wasko, Sarmatism or the Enlightenment: The Dilemma of Polish Culture, Sarmatian Review 17, no. 2 (April 1997), accessed February 27, 2021, http://www.ruf.rice.edu/~sarmatia/497/wasko.html. For Eurasianism, see Marlène

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notion that the Hungarian state and nation should play a leading role in the cultural, political and economic scene in the Balkans, Eastern Europe and perhaps even the Middle East. After the First World War, Turanism became the ideology of loss and frustration, and internal tensions broke up the movement. At the same time, the government cherry-picked whichever elements it deemed useful, and this paved the way for the emergence of the idea of “kindred peoples”. By the late 1930s and early 1940s, new views had emerged among radical Turanists, views that drew on radical anti-Habsburg, anti-German stances and calls for national independence. They drew, furthermore, on frustrations with the world of academia and the universities and anti-communism tinged with racist notions of protecting the purity of the Hungarian people. Because of the essentially anti-Russian stance of the Hungarian nationalism since the nineteenth century, Turanism could not meet Eurasianism, however, they shared some ideological assumptions. After 1945, in certain circles of the Hungarian émigré community, these views gave an additional thrust to notions of “kindred peoples”, especially to assertions concerning the alleged kinship between the Sumerians and the Magyars. In the Hungarian public sphere under state socialism, intellectuals susceptible to these approaches tended to be marginal. They voiced their views among friends and in private gatherings, and they lent and borrowed books on the subject to and from one another. After 1990, there was a general turn away from the East in the country. Two factors that led to the increasingly palpable emergence of these ideas and the return of some of its elements to public discourse were a growing dissatisfaction with the promises of the prosperity which would come with integration into the Euro-Atlantic system and the permanent political crisis of the early 2000s. These ideas also gained currency, of course, because political figures who espoused them attained prominence and made them increasingly acceptable in political and public life. This manner of speaking is worthless at this point if anyone wishes to use it as a foundation for a political platform in Hungary. It is worthless not because it is for some reason inappropriate to take an interest in the Eastern roots of Hungarian culture or the Hungarian people or to explore the contradictions between Hungary’s place in Laruelle, Russian Eurasianism: An Ideology of Empire, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 2012. And Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation, London: Hurst and Company, 1995.

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Europe as a country with a distinctive language and history and the larger project of Western modernization and integration. But for the past two centuries, the Hungarian national project has consisted essentially of efforts on the part of the Hungarian élites to bring European forms (for instance, cultural, scientific and political institutions) to Hungary. This has been seen as the precondition of success, prosperity, and liberty.44 The great liberal generations of the nineteenth century believed that they were creating the legal and infrastructural framework for Westernstyle modernization. If the framework were established, they believed the people of Hungary would behave like the people of England and the Netherlands. They would be burgers, citizens, and bourgeois all at once. Things did not quite turn out this way, but that is another story. Nonetheless, the past two centuries have had tremendous weight. The various models of Westernization began to appear in Hungarian society, if at times in jumbled or distorted form. “Modernization” and “reform” became stone cliffs so unmovable in public thinking that even the communists had to make appeals to them from time to time. For most Hungarians, the ideal society is, fundamentally (if also with self-contradictions), Western society. In a best-case scenario, the turn to the East is something with an exotic appeal.

44 On the history of ideas in Hungary in the nineteenth century, see Balázs Trencsényi, Maciej Janowski, Monika Baar, Maria Falina, Michal Kopecek (eds.), A History of Modern Political Thought in East Central Europe. Volume I: Negotiating Modernity in the ‘Long Nineteenth Century’, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016, particularly Chapters 1 and 2.

CHAPTER 9

Finding Compatibility Between Eurasian Partnership and Indo-Pacific Security: And Indian Perspective P. S. Raghavan

India’s engagement with the continental Eurasian landmass goes back millennia and are woven into its history, culture, literature, legend and mythology. The first recorded footprint is that of the Mahajanapadas —a conglomeration of kingdoms, from the sixth century BCE, in northern India and extending to modern-day Pakistan, Afghanistan and swathes of Iran and Central Asia. Many of these regions subsequently formed part of the Mauryan Empire between the fourth and second century BCE, while the Kushan Empire in the first and second century CE straddled the Himalayan range and extended from central and northern India to Central Asia and parts of Xinjiang (in present-day China). The Silk Road, connecting India with China and Europe through Central Asia, flourished from the third century BCE to about the fifteenth century CE. The Silk Road was far more than merely a trade corridor from China to Europe (as it is often portrayed today). In fact, it was more importantly a channel

P. S. Raghavan (B) National Security Advisory Board, Bangalore, India © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Diesen and A. Lukin (eds.), The Return of Eurasia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2179-6_9

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for exchange of ideas, religions, cultures and philosophies between India, Central Asia and China. Buddhism spread from India to Central Asia and China by this route. In the other direction, the Sufi tradition came to India from Central Asia. Interactions over thousands of years contributed to close cultural influences in architecture, dance, music and cuisine across this space. The main current of Islam flowed into India by the land route, via Afghanistan, through Persian and Turkic communities (though Arab traders had already earlier introduced Islam to India’s southwestern coast). Centuries later, the Moghuls came to India from what is now Uzbekistan. India’s maritime connection with Asia was equally ancient and intensive. The trade of spices and other condiments from maritime Asia through India to Arabia and onward to Europe was perhaps as consequential for the European economy as the trade by the Silk Road. From the third century BCE, there were flourishing trade, cultural and political relations of South Indian kingdoms with Southeast Asian kingdoms (the entire space of today’s ASEAN). Indian traders, teachers and priests were influential in these societies until at least the sixteenth century CE. Both Hinduism and Buddhism came to this region from India (and mainly by the sea route). This extraordinary Indian “soft power” in continental Eurasia and maritime Asia suffered during the British colonial occupation of India. Subsequently, communist orthodoxy and Soviet settlement policies in Central Asia diluted some of the civilizational linkages. Cold War alignments inhibited a proactive renewal of cultural and other links with maritime Asia. India’s post-Cold War foreign policy strategies seek to resurrect this “soft power”, to reinforce political and economic approaches. This paper analyses the evolution of the strategies for Indo-Pacific (as India now terms the maritime domain) and Eurasian structures. It examines whether (and how) these strategies could be mutually compatible, rather than mutually exclusive. ∗ ∗ ∗ In remarks at the Russian International Affairs Council in December 2020, Russia’s Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov accused the “US-led West” of trying to restore a unipolar world order with “anti-China

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games … by promoting Indo-Pacific strategies, the so-called “Quad” … attempting to undermine [Russia’s] close partnership and privileged relations with India”. Later in the same speech, he lauded the strengthening dialogue “with our Chinese and Indian colleagues”.1 Lavrov’s comments were widely interpreted in Indian political, media and academic circles as insensitive to the ongoing India–China military standoff in the Ladakh region. The insinuation that India was being led unwillingly into “anti-China games” was considered condescending. Elements in Indian society, which had been advocating a closer Indian partnership with the United States, saw an opportunity to reinforce their argument that, in the face of the continuing challenges to its security from China (and an insensitive Russia), India should now make the “strategic choice” of aligning itself more closely with the United States. In a subsequent media conference, Lavrov walked back on some of his remarks, responding to criticism in India. He extolled the strength of the India–Russia partnership and expressed understanding that India will not move Indo-Pacific cooperation “in a way that would be not positive and not constructive”. He added that the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), which is very representative, could promote constructive and stabilising ideas for the Eurasian region, as well as the Asia–Pacific.2 The above highlights two persistent themes in Russia’s recent foreign policy pronouncements. One is that the Indo-Pacific is an artificial construct, with a strongly anti-China (and anti-Russia) thrust. Russia is more comfortable with the geopolitical construct of the Asia–Pacific. Second, a Eurasian partnership is a more inclusive concept, which meets the interests and aspirations of countries of the Asia–Pacific.

India’s Post-Cold War Challenges The end of the Cold War and the breakup of the Soviet Union substantially altered India’s external environment. The disruption of political, 1 Sergey Lavrov, Remarks at the General Meeting of the Russian International Affairs Council, December 10, 2020, https://russiancouncil.ru/en/analytics-and-comments/ analytics/remarks-at-the-general-meeting-of-the-russian-international-affairs-council/?sph rase_id=72773010. 2 Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov’s Remarks and Answers to Media Questions at a News Conference on the Results of Russian Diplomacy in 2020, Moscow, January 18, 2021, https://www.mid.ru/en/foreign_policy/news/-/asset_publisher/cKNonkJE0 2Bw/content/id/4527635.

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economic and defence cooperation with the USSR, its closest partner, created major uncertainties. The political relationship was diluted, as Russian policymakers turned westward for democratic inspiration, capital and security guarantees. Exchanges of high-level visits slowed down and there was evidence of Russia’s policies on India being influenced by US pressures. The reversal of a high-profile commitment by President Yeltsin in 1993, to supply Russian cryogenic engines at an important stage in India’s space programme, was symptomatic of this.3 In the listing of Russian priorities in the official ‘Concept of Foreign Policy of the Russian Federation’, issued in January 1993, India did not find separate mention: West and South Asia were clubbed together in seventh place, after the CIS, Arms Control, economic reform, the US, Europe and the Asia–Pacific region.4 Military supplies were severely affected, as the Russian military-industrial complex struggled to cope with the impact of the economic chaos on supplies and pricing. The dismantling of the economic arrangements with the Soviet Union and its Warsaw Pact allies coincided with a financial crisis in India, necessitating a comprehensive economic liberalization programme, which drew support from the West. Indian businesses, used to the certainties of the rupee-rouble trade of the Soviet era, were unable to cope with the more challenging Russian business environment of the 1990s. The jolt to a secure and exclusive relationship spurred the search for new approaches. Freed from the political and economic straitjackets of the Cold War, India could leverage the size of its market for civil and defence imports (opened up by its economic liberalization programme), the revolution in information and communications technologies (which it was well-positioned to exploit), its demographic profile, democratic credentials and newly recognized opportunities‚ flowing from its strategic location on the Indian Ocean and its global network of relations with developing countries in the Non-Aligned Movement. India’s global positioning was further altered when it declared itself a nuclear weapons power, after its nuclear tests of 1998. India–Russia relations regained some of their momentum towards the end of the last millennium, as increasing frictions between Russia and

3 Mohanty, Arun, Tracing Indo-Russian Diplomatic History (p. 244), Routledge, 2019. 4 J. Bakshi, Russia in India’s Strategic Thinking, IDSA Publication, https://www.idsa-

india.org/an-jan-6.html.

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the West, on issues of independence and sovereignty, led to a recalibration of Russian foreign policy. India responded with cautious support for the initiative of the Russian strategist, Yevgeny Primakov, for a “strategic triangle” of Russia, India and China (RIC), which sought to move away from a unipolar world towards multipolarity in global political and economic decision-making. Even at that time, India was concerned that the Russia–China axis may draw it into an unnecessarily confrontational posture vis a vis the West. This lingering unease was reflected in the Joint Communique of a 2007 RIC meeting in Harbin (China), which declared that the trilateral cooperation “seeks to broaden common ground amidst divergent interests” [emphasis added].5 India reacted with greater enthusiasm to the establishment of BRIC as an intergovernmental construct—a Russian idea, first presaged in President Putin’s famous speech at the Munich Security Conference in 2007. While subscribing to the strategic thinking behind RIC, India welcomed the tempering influence of Brazil in the grouping.

The Search for Multipolarity: US, Russia, China The strategic autonomy signalled by RIC cooperation did not impede the rapid development of India–US relations. The new circumstances of the twenty-first century presented both countries with the opportunity of escaping Cold War paradigms, which had influenced the infamous US “tilt” towards Pakistan in the India–Pakistan conflict of 1971–1972 and harsh technology-denial regimes after India’s nuclear explosion in 1974 (further intensified after the second round of nuclear tests in 1998). After its economic liberalization, India was an attractive trade and investment destination, besides an exciting market for defence supplies. On its part, India seized the opportunity to strengthen partnership with the sole superpower. The impetus to economic growth from US investments was a major incentive, as also the promise of sophisticated US defence equipment, which could help diversify India’s defence acquisitions, hitherto almost solely from Russia. The strategic partnership enabled India to work with the United States on the shared goal of assisting economic development and democracy in Afghanistan. The significant Indian development 5 Indian Ministry of External Affairs website, http://www.mea.gov.in/press-releases. htm?dtl/3236/Joint_Communiqu_of_the_Meeting_of_the_Foreign_Ministers_of_the_Peo ples_Republic_of_China_the_Republic_of_India_and_the_Russian_Federation.

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assistance presence in that country (which has grown to exposure of over US$3 billion by 2020) helped to discourage the use of Afghan territory by Pakistan‚ for hostile terrorist activity against India, as had happened in the 1990s during the Taliban rule in Afghanistan. An important strategic underpinning to the burgeoning India–US relationship was their shared perceptions about China. US policymakers, conscious of the emerging strategic challenge from a rising China, saw a strong, democratic India as a potentially countervailing presence in this region.6 In the eyes of US strategists, the nuclear tests (though it upset the strongly-entrenched non-proliferation lobbies) signalled a shift in India’s strategic thinking from a non-aligned, pacifist mode to a more muscular one, willing to protect its security interests in its region. Given the unhappy history of India’s relations with China over four decades, India obviously welcomed this perspective, entailing US support for strengthening India’s military power in its region, which senior US State Department officials articulated clearly in background briefings. The evolution of India’s perspectives on the Indo-Pacific dates from this period, well before the term or its geographical definition emerged. From the earliest stage of rejuvenation of India–US relations, India’s principal effort was to get the United States to lift the decades-old draconian technology-denial measures, which had hampered India’s industrial development in both civilian and military sectors. These measures were “punishments” for India’s “violations” of the global non-proliferation regime, even though India is not a party to the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India argued that a strategic partnership could not be sustained, when wide-ranging sanctions influenced public perceptions against the United States. India also made the case that it had not violated any treaty obligations and had been a responsible developer of nuclear capability, not sharing it with non-nuclear countries. But the China angle weighed more with the United States than these arguments, together with the interests of the US defence industry, to make inroads into the Indian arms market‚ and of its nuclear industry‚ to participate in India’s ambitious nuclear power generation plans. The result was that the United States almost single-handedly amended the global non-proliferation rules to make an exception for India and got the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group (which was meant to prevent countries 6 Condoleezza Rice, US National Security Advisor (2001–05) and Secretary of State (2005–09), No Higher Honour (p. 437), Simon & Schuster, 2011.

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like India from enhancing their nuclear weapons capability) to open up cooperation with India in civilian applications of nuclear energy, waiving the requirement of signing the NPT. This was a major milestone in India– US relations. It opened the door to US defence sales to India, which rose from near-zero levels in 2008 to over US$20 billion over the next ten years. The United States is now India’s largest trade partner and a major source of investment. Over a million Indian students are in US universities. The Indian community in the United States has a business and technology presence, far out of proportion to its numerical strength; it is gradually acquiring political influence as well. This intensification of India–US relations coexisted with a new vibrancy that President Putin imparted to the India–Russia relationship, when he assumed office. In an important speech at the Indian Parliament during his first visit to India in October 2000, he declared that Indian and Russian geopolitical interests coincided and, therefore, the relationship was “one of the top priorities of Russian foreign policy”. Also important from India’s perspective was his assurance that, no matter how Russia’s relations with other countries developed, “be it Asian or other countries”, they would never be alternatives to relations with India, or prejudice them. Putin made it clear that the strategic partnership with India was an integral part of Russia’s effort at building alternate poles in a post-Cold War unipolar world.7 The new strategic partnership rejuvenated political cooperation, bilaterally and in multilateral organizations. But its most significant impact was on cooperation in defence, nuclear energy and hydrocarbons. Defence cooperation expanded in range and depth, with Indian acquisitions from Russia of major weapons platforms and joint work on developing others. Though details are shrouded in secrecy for obvious reasons, senior officials in the Indian defence establishment confirmed that the cooperation validated Putin’s public assertion that Russia does not transfer to any country the levels of defence technologies that it transfers to India. The India–Russia joint venture, Brahmos, set up to manufacture anti-ship missiles designed in Russia, has since developed missiles for the Army, Navy and Air Force. An interesting fact, indicative of the depth of the defence cooperation is that the Indian Armed Forces now operate more

7 Address to the Indian parliament, 04.10.2000, http://parliamentofindia.nic.in/jpi/ December2000/CHAP-1.htm.

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Su-30 planes and T-90 tanks than the Russian Armed Forces.8 Even though the United States was instrumental in opening up international civil nuclear cooperation with India, it was Russia that walked in through the opened door. Russian collaboration in Indian nuclear power generation commenced in 2002, resurrecting a 1988 Indo-Soviet agreement. It intensified after the India–US nuclear deal. Indian investments in the Russian hydrocarbons sector increased progressively and are now valued at around US$15 billion. The US$13 billion investment by Russia’s Rosneft, in downstream projects in the hydrocarbons sector in India, is Russia’s largest foreign investment in a single project. In the early 2000s, Russia supported India’s efforts for liberation from “nuclear apartheid” and technology sanctions. At one stage, President Putin advised Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee that, while Russia would back the idea fully (and France was also on board), India should find ways to persuade the United States, because that would be the decisive influence. Russia was naturally conscious of the potential impact of India’s developing partnership with the United States on India–Russia relations, particularly defence cooperation. However, as long as US–Russia relations remained on even keel, the India–US relationship did not create major frictions with Russia. In fact, during the prolonged military face-off along the India–Pakistan border in 2002–03, the US and Russian Presidents consulted with each other a few times on ways to de-escalate tension. At US request, President Putin had separate detailed discussions with the Indian PM and the Pakistani President on the margins of a multilateral event in Kazakhstan and provided feedback to the US President, who “praised” the Russian President’s efforts.9 India–China relations also gained traction in the early 2000s, side by side with India’s strategic partnerships with the United States and Russia. Relations between the two countries had soured within a decade of India’s independence. India’s grant of refugee status to the Dalai Lama in 1959, the military conflict in 1962, the 1963 China–Pakistan agreement (by which Pakistan ceded to China the trans-Karakoram tract of Pakistan-Occupied Kashmir), the China–Pakistan nexus since the 1950s

8 Vladimir Karnozov, Ideal Partners, Force, 14 (1), September 2016, pp. 14–18. 9 https://georgewbush-whitehouse.archives.gov/news/releases/2002/06/20020606-

3.html.

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and Chinese encouragement of insurgent groups in India’s northeast, ensured that relations remained less than cordial. The overhang of the 1962 war was gradually removed by India–China agreements of 1993 and 1996 to maintain peace and tranquillity in the border areas—even though the actual boundary was not delineated. The underlying understanding was that India and China could develop other aspects of their relations, while separately trying to resolve differences over the boundary. In 2003, both these strands were strengthened. The two countries appointed high-level Special Representatives to bring a political perspective to the resolution of the boundary question and to report directly to the respective leaders. This initiative yielded an agreement in 2005 on political parameters applicable to a boundary settlement, which met many of India’s concerns, including a provision for safeguarding the interests of settled populations in the border areas. In India’s interpretation, this covered populations in the Indian state of Arunachal Pradesh, which China has been claiming as “South Tibet”. There were other confidence-building gestures, like China agreeing to correct its maps to show Sikkim as a part of India, in return for India formalizing the position that the Tibetan Autonomous Region is a part of the People’s Republic of China. This development was the product of the post-Cold War striving for multipolarity in the world order. India’s increasing political clout, the opening of its market and expanding India–US relationship may have influenced the Chinese approach to India, which seemed to offer the first real chance of resolving the border issues and addressing the other irritants that had bedevilled relations. The immediate outcome was growth in trade, investment, cultural and educational cooperation between the two countries. China soon became India’s largest trade partner and a significant foreign investor, as Chinese consumer electronics poured into the Indian market and Chinese companies invested in an array of Indian start-ups. The growth of the Russia–China strategic partnership in the early 2000s was contemporaneous with the India–China détente described above. The fundamental difference between the two processes was that the former followed a border settlement and the resolution of major politico-ideological differences, while the latter predicated a settlement of the border on harmonious development of other facets of the relationship. There were objective reasons for this significant divergence, including (as later events have shown) China’s ambitions in both the continental and

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maritime domains. With the subsequent geopolitical flux, the boundary question has become even more intractable.

Post-2008: Configurations Change Many Russian scholars have identified 2008 (when the Bucharest NATO Summit decided that Georgia and Ukraine would be invited into NATO) as a turning point in Russia’s Eurasia “pivot” and 2014 (the accession/annexation of Crimea) as the breaking point of Russia–West relations. Russia’s most conspicuous Eurasian move was to add further political, economic and military content to the strategic partnership with China, which had already been developing strongly since 2000. This was an understandable response to the political isolation and economic sanctions that the West sought to impose, in response to Ukrainian events and other issues that were raised from time to time. During the same period, India and China were moving apart. The quality of bilateral dialogue was diluted and the Special Representatives could not achieve any further substantive progress in their discussions. In India’s view, the Chinese reneged on their 2005 commitments. The articulation of the Chinese claim to Arunachal Pradesh (“South Tibet”) increased in stridency. India saw the thrust of Chinese political, economic and military activity in its neighbourhood—Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka and Maldives—as undermining its influence in these countries. China’s support for Pakistan’s missile and nuclear programmes has continued since the 1950s, as also the diplomatic cover it has provided to Pakistan in its campaigns against India in international forums. Among other recent acts have been shielding Pakistan from international censure for harbouring anti-India terrorists and blocking India’s entry into the Nuclear Suppliers’ Group. Many analysts believe that China’s positive signals on relations with India (including hinting at a potential border settlement) in the early 2000s were probably motivated by the desire to forge a mutually beneficial partnership that would restrain India from joining a US strategy to contain or balance China. With the India– US nuclear deal of 2008, the Chinese probably assessed that this was no longer possible. In addition, as Andrew Small notes in The ChinaPakistan Axis, Chinese decision-making echelons were increasingly being

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occupied by officials who believed that China was now powerful enough to take a more forceful stance on territorial and other bilateral disputes.10 China’s Pakistan nexus was qualitatively reinforced by the launch of the China–Pakistan Economic Corridor (CPEC), as part of China’s Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It is a major initiative for an infrastructure corridor, connecting western China to the Pakistani port of Gwadar on the Arabian Sea, passing through a part of Pakistan-occupied Kashmir that was ceded to China by Pakistan in 1963. This was an affront to India’s sovereignty, but its wider implications are even more serious. Gwadar Port is reported to have been leased to China until 2059. Chinese companies operating the port are said to be building an international airport, with Chinese grant assistance. It is reasonable to assume that these are not merely altruistic decisions, but reflect the strategic value to China of access to the Arabian Sea, and proximity to energy-rich West Asia. There are intermittent reports of Chinese naval submarines surfacing off the Gwadar coast. There are continuing discussions and controversies in Pakistan about the economic viability of many CPEC projects and the debt burden they will impose on Pakistan. The Pakistani press has reported on much more expansive Chinese plans for using CPEC as the base for a much wider Chinese presence in Pakistan, including exploitation of natural resources, large-scale farming operations, the establishment of surveillance systems in Pakistani cities, creation of a national fibre optic network and a Chinese manufacturing presence across various industries. Even if only some of this is achieved, it would consolidate Chinese political and economic dominance in Pakistan.11 Gwadar port is an important link in the chain of ports that is envisaged in China’s Maritime Silk Road (MSR), which the maritime segment of the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). It includes ports in the Indian Ocean, where China wants a presence (for trade and/or military reasons)—from Myanmar through Sri Lanka to Maldives and all the way to Djibouti and further to Africa’s eastern and southern coast. This expansion of Chinese presence across the Indian Ocean impinges directly on India’s economic and security interests.

10 Andrew Small, The China-Pakistan Axis: Asia’s New Geopolitics, Oxford University Press, New York, 2015. 11 Exclusive: CPEC Master Plan Revealed, Dawn, June 21, 2017, accessible at: https:// www.dawn.com/news/1333101.

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The Indo-Pacific, Not Asia–Pacific The economic and strategic importance to India of the geographical space spanning the Indian and Pacific Oceans has been recognized by Indian analysts since the early 2000s. The term “Indo-Pacific” to describe this space is believed to have first figured in a paper by the Indian analyst, Gurpreet Khurana, in 2007.12 Later that year, Japanese Prime Minister Shinzo Abe spoke in the Indian Parliament of the “dynamic coupling” of the Indian and Pacific Oceans.13 India is, in many ways, a sea-locked country: for political, security or geographical reasons, mobility of goods and people across its land borders is relatively limited. Hence, the Indian Ocean carries over 90% of India’s foreign trade, including most of its energy supplies. The value of this foreign trade is about 40% of India’s GDP. Over 30% of this trade moves across the Malacca Straits. The security of its 7500 km coastline is an important concern. The marine resources of the Indian ocean contribute significantly to the economies of its littoral states. Drug movements, arms smuggling and human trafficking are perennial issues in these waters. In the crowded sea lanes of the Indian and Pacific Oceans, piracy is a constant threat to shipping, and terrorist movements threaten the Indian coastline. India’s worst terrorist attack—in Mumbai in 2008—was launched from the sea. India’s foreign policy is, therefore, driven by economic, security and strategic interests to prevent the domination of this region by any country. China’s unilateral assertion of its territorial claims in the South China Sea, its coercive actions against countries for bilateral grievances (Japan, Korea, Philippines, Vietnam and Mongolia are recent examples) and the geopolitical implications of the BRI have aroused concerns, which are shared by other countries in this space that have borne the brunt of China’s unilateral actions. This has driven India’s efforts for a cooperative order in the region that establishes an equilibrium of interests and aspirations. Foreign Minister Lavrov’s comments quoted earlier indicate suspicion about Indian thinking behind the Indo-Pacific concept. Official Russian

12 Gurpreet S. Khurana, Security of Sea Lines: Prospects for India-Japan Cooperation, Strategic Analysis (Vol. 31 [1], pp. 139–153), IDSA/Routledge, January 2007. 13 Confluence of the Two Seas, Speech by Prime Minister of Japan in the Indian Parliament, August 22, 2007, https://www.mofa.go.jp/region/asia-paci/pmv0708/speech-2. html.

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comments frequently reiterate that Russia is more comfortable with the Asia–Pacific as a construct, emphasizing the centrality of ASEAN and of the dialogue mechanisms developed around it. There are some obvious reasons why India has a different perspective on this. The Asia–Pacific is a geopolitical construct of the Cold War, when the United States extended a security umbrella for its allies against the Soviet Union and its allies. With the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the rise of China as the dominant power in the region, this construct is obsolete. As per its geographical definition, India was not a part of the Asia–Pacific—the region stretched from ASEAN, Northeast and East Asia to the US west coast. The exclusion of India from Asia–Pacific structures continued after the Cold War. APEC (Asia–Pacific Economic Cooperation), which was created in 1989 did not (and still does not) include India. Similarly, India was not an original participant in the Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM) in 1996. It was admitted only in 2006. It is a glaring anomaly to exclude Asia’s second-largest country, with a population of 1.3 billion and an economy of $2.6 trillion, strategically located on the Indian Ocean, from dialogue mechanisms of the region. There is no confusion in Indian minds about the geographical definition of the Indo-Pacific: it extends across the expanse of the two oceans, from Africa to America. India has interests in the entire space. However, the situation in the western Indian Ocean is qualitatively different from that in the eastern Indian Ocean, joined with the Pacific Ocean. The US definition covers only the eastern part, as underlined by the re-designation of the US Navy’s Pacific Command as Indo-Pacific Command. Given their strong local concerns in the region, this is also the definition that ASEAN, Australia and others in this region prefer. India has gone along with this, while developing a separate strategy to promote its interests in the western Indian Ocean (the western part of the Indo-Pacific).

A Cooperative Approach for the Indo-Pacific India has sought to forge convergences with countries in this region, through its “Act East” policy of strengthening bilateral and plurilateral partnerships. Annual India-ASEAN summits have enabled regular exchanges of views about the security situation in the region. Though there are nuances in ASEAN countries’ perspectives, there are common underlying concerns that they share with India. This was demonstrated by the unique presence of the heads of all 10 ASEAN countries in New Delhi

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in 2018, celebrating India’s Republic Day and 25 years of India-ASEAN dialogue. It may be noted that, despite recent Russian pronouncements on Eurasia, the ASEAN-Russia summit in Singapore in November 2018 was only the fourth such summit from 2005 onwards. India’s strong partnership with Japan, dating back to 2000, was strengthened further during the stewardship of Prime Minister Shinzo Abe, who enunciated his vision of the Indo-Pacific in a speech to the Indian Parliament in 2007. In 2016, India’s Prime Minister Narendra Modi moved to impart fresh momentum to a nearly-moribund organization for cooperation among littoral countries of the Bay of Bengal—the Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation (BIMSTEC), including Nepal, Bhutan, Bangladesh, Myanmar, Sri Lanka and Thailand—to strengthen cooperation for connectivity and maritime security in this enclave of the Indo-Pacific, which stretches from the Malacca straits to India’s east coast. A meeting of National Security Advisors of these countries has added a wider security focus to the agenda. A close strategic dialogue with Vietnam has been traditional for decades. Indonesia, Korea and Australia have also strengthened relations with India. There are regular capacity-building joint exercises with a number of regional navies. The strategic underpinning of the India–US partnership has been mentioned. As China’s assertiveness increased, involving unilateral enforcement of its claims and interests, the United States took a number of initiatives with its allies and partners in the region. The most highprofile among these initiatives is what was originally the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue of India, US, Japan and Australia (now dubbed Quad— India does not use the term “Security Dialogue” for it). It was launched in 2007, but quickly shelved, as China protested strongly, and both India and Japan were launching fresh initiatives to smoothen relations with China. The Quad dialogue recommenced in 2017, and was recently upgraded from the level of officials to that of Ministers. Taking it a level higher, the heads of state/government of the four countries met virtually in March 2021, issued a joint statement and jointly authored an opinion piece in the US daily, The Washington Post. The Quad has generated considerable rhetoric, promoted by the Trump Administration, picked up by other political leaders and amplified by the media. Stripped of rhetoric, the fundamental driver of the dialogue is concern about Chinese assertiveness and the desire to seek a cooperative order in the region. The broad objectives are political equilibrium and a sustainable security architecture, though there are as many perspectives

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about the definition of these terms, and the paths to achieve them, as the number of participants in the dialogue. Broadly, the elements of a peaceful order in the region, as enunciated by them, are unexceptionable: respect for sovereignty and independence of all nations, large and small; peaceful resolution of disputes; free and fair trade and investment … adherence to international rules and norms, including freedom of navigation and overflight. They are included in Indian Prime Minister Modi’s keynote address at the Shangri La Dialogue in Singapore in June 2018, which was widely acclaimed as a balanced vision of the Indo-Pacific.14 The unease about the concept arises from the formulations in strategy documents put out by the Trump Administration, which define the US Indo-Pacific strategy in terms of a “geopolitical rivalry between free and repressive world order visions” and promise a lethal, resilient and rapidly innovating Joint Force…15 It is clear from the statements of individual Quad countries that they do not define their Indo-Pacific vision in these terms. The Quad countries rebuff descriptions of it as a strategy or an alliance or a closed club or a starting point of an arc of democracy encircling China. They are conscious of their economic interlinkages with China and Chinese military dominance in the region. In short, therefore, the Quad and other multilateral initiatives in the region have to reconcile the nuances of individual interests and constraints of countries in the region. The Biden Administration has put the Trump Administration’s strategy documents under review. A distinct change in tone is evident in the Quad joint statement and the opinion piece of March 2021. It remains to be seen if this will lead to a greater coherence of purpose. The bottom line for India was expressed by its External Affairs Minister in a recent speech on India-China relations: a multipolar world should also have a multipolar Asia.16 The situation, therefore, is that discussions on the Indo-Pacific are work in progress. The major achievement so far has been the acceptance of the term, as a geographical expression, by most countries of the region. 14 https://www.mea.gov.in/Speeches-Statements.htm?dtl/29943/Prime+Ministers+

Keynote+Address+at+Shangri+La+Dialogue+June+01+2018. 15 US DoD Indo-Pacific Strategy Report, June 1, 2019, https://www.defense.gov/ Newsroom/Releases/Release/Article/1863396/dod-releases-indo-pacific-strategy-rep ort/. 16 Keynote Address by External Affairs Minister at the 13th All India Conference of China Studies (mea.gov.in), January 28, 2021.

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ASEAN (and, separately, Indonesia), Japan and Australia have publicly announced their perspectives on the Indo-Pacific. The difficult part is to broaden the canvas of concrete cooperation initiatives, based on shared interests and concerns.

Russia and the Indo-Pacific The effort to draw Russia into a dialogue on the Indo-Pacific was furthered during Indian Prime Minister Modi’s Vladivostok visit in September 2019. India’s message to Russia has been that efforts to prevent Chinese hegemony in the region should be in Russia’s interest as well, if it sees itself as an independent Pacific power. The initiative to strengthen Indian presence in the Russian Far East (which includes an Indian line of credit of US$ 1 billion to fund development of projects in the region), and to activate a Vladivostok-Chennai maritime trade corridor reinforced this message. In their media statements, both Modi and Putin referred to it in their own ways: “Russia and India are working together to ensure security and stability in Asia, and the Pacific and Indian oceans.” (Putin) and, “we held a useful discussion on India’s concept of an open and inclusive Indo-Pacific Region” (Modi).17 Russian suspicion of the concept, however, lingers. When asked about it by an Indian analyst in October 2019, Putin said ASEAN and its structures already exist, that “bloc-based” organizations are “un-Asian”, Asian countries want a network of cooperation and, finally, trying to contain China is a self-destructive enterprise.18 Most countries in the Indo-Pacific would agree with all of this. As observed earlier, an intimate political and economic engagement with China characterises their situation. This, together with China’s military and economic dominance of the region, means that the search for an Indo-Pacific security architecture should not seek to contain or confront China. This explains the cautious response by countries of the region to the US discourse on a Free and Open Indo-Pacific. Countries also recognize the importance of military strength in the region, since extreme asymmetry perpetuates disequilibrium. India, Australia and Japan have 17 Press Statements Following Russian-Indian Talks, September 4, 2019, Russky Island, Primorye Territory, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61442. 18 Vladimir Putin at a Plenary Session of the Valdai International Discussion Club, Sochi, October 3, 2019, http://en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/61719.

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all budgeted for strengthening their maritime defence capabilities. In the longer term, conditions have to be created to draw China into meaningful discussions for an open and inclusive cooperative order.

The Course of Eurasian Partnership In this respect, the underlying objectives of most participants in the IndoPacific dialogue are identical to, or closely aligned with, the objectives of the Eurasian partnership, which President Putin has advocated and whose elements have been fleshed out by a number of Russian scholars. Putin spelt out his vision, in June 2016, as a multi-speed economic and technological integration of countries and organizations in Eurasia, with the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) at the core. About 40 countries and international organizations, he said, were already seeking free trade agreements with the EAEU, which could initially link up with countries, with which Russia already has close partnership: China, India, Pakistan, Iran and the CIS countries, through bilateral and multilateral agreements on trade, research and technology sharing. The pace of interaction and integration could match the comfort levels of individual countries. This network would provide the underpinning for a broader Eurasian partnership.19 Putin’s formulation was incorporated into the Russia-China – declaration, signed by the leaders of the two countries, during the Russian President’s visit to China in June 2016. The declaration linked the EAEU with the SREB (the Eurasian segment of the BRI) and supported a “comprehensive Eurasian partnership, based on … openness, transparency, and mutual interests”, and including EAEU, SCO, and ASEAN member countries. Scholars associated with the Valdai Discussion Club, which regularly arranges interactions with senior Russian dignitaries, including President Putin, elaborated on these ideas in a series of annual papers. One identified the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO) as a suitable host of intergovernmental committees to coordinate cooperation on trade liberalization, synchronization of standards, counter-terrorism, cybercrime and

19 Vladimir Putin, Plenary session of St Petersburg International Economic Forum • President of Russia (kremlin.ru), June 17, 2016.

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other shared interests.20 Another said the EAEU-SREB alignment project should give a new impetus for the Shanghai Cooperation Organization to develop into an important platform for regional cooperation and international security.21 In 2018, a Valdai Club paper declared that Russia was well-positioned to become the leading security provider in Eurasia, and had the “militarypolitical weight” to mediate old and new conflicts between China, Japan, India and the two Koreas. The effort would also be to place China “in a web of ties, institutions and balances, which excludes the possibility of even a soft hegemony that would be unacceptable to its major neighbours”. This means getting China “to resist the millennia-old inertia of the Middle Kingdom, quietly rolling over its neighbours”. The paper adds that India–China tensions are pushing India into American arms, and Russia should arrest this trend by leveraging its traditionally close relations with India, to engage it more intensively in Greater Eurasia, of which it has always been a part—historically, economically and culturally.22 Chinese aspirations to hegemony are also mentioned in an earlier Valdai paper: “Eurasia will be able to establish itself as a centre of gravity, only if Beijing does not aspire to hegemony”.23 This objective of drawing China into a cooperative order, with sensitivity to the aspirations of other countries in the region, matches exactly with what countries in the Indo-Pacific are hoping to achieve through their cooperation. This is not surprising, since there is significant overlap of “target” countries of Eurasia and the Indo-Pacific (South Asia, ASEAN, Japan, Korea). The years since Putin’s announcement of his vision have tested many of its assumptions. For example, the link between the EAEU and the SREB seems to be still work in progress. Many Russia-China discussions have been reported in the intervening years, but at the second Belt and

20 S. Karaganov, From East to West, or Greater Eurasia, Russia in Global Affairs, October 25, 2016, http://eng.globalaffairs.ru/pubcol/From-East-to-West-or-Greater-Eur asia-18440. 21 Valdai Discussion Club, Toward the Great Ocean—4: Turn to the East, September 2016. 22 Valdai Discussion Club, Toward the Great Ocean—6: People, History,Ideology, Education, September 2018. 23 Valdai Discussion Club, Toward the Great Ocean—5: From the turn to the East to Greater Eurasia, September 2017.

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Road Forum in Beijing in April 2019, Putin was still talking about it in the future tense. One of the Russian objectives must have been to have SREB projects routed through EAEU, rather than be decided bilaterally by China with individual member countries, with no Russian input into them. In practice, BRI projects so far have been largely bilateral. Also, most China–Europe connectivity projects have taken a southern route through Central Asia and the Caucasus, and not through Russia. Russia is modernizing the Trans-Siberian Railway and the Baikal–Amur Mainline, connecting its Far East to western Russia, raising their capacity 1.5-fold. BRI does not appear to be generating commensurate traffic on this route. EAEU itself is still to resolve integration issues among its member countries, before it can embark on an ambitious integration project with others. Belarus’ demands, for a single market within EaEU for natural gas, oil and petroleum products by 2025, have been well-publicized; other members are pressing their demands more discreetly. Vietnam has concluded its FTA with EaEU, but India’s discussions are dragging on since 2015, because of procedural issues on all sides. India would like a Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement, whereas the Eurasian Economic Commission is only empowered to negotiate Free Trade Agreements (and the smaller EaEU members are reluctant to add services and investment in the agreement). The military standoff between India and China in 2020 was a major test of the propositions of a Eurasian partnership. Two ministerial meetings of the RIC were held during this period, one virtual and one physical (luncheon meeting). The joint press statements on these meetings contained anodyne formulations (shared understanding on response to the pandemic, central role of the UN, commitment to international law as in the UN Charter), indicating few substantive areas of convergence on current problems. Russian Foreign Minister Lavrov tried to give a positive spin on the meetings to the media, asserting that the three countries had overlapping or similar approaches to the key problems of our time. He added that they agreed it was “critically important” to reinforce the ASEANcentric interaction for cooperation in the Asia–Pacific. The obvious point is that, if there had been a consensus on these views, they would have been included in the joint statement. Physical meetings of SCO Foreign and Defence Ministers were also hosted by Russia in 2020, in addition to a virtual meeting of their National Security Advisors (NSAs) and a Summit. They provided the

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opportunity of bilateral meetings of the Foreign and Defence Ministers of India and China, though neither of them recorded discernible progress in resolving the border standoff. Russian officials were careful to disclaim any mediatory role, with Lavrov saying only that Russia was happy that the meetings took place on its territory. The Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs spokeswoman was more explicit in stating that Russia respects “the desire of Beijing and New Delhi to act independently … without the interference of other countries, using well-functioning multi-level mechanisms of bilateral dialogue …” and hopes that “as responsible members of the international community, [they will] find mutually acceptable peaceful options for defusing tensions as soon as possible”. There was also a minor disruption of the SCO NSAs meeting, because a bilateral India-Pakistan issue reared its head. The SCO meetings and the summit showed that the organization is still far from attaining the role of a “binder” of Eurasian cooperation.

Can India Disengage from Eurasia? Nevertheless, there is no basis to the suspicion, occasionally expressed in Russia, and reinforced by some media and political pronouncements in India, that India is disengaging from Eurasia and moving towards a quasi-alliance with the United States. Two major imperatives flow from India’s geography: protection of its economic and security interests in the Indo-Pacific space and securing its strategic interests in the continental landmass to its north and west. The former has inspired the Act East policy of bilateral and multilateral engagements in Southeast and East Asia, and the Pacific. As elaborated earlier, shared India–US interests in this maritime domain have been a strategic underpinning of the their bilateral partnership. Indian and US perspectives are less convergent in India’s continental neighbourhood. Connectivity and cooperation with Afghanistan and Central Asia need engagement with Iran and Russia, as well as with the Russia–China dynamics in the region. The political and strategic importance of the partnership with Russia is frequently reiterated by the Indian political leadership, and was again illustrated by the high-level exchanges in 2020. The Indian leadership has repeatedly asserted that, though non-alignment lost its conceptual meaning after the Cold War, the independence of action that inspired it remains a tenet of India’s foreign policy; and it precludes alliances.

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The India-China tensions and the India-Pakistan frictions frequently arouse debates in India about the continued value of its SCO membership. China has consolidated its energy and economic foothold in the region. Analysts note the progressive undermining of the unwritten Russia-China understanding on the separation of roles in Central Asia: that Russia will provide the politico-security umbrella, while China will be the dominant economic presence. China’s ambitions for greater political influence and military presence are now clearly manifest. India has to factor these realities into its activities in the SCO. Differences with China on regional issues and international developments may complicate deliberations in SCO. If relations of both Russia and China with the United States deteriorate further, India will have to tread another tightrope. There is also some incongruity in standing together with China, which is clearly seeking a co-equal bipolarity with the United States, to echo SCO’s demand for a multipolar world. At the same time, economics and geopolitics argue for India’s continued membership of the organization. Its members occupy a huge landmass adjacent to India’s extended neighbourhood, where India has important economic and security interests. Its Central Asian countries border Afghanistan, Pakistan, Iran and China. A narrow sliver of land separates southern Tajikistan from Pakistan-occupied Kashmir. In a complex neighbourhood, it makes political sense to strengthen relations with neighbours’ neighbours. With Pakistan joining the SCO and Afghanistan and Iran knocking on its doors, the logic of India’s membership becomes stronger. The centuries’ old Indian economic and cultural links with Central Asia provide fertile ground for the revival of relations, which effort was intensified when Indian Prime Minister Modi visited all the Central Asian countries in July 2015. Central Asia, with its abundance of natural resources, offers interesting opportunities for economic cooperation. India’s civilizational links with this region have been mentioned. An effective Indian presence requires the development of the multimodal transport corridor through Iran (International North South Transport Corridor, INSTC), which progresses with its own stop–go momentum. The Central Asian countries are keenly interested in the access to the Indian Ocean that this corridor would provide, as well as the prospect of India breaking into the Russia–China duopoly in their region. In his intervention at the Belt and Road Forum in Beijing in 2019, President Putin reminded his Chinese hosts that the Eurasian partnership has a broader agenda than the BRI:

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“to integrate integration frameworks”—promoting closer alignment of various bilateral and multilateral integration processes currently underway. He mentioned the INSTC in this context, with the result that it was included as one of the 283 “deliverables” from the Forum. The history and current relevance of India’s strategic partnership with Russia, cemented by multi-faceted defence collaboration, cooperation in hydrocarbons and nuclear energy projects, interests in natural resources and niche technologies, is often underestimated as a factor in India’s attachment to Eurasia. A compelling reality is that, after nearly two decades of diversification of defence acquisitions, about 50 percent of India’s defence imports are still from Russia.

Eurasian Partnership Is More Than Russia-China Partnership President Putin has outlined an inclusive vision for Eurasian partnership, and some analysts mention the need to address the concerns of countries of the region. However, Indian academics note the widely prevalent tendency among Russian scholars to treat the Russian pivot to Asia as essentially a pivot to China, with the implicit assumption that others would be added. Dmitri Trenin, for example, has written of Putin’s move from Greater Europe (Lisbon to Vladivostok) to Greater Asia (Shanghai to St Petersburg).24 This is not a definition of Greater Asia, which would attract India (or, for that matter, Japan or Korea). The Valdai paper’s recommendation for special attention to India has been quoted earlier; this is important in the context of RIC and SCO engagement, where Russia and China are often seen to be coordinating positions in advance. In this context, President Putin created a flutter, in India and elsewhere, by a comment about a possible Russia–China alliance. In response to a question from a Chinese journalist in October 2020, he said the Russia–China relationship is one of deep trust, with durable ties in aviation, nuclear power, infrastructure and hydrocarbons, and significant military-technical cooperation. Putin said he would not rule out a military alliance, though it is not on the cards now. He added that Russia–China

24 Dmitri Trenin, From Greater Europe to Greater Asia? The Sino-Russian Entente, Carnegie Moscow Center, April 9, 2015, http://carnegie.ru/2015/04/09/from-greatereurope-to-greater-asia-sino-russian-entente.

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cooperation is boosting the defence potential of the Chinese army, which is in the interest of both Russia and China. It is not clear if this was a statement of conviction, a warning to the West, a reassurance to China (after accelerating arms supplies to India) or, indeed, a message to India about its perceived closeness to the United States. But it is clear that a Russia–China military alliance would radically alter the premises of a Greater Eurasian partnership. Meanwhile, Russia has taken a number of initiatives to broaden cooperation in Eurasia beyond the Russia–China axis, to increase its room for manoeuvre in promoting Eurasian cooperation processes. Energizing Korean connections, reinvigorating defence collaboration with Vietnam and skilfully inserting itself into the political settlement process in Afghanistan are some examples. But the most important has been the Putin–Abe dialogue towards resolving the vexed Kurile Islands issue and concluding a peace treaty that would finally “normalize” Russia-Japan relations. At their meeting in November 2018, they were reported to have agreed to resolve the dispute on the basis of their bilateral declaration of 1956 (under which the Soviet Union agreed to cede two of the four southern islands to Japan). However, this can go ahead only if Russia gets assurances that the United States would not put military bases on the ceded islands. This requires amendment of the US–Japan security treaty, which incorporates the right to put military bases on the islands. Japan’s effort to “normalize” relations with Russia is obviously to “balance” China in the region. Russia, while not stating it in quite these terms, would be happy with the outcome. But it can happen only if the United States sees it as a viable and desirable development from its strategic perspective.

Mutually Compatible or Mutually Exclusive? An analysis of the Greater Eurasia concept and the idea of an Indo-Pacific cooperative order shows that both have remarkably similar objectives. One is premised on a progression from economic interlinkages to political understandings that would underwrite peace and security. The other relies on political and diplomatic initiatives to create an equitable order in the region that would facilitate mutually beneficial economic cooperation in conditions of equal security for all. Both recognize the importance of the careful handling of China to achieve these objectives. There is a significant overlap of potential participants or “targets” of these two projects.

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What puts them in direct confrontation is the mutual suspicion between the principal sponsors of the two projects. This probably explains the uncharacteristic Russian position of clinging to a Cold War construct of the Asia–Pacific and steadfastly refusing to accept a terminological change that its partners have accepted. The firm conviction that it is an American ploy to create a new alliance against China (and Russia) probably draws from the experience of US–Russia confrontations (directly or through their proxies) across multiple geographical theatres—most obviously in Ukraine, Syria and Afghanistan. Russia’s rejection of the Indo-Pacific is based on politics, not geography. This brings us back to the trigger for Russia’s move towards a Eurasian partnership: a near-breakdown of relations with the “US-led West”. Eventually, this may also define the limits of the Eurasian partnership, through restrictions placed on the interactions of the more West-oriented countries in the region. The determining factor in this would be the emerging configuration of the US–Russia-China triangle, which will have a profound influence on the course of Eurasian processes. Writing in the US journal, Foreign Affairs, in 2016, veteran Chinese diplomat Fu Ying described US–China–Russia relations as resembling a scalene triangle (with all sides unequal), in which the United States and Russia were furthest apart, China and Russia closest, and China and the United States of intermediate length.25 This was when the United States was intent on imposing costs on Russia for its “adventures” in Crimea, but more lenient on Chinese transgressions in the South China Sea and Xinjiang. It suited China perfectly to have Russia dependent on its support, while it strutted the world stage, expanding its influence in the United States and Europe. This is the configuration that best suits China: US-Russia hostility making Russia dependent on Chinese support, while China deals with the United States on an equal footing, on bilateral and global issues. If the Biden Administration alters the configuration of this triangle, based on current US geopolitical calculations, the shape of the Eurasian partnership could also change.

25 Fu Ying, How China Sees Russia: Beijing and Moscow Are Close, but Not Allies, Foreign Affairs, January/February 2016, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/china/ 2015-12-14/how-china-sees-russia.

CHAPTER 10

Is Southeast Asia ‘Eurasian’? Bilahari Kausikan

The title of this chapter is not a question that lends itself to a straightforward response. Its significance perhaps lies more in the asking rather than the answer because asking exposes connections, complexities and nuances that might otherwise escape attention. ‘Eurasia’ is an ambiguous idea because it is multi-dimensional. Is ‘Eurasia’ a spatial concept largely, but certainly not entirely, defined by Russia, Central Asia and China as its core, but whose boundaries still lack clear definition? Or is ‘Eurasia’ the pseudo-scientific geopolitical concept propounded in the theories of Halford Mackinder and others of his intellectual bent? Or is it the imagined ‘Eurasia’ of the quasi-philosophical musings infused with a peculiar amalgamation of bereavement for lost power and status, assertive ethno-nationalism, religiosity and Russia’s ambivalent and convoluted relationship with the idea of ‘Europe’ that the likes of Lev Gumilev and Alexander Dugin, among others, indulged themselves with in recent times, but which have intellectual roots dating back to the 1920s or earlier? All three broad possibilities have valid claims to the definition of ‘Eurasia.’ B. Kausikan (B) Middle East Institute, National University of Singapore, Buona Vista, Singapore e-mail: [email protected] © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Diesen and A. Lukin (eds.), The Return of Eurasia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2179-6_10

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‘Eurasia’ is a ‘Rashomon term’, after a short story by Akutagawa Ryunosuke1 : its meaning depends on the perspective and interests of the user. We may think we are communicating about the same thing, but more often than not we are only using the same words. This is true even of the most apparently specific of proper nouns. ‘Europe’ and ‘Asia’ have ancient and complex etymologies that are as much cultural as spatial. This makes their boundaries fluid; situational and conditional rather than static. Under the circumstances of his times, Metternich’s quip: ‘Asia begins at the Landstrasse’—the highway leading east from Vienna into Hungary—was not entirely a joke. Geography is seldom only geography but is often determined by political calculations. That is to say, whether a country or region is considered part of ‘Eurasia’ or ‘Europe’ or ‘Asia’ is as much a matter of choice as spatially determined, although the choice may not be your own. In the Meiji era, the educator and reformer Fukuzawa Yukichi advised ‘leaving Asia and joining the West’. Erdogan’s Turkey geographically straddles ‘Asia’ and ‘Europe’ and is a member of NATO, but its links to the political ‘West’ appear increasingly tenuous. The Association of Southeast Asian Nations’ (ASEAN) invitation to the US and India to join the East Asia Summit (EAS) had more to do with their strategic weight or perceived potential than location. ASEAN refused to consider Canada which had at least as good a claim as the US in geographic terms or the EU which certainly had a better claim than India in economic terms. Russia has a clear geographic claim to inclusion in the EAS by virtue of its far eastern territories. But despite its Pacific coast, procession of Sakhalin, and historically close relations with India, it is not to be taken for granted that Russia will ever be considered part of the geopolitical ‘IndoPacific.’ Post-Brexit Britain wants to join the CPTPP (the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership) although it is nowhere near the Pacific, whereas the US, undoubtedly a Pacific power, renounced membership in the CPTPP’s predecessor, the TPP. This was

1 “In a Bamboo Grove” in Ryunosuke Akutagawa, Rashomon and Seventeen Other

Stories (London: Penguin, 2006), pp. 10–19. This is the actual title of the story of differing perspectives and “Rashomon” is actually another story by Akutagawa with a different theme. However, the famous Japanese film director, Kurosawa Akira, used ‘Rashomon’ as the title of his film of “In a Bamboo Grove” and that is how the term entered the English language.

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a choice by the Trump administration that the Biden administration is unlikely to be able to reverse anytime soon. Southeast Asia is not a region with an intrinsic cultural coherence or clear geographical boundaries. Even the term ‘Southeast Asia’ was not widely used until World War II. Geopolitically, Southeast Asia, given its strategic location connecting the Pacific and Indian Oceans, has been defined more by the sea than the land, and fits awkwardly into both the spatial and geopolitical conceptions of ‘Eurasia’. Half of ASEAN, whose membership today defines Southeast Asia, is the southern-most continuation of the vast continental landmass of which ‘Europe’ is a minor western promontory. Mainland Southeast Asia is being physically linked to Central Asia and Europe via China by railway lines running north. But Chinese railway lines continuing westwards across Central Asia bypass existing railway lines across Siberia, at least for now.2 At the same time, the other half of Southeast Asia dribbles into a scatter of archipelagoes connected to Europe by sea not land. The mainland and the maritime sit uneasily even within ASEAN.3 In 1919 Halford Mackinder summarized his theory of ‘The Geographical Pivot of History’ in an aphorism: ‘Who rules East Europe commands the Heartland; who rules the Heartland commands the World-Island; who rules the World-Island commands the world’.4 In the Mackinderian worldview (apparently adopted by Dugin5 ) no ASEAN member is part of the Eurasian ‘Heartland’ (and, it is worth recalling, only the eastern half 2 See David M. Lampton, Selina Ho & Cheng-Chwee Kuik,Rivers of Iron: Railroads and Chinese Power in Southeast Asia (University of California Press, 2020) and “Central Asia, Global Value Chains and China’s ‘Silk Road Economic Belt’ Initiative” by Richard Pomfret in Jean-Paul Larcon ed. The New Silk Road: China Meets Europe in the Baltic Sea Region (Singapore: World Scientific, 2017), pp. 133–155, particularly pp. 136–140 and case 6.2 on p. 154. 3 See “ASEAN and the Geopolitics of Mainland & Maritime Southeast Asia” by Bilahari Kausikan in Journal of Greater Mekong Studies, Volume 3, Issue 2, August 2020 pp. 13– 22. 4 Halford Mackinder, Democratic Ideals and Reality: A Study in the Politics of Reconstruction (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1996, p. 106. See also the map of Eurasia on page x of Charles Clover, Black Wind, White Snow: The Rise of Russia’s New Nationalism (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2016). According to Clover, this map was first outlined by Mackinder and reproduced in Russian by Alexander Dugin in The Foundations of Geopolitics (1997). 5 Alexander Dugin, Last War of the World-Island: The Geopolitics of Contemporary Russia (London: Arktos, 2015).

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of ‘Europe’ is in the ‘Heartland’). Vietnam, Laos, Cambodia, Thailand, the northern islands of the Philippines, and possibly a sliver of northern West Malaysia, are within Mackinder’s ‘Rimland’, while the rest of what is now ASEAN is subsumed into the broader ‘World Island’, more objects than actors in what he thought were the most crucial geopolitical contests. Mackinder’s theories read quaintly in the twenty-first century. But it is not just a matter of antiquarian curiosity to recall them. One of Mackinder’s objectives was to warn Britain that its traditional reliance on sea power was inadequate as improved land transport opened up the Eurasian heartland. Although we should not exaggerate it, this has some contemporary resonance as strategic competition between the US and Russia and the US and China will be a structural feature of international relations for the foreseeable future. Since 1969, when the ‘Guam Doctrine’ was announced as part of Nixon’s plans to disengage from ground wars in Indochina, the US has relied primarily on sea-power to act as the off-shore balancer in Asia. Despite a short post-9/11 sojourn in Central Asia, the US is today a secondary player there, with no coherent continental strategy except to disengage from Afghanistan and the Middle East. By contrast, Post-Soviet Russia remains primarily a land-power and does not seem to have given much attention to the sea, except in the North Atlantic and Baltic—areas crucial to Russia’s European (not ‘Eurasian’) core—and, more peripherally, the eastern Mediterranean. Since 2014, some Russian intellectuals have made erudite arguments to invest Moscow’s ‘turn to Asia’ with a respectable intellectual pedigree, and indeed Moscow’s Asian connections have deep roots.6 But the fact remains that since the time of Peter the Great, Russia’s benchmarks for itself have been Western and Moscow has turned to the East usually only after rejection by the West as, for example, after the nineteenth century Crimean War. At any rate, the actions of the current Russian government have not matched the eloquence of its intellectual spokesmen. Today, Russia’s Asian policies are overwhelmingly focused on China and Central Asia. Russia’s Pacific fleet is a pale shadow

6 William Leatherbarrow & Derek Offord (eds.) A History of Russian Thought (Cambridge University Press, 2010), pp. 217–240.

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of its Soviet predecessor. Moscow’s idea of ‘Eurasia’ is primarily landbased, although global-warming and the opening up of Arctic sea-routes may in time give a broader definition to its idea of ‘Eurasia’.7 Only China has paid anything approximating equal attention to the land and sea in terms of the development of its capabilities and strategic concepts. China’s Belt & Road Initiative (BRI) encompasses both land and sea. It remains to be seen if this imbalance in capabilities and strategic imagination between the three major powers will be redressed and what the long-run consequences will be for the US and Russia if these asymmetries of resources and attention persist. Extrapolations from emerging trends are premature given the many uncertainties generated by the increasing velocity of technological and other changes. But the slow but inexorable re-emergence of traditional patterns of relationships between Central Asia and the Middle East, South Asia and East Asia, could invest these lacunae with potentially significant consequences. Kent E. Calder has written two impressive books arguing for the increasing strategic significance of Eurasia.8 He makes a persuasive case, but I remain agnostic. Among other reasons because of the many latent rivalries in a complex region of not yet entirely stable Central Asian states. It also remains unclear whether Russia’s Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and China’s BRI are complementary, as Moscow and Beijing insist, or competitors, and whether economic competition in which for now China seems to have the upper hand, will bring nascent geopolitical tensions to the surface and if so, how they will be managed. Furthermore, for all the grandeur of its vision, the BRI is still a motley collection of projects undertaken for a diversity of reasons, not all of which are commercial, wrapped up in a slogan, and presented as a strategy. The maritime component of the BRI seems to me far more viable than the land component, among other reasons, because the unit cost of rail transport is always going to be higher than sea transport. But whether land or sea, many BRI projects are troubled, being scaled down or suspended as China for all its vast reserves, cannot afford to indefinitely fund unviable projects. 7 For this reason Singapore, a tropical island just north of the equator, joined the Arctic Council as an observer in 2013. 8 Kent E. Calder, Super Continent: The Logic of Eurasian Integration (Stanford University Press, 2019) and The New Continentalism: Energy and Twenty-First Century Eurasian Geopolitics (Yale University Press, 2012).

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What is certain, however, is that ASEAN figures in US–China competition primarily in the maritime domain. ‘Eurasia’ seems almost entirely absent from the Southeast Asian strategic calculations of both the US and China except obliquely in the latter case as part of its overall BRI approach. ‘Eurasia’ is also no part of ASEAN’s efforts to cope with USChina competition.9 Central Asia is still largely terra incognita to much of Southeast Asia whose ‘Eurasian’ connections are primarily to China with Russia a distant second.10 The key, if usually unstated, factor in ASEAN’s calculations vis-à-vis the anxieties that China evokes is still the US. At the end of the 1980s, a combination of Filipino domestic politics and natural disaster forced US military forces out of Clark Airfield and Subic Bay in the Philippines. Singapore who had long argued for the indispensability of a US military presence to maintain balance in Southeast Asia, offered the use of our facilities to a small logistics unit of the US 7th Fleet. In 1990 an MOU was concluded with the US to give effect to this offer. Indonesia and Malaysia reacted with vehement public criticism. However, when Singapore signed a strategic framework agreement with the US in 2005 that provided for much-enhanced security and defence cooperation and when the 1990 MOU was renewed in 2019, there was nary a whisper of criticism. The change of attitude reflects a growing concern with China’s behaviour. David Shambaugh demonstrates that while China’s influence has grown, there has been no diminution of ties with the US in Southeast Asia which in some cases has grown in tandem.11 There is at present no alternative to the US. Russia plays only a marginal role in Southeast Asian affairs. ASEAN’s engagement of Moscow is at present more a matter of assuaging the amour propre of a Permanent Member of the Security Council by giving it a formal role rather than recognition of strategic significance. In my 9 However, Central Asian states seem to be paying some attention to ASEAN’s experience as they develop an interest in regionalism. See “Central Asia: All Together Now” by Bilahari Kausikan, Fredrick Starr & Yang Cheng in The American Interest, June 16, 2017. 10 To take just one indicator, in 2019 the total volume of ASEAN-Russia trade was US$18.2 billion whereas the total volume of ASEAN-China trade was US$ 508 billion. 11 David Shambaugh, Where Great Powers Meet: America & China in Southeast Asia (Oxford University Press, 2021). On the complexity and ambivalence of Southeast Asian attitudes towards China see Murray Hiebert, Under Beijing’s Shadow: Southeast Asia’s China Challenge (Rowman & Littlefield, 2020) and Sebastian Strangio, In the Dragon’s Shadow: Southeast Asia in the Chinese Century (Yale University Press, 2020).

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experience, neither ASEAN nor Russia have given much real thought to what role the other could play in their overall strategies.12 To be sure, Vietnam and Singapore have signed on to the EAEU. Thailand, Indonesia, Cambodia and the Philippines are reported to be interested in doing so too, although it is unlikely that this is a matter of great priority to these governments. The EAEU and the ASEAN Secretariat have signed an MOU on economic cooperation, phrased in very general terms.13 Former Secretary of State Hillary Clinton has castigated the EAEU as an attempt to ‘re-Sovietize’ the region and vowed to thwart it.14 This was an empty threat. But one need not go so far as she did to recognize that the EAEU is a political as well as an economic project. The point, however, is that ASEAN and its members were aware of such considerations but ignored them. In ASEAN’s diplomacy, doing nothing or looking the other way is sometimes a form of doing something. In August 2014, the Joint Communique of the 47th ASEAN Foreign Minister’s Meeting (AMM) expressed concern over the situation in Ukraine, called for de-escalation and dialogue, and expressed support ‘for the peaceful efforts taken by all parties to resolve the situation’.15 The language was pointedly anodyne. This was the first and only time the AMM or the ASEAN Summit has ever expressed a view on Ukraine. Two years later, at a time when the US and the EU were sanctioning Russia, the ASEAN-Russia Summit—the first ever—took place as scheduled in Sochi in May 2016 with no discussion on Ukraine.16

12 See “ASEAN-Russia Relations: The Way Forward” by Bilahari Kausikan in Tommy

Koh, Sharon Seah Li-Lian & Chang Li Lin (eds.) 50 Years of ASEAN and Singapore (World Scientific, 2017), pp. 205–210 and “How to be Strategic?” by Bilahari Kausikan in ASEANFocus, No.3, June-July 2016, pp. 2–5. 13 Memorandum of Understanding between Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Eurasian Economic Commission on Economic Cooperation. https://asean.org/ storage/2018/11/MOU-between-ASEAN-and-the-EEC_Signed-English.pdf. 14 Charles Clover, “Clinton vows to thwart new Soviet Union”, Financial Times, December 7, 2012. https://www.ft.com/content/a5b15b14-3fcf-11e2-9f71-001 44feabdc0. 15 2014 Joint Communique of the 47th ASEAN Foreign Ministers’ Meeting. Issued in Nay Pyi Taw, Myanmar on 8 August 2014. https://cil.nus.edu.sg/wp-content/uploads/ formidable/18/2014-47th-AMMJC.pdf. 16 Sochi Declaration of the ASEAN-Russian Federation Commemorative Summit to Mark the 20th Anniversary of ASEAN-Russian Federation Dialogue Partnership “Moving Towards a Strategic Partnership for Mutual Benefit.”.

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The shadow of the Soviet past has instilled a lingering ‘big power’ mindset in Russia and some Central Asian countries that often leads to underestimation of the agency of small countries and regional organizations like ASEAN, particularly when the agency is expressed more by inaction rather than action as in the Ukraine example. Consequently, there is a great deal of untapped potential in the relationship between ASEAN and ‘Eurasia’ particularly, and somewhat counter-intuitively, in the third of the definitions of ‘Eurasia’ outlined at the beginning of this essay. Shorn of its more fantastical speculations and its narrowly Russian focus and in particular, its extreme ethno-nationalism, what that idea of ‘Eurasia’ has in common with Southeast Asia is a desire to maximize autonomy in what for the last two centuries has been a largely Westernshaped global order.17 The end of the Cold War and the implosion of the former Soviet Union, whatever its other effects, created a fundamental imbalance in the international system and a new equilibrium has yet to be established. The desired order implicit in that idea of ‘Eurasia’ and in ASEANcreated forums such as the EAS, the ASEAN Regional Forum and The ASEAN Defense Ministers’ Plus meeting is multipolar because multipolarity maximizes agency and autonomy by broadening the space for a manoeuvre. There are of course significant differences between Russian and Chinese ideas of multipolarity18 and ASEAN’s still somewhat nascent, or at least unstated, notion of multipolarity, the most important of which is the latter’s attitude towards the West. ASEAN is often skeptical about and occasionally uncomfortable with specific Western policies, but is not hostile towards the West. Still, in general terms, ASEAN and ‘Eurasia’ occupy the same broad intellectual space with regards to multipolarity. Multipolarity of a sort is already slowly emerging from the delusions of the immediate post-Cold War. But it is still inchoate and what direction it will take is still open. It is worth recalling that the crisis in Ukraine

https://www.asean.org/wp-content/uploads/2016/05/Sochi-Declaration-of-theASEAN-Russia-Commemorative-Summit-Final.pdf. 17 See Clover, op cit, pp. 8–20, pp 131–148, pp. 151–207 and pp. 187–305 and Robert Nalbandov, Not By Bread Alone: Russian Foreign Policy Under Putin (Potomac Books, 2016), pp. 334–344. 18 Alexander Lukin, “A Russian Perspective on the Sino-Russian Rapprochement,” Asia Policy. 2018. Vol. 13. No. 1. P. 19–25.

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was the dénouement of the systematic disregard of Russian national interests that was fed by the triumphalism that characterized Western policy in the 1990s and early 2000s and in particular the eastward expansion of NATO.19 That was certainly a significant factor in the process of disenchantment with the West that eventually led the Russian state to appropriate for its own purposes the hitherto marginal and eccentric ideas of Dugin and others of his ilk. Western and Russian attitudes and policies act and react to each other resulting in a vicious circle that needs to be broken if Southeast Asia is to fully embrace the idea of ‘Eurasia’ in any of its definitions.

19 “Thinking About Russia: A Personal Perspective” by Bilahari Kausikan in Commentary, Journal of the National University of Singapore Society, Vol. 26, 2017, pp. 116–122.

CHAPTER 11

The United States and Eurasia in Historical Perspective Thomas Graham

Eurasia has stood at the center of American foreign-policy concerns since the founding of the republic in 1776. The European balance of power played a central role in the birth of the nation and its expansion across North America in the nineteenth century. In the twentieth, shaping the balance of power first in East Asia, then in Europe, and finally in Eurasia as a whole became, and remains to this day, vital to American security and prosperity. In the American mind, for the past 125 years Russian expansionism more often than not posed the gravest threat to the equilibrium that served American interests, replaced briefly by Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in the years running up to and during the Second World War and perhaps overtaken by China during the past decade. Throughout, geopolitical necessities and ideological preferences have competed for pride of place in American policy, giving it the unique cast that has distinguished the United States from other great powers on the global stage.

T. Graham (B) Council on Foreign Relations, New York, United States of America © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2021 G. Diesen and A. Lukin (eds.), The Return of Eurasia, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-16-2179-6_11

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America’s engagement with Eurasia falls into six slightly overlapping periods. The first, from 1776 roughly to the end of the nineteenth century, was a time of isolationism and continental expansion aided by rivalry among Europe’s great powers. The second period in the late nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth, saw an effort to shape the equilibrium in Northeast Asia, focused primarily on Russian and Japanese activities in Manchuria. The central task of the third period was preventing Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan from achieving domination over Europe and the Far East, respectively, during the Second World War. The fourth period, the Cold War, witnessed a sustained effort to contain the Soviet Union and deny it control over Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia. The fifth period commenced with the end of the Cold War and the unfolding of a grand American ambition to integrate Eurasia into a US-led liberal international order. And now the return of great-power competition marks the opening of a sixth period of tremendous flux, out of which will eventually emerge a new Eurasian equilibrium with unknown consequences for American security and prosperity.

America Observes: Geopolitical Isolationism, Commercial Engagement As is well established, in the decades after it won independence from Great Britain, the United States pursued an isolationist foreign policy. In his Farewell Address, President George Washington warned his countrymen against political engagement in Europe and advocated neutrality. The country, he advised, could “trust to temporary alliances for extraordinary emergencies,” but it should “steer clear of permanent alliances” and refrain from creating permanent enemies or permanent friends. America’s “detached and distant situation” enabled it to pursue a different course in foreign policy, while doing everything it could to protect and nourish its republican form of government, which was only in the early stages of formation.1 As President, Thomas Jefferson followed in Washington’s footsteps, declaring in his first inaugural address in 1801 that

1 See Transcript of President George Washington’s Farewell Address (1796), available at https://www.ourdocuments.gov/doc.php?flash=false&doc=15&page=transcript.

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one of his administration’s guiding principles would be “honest friendship with all nations, entangling alliances with none.”2 Two decades later, in 1823, President James Monroe unveiled the doctrine that bears his name, warning European powers against further efforts at colonization in the Western Hemisphere and foreswearing American entanglement in Europe’s political affairs. Isolationism, however, did not mean that the United States was uninterested in European affairs. On the contrary, the country followed European developments quite closely, sending representatives abroad from the very beginning to gain support for its war for independence. France’s, and to a much lesser extent Spain’s, financial and military support was critical to the colonies’ victory; Russian neutrality was welcomed. None of those countries—and most certainly not autocratic Russia—had any sympathy for the colonies’ anti-monarchical, republican cause, but each saw benefit in the rebellion for its own position in the European balance of power. For France, American independence brought revenge for Britain’s having driven France out of North America during the Seven Year’s War (or the French and Indian War, as it is known in the United States) a generation earlier. Spain hoped to gain territory in Europe (Gibraltar) and secure its territory in North America (East Florida). Russia, meanwhile, was focused on preserving the European equilibrium, especially between France and Great Britain, and not getting drawn into the distant conflict. Once independent, the United States exploited European rivalries as it pursued what was its main strategic ambition, rapid expansion across, and domination of, the North American continent. The Louisiana Purchase, which gave America control of the vast Mississippi River watershed, was made possible by Napoleon’s urgent need for money to finance his wars against England and other European powers. The United States took advantage of Spain’s decline as a result of the Napoleonic Wars to seize Florida in the 1810s. It worked with Great Britain to contain Russian ambitions in the Oregon territory. And it relied on the British navy’s supremacy in the Atlantic to enforce the Monroe Doctrine, which was proclaimed long before the United States had developed the naval capacity to mount a credible defense on its own. Although America’s political engagement in Europe was limited, the same cannot be said of its commerce. From its infancy, the United States

2 Address available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/jefinau1.asp.

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was a nation of merchants. Even as it evaded political entanglements, it built up its trade with Europe. Its unrelenting defense of the rights of neutrals underscored its intention to maintain lucrative trade with European states regardless of the state of relations among them. The country felt so strongly about neutrals’ rights that it was prepared to go to war to defend them, as it did with Great Britain in 1812. Europe was not the only market American merchants developed. They vigorously explored opportunities in Asia, long before the United States had gained a foothold on the Pacific in the middle of the nineteenth century. China was the focus of the burgeoning commercial activity. The United States added Japan after Commodore Perry sailed to Tokyo to open that country up to foreign trade in 1853. Geopolitical isolationism and commercial engagement thus framed America’s approach to Eurasia for well over a century after the country’s founding. This approach was appropriate for a fledgling nation, geographically distant from European conflicts, determined to grow its power and dominate a continent, while nurturing its liberty and republican foundations, which constant geopolitical engagement would have jeopardized. But as American power and wealth grew, it would prove unsustainable.

America Engages: Shaping the Balance in the Far East The United States could not escape the temptations of the Age of Imperialism as it its national wealth and power grew exponentially in the last decades of the nineteenth century. Unprecedented economic growth transformed the United States into one of the leading industrial powers, perhaps even the absolute leader, by 1900. Expansion across the continent had reached its end, fulfilling America’s “manifest destiny” to occupy a continent, but the closing of the frontier begged for other outlets for American dynamism. The evident success of America fueled a burgeoning ambition among elites to take their country’s “exceptional” model abroad. Meanwhile, European powers’ rush to seize territory, first in Africa and then in Asia, created an urgency for America to enter the fray while there were still unclaimed territory and markets.3 3 See Paul Kennedy, The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000 (New York: Vintage Books, 1987), pp. 242–249; Fareed Zakaria, From Wealth to Power: The Unusual Origins of America’s World Role

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In this setting, the Spanish-American War of 1898 marked a momentary break with America’s isolationist tradition and a brief flirtation with European-styled imperialism. As a result of this short, victorious war, the United States acquired territory not only in the Caribbean, but also in the Western Pacific, including most importantly the Philippines. The annexation of Hawaii in 1898 gave the country a strategically critical base on the route to Asia. With these geopolitical assets to defend and exploit, the United States was actively engaged in the diplomacy of Asia in the early years of the twentieth century, maneuvering among European great powers—France, Germany, Great Britain, and Russia—and the Asian upstart Japan, as well as China, the object and playing field of the imperialists’ contest. Theodore Roosevelt was the president most closely associated with this foreign-policy activism during his term in office from 1901 to 1909. An unabashed imperialist, he was also an astute student of global politics, “approach[ing] the global balance of power with a sophistication matched by no other American president,” as Henry Kissinger once noted.4 He understood that as America took its place among the great powers, it could no longer be indifferent to the balance of power in Europe, the center of global power, or in the Far East, a region of tremendous potential power. He recognized further that the European powers’ struggle for influence and control in the Far East would affect the balance back in Europe. To protect its interests in these interlocking contests at the opposite ends of Eurasia, the United States had no choice but to engage in shaping that balance, even if—in a bow to American tradition—it would continue to avoid “entangling alliances” and stand apart from the great-power system as such. Although Roosevelt would play a mediating role in the Franco-German crisis over Morocco in 1905 and 1906, he, like most Americans, tended to see the European balance of power as self-regulating, a system to be monitored and exploited but not actively shaped. He consequently devoted more of his energy to the Far East, where the United States was already engaged in stiff competition for markets and concessions. How the United States positioned itself in this contest, he was convinced, (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1998), pp. 131–136; Charles A. Kupchan, Isolationism: A History of America’s Efforts to Shield Itself from the World (Oxford: University Press, 2020), pp. 167–176. 4 Henry Kissinger, Diplomacy (New York: Simon & Schuster, 1994), p. 41.

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would have far-reaching ramifications for America’s own security and prosperity.5 Roosevelt’s views on the global and more narrowly the Asian situation were influenced by two of his friends, Brooks Adams, a scion of a legendary American political family,6 and Alfred Thayer Mahan, the country’s preeminent naval historian and among its most influential strategic thinkers. Each published a collection of essays in 1900—Adams, America’s Economic Supremacy and Mahan, The Problem of Asia—that were to shape Roosevelt’s thinking as president. Both underscored the growing role of Asia in global affairs, and both voiced deep concerns about Russian expansionism. Adams made a powerful case for a more active US role in China. Europe, he believed, was rapidly depleting its natural resources; its search for new sources would lead to northern China, which had an abundance of them. At the same time, Russia, with an insatiable need for foreign capital to fuel its industrialization, was in search of a resource-rich territory it could mortgage to foreign powers. Northern China was an obvious target. Those circumstances combined to pose a challenge to the United States, “for the United States could hardly contemplate with equanimity the successful organization of a hostile industrial system on the shores of the Pacific, based on Chinese labour, nourished by European capital, and supplied by the inexhaustible resources of the valley of the Ho-Hang-Ho [Yellow River].” Since Great Britain, in Adams’ estimation, was in decline, the only country in a position to oppose Russia, or possibly both Russia and Germany, in northern China was the United States.7 Russian expansion alarmed Mahan as well. He saw the Russian empire as the quintessential land power in search of the benefits of maritime trade; that drove it “to acquire, by possession or by control, the usufruct of other and extensive maritime regions, the returns from which

5 See Ibid., pp. 253–255. 6 For a much overstated argument that Adams exercised an outsized influence on

Roosevelt’s thinking, and therefore U.S. policy in the Far East, see William Appleman Williams, American-Russian Relations 1781–1947 (New York: Octagon Books, 1971), pp. 30–47. 7 Brooks Adams, America’s Economic Supremacy (n.p.: Origami Books, 2019), pp. 114–129. The quotation is on p. 116.

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shall redound to the general prosperity of the entire empire.”8 That quest brought it into relentless conflict with Great Britain, the leading maritime power, for control of what Mahan called “the debatable and debated ground,” roughly the territory in Asia lying between the thirtieth and fortieth parallels of latitude, stretching from the Levant through Afghanistan to the Yangtze River Valley in China.9 While Mahan noted that Russia had a promising route to the sea in the West either through Persia to the Persian Gulf or through the Levant to the Mediterranean, he was particularly worried about the promising route he saw in the East through Manchuria to China’s Pacific seaboard. A dominant Russian presence there would threaten not only American trade with China but also American activities in the Pacific. The United States thus had a vital interest in working with Great Britain to counter Russian expansion and thereby preserve the balance of power in the Far East. With that argument, Mahan became one of the first strategic thinkers to identify the emergence of a rival hegemonic power within continental Asia as strategic threat to American interests in the Asia-Pacific.10 Mahan’s call for a more robust American presence in the Far East had one further element that echoes in more recent US policy toward the region. He was convinced that China would eventually emerge as a significant power, much as Japan had after the Meiji Restoration in 1868. In his view, it was critical that China be integrated into Western civilization before it became strong—or that it become a “responsible stakeholder” in the global system, as American policymakers would argue in the 2000s. Otherwise, it would pose a major challenge (as it does today). China’s eventual rise also provided another reason for the United States to oppose Russia in the Far East; in Mahan’s view, America’s interest lay squarely in its, not despotic Russia’s, introducing China to Western civilization. Before he assumed the presidency, Roosevelt did not share Adams’s and Mahan’s aversion to Russia. He was not especially hostile toward

8 Alfred Thayer Mahan, Problem of Asia: Its Effect upon InterThenational Politics (New Brunswick: Transaction Publishers, 2003), pp. 76–77. 9 Ibid., pp. 66–67. 10 Ibid., pp. 38–86. See also Michael J. Green, By More Than Providence: Grand

Strategy and American Power in the Asia Pacific Since 1783 (New York: Columbia University Press, 2019), pp. 79–65.

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Russia or its expansion in China. Indeed, contrary to Mahan, he was comfortable with Russia’s acting as a civilizing influence there.11 By the time he became president, however, the situation had changed, and Roosevelt quickly came to share Adams’s and Mahan’s fears about Russian designs in the Far East. The United States found itself locked in an ever tenser competition with Russia (and Japan) in northern China. Russia was building a railroad across Manchuria. It was dragging its feet on withdrawing its troops from the region, as it had agreed to do after the suppression of the Boxer Rebellion. It was violating the US. Open Door policy, which it had formally accepted, that supported American commercial interests by promoting China’s territorial integrity and precluding the creation of exclusive spheres of interests. Fears were rising that Russia would ultimately annex Manchuria.12 In good realpolitik fashion, Roosevelt hoped to exploit Russo-Japanese antagonisms to advance the US position. Because he considered Russia to be the stronger power, he welcomed steps that strengthened Japan to create an equilibrium that favored American interests. Accordingly, when war broke out between these two powers in 1904, Roosevelt was proJapanese, as was American public opinion, even though the United States formally remained neutral. The war, he cynically hoped, would weaken Russia and bolster Japan, creating the balance he sought while draining both countries militarily and financially so that they would pose lesser threats to American interests in the region.13 Roosevelt’s tilt—but not his ultimate goal—shifted, as the Japanese humiliated the Russians on land and at sea. Fearing that Japan would drive Russia from Manchuria, the president launched a vigorous effort to mediate the conflict, which ultimately bore fruit with the Treaty of Portsmouth in 1905. The settlement, negotiated under Roosevelt’s watchful eyes, ratified a major Japanese role in Manchuria but one balanced by a continued Russian presence. Meanwhile, the revolution

11 See Howard K. Beale, Theodore Roosevelt and the Rise of America to World Power

(Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins University Press, 1956), pp. 260–263. 12 See Norman E. Saul, Concord and Conflict: The United States and Russia 1867– 1914 (Lawrence, KS: University Press of Kansas, 1996), pp. 467–474. 13 See Edward H. Zabriskie, American-Russian Rivalry in the Far East: A Study in Diplomacy and Power Politics 1895–1914 (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1946), pp. 101–108; Beale, pp. 268–271.

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had erupted in Russia, and Japan was financially exhausted. Roosevelt had seemingly achieved his goal.14 Through his actions during the Russo-Japanese War, the Moroccan crisis, and other events, Theodore Roosevelt took the first steps toward the elaboration of an American grand strategy toward Eurasia, laying down principles that were to guide American policy later in the century. Most important was his conviction that the United States had a vital interest in preserving a balance of power in both Europe and the Far East—that is, the preventing the rise of a hostile hegemon in either region—and an obligation to intervene when that balance was at risk. He sought to accomplish that in his relations with Russia and Japan in the Far East and in the crisis between France and Germany over Morocco. He also reinforced the view that the United States had an abiding interest in preserving China’s independence and territorial integrity. That would ease the creation of an Asian equilibrium favorable to the United States and keep open opportunities for American trade and investment, as long as China itself was not controlled by a hostile regime. Roosevelt’s experience also foretold the challenges the United States would face in shaping a beneficial balance of power amidst the shifting fortunes of the great powers and their reassessments of their interests. Contrary to his design, Russia and Japan patched up their differences after the Russo-Japanese War and combined efforts to limit the American presence in Manchuria. Not Russia, Roosevelt’s nemesis, but Japan was to rise as America’s main challenger in the Far East and Pacific in the decades leading up to the Second World War. More consequential, the European balance of power proved not to be self-regulating, as German power and ambitions—and, following its defeat in the First World War and the punitive Treaty of Versailles, resentment—grew in the decades after Roosevelt left office.15

14 For detailed descriptions of Roosevelt’s mediation effort, see Zabriskie, pp. 113–130; Beale, pp. 268–314. On Roosevelt’s Far Eastern policy, see John Lewis Gaddis, Russia, the Soviet Union, and the United States: An Interpretative History (New York: John Wiley and Sons, Inc., 1978), pp. 32–41. 15 See Green, pp. 96–102.

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America Repudiates Isolationism: Confronting Germany and Japan After Roosevelt’s burst of activism, America’s isolationist tradition quickly reasserted itself. The short, victorious participation in the First World War did nothing to change America’s mood. Congressional and public resistance easily overwhelmed President Woodrow Wilson’s attempt to institutionalize America’s global geopolitical engagement as a leading member of the League of Nations. The next upsurge of intellectual and policy focus on Eurasia would have to await the gathering clouds of global conflict in the late 1930s. The burgeoning aggression of Nazi Germany and Imperial Japan in Europe and the Far East, respectively, posed a threat to the United States unprecedented in American history at the time. To be sure, the German threat to the European balance of power system was not particularly new. Similar challenges had arisen twice before in the American experience, during the Napoleonic Wars, when the fledgling American republic was in no position to intervene decisively, and during the First World War, when it did to shift the scales against Imperial Germany, This time, however, the challenge in Europe coincided with a growing menace in the Far East, as Japan seized the Chinese Pacific coast and threatened to drive Great Britain from the region. To make matters worse, the threats in Europe and the Far East were linked with the signing of the Tripartite Pact in September 1940, a military alliance of Germany, Italy, and Japan. For the first time, the United States faced a direct threat from a coalition of foes that could draw on the most productive regions of the Eurasian supercontinent.16 Two other factors only amplified the geopolitical danger. First, the Eurasian enemies were all bellicose totalitarian states determined to put an end to liberal democratic societies. Ideology thus lay at the center of the conflict, transforming a geostrategic contest into an existential struggle. Second, the technology of warfare had taken on a more alarming character. Weapons systems had grown more destructive over a longer range, and non-military means—subversion, economic sanctions, disinformation, revolutionary propaganda—took on ever greater roles in the 16 For a contemporary assessment of the changing nature of the threat to the United States, see Edward Mead Earle, “The Threat to American Security,” Yale Review XXX (Spring 1941), pp. 470–480.

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contest, creating an earlier version of what we now call hybrid warfare, which knew no geographical barriers.17 The two vast oceans, the Atlantic and the Pacific, no longer provided the great measure of security to North America that they once did. In these circumstances, the Western Hemispheric fortress the United States had built since its founding now suddenly appeared vulnerable. Continental defense was no longer adequate to America’s security needs. Its burgeoning power, expanding foreign trade and investment, and support for democracy required the United States to intervene earlier and more actively in Europe and in the Far East to defeat not only geopolitical but also ideological threats. Such was the logic pressed by a new breed of American strategists against a reluctant American establishment and public.18 President Franklin Roosevelt accepted this logic. After his reelection in 1936, it fell to him to prepare the country for war, in part by persuading Congress—which passed three Neutrality Acts between 1935 and 1937— as well as the American public that isolationism was no longer realistic. This was a formidable challenge, especially with regard to war in Europe. As late as July 1941, Gallup polls suggested that that nearly four-fifths of Americans believed the United States should stay out of the war against Germany and Italy—the horrors of trench warfare during the First World War cast a long shadow.19 The majority was nevertheless comfortable with acts short of war, such as providing aid to the British and the US navy’s shooting at German submarines and warships on sight; furthermore, nearly 70 per cent thought Britain would defeat Germany without Americas’s entry into the war.20 By contrast, the American public was 17 Ibid., pp. 454–464; Robert Endicott Osgood, Ideals and Self-Interest in America’s

Foreign Relations: The Great Transformation of the Twentieth Century (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1953), pp. 400–402. 18 Ibid., pp. 391–397. 19 The poll was conducted between June 26 and July 1, 1941. See Dr. George H.

Gallup, The Gallup Poll: Public Opinion 1935–1971, Vol. 1: 1935–1946 (New York: Random House, 1972), p. 290, available at http://www.ibiblio.org/pha/Gallup/Gallup. pdf. 20 The poll on whether to aid Britain was conducted between June 26 and July 1, 1941. The one on which side would win the war was conducted between August 21 and 26, 1941. The one on shooting German submarines and warships on sight was conducted between September 19 and 24, 1941. In a separate poll conducted between September 19 and 24, 1941, when asked whether it was more important to stay out of the war or

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more willing to risk war with Japan. Asked in September 1941 whether the United States should take steps to prevent Japan from becoming more powerful, even at the risk of war, 70 percent was willing to do so.21 This discrepancy arose perhaps because the United States had played an active diplomatic and military role in the Pacific since 1900, and American possessions, notably the Philippines, were under direct Japanese threat. Roosevelt began his campaign with his so-called Quarantine Speech of October 1937, delivered after the formation of the Berlin-Rome Axis in 1936 and the renewal of Japanese aggression in China. “There is a solidarity and interdependence about the modern world, both technically and morally,” he warned, “which makes it impossible for any nation completely to isolate itself from economic and political upheavals in the rest of the world, especially when such upheavals appear to be spreading and not declining.” Without going into detail, he suggested that it might become necessary to quarantine those few nations that were threatening “a breakdown of all international order and law.” “We are determined to keep out of war,” he added, “yet we cannot insure ourselves against the disastrous effects of war and the dangers of involvement.”22 The Munich Agreement of September 1938 convinced Roosevelt that the United States had to come to the defense of the West European democracies, and he accelerated the pace toward war. In his January 1939 State of the Union address, he declared that the time had come to prepare to defend America, for “survival cannot be guaranteed by arming after the attack begins—for there is a new range and speed to offense.” He argued that neutrality, often in an unintended way, might “actually give aid to an aggressor and deny it to the victim. The instinct of self-preservation should warn us that we ought not to let that happen any more.”23 In November, he persuaded Congress to pass a Neutrality Act that allowed belligerents to buy American arms and ammunition on a cash-and-carry basis, that is, they had to pay in cash and transport the purchased goods

defeat Germany, 70 percent chose defeat Germany. See Ibid., pp. 290, 297, 299, and 300, respectively. 21 The poll was conducted between September 21 and 26, 1941. See Ibid., p. 296. 22 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, Quarantine Speech (October 5, 1937), available

at https://web.archive.org/web/20120509132052millercenter.org/president/speeches/ detail/3310. 23 Franklin Delano Roosevelt, State of the Union (January 4, 1939), available at http:// www.let.rug.nl/usa/presidents/franklin-delano-roosevelt/state-of-the-union-1939.php.

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on their own or neutral vessels. Since the British Navy controlled the Atlantic, the Act was, as Roosevelt intended, an effort to help arm Great Britain against Germany. In December 1940, after the fall of France warned of a possible total collapse of the balance of power in Europe, Roosevelt proposed lending war supplies to Great Britain and other nations fighting Germany. His initiative was subsequently codified in the Lend-Lease Act of March 1941. In August, Roosevelt and Churchill issued the Atlantic Charter of principles for world order after the defeat of Nazi Germany, and shortly thereafter Roosevelt empowered the U.S. Navy to sink German and Italian submarines operating in the Atlantic.24 Meanwhile, Roosevelt was acting against Japan in the Far East, abrogating the bilateral commercial treaty, embargoing the sale of oil to Japan, and building up US naval forces in the Pacific, but not nearly with the same focus and energy he devoted to Europe, where he rightly saw the by far graver threat.25 How quickly Roosevelt would have succeeded in bringing his country into the war as an active belligerent absent the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor on December 7, 1941, and the ensuing German declaration of war on the United States, is an open question. But once attacked, the United States responded with an unprecedented and overwhelming effort, in alliance with Great Britain and the Soviet Union, to compel the enemy powers to surrender unconditionally.26 Although it took nearly four years, the outcome was never really in doubt given the combined power of the Grand Alliance, led by Great Britain, the Soviet Union, and the United States. While the British wanted to restore the balance of power in Europe at the end of the war as the most reliable guarantee of its security and the Soviets sought preeminence on the continent for the same reason, the Americans—and Roosevelt first of all—set great store in the creation of a world organization that would secure and preserve peace and promote international law, not only in Europe but also in the Far East and elsewhere. In other words, for Roosevelt, the solution to the problem of 24 For an analysis of Roosevelt’s steps toward war, see Kissinger, pp. 369–393. For an argument that Roosevelt was more reluctant to take the United States to war than Kissinger indicates, see Kupchan, pp. 280–286. 25 See Green, pp. 175–182. 26 See the statement on the Casablanca Conference issued on February 12, 1943,

available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/wwii/casablan.asp.

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hostile hegemonic powers in Europe and the Far East—and thus the reliable guarantee of American security—was not the reconstruction of a stable balance of power. Rather, it lay in overcoming the balance-ofpower system as such in favor of a law-based world organization, in which the United States would occupy a prominent role, along with a very few other (friendly) powers. Gaining the final Soviet agreement to the establishment of the United Nations at the Yalta Conference in February 1945 was one of Roosevelt’s great achievements, in his own estimation. He did not live long enough— he died shortly before the end of the war—to see how quickly his effort to end the balance-of-power system only led to the creation of an even larger, all-encompassing one on a global scale, in which the primary struggle would be for control of Europe.

America Leads: Containing Russia A few short months after the end of the war, Roosevelt’s vision crashed against the harsh reality of Soviet suspicion, hostility, and brutal conduct. Moscow imposed its political and socio-economic system on the Eastern European states it occupied; it fueled civil war in Greece and threatened Turkey; it lingered in its zone of occupation in northern Iran; and it penetrated Xinjiang and Manchuria.27 The mounting pressure to confront Moscow under Roosevelt’s successor, Harry Truman, was crystalized in February 1946 by George Kennan’s “Long Telegram” from the US embassy in Moscow analyzing the sources of Soviet conduct and the character of the Soviet threat. In Kennan’s telling, Soviet behavior emerged out of a particularly toxic witches’ brew of Marxist ideology and historical Russian insecurities that led the Kremlin “to seek security only

27 See, for example, “George Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’,” February 22, 1946, History and Public Policy Program Digital Archive, National Archives and Records Administration, Department of State Records (Record Group 59), Central Decimal File, 1945–1949, 861.00/2–2246; reprinted in U.S. Department of State, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, Volume VI, Eastern Europe; The Soviet Union (Washington, DC: United States Government Printing Office, 1969), pp. 696–709. http://digitalar chive.wilsoncenter.org/document/116178; H. Freeman Matthews, Memorandum by the Acting Department of State Member (Matthews) to the State–War–Navy Coordinating Committee, April 1, 1946, in U.S. Department of State, ed., Foreign Relations of the United States, 1946, General; the United Nations, Volume I (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 1972), Doc. 591.

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in patient but deadly struggle for total destruction of rival power, never in compacts and compromises with it.” Peaceful coexistence was consequently impossible and negotiations problematical.28 Although it had not been his intention, Kennan had laid the intellectual foundations for the policy of containment, which the United States would pursue in one form or another until the end of the Cold War. Containment was designed to meet the new conditions the United States faced in Eurasia with the emergence of the Soviet Union as the primary threat. The goal remained largely the same: to prevent hostile powers from dominating Europe and the Far East. With British power now in decline, protecting the Middle East, a critical source of energy and the transit corridor linking Europe and the Far East, from domination by hostile powers became an added requirement. But the threat no longer emerged from within the regions themselves, as it had during the Second World War. Rather, it emanated from the very center of Eurasia, from the region that the geopolitician Halford Mackinder had identified a half century earlier as the strategic “heartland,” control of which in his view would lead to domination of all of Eurasia and ultimately the world.29 That circumstance gave the Soviet threat a different, more troubling dimension that the recent combined German-Japanese challenge had lacked: It was much less susceptible to the direct application of American military power, especially if the United States lacked footholds on the Eurasian landmass. Although it is difficult to ascertain how much influence Mackinder exercised on American policymakers, his geopolitical observations did infuse much of the debate in the United States at the time, and American policymaking bore echoes of his thinking. American officials accepted the reality that the Soviet Union could not be subdued militarily because of its geographical location. In his Long Telegram, Kennan called consideration of intervention against the Soviet Union “sheerest nonsense.” Another State Department official took as axiomatic America’s “military ineffectiveness within the land masses of Eurasia.”30 Similarly, American officials were clear that the resources of Eurasia far outweighed those available to

28 See “George Kennan’s ‘Long Telegram’.” 29 H.J. Mackinder, “The Geopolitical Pivot of History,” The Geographical Journal

23/4 (April 1904), pp. 421–437. 30 Matthews.

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the United States in the Western Hemisphere. There was then no alternative to blocking Soviet expansion in Eurasia, and doing that would require the United States to gain and retain a foothold in Europe and the Far East. In short, the United States had little choice but to abandon its traditional commitment to neutrality. But first, President Truman had to overcome the still powerful domestic isolationist impulse, which had vigorously reasserted itself with the end of the Second World War. The moment came early in 1947 when London informed Washington that it could no longer provide financial support to Greece and Turkey, two strategically located countries under communist pressure. In an address to a joint session of Congress, Truman laid out the case for coming to their aid, presenting the situation as a struggle between free peoples and totalitarian aggression. A failure to act, Truman warned, would be a blow to the United States’ own security. In what came to be known as the Truman Doctrine, he stated that “it must be the policy of the United States to support free peoples who are resisting attempted subjugation by armed minorities or by outside pressures”—an ideological justification, it should be noted, for tackling what was essentially a geopolitical problem. To ease concerns about military engagement for a country weary of war, he stressed that the help should be primarily in the form of economic and financial aid.31 After considerable debate, both houses of Congress accepted Truman’s logic in overwhelming votes, putting an end to America’s isolationist tradition and opening up an era of intense global engagement and leadership.32 There followed a set of policies designed to block the Soviet Union’s advance, first in Europe, but eventually in the Middle East and the Far East, that is, all along the Soviet Union’s periphery. In 1947, shortly after Truman’s address, Secretary of State George Marshall announced what came to be called the Marshall Plan to promote Europe’s economic recovery, in part by fostering greater integration among European states. NATO followed in 1949, underscoring the American commitment to the defense of Western Europe. In the early 1950s, the United States 31 See President Harry S. Truman’s Address before a Joint Session of Congress, March 12, 1947, available at https://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/trudoc.asp. 32 On the making of the Truman Doctrine, see Robert B. Zoellick, America in the World: A History of U.S. Diplomacy and Foreign Policy (New York: Twelve, 2020), pp. 260–265.

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undertook further defense commitments with the creation of the Central Treaty Organization (CENTO) in the Middle East, the Southeast Asian Treaty Organization (SEATO), and defense alliances in the Far East with Japan, South Korea, and the Republic of China (Taiwan). In addition, the United States worked on the economic rehabilitation of its recent enemies, Germany and Japan, to diminish their susceptibility to Soviet blandishments and subversion. In all these efforts, the goal was to create self-confident centers of power that could resist Soviet pressure rather than spheres of influence subservient to Washington. The contrast with Soviet conduct was designed to be stark, and the rejection of traditional balance-of-power politics glaring.33 The foundational document for the policy of containment was a directive from April 14, 1950, entitled US Objectives and Programs for National Security—better known as NSC-68. It posited an existential struggle between the United States and the Soviet Union, grounded in “a basic conflict between the idea of freedom under a government of laws, and the idea of slavery under the grim oligarchy of the Kremlin,” which was determined to spread its writ across the globe, starting with the domination of Eurasia. According to NSC-68, essential to the Soviets’ fundamental design was the destruction of the United States’ integrity and vitality. The American task was thus to thwart Soviet ambitions while avoiding nuclear war, and that required the United States to lead what was then called the free world. “The frustration of the Kremlin design,” NSC-68 declared, “requires the free world to develop a successfully functioning political and economic system and a vigorous political offensive against the Soviet Union. These, in turn, require an adequate military shield under which they can develop. It is necessary to have the military power to deter, if possible, Soviet expansion, and to defeat, if necessary, aggressive Soviet or Soviet-directed actions of a limited or total character.”34

33 John Lewis Gaddis, Strategies of Containment: A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War, revised and expanded edition (Oxford: University Press, 2005), pp. 56–64. 34 “NSC-68, A Report to the National Security Council by the Executive Committee on United States Objectives and Programs for National Security, April 14, 1950,” Naval War College Review 28 /3 pp. 51–108. Available at: https://digital-commons.usnwc. edu/nwc-review/vol28/iss3/1. The quotations are on pages 56 and 98, respectively.

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As Henry Kissinger has noted, Americans took what the Soviets would have seen as a geostrategic struggle and transformed it into a struggle between two ways of life. “The Truman Doctrine,” he wrote, “marked a watershed because, once America had thrown down the gauntlet, the kind of Realpolitik Stalin understood best would be forever at an end, and bargaining over reciprocal concessions would be out of the question. Henceforth, the conflict could be settled by a change in Soviet purposes, by the collapse of the Soviet system, or both.”35 NSC-68 transformed this posture into formal policy. After Stalin’s death, the Soviets themselves adopted the American framing, combining geopolitical and ideological motives and goals in their policies and at times favoring Marxist–Leninist appeals over national interest, contrary to Stalin’s predilections. The Cold War promised to be long, bitter, and extremely dangerous. Although the United States fought two land wars in Asia, in Korea and Vietnam, and the communist victory in China in 1949 sent shockwaves through the American establishment, Europe was the main battlefield of the Cold War. Hundreds of thousands of heavily armed troops on hair-trigger alert faced one another across the front running through the center of Germany. A divided Berlin lay at the center of the struggle, producing crises from the late 1940s into the early 1960s. Soviet suppression of revolts in East Germany, Hungary, and Czechoslovakia periodically raised East-West tensions. Fear of direct confrontation between the Soviet Union and the United States, and their allies, with the risk of escalation to the nuclear level, was ever-present. The most perilous Cold War episode, the Cuban Missile Crisis, which brought the world to the cusp of thermonuclear war, had its origin in a Soviet scheme to redress the strategic balance in Europe. The Middle East and the Far East also presented Washington with numerous challenges, but nothing on the order of those in Europe. Wars in the Middle East erupted primarily for local reasons, and Moscow’s and Washington’s respective clients often proved unreliable, which tempered the contest between the two superpowers. And in the Far East, the rise of Red China, which had initially so alarmed Washington, quickly produced a schism in the international communist movement, accelerating strategic competition between the Soviet Union and China, and eventually erupting in bloody border skirmishes in the late 1960s. The

35 Kissinger, pp. 452–453.

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United States was to adroitly exploit this rift, starting with the policy of detente under President Richard Nixon, to advance its interests vis-a-vis both of the communist giants. Likewise, the war in Vietnam, no matter how devastating to America’s domestic tranquility and self-confidence, never posed the strategic challenge Washington mistakenly perceived. By the middle of the 1970s, the United States had arguably achieved its key strategic goals in Eurasia. It had stabilized the front in Europe with the signing in 1975 of the Helsinki Accords, which still left open the possibility of peaceful changes in borders, a provision critical to German reunification 15 years later. It had driven the Soviet Union out of the Middle East as a major player in the peace process after the Yom Kippur War of 1973. And it had aligned with China against Soviet expansion in Asia after Nixon opened up relations with that country in 1971. At the same time, the United States had also reached arms control agreements with the Soviet Union that reduced the risk of nuclear war. It was a remarkable set of achievements, especially coming as it did at a time when the United States was struggling with a stinging defeat in Vietnam and the domestic political upheaval of Nixon’s Watergate debacle. Yet the obvious success in Eurasia was overshadowed in the American debate by the Soviet offensive in the Third World, especially in Africa and Central America, which was driven more by the ideological need to show that communism was advancing worldwide than by hard-nosed calculations of the Soviet Union’s geopolitical interests. And the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in December 1979, once again more for ideological than good strategic reasons, led to a sharp deterioration in superpower relations and intensified alarm at what was seen in Washington as the escalating Soviet threat even as the Soviets’ domestic travails were rapidly mounting. The Soviet Union, with Cuba’s help, was penetrating ever deeper into the United States’ North American bastion. And with Soviet troops in Afghanistan and the Horn of Africa, and America’s loss of its ally in Iran after the Islamic Revolution, Moscow was taking aim at the Persian Gulf region—or at least so thought Washington,36 although it possessed little hard evidence of a grand Soviet strategic design.37 36 See Zbigniew Brzezinski, Power and Principle: Memoirs of the National Security Adviser 1977–1981 (New York: Farrar, 1983), pp. 426–432. 37 For more extended discussion of the Soviet reasons for intervening militarily, see Raymond L. Garthoff, Detente and Confrontation: American-Soviet Relations from Nixon to Reagan, Revised Edition (Washington, DC: The Brookings Institution, 1994),

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The United States’ immediate response was to declare what became known as the Carter Doctrine, namely, that the United States would regard an attempt by any outside power to gain control of the Persian Gulf region “as an assault on the vital interests of the United States,” which it would be prepared to repel “by any means necessary, including military force.”38 This doctrine made explicit what had been implicit since the beginning of the Cold War: American security was intertwined not only with Western Europe and East Asia, but also with the broader Middle East.39 A more forceful response came after 1981 with the arrival of the Reagan administration, which was intent on rolling back, not simply containing, Soviet power in Eurasia and elsewhere in the world.40 Even with the Soviet Union in retreat under Gorbachev, the administration stressed the vast dimensions of the Soviet threat. The 1987 National Security Strategy spoke of the Soviet Union’s “natural geographic advantage with respect to the countries on the Eurasian rim, and growing capability to launch simultaneous offensives in Europe, Southwest Asia, and the Far East,” while reiterating that preventing “the domination of the Eurasian landmass by the USSR (or any other hostile power, or coalition of powers)” remained a major objective of U.S. foreign policy.41 The administration’s pressure on the Soviet Union was relentless in the Third World and in Eastern Europe; it pressed for internal changes in the Soviet Union itself; and it did all this while engaging the Kremlin productively on arms control and improving the atmosphere surrounding relations. The George H.W. Bush administration that followed continued the same basic approach as the Soviets completed their withdrawal from Afghanistan, retrenched elsewhere in the Third World, and watched the pp. 1023–1046, which is based on a close reading of the declassified official Soviet documents, as well as contemporary Soviet commentary. 38 Jimmy Carter, The State of the Union Address Delivered Before a Joint Session of the Congress. Online by Gerhard Peters and John T. Woolley, The American Presidency Project https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/node/249681. 39 See Brzezinski, Power and Principle, pp. 443–454. 40 See National Security Decision Directive Number 75, “U.S. Relations with the

USSR,” January 17, 1983, available at https://www.cia.gov/library/readingroom/docs/ CIA-RDP10M00666R000300910001-8.pdf. 41 National Security Strategy of the United States (The White House, January 1987), pp. 4 and 28, available at https://history.defense.gov/Portals/70/Documents/nss/nss 1987.pdf?ver=FUZbPLy3ZDfa4UTDpMkNzw%253d%253d.

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people of their East European allies overthrow their communist rulers in 1989. For all practical purposes, the Cold War was over by the end of that year. In the end, it was the ideologically driven offensive in the Third World, beyond Russia’s traditional security concerns along its periphery in Eurasia, that led to imperial overstretch and strained the Soviet economy to the breaking point. Even in Afghanistan, a region of traditional Russian activity, the Soviets advanced beyond their traditional goal of maintaining a buffer zone to an effort to absorb the country into an exclusive sphere of influence—with devastating consequences. Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev’s effort to revitalize the economy, in part by retrenchment abroad, created a momentum of retreat from the Third World which eventually reached into the Soviet Bloc in Europe and then into the Soviet Union itself, ending in the collapse of the country and the emergence of fifteen new states in 1991. In this sense, the Cold War ended on the terms Washington had stipulated at the beginning, in the collapse of the Soviet system, but in a manner that few Americans had anticipated.

America Dominates: Hegemonic Ambitions Upended The end of the Cold War at least temporarily eliminated the threat of a hostile power dominating Eurasia. However, as the 1990 National Security Strategy pointed out, the facts on the ground might have changed, but the geopolitical necessities had not.42 The task for the United States, if it was to sustain its newly acquired global primacy, was therefore to create the conditions that would reduce the risk of a threat of Soviet dimensions from reemerging on the territory of the former Soviet space or elsewhere on the Eurasian supercontinent. In pursuit of that goal, the first three American presidents elected after the end of the Cold War—Bill Clinton, George W. Bush, and Barack Obama—shared four broad objectives: (1) integration of Russia into the Euro-Atlantic Community as a free-market democracy; (2) consolidation of the sovereignty, independence, and territorial integrity of all the former Soviet states; (3) expansion of the key institutions of the Euro-Atlantic Community into Eastern Europe to stabilize the European continent; and (4) arms control measures to maintain the safety and security of the 42 National Security Strategy of the United States (The White House, March 1990), p. 2, available at https://nssarchive.us/wp-content/uploads/2020/04/1990.pdf.

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former Soviet arsenal, reduce the Russian and American nuclear arsenals, and preserve strategic stability, while freeing the United States to deal more vigorously with nuclear threats from other so-called “rogue states.” At the same time, these administrations pursued three additional objectives to reduce threats elsewhere in Eurasia: (1) integration of China into the American-led international order as a “responsible stakeholder,” (2) partnership with India and enhanced relations with East Asian allies, and (3) isolation of Iran. In the first months of their terms in office, Clinton called for a “strategic alliance with Russian reform,” George W. Bush for a “qualitatively new relationship” with Russia, and Obama for a “reset” with the aim of easing Russia’s integration into the Euro-Atlantic Community. All three provided support for political and economic reform. They all welcomed closer Russian interaction with key Euro-Atlantic institutions and with the G-7 of advanced industrial democracies, which was transformed into a G-8 with Russia’s inclusion under Bush. And all three had frequent meetings and phone calls with their Russian counterpart to create at least the appearance of treating Russia as a respected partner. Nevertheless, each president left office with relations with Russia in worse shape than he had found them. Relations stumbled over geopolitical clashes—in the Balkans under Clinton, in the former Soviet space under Bush, and in the Middle East and finally Ukraine under Obama. During his term, each president grew increasingly uncomfortable at what he saw as Russia’s turn toward authoritarian practices, which gave the lie to his rhetoric that US–Russian partnership was grounded in shared democratic values. And each president grew alarmed at Russia’s determination to assert its prerogatives on the global stage, even if they ran counter to American interests. Thus emerged a fundamental gap in American and Russian goals and ambitions. The United States wanted to change Russia (as it had since the early days of the Cold War) so that it could be smoothly integrated as a junior partner in a US-led global order. Russia wanted to restore its power so that it could regain its status as a great power, which lay at the core of Russian identity and national purpose. The tension ultimately led to a near total breakdown with the eruption of the Ukraine crisis in 2014, after which the United States abandoned its effort to integrate Russia into the Euro-Atlantic Community and returned to isolating and containing Russia instead. This outcome was a huge disappointment, but not necessarily a surprise. Indeed, the administrations’ other three Russia-related objectives

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were in many ways designed as hedges against the return of an adversarial US–Russian relationship. Consolidation of the independence, sovereignty, and territorial integrity of the other former Soviet states, for instance, was intended to promote geopolitical pluralism in Eurasia. As Zbigniew Brzezinski, a leading American strategic thinker, explained, “The consolidation of geopolitical pluralism would inhibit the temptation to reinvent the empire, with its pernicious effects on prospects for democracy in Russia. In not being an empire, Russia stands a chance of becoming, like France or Britain or earlier post-Ottoman Turkey, a normal state.43 In line with this reasoning, the United States immediately recognized the newly independent states that emerged with the breakup of the Soviet Union in December 1991 and moved quickly to set up embassies in each one.44 Thereafter. the United States steadfastly refused to legitimate any of the multilateral institutions that Moscow set up to maintain its influence in the former Soviet space, such as the Commonwealth of Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the Eurasian Economic Union. The intensity of America’s relations with individual former Soviet states varied over time as a function of its geopolitical ambitions and the goals of the emerging state. Four—Ukraine, Georgia, Azerbaijan, and Kazakhstan—became focal points of American policy, in part because of the role they could play in curtailing Russian power. A westward leaning independent Ukraine, for example, reduced the risk that Russia could recreate the Slavic core of the Soviet Union, which was the key pillar of its geopolitical heft and influence in world affairs. Georgia and Ukraine together could help constrict Russian options in the strategically important Black Sea region, while Georgia and Azerbaijan could provide the energy resources and transportation corridor circumventing Russian territory to erode Russia’s dominant position in the energy markets of Central East Europe. These two states also provided a corridor into Central Asia free of Russian interference. Finally, Kazakhstan was not only rich in energy resources but strategically located between Russia and China in 43 Zbigniew Brzezinski, “The Premature Partnership,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 1994), available at https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/russian-federation/1994-0301/premature-partnership. 44 See James A. Baker, III, The Politics of Diplomacy: Revolution, War and Peace 1989–1992 (New York: Putnam, 1995), pp. 625–627. See also George Bush and Brent Scowcroft, A World Transformed (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1998), pp. 542–545.

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the Eurasian heartland. A solid American presence there would challenge Russia’s position in Central Asia. The United States insisted that its goal was to foster the development of stable, prosperous, democratic states in the former Soviet space, which it argued should only serve Russia’s interest. Moscow was not persuaded. Indeed, after the Rose Revolution in Georgia in 2003 and the Orange Revolution in Ukraine in 2004, both with anti-Russian undertones, it came to the conclusion that US democracy promotion was little more than a smokescreen to conceal a concerted American effort to advance its geopolitical goals at Russia’s expense in its strategic backyard. Thereafter, clashes over former Soviet states were to poison the entire US–Russian relationship. In Europe, the American goal was the same—to limit Russia’s strategic options. But the method was the opposite—rather than foster geopolitical pluralism, the United States sought to consolidate Europe through the expansion of the two core Western-dominated institutions, NATO and the European Union, eastward into former Soviet Bloc countries and ultimately into the former Soviet space itself. As with its policies toward the former Soviet space, Washington assured the Kremlin that NATO expansion would be good for Russia. It would extend the zone of political stability into Central Europe, a senior U.S. official wrote in 1995, and that should be a welcomed development for Russia, which “twice in [the 20th] century … ha[d] suffered greatly because of that region’s instability.” To be sure, the official frankly acknowledged Russian suspicions about NATO and admitted that expanding the Alliance was indeed in part intended as a hedge against Russia’s return to its imperialist ways. But he also stressed Washington’s desire to reach “political understanding and arrangements for continuing cooperation and coordination” with Russia. And he left open the possibility of Russian membership in NATO should it continue its path to democracy.45 To ease Russian concerns, before the first round of post-Cold War expansion, NATO negotiated a treaty with Russia to regulate relations. Of particular note, NATO declared its commitment not to deploy nuclear infrastructure, or permanently base substantial combat forces, in new member states. It also created the NATO-Russia Permanent Joint 45 Strobe Talbott, “Why NATO Should Grow,” New York Review of Books (August 10. 1995), available at https://www.nybooks.com/articles/1995/08/10/why-nato-sho uld-grow/.

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Council, reconstituted as the NATO-Russia Council in 2002, to give Russia greater insight into the Alliance’s goals and operations, as well as to consider joint actions on a limited, but expandable range of issues.46 The Council, however, never reached its full potential because of growing suspicions between the two sides. Russia’s use of force against Georgia in 2008 and Ukraine in 2014 to demonstrate in part its fierce opposition to any move to bring those two states into NATO ultimately raised tensions to the breaking point. In 2014, NATO suspended all practical cooperation with Russia.47 Finally, with nuclear arms control measures, the United States sought to consolidate the former Soviet arsenal under Russian control, while enhancing the safety and security of Russia’s nuclear infrastructure and preserving strategic stability. Shortly after the breakup of the Soviet Union, the United States launched the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) Program to provide assistance to Russia in securing its nuclear weapons and other assets. The Clinton administration then played an active role in ensuring that Ukraine would dismantle the Soviet nuclear assets it had inherited and send the weapons themselves back to Russia for disposal. The George W. Bush and Obama administrations subsequently negotiated arms reductions treaties with Russia to limit the size of their nuclear arsenals out to early 2021. But over Russia’s objections, Bush also withdrew from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty so that the United States could build missile defense systems against “rogue states,” such as North Korea or Iran. Russia has never accepted that explanation, however, seeing US missile defense rather as a threat to its nuclear deterrent and part of a larger US effort to gain strategic superiority. While Russia was initially the primary focus of US efforts to prevent the domination of Eurasia by a hostile power, China’s rapid rise in the post-Cold War era eventually captured Washington’s attention as an emerging strategic challenge. During the George W. Bush administration, the United States made its first concerted effort to manage this problem, and its approach was not dissimilar to the approach it had taken toward Russia; that is, the goal was to integrate China further into the US-led 46 See Founding Act on Mutual Relations, Cooperation and Security between NATO and the Russian Federation signed in Paris, France, May 27, 1997, available at https:// www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/official_texts_25468.htm. 47 See the brief description of the NATO-Russia Council on the NATO website, available at https://www.nato.int/cps/en/natohq/topics_50091.htm.

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liberal international order as a “responsible stakeholder.” A China more transparent about its security ambitions, less mercantilist in its economic policy, more democratic in its politics, and more willing to cooperate with the United States in dealing with common challenges, such as North Korea, could “work with [the United States] to sustain the international system that has enabled its success,” as a senior U.S. official put it.48 Rhetorically, this goal did not change as the Obama administration advocated a pivot to Asia.49 But the administration’s desire to build up the US military presence in the Indo-Pacific region and its effort to revitalize US alliances and strengthen trilateral cooperation with Japan and Australia belied a deepening concern about the direction of China’s development. In this vein, Obama advocated for a Trans-Pacific Partnership so that the United States, not China, would write the rules for economic interaction among the countries of the rapidly integrating Asia-Pacific economic zone.50 The George W. Bush administration’s decisions to move beyond estrangement to a strategic partnership with India was part of the effort to manage China’s rise. In 2001 the United States lifted sanctions levied in response to India’s earlier nuclear tests, and in 2005 the two countries concluded a landmark civil nuclear cooperation. Since then, defense and intelligence cooperation has accelerated, as concerns about China mounted in both countries.51 More recently, the two countries have joined Japan and Australia in a quadrilateral security dialogue focused on the Indo-Pacific region and meeting the security and economic challenge posed by China. The final piece of the Eurasian puzzle was Iran. Since the Islamic Revolution of 1979, US relations with Iran have been profoundly adversarial, 48 Robert Zoellick, “Whither China? From Membership to Responsibility,” Remarks to the National Committee on U.S.-China Relations, New York City, September 21, 2005, available at https://2001-2009.state.gov/s/d/former/zoellick/rem/53682.htm. See also Green, pp. 496–498. 49 See Hillary Clinton, “America’s Pacific Century,” Foreign Policy (October 11, 2011), available at https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/10/11/americas-pacific-century/. 50 Barack Obama, “President Obama; The TPP would let America, not China, lead the way on global trade,” The Washington Post (May 2, 2016), available at https://www.was hingtonpost.com/opinions/president-obama-the-tpp-would-let-america-not-china-leadthe-way-on-global-trade/2016/05/02/680540e4-0fd0-11e6-93ae-50921721165d_story. html. 51 See Green, pp. 498–500.

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and the thrust of US policy has been to contain Iranian ambitions in the Persian Gulf region and beyond. It has worked closely with Israel and its Arab partners to thwart Iranian ambitions on the Arabian Peninsula and in the Levant. Israel and its European allies have been the main partners in the effort to curtail the operations of Iranian-supported terrorist organization, starting with Hezbollah. Meanwhile, the United States has worked closely with Russia, key European states, and eventually China to contain Iran’s nuclear ambitions. Together, they negotiated the Joint Comprehensive Program of Action, which proved effective in limiting Iran’s nuclear ambitions until the United States withdrew under President Donald Trump in 2018. Some thirty years since the end of the Cold War, this comprehensive US Eurasia strategy has failed to achieve its grandest ambition of firmly anchoring American primacy on the supercontinent. The reasons are many. Most important, Russia and China have rebuffed efforts to integrate them into an international framework designed and led by the United States. Their resistance to US blandishments and pressure has mounted rapidly in the last 10 to 15 years, as Russia recovered from a profound crisis of the first post-Soviet decade and China continued its remarkable, unprecedented economic expansion. But American missteps also took their toll. The misguided wars in Afghanistan and Iraq under George W. Bush tarnished America’s reputation as a world power. The global financial crisis of 2008/2009—the result, in part, of deregulatory policies developed and pressed most eagerly in the United States—undermined confidence in the American economic system. More recently, despite not actually deviating radically from the United States’ Eurasian strategy, President Trump’s nationalist rhetoric, erratic leadership, and public disrespect of allies have only produced graver doubts throughout the world about America’s global role. Nevertheless, there is little danger of a hostile power or coalition of powers dominating the strategically important regions of Eurasia— Europe, the Middle East, and East Asia—at least for now. Russia’s sway over the former Soviet space has been constrained. Europe has been consolidated and remains America’s closest ally despite the contretemps of the Trump era. Iran has been largely contained in the Middle East. And China, while its power continues to grow, has met increasing resistance to its ambitions from Japan, India, Australia, and others in the IndoPacific region. To what extent these developments were the outcome of

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American design or of geopolitical and economic trends beyond America’s control is an open question. But surely American policy played some role, especially in the early post–Cold War world in laying out a broad framework for Eurasian developments.

America Ponders: A New Eurasian Order? The current arrangements in Eurasia are hardly fixed. The world has entered a period of tremendous flux. Great-power competition has returned for an extended period, nowhere more robustly than in Eurasia. And the challenge to the United States in Eurasia has taken on a new character. During the twentieth century, the aspiring hostile hegemon in Eurasia was a European power, first Germany and then Russia, and Europe was the main theater of contention. The Far East was always a factor, but a secondary one—East Asia simply paled in comparison to Europe in industrial might, economic value, military capabilities, and dynamic powers. That situation is rapidly reversing as the center of global dynamism shifts to the Asia–Pacific region, and China rapidly emerges a peer strategic competitor for the United States. What this development will mean for the equilibrium in Eurasia remains to be seen. China is seeking to replace the United States as the dominant power in the Western Pacific. In part through its expansive Beltand-Road Initiative, it is extending its sway throughout the Indo-Pacific and into Central Asia, the Middle East, and Europe—to say nothing of non-Eurasian regions like Africa. And it is vigorously competing with the United States in high-tech industries and over the power to set the standards that will guide future socio-economic developments across Eurasia, and indeed throughout the world. It would appear unlikely that China can dominate Eurasia, or even East Asia for that matter. Power is diffusing, and countries are increasingly jealous of their sovereignty and independence. That is good news for the United States. But the United States has more than just an interest in preventing the rise of a hostile hegemon in Eurasia. It also has an interest in the creation of a stable equilibrium that affords it the possibility of productive interaction with the rich markets of the supercontinent. For that to come about, the United States will have to engage, but perhaps not in the way it has since the late 1930s. It no longer has the capacity to be the leader—and it is clear that powerful countries to

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do want it to be the leader—and it cannot impose its values. Instead of eschewing balance-of-power politics in favor of a US-led world order, the United States is going to have to become a deft manipulator of the balance of power and learn how to coexist in a world of diverse value systems. Geostrategic calculation needs to take precedence over ideological preferences. Whether the United States can make that adjustment in its approach to Eurasia will be one of the major dramas of the next decade and beyond.