The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy In Korea, 1941-1950 0824809734, 9780824809737

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The Reluctant Crusade

A Study from the Center for Korean Studies University o f Hawaii

The Reluctant Crusade AMERICAN FOREIGN POLICY IN KOREA, 1941-1950

James Irving Matray

UNIVERSITY O F HAWAII PRESS H o n o lu lu

© 19 8 s UNIVERSITY O F HAWAII PRESS ALL RIGHTS RESERVED MANUFACTURED IN THE UNTIED STATES O F AMERICA

Library o f Congress Cataloging in Publication Data Matray, James Irving, 1948The reluctant crusade. Bibliography: p. Includes index. 1. United Sates—Foreign relations—Korea. 2. Korea— Foreign relations—United Sates. 3. United Sates— Foreign relations— 1933-1945. 4. United States—Foreign relations— 1945-1953. 5. Korea (South)—Politics and government—1945-1948. 6. Korea (South)—Politics and government— 1948-1960. I. Tide. E183.8.K7M28 1985 327.730519 85-1079 ISBN 0-8248-0973-4

We acknowledge with thanks permission from the publishers to reprint portions of this book that appeared in D iplom atic H istory 2 (Spring 1978): 181-196 (Scholarly Resources, Inc.); Pacific H istoricalReview (Pacific Coast Branch o f the American His­ torical Association); and The Historian (Phi Alpha T h ea International Honor Soci­ ety in History).

To Karin

The activities o f the U.N. in Korea have been described as “the reluctant crusade.". . . Korea’s significance is not the fin a l crusade. It is not finally making valid the idea o f collective security. . . . In Korea the Russians presented a check which was drawn on the bank account o f collective security. The Rus­ sians thought the check would bounce. They thought it was a bad check. But to their great surprise, the teller paid it. The important thing was that the check was paid. The importance w ill be nothing i f the next check is not paid and i f the bank account is not kept strong and sufficient to coverall checks which are drawn upon it. Dean G. Acheson June 29,1951

Contents

Acknowledgments Abbreviations Introduction 1. An Endto Indifference 2. Captive of the Cold War 3. In Search ofa Settlement 4. Patience with Firmness 5. An Avenuefor Escape 6. A House Divided 7. The Dilemma of Withdrawal 8. Test Case of Containment 9. Promise andPerformance 10. Fulfillment of a Commitment Conclusion Notes SelectedBibliography Index

xi x iii 1 5 28 52 75 99 125 151 175 200 226 253 259 319 331

Acknowledgments

Every historian knows th at research and w riting would be impossible without the help o f countless people, especially archivists, colleagues, family, and friends. I was fortunate in th at wherever I traveled to do research, the staff members o f these institutions were not only com­ petent but also uniformly pleasant and eager to provide assistance. In particular, John Taylor, W illiam Cunliffe, and Edward Reese at the Modem Military Branch o f the N ational Archives devoted a great deal of time and energy to removing barriers to an expeditious search for documents. Nancy Bressler at the Princeton University Library kindly granted access to the Dulles papers even though she was involved in reclassifying these materials. A t the M acArthur Memorial Library, Larry Redford’s efficiency ensured th at none o f my lim ited tim e was wasted. I also want to thank num erous unnam ed people at the Library of Congress, the University o f Virginia Library, Clemson U ni­ versity Library, and the Diplom atic Records Division at the N ational Archives. I owe a special debt o f gratitude to the Harry S. Truman Library Institute and its director Benedict Zobrist for awarding me research grants during 1976 and 1982. D uring my three visits to Indepen­ dence, Dennis Bilger assumed primary responsibility for helping m e and spent many hours uncovering and bringing to my attention sig­ nificant documents. His professional skill and warm th are characteris­ tic of the entire staff at the Truman Library, m aking it an outstanding research institution. Also, I am grateful to the College o f Arts and Sciences Research Center at New Mexico State University for its con­ tinuing financial support. This study began in 1974 as a dissertation project under the direc­ tion of Norman A. Graebner at the University o f Virginia. I am deeply indebted to Professor G raebner for his guidance and assistance not only in completing this book but throughout my graduate and

Xll

Acknowledgm ents

subsequent professional career. His sincere concern for my personal progress continues to provide a source of inspiration and a model for emulation. His comments on style and content were invaluable. The late Edward E. ^hunger read parts of the original manuscript and reminded me o f the importance of balance and objectivity in histori­ cal interpretation. More recently, I have had the good fortune to receive encourage­ m ent and advice from George C. Herring o f the University of Ken­ tucky. W ithout Professor Herring’s help, the revised dissertation m ight never have appeared in print. John Lewis Gaddis o f Ohio Uni­ versity provided valuable suggestions for revision and offered rein­ forcement when I needed it most. Michael C. Sandusky’s comments were helpful in the final stages of revision. I also am grateful for per­ mission to use material initially appearing in D iplom atic History, The Pacific H istorical Review, and The Historian. Damaris Kirchhofer deserves credit for excellent editorial advice. My thanks also to the staff at the University of Hawaii Press for their help in preparing the manuscript for publication. Finding inexpensive housing while researching in Washington, D .C ., is difficult at best. Thus I am especially grateful that, while a graduate student, I was able to stay at the home of Tony Lemer and his family. Since 1980, my colleagues here at New Mexico State Uni­ versity, especially Joan M. Jensen and Monroe L. Billington, have helped me in times of frustration. Finally, this book is dedicated to my wife Karin in appreciation for her innumerable sacrifices. W ith­ out Karin’s understanding, encouragement, and unfailing devotion, I never could have completed either a doctoral program or this book. If I am a success, most of the credit ultimately belongs to her.

Abbreviations

AMG DPRK ECA GARIOA JCS KMAG KPG KPR MDAP NSC OSS PKMAG ROK SANACC SKIG SKILA SWNCC UNCOK UNRRA UNTCOK USAHK

American Military Government in Korea Democratic People’s Republic of Korea Economic Cooperation Administration Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas Joint Chiefs of Staff Korean Military Advisory Group Korean Provisional Government Korean People’s Republic Military Defense Appropriations Program National Security Council Office of Strategic Services Provisional Korean Military Advisory Group Republic of Korea State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee South Korean Interim Government South Korean Interim Legislative Assembly State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee United Nations Commission on Korea United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea United States Armed Forces in Korea

The transliteration of Korean names in the text is based on the McCuneReischauer System, except for those widely accepted and familiar spellings such as Syngman Rhee, Kim II Sung, Pyongyang, and Seoul.

Introduction

Just before dawn on June 30, 1950, President Harry S. Truman received an urgent telephone call from Secretary o f the Army Frank Pace. South Korea, Pace explained, could n o t prevent N orth Korea from conquering the entire nation w ithout im m ediate help from American ground troops. In reply, H um an authorized the use o f combat forces to prevent a Com m unist trium ph in the Korean War. That the president would even consider sending American soldiers to fight on this distant Asian peninsula surely would have startled coundess citizens in the U nited States a decade earlier. A lthough American involvement in Asian affairs had increased steadily after the Civil War, the U nited States rarely contem plated the direct appli­ cation o f military power. A n exception was the Philippines, yet even there Washington had begun a retreat from its com m itm ents after World War I. But Jap an ’s attack on Pearl H arbor had inaugurated a process o f change in the way American leaders assessed the role o f the United States in international affairs. Trum an’s com m itm ent o f ground troops in Korea m arked the climax o f a fundam ental transfor­ mation in American foreign policy from restrained involvem ent to global interventionism. Axis aggression convinced m ost American leaders th at th e U nited States could not follow an isolationist foreign policy after World War II without jeopardizing the nation’s security.1 “We cannot withdraw from participation in th e political and economic decisions affecting other parts o f the world,’’ one American official wrote in 1944, “without thereby losing a share in the control o f our own future. We shall either help to stam p our pattem on world affairs or have some­ one else’s pattem im posed on us.’’2 Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe during the last year o f W orld War II seemed to confirm the accuracy of this assessment. Yet the U nited States embraced this new activist approach in foreign affairs only w ith great uncertainty and relue-

i

Introduction

tance. Ultimately, it was the perceived threat of Soviet ideology and power that pushed the United States further from its isolationist past. After 1943, a basic trend in world affairs was Washington’s increasing willingness to assume primary responsibility for maintaining global peace and stability. It was significant, however, that the United States implemented policies for countering the Soviet challenge all of which emphasized the importance of restraint. American involvement in Korean affairs prior to the outbreak of war in 1930 both reflected and played a crucial role in this broad shift in foreign policy. Korea was, admittedly, only a small part of the American vision for postwar global reconstruction during World War II and immediately thereafter. Yet Washington’s response to instabil­ ity in Korea typified its overall approach in Asia following the defeat of Japan. President Franklin D. Roosevelt pledged in the Cairo Dec­ laration o f 1943 that the United States would help supervise the res­ toration of independence and self-government to a nation previously the recipient of scant American attention. A stable Korea presumably would act as an economic and diplomatic partner for the United States in the postwar world. In September 1943, following American military occupation of the southern half of Korea, Washington had an opportunity to implement its plan but experienced difficulties from the outset. N ot only did Korea face the complex task of social, political, and economic readjustment after years of Japanese colonial dom ination, but many Koreans resisted American advice and de­ manded immediate and complete independence.3 Still worse, the Soviet Union had occupied the northern half of the Korean peninsula and American concern over Moscow’s intentions hampered an un­ emotional assessment of Korea’s problems. American negotiations with the Soviet Union for Korea’s reunifica­ tion during 1946 and 1947 failed miserably. Much like Germany, Korea emerged after World War II, in the words of Frank Baldwin, as a “hostage to strategies and ambitions of the cold war’’ rather than a liberated nation.4 Truman's policy in Korea mirrored the pattem established in Eastern Europe, as the United States refused to accept Soviet intransigence but lacked sufficient power to force a settlement on American terms. W ithout an overall plan for dealing with Soviet obstructionism, American foreign policy manifested considerable irresolution during the early years of the Cold War.3But this situation changed significantly with George F. Kennan’s formulation of the containment policy and its subsequent application in Europe during

Introduction

3

1947. At the tim e, Kennan was U.S. chargé d ’affaires in Moscow and considered an expert on the Soviet Union. Kennan’s containm ent strategy had a powerful im pact on the Tru­ man administration because it provided a m ethod for countering the Soviet challenge w ithout requiring an unqualified com m itm ent o f American power. Containm ent prom ised to halt Russian expansion and preserve American security at the relatively low cost o f economic, technical, and military assistance.6 If smaller nations could provide for their own defense with American aid and advice, a positive guar­ antee of military protection would not be necessary. K ennan’s strat­ egy thus would perm it the U nited States to foster international stabil­ ity without necessitating an increase in defense spending or the sacrifice of American lives. More im portant, containm ent promised ultimate victory in the Cold War w ithout requiring a resort to war. Although success would not emerge quickly, Moscow’s defeat would occur eventually in “either the breakup or the gradual mellowing o f Soviet power.’’7 Containment would facilitate as well the realization o f Truman’s goal of national self-determ ination. The Soviet Union, Truman believed, exploited postwar economic distress to foster civil strife th at allowed Communist m inorities to seize power and prevent freedom of choice. Kennan’s form ula assumed th at nations would reject com­ munism if the U nited States denied the Soviets an environm ent con­ ducive to expansion.8 The strategy appeared especially successful in Western Europe, largely because the Soviet Union never seriously challenged American interests there. In Asia, on the other hand, Tru­ man’s policy encountered vexing difficulties from the start, particu­ larly in China. Nevertheless, Truman retained confidence in the ultim ate promise of containment. By 1948, Korea had emerged as the test case o f his Asian policy, as the adm inistration prepared a three-year program for economic and military aid. American objectives in Korea were far more grandiose than most observers realized at the tim e. A rthur C. Bunce, the American economic advisor in Korea, indicated the nature of W ashington’s expectation when he expressed his hope in one revealing letter th at the South Korean leaders “will institute a whole series of necessary reforms which will so appeal to the N orth Koreans that their army will revolt, kill all the nasty Communists, and create a lovely liberal democracy to the everlasting credit o f the U.S.A.!”* Containm ent in Korea aim ed at inflicting a major defeat

4

Introduction

on the Soviet Union and scoring a crucial victory for national selfdetermination. For Truman, containment would act as a liberating force. At least that was the hope. Containment in Korea never reached the level o f success that Tru­ man and his advisors anticipated. By the beginning of 1950 South Korea still remained politically divided and economically weak and the future of containment as a liberating force in Korea seemed in doubt. At this juncture, North Korea attacked South Korea and shat­ tered the theoretical foundations of American foreign policy. Con­ tainm ent now appeared inadequate, for the challenge of Soviet ideol­ ogy and power was not only economic but also military in nature. Faced with Stalin’s apparent drive for world conquest, the adminis­ tration concluded that the United States could not, without grave risk, lim it its commitment to preserve international stability. As one State Department official warned dramatically in the autum n of 1950, “though the fire be distant at the moment, if it is not extin­ guished it will surely spread and will ultimately threaten our own homes.’’10 American policy toward Korea from 1941 to 1950 presents an excellent case study for understanding how the United States reluc­ tantly adopted a thoroughly internationalist approach in foreign affairs after World War II. Despite Korea’s secondary importance for American national security during these years, Truman and his advi­ sors nevertheless looked to this nation for clues regarding the extent to which the United States should be involved in world affairs. Korea therefore played a pivotal role in the postwar transformation of American foreign policy. Prior to the Korean War, American leaders accepted a series of assumptions that permitted a restrained course in diplomacy and reflected the continuing influence of an isolationist past. Consequendy, Washington’s dispatch of American ground forces came after the United States had labored long and hard to lim it its commitment for military acdon in Korea and elsewhere in Asia. Military intervention constituted more than an admission that .Washington’s policy in Korea had failed, however. Truman’s decision to commit combat troops signaled the adopdon of a new globalist course in intemadonal affairs and the final abandonment of an isola­ tionist tradidon in American foreign policy.

CHAPTER I

An End to Indifference

World War II ended a tradition o f American indifference toward Korea. This policy shift was both surprising and significant because the United States previously had seen no national interests worth defending on the Korean peninsula. Before 1941, Korean affairs had been the exclusive concern o f closer and m ore powerful neighbors— Russia, China, and Japan. Korea was, in fact, the strategic focal point of northeast Asia. As a result, the Korean people had been the longsuffering victims o f great power rivalry throughout m ost o f their his­ tory.1Japan eventually established com plete political and economic control over Korea shortly before the outbreak o f W orld War I, thereby removing the peninsula, at least temporarily, from the arena of international conflict.2 In the wake o f Japan's defeat in World War II, however, Korean affairs again involved a contest for influence among great powers. The only difference was th at in 1945 the U nited States emerged as a principal com petitor in the struggle to determ ine Korea's destiny. An American desire to expand trade opportunities in the Pacific was the central feature o f early relations between the U nited States and Korea. Although some Americans had pointed to Korea's com­ mercial potential before the Civil War, Secretary o f State W illiam H . Seward made the first earnest attem pt to open contacts w ith th e “Hermit Kingdom." In 1866, he dispatched the G eneral Sherm an to Korea, but after the ship ran aground, Koreans boarded the vessel, burned it, and m urdered th e crew. Seward's successor, H am ilton Fish, tried to negotiate a commercial treaty w ith Korea in 1871, b u t he failed as well.9 Ultimately, it was Sino-Japanese com petition for dominance over the peninsula th at led to the establishm ent o f form al diplomatic relations between the U nited States and Korea. To offset rising Japanese political influence, China facilitated the negotiation in 1882 of the Korean-American treaty o f friendship and commerce.

6

CHAPTER I

This agreement provided for the exchange o f diplomatic representa­ tives, protection of navigation rights, extraterritoriality, and most favored nation status in commercial affairs. One additional provision would have particular importance in the future: The two nations promised that in the event “other powers deal unjustly or oppres­ sively with either government, the other will exert their good offices, on being informed of the case, to bring about an amicable arrange­ ment.“4 11 American diplomatic representatives in Korea labored diligently 11during subsequent years to expand commercial opportunities while 11striving to remain uninvolved in the ongoing Sino-Japanese rivalry. W hen China and Japan finally went to war over die peninsula in 1894, Korea appealed to the United States to fulfill its obligations under the treaty of 1882 and intervene in the dispute. Accordingly, the American ambassador in Tokyo notified Japanese authorities that the “President will be painfully disappointed should Japan visit upon her feeble and defenceless neighbor the horrors of an unjust war.” But words alone would not preserve Korea's sovereignty. The militar­ ily superior Japanese easily defeated China, eliminating Chinese influence from the Korean peninsula. * After the Sino-Japanese War, Washington instructed its diplomats in the Korean capital at Seoul not to interfere in Korea's internal affairs. H us commitment to a pol­ icy of noninvolvement became stronger as Russia began to challenge Japanese hegemony in Korea. Despite pressure from American Minis­ ter Horace N. Allen to reverse Washington’s policy, the United States remained indifferent to Korea’s fate.6 This approach properly reflect­ ed the extent of American interests in Korea, however, since the pen­ insula was neither politically nor economically vital to the United States. In February 1904, Japan staged its surprise attack on the Russian fleet at Port Arthur, thus initiating the long-anticipated Russo-Japa­ nese War. Japan’s military victory was quick and complete, confirm­ ing its preeminent position in Korea. Realizing that the United States could do little to preserve Korea’s freedom, President Theodore Roosevelt decided to acknowledge Japanese control in return for important concessions in other areas. In the Taft-Katsura agreement of 1905, the United States recognized Japanese hegemony in Korea, while Japan accepted American dominance over the Philippines. Before the end of the year, the United States had closed its embassy in Seoul and terminated official relations with Korea.7

An End to Indifference

7

Japan formally annexed Korea in 1910, systematically integrating the peninsula into its im perial structure during the next decade. Yet the Korean people did not accept dictation meekly. D espite brutal repression, Koreans continually staged dem onstrations protesting Japanese imperialism.8 W ashington studiously avoided involvem ent in such revolutionary activities. In A pril 1919. for exam ple, the State Department advised its consular representatives in Korea to “ be extremely careful not to encourage any belief th at the U nited States will assist the Korean nationalists in carrying out their plans.”9 There­ after, Americans conducted only some missionary work and desultory trade. Although Korean patriots never forgave the U nited States for its policy of silence regarding Japanese subjugation o f Korea, Jap an ’s close regulation o f all outside contacts w ith Korea left W ashington no other choice. Following World War I, several Koreans sought to enlist foreign support for the liberation o f their nation. As Korean exiles scattered to China, the Soviet U nion, and the U nited States, a num ber o f groups emerged, each forwarding a variety o f tactics and strategies for achieving Korea’s independence.10 From the outset, factionalism was the dominant characteristic o f the Korean independence move­ ment.11 Certainly the m ost well-known organization was the selfstyled “Korean Provisional G overnm ent” (KPG), form ed by Korean leaders in the afterm ath o f the abortive March First Rebellion in 1919.12 But many Korean radicals became disenchanted w ith the KPG’s reliance on diplomacy and propaganda as prim ary weapons in the fight for independence.13 Y>ung Koreans in particular favored a more direct and violent strategy. As a result, Com m unist revolution­ ary ideology emerged as a popular and powerful force not only among Korean exiles b u t inside Korea itself.14 This lack o f unity in outlook and purpose in the Korean liberation m ovem ent m ade com­ mon action under a single leader impossible. After the outbreak o f W orld War II, Korean exile leaders intensi­ fied their efforts to procure American support for Korea’s liberation. Almost immediately, several groups appealed to the State D epart­ ment for recognition and assistance. Invariably, each harped on the need for vigorous steps to h alt Japanese im perialism , as well as Korea’s readiness for independence. O ne especially active Korean exile was Han Kil-su, representative o f the Sino-Korean People’s League. In May 1941, H an urged the U nited States to prohibit Japa­ nese use of the Panam a Canal while restricting oil shipm ents to Japan

8

CHAPTER I

and freezing Japanese assets in the United States. He also pledged that a Korean guerrilla army, fighting in northern China, would con­ tinue to combat Japanese expansion. lo encourage resistance efforts, Han suggested that Washington issue a public statement advocating Korea’s independence and applauding Korean military action.15 Kim Ku, now president of the KPG and living in exile in Chung­ king, challenged the legitimacy o f Han Kil-su and all other exile groups. Only the KPG, he claimed, was worthy of recognition and material assistance from the United States and China. Cho So-ang, the KPG’s foreign minister, appealed to Secretary of State Cordell Hull on several occasions for the extension o f Lend Lease aid.16 The United States rejected this and all other Korean requests for recogni­ tion and support, maintaining strict impartiality toward all rival exile factions. President Roosevelt and his advisors recognized that aid to the Koreans would not be sufficient to counteract Japanese expan­ sion. It m ight even increase Japan’s aggressiveness and lead to open hostilities with the United States, which Roosevelt still hoped to avoid. Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor forced the United States to alter its Asian policy and devise a strategy that would promote peace and security in the Pacific after the end of World War II. The success of its postwar policy in Asia, however, would require the emergence of a stable government in Korea capable of self-defense and worthy of international diplomatic support. Roosevelt and his advisors saw that in the absence of positive measures to achieve such a result, competi­ tion for influence and control in Korea would resume. Korea’s future depended upon the ability of the Allies to cooperate in the negotia­ tion of an agreement that would protect the interests of all nations directly involved in the peninsula. Thus, the Roosevelt administra­ tion came to advocate an international trusteeship for Korea in an effort to eliminate this strategic area as a potential source of tension and conflict in the postwar world.17 William R. Langdon of the Division o f Far Eastern Affairs provided the foundation for Roosevelt’s wartime policy toward Korea during February 1942. In a key memorandum, Langdon noted that the vast majority of Koreans were illiterate and poor, politically inexperi­ enced, and economically backward. After forty years of Japanese domination, only older Koreans could even remember freedom. One can pinpoint the origins of American support for a Korean trustee­ ship in Langdon’$ observation that “for a generation at least Korea

An End to Indifference

9

would have to be protected, guided, and aided to m odem statehood by the great powers." He w ent on to suggest th at the U nited States should sponsor those Korean exiles w ith proven ties inside Korea, such as the guerrilla forces located in M anchuria, and avoid being “stampeded” into recognition o f any “ shadow organization.” Even an American promise o f postwar independence would be ill advised, Langdon argued, since it “would only do the Korean cause harm , give the Japanese and their allies a good laugh, and irritate our own friends if we prom ised independence to one Asiatic people as we were being pushed out o f our own possessions in Asia by the Japanese.” In any event, Langdon recom m ended th at the adm inistration form ulate a definitive policy on Korea only after consultations w ith China and the Soviet U nion.18 Roosevelt undoubtedly was aware o f the contents o f Langdon’s memorandum. In a radio address on February 23, 1942, the presi­ dent referred to the Korean “ experience o f enslavem ent” under the Japanese. He then guaranteed th at the prom ise o f national self-deter­ mination enunciated in the A tlantic C harter applied “to the whole world.” Significantly, this statem ent corresponded precisely to Lang­ don’s recommendation th at the U nited States, “ u n til the situation becomes clearer, not go beyond referring . . . to the th ird principle for a better world proclaim ed in the joint Anglo-American declara­ tion of August 14, 1941, namely our ‘respect o f the right o f all peo­ ples to choose the form o f governm ent under which they will live’ and our ‘wish to see sovereign rights and self-governm ent restored to those who have been forcibly deprived o f th em ’.”19 Roosevelt’s Korea policy dem anded im partiality and delay during the first year o f American involvem ent in W orld War II. Korean exiles in the United States and C hina opposed this position, however, and sought positive American action for K orea’s liberation. O n Decem ber 9,1941, Kim Ku formally asked the U nited States to extend recogni­ tion and Lend Lease assistance to the KPG. Simultaneously, Syngman Rhee (Yi Sùng-m an), th e KPG’s official representative in W ashing­ ton, applied intense pressure on the adm inistration to force an aban­ donment o f im partiality.20 From th e outset, th en , the KPG was determined to play a significant role in the evolution o f wartim e American policy toward Korea. Kim K u’s request was hardly unique. Countless dem ands for rec­ ognition from ad le groups representing other nations poured into the State D epartm ent. In response, the adm inistration announced

IO

CHAPTER I

that it did not intend to recognize any “free movement” and warned all exile leaders not to attem pt to divide the American people. The United States government also urged its citizens not to participate directly in the efforts of these foreign representatives to obtain sup­ port.21 Thus, despite numerous pleas from the Koreans, Washington rejected all requests for assistance.22 In refusing to recognize the KPG, American leaders avoided setting a dangerous precedent re­ quiring similar action elsewhere in Asia.22 More im portant, the Roosevelt administration believed that the success o f trusteeship in Korea depended upon respect for the principle of national self-deter­ mination. Several other questions suggested the need for caution. For exam­ ple, none o f the Korean exile groups had strong organizational back­ ing inside Korea. Furthermore, factional disputes between rival leaders prevented unified action even after Pearl Harbor. During dis­ cussions with State Departm ent official Alger Hiss in December 1941, Rhee discounted Han’s influence in the Korean independence movement. Only the KPG, he insisted, deserved American and Chi­ nese recognition. In reply, Hiss offered yet another cogent reason for delay. The United States could not alter its policy of impartiality until Washington had consulted not only China but also the Soviet Union. Moscow, Hiss continued, held a major interest in the fate of Korea but could not engage in consultations until it was at war with Japan. Stanley K. Hornbeck, division chief for Far Eastern Affairs, summar­ ized Washington’s attitude when he observed that recognition of any exile group “might involve responsibilities which in the light of later events it m ight have been better for this government not to have assumed.”24 Rhee was able, however, to persuade several private American citi­ zens to sponsor the KPG’s cause. John W. Staggers and Jay Jerome Williams, two Washington businessmen, exerted notable pressure on the administration to alter its stance. W hile ruling out recognition, the State Department encouraged Staggers and Williams to maintain contacts with the KPG and keep the administration informed of Rhee's activities. Staggers evidently interpreted this suggestion as tantam ount to unofficial recognition. In January 1942, he instructed Han to channel his activities through Rhee’s Washington-based Korean Commission. The United States, Staggers asserted, had rec­ ognized Rhee as the legitimate representative of Korea’s government in exile. Han immediately requested verification. Undersecretary of

An End to Indifference

ii

State Sumner Welles quickly disavowed Staggers’ allegations and reaffirmed American im partiality.25 Leaders o f the KPG then decided upon a direct appeal to the American people. O n February 28, 1942, a three-day “ Liberty Con­ ference” opened in W ashington, D .C . Speakers dem anded im m edi­ ate recognition o f Kim K u’s regim e as the legitim ate representative o f the Korean nation. After attending the conference, Langdon and Hombeck dismissed the entire affair as a “publicity stunt.” 26 Yet the administration apparently concluded th at its Korea policy now re­ quired public clarification. A t a press conference on March 2, U nder­ secretary Welles confirmed th at the State D epartm ent had the Korean m atter under consideration and would announce any change in policy. The U nited States regarded all free m ovem ents w ith “utmost sympathy,” Welles declared, b u t the Korean case involved certain complex problem s th at required caution and delay.27 Korea simply could not generate sufficient public interest to force a change in Roosevelt’s policy. O ne person who would not take no for an answer was Jam es H. R. Cromwell, the form er American Ambas­ sador to Canada. In a letter to Cordell H ull, Cromwell explained th at Rhee’s followers had developed “ a blueprint for revolution by arson” and therefore deserved American assistance. The KPG would not implement its plan, however, u n til the State D epartm ent recognized it as “the de facto governm ent o f the Republic o f Korea.” 28 This resort to blackmail failed to alter W ashington’s policy. H ull’s reply emphasized that the adm inistration was determ ined to avoid any action depriving captive peoples o f the right to freedom o f choice. Moreover, American recognition was not necessary if the KPG genu­ inely wanted to dem onstrate its devotion to the A tlantic Charter. In July, Hull announced publicly th at the U nited States endorsed the efforts o f all exile groups willing to fight for their nation’s freedom .2’ Undaunted, Cromwell now raised the issue w ith his old friend Adolph A. Berle, the assistant secretary o f state. If the U nited States sponsored a systematic cam paign o f sabotage and subversion inside Korea, it could build a “ bonfire" in Jap an ’s backyard at very low cost. “Adolph,” Cromwell pleaded, “ you are about the only fire­ cracker I know in the State D epartm ent—why don’t you do it? ” O n July 31, Berle referred Cromwell’s proposal to the Jo in t Intelligence Committee. Although the com m ittee’s report advised against recog­ nition of the KPG, it stressed the im portance o f m aintaining contacts with the various Korean exile groups. At some future date, the

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CHAPTER I

U nited States m ight adopt Cromwell’s plan; the report therefore rec­ ommended soliciting the comments of General Joseph Stilwell in China.30 For Stilwell, Cromwell’s scheme was utterly infeasible. The KPG had few contacts inside Korea and its ability to spark a rebellion was dubious at best. Such an operation, Stilwell believed, would be a waste of money, provide no tangible benefits, and entail grave politi­ cal risks. Army Chief o f Staff General George C. Marshall concurred, observing that it would be “doubtful policy to blindly pick some group . . . , thus antagonizing other groups’’ which m ight emerge later. As a result, American military leaders rejected Cromwell’s plan, informing Berle on September 24 of the decision. They urged Berle to explain to the KPG’s supporters that lim ited American assistance alone could not produce a revolution in Korea. Even if an uprising did occur, Japan would have little trouble suppressing such a poorly organized rebellion.31 American diplomats and missionaries fleeing Korea during the summer of 1942 substantiated Stilwell’s assessment. They dismissed promises of independence or recognition as pointless in view of the totality of Japanese control in Korea. A rthur B. Emmons III, the American vice-consul in Korea, was among those being repatriated to the United States aboard the Swedish vessel Gripsholm. After his arrival, Emmons subm itted a memorandum emphasizing the im­ probability of a Korean uprising against Japan. The isolation and eco­ nomic straits of the average Korean produced incredible political apa­ thy. Emmons went on to remind the administration that the Korean peninsula was situated in a precarious geographic position between China, Russia, and Japan. Korea would emerge after World War II as the object of a dangerous international rivalry, he warned, “unless such pressure could be neutralized by some effective form o f interna­ tional agreement to which Far Eastern Countries concerned would give their sincere effective support.” 32 China’s close relationship with the KPG reinforced Roosevelt’s commitment to nonrecognition. In January 1942, Clarence Gauss, the American ambassador to China, reported that Chiang Kai-shek exerted undue influence over the KPG and Kim Ku. Cho So-ang, Gauss explained, was evasive and secretive when questioned about the KPG’s financial resources.33 Moreover, Washington began to receive reports that the Chinese intended to recognize the KPG and extend a promise of postwar independence. Replying to a request for

A n End to Indifference

13

confirmation, Gauss stated th at although the rum ors were accurate, Chiang opposed precipitate action.34 Then Chinese Foreign M inister T. V. Soong suggested in a letter to Roosevelt dated A pril 8 th at the Allies issue a joint declaration prom ising Korea postwar indepen­ dence and extending formal recognition to the KPG. Soong proposed as well that the Allies train and equip a "K orean People’s Arm y” capable o f conducting sabotage and espionage operations inside Korea. This Chinese dém arche caught the adm inistration o ff guard. Undersecretary Welles instructed Gauss to impress upon Chiang th e importance o f delay, since "parallel and cooperative action . . . would be desirable so far as practical.” 33 In all probability, Welles consulted H om beck regarding Soong’s proposals. In a m em orandum dated A pril 11, Hornbeck confessed deep misgivings about issuing a prom ise o f postwar independence for Korea. Some form o f "dom inion status” would be necessary after the war, he contended, because Korea would be incapable o f im m ediate self-government. Hom beck also believed th a t "th e work o f th e peacemakers be not im peded by ham pering antecedent com m it­ ments to a greater extent than is necessary.” For the present, he advised delay.36 Welles followed H om beck’s recom m endations closely in responding to Roosevelt’s request for com m ents on Soong’s letter. Recognition of any single exile group, he insisted, would be prem a­ ture, while a promise o f independence would "lack reality.” Welles acknowledged, however, th a t the plan for creating an irregular Korean army possessed some m erit. Furtherm ore, the Allies should attem pt to foster unity w ithin th e Korean exile m ovem ent.37 Welles subsequendy convinced other m em bers o f the adm inistradon th at it would be unwise to adopt a m ore positive course w ith respect to Korea. On April 15, the Pacific War Council form ally endorsed the State D epartm ent’s position.38 China’s attitude toward Korea reflected C hiang’s fear o f Soviet intentions in Asia. He was well aware o f Soviet and Chinese Com m u­ nist support, both financial and m oral, for th e Korean guerrillas fighting in northern China. A fter Moscow entered the war against Japan, Chiang expected Stalin to utilize the Korean exiles in Siberia and Manchuria to control Korea’s postwar developm ent. Even before receiving the American response to Soong’s initiative, Chiang called publicly for im m ediate A llied recognition o f th e K PG .39 Secretary Hull, in a m em orandum to Roosevelt, worried th at if China recog­ nized the KPG, th e Soviet U nion would sponsor its own group.

i4

CHAPTER I

Given China's geographic and historic association with Korea, how­ ever, the secretary of state thought the United States should not object strongly to whatever policy Chiang decided to follow. Never­ theless, Hull instructed Gauss to impress upon the Chinese that the administration would not endorse China’s recognition of the KPG. Washington had decided that the Korean exile movement not only lacked unity but had “little association with the Korean population in Korea.”40 Washington’s reticence compelled Chiang to reconsider his posi­ tion. In May, Gauss informed Hull that the Chinese had decided to postpone action until the KPG was sufficiently representative of the entire Korean exile movement to warrant Allied recognition.41 In all probability, both American and Chinese leaders then explained to the Koreans that unity was a prerequisite for international support. Han Kil-su quickly subm itted to the State Departm ent a plan for military and political consolidation. It provided, in part, for the cre­ ation of a “unification committee” composed o f representatives from both the KPG and the guerrilla forces in northern China.42 Although Hull doubted whether the Koreans would be able to cooperate, he forwarded Han’s proposal to Gauss for comment. The ambassador shared H ull’s pessimism about the prospects for success. Subse­ quently, rivalry and friction within the Korean independence move­ m ent persisted and all efforts for cooperative action collapsed.43 Curiously, Chinese involvement with the Korean exiles at Chung­ king caused the Roosevelt administration to view China as a greater threat than the Soviet Union to Korea’s independence. Chiang and T. V. Soong, however, never ceased emphasizing China’s determina­ tion that Korea would emerge as a free nation after the war. Chinese leaders insisted that they sought international responsibility, not domination, in the postwar world.44 Yet the United States found ample reason to question China’s motives. In October 1942, Kim Ku granted Chiang control over the KPG’s military force in return for financial aid. Rumors spread that the agreement also bound “Korea to China in any postwar scheme in the Orient.”43 American diplo­ mats at Chungking immediately probed the KPG for information about the terms of its arrangement with Chiang. Cho So-ang explained to Vice-Consul O. Edmund Clubb that the KPG’s finan­ cial limitations necessitated dependence on China. Kim Ku could term inate the relationship, he suggested, if the United Sûtes agreed

A n End to Indifference

*5

to extend Lend Lease assistance.46 Such incidents merely increased American suspicion o f C hina’s expansionist in ten t and reduced the likelihood of American backing for the KPG. Roosevelt and his advisors believed th at C hina would play a key role in the success o f postwar Am erican policy in Korea and elsewhere in Asia. State D epartm ent official Jo h n C arter Vincent argued, for example, that the U nited States should rely on Chiang to encourage the KPG to broaden its support.47 A t the same tim e, the adm inistra­ tion recognized th at China had to develop internal strength if it expected to help w ith the preservation o f peace in the Pacific. In a let­ ter written to Chiang (which Roosevelt revised and approved), Owen Lattimore, an expert on Asia and Roosevelt’s special advisor to Chiang, stressed the im portance o f C hina acting as a “ policem an” in Asia. China’s participation in th e postwar reconstruction o f Asia was essential, but the U nited States would n o t perm it Chiang to dom i­ nate any o f C hina’s neighbors. Moreover, Lattim ore rem inded Chiang that the views o f the Soviet U nion were extremely im portant. As a result, “it would be undesirable to exclude Russia from such problems as the independence o f Korea,” because this would merely create tension and spawn m istrust am ong the Allies.48 China’s apparent determ ination to reestablish its preem inence in Korean affairs added urgency to the task o f form ulating a specific program for trusteeship. D uring the autum n o f 1942, the Division o f Far Eastern Affairs proposed th a t a com m ittee comprised o f represen­ tatives from China, New Zealand, and the U nited States develop a united policy on Korea. This com m ittee would seek “ to cooperate with the Korean people in setting up and establishing a national government of Korea and . . . to assist in form ing a tem porary trust­ eeship under which there would be given advice and technical assis­ tance.” State D epartm ent officials also proposed measures for coordi­ nation with the Soviet U nion.49 If all went well, the m ajor powers would agree to a trusteeship arrangem ent and thereby ensure the postwar sovereignty o f Korea. Wartime policy toward Korea illustrates Roosevelt’s emphasis on Allied cooperation as the crucial requirem ent for the preservation o f American security interests in Asia. In one address, the president pointed to the Philippine experience as a m odel for the future devel­ opment of small nations in Asia. American policy toward the Philip­ pines had been

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based on two important factors. Hie fitst is that there be a period of preparation, through the dissemination of education and the recogni­ tion and fulfillment of physical and social and economic needs. The second is that there be a period of training for ultimate independent sovereignty, through the practice of more and more self-government, beginning with local government and passing on through various steps to complete statehood.10 Roosevelt insisted that the stability o f independence depended on training and experience in self-government. Significantly, the Institute o f World Affairs provided something of a trial balloon for Roosevelt’s trusteeship policy for Korea. In Decem­ ber 1942, that organization recommended just such a plan, but the Korean exile reaction was immediate and hostile. The KPG and Rhee denounced the proposal as Japanese-inspired and promised to resist any postwar mandatory status. Kim Ku declared that Korea “must secure her . . . absolute independence,” arguing that Korea’s politi­ cal experience was of longer duration than Japan’s. Cho So-ang reminded the administration that trusteeship “does not accord with the Atlantic Charter, is against the will o f 30.000.000 [sic] Koreans and ever endangers peace in Eastern Asia.” The State Department provided Roosevelt with reports of these protests. Thus, the president knew at an early date that the most vocal Korean exiles opposed the heart of his Korea policy.51 Trusteeship offered little to the KPG, but Kim Ku still had reason for optimism. Late in 1942, Rhee had established a close relationship with Colonel Preston Goodfellow of the Office of Strategic Services (OSS). Together, Rhee and Goodfellow drew up a plan to train and equip one hundred Koreans for espionage and sabotage activities inside Korea. Goodfellow then urged the State Department to recog­ nize the KPG and adopt the program, asserting that any delay “m ight be of benefit to the Soviet Union in any plans the latter m ight have in respect of Korea.” 52 But State Department officials quickly rejected Goodfellow’s scheme, doubting both the unity and the ability of Kim Ku’s regime. Moreover, the administration feared that “to try to steal a march on the Soviet Union . . . might create fresh difficulties.”55 Surprisingly, Great Britain registered greater opposition to Roose­ velt’s policy in Asia than either the Soviet Union or China. In November 1942, Prime Minister W inston Churchill had made it

17

quite clear that the British Em pire would rem ain intact following World War II.54 Accordingly, Lord Halifax, British ambassador in Washington, subm itted a proposal pertaining to A llied policy in colonial areas to the U nited States in February 1943. Halifax recom­ mended that the Allies issue a declaration prom ising total destruction of the Axis aggressors and the creation o f world peace in the postwar era. He then noted th at while some colonial peoples were sufficiently advanced to ensure their own security and prosperity, others required experience in self-government and international guidance prior to independence.” Britain therefore proposed th at the Allies designate “trustee” nations to develop social, economic, and political institutions in the less advanced colonial areas in the interests o f world peace and com­ mercial activity. Colonial policy was an im portant item on the agenda for Anglo-American discussions w hen, in March 1943, British For­ eign Minister Anthony Eden visited W ashington. W hile in the United States, Eden conferred prim arily w ith Roosevelt, Welles, and presidential advisor Harry Hopkins. B ut H ull was interested in dis­ cussing the Halifax proposal on colonial peoples and m et w ith Eden privately on March 22. A fter Eden had sum m arized the British posi­ tion, Hull countered th at any colonial policy had to em phasize the development o f sufficient experience in self-governm ent to guarantee complete independence w ithout external interference o f any kind. Hull believed that the British proposal did not go far enough in this respect.” Hull then offered an alternative plan stressing m axim um local par­ ticipation in self-government and rapid realization o f independence. During discussions w ith Roosevelt th at same day, Eden expressed con­ cern over too broad an application o f trusteeship and overreliance on China’s role in postwar affairs. Hopkins noted the divergence o f opinion between Britain and the U nited States when he stated later that “it becomes clearer all the tim e th at Eden thinks very little o f a trusteeship and would rather have the full responsibility in the hands of one country.” *7 O n March 27, Roosevelt conveyed to Eden his gen­ eral approval o f H ull’s proposal. The president declared th at the Allied policy toward dependent peoples had to possess universal applicability. Roosevelt advocated international control over Indo­ china and the Japanese-m andated islands. Furtherm ore, “ Korea might be placed under an international trusteeship, with China, the United States and one or two other countries participating.” ” Eden

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CHAPTER I

reacted favorably to Roosevelt’s comments but said that Hull's pro­ posal was not the final word. Hopkins privately voiced optimism, thinking that Britain would not demand a restoration of colonial rule in all areas. Hull agreed. On March 29, he acknowledged that his proposal was subject to revision.’9 In reality, the American proposal deeply disturbed Eden, who wor­ ried about its wider implications for the British Empire. Eden decid­ ed nevertheless to hold his criticism in reserve until a later date. In his public evaluation o f the conference, Roosevelt claimed that discus­ sions had produced Anglo-American agreement in virtually every area. Yet his inability to announce any specific policy decisions indi­ cated the inconclusive nature of the results. On March 29, Welles dis­ cussed the outcome of the Anglo-American negotiations with T. V. Soong. The United States and Britain, he explained, intended to treat China as a major power after the war. Roosevelt and Eden also had agreed to trusteeship for Korea, but the specific features of the plan would await consultations with the Soviet Union.60 Despite the ambiguous results of the Roosevelt-Eden discussions, the United States proceeded with the development of comprehensive plans for a trusteeship system. In April 1943, the State Department finished a specific proposal providing for machinery to implement, supervise, and finance a program of international control. The mem­ orandum discussed positive guarantees for international respect re­ garding the principle of a commercial "open door” and then made reference to Korea, among other areas, as suitable for the application of trusteeship. Korea was "to be temporarily administered by the Council, anticipating independence probably with close economic ties with China.”61 Although the administration had linked Ameri­ can policy firmly to trusteeship, it never vocalized the decision. The State Department would issue only a formal promise that the Allies intended to strip Korea from Japan and accord it national selfdetermination after the war.62 Allied military victories in the Pacific during 1943 forced the United States to consider more seriously the impact of Soviet entrance into the war against Japan. In August, Hombeck prepared a memo­ randum outlining Soviet objectives in the Pacific, which accentuated the importance of Russian national security. As in Europe, Stalin’s paramount political objective was to establish political dominance over neighboring countries. Hombeck then observed that Moscow maintained close ties with a group of Korean guerrillas in Siberia and

A n End to Indifference

*9

thus possessed an excellent in stru m en t for exploiting unrest and exerting Soviet influence in postw ar K orea. In a letter to H ull, Horn* beck referred to th e likelihood o f conflict in K orea after W orld War II: The future of Korea . . . will, it is believed, be of paramount impor­ tance to Soviet Russia and to China. The Soviet Union may be expected to exen efforts to assure that the future government of Korea is favor­ ably disposed and ideologically sympathetic to the Government of the U.S.S.R. Such a policy, if vigorously pursued by the U.S.S.R., would almost certainly conflict with Chinese policy in regard to Korea. Soviet agreement to trusteeship, n o t to m ention th a t o f C hina and Britain, thus assumed added im portance. W hile Roosevelt and his advisors favored trusteeship for m oral reasons in certain areas, strate­ gic considerations were to dom inate A m erican thinking w ith respect to Korea.63 For Rhee, Stalin’s expansionist am bitions dem anded im m ediate American recognition and assistance for th e KPG . In a letter to Roosevelt, Rhee pointed o u t th a t “ the danger o f Russian expansion, so feared and dreaded by the U nited States forty years ago, has n o t entirely disappeared.’’64 Chiang too stated his anxiety over Soviet aspirations with increasing frequency during 1943. He feared th at Stalin would exploit postwar unrest in Korea to achieve total sway. To avoid such a result, China exhorted the U nited States to join in a tri­ partite conference w ith Britain to devise an agreem ent guaranteeing Korea’s independence. For Soong, trusteeship provided th e best means to attain this objective. In private discussions w ith H ull, H ornbeck insisted th at a neutral Korea was essential for peace and stability in Asia and would require Soviet-Chinese agreem ent. D uring the autumn of 1943, the Roosevelt adm inistration concentrated on achieving an accord am ong all four m ajor powers for a Korean trust­ eeship.65 Hull resumed his straggle to convince the British o f the wisdom o f trusteeship at the first Quebec Conference in August 1943. A fter twice refusing to discuss the m atter, Eden finally stated his disap­ proval of the emphasis on “ independence” in the American pro­ posal. Several British dom inions preferred continued im perial ties, despite the liberty to request independence at any tim e. H ull reas­ sured Eden that the U nited States did not favor im m ediate indepen-

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CHAPTER I

dence but believed it necessary to emphasize freedom as the ultimate goal. Eden stood his ground and British antipathy toward Hull's pro­ posal continued for the balance of the war.66 In October 1943, Hull traveled to Moscow for a meeting of the Allied foreign ministers. Prior to his departure, Roosevelt instructed his secretary o f state to pursue a definite agreement favoring wide application of the American trusteeship proposal.67 The president hoped that through publicizing the plan, popular support would force British, Chinese, and Russian compliance. Thus, on October 29, Hull raised the issue of dependent peoples and distributed his proposal. He regretted that there would not be enough time to dis­ cuss colonial policy in depth. Eden reminded Hull that Britain had registered its opposition to the American plan just three days earlier. Soviet Foreign Minister V. M. Molotov, on the other hand, agreed that the issue was of vital importance and deserved study and discus­ sion.68 As a result, the other Allied leaders could expea the United States to raise the issue of trusteeship during the upcoming meetings at Cairo and Teheran in November 1943. Roosevelt was determined to obtain British and Chinese consent for a three-power trusteeship for Korea at Cairo and was confident of Chiang's support.69 On November 23, however, Chiang strongly endorsed the issuance o f an immediate statement promising Korean independence. This statement apparently revived Roosevelt’s appre­ hensions, since he conveyed fears regarding China’s “wide aspira­ tions’’ to Churchill the following day. Roosevelt suspected that Chiang sought military occupation of Korea at the end of World War II.70 Despite such anxieties, Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang agreed to issue the famous Cairo Declaration, which promised the liquida­ tion of the Japanese Empire and the restoration o f Chinese sover­ eignty over Manchuria and Formosa. W ith respea to Korea, the Cairo Declaration stated that the Allies, “m indful of the enslave­ m ent of the people of Korea, are determined that in due course Korea shall become free and independent.” 71 Although the declara­ tion avoided specific references to trusteeship, the Allies unquestion­ ably had indicated an intention to impose on Korea an interim period of international supervision. Many scholars have faulted Roosevelt for including the phrase “in due course” in the Cairo Declaration, contending that the United States should have satisfied Korean demands for immediate indepen­ dence. “The proviso,” Bruce Cumings writes, “ reflected only the

A n End to Indifference

XI

paternalistic, gradualist elem ent o f the trusteeship idea th a t deem ed no colonial people fit to run th eir own affairs w ithout a period o f tutelage.” 72 In reality, the president recognized th at postw ar peace and stability in the Pacific depended upon the support o f B ritain and China for joint action in th e reconstruction o f Korea and other nations. Nor did Roosevelt seek to dom inate th e peninsula, as Cum ings contends. Roosevelt realized th a t C hiang’s aspirations in Korea would alarm Stalin. He therefore pursued an international trustee­ ship to reassure not only B ritain and C hina b u t also the Soviet U nion and thereby preserve Korea’s independence. Thus, Roosevelt left Cairo for Teheran in ten t upon gaining Stalin’s assent for the Cairo D eclaration and a Korean trusteeship. O n November 30, Stalin said th at although he could m ake no com m it­ ments, he approved o f the Far Eastern com m uniqué. Roosevelt later avowed that Stalin had agreed specifically th a t “th e Koreans are n o t yet capàble o f exercising and m aintaining independent governm ent and that they should be placed under a 40 year tutelage.” Roosevelt must have been pleased about his Korea policy when he left Teheran; the Allies now appeared u n ited behind trusteeship.79 Upon his return to W ashington, Roosevelt announced th a t th e Cairo Declaration involved “ th e restoration o f stolen property to its rightful owners and the recognition o f th e rights o f m illions o f people in the Far East to build up th eir own form s o f self-governm ent w ith­ out molestation.” 74 D espite the president’s prom ise o f eventual inde­ pendence, the Korean exile m ovem ent was thoroughly dissatisfied with the Cairo Declaration and dem anded clarification o f the phrase “in due course.” Kim K u charged th a t A llied policy tow ard Korea was insulting and disgraceful because it envisioned a continuation o f outside control.79 Such criticism o f Am erican policy was unjustified. All indications pointed to Korean unpreparedness for independence and to the probability o f Sino-Soviet disagreem ent over the best means of reconstructing the Korean nation. Ihisteeship afforded the dual benefit of ensuring th a t th e Koreans could p ro te a their own sovereignty and security while reducing th e likelihood o f conflict among great powers in a strategic area. It was specious to argue th at Korea’s long history o f self-governm ent negated forty years o f Japa­ nese colonialism.76 Early in 1944, th e State D epartm ent began to develop concrete plans for the occupation and adm inistration o f Korea. In M arch, th e Inter-Divisional Area C om m ittee on the Far East produced three

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CHAPTER I

papers dealing with American policy aims in Korea.77 Hiss and Clubb were principally responsible for the proposals dealing with occupa­ tion and administration. The first paper stressed that Korea had been subject to Japanese rule for decades and exiles had doubtful local sup­ port and negligible administrative experience. The largest group of exiles were Soviet-trained and imbued with Communist ideology, numbering approximately thirty-five thousand compared to one thousand located at Chungking. If the Soviet Union entered the Pacific war, the paper predicted that it would occupy a large portion of the Korean peninsula.7* The second paper recommended that since the United States, Brit­ ain, China, and the Soviet Union each possessed legitimate interests in Korea, all four nations should participate in the occupation and administration of the country. The Allies had to avoid one-power control at all costs. If zonal division proved unavoidable, the occupy­ ing nations should fashion a unified administration as quickly as pos­ sible. Although the paper called for military responsibility over civil affairs in the American zone, it offered no details pertaining to the proposed trusteeship. The third paper, which dealt with the utiliza­ tion of Japanese technical personnel, would have considerable impor­ tance later. It postulated that the Allies might not be able to main­ tain industrial operations with Korean and military personnel alone. Thus, the United States intended to permit Japanese technicians to continue to function where security allowed and qualified Koreans were not available. Events soon demonstrated that the paper was mis­ taken when it speculated that “politically undesirable results of the use . . . of Japanese technical . . . personnel can to a great extent be controlled and will be more than offset by the practical need for the use of such personnel.”7* On May 3, 1944, the State Department Postwar Programs Com­ m ittee discussed and approved the three papers with only minor alterations. The committee members generally agreed that an inter­ national trusteeship was “absolutely necessary” for Korea because of past competition among the great powers over the strategic area. The only change advised that the United States should not accept an exclusive mandate in Korea under any circumstances.80 Simultane­ ously, the administration reaffirmed its policy of impartiality toward the exile movement. It denied the KPG’s request for representation on the United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), arguing that it would exploit this concession for political

An End to Indifference

2-3

gain. American leaders believed th a t "th e efforts o f each faction are directed toward obtaining political capital, prestige and m onetary assistance for that faction and n o t for th e benefit o f a concerted effort directed toward liberation o f Korea.” *1 D espite constant prodding from the KPG during the spring o f 1944, W ashington would n o t recognize the Kim K u regim e.82 China’s behavior after the Cairo Conference elim inated any linger­ ing doubts w ithin the Roosevelt adm inistration about the wisdom o f its Korea policy. Reports from C hungking revealed th at C hiang, in an effort to foster unity, had threatened to term inate Kim K u's subsidy unless the KPG ended its factional divisions.** Such highhanded treatment drew criticism from n o t only th e Koreans b u t also Am eri­ can diplomats in C hina. C lubb told C hiang th at the U nited States would not tolerate interference in th e rights o f C hina’s neighbors to determine their own destiny. O nly cooperation, n o t unilateral acts, he admonished, would guarantee C hina’s security in the postwar world. Foreign Service Officer Jo h n S. Service was far m ore distressed about Chiang’s preoccupation w ith Soviet expansionism . Observing that the generalissimo’s obsession was producing divisions in the Kuomintang, Service warned th a t C hiang was weakening C hina and contributing to economic deterioration, thus forcing the people in Korea and on Formosa to tu rn to Moscow as a last resort.84 By the summer o f 1944, Soviet agreem ent to a specific trusteeship agreement for Korea also had assum ed added im portance. In July, Roosevelt approved G eneral D ouglas M acA rthur’s plans for the inva­ sion of the Philippines and the final assault on Jap an . Am erican m ili­ tary leaders had convinced Roosevelt th at Soviet participation in the Pacific war would render the defeat o f Japan infinitely easier. Yet, despite Stalin’s concern for Soviet security in Asia, Moscow would not enter the war against Japan u n til victory in Europe was certain. The OSS noted ominously th at if, at the m om ent o f Soviet entry, "th e trend in Europe is toward com petition am ong the powers, a corre­ sponding com petition can hardly fail to arise in the Far East.” Stalin would not accept, for exam ple, a Korean governm ent m ore favorable toward China than toward th e Soviet U nion. G iven C hiang’s deter­ mination to reestablish preponderant Chinese influence in Asia, th e report advised th at Sino-Soviet conflict in Korea was highly prob­ able.*» Washington’s dilem m a was clear. The U nited States desired Soviet entry into the war against Jap an , b u t it feared th a t C hina w ould be

M

CHAPTER I

unable to cooperate with Moscow for the preservation of peace and security in the area. Hull believed that trusteeship, while reassuring the Chinese, would prevent any undesirable political ramifications stemming from Soviet participation in the Pacific war. He therefore intended to delineate Allied policy on dependent peoples at the Dumbarton Oaks Conference in August 1944. American military leaders, afraid that discord among the Allies would delay Soviet entry and thereby prolong the Pacific war, forced Hull to postpone action on colonial policy. The War Department observed pessimistically that any trusteeship agreement would be irrelevant, since “the fall of Japan will leave Russia in a dominant position on continental North­ east Asia, and . . . able to impose her will in all that area.”86 State Department officials manifested greater optimism about the future of American policy in Korea, but they saw the need for more positive steps. Assistant Secretary Berle now implored the administra­ tion to approve and implement Rhee’s plan for the creation of a Korean espionage army. If the United States utilized the KPG, he argued, it not only could hasten the defeat of Japan but also forestall Soviet mastery in postwar Korea.87 Hombeck, on the other hand, accepted the Soviet occupation of Manchuria, Mongolia, and Korea at the end of the war as an unavoidable probability. To check further Stalinist expansion, he advocated providing Chiang with sufficient military aid and diplomatic support for the creation of a strong China. Since the United States and Britain would be concentrating on defeating Japan, only China could construct a barrier to Soviet aggression elsewhere in Asia.88 China’s internal political and economic problems, however, under­ mined the logic of Hombeck’s strategy. As early as May 1944, Roosevelt suggested during a cabinet meeting that Chiang’s regime would not survive for the duration of the war. Perhaps worse, Chiang’s expansionist ambitions continued to alarm American repre­ sentatives in China. Langdon, now consul general at Kunming, reported that the Chinese were more interested in establishing hege­ mony in Tibet, Mongolia, and Korea than fighting Japan.89 Allied agreement still seemed the best method for preserving postwar peace. By August 1944, the administration was contemplating an Allied conference to reach agreement on military government in the territo­ ries recaptured from Japan.90 In October 1944, Moscow satisfied American desires for a Soviet commitment to enter the Pacific war. Stalin informed the American

An End to Indifference

2-5

ambassador to the Soviet U nion, W. Averell H arrim an, th at Moscow would declare war on Japan w ithin three m onths after th e defeat o f Germany. He then asked H arrim an w hat concessions Russia could expect in return for participation in th e war. H arrim an quickly alert­ ed Roosevelt th at C hina’s fu ture w ould be in jeopardy if th e Allies disagreed on the postwar reconstruction o f Asia. Secretary o f War Henry L. Stimson seconded this assessment, pointing out th a t only firm agreements would provide a sound foundation for th e postwar peace settlem ent and guarantee Am erican security in th e Pacific.91 American m ilitary strategy thus played a critical role in th e adm in­ istration’s deliberations regarding Korea during the first m onth o f 1945. The Jo in t Chiefs o f S taff (JCS) even recom m ended th at th e Soviets occupy the entire peninsula at an early date to prevent Jap a­ nese reinforcement o f th e hom e islands prior to the Am erican inva­ sion. Despite Adm iral W illiam D . Leahy’s vigorous dissent, Roose­ velt endorsed Russian participation in th e Pacific war a t th e earliest possible m om ent to ensure a quicker and less costly victory. Conse­ quently, the Roosevelt adm inistration rejected any action th a t m ight arouse Soviet suspicion o f Am erican intentions. Trying to lim it Sta­ lin’s participation in the postwar reconstruction o f Asia w ould only undermine China’s position and place K orea’s independence in doubt.92 As Roosevelt left for his m eeting a t Yalta w ith C hurchill and Stalin, his m ain objective was to confirm plans for Soviet entry into the Pacific war while gaining an A llied agreem ent th at would produce a strong China and an independent Korea. State D epartm ent officials had draw n specific plans for Korea in preparation for the Yalta Conference, which followed the recom m en­ dations o f the Pacific W ar Council reports form ulated during the spring of 1944. This briefing paper placed a high priority on interAllied participation in th e occupation and civil adm inistration o f the Korean peninsula, suggesting a four-pow er trusteeship if the Soviet Union entered the Pacific war. The achievem ent o f a detailed agree­ ment was essential if the Allies expected to avoid prolonged occupa­ tion or any delay in granting independence. The paper pointed o u t, however, that it “w ould seem advisable to have Soviet representation on an interim adm inistration regardless o f w hether or n o t th e Soviet Union enters the war.’’95 Thus, on February 9 ,1 9 4 5 , Roosevelt raised the issue o f Korea d u r­ ing discussions w ith Stalin at Yalta and proposed a three-pow er tru st­ eeship. The president pointed to Am erican experiences in the Philip-

2.6

CHAPTER I

pines and surmised that the Korean trusteeship would last twenty to thirty years. Stalin responded that the shorter the duration the better. He then inquired about the stationing of foreign troops on the pen­ insula. After agreeing that there should be no foreign military forces stationed in Korea, Roosevelt mentioned the “delicate” matter of possibly excluding the British from participation in the Korean trust­ eeship. The president believed that there was no necessity for British inclusion in the arrangement. Stalin disagreed, pointing out that Churchill would be offended and might “kill us.”94 Roosevelt and Stalin thus agreed to a four-power trusteeship for Korea in addition to the concessions the Soviet Union received in return for participa­ tion in the Pacific war. Roosevelt undoubtedly left Yalta confident that Soviet-American agreement had enhanced the likelihood that both China and Korea would be independent and sovereign nations at the end of World War 11." Scholars have debated at length the wisdom of the Yilta agreement on the Far East. W ith the benefit of hindsight, many have argued that Soviet participation in the Pacific war was unnecessary. Some writers have termed Roosevelt’s failure to consult China as “unpleas­ ant and immoral” ; others have charged that the president “gave away” too m uch." Regardless of the larger aspects of the Yilta agree­ ments, one can hardly find fault with the Korean arrangement. All Korean experts in Washington agreed that Korea was not sufficiently prepared for self-government, and American experiences with the exile movement added credence to this conclusion. More important, Korea represented a particularly difficult problem for the administra­ tion because Washington harbored conflicting fears of British imperi­ alism, Chinese expansionism, and Soviet communism. Roosevelt speculated that Allied support for trusteeship would permit Korea to develop enough political skill and experience for the maintenance of independence. Strategic considerations dictated American advocacy of a Korean trusteeship and underlined the realism of the policy. In view of past Sino-Soviet competition for control in Korea, only an Allied agree­ ment could encourage an atmosphere of stability in that area. Success would depend upon mutual trust, harmony, and cooperation which would be impossible if Korea obtained sovereignty and indepen­ dence prematurely.97 Trusteeship would foster Allied cooperation and coordination, thus ensuring Korea protection until it developed the capacity for self-direction. Roosevelt was aware that the Korean exiles

A n End to Indifference

*7

violently opposed trusteeship, b u t all th e facts at his disposal and th e strategic nature o f the peninsula dem anded a period o f preparation prior to full independence. Roosevelt therefore listened to his experts on Korea and adopted the realistic policy o f pursuing A llied endorsem ent o f a K orean tru st­ eeship. W ithout such an agreem ent, alm ost certainly Korea once again would become th e victim o f a great power rivalry.9* The U nited States then would have to apply considerable m ilitary pow er to guar­ antee Korea’s independence. By 1945, Roosevelt refused to divert any resources from operations contributing directly to the defeat o f Japan. The president also rem ained com m itted to A llied cooperation as the basis for peace in the postwar world. A fter forty years o f Jap a­ nese dom ination, Tyler D ennett concluded early in 1945, Korea had emerged as “a test case in international cooperation and international good faith.”" American indifference tow ard Korea was at an end.

C H A PTER

x

Captive o f the Cold War

Wartime negotiations among the Allies suggest that a Soviet-Ameri­ can dispute over the fate of postwar Korea was far from inevitable. At "Yalta, Roosevelt and Stalin agreed that since Korea would be incapa­ ble of self-government after liberation from the Japanese Empire, a four-power trusteeship would provide the best method for removing the peninsula from the arena of great power rivalry and conflict. Both Washington and Moscow appeared to share the common goal of creating stable economic and political conditions in postwar Korea and favored cooperation and coordination to achieve this result.1 Roosevelt’s Korea policy was realistic because it acknowledged that the Soviet Union, by virtue of its superior military position on the Asian mainland, could occupy Korea unilaterally at the end of the war. The president believed that national self-determination in Korea was possible only if the Allies managed to satisfy divergent national interests in this strategic area and fashion a new balance of power underwriting Korea’s independence. For Stalin, the preservation of Russian national security in north­ east Asia was of much greater importance than the fulfillment of ide­ alistic principles. He would not perm it the emergence of a Korean government hostile to the Soviet Union under any circumstances. Yet the Russian leader had good reason to believe that Soviet-trained Koreans, not to mention domestic Communists and those returning from exile in China, would exercise strong influence in any postwar Korean provisional government.2 Stalin’s opposition to the mainte­ nance of foreign troops in Korea during trusteeship implied that he expected significant popular appeal for communism and the Soviet Union in Korea after World War II. Although Stalin may have sought direct domination over Korea as a war aim, no conclusive evidence exists to substantiate this contention.3 It is quite possible that Stalin’s

Captive o f the C old War

X9

support for trusteeship was sincere, since he believed th e arrange­ ment would not prevent Moscow from having decisive influence over the development o f postwar Korea. Unfortunately, neither Roosevelt nor Stalin anticipated th a t th e defeat of Japan would follow so quickly after A llied victory in Europe. Consequendy, the A llied leaders had n o t discussed trustee­ ship in detail at Yalta. They had decided instead th a t a five-m em ber committee, composed o f representatives from m em ber nations on the proposed Security Council o f th e U nited N ations, would m eet prior to the San Francisco Conference to discuss th e term s o f an interna­ tional trusteeship system.4 C hiang, however, rem ained uneasy about Russian ambidons in Asia and therefore resisted any fu rther delay on the trusteeship issue.9 During conversations in W ashington, the Chinese advocated im ­ mediate recognition o f the K PG and adoption o f a plan for threepower military adm inistration o f Korea after liberation; there would be Soviet participation once Moscow entered th e Pacific war. State Department official Joseph B allantine replied th at th e U nited States was willing to exchange proposals b u t would n o t alter its policy o f nonrecognition. Vincent advised newly appointed Secretary o f State Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., th a t Sino-Soviet discussion “ o f th e future position o f Korea should be avoided if possible and, in any event, should be ‘purely exploratory’.” Final determ ination o f A llied policy on Korea required sim ultaneous consultations betw een all nations with legitimate interests on the peninsula.6 Soviet behavior in Eastern Europe shortly after Yalta frightened the Roosevelt adm inistration and appeared to substantiate C hiang’s warnings. Growing Am erican fears o f “ sovietization” soon would undermine and ultim ately destroy W ashington's confidence in th e advantages of a Korean trusteeship. Syngman Rhee acted quickly to cultivate and exploit this em erging Soviet-American rifi and thereby encourage the U nited States to provide positive assistance to th e Kim Ku regime. He notified th e adm inistration th a t Moscow intended to dominate Korea and had created a “ Korean Liberation C om m ittee” in Siberia for this purpose. Rhee’s attem pt to equate Korea w ith Poland was unm istakable. He dem anded an im m ediate investigation and reiterated the wisdom o f extending recognition to the K PG .7 When the State D epartm ent ignored his advice, Rhee charged th at Roosevelt had agreed at Yalta to perm it Soviet dom inance over post­ war Korea. “It is n o t the first tim e,” he bitterly rem inded the

30

CHAPTER!

Roosevelt administration, that “Korea was made a victim of secret diplomacy."8 American leaders did not dispute the accuracy of Rhee’s assessment of the strength o f the Korean Communist movement. Sources indi­ cated that Moscow had trained and equipped more than 100,000 Korean guerrillas for the liberation of Korea. American intelligence reports also revealed that the Chinese Communists had created a “Korean Revolutionary Military-Political School" at Yenan to train Korean leaders for the postwar administration of Korea.9 Although the KPG persistently claimed that it was the strongest and bestorganized resistance group, such information provided abundant contrary evidence. Kim Ku’s regime still manifested extreme fac­ tionalism, while its principal leaders appeared preoccupied with the pursuit of personal ambition and financial gain. Consequently, the administration persisted in its refusal to recognize the legitimacy of any Korean exile group.10 American leaders hardly welcomed the prospect of a Communist victory in Korea, but they confronted the fundamental problem of being unable to find a capable and popular «die group worthy of aid and support. Irusteeship and impartiality thus remained the hallmarks of Roo­ sevelt’s Korea policy. Yet Stimson and Secretary of the Navy James V. Forrestal harbored serious doubts about Roosevelt’s entire approach toward the reconstruction of colonial areas. American responsibility for dependent peoples and power for action, they argued, lacked spe­ cificity. Both men worried that the United States would surrender areas of strategic importance in the Pacific but other nations would not follow suit. During a cabinet meeting on March 9, 1945, Roose­ velt dismissed these arguments and reaffirmed his support for a sys­ tem of trustee nations deriving authority from the proposed postwar international security organization. Three weeks later, Stettinius flatly insisted on discussing the trusteeship issue at the San Francisco Conference.11 Washington envisioned the inclusion o f Korea in this larger trust­ eeship formula. As a result, the State Department rejected all requests for Korean representation at San Francisco.12 In the mean­ tim e, the administration was formulating a specific program for the occupation and interim administration of Korea. During November 1944, Roosevelt had created the State-War-Navy Coordinating Com­ mittee (SWNCC), comprised of assistant secretaries from each de­ partm ent, to improve civil-military consultation on major policy

Captive o f th e C old War

31

questions. By the following M arch, th e SW NCC had com pleted work on a series of papers dealing w ith th e treatm ent o f th e Korean popu­ lation during occupation, the utilization o f Koreans and Japanese in the military governm ent, and th e deportation o f Japanese to th eir home islands. The SW NCC also discussed th e com position o f th e occupation force and the relationship betw een th e tem porary m ilitary administration and the future international supervisory authority. By April, American plans for the transition period betw een liberation and trusteeship were virtually com plete.1* T hat sam e m onth, Roose­ velt stated publicly th at the U nited States n o t only advocated postwar international control over Jap an ’s m andates b u t intended to partici­ pate in these trusteeship arrangem ents as w ell.14 Roosevelt’s hope for postwar peace and security in Korea depended entirely upon the m aintenance o f A llied cooperation and m utual trust. Understandably, Stalin’s determ ination to achieve hegem ony in Eastern Europe caused Roosevelt to question th e Soviet leader’s will­ ingness to fulfill A llied agreem ents. N evertheless, when Roosevelt died on April 12, he still was optim istic about th e chances for contin­ ued Soviet-American cooperation despite sharp differences over such issues as the fate o f Poland.15 If th e fu ture o f Soviet-American rela­ tions in Eastern Europe appeared uncertain, however, Am erican pol­ icy toward Korea rem ained intact. W hether Soviet aspirations in Asia would have become a source o f serious concern in W ashington had Roosevelt lived will always be debatable. But Harry S. Trum an's assum ption o f the presidency marks a distinct turning p o in t in Am erican policy tow ard Korea. Almost from the outset, the new president expected Soviet actions in Asia to parallel Stalin’s policies in Eastern Europe. A lthough no clear relationship existed betw een th e two areas, Trum an preferred to view Soviet expansionism as an unchanging force in p o s tv ^ international affairs. Less than one week after taking office, TrumanR eversed Roosevelt’s position on th e territorial trusteeship lssue ancfadopted the Stimson-Forrestal approach. W ashington now would resist any detailed discussion o f th e m achinery for an international trusteeship system at the San Francisco C onference.14 This decision signaled th e beginning o f Trum an’s search for an alternative in Korea th a t would eliminate any opportunity for Soviet expansionism . Truman responded to postwar instability in colonial areas in a thor­ oughly predictable fashion th a t reflected his deep devotion to th e American tradition o f political liberalism . Like m ost Americans, the

3*

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new president assumed that liberated peoples, if given a free choice, would opt to follow the American model for political, economic, and social development in reconstructing their nations. Convinced of American altruism and the superiority of its political system, Truman hoped to use the power and influence of the United States to foster the emergence of democracy and economic development in colonial areas.17 In theory, the realization of the Wilsonian dream of world­ wide democracy, the ultimate goal of Truman’s approach, would produce an international system of maximum stability. More impor­ tant, if nations shared American values and institutions they would be more likely to act in partnership with the United States after World War II. In practice, however, Truman’s policy toward colonial areas came to focus almost exclusively on sponsoring governments that favored the achievement of American objectives regardless of their affection for democratic principles. For Truman, Soviet actions in Eastern Europe demonstrated Sta­ lin's determination to prevent the realization of his postwar aims in liberated areas. W ith considerable justification, the new president acted to counter the perceived threat of Soviet expansionism, despite the obvious limitations on the power of the United States.1* Many of Roosevelt’s advisors welcomed Truman’s decisive and confrontational style. These men had become dissatisfied with Roosevelt’s continued faith in Moscow’s willingness to cooperate with the United States and encouraged the new president to adopt a tougher stance on negotia­ tions with the Russians. Ambassador Harriman informed Truman during private discussions that Stalin was imposing his will on the nations of Eastern Europe in utter disregard of all wartime agree­ ments. Admiral Leahy and Secretary Forrestal joined Harriman in asserting that Soviet behavior represented a serious political and stra­ tegic threat to American security. In response, Truman assured his advisors that he intended to be firm in his dealings with Stalin and to insist upon the fulfillment of Allied agreements.19 Truman embraced without hesitation the hard-line attitude toward Stalin that many of Roosevelt’s advisors recommended. ’’To a man of Thiman’s blunt, contentious personality,” John Lewis Gaddis has observed, “this tough policy must have seemed particularly conge­ nial.”20 Almost immediately, Truman came to rely on those advisors most dedicated to a policy of toughness toward the Soviet Union.21 On April 23, 1945, the president told his advisors that when he met Molotov that day, he would assume a firm stand on Poland and

Captive o f th e C old War

33

demand Soviet compliance w ith th e \ä lta agreem ents.22 A lthough Truman had not abandoned com pletely th e possibility o f a réconcilia* tion with the Soviet U nion,29 his uncom prom ising rhetoric indicated that he did not fully share his predecessor’s confidence in th e proba­ bility of Soviet-American cooperation for th e resolution o f postw ar international problem s. Leahy applauded the change in Am erican policy. W ith th e im m i­ nent defeat o f Germany, he noted, “ no particular harm can now be done to our war prospects even if Russia should slow down or even stop its war effort in Europe and Asia.“ 24 Thus th e Truman adm inis­ tration began at an early date to question the wisdom o f continuing to encourage Soviet involvem ent in the war against Jap an . W hile harsh words would not induce th e Soviet U nion to retreat from East­ ern Europe, the situation in Asia was different. The U nited States could prevent a repetition o f this unhappy series o f events in East Asia because the Red Army was n o t in occupation o f the area. A m eri­ can leaders recognized th at if Am erican forces liberated the nations under Japanese dom ination, Soviet expansion in Asia w ould not emerge as an international headache in the postwar world. Harriman believed th at the U nited States should resist Soviet expansionism not only in Europe b u t in Asia as well. H e explained to Truman that the U nited States could expect the same pattern o f Soviet conduct in M anchuria and Korea th at existed in Poland and Rumania. On May 12, 1945, H arrim an rem inded the president th at Russian intervention in the Pacific war would entail Soviet participa­ tion in the occupation and reconstruction o f Japan. In regard to Korea, Harriman alleged th at during discussions at Yalta, Stalin had questioned the need for trusteeship should th e Koreans prove able to create a “satisfactory governm ent.” American diplom atic records pro­ vide no evidence o f such a statem ent, yet H arrim an advanced the opinion th at unless the U nited States acted to prevent it, there “would unquestionably be a Bolshevik or Soviet governm ent” in Korea after World War II.25 That same day, Undersecretary o f State Joseph C. Grew registered similar anxiety over the consequences o f Soviet entry into the Pacific war. He urged Truman to obtain Stalin’s assent to a num ber o f condi­ tions prior to the im plem entation o f the Yalta agreem ent on the Far East. Grew desired Moscow’s unqualified support for Chiang Kaishek’s regime in C hina, respect for the term s o f the Cairo Declara­ tion, and agreem ent to the establishm ent o f a four-power trusteeship

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in Korea. Grew echoed Harriman’s sentiments when he argued that the Soviet Union, in refusing to fulfill its promises in Europe, had sacrificed American trust. Thus, the United States had every right to deny Stalin a free hand in Asia.26 Grew’s recommendations, coupled with Harriman’s remarks, apparently had a significant impact on the president. Their assessment, as subsequent events would reveal, appears to have convinced Truman that if Stalin occupied the Korean peninsula unilaterally, Korean self-government meant sovietization. Korea’s fate ultimately was tied to American military capabilities and Truman’s strategy for the defeat of Japan. If Stalin refused to endorse a Korean trusteeship, only prior American occupation of the peninsula could guarantee independence for Korea. American mili­ tary leaders never ceased emphasizing that defeating Japan was the highest priority. General MacArthur, for example, pressed Washing­ ton not to delay a frontal assault on the heartland of Japan. He also favored early Soviet participation in the Pacific war, remarking cyni­ cally that Moscow would inevitably seize Manchuria and Korea after World War II and m ight as well earn these territorial acquisitions.27 Grew disagreed strongly with MacArthur’s reasoning. If Moscow entered the Pacific war, he predicted, the Soviet Union would become the dominant power in postwar Asia and constitute an even greater threat than Japan to American security. Grew offered the dire prophecy that once the Soviets entered the war, “Mongolia, Manchu­ ria, and Korea will gradually slip into Russia’s orbit, to be followed in due course by China and eventually Japan.’’ To avert such a distaste­ ful turn of events, the United States had to maintain its military power and control several strategic areas in the Pacific. It would be fatal to trust the Soviet Union, Grew warned, since Stalin would exploit any sign of American weakness. While Grew kept these visions of falling dominoes in Asia largely to himself, Harriman did not hesitate to convey similar apprehensions to Thiman. On May 13, the ambassador exhorted the president to meet with Stalin and Chur­ chill within a few weeks to terminate the developing split among the Allies. Harriman specifically mentioned the Korean trusteeship as an issue urgently in need of clarification.2* An apparently insoluble dilemma challenged Truman’s foreign policy in Asia. Washington had to devise a military strategy for vic­ tory over Japan that would provide a strategic position from which the United States could react effectively in the face of anticipated Soviet duplicity. On May 21, the War Department presented its case

35

in defense o f M acArthur’s tw o-phase p lan for th e defeat o f Jap an . It specifically rejected Grew’s suggestion th a t th e U nited States w ith­ hold the Yalta concessions u n til Stalin prom ised to respect th e sover­ eignty of China and Korea. T he W ar D epartm ent judged th e entire issue to be o f academic interest alone because “ Russia is m ilitarily capable o f defeating th e Japanese and occupying K arafuto, M anchu­ ria, Korea and N orthern C hina before it w ould be possible for th e U.S. military forces to occupy these areas.” O n th e positive side, Soviet intervention in th e war against Jap an w ould save A m erican lives. Faced w ith conflicting advice, T him an rejected th e State D e­ partment's position. T he president h ad no choice. A m erican options were few and far from prom ising. O n May 25, Thim an approved MacArthur’s p lan .2’ Truman soon realized, as h ad Roosevelt, th a t if th e U nited States could not use its m ilitary pow er in Asia to com pel Soviet caution, diplomatic agreem ent was th e only alternative. A t th e same tim e, his tough rhetoric had done little to alter S talin’s policies in Eastern Europe. Rather th an arranging for an early m eeting o f A llied leaders, as Ambassador H arrim an desired, th e president decided instead to dispatch Harry H opkins to Moscow in an effort to resolve outstanding differences and encourage Soviet com pliance w ith W ashington’s defi­ nition of the Yalta agreem ents. State D epartm ent officials form ulat­ ed a detailed set o f instructions regarding K orea for th e H opkins m is­ sion. It was particularly im p o rtan t, they believed, for H opkins to obtain Soviet support for a four-pow er trusteeship w hich guaranteed equal representation in th e A llied civil adm inistration o f postw ar Korea. Moreover, H opkins was to gain S talin’s assurance th a t th e international arrangem ent w ould concentrate on training reliable local Koreans for self-governm ent. T he State D epartm ent hoped that, through A llied cooperation, trusteeship w ould produce a K o­ rean government th a t truly reflected th e free will o f th e people. B oth the War and Navy departm ents approved these recom m endations, but both counseled delay regarding specific arrangem ents pertaining to military m atters.30 Thus the Truman adm inistration h ad resurrected Roosevelt’s policy of seeking Allied agreem ent for a detailed trusteeship arrangem ent in postwar Korea. All this planning was superfluous, however. A t Mos­ cow, Hopkins com pletely ignored th e State D ep artm en t’s instruc­ tions and failed to discuss in detail K orea’s fu tu re. H e m erely reminded Stalin th a t a t Yalta, he an d Roosevelt h ad agreed only to a

36

CHAPTER 1

four-power trusteeship of unspecified duration. Hopkins then sug­ gested that the period of international guidance might last as long as twenty-five years, but certainly a minimum of five years. Stalin avoided a discussion of specifics as well, but he reaffirmed his unqualified endorsement of a four-power trusteeship for Korea.31 Stalin’s comments to Hopkins provided little evidence that the Soviet leader intended to undermine the Korean trusteeship agree­ m ent. Soviet conduct in Eastern Europe did suggest the possibility, however, of Stalinist ambitions in Asia. Chiang never doubted for a moment Moscow’s sinister plans for Korea and continually pestered Washington about the existence of Soviet-trained Korean guerrillas in Siberia. Nevertheless, the United States closely adhered to its impar­ tial stance. In June 1943, Grew announced publicly that the KPG did not have “at the present time the qualifications requisite for obtain­ ing recognition.’’ That same m onth, during discussions with T. V. Soong, Truman stated confidently that Stalin intended to endorse both Chiang’s government in China and international control over postwar Korea.32 The president apparently had made up his mind to trust Stalin to fulfill his promises. In the absence of a willingness to use military power, Human had no other alternative. Military strategy buttressed Truman’s commitment to a trusteeship for Korea. In contrast to Grew and other officials in the State Depart­ m ent, American military leaders appeared far less troubled about Soviet aspirations in Asia. Following the collapse of Germany, Tru­ m an’s military advisors continued to lobby for direct invasion and Soviet entry in the Pacific war as the best method for defeating Japan. Late in May 1945, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) discarded a proposal to land troops in Manchuria and Korea, because such an operation would prolong the war and have doubtful impact on the Japanese war machine. Since Washington’s highest priority was the rapid subjuga­ tion of Japan, “the employment of substantial United States forces in Manchuria and Korea is not justified.’’33 A military strategy of this sort precluded the achievement of a sufficiently powerful military position after the war from which the United States could block Soviet expansion on the northeast Asian mainland. Truman gave final approval to MacArthur’s invasion plan—codenamed “Olympic”—at a W hite House strategy meeting on June 18, 1945. At that time, Marshall managed to convince Navy Chief of Staff Admiral Ernest R. King that the United States had to occupy the island of Kyushu prior to a direct invasion of Japan. His strongest

Captive o f th e C old War

37

argument em phasized th a t o p eratio n O lym pic was th e least expen­ sive strategy available, particu larly in com parison w ith a p o te n tia l landing on the K orean p eninsula: An outstanding military point about attacking Korea is the difficult terrain and beach conditions which appear to make the only acceptable assault areas Fusan (Pusan) in the southeast comer and Keijo (Seoul), well up the western side, lb get to Fusan, which is a strongly fortified area, we must move large and vulnerable assault forces past heavily for­ tified Japanese areas. The operation appears more difficult and cosdy than assault on Kyushu. Keijo appears an equally difficult and cosdy operation. After we have undertaken either one of them we still will not be as far forward as going into Kyushu. Marshall’s strategy called for Soviet m ilitary m ovem ent in to M anchu­ ria and Korea in order to accept th e surrender o f Ja p a n ’s forces.94 Although H um an approved these recom m endations, he decided to delay final authorization for th e second phase o f th e plan—th e actual invasion of Japan—since he was aware th at th e successful testing and use of the atomic bom b m ight m ake this cosdy operation unneces­ sary.” American m ilitary planners already were preparing for th e possible sudden collapse o f Japan in th e afterm ath o f an atom ic attack. O n June 14, the JCS instructed M acArthur and Pacific Fleet Com m ander Chester W. N im itz to be ready for Jap an ’s prem ature surrender and to formulate plans for the early occupation o f Japan. O n Ju n e 29, Human approved this action and also authorized an intensification o f bombing and blockade operations against Japan in order to reduce the enemy’s ability to resist an American invasion. If a direct assault on Japan became necessary, W ashington believed th at operations could commence no earlier th an N ovem ber 1 ,1 9 4 5 .36 While completing m ilitary plans, th e H um an adm inistration also prepared for the Potsdam Conference. Early in May 1945, Secretary Stimson requested a policy position paper on Korea from the State Department. The report pointed o u t th at widespread unrest and demands for agrarian reform were likely in Korea after years o f im pe­ rialist exploitation. The lack o f an experienced and representative group of exiles to assume governm ental responsibilities would com­ pound Korea’s problem s. Alarmingly, the report predicted th at Mos­ cow would "probably occupy all or p art o f Korea’’ and insist upon establishing a friendly governm ent composed o f exiles trained in the

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Soviet Union. The State Departm ent reasoned that poor economic conditions in postwar Korea would encourage a favorable reception of Communist ideology; a Soviet-sponsored socialist regime “might eas­ ily receive popular support.”57 For the State Departm ent, Korea’s future hinged upon the ability o f the Allies to agree on a m ultinational invasion force for the libera­ tion of the peninsula. Although American participation was impor­ tant, it was vital that none “of the interested countries alone . . . invade Korea,” particularly the Soviet Union. Final briefing papers for Potsdam urged that the Allies designate Korea a combined zone o f military operations under a single command. A four-power inter­ national supervisory body would replace the military government as quickly as possible to shorten the duration o f occupation and reduce the chance of tension within the Grand Alliance. At Potsdam, Amer­ ican planners hoped to obtain “agreement among the three powers that, with China’s anticipated cooperation, they will jointly support whatever measures appear best adapted to develop in Korea a strong, democratic, independent nation.” Finally, the State Department wanted Truman to elicit from Stalin specific assurances of his concur­ rence with the Cairo Declaration.58 Truman’s Korea policy thus envisioned the achievement of inde­ pendence in three stages consisting o f Allied occupation and military government, international administrative supervision, and finally complete sovereignty.59 Significantly, American military leaders ap­ proved the State Departm ent plan but warned that the United States “should not attem pt to back up the Cairo Declaration with armed force.”40 There appeared to be no cause for anxiety, however, since Moscow still advocated a trusteeship for Korea. In July 1945, Stalin raised the Korean issue during consultations with T. V. Soong for the development of a postwar Sino-Soviet treaty ratifying the Yalta agree­ m ent on the Far East. Molotov commented that the Korean trustee­ ship proposal was unusual and unprecedented, thus requiring a de­ tailed understanding among the Allied nations most concerned about Korea’s future. Soong was evasive. He later told Harriman that he was afraid Moscow intended to install Soviet-trained exiles in the postwar Korean government and thereby dominate the nation. Harri­ man fully shared Soong’s apprehension. He implored Truman to have the State Department prepare “a detailed discussion of the character of the proposed four-power trusteeship for Korea” in anticipation of the Potsdam Conference. Evidently the president acted on this

Captive o f the C old War

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advice, since Leahy cabled instructions to Grew for the preparation o f such a study while en route to Germany.41 News of the successful testing o f the atom ic bom b reached Truman on the day he arrived at Potsdam . Stim son recorded in his m em oirs that at this point the president began “ losing his interest“ in Soviet entry into the Pacific war.42 The atom ic bom b soon would have a decisive impact on American policy toward Korea. As later develop­ ments would reveal, both Truman and his newly appointed Secretary of State James F. Byrnes hoped th a t em ploying the atom ic bom b against Japan would end the war quickly. W hile their prim ary reason for using the bom b was to save Am erican lives, Thim an and Byrnes surely must have recognized th e diplom atic and strategic benefits o f an early Japanese surrender. If th e Pacific war ended prior to Mos­ cow’s declaration o f war on Jap an , th e U nited States could avoid th e numerous anticipated com plications entailed in Russian participation in the reconstruction o f Japan. Furtherm ore, Ja p an ’s prem ature sur­ render would perm it the U nited States to occupy Korea unilaterally and avoid the distasteful necessity for trusteeship. Stimson sensed th e danger associated w ith leaving anything to chance. He insisted th a t an agreem ent on th e m ultinational occupa­ tion of Korea rem ained o f vital im portance: If an international trusteeship is not set up in Korea, and perhaps if it is, these Korean divisions [in Siberia] will probably gain control, and influence die setting up of a Soviet dominated local government, rather than an independent one. This is the Polish question trans­ planted to the Far East.49 Japan’s rapid surrender, however, w ould preem pt Soviet entrance into the Pacific war, thereby elim inating th e possibility o f a sovietized Korea. For Truman and Byrnes, th e atom ic bom b would offer an ave­ nue of escape from the Korean dilem m a. Stalin's comments at Potsdam convinced Truman th a t such a strat­ egy in Korea was feasible. O n July 17, Stalin stated th at he would not declare war on Japan u n til C hina ratified the term s o f the Yalta agree­ ment on the Far East. Thim an countered th at there existed certain misunderstandings about th e provisions o f the accord. For exam ple, the United States believed th at the Chinese port o f D airen ultim ately was to become a free port under the supervision o f China. O n the fol­ lowing day, Stalin announced th a t the Soviet U nion would not be

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prepared to wage war against Japan before August 15, 1945.44 These initial exchanges confirmed that if the United States could compel Japan to surrender during the first two weeks of August, it could pre­ em pt Soviet entry into the Pacific war. Byrnes privately proposed that the Allies issue an ultim atum demanding Japan's capitulation within two weeks and threatening complete destruction after that deadline. If Soong stood firm in resisting Soviet demands for acceptance of the Yalta concessions and Stalin delayed military action in Asia, the atomic bomb would bring the prom pt defeat of Japan, he reasoned, "and this will save China.”4’ Concurrently, such a chain of events would preclude Soviet control over Dairen and Korea as well. On July 22, the Allied leaders addressed the issue of international trusteeship. Stalin pointed to Molotov as the expert on the subject and suggested that the time had come to consider specific areas, such as the Italian colonies and the m andated islands. British Foreign Min­ ister Anthony Eden's sharp rejoinder was "D o you want our man­ dates?” Stalin replied that there were other mandates deserving attention; the Allies could also exchange views on Korea. Churchill openly objected to further discussion of the matter, but Truman stat­ ed his willingness to refer the trusteeship issue to the Council of For­ eign Ministers. An acrimonious and prolonged discussion then en­ sued regarding the fate of the Italian colonies, as Churchill displayed marked suspicion o f Moscow’s motives and intentions in the Mediter­ ranean. Reluctantly, the prime minister agreed to allow the Council o f Foreign Ministers to consider the Soviet proposal on trusteeship.44 Unfortunately, the Allies had reached no firm agreement on Korea because the trusteeship question had become entangled in the unre­ lated issue o f Anglo-Soviet competition in the Mediterranean. The last and best chance to settle the Korean problem amicably had been lost.47 Leahy later observed, accurately, that the long discussion of trustee­ ship had in fact revealed nothing definite about Stalin's postwar aspi­ rations.48 Britain’s overreaction made the task of assessing Soviet intentions no easier. Moscow’s proposal on trusteeship was inoffensive enough, while the Soviet Union possessed a clear right to lay claim to certain Axis mandates. Additionally, the \k lta agreements called for Allied negotiations to determine the specifics of an international trusteeship system.49 Events in Eastern Europe, however, prevented Truman from trusting Stalin. On July 23, Harriman visited Stimson and painted a disturbing picture of Stalin’s ambitions in colonial

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areas. The Soviet U nion, H arrim an avowed, was no longer acting like a continental power b u t was seeking “ to branch in all directions.” H e speculated that Stalin favored an im m ediate trusteeship in Korea in order to demand a sim ilar settlem ent on H ong K ong and Indochina. Aware that Britain and France w ould scoff at these proposals, H arri­ man believed Stalin and M olotov w ould “ probably drop their pro­ posal for trusteeship o f Korea and ask for solitary control o f it.” ’0 Stimson conveyed H arrim an’s scenario to Trum an during a conver­ sation later that m orning. The president agreed th a t Russia was dem ­ onstrating an expansionist in ten t, b u t he th o u g h t Stalin was bluff­ ing. Stimson reported in his diary th a t Trum an th en assured him th a t “the United States was standing firm and he was apparently relying greatly upon the inform ation as to S -l.” Earlier th a t day, Truman had received word th at the U nited States w ould be able to drop an atom ic bomb (code-named “ S -l” ) on Jap an during th e first week o f A u­ gust.’1 Truman and Byrnes undoubtedly reasoned th at if they used the bomb on schedule and Jap an surrendered, th e Soviet U nion would not enter the Pacific war an d only C hina, B ritain, and th e United States would occupy Korea. Marshall did not share Trum an’s certitude about this atom ic strat­ egy. On July 23, he explained to Stim son th a t Soviet troops already were massing in Siberia and th e U nited States could do little to pre­ vent the seizure o f any territory Stalin desired. Marshall continued to favor early Soviet intervention in to th e Pacific war as th e surest method for hastening Jap an ’s subjugation. D uring th e A llied m ili­ tary meeting the following day, th e Am erican position seem ed to reflect Marshall’s view point. Soviet G eneral Alexei E. A ntonov stated that the Soviet army w ould enter th e war in the latter part o f A ugust. He then requested a target date for Am erican invasion o f Korea. Marshall responded th a t th e U nited States did not contem plate a landing in Korea in the near fu tu re. Since Korea was vulnerable to air attacks from Japan, W ashington was concentrating instead upon the early occupation o f Kyushu as its highest priority.52 Ignoring the planning papers, Am erican m ilitary leaders thus agreed to nothing specific regarding th e m ultinational occupation o f Korea. The Allies d id n o t establish clear lines for ground action because, as Truman explained in his m em oirs, “ it was n o t anticipated by our military leaders th a t we w ould carry our operations to Korea.” On July 26, A llied m ilitary planners m et again and settled upon zones of air and naval operations, resulting in th e division o f Korea

42-

CHAPTBR X

just below the 41st parallel. W hen Antonov asked for the exact date of the American landing on Kyushu, Marshall replied that the United States would begin its operations in late October. Antonov expressed approval but openly voiced a preference for American action at an earlier date.” Meanwhile, American military experts apparendy had altered their posidon and now accepted Truman’s argument that victory over Japan no longer required Soviet pardcipadon in the Pacific war. On July 25, Marshall requested MacArthur’s plan for the occupadon of Japan in the event of sudden surrender, as well as informadon on force requirements for landing in Korea. In response, MacArthur’s headquarters informed Washington that its plan, although incom­ plete, provided for the occupadon of Japan twelve days after surren­ der and entry into Korea at a later date. Marshall immediately ordered MacArthur to prepare to enter Japan on a moment’s nodce and to establish the occupadon of the Korean peninsula as his next highest priority.” During discussions with Lieutenant General John E. Hull, Marshall asserted that if the Soviets invaded Korea, the United States had to gain control over at least two major ports. There­ fore, Marshall and Hull settled upon a line near the 38th parallel as a minimum policy objecdve, but they remained hopeful that Japan’s quick surrender would make Soviet military acdon in Korea unneces­ sary.” Washington’s Korea policy thus experienced a remarkable transfor­ mation during the Potsdam Conference. Truman and his advisors decided to discard trusteeship in anriciparion of a rapid end to the Pacific war that would forestall Soviet occupadon. At the Council of Foreign Ministers meeting on July 23, Byrnes joined Eden in oppos­ ing detailed discussion of trusteeship. Molotov agreed to table his proposal, but he asked that the final protocol provide specifically for adding the trusteeship issue to the agenda at the foreign ministers meeting scheduled for September in London. When Eden objected, Molotov insisted that the protocol at least note Moscow’s raising of the issue. After some discussion, Byrnes said he would support this request.’6 But when the Allies drafted the final protocol, both Byrnes and Eden opposed the inclusion of a general statement on trusteeship. Byrnes claimed that Moscow’s proposal was unacceptable because “trusteeship as presented in the Soviet request was much broader and it was not his understanding that the Big Three had agreed to refer it

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to the Council o f Foreign M inisters." M olotov relented, declaring th a t he did not intend to press the m atter.97 A nd so, th e final protocol noted only that the Allies had exam ined th e trusteeship issue b u t referred specifically to th e Italian colonies alone. Stalin grudgingly acquiesced, com m enting th a t " th e Russians were given very little in this paper."98 D espite Moscow’s genuine desire for an accord a t Pots­ dam, the Allies had reached no definite agreem ent on Korea. Irum an’s strategy for preem pting Soviet intervention in th e Pacific war proceeded according to plan. O n Ju ly 26, th e U nited States and Britain issued th e Potsdam D eclaration threatening Japan w ith "prompt and u tter destruction" if it d id n o t surrender forthw ith. Two days later, Byrnes confessed to Forrestal th at "h e was m ost anx­ ious to get the Japanese affair over w ith before th e Russians got in." If Moscow moved into Japanese-occupied areas, he w arned, " it w ould not be easy to get them o u t."99 In th e absence o f a response from Japan, the U nited States dropped atom ic bom bs on H iroshim a and Nagasaki on August 6 and 9 respectively. In th e interim , th e Soviet Union declared war on Japan an d subscribed to th e Potsdam Declara­ tion, which included a reaffirm ation o f th e pledge to strive for th e eventual independence o f K orea.60 For H u m an , Stalin’s decision to enter the war earlier th an A m erican leaders expected was tragic because it spoiled his strategy for achieving unilateral Am erican occu­ pation of Korea. Yet one scarcely can fau lt th e Soviet U nion for trying to avert a fa it accom pli and to ensure participation in th e determ ina­ tion ofJapan’s future. A t th e sam e tim e, Soviet entry into th e Pacific war meant th at the U nited States was n o t in any position to guarantee Korea’s postwar independence.61 Byrnes observed in his m em oirs th a t Jap an ’s ab ru p t surrender was no surprise.62 Soviet intervention in th e war before A ugust 15, how­ ever, certainly was unexpected. T he SW NCC already was p u ttin g th e finishing touches on plans for th e occupation o f Japan. O n July 28, MacArthur had cabled his proposal—code-nam ed "B lacklist"— which anticipated unified A llied occupation and adm inistration o f Japan, Korea, the C hina coast, and Formosa. N im itz opposed Mac­ Arthur’s plan and sent A dm iral K ing his own proposal, which called for a more rapid occupation u n d er th e direction o f th e navy. This intetservice feud forced th e JCS to defer action u n til after th e Pots­ dam Conference. W hile M acA rthur and N im itz searched for a com­ promise, Marshall considered including Korea in th e Chinese zone o f operations and cabled L ieutenant G eneral A lbert C. W edemeyer,

44

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American advisor to Chiang in Chungking, requesting comments on the idea.*9 Moscow’s declaration of war against Japan meant that the United States could not afford the luxury of further delay. On August 10, Washington ordered Wedemeyer to assist China in occupying For­ mosa and Korea, while American forces would concentrate on Japan. That same day, Japan asked for surrender terms and the administra­ tion made one final stab at preventing unilateral Soviet occupation of Korea. Byrnes instructed the SWNCC to prepare a plan for SovietAmerican occupation of Korea, a plan which would divide the penin­ sula into two zones with the line as far north as possible.*4 American military leaders cautioned against such action, pointing out that the United States had limited men and material in that area whereas the Soviet army was poised on the Korean frontier. Nevertheless, late in the evening on August 10, the SWNCC instructed Colonels C. H. Bonesteel III and Dean Rusk to find a line in Korea that would har­ monize the political desire to have American forces receive the sur­ render as far north as possible with the obvious restrictions on the ability of the United States to reach the area. Bonesteel and Rusk decided upon the 38th parallel as a suitable dividing line, and the SWNCC incorporated this provision into a preliminary draft of “General Order Number One.”49 Truman, recognizing the need to act quickly, informed the other Allies immediately of the general terms for accepting Japan’s surren­ der. He still hoped that the United States could occupy most of Korea. On August 11, the president ordered Marshall to arrange for the occupation of Dairen and a port in Korea as soon as possible.46 In all probability, Truman was acting on the advice of Edwin W. Pauley, the American representative on the Allied Reparations Commission, who sent an urgent cable from Moscow on the same day recommend­ ing quick and drastic measures: Conclusions I have reached through discussion on reparations and oth­ erwise . . . lead m e to th e b elief th a t our forces should occupy quickly as m uch o f th e industrial areas o f K orea and M anchuria as we can, starting a t the southerly tip and progressively northw ard. I am assum­ ing all o f this will be done at no risk o f A m erican lives . . . and occu­ pancy to continue only u n til satisfactory agreem ents have been reached betw een th e nations concerned w ith respect to reparations and territo­ rial rights and o th er concessions.47

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The following day, H arrim an strongly endorsed th is call fo r vigorous action: Considering the way Stalin is behaving in increasing his demands on Soong, I recommend that these landings be made to accept surrender of the Japanese troops at least on the Kwantung Peninsula and in Korea. I cannot see that we are under any obligation to the Soviets to respect any zone of Soviet military occupation. The ambassador urged th at th e U nited States establish a position in Korea and at Dairen as soon as practicable.68 At the SWNCC m eeting o f A ugust 12, A dm iral M. B. G ardner outlined Truman’s desires. He proposed a revision o f G eneral O rder Number One to include the 39th parallel, thus providing for A m eri­ can occupation o f D airen and a larger portion o f th e Korean p enin­ sula. After referral o f the proposal to the JC S, the SW NCC reaf­ firmed the 38th parallel, probably because the Red Army already had entered Korea. Brigadier G eneral George A. Lincoln explained th at the Soviet Union certainly would not accept the new line, nor could the United States hope to reach a point further n o rth .69 Thus the final draft o f General O rder N um ber O ne possessed only m inor changes with respect to Korea; on A ugust 15 Truman dispatched it to the other Allies for approval. The JCS was satisfied th at the 38th par­ allel provided both for American control over the capital o f Korea and for sufficient land to apportion zones o f occupation to China and Britain. Yet American leaders did recognize th at the Allies had not agreed on administrative and governm ental control in Korea after occupation. The JCS advised Truman to obtain a detailed agreem ent, while at the same tim e form ulating a policy directive for the eventual American occupation com m ander.70 Years later, Truman tried to portray the 38th parallel decision as the product of military expediency and convenience. “ O f course,” the president remarked in his m em oirs, “ there was no thought at the time other than to provide a convenient allocation o f responsibility for the acceptance o f the Japanese surrender.” 71 In reality, political and strategic considerations were prim arily responsible for American actions.72 Truman and his advisors believed th at if Stalin dom inated the Korean peninsula, the Soviet U nion could underm ine C hiang’s position in China and p u t the security o f Japan in jeopardy. Consequendy, at the tim e o f Jap an ’s surrender, th e occupation o f some por-

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don of Korea was Washington's second priority in Asia. But after Thiman jettisoned trusteeship, the United States lacked sufficient power to block Soviet military occupation of the entire peninsula once Mos­ cow had entered the Pacific war. Many American leaders therefore doubted whether Stalin would accept the 38th parallel, and a “short period of suspense” followed Washington’s transmission of General Order Number One to Moscow. The JCS, anticipating a rejection, was prepared to order the immediate occupation of Pusan.73Just as Stalin maintained good faith on trusteeship, however, he also cooper­ ated in approving expeditiously the terms for accepting Japan’s sur­ render.74 Scholars have criticized the decision to divide Korea into two zones o f occupation and have advanced a variety of reasons to buttress their position. Certainly the line was ill advised as a permanent boundary since it cut across natural areas of geographic, cultural, and climatic continuity. On the west coast, for example, a small peninsula was part o f the American zone, yet the United States possessed no land con­ nection to the area.73 Given the alternative of complete Soviet con­ trol, however, Ihunan thought he had registered a major success. Sta­ lin's decision to intervene prematurely in the Pacific war had ruined Ih u n an ’s strategy for excluding the Soviet Union entirely from partic­ ipation in Korea’s reconstruction. As a result, the United Sûtes had to settle for half a loaf since its troops were more than six hundred miles away. The Red Army could have occupied the entire peninsula before American forces reached Korea, and Ihunan discerned the political importance of avoiding such an event. If he had not, the United States would never have pressed for a zone of occupation in that area.76 Only Stalin’s willingness to accept the surrender agree­ ment made possible the subsequent American occupation of south­ ern Korea. Under these circumstances, control over half the Korean peninsula was the most that Ihunan or anyone else could have expected.77 Stalin’s decision to approve the American proposal for a division of Korea at the 38th parallel was not the product of altruism. In all probability, Stalin sought to maintain good relations with Ihunan in order to gain an equal voice in determining Japan’s future develop­ m ent.76 At the same time, the Soviet leader undoubtedly viewed the 38th parallel as a suitable division of Korea into spheres of influence. Furthermore, the line possessed some basis in history while constitut­ ing a rough halving of the peninsula.79 Stalin would have preferred a

47

unified and “friendly” Korea, b u t he o p ted for tem porary division in the interests o f A llied harmony. If Soviet-American relations dete­ riorated, he could always retain control in th e north and preserve Soviet national security interests in northeast Asia. A n attem p t to seize the entire peninsula, on the o th er h an d , would only alarm Washington and thereby negate possible concessions in m ore im por­ tant areas.80 A concern for the future o f Jap an also dom inated Trum an’s th in k ­ ing with respect to Korea. T he president believed th a t Am erican occupation o f southern Korea w ould m ake it infinitely easier for th e United States to m aintain its com m and over th e postw ar reconstruc­ tion of Japan. W hen Stalin requested a Soviet zone o f occupation in Japan, Truman refused to comply. H arrim an, suspecting th a t Moscow sought to dom inate Japan and K orea, enthusiastically applauded this decision. On August 27, the am bassador m et w ith Stalin and appar­ ently won his consent for th e A m erican occupation policy in Japan. Significantly, Stalin chose to respect th e K orean arrangem ent despite Truman’s obduracy regarding Jap an and subsequently instructed th e Red Army to rem ain north o f th e 38th parallel.81 Yet Trum an’s refusal to grant Stalin an equal voice in determ ining policies for Japanese reconstruction m eant th at a successful resolution o f th e K orean prob­ lem would be far m ore difficult. N evertheless, Trum an rem ained o u t­ wardly optimistic. A t a news conference less th an a week after Ja p an ’s surrender, the president confidendy declared th at Korea eventually would emerge as a free and u n ited n ad o n .82 In view o f th e absence o f firm Allied agreem ent on Korea, wishful thinking alone could justify Truman’s cheerful oudook. Perhaps worse, the adm inistration never seem ed to understand that the United States would face th e form idable task o f im plem ent­ ing change in postwar Korea in a chaotic atm osphere. The im pact o f Japanese colonial policies had been particularly traum atic on K orea’s traditions and social institutions.89 A nti-im perialist agitation and rev­ olutionary nationalism soon w ould com plicate the form ulation and implementation o f Am erican policy in K orea.84 Most underground leaders inside Korea favored rapid and sweeping reform s, b u t few had developed specific program s for postwar reconstruction. N one could claim experience in governm ent, while factional disputes pre­ vented united and purposeful action.89 The only m ajor group th at enjoyed some sem blance o f cohesion was the C om m unist party, which had operated as the leading elem ent in th e resistance move-

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ment. The undisputed leader of the Korean underground was Pak Hön-yöng, a Communist who had organized cells and published a radical newspaper before and during World War II.”6 On the eve of Soviet-American occupation of Korea, the Communist party, ac­ cording to Gregory Henderson, was extremely popular, particularly among young Koreans, and “unquestionably the country’s most important single political force.”87 Not surprisingly, the Japanese fretted more about Pak’s under­ ground than the feeble exile movement and therefore suppressed news of Allied military victories. In the aftermath of Japan’s surren­ der, Japanese leaders in Korea understandably feared retaliation from their former servants. When the Koreans staged a spontaneous holi­ day to celebrate Japan’s defeat, replete with wild parties and mass demonstrations, these anxieties were if anything heightened. Conse­ quently, Japan’s governor, Noboyuki Abe, approached local Korean leaders and proposed the formation of a transition government capa­ ble of maintaining law and order and protecting Japanese lives and property. Prominent leftist leader % Un-hyöng agreed to cooperate, but only on the condition that Abe release all political prisoners, guarantee freedom of speech, and forswear interference in % ’s politi­ cal activities. Abe consented and on August 15 % formed the “Com­ mittee for the Preparation of Korean Independence.”88 % promptly set about creating local “people’s committees” (an unfortunate designation) to assume administrative responsibilities. Most Koreans accepted % ’s authority, including landlords, intellec­ tuals, students, and professional people. Moreover, % ’s 135 commit­ tees were able to exploit the Japanese communication, transporta­ tion, and administration network, rapidly achieving a measurable amount of centralized power. These people’s committees quickly expropriated the land of the Japanese and their Korean collaborators, while simultaneously releasing all political prisoners. By the end of August, % had emerged as the unchallenged de facto leader throughout Korea.89 Soviet entry into Korea enhanced this leftward drift. % realistically recognized that he had to respect the desires of the Communists if he expected Soviet backing. Predictably, wealthy Koreans were the sub­ ject of ever increasing political repression, as % ’s collaborators denied conservatives any influence in political affairs. When news arrived in late August that the United States would occupy southern Korea, % decided to convene a national congress in Seoul to provide his regime

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with the stamp o f legitimacy. A lthough TÖ tried to attract a broad cross section o f Korea’s political leadership, th e C om m unists m an­ aged the proceedings from th e outset and engineered th e adoption o f a platform advocating th e expropriation o f all Japanese property and recommending a num ber o f o th er specific social and econom ic re­ forms. On Septem ber 6, 1945, in th e presence o f six h u n d red dele­ gates, TÖ proclaimed th e establishm ent o f th e “ Korean People’s Republic’’ (KPR) and prom ised elections before March 3 1 ,1 9 4 6 .90 Meanwhile, the Truman adm inistration was involved in a frantic scramble to achieve m ilitary occupation o f Korea w ithout delay. Washington initially had instructed Stilw ell’s Tenth Army to land on the Korean peninsula. A fter Trum an ordered Am erican m ilitary leaders to occupy the peninsula ahead o f schedule, th e JCS contem ­ plated relying on Chinese forces to en ter K orea b u t th en turned to the Twenty-Fourth Corps stationed on Okinawa and under th e com ­ mand of Lieutenant G eneral Jo h n R. H odge. As in other areas, avail­ ability and a need to act fast dictated th e choice o f th e occupation force.91 Obviously, Truman and his advisors had n o t anticipated th a t the United States would have to occupy only a portion o f Korea on such short notice. In fact, on th e eve o f Am erican entry into K orea, Washington had not com pleted a definitive set o f directives for th e commander o f the occupation force. Shordy after Jap an ’s surrender, M acA rthur began to form ulate detailed instructions for H odge. O n A ugust 22, he requested infor­ mation from the JCS pertaining to A llied agreem ents on Korea, explaining that he intended to operate on the assum ption o f quadri­ partite occupation. In reply, th e JCS inform ed M acA rthur th at th e State D epartm ent had no knowledge o f any specific agreem ent re­ garding the occupation; th e Allies had only settled upon a trustee­ ship for Korea after Jap an ’s defeat. Accordingly, the JCS ordered MacArthur to adm inister K orea’s civil affairs in a way th at would facilitate the im plem entation o f th e trusteeship arrangem ent. More­ over, the commander o f th e U nited States A rm ed Forces in Korea (USAFIK) should strive to create an A llied control council in Korea for the coordination o f occupation policy.92 Early in September, W ashington cabled a directive to M acArthur clarifying these instructions. As soon as practicable after arrival, the USAFIK comm ander was to contact th e Soviet occupation com m an­ der and propose the form ation o f an adm inistrative body capable o f formulating unified policies for all Korea. In accordance w ith estab-

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lished policy, the JCS authorized Hodge to utilize Japanese officials and Korean collaborators temporarily where security permitted and technical expertise was in short supply. On September 7, 1945, MacArthur formally established American control in Korea south of the 38th parallel. The next day, General Hodge and his Twenty-Fourth Corps finally landed in Korea." At that time, Washington had not finished detailed guidelines for the occupation. It would be nine months before Washington would send Hodge a final directive on Korea. Forced to rely on expediency and common sense, rather than on long-range plans, American officials in Korea manifested uncer­ tainty and vacillation from the start. One member of the American Military Government (AMG) later dubbed the United States occupa­ tion of Korea as “operation trial and error.”94 An atmosphere of anarchy developed in southern Korea soon after American troops arrived on the peninsula. Korean exile groups en­ couraged internal instability by distributing copies of the Cairo Dec­ laration that purposely mistranslated “in due course” as “immedi­ ately” or “in a few days.” In his initial report to Washington, H. Merrell Benninghoff, Hodge’s political advisor, observed that “southern Korea can best be described as a powder keg ready to explode at the application of a spark.”9’ Hodge wisely sought assis­ tance from local Korean leaders to deal with the threat of domestic violence. Upon requesting a meeting with two representatives from each party, 1,200 Koreans responded to the startled American gen­ eral’s invitation. While these politicians universally condemned any delay in the restoration of Korean self-government, there was agree­ ment on little else. Given the revolutionary climate, it was hardly sur­ prising that Hodge, from the outset, placed a premium on the main­ tenance of law and order in southern Korea. He judged even the most remote threats to the security of his command intolerable. Less than two weeks after the start of American occupation, Hodge began to send a steady stream of cables pleading for removal of the partition at the 38th parallel and military withdrawal at the earliest possible date.96 Early reports of Soviet behavior in northern Korea made a bad situ­ ation seem dangerously worse. After visiting the Soviet zone, an Aus­ tralian journalist informed MacArthur that the Russian army was treating the people with “ barbarous cruelty” and striving to replace the existing order with a “Bolshevik philosophy.” Moscow’s ultimate purpose, he speculated, was

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the establishment here not of a democratic but a Communist type o f government. Their concept. . . embodies the complete reduction of the social structure to chaos, absolute integration and mass destruc­ tion. . . . I believe that you can anticipate aggressive action in support of their fundamental purpose which is not so much the establishment of a sound peace and its preservation as it is the imposition of their own philosophy of life in Japan and Korea.97 Many wealthy Koreans, who had fled southw ard follow ing Soviet entry into the north, were relating stories to A m erican occupation officials of looting, confiscation, an d even sexual assaults. Still m ore disturbing, the Com m unists reportedly were usurping political pow er and organizing “people’s com m ittees.” 98 For Trum an and his advi­ sors, the sim ilarities betw een events in northern K orea and Eastern Europe m ust have been painfully obvious. W ithin one m onth after Ja p a n ’s surrender, th e U nited States thus confronted agonizing problem s in Korea. D espite T him an's desper­ ate attem pts to elim inate any possible chance for Stalinist expansion in Korea, sovietization north o f th e 38th parallel already seem ed well under way. By contrast, th e fu tu re o f A m erican occupation in south­ ern Korea appeared fraught w ith dangerous com plications. Yet Tru­ man's predicam ent was largely o f his own creation. O n several occa­ sions, Stalin had indicated a desire for an A llied agreem ent on trusteeship for Korea, b u t Trum an’s consistent lack o f enthusiasm for a firm settlem ent had prevented th e achievem ent o f an accord. As a result, we shall never know w hether trusteeship w ould have recon­ ciled Soviet-American differences in Korea. Instead, th e Soviet Union and the U nited States each occupied h a lf o f the peninsula, thereby requiring a diplom atic agreem ent to end th e artificial divi­ sion of Korea. Since Soviet-Am erican relations in Europe had recently experienced a steady and serious deterioration, it was highly im prob­ able that either Stalin or Trum an w ould acquiesce in any agreem ent appreciably strengthening his adversary.99 T hus, Korea em erged at the end o f World W ar II as a divided nation th at was n o t ind ep en d en t but a captive o f the Cold War.

CH APTER

3

In Search o f a Settlement

Joint Soviet-American occupation of Korea in 1945 was among the most unfortunate legacies of World War II. From the outset, Korea’s future would depend on the ability of the United States and the Soviet Union to maintain friendly relations in the postwar world. Contemporary observers immediately acknowledged the symbolic importance of the Soviet-American confrontation across the 38th par­ allel. If the major powers agreed to end the artificial division of the peninsula and grant Korea its independence, the world could expect future cooperation in other areas.1 Any reason for optimism van­ ished, however, as Washington and Moscow began to implement uni­ lateral policies of zonal reconstruction that totally disregarded the interests of their adversary.2 Each nation’s approach reflected its own political, economic, and social system, since both American and Soviet leaders wanted Korea to emulate their model for national development.9 The result was the emergence of two Koreas and the peninsula became a major battleground in the Cold War. Tragically for Korea, the price of liberation from Japanese domination was dis­ memberment.4 Korea’s partition was particularly undesirable because the 38th parallel separated two areas that were traditionally dissimilar. The north was rich in industry, hydroelectric power, and such minerals as coal, iron ore, and a variety of chemicals. The south, on the other hand, was much more agricultural and produced large amounts of rice and fish. More important, the two zones possessed basic social and religious differences and even were separated politically during ancient times.9 Divergent systems of land tenure represented yet another major contrast. South Korea suffered from serious agrarian overpopulation and Japanese absentee landownership. Moreover, the American zone contained an inordinate share of rich and conservative

53

landlords, destitute farm er-tenants, and dissatisfied workers.6 Land­ lordism was m uch less prevalent in th e n o rth , w here plots were smaller and less productive. Finally, Japanese colonialism had shat­ tered traditional patterns in K orea, b u t th e process o f developm ent and modernization was incom plete as W orld W ar II came to an end. Severe dislocation, uncertainty, an d tension in K orean society fu rth er complicated an already difficult situ atio n .7 John R. Hodge, th e USAFIK com m ander, lacked th e necessary training and experience to deal effectively w ith th e com plex chal­ lenges he faced in Korea. A to u g h , gristly com bat soldier who had served with distinction a t Leyte, B ougainville, and O kinaw a, he could boast litd e understanding o f politics or adm inistration.8 U pon arrival, Hodge hardly endeared him self to th e local populace w hen he commented tactlessly th a t “ K oreans are th e sam e breed o f cats as th e Japanese.“9 He prom pdy tu rn ed for inform ation and advice to those Koreans who could speak English an d had ties to A m erican m issiona­ ries. Consequendy, th e AMG soon earned th e derisive sobriquet “government by interpreter.“ 10 D eclining m orale w ithin th e USAFIK was another persistent problem th a t H odge never m anaged to re­ solve. Inadequate housing, irregular delivery o f supplies, an d inferior post exchange facilides only stirred greater discontent am ong A m eri­ can soldiers already anxious to retu rn hom e after th e surrender o f Japan.11 Koreans assailed th e AM G alm ost from th e m om ent o f its creadon. At his first press conference, H odge announced th a t th e lim itadons on American m anpow er w ould require th e tem porary u tilizatio n o f Japanese adm inistrative personnel. Protests from th e K orean people were immediate and violent, producing far m ore confusion th an th e policy sought to prevent. Criticism o f H odge’s action was harsh in th e United States as w ell.12 O n Septem ber 12, Ih im a n publicly defended the decision as a m atter o f practical necessity b u t prom ised to remove the Japanese officials as soon as possible. T he SW NCC now saw th a t it would be a m istake to use Japanese officials during th e occupation and ordered H odge to abandon th e policy. In K orea, H odge had deposed Governor A be even before receiving these instructions from Washington.19 Nevertheless, th e adm inistration’s K orea policy was a target o f con­ tinuing adverse publicity. U ndersecretary o f State D ean G . Acheson therefore advocated th e form ulation o f a detailed public clarification. Such a policy statem ent, he suggested, should em phasize th at th e use

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3

of Japanese technicians was only temporary while reminding observ­ ers that the achievement of Korean independence would require “time and patience.” On September 18, Truman issued a statement on Korea summarizing Acheson’s arguments. It included a pledge that any Japanese officials retained in positions of importance would act wholly as “servants of the Korean people.” By October 18, Hodge had removed virtually all Japanese nationals from the American zone.14While the incident seemed somewhat trivial, it held great sig­ nificance for the future. By reacting so quickly in order to silence popular dissent, the United States had established a dangerous prece­ dent. Korean leaders now concluded that Washington would alter policy in the face of political protests and mass demonstrations. American occupation officials never really learned how to respond to the chaotic atmosphere in Korea. Increasingly, they perceived most Koreans as impetuous children unaware of the magnitude of the Soviet threat facing their nation.16 To foster stability, Hodge and the AMG turned to the most educated and wealthy members of Korean society for advice and support. For Benninghoff, Hodge’s political advisor, the attitude of the upper class was the most encouraging aspect of Korean politics. Consequently, American representatives in Korea developed a close relationship with conservative Korean landowners and businessmen from the outset of the occupation. Not sur­ prisingly, Hodge began at an early date to urge Washington to facili­ tate the return of the KPG to Korea. Acting as a figurehead government, he argued, Kim Ku’s regime would stabilize the situa­ tion.17 Under the circumstances, Hodge’s refusal to cooperate with the KPR was a foregone conclusion. Equating events in Korea with those in Eastern Europe, he easily accepted the argument that \b ’s govern­ ment was under Soviet domination and therefore subversive. Hodge summarily dismissed W s claim to legitimacy, declaring that the KPR represented only a minority of the Korean populace. He then out­ lawed the people’s committees and created new local councils under conservative control.18 Although the Communists did in fact domi­ nate W s government, the KPR had demonstrated efficiency and popularity during its short period of ascendance. Genuine impartial­ ity and a desire for national self-determination seemed to require that the United States at least cooperate with Tfo. Yet Hodge’s preference for stability and his dread of Soviet ambitions in southern Korea pre­ cluded an evenhanded approach. While officially sponsoring neither

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the conservatives nor th e radicals, H odge pursued policies designed to bolster rightist political pow er.19 Virtually every attem p t H odge m ade to fashion a political coalition around the conservatives culm inated in frustration and disillusion­ ment. Factional disagreem ents were so intense th a t unity was o u t o f the question. “Every tim e tw o Koreans sit dow n to dinner," one American official lam ented a t th e tim e, “ they form a new political party." Benninghoff sadly ad m itted th a t th e KPR was far b etter organized than the “ dem ocratic conservatives."20 U ndaunted, H odge remained determ ined to forge a political alliance in K orea th a t exduded the extreme left. Early in O ctober, M ajor G eneral A rchibald V. Arnold, the Am erican m ilitary governor, announced th e ap p o in t­ ment of an “Advisory C ouncil" com prised o f eleven p rom inent Koreans under the chairm anship o f K im Söng-su, a leading conserva­ tive. Most Koreans considered th e Advisory C ouncil unrepresenta­ tive, since Kim, a wealthy prew ar landlord and businessm an, typified its membership. Foolishly, H odge ap p ointed a w ell-know n collabora­ tor to the body, ensuring th a t it w ould be “ universally h ated an d dis­ trusted throughout K orea."21 N evertheless, H odge anticipated th a t the Advisory Council w ould underm ine Yb’s popularity and foster Korean self-government un d er conservative direction. D espite A m er­ ican efforts, these Korean leaders exhibited far m ore concern w ith achieving special privileges and advancing th eir own political status than with democratic principles.22 Soviet actions in northern K orea du rin g th e autum n o f 1945 sug­ gested that Moscow was m uch b etter prepared th an th e U nited States to deal with the problem s o f K orean occupation. Soviet officials at once established a close w orking relationship w ith local K orean Com ­ munists. Moreover, m any Koreans who h ad accom panied th e Soviet occupation force were Russian citizens or m em bers o f th e Red Army.25 Yet Stalin probably was n o t follow ing a preconceived “ blue­ print for sovietization." It is m ore likely th a t Moscow instructed its occupation com m ander, C olonel G eneral Ivan Chistiakov, to use any local Koreans who were friendly tow ard th e Soviet U nion in fashion­ ing a provisional governm ent.24 O n A ugust 25, Chistiakov sanc­ tioned the authority o f th e KPR, b u t he also consulted w ith other well-known leaders such as Cho M an-sik. In its initial phase, Russian occupation policy m anifested notable caution, as Chistiakov p erm it­ ted local Koreans to organize peo p le’s com m ittees. In contrast to Eastern Europe, Stalin allow ed th e Koreans to exercise a degree o f

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real authority. Conceivably, the Soviet leader did not believe that national self-determination necessarily would result in an anti-Soviet government.25 Benninghoff never doubted for a moment that the Soviet Union intended to impose a puppet regime on northern Korea as a prelude to extending its imperialist hold over the entire peninsula. Com­ paring Korea to Rumania, he predicted that the Soviet Union “will sovietize northern Korea as they sovietized eastern Europe.” Hodge fully shared BenninghofFs certainty regarding Moscow's hostile in­ tent. The Soviet commander in the north, he complained to Wash­ ington in an early cable, had not responded to his communications, thereby preventing any progress toward Korean independence and self-government. For Hodge, continued partition was part of the Soviet expansionist strategy in Korea, since the south’s inability to obtain coal and electric power in the north was causing economic dis­ tress in the American zone. The artificial division of Korea, Hodge concluded, has "created a situation impossible of peaceful correction with credit to the United States unless immediate action on an inter­ national level is forthcoming to establish an overall provisional gov­ ernment which will be fully supported by occupation forces under a common policy.” 26 In China, Chiang Kai-shek already had decided that it was point­ less even to attem pt cooperation with the Soviets. Only active promo­ tion of the KPG would forestall a Communist takeover throughout Korea. Chiang urged American representatives in Chungking to use members of the KPG in the military government of Korea. He even suggested formal recognition of the Kim Ku regime.27 Administra­ tion officials in Washington understood that acting along these lines would reinforce Stalin’s determination to retain his hold on the north. As early as September 3, 1943, the Soviet Union had assailed the KPG and rejected its claim to legitimacy. Writers in the Soviet press insisted that Korea had to rely on its closest neighbors for post­ war economic, social, and political development. These articles men­ tioned Syngman Rhee by name and warned that Moscow could never be certain of Korea’s friendship if individuals hostile to the Soviet Union gained political power.28 Consequently, the United States maintained its nonrecognition policy toward the KPG. Washington informed Chiang that it would welcome the participation of all qualified Koreans in the AMG but would withhold official status for any individual or group. On Octo-

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ber 16, Acheson form ally announced th a t th e U nited States w ould provide transportation to K orea for all exiles. Significantly, Byrnes cabled Patrick J . Hurley, who replaced G auss as U .S. am bassador to China, that the adm inistration was especially interested in facilitating the return of Kim K u and an o th er pro m in en t exile nam ed K im Kyusik. At the same tim e, th e State D ep artm en t w anted to avoid any ties with Rhee. O n Septem ber 5, it h ad delayed th e approval o f R hee’s return because his passport bore th e title “ H igh Com m issioner.’’29 Undoubtedly, H u m an ’s diplom atic advisors were cautious because they realized th at R hee’s anti-Soviet convictions w ould ham per American efforts to establish contacts w ith th e Soviet occupation commander. At this p o in t, Preston G oodfellow interceded on b eh alf of his old friend and persuaded R uth B. Shipley, chief o f th e State Department’s Passport D ivision, to issue th e necessary papers. W ith ­ out consulting anyone, Shipley granted th e passport after deciding that Rhee was “a nice patriotic old gentlem an.” 30 While en route to Seoul aboard an A m erican m ilitary transport, Rhee stopped in Tokyo for a m eeting w ith M acA rthur. D uring discus­ sions, MacArthur confirm ed th a t Rhee w ould receive no special con­ siderations from th e U nited States. Yet, in a cable to W ashington, political advisor George A tcheson spoke strongly against an im partial stance: I believe the time has come when positive American action, in the political field in Korea, should be taken. I realize that to give open official approval or support to any one leader, group or combination, is contrary to past American thinking. But situation in Korea fully war­ rants such a step and there is reason to believe that unless positive action is taken to give the Koreans a start in governmental participation and organization, our difficulties will increase rather than diminish, and the Communistic group set up and encouraged by the Soviets in northern Korea will manage to extend its influence into southern Korea with results which can readily be envisaged.31 Apparently, M acArthur agreed w ith A tcheson’s assessm ent, since Rhee returned to Korea aboard M acA rthur's private p lan e.32 Upon his arrival, H odge greeted Rhee w ith great fanfare, praying that this ostentatious welcome w ould contribute to political stability. He even provided Rhee w ith a room in th e AM G’s hotel, gas cou­ pons, and a personal bodyguard. O n O ctober 21, Rhee appeared as an unscheduled speaker a t a celebration in honor o f th e Am erican

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occupation forces. Hodge introduced Rhee personally to a crowd of more than fifty thousand Koreans, praising him as “a great man who has given his entire life to the freedom of Korea.” According to the USAFIK commander, Rhee was “a man driven from his home by oppressors who . . . has worked without personal ambition to get Korea into the family of free nations and he has lived to see this being accomplished.” There can be little doubt that such favoritism engen­ dered Soviet distrust of American motives and intentions in Korea. Rhee, in his remarks at the celebration, not only chastised the Soviet Union but also denounced partition at the 38th parallel. He declared that the people of Korea would fight to achieve reunification and would demonstrate that “we are quite able to run our affairs.” Subsequendy, Rhee moved expeditiously to create a political coalition under his own direction.93 Meanwhile, Rhee’s friends in Washington were prodding the ad­ ministration to sponsor Rhee. On November 5, Jay Jerome Williams, one of Rhee’s wartime boosters, wrote Truman asking him to appoint Goodfellow as his personal representative in Korea. Not only had Hodge requested Preston Goodfellow’s services, but Goodfellow’s familiarity with Korean exile leaders would be useful in ending polit­ ical factionalism in postwar Korea. John Carter Vincent, director of the Office of Far Eastern Affairs, vigorously opposed the plan, point­ ing out that Williams, Rhee, and Goodfellow had criticized the State Department’s wartime policy on Korea.34 Responding to Truman's request for advice, Byrnes recommended that the president permit Goodfellow to join the AMG if Hodge desired it but without any official status. Truman instructed his secretary of state to “handle the matter as you see fit.” Shortly thereafter, Goodfellow traveled to Korea and became Hodge’s special advisor.33 This was an incredible blunder, but the administration innocently allowed it to happen without fully understanding its political implications. Few actions could have done more to undermine Washington’s efforts to avoid being linked with Syngman Rhee. By now, Thiman’s advisors had concluded that unless the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to a settlement in the near future, Korea would never achieve either reunification or independence. Fur­ ther delay instead would increase the likelihood that Korea’s parti­ tion would become permanent. To solve the Korean problem, the SWNCC had revived the trusteeship formula during mid-September and had begun work on a specific proposal. Washington remained

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hopeful as well th at the Soviet occupation com m ander w ould agree to coordinate w ith H odge in the im p lem en tatio n o f uniform occupation policies. Significantly, th e SW N CC instructed H odge to create an adm inistrative structure su itab le for use throughout K orea should the final trusteeship agreem ent conform to A m erican plans for recon­ struction.96 By early O ctober, how ever, H odge h ad inform ed W ash­ ington that C histiakov still was sp u m in g substantive n ego tiatio n s. Faced with Moscow’s intran sigen ce, the ad m in istratio n decid ed to approach the Soviet governm ent w ith a form al request for local coor­ dination.97 Hum an’s diplom atic advisors worked on a d raft proposal for break­ ing the Korean deadlock during th e second week o f O ctober. 1b obtain firsthand inform ation from Korea, th e State D epartm ent instructed B enninghoff to return at once to th e U nited States. D ur­ ing subsequent discussions, B enninghoff stated frankly th a t th e United States could expect an im proved situation in Korea only if Washington provided m ore civilian advisors and economic aid, created a “figurehead governm ent,” and elim inated th e artificial division at the 38th parallel. Decisive steps were im perative, he warned, since popular support for the A m erican occupation was beginning to erode.96 M ilitary leaders in th e U nited States also were anxious for some sort o f setdem ent because w ithdraw al from Korea was a basic elem ent in th e overall plan for A m erican dem obilization. For Secretary o f War Robert P. Patterson, it was absolutely essential to reduce the num ber o f troops in K orea at th e earliest possible date. The War D epartm ent favored th e creation o f a Korean “ constabulary army” capable o f preserving law and order w ith help from a sm all detachment o f American troops.99 By October 18, the State D epartm ent had com pleted work on its proposal and had obtained approval from th e JCS. Four days later, the SWNCC forwarded the final recom m endadons to Byrnes. The plan provided th at W ashington w ould open negodadons w ith Mos­ cow as soon as possible for the coordination o f occupation policy in Korea, the removal o f the 38th parallel p artitio n , and the establish­ ment of an international trusteeship.40 To prepare the Am erican peo­ ple for the planned dém arche, V incent announced publicly on O cto­ ber 21 th at the U nited States endorsed the principle o f A llied cooperation in the supervision and guidance o f dependent peoples. The United States and C hina already had agreed to a period o f prepa­ ration for self-governm ent in Korea, and V incent was optim istic

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about the prospects for Soviet-American cooperation in the recon­ struction of that nation.41 Alarming news from Tokyo then suddenly brought forth a sense of great urgency. MacArthur reported that the Soviet Union was stripping factories and industrial installations in northern Korea and shipping these materials to Russia. He alerted Edwin A. Locke, Jr., Truman's personal representative, that unless the United States acted swiftly, Korea’s partition would become per­ manent.42 On November 3, Byrnes informed Harriman in Moscow of the administration’s new policy decision on Korea, instructing him to approach the Soviets with a request to end the 38th parallel as “a closed barrier.” The United States also desired adequate and regular delivery of coal and electric power to the south, uniform fiscal poli­ cies, coastwide shipping, orderly resettlement of displaced persons, and the resumption of interzonal trade and communications. Harri­ man was to ask the Soviet government to grant its occupation com­ mander the power to negotiate locally for the realization of Korean independence. Four days later, Byrnes further instructed Harriman to raise with Molotov the issue of alleged Soviet removals of power sta­ tion equipment from the area along the \!klu River.43 Harriman immediately complied with Byrnes’s directive, but he was pessimistic about the chances for success. Stalin would not loosen his grip over northern Korea because the area could then become a springboard for an attack on Russia. From the Soviet viewpoint, Har­ riman reasoned, Korea was no different than Finland, Poland, or Rumania. Fotrestal echoed Harriman's skepticism about the pros­ pects of Moscow’s accepting the American proposal. Byrnes, he thought, did not comprehend Soviet ideology.44 The War Depart­ ment was somewhat more sanguine. Yet it did not foresee a quick settlement and therefore urged the implementation of a public infor­ mation program to counter criticism of continued American occupa­ tion of Korea. If Soviet-American negotiations failed, however, the War Department favored prompt withdrawal from the peninsula.43 Members of the State Department, by contrast, attached special significance to the achievement of a trusteeship agreement for Korea. The preliminary draft for such an arrangement contained no fewer than thirty-eight articles. Alger Hiss and other State Department officials defended the length and detail of the document. The Korean accord, they argued, “will be the first of several trusteeship agreements and should be a model for them.”46 Vincent confidendy

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assured the W ar D epartm ent th a t Soviet-Am erican negotiations would result in th e term ination o f th e K orean p artitio n , th e creation of a trusteeship, and th e w ithdraw al o f A m erican troops. V incent added, however, th a t Stalin’s w illingness to accept th e A m erican pro­ posal would depend to a large extent on th e ability o f th e USAFIK commander to be im partial tow ard th e various political factions in southern Korea. Recognition o f a particular group, he cautioned, might “encourage th e Soviet com m ander to sponsor a sim ilar group in his zone and thus postpone establishm ent o f a unified Korea.” Vincent’s advice was unnecessary, since th e W ar D epartm ent already had dispatched a w arning to H odge. N oting Soviet hostility tow ard Rhee, it had rem inded th e USAFIK com m ander th a t close relations with Rhee would ten d “ to jeopardize success o f U nited States negoti­ ations . . . regarding 38°.”47 Truman’s Korea policy th u s h ad com e full circle during 1945, as the adm inistration returned to th e trusteeship form ula as th e only way short o f war to achieve K orean independence and self-govern­ ment.48 The chances for success now were rather slim , however, since both the U nited States and th e Soviet U nion were entrenched firm ly in a divided Korea. N evertheless, Trum an m anaged to enlist B ritish and Canadian support for convening a m eeting o f th e Council o f For­ eign Ministers at th e earliest possible date to discuss Korea and a number o f other issues. D uring these negotiations, th e U nited States would propose “ establishing an international control o f K orea for a period o f five or m ore years in preparation for self-governm ent” and recommend th at “ assent o f C hina and th e Soviet Republics should be obtained through diplom atic channels.” 49 O n N ovem ber 16, 1945, the State D epartm ent announced th a t th e U nited States in ten d ed to approach the Soviet U nion again in an effort to reestablish “ com m u­ nications, trade, and free passage o f individuals” betw een northern and southern Korea. A positive response from th e Russian govern­ ment, the adm inistration hop ed , w ould open th e way to K orea’s reunification and independence.’0 If Truman and his advisors th o u g h t th a t th e Koreans had changed their minds regarding trusteeship, they were sadly m istaken. Rhee seized the initiative and attem pted to unify all political elem ents around a dem and for im m ediate self-governm ent. His associates became the m ost outspoken critics o f th e 38th parallel p artition and mobilized opposition b o th to trusteeship and to cooperation w ith th e Soviet Union. Early in N ovem ber, Rhee convened a conference o f

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forty-five political parties and issued a demand for Korea’s immedi­ ate independence. If the United States would recognize the KPG, Rhee and his followers promised elections within one year. The con­ ference adjourned after adopting a resolution expressing “shock and consternation’’ over Vincent’s proposal for a joint trusteeship in Korea.’1 Rhee’s activities constituted an intentional threat to the adminis­ tration’s strategy for negotiating a settlement with the Soviet Union. Yet Hodge believed that the United States should bolster the conser­ vatives rather than restricting their activities. Economic distress in the American zone was providing the KPR with a powerful weapon for discrediting the United States, and the conservatives were eager to assist occupation officials in countering leftist agitation. The USAFIK commander appealed for American recognition of Kim Ku’s govern­ m ent, while MacArthur offered to transport the KPG from Chung­ king to southern Korea.’2 Assistant Secretary of War John J. McCloy favored approval of Hodge’s recommendations. Syngman Rhee was not only reliable, he advised Acheson, but also self-confident and clear-headed in pur­ pose. Since the Soviet Union probably would refuse to negotiate, McCloy suggested that the AMG maximize the use of Korean exiles to prepare diem for the rapid assumpdon of governmental responsi­ bilities.” Acheson would not go much beyond fostering the return of officials in the KPG to Korea without special status. Kim Ku and other members of his regime thus arrived in Korea on November 23 as nothing more than private citizens. Acheson’s caution was justi­ fied. Prior to the KPG’s departure from China, Chiang had provided it with a large amount of money and several Chinese advisors.” Although the exact nature of China’s influence in Kim Ku’s regime was unclear, Stalin certainly could not have been pleased about the KPG’s close contacts with Chiang. William R. Langdon, who had joined Benninghoff as a political advisor to Hodge, rejected the logic of the administration’s persistent devotion to impartiality. Ironically, the man who had fathered the idea of trusteeship for Korea now advised Byrnes to jettison the policy and actively support Kim Ku’s regime. Not only did “all elements and parties’’ consider the KPG to be “quasi-legitimate,” but popular hostility to trusteeship meant that it would be foolish for the United States to continue to advocate international control. Langdon sub­ mitted a detailed plan for transferring power in Korea to Kim Ku

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with or w ithout Moscow's approval. H odge, n o tin g th e steady rise in % ’s popularity am ong th e uned u cated , w orking m asses, concurred. Since refused to renounce his claim to legitim acy, H odge inform ed MacArthur th at he w ould issue a "declaration o f w ar" on th e KPR to halt its activities.” But Langdon and H odge were overreacting. N ot all th e leftists were under Soviet direction, and m any were sim ply dem anding major reforms. Langdon him self ad m itted th a t it was n o t clear which political group enjoyed th e w idest popular support. Still, the political chaos in southern Korea had convinced Langdon and H odge th a t th e safest course was recognition o f th e K PG . Yet em bracing th e conser­ vatives would not resolve th e A m erican dilem m a; it w ould m erely increase leftist anim osity and m ake th e chances o f a settlem ent w ith the Soviet Union m ore rem ote. Perhaps worse, rising inflation, eco­ nomic deterioration, and th e steady influx o f northern refugees in to the south added to th e already m ounting unrest in th e Am erican zone.’6 Byrnes was aware o f th e precarious situation in K orea, b u t he apparendy thought th at only a Soviet-Am erican agreem ent offered an answer to W ashington’s predicam ent. Stalin, he rem inded Lang­ don, would not accept an A m erican fa it accom pli. Langdon retorted that the Korean desire for im m ediate self-governm ent was so strong that any effort to im plem ent a trusteeship w ould ignite civil strife. As an alternative, he suggested Soviet-Am erican negotiations a t th e gov­ ernmental level for th e creation o f separate governm ents in each zone.’7 Despite Langdon’s w arnings, th e adm inistration m aintained its firm com m itm ent to a K orean trusteeship, although it decided to delay the announcem ent o f th e policy u n til H odge h ad tim e " to make necessary arrangem ents to prepare to counteract th e expected unfavorable reception by th e K oreans o f th e trusteeship plan." By late November, th e SW NCC h ad fo rm ulated a d etailed position paper on Am erican policy in Asia for th e upcom ing C ouncil o f For­ eign Ministers m eeting in Moscow. A fter acknow ledging th a t th e Soviets assigned special strategic significance to K orea, th e SW N CC report offered th e follow ing realistic observation: In this regard, we m ust recognize that the U nited States occupies an exposed and untenable position in Korea from both a military and political standpoint. A prolonged occupation o f Korea on our part can­ not but create suspicion by the USSR th at we have advanced our m ili-

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tary strength in East Asia to points beyond those which are necessary and requisite for the security of the United States. . . . Washington therefore should anticipate and accept the Soviet desire for inordinate influence in Korea. The paper recommended trustee­ ship as a means of lessening the likelihood of Russian domination, reducing tensions in northeast Asia, and perm itting American with­ drawal. If Stalin insisted upon exclusive control, however, the United States should terminate any further consideration of trusteeship and grant Korean self-government.’8 Secretary Byrnes thus traveled to Moscow in December 1945 deter­ mined to negotiate a trusteeship arrangement for Korea. Upon his arrival, however, he received an alarming report from Seoul that con­ ditions in southern Korea had reached crisis proportions. Popular resentment over the denial of self-government had become so wide­ spread, Hodge exclaimed, that a favorable atmosphere now existed in the American zone for "radical leftism if not raw Communism." The general public was manifesting an increasing tendency "to look to Russia for the future" because of "the usual oriental slant" of "doing homage to the man with the largest weapon." The USAFIK comman­ der warned against any attem pt at trusteeship and labeled outside supervision a “sword of Damocles" hanging over the Korean people. Although he admitted that the Koreans were not prepared for inde­ pendence, Hodge was convinced that the lesser evil was a quick resto­ ration of self-government. In the absence of a suitable agreement, he recommended dramatically that the United States and the Soviet Union withdraw and leave Korea to its "own devices and an inevita­ ble upheaval for its self-purification."’’ Not surprisingly, Byrnes acted immediately at Moscow to place the Korean matter on the agenda. Subsequendy, he proposed that the occupadon commanders engage in local negodations to resolve the issues Harriman had raised in November. The creadon of a unified administradon represented the indispensable first step, he claimed, for Korean reunificadon, trusteeship, and eventual independence. Molotov countered that a general agreement for a Korean trusteeship was a prerequisite for any discussion of specific issues relating to reunificadon. He requested a copy of the American proposal and time to study its provisions. British Foreign Minister Ernest Bevin wanted to see the original Soviet-American agreement, but Molotov explained correcdy that there had been only "an exchange of views."

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The foreign m inisters agreed to defer consideration o f th e m atter until Molotov had studied th e A m erican proposal.*0 In the final Am erican paper, Byrnes m erely sum m arized his lengthy trusteeship proposal. H e focused instead on th e H arrim an recommendations and th e vital necessity for local coordination to lift the barrier at the 38th parallel. H is proposal also included provisions for the possible extension o f trusteeship to ten years. O n D ecem ber 17, Bevin spoke strongly in favor o f th e A m erican position. H e sug­ gested referring the proposal to com m ittee to work o u t th e details. Molotov explained th at he had n o t had sufficient tim e to consider th e plan and requested a delay th en an d again a t th e m eeting th e follow­ ing day. Finally, on D ecem ber 20, M olotov accepted th e Am erican argument th at local discussion o f “ u rg en t” questions was needed, but he wanted prior agreem ent on a long-term trusteeship plan as well. Bevin inquired w hether Moscow found th e A m erican proposal acceptable. Molotov replied th a t he w ould d istrib u te a counterpropo­ sal that evening. Byrnes « p resse d his desire for cooperation b u t, for some unexplained reason, alleged th a t th e A m erican p lan corre­ sponded to “w hat Stalin had in m ind four m onths ago in Berlin.” Bevin then stated th at fu rth er consideration o f th e K orean issue would await receipt o f th e Soviet paper.61 As promised, M olotov later circulated th e Soviet proposal on Korea. It contained four specific provisions. First, th e m ajor powers would create a “ provisional, dem ocratic K orean governm ent” to undertake all necessary m easures for th e developm ent o f K orean industry, transportation, agriculture, and culture. Second, represen­ tatives from Soviet and A m erican occupation forces w ould form a “Joint Commission” to consult w ith local K orean parties and social organizations to form ulate procedures for th e creation o f a provi­ sional governm ent. T hird, th e Soviet-A m erican Jo in t Com m ission would “work o u t m easures o f h elp and assistance (trusteeship) in th e political, economic, an d social progress” o f Korea tow ard dem ocratic self-government and independence. It also w ould form ulate a fiveyear trusteeship p lan and subm it it for approval to th e fo u r m ajor powers. Finally, th e Soviet an d A m erican occupation com m anders would convene a “Jo in t C onference” w ithin two weeks to answer “urgent questions” an d begin perm an en t coordination o f adm inis­ tration.62 Byrnes approved M olotov's proposal on D ecem ber 21 w ith only minor alterations. Initially, th e Soviet U nion and th e U nited States

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both judged the Moscow agreement on Korea entirely satisfactory. Moscow agreed to a trusteeship because it still desired a united Korea under a government friendly toward the Soviet Union. Opposition to such a plan would mean unilateral American control in the south, while at the same time reducing the likelihood of compromise and concession on other issues.63 Tfet Moscow would not risk the emer­ gence of an anti-Soviet regime in Korea and therefore refused to end the partition of the peninsula prior to the successful implementation of a specific plan for a provisional government and trusteeship. Byrnes too negotiated in good faith, patiently searching for a com­ promise that was satisfactory to both nations. He accepted the Soviet proposal in the interests of Soviet-American cooperation and because it was only marginally different from the American plan. More important, Byrnes intended to utilize the Korean accord as a bargain­ ing counter during later negotiations. On the day after the adoption of Moscow's proposal on trusteeship, Byrnes indeed reminded Molo­ tov of American concessions on Korea and requested similiar Soviet consideration with respect to Washington’s position on Rumania and Bulgaria.64 Truman’s advisors certainly realized that the Moscow agreement would please few Koreans. Administration officials were convinced, however, that Korea’s political immaturity justified a denial of imme­ diate independence. The temporary continuation of outside control seemed the only way to secure Soviet cooperation for the achievement of reunification, lb follow the advice of Langdon and Hodge and undertake unilateral action in southern Korea would merely guaran­ tee the permanent division of the peninsula. As expected, news of the trusteeship plan sparked a storm of protest in the American zone that bordered on mass hysteria. Extremists held street demonstra­ tions, closed stores and schools, and staged work stoppages. Rowdy youth groups roamed the streets of Seoul intimidating AMG person­ nel and distributing leaflets and posters decrying trusteeship.63 Predictably, Hodge instantly appealed to Washington for a recon­ sideration of its position on Korea’s future. The United States, he believed, should “kill the trusteeship idea.” The JCS responded with the optimistic prediction that once Hodge had explained the decision fully, the Koreans would accept the Moscow agreement. Instead, the situation in southern Korea deteriorated further. Kim Ku ordered his followers not to cooperate with American occupation officials and even threatened to seize power. Subsequently, all Korean employees

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of the AMG went on strike. H odge now inform ed W ashington th a t it should avoid even using th e w ord “ trusteeship,’' since any m ention o f it “immediately precludes any norm al process o f reasoning o f th e Koreans.”« Initially, the Com m unists an d m em bers o f th e extrem e left joined all Koreans in denouncing trusteeship, b u t suddenly they reversed themselves and became th e m ost outspoken defenders o f th e Moscow agreement. D uring a dem onstration on January 3, 1946, they hastily substituted the word “ u p ” for “ dow n” on th eir signs, which th en read “Up with H usteeship!” In all probability, Soviet officials had ordered the switch, b u t th e C om m unists could hardly have expected the United States to adopt a m ore favorable a ttitu d e tow ard th eir political aspirations if they h ad opposed trusteeship. More im p o rtan t, members of the extrem e left m anifested laudable realism in recogniz­ ing that Korea could n o t achieve reunification and independence except through fulfillm ent o f th e Moscow agreem ent.67 Byrnes reacted to these K orean protests against trusteeship in an unexpected and extrem ely u n fo rtu n ate fashion. U pon his retu rn from Moscow, he delivered a radio address sum m arizing th e results o f the conference. A fter expressing displeasure over th e lack o f progress toward Korea’s reunification, Byrnes voiced satisfaction th a t th e United States and the Soviet U nion had agreed to open discussions for the resolution o f pressing adm inistrative and econom ic problem s. He then m entioned the trusteeship agreem ent, b u t he included th e suggestion th at the Jo in t Com m ission m em bers “ m ay fin d it possible to dispense with a trusteeship” because th e ultim ate goal in Korea was to hasten the restoration o f fu ll sovereignty. Evidendy in response to Korean com plaints and w ithout Moscow’s approval, Byrnes had added a qualification to th e recendy negotiated Soviet-Am erican accord on K orea.« Curiously, Acheson later to ld th e Chinese th a t Moscow favored this abandonm ent o f a basic provision in th e K orean settlement. Since the trusteeship arrangem ent w ould only com plicate Korea’s future, he argued, it was unnecessary.69 In reality, th e Soviet Union must have concluded th a t th e U nited States d id n o t in ten d to respect the terms o f th e Moscow agreem ent. Truman’s reaction to th e Moscow Conference was pardally respon­ sible for the equivocadon on trusteeship contained in Byrnes’s speech. On D ecem ber 26, th e president to ld Leahy th a t his secretary of state was guilty o f appeasem ent at Moscow. T he appearance o f compromise, he suggested, actually m asked a com plete Soviet vie-

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tory. In his memoirs, Truman charged th a t4‘Byrnes lost his nerve in Moscow” and granted unnecessary concessions without the presi­ dent’s knowledge or consent.70 At an evening meeting three days later, Truman conveyed his displeasure to Byrnes. Thus, when the sec­ retary of state qualified American policy on Korea the next day, he undoubtedly was acting in accordance with Truman’s wishes. By early 1946, there can be no doubt that the president had mied out any fur­ ther compromises with Stalin. In a now famous unsent letter dated January 5, Truman explained to Byrnes that at Moscow he should have demanded the creation in Korea of a strong central government and positive measures for economic reconstruction. In his concluding sentence, Trnman stated defiantly, ‘‘I’m tired babying the Soviets.”71 In Korea, Hodge eagerly grasped Byrnes’s statement to reassure the KPG that the United States did not intend to implement a trustee­ ship. Despite clear evidence to the contrary, he privately told Kim Ku and Syngman Rhee that trusteeship was not an indispensable aspect of the Moscow agreement. Hodge even issued a public statement pledging that independence would follow rapidly after reunification and the creation of a provisional government.72 These assurances had the desired effect. Kim Ku ordered AMG employees back to work, thus ending four days of near pandemonium. A relieved Hodge cabled Washington that the crisis had passed. The KPG had been able to retreat with only a minimal loss of prestige, the USAFIK com­ mander observed, because Byrnes had provided “a very small hole for saving Korean face.” If Washington refrained from future references to trusteeship, Hodge predicted, the issue would disappear.72 Hodge’s actions after the Moscow Conference contributed to an increasingly polarized political situation in southern Korea. He con­ sidered anyone who favored trusteeship to be a Communist sympa­ thizer, while strengthening his ties to the conservatives who de­ pended on opposition to trusteeship for popular appeal. This approach entailed great risks, since the United States ultimately would confront an inescapable dilemma. The Moscow agreement demanded that Washington advocate some form of trusteeship for Korea. If Truman expected to resolve the Korean predicament, he either would have to persuade the conservatives to accept trusteeship or abandon the extreme right entirely.74 Failure to implement the Moscow agreement, on the other hand, would guarantee the perma­ nent partition of the Korean peninsula. In preparation for the opening of Soviet-American negotiations on

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Korea, Secretary o f W ar Patterson visited th e A m erican zone o f occu­ pation during January 1946. Shortly after his arrival, Patterson con­ ferred with Hodge and privately recorded his confidence in th e ability of the USAFIK com m ander. H e also spoke to several K orean leaders "dressed in black coats, swallow-tails, w ith striped trousers/’ A t a press conference, th e secretary o f war explained th a t H odge was doing "a constructive jo b ” because he was relying on th e best talen t in Korea for advice. A lthough he declined to specify w hen th e m ajor powers would grant Korea com plete independence, Patterson ex­ horted the Korean people to “ m aintain a u n ited political fro n t so that the world may know exactly w hat you w ant.” 7’ Significantly, Patterson chose n o t to com m ent on a num ber o f questions that newsmen had subm itted prior to th e press conference. He refused to respond to any inquiries about th e n atu re o f th e tru st­ eeship agreem ent, for exam ple, or to explain how th e foreign m inis­ ters had broached th e issue during the Moscow Conference. N or would Patterson outline th e troop strength o f th e A m erican arm y during the rem ainder o f the occupation. This evasiveness angered th e American soldiers in Korea. They had m et on January 9. prior to th e arrival o f the secretary o f war, to organize protests against fu rth er delays in dem obilization. Patterson discussed these grievances w ith six soldiers and expressed sym pathy for th eir p lig h t. H e th en in ­ formed them o f W ashington’s in ten tio n to replace h a lf o f th e occupa­ tion force with volunteers and draftees during th e next five m onths. Since Korea’s transition from m ilitary occupation to self-governm ent and independence w ould be sw ift, th e U nited States could reduce significandy the num ber o f troops stationed on th e peninsula. A fter observing conditions in southern Korea, however, Patterson conduded that the Am erican occupation forces enjoyed warm and com­ fortable barracks, good food, and adequate health facilities.76 Upon his return to W ashington, Patterson held another press con­ ference. American policy in Korea, he explained, sought to assist “the Koreans in getting an independent stable governm ent in order that the Japanese may n o t renew th eir designs there . . . for fu rth er aggressive warfare.” The Soviet U nion shared this objective b u t dis­ agreed on the leaders m ost able to create a friendly and peaceful Korea. Patterson th en voiced hope th a t subsequent negotiations between the U nited States and th e Soviet U nion w ould resolve such outstanding differences.77 Com m ents in th e Soviet press seem ed to justify a degree o f optim ism , as Russian writers confidendy am ici-

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pated that Sovict-American cooperation would produce reunification and a rapid restoration of economic recovery and political stability. In the United States, commentators looked to the successful implemen­ tation of Korean trusteeship as an indication of rising confidence and m utual trust among the great powers.7* Sovict-American negotiations at the local level to answer “urgent questions” represented an early test of whether the Moscow agree­ m ent would resolve the Korean predicament. Hodge and Chistiakov promptly agreed to convene a joint conference in Seoul sometime during the third week of January 1946. The JCS instructed the USAFIK commander to rely on Harriman’s letter as the foundation for negotiations. His primary objective was to remove the 38th paral­ lel as a fortified barrier in Korea and establish a liaison with the Soviet commander to facilitate economic and administrative coordi­ nation. Domestic reforms, however, would have to await the achieve­ m ent of reunification.79 On January 16, the Soviet delegation arrived in Seoul and met immediately with American representatives to discuss ending the 38th parallel partition. After fifteen sessions, it was quite apparent that the two delegations interpreted the Moscow agreement dif­ ferently. The Soviets sought coordination of policy and the exchange of goods alone; the Americans favored complete administrative and economic integration.80 Moscow declined, for example, to discuss either the free circulation of newspapers in the north or uniform fiscal policies. Moreover, the Soviets would agree to offset fertilizer and power deficiencies in the south only in return for rice shipments to the northern zone. The American delegates desired more extensive coordination, while insisting that there was no rice surplus in the south. The Soviet delegation refused to alter its position and sug­ gested a temporary adjournment.81 Plainly, Moscow had no intention of weakening its control in northern Korea. Soviet unwillingness to accept American proposals for dealing with “urgent questions” irritated Hodge, who complained to Washington that point four of the Moscow agreement consisted of “weasel words.” Hodge’s frustration was understandable, since he blamed the partition for food and electricity shortages in southern Korea. Cer­ tainly, Moscow could have acted to ease Hodge’s problems, but rising suspicion of Washington's insincerity, coupled with a desire to weaken the American hold south of the 38th parallel, precluded any magnanimous gestures.82 Furthermore, the Soviet position was legal-

ly correct, since the Moscow fo rm u la d id not envision com plete zo nal integration. Despite Hodge’s unhappiness, th e final Soviet-A m erican agree­ ment on economic and adm inistrative coordination co n stitu ted an encouraging sign. Rail, truck, an d coastw ide shipping trade betw een zones was resum ed, as was nationw ide m ail service. T he negotiators also agreed to create a perm anent liaison betw een com m ands an d to begin coordination at checkpoints along th e 38th parallel. W hile th e Soviet delegation approved th e use o f uniform radio frequencies, it refused to perm it free d istrib u tio n o f newspapers in th e n o rth or to allow unified fiscal policies. T he Russians flatly rejected jo in t control over transportation, electric power, and com m unications, arguing that a definitive national arrangem ent for econom ic and adm inistra­ tive unity had to await th e creation o f a provisional governm ent for all Korea.89 For Hodge, the behavior o f th e Soviet delegation confirm ed his worst suspicions. The USAFIK com m ander w arned W ashington th a t it could expect a sim ilar divergence o f in terp retatio n w hen negotia­ tions began for the creation o f a provisional governm ent. H e urgently requested a detailed directive for th e forthcom ing political confer­ ence. As an essential precondition for negotiations, H odge believed that the United States should insist u p o n th e im m ediate establish­ ment of complete freedom o f speech, press, and m ovem ent th rough­ out Korea. If Moscow refused to open th e northern zone, th e USAFIK commander recom m ended th a t W ashington perm it him to “discreetly let the Korean people know th a t th e Soviets are failing to cooperate with th e U .S. in breaking down th e 38° barrier.” 84 The State Departm ent rejected H odge’s p lan , no d o u b t recognizing th a t it would hardly facilitate Soviet-A m erican negotiations. W ashington would authorize only th e issuance o f a press release stating th a t th e American delegation had favored a w ider agreem ent for zonal in te ­ gration.« American occupation officials saw th a t th e fate o f K orea h in ged on the outcome o f th e Jo in t C om m ission d elib eratio n s. U nless th e United States acted sw iftly to b olster conservative elem en ts in south­ ern Korea, they b elieved , th e extrem e left an d th e C om m unists would dom inate th e provisional governm ent. H odge p laced sp ecial importance on m axim izin g th e p o p u larity an d p restige o f K im K u and his followers. H e even w an ted W ashington to sponsor th e KPG ’s participation in U n ited N ations activ ities. B enninghofif u n d o u b ted ly

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had the Joint Commission negotiations in mind when he suggested that die administration refer to the Korean representadve body work­ ing under the Joint Commission as an “interim government,” rather than a “provisional government,” since die Kim Ku regime already held the latter designation.*6 Acheson spumed both proposals and instructed the American command to treat the KPG as a political party alone and without any special status. The War Department, while approving this acdon, noted that “this confusion might con­ ceivably give the US members of the Joint Commission some bargain­ ing advantage in discussions with the Soviets establishing a 'Provi­ sional Government’.”87 Washington had good reason to withhold any hint of public sup­ port for the KPG. Kim Ku and his backers had made plain their detetminadon to block implementation of the Soviet-American agreement on Korea. During January 1946, Kim Ku had organized all conservative groups into an ‘‘Anti-Trusteeship Committee” dedi­ cated to the restoration of Korea’s sovereignty at the earliest possible date.88 Even Hodge could see that such blatant opposition to the Moscow agreement was counterproductive. As a result, Archer L Lerch, Arnold’s replacement as military governor, publicly warned the Korean people that violent protests and political unrest would in fact guarantee the imposition of a trusteeship. In addition, Hodge oudawed several rightist youth groups that had been in large part responsible for the political agitation and violence in southern Korea during the occupation.89 Despite these actions, American occupation officials sdll considered W s KPR the primary threat to law and order.90 For the Soviet Union, Hodge’s efforts to prevent criticism of the Moscow agreement were thoroughly inadequate. On January 19. 2b* denounced the AMG for permitting verbal attacks not only on trust­ eeship but on the Soviet Union as well. Three days later, it charged Hodge with inspiring public opposition to the Moscow agreement.91 The USAFIK commander summarily dismissed these accusations as groundless. In response to Moscow’s indictment, Hodge explained in a public statement that there was nothing reprehensible about advo­ cating freedom of «pression. While Hodge’s defense of a basic dem­ ocratic principle may have been laudable, it did not contribute to a successful resolution of the Korean problem. In fact, Hodge privately heaped scorn on the Moscow agreement, arguing that Soviet and Korean views on trusteeship were incompatible.92

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Faced with H odge's obduracy, th e Soviet U nion decided to p u b li­ cize the text of the A m erican proposal on K orea a t th e Moscow C on­ ference in an effort to em barrass th e U nited States. In its original form, Byrnes's plan had n o t included m easures for a provisional gov­ ernment and would have postponed independence for ten years. In a deliberate fabrication, Toss th en claim ed th a t th e Soviet U nion h ad opposed trusteeship from th e start b u t A m erican resistance to im m e­ diate self-government had forced M olotov to accept th e trusteeship arrangement. George F. K ennan, th e A m erican chargé in Moscow, speculated that the Soviets sought to portray all nonleftist political leaders as collaborators an d reactionaries an d thereby insist upon their exclusion from participation in th e provisional governm ent. If successful, this strategy w ould eventuate in C om m unist control over a reunited Korea.93 Acheson acted at once to counter these Soviet claim s. T he U n ited States, he publicly declared, was com m itted to th e rapid achievem ent of a united and independent K orea. Byrnes h ad proposed liftin g th e barrier at the 38th parallel, rath er th an th e creation o f a provisional government, because reunification was th e necessary first step for th e promotion o f Korea’s welfare. Acheson th en falsely alleged th a t, at Moscow, Byrnes and M olotov h ad discussed th e possibility th a t tru st­ eeship m ight not be necessary, b u t, if it was, th e arrangem ent w ould last at least five years and perhaps longer.94 M eanwhile, H arrim an met with Stalin and tried to reassure th e Soviet leader o f Am erican good faith. Stalin, in reply, p o in ted angrily to reports from Korea that the American m ilitary governor was encouraging criticism o f th e Moscow agreem ent. H arrim an insisted th a t th e rum ors were w ithout foundation and inconsistent w ith A m erican policy. Stalin rem ained skeptical. W ashington, he th o u g h t, should issue a public disavowal of any actions th at had contributed to anti-Soviet sentim ent in south­ ern Korea.93 At the outset o f 1946, th en , W ashington’s search for a settlem ent in Korea had resulted in a renew ed com m itm ent to th e achievem ent of a trusteeship. T he prospects fo r successful im plem entation seem ed questionable at best, however, given th e rapidly developing p attem of mutual distrust betw een th e U nited States and th e Soviet U nion. Nevertheless, there was reason for optim ism . Initial Soviet-Am erican negotiations at th e local level had experienced significant progress, and the overall Moscow agreem ent provided a w orkable fram ework for permanendy resolving th e K orean problem . “ O nly persons

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soaked in mistrust,” Herbert Feis has observed, “could have resisted the cheerful conclusion that the Soviet Government was going to abstain from using its advantageous position in Korea to thwart [American objectives] in Japan or China.”96 Yet Truman had con­ cluded in the aftermath of the Moscow Conference that the agree­ ment on Korea was tantamount to appeasement. This attitude sug­ gested that the administration was prepared to assume a tough stance during subsequent negotiations with Moscow and demand Soviet acceptance of the American vision of Korea’s future. I f Human had decided to adopt an inflexible posture on Korea, such an approach would involve distinct limitations. Soviet interests on the Korean peninsula were unquestionably greater than those of the United States. At the time, Truman had not formulated a con­ crete plan to produce the requisite military and economic power to force a settlement on American terms. Perhaps more important, Sta­ lin undoubtedly believed that since Korea was of secondary impor­ tance to American national security, Washington would not risk involvement in a major war to impose its will. The absence of any vital interests in Korea, coupled with the lack of sufficient power to alter the course of events significandy, meant that an American deci­ sion to assume a hard line on the Korean issue would result in little more than rhetorical bombast.97 If Thiman wanted to be tough with Stalin, Korea was surely the wrong place for a test of strength.

CHAPTER

4

Patience w ith Firmness

Truman's policy toward th e Soviet U nion experienced a fundam ental reorientation during the first m onths o f 1946. Previously, th e adm in­ istration had been w illing to com prom ise w ith Moscow. A fter th e Moscow Conference, however, Truman decided to “ get tough w ith Russia.” For both political and diplom atic reasons, th e president had concluded that granting fu rth er concessions to th e Soviet U nion would be unwise and dangerous. Secretary Byrnes accepted th e change and labeled the new approach “patience w ith firm ness.” 1 In Korea, the new policy m eant th at W ashington w ould dem and Soviet acceptance o f the Am erican interpretation o f th e Moscow agreem ent. If Stalin failed to acquiesce, th e U nited States w ould rem ain in occu­ pation of southern Korea presum ably u n til th e Soviets agreed to a settlement on Am erican term s. Events in Korea during 1946 illustrated well th e distinct lim ita­ tions of W ashington’s new policy. A n equitable solution to th e Korean problem was possible only if th e U nited States and th e Soviet Union were willing to com prom ise. In th e absence o f serious negotia­ tions, Korea never would achieve reunification and independence peacefully. Yet the adm inistration apparently believed th a t it. could outwait Stalin and compel th e Soviet U nion to relinquish its grip on northern Korea. Truman confidently expected th at his new posture of; verbal toughness would force Moscow “to play th e gam e the Am eri- >\ can way.”2 But rather th an encouraging a settlem ent, W ashington’s ; policy of “ patience w ith firm ness” guaranteed th at Korea w ould be a \ permanently divided nation. Soviet actions in northern Korea early in 1946 suggested th a t Mos­ cow did not intend to retreat. D uring the autum n o f 1945, th e Soviets had perm itted the northern Koreans to elect representatives to local people’s com m ittees. B ut when the U nited States yielded to southern Korean protests against th e Moscow agreem ent, th e Soviet Union quickly reappraised its policy. To ensure Russian m astery over a

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friendly northern Korea, Moscow proceeded to install its trusted cli­ ents into positions of authority. Symbolic of this shift in policy was Chistiakov’s decision to place Cho Man-sik under house arrest for opposing trusteeship.3 The most important of the new leaders in northern Korea was an obscure exile named Kim II Sung (Kim IIsöng) who had not even arrived in the Soviet zone of occupation until September 1945. At a conference in the northern capital of Pyong­ yang during February 1946, representatives elected Kim chairman of the “Provisional People’s Committee.”4 From this point onward, only Korean leaders unquestionably loyal to the Soviet Union occu­ pied the higher administrative and political offices in the northern zone.3 At the same time, Moscow recognized that most Koreans wanted sweeping social and economic change. In March 1946, the Soviet Union implemented a major reform program expropriating land held by Japanese collaborators, large landlords, and the church. Hie northern Korean regime distributed this land without requiring cash payment. The following June, Kim II Sung’s government national­ ized all large-scale industry, transportation, communications, and banking, while mandating the eight-hour day and proclaiming sex­ ual equality.6 These Soviet-sponsored actions had a significant if indi­ rect impact on southern Korea. As Langdon, Hodge’s political advi­ sor, observed at the time, reforms in the north “have fallen heavily on the unfortunate conservative and propertied classes, many of whom have taken refuge in our zone.”7 While it is impossible to be abso­ lutely certain about events in northern Korea, the Soviet Union appears to have satisfied the popular desire for significant reforms while simultaneously building a sound foundation for a Korean socialist state. Possession of land was of particular importance, since it gave the average citizen a stake in the new government. With the exception of endorsing trusteeship, Moscow definitely had a better understanding of Korean political and social affairs than did the United States.8 American occupation of southern Korea demonstrated far less organization and more division in purpose than Soviet policy in the north. Hodge was in large part responsible for American problems because of his preoccupation with the perceived threat of a Commu­ nist seizure of power in the south. An obsessive fear of Soviet expan­ sionism dictated virtually all of Hodge’s actions as occupation com­ mander; invariably his highest priority was the maintenance of law

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and order. As a result, during O ctober 1945, he organized a K orean “National Civil Police Force” to assist th e USAFIK in preserving internal stability. O ccupation officials chose individuals w ith prior police experience, however, resulting in th e selection o f a preponder­ ant number of Koreans who had obtained train in g from th e Jap a­ nese. This Korean police force a t once established close ties w ith th e extreme right and openly directed hostility tow ard th e left. Since many members o f the Korean police force h ad helped th e Japanese to suppress the wartime underground, they naturally feared retaliation if leftist elements assum ed political pow er.9 N evertheless, H odge viewed the Korean police force as a partial answer to A m erican m an­ power shortages.10 Late in N ovem ber 1945, h e happily predicted th a t a group of twenty-five thousand trained Koreans w ould be able to relieve the USAFIK o f norm al police functions by January 1 ,1 9 4 6 .11 Declining m orale w ithin th e A m erican occupation force was an even more urgent reason causing H odge to plead for drastic steps toward Korean self-governm ent. N ot only should th e U nited States provide the local police force w ith large am ounts o f surplus arm s and equipment, but H odge w anted th e adm inistration to authorize th e creation of a “N ational D efense Force” as w ell. Such a “ constabulary army,” he reasoned, w ould attract m em bers o f th e scattered param ili­ tary forces in southern K orea an d therefore end th e dangerous com ­ petition between these private arm ies. Secretary o f W ar Patterson enthusiastically endorsed H odge’s suggestion. If th e U nited States organized and equipped a constabulary army, no fu rth er increases in strength would be necessary for th e USAFIK.12 T he State D epart­ ment, afraid th at such action m ight im peril negotiations w ith the Soviet Union, registered its vigorous dissent. Consequently, th e administration deferred a decision on th e N ational D efense Force until after the opening o f discussions at th e Jo in t C om m ission.19 Apparently, Hodge had expected W ashington to approve his plan for a National Defense Force. D uring February 1946, he opened a training school in Seoul and solicited candidates from a num ber o f quasi-military groups operating in southern Korea since liberation. Hodge was so pleased w ith th e results th a t he th en organized a “National Y m th A ssociation” to provide th e m anpow er for a genu­ ine Korean army at som e fu tu re date. A n H o-sang, a graduate o f th e University o f Jen a in G erm any and an avowed adm irer o f H itler’s Nazi Youth, became th e director o f this new organization. W hile th e United States provided th e equipm ent and advice, A n Ho-sang

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developed a program o f anti-Communist political indoctrination and strict discipline that readily lent itself to rightist exploitation. Far from contributing to internal stability, Hodge’s actions encouraged domestic violence and unrest. By the summer of 1946, youth groups representing both the right and the left were engaged in guerrilla warfare and terrorism on a major scale throughout the American zone of occupation.14 lb his credit, Hodge was not entirely insensitive to the popular desire in southern Korea for change. In fact, he favored extensive social and economic reforms.1’ However, Hum an’s diplomatic advi­ sors adamantly refused to approve any major reforms prior to the for­ mation of a provisional government. Hodge believed that the steady deterioration of conditions south of the 38th parallel precluded fur­ ther delay. Increasingly, he came to blame his difficulties on the State Department’s refusal to follow any of his policy recommendations. In one particularly bitter cable, Hodge demanded to know who was responsible for advising against a decision to abandon trusteeship and grant Korea its immediate independence. Warning that the Korean people were losing confidence in the United States, he appealed for positive steps to counter rising Soviet influence in the south. The USAFIK commander even volunteered to serve as "a sacrificial goat,’’ leaving Korea and assuming all blame for Washington’s failure to achieve a bilateral settlement with the Soviet Union. If Washington persisted in its present course of delay, Hodge believed Stalin eventu­ ally would dominate the entire peninsula. Korea “will never be really united,” he pessimistically concluded, “until the Russians are sure that the whole will be soundly communistic.” 14 For Hodge, conservative political elements in the American zone represented the only certain barrier to Stalin’s expansionist ambi­ tions. During January 1946, Hodge implored Washington to delay the convening of the Joint Commission until the right had an oppor­ tunity to form a broader and more unified political coalition.17 To that end, he prevailed upon Kim Ku and Rhee to liquidate the KPG in return for the creation of a new “Representative Democratic Coun­ cil.” None other than Preston Goodfellow, having recently arrived in Korea as Hodge’s advisor, became the principal architect of this new advisory body. Not surprisingly, conservatives dominated the Repre­ sentative Democratic Council and Rhee served as its chairman. Hodge publicly avowed that the body did not constitute a provisional government but was merely a device to increase the Korean role in

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the formulation o f Am erican occupation policies.18 In reality, H odge was trying to m obilize unity am ong th e conservatives in anticipation of the Joint Commission’s deliberations. BenninghofF even recom ­ mended that W ashington g ran t $50 m illion in aid to th e new advi­ sory body in order to bolster its prestige and offset rising Soviet p o p u ­ larity in the south.19 During early 1946, th e K orean conservatives experienced a steady rise in popularity because o f A m erican sponsorship an d popular opposition to trusteeship. Yet H odge’s m aneuvers to strengthen th e right, while successful, had u n fo rtu n ate consequences. “ By throw ing United States support only to th e rig h t in a country which dem anded and needed radical reform ,” G lenn Paige has observed, A m erican occupation officials “ alienated a healthy segm ent o f th e left w hich could have been wooed and perhaps even won by a living exposition of American democracy.” Far worse, once excluded from access to political power, m any m ilitan t K orean radicals o p ted for a closer alli­ ance with the C om m unists.20 Moreover, H odge’s actions fu rth er reduced the likelihood o f a Soviet-A m erican settlem ent. Moscow admittedly would have sought extensive leftist and C om m unist rep­ resentation in th e provisional governm ent regardless o f events in th e south. However, Am erican preferential treatm en t for th e conserva­ tives caused the Soviet U nion to becom e even m ore inflexible in its demands for a friendly K orea. Early in 1946, th e State D epartm ent had begun to prepare for th e Joint Commission negotiations. It h ad n o t com pleted its work, how­ ever, when Hodge requested instructions. T hus, th e USAFIK com ­ mander received an SW NCC policy paper on February 11 th a t dealt only with point one o f th e Moscow agreem ent. W ashington instruct­ ed Hodge to take no action beyond th e form ation o f a provisional government, while encouraging “ th e various K orean political fac­ tions to reach fundam ental agreem ents on th e political, econom ic and social policies to be applied by th e new governm ent, including essential democratic reform s.” Significantly, th e SW NCC paper also authorized Hodge to civilianize th e m ilitary governm ent rapidly and provide local Koreans w ith th e experience necessary to allow sw ift assumption o f governm ental responsibilities. In th e event o f a break­ down at the Jo in t Com m ission, th e adm inistration in ten d ed to implement a program o f “ K oreanization” in th e southern zone alone.21 Hodge still th o u g h t th a t th e U nited States h ad to o btain Soviet

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consent for freedom of speech, press, and movement throughout Korea prior to the opening of negotiations at the Joint Commission. If Moscow demurred, it would not be possible to acquire an accurate cross section of Korean opinion. During February 1946, Harriman visited Korea. Hodge evidently persuaded the ambassador that unless the United States guaranteed unrestricted freedom of expression in Korea, the Soviet Union would install a puppet regime on the penin* sula. Upon his return to Washington, Harriman conveyed to Truman his conviction that Stalin sought to extend Soviet ideology and terri­ torial hegemony throughout East Asia. Since “the Russians . . . were going to take advantage of” Hodge’s vulnerable position, an Ameri­ can posture of firmness in Korea was essential.32 Presumably in response to Harriman’s advice, Washington approved Hodge’s recom­ mendation to insist upon the right of free expression in consultations at the Joint Commission. If Moscow spumed this proposal, Hodge would announce that the Soviet Union was barring free speech and elementary civil liberties. American leaders were confident that pop­ ular criticism of Moscow would then force Stalin to retreat and accept Washington’s position.23 Simultaneously, news arrived in Seoul of the creation of the “Provi­ sional People’s Committee’’ in the north. For Hodge, these events in the Soviet zone suggested that the Communists would attempt to seize power in the south in the very near future, lb counter this seri­ ous challenge, Hodge informed Washington of his intention “to keep up prestige of the Korean Representative Démocratie Council, make every effort to gain full backing of the Korean people, and dis­ credit the Communists. This will probably get liberal and pink press of US on my back, but feel any other local action now would be fatal.’’ Truman’s advisors were similarly alarmed. One State Depart­ ment memorandum warned that the Soviets “are applying the same tactics they have applied in Eastern Europe in order to gain control . . . through military minority groups controlled by the Soviet Gov­ ernment.’’24 But Washington did not believe that an effective re­ sponse to the Soviet threat required an exclusive reliance on Rhee and Kim Ku. The War Department instructed Hodge to broaden his base of support and to insist on open conservative advocacy for social and fiscal reform. If the conservatives declined to adopt such a program, the cable concluded, “it should be made clear to them that they can receive no further U.S. backing.”23 Soviet and American representatives finally met in Seoul on March

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20, 1946, for the start o f th e Jo in t Com m ission negotiations. Even before hard bargaining began, bo th sides h ad draw n clear lines o f dis­ agreement. In his opening statem ent, Colonel G eneral Terenty F. Shtikov declared th at the Soviet governm ent was com m itted to th e realization in Korea o f “ a true dem ocratic and in d ependent country, friendly to the Soviet U nion, so th a t in th e fu tu re it will n o t becom e a base for an attack on th e Soviet U nion.” Therefore, th e Korean provi­ sional government had to reflect n o t only w ide representation b u t also unqualified support for th e term s o f th e Moscow agreem ent. In response, Hodge em phasized th a t th e U nited States was determ ined to see that “a governm ent th a t corresponds to th e views o f th e m ajor­ ity is established.” Only national self-determ ination, he argued, could produce “th e political, econom ic, and social progress o f the Korean people, the developm ent o f dem ocratic self-governm ent and the establishment o f the national independence o f Korea.” 26 As in Eastern Europe, K orea’s fate hinged upon th e ability o f th e great powers to resolve divergent interpretations o f an international agree­ ment.27 Shtikov, during the early sessions, resisted th e A m erican desire for nationwide consultations; he favored discussions w ithin each in d i­ vidual zone instead. The A m erican delegation, in its private cables, dismissed the Soviet position as arbitrary. Strangely, Am erican repre­ sentatives in Seoul were surprised a t Moscow’s determ ination to implement the trusteeship agreem ent.28 D uring later sessions, Shti­ kov favored consultation only w ith parties th a t backed th e Moscow agreement. The Am erican proposal for a national “ C onsultative Union,” he insisted, was contrary to th e Moscow agreem ent and therefore unacceptable. Shtikov also opposed treating Korea as a unit. Administrative or econom ic integration, he explained, had to await the creation o f a provisional governm ent.29 Despite these differences, th e negotiators ultim ately reached agreement on the first phase o f action at th e Jo in t Com m ission. This stage would include consultation w ith local parties, consideration o f a political platform , recom m endation o f a charter, and th e choice o f personnel for the provisional governm ent. The Jo in t Com mission organized three subcom m ittees to form ulate specific m easures for attaining each objective. Moscow thus had dem onstrated an unm is­ takable willingness to im plem ent th e Moscow agreem ent, b u t only if the United States agreed to a provisional governm ent and trusteeship prior to reunification. Soviet political advisor G . M. Balasanov told

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his American counterpart Langdon that Moscow expected a workable settlement in Korea before the end of May 1946.30 Although there was ample reason for mild optimism, Hodge con­ tinued to issue pessimistic forecasts from Seoul. He chided Washing­ ton in particular for its devotion to negotiations and its failure to con­ sult him before adopting the trusteeship policy. Byrnes’s patience finally wore thin. In a letter to Patterson, he denied that the adminis­ tration had failed to keep Hodge informed on the terms of the Mos­ cow agreement. Byrnes confessed himself "somewhat perturbed by the attitude taken by General Hodge” in view of the relatively prom­ ising start in the Joint Commission negotiations. The secretary of state reminded Patterson that the United States was committed to the fulfillment of the Moscow agreement. Thus, Hodge’s job was to cooperate with the Soviets, not to debate the wisdom of a Korean trusteeship.51 Patterson replied immediately. In his letter to Byrnes he empha­ sized that interdepartmental coordination was crucial to the success­ ful formulation and implementation of American foreign policy. His recent visit to Korea had convinced him of Hodge’s earnest desire for cooperation. Even Harriman, the secretary of war explained, had been "so favorably impressed by General Hodge’s ability and diplo­ macy that he now believes that there is a possibility for reaching a solution in Korea which will be satisfactory to the United States." The JCS too categorically stated its confidence in Hodge, commenting that the State Department probably had not kept the USAFIK com­ mander adequately informed.52 An emerging deadlock at the Joint Commission soon overshad­ owed this dispute between the State and War departments. Shtikov had made it quite plain that both commands had to agree on the par­ ries for consultation and all had to support the Moscow agreement fully. Soviet suspicion of American intent naturally increased when the American delegation announced that there were five hundred legitimate parties and social organizations in southern Korea eligible for consultation compared to only forty in the north. When Shtikov objected to consultation with groups hostile to trusteeship, Langdon retorted that Korean hostility to the Moscow agreement did not con­ stitute an acceptable criterion for determining legitimacy. Byrnes instantly approved the American delegation’s decision to resist Mos­ cow’s attempt to exclude those parties opposing trusteeship from con­ sultation.55

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Many observers surm ised th a t th e absence o f published reports from the Joint Commission probably indicated a lack o f progress in negotiations. Rumors o f arm ed clashes a t th e 38th parallel d id n o th ­ ing to allay popular apprehension .94 T he Soviet U nion, q u ite obvi­ ously, was using the trusteeship issue as a device to prevent a sizable group of anti-Soviet Korean leaders from o btaining access to political power. Yet the U nited States was in th e unenviable position o f insist­ ing upon consultation w ith those very individuals who sought to undermine the work o f th e Jo in t Com m ission. N evertheless, State Department official V incent endorsed th e actions o f th e A m erican delegation, arguing th a t to disenfranchise an “ overw helm ing m ajor­ ity of southern Koreans because they disagree w ith us as to th eir read­ iness for independence w ould be unreasonable and undem ocratic .” 99 In reality, as Langdon ad m itted , fears o f sovietization dictated th e behavior of the Am erican delegation. T he U nited States believed that the exclusion o f the conservatives w ould ensure a C om m unist seizure of power. R ather th an bow ing to Soviet dem ands, W ashing­ ton assumed a posture o f inflexible opposition. “ If we can hold this fort all along the line from Korea to T im buktoo,” one A m erican offi­ cial remarked at the tim e, “we m ay start to get som ewhere .” 96 Washington's resort to a p atien t b u t firm approach in Korea paid immediate dividends. O n A pril 18, th e Soviet-Am erican negotiators appeared to have broken the deadlock w ith th e publication o f a jo in t communiqué on consultation. T he Jo in t Com m ission agreed to con­ sult all “democratic parties and social organizations which are truly democratic in their aim s” and w ould sign a declaration pledging to uphold Soviet-American decisions on th e creation o f a provisional government. More im portant, th e com m uniqué included as well a provision requiring all signatories to accept th e trusteeship section o f the Moscow agreem ent.97 H odge recorded his satisfaction w ith th e compromise, since it seem ed to perm it consultation w ith th e extrem e right. Despite the agreem ent, however, th e USAFIK com m ander still worried that the Com m unists w ould dom inate th e provisional gov­ ernment. Since “ the southern political structure includes alm ost equally le f t. . . and m oderate-rightists,” H odge apprised th e W ar Department, “we w ould eith er have to nom inate an unrepresentative slate for the south or expect its being outnum bered by com bined strength of N orth and South Moscow controlled groups .” 98 Moscow's stand on consultation after th e com prom ise also irked Hodge. Shtikov w anted to exclude m any prom inent conservative

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leaders because they were affiliated with no specific organized groups. The American delegation insisted upon consultation with "all schools of political thought irrespective of our estimate of their popular backing.” Hodge exhorted Washington to hold firmly to the principle of wide consultation until the Soviet Union accepted the American position. In the meantime, we shall build up evidence o f exclusions o f all but Leftist parties in north and south and lack o f facilities for US to observe in the north. We will then dem and either im m ediate lifting o f 38 barrier and complete freedom in north for the political activities o f moderate parties or else acceptance o f our views in m atter of composition o f government, struc­ ture, etc.

If Moscow objected, Hodge postulated that the “threat of full public­ ity . . . to which the Russians have already shown their sensitivity” would force Soviet compliance. Washington approved Hodge’s rec­ om mendations." The stage was now set for a complete breakdown in negotiations at the Joint Commission. In contrast to Hodge, Syngman Rhee and Kim Ku greeted the Soviet-American compromise with dismay, since it required them to sign a pledge of support for trusteeship. The Representative Demo­ cratic Council had declared its opposition to perpetuation of outside control, but now it would have to reverse itself or risk exclusion from the Joint Commission negotiations. Hodge endeavored to resolve the dilemma. The Korean people still enjoyed unfettered freedom of expression, he declared, and former military governor Arnold, now head of the American delegation at the Joint Commission, seconded his assessment. The Soviet Union certainly did not share Hodge’s interpretation of the compromise agreement. In fact, Moscow’s repre­ sentatives at the Joint Commission had already begun to argue with considerable justification that a mere signature on a pledge provided no guarantee of support for the Moscow agreement. Shtikov stated frankly that he would not sanction consultation with those groups most critical of trusteeship. When the American delegation ada­ mantly upheld the principle of absolute freedom of expression, nego­ tiations reached an impasse.40 On May 7, Hodge informed Washington that he would propose an adjournment of the Joint Commission the following day sine die. He offered several reasons for his decision. First, the American stand

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against Soviet dem ands for th e exclusion o f parties n o t u n d er its domination would bolster th e m orale o f anti-C om m unist K orean nationalists. Second, advocacy o f free speech was a sound position internationally, since no n ation w ould favor penalizing individuals for resisting outside control. T h ird , H odge reasoned th a t if th e United States forced th e Soviet U nion to back dow n, popular pres­ sure in the north would weaken th e foundations o f Moscow's p u p p et regime. Finally, the USAFIK com m ander stated boldly th a t if “ K orea is to be truly independent, th e tim e for a showdown on Soviet pre­ tensions is now." The only way to achieve K orea’s reunification, Hodge advised, “ is by standing firm on th e position we have taken and letting the Soviets m ake th e next m ove .’’41 For some observers at th e tim e, th e adjournm ent o f th e Jo in t Com ­ mission on May 8 constituted th e first step tow ard civil war. Indeed, by the spring o f 1946, scattered acts o f violence and th e discovery o f assassination plots were everyday occurrences in th e A m erican zone .42 Langdon appealed to the adm inistration to approach Moscow a t th e government level w ith a request for adoption o f a tim etable to achieve m utual m ilitary w ithdraw al by February 1947 .43 W hile W ash­ ington appreciated the gravity o f th e situation in southern K orea, it was bent on showing its resolve. Acheson inform ed Seoul on May 18 drat the adm inistration w ould n o t reopen negotiations a t th e Jo in t Commission until Moscow recognized th e principle o f freedom o f expression. Ultim ately, Soviet resistance to consultations w ith critics of trusteeship would discredit Moscow inside Korea and com pel Sta­ lin to accept the Am erican p o sitio n .44 Late in May and in accordance w ith p rio r plans, th e SW NCC authorized an election in southern K orea for th e creation o f a lim ited degree of representative governm ent. T he facade o f self-rule in th e north, Irum an’s advisors believed, h ad placed A m erican governance in the south in an unfavorable lig h t. R esponding to advice from Wal­ ter Bedell Sm ith, th e new A m erican am bassador to th e Soviet U nion, Washington instructed H odge to m axim ize Korean participation in the formulation o f occupation policy and o btain a truly representa­ tive provisional governm ent.43 Langdon welcom ed this new policy directive. The Soviet strategy, he asserted, depended upon Am erican frustration and eventual w ithdraw al opening th e way to a C om m u­ nist seizure of power. T hrough unity, patience, and resolve, however, the United States could foster th e em ergence o f a strong, indepen­ dent, democratic coalition and thereby thw art Moscow’s p lan .46 Even

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Preston Goodfellow was pleased. Upon his departure from Korea, he proclaimed that the Koreans were ready for self-government. If Mos­ cow refused to permit the Joint Commission to reconvene, he favored holding elections without delay for a separate southern Korean gov­ ernment.47 Moscow quickly indicated that the success of Washington’s strategy was unlikely. Both Izvestia and Pravda castigated the United States for violating the Moscow agreement and then adjourning the Joint Commission without justification. The Soviets charged that Hodge was encouraging reactionaries to oppose the Moscow agreement while refusing to consult a number of truly democratic parties. The United States was determined to install reactionaries in the Korean provi­ sional government at all costs, they insisted, in order to prevent democracy and subordinate Korea to American political and eco­ nomic influence. As a result, Moscow was demanding “precise and undeviating observation of the obligations undertaken . . . at the Moscow Conference.” There could be no reunification of Korea prior to the formation of a provisional government. Furthermore, Moscow would never consult with Korean leaders hostile to the Soviet Union. Under no circumstances, one Soviet writer declared, would the Soviet Union permit “imperialist forces” to use Korea “as a base and jumping-off place for an attack on our country.”48 Moscow’s verbal toughness did not weaken the administration’s commitment to “patience with firmness” in Korea. In fact, Edwin Pauley's trip to northern Korea during the early summer of 1946 strengthened Washington’s confidence in its hard-line approach. Pauley was Truman's representative on the Allied Reparations Com­ mission and had expressed concern in December 1945 about the reports of Soviet removal of equipment from northern Korea. On December 7, Pauley had announced that a final assessment of repara­ tions for Korea would have to await an analysis of the needs of the entire nation. In view of the temporary division of Korea, he sug­ gested that a survey team inspect both the American and Soviet zones. Two weeks later, Truman approved Pauley’s proposal. On March 22 ,1946, Pauley further advised that the United States should request Soviet permission to enter northern Korea for the purpose of verifying reports of large-scale removals of industrial equipment from that area.48 At a press conference on May 2 , Truman endorsed Pauley’s recom­ mendations. Only full knowledge of the resources and productive

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capacity of northern Korea, th e president rem arked, w ould perm it a proper formulation o f a reparations program for Jap an and "any long-range plan for the peaceful econom y o f East Asia.” Eleven days later, Byrnes formally requested th a t Moscow allow Pauley to en ter northern Korea. To everyone's surprise, Chistiakov g ranted perm is­ sion for the inspection .90 Subsequently, Pauley com piled a detailed account of his trip to th e Soviet zone. U pon his arrival in northern Korea on May 29, Chistiakov assured h im th a t th e rum ors o f Soviet removals were w ithout foundation. Pauley inspected a large num ber of pig iron, fertilizer, alum inum , an d textile factories. T he Soviets denied entrance only to a sm all area on th e northeast coast around Hungnam, arguing th a t th e train ride to th a t location w ould require far too much tim e. W hile he d id notice som e generators crated for shipment, Pauley attrib u ted looting to th e illegal acts o f th e K oreans themselves. U pon inquiry, m any o f those people who h ad reported Soviet removals told Pauley th a t they h ad n o t w itnessed personally such activities.91 After his return to S eo u l, P auley reported th a t th ere w ere ‘‘no sub ­ stantial industrial rem ovals from th e R ussian -ad m in istered territo ry of Northern Korea.” In m arked contrast to M an ch uria, th e Soviets were striving to reh ab ilitate an d restore n orthern K orea’s in d u strial activity, rather than crip p le econom ic recovery. In h is form al report to Truman, Pauley noted th at Soviet p o licies in northern K orea in d i­ cated Moscow’s in ten tio n to stay in occupation u n til its p up p ets achieved com plete control. Since K orea’s econom y was conducive to the development o f com m unism , th e Soviet strategy w as experienc­ ing success. Pauley th en co m p lained th at K orea was ‘‘n ot receiving the attention and consideration it sh o u ld .” T he confrontation o f d e­ mocracy and com m unism across th e 38th p a ra lle l, h e stated b lu n d y, meant that Korea was ‘‘an id eo lo gical b atd egro u n d upon w hich our entire success in A sia m ay d ep en d .” P au ley w arned again st an y A m er­ ican concessions to th e Soviet U nion because th e loss o f K orea w ould endanger the security o f Ja p a n .92 Pauley also proposed a series o f specific policy actions. First, th e United States should inaugurate a propaganda cam paign h ig hlight­ ing Soviet violations o f existing agreem ents dealing w ith K orea’s future. Second, the AM G should educate Koreans on th e advantages of the democratic system . T hird, A m erican econom ic aid to K orea for recovery was advisable. Finally, th e U nited States should transfer to Korea a num ber o f teachers and technicians to foster industrial

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growth. Unless the United States met popular needs and desires, Pauley concluded, the Soviet Union eventually would dominate the entire peninsula. Pauley’s report impressed Human greatly. The pres­ ident immediately arranged a meeting with Byrnes for a thorough reassessment of American policy in Korea.” Earlier in June 1946, Assistant Secretary of State for Occupied Areas John H. Hilldring had arrived at similar conclusions. He drafted a memorandum stressing the need to broaden the base of Korean participation in governmental affairs. According to Hill­ dring, the deadlock at the Joint Commission was the result o f a dash between U nited States insistence upon respect for the prindple of freedom o f speech and Soviet determination to prevent certain avowedly anti-Soviet Korean leaders from participation in the Provisional Korean Government. These leaders constitute a group of older "emigre ” Koreans who have returned to Korea since the capitu­ lation of Japan. They are not thought to be completely representative of Korean political opinion, nor are they felt to be essential to the establishment of Korean democracy or the attainm ent of United States objectives in Korea. On the other hand, their presence on the political scene gready increases the difficulty of reaching an agreement with the Soviet Union. For these reasons, it can be concluded that attainm ent of United States objectives in Korea is on the whole hampered rather than aided by their participation in Korean politics.

Hilldring also wanted the AMG to continue to pursue coordination with the Soviets and an early resumption of negotiations at the Joint Commission. Perhaps American observance of the Moscow agree­ ment in combination with growing Korean enthusiasm for participa­ tion in southern political affairs would force Moscow to recognize the principle of freedom of expression.54 Following the advice of the State Department, Truman approved the policy recommendations of Pauley and Hilldring. In a letter to Pauley, the president outlined his intention to institute a series of reforms in the American zone, including land distribution and even the nationalization of certain industries.55 On July 17, the War Department instructed Hodge to forsake his exclusive attachment to the Korean conservatives in favor of a broad coalition embracing lib­ erals and moderates as well. Wide Korean support for American occupation policies would add substance to the administration’s posi­ tion and place pressure on Moscow to resume negotiations at the Joint

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Commission. W ashington w ould n o t consider a direct approach to the Soviet Union at th e governm ental level, th e W ar D ep artm en t concluded, unless political unrest in southern K orea reached crisis proportions.* In a letter to H odge, Jo in t Com m ission delegate Charles W. Thayer explained th a t th e adm inistration w anted to p er­ mit the Russians “ to come back gracefully an d w ith o u t loss o f face .“ ’7 But these new instructions again h ad ignored H odge’s recom m enda­ tions, and the USAHK com m ander m ade no effort to h id e his dis­ pleasure. W ithout stronger action for th e resum ption o f negotiations, he protested, the Koreans w ould becom e m ore restive and th e occu­ pation force less popular. D irect contact a t th e governm ent level was imperative.’8 Still, the State D epartm ent adam antly refused to alter its stand. Hilldring professed th a t “ th e U n ited States has m ore to gain by p u r­ suing a positive constructive program in K orea th an by dem onstrat­ ing to the Soviets . . . our anxiety to dispose o f th e K orean problem quickly.” The War D epartm ent, endorsing H odge’s assessm ent, dis­ agreed and therefore referred th e m atter to th e SW NCC for review. Early in August, the SW NCC inform ed th e JC S th a t for “ tactical rea­ sons” the U nited States had “ to indicate to Soviets in every way possi­ ble that U.S. is determ ined to rem ain in K orea u n til U .S. objectives have been achieved.” T hus, it was reasoned, th e State D ep artm en t’s policy was the correct approach a t th a t tim e and deserved an o p p o rtu ­ nity to dem onstrate its success.’9 O n A ugust 3, th e W ar D epartm ent cabled Hodge th at th e position o f th e State D ep artm en t h ad pre­ vailed. There w ould be no A m erican dém arche a t th e governm ent level and Hodge was to im plem ent W ashington’s m ost recent policy directives. A dditionally, occupation officials were now to im press upon the Koreans th a t trusteeship was a fundam ental aspect o f th e Moscow agreem ent; they could n o t expect im m ediate independence. Under no circumstances was th e AM G to convey a sense o f im pa­ tience, because the adm inistration was determ ined to “ stick it o u t” and force Moscow “ to m ake th e first step tow ards a resum ption o f negotiations.”80 Despite the SW NCC’s decision, th e Thim an adm inistration re­ mained badly divided on th e issue o f K orea. A m erican m ilitary experts were dubious ab o u t th e prospects for successful im plem enta­ tion of the Pauley and H illdring proposals. More im p ortant, an improvement in southern K orea’s econom ic situation w ould require considerable financial support and th e W ar D epartm ent judged its

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resources inadequate for the task/ 1 Probably in response to persistent prodding from his military advisors for withdrawal, Tniman inter­ vened. In a letter to Patterson dated August 12 , the president frankly observed that the United States would have to continue to occupy Korea for “a considerable length of time.” Successful implementa­ tion of Pauley’s recommendations would require the War Depart­ ment to cooperate fully in the acquisition of adequate funds and experienced personnel. Truman informed Patterson that he expected his cooperation and was instructing the Navy Department to provide every assistance necessary for the achievement of American objectives in Korea. Two days later, Secretary of the Navy Forrestal joined the State Department in pledging total support for Truman's new policy in Korea. He promised to cooperate with Patterson and the War Department in carrying out Pauley’s proposals/ 3 Meanwhile, Hodge had begun reluctantly to implement the ad­ ministration’s directives. During the summer of 1946, he attempted to build a moderate coalition around the leadership of Kim Kyu-sik, former foreign minister in the KPG. Kim was well suited for the role, since the elderly scholar-statesman had been the symbolic leader of Korean liberals after World War I and was regarded as one of the few selfless leaders in postwar Korea/ 3 Everyone recognized that Wash­ ington’s new policy sought to increase mass support for the United States in the south and thereby outflank growing Soviet influence. Rumors quickly circulated that the AMG was preparing to organize an interim council excluding all extreme conservatives. On July 1, 1946, Military Governor Lerch announced that the AMG soon would sponsor the formation of a South Korean Interim Legislative Assem­ bly (SKILA) that would be half-elected and half-appointed. Lerch emphasized, however, that the SKILA would constitute merely a step toward democracy and not the creation of a permanent separate gov­ ernment.64 This new policy, if implemented in September 1945, might have contributed to the emergence of a united, democratic, and indepen­ dent Korea. Now, however, the fortunes of the moderate coalition would depend on whether the United States and the Soviet Union resolved their differences in Korea and arranged a settlement accepta­ ble to both sides/ 3 While the chances for success seemed slim, the wisdom and realism of the new American approach represented a welcome change from past policy. Almost immediately, Langdon reported progress toward the achievement of political unity. Much to

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the chagrin o f Syngm an Rhee an d K im K u, K im Kyu-sik easily managed to join forces w ith Y6 an d form a “ C oalition C om m ittee” to build support for A m erican policy .66 Elections for an interim legislative assem bly alone w ould n o t resolve southern K orea’s political problem s since th e n atio n h ad no familiarity with democracy. T he trad itio n al reliance on com m unity government m eant th a t individual freedom o f choice h ad little chance of prevailing. W idespread illiteracy m ean t th a t it w ould be possible to use the secret ballot only a t th e final stage o f an indirect election process. A nd th en th ere was th e d istu rb in g problem o f Syngman Rhee, who m aintained considerable popularity because o f Hodge’s initial backing and his rep u tatio n as a patriotic leader. D u r­ ing discussions in W ashington, Thayer recom m ended th a t Rhee “ be gently eased out o f th e K orean political p ictu re” since he “ h ad o u t­ lived his period o f usefulness.” S ubsequent events showed th a t this was more easily said th an done. N evertheless, H odge, in approving the SKUA plan, publicly reaffirm ed A m erican advocacy o f th e Mos­ cow agreement.67 Conservative Korean leaders began a t once to m obilize in an effort to control the forthcom ing SKILA elections. T he C om m unist party, on the other hand, denounced A m erican policy as prem ature an d in violation of the Moscow agreem ent. Pak H ön-yöng, C om m unist leader of the w artim e u n d erground, in stitu ted an organized cam ­ paign to disrupt the Kim-VÖ coalition, Y6 h eld o u t against C om m u­ nist pressure and labored diligendy to m oderate leftist dem ands for immediate and sweeping reform s .68 W ashington’s professed w illing­ ness to reopen talks w ith th e Soviet U nion also ham pered C om m unist operations. O n A ugust 13, 1946, Acheson reiterated th e adm inistra­ tion’s position th a t it was ready to resum e Soviet-A m erican negotia­ tions at any tim e. Kim and Yb therefore experienced m arked progress in reducing C om m unist political appeal and in increasing popular enthusiasm regarding th e SKILA elections .69 American occupadon officials, w hile preparing for th e selection o f delegates to the interim legislature, also took steps to provide certain Koreans with experience in governm ent and adm inistration. H odge appointed several local leaders to work w ith various AMG bureaus as a prelude to the creation o f a South K orean Interim G overnm ent (SKIG). The USAFIK com m ander even began to transfer operational control to the Koreans on A ugust 31, 1946. M ost southern Koreans acclaimed this new opp o rtu n ity to participate in governing th eir own

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affairs. While many Koreans joined the Kim-\& coalition in anticipa­ tion of eventual self-government, a desire for major reforms caused several moderate leaders of the right to split with the extreme conser­ vatives. At the same time, Hodge acted to regularize fiscal and eco­ nomic policies in the American zone. He also formally established a “constabulary army," supplying it with American equipment and allowing it to participate in the military maneuvers and antiguerrilla operations of the USAFIK. By early 1947, the constabulary army had elevated its prestige and effectiveness to the point where it could check the police force, which frequently abused its power.70 For Langdon, the success of Washington’s policy in southern Korea was more apparent than real. On August 23, he assailed the adminis­ tration’s strategy of delay, arguing that the “law of diminishing returns has set in.” Since leftists in the American zone were bent upon an obstructionist course, any progress toward genuine democ­ racy was impossible. Only reunification, Langdon insisted, would sat­ isfy all Koreans and end domestic political unrest. Consequently, a resumption of the Joint Commission negotiations was essential. Sig­ nificantly, Arthur C. Bunce, Hodge’s economic advisor, disagreed with Langdon’s dire assessment. In a cable to Byrnes, Bunce admitted that the situation was difficult but voiced unqualified agreement with Pauley’s recommendations. If Washington spent enough money, he predicted, the United States would be able to “outsit the Russians and sell democracy.” Bunce’s comments reinforced the administra­ tion’s determination to persevere. While postponing “an approach to the Soviets on the governmental level,” Washington instructed the AMG to encourage local support for land reform, equal economic opportunity, trade unionism, and freedom of political expression.71 American optimism appeared justified after Langdon visited the Soviet zone on October 9,1946. While in the north, Hodge’s politi­ cal advisor enjoyed not only freedom of movement but also cordial treatment. During discussions, Soviet political advisor Balasanov con­ fided to Langdon that his government was anxious to reconvene the Joint Commission. However, Moscow would never agree to consult with Rhee and Kim Ku because these two leaders were hostile to the Soviet Union. He also disdained the American notion that opposition to trusteeship was compatible with support for the Moscow agree­ ment. Langdon argued that eventually Rhee and Kim Ku would favor trusteeship and therefore should participate in the consultation process. Balasanov vehemently disagreed, but he accepted a compro-

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mise nonetheless. Langdon and Balasanov decided th a t a pledge n o t to undermine the work o f th e J o in t C om m ission was sufficient to war­ rant consultation .72 Langdon returned from Pyongyang in a buoyant m ood. In his report to W ashington, he explained th a t th e Langdon-B alasanov compromise would require all K orean parties to prom ise n o t to “foment or instigate mass op p o sitio n ” eith er to th e Jo in t Com m is­ sion or the Moscow agreem ent. More im p o rtan t, Balasanov dem on­ strated a genuine desire for cooperation, w hile com m enting hope­ fully that a Soviet-American settlem en t in K orea w ould foster a relaxation of tension in o th er areas. B ut on O ctober 26, Chistiakov communicated to H odge his w illingness to resum e talks based only on the “exact fulfillm ent” o f th e Moscow agreem ent. W ith som e jus­ tification, the Soviet occupation com m ander observed th a t it w ould be counterproductive to discuss th e im plem entation o f th e Moscow agreement with those Koreans whose pledge o f support was “ an empty declaration.” Chistiakov rem inded H odge th a t it was th e United States, not th e Soviet U nion, th a t h ad suspended th e Jo in t Commission. Only th e creation o f a provisional governm ent, how­ ever, would open th e door to K orea’s reunification and econom ic recovery.75 On November 1 , H odge proposed th e resum ption o f th e Jo in t Commission negotiations based on th e Langdon-Balasanov com pro­ mise. The U nited States rem ained com m itted to th e principle o f free­ dom of expression, b u t H odge agreed th a t instigation o f mass opposi­ tion to the Moscow agreem ent was im proper and an abuse o f free speech. Then the USAFIK com m ander attem p ted to defend his pre­ vious actions. The Moscow agreem ent, H odge argued lamely, was n o t specific on th e exact n ature o f th e trusteeship envisioned for Korea. Chistiakov replied on N ovem ber 26 th a t it was im perative to exclude from consultation all K oreans w ho previously had opposed trustee­ ship. The Langdon-Balasanov com prom ise provided no guarantee that these “reactionary parties and groups” w ould “ retreat from th eir hostile position towards th e Moscow D ecision, b u t m erely curtail temporarily th eir activities . . . so th a t they m ay have an opportunity to take part in th e consultation w ith th e Jo in t Com m ission.” W hile Moscow was a cham pion o f free speech, it also believed th at consulta­ tion with such groups w ould ham per efforts to im plem ent th e Mos­ cow agreement.74 Hodge quickly grasped a t Soviet su pport for freedom o f exprès-

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sion. The two nations, he suggested, were close to arriving at a basis for the resumption of negotiations at the Joint Commission. Al­ though exclusion of those opposed to a trusteeship violated the prin­ ciple of freedom of speech, Hodge offered to accept the Soviet pro­ posal of October 26 as the basis for discussion. The absence of any Soviet reply, coupled with the rigidity of Chistiakov’s prior communi­ cations, convinced Bunce that Moscow had spumed the latest Ameri­ can proposal.7’ As 1946 came to a close, it appeared that negotiations between the United States and the Soviet Union never would resume, leaving Korea a divided nation. Moscow’s reluctance to reconvene the Joint Commission demon­ strated that the administration’s policy of “patience with firmness” would not induce the Soviets to retreat. Ironically, further delay instead had undermined the American position south of the 38th parallel as Hodge’s efforts to build political unity and stability failed miserably. The Communist party understood that Washington’s “Koreanizarion” policy soon would rob them of any influence in south­ ern affairs. Late in September, Pak Hön-yöng organized a campaign of strikes and disturbances to protest the creation of a separate gov­ ernment. The Communists resorted to threats and bribes; they even kidnapped YÜ in an effort to destroy the Coalition Committee. Ini­ tially, Hodge resisted pressure from the right to retaliate, following a course of inaction. I f the United States opted for repression, the gen­ eral could foresee Communists becoming martyrs, while American occupation officials would appear to resemble the Japanese. After a serious riot at Taegu in October, however, Hodge issued a warrant for Pak’s arrest and permitted the police and rightist youth groups to punish the Communists. A vicious circle of violence then emerged as rightist brutality provoked leftist retaliation, setting off a new round of savage excesses.76 Hodge easily accepted the simple explanation that political turmoil in the American zone was part of a Soviet plot to seize power. In fact, many Koreans were expressing frustration with rising inflation and persistent shortages. Worse still was the onerous rice collection pro­ gram. Chaotic postwar economic conditions and the influx of refu­ gees from the north had created a severe food deficiency, compelling Hodge to institute a program of forced requisitions. For most Kore­ ans, the quotas were excessive. As the general public resisted collec­ tion, Hodge increasingly turned to the Korean police to enforce the system. Unfortunately, the police exploited far-reaching powers for

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investigation and punishm ent to elim inate leftist opposition, fre­ quently resorting to terrorism and to rtu re. To a group o f visiting American congressmen, th e U n ited States appeared to be follow ing an “uncertain, fum bling, confused policy” in K orea .77 Rising violence and disruption in th e A m erican zone jeopardized the upcoming SKILA elections. Sim ultaneously, K im and Yb were finding it more difficult to prom ote political u n ity in th e prevailing atmosphere o f m urder, sabotage, and destruction. W hen th e Coali­ tion Committee com plained th a t dom estic instability w ould m ake truly free elections im possible, H odge convened a “Jo in t A m ericanKorean Conference” to investigate th e reasons for popular discon­ tent.78 Kim and % were n o t, however, entirely satisfied. W hen th e Coalition Com m ittee announced on O ctober 4 th a t it favored th e early creation o f an interim legislative assembly, it attached certain conditions. Kim and Yb dem anded th e elim ination o f any Am erican veto over legislation, exclusion o f collaborators as candidates for elec­ tion, recognition o f th e national authority o f th e body, an d provisions for close observation and supervision o f th e voting process to ensure fairness.79 This conditional endorsem ent perm itted A m erican occu­ pation officials to proceed w ith plans for th e creation o f th e SKUA. Cooperation betw een th e U n ited States and th e C oalition Com ­ mittee was exceedingly short-lived, prim arily because H odge th o r­ oughly m ishandled th e SKILA elections. Ignoring th e dem ands o f the Kim -% group, M ilitary G overnor Lerch announced on O ctober 13 that the AMG w ould conduct elections w ithin five days. % im m e­ diately protested th at recent disturbances provided a poor atm o­ sphere for free choice. Moreover, m any Korean leaders were in h iding and would be unprepared for p articip atio n .80 D espite such cogent arguments, the AMG held elections from O ctober 17 through 22 without serious disorders. K im and Y6 boycotted th e voting process, however, because o f H odge’s unnecessary haste. As a result, and because followers o f Rhee an d K im K u controlled th e adm inistrative facilities, the conservatives scored a sw eeping victory. Many collabora­ tors gained election, and only fourteen o f forty-five representatives to the SKILA were n o t extrem e rightists. N evertheless, H odge was elat­ ed. Lerch announced th a t th e SKILA w ould convene to begin its deliberations no later th an N ovem ber 3 , 1946 .81 Few knowledgeable observers accepted th e outcom e o f th e SKILA elections as a product o f th e p o p u lar w ill. Even Bunce, in one private letter, adm itted th a t th e elections were ‘‘a ru b b er stam p affair.” 82

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Fearful of a leftist victory, the AMG election law guaranteed a rightist triumph. Indirect elections permitted the village "hetman” to dic­ tate the selection of electors, while the taxpayer qualification meant overrepresentation for Korean landlords, businessmen, and profes­ sional people. The Coalition Committee also charged police interfer­ ence, misrepresentation, and falsification of returns. In view of the intimidation, beatings, and mob action of the prior month, no rea­ sonable person could have expected truly free elections.83 Perhaps worse, according to former AMG official E. Grant Meade, “the majority of the people were in favor of the left, but were too apa­ thetic, cynical, and poorly organized to make a real contest of the election.”84 American blunders during and after the SKILA elections showed once again that the administration’s policy toward Korea suffered from illogic and inconsistency. After striving diligently to fashion a moderate alternative in Korean politics, the AMG proceeded to undermine the Kim-Tfö group. American occupation officials were preoccupied with limiting leftist political power in the south. Com­ munist dominance in the north meant that maximum rightist repre­ sentation in the American zone was crucial to the maintenance of some sort of balance.81 To placate Kim, Hodge promised to appoint more moderate delegates to the remaining forty-five seats. He even asked Kim to supply him with a list of prospective candidates and from it Hodge selected what one observer considered a fair cross sec­ tion of Korean political thought. Hodge also approved new elections in two districts where evidence of fraud was particularly apparent. Early in December, the American occupation commander proudly announced that the SKILA would convene on schedule with Kim serving as president of the interim legislative body.86 Hodge’s efforts to appease Kim and the moderates infuriated the extreme right. On December 12 , twenty conservative delegates boy­ cotted the opening session of the new legislature in protest over Hodge’s appointments. Rhee already had met with the USAFIK com­ mander and had condemned his actions. Hodge, in response, warned Rhee that he would not permit the extreme conservatives either to intimidate him or to seize power illegally.87 Unable to influence Hodge, Rhee traveled to the United States and tried to arrange a meeting with Byrnes. After the State Department rejected his re­ quest, Rhee publicly scolded the Human administration for appease-

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ment, blaming W ashington’s advocacy o f trusteeship for producing a divided Korea.88 Rhee’s activities chagrined A m erican leaders b o th in W ashington and in Seoul. If th e extrem e conservatives rem ained loyal to R hee, the United States w ould have no choice u n d e r th e L angdon-B alasanov compromise b u t to insist u p o n th eir exclusion from consulta­ tion.89 To counter R hee’s disruptive tactics, th e State D ep artm en t instructed the AMG to strengthen th e C oalition C om m ittee an d th e SKUA. The rising popularity o f m oderate forces in southern K orea would persuade Rhee th a t his cause was hopelesss. O n D ecem ber 2 1 , Hodge recommended to Rhee th a t h e dissolve th e R epresentative Democratic Council, since “ it no longer has any official status as an advisory body connected w ith th e m ilitary governm ent.” 90 Washington’s attem p t to underm ine R hee’s political position caused the rightist leader to im p lem en t a bold and aggressive new strategy. Recognizing th a t th e p o p u lar desire for self-governm ent was gathering strength, he issued a proclam ation dem anding im m ediate independence and national self-determ ination for southern Korea alone. If the U nited States failed to comply, Rhee ordered his fol­ lowers to stage acts o f violence an d sitdow n strikes to dem onstrate that Washington was “ helpless w ith o u t cooperation o f his group.” These were not idle threats. A side from R hee’s substantial popularity, Hodge had appointed m any extrem e conservatives to positions in th e South Korean Interim G overnm ent w ho were now Rhee’s operatives. Faced with this sharp challenge to his authority, H odge begged W ash­ ington for help, w arning th a t “ we cannot and m ust n o t overlook his potential to do irreparable dam age unless carefully handled.” Per­ haps Goodfellow or A rnold, he p lead ed , could approach Rhee and persuade him to forsake his dem ands for a separate southern K orean government.91 By the end o f 1946, it was painfully clear th a t Trum an’s policy o f “patience with firm ness” in K orea h ad failed. N ot only had Moscow refused to reconvene th e Jo in t C om m ission, b u t events in th e A m eri­ can zone were n o t likely to force th e Soviet U nion to retreat as th e administration had anticipated. W ashington’s decision to sponsor th e creation o f a m oderate coalition in southern Korea had alienated Rhee thoroughly. H odge was guilty o f u tte r incom petence in a t­ tempting to bolster th e K im -'ïb group. Even worse, rapid deteriora­ tion continued to characterize econom ic an d social conditions south

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of the 38th parallel. Drastic steps to improve the situation were imperative, yet the military and diplomatic capabilities of the United States with respect to Korea were extremely limited. Hodge was barely able to maintain the security of his military command in southern Korea, let alone apply enough pressure on the Soviet Union to moderate its position. Understandably, many administration offi­ cials were advocating the redeployment of American occupation forces from Korea to Japan, where the United States had far more vital strategic interests.92 Yet Truman’s predicament in Korea was predictable. Once the president had chosen not to entertain any more proposals for compro­ mise with Moscow, a Soviet-American deadlock was certain. Signifi­ cantly, the administration remained wedded to its policy of verbal toughness even after the breakdown in negotiations at the Joint Com­ mission.93 Truman's harsh words, however, did not produce the desired change in Moscow's behavior; nor did holding firmly to prin­ ciple raise the odds favoring a settlement on American terms.94 The gap between ends and means in Washington’s Korea policy was both obvious and dangerous. If Truman failed to bring the administra­ tion’s objectives in line with American capabilities, the United States would have no choice but to withdraw from southern Korea forthwith under humiliating circumstances. Far from resolving American prob­ lems, by the end of 1946 “patience with firmness’’ in Korea had resulted in a deeper crisis gravely threatening the credibility and pres­ tige of the United States throughout East Asia.

CHAPTER 5

A n A venue fo r Escape

American experiences in K orea d u rin g 1946 left little d o u b t th a t an attempt to outw ait th e Russians was foolish. N o t only h ad Moscow refused to negotiate, b u t W ashington’s position in southern K orea was rapidly becom ing u n ten ab le. By early 1947, A m erican leaders knew that further indecision w ould invite disaster, b u t dom estic pres­ sure for dem obilization an d a balanced bud g et seriously lim ited th e administration’s policy options. Significantly, H um an shared th e popular desire to restrict th e extent an d d u ratio n o f th e U n ited States commitment to preserve w orld peace and stability. In K orea, how ­ ever, a decision to w ithdraw w ould involve grave dangers. T he depar­ ture of American occupation forces, one group o f m ilitary planners noted in October 1946, w ould “ leave K orea’s politically im m ature people open to control through highly-organized C om m unist m inor­ ities.” Yet this JCS study predicted pessim istically th a t Moscow proba­ bly would obtain at least indirect sway th ro u g h o u t K orea by 1956 regardless o f Am erican actions . 1 Faced w ith th is distasteful dilem m a, Truman began to search fo r an avenue for escape in K orea th a t w ould permit the adm inistration to m ain tain its credibility in Asia w ithout an unqualified com m itm ent o f A m erican pow er.2 After more th an a year o f m ilitary occupation, reports from Seoul afforded scant room for optim ism . D u rin g O ctober 1946, H odge informed W ashington th a t h e expected a Soviet-sponsored invasion of southern Korea w ithin six m o n th s an d d o u b ted th e ab ility o f th e USAFIK to deter a n o rth ern K orean a ttem p t a t forcible reunification. He urgendy requested ad d itio n al troops an d perm ission to stren g th ­ en the rightist youth groups. In a personal le tter to Secretary o f W ar Patterson, the occupation com m ander sadly explained th a t “ th in g s are far from sm ooth’’ because the Koreans want their own country to themselves and . . . the Rus­ sians are constandy infiltrating their highly trained and indoctrinated

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agitators into our zone to take full advantage of every possible point in the low level economic situation that can cause discontent. . . . The international flavor is becoming heavy and there can be no question but as to the worldwide push of Communism with the main all-out effort now directed against the United Sûtes. I hope our nation wakes up before we become too saturated with the Soviet brand of “democracy. Early in 1947, Hodge cabled the War Department that inflation, power shortages, and insufficient food were contributing to a major economic crisis which was discrediting the AMG and spawning domestic violence. Hodge appealed to the administration to forsake its persistent devotion to negotiations with Moscow. This policy, he observed, only encouraged further dismay, discouragement, and declining Korean morale.9 Once again, Washington ignored Hodge’s advice. Both Vincent and MacArthur considered the utilization of youth groups for defense to be “entirely inappropriate.’’ Furthermore, the Sute Department still hoped for an early resumption of negotiations at the Joint Com­ mission and wanted to avoid any indication that Washington favored a sharper confrontation. As one administration official «plained at the time: Our position in Korea is clearly hopeless unless cooperation with the Russians can eventually be achieved. Unilateral action must be pre­ sented as a short-run course which has been forced upon us. Our pro­ gram, it should be emphasized, is a means of demonstrating to the USSR that cooperation is desirable. If Washington demonstrated its firm intention to fulfill its commit­ ments and its willingness to cooperate with the Soviet Union, Tru­ man’s diplomatic advisors believed that Korea would gain a demo­ cratic government and national independence.4 War Department officials were determined nevertheless to force a thorough reconsideration of American policy in southern Korea. During January 1947, manpower and material shortages were so acute that a continued occupation seemed impossible. Truman’s mili­ tary advisors complained that the War Department lacked sufficient resources to finance American operations in Korea—which now cost more than $1 million daily. Patterson decided that the State Depart­ ment had to ask Congress for additional funds or accept the necessity

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IOI

for military w ithdraw al. Sim ultaneously, M acA rthur su b m itted a series of proposals for breaking th e Soviet-A m erican deadlock. O n January 22 , W ashington began to consider his recom m endations, which included the subm ission o f th e K orean issue to th e U n ited Nations, the form ation o f an in tern atio n al com m ission o f disinter­ ested nations to devise a p lan for fu lfillin g th e Cairo D eclaration, a four-power conference to clarify th e Moscow agreem ent, an d , finally, a high-level Soviet-American conference to resolve basic issues p re­ venting reunification and independence. F urther delay, M acA rthur warned, would be calam itous fo r th e K orean people, A llied w artim e commitments, and A m erican prestige an d influence in A sia.’ On January 23, A ssistant Secretary o f W ar How ard C . Peterson received detailed com m ents on M acA rthur’s proposal from experts in the War D epartm ent. This m em orandum rejected as prem ature b o th MacArthur’s recom m endations an d th e alternative course o f granting southern Korea im m ediate independence. These m ilitary officials proposed instead th a t th e U n ited States redouble its efforts for an agreement with the Soviet U nion w hile transferring adm inistrative responsibility from H odge to th e State D ep artm en t. A fter reading die memorandum, V incent concurred th a t M acA rthur’s recom m en­ dations were im practical because all o f th em required Soviet coopera­ tion for success. A new approach to Moscow, on th e o th er h an d , probably would be useless and m erely indicate W ashington’s im pa­ tience. Vincent endorsed P atterson’s proposal to request $50 m illion horn Congress to continue A m erican occupation. T he State D epart­ ment apparently retained confidence th a t if th e U nited States stood firm the Soviet U nion eventually w ould retreat .6 Patterson spoke strongly in favor o f ad o p tin g th e W ar D epart­ ment’s proposal a t an SW NCC m eeting o n January 29. A t th a t tim e, he labeled Korea th e “ single m ost u rg en t problem now facing th e War Departm ent.’’ A fter n o tin g significant shortages o f transporta­ tion, electric power, and fertilizer, th e secretary o f war em phasized that a paucity o f able K orean political leaders only m agnified th e AMG's problems. Further negotiations w ith th e Soviet U nion also seemed poindess. D espite P atterson’s argum ents, th e SW NCC decid­ ed that continued occupation o f K orea was essential. To relieve pres­ sure on the War D epartm ent, T rum an’s advisors agreed to approach Congress with a request for financial assistance to prevent econom ic and polidcal collapse in th e A m erican zone o f m ilitary occupation. The SWNCC also created a “ Special Inter-D epartm ental C om m it-

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tee'* composed of Arnold, James K. Penfield, and J. Weldon Jones (representing the War Department, State Department, and Bureau of the Budget, respectively) to formulate a positive program for aid to Korea.7 Soviet policy in northern Korea early in 1947 further encouraged the administration to abandon its patient and firm approach. Having completed its reform program the Provisional People’s Committee held elections from November 1946 to March 1947 for representatives who would create a permanent government. As anticipated, there was only one candidate for each office who sought either approval ot rejection from the voters. In February, a “Congress of People’s Com­ mittees” convened and approved retroactively all previous reforms. It also adopted a national economic plan for the completion of nation­ alization and the consummation of agrarian collectivization. The congress then created a permanent “People’s Assembly,” which in turn elected a presidium and organized a supreme court.8 Moscow’s actions had hardly taken place in a vacuum. Much as the United States was building the foundation for self-government in southern Korea, the Soviet Union was fashioning a separate regime north of the 38th parallel. While Moscow consolidated its position in northern Korea, Rhee accelerated his public attack on American occupation policies in the south. Langdon reported early in 1947 that Rhee’s “henchmen” were organizing a campaign of violence and obstruction aimed at embar­ rassing the United States. He urged Washington to issue a statement warning those involved in disruptive activities that opposition to the Moscow agreement would preclude participation in any provi­ sional government. The administration complied at once, publishing Hodge’s public order calling on all Koreans to cease instigating oppo­ sition to the AMG. Significantly, the USAFIK commander freely admitted in his statement that the Korean dissidents, through “illadvised political activity,” were hampering and delaying a settlement at the Joint Commission.9 W ords alone w ould n o t d eter R hee. Because o f early American backing, th e extrem e conservatives d o m in ated n o t only th e Korean police force b u t th e N atio n al 'Ybuth M ovem ent as w ell. In fact, the USAFIK h ad provided train in g an d eq u ip m en t fo r b o th groups. The N ational Y rn th M ovem ent now n u m b ered approxim ately 30,000 and was u n d er th e com m and o f a form er officer in th e Chinese army nam ed Y i Pöm -sök, w ho retain ed d o se ties w ith C hiang Kai-shek.

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Ultranationalism and strict discipline w ere th e p rim e characteristics o f the movement. U nfortunately, m ost m em bers w ere sons o f w ealthy landlords and businessm en, w ho, as L angdon lam en ted in one cable, invariably belonged to “ those political parties w hich, by th eir agita­ tion of the ‘trusteeship’ issue, . . . have caused US-USSR relations in the country to become even m ore strained.” A n other official observed cynically that “ the K uom intang youth groups were hardly ones to emulate in the quest o f establishing a sound basis for a dem ocratic society in Korea.” N evertheless, th e N ational 'Vbuth M ovem ent was a major source of political ag itatio n an d th e police represented an u n re­ liable check on its activities .10 American attem pts to reduce criticism from th e extrem e rig h t made Rhee angry and even m ore d eterm ined to force th e U nited States to alter its policies. T he o ld p atrio t now began a personal assault on Hodge, charging th a t th e USAFIK com m ander was respon­ sible for the delay in granting independence to K orea. In a personal letter to MacArthur, Rhee appealed for help in persuading W ashing­ ton to forsake further negotiations w ith Moscow. H e urged instead separate elections for a provisional governm ent in southern K orea alone.11 At the SKUA, th e conservatives o b tain ed passage o f a resolu­ tion denouncing trusteeship a n d rejecting any com prom ise on th e principle o f freedom o f expression. H odge grum bled th a t alth o u g h the great m ajority o f K oreans opposed trusteeship, a few rig h tist leaders were exploiting th e issue to fu rth er “ th eir own ends and rebuild a waning personal power.” I f th e Jo in t Com m ission recon­ vened, he confessed, th e U n ited States w ould have to accept th e exclusion o f these groups from co n su ltatio n . 12 Rhee’s strategy h ad placed th e U n ited States in a nearly im possible position. If Moscow agreed to resum e n eg o tiations, th e absence o f th e conservatives w ould gu aran tee th a t a reu n ited K orea w ould have a leftist-dominated provisional governm ent. N o r w ould th e fo rm atio n of a separate governm ent in so u th ern K orea necessarily im prove th e situation, since K orean leaders seem ed incapable o f cooperation. Hodge was unable to suggest any altern ativ e courses o f action w orthy of consideration, offering in stead a n extrem ely d ire prognosis: Korea has developed into a real hot-spot o f the O rient, now ripe for a full-fledged civil war o f unsurpassed savagery unless positive and coop­ erative international action is taken immediately. It is my carefully con­ sidered opinion th at unless th e Jo in t Commission should successfully

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reconvene or positive action be taken in Korean situation on a national level within the next two months, we may lose the opportunity of accomplishing our avowed mission in Korea and will have lost the con* fidencc of the Koreans.1* Few American leaders familiar with the Korean predicament could have quibbled with Hodge's assessment. The administration had to alter its policy in Korea or risk a catastrophe. Late in February 1947, the Special Inter-Departmental Committee completed its reconsideration of the Korean problem. Its report con­ cluded that the USAFIK’s position soon would become untenable if the United States maintained its present policy. Granting indepen­ dence to a separate South Korea, on the other hand, would stimulate further economic deterioration and lead eventually to Soviet domina­ tion. The United States could refer the entire Korean matter to the United Nations, but this measure would constitute an admission of failure and draw charges of bad faith from the Soviet Union. Since Washington’s biggest problems in southern Korea were lack of money and an uncooperative populace, the Special Inter-Departmental Committee recommended instead the adoption of a plan for $600 million in economic aid over three years. Implementation of the assis­ tance program in conjunction with an approach at the Council of For­ eign Ministers would demonstrate to Congress Thiman’s determina­ tion to fulfill American commitments in Korea and convey to Moscow the extent of Washington’s resolve. W ithout such positive action, the administration would have no choice but to withdraw mil­ itarily and thereby “seriously impair the U.S. world position.”14 Truman’s advisors thus had devised an aggressive program that offered some hope of receiving wide popular backing in southern Korea. Once the Korean people began to enjoy the benefits of selfgovernment and economic recovery, American leaders believed that democracy and private enterprise would provide a stable basis for Korea’s independence. Tfct die committee’s recommendations also constituted in essence a decision to create a separate government south of the 38th parallel. These administration officials assumed that if the United States spent enough money, Stalin would be una­ ble to match the effort and would have to accept a settlement on American terms. Obviously, the United States could not betray any sign of weakness or the policy was doomed to fail. Washington’s defeat in a clear test of strength with Moscow, the committee’s report

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emphasized, could have disastrous w orldw ide ram ifications. T he State Department endorsed th e program enthusiastically, although it reiterated its opposition to approaching th e Soviet governm ent for the resumption o f negotiations a t th e Jo in t C om m ission . 15 In Korea, Langdon had arrived a t conclusions resem bling those o f the Special Inter-D epartm ental C om m ittee. H e favored th e building of a strong constitutional, representative, dem ocratic governm ent in southern Korea under th e leadership o f K im Kyu-sik. A constructive program of economic assistance coupled w ith K oreanization w ould foster the emergence o f a genuinely m oderate political m ajority. T he American policy, if successful, w ould prevent Rhee from seizing power and induce th e Soviets to cooperate a t th e Jo in t Com m ission. Buncc echoed Langdon’s faith in th e p la n . 16 lb m uster su p p o rt for this activist program in K orea, H odge retu rn ed to W ashington early in 1947. Patterson pressed Trum an to m eet w ith th e USAFIK com ­ mander and discuss th e critical n atu re o f th e situ atio n in K orea. Hodge was “a splendid soldier,” th e secretary o f w ar to ld th e presi­ dent, with a “ brilliant fig h tin g record” during W orld W ar II . 17 Shortly after his arrival in th e U n ited States, H odge conferred w ith Human at the W hite H ouse. T he USAFIK com m ander com m ented in detail on the econom ic distress an d political chaos in th e A m erican occupation zone, stating em phatically th a t only a Soviet-A m erican agreement would provide for th e resolution o f K orea’s difficulties. Evidendy Hodge’s rem arks im pressed th e president, for Trum an authorized one final overture to th e Soviet U nion. In his public com ­ ments after the conference, H odge chastised Moscow for creating a powerful army in northern K orea in direct violation o f th e Moscow agreement. He speculated th a t th e m ilitary force included a t least 500,000 troops. This establishm ent placed southern Korea a t th e mercy of its m ilitarily superior n o rth ern neighbor. If Soviet recalci­ trance continued, H odge explained th a t th e U n ited States w ould have no choice b u t to sponsor a separate governm ent in southern Korea.18 While in W ashington, H odge also appeared before th e Senate Armed Services C om m ittee on February 25. In his recollections o f th e testimony, Senator H arry Byrd o f V irginia rem em bered th e USAFIK commander’s w arning th a t if th e U n ited States w ithdrew , th e n o rth ­ ern regime would seize control over th e en tire peninsula. U n d o u b t­ edly, Hodge did n o t recom m end continued occupation b u t probably emphasized instead th e necessity for a negotiated settlem ent . 19 In

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any event, at a press conference that same day, newly appointed Sec­ retary of State George C. Marshall announced that he had ordered a new study of American policy in Korea. The New York Times lauded Washington's apparent determination to prevent Korea from becom­ ing a “new Poland” in Asia. It also predicted that Marshall would raise the issue at the upcoming Council of Foreign Ministers meeting scheduled for April in Moscow.20 Truman’s reconsideration of his policy in Korea came at a particu­ larly troublesome moment in his administration. Adoption of the recommendations of the Special Inter-Departmental Committee would require congressional approval. In 1946, however, the Repub­ lican party had registered significant gains in the midterm elections. For the first time since 1930 , the Democrats were in a minority in both houses of Congress. Accordingly, Truman and his advisors expected staunch congressional opposition to foreign aid and military expenditures. Congress provided early justification for the adminis­ tration’s apprehension when it cut $6 billion from the budget to allow for a reduction in taxes. Simultaneously, the crisis in Greece and Turkey forced Washington to reassess its overall strategy in the Cold War.21 The outcome of this reappraisal would have a decisive impact on American policy in Korea. On March 10 , 1947, Hilldring signaled the administration’s new interest in resolving the Korean impasse when he addressed the Eco­ nomic Club of Detroit. In his speech, the assistant secretary of state declared that an American failure to fulfill its moral obligations to Korea would bring “discouragement and disappointment to demo­ cratic peoples everywhere . . . , and the damage to real democracy throughout the world would be incalculable.” Consequently, Wash­ ington intended to fortify its position in southern Korea while wait­ ing for the Joint Commission to reconvene.22 Two days later, Thiman used similar arguments when he delivered his famous address to Con­ gress requesting economic and military assistance for Greece and Tur­ key. As the president explained in his “Thiman Doctrine” speech, “I believe that we must assist free peoples to work out their own desti­ nies in their own way.”29 Scholars generally agree that in 1947 the United States rejected with finality the prewar policy of isolationism and assumed complete responsibility for the preservation of international stability against the challenge of Soviet ideology and power.24 Yet one must question whether the Thiman Doctrine speech actually represented a major

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turning point in postw ar A m erican diplom acy. T he U n ited States already had registered opposition to totalitarianism du rin g W orld War II and had im plem ented certain m easures after 1945 to counter the Soviet threat. The failure o f “ patience w ith firm ness“ h ad com ­ pelled the adm inistration to alter its tactics, b u t th e basic strategy h ad not changed. H um an now sought to contain th e Soviet U nion through the use o f econom ic assistance, an d th is policy required con­ gressional approval. The crisis in G reece an d Turkey was th en m erely the first occasion obliging Trum an to request an appropriation o f funds.2’ Truman's actions regarding G reece an d Turkey reveal his preference for limited means in com bating th e Soviet th reat. In th e Trum an Doctrine speech, th e president him self asserted th a t “o u r h elp should be prim arily through econom ic an d financial aid w hich is essential to economic stability an d orderly political processes.” A t rel­ atively low cost, and w ithout th e loss o f A m erican lives, Trum an expected to halt Soviet expansion th ro u g h encouraging th e develop­ ment of local self-defense .26 T he adm inistration suspected, however, that Congress and th e A m erican people w ould n o t accept th e fi­ nancial burdens involved in ad o p tin g th e containm ent policy. The Republican party had m ade p lain its d eterm ination to reduce govern­ ment spending, and its em phasis o n econom y th reaten ed to circum ­ vent Human’s strategy. T he p resident was aware th a t it w ould be impossible to im plem ent co n tainm ent unless he educated th e general public to the necessity for accepting th e responsibilities o f w orld lead­ ership. Consequently, his speech appealed directly to em otion and portrayed the Soviet th reat to A m erican security as im m ediate, d ire, and global in proportions .27 But Thiman’s elaboration o f th e containm ent policy actually im ­ plied a much w ider com m itm ent o f A m erican pow er and prestige than the president in ten d ed . Trum an, in reality, envisioned a p lan o f "rational interventionism ” relying w holly on econom ic aid an d tech­ nical advice. Far from being revolutionary, containm ent sought to preserve American security th ro u g h a m easured increase in an already reluctant com m itm ent to act decisively fo r th e achievem ent o f in ter­ national peace and stability .28 C ontainm ent was, a t th e sam e tim e, a logical and som ewhat realistic response to th e perceived Soviet strat­ egy of political intim idation an d subversion. Conscious o f th e severe restrictions on A m erican m anpow er, th e Trum an adm inistration nev­ er contemplated using com bat troops. N or did m ost A m erican lead-

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ets believe that an outbreak of hostilities would be probable if the United States provided southern Korea with limited military assis­ tance. According to the SWNCC defense program, southern Korea would receive small arms and enough radios, vehicles, and spare parts to equip a “police-style constabulary army" consisting of about 25,000 individuals.29 \ Korea thus provides an excellent example of containment in Asia. ' In 1947, the United States embarked on a long and difficult road leading toward the creation of a stable government in southern Korea capable of defending itself. Dean Acheson, during the Senate For­ eign Relations Committee hearings on aid to Greece, confirmed that the administration was contemplating a $200 million program in eco­ nomic and technical assistance for Korea spread over three years. This plan, if successful, would permit the United States to withdraw from Korea, but not at the price of surrendering the peninsula to Soviet domination .90 Rather, the emergence of a viable government south of the 38th parallel would induce Moscow to compromise and permit reunification on terms acceptable to the United States. At least that was the hope. American leaders had found what appeared to be a promising ave­ nue for escape from the Korean predicament at a time when the pres­ sure for military withdrawal was acute. During early 1947, disgrun­ tled members of the American occupation force instigated a publicity campaign to dramatize the desperate plight confronting the United States in Korea. Several servicemen wrote letters to newspapers and relatives complaining about insufficient food, inferior medical care, inadequate housing, deficient clothing, and preferential treatment for the officers. Perhaps worse, some berated the AMG for ineffi­ ciency and corruption, charging occupation officials with brutality and illegal search and seizure.31 Hodge received word of these accusa­ tions while in Washington and promptly ordered an investigation. Subsequent reports dismissed these grievances as either exaggerated or groundless, attributing them to the loneliness of newly arrived sol­ diers.32 Nevertheless, the administration undoubtedly discerned that a decision to delay withdrawal much longer involved significant polit­ ical risks. Simultaneously, the State Department was refining its aid program for southern Korea. In its final form, the plan envisioned $540 mil­ lion in assistance to the new provisional government. Within three months after securing congressional approval, civilian advisors would

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replace military officials, w hile K orean particip atio n in governm ental affairs would expand greatly. In ad d itio n , th e president w ould ap ­ point a new political advisor in K orea w ith m uch w ider adm inistra­ tive and decision-making powers. O n M arch 28, A cheson forw arded the proposal to Patterson. T he State D ep artm en t, he explained, intended to im plem ent th e program d u rin g fiscal 1948 even if nego­ tiations resumed at th e Jo in t C o m m ission." In response, Patterson expressed doubts th at an aid program w ould im prove conditions in southern Korea because th e situ atio n was "p o ten tially explosive.” In a letter to Assistant Secretary o f W ar Peterson, Patterson fau lted th e State D epartm ent’s p lan for prolonging th e occupation and advocat­ ed instead "a course o f action w hereby we get o u t o f K orea a t an early date and . . . all our m easures should have early w ithdraw al as th eir overriding objective .” 34 While agreeing on th e necessity for m ilitary w ithdraw al, H odge did not favor an ab ru p t end to A m erican occupation. U pon his retu rn to southern Korea, he publicly endorsed a program for econom ic and political assistance. ‘‘If we can’t g et Russian cooperation,” H odge remarked at a press conference, "w e m u st carry o u t our com m itm ents alone.” The USAFIK com m ander em phasized th a t th e U n ited States was not creating a separate governm ent, b u t only attem p tin g to foster freedom, democracy, and sound governm ent in southern K orea. Some observers in th e U n ited States and K orea speculated th a t once Moscow understood th e scope o f th e A m erican p lan , it w ould m ove to reconvene the Jo in t Com m ission. For these optim ists, news th a t Lieutenant G eneral G . P. K orotkov h ad replaced Chistiakov as occu­ pation commander suggested th a t th e Soviets h ad o p ted for a m ore conciliatory approach .33 Truman was n o t as eager as H odge to publicize A m erican plans for Korea. On two occasions d u rin g th e spring o f 1947, th e president denied having reached a decision on extending aid to th e divided nation.36 In all likelihood, Trum an d id n o t w ant to alarm Stalin on the eve of M arshall’s final overture a t th e upcom ing m eeting in Mos­ cow. The adm inistration h ad m ade an irrevocable decision, however, to break the Korean deadlock. I f th e Soviets refused to reopen negoti­ ations, the U nited States in ten d ed to im plem ent its aid program for southern Korea and, as a last resort, subm it th e entire issue to th e United Nations for consideration. W ashington was determ ined to withdraw as well, since it believed th a t th e U nited States could n o t afford to match Soviet m ilitary pow er on th e peninsula. V incent sum -

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marized the administration’s attitude when he stated succinctly that “our program seems to us to be the only feasible way of accomplish­ ing [the reduction of our commitments] once we rule out the alterna­ tive of abandonment of Korea to USSR domination .”57 For Truman and his advisors, then, the fourth Council of Foreign Ministers meeting in April 1947 represented the last chance for the Soviet Union to choose cooperation rather than confrontation with respect to Korea. Shortly after his arrival in Moscow, Marshall cabled to Washington, for comment, a draft letter to Molotov requesting resumption of the negotiations at the Joint Commission. Acheson’s reply advised that any American overture should emphasize total Soviet responsibility for the Korean impasse. Moscow had sought to exclude a majority of the Korean leaders; until it reversed its position and recognized the principle of freedom of expression, any further negotiations would be futile. Acheson obviously had dismissed Mar­ shall’s final overture on Korea as a gratuitous formality. Once Moscow reaffirmed its intransigent position, the United States, with the appearance of legitimacy, would implement the Moscow agreement in the southern zone alone.58 Soviet-American negotiations at Moscow were a dismal failure. Fol­ lowing the meeting’s adjournment, Truman decided that it would be unwise to conduct further bilateral talks with Moscow at the govern­ ment level. Instead, Washington would concentrate in the future on building “situations of strength” in local areas to halt the Soviet advance. At the same time, Soviet-American differences now were receiving wide comment in the American press as the existence of a “Cold War” became common knowledge among the general pub­ lic.59 Strangely, the Moscow Conference of 1947 also witnessed a Soviet-American reconciliation, albeit temporarily, on the issue of Korea. Stalin surely was aware that a separate government in south­ ern Korea would be anti-Soviet and probably decided to make one final stab at a negotiated settlement.40 Marshall’s letter to Molotov at Moscow adhered to Acheson’s rec­ ommendations. It blamed the Soviet Union for blocking the eco­ nomic reunification of Korea and thereby preventing the realization of the Cairo Declaration. The American occupation commander had attempted to reopen the Joint Commission negotiations, but the Soviet commander had not responded favorably. The deadlock, Mar­ shall insisted, was the product of the Soviet Union’s desire to exclude a majority of southern Korea’s leaders from consultation because of a

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unilateral definition o f th e w ord “ dem ocratic.” H e th en recom m end­ ed that, in the interests o f K orea’s w ell-being, th e Jo in t Com m ission reconvene on a basis o f respect for th e principle o f freedom o f expres­ sion. In the m eantim e, W ashington in ten d ed to im plem ent th e Mos­ cow agreement in its own zone o f occupation .41 M arshall’s letter was tantamount to an u ltim atum . I f th e Soviets d id n o t agree to recon­ vene the Joint Com mission o n A m erican term s, th ere w ould be no more negotiations. Not surprisingly, M olotov’s response charged th a t th e U nited States had violated the term s o f th e Moscow agreem ent and therefore was responsible for the absence o f progress a t th e Jo in t Com m ission. Eco­ nomic and political reunification was a prerequisite for K orean in d e­ pendence and prosperity, M olotov agreed, b u t possible only after th e formation of a provisional governm ent. U nfortunately, he w ent on, the American delegation h ad insisted u p o n consultation w ith in d i­ viduals avowedly opposed to th e basic provisions in th e Moscow agreement and the Soviet delegation h ad correcdy resisted th is de­ mand. After sum m arizing Soviet-sponsored reform s in th e n o rth , Molotov then cleverly p o in ted to th e absence o f sim ilar progress in the south. Since Moscow was dedicated to K orea’s eventual in d ep en ­ dence, however, th e Soviet U nion w ould agree to reconvene th e Jo in t Commission on May 20 “o n a basis o f an exact execution o f th e Mos­ cow Agreement on K orea .”42 Marshall quickly recognized th a t Moscow planned to use th e phrase “exact execution” to exclude K orean leaders opposed to tru st­ eeship. lb avoid any fu rth er m isunderstandings, he again w rote Molotov and recited th e A m erican in terp retatio n o f th e Moscow agreement. The U nited States believed th a t th e Jo in t Com m ission should not deny any K orean representative th e rig h t o f consultation simply because o f previously expressed views on th e fu tu re govern­ ment of Korea—provided each individual was w illing to cooperate with the major powers. T he U n ited States w elcom ed th e suggestion in Molotov’s letter, M arshall co n tin u ed , th a t th e Soviet U nion fa­ vored free elections after reunification. I f M olotov found th e contents of his letter acceptable, M arshall concluded, th e U nited States w ould participate in a resum ption o f negotiations a t th e Jo in t Com m ission on May 20 ,1 947 .45 In his reply, M olotov referred specifically to th e exchange o f views between the occupation com m anders on th e “ conditions for consul­ tation” at the Jo in t Com m ission. H e th en accepted H odge’s am end-

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meats to the Soviet proposal of November 26 , 1946, which provided for consultation only with those groups fully in accord with the provi­ sions of the Moscow agreement. Signing the communiqué agreed to on April 18,1946, was sufficient for consideration, he explained, but the negotiators were obliged to exclude from consultation any party or group that “fomented or instigated” active opposition to the work of the Joint Commission. On May 12 , Marshall approved Molotov’s proposal. It was clear, however, that the extreme conservatives would continue to criticize trusteeship. As Langdon explained, unless the Soviet Union approved unrestricted freedom of expression, the right would not participate.44 Administration officials were certain that the threat of a program of economic assistance in southern Korea had forced Moscow to com­ promise. A confident Truman stated publicly that Secretary Mar­ shall’s actions represented a major step toward the realization of a unified and democratic government for all Korea. Few observers in the United States resisted the temptation to repeat Truman’s opti­ mism, since the Soviet Union seemingly had backed down in the face of American economic superiority.4’ Rather than producing a setdement, however, Truman’s strategy could lead only to a more intracta­ ble Soviet-American stalemate in Korea. As Patterson cautioned at the time, a Soviet retreat was unlikely; Moscow occupied a stronger geographic position with regard to Korea, while the United States had few important strategic or economic interests directly involved in the peninsula. \fet both Truman and Marshall discounted Patterson’s argument that the benefits of continued occupation were not worth the expense. They still expected to obtain a settlement on acceptable terms and without an unqualified commitment of American power.44 Meanwhile, in Korea, Syngman Rhee had received word of the Truman Doctrine speech with undisguised delight. In a personal let­ ter to the president, he congratulated Truman for his “courageous stand against communism” and urged him to “instruct the American military authorities in Korea to follow your policy and abandon their efforts to bring about coalition and cooperation between national­ ists and communists.” Rhee insisted that Washington should con­ sider Korea as much a “bulwark against communist expansion” as Greece.47 News of the Marshall-Molotov compromise suddenly trans­ formed rightist euphoria into utter consternation and despair. Kirn Ku announced his intention to recreate the KPG and attempt a sei­ zure of power. When Military Governor Lerch barred the KPG from

staging political m eetings, th e R epresentative D em ocratic C ouncil demanded im m ediate A m erican w ithdraw al an d th e transfer o f p o lit­ ical authority to an interim governm ent. It also declared defiantly that it would accept neither trusteeship nor th e conditions for consul­ tation. Langdon, in a cable to W ashington, ridiculed Rhee and K im Ku as diehards whose “ fate is b o u n d u p in th e sta tu s q u o '.' They obviously wanted to em barrass th e U n ited States and sabotage th e Joint Commission. Since m ost southern K oreans were ju b ilan t ab o u t the resumption o f negotiations, L angdon advised th e adm inistration to ignore rightist protests .48 Rhee’s displeasure was understandable. H e and K im K u cringed at the thought o f exclusion from p articip atio n in th e new provisional government. A lthough the p o p u lar desire for self-governm ent was genuine, the extreme conservatives were in fact exploiting th e issue o f trusteeship to advance th eir own political am bitions. M ajor G eneral Alben E. Brown, A rnold’s replacem ent as head o f th e A m erican del­ egation at the Jo in t Com m ission, attem p ted to placate Rhee du rin g several private conferences b u t experienced little success. Finally, Brown had to warn Rhee and K im K u directly th a t continued criti­ cism of the Soviet U nion and trusteeship w ould result in exclusion from consultation .49 Rhee replied bitterly th a t A m erican participa­ tion in the Joint Com mission guaranteed th e em ergence o f a coalition government in Korea and an eventual C om m unist takeover. Unless the United States clarified th e exact n atu re o f th e trusteeship contem ­ plated for Korea, Rhee om inously predicted th e outbreak o f violent rebellion throughout southern K orea .’0 H illdring quickly instructed Hodge firmly to resist Rhee’s dem ands. T he U nited States was deter­ mined to fulfill the provisions o f th e Moscow agreem ent and w ould advocate the creation o f a separate southern K orean governm ent only if negotiations w ith Moscow failed .91 Soviet-American deliberations a t th e Jo in t Com m ission resum ed in a cordial atm osphere o f inform ality and ease. B ut alm ost im m edi­ ately the negotiators began to disagree on th e conditions for consulta­ tion. The Soviets proposed sending invitations for participation in a “consultative body” only to th e th irty largest parties, w hile all o th er groups would m erely subm it com pleted questionnaires. T he U nited States, on the other h and, opposed this proposal and sought discus­ sions with all parties claim ing a m inim um o f a thousand m em bers in two or more provinces. T he Jo in t Com m ission th en could choose a representative body o f individuals to form a provisional governm ent.

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Shtikov, as head of the Soviet delegation, requested a recess to study the American proposal. A press report that the negotiations had adjourned indefinitely illustrated well the extent of pessimism sur­ rounding the Joint Commission talks.’2 Nonetheless, the Joint Commission enjoyed steady progress during subsequent sessions, despite certain differences of opinion. On June 7, it completed an agreement on consultation. The Soviets accepted consultation with all parties that signed the communiqué pledging support for the Joint Commission. The Americans, in return, agreed to Moscow’s proposal to include a provision in the questionnaires regarding mandatory exclusion of Japanese collaborators from parridpation in the provisional government because of “the soundness of the principle it represents.” Washington’s representatives also ap­ proved the formation of a “consultative body.” Submission of the applications for consultation were due no later than June 23, 1947. After subcommittee 1 had studied the applications, it would com­ pose a list of eligible parties and extend invitations for consultations in Seoul on June 23 and in Pyongyang five days later. Any party or social group could submit a completed questionnaire expressing its preferences with respect to the nature of Korea’s future government. On July 3, the Joint Commission and the Koreans would begin work on the creation not only of a provisional government but also a pro­ gram outlining the structure, principles, and platform of the final Korean government. Marshall publicly acclaimed the agreement as “especially gratifying,” voicing hope that the Joint Commission would create a provisional government at an early date.” American leaders easily concluded that the Truman Doctrine speech was responsible for the progress at the Joint Commission. One War Department official speculated that Stalin expected his new atti­ tude of conciliation would cause the US Governm ent, or at least Congress, to be so optimistic as to abandon, in expectation o f early agreem ent by the Joint Commission, the proposed program o f economic, political and educational rehabili­ tation in our zone, m entioned by General Marshall. The Soviets would then have reason to hope th at delay and obstruction in the Joint Com­ mission will so discourage the US people, and the Korean people, as to assure eventual accomplishm ent o f Soviet aims. . . .M

Although this scenario may have been accurate, Stalin certainly would not m aintain his conciliatory approach if it appeared that

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action at the Jo in t Com mission w ould n o t produce a provisional gov­ ernment friendly to th e Soviet U nion. N evertheless, th e adm inistra­ tion’s confidence in the power o f containm ent as a coercive force now was complete. Truman ordered th e form ulation o f an econom ic aid program for Korea regardless o f events a t th e Jo in t Com m ission. If the threat of economic assistance h ad induced Soviets to com prom ise, he reasoned, similar tactics eventually w ould force Moscow to agree to reunification as well. Administration planners, however, d id n o t judge A m erican in ter­ ests in Korea sufficient to w arrant an u n q u alified com m itm ent o f power. In fact, one JCS study concluded th a t K orea was second only to the Philippines in its strategic unim portance to th e national secu­ rity of the U nited States. O n th e o th er h an d , G reece, Italy, and Iran alone needed American assistance m ore th an K orea. Significantly, the JCS strongly advocated th e ad o ption o f an aid program for Korea because this is the one country within which we alone have for almost two years carried on ideological warfare in direct contact with our opponents, so that to lose this battle would be gravely detrimental to United States prestige, and therefore security, throughout the world, lb abandon this straggle would tend to confirm the suspicion that the United States is not really determined to accept the responsibilities and obligations of world leadership, with consequent detrim ent to our efforts to bolster those countries of Western Europe which are of primary and vital importance to our national security. Containment in Korea was essential, th en , for ideological and diplo­ matic reasons rather th an m ilitary an d strategic factors. T he JCS indirecdy referred to K orea’s lim ited w orth w hen it advised th a t “ cur­ rent assistance should be given K orea only if th e m eans exist after suf­ ficient assistance has been given th e countries o f prim ary im portance . . . for the U nited States.” ” Truman’s m ilitary advisors obviously classified Korea as a periph­ eral issue in their postw ar strategic calculations. N evertheless, they agreed with the State D epartm ent th a t th e U nited States had to m ake a genuine effort to b u ild econom ic strength and political stability in southern Korea prior to w ithdraw al. By contrast, T m m an’s diplo­ matic advisors were m ore sanguine th a t a positive approach would compel the Soviets to accept a settlem ent on A m erican term s. O n

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J u n e 3, 1947, A cting B udget D irector Frederick J . Lawton approved th e $215 m illio n K orean assistance program for fiscal 1948. In for­ w arding th e p la n to T rum an, Law ton n o ted th a t th e State Depart­ m e n t "feels th a t econom ic im provem ent in S outh Korea will help to overcom e Soviet reluctance to reu n ite th e tw o zones.” Moreover, reu n ificatio n w ould facilitate th e achievem ent o f economic self-suffi­ ciency, th ereb y red u cin g th e cost an d d u ratio n o f American assis­ tance. S tate D ep artm en t officials also h ad prepared for the president a m essage to C ongress req u estin g approval for th e Korean aid pro­ gram . T him an’s diplom atic advisors w ere confident th at the strategy o f co n tain m en t w ould achieve A m erican objectives in Korea at rela­ tively low co st.’6 C ircum stances prev en ted th e ad m in istratio n from implementing its co n tain m en t policy in K orea d u rin g 1947. First, Chiang Kai-shek was badgering W ashington fo r m ore econom ic and military assis­ tance. B ut th e p resid en t was h esitan t to sponsor C hiang because of C om m unist m ilitary victories over th e N ationalists.’7 If Truman d en ied aid to th e K u o m in tan g , h e w ould have far m ore difficulty securing an ap p ro p riatio n fo r K orea. Second, Trum an saw that Con­ gress w ould be parsim onious irrespective o f th e n ation involved. If th e ad m in istratio n su b m itted to o m any requests in Asia, it would im peril th e program fo r E uropean econom ic recovery. Congressional reluctance to approve aid fo r G reece expeditiously during the spring o f 1947 caused Trum an to consider p o stp o n in g th e appropriation request fo r K orea. T h en , o n J u n e 27, Senator A rth u r H . Vandenberg took th e decision o u t o f th e ad m in istratio n ’s hands. The influential R epublican leader n o tified A cheson th a t h e w ould oppose any new au thorizations fo r foreign assistance d u rin g th e rem ainder of that congressional session.’* W hile Congress was fru stratin g th e application o f containm ent in K orea, events a t th e Jo in t Com m ission experienced a fatal deteriora­ tio n . T he ability o f th e U n ited States an d d ie Soviet U nion to cooper­ ate h ad surprised R hee an d K im K u. O riginally th e two leaders had disdained to w ork w ith th e Jo in t C om m ission, b u t now they an­ nounced th e ir w illingness to p articip ate in consultations. Similarly, w hen Rhee saw th a t his strategy o f confrontation m erely reinforced W ashington’s d eterm in atio n to im p lem en t th e Moscow agreement, h e to n ed dow n his criticism o f H odge an d th e A M G .’9 Y et both Rhee an d K im K u still vigorously opposed trusteeship. O nce again Brown lectured th e extrem e rig h t th a t such an a ttitu d e w ould preclude par-

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ticipation in the consultative process an d th e new provisional govern­ ment.60 Rhee now resum ed his pugnacious p o sture, rebuking th e U n ited States for violating th e principle o f freedom o f expression an d in te n d ­ ing to betray Korea. K im K u organized a series o f dem onstrations against trusteeship an d , o n Ju n e 24, one group o f extrem e rightists even pelted m embers o f th e Soviet delegation w ith stones and d irt. Shtikov protested im m ediately, b u t H odge d id n o th in g .61 These activities substantiated Soviet charges th a t th e pledges o f th e extrem e conservatives to cooperate w ith th e Jo in t Com m ission were insincere. Shtikov’s dem and for th e exclusion o f rightists opposed to trusteeship was a virtual certainty. H odge now faced an unpleasant choice. H e could not tolerate open defiance o f A m erican authority, yet repres­ sion of the conservative critics w ould spawn m ore violence. R ather than punishing the dem onstrators, th e USAFIK com m ander decided merely to chide Kim K u publicly for his behavior. As expected, th e extreme conservatives chose n o t to apply for consultation an d d id n o t even fill out questionnaires. H odge cabled W ashington th a t K im K u now was planning a num ber o f rail an d pow er strikes to dem onstrate public hatred o f trusteeship.62 On June 25, the Jo in t Com m ission resum ed its deliberations in an “extremely cordial” atm osphere. A prelim inary C onsultative Body composed of 425 K orean leaders was present. T he negotiators h ad registered the results o f th e questionnaires, w hich revealed th e d eli­ cate nature o f the A m erican predicam ent in K orea. W hile th e leftist respondents m anifested considerable unity, organization, and p u r­ pose, the rightist elem ent was thoroughly divided. In th e n o rth , three parties and thirty-five social organizations, representing ap­ proximately thirteen m illion individuals, filed for consultation. In the south, on the o th er h an d , m ore th an four h u n d red parties regis­ tered with the Jo in t Com m ission and claim ed an incredible com ­ bined m em bership o f sixty-two m illion people (three tim es larger than southern K orea’s entire p o p u latio n ). Slightly m ore th an fifty percent of the respondents were rig h tist, b u t even H odge adm itted that the results “ obviously indicated duplication and padding.” Rhee frankly confessed th a t h e h ad su b m itted a questionnaire sim ply to gain participation in consultation.63 Moscow’s representatives naturally viewed th e num ber o f parties seeking consultation in th e south as inordinately h igh. The rig h t was primarily responsible for th e exaggerated figures, since tw o-thirds o f

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those groups registered were m em bers o f th e conservative element.64 I f th e Jo in t Com m ission disqualified only a sm all num ber o f rightist parties, a leftist m ajority was certain. Shdkov lost no tim e insisting on th e exclusion o f those eig h t parties belonging to th e “ Anti-Trustee­ ship C om m ittee,” w hich he blam ed for th e assault on the Soviet dele­ g atio n .6’ A greeing w ith th e A m erican delegation th a t the disqualifi­ cation o f th e rig h tist parties in question w ould ensure a leftist dom inated provisional governm ent, M arshall approved w ithout hesi­ tatio n Brown's request to oppose firm ly th e exclusion o f these par­ ties.66 Soviet-Am erican negotiations thus returned to the same point o f im passe confronted in th e spring o f 1946. W ashington’s options at th e Jo in t Com m ission were now painfully obvious. If th e U nited States inflexibly dem anded full rightist partic­ ipatio n in th e consultative process, reunification was impossible. On th e o th er h an d , a decision to com prom ise and exclude the most extrem e conservatives w ould guarantee a leftist m ajority in the new provisional governm ent. The situation seem ed even m ore bleak after th e A m erican delegation visited Pyongyang early in July. Joseph E. Jacobs, H odge’s new political advisor, was a m em ber o f the group and cabled his observations to W ashington. Since Jacobs previously had served in A lbania, adm inistration officials undoubtedly read his assessm ent w ith keen interest. In his report, Jacobs observed that an authentic C om m unist satellite regim e sim ilar to th e Soviet puppet governm ents in Eastern Europe now controlled affairs in northern K orea. The added presence o f a strong arm y and police force meant th a t even if th e Jo in t Com m ission m anaged to form a representative provisional governm ent, th e northern Com m unists could easily ex­ p lo it political divisions in th e south to obtain to tal control. For Jacobs, th e strategy o f th e extrem e conservatives was both logical and realistic, since th e survival o f th e K orean rig h t depended on the fail­ ure o f th e Jo in t Com m ission and A m erican sponsorship o f a separate governm ent in southern K orea.67 A m erican officials in Seoul now concluded th a t a negotiated agree­ m en t acceptable to th e U nited States was no longer attainable.68 Dur­ ing th e second week o f July, th e attitu d e o f th e Am erican delegation at th e Jo in t Com m ission stiffened noticeably, as it firm ly rejected the Soviet position on consultations. H odge asserted th a t Shdkov’s de­ m and for th e exclusion o f conservative parties refusing to renounce m em bership in th e A nti-Trusteeship C om m ittee was a “ leftist ruse” designed to prevent all rightist participation in th e provisional gov-

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emment. He inform ed W ashington o f his in ten tio n to insist u p o n complete freedom o f speech for all groups, even a t th e risk o f perm a­ nent adjournment. H odge th en lifted th e ban on public dem onstra­ tions against the Moscow agreem ent. T he conservatives hailed this action as signaling an end to appeasem ent o f th e Soviet U nion. Few observers failed to discern W ashington’s ap p aren t w illingness to accept an inevitable and final breakdow n in negotiations a t th e Jo in t Commission.® Rhee’s campaign against trusteeship and cooperation w ith th e Soviet Union then reached a clim ax. D u rin g discussions w ith H odge, Rhee explained th at he and his follow ers m ig h t n o t participate in a new provisional governm ent or even su pport it if th e Jo in t Com m is­ sion was responsible for its creation. T hen, on Ju ly 19. a rightist fanatic assassinated Y6 who h ad been w orking hard to attract rightist backing for the C oalition C om m ittee. W s d eath dem onstrated dra­ matically the price o f pursuing a m oderate political course. Few Korean leaders in the fu tu re could oppose Rhee and advocate cooper­ ation with the Jo in t Com m ission w ithout placing th eir lives in grave clanger.70Jacobs cabled W ashington th a t a p artnership w ith Rhee was the only rem aining option if th e U n ited States expected to counter mounting violence and unrest south o f th e 38th parallel. Ironically, however, W ashington’s quixotic search for a political alternative to the extreme right had alienated Rhee thoroughly and th e conserva­ tives no longer were responsive to A m erican advice and influence.71 State D epartm ent officials by th is tim e h ad acknow ledged th a t th e creation of a separate governm ent probably was unavoidable. O n Ju ly 25, Jacobs received word th a t W ashington was giving urgent consider­ ation to a num ber o f alternatives for breaking th e deadlock over Korea. The adm inistration prom ised a specific policy directive w ithin one week. In the m eantim e, th e A m erican delegation a t th e Jo in t Commission was “ to use all appropriate m easures to insure continu­ ance of negotiations.” 72 B ut W ashington still w inced at th e th o u g h t of victory for “Rhee’s corrupt m inority.” R ealizing th a t democracy never could flourish in th e prevailing atm osphere o f terror, extortion, and destruction, th e adm inistration ordered H odge to take steps for the elimination o f police corruption and youth group violence. These actions, while adm irable, w ould come too late to underm ine th e pre­ dominance o f the extrem e right in southern politics.73 O ccupation officials simply lacked enough tim e to alter political conditions. O n July 29, Shtücov spum ed th e final series o f A m erican proposals at th e

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Jo in t Com m ission an d negotiations reached th e p oint of complete collapse. Jacobs inform ed W ashington th a t th e Soviet representatives h ad resorted to a strategy o f stall and delay; th e American delegation urgently needed new instructions.74 T hat sam e day, Jo h n M. A llison, assistant ch ief o f th e Division of N ortheast A sian A ffairs, finished work on a draff proposal aimed at breaking th e K orean deadlock perm anently. A llison’s plan outlined specific m easures to m eet three d ifferen t contingencies. First, if the Soviet U nion broke o ff negotiations a t th e Jo in t Commission prior to A ugust 5, th e U nited States w ould request a special m eeting of the C ouncil o f Foreign M inisters. A t this conference, M arshall would pro­ pose free elections u n d er U nited N ations supervision to select dele­ gates for a legislature in each zone o f occupation. These Korean leaders th en w ould choose representatives to serve in a provisional governm ent th a t w ould speak for th e entire nation. A fter consulta­ tio n w ith th e fo u r m ajor pow ers, th e new K orean governm ent would arrange for w ithdraw al o f foreign troops and th e acquisition of aid for econom ic recovery. If Moscow refused to accept th e American pro­ posal, th e U nited States w ould subm it th e issue to the United N ations and im plem ent th e sam e p lan in southern Korea alone.77 A llison’s second contingency provided th a t if th e Soviet Union per­ sisted in its intransigence a t th e Jo in t Com m ission beyond August 5, M arshall w ould suggest th a t th e tw o delegations form ulate a joint report sum m arizing th e extent o f progress tow ard Korean self-gov­ ernm ent. Sim ultaneously, th e U nited States w ould im plem ent the program ou tlin ed in th e first contingency in southern Korea and sub­ m it th e K orean issue to th e U nited N ations for resolution. Finally, A llison’s proposal provided for th e possibility th a t Moscow m ight not respond to any A m erican dém arche. In th a t case, th e U nited States w ould create a separate governm ent in th e A m erican zone and refer th e issue o f K orean reunification to th e U nited N ations on Septem­ ber 10,1947. Early in A ugust, an A d Hoc C om m ittee o f the SWNCC advised approval o f A llison’s p lan. In its report, th e committee w arned th a t w ithout positive action, rising violence in southern K orea w ould force th e U nited States to w ithdraw , lb abandon Korea u n d er such circum stances w ould guarantee Soviet dom inance over th e entire peninsula and “ discourage those sm all nations now relying upon th e U .S. to support them in resisting internal or external Com­ m unist pressure.” 76 Patterson and Forrestal eagerly em braced A llison’s proposal, pre-

An Avenue fo r Escape

in

sumably in the belief th at it w ould speed w ithdraw al. H illdring added his support as well. In p reparation fo r th e new A m erican in i­ tiative, the State D epartm ent released a series o f statistics p ertaining to negotiations at the Jo in t C om m ission in a transparent a ttem p t to portray the Soviet U nion as th e cham pion o f m inority rule in K orea.77 Then, in accordance w ith A llison’s second contingency, A m bassador Smith, on August 12, presented M olotov w ith a le tter from M arshall proposing that the Jo in t C om m ission form ulate a report on th e progress of Korean independence. Since previous efforts to realize Korea’s sovereignty had experienced litd e success, M arshall recom ­ mended a Soviet-American conference on A ugust 21 to discuss th e course of negotiations at th e Jo in t C om m ission.78 Washington also took steps to bolster H odge’s position in southern Korea. The State D epartm ent issued a press release stating categori­ cally that the U nited States h ad one policy in K orea and H odge h ad "faithfully and consistendy acted in conform ance therew ith u n d er difficult and complex circum stances.” 79 Yet after th e A m erican in itia­ tive of August 12, th e AMG w ould have no trouble w ith th e conser­ vatives. Now the left alone w ould assail A m erican policy, since a sepa­ rate government served rig h tist purposes. T hus, H odge instructed th e police to conduct a series o f raids against th e extrem e left, seizing subversive docum ents and im prisoning several C om m unist leaders. For Jacobs, a viable southern regim e closely allied w ith th e U n ited States required drastic m easures. H e believed W ashington should abandon its “provisional” policies and create a separate governm en­ tal structure in southern K orea. H odge agreed and requested perm is­ sion to close all rem aining leftist new spapers. “ T he tim e for p o lite­ ness, accepted as weakness by th e C om m unists an d by th e Russians,” the USAFIK com m ander boldly proclaim ed, “ is ended.” 80 Meanwhile, Brown h ad proposed th a t th e tw o delegations a t th e Joint Commission begin work on a sum m ary report. Shtikov replied that he had no authority to discuss th e m atter. A m erican occupation officials in Seoul suspected an o th er Soviet a ttem p t to stall th e negoti­ ations and exhorted W ashington to im plem ent th e rem ainder o f its contingency plan aggressively. Brown inform ed Shtikov th a t th e United States planned to form ulate a unilateral response subject to change if Moscow decided to participate. O n A ugust 20, th e A m eri­ can delegation com pleted a separate report an d forw arded it a t once to Washington.81 Three days later, th e adm inistration received Molo­ tov’s answer to M arshall’s proposal. T he Soviet leader reiterated Mos-

1X2.

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cow ’s p o sitio n th a t those p a ttie s belonging to th e Anti-Trusteeship C om m ittee h ad to renounce o p p o sitio n to th e Moscow agreement in o rd er to qualify fo r co n su ltatio n . H e th e n decried the recent arrests an d im prisonm ents in so u th ern K orea as “ abnorm al and inadmissable.” N evertheless, M olotov accepted th e A m erican proposal for the fo rm u latio n o f a jo in t rep o rt in th e interests o f achieving Korea’s independence.*2 In K orea, Shtikov now in d icated th a t h e was prepared to begin consideration o f a sum m ary rep o rt, b u t th e American delegation obviously h ad registered a fa it accom pli. Brown, in reply, delivered a b listering d en u n ciatio n o f th e Soviet delegation for its protests against th e recent arrests in th e A m erican zone. H e reproached Shti­ kov fo r exploiting a false issue to m ask Moscow's resistance to broad consultation w ith all leg itim ate K orean groups. More important, it was Soviet-sponsored in filtratio n o f subversives in to southern Korea th a t h ad m ade these defensive operations necessary. Brown gra­ tuitously offered to release these peo p le, however, if the Soviets w ould free political prisoners in th e n o rth an d agree to a formula for w ider consultations a t th e J o in t Com m ission. Jacobs observed pri­ vately th a t A m erican atten d an ce a t fu tu re sessions was pointless in view o f Shdkov’s “ uncom prom ising, u n ten ab le, and intransigeant" attitude.** A dm inistration officials w ere d eterm in ed to m aintain the initiative an d therefore decided to aban d o n all fu tu re efforts to work through th e Jo in t Com m ission. O n A ugust 26, R obert A. Lovett, Acheson’s replacem ent as undersecretary o f state, w rote a letter to Molotov charging th e Soviet U nion w ith violating th e M arshall-M olotov com­ prom ise. M em bers o f th e A nti-T histeeship C om m ittee had signed th e required pledge o f cooperation and h ad n o t agitated against the Moscow agreem ent, yet th e Soviet delegation h ad dem anded unjusti­ fiably th e exclusion o f these p arties from consultation. Rather than being guilty o f “ oppression an d persecution,” he continued, Hodge was trying to m ain tain law an d order in th e A m erican zone. Since fu tu re discussions in K orea w ould be useless, Lovett recommended a four-pow er conference in W ashington to convene on September 9, 1947, for consideration o f th e jo in t rep o rt. A t th a t tim e, the United States w ould propose th e ado p tio n o f a p lan for achieving Korea’s reunification and econom ic recovery.*4 In Moscow, A m bassador Sm ith predicted th a t th e Soviets would n o t accept W ashington’s latest dém arche, arguing th a t Korea occu-

An Avenue fo r Escape

1 2 .3

pied a vital strategic location for th e Russians. Lovett cabled Sm ith’s assessment to Seoul and instructed Jacobs to prepare for the likely submission o f the Korean m atter to th e U nited N ations for consider­ ation.8’ On September 4, W ashington received th e anticipated Soviet rejection of Lovett’s proposal. In his letter, Molotov condem ned th e United States for ham pering the emergence o f a democratic govern­ ment in Korea. The Soviet leader rejected both British and Chinese participation in future Soviet-American deliberations, insisting th at negotiations at the Jo in t Commission alone could resolve the Korean problem. After receiving M olotov’s letter, Trum an, following A lli­ son’s third contingency plan, instructed Marshall to address the United Nations General Assembly on Septem ber 17,1947, and place the Korean issue on its agenda.86 Truman resorted to action at the U nited N ations not merely to break the Korean stalem ate b u t also to facilitate Am erican w ith­ drawal at the earliest possible date. Given the m onum ental problem s facing the adm inistration in its struggle w ith the Soviet U nion, Wash­ ington’s desire to leave this strategically unim portant area was scarce­ ly surprising.87 Congressional hesitancy to provide southern Korea with financial aid, coupled w ith th e lim itations on American m an­ power and m aterial, had in fact elim inated th e other alternatives. As Jacobs noted in Septem ber 1947, unless the adm inistration found an answer to the Korean predicam ent soon, “we may have to abandon the country willy nilly.” 88 B ut w ithout Soviet cooperation, successful withdrawal would require the creation o f a separate southern Korean government. The extreme right now dom inated southern politics, however, a fact th at few in W ashington fully appreciated. Conse­ quently, after the U nited States disengaged, the emergence o f a truly open and democratic society in southern Korea would be a virtual impossibility.89 For many scholars, Trum an’s decision to subm it the Korean issue to the United Nations revealed his desire to cast aside an unw anted bur­ den. The adm inistration, critics charge, was attem pting to exploit th e international organization and withdraw from Korea w ithout appear­ ing to abandon an American com m itm ent.90 But this interpretation does not provide an acceptable explanation for American behavior. International involvement actually was another essential elem ent in Truman’s strategy o f containm ent in Korea. A lthough American leaders expected Soviet refusal to cooperate, they hoped the U nited Nations would agree to sponsor elections in the American zone alone.

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A separate governm ent south o f th e 38th parallel would then enjoy m oral and m aterial support from th e w orld community, contributing to its internal econom ic strength and political stability. Similarly, U nited N ations sponsorship m ig h t persuade Congress to authorize an appropriation for econom ic assistance.91 International action seemed to provide th e m eans to bridge th e gap betw een the administration’s objectives in K orea and its reluctance to com m it unlim ited American pow er to achieve success.92 For Trum an and his advisors, the United N ations offered an avenue fo r escape from K orea th at would lead to th e fu lfillm ent rather th an th e abdication o f Am erican obligations to this sm all A sian nation.

CHAPTER 6

A House D ivided

Congressional reluctance to finance new international com m itm ents during the summer o f 1947 forced th e adm inistration to postpone temporarily the application o f its containm ent policy in Korea. Nev­ ertheless, Truman and his advisors were w illing to be p atient because they anticipated a m arked im provem ent in th e Korean situation once the United Nations began to consider the reunification issue. C ertain State Departm ent officials em phasized th a t relying on the U nited Nations would produce some indirect benefits. W ashington could demonstrate, for example, its good faith , its desire to fulfill its com­ mitments, and its devotion to international cooperation. Moreover, the Korean issue provided an excellent opportunity to assume an unequivocal stance in defense o f national self-determ ination before the world comm unity.1 Some Am erican leaders even predicted th at if the United Nations showed unity and resolve, Stalin m ight agree to a settlement in Korea on the adm inistration’s term s. A fter all, during the Iranian crisis early in 1946, world opinion had seem ed to play a significant role in Moscow’s decision to w ithdraw .2 Predictably, Trum an’s U nited N ations gam bit in Korea was des­ tined to fail. Stalin was certain to reject Lovett’s proposal o f A ugust 26 because the Soviet U nion would be in a m inority at any fourpower conference. Similarly, Moscow w ould resist action at the United Nations. Since a large m ajority o f m em ber nations were aligned closely w ith the U nited States, however, Stalin could not pre­ vent the General Assembly from endorsing American policy. Yet without Soviet cooperation, th e U nited N ations would be unable to achieve Korean reunification. To his credit, Thim an expected the Soviet Union to be uncooperative, b u t he still held out hope th at adverse world opinion would induce Stalin to retreat. In fact, politi­ cal and psychological pressure o f this sort would merely harden Mos­ cow’s resolve. Ultim ately, Thim an’s attem pt to legislate an agreem ent on Korea, rather than reaching a settlem ent through diplomacy,

lié

CHAPTER 6

w ould elim inate any fleetin g chance for a genuine resolution. Ear from achieving peaceful reu n ificatio n , th e U nited Nations would co n trib u te to th e em ergence o f tw o Koreas b o th dedicated to ending th e artificial division o f th e p eninsula regardless o f cost.3 A fter receiving M olotov’s rejection o f th e latest American initiative on Septem ber 4 , th e adm inistration m oved quickly to prepare for action at th e U nited N ations. U ndersecretary Lovett inform ed Molo­ tov on Septem ber 16 th a t th e U n ited States w ould place the Korean issue on th e agenda o f th e in tern atio n al organization the following day. In his speech before th e G eneral Assembly, Secretary of State M arshall professed th a t th e prim ary reason fo r th e Soviet-American im passe over K orea was Moscow’s adam ant stand against the princi­ p le o f u n fettered freedom o f expression. Since th e U nited States and th e Soviet U nion had been unable to fu lfill past agreements on K orea, M arshall asked fo r in tern atio n al action to remove this threat to w orld peace.4 The S tate D epartm ent already had in hand a pro­ posal to break th e K orean deadlock, a p lan w hich provided for free elections u n d er U nited N ations supervision w ithin six months after adoption. This legislature, reflecting th e tw o-to-one population su­ periority o f southern K orea, w ould form ulate a constitution and ap p o in t officials for a provisional governm ent. Perhaps the most im p o rtan t provision called for th e creation o f a “U nited Nations Tem porary Com m ission o n K orea” (UNTCOK) com prised of eleven nations to supervise th e elections, foster freedom o f choice, and report its findings to th e G eneral Assem bly.3 C om m unist m ilitary victories in C hina du rin g th e sum m er of 1947 added urgency to th e task o f ob tain in g approval for th e American proposal. Political instability in C hina represented yet another serious th reat to th e security o f th e A m erican occupation force in southern K orea. Trum an, acknow ledging b o th th e strategic and political rela­ tionship betw een events in C hina and K orea, dispatched Lieutenant G eneral A lbert C. W edem eyer on a fact-finding mission to the two nations during Septem ber 1947 p u rsu an t to an overall reappraisal of A m erican policy in A sia.6 W edemeyer, shortly after his arrival in C hina, cabled M arshall th a t th e Soviet U nion was im plem enting a m asterful p lan for dom inance thro u g h o u t Asia. H is w arning con­ firm ed W ashington’s suspicion th a t Stalin w ould spread Russian influence in to any area w here conditions seem ed conducive to con­ q u est.7 In his report from K orea, W edem eyer declared om inously that the

A House D ivided

12-7

“same sinister forces th a t m ilitate against a program o f dem ocratiza­ tion and rehabilitation in o th er areas o f th e w orld are p resen t in Korea.” A lthough o u trig h t invasion was im probable, W edem eyer believed that Korea h ad to develop sufficient m ilitary stren g th to combat the threat o f Soviet-sponsored in filtratio n an d subversion. Any further attem pts to cooperate w ith Moscow w ould n o t only be useless but would advance th e Soviet strategy o f political expan­ sion and economic enslavem ent. By contrast, prem ature w ithdraw al would guarantee a com plete Soviet victory, w hile lim ited financial assistance would n o t result in econom ic self-sufficiency. For W ede­ meyer, any “ideological retreat” in K orea was unacceptable because it would enhance Soviet prestige in Asia, thereby w eakening th e American position in Ja p an .8 Wedemeyer adm itted, however, th a t th e creation o f genuine de­ mocracy in southern Korea w ould n o t be easy. B oth th e local police and the National 'Vbuth M ovem ent, he reported, h ad com m itted countless acts o f to rtu re, extortion, brutality, and arbitrary arrest, earning the universal h atred an d distrust o f th e general public. Yet the AMG had to rely on these very elem ents to m aintain law and order. Under present circum stances, truly free elections w ould be impossible because th e extrem e rig h t w ould control th e outcom e. Nevertheless, W edemeyer th o u g h t southern K orea could em erge as a vital “bulwark o f freedom ” in Asia if th e U nited States provided extensive economic assistance an d form ed an A m erican-officered “Korean Scout Force.” W ith exaggerated optim ism , he predicted that positive Am erican m easures o f th is kind w ould com pel th e Soviet Union eventually to accept a “ neutralized K orea” as a buffer zone in northeast A sia.9 While m ulling over W edem eycr’s rep o rt, W ashington asked Jacobs for his ideas on fu tu re policy in K orea. H odge’s political advisor pointedly replied th a t consideration o f any specific p lan w ould b e a waste of energy prior to th e ad m in istratio n ’s d eterm ination o f w heth­ er Korea was crucial to A m erican security interests. If W ashington decided not to apply a policy o f co n tain m en t in K orea, h e recom ­ mended a quick and graceful w ithdraw al. T his o p tio n w ould eventu­ ate in anarchy and considerable bloodshed, Jacobs a d m itted , b u t he then philosophically offered ju stificatio n fo r such action: In any event we c a n n o t give dem ocracy, as w e know it, to any p eo p le o r cram it dow n th e ir th ro a ts. H isto ry cries lo u d ly th a t th e fru its o f

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democracy come forth only after long evolutionary and revolutionary processes involving the expenditure o f treasure, blood and tears. Money cannot buy it; outside force and presure [sic] cannot nurture it. Regardless o f th e u ltim ate outcom e o f th e policy reassessment, Jacobs appealed for an early decision, w arning th a t delay would make the en tire K orean qu estio n o f academ ic in terest alo n e.10 Som e ad m in istratio n officials shared W edem eyer’s judgm ent that th e U n ited States could ill afford to abandon Korea. Francis B. Stevens o f th e D ivision o f East E uropean A ffairs asserted that certain ideological im ponderables outw eighed K orea’s strategic value. He opposed w ithdraw al on political grounds, arguing th a t Korea is a symbol to the watching world both of the East-West struggle for influence and power and of American security in sponsoring the nationalistic aims of Asian peoples. If we allow Korea to go by default and to fall within the Soviet orbit, the world will feel that we have lost another round in our match with the Soviet Union, and our prestige and the hopes of those who place faith in us will suffer accordingly. In the Far East, the reliance of national movements on American suppon would be seriously shaken, and the consequences might be far reaching. In conclusion, Stevens claim ed th a t a com plete Com m unist victory in K orea w ould reinforce S talin’s devotion to his expansionist strategy of subversion and indirect aggression.11 D espite Stevens’s assessm ent, strategic considerations dominated th e outlook o f m ost o f Iru m an ’s advisors w ith respect to Korea. Both th e Policy Planning Staff and th e Division o f N ortheast Asian Affairs agreed th a t th e global com m itm ents o f th e U nited States were so extensive th a t th e adm inistration m ight have to withdraw prema­ turely from the peninsula. O n Septem ber 15, the SWNCC requested com m ents from the JCS on th e relationship o f Korea to American national security.12 In a now fam ous m em orandum , the JCS respond­ ed categorically th at “ from the standpoint o f m ilitary security, the U nited States has little strategic interest in m aintaining present troops and bases in Korea.’’ W hile any American offensive on the Asian m ainland would bypass Korea, Ih im an ’s m ilitary experts be­ lieved th at an enemy position on the peninsula would be vulnerable to air attack. Thus, the U nited States could contribute more effec­ tively to its national security by deploying the Korean occupation

A House D ivided

12.9

forces in areas o f greater strategic im portance. T he JC S w arned th a t in the absence o f a m ajor program for social, political, an d econom ic rehabilitation, disorder and unrest in K orea w ould underm ine W ash­ ington’s position thoroughly. Forced w ithdraw al, rather th an volun­ tary disengagement, w ould be h u m iliatin g an d inflict infinitely greater damage on th e in tern atio n al prestige o f th e U nited S tates.13 For many American leaders, th e JC S report dem anded precipitate withdrawal from Korea. G eorge F. K ennan, head o f th e Policy Plan­ ning Staff, was particularly im pressed. In a letter to th e State D epart­ ment, Kennan explained th a t if th e JC S assessm ent was correct, “ we feel that our policy should be to cu t o u r losses and get o u t o f there as gracefully but prom ptly as possible.” T he JC S report m erely added weight to the War D ep artm en t’s argum ent th a t th e U nited States could not afford to im plem ent a positive program in Korea. O th er administration officials, however, were m ore sensitive to th e w arnings of Wedemeyer and Stevens. T he State D epartm ent in particular assigned great im portance to achieving a settlem ent “ w hich w ould enable the U.S. to w ithdraw from K orea as soon as possible w ith th e minimum of bad effects.” R ather th an m ake a hasty decision, H u ­ man elected to w ait u n til th e U n ited N ations had acted on th e A m er­ ican proposal. If the international organization m anaged to create a Korean provisional governm ent, Congress m ight consider approving an economic aid program . Even th en , as Leahy noted at th e tim e, th e “feasibility of [W edem eyer’s] recom m endations w ill. . . have to be considered . . . in relation to U .S . com m itm ents and possible fu tu re commitments elsewhere in th e w orld.” 14 Surprisingly, H odge em erged as a vocal proponent o f th e State Department’s position. Late in Septem ber, th e U SA FK com m ander urged im plem entation o f W edem eyer’s recom m endations during dis­ cussions with K enneth C. Royall, th e new secretary o f th e arm y who was visiting southern Korea on a fact-finding m ission. A lthough he shared the JCS assessment o f K orea’s lim ited strategic value, H odge believed that th e U nited States could n o t tolerate fu rth er Soviet expansion w ithout irreparable dam age to A m erican prestige. H e favored only staged w ithdraw al over a nine-m onth period. Prior to departure, the U nited States w ould have to train and equip a strong local army. Since econom ic self-sufficiency was th e key to southern Korea’s survival, H odge also advocated a five-year rehabilitation pro­ gram. Apparently, H odge’s advice persuaded th e W ar D epartm ent that outright abandonm ent o f K orea w ould be ill advised. It now

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decided to press for im plem entation o f a billion-dollar aid plan for K orea over five years, a program w hich w ould perm it the United States to w ithdraw safely. T hrough interdepartm ental coordination and congressional cooperation, th e U nited States m ight be able to bu ild an "ideological bridgehead on th e A sian m ainland.” 15 Moscow evidently concluded th a t W ashington’s démarche at the U nited N ations represented a p o ten tial th reat to the Soviet position in northern K orea. A t th e Jo in t Com m ission, Shtikov recommended m utual Soviet-Am erican m ilitary w ithdraw al from the peninsula, arguing th a t th en th e K orean people could organize a provisional governm ent independently. Brown replied th a t an American re­ sponse was im possible now th a t K orea’s fate was in the hands of the U nited N ations. A lm ost certainly, Stalin was trying to force American disengagem ent from K orea prior to th e application o f containment. W ith o u t A m erican m ilitary protection, southern Korea could not com pete w ith its econom ically and m ilitarily superior northern neigh­ bor. U nited N ations consideration o f th e K orean issue would damage Moscow’s in ternational im age as well. A n anticipated American refusal to w ithdraw , on th e o th er h an d , w ould shift blame for the absence o f K orea’s independence from th e Soviet Union to the U nited S tates.16 Moscow’s proposal for m u tu al m ilitary w ithdraw al strengthened th e position o f those A m erican leaders favoring an early departure from Korea. Lovett and Charles E. Saltzm an, who had replaced H illdring, already had suggested th a t th e JCS and the Policy Plan­ ning S taff develop plans for w ithdraw al should th e U nited Nations fail to resolve th e K orean problem . A dm inistration officials now had to devote im m ediate atten tio n to th e m atter. D uring a cabinet meet­ ing on Septem ber 29, M arshall observed th a t th e Soviet proposal provided an opportunity for "g ettin g o u t o f Korea.’’ In response, H arrim an questioned w hether th e U nited States could leave Korea "w ith o u t loss o f face.’’ Subsequently, th e Policy Planning Staff and th e State D epartm ent advised th a t th e adm inistration could not “ scuttle and ru n ’’ in K orea w ithout dam aging Am erican prestige. Yet th e creation o f a viable southern K orea w ould require considerable m oney and effort. If th e adm inistration attem pted to develop a capacity for self-defense south o f th e 38th parallel, however, Mos­ cow’s proposal w ould provide justification for an eventual disengage­ m ent and b lu n t harsh criticism o f th e U nited States for appearing to shirk its responsibilities. T hus, th e adm inistration decided to incor-

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porate the Soviet idea on w ithdraw l in to its proposal at th e U n ited Nations.17 As expected, the Soviet U nion attem p ted to affix blam e to th e United States for the K orean im passe and thereby underm ine A m eri­ can policy at the U nited N ations. In a letter to M arshall d ated O cto­ ber 10, Molotov alleged th a t W ashington, through its insistence on consultations w ith reactionary K orean p arties, had prevented im ple­ mentation o f the Moscow agreem ent a t th e Jo in t Com m ission. Now the Soviet delegation had proposed m u tu al m ilitary w ithdraw al and the United States refused to respond, once again prolonging th e achievement o f Korea’s independence. Finally, M olotov reiterated that the Soviet governm ent opposed U n ited N ations consideration o f the Korean issue. O ne week later, U ndersecretary Lovett sent a reply to Molotov. Since m ilitary w ithdraw al was linked to th e question o f independence for K orea, he avowed, any decision on th e issue required action at th e U nited N ations. Lovett em phasized th a t th e United States believed in tern atio n al consideration o f th e K orean problem was the only alternative because Soviet-Am erican negotia­ tions had reached a stalem ate.18 At the U nited N ations, W arren R. A ustin, in his capacity as perm a­ nent representative, presented a d raft resolution on Korea on O cto­ ber 17,1947, and urged rapid international approval. This plan d if­ fered from the State D ep artm en t’s d raft o f Septem ber 18 in only two respects: It specifically called for elections no later th an March 31, 1948, and provided for Soviet-A m erican m ilitary w ithdraw al after th e formation of a provisional governm ent.19 T he follow ing day, Brown, as head of the A m erican delegation, suggested a recess o f th e Jo in t Commission in anticipation o f international action. D uring th e next session, Shtikov announced th a t th e Soviet delegation w ould w ith­ draw from the negotiations perm anently because th e U nited States had blocked im plem entation o f th e Moscow agreem ent. O n O ctober 23, the Soviet representatives left Seoul and th e Jo in t Com mission negotiations officially en d ed .20 Less th an one week later, Moscow sub­ mitted a formal proposal to th e U nited N ations for jo in t SovietAmerican withdrawal from K orea.21 Now th e future o f a divided Korea was fully in th e hands o f th e international organization, if it chose to act. Washington’s efforts to break th e K orean deadlock had a profound impact on dom estic politics in th e A m erican zone. A t first, th e Korean people reacted as adm inistration officials expected. M olotov’s

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rejection o f a four-pow er conference to revise th e Moscow agreement b ro u g h t a wave o f unfavorable, anti-S oviet com m ent. Rhee, Kim Ku, an d leading prew ar conservative K im Söng-su recognized at once the significance o f th e breakdow n in Soviet-Am erican negotiations. The extrem e rig h t in itia ted a high-pow ered publicity campaign to force th e U nited States to g ran t im m ediate elections for a separate govern­ m en t, alth o u g h it appealed to W ashington to delay military with­ draw al.22 D uring O ctober, relations betw een Rhee and the AMG quickly deterio rated . O n one occasion, a large group o f conservatives staged a dem onstration outside H odge’s headquarters. Hodge re­ sponded th e follow ing day w ith a public announcem ent that the U nited States could n o t set a specific date for elections until after in tern atio n al consideration o f th e K orean m atter.23 A furious Rhee now charged H odge w ith trying to foster th e revival o f communism in southern K orea. T he AM G could expect work stoppages and “a great deal o f trouble,” h e th reaten ed , if elections did n ot occur in the very near fu tu re.24 N o t only d id th e prospect o f renew ed internal violence and disor­ d er confront a distu rb ed H odge, b u t th e Soviet proposal for mutual m ilitary w ithdraw al m ade him even m ore nervous. Beginning in May 1947, th e USAFIK com m ander viewed w ith growing anxiety the im m inent Soviet m ilitary disengagem ent from northern Korea. In th e afterm ath o f a Russian w ithdraw al, H odge believed that the northern K orean p u p p et arm y m ight m ount an invasion against the south. In response, W ashington instructed H odge to rely on “the m eans available in case o f operations across th e border by Korean groups from th e no rth .” 23 A fter Moscow form ally proposed with­ draw al, H odge again urged th e adm inistration to reassess the impli­ cations o f a unilateral Soviet w ithdraw al from northern Korea. In par­ ticular, th e occupation com m ander requested an increase in the num ber o f civilian advisors in southern K orea and permission to cre­ ate a large constabulary army.26 W ashington refused to comply. Once representatives o f th e U nited N ations were present in Korea, the adm inistration believed th a t th e th reat o f arm ed invasion southward across th e 38th parallel virtually w ould disappear.27 This expectation rested on th e key assum ption th at Soviet inten­ tions in Asia essentially were lim ited. M arshall indicated as much during a cabinet m eeting on N ovem ber 7, w hen he presented a Pol­ icy Planning S taff report on th e w orld situation. The secretary of state speculated th a t th e Soviet U nion d id n o t w ant war b ut sought to use

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tactics of indirect aggression an d subversion to ex tend its influence into areas o f instability. Asia was particularly susceptible to Moscow’s strategy because th e area suffered from p ersisten t uncertainty. T hen Marshall directed his rem arks specifically to conditions in K orea, observing glumly th a t there was no longer any real h o p e o f a g en u in ely p eacefu l a n d free dem o cratic development in th a t country. Its p o litic al life in th e co m in g p erio d is bound to be d o m in ated by p o litic al im m atu rity , in to leran ce a n d vio­ lence. W here such co n d itio n s p rev ail, th e C o m m u n ists are in th e ir ele­ ment. Therefore, we c an n o t c o u n t o n n ativ e K o rean forces to h e lp u s hold the line against Soviet exp an sio n . Since th e te rrito ry is n o t o f d eci­ sive strategic im portance to u s, o u r m a in task is to ex tricate ourselves without too great a loss o f p restig e.

Marshall proposed th a t th e adm inistration carefully form ulate plans for countering the Soviet challenge based u p o n a realistic assessm ent of American capabilities. Since th e Soviet U n io n ’s m ilitary an d eco­ nomic power in Asia was lim ited , th e U n ited States still could counter the threat effectively.28 Marshall’s assessment fortified th e d eterm ination o f m any A m eri­ can military planners to leave K orea a t th e earliest possible m om ent. On November 10, W edemeyer, now director o f p lanning and opera­ tions, informed Hodge and M acA rthur th a t th e D epartm ent o f th e Army was considering a proposal for disengagem ent du rin g th e autumn of 1948 regardless o f events a t th e U nited N ations. H e requested comments on th e logic o f this option should Moscow reject simultaneous withdrawal. H odge responded th a t, in his opinion, th e Soviet Union would never cooperate w ith th e U nited N ations or per­ mit reunification. H e therefore recom m ended, as he had during his conversations w ith Royall two m onths earlier, th at th e U nited States supervise the form ation o f a separate governm ent in southern Korea to include the creation o f a large constabulary army and th e im ple­ mentation of an economic aid program . Rhee and his cohorts would score a landslide victory in separate elections, he adm itted, n o t least because of a probable leftist boycott. Nevertheless, H odge was hopefill that several m oderate leaders would gain office and tem per Rhee’s reactionary extremism .29 For Hodge, American m ilitary withdrawal from Korea would be disastrous unless the U nited States fulfilled certain conditions. He

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th o u g h t W ashington should ad o p t th e five-year rehabilitation pro­ gram th a t th e AM G h ad form ulated th e previous September. If it w ere im plem ented, a w ell-staffed A m erican embassy then could pro­ vide supervision an d periodic reports to W ashington on the progress o f recovery. O nce th e southern K orean governm ent developed eco­ nom ic stren g th an d political stability, H odge predicted that “nation­ al feeling am ong th e n o rth K oreans m ay be aroused and sufficient pressure bro u g h t to bear u p o n th e Soviets to com pel them to permit . . . an am algam ation o f th e tw o areas.” H odge’s recommendations provided an unm istakable b lu ep rin t fo r th e application of contain­ m en t in southern K orea. Yet his expectations were much grander. If successful, containm ent in K orea w ould act as a liberating force and ultim ately produce reunification o f th e peninsula under a govern­ m en t acceptable to th e U nited S tates.90 R eports from Seoul d u rin g th e au tu m n o f 1947 suggested that the em ergence o f a liberal dem ocracy in southern Korea was highly unlikely w ith or w ithout A m erican assistance. Jacobs informed the S tate D epartm ent th a t R hee’s activities and th e response of the ex­ trem e conservatives to th e Jo in t Com m ission questionnaires indicated how even th e m ost educated K oreans possessed no conception of basic dem ocratic principles. Worse still, Rhee was afraid that he m ight lose truly free elections and in ten d ed to rely on the police and rightist youth groups to m anufacture an electoral victory. Moderate K orean leaders appealed to occupation officials to check rightist political in tim id atio n , b u t th e AMG could do little to restrain the extrem e conservatives. By late O ctober, arbitrary arrest and prolonged im prisonm ent had obviated any possible leftist challenge. Although Hoidge still detested Rhee, he prodded W ashington to authorize sep­ arate elections w ithout fu rth er delay, arguing th a t the Communists were then at a low p o in t in term s o f popularity and activism.91 W hile th e prospects for A m erican success in Korea appeared slight, W ashington’s policy at th e U nited N ations experienced rapid prog­ ress. O n N ovem ber 4, th e organization’s political committee ap­ proved th e Am erican proposal on K orea, which now provided for Soviet? American w ithdraw al from th e peninsula w ithin ninety days after th e creation o f a provisional governm ent. Some administration officials were troubled about appearing unduly hasty, b ut the Soviet proposal on w ithdraw al gave th e U nited States no choice. Much to th e satisfaction o f Trum an and his advisors, th e G eneral Assembly passed the Am erican-sponsored resolution on Novem ber 14 by a wide

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margin.52 American leaders were also happy w ith th e com position o f the UNTCOK. O f the nine m em bers, C anada, A ustralia, C hina, France, El Salvador, and th e Philippines all had close econom ic, political, and m ilitary ties to th e U nited States. O nly Syria and India were likely to ham per the p u rsu it o f A m erican policy objectives, while the final m em ber, th e U kraine, probably w ould decline to serve.55 Marshall was ju b ilan t. H e im m ediately instructed H odge to prepare for elections and contact th e UNTCOK to determ ine a spe­ cific date for the balloting.54 Thus, the U nited N ations had chosen to follow th e p ath th a t reflected the political and diplom atic im peratives o f th e U nited States, but one possessing little realistic chance o f leading to K orea’s peaceful reunification. A fter all, Moscow already had announced its refusal to cooperate w ith th e U nited N ations.55 Furtherm ore, m any nations worried about the violence and political instability in south­ ern Korea and cautioned against international involvem ent in th e Korean affair. H . V. Evatt o f A ustralia, for instance, insisted during discussions with adm inistration officials th a t Korea was a question for Soviet-American resolution or, as a last resort, a Japanese peace con­ ference. Marshall strongly disagreed, arguing th a t only international action could break the Korean deadlock. H e assured Evatt, however, that the United States did n o t in ten d to desert Korea and was deter­ mined to fulfill its com m itm ents. Jo h n Foster D ulles, a m em ber o f the American delegation at the U nited N ations, th en expressed o p ti­ mism that the international organization w ould induce the Soviet Union to cooperate in th e achievem ent o f Korean reunification and independence. These argum ents failed to convince Evatt, who re­ mained skeptical about th e wisdom o f A ustralia becom ing involved in the complicated Korean d isp u te.54 Events in southern Korea m ade it m uch harder for Am erican leaders to reassure wavering m em bers o f th e U nited N ations. A fter the General Assembly approved th e Am erican resolution, Rhee accel­ erated his cam paign for early elections south o f th e 38th parallel. Jacobs cabled W ashington th a t th e extrem e right w anted “ rigged” elections and therefore opposed international supervision. Conserva­ tive reliance on terror and intim idation, he concluded sadly, “ readily lends itself to Soviet charges th at Rhee is reactionary, pro-Japanese and Fascist.” 1b silence Rhee, Major G eneral W illiam F. D ean, Lerch’s replacement as m ilitary governor, announced th at any fu rth er steps toward self-governm ent in Korea had to await the arrival o f the

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UNTCOK . Rhce now denounced th e U nited States for breaking its pledges to K orea an d playing in to th e hands o f the Communists. O th er K orean leaders also h ad begun to express fears that the United N ations w ould n o t authorize elections w ithout Soviet consent. Final­ ly, on D ecem ber 7, H odge publicly reassured th e southern Korean people th a t there w ould be elections in th e near future, but only u n d er th e supervision o f th e U nited N ations.37 For m any o f Trum an's diplom atic advisors, H odge now represented a significant barrier to th e fu tu re success o f Am erican policy in Korea, since he could n eith er restrain Rhee nor m aintain law and order in southern Korea. T he JCS disagreed and staunchly resisted a proposal for H odge’s relief. G eneral D w ight D . Eisenhower, army chief of staff, argued th a t H odge’s know ledge and experience were invalu­ able, w hile A ssistant Secretary o f State Saltzm an pointed out that rem oval o f th e USAFIK com m ander w ould constitute a major tri­ um ph for Rhee and th e extrem e rig h t.3* Several State Department officials rem ained dissatisfied w ith H odge’s perform ance, however. W. W alton B utterw orth, director o f th e O ffice o f Far Eastern Affairs, believed th a t H odge’s tolerance o f “ police state tactics” in southern K orea w ould alienate m em bers o f th e UNTCOK and thereby damage th e im age o f th e U nited States at th e U nited N ations. American mili­ tary leaders were n ot sym pathetic to such argum ents. In fact, one Army D epartm ent official suspected th a t Butterw orth was “laying th e necessary groundw ork to place th e blam e for ultim ate US failure in K orea at d ie doorstep o f th e Army.” 39 State D epartm ent officials had good reason for concern. On De­ cem ber 3, an alleged supporter o f K im K u assassinated rightist leader Chang Tök-su, who recendy had em erged as an advocate of super­ vised décrions. For State D epartm ent official Penfield, recurrent political violence in southern K orea was intolerable in view of the im m inent arrival o f th e UNTCOK. H e dem anded th at the AMG act decisively for th e prom pt restoration o f internal stability. Lovett also instructed H odge to prevent th e police from engaging in any further abuses o f power.40 Langdon attem p ted to assure Washington that occupation officials already had adopted strong measures to control dom estic unrest. He prom ised to investigate C hang’s assassination personally and press th e Korean police to release all purely political prisoners. But Langdon rem inded Lovett th a t Korea was “politically excited, restive, and frustrated, and economically on a subsistence

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margin.” W ashington had to take these disruptive factors into consid­ eration if it expected to evaluate th e AM G’s perform ance accurately.41 Langdon blam ed Rhee and th e extrem e right for th e chaotic atm o­ sphere in southern Korea. B ut occupation officials sadly were com ing to realize that w ithout Rhee’s cooperation, an acceptable solution to the Korean problem would not be possible. Even Lovett adm itted in one cable that nothing could “ prevent Rhee from running away w ith the election.” A realistic assessment seem ed to suggest th a t the United States should begin to cultivate good relations w ith Rhee and the extreme right as soon as possible. W ashington th en could hope that Rhee would become less strident and intolerant when he had to depend on American aid for his regim e’s survival. M eanwhile, Tru­ man’s advisors were fearful th at Rhee’s actions w ould alienate th e UNTCOK. Accordingly, W ashington ordered th e AMG to concen­ trate on creating an atm osphere in which th e Korean people at least appeared to enjoy freedom o f choice, thereby ensuring international supervision of the electoral process.42 American trepidation over a possible erosion o f support at the United Nations was thoroughly justified. C anada was n o t at all enthusiastic about participating in th e UNTCOK m ission. Prim e Minister MacKenzie K ing strenuously opposed any involvem ent in the Korean affair during D ecem ber 1947, precipitating a cabinet cri­ sis in Canada. H um an delivered a personal appeal to K ing n o t to withdraw from the UNTCOK. In reply, K ing asserted th a t only nations directly concerned should be involved in the determ ination of Korea’s destiny. For K ing, the UNTCOK was em barking on a “fool’s errand,” since Soviet cooperation was extremely im probable. In the end, the price o f international intervention w ould be too high, as the U nited N ations would experience frustration and em barrass­ ment, thereby weakening its ability to influence events in m ore important areas such as Europe. If the m ajor powers could not agree, King questioned w hether the sm aller nations could fin d an answer to the Korean im passe.43 Canadian obduracy came as a com plete surprise to the U nited States. One State D epartm ent official speculated th a t “ K ing was making this issue a declaration o f independence to show th at C anada reached its decision independently o f th e U nited States.” Since a Canadian boycott o f the UNTCOK would dam age Am erican prestige seriously, he suggested th at th e adm inistration perm it K ing sim ply to

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avoid ap pointing a representative. I f W ashington did not press the C anadian governm ent, th e issue m ig h t disappear quietly. Apparently Trum an rejected such an approach, since he instructed Lovett to address another direct appeal for cooperation to King. In his letter, Lovett stressed th a t a “ calculated policy o f boycott” would defeat the en tire program o f th e U nited N ations and serve to advance Soviet interests w hile ham pering th e realization o f Korea’s independence. M ost im portant, th e U nited States and C anada had to avoid even the appearance o f discord in th e ir m utual relations because enemy na­ tions w ould exploit any disagreem ent to underm ine the security of b o th countries.44 K ing now decided to dispatch his foreign m inister, Lester B. Pear­ son, to W ashington to discuss th e m atter in detail. D uring conversa­ tions w ith A m erican leaders, Pearson explained th a t King feared the consequences o f U nited N ations involvem ent in such a volatile issue. Even B ritain agreed th a t K orea was o f secondary importance and w ould h in d er cooperation in th e U nited N ations Security Council. C anada opposed as well W ashington's apparent desire to exclude the northern Koreans from th e U nited N ations debate. Lovett responded th a t w ithout at least token C anadian participation in the UNTCOK m ission, adverse publicity w ould destroy th e tem porary commission’s credibility. A fter expressing sym pathy for th e American stand, Pear­ son suggested th a t Trum an m ake one final plea for a reversal of Can­ ada’s position.4’ O n January 5, 1948, Trum an again w rote Prim e Minister King appealing for C anadian cooperation w ith th e U nited Nations resolu­ tion on K orea. The president em phasized th a t international involve­ m en t was aim ed at producing a settlem ent, n o t at increasing SovietA m erican tensions. W ithout C anadian participation, the UNTCOK w ould be unable to achieve K orean independence. More important, th e world com m unity w ould m isinterpret a C anadian boycott and begin to question th e viability o f th e U nited N ations. Truman asked K ing to consider th e “ larger pictu re” an d avoid any speculation about C anada’s com m itm ent to th e international organization. Al­ though Trum an adm itted th e probability o f a Soviet boycott of the UNTCOK, he predicted th a t th e presence o f th e tem porary commis­ sion on th e peninsula w ould lead eventually to K orea’s reunification and independence.46 Evidently, Thim an’s resort to pressure diplom acy brought the de­ sired result, since K ing agreed to appoint a representative to the

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UNTCOK. But King notified th e U nited States th at if Soviet cooper­ ation should “not be forthcom ing, and the Commission n o t return its mandate to the U nited N ations in view o f th e im possibility o f carrying out th at m andate in th e whole o f Korea, our representative will be told to withdraw from th e Commission.”47 Even K ing’s condi­ tional support satisfied Trum an, who quickly conveyed his gratitude to the prime m inister for C anada’s change o f heart. International encouragement for the UNTCOK’s m ission was vital, he explained, because it m ight com pel th e Soviets to perm it entry into northern Korea. In his subsequent com m ents, however, Truman revealed th e actual nature o f his expectations. If the Soviet U nion refused to coop­ erate, the president pointed o u t th at th e UNTCOK, since it would enjoy complete freedom o f action, th en could observe elections in southern Korea alone. Even a strong governm ent south o f th e 38th parallel, Truman rem inded K ing, w ould constitute a m ajor step toward democracy for the entire n ation.48 Despite the misgivings o f several m em bers, th e UNTCOK traveled to Korea in January 1948 in search o f a solution to the Korean prob­ lem. Upon its arrival, H odge greeted th e tem porary commission along with an extremely large crowd th at one observer described as “a rightist show.” Predictably, th e extrem e left boycotted th e welcoming ceremonies and declared its unw illingness to cooperate w ith the UNTCOK. The Com m unist party dem anded instead prom pt SovietAmerican withdrawal and tried to organize a general strike and a campaign o f sabotage to protest international involvem ent. To pre­ serve law and order, Hodge invoked a curfew and warned against any acts of violence.49 Simultaneously, H odge provided the UNTCOK with office space, housing, transportation, and food. Thus, while leftist leaders were either in hiding or in jail, the right controlled gov­ ernment services upon which the tem porary commission would de­ pend for its daily needs. G iven these circumstances, the UNTCOK would have great difficulty m aintaining its im partiality.70 Moscow’s attitude was central to the prospects for the UNTCOK’s success. Many observers thought th at the Soviets would not defy over­ whelming pressure from the world com m unity for international action and would perm it reunification during 1948. Any reason for optimism vanished, however, when the Ukraine announced its refus­ al to participate in the activities o f the UNTCOK. Marshall had antic­ ipated Soviet intransigence. H e sent instructions to Langdon to impress upon the tem porary commission th at it had the power to

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hold elections in southern K orea alone.*1 In its first meeting, the UNTCOK expressed regret over th e U krainian decision. Despite the late arrival o f th e delegate from El Salvador, th e temporary commis­ sion rapidly agreed to approach each occupation commander with a request for cooperation an d th e release o f all political prisoners. Also, th e UNTCOK organized two com m ittees; one was to ensure the exis­ tence o f a free atm osphere in K orea, w hile th e other would determine w ho w ould participate in consultations w ith th e temporary commis­ sion.*2 H odge answered th e UNTCOK w ith a pledge o f full cooperation in th e holding o f free and un fettered elections in the American zone. The Korean people were ready, he asserted, to assume the responsi­ bilities o f self-governm ent. To no o n e’s surprise, Soviet occupation com m ander K orotkov ignored th e tem porary commission’s commu­ nication. U nited N ations Secretary G eneral Trygve lie then ap­ proached th e Soviet delegation directly w ith a plea for cooperation. In reply, A ndrei Grom yko rem inded Lie th a t the Soviet Union already had indicated its “ negative attitu d e ” tow ard the UNTCOK’s activities. A ustin now pressed Lie to declare his advocacy of super­ vised elections in southern K orea alone.** Rhee also moved to exploit Moscow’s uncooperative stand, publicly dem anding separate elec­ tions and th e creation o f a security force in southern Korea.*4 For the first tim e, th e objectives o f Rhee and th e U nited States were iden­ tical. For Kim Kyu-sik, internationally supervised elections in the Amer­ ican zone alone w ould be disastrous. O n th e eve o f the temporary com m ission’s arrival, th e m oderate Korean leader had formed a “ N ational Independence Federation” to build support for the con­ vening o f a “ N orth-South Conference” to elim inate the partition of Korea. O nly the Koreans them selves, Kim insisted, could end parti­ san strife and achieve th e political unity necessary for reunification. H e predicted th a t th e arrival o f th e UNTCOK would not bring reuni­ fication b u t would instead guarantee th e perm anent division of Korea.** Significantly, K im m anaged to enlist the backing of Kim K u, who split w ith Rhee and announced his opposition to anything less than nationw ide elections.*6 H e also experienced success during consultations w ith the UNTCOK, im pressing m em bers o f the tempo­ rary commission w ith th e strength o f his argum ents. If the UNTCOK desired truly free and dem ocratic elections, Kim advised, “ it will take considerable tim e to make necessary preparations.” Should Moscow

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bar entry to the northern zone, th e m oderate leader strongly urged the UNTCOK to refer the entire m atter back to the U nited N ations Interim Committee for reconsideration. Several tem porary commis­ sion members were receptive to K im 's view point. Consequently, a number of the UNTCOK delegates favored a delay u n til th e tem po­ rary commission could confer w ith th e U nited N ations Interim Com ­ mittee.57 Rising violence and disruption in the A m erican zone contributed to this hesitancy. In January 1948, the extrem e left organized a “ G en­ eral Strike Com m ittee” to instigate work stoppages and acts o f sabo­ tage throughout southern Korea. W ithin four m onths, political unrest produced alm ost three hundred deaths and m ote than ten thousand im prisonm ents. H odge's efforts to counter political turm oil south of the 38th parallel greatly disturbed certain m em bers o f th e UNTCOK. Delegates George Patterson o f Canada and S. H . Jackson of Australia began to exert strong pressure on th eir colleagues to investigate H odge’s “police tactics.” For Jacobs, criticism o f the AMG and bickering am ong the UNTCOK m em bers was delaying the for­ mation of a separate governm ent in the south. O nly Liu Yu-wan o f China and Jean-Louis Paul-Boncour o f France were realistic enough to accept the fact th at the elections would be im perfect and would exclude the northern Koreans. If the UNTCOK fully endorsed Am er­ ican policy, Jacobs reasoned, such dissidents as Kim Kyu-sik and Kim Ku would bow to the inevitable and advocate separate elections as well.58 Rhee, having failed to prevent internationally supervised elections, now feared that the tem porary commission m ight delay the creation of a separate governm ent indefinitely. H e therefore threatened to stage widespread dem onstrations and spark acts o f political violence unless elections occurred in the very near future. Jacobs alerted the administration th at it could not ignore Rhee because the conservative leader boasted a sizable following. Yet Rhee’s popularity, he re­ marked disdainfully, “has nothing to do w ith love or veneration for the man. . . . It is . . . the result o f a wide belief th at Rhee is the source of all present and future political power in South Korea, the supreme protector o f vested interests and the existing order o f things, and that he is the m an on whom to stake all one’s fortunes.” Both Jacobs and Hodge agreed th at referral o f the Korean issue back to the United Nations would be calam itous. Occupation officials appealed to Washington to persuade the Interim C om m ittee not to delay elec-

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tions any longer.59 H odge also inform ed th e adm inistration of his desperate need fo r m ore troops to m aintain law and order. Unable to supply additional forces, W ashington approved MacArthur’s sugges­ tion to authorize an expansion o f th e Korean constabulary army to 50,0 0 0 .» Events in northern K orea confirm ed th a t th e form ation of a sepa­ rate southern Korean governm ent was an urgent necessity. American liaison officers in Pyongyang reported th a t th e northern Korean regim e was on th e verge o f prom ulgating a new constitution. On Feb­ ruary 16, 1048, th e People’s C om m ittee proclaim ed its intention to form a governm ent representing all K orea w ithin the next few m onths.61 In subsequent statem ents, th e northern Koreans con­ dem ned th e UNTCOK as a tool o f th e U nited States and called upon all southern Koreans to resist th e creation o f a separate government. In addition, th e People’s C om m ittee dem anded immediate Ameri­ can m ilitary w ithdraw al from th e peninsula.62 Leahy’s private reac­ tion undoubtedly m irrored th a t o f m ost adm inistration leaders when he piously denounced these northern Korean actions as blatant defi­ ance o f th e U nited N ations and an exam ple o f Soviet “ satellization.” Since th e northern Koreans possessed a strong army, Moscow’s puppet regim e could conquer th e entire peninsula easily if the United States failed to create a strong governm ent in th e south.62 N orthern K orea’s actions, by contrast, reinforced the reticence of th e UNTCOK. The tem porary commission already had concluded th a t separate elections w ould harden th e division o f Korea and open th e way to a bloody civil war. O n February 6, it decided to refer the Korean m atter to th e Interim C om m ittee for reconsideration in view o f th e Soviet U nion’s uncooperative attitu d e. In its report, the UNTCOK recom m ended th a t the U nited N ations authorize the elec­ tion o f consultants alone to assist in determ ining Korea’s destiny. S. H . Jackson, th e A ustralian delegate, suspected th at the Interim Com m ittee would ignore th e UNTCOK’s advice. He therefore pre­ vailed upon his colleagues to include in th e report the suggestion that any governm ent em erging from separate elections would represent only th e southern zone and n ot all Korea. Jackson also wanted to attach an assessment o f conditions in southern Korea emphasizing H odge’s penchant for political repression, b u t his colleagues rejected this proposal. Indian delegate K. P. S. M enon thus traveled to New \b rk carrying a report th a t contained few specific recommendations from the UNTCOK on how to resolve th e K orean predicam ent.64

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Jacobs harshly criticized th e U N TC O K ’s actions as hasty, unfair, and based “alm ost solely o n testim ony given by im m ature K orean leaders who are . . . com pletely overlooking th e n eed for u n ity on a sensible, coherent plan for salvaging w hat m ay yet be salvaged for their country.” He blam ed th e tem porary com m ission’s uncooperative attitude on a “British bloc” th a t allegedly was conspiring to retain American troops in K orea presum ably forever. By delaying free elec­ tions and m ajor reform s, In d ia, A ustralia, an d C anada, w ith th e assistance of Syria, were playing “ in to Soviet hands.” Jacobs singled out Jackson as a C om m unist sym pathizer w ho was using th e civil rights issue to frustrate th e U n ited States, thereby repaying W ashing­ ton for excluding A ustralia from p articip atio n in th e occupation o f Japan. Syria, on th e o th er h an d , was opposing separate elections to gain leverage regarding A m erican policy tow ard Palestine. O nly China and the Philippines understood th a t Moscow w ould never allow Korea’s reunification except th ro u g h an invasion from th e north.6* World leaders had n o t failed to notice th e m arked increase o f vio­ lence and disruption in southern K orea. In th e interests o f peace and stability, the Interim C om m ittee th u s decided to consider th e UNTCOK report earlier th an it originally h ad in ten d ed . T he U nited Nations now confronted th e distasteful choice eith er to reject positive action in the face o f Soviet intransigence or to sponsor separate elec­ tions and solidify the K orean p a rtitio n . Most m em bers o f th e Interim Committee believed, however, th a t supervised elections w ould allow most Koreans to experience dem ocracy an d m ig h t even spur popular demands in the north for reunification. W ithdraw al and inaction, on the other hand, w ould open th e way to C om m unist control th ro u g h ­ out the peninsula.66 M arshall instructed th e A m erican am bassador in the capital o f each UNTCOK m em ber to press for acceptance o f sepa­ rate elections as th e lesser evil. T he B ritish reaction was typical o f those nations who opposed A m erican policy recom m endations. Lon­ don believed th a t separate elections w ould reinforce th e division o f Korea and questioned th e logic o f antagonizing th e Soviet U nion on what appeared to be an issue o f secondary im portance. N evertheless, the British agreed to approve th e form ation o f a separate southern Korean governm ent as a last reso rt.67 Washington was acutely aware o f w idespread resistance in th e United Nations to supervised elections in southern K orea alone. Yet the adm inistration m ied o u t any fu rth er delays. M arshall instructed

CHAPTER6

A ustin to acquiesce only in a b rief adjournm ent for the examination o f th e UNTCOK report. D uring later deliberations, the American delegation was to insist upon fu lfillm ent o f the November 14 resolu­ tion in those areas open to observation. W hen Menon presented the UNTCOK report, A m erican delegate P hilip C. Jessup urged the Interim C om m ittee to authorize elections for a separate southern K orean governm ent.68 M cnon’s response was noncommittal, al­ though he d id state th a t Korea w ould be ready for independence only after reunification. The Interim C om m ittee now declared a ten-day recess to consider b o th th e UNTCOK report and Jessup’s proposal.* W hile th e Interim C om m ittee studied M enon’s recommendations, th e adm inistration inaugurated a high-pow ered campaign to mobi­ lize support for th e A m erican position. In cables to Britain and India, M arshall em phasized th a t th e K oreans would n ot accept mere consul­ tatio n w ith th e U nited N ations because th e vast majority of the peo­ ple favored quick elections and im m ediate independence. While he adm itted th at conditions in th e Am erican zone were less than ideal, th e secretary o f state vigorously denied th a t the situation bordered on u tter chaos. M arshall’s tactics worked. O n February 23, London inform ed W ashington th at it would accept Jessup’s proposal, dis­ avowing any desire to hinder th e accom plishm ent o f American objec­ tives. India concurred as w ell, in large p art because the United States prom ised th a t elections would produce a governm ent for all Korea and n ot just the south. O nce a legislature em erged representing twothirds o f Korea, M arshall insisted in one cable to New Delhi, Moscow would have no choice b u t to recognize its legitimacy. Thus, the U nited States m anaged to convince two o f th e Interim Committee’s m ost influential m em bers th at separate elections would promote, rather than prevent, th e im plem entation o f th e November 14 resolu­ tion on K orea.70 O n February 24, Jessup form ally recom m ended th at the UNTCOK observe elections for representatives to a national assembly in those areas o f Korea accessible to th e tem porary commission. He confi­ dently predicted th at this measure would bring democracy to the m ajority o f th e Korean people and open th e way to Soviet-American m ilitary withdrawal. Two days later, th e Interim Comm ittee approved Jessup’s proposal w ithout am endm ent. Significantly, Canada and A ustralia voted against th e resolution, while eleven other nations abstained.71Jessup’s presentation greatly impressed advocates of the American proposal, b ut W ashington’s diplom atic maneuvers and the

A House D ivided recent coup in Czechoslovakia were th e key factors producing th e administration’s triu m p h .72 Now th e stage was set for th e creation o f a separate government as a p relude to A m erican m ilitary w ithdraw al. In Korea, Hodge eagerly approached th e tem porary com m ission asking for the early establishm ent o f a specific d ate for th e elections. After consultations betw een M enon an d th e U SA H K com m ander, the UNTCOK convened to consider th e m atter. D espite P atterson’s absence from this m eeting, th e tem porary com m ission inform ally approved Hodge’s recom m endation for elections on May 9 u n d er international supervision.79 O n th e anniversary o f th e M arch First Rebellion of 1919, H odge apprised th e southern K oreans o f th e UNTCOK’s decision.74 Patterson, on his retu rn from Ja p an , was irate. The Interim C om m ittee, he p ro tested , h ad n o t ordered b u t only “recommended” th a t th e U N TCO K supervise elections. His main concern was th a t K orean m oderates an d leftists w ould boycott the elections and thereby guarantee a sw eeping victory for th e extreme right. Far worse, th e tem porary com m ission had acted w ith­ out his consent. W hen his colleagues refused to issue a clarification o f the decision, Patterson w alked o u t in a h u ff.79 Menon im m ediately relented and agreed to reconsider th e w hole matter. W hen the UNTCOK reconvened on M arch 12, Jackson sug­ gested that the tem porary com m ission revoke its original decision in view of the probability o f an electoral boycott. Instead, th e UNTCOK should sponsor a national conference for th e holding o f nationw ide elections under international supervision an d th en w ithdraw from Korea. Jackson spoke vehem ently against any action th a t w ould bar northern participation in elections because th is w ould reinforce K o­ rea’s partition at the 38th parallel. French delegate Paul-Boncour dis­ agreed. He urged instead th e rapid im plem entation o f th e in itial decision to supervise separate elections. Syria’s representative th en offered a compromise: T he tem porary com m ission w ould observe elections in southern Korea alone on May 9, 1948, b u t only if an atmosphere conducive to freedom o f choice existed. In a crucial vote, the UNTCOK approved th e Syrian com prom ise, although C anada and Australia dissented. T hus, th e tem porary com m ission discarded the aim o f reunification before or th ro u g h a nationw ide election. This decision m eant th a t th e U n ited N ations w ould have a m oral obligation to defend th e governm ent em erging from separate elec­ tions in the south.76 Washington now becam e virtually obsessed w ith preventing any

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fu rth er delays. Several K orean religious groups, for example, request­ ed a one-day postponem ent o f th e elections (May 9 was a Sunday), b u t th e U nited States refused. W hen Langdon attributed this sugges­ tion to A m erican m issionaries, M arshall asked several churches in die U nited States to instruct th eir representatives to advocate holding elections on schedule.77 U ltim ately, th e adm inistration grudgingly agreed to postpone th e elections to May 10. Jacobs reported that a solar eclipse was expected on May 9 and Koreans would construe it as a bad om en. For N iles Bond o f th e Division o f Northeast Asian A ffairs, th e Soviet U nion had conspired to force the postponement. In a m arginal note on th e cable, he confessed his amazement at “the lengths to which th e Comm ies w ill go!” 7* His comment illustrates well th e m ood in W ashington early in 1948. Am erican occupation officials were preparing for separate elecdons even before th e UNTCOK agreed to supervise the balloting. For exam ple, th e AMG initiated a publicity cam paign chastising Korean leaders threatening to boycott th e elections.79 Hodge recognized that w ithout a large voter tu rn o u t, th e southern Korean government w ould not enjoy enthusiastic international approval. He was deter­ m ined, therefore, to m axim ize th e participation o f the Korean peo­ ple in the election, im plem enting an extraordinary program to edu­ cate the southern populace on th e dem ocratic process. The AMG used radio broadcasts, classroom sessions, pam phlets, handbills, loudspeakers, and train exhibits to inform th e people “ better than they have ever been inform ed o f anything in their history.”80 Hie cam paign was a huge success. O n A pril 14, th e AMG could report th at m ore than ninety percent o f all eligible voters or approximately eight m illion people had registered. For Hodge, these statistics proved th at despite Com m unist threats o f violence, there existed a strong desire am ong th e people for elections. O ne AMG official was far m ore candid when he observed th a t w ithout th e American propoganda drive, force would have been necessary to register voters.01 Moscow hardly looked w ith favor on events in southern Korea. To offset W ashington’s successes, th e Soviet U nion attem pted to force the U nited States to recognize th e legitim acy o f the northern regime. O n March 17, Russian occupation com m ander Korotkov informed Hodge th at he no longer would act as m ediator between the United States and the northern Koreans. He forwarded a letter from Kim II Sung as well, indicating th at the northern Korean government in­ tended to halt the flow o f electricity to th e American zone on April

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15 because the U nited States h ad n o t p aid its b ills.82 O ne week later, Hodge confronted a m ore im m ediate crisis w hen th e n o rth ern D em o­ cratic Coalition Front proposed a "N o rth -S o u th C onference" to arrange nationwide elections an d o b tain w ithdraw al o f all foreign troops. This conference w ould convene in Pyongyang on A pril 14, and the northerners invited a group o f th irteen southern K orean leaders to attend, including K im Kyu-sik an d K im K u. K im Kyu-sik responded favorably and asked H odge to provide credentials and transportation. N ot surprisingly, th e USAFIK com m ander refused either to help or to h in d er southern K oreans choosing to p articipate in the conference.8* Jackson and Patterson encouraged K im K yu-sik and K im K u to attend the N orth-South C onference an d even prom ised to postpone separate elections in th e event o f success. Prior to d ep artu re, K im Kyu-sik requested th a t th e n o rth ern K oreans accept certain condi­ tions, including pledges th a t th e conference w ould n o t advocate a dictatorship, nationalization o f all industries, foreign m ilitary bases, or less than free elections. W hen th e n o rth ern K oreans consented, Kim Kyu-sik and Kim K u traveled to Pyongyang, arriving in th e northern capital on A pril 21.84 A fter a week o f discussions, however, it was clear th at the conference was indeed a sham . T he constitution and governmental structure it o u tlin ed paralleled closely th e Soviet system. Delegates also issued a proclam ation blam ing th e U nited States entirely for the p artitio n a t th e 38th parallel and calling on all true Korean nationalists to dem and th e im m ediate w ithdraw al o f American forces and th e UN TCO K. A lthough K im Kyu-sik was dis­ appointed with the results, he retu rn ed to Seoul w ith a prom ise from Kim II Sung th at th e northern governm ent w ould accept truly free elections and not cut o ff electric power. In retu rn , K im Kyu-sik agreed to boycott elections in th e so u th .8* Immediately follow ing th e N orth-S outh C onference, C om m unist leaders in southern K orea intensified th eir program o f violence and subversion. They utilized threats o f rioting and assassination to con­ vince the UNTCOK it should n o t supervise th e elections. I f this strat­ egy failed, the chaos a t least w ould discourage voter tu rn o u t. The local police retaliated w ith accelerated antileftist repression, while Hodge placed the constabulary arm y on perm anent alert. T he SKIG also organized a series o f "C om m unity Protective Associations" to assist in the m aintenance o f local law and order. These bodies soon degenerated into unruly youth gangs arm ed w ith clubs and axes

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roam ing th e countryside terrorizing anyone suspected of being a C om m unist.86 D uring th e first fo u r m onths o f 1948, police and polit­ ical extrem ists killed m ore than 250 people. There were another 200 victim s o f indiscrim inate violence in A pril including eight election officials and two candidates .87 D om estic instability peaked during th e week just prior to the May 10 election, w hen m ore than 300 people died, o f whom only 32 wete policem en. The local police could influence and intimidate voters in m ore subtle ways. The AMG, for exam ple, required the southern Koreans to register for th e election at die same place where they obtained food ration cards, a situation tailor-m ade for blackmail. At th e same tim e, threats, beatings, robbery, and imprisonment were th e order o f the day. O ccupation officials naturally were troubled about th e K orean extrem ists exerting excessive and improper political pressure on th e average citizen. B ut th e AMG was either unable or unw illing to restrict in any way th e activities o f the police and the youth groups .88 To argue th a t an atm osphere conducive to freedom of choice existed in southern Korea during early 1948 would have been ridiculous. Predictably, th e extrem e conservatives dom inated the list of candi­ dates for th e May 10 elections. The subsequent legislature therefore would n o t reflect a representative cross section o f southern Korean political opinion. O f th e nearly one thousand candidates, the AMG estim ated th a t m ore than three-fourths were allied closely either with Rhee or w ith Kim Söng-su .89 Twelve candidates, including Rhee, ran w ithout opposition. In a b latan t dem onstration o f Rhee’s inordinate influence over th e electoral process, th e N ational Election Committee rejected th e application for candidacy o f D aniel Choi, who wanted to run against Rhee .90 D espite obvious unfairness and tampering, the UNTCOK nevertheless agreed to a com prom ise th at permitted inter­ national supervision o f th e elections. O n A pril 28, five membets voted th at a “ reasonable degree o f free expression” existed in south­ ern Korea. The representatives from A ustralia, Canada, and Syria chose n ot to participate in this sham eful charade and abstained.91 Once it had decided to supervise elections in southern Korea, the UNTCOK confronted an im possible task. Before and during the bal­ loting, observation team s had scarely enough tim e to make even cur­ sory investigations. As Leon G ordenker explains, members of the UNTCOK “could hardly do m ore than show themselves and hope to attract com plaints and significant inform ation .” 92 W hen the southern

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Korean people cast votes on May 10, th e elections produced th e resounding victory for th e extrem e rig h t th a t everyone expected. David E. Mark, the Am erican vice-consul in Seoul, reported th a t vot­ ing occurred in a calm, q u iet, an d orderly atm osphere. M ore th an ninety percent o f all registered voters cast ballots an d , in a n um ber o f areas, all voting was com pleted w ithin th e first four hours th e polling places were open. O ne editorial in th e N ew York Tim es praised th e outcome, commenting th at th e results surpassed th e records o f longestablished democracies in th e realm o f voter participation. T he elec­ tions, it concluded, were indicative o f K orea’s readiness for in d ep en ­ dence and self-governm ent.93 Jacobs, in his private com m unications, was far m ore reserved in his assessment. He noted th a t th e organization an d efficiency o f th e elec­ tions were unprecedented and therefore “ should give rise to a certain degree of caution . . . in our appraisal o f th a t efficiency.” Certainly, the number o f ballots cast in an election provided a poor yardstick for measuring the health o f a dem ocratic political system . A fter all, th e United States constandy p o in ted to such h ig h voter tu rn o u t in th e Soviet Union as proof o f th e undem ocratic n atu re o f its elections. By any reasonable standard, th e southern K orean elections o f May 1948 failed to produce results th a t accurately reflected th e p o p u lar w ill. Koreans cast ballots in m any cases for independence, rath er th an for any particular candidate. Moreover, th e average citizen, after being ignored for so long, now enthusiasdcally w elcom ed com m unication and contact w ith political leaders, experiencing an enjoyable new “sense of participation.” Finally, th e police force an d th e youth groups either persuaded or com pelled wavering Koreans to vote. O n election day alone, political violence resulted in forty-five deaths.94 For many observers in th e U n ited States, th e southern K orean elec­ tions were extremely discouraging. O ne w riter com m ented disparag­ ingly that police terrorism an d a leftist boycott constituted “ a perverted application o f dem ocratic principles o f free elections.” 93 Nevertheless, Marshall was elated w ith th e outcom e and im m ediately congratulated the southern K orean people. According to th e secre­ tary of state, “the fact th a t som e 90 percent o f the registered voters cast their ballots, despite th e lawless efforts o f a C om m unist-dom ina­ ted minority to prevent or sabotage th e election, is a clear revelation that the Korean people are determ ined to form th eir own govern­ ment by democratic m eans.”94 More im p o rtan t, the southern K orean elections perm itted W ashington to proceed w ith its schedule for m ili-

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tary disengagem ent. Less th a n tw o weeks after the election, theJCS ordered M acA rthur to im p lem en t th e preparatory phase of the with­ draw al operation— code-nam ed “ C rabapple.” American dependents prom ptly began to leave K orea, w hile H odge transferred surplus mil­ itary eq u ip m en t to th e constabulary army.97 For Trum an, th e so u th ern K orean elections surely represented a m ajor foreign policy success, particularly after m ore than two years of fru stratio n an d failure. N o t only h ad d ie U nited Nadons hilly sup­ p o rted A m erican aim s, b u t th e new southern Korean government now could expect to receive intern atio n al diplom adc approval and encouragem ent as w ell. T he adm inistration undoubtedly would have sponsored separate elections in any case, b u t international supervi­ sion provided th e U nited States w ith a crucial propaganda victory Moscow’s refusal to cooperate w ith th e U nited N ations had damaged Soviet prestige in th e w orld com m unity, w hile W ashington had dem­ onstrated its devotion to th e principles o f democracy and national self-determ ination. B ut th e U nited N ations also had helped to create a situation fraught w ith danger. " In b oth north and south Korea,” one A m erican official observed later, "th e drive for national unifica­ tio n was to be a prim ary political force: neither area could be expected to be satisfied w ith th e status quo.’’9* Rather than resolving th e K orean problem , in ternational involvem ent resulted in the for­ m al em ergence o f K orea as a house divided and inviting an attempt at forcible reunification.

C H A PTER 7

The D ilem m a o f W ithdraw al

Scholars long have accepted th e easy in terp retatio n th a t th e H um an administration was unw illing to ad o p t a firm stand against Soviet expansionist am bitions in K orea. Far worse, w ith th e benefit o f h in d ­ sight, writers have charged th a t H u m an and his advisors created an anti-Communist governm ent south o f th e 38th parallel an d th en filled to provide sufficient m oral an d m aterial support to ensure its survival.1 Such an appraisal does n o t provide an accurate picture o f the extent of W ashington’s com m itm ents in K orea after May 1948. Rather than staging a quick w ithdraw al after th e form ation o f th e new South Korean governm ent, for «cam ple, th e adm inistration postponed disengagem ent for m ore th an a year, defying th e advice o f American m ilitary experts. Sim ply statqdT'H u m an d jd n o t in te n d to shirk American responsibilities in K orea. H is strategy envisioned instead the emergence o f an econom ically strong an d politically sta­ ble South Korea th at w ould p erm it th e U n ited States to w ithdraw safely and w ithout surrendering th e en tire peninsula to Soviet dom i­ nation.2 Once the U nited N ations intervened in th e Soviet-A m erican dis­ pute over Korea, th e adm inistration began to devote serious atten ­ tion to developing a schedule for m ilitary w ithdraw al. From th e o u t­ set, State D epartm ent officials w orried th a t if th e U nited States ignoted its com m itm ents in K orea, th e U nited N ations w ould n o t continue to play an active role in K orean affairs. Early in January 1948, the State-A rm y-N avy-A ir Force C oordinating C om m ittee (SANACC) received a report from its subcom m ittee on th e Far East discussing the issue o f w ithdraw al. T he paper stressed th a t th e U nited States could not disengage m ilitarily before th e K orean elections because this step w ould constitute a sign o f bad faith w hile jeopardiz­ ing local law and order. T he subcom m ittee therefore recom m ended the development o f a program for th e creation o f a strong constabu-

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lary arm y an d th e im p lem en tatio n o f a m ultiyear plan for economic developm ent p rio r to d ep artu re. S till, th e report acknowledged that m anpow er shortages dem anded early withdraw al from Korea. After reading th is paper, sta ff m em bers o f th e newly created National Secu­ rity C ouncil (N SC) decided to in stru ct th e SANACC to “prepare, asa m atter o f priority, a rep o rt o n K orea for Council consideration'’ and subm ission to th e p resid en t . 9 Sim ultaneously, A m erican m ilitary planners completed a tentative tim etab le fo r w ithdraw al, providing fo r a series o f troop reductions over a period o f th ree m onths. This Arm y D epartm ent study specu­ lated th a t K orean elections w ould occur no later than March 31, 1948. If th e N ational Assem bly convened by May 15, the report con­ tin u ed , K orea w ould have a provisional governm ent no later than A ugust 15. In accordance w ith th e U nited N ations resolution, the U nited States w ould com plete m ilitary withdrawal from the penin­ sula ninety days later on N ovem ber 15, 1948. In the interim, the adm inistration w ould present a financial aid request to Congress for occupied areas, a proposal w hich w ould include funds for Korea. Such lim ited assistance, th e Army D epartm ent hoped, would place K orea on th e road to econom ic self-sufficiency .4 Beginning in January 1948, Arm y D epartm ent officials pressed the State D epartm ent to finish a detailed financial assistance program for K orea. If Congress d id n o t receive th e aid request by March 1, they cautioned, m ilitary w ithdraw al could n o t proceed on schedule.’ Tru­ m an’s diplom atic advisors were suspicious o f th e Army Department’s apparent desire to disengage from K orea regardless of conditions at th e tim e o f departure. W. W alton B utterw orth, office chief for Far Eastern A ffairs, observed th a t th e U nited States had a moral commit­ m ent to Korea and had to avoid th e slightest h in t o f attempting to "scuttle and run.” A lthough it was w illing to support withdrawal by N ovem ber 15, th e State D epartm ent was convinced that flexibility was essential. South K orea’s survival was doubtful if it did not have an adequate security force prior to Am erican departure. Secretary M arshall privately confessed his misgivings about whether the Army D epartm ent would perm it enough tim e to train a constabulary army sufficiently pow erful and disciplined to prevent a N orth Korean inva­ sion .4 D uring a cabinet m eeting on March 1 2 , he advised that there was surplus m ilitary equipm ent available in South Korea and the USAHK should use it to train m ore Koreans for service in the con­ stabulary army.7

The Dilemma o f W ithdraw al

*53

Undersecretary o f th e A rm y W illiam H . D rap er was u tterly dis­ satisfied with the State D ep artm en t’s a ttitu d e . M arshall a n d his col­ leagues, he com plained, seem ed to consider th e ad o p tio n o f a firm date for withdrawal as synonym ous w ith appeasem ent. D u rin g his testimony before the H ouse C om m ittee o n Foreign A ffairs, D raper stated bluntly th at th e U n ited States could n o t occupy S outh K orea forever. Sooner or later, th e K oreans w ould have to resolve th eir own problems.8 D raper’s consternation was u n d erstan d ab le. In February 1948, the JCS concluded th a t th e U n ited States could n o t block a Soviet thrust into Europe w ithout congressional approval fo r a $9 bil­ lion supplement to th e defense b u d g et. Trum an refused to approve the request. The U nited States could n o t co unter Soviet expansion everywhere, he explained, an d still m ain tain its dom estic financial and economic strength.9 Restrictions on defense m ean t th a t w ith­ drawal horn areas not vital to A m erican n ational security was inevit­ able. Accordingly, th e JCS reported on February 21 th a t since th e troops “now deployed in K orea are sorely needed elsewhere . . . , it would be highly desirable to w ithdraw o u r forces . . . a n d to u tilize them for essential and pressing needs.” T him an therefore decided to authorize the JCS to begin preparations for disengagem ent from Korea before the end o f 1948.10 On March 25,1948, Thim an received th e final SANACC rep o rt on American policy in Korea. T he proposal, N SC -8, o u tlin ed steps for the creation of a separate and in d ep en d en t South K orea. It n oted that the American zone suffered from econom ic weakness and th e threat of military invasion from a Soviet-sponsored regim e in th e north. To abandon South K orea to C om m unist dom ination w ould improve the Soviet political an d strategic position w ith respect to China and Japan. As a result, NSC-8 recom m ended th a t th e U nited States provide $185 m illion in econom ic aid to South K orea for fiscal 1949 and create “ so far as practicable” a sm all constabulary arm y capable o f self-defense “ against any b u t an overt act o f aggression by north Korea or o th er forces.” T he p ap er projected A m erican m ilitary withdrawal no later th an D ecem ber 31, 1948. NSC-8 ended w ith a warning that the U nited States should “ n o t becom e so irrevocably involved in the K orean situation th a t any action taken by any faction in Korea or by any o th er pow er in Korea could be considered a casus W fo rth e U .S .” » After discussions a t th e NSC m eeting o f A pril 2, Thim an approved NSC-8. His decision reflected a desire to pursue a m iddle road in

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responding to th e Soviet challenge in Korea. The United States could n o t cut and run because this act would constitute a betrayal of its com m itm ents. W ashington’s allies and enemies alike would con­ dem n th e adm inistration for exploiting the U nited Nations as a cover for the abandonm ent o f Korea. N or was Truman willing to guarantee South K orea’s political independence and territorial integrity against open m ilitary aggression. The Soviet m ilitary advantage on die Asian m ainland would m ake such an operation foolhardy at best. Instead, th e Thim an adm inistration w ould attem pt to foster indigenous eco­ nom ic strength, political stability, and m ilitary power so that South K orea could protect itself. Trum an was operating on the central assum ption th a t th e Soviet U nion w ould not perm it North Korea to attem p t m ilitary conquest o f th e peninsula. As Leahy remarked at the tim e, ’’th e U .S.S.R . does n o t in ten d to accomplish its political pur­ poses by th e use o f arm ed force b u t will continue its efforts by infiltratio n and underground activities .’’12 T hat sam e m o n th , Royall and D raper traveled to South Korea in th e com pany o f four A m erican econom ic experts to gather the neces­ sary inform ation for a specific assistance program . A fter three days of discussions w ith p rom inent local businessm en and political leaders, Trum an’s advisors concluded th a t th e Koreans were eager to assume control over th eir ow n affairs. In its report, th e Army Committee offered this assessm ent: For a tim e after withdrawal. . . the new independent Korean Govern­ m ent will require continuing American aid, advice, food and taw m aterials in order to m aintain at least the present ration level and to achieve necessary rehabilitation and governmental effectiveness. This assistance we feel should be provided for an interim period, with steps taken to assure th at it is properly utilized. The Committee believes that firm support by the U nited States and the U nited Nations to the new Korean Governm ent will inestim ably help to develop participation in future Far Eastern trade on a basis valuable to the Korean people and to their neighbors. Financial assistance alone, th e com m ittee reasoned, would provide K orea w ith sufficient m eans to train technicians and exploit its own resources. Eventually, South K orea w ould obtain th e capacity for selfsufficient economic grow th.13 State D epartm ent officials were enthusiastic about the Army Com*

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mittee’s recom mendations. The Trum an adm inistration therefore decided to continue financial aid through fiscal 1949- If th e new South Korean governm ent “shows m ore vitality th an they expect it will,” American planners th en w ould consider im plem entation o f a major recovery program during fiscal 1950.14 M eanwhile, th e Army Department had authorized th e expansion o f South Korea’s security force to fifty thousand troops, th e form ation o f an Am erican advisory team, and the transfer o f all necessary m ilitary equipm ent before withdrawal. Truman’s m ilitary advisors visualized th e creation o f a well-equipped constabulary arm y having enough strength “ to im ­ pose martial law, to com bat m ilitary or guerrilla forces . . . , or to repel minor invasions from the north.’’ D espite reservations about the prospects for economic recovery, th e adm inistration had no intention of leaving South Korea “ defenseless’’ at th e tim e o f Am erican w ith­ drawal.15 W ith American aid and advice, the Koreans ultim ately would achieve the political and econom ic stability requisite for selfdefense, thereby frustrating th e Soviet strategy o f expansion. But when South Korea’s newly elected legislature assum ed power in the spring o f 1948, it confronted a host o f vexing problem s. Am er­ ican occupation policy had brought severe lim itations on civil liber­ ties, for instance, am ong them press censorship, arbitrary arrest, and restrictions on freedom o f speech. A t th e same tim e, thuggery and political violence precluded th e m aintenance o f genuine law and order. Even worse, South Korea’s economy was on the verge o f col­ lapse. By early 1948, industrial productivity was still eighty percent below wartime levels. Furtherm ore, South Korea suffered from food shortages, ram pant inflation, high unem ploym ent, profiteering, and a thriving black m arket. Lacking trained technicians, raw m aterials, power resources, and replacem ent parts, th e prospects for future eco­ nomic growth were bleak.16 O n th e eve o f elections in South Korea, Hodge had m ade an attem p t to rem edy the unsuccessful policies o f the past. The AMG announced new land reform measures th at per­ mitted individuals to purchase farm s w ith gradual paym ents over a fifteen-year period. B ut the situation required m ore drastic action if the Republic o f Korea (ROK) was to become a genuine “ bulwark o f democracy.’’ The steady exodus o f people fleeing from th e north to the American zone after 1946 com pounded South Korea’s difficul­ ties.” Not surprisingly, th e N orth Korean governm ent sought to exploit and accelerate the economic deterioration in the south. O n May 14,

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N orth K orea sh u t o ff electric pow er across th e 38th parallel. Hodge protested, appealing to th e Soviet occupation commander to restore pow er and participate in new negotiations to resolve the dispute per­ m anently. The Soviets replied th a t H odge would have to deal directly w ith th e N orth K orean governm ent.18 W hen the Soviet occupation com m ander announced th a t he would n o t act even as a mediator, M arshall decided to approach Moscow. In a letter to Molotov, the sec­ retary o f state requested a reversal o f th e decision, explaining that the loss o f electricity had produced great hardship for the South Korean people. Soviet official A ndrei Vyshinsky’s curt response blamed die U nited States for th e pow er sh u to ff because it had not fulfilled its financial obligations. Even so, he said, th e N orth Koreans were will­ ing to negotiate a settlem ent; only W ashington’s refusal to recognize th e legitim acy o f th e People’s C om m ittee prevented the resumpdon o f electric pow er.19 D uring July, H odge m ade one final stab at resolv­ ing th e dispute, b u t he insisted upon Soviet participation. When the Soviet occupation com m ander again refused to m ediate, die adminis­ tration abandoned furth er discussion o f th e m atter.20 Rhec and th e extrem e right may very well have welcomed the power shutoff. Now th e average South Korean citizen would find it difficult to tru st either Moscow or th e governm ent o f North Korea. Perhaps m ore im portant, Kim Kyu-sik and Kim Ku had accepted as sincere Kim II Sung’s prom ise to m aintain electric power, and the decision to term inate it destroyed th e credibility o f Rhee’s two main adversaries.21 Even before th e pow er shutoff, however, it was obvious th a t th e new South Korean governm ent would be decidedly antiSoviet. Ju st prior to th e elections, th e SKIG had issued a statement denouncing Soviet obstructionism and dom ination over the north. The m ost vocal sponsors o f this resolution subsequently gained elec­ tion to th e new legislature .22 T hen, on May 29, the legislative assem­ bly m et secretly and overwhelm ingly elected Rhee as chairman of the body. Two days later, th e new legislature formally convened in its opening session. H odge delivered an address appealing to the North Koreans to hold dem ocratic elections and join th e south. He suggest­ ed th a t th e legislature leave one hundred seats vacant for the north­ ern representatives, while establishing a liaison w ith the UNTCOK.M H odge’s speech reflected W ashington’s desire to m aintain interna­ tional involvem ent in the Korean affair. Indeed, in a letter to Army Undersecretary D raper, Lovett registered th e State Department’s opposition to a restrictive role for th e UNTCOK. The United Sates

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instead should encourage th e tem porary com m ission to fulfill its con­ sultative function as a positive elem ent in Am erican w ithdraw al oper­ ations.24 MacArthur evidently opposed a cooperative approach, since he prevented the UNTCOK from entering Jap an for th e purpose o f drawing up its report on th e Korean elections. W hen M arshall objected to this decision, M acArthur relented, b u t th e UNTCOK already had chosen to travel to Shanghai instead. O n Ju n e 7, the tem ­ porary commission returned to Seoul and three days later voted to make itself available for consultation w ith th e new governm ent o f South Korea.29 Yet chronic disunity w ithin th e UNTCOK still preduded the adoption o f a firm position on th e m ost controversial issues. Since vigorous action w ould reveal its deep divisions, the tem ­ porary commission had no choice b u t to perform an essentially pas­ sive role. A consensus did exist, however, th at th e new South Korean government was not national in character. Ignoring protests from the legislative assembly, the UNTCOK recognized its authority as legiti­ mate in South Korea alone. O n th e other h and, the tem porary com­ mission voted to attend the next session o f th e legislative assembly and pledged its support for th e new South Korean regim e.26 On June 25, the UNTCOK approved a prelim inary report on the recent elections in the Am erican zone. A m ajority o f the tem porary commission’s m em bers agreed th at high voter tu rn o u t and an atm o­ sphere o f freedom proved th e elections were “ a valid expression o f the free will o f the electorate in those parts o f Korea which were acces­ sible to the Commission . . . which . . . constituted approxim ately two-thirds o f the people in Korea.” 27 Canada, A ustralia, and Syria sharply disagreed w ith this statem ent, and A ustralian delegate Jackson even walked out o f the m eeting in protest. D espite such discord, Salvadoran delegate M iguel Valle addressed the new Korean legisla­ ture on June 30. He announced th a t th e tem porary commission con­ sidered the South Korean governm ent to be legitim ate and was pre­ pared to open consultations. In reply, Rhce thanked th e UNTCOK for its approval and support. If the tem porary commission now could supervise elections in the north, he declared, th e elected representa­ tives then could occupy th eir seats in the ‘‘N ational Assembly.” 26 After receiving international sanction, the new legislature turned its attention to form ulating a governm ental structure. O n July 12, the South Korean leaders com pleted work on the constitution. Super­ ficially, the ROK was a traditional democracy based on the popular election o f representatives to a unicam eral legislature for a two-year

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term . T he legislative assem bly elected a president to serve for four years, w ho in tu rn app o in ted a prim e m inister and cabinet members subject to th e approval o f th e legislature. Several peculiarities in the schem e contradicted dem ocratic traditions, however. The assembly could n o t alter th e provisions o f presidential budget proposals, for exam ple; it only could approve or reject. T he president also possessed great pow ers over th e form ulation and im plem entation of policies th a t d id n o t require legislative coordination. A fter declaring a state of national emergency, th e chief executive could rule by decree, appro­ priatin g m oney an d passing laws w ithout th e consent o f the assembly. Yet th e president could n o t dissolve th e legislature if it opposed his policies. In th e likely event o f a disagreem ent, therefore, prolonged deadlock and eventual executive dictatorship were almost inevit­ a b le .» N evertheless, K orea's progress tow ard democracy was a matter of great satisfaction to Trum an and his advisors. As the administration prepared for th e form al transfer o f political power to the new South K orean governm ent, it also decided on a m ajor change in American personnel. O n A pril 27, M arshall had recom m ended that Truman app o in t Jo h n J . Muccio o f Rhode Island as th e first ambassador to the ROK. A career foreign service officer, Muccio had obtained his experi­ ence in Latin A m erica, A sia, and finally in Berlin. Muccio speculated later th a t Trum an chose him because o f his fam iliarity with the prob­ lem s o f m ilitary occupation in a divided nation—Germany.30 Shortly thereafter, A m erican m ilitary leaders decided to replace Hodge as soon as possible. Obviously, th e USAFIK com m ander's ability to cooperate w ith Rhee w ould be essential for successful withdrawal. H odge’s continued presence in South Korea would only encourage tension and disagreem ent. T hus, th e JCS selected Major General Jo h n B. C oulter (H odge’s executive officer) because he had avoided involvem ent in internal political affairs. Y et W ashington did not w ant to give th e im pression th a t it was reacting to pressure from Rhee. The JCS therefore instructed M acA rthur to delay announcing th e change o f com m and u n til th e eve o f H odge’s departure from South K orea .31 Army D epartm ent officials now were determ ined to withdraw from K orea on schedule, regardless o f conditions in the ROK at the tim e o f departure. Early in Ju n e, Secretary Royall authorized the shipm ent o f a six-m onth supply o f am m unition, assorted military equipm ent, and replacem ent parts. H e th en proposed to Marshall

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that logistical and adm inistrative preparations for tactical withdrawal begin on July 1, 1948. Since H odge w ould be ready to transfer the direct administration o f Am erican responsibilities in South Korea to the State Departm ent on Septem ber 2, Royall w anted th e secretary o f state to organize a diplom atic m ission capable o f effective operation at the earliest possible date. By th e end o f July, th e Army D epart­ ment had evacuated th e last m ilitary dependents from South Ko­ rea.32 But the State D epartm ent was n o t prepared to move w ith such haste. On July 8, Lovett rem inded Royall th a t NSC-8 called for a flexible policy on w ithdraw al and coordination w ith th e U nited Nations. W hile disengagem ent could begin as scheduled on A ugust 15, the State D epartm ent insisted th a t th e Army D epartm ent had to be ready to suspend, adjust, or delay th e w ithdraw al operation on a moment’s notice.33 Reports from Seoul seem ed to justify th e State D ep artm en t’s cau­ tion. Hodge m oaned th a t South K orea’s new legislators were less con­ cerned with the general welfare o f th e n atio n th an w ith obtaining “personal and individual power, by fair m eans or foul.” For Jacobs, political com petition in th e legislature, coupled w ith th e U N TCO K ’s qualified endorsem ent for th e ROK, dem anded a delay o f A m erican disengagement. Moreover, th e legislative assem bly w ould n o t finish the formation o f a governm ent u n til Ju ly 30, b u t th e w ithdraw al schedule required com pletion o f th is process th irty days earlier. T hus, Jacobs urged Marshall to bring this fact strongly to a tte n tio n D e p a rtm e n t o f A rm y so th a t its operational plans based o n th a t d a te w ill b e delay ed accordingly [u n til September 15] an d th u s p rev en t th is p h ase o f o u r p la n n in g a n d o p era­ tions from g ettin g o u r [rie] o f lin e w ith p o litical phases. By all m eans no action to im p lem en t W illiam D ay [w ithdraw al day] sh o u ld be tak en as resulting pu b licity w ill co m p licate if n o t jeo p ard ize o u r h o p e th a t UNTCOK w ill give fo rm al ap p ro v al to new g o vernm ent.

Marshall acted swiftly on th is recom m endation an d began to press th e UNTCOK m em bers’ hom e governm ents to extend some form o f rec­ ognition to the ROK. I f th e in tern atio n al organization d id n o t acknowledge the national character o f th e Rhee governm ent, Mar­ shall reasoned, th e Soviets w ould create a separate regim e in th e north and m ake K orea’s p artitio n p erm an en t.34 In Moscow, Am bassador Sm ith pragm atically observed th a t th e

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U nited N ations could n o t prevent th e creation o f a puppet govern­ m ent north o f th e 38th parallel. Following American withdrawal, he speculated, Com m unist N orth K orea w ould “ enforce its claim of un ited governm ent for all K orea, preferred m ethod to be usual infiltration and carrying o ff political coup when time [is] ripe.”” Indeed, on Ju ly 1 0 , K im II Sung announced th at work on a constitu­ tio n was near com pletion. This docum ent provided for a national governm ent w ith its capital at Seoul. H e explained that the People’s C om m ittee w ould sponsor elections throughout Korea on August 25, w hile displaying a new national flag sporting a ham mer and sickle. K im II Sung also rebuked th e U nited S û tes for creating a police state in th e south and dem anded im m ediate American military with­ draw al.36 lb counter N orth K orea’s claim to legitimacy, the administration decided to perm it th e South K orean governm ent to send representa­ tives to th e U nited N ations .37 This decision involved major risks, since Syngman Rhee was em erging as an even greater source of em barrassm ent for th e U nited S û tes. Early in A pril, Hodge advised W ashington to retain a tig h t grip over all aid to South Korea. “ Already Rhee is passing word around,’’ he reported, “that economic aid from U nited S û tes ’is in th e bag,’ m eaning his bag, and that no US official will be able to tell Koreans how they shall use it.” Hodge later alerted th e adm inisturion th a t it could expect “ all sorts of she­ nanigans” from Rhee after he had brought “ in his gang of carpetbag­ gers .” 38 Since Rhee’s election as th e first president o f the ROK was certain, many American officials despaired th a t he would exploit his position o f power to establish a personal dicutorship. Perhaps worse, Jacobs predicted th a t Rhee’s “ loose bom bastic utterances” against th e Soviet U nion and com m unism eventually would have a disastrous im pact on American policy at th e U nited N ations .39 U nfortunately for th e adm inistration, there was nothing the Unit­ ed S û tes now could do to deny Rhee a position o f predominance in th e South Korean governm ent. O n July 17, th e legislative assembly prom ulgated th e constitution and three days later it elected Rhee as th e ROK’s first president, thereby satisfying his lifelong ambition.40 Subsequent scholars, as John Lewis G addis has pointed out, have debated w hether Syngman Rhee’s rise to preem inence in postwar Korean political affairs was th e product o f “ inadvertence or de­ sign .” 41 For some, Trum an’s policy in Korea from its inception was inconsistent, inept, and irresolute. W ashington thereby became in-

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crcasingly com m itted, unintentionally, to a group o f individuals w ed­ ded to a philosophy at variance w ith A m erican ideals.42 W riters a t th e other extreme dismiss A m erican professions o f su p p o rt for dem ocracy in Korea as insincere. They contend th a t from th e very beginning, Truman favored and actively encouraged th e political triu m p h o f Syngman Rhee. For th e U nited States, R hee’s obvious dictatorial pro­ clivities were less worrisome th an his w illingness to cooperate for th e achievement o f Am erican political, econom ic, an d strategic objec­ tives in the postwar w orld.49 Both interpretations overestim ate th e pow er o f th e U nited States to determine events in Korea after W orld W ar II. In reality, R hee’s vic­ tory was the outgrow th o f forces largely beyond Ih im a n ’s control. For example, the Soviet U nion was thoroughly unw illing to p erm it con­ servative political leaders in K orea to participate in th e process o f reconstruction. Moscow’s ap p aren t d eterm in atio n to im pose an u n ­ democratic Com m unist system on K orea caused A m erican officials to look upon the extrem e rig h t as th e lesser o f two evils. Beyond th a t, Rhee had earned his victory. D uring W orld W ar II an d after, Syngm an Rhee consistently dem onstrated th a t h e was politically astute and opportunistic, even ruthless, in his p u rsu it o f power. A dm inistration officials, at least in W ashington, honestly attem p ted to prevent a political trium ph for Rhee du rin g th e first tw o years o f th e occupa­ tion. In the end, Trum an deserted his goal o f democracy in K orea only after the Soviet U nion an d Rhee h ad rem oved any chance for th e early achievement o f this objective. T he final outcom e hardly corre­ sponded with the original desires an d expectations o f m ost Am erican leadets. Having attained political dom inance, Rhee had no in ten tio n o f permitting anyone to challenge his authority. H e appointed only his dosest political associates an d tru sted functionaries to governm ent office.44 Despite criticism from rival politicians, on A ugust 4 th e leg­ islature approved R hee’s cabinet selections, including Yi Pöm -sök, leader of the N ational Y m th M ovem ent, th e com prom ise candidate for prime m inister. Two days later, Rhee inform ed H odge th a t th e newly formed governm ent was prepared to assum e fu ll adm inistrative authority in South Korea. W hile stating his desire to continue “felici­ tous” relations w ith the U nited N ations, th e new president also urged W ashington to delay w ithdraw al. T he U nited States could not leave, he insisted, u n til th e ROK h ad achieved the m ilitary capability requisite for self-defense.45

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H odge and Jacobs agreed w ith R hee’s assessment. In separate cables, they inform ed W ashington th a t th e announcement of immi­ n en t w ithdraw al w ould destroy m orale in South Korea and with it ail previous progress tow ard th e creation o f a strong government. The C om m unist party unquestionably w ould renew its strategy of subver­ sion and attem p t to seize political pow er after American disengage­ m ent. H odge advanced th e opinion th a t “we should stand firm everywhere on Soviet perim eter, including Korea, until we know m ore clearly w hat actions w ill be taken in General Assembly and w hat w ill be outcom e o f our present negotiations with respect t o . . . Germany.“ W ashington’s top representatives in Seoul concurred that w hile th e U nited States should start to transfer authority to the ROK, a delay o f com plete m ilitary w ithdraw al was im perative .46 Such advice confirm ed th e growing conviction o f officials in the State D epartm ent th a t it was necessary to postpone disengagement. N ot surprisingly, th e Army D epartm ent m anifested greater confi­ dence th an Trum an's diplom atic advisors in South Korea’s ability to defend itself. D uring th e orientation o f Muccio as the new American am bassador to th e ROK, m ilitary officials avowed that containment in K orea did n o t require th e presence o f com bat forces horn the U nited States. Stalin w ould n o t order an invasion across the 38th par­ allel, they claim ed, because his strategy relied instead on indirect aggression. Furtherm ore, Syngman Rhee "was, as a result of the Army’s substantial effort in training and equipping the South Kore­ an forces, in a strong bargaining position to talk with the North Koreans on unification.” Positive American action therefore had placed th e Soviet U nion on th e defensive and provided sound reasons for optim ism . In response, Muccio agreed to advocate a wider role for th e S a te D epartm ent in supervising K orea’s economic recovery.47 Muccio then attem pted to justify th e dilatory attitude of the State D epartm ent. Trum an’s diplom atic advisors were hesitant to assume full responsibility for South K orea’s economic rehabilitation “owing to a feeling th at Congress d id n o t w ant State to handle programs of this nature.” D raper brushed aside this explanation. Marshall and his colleagues, he argued, were trying to shirk their responsibilities. If th e State D epartm ent's indifference persisted, D raper suggested that th e Army D epartm ent m ight order th e removal o f all military equip­ m ent from Korea intended for transfer to th e constabulary army. Since th e State D epartm ent did n o t consider South Korea sufficiently im portant to generate interest in its survival, it would be foolish to

leave a substantial m ilitary investm ent in an area destined for Soviet domination.48 To end this interdepartm ental dispute, Trum an intervened. O n August 16, the president ordered th e departm ents involved to decide which agency was best able to m anage the K orean rehabilitation program. During subsequent discussions, the Army D epartm ent insisted upon the rapid term ination o f its obligations in Korea. By contrast, Lovett professed th at th e State D epartm ent d id n o t have enough trained personnel to supervise th e program , while Congress had shown a desire to exclude th e diplom atic branch from any involve­ ment in foreign aid. Paul G . H offm an, director o f th e Economic Cooperation A dm inistration (ECA), voiced sym pathy for Lovett’s position, but he strongly agreed w ith th e Army D epartm ent’s con­ tention that the m ilitary should n o t adm inister th e foreign assistance programs of the U nited States.49 Hoffman soon recognized th a t th e ECA was th e only logical candi­ date to supervise the aid program for South K orea. A consensus also existed that a small-scale operation w ould be a waste o f tim e and money. Yet Hoffm an d oubted w hether Congress w ould “ continue to pour money into Korea, w hich was a rather questionable invest­ ment.’’ Despite these reservations, he agreed to form ulate a specific assistance plan in cooperation w ith th e State D epartm ent for inclu­ sion in the budget proposal for fiscal 1950. Significantly, as one State Department m em orandum revealed, th e ECA director was far from satisfied. In fact, he was skeptical ab o u t the logic o f th e entire ven­ ture: The whole problem is o n e o f S tate D ep artm en t fo reign policy. It has n o economic justificatio n . [H offm an] w ould h o ld o u t h o p e th a t K orea would offer any k in d o f econom ic bulw ark. H e gathers th a t it has no strategic im portance from a m ilitary p o in t o f view. ECA w ill look to th e State D ep artm en t fo r lead ersh ip in th e program to be carried o u t. H e regards th e o p eratio n as a h o ld in g o ne— m aking good o n pledges to Korea.

On August 25, Trum an instructed th e Army D epartm ent to transfer its responsibilities to th e ECA on January 1,1949- H offm an began at once to gather personnel and organize an aid m ission to South Korea.,0 Saltzman, as assistant secretary o f state for occupied areas, super-

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vised com pletion o f a d raft proposal for aid to Korea early in Septem­ ber. H is m em orandum rejected as unw ise continued reliance on an n u al relief appropriations an d em phasized instead the advantages o f a m ultiyear program for th e developm ent o f economic self-suffi­ ciency. T he proposed p lan called for A m erican aid to begin in 1949 an d envisioned congressional approval for $180 m illion in economic assistance to South K orea d u rin g fiscal 1950. Hoffman eagerly advo­ cated adoption. D raper was happy w ith th e proposal as well, largely because th e State D epartm ent finally had taken a direct role in K orean affairs. Even so, he expressed skepticism whether Congress w ould authorize an appropriation o f funds. Lovett agreed, stating flatly th a t th e program was “ too rich for my blood at the moment.” C oupled w ith sim ilar requests, aid to K orea would place an excessive strain on th e A m erican economy. N evertheless, Lovett admitted that th e U nited S û tes could n o t abandon South Korea. He therefore approved Saltzm an’s d raft proposal and prom ised to work for con­ gressional consent.” M eanw hile, th e adm inistration finished preparations for the offi­ cial transfer o f governm ental pow er from th e AMG to the South K orean governm ent. A t th e U nited N ations, the American delega­ tio n drafted a le tter from H odge to th e UNTCOK inform ing the tem­ porary com mission o f th e successful form ation o f a Korean govern­ m ent. T he U nited States scheduled an inauguration ceremony for A ugust 15, th e anniversary o f Jap an 's surrender. H odge’s subsequent departure from K orea in conjunction w ith th e arrival of Muccio w ould sym bolize th e end o f A m erican occupation and the restoration o f K orea’s sovereignty .*2 lb avoid losing international backing for the ROK as a result o f these actions, on A ugust 12 th e State Department announced th e appointm ent o f Muccio as “ special representative” to South K orea, rather th an am bassador. W hile the U nited Sûtes in tended to aw ait final action at th e U nited N ations, the statement continued, W ashington believed th a t th e Rhee governm ent was the political authority envisioned in th e N ovem ber 14 resolution. It also expressed th e hope th a t th e N orth K orean people, whom the Soviet U nion had denied freedom o f choice, w ould join th e ROK “in due course.” ” Am erican m ilitary governm ent officially ended as planned on A ugust 15 w ith th e form al establishm ent o f th e Republic of Korea. M acArthur atten d ed th e inauguration cerem ony and delivered a

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speech declaring th at th e 38th parallel “ barrier m ust and w ill be to m down. Nothing shall prevent th e u ltim ate u n ity o f your people as free men of a free nation.” Observers in th e U n ited States com m ented positively on events in South K orea, since th e adm in istratio n ’s policy appeared to have given b irth to a broadly based governm ent th a t enjoyed international approval.’4 Trum an was th rilled . In a letter to Hodge, he credited th e USAFIK com m ander w ith producing th e “outstanding success” o f creating a constitutional governm ent in Korea and thereby bringing freedom to a dow ntrodden people. “ By your skill, initiative and diplomacy,” th e presid en t en thused, “ you have overcome seem ingly insurm ountable obstacles and you have earned the gratitude o f th e people, b o th o f th e U n ited States and o f Korea.” For H um an, national self-determ ination h ad triu m p h ed in South Korea, at least on th e surface.” American m ilitary experts too were pleased in th e wake o f th e fo r­ mal inauguration o f th e ROK, because th e U nited States now could withdraw on Septem ber 15 as scheduled. In preparation for dis­ engagement, th e Army D epartm ent organized th e Provisional K ore­ an Military Advisory G roup (PKM AG) on A ugust 15. Com posed o f 240 men, the PKM AG’s m ission was to create, train , and equip a constabulary army o f sufficient strength to d eter an invasion from th e north.” W hile welcom ing th is action, th e State D epartm ent w ith­ held approval for w ithdraw al o n Septem ber 15. In a m em orandum to the Army D epartm ent, B utterw orth em phasized th a t NSC-8 d id n o t preclude further delay. More im p o rtan t, th e A m erican public now favored firm resistance to fu rth er Soviet expansion in K orea, rath er than precipitate w ithdraw al. B utterw orth concluded w ith a rem inder that both Hodge and Jacobs h ad advised postponem ent o f disengage­ ment until the U nited N ations acted on the U NTCOK rep o rt.’7 Army D epartm ent officials rem ained adam antly opposed to an indefinite prolongation o f m ilitary occupation in Korea. U ltim ately, American leaders arrived a t a com prom ise. T he USAFIK w ould com­ mence withdrawal on Septem ber 15 b u t w ould be prepared to h alt the operation on a m om ent’s notice. Furtherm ore, the JCS instructed Hodge not to refer to the im m inence o f disengagem ent upon his own departure from Korea. T he Arm y D epartm ent approved these in ­ structions with reluctance because th e Chinese Com m unists had just overrun all o f M anchuria; th e U nited States now seem ingly occupied an untenable position in K orea.’® N evertheless, when Hodge left

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K orea he exuded optim ism , p redicting th a t a working democracy in South K orea w ould w eaken Soviet dom inance in the north and open th e way to peaceful reu nification . ’9 Sim ultaneously, th e adm inistration struggled to retain active inter­ n ational involvem ent in th e K orean affair. The UNTCOK had com­ p leted its final rep o rt o n Ju ly 25. M uch to the satisfaction of the U nited States, th e tem porary com m ission inform ed the United Na­ tions th a t “ a reasonably free atm osphere” existed in Korea during th e May elections. T he U N TCO K ’s report recommended, however, th a t th e in tern atio n al organization n o t extend its presence or expand its role in K orea. W hile it approved W ashington’s creation of a con­ stabulary army, th e tem porary com m ission strongly urged the United N ations to term inate its involvem ent in th e Korean m atter after the U nited States w ithdrew . In K orea, Jacobs was afraid that the tempo­ rary com m ission m ig h t leave th e peninsula prior to international con­ sideration o f its report. O nly th e presence o f the UNTCOK, he urgently cabled W ashington, could restrain th e Soviet ’’stooges” inside South K orea and no rth o f th e 38th parallel. Marshall ordered A ustin to cam paign actively at th e U nited N ations for an extension of international involvem ent in K orean affairs. The UNTCOK would contribute n o t ju st to th e ROK’s prestige, th e administration be­ lieved, b u t also to th e stabilization o f relations w ith the north and the developm ent o f political and social stability throughout the penin­ sula .60 South K orea’s new governm ent experienced a sadly inauspicious beginning. D uring A ugust, several o f th e nations with representa­ tives on th e UNTCOK inform ed W ashington o f their unwillingness to extend unqualified recognition to th e ROK .61 Still worse, almost from th e outset, disagreem ent and friction surfaced between the South Koreans and th e U nited States. The agreem ent on the transfer o f governm ental authority, for exam ple, provided th at the United States would retain com m and over th e constabulary army and the police force u n til th e com pletion o f w ithdraw al. Both the prime min­ ister and th e foreign m inister threatened to resign in protest over this infringem ent on K orea’s sovereignty .63 Fearing th at the dispute would prevent his departure, H odge pressed W ashington to permit th e arrival o f Muccio as scheduled on A ugust 23 even if the agree­ m ent rem ained unsigned. Once in Seoul, Muccio could tell Rhee that there would be no economic or m ilitary assistance until the ROK approved th e term s o f th e transfer agreem ent. The administration

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summarily dispatched Muccio to South K orea to assum e prim ary responsibility for Am erican policy.69 Two days after his arrival in Seoul, Muccio cabled W ashington th a t Rhee had signed the transfer agreem ent. In all probability, Muccio had utilized economic aid as a diplom atic w eapon to induce th e South Koreans to accept a com prom ise. T he U nited States agreed to permit the ROK to assume control over the police as o f Septem ber 3, but it would retain authority over th e constabulary arm y u n til m ili­ tary withdrawal. The transfer agreem ent stated as well th at th e United States would begin its departure at “ th e earliest practicable time.”64 Early in Septem ber, Rhee form ally asked th e U nited States for economic and m ilitary aid. W hile Muccio advocated approval o f the request, he insisted th a t any technicians or advisors serving in Korea possess total freedom o f action to ensure th e efficient utiliza­ tion of American assistance. It was d o u b tfu l, however, w hether th e Korean legislature would accept such conditions. Several legislators already had recorded th eir opposition to the Korean-A m erican Finan­ cial and Property Settlem ent because it required the ROK to repay the United States for the costs o f th e occupation.69 Events in N orth Korea represented a m ore dire th reat to the sur­ vival of the ROK than discord w ith th e U nited States. O n A ugust 23, the People's Com m ittee sponsored elections, allegedly nationw ide, for delegates to a “ Suprem e Korean People’s Assembly.” D uring th e first week in Septem ber, this body m et in Pyongyang and prom ulgat­ ed a constitution. The legislature also elected a “ Suprem e People’s Council” and chose Kim Til-bong as chairm an. Kim Tu-bong th en selected Kim II Sung as prem ier and called upon him to form a cabi­ net, thereby providing d ie ruling authority for the “Dem ocratic Peo­ ple’s Republic o f Korea” (DPRK). The new N orth Korean govern­ ment claimed to represent th e entire nation, stating its intention to send delegates to th e U nited N ations.66 As his first act, Kim II Sung addressed letters to both H um an and Stalin requesting recognition and the removal o f occupation troops. O n Septem ber 19, Stalin for­ mally recognized the DPRK as K orea’s legitim ate governm ent and pledged Soviet support. In com pliance w ith K im ’s request, he also announced th at the Soviet U nion w ould w ithdraw its forces from North Korea before the end o f 1948. The Soviet leader th en invited the U nited States to follow su it.67 These developm ents apparently caught H um an and his advisors completely o ff guard. Stalin’s m aneuver had placed the adm inistra-

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tion in an em barrassing and dangerous position. North Korea un­ questionably was stronger th an South K orea militarily, economically, an d politically, and Moscow could disengage w ithout hesitation. Hu­ m an could n o t act w ith such alacrity, however, since American with­ draw al w ould place th e existence o f th e ROK in jeopardy. On the o th er hand, South K orea’s continued dependence on American mili­ tary protection virtually w ould preclude w idespread international rec­ ognition o f th e ROK as th e legitim ate national government of Korea. Far m ore om inous, tw o K orean governm ents soon would control their own affairs, each com m itted to th e destruction o f its rival. In the afterm ath o f Soviet-Am erican w ithdraw al, civil war for the purpose of forcible reunification was a near certainty. Knowledgeable Americans saw th a t South K orea had little chance o f surviving such a struggle.6* Aware th a t N orth K orea constituted a grave threat to the survival of South K orea, th e Army D epartm ent instructed Jo h n B. Coulter, the new USAFIK com m ander, to m inim ize all equipm ent removals from K orea during w ithdraw al. A lthough it was still desirable to “button it u p as soon as practical,” A m erican m ilitary leaders did not want to leave th e ROK defenseless a t th e tim e o f disengagem ent.69 For Rhee, th e form ation o f a rival governm ent in th e north dem anded an indef­ in ite postponem ent o f Am erican w ithdraw al. H e sent Cho Pyöng-ok to W ashington as his personal representative to press the Truman adm inistration n o t to desert K orea “w hen th e battle was only half won.” W hile in th e U nited States, Cho tried to persuade American leaders th a t disengagem ent w ould only invite a Comm unist invasion from th e north. D uring Septem ber, C hang Myön, the new Korean am bassador to th e U nited States, joined Cho in W ashington and he too im plored th e adm inistration to delay w ithdraw al. At the same tim e, he voiced fears th a t representatives from the north would attend th e next session o f th e U nited N ations, thus endangering the ROK’s chances for obtaining recognition and subsequent admission to th e international organization . 70 American problem s in South Korea reached a dram atic climax in O ctober when a m ajor rebellion erupted in Chölla nam do, a county in th e southernm ost portion o f th e peninsula. N ear the town of TÖsu, a small group o f Com m unists, who had m anaged to infiltrate the constabulary army, staged th e original uprising on th e night of Octo­ ber 19. Some two hundred soldiers soon joined the rebellion in pro­ test over alleged officer abuse. Peasants and workers then added their support to th e uprising because o f growing dissatisfaction with eco-

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nomic deterioration and police corruption. T he rebel force quickly swelled to more th an three thousand people an d proceeded to occupy the town of fö su , establishing “ p eo p le’s courts” to try an d execute policemen, army officers, an d governm ent officials.71 T he “'fösu Rebellion” rapidly spread to Sunch’ö n , as rebels seized am m unition centers and burned police stations. M any people joined th e uprising in anticipation o f an im m inent N o rth K orean invasion. T he rebels even raised the N orth K orean flag in Sunch’ö n an d pledged loyalty to the DPRK. W hile expanding th eir area o f control, th e C om m unist leaders punished anyone suspected o f su p porting th e Rhee regim e. Americans in Seoul th o u g h t th e ROK was on th e brink o f to tal col­ lapse.72 Coulter was determ ined to avoid direct involvem ent in th e fö su Rebellion. The PKM AG, however, prom ptly m obilized loyal con­ stabulary forces to m ove against insurgent strongholds. T he uneven terrain, and the fact th a t rebels wore A m erican uniform s an d used American equipm ent, m ade th e task o f th e constabulary arm y ex­ tremely difficult. O n O ctober 27, ROK forces began to counterattack and the result was a b loodbath. F ighting in th e streets o f fö su spared few citizens, and th e constabulary arm y’s retaliation against th e rebels was merciless. G overnm ent forces eith er b eat to d eath or sum ­ marily executed anyone suspected o f sym pathizing w ith th e insur­ gency.73 Meanwhile, Rhee im plem ented strong m easures to purge any remaining leftists in th e ROK’s security forces. T he legislature passed the N ational Security A ct, w hich im posed, in essence, m artial law in South K orea. T he governm ent proceeded to dism iss school­ teachers and civil adm inistrators suspected o f disloyalty, w hile cen­ soring newspapers and im prisoning dissident editors. T he constabu­ lary army eventually reestablished control in th e south, b u t th e fö su Rebellion significantly w eakened popular confidence in th e young and inexperienced governm ent o f South K orea.74 Adm inistration officials in W ashington received news o f th e fö su Rebellion with shock, n o t least because o f th e w idespread public sup­ port for the uprising. Most o f th e rebels were n o t C om m unists or fel­ low travelers b u t average citizens w ith legitim ate grievances. More distressing, the incident revealed th e ease w ith w hich th e C om m u­ nists could infiltrate th e constabulary arm y and exploit popular dis­ content. A lthough th e loyal ROK m ilitary u n its operated effectively, it would be some tim e before real stability prevailed in South Korea. For Muccio, th e new governm ent faced a clear challenge:

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If the government and nation arose to the occasion, the Rebellion would become the spark which drew all but the Communist elements in the nation together. . . . If, on the other hand, no firm stand were taken for reform, if efforts at change were virtually branded “treason,” if a new spirit of patriotism were not infused into the people, the situa­ tion could rapidly deteriorate into mass uncertainty, discontent and anarchy. M ost inform ed observers perceived th a t th e Rhee government had reached an early crossroads. O nly political unity and serious reform could elicit popular confidence in th e ROK and counteract adverse propaganda from th e n o rth .7’ N orth K orea's ability to exploit such disturbances as the %su Rebellion increased th e likelihood o f an overt m ilitary assault across th e 38th parallel. As Muccio n oted in one cable, it was “more than probable th a t if th e internal South K orean situation worsens to the extent likely u nder continuous N orth K orean-inspired disturbances, th e N orth K orean Army w ould intervene under the banner of restor­ ing order and aiding ‘dem ocratic’ elem ents o f the population.” Con­ fronted w ith invasion from th e no rth , Muccio argued, the ROK’s chances for survival were n o t good. Popular opposition to Rhee’s heavy-handed leadership was on th e rise. The domestic situation pre­ sented a “ grave picture,” and Muccio expected an invasion from the no rth in th e spring o f 1949- O nly continued American military pro­ tection, he advised W ashington, could forestall the demise of the ROK. The U nited States had to delay withdraw al and provide South Korea w ith a “period o f grace” for th e developm ent o f economic and political stability . 76 O ne outside event th a t had a distinct influence on the administra­ tio n ’s deliberations on w ithdraw al was th e Com m unist triumph in C hina. The Chinese N ationalists never missed an opportunity to warn th e South Koreans th a t th e U nited States eventually would abandon the ROK to Soviet dom ination .77 In November, Rhee moved vigorously to obtain a postponem ent o f American withdrawal. Muccio cabled W ashington th at th e ROK’s president was planning to appeal to the U nited N ations for passage o f a resolution permitting th e U nited States to occupy South Korea u n til it developed the capac­ ity for self-defense . 78 Subsequendy, Rhee addressed a personal letter to Truman requesting form ally th a t th e U nited States delay military w ithdrawal. H e m entioned, moreover, th a t an unequivocal statement

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of Washington’s com m itm ent to defend th e ROK w ould reassure th e South Korean people and prevent th e loss o f hope. Rhee also wrote to MacArthur pleading for tanks, patrol ships, com bat aircraft, and machine guns to assist South Korea in its fig h t against com m unism . He claimed th at “ the m ere appearance o f th eir existence a t our dis­ posal will give the people assurance o f th eir security.” 79 Truman and his advisors th u s faced an annoying dilem m a. There were compelling reasons for w ithdraw al, b u t th e adm inistration feared that the South Korean governm ent would collapse shortly after disengagement. Such an eventuality w ould inflict serious dam ­ age on the credibility and prestige o f th e U nited States. Conse­ quently, the Truman adm inistration, although determ ined to end American occupation, w ould n o t ignore its political com m itm ent to the survival o f South Korea. In th e wake o f th e Tfcsu R ebellion, Marshall, Lovett, and Saltzm an all w ent on record against fixing a specific date for the com pletion o f w ithdraw al because o f th e prevail­ ing atmosphere o f chaos in South Korea. C om plete disengagem ent at that time would be prem ature and prejudicial to Am erican security interests in Asia. Since th e U nited N ations had not acted on Korea, the January 15 deadline for to tal w ithdraw al also was unrealistic. Accepting these argum ents, W ashington instructed M acArthur to halt disengagement and m aintain one regim ental com bat team in South Korea u n til the U nited N ations requested w ithdraw al.90 Army D epartm ent officials were still anxious to im plem ent the withdrawal operation—now code-nam ed “ Twinbom.” They accepted the latest postponem ent grudgingly because Korea continued to drain the Army D epartm ent’s shrinking financial resources. Early in December 1948, the adm inistration decided to reduce th e defense budget for fiscal 1950 and lower th e ceiling on m ilitary expenditures for the following year. D espite warnings from the JCS th at such restrictions would underm ine its ability to preserve Am erican nation­ al security, Truman approved these decisions. The adm inistration’s approach was the direct outgrow th o f the president’s persistent desire to lim it the postwar com m itm ents o f the U nited States in interna­ tional affairs. Even the crisis over Berlin failed to shake T hunan’s con­ viction that the world situation in 1948 did n o t rule o u t further reductions in the size o f the Am erican m ilitary establishm ent and the defense budget. Spum ing advice from Forrestal and others, the presi­ dent placed a higher priority on financial aid to American allies than on building the m ilitary power o f the U nited States.81

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T rum an’s strategy fo r h altin g Soviet expansionism therefore em­ phasized th e capacity for local self-defense. The administration hoped to achieve this objective in areas outside o f Western Europe an d Jap an w ith o u t providing an unqualified guarantee of military protection. South K orea represents a prim e example of Trumans preference for econom ic rather th a n m ilitary m eans to counter the Soviet challenge in those nations th a t were im portant but not vital to A m erican national security .82 In form ulating an economic assistance agreem ent, A m erican leaders studiously sought to avoid making an u nlim ited com m itm ent to th e survival o f South Korea. The Army D epartm ent strenuously opposed a categorical statem ent that aid to th e ROK was vital to A m erican security: “ A n O riental mind would literally in terp ret and readily m isconstrue this statem ent as an uncon­ ditional guarantee o f continued fu ll support. Future circumstances may n ot w arrant such a construction. It w ould be difficult then to repudiate.” Worse still, a pledge o f open-ended support would have serious “ psychological im plications” because it would retard the developm ent o f a spirit o f self-reliance am ong th e South Koreans.” Some ofT rum an's diplom atic advisors also thought that the United States should n o t exaggerate th e anticipated benefits of American econom ic aid. Since th e U nited States was “ using economic assistance as a political prop,” one State D epartm ent official advised, “we should have language th a t w ill enable us to play by ear without em barrassm ent.” O n th e o th er h an d , if th e adm inistration was not optim istic about th e prospects for success, congressional approval for th e Korean aid program was unlikely .84 U ntil Ju n e 3 0 , 1949t it could draw funds for th e ROK from congressional appropriations under th e program for G overnm ent A id and R elief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA). A fter th at date, th e adm inistration would be unable to finance its operations in South Korea. Presumably, American military w ithdrawal could elim inate GARIOA as a financial option even ear­ lier. D espite certain reservations, Trum an’s advisors agreed nonethe­ less th at congressional approval for a K orean aid program was vital n o t only for prom pt disengagem ent b u t also for the long-term sur­ vival o f th e ROK.8’ O n D ecem ber 1 1 , th e Trum an adm inistration announced that it had concluded negotiations w ith th e ROK on an economic assistance package. It provided in p art th a t th e U nited States could terminate all aid w ithout notice if th e South Koreans abused the program. Thus, Trum an's advisors ensured th at fu tu re assistance was contin-

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gent upon the ROK’s perform ance. T hat sam e m onth, H offm an and his ECA team arrived in Korea to determ ine th e extent o f South Korea's needs. Press reports speculated th a t th e adm inistration in ­ tended to request congressional approval for $300 m illion in eco­ nomic aid over three years. In his com m ents to newsm en, H offm an predicted that Congress would authorize assistance for th e ROK. Significantly, he also h in ted th a t W ashington m ight expand th e pro­ gram in the event o f reunification.86 Am erican leaders therefore an­ ticipated that the prom ise o f econom ic benefits w ould spur popular demands in N orth Korea for am algam ation w ith th e south. Washington’s com m itm ent to provide econom ic assistance to South Korea had an alarm ing im pact on th e ROK. Officials in th e Rhec government m anifested a new sense o f self-confidence, result­ ing in the issuance o f a num ber o f belligerent public statem ents. O n December 18, for exam ple, Foreign M inister C hang T ’aek-sang announced th at N orth Korea constituted Mlost territory” and th e ROK planned to recover it at th e earliest possible m om ent regardless of cost. If the Com m unists prevented the N orth Korean people from fulfilling their desire for reunification, Chang declared, South Korea would resort to m ilitary conquest and elim inate th e artificial division at the 38th parallel.87 Muccio and C oulter received news o f this state­ ment with surprise and consternation. D uring im m ediate consulta­ tions with Rhee, th e Am erican am bassador assailed C hang’s com­ ments as bellicose and unduly provocative. Such pronouncem ents, Muccio adm onished, were n o t only ill advised, b u t contrary to the United States policy o f pursuing reunification through peaceful means alone.88 But verbal protests would n o t deter Rhee from attem pting forcible reunification as soon as th e ROK possessed sufficient power to launch an invasion into N orth Korea. C oulter was aware o f this danger and wanted to lim it the offensive m ilitary capabilities o f the ROK, thereby m inim izing the chances for an assault northw ard across the 38th parallel. For Rhee and his supporters, however, N orth K orea’s military superiority was intolerable. In Decem ber, Rhee requested a large num ber o f com bat planes and coast guard ships w ith m ainte­ nance supplies for six m onths. W ithout hesitation, C oulter cabled Washington recom m ending disapproval o f th e aircraft provision.89 Rhee soon recognized th at an aggressive posture would jeopardize all American aid to the ROK and dim inish the opportunities for eventu­ ally achieving his objective o f reunification, lb reassure the U nited

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States, he dism issed his foreign m inister. Nevertheless, the incident left an indelible im p rin t o n th e U nm an adm inistration. Under no circum stances w ould th e U nited States provide the ROK with enough m ilitary pow er to stage an offensive in to N orth Korea.90 By th e en d o f 1948, th e Trum an adm inistration was still wrestling w ith th e dangerous K orean predicam ent. The new South Korean governm ent had dem onstrated scant political unity, making decisive progress tow ard econom ic recovery virtually impossible. Moreover, th e Soviet U nion h ad trained and equipped a powerful army in N orth K orea capable o f conquering th e entire peninsula following A m erican w ithdraw al. As a result, th e adm inistration manifested an em barrassing reluctance to end A m erican occupation of South Korea. A nd now another factor h ad em erged to complicate further the dilem m a o f w ithdraw al. W ashington w anted to provide the ROK w ith enough m ilitary equipm ent to guarantee its survival. Yet once th e U nited States rem oved its troops from th e peninsula, nothing could stop Syngman Rhee from attem pting forcible reunification.91 N evertheless, th e Trum an adm inistration rem ained committed to m ilitary disengagem ent a t th e earliest possible date. If the United States continued to occupy South K orea, th e ROK never would develop th e confidence necessary for th e m aintenance of self-defense, let alone th e achievem ent o f w idespread international diplomatic and m oral support. W ith Am erican assistance and advice, on the other h an d , there was reason to ex p ea th e eventual realization of economic recovery and political stability south o f th e 38th parallel. Despite seri­ ous weaknesses, American leaders still were hopeful that the Rhee governm ent, in th e absence o f an unqualified com m itm ent of Amer­ ican power, ultim ately could com pete on equal term s with the Com­ m unist regim e in th e north. B ut Trum an’s strategy for countering the th reat o f Soviet expansionism in Korea could produce neither success nor failure u n til after American m ilitary withdrawal.

CHAPTER 8

Test Case o f C ontainm ent

Washington’s decision to postpone w ithdraw al from K orea during the autumn o f 1948 dem onstrated th e ad m in istratio n ’s com m itm ent to South Korea’s survival. If Trum an actually sought to abandon th e ROK, his refusal to order m ilitary disengagem ent m ade little sense. On the other hand, A m erican leaders h ad n o t acted w ith notable vigor in attem pting to form ulate an d im plem ent an aid program for South Korea. W ithout extensive A m erican h elp , th e ROK never could attain the level o f econom ic self-sufficiency requisite for genu­ ine political independence. T he Trum an adm in istratio n ’s hesitancy was partially the outgrow th o f dom estic politics in th e U n ited States. After all, few people th o u g h t Trum an w ould be president in 1949. Following his surprising reelection, however, Trum an appeared d eter­ mined to adopt a m ore positive approach in b o th dom estic and for­ eign affairs. This fresh sense o f confidence in th e adm inistration h ad a significant im pact on A m erican policy in K orea. In his inaugural address, Trum an o u tlin ed an im p o rtan t new ele­ ment in his foreign policy. T he U n ited States, h e explained, w ould begin to utilize econom ic aid and technical advice for th e im prove­ ment of internal conditions in underdeveloped countries. C om m en­ tators subsequently labeled th is new strategy “ P oint Four.’’ A lthough 111101X0 later denied th a t th e policy was anti-C om m unist, P oint Four obviously sought to dissuade recipient nations from adopting th e Soviet model for political, econom ic, and social developm ent.1 T he success of die M arshall Plan in Europe encouraged adm inistration officials to believe th a t a sim ilar approach w ould produce econom ic recovery elsewhere in th e w orld.2 D ean A cheson, Trum an’s new secre­ tary of state, unquestionably shared this opinion. T hrough a reliance on limited m eans, Acheson was confident th a t th e U nited States could foster the em ergence o f “ situations o f stren g th ’’ in strategic

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locations around th e globe an d thereby prevent further Soviet expan­ sionism .3 To an ex ten t, th e U nited States had followed the Point Four strategy in S outh K orea before 1949- N ot surprisingly, at the start of T hiraan’s second term th e ROK occupied a central place in his policy tow ard th e underdeveloped nations o f Asia. Events in C hina enhanced South K orea’s importance for the ad­ m inistration. Trum an an d his advisors believed th at Chiang Kai-shek him self was prim arily responsible for th e im m inent triumph of com­ m unism in C hina. D espite considerable Am erican assistance, Chiang had lost th e support o f th e C hinese people because he had ignored /p o p u la r grievances and failed to im plem ent reforms. In South Korea, however, th e U nited States had a second chance to build a popular and dem ocratic governm ent w orthy o f em ulation in Asia. If Wash­ ington could prom ote econom ic strength and political stability south o f th e 38th parallel, it w ould prove th a t other nations could resist Soviet dom ination w ithout an unlim ited com m itm ent of American power. As Trum an explained in his m em oirs, the United States w anted th e Rhee governm ent “ to bring a m easure of prosperity to th e peasants th a t w ould m ake them tu rn th eir backs on the Commu­ nist agitators .” 4 D uring 1949, Trum an and his m ajor advisors increas­ ingly cam e to view South K orea as n o t ju st a bulwark against further Soviet expansionism b u t also th e test case o f containm ent in Asm. International action on th e K orean issue late in 1948 contributed to th e adm inistration’s confidence in th e wisdom o f its strategy. Orig­ inally, W ashington had planned to ask th e U nited Nations to recog­ nize th e ROK as th e governm ent it had envisaged in its resolution of N ovem ber 14, 1947. B ritain and C anada had notified the adminis­ tration, however, th a t it could n o t support this position.’ Rather than risking public opposition from two close allies, W ashington altered its proposal. The U nited States now w ould recom m end that the United N ations recognize th e ROK as th e only legitim ate government on the Korean peninsula and allow representatives from South Korea to par­ ticipate in its fu tu re deliberations. N orth Korea, by contrast, would ' n ot have a chance to present its case, although the administration would not insist upon this provision. W ashington’s revised proposal also provided for a new “ U nited N ations Commission on Korea” (UNCOK) to supervise th e dissolution o f all non-ROK military and adm inistrative organizations in K orea and to report to the General Assembly on the progress o f reunification. Since the administration believed th a t Canada, Syria, and India had lacked a strong interest in

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Korea’s future, it in ten d ed to encourage th e exclusion o f these nations from m em bership on th e new in tern atio n al com m ission.6 On October 30, th e Political an d Security C om m ittee o f th e United Nations began to consider th e U N TCO K report. T he tem po­ rary commission, w hile n o tin g A m erican cooperation an d Soviet obduracy, concluded th a t b o th n atio n s an d “ th e tension prevailing in the international system ” were responsible for th e K orean im passe. Only reunification w ould p erm it all o f K orea to experience political, economic, and social progress, b u t th e U N TCO K offered no p lan for achieving this result. T he fin d in g s o f th e tem porary com m ission induded the om inous prediction th a t in th e absence o f a n egotiated setdement, a civil war and forcible reunification w ould follow SovietAmerican withdrawal. T he U n ited N ations again faced a p ain fu l choice. A decision to term in ate its involvem ent in th e K orean affair meant that the U nited N ations w ould abandon its m oral obligation to the ROK. A doption o f th e A m erican proposal, however, w ould alienate the Soviet U nion an d in all probability lead to involvem ent in a civil war.7 In its final form , th e d raft resolution provided th a t w ithin ninety days after adoption th e U N CO K w ould observe and verify SovietAmerican withdrawal from th e peninsula. W ashington’s decision to forsake its claim th a t th e ROK was th e national governm ent o f Korea now produced its biggest diplom atic rew ard. O n N ovem ber 21, th e Political and Security C om m ittee voted unanim ously against a Soviet proposal to invite representatives from th e DPRK to participate in th e debate.8 Some com m entators in th e U n ited States d id n o t appreciate the extent o f th e A m erican victory an d dem anded U nited N ations recognition o f th e national character o f th e ROK as well. A dm inistra­ tion officials realized, however, th a t if th e U n ited States assum ed an extreme and inflexible position, a n um ber o f nations w ould refuse to cooperate, thus barring fu rth er progress tow ard th e achievem ent o f American objectives. C onditional recognition from th e U nited N a­ tions definitely was preferable to im partiality.9 Ihim an’s policy on K orea a t th e U nited N ations experienced to tal success during th e last m onth o f 1948. O n D ecem ber 6, th e Political and Security C om m ittee voted by a large m argin to reject th e DPRK’s daim to legitimacy an d instead to invite th e ROK to send representa­ tives to the U nited N atio n s.10 It th en tu rn ed its atten tio n to W ashing­ ton’s proposal calling for continued international involvem ent in Korean affairs. Jo h n Foster D ulles delivered a strong speech appeal-

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ing for U nited N ations approval o f th e resolution. He stressed that it w ould be "u n th in k ab le th a t th e U nited N ations should in any way disow n th e consequences o f its ow n creative program ."11 Once again, A m erican diplom atic pressure was effective. O n December 8 , the Political and Security C om m ittee overwhelm ingly voted to recom­ m end th a t th e G eneral Assem bly ad o p t th e American resolution. It am ended th e proposal to provide fo r withdrawal o f foreign troops from K orea "as soon as practicable," rather than ninety days, after adoption. A t th e sam e tim e, th e com m ittee refused to recognize the ROK as K orea’s national governm ent, observing that it controlled only h a lf th e peninsula . 12 Four days later, th e G eneral Assembly easily approved the Ameri­ can-sponsored resolution despite sharp criticism from the Soviet dele­ gation. A fter rejecting Moscow's proposal to disband the planned com mission on K orea by a w ide m argin, th e G eneral Assembly voted to create a new com mission th a t w ould be sm aller than its predeces­ sor, excluding b o th C anada and th e U kraine. W ithin thirty days, the UNCOK w ould arrive in K orea and begin to cooperate with the ROK for th e achievem ent o f reunification . 19 D ulles spoke for the adminis­ tration w hen h e publicly applauded th e G eneral Assembly’s stand. The U nited N ations, he explained, had n o t surrendered to the North K orean strategy o f political intim idation. Privately, Dulles suggested th a t international acceptance o f W ashington’s policy in Korea might possess even broader significance: "O verw helm ing Assembly vote on Korea starts South K orea o ff w ith as m uch political and moral back­ ing as can be m obilized through U N . A part from K o rea,. . . Korean case in Assembly has contributed to m ore friendly relations between Far Eastern peoples and th e US .’’14 For Truman and his advisors, the U nited N ations resolution o f D ecem ber 12 represented a stunning victory for th e U nited States over th e Soviet U nion in the Cold War. Soviet officials hardly welcomed W ashington’s trium ph at the U nited N ations. Nevertheless, Moscow had prepared for such an eventuality. The Soviet U nion now accelerated its propaganda cam­ paign stressing th e significance o f its m ilitary withdrawal from Korea before th e end o f 1948. Both Pravda and Izvestia called on the U nited States to term inate its occupation o f South Korea as well. Soviet com m entators casually dism issed references to the probability o f civil war following w ithdraw al as ridiculous and insulting to the Korean people . 19 The adm inistration saw th at it had to take positive steps in th e direction o f disengagem ent in order to counter Moscow's

179 efforts to discredit th e ROK. W ash in gto n th erefo re in stru cted M acArthur to withdraw a ll m ilitary forces from South K orea w ith th e excep­ tion of one regim ental com bat team . B y early 1949, th e U n ited States could announce th at a ll rem ain in g A m erican troops in K orea w ere under the command o f B rigad ier G eneral W illia m G . R ob erts, h ead ofthePKMAG.16 But partial w ithdraw al d id n ot satisfy T rum an's m ilita ry advisors who wanted a specific d ate for co m p lete d isen gagem en t. Less th an two weeks after the U n ited N ations called for th e rem oval o f a ll for­ eign troops from K orea “ as soon as p racticab le,” U ndersecretary D ra­ per asked the State D epartm ent to approve th e w ith d raw al o f a ll remaining troops from th e ROK no la te r th an M arch 3 1 ,1 9 4 9 - Since the protection o f South K orea w as n ot w orth a m ajo r w ar, h e arg u ed , the American occupation force w o uld b e a lia b ility in th e event o f military conflict in A sia .17 P o litical an d d ip lo m atic factors reinforced military justification for w ith d raw al. O n D ecem ber 30, th e Soviet Union announced th a t it h ad co m p leted m ilita ry d isen gagem en t an d asked the U nited States to com ply w ith th e U n ited N ations reso lution as well. Moscow charged th at A m erican occupation an d p lan s for eco­ nomic assistance co n stituted im p erialism an d proved th e U n ited States was seeking to exp lo it K orea. T he ad m in istratio n co uld not ignore the risks involved in a decisio n to d elay co m plete w ith d raw al. The Soviet U nion w ould use W ash in gto n 's co n tin u ed presence in Korea as a propaganda w eapon to u n d erm in e in tern atio n al backin g for the ROK.18 Communist successes in C h in a convinced o th er A m erican lead ers that the U nited States h ad to postpone d isen gagem en t from K orea indefinitely. Max B ishop, c h ie f o f th e D ivision o f N ortheast A sian Affairs, believed th at w ith th e loss o f C h in a, A m erican aban don m ent of the ROK w ould destroy th e confidence an d m o rale o f a ll n ation s in Asia. Perhaps worse, C om m unist conquest o f South K orea w ould advance gready the Soviet d rive to d o m in ate Ja p a n — “ a targ et o f prime im portance to w orld com m unism .” B ishop opposed early w ith ­ drawal because it m igh t co n trib u te “ to th e expansion o f a h o stile communist p o litico -m ilitary pow er system in N ortheast A sia.” T he United States should strive in stead to create a rin g o f strong states in Asia capable o f h altin g fu rth er Soviet expansion. J . L eighton S tu art, the American am bassador in C h in a, even u rged W ashington to seize the m ilitary and d ip lo m atic in itia tiv e in K orea. D ecisive action through “the U n ited N ations fram ew ork,” h e sp eculated , “ m igh t

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catch th e Soviets o ff balance” an d counter the loss of prestige the U n ited States w ould suffer follow ing th e anticipated fall of Chiang’s regim e.19 M acA rthur’s ju d g m en t played a m ajor role in the Truman adminis­ tratio n ’s decision to reevaluate its policy toward Korea. Late in D ecem ber, he inform ed W ashington th a t although he would main­ tain one regim ental com bat team on th e peninsula, he did not think it was a requirem ent o f his assigned m ission “ to secure or to make plans to secure southern K orea.” In th e absence of Soviet interven­ tio n , th e ROK w ould have to depend on its own military forces for protection. For B uttetw orth, director o f th e Office of Far Eastern A ffairs, M acA rthur’s attitu d e was disturbing, especially in light of reports from Seoul th a t th e ROK was n o t receiving sufficient military assistance. USAFIK C om m ander C oulter cabled Washington that South K orea d id n o t have enough equipm ent to maintain a viable constabulary army. H e appealed for an early decision on the extent of th e adm inistration’s com m itm ent to provide th e ROK with the abil­ ity to defend itself. These reports, com bined w ith the warnings horn Bishop and S tuart, convinced B utterw orth th a t the United States had to reconsider its K orea policy. In a m em orandum to Lovett dated Jan­ uary 10, he proposed an im m ediate redefinition o f American aims in K orea u nder NSC-8. Subsequently, th e State D epartm ent decided to request com m ents bo th from Muccio and MacArthur on the broad m ilitary, political, and psychological issues related to the withdrawal question.*0 W ashington received a prom pt response from Muccio. The ambas­ sador stated frankly th a t South K orea had no t attained the stability necessary for survival in th e wake o f early American withdrawal. He strongly recom m ended th a t th e U nited States delay disengagement for “ several m onths” u n til it was certain an invasion from the north would n ot follow its departure. O nly continued American occupation w ould provide th e “ breathing space” th a t th e ROK needed to develop political stability and econom ic recovery. After South Korea resolved its m anifold problem s, th e U nited S ûtes could withdraw safely and w ithout fear o f Com m unist conquest o f the entire penin­ sula. Rhee’s request for a delay o f m ilitary withdrawal, Muccio argued, would provide justification before th e international commu­ nity for a postponem ent o f Am erican departure. W hile he shared the desire to disengage, Muccio asserted th a t th e N ational Security Coun­ cil had to consider th e consequences o f prem ature withdrawal. In

i8 i

response to M uccio’s assessm en t, L o vett, o n Ja n u a ry 17, fo rm ally referred the Korean m atter to th e N SC an d req u ested a th o ro u gh reexamination.21 Two days later, W ashington received M acA rth u r’s ap p raisal. In h is cable, MacArthur recom m ended A m erican w ith d raw al from K orea oo later than M ay 1 0 ,1 9 4 9 — th e an n iversary o f K orea's first electio n . Long-range stab ility in South K orea, h e o bserved, w as n o t lik e ly because of the ROK’s “ p en ch an t fo r d ictato rsh ip ” an d to ta l in a b ility to improve economic co n ditio n s. M acA rthur em p h atically opposed a guarantee of m ilitary protection fo r th e ROK, n o tin g th a t in th e “event of any serious th reat to th e secu rity o f K orea, strategic an d military considerations w ill force ab an d o n m en t o f an y p reten se o f active m ilitary support.” W h ile th e p eo p le o f Ja p a n w o uld accept withdrawal if W ashington ann o un ced its in ten tio n s in advan ce, M ac­ Arthur warned the ad m in istratio n th a t a p o licy o f d elay in v ited disas­ ter: “The longer U S forces rem ain in K orea th e greater th e risk o f being placed in position o f effectin g w ith d raw al u n d er co nditions amounting to direct pressure rath er th an as a vo lun tary act. D am age to US prestige in such event w o u ld be irrep arab le.” N ot o n ly could the United States not gu aran tee th e ROK’s su rvival, b u t it was improbable th at it could train an d eq u ip an in d igen o u s arm y strong enough to protect South K orea from eith er subversion or invasio n. Finally, M acArthur m ention ed th a t th e U N CO K , by en co uragin g d is­ engagement, could provide a v alu ab le “ psych olo gical cover for w ith ­ drawal.”22 Although the Ih im an ad m in istratio n u ltim a te ly w o u ld d elay d is­ engagement despite th e g en eral's reco m m en d ation s, it agreed w ith MacArthur’s ju d gm en t th a t th e U n ited S tates sh ould su p p ly o n ly “economic aid and m ilitary assistan ce” to those frien d ly governm ents on the m ainland s till resistin g R ussian d o m in atio n . M acA rthur fu r­ ther em phasized th a t W ash in gto n 's p rim ary o b jective sh o u ld b e to establish defensive positio ns on m ajo r islan d s circlin g th e A sian co n ti­ nent. In March 1949» th e g en eral even m ad e h is view s p u b lic , possi­ bly in an effort to in flu en ce th e a d m in istratio n ’s policy. D u rin g an interview w ith B ritish jo u rn a list G . W ard P rice, M acA rthur traced a "line o f defense” fo r th e U n ited S tates in th e P acific ex clu d in g b o th the ROK and Taiw an: It starts from th e P h ilip p in e s a n d c o n tin u e s th ro u g h th e R yukyu A rch i­ pelago, w hich in clu d es its m a in b a stio n , O k in aw a. T h e n it b e n d s b ack

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through Japan and the Aleutian Island chain to Alaska. Though the advance of the Red Armies in China places them on the flank of that position, this does not alter the fact that our only possible adversary on the Asiatic continent does not possess an industrial base near enough to supply an amphibious attacking force. W hile M acA rthur apparently accepted th e inevitability of Commu­ nist control thro u g h o u t K orea, h e was confident that the United States could preserve its security interests in A sia.29 U nderstandably, th e South K oreans w anted the United States to expand rath er th a n reduce its com m itm ents to th e ROK. During dis­ cussions in W ashington, Cho Pyöng-ok spoke fearfully about how, w ith th e fall o f C hina, hostile C om m unist forces would surround the ROK. Rash leaders in South K orea, he told Butterworth and Bond, now m ight advocate a deal “w ith no rth Korea on terms laid down by th e latter." In reply, B utterw orth advised th a t South Korea had to pursue a dynam ic policy o f progressive reform and thereby promote th e popular loyalty necessary for in tern al political unity and strength. I f th e ROK ignored popular dem ands, it w ould make the same fatal m istake th a t C hiang had m ade in C hina. Cho responded that an "enlightened and progressive program . . . m ight well be a luxury w hich could n o t be afforded by a governm ent fighting for its vety existence.” B utterw orth countered th a t if th e ROK satisfied the desires o f th e people, it m ight n o t have to worry about its survival.14 These com m ents provided a concise sum m ary o f the State Depart­ m en t’s position on K orea. W hile opposing early withdrawal, Tru­ m an’s diplom atic advisors viewed th e ROK’s ability to develop popu­ lar support as th e key to successful self-defense against the threat of C om m unist expansion. To reassure th e South K oreans, Thim an dispatched Royall and W edemeyer to th e peninsula early in February on a fact-finding mis­ sion. Ju st prior to th eir arrival, N orth Korea intensified its campaign o f border violence and guerrilla action. Rhee quickly appealed to W ashington for an increase in m ilitary assistance. In their convetsations w ith Royall and W edemeyer, th e South Korean officials harped on th e im portance o f m ilitary pow er for th e protection of the ROK and th e eventual achievem ent o f reunification. Y i Pöm-sök predicted th a t th e Soviet U nion was about to start a third world war. Thus, as th e situation in C hina deteriorated, "K orea should be increasingly im portant as a stepping stone for offensive action." He thought the

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United States should d elay w ith d raw al w h ile p ro vid in g th e ROK w ith more m ilitary aid to overcom e th e tem po rary su p erio rity o f th e north­ ern regime. In response, W edem eyer reite rated th e S tate D epart­ ment’s argum ent th at “ th e greatest co n trib u tio n th a t th e K oreans could make to the overall w orld situ atio n w o u ld be to estab lish stab il­ ity in their hom eland, to develop a happy, in d u strio u s p eo p le; a strong government alo n g dem ocratic lin es.” K orea’s h ig h est p rio r­ ity, he said, was to create econom ic stren g th , n ot a larg e m ilitary force that “would m ake a disp rop o rtion ate d rain on th e co un try’s economy.”25 Rhee dismissed these argum en ts. O n ly sup erio r m ilitary pow er, h e insisted, would achieve K orea’s reu n ificatio n . O nce South K orea invaded the north, R hee p red icted th at because o f low m o rale, “ a large proportion o f th e N orth K orean arm y w o uld desert.” T he reu n i­ fication of Korea was w ith in easy grasp because th e p eo ple in th e north were hostile to th e C om m unist regim e. Success, however, would require the S tate D epartm ent to jettiso n its p o licy o f v acilla­ tion that already had “p layed a strong p art in th e loss o f C h in a.” Rather than accepting a sim ilar “ sello u t,” R hee th reaten ed not to approve Am erican w ithdraw al un less th e U n ited States en larged its military advisory group and th e am o un t o f m ilitary aid to th e ROK.26 This exchange w ith R hee convinced R oyall th at an early A m erican withdrawal was im p erative. D u rin g talk s w ith M uccio and R oberts, he asserted that the U n ited S tates co uld u se Soviet disengagem ent from the north to ju stify its ow n d ep artu re. M uccio d isagreed ; th e United States could not d isen gage u n til it h ad persuaded South Korea that it d id not in ten d to desert th e in fan t regim e. If th e South Koreans felt secure and co n fid en t, th e ROK w ould achieve econom ic self-sufficiency and th e p o litical support o f th e m asses. Roberts sec­ onded Muccio’s assessm ent. T he ROK, h e arg u ed , w arranted A m eri­ can assistance because its so ldiers w ere lo yal to th e governm ent an d would fight to protect th e n atio n . A lth o ugh h e d id not th in k South Korea needed tanks or a navy, R oberts advocated extensive m ilitary assistance. Obviously, R oyall h ad fa ile d to a lter th e opinions o f W ash­ ington’s two most im p o rtan t o fficials in S eoul on th e issue o f w ith ­ drawal. In fact, M uccio retu rn ed to th e U n ited States w ith R oyall to argue his case again st an y red uctio n in th e A m erican com m itm ent to South Korea.27 It th u s w ould be am id co n flictin g advice th at Ih im an would decide the extent o f fu tu re A m erican involvem ent in K orea. On March 22, top ad m in istratio n o fficials reconsidered A m erican

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policy in K orea a t th e thirty-sixth m eeting o f the National Security C ouncil. T he S tate D epartm ent began its reappraisal with a reviewof events in K orea du rin g th e previous year. D espite American aid aod advice, th e new South K orean governm ent had not developed suffi­ cien t m ilitary and econom ic strength to defend itself against the chal­ lenge o f th e Soviet p u p p et regim e in N orth Korea. If the United States w ithdrew abruptly from K orea at th at tim e, the repon de­ clared, this "disengagem ent w ould be interpreted as a betrayal by the U .S. o f its friends and allies in th e Far East and m ight contribute sub­ stantially to a fundam ental realignm ent o f forces in favor of the USSR thro u g h o u t th a t p art o f th e w orld." Moreover, premature American w ithdraw al w ould shatter th e confidence o f South Korea and thus guarantee th e rapid dem ise o f th e ROK. Such a dramatic Communist victory w ould dam age A m erican interests because it would destroy th e viability o f th e U nited N ations and force smaller countries to seek an accom m odation w ith Moscow. The study—N SC-8/1—therefore concluded th a t despite th e uncertain prospects for success, Washing­ to n had to provide th e ROK w ith continued diplomatic support and econom ic, technical, and m ilitary assistance.2* A t th e same tim e, N S C -8 /1 acknowledged th at American military disengagem ent was essential because the U nited Nations had asked for th e removal o f all foreign troops. Both Muccio and MacArthur had advised, however, th a t th e U nited States could withdraw safely if th e adm inistration satisfied certain conditions. First, Washington had to train , equip, and supply a security force in Korea sufficiendy pow­ erful to m aintain internal order and deter an open attack from the north. Second, th e EGA had to im plem ent a three-year program of technical and econom ic aid for recovery and self-sufficient growth. Finally, th e U nited N ations had to continue its policy of diplomatic and political support as a boost to South Korea’s morale. NSC-8/1 closed w ith th e om inous prediction th a t if th e U nited States delayed departure th e "occupation forces rem aining in Korea might be either destroyed or obliged to abandon K orea in th e event o f a major hostile attack, w ith serious dam age to U .S. prestige.” 29 Truman approved N S C -8/1 on March 23 w ith certain significant revisions. In its final form , th e paper—-NSC-8/2—represented a compromise th a t sought to accom m odate th e conflicting desires of both diplom atic and m ilitary leaders. The adm inistration now re­ solved to gain approval from Congress for a three-year program of economic aid to th e ROK and m ilitary security prior to American

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withdrawal. Furtherm ore, th e U n ited S tates w o uld provide enough equipment and arm s to m ain tain a secu rity force o f m ore th an 100,000 men. For R oyall, N SC -8/2 h ad provided “ an excellen t solu­ tion to a tough problem ." Yet M uccio ad m itted th a t “ w h ile th ere h ad been improvement [in South K orea] since th e O ctober u p risin g , there were still m any questions m arks w hich co n stitu ted a calcu lated risk that had to be taken.“ 30 NSC-8/2 also establish ed Ju n e 3 0 , 1949t as a firm d ate for th e complete w ithdrawal o f A m erican com bat forces. T he m o d ificatio n s made in NSC-8/1 reflected th e d eterm in atio n o f Ih im a n ’s m ilitary advisors to prevent any chance for fu rth er postponem ent. T he S tate Department, for exam ple, favored w ith d raw al o n ly after th e U n ited States had transferred a ll necessary m ilitary eq u ip m en t to th e con­ stabulary army and consulted w ith th e U n ited N ations an d th e ROK. In its final form , however, N SC -8/2 p rovided for d ep artu re by Ju n e 30 without regard for an y o th er contingency. It also set specific lim its on the size of the arm y (6 5 ,0 0 0 ), coast gu ard (4 ,0 0 0 ), an d p olice (33,000). These forces w ould receive lig h t w eapons alo n e, an d th e paper expliddy ruled o ut th e creatio n o f a K orean navy. O bviously, American m ilitary experts w an ted to elim in ate an y p o ten tial for South Korea to attem p t fo rcib le reu n ificatio n an d thereby ig n ite a major war. A t the sam e tim e, N SC -8/2 em phasized th at A m erican military w ithdrawal should in no w ay im p ly an y lessenin g o f th e administration’s interest in th e ROK’s fu tu re su rv iv al.31 'human’s new strategy in K orea d ep en d ed for success on South Korea’s ab ility to m ain tain m oral an d m aterial support from th e international com m unity. O n Jan u a ry 1 ,1 9 4 9 , th e U n ited States h ad attended form al recognition to th e ROK as th e leg itim ate govern­ ment of all Korea and p led g ed fu ll support for th e UNCOK’s efforts to achieve reunification. H um an also prom ised th at th e U n ited States would not w ithdraw u n til th e ROK was cap ab le o f self-d efen se.32 Even so, several m em bers o f th e UNCOK w ere h esitan t to becom e actively involved in K orean affairs. U pon h is arrival in K orea, Egon Ranshofen-Wertheimer, th e UN CO K’s p rin cip al secretary, created a major headache for th e U n ited S tates w hen h e stated p u b licly th at in view of Moscow’s in tran sigen t a ttitu d e , th e UNCOK should w ith ­ draw entirely from K orea. M uccio in stan tly ap p ealed to th e UNCOK to cooperate w ith the ROK an d attem p t to gain access to N orth Korea. The m ere presence o f th e com m ission in K orea, th e am bassa­ dor em phasized, bolstered th e m o rale o f th e R hee governm ent and

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d eterred an invasion from th e n o rth . D uring subsequent discussions, o th er A m erican officials claim ed th a t if th e UNCOK simply appeared a t th e 38th p arallel, th e N o rth K oreans would grant entrance rather th an risk in tern atio n al condem nation.** Evidently, th e efforts o f W ashington's diplom atic representatives in Seoul were n o t in vain. A fter several m eetings, the UNCOK recog­ nized th e ROK as legitim ate and declared its commitment to the achievem ent o f K orean reunification. Rhee, however, responded with a public announcem ent s a tin g his com plete opposition to any UNCOK attem p t to contact th e northern regim e, arguing that this effort w ould constitute tacit recognition o f th e Communist govern­ m en t and an affront to th e ROK.*4 Even before the arrival of the UNCOK in K orea, Rhee had s a te d publicly th a t UNCOK’s mission, he believed, was to provide unqualified support for the ROK and investigate th e u n d em o catic and illegal nature o f the North Korean regim e alone. R hee’s dem and th a t th e commission ignore criticism of his governm ent and evidence o f political repression in the south ensured th a t friction w ould em erge in relations between the UNCOK and th e ROK. N evertheless, th e UNCOK attem pted to cooperate. R ather th an approaching th e DPRK, it addressed an appeal directly to th e Soviet U nion, requesting assistance for the setdement of the Korean dispute. The com mission also announced that it would stay in South Korea to observe and verify American m ilitary withdrawal.M W hile Muccio was in W ashington, Everett E Drumright, the embassy chargé, pressed Rhee to cooperate w ith the UNCOK and avoid any disagreem ent. H e privately im plored the president of the ROK neither to criticize nor to restrict th e activities of the commission in South Korea.*6 D rum right's efforts were for naught. Rhee prohib­ ited all Korean citizens n ot affiliated w ith his government from con­ tacting th e UNCOK and satio n ed police outside the commission’s headquarters to m onitor visitors. Predicably, Ranshofen-Wertheimer vigorously protested Rhee’s interference in the commission’s opera­ tions. H e rem inded D rum right th a t th e UNCOK’s job was not only to foster reunification b u t to observe th e developm ent of democracy throughout Korea as well. Broad consultations were especially impor­ ta n t in South Korea because th e ROK resem bled a "fascist police state.” In reply, one American official pointed to "the tradition of m isrule in Asia” to explain Rhee’s behavior. He then told the UNCOK’s principal secretary th at th e ROK’s survival depended on

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international support an d therefore ju stifie d overlooking its short­ comings.37 While Am erican o fficials in S eo u l stru g g led to m ain tain frien d ly relations between th e ROK an d th e U N CO K , th e ad m in istratio n h ad it much easier at the U n ited N atio n s. In F ebruary 1949, b oth K orean governments ap p lied for adm issio n to th e in tern atio n al o rgan izatio n . During subsequent d eb ate, Soviet rep resen tative Jaco b M alik a lleg e d that the U nited States h ad em p lo yed terror an d in tim id atio n to manipulate the elections in S o u th K orea. T he A m erican d eleg atio n countered that com m issioners from th e U n ited N ations h ad observed the voting process an d verified th e leg itim acy o f th e resu lts. W ashing­ ton again scored a m ajor d ip lo m atic victory w hen th e S ecurity C oun­ cil decided to refer d ie ROK’s ap p licatio n to th e U n ited N ations Membership C om m ittee. M alik d ecried th e actio n as an outgrow th o f Anglo-American d ictatio n . D espite M oscow’s protests, th e M em ber­ ship Committee recom m ended approval o f th e ROK’s ap p licatio n .38 lb no one’s surprise, th e Soviet U nion cast a veto on A p ril 8 to prevent the ROK’s adm ission. A m erican d eleg ate W arren A u stin promptly condem ned Moscow for ag ain v io latin g th e w ill o f th e United Nations an d blo cking progress tow ard ach ievin g K orea’s reunification and in d ep en d en ce.39 Dmmright not only expected b u t even w elcom ed th e Soviet veto. He observed h ap p ily th at it w o uld have th e “ advantageous effect o f further alienating K orean p eo p le from Soviets an d ren d erin g m ore difficult Soviet attem pts [to ] a tta in h egem o n y” over th e en tire p en ­ insula. Popular h o stility tow ard th e Soviet U nion w as esp ecially desir­ able because o f R hee’s in a b ility to foster p o litical u n ity in South Korea. A powerful co alitio n in th e leg islativ e assem bly h ad surfaced early in 1949 to ch allen ge R h ee’s autho rity. D rum right inform ed Washington th at th e m em bers o f th is “ Ybung G roup” w ere in ten sely nationalistic and therefore h o stile to an y trace o f fo reign d ictatio n . The Young Group dem an d ed im m ed iate A m erican m ilitary w ith ­ drawal and opposed th e ECA pro gram , favo rin g in stead th e achieve­ ment of reunification thro ugh n ego tiatio n s w ith th e N orth K orean regime. To D rum right, th e lead ers o f th is co alitio n w ere hopelessly naive and un realistic because “ th ey do n ot clearly recognize th e nature of Sovietism . . . th e w orld over, an d th e im p o ssib ility o f compromise w ith th e Soviets, w ith o u t com plete loss o f in d ep en ­ dence, democracy, an d , p erhap s, life itself.”40

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A m erican officials in Seoul endeavored to convince members of the \b u n g G roup th a t th e m agnitude o f th e Soviet threat demanded cooperation w ith Rhee. D uring private conversations, Vice-Consuls D avid Mark and G regory H enderson rem inded leaders of the coali­ tio n th a t th e Soviets had stifled democracy in N orth Korea. Logically, th e K orean assem blym en retorted th a t if a negotiated reunification was im possible, th en civil war was inevitable. The American diplo­ m ats insisted to th e contrary th a t eventual amalgamation was posable w ithout violence o r surrender: Korea was a m iniature o f the world. As Korea was split, so was die world. However, it was not certain at all that war between Russia aod America was the inevitable outcom e o f this. Many Americans felt that after a num ber o f years o f tension, the Soviet Union might come to its senses, compromise, and change towards peaceful paths. That was the hope on which American foreign policy was based. Similarly, in Korea, the division m ight be a line o f tension, as now, for a number of yean w ithout erupting into war. Then, if, finally, the United States and Soviet relations im proved, so would N orth and South unify.

A lthough peaceful reunification m ight never occur, Mark and Hen­ derson exhorted these South K orean leaders to work through the U nited N ations for internal political unity and thereby “provide a shining exam ple for N orth K orea, and at th e same time, be strong enough to discourage attack.” 41 Rhee disagreed w ith both th e Vbung G roup and the United States on th e best m ethod for accom plishing reunification. On February 18, th e ROK’s president appointed governors for five provinces in the north, causing speculation th a t an invasion o f North Korea vas im m inent.42 T hen, th e following m onth, Rhee sent Cho Pyöng-ok to W ashington again to plead for m ore m ilitary aid. South Korean Ambassador Chang presented Acheson w ith a memorandum prior to Cho’s arrival outlining th e objectives o f his mission. Rhee’s represen­ tative would request sufficient m ilitary assistance to attain “parity” w ith N orth Korea, thus providing South Korea with the “psychology of safety” requisite for social stability. The memorandum went on to explain that die ROK needed additional m ilitary power to achieve its two historic goals—unification, w ithout which true economic and political independence was impossible, and strength to “contribute our due share as a bastion of democracy in the Far East in combatting

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the overexpanding co m m un istic forces.” T h e R h ee go vern m en t b e­ lieved that the U n ited S tates sh o u ld im p lem en t in S o u th K orea a comprehensive program o f exten sive m ilita ry a id ju s t as it h ad d o n e in Greece.49 Drumright veh em ently opposed an y expansion o f th e ROK’s m ili­ tary capabilities, w arn in g th a t R hee w as b en t on fo rcib le reu n ifica­ tion. Moreover, W ashington h ad to p ersu ad e th e S o u th K orean gov­ ernment to forsake its obsession w ith m ilita ry pow er or sig n ifican t progress toward econom ic an d p o litic a l stren g th w o u ld b e im possi­ ble.44 D rum right’s com m ents p ro b ab ly co n trib u ted to th e ad m in is­ tration’s decision to im press u p o n R hee th e lim ite d n atu re o f th e m il­ itary aid program co n tem p lated fo r th e ROK an d th e im m in en ce o f American w ithdraw al. W ashington also w orried th a t un less it n o tified Rhee, adm inistrative an d lo g istic al p rep aratio n s fo r d ep artu re w ould frighten the South K oreans. A cheson therefore in stru cted M uccio to inform both Rhee an d th e UN CO K o f A m erican in ten tio n s to w ith ­ draw within th e “ next few m onths.” T his m essage w o uld avert an y embarrassment lik ely to resu lt from rum ors p rio r to th e o fficial w ith ­ drawal announcem ent, w h ile en co u ragin g th e K oreans to accept th e decision.4* Muccio already h ad started to p rep are R hee for A m erican d is­ engagement d u rin g m eetin gs im m ed iately after h is retu rn to South Korea. He prom ised th e ROK’s p resid en t th at th e U n ited S tates would provide su b stan tial m ilita ry a id b oth before an d after w ith ­ drawal. On A pril 5, th e am bassador o u tlin ed W ashington ’s p lan s in more detail. Once R hee grasp ed th e lim ite d scope o f th e m ilitary assistance program , h e registered h is d issatisfactio n . R eu n ificatio n , Rhee protested, w ould req u ire a m ore extensive A m erican com m it­ ment. The ROK need ed airp lan es an d com bat sh ip s, n ot w ords, to achieve success. The m ajo rity o f northerners, R hee co n tin u ed , des­ pised Com m unist ru le an d favored u n ity w ith th e so uth. Even th e army would jo in a revolt w hen h e “ gave th e sig n al.” A fter fu rth er d is­ cussions, Muccio convinced R h ee, a t least tem porarily, th at th e United States w ould n ot a lte r its p lan s. H e th en asked th e ROK’s president to state p u b licly th a t A m erican m ilitary assistance w as su ffi­ cient for the preservation o f S o u th K orea’s security. R hee agreed th at such an announcem ent w ould h ave psychological an d p o litica l v alu e. He promised to com ply w ith M uccio’s req u est in a few d ays.46 Following conversations w ith R h ee, M uccio m et w ith th e UNCOK to brief its m em bers on A m erican p lan s for w ith d raw al. T he ROK, h e

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observed, h ad experienced a recent im provem ent in economic and political conditions m aking it possible for the United States to rem ove its occupation forces. Muccio said he hoped the commission w ould observe an d verify A m erican com pliance with the withdrawal provision o f th e U nited N ations resolution o f December 12, 1948. French delegate H enri Costilhcs spoke against American plans for m ilitary disengagem ent. The U nited States, he believed, should rem ain in occupation o f South K orea for five additional years.47Muc­ cio soon confronted an even bigger aggravation than the possibility of th e U NCO K ’s resisting A m erican policy. Rhee now announced that w ithout a m ore “ concrete com m itm ent” for American military assis­ tance, he w ould n o t sanction w ithdraw al. O n April 14, Rhee sent a letter to Muccio form ally requesting th a t th e U nited States reaffirm th e K orean-A m erican treaty o f 1882. A cting on instructions from Acheson, th e A m erican am bassador inform ed Rhee that while time h ad rendered th e earlier agreem ent inoperative, Washington was w illing to negotiate a new treaty. H e again appealed for an official South K orean endorsem ent for Am erican withdraw al.4* A pparently, Muccio m anaged to persuade Rhee to alter his posi­ tio n . A t a press conference on A pril 18, th e ROK's president an­ nounced th a t th e U nited States w ould w ithdraw in the near future, b u t it w ould continue to provide m ilitary aid and advice. Rhee also stated confidently th a t th e constabulary army could repel any attack from th e n o rth .49 A fter a trip to th e southern provinces, however, Rhee changed his m ind and revived his dem ands for more military assistance. H ie ROK required enough equipm ent to arm an addi­ tional 100,000 troops plus 500 m ore Am erican military advisors. Events in C hina only m ade th e situation worse. W hen the Commu­ nist arm ies crossed th e Yangtze River th a t m onth, Rhee declared that unless W ashington provided greater m ilitary aid, he would oppose A m erican disengagem ent. Muccio recom m ended th at the adminis­ tratio n satisfy Rhee's desires, since this was th e price tag for obtaining th e ROK’s support for w ithdraw al. South Korea also appeared to need m ore m ilitary equipm ent, especially for its coast guard. The U nited States, Muccio advised, “ cannot risk being penny wise and pound foolish.” 70 Acheson would n o t knuckle u n d er to Rhee’s dem ands. He instruct­ ed Muccio to announce instead th e form al establishment of the Korean M ilitary Advisory G roup (KM AG), hoping that this measure w ould placate Rhee and bolster South K orean morale. On May 2,

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Muccio presented R hee w ith th e o fficial an n o un cem en t o f th e KMAG. In response to R h ee’s req u est, PK M AG C om m ander R oberts outlined his plans for d ie fu tu re o f th e m ilita ry advisory g ro u p .91 Rhee’s minister o f defense th en p o in ted to events in C h in a, suggest­ ing that W ashington’s p o licy tow ard K orea now req u ired revision. Muccio replied th at w h ile h e d ep lo red th e situ atio n in C h in a, it fu r­ ther reduced the p o ssib ility o f invasio n from th e n orth an d m ig h t provide the ROK w ith “ b reath in g space.’’ W h en th e d efen se m in ister complained that th e U n ited S tates h ad d eserted K orea on tw o p rio r occasions in its history, M uccio co un tered th a t if th e ROK “ set u p a sound, strong and good . . . G overnm ent th a t w ill satisfy th e asp ira­ tions of the Korean peo ple . . . , little tro u b le sh o u ld b e an ticip ated from North Korea.” R hee th en spoke a t len g th ab o u t th e u n certain ty surrounding W ashington’s w illin g n ess to d efen d South K orea. M uc­ cio pointed to the econom ic an d m ilita ry assistance program s as proof of the American com m itm ent to th e ROK. A t th e close o f th e m eet­ ing, however, Rhee said h e h o p ed Iru m an w o uld “ clarify th is situ a­ tion.”« Rhee now was d eterm in ed to force th e U n ited S tates to a lte r its policy. On May 7, h is O ffice o f P u b lic Inform ation released a state­ ment challenging W ashington to d efin e th e exten t o f its com m itm ent to the ROK. President R hee w an ted to know w h eth er South K orea was in the first lin e o f A m erican d efen se. D id th e U n ited States con­ sider an attack on th e ROK eq u iv alen t to an attack on itself? T he announcement also b lam ed W ashington for p erm ittin g th e Soviets to occupy the north, en co uraging a revival o f com m unism in th e so u th , and preventing th e ROK from d evelo p in g th e cap acity for selfdefense. This statem ent in fu riated A cheson. H e an g rily in structed Muccio to inform R hee th a t th e U n ited States considered such p u b lic pressure “not only a grave breach [o f] o rd in ary d ip lo m atic courtesy but also as sharply inconsistent w ith [th e] sp irit [o f] m u tu al frien d ­ liness and good fa ith .” T hese “ u n fo rtu n ate utterances,” A cheson warned, “m ay w ell have serious adverse consequences in term s [o f] pending requests [for] econom ic an d m ilitary a id for K orea.” If R hee persisted in m aking “ ill-co n sid ered ” statem en ts an d “u n realistic” aid requests, the U n ited S tates m ig h t d ecid e to reduce rath er th an expand the size o f its assistance program for South K o rea ." Muccio had alread y to ld R hee th a t he was “ d istu rb ed an d even shocked” at the “ tone an d co n ten t” o f th e recen t governm ent state­ m ent." Yet the am bassador b eliev ed th a t th e ad m in istratio n should

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provide th e ROK w ith m ore m ilitary equipm ent, even combat ships and airplanes. These recom m endations dismayed American military planners, w ho com plained th a t Muccio was allowing Rhee to use ad d itio n al m ilitary assistance as a condition for withdrawal. Louis A. Johnson, th e new secretary o f defense, addressed a letter to Acheson stressing th e im portance o f avoiding “ the unwarranted expense w hich w ill result from fu rth er delay and indecision in this mattet” Previous postponem ents o f O peration Twinbom , he noted, "hare already created serious logistical and budgetary problems.”” Acheson prom ised to consult M uccio regarding th e issue o f withdrawal, but he rem inded Johnson th a t th e State D epartm ent never had agreed to a specific date for departure. T he U nited States had to be patient ot risk losing any chance to achieve its aims in Korea. Simultaneously, Muccio sent another cable to W ashington urging an increase in mili­ tary aid for South K orea. I f th e adm inistration complied with the ROK’s request, he argued, “ I s til l. . . may be able to sell Rhee on our target date thereby avoiding inevitable world censure should we appear to be w ithdraw ing unilaterally.” 56 R hee’s coercive tactics had a decidedly negative impact on Ache­ son. O n May 9 , he advised Muccio th a t additional military aid to the ROK was “ absolutely o u t o f [the] question.” N ot only did the United States lack th e desired equipm ent, b u t it would not permit Rhee to extract a higher price for an endorsem ent o f withdrawal. After receiv­ ing M uccio’s consent, Acheson also approved the Army Department's request to dow ngrade th e security classification of the withdrawal operation from secret to restricted. Now nothing could stop Ameri­ can disengagem ent on Ju n e 30.57 Muccio subsequently infoimed Rhee th a t th e U nited States w ould com plete military withdrawal w ithin th e “ next few weeks.” A lthough there would be no reduction in American aid to South Korea, W ashington did not intend to strengthen th e ROK’s m ilitary capabilities. Rhee explained that while he accepted these decisions, South Korea still needed a strong state­ m ent o f American support to convince th e people that withdrawal was n ot a “ catastrophe.” H e also suggested th a t the United States cre­ ate a “ Pacific Pact” sim ilar to NATO. Muccio cabled Acheson that Rhee, despite his disappointm ent, probably would not attempt to im pede th e com pletion o f disengagem ent.5* W hile M uccio’s assessment o f Rhee’s attitu d e may have been cor­ rect, South Korea’s m inisters o f foreign affairs and defense still were bent on forcing th e U nited States to expand its commitment to

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defend the ROK. O n M ay 19« th e y issued a jo in t statem en t d em an d ­ ing that W ashington p rovide for “ th e ad eq u ate d efen se o f th e Republic of Korea before th ey w ith d raw th e ir forces.” Since th e United States had “created th e 3 8 th p a ra lle l,” it h ad a “ m oral o b lig a­ tion" to ensure South K orea’s m ilita ry p a rity w ith th e Soviet p u p p et regime in the north. M uccio lost little tim e co m p lain in g to R hee th at this statement had created sp ecu latio n in th e press ab o u t a K oreanAmerican rift on th e issue o f w ith d raw al. W h en R hee called in h is foreign m inister for an ex p lan atio n , B en C . L im b (Y im P yö n g-jik ), "in a shrill voice,” scolded th e U n ited S tates for “ se llin g C h in a dow n the river." South K orea’s lead ers h ad th e rig h t, h e ex claim ed , to p ub licize W ashington’s decision to rep eat th e sam e m istakes in K orea. Muccio calm ly observed th a t i f R hee sh ared th ese view s, th en perhaps he should dose th e A m erican em bassy an d leave South K orea. Recognizing that Lim b h ad gone too far, R hee p revailed upon h is defense m inister to apo lo gize to M uccio both for th e statem en t an d for the behavior o f his fello w cab in et m e m b er." Washington was d eterm in ed to co m plete w ith d raw al on sch edule even without the cooperation o f th e ROK. B y th e en d o f M ay, th e United States had transferred th e rem ain in g arm s, am m u n itio n , communications eq u ip m en t, veh icles, an d spare p arts o f th e USAFIK to the constabulary arm y. Faced w ith th e in ev itab le, Foreign M inister Limb held a press conference a n d , in a rem arkab le reversal o f o p in ­ ion, declared that the ROK possessed en o ugh m ilitary pow er “ to con­ quer North Korea w ith in th ree days.” For M uccio, L im b’s rem arks represented “a refreshing contrast to th e stead y stream o f o fficial comment of late ” focusing on South K orea’s m ilitary w eakness.60 Pri­ vately, however, th e R hee governm ent w as d esp erately tryin g to p er­ suade the U nited States to d elay its d ep artu re. Two cab in et m em bers visited Muccio and ap p ealed for a six-m onth postponem ent o f w ith ­ drawal. Rhee sent a fran tic le tte r to M acA rthur p red ictin g an invasion from the north fo llow in g A m erican d isen gagem en t in th e absence o f more m ilitary assistance. S outh K orea, h e p lead ed , was involved in a "fight for its life ” an d n eed ed sh ip s, airp lan es, an d am m un itio n to halt the spread o f com m unism for th e rest o f th e “ free w orld.” A t th e United N ations, Cho Pyöng-ok approached th e A m erican d eleg atio n and begged for a one-year d elay o f w ith d raw al u n til th e ROK was capable o f self-defense.61 Muccio inform ed th e ad m in istratio n th at “ a sense o f crisis bor­ dering on p anic” now p revailed in South K orea. “ C lam our an d fear

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aroused by troop w ithdraw al/’ he sadly confessed, “have far exceeded m y expectations.” U nless W ashington found a way to reassure the ROK, th e U nited States could expect th e next three weeb to be extrem ely unpleasant. For th e adm inistration, the antics of South K orea’s leaders to force a postponem ent o f withdrawal were intolera­ ble. O n Ju n e 2, U ndersecretary o f State Jam es E. Webb handed C hang an aide-m ém oire protesting th e ROK’s distribution of errone­ ous inform ation deprecating th e extent o f American military support and th e size o f th e constabulary army. Constant references to the ROK’s m ilitary weakness, W ebb w arned, would destroy the will of th e South K orean people to resist an invasion and therefore courted disaster. W ashington w ould n o t change its plans for withdrawal. In conclusion, W ebb lectured th e ROK’s am bassador that no amount of m ilitary assistance w ould guarantee th e survival o f South Korea if the general populace was n o t determ ined to prevent a Communist sei­ zure o f power.62 O n Ju n e 6, Muccio m et w ith Rhee and discussed Webb’s protest. The ROK’s president claim ed th a t he now had abandoned further efforts to delay A m erican w ithdraw al. The following day, however, Rhee form ally asked th e U nited States to create a “Pacific Pact" devoted to blocking C om m unist expansion in Asia. When it became clear th a t an unqualified guarantee o f m ilitary protection from the U nited States was n o t forthcom ing, th e Rhee government resumed its cam paign to delay th e departure o f th e American occupation force. T hroughout the m onth o f Ju n e, th e ROK sponsored mass demonstra­ tions protesting W ashington’s decision to withdraw. South Korean leaders em phasized th at th e U nited States had an obligation to ensure th e survival o f th e ROK as a crucial bastion o f democracy in Asia. Refugees from N orth Korea were particularly vocal in demand­ ing additional m ilitary assistance and a firm pledge of American pro­ tection. The Com m unist regim e in N orth Korea, they feared, had m arked them for im m ediate execution after the invasion and con­ quest o f South K orea.69 D espite these appeals, th e adm inistration refused to alter its plans for w ithdrawal before Ju n e 30. W hile acknowledging the possibility o f arm ed invasion from the north, American leaders believed that the U nited States could ensure th e survival o f th e ROK without having to rely on its m ilitary power. Ju st prior to w ithdrawal, Truman’s military advisors prepared a detailed study discussing American alternatives in the face o f an open assault across th e 38th parallel. The paper began

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with a consideration o f th ree im m ed iate courses o f possible fu tu re action in Korea. The U n ited S tates co u ld “ encourage th e R hee Gov­ ernment to attem pt th e p eacefu l u n ificatio n o f K orea b y d irect n ego ­ tiations w ith the N orth K orean regim e.” W h ile possessing obvious propaganda v alu e, n eith er governm ent w as lik e ly to accept th is a lte r­ native. If the n ego tiatio n o p tio n w as “ tested , tried an d unsuccess­ ful,” the U nited States m ig h t consider o rg an izin g a K orean u n d er­ ground task force to o perate in th e n o rth , tak in g ad van tage o f popular hostility to th e C om m unist regim e an d in stig atin g a reb el­ lion. North Korea could use th is o p eratio n , th e stu d y cau tio n ed , to justify not only continued subversion in th e south b u t even an in v a­ sion. American m ilitary experts d e fin ite ly p referred th e th ird altern a­ tive, which provided o n ly for A m erican w arships to m ake p erio d ic visits to South K orea.64 The rem ainder o f th e report discussed a v ariety o f options av ailab le to the U nited States after an open N orth K orean assau lt across th e 38th parallel. S ign ifican tly, th e stu d y assum ed th a t N orth K orea d id not possess “ th e cap ab ility o f su stain ed an d com prehensive m ilitary operations w ithout C hinese C om m unist an d Soviet-M anchurian a id and support.” If th e U n ited S tates chose n o t to counter an “ a ll-o u t” invasion, Com m unist forces m ig h t destroy th e ROK an d conquer th e entire peninsula. To avoid in tern atio n al “ recrim in atio n ,” th e U n ited States would have to tak e som e p o sitive actio n . T he p ap er’s first rec­ ommendation was th at in th e event o f an in vasio n , W ashington should evacuate a ll A m erican citizen s an d m ilitary advisors from Korea. Then th e U n ited S tates sh o u ld refer th e m atter p ro m ptly to the United N ations an d req u est an em ergency session o f th e Security Council. This m easure w ould u n d erlin e th e “ in tern atio n al ch aracter” of the situation an d avoid “ th e onus o f U .S . u n ila te ra l resp o n sib ility and action.” D espite th e lik elih o o d o f d elay, in actio n , an d a Soviet veto, the adm inistratio n co uld ign o re th e U n ited N ations o n ly at th e risk o f destroying th e in tern atio n al o rgan izatio n . Far m ore im por­ tant, this course o f action w o uld force Moscow to d eclare p u b licly its “cooperative or non-cooperative in ten tio n s.”65 Since A m erican m ilitary lead ers h ad so ugh t previously to lim it United States com m itm ents in K orea, it w as n ot surp risin g th at th e authors o f this p ap er opposed an y fu rth er steps o f a p ositive n atu re. The study dism issed, for ex am p le, th e altern ativ e o f u n d ertak in g a “police action” w ith th e sanction o f th e U n ited N ations an d m u ltin a­ tional p articip ation . A lth o u gh th is option w ould fo rtify th e in tern a-

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tional organization an d m ig h t even d eter fu tu re acts o f aggression, it also w ould require congressional approval and therefore entail disas­ trous delays. A m erican participation w ould deplete the manpower and m aterial resources o f th e U nited States at a dangerous moment in European affairs as w ell. Consequently, th e paper recommended mil­ itary participation in a “ police action” as a last resort alone and only w ith “com plete cooperation and fu ll participation by other mem­ b ers” « Predictably, th e study advised against unilateral military interven­ tio n . A n A m erican “ task force” w ould com m and universal respect and inspire anti-C om m unist m ovem ents in other countries. Further­ m ore, it “ m ight have sufficient deterrent effect to cause North K orean w ithdraw al to th e 38th parallel and obviate police action engagem ent.” O n th e o th er h an d , unilateral intervention would rees­ tablish A m erican responsibility for K orea after th e United States had struggled for five years to extricate itself from th e peninsula. Perhaps worse, if th e U nited States intervened, th e paper warned propheti­ cally, this step m ight force C hina to align itself openly with North K orea and thus “ lead to a long andcosdy involvem ent of U.S. forces in an undeclared war.” A decision to send American combat troops back to Korea therefore w ould constitute unsound policy with ad­ verse m ilitary im plications. A t th e same tim e, if Washington resorted to unilateral m ilitary action, it w ould justify Soviet charges of Ameri­ can im perialism and m ight lead to a third world war.67 Finally, th e study assessed th e logic o f extending to the ROK an unqualified guarantee o f Am erican m ilitary protection. While such a pledge m ight d eter a N orth K orean invasion, it also would require a conversion from indirect economic aid to th e direct supply of large am ounts o f m ilitary equipm ent to South Korea. It would be “mili­ tarily undesirable and strategically unsound,” th e paper stressed, to divert m ilitary aid to th e &OK from areas w ith a higher priority. The U nited States would be sponsoring as well a government that ap­ peared unable to m aintain popular support. More im portant, in con­ trast to Greece, Korea is a liberated a n a which did not contribute to the victory and it is in the opinion of the Joint Chiefs o f Staff o f litde strategic value. Tb apply the Truman Doctrine to Korea would require prodigious effort and vast expenditure far out o f proportion to die benefits to be expected.

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In summary, the stud y advised th a t i f econom ic a id could n ot foster stability in the ROK, it w as not w orth th e cost o f m ilitary protection. After reviewing th e p ap er, th e JC S n o ted th a t th e stu d y’s conclusions were consistent w ith its p o sitio n on K orea’s relatio n sh ip to A m erican security interests. The JC S em p h asized th a t “ an y com m itm ent to United States use o f m ilitary force in K orea w o uld b e ill-ad v ised an d impractical in view o f th e p o ten tialitie s o f th e o verall w orld situ atio n and of our heavy in tern atio n al o b lig atio n s as com pared w ith our cur­ rent m ilitary strength.” 6* Washington’s absolute refusal to extend an u n q u alified gu aran tee of m ilitary protection to South K orea gave th e appearance th a t th e United States w ould stan d asid e as th e C om m unist em pire absorbed the ROK. But w h ile A m erican lead ers w ere d eterm in ed to w ithd raw , they rem ained firm ly co m m itted to p ro vid in g South K orea w ith extensive econom ic, m ilitary, an d tech n ical assistance. T he ad m in is­ tration’s approach m akes sense o n ly in th e context o f a series o f key policy assum ptions. Trum an an d h is advisors, for «cam p le, w ere con­ vinced that the Soviet U nion w o uld not p erm it N orth K orea to stage an armed invasion. A ccordingly, th e co n tain m en t o f C om m unist expansion in Korea d id not seem to req u ire th e d irect ap p licatio n o f American m ilitary power. R ather, th e U n ited S tates w ould h elp th e ROK to achieve th e econom ic stren gth an d p o litical u n ity necessary for the m aintenance o f self-d efen se. D om estic p o litical pressure in the U nited States co n trib u ted to th e ad m in istratio n ’s decision to rely on lim ited m eans. If Trum an gran ted R hee’s req u est for an u n q u ali­ fied guarantee o f m ilitary pro tection , C h ian g K ai-shek’s frien d s in Congress could argu e w ith com plete ju stificatio n th a t sim ilar action in China w ould have prevented th e triu m p h o f C om m unist forces over the K uom intang. Truman's strategy in K orea co uld not succeed unless Congress agreed to finance h is aid program for th e ROK. O n Ju n e 7 ,1 9 4 9 , th e adm inistration announced th a t it w ould ask for $150 m illio n in eco­ nomic and tech n ical assistance for South K orea. T he press release included the first o fficial reference to th e fact th at th e U n ited States would w ithdraw its occupation forces from K orea in the very near future. The ad m in istratio n ’s decision to announce m ilitary d is­ engagement sim ultan eo usly w ith its aid program for th e ROK was not coincidental. T he press release sp ecifically p o in ted to A m erican plans for assistance as proof th at “ th is w ithdraw al in no w ay ind icates a lessening o f U n ited States in terest in th e R epublic o f K orea, but

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lath er another step tow ard th e norm alization o f relations with that republic and a com pliance on th e p art o f the U nited Sûtes with the . . . D ecem ber 12 resolution o f th e G eneral Assembly.” In conjunc­ tion w ith th e UNCOK, th e U nited S û tes would continue to work for th e achievem ent o f a free and u n ited K orea.69 A dm inistration officials anticipated th a t Congress would not ap­ prove th e K orean aid request w ithout a fight, especially from the Republicans. U ndersecretary W ebb therefore advised Ihim an to send a special message to Congress em phasizing the vital importance of assistance for South K orea and th e necessity for immediate passage of th e bill. T he State D epartm ent already had drafted such a statement and had secured th e approval o f th e EGA and the Bureau of the Bud­ g e t.70 Ih im an acted on W ebb’s recom m endation and transmitted a personal appeal to Congress for th e continuation o f assistance to the ROK past Ju n e 30,1949- T he U nited S û tes, th e president explained, was helping to build a m ilitary force in South Korea capable of selfdefense “ short o f an aggressive war supported by a major power.” But w ithout sustained A m erican assistance, Truman predicted, the ROK w ould collapse “ inevitably and rapidly.” 71 Trum an’s message then focused on th e Korean aid program itself. T he U nited States, he prom ised w ould pursue genuine economic recovery and developm ent, rather than m ere relief. Modeled after the M arshall Plan, th e program w ould cost only slighdy more than main­ taining th e previous approach and would eventuate in economic selfsufficiency. Trum an th en revealed th e w ider significance of his Kore­ an strategy in a rem arkable statem ent th a t deserves quotation at length: Korea has become a testing ground in which the validity and practical value o f the ideals and principles o f democracy which the Republic [of Korea] is putting into practice are being matched against the practices o f communism which have been imposed upon the people of north Korea. The survival and progress o f the Republic toward a self-support­ ing, sab le economy will have an immense and far-reaching influence on the people o f Asia. Such progress by the young Republic will encourage the people o f southern and southeastern Asia and the islands of the Pacific to resist and reject the Communist propaganda with which they are besieged. Moreover, the Korean Republic, by dem­ onstrating the success and tenacity o f democracy in resisting commu­ nism, will stand as a beacon to the people o f northern Asia in resisting the control of the communist forces which have overrun them.

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If Congress approved assistance for S o u th K orea, H um an stated confidently, the U nited States w o uld be a b le to tak e a m ajor step tow ard achieving peace an d dem ocracy th ro u gh o u t A sia .72 On the eve o f A m erican m ilita ry w ith d raw al, th e fu tu re o f South Korea no longer was a p erip h eral issue for Trum an and h is advisors; now it had come to assum e g reat im p o rtan ce. To an ex ten t, th is change was an outgrow th o f dom estic p o litical pressures in th e United States. The failu re o f th e R ep u b lican p arty to cap tu re th e presidency in 1948 h ad erased th e last rem nants o f b ip artisan sh ip in foreign affairs. T he Trum an ad m in istratio n therefore recognized from the outset th a t it w ould o b tain congressional approval for th e Korean aid package o n ly w ith co n siderable d ifficu lty. W orse s till, th e supporters o f C hiang K ai-shek w o uld seize up o n th e K orean issue to focus public atten tio n on th e ad m in istratio n ’s resp o n sib ility for th e Communist victory in C h in a.79 In his m essage to C ongress, Trum an w as attem p tin g to p revent his critics from gain in g enough b ackin g to block passage o f th e K orean aid bill. U ltim ately, if th e assistance program w as a success an d th e ROK survived, th e ad m in istratio n co uld refu te R epublican charges that Thiman’s foreign p o licy in v ited disaster. Yet th e p resid en t’s m es­ sage also showed th at by th e sum m er o f 1949, K orea occupied a cen­ tral position in W ashington’s o verall approach in A sia. If South K orea were able to achieve p o litical an d econom ic progress w ith A m erican assistance, itjso o u ld ^ p ro yejh at th e U n ited States could h alt fu rth er Soviet expansion in A sia w ith o u t an u n q u alified com m itm ent o f power. For Trum an, th e success o f con tainm en t in K orea was th ere­ fore im portant for both p o litical an d d ip lo m atic reasons, d esp ite th e obvious risks.

CHAPTER

9

Prom ise a n d Performance

O n Ju n e 29, 1949. th e U nited States w ithdrew the last of its combat forces from K orea, th u s ending m ore than three years of military occupation. Embassy C hargé Everett E D m m right noted in a able to W ashington th a t South K orea's leaders undoubtedly “shared the em otions o f a second-string quarterback who suddenly finds himself carrying th e ball after m onths o f criticizing from the bench.”1Ameri­ can leaders were confident, however, th a t th e ROK could survive w ithout Am erican m ilitary protection. Indeed, during the first half o f 1949, W ashington had received a num ber o f optimistic dispatches from Seoul reporting progress tow ard economic recovery and political stability. W hile th e constabulary army had nearly eliminated guerrilla activity in South K orea, international diplom atic support had stimu­ lated increasing self-confidence in th e Rhee government.2 But the adm inistration's expectations were no t entirely negative in nature, since many officials anticipated th a t containm ent in Korea would act as a liberating force. Eventually, th e N orth Koreans would recognize th e superiority o f South K orea’s political and economic system, over­ throw th e Com m unist regim e in th e north, and appeal for reunifiation under the ROK. South Korea’s perform ance after American withdrawal never seemed to justify th e adm inistration’s confidence in the promise of containm ent through lim ited m eans. Rhee’s penchant for political repression was particularly em barrassing in this regard. During May 1949, the ROK’s president ordered th e im prisonm ent of several news­ paper editors who were vocal proponents o f early American military w ithdraw al.2 Dissidents in th e South Korean legislative assembly, especially th e \b u n g G roup, were determ ined to prevent Rhee from further expanding his political authority. Friction between the execu­ tive and the legislature had surfaced in the past, but now relations between the two branches experienced a com plete breakdown. When

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Rhee blocked an in vestigatio n o f a lle g e d co rruption in h is ad m in is­ tration, the legislative assem b ly voted n ot to conduct an y fu rth er business u n til it o b tain ed g reater control over th e m em bers o f R h ee’s cabinet.4 Rhee also was at odds w ith th e Y bung G roup over th e role o f th e UNCOK in achieving reu n ificatio n . In Ju n e , m em b ers o f th e com ­ mission visited the 38th, p ara lle l an d attem p ted to contact th e N orth Korean governm ent. A fter w arn in g the. UNCOK to leav e, N orth Korean troops fired on. th e com m ission m em bers. R anshofen-W ert­ heimer now told Jo h n R G ardiner, first secretary a t th e A m erican embassy, that th e UNCOK w o uld leave K orea as soon as it h ad veri­ fied W ashington’s m ilitary d isen g ag em en t.9 K im Y ak-su, a lead er o f the Young G roup, u rged th e UN CO K to stay, arg u in g th a t un less th e United Nations achieved reu n ificatio n , a K orean civ il w ar w as in ev i­ table. In response, th e UNCOK agreed to m ake one fin a l ap p eal to North Korea for cooperation. L ate in Ju n e , th e com m ission fo rm ally proposed in tern atio n ally supervised election s thro ugho ut K orea for representatives to a u n ified go vern m en t.6 These efforts a t ach ievin g a reco n ciliatio n w ith th e N orth K oreans so angered Rhee th a t h e d ecid ed to silen ce th e Y>ung G roup p er­ manently. On Ju n e 2 1 , th e ROK’s p resid en t ordered th e police to arrest six o f its m em bers on charges o f conspiring w ith N orth K orea to overthrow the governm ent. T he fo llo w in g day, p o lice im prisoned Kim Yak-su.7 T hen, on Ju n e 2 6 , an arm y officer assassinated K im Ku, who had been p u sh in g for n ego tiatio n s betw een th e ROK an d North Korea. R hee d en ied ' co m p licity in th e k illin g , p o in tin g out that the assassin was a m em ber o f K im K u’s own p o litical party. N ev­ ertheless, the in cid en t com bined w ith recent im prisonm ents in d ica­ ted that d isagreein g w ith th e R hee governm ent could e n tail very unpleasant consequences.8 During discussions w ith R hee, M uccio co m p lained th at th e latest resort to p o litical repression w as d am agin g th e ROK’s im age before the world com m unity. T he ROK’s p resid en t agreed th at th e arrests were unfortunate, b u t h e in sisted th a t extrem e m easures w ere neces­ sary because South K orea was “ fig h tin g for life again st [th e] C om m u­ nist m enace.” For D ru m righ t, R h ee’s m otives w ere p aten tly p o litical, since Kim Yak-su h ad been h is ch ie f nem esis for som e tim e. M ore im portant, it was w rong to p u n ish in d iv id u als who h ad contributed gready to stren gth en in g dem ocracy in South K orea. A lth o ugh th e Young Group was n ot actin g to prevent a C om m unist takeover,

CHAPTER9

D rum right observed, “ th e ir criticism s, if over-emotional, generally h ad a plausible basis; an d th e ir support o f such popular measures as th e local adm inistration an d land reform bills, against the conserva­ tives, was in strum ental in passing th e legislation.” American pleas for m oderation h ad no effect on R hce. In July, th e police arrested seven m ore assem blym en in an o th er b latan t attem pt to stifle criticism. D rum right reported th a t R hee now could dictate to the legislative assembly.9 Events in N o rth K orea w ere to som e extent responsible for the increasing political repression in th e ROK. In anticipation of Ameri­ can w ithdraw al, th e DPRK accelerated its propaganda program for w eakening th e ROK. O n Ju n e 2 8 ,1 9 4 9 , N orth Korea announced the form ation o f a “ U nited K orean D em ocratic Fatherland Front” dedi­ cated to reunification u n d er C om m unist rule through force if neces­ sary. C om m unists in th e n o rth and south also joined forces in a new “ W orker's Party” w ith K im II Sung as chairm an and Pak Hön-yöngas vice-chairm an. O n Ju ly 7, th e DPRK dem anded the immediate and to tal w ithdraw al o f b oth th e U nited States and the UNCOK from the peninsula. Furtherm ore, it appealed to th e people o f South Korea to revolt and oust th e Rhee governm ent from power as a necessary pre­ cursor to reunification. T he N o rth K orean governm ent promised free elections thro u g h o u t K orea no later th an Septem ber 1 5 ,1949-10 These disturbing events, coupled w ith Rhee’s frantic, last-minute m aneuvers to im pede A m erican m ilitary w ithdraw al, further compli­ cated th e adm inistration’s task o f obtaining approval for economic assistance to South K orea. D uring hearings before the House Com­ m ittee on Foreign A ffairs, however, H um an's advisors consistently stressed th a t th e K orean aid program offered the promise of ultimate success in Korea and elsewhere in Asia. O n Ju n e 8, Undersecretary W ebb referred to th e w ider significance o f th e ROK when he pre­ dicted th a t Am erican assistance to South Korea would foster reunifi­ cation on a dem ocratic basis and thereby inspire millions of Asians. A lthough there were no guarantees o f success, Communist domi­ nance throughout Korea was a certainty w ithout American help. ECA D irector H offm an then appeared before th e House committee and oudined th e adm inistration ’s three-year program . He echoed Webb’s com m ents on th e im portance o f South K orea, labeling the ROK the “ key outpost o f democracy in th e Far East today.” The Korean aid plan, he avowed, would be cheaper than m ere relief over the long haul. H offm an th en m entioned th e prom ise o f eventual liberation of

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North Korea when he reasoned th a t reunification “ o f th e country can be achieved on satisfactory term s only if th e G overnm ent and econ­ omy of south Korea become so clearly vigorous and sound as to con­ vince the people o f north Korea th a t th eir best interests lie in union” 11 Republican critics o f the ad m in istratio n in stan tly grasped the Korean assistance program as a m eans to in d ict H um an ’s C h in a p o l­ icy. These congressmen argued th at C h in a was as m uch a sym bol o f democracy in A sia as K orea, yet the ad m in istratio n had done little to prevent a Com m unist victory in th at n atio n . In rep ly to W ebb’s p re­ sentation, W alter Ju d d o f M innesota stated cau stically th at “ K orea is the first o f the rat holes th at we w ill have to pour m oney into a ll around China if we do not p lu g th e basic rat hole in C h in a.” Both Judd and Lawrence Sm ith o f W isconsin declared th eir opposition to the Korean aid request unless th e State D epartm ent clarified its Asian policy.12 O ne w eek later, W ebb again appeared before th e House com m ittee to defend th e ad m in istratio n ’s policy. T he failu re of democracy in C h in a, he ad m itted , was regrettab le b ut not the con­ sequence of insufficient A m erican aid . C h ian g K ai-shek had chosen not to im plem ent reform s and thus lost th e confidence o f the C hinese people. In K orea, on the other h an d , th e U n ited States could con­ tribute to the spread o f dem ocracy w h ile strength en ing th e U nited Nations. The best weapon again st Soviet expansionism , W ebb con­ cluded, was A m erican assistance for th e realizatio n o f prosperity and self-government in the underdeveloped nations o f th e w o rld .19 Congressional opponents o f th e K orean aid b ill then shifted th eir attack to the threat o f invasion from the north after A m erican m ili­ tary w ithdraw al. On Ju n e 17, Jo h n D . Lodge o f C onnecticut charged that it was m eaningless to “ talk sim ply about how econom ic aid w ill help them to resist com m unism and then m ake up our m inds th at we intend to dim inish our forces.” To sub stan tiate his argum en t, Lodge pointed to a recent article in Tim e m agazine discussing p o litical instability in the ROK and th e incredib le size o f the N orth Korean army. M ajor G eneral C harles L. B oite, director o f A rm y D epartm ent planning and operations, insisted th at the article exaggerated the dangerousness o f the situ atio n . T he South K orean arm y had per­ formed effectively in scattered m ilitary engagem ents at the 38th par­ allel and now was “far b etter eq uipp ed than the N orth K orean troops.” O ther A m erican m ilitary officials advocated econom ic assis­ tance to South Korea despite the absence o f A m erican troops. The

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ROK’s survival, they argued vaguely, possessed “ indirect'’ impor­ tance for A m erican m ilitary security. Trum an’s m ilitary experts agreed th a t th e Soviet U nion could conquer th e ROK “without any great m ilitary difficulty,” b u t they im plied th a t an open invasion of South K orea was unlikely.14 Trum an could n o t p erm it a prolonged debate over the Korean aid package because he w ould be unable to use GARIOA funds after Ju n e 30, 1949- Consequently, th e president m et with congressional leaders privately an d attem p ted to convince them of the absolute necessity for quick passage. K orea was th e last “ foothold of democ­ racy” in northeast A sia, h e rem arked during discussions, and the people o f Asia w ould be less w illing to resist Soviet expansionism if th e ROK collapsed. A lthough th e D em ocratic leaders emerged from th e m eeting w ith confident predictions about the chances for approv­ al, Trum an could n o t w ait.11 O n Ju n e 23, Secretary o f State Acheson appeared before th e H ouse com m ittee in a final effort to gain passage before th e deadline. Acheson testified th a t even w ithout American m ilitary protection, South K orea w ould be able to “hold [its] own against th e northern K oreans." T he ROK’s future survival depended upon th e achievem ent o f econom ic self-sufficiency, however, and this w ould require a continuation o f A m erican economic assistance. The U nited States, Acheson to ld his listeners, could no t abandon South Korea because it “ stands as a sym bol o f h o p e” for the rest of Asia.14 D espite th e adm inistration’s appeals for rapid action, it was dear th a t Congress w ould n o t approve th e K orean aid bill prior to the June 30 deadline. B udget D irector Lawton therefore proposed that Hu­ m an request supplem ental assistance for tw o m onths “at the going rate.” In th e m eantim e, Congress presum ably would authorize the entire package. O n Ju n e 30, Congress passed a jo in t resolution pro­ viding for a one-m onth extension o f A m erican assistance to South K orea u nder th e 1949 Foreign A id A ppropriations Act. The follow­ ing day, th e adm inistration registered an even m ore im portant victory w hen th e H ouse C om m ittee on Foreign Affairs recommended ap­ proval o f th e Korean aid b ill.17 The five Republican members of the com m ittee, however, issued a m inority report opposing the assistance program . A lthough th eir prim ary m otives were blatantly partisan, these congressmen nonetheless offered a valid and realistic critique of th e Trum an adm inistration’s policy in Korea. In their m inority report, th e Republicans claim ed th at political fac­ tionalism and dom estic violence south o f th e 38th parallel meant the

economic assistance program w o uld b e “foredoom ed to failu re.“ Although the ad m in istratio n a d m itted th a t th e ROK w o uld n ot sur­ vive a major C om m unist m ilitary assau lt, it h ad w ithdraw n A m erican troops “at the very in stan t w hen lo gic an d com m on sense both demanded no retreat.“ U nless th e U n ited S tates “ is p repared to m eet force with com parable force,“ th e report co n clu d ed , “ econom ic assis­ tance cannot o f itse lf in sure th e safety or th e in te g rity o f South Korea.” In fact, th e ad m in istratio n ’s assistance program w o uld “ o n ly enhance the prize to be taken by force o f arm s an d in tern al in trig u e.” While South Korea w ould be th e “ lo g ical ’show case’ for th e w ares o f democracy in the O rient,” th e report p red icted th a t th e ROK w ould be unable to w ithstand th e aggressive p o litical tactics o f Moscow because o f the “ surrounding clim ate o f ram p an t C om m unism .” T he Thiman ad m inistration’s efforts to construct a “ d ik e o f san d ” in Korea, the R epublicans asserted d ram atically, w o uld n ot stem th e “tides which threaten to w ash aw ay th e fo un d ation s o f every co n stitu­ tional governm ent in A sia.“ 18 Adm inistration o fficials h ad know n a ll alo n g th a t th e R epublicans would not perm it au th o rizatio n o f a id to K orea w ith o u t a fig h t. Rather than risk even greater o pp o sitio n , th ey h ad not resisted pas­ sage of the Lodge am en d m en t, p ro vid in g for th e term in atio n o f assis­ tance if Com m unists jo in ed th e R hee governm ent. B y J u ly 8 , C lark Clifford had n o tified th e p resid en t th a t th e K orean aid b ill was a “rather urgent m atter.” U nless Trum an exerted strong lead ersh ip , th e Republican p arty w ould exp lo it th e K orean issue to attack h is C h in a policy and thereby d iscred it th e ad m in istratio n . Trum an discussed the situation im m ed iately w ith several D em ocratic congressm en. These leaders p red icted th a t th e floor d eb ate in th e H ouse w ould be intense and the fin a l vote ex trem ely close. T hus th ey w ere leery o f forcing the aid b ill o u t o f th e R ules C o m m ittee “ because o f p o ssib il­ ity of defeat on th e floor.” B y th e en d o f Ju ly , th e ad m in istratio n h ad no choice but to request an o th er extension o f th e in terim a id pro­ gram for K orea. In th e en d , C ongress approved an appropriation o f funds to provide tem porary econom ic assistance to th e ROK thro ugh February 1 5 ,1 9 5 0 .« In Korea, Syngm an R hee carefu lly w atched these discussions and attempted to encourage favorable actio n . In h is p u b lic statem en ts, h e pledged that South K orea w ould fig h t “ to th e last m an ” in defense of its liberty. W hen th e H ouse com m ittee passed th e Lodge am end­ ment, Rhee was ecstatic. H e q u ick ly issued a p u b lic prom ise never to

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ap p o in t a C om m unist to his cab in et.10 lb th e administration’s cha­ g rin , Rhee apparently concluded th a t he now could resume his cam paign o f political repression in th e nam e o f anticommunism. In July, police arrested several new sm en who had cooperated with the U NCO K an d allegedly h ad expressed opinions reflecting “the Com­ m unist line.” 11 Acheson angrily instructed Muccio to inform Rhee th a t th e activities o f these new sm en “ cannot in our view be regarded by any civilized standards as constituting offense, however, slight against ROK.” Furtherm ore, n o t only did “ such arbitrary action” tar­ nish South K orea’s intern atio n al im age, b u t it also strengthened the hands o f those w ho opposed th e K orean aid bill and made passage of th e program “ m uch m ore difficult.” W hen Muccio conveyed Acheson’s opinions to R hee, th e p resident o f th e ROK agreed to halt the arrests. South K orean officials continued to insist, however, that extrem e m easures were necessary for th e preservation of internal secu­ rity.11 For Rhee, N orth K orea’s new propaganda cam paign to discredit his governm ent justified an increase in m ilitary assistance for the ROK. In W ashington, Cho Py6ng-ok requested sufficient equipment to enlarge th e constabulary arm y to 100,000. Moreover, the ROK still w anted “ a specific assurance th a t th e U nited States would come to th e defense o f th e R epublic o f K orea in th e event o f an armed attack against it.” Acheson stated bluntly th a t such a com m itm ent was “out o f th e question.” 13 U ndaunted, Rhee kep t u p his pressure on the adm inistration, inviting C hiang K ai-shek and th e president of the Philippines to visit South K orea for discussions regarding the forma­ tion o f a “ Far East Security Pact.” Early in A ugust, Chiang arrived in th e ROK and conferred w ith Rhee. The two leaders emerged from th eir m eeting jointly urging th e early creation o f an anti-Communist alliance in A sia.14 B ut th e adm inistration still w ould n o t alter its policy. On August 11, for exam ple, Trum an twice refused to com m ent on the logic of R hee’s proposal for a Pacific Pact. O n Septem ber 26, the president sent a personal reply to Rhee’s m ost recent request for more military equipm ent. In his letter, Trum an n oted th a t the United States already had given South Korea substantial m ilitary aid including a large num ber o f advisors. Far m ore im portant, W ashington believed th a t “ th e security o f the Republic o f Korea can best be served by the developm ent o f an efficient, com pact Korean force rather than by amassing large m ilitary forces which w ould be an insupportable bur-

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den on the econom y o f th e country.” 25 C ertain ly, S o u th K orea co u ld not charge th at th e ad m in istratio n w as n eg lectin g its defense estab ­ lishment. On J u ly 2 5 , T rum an h ad su b m itted th e M u tu al D efense Appropriations Program (M D A P) to C ongress, a proposal w hich induded m ilitary assistance for th e ROK. In h is m essage req u estin g prompt approval, th e p resid en t p o in ted o u t th a t South K orea con­ fronted a serious th reat o f invasion an d n eed ed en o ugh eq u ip m en t to deter an attack. If C ongress passed h is p ro p osal, th e ROK w o uld be able to m aintain “ a sm all force to p ro tect its in tern al secu rity an d defend itself again st o utsid e aggression short o f fu ll scale war.” 26 Some Am erican o fficials endorsed a d d itio n al m ilita ry a id to South Korea only w ith deep m isgivin gs. O n J u ly 19, th e N SC staff received an intelligence report observing th a t th e “ p red o m in an t tren d in Korea is toward com plete C om m unist co n tro l” an d th is process “ m ay be accelerated by th e in efficien cy an d sh o rtsigh ted au th o ritarian ism which characterize th e R ep u b lic’s efforts to restrain C om m unism in its territory.” R ather th an lau n ch in g an open in vasio n , how ever, Mos­ cow probably w ould co n tin ue to rely on “ psychological w arfare, harassing border in cid en ts an d g u e rrilla operations thro ugh o ut th e Republic.” As a resu lt, th ere w as a chance th a t th e ROK co uld sur­ vive, particularly w ith A m erican assistance an d “ th e developm ent o f traditional K orean attitu d es an d stan dards th a t are in co m p atib le w ith Communism.” A n A rm y D ep artm en t stu d y offered sp ecific reasons for avoiding an open-ended co m m itm en t. F irst, if th e U n ited States limited the ROK’s su p p ly o f reserve m ilitary eq u ip m en t, R hee w ould not be able to stage a su stain ed invasion in to N orth K orea. Second, the constabulary arm y h ad b een w asteful in its use o f m ilita ry su p ­ plies and now w ould have to exercise restrain t. F in ally, in th e even t o f a North Korean assault th e U n ited S tates w o uld lose less eq u ip m en t to the Com m unist reg im e .27 In all p ro b ab ility, A m erican m ilita ry lead ers based th e ir recom ­ mendations to som e ex ten t on ad vice received from th e com m ander of the KMAG. G en eral R oberts o pp o sed, fo r ex am p le, R h ee’s req u est for large tanks because o f th e lim ite d w eig h t cap acity o f b rid ges in South K orea. A t a press conference in Ju n e 1949, R oberts w en t in to more d etail: M echanization is u n n ecessary in th is co u n try as it is to o h illy , to o m an y m ountains, a n d rice fie ld s. T anks c o u ld o n ly b e u se d o n ro ad s. . . . They can b e sto p p e d b y o b stacles, m in e s, b azo o k as, a n d [a n tita n k ]

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guns. . . . Gadgets do not win wan. Good solid infantry training under good officers will adequately defend [South Korea].3*

Thus, the American military assistance program would seek to create a relatively small and efficient force well schooled in military tech­ niques. The administration intended to provide the ROK only with essential military assistance for the maintenance of internal security and an effective deterrent.*» R hee’s belligerence buttressed W ashington's determination to lim­ it m ilitary assistance to th e ROK. D uring A ugust, Roberts reported th a t th e South K orean arm y was responsible for recent border incidents because it had established salients north o f the 38th parallel. W hile opposing any expansion o f th e American military aid pro­ gram , he also w arned Rhee th a t if th e ROK launched an offensive in to N orth K orea, “ all advisors w ill p u ll o u t and the ECA spigot will be tu rn ed off.” Roberts had other com plaints about the constabulary army. Many o f its officers were political appointees who lacked mili­ tary expertise, loved cerem onies, and were preoccupied with rank and status. Worse still, th e South Koreans in general resisted American advice. Rhee’s high-pow ered recruitm ent program also had attracted people o f quesdonable ability and intendons for the constabulary army. W hen th e ROK requested tanks, heavy artillery, and mote am m unition in Septem ber, Roberts again registered a sharp dissent. Approval o f th e proposal w ould n o t increase the ROK’s security but instead m ight "encourage an invasion o f N orth Korea by South Korean arm ed forces.” 50 Surprisingly, Muccio d id n ot agree w ith Roberts that South Korea had enough m ilitary equipm ent. Throughout the period following American w ithdraw al, th e am bassador prodded the administration to provide additional m ilitary aid, including patrol boats and subma­ rine chasers, to th e ROK. For Muccio, an expansion o f assistance for th e constabulary army was especially im portant because of the neces­ sity to control guerrilla operations in South Korea. If the United S û tes failed to provide m ore support, he w arned, the Communists would continue “ to create terror and chaos in th e south, the ultimate objective o f which is unm istakably to insure Soviet control of the South Korean peninsula and thus w ipe ou t non-Soviet influence from th e Asian m ainland extending from th e Arctic Circle to French Indochina.” W hen Moscow announced th a t it would provide North Korea w ith an air force, Muccio im plored W ashington to send “high

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performance aircraft” to th e ROK as w ell. In any case, th e U nited States had to fu lfill th e m ilitary assistance provisions o utlin ed in NSC-8/2 with respect to the constabulary arm y and th e coast g u ard .91 Truman’s advisors in W ashington were h esitan t about autho rizin g additional m ilitary assistance. For one th in g , th ey d id not trust th e South Koreans. Rhee constandy fu eled A m erican uneasiness, as on November 3 when he told M uccio th at the ROK “w ould have to be prepared to fight and u n ify the country by force if necessary.” M ore­ over, Congress had not appropriated sufficient funds to accom plish previously established goals regard in g the m ilitary cap ab ilities o f the ROK. Webb inform ed M uccio th at fu lfillin g the provisions o f NSC8/2 would require d ivertin g funds from m ore v ital program s. “ D eci­ sions must be based on overall n atio n al interests,” he exp lain ed , thus requiring an “evaluation [of] com parative risks.” W ebb asked M uccio whether South Korea could preserve its security w ithout ad d itio n al m ilitary aid . If it could not, it m igh t be unw ise for the U n ited States to provide the ROK w ith any assistance.32 In response, M uccio stated th at w h ile the am ount o f m ilitary aid then contem plated for South K orea was “ p aten tly in ad eq u ate to cover all contingencies sp ecifically an all-o u t attack from north sup­ ported by Soviets and C hinese C om m unists, w e are strongly o f view [that] risks involved are not inacceptable [sic]!' A lthough Moscow had gready expanded th e m ilitary capacity o f th e N orth K orean regim e, Muccio still thought th a t th e Soviets w ould not order an invasion o f the ROK b u t w ould “ instead continue present tactics o f subversion and sabotage.” T he am bassador then reported “ rem ark­ able progress” tow ard co n tro llin g g u errilla activ ities, im proving gov­ ernment ad m inistratio n, and achieving econom ic recovery. Consequendy, Muccio strongly advocated continued A m erican assistance: U nder no circum stances sh o u ld M D A P fo r K orea b e ab an d o n ed . Such a step w ould co n stitu te u tte r reversal o f a co n sisten t policy tow ard ROK, w ould subject us [to ] criticism an d rid icu le in U N a n d elsew here, and w ould u tterly destroy fa ith an d confidence o f K oreans a n d v irtu ­ ally all o th e r F ar E astern p eo p les in professed d eterm in a tio n o f US to com bat C om m unist aggression a n d enorm ously facilitate Soviet p en e­ tration an d co n q u est o f all F ar E astern areas.

In conclusion, M uccio u rged th e ad m in istratio n to reconsider its p o l­ icy o f lim ited m ilita ry a id fo r th e ROK, “ since k eep in g S outh K orea

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free o f C om m unist occupation can conceivably influence profoundly fu tu re course o f Far Eastern developm ents.” 3* In D ecem ber 1949, Rhee decided to m ake another formal request to th e U nited States fo r m ore m ilitary equipm ent. In particular, the ROK’s president w anted th e adm inistration to support the “develop­ m en t, supply, m in in g and advising” o f a South Korean air force. Muccio advised approval, arguing th a t th e “ request is a modest one.” If W ashington failed to increase m ilitary assistance, the ROK would attem p t to purchase th e equipm ent w ith its own funds, thereby ham­ pering econom ic recovery.34 R ather than approving Rhee’s request, th e adm inistration sent an MDAP survey team to South Korea that sam e m onth to devise plans for fu tu re m ilitary assistance to the ROK. W ashington’s decision n o t to follow his advice angered Muccio. He cabled th e adm inistration th a t th e “ MDAP program for Korea, as presently constituted, is wholly inadequate.” The success of the ECA program , Muccio rem inded W ashington, was “dependent on the m aintenance o f peace and order” in South Korea. He therefore sug­ gested boldly th a t th e U nited States double the size of the military aid program projected for th e ROK.33 D espite endless appeals from Muccio during the autumn of 1949, th e adm inistration did n o t waver. G iven th e parsimonious mood of Congress and th e anxiety surrounding Rhee’s intentions, there was no alternative. W ashington freely adm itted th at South Korea could not defend itself against a massive m ilitary assault from the north, but it believed th e Soviet U nion w ould n ot sponsor an invasion, particularly w ith a U nited N ations commission on the scene. For Truman and his advisors, m aintaining international involvem ent in Korean affairs was therefore a high priority. A lthough several members of the com­ mission had opposed W ashington’s decision to withdraw, the UNCOK had stayed in Korea to observe and verify the departure of American com bat forces. The commission also had formally asked the Soviet U nion at th e U nited N ations for permission to inspect North Korea and determ ine w hether Russian troops had withdrawn.54Nat­ urally, the U nited States w anted the UNCOK to remain in South Ko­ rea perm anendy. Acheson even thought th e U nited Nations should provide m ilitary observers to assist th e com mission.37 Political repression in S outh K orea m ade it m uch harder for the U nited States to induce th e U N CO K to cooperate w ith its policy in K orea. W hen R hee arrested th e new sm en assigned to cover the com­ m ission’s activities, th e U N CO K suspended all press conferences to

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“avoid any further repercussions.” A lthough Rhee m anaged to per­ suade the commission to reverse its decision, th e incident scarcely encouraged a favorable assessment o f th e progress o f democracy in South Korea.38 Muccio was especially jittery because th e commission was then in the process o f form ulating its report to th e U nited Nations. During the m iddle o f A ugust, rum ors spread th at th e com­ mission intended to recom m end referral o f th e Korean dispute back to the Soviet Union and the U nited States for settlem ent.39 For Muc­ cio, it was imperative for W ashington to keep the U nited N ations involved in the Korean affair. In a letter to State D epartm ent official Niles Bond, the ambassador professed th a t th e dispute in Korea was an international rather th an a bilateral issue. A new UNCOK was indispensable for bolstering th e ROK’s m orale and deterring an attack from the north. In fact, the next comm ission, Muccio believed, should have the specific duty o f m onitoring m ilitary activities on the peninsula.40 In the end, the UNCOK report corresponded w ith neither Wash­ ington’s desires nor its expectations. The commission inform ed the United Nations th at w ithout a Soviet-American agreem ent, Korea never would achieve reunification and probably would experience a barbarous civil war. The UNCOK blam ed both th e Soviet U nion and the United States for posturing instead o f working for a resolution o f the problem. Muccio was displeased w ith the report. In one cable, the ambassador attem pted to refute th e docum ent’s other m ajor condusions. He strenuously denied, for exam ple, the charge th a t Rhee was an authoritarian leader. A lthough the South Korean police force was guilty o f political repression, the same conditions would exist in Washington if the threat o f an invasion were as great. Muccio agreed that the adm inistration was “ inefficient and undisciplined,” b u t he predicted im provem ent w ith the passage o f tim e. W hile the m orale of the constabulary army was high, the general public was loyal to Rhee. Far more im portant, in contrast to N orth Korea the South Koreans could criticize their governm ent, as “ the non-com m unist opposition remains relatively free.”41 Despite unhappiness over the comm ission’s findings, adm inistra­ tion officials recognized th at the U nited States would have to endorse the UNCOK report at the U nited N ations. Acheson even cleverly devised a strategy to use the report for th e creation o f a new commis­ sion with expanded powers. Since there was a threat o f war in Korea, international respresentatives had to be on the scene to observe and

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rep o rt any m ilitary activity leading to th e outbreak o f hostilities.42On Septem ber 26, th e U nited States, C hina, A ustralia, and the Philip­ pines jo intly su b m itted a resolution to th e A d Hoc Political Commit­ tee o f th e U nited N ations providing for th e maintenance of a com­ m ission in K orea to observe conditions and report any developments “ w hich m ig h t lead to or otherw ise involve m ilitary conflict.” Rather th a n m erely being available for consultations, the new UNCOK w ould offer its “ good offices” form ally to both the north and the south to achieve reunification. M oreover, th e commission would be available to verify Soviet w ithdraw al.4* In his speech urging rap id passage o f th e resolution, American del­ egate Charles Fahy blam ed th e N o rth K orean regime for the absence o f reunification because it h ad “ flo u ted ” th e desires of the United N ations. Still worse, N orth K orea had created th e danger of a “brutal conflict,” m aking a new com m ission necessary to act as a stabilizing force in K orea. In th e event o f conflict, Fahy concluded, the UNCOK w ould provide accurate inform ation on its “ nature and origin, and regarding th e responsibility th ereo f .” 44 O nce again, American policy on K orea at th e U nited N ations was a com plete success. On October 3 , th e A d Hoc Political C om m ittee voted overwhelmingly to recom­ m end th e adoption o f th e resolution w hile rejecting a Soviet proposal to abolish th e UNCOK and declare its previous activities an illegal interference in K orea's internal affairs .42 Fahy subsequently ad­ dressed th e G eneral Assem bly and appealed for passage of the resolu­ tio n . Ignoring Soviet opposition, th e G eneral Assembly approved the A m erican-sponsored proposal on O ctober 21 by a wide margin. One m onth later, it also adopted a resolution asking the Security Council to reconsider th e ROK’s application for m em bership in the United N ations .44 A lthough th e Trum an adm inistration seem ingly had scored a ma­ jor victory a t th e U nited N ations, th e international action on Ko­ rea somehow lacked reality. The new commission was supposed to achieve a peaceful settlem ent in K orea, yet th e U nited Nations reso­ lutio n acknowledged th e probability o f arm ed conflict on the penin­ sula. “ A m iracle would be in order,” Muccio candidly admitted, “to remove th e 38th parallel and unify th e country at th e stroke of some­ one’s p en .” 47 Reactions in K orea to th e U nited Nations resolution also suggested th a t th e UNCOK’s m ission was foredoomed to failure. A summary o f N orth K orea’s attitu d e appeared in a letter to Trygve Lie, th e secretary general o f th e U nited N ations, from Pak Hön-yöng

which denounced international consideration o f th e Korean issue in the absence o f representatives from the DPRK. N orth Korea, Pak emphasized, rem ained com m itted to reunification by force if neces­ sary. Rhee announced th at he w ould cooperate w ith th e new commis­ sion, but he staunchly opposed any consultation, negotiation, or con­ tact with the N orth Korean regim e. N ot only w ould such action be useless, it would constitute appeasem ent. Rhee also said th a t he would not perm it the commission to protect Com m unists in South Korea, stressing th at the ROK's survival was a t stake.48 During Septem ber 1949, th e South Korean governm ent stepped up its campaign o f political repression. A bew ildering group o f agen­ cies—including the police, th e military, and various youth organiza­ tions—joined in punishing anyone suspected o f subversive activity. Throughout O ctober there was a steady rise in th e num ber o f investi­ gations, arrests, indictm ents, and trials, lb an extent, Rhee was able to utilize the judicial system to strengthen his autocratic rule. The South Korean police force systematically violated civil liberties to obtain evidence, often resorting to torture to obtain confessions.49 These transgressions were m ost evident during the trials o f arrested members o f the legislative assembly. Judges prohibited defense wit­ nesses, for instance, while perm itting prosecutors to introduce a great deal of “irrelevant and im m aterial“ evidence. They even m ade preju­ dicial and subjective com m ents from the bench. Nevertheless, ViceConsul Gregory H enderson inform ed W ashington, th e ROK still “failed to im plicate th e defendants in any subversive or com m unist plot against the Govt and failed to cast extraordinary suspicion o f any kind over their activities.” 50 W hile the U nited States was distressed about the absence o f politi­ cal democracy in the ROK, South Korea’s economic problem s soon overshadowed all other difficulties. Rhee’s obsession w ith achieving military security and political stability had placed a heavy strain on the ROK’s financial resources. To an increasing degree, die govern­ ment had resorted to heavy borrowing and an expansion o f paper cur­ rency to finance its operations against dom esdc subversion. D eficit spending inevitably produced runaway inflation and financial insta­ bility.51 Yet Rhee would not expand die governm ent’s tax base and perm itted police, th e m ilitary, and th e youth groups to extract “vol­ untary contribudons” from th e general public. Some wealthy indi­ viduals escaped paying taxes altogether. By Decem ber 1949, the ROK’s indebtedness to th e Bank o f Korea was m ore than sixty percent

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higher th an th e law allow ed. D espite a significant increase in food production. South K orea’s foreign trade rem ained seriously imbal­ anced. Insufficient electric pow er and inadequate managerial skill only m agnified th e ROK’s econom ic crisis.” Muccio n o tified th e adm inistration in November that South Ko­ rea’s “ unsound financial practices’’ had produced a dangerous deteri­ oration o f th e economy. I f th e ROK d id n ot correct these problems expeditiously, South K orea never w ould achieve recovery and eco­ nom ic stability. T he ECA officials in Seoul, he went on, had formu­ lated an eig h t-p o in t reform program which stressed the need to im prove tax collection procedures, raise th e prices for public utilities, elim inate unnecessary governm ent expenditures, adopt sound ac­ counting procedures, and expedite th e sale o f vested property. Dur­ ing talks w ith R hee, Muccio pushed for rapid implementation of these recom m endations. The am bassador assured Washington that th e ROK’s president had grasped th e extent o f American “apprehen­ sion and urgency” and w ould devote im m ediate attention to the eco­ nom ic situ atio n .” For B utterw orth, th e deterioration o f South Korea’s economy was frightening. M uccio’s reports from Seoul, he stated baldly, “read like C hina 1948!” Unless th e U nited States induced the ROK to institute m ajor fiscal reform s, econom ic disaster appeared inevitable. Butterw orth therefore instructed Muccio to apply “firm , continuing and effective pressure” on Rhee to im plem ent decisive reform measures in th e area o f taxation and public finance. Although the South Koreans probably would resent American advice, he was hopeful that Muccio could achieve some degree o f success. Three days later, Butterw orth provided Acheson w ith a summary o f the economic crisis in South Korea. H e em phasized in particular th e ROK’s failure to insti­ tu te land reform , which was indispensable for m aximum agricultural productivity. The legislative assembly had approved a bill to reduce farm tenancy in A pril 1949, b u t Rhee had not implem ented the mea­ sure because o f his dependence on large landowners as political allies.” Acheson acted prom ptly to com pel th e South Korean government to institute reforms. The adm inistration, he cabled Muccio, folly endorsed th e ECA recom m endations for a restoration of financial sta­ bility in the ROK. Acheson ordered Muccio to approach Rhee and dem and rapid im plem entation o f th e ECA reform program with the advice o f American officials. He was to impress upon the ROK’s presi-

Promise and Performance

u 5

dent that economic stability was as im portant to South K orea's sur­ vival as military security. “Unless President Rhee and his G overnm ent show the willingness and the ability to inaugurate m easures designed to stabilize the internal economy o f Korea," Acheson w arned, "th e United States G overnm ent will be forced to reexam ine the character and extent o f economic assistance which can be m ade available." Even before receiving Acheson’s form al protest, Rhee apparently had decided to im plem ent some o f th e ECA’s recom m endations. In late December, the ROK’s president placed restrictions on governm ent spending, increased th e charges for public services, and tightened the tax collection system. But for Am erican officials in Seoul, m ore extensive reforms were necessary to balance the budget and resolve the financial crisis.” To spur the adoption o f additional reform m easures, Philip Jessup traveled to South Korea in January 1950 for talks w ith Rhee and other government leaders. W hen he visited the legislative assembly, its chairman remarked th at th e U nited States, "th o u g h sincere, seems rather scattered and weak" on th e issue o f foreign aid in com parison with "the definite and determ ined help o f Soviet Russia" to N orth Korea. Jessup retorted th at South K orea's future would depend on the ability o f the ROK to be "successful in holding and m aintaining the fundam ental institutions o f personal freedom ." T hen, during his speech before the Korean C ham ber o f Com merce, Jessup em phasized that the U nited States would provide assistance only for those nations willing to help themselves. Fundam ental to th e fight against Com­ munist aggression, he continued, was the achievem ent o f sound eco­ nomic growth and political freedom . The ROK did not require greater military capabilities because "strength is not sim ply a m atter of arms and force. It is a m atter o f economic growth and social health and vigorous institutions, public and private." Jessup then appealed for decisive steps to balance the budget and ensure political free­ dom.” After listening to Jessup's address, D rum right judged it "th e m ost candid speech m ade by an Am erican official since the end o f occupa­ tion.” The South Koreans, however, certainly did not appreciate Washington’s resort to public pressure. Im m ediately after the speech, Rhee issued a form al statem ent denying th at the ROK faced an eco­ nomic crisis or lacked popular support. D uring subsequent discus­ sions, Rhee harped on the im portance o f additional m ilitary aid and promised victory in the struggle w ith the north. Jessup was im-

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pressed, believing th e president had m ade a strong case for antiair­ craft guns and som e airplanes. Yet he adm onished Rhee that the U nited States still expected th e ROK to im plem ent more measures for reform , particularly for th e reduction o f the high rate of inflation. Jessup th en expressed th e hope th a t upon his return to Washington, th e adm inistration “ w ould have reports from Ambassador Mucdo t h a t . . . all o f th e m ajor problem s confronting Korea would have m oved forward to a solution." H e added th at the United States vas “ sym pathetic" tow ard th e idea o f a Pacific Pact but thought it “ could n o t be im posed from outside." Rhee replied with a promise “ to take active steps" to control inflation. Shordy thereafter, he announced his in ten tio n to sell governm ent-owned land and facto­ ries, w hile holding a bond issue and lottery to reduce the money supply .»7 Muccio m et w ith Rhee th e day after Jessup's departure. He pre­ sented th e South K orean president w ith th e ECA’s program for finan­ cial reform and A cheson's dem and for its im mediate implemen­ tatio n . T he U nited States was distressed, Muccio explained, that “ President Rhee d id n o t take a m ore serious view of die mounting inflation.” Chinese officials too had claim ed th at they could halt infladon at any tim e. Their failure to institu te financial reform, the am bassador pointedly observed, had contributed more to Chiang’s dow nfall than Com m unist m ilitary victories. W hen Rhee attributed lack o f progress to his m inisters, Muccio disagreed, blaming instead “ inordinate delay" caused by Rhee’s refusal to delegate authority. In his summary cable to W ashington, Muccio lam ented that Rhee vas simply unable “ to grasp th e tho u g h t th a t a M inister should be any m ore than a ‘yes’ m an whose sole purpose was to carry out the Presi­ d en t’s ideas.” For th e am bassador, Rhee’s unwillingness to share lead­ ership and responsibility was th e m ain cause o f the “unsatisfactory situation .” »8 A t th e outset o f 1950, South Korea’s polirical and economic per­ formance during the previous six m onths provided scant justification for optim ism regarding the prom ise o f containm ent. % t upon his return to W ashington, Jessup reported th at a consensus existed am ong American representatives in Seoul th a t South Korea was capa­ ble o f resisting Com m unist expansionist pressure. As a result, the adm inistration continued to pursue the realization of a viable govern­ m ent south o f the 38th parallel.»8 Events in China coincidentally pro­ duced a sharp rise in th e im portance o f the ROK to the administra-

Promise and Perform ance

2J ?

tion’s overall policy in Asia. By late 1949, Trum an and his advisors had concluded th a t th e m ainland C hinese w ould invade Taiwan in the very near future and destroy th e last rem nants o f th e K uom intang regime.60 On January 5 ,1 9 5 0 , th e presid en t announced his determ i­ nation not to becom e em broiled in C hina’s civil war. A lthough th e United States w ould continue econom ic aid to Taiwan, A m erican m il­ itary assistance and advice w ould cease.61 Anticipating harsh criticism o f th e ad m in istratio n ’s stand on C hi­ na, Acheson issued a public clarification. T he secretary o f state denied that Trum an's statem en t signaled a reversal o f A m erican pol­ icy. The U nited States, he stated firmly, h ad recognized Taiwan as Chinese territory during W orld W ar II and w ould n o t violate its past agreements. More im p o rtan t, A cheson argued th a t m ilitary aid would not help th e N ationalists because th e U nited States could n o t give “a will to resist an d a purpose for resistance to those who m ust provide it for them selves.” 62 O n January 1 2 ,1 9 5 0 , A cheson delivered his celebrated speech before th e N ational Press C lub in an o th er attempt to defend Trum an’s C hina policy. B ut th e address also pro­ vides conclusive evidence th a t th e adm inistration judged th e survival of the ROK as crucial to th e fu tu re success o f its overall policy in Asia. Subsequendy, scholars too o ften have focused atten tio n solely on Acheson’s exclusion o f th e ROK from th e A m erican “ defensive perimeter.” W ith th e benefit o f h in d sig h t, these observers charge that the U nited States invited a N o rth K orean invasion.69 Such an appraisal obscures th e real significance o f th e address as a definitive statement o f A m erican policy objectives an d expectations in Asia. In Korea, the Truman adm inistration still sought to prove th a t the United States could h alt Soviet expansion w ithout an unqualified commitment o f power. In his speech, Acheson explained th a t th e people o f Asia were involved in a struggle to overcome essentially two m ajor threats— eco­ nomic privadon and foreign dom inadon. Asian leaders believed th a t the resoludon o f these two problem s w ould require th e achievem ent of self-government. T he U nited States, Acheson claim ed, always had worked to foster independence for th e nations o f Asia, w hile th e Soviet Union w anted to deprive these people o f control over th eir own affairs. W ashington therefore opposed com m unism n o t for self­ ish reasons b u t because it was th e “ spearhead o f Russian im perial­ ism.” If the U nited States expected to defeat Moscow’s strategy for expansion, the secretary o f state stressed, it was vital to avoid any

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action th a t m ig h t obscure th e tru e n atu re o f Soviet intentions. For ex­ am p le, A sians w ould in te rp re t A m erican reliance on military means to co u n ter C om m unist aggression as evidence o f imperialism .64 A cheson also n o ted th a t A m erican m ilitary capabilities in Asia w ere lim ited . B eyond Jap an , th e Ryukyus, and the Philippines, he observed, “ it m u st be clear th a t no person can guarantee these areas against m ilitary attack.” As a resu lt, in th e event o f open aggression “ th e in itia l reliance m u st be o n th e people attacked to resist it and th e n u p o n . . . th e U n ited N ations w hich so far has not proved a weak reed to lean on by any people who are determ ined to protect th e ir independence against o u tside aggression.” Admittedly, Acheson’s rem arks im p lied th a t th e U n ited States d id not plan to defend th e ROK w ith m ilitary power. Tet th e secretary o f state based his assessm ent on th e assum ption th a t South K orea would not face open arm ed aggression. For A cheson, th e m ilitary th reat was not as imme­ d iate as th e challenge o f “ subversion and penetration.”6’ This convic­ tio n p erm itted th e adm inistration to ad o p t a strategy emphasizing th e developm ent o f local stren g th and self-reliance as the best means for dealing w ith dom estic violence and political agitation. Truman and his advisors believed th a t th e U nited States could achieve peace and stability beyond th e “ defensive perim eter” in Asia without an open-ended com m itm ent o f A m erican pow er because they judged th e Soviet th reat in th a t area to be essentially lim ited in nature. A cheson’s Press C lub speech dem onstrates how the Truman admin­ istration looked to K orea for p ro o f th a t Asian nations could avert Soviet dom ination w ithout an unqualified guarantee of American m ilitary protection. Acheson asserted th a t communism thrived on econom ic dislocation and social upheaval. If Asian nations developed strong dem ocratic institutions and stable econom ies, they could with­ stand C om m unist political pressure. T he U nited States, the secretary o f state continued, could contribute to political and economic stabil­ ity in Asia through providing econom ic aid , technical knowledge, and adm inistrative advice. B ut A m erican help alone was not enough. Acheson insisted th a t Asian leaders them selves had to demonstrate th e w ill to im prove conditions and develop th e capacity for selfdefense. H e poin ted to C hina in an effort to substantiate his argu­ m en t. C hiang K ai-shek, A cheson contended, had failed to satisfy po p u lar needs and w ants. As a result, th e Chinese people “ brushed him aside .” 66 Acheson th en specifically m entioned South K orea as an area where

2 J9

the United States was providing lim ited assistance an d thereby fos­ tering the emergence o f a strong democracy. In th e ROK, h e stated confidently, there existed “ a very good chance” fo r successful resis­ tance to Com m unist expansion a n d it d id n o t req u ire an express pledge of American m ilitary p ro tectio n . T he ad m in istratio n ’s strat­ egy in Korea would succeed, A cheson p red icted , because in contrast to China the South Koreans n o t only w anted A m erican aid b u t w ould use it effectively. It w ould be “ u tte r defeatism an d u tte r m adness” for the United States to w ithhold such assistance. T he secretary o f state indicated the im portance o f S outh K orea to Trum an's policy in Asia when he concluded th a t “we have a greater op p o rtu n ity to be effective” in Korea th an anyw here else on th e A sian m ain lan d .67 Acheson’s address actually was n o th in g m ore th an th e public enunciation o f a strategy th a t th e Trum an adm inistration h ad p u r­ sued in Korea w ith varying degrees o f intensity since 1946. As Muccio later explained, th e Press C u b speech signified no m ajor policy departure; Truman and his advisors always h ad considered econom ic assistance as m ore effective th an m ilitary pow er for influencing events in Asia.68 At least th e adm in istratio n ’s approach was realistic, since it acknowledged th e im portance o f nationalism in th e postw ar w orld. Active and direct A m erican interference in th e in tern al affairs o f Asian nations w ould be foolish an d counterproductive because it would alienate people hostile to any h in t o f im perialism . A cheson’s speech reflected W ashington’s recognition th a t A sian nationalism was the most effective w eapon against Soviet expansion. In th e long ru n , American economic assistance w ould help b u ild prosperity in Asia, thereby persuading th e people to sh u n th e C om m unist m odel for political, economic, an d social developm ent.69 For th e m ost p art, Truman's critics and th e general public never understood th e tru e nature of the adm inistration’s policy assum ptions and expectations in Korea and elsewhere in A sia.70 Acheson abruptly discovered th a t his efforts to m arshal political support for Trum an’s approach in Asia had failed. O ne week after his Press Club speech, th e H ouse defeated by a single vote its version o f the bill providing econom ic assistance to th e ROK for th e rem ainder of fiscal 1950. Most observers agreed th a t congressional unhappiness over the trium ph o f com m unism in C hina was responsible for th e outcome.71 Rejection o f th e K orean aid bill shocked Rhee, who had anticipated easy passage after reading A cheson’s plea for a continua­ tion of the aid program . ECA officials in Seoul expressed sim ilar dis-

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ap p o in tm en t. B unce w arned th a t w hile aid would continue for the im m ed iate fu tu re , th e p ip elin e soon w ould run dry and force the ter­ m in atio n o f several critical program s. Simultaneously, South Korea's legislature ad o p ted a resolution appealing to the United Sûtes for co n tin u ed econom ic assistance. In W ashington, Ambassador Chang conveyed his anguish to B utterw orth th a t th e defeat of the aid bill com bined w ith th e Press C lu b speech signified an American decision to ab an d o n th e ROK. B utterw orth assured Chang that the United States was n o t w avering in its com m itm ent to South Korea’s survival an d th e ad m in istratio n in ten d ed to pressure Congress for a reversal of its p o sitio n .” Im m ediately after th e H ouse vote, Trum an issued a public state­ m en t expressing "concern an d dism ay” over the rejection of the K orean aid b ill an d urging a quick reconsideration o f the matter. W ith th e p resid en t’s endorsem ent, Acheson sent a personal letter to Congress asking it to reverse its action on th e aid program. Korea, the secretary o f state alleged, represented a test o f American intentions an d th e w orld com m unity w ould in terp ret "o u r conduct in Korea as a m easure o f th e seriousness o f o u r concern w ith the freedom and wel­ fare o f peoples m ain tain in g th e ir independence in the face of great obstacles.” D em ocratic leaders in Congress responded at once to the ad m inistration's appeals. Tom Connally, chairm an o f the Senate For­ eign Relations C om m ittee, announced th a t th e Senate authorization b ill for aid to K orea w ould provide th e necessary means to rectify the situ atio n . South K orea, h e declared, was a “ testing ground for dem ocracy” th a t was badly in need o f a “ psychological lift.”” Even leading R epublican senators criticized th e House vote as ill advised. D uring discussions w ith A cheson, Senator Arthur H. Vandenberg voiced agreem ent w hen th e secretary o f state confessed that h e was “ shocked a t th e stupidity o f th e Republicans in the House.” V andenberg prom ised to work for rapid and decisive action to repair th e dam age .74 To overcom e opposition to Ih im an ’s program, the Senate Foreign Relations C om m ittee am ended its bill to include pro­ visions for m ore aid to C hiang K ai-shek’s governm ent and termina­ tio n o f all assistance to th e ROK on Ju n e 30, 1 9 5 0 . Although Ache­ son disliked these changes, congressional consent for aid to Korea was unlikely w ithout th e conditions. O n February 1 , th e House Commit­ tee on Foreign A ffairs voted to recom m end passage o f the administra­ tio n ’s program w ith th e Senate revisions. In its report, the committee advised th e House to avoid overem phasis in consideration of the mea-

2.2J

sure on “the situation w ith respect to civil liberties in South Korea” because the “ultim ate aspiration rather than the present fact may be of greater importance.”7’ Truman’s congressional allies thus had arranged a compromise with critics of the adm inistration in th e House. O n February 9, the House passed the amended version o f the Korean aid bill by a wide m argin. The next day, the Senate gave unanim ous consent to the measure without debate. In the end, the adm inistration had persuaded m ost congressmen that w ithout American aid to the ROK, m illions o f Asians would lose faith in their ability to resist Com m unist dom ina­ tion. As Representative Jacob Javits o f New \b rk stated succincdy at the time, “all o f Asia is watching this test case.” 76 Less than three weeks later, Budget Director Frank Pace, J r., formally requested $100 million in aid to the ROK for fiscal 1951. Subsequently, Hoffm an appeared before the House Com m ittee on Foreign Affairs and urged approval for the second year o f the aid program . Since the ROK had made “spectacular progress” toward economic recovery, he reasoned, it deserved additional assistance.77 Administration officials wisely sought to avoid the delays th at had beset the Korean aid program since the sum m er o f 1949. To encour­ age early approval for a second year o f assistance, Acheson m ade a personal appearance before the House com m ittee. D uring his testi­ mony, he told these congressmen th at w ith American help, the ROK would build enough strength to “serve as a nucleus for the eventual peaceful unification of the entire country on a democratic basis.”78 Truman even sent a personal letter to the House com m ittee urging favorable action on the adm inistration’s program . Communism, he argued, thrived on poverty, misery, and insecurity. Therefore, foreign aid was the “keystone o f our protection” because it would help peo­ ple around the globe to achieve economic independence and political freedom. On March 31, the House complied w ith Thim an’s request and voted its approval for a second year o f economic assistance to South Korea.7* Acheson was rightly suspicious th at congressional passage o f the aid bill would cause Rhee to relax his efforts to curb inflation. D uring February, D rum right cabled W ashington th at despite constant prod­ ding, the “Republic o f Korea does not recognize grave consequences [of] continued deficit spending.” W hile Rhee denied the existence o f a financial crisis, other cabinet members thought the situation was beyond control.80 In reply, Acheson instructed Muccio to rem ind

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Rhcc th a t Congress w ould reappraise th e aid program during June 1 9 5 0 . T he ad m in istratio n view ed w ith “ great concern and disappro­ b atio n “ th e refusal o f S outh K orean leaders to accept responsibility fo r th e ROK’s difficulties, th e official distortion o f the facts surround­ in g th e financial situ atio n , an d R hee’s tendency to disregard the advice o f th e EC A . W hen congressional hearings opened to consider th e b u d g et fo r fiscal 1951, A cheson expected proof of the ROK’s progress tow ard controlling in flatio n and correcting administrative w eaknesses.81 Follow ing discussions w ith R hee, D rum right informed Acheson th a t th e ROK’s p resid en t h ad received criticism o f his policies with “ extraordinary good h eart an d gave assurances th at he is with us 100 percent in seeking m easures to curb inflation.“ O n March 4, however, Prim e M inister Y i Pöm -sök, in a le tter to ECA Director Hoffman, disclaim ed th e existence o f a financial crisis. T hat same month, sev­ eral m em bers o f th e legislative assem bly visited th e United States and m anifested sim ilar indifference. D uring a m eeting with Acheson, they expressed th e hope th a t “ th e A m erican defense line in the Far East could be stretched to include South Korea.” Economic advisor Bunce, w ho was in W ashington for consultations, blamed Rhee’s dos­ est advisors for th is failure “ to appreciate th e nature and gravity of th e inflationary th rea t in K orea.“ Worse still, Rhee’s authoritarianism and incom petence w ere preventing any im provem ent in economic conditions. Bunce suggested th a t W ashington m ight have to deliver an ultim atum th reaten in g to cu t o ff all assistance. State Department officials now decided to recall Muccio for discussions. Upon returning to Seoul, Muccio w ould present Rhee w ith new and stronger demands fo r reform , am ong th em a th rea t to w ithhold m ilitary aid in order to force com pliance .83 M eanwhile, Congress’s in itial rejection o f th e Korean aid bill had sparked a renew al o f political friction in th e ROK. Rhee’s critics in the legislature charged th a t th e p resid en t’s dictatorial and undemocratic practices n o t only were preventing th e developm ent o f popular sup­ p o rt b u t now had underm ined th e ROK’s im age in the United States. Unless th e legislative branch acted to h alt th e trend toward centrali­ zation o f political pow er in th e hands o f th e executive, many South K orean leaders feared th a t W ashington eventually would terminate all assistance. Accordingly th e legislature, in February 1950 , began to consider an am endm ent to th e constitution th a t would make the cab­ inet responsible to th e legislative assembly. Rhee heaped scorn on the

Promise and Perform ance

12.3

proposal, arguing th a t it w ould w eaken unjustifiably th e pow er o f th e president and produce chaotic changes in th e adm inistrative appa­ ratus of the ROK. H e th en in au g u rated an intensive cam paign o f threats and propaganda to defeat th e am endm ent. W hen th e legisla­ tive assembly voted on th e m easure in M arch, th e am endm ent failed to obtain the tw o-thirds m ajority necessary fo r passage. More th an sixty delegates cast blank ballots, however, to p rotest th e Rhee gov­ ernment’s m anipulation o f th e outcom e.83 Far more aggravating for th e U n ited States, th e legislature recendy had rejected Rhee’s proposals regarding lan d reform w hile refusing to act on his recom m endations for h an d lin g th e financial crisis. To break the deadlock, Rhee proposed an am endm ent to th e constitution pro­ viding for the creation o f a second house in th e legislative assembly. A unicameral legislature, he claim ed, was “ extraordinarily dangerous” and hampered th e achievem ent o f genuine political stability in South Korea. Also, Rhee urged th e adoption o f an other am endm ent to per­ mit popular election o f th e president o f th e ROK. Finally, he recom ­ mended a postponem ent o f legislative elections scheduled for May 1950 until the assembly had passed his bu d g et and tax proposals as well as the new election law. Criticism o f R hee’s announcem ent was immediate and w idespread, forcing th e president to abandon tem po­ rarily his position on postponing elections in th e ROK.84 South Korea’s problem s now reached a dram atic clim ax. In a letter to Yi Pöm-sök dated March 23, H offm an chided th e prim e m inister for unwarranted optim ism regarding th e econom ic situation in South Korea. The ROK had to take steps to increase taxes and reduce spend­ ing; stopgap m easures were n o t enough to restore confidence in th e government and the economy. “ Unless I am convinced th a t a fo rth ­ right, im m ediate effort will be m ade to control inflation in Korea,” Hoffman threatened, “ I m ust consider th e advisability o f requesting a lesser” am ount o f econom ic aid. In response, Rhee dem anded th a t the legislative assembly act positively on his budget and tax proposals without further delay. O n A pril 1, he form ally announced a post­ ponement o f legislative elections u n til Novem ber. H olding elections on schedule would only divert th e legislature’s atten tio n away from South Korea’s financial problem s. If th e assem bly approved his rec­ ommendations for reform and thereby ensured a continuation o f American assistance, Rhee prom ised to reverse his decision.8’ For the H um an adm inistration, th e political deterioration in South Korea was intolerable. A m erican leaders w anted economic reform ,

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b u t n o t a t th e price o f sacrificing th e appearance o f democracy in the ROK. Thus A cheson m oved sw iftly to force Rhee to obtain approval fo r his financial proposals w ith o u t postponing th e elections. On April 3, A ssistant Secretary o f S tate D ean Rusk presented Ambassador C hang w ith a m essage for R hee th a t am ounted to an ultimatum. U nless th e ROK in stitu te d th e “ drastic m easures required to curb the grow ing inflation,” W ashington w ould reexam ine and readjust the EGA program fo r South K orea. I f th e ROK’s financial crisis persisted, fu rth er A m erican assistance could n o t be effective. The note also rem inded th e Rhee governm ent th a t “ U nited States aid, both mili­ tary an d econom ic, . . . has been predicated upon the existence and grow th o f dem ocratic in stitu tio n s” w ithin th e Republic of Korea. T herefore, W ashington deplored th e decision to postpone the May elections. In response, C hang prom ised to convey the message to Rhee b u t defended th e p resid en t’s actions. Delaying the elections was necessary because th e legislature h ad refused to pass the budget. Rusk disagreed, p o in tin g o u t th a t postponem ent was inconsistent w ith dem ocratic principles an d w ould alienate friends of the ROK at th e U nited N ations. In tern atio n al approval was a vital source of stren g th th a t South K orea could n o t afford to sacrifice.* A fter presenting this stem w arning to th e ROK, Washington announced th a t M uccio w ould retu rn to th e U nited States to discuss South K orea’s political an d econom ic progress and problems. Prior to departure, Muccio m et w ith R hee an d pleaded for an expeditious im plem entation o f econom ic reform s. The am bassador then stated th a t th e use o f arbitrary arrest an d to rtu re coupled with a postpone­ m ent o f th e elections spoke volum es ab o u t th e undemocratic charac­ ter o f his regim e. There were no explanations th a t would suffice in defense o f these actions. W hen Rhee asked w hat Washington wanted him to do, M uccio’s reply was sim ple. T he U nited States expected the South K oreans to hold th e elections o n schedule and to agree on a b u dget including higher taxes to elim inate th e deficit.87 On April 7, Rhee appeared before th e legislature and discussed the possible loss o f A m erican aid. H e appealed for rapid passage o f his budget pro­ posal w hile prom ising n o t to delay th e May elections. Drumright reported th a t th e South K oreans had received th e American message as “ th e stem w arning w hich it was in ten d ed to be.” Although the press th o u g h t th e ROK had suffered harsher treatm ent than it deserved, he predicted th a t th e legislature w ould act quickly to satisfy A m erican dem ands .88

Promise and Perform ance

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South Korea’s political leaders were acutely aware th a t they w ould pay a stiff price for defying th e U n ited States. O n A pril 11, th e ROK’s home m inister form ally announced th a t th e governm ent would sponsor elections th e follow ing m o n th . M eanw hile, Rhee was exerting added pressure on th e legislature to approve his reform pro­ posals. Upon his departure from Seoul, M uccio applauded these actions. Subsequendy, th e legisladve assem bly approved R hee’s b u d ­ get proposal, which included provisions for a sharp increase in taxes and higher charges for public services.89 W hile som e observers com­ mended the ROK for its courage, others confessed doubts ab out th e future of democracy and econom ic grow th in South K orea. A fter all, events in the ROK appeared to resem ble closely th e om inous situa­ tion in China three years earlier.90 N evertheless, th e Trum an adm inis­ tration still hoped th a t South K orea w ould im prove its perform ance, thereby restoring faith in th e prom ise o f containm ent in Asia through economic means.

C H A P T E R io

Fulfillment o f a Commitment

D espite vexing p o litical and econom ic problem s in South Koita dur­ in g th e spring o f 1 9 5 0 , th e Trum an adm inistration was confident that th e ROK could survive. This optim istic attitu d e depended on the basic assum ption th a t local C om m unist parties, rather than orga­ nized m ilitary forces, acted as th e prim ary vehicles o f Soviet expan­ sion. A m erican leaders also believed, as one W hite House staff mem­ ber explained, th a t “ com m unism as a force in th e domestic politics of all countries feeds o n econom ic, social and national insecurities [and] fades as these lessen .’’1 T hus, T rum an’s strategy in Asia deemphasized m ilitary techniques and focused instead on fostering economic and social stability. Yet A m erican officials do u b ted th a t any single nation could provide unilaterally th e stren g th necessary to counter all poten­ tial Soviet m ilitary th ru sts. Such an effort, Undersecretary Webb sat­ ed publicly in May 1 9 5 0 , w ould lead inevitably to economic suicide. T he “ free w orld’’ could create th e strength required for its protec­ tio n , he argued, only “ if all nations w hich have an identity of inter­ ests contribute as best they can th ro u g h self-help and mutual aid to th e com m on stren g th o f th e w hole g ro u p .’’2 Some A m erican leaders h ad started to question the wisdom of this restrained approach w hen th e Soviet U nion acquired the atomic bom b in 1949- In January 1950, Trum an authorized the building ofa hydrogen bom b an d ordered his advisors to undertake a reappraisal o f A m erican foreign policy. These decisions represented an escalation o f concern, b u t n o t a change in th e overall approach of the adminis­ tratio n . 3 Early in A pril, Trum an’s advisors subm itted a report empha­ sizing th e necessity for th e U nited States and its allies to build addi­ tional political, econom ic, an d m ilitary strength to counter the growing danger o f Soviet expansionism . To obtain more specific inform ation on th e nature and costs o f such a policy, the president referred th e paper to th e NSC. T he now fam ous NSC -68 called for a drastic increase in A m erican m ilitary capabilities, arguing that the

Soviet threat was global in scope because local Com m unist move­ ments operated in accordance w ith Moscow’s directions. NSC-68 advanced the conclusion th at only th e adoption o f a $50 billion defense budget would enable the U nited States to counter effectively this dire threat to international stability.4 Truman was reluctant, however, to accept extrem e assum ptions and conclusions about the nature o f the Soviet challenge. N ot only did the president refuse to im plem ent NSC-68, he invited his advisors to raise questions regarding th e validity o f any aspect o f the docum ent. Several adm inistration officials subsequently expressed alarm over the lack of clarity and precision in NSC-68’s assessment o f the danger. In response, Ih im an professed th at th e program under consideration “definitely was not as large in scope as some o f th e people seem ed to think.”’ Rather th an trying to build a consensus endorsing an ex­ panded military capacity, the president was contem plating instead a further reduction in defense spending to balance the budget. Tru­ man’s position m ust have delighted his economic advisors, who believed th at the projected expenditures in NSC-68 were outra­ geously high. Certainly, Congress would n o t authorize new taxes in a time of financial retrenchm ent, while the adm inistration appreciated the political benefits o f concentrating its lim ited funds on dom estic programs. Truman and m ost o f his closest advisors acknowledged th at the Soviet threat m ight be both m ilitary and global in nature, b u t they refused to act on their suspicions and take positive steps to produce the power necessary to m eet such a challenge.6 Significantly, events in South Korea after A pril 1950 encouraged the belief in W ashington th at the adm inistration’s restrained ap­ proach was beginning to pay dividends. O ne source o f optim ism was the continued involvem ent o f th e U nited N ations in Korean affairs. In February 1950, the UNCOK had attem pted to contact representa­ tives of the DPRK at the 38th parallel, b u t N orth Korean troops fired on members o f the commission. Nervous about the possibility o f an imminent invasion, the UNCOK recom m ended th at the U nited Nations send trained m ilitary observers to m onitor developm ents on the peninsula. Secretary General Trygve Lie com plied, dispatching a team of eight experts w ith instructions to report on any circumstances pointing to the outbreak o f conflict in Korea. For the U nited States, this decision constituted a m ajor victory. American officials in Seoul, however, were unhappy w ith the UNCOK’s persistent efforts to establish contacts w ith N orth Korea, knowing th at this undertaking

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w ould offend th e R hee governm ent. In A pril, th e commission asked Lie to req u est Soviet cooperation du rin g his upcoming visit to Mos­ cow in g aining access to N o rth K orea to verify Soviet withdrawal. R ather th a n risking a “ very u n fo rtu n ate controversy,” Muccio did not inform R hee o f th is p lan n ed dém arche.1 For M uccio, it was m uch m ore im p o rtan t to persuade the UNCOK to cooperate w ith th e ROK an d to supervise th e May elections for seats in th e legislative assembly. O n A pril 24, Rhee invited the com­ m ission to observe th e b allo tin g an d certify th e legitimacy of the out­ com e. D espite th e in itia l reticence o f C hina's delegate, the UNCOK u ltim ately voted to supervise th e elections, m uch to the relief of the U n ited States. B u t th e com m ission w ould have a smaller staff and few er facilities fo r observation th a n it m ustered two years earlier. At best, it could perform only a cursory role in th e elections. Meanwhile, Rhee h ad in stitu te d a new cam paign o f political repression to weaken those groups opposing his policies. D uring May, police arrested more th a n a thousand people o n charges o f subversion and conspiratorial contact w ith N o rth K orea, in clu d in g fifty candidates and one mem­ ber o f th e legislature. T h at sam e m o n th , Rhee appointed a new head fo r th e police force an d ordered him to replace any disloyal subordi­ nates. D ru m rig h t pro tested these actions, arguing that Rhee had to avoid any evidence o f a desire to "rig th e elections .” 8 N evertheless, m ore th a n tw o thousand candidates ran for election to th e legislature, th e vast m ajority as independents. H ie main issues in th e cam paign centered o n dissatisfaction w ith Rhee’s leadership an d th e legislature’s control over th e cabinet. Muccio cabled Wash­ in g to n th a t th e political atm osphere was “freer than 1948.” Al­ th o u g h h e anticipated th e d efeat o f m ost incum bents, the ambassa­ dor predicted th a t th e elections “ w ill n o t prove a decisive victory for any contesting group.” O n election day, an atm osphere of law and order prevailed, p erm ittin g th e U NCO K to certify the results as legit­ im ate . 9 D espite R hee’s resort to violence and intim idation, more th an ninety percent o f all eligible voters cast ballots. More significant, few o f R hee’s followers gained election; in fact, th e most popular can­ didates were those w ho had been victim s o f police repression. Chron­ ic political unrest and econom ic dislocation also influenced the out­ com e . 10 For W ashington, th e elections provided a glimmer of hope th a t genuine political freedom eventually would trium ph south of th e 38th parallel. T he Trum an adm inistration could claim with some justification th a t in contrast to N orth K orea, th e ROK was making

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2.2.9

progress toward a working democracy. N ot only had th e Rhee govern­ ment perm itted elections; it h ad accepted an unfavorable outcom e at that.» Then a new crisis erupted to com plicate th e adm inistration’s efforts to strengthen the ROK. Early in May, Senator Connally, in a p u b ­ lished interview, had observed th at whenever the Soviet U nion "takes a notion she can just overrun Korea just like she will probably overrun Formosa when she gets ready to do it.” Since th e fall o f th e ROK was inevitable and Korea was “ not absolutely essential,” Con­ nally believed the U nited States should prepare to abandon the pen­ insula. Rusk im m ediately urged W ebb to rem ind th e senator th a t his statements betrayed “ an attitu d e o f defeatism which th e D epartm ent does not share and which it has consistendy endeavored to counter­ act.” At a press conference on May 3, Acheson com m ented on Con­ nally’s remarks, stating th at th e adm inistradon had indicated on many occasions the im portance it attached to South Korea. N ot only had the U nited States pardcipated in the form adon o f the ROK, b u t it was “now giving them very substantial economic help, m ilitary assistance and advice.” Even so, D rum right reported from Seoul th at Connally’s interview had “ shaken to an appreciable extent” South Korea’s confidence in American protecdon should N orth Korea stage an invasion. The general public had “ received w ith acclaim” Acheson’s clarification, however, while President Rhee seem ed reassured.12 Despite Connally’s remarks, the South Korean elecdons had a favorable impact on Congress. Late in May, the House and the Senate overwhelmingly passed a compromise bill for an extension o f the Korean aid program through fiscal 1931.13 Having secured continued economic assistance, adm inistradon offidals shifted attention to m ili­ tary aid. Muccio rem ained convinced th at the U nited States had to expand the m ilitary capabilities o f the ROK to protect “our stake” in South Korea.14 KM AG Com m ander Roberts strongly endorsed Muccio’s position, observing th at “ the cheapest thing big industrial America can do is to furnish other people the product o f our factories and resources in order th at they may shoot . . . first and well for Uncle Sugar.” W hen the MDAP survey team visited the ROK in December 1949, South Korean officials dwelt on the necessity for more military assistance to offset the increasing size and power o f the North Korean army.15 A fter study, the MDAP survey team concluded that the ROK warranted additional aid. In its report, it recom mend­ ed approval o f Muccio’s proposal to double the am ount o f the Korean

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m ilitary aid program to $ 2 0 m illio n , focusing the expenditures 00 p atro l boats, com bat aircraft, an d heavier artillery . 16 W hen M uccio retu rn ed to W ashington in A pril 1950 , he lobbied vigorously fo r m ore m ilitary aid to South K orea, pointing to a “grow­ in g sense o f responsibility" in th e ROK, particularly with respect to train in g in th e constabulary army. H e stressed th at the South Koreans "have th e w ill an d th e ab ility to d efen d themselves," but Washington h ad to provide th e “ m issing com ponent" o f m ilitary and economic aid . “ K orea is a sym bol o f U .S. interest in Asia," Muccio insisted, and needed only a sm all am o u n t o f additional assistance to preserve its freedom an d independence. D efense D epartm ent officials resisted M uccio’s recom m endations, arguing th a t NSC-8 / 2 did not envision any increase in m ilitary aid . 17 Even if NSC-8 / 2 were revised, the U n ited States lacked sufficient fu n d s, equipm ent, and trained per­ sonnel to satisfy these requests. Muccio answered that all he wanted was “ m erely a few defensive com bat planes, for morale purposes.” If th e U nited States could n o t provide m ore aid under the MDAP, South K orea w ould raise taxes to finance an expanded military pro­ gram , thereby w eakening its chances for econom ic recovery.18 South K orea’s m ilitary capabilities represented an agonizing di­ lem m a for th e adm inistration because o f R hee’s publicly stated inten­ tio n to achieve reunification a t any price. O n March 1, the ROK’s president had announced th a t South K orea would not ignore forever th e cries o f distress from th e people in N orth Korea. Despite advice from th e ROK’s “ friends across th e seas," Rhee pledged that “we shall respond .’’19 A fter th e May elections, th e State Department nev­ ertheless proposed an increase o f $ 6 m illion in m ilitary aid to South K orea. D ie JC S prom ptly registered sharp dissent, asserting that it was difficult to justify additional funds on m ilitary grounds because “ K orea is o f little strategic value to th e U nited States.” It would approve th e plan only “ if political considerations are overriding.” But th e JCS insisted th a t th e U nited States should n ot provide the ROK w ith m ore m ilitary aid unless it was vital to South Korea’s morale and internal stability .20 By Ju n e 1950, th e adm inistration appeared close to making a deci­ sion to enlarge m ilitary assistance to th e ROK significantly. Although South Korea was n o t crucial to th e national security o f the United States, Trum an and his advisors still judged th e ROK’s survival to be an im portant A m erican interest. In his report o f Ju n e 1 to Congress on th e progress o f th e MDAP, th e president indicated his belief that

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the U nited States co u ld h a lt Soviet exp an sio n in K orea an d elsew here in the world if it created th e capacity fo r local self-d efen se. A lth o u g h he em ployed g lo b alist rh eto ric, T rum an d id so to b u ild congressional support for th e c o n tin u atio n o f a n essentially lim ite d policy d esig n ed to avert th e direct ap p licatio n o f A m erican m ilitary pow er. C o m m u ­ nist im perialism , h e claim ed , “ seeks to g ain its en d s by in tim id a tio n , by fom enting disorders, a n d by a tte m p ts to force in te rn a l collapse." Therefore, th e U n ite d S tates co u ld co u n ter th e Soviet strateg y o f expansion th ro u g h p ro v id in g econom ic a id , rely in g o n th e U n ite d N ations, and creating local m ilitary s tre n g th .21 A dm inistration officials d efin itely w ere aw are o f th e d an g er o f an invasion from N o rth K orea. N ev erth eless, th e y firm ly believed th a t once Congress ap proved a b o o st in m ilitary aid fo r th e R O K , th e R hee governm ent w ould b e su fficien tly stro n g to discourage an attack fro m the north. B ut W ashington w ould n o t p ro v id e S o u th K orea w ith th e m ilitary capability to a tte m p t fo rcib le reu n ificatio n , fearin g as w ell that th e ROK’s econom y co u ld n o t to lerate g reater ex p en d itu res o n defense .22 U ltim ately, Iru m a n a n d h is advisors th o u g h t th e ROK would be able to d efen d itse lf w ith o u t extensive A m erican aid o r advice. As early as A p ril 1 9 5 0 , R o b erts, actin g o n in stru ctio n s from the Army D ep artm en t, h ad o rd ered th e g rad u al cu rta ilm en t o f th e KMAG’s advisory fu n ctio n s in th e R O K .29 R eports fro m Seoul sug­ gested th a t th e constabulary arm y now h a d received en o u g h tra in in g to w ithstand a N o rth K orean attack . In o n e cab le, M uccio brag g ed that th e South K oreans b en efited fro m su p erio r “ tra in in g , lead er­ ship, m orale, m arksm anship a n d b e tte r sm all arm s e q u ip m en t." D uring May, E dgar A . J . Jo h n so n o f th e ECA declared p u b licly th a t the ROK’s arm y was capable o f rep ellin g an invasion force fro m th e north twice its size. W h en R oberts le ft K orea th e follow ing m o n th , he stated unequivocally th a t th e ROK h a d th e “ b est d am n arm y o u t­ side th e U n ited S tates .” 24 For M uccio, S o u th K orea’s survival req u ired m ore th a n ju st m ili­ tary and econom ic assistance. H e co m p lain ed , fo r exam ple, th a t th e adm inistration, in its p u b lic p ro n o u n cem en ts, freq u en tly o m itte d South K orea w hen m e n tio n in g th o se n atio n s o f “ esp ecial" in terest to the U nited S tates. I t was im p erativ e fo r W ashington to avoid any h in t th at th e ROK h a d “ b een w ritten o ff as ex p en d ab le." Early in J u n e , the am bassador w rote a le tte r to M acA rthur ad m o n ish in g Secretary o f D efense Jo h n so n fo r d ecid in g n o t to com e to S o u th K orea w hile in Japan fo r talks la te r th a t m o n th . R hee a n d his advisors w ere “ ra th e r

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b itte r” because A m erican leaders seem ed "m ore interested in devel­ o p in g an d sustaining th e ir recent enem y than their long friends.” He im plored M acA rthur to convince Johnson th a t a visit of only one day w ould assuage fears in th e ROK o f A m erican abandonment. Mucdo restated these opinions in a le tte r to Rusk. T he “visits of the five Sen­ ators and te n R epresentatives to K orea last autum n, and that of Dr. Jessup last January,” th e am bassador observed, “had an excellent effect b o th in inform ing th e visitors an d in affecting Korean judg­ m en t ab o u t U n ited States in ten tio n s and in raising Korean morale.” Evidence o f “ strong con tin u ed in terest” was as im portant as financial aid for th e successful achievem ent o f A m erican aims in Korea.2’ Possibly in response to M uccio’s advice, Ih u n an dispatched his recently ap p o in ted special counsel on foreign affairs, John Foster D ulles, to K orea as p a rt o f his m ission to Jap an “ regarding the possi­ bilities o f n egotiating a Japanese Peace Ifeaty.” Dulles left the United States on Ju n e 14 an d fo u r days later personally surveyed the situation a t th e 38th parallel. A t th a t tim e, h e congratulated the ROK for the “ great strides” it h ad m ade tow ard achieving democracy and eco­ nom ic prosperity .16 In his address to th e South Korean legislature, D ulles said th a t th e ROK was “ in th e fro n t line o f freedom.” South K orea had created a s u b ie governm ent, a loyal military force, and im proving econom ic conditions, proving th a t the task of resisting Soviet expansionism was n o t hopeless. D ulles then reaffirmed Wash­ in g to n ’s confidence in th e pow er o f containm ent as a liberating force w hen he declared: “ As you esu b lish here in South Korea a whole­ some society o f steadily expanding w ell-being, you will set up peace­ fu l influences w hich w ill disintegrate th e h old o f Soviet Communism o n your fellows in th e no rth an d irresistibly draw them into unity w ith you.” D ulles concluded his rem arks w ith a pledge of American support for th e “ G reat K orean Experim ent,” promising that “you w ill never be alone so long as you continue to play your part in the great design o f hum an freedom .” 27 A fter studying conditions in South K orea, D ulles was genuinely optim istic about th e ROK's fu tu re. In one private letter, he noted th a t th e “ British M inister, w ho h ad had wide experience in eastern countries, . . . had never seen as encouraging an experiment in democracy.” W illiam R. M atthews o f th e A rizona Daily Star, a dose friend o f D ulles who accom panied him on th e trip, was similarly im pressed. W hat th e Koreans h ad accom plished, he thought, was “ unbelievable.” The general public m anifested a high degree of

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“vitality an d a m b itio n ,” w h ile th e RO K arm y w as co m m itte d to defending th e n a tio n . In fa c t, M atthew s b eliev ed th e S o u th K o rean military force “ co u ld w ith in th e n ex t year ta k e th e offensive a n d tak e over N orth K orea.” A fter m e e tin g p riv ately w ith R h ee, M atthew s offered th e rath er sta rtlin g con v ictio n that the Republic o f Korea will w ithin a year launch th e offensive to take over N orth Korea and u n ite th e country. The President . . . said it had to be done w hether it provoked war or not. He thought it could be done within a few days, because the people o f N orth Korea will rise up to help out, the m inute they see liberation is under way. Matthews p o in ted to th e co n fid en ce o f A m erican rep resen tativ es in Seoul as an o th er in d icatio n o f risin g o p tim ism in S o u th K orea. F ar from being a lo st cause, th e ROK w o uld “ h o ld th e lin e ” ag ain st Soviet expansion w ith m in im al A m erican assistance.2* Once Rhee h ad su fficien t m ilitary pow er, th e re co u ld b e little doubt th a t h e w ould a tte m p t fo rcib le reu n ificatio n . S o u th K orea's m ilitary capabilities in th e sp rin g o f 1 9 5 0 , how ever, p reclu d ed such an operation. T he constabulary arm y w as com prised o f approxim ately 1 0 0 ,0 0 0 troops b u t possessed eq u ip m e n t fo r a force only tw o -th ird s that size. W hile m uch o f th e RO K ’s m ilitary eq u ip m en t was u n ser­ viceable an d replacem ent p arts w ere in sh o rt supply, th e U n ited States purposely h a d lim ited th e stock o f am m u n itio n .29 By co n trast, the DPRK h ad created an arm y o f a b o u t 135,000 w ell-train ed an d highly organized troops. In Ju ly 1949, aro u n d 10,000 seasoned an d experienced K orean soldiers h ad re tu rn e d from C h in a a fte r h elp in g the C om m unists d efeat th e K u o m in tan g . Far m ore im p o rta n t, d u r­ ing A pril an d May 1 9 5 0 th e Soviet U nion h a d provided th e D PR K w ith a large n u m b er o f trucks to increase th e m o b ility o f th e arm y. Concurrently, Moscow h ad sh ip p ed fo r th e first tim e th e tan k s, heavy artillery, an d airplanes th a t gave N o rth K orea a decisive tem porary edge. Since th e ROK w ould n o t receive th e new eq u ip m en t allocated under th e M DAP fo r several m o n th s, th e D PR K ’s superiority, in term s o f w ar-m aking p o te n tia l in Ju n e 1950, was beyond q u estio n .50 N orth K orea’s p o litical leaders w ere ju st as d eterm in ed as R hee to reunify th e K orean p en in su la. D u rin g th e sp rin g o f 1950, th e D PRK attem p ted to accom plish th is objective th ro u g h peaceful m eans. O n Ju n e 7, th e “ F atherland F ro n t” issued a p u b lic statem en t d enounc­ ing th e May elections in S outh K orea an d rid icu lin g th e ROK as an

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A m erican-sponsored police state. Furtherm ore, it proposed a meet­ ing to discuss peaceful u nification an d th e form ation of a committee to organize an election early in A ugust for delegates to a national leg­ islature. T he proposal called fo r th e exclusion o f Rhee and Yi Pômsök from p articip atio n , however, w hile prohibiting the UNCOK from observing th e elections. Predictably, th e ROK scornfully rejected the p lan , announcing its in ten tio n to boycott th e proceedings. Mucdo dism issed it as “ purely [a] propaganda cam paign” to offset the C om m unist failure to p revent th e recent elections. But the acting chairm an o f th e U N CO K , A . B. Jam ieson o f Australia, greeted the proposal w ith enthusiasm , recom m ending in a public broadcast a m eeting to discuss possible in tern atio n al consultation and observa­ tio n .« O n Ju n e 1 0 , N o rth K orean representatives m et with members of th e UNCO K a t th e 38th p arallel. They presented the commission w ith copies o f a DPRK appeal to th e South Korean people to support th e proposal o f th e F atherland F ront b u t w ould not discuss the matter in d etail. A fter an exchange o f gunfire and considerable confusion, th e N o rth K oreans ruled o u t any U nited N ations participation in th e process leading to reunification. T he following day, three men crossed th e 38th parallel and en tered South Korea carrying a “Peace M anifesto.” S outh K orean troops prom ptly arrested these representa­ tives o f th e F atherland Front, indicating again th e ROK’s unswerving hostility to any N o rth K orean proposal for reconciliation. Mucdo urged Rhee to free th e three w ith o u t delay, however, thereby avoid­ ing support for “ N orth K orean propaganda.” « In all probability, th e DPRK anticipated a favorable public recep­ tio n for its initiatives in th e so u th . A fter all, th e May elections had resulted in a rep udiation o f R hee’s leadership. Furthermore, as Muccio confessed at th e tim e, th e “ superficial reasonableness” of North K orea’s proposals “ m ay be attractive to a large body [of] South Korea public opinion.” A ccording to one rep o rt, a group o f South Koreans had subm itted a p etitio n to th e Rhee governm ent on June 3 calling for reunification on any term s and bearing th e signatures of mote th an rive m illion people. T he DPRK undoubtedly hoped that public opinion w ould com pel Rhee eith er to accept its proposal for reunifi­ cation or risk an insurrection. In a final dem onstration of its sincerity, th e Fatherland Front, on Ju n e 19, proposed a m erger of the two legis­ latures for th e purpose o f draw ing u p a new constitution and super­ vising nationw ide elections. For M uccio, this latest overrate “conceiv-

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ably m ig h t. . . serve as [a] prelim inary step tow ard all-o u t war, although [this] seems im probable.” ** Having failed to achieve reunification peacefully, th e DPRK now decided to use force. O n th e m orning o f Ju n e 25, 1950, th e N o rth Korean army launched a m assive assault southw ard across th e 38th parallel along six invasion routes. From th e start, South K orea could provide only token resistance to th e larger an d b etter-eq u ip p ed northern force. The DPRK probably d id n o t m ake th e final decision for war until the last two weeks before th e attack, w hen it ordered its army into position. O n th e eve o f th e invasion, N o rth K orea’s leaders apparently thought th a t th eir “ peace strategy” still m ight succeed. Captured N orth Korean docum ents revealed later th a t th e DPRK did not even recall its m ilitary forces from w eekend pass u n til th e n ig h t before the attack. D espite such short notice, N o rth K orea’s leaders must have been confident th a t th e DPRK arm y w ould overwhelm th e militarily inferior ROK forces. More im p o rtan t, they undoubtedly expected the South K orean people to welcom e th e invasion and join in a rebellion to oust th e Rhee regim e from power. Indeed, th e N orth Korean army halted briefly after crossing th e parallel, consum ing three full days before traveling th e short distance to Seoul.*4 Scholars have spent considerable tim e discussing th e question o f Russian involvement in th e outbreak o f th e K orean War. U n til w riters gain access to archival m aterials eith er in th e Soviet U nion or N orth Korea, Moscow’s role in th e events leading to th e DPRK’s decision to invade South Korea obviously will rem ain a m atter o f speculation. But one conclusion seems alm ost beyond dispute: If N orth Korea had not been willing to pursue reunification o f th e peninsula regardless o f cost, there would have been no invasion. Those who stress Soviet responsibility for th e K orean W ar assign far too little im portance to the domestic origins o f th e conflict. Both Koreas were obsessed w ith ending the partition and m erely were w aiting for th e first o p p o rtu ­ nity to stage a “war o f liberation.” *5 By Ju n e 1950, two m ain factors probably convinced th e N orth Koreans th a t a strategy o f subversion and infiltration w ould n o t bring th e collapse o f th e ROK. First, th e May elections seem ed to represent progress tow ard th e achievem ent of a viable political system in South Korea. Second, econom ic condi­ tions in the ROK recently h ad experienced a m arked im provem ent, while the Rhee governm ent h ad im plem ented strong m easures to resolve the financial crisis.*6 Perhaps m ore im p o rtan t, W ashington's proposal for greater m ili-

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tary assistance to th e ROK m ay have created considerable anxiety in Pyongyang. T he recent Soviet shipm ent o f m ilitary supplies had pro­ vided th e DPRK w ith a decisive b u t tem porary military advantage. F urther delay w ould only raise th e odds against a successful inva­ sion .37 In o p tin g for forcible reunification, N orth Korea's leaden therefore w ere acting in th e ir own interests regardless of Soviet desires. W hile hardly an incontrovertible source, the memoits of N ik ita K hrushchev su b stan tiate th is interpretation. According to K hrushchev, K im II Sung traveled to Moscow in the fall of 1949 and ap p lied heavy pressure on Stalin to sponsor an invasion of South K orea. K im p redicted th a t at th e “ first poke“ militarily, the people o f South K orea w ould rise u p and oust th e Rhee government horn power. “ N aturally,“ K hrushchev explains, “ Stalin couldn’t oppose th is idea,“ since it w ould underm ine Moscow’s reputation as a staunch defender o f revolutionary m ovem ents. If Stalin rejected K im ’s p lan , K hrushchev reasons, th ere was th e clear possibility that th e DPRK w ould launch an invasion in defiance o f the will of the Soviet U n io n . 38 In its assessm ent o f th e K orean War, th e H um an administration devoted no atten tio n w hatsoever to th e dom estic origins of the con­ flict. H u m an an d his advisors w ere certain th a t the Soviet Union had ordered th e invasion. A cheson, fo r exam ple, later declared dramati­ cally th a t S talin’s “ dagger th ru st p in n ed a w arning notice to the wall w hich said: ‘G ive u p or be conquered!’ ” For H um an, as Ernest R. May has show n, th e lessons o f th e 1 9 3 0 s h ad created an axiom that dom inated his th in k in g . M anchuria, E thiopia, and Munich had proved th a t appeasem ent, fa r from h altin g aggression, only guaran­ teed a fu tu re w ar u n d er even m ore d ifficu lt circumstances.39 As the p resident rem arked privately tw o days after th e attack, the United States h ad to act decisively because: Korea is the Greece o f the Far East. If we are tough enough now, if we stand up to them like we did in Greece three years ago, they won’t take any next steps. But if we just stand by, they’ll move into Iran and they’ll take over the whole Middle East. There’s no telling what they’ll do, if we don’t pu t up a fight now. For A m erican leaders, th e N o rth K orean assault was aimed not at the lim ited goal o f reunification b u t in stead at achieving the first step in th e Soviet b lu ep rin t fo r w orld co n q u est.40 W ith in a few days after the

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invasion, the ad m in istratio n h a d je ttiso n e d th e policy o f restrain t Acheson had o u tlin ed in h is Press C lu b speech an d em braced an approach rooted in a g lo b alist assessm ent o f th e n a tu re o f th e Soviet challenge.41 North K orea’s attack o n S o u th K orea convinced th e T rum an a d ­ m inistration th a t Moscow h ad a lte re d its tactics fo r expansion a n d now would engage in o p en m ilitary aggression to ex ten d th e area o f Soviet control. It follow ed logically th a t th e U n ite d S tates could n o t expect to preserve w orld peace a n d stab ility if it co n tin u ed to restrict its involvem ent in in tern atio n al affairs to p ro v id in g econom ic a id , technical advice, an d lim ited m ilitary assistance. A g lo b al m ilitary threat o f such m o n u m en tal p ro p o rtio n s seem ed to d em an d a drastic alteration o f A m erican fo reig n policy .” 43 N evertheless, th e ad m in is­ tration adopted a course o f actio n com m ensurate w ith its ow n estim a­ tion of th e danger only w ith considerable reluctance. T he p resid en t could have dispatched com bat tro o p s to th e p en in su la im m ed iately to crush th e aggressor sw iftly a n d th ereb y d em o n strate th e ex ten t o f W ashington's resolve. In stead , T rum an h o p ed th a t S o u th K orea could defend itself w ith o u t such assistance. I f th e ROK h ad been able to repel th e N o rth K orean assault alo n e, th e ad m in istratio n m ig h t well have gained renew ed confidence in its A sian strategy a n d co n tin ­ ued to pursue a lim ited approach. Press reports o f th e N o rth K orean invasion arrived in W ashington on the evening o f J u n e 24. R esponding to a req u est fo r co n firm atio n , Muccio cabled th a t “ it w ould ap p ear from th e n atu re o f th e attack . . . th at it constitutes [an] a ll-o u t offensive against R O K .” 49 S tate D epartm ent officials pro m p tly co ntacted A ssistant Secretary Rusk and newly ap p o in ted Secretary o f th e A rm y Frank Pace, Jr. Rusk th e n notified A cheson, w ho was n o t in th e cap ital over th e w eekend. T he secretary o f state approved w ith o u t h esitatio n R usk’s recom m enda­ tion th a t th e S tate D ep artm en t begin to fo rm u late a U n ited N atio n s resolution dealing w ith th is “ breach o f peace” in K orea fo r consider­ ation at an em ergency session o f th e Security C o u n cil.44 T his decision was entirely consistent w ith p ast A m erican policy. T he A rm y D ep art­ m ent’s contingency p la n o f J u n e 1949 h ad called fo r referral o f such an incident to th e U n ited N atio n s. M oreover, A cheson h ad said in his Press C lub speech th a t in th e ev en t o f o p en m ilitary aggression, th e nation u n d er attack sh ould rely first u p o n its ow n defenses an d th e n on th e in tern atio n al o rg an izatio n . T hat sam e evening, A cheson telep h o n ed T rum an, w ho was a t his

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hom e in In d ep en d en ce. T he presid en t at once agreed with the secre­ tary o f state th a t th e U n ited States should provide help to South K orea only in conjunction w ith th e U nited Nations. Human al» decided n o t to re tu rn to th e capital im m ediately because he did not w ant to “ alarm th e people.“ 4’ Since ch ief American delegate Warn A ustin was vacationing in V erm ont, A ssistant Secretary of StateJohn D . H ickerson contacted Secretary G eneral Lie and briefed him on the reports from K orea. “ My G o d , Jack,“ exclaimed Lie in reply, “this is w ar against th e U n ited N atio n s!“ Hickerson then explained that A m bassador E rnest A . Gross w ould call later and officially submit the m a tter to th e in tern atio n al organization for consideration. lie said he w ould convene an em ergency session o f th e Security Council, but he cautioned th a t th e U nited N ations could n o t act until it had received a rep o rt from th e U N CO K .46 T he adm inistration’s request for inter­ n atio n al action on th e K orean incid en t was to some extent the out­ grow th o f a desire to avert a direct and unilateral application of A m erican m ilitary pow er. U nited N ations support for the ROK would bolster th e m orale o f th e South K oreans and greatly improve the abil­ ity fo r local self-defense. News from Seoul follow ing th e attack cast grave doubts on whether th e U nited States could lim it its involvem ent in the conflict. Muccio reported th a t N o rth K orea’s air superiority constituted an “exceed­ ingly serious th reat,” as enem y aircraft began strafing Seoul and K im po airfield on th e afternoon o f th e invasion. “Future course of hostilities,“ h e w arned, “ m ay dep en d largely on whether US will or w ill n o t give ad eq u ate air assistance.” Muccio by then had appealed to M acA rthur for ad d itio n al eq u ip m en t and am m unition. After com­ plying w ith this req u est w ith o u t th e adm inistration’s authorization, M acA rthur forw arded to W ashington his assessment of the Korean situ atio n in th e first o f a series o f teleconferences: There is no evidence to substantiate a belief that the north Koreans ate engaged in a lim ited objective offensive or in a raid. On the contrary, the size o f the north Korean forces employed, the depth of penetra­ tion, the intensity o f the attack, and the landings made miles south of the parallel on the east coast indicate that the north Koreans are engaged in an all-out offensive to subjugate south Korea. A lthough th e S outh K oreans w ere shocked, M acA rthur reported that th e m orale o f th e ROK arm y was goo d , w hile th e general public was

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“fairly stable.” In reply, A rm y C h ie f o f S taff G en eral J . Law ton C ol­ lins conveyed W ashington’s g ra titu d e fo r M acA rthur’s “ su p erb a n d timely action” in p roviding m ore m ilitary aid to th e RO K .47 Meanwhile, th e U n ited S tates h a d req u ested form ally th a t th e Security Council m eet in em ergency session to review th e crisis in Korea. It was im p o rtan t, ad m in istratio n officials th o u g h t, fo r th e American public to learn o f th e N o rth K orean attack a n d th e in itia ­ tive at the U nited N atio n s sim ultaneously .48 D esp ite th is em phasis o n international action, how ever, it was clear th a t S o u th K o rea’s survival would depend entirely o n th e e x te n t o f W ash in g to n ’s co m m itm en t to prevent th e D PRK arm y from co n q u erin g th e en tire p en in su la. D u r­ ing the m orning o f J u n e 25 (W ashington tim e), th e S tate D ep art­ ment finished work o n a reso lu tio n . In its fin al fo rm , th e A m erican proposal labeled th e N o rth K orean attack an unprovoked “ act o f aggression.” It provided th a t th e Security C ouncil w ould call u p o n North K orea to cease fire an d w ithdraw from S o u th K orea, w hile requesting th a t all n atio n s w ith h o ld any assistance to th e N o rth Korean regim e. F u rtherm ore, it w ould in stru c t th e U N C O K to m o n i­ tor com pliance w ith th e reso lu tio n .49 L ater th a t day, A cheson te le ­ phoned th e presid en t an d advocated h is re tu rn to th e cap ital w ith o u t delay. Trum an agreed, in stru ctin g A cheson to arrange a m eetin g o f his top advisors fo r th a t evening a t B lair H ouse . 70 W hen th e Security C ouncil m e t th a t sam e aftern o o n , several d ele­ gates spoke against W ashington’s proposal. They argued th a t th e re was not enough in fo rm atio n to su b stan tiate th e charge th a t N o rth Korea was g u ilty o f aggression. T h e U N C O K ’s p relim inary rep o rt indicated th a t th e K orean in c id en t was assum ing th e character o f a full-scale war, b u t it recom m ended possible U n ited N atio n s m ed ia­ tion alone. M oreover, th e attack w as scarcely “ u n p ro v o k ed ” an d th e conflict appeared to be a civil war. For m any representatives, a deci­ sion o f this m ag n itu d e req u ired m ore tim e fo r co n su ltatio n w ith home governm ents. To overcom e these w orries, Lie exercised strong leadership an d delivered an im passioned speech, w hich stated in pan: “ The p resent situ atio n is a serious one an d is a th re a t to in tern a­ tional peace. T he Security C ouncil is, in m y o p in io n , th e co m p eten t organ to deal w ith it. I consider it th e clear d u ty o f th e Security C oun­ cil to take steps necessary to re-establish peace in th a t area.” O ver Yugoslavia’s objections, th e Security C ouncil passed th e A m erican proposal w ith only m in o r changes . 71 T rum an an d his advisors h o p ed that adverse w orld o p in io n w ould force th e N o rth K orean arm y to

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retreat w ith o u t necessitating W ashington’s resort to direct military m eans. H u m an ’s policy o f relying on th e U nited Nations worked only because th e Soviet delegation was n o t present at the Security Council an d therefore u n ab le to veto th e A m erican resolution.” It is highly unlikely, however, th a t in th e absence o f a U nited Nations sanction th e U nited S û tes w ould have rem ained inactive following the North K orean attack. Yet W ashington gladly exploited the Soviet boycott to give th e im pression th a t th e en tire w orld com munity was united in its d eterm ination to resist Soviet-inspired aggression. Truman also recog­ nized th a t if h e stressed th e principle o f collective security, he would g e n e u te m ore dom estic political support for his policies.” But the ad m inistration’s approach unquestionably misled the American peo­ p le regarding th e n atu re o f th e conflict. K ennan, who had resigned his position as head o f th e Policy Planning Staff just prior to the N o rth K orean attack, argued later th a t he was aware at the time of th e dangers o f in tern atio n al involvem ent in the Korean crisis. He p urportedly urged Trum an to act unilaterally, avowing that the U nited S û tes possessed b o th th e pow er and th e right to intervene in K orea alone. “ This was, finally, a civil conflict,” Kennan recalls in his m em oirs, “ n o t an in tern atio n al one; and th e term ’aggression’ in the usual in tern atio n al sense was . . . m isplaced .” 54 Few o f T rum an’s diplom atic advisors shared Kennan’s viewpoint. A t th e sam e tim e, som e A m erican leaders believed that the United S û te s should be ready to im p lem en t drastic measures to ensure South K orea’s survival. In a cable from Tokyo, D ulles encouraged the ad m in istu tio n to p repare to d efend th e ROK regardless of cost: It is possible that the South Koreans may themselves contain and repulse the attack and, if so, this is the best way. If, however, it appeals that they cannot do so, then . . . United Sûtes forces should be used. . . . To sit by while Korea is overrun by unprovoked armed attack would start a disastrous chain of events leading most probably to world war. M acA rthur, in requesting au th o rizatio n to send more supplies to South K orea, also com m ented th a t th e situ atio n was grave and might req u ire A m erican m ilitary in terv en tio n .” In Moscow, A m erican diplom atic represenutives were even mote vehem ent in urg in g W ashington to be decisive. Members of the

M1 embassy staff insisted th a t although Moscow d id n o t favor a m ajor war, “this aggressive m ilitary m ove against [the ROK] represents dear-cut Soviet challenge which in our considered opinion US should answer firmly and swiftly as it constitutes direct th reat to our leader­ ship [of the] free world against Soviet C om m unist im perialism .” Any delay would hasten the collapse o f South K orea and em bolden Mos­ cow to embark on sim ilar adventures elsewhere in th e international community with “calculably grave unfavorable repercussions.” If, by contrast, the U nited States acted w ith speed and resolve, th e Soviets might forsake further aggressive action. T he “ K rem lin’s K orean adventure,” the cable concluded, thus offers us op p o rtunity to show th a t w e m ean w hat we say by talk in g of firmness and at th e sam e tim e to u nm ask p resen t im p o rtan t Soviet weaknesses before eyes o f w orld a n d particu larly A sia w here p o p u lar concept [of] Soviet pow er [is] grossly exaggerated as resu lt [of] recent Soviet political and pro p ag an d a successes [in] th a t area .*6

Ignoring such advice, A m erican leaders showed a preference for restraint in searching for an appropriate response to th e Korean crisis. In preparation for the first m eeting at Blair H ouse, the State D epart­ ment formulated a list o f policy alternatives th a t included such lim ­ ited options as sending South K orea all essential equipm ent regard­ less of current programs and p erm ittin g the officers in the KMAG to remain with the constabulary arm y.’7 If necessary, the U nited States would use naval and air power to establish a protective zone around Seoul and the port o f Inchon to perm it the successful evacuation o f all American personnel. In its report, the State D epartm ent outlined as well a more positive course. If South K orea’s survival dem anded drastic measures, the U nited States m ight com m it ground forces “to stabilize the combat situation including if feasible the restoration o f original boundaries at 38 degree parallel.” Significantly, the State Department recom mended th a t M acArthur send a survey team to South Korea forthw ith to determ ine the m inim um am ount o f assis­ tance required to enable the ROK to defend itself w ithout at the same time underm ining the security o f Japan. Acheson cabled Muccio that he hoped South Korea could hold on until the adm inistra­ tion had an opportunity to study these options.58 Early that evening, T r u m a n returned to W ashington. Acheson, Johnson, and W ebb were at the airport to greet the president and

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b rie f h im o n th e m ost recen t reports from Seoul. Once the car doors h ad closed, W ebb recalled later, Trum an declared that this was “a challenge th a t we m u st m eet. By G o d , I ’m going to let them have it.” Jo h n so n th e n p led g ed his su p p o rt fo r a firm stand, knowing, accord­ in g to W ebb, th a t A cheson opposed precipitate action. Tb avoid a possible arg u m en t a t th a t tim e, W ebb sum m arized the State Depart­ m e n t’s proposal, u rg in g th e p resid en t to hear it out before making any decisions. T rum an agreed, b u t W ebb was still troubled over the im plications o f th e p resid en t’s rem arks. U pon arrival at Blair House, W ebb follow ed Trum an in to th e cloakroom and closed the door. “ K now ing from m y B ureau o f B udget days th at the President had always given m e a large am o u n t o f freedom to express the results o f sta ff w ork,” W ebb explained th a t h e and Acheson preferred a restrained approach. H e asked th e president to resist the temptation to approve drastic steps u n til th e U n ited N ations had a chance to act o n th e K orean in c id en t . 59 D u rin g inform al discussions before dinner, Johnson urged General O m ar N . Bradley, chairm an o f th e JC S, to read a memorandum that M acA rthur h ad prepared stressing th e strategic importance of pre­ venting th e C om m unists from seizing Taiwan. A fter Bradley had fin­ ished, Trum an deferred consideration o f th e m atter until after the m eal.60 D uring d in n er, conversation centered on the global nature of th e Soviet challenge in K orea. These A m erican leaders easily agreed th a t th e N o rth K orean attack was equivalent to H iderite aggression an d appeasem ent was n o t a viable alternative. Many o f the partici­ pan ts feared th e possibility o f a w ider war. If th e N orth Korean army was unable to subdue th e ROK’s forces, th e Soviet Union or China m ig h t en ter th e conflict. Everyone shared th e hope that the South K oreans could d efend them selves w ithout the necessity for drastic A m erican assistance .61 Following dinner, A cheson sum m arized th e State Department’s recom m endations. H e also suggested th a t Trum an order the Seventh Fleet in to th e Taiwan Straits to prevent an attack either on the island or th e Chinese m ainland. Bradley registered his immediate suppon for A cheson’s proposals. H e th o u g h t th a t th e U nited Sûtes had to draw a line against Soviet expansionism som etim e and Korea “was as good an occasion . . . as anyw here else.” Yet Bradley advocated only th e use o f A m erican air and naval pow er to h alt the North Korean advance. H e advised against th e dispatch o f ground forces to Korea because he doubted th a t Moscow w anted war w ith the United Sûtes

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and, presum ably, u n lim ite d A m erican in v o lv em en t w ould com pel the Soviets to intervene m ilitarily .62 Naval C hief o f S taff A d m iral Forrest P. S herm an seconded B rad­ ley’s assessm ent b u t stated d efia n tly th a t if th e Soviets w an ted w ar, “they will have it.” S herm an w an ted to avoid a to ta l co m m itm en t o f American power, how ever. H e favored in ste ad an increase o f A m eri­ can advisory personnel in th e ROK an d reliance o n air pow er to delay the N orth K orean advance. A ir Force C h ie f o f S taff G eneral H oyt S. Vandenberg th e n rem in d ed his colleagues th a t w hile a lim ited ap ­ proach was feasible, th e U n ite d S tates was n o t p rep ared to co u n ter Soviet m ilitary pow er if S talin chose to en te r th e K orean conflict. Frank Pace, J r., Francis P. M atthew s, an d T hom as K . F in letter, th e secretaries o f th e arm y, navy, a n d air force, respectively, all agreed th a t in the absence o f Soviet m ilitary in terv en tio n , A m erican air pow er was sufficient to preserve S outh K orea’s survival. T rum an’s civilian advisors, w hile acknow ledging th e n eed fo r som e k in d o f p ro m p t action, were u nanim ous in o p p o sin g th e use o f A m erican com bat troops .65 These com m ents reinforced T rum an’s o rig in al in clin atio n to follow W ebb’s cloakroom advice an d approve th e S tate D ep artm en t’s recom ­ m endations for a lim ited in itia l response to th e K orean crisis. H e decided to auth o rize th e sh ip m en t o f all necessary supplies to th e ROK, th e dispatch o f a survey team to S eoul, an d th e tran sfer o f th e Seventh Fleet from th e P h ilip p in es to Ja p a n . M oreover, T rum an instructed F in letter to m ake p rep aratio n s fo r th e d estru ctio n o f all Soviet airbases in A sia; th e S tate an d D efense d ep artm en ts w ould for­ m ulate contingency p lan s fo r reactin g to th e nex t p ro b ab le location of Soviet aggression. A fter approving a press release, th e p resid en t told his advisors to stress in th e ir p u b lic com m ents th a t th e U n ited States was acting u n d er in tern atio n al au th o rity an d w ould lim it its m ilitary involvem ent to p ro tectin g th e A m erican evacuation from South K orea. Trum an said h e w ould consider a m ore drastic course only if N o rth K orea d efied th e U n ited N atio n s reso lu tio n .64 These decisions a t th e first B lair H ouse m eetin g show ed how relu ctan t Tru­ m an and his advisors w ere to im p lem en t extrem e m easures d u rin g th e first hours afte r th e D PR K ’s assault. A lth o u g h it perceived th e invasion as p a rt o f th e Soviet design fo r w orld co n q u est, th e ad m in is­ tration nevertheless h ad n o t lo st confidence in S o u th K orea’s capacity for self-defense. Subsequent rep o rts from Seoul pro v id ed som e reason fo r o p ti-

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m isai. A fter receiving new instructions based on the decisions at Blair H ouse, M acA rthur’s ch ief o f sta ff invited officials in Washington to “ com e over an d jo in th e fig h t. W e are delighted with your lines of action an d th is aid sh ould tu rn th e tric k /’ Muccio cabled Rusk that th e S outh K oreans w ere “ h o ld in g th e ir ow n” and there was evi­ dence o f N o rth K orean disengagem ent. By th e morning of June 26 (W ashington tim e), A cheson could inform congressional leaders that “ things seem ed to be in p retty good shape .” 65 But it soon became obvious th a t despite W ashington’s show o f concern, the ROK army could n o t h alt th e N o rth K orean advance. Later that day, Muccio ordered m ost o f th e em bassy sta ff to evacuate Seoul.66 At the same tim e, th e am bassador apprised W ashington o f his intention to “re­ m ain Seoul w ith lim ited staff u n til b itte r end.” Drumright tried to “ argue th e A m bassador o u t o f m aking a m artyr o f himself,” but Muccio w anted to avoid charges th a t th e U nited States had betrayed th e ROK. A cheson quickly cabled Muccio th a t it would be inadvis­ able for him to be taken hostage an d h e should evacuate Seoul at once. T hus, on th e m orning o f Ju n e 27 (K orean tim e), Muccio left Seoul, leaving th e KM AG b eh in d . 67 M eanw hile, Trum an h ad h eld a second m eeting at Blair House on th e n ig h t o f Ju n e 26 (W ashington tim e) to discuss the deepening cri­ sis. O nce again, A cheson opened th e conversations and recommend­ ed rem oving all restrictions o n th e use o f naval and air power in K orea. T he president approved th is proposal, b u t he emphasized th a t A m erican operations should n o t extend north o f the 38th paral­ lel. Acheson th en raised th e issue o f Taiwan. Truman now decided th a t th e Seventh F leet should m ove in to th e Taiwan Straits. But this action d id n o t signal an end to th e adm inistration’s desire to limit its involvem ent in th e C hinese civil war. Curiously, the president sug­ gested th a t th e U nited States propose a restoration o f Japanese con­ tro l over Taiwan. A cheson cautioned Trum an th a t it would be unwise to “ get m ixed u p ” in C hina’s adm inistration o f th e island. Truman agreed, declaring disdainfully th a t he w ould n o t give the government o f C hiang K ai-shek “ a nickel” because previous American aid had been “ invested in U nited States real estate .” 68 Trum an and his advisors touched briefly on policy at the United N ations. Acheson explained th a t th e U nited States would submit a new resolution to th e Security C ouncil th e next day. After Hickerson read th e d raft, Trum an stressed th e im portance o f unqualified inter-

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national support for th e A m erican p lan . W hen Rusk raised th e possi­ bility of a Soviet veto, th e p resident rem arked th a t such an event would be beneficial, since it w ould help " to lay a base for our action in Formosa.” Discussions th en shifted to th e b attlefield situation in Korea. General Collins reported pessim istically th a t th e ROK was on the verge o f total collapse. Acheson com m ented th a t if K orean attempts at self-defense failed, th e U nited States h ad to intervene more direcdy. Johnson disagreed, insisting th a t th e U nited States had done enough. Ih im an spoke in favor o f A cheson’s position, declaring somewhat vaguely th a t "w e m ust do everything we can for th e Korean situation—for th e U n ited N ations.” Bradley and Collins, assuming th at Truman had ju st indicated his willingness to com m it combat ground forces, rem inded th e president th a t such a decision would entail the need for m obilization. In reply, b o th Ih im a n and Acheson voiced the hope th a t th e U nited States could avoid this dras­ tic step.69 Truman’s decisions a t th e second Blair H ouse m eeting represented only a m inor change in tactics. A ir and naval pow er still were th e basic ingredients in the A m erican response. T he president continued to place faith in South K orea’s ability to defend itself w ith lim ited assistance. Collins transm itted new instructions to Tokyo authorizing MacArthur to “offer fullest possible support to South K orean forces so as to perm it these forces to reform .” In ad d itio n , "KM AG person­ nel should rem ain w ith K orean forces to insure continued and effec­ tive South Korean resistance.” 70 A t noon th e next day, Trum an informed the Am erican people o f his decisions w ith respect to Korea. Pursuant to th e Security C ouncil resolution o f Ju n e 25, he had ordered American air and sea u n its " to give th e K orean governm ent troop cover and support.” Furtherm ore, th e U nited States w ould "neutralize” Taiwan and increase th e am ount o f econom ic and m ili­ tary aid to Indochina and th e Philippines. These actions were nec­ essary, Truman explained dram atically, because th e Korean attack "makes it plain beyond all d o u b t th a t th e international com m unist movement is prepared to use arm ed invasion to conquer independent nations.”71 That afternoon, th e Security Council again considered th e K orean issue. The UNCOK had cabled its report on th e incident, inform ing the United N ations th a t N orth K orea had ignored th e Ju n e 25 resolu­ tion. Further rails for a ceasefire and m ediation, it reported, w ould

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b e p o in tless . 72 T he A m erican deleg atio n lost litd e tim e seizing upon th e U N C O K rep o rt to p u sh th ro u g h a resolution legitimizing the previous actions o f th e U n ited States. A ustin read Truman's state­ m en t deno u n cin g N o rth K orea fo r aggression and a flagrant disre­ gard o f th e w ill o f th e U n ited N ations. H e then formally requested th a t “ th e M em bers o f th e U n ited N ations furnish such assistance to th e R epublic o f K orea as m ay be necessary to repel the armed attack an d to restore in tern atio n al peace an d security in the area." Earlier th a t day, Soviet delegate Jacob M alik h ad rejected Lie’s appeal to a tten d th e Security C ouncil session. As a result, the United States again was able to o b ta in in tern atio n al approval for its proposal.” Trum an m et w ith S tate D ep artm en t officials th at evening to con­ sider th e possibility o f Soviet m ilitary intervention in the conflict. A dm inistration officials w ere afraid th a t in th e event South Korea successfully d efended itself, Moscow m ig h t feel obliged to assist its C om m unist clien t in com pleting th e conquest o f th e peninsula. Dur­ ing th e NSC m eeting th e next m orning, American leaders agreed th a t th e decision to assist in defen d in g th e ROK did not involve a com m itm ent to engage in w ar w ith th e Soviet U nion. Truman then m entioned th e “ need to resurvey o u r policy papers so far as the Soviet U nion is concerned.’’ Johnson responded th a t work on such a reassess­ m en t was near com pletion. T he D efense D epartm ent had given gen­ eral approval to a S tate D ep artm en t p ap er regarding possible Soviet intervention, b u t it was m ulling over som e changes in phrasing. Tru­ m an to ld his advisors th a t th e rep o rt h ad to be kept secret to avoid alarm ing th e general p ublic. F in letter th en recommended approval for air strikes against supply lines an d bases in N orth Korea. Al­ though Trum an authorized V andenbetg to study this proposal, he w ithheld consent, presum ably because he feared Soviet intervention w ould follow any m ilitary action in N orth K orea .74 N orth K orea was doing q u ite w ell w ithout th e help o f the Red Army.77 N evertheless, M acA rthur ordered th e commander of the KMAG to “ repair to your form er locations. M omentous decisions are in th e offing. Be o f good cheer.’’ In accordance w ith instructions, he also dispatched a survey team to th e ROK u nder the command of Brigadier G eneral Jo h n H . C hurch . 76 A fter talks with Muccio at Suwön late on th e evening o f Ju n e 27, C hurch set about reorganizing th e ROK army. Evidently he experienced notable success, since Muc­ cio sent a rather encouraging cable to W ashington the following m orning:

Fulfilment o f a C om m itm ent

*47

Situation had deteriorated so rapidly [that] had not President’s deci­ sion plus arrival General Church party become known here, doubtful any organized Korean resistance would have continued through night. Combat aid decision plus Church’s orders have had great moral effect. Ambassador Muccio was optim istic th at the forthcom ing American air strikes would dem oralize th e N orth Korean forces and m ake it possible for the ROK army to reform south o f th e H an River.77 By the afternoon o f Ju n e 28, N orth Korean forces had occupied Seoul. Subsequent cables from South Korea indicated th at the Rhee government was “seriously dispirited” as th e constabulary army con­ tinued to retreat. In his report to M acArthur, Church advised th at extreme measures were essential “ if situation is to be stabilized.” A t least two American com bat team s would be needed to restore the line along the 38th parallel.78 In response, M acArthur decided to survey the situation personally. W hile en route to Suwön on the m orning o f June 29, he authorized bom bing missions north o f the parallel, although his instructions specifically prohibited this m easure.79 Upon arrival, MacArthur conferred w ith the ROK’s chief o f staff and then drove northward to observe the battlefield situation at the H an River. He concluded th at South K orea’s position was indeed desperate. During a m eeting w ith Muccio and Rhee (who had flown to Suwön from Taejön), M acArthur m entioned w ithout elaborating th at he had arrived at a num ber o f m om entous decisions.80 Yet after returning to Tokyo, the general cabled a decidedly optim istic report to W ashing­ ton. Despite fifty percent casualties, M acArthur explained, the South Korean army was beginning to regroup at Taejön and soon m ight be able to halt the N orth Korean advance w ithout drastic m ilitary assis­ tance from the U nited States.81 A new sense o f optim ism characterized discussions at the NSC meeting late on the afternoon o f Ju n e 29. In addition to M acArthur’s report, W ashington had received word from Moscow th at the Soviet Union had announced its intention to avoid involvem ent in the Korean dispute.82 This inform ation encouraged the belief th at the United States could ensure the survival o f the ROK w ithout having to forsake its policy o f restraint. Yet Truman and his advisors still worried about the possibility o f Soviet intervention; they w anted to avoid any action that m ight ignite a m ajor war. Having reached agreem ent w ith the State D epartm ent, Johnson read and recom m ended approval for the proposed JCS directive to M acArthur. The key provision stated

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th a t in th e ev en t “ su b stan tial Soviet forces actively oppose our p resen t o p eratio n s in K orea, U n ited States forces should defend them selves, sh o u ld tak e n o action o n th e spot to aggravate the situa­ tio n an d sh o u ld rep o rt th e situ atio n to W ashington ."89 W h ile Jo h n so n was read in g th e directive, Thiman interrupted. T here sh ould be n o im p licatio n , h e stated emphatically, that the U n ited States was going to w ar w ith th e Soviet Union at this time. H is rem arks revealed his co n tin u in g devotion to caution in respond­ in g to th e K orean crisis: "W e m u st be dam n careful. We must not say th a t we are an ticip atin g a w ar w ith th e Soviet U nion. We want to take any steps we have to to p u sh th e N o rth K oreans behind the line . . . b u t I d o n ’t w ant to g et us over-com m itted to a whole lot of other th in g s th a t could m ean w ar." Jo h n so n said he understood and fin­ ished th e directive. H e th e n explained th a t th e JCS believed it was essential fo r th e U n ited States to establish a beachhead in South K orea in case a to tal evacuation o f A m erican personnel became neces­ sary. Pace urged approval b u t n o ted th a t he had “ considerable reser­ vations" ab o u t placing any lim itatio n s on M acArthur. Truman retort­ ed th a t restrictions w ere indispensable if th e U nited States expected to avert a w ider war. A m erican m ilitary involvem ent, he avowed, was designed to d o n o m ore th a n "k eep th e N orth Koreans from killing th e people we are trying to save .” 84 A pparently, th e p resid en t w anted th e freedom to reconsider his decision to p u n ish th e aggressor in K orea if th e price o f American interv en tio n was an open m ilitary clash w ith th e Soviet Union. Acheson’s com m ents revealed sim ilar concern over th e danger of an escala­ tio n o f hostilities. W hile h e approved o f M acArthur’s decision to launch air strikes n o rth o f th e p arallel, th e secretary o f state pointed to th e p o tentially catastrophic consequences o f accidental flights into M anchuria. However, Moscow’s p ublic posture o f neutrality apparently rem oved m any o f th e m isgivings Acheson had regarding an u n q ualified com m itm ent o f A m erican pow er in defense of South K orea. If necessary, A cheson stated firm ly, th e U nited States should use com bat ground forces. " I t w ould be a great disaster," he argued, " if we were to lose now ." Trum an agreed w ith Acheson that Moscow d id n o t w ant a direct m ilitary clash w ith th e U nited States in Korea, rem arking prophetically th a t " th e Russians are going to let the Chi­ nese do th e fig h tin g for th em ." W hen th e president closed the meet­ in g , he to ld Johnson to have M acA rthur su bm it daily reports so that

Fulfillment o f a C om m itm ent

249

Washington would be kept fully inform ed about developm ents in Korea.” That evening, the JCS dispatched new instructions to Tokyo au­ thorizing MacArthur to em ploy “ such army com bat and service forces as to insure the retention o f a po rt and air base in th e general area [of] Pusan-Chinhae.” M acArthur could engage purely m ilitary targets in North Korea if this was necessary for th e reduction o f South Korean casualties. “Special care will be taken,” th e JCS em phasized, “ to insure that operations in N orth Korea stay well clear o f the frontiers of Manchuria or th e Soviet U nion.” W ashington cautioned MacAr­ thur that the U nited States did n o t w ant war w ith Russia. The adm in­ istration’s instructions concluded th at if the Soviets intervened m ili­ tarily, American forces should im plem ent defensive measures alone and MacArthur should report th e situation to W ashington w ithout delay.” Before dawn on June 30 (W ashington tim e), the JCS received MacArthur’s report on his inspection o f the battlefield situation in Korea. The general noted th a t the ROK arm y lacked leadership and was in a state o f u tter confusion because o f the absence o f plans for an orderly withdrawal. The attack had been a total surprise; effective resistance seemed im possible. The N orth Korean army, on the other hand, was well equipped and highly trained, boasting some o f the best combat units M acArthur had ever seen. “ It is now obvious,” the general charged, “ th at this force has been b u ilt as an elem ent o f Communist m ilitary aggression.” W ithout decisive action, MacAr­ thur predicted, N orth Korea probably would conquer the entire pen­ insula. “The only assurance for the holding o f the present line, and the ability to regain later th e lost ground,” he advised W ashington, “is through the introduction o f US ground com bat forces into the Korean battle area.” M acArthur recom m ended im m ediate authoriza­ tion for the dispatch o f one regim ental com bat team to the front line and the introduction o f two additional divisions as soon as practicable for use in a counteroffensive. A m ore lim ited American m ilitary oper­ ation, he warned, would be either “ needlessly costly in life, money, and prestige” or even “ doom ed to failure.”87 American officials received M acArthur’s recom m endations w ith alarm. His previous report had led the adm inistration to believe th at it could avoid the use o f ground troops. Collins advised Tokyo th at a decision o f such m agnitude required “ several hours for consider-

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atio o .” H e asked M acA rthur if th e instructions o f the prior night w ould n o t suffice to m eet th e situ atio n temporarily. MacArthur rep lied th a t these orders d id n o t provide enough latitude for effective action. “ T im e is o f th e essence,“ h e stated categorically, “and a dearcu t decision w ith o u t delay is im perative.” Collins still hesritated, explaining th a t th e te n o r o f p rio r discussions at the White House “ clearly ind icated to m e th a t th e P resident would wish carefully to consider w ith h is to p advisors before authorizing introduction of A m erican com bat forces in to b attle area.” Finally he agreed to com­ ply w ith M acA rthur’s req u est, prom ising an answer in thirty min­ u tes .88 C ollins th e n contacted Pace and sum m arized MacArthur’s proposals. A t ju st before five o ’clock th a t same morning, Pace telep h o n ed Trum an an d apprised him o f th e situation. The presi­ d e n t’s in itial reaction suggested a lingering desire again to avoid dras­ tic steps. “ D o we have to decide to n ig h t?” he asked. Pace then told th e p resid en t th a t in M acA rthur’s judgm ent th e ROK would fall w ith o u t A m erican m ilitary interv en tio n . To prevent South Korea’s collapse, H um an decided to authorize th e com m itm ent of one regi­ m en tal com bat team . H e deferred action on th e use of two combat divisions u n til later th a t m o rn in g . 89 T here can be no d o u b t th a t M acA rthur’s em phatic request for authority to use com bat ground forces was th e crucial element in Hu­ m an ’s decision. T he president rem oved th e final restrictions on W ashington’s com m itm ent to d efen d th e ROK only after MacArthur h ad reported th a t South K orea was thoroughly incapable of defend­ in g itself. Several hours after his telephone conversation with Pace, Trum an convened a m eeting w ith his m ajor advisors. By this time, W ashington had received word from Muccio confirming MacArthur’s assessm ent. T he am bassador reported th a t South Korea’s army was in sham bles, its people dem oralized, an d its governm ent near disinte­ gratio n .90 A fter soliciting com m ents, th e president found that a con­ sensus existed on th e necessity fo r unrestricted use of American ground troops in th e K orean conflict. Trum an and his advisors agreed th a t noth in g less th a n th e fu tu re peace and security o f the world com­ m unity was at stake in K orea. I f N o rth K orea conquered the ROK, they believed, th e Soviet U nion w ould instigate new acts of armed aggression elsewhere in th e w orld. Eventually, unrestrained Commu­ nist expansion w ould endanger th e n ational security o f the United States as w ell.91 For N orth K orea’s leaders, W ashington’s decision to commit

1 5I

ground forces in the Korean conflict probably cam e as a surprise, b u t it may not have been entirely unexpected. A dm ittedly, th e DPRK had reason to think th at th e U n ited States w ould n o t use m ilitary means to prevent the dem ise o f th e ROK, since Acheson h ad placed South Korea outside the A m erican “ defensive perim eter.” 92 O n th e other hand, Kim II Sung and his colleagues m ust have recognized that such a blatant challenge w ould dem and a firm response. Yet North Korea accepted th e risk o f A m erican m ilitary action because it feared the consequences o f postponing th e invasion, w hile anticipat­ ing a quick and easy victory. As K hrushchev recalls in his m em oirs, “we were inclined to th in k th a t if th e war were fought swiftly . . . then intervention by th e USA could be avoided.” 93 Because H um an delayed his decision for m ilitary intervention, K im II Sung’s predic­ tion was almost correct. For American officials, th e attack on South K orea signaled a drastic alteration in Soviet tactics. N evertheless, caution and restraint charac­ terized W ashington’s initial reaction to th e K orean crisis. O nly w hen the DPRK threatened to overrun all o f K orea d id H um an decide to defend the ROK regardless o f cost. A m erican policy in Korea before the invasion explains the adm inistration’s reluctance to com m it com ­ bat ground troops. By 1949, H um an an d his advisors had concluded that with American econom ic aid , technical advice, and m ilitary assistance, South Korea w ould develop th e capacity for self-defense and thereby deter an attack from th e n o rth . C ontainm ent in Korea, they believed, was possible in th e absence o f an unqualified guaran­ tee of military protection from th e U nited States because th e Soviet challenge in Asia was essentially lim ited in nature. As Acheson explained later: “The view was generally held th a t since th e C om m u­ nists had far from exhausted th e potentialities for obtaining their objectives through guerrilla and psychological warfare, political pres­ sure and intim idation, such m eans w ould probably continue to be used rather than overt m ilitary aggression.” D espite evidence th at an act of armed aggression was im m inent in th e spring o f 1950, Am eri­ can leaders therefore dism issed th e ROK as a probable target. As a result, the DPRK’s invasion n o t only surprised b u t thoroughly shocked adm inistration officials.94 While American policy in K orea prior to th e attack explains H u ­ man’s initial hesitancy, it also m ade th e decision to dispatch ground troops to Korea a near certainty once th e ROK proved incapable o f defending itself. N orth K orea’s attack represented an unm istakable

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challenge to A m erican credibility an d prestige throughout the world. I f W ashington allow ed S outh K orea to hill, few nations would place fa ith in fu tu re pledges o f su p p o rt from th e U nited States.9’ Offer g reater im portance, how ever, was T rum an’s unwillingness to abandon an objective th a t th e U n ited States h ad pursued for almost a decade. Since Pearl H arbor, A m erican leaders h ad tried to foster the emer­ gence in K orea o f an in d e p en d en t and prosperous nation possessing a strong governm ent th a t reflected th e w ill o f th e people. To permit the C om m unists to co n q u er S outh K orea after th e United States had expended so m uch in energy an d resources to prevent just such an outcom e sim ply was n o t a viable alternative. Predictably, Truman chose to com m it gro u n d forces in th e conflict to ensure the survival of th e ROK. In th e e n d , A m erican m ilitary intervention in the Korean W ar co n stitu ted no reversal o f policy, b u t m erely the fulfillment of a com m itm ent.

Conclusion

In his farewell address, Harry S. Truman pointed to the decision to commit combat ground forces in th e Korean War as “ th e m ost important in my tim e as president.“ 1 W hile some experts on the Tru­ man eta might quibble w ith die president’s assessment, m ilitary intervention in Korea represents a w atershed in th e history o f Am eri­ can diplomacy after W orld War II. Prior to Ju n e 25,1950, th e Thim an administration was uncertain regarding the nature and m agnitude o f the Soviet threat to the national security o f th e U nited States. It therefore sought to counter th e perceived challenge o f Soviet ideol­ ogy and power through a reliance on lim ited m eans.2 N orth Korea’s attack on South Korea had a dram atic im pact on the adm inistration’s assumptions. “Here for the first tim e since the end o f W orld War II,“ Truman observed later, “ the Com m unists openly and defiandy em ­ barked upon military force and invasion.” Soviet expansionist am bi­ tions now seemed global in scope and m uch m ore dangerous, de­ manding an extreme response from the U nited States. Trum an’s dispatch of ground troops to Korea sym bolized th e final break w ith a restrained approach. Am erican leaders were convinced th at the secu­ rity of the United States now required an unqualified com m itm ent o f power for the preservation o f world stability.3 American foreign policy in Korea from 1941 to 1950 provides a telling example o f how the U nited States, before the outbreak o f the Korean War, attem pted to rely on lim ited m eans to accomplish its aims in postwar international affairs. Throughout these years, Wash­ ington pursued the achievem ent o f a reconstructed Korean nation that reflected the American m odel o f political, economic, and social development. American leaders never abandoned this objective, al­ though they sought to attain it w ithout a full com m itm ent o f power and prestige. W hile the U nited States traditionally had been indiffer­ ent to Korea’s fate, in the afterm ath o f Pearl H arbor Roosevelt and

2-54

Conclusion

his advisors acknow ledged a t once th e im portance o f the Korean pen­ in su la to th e m aintenance o f postw ar peace in Asia. Realistically, the ad m in istratio n advocated th e creation o f a four-power trusteeship for th e achievem ent o f K orea’s independence. W hen Truman became p resid en t in 1945, how ever, Soviet expansionism in Eastern Europe h ad beg u n to alarm A m erican officials. Consequently, Truman tem­ porarily discarded th e tru steesh ip form ula and attempted to liberate K orea unilaterally. A fter S talin sen t th e Red Army into Korea ahead o f schedule, Trum an hastily gained Soviet acceptance of Korea's divi­ sion in to zones o f m ilitary occupation a t th e 38th parallel. Follow ing th e Soviet-A m erican p artitio n o f Korea, Truman never w avered in his com m itm ent to th e achievem ent of reunification u n d er a governm ent favorable to th e U nited States. At the Moscow C onference in D ecem ber 1945, th e adm inistration resurrected the trusteeship id ea an d o b tain ed Soviet support for this solution to the K orean problem . B ut w hen Moscow refused to accept Washington's in terp retatio n o f th is agreem ent, Trum an rejected further negotia­ tions an d began to search fo r som e way to break the Korean deadlock w ith o u t resorting to m ilitary m eans. G eorge F. Kennan’s contain­ m en t policy ultim ately provided Trum an w ith the answer to his pre­ dicam ent. Initially, th e adm inistration believed that economic aid w ould force Moscow to accept a settlem ent in Korea on American term s. W hen th e Soviets failed to retreat, Trum an’s policy drifted to th e creation o f a separate governm ent capable o f self-defense. If suc­ cessful, this strategy w ould eventuate in th e emergence of a strong, dem ocratic, W estern-oriented n atio n , thereby permitting a safe A m erican w ithdraw al in th e absence o f an unqualified guarantee of m ilitary protection. Trum an’s com m itm ent to S outh K orea’s survival was much greater th a n m ost scholars acknow ledge. R ather than seeking to desen the ROK, th e adm inistration consistendy provided it with economic assistance, technical advice, an d m ilitary aid during the period before Ju n e 25, 1 9 5 0 . By early 1949, Trum an and his advisors had come to view South K orea as th e test case o f containm ent in Asia. South K orea’s survival was im p o rtan t because it w ould resolve two major problem s. First, th e adm inistration hoped to atone for its perceived failure in C hina and elim inate R epublican carping at Truman’s for­ eign policy. Second, Thim an needed p ro o f th at the United States could h alt Soviet expansion in Asia w ithout a reliance on force of arm s. Thus, in K orea, containm ent prom ised to achieve a great deal

Conclusion

M5

at home and abroad a t relatively low cost in term s o f m en a n d m ate­ rial. American expectations in K orea w ere even gran d er, how ever, since Truman an d his advisors believed th a t co n tain m e n t w ould act as a liberating force. O nce th e N o rth K oreans recognized th e b en efits o f American econom ic an d d ip lo m atic su p p o rt, th ey presum ably w ould overthrow th e Soviet p u p p e t regim e an d seek reu n ificatio n u n d e r th e South Korean governm ent. Such an ev en tu ality w ould in flic t a sig n if­ icant defeat on th e Soviet U n io n a n d reg ister a key victory fo r th e principle o f n atio n al self-d eterm in atio n . Radier th an fillfillin g th e prom ise o f co n tain m e n t, th ro u g h o u t its first two years o f existence S o u th K orea was politically div id ed an d economically w eak. Even so, th e a d m in istratio n ’s co m m itm en t to th e survival o f th e ROK rem ain ed in ta c t. Late in D ecem ber 1949, fo r example, Trum an approved N S C -4 8 /2 , w hich declared th a t th e United States “sh ould co n tin u e to pro v id e fo r th e extension o f p o liti­ cal support an d econom ic, tech n ical an d m ilitary aid to th e dem ocrat­ ically-elected G overnm ent o f th e R epublic o f K orea .” 4 M uch to th e gratification o f A m erican officials, co n d itio n s in th e ROK experi­ enced a m arked im provem ent d u rin g th e sp rin g o f 1 9 5 0 . T h en su d ­ denly the DPRK attacked S o u th K orea. C o n tain m en t th ro u g h eco­ nomic m eans alone ap p eared to b e in a d eq u ate , since th e Soviet Union now sought to co n q u er th e w orld m ilitarily. D esp ite its d ire assessment, th e ad m in istratio n d id n o t ab an d o n its lim ited approach until th e ROK show ed th a t it was u tte rly in cap ab le o f self-defense. W ith N orth K orea o n th e verge o f to ta l victory, T rum an relu ctan tly decided to d efend th e ROK regardless o f cost. Significantly, th e T rum an ad m in istratio n considered N o rth K orea’s invasion as a vindication o f its co n tain m en t policy in S o u th K orea. Shortly after th e attack , Jo h n Foster D ulles spoke fo r th e ad m in istra­ tion when h e claim ed th a t o n e th in g was certain : “ [T he N o rth Koreans] d id n o t do th is p urely o n th e ir ow n b u t as p a rt o f th e w orld strategy o f in tern atio n al com m unism .” S outh K orea, h e arg u ed , was making rem arkable progress tow ard p o litical freedom an d econom ic stability ju st before th e invasion. For th e Soviet U n io n , th is “ prom is­ ing experim ent in dem ocracy” in A sia was a source o f em barrass­ m ent, as w ell as “ a dangerous salien t o n th e otherw ise C om m unistdom inated m ain lan d o f N o rth A sia.” S talin an d his colleagues h ad “found th a t they could n o t destroy it by in d irect aggression, because the political, econom ic, an d social life o f th e R epublic was so sound that subversive efforts, w hich h a d b een trie d , h a d failed .” ’ A m erican

2-56

Conclusion

leaders th erefo re co n clu d ed th a t th e very success of containment in K orea h ad forced M oscow to a lte r its tactics. Since Asians would (eject com m unism if given a free choice, they reasoned, Stalin had turned to o p en m ilitary co n q u est to expand th e area o f Soviet control.6 M oscow’s reso rt to arm ed force fo r th e destruction of “wholesome” n atio n s ap p eared to justify, i f n o t dem and, an American willingness to em ploy its m ilitary pow er to co u n ter th e new Soviet strategy. As D ulles explained a t th e tim e , “ th e K orean affair shows that commu­ nism can n o t b e checked m erely by building up sound domestic econom ies .’’7 In d eed , th is policy h ad only encouraged military ag­ gression. W ashington now fre tte d th a t th e Soviet Union would initi­ ate sim ilar th ru sts in to such areas as Indochina and Yugoslavia. Still m ore alarm ing, if S talin h ad attacked South Korea because of its p olitical an d econom ic progress, th ere was a strong possibility of “ Soviet application [of] sim ilar reasoning to Western Europe.”1 “ Since in tern atio n al com m unism m ay n o t be deterred by moral prin­ ciples backed by p o te n tia l m ig h t,’’ D ulles concluded, “we must bad those principles w ith m ilitary strength-in-being, and do so quickly.”7 N o rth K orea’s attack therefore convinced Truman and his top advi­ sors th a t only superior conventional m ilitary power—and the willing­ ness to use it against a C om m unist aggressor—would deter Soviet expansionism in th e fu tu re. Predictably, th e adoption and imple­ m en tatio n o f NSC -6 8 now appeared n o t only logical but imperative if th e U nited States was to preserve its national security. As Acheson recalled later, “ K orea m oved a g reat m any things from the realm of theory . . . in to th e realm o f actuality and . . . urgency." The Kore­ an W ar, th e secretary o f state confessed, “ was in part an opportunity to ad o p t openly a policy urgently recom m ended in private for some m onths previously .” 10 A fter Ju n e 1950, American foreign policy assum ed a decidedly m ilitaristic flavor. Foreign military assistance, for exam ple, experienced a sharp increase as Indochina, Taiwan, and th e Philippines in p articular received large am ounts o f such aid. The change in th e A m erican approach tow ard affairs in Europe was possi­ bly m ore profound. Before K orea, NATO’s development had been rath er slow, casual, an d inefficient. Following American military intervention in th e conflict, th e U nited States sent combat forces«) Europe and created a u n ified com m and w hile strenuously advocating th e rearm am ent o f W est G erm any . 11 W ashington’s obsession w ith m ilitary preparedness after the out­ break o f th e K orean W ar co n stitu ted a dram atic reversal in the Tru-

Conclusion

2-57

man administration’s policy on defense spending. Korea ushered in a new era of large m ilitary budgets, as leaders in Congress approved sharp increases in expenditures for defense w ith scarcely a w him per.12 The American people accepted this rem arkable transform ation w ith­ out protest largely because o f Trum an’s globalist assessment o f the meaning of the Korean conflict. The president portrayed the Soviet Union as the very em bodim ent o f perfidy and evil, a nation whose leaders were determ ined to im pose the Com m unist system in piece­ meal fashion on an unw anting world. As a result, the general public became convinced th at the Com m unist m ovem ent was m onolithic and the Munich analogy was valid. O n the other hand, Truman's rhetoric gave the impression th at th e U nited States was in the van­ guard of a new worldwide crusade to defend the principles o f peace and democracy. If the American people chose not to accept com plete responsibility for halting further Soviet expansion, the results would be catastrophic.13 Truman’s rhetorical justification for American intervention in the Korean War fostered public support for his policies, at least early in the conflict. But his actions had a regrettable im pact on the subse­ quent course of Soviet-American relations. W hile the Truman Doc­ trine speech started the process o f hardening the attitudes o f Ameri­ can leaders toward the efficacy o f negotiations w ith Moscow, the war in Korea convinced them th at Stalin did not w ant a diplom atic setdement. After June 1950, American diplomacy became steadily more rigid, as the nation’s leaders pursued policies and program s with noticeably greater inflexibility.14 Acheson set the tone for the future of American foreign policy when he insisted in 1951 th at world sta­ bility after Korea would require a constant reaffirm ation o f the viabil­ ity of collective security. If Russia was unable to expand, eventually it would become frustrated and, as George K ennan had predicted, either “mellow” or “wither away.” Thus Acheson could claim th at “time is on our side, if we m ake good use o f it.” 15 Acheson’s analysis, however, spawned the unrealistic hope th at the U nited States could gain diplomatic victories through a strategy o f stalem ate and inac­ tion. In reality, an unwillingness to accept anything less than a per­ petuation of the status quo removed any chance for a reduction o f the tension and hostility in Soviet-American relations. Truman’s decision to com m it com bat troops in the Korean War therefore marked a crucial turning point in postwar American diplo­ macy. Previously, the U nited States had sought to counter the expan-

MS

Cotulusion

sion o f Soviet in flu en ce in th e w orld through pursuing a policy that corresponded to K cn n an ’s original conception o f containment. As Jo h n Lewis G ad d is explains, K ennan believed th at the United States could m eet th e Soviet challenge m ost effectively through “strength­ en in g local forces o f in d ep en d en ce an d by getting them to assume p a rt o f th e b u rd e n / ' 16 T rum an’s policy before the North Korean attack was sensible because it recognized th e superior strength of n ationalism over com m unism as a force in international affairs. Fur­ th erm o re, it acknow ledged th e obvious lim itations on the power of th e U n ited States to control events in A sia. B ut South Korea’s inabil­ ity to d efen d itse lf destroyed th e adm inistration’s confidence in the feasibility o f a restrain ed approach. T he failure o f its limited policy in K orea convinced Trum an an d his advisors th a t the prospects for halt­ in g C om m unist expansion elsew here in th e world were slim indeed w ith o u t positive guarantees o f A m erican m ilitary protection. In th e fin al analysis, th e K orean W ar shattered the last vestiges of u n certain ty an d vacillation in th e m inds o f adm inistration officials regarding Soviet in ten tio n s. A m erican leaders never doubted for a m om ent th a t S talin h ad ordered th e invasion in a determined effort to extend th e area o f Soviet control. Trum an and his advisors defined th e N o rth K orean attack fo r th e A m erican people as part of the design o f “ w orld com m unism ” fo r global conquest, although Ko­ rea’s postw ar history ind icated th a t a civil war was in fact probable. A fter Ju n e 1950, any evidence o f political instability in die world th u s assum ed th e character o f a new Soviet threat to intemadonal peace an d security th a t th e U n ited States could tolerate only at grave risk. Increasingly, W ashington cam e to rely on m ilitary intervendon, rath er th a n nationalism an d indigenous hostility to Russian domina­ tio n , as th e best m ethod for com bating th e vague threat of “interna­ tio n al com m unism .” As a result, follow ing the Korean War, Ameri­ can leaders rarely took in to account th e relationship between ends an d m eans in th e form ulation o f policies for dealing with revolutionary violence an d in stability in th e international community.17 Ulti­ m ately, Trum an’s decision to com m it com bat ground forces in Korea w ould m ark th e beginning o f a relu ctan t American crusade to pre­ serve w orldw ide peace and stability th ro u g h m ilitary means.

N o tes

Abbreviations CCAC CCS CSA CTO DSB FRUS FW JCS NYT OF OPD OSS P&O PPF PSF PTO PWC RA RG TS WDSCA

Combined Chiefs Action Committee Combined Chiefs of Staff Chief of Staff of the Army China Theater of Operations Department o f State B ulletin, U.S. Department of S ate Foreign Relations o fth e U nited States, U. S. Department of State file with Ü.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff New York Times President’s Official File Opeations Planning Division U.S. Office of Stategic Services Planning and O peations President’s Personal File President’s Secretary’s File Pacific Theater of O peations Postwar Committee Research and Analysis Record Group top secret War Department Section on Civil Affairs

Full references to sources cited in the notes are given in the Selected Bibliography.

Introduction 1. Ernest R. May, "Lessons" o fth e Past: The Use and Misuse o f History in Am eri­ can Foreign Policy, pp. 3-18; John Lewis Gaddis, The U nited States and the Origins o f the Cold Wir, 1941-1947, pp. 23-25; John W. Spanier, American Foreign Policy Since W orldW arll, pp. 19 - 20 .

i6o

N otes to Pages 1-7

2. Intelligence Report. “Political Strategy for the Far East,” October 28,1944, OSS Records, RA 2666: see also Ronald Steel. Pax Americana, pp. 21-22. 3. E. Grant Meade. American Military Government in Korea, p. 44. 4. Frank Baldwin. “ Introduction.” in Frank Baldwin, ed.. Without Parallel: Tbe American-Koreon Relationship Since 194}. p. 3. 5. John Lewis Gaddis. “Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?” Foreign Affairs 52 (January 1974): 391. 6. George F. Kennan. Memoirs 1925-1930. pp. 354-367; John Lewis Gaddis, “Containment: A Reassessment.” Foreign Affairs 55 (July 1977): 876. 7. George F. Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct” Foreign Affairs 25 0uly 1947): 581. 8. Jonathan Daniels. The Man o f Independence, p. 368. 9. Arthur C. Bunce to James K. Penfield, January 20, 1948, Dept, of State Records, 895 .00/1-2048. 10. U.S. Dept, of State, The Fight Against Aggression in Korea, p. 1. CH APTER i : Am End to

Indifference

1 . Glenn D. Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Republic, p. 18; see also Gregory Henderson, Korea: The Politics o f tbe Vortex, p. 121 ; Robert R. Simmons, The Strained Alliance: Peking, Pyongyang, Moscow and tbe Politics o f the Korm Civil War, pp. 4-10. 2 . George M. McCune and Arthur L. Grey, Jr., Korea Today, p. 26; James F. Schnabel, Policy and Direction: The First Year, p. 4. 3. U.S. Dept, of State, A Historical Summary o f United States-Korean Relations 1834-1962, pp. 3,41. 4. Roben K. Sawyer and Walter G. Hermes, Military Advisors in Korea: KMAGm Peace and War, p. 4; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, pp. 3-4; Robert T. Other, Syngman Rhee: The Man Behind the M yth, p. 335 . Dept, of State, A Historical Summary, p. 6 . 6 . Henderson, Korea, p. 1 2 1 ; Simmons, The Strained Alliance, pp. 12-14. 7 . Dept, of State, A Historical Summary, pp. 54-55; Norman A. Graebner, Ideas and Diplomacy: Readings in the Intellectual Tradition o f American Foreign Pokey, p. 344. 8 . Henderson, Korea, pp. 76-78; Paige, The Korean People's Democratic Repub­ lic, pp. 18-19; McCune and Grey, Korea Today, p. 26. 9 . Dept, of State, A Historical Summary, p. 8 ; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p .4 . 10 . Chong-sik Lee, The Politics o f Korean Nationalism, p. 154; David J. Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East, pp. 256-257; Harold M. Vinacke, The UnitedStates and the FarEast, 1945-1951, p. 57. 1 1 . Lee, The Politics o f Korean Nationalism, pp. 230-231; McCune and Grey, Korea Today, p. 16; Simmons, The Strained Alliance, p. 14. 12 . Dae-sook Suh, “A Preconceived Formula for Soviedzation: The Communist Takeover of North Korea,” in Thomas T. Hammond, ed.. The Anatomy o fCommu­ nist Takeovers, p. 476; Leland M. Goodrich, Korea: A Study o f U.S. Policy in tbe U.N., p. 9 ;Joungwon A. Kim, D ivided Korea: The Politics o fDevelopment, 19451972, p. 36. Some writers have argued that the United States should have recognized the KPG as the legitimate heir to political authority in Korea. See, for example, Oliver, Syngman Rhee, pp. 136-143; Richard C. Allen, Korea's Syngman Rhee: An Unauthorized Portrait, pp. 49-50; Soon-sung Cho, Korea in World Politics 1940-

Notes to Pages 7-11

2.6 1

1910: An Evaluation o f American Responsibility, p. 90 . Shortly after its formation, however, the KPG began to suffer from bitter factional disputes and quickly lost all organizational support inside Korea. By 19 2 1 , the KPG was defunct and its claim to legitimacy during World War II bore no relationship to the reality of the Korean independence movement. See Henderson, Korea, pp. 79-86; Lee, The Politics o f Korean Nationalism, pp. 150-164. 13. William L. langer, “Korean Independence Movement,’* May 14,1942, Dept, of State Records, 895 .0 1 / 60- 2 1 / 26 . 14. Korean radicals formed a Communist party in 1 9 2 1 . Since the Soviet Union alone provided assistance to the revolutionary movement in Korea during the interwar years, the Korean Communist party enjoyed increasing popularity. By the eve of World War II, it had far outstripped the KPG in terms of influence and power inside Korea. See Henderson, Korea, pp. 314-319; Lee, The Politics o f Korean Nationalism, pp. 158,178-179. 15. Han Kil-$u to Cordell Hull, May 13, 1941, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/ 727; Edward Lim to Hull, ibid., 895.00/730. 16. Cho So-ang to Hull, June 6 , 1941, ibid., 895.00/729; Lee, The Politics o f Korean Nationalism, p. 228. 17. Bruce Cumings has exaggerated the aggressiveness of Roosevelt’s postwar intentions in Asia, arguing that trusteeship “was meant to accommodate postwar American security concerns, open the colonies to American commerce and tutelage, and corral communist and anticolonial revolution.” In reality, the president’s motives were essentially defensive. Rather than pursuing “hegemony in the postwar world,” as Cumings contends, Roosevelt wanted to prevent any other nation from achieving precisely this objective without having to fight a new war. See Bruce Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War: liberation and the Emergence o f Separate Regimes, 1945-1947, pp. 129-130. 18. William R. Langdon memorandum, February 20 , 1942, Dept, of State Records, 895.01/79* 19. Ibid.; Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Radio Address by the President of the United States on Washington’s Birthday,” DSB 6 (February 28,1942): 188. 20. Kim Ku to Franklin D. Roosevelt, December 9,1942, Dept, of State Records, 895.01/48; Cho So-ang to Clarence Gauss, February 4, 1942, ibid., 895.01/78; StanleyK. Hombeck memorandum, April 20,1942, ibid., 895 .0 1 / 102 . 2 1 . Sumner Welles, “Policy Regarding ‘Free Movements’ in the United Sates,” DSB 5 (December 13,1941): 519 - 520 . 22. Charles I. Faddis to Hull, December 8 ,1941, Dept, of S ate Records, 895.01/ 49; Hull to Guy Gillette, January 6 , 1942, ibid., 895 .0 1 / 59 ; John W. Staggers, Jay Jerome Williams, and Frederick Harris to Hull, January 9, 1942, ibid., 895.01/60; Samuel Wilder King to Hull, January 19,1942, ibid., 895.01/63; Syngman Rhec to Hull, February 7, 1942, FRUS1942,1, 859; Adolph A. Berle to Rhee, February 1 9 , 1942, ibid., 862; Rhee to Berle, March 24,1942, ibid., 865. 23. Charles M. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol: American Foreign Policy, the Cold War, and Korea, 1945-1950, p. 10 . 24. Alger Hiss memorandum, December 18, 1941, Dept, of S ate Records, 895.0 1 /60-5/26; Hombeck memorandum, December 20, 1941, ibid., 895.01/54; sec also Oliver, Syngman Rhee, p. 178. 25. Laurence E. Salisbury memorandum, December 23, 1941, Dept, of S ate Records, 895.01/52'/:; Staggers to Han, January 30, 1942, ibid., 895.01/60-10/26; Hombeck and Welles to Han, February 9,1942, ibid., 895.01/92. 26. “Korean Liberty Conference” memorandum, Match 3, 1942, ibid., 895.01/ 84; NYT, March 2 ,1942, p. 7 .

1.62.

N otes to Pages 11-14

27. Welles press conference comments, March 2, 1942, FRUS1942,1,864; NYX March 3.1942, p. 7. 28. James H. R. Cromwell to Hull, May 3 ,1942, Dept, of State Records, 893.01/ 123. Upon hearing of Cromwell’s resort to blackmail, Han Kil-$u immediately exploited the situation and attempted to discredit the KPG. In a series of lettre, Han charged Rhee with a “selfish greed for power” and dismissed the KPG’s threats as “childish and ridiculous." All “true Korean patriots,” he insisted, would fight Japan to the death and did not expect to receive independence on “a silver platter.” See Han to Hull, July 3,1942, ibid., 895.01/137; Han to Hombeck, July 24, 1942, ibid., 895.01/157; Han to Hull, August 15,1942, ibid., 895.00/836. 29. Hull to Cromwell, May 20,1942, ibid., 895.01/137; Cordell Hull, “Thel a and Human Freedom,” DSB 7 (July 25,1942); 639-646. 30. Cromwell to Berle, July 17, 1942, Dept, of State Records, 895.01/133; Cromwell to Berle, July 27, 1942, ibid., 895.01/165; Berle to Cromwell, July 31, 1942, ibid., 895 .0 1 / 16 5 ; JCS report 73, August 9, 1942, JCS Records, CCS 092 Korea (8-5-42), RG 218; JCS to General Joseph Stilwell, August 15, 1942, ibid. 3 1 . JCS memorandum, September 25, 1942, JCS Records, CCS 092 Korea (8-542), RG 218; General George C. Marshall memorandum, August 11 , 1942, ibid.; JCS to Berle, September 24,1942, ibid. Hombeck completely agreed with the assess­ ment of Roosevelt’s military advisors. Moreover, he privately expressed admitatioo for the “organized bands of embittered, resolute, daring, and physically effecthe Korean insurgents” operating in Siberia and Manchuria, who were willing to fight without any American assistance. By comparison, the old conservatives at Chungking appeared self-seeking and ambitious. See Hombeck memorandum, August 13, 1942, Dept, of State Records, 895.01/98. 32 . Maxwell M. Hamilton to Berle, July 23,1942, Dept, of State Records, 895.01/ 156A; Arthur B. Emmons III memorandum, August 14,1942, ibid., 895.01/ 156A; Harold B. Quarton memorandum, August 15, 1942, ibid., 895.01/157. 33. Gauss to Hull, January 3, 1942, ibid., 895.01/56 ; Salisbury memorandum, Match 14, 1942, ibid., 895.01/86; Far Eastern Affairs memorandum, March 17, 1942, ibid., 895.01/81. 34. Gauss to Hull, March 25, 1942, ibid., 895.01/104; Welles to Gauss, Match 25,1942, FRUS 1942, China, 730; Gauss to Welles, March 28, 1942, ibid., 730-731; ATIT March 1,1942, p. 10. 35. T. V. Soong to Roosevelt, April 8 , 1942, FRUS 1942, I, 868-869; Welles to Gauss, April 1 1 ,1942, Dept, of State Records, 895.01/96. 36. Hombeck to Welles, April 1 1 ,1942, Dept, of State Records, 895.01/ 962/i. 37. Roosevelt to Welles, April 8 , 1942, FRUS 1942, I, 867; Welles to Roosevek, April 13,1942, ibid., 870-872. 38. George M. Elsey memorandum, August 6 , 1948, Dept, of State Rccoids, 895.01/8-648; Hamilton memorandum, April 25,1942, ibid., 895.01 / 118'/!. 39 . Gauss to Welles, April 10 , 1942, Dept, of State Records, 895.01/96; Hornbeck memorandum. Mardi 27, 1942, ibid., 895.01/101; Gauss to Hull, April 18, 1942. FRUS 1942,1,872-873. 40. Hull to Roosevelt, April 29, 1942, FRUS 1942,1, 873; Hull to Gauss, May 1, 1942, Dept, of State Records, 895.01/99. 41. Gauss to Hull, May 7, 1942, Dept, of State Records, 895.0 1 / 112 ; Gauss» Hull, May 16 , 1942, ibid., 895.01/130. 42. Han to Hombeck, April 20, 1942, ibid., 895.01/102; memorandum of con­ versation, n.d., ibid., 895.01/60-23/26; memorandum of conversation, n.d.,ibid., 895.01/60-25/26.

43. Hull to Gauss, May 8 , 1942, FRUS 1942,1, 876 - 877 ; Gauss to Hull, May 13, 1942, ibid., 877; Gauss to Hull, June 19 , 1942, ibid., 877-878.

Notes to Pages 14-18

2.63

44. Gauss to Hull, August 18 ,1942, FRUS1942, China, 738-739; Gauss to H ull, November), 1942, ibid., 174;NYT, October 12 ,1942, p. 9; NYT, March 13,1943, p. 5; Gauss to Hull, January 7,1943, FRUS 1943, China, 842-843. 45. Gauss to Hull, December 19, 1942, FRUS 1942, China, 748; Gauss to H ull, June 19, 1942, Dept, o f State Records, 895.01/148; Roy P. McNair, Jr., to War Department, December 11 , 1942, ib id ., 895.01/228; McNair report, January 12 , 1943, ibid., 895.01/216; Gauss to H ull, January 15, 1943, ib id ., 895.01/213; Lee, ThePolitics o f Korean Nationalism, pp. 222-224. 46. Gauss to Hull, December 9, 1942, D ept, o f State Records, 895.01/197. In October, Cho So-ang announced publicly that factionalism in the exile movement had disappeared and all Koreans now supported the KPG. He also wrote a personal letter to Hull dismissing as a “ m isunderstanding” the suggestion that the KPG would not fight Japan in the absence o f American recognition. See NYT, October 26, 1942, p. 2 ; Cho So-ang to H ull, October 1 , 1942, D ept, o f State Records, 895.01/183. Nevertheless, reports o f disunity in the Korean independence move­ ment continued to reach Washington from Chungking. See Gauss to H ull, Novem­ ber 25, 1942, Dept, of State Records, 895.01/199; Han to George Atcheson, Decem­ ber 4, 1942, ibid., 895.01/198; Roy P. McNair, Jr., “ Analysis of Political Parties,” October 28 ,1942, OSS Records, report 24638. 47. John Carter Vincent memorandum, May 1942, D ept, o f State Records, 895.01/148; see also Michael Schalter, The U.S. Crusade in China, 1938-1943, p. 90. 48. Owen Lattimore to Chiang Kai-shek, draft letter, December 18, 1942, FRUS 1942, China, 186-187. 49. Division of Far Eastern Affairs memorandum, October 10 , 1942, D ept, o f Sate Records, 895.00/840. 50. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “Radio Address on the 7 th Anniversary of the Philip­ pines Commonwealth Government, November 15, 1942," Public Papers, Roosevelt, XI, p.475. 51. NYT, December 23,1945, p. 6 ; Gauss to H ull, December 29,1942, D ept, o f State Records, 895.01/207; Vincent to H ull, May 1 1 ,1943, ibid., 895.01/256. 52. Rhee to Preston Goodfellow, October 10 , 1942, D ept, o f State Records, 895.01/231; Goodfellow to War D epartm ent, February 17, 1943, ibid.; Oliver, SyngmanRhee, p. 185. 53. Hamilton memorandum, February 2 6 ,1943, D ept, of State Records, 895.01/ 218. 54. Herbert Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin: The War They Wagedand the Peace They Sought, pp. 214-215. 55. Lord Halifax to H ull, February 4, 1943, reel 30, folder 2 1 6 , box 59, Cordell Hull papers. 56. Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, p. 1 20 ; Hull memorandum, March 2 2 , 1943, FRUS 1943, HI, p. 28-34; Cordell H ull, The Memoirs o f Cordell Hull, II, p. 1236. 57. U.S. draft declaration, March 9, 1943, FRUS 1943, I, 747-749; H ull, Mem­ oirs, H, pp. 1235 - 1236 ; Harry Hopkins memorandum, Match 2 2 ,1943, FRUS 1943, HI, 34-36. 58. Hull memorandum, March 27, 1943, FRUS 1943, III, 37; Henry L. Stimson and McGeorge Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, pp. 599-600; HuU, Memoirs, II, pp. 1234,1595-1596. 59. Hopkins memorandum, March 27,1943, FRUS 1943, HI, 38-39; Hull memo­ randum, Match 29,1943, ibid., 40-41. 60 . Anthony Eden, The Reckoning, p. 595; Franklin D. Roosevelt, "The Eight Hundred and Eighty-eighth Press Conference (Excerpts), March 30, 1943,” Public

Z64

N o tes to Pages 18-21

Papers, Roosevelt, XII, 1 3 1 - 13 2 ; Welles memorandum, March 29, 1943, FRUS 1943, China, 843-846. 61. Memorandum on International Trusteeship, April 15, 1943, FRUS, The Con­ ferences at Washington and Quebec, 1943, 720-726. 62. NYT, April 8,1943. p. 11 ; Territorial Committee minutes, July 16, 1943. reel 49, folder 336, box 85-86, Hull papers. 63. Hombeck memorandum, August 19. 1943, reel 23, folder 159, ben 51- 32, Hull papers; Hombeck to Hull, October 4, 1943, reel 24, folder 160, ben 52-53, ibid. 64. Rhee to Roosevelt, May 15,1943, Dept, of State Records, 895.01/257; see also Rhee to Gauss, October 18, 1943, ibid., 895.01/305; Korean exile petition to Roosevelt,June 1 1 ,1943, ibid., 895.01/269. 65. NYT, September 7,1943. p. 8 ; Atchcson to Hull, August 20, 1943, Dept, of S ate Records, 895.01/286; Hombeck memorandum, September 28, 1943, FRUS 1943, China, 133-135; Hombeck to Hull, October 1 ,1943, reel 24, folder 160, bat 52-53, Hull papers. 66 . Department of S ate minutes, August 20 , 2 1 , 1943, FRUS, Washington and Quebec, 914, 919; Leo Pasvolsky memorandum, August 18, 1943, ibid., 717; conference notes, August 2 1 , 1943. ibid., 926-927; Hull, Memoirs, O, pp. 12371238 . 67. Pasvolsky memorandum, October 3, 1943. FRUS 1943, I, 542-543; Hull, Memoirs, II, pp. 1304-1305.1596. 68 . Feis, Churchill, Roosevelt, Stalin, pp. 214-215; Hull, Memoirs, II, pp. 13041305. Admiral William D. Leahy never accepted the wisdom of universal application of trusteeship, particularly for Japanese-mandated islands; see Leahy, I Whs Then, pp. 210 , 258. Secretary of War Henry L. Stimson and Army Chief of Staff General George C. Marshall agreed; see conference notes, October 29,1943, FRUS 1943,1, 666-667. 69. Memorandum of conversation, November 1 1 , 1943, FRUS, The Conferences at Cairo and Teheran, 1943,257. Harry Hopkins advised Roosevelt that it was consis­ tent with Soviet policy to expect Stalin's concurrence; see Hopkins memorandum, November 23,1943, ibid., 376. 70. Conference notes, November 23, 1943, ibid., 325; China memorandum, November 24, 1943, ibid., 334; Roosevelt-Churchill meeting notes, November 24, 1943, ibid., 389. 71. "Conference of President Roosevelt, Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek, and Prime Minister Churchill in North Africa,” DSB 9 (December 4, 1943): 393. Great Britain’s draft for the Cairo Declantion introduced the phrase “in due course." In the original American draft, Hopkins had used the words “at the earliest possible moment,” while Roosevelt had substituted the phrase "at the proper moment.” See the British draft dedaation, n.d., FRUS, Cairo and Teheran, 404; American draft dedaation, n.d., ibid., 400. 72. Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, p. 106; see also Herbert Feis, The China Tingle: The American Effort in China from Pearl Harbor to the MarshallMis­ sion, pp. 252-254. 73. Conference notes, November 30,1943, FRUS, Cairo and Teheran, 566; Patcffic War Council notes, January 12 ,1944, ibid., 869; NYT, December 2 , 1943, p. 3. 74. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “ ‘Keep Us Strong in Our Faith That We Fight for a Better Day for Mankind’—Christmas Eve Fireside Chat on Teheran and Cairo Con­ ferences, December 24,1943,” Public Papers, Roosevelt, XII, 555-556. 75. NYT, December 6 , 1943, p. 6 ; NYT, December 15, 1943, p. 22; NYT, March 2 ,1944, p. 8 ; Gauss to Hull, December 7,1943, FRUS 1943, HI. 1096.

Notes to Pages 21-23

x6

5

76. For a contrary view see Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol, p. 58; Cho, Korea in WorldPolitics, p. 23. 77. Department of S ate m em orandum , March 29, 1944, PRUS 1944, V, 12251242. These three papers directly contradict Charles M. Dobbs’s contention that prior to the spring of 1945, American officials had made few plans regarding Korea and had engaged in only theoretical and “idle musings” about trusteeship; see Dobbs, The UnwantedSymbol, pp. 24,29, 31. 78. “Korean Political Problems,” PWC-124a, May 4, 1944, Postwar Committee Documents, 120-140, box 380, Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., papers. 79. “Composition of Korean Occupation Forces," PWC-125, March 29, 1944, ibid.; “JapaneseTechnical Personnel,” PWC-126, March 29,1944, ibid. 80. PWC-105, April 4,1944, Postwar Committee Documents, 100- 12 0 , box 380, ibid.; Postwar Programs Committee m inutes, 27th m eeting, May 3, 1944, Postwar Programs Committee m inutes, February 1 -M ay 31,1944, box 3 2 , ibid. 81. “Korea: Participation in UNRRA,” July 14, 1944, State D epartm ent miscella­ neous file, Political Committee Documents, 1944, box 378, ibid. ; Policy Committee minutes, 72nd meeting, July 7,1944, Policy Committee m inutes, box 378, ibid. ; see alsoJoseph Ballantine to Han, February 14, 1944, D ept, of S a te Records, 895.01/ 317A. 82. Hull to Gauss, Match 28 ,1944, FRUS1944, V, 1290; Gauss to H ull, April 13, 1944, ibid., 1290-1291; Gauss to H ull, May 19, 1944, ib id ., 1292-1294; Gauss to Hull, June 3 ,1944, ibid., 1294; Gauss to H ull, June 1 ,1944, D ept, o f S a te Records, 895.01/343; Rhee to Dum barton Oaks Conference participants, August 18, 1944, ibid., 895.01/8-2144; Rhee to Roosevelt, September 1 1 , 1944, ibid., 895.01/91144; Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., to Roosevelt, October 27, 1944, box 2 1 6 , Stettinius papers. 83. Gauss to Hull, May 4, 1944, D ept, of S ate Records, 895.01/333; Gauss to Hull, May 15,1944, enclosure, ibid., 895.01/337. 84. O. Edmund Clubb memorandum, May 19, 1944, PRUS 1944, VI, 790-791; John S. Service memorandum, April 7, 1944, ibid., 780; Gauss to H ull, June 29, 1944, Dept, of S ate Records, 895.01/6-2944. 85. Leahy, I Was There, pp. 250-259; “ Russia, China, and the Far Eastern Settle­ ment,” June 5 . 1944, OSS Records, RA 2 2 1 1 ; intelligence report, September 22 , 1944, ibid., RA 2211.15. 86. Hull, Memoirs, II, pp. 1599,1706; E. F. Cress to JCS, July 27,1944, D ept, of the Army Records, OPD 336 Korea TS, RG 319. 87. Berle to Joseph C. Grew, July 2 1 , 1944, Dept, of S ate Records, 895.01/72144; see also War Departm ent m em orandum , November 1 2 , 1943, D ept, of the Army Records, OPD 381 China, sec. IV (8 Nov 43), RG 319; memorandum for the JCS, December 9, 1943, ibia. American military leaders refused to approve Berle's plan; seeJCS memorandum, July 31,1944, D ept, of State Records, 895.01/7-2144. 88. Hombeck to Hull, July 1 8 ,1944, reel 49, folder 371, box 85-86, Hull papers; see also “Political Stategy for the Far East,” October 28, 1944, OSS Records, RA 2666. 89. Policy Committee m inutes, 47th m eeting. May 19, 1944, Policy Committee Minutes, box 370, Stettinius papers; Stettinius to Grew, May 5, 1944, box 216, ibid.; Langdon to H ull, August 1 , 1944, PRUS 1944, VI, 495; Service memoran­ dum, September 23,1944, ibid., 587. 90. Stettinius to Gauss, August 3, 1944, Memos to Hull, box 730, Stettinius papers. 91. W. Averell Harriman to Roosevelt, October 10 , 1 1 , 15, 17, 1944, PRUS, The Conferences at Malta and Yalta, 1945, 362-365, 368-371; General John R. Deane to

2.66

N otes to Pages 2)-)0

JCS, October 15, 17, 1944, ibid., 366-368, 371-374; Harriman to Roosevelt, December 15,1944. ibid., 378-379; Feis, The China Tangle, pp. 228-232. 92 . Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, p. 603; Leahy, 1Wes There, p. 293; Feis, The China Tangle, pp. 232-233; Grew to Stettinius, January22, 1945, Japan, box 721, Stettinius papers; intelligence report, December 7,1944,OSS Records, report 105310. 93. Briefing book paper, “Inter*Allied Consultation—Korea,” n.d., FRUS, Mdte and Yalta, 358-361. 94. Charles E. Bohlen minutes, February 8 ,1945, ibid., 770. 95. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “The Nine Hundred and Ninety-second Press Confer­ ence—Held En Route from Yalta (Excerpts), Aboard the U.S.S. Quincy, February23, 1945,” Public Papers, Roosevelt, XIII, 562-564; see also Schallet, The U.S. Cnuede in China, p. 2 12 . James F. Byrnes, who was present at Yalta and soon would become secretary of state, later argued mistakenly that Roosevelt and Stalin had agreed toa Korean trusteeship only “if a transition period were necessary”; see Byrnes, SpeaJtmg Frankly, p. 2 21 . 96 . Joseph C. Grew and Walter Johnson, eds.. Turbulent Era: A Diplo­ matic Record o f Forty Years 1904-1945, II, p. 1444; Charles E. Bohlen, The Trentform ation o f American Foreign Policy, p. 36; Cho, Korea in World Polities, pp. 32-33. 9 7 . Tyler Dennett, "In Due Course,” Far Eastern Survey 14 (January 17, 1945): 1-3. 98 . Arthur C. Buncc, “The Future of Korea: Part I,” Far Eastern Survey 23 (April 19 ,1944): 67-70; see also Arthur C. Bunce, “The Future of Korea: Patt II,” FarBest­ em Survey 23 (May 17,1944): 85-88. 99. Dennett, “In Due Course,” p. 4. CHAPTER a: Captive o f the Cold War 1 . Akira Iriye, The Cold War in Asia: A HistoricalIntroduction, pp. 74,113, 126127. 2 . Robert M. Slusser, “Soviet Far Eastern Policy, 1945-50: Stalin’s Goals in Korea,” in Ifonosuke Nagai and Akira Iriye, eds.. The Origins o f the Odd Wave Asia, pp. 131-133; Suh, “A Preconceived Formula for Sovietization,” p.488. 3 . Several scholars have noted that Moscow’s initial actions in northern Korea after occupation were rather haphazard, indicating the absence of a premeditated plan for "sovietization.” On this point see Chong-sik Lee, "Kim U-song of North Korea,” Asian Survey 7 (June 1967): 378; Suh, “A Preconceived Formula for Sovietization,” p. 475; Simmons, The Strained Alliance, p. 25. 4. Yalta communiqué, "Territorial 'Busteeship,” FRUS, The Conference ofBerka (Potsdam), 194}, II, 1568. 5 . Ballantine memorandum, February 5, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1018-1020; Erie R. Dickover memorandum, January 24, 1945, Dept, of Sate Records, 895.01/12445. 6 . Ballantine memorandum, February 17, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1021; John Car­ ter Vincent to Stettinius, February 8 ,1945, FRUS 1945, VII, 854. 7. Stettinius to Patrick J. Hurley, February 20, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1022-1023; see also Major General H. A. Craig summary, February 13 ,1945, Dept, of the Army Records, OPD 381, CTO, RG 319. 8 . Rhee to Stettinius, May 15, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1028; see also intelligence report, June 25,1945, OSS Records, report 3201 .

Notes to Pages 30-33

2.67

9. Intelligence report, February 27, 1945, OSS Records, report 120760; intelli­ gence report, March 1,1945, ibid., report 116077. 10 . Atcheson to Stettinius, March 1 ,1945, FRUS1945, VI, 1024; Grew to Hurley, March 20,1945, ibid., 1025. 1 1 . Stimson and Bundy, On A ctive Service in Peace a nd Wir, pp. 556-557; cabinet meeting minutes, March 9,1945, in W alter Millis, ed., The ForrestalDiaries, p. 33; James V. Forrestal memorandum, March 30 ,1945, ibid., pp. 37-38. 12 . Rhee to Stettinius, March 8 , 1945, Dept, of State Records, 500.CC/3-845; Han to Stettinius, March 9,1945, ibid., 500.CC/3-945; A/YE March 1 ,1945, p. 3. 13. SWNCC papers 76, 77. 78, 99, 101, Match 19, 1945, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. I, RG 218. 14. Franklin D. Roosevelt, “The Nine Hundred and Ninety-eighth Press Confer­ ence (Excerpts), April 5,1945,” Public Papers, Roosevelt, XIII, 609 - 6 10 . 15. Gaddis, The U nited States and the Origins o f the Cold War, pp. 172-173; Lisle A. Rose, Dubious Victory: The U nited States and the P nd o f W orld War II, II, pp. 96-99; Robert H. Ferrell, “Hum an's Foreign Policy: A Traditional View,” in Richard S. Kirkendall, ed., The Truman Period as a Research Field: A Reappraisal, 1972, p. 26. 16. President Human made this decision on April 18, 1945, during discussions with Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., James V. Forrestal, and Stimson, his secretaries of sate, navy, and war respectively; see “International Trusteeship” memorandum, April 18, 1945, Memoranda for the President, box 735, Stettinius papers. Subsequendy, Stettinius agreed only to the principle of trusteeship and rejected a Soviet request to discuss specifics; see Andrei Gromyko to Stettinius, June 20 , 1945, FRUS, Berlin, II, 633; Stettinius to Gromyko, June 23,1945, ibid., 634. 17. Alonzo L. Hamby, Beyond the New Deal: Harry S. Truman and American Lib­ eralism, pp. 115, 353-354; Daniels, The Man o f Independence, pp. 368-369; see also Richard J. Barnet, Intervention and Revolution: The U nited States in the Third World, p. 27 . 18. Bruce Cumings argues cogently that in the aftermath of Roosevelt’s death, the balance shifted away from American leaders favoring an internationalist approach toward “those who preferred classic nationalist methods: the use of military force and occupation, direct confrontation with the Soviets, and the establishment of defi­ nite territorial boundaries.” He fails to mention, however, that Stalin already had adopted an identical approach in Eastern Europe convincing Human of the necessity to respond in kind. See Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, p. 130. 19. Harry S. Human, Memoirs, vol. I: Year o f Decisions, pp. 76-79; Gaddis, The United States and the Origins o f the Cold War, pp. 201-203. 20. Gaddis, The U nited States and the Origins o f the Cold War, p. 206. 2 1 . Schallet, The U.S. Crusade in China, p. 224; David S. McLellan, “Commen­ tary,” in Kirkendall, The Truman Period as a Research Field, p. 153; Alonzo L. Hamby, The Im perial Years: The U nited States Since 1939, p. 11 0 ; George Curry, JamesF. Byrnes, p. 313. 22. Human, Year o f Decisions, pp. 79-82. 23. Gaddis, The U nited States and the Origins o f the Cold War, pp. 198-206; Rose, Dubious Victory, pp. 104-105; see also Wilson D. Miscamble, "Anthony Eden and the Human-Molotov Conversations,” Diplom atic History 2 (Spring 1978): 167180. 24. William D. Leahy, diary entry, April 23, 1945, Diaries 1945, box 5, William D. Leahy papers. 25. James V. Forrestal memorandum. May 1 2 , 1945, in Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 56; Herbert Feis, Contest overJapan, pp. 27-28.

x68

N o te s to Pages 34-40

26. Grew and Johnson, Turbulent Era, II, pp. 1456-1457. 27. Herbert Feis, The A tom ic Bom b a nd the E nd o f World W trll, p. 13. 28. Grew memorandum, May 15, 1945, FRUS, Berlin, 1 ,14; Grew andJohnson, Turbulent Bra, II, pp. 1445-1446,1462-1464. 29. Grew and Johnson, Turbulent Bra, II, pp. 1458-1459; see also Rose, Dubm Victory, pp. 132-133; Feis, The A tom ic Bom b and the End o f World WarII, p. 7. 30. Grew to John J. McCloy, May 2 1 , 1945, Dept, of the Army Records, 0 PDJ6J TS (5 June 45), RG 319; Grew to Fottestai, May 2 1 ,1945, FRUS 1945, YU, 882-883. 31. Memorandum o f conversation. May 28, 1945, FRUS, Berlin, 1,47; see also Herbert Feis, Between Warand Peace: The Potsdam Conference, pp. 114-116. 32. Dewitt C. Poole memorandum, May 20 , 1945, FRUS 1945, VII, 870-873; Joseph C. Grew, “Review o f Policy Regarding Korea,“ DSB 12 (June 10, 1945): 1058-1059; Elsey to Ihim an and Leahy, July 1,1945, FRUS, Berlin, 1,309-310; For, The Atom ic Bomb and the E nd o f World War II, pp. 164-165. Britain agreed com­ pletely with Washington’s nonrecognition policy toward the KPG. SeeJohn M. Alli­ son, Ambassador from the Prairie or Allison Wonderland, p. 96; Winant to Stemnius.July 2 ,1945, Dept, of State Records, 711.95/7-245. 33. E. F. Cress toJCS, May 31.1945, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea(3-19-45), sec. I, RG 218; Feis, The China Tangle, p. 288; Grew and Johnson, TurbulentEn, D, pp. 1466-1468. 34. At the same time, Admiral King reminded Human that Soviet aid was oo longer indispensable and therefore the United States did not have to “beg" forSta­ lin’s assistance. See Briefing book paper 598, “Objectives and StrategyJapan,”June 18 ,1945, FRUS, Berlin, 1 ,904-905; see also Feis, The Atomic Bomb and the Endof World WarII, p. 8. 35. Leahy notes, June 18, 1945, Diaries 1945, box 5, Leahy papers; Feis, The Atom ic Bomb and the End o f World WarII, p. 1 1 . 36 . JCS memorandum, June 19,1945, FRUS, Berlin, 1,910-911; Feis, The Chiu Tangle, p. 296. 37. State Department policy paper, June 22 ,1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 561-564. 38. Briefing book paper 605, “Relationship of the Soviet Union to the Tht Against Japan,” n.d., M US, Berlin, I, 924-927; Briefing book paper 606, n.d., ibid., 927; Briefing book paper 251, June 29, 1945, ibid., 310-311; Briefing book paper 252, July 4,1945, ibid., 311-313. 39 . Briefing book paper 253, July 4, 1945, ibid., 314; Leahy notes, n.d., ibid., 314-315. 40. Chandler to George A. Lincoln, July 6 , 1945, Dept, of the Army Records, OPD 014.1 TS, sec. Ill, RG 319. 41. Harriman to James F. Byrnes, July 3,1945, FRUS 1945, VII, 914; Harrimanto Human, July 9,1945, FRUS, Berlin, I, 234. 42. Stimson and Bundy, On Active Service in Peace and War, p. 637; see alsoGad­ dis, The U nited States and the Origins o f the Cold War, pp. 244-245; BattonJ. Bern­ stein, “American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War,’’ in Barton). Bern­ stein, ed., Politics and Policies o f the Truman Administration, p. 32. 43. Stimson to Human, July 16 , 1945, M US, Berlin, II, 631. 44. Walter Brown notes, July 1 7 ,1 8 ,1945 , file 54 (l).JamesF. Byrnes papers. 45. Walter Brown notes, July 20, 1945, ibid.; Harry S. Human, diary entry, July 18, 1945, in Robert H. Ferrell, ed., O ff the Record: The Private Papers ofHarry S. Truman, p. 54; see also Gar Alperovitz, Atom ic Diplomacy: Hiroshima and Pots­ dam, pp. 103-106; Bernstein, “American Foreign Policy and the Origins of the Cold War,” p. 35; Schallet, The U S. Crusade in China, pp. 256-258. 46. Conference notes, July 22 , 1945, M US, Berlin, II, 264-266; Human, Yearof

Notes to Pages40-44.

2.69

Decisions, pp. 373-374; see also Bruce Cumings, “American Policy and Korean Lib­ eration,” in Baldwin, W ithout Parallel, p. 41. 47. Cumings, The Origins o f the Korea» War, p. 113; Cho, Korea i» World Poli­ tics, p. 44. 48. Leahy, diary entry, July 22, 1943, Diaries 1943, box 3, Leahy papers; Leahy, / WasThere, pp. 404-408. 49. Soviet trusteeship proposal, document 733, July 20, 1943, FRUS, Berlin, II, 632; Yalta communiqué, “Territorial Trusteeship,” ibid., 1368. 30. Sdmson, diary entry, July 23,1943, ibid., 260n. 31. Ibid.;Feis, The Atomic Bomb and the End o f World WarII, p. 89. 32. Combined Chiefs of Staff report, July 24,1945, FRUS, Berlin, II, 1462-1469; Tripartite Military Meeting minutes, July 24, 1945, ibid., 344-353; see also Feis, The Atomic Bomb and the End o f World War II, pp. 89-90; Carl Berger, The Korean Knot: A Military-Political History, p. 42. 53. Truman, Year o f Decisions, p. 383; Soviet-American Chiefs of Staff Meeting minutes,July 26,1945, FRUS, Berlin, II, 410-415. 54. Marshall to MacArthur, July 25,1945, Dept, o f the Army Records, OPD 014.1 TS, sec. Ill, RG 319; H. A. Craig to John E. Hull, July 25, 1945, ibid.; Thiman, YearofDecisions, pp. 433-434; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 7. 55. Roy E. Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yàlu Qune-November 1950), pp. 2-3; Feis, The China Tangle, p. 326. 56. Council of Foreign Ministers Meeting minutes, July 23, 1945, FRUS, Berlin, D,282-283. 57. Soviet draft proposal on trusteeship, n .d ., ibid., 1594-1595; Council of For­ eign Ministers Meeting minutes, August 1,1945, ibid., 550-551. 58. State Department minutes, August 1, 1945, ibid., 593; Charles Tfost memo­ randa, August 7, 9, 1945, ibid., 604-606, 636-637; Potsdam protocol, August 1, 1945, ibid., 1493. 59. “Potsdam Declaration,“ DSB 13 (July 29, 1945): 137-138; Forrestal memo­ randum, July 28,1945, inM illis, The ForrestalDiaries, p. 78. 60. Editor’s note, FRUS, Berlin, II 1474-I475n. 61. Feis, Contest overJapan, p. 962. Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 212. 63. Sutherland to Marshall, July 28, 1945, Dept, of the Army Records, OPD 014.1 TS, sec. IB, RG 319; Memorandum for the JCS, August 1, 1945, ibid.; Marshall to Wedemeyer, August 9,1945, Dept, of the Army Records, OPD 371 TS, Korea, RG 319. 64. Thiman, Year o f Decisions, p. 444; Feis, The China Tangle, p. 337; see also Schalter, The 13.S. Crusade in China, pp. 263-264. 65. SWNCC Meeting minutes, August 11, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 634-637; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 9 ;J. Lawton Collins, War in Peacetime: The His­ tory and Lessons o f Korea, p. 25n. In his memoirs, John M. Allison contends that Brigadier General George A. Lincoln, who “was then supposed to be the Korean expert,” was responsible for the decision to divide Korea at the 38th parallel; see Alli­ son, Ambassadorfrom the Prairie, pp. 116-117. In a passage contained in the origi­ nal draft but deleted from the final manuscript, however, Allison admits that “I will not vouch for the story but it seems probable.” See page proofs, Ambassadorfrom the Prairie, folder 2, box 1.John M. Allison papers. 66. Memorandum for the Chief of Staff, August 11, 1945, Dept, of the Army Records, OPD 014.1, sec. Ill, RG 319. 67. Edwin W. Pauley to Thiman, August 11,1945, PSF (Pauley), Harry S. Thiman papers.

170

Notes to Pages45-41

68. Q uoted in Trum an, Year o f Decisions, pp. 433-434. 69. SW NCC M eeting m inutes, A ugust 12, 1945, FRUS1945, VI, 645; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 10. 70. JCS m em orandum , A ugust 14, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 657-658; Feis, The Atomic Bomb and the End o f World War ll, p. 151. 71. H um an, Year o f Decisions, p . 445. Later historical accounts have for the mm part accepted H um an’s description o f the origins o f the 38th parallel decision with­ o u t hesitation. See A rthur L. Grey, Jr., “ The Thirty-Eighth Parallel,” ForeignAffût 29 (A pril 1951): 485-487; Max Beioff, Soviet Foreign Policy in the Far Fast, 19441951, p. 156; Beiger, The Korean Knot, p . 47; Kim, Divided Korea, p. 31; Iriye, The Cold War in Asia, p . 126; Cabell Phillips, The Truman Presidency: The Hislot} o f a Triumphant Succession, p . 292. D uring the immediate postwar yean, many observers believed th a t the Allies had agreed to the 38th parallel division at Yaltaoi at Potsdam . See NYT, Septem ber 29, 1945, p . 14; NYT, October 18, 1945, p. 4; NYT, O ctober 20, 1945, p . 10; M cCune and Grey, Korea Today, pp. 42-43; Meade, American Military Government in Korea, pp. 91-92; Oliver, Syngman Rhee, pp. 201-202; see also C ollins, War in Peacetime, p . 25; Matthew B. Ridgway, Tlx Korean War, pp . 42-47. 72. John Lewis G addis, “ Korea in American Politics, Strategy, and Diplomacy, 1945-1950,” in Nagai and Iriye, eds.. The Origins o f the Cold Warm Asia, p. 278. Bruce Cum ings appropriately labels the American occupation of southern Koita “ the first postwar act o f containm ent” ; see Cum ings, The Origins of the Köret» War, p. 131. See also May, “Lessons” o f the Past, pp. 53-55; Gabriel Kolko, The Politics o f War: The World and United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1945, pp- 601604. 73. War D epartm ent m em orandum , n .d .. D ept, o f the Army Records, 0PD 014.1, sec. Ill, RG 319; Feis, The China Tangle, p. 338; Schnabel, PolicyandDirec­ tion, p . 11. 74. Stalin to H um an, August 12, 16, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 634, 667-668; Hu­ m an, Year o f Decisions, p . 444; Jam es E. W ebb testimony, U.S. Congress, House, Com m ittee on Foreign Affairs, Korean Aid, p. 118. 75. Shannon McCune, “The Thirty-Eighth Parallel in Korea," World Politics 1 (January 1949): 227; Harry J . M iddleton, The Compact History of the Korea» Wee p . 25; John C. Caldwell, The Korea Story, p . 10; Grey, “The Thirty-Eighth Parallel,’' p . 485. 76. D ept, o f State, The Fight Against Aggression in Korea, p. 3; Walter G. Hermes, Truce Tent and Fighting Front, p . 5; see also Gaddis, "Korea in American Politics, Strategy, and Diplomacy,” p. 278. 77. G oodrich, Korea, p . 13; Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol, p. 29. Dean Rusk later confessed his surprise th at Moscow agreed to terms which clearly did not reflect the Soviet U nion’s superior m ilitary position. See Dean Rusk to G. Bernard Noble, July 12,1950, FRUS 1945, VI, 1039. 78. Slusser, “Soviet Far Eastern Policy,” p . 137; M artin Lichterman, “To the Yalu and Back,” in Harold Stein, ed ., American Civil-Military Decisions: A Book of Case Studies, p . 634. 79. Ironically, the Japanese proposed a sim ilar line for the division of Korea into spheres o f influence to Tsarist Russia in 1896. See Collins, Worin Peacetime, p- 25; Beioff, Soviet Foreign Policy in the Far East, p. 156; McCune, “H ie Thirty-Eighth Parallel in Korea,” p. 226. 80. Grey, “The Thirty-Eighth Parallel,” p . 486; Cumings, “American Policy and Korean Liberation," pp. 46-47. 81. Stalin to H um an, August 16, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 667-668; Human toSta-

N otes to P ages 4 7 -5 1

iji

lin, August 17,1943, ibid., 670; Harrim an to Byrnes, A ugust 23,1945, ib id ., 689690; Haniman to Truman, August 27,1945, ib id ., 695-696. 82. Harry S. Truman, “The President’s News Conference o f August 16, 1945,’* PublicPapers, Truman, 1 ,226. 83. Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, p . xxiii. 84. Steel, PaxAmericana, p. 126; McLellan, “Commentary,’’ p. 159. 85. Lee, The Politics o f Korean Nationalism, pp. 271-273; Kim, D ivided Korea, pp. 20-21; Baldwin, “ Introduction,” p. 5. 86. Meade, American Military Government in Korea, pp. 32-33; Lee, “Kim IIsong of North Korea,” p. 378; Belofif, Soviet Foreign Policy in the Far Bast, p. 158. Several scholars have noted that factionalism afflicted the Korean Com m unist party as much as other political groups in Korea. Furtherm ore, Soviet support was inconsis­ tent and halting at best. For example, the Korean Com m unist party was expelled from the Comintern in 1928 because o f “ deviationism.” See John W. W ashburn, “Soviet Russia and the Korean Com m unist Party,” Pacific Affairs 23 (Match 1950): 59-61 ; Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Far East, pp. 51-52. 87. Henderson, Korea, pp. 320-322. 88. Richard E. Lauterbach, “ Hodge’s Korea," Virginia Quarterly Review 23 (June 1947): 350; Cumings, “American Policy and Korean Liberation,” pp. 54-55; Hen­ derson, Korea, pp. 114-115; Kim, D ivided Korea, pp. 48-49. Japanese Governor Nobuyuki Abe’s selection of a leftist to lead the provisional government in Korea had much to do with his expectation that the Soviet Union would occupy the entire peninsula. See Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol, p. 35. 89. Henderson, Korea, pp. 115-118; D allin, Soviet Russia and the Far East, p. 258; Cho, Korea in World Politics, pp. 70-72; Berger, The Korean Knot, p. 52; Allen, Korea’s Syngman Rhee, p . 74; Meade, American Military Government in Korea, pp. 71-72. 90. Lauterbach, “Hodge’s Korea,” pp. 350-351; McCunc and Grey, Korea Today, p. 46; Henderson, Korea, p. 119; Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, pp. 8588; Belofif, Soviet Foreign Policy in the Far East, p. 158. 91. Assistant Chief of Staff m em orandum , August 12, 1945, D ept, of the Army Records, OPD 014.1 TS, sec. IV, RG 319; Brief ofJCS study, August 15, 1945, ibid.; Sawyer and Hermes, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 3. 92. MacArthur to JCS, August 22, 1945, FRUS1945, VI, 1037n.; draft memoran­ dum to JCS, n .d ., ibid., 1037-1038; SWNCC to MacFarland, August 24, 1945, ibid., 1038n. 93. SWNCC to JCS, September 2, 1945, JCS Records, CCAC 014, sec. I, RG 218; JCS to MacArthur, September 2, 1945, ibid.; MacArthur proclamation, September 7, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1043; NYT, Septem ber9,1945, p. 1. 94. JCS to Lieutenant General John R. Hodge, August 5, 1945, JCS Records, CCAC 014, Korea, sec. I, RG 218; Meade, American Military Government in Korea, p. 225. 95. H. Merrell Benninghofif to Byrnes, September 15, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1049-1052; Meade, American Military Government in Korea, p. 44; Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, p. 111. 96. Hagwon Sunoo and W illiam N . Angus, “American Policy in Korea: Two Views,” Far Eastern Survey 25 (July 31, 1946): 230; U-Gene Lee, “ American Policy Toward Korea 1942-1947: Formulation and Execution” (Ph.D . dissertation, George­ town University, 1973), pp. 167-168; Hodge to War, September 29, 1945, D ept, of the Army Records, OPD 014.1 TS, sec. V, RG 319. 97. Leahy, diary entry, September 29, 1945, Diaries 1945, box 5, Leahy papers; MacArthur to War, September 18,1945, PSF 41 (Korea), Thunan papers.

x7r

N otes to Pages 51-54

98. Vincent to Acheson, October 1 , 1945, PRUS 1945, VI, 1066-1067; Benninghoff to Byrnes, October 1,1945, ibid., 1065-1066. 99. Vinacke, The U nited States and the Far East, p. 59; Cho, Korea in WorldPoRtics, p. 156; Pauline Tompkins, American-Russian Relations in the Far East, p. 319; Goodrich, Korea, pp. 16-17; Baldwin, “Introduction,” pp. 6- 8 . CHAPTER y

In Search ofa Settlement

1. N YX N ovem ber 25, 1945, IV, p . 8. 2. T hat both the U nited S û tes and the Soviet Union could possess legitimate interests in Korea after W orld W ar II would seem to be an assertion beyond serious dispute. N evertheless, Bmce Cum ings charges th at the United Sûtes was guilty ofan “ unprecedented expression o f am bition” in attem pting “to project its power onto the Asian m ainland and to challenge the Soviet Union in a country that touched Soviet borders, one in which the Russians had long had an interest.” See Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, p . 116. A t the other extreme, Charles M. Dobbs con­ tends th at “ the Soviets had done little to deserve” a voice in the postwar reconstruc­ tion o f Korea because Russia “had m ade no significant contribution to the defeat of Japan.” See D obbs, The Unwanted Symbol, p . 65. 3. NYT, Septem ber 29, 1945, p . 14; M eade, American Military Government m Korea, pp . 4 -5 ; K im , D ivided Korea, pp . 3-8. 4. McCune and Grey, Korea Today, p . 271; Baldwin, “ Introduction,” p. 3; Lauterbach, “ H odge's Korea,” p . 3495. Intelligence report, n .d ., OSS Records, report XL10423; “Review of Korea’s Postwar Economy,” Far Eastern Economic Review 11 (August 23, 1951): 230-237; M cCune, “The Thirty-Eighth Parallel in Korea,” p . 228; Schnabel, Policy andDirec­ tion, p . 12; see also McCune and Grey, Korea Today, p. 596. Lee, The Politics o f Korean Nationalism, p . 229; Andrew J. Gtajdaiuev, “ Korea Divided,” Far Eastern Survey 14 (O ctober 10,1945): 281-283; McCune and Grey, Korea Today, p . 128. 7. Cum ings, The Origins o f the Korean War, pp. 39-67; U.S. Dept, of Com­ m erce, “Economic Conditions in South Korea, 1947,” International Reference Ser­ vice 5 (Decem ber 1948): 1-38. M emorandum for the President, n .d ., PPF 3920 (John R. Hodge), Human papers; see also D obbs, The Unwanted Symbol, pp. 33-34. 9. Q uoted in John G unther, The Riddle o f MacArthur: Japan, Korea and the fee East, p. 180. 10. C. Clyde M itchell, Korea: Second Failure in Asia, p. 15; Henderson, Korea, pp. 212-214.

11. T. Fehrenbach, This K indofW tr: A Study in Unpreparedness, p. 39; Meade, American Military Government in Korea, p. 88. 12. SWNCC m em orandum , Septem ber 10, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1044-1045; NYT, Septem ber 10,1945, p. 1; NYT, Septem ber 11,1945, pp. 1,22. 13- Harry S. Truman, “The President’s News Conference o f September 12,1945,” Public Papers, Truman, I, 318; SWNCC m em orandum , September 11, 1945, JCS Records, CCAC 014 Korea (8-28-45), sec. I, RG 218; NYT, September 12,1945, p. 24; NYT, Septem ber 14,1945, p . 1. A t the press conference on September 12, Hu­ m an also stated that the use o f Japanese personnel was a theater decision. In reality, Hodge was following orders from W ashington. See State Departm ent memorandum, “Japanese Capitulation,” n .d ., file 569 (2), Byrnes papers. 14. Acheson to Truman, Septem ber 14, 1945, OF 471, Hum an papers; Harry S.

N otes to P ages 5 4 -5 7

V3

Human, “Statement by the President on the liberation o f Korea, Septem ber 18, 1945,” Public Papers, Truman, I, 324-325; N YT, September 21, 1945, p. 20. 15. Meade, American M ilitary G overnm ent in Korea, p. 151. 16. Ibid., pp. 228-229; Steel, Pax Am ericana, p. 269; Tàe-ho Yoo, The Korean Warand the U nited N ations: A Legalan d D iplom atic H istorical Study, p. 49. 17. Benninghoff to Byrnes, Septem ber 15, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1049-1052; Langdon to Byrnes, November 26, 1945, ib id ., 1135; D enna Frank Fleming, The Odd Waraudits Origins, II, p. 590. 18. Meade, American M ilitary G overnm ent in Korea, p . 235; Cho, Korea in WorldPolitics, p. 73; Henderson, Korea, p. 130. 19. Bertram D. Sarafan, "M ilitary Government: Korea,” Par Eastern Survey 15 (November 20,1946): 349-350; Berger, The Korean K not, p. 50; Meade, Am erican Military Government in Korea, p. 227. Bruce Cumings overstates the case when he argues that American occupation officials pursued an “ activist, conscious, dynamic . . . policy of seeking a Korea . . . oriented toward and responsive to American interests.” For Cumings, these officials wanted only “loyal allies who could be counted upon to stem the tide of domestic revolution in Korea” ; See Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, pp. 136, 143. In reality, Hodge rightly emphasized the maintenance of internal stability in southern Korea while viewing with trepidation the presence of Soviet troops north of the 38th parallel. Given the established pat­ tern of Russian behavior in Eastern Europe, initial American occupation policies were neither surprising nor thoroughly unreasonable. Cumings himself admits that “Hodge could not simply manufacture both ‘responsible’ and anticommunist Korean leadership. He had to find his allies where he could.” From the start, Ameri­ can occupation officials "saw the whole People's Republic apparatus as a creature of Soviet designs” ; ibid., pp. 183,187. 20. Quoted in Lauterbach, “Hodge’s Korea,” p. 354; Benninghoff to Byrnes, Sep­ tember 29, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1061-1065. 21. Benninghoff to Atcheson, October 9, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1069; Hender­ son, Korea, p. 130; Meade, Am erican M ilitary G overnm ent in Korea, p. 61; Sunoo and Angus, “American Policy in Korea,” p . 228. 22. MacArthur to War, September 29, 1945, Dept, o f the Army Records, OPD 381 CTO, RG 319; Benninghoff to Atcheson, October 9, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1070; NYT, October 10,1945, p. 7; N YT, October 14,1945, p. 10. 23. U.S. Dept, of State, N orth Korea: A Case Study in the Techniques o f Takeover, p. 13; Suh, “ A Preconceived Formula for Sovietizarion,” p. 477; Hender­ son, Korea, p. 325. 24. Cumings, The Origins o f th e Korean War, pp. 385-386. 25. McCune and Grey, Korea Today, p. 52; Kim, D ivided Korea, p. 88; Cumings, “American Policy and Korean liberation,” p. 55; Simmons, The Strained Alliance, p. 24. 26. Benninghoff to Byrnes, September 26, 29,1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1059-1060, 1061-1065; Hodge to MacArthur, September 24,1945, ibid., 1054-1057. 27. Walter S. Robertson to W ashington, September 25, 1945, ibid., 1057; Acheson memorandum, September 26,1945, D ept, of State Records, 895.01/9-2645. 28. Harriman to W ashington, September 3, 1945, D ept, of State Records, 895.01/9-345. 29. Acheson to Robertson, September 27, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1060; Acheson to Hurley, September 21, 1945, ibid., 1053-1054; Byrnes to Hurley, October 16, 1945, ibid., 1092-1093; “'Davel to Korea,” DSB 13 (October 21,1945): 643; N Y T, October 20,1945, p. 10. 30. Oliver, Syngman Rhee, pp. 210-211; Henderson, Korea, p. 128. According to

2-74

N otes to Pages 57-61

Bruce C um ings, Preston G oodfellow received prom ises o f certain economic conces­ sions and trad in g rights in postw ar K orea as paym ent for facilitating Rhce's mum. "L et us be frank,” C um ings concludes, "H odge, MacArthur, Goodfellow, andRhee conspired against established State D epartm ent policy.” See Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, p p . 188-18931. M acA rthur to W ar, O ctober 19, 1945, D ept, o f the Army Records, OPD 381 CTO , RG 319; A tcheson to Byrnes, O ctober 15,1945, FRUS1945, VI, 1091-1092. 32. NYT, O ctober 1 8 ,1945, p . 4; H enderson, Korea, pp. 128-129; Kim, Divided Korea, p p . 57-58; O liver, SyngmanRhee, p p . 213-214. 33. NYT, O ctober 2 1 ,1 9 4 5 , p . 30; see also D obbs, The Unwanted Symbol, p. 47; C um ings, The Origins o f the Korean War, p . 191. 34. Jay Jerom e W illiam s to Byrnes, N ovem ber 5, 1945, D ept, of State Records, 740.00119 C ontrol (K o rea)/11-545; V incent m em orandum , November 11,1943, ib id ., 740.00119 C ontrol (K o rea)/11-1145. 35. Byrnes to Iru m a n , N ovem ber 13, 1945, ib id ., 740.00119 Control (Ko­ rea)/ 11-1345; Trum an to Byrnes, N ovem ber 16, 1945, ibid., 740.00119 Control (K o rea)/11-1645. 36. W ar D epartm ent m em oranda, Septem ber 18, 30, 1945, Dept, of the Army Records, OPD 014.1 TS, sec. V, RG 319; M arshall to MacArthur, October 1,1943, FRUS 1945, V I, 1067-1068. 37. JCS 1483/12, O ctober 3, 1945, JC S Records, CCAC 014 Korea, sec. D, RG 218; JC S to H odge, O ctober 4 , 1945, ib id .; M acArthur to JCS, October 11, 1943, FRUS 1945, VI, 1071-1072; H odge to W ar, O ctober 12, 1945, Dept, of the Anny Records, OPD 336 K orea, sec. I, RG 319. 38. H odge to B enninghoff, O ctober 16, 1945, D ept, o f the Army Records, OPD 336 K orea, sec. I, RG 319; T. N . D upuy to Lincoln, O ctober 29,1945, ibid.; Lincoln to H ull, N ovem ber 1 ,1 9 4 5 , ibid. 39- H ull to Lincoln, O ctober 3, 1945, ib id ., OPD 320.2 PTO, RG 319; Wu D epartm ent m em orandum , O ctober 8 ,1 9 4 5 , ib id .; War to MacArthur, October27, 1945, ib id .; Robert P. Patterson to Byrnes, N ovem ber 1,1945, FRUS 1946,1 ,1111. 40. D raft proposal on Korean trusteeship, O ctober 13, 1945, file 569 (2), Byrnes papers; SW NCC to Byrnes, O ctober 2 2 ,1 9 4 5 , FRUS 1945, VI, 1093-1096; SWNCC to JC S, O ctober 24, 1945, ib id ., 1096-1103; see also Berger, The Korean Knot, p . 57. 41. Jo h n C arter V incent, "T lie Post-W ar Period in the Far East,” DSB 13 (October 21,1945): 644-648. 42. Trum an, Year o f Decisions, p p . 521-522; see also Byrnes to Haniman, N ovem ber 9 ,1 9 4 5 , FRUS 1945, VI, 1118-1119; G ilm er to H ull, November 7, 1945, D ept, o f th e Army Records, OPD 336 K orea, sec. I, RG 319. 43. Byrnes to H arrim an, N ovem ber 3, 7, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1106-1109, 1112-1113. 44. H arrim an to M olotov, N ovem ber 8, 1945, FRUS 1945, II, 627; Harriman to Byrnes, N ovem ber 12, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1121-1122; SWNCC Meeting min­ utes, N ovem ber 6 ,1 9 4 5 , in M illis, The Forrested Diaries, pp . 107-108. 45. H ull to Russell L. V ittrup, N ovem ber 10, 1945, D ept, o f the Army Records, OPD 336 Korea, sec. I, RG 319. 46. Thistecship proposal, N ovem ber 6, 1945, file 596 (2), Byrnes papers; Blakeslee to V incent, N ovem ber 14, 1945, D ept, o f State Records, 740.00119 Control (K orea)/11-1445. 47. Vincent to V ittrup, N ovem ber 7, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1113-1114; War to M acArthur, O ctober 22, 1945, JC S Records, W illiam D . Leahy file, Korea 19461947, RG 218. 48. Charles M. D obbs offers a different, though unconvincing, assessment. Tie

Notes to Pages 61-65

z 75

State Department, he argues, favored trusteeship not only because it saw Korea as a "back-burner” issue but also because it was still “chasing the illusion o f postwar cooperation with the Soviet Union.” Worse still, “Washington officialdom sought to overlook Korea, thinking that the problem m ight solve itself or disappear.” See Dobbs, The UnwantedSymbol, pp. 53-53. 49. Leahy, diary entry, November 11, 1945, Diaries 1945, box 5, Leahy papers; Human, Year o f Decisions, p. 540; see also “Joint Policy Declaration,” November 13.1945, file 569 (2), Byrnes papers. 50. “United States Forces in Korea,” DSB 13 (November 18,1945): 812-813. 51. NYT, November 3, 1945, p. 5; Rhee to Byrnes, November 4, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1110-1111; Ben C. Limb to Vincent, November 7, 1945, ibid., 11151117. 52. Hodge to War, November 2, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1106; MacArthur to Marshall, November 5,1945, ibid., 1112; MacArthur to Marshall, October 29,1945, Dept, of the Army Records, OPD 336 Korea, RG 319. 53. JohnJ. McCloy to Acheson, November 13,1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1122-1124. 54. Vincent to Acheson, November 16,1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1127-1128; Hull to Hodge, November 21, 1945, D ept, o f the Army Records, OPD 336 Korea, RG 319; embassy report, October 25, 1945, ibid.; NYT, November 20, 1945, p. 4; NYT, December 4, 1945, p. 2; McNair to War, November 16, 1945, OSS Records, report XL31447. 55. Langdon to Byrnes, November 18, 20, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1129-1133; Hodge to MacArthur, November 25,1945, ibid., 1133-1134. 56. Langdon to Byrnes, November 26, 1945, ibid., 1134-1136; NYT, November 22, 1945, p. 11; NYT, November 27, 1945. p. 3; NYT, December 2, 1945, p. 36; NYT, December 6,1945, p. 3. 57. Byrnes to Langdon, November 29, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1137-1138; Lang­ don to Byrnes, December 11,14,1945, ibid., 1142-1144. 58. Memorandum forJCS, December 11, 1945, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. HI, RG 218; SWNCC policy paper, November 29,1945, file 569 (3), Byrnes papers. 59. MacArthur for Hodge to JCS, December 16, 1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1144— 1148. 60. Moscow Conference minutes, December 16, 1945, FRUS 1945, II, 617-621. During negotiations at Moscow, American military leaden pestered Byrnes about the need to break the Soviet-American deadlock over Korea. Secretary of War Robert P. Patterson, for example, reminded the State Department that the situation in Korea was deteriorating rapidly and therefore demanded positive steps. The JCS also com­ plained that it was unable to issue adequate directives to Hodge and was urgently in need of advice. For Forrestal, the only answer in Korea was for the United States to propose mutual military withdrawal and immediate independence. If Moscow demurred, each nation could implement a five-year trusteeship in its own zone under the supervision of the United Nations. See Patterson to Acheson, December 19.1945, Dept, of the Army Records, OPD 336 Korea, RG 319; James C. Dunn to Byrnes, December 19, 1945, JCS Records, CCS 014.1 TS, Korea, RG 218; Forrestal memorandum, December 19,1945, in Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, p. 125. Despite such pressure, the State Department refused to waver in its pursuit of a bilateral agreement. See Acheson to Langdon, December 20, 1945, Dept, of State Records, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/12-2045; War to MacArthur, December 20, 1945, JCS Records, Leahy file, Korea 1946-1947, RG 218. 61. American proposal on Korea, December 17, 1945, FRUS 1945, II, 641-643; Moscow Conference minutes, December 18,19,20,1945, ibid., 639,660,697-698. 62. Soviet proposal on Korea, December 20,1945, ibid., 699-700.

176

N otes to Pages 66-70

63. Moscow Conference m inutes, inform al m eeting, December 21,194$, ibid., 716-717; Feis, Contest over Japan, p . 84; Goodrich, Korea, p. 21. Some schohc have insisted th a t Moscow’s support for trusteeship was insincere, but they provide no evidence to substantiate this contention. See Cho, Korea in WorldPolitics, p. 97; D allin, Soviet Russia an d the Par East, pp. 226-227. 64. Moscow Conference m inutes, inform al m eeting, December 22,194$, FR.US 1943, II, 717; Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, pp. 221-222. 69. Langdon to Byrnes, Decem ber 30, 1945, D ept, o f S ate Records, 740.00119 Control (K orea)/12-3045; A rthur B. Emmons III to Byrnes, December 30,194$, FRUS1943, VI, 1152-1153; Hodge to MacArthur, December 30,1945, ibid., 11$4. 66. Hodge to War, December 30, 1945, D ept, o f the Army Records, OPD 3)6 Korea, RG 319; G eneral Dwight D . Eisenhower to MacArthur, December 30,194$, FRUS1943, VI, 1154-1155; Hodge to War, December 31,1945,JCS Records, Leahy file, Korea 1946-1947, RG 218; NYT, December 31,1945, p. 1. 67. NYT, Decem ber 28,1945, p . 12; Hodge to War, December 31,194$, Dept, of S a te Records, 740.00119 Control (K orea)/12-3045; Kim, DividedKorea, p. 62. 68. Jam es F. Byrnes, “ Report by the Secretary o f S ate on the Meeting of foreign M inisten,” D S B 13 (Decem ber 30,1945): 1035-1036; Allison, Ambassadorfrom the Prairie, p. 118. A fter engaging in an exercise of strained logic. Brace Cumings con­ cludes th at the text o f the Moscow agreem ent “ implied that a trusteeship might not be necessary.” In fact, the accord specifically called for a five-year period of outside supervision prior to com plete independence. W hen Cumings asserts that Byrnes had advanced “an accepablc interpretation” o f the Moscow agreement, he distorts its clear m eaning. See Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, pp. 217,220. 69. M emorandum o f conversation, January 4, 1946, Dept, of State Records, 740.00119 Control (K orea)/1-446. 70. Leahy, diary entry, December 26, 1945, Diaries 1945, box $, Leahy papes; Truman, Year o f Decisions, pp. 547-550; Daniels, The Man o f Independence, pp. 308-310. 71. Truman, Year o f Decisions, p . 552; W illiam Hillman, ed., Mr. President: The First Publication from the Private Dûmes, Private Letters, Papers, and Revealing Interviews o f Harry S. Truman, pp. 21-23; Daniels, The Man o f Independence, p. 310. 72. Langdon to Byrnes, December 30, 1945, D ept, o f S ate Records, 740.00119 Control (K orea)/12-3045; NYT, January 2,1946, p. 2. 73. NYT, January 3,1946, pp. 2 ,1 8 ; NYT, January 4,1946, p. 20; Hodge to Wur, January 3,1946, JCS Records, CSS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. Ill, RG 218; see also Kim, DividedKorea, p. 62. 74. Lloyd C. Gardner, “ Introduction,” in Lloyd C. Gardner, ed., The Korean War, p. 15; Goodrich, Korea, p. 53. 75. M emorandum, December 27,1945, Trips Overseas, General Correspondence 1945-1947, box 23, Robert P. Patterson papers; Robert P. Patterson, diary entries, January 13,14,1946, ibid. 76. M emorandum on press conference questions, January 13, 1946, ibid.; Patter­ son, diary entries, January 13, 14,1946, ibid.; NYT, January 11,1946, p. 4; NYT, January 13,1946, p . 18. 77. Patterson, press conference remarks, January 26, 1946, Press Conferences, ibid. 78. Beloff, Soviet Foreign Policy in the Far East, pp. 160-161; NYT, January 4, 1946, p. 20; N Y T January 18,1946, p. 18. 79. “American and Soviet Commands in Korea Plan Administrative Coordina­ tion,” DSB 14 (January 27, 1946): 111-112; NYT, January 11, 1946, p. 4; JCS to Hodge, December 29, 1945» JCS Records, Leahy file, Korea 1946—1947, RG 218;

2-77 JCS to MacArthur,January 5,1946, FRUS1946, VIII, 607; Hodge to Byrnes, January 12,1946, ibid. 80. NYT, January 16, 1946, p. 2; NYT, January 17, 1946, p. 17; Benninghoff to Byrnes, February 15, 1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 634-636; U.S. Dept, of State, The

Recordoh Koreah Unification 1943-1960: Narrative Summary with Principal Docu­ ments, pp. 5-6. 81. Âuil R. Goode to Hull, January 29, 1946, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 337, case 5, RG 319; U.S. Dept, of State, Korea’s Independence, p. 4. 82. Hodge to Wir, January 25, 1946, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), $cc.m,RG218. 83. Hodge to War, January 18, 1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 611-612; Hodge to War, February 19,1946, JCS Records, CCAC 014 Korea (8-28-45), sec. HI, RG 218; NYT, February 7,1946, p. 17; NYT, February 8,1946, p. 12. 84. Hodge to W u, January 22,1946, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. III,RG218. 85. Dupuy memorandum, February 13, 1946, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. HI, cases 3-15, bo* 21, RG 31986. James C. Dunn to SWNCC, January 4,1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 605-606; Ben­ ninghoffto Byrnes, January 7,1946, ibid., 608. 87. Dupuy memorandum, February 19, 1946, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 014.1 TS, sec. I, case 1, box 6, RG 319; Acheson to Benninghoff, January 12, 1946, FRUS1946, VHI, 610. 88. Benninghoff to Byrnes, January 23, 1946, FRUS 1946, VIH, 615-616; NYT, January 14,1946, p. 2; Kim, Divided Korea, p. 63. 89. NYT January 20,1946, p. 19. 90. Benninghoff to Byrnes, January 22,1946, FRUS 1946, VHI, 613-614. 91. NYT, January 23, 1946, p. 15; NYT, January 27, 1946, p. 19; Berger, The Korean Knot, pp. 62-63. 92. NYT January 24,1946, p. 19; Hodge to War, January 25,1946, JCS Records, Leahy file, Korea 1946-1947, RG 218. 93. George F. Kennan to Byrnes, January 25,1946, FRUS 1946, VIH, 617-620. 94. Dean G. Acheson, “Administration of Korea,“ DSB 14 (February 3, 1946): 155; NYT January 26,1946, p. 7; Vincent to Benninghoff, January 25,1946, Dept, of State Records, 740.00119 Control (K orea)/1-2546. 95. Harriman to Byrnes, January 25,1946, FRUS 1946, VHI, 622. 96. Feis, Contest overJapan, p. 98; see also Byrnes, Speaking Frankly, p. 222. For acontrary view, see Dobbs, The UncountedSymbol, pp. 64,74-75. 97. Richard D. Bums, “James F. Byrnes (1945-1947),” in Norman A. Graebner, ed., An Uncertain Tradition: American Secretaries o f State in the Twentieth Century, p. 243; Cutty,James F. Byrnes, p. 306; Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, pp. 113-114. CH APTE R

4: Patience with Firmness

1. Gaddis, The United States and the Origins o f the Cold War, pp. 284, 313; Curry,James F. Byrnes, p. 309; Feis, Contest overJapan, p. 124; H. Bradford Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics: Pearl Harbor to Korea, p. 211. 2. William Reitzel, Morton A. Kaplan, and Constance G. Coblenz, United States Foreign Policy, 1943-1933, p. 89; see also Joseph Marion Jones, The Fifteen Weeks (February 21-June 3,1947), p. 11. 3. Walter Reumann to lieutenant Colonel Enden, February 23,1946, Alpha Cor­ respondence, Korea Documenn 1946, Charles W. Thayer papen; Kim, Divided Korea, p. 92; Suh, “A Preconceived Formula for Sovietization,” p. 486.

i

78

N otes to Pages 76-SO

4. In these elections, there was only one candidate for each position; the vote «as for or against, as is common in Communist countries. Lee, “Kim Il-song of North Korea,” pp. 377-378; John N . W ashburn, “Russia Looks at North Korea," Pacific Affairs 20 (June 1947): 134-13$; W ilbert B. D ubin, “The Political Evolution of the Pyongyang Governm ent,” Pacific Affairs 23 (December 1930): 384; Kim, Divided Korea, p . 91; H enderson, Korea, p. 326. For a contrary interpretation of Kim II Sung's qualifications as a popular nationalist leader and wartime guerrilla fighter, see Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, pp. 395, 399,420. 5. McCune and Grey, Korea Today, p. 180; Mitchell, Korea, pp. 16-17; Daliin, Soviet Russia a n d the Bar East, p p . 286-288. 6. W ashburn, “Russia Looks at N orth Korea,” p. 156; McCune and Grey Kona Today, pp. 201-202; Suh, “ A Preconceived Formula for Sovietization,” pp. 480, 487-488; Kim, D ivided Korea, p . 96. 7. Langdon to Byrnes, A ugust 23,1946, FRUS1946, VIII, 728. 8. Jon Halliday, “The U nited N ations and Korea,” in Baldwin, Without Parallel, p. 122; Cho, Korea in World Politics, p . 131; D ept, of State, NorthKorea, pp. 6-7, 57; Lauterbach, “ H odge’s Korea,” p. 358. 9. Kim, D ivided Korea, pp. 54-55, 66-67; Henderson, Korea, pp. 142-143; Cum ings, “ American Policy and Korean Liberation,” p. 74. 10. Sawyer and Hermes, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 10-11. 11. M acArthur to War, November 26, 1945, D ept, of the Army Records, OPD 014.1 TS, sec. V .R G 319. 12. M acArthur to Eisenhower, November 26,1945, FRUS 1945, VI, 1136; Patter­ son to Byrnes, November 1,1946, FRUS 1946,1 ,1111. 13. JCS to MacArthur, January 9, 1946, JCS Records, Leahy file, Korea 19461947, RG 218. 14. Sawyer and Hermes, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 12; Kim, Divided Kona, p. 67; Henderson, Korea, p . 141. 15. Bonesteel m em orandum , February 23, 1946, D ept, of die Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. I, cases 1-14, box 87, RG 319; Eisenhower to MacArthur, Feb­ ruary 23,1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 638-639; see also U.S. Dept, of State, Korea 1941 to 1948: A Report on Political Developments and Economic Resources with Selected Documents, pp. 29-31; Lauterbach, “ H odge’s Korea,” pp. 360-361. 16. MacArthur to JCS, February 2,1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 628-630. 17. Hodge to War, January 22,1946, ib id ., 613. 18. Benninghoff to Byrnes, January 28,1946, ibid., 627; NYT, January 29,1946, p. 1; NYT, February 9,1946, p. 10. 19. Benninghoff to Acheson, January 13, 1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 611; Benninghoff to Byrnes, February 15, 1946, ib id ., 630. 20. Glenn D . Paige, “ Korea,” in Cyril E. Black and Thomas P. Thornton, eds., Communism and Revolution: The Uses o f Political Violence, p. 221; NYT, February 19,1946, p. 12. 21. War to Hodge, February 6,1946, D ept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. III, cases 3-15, box 21, RG 319; SWNCC policy paper, January 28,1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 624-627. 22. MacArthur to JCS, February 12, 1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 632-633; Dupuy memorandum, February 13,1946, D ept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. Ill, cases 3-15, box 21, RG 319; Leahy, diary entry, February 21, 1946, Diaries 1946, box 5, Leahy papers; W. Averell Harriman, January 10, 1980, Oral History Interview Transcript, p. 12, Truman Library; NYT, February 3,1946, p. 23. 23. JCS to MacArthur, February 28,1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 644. 24. Hodge to War, February 24, 1946, ibid., 641; draft memorandum, February

Notes to Pages 80-86

V 9

28,1946, Dept, of State Records, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/2-2846. At this junc­ ture, George F. Kennan's now famous “long telegram” may have had some impact oo Washington's policy in Korea. Charles M. Dobbs contends that after "adopting the ideology of containment” early in 1946, "theU .S. government redefined the sit­ uation [in Korea] and considered intelligence only as it fit a preconceived notion of the emerging bipolar struggle. There would be no shadings of gray until it was too late. The damage was wrought by well-meaning, but sadly dose-minded men.” See Dobbs, The UnwantedSymbol, pp. 77-78. 23. War to Hodge, March 1, 1946, JCS Records, CCAC 014 Korea, sec. Ill, RG 218. The parallels between United Sûtes policy in southern Korea and China are obvious. 26. Hodge to Byrnes, March 22,1946, PRUS1946, VIII, 652-653. For a complete text of both speeches, see McCune and Grey, Korea Today, pp. 276-281. 27. NYT, March 21,1946, p. 24. 28. John Z. Williams to Vincent, March 25,1946, Dept, of Sute Records, 501.BB Korea/3-2546. 29. Williams to Hugh Boston, April 2,1946, ibid., 501.BB Korea/4-246. 30. Ibid.; NYT, March 31,1946, p. 14. 31. Byrnes to Patterson, April 1,1946, PRUS 1946, VIII, 655-656. 32. Patterson to Byrnes, April 10,1946, Dept, of Sute Records, 740.00119 Con­ trol (Korea)/4-1046. 33. Williams to Boston, April 2, 1946, ibid., 501.BB Korea/4-246; Byrnes to langdon, April 5,1946, PRUS 1946, VIII, 657-658. 34. NYT, April 11,1946, p. 13; NYT, April 17, 1946, p. 24; Langdon to Byrnes, April 30,1946, FRUS1946, VIII, 662-663. 35. Vincent to Byrnes, April 12, 1946, Dept, of Sute Records, 501.BB Korea/41246; Byrnes to Langdon, April 16,1946, PRUS 1946, VIII, 660-661. 36. Langdon to Byrnes, August 30,1946, Dept, of State Records, 711.00/8-3046; “Durly” [sic\ to Charles W. ‘Duyer, April 11, 1946, Alpha Correspondence, Korea Documents 1946, Thayer papers. 37. “Communiqué Issued by U.S.-Soviet Joint Commission on April 18, 1946,” DSB16 (January 26,1947): 173. 38. Hodge to War, April 20, 1946, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. I, cases 1-14, box 87, RG 319. 39. Ibid.; Acheson to Moscow, Nanking, and Paris embassies, April 25, 1946, PRUS 1946, VIII, 661. 40. NYT, April 11, 1946, p. 13; NYT, April 23, 1946, p. 11; NYT, April 27, 1946, p. 5; Langdon to Byrnes, April 14,1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 660. 41. Hodge to War, May 7, 1946, JCS Records, Leahy file, Korea 1946-1947, RG 218; Hodge to War, May 9,1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 665-667. 42. NYT, April 26, 1946, p. 8; NYT, May 8, 1946, p. 10; NYT, May 9, 1946, p. 15; Langdon to Byrnes, April 30, 1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 663; Langdon to Byrnes, May 8,1946, ibid., 677. 43. Langdon to Byrnes, May 8,1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 667-674. 44. Acheson to Seoul, May 18,1946, ibid., 680; Hull and Bonesteel to MacArthur and Hodge, May 11,1946, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 014.1 TS, sec. I, case 1, box 6, RG 319; see also NYT, May 11,1946, p. 26. 45. SWNCC memorandum, May 22, 1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 680-681; Walter Bedell Smith to Byrnes, May 18, 1946, ibid., 680; Borton to Williams, May 21, 1946, Dept, of Sute Records, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/ 5-2146. 46. Langdon to Byrnes, May 24,1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 685-688. 47. Byrnes to Langdon, May 25,1946, ibid., 689; War to Langdon, May 25,1946,

i8 o

Dept,

N otes to Pages 86-91 of State Records, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5-2546; NYT, May 24,1946,

p. 12. 48. Smith to Byrnes, July 1, 1946, D ept, of State Records, 740.00119 Control (K orea)/7-l46; NYT, May 16, 1946, p. 15; Belofif, Soviet Foreign Policy in the ht East, p . 163. 49. Edwin Pauley statem ent, December 7, 1945, PSF (Pauley), Human papeis; H um an to Pauley, Decem ber 21, 1945, ibid.; Pauley to Human, Match 22,1946, ibid. 50. Harry S. H um an, “H ie President’s Press Conference of May 2,1946,” Public Papers, Truman, H, 224-225; Pauley to Byrnes, May 10,1946, Confidential, White House Messages, Traffic 1946, box 3, Robert L. Dennison papers; memorandum, n .d ., ib id .; Byrnes to Pauley, May 15,1946, ibid. 51. Edwin W. Pauley, diary notes, June 20, 1946, PSF (Pauley), Human papeis; Carter to Wolfe, May 30, 1946, Confidential, W hite House Messages, Traffic 1946, box 3, D ennison papers. 52. Edwin W. Pauley, “ Survey o f Resources in Manchuria and Korea and the Euro­ pean Reparations Program,” DSB 15 (August 4, 1946): 233-234; Pauley to Human, Ju n e 22,1946, FRUS1946, VHI, 706-708. 53. Ib id .; H um an to Acheson, July 3, 1946, PSF (Cabinet File), Sate Depart­ m ent, folder 2 (Acheson), box 160, H um an papers. 54. John H. H illdring m em orandum , June 6,1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 692-698. 55. H um an to Pauley, July 16, 1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 713-714. Charles M. Dobbs is mistaken when he states that Pauley’s report “fell on largely deaf eats”; see D obbs, The Unwanted Symbol, p. 205. 56. War to MacArthur, July 17, 1946, JCS Records, Leahy file, Korea 1946-1947, RG 218. 57. Thayer to Hodge, July 17, 1946, A lpha Correspondence, Korea Documents 1946, Thayer papers. 58. War D epartm ent m em orandum , July 25, 1946, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. I, cases 1-14, box 87, RG 319. 59. H illdring to SWNCC, July 25, 1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 719; SWNCC toJCS, August 2,1946, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. VIII, RG218. 60. Dupuy m em orandum , A ugust 3,1946, D ept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. I, cases 1-14, box 87, RG 319. 61. Dupuy m em orandum , June 13, 1946, ibid., P&O 091 Korea, sec. II, case 13, box 87, RG 319; Craig mem orandum , June 4, 1946, ibid., P&O 014.1 TS, sec. I, case 1, box 6, RG 319. Similarly, the Navy D epartm ent had been hesistant to furnish the necessary personnel to establish a Korean coast guard. See Hodge to War, August 8,1946, ibid., WDSCA 014 Korea, 11 June 1946, sec. Ill, box 249, RG 165. 62. H um an to Patterson, August 12, 1946, ibid., CSA 091 Korea, RG 335; JCS memorandum, August 2, 1946, ibid.; Fotrestal to Human, August 14, 1946, OF 471, Truman papers. 63. Benjamin Weems, “Behind the Korean Elections,” Far Eastern Survey 17 (June 23,1948): 143; Lee, The Politics o f Korean Nationalism, p. 141; Kira, Divided Korea, pp. 28-29. 64. N Y EJune 22,1946, p. 2; NYT, July 2,1946, p. 17. 65. Henderson, Korea, p. 134. 66. Langdon to Byrnes, July 3, 1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 710-711; Kim, Divided Korea, pp. 69-70. Hodge placed a young first lieutenant named Leonard Bensch in charge of creating this centrist political coalition. According to former American mil­ itary governor Archibald V. Arnold, Bertsch soon was “running furiously in all direc­ tions trying to gather up Korean support sufficient to bring about a coalition, a

Notes to Pages 91-96

2.81

Korean legislature and death to the Commie.” See Archibald V. Arnold to Thayer, August 20,1946, Alpha Correspondence, Korea Documents 1946, Thayer papers; seealso Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, pp. 254-256. 67. Memorandum of conversation, July 16, 1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 715-716; NTTJuly 10,1946, p. 5; McCune and Grey, Korea Today, p. 6. 68. Langdon to Byrnes, July 28, 1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 720-721; Langdon to Byrnes, August 2,1946, ibid., 722-723; Joseph E. Jacobs to Marshall, July 31,1947, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/7-3147. 69. Dean G. Acheson, “Anniversary of Korean liberation,” DSB 15 (August 25, 1946): 384. Communist involvement in a counterfeiting operation also hampered party efforts to build popular appeal; see NYT, July 30,1946, p. 7. 70. Archer L. Letch to Shoemaker, September 16,1946, Correspondence, General 1946-1947, box 1, Edgar A. J. Johnson papers; NYT, August 25, 1946, p. 28; NYT, September 15, 1946, p. 7; NYT, September 19, 1946, p. 13; McCune and Grey, Korea Today, p. 74; Sawyer and Hermes, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 22-26. 71. Langdon to Byrnes, August 23, 1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 726-729; Bunce to Byrnes, August 26, 1946, ibid., 731-733. Bunce already had endorsed Pauley’s rec­ ommendations late in June 1946 in an article he prepared for publication in Pacific Affairs. Bunce charged in his essay, entitled “Can Korea Be Free?” that Hodge’s affection for the extreme conservatives and his tolerance of opposition to trusteeship were primarily responsible for American problems in southern Korea. Soviet distrust of the United Sûtes therefore was justified and only a reversal of past policy would lead to a settlement. Not surprisingly, Hodge blocked publication of the article. Acheson, on the other hand, was impressed with Bunce’s ability and urged Byrnes to recommend his appointment as the first ambassador to Korea. See Langdon to Byrnes, June 13,1946, Dept, of Sure Records, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6-1346; Acheson memorandum, August 9.1946, ibid., 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8-946. 72. Langdon to Byrnes, October 9,17,1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 743-748. 73. Ibid. ; Langdon to Byrnes, November 1,1946, ibid., 757-759. 74. Langdon to Byrnes, November 2, 1946, ibid., 760; Langdon to Byrnes, December 10,1946, ibid., 779-780. 75. ‘‘Proposal for Reopening Joint Commission,” DSB 16 (January 26, 1947): 168-173; Bunce to Edwin Martin, December 31, 1946, Dept, of Sure Records, 895.00/12-3146. 76. NYT, September 29,1946, p. 53; NYT, September 7,1946, p. 16; memoran­ dum of conversation, October 9,1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 741-742. For detailed cov­ erage of revolutionary violence in southern Korea during the autumn of 1946 and the American response, see Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, pp. 351-381. 77. NYT, August 4,1946, p. 5; NYT, September 30,1946, p. 12; Sarafan, “Mili­ tary Government,” p. 352; Henderson, Korea, pp. 142-144; Cumings, The Origins of the Korean War, pp. 201-205. 78. NYT, October 8, 1946, p. 10; NYT, October 10, 1946, p. 12; NYT, October 11,1946, p. 10; Langdon to Byrnes, November 1,1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 754-756; Kim, Divided Korea, p. 67. 79. Langdon to Byrnes, November 3,1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 761-762. 80. NYT, October 16,1946, p. 8. 81. Langdon to Byrnes, November 3, 14, 1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 763, 767; Meade, American Military Government in Korea, p. 189. 82. Bunce to Martin, February 2,1947, Dept, of Sure Records, 895.00/2-247. 83. Langdon to Byrnes, August 30, 1946, ibid., 711.00/8-3046; Henderson, Korea, pp. 153-154; McCune and Grey, Korea Today, pp. 78-80; Mitchell, Korea, p. 18; Halliday, “The United Nations and Korea,” p. 115.

Notes to Pages96-101 84. Meade, American Military Government in Korea, pp. 186-187. 85. Ibid., p. 186; Henderson,Korea, p. 153. 86. Langdon to Byrnes, November 24, 1946, FRUS1946, VIII, 770; Langdon to Byrnes, December 5, 27, 1946, ibid., 773-774, 780-781; "Korea: A Chronologyof Principal Events, 1945-1950," World Today 6 (August 1950): 321. 87. Langdon to Byrnes, November 27,1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 772; NYT, Decem­ ber 13,1946, p. 12; Berger, The Korean Knot, pp. 70-71. 88. NYT, December 6,1946, p. 18; NYT, December 11,1946, p. 18; LouiseYim to Byrnes, November 1946, file 569 (3), Byrnes papers. 89- Langdon to Byrnes, December 12,1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 775-778. 90. State Department memorandum, December 13, 1946, Dept, of State Rec­ ords, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/12-1346; MacArthur for Hodge to War for Rhce, December 21, 1946, Dept, of the Army Records, WDSCA 014 Korea, sec. IV, 11 June 1946, box 249, R G 165. 91. Hodge to Byrnes, December 31, 1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 785-786; Buoce to Martin, December 31,1946, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/12-3146. 92. MacArthur was particularly outspoken in urging the movement of American occupation forces from Korea to Japan. See Major General Latins Notstad memoran­ dum, November 26, 1946, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 337 TS, sec. I, cases224, box 73. RG 319. 93. Clark Clifford's “Russian Report," completed in September 1946, provides strong evidence that the administration had not lost confidence in its “get tough” approach. Any sign of vacillation or indecision, Human's special counsel advised, would only encourage further Soviet aggression and reduce congressional supportfor a hard-line policy. See George M. Elsey, April 4, 1970, Oral History InterviewRanscript, II, p. 263, Human Library; Hamby, Beyond the New Deal, p. 118; Gaddis, The United States and the Originsofthe Cold War, pp. 319-321,339-341. TheNt» York Times called for a strong and unyielding American stand in Korea, arguing that this Asian nation represented “a testing ground for the kind of settlements wewould like to see elsewhere” ; See NYT, September 1,1946, IV, p. 6. 94. Susan M. Hartmann, Truman and the 80th Congress, p. 48. CH APTER

$: An Avenuefo r Escape

1. Joint Staff Planners memorandum, "Estimate of Probable W>rld Political Situ­ ation Up to 1956,” October 9,1946, JCS Records, CCS 092, RG 218. 2. On the importance of maintaining credibility in American policy toward Korea, see William Whitney Stueck, Jr., The Road to Confrontation: American PaIkj Toward China and Korea, 1947-1950, pp. 28-30. 3. MacArthur to Eisenhower, October 28, 1946, FRUS 1946, VIII, 750-751; Hodge to Patterson, November 5, 1946, John R. Hodge, General Correspondence, 1945-1947, box 20, Patterson papers; Hodge to War, January 17,1947, Korea-Gen­ eral file, box 1, Johnson papers. 4. War Department memorandum, October 29, 1946, Dept, of the Army Rec­ ords, P&O 092 TS, sec. V-A, pt. I, case 85, box 31, RG 319; Vincent to Byrnes, Octo­ ber 29, 1946, FRUS 1946, VIE, 751-752; Ernest Gross to Boston, January 6, 1947, Dept, of State Records, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1-647. 5. Notstad memorandum, January 4, 1947, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O091 Korea, sec. Ill, cases 16-50, box 87, RG 319; Hodge to War, January 17,1947, ibid., WDSCA 014 Korea (1 Nov 46-31 Jan 47), sec. V, box 249, RG 165; MacArthur» War, January 22,1947, ibid.

Notes to Pages 101-107

x83

6. Lincoln to Howard C. Peterson, January 23. 1947, ibid., P&O 092 TS, 19461948, case 83, RG 319; Vincent to Marshall. January 27,1947, FRUS1947, VI, 601603. 7. Fonestal memorandum, January 29, 1947, in Millis, The ForrestalDiaries, pp. 241-242; Memorandum of the Special Inter-Departmental Committee, February 23, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 609-618. 8. DaJlin, Soviet Russia and the Far East, pp. 291-292; McCune and Grey, Korea Today, p. 173; Kim, D ivided Korea, pp. 103-106. 9. Langdon to Marshall, January 17, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 598-600; John R. Hodge, “Activities of Dissident Korean Groups,” DSB 16 (February 2, 1947): 210; NYXJanuary 23,1947, p. 15. 10. Langdon to Marshall, January 21, 1947, Dept, of State Records, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/1-2147; Jacobs to Marshall, August 21, 1947, ibid., 740.00119 Control (Korea)/8-1247. 11. NYX January 24, 1947, p. 13; Rhee to MacArthur, January 20, 1947, Private Correspondence, VIP file, folder 43, box 9, RG 10, Douglas MacArthur papers. 12. Hodge to State, January 26, 1947, Dept, of the Army Records, WDSCA 014 Korea (1 Nov 46-31 Jan 47), sec. V, box 249, RG 165. 13. Hodge to MacArthur for War, January 20,1947, ibid. 14. Memorandum of the Special Inter-Departmental Committee, February 25, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 609-618. 15. Ibid.; Vincent and Hilldring to Marshall, February 28, 1947, ibid., 618619. 16. Langdon to Marshall, February 20, 1947, ibid., 607-608; Bunce to Martin, Febtuary 24,1947, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/2-2447. 17. Marshall to MacArthur, February 7, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 606; Patterson to Truman, February 19,1947, OF 471, Truman papers. 18. Harry S. Tuman, Memoirs, vol. II: Years o f Trial and Hope, p. 323; NYT, Febtuary 25,1947, p. 1. 19. Pattetson to Hodge, Febtuary 24, 1947, John R. Hodge, General Correspon­ dence, 1945-1947, box 20, Patterson papers; U.S. Congress, Senate, Joint Commit­ tee on Armed Services and Foreign Relations, Military Situation in the Far East, III, p. 2008. 20. NYT, Febtuary 26,1947, pp. 2,24. 21. Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, pp. 90-91. 22. John H. Hilldring, “Korea—House Divided,” DSB 16 (March 23,1947): 544547. 23. Harry S. Truman, “Recommendations on Greece and Tirkey,” DSB 16 (March 23,1947): 536. 24. Leahy, diary entry, March 12, 1947, Diaries 1947, box 5, Leahy papers; Selig Adler, The Isolationist Impulse: Its Twentieth Century Reaction, p. 406; W. W. Rostow, The United States in the World Arena: An Essay in Recent History, p. 208; Roben H. Ferrell, George C. Marshall, pp. 74-75. 25. Gaddis, “Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?” p. 389; Gaddis Smith, Dean Acheson, p. 47; Hartmann, Truman and the 80th Congress, p. 54. 26. Tuman, “Recommendations on Greece and Turkey," p. 536. 27. Tuman, Years o f Trial and Hope, p. 106; Leahy, diary entry, February 27, 1947, Diaries 1947, box 5, Leahy papers; Gaddis, The United States and the Origins o f the Cold War, pp. 317, 352; Eric F. Goldman, The Crucial Decade—A n d After: America 1945-1960, p. 59; Westetfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 222; Athan Theoharis, Seeds o f Repression: Harry S. Truman and the Origins o f MacCarthyism, pp. 56-57.

184

N otes to Pages 107-111

28. H artm ann, Truman an d the 80th Congress, p. 106; Gaddis, "Was the Truman D octrine a Real Turning Point?” p . 398; Norman A. Graebner, “Global Contain­ m ent: The Truman Years,” Current History 37 (August 1969): 77; Gabriel A. A lm ond, The American People a n d Foreign Policy, p. 12; Steel, Pax Americana, p. 23. Even Joseph Marion Jones refers to containm ent as "not an illogical extension of lend lease” ; see Jones, The Fifteen Weeks, p. 21. 29. SWNCC Ad-hoc Com m ittee Report on Hum an Doctrine, February 21, 1947, FRUS1947, VI, 727-730; see also G addis, "Containm ent: A Reassessment,” p. 876. 30. NYT, March 21, 1947, p. 12; NYT, March 23, 1947, p. 8. During Iris testi­ mony, Acheson indicated the lim ited nature o f the Truman Doctrine when he stressed th at the adm inistration did not intend to help every nation. Although the principle was dear, action would depend on each individual case. SeeJones, The Fif­ teen Weeks, pp. 191-193; G addis, The U nited States and the Origins of the Cold War, p .3 3 2 . Yet H um an and his advisors definitely planned to request economic aid for Korea. Thus, John Gaddis is mistaken when he seems to suggest that from the outset H um an had excluded Korea from his strategy for containing Soviet expansion. See G addis, “ Korea in American Politics, Strategy, and Diplomacy,” p. 281. 31. Hodge to Seoul, March 3, 1947, D ept, of the Army Records, P&O 312.1, sec. XII-A. case 467, RG 319; Evetsull report, April 1,1947, ibid., P&O 091 Korea, sec. Ill, cases 16-30, box 87, RG 319; Sergeant Harry H. Savage to Human, March 31, 1947, D ept, o f State Records, 895.01/3-3147. 32. Seoul to Hodge, March 6, 1947, D ept, o f the Army Records, P&O 312.1, sec. XII-A, case 467, RG 319; O rlando Ward to Paul J. Mueller, April 1,1947, Far East Command Records, Ward m em orandum folder, box 1, RG 6, MacArthur papers. 33. H illdring to Vincent, March 25, 1947, D ept, of State Records, 740.00119 Control (K orea)/3-2547; Vincent to H illdring, March 27, 1947, ibid., 740.00119 Control (K orea)/3-2747; Acheson to Patterson, March 28, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 621-623. 34. Patterson to Acheson, April 4, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 626-627; Forrestal m em orandum , A pril 25, 1947, in Millis, The Forrestal Dianes, p. 265; Patterson to Peterson, April 7, 1947, D ept, o f the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. II, case 15, box 87, RG31935. NYT, A pril 1,1947, p. 17; NYT, April 6,1947, p. 43; NYT, April 11, 1947, p . 18. 36. Harry S. H um an, "The President’s News Conference of A pril3, 1947,” Public Papers, Truman, III, 191; Harry S. H um an, “The President’s News Conference of May 15,1947,” ib id ., 247. 37. Vincent to Acheson, A pril 8,1947, D ept, o f State Records, 740.00119 Control (K orea)/4-847. Charles M. Dobbs erroneously contends that the crisis in Greece and Turkey "caused President H um an to drop the economic plan for south Korea” and also seek "to reconvene the Jo in t Commission.” See Dobbs, The UnwantedSymbol, p . 85. 38. Marshall to Acheson, April 2, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 624-625; Acheson to Marshall, April 5,1947, ib id ., 628-629. 39. Coral Bell, Negotiation from Strength: A Study in the Politics o f Power, p. 21; Alexander DeConde, “George C. Marshall (1947-1949),” in Graebner, An Uncer­ tain Tradition, p. 252. 40. D allin, Soviet Russia an d the Far East, p. 304; Cho, Korea in World Politics, p . 158. 41. "U .S. Urges Reconvening o f Jo in t U .S.-U .S.S.R. Commission,” DSB 16 (April 20,1947): 716-717; NYT, A pril 13, 1947, p . 47.

Notes to Pages 111-113

z85

42. Molotov to Marshall, April 19,1947, FRUS1947, VI, 633-634. 43. Marshall to Molotov, May 2,1947, ibid., 638-63944. Molotov to Marshall, May 8,1947, ibid., 640-642; Marshall to Molotov, May 12.1947, ibid., 643; Langdon to Marshall, May 11, 1947, ibid., 639-640; see also “Soviet Position on Resumption ofJoint Commission on Korea,” DSB 16 (May 18, 1947): 995-996. 45. Harry S. Truman, "The President’s Special Conference with the Association of Radio News Analysts, May 13,1947," Public Papers, Truman, IQ, 240; New Repub­ lic, May 5, 1947, pp. 25-27; Time, May 30,1947, pp. 30-31; Life, May 19, 1947, p. 32. The New York Times in particular applauded the administration’s decision to ask for economic aid to southern Korea. “The best way to meet Communism North of the Thirty Eighth Parallel,” one editorial advised, “is to strengthen democracy south of the border, to show there that the latter is the better way of life, to prove that life, liberty and happiness can be better pursued in a democratic society than a totalitar­ ian one.” See NYT, April 13,1947, IV, p. 8; NYT, April 23,1947, p. 24; NYX April 25.1947. p. 7. 46. Forrestal memorandum, May 7,1947, in Millis, The PorrestalDiaries, p. 273. Some American officials in Seoul were justifiably skeptical about the chances for suc­ cess at the Joint Commission. After all, the Soviets had not accepted meekly the American position and, under the Marshall-Molotov compromise, the Soviet delega­ tion still would be able to exclude those groups opposed to trusteeship. Perhaps worse, when negotiations resumed the United States would find itself in the awk­ ward position of being obliged to endorse Soviet opposition to consultation with those very groups whose freedom of speech it had demanded during previous ses­ sions. See NYT, May 1,1947, p. 15; NYT, May 12, 1947, p. 20; Beloff, Soviet For­ eign Policy in the FarEast, p. 168. 47. Rhee to Truman, March 13, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 620; Rhee to Thiman, March 26, 1947, OF 471, Truman papers. Robert T. Oliver claims that the State Department had decided in December 1946 to sponsor Rhee after finally realizing that Hodge’s opposition to Rhee was undemocratic and favorable to Soviet aims in Korea. MacArthur allegedly played a pivotal role in this shift, since he persuaded his good friend John H. Hilldring to speak on behalf of Rhee. See Oliver, Syngman Rhee, pp. 232-233. In reality, Truman’s diplomatic advisors had not changed their negative attitude toward Rhee. When Rhee requested an interview with Patterson, for example, State Department officials urged rejection of the request, observing that he “was one of the most dangerous figures in Korean political life” and “had done more than any other Korean to make it difficult for the U.S. Army in Korea.” See Major General Albert E. Brown to War, March 14, 1947, Dept, of the Army Records, WDSCA 014 Korea (1 Feb to 30 Apr 47), sec. VI, box 250, RG 165; War Department Intelligence Division memorandum, March 26, 1947, ibid., CSA 091 Korea, case 8, RG 335; Penfield memorandum, March 28, 1947, Dept, of State Records, 895.01/3-2847. 48. NYT, May 14,1947, p. 10; NYT, May 18,1947, p. 31; NYT, May 17,1947, p. 7; Hodge to War, May 17, 1947, Dept, of the Army Records, WDSCA 014 Korea (1 May to 30 Jun 47), sec. VII, box 250, RG 165; langdon to Marshall, May 17, 18, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 644-645. 49. Langdon to Marshall, May 21,1947, Dept, of State Records, 740.00119 Con­ trol (Koiea)/5-2l47; NYT, May 19,1947, p. 3. 50. Langdon to Marshall, May 21, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 646-647; Rhee to MacArthur, May 23, 1947, Private Correspondence, VIP file, folder 43, box 9, RG 10, MacArthur papers.

2.86

Notes to Pages113-119

51. Hilldring to Hodge, May 21,1947, Dept, of State Records, 740.00119 Conool (K orea)/5-2l47; Marshall to Langdon, May 23,1947, FRUS1947, VI, 648-649. 52. Langdon to Marshall, May 23, 24, 30, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 649-653,655657; NYT, May 29,1947, p. 1; NYT, May 30,1947, p. 4. 53. Langdon to Marshall, June 1, 4, 6, 7, 9. 11, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 658-663, 665-673; N IX June 1.1947, p. 18; NYT, June 2,1947, p. 3; NIXJune 3, 1947,p. 10; NYT, June 5, 1947, p. 18; NYT, June 8, 1947, p. 27; George C. Marshall, “Hope Expressed for Early Provisional Government for Korea,’’ DSB 16 (June 22, 1947): 1249. 54. Lincoln to Norstad, May 12, 1947, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O092TS, sec. V-A, pt. I, case 85, box 31, RG 319. 55. JCS to SWNCC, May 5,1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 737-739. 56. Frederick J. Lawton to Human, June 3, 1947, OF 471, Human papers; State Department draft speech, June 3, 1947, ibid.; Bell, Negotiation from Strength, P- 23. 57. Tang Tsou, America ’s Failure in China, 1941-1950, pp. 446-453. 58. Acheson to Marshall, June 27, 1947, Dept, of State Records, 740.00119 Con­ trol (Korea)/6-2747; Acheson to “Jim " (Webb], Aug. ? [sic], 1950, Memoranda of Conversations, May-June 1950, box 65, Dean G. Acheson papers; see also Walter Lippman, The Cold War: A Study in U.S. Foreign Policy, pp. 45-46. 59. Hodge to Hilldring, May 26, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 651-652; NYT, May20, 1947, p. 24; NYT, May 26, 1947, p. 12; NYT, June 7, 1947, p. 7; Time, June 2, 1947, p. 34. 60. Jacobs to Marshall, June 20,1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 677; NYT, June 14, 1947, p .8 . 61. NYT June 17,1947, p. 13; NYT June 24,1947, p. 17; NIX June 25, 1947, p. 20. 62. Hodge to Marshall, June 19, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 675; Hodge to Wir, June 27,1947, Dept, of the Army Records, WDSCA 014 Korea (1 May to 30jun47), sec. VII, box 250, RG 165. 63. Jacobs to Marshall, June 26, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 679; Hodge to Marshall, June 26,1947, ibid., 679-680. 64. For a contrary view, see Dobbs, The UnwantedSymbol, p. 100. 65. Jacobs to Marshall, July 3, 4, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 687-689; NYT, July 6, 1947, p. 22. 66. Jacobs to Marshall, June 28, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 680-682; Marshall to Jacobs, July 2,1947, ibid., 682. 67. Jacobs to Marshall, July 7,1947, ibid., 690-691; “Joseph E. Jacobs Appointed Political Adviser to USAF in Korea," DSB 16 (June 15, 1947): 1178. 68. Jacobs to Marshall, July 8,1947, ibid., 693-695; NYT July 6,1947, p. 22. 69. Hodge to Marshall, July 10, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 697-700; NYT July 12, 1947, p. 4. 70. Hodge to Marshall, July 17, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 708-709; Jacobs to Marshall, July 19, 1947, ibid., 709-710; Jacobs to Marshall, July 31,1947, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/7-3147; Jacobs to Marshall, August 6,1947, ibid., 895.00/8647; NYT July 20,1947, p. 34; NYT July 27,1947, p. 7; The Nation, September^ 1947, pp. 228-229. 71. Jacobs to Marshall, June 20, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 676-677; Jacobs to Marshall,July 21,1947, ibid., 710-711; Kim, DividedKorea, pp. 78-7972. Marshall to Jacobs, July 14,1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 701-703; Borton toJacobs, July 25,1947, Dept, of State Records, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7-2547. 73. Borton memorandum, July 24,1947, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/7-2447;

Notes to Pages 120-124

z 87

Hodge to War, July 27, 1947, ibid., 740.00119 Control (Korea)/7-2747; Hodge to Wrrjuly 27,1947, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. XI, RG 218. 74. Jacobs to Marshall, July 30, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 736; Jacobs to Marshall, August 2,1947, ibid., 737; NYT, August 8, 1947, p. 8; Time, August 4, 1947, p. 16. For Hodge, further negotiations at the Joint Commission would be “absurd.” He therefore advised Washington to sponsor the extreme right openly and approve a new campaign to "stamp out communism . . . even at the cost of bloodshed.” See War Department summary, August 1,1947, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 092 Korea TS, sec. V-A, pt. I, case 85, box 31, RG 319; Hodge to Marshall, August 6, 7, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 744-745. 75. John M. Allison memorandum, July 29,1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 734-735. 76. Ibid.; Ad-hoc Committee to SWNCC, August 4,1947, ibid., 735-741. 77. Hilldring memorandum, August 6, 1947, ibid., 742; Hilldring to Lovett, August 8,1947, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/8-847; “ Statement by Chief Com­ missioner of the American Delegation,” D SB 17 (August 10,1947): 296-297. 78. Marshall to Smith, August 11, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 748-749; “U.S. Requests Report from Joint Commission,” DSB 17 (August 24,1947): 398—39979. Robert A. Lovett to Jacobs, August 15, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 754; “Denial of Orange of Policy Toward Korea,” DSB 17 (August 24,1947): 39980. Jacobs to Marshall, August 14, 17, 21, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 753-755, 760761; Hodge to War, August 25, 1947, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. XI, RG 218. 81. Jacobs to Marshall, August 14, 19, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 753-754, 756-757; Hodge to Marshall, August 20,1947, ibid., 757-760. 82. Lovett to Jacobs, August 23, 1947, ibid., 764-765; “Letter from the Soviet Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Secretary of State,” DSB 17 (September 7, 1947): 475. 83. Jacob to Marshall, August 20, 22, 25, 26, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 760, 762763.766-769. 84. Allison to Lovett, August 26, 1947. Dept, of State Records, 740.00119 Con­ trol (Korea)/8-2647; Lovett to Smith, August 21, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 771-774; “Utter from the Acting Secretary of S ate to the Soviet Foreign Minister,” DSB 17 (September 7,1947): 473-475. 85. Smith to Marshall, August 28, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 775-776; Lovett to Jacob, September 4,1947, ibid., 779. 86. Molotov to Marshall, September 4, 1947, ibid., 779-781; “Korean Question to Be Referred to General Assembly,” DSB 17 (September 28,1947): 623-624. 87. Human, Years o f Trial and Hope, pp. 324-325; Acheson comments, February 13,1954, Princeton Seminars Hanscript, reel 1, ap e 1, pp. 7-9, Acheson papers. 88. Jacob to Marshall, September 8, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 763; see also NYT, September 10,1947, p. 26. 89. Kim, Divided Korea, pp. 78-79; Henderson, Korea, pp. 135-136. 90. Denis Stairs, The Diplomacy o f Constraint: Canada, the Korean War, and the United States, pp. 5-6; Cho, Korea in World Politics, p. 205; Tsou, America’s Fail­ ure in China, p. 557; Goodrich, Korea, pp. 37-41; Henderson, Korea, pp. 148-150. 91. Dean Rusk to Gross, May 9, 1947, Dept, of S ate Records, 895.00/5-947; Reitzel, Kaplan, and Coblenz, U nited States Foreign Policy, pp. 176-177; Halliday, "The United Nations and Korea,” p. 119; Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, pp. 89-90. 92. Gaddis, “Korea in American Politics, Stategy, and Diplomacy,” pp. 282-283; Stain, The Diplomacy o f Constraint, p. 17; Vinacke, The U nited States and the Far Fast, p. 65.

2.88

N otes to Pages 125-131 CHAPTER 6: A House Divided

1. Rusk to Gross, May 9, 1947, D ept, of State Records, 895.00/5-947; Rritzd, K aplan, and Coblenz, U nited States Foreign Policy, pp. 176-177. 2. Robert G. Wesson, “The U nited Nations in the World Outlook of the Soviet Union and the U nited States,” in Alvin Z. Rubinstein and George Ginsbutgs, eds., Soviet and American Policies in the U nited Nations, pp. 6-7; Stueck, The Rod to Confrontation, pp. 88-89. 3. Lincoln Bloomfield, The U nited Nations and US. Foreign Policy. A NewLook at the National Interest, p. 182; Halliday, “H ie United Nations and Korea," pp. 120-121; Goodrich, Korea, pp. 38-39. 4. Lovett to Molotov, September 16, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 790; George C. Marshall, “ A Program for a More Effective United Nations,” DSB17 (September 28, 1947): 619-620; NYT, September 18,1947, pp. 8,24. 5. Lovett to Warren R. Austin, September 18,1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 794-795. 6. Marshall memorandum, July 8, 1947, Confidential, State Department, Corre­ spondence, 1946-1947, W hite House Central Files, folder 9, box 34, Ihunao papers; “Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer Heads Mission to Study Conditions in China and Korea,” DSB 17 (July 20,1947): 149. 7. W. Walton Butterworth to Marshall, January 6,1947, FRUS 1947, VII, 10;JCS to SWNCC, June 9, 1947, ibid., 839-846; Clubb memorandum, August 3,1947, ibid., 705; Wedemeyer to Marshall, August 8, 1947, ibid., 713; A. Bland Caldera) Wedemeyer, August 13,1947, ibid., 722. 8. Wedemeyer to J. Leighton Stuart, September 3, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 765; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee on Armed Services, Report to the President, Sep­ tember 1947, By Lt. Gen. A. C. Wedemeyer, pp. 1-23. 9. Wedemeyer Report, September 19,1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 796-803. 10. Jacobs to Marshall, September 19,1947, ibid., 804-807. 11. Francis B. Stevens memorandum, September 9,1947, ibid., 784-785. 12. Ibid.; SWNCC to JCS, September 15, 1947, Korean Documents, box 10, David Lloyd papers. 13. Forrestal to Marshall, September 26,1947, Korean Documents, box 10, Lloyd papers; JCS to SWNCC, September 26,1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 817-818. 14. Kennan to Butterworth, September 24, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 814; McClin­ tock to Rusk, September 9, 1947, Dept, o f State Records, 895.00/51-1647; “Chro­ nology of Action by the National Security Council and the NSC Staff on U.S. Policy Toward Korea” (Korea-Classified Background Materials), Miscellaneous, box 77, George M. Elsey papers; Leahy to Thiman, n.d. (China-Foreign 1948), PSF 32, Hu­ man papers. According to Charles M. Dobbs, Wedemeyer’s “visit was for naught because by the time Wedemeyer could submit his report, the government in Wash­ ington had decided to take the Korean issue to the United Nations”; see Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol, p. 208. In fact, the administration did subsequently follow Wedemeyer’s recommendations. Had it not been for congressional opposition, the provisions of the Wedemeyer report would have experienced a more rapid and com­ plete implementation. See memorandum. May 2, 1951, OF: Wedemeyer Mission, Truman papers. 15. Dupuy to Norstad, October 2, 1947, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O091 Korea, case 106, box 89, RG 319; Economic Report on Korea, ibid.; Army Depart­ ment memorandum, September 23,1947, ibid. 16. Jacobs to Marshall, September 26,1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 816-817; NYT Sep­ tember 27, 1947, p. 1. 17. Bunce to Martin, September 28, 1947, Dept, of State Records, 740.00119

Notes to Pages 131-135

2.S9

Control (Korea)/9-2847; S ate Department memorandum, September 24, 1947, ibid., 740.00119 Control (Korea)/9-2447; Cabinet Meeting, September 29, 1947, in Millis, The Fonestal Diaries, pp. 321-322; Butterworth to Lovett, October 1, 1947, FRUS1947, VI, 820; Acheson testimony. Military Situation in the Far East, p. 2010. 18. Molotov to Marshall, October 10, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 827-828; Lovett to Smith, October 17,1947, ibid., 836-837. 19. Austin to Lie, October 17, 1947, ibid., 832-835; Warren R. Austin, “The Problem of the Independence of Korea,“ DSB 17 (October 26, 1947): 820-822; NYX October 18,1947, p. 14. 20. Jacobs to Marshall, October 18, 20, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 837, 842-843; NYX October 21,1947, p. 11. 21. Austin to Marshall, October 29,1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 849. 22. Jacobs to Marshall, August 17, 23, 1947, ibid., 755, 763; Jacobs to Marshall, September 12, 30, 1947, ibid., 787-788, 819; Jacobs to Lovett, September 9 ,1947, Dept, of Sate Records, 895.00/9-947; NYT, September 11,1947, p. 15. 23. Jacobs to Marshall, August 7, 1947, ibid., 745-746; Jacobs to Marshall, Sep­ tember 20, 1947, ibid., 809; Jacobs to Marshall, October 8,9,1947, ibid., 824-827; NITOctober 8,1947, p. 11. 24. Rhee to Korean Commission, October 18, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 838-839; Jacobs to Marshall, October 10,29,1947, ibid., 829-830,848-849. 25. Benjamin F. Taylor memorandum, May 2, 1947, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. V, case 65, box 88, RG 319; Lincoln memorandum, May 20, 1947, ibid., P&O 091 Korea, sec. I, cases 1-14, box 87, RG 319; Dupuy memoran­ dum, May 9,1947, ibid., P&O 092 TS, sec. V-A, pt. I, case 85 only, box 31, RG 319. 26. Lincoln memorandum, May 7,1947, ibid., P&O 091 Korea, sec. I, cases 1-14, box 87, RG 319; Dupuy memorandum, October 15, 1947, ibid., P&O 091 Korea, sec. Ill, cases 16-50, box 87, RG 319. 27. S. L. Scott memorandum, October 16,1947, ibid., P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. I, pt. I, box 20, RG 319; William H. Draper to Hodge, October 26,1947, ibid., P&O 091 Kora, sec. II, pt. I, case 2 only, box 87, RG 319. 28. Policy Planning Staff report, November 6,1947, FRUS 1947,1 ,770-777; edi­ tor’s note, ibid. 29. Wedemeyer to MacArthur and Hodge, November 10, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 856; Hodge to JCS, November 21, 1947, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Kota TS, FW 38, RG 319. 30. R. F. Seedlock memorandum, November 28, 1947, Dept, of the Army Rec­ ords, P&O 091 K ota TS, sec. I, case 1, box 20, RG 319* 31. Jacobs to Marshall, O ctobcr21,1947, Dept, of Sate Records, 740.00119Control(Kora)/10-2l47;Jacobs to Marshall, October 24,1947, ibid., 895.00/10-2447; Jacobs to Marshall, October 10, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 830; Hodge to JCS, Novem­ ber 3, 1947, ibid., 852-853. 32. Austin to Marshall, November 14, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 857-859; Seedlock memorandum, November 4,1947, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 K ota, sec. IB, cases 16-50, box 87, RG 319. Before it approved the American-sponsored resolu­ tion, the General Assembly rejected both a Soviet proposal for mutual withdrawal and one to permit the appearance of representatives from northern K ora before the United Nations. Sce NYT, October 30,1947, p. 24; “Korea: A Chronology," p. 322. 33. NYT, November 5,1947, p. 26; Leon Gordenker, The United Nationsand the Peaceful Unification o f Korea: The Politics o f Field Operations 1947-1950, p. 31. 34. Marshall to Jacobs, November 17, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 860-861; Jacobs to Marshall, November 19,1947, ibid., 861-862.

190

N otes to Pages 135-140

35. Gordenker, The U nited Nations an d the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, p. 21; Tompkins, A merican-Russian Relations in the FarEast, pp. 330-331. 36. M emorandum o f conversation, October 28,1947, FRUS1947, VI, 552-553. 37. Langdon to M arshall, November 29, 1947, ibid., 865-866; Langdon to Mar­ shall, Decem ber 7, 1947, ib id ., 871-872; Jacobs to Marshall, November 17,19, 1947, ib id ., 859-860, 863-864; Hodge to Marshall, December 2,1947, ibid., 866867; Jacobs to M arshall, November 11, 1947, D ept, o f State Records, 895.01/111147; NYT, Novem ber 29,1947, p. 8. 38. Eisenhower to Marshall, Decem ber 3, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 868; Charles E. Saltzman to Marshall, Decem ber 4, 1947, ib id ., 869-870; Marshall to Eisenhower Decem ber 4,1947, ib id ., 870. 39. Taylor m em orandum , Decem ber 8, 1947, Dept, of the Army Records, P&0 091 Korea TS, sec. V, case 31, box 22, RG 31940. NYT, Decem ber 7, 1947, p . 18; Penfield to Hodge, December 11,1947, D ept, of State Records, 895.00/12-1147; Lovett to Langdon, December 11, 1947, FRUS 1947, V1 ,876-877. 41. langdon to Lovett, December 13,1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 877-878; Langdooto Lovett, December 19,1947, D ept, o f State Records, 895.00/12-1947. 42. Langdon to Lovett, December 6, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 871; Lovett to Langdon, December 15, 1947, ib id ., 878; W hitm an to Bunce, December 12, 1947, D ept, o f State Records, 895.00/12-1247. 43. Stairs, The Diplomacy o f Constraint, p. 13; Ray Atherton to Marshall, Decem­ ber 27,1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 880-882; see also Dobbs, The UnwantedSymbol, pp. 120-128. 44. Samuel Reber m em orandum , December 30, 1947, FRUS 1947, VI, 886-887; Lovett to MacKenzie King, December 30,1947, ibid., 883-886. 45. Lovett mem orandum, January 3,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1079-1081. 46. Truman to King, January 5,1948, ib id ., 1081-1083. 47. Edward T. Wailes to Lovett, January 9, 1948, ibid., 1084; King to Human, January 8, 1948, Confidential, State D epartm ent, Documents, 1947-1948, White House Central Files, folder 11, box 35, Truman papers; Stairs, The Diplomacy 0] Constraint, pp. 16-17. 48. Truman to King, January 24,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1086-1087. 4 9 . N Y T January 9,1948, pp. 1,12; N YT, January 10,1948, pp. 18,22. 50. Gordenker, The U nited Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Korea, pp. 50-52. 51. N YT January 10, 1948, p. 14; Marshall to Langdon, January 6,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1083. 52. N Y T January 13,1948, p. 2; N Y T January 14,1948, p. 10; NYT January 18, 1948, IV, p. 10. 53. Jacobs to Marshall, January 24,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1085-1086; N IT Janu­ ary 24,1948, p. 14; D allin, Soviet Russia and the Far East, p. 309. 54. NYT, January 28, 1948, p. 2; Jacobs to Marshall, January 30, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1088-1089. 55. Langdon to Marshall, December 30, 1947, Dept, of State Records, 895 01/ 12-3047. The extreme right quickly resorted to political intimidation to undermine Kim’s efforts at building a moderate coalition. See Langdon to Marshall, January 3, 1948, ibid., 895.00/1-348. By early 1948, Hodge had cabled Washington that Rhee and his followers had brought southern Korea to the brink of total anarchy through the use of terrorism, beatings, extortion, and other tactics “comparable to those of Al Capone in Chicago.” See Hodge toJCS, January 3,1948, ibid., 895.00/1-348.

Notes to Pages 140-145

Z91

56. Kim Ku may have believed sincerely that separate elections would harden the line partitioning Korea. It would seem more likely, however, that the rightist leader had come to recognize that Rhee, after sweeping die elections, would refuse to share power with his former ally. See Jacobs to Marshall, February 10, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1101-1103; Kim, Divided Korea, pp. 79-80. 57. Jacobs to Marshall, January 29, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1087-1088; Jacobs to Marshall, February 2,1948, ibid., 1089-1091. 58. NYT, February 8, 1948, p. 1; NYT, February 11, 1948, p. 10; Jacobs to Marshall, February 8,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1095-1097. 59- Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, p. 66; Jacobs to Marshall, February 9, 1948, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/2-948; Jacobs to Marshall, February 10,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1099-1101. 60. Sawyer and Hermes, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 28-29; White House Meeting, February 18,1948, in MilUs, The ForrestalDiaries, p. 375. 61. Jacobs to Marshall, January 31, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1088-1089; NYT, Feb­ ruary 14,1948, p. 10. 62. Jacobs to Marshall, February 24, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1129-1131; Time, February 23, 1948, p. 34; Dallin, Soviet Russia and the Par East, p. 310; Kim, DividedKorea, pp. 105-106. 63. Leahy, diary entry, February 16, 1948, Diaries 1948-1950, box 6, Leahy papers. 64. Jacobs to Marshall, February 5,6,13,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1093-1095,1109; Goodrich, Korea, p. 50. 65. Jacobs to Marshall, February 12, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1105-1109; Hodge to Marshall, February 14, 1948, ibid., 1110-1113; Langdon to Marshall, February 17, 1948, ibid., 1114-1116. 66. NYT, February 8,1948, IV, p. 10; NYT, February 10,1948, p. 17; NYT, Feb­ ruary 13,1948, p. 20. 67. Marshall to certain diplomatic offices, February 9, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1098-1099; Robert L. Butler to Marshall, February 12,1948, ibid., 1104; Waldemar J. Gallman to Marshall, February 12,1948, ibid., 1105. 68. Marshall to Austin, February 18,1948, ibid., 1116-1117; NYT, February 20, 1948, p .l. 69 . Marshall to Langdon, February 20, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1124; Gordenker, The UnitedNations and the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, p. 70. 70. Marshall to London, February 21, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1124-1125; London to Marshall, February 23, 1948, ibid., 1125n.; Marshall to New Delhi, February 24, 1948, ibid., 1127-1128; New Delhi to Marshall, February 26,1948, ibid., 1128n. 71. Austin to Marshall, February 24-, 1948, ibid., 1128-1129; NYT, February 25, 1948, p. 8. Abstaining were Syria, Colombia, Venezuela, Panama, Egypt, Iraq, Afghanistan, Saudi Arabia, Norway, Denmark, and Sweden. See “Need for Elec­ tions in Korea,” DSB18 (March 7,1948): 297-298; NYT, March 27,1948, p. 1. 72. Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, pp. 71-75; NYT February 27,1948, p. 20. 73. Langdon to Marshall, February 20, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1121-1122; NYT, Match 3,1948, p. 13; Stairs, The Diplomacy o f Constraint, p. 22. 74. NYT, March 2,1948, p. 13; “Korean Elections to Be Held on May 9," DSB 18 (March 14,1948): 344-345. 75. NYT, March 9,1948, p. 12; NYT, Match 10,1948, p. 5; Langdon to Marshall, Match 10, 11, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1146-1149; Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, p. 79.

2.$7.

N otes to Pages 145-148

76. Langdon to M aishall, M atch 12, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1150-1115; Gordenker. The U nited Nations an d the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, pp. 83-85; NYX M atch 13,1948, p . 8. 77. Langdon to M aishall, Match 9, 1948, D ept, o f State Rccotds, 895.00/3-948; M atshall to Langdon, Match 11,1948, ib id ., 895.00/3-1148. 78. Jacobs to M atshall, M atch 24, 1948, ib id ., 501.BB Kotea/3-2448; Jacobs to M atshall, A p ril4 ,1 9 4 8 , ib id ., 895.00/4-448; N YT, A pril4,1948, p. 11. 79. Langdon to M atshall, Match 6 ,1 2 ,1 7 . 25, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1142-1143, 1151, 1155-1158. 80. Jacobs to M atshall, A pril 8, 1948, D ept, o f State Records, 895.00/4-848; Jacobs to M atshall, A pril 14,1948, ib id ., 740.00119 Control (Korea)/4-l448. 81. N YT, A pril 14, 1948, p. 8; Jacobs to Marshall, April 13,1948, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/4-1348; Jam es L. Stewart to Hodge, April 22, 1948, ibid., 895.00/ 4-2248. 82. Jacobs to M atshall, Match 24,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1158-1159; NYT, April 19.1948, p . 3. Hodge anticipated that the Soviets would attempt to use the south’s dependence on electricity from the north as a diplomatic weapon. Even so, he urged W ashington to delay com plete paym ent in electrical equipment, arguing that Mos­ cow would continue to supply electricity to the south as long as it expected to teceive the coveted materials in return. W hile the Army Department approved this pro* posai, it also pressed the Navy D epartm ent to provide power batges for southern Kotea in case o f an emergency. See Dupuy to Notstad, October 2,1947, Dept, ofthe Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. Ill, case 106, box 89, RG 319; Wedemeyer mem orandum , November 26,1947, ib id ., P&O 091 Kotea, sec. IV, cases 50-65, box 87.R G 319. 83. Jacobs to Marshall, March 29, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1162-1163; Jacobs to Marshall, April 5,1948, ib id ., 1169-1170; NYT, March 27,1948, p. 1; Time, April 5.1948, p. 29. 84. Jacobs to Marshall, April 30, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1180; NYT, April 21, 1948, p . 14; NYT, April 22,1948, p . 2. 85. Jacobs to Marshall, April 30, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1184- 1186; Jacobs to Matshall, May 3, 1948, ibid., 1188-1191; NYT, May 1, 1948, p. 1; NYT, May 6, 1948, p. 15; Gordenker, The U nited Nations and the Peaceful Unification of Rone, p. 311; Paige, “Korea,” p. 225. 86. Jacobs to Marshall, May 7, 1948, D ept, o f State Records, 895.00/5-748; Time, May 17,1948, p. 33; D ept, o f State, Korea 1945 to 1948, p. 15; Henderson, Korea, p. 157; D allin, Soviet Russia an d the Far East, pp. 311-312; McCune and Grey, Korea Today, pp. 227-228. 87. Jacobs to Marshall, April 27, 1948, D ept, o f State Records, 895.00/4-2748; N YT, April 28, 1948, p. 17; Henderson, Korea, p. 156; Stairs, The Diplômée} of Constraint, p. 25. 88. McCune and Grey, Korea Today, pp. 228-230; Gordenker, The United N ationsand the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, pp. 92-93. 89- Jacobs to Marshall, April 27, 1948, D ept, of State Records, 895.00/4-2748; C. Clyde Mitchell, “Land Reform in South Korea," Pacific Affairs 22 (June 1949): 151; W. D. Reeve, The Republic o f Korea: A Political and Economic Study, p. 31; Weems, “Behind the Korean Elections,” p . 142. 90. Gordenker, The U nited Nations and the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, p. 98; Allen, Korea'sSyngman Rhee, p . 94. 91. Jacobs to Marshall, April 27, 28, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1182-1184; “U.N. Temporary Commission to Observe Elections in South Kotea,” DSB 18 (May 30,

Notes to Pages 148-152

z 93

1948): 700; G ordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, p. 105. 92. Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, pp. 88, 95-96; see also Hodge to Marshall, April 8, 1948, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/4-848. 93. Jacobs to Marshall, May 12, 1948, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/5-1248; NIT May 11,1948, p. 11; NYT, May 22,1948, p. 14; Yoo, The Korean War and the UnitedNations, p. 19; Caldwell, The Korea Story, p. 37. 94. Jacobs to Marshall, May 10, 13, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1192, 1195-1197; Jacobs to Marshall, May 12, 1948, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/5-1248; NYT, May 10,1948, p. 1; Henderson, Korea, pp. 217-218; Kim, Divided Korea, p. 81; McCune and Grey, Korea Today, p. 229. Incredibly, Soon-sung Cho points to the South Korean elections as a clear indication of political maturity; see Cho, Korea in WorldPolitics, p. 208. 95. \bng-jeung Kim, “The Cold War: The Korean Elections,” Far Eastern Survey 17 (May 5,1948): 101-102; see also U.S. News, May 7, 1948, p. 19; NYT, May 3, 1948. p. 20. 96. George C. Marshall, “Korean People Congratulated on Election,” DSB 18 (May 30,1948): 700; see also NYT, May 10,1948, p. 20. 97. Gilchrist memorandum, May 19,1948, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. I, case 1, pt. III-A, box 20, RG 319; Lawson memorandum, May 25, 1948, ibid.; NYT, May 21,1948, p. 7. 98. Dept, of State, North Korea, p. 11; see also Commonweal, February 13,1948, p. 447; Kolko, The Politics o f War, p. 604.

CHAPTER 7: The D ilem m a o f W ithdrawal

1. Cho, Korea in World Politics, p. 244; Ferrell, George C. Marshall, pp. 248249; Goodrich, Korea, pp. 70, 95; Kim, Divided Korea, pp. 74-75; Henderson, Korea, pp. 149-150; Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification ofKorea, p. 5. 2. Russell D. Buhite, “ ‘Major Interests': American Policy Tbward China, Taiwan, and Korea, 1945-1950,” Pacific Historical Review 47 (August 1978): 444-446; Gad­ dis, “Korea in American Politics, Strategy, and Diplomacy,” p. 283. 3. Schuyler to Blum, January 2,1948, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. XIV, RG 218; “Chronology of Action by the National Security Council,” Elsey papers. 4. Memorandum for Wedemeyer, November 24, 1947, Dept, of the Army Rec­ ords, P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. Ill, cases 3-15, RG 319; Schuyler to Arnold, Decem­ ber 30,1947, ibid., P&O 091 Korea, sec. V, RG 319. 5. Seedlock memorandum, January 31,1948, ibid., P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. Ill, cases 3-15, RG 319; Maddocks memorandum, February 9, 1948, ibid., CSA 091 Korea TS, RG 335. 6. Butterworth to Marshall, March 4, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1137-1139; Allison memorandum, March 5, 1948, ibid., 1139-1141; see also Niles Bond, December 28, 1973, Oral History Interview Thuiscript, p. 34, Truman Library; Allison, Ambassador from the Prairie, pp. 120-121. 7. Cabinet Meeting notes, March 12, 1948, Notes on Cabinet Meetings (January 9-December 31, 1948), Post Presidential File (Set I), box 1, Matthew J. Connelly papers.

2-94

Notes to Pages

8. Biddle to W edemeyer, March 5, 1948, D ept, o f the Army Records, P&O091 Korea TS, sec. Ill, cases 3-15, box 21, RG 319; Herbert D rub, Harry S. Trumenmd the Russians 1945-1953, p . 226. 9- W arner R. Schilling, “H ie Politics o f N ational Defense: Fiscal 1950," in Warner R. Schilling, Paul Y. H am m ond, and G lenn H. Snyder, eds., Strategy, Politics end Defense Budgets, p . 41. 10. Army to MacArthur, March 18, 1948, D ept, of the Army Records, P&O091 Korea TS, sec. I, case 1, box 20, RG 319; “ Chronology of Action by the National Security Council,“ Elsey papers. 11. Sidney Souers to H um an, A pril 2, 1948, FRUS1948, VI, 1163-1169- Secre­ tary o f the Army K enneth C. Royall was responsible for adding the qualifying phrase “ so far as practicable.” Also, the JCS doubted whether there was enough time to build a viable South Korean constabulary army. See “ Chronology of Action by the N ational Security Council,” Elsey papers. 12. Ib id .; Leahy, diary entry, January 8, 1948, Diaries 1948-1950, box 6, Leahy papers. 13. Percy H. Johnston, Paul G . Hoffman, Robert F. Lorec, and Sidney H. Scheuet, U.S. Army Com m ittee Report, April 26, 1948, Economic Position and Prospects of Japan and Korea and Measures Required to Improve Them, U.S. Department ofthe Army. 14. Seedlock m em orandum , April 16, 1948, D ept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. IV, cases 16-30, box 22, RG 319; Lovett to Jacobs, April 16,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1179-1180. 15. Wedemeyer to J . Lawton Collins, March 5,1948, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. I, case 1 only, p t. II-A , RG 319; Timberman to Collins, March 11,1948, ibid.; Army to MacArthur and Hodge, March 18,1948, ibid., pt. I; Hodge to MacArthur, April 19,1948, ib id ., p t. II-B. 16. U.S. D ept, o f Commerce, “Economic Review o f the Republic of Korea,” International Reference Service 6 (June 1949): 1-5; U.S. News, February 6,1948, p. 67; Mitchell, Korea, pp. 24-27. 17. D ept, of Commerce, “Economic Conditions in South Korea, 1947,” p. 1; Weems, “ Behind the Korean Elections,” p. 145; Cho, Korea in World Politics, p. 235; Mitchell, “Land Reform in South Korea," p. 144; McCune and Grey, Kont Today, p. 133. 18. Jacobs to Marshall, May 22,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1203-1204; NYT, May 14, 1948, p. 1; NYT, June 16, 1948, p. 17; NYT, June 18, 1948, p. 51; “U.S. Urges Soviet Command to Resume Electric Power to South Korea,” DSB19 (July 11, 1948): 50-51. 19. Jacobs to Marshall, June 2, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1214-1215; Marshall to Smith, June 24, 1948, ib id ., 1127-1129; Smith to Marshall, July 21, 1948, ibid., 1252-1253. 20. Bunce to Marshall, July 22, 1948, ib id ., 1254; Jacobs to Marshall, August 7, 1948, ibid., 1268; “U.S. Proposals Regarding Resumption of Delivery of Electric Power to South Korea,” DSB 19 (August 1,1948): 147-148. 21. Bunce to Marshall, May 15,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1198-1199; NYT, May 17, 1948, p. 18; Time, May 17, 1948, p. 33; D ept, of State, Korea 1943 to 1948, pp. 35-36; Paige, “Korea,” p. 225. W hile the administration fully expected the North Korean regime to shut off electric power, it also recognized that a prolonged reliance on emergency power barges for electricity “would be neither economical nor practical for the Korean economy.” See Wedemeyer memorandum, November 26, 1947, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. IV, cases 50-65, box 87, RG 319; Wedemeyer memorandum, May 4,1948, ibid.

Notes to Pages 156-160

195

22. NYX May 29, 1948, p. 4; Jacobs to Maishall, May 19, 1948, FRUS1948, VI, 1201- 1202 .

23. John R. Hodge, “Suggestions to Korean Assembly on Formation of New Gov­ ernment,” DSB18 (June 20,1948): 800. 24. Lovett to Draper, May 19,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1200-1201. 23. William J. Sebald to Benninghoff, May 10, 1948, Dept, of State Records, 501.BB Korea/5-1048; Jacobs to Marshall, June 17, 1948, ibid., 895.00/6-1748; “Temporary Commission Resolution,” DSB 18 (June 20,1948): 800. 26. Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, pp. 128-129, 139-140; Marshall to Jacobs, June 4, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1215-1216; Jacobs to Marshall, June 11,1948, ibid., 1218-1219. 27. Hodge to Marshall, June 28, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1229-1230; N IT June 27.1948, p. 12. 28. Jacobs to Marshall. June 30, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1231-1232; Jacobs to Marshall, July 7,1948, ibid., 1233-1234; A ftT June 30, 1948, p. 13; NY% July 1, 1948, pp. 12,22. 29- NYT, July 14, 1948, p. 22; Jacobs to Marshall, July 26, 1948, Dept, of State Records, 895.01/7-2648; Dept, of Sate, Korea 1943 to 1948, pp. 17-18; Paul S. Dull, “South Korean Constitution,” Far Eastern Survey 17 (September 8, 1948): 205-207. 30. Marshall to Human, April 27,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1183-1184; John J. Muccio, February 10, 1971, Oral History Interview Hanscript, pp. 5-6, Human Library; Seedlock to Wedemeyer, March 15, 1948, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. Ill, cases 3-15, box 21, RG 319. 31. Buttetworth to Lovett, May 11, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1192-1194; Gilchrist memorandum, May 13, 1948, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. Ill, cases 16-30, box 22, RG 319. 32. NYT, May 21, 1948, p. 7; Lawson memorandum, June 9, 1948, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. V, case 66, box 88, RG 319; Royall to Marshall, June 23,1948, ibid., P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. Ill, cases 3-15, box 21, RG 319; Saltzman to Lovett, July 30,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1265. 33. Marshall to Royall, June 23, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1224-1225; Lovett to Royall.July 8,1948, ibid., 1234-1235. 34. Hodge to General Omar N. Bradley, June 17, 1948, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. V, case 65, box 88, RG 319; Jacobs to Marshall, July 9, 1948, Dept, of State Records, 501.BB Korea/7-948; Marshall to certain embassies, July 10,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1235-1237. 35. Smith to Marshall, June 30, 1948, FRUS 1948, VII, 326-327; Smith to Marshall, July 14,1948, ibid., VI, 1240. 36. Jacobs to Marshall, July 11,1948, ibid., VI, 1238-1239; NYT, July 12, 1948, p. 10. 37. Jacobs to Marshall, July 25, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1259-1261; Marshall to Jacobs, July 27, 1948, ibid., 1263-1264; Buttetworth memorandum, August 2., 1948, Dept, of State Records, 501 .BB Korea/8-248. 38. Hodge to Marshall, April 8,1948, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. XV, RG 218; Hodge to MacArthur, May 17, 1948, Private Correspondence, VIP file, folder 73, box 5, RG 10, MacArthur papers. 39. Jacobs to Marshall, July 18, 1948, Dept, of State Records, 501.BB Korea/71848; Jacobs to Marshall, July 27,1948, ibid., 895.01A/7-2748. 40. A m ;July 20,1948, p. 12; NYT, July 2 7 ,1948, p. 14. 41. Gaddis, “Korea in American Politics, Strategy, and Diplomacy,” p. 279. 42. Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol, pp. 29, 111, 194; Cho, Korea in World Poli-

z$6

Notes to Pages 161-166

tics, pp. 134-136; Kim, D ivided Korea, pp. 74-7$; Dallin, Soviet RussiaandtheFer East, pp. 298-299; Henderson, Korea, p. 121. 43. Cumings, The Origins o f the Korean War, pp. 135-136,184-185,439-440; Joyce Kolko and Gabriel Kolko, The Limits o f Power: The Worldand UnitedStetes Foreign Policy, 1945-1934, p . 277; Halliday, “H ie United Nations and Korea,” pp. 109-110. 44. Jacobs to Marshall, A ugust 16,1948, D ept, of State Records, 895.00/8-1648; H enderson, Korea, pp. 160-161; Kim, D ivided Korea, pp. 119-120; Reeve, The Republic o f Korea, p . 29. 45. Jacobs to Marshall, A ugust 6, 10, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1266-1268,1270; Jacobs to Marshall, A ugust 2, 1948, D ept, o f State Records, 895.00/8-248; NYT, A ugust 6,1948, p. 4; NYT, August 10,1948, p. 12. 46. Jacobs to Marshall, August 12, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1272; Hodge to JCS, A ugust 12,1948, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. XVI, RG 218. 47. H .A .B. to Schuyler, A ugust 9, 1948, D ept, of the Army Records, P&O091 Korea TS, sec. V, case 31, box 22, RG 31948. Schuyler m em orandum , August 9,1948, ibid. 49. Lawton to Truman, August 16,1948, OF 471, Truman papers; Truman to lawton, August 16, 1948, ib id .; C.V.R.S. to Schuyler, August 20, 1948, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. V, case 31, box 22, RG 319; see also Truman, diary entry, April 3,1948, in Ferrell, O ff the Record, p. 129. 50. Lawton to H um an, n .d ., OF 471, H um an papers; Human to Marshall, August 25, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1288-1289; Philander P. Claxton, September 1, 1948, D ept, o f State Records, 895.50 Recovery/9-148. 51. Saltzman m em orandum , September 7, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1292-1298; Marshall to Paul G. Hoffm an, September 17, 1948, ibid., 1303-1305; Hoffman to Marshall, October 1, 1948, ib id ., 1312-1313. 52. Jessup to Marshall, July 26, 1948, ib id ., 1262-1263; Marshall to Jessup, July 27,1948, ib id ., 1263-1264. 53. Lovett to H um an, July 28, 1948, ib id ., 1264; “Policy Toward New Korean Government,“ D SB 19 (August 22,1948): 242; NYT, August 13,1948, p. 1. 54. NYT, August 15, 1948, p . 1; NYT, August 15, 1948, IV, p. 8; U.S. News, August 6,1948, p. 20; Time, August 23,1948, p. 24. 55. Hum an to Hodge, June 23,1948, PPF 3920, Human papers. 56. Sawyer and Hermes, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 31-32,35. 57. Butterworth memorandum, August 17,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1276-1278. 58. JCS to MacArthur for Hodge, August 27, 1948, JCS Records, CCS 383-21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. XVII, RG 218; Wedemeyer to Forrestal, August 30, 1948, D ept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. I, case 1, pt. Ill— B, RG 319. 59- NYT, August 29,1948, p. 7. Hagically, Hodge continued to experience bitter frustration after his departure from Korea. Upon his return to Washington, he found that the Army Departm ent did not intend to give him a new assignment and even wanted to withhold one o f his distinguished service medals. See Hodge to MacAr­ thur, September 11, 1948, Private Correspondence, VIP file, folder 73, box 5, RG 10, MacArthur papers. 60. Jacobs to Marshall, August 18,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1279-1281; Marshall to Austin, August 20, 1948, ibid., 1284; Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, pp. 141-142. 61. Stuart to Marshall, August 13, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1272-1273; Lewis Douglas to Marshall, August 13,1948, ibid., 1273; Lester Pearson to Julian F. Har­ rington, August 13,1948, ibid., 1274-1275; Howard Donovan to Marshall, August 14,1948, ibid., 1276; Otsen N. Nielson to Marshall, August 18,1948, ibid., 1281.

Notes to Pages 166-171

2-97

62. Jacobs to Maishall, August 18, 1948, ibid., 1282-1283; Hodge to Marshall, August 19,1948, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. XVI, RG 218. 63. Hodge to Marshall, August 18,1948, JCS Records, Leahy file, Korea 1948, RG 218; Hodge to State, August 21, 1948, ibid., CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. XVI, RG 218; NYT, August 24,1948, pp. 6-7. 64. "Military and Security Measures Effective Until Completion of Withdrawal of United States Forces from Korea,” Treaties and Other InternationalActs, Series 1918; Jacobs to Marshall, August 24,1948, FRUS1948, VI, 1287; NYT, August 25, 1948, p. 14. 65. JohnJ. Muccio to Marshall, September 3, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1287; NYT, September 3,1948, p. 12. 66. NYT, September 1, 1948, p. 7; NYT, September 11, 1948, p. 4; Dept, of State, Korea 1945 to 1948, p. 21; Berger, The Korean Knot, p. 82; Kim, Divided Korea, pp. 107-108,166-168. 67. Foy D. Kohler to Marshall, September 19,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1306; "Posi­ tion on Withdrawing Occupying Forces From Korea,” DSB 19 (October 3, 1948): 440; “Position on Withdrawal of Hoops from Korea,” DSB 19 (October 10, 1948): 456; Human, Years o f Trialand Hope, p. 328. 68. NYT September 20,1948, pp. 1, 24; NYT, September 21,1948, p. 16; NYT, September 25,1948, p. 16; Time, September 27,1948, p. 32; Yoo, The Korean War andthe United Nations, p. 22. 69. Hodge to Coulter, September 17,1948, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. V, case 65, box 88, RG 31970. Lovett memorandum, September 23, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1309-1311; Marshall memorandum, October 13,1948, ibid., 1314-1315. 71. NYT, October 21, 1948, p. 1; NYT, October 25, 1948, p. 12; Muccio to Marshall, October 28,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1317-1318; Time, November 1,1948, p. 34. 72. Lieutenant Colonel John C. O ’Byme memorandum, November 15, 1948, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. V, case 65, box 88, RG 319; NYT, October 21,1948, p. 26; Time, November 8,1948, pp. 32-33. 73. O'Byme memorandum; NYT, October 22, 1948, pp. 1, 10; NYT, October 26,1948, p. 12; NYT, October 27, 1948, pp. 9, 26; Life, November 15, 1948, pp. 55-58; Time, November 1, 1948, p. 34; Sawyer and Hetmes, Military Advisors in Korea, p. 40. 74. NYT, November 6,1948, p. 6; Henderson, Korea, pp. 162-164. 75. NYT, October 25, 1948, p. 12; Muccio to Marshall, November 16, 1948, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/11-1648. 76. Muccio to Marshall, October 26, 1948, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/102648; Muccio to Marshall, November 4, 1948, ibid., 895.00/11-448; Muccio to Marshall, November 12,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1325-1327. 77. Jacobs to Bond, October 22,1948, Dept, of State Records, 501.BB Korea/102248; Jacobs to Marshall, October 18,1948, ibid., 501.BB Korea/10-1848; Jacobs to Bond, October 27,1948, ibid., 501.BBKorea/10-2748. 78. NYT, November 10, 1948, p. 15; NYT, November 13, 1948, p. 6; Muccio to Marshall, November 19, 1948, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/11-1948; Muccio to Marshall, November 9,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1323. 79. Muccio to Marshall, November 5, 19, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1320-1321, 1331-1332; Rhee to MacArthur, November 29, 1948, Private Correspondence, VIP file, folder 43, box 8, RG 10, MacArthur papers. Representatives in the legislative assembly joined Rhee in pleading for a postponement of American withdrawal and overwhelmingly passed a resolution requesting a continuation of the occupation.

z$8

Notes to Pages 17I-W

Prime M inister Yi Pöm-sök castigated the United States in public for stripping its forces to an unacceptable level in preparation for withdrawal on a moment's notice. Thus the South Koreans were able to unite, but only in demanding a greater com­ m itm ent o f m ilitary protection from the Hum an administration. See NYT, Novem­ ber 21, 1948, p . 30; NYT, November 23, 1948, p. 22; NYT, November 24, 1948, p. 3; Muccio to Marshall, November 19, 1948, FRUS1948, VI, 1332-1333; Mudoto Marshall, December 17,1948, D ept, o f State Records, 895.00/12-1748. 80. Claxton m em orandum , October 29, 1948, Dept, of State Records, 501.BB K orea/10-2948; Saltzman to Wedemeyer, November 4,1948, ibid., 501.BB Korea/ 11-448; Lovett to Marshall, November 5, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1319; Saltzman to Wedemeyer, November 9, 1948, ib id ., 1324; JCS to MacArthur, November 1), 1948, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. XVIII, RG 218; JCS memo­ randum , n .d ., ibid.; see also Bond, December 28, 1973, Oral History Interview Transcript, pp. 30-31; U. Alexis Johnson, January 19,1975, Oral History Intetviev Transcript, p. 35, H um an Library. 81. Forrestal m em orandum , October 5,1948, in Millis, The ForrestalDiaries, pp. 498-499; Leahy, diary entry, November 5, 1948, Diaries 1948—1950, box 6, Leahy papers; Frank Pace, Jr., January 22, 1972, Oral History Interview Hanscript, pp. 3334, H um an Library; H um an, Years o f Trial and Hope, p. 40; Ferrell, George C. Marshall, pp. 242-245; Schilling, “The Politics o f National Defense," pp. 191-193, 197-198. 82. Forrestal to W alter G. Andrews, December 13, 1948, in Millis, The Forrestal Diaries, pp. 536-538; Buhite, “ 'M ajor Interests’,” p. 444. 83. Colonel A. T. MacNamara mem orandum , November 8, 1948, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. V, case 65, box 88, RG 319. 84. E. B. Eichholz to Claxton, November 15, 1948, Dept, of State Records, FW 895.50 Recovery / 11-1548. 85. Seedlock m em orandum , January 31, 1948, Dept, of the Army Records, P&0 091 Korea TS, sec. Ill, cases 3-15, box 21, RG 319; U.S. Congress, House, Commit­ tee on A ppropriations, Background Information on Korea; Dept, of State, Korea 1945 to 1948, p. 39. 86. U.S. D ept, o f State, "Economic Cooperation with Korea Under Public Law 793~80th,” Treaties and Other International Acts, Series 1908; NYT, December 11, 1948, p. 1; NYT, December 14, 1948, p. 25; NYT, December 17, 1948, p. 10. 87. Christian Century, January 12,1948, p. 36; NYT, December 19,1948, p. 12. 88. Muccio to Marshall, December 18, 1948, D ept, of State Records, 895.00/121848; Coulter for Muccio to Marshall, December 20,1948, ibid., 501.BB Korea/122048. 89. Folk memorandum, December 24, 1948, D ept, of the Army Records, P&0 092, sec. X, case 139, RG 31990. NYT, December 25,1948, p. 2. 91. Owen T. Jones to Marshall, September 15, 1948, Dept, of State Records, 895.01/9-1548; Channing Liem, “U nited States Rule in Korea,” Far Eastern Survey 18 (April 6,1949): 77-80; NYT, August 24,1948, p. 6. CHAPTER 8: Test Case o f Containm ent

1. Adler, The Isolationist Impulse, pp. 370, 403; Human, Years o f Trial end Hope, p. 238; George M. Elsey, July 10,1969, Oral History Interview Transcript, pp. 143-145, Human Library.

Notes to Pages 175-181

2-99

2. Athan Theoharis, “The Rhetoric of Politics,” in Bernstein, Politics and Policies ofthe Truman Administration, pp. 210-211; Graebner, “Global Containment,” pp. 79-80. 3. McGeorge Bundy, ed., The Pattern o f Responsibility, p. 22; Smith, Dean Acheson, p. 16; Norman A. Graebner, “Dean G. Acheson (1949-1933)," in Graebner, An Uncertain Tradition, p. 269. 4. Truman, Years o f Trialand Hope, p. 330. 5. Rusk to Lovett, September 10,1948, FRUS1948, VI, 1299-1300; Don C. Bliss to Marshall, September 11, 1948, ibid., 1302; Bond memorandum, September 14, 1948, ibid., 1300-1301. 6. U.S. United Nations position paper, October 22, 1948, ibid., 1313-1316; But* terworth to Lovett, November 3, 1948, ibid., 1319; Jacobs to Bond, October 18, 1948, Dept, of State Records, 301.BB Korea/10-1848. 7. “The United Sûtes in the United Nations,” DSB19 (November 7, 1948): 576; Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, pp. 141142. 8. NYT, November 3,1948, p. 6; Marshall to Lovett, November 16, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1327-1330; “The United Sûtes in the United Nations,” DSB 19 (Novem­ ber 21,1948): 637. 9. NYT, November 30,1948, p. 26; NYT, December 4,1948, p. 2. 10. Dulles to Marshall, December 6, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1335; NYT, Decem­ ber?, 1948, p. 17. 11. John Foster Dulles, “U.S. Urges Continuation of Temporary Commission on Korea,” DSB 19 (December 19,1948): 758-760; NYT, December 8,1948, p. 22. 12. Dulles to Marshall, December 9, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1336; “The United States in the United Nations,” DSB 19 (December 12,1948): 728. 13. Dulles to Marshall, December 12, 1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1336-1337; NYT, December 10,1948, p. 24. 14. NYT, December 8, 1948, p. 30; NYT, December 13, 1948, p. 3; Dulles to Marshall, December 13,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1337. 15. Berger, The Korean Knot, pp. 84, 88-89; see also Muccio to Marshall, Decem­ ber 13,1948, Dept, of Sute Records, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/12-848. 16. Sawyer and Hermes, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 36-37; Time, January 10, 1949, p. 19; NYT, December 30,1948, p. 3; NYT, January 15,1949, p. 5. 17. Duper to Saltzman, December 22,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1341-1343; Zierath memorandum, January 6, 1949, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. V, case 31, box 22, RG 319. 18. NYT, December 31,1948, p. 4; Muccio to Acheson, January 6,1949, Dept, of Sute Records, 895.00/1-64919. Max Bishop to Butterworth, December 17,1948, FRUS 1948, VI, 1337-1340; J. Leighton Stuart to Marshall, December 29,1948, FRUS 1948, VII, 695. 20. Army Department memorandum, January 10, 1949, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. I, cases 5-16, box 162, RG 319; W. A. Rudlin memorandum, January 19, 1949, Dept, of Sute Records, 501.BB Korea/1-1949; Coulter to JCS, January 11, 1949, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. XIX, RG 218; Butterworth to Lovett, January 10,1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2, 942943. 21. Saltzman to Duper, January 25,1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2,944-945. Ache­ son wanted to discuss only the political and military aspects of formulating a new position on Korea while avoiding the specific issue of withdnwal. See Acheson to Royall, January 25, 1949, Background file, Department of Sute, PSF-Korean War Documents, box 1, Truman papers.

300

N otes to Pages 181-186

22. M acA rthur to JC S, January 19, 1949, D ept, o f the Army Records, P&O 091 K orea TS, sec. V, case 31, box 22, RG 319. 23. Ib id .; Army D epartm ent m em orandum , January 10, 1949, ibid., P&O 091 K orea TS, sec. I, cases 5-16, box 162, RG 319; N YT, March 2, 1949, p. 22; seed» Ridgway, The Korean War, p . 12. 24. N Y T , January 1 ,1 9 4 9 , p . 4; m em orandum o f conversation, January 5, 1949, FRU S1949, VII, p t. 2,94 0 -9 4 1 . 25. N Y T , February, 5, 1949, p. 5; N Y T , February 9, 1949, p. 15; Army Depart­ m ent m em orandum , February 8 ,1 9 4 9 , D ept, o f the Army Records, CSA 091 Korea TS, RG 335; T hunan, Years o f Trial a n d H ope, p. 329. 26. RoyaU m em orandum , February 8, 1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2, 956-958; Muccio m em orandum , February 25,1949, ib id ., 958-959. 27. Army D epartm ent m em orandum , February 8, 1949, Dept, of the Army Records, CSA 091 Korea TS, RG 335. 28. N S C -8 /1, March 16,1949, ib id ., P& O 091 Korea, sec. I-A.RG319. 29. Ib id .; see also Royall to Acheson, January 25,1949, ibid., P&O 091 Korea TS, box 163, RG 319. 30. N S C -8 /2, Match 22, 1949, FRUS 1949, VII, p t. 2, 969-978; “Chronology of Action by the N ational Security Council,“ Elsey papers. In approving NSC-8/2, the Truman adm inistration merely reaffirm ed a commitment to implement a program for economic aid and technical advice for Korea that it had initially begun to consider early in 15)47. Lewis McCarroll Purifoy is therefore incorrect when he contends that it was the emergence o f McCarthyism early in 1950 that caused the State Department to make “ plans to provide various forms o f assistance to small states on China's periphery, particularly Korea . . . . by way o f demonstrating to critics that the departm ent was as determ ined to ‘stop the expansion o f Communism’ in Asia as in Europe.” See Purifoy, Harry Trum an’s China Policy: McCarthyism and the Diplo­ macy o f H ysteria, 1947-1921, pp. 149-150. 31. Maddocks to Army C hief o f Staff, March 7,15)49, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. I, box 163, RG 319; Maddocks to Secretary of the Army, March 22,1949, ibid. ; Sawyer and Hermes, M ilitary Advisors in Korea, p. 38. While accepting the revisions in N S C -8 /1, Acheson emphasized in discussions with Hu­ m an’s other top advisors that “the success o f the policy set forth therein may well be dependent upon the adequacy o f the transfer o f military equipment and supplies . . . in furnishing the Korean Government with effective security forces equipped » fill im mediately the gap left by the withdrawal o f U.S. occupation forces and to bridge the critical period until m ilitary assistance to be provided under pending leg­ islation begins to flow.” See NSC Meeting m inutes, March 22, 1949, NSC Meetings 28-37 (December 2, 1948-April 7, 1949), PSF-National Security Council Docu­ m ents, box 205, Truman papers. 32. “U nited States Recognizes Republic o f Korea,” DSB 20 (January 9,1949): 5960; N YT, January 2,1949, p . 1. 33. Muccio to Acheson, February 9, 1949, D ept, of State Records, 501.BB K orea/2-949; John P. G ardiner m em orandum , February 7, 1949, FRUS 1949, VII, p t. 2,953-955. 34. N YT, February 13,1949, p. 47; N YT, February 19,1949, p. 4; Seoul»Ache­ son, February 15,1949, D ept, o f State Records, 501. BB Korea/2-1549. 35. Muccio to Marshall, December 7, 15)48, D ept, o f State Records, 895.00/12748; Seoul to Acheson, February 18,1949, ib id ., 501.BB Korea/2-1849; NYT, Feb­ ruary 22, 15)49, p.3; Gordenker, The U nited N ations a n d the Peaceful Unification of Korea, p. 153.

Notes to Pages 186-191

301

36. Everett F. Drumright to Acheson, February 12 ,1949, FRUS1949, VII, pt. 2 , 960- 961. 37. Gregory Henderson memorandum. Match 7, 1949, Dept, of State Records, 501.BB Korea/3-749; David Mark memorandum, March 12 , 1949, ibid., 501.BB Korea/3-1249; Muccio to Acheson, April 18, 1949, ibid., 895.00/4-1849; Gotdenker, The UnitedNations and the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, pp. 155-156. 38. NYT, February 3 ,1949, p. 12; NYT, February 12 ,1949, p. 13; NYT, February 17.1949. pp- 3, 22 ; “Korean Membership in the United Nations,” DSB 20 (Febru­ ary 20,1949): 227; “The United States in the United Nations,” DSB 20 (February 27,1949): 253-254. 39. “The United States in the United Nations,” DSB 20 (April 17,1949): 492. 40. Drumright to Acheson, Match 17, 1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2 , 967. The Young Group also opposed the Korean-American Financial and Property Settlement and Rhee’s plan to give the United States the Banto Hotel for its embassy. See Drumright to Acheson, February 11 ,1949. Dept, of State Records, 740.00119 Con­ trol (Korea)/2-l 149. 41. Drumright to Acheson, February 11 ,1949, enclosures, Dept, of State Records, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/2-U49. 42. Muccio to Acheson, February 26,1949. ibid., 895.01/2-2649. 43. NYT, Match 13,1949, p. 52; Acheson memorandum, March 24,1949, Dept, of State Records, 895.20 Missions/3-2449. 44. Drumright to Acheson, March 15, 1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2 , 966 ; Drumright to Acheson, March 14,1949, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/3-1449. 45. Acheson to Seoul, April 5, 1949, Dept, of State Records, 895.20 Missions/4549. 46. Muccio to Acheson, April 5,1949, ibid., 740.00119 Control (Kotea)/4-549; Muccio to Acheson, April 9 , 12 ,1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2 , 981 - 982 ,986-987. 47. Gardiner memorandum, April 6 , 1949. Dept, of State Records, 501.BB Kotea/4-649; memorandum of conversation, April 8 , 1949, ibid., 740.00119 Con­ trol (Kotea)/4-849. 48. Muccio to Acheson, April 14,1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2,988; Rhee to Muc­ cio, April 14,1949, ibid., 990-991; Acheson to Muccio, April 15,1949, ibid., 992; Muccio to Acheson, April 16,1949, ibid., 992 n. 49. Butterworth to Acheson, April 18, 1949, ibid., 992-993; NYT, April 19, 1949, pp. 1,24; Muccio to Acheson, April 18,1949, Dept, of State Records, 501.BB Korea/4-1849. 50. Muccio to Acheson, April 30 ,1949, Dept, of State Records, 895.001 Rhee/43049; Muccio to Acheson, May 7 ,1949, ibid., 501.BB Korea/5-749; NYT, April 30, 1949, p. 4; NYT, May 7 ,1949, p. 4; Muccio to Acheson, April 26,1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2 ,995-997. 51. Acheson to Muccio, April 28 ,1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2 , 997-998; Muccio to Acheson, May 2 , 1949, ibid., 1000-1003; “Korean Military Advisory Group Established,” DSB 20 (June 19,1949): 786-787; see also NYT, May 8 ,1949, p. 29. 52. Muccio memorandum. May 2 ,1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2,1003-1005. 53. Muccio to Acheson, May 7 ,1949, ibid., 1011- 1012 ; Acheson to Muccio, May 9.1949, ibid., 1014-1016; Acheson to Muccio, May 9,1949, Dept, of State Records, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/5-949; Muccio to Acheson, June 13, 1949. ibid., 895.00/6-1349. 54. Muccio to Acheson, May 9, 12, 1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2 , 1013, 10211022; Muccio memorandum, May 10,1949, ibid., 1016-1018. 55. Muccio to Acheson, April 29, 1949, ibid., 998-999; Muccio to Acheson, May

N otes to Pages 192-199 3, 1949. ib id ., 1005-1006; Louis A. Johnson to Acheson, May 4,1949, ibid., 1007; Lawson to Secretary o f th e Army, April 29, 1949, D ept, of the Army Records, P&0 091 Korea TS, sec. I-A , bk. 2 , box 163, RG 319. 5 6 . Muccio to Acheson, May 6 , 1 1 , 1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2 , 1008-1009, 1018-1019; Acheson to Johnson, May 10 ,1949, ib id ., 1016. 57. G ordon Gray to Acheson, A pril 29,1949, ibid., 999; Acheson to Muccio, May 9, 1949, ib id ., 1014-1015; Butterworth to Maddocks, May 13, 1949, ibid., 10221023; Muccio to Acheson, May 13, 1949, D ept, o f State Records, 501.BB Korea/51349. 58. Muccio to Acheson, May 17,1949. FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2 , 1029- 1030. 59. Muccio to Acheson, May 19, 2 0 ,1949, ibid., 1030-1031,1033-1034; memo­ randum o f conversation, May 2 1 , 1949, D ept, o f State Records, 740.00119 Control (K orea)/5-2149. 60. N YT, May 29, 1949, p. 17; Muccio to Acheson, June 3,1949, Dept, of State Records, 740.00119 Control (K orea)/6-349. 61. Muccio to Acheson, May 26, 1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2 , 1034-1035; John C. Ross to Acheson, Ju n e 1 ,1949, ib id ., 1036-1037; memorandum of conveisadoo, June 4 , 1949, D ept, o f State Records, 740.00119 Control (Korea)/6-449; Rheeto MacArthur, May 2 2 , 1949, Private Correspondence, VIP file, folder 43, box 9, RG 1 0 , MacArthur papers. 62. Muccio to Acheson, May 31, 1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2 , 1035- 1036;James E. W ebb to Muccio, June 3,1949, ib id ., 1037-1038. 63. Muccio to Acheson, June 6 , 1949, ibid., 1039; Muccio to Acheson, June 7, 1949, D ept, o f State Records, 501.BB K orea/6-749; Drumright to Acheson, July 5, 1949, ib id ., 895.00/7-549. For a detailed discussion of Rhee’s maneuvers regard­ ing the form ation o f a "Pacific Pact,” see Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol, pp. 171175. 64. Army D epartm ent mem orandum , June 27, 1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2, 1046-1057. Muccio already had recommended that American warships should visit South Korea periodically as a show of concern. O n July 8 , 1949, a cruiser and two destroyers arrived at Pusan for a three-day “goodwill visit.” See Boite memorandum, June 2 3 , 1949, D ept, o f the Army Records, CSA 091 Korea TS, RG 335; NYT, July 9,1949, p. 5. 65. Army D epartm ent m em orandum , July 27,1949,1052-1054. 6 6 . Ibid., 1054. 67. Ibid., 1054-1055. 6 8 . Ibid., 1055-1057; see also JCS to CSA, June 23, 1949. JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. XX, RG 218. 6 9 . “U.S. Policy Toward Korea,” D SB 20 (June 19, 1949); 781. The human adm inistration also subm itted to Congress a request for nearly $2 million to finance “ an inform ational, cultural, educational and exchange o f persons program” for the ROK. See Webb to Souets, June 6 , 1949, NSC Meeting 36-March 22 ,1949, NSC Meetings 28-37 (December 2, 1948-April 7, 1949), PSF-National Security Council Documents, box 205, Truman papers. 70. Acheson to John Kee, May 1 1 , 1949, Memoranda of Conversations, May-June 1950, box 65, Acheson papers; Webb to Truman, June 4,1949, Memorandum-Con­ gress, Korea file, Charles S. Murphy papers. 71. Harry S. Truman, “Request to Congress for Continuing Economic Assistance,” DSB 20 (June 19,1949): 781-783. 72. Ibid. Given the substantive provisions and rhetorical justifications of human’s speech, it is difficult to accept the argum ent that McCarthyism was primarily respon­ sible for W ashington’s increasing com m itm ent to South Korea. Nevertheless, Lewis

Notes to Pages 199-204

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McCanoli Purifoy contends that “only ‘McCarthyism’ had the demonic power to force the administration to reverse policies” and to manifest a “rising passion for adventures on the Asian continent” ; see Purifoy, Harry Truman's China Policy, p. 167. For a similar interpretation regarding the relationship between McCarthyism and Truman’s Korea policy, see Dobbs, The UnwantedSymbol, p. 177. 73. Louis L. Getson,John Poster Dulles, p. 36; David S. McLellan, Dean Acheson: The State Department Years, pp. 191- 192 ; Tsou, America's Failure in China, pp. 489,499; Westerfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, pp. 306-307. C H A PTE R 9 :

Promise and Performance

1. NYT, June 29, 1949, p- 11; AfYTJune 30, 1949, p. 9; “Korea,” DSB 20 (July 4, 1949): 848; Drumright to Acheson, July 11, 1949, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/7-1149. 2. Drumright to Acheson, January 7, 1949, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/1749; Drumright to Acheson, February 9, 1949, ibid., 895.00/2-949; Muccio to Acheson, January 27,1949, FRUS1949, VII, pt. 2,947-952; Roberts to Wedcmeyer, May 2,1949, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. Ill, cases 41-60, box 548, RG 319. 3. NYT, May 5, 1949, p. 16; Muccio to Acheson, May 19, 1949, Dept, of State Records, 501.BB Korea/5-1949; Muccio to Acheson, June 13, 1949, ibid., 895.00/ 6-1349. 4. Muccio to Acheson, June 7, 1949, Dept, of State Records, 895.002/6-749; Muccio to Acheson, June 16,1949, ibid., 895.032/6-1649; Muccio to Acheson, June 18.1949. ibid., 895.002/6-1849. 5. Gardiner to Acheson, June 20,1949, Dept, of State Records, 501.BB Korea/62049; NYT, June 16,1949, p. 4. 6. NYT, June 19, 1949, p. 12; Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, pp. 164-165. 7. NYT, June 22,1949, p. 3; NYT, June 23, 1949, p. 3; Muccio to Acheson, June 22, 1949, Dept, of State Records, 895.00B/6-2249; Muccio to Acheson, June 23, 1949, ibid., 895.00B/6-2349. 8. A/yjJJune 27,1949, p. 1; NYT, June 28,1949, p. 10; Muccio to Acheson, June 27.1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2, 1045-1046; Henderson to Acheson, June 29,1949, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/6-2949; Drumright to Acheson, July 11, 1949, ibid., 895.00/7-1149. 9. Muccio to Acheson, June 25, 1949, Dept, of State Records, 895.00B/6-2549; Drumright to Acheson, July 11, 1949, ibid., 895.00/7-1149; Drumright to Acheson.July 8,1949, ibid., 895.00B/7-849; Henderson to Acheson, July 9,1949, ibid., 895.00/7-949. 10. Muccio to Acheson, July 14,1949, ibid., 501.BBKorea/7-l449; NYT? July 8, 1949, p. 1; NYT, July 9, 1949, p. 5; Kim, Divided Korea, pp. 169-170; Beloff, Soviet Foreign Policy in the Far East, p. 178. 11. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Korean Aid, pp. 7-26; NYT, June 9 ,1949, p. 18 . 12. Korean Aid, p. 29; see also NYT, June 11,1949, p. 4. 13. Korean Aid, pp. 112-117. 14. Ibid., pp. 43-44, 124, 137,170-173,180-181; see also Time, June 20,1949, pp. 31-32. 15. Memorandum for Ihim an, June 18, 1949, Dept, of Sate Records, 895.50 Recovery/6-1849; JVYTJune 21,1949, p. 13.

304

N otes to Pages 204-208

16. Korean A id , p p . 191-192; “ Aid to Korea,” D SB 21 (July n , 1949): 37; M T Ju n e 24,1949, p . 2 . 17. Lawton to H um an, Ju n e 28, 1949. Correspondence, box 6 , FrederickJ. Lawton papers; B ackground Inform ation on Korea, pp. 1- 2 ; U.S. Congress, House, C om m ittee on Foreign Affairs, A id to Korea; N YT, July 1 ,1949, p. 6 . 18. U .S. Congress, H ouse, Com m ittee on Foreign Affairs, A id to Korea, Minority Report. 19. Clark Clifford to Ih u n an , July 8 , 1949. “ Support for the Korean Aid Pro­ gram,” Official file: Economic Assistance to Korea, Clark M. Clifford papets; Foster m em orandum , A ugust 23, 1949. Korea data-general, PSF-Korean War file, bar 243, Ih u n an papers; Truman to Acheson, October 17,1949, Memoranda of Conver­ sations, O ctober-N ovem ber 1949. box 64, Acheson papets; U.S. Congress, House, Com m ittee on A ppropriations, Supplem ental Estim ate o f Appropriation Continu­ ing fo r Two M onths th e Present Program o f Assistance to the Republic o f Korea; B ackground Inform ation on Korea, pp. 28-29; “ Supplemental Estimate of Appro­ priation for Fiscal 1930,” D SB 21 (July 2 $, 1949): 117-118. 2 0 . N Y T Ju n e 8 ,1 9 4 9 , p . 7; N Y T Ju n e 1 0 ,1949, p. 4; NYT July 2 ,1949, p. 4; Muccio to Acheson, July 2 ,1949, FRU S1949, VII, p t. 2,1057-1058. 2 1 . NYT July 3, 1949, p . 13; NYT July 19,1949, p. 8 ; Muccio to Acheson, July 1 8 ,1 9 ,1 9 4 9 , FRUS 1949, VII, p t. 2,1062-1063. 2 2 . Acheson to Muccio, July 19, 1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2 , 1063; Muccio to Acheson, July 2 1 ,2 3 ,1 9 4 9 , ib id ., 1065-1066; N Y T July 23,1949, p- 4. 23. N Y T July 12 ,1949, p- 3; N Y T July 2 6 ,1949, p. 16; Acheson memorandum, July 11 ,1949, FRUS 1949, VU, p t. 2,1058-1059. 24. D rum right to Acheson, August 1 0 , 1949, D ept, o f State Records, 895.00/ 81049; Muccio to Acheson, August 16,1949, ib id ., 895.001 Rhee/8-1649. 25. Harry S. Truman, “The President’s News Conference of August 11, 1949,” Public Papers, Truman, V, 421; H um an to Rhee, September 26, 1949, FRUS 1949, VU, p t. 2,1084-1085. 26. Harry S. H um an, “ Special Message to the Congress on the Need for a Military Aid Program, July 25, 1949,” Public Papers, Truman, V, 398 . When the United States withdrew from Korea, it transferred to the ROK military equipment valued at $ 1 1 0 m illion based on 1949 replacement costs. See Background Information on Korea, pp. 33-34; see also “ Report on Military Assistance Rendered to Foreign Countries Since V-J Day,” DSB 21 (Septem ber 26, 1949): 479; Acheson to Soucis, July 19,1949, NSC M eeting 36-March 2 2 ,1949, NSC Meetings 28-37 (December 2, 1948-April 7, 1949), PSF-National Security Council Documents, box 205, Ihunan papers. 27. “ Chronology o f Action by the N ational Security Council,” Elsey papets; Lawson memorandum, July 19, 1949, D ept, o f the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea IS, sec. I, cases 5-16, box 162, RG 319* 28. Roberts to Boite, September 13, 1949, D ept, o f the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. UI, cases 41-60, box 548, RG 319; Seoul to Acheson, June 16,1949, D ept, of State Records, 740.00119 Control (K orca)/6-l649. 29. Lawson memorandum, July 19, 1949, D ept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. I, cases 5 - 1 6 , box 162, RG 319; Major General R. E. Duff for Boite to Army Chief of Staff, September 1 2 , 1949, ib id ., P&O 091 Korea TS, sec. I-E, bk. 1, box 163, RG 319; Gray to Johnson, September 13,1949, ibid., CSA 091 Korea TS, RG335. 30. For Roberts, the South Korean soldier “has many qualities I’d like to transfer to American soldiers, [such as] attentiveness, stoicism, a desire to team, a ready will­ ingness to die if ordered, tenacity. His weaknesses are his desire to kick civilians around . . . , his sadistic tendencies and his leaders. These soldiers actually seem to

Notes to Pages208-213

3°5

revel io disagreeable weather and hardships/’ “If they can only fight as well as they parade,” he concluded sarcastically, “we are ’in’." See Roberts to Boite, August 19, 1949, ibid., P&O 091 Korea, sec. Ill, cases 41-60, box 348, RG 319; Drumright to Acheson, July 11, 1949, Dept, of State Records, 895.00/7-1149; Sawyer and Hermes, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 58-65. 31. Muccio to Acheson, July 26 ,1949, FRUS1949, VII, pt. 2 ,1066-1067; Muccio to Acheson, September 16,1949, ibid., 1079-1080; Muccio to Acheson, October 13, 19,1949, ibid., 1086-1089; Muccio to Acheson, November 8 , 10,18, 1949, ibid., 1094-1096,1099- 1100 . 32. Muccio to Acheson, November 4, 1949, ibid., 1093-1094; Webb to Muccio, November 28, 1949, ibid., 1101- 1102 . When Congress approved the MDAP in 1949, it provided for $10,970,000 in military aid to South Korea. This figure, how­ ever, was substantially less than the president’s request. See editor’s note, ibid., 1086. 33. Muccio to Acheson, December 1,1949. ibid., 1102-1104. 34. Muccio to Acheson, December 7, 1949, ibid., 1005- 1006; John Z. Williams memorandum, December 7, 1949, ibid., 1004-1005; see also Rhec to MacArthur, December 2, 1949, Private Correspondence, VIP file, folder 43, box 8 , RG 10 , MacArthur papers. 35. Acheson to Muccio, December 9, 1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2,1107; Muccio to Acheson, December 16 ,19,1949, ibid., 1108-1110. 36. Webb to Muccio, June 3, 1949, ibid., 1038 ; Muccio to Acheson, June 11, 1949, ibid., 1040-1041; “Korea," DSB 21 (July 18, 1949): 48; NYT, July 12, 1949. p. 3; N IT July 13,1949, p. 18. 37. Acheson to Muccio, July 11 , 1949, Dept, of State Records, 501.BB Korea/71149; Acheson to Muccio, July 19, 1949, ibid., 501.BB Korea/7-1949; Muccio to Acheson,July 22,1949, ibid., 501.BBKorea/7-2249. 38. Muccio to Acheson, July 23,1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2 , 1065- 1066 . 39. Muccio to Bond, July 25, 1949, Dept, of State Records, 501.BB Korea/72549; Muccio to Bond, August 4, 1949, ibid., 501.BB Korea/8-449; Muccio to Bond, August 6 ,1949, ibid., 501.BBKotea/8-649; NYT, August 27,1949, p. 5. 40. Muccio to Bond, August 20 ,1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2 ,1068-1069. 41. NYT, September 9, 1949, p. 1; NYT, September 10 , 1949, p. 7; Muccio to Bond, September 12,1949, Dept, of Sate Records, 501.BB Korea/8-3149. 42. Acheson to Moscow, September 13, 1949, Dept, of Sate Records, 501.BB Korea/9-1349; see also “U.S. Position on Problems Confronting Fourth General Assembly,” DSB 21 (October 3,1949): 490,494. 43. “Korea," DSB 21 (October 3,1949): 499; NYT, September 30,1949, p. 5. 44. Charles Fahy, “The Position of Korea in International Affairs Today," DSB 21 (October 24, 1949): 625-626; see also Bloomfield, The United Nations and U.S. ForeignPolicy, p. 171. 45. “Korea,” DSB 21 (October 10,1949): 539; NYT, O ctober4,1949, p. 5. 46. Charles Fahy, “The Problem of the Independence of Korea," DSB 21 (Novem­ ber 7,1949): 694-695. On the new commission, Turkey replaced Syria. See United Nations Resolution, October 21 , 1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2 , 1090-1092; NYT, October 14, 1949, p. 26; NYT October 22 , 1949, p. 6 ; “The United Sates in the United Nations," DSB 21 (October 31, 1949): 662 ; “Admission of New Members,” DSB22 (January 2,1950): 35-36. 47. Muccio to Acheson, October 7,1949, Dept, of Sate Records, 895.00/10-749; Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, pp. 24-25. 48. Muccio to Acheson, October 17, 1949, FRUS 1949, VU, pt. 2 , 1087-1088; NYT, October 6 ,1949, p. 13; NYT, October 18,1949, p. 20 . 49. Drumright to Acheson, September 13,1949, Dept, of Sate Records, 895.00/

306

N otes to Pages 213-218

9—1349; Muccio to Acheson, October 7,1949, ibid., 895.00/10-749; NYT, Septem* ber 6 ,1949, p. 15; NYT, September 16 ,1949, p. 15; Muccio to Acheson, November 3, 1949, D ept, o f State Records, 895.00/11-349; Muccio to Acheson, November^ 1949, ib id ., 895.00/11-749; Henderson, Korea, pp. 165-166. 50. Henderson to Acheson, November 28, 1949. Dept, of Sate Records, 895.00/ 11-2849; Muccio to Acheson, December 2 ,1949, ibid., 895.00/12-249. 51. “Economic Developm ent in South Korea,” Far East Economic Review 7 (Octo­ ber 20, 1949): 519-521; “ Review o f the Economy o f the Republic of Korea,” FarEast Economic Review 10 (January 1 1 , 1951): 41—47; see also The Nation, August 13, 1949, pp. 151-153; Business Week, September 17,1949, pp. 116-118. 52. Muccio to Acheson, November 7, 1949, D ept, of S ate Records, 895.00/11749; NYT, Septem ber 1 2 ,1949, p. 15; NYT, September 13, 1949, p. 17; NIT Jan­ uary 1 ,1950, p. 74; U.S. D ept, o f Commerce, “Economic Review of the Republic of Korea, 1949.” International Reference Service 7 (July 1950): 5-7. 53. Muccio to Acheson, November 14,1949, FRUS1949, VII, pt. 2 , 1096- 1098. 54. Butterworth to Acheson, December 16, 1949, ibid., 1110 - 1112; Buttetwotth to Muccio, December 13,1949, D ept, o f S ate Records, 895.51/12-1349. 55. Acheson to Muccio, December 30, 1949, FRUS 1949, VII, pt. 2,1112-1114; ECA report, December 31, 1949, D ept, o f S ate Records, 895.51/12-3149; see al» N Y T January 4,1950, p. 74. 5 6 . D rum right to Acheson, January 2 8 , 1950 , FRUS 1950, VII, 20- 22 ; NYT, Jan­ uary 13,1950, p. 3; N Y T January 1 4 , 1 9 5 0 , p. 1 . 57. Jessup m em orandum , January 14, 1950 , FRUS 1950, VII, 1—3; Drumrightto Acheson, January 28, 1 9 5 0 , ib id ., 18-20; editor’s note, ibid., lln .; NY£ January 15,1950, p. 2. 58. Muccio to Acheson, January 18 , 1950 , FRUS 1950, VII, 8 - 11 . 59- Jessupm em orandum .January 14, 1950, ibid., 5-7. 60. Wedemeyer testimony, Military Situation in the Far East, p. 2296 ;Johnson tes­ timony, ibid., pp. 2578-2579; Bundy, The Pattern o f Responsibility, p. 185; Tsou, America’s Failure in China, pp. 534-535; Purifoy, Harry Truman’s China Policy, pp. 142-147; Ernest R. May, “'Die N ature o f Foreign Policy: The Calculated Versus the Axiomatic,” D aedalus9\ (Fall 1962 ): 656-667. 6 1 . “U nited States Policy Toward Formosa,” DSB 22 (January 16 , 1950): 79. 62. Ibid., pp. 79-81. Acheson later stated that only American military interven­ tion could have prevented the destruction o f Chiang Kai-shek’s regime on Taiwan early in 1950. If W ashington had intervened, however, Truman and his advisors feared that this measure would discredit the United States in Asia and thereby help the Soviet Union. According to Acheson, the adm inistation announced its intention to avoid involvement in the Chinese civil war in order to tell the people of Asia » “ Keep your chin up; it doesn’t m atter; this isn’t important.” See Achesoo testimony, Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 1672-1675. 63. John W. Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy andthe Korean Wat, p. 2 0 ; Glenn D. Paige, The Korean Decision June 24-50, 1950, p. 351; Robert Leckie, Conflict: The History o f the Korean War, 1950-1953, pp. 36-37; David Rees, Korea: The Lim ited War, p. 14; Richard Rovere and A rthur M. Schlesinger, Jr., The General and the President and the Future o f American Foreign Policy, p. 101; Robert T Oliver, Why War Came in Korea, pp. 233-234; Berger, The Korean Knot, p. 97; Phillips, The Truman Presidency, p. 293. 64. Dean G. Acheson, "Crisis in Asia: An Examination of United Sates Policy," DSB 22 (January 16 ,1950): 111-113. 65. Ibid., pp. 115 - 116 . Both MacArthur and the JCS agreed with Acheson’s assessment that South Korea was beyond the American “defensive perimeter.’’ Sec Collins, Worin Peacetime, p. 31; George F. Kcnnan comments, February 13, 1954,

Notes to Pages 218-221

3 0 7

Princeton Seminars Transcript, reel 1, a p e 2, p. 2, Acheson papers. In his memoirs, Acheson dismissed charges that he had given the North Koreans a “green light” to invade the ROK as “specious, for Australia and New Zealand were not included either and the first of all our mutual defense agreements was made with Korea.” See Dean G. Acheson, Present at tbe Creation: My Years in the State Department, p. 3)8; see also McLellan, Dean Acheson, pp. 209-210. 66. Acheson, “Crisis in Asia,” pp. 113-115,116-117. 67. Ibid., p. 117; see also Acheson comments, February 13,1954, Princeton Semi­ nars Transcript, reel 1, a p e 2, p. 2, Acheson papers. 68. Muccio, February 10, 1971, Oral History Interview Transcript, p. 16; see also Reitzel, Kaplan, and Coblenz, United States Foreign Policy, p. 2. 69. Tsou, America’s Failure in China, p. 536; Dobbs, The Unwanted Symbol, p. 181; May, “The Nature of Foreign Policy," pp. 661-662. 70. Smith, Dean Acheson, p. 137; Gaddis, “Korea in American Politics, Strategy, and Diplomacy,” pp. 284-285. 71. NYT, January 20, 1950, p. 1; NYT, January 21, 1950, p. 16; Background Information on Korea, pp. 18-22; Christian Century, February 1,1950, p. 132; see also Michael A. Guhin, John Foster Dulles: A Statesman and His Times, p. 98; Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 35; Tsou, America’s Failure in China, p. 538. For a contrary view, see Purifoy, Harry Truman ’s China Policy, p. 194. 72. NYT January 20, 1950, p. 4; NYT, January 21, 1950, p. 5; Williams memo­ randum, January 20,1950, FRUS1950, VII, 11-14; Drumright to Acheson, January 21.1950, Dept, of S ate Records, 795.00/1-2150. 73. “Regret Expressed Over House Action on Aid to Korea,” DSB 22 (February 6, 1950): 212; NYT January 22,1950, p. 1. 74. Acheson Memorandum, January 21,1950, Memoranda of Conversations, January-February 1950, box 65, Acheson papers; Lucius Battle memorandum, January 21.1950, ibid.; NYT, January 21,1950, p. 1. 75. NYT, January 25, 1950, p. 1; NYT, January 31,1950, p. 2; NYT, February 1, 1950, p. 12; NYT, February 2, 1950, pp. 3, 26; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Economic Assistance to Certain Areas in the FarEast. 76. "Economic Assistance to Certain Areas of the Far East,” DSB 22 (March 13, 1950): 405; NYT, February 8,1950, p. 11; NYT, February 10,1950, p. 1; NYT, Feb­ ruary 11, 1930, pp. 6, 14; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Providing for Foreign Economic Assistance; U.S. Congress, House, Committee of Conference, Conference Report on Foreign Economic Assistance Act o f 1950; U.S. Congress, Senate, Committee of Conference, Conference Report on Foreign Eco­ nomic Assistance Act o f 1950. 77. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, Supplemental Esti­ mate for Assistance to the Republic o f Korea; U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Foreign Affairs, A Bill to Amend the Economic Cooperation Act o f 1948; U.S. Con­ gress, Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Foreign Economic Assistance, 1950. 78. A Bill to Amend the Economic Cooperation Act o f 1948, pp. 356-357. Ache­ son delivered the same presenation to the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations. See Dean G. Acheson, “Continued Aid to Korea Requested," DSB 22 (March 20, 1950): 454-455; NYT, March 8,1950, p. 6. 79- Harry S. Truman, "Letter to the Chairman, House Committee on Foreign Affairs, Urging Enactment of the Foreign Assistance Act, March 25, 1950," Public Papers, Truman, VI, 228-229; NYT, March 31,1950, p. 18. 80. Acheson to Muccio, February 3, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 25-26; Drumright to Acheson, February 10,1950, ibid., 26-28. 81. Acheson to Muccio, February 14,1950, ibid., 28-29. 82. Drumright to Acheson, February 21, 1950, ibid., 29-30; Bond memoran­

N otes to Pages222-228

3o 8

dum . Match 15,1950, ib id ., 30-33; Achesonmemorandum, Match22,1950,Mem­ oranda o f Conversations, M atch-A pril 1950, box 65, Acheson papers. 83. NYT, January 24,1950, p . 8; NYT, February 2,1950, p. 3; NYT, February 8, 1950, p . 12; NYT, March 10,1950, p . 14; NYT, Match 12, 1950, p. 17; NYT, March 14, 1950, p. 10; U.S. D ept, o f State, The Conflict in Korea: Events Prior to the Attack on June 25,1950, p . 22; Kolko and Kolko, The Limits o f Power, p. 567. 84. NYT, February 1, 1950, p. 13; NYT, Match 15,1950, p. 16; NYT, Match 22, 1950, p . 17; Gordenker, The U nited Nations and the Peaceful Unification ofKorn, p . 170; Muccio to Acheson, Match 31,1950, D ept, o f State Records, 795.00/3*3150. 85. NYT, Match 31,1950, p. 4; NYT, April 1,1950, p. 5; NYT April 4, 1950, p. 26; John W. foster to Seoul, Match 27,1950, FRUS1950, VU, 36-37. 86. Bond m em orandum , April 3, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 40-43; Acheson to Chang, April 3 ,1950, ib id ., 43-44; “U .S. Concerned Over Korea's Mounting Infla­ tion,'’ DSB 22 (April 7, 1950): 602. Muccio recommended the inclusion of the sec­ tion dem anding the holding o f elections in South Korea on schedule. See Muccio to Acheson, April 1,1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 39-40. 87. NYT, A pril 8,1 9 5 0 , p . 1; Muccio to Acheson, April 4,1950, FRUS 1950, VO, 44-45. 88. D rum right to Acheson, A pril 28, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 52-58. 89. NYT, April 12,1950, p. 3; NYT, April 16,1950, p. 36; NYT, April 18, 1950, p . 13; N Y T April 24, 1950, p. 5; W. G . Hackler memorandum, April 27, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 48-49. 90. NYT, April 27, 1950, p. 28; Christian Century, April 19,1950, p. 485; U.S. News, April 7, 1950, pp. 24-26; Dorothy Woodman, “Korea, Formosa, and Wbrld Peace,” Political Quarterly 21 (October 1950): 368; Bundy, The Pattern o f Responsi­ bility, p . 30; see also Kolko and Kolko, The Limits o f Power, p. 569.

CHAPTER io :

fulfillment ofa Commitment

1. Richard B. N eustadt to Stephen J . Spingam, June 8, 1950, International Affairs, Foreign Policy file, box 18, StcphenJ. Spingam papers. 2. Webb comments, May 15, 1950, “ Freedom Budget Panel,” Speech file, Frank Pace, Jr., papers. 3. Paul Y. Hamm ond, "NSC-68: Prologue to Rearmament,” in Schilling, Strat­ egy, Politics, and Defense Budgets, p p . 289-292; Bell, Negotiation from Strength, pp. 36-37. 4. Truman, Years o f "Biol and Hope, pp. 311-312; Charles S. Murphy, May 19, 1970, Oral History Interview Transcript, p. 184, Truman Library; Hammond, "NSC68,” pp. 308-309, 320, 326, 329-330. 5. Truman to Lawton, May 23, 1950, Memoranda for HST, Agendas and Notes, box 6, Lawton papers; H erbert Feis and Paul Nitze comments, October 10, 1953, Princeton Seminars Transcript, reel 2, tape 2, pp. 11-12, Acheson papers. 6. Hammond, “NSC-68,” pp. 331-332, 345, 362, 370; Rostow, The United States in the World Arena, p. 225; W esterfield, Foreign Policy and Party Politics, p. 340. One adm inistration official later complained that throughout the spring of 1950, NSC-68 “was being . . . nibbled to death by the ducks.” See Adrian Fisher comments, October 10, 1953, Princeton Seminars Tanscript, reel 2, tape 2, p. 11, Acheson papers. 7. NYT, February 17, 1950, p. 13; NYT, February 26, 1950, p. 32; Muccio to Acheson, May 3, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 66; Drumright to Acheson, May 5, 1950, ibid., 68-74.

Notes to Pages228-231

309

8. NYX March 3,1950, p. 10; NYX May 12,1950, p. 3; NYT, May 26, 1950, p. 9; NYT, May 27, 1950, p. 4; Dmmright to Achcson, May 1, 2, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 58-61,63-64; Gordenker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, pp. 179-181,203-205; Hendeison, Korea, p. 258. 9. NYT, May 30, 1950, p. 18; Muccio to Acheson, May 27,1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 89-92; “The United Sûtes in the United Nations,” DSB 22 (June 19, 1950): 1021; U.S. Dept, of State, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, pp. 18-19. 10. NYT, May 28,1950, p. 23; NYT, May 31, 1950, p. 8; NYT June 1, 1950, p. 10; NYT, June 4, 1950, IV, p. 2; Hendeison, Korea, p. 288; Dept, of die Army, Korea-1950, p. 8. 11. NYT, June 2, 1950, p. 22; Gunther, The Riddle ofMacArtbur, pp. 188-189; Beiger, The Korean Knot, p. 99; Rees, Korea, p. 20. 12. Rusk to Webb, May 2, 1950, FRUS 1950, VU, 64-66; editor’s note, ibid.; Drumright to Acheson, May 2,9.1950, ibid., 66-67,77-78. 13. NYT, May 7,1950, IV, p. 12; NYX May 23, 1950, p. 2; NYT, May 26, 1950, p. 1. 14. Muccio to Acheson, January 25, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 15-18; Allison to Najeeb Halaby, January 31, 1950, ibid., 24-25; see also Drumright to Acheson, March 16,1950, ibid., 34-35. 15. Roberts to Wedemeycr, May 2, 1949, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. Ill, cases 41-60, box 548, RG 319; Drumright to Acheson, May 11,1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 83-84. 16. Roberts memorandum, January 25, 1950, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. IV, case 60, box 549, RG 319; Bond and Lawson memorandum, Feb­ ruary 8,1950, ibid. 17. W. G. Hackler memorandum, April 27, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 48-51; see also Acheson to Muccio, April 13, 1950, ibid., 43-46; Drumright to Acheson, April 20,1950, ibid., 46-47. 18. Bond memorandum, May 10, 1950, ibid., 78-81; Acting MDAP Director to Rusk, May 10,1950, ibid., 82-83; Webb to Seoul, May 19,1950, ibid., 85-86; Muc­ cio to Acheson, May 23,1950, ibid., 87-88. At one press conference, Rhee even sug­ gested that the South Koreans would expand their military capabilities by “selling our bodies if necessary.*’ See Drumright to Acheson, January 25, 1950, Dept, of State Records, 795.00/1-2550. 19. NYT, March 2,1950, p. 20; JohnJ. Muccio, December 27,1973, Oral History Interview Thmscript, pp. 14-16, Truman Library. 20. Leven C. Allen toJCS, May 26,1950, JCS Records, CCS 383.21 Korea (3-1945), sec. XXI, RG 218; Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense, n.d., ibid. 21. U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Appropriations, First Semiannual Re­ port on liutual Defense Assistance Program. 22. Sawyer and Hermes, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 104, 106, 186; Military Situation in the FarEast, p. 2115; see alsoJohn Dille, Substitute for Victory, pp. 1819; Hendeison, Korea, p. 341; Leckie Conflict, pp. 36-37. During June 1950, Muc­ cio cabled Washington that he believed, “and KMAG concurs, should South Korean forces be strengthened by some measure [in] air defense and heavy artillery, superior­ ity or at least reasonable equality would rest with South vis-à-vis North Koreans.’’ See Muccio to Acheson, June 14,1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 105. 23. Boite to Roberts, December 28,1949, Dept, of the Army Records, P&O 091 Korea, sec. IV, case 61, box 549, RG 319; Muccio to Acheson, June 23,1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 121-124; Sawyer and Hermes, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 112-113. Army Department officials decided to order a phased reduction in the size of the KMAG after Roberts reported that the ROK constabulary army, during recent sue-

3 io

N otes to Pages 231-235

cessful operations against guerrillas in South Korea, had proved its ability to halt an invasion from the north. For Boite, these comments from Roberts were especially timely because "currently, the JCS are studying, on a global basis, the possibility of reducing missions, advisory groups and other special assignments.” On April 18, M acArthur received word from Washington that it was “ increasingly important. . . to economize in terms o f personnel and dollars in Korea.” Ironically, Roberts devel­ oped a plan for a forty percent reduction in the KMAG by January 1,1931, which arrived in W ashington on the day N orth Korea invaded the ROK. Sec Roberts to Boite, March 8,1950, Boite to Roberts, March 27,1950, Dept, of the Army Records, 091 Korea, sec. I, cases 1-20, box 121, RG 319; D uff to MacArthur, April 18, 1950, ib id ., sec. I-B, case4 only, bk. I, subs. 1-, box 121. 24. Q uoted in Robert D . H cinl, Victory a t High Tide: The Inchon-Seoul Cam­ paign, p. 12; NYT, May 20, 1950, p. 7. Muccio was much impressed with the ROK constabulary army’s systematic destruction o f guerrilla forces in North Kyongsang province. "W ith loss during past three weeks o f about 500 men and several hundred weapons," he enthused, “N orth Koreans may be loath to commit more men and equipm ent to such adventures." See Muccio to Acheson, April 4, 1950, Dept, of State Records, 795B.00/4-2550. See also Central Intelligence Agency report, June 19,1950, FRUS1950, VII, 109-111; Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 43. According» one report in Time magazine, "m ost observers now rate the 100,000-man South Korean army as the best of its size in A sia"; Time, June 5,1950, p. 26. 25. Muccio to MacArthur, June 4, 1950, Private Correspondence, VIP file, folder 30, box 8, RG 10, M acArthur papers; Muccio to Rusk, May 25, 1950, FRUS 19)0, VII, 88-89; Muccio to Rusk, June 1,1950, ib id ., 96-97. 26. “John Foster Dulles to Visit Korea and Japan,” DSB 23 (June 19, 1950): 998; "Statem ent by John Foster Dulles on D eparture for Far East,” DSB 23 (June 26, 1950): 1061; NYT, June 8, 1950, p. 13; NYT, June 19,1950, p. 3; Allison, Ambas­ sadorfrom the Prairie, p. 147. 27. John Foster Dulles, "The Korean Experiment in Representative Government,” DSB 23 (July 3, 1950): 12-13; NYT, June 20, 1950, p. 20. According to John M. Allison, who accompanied Dulles on his trip to Korea, administration officials in W ashington were responsible for drafting the Dulles speech. Sec Allison, Ambassa­ dor from the Prairie, p. 130. 28. Dulles to W illiam L. Holland, August 17, 1950, Korea 1950, John Foster Dulles papers; Dulles to H olland, September 7, 1950, ibid.; William R. Matthews» D ulles, June 20,1950, Correspondence, box 142, ibid. 29. Applem an, South to the Naktong, North to the Yaiu, pp. 12-18; Henderson, Korea, pp. 149, 341; H einl, Victory at High Tide, pp. 12-13; H. A. DeWeerd, "Strategic Surprise in the Korean War," Orbis 6 (Fall 1962): 438. 30. D rum right to Acheson, May 11, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 83-84; Central Intel­ ligence Agency report, June 19, 1950, ib id ., 118-121; Schnabel, Policy and Direc­ tion, p. 37; D ept, o f State, North Korea, pp. 17, 114-116; see also Allen S. Whit­ ing, China Crosses the Yaiu: The Decision to Enter the Korean War, p. 43. 31. Muccio to Acheson, June 9 ,1 0 , 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 98-102; NYT, June 9, 1950, p. 15; N T T June 10,1950, p . 4. 32. Muccio to Acheson, June 11, 12, 13, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 102-104; NY% June 11,1950, p . 26; "The U nited States in the U nited Nations,” DSB 23 (June 19. 1950): 1021. 33. Muccio to Acheson, June 16,1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 106-107; Schnabel, Pol­ icy and Direction, p. 9; D ept, o f the Army, Korea-1950, pp. 7-9; Beloff, Soviet For­ eign Policy in the Far East, p . 182; Kim , D ivided Korea, p. 173. 34. D rum right to Allison, July 5, 1950, Topical file 1, folder 3, PSF-Korcan War

Notes to Pages235-237

3 H

Documents, box 4, Human papers; Muccio, February 10, 1971, Oral History Inter­ view Transcript, p. 32; Muccio, December 27, 1973, Oral History Interview Hanscript, pp. 10-11; Strobe Talbott, ed., Khrushchev Remembers, p. 369; Appleman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yatu, pp. 19-20, 34. Some revisionist historians have attempted to prove that Rhee initiated the attack starting the Korean War. These writers argue that during the Dulles visit to the ROK, American leaders and Rhee completed plans for a South Korean invasion of North Korea. See I. F. Stone, The Hidden History o f the Korean War, pp. 22-27; Karunakar Gupta, “How Did the Korean War Begin?'* China Quarterly (October-December 1972): 699-716. Scant evidence exists, however, to substantiate such an interpretation. On this point, see Robert R. Simmons, Chong-$ik Lee, W. E. Skillend, and Karunakar Gupta, "Comment,” China Quarterly (April-June 1973): 354-368. 35. Lloyd C. Gardner, “Truman Era Foreign Policy: Recent Historical Trends,” in Kirkendall, The Truman Period as a Research field, p. 59; Wilbur W. Hitchcock, “North KoreaJumps the Gun,” Current History 20 (March 20, 1951): 142; Fleming, The Cold War and Its Origins, II, pp. 605-606; Robert R. Simmons, “The Korean Civil War,” in Baldwin, Without Parallel, pp. 149, 171; Gordcnker, The United Nations and the Peaceful Unification o f Korea, p. 241. For an assessment of the extent of Soviet involvement in the outbreak of the war in Korea, see William Stueck, “The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Korean War,” World Politics 28 (July 1976): 622-635. 36. William Stueck, “Cold War Revisionism and the Origins of the Korean Conflirt: The Kolko Thesis,” Pacific Historical Review 42 (November 1973): 547; Mar­ guerite Higgins, War in Korea, p. 162; “Review of Korea’s Postwar Economy," pp. 235-236; Fehrenbach, This Kind o f War, p. 53; Paige, “Korea,” pp. 227-228. 37. Hitchcock, “North Korea Jumps the Gun,” p. 142; Stueck, “The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Korean War,” p. 631; see also Kolko and Kolko, The Limits o f Power, pp. 573-578; Simmons, The StrainedAlliance, p. 114. 38. Tklbott, Khrushchev Remembers, pp. 367-368. 39. Acheson testimony. Military Situation in the Far East, pp. 1715, 1936; Tru­ man, Years o f Tried and Hope, pp. 333, 464; May, “The Nature of Foreign Policy,” pp. 662-663; May, “Lessons” o f the Past, pp. 73-74, 80-82; Dept, of State Intelli­ gence Estimate,June 25,1950, FRUS1930, VII, 149. 40. Elsey notes, June 26,1950, box 71, George M. Elsey papers. 41. Gardner, “Introduction,” pp. 7,11; Military Situation in the Far East, p. 971; Fleming, The Cold Warand Its Origins, II, pp. 602-604. 42. Marshall D. Shulman, Stalin’s Foreign Policy Reappraised, p. 140; Bundy, The Pattern o f Responsibility, p. 245. 43. Acheson to Muccio, June 24,1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 125; Muccio to Acheson, June 25, 1950, ibid., 125-126; Albert L. Warner, “How the Korean Decision Was Made,” Harper's 202 (June 1951): 99. At 6:30 A.M. in Seoul, the KMAG received word from South Korea’s duty officer of an "exceptionally strong attack” across the 38th parallel. After three more reports, the KMAG notified Drumright, who “dis­ missed it as Just another rumor.” But when the KMAG had confirmed that North Korea was engaged in an invasion in force, Drumright contacted Muccio at 9:30 A.M. See Drumright to Allison, July 5, 1950, Topical file 1, folder 3, PSF-Korean War Documents, box 4, Human papers. Muccio waited for positive confirmation from the KMAG before cabling news of the attack to Washington at 11:26 A.M. Because of the fourteen-hour time differential, the administration received this information at 9:26 P.M. on June 24. See Elsey memorandum, June 26, 1950, Korea (June 24, 1950), box 71, Elsey papers; Muccio, February 10,1971, Oral History Interview Tran­ script, pp. 30-32.

31*

N otes to Pages 251-242

44. Editor’s note, FRUS 1950, VII, 126-127; Acheson comments, February 13, 1954, Princeton Seminars Transcript, reel 2, u p c 1, p. 1, Acheson papers; Frank Pace, Jr., January 21,1971, O ral History Interview Transcript, p. 67, Truman Library; Elsey m em orandum , June 26, 1950, Korea (June 24, 1950), box 71, Eiscy papers; Acheson, Présentât the Creation, pp. 401-402. 45. Acheson, Present a t the Creation, p. 404; Truman, Years o f InalandHope, p. 332; Eben A. Ayers chronology, June 25, 1950, Diary-1950, box 16, p. 94, Eben A. Ayers papers; Thiman to Elsey, June 27, 1950, Korea (June 24,1950), box 71, Elsey papers; N oble to Elsey, June 29, 1951, ibid.; memorandum of conversation, n.d., ib id .; Rusk m em orandum , August 7,1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 128. 46. Trygve Lie, In the Cause o f Peace, pp. 327-328; John D. Hicketson, June 3, 1973, Oral History Interview Thmscript, pp. 93-94, Truman Library; Warner, “How the Korean Decision Was Made,” p. 100. 47. Muccio to Acheson, June 25, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 129; Muccio to MacArthur, June 25, 1950, ib id ., 133; teleconference, June 25, 1950, ibid., 135-138; M acArthur to Irwin, June 25, 1950, Acheson bridling book, Korea (June 25, 1950), box 71, Elsey papers; Schnabel, Policy an d Direction, p. 65. 48. Editor’s note, FRUS 1950, VII, 128; Acheson to certain embassies, June 25, 1950, ib id ., 131; Hicketson, June 5,1973, Oral History Interview Transcript, p. 95; see also U.S. D ept, o f State, Guide to the U N . in Korea, p. 6. 49- U nited S ates resolution, June 25, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 155-156; “U.S. Presents Cease-Fire Resolution to Security Council,” DSB 23 (July 3, 1950): 3-5. 50. Editor’s note, FRUS 1950, VII, 143; Thiman to Elsey, June 27, 1950, Korea (June 25, 1950), box 71, Elsey papers; Elsey notes, n .d ., ibid.; Acheson, Présenta the Creation, p . 404; W arner “ How the Korean Decision Was Made,” p. 100. 51. Charles P. Noyes m em orandum , June 25, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 144-147; editor’s note, ibid. ; Lie, In the Cause o f Peace, p. 330. 52. Bundy, The Pattern o f Responsibility, p. 254; Bloomfield, The United No­ tions an d U.S. Foreign Policy, p . 13; E. Joan Parr, “Korea—Its Place in History," Political Quarterly 23 (O ctober 1952): 358. 53. Edwin C. Hoyt, “ The U nited States Reaction to the Korean Attack,’’ Ameri­ can Journal o f International Law 55 (January 1961): 49, 55; Coral Bell, “Korea and the Balance of Power,” Political Quarterly 25 (January-March 1954): 27; Spanier, The Truman-MacArthur Controversy an d the Korean War, p. 38; Bloomfield, The U nited Nations and U.S. Foreign Policy, pp. 63,66-67. 54. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, p . 490; see also Goodrich, Korea, p. 117; Philip E. Mosely, "Soviet Policy and die War,” Journal o f International Affairs 6 (Spring 1952): 107-114; Reitzcl, K aplan, and Coblenz, United States Foreign Pol­ icy, pp. 266-267. 55. Dulles and Allison to Acheson and Rusk, June 25, 1950, Korea (June 25, 1950), box 71, Elsey papers; M acArthur to j. Lawton Collins, June 25,1950, Far East Command Records, Korea file 1, folder 4, box9, R G 6, MacArthur papers. 56. Walworth Barbour to Acheson, June 25, 1950, FRUS 1950, VH, 139-140. Ambassador Alan G. Kirk later endorsed this call for a firm stand. See Kirk to Ache­ son, June 27, 1950, ib id ., 19957. JCS briefing paper, June 25, 1950, Korea (June 25, 1950), box 71, Elsey papers. 58. Memorandum, June 25, 1950, ibid.; Acheson to Muccio, June 25, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 156-157. 59. Ayers chronology, June 25,1950, Diary-1950, pp. 94-95, Ayers papers; Webb to John W. Snyder, April 25, 1975, General Correspondence, 1973-1975, S-folder2, James E. Webb papers.

Notes to Pages242-246

3 13

60. Beverly Smith, “The White House Story: Why We Went to War in Korea,” Saturday Evening Post 224 (November 10,1931): 76; Collins, Worin Peacetime, p. 13. For the full text of MacArthur’s memorandum, see FRUS1950, VII, 161-163. 61. Acheson comments, February 13,1934, Princeton Seminars Transcript, reel 2, tape 1, p. 3, Acheson papers; Smith, “The White House Story,” pp. 78-79. 62. Jessup memorandum, June 23, 1930, Memoranda of Conversations, MayJunc 1930, box 63, Acheson papers. 63. Ibid. 64. Ibid.; Human, Years o f Trialand Hope, pp. 334-333; Acheson, Present ta the Creation, p. 406; Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 14; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 69; see also Paige, The Korean Decision, pp. 130-143. 6$. Muccio to Acheson, June 23, 1930, FRUS 19)0, VII, 163-166; Acheson to Kee, June 26,1950, ibid., 170-171; teleconference, June 25, 1950, Korea (June 25, 1950), box 71, Elsey papers; Acheson to Connally, June 26, 1950, Memoranda of Conversations, May-June 1950, box 65, Acheson papers. Nevertheless, Muccio had ordered the evacuation of dependent American women and children. By early morn­ ing on the second day of the war, nearly seven hundred people were safely aboard the Norwegian fertilizer ship Reinboldt and on their way to Japan. See Muccio to Ache­ son, June 26,1950, FRUS 19)0, VII, 140-141,154-155,168; Drumright to Allison, July 5, 1950, Topical file 1, folder 3, PSF-Korean War Documents, box 4, Human papers; Sawyer and Hermes, Military Advisors in Korea, pp. 120-123. 66. One reason why Muccio delayed the evacuation of Seoul was to discourage government officials from fleeing southward. During discussions with Rhee, he emphasized that once the president and his cabinet left the capital, the South Korean people would become demoralized and “much of the battle would be lost.” Worse still, “think what history will say of you,” the ambassador advised. Terrified at the thought of being captured, Rhee and his cabinet “took off for the tall timber” on the morning ofjune 27. See Muccio to Acheson, June 26,1950, FRUS 19)0, VII, 141-143; Hickerson, June 5, 1973, Oral History Interview Transcript, pp. 101-102; Muccio, February 10,1971, Oral History Interview Transcript, p. 34. 67. Muccio to Acheson, June 26, 27, 1950, FRUS 19)0, VII, 170, 173, 184-185; Acheson to Sebald, June 26, 1950, ibid., 178; Drumright to Allison, July 5, 1950, Topical file 1, folder 3, PSF-Korean War Documents, box 4, Truman papers; see also Allison, Ambassadorfrom the Prairie, pp. 134-136. 68. Jessup memorandum, June 26, 1950, Memoranda of Conversations, MayJune 1950, box 65, Acheson papers. 69. Ibid.; Truman to Elsey, June 27, 1950, Korea (June 26, 1950), box 71, Elsey papers. 70. Teleconference, June 26, 1950, Korea (June 26, 1950), box 71, Elsey papers; Smith, "The White House Story,” pp. 80-81; Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 167; Ledrie, Conflict, p. 53. 71. Harry S. Truman, “U.S. Air and Sea Forces Ordered into Supporting Action,” DSB 23 (July 3, 1950): 5. 72. Muccio to Acheson, June 26, 1950, FRUS 19)0, VII, 168-169; UNCOK to Lie, June 26, 1950, ibid., 207; Dept, of State, United States Policy in the Korean Crisis, pp. 2-3,19-21. 73. Austin to Acheson, June 27, 1950, FRUS 19)0, VU, 208-209; “Resolution Adopted by United Nations Security Council,” June 27,1950, ibid., 211; Warren R. Austin, “U.S. Asks Security Council to Assist in Repelling Attack,” DSB 23 (July 3, 1950): 6-8; Lie, In the Cause o f Peace, pp. 332-333. 74. Elsey notes, June 27,1950, Korea (June 27,1950), box 71, Elsey papers; Ache­ son to Johnson, June 28,1950, FRUS 19)0, VU, 217; memorandum of conversation.

314

N otes to Pages 246-249

June 28, 1950, Memoranda o f Conversations, May-June 1950, box 65, Acheson papers; NSC M eeting m inutes, June 28,1950, NSC Meeting 58-June 28, 1950, NSC Meetings 56-64 (May 4-A ugust 10, 1950), PSF-National Security Council Docu­ m ents, box 208, H um an papers; Lindsay memorandum, June 28, 1950, JCS Records, CCS 383-21 Korea (3-19-45), sec. XXI, RG 218; Truman, Yeanof Trialted Hope, pp. 340-341. 75. N orth Korean m ilitary forces entered Seoul during the late evening ofJune 27. By th at tim e, the ROK’s m ilitary chief o f staff had destroyed prematurely the pedes­ trian bridge across th e H an River. N ot only were several American advisoß then trapped in Seoul, b ut th e “ blowing o f the bridge was the breaking point for control over the populace . . . . and from that point on panic, confusion and disorder reigned in die city." See Major General Frank E. Lowe, n .d., Report on Mission, Appendix to KMAG report, tab 1, PSF-FrankE. Lowe file, box 246, Human papers. 76. A ppiem an, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 40-43; Sawyer and Hermes, Military Advisors in Korea, p . 133. 77. Muccio to Acheson, June 28,1950, FRUS1950, VII, 210-211. 78. A ppiem an, South to the Naktong, North to the Ysdu, p. 44; Drumright to Acheson, June 29,1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 220-221; Dept, of die Army, Korea-1910, p . 13; Church to MacA rthur, Ju n e 28,1950, Far East Command Records, Correspon­ dence, folder 1, box 4, RG 6, MacArthur papers. 79. Douglas MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 332; Collins, War in Peacetime, pp. 18-19; Schnabel, Policy an d Direction, p. 74; see also Richard R. Haynes, TheAntsome Power: Harry S. Truman as Commander in Chief, p. 177. 80. A ppiem an, South to the Naktong, North to the Yalu, pp. 44-45; Drumright to Acheson, June 29, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 227-228; Major General John H. Chiles, July 27,1977, Oral History Interview Thnscript, pp. 33-34, Human Library. 81. Acheson notes, June 29, 1950, Korea (June 29, 1950), box 71, Elsey pipeis; D rum right to Allison, July 5, 1950, Topical file 1, folder 3, PSF-Korean War Docu­ m ents, box 4, H um an papers; M acArthur to JCS, June 29,1950, Far East Command Records, Korea file 1, folder 4, box 9. RG 6, MacArthur, papers. 82. Kirk to Acheson, June 29,1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 229-230. 83. NSC Meeting m inutes, June 28 [29], 1950, NSC Meeting 59-June 29, 1950, NSC Meeting 56-64 (May 4-A ugust 10, 1950), PSF-National Security Council Doc­ um ents, box 208, H um an papers; NSC M eeting summary, June 29, 1950, NSC Memoranda for the President (M eeting Discussions, 1948—1953), ibid., box 220, Hum an papers; Elsey notes, June 29, 1950, (W hite House-State-Defense Meeting, 5 P.M .,June 29,1950), box 71, Elsey papers. 84. Ibid.; see also H um an, Years o f Trial and Hope, pp. 341-342; Paige, The Korean Decision, pp. 248-249. 85. Ibid.; Acheson, Present at the Creation, pp. 411-412. 86. JCS to MacArthur, June 29, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 240-241; Babcock to Dulles, November 24,1950, Conference Dossiers (UN-China 1950), file 473, Dull« papers; Acheson briefing paper, n .d . (W hite House-State-Defense Meeting, 5 P.M., June 29,1950), box 71, Elsey papers. 87. MacArthur to JCS, June 30,1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 248-250; Glenn Paige lus noted the discrepancy between the contents o f this report and the timing of its dis­ patch. MacArthur returned from Suwön fifteen hours before he requested the use of American combat ground forces; see Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 239-1» all probability, General Church’s extremely pessimistic report on the afternoon ofJune 30 (Korean time) stimulated MacArthur’s action. At that time, Church cabled Tokyo that the situation had deteriorated further and the South Korean army could not halt the Communist advance. See Appieman, South to the Naktong, North to the Yda, pp. 56-57.

Notes to Pages 250-255

315

88. Memorandum, June 30, 1930, Korea (June 30, 1930), box 71, Elsey papers; teleconference, June 30, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 250-252; Far East Command Records, Korea file 1, folder 4, box 9, RG 6, MacArthur papers. 89. Pace, January 22,1972, Oral History Interview Transcript, pp. 73-74; Acheson briefing paper, June 30, 1950, Korea (June 30, 1950), box 71, Elsey papers; see also Human, Years o f Trialand Hope, p. 342; Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 256. 90. William J. Sebald to Acheson, June 30, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 254-255; H u­ man, Years o f Trial and Hope, p. 343; Ayers chronology, June 30,1950, Diary-1950, box 16, p. 102, Ayers papers; Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 79. 91. Elsey notes, June 30,1950, Korea (June 30,1950), box 71, Elsey papers; Elsey, April 9, 1970, Oral History Interview Transcript, p. 270; Paige, The Korean Deci­ sion, p. 260. 92. Stueck, “The Soviet Union and the Origins of the Korean War” p. 632; Gad­ dis, “Korea in American Politics, Strategy, and Diplomacy," pp. 285-286; Whiting, China Crosses the Yalu, pp. 38-39; Paige, “Korea,” pp. 227-228. 93. Talbott, Khrushchev Remembers, p. 368. 94. Acheson testimony, Military Situation in the Far East, p. 1991; Human, Years of Trial and Hope, p. 331; Muccio to Acheson, June 29, 1950, FRUS 1950, VII, 99101; see also Schnabel, Policy and Direction, p. 64; McLellan, Dean Acheson, pp. 268-269. Kennan, Collins, and MacArthur all emphasize that the North Korean attack was a complete surprise. See Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, p. 485; Collins, War in Peacetime, p. 2; MacArthur, Reminiscences, p. 327; see also Gaddis, “Korea in American Politics, Strategy, and Diplomacy,” p. 286. In May 1950, the ROK’s defense minister warned that a North Korean invasion was imminent. See NYT, May 11,1950, p. 14; editor’s note, FRUS 1950, VII, 85. Rhee had pointed to the threat of an attack from the north so often in the past, however, that American leaders did not assign any particular importance to these recent warnings. See Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, p. 168. 95. Human, Years o f Trial and Hope, p. 333; Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, p. 486; Collins, Worin Peacetime, p. 41. Recendy, several writers have stressed that Hu­ man intervened in the Korean War to preserve American credibility and prestige. See Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, p. 173; Buhite, “ ‘Major Interests’,” pp. 450451; Gaddis, “Korea in American Politics, Strategy, and Diplomacy,” p. 288. While this interpretadon is both important and valid, it is not particularly new. For earlier examples, see LouisJ. Halle, The Cold War as History, p. 208; Spanier, The TrumanMacArthur Controversy and the Korean War, p. 28; Robert E. Osgood, Limited War: The Challenge to American Strategy, p. 166; Berger, The Korean Knot, p. 108; Fehrenbach, This Kind o f War, p. 80; Rovere and Schlesinger, The General and the President, p. 99; Rostow, The United States in the WorldArena, p. 235. Conclusion 1. Harry S. Human, “The Challenge of the Cold War,” DSB 28 (January 26, 1953): 127; see also Human, Years o f Trial and Hope, p. 463; Francis H. Heller, The Korean War: A 25-YearPerspective, pp. 3-92. Gaddis, “Was the Human Doctrine a Real Timing Point?” p. 391. 3. Human, Years o f Trial and Hope, p. 464; see also Acheson comments, October 11, 1953, Princeton Seminars Hanscript, reel 6, tape 1, p. 2, Acheson papers; Smith, Dean Acheson, pp. 423-424. 4. NSC Meedng minutes, December 29, 1949, NSC Meeting 50-December 29, 1949, NSC Meetings 48-55, PSF-National Security Council Documents, box 207, Truman papers; sec also Webb to James S. Lay, Jr., February 10, 1950, NSC Meeting

3i6

N otes to Pages 255-251

36-M arch 22, 1949, NSC M eetings 28-37 (December 2 , 1948-April 7,1949), ibid. Subsequent scholars have noted correctly th at the administration foiled to publicize the extent o f its com m itm ent to the ROK prior to North Korea’s invasion. See Stueck, The Road to Confrontation, p p . 161-162; Goodrich, Korea, p. 100; Paige, The Korean Decision, p p . 65-66. 5. John Foster DuUes, “A M ilitarist Experiment," DSB 23 (July 10, 1950): 49-50; John Foster D ulles, " lb Save H um anity from the Deep Abyss," New York Tim Magazine, July 30, 1950, pp. 5, 34; Dulles memorandum, June 29, 1950, BUS W O , VII, 237. 6. John Foster D ulles, “ Korean Attack Opens New Chapter in History,” DSB 21 (A ugust 7, 1950): 207-210; D ulles, “ A M ilitarist Experiment," pp. 49-50; Dulles, "To Save H um anity from the D eep Abyss," p. 34; see also Iheoharis, Seeds of Repression, p. 62; Shulm an, Stalin's Foreign Policy Reappraised, p. 140. 7. John Foster D ulles, “U .S. Military Action in Korea,” DSB 23 (July 17, 1950): 88- 92 . 8. W ashington to Ibkyo, June 27,1950, Far East Command Records, Korea file 1, folder 4, box 9, RG 6, M acArthur papers; Acheson to certain embassies, June 26, 1 9 5 0 , FRUS m o , VII, 1 6 6 . 9. D ulles, “lb Save H um anity from the Deep Abyss," pp. 34-35; Dulles, ‘‘U.S. M ilitary Action in Korea," pp. 90-91. 10. Acheson com ments, O ctober 10,1953, Princeton Seminars Transcripts, reel 2, tape 2, p. 15, Acheson papers. O ne adm inistration official later observed that “we were sweating over it, and then—with regard to NSC-68—thank God Korea came along.” See Barrett com ments, O ctober 10,1953, ibid., reel 3, tape 1, p. 3; see also N itze comments, O ctober 11, 1953, ib id ., reel 6, tape 1, pp. 1-4; FrederickJ. Lavton, July 9, 1973, Oral History Interview Thuiscript, p. 20, Truman library; Bundy, The Pattern o f Responsibility, p. 77. Many writers have pointed out that the Korean War provided the stim ulus for im plem entation o f NSC-68. On this issue see Gaddis, "Korea in American Politics, Strategy, and Diplomacy," pp. 290-291; Bell, Negotia­ tion from Strength, p. 38; Graebner, “ Dean Acheson,” p. 272; McLellan, “Com­ mentary," p. 156; Simmons, The Strained Alliance, pp. 141-142; Walter LaFebet, America, Russia, and the C old War, 1945-1966, p. 104; Bert Cochran, Harry Bum» and the Crisis Presidency, pp. 348-349. 11. Bundy, The Pattern o f Responsibility, p. 76; Rostow, The United States m the World Arena, p. 257; Rees, Korea, p. 445; Charles E. Bohlen, The Transformation of American Foreign Policy, p. 114; Gardner, "Introduction," pp. 5, 13; Steel, Pax Americana, p. 129; May, "The N ature o f Foreign Policy," p. 663; Scyom Brown, "Korea and the Balance o f Power," in Allen G uttm an, ed., Korea: Cold War end Lim ited War, pp. 249, 258; Norman Kaner, "I. F. Stone and the Korean Wir,” in Thomas G. Paterson, ed ., C old War Critics: Alternatives to Foreign Policy in the Tru­ man Years, pp. 247-248. 12. Bundy, The Pattern o f Responsibility, pp. 77-80; Stueck, The Road to Con­ frontation, pp. 173-174; Bell, Negotiation from Strength, p. 17; Graebner, “Dean Acheson,” p. 272. 13. Kennan, Memoirs 1925-1950, pp. 498-499; Spanier, The Trvman-MacArtkur Controversy and the Korean War, p. 270; Osgood, Lim ited War, pp. 166,191-192; Theoharis, Seeds o f Repression, pp. 65-66; Paige, The Korean Decision, p. 352; Almond, The American People and Foreign Policy, pp. 79, 159; Gardner, ‘“Human Era Foreign Policy," p. 59; W illiam Appleman Williams, The Tragedy o f American Diplomacy, p. 273; see also Michael S. Twedt, “The War Rhetoric of Harry S. Hu­ man During the Korean Conflict” (Ph.D . dissertation, University of Kansas, 1969), p p .232,242.

Notes to Pages 257-258

3 17

14. Noiroan A. Gtaebner, Cold War Diplomacy 1945-1960, pp. 57-60; Bell, “Korea and the Balance of Power,” p. 29; Reitzel, Kaplan, and Coblenz, United States Foreign Policy, pp. 302,323. 15. Quoted in Rees, Korea, p. 449; see also Bundy, The Pattern o f Responsibility, pp. 253-254; May, "Lessons" o f the Past, pp. 75-76; Higgins, Worin Korea, p. 17. 16. Gaddis, “Containment: A Reassessment,” p. 876. 17. Charles E. Bohlen offers the compelling conclusion that in the absence of the Korean War, “I seriously doubt that we would have any involvements of a military nature in the Pacific.” See Bohlen, The Transformation o f American Foreign Policy, p. 114. John Lewis Gaddis has pointed out that American military capabilities did not match Thiman’s globalist rhetoric until after the Korean War. As he explains, “despite its sweeping language the Thiman administration, between 1947 and 1950, had neither the intention nor the capability of policing the rest of the world; . . . the real commitment to contain communism everywhere originated in the events sur­ rounding the Korean War.” See Gaddis, “Was the Truman Doctrine a Real Turning Point?” p. 386; see also Denis Brogan, “The Illusion of American Omnipotence,” Harper’s 205 (December 1952): 22-27; Steel, Pax Americana, p. 23; Brown, “Korea and the Balance of Power,” p. 255; Baldwin, “Introduction,” p. 16; HarryJ. Middleton, The Compact History o f the Korean War, pp. 231-232; Gardner, “Introduc­ tion,” p. 24.

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3 io MEMOIRS AND PERSONAL ACCOUNTS Acheson, Dean G . Present at the Creation: My Years in the State Department. New \b rk : N orton, 1969. Allison, John M. Ambassador from the Prairie or Allison Wonderland. Boston: H oughton M ifflin, 1973. Byrnes, Jam es F. Speaking Frankly. New Ybtk: Harper & Row, 1947. Collins, J . Lawton. War in Peacetime: The History and Lessons o f Korea. Boston: H oughton M ifflin, 1969. Eden, Anthony. The Reckoning. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1956. Ferrell, Robert H ., ed. O ffth e Record: The Private Papers o f Harry S. ’Pitman. New \b rk : Penguin Books, 1980. Grew, Joseph C ., and Johnson, Walter, eds. Turbulent Bra: A Diplomatic Recordof Forty Years 1904-1945. 2 vols. Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1952. H ull, Cordell. The Memoirs o f Cordell Hull. 2 vols. New York: Macmillan, 1948. K ennan, George F. Memoirs 1925-1950. Boston: Litde, Brown, 1967. Leahy, W illiam D. I Was There. New "fork: McGraw-Hill, 1950. Lie, Trygve. In the Cause o f Peace. New \b rk : Macmillan, 1955. MacArthur, Douglas A. Reminiscences. New "fork: McGraw-Hill, 1964. Millis, Walter, ed. The ForrestalDiaries. New York: Viking Press, 1951. Ridgway, M atthew B. The Korean War. Garden City: Doubleday, 1967. Rosenman, Samuel I., ed. The Public Papers and Addresses o f Franklin D. Roosevelt. Vols. 11-13. NewTfork: Random House, 1950. Stimson, Henry L., and Bundy, McGeorge, eds. On Active Service in Peace and War. New \b rk : H arper & Row, 1947. Talbott, Strobe, ed. Khrushchev Remembers. Boston: Litde, Brown, 1970. Ihim an, Harry S. Memoirs. Vol. 1: Year o f Decisions. Garden City: Doubleday, 1955. --------- . Memoirs. Vol. 2: Years o f Trialan d Hope. Garden City: Doubleday, 1956. GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS U.S. Congress. House. Conference Committee. Conference Report on Foreign Eco­ nomic Assistance A ct o f 1950. H. Rept. 2117 to accompany H.R. 7797, 81st Cong., 2nd sess.. May 19,1950. --------- . Committee on Appropriations. Supplemental Estimatefor Assistance to the Republic o f Korea. H. Doc. 480 and 481, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., February 27, W O . --------- . Committee on Appropriations. Supplemented Estimate o f Appropriation Continuing fo r Two Months the Present Program o f Assistance to the Republic o f Korea. H. Doc. 2 4 7 ,81st Cong., 1st sess., June 29,1949--------- . Committee on Foreign Affairs. A id to Korea. 2 pts., H. Rept. 962 on H.R. 5330,81st Cong., 1st sess., July 1,1949. --------- . Committee on Foreign Affairs. Background Information on Korea. H. Rept. 2495 Pursuant to H.R. 206, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., July H. 1950. --------- . Committee on Foreign Affairs. A BUI to A m end the Economic Cooperation A ct o f 1948. Hearings on H.R. 7378, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., FebruaryMarch, 1950. --------- . Committee on Foreign Affairs. Economic Assistance to Certain Areas in tie Far East. H. Rept. 1571 to accompany S. 2319, 81st Cong., 2nd sess., Feb­ ruary 1,1950.

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In d ex

N ame In d ex Abe, Noboyuki, 48, 53, 271n. 88 Acheson, Dean G., 122, 242; and aid pro­ grams for ROK, 191,192, 204, 219, 220222,229, 300n. 31,307n. 78; assessment of Truman Doctrine, 284n. 30; attitude toward Nationalist China and Chinese civil war, 217,219, 220, 306n. 62; criticism of Syngman Rhee and ROK, 206, 224; and implementation of Moscow agreement, 67, 73,110; National Press Club speech, 217219, 237, 251, 306n. 65; participation in Blair House meetings, 242-243, 244-245; plans for aid to southern Korea, 108-109; position on use of U.S. combat troops in Korea, 245,248; pressure on ROK to adopt ECA reform program, 214-215, 221-222, 224; response to outbreak of Korean War, 236, 237, 242, 244; andUNCOK, 189, 211-212; and U.S. commitment to ROK, 229,251, 306n. 65; and U.S. withdrawal, 189,190,192, 299n. 21, 300n. 31; and U.S. occupation policies, 53-54, 57,62, 72,109, 281n. 71; and U.S. strategy for halting Soviet expansionism, 175-176, 256,257 Allison,John M., 120-121, 269n. 65, 310n. 27 An Ho-sang, 77-78 Antonov, Alexei E. (General), 41,42 Arnold, Archibald V. (Major General), 55, 84,97,113, 280n. 66 Atcheson, George, 57 Austin, Warren R., 131,140,187, 238, 246 Balasanov, G. M., 81-82,92-93 Benninghoff, H. Merrell, 62, 71,79; appraisal of Soviet intentions in Korea, 56; assessment of political situation in southern Korea, 50, 54, 55, 59 Berte, Adolph A., 11-12, 24, 265n. 87

Bevin, Ernest, 64,65 Bishop, Max, 179,180 Boite, Charles L. (Major General), 203, 310n. 23 Bond, Niles, 146,182,211 Bonesteel, C. H., Ill (Colonel), 44 Bradley, OmarN. (General), 242-243, 245 Brown, Alben E. (Major General), as head of U.S. delegation at Joint Commission nego­ tiations, 113,116-117,118,121,122,130, 131 Bunce, Arthur C.: comments on SKILA elec­ tions, 95; and economic aid to Korea, 94, 105, 220; and Pauley repon, 92, 281n. 71; on reform in ROK, 3, 222 Butterworth, W. Walton, 136,152,165,180, 214,220 Byrnes,JamesE, 75,96, 275n. 60, 281n. 71; desire for U.S. occupation of Korea, 39, 43; discussions at Potsdam on trusteeship, 42-43; andJoint Commission negotia­ tions, 82; onJapan's defeat in World War II, 39,40,43; participation in the Moscow Conference of 1945,64-66,67-68, 72, 276n. 68; and Pauley visit to northern Korea, 87,88,92; and trusteeship, 62,63, 64,266n. 95 Chang Myön, 168,188,194, 220, 224 Chang T’aek-sang, 173 Chang Tbk-su, 136 Chiang Kai-shek, 14,15,43,102; and Chi­ nese influence in Asia, 23; fears of Soviet expansionism, 13,19, 23, 29, 36; and KPG, 12-13, 23, 56,62; opposition to negotiations with Soviet Union, 56; posi­ tion on Korean independence, 14, 20, 21; and reforms in China, 176,182, 203, 218; support for in U.S. Congress, 197,199, 203, 220; U.S. support for, 116,176, 222;

332.

U.S. policy toward with respect to Chinese civil war. 176,182,197.199. 203,216. 218, 244. 306n. 62; visit to ROK, 206 Chistiakov, Ivan (Colonel General); attitude toward negotiations for reunification, 39. 70; and Joint Commission negotiations, 93,94; and Pauley visit to northern Korea, 87; as Soviet occupation commander in northern Korea, 33,76,109 Cho Man-sik, 33,76 Cho Pyöng-ok, 168,182,188,193. 206 ChoSo-ang. 8,12,14-13,16. 263n. 46 Church, John H. (Brigadier General), 246, 247, 3l4n. 87 Churchill, Winston, 16-17,20.23,26.34, 40 Clifford, Clark, 203, 282n. 93 Clubb, O. Edmund, 14,22.23 Collins, J. Lawton (General), 239,243,249250, 315n. 94 Connally, lom, 220,229 Coulter, John B. (Major General), 158,168, 169.173,180 Cromwell. James H. R., 11-12,262n. 28 Cumings, Bruce, 20-21,261n. 17,267n. 18, 270n. 72. 272n. 2 ,273n. 19,274n. 30, 276n. 68.281n. 76 Dean, William E (Major General), 135-136 Dobbs, Charles M„ 265n. 77. 272n. 2, 274n. 48.279n. 24, 280n. 55, 284n. 37. 288n. 14 Draper, William H., 153,154.156,162-163, 164,179 Drumright, Everett E, 200,215; criticism of Syngman Rhee, 201-202; and inflation cri­ sis, 221,222, 224; and internal stability of ROK, 187,189; reaction to DPRK invasion of ROK. 244, 31 In. 43; and ROK relations with UNCOK, 186 Dulles, John Foster: reaction to outbreak of Korean War, 240,255-256; as U.S. repre­ sentative to United Nations, 135,177-178; visit to ROK, 232,310n. 27, 31 In. 34 Eden, Anthony, 17-18,19-20,40.42 Emmons, Arthur B., Ill, 12 Fahy, Charles, 212 Finletter, Thomas K., 243, 246 Forrestal, James V, 32,43.60,90,171; posi­ tion on Allied colonial policy, 30,267n. 16; support for U.S. withdrawal from Korea, 120-121,275n. 60 Gaddis, John Lewis, 32,160,258, 284n. 30, 317n. 17 Gauss, Clarence, 12,13,14, 57

Nameindex Gardner, M. B. (Admiral), 45 Goodfellow, Preston (Colonel), 16,57,38, 78.86,97.274n. 30 Grew, Joseph C., 33-34.35,36.39 Gromyko, Andrei, 140 Halifax, Lord, 17 Han Kil-su, 7-8,10,14,262n. 28 Harriman, W. Averell, 35,64,65; advocacy for firm Allied agreements, 25,34,38; concern regarding Soviet expansion, 25, 32,33-34, 38,40-41,47,80; discussions with Stalin, 25,47,70; position on U.S. withdrawal, 130; and Soviet participation in Pacific war, 25,33; and U.S. Koreapol­ icy, 33-34,38,41,45,60,73,82; andU.$. occupation, 45,47,70; visit to southern Korea in 1946,80 Henderson, Gregory, 48,188,213 Hickerson, John D., 238,244 Hilldring, John H., 88,89, 106.113,121, 130.285n. 47 Hiss, Alger, 10,22,60 Hodge, John R. (Lieutenant General), 49,50, 53,61, 101,275n. 60; attitude toward Korean self-government and reform, 7779,85.91-92, 109,136,155; and creation of moderate coalition, 88-89,90,94,9697, 280n. 66; and creation ofseparategov­ ernment in southern Korea, 109,121.129, 132-134; and economic aid to ROK, 160; and elections of May 1948,145-147; emphasis on and efforts to promote politi­ cal stability, 50. 54-55, 57,63-64,66-67, 72, 76-78,97,117,121-122,136,139, 141-142; fears invasion ofsouthern Korea, 99,105.132; fears Soviet expansion and Communist subversion, 54-56,76-78,80, 94,99-100.121,129,162; handling of SKJLA elections, 91,95,96; andJoint Commission negotiations, 78-80,81-85, 89,93-94,103, 105,111-112,117,287n. 74; and KPG and conservatives (rightists), 54-55,62-63,68,80,94.121,139,141, 281n. 71; and KPR and leftists in southern Korea, 54-55,62-63,68,71-72,78-80, 83, 273n. 19; and local negotiations for reunification, 59, 70-71; and Moscow agreement, 70-72,86,91,93,119,136; and North Korean electric powershut-off, 156,292n. 82; opposition to trusteeship, 64,66, 72, 78.82,281n. 71; position on reunification and U.S. withdrawal, 50,56, 64,105, 109, 129, 132-134,161,165; replacement and departure from Korea, 158,165-166,296n. 59; response to dis­ content within USAFIK, 53,108; and ROK, 156, 158,160-161,166;andsouth-

Name Index em Korean police, constabulary army, and youth groups, 77-78,92,119,147,150; and Syngman Rhee and the conservatives (rightists), 57-58,78-79,94,96-97,102103,113,116-117,119,132-134,136, 160,274n. 30,285n. 47,290n. 55; and United Nations and UNTCOK, 135-136, 139-142,145,164; U.S. approval and crit­ icismof his performance, 53,69,82,105, 121,136,165; use ofjapanese administra­ tors and technicians, 53, 272n. 13; visit to United Sûtes and testimony before Con­ gress in 1947.105-106 Hoffman, Paul G.: congressional testimony on Korean aid program, 202-203, 221; and inflation crisis, 222, 223; planning for ROKeconomic aid program, 163,164; visit to Korea in 1948,173 Hopkins, Harry, 17.18,35-36,264nn. 69, 71 Hombeck, Stanley K., 10,11,13,18-19,24, 262n. 31 Hull, Cordell: and Allied recognition and support for the KPG, 8,11,13-14, 263n. 46; attitude toward Allied colonial policy, 17-18,19-20,24 Jackson, S. H., 141,142,143,145,147 Jacobs, Joseph E., 119,123; advocacy of sepa­ rate government in southern Korea, 121; attitude toward UNTCOK and its involve­ ment in Korean affairs, 141,143,159,160, 166; and conservatives (rightists) in south­ ern Korea, 118,119,134,135,141,160; and elections of May 1948,134,135,143, 146,149; andJoint Commission negotia­ tions, 122; and U.S. withdrawal, 123,127128,143,159,162,165,166; visit to northern Korea, 118 Jessup, PhilipC., 144-145, 215-216, 232 Johnson, Louis A., 231; participation in Blair House meetings, 241-242, 245; and U.S. withdrawal, 192; and U.S. policy in Korean War, 246,247-248 Judd, Walter, 203 Kennan, George E: advocacy of U.S. with­ drawal, 129; assessment of Soviet strategy in Korea, 73; formulation of containment strategy, 2-3,254, 257, 258; his "long tele­ gram," impact on Korea, 279n. 24; reac­ tion to North Korean attack, 240, 315n. 94 Khrushchev, Nikiu, 236, 251 Kim II Sung (Kim Il-söng): background and actions as leader of North Korea, 76,160, 167, 202, 278n. 4; and North Korean elec­ tric power shut-off, 146-147,156;and North Korean invasion, 236,251

333

Kim Ku, 136; assassination of, 201; attitude toward Coalition Committee and SK1LA elections, 91,95; criticism of Soviet Union and communism, 113; efforts to obtain aid and support for KPG, 8,9; andJoint Com­ mission negotiations, 116-117,132; and North Korean electric power shut-off, 156; opposition to trusteeship, 16,21,66-67, 68, 72,84,116-117; relations with Hodge and AMG, 54,62-63,66-67,71-72, 78, 112-113,117; Soviet attitude toward, 92; support for elections and split with Syng­ man Rhee, 140,141,147, 201,291n. 56; ties with Nationalist China, 12,14, 23; U.S. policy toward, 57,62,80 Kim Kyu-sik, 57,90,105; and Coalition Committee, 90-91; efforts to achieve peaceful reunification, 140,147,290n. 55; and elections of May 1948,147; and North Korean electric power shut-off, 147,156; relations with UNTCOK, 140-141,147; and SKUA elections, 95,96 Kim Söng-su, 55,132,148 Kim Tu-bong, 167 Kim Yak-su, 201 King, Ernest R. (Admiral), 36,43,268n. 34 King, MacKenzie, 137-139 Korotkov, G. P. (Lieutenant General), 109, 140,146 Langdon, William R., 76; assessment of Soviet strategy in Korea, 85; and elections of May 1948,146; relations with Rhee and conservatives (rightists), 102-103,112113,137; relations with UNTCOK, 139; and trusteeship, 8-9,62,66; and U.S. occupation policies, 62-63,92,105,136137; as U.S. representative in China, 24; visit to northern Korea in 1946,92-93 Lattimore, Owen, 15 Lawton, FrederickJ., 116, 204 Leahy, William D. (Admiral), 39,67; and Allied policy on trusteeship, 40, 264n. 68; fears Soviet expansionism, 32,142,154; position on Soviet entry into Pacific war, 25, 33; and U.S. policy toward Korea, 129, 142 Lerch, Archer L, 72,90,95, 112-113,135 Lie, Trygve, 140, 212, 227, 228, 238, 239, 246 Limb, Ben C. (Yim Pyöng-jik), 193 Lincoln, George A. (Brigadier General), 45, 269n. 65 Lodge, John D., 203 Lovett, Robert A., 123,180,181; and Can­ ada’s participation in UNTCOK, 138,156157; and economic aid program for ROK, 163,164; efforts to break Soviet-American

334

deadlock over Korea, 122,125; and elec­ tions of May 1948,137; referral of Korean issue to United Nations, 126,131; and U.S. withdrawal, 130,131,159,171; and U.S. occupation policies, 122 MacArthur, Douglas A. (General), 231,232; assessment of Soviet expansionism, 34, 181-182, 306n. 65; instructions and initial actions in Korean Wir, 241-242, 245, 246, 247-248; memorandum on defense of Tai­ wan, 242, 313n. 60; recommendations for breaking Soviet-American deadlock, 101; and reductions in KMAG, 310n. 23; rela­ tions with ROK, 164-165,193; response to and initial report on North Korean inva­ sion of South Korea, 238-239, 315n. 94; and Syngman Rhee, 57,171, 193, 274n. 30, 285n. 92; andUNTCOK, 157; and U.S. military strategy, World War II, 23, 34, 35, 36, 37,42,43; and U.S. occupation policies, 49, 50, 57,60, 62,100,142,158; and U.S. withdrawal, 133,150,171,179, 180,181,184, 282n. 92; on use of Ameri­ can combat troops in Korean War, 240, 247,249-250, 3l4n. 87 McCloy, JohnJ., 62 Malik, Jacob, 187, 246 Mark, David E., 149,188 Marshall, George C. (General), 162; and Allied military strategy, 36-37,41-42,4344; and Allied policy on trusteeship, 264n. 68; assessment of Soviet expan­ sionism, 132-133; efforts to strengthen ROK, 152,162,171; and elections of May 1948,146,149; and Joint Commission negotiations, 110-112,114,118,121,131; and North Korean electric power shut-off, 156; and United Nations involvement in Korean affair, 120,123,126, 135,139140,143,144,157,159,166; and U.S. policy toward Korea, 12,106,109, 111, 112,113,135,158; and U.S. withdrawal, 130,133,152,159, 171 Matthews, William R., 232-233 Menon, K. P. S., 142,144,145 Molotov, V. M., 32,126; and Allied colonial policy, 20,40,42-43; and Joint Commis­ sion negotiations, 110-112; and North Korean electric power shut-off, 156; partic­ ipation in Moscow Conference, 64-66, 73; and Soviet-American occupation of Korea, 60; and trusteeship, 38,41 Muccio,JohnJ., 164,186, 234, 241; advocacy for military aid to ROK, 170,184, 189, 190,191-192, 208-210, 229-230, 309n. 22; as ambassador to ROK, 158,164,166167; assessment of Acheson’s Press Club

N a m Index

speech, 219; assessment of Rhee, ROK, and constabulary army, 211,216,310n. 24; on chances for Korean reunification, 212 ; and continued United Nations involvement in Korean affair, 211; and economic aid to ROK, 162,163,167,170, 184,191,230; and elections of May 1950, 224, 228,308n. 86; and evacuation of Seoul, 244,313nn. 65,66; featsNorth Korean invasion of South Korea, 170,191, 208, 209,211,234-235; fears South Korean invasion of North Korea, 173,209; and inflation crisis in ROK, 214-215,216, 222-225; negotiations with Rhee on U.S. withdrawal, 189-191» 192-194; posidon on reform in ROK, 169-170,191,214, 216, 224; position on U.S. withdrawal, 162, 170, 180- 181,183-184,192; rela­ tions with UNCOK, 185-186,211,228; response to and reports on North Korean invasion, 237, 238, 244,246-247,250, 311n. 43 ; and U.S. commitment to ROK, 231- 232 , 302n. 64 Nimitz, Chester W. (Admiral), 37,43 Pace, Frank, Jr., 1, 221,237,243.248.250 Paige, GlennD., 79, 3l4n. 87 Pak Hön-yöng, 48,91,94.202,212-213 Patterson, George, 141,145,147 Patterson, Robert R, 90,99; assessment of Hodge's performance, 82,105; pressurefor reductions in USAFIK, 59; support for con­ stabulary army, 59,77; support for positive U.S. policy in Korea, 100-101,120-121, 275n. 60; and Syngman Rhee, 285n. 47; and U.S. withdrawal, 100-101,109. U2, 120-121 ; visit to southern Korea in 1946, 69, 82 Paul-Boncour, Jean-Louis, 141,145 Pauley, Edwin W., 44,86-88,281n. 71 Penfield, James K., 102,136 Peterson, Howard C., 101,109 Purifoy, Lewis McCarroll, 300n. 30,302n. 7 Ranshofen-Wertheimer, Egon, 185,186 Rhee, Syngman (Yi Süng-man), 231.234, 274n. 30, 297n. 79; activities as represen­ tative of KPG, 9 , 10,1 1 . 16,24,29730, 262n. 78; attitude toward communismand Soviet Union, 19, 29.57,61-62,112-113. 119, 160,205-206,213; behavior as presi­ dent, 161, 170, 186- 187. 200- 202, 206. 211, 213,216, 222-224,228; cnticismot Hodge, United States, and U.S. tion policies, 58,102-103,112-113, 136; demands for elections and separat government, 97,103,132,135,140- »

Name Index desire forU.S. aid, 137,166-167, 171, 173,182-183,188,190-193.205-207, 210,215-216,219,223.309n. 18; desire forU.S. military protection, 170-171, 191-194,197, 229, 315n. 94; determina­ tion to reunify Korea, 173-174,182-183, 188-189, 208-209s 215, 230, 233* 311n. 34; and elections of May 1948,137,148, 156, 291n. 56; and elections of May 1950, 223-224, 228-229; and inflation crisis, 215-216, 221-225; manipulation of police and youth groups, 133; and North Korean electric power shut-off, 156; opposition to, as president of ROK, 187-188, 200-202, 222-223, 228, 234, 301n. 40; opposition to trusteeship, 61-62,68,84,97,113,116, 119; opposition to U.S. withdrawal, 161, 168,170,180,183,189-192,194, 200, 202; and Pacific Pact proposal, 192,194, 206, 302n. 63; popularity and power of, 97,133,137,141,160-161,211; reaction to North Korean invasion, 247, 313n. 66; rejection of DPRK's legitimacy, 157,186, 212, 230; relations with Hodge and AMG, 57-58, 78,91,96-97,102-103,112-113, 116-117; and SKILAelections, 91,95; as source of violence and obstruction, 97, 102,113,135-136,141, 290n. 55; Soviet criticism of, 56,61,92,135; ties with Pres­ ton Goodfellow, 16, 58, 274n. 30; and United Nations, UNTCOK, and UNCOK, 135,141,157,170,186, 201, 211-213. 228; U.S. attitude and policy toward, 5758,62,80,91, 97,119,136-137,158, 160-162, 285n. 47 Roberts, William G. (Brigadier General): and aid programs for ROK, 183, 207-208, 229; assessment of constabulary army, 208, 231, 304n. 30, 309n. 23; as head of PKMAG and KMAG, 179,191, 231, 310n. 23; and U.S. withdrawal, 183 Roosevelt, Franklin D., 19, 25; attitude toward Nationalist China, 15, 20, 24; at Cairo Conference, 20; and Cairo Declara­ tion, 2, 20-21, 264n. 69, 71; death of, 31, 267n. 18; desire to avoid war withJapan, 8; desire for Soviet entry into Pacific war, 25; impartiality toward Korean indepen­ dence movement, 8,12; position on Allied colonial policy, 17-18, 20, 30-31, 261n. 17; pursuit of trusteeship agreement, 9, 13,15-16, 20-21, 25-29, 35,253-254, 266n. 95; reaction to Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe, 31-32; at Teheran Confer­ ence, 21; and U.S. military strategy, World War II, 23, 25, 27; at Yalta Conference, 25-26, 29 Royall, Kenneth C., 133; and NSC-8/1,185,

335 294n. 11; support forU.S. withdrawal, 158-159,183; visits to South Korea, 129, 154,182 Rusk, Dean, 229, 232; and inflation crisis, 224; and outbreak of Korean War, 237, 244, 245; role in decision to divide Korea, 44, 270n. 77 Saltzman, Charles B., 130,136,163-164, 171 Service, John S., 23 Sherman, Forrest P. (Admiral), 243 Shtikov, Terenty F. (Colonel General), 119, 131; activities as head of Soviet delegation at Joint Commission negotiations, 81-84, 114,121-122,130; criticism of conserva­ tives (rightists), 117-118 Smith, Lawrence, 203 Smith, Walter Bedell, 85, 121,122-123, 159-160 Soong, T. V., 13,14,18, 19,36, 38,40 Staggers, John W., 10 Stalinjoseph, 68, 75,104,109, 254, 257; and Allied policy on trusteeship, 40, 264n. 69; attitude toward United Nations involvement in Korean affair, 125,130; desire for U.S. withdrawal, 130,167-168; and division at 38th parallel, 46-47; drive for world conquest, 4, 80,126,128, 256; and Eastern Europe, 32, 35, 267n. 18; emphasis on Russian national security, 23, 28; expansionist ambitions in Korea, 13, 19, 28, 34,41, 55. 78,162; and fulfillment of Allied agreements, 31, 32, 33-34, 35; interests and aims in Korea, 46-47, 51,60, 110,114-115; and Joint Commission negotiations, 85; negotiations with Nation­ alist China about Yalta agreement, 38, 39, 45; position on reunification, 61; position on trusteeship, 21, 26, 28-29, 33-34, 3536, 38,40-41,46, 51; at Potsdam Confer­ ence, 39-40,43,65; relations with DPRK, 167; role in outbreak of Korean War, 236, 243, 258; and self-government in northern Korea, 55-56; and Soviet entry into Pacific war, 24-25, 39-40,46, 268n. 34; suspi­ cions of American intentions in Korea, 62, 73; at Teheran Conference, 21; at Yalta Conference, 25-26 Stettinius, Edward R.,Jr., 29, 30, 267n. 16 Stevens, Francis B., 128,129 Stilwell, Joseph (General), 12,49 Stimson, Henry L., 40,41; concerns about Soviet expansionism, 25, 39; position on Allied colonial policy and trusteeship, 30, 264n. 68, 267n. 16; and U.S. policy toward Korea, 37, 39 Stuart, J. Leighton, 179,180

33^

Thayer, Charles B., 89.91 Ihiman, Harry S., 38,104,232; and aid pro­ gram for ROK, 163,197-199,204-205, 220-221,302n. 72; and aid to southern Korea, 109,115-116,284nn. 30,37. 306n. 62; approach toward reconstruction of Asia after World Wur II, 31-32,47, 267n. 16; assessment of Soviet threat in Korea, 2, 39. 51.80,154,197,218,236, 242,246,248, 250,253; attitude toward communism and Soviet Union, 3,31-33, 35-36,40-41,51,67-68,74-75,109-110, 153,178, 226,245, 257-258,267n. 18; attitude toward Nationalist China and defense of Taiwan, 116,197.217,242, 244,306n. 62; and containment strategy, 3,4,106-107,110,123-124,171-172, 197,218,257-258.284n. 37; decision to commit U.S. combat forces in Korean War, 1,250, 252-253,255. 257-258,315n. 95; and defense spending, 153,171,226-227, 256-257; desire for United Nations involvement in Korean affair, 123-125, 129,137-139,178,210,237, 240,243; desire to avoid using U.S. combat troops in Korean War, 239-240,242-243, 245,248; and division at 38th parallel, 43-46,254, 270n. 71 ; expectations for emergence of free, united, and democratic Korea, 47, 112,125,158,161,165,254; extent of commitment to ROK, 151, 153-154,171, 175,182-183,191,197-199,206,219, 230-231,248-250; and implementation of Moscow agreement, 68, 74-75,284n. 37; and military aid to ROK, 206-207,230231.243, 305n. 32; and national selfdetermination, 3,4, 31-32; and Pacific Pact proposal, 206; and Pauley report, 8688; plans for U.S. international role after World War II, 99,171.227; at Potsdam Conference, 39-40; preference for eco­ nomic means to counter Soviet expansion, 171-172,197,219,221, 226,231,254; reaction to recommendations in NSC-68, 226-227; reelection in 1948, impact on U.S. policy in Korea, 175-176, 199; rela­

N am e Index

tions with Syngman Rhee and ROK, 112, 158,161,206-207; response to North Korean invasion, 1,4,236-245,248-249, 251,255,257,317n. 17; and separateelec­ tions in southern Korea, 139,150; and U.S. Congress, 106,116,197-199.204205,220-221,230-231; and U.S. military strategy, Wodd War II, 34-37,39,41-43, 268n. 34; and U.S. occupation ofKorea, 41,43-45,49, 51,53-54,58,61,90,105, 254,272n. 13; and U.S. withdrawal, 90, 129, 153,168, 170-171,174-175; and Yalta agreements, 32-33,39 Vandenbetg, Arthur H., 116,220 Vandenberg, Hoyt S. (General), 243,246 Vincent, John Carter: attitude toward Nationalist China, 15; andJoint Commis­ sion negotiations, 83; and trusteeship, 5960,60-61,62; and U.S. policy toward Korea, 29,58,100,101,109-110 Webb, James E., 229; and economic aidpro­ gram for ROK, 198,202,203; and military aid program for ROK, 194,208; participa­ tion in Blair House meetings, 241-242, 243; and U.S. strategy to counter Soviet expansion, 227 Wedemeyer, Alben C. (Lieutenant General): planning U.S. withdrawal, 133; andplans for U.S. occupation, 43-44; report onvisit to China and Korea, 126-128, 129-130, 288n. 14; visit to South Korea in 1949, 182-183 Welles. Sumner, 11,13.17,18 Williams, JayJerome, 10,58 Yi Pöm-sök, 234; and inflation crisis, 222, 223; as leader of National \buth Move­ ment, 102,161; opposition to U.S. with­ drawal, 182-183,298n. 79;tiestoChiang Kai-shek, 102 Yb Un-hyöng: assassination of, 119; and co­ alition Committee, 91.94,95; Hodge s efforts to undermine and discredit, 54, »< 63,72; as leader of KPR, 48-49,54

Subject Index

337

Subject In d ex Acheson’s National Press Club speech, 217— 219,220,236-237, 306n. 65 Allied colonial policy: Anglo-American dis­ cussions of, 17-18,19-20; and dependent peoples, 17, 20, 24, 59; Nationalist China’s position on, 29; Soviet position on, 20,40,42-43,264n. 68,267n. 16; and trusteeship system, 17,20,24,29-31,40, 42-43; U.S. military leaders’ position on, 24,30 Allied cooperation: deterioration of, 34; importance of to Korea, 8,13,15,18,19, 20, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, 28,29, 31, 38, 5960; and occupation and administration of Korea, 21-22, 35, 38,41-42,43,44,45, 59-60; to promote unity in Korean inde­ pendence movement, 13,14; and recon­ struction of Asia, 15-16,24,25; Roosevelt’s pursuit of, 15,21,26, 30,31; Stalin’s desire for, 46-47; Truman's posi­ tion on, 33, 35 Allied Reparations Commission, 44,86 Allies, 42,44,45,49 American military advisors in South Korea, 155,165,190-191,206; participation in Korean War, 241,243,244, 245,246, 311n. 43,3l4n. 75; plans for reduction in role of, 231, 309n. 23; relations with con­ stabulary army, 208; South Korea’s desire for increase of, 183,190; U.S. plans for evacuation of, 195. See also Constabulary army; Korean Military Advisory Group; Provisional Korean Military Advisory Group American Military Government in Korea (AMG), 89,101,108; attitude toward Korean people and nation, 53, 54, 55,64, 134; charged with using “police state” tac­ tics, 136,141,160; criticism of and support for impartial approach, 57, 58, 59,61,6263,121; efforts to promote self-govern­ ment, 55, 56, 59,62, 77, 78-79,85, 87, 88,90,91,95-96,105,109; and elections of May 1948,137,146,148; and Korean advisors and employees, 53, 54,66-67,68, 69, 78-79,95,97; Korean criticism of, 5354, 55, 59,66,100,104; position on reforms in southern Korea, 70, 88,92,143, 155; relations with KPR and leftists, 5455,62-63, 71,92,96,134, 273n. 19; rela­ tions with KPG, conservatives (rightists), and Syngman Rhee, 54-55,62-63,68, 7172, 78-79,90,95,96,102-103,112-113, 116,119, 121,132, 135-137, 280n. 68, 281n. 71, 287n. 47; and SKILA elections,

90,95,96; Soviet criticism of, 72,73; U.S. preparations for establishment of, 22, 3031, 50; U.S. preparations for termination of, 158,161,162,164-165; use ofJapa­ nese administrators and technicians, 22, 50, 53-54, 272n. 13. See also American military occupation of Korea; U.S. Depart­ ment of War American military occupation of Korea, 48, 270n. 72; and American public opinion, 53,60,80,95; and Chinese civil war, 126; and conservative (rightist) political activity, 54-55,62,63,68,71-72,78-79,96,102, 103,112-113,116,119,134,281n. 71, 287n. 47; difficulties and problems sur­ rounding, 2,47,51,63-64,101,155, 285n. 47; efforts to broaden base of sup­ port for, 80,88,90-91,94,96,97,105, 119; efforts to establish control, 39,46, 59, 75, 254; efforts to outwait Soviet Union, 75,89.92,94,99.106; and feats of Soviet ambitions in southern Korea, 54, 71, 76, 78,83,85,94,99-100,118,146-147, 273n. 19; instructions and initial policies, 49-50, 53-54, 59,61, 76, 272n. 13; plan­ ning for during World War II, 2,21-22, 30-31, 36-37,41-42,43-45,49-50; and pressure for funding and troops, 99,100, 101,104,142; and pursuit of political sta­ bility and unity, 54,63, 72, 76-78, 79,94, 127,136-137, 273n. 19. 281n. 76; rela­ tions with police and youth groups, 72, 7778,102-103,119,127,148; repression of Communists and leftists, 54-55,62,63, 80,94, 96,121,122,134,139,141, 287n. 74; Soviet criticism of, 72, 73, 111, 122, 179; transfer of power to ROK, 158,161, 162,164-165; Truman's policy regarding, 39,41,112, 254; and U.S. occupation of Japan, 47, 87,98,127,179,181; U.S. policy statements regarding, 53-54,102, 121. See also American military govern­ ment in Korea; American military with­ drawal; U.S. Armed Forces in Korea; U.S. Department of War; U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff American military withdrawal from Korea: as abandonment of U.S. commitments, 123, 130,151,154, 170,175,179,183,192, 193; after creation of stability, 115,123124,129-130,133,151,155,161,168, 170,172,183, 184-185,189,193, 254, 300n. 31; and aid programs for ROK, 151152, 154,155,172,180,189,190-191, 192,197-198; arguments favoring and

338

Subject Index

support for, 50, 59,63-64,89-90,98, Berlin, 158,171 100-101,109,112.120-121, 123, 127, Blair House meetings, 239,241,242-244, 128-129, 130, 133, 152, 153, 171.183; 244-245 arguments against and opposition to, 99, Britain: and Cairo Declaration, 264n. 71; 104, 126-127,128, 129-130,152,159, fears of Soviet expansionism, 40; interests, 162,168,170,171,179,180,184,185, involvement, and policy in Korea, 19.20, 21,22,26,61,64-66,268n. 32; and occu­ 203-204, 205; completion of, 185,192, pation of Korea, 24,41,45; policy towatd 193.194, 200; and forced departure, 98, China, 17,18; position on Allied colonial 104,120,129,181,184; impact on U.S. policy, 16-18,40,42-43; position on tiustoccupation ofJapan, 181; Korean demands eeship, 17-18,19-20; and United Nations for, 112,147, 187, 200; Korean opposition action regarding Korea, 138, 143-144,176 to, 161,168,183,192-194, 202, 297n. 79; Bureau of the Budget, 102,198,221,242 planning and preparations for, 108,149— 150,151-152,153,158-159.165,166, Cairo Conference, 20,23 167,171,174, 179.184-185.189-190, Cairo Declaration, 2,20,21,22,38,50,101, 192,193,194,197-199; postponements 110, 264n. 69,264n. 71. ton/jio Trustee­ and delays, 151,168,171,174,175,180, ship for Korea 181,192; as prelude to Communist seizure Canada, 61; cabinet crisis over involvement in or North Korean invasion, 85,105,127, Korean affair, 137-139.144; participation 130,132,168,170,171,174,180, 184, on UNTCOK, 135.137-139.141,143, 193, 203-204, 205; Soviet and North 145, 148,157, 176; and ROK, 176; and Korean pressure for, 85,130-131,142, UNCOK, 176-177,178 160,167-168, 178-179, 202; trusteeship as China: civil war and Communist victoryin, means to facilitate, 64; and the United 116,126,165,170,176,179,182,183, Nations, 123, 159,165, 170, 171, 177, 190,197-199,203,217,219.244,306n. 178.179.180.184, 185,190,198, 201, 62; competition withJapan over Korea, 5210. S ee also National Security Council; 6; criticism of U.S. policy toward, 193, U.S. Department of the Army; U.S. Joint 199, 203. 205,217,219,254; and Korea. Chiefs of Staff 12, 13,18, 126, 179.182,183,190,191. Anti-Trusteeship Committee, 72,118,122 193,197,199,203,216-217.219.225. appeasement, 67. 74,96-97,119,153,213. 254, 306n. 62; Truman's policy toward, 236,242 126,197,198,203,205,217,242-244; Asia, 9,63,158,186; Allied policy on recon­ U.S. plans for after Wwld War II, 15.17, struction of, 15-16, 24, 25; impact of 18, 24,25,26; U.S. policy toward after Korean War on U.S. policy toward, 241, World War II, 3,74,279n. 25. See also 243, 317n. 17; importance of Korea’s posi­ Nationalist China; Chinese Communists tion in, 2,15,19, 28,87,127,128-129, Chinese Communists: and Chinese civil war, 171.176.178.179.184.194, 198-199. 170,176,179,182,183,197.199,203, 202-204,205, 209-210,216-217,218219; and Korean War, 248; as threat to 219, 220, 221,230,255, 282n. 93; nation­ ROK. 195.196,203.209; as threat toTilalism in, 217-218, 219; Roosevelt’s policy wan, 217, 242; ties with Korean guerrillas, toward, 15-16, 21, 253-254, 261n. 17; 13,30,233; victories over Nationalists, Soviet position in, 28, 33, 34, 36,47,127, 154.184, 251; Truman’s policy toward, 3,116,126,165,190.216.233 loalition Committee, 90-92,94-97, 11“ 31-32, 34, 35, 36,116,126,176,198-199, edition government in Korea, H2,1 3 217-219, 226, 237. 254, 258, 300n. 30, •~u\Y7„r ? a si 106-107. HO, 267n302n. 72, 306n. 62; U.S. interests in after World War II, 8,10,15-16,18, 33; U.S. >ration and collaborators, 48,50,55, efforts to counter Soviet expansion in, 179, 76,95,114 181,194,198-199. 202,203,204-205, ive security, 240,257 206,208. 209,217-219, 251,254. S ee also jnism, 160,171,193,198.205,258. Pacific :al in Korea. 7.28.47-48; identify Atlantic Charter, 9,11,16 i Soviet expansionism, 3,26,5 . • atomic bomb, 37, 39,40,41,43, 226 232,256-258; and instability «id«oAustralia: opposition to U.S. policy in Korea, ifc distress, 3,133,218,221,22 , 135,144; participation on UNTCOK, 135, in ROK. 191,194,201,207 141,142,143.148,157; andUNCOK, 212 , 234

«rives (rightists) in southern Korea.

Subject Index 52-53,290n. 55; attitude toward demo­ cratic principles and reform, 55,80,133, 135; as barrier to Soviet expansionism, 78; criticism of AMG, 96,102,112,132; criti­ cismof Soviet Union, 113,117,119; efforts of AMG and Hodge to restrict activities of, 97,102,103,112-113, 117, 119,135-136; factionalism among, 55,92, 117; intimidation and criticism of U.S., 96,97.102,112-113,116-117, 132,135. 136; andJoint Commission negotiations, 113,116-118; KPR repression of, 48; and North Korean electric power shut-off, 156; opposition to trusteeship and Moscow agreement, 68, 72,103,112,113,119, 281n. 71; popularity and power of, 119, 123,127, 133; position on U.S. with­ drawal, 113,132; pressure for creation of separate government, 97,103,113,118, 132, 290n. 55; repression of leftists, 62, 78,94,135; Soviet criticism of, 161; sup­ port from Hodge and AMG, 54-55,62-63, 78-79,96,97,102, 281n. 71, 287n. 74; ties with police and youth groups, 78,102103; U.S. attitude toward, 80, 88,119, 136,137,160-161. See also Korean Provi­ sional Government; Southern Korea constabulary army, South Korean: capabilities of, 208, 211, 230, 231, 233, 304n. 30; conservative (rightist) ties with, 140; as deter­ rent to Soviet expansion and North Korean invasion, 133,152,155,165,181,184, 190.207, 208, 231, 251, 309n. 23; elec­ tions of May 1948,147; loyalty to ROK, 183.208, 231, 233; operations against guerrillas, 155, 200,208, 309n. 23, 310n. 24; performance during Korean War, 235, 238, 243-244, 245, 246-247, 248, 249250,255, 3l4n. 87; and South Korean police, 92; South Korea's desire to strengthen, 190,194, 206, 208, 229, 309n. 18; and UNTCOK, 166; U.S. desires to limit, 173-174,185,189,192, 206-208, 209, 231, 233; U.S. efforts to strengthen, 142,150-153,155,158,162,168,174, 180,184-185,190-191,193, 208-209, 229-230, 244-245, 294n. ll,300n. 31, 304n. 26; and U.S. military advisors, 165, 237, 245, 246-247; and U.S. withdrawal, 77,129; and \bsû Rebellion, 168-169. See also Korean War; North Korean invasion of South Korea; Self-defense; U.S. Depart­ ment of the Army containment: in Asia, 3,108,199; as coercive force, 114-115; in Europe, 2, 3,156; Kennan’s formulation of, 2, 254, 257-258; in Korea, 3,4,108, 114,115-116,123-124, 125,127.130,134,162,174,196-199,

339

202-203, 216, 217-219, 225, 254,255, 277n. 72, 279n. 24,284n. 30; Korea as test case of, 3,176,198-199, 202,203204,205,217, 220,221,254; as liberating force, 4,134,198-199, 200, 202-203, 221, 232,255; nature and objectives of, 3,107, 257, 284n. 28,30; success of, 255-256; through limited means, 3,107,175-176, 181.197, 200, 203, 217-219, 225, 226, 230-231, 237, 253, 255, 257-258; through local self-defense, 3, 107,172,174,175176.197, 200. 203, 218, 226, 230-231, 237, 251, 254, 258; through U.S. military power, 3, 176, 218, 255, 256-257, 258, 317n. 17 Council of Foreign Ministers, 40,42,61,104, 120

Dairen, 39,40,44,45 defense spending, U.S.: 3, 153,171, 226227,256-257, 316n. 10 defensive perimeter, 181-182, 217, 218,222, 251, 306n. 65 demobilization, 59,69,99 Democratic Fatherland Front, United Korean, 202, 233-234 Democratic party, 106, 204, 205, 220 Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK, North Korea): army of, 170,174, 183,189, 203, 229, 233. 235, 242, 246, 249, 3l4n. 75; creation and constitution of, 160,167; demands for U.S. with­ drawal, 160,167, 202; efforts to weaken ROK, 155-156,163,168-169,182,195, 202, 206, 209. 233-234, 235, 292n. 82, 294n. 21 ; internal popular support for, 183,189,195, 233; plans for attack on South Korea, 235-236, 251, 255; pleas for support in South Korea, 169, 202, 234, 235, 236; reaction to U.S. intervention in Korean War, 250-251; South Korean threats to invade, 173-174,188,191.193, 208, 230, 233; Soviet influence over and relations with, 154,162,167,184,197, 232, 235, 236, 246, 255; Soviet military aid to, 208, 209, 215, 233, 236; Soviet pressure for U.S. and United Nations recognition of, 146,156,177; strategy of subversion and political intimidation, 160,178, 207, 235; as threat to ROK survival, 154,160, 162,166,167,168,174,184,190,191, 193, 194-197, 200, 202-203, 205, 207, 210,211,218,229-230,231,232,233, 255; and United Nations, 167,168,177, 186, 201,202, 212-213. 227, 234, 245246; U.S. bombing of, 246, 247, 248, 249; U.S. criticism of, 212; U.S. desire to weaken and discredit, 195,198-199, 200,

Subject Index

340 202-203, 212, 221, 233; U.S. hope for amalgamation with the ROK, 3-4,164, 163,166,173,188,221. S ee a h o Northern Korea; North Korean invasion of South Korea democratic principles, 72; familiarity of Korean people with, 91.127; and décrions of May 1948,146,149; and ROK constitu­ tion, 138; Truman’s policy on and support for, 31-32,138,161,198; U.S. stand on, 130,161,203,224. S ee a lso National selfdetermination demonstrations, Korean, 7,48,33-34,6667,117,119,194 East Asia, 16, 33.64,80,87,98. S ee also Asia Eastern Europe: compared with Asia, 31, 33; compared with Korea, 2,29, 33, 51,54, 55-56,60,80,81,106,118; Soviet behav­ ior in and policy toward, 1, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36,40-41,254,267n. 18; U.S. policy toward, 1, 32. S ee also Soviet expansionism economic assistance, U.S.: to create situations of strength. 175-176,218, 230-231; as diplomatic weapon and to achieve Korean reunification, 104,105,112,115,167, 173,175-176,191, 208, 215,222, 223224,254; as incentive for Soviet expansion, 205, 255-256; Soviet criticism of, 179; for underdeveloped nations, 175-176,181, 203. S ee also Republic of Korea; Southern Korea; U.S. Congress Economic Cooperation Administration (ECA), 231; aid mission to ROK, 163, 173, 219-220; assumes responsibility for eco­ nomic aid to Korea, 173; and economic aid program for ROK, 163,164,184,187, 198, 202,208,210, 223-224; and inflation crisis, 214,216,222,223-224. S ee also Economic assistance elections of May 1948: balloting and out­ come, 148-149; and conservatives (right­ ists), 137,145,148,156; criticism of, 149; as expression of popular will, 145,148, 149,157,293n. 94; Korean opposition to, 147,291n. 56; leftist and Communist reac­ tion to, 146,147-148,149; police and youth group involvement in, 147; Soviet attitude toward, 146,147; and United Nations, 144-145,146,148,187; UNTCOK report on. 157,165,166; and U.S. withdrawal. 149-150,151,152; U.S. preparations for, 137,145,146,147,148; violence surrounding 147-148,149,290n. 55. S ee also Separate government; United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea elections of May 1950,223,224-225,228229.230,234,308n. 86

dectric power shut-off. North Korean, 146, 147,133,292n. 82,294n. 21 El Salvador, participation on UNTCOK, 1)3, 140,157 Europe, 34, 51,137,196; Allied military action in, 23.33; U.S. efforts to contain Soviet expansion in, 2, 153,175,256, 300n. 30 Foreign Aid Appropriations Act of 1949,204 Formosa, 20,23,43,44,229,245. See also Taiwan Fiance, 41,208; participation on UNTCOK, 135,141,145,190 General Order Number One, 44,45,46 Germany, 2.25,33,36.39. 158,162,256 global interventionism, U.S., 1,2,4,236237.253,257,258,317n. 17 Government Aid and Relief in Occupied Areas (GARIOA), 172,204 Greece, 106, 107,108.112,115,116,189. 196,236,284n. 37 guerrilla activities: against ROK, 155,182, 200,207,208,209,251,309n. 23.310n. 24; in Manchuria and China, 8,9«13«14« 30,262n. 31; in Siberia, 18-19,36; in southern Korea, 92 Hopkins Mission, 33-36 imperialism: American, 179« 196,218,219, British, 26; Japanese, 7-8; Soviet and Communist, 217,231,241 India: participation on UNTCOK, 135,142, 143,176; policy toward Korea, 144; and UNCOK, 176-177 Indochina, 17,41,208,245,256 inflation crisis in ROK, 213-216,221-225, 226,235 . Inter-Divisional Area Committee on tnc East, 21-22 Izvestia , 86,178 an, 10,11,16.18,74.98.231: attack«» Pearl H arbor, 1 ,8 ; colonial pohey m Corea, 7,47, 53; conquest and donunanon

if Korea, 2,5-7,8,9.12.21,27,5 , est with Russia and China for control cats Corea, 5-6,270n. 79 ; defeat of mWorld »hr II, 5.43,44-45,46.47,48.49. 13, 164,272n. 2; fate of mandated dands. 17. 31,264n. 68; andK°r«n Wax. 241. !43,244; policy in Korea after Wind I , 48,271n. 88; and reparations. 87; ana J. S. after World War II. 172,218;U.S. ilans for defeat of, 23,24,25.27, 9. 14-35,36-37,39-40,41-42,43

Subject Index

34i

15,17,21-22, 30-31,35,36-37,39,4142,265n. 77; U.S. policy before World War II, 2, 5-7,253; underground leaders, World War II, 47-48 Korean aid bills: in 1950,197-199, 202-205, 206, 219-221, 222; in 1951, 221, 229. See j/roU.S. Congress Korean-American Financial and Property Set­ tlement, 166-167, 301n. 40 Korean-American Treaty of Friendship and Commerce, 5-6,190 Korean civil war, 239,258; fears of, 85,103, 150,168,188,201; Soviet position on, 177; UNTCOK position on, 178, 211,212. See also Korean War; North Korean inva­ sion of South Korea; Partition of Korea; Reunification of Korea; South Korean invasion of North Korea Korean Communist party, 79,136,205-206; actions in North Korea, 51,202; attitude of U.S. occupation officials toward, 68,71, 80,83; demands for U.S. withdrawal, 139; efforts to subvert ROK, 162,168-170,176, 182, 202, 208, 234; formation of and fac­ tionalism within, 26In. 14, 271n. 86; influence over KPR, 48-49, 54; popularity and strength of, 28,29,47-48,83,94, 134, 26ln. 14; position on trusteeship and Moscowagreement, 67,68; ROK's repres­ sion of, 206, 213, 287n. 74; as source of disruption and violence, 94,139,146,147, 149; and SKILA elections, 94; Soviet ties with and support for, 28, 55,67, 26ln. 14, Korea: appeal of Communist ideology in, 7, 271n. 86; and UNTCOK, 139; U.S. occu­ 28, 37,47-48,87; compared with Eastern pation repression of, 94,121,134,139, Europe, 2,29, 33, 39, 51, 54, 55-56,60, 147, 280n. 66; and Yosù Rebellion, 16880, 81,106; and democracy, 8,91; differ­ 170. See also Korean People’s Republic; ences between north and south, 52-53; Leftists in southern Korea fears of Sino-Soviet conflict over, 18-19, Korean independence movement: attitude of 23, 36; impact of Cold War on, 2, 51, 52; U.S. military leaders toward, 12, 26, instability during World War 11, 2,47, 53, 262n. 31,265n. 87; and Communist ide­ 54; Japanese rule over, 2, 7-8,9,12, 21, ology, 7, 22; factionalism within, 7,10,14, 27,37,47,53; revolutionary nationalism 23,47, 26ln. 12, 262nn. 28, 31, 263n. in, 37,47; role in U.S. planning and pol­ 46; pursuit of U.S. aid and support, 7,9; icy, 2, 3,4,8,19,28,45-46,106,108, and underground, World War II, 47-48, 115,127-130,151, 161,172,175,19677; U.S. impartiality toward, 8,9,10,11, 197,198-199, 202, 203-204, 217, 21812,13,14, 22, 29-30,36. See also Guer­ 219, 220, 221, 229, 230, 252, 254, 275n. rilla activities; Korean patriots and exiles; 30,282n. 93; Roosevelt's policy toward, Korean Provisional Government 8-9,11, 21,26, 28, 30, 31, 35, 253-254; Korean independence and self-government: strategic importance of, 4,8,12,19,21, extent of in northern Korea, 55-56, 75-76; 22,26-27, 28,45-46,60,63-64, 74,86, Korean demands for, 2,8,16, 20, 50,6198.115, 122-123,127, 128-129,133, 153, 62,63,64, 72,97,113,144,149; Korean 163,179,181,182,196,197; Truman's readiness for, 7,8, 13* 16, 21, 22, 26, 28, policy toward, 38,44-46,61,68, 74,90, 36-37,47, 58,64,66,83, 86,140,144, 97,106,123-124,126,160-161,175,177, 149; Nationalist China’s position on, 14, 185,197-199; and U.S. military strategy 19; in southern Korea, 64,101,102,103, during World War II, 25, 34, 36; U.S. 104,108,109; Soviet position on, 43,69, plans for during Woild War II, 2,8-9,13,

Japanese Empire, 20,28. See also Japan Joint (Soviet-American) Commission, 65,67, 77,105,109,279n. 26; areas of agreement and progress, 81,83,93,111-112,114, 117; and conservatives (rightists), 83-84, 92-93,97,102, 111, 112,113,116-119, 285n. 46; creation of consultative body, 113,114,117; deadlock and adjournment in May 1946,84-85,86,88,98; deteriora­ tion of negotiations and permanent adjournment, 116-120, 121,122,131; dis­ cussions on joint report, 120,121,122; dis­ cussions on trusteeship, 81,82,83,84,85; efforts to reconvene, 86,88-89,92-97, 100,105,106,109.110.284n. 37; posi­ tion of U.S. occupation officials on, 71-72, 78-79,92, 285n. 46, 287n. 74; Soviet position on conditions for consultation, 80, 81,82,83-84,92-93,110-112,113-114, 117,118-119,121-122, 285n. 46; Soviet proposal for mutual withdrawal, 130,131; U.S. position on conditions for consulta­ tion, 80,82,83.84,85,92-93, 97,102, 103,110-112,113,116-119, 122,131, 285n. 46; U.S. preparations for, 68-69, 71-72,79,80; U.S. support for freedom of expression, 79-80,84,85,88, 93,110112,119,126,285n. 46. See also Moscow agreement Joint (Soviet-American) Conference, 65,7071,73

M* 81, 111, 122, 131; through early U.S. mili­ tary occupation, 34, 39-40,41,42,43; through Moscow agreement, 63,67, 112; through Soviet-American agreement, 38, 61, 62, 63, 75, 90,100, 101. 105, 111; through trusteeship, 8, 12,13, 15, 19, 20, 21, 26, 27, 28, 38, 51, 61,64, 65. 254; United Nations supervision of progress toward, 135, 138; U.S. commitment to period of preparation for, 20, 21, 26-27, 54, 59, 61, 66, 89, 276n. 68; U.S. criticism of Soviet Union for preventing, 56,111, 187; U.S. support for, 2, 9,12,13, 18, 20, 69, 73,81,252 Koreanization, 79, 94, 105 Korean Military Advisory Group (KMAG), 190, 207, 231, 241, 244, 245, 246, 309nn. 22, 23, 31 In. 43. See also American mili­ tary advisors in Korea; Constabulary army Korean patriots and exiles, 7, 58, 262n. 28; as advisors during U.S. occupation, 56,62, 88; backing inside Korea, 9, 10, 14, 22; in China, 9, 14, 22, 28, 30, 262n. 31; criti­ cism of trusteeship, 16, 21, 26-27, 50; Jap­ anese attitude toward, 48; pursuit of U.S. aid and support, 9, 10; return to Korea, 57, 62, 76; in Siberia, 13, 22, 29, 262n. 31; in U.S., 7, 9. S ee also Guerrilla activi­ ties; Korean independence movement; Korean Provisional Government Korean people, 5, 15, 69, 80, 81, 84, 101, 130,178; attitude toward communism and Communist party, 38, 207; attitude toward Soviet Union, 38, 131-132,187; attitude of U.S. occupation officials toward, 53, 54, 55,64,140; desire for change and reform, 47, 76, 79; and elections of May 1948, 146, 149; familiarity with democratic principles, 91,127; opposition to trusteeship, 7,48, 64, 103,144,187; reaction to U.S. occupa­ tion of Korea, 53, 55, 78; revolutionary activity of, 7, 47 Korean People’s Republic (KPR): Communist involvement in, 48-49, 54; conservative (rightist) relations with, 48; efficiency, organization, and claim to legitimacy, 54, 55, 63; Japanese involvement in, 48, 27In. 88; policies and programs of, 49; popular support for, 48-49,63; Soviet sup­ port for, 54, 55; U.S. occupation policy toward, 54,62,63, 72, 273n. 19. S ee also Korean Communist Party; Leftists in southern Korea Korean Provisional Government (KPG): fac­ tionalism within, 26 Inn. 12, 14; forma­ tion of and claim to legitimacy, 7, 8,10, 11,14, 30, 260n. 12, 263n. 46; liquida­ tion of, 78; and Marshall-Molotov compro­

Subject Inda mise, 112-113; Nationalist China's sup­ port for, 12,14,23,29,56,62; opposition to trusteeship and Moscowagreement on Korea, 16,68, 72; plans for military opera­ tions againstJapan, 11,12,13,16,24, 263n. 46, 265n. 87; pressure for U.S. aid and support, 8,9,10,11,14-15,16,19, 22-23, 24, 263n. 46; relations with Hodge and the AMG. 54,62,63.68,71-72. 90; return to Korea in 1945,62; Soviet criti­ cism of, 56; support from American citi­ zens for, 10,11,12,16; U.S. pressure to broaden support for, 14,15; U.S. refusal to recognize, 8,10, 11, 12, 14,15,16,22-23, 29-30, 36,260n. 12,263n. 46. See also Conservatives (rightists) in southern Korea; Korean independence movement; Korean patriots and exiles; U.S. Department of State Korean War: discussions in U.S. on commit­ ment of combat forces in, 240-241,242243. 245, 247, 249-250,251; dispatch of U.S. survey team, 243,246-247,3l4n. 87; evacuation of U.S. personnel, 195,241, 243, 244, 248, 313nn. 65,66; impart on U.S. foreign policy, 236-237,250,251252, 253, 255-258, 3l6n. 10,317n. 17; initial U.S. reaction to, 238-239,241-242, 244, 251; origins of, 235-237,239,258, 310n. 34; Soviet involvement in, 235,236, 240-241, 242-243,245,247,248,258, 31 In. 35; United Nations reaction to, 238, 239, 245-246; U.S. commitment ofcom­ bat forces in, 1,4,195-197,237,248, 250-251, 252, 253,255,257,258,3l4n. 87, 315n. 95; U.S. emphasisonneedfor international action on, 195-196,243, 244-245, 246; U.S. preparations for Soviet and Chinese intervention in, 196,242, 246, 247-248, 249; use of U.S. air and naval power in, 241, 242-243,244,245, 247. See also Blair House meetings; Con­ stabulary army; North Korean invasionor South Korea Kuomintang. See Nationalist China Kyushu, 36, 37,41,42 land ownership, 52- 53;Japanese, 48;KPR policy on, 48,49; ROK policy on, 20 , 214, 216,223; Soviet policy on, in noitnem Korea, 76,102; U.S. policy on, in southern Korea, 88,92, 155 Langdon-Balasanov compromise, 92-93, _ See also Joint (Soviet-American) Commis* >n; Moscow agreement its in southern Korea, 48; deman form, 63; and Joint Commission negot«>ns, 71,117-118; opposition of AMUw.

Subject Index 54-55,62-63,71,79,96,113,134, 141, 147; opposition to elections of May 1948, 133,141,143,149; popular support for and effectiveness of, 96,117; position on trusteeship and Moscow agreement, 67; relations with UNTCOK, 79; repression of, 139,147-148; Soviet involvement with, 63; as threat to stability, 72,92,141, 281n. 76; ties with Communist party, 79. See also Korean People's Republic Lend Lease, 8 ,9 ,15,284n. 28 Lodge amendment, 203-206

343 Munich analogy, 236, 257 Mutual Defense Appropriations Program (MDAP), 207, 209. 210, 229-230, 233, 305n. 32

National Assembly of Republic of Korea: arrest and trial of members, 201-202, 213, 228; claim to legitimacy, 157; criticism of U.S., 167, 215; Dulles address to, 232, 310n. 27; and economic aid program for ROK, 215, 220, 222, 224, 225; factional­ ism and competition within, 159; formula­ tion and adoption of ROK constitution, 157-158; friction with and efforts to check Manchuria, 44,87,163, 236; and Allied mili­ power of SyngmanRhee, 167,187-188, tary strategy, World War II, 36, 37; and 200-202, 214, 222-223, 224, 228,301n. Cairo Declaration, 20; fears of Soviet con­ 31; and inflation crisis, 222, 223, 224; and trol over, 24, 33, 34, 33; Korean guerrilla land reform, 214; membership of, 156; operations in, 9,13,262n. 31; and Korean passage of National Security Act, 169; rela­ War, 248, 249 tions with UNCOK and UNTCOK, 156, March First Rebellion, 7,145 157, 201; and U.S. military withdrawal, Marshall-Molotov compromise, 112,122, 152, 297n. 79* See also Elections of May 285n. 46. See also Joint (Soviet-American) 1948; Elections of May 1950; Republic of Commission; Moscow agreement Marshall Plan, 175,198 Korea nationalism, 217-218, 219, 256 missionary activities, 7,12, 53,146 Moscowagreement on Korea: communiqué Nationalist China, 9,10; decline and fall of, on consultations, 83, 84,111-112; 116,170,176,182,197, 199, 203, 216, 218, 233, 306n. 62; fears of Soviet expan­ divergence of interpretations on, 70-71, 81.82, 254; Hodge's criticism of, 70, 71, sionism, 13,19,23, 29, 36, 38; interests in 72; implementation in southern Korea, Korea and Asia, 14,15.19, 20, 22, 24, 26; 110,111 ; Korean reaction to and criticism and Moscow agreement, 67; and plans for Korean trusteeship, 15,17,19, 20, 21,61; of, 66-67, 72, 73, 75,86,93,119; as means to achieve reunification, 69-70; popular support for, 176, 203; position on negotiation of terms and approval, 65-66; reforms, 176, 203, 216; Soviet attitude Soviet inflexibility on terms of, 73,81, 82, toward, 36; Truman's policy toward after 84,93, 111-112,121-122, 123,131-132; defeat in Chinese civil war, 217, 219, 220, 242, 244; and UNCOK, 212, 228; and Soviet suspicion of U.S. insincerity regard­ ing, 70, 72, 73, 82; Soviet and U.S. charges UNTCOK, 135,141,143; U.S. economic of violations of, 86, 93,105,110-111, and military aid to, 116,197,199, 203, 220, 244, 256; U.S. efforts to strengthen, 122-123,131; trusteeship provision of, 67, 40; and U.S. military occupation of Korea, 68.69.81.82, 83, 85, 89,92,93, 111, 254,276n. 63, 285n. 46; U.S. equivoca­ 41,43-44,45,49; and U.S. plans for Asia tion on terms of, 67-68,73,93, 276n. 68; after World War II, 13,14,16; warnings of U.S. betrayal of the ROK, 170; weakness U.S. inflexibility on terms of, 75, 79, 111, 122; U.S. support for, 66, 72, 81, 82, 88, of, 23, 24. See also China National Security Council (NSC): and Korean 91,101,113,116. See also Joint (SovietWur, 246, 247; and North Korean invasion American) Commission; Joint (Sovietof South Korea, 208; paper NSC-8,153American) Conference; Trusteeship for Korea 154,159,165,180; paper NSC-8/1,184, Moscow(Council of Foreign Ministers) Con­ 185, 294n. 11, 300n. 30; paper NSC-8/2, 184-185, 209, 230, 299n. 21, 300n. 30; ference of 1945, 86, 254; Byrnes report on, paper NSC-48/2, 255; paper NSC-68, 67-68; discussions on Korea, 64-66,69, 226-227, 256, 308n. 6, 3l6n. 10; position 73; impact on U.S. foreign policy, 74, 75; on military aid to ROK, 207; and U.S. Truman's reaction to, 67-68; U.S. prepara­ withdrawal, 152,180-181,184-185 tions for, 63-64. See also Moscow agree­ ment national self-determination, 3,4; in Korea, 10,18, 28, 54,81, 252, 254; in southern Moscow(Council of Foreign Ministers) Con­ Korea and ROK, 97,165; Soviet attitude ference of 1947, 106,109,110

344

toward, 28,56; U.S. stand on, 9,106,125, 150 National %uth Association (Movement), 7778,102-103,127,161. S ee a lso Youth groups NATO, 147,192 N e w York T im es, 106,149,282n. 93,285n. 45 northern Korea (Soviet zone): compared with Eastern Europe, 55-56, 118; creation of separate government in, 102,142,159; demands for U.S. withdrawal, 142,147; early reports on developments in, 50-51; extent of Soviet control in, 55-56, 75-76, 85,102,118,147; importance of to Soviet interests and security, 47, 56,60, 70, 7576; and Joint Commission negotiations, 117; leadership and elections in, 76,102; military force in, 3,105,118,132,142; proposal for nationwide elections, 147; and reforms, 76,102, 111; refugees from, 50, 63, 76,94,155,194; relations with United Nations and UNTCOK, 138,142,147, 289n. 32; rumors of Soviet industrial removals from, 60,86,87; as Soviet pup­ pet, 56,85,87,118,142; as threat to southern Korea, 105,118,132,142,143, 153; U.S. desire to gain access to, 71,80, 84,86-87; U.S. efforts to weaken Soviet position in, 3,85,134, 156; U.S. officials, visits to, 86-87,92,118,142. S ee a lso Democratic People’s Republic of Korea; Soviet occupation of northern Korea North Korea. S ee Democratic People’s Republic of Korea North Korean invasion of South Korea: as Hitlerite aggression, 236,242; planning, launching, and progress of, 1,235, 236, 237, 238,243-244, 245, 246-247,248, 249-250,255, 311n. 43,313n. 75; reac­ tion in U.S. and impact on policy, 4,237, 239, 242-243, 251; ROK warnings of, 168, 193,194,315n. 94; South Korean ability to repel, 1,170,190,194,207,210,231, 235,237,238,242,243-244, 245,246. 247,249-250, 255, 258, 309n. 23; and Soviet involvement, 162,197, 204, 207, 209, 210.229,235,236, 258, 31 In. 35; and United Nations, 195,237-238,239240; United Nations as deterrent to, 132, 166,185-186,201,210,211; U.S. actions to halt, 239. 240,243, 245, 246-247,249, 250,251, 315n. 95; U.S. fears of, 99,105, 132,143,160,166,169,170,174,180, 191, 209,210, 211-212; U.S. planning for, 153-154,194-197,204,207,218,226, 231. 234-235.237,251, 315n. 94.S e e a ls o Constabulary army; Korean War

Subject Index North-South Conference, 140,147. See also Reunification Pacific, 5, 18,30,181,198,317n. 17; U.S. policy planning for during WorldWirII, 8, 15, 21,34. See also Asia Pacific Pact, 192, 194,206,216,302o. 63 Pacific war: Allied planning and strategyin, 23, 24; relationship to Korea, 25,33; Soviet entry into, 18,22,23-24,25,26, 33,34,35,36,37,41,46; U.S. oppositioo to Soviet entry, 33,39-40,41,42,268n. 34. S ee also Japan Pacific War Council, 13,25 partition of Korea, 52,86, 159,254; Allied planning for, 41-42,44— 45; DPRKdeter­ mination to eliminate, 202,213,233,235, 236; Korean criticism of, 58,61-62,9697; permanence of, 58,60,61,66,68,75, 94,212; ROK determination to eliminate, 173, 182,189, 193.208,209,215,230, 233,235; and elections in southern Korea, 140,143,145,147,202,291n. 56; Soviet position on, 66,70-71 ; as Soviet strategy objective, 56,85; and United Nations, 125-126; U.S. blamed for. 147,191.193; U.S. efforts to remove, 60-61,65,70-71, 73, 75,84. See also Reunification; Separate government; 38th parallel Pauley report, 87-88,89,90,92,280n. 55, 28In. 71 Pearl Harbor, 1,8.252,253. See oho Japan People’s Committee, 142, 156,160,167 people’s committees, 48,51,54,75,102 Philippines, 6; importance for U.S. after World WarU, 115,181, 218;asmodelfor Allied colonial policy, 15-16,25— 26; and Pacific Pact proposal, 206; participationon UNTCOK, 135,143; and UNCOK, 212; U.S. action to strengthen after the out­ break of the Korean War, 243,245,256, and World War II, 23 Point Four, 175-176. See also Economic assis­ tance Poland, 29, 31,32, 39,60,61 police. South Korea: arrest of National Assembly members and newsmen, 201, 206, 210-211,228 ; corruption and abuse of power, 92,94-95,96,119,127,136, 148, l69,211,213;andNSC-8/2,185; relations with UNCOK, 186; repression0 Communists and leftists, 77,94-95.1 148, 206, 213; role in elections of May 1948 and May 1950.134,148,149.228; ties with conservatives (rightists), 77,10 • U.S. efforts to retain control over, 166167; U.S. plans for and creation of, 77

Subject Index PolicyPlanning Staff, 128,129,130,132, 240 political prisoners, 48,122,136,140 postwar reconstruction: American model for, 30-31.52,79,253; in Asia, 15,87,219; in Japan, 47; in Korea, 46.47, 52,59-60,68, 104,161,253,272n. 2; Soviet model for, 52,175,219; U.S. approach toward, 2.15, 30 PotsdamConference, 37-46,65,270n. 71 Pravda, 86,178 Provisional Korean Military Advisory Group (PKMAG), 165,169,179,191. See also American military advisors in Korea; Con­ stabulary army; Korean Military Advisory Group Provisional People’s Committee, 76,80 reparations, 44,86-87 Representative Democratic Council, 78-79, 80,84,97,113- S u also Conservatives (rightists) in southern Korea; Korean Provi­ sional Government Republican party, 106,116,198,199,203, 204-205,220,254 Republic of Korea (ROK, South Korea): as bulwark of democracy, 155,176,188-189, 194; commitment to reunification, 173174,188,189,193.208; Communist, Soviet, and DPRK threat to, 160,162,163, 167,168,170,174,182,184,188-190, 191.193,197-199,201-203,205,207211,218,229,233; DPRK and Soviet efforts to weaken, 155-156,167-170,178179,182,195,202,206,209,233-234, 235,255,292n. 82; desire for U.S. military protection, 154,162,170-172,174,176, 181,188,191-194,196-197.200,204, 206.218-219,222,229,251,298n. 79; expectations of a North Korean invasion, 168,169,193,194.229,315n. 94; friction with U.S., 166-167,183,189-194,200, 215-216,222-225,301n. 31; impact of Korean War on, 247,250,313n. 65, 3l4n. 75; instability in and opposition internally to, 168-170,171,185,187-188, 203-205,207,213,222-223,228; military and economic aid for, 3, 152, 153,155, 158,160,161,162-163,166-167,171, 172,173-174,180,182-185,188-189, 190-194,196-198.202-205,206-210, 215-216,219-224,229-230,231.233, 235-236,254-255,300n. 31, 304n. 26, 305n. 32,309n. 22; need for United Nations and international support, 151, 154,156,159,160,164,166,168,174, 176-179.184-188, 200,201, 206, 210, 212,224,228; position on U.S. with­

345

drawal, 161,192-194,297n. 79; program for economic recovery, 162-164,172-173, 175.180,183,184,189,197-198,203207.210.214- 215; progress toward democracy in, 158,160,165,166,186, 198, 200,201,203,206,211,213,215, 220-221,223-224,228-233,235.255; and reform in, 170,182,191; relations withUNCOK, 186,187,210-211,227228; repression of Communists and leftists, 169.201-202,206-207,210,213,224, 228; Soviet criticism of, 187; strength of in comparison to DPRK, 162,168,169,173, 182-183,184,188,191,193.203,309n. 22; U.S. commitments in, 151, 152-155, 162-164,168,171-172,174-175,176, 179-183.185,189,191-200,202-204, 206.210.215- 221,223-224,226,229232,239,242-246,248,250-252,254255.294n. 21,300n. 30,302n. 64,72, 306n. 65; U.S. desires for reform in, 3, 214-215,216,221-222,223-224; U.S. officials, visits to, 154, 182-183,215-216, 31In. 34; U.S. pursuit of economic recov­ ery in, 198,200, 209,210, 221, 225, 230, 231,232-233; U.S. support for the national character of, 159,160,164,168, 176,177,185; U.S. transfer of authority to, 158,161,162,164-165 reunification of Korea: Korean desire for, 58, 92,234; Soviet position on, 64,66,81,86, 143; through action at United Nations, 120, 123, 125-126,131,135,137-139, 143,176,178,186,187,198,201,212; through Communist takeover in South Korea, 182, 183; through creation of sepa­ rate government in southern Korea, 108, 109.115- 116,127,134,139,143,144. 254; through nationwide elections, 120, 140,147,201,202,234; through peaceful means, 140,147,173,187-188,195.221, 233-235; through force, 99,150,168, 173-174,177, 185,193,202, 208, 209, 212,213,230; through revolution in North Korea, 4,134,164, 165, 166,173,183, 188, 189,200,202-203,221,232,255; through Soviet-American negotiations, 2, 51,52, 56,59,60-63,65,67,69-70,71, 73.75.89.92.101.104.110.115- 116, 211; through trusteeship and implementa­ tion of Moscow agreement, 60-61,64,65, 67.68,73,93, 111, 123; through U.S. eco­ nomic aid, 104,105,112,115-116,134, 173,202-203, 212,221,254-255; through U.S. toughness toward Soviet Union, 80, 83.85,86,87,92.94,97,98; U.S. desire for, 67.122, 173,185,254. See also Mos­ cow agreement; Partition of Korea

346 rice (food), 52, 70; shortages of in ROK, 155, 214; shortages of in southern Korea, 94, 100; U.S. requisition and rationing system in southern Korea, 94,148 Rumania, 33, 56,60,66 Russia, Tsarist, 5,6,19, 270n. 79. See also Soviet Union San Francisco Conference, 29,30, 31 self-defense, local: as alternative to U.S. mili­ tary protection, 3,107,172,194,197, 200, 218, 251, 254; as barrier to Soviet expan­ sionism, 110,155,172,197, 203, 204; as condition for U.S. withdrawal, 109-110, 115,130,151,154,155,165,168,170, 174,180; Korean capacity for, 161,191, 193, 204, 207-208, 209, 216, 218-219, 226,230,231,232-233, 243, 249-250, 255, 309n. 23; U.S. pursuit of in Korea, 8, 130,151,153,154,155,174,184-185, 194,197-198, 203-204, 230-231,251, 254, 294n. 11. S ee also Constabulary army; Containment separate government in southern Korea, 86; to break Soviet-American deadlock, 109, 111, 113,119; Communist and leftist atti­ tude toward, 94,121; conservative (right­ ist) support for, 97, 103,113,118,121, 290n. 55; as device to force Soviets to retreat, 108, 111, 127, 254; elections for, 123,135-136,137,145,146,147-149; to facilitate U.S. withdrawal, 109-110,123, 145, 254; importance to U.S. of interna­ tional backing for, 123-124,135-136, 137-139,145,150; Korean opposition to, 140,145,147; position of U.S. occupation officials on, 63,64,90, 97,105,121,133, 141,143; Soviet position on, 110; as step toward democracy and reunification, 108, 109,115-116,127,134,139,143,144, 254; United Nations position on, 140,143; and U.S. containment policy, 108; U.S. planning and support for, 79,100,104, 108, 110,113,115,119,120,139, 140, 142, 143-144,150,153-154. S ee also Elec­ tions of May 1948; Partition of Korea; Republic of Korea; United Nations; United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea southern Korea (American zone): agitation against trusteeship in, 61-62,66-67,68, 72, 75, 79; as a bulwark against Soviet and Communist expansion, 112,127, 285n. 45; criticism of U.S. occupation policies in, 2, 53-54, 55, 59; economic distress and weakness in, 56,62,63, 70, 78, 89-90,94, 97-98,99-100,101,104,105,136-137, 153, 275n. 60; fears of Soviet and Commu­ nist expansion into, 54, 56, 57,64, 73, 78,

Subject Index 80, 83* 85,88,94,99* 109-110,113,118, 127-128,130, 133,143,153; instability and political factionalism in, 2, 50,53-54, 58,63,64,66-67,68,72,78,85,92,94, 95,96,97-98,100,103,105,109,118119* 132,133* 135* 136-137,141,143, 144,147-148,273n. 19; prospects for democratic development in, 123, 127, 133, 134, 281n. 71; removal of theJapanese from, 54; Soviet and Communist popular­ ity and influence in, 72,73,78,79,88,94, 131-132, 156; Soviet efforts to undermine U.S. position in, 56, 70,73,85,99-100, 122,127,146-147; U.S. officials, visits», 69* 80, 82,126-127,129,288n. 14; U.S. plans for aid to, 59,87,101-102,104,108, 112, 115, 116, 127, 129-130, 133,134, 254, 284nn. 30,37,285n. 45,300n. 30; U.S. and separate elections in, 104,108, 123, 136-137,139-140,145; weaknessof in comparison with northern Korea, 105, 130,142. See also American MilitaryGov­ ernment in Korea; American militaryoccu­ pation of Korea; Republic of Korea South Korea. See Republic of Korea South Korean Interim Government (SKIG), 91,97,147,156 outh Korean Interim Legislative Assembly (SKILA): attitude toward trusteeship and freedom of expression, 103; conservative (rightist) dominance of, 95,96; elections for representatives to, 95-96; popular sup­ port for, 91-92; U.S. planning for creation of, 85,90,95,280n. 66 outh Korean invasion of North Korea: ROK threats to stage, 173,191.193,208,209, 215, 230; U.S. fears of, 173-174,185,188, 207, 208, 209,210,230,233,310n. 34; U.S. opposition to, 173-174,185,207, 208, 231. See also Constabulary army; Republic of Korea oviet-American disagreement: in Eastern Europe, 29,31 ; fears of with respect to Korea, 51, 52; atJoint Commission negouations, 81,82-83,84,88.113-114,1U118,121,131-132; on freedom ofexpres­ sion, 84,85,93-94.110,121,126; on Moscow agreement, 70-71,75, , *? ” 94, 111, 254; on reconstnicdon and leader­ ship of Korea after World War II, 69.71; on Yalta agreements, 39 .. r oviet-American negotiations: opposition U.S. occupation officials to, 100,107, « 127; U.S. emphasis on toughstanceon. 32,67-68.75,83.84,85,94,97,98,101. 105, 257. See also Joint (Sovret-Amenon) Commission; Joint (Soviet-Amencan) ference

Subject Index Soviet-American occupation of Korea: absence of Allied agreement on, 47,49; criticism of, 46; diveigence of policies in each zone, 52; Soviet attitude toward coor­ dination of policies, 56, 59» 60,64-66, 70, 81; U.S. desire for coordination of policies, 49,56, 57, 59,60,61,64,67, 70; U.S. plans for, 44. See also American military occupation of Korea; Joint (Soviet-Ameri­ can) Conference; Partition of Korea; Soviet military occupation of Korea Soviet-American relations; deterioration of, 51,73,110, 267n. 18; impact of Korean War on, 257; regarding Eastern Europe, 31; regarding Korea, 47, 51, 52 Soviet-American withdrawal from Korea: Soviet proposals for, 130-131,132,134, 289n. 32; United Nations involvement with, 130,131,134,144-145,152,177, 178,180,184, 275n. 60, 289n. 32; U.S. position regarding, 85,120,131,133,134. See also American military withdrawal from Korea; Soviet military withdrawal from Korea; United Nations Commission on Korea Soviet (Red) Army, 33,46, 210; behavior in northern Korea, 50; entry into Korea, 41, 44,45,47, 254; Korean soldiers serving in, 55; and Korean War, 246, 247, 248. See also Soviet military occupation of Korea Soviet (Communist) expansionism: blueprint for world conquest, 236, 243, 253, 255, 257,258; in Eastern Europe, 29, 31, 32, 35, 36,40-41, 254,267n. 18; fears of in Asia, 13,24, 29, 31, 33, 34, 35, 36,43, 80, 126,132-133,179,194,199, 203, 206, 208, 209; fears of in China, 25, 34,45, 153; fears of inJapan, 34,45,47, 51,153, 179; fears of in Korea, 2,14,16,18-19, 24, 29-30, 33, 35, 36, 38, 39,41,47, 5051, 54, 56,64, 73, 78, 80,99-100,109110,114, 120, 126-127, 128, 154, 162163,187, 229; impact of Korean War on U.S. assessment of, 236-237, 242-243, 245; impact on U.S. policy, 1-2, 31, 32, 33,40-41, 254; nationalism as a barrier to, 217- 218, 219, 258; need to halt in Korea, 33, 57,80,100, 106, 115,120, 127, 128, 129-130,153,154,162,165,176,179180,193,198-199, 203-204, 209-210, 218- 219, 220, 221, 230,236,240-241, 242, 250, 251-252, 282n. 93, 285n. 45; nature and objectives of, 4, 107,187, 217— 218, 226-227, 251, 253; through military means, 4,154, 226-227, 237, 245, 249, 250, 251, 253, 255, 256, 258; through sub­ version and indirect aggression, 3,107, 128,132-133,154,162,198, 207, 209,

34 7

217-218, 226, 231, 251, 255; United Nations as a barrier to, 218,231,240; U.S. strategy to counter, 2, 3, 33, 35,45-46, 107,110,133,153, 171-172,179.194, 199, 203, 217-219, 221, 226-227, 231, 237, 253, 254, 256-258, 282n. 93. 300n. 30; U.S. strategy to counter in Korea, 31, 32, 37-38,64,80,83,90,104,108,127, 133,151,153-154,162,172,174,175176,179-180,182,194-199, 204-205, 215, 216,218-219, 225. 231, 233, 237, 250, 251, 254. See also Communism; Soviet Union "sovietization" (satellization): blueprint for in Korea, 55; in Eastern Europe, 56; in northern Korea, 51, 55-56,142, 266n. 3; fears of in Korea, 29. 34, 39. 51, 56,83. See also Soviet expansionism Soviet military occupation of Korea, 2,48, 109,191 ; and creation of army in northern Korea, 105,174; impact on Korean poli­ tics, 48, 271n. 88; and North Korean elec­ tric power shut-off, 146,156; possible establishment of throughout Korea, 28, 43,45,46, 271n. 88; preparations for and initial policy actions surrounding, 51, 5556, 75-76, 266n. 3; U.S. anticipation of, 22, 24, 35, 36-37,41,42; U.S. efforts to prevent. 33. 34, 39,40,4l, 42,43,44, 51. See also Northern Korea; Soviet Army; Soviet military withdrawal from Korea Soviet military withdrawal from Korea: com­ pletion of, 179,183; as means to force U.S. withdrawal, 168,178-179; as prelude to a North Korean invasion, 132,168; Soviet plans for, 167,178; UNCOK’s desire to verify, 210, 212, 228. See also Soviet mili­ tary occupation of Korea Soviet Union: and Asia, 16,18, 28, 31, 34, 44-45, 80, 132-133. 217-218,251,255, 306n. 62; attitude toward Syngman Rhee and KPG, 56,61; challenge and threat to U.S., 2, 3,4. 26. 32, 34, 60, 80,100,104, 106, 236-237, 253, 257, 258; criticism of U.S. policy in Korea, 72-73,86,179; desire for "friendly" Korea, 19, 23, 28, 37-38,46-47, 55. 56,66, 75-76, 79.81, 92,114-115; entry into Pacific war, 10,13, 23, 24-25. 39-40,41,43,44,46, 272n. 2; intentions in China, 34, 36,153; inten­ tions in Korea, 2,18-19, 28-29, 33. 34, 36-37,38.39,41,50-51, 55-56, 73, 74, 87, 130, 229, 242-243. 272n. 2, 285n. 42; interests inJapan after World War II, 33, 34,43,46,47,153; policy toward Europe, 3,18, 23; policy toward United Nations involvement in Korean affair, 123,125, 130-131.135,140,142,150,177,178,

348 212,289n. 32; press comments on Korea, 36,69-70, 72; reaction to United Nations actions during Korean War, 193,196, 240, 243, 246; strategic and security interests in Korea, 10,12, 14,19, 22, 23,47,60,6364, 74,81,86,112,122-123, 272n. 2; sus­ picions regarding U.S. intentions in Korea, 58,63-64,67, 70, 72, 79,86, 281n. 71; ties with Korean exiles, 13,18-19, 22, 28, 29, 37-38, 39; Truman’s policy of tough­ ness toward, 32-33. 35,41,67-68, 74, 75, 98; U.S. desire to consult on Korea during World Warll, 9,10,15,18,19; and war­ time agreements, 31,33, 34, 35. S ee also Communism; Soviet expansionism; Soviet military occupation of Korea Special Interdepartmental Committee, 101102,104,105,106 State-Army-Navy-Air Force Coordinating Committee (SANACC), 151-152,153 State-War-Navy Coordinating Committee (SWNCC): and economic aid to southern Korea, 101-102; andJoint Commission negotiations, 79, 89; and military aid pro­ gram for ROK, 108; and occupation of Japan and Korea, 30-31,43,45; and selfgovernment in southern Korea, 79,120; and Soviet-American occupation of Korea, 44,45; and trusteeship in Korea, 58-59, 63-64; and U.S. withdrawal, 101-102, 120; and use ofjapanese administrators and technicians, 53 Syria: participation on UNTCOK, 135,143, 145,148,157,176; andUNCOK, 176177, 305n. 46 Thegu riot, 94,281n. 76. See also Southern Korea Taiwan, 181, 217, 242,244,245, 256. See also Formosa Toss, 72, 73

Teheran Conference, 20,21 38th parallel: armed clashes at, 83,182, 203, 208, 234; criticism of, 46, 50, 59; reasons for choice as dividing line, 42,44-46, 269n. 65, 270n. 71; reasons for Soviet acceptance of, 46-47, 270n. 77; symbolism of, 52,87. See also Partition of Korea; Reunification of Korea T im e, 203, 310n. 24 Truman Doctrine, 106-107,112,114,196, 257, 284n. 30. See also Containment; Soviet expansionism trusteeship for Korea: to achieve indepen­ dence, 8,12,13, 15, 19, 20, 21, 26, 27, 28, 38, 51,61,64,254; to achieve reunifi­ cation, 59-61,64,66,69-70, 81; Allied policy on, 17,21, 25, 26, 27, 28, 29, 35-

Subjectlndex 36, 38,40,43,49,266n. 95; Koreanctidcism of and opposition to, 16,62,63,64, 66-67,72,79,103,112,113,117,281n. 71, 285n. 47; Nationalist China’sattitude toward, 18,29,38,59,65; oppositionof U.S. occupation officials to, 62-63,64,66, 68, 72, 78,82; Roosevelt’s policyon, 8-9, 16,17, 19.20,25-27,28,30,35,254, 26ln. 17; Truman's policy on, 31,35,36, 38, 51,61,254; U.S. abandonment ofin 1945, 29, 31,39,42,46; U.S. planningfor during World War II, 8-9,10,15.17,18, 19, 30-31, 33-34,37-39,265n. 77; U.S. plans for British participation in, 26,65; U.S. plans for Soviet participation in, 21, 23, 25,61; U.S. revival and puisuit ofdur­ ing fall of 1945, 58-59,60-61,63,64-66, 72-73,275nn. 30,60. See also CairoDec­ laration; Joint (Soviet-American) Commis­ sion; Moscow agreement; U.S. Department of State Turkey, 106,107,284n. 37,305n. 46 24th Corps, 49, 50. See also U.S. Armed Forces in Korea Ukraine, 135,139,140,178 United Nations, 71, 101,133, 184,203,209, 227; as barrier to Soviet expansionism, 218, 231, 240; to break Soviet-American dead­ lock, 123, 125, 135, 151.275n. 60;commitment to ROK, 145, 177- 178; consider­ ation of North Korean invasion of South Korea, 195,237-238,239-240,244-245, 245-246; consideration of report from UNTCOK, 166,167; consideration of reports from UNCOK, 238,239,245-246, contribution to permanent partition of Korea, 126, 135, 150,174; andcreauonot separate government, 140,143,144.145, and DPRK, 168,176, 177.178,187, 2122 1 3 ,289n. 32; importance of support tor a separate government and ROK, 124,129. 136,143,156,159.160,164,168,176, 178, 179-180.184,185,186-187,188, 210, 224; Interim Committee consider­ ation, 141,142, 1 4 3 - 1 4 5 ; involwmentm Soviet and American withdrawal, 123, 131. 134, 144, 145, 152,159.165.170, 171, 177, 178, 179,180,184,185,190. 198,289n. 32; military observers m Korea, 210,211-212,227; opposition of some members to involvement in Korean anair. 135, 137-139.143, 176; relations«* ROK and consideration of application tor admission, 160, 161, 162,164,176,,17 • 187,212; resolution of December 12, 1948.176-178,190,198; resolution«* June 25, 1950,238,239-240,243,245.

Subject Index resolution ofJune 27,1950,244-245, 245246; resolution of November 14,1947, 126,134-135,138,144,164,176,289n. 32; resolution of October 21,1949, 212; Soviet policy on consideration of Korean problem, 123, 125,130,131.135, 136, 137,138,143,150, 171,178,185,187, 212; supervision of elections in Korea, 120, 123,126,131,135-136,143,144,187; support for U.S. policy in Korea, 125,134, 135,143,144,150,177,178,212,239240, 246; and trusteeship, 29, 30, 31; U.S. desire for continuing involvement, 166, 174,176, 177,178,185-187,195, 210, 211-212, 224, 227, 238, 239, 242, 243, 244-245,246; U.S. plans for consideration of Korean problem, 104,109,123,125, 126,130-131,134, 288n. 14. See also Korean War; United Nations Commission on Korea; United Nations Temporary Com­ mission on Korea United Nations Commission on Korea (UNCOK): as deterrent to North Korean invasion, 185-186, 201, 210, 211, 212; and DPRK, 185,186, 201, 202, 227, 234; and elections of May 1950, 228; expansion of powers and responsibilities, 211-212; fears of North Korean invasion, 227; first report to United Nations, 211; formation, responsibilities, and prospects for success of, 176-177,178,186, 212; outbreak of Korean War, 238, 239, 245-246; pursuit of reunification, 178,186,198, 201, 212, 234; and ROK, 185-186,187, 201, 206, 210-211, 227-228; and Soviet Union, 178, 186, 210, 212; and Soviet withdrawal, 210, 212, 220; and U.S. withdrawal, 177.181. 186,189-190, 201, 210 United Nations Relief and Rehabilitation Administration (UNRRA), 22-23 United Nations Temporary Commission on Korea (UNTCOK): attitude of U.S. occu­ pation officials toward, 141,143,159,166; Canada's reluctance to serve on, 137-139; composition and duties of, 126,135-136; and constabulary army, 166; consultations with Koreans, 140,143; contacts with northern Korea, 139,140,142,147; denial ofROK’s national character, 142,157,159, 166; as deterrent to North Korean inva­ sion, 132,166; efforts to achieve Korean reunification and independence, 138,139, 140,145; involvement in U.S. withdrawal, 156-157,166; and leftists in southern Korea, 139; position on freedom in south­ ern Korea, 137,140,145,148,157,166; preparations for elections of May 1948, 135; reaction to instability in southern

349

Korea, 141,142,147; referral and report to Interim Committee, 141,142,143,144; relations with Hodge and AMG, 139,140, 141,142,145, 177; report on elections of May 1948,157,165,166,167; Soviet atti­ tude toward, 137,138-139.140-141,142, 177; supervision of elections in southern Korea, 139-140,141,142,143,144,145, 146,147,148; support for nationwide elec­ tions, 141,142,143,145,147; andSyngmanRheeandROK, 137,156,157,164. See also Elections of May 1948; Separate government United Sûtes: commitment to southern Korea, 4,99,104,107-108,109-110,112, 115,123,124,129,130,135, 284n. 30, 300n. 30; credibility and prestige of, 98, 99,101,115,130,137,154,171,179-180, 181,184,209,220, 228, 229, 249, 251252, 253, 315n. 95; emphasis on restraint in foreign affairs after World War II, 1-2, 3,4,106-107,153,171, 176,181,195197, 203,218-219, 226, 227,231,237, 241, 253, 258, 317n. 17; and importance ofKorea after World War II, 2,4, 5,8,19, 20, 27; interests, aims, and position in Korea of, 6,45-46,63-64,73, 74,98,112, 115, 123, 127, 128-129,133,153,161, 163,171,179,181,184,192, 209, 218219,220,230,252, 253; isolationist tradi­ tion in, 1,2,4,106; national security of, 1, 3,4,25, 32, 34,64, 74,107,115, 128129,138,153,171,172, 203-204, 230, 250, 253, 256; plans and policies for Asia after World War II, 2,8,15, 23-24,25, 26, 27, 30, 33. 34, 35, 36,63-64,87,98,99, 171,182, 184,197-199, 217-219. 237, 254-258; policy in Europe, 3, 256, 300n. 30; policy on exile groups, 9-10,11; policy on Korea before World War II, 2, 5-7,253; policy on Korean independence move­ ment, 8-9,10,11,13, 14, 22-23, 30-31, 36, 55-56,260n. 13; policy on use of mili­ tary power, 1, 3,4,27, 34, 35, 36, 38,99, 107, 108,115,153,171-172,194-197, 199. 206, 218, 226-227, 231, 236, 237, 238, 253, 254, 256, 258; reaction to Soviet expansion in Eastern Europe, 1-2, 3,3133, 34, 36,40-41, 267n. 18; response to Axis aggression, 1,106; role in interna­ tional affairs after World War II, 1, 2, 3,4, 99,106, 253,257-258; and Soviet inter­ vention in Korea, 2,13, 33-35, 38, 39,43, 44-46 U.S. Armed Forces in Korea (USAFIK): cele­ bration in honor of, 57-58; conditions in southern Korea for, 53,69,108; declining morale and discontent within, 53,69, 77,

35°

108; operations against guerrillas, 92; rea­ sons for selection of, 49; relations with con­ stabulary, police, and youth groups, 77, 92,102,152,193; vulnerability of, 63-64, 80,94,97, 99,104,108,123,126,16$, 179,184; withdrawal from Korea, 16$, 193, 200. See also American military occu­ pation of Korea; American military with­ drawal from Korea U.S. Congress: aid to Greece, 106,108,116; aid to Nationalist China, 220; and contain­ ment, 107,116; criticism of Ihiman’s pol­ icy in China and Korea, 197,199, 203, 204-20$, 219-220, 2$4; and defense spending, 227, 2$7; and economic aid pro­ gram for ROK, 1$2,162,163,164,172, 173,184,191,197-199, 202-20$, 206, 220-222, 229, 302nn. 69, 72, 307n. 78; and economic aid to southern Korea, 104, 106,108,114,116, 123,124,129,130, 288n. 14; and funding for U.S. occupation of Korea, 100, 101; hearings on U.S. policy in Korea, 10$, 1$3, 202-204, 221, 222; and Korean War, 196, 244; and military aid program for ROK, 191, 207, 209, 230, 30$n. 32; position on foreign economic and military aid programs, 106,116,12$, 162-163, 210, 230-231; rejection of Korean aid bill for 19$0, 219-220, 222; relations with State Department, 116,162163; and U.S. withdrawal, 203, 20$ U.S. Department of the Army: advocacy for U.S. withdrawal, 162,16$, 168,171,179, 184,18$, 192; criticism of Department of State, 136,1$3,162-163,164,184; desire to end responsibilities in Korea, 1$8-1$9, 163,171; and economic aid for ROK, 1541$$, 163,164, 203-204; and North Korean electric power shut-off, 292n. 82; planning for U.S. withdrawal, 133.1$2,1$3,157159; position on military aid for constabu­ lary army, 1$8,162-163,168, 203, 207208; and possibility of North Korean invasion, 194-197, 204, 207, 237 U.S. Department of Defense, 192, 230, 243, 246 U.S. Department of the Navy, 3$, 43,90, 280n. 61, 292n. 82 U.S. Department of State, 7,88,134; and Allison’s plan to break the Soviet-Ameri­ can deadlock, 120-121,123; attitude toward Hodge and U.S. occupation poli­ cies, 82,121,136, 281n. 71; desire for strong ROK, 1$2,162,182, 229; discord with Department of War and Department of the Army, 77, 82, 89-90,100-101,136, 152-153, 162,184, 27$n. 60; andeconomic aid for southern Korea, 101-102,

S u b ject Index

108-109,152; and economic recoverypro­ gram for ROK, 162, 163,164,172,198; and inflation crisis, 214-21$; andJoint Commission negotiations, 71,79; andmil­ itary aid program for ROK, 191,192,194, 209, 230; planning for trusteeship infall of 194$, $9,60-61, 27$nn. 48,60; planning for trusteeship in World War II, 1$, 16,18, 22, 24, 3$, 38-39; planning for occupation and administration of Korea, 21-22,21, 30, 3$, 37-38,41,49; policy on Chinaand Asia, 183, 203; policy on exile groups, 910,11; policy on Korean independence movement, 11,13, 30,3$, 58,262n. 31; and political affairs in southern Korea, 61, 80; position on relations with Soviet Union, 15, 16,33-35,36,77,89,100, 101,10$, 275n. 48,300n. 30;positionon U.S. withdrawal, 61, 128,129,130,151, 152, 153, 159,162,165,171,179,182, 184,192; preparations to establish embassy in South Korea, 108-109,159,162,166167; and proposals regarding North Korean invasion, 237,238,239,241,242, 246, 247; and reform in southern Korea and ROK, 78, 214-215; relations with KPG and Syngman Rhee, 10,11,16,57, 58,96, 275n. 30,28$n. 47; and reunifica­ tion through negodadon, 77,115-116; and ROK, 182; and a separate government in southern Korea, 115,119; and United Nauons policy on Korea, 126,130,131, 135,136, 151, 156-157,164,211,237, 238,239 . S. Department of Wu: attitude toward politics in southern Korea, 80,88— 89; and constabulary army, 59; discord with Department of State, 82,89,100-101, 109,129-130; and economic aid to south­ ern Korea, 101-102,109,114,129-130; and Joint Commission negotiations, 72, 83; opposition to trusteeship, 24,35; P™ for defeat ofJapan in World War II, 34-35, plans for U.S. occupation of Korea, 35, position on U.S. withdrawal, 59,60,8990,100-101,109,129- 130; and Soviet intentions regarding Korea, 114 S. Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS), 59; assessment of Korea’s strategic importance, 115, 128-129,196-197,230,306n. 65; and defense spending, 153,171; and economic aid to southern Korea, 115,197; ins^ c’ tions on U.S. occupation policy, 45,49-50, 275n. 60; andJoint (Soviet-American) Conference, 70; and Korean War, 247248, 249; and military aid program tor ROK, 230, 294n. 11, 310n. 23; plans«* defeat ofJapan in Wbrld War II, 25,36,

Subject Index plans for U.S. occupation ofJapan and Korea, 43,45,46,49; support for Hodge, 82,136; and trusteeship for Korea, 49,66; and U.S. withdrawal, 99,128-129,130, 150,153,158 U.S. Office of Strategic Services (OSS), 16,23 Wedemeyer report, 126-127,129, 288n. 14 Western Europe, 3,115, 172,256. See also Europe Yalta Conference, 25, 29; agreement on Far East, 26, 33-34, 35, 38, 39; agreements, 33, 35,40; and Korea, 25-26, 29, 33, 35-

351

36, 266n. 95,270n. 71; Sino-Soviet nego­ tiations on, 38, 39,40,45 Yosü Rebellion, 168-170,171, 185 Young Group, 187-188, 200, 201, 301n. 31. See also National Assembly youth groups: conservative (rightist) exploita­ tion of, 78,102,134; extent of U.S. sup­ port for, 77-78,99,100,102-103; repres­ sion of Communists and leftists, 94, 147-148, 213; as source of instability, 66, 78,103,127,147-148,149; U.S. efforts to control or eliminate, 72,119. See also National Youth Association Yugoslavia, 239, 256

A bout the Author

Jam es Irving Matray earned his doctoral degree in United States his­ tory at the University o f V irginia, where he specialized in American diplomacy. He holds a m aster’s degree from the University of Virginia and a bachelor’s degree from Lake Forest College, where he graduat­ ed w ith honors and was elected to Phi Beta Kappa. Presently an assis­ tan t professor o f history at New Mexico State University in Las Cruces, he has taught previously at the University o f Texas at Arlington, Cali­ fornia State College in Bakersfield, Glenville State College in West Virginia, and Delaware State College. His articles have appeared in D iplom atic H istory, the Journal o f Am erican History, the Pacific His­ torical Review, and The H istorian. In 1980, he was co-recipient of the Stuart L. Bem ath Article Award from the Society for Historians of American Foreign Relations.

A Study from th e C enter for Korean Studies University o f Hawaii

The Center for Korean Studies was established in 1972 to coordinate and develop the resources for the study of Korea at the University of Hawaii. Its goals are to enhance faculty quality and performance in Korean studies; to develop comprehensive, bal­ anced academic programs; to stimulate research and publications; and to coordinate the resources of the University of Hawaii with those of other institutions, organiza­ tions, and individual scholars engaged in the study of Korea. Reflecting the diversity of the academic disciplines represented by affiliated members of the University fac­ ulty, the Center seeks especially to promote interdisciplinary and intercultural studies. Studies from the Center for Korean Studies Studies on Korea: A Scholar's Guide, edited by Han-Kyo Kim. 1980 Korean Communism, 1943-1980: A Reference Guide to the Political System, by Dae-Sook Suh. 1981 Korea and the United States: A Century o f Cooperation, edited by Youngnok Koo and Dae-Sook Suh. 1984 The Reluctant Crusade: American Foreign Policy in Korea, 1941-1930, by James I. Matray. 1985

Production Notes

This book was designed by Roger Eggers. Com­ position and paging were done on the Quadex Composing System and typesetting on the Compugraphic 8400 by the design and production staff of University of Hawaii Press. The text typeface and display typeface is Gara­ mond. Offset presswork and binding were done by VailBallou Press, Inc. Text paper is Glatfelter Offset, basis 50, a “permanent” uncoated paper.