The regeneration of east Manchester: A political analysis 9781526102874

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THE REGENERATION OF

EAST MANCHESTER

The book explores the role of public sector agencies such as New East Manchester, NDC/Beacons and the Housing Market Renewal Programme; the Manchester voluntary sector and the private sector including the major investments linked to Manchester City Football Club and the Etihad Campus. While the book focuses on a single regeneration initiative, it has wider relevance to national and international regeneration initiatives. The book assesses the outcomes of the regeneration initiative although it demonstrates the difficulties in producing a definitive evaluation. It has a political focus and illuminates and challenges many assumptions underpinning three major current academic debates: governance, participatory democracy and ideology.

BLAKELEY AND EVANS

East Manchester has been the site of one of the most substantial regeneration projects internationally. Urban regeneration was a central plank of New Labour policy and the approach has radically altered since the election of the Coalition Government in 2010. East Manchester was one of the most deprived areas of Britain in 1997, referred to as a ‘basket case’ in dire need of regeneration. The initiative in east Manchester confirmed the tag that the city is the ‘regeneration capital’ of the United Kingdom.

The book is relevant to students of politics, geography, sociology, public administration and recent history but will also interest practitioners, academics and general readers interested in urban regeneration. Mancunians will also be fascinated in the rapidly changing face and character of their city as will those with an interest in Manchester’s football, the Commonwealth Games and Sportcity. Georgina Blakeley is Lecturer in Politics at the Open University Brendan Evans is Emeritus Professor of Politics at the University of Huddersfield Cover image © Len Grant ISBN-978-0-7190-8440-9

www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk

GEORGINA BLAKELEY AND BRENDAN EVANS

The regeneration of east Manchester

The regeneration of east Manchester A political analysis Georgina Blakeley & Brendan Evans

Manchester University Press Manchester and New York distributed in the United States exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan

Copyright © Georgina Blakeley and Brendan Evans 2013 The right of Georgina Blakeley and Brendan Evans to be identified as the author of this work has been asserted by them in accordance with the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988. Published by Manchester University Press Oxford Road, Manchester M13 9NR, UK and Room 400, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA www.manchesteruniversitypress.co.uk Distributed in the United States exclusively by Palgrave Macmillan, 175 Fifth Avenue, New York, NY 10010, USA Distributed in Canada exclusively by UBC Press, University of British Columbia, 2029 West Mall, Vancouver, BC, Canada V6T 1Z2 British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data applied for ISBN  978 0 7190 8440 9  hardback First published 2013 The publisher has no responsibility for the persistence or accuracy of URLs for any external or third-party internet websites referred to in this book, and does not guarantee that any content on such websites is, or will remain, accurate or appropriate.

Typeset by Servis Filmsetting Ltd, Stockport, Cheshire

Contents

List of tables and figures vi Acknowledgementsvii Foreword by Sir Howard Bernstein, Chief Executive, MCC ix List of acronyms and abbreviations xi

1 Introduction 2 The past and present of east Manchester 3 Partners in regeneration 4 A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 5 What works in east Manchester? Evaluation in theory and in practice 6 The ideology of urban regeneration initiatives 7 Who governs east Manchester? 8 Who participates in regeneration? 9 Conclusion

1 7 21 38 78 106 133 155 191

Bibliography197 Index219

List of tables and figures

Tables 3.1 Key regeneration structures

23 Figures

1.1 Map of east Manchester’s regeneration area with ward boundaries 5 1.2 Map of east Manchester’s regeneration area with Beacons, NEM and MCC boundaries6 2.1 Fort Beswick 13 3.1 East Manchester Academy 35 4.1 B of the Bang 66 4.2 Chips Building 68 6.1 Tony Blair meets residents 110 8.1 Alleygating 163 8.2 Resident consultation on masterplans 169

Acknowledgements

We are very grateful for the support which we have received from the many elected and unelected officials in Manchester whom we interviewed at length. This includes individuals from Manchester City Council (MCC) and various organisations in east Manchester who were generous with their time, such as The Grange, Communities for Stability (C4S) and Manchester City Football Club (MCFC). We also wish to acknowledge the patient support of NEM and NDC/Beacons’ staff who enabled us to use the extensive documentation in their care. Library staff at the Open University, Huddersfield University, Manchester and Leeds Universities and British Libraries also gave us valuable assistance. We pay particular tribute to the many residents who, despite having many demands on their time or problems to resolve, took us into their confidence and gave us frank opinions about their experiences in east Manchester. We also wish to thank the editors of academic journals who encouraged us by publishing articles on east Manchester which we submitted and to conference and seminar organisers who invited us to present papers on the politics of urban regeneration. Tony Mason at Manchester University Press also helpfully guided us in such a way to enable us to complete this book and Len Grant kindly provided us with images which have illustrated it. Finally, we are grateful to our respective families for their forbearance, particularly when we gave priority to the research and writing of the book when they would have welcomed our time and company.

Foreword

Looking back to the early 1980s, it is clear that the picture in east Manchester was one of urban decline. Thirty years of deindustrialisation had ripped the heart out of the city’s engineering heartland, leaving in its wake widespread dereliction, an ever-­dwindling population and meagre employment opportunities. Despite an unsuccessful Olympics bid in 1995, east Manchester had become the focus of a major sporting centre should an event be awarded to the city. By 1999 the decision had been made to bring together a range of brand new world-­class sporting facilities and investment required to host the 2002 Commonwealth Games. These Games became the catalyst for extensive regeneration in east Manchester and the city saw 2002 as an opportunity beyond a major sporting event and looked further, determined to leave a lasting legacy of physical, economic and social ­regeneration – the first time a Games had been used as a driver for change in the host city, which has now become a benchmark for the new era in large-­event ­hosting. The Commonwealth Games accelerated regeneration in Manchester by twenty years or more, and driving this rebirth through sport gave the city and wider region the world-­beating sporting facilities for which east Manchester is now renowned –­attracting the world’s top athletes and giving the stars of tomorrow the tools they need to hone their skills. Capitalising on the momentum of the Games, the city gave birth to New East Manchester (NEM), a pioneering urban regeneration company whose energy focused on change in the area to attract new business investment, new homes, new schools and libraries and a new era in the history of east Manchester. NEM’s core aims remain to this day to raise both the incomes and the aspirations of east Manchester people and by strengthening the local economy

x

Foreword

through new business, hundreds of new jobs have been created, helping to get local people into work and build that sense of pride that is vital for successful neighbourhoods. Now the home of MCFC and British Cycling, east Manchester continues to build on the success of the last decade. With new investment and flourishing opportunities, the future seems bright. The book tells the story of the regeneration of east Manchester. Of course, the transformation of the area is an ongoing story – and one which is still being written. But we are proud of the achievements of the last fifteen years and welcome this in-­ depth study of the journey we went on to reach the point we’re at today. Sir Howard Bernstein, Chief Executive, MCC

List of acronyms and abbreviations

4CT AC ABC ABI AGGS AGMA APUDG ASBAT ASBO AUVC BBC BME BURA C4S CITC CMDC CPO CRESR CSR DBIS DCLG DETR DfT DLA DoE EAZ

Four Communities Together Audit Commission Acceptable Behaviour Contract Area Based Initiative Altrincham Grammar School for Girls Association of Greater Manchester Authorities All Party Urban Development Group Anti-­Social Behaviour Area Team Anti-­Social Behaviour Order Ancoats Urban Village Company British Broadcasting Corporation black and ethnic minority British Urban Regeneration Association Communities for Stability City in the Community Central Manchester Development Corporation Compulsory Purchase Order Centre for Regional Economic and Social Research Comprehensive Spending Review Department of Business, Innovation and Skills Department for Communities and Local Government Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions Department for Transport Disability Living Allowance Department of Education Education Action Zone

xii EDF EDP EIP EMBRACE EMCT EMLIS EMNNT EMRF EMSAZ EP ERCF ERDF ESOL EZ GMC GMCA GMP GMPTE GO GONW GP GPF HA HAZ HCA HMRP HMSO ICT IDeA IEF ILD ILP IMD IOM IRO ISP JSA JOG KINS KPI LEA LEP

List of acronyms and abbreviations European Development Fund Eastlands Development Partnership Education Improvement Partnership East Manchester Burglary, Robbery and Auto Crime East Manchester Community Transport East Manchester Landlord Information Scheme East Manchester Neighbourhood Nuisance Team East Manchester Residents’ Forum East Manchester Sports Action Zone English Partnerships Estates’ Renewal Challenge Fund European Regional Development Fund English as a second or other language Enterprise Zone Greater Manchester Council Greater Manchester Combined Authority Greater Manchester Police Greater Manchester Passenger Transport Executive Regional Government Office (formerly IRO) Government Office for the North West General Practitioner Growing Places Fund Housing Association Health Action Zone Homes and Communities Agency (formerly EP) Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders Her Majesty’s Stationery Office (within OPSI) Information and Communications Technology Improvement and Development Agency Impact Evaluation Framework Index of Local Deprivation Independent Labour Party Index of Multiple Deprivation Integrated Offender Management Integrated Regional Office Intensive Support Project Job Seeker’s Allowance Joint Openshaw Group Key Individual Networks Key Performance Indicator Local Education Authority Local Economic Partnership

LGA LSP LSVT MAES MANCAT MBC MCC MCFC MCIN MEN MIER MMU MP MP NAO NDC NEET NEM NEMA NEMET NHB NIACE NP NPM NRF NRU NWDA ODPM ONS OPSI PCT PFI PPP PSA RAB RDA RGF RGO RIHSC RRO RSG RSL

List of acronyms and abbreviations xiii Local Government Association Local Strategic Partnership Large Scale Voluntary Transfer Manchester Adult Education Service Manchester College of Advanced Technology Metropolitan Borough Council Manchester City Council Manchester City Football Club Manchester Community Information Network Manchester Evening News Manchester Independent Economic Review Manchester Metropolitan University Manchester Partnership Member of Parliament National Audit Office New Deal for Communities (people) not in education, employment or training New East Manchester Urban Development Company North and East Manchester Advertiser NEM education team New Homes Bonus National Institute of Adult and Continuing Education Neighbourhood Planning New Public Management Neighbourhood Renewal Fund Neighbourhood Renewal Unit North West Development Agency Office of the Deputy Prime Minister Office of National Statistics Office of Public Sector Information Primary Care Trust Private Finance Initiative public–private partnership Public Service Agreement Regional Arts Board Regional Development Agency Regional Growth Fund Regional Government Office Research Institute for Health and Social Change (MMU) Regulatory Reform Order Residents’ Steering Group Registered Social Landlord

xiv RTPI SAZ SEN SOA SRB SRF TARA TEC TPDC TUC UDC UMIC URC UROG VAM VIP

List of acronyms and abbreviations Royal Town Planning Institute Sport Action Zone special educational needs Super Output Area Single Regeneration Budget Strategic Regeneration Framework Tenants’ and Residents’ Association Training and Enterprise Council Trafford Park Development Corporation Trades Union Congress Urban Development Corporation University of Manchester Incubator Company Ltd Urban Regeneration Company Urban Renewal Officers’ Group Voluntary Action Manchester Very Important Parent

1 Introduction

The regeneration of east Manchester is one of the largest projects of urban regeneration internationally. It provides one of the best possibilities for examining the character of Area Based Initiatives (ABIs) for addressing urban decline and the related social and economic problems. We examine the specific case study of east Manchester in depth. While each such initiative is sui generis, neither is regeneration entirely localist but is set in the context of a wider political economy. The purpose of this case study is to examine the east Manchester initiative which it has been argued is the most ‘policy thick’ area in Britain (Ward, 2003: 123). The narrative of how east Manchester became such an extreme case of deprivation, and of the various attempts to respond to the problem, is itself a purpose of the book and we describe the way in which the initiative emerged and explain how it developed. The revival of a substantial area of a great city, which began in a major way with the new Labour Government after 1997, is a task that is never completed. The global recession, the election of the Coalition Government and subsequent cuts in public spending significantly altered the course and extent of regeneration, but some projects continue. Urban regeneration in Britain has always been broadly defined and included physical, economic and social regeneration. It has tended to combine an attack on decline together with a vision of an urban renaissance, although in practice there is a gap between the two. Problems of urban decline were first acted upon in Britain with the urban programme of 1968 but since then ABIs have proliferated both nationally and internationally. Yet the problems in Britain were more marked by the 1970s than in comparable countries and the term ‘urban regeneration’ appears to have developed from British metropolitan planning. The oil crisis of 1973 advanced economic decline and similar policy responses have emerged internationally. Since many of the forces which have created urban problems are themselves ­international

2

The regeneration of east Manchester

in character, and many of the policies are similar, it is tempting to describe urban regeneration as global. Yet there are varying local approaches and adaptations in response to specific circumstances. In some cases urban regeneration is about adapting the existing built environment while in others this combines with an attention to social problems, with varying degrees of state direction. The case of east Manchester is distinguished by its holistic approach, which seeks to cover economic, social and cultural regeneration. ­ It is important to describe the regeneration of east Manchester, but the narrative itself is insufficient without attempting to evaluate its success. There is no attempt here to offer a definitive evaluation of the initiative and still less to offer one of the success of ABIs in general. Instead, we present the results of some specific evaluations which have been undertaken, as well as considering the pitfalls in the evaluation process itself. Despite the difficulties of presenting an overall assessment, we suggest a number of achievements and limitations in the case of east Manchester. Yet our purpose goes beyond simply describing, analysing and evaluating the regeneration of east Manchester since 1997. While we do describe the actors involved, and offer an overview of what they have accomplished, we consider further relevant issues. The agencies and structures which are involved in the process form a complex and diverse network. This raises the question of whether the project can be regarded as one of traditional government, or whether it is rather a case of fragmented governance. Also, given the extent to which a complicated partnership has been engaged in regeneration, it is necessary to enquire how far there has been a successful co-­ordination of the project. The inclusion of a diverse range of statutory and non-­statutory bodies in the initiative has been an advantage by virtue of the range of interests it expresses, while potentially posing a problem because of the resulting managerial challenge. The regeneration of this particular area, its selection as a problematical segment of British urban life, the aims which have been established for it and the methods adopted are not value-­free. It is necessary to interrogate the motives and intentions of policy-­makers and to elicit the ideology, implicit or explicit, which underpinned the project under New Labour and led to its weakening under the Coalition Government. This relates closely to the debate about who have been the beneficiaries. Much is made by the proponents of the aim of engaging residents and responding to their aspirations in the process and outcome of regeneration. We investigate what has actually happened towards fulfilling this aim and seek to determine the extent and nature of resident participation in the project. We are sensitive to the actual realities of the context of east Manchester and so aim to present an account which appreciates the experiences of people who are trying to conduct their lives in often trying circumstances. Equally, while we criticise the work undertaken by the institutions involved in the regeneration project we also note that many individuals have strained every sinew to make the project a



Introduction 3

success in order to improve the prospects for an impoverished part of Manchester. Accordingly, we pay attention to agency. The specificities of time as well as of place are crucial in analysing a major urban regeneration programme. While we note that urban regeneration is a ubiquitous activity we address a specific spatial question, that of the particular needs and solutions which have emerged in east Manchester. If there are common issues confronting cities across the world, and even similar pressure resulting from the trend towards globalisation, we argue that the interactions between global economic pressures, national political forces and specifically local issues are particularly important. Of equal importance to the spatial specificities of east Manchester is the temporal dimension. Whether the issue is how the project is governed, how policy is made and implemented, its ideological imperatives or the degree to which genuine participation has been accomplished, the answer is not static in character. Specific ‘snapshots’ of these issues at various stages between 1997 and 2012 will yield quite different responses. Over the duration of the initiative, governing arrangements have altered, central government’s involvement has varied, policies have been tried and abandoned, objectives have been modified and participation has been spasmodic, so a time-­sensitive perspective is required. There are sociological, cultural, geographical and economic aspects in the case of east Manchester, but the primary focus here is political. Ultimately, the establishment, maintenance and survival of this type of initiative is a political issue regardless of the social, cultural and economic impacts of the programme. It remains a political project despite the role of private monies, and public money has a major role to play. Governance, ideology and participation are political concepts but politics is vital in two other respects. First, the analysis here explores the policies of the Thatcher and Major Governments, and focuses especially on the impact of New Labour and the election of the Coalition Government in 2010, which have been major landmarks in the manner in which urban regeneration has been taken forward. We analyse the public policies involved in the programme which highlights the fact that a temporal perspective is essential. There are continuities, but also discontinuities in policy, when central governments change. Second, we are critical of the idea of there being a single public interest. Political decisions benefit some and harm others. ‘Power’ here is understood as a zero-­sum game. In the judgements that we advance, therefore, we recognise that some people have gained and others have lost, or perceive themselves to have gained or lost. In other words the various stakeholders in the east Manchester initiative will have different views about the overall efficacy of the programme. We have avoided the word ‘community’ thus far. The term is plagued by a multiplicity of definitions, some of which are normative and even romantic in nature, and others simply geographical descriptions. Further, the dispersed nature of east Manchester raises serious doubts about the possibility of cohesiveness at either a

4

The regeneration of east Manchester

descriptive level or in terms of a common identity. Nor can the area be described as a single neighbourhood, but rather as an agglomeration of neighbourhoods which are sometimes in competition with each other for attention and the deployment of resources. Where the term ‘community’ is used in the book it is to reflect the language of those actors who use the term as both a passive and an active entity. The term ‘community’ is also used because it has an ideological resonance for some of the participants in the regeneration process. The focus of this book goes beyond a detailed case study of regeneration in east Manchester to have wider relevance by using practice to analyse a series of theoretical topics. The first part of the book describes and evaluates various aspects of the initiative. We begin with a brief historical introduction which emphasises the importance of the temporal and highlights change and continuity in urban regeneration. A description of the structures engaged, either temporarily or permanently, in the regeneration of east Manchester is provided in Chapter 3. They range from formal structures with an elite genesis such as MCC, NEM, New Deal for Communities (NDC/Beacons), Regional Government Office (GO), North West Development Agency (NWDA), and English Partnerships (EP), now renamed as the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA), through voluntary bodies such as Four Communities Together (4CT) to groups of local activists such as Communities for Stability (C4S). Some of these bodies have a sole focus on the regeneration of east Manchester while others have it as only a part of their functions. Chapter 4 provides a description of the key projects which comprised the regeneration initiative and also suggests a periodisation of the process which demonstrates the significance of temporality. While our objective is not to provide a definitive evaluation of the initiative’s success, in Chapter 5, we discuss the major evaluation reports which have been produced and highlight positive and negative elements of the initiative. The second part of the book uses practice in east Manchester to analyse a series of theoretical topics. While the first part of the book began with the historical context of urban regeneration and of Manchester’s experience in this area, we provide context for the second part of the book with an analysis of the ideological roots of regeneration policy with a view to examining how national and local ideology interact. Since we argue that policy decisions are rooted in political values, Chapter 6 seeks to tease out the ideological principles behind New Labour’s establishment of the initiative and its future under the Coalition Government. Chapter 7 addresses the the co-­ordination of these diverse institutions and uses this evidence to interrogate the concept of governance. This chapter on governing arrangements provides a corrective to recent publications which diminish the role of local government and is wary of replacing existing approaches to local politics with imported interpretations from such different political and economic systems as the United States. We argue on the basis of east Manchester that the idea of traditional government with a powerful central and local state still carries validity.



Introduction 5

1.1  Map of east Manchester’s regeneration area with ward boundaries

Finally, one of the recurring themes in the analysis of urban regeneration is the extent to which residents have been involved in the process. Chapter 8 evaluates resident participation against the specific circumstances of east Manchester rather than against any normative ideal of what constitutes ‘genuine’ participation. In the Conclusion, we reiterate the book’s main arguments (Figure 1.1, 1.2).

6

The regeneration of east Manchester

1.2  Map of east Manchester’s regeneration area with Beacons, NEM and MCC boundaries

2 The past and present of east Manchester

An appreciation of contemporary urban issues requires an understanding of the historical context. Historical amnesia is to be avoided. It is easy to discard the ahistorical claim that the present situation is not comparable with anything from the past because many of the ‘underlying problems’ continue. As Marcus argues, however (1974: 253), there is scope to debate what those ‘underlying problems’ actually are. Yet the view of MCC leader Richard Leese is understandable from the perspective of improving east Manchester’s image. He asserted the need ‘to draw a line on using the history of east Manchester when describing the area’ because he believed a focus on its history was unhelpful (NEM Board Minutes, 30/11/2004). Yet many of those involved in the regeneration of the area emphasise the historical roots of east Manchester’s contemporary problems in describing ‘the basket case’ that it had become by the late 1990s. A historical focus also demonstrates the importance of a temporal approach to understanding urban regeneration. The comparability of aspects of the past in Manchester with the current situation is suggested by the aspiration of those presently engaged in east Manchester’s regeneration to return the area to the position which it occupied in the nineteenth century as the wealth-­generating part of the city. In the nineteenth century wealth was created by the mining, textiles and engineering industries and while currently the aim is to create the city’s wealth through different means, the comparison between the two eras is apparent (Interviews, 30/03/2010). A historical understanding also assists an appreciation of the problems and possible solutions to the malaise of east Manchester and guards against the error of thinking that everything which is occurring is novel. The issues of economic change, social deprivation, the spatial and socially dispersed nature of the population, the initiatives undertaken by local elites to improve the quality of life, the interventionist tradition of the local Council, the styles of

8

The regeneration of east Manchester

popular culture and particularly the focus on housing problems have long resonated in the city, and particularly in the eastern neighbourhoods. Nor is the importance of understanding the processes of change and continuity confined to the distant past. To understand the emergence of the focus on regenerating east Manchester it is vital to understand the politics and economics of Manchester from the 1970s to the arrival of the New Labour Government of 1997. The deprivation inflicted upon the working classes by the rapidity of nineteenth-­century industrialisation was reflected in the consequences of the equally rapid deindustrialisation of east Manchester after the 1970s. Temporal issues also surface when we consider that the deprivation of east Manchester ‘is also the result of the United Kingdom being the first industrial nation [so] that its infrastructure has become more outworn than that of other countries which have also engaged in regeneration in recent years’ (Crouch, Fraser and Percy, 2003: 1). Parallels in history The activities of the ‘Manchester men’ in the nineteenth century have their counterparts in the individuals who seek to address contemporary problems. Alongside the new exploitative mill and factory owners of the Industrial Revolution were men, or in the case of the novelist Mrs Elizabeth Gaskell, a woman, who sought improvements. These individuals described the social conditions of the working classes. Dr James Kay, for example, who worked at the Ancoats Dispensary in a shoddy building in an area of factories and tenements, wrote a report on sanitary conditions which confirmed the link between ill health and a squalid environment (Messinger, 1985: 37). In the novels of Mrs Gaskell, the divergence between rich and poor was a central theme. One of her fictional characters refers to the gulf between the classes by asking, ‘why are they so separate, so distinct, when God has made them? . . .Whose doing is it?’ (Hunt, 2010: 55). Reform movements resulted, therefore, from the activities of civic-­minded individuals, and individual agency remains important today. Responding to Dr Kay, and to other commentators, the Manchester Improvement Committee set up in 1844 led to the Borough Police Act of 1844 and the Sanitary Improvement Act of 1845, which were examples of Manchester giving a lead to other large towns in the country (Briggs, 1963: 107). The efforts of one reformer, the Liberal MP Mark Philips, led to the creation of A Committee for Securing Open Spaces for Recreation and then to the establishment of the first large public park in an English city in 1846 (Briggs, 1963: 132). Philips Park in the Bradford neighbourhood provides recreational space to this day. The temperance mission and the university settlement charity were set up in Ancoats in the 1890s (Kidd, 2006: 152). Similarly, Manchester business leaders in the 1980s and 1990s were active in urging the regeneration of the city (Cochrane, Peck and Tickell, 1996; Peck and Ward, 2002: 9). MCC has long had an activist tradition with growing civic responsibility, and by the 1890s it was ‘one of the strongest and most



The past and present of east Manchester 9

effective civic authorities ever known’ (Kidd, 2006: 156). In the late Victorian era civic identity accompanied commercial viability and, in a similar way, the partnership between business and MCC since the 1980s has aimed at reviving the city’s economy. Neither set of individuals in either period were entire paragons of altruism and were as much motivated by a desire to improve the quality of the life in the city generally as to focus on the greatest need, the situation faced by the poorest people in society. The specific origins of the localities of east Manchester can be traced back to the hamlets of Openshaw, Gorton and Ancoats in the fourteenth century but the final city boundary was determined only in 1938 and included Gorton, West Gorton, Openshaw and Newton Heath which were all included in 1890, and Bradford which was attached in 1889 with the remainder of Gorton joining in 1890 (Kidd, 2006: 202). The Manchester Plan, issued in 1995 by MCC, defined east Manchester as being bounded by the Oldham Road and the Hyde Road and following a wedge extending from the city centre (Great Ancoats Street) to the city boundary with Oldham and Tameside. It defined the problems of Gorton as dense housing, a poor environment and a lack of space; of Bradford as dereliction and decay; of Ancoats as the decline of business and employment and, for the area as a whole, of a trend since the 1960s towards unemployment, decline, the rise of vacant and derelict land and under-­utilised buildings (MCC, 1995). It was the coming of the Industrial Revolution which led to the rapid growth of the city to such an extent that Asa Briggs memorably described Manchester as the ‘shock city’ of the 1840s (Briggs, 1963: 108). Industrialisation and urbanisation proceeded hand in hand between 1850 and 1910 (Waller, 1991: 69). As early as 1731 Ashton Old Road opened as a turnpike road with toll gates, including one at Grey Mare Lane where the headquarters of NEM is currently based, and in 1740 John Seddon bought the mines and coal veins from Sir Oswald Mosley to develop coal mines in Bradford (Grant, 2010: 20). The construction of the Ashton Canal in 1792 and the Rochdale Canal in 1804 ensured that the eastern part of the city would develop commercially and industrially. Such major mills as those in Ancoats, for example, in Redhill Street and Jersey Street, date from the 1790s, and mills overshadowed everything in Pollard Street (Franck, 1994: 17–18). The canals were used to process coal, and raw and processed cotton. At present, such mills are acquiring a new role in the regeneration process as hotels and apartments and the canals are being transformed to become aesthetic and environmental assets. Coal was also transported to Manchester by the Bridgewater Canal from 1741 (Glinert, 2009: 11) and coal mining in Bradford in east Manchester drove forward the manufacture of steel and cotton (Grant, 2010: 180). These developments led to the emergence of a ‘poverty belt’ around the city centre as the profits generated by the mills and factories were transported outside the area to more extravagant dwellings where the new entrepreneurial class lived. This new wealthy class built houses in order to escape the dreadful living c­ onditions

10

The regeneration of east Manchester

experienced by those housed in the inner ring of the city. Only currently, with the demolition of houses in the regeneration neighbourhoods of north and east Manchester, might there be a challenge to the residential pattern which was in place by the 1850s; that of concentric circles with the poorest living in an inner ring, surrounded by a solid mass of working-­class terraces, and then an outer ring of ­middle-­class suburban villas. The factories in Ancoats, nearby Holt Town and Beswick grew up together with very dense working-­class housing for the employees (Kidd, 2006: 160). Regeneration officers in east Manchester still refer to the ‘doughnut’ shape of the city, recognising that in relative terms the position of class-­based residential segregation remains unchanged, although their purpose is to develop mixed housing in order to alter it. It remains a challenge (Interview, 30/03/2010). By the time of the 1841 Census, therefore, the city of Manchester had emerged and was recognised as a great urban centre. It was simultaneously renowned for unleashing appalling social and economic conditions for the new working class. The squalor of the conditions was widely commented upon by contemporaries, and as Paris in the 1900s or London in the 1960s, Manchester was as much visited and written about as it is today. While the poverty and squalor have clearly been reduced in absolute terms since the nineteenth century, the problems of social and economic deprivation have a long history. Manchester suffered dreadful slums, frightening epidemics, appalling mortality rates and enormous inequalities (Platt, 2005: xiv). De Tocqueville described a city of ‘a few great capitalists, thousands of poor workmen and a little middle class’ (Kidd, 2006: 18). He referred to the lack of control over pollution and to the daily emissions enveloping the city in a blanket of smoke. He foresaw ‘bloody division and social conflict between the privileged few and the disadvantaged many’ (Platt, 2005: 4). The French journalist, Léon Faucher viewed Manchester as ‘an unnatural grotesque outgrowth’ and as a ‘monstrous agglomeration’ of suburbs (Faucher, 1969: 16). Most famously, Engels, through his long-­term direct contact with the workers of Manchester, described the horrors of urban industrial life. He graphically referred to ‘women made unfit for childbearing, children deformed, men enfeebled, limbs crushed, whole generations wrecked, afflicted with disease and infirmity, purely to fill the purses of the bourgeoisie’ (Hunt, 2010: 108). While the problems of pollution were fewer by the late 1990s, the social conditions and the inequalities suffered by the residents of the inner ring of the city were still apparent before the regeneration of east Manchester commenced at the end of the decade. Gradually, since the 1970s, and according to many residents and regeneration officials, exacerbated by the years of Thatcherism, an area which was an economic and industrial giant had deteriorated into ghost neighbourhoods (Interviews, 1/09/2004 to 26/05/2010). Periods of sharp decline, however, also have historical precedents with, for example, the recurrent cotton crises of the 1870s, 1880s and 1890s and the inter-­war slump (Kidd, 2006: 102). Political movements emerged during the nineteenth century, as a response to



The past and present of east Manchester 11

the condition of class-­based inequality. On the one hand, representing the cosmopolitan merchant class was the middle-­class politics of the Liberal Party, the free trade campaign and the Anti-­Corn Law League which originated in the city in 1839 (Kidd, 2006: 149). These political movements drew their support from middle-­class suburbs such as Victoria Park and Cheetham Hill (Kidd, 2006: 40). The owners of the large mills and factories were geographically detached from their workers, and this further facilitated a divergence between the political movements of the new middle-­class and the new working classes. Middle-­class and mainly Liberal Party politics were countered, however, by a history of protest, generated by the poor living standards and exploitation experienced by the new working class. These protests led on one occasion to violent riots at New Cross, where Oldham Road and Great Ancoats Street meet, which spiralled into the infamous Peterloo massacre of 1819 which has captured the imagination of later generations (Kidd, 2006: 76). The protests not only took the form of violent upsurges, however, but also led to the formation of such organised structures as Chartism, Trade Unionism and the Suffragettes. Beswick also accomplished the election of the first-­ever Independent Labour Party (ILP) candidate in 1894, and other electoral breakthroughs followed in Bradford and Openshaw (Kidd, 2006: 175). This early flowering of Labour political activity led indirectly to the growing domination of the Labour Party in post-­ Second World War Manchester politics, apart from a brief interlude in opposition from 1968 to 1971, so that by the time of the launch of the regeneration initiatives of the 1980s and 1990s there was an apparently permanent Labour control of the City Council which could ensure a consistently developing set of policies untrammelled by effective political opposition. The MCC leader after 1997, Sir Richard Leese, ensured the continuity of policy established by Graham Stringer from 1987 (Grant, 2010: 7). The main electoral change during the twentieth century was the replacement of the nineteenth-­century Liberal influence, initially by a strong Conservative opposition to Labour, and later the disappearance of the Conservatives from both the City Council and Parliamentary representation, and only recently has there been the limited reappearance of the Liberal Democrats. By the twenty-­ first century, it is a strong Labour domination challenged by a minority of Liberal Democratic councillors which characterises Manchester politics. It is notable, however, that while the Liberals in the nineteenth century embedded middle-­ class privilege (Platt, 2005: 70), they combined in the early years of the twenty-­ first century an electoral base in the outer suburbs and inroads in deprived parts of east Manchester, with a claim to be upholding the interests of residents there against an unsympathetic and bureaucratic Labour Council (Interviews and C4S meeting, 04/11/2008). Demographic change, suburbanisation and ­working-­class domination of the population within the city boundaries explain the political character of the city. In east Manchester the parliamentary representation is exclusively Labour but no longer does the Labour Party control all of the wards, as the Liberal Democrats have infiltrated such areas as Gorton and Newton Heath. Any

12

The regeneration of east Manchester

ascendancy, however, remains contingent. In the 2011 local elections, the Liberal Democrats lost seats in east Manchester. East Manchester’s neighbourhoods There are also historical precedents with reference to particular neighbourhoods. Ancoats has always been identified as a problem neighbourhood and was a part of the ‘doughnut’ ring of squalor on the north eastern side of the city centre. Originally, a small rural hamlet, and in 1790 an area in which nature predominated, it was replaced by mills and machines and by the erection of crowded dwellings; described as ‘jerry built hovels’ (Platt, 2005: 51). The environmental injustice endured by this part of east Manchester led to ‘the bitter cry of Ancoats’ becoming a ‘chorus of support for social and environmental justice’ (Gilbert, 2001: 325). From being the world’s first heavily industrialised suburb it became the place where half the local children died before they were five years old (Glinert, 2009: 141). Yet the legacy of the mills, such as the line of cotton mills which runs alongside the Rochdale canal near to Great Ancoats Street, has left buildings which can either be incorporated into the revival of the neighbourhood or can be demolished to make way for new apartments. Bradford was an economically active neighbourhood until 1968, consisting of a coal mine, the Stuart Street power station, huge gasometers and a number of engineering works (Glinert, 2009: 151). There was much enforced re-­housing in the 1960s and 1970s, which some residents have compared unfavourably with the more sympathetic relocation process which has taken place since 1999 (Interview, 31/07/2007). Fort Beswick was a notorious housing project constructed in 1969. Its deck-­access flats and maisonettes were attached to an unattractive building which led to serious structural problems and ultimate demolition in 1982 (Grant, 2010: 27). Residents were particularly aggrieved as they claimed that their warnings that the housing was built on a local coal seam had been ignored (Figure 2.1). It is the creation of Sportcity, and the investments which could flow from the developments linked with MCFC, which is now central to the regeneration prospects of the Bradford and Beswick neighbourhoods (Interview, 30/03/2010). Clayton remains a working-­class area but it has also lost most of its industry, and as recently as 2008 the Clayton Aniline Company, which was the largest manufacturing plant in Manchester specialising in lubricants, printing inks and plastics, closed down. It had characterised the industrial strength of the area in the inter-­war years when, despite the slump, it had continued and secured a reputation as a good employer (Davies, 1963: 218). Gorton was featured in the television drama Shameless, which displayed its impoverished character. Its decline was precipitated by the closure of Beyer, Peacock in 1966, despite the company having produced over 8,000 railway engines in the previous century, as a result of the switch from steam to diesel in the 1950s



The past and present of east Manchester 13

2.1  Fort Beswick

(Grant, 2010: 26). Gorton’s image has been improved by the restoration of the Monastery building from the derelict structure into which this Pugin building had declined to its current utilisation as a community centre. Beer consumption was an important element of recreation in east Manchester through breweries such as Wilson’s of Newton Heath and Chester’s of Openshaw. The public houses which grew up further illustrated local culture, ‘when the workplace was reinforced by an active relationship with the public house’ where ‘working class culture was at its most impenetrable’ (Platt, 2005: 54). Such ‘pubs’ were masculine environments which also excluded people who came from outside the area. In contrast, merchant pubs grew up in the city centre. Promotional literature from regeneration agencies such as NEM suggests that boutique bars and coffee shops are part of an attempt to attract higher-­social-­status residents (NEM, 2010a). Such facilities, however, are conspicuous by their absence and remain largely confined to areas closest to the city centre. Football is also a long-­standing feature of the popular culture in the east of the city, as both Manchester City and Manchester United football clubs emerged from the area (Franck, 1994: 113; Grant, 2010: 21; Glinert, 2009: 150, 153). Currently, MCFC repays the compliment by investing in the area and by its activities under the aegis of ‘City in the Community’ (CITC). This is not the place to consider whether the deindustrialisation and subsequent regeneration activities have destroyed a community ethos and character in either east Manchester or in specific neighbourhoods, and different residents have contrasting views. It is apparent that east Manchester residents vary in their

14

The regeneration of east Manchester

geographical self-­identification and their degree of attachment to place: some feel links to specific neighbourhoods; fewer identify with the wider and vaguer ideas of Eastlands and east Manchester; while for many the city centre of Manchester is, often quite literally, a different world (Interview, 17/09/2010). Certainly regeneration officials utilise these localised identities, either in isolation or in combination, in pursuing particular projects. One official under the aegis of NEM, for example, focused on social programmes for Beswick and another working under the aegis of NDC on similar programmes in Openshaw (Interviews, 14/04/2010). Nevertheless, there is some evidence that the identity of east Manchester as a place has gained some ground among residents (Interview, 12/04/2011). Yet if the socio-­ economic changes of the last few decades have undermined community solidarity and pride, it is also true that the growing heterogeneity of the area, with the recent influx of asylum seekers and Chinese people, has further undermined a sense of identity. Historically, east Manchester has been white and skilled and semi-­skilled working class but with a small Italian immigration into Ancoats and a much larger Irish immigration more widely in the city. It was the area around Chorlton-­on-­ Medlock that was the notoriously deprived area of Little Ireland, but there is a significant Irish heritage population in parts of east Manchester. Manchester and post-­war urban regeneration Manchester is impeded in some ways in pursuing a vigorous urban regeneration policy. Its boundaries are restricted as a result of local government reform in 1972 creating, ‘a declining population and an exceptionally weak residential tax base: 94% of its dwellings fall in Council Tax valuation bands A–C and only 0.4% in bands G–H. All the more affluent suburbs lie beyond it limits’ (Hebbert and Deas, 2000: 82). There were serious attempts to deal with the problems of the city by MCC in the decades immediately after the Second World War but they were unable to create a strong enough local economy to respond to the collapse of manufacturing industry. Yet the nature of change in Manchester is sometimes misunderstood. It was not simply the loss of traditional industries that created the problem, as urban manufacturing in Manchester was ‘a rich admixture’ of light and heavy industry and an intermediate services sector (Hutton, 2008: 20). A severe long-­term decline in the city economy had become apparent in the 1970s as population moved out and jobs were lost (Mace et al., 2004: 8). The implementation of laissez-­faire Thatcherite policies in the 1980s exacerbated the problem. There was a clear warning of social discontent when the urban riots of 1981 took place. The shift from manufacturing to service industries was well advanced by this time, although the explosion of financial, consultancy, distributive and tourist industries in other parts of the city only occurred after the mid 1980s (Mace et al., 2004: 194). There was an element of anti-­ immigrant sentiment in the riots of 1981. Neighbourhoods such as Clayton were affected where ‘shops were looted, vehicles overturned and set on fire, petrol bombs



The past and present of east Manchester 15

thrown and police and ambulance men injured’ (Hylton, 2003: 225). This was a reminder that beyond the city centre the indices of deprivation were affecting daily life and creating deep discontent. Despite improvements through regeneration, the 2011 riots provided a further reminder of the deep-­seated nature of deprivation. The right-­wing response to the social problems of the 1980s was to weaken the state, stress financial responsibility and limit public expenditure. MCC pursued a left-­wing alternative strategy until 1987, experimenting with decentralisation, local economic development, equal opportunities policies, the devolving of budgets and decision-­making to neighbourhoods and an oppositional strategy towards Thatcher’s central government (Cochrane, Peck and Tickell, 1996). MCC’s ruling Labour group was led by the left of the city Labour Party from 1984 and until the result of the General Election of 1987 it showed little interest in responding to central government initiatives. When a third successive Thatcher victory demonstrated that national policy was unlikely to alter there was some change in attitude by MCC and a greater readiness to engage with government, and as a result a serious economic strategy emerged (Robson, 2002: 36). The policy focus shifted towards that of working with the Conservative national agenda and to compete with other local authorities for national grants to revive urban areas. Before the strategic change in 1987 MCC’s policy had been to regard enticing firms to bring jobs in from another local authority as inimical to local government solidarity and as allowing private capital to encourage authorities to compete against each other. If from 1984 to 1987 MCC had sought to promote economic activity by its own efforts, its change in attitude after 1987 coincided with the Thatcher Government’s political impulse to do ‘something about those inner cities’. This was because it was only inner-­city constituencies that had produced a swing towards Labour in the General Election of June 1987 (Butler and Kavanagh, 1989: 331). Ironically, Stringer’s anti-­discrimination policies between 1984 and 1987 helped facilitate close relationships with business interests involved in Manchester’s club and gay scene and so contributed towards the growth of networks around regeneration (Interview, 27/02/2006). The cultural diversity which the gay scene provided encouraged industries like fashion, design, new media and music in the city centre and fringe areas such as the Northern Quarter which is contiguous with east Manchester (O’Connor, 2000). Stringer was implicitly accepting that city economies were no longer protected by the nation-­state, that inter-­city competition was necessary and that Manchester had become converted to the ‘new localism’ (Goetz and Clarke, 1993). Manchester was returning to its nineteenth-­century traditions of liberalism and free trade with this revival of business activism (Peck and Tickell, 1994; Taylor, Evans and Fraser, 1996). Yet the change in policy by central government and MCC alike represented a political victory for the Thatcher Government rather than for MCC, in that it was a centralising process in which the changing rules of finance were fundamentally undermining the scope for local autonomy (Cochrane, 1993: 31). MCC’s ‘turn to entrepreneurialism’ involved a new focus on the ­development

16

The regeneration of east Manchester

of a pragmatic relationship with local business and central government with the aim of ‘boosting’ the city (Peck and Ward, 2002: 13). Stringer also gained the confidence of local businesses by his collaborative efforts with regard to the development of Manchester Airport and Ship Canal (Interview, 27/02/2006). The Chief Executive of MCC, Sir Howard Bernstein, supported Stringer and even allowing for the impact of circumstances their agency was crucial. MCC became adept at anticipating new funding opportunities and putting together grant coalitions of private and public sectors within tight deadlines (Cochrane, Peck and Tickell, 1996). The emergence of the Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) in 2011 extended this ‘can-­do’ mentality of MCC, and its readiness to work with governments of all persuasions to promote the wider Greater Manchester area (Interview, 15/03/2012). MCC has also been adept at maintaining financial ownership, either in full or in part, of key strategic resources such as Manchester Airport, Manchester Ship Canal as well as land–for example, that around the Etihad Stadium. Urban regeneration initiatives can be traced back to the Urban Programme of 1968 and to the Inner Urban Areas Act of 1978, which respectively provided funds to improve social conditions and to allow local authorities to promote economic development.1 Previously there had been the New Town movement of the 1940s and massive slum clearance in the 1950s and 1960s. By the early 1980s the problems of economic and social decline in cities such as Manchester had become chronic but the Thatcher Government initially neglected the problems. In 1980, however, the Local Government Planning and Land Act dismantled Labour’s initiatives, set up Enterprise Zones (EZs) and Urban Development Corporations (UDCs) and placed the focus on enabling land assembly for private development (Thornley, 1991: 206). EZs were essentially simplified planning areas to encourage new businesses, and UDCs were appointed bodies to promote private investment to facilitate physical development (Lawless, 1994). The inner-­city riots of 1981 led to interventions by the Secretary of State for the Environment, Michael Heseltine, which prepared the way for the more ambitious policies which emerged after 1987. In 1992, MCC launched the East Manchester Regeneration Strategy, which astutely recognised that an international sporting activity might kick-­start regeneration (Grant, 2010: 31). This was followed up by Stringer formally announcing that Manchester was to bid for the 2002 Commonwealth Games (Grant, 2010: 31).The announcement symbolised MCC’s developing pragmatic relationship with local business and central government to ‘boost’ the city. Bernstein had been aware that MCC had been guilty of ‘a collective misunderstanding of what the role of local government ought to be in terms of championing and articulating a vision of how cities should perform in a regional and national context’ (Hetherington, 2004a). MCC leaders, journalistically described as ‘hard left turned new realist’ (Hetherington, 2004b), had come to 1   There are many excellent accounts of the history of urban regeneration in the United Kingdom, for example, Imrie and Thomas (1993); Jones and Evans (1999); Tallon (2000).



The past and present of east Manchester 17

accept the view that welfare reductions were a consequence of the fiscal crisis of the state and that the Keynesian social welfare state had become overloaded (Skelcher, 2000). The realist turn had also been aided by the effective relationship between Stringer and Heseltine under the Major Government, which led to the sense that each could do business with the other (Interview, 27/02/06). The focus of the Conservative Government’s regeneration policies in the 1980s was upon market forces and the role of the private sector. An important element in the rise of Manchester’s enthusiasm for urban regeneration was the growing concern of business interests in the city in reviving Manchester’s reputation. Groups of Manchester businessmen became active in boosting the city, and while they were motivated by a desire to enhance their own companies, their initiatives coincided with MCC’s emphasis after 1987 on economic development. The awarding of grants for the creation of the Central Manchester Development Corporation (CMDC) and the Trafford Park Development Corporation (TPDC) in 1988 resulted from MCC’s readiness to support the private sector. A network of local businessmen who were working to bring the Olympic Games to Manchester, and who were already collaborating in the Training and Enterprise Councils (TECs) set up by the Conservative Government in 1988 (Evans, 1992: 128), secured the contracts to establish these two Urban Development Corporations (UDC). The role of the local businessmen led to them acquiring the sobriquet of the ‘Manchester Mafia’; MCC, however, welcomed their involvement as it enabled it to advance its own new strategic agenda without appearing to be merely promoting its own sectional interest (Blakeley, 2010: 134). In the United States urban regeneration was aimed at physical renewal and was market-­led, as it was under the Conservative Government after 1987. Yet decades previously the limitations of this approach had been highlighted by a complaint in the United States that a market-­driven approach to urban regeneration led to a neglect of human needs and that polishing the image of the city and redeveloping buildings did little to rehabilitate the urban poor (Wilson, 1966: 667). The visible gains from the CMDC’s work such as the Bridgewater Concert Hall, the G-­Mex centre, the extension to the City Art Gallery and the refurbishment of the Great Northern Warehouse as a cultural and recreational centre did little to assist the deprived areas of Manchester’s infamous ‘doughnut’ (Deas and Ward, 1999; Williams, 2002: 174). The foremost expression of the impact of the ‘Manchester Mafia’ was the Olympics bid. It was Bob Scott from the private sector who organised a popular campaign in 1985 in which he rang round ‘the great and the good’ and got them to join his committee (Cochrane, Peck and Tickell 1996: 1327). The attempts to secure the Games in both 1996 and 2000 failed, but the experience gained and the contacts secured enabled the achievement of the Commonwealth Games in 2002. It reflected the new confidence in the city and challenged the image of ‘poverty, inequality and violent crime’ (Taylor, Evans and Fraser, 1996: 79). A close analysis of the experience of Manchester suggests that MCC played a

18

The regeneration of east Manchester

leading role, despite the preferences of some Conservatives nationally for business-­ led initiatives. Far from the private sector providing the capital and receiving the profits from regeneration, as tended to happen in American-­style urban growth coalitions, Manchester businessmen engaged in a ‘grant coalition’ to seek public monies (Cochrane, Peck and Tickell, 1996: 1331). Yet even allowing for the focus on securing public money and the continuing close involvement of MCC it was the impetus of Bob Scott and his private sector network which provided much of the drive and pointed the way for the achievement of the Games in 2002. The language employed in the bid for the Commonwealth Games, to the effect that Manchester was ‘one of Europe’s most exciting and energetic places’, reflected the place marketing ethos of these early efforts at regenerating the city (Mellor, 2002: 219). While such an initiative, in which there was collaboration between private sector businessmen, an increasingly pragmatic Labour local authority and a Conservative central government, was unlikely to place great emphasis upon raising the living standards of the relatively impoverished districts of the city, the legacy of collaboration created a dynamic in which initiatives with a greater focus on social exclusion could subsequently develop. In 1991 the Major Government launched the City Challenge programme. This involved a broader focus than just the property development, image building and place marketing which had underpinned the UDCs. This resulted from a growing challenge to the ‘trickle down’ ideas of the 1980s towards a far more explicit focus upon deprivation (Smith, 1999: 2). City Challenge emphasised the attraction of inward investment, the creation of enterprise cultures and the effective management of resources by partnerships between local authorities and others with a stake in local areas, and the need for a clear end vision (Lawless, 1994). MCC secured two City Challenge grants to regenerate the deprived Hulme quarter of the city in 1992 and, in the aftermath of the IRA bomb attack in 1996, to renew the city centre (Robson, 2002: 39). Some of the officials seconded by MCC to work in the case of Hulme later transferred to the east Manchester regeneration programmes and similarities are apparent between the structures set up to run both (Interview, 14/04/2010). It is apparent that the myth that it was the devastation caused by the IRA bomb in 1996 which led to the regeneration of Manchester is incorrect. The IRA bomb intensified MCC’s regeneration activity, but was never the catalyst. The project had begun almost a decade earlier. The alacrity with which Heseltine provided support to Manchester after the bomb attack is evidence, however, that MCC had acquired a positive image as an energetic and politically acceptable local authority. The award of City Pride status to Manchester in 1994, which was an accolade also achieved only by London and Birmingham, signified ‘the Conservative Government’s approval of the City Council’s approach’ (Robson, 2002: 35). It was a precursor of the achievement of City Region and GMCA status which were gained in 2009 and 2011, respectively. Among the plethora of Conservative initiatives was the Single Regeneration



The past and present of east Manchester 19

Budget (SRB). This bridged the policy gap between the Conservative Government’s previous market-­and property-­led approach to regeneration and a greater emphasis upon the human scale which New Labour emphasised in the urban initiatives it launched after 1997. The Conservative Party Manifesto at the 1997 General Election announced its turn towards a concern to ‘regenerate the worst housing estates and transform the lives of those who live in them’ (Conservative Party, 1997: 41). The alleviation of deprivation and poverty and addressing the problems of social exclusion was more central to New Labour’s philosophy but it was also an emerging theme in the various SRB programmes. Manchester was successful and secured eight SRB schemes. One was in east Manchester for the suburbs of Clayton, Beswick and Openshaw and became absorbed into the work of the NDC programme in 1999. It is apparent, therefore, that the ideas of ABIs were well in place before the arrival of New Labour, and that Manchester was in the forefront of applying them. Indeed MCC officials and local councillors alike argue that it was as much a matter of New Labour learning from the experience of Manchester in the development of its urban policies than the reverse (Interviews, 30/09/2004–04/12/2004). The transition from promoting the city generally and renewing the city centre in particular to that of regenerating the deprived parts of Manchester was facilitated by the logic of recognising that the problems of a very different city existed beyond the centre. Prestige projects such as the Commonwealth Games Stadium provided an opportunity to revive the fortunes of the increasingly benighted districts surrounding it. MCC, for ideological reasons of social justice as well as recognising the electoral considerations of neglecting the needs of deprived Labour-­held wards, was anxious to extend its focus beyond the city centre. The Major Conservative Government’s launch of the City Challenge bids of 1991, the City Pride Initiative in 1994 and the SRB initiative in 1996, represented a bridge towards New Labour’s conceptions of urban regeneration after 1997 (Lawless, 1994). The SRB programme was a ‘bottom up’ initiative, in that successful bidding was linked to claims from bidders about ‘community’ involvement in the process. The element of continuity between the Conservative and New Labour Government is evident in the Labour Government continuation of the project with a launch of a fifth round of SRB bids in 1998 (Robson, 2002: 41). The late Conservative and New Labour initiatives alike suggested a recognition that physical change and investor-­led regeneration were an incomplete response to ‘the multiple task environment inherent in revitalising cities, particularly those associated with community building and a socially inclusive urban development agenda’ (Williams, 2002: 175). ­ In 1997, as the New Labour Government was being elected, there was a clear understanding that while the city centre, the canals and the quays were becoming showcases for the city, which Bob Scott described as an ‘urban renaissance to refine the whole concept of urban living’ with an emphasis upon tourism, housing and leisure (Scott, 2002: 146), poorer people were actually being neglected. Some local businessmen continued their work at the city level with the McEnroe Group,

20

The regeneration of east Manchester

which comprised designers, musicians, fashion experts and others which focused on the lifestyle revolution in the city centre (Hebbert and Deas, 2000: 86). This was a further focus on the core of the city, and MCC turned its attention to developing its SRB and City Challenge work with a concentration on deprived inner-­city suburbs. Even here it still favoured a measure of gentrification as a solution to the problem of these districts, considering that an urban regeneration strategy based on understanding cities should be ‘fun’ (Franklin, 2010: 183). This coalesced with New Labour’s national-­level focus upon local deprivation and accelerated the policy shift away from buildings towards a holistic strategy. While this was becoming an international policy focus, the United Kingdom faced particularly acute problems (Russell et al., 1996). Whether the activities and programmes in east Manchester have addressed these problems satisfactorily is a question for the remainder of this book.

3 Partners in regeneration

The structures established to regenerate east Manchester have developed since New Labour’s election in 1997. Some of the structures have had a sole focus on east Manchester while others have operated beyond that geographical area but made a contribution to the work of regeneration in that part of the city in the course of their activity, such as the Local Strategic Partnership (LSP) and the Manchester Partnership (MP). It is also necessary to separate those structures which have a central and long-­standing role in the project from those for whom work in east Manchester is subsidiary and often transient, such as specific property development companies. The chapter differentiates those structures which had as their specific raison d’être the regeneration of east Manchester from those which are either located in the voluntary sector or which played a peripheral role within regeneration partnerships. ­ A central theme of this book is an awareness of the temporal character of the east Manchester project. The phenomenon is demonstrated by recognising that under New Labour some structural reorganisations took place, for example the NDC/Beacons project ended and new structures, such as the Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders project (HMRP), were introduced. With the formation of the Coalition Government in May 2010 more dramatic changes have occurred and some structures such as the Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) have been abolished, to be replaced by Local Economic Partnerships (LEPs). NEM, east Manchester’s Urban Regeneration Company (URC), continues, but in a limited capacity and is now wholly owned by MCC. Reductions in public expenditure are changing the nature of local government, and in some areas of the country there has been a retreat from regeneration as this is not a statutory requirement. This is demonstrated by the Coalition Government’s closure of the Salford and N ­ orth-­East Lincolnshire URCs.

22

The regeneration of east Manchester

The institutional pluralism of the structures has been brought about because of the ubiquity of partnerships in recent British government. Since the Thatcher Government of 1979–90 there has been a strong tendency for governments to promote partnerships, whether between public structures or between the public sector in collaboration with partners from the private and the voluntary sectors. Partnerships have become a widespread phenomenon in the field of urban regeneration internationally, although the constraints of both time and place on the precise nature of such partnerships are considerable. Not only do partnerships evolve with the passage of time, but there are national and intra-­national variations in the form that they display. Partnerships are conceived widely as the ‘normal way of doing business’, even though the term is neither neutral nor does it have a fixed meaning. The ubiquity of the practice across many countries obviously leads to a loss of ­conceptual sharpness (Larner and Craig, 2005: 403). The structures: 1997–2012 The main structures involved in the regeneration of east Manchester (Table 3.1) were MCC and its related MP; NEM, which also drew in NWDA and EP; NDC/ Beacons; the HMRP and an array of private sector and voluntary organisations. MCC also plays a key role in the recently formalised city-­region structure. MCC Although east Manchester was a discrete project and received particular attention, MCC was always aware of its wider responsibility for the city and increasingly throughout the period emphasised its commitment to becoming the centre of the city-­region. Through the prism of east Manchester, it is possible to understand both the aspirations of MCC with regard to the city and city-­region and MCC’s particular mode of operation. ­ MCC has a crucial role in east Manchester and provides a continuity and stability which ensures that the aims of regeneration can be accomplished. Yet MCC was required to report to regional and national structures. The role of MCC was not entirely formal in regeneration policy until 2011, however, when east Manchester was defined as one of five areas for strategic regeneration within the city boundary. This addressed the concerns of other parts of the city, some of which had cast an envious eye at the investments which were attracted to the east of Manchester (Interview, 15/04/2011). MCC had long sought recognition of the city as a regional capital and its desire for an upscaling to city-­region status was pursued in tandem with its interest in rebuilding neighbourhoods. It still perceives no contradiction between the two. A sign of this more localised interest appeared as New Labour was elected. As Sean McGonigle ended his role in leading the Council’s housing

Lord Rogers of  Riverside produced the Urban Task Force report, Towards an Urban Renaissance (1999), which urged the ODPM to create URCs to regenerate areas of urban decline NEM was formed  in 1999 and was one of three pilot URCs A national area-­  based initiative established by New Labour in 1998

New East Manchester Ltd NEM

New Deal for Communities NDC/Beacons

Origins

Structure

It secured £51.75 m  in government funding over a ten-­year period and a further £25 m from the SRB covering a smaller area within the wider NDC area

NEM was formed  as a Joint Venture Company between MCC, NWDA and EP, each of which provided £250,000 per annum over the ten-­year programme

Funding

A more ambitious  version of the SRB, NDCs aimed to improve the quality of life of residents

NEM had a  strategic remit to oversee the holistic regeneration of east Manchester Its powers derived  from national government

Powers NEM is now  sustained by MCC as one of the few remaining URCs but in name more than in function

Current status

Twelve-­member NDC was a ten-­   board comprising  year programme six residents, which finished four from other formally in 2010 public sector although NDC/ partnerships, one Beacons had from the voluntary earlier merged sector and one with NEM in from the business 2009 community

Nine original  members: two from each of the three founding organisations, plus two local residents and one from local business

Board membership

Table 3.1  Key regeneration structures

Beswick, Clayton and  Openshaw

From 1999 to 2004,  NEM covered Miles Platting, Ancoats, Clayton, Beswick, Bradford and parts of Gorton North From 2004, Newton  Heath, the remainder of Gorton North and Gorton South were added

Geographical area

Origins

New Labour  required local authorities to establish LSPs. The MP was formed in 2002

The NWDA was  one of eight RDAs established in 1999 following the Regional Development Agencies Act of 1998

Structure

Manchester Partnership MP

North West Development Agency NWDA Funding from six  central government departments was combined into a ‘single pot’ which funded the RDAs In 2010/2011, the  NWDA received £275 m from this pot

MP is funded by  MCC

Funding LSPs combined  key public service providers, local communities and the voluntary and private sectors to promote physical and economic regeneration RDAs promoted  economic development LEPs assumed  some of their functions

Powers

The Board  comprised fifteen members who were well-­ known regional figures from industry, media and the public and voluntary sectors

The non-­executive  Board comprises representatives from the public, private and voluntary sectors

Board membership

Table 3.1  (continued)

All RDAs were  closed by the Coalition Government at the end of March 2012

The MP continues  unlike LSPs in other local authority areas

Current status

North-­west region

MCC local authority  area

Geographical area

EP was the UK  government national regeneration agency

The DETR  established this national initiative in 2002 Manchester and  Salford was one of nine areas allocated funds

English Partnerships EP Now Homes and Communities Agency (HCA)

Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders HMRP According to  the AC, some £2.2 bn funding was invested in HMRP, which also got more than £1 bn additional investment from public and private partners The Manchester–  Salford HMRP received £361 m in government funding

Received central  government funding via the DCLG

Between 2003  and 2011 it tackled the problem of declining housing demand in parts of the Midlands and the North of England

Carried out  national regeneration functions

The Secretary of  State at the DCLG appoints Board members Current members  include local authority, RDA, Housing Corporation and private sector representatives HMRP was  operated by MCC and Salford Council, and in the case of Manchester was largely delegated to NEM HMRP funding  ended on 31 March 2011

On 1 December  2008, the EP became the HCA which had a reduced role

Parts of Manchester  and Salford although nationally it covered the Midlands and the North of England

National coverage

26

The regeneration of east Manchester

programmes in Hulme and Moss Side, MCC urged him to become involved in the initiatives which the New Labour government was promoting in east Manchester (McGonigle, 2010: 9). MCC had already adopted the mechanism of partnerships to promote local economic development, and combined an enthusiasm for developing the city on an area basis with aspirations for the more comprehensive development of the wider city. It had simultaneous projects in other parts of the city, such as north Manchester, Cheetham and Broughton, the Stockport Road corridor and Wythenshawe (MCC, 2005a). MCC’s growing concern with planning the development of the city in general was apparent when it launched The Connected City initiative in 2005. This drew the east Manchester wards of Gorton North and Gorton South within a regeneration plan for the southern part of the city, even though those particular wards were part of NEM’s ­regeneration  brief. At this stage the regeneration of east Manchester was sufficiently central to the city-­wide project for the launch of The Connected City to stress that east Manchester was a business area showing ‘continued growth’ (MCC, 2005a). As early as 2005, MCC asserted that it was a regional capital. Long before the city-­region was formalised in 2010 MCC had claimed that as the hub of Greater Manchester it should manage the legacy of metropolitan services after the abolition of the Greater Manchester Council (GMC) in 1986 (Leach et al., 1991: 78–80). Yet it acknowledged the sharp contrast between a flourishing city centre economy and the deprivation suffered by its surrounding neighbourhoods ‘characterised by unemployment and inactivity levels that are typical of an economy in recession’ (MCC, 2005a: 26). MCC was ready, therefore, to embrace local urban regeneration initiatives and it welcomed the opportunity to launch an ABI and promoted east Manchester as one of the biggest and most significant ABIs nationally. Structures and policies alter, and most recently a process of policy shuffling, or ‘spatial ­shuffling’ has occurred (Headlam and Hincks, 2010: 175). New Labour advanced the city-­region idea when it granted a special status to Manchester as the hub of a city-­region in formalising the role of the Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) in 2010. Under the Coalition Government, this became the GMCA in April 2011 (www.agma.gov.uk/, accessed 04/04/2010). The new structure expressed its commitment to regeneration when it stated that the purposes of the city-­region included the improvement of the opportunities for regeneration to enable Manchester to become an economic powerhouse (www.agma.gov.uk/, accessed 04/10/2010). The lead figures in this new structure are the Chief Executive of MCC, Sir Howard Bernstein, and the MCC leader, Sir Richard Leese. The city-­region emerged from the ashes of New Labour’s failed promotion of regional assemblies. One participant in MCC argued that ‘we are no longer meant to use the “R” word’ (Interview, 16/01/2011). As a ‘super council’­, the GMCA is governed by a senate of the ten council leaders and offers a means of pooling funding across the ten boroughs without formally reorganising



Partners in regeneration 27

local government. Sir Richard Leese, as MCC leader, expressed his enthusiasm for the merits of a concerted voice (Leese, 2010: 2). The centrality of temporal considerations in the structural alterations which have affected Manchester is apparent when, in 1997, Office of the Deputy Prime Minister (ODPM) officials argued that city-­regions were tired ideas and in the north-­west of England the region was what counted (Hebbert and Deas, 2000: 89). Yet two years later ambiguity appeared. While RDAs were set up with limited powers and scant budgetary autonomy, the 1999 Urban White Paper stressed the importance of the great cities as the engines of economic growth within their regions (Deas and Ward, 1999; DETR 1999). Labour’s Manifesto commitment of 1997 to elected regional assemblies was abandoned in 2005 (Garnett and Lynch, 2009: 295). The Coalition Government reinforces the existence of the city-­region as the key spatial structure and perceives cities to be motors of economic growth. Yet the new city-­region structure may dilute the focus which MCC is able to devote to the ­continuing regeneration requirements of east Manchester. There are relationships between the east Manchester initiative and the policies of the wider city-­region. The city-­region can assist the development of the eastern sector of the city but, reciprocally, improvements in the east of the city contribute to the performance of the wider city-­region. It appears that MCC is concerned to persevere with its regeneration in the east as a self-­standing project, and officials insist that MCC will ‘not walk away from its commitment to east Manchester’s regeneration’ (Interview, 22/10/2010). Doubts must linger, however, as the impact of the reduction of funding for Town Halls by 26%, or £5.4 bn, over five years, ‘fundamentally alters the way that councils work and the work that councils do’ (Sawford, 2010). City Deals represent a further structural alteration. Manchester was in the first wave of eight cities securing a City Deal, which have the potential to offset the cuts in public expenditure which have been imposed and give it the prospect of some greater autonomy in the area of business support (Marlow, 2012). The initiative is a deal between central government and the ten combined local authorities. An unusual feature of the Manchester City Deal is the Earnback scheme, which allows the GMCA to reinvest income from local economic growth. It remains too early to judge whether City Deals represent devolution, although tying their success to economic growth suggests scepticism in difficult economic circumstances (Jones, 2012). MP The importance of partnerships under New Labour required MCC to establish an LSP, the MP, which brought together the main public service providers, local communities and the voluntary and private sectors (NIACE, 2000). The aim of the MP was to promote physical and economic regeneration and to narrow the gap

28

The regeneration of east Manchester

between deprived areas and the rest of the country. The MP was formed in January 2002 and developed the Manchester Community Strategy and the Manchester Neighbourhood Renewal Action Plan. A direct connection with MCC’s processes is apparent in the link between the MP and the Council’s system of ward co-­ ordination. NEM officials have intermittently acted as ward co-­ordinators, which symbolised both structural and personnel interconnections. LSP Guidance from central government appeared to strengthen the local state (DETR, 2001: 9). In practice the Treasury, while endorsing localist rhetoric about regenerating disadvantaged areas by ‘a proper strategic division of responsibilities between different levels of government’, actually combined with the Delivery Unit in ten Downing Street to design the Public Service Agreements to ensure that the Chancellor’s economic and social vision was accomplished (Gray and Jenkins, 2004: 274–276). The ultimate control which central government possesses even over a relatively powerful city was demonstrated by the abolition of the MP in ­conformity with the preference of the Coalition Government. East Manchester’s URC: NEM The main agency involved in the regeneration of east Manchester is NEM. This was established as a URC when central government invited MCC to offer a proposal for a regeneration company. Such companies had been advocated by the Urban Task Force report produced by Lord Rogers of Riverside, Towards an Urban Renaissance, which reported to the ODPM in June 1999 urging area-­based projects to revive areas of urban decline (DETR, 1999).There was a strong feeling among Manchester’s local government elite that Rogers was simply building on Manchester’s experience and certainly he visited the city to investigate its structures during the course of preparing his report (Interview, 30/09/2004). NEM was to address ’one of the largest regeneration challenges in the country’ (NEM Shadow Board Minutes, 16/07/1999). The key aims of NEM were outlined in the New Town in the City Strategic Framework (NEM, 2000). NEM’s remit was widened when in 2004 it was given responsibility for the regeneration of the adjacent Gorton and Newton Heath districts so that it was responsible for the whole of east Manchester from the city centre to the boundaries of Tameside. NEM was one of three pilot URCs, the others being in Liverpool and Sheffield, but NEM was unique in having a large residential population. These and subsequent URCs were separate private legal entities established in locations where there was perceived market failure and where it was considered that a mere combination of existing agencies, including local authorities, could not have the desired effect (ODPM, 2003: 6). The general brief for URCs was reaffirmed in 2003 as being to ‘work with a range of private and public sector partners, including Local Strategic Partnerships, to redevelop and bring investment back to the worst areas of our towns and cities’ (ODPM, 2003: 4).



Partners in regeneration 29

The first meeting of the Shadow Board of NEM in Manchester Town Hall made MCC’s centrality evident. It was MCC which prepared the original vision and proposed a Joint Venture Company in partnership with the NWDA and EP. The formal partnership nature of the proposed URC was obvious in the proposal to co-­ordinate public and private sector investment in consultation with residents and the local business and voluntary sectors. The Board would have nine members, with two from each of the three participating organisations, plus two residents and one from local business; and there would be a small executive team led by a ­h­ igh-­profile Chief Executive. MCC’s centrality was evident in the statement that it ‘will also ensure that its statutory functions will be delivered in a co-­ordinated manner’ (NEM Shadow Board Meeting, 16/07/1999). Yet the first Chief Executive was drawn not from MCC but from NWDA. She was Marianne Neville-­Rolfe, although this was not to be an enduring arrangement. The four individuals who met to ‘direct and shape the new company’ were Howard Bernstein and Tom Russell from MCC and Mike Shields and David Shelton, respectively, from NWDA and EP. From the outset MCC’s voice was central, therefore, and this group appears to have devised the Vision for the new URC, launched a baseline study of the needs of the area and set up a tendering process for consultants. The first year’s work was defined as the ‘development of the Strategic Masterplanning Framework’ (NEM Shadow Board Meeting, 16/07/1999). Bernstein was named as the first Company Secretary. NEM was formally launched in October 1999 and incorporated by Companies House in February 2000 with a long-­term remit of overseeing the holistic regeneration of the area (NEM Shadow Board Minutes, 16/07/1999; NEM Board Minutes 21/02/2000). The speeches delivered at NEM’s launch gave eight indicators of the intended future direction. First, the role of community participation was emphasised by a local priest, Tim Presswood, who became a Board member. Second, Leese underlined the extent of the deprivation and applauded those people who had remained in east Manchester to keep the area going and pledged to look after their interests if they remained. Third, the role of national government was signalled by the promise that central government departments ‘will be closely monitoring the progress of the new companies and will be developing new regeneration policies in response to the issues raised’. Fourth, it was reported that ‘streamlined arrangements with the City Council will be agreed to assist the company in its day to day operation’. Fifth, it was noted that the boundaries of east Manchester were fluid, which was significant as NEM’s boundaries were later extended. Sixth, the importance of education was demonstrated by the intention of the Manchester College of Advanced Technology (MANCAT) to work with NEM through its Openshaw campus. Seventh, the intention to provide development companies with housing construction contracts was apparent in Bernstein’s announcement that ‘major house building groups had expressed enthusiasm for creating new and sustainable homes in the area’ (NEM Shadow Board Minutes, 09/12/1999). Finally, it was clear that NEM was not to function de novo, but was to sweep up existing projects under

30

The regeneration of east Manchester

its control by assuming responsibility for the Health, Sports and Education Action Zones (HAZs, SAZs and EAZs), the Ancoats Urban Village Company, SureStart, the Miles Platting/Eastside initiative and the Commonwealth Games and related Sportcity developments. Its role was to ensure that all of these projects worked to ‘a common agenda’. The ‘umbrella’ function of NEM was also clear in the case of the HMRP, which was a national initiative set up in 2002; Manchester and Salford was one of nine areas allocated funds. Its purpose was to regenerate the housing market in city areas where demand was collapsing and to encourage the demolition of old properties and their replacement by newly built houses and flats. In the case of east Manchester, at least, it was clear that HMRP was seen by NEM as yet another ­funding stream to bend to its housing aims. The difficulty in sustaining the independence and budget of NEM is evidenced by both national and localised developments. At the national level, the stepping down in March 2011 of the Director-­General for regeneration, Irene Lucas, from the Department for Communities and Local Government (DCLG), signified the declining importance of regeneration (Planning, 2010). The impact of this change in central impetus was also demonstrated in localities other than Manchester. In neighbouring Salford, for example, the Central Salford URC was closed in March 2011 due to the loss of HCA and NWDA funding. The Salford URC’s achievements, including the development of the MediaCityUK scheme, failed to save it (Jordan, 2010: 5). In Liverpool the URC, Liverpool Vision, had already been changed to an economic development company in 2008 and in December its work was brought within the City Council (Wilmer, 2010: 19). Even privatisation is not excluded, as the North-­East Lincolnshire Council outsourced its comprehensive regeneration programme to the Balfour Beatty company (Cook, 2010: 38). NDC: Beacons for a brighter future The other main regeneration structure was NDC/Beacons. This served a smaller area than NEM, covering only the neighbourhoods of Clayton, Beswick, Bradford and Openshaw while from the outset NEM also included West Gorton and Abbey Hey (NEM Board Minutes, 12/02/2004). The two programmes also began at different times, their objectives were different, albeit overlapping, and NEM outlasted NDC/Beacons. The two structures had a complex relationship but they increasingly merged their activities, first informally but, after 2009, formally. If central government was far from ‘joined-­up’ in its launching of two different ABIs in the same area, compensatory collaboration was accomplished at the local level. NDC/Beacons drew together over £50 m of public finance from direct funding and from the SRB. NDC/Beacons was governed by a Board involving MCC with twelve members, six of whom were residents, four from other public sector



Partners in regeneration 31

partnerships, one from the voluntary sector and one from the business community (Interview, 13/02/2006). These two organisations co-­operated with each other: for example, NDC/Beacons found community representatives to serve on the NEM Board, and they operated in the same building in Grey Mare Lane, Beswick. NEM and NDC/Beacons had close relationships with MCC and Sean McGonigle, the Chief Executive of Beacons/NDC, was seconded from MCC; in 2008 he reverted to being MCC Deputy Chief Executive. The NDC had a narrower focus than that of holistic regeneration, was contracted to improve the quality of life of residents and was a more ambitious version of the SRB. The greater overall importance of NEM was evident from its wider geographical and functional remit. Geographically, it was responsible for a larger area of east Manchester and functionally it had oversight of the entire regeneration process, addressing the i­nter-­linked issues of housing, transport, employment, education and crime (Interview, 01/09/2004). There were areas of overlap between the two structures, however, as when the NDC/Beacons Board agreed to fund Employment and Training and Business Development programmes. The two structures funded a local newspaper, the North and East Manchester Advertiser (NEMA), to assist communication with the local neighbourhoods (NDC/Beacons Board Minutes, 28/01/2002). The clearest sign of the extent to which NDC/Beacons was a central part of NEM’s remit was its expenditure on the large-­scale voluntary stock transfer to Eastlands Homes, which accounted for the largest single share of its budget despite the fact that housing was within NEM’s purview rather NDC’s (Roberts, 2010). An Away Day of the senior staff in both structures in 2008 led to a new Implementation Plan and the acceptance of an NDC Exit Strategy (NEM Away Day, 19/09/2008). NEM was anxious that the work of the two structures be co-­ordinated and mutually compatible, and it was agreed that Russell and McGonigle would attend each other’s Board meetings; in January 2002 NDC/Beacons also urged a joint meeting. (NDC/Beacons Board Minutes, 28/01/2002). Both structures also agreed that they should jointly review their progress against baselines after three, six and ten years of operation in line with the DETR demands (NDC/Beacons Board Minutes, 10/06/2002). Contributory partners The array of organisations in regeneration partnerships ranges from purely private sector to voluntary sector organisations. What unites this diverse range is that they are only partially concerned with the regeneration of east Manchester, or are concerned with one specific element of regeneration, but they remain part of the structural landscape. The NDC/Beacons Exit Strategy led to certain functions being transferred to the voluntary sector, such as 4CT, based at The Grange, Sporting Edge in Openshaw and the Manchester Settlement. 4CT refers to the four ‘communities’ of Beswick,

The regeneration of east Manchester

32

Clayton, Bradford and Openshaw and it undertakes activities to bind people together and to run facilities used by residents (Interview, 17/09/2010). A key service is a Credit Union, as east Manchester had been plagued by loan sharks.1 It is clear that NDC/Beacons saw 4CT as one way in which it could maintain some of its legacy. 4CT also links with Manchester City Football Club (MCFC) and received an MCFC award for the quality of its partnership work. A representative of MCFC attends 4CT Board meetings (attended by authors on 15/04/2011). The head of 4CT commented that MCFC’s support ‘is absolutely vital in terms of shared resources, publicity, staff and access to new funding opportunities. We look forward to sharing a very successful blue future’ (MCFC, 2010). The voluntary sector had been involved previously in east Manchester, however, under the aegis of Voluntary Action Manchester (VAM) and the Community Chest. The Community Chest provides grants for voluntary organisations to encourage greater involvement in local community activities such as providing a newsletter, offering information and communications technology (ICT) training programmes and maintaining local community facilities (Interview, 14/10/2004 and VAM, 2004). NEM and NDC/Beacons encouraged other organisations such as Recycled Teenagers for older residents and bodies dealing with allotments and environmental improvements. 4CT and the Manchester Settlement are now the hub of voluntary activity in the communities where they operate. The Manchester Settlement operates in Openshaw and is an extension of a charity that has involved Manchester University undergraduate volunteers since 1895. It continues to provide services, but has become more professionalised. It always operated in Ancoats in the eastern part of the city, in recognition of the serious need to support deprived residents. It remained focused on east Manchester after May 2009 when it moved into new premises, the New Roundhouse, in Openshaw. The Manchester Settlement also invites local people to suggest what services should be offered. Currently it provides basic adult education in conjunction with the Manchester Adult Education Service (MAES) and book exchange, chess and breakfast clubs. It also runs an independent school for young people aged 13 to 16, a Young People’s housing project, a Playscheme, a Legal Advice Centre and community activities such as Connexions drop-­in services, Moneyskills and Valuing Older People events and beginners’ ­computer sessions (Manchester Settlement, 2009: 1–4). There are also localised groups operating within specific neighbourhoods, such as the initiative by Manchester Community Information Network (MCIN) in launching Gortoneye as a gateway to local information for Gorton residents, (www.­m anchester.gov.uk/download/10628/gorton_north_ward_newsletter_spring_2009, accessed 31/07/2009). While some groups have endured longer than others, and the performance of the specific functions have sometimes been transferred between different organisations, the concerns that they address are 1

  Visits to the Grange revealed the demand for the Credit Union’s services.



Partners in regeneration 33

permanent. The arrival of the ‘Big Society’ idea has had an ambiguous effect on these charitable and voluntary organisations. Government intends them to fill in gaps in state provision but the financial situation has reduced their capacity, for example, 4CT wishes but is unable to replace the disappearance of the Manchester Youth Service. This demonstrates the limitations of civil society in substituting for statutory agencies (4CT Board Meeting, attended by authors on 15/04/2002). Residents stepped in to maintain services destroyed by the Government’s deficit reduction strategy. For example, the proposal to close the Miles Platting SureStart centre led to the Park View Community School stepping in to save it. Councillor Battle, while blaming government for the potential loss of the SureStart centre, supported the initiative, arguing that ‘the people of Miles Platting have always worked together to make the most of their local community’ and an MCC official promised the transfer of early years’ activities, including SureStart, by commissioning ‘a more targeted family offer from local providers’ (NEMA, 17/02/2011). As has been noted, MCFC works with groups such as 4CT. MCFC representatives also sit on the NEM and Eastlands Homes Boards. As soon as Sportcity was located in east Manchester, as a result of the Commonwealth Games in 2002, it was apparent that a subsequent role would have to be found for the Stadium in order to avoid it becoming a white elephant, ₤200 m was invested in the Commonwealth Games for sporting venues which ‘was the first time in Britain that a major sports event was integrated . . . with regeneration’ (Gratton, Shibli and Coleman, 2005: 993). By 2004 there had been an increase of 450 jobs and a notable increase in tourism. The Cambridge Group estimated that the Games contributed to Manchester moving up the European Cities Monitor from nineteenth place in 2002 to thirteenth in 2003 (Gratton, Shibli and Coleman, 2005: 994). After Manchester City inherited the Stadium in 2003 it continued to create part-­time casual employment for local people in such areas as match day stewarding and catering, and the very existence of the Stadium established a functioning residential market which had previously disappeared (Davies, 2008: 34). One study attributes the creation of EAZs, SAZs and HAZs to the Commonwealth Games (Smith and Fox, 2007).This was much less significant, however, than the purchase of the club by a wealthy Middle Eastern family in September 2009. NEM staff refer to the club as the richest in the world and believe that it will assist in filling the gap inflicted by public spending reductions, others wait to see what transpires. It is apparent, however, that since its new ownership, the club is undertaking a major investment programme in the area surrounding the Stadium, leading Eddie Smith to claim that ‘the first wave of east Manchester regeneration has been done by the public sector and the second wave is hopefully going to be undertaken by the football club’ (NEMA, 17/03/2011). MCFC is involved with a major leisure complex on the land which had been earmarked for the Casino which was awarded to MCC and subsequently withdrawn. Whether the hopes of those in NEM and MCC about the economic significance of the Club’s future investment proves to be warranted, MCFC remains active

34

The regeneration of east Manchester

through its CITC activities. For example, one of its staff, the former goalkeeper Alex Williams, was awarded an MBE in 2001 as a direct result of CITC activities. Its current projects include the Kicks programme for deprived children, after-­school classes in literacy and numeracy and work with unemployed adults. CITC staff stress that the Club’s senior management is foursquare behind the scheme. The Club has a continuing dialogue with east Manchester officials, Eastlands Homes and local school governing bodies, the purpose of which is to ensure that the visions of the Club and of NEM and MCC coincide (Interviews, 14/04/2010). Property and business interests are engaged in the regeneration process and such companies as Gleeson, Lovell and Urban Splash have been long, if intermittently, involved. The Neighbourhood Planning (NP) process instigated by NEM, for example, was often shared with the private sector, which was charged with undertaking the process under NEM’s supervision. These companies and their competitors retain an interest in housing development, but their role has declined since the 2008 recession. The banking crisis and the withdrawal of funds for investment, coupled with the impact of the recession on housing demand, led to a decline in house building. NEM had planned for 800-­1,000 houses per annum, but in 2009 only 507 were constructed. Developers are not only building fewer houses but are seeking out easier greenfield sites for their work (Interview, 31/03/2010). The ending of neighbourhood fund grants also led MCC to cancel the £8.8 m plan for the refurbishment of west Openshaw. This exemplifies that public spending is unable to compensate for the departure of property companies in investing in development (NEMA, 03/02/2011). The need for a temporal analysis responsive to public policy, structural changes and the vagaries of the market is evident. While views vary among public and voluntary sectors about whether it was the recession or the funding reductions which did most damage to the strength of the regeneration initiative, they are clearly linked and cumulatively had a major negative impact (Interviews, 16/12/2010). In addition to the role of the private market in housing, non-­profit-­making arms-­length organisations were also involved in regeneration. Registered Social Landlords (RSLs) became significant regeneration players. Eastlands Homes is now the main social landlord in east Manchester and is responsible for delivering a housing improvement programme and for finding new and innovative ways of encouraging tenant and resident participation, assisted by the ‘dowry’ provided under the Large Scale Voluntary Transfer (LSVT) arrangement with NDC/ Beacons. There are other Housing Associations (HAs) such as Northern Counties, the Guinness Trust and Mosscare Housing in the High Legh area of Openshaw. These HAs and NP in east Manchester led to the proliferation of Tenants’ and Residents Associations. These informal structures have been tied in with the NEM and NDC Boards by a process of indirect election of Board members. Other structures, which while themselves products of regeneration have become active agents in the area, are the schools. While such schools as Ashbury Meadow



Partners in regeneration 35

3.1  East Manchester Academy

Primary and the East Manchester Academy were the result of distinct national funding streams, their success makes them active contributors to the regeneration of the area. NEM worked to promote both a new primary and secondary school and did much to assemble the land in conjunction with developers as a part of the NP process (NEM Board Minutes, 18/03/2002). NDC/Beacons contributed £600,000 towards the Academy’s building costs to ensure that the needs of the wider community would be stressed (NEM, 2008/2009: 15). The Academy’s appeal is signalled by its having been heavily over-­subscribed; its outreach activities are important, with the new district library attached to the school and the venues provided for adult education and community events (Interview, 14/04/2010). The Academy might replace the work of the Adult Education agencies, or offer alternative venues to The Grange, but it aims to avoid duplication. The inter-­connectedness with MCC is apparent in MCC’s representation on the Academy Trust (Figure 3.1). NEM also worked directly with other local structures which work in east Manchester as a part of their activities. They include NHS Manchester, the Greater Manchester Police (GMP) and JobCentre Plus. These public bodies have worked with either NEM or NDC/Beacons to provide multi-­agency activity, whether in the promotion of healthy living, combating crime and anti-­social behaviour or providing work for residents (NEM and NDC, 2009). Many contributed to the work of the Public Agencies Forum set up by NDC/Beacons in November 1999 to enable residents to influence local services on the ground (Roberts, 2010: 13).

36

The regeneration of east Manchester

If New Labour sometimes aided the blurring of public/private/voluntary sector boundaries, that process has been accelerated by the Coalition Government, which has not abandoned the concept of partnership but advances it in a different form to intensify the role of the private and voluntary sectors. The application for a LEP for Greater Manchester secured early government approval. The acceptance of a bid on behalf of Manchester, Bolton, Bury, Oldham, Rochdale, Salford, Stockport, Tameside, Trafford and Wigan suggests that government welcomes a harmony between the boundaries of the city-­region and the LEP. The LEP is a business-­led partnership with local authorities, and the Regional Director of British Petroleum was named as the first chair (Townsend, 2011: 6). The LEP is expected to bring together businesses and civic leaders to assist in the delivery of the national policy on planning. It will be involved with the issues of housing, planning and transport and will have access to a Regional Growth Fund (RGF), although that promises less funding than was available under the aegis of the NWDA.2 The danger of overlapping responsibilities between the city-­region and the LEP is evident. Yet this may be mitigated by the involvement of local government in the two structures and by the clear set of powers allocated to the city-­region. The partnership structure remains, therefore, but there is some doubt about the strength and capacity of LEPs given the warnings that they will not be supported with sufficient funds for them to flourish (Gillman, 2010: 4). By 2012 an observer suggested that LEPs would become irrelevant without greater government support, clarity of purpose and a statutory foundation (Planning, 2010). Conclusion The complexity of east Manchester’s regeneration process is demonstrated by its array of structures, and that phenomenon is exacerbated by the fact that the organisations involved change over time. These changes in the structural architecture highlight the importance of a temporal perspective: while NEM survived and MCC remained the key player, NDC/Beacons, HMRP, EP and NWDA have been and gone. The emergence of LEPs and the city-­region may not change the economic and social issues with which NEM had been established to deal, but they will change the priorities and affect the specific structures. The theme of change and continuity has been evident in the history of the structures in east Manchester. This continuity is evident in NEM’s ongoing, albeit much reduced, role. Structural changes were also apparent in the earlier merger of NDC with NEM in 2009, the change from EP to its successor body, the Homes 2   A signal of the power relationships within the Coalition is apparent from the visit of the Business Secretary, Vince Cable, to Manchester in June 2010, when he told staff that the NWDA would continue as it was doing valuable work in a deprived region, only for government to announce its removal shortly afterwards (Interview, 26/05/2010).



Partners in regeneration 37

and Communities Agency (HCA) in 2010 and the ending of the HMRP initiative. The future role of HCA is also questionable, as it faces a major funding squeeze and announced that it was reducing its commitments after April 2011, weakening its capacity to engage in renewal, although it was able in 2011 to work with the Peel Land and Property company and MCC to assist in completing the Cube Apartments in Ancoats in which it had invested £4.93 m (HCA, 2011). The over-­arching concept for the regeneration programme is that of partnership, and New Labour intended the plethora of structures to work together to regenerate deprived inner-­city areas. MCC takes a pride in the role that partnerships play in its affairs. It has claimed that ‘partnership working is at the heart of our many achievements’ and that such an approach has been ‘pivotal to policy implementation’ (Interviews, 30/04/2004). The extent to which the structural pluralism of the east Manchester initiative created waste and duplication rather than economy and effectiveness, however, is a judgement which divides opinion. One participant, for example, criticised the manner in which New Labour increased the cost of regeneration by the involvement of Regional Government Offices (RGOs), RDAs, the SRB initiative and newly created structures such as the HMRP, instead of adhering to tried and tested programmes such as City Challenge (Interview, 3/02/2012). Changes of government often lead to institutional tinkering, even when the ideological shift is not substantial. What is less contestable, however, is the importance of MCC in alleviating this structural complexity. Chapter 7 locates this within the debate about the changing role of the state.

4 A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester

The regeneration of east Manchester was a product of New Labour. In many countries targeted geographical programmes were being launched to tackle the problems of distressed urban areas (Smith, 1999: 2). New Labour modified the approach that it inherited in favour of a more ‘bottom up’ strategy, and before it launched NDC/Beacons and NEM in 1999 and 2000 it had already established EAZs, HAZs and refocused SRB towards the most deprived areas (DETR, 1998a). This was a holistic approach to regeneration. One local activist complained that the NEM projects were ‘disjointed’, but collectively they still attempted to provide coherence to east Manchester’s regeneration. To make sense of the plethora of projects we follow the key thematic areas identified by NEM and NDC. Inevitably, given the scale of the regeneration initiative–for example, NDC/Beacons was responsible for over 190 projects (NDC, 2009: 5.10)– and the diverse range of agents involved, we only discuss key projects, indicative of the types of activities undertaken. They cannot capture the full volume and diversity of activity. The temporal aspect is evident as we map the changes and continuities in regeneration priorities from NDC’s original delivery plan of 1999 and NEM’s Strategic Regeneration Framework (SRF) of 2000–2008 to the present day, including the SRF of 2008–2018 and the Eastlands Regeneration Framework which resulted from the agreement between MCC, MCFC and NEM in 2011. We also consider the impact of the global recession after 2008, the change in national government in May 2010 and the resulting cuts to public spending. The complex nature of this temporal aspect is present in the recognition by residents and regeneration agents that while the clustering of regeneration opportunities in east Manchester from 1999 was a one-­off golden opportunity, regeneration required upwards of thirty years to bear fruition. The spatial aspect features in our recognition of the geographical opportunities



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 39

and limitations presented by the location of east Manchester and its situation in the wider city-­region, national and global economies. There are also spatial distinctions within the relatively heterogeneous area of east Manchester, and a case study of Ancoats is presented to illustrate these. The deprivation in 1997 and the resulting challenges posed to regeneration varied across neighbourhoods. ­City-­centre-­facing districts such as Ancoats had more opportunity for improvement than more deprived neighbourhoods, most particularly Newton Heath, which was only added to the regeneration project in 2004, and has had less time to reap its benefits. NDC/Beacons was funded by central government with the total of £76.65 m achieved by a mixture of specific funding and the transfer of monies from the established SRB project. NEM was originally funded by the company’s member bodies, English Partnerships (EP) later the Homes and Communities Agency (HCA), Manchester City Council (MCC) and the North-­West Development Agency (NWDA) each providing £250,000 per annum, although it attracted money from other public and private sources (NEM Shadow Board Minutes, 16/07/1999). Building on the existing base NEM’s SRF for east Manchester (2000–2008) recognised the uphill nature of the task because of the area’s long-­term economic and social decline. There were strengths, however, including the availability of land, its attractiveness for development purposes and its proximity to the M60 orbital motorway and the city centre which, since the 1990s, had experienced some renaissance. NEM was able to exploit brownfield land for its major projects including Sportcity, which contained 65 ha of one of the most contaminated sites in Europe and Central Business Park which utilised 182 ha at the cost of £5 m (Dixon, Otsuka and Abe, 2011: 968). The holding of the 2002 Commonwealth Games and the resulting Sportcity complex was recognised as a catalyst for regeneration. The NDC programme was geared to achieving maximum value from the Games, so delivery was frontloaded, with the majority of expenditure taking place in the first few years. The NEM Board similarly recognised the importance of identifying ‘quick wins and early priorities’ through the Masterplanning process in order ‘to give local people a sense of progression and to attract new investors’ (NEM Board Minutes, 16/03/2000). It affirmed that ‘The opportunity of the 2002 Games must not be missed’ (NEM Board Minutes, 6/04/2000). The level of commitment from national, regional and local levels of government was an unprecedented opportunity. East Manchester benefited from the EAZs, SAZs, HAZs and SureStart programmes and, in 2004, acquired HMRP funds as part of a wider allocation to Manchester and Salford: Taken together these programmes provide the basis for a major improvement in the lives and prospects of residents . . . The £90 million committed to these programmes

40

The regeneration of east Manchester

over ten years represents a large investment in east Manchester that will have a strong regeneration effect in its own right and will act as a basis to attract further funding from European Structural Funds and from the Lottery. (NEM, 2000: 7)

The baseline from which the various regeneration agents were working, however, made for grim reading. By all of the usual indices, east Manchester was an area of multiple deprivation, whether the measure was poor educational attainment, economic decline, high crime rates, many low-­income and benefit-­dependent households, few or low-­skill jobs, community breakdown, inferior quality public services, poor health status, a transient population and a depressed appearance. When Government launched its £2 bn NDC programme in 1998, Manchester was the third most deprived local authority in the country. In 2004, 90% of east Manchester’s residents lived in neighbourhoods classed as being among the worst 10% in England, with the majority of residents (33,000) living in the worst 1% of neighbourhoods (NEM, 2006/2007: 16). In 2004, NEM extended its boundaries to incorporate Gorton and Newton Heath; this extension virtually doubled NEM’s operations and population. As the then chairman of NEM, Robert Hough, recognised: With no accompanying increase in financial resources, there is a particular challenge here for New East Manchester to secure better use of existing mainstream resources to ensure that these new areas receive real and tangible benefit from the regeneration programme. (NEM, 2004/2005: 4)

By 2006, however, the Chairman’s Annual Report stated that NEM had reached ‘a significant turning point, with private sector investment outstripping public funding for the first time’ (NEM, 2006/2007: 2). In the 2007/2008 Annual Report, the Chairman declared that NEM and its partners had seen ‘the long term economic and population decline of East Manchester arrested. The area has now been stabilised and the foundations have been laid to enable East Manchester to play its full part in supporting the continuing economic growth of the Manchester City Region’ (NEM, 2007/2008: 05). In recognition of this turning point, east Manchester’s SRF was refreshed following consultation and was approved by the NEM Board in November 2007. The 2008/2018 SRF simplified the range of themes to focus on three core objectives – Raising Incomes, Raising Aspirations and Raising Families – which were to be achieved through three frameworks: the Economy and Employment Framework, the People and Communities Framework and the Neighbourhoods and Places Framework. The revised SRF came at a difficult time. The major challenge after 2008 was the recession, but it did not prevent the extension of Metrolink. The property market was badly affected, however, with commercial properties particularly suffering as speculators held properties in the hope that values would rise and capital grow as a result of regeneration. The failure to develop land for housing also led to empty properties. Not all was negative, as Alan Turing Way and Great Ancoats Street



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 41

were emerging as two positive employment corridors and Central Park was emerging as an incubator scheme for small businesses (CBRE, 2008). In addition to the challenges presented by the recession, key funding streams such as NDC monies came to an end and the Coalition Government cut public funding in its 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR). The new SRF claimed that: There is a real danger that unless east Manchester continues to improve, the progress made to date will unravel . . . Put simply, unless further improvements are secured, there is no guarantee that the gains made in the last seven years will be maintained. (NEM, 2008: 5)

The danger of the progress unravelling became more real when, in February 2011, MCC announced the cuts it would need to make in light of spending reductions imposed by central government. Following on from the Coalition Government’s abolition of the NWDA and the changing functions of HCA, MCC became the only remaining funding partner although its position was boosted when it signed in 2010, along with MCFC and NEM, a new deal to continue regeneration in the area around the Etihad Stadium. Key strategies NEM’s SRF, A New Town in the City, co-­ordinated all regeneration activity and aligned NEM’s key targets with those of the NDC/Beacons Programme and other regeneration agents. NEM’s core functions were: to act as a custodian of the regeneration framework; to co-­ordinate the range of regeneration programmes and  initiatives, including the mainstream public sector services; to drive forward key physical developments such as the new town centre, the business park development, the private sector housing programme and key improvements to the public realm and environment; and to lever in private sector investment through place marketing (NEM, 2000: 46). These core functions were translated into the following targets over its original ten-­year life span: doubling the population to 60,000, building up to 12,500 new homes of diverse type and tenure, improving and modernising 7,000 existing homes, creating up to 10,000 new jobs, developing an integrated transport system, creating a 160 ha business park, improving retail provision and community amenities, completing the Sportcity complex and building a new town centre around it, and raising educational achievement above Manchester’s average (NEM, 2002/2003: 8–9). These targets complemented NDC’s strategy in its original ­delivery plan which aimed to: Strengthen the area’s economic base; reduce levels of worklessness; engage the community in the management of local housing and facilities; deliver mainstream resources in a way which is more responsive to local need; achieve a much more stable community with lower levels of out migration; build the capacity of the local

42

The regeneration of east Manchester

community for greater involvement and participation; deliver new and improved community facilities; and achieve a self-­sustaining private housing sector. (Roberts, 2010: 5–6)

These aims were translated into seven themes: crime and community safety; education and young people; health and well-­being; worklessness and economic programme; physical environment; sport and local services; community capacity and cohesion (Roberts, 2010: 6). Putting together NEM’s targets and NDC’s seven themes, this chapter considers regeneration projects under the headings of housing and the physical environment; education; employment; crime and community safety; health and well-­being; transport; sport and community facilities. Yet it must be recognised that the individual projects overlapped in practice and ‘the two funding streams were inextricably linked’ (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 15/04/2008). The NDC theme of community capacity and cohesion is considered in Chapter 8. Housing and the physical environment East Manchester’s population had declined by 12.9% from 36,170 in 1991 to 31,503 by 1999. This left many abandoned properties and, for remaining residents, values had declined. In particular, ‘Values of terraced stock in the last 10 years have dropped from £25,000-­£30,000 to as low as £5,000 creating significant negative equity’ (NEM, 2000: 11). There were also high levels of social rented properties: 43% of the housing was council owned and vacancy rates were high, reaching as much as 20% or even 40% in a few discrete areas (NEM, 2000: 11). The privately rented sector (42% of the stock) fared little better: it was characterised by poor housing conditions, poor management and benefit dependency. NDC’s 1999 delivery plan identified housing and the physical environment as key contributory factors to the area’s decline. A vicious circle of poor property conditions, loss of population and vacant properties was exacerbated by the visual impact of large tracts of derelict land. Moreover, the profile of the housing stock compared unfavourably. Terraced housing, representing 57% of the housing stock compared to 36% in Manchester, dominated. Over half (53%) of all households rented from social landlords, with the majority (37%) being council tenants. Only 32% of properties were ­owner-­occupied, compared to 42% in Manchester and 69% in the north-­west and nationally (Roberts, 2010: 58). While one commentator was incorrect in stating that regeneration in east Manchester was predominantly about housing and property development, it was the ‘single most important issue that emerged through extensive consultations’ on the SRF (NEM Board Minutes, 17/04/2002). A strategy of building new homes and improving existing ones, and their surrounding physical environment, was essential to retain existing residents and to attract new people. Although it was recognised



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 43

that each of the fifteen neighbourhoods had different requirements, the need to support existing residents to stay was paramount. An intensive NP programme was therefore established, which was underpinned by a ‘Right to Remain, Right to Return’ guarantee (NEM 2002/2003: 32). This, together with the guarantee of re-­ housing on a like-­for-­like basis, and the chance to move with neighbours to ensure that communities stayed together, became NEM’s policy (NEM Board Minutes, 28/08/2002). This did not always address the problems of affordability, however, and attractive apartments such as those at Sportcity caused equity problems (NEM Board Minutes, 30/11/2004). In 2002, for example, three-­quarters of homes were affordable for people on average incomes, but this had fallen to 35% by 2005 (NEM Board Minutes, 03/10/2006).This mattered, as NEM encouraged owner occupation as an end in itself and to uplift the area socially. Even in 2007 NEM still sought to fulfil the aim of 60% owner occupation (NEM Board Minutes, 21/11/2007). A related aim was to ensure some balance between apartments and houses, as resident Board members were concerned that there was an insufficient focus on family housing. Housing was also seen as a priority for NEM and NDC/Beacons to halt the decline of the area. Achieving an ‘early win’ through improving housing and the environment was seen as crucial to gaining resident buy-­in to regeneration. In addition to the residential development at Sportcity, the main areas focused on initially were Beswick, Ancoats and the New Islington Millennium Community. Completed in December 2002, the Beswick NP included the building of 1,100 new homes over a six-­to-­eight year period, a new primary school with associated community facilities, identifying a potential site for a new secondary school, modernising council owned housing through a transfer to a new housing company (Eastlands Homes) and improving a small number of retained private housing (NEM, 2002/2003: 33). The plans for a new secondary school were the source of controversy, as described in Chapter 8. The episode demonstrated that in regeneration there are losers and winners and that individual strategies, in this case for education and for housing, are inter-­connected. Providing a new school to attract new families and improve educational outcomes disrupted the lives of residents, who did not trust NEM to provide them with suitable alternative accommodation (NEMA, 22/10/2004). In the Sportcity area, development partners Countryside Properties provided over 350 new homes for sale in a mixed residential development of apartments and town houses. In the New Islington Millennium Community, 1,400 new homes, a community school, clinic and shops were to be built with partners Urban Splash (NEM, 2002/2003: 34). Neighbourhood plans were approved in April 2003 to begin transforming the 200-­unit run-­down Cardroom Council Estate into a modern development capable of attracting new residents to city-­centre living (NEM, 2002/2003: 18). A development agreement for the Miles Platting Neighbourhood scheme was launched in 2004 under a Private Finance Initiative (PFI) which unlocked £160 m of public money and a similar level of private investment (NEMA,

44

The regeneration of east Manchester

17/12/2004). More than 1,500 council houses and flats were to be refurbished and around 1,000 new homes built. Miles Platting’s schools, shops, services and green spaces were also to be improved. NEM benefited from the Government’s ten-­year HMRP, established to tackle housing market failure in nine pathfinder areas in England. East Manchester gained £30 m over an initial three years, which was directed at tackling the pre-­1919 terraced properties which were badly maintained, often privately rented and poorly managed (NEM, 2002/2003: 34). In the case of Toxteth Street in Openshaw, the availability of HMRP funds advanced the plans for an ambitious housing renewal. NEM appointed a housing provider, Lovell, which participated in consultations to prepare a comprehensive NP which affected over 700 properties (NEMA, 11/07/2003). Resistance to the subsequent Compulsory Purchase Order (CPO) ensured that the process became even more protracted, although by 2005 the neighbourhood plan had been approved and St Peter’s School had been demolished to make way for fifty-­one properties (NEM, 2004/2005: 19). By 2009 demolition and building were going forward in Miles Platting and Toxteth Street (NEM, 2009/2010: 32). Eastlands Homes is now the main social landlord in east Manchester. Established in 2003, it assumed the ownership and management of 2,899 council homes in Beswick, Openshaw and Clayton (Grant, 2010: 111). The transfer was made possible by money from two funding streams managed by NEM – NDC and SRB – which provided £20.3 m. Indeed, investment in housing and the physical environment represented nearly half of the NDC/Beacons’ budget. Leading local activists were strongly in favour of the transfer of homes to an independent housing company ‘custom made in east Manchester’ (NEMA, 8/08/2003). On its first anniversary Eastlands Homes could boast over 2,000 improvements in nearly 1,000 homes as well as creating new jobs, with trainees learning new skills and trades (NEMA, 10/09/2004): Eastlands Homes was not unique, as Northern Counties, the Guinness Trust and Mosscare Housing were also prominent social landlords, and High Legh housing in Openshaw, for example, was transferred from Manchester Housing to Mosscare Housing. NEM had a policy of confining the RSLs to those four organisations (NEM Board Minutes, 17/04/2002). Under the transfer, NDC/Beacons wanted the delivery of a £61.1 m improvement programme in the first five years and a repairs and maintenance programme over thirty years which Manchester’s Director of Housing described as ‘decent homes in decent places, for decent people’ (Urban Regeneration Companies, 2002). By 2004/2005, improvements had been made to 2,000 of these homes and nineteen new homes had been built (NEM 2004/2005: 16). Eastlands Homes also assumed some neighbourhood management responsibilities, including the cross-­tenure neighbour nuisance team and the neighbourhood wardens (NEM, 2002/2003: 30). By 2004/2005, the neighbourhood warden’s scheme was part-­funded by Eastlands and HMRP (NEM, 2004/2005: 21).



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 45

NEM also improved the public realm. It decided that east Manchester had natural advantages to exploit, such as large green spaces, and sought to utilise these to provide routes through communities to encourage interaction and improve amenities for residents. The Public Realm strategy set out the specifications for the quality of design and materials for public spaces (NEM Board Meeting, 01/06/2006). NDC/Beacons undertook improvements to the infrastructure and amenities at Bradford, Openshaw, Clayton and Philips Parks. Improvements to Philips Park were linked to wider transformations as a result of monies secured in 2004/2005 from NWDA and the European Regional Development Fund (ERDF). This investment, alongside NDC/Beacons’ money, led to the completion of a play area for older children, access improvements, pond works, fencing, boundary wall repair and the production of a long-­term landscape plan. From 2006/2007, the ongoing development of Philips Park was incorporated into the wider Medlock Valley Programme, which was also funded through NWDA monies (NEM, 2005/2006: 9). By 2007, the Medlock Valley Way had been completed and Philips Park, Openshaw Park and Gaskell Street Park in Newton Heath had secured Green Flag status (NEM, 2007/2008: 20). Clayton Vale, a four-­mile area where the River Medlock runs through the Clayton neighbourhood, became a local nature reserve (NEM, 2008/2009: 16). Smaller community projects also improved the physical environment. One was community alleygating, which turned alleyways into attractive communal spaces. By 2004, 180 alleys had been closed and gated (NEM, 2004/2005: 21). With Groundwork as its key partner, NDC/Beacons’ community environment programme facilitated resident groups in creating community gardens from derelict land. NDC/Beacons ran an annual garden competition and helped to encourage involvement in national events including In Bloom and 100 Days’ Challenge. Residents’ pride was apparent in their organising an unveiling ceremony by the MP for Manchester Central, Tony Lloyd, of the Heather Street alleyway mural and garden in Clayton (Interview, 10/10/2005). In 2009, a community orchard was opened at Philips Park, maintained by volunteers and visited by hundreds of school children each year (Grant, 2010: 166). NEM also focused on significantly increasing the amount of family housing as ‘the key means by which East Manchester will grow its population to levels which support better neighbourhood services’ (NEM, 2007: 15). This was a recognition that much of the new housing consisted of high-­density apartments at the edge of the city centre while across east Manchester the range, quality and value of housing remained unattractive to new residents. Although home ownership had increased, at 35% it still remained at almost half the national average. In early 2012, the median house price in the area (£98,466) remained well below the average house price in Manchester (£146,935) and the number of detached and semi-­detached houses likely to attract families was low (MCC, 2012a). Turnover in both the social rented and private rented sector remains high.

46

The regeneration of east Manchester

The private rented sector suffered from the ‘widespread speculative purchasing of properties at extremely low prices where a very quick return can be secured by letting the property to tenants eligible for housing benefit’ (NEM Board Meeting, 17/04/2002). There was also much anti-­social behaviour by tenants. To tackle this issue in the private rented sector, the East Manchester Landlord Information Scheme (EMLIS) was launched in March 2004 to register private landlords. This scheme provides references to better inform people wishing to rent privately. It was so successful that the scheme was implemented across the city (NEM, 2004/2005: 18). It also aimed to prevent perpetrators of anti-­social behaviour from moving around the area unchallenged and so offered landlords accurate information about the people that they let to (NDC, 2005b.) Alongside EMLIS, NDC/Beacons raised the issue of licensing landlords with government in 1999 and the Department of Environment, Transport and the Regions (DETR) circulated a consultation document in 2001. This led to the selective licensing of private landlords, confirmed by the DCLG in May 2007 for a five-­year period, which covered Bradford and Gorton north and south wards, so private rented property there had to have a licence. The task that followed was to identify the properties that should be licensed and to prosecute those landlords who evaded their duties. Yet it was also reported that the concerns which residents and NEM had expressed on the uselessness of the licensing system, ‘including the lack of a noticeable difference in how properties in the private rented sector are managed and the lack of any apparent enforcement activity’, required the NEM Board to review the situation (NEM Board Meeting, 20/02/2008). NDC/Beacons reported the continued vulnerability of its area to recessionary factors and the housing market, and the continuation of pockets with a high proportion of vacant property including within the new-­build stock. Empty property rates had reduced significantly during the period 2009–2011, from 10% vacancy down to less than 6%, yet this remained higher than the Manchester average of 4.8% (MCC, 2012e). Reflecting New Labour’s economic optimism, NEM appeared to forget that property markets are prone to ‘boom and bust’ (Harvey, 1985: 50). This is well illustrated by a comparison of mean overall house prices and overall number of sales. In 2000/2001, the mean house price in east Manchester was £23,459 compared to a Manchester average of £61,300. By the heyday of regeneration in 2007/2008 comparable figures were £113,734 against £155,183. By 2010/2011, however, these figures had fallen to £99,277 and £146,961, respectively. Sales followed a similar trend. In 2000/2001, overall sales in east Manchester were 1,006 compared to a Manchester average of 8,165. In 2007/2008, the comparable figures were 1,873 against 11,182. By 2011/2012, overall sales in east Manchester had declined to 734 against 4,834 in Manchester (MCC, 2012a). NEM not only acknowledged the problem of landlords buying to let but admitted that little could be done to prevent it, despite its deleterious effect on community cohesion (NEM Board Meeting, 21/11/2007). Housing development following



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 47

the recession became largely static, although a number of micro-­projects were progressed, so that the challenge, according to one interviewee was ‘how you sustain and continue to promote housing in this current climate’ (Interview, 16/12/2010). This problem predated the 2010 General Election. Sir Bob Kerslake, when he was Chief Executive of the HCA, stated in 2009 that ‘no longer can the Government rely on developers to finance affordable housing, local services and infrastructure’ because ‘the boom is over’ (Walker, 2009: 19). East Manchester, however, had some capacity to buck the trend given that they had built a platform over the previous twelve years which had allowed some momentum to be sustained. NEM’s Chief Executive claimed that ‘their advantage is that they have plenty of remediated land which has been made available through CPOs’ (Interview, 10/02/2012). NEM and MCC (2012a) also remained optimistic that east Manchester’s population ‘is forecast to increase over the next ten years, primarily driven by families taking advantage of new housing provision’, although other commentators provided evidence that NEM’s aspiration of attracting families would be hard to fulfil as high-­density apartment living in areas close to the city was unappealing to families (Mace, Hall and Gallent, 2007). In harmony with national and local policy, developers have been major beneficiaries of the housing strategies of east Manchester, although NEM submitted all developers to a competitive process and required their engagement in NP. Some developers, such as Urban Splash and Igloo, have wider perspectives than profit, such as the promotion of a new style of city living and sustainability; agents other than residents gain from the regeneration process and some interests seized unintended opportunities. For example, a local councillor complained that in one neighbourhood estate agents ‘touted for business’ by visiting local people telling them that their properties were to be demolished under future CPOs (Interview, 07/02/2006). More generally, a consultant reported that speculators held properties hoping that values would increase and capital growth obtained. ‘By unrealistic aspirations of value they frustrate the delivery of schemes. When faced with CPOs they technically challenge them to secure an above market settlement. Some ­speculators target compulsory purchase areas to profit’ (CBRE, 2008). Housing redevelopment creates both winners and losers. Despite NEM’s ‘Right to Remain, Right to Return’ guarantee, it has been disturbing for some householders, to the extent that one activist suggested that housing should have been dealt with separately, as had it not been for the problems which it caused for many residents NEM would have been popular (Interview, 15/04/2011). Other residents have benefited from housing redevelopment and display pride in living in their area (Interview, 16/12/2010). However sensitively housing redevelopment is handled, the use of CPOs and demolition creates distress among those affected. NEM’s holistic approach was particularly important in this area: ‘If you go to people saying we’re going to knock your house down, they’ll object. But, if you say you’ll build a new school, a surgery and provide new housing, it’s a different ball game’ (Interview,

48

The regeneration of east Manchester

16/12/2010). Another official claimed that although he would not claim they had got everything right, and it is understandable that people protest against CPOs, they had ‘tried to work as much as we can with the grain and to work sensitively’, so more houses had been refurbished than knocked down (Interview, 16/12/2010). Yet one Manchester MP stated: ‘Some people will always lose out – some people’s houses will be destroyed in order to build a new school. Within any regeneration process there are individual decisions which are brutal in human terms’ (Interview, 10/10/2005). Education Attainment in east Manchester was poor, with just under 25% of pupils achieving five GCSE passes at grade A*–C compared to a national average of 46% and a Manchester average of 29%. Attendance was similarly poor: secondary schools in east Manchester had an attendance rate of 79%, 6 percentage points lower than Manchester and 15 percentage points lower than the UK average. Attainment amongst the workforce was low, with 77% lacking a GCSE-­level qualification and only 4% having a degree. Aspirations were also low, with inadequate numbers continuing into education post-­16 while 11% of all school leavers in the NDC/Beacons’ area became unemployed (Roberts, 2010: 36). The NEM Board recognised that an education and training strategy was ‘an important part of the overall masterplanning exercise’ (NEM Board Minutes, 06/04/2000). It was ‘pivotal’ to the sustainability of the programme and ‘at the heart of regeneration’ (NEM, 2005/2006: 26). A report analysing primary and secondary education found that ‘there is significant underachievement amongst young people at all stages of compulsory education’ and that this had ‘knock-­on effects on the transition from school to work and the worklessness phenomenon that exists in east Manchester’ (NEM Board Meeting, 06/04/2000). For NEM and NDC/Beacons, education highlighted the need for a holistic approach. Improving education provision would make the area more attractive to existing residents and help attract more families to achieve NEM’s target of doubling the population. Improving the qualifications and skills levels of existing residents would also help improve employment. Education also typified the partnership approach to regeneration, as it drew in SureStart, the EAZ, the Early Years Development and Childcare Partnership, the Clayton Children’s Centre, NDC/ SRB, and the Local Education Authority (LEA) MAES. The SRF detailed three priorities: raising attainment and school improvement, promoting inclusion, and community and lifelong learning (NEM, 2000: 22). These aligned with the three issues the EAZ would address: improving teaching and learning, social exclusion, and the promotion of excellence and community support for teaching and learning (Roberts, 2010: 36). NDC/Beacons aimed to promote projects which would complement those of the EAZ and to maintain



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 49

its achievements after it ended in 2005/2006 (Roberts, 2010: 36). It believed that investment in education could help to reverse generational unemployment and educational expectations among children and their families (Roberts, 2010: 36–37). Local activists complained, however, about a lack of tracking of the progress of children through SureStart and local primary schools through to secondary education, although that issue was being addressed after protests in 2010 (Interview, 16/06/2010). East Manchester’s educational infrastructure was improved by a new building for Ravensbury Primary School in Clayton, which opened in July 2002. In September 2004, a new primary school replaced the existing Ashbury Meadow and Bank Meadow Schools and the East Manchester Academy opened in the autumn of 2010. These new facilities adhere to the ‘extended school’ concept of providing community facilities. Ravensbury Primary School, for example, includes a community wing and runs a junior youth club (NEM, 2004/2005: 23). Ashbury Meadow Primary School in Beswick has a specially designed wing to maximise extended school provision and the school is part of the Children’s Centre. East Manchester’s £31.5 m Academy, the first new-­build secondary school in the area, specialises in the built environment to support the construction activity taking place as part of regeneration. Laing O’Rourke and Bovis Lend Lease sponsor the Academy (NEM, 2008/2009: 15). NDC/Beacons contributed £600,000 to facilitate community services so that, outside of normal school hours, the buildings and grounds of the Academy could be used by groups, clubs and for adult learning opportunities. The Academy also houses a new district library for students and residents (NEM, 2008/2009: 15).1 Funding was secured through the Building Schools for the Future programme for the rebuilding of Cedar Mount High School to form part of the £25.4 m Education Village in Gorton (NEM, 2005/2006: 31). This exemplified NEM’s merging of funds from national programmes with monies raised independently, a process which also happened with the SureStart nursery in the Wells Centre in Clayton (NEMA, 27/02/2004). Gorton Education Village opened in September 2008 and combined two schools – Cedar Mount High School and Melland Special Educational Needs (SEN) High School – on a single-­site campus which provides 900 co-­educational places and 110 specialist support SEN places (www.­manchester.gov.uk, accessed 14 March 2011). Also in Gorton, Wright Robinson College, which opened in September 2007, was rebuilt with £43 m PFI funding. The College focuses on sports and arts and includes a swimming pool and other sporting f­ acilities which residents and nearby schools can also use (NEM, 2006/2007: 24). 1   MCC’s funding cuts announced in 2011 will mean that two small libraries in east Manchester – Clayton Library and East City library – will close as both are near the brand new Beswick Library. East City library was only a temporary library before Beswick Library opened. It is also proposed that Miles Platting Library will close, but only once a new library is opened in a new joint service centre in the area (NEMA, 10/03/2011).

50

The regeneration of east Manchester

Another development was the designation of east Manchester as a 14–19 ‘Pathfinder’ area to link the school curriculum to economic development. To achieve this, the Pathfinder used its funding to implement electronic, individualised learning programmes for young people; to provide more vocational courses in schools linked to employment trends; to improve progression routes into Further Education Colleges, Post-­16 and Higher Education; and to provide enterprise education, including financial, literacy and employability skills (NEM, 2002/2003: 51). Additional Connexions support for disaffected pupils between school and Post-­16 provision was provided. Joint working with NEM’s Economic Programme team and collaboration with employers ensured that students would benefit from the jobs created through regeneration. NEM stated in 2004 that ‘Early indications show that the 14–19 Pathfinder is having a marked impact on students’ motivation, attendance and their capacity to attain improved examination results’ (NEM, 2004/2005: 28). For children and young people considered to be at risk from disaffection, there were complementary education projects funded by ONTRACK, such as the NDC/Beacons’-­funded Pyramid Clubs – weekly after-­school clubs run over a ten-­week period for Year 3 children designed to boost confidence, self-­esteem and communication skills – Fast Track and the Let’s Reachout Programme (NEM, 2004/2005: 27). All children at the clubs could take part in cooking and arts and crafts exercises (NDC, 2005b). In the summer of 2007, the One 4 All campaign promoted the take-­up of places in east Manchester schools to reduce the high number of pupils crossing into Tameside for secondary education (NEM, 2007/2008: 24). By 2005/2006, NEM announced that GCSE results were level with the Manchester average for the first time and that attendance levels were close to Manchester’s secondary school average and level with Manchester’s primary school average (NEM, 2005/2006: 32). By 2011, the percentage of pupils achieving 5 GCSE passes in east Manchester remained within shouting distance of the Manchester average of 51.1%, although there were variations between wards, with Gorton North surpassing the Manchester average at 52.6% while Miles Platting and Newton Heath were significantly below at 34.7%, demonstrating that the spatial dimension operates at a micro-­level (MCC, 2012e). These spatial variations were also reflected in truancy rates. The east Manchester average of 1.87% compared with the city average of 1.60%, although Gorton North was below this at 1.43% while Miles Platting and Newton Heath were again outliers with a rate of 2.31% (MCC, 2012e). The up-­dated SRF recognised the importance of sustaining the improvements of the first seven years (NEM, 2007: 45). The Eastlands Community Plan, signed in 2011 by NEM, MCC and MCFC, proposes a new Sixth Form College as part of the ‘Beswick Community Hub’ to build on what has already been achieved. The Altrincham Grammar School for Girls (AGGS) Academy Trust has applied to Government for a ’16–19 Free School’ with the aim of increasing the number of young people going on to higher education as well as contributing to the edu-



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 51

cational provision of MCFC’s proposed Football Academy (NEM and MCC, 2012:12). Admirable though such improvements are, the challenge is how to sustain them. NEM was concerned about the Exit Strategy for the NEM education team (NEMET) and the new NEM Chief Executive, Eddie Smith, persuaded the Board in February 2008 that the team be funded for another year to allow the opportunity for NEMET to change into a traded service of MCC as an Education Improvement Partnership (EIP) (NEM Board Minutes, 20/02/2008). Education is one of the key areas for improvement if NEM is going to succeed in attracting families as a means of reaching its population targets. Mace, Hall and Gallent (2007) argue for further pump priming. Employment East Manchester declined from the manufacturing powerhouse of the city to the epitome of economic inactivity, losing 60% of its economic base between 1975 and 1985 (NEM, 2002/2003: 6). Between 1991 and 1999, economic activity rates in Bradford, Beswick and Clayton fell to 62%, 10% lower than the proportion of economically active residents nationally (NEM, 2000: 11). The unemployment rate in 1999 was 8.2%, more than double the Greater Manchester and national average (NEM, 2000: 10). Long-­term unemployment was also a problem: ‘one tenth of unemployed residents have never had a paid job and a further 38% have been out of work for two years or more’ (NEM, 2000: 11). In 1999, over half of all households received benefits (housing benefit and/or income support) compared to 39% for Manchester (NEM, 2000: 11). Those in work received, in 1996, an average gross weekly income of £163.30, compared to Manchester’s average of £190. The main challenge was tackling the culture of worklessness, perpetuated through the generations, and evidenced by high levels of condoned school absenteeism (NEM, 2000: 17). As one interviewee asserted: ‘Thatcher’s legacy was three generations who never got out of bed’ (Interview, 26/01/2007). This culture of worklessness is exacerbated by 40% of businesses claiming an inability to recruit staff locally (NEM, 2000: 11). One interviewee asserted that the factors associated with the collapse of manufacturing have gone and worklessness is more about cultural issues. In families where nobody has ever worked it is difficult for people to understand the value of employment beyond its financial benefits (Interview, 17/09/2010). Together with NDC and agencies like JobCentre Plus and Connexions, NEM had three strategic objectives to strengthen the economic base of the area: building the local business base, creating opportunities for new business development, and improving skills and reducing employment. East Manchester was becoming a ‘pluralist economy’ and there was ‘no single magic bullet to transform the economy’. Alongside maintaining east Manchester as a hub of manufacturing, there

52

The regeneration of east Manchester

was a focus on grasping new opportunities in culture and the media (Interview, 10/04/2012). Central Park, originally conceived as the North Manchester Business Park, was identified by the initial Masterplanning Team as one of the priority projects (NEM Board Meeting, 06/04/2000). The aim was to create a 160 ha ‘campus-­style’ business and industrial park, on the border between east and north Manchester, on the site of the former Monsall Hospital, to attract large-­scale employers (NEMA, 26/02/2004). The location of the Fujitsu UK regional headquarters and the decision by GMP to develop its new Headquarters facility for the ‘A’ Division on the site were successes. Another success was the agreement between MANCAT and Greater Manchester’s four universities to deliver a centre of excellence for the innovative commercial development of information and communications technology (ICT), which became known as One Central Park. One Central Park provides activities from vocational training and foundation degrees to postgraduate qualifications, research and business incubation. The New Technology Institute run by MANCAT provides ICT education and training to residents. The University of Manchester Incubator Company Limited (UMIC) encouraged ICT business start-­up (NEM, 2005/2006: 11). The development of the former Sharp building to create a national hub for digital animation complements the activities of One Central Park, and the Sharp Project links to east Manchester’s new Academy (Interview, 16/12/2010). MCC, the NWDA and the ERDF funded a £16.5 m refurbishment, and the building now houses twenty-­five companies specialising in digital content production, digital media and production for TV and film (www. thesharpproject.co.uk/news/, accessed 29/10/2010). A related initiative, jointly funded by NWDA and ERDF, is the City Works developed at the Openshaw Business Centre, with over 180,000 ft2 of new office and light industrial floor space, which opened in 2009 (NEM Board Minutes, 20/11/2007). The effects of the recession are not straightforward: progress has stalled in Central Park but continues with regard to the Sharp Project. Regeneration in east Manchester has been partly supermarket-­led in line with the Under-­served Markets project launched by ODPM and Business in the Community in 2003 to investigate retail investment as a catalyst for regeneration; three out of the big four supermarkets have built new stores. Officials point to support for other businesses and the promotion of new small enterprises but recognise that Sir Howard Bernstein intervenes directly to interest major companies (Interview, 30/04/2004). The first major supermarket was Asda Wal-­Mart, which built its largest store in the UK adjacent to Sportcity. This opened in June 2002 providing 800 new jobs. To maximise the number of residents gaining employment, a multi-­agency group was established to provide Asda with a pre-­employment service. The partnership comprised NEM, NDC/Beacons, JobCentre Plus, Employment and Regeneration Partnership, Careers Partnership, MANCAT and MAES, and ensured that ­residents



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 53

benefited from pre-­employment training to apply for jobs at the store (NEM, 2002/2003: 25). This approach, which ensured that 90% of Asda’s workforce lives within fifteen minutes of the store, was detailed in a best-­practice guide for future recruitment exercises (NEM, 2002/2003: 25). In Gorton, planning permission was granted in 2006 for a new Tesco store, ten additional shops and a refurbished market hall as part of an anchor development to regenerate Gorton district centre, which includes community and health facilities (NEM, 2005/2006: 3). In partnership with Tesco and JobCentre Plus, NEM facilitated the recruitment of residents into 99 of the 320 newly created jobs (NEM, 2008/2009: 8). In November 2010, a Morrisons superstore opened as part of the £40 m Lime Square Development on Ashton Old Road. NEM worked with Morrisons and Dransfield Properties to ensure that residents filled many of the new vacancies. Of the 320 new jobs created by the new store, 144 have gone to local unemployed people (www.dransfield.co.uk/news.php?id=536&src=property, accessed 14/03/2010). Step Ahead, the Beswick-­based employment centre which helped Asda with the pre-­recruitment process, collaborated with JobCentre Plus in ensuring that residents can gain the jobs created as new shops open. In July 2005, clothing retailers Next opened a store adjacent to Asda Wal-­Mart and created over fifty jobs (NEM, 2004/2005: 7). A related scheme, the Job Brokerage project run by NDC/ Beacons, matched residents to job vacancies by providing advice and training. It was an original idea, simultaneously identifying suitable vacancies for the benefit of employers and job seekers. It helped residents who did not fall into the main targeted groups, identified vacancies not advertised by the normal routes and offered post-­employment support for those whose jobs were short-­term (NEM Board Meeting, 30/11/2004). The scheme’s success was recognised when the NDC/ Beacons’ board increased its budget by £174,483 in 2005 (NDC/Beacons’ Board Meeting, 10/01/2005). The Job Brokerage project, which supported vulnerable adults by stopping them being passed between agencies, worked closely with the ‘No Wrong Door’ initiative piloted in two neighbourhoods (NEM, 2008/2009: 8). East Manchester Business Advisers, also based at the Step Ahead office in Beswick, provided advice to established businesses and business start-­ups. The Business Advisers and the Business Development Group attempted to tackle the low level of start-­ups in the area, which was below the regional and national average (NDC, 2003: 146). Residents could also get support to become self-­employed through the Manchester Metropolitan University (MMU) New Entrepreneurship Scholarship Schemes. These schemes offered mentoring, advice and financial support to help with start-­up costs. In 2004/2005, seventeen residents had started ­businesses (NEM, 2004/2005: 12). In 2007, NEM’s business support team piloted the EnterPrize competition aimed at new businesses that had been trading for fewer than two years. Entrants could win a first prize of £10,000, but simply by participating companies gained

54

The regeneration of east Manchester

experience and advice from investors in small businesses and the opportunity to network. The first prize winner was Maciej Orzechowski, who invested his prize money in the development of a trial product for Smart Plan, his computer software design company. At the awards event, NEM secured private sector sponsorship for two further rounds of the competition in 2008/2009 (NEM, 2007/2008: 12). In 2010, 4D Creative, based in Hope Mill in Ancoats, won top prize for their design and installation of innovative classrooms in primary and secondary schools (NEMA, 09/12/2010). The North West National Academy for Enterprise, supported by the Peter Jones Foundation, was also established at Central Park (NEM, 2006/2007:7; 2008/2009: 8). The EnterPrize theme was enhanced in 2008 with the MentorPrize competition. Working with MCFC, NEM challenged students from three high schools – St Peter’s RC, Cedar Mount and Wright Robinson College – to create a business strategy which would enhance fans’ match-­day experience. Working with a local business mentor, student teams designed and marketed a solution to a real-­life business challenge facing the Football Club. Three girls from Cedar Mount won the prize with their idea for using Bluetooth on mobile phones to pre-­order food before and during the match (NEM, 2008/2009: 9). In March 2006, NEM launched the Employers’ Network, which supported businesses to grow through providing information and advice, encouraging links between them and enabling them to work together to address common issues and to have a voice in regeneration (NEM Board Minutes, 01/06/2006). The aim was for businesses to pay for membership to secure commitment and viability beyond March 2007 when existing funding ceased (NEM, 2005/2006: 13). After that date, the NEM Employers’ Network has remained free for local businesses after securing additional NWDA and MCC funding. In March 2011, this funding ended but NEM is exploring other means of facilitating the group (Interview, 21/03/2011). Aspire Recruitment Partnership, originally supported by NDC/Beacons, aimed to meet the temporary and permanent recruitment needs of companies by providing a pool of skilled temporary staff. The scheme was intended to reduce the number of residents receiving incapacity benefit and targeted those furthest from the labour market. In 2004, it won the ODPM’s Award for Innovation in Recruitment, having helped seventy people get jobs in that year: unlike other schemes, this gave access to full-­time employment opportunities. NEM argued that Aspire was unique as when ‘not on assignment “employees” are given career progression advice and training’ (NEM, 2004/2005: 12). The Aspire job brokerage model linked the unemployed to appropriate job aspirations and included job seekers allowance (JSA) claimants (NEM Board Minutes, 11/04/2006), and then extended to become a city-­wide programme, operated by Work Solutions. In April 2007, it became fully self-­financing, with an annual turnover of £2.5 m and a payroll of more than 150 staff in a typical week and it created 200 new jobs (NEM, 2006/2007: 9). NEM received a royalty from Aspire to fund other employment and training for residents (NEM, 2005/2006: 14).



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 55

The Regeneration Assistants project was a two-­year, work-­based learning programme leading to a Foundation Degree in Neighbourhood Renewal with the Open College Network and Salford University. Residents gained work experience and a qualification. In 2005, a project co-­ordinator and four resident regeneration assistants from the NEM area were recruited to the project following an overwhelming response from residents (NEM, 2004/2005: 12). SureStart and Eastlands Homes each agreed to fund a placement for the two-­year programme (NEM, 2005/2006: 14). The original four participants all found employment with NEM and MCC (NEM, 2006/2007: 3, 6). In September 2008, a fourth cohort of Regeneration Assistants was recruited bringing the total to seventeen residents employed since 2005 (NEM, 2008/2009: 8). Schemes like the Intensive Support Project (ISP), established by NDC/Beacons in 2002/2003, worked intensively with residents who faced the greatest barriers to getting and keeping jobs (NEM, 2002/2003: 26). Specialist and long-­term interventions were required as people accessing the scheme had chaotic lifestyles and faced multiple barriers to work, including mental health, alcohol and drug-­related problems and/or a criminal record. A support worker was assigned to each client ‘to ensure stability and to build up a relationship of trust’ (NEM, 2005/2006: 14). Support and advice continued for up to twelve months once the client moved into employment or training. The ISP expanded from its original remit to include support for young people not in education, employment or training (NEETs) and was extended to North Manchester (NEM, 2005/2006: 14). Another NDC/Beacons’ project, Skills for Life, was established in 2002 to provide support for residents with low basic skills or English as a second language who would not otherwise be eligible for mainstream support. It improved their skills and qualifications, including the development of a Home Tuition project which provided one-­on-­one teaching in literacy, numeracy and English as a second or other language (ESOL) in residents’ homes. Another project, Down Your Street, targeted residents to encourage them to engage in learning and to spread the word to neighbours. Nine Community Learning Centres improved skills through signposting residents to employment and training opportunities and the provision of free ICT facilities and related training (NEM, 2004/2005: 13). In 2006, the Skills for Life Project was delivered across the NEM area. NEM also encouraged the development of skills for those who were less far from the labour market. For example, a Construction Skills centre was opened in October 2010 by the two local MPs, Gerald Kaufman and Tony Lloyd (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 21/10/2008). The focus on improving basic skills among adults was seen as necessary given the ‘low value given to learning and qualifications by residents’ identified by the initial report commissioned by NEM into the local training and education situation. This report also emphasised ‘the apathy shown by the unemployed to improving their skills and qualifications and the feeling of inevitability’ which had resulted in the disengagement of many from the labour market or education and training (NEM Board Minutes, 6/04/2000).

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The regeneration of east Manchester

Improving childcare provision was another strategy to improve employability. Affordable and accessible crèche provision (300 places per month) and the development of pre-­/after-­school and holiday care (up to 500 new places) was a priority (NEM, 2004/2005: 24). In April 2005, the Wells Centre Nursery opened in Clayton providing seventy childcare places, a crèche, a childcare training room and external play areas. Nursery provision also exists at Ashbury Meadow Children’s Centre and Community Wing. The £2.1 m Newton Heath Children’s Centre opened in February 2007, offering fifty-­six childcare places, links to JobCentre Plus, training opportunities and family support (NEM, 2004/2005: 24). MAES and local training providers work closely with the Centre and JobCentre Plus to keep users informed about job opportunities. The Centre offers parenting and family support groups, breastfeeding groups, baby massage, stop smoking sessions and English, maths and IT classes. Officers from NEM’s economic team provided a dyslexia support service and the job brokerage team ran drop-­in sessions (NEM, 2006/2007: 18; 2007/2008: 21). In March 2008, two new Children’s Centres opened: one in Miles Platting and another in Gorton North (NEM, 2007/2008: 20). NEM reported in its up-­dated SRF that over 3,000 new jobs had been created while significant assets like Sportcity and Central Park had laid the foundations for continued investment (NEM, 2007: 9). NEM claimed that more than 6,200 residents had been assisted into employment and the percentage of working age residents claiming benefits had reduced from 40% in 2000 to below 33% (www. east-­manchester.com/achievements/index.htm, accessed 20/10/2010). Yet, any judgement about the success of these policies is time-­dependent and subject to statistical inexactitude. In September 2003, figures from MCC’s Planning Studies Department revealed unemployment rising in all the east Manchester wards and falling in Gorton, then outside the NEM area, which led a local Liberal Democrat councillor, Marc Ramsbottom, to brand the entire regeneration programme ‘a flop’ (NEMA, 25/09/2003). Yet it was accurate for NEM to assert that ‘given that the scale of worklessness locally is the result of at least three decades of economic decline in east Manchester the scale and breadth of employment programmes’ needed to be particularly robust (NEM Board Minutes, 30/11/2004). Accurate measurement was difficult as the register revealed ‘churning’, with some signing on while others signed off (NEM Board Minutes, 01/06/2006). Meaningful statistics on the economically inactive rather than the registered unemployed are unavailable (NEM Board Meeting, 13/05/2004). Nevertheless, worklessness remains ‘the defining feature’ of east Manchester (NEM, 2007: 18). Consultations with youth in Clayton revealed a high percentage with no long-­term aspirations ‘identifying reliance on benefits as a preferred option’ (NDC/Beacons’ Board Meeting, 22/10/2007). By 2012, NEM and MCC (2012) recognised rising youth unemployment as a major issue. The impact of the recession is evident although the problem is put into perspective by noting a very similar increase in youth unemployment rates across Manchester as a whole between 2008 and 2012 (MCC, 2012e). As the



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 57

various strands of regeneration interact, one local councillor accurately argued that unless worklessness was addressed many residents would be unable to afford the mortgages as NEM sought to increase owner occupation (Interview, 07/02/2005). Crime and community safety NEM and NDC/Beacons focused considerable efforts on addressing crime when it emerged as the most significant area of concern for residents in surveys and in consultation over NEM’s first SRF (NEM, 2000: 11). NDC/Beacons’ 1999 Delivery Plan emphasised the importance of reversing the ‘destructive levels and corrosive fear of crime and anti-­social behaviour’ and recognised that ‘Combating crime and making the area safer was residents’ number one priority’ (Roberts, 2010: 27). Addressing these issues was necessary to achieve success in other projects, such as halting population decline and attracting new residents. NDC/Beacons established a crime, community safety and anti-­social behaviour task group, combining residents with the police to develop a local crime and disorder strategy. This focused on CCTV and street lighting improvements, short-­term additional police operations, neighbourhood wardens, a cross-­tenure neighbourhood nuisance team and support for families and drug and alcohol users. In July 2001, the largest Warden scheme in Manchester began with a sixteen-­ member team patrolling Beswick, Clayton and Openshaw on foot and by bicycle seven days a week (NDC, 2003: 70). This initiative was subsequently rolled out to Miles Platting and Ancoats after external funding was achieved. Two community safety officers were appointed to cover these five areas (NEM, 2002/2003: 39). By 2005/2006, wardens were provided for Gorton and Newton Heath. The warden team had additional duties, such as reporting environmental repairs and checking the locks on alleygates (NDC, 2005a: 4). The east Manchester Neighbour Nuisance Team (EMNNT) was established in April 2000. Initially managed by the NDC/Beacons’ team, the EMNNT was the first cross-­tenure team in the United Kingdom. In 2004, Eastlands Homes took over the running of the team and in December 2006 the EMNNT was merged with the Warden service to form the Eastlands Homes Community Safety Team (Grant, 2010: 150). After EMNNT was established, overall levels of anti-­social behaviour declined. One negative development, however, occurred in April 2009 when MCC decided through its Anti-­Social Behaviour Area Team (ASBAT) to resume responsibility for the private sector element. Sustaining such activity is important and again the temporal aspect becomes evident. Some residents indicated that the effectiveness of these services declined and that the innovative cross-­tenure nature of the EMNNT disappeared with the transfer of responsibility for private sector neighbour nuisance to MCC. Eastlands Homes still employs wardens, but they now focus primarily on their own estates. Residents’ perceptions of the police were initially very poor. Residents complained about the lack of police activity on drug dealing and were dissatisfied with

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The regeneration of east Manchester

the defence that the police were only interested in capturing major drug criminals (Focus Group, 01/07/2006). This was confirmed in numerous interviews with comments such as ‘projects fall down because the police never fully get on board’ or ‘the police won’t come out if you report an incident, they’ll just tell you to move’ being common (Focus Group, 24/04/2006 and Interviews, 31/07/2006). Changing the relationship between residents and the police was therefore a crucial early target. In 2001, Operation Excalibur was launched. Funded by NDC/Beacons’ and SRB monies, it was a high-­profile police operation which consisted of foot and horseback patrols, mobile police stations and extra police officers targeting crime hotspots. Another high-­profile project was East Manchester Burglary, Robbery and Auto Crime (EMBRACE): a partnership between GMP, the Youth Offending Team, the Probation Service and NDC/Beacons to deal with the forty most prolific offenders in east Manchester. It aimed to reduce burglary, robbery and vehicle crime within the NDC/Beacons’ area by tackling the root causes of criminality such as homelessness, unemployment and substance abuse. Once identified, the prolific offenders were visited up to four times per week, helped to find work and access training and, where necessary, helped with substance treatment (NDC, 2003: 73). Those who continued offending after intensive intervention were targeted and arrested. Subsequently, the project was extended across the GMP North Division as the Integrated Offender Management (IOM) Scheme drawing on mainstream funding (NEM, 2004/2005: 21). NEM’s Community Safety Team worked with various partners including the Youth Service, the Neighbourhood Wardens, GMP, the EMNNT and the Youth Offending Team to address crime and safety. This partnership approach led to Acceptable Behaviour Contracts (ABCs) and community conferences involving residents, councillors and young people to resolve problems (NEM, 2004/2005: 20). Low-­level anti-­social behaviour was also targeted through the Streetwork Project, which provided youth workers who worked with the Youth Intervention Officer and Community Safety Officers (NEM, 2004/2005: 23). Other projects to engage young people included the activities provided by the Joint Openshaw Group (JOG) which co-­ordinated a programme of school play schemes and Positive Activities for Young People. In partnership with the east Manchester SAZ, JOG also provided activities for young people over the school holidays including cheer-­ leading, football, basketball, boxing, tennis and swimming (NEM, 2004/2005: 23). The Family Support Project delivered by DISCUS counselling services worked with families experiencing multiple problems (NEM, 2002/2003: 40) and young people most at risk of entering the Youth Justice System. In 2004/2005, the project expanded to all of east Manchester and to the 8–12-­year age group (NEM, 2004/2005: 23). This involved preventative work with younger siblings of those offenders already being supported. In 2007/2008, DISCUS developed a programme targeting schools with the highest number of pupils not in education, employment and training (NEM, 2007/2008: 20).



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 59

As with other policy areas, the situation with regard to crime remained fluid and success stories like the EMBRACE project, which significantly improved the relationship between residents and the police, were juxtaposed with the perception by residents that crime and the fear of crime remained critical issues linked, in particular, to the intractable nature of worklessness. By 2011/2012, both crime rates and anti-­social behaviour in east Manchester remained above the city average with the exception of Gorton North (MCC, 2012e). Health and well-­being Poor health was intensified by unemployment and a bad physical environment. The legacy of industrial decline explains ill health among older people while high levels of drug and alcohol abuse, combined with inactive lifestyles, exacerbated health inequalities: 30% of residents were disabled, incapacitated or long-­term sick compared to 17% across Manchester and 13% nationally (Roberts, 2010: 52). The overall mortality rate was over 50% above the national average and deaths from lung cancer and respiratory disease also well above the national average. The pre-­16 conception rate was one of the highest nationally and 68% of under-­5’s suffered from dental disease (NEM, 2000: 10). Improvements in health were difficult to disentangle as an expression of NEM or NDC/Beacons as other agencies, particularly the HAZ, were involved and NEM itself proclaimed that ‘the health of residents will only improve as a result of improvements in other programme areas such as housing, education, community safety and environmental improvements’ (NEM, 2005/2006: 22). NEM and NDC/ Beacons built on the HAZ delivery plan which was operating before NDC, and SureStart investment in childcare assisted in improving health outcomes. Health was not a stand-­alone theme ‘but was linked to the wider well-­being agenda and activity within other NDC/Beacons’ themes, including worklessness. Cultural activity and health were linked through schemes such as healthy cooking and stand-­up comedy to combat depression and improve self-­confidence (Roberts, 2010: 54). NEM worked with health agencies to improve primary care facilities and people’s access to them. Projects included a £6.5 m Ancoats Health Centre, opened in October 2007, to provide primary health and social care for New Islington Millennium Village residents and the wider Ancoats and Piccadilly Basin areas. As part of the Miles Platting PFI, NEM worked with the Primary Care Trust (PCT) to develop a Joint Service Centre combining health provision, a library, advice services, activities for young people, leisure facilities and a one-­stop shop (NEM, 2006/2007: 18). A health centre opened in Openshaw in 2007 offering a GP surgery and antenatal, midwifery and physiotherapy services, and improvements were made to Clayton Clinic (NEM, 2007/2008: 20). NDC Beacons developed an East Manchester Teenage Pregnancy Action Plan

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The regeneration of east Manchester

which combined awareness-­raising and other preventative action with support for young mothers. Olivia Lodge, which opened in 2004, provided supported housing for young mothers and their babies. NEM also sought preventative action on the high levels of teenage pregnancies through a multi-­agency partnership. At times its statements verged on urging abstention as CDs were handed out to young people with such songs as ‘Don’t Think You Can Sleep With Me’ and ‘Sex is not a Game’. The Government’s teenage pregnancy and urban renewal units commended the approach (NEM, 2002/2003: 42–43). The ‘Activity Bus’ was introduced following consultation with residents who wanted better access to sports facilities. It was delivered by the SAZ, NDC, HAZ and the PCT (EMSAZ, 2003: 14) and provided free transport to leisure centres, parks and swimming pools to improve residents’ health (NEM, 2002/2003: 60). ‘Bus Buddies’ were on every route to meet and welcome passengers (NEM, 2005/2006: 25). By 2005/2006, the bus had achieved over 3,000 passenger trips (NEM, 2005/2006: 26). The Breakfree Project supported young people with mental health problems and the Feel Good Factor offered activities to improve mental health in local venues. The project encouraged adults with mental health problems to use leisure, sport and culture as part of their therapy. A similar initiative, also suggesting that the regeneration project was about changing people and communities, as discussed in Chapter 6, was the smoking cessation initiative of NDC/Beacons based in the Victoria Mill in Miles Platting (NEMA, 3/10/2003). The Generation Project started as a two-­year pilot project in the NDC/Beacons’ area which provided information and advocacy services for residents and their carers who were over fifty-­five. It helped older residents through the disruptive process of housing renewal. When the NDC/Beacons’ funding stopped at the end of 2006/2007, the project received funding from the Big Lottery Fund. Established by Lifeline Manchester and supported by NDC/Beacons, NEM and MCC’s Alcohol Strategy Team, Outlook worked with drug and alcohol users and their families during drug detoxification and offered training and employment advice. It assisted with basic reading and writing skills, housing issues and personal problems. NEM cited studies that showed that more than half of residents had an average reading age of just eleven which acted as a barrier to drug users wanting to detoxify (NEM, 2006/2007: 20). Outlook was mainstreamed in 2005/2006, supported by MCC’s Drug and Alcohol Strategy Team (NEM, 2005/2006: 26). According to NEM, on average two people a month gained employment as a result of the project, two a month secured accommodation and six to eight people a month accessed full-­time education, training and employment (NEM, 2006/2007: 20). Improvements to health and well-­being were difficult to achieve given that the PCTs were restructured on numerous occasions. It is evident that significant health inequalities remain since key health indicators change only gradually. In the c­ ontext



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 61

of public sector expenditure cuts, maintaining the momentum which has been achieved is a challenge. Hence the exhortation from the Director of Public Health to ensure that the 2011 Eastlands Community Plan investment proposals were used ‘to improve the health outcomes for residents and to dramatically change the life chances of the local community’ (NEM and MCC, 2012: 7). Transport East Manchester is characterised by low levels of car ownership and limited public transport off the major routes. NEM described transport as fundamental to maximise investment, attract and retain residents and businesses (NEM Board Meeting, 01/06/2006). The Labour Government’s commitment to build two Metrolink services crossing east Manchester boosted the area: one to go to Oldham and Rochdale and another to Ashton-­under-­Lyne. The Oldham/Rochdale line serves Central Park while the Ashton line serves Sportcity. Early optimism about getting the new Metrolink to connect the city centre with Sportcity prior to the 2002 Commonwealth Games quickly turned to a more realistic objective of simply getting the Metrolink lines at all. Maintaining Government commitment to build Metrolink services has not been easy, and there was a contentious period in 2004 when central government withdrew its support on financial grounds and NEM and MCC launched an aggressive campaign. Leese expressed MCC’s anger at the challenge to this fundamental part of the regeneration strategy and the campaign included visits to lobby MPs as well as Alistair Darling, the Secretary of State for Transport, to reinstate the project (NEM Board Minutes, 16/09/2004; NEMA, 12/11/2004). Ultimately, Darling relented. Even in 2012, when stations were appearing along the routes, the New Labour Government’s prevarication on this issue still rankled with senior MCC officials (Interview, 10/04/2012). Another major project was the £36 m Gateway Interchange to connect Central Park to the M60 motorway and the city centre. Completed in 2005, it provides a single point of access for private and public transport users of Metrolink, rail and bus services (NEM, 2004/2005: 6). NEM estimated that the Metrolink connection through Central Park ‘will make a significant impact on investor confidence and attract up to 10,000 jobs to Central Park’ (NEM, 2005/2006: 2). NP also considered transport. In the New Islington Millennium Community, for example, a canal link between the Ashton and Rochdale Canals was designed to improve access and stimulate new housing development, and the concept of ‘shared space’ inspired the remodelling of Old Mill Street to encourage pedestrians. The public realm throughout the area was similarly remodelled (NEM, 2004/2005: 8). The Beswick NP proposed a ‘green route’ to prioritise pedestrians and cyclists and connect residential areas to the new primary school, open spaces and new retail and community facilities (NEM, 2002/2003: 60). NPs also tackled wider traffic ­management issues and alleygating addressed joy riding and ‘rat-­running’.

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In 2006, East Manchester Community Transport (EMCT), was launched to cater for people without cars or who had difficulty accessing public transport. This initiative was funded by Greater Manchester Passenger Transport Executive (GMPTE), the Neighbourhood Renewal Fund (NRF) and NEM. With its small fleet of minibuses, EMCT helped residents access shops and services. It responded to demand and more than 4,000 trips a month were made to various destinations. Eventually, the EMCT initiative was merged with its parent company, Manchester Community Transport (Interview, 29/06/2012). Sport and community facilities Given the Commonwealth Games in 2002 and the development of Sportcity, sport was a key theme for NDC/Beacons and NEM which linked with other targets in health, diversionary activities for young people and volunteering programmes. A SAZ established in 2000 operated across the same boundaries as NDC/Beacons and was part funded by the latter and Sport England. The SAZ manager was based within the NDC/Beacons’ offices, which helped to maximise collaboration. The SAZ supported the expansion of Community Sports Clubs and helped them in gaining grants, with many going on to win in their respective competitions (NEM, 2005/2006: 25). Various other partners were also involved in initiatives before, during and after the Commonwealth Games to ensure that its legacy was not squandered: Manchester Leisure, Manchester PCT, Sport England, CITC and the NACRO Sports Project. The most visible legacy of the 2002 Commonwealth Games is the impressive infrastructure at Eastlands which comprises the City of Manchester Stadium (now the Etihad Stadium), the Manchester Regional Arena, the Regional Tennis Centre, the British Cycling Centre (including the Velodrome and BMX track) and the National Squash Centre. Some venues were used in the 2012 Olympic Games. Sport as a diversionary activity for young people has been promoted through the NACRO Sports Project and activities delivered by Wright Robinson college and CITC at Sporting Edge. CITC was well established in Moss Side where MCFC’s stadium was located previously but the effort transferred to east Manchester. Sporting Edge is a new £1.1 m sports centre on the site of the former St Peter’s RC High School in Openshaw, completed in 2007. 4CT manages this facility, which also offers community space and a computer suite to provide training and Internet access to residents (NEM, 2006/2007: 20). In addition to Sporting Edge, other community facilities such as The Grange in Beswick and the New Roundhouse in Openshaw enabled a neighbourhood-­based delivery of services. The Grange, a local community centre managed by 4CT, provides cheer-­leading, adult education classes, IT training sessions for older people, a daily Credit Union service and community social events (NEM, 2004/2005: 23). Service providers located at The Grange include MAES, the Credit Union,



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 63

Manchester Early Years and Play. In the New Roundhouse, Manchester Settlement run an education programme for young people between thirteen and sixteen who are unable to fulfil their potential at mainstream secondary schools (Grant, 2010: 171). One of the most successful projects of NDC/Beacons was Eastserve, set up in 2000 as a means of communication between the regeneration structures and residents to address the IT literacy gap and to get more of the population on-­ line. Eastserve provided hardware, broadband internet connection at a low price and ICT training and it became one of the biggest schemes of its type in Europe. The NDC/Beacons’ Board claimed that it was ‘one of the most successful in the Beacons programme’ and that ‘The benefits of the project have been wide-­ranging and exceeded all expectations’ (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 18/08/2003). Prior to the project only 2% of children had access to a computer at home; this figure rose to 47% in 2003 (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 18/08/2003).The scheme was popular given its comparatively low cost vis-­à-­vis commercial rates and using the Credit Union to fund purchase of the equipment also provided benefits. NDC/ Beacons reported that some residents had savings for the first time ever and 70% of those who took out an Eastserve loan remained with the Union (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 18/08/2003). The NEM/NDC/Beacons’ headquarters in Grey Mare Lane is another potential community resource. It cost £810,697 and NDC/Beacons contributed the most. NEM is currently able to retain it until 2014–2015. If the building is either sold or rented in future the money raised must be ring-­fenced for regeneration within the original NDC/Beacons’ area (MCC, 2009b). An alternative use would be to retain the building after 2015 as a community facility (NDC, 2009: 4.) This is the least likely option, however, given the availability of alternative venues. The expansion of Metrolink will have a positive impact on the ongoing development of the Sportcity complex which, according to the NEM Annual Report in 2005/2006, ‘is already the North West’s fastest growing visitor destination’ (NEM, 2005/2006: 2). MCC officials are confident that Manchester fully exploited a multi-­ sports event to leave a legacy. The Government’s decision, however, to abandon the proposal for regional casinos affected this legacy, albeit temporarily (NEM, 2005/2006: 2). Senior MCC officials claimed that ‘the famous Gordon decision’ was a major setback and that it has taken them five years to reposition (Interview, 10/04/2012). Fortuitously for MCC and east Manchester, a development partnership between MCC, NEM and MCFC can fill the gap and provides substantial private sector investment to continue regeneration when public sector funds are short: ‘The general consensus across Manchester, although not one voiced by either club or council, is that City’s wealthy owners are ready to spend millions, if not billions, in and around Eastlands’ (Donohue, 2011: 8). In March 2010, NEM and MCC signed a memorandum of understanding with MCFC which committed the parties to develop a transformational plan for East Manchester focused on the area around the Etihad Stadium and i­ncluding

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The regeneration of east Manchester

Openshaw West. In March 2011, the creation of the Eastlands Development Partnership (EDP) formalised this initial memorandum of agreement ‘to drive forward the comprehensive development of the Etihad Campus [formerly Sportcity] and its surrounding area’ (MCC, 2012b). Following extensive consultations, the MCC Executive approved the Eastlands Regeneration Framework, and a Draft Eastlands Community Plan, on 13 July 2011, which up-­dated east Manchester’s 2008/2018 SRF. Following further consultation, especially with residents, the 2012/2013–2016/2017 Eastlands Community Plan contains four main strands which reflect the core drivers of east Manchester’s 2008/2018 SRF. They are: to improve the educational offer; to strengthen community sports and leisure provision and participation; to improve health outcomes for residents; and to increase investment and local employment. Eight key initiatives are proposed. The MCFC Academy, and associated community facilities on the Openshaw West site, adjacent to the stadium, has already been approved and is financed by the Club. MCC and NEM are developing a business case for each of the remaining seven initiatives to attract the necessary private and public resource. The Manchester Velopark will complement the existing cycling facilities at the Velodrome, including the new £24 m Indoor BMX Arena, with off-­road cycling provision in Clayton Vale. The Belle Vue Sports Village aims to accommodate new national centres for Speedway, Basketball and Taekwondo and to improve community and school sports facilities and the Ten Acres Lane Sports will become a training centre for Martial Arts and Taekwondo. The remaining four initiatives form the ‘Beswick Community Hub’. These are: the East Manchester Sixth Form College; the Manchester Institute of Sports Science and Sports Medicine; the Manchester House of Sport (to accommodate various sports and leisure bodies); and the Beswick Leisure Hub of community and sports facilities along Grey Mare Lane on land adjacent to the East Manchester Academy (NEM and MCC, 2012). As part of securing their planning permission for the Football Academy, MCFC set aside £3 m to develop a community swimming pool as part of the Beswick Leisure Hub (NEM and MCC, 2012). MCC can accurately claim that it is as a result of the new Stadium that the transformation of MCFC’s finances occurred so enabling the massive investment around the Ethiad Campus and the resulting creation of thousands of jobs. It remains to be seen whether residents or the Football Club are the main beneficiaries of the EDP and the Eastlands Community Plan. One interviewee asserted that the development is of ‘mega’ importance for east Manchester while another regards it as an asset for MCFC dressed up as a community project (Interviews, 03/02/2012, 10/02/2012). Nevertheless, MCC’s Executive highlighted that over the last three and a half years ‘the Club’s commitment to East Manchester has become much deeper and broader, setting an example for other Premiership Football Clubs . . . to become involved in transforming their communities’ (MCC, 2012b: 5.1). Apart from sport, art and culture projects for young and older people and BME aimed to strengthen the community spirit. They included Eastfeast, which provided



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 65

singing and drumming sessions and Parties in the Park.2 One party in Philips Park had been marred by adults drinking and a rigorously enforced alcohol exclusion zone was agreed for future events (NEM Board Meeting, 22/07/2008). More focused activities included the East Manchester Food and Drink Festival; Outlook Music to tackle alcohol and drug problems; Angels Community Arts, which consisted of visual arts classes; the Barmy Amateur Acting Group; and the East Manchester Black History Month (NEM Board Meeting, 11/04/2006). The B of the Bang sculpture was commissioned by NEM in 2003 to mark the Commonwealth Games and to utilise public art as means of enlivening east Manchester in a highly visible location at the crossroads of Alan Turing Way and Ashton New Road, next to the stadium (Figure 4.1). It was designed by Thomas Heatherwick (NEMA, 13/08/2004), unveiled in January 2005 and ultimately demolished in 2009, despite the sculptor Anthony Gormley pleading for its retention. Gormley praised MCC for commissioning the sculpture and condemned it for a loss of nerve in agreeing to demolition (Linton, 2009). The sculpture was fenced off for safety reasons because parts of the structure were insecure and the local press demanded that the problem be ‘sorted’ (Osuh and Ottewell, 2006). One interviewee said that regardless of what people thought about aspects of the regeneration process it had not bequeathed any ‘white elephants’ (Interview, 17/08/2011). The B of the Bang was an exception. Locals dubbed it as ‘bang out of order’ and some considered it celebrated gun culture. Others argued for a structure which reflected the history of mining in the area. Residents were particularly upset that advanced pictures had suggested that the sculpture would be a ‘silver burst of light’ when in fact it turned out to be a rather orangey-­brown colour (NEMA, 13/08/2004). At first, Russell defended the £1.4 m spent on the sculpture because of the ‘reality that funds don’t come without some strings, and that we couldn’t spend that money on anything other than art work’ (NEMA, 01/04/2005). He referred to it as ‘a new imprint on the skyline of east Manchester’ responding to a resident who protested that it was a ‘ridiculous’ idea given the area’s other needs (NEMA, 21/05/2004). Yet Russell’s response could not explain away the subsequent demise of the project on grounds of public safety. MCC sought an out-­of-­court settlement, securing £1.7 m compensation (BBC, 2008) with the four companies involved in the design, fabrication and installation (NEM Board Meeting, 20/02/2008). Other more successful projects included the restoration of Gorton Monastery, which has been described as the ‘catalyst for Gorton’s regeneration’ (NEMA, 19/11/2004a). A commuter with roots in Gorton noticed the decay when he passed the building on his daily train journey and he took the initiative to restore it. MCC supported a funding campaign to save the buildings launched the year before by the Monastery of St Francis and Gorton Trust. A total of £6.5 m was raised through public donations and monies from the Heritage Lottery Fund, English Heritage, the 2

  The authors attended a party at The Grange in 2007 which had several hundred attendees.

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The regeneration of east Manchester

4.1  B of the Bang



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 67

NWDA, The Architectural Heritage Fund and ERDF (www.themonastery.co.uk/ Our-­History.html, accessed 21 October 2010). It reopened in 2007 and hosts community events. New housing is also being built on neighbouring land which will form part of Gorton Monastery Village. NEM supported the initiative and worked with the Monastery Trust to develop the property around the building, including a training centre (NEM Board Minutes, 13/05/2004). Ancoats: a case study While all the districts of east Manchester were blighted, specific problems varied from one area to another. Residents described drug addiction and crime as an outstanding issue in one district, for example, as against the problem of private landlords in another. If the problems varied in type and intensity between neighbourhoods, NEM and NDC/Beacons also had a differential impact across the area. To illustrate the process there is value in examining the regeneration of a particular neighbourhood. A case study of Ancoats illustrates both spatial and temporal elements at work. Ancoats is contiguous with the city centre and work was under way in the area before NEM was launched. In the 1990s, it had become a ‘no go’ area after fifty years of physical decline. NEM aimed to reverse this by utilising its location of a ten-­ minute walk from two railway stations by creating a new urban village with up to 5,000 people, and an economy of 3,000 jobs on a 20 ha site. Early in the regeneration process Gleeson and Persimmon completed ninety-­two one-­and two-­bed apartments and the former Express Newspapers’ Building on Great Ancoats Street was transformed into a development for small business and residential purposes (NEM, 2002/2003: 19). Great use was made of the historical mills in Ancoats: The Royal Mill complex was converted into city apartments while Waulk Mill was converted for commercial use and is home to the New Islington Visitor Centre. Ancoats possessed the developments which those with a cursory knowledge of the initiative are familiar, including such glamorous projects as the Chips Building, the Islington Wharf, the City Lofts, the Cutting Room Square and the Angel meadow open space (www.east manchester.com/living/ancoats/index.htm). Regeneration in Ancoats also advanced the New Islington Millennium Village Project, including a health centre, primary school, a park and marina, a tram stop on the Metrolink and a bridge to link New Islington to the rest of Ancoats (NEM Board Meeting, 31/08/2000). New Islington was the name of an historic mill in the area. The New Islington Wharf was begun in 2007, and originally under the auspices of EP and requiring NWDA’s invocation of CPOs on land which it owned, the development company Igloo erected a building which contains offices, a hotel and waterside restaurant and a future for abandoned but listed lock-­keepers’ cottages. It was next to the showpiece Chips Building which is sliced horizontally into three storeys which angle against each other like chips on a plate (Figure 4.2). NEM promoted these developments as much as those tackling disadvantage as they reflected the public

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The regeneration of east Manchester

4.2  Chips Building



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 69

glamour which they gave to NEM’s work. It was necessary for NEM to reassure anxious residents, however, with a guaranteed right to an equivalent new home on site wherever possible (NEM Board Minutes, 17/04/2002). The Cardroom Estate had been constructed in the 1970s and suffered anti-­social behaviour and an exodus of residents, but its demolition in the early 2000s was opposed by many residents (NEMA, 05/11/2004). Once a desperately neglected area, Ancoats had some advantages. First, it was adjacent to the increasingly fashionable Northern Quarter. Second, the regeneration of Ancoats after 1999 built upon the work of the Ancoats Urban Village Company (AUVC) partnership between MCC, English Heritage and the NWDA which NEM absorbed in 2004 (NEM Board Meeting, 16/09/2004). This consolidated the earlier decision in 2000 that NEM should ‘oversee the initiative’ (NEM Board Meeting, 31/08/2000). The AUVC was formed in 1996 with its own Trust (NEM Board Minutes, 17/04/2002), and had enabled, at an early stage, design-­ conscious property development companies such as Urban Splash to convert former mills into fashionable apartments. Third, the east Manchester project carried over elements of the urban renaissance ethos which had characterised the rehabilitation of the city centre. Some of this ethos flourished in Ancoats, as NEM thought it could help diversify east Manchester’s population. NEM was not simply about responding to deprivation, but promoted elements of urban renaissance to enhance the quality of city life; regeneration in Ancoats took this form. The Annual Review of Ancoats in 2008/2009 described the progress which had been achieved, but also outlined the effect of the recession on delaying those projects in the Ancoats Regeneration Village Strategy which required private sector investment. The Review stated, however, that the public sector could respond to the economic downturn with its Maintaining Momentum Strategy, a product of the 2006 mid-­term NEM evaluation report discussed in Chapter 5. Buildings were consequently conserved and redeveloped and the Ice Plant was an example of a renovation completed after the recession. Other projects saved by NEM’s Maintaining Momentum Strategy included the Flint Glass Wharf, which comprised 130 penthouse apartments plus various commercial and retail units, and the Cutting Room Square (NEM, 2004/2005: 7). This is a sunken square safe for children to play in, a meeting place with seats and a venue for events. Public funding was needed to advance many of these projects and to ensure good-­quality design and the use of empty historic buildings. In the early stages of these developments private sector interests expressed concern about profitability, so NEM stressed guarantees that the sites would be unlocked for the market by proactive CPOs (NEM Board Minutes, 4/17/04/2002). It was the Maintaining Momentum Strategy which enabled progress to continue by providing timely financial support from the public purse in the expectation of a subsequent economic recovery. Even in the less favourable economic circumstances of 2012, the Ancoats project will be completed because the HCA has ‘identified Ancoats as a priority’ (Interview, 10/04/2012). The

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The regeneration of east Manchester

recession ultimately had a negative effect even here, however, as plans for developing the waterfront in Holt Town were delayed (www.east-­manchester.com/living/ living-­neighbourhoods/holt-­town/index.htm, accessed 21 June 2012). In contrast to Ancoats, the districts which were added to NEM after 2004 fared less well, as one senior official involved admits (Interview, 16/12/2010). Newton Heath and Gorton complained of their exclusion from NEM, and one ex-­councillor from Newton Heath objected that their exclusion had led to his ward being unable to access funds under the HMRP, ensuring that it would become ‘the sink estate of the future’. Newton Heath is located on the extremities of the NEM area which means that, added to a temporal disadvantage of being a latecomer to the project it is also spatially remote from the hub of the regeneration surrounding the Stadium and NEM headquarters. While views differ among those engaged in NEM and NDC/Beacons about the extent to which Gorton and Newton Heath derived the same level of benefits as the rest of NEM’s territory as a result of their later incorporation, one leading political actor forcibly stated that if there was a regeneration process in east Manchester, Gorton only received a few ‘bits and pieces’ (Interview, 23/06/2012). In short, if Ancoats was the most favoured area both temporally and spatially, those areas furthest from the city centre, such as Gorton and particularly Newton Heath, and which became subject to regeneration much later, have gained least. Those in between are the neighbourhoods in the original NDC/Beacons’ territory and near to the Stadium which are relatively well placed, although Openshaw West is much less favoured. This imbalance could be exacerbated by the new focus on MCFC and the EDP, although some senior officials maintain otherwise (Interview, 10/04/2012). Stages in the regeneration narrative The State of the Wards Report is an annual publication which demonstrates the performance of each Manchester ward and while some are not co-­terminus with east Manchester there are some which are located entirely in NEM’s territory. The 2010/2011 State of the Wards Report demonstrated the continuing deprivation of both north and east Manchester compared to the city generally (MCC, 2011). Whether the measure is unemployment, NEETs, crime, dissatisfaction with the neighbourhood or the over-­arching Index of Multiple Deprivation (IMD), east Manchester wards remain in the lowest third of the thirty-­two city wards, and Miles Platting and Newton Heath have a particularly poor performance (MCC, 2010). Regeneration has merely alleviated rather than solved the problem, although the projects described here, which are far from an exhaustive account, demonstrate the enormous input by those involved. An event was held in March 2010, attended by John Prescott, to mark both the ‘success’ of NDC/Beacons and the tenth anniversary of NEM. Sean McGonigle



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 71

expressed his concern that, for all the many gains, there was still deep deprivation, long-­term unemployment and skills deficits (NDC/Beacons’ Board Meeting, 10/09/2009). This was a summative conclusion, but it is inappropriate to present a static picture of the success of projects owing to the temporal impact of events. Some projects endured and others were more transient. It is clear, however, that despite the claims made on behalf of City Challenge, the high watermark in British urban regeneration, reflected in east Manchester, was from 1997 to 2008. In interpreting the temporal issues, five main stages in the regeneration narrative can be discerned. First, the period covering the launch of NDC/Beacons and NEM in 1999 to the Commonwealth Games in 2002 was full of dynamism, but with some ambiguity. The ambiguity was apparent when one MCC Councillor stated that the need was to stabilise the area (Interview, 07/02/2005), alongside the main pressure to produce a massive impact so that the area was impressive enough to stage the Commonwealth Games with visitors from across the world converging on the stadium. As Leese expressed it at NEM’s launch in October 1999, in the thousand days to the Games much must be achieved as ‘we will be showing off a radically new east Manchester’ (NEM Board Minutes, 12/01/2000). Bernstein also stressed that big improvements were needed before the Games, particularly to the canal corridor from the city centre to the stadium (NEM Board Meeting, 12/01/2000). Some actions were patently short-­term and cosmetic, such as temporary improvements to the Oldham Road corridor, the demolition of the Auld Lang Syne pub in Pollard Street, a CPO to remove the Victoria Mill and the installation of horticulture just one week before the games (NEM Board Meeting, 3/07/2002). At the end of this first stage Russell could present a long list of achievements such as Sportcity, Asda, the improved canal corridor, the business park, house building, community parks, more open spaces, removing ‘grot spots’, help to local businesses, new employment opportunities, volunteer programmes, CCTV, community wardens and much more (NEM, 2003). The second stage, from 2002 to 2006, was one of creativity and consolidation when MCC, having established its influence, stepped back as it was satisfied with the progress being achieved, and many of the projects described in this chapter emerged or were strengthened. This was the time when there occurred, ‘a planned shift in the company’s operational activities from strategic planning to programme management and implementation’ (NEM Board Meeting, 21/12/2004), and NEM and NDC/Beacons sought evaluations of their effectiveness. It was at this time that government ministers were most likely to visit as the project came to fruition and ministerial interest had yet to decline. This was also when Manchester’s role as the regeneration capital was recognised by the holding of the Delivering Sustainable Communities’ Summit in the city (NEMA, 05/02/2004) and when the Prime Minister visited The Grange Centre, and gave an on-­site interview to GMTV praising the ‘high esteem’ in which the NDC/Beacons’ programme was held (NDC/ Beacons’ Meeting, 10/01/2005). A few months later Blair visited the Wells Centre

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The regeneration of east Manchester

to observe the approach to tackling anti-­social behaviour and to see the alleygating initiative. On both visits he talked to residents. David Miliband, the Minister for Local Government, also met residents, including three NDC/Beacons’ Board members. He informed Sean McGonigle that NDC/Beacons had made a positive difference (NDC/Beacons’ Board Meeting, 14/11/2005). The visit of both Richard Caborn, the Minister of State at the Department of Culture, Media and Sport, and Phil Woolas, the Minister for Local Government, to observe the North-­West Street Games also testified to the frequency of ministerial visits in this year (NDC/ Beacons’ Board Meeting, 9/05/2005). NDC/Beacons participated in the Pride in Manchester and the Celebrating Excellence events in the summer of 2005 (NDC/ Beacons’ Board Meeting, 14/01/2005). Also in 2005, while NDC programmes nationally were cut by 8.4%, NDC/Beacons only lost £7,000 out of its total budget of £1,700,000 (NDC/Beacons’ Board Meeting, 10/01/2005). The third stage was from 2006 to 2008, when there was a growing awareness of the need to sustain the progress achieved as the signs of more straitened times were looming, together with an appreciation that the organisational landscape had changed nationally with nineteen new URCs, eight other HMRP projects, the Thames Gateway and the 2012 Olympics ‘competing for policy attention, public funding and private investment’ (NEM Board Meeting, 01/06/2006). Other developing concerns were the ministerial change of responsibility for regeneration from ODPM to DCLG, which was accompanied by EP shifting its focus from economic development to housing, the NWDA becoming reluctant to delegate authority to NEM and focusing more on new sub-­regional partnerships, the growing collaboration between MCC and Salford Council over the HMRP, MCC’s appointment of a Director of Neighbourhood Services whose approach to the delivery of mainstream public services might differ from that prevailing in east Manchester and NRF, which NEM had accessed, coming under threat in 2008. The NEM Board considered that the combined impact of these changes implied a lesser role for NEM in providing direct services and a greater role in acquiring land and property (NEM Board Meeting, 14/12/2006). It was almost as if NEM was forewarned about the forthcoming recession and public policy changes. The fourth stage was from 2008 to 2010, when this mood of trepidation was accentuated by the recession but accompanied by a desire to persevere and fulfil as many projects as possible. This aspiration was expressed in NEM’s report for 2008/2009 and 2009/2010, endorsed by evaluation reports, which argued that in a recession it was all the more necessary to maintain public investment in regeneration. In the 2009–2010 report NEM’s Chairman was ‘very positive’ about the future (NEM, 2009/2010: 4). The fifth stage is the period since 2010 and the formal merger between NEM and NDC/Beacons on 1 October 2010 (NDC/Beacons’ Board Meeting, 22/10/2007), when the decline in public funding for regeneration, coupled with major cuts in



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 73

local government grants, led to a decline in central government’s focus on regeneration. The position in east Manchester remains stronger than in many other cases, however, as MCC fulfils its commitment. NEM survives as a company but now wholly MCC owned and its Chief Executive now divides his time between representing the interests of east Manchester and fulfilling his city-­wide strategic regeneration role. The dominance of the temporal dimension in understanding the regeneration initiative in east Manchester was recognised by Russell, who stated that regeneration ‘is a highly dynamic process and, as the context changes so too must NEM’s approach, priorities and methods of working’ (NEM Board Meeting, 01/06/2006). Also, in responding to the major mid-­term evaluation report in 2006 NEM stated that its original SRF was designed to meet the circumstances of the time; but since then changes had occurred such as MCC’s City Employment Strategy and the Children and Young Persons’ Plan (NEM Board Minutes, 03/10/2006). By 2009 NEM was becoming more integrated in MCC’s wider regeneration strategy and its publicity emphasised the work of MCC’s Regeneration Division. The Division was more explicit than before that regeneration initiatives were primarily concerned with improving the quality of the delivery of MCC’s own services and those of other public sector agencies. There was also an increasing MCC focus upon the wider city region and the role of regeneration as a key economic driver for the North-­West of England in the promotion of city-­region governance. As MCC leader, Leese had been initially concerned to play down concerns about the future of regeneration after the 2010 General Election as fears grew about threats to the plan for a BMX arena and the Sarah Tower development in Ancoats. Yet his view was that the ‘jug was . . . half full’. If on one side, ‘much of the infrastructure needed to drive forward economic progress is already in place’, it was also true that ‘the regeneration job is only half done’ (NEMA, 27/05/2010). If east Manchester is to receive far less attention from the public sector than previously, the EDP will be a partial substitute. National policies impinged on the fate of east Manchester, and continue to do so. While the NEM Board was informed that ministerial changes made policy implementation difficult a leading local regeneration official argued that it was the same civil servants who negotiated with MCC, NDC/Beacons and NEM and so individual ministerial changes in DCLG did not always have a major impact. One significant change, however, was the replacement of John Prescott as the minister responsible for regeneration in May 2006, which led regeneration experts to comment that ‘One cannot witness Prescott’s departure without feeling some qualms about the future for the regeneration sector’ (Carpenter and Willis, 2010). The CSR announced in 2006, coupled with Prescott’s departure from the ODPM, could mean resource problems for NEM (NEM Board Meeting, 03/10/2006). There was a view that as NEM shifted from service delivery to promoting private sector development it could retreat into being a property company. The Chief Executive argued

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The regeneration of east Manchester

that NEM should maintain a holistic focus and still work with mainstream agencies to connect physical developments to the social and economic needs of residents (NEM Board Meeting, 03/10/2006). Sir Richard Rogers also paid tribute in 2012 to Prescott’s impact on urban politics (Higgins, 2012). Prescott’s departure coincided temporally with the emergence of the third phase of the east Manchester initiative, when officials began to anticipate a more constrained period of expenditure. After the recession New Labour also diminished expectations and one columnist stated that ‘housing and regeneration projects have been grinding to a halt since the spring of 2008’ (Carpenter and Willis, 2010). This view under-­estimated the further decline in funding which the Coalition Government would instigate, such as the departure of MCC’s Deputy Chief Executive for regeneration as part of job cuts (Hickey, 2011a), and the comment by a DCLG official that regeneration officials must ‘get off the drug’ of public funding to kick start regeneration (Hickey, 2011b). As one leading MCC regeneration official commented in light of the cuts ‘it’s through a glass darkly now’ (Interview, 16/12/2010). The need to attract private investment was a New Labour theme, although it was difficult to measure precisely the extent of private sector investment. This was because private investment includes projects which receive assistance from NEM, such as officer time. The estimate in 2006 was that about £912 m of public investment including funding from public sector agencies and an expectation of £1,283 m from the private sector would lead to the 1: 2.16 ratio (NEM Board Meeting, 11/04/2006). The recession soon proved that private investment dries up when credit is scarce and public investment reduces. In the market-­driven strategy outlined by the Coalition Government major urban regeneration projects will largely evaporate. There is some prospect that MCC may be able to seize opportunities from government schemes which ostensibly address other purposes. The Coalition Government wants more houses built and local authorities can have discretion about their location. The New Homes Bonus (NHB) provides £432 m ‘unring-­fenced funds’ for new buildings (Regeneration and Renewal, 2012). There are signs that east Manchester will continue to receive new housing from this fund, but not on the scale originally planned. Senior MCC officials remained optimistic with regard to the potential for housing in east Manchester given that they had remediated land for use and had also taken ‘brave’ decisions by removing from the market available building land in the Lower Medlock Valley and West Gorton until market conditions were more favourable (Interview, 10/04/2012). In this regard, they stressed that ‘the key to regeneration is to ensure that the sequencing is right and reading market capacity correctly’ (Interview, 10/04/2012). By late 2012 the market had not yet revived but MCC’s possession of remediated land in West Gorton enabled regeneration to proceed in order to attract and retain economically active residents and to improve individual and collective self-­esteem by improving the neighbourhood. The MCC Executive approved a revised master-



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 75

plan which promoted, for example, the refurbishment of social housing through transferring the stock to Guinness Northern Counties, the demolition of over 400 homes including two tower blocks, the development of 1,000 new homes for rent and sale, a new community park, the development of a community hub and the utilisation of existing buildings for future employment use (MCC, 2012d). The Coalition Government’s emphasis on economic growth through rebalancing the economy towards manufacturing may also provide opportunities for local policy-­makers in councils and LEPs to divert resources to regeneration from the RGF, the Growing Places Fund (GPF), the NHB and the City Skills Fund (Regeneration and Renewal, 2012). The plethora of small pots of money appears not to reflect joined up thinking as it cannot be characterised as entirely free market, centralist or localist, although as one insider expressed it in 2011 the approach to regeneration is not about a central impetus but will certainly be ‘public cash lite’ (Brown, 2011a). It is clear that it took specific public investment in, for example, the Maintaining Momentum Strategy when the recession hit in 2008 to enable the completion of projects in Ancoats. The macroeconomic strategy of cutting the deficit cannot address the problems of collapsing land and property values in declining areas. As funding diminishes, the Manchester city-­region is expected to draw from the political skills of MCC and ensure that it works with the Coalition Government to extract funds. Its evidence to the parliamentary select committee discussed in Chapter 6 suggests it will not engage in political resistance, as in the early 1980s. Equally, the political skills of MCC within the city-­region are expected to support continuing investment in the inner city of Manchester itself.3 The GMCA (GMCA) is also relatively well placed, as the Manchester Independent Economic Review (MIER) predicts that the city-region is the one best placed outside London to achieve economic growth (MIER, 2009: 7). In some respects it is hard to separate out the impact of the recession from that of the policies of the Coalition Government, as both are related. NEM recognised ‘how the changing economic circumstances are impacting on the regeneration programme’ (NEM Away Day, 19/09/2008), but one conclusion is inescapable. Those who argue that the complete regeneration of east Manchester as a predominantly public sector project which would require thirty years will be disappointed. Conclusion The politics of the regeneration of east Manchester defies easy characterisation, other than the centrality of MCC. Operating through its surrogates of NEM and NDC/Beacons, MCC is ultimately subject to the will of the central state despite 3   The appointment of Lord Peter Smith, formerly head of Wigan Metropolitan Borough Council, as leader of GMCA should counter the tendency for MCC to dominate (Interview, 15/03/2012).

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The regeneration of east Manchester

its skilful management of central government initiatives regardless of which party is in government. The dramatic impact of the change of Government on east Manchester was diminished in practice by the experience of the recession and the tapering of funding which was already occurring. Leading political figures in Manchester saw the impact of Government cuts on Manchester as particularly harsh, but also maintained that they had been planning for cuts quite a long way ahead (Interview, 10/03/2012). The majority of the NEM/NDC/Beacons’ funded projects have ceased to exist in their original form. Similar services are present in some cases, however, and have developed by capturing the learning from the ‘pilot’ status of the interventions developed in east Manchester (Interview, 29/06/2012). The Family Support project, for example, provided the background to the Manchester Family Information Services and its Complex Families Parenting Team; the EMBRACE project was rolled out across the GMP North Division as the IOM Scheme drawing on mainstream funding (NEM, 2004/2005: 21) and the Aspire Recruitment Partnership extended to become a city-­wide programme, operated by Work Solutions. Others such as the ‘Activity Bus’ and the East Manchester Community Bus proved short-­lived. While holistic approaches to regeneration are no longer on the agenda for the foreseeable future, senior figures at NEM and MCC believe that the problems of market failure and the lack of any compensatory regeneration strategies cannot endure (Interview, 10/04/2012). The Labour Party is now reviewing its policies and it appears that it is questioning urban regeneration policy (Interview, 09/02/2012). Yet the experience in east Manchester demonstrates unequivocally that all the aspects of urban life closely interact, and for public policy to tackle any one element in isolation, even that of economic growth, is insufficient. It is clear that all of the projects discussed are inter-­connected and there is not one which is the bedrock of the rest, although housing and employment loom large. A geographically centred community necessarily implies a major focus on housing, as it is the shared experience of living in a place which constitutes the east Manchester ‘community’. Housing was the single most contentious issue; yet uplifting housing depends on employability, which is itself affected by other policies. The emphasis in east Manchester has been upon providing major projects such as Sportcity, supermarkets and the failed attempt at securing a Casino as magnets to entice visitors, often from across the region, and it has the remediated land to accommodate these land-­hungry developments (Mace, Hall and Gallent 2007). This makes east Manchester as much a destination as a residential area. NEM has pragmatically responded to these types of developments. The Commonwealth Games catalysed regeneration but east Manchester would have been a strong candidate in any event: the Games merely affected the scale and nature of the initiative. Space and time are decisive. Space and location determined which parts of east Manchester received the more upmarket renaissance type of



A New Town in the City: the narrative of east Manchester 77

regeneration because of contiguity with the city centre or proximity to the Etihad Stadium and which parts received only remedial attention to convert decline into relative deprivation. Those neighbourhoods which, because of their location, received greater regeneration in the halcyon years between 1999 and 2007 gained most. It is not ‘who’, but more’ where’ and ‘when’ which matters.

5 What works in east Manchester? Evaluation in theory and in practice The east Manchester initiative is twelve years old and covers a period of high activity, the impact of an economic recession and financial cutbacks leading to a re-­conceptualisation of the project. It is therefore timely for an evaluation. It is argued that urban regeneration initiatives have had a positive effect in urban areas in the last twenty years (Power, 2009). As one of the largest such initiatives in the country, east Manchester provides evidence to assist in the making of future urban policy. Most of the evaluations which we draw upon are professional and top down in nature but we leaven these by information on the attitudes of residents. Evaluation: methodological constraints Before attempting to evaluate the east Manchester initiative it is necessary to discuss the methodological difficulties which the concept raises. An entirely neutral evaluation is difficult. It has become a major activity because policy-­makers need information on the effectiveness of public policy initiatives. Accountability for the expenditure of public money is a requirement in contemporary political life. Such a focus on value for money is the more essential since the Coalition Government has placed a central focus upon deficit reduction. Yet the evaluation of area-­based initiatives is fraught as there are vested interests involved who have concerns about the continuation of public bodies, the maintenance of budgets and the employment of staff. Mere self-­reflection by participants in an urban regeneration structure is unlikely to be satisfactory. A further problem is the profusion of different criteria in the evaluation of this policy field from different government departments (DETR, 2002; ODPM, 2005). The question of what specifically is to be evaluated is crucial and is value-­driven. For example, while the concern of the private sector is financial, the concern of public projects should be people’s well-­being (Lichfield, 2010: 130).



What works in east Manchester? Evaluation in theory and in practice 79

The evaluation of the regeneration of east Manchester is a public project and so the results should attempt to maximise the public benefit. Generic dilemmas in the evaluative process These problematic issues specifically linked to the field of urban regeneration are complicated by generic methodological issues. Evaluation should be differentiated from the concept of policy success. ‘Policy success’ suggests that projects have served their purpose if they are favourably perceived by the electorate (McConnell, 2010: xv). In contrast to this political assessment, ‘policy evaluation’ has a wider purpose. According to Dye (cited in McConnell, 2010: 13), evaluation is ‘the learning about the consequences of policy’. Browne and Wildavsky (1987) term evaluation as a process which can discover what is working and what is not. Verdung (2006: 37) defines evaluation as a ‘careful assessment of the merit, worth and value of the content, administration, output and effects of ongoing or finished government interventions, which is intended to play a role in future practical action situations’. Evaluation has also been defined as assessing the relative value of a phenomenon by appraisal against a standard and measuring the extent to which a programme realises certain goals (Banner, Doctors and Gordon, 1975: xvii). Others advance a more scientific definition, describing comprehensive evaluation as monitoring, impact assessment and ex post facto cost benefit or cost effectiveness analysis (Rossi, Freeman and wright, 1979: 16). An extended definition is that evaluation ‘is socially constructed and politically articulated . . . evaluation operates within discursive ­systems . . . Its social meaning is pre-­constituted within wider relations of power independently of any particular use’ (Taylor and Balloch, 2005: 1). This definition argues that evaluations are specifically designed to perpetuate existing policy pathways. ­ The process of evaluation is itself political, from the original conception of how a project is to be evaluated, through the methods that are used, to the conclusions that are drawn (Weiss, 1987: 12). All evaluators have political values. As Greenberger (1983: 280) argues, ‘seeing may be believing, but believing is also seeing’, and ‘facts alone cannot resolve a controversy rooted in subjective values’. This is not to condemn the value of evaluation, but to recognise that political goals conflict in a democratic society. Yet the competition between goals is not neutral, as there is a strong tendency for the wishes of clients to be subordinate to those of elites (Kelly, 1987: 272). Nor is the only conflict that between clients or residents, on the one hand, and elites or structures, on the other. Different client groups may themselves hold competing priorities, for example, between job opportunities and housing improvements or between one neighbourhood and another. Evaluation is also politically connected to the desires of government. Governments set up pilot projects with the intention of evaluating their success before implementing them more generally, only then to succumb to proceeding

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The regeneration of east Manchester

with the policy before any opportunity for evaluation has occurred. Governments are prone to carry the idea of continuous evaluation to a fault by too premature a scrutiny in their desire for ‘quick fixes’ to generate the appearance of activism with the electoral cycle in mind (McConnell, 2010: 11). Political pressures have led to evaluation becoming a vital tool in policy analysis since the 1960s; this results from the growth in public initiatives which draw upon public funding, and so the claim for accountability has intensified (Palumbo, 1987: 21).This demand has increased since the 2008 global economic crisis, leading national governments to challenge cherished programmes. Policy-­makers no longer assume that regeneration initiatives can solve poverty cost effectively (Wagner and Jordan, 2009) The Coalition Government is inclined to change the policies and structures it inherited on ideological rather than evaluative grounds. Evaluation can focus on outcomes, or process, or both simultaneously. There is no agreement on the meanings of such commonly used terms as ‘impact analysis’, ‘assessment’ and ‘appraisal’; or between outputs, effects, impacts and outcomes. When an evaluation examines outputs there is a wide range of output or impact measures to be applied. Evaluation can be quantitative or qualitative, and we use both types of analysis. It can be active in the sense of including the recipients of the process in the design of the evaluation, or relegate those affected to the passive role of consumers. The evaluation can be undertaken in-­house, by an agency commissioned by the regeneration structures themselves, or by independent evaluators. Evaluation should be limited to what is measurable, but this is not straightforward. In order to remove confounding effects evaluators should isolate the specific effects attributable to a given policy action and abandon all extraneous factors (Banner, Doctors and Gardon, 1975: 13–14). The evaluation may occur at the end of the project, during its course or even be an ex ante process in which the targets are simply a given. Ideally, evaluation should include the establishment of initiatives, the nature and scale of its beneficiaries, a clear statement of objectives, a link between those objectives and the proposed interventions, and a distinct role identified for each partner where collaboration is proposed (NAO, 2011). Long-­term should also be differentiated from immediate effects, particularly as politicians often favour ‘quick fixes’ to perpetuate funding streams. The evaluation process can investigate covert or overt goals and determine whether a particular initiative has single or multiple aims. Where there are many goals, they may differ in importance, be contradictory, or evolve over time. There is also a need to differentiate abstract goals from objectives which are specific operational statements. When a project is based upon the principle of a partnership is it necessary to interrogate the quality of that partnership as a process rather than simply the outcomes it achieved. In east Manchester, for example, is it appropriate to assess NEM against the aims of URCs in general, as specified in the Urban Task Force report? The report stated that a ‘URC should be capable of acting swiftly, as a single purpose delivery body to lead and co-­ordinate the regeneration neighbour-



What works in east Manchester? Evaluation in theory and in practice 81

hoods in accordance with the objectives of a wider local strategy which has been developed by the local authority and its partners’ (DETR, 1999: 147). This could produce a subjective analysis based upon the perceptions of many different individuals and organisations. This applies to the specific partnership remit provided for NEM, as ‘custodian of the vision and regeneration framework for the whole of east Manchester’ charged with the ‘co-­ordination’ of all regeneration activity. NEM’s composition provides ‘the strongest partnership of national, regional and local tiers of government, allied with the involvement of the local community and the private sector’ (NEM, 2000: 46). There is also the question of whether clients should be surveyed, and if so should it be through a mechanism to ask the entire population or through a randomly selected group? Obviously there is the constant danger that evaluation can be superficial. Pseudo-­evaluation, for example, can take the form of ‘eyewash’ or making everything appear to be positive; or whitewash or covering up failure. There is also the issue of who reports the results of an evaluation, as it is possible for the results to be filtered, perhaps to impress those government ministers or funding agencies which have the power to decide the future of the structures evaluated. The results of evaluations can be brushed aside if they do not match the ideological preconceptions of policy-­makers. An example in east Manchester is the Audit Commission (AC) report on the HMRP. The report stated that the £600 m scheme had been a success and had involved housing demolition and replacement homes in lower east Manchester which ‘could be put at risk’ because of cuts to the programme by the Coalition Government. Yet despite the advice of the independent evaluation that cutting the scheme in Manchester would create a ‘cycle of decline’ the Coalition Government cut the scheme, and dismissed it in highly pejorative terms (MEN, 2011). These issues are but a sample of problems involved in evaluative research.1 Value judgements are now unavoidable in the evaluation process and the evaluation literature proposes a shift from a description of strengths and weaknesses against defined objectives to a more value pluralist approach. This latest tendency examines the issues raised by a variety of stakeholders, recognising that distinct audiences can reach different conclusions based on diverse values, even when presented with the same factual evidence. There is no ontology of a single objective reality: evaluation itself can create reality (Guba and Lincoln, 1989). This raises the possibility of evaluation going beyond the issue of whether a project has delivered its objectives and questioning whether the initial aims were themselves valid. Technical and academic evaluation need not differ. Academics may focus on the ideological content, the wider context and the long-­term effects of an initiative and consider whether it was conceived as a market, ‘planned’, or a hybrid strategy. They are also prone to cautious judgements, to debate the degree to which an initiative 1   There is a vast literature on the problems of evaluation, for example, Mason (1999); McConnell (2010); Place North-­West (2010); Raco (2007); Rossi, Freeman and Wright (1979); Smith (1999); Verdung (2006).

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The regeneration of east Manchester

has succeeded, and inclined to highlight a negative verdict, although for constructive purposes. Specific dilemmas in the evaluation of east Manchester All the methodological dilemmas which have been considered raise their heads in this particular case. The evaluation of the east Manchester initiative is sui generis because of its spatial and temporal characteristics. National and international commonalities between ABIs may be real, but there are many particularities preventing general judgements about their efficacy. The multiplicity of stakeholders in east Manchester – M ­ CC, NEM, NDC/Beacons, NWDA, EP, the DCLG, the ODPM, private developers, local businesses, the residents and the different individual neighbourhoods – ensure that a consensus is unfeasible. Two experts on urban affairs argued that the work of URCs was nebulous and focused on co-­ordinating the work of other structures to promote the betterment of cities. Because such an output is hard to capture, they urged that work be done to produce mechanisms for such evaluations (Parkinson and Robson, 2000: 615). NEM was given a range of aspirations to accomplish and their prioritisation was not specified (NEM, 2000). The evaluation of urban regeneration projects must be concerned with the entirety of issues, and not simply with one, such as physical planning (Lichfield, 2010: 128). An integrated evaluation is required which overcomes government departmentalism and enables an analysis of the human consequences. Too often, evaluation is partial and focuses on the concerns of specific central or local government departments. As a public project, the regeneration of east Manchester should lead to public benefits; the targets specified in the SRF are primarily public, although the extent to which private funding has been levered in is measured. Other evaluation dilemmas intrude. The issue of temporality matters. Intermediate effects may differ from summative assessment. This evaluation considers what has been achieved, but takes account of economic recession and public expenditure cutbacks; evaluation depends on the moment that it is undertaken. NEM was designed to run for at least fifteen years, in which case policy-­makers were never going to await a summative evaluation. Even when a summative evaluation occurs, as with the final evaluation of the NDC/Beacons in 2010, it is difficult to disentangle the unique contribution made by just one of the structures involved. Yet Ekosgen was explicit about its use of the Impact Evaluation Framework (IEF) which aims to take account of non-­additionality, deadweight, leakage, displacement and multiplier effects, so that it is net rather than gross impact which is assessed. The same evaluation also sought to compare the NDC/Beacons’ outcomes against those achieved in other NDC areas (Roberts, 2010: 41). Also, are qualitative or the quantitative data the most compelling? The targets against which progress tends to be evaluated are mainly quantitative. This is problematical in evaluating the



What works in east Manchester? Evaluation in theory and in practice 83

east Manchester initiative as the manner in which data is collected and presented is often inconsistent. The most recent data, for example, is ward-­based rather than focused on NDC/Beacons or NEM boundaries. For many residents it is the qualitative and perceptual dimension which is most significant. Even when the evaluations include longitudinal Residents’ Perception Surveys, clients were not involved in designing the survey. In short, definitive conclusions are unlikely, although in a rational policy-­making environment major projects require evaluation, even if against limited quantitative targets. Our starting point is the strong need for the regeneration of east Manchester owing to the extent of deprivation in the late 1990s. This still permits us to interrogate the ideological assumptions underpinning the initiative and to heed the diversity of the audiences who are affected. We consider that public participation and accountability are desirable. Our focus is on temporal and spatial factors because regeneration occurs within a specific location at a given time and with consequential constraints. This focus on the specificities of location and time is appropriate because as Masser (1996: 59) says, the ‘essential strength of case studies lie in their ability to take account of local detail’. Such local detail as existing economic circumstances, the local tax base and the views of residents at the outset of the process are relevant. In an evaluation, NEM itself acknowledged spatial and temporal issues. In the Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) it issued in December 2006 it stated the need to include its ‘extended boundaries’, given the addition of Gorton and Newton Heath to the original neighbourhoods in 2004, owing to the impact this change would have on any evaluation of progress. Yet some might assert that this emphasis upon the specificity of the circumstances confronting the regeneration agencies in east Manchester might provide a pretext to justify limited achievement. We rebut this and assert that even with limited resources it is the responsibility of those engaged in regeneration to use the cards they have been dealt effectively. We also adopt a pragmatic view of the partnership strategy itself and assume that it is the results which matter and over a longer period rather than merely quick ‘fixes’. Realistically, however, NEM and government ministers were seeking early achievements to claim political success for propagandist purposes. At the same time we agree that a longer view makes it more difficult to attribute causality. This deters us from making sweeping overall judgements, recognising that reality is constructed by diverse interests. While we dealt with policy-­makers and other staff in east Manchester because they are the ‘gatekeepers’ of information, we maintained our independence (Gregory and Masser , 1996: 5). If we consider that harm is being done by the east Manchester initiative then it is incumbent on us to reveal that, with supporting evidence. Even academic evaluators should seek ‘to improve social conditions and community life’ (Browne and Wildavsky, 1987: 146). Given these general and specific difficulties it could be argued that evaluation should be abandoned. This is too nihilistic. A perspective over twelve years enables judgements to be made, highlights issues of urban change and continuity and so

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provides officials and residents with a rounded understanding. Yet the problems in evaluating a holistic initiative in its entirety explain our reluctance to evaluate it definitively. Above all, the spatial reality of east Manchester, exemplified by the sheer scale of its economic and labour market disadvantage in 1999 and changes to the initiative after 2010, militates against a dogmatic conclusion. Evaluations in practice Various considerations complicate the issue of whether urban regeneration is of value. Some have argued that urban policy interventions have not generally arrested urban decline and that the problem remains that ‘towns that were once in the right place at the right time, may well now be in the wrong place at the wrong time’ (Leunig, Swaffield Hartwich, 2007: 62). An early evaluation of the first three URCs  – NEM, Liverpool Vision and Sheffield One – was commissioned by the DETR, the NWDA and Yorkshire Forward. They concluded that even with just three entities to compare the individuality of each, resulting from the spatial and historical context, was striking (Parkinson and Robson, 2000: 4.39). The focus in this chapter is on the major evaluative analyses which have taken place, but we also heed the reactions of individuals and structures acquired during our research. It is necessary to distinguish between process and outcomes. Our concern is with outcomes as the responses of residents and others to the process are discussed in Chapter 8. It is also the case that a judgement made in the spring of 2010, when it appeared that regeneration in some form would continue despite the recession and government cuts, must be different from one in 2017 or 2027, when the impact of the EDP should be apparent. Generic evaluations in practice Much of the early evaluation of urban regeneration examined the case for and against ABI initiatives. This was because by 1998 over 80% of the funds were aimed at the sixty-­five most deprived districts as determined by the Index of Local Deprivation (ILD) (DETR, 1998b). While this evaluation discerned many benefits, there are different ideological views on the subject. The left-­wing argument against ABIs is that deprivation is a national and class issue and that programmes to tackle it should be mainstreamed; while from a right-­wing perspective one objection is that ABIs intervene in the free market with a distorting effect (Smith, 1999: 4–6). Yet while evaluating ABIs is valuable they represent only a tiny proportion of public expenditure, estimated as 1% of the total monies devoted to urban regeneration (Muscat, 2010). The AC produced a general evaluation in 2002 on the overall performance of ABIs. Its report was inconclusive in that it pointed to both gains and losses and, while based on active research, its conclusions might well have been developed at a



What works in east Manchester? Evaluation in theory and in practice 85

purely abstract level. The arguments adduced in favour of ABIs were the real nature of the need which they addressed, the consequential integration of local service delivery into a holistic approach, the encouragement of innovation and experimentation, the ring-­fencing which ensured that monies reached their intended target, the effect of voluntary bodies galvanised into action and the impact of local programmes raising awareness in deprived neighbourhoods. The disadvantages were the temporary nature of staff appointments, the lack of progression in policy and service delivery when projects ceased, the opportunity costs involved in diverting staff time to engage in the bidding process and the high administrative costs exacerbated by the volume of separate local initiatives. There was also concern that a neighbourhood focus distracted attention from improving mainstream services. The report concluded that some of the disadvantages of ABIs could be alleviated by funding only truly innovative projects in future which, although time-­bound, could have their funding tapered rather than ended abruptly. In short, much of the case against ABIs was their lack of sustainability (AC, 2002: 17). Some arguments against ABIs in the east Manchester context were less valid in that NEM had staff continuity owing to the policy of seconding MCC staff coupled with NEM’s long-­term role. The problem about the lack of sustainability was endorsed by one resident of east Manchester, however, with the question: ‘what happens when the regeneration roadshow moves on?’ (Interview, 31/07/2006). Others have concluded that the legacy of regeneration is tenuous as the same problems simply reappear (Coulson, 2005a). The concern about a lack of sustainability emerged in the final review of the NDC/Beacons’ programme, which contended that ‘the area remains fragile and in need of further sustained investment and improved service delivery in order to narrow further the socio-­economic disparities which still persist’ (Roberts, 2010: 3). Yet in evaluating the success of ABIs within their own time-­frame, and disregarding sustainability, it is difficult to avoid the ­conclusion that local regeneration initiatives have merit. There have been general and specific evaluations of the work of NDCs. At a general level Sheffield Hallam University undertook an evaluation from 2002 to 2010 examining all thirty-­nine partnerships (DCLG, 2010). While this national evaluation drew together all of the lessons across the country about the impact of this type of neighbourhood renewal, and could measure effectiveness in such areas as health, education, worklessness, housing and crime, it lacked specificity in differentiating the performance of particular NDCs. The first phase of this evaluation culminated in 2005. At this point, it appeared that ABIs worked well. The report revealed improved outcomes on the knowledge of residents about the work of their own NDCs, a falling fear of burglary, positive feelings about the neighbourhoods, which were improving at a greater rate in NDC areas, stabilising of populations and better outcomes in relation to unemployment for those staying in NDC areas than in non-­NDC comparator areas (DCLG, 2010). Between 2002 and 2008, there was an improvement in thirty-­two out of the thirty-­six core indicators on crime,

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e­ ducation, health, worklessness, community and housing and the physical environment (CRESR, 2009). Nevertheless, the report emphasised the need for realistic targets given limited resources and NDCs and ABIs generally should be judged by what ‘they can plausibly achieve’, given financial institutional, demographic and power constraints (CRESR, 2007: 85). Financially, NDCs have about £100 per person to spend, people leaving NDC areas are likely to be the most capable of supporting regeneration and are being replaced by those imposing more ‘people based demands’ (CRESR, 2007: 85–86). Many of the conclusions of this national evaluation were vindicated in the NDC/ Beacons’ initiative. Yet the differences are notable. Education improved markedly in the NDC/Beacons’ area although the active involvement of the EAZ and its absorption into NEM may have assisted this. While there may be a resonance between the national situation and NDC/Beacons in housing dilemmas, it is almost impossible to disentangle the impact of NDC/ Beacons from wider NEM and HMRP activities. Also the NDC/Beacons’ initiative was more effective in terms of sustainability, in that there was a Succession Strategy to address continuity. It also benefited from good executive leadership. NDC/Beacons was perceived more favourably than many of its counterparts. The NDC/Beacons’ Chief Executive reported in January 2004 that government sought to ensure that NDCs spent their money to deliver their targets. Many NDCs were failing so NDC/Beacons was well placed to take up any surplus funding over the £51,750 m it had already been awarded (NDC/ Beacons’ Board Minutes, 26/01/2004). The Deputy Prime Minister also believed that NDC/Beacons was performing well. He stated that ‘in Manchester I saw how the New Deal had built a new primary school and had given people the pride and confidence to create a new open space complete with a bandstand out of a patch of derelict land’ (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 26/04/2004). This was significant in that it revealed central government’s positive view of NDC/Beacons, but it also suggested a confusion about which projects were NDC-­rather than NEM-­led. Specific evaluations of the east Manchester initiative While it is unthinkable that there would be no evaluations of the impact and effectiveness of public and private expenditure in east Manchester, the vast cost incurred appears excessive (Interview, 16/12/2010). An overall figure of £17 m has been estimated and some of that money could have been used to enable regeneration activity. It is hard to dispel the concern that evaluation has proved to be a boon for consultants from private and public sectors alike; it is substantially from their work, however, that some of the content of this chapter is derived. The formal evaluations do not tell all, however, as they fail to determine whether the investment of time and money was warranted and neglect the opportunity costs of officials supporting projects which failed such as the B of the Bang sculpture and the Casino. These unsuccessful ventures should be considered in any over-­arching judgements.



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Differentiating the specific impact of individual structures and programmes in the regeneration of east Manchester is complex. Although, the evaluations analysed here assume that efforts can be made to isolate the impact of NEM and NDC/ Beacons, their combined impact cannot easily be separated. Nor is the problem confined to the contribution of the structures, as it is problematical to distinguish their inputs from the effect of broader market influences, labour markets and patterns of migration. An evaluation of the regeneration initiative could focus upon specific programmes within NEM and NDC/Beacons, or on particular neighbourhoods such as Beswick and Gorton. The growing integration of the two structures led to confusion so even the specialist press erroneously stated that the NDC/ Beacons’ programme ‘was run by an urban regeneration company’ and rolled up NDC and SRB monies into the NEM total budget (Place North-­West, 2010). It is equally hard to separate the joint impact of NEM from pre-­existing structures and from mainstream services in the area. A number of specific evaluations have examined either NDC/Beacons or NEM, rather than the east Manchester initiative in its entirety. This was the corollary of having two structures resulting from distinct funding streams and with different accountabilities. Since most of the evaluation was directed to either NDC/ Beacons or NEM, it is necessary to discuss these first before attempting to make a cautious over-­arching assessment about the entire initiative. A further proviso is that while the earlier discussion argued that evaluations can be external and more objective, or internal and possibly biased, some evaluations were a hybrid. The interim evaluation of NEM’s performance in 2005/2006 by the Government Office for the North West for example, was jointly commissioned and funded by NEM, EP, NWDA, MCC and the GONW, and it addressed national and regional issues and ‘local policy and practice’. The recurring Kwest survey of resident satisfaction was an external exercise, although it depended on being awarded the contract by NDC/Beacons. The Research Institute for Health and Social Change (RIHSC) of MMU secured the contract from the NEM Board, and relied for its evaluation, as it acknowledged, on the ‘continued input and advice’ from within NEM which ‘ensured the study was able to take place’ (Woolrych, Sixsmith and Kagan, 2007: Acknowledgements). In short, the formal evaluations were never entirely ‘pure’ or external. The reports themselves were thoroughly considered by the respective Boards, however, and so influenced the strategic direction of regeneration (NEM Board Minutes, 14/12/2006). In 1999, the NEM Shadow Board acknowledged the importance of evaluation. The first Chief Executive, Marianne Neville-­Rolfe, asserted that Government ‘will be closely monitoring the progress of the new companies and will be developing new regeneration policies in response to the issues raised’ (NEM Shadow Board Minutes, 16/07/1999). Regardless of government monitoring, however, NEM was prepared to learn from and act upon the recommendations of its own evaluations. The interim evaluation of NEM in 2006 led to self-­analysis and new approaches.

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The Minutes of the Board meeting which followed its publication urged greater resident involvement and accepted ‘the difficulty of reconciling the different objectives of residents and developers’ as well as determining realistic targets together with the need to appoint quality staff to support the Chief Executive (NEM Board Minutes, 01/06/2006). At the following meeting, it was agreed to tackle the flat management structure below the Chief Executive by appointing a new Deputy Chief Executive who could strengthen the generic capacity of the management team. The Deputy Chief Executive would also ensure the better integration of programmes and financial management systems and lead specific high-­level projects (NEM Board Meeting, 01/06/2006). NEM also held Away Days, and in 2004 such an event raised questions as to whether restoring architecturally significant buildings and engaging stakeholders should be given priority plus the need for a public annual meeting and the allocation of specific assignments to individual Board members. The event produced an Action Plan linked to reporting arrangements on transport, a green spaces strategy, a bulletin board, the provision of private rented sector accommodation, the maximisation of the use of Sportcity, the progress of Central Park and the lobbying of government (NEM Board Meeting, 16/09/2004). The second Away Day was more elegiac as it sought to determine a future in which NEM’s role was reduced. This event was facilitated by Professor Alan Harding and examined the Annual Report for 2007/2008, Resident Perception Surveys, skills surveys, current market conditions and recent Implementation Plans. As NEM ceased delivering public services entirely, the question became ‘What Is NEM responsible for?’ (NEM Board Meeting, 20/02/2008) KPIs The formal system of measuring NEM’s performance was through the KPIs which were periodically presented to NEM Board meetings, enabling a process of continuous evaluation. Even before that system was established every Board meeting received a report from the Chief Executive on progress on key projects and these qualitative reports continued alongside quantitative KPIs. The Chief Executive expressed the judgement that the KPIs should focus on individual spatial areas as there could be instability in the middle of more stable areas, although NEM chose to publish data about east Manchester as a whole. To assist in the gathering of information NEM and NDC/Beacons jointly carried out resident baseline surveys which provided an important input (NEM Board Meeting, 03/07/2002). In October 2001, the NEM Board agreed thirteen KPIs across six thematic areas to be measured against baseline data from 1999–2000 where available. At the end of 2002 the Board was presented with the first progress report. There was disappointment about the rate of unemployment as there was no real change in the figures since 2001. Unemployment was measured by calculating



What works in east Manchester? Evaluation in theory and in practice 89

the numbers in work or on government programmes compared to the working-­age population of those actively seeking work as captured by JSA. Yet throughout NEM drew comfort from the comparative figure in 1996 of 21.1% unemployed (NEM Board Meeting, 12/11/2003). There was also concern about crime, especially the burglary rate, although Board members expressed hopes about the impact of the EMBRACE programme. There were further issues about the failure to reduce housing voids, although again there was hope that the imminent commencement of the HMRP and the Empty Properties’ Initiative would alleviate the situation. More positively, there were early signs of progress from the EAZ in closing the gap on performance with city and regional benchmarks. The Board responded by determining to reduce unemployment levels by 5% and to cut burglaries to the Greater Manchester City Region average. The data on population actually suggested a decline. This was alarming against the SRF aspiration of doubling the population to 60,000 in the original NEM area. The KPI was adjusted to that of stabilising the population (NEM Board Meeting, 20/10/2002). The NEM Board refined the KPIs eighteen months later in early 2003, for various reasons. First, there was concern that national data as a comparator was of limited use; secondly, that major and minor indicators should be differentiated; and thirdly that more detailed operational indicators should be developed to enable a more effective ‘drilling down’ to facilitate better judgements. The consequence was to modify the targets to those of reducing crime levels to those of the north-­west region, to reduce unemployment to the national average, to secure educational outcomes equivalent to those of the top quartile in the north-­west, to obtain a resident satisfaction rate of 75%, to build 12,500 new homes and to reaffirm the aim of increasing the population to 60,000 by 2010 (NEM Board Meeting, 21/05/2003). There was no explanation for returning to the original population target, the suitability of which had been questioned in 2001. By September 2003, however, the KPIs indicated a more positive performance as the picture was improving, with favourable indicators on the gearing of public versus private investment, educational performance and housing. At the start of 2004, members took issue with data on population growth as the census registered a fall. Leese argued the figures were inaccurate and MCC intended to undertake its own house-­to-­house survey to garner accurate information (NEM Board Meeting, 12/02/2004). An equally favourable picture emerged at the end of 2004, although two problems intruded. First, the data on low birth weights and teenage conceptions were delayed nationally. Secondly, the data on car crime was unreliable as the unit of measurement included the Northern Quarter, next to the city centre, which inflated the figure. Most of the data on crime showed an improvement; moreover, the rate of unemployment was ‘the lowest it has been’ and ‘the gap between east Manchester and the city as a whole was closing’. The report on the ratio of public to private spending, which was 1: 6.1, was ‘promisingly on course’. Examination results and attendance in schools were also improving and were now comparable

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to Manchester as a whole. While 839 new homes had been constructed the target of 3,500 was considered unlikely to be met, although the void rate had fallen from 14.1 to 11.17%. House prices had risen above the growth rate nationally. Yet the scepticism about the accuracy of census data could not conceal the reality that the population target figure of 60,000 would have to be revised (NEM Board Meeting, 30/11/2004). As if the complications in evaluating progress through KPIs were not already difficult, NEM had only existed for four years when the issue of extending its borders challenged evaluation. This involved a 65% increase in territory and a doubling of the number of properties in the regeneration area, which meant revising the base against which regeneration was measured (NEM Board Meeting, 12/02/2004). This played havoc with KPIs. In the evaluations of NEM it became necessary to differentiate between the original and the extended NEM area as the baseline figures were different–1999 for the original area and 2004 for the additional neighbourhoods (NEM Board Meeting, 08/02/2005). There was a concern that unless the data was presented separately the work carried out to date within the original boundaries could be diluted. On most counts the data for the more recently added districts produced better statistics, suggesting less severe deprivation in those neighbourhoods: yet the rate of improvement in the original area was greater, suggesting some positive impact of regeneration policies. By the end of 2005 the KPIs reported progress, particularly on house prices, but there was a tendency for both official and independent Board members to downplay more negative indicators. For example, it was suggested that the increases in crime were the result of improved reporting and on unemployment: Leese asserted that some people would always be unfit for work (NEM Board Meeting, 08/02/2005). In 2006 NEM reported that the ratio of private as against public investment in east Manchester was improving. At that stage while 47% of the monies expended were from public sources, £1,756 m was anticipated from the private sector. This could lead to a revised gearing of 1: 2.16 (NEM Board Meeting, 03/10/2006). The Chair ensured there would be no complacency, however, when he urged that there should be closer links between KPIs and the process of direct delivery by publishing milestones which could explain any slippage (NEM Board Minutes, 14/12/2006). Yet despite the continuing progress in performance, which was sometimes superior to that of Manchester, and by 2007 closing the gap with comparative national data, the Board concluded that the recovery remained fragile. It was noted in 2007 that a few targets would not, at the existing rate of progress, be met by 2010 and there was a need to review the overall regeneration framework. Board members identified challenges, including the ending of the HMRP funding and the closure of businesses in the area such as GEC, Alstom, Sharp and CIBA. In May an official expressed concern that unemployment was plateauing in the extended NEM area at 5.7% and in discussion it emerged that NEM was engaged in work with JobCentre



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Plus on the links between the decrease of Incapacity Benefit and disability living allowance (DLA) claimants and the increase in JSA claimants, especially where claimants come on and off the register in a short space of time. It appeared that gains in employment were fragile and that, as with regeneration projects elsewhere, only a small fraction of the budget was spent on tackling unemployment (APUDG 2009). More positively, new house building activity was exceeding the target (NEM Board Minutes, 15/05/2007). Yet, in general, the KPIs just before the recession were improving. At the November 2007 meeting, for example, burglary rates were at their lowest since 2000, the GCSE English results had improved to within 2% of Manchester, and house prices had risen to £100,000 for the first time, which represented a 45% rise since 2000 measured against a 202% national increase (NEM Board Meeting, 21/11/ 2007). The looming impact of the recession was displayed in the KPIs’ Milestones Report by the end of 2008, however, which noted that of the forty Milestones, only eighteen had been achieved, twenty were being re-­profiled and two were failing. At the November 2009 meeting, there was a clear shift towards private sector investment, when a new target of the value for money of private sector leverage was proposed. The greater uncertainty was also evident with the statement that while NEM targets were to be further reviewed it was ‘not appropriate to undertake this review until economic conditions have stabilised and there can be a better assessment of the medium term prospects for the economy’ (NEM Board Meeting, 25/11/2009). In May 2010 more indicators were on a downward trajectory, including the number of new homes built, the percentage of owner occupiers and the average house price, which had fallen from £112,952 to £99,624. Yet increased prices had been of limited value for residents who had been unable to afford them and the existence of shared equity ownership had not been fully resolved. Unemployment had also increased from 5.4% in 2005 to 8.1% in 2008, the numbers claiming JSA had risen from 35.3% to 43.4% and the number on long-­term Incapacity Benefit had risen from 56.7% to 63.7% (NEM Board Minutes, 20/05/2010). The KPIs at the end of 2010 revealed further decline, although it is certain that this was from a higher base than would have been achieved without the east Manchester ABI. Population grew from 65,123 in 2007/2008 to 68,053 in November 2010 in the extended area and NEM now found the Office for National Statistics (ONS) data more reliable about population than the census figures. The number of new homes in the same period fell from 822 to 814, the net added homes from 766 to 318, home ownership fell from 37% to 33% (whereas in Manchester it was almost 50% and nationally almost 70%). House prices fell steeply from £112,976 to £101,961 while in Manchester they stood at £141,307, in the north-­west, £119,555 and nationally £165,732. The rate of resident satisfaction had plateaued at 64% in 2007–2008 and 66% in 2010 but the comparative figures were over 70% for the city and more than 80% for the country. The numbers on benefit was 22.4% against 19.4% in the north-­west and 16.5% in England; and the unemployment rate was 7.6% compared

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to a figure in Manchester of 5.5% and in England of 3.9%. It can be questioned, therefore, whether regeneration could resolve long-­term unemployment. The problems of evaluation were becoming apparent owing to some indices improving with others stabilising or declining, together with the problems of comparing both absolute and relative performance. As well as KPIs, this emerges from the evidence of the national IMD. This is a composite of seven sets of statistics: income; employment; health and stability; education, skills and training; barriers to housing and services; crime and disorder; and the living environment. The IMD defines the areas of highest deprivation as Super Output Areas (SOA). The IMD for 2004 revealed that 28 of the 38 SOAs in east Manchester were in the bottom 1% of the country (Woolrych, Sixsmith and Kagan, 2007: 10). Manchester emerged as the fourth most deprived local authority area in 2007 compared with third in 2004 but still ‘it has shown the greatest relative improvement nationally’. While in 2004 a quarter of east Manchester residents were among the most deprived category nationally by 2007 this had reduced to one in ten. In 2007, two SOAs were in Newton Heath, three in Gorton and two in the original NEM area but 31 had improved in east Manchester as a whole between 2004 and 2007. Yet even in the 2007 report deprivation was concentrated ‘around the east and north of the city’, leading NEM officials to conclude that ‘the results confirm that the scale of disadvantage across the area remains a challenge’. NEM officials recognised that they were not only dealing with ‘one of the most deprived parts of the country . . . but that the deprivation was on a significant scale and was deep seated’ (NEM Board Meeting, 20/02/2008). Nevertheless, officials argued that NEM had led to the decline being arrested and that ‘the direction of travel is clearly positive’. For example, on income 32/38, on employment 24/38, on crime 18/38 and on health 17/38 of the SOAs had shown improvement. In the field of education 5 SOAs were in the worst 1% nationally compared to 9 in 2004. Housing revealed the greatest change, as in 2004 7 SOAs had been in the worst 10% of the country and that had fallen to none in 2007 (NEM Board Meeting, 20/02/2008). Overall, the IMD revealed a limited but valuable reduction in relative deprivation, but highlighted the crucial issue of sustainability. Evaluating NDC/Beacons NDC/Beacons was evaluated exhaustively. The periodic Perception Surveys of residents, the national MORI surveys and investigations by the NWDA and DTZ in 2009, for example, revealed the extent to which the programme had been scrutinised (NDC/Beacons’ Board Meeting, 10/09/2010). The NDC/Beacons’ Board members analysed a MORI survey on the performance of NDCs nationally (MORI, 2004) and members were untroubled that it revealed only a minority of people who knew what NDC/Beacons did. The multiplicity of initiatives in the area made it difficult for residents to know ‘who does what’, and residents were better informed



What works in east Manchester? Evaluation in theory and in practice 93

about specific projects which NDC delivered than they were with the ‘brand’–for example, 80% had heard about the Warden scheme; 43% knew about the alleygating initiative, with one in four reporting that it had benefited them or somebody in their household; and 62% were aware of Eastserve. The percentage of residents responding positively to the question ‘had the area improved’ had fallen from 58% to 50%, although this was more positive than for the country as whole On the issue of crime there were contradictory perceptions. While there was a 3% increase in those who felt the situation had improved, there were increases of 8% in those worried about teenagers ‘hanging around the streets’, and about drug dealing and usage (NDC/ Beacons’ Board Minutes, 10/01/2005). A representative from GONW argued that the results of MORI’s national evaluation did not reveal the distance that NDC/ Beacons had travelled. McGonigle still felt that it was necessary to demonstrate value for money, to present a forward strategy, and to promote mainstreaming and sustainability (NDC/Beacons’ Board Meeting, 10/01/2005). The NWDA had been responsible for the SRB 5 element which had been incorporated into NDC/Beacons in 1999 and in 2008 proposed an evaluation of the SRB aspect of the work. Yet the difficulty in separating that element from the rest of NDC/Beacons meant that ‘NDC funded activity will be examined as well, recognising that the two funding streams are inextricably linked’. The resulting report was favourable, although it repeated the need to maintain good mainstream service provision (NDC/Beacons’ Board Meeting, 21/10/2008). Before the final NDC/Beacons’ evaluation, McGonigle presented his assessment. He was satisfied that some structures which had been established had endured, such as the NDC/ Beacons’ Board, Task Groups, the Public Agencies Forum and the Residents’ Forum. He judged that NDC/Beacons had been in the vanguard of the national initiative but cautioned that serious problems remained. These were the need for improved neighbourhood management, the continuing problems of ‘deep deprivation’, long-­term unemployment, a skills deficit and the need to ‘maintain a community focus’. Most significant, was his statement that he had ‘always been clear’ that regeneration would take twenty-­five years and that there was still ‘a long way to go’ (NDC/Beacons’ Board Meeting, 10/09/2009). The major evaluation of NDC/Beacons, which had the merit of judging an initiative at its conclusion, was undertaken by Ekosgen. Smith, as Chief Executive, asserted that NEM sought ‘an open and honest assessment so we can use the results to shape how we take forward the regeneration of the area in the future’ (www. east-­manchester.com/press-­releases/159/east-­manchester-­s-­ndc-­publishes-­final-­ evaluation/index.htm, accessed 02.09/2011). In over-­arching terms it concluded that NDC/Beacons had been successful, even after allowance was made for deadweight factors and the overlapping responsibilities of NDC/Beacons, NEM and mainstream agencies. The IEF which it applied measured both gross and net impact, and non-­additionality, deadweight, leakage, displacement and multiplier effects. The key question of whether the change that was effected was more than

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in other areas, and the extent to which it was attributable to NDC/Beacons, was addressed by measuring the change in the NDC/Beacons’ area against Harpurhey, north Manchester, and the national picture. Without NDC/Beacons, however, the area would still have had both SRB funding and support from the NWDA, so apportioning the precise element attributable to NDC/Beacons was challenging. When such allowances had been made, the verdict on the impact of NDC/Beacons’ progress was positive, but with a concern about sustainability. The report implicitly stressed the validity of three of our main conclusions: the temporal, spatial and agency effects. The temporal dimension was stressed because of the changing economic context and the prospect of reduced funding. The spatial specificity was also recognised. As one of the early NDCs, and with the existing activity of an SRB initiative, the locals had a year to put their bid together, with MCC staff, partners and residents already in a relationship (Roberts, 2010: 4). A further spatial element was the relationship between NDC/Beacons and MCC, which was defined as ‘strong’ and permissive, with NDC/Beacons left to ‘innovate in response to its local environment’ (Roberts, 2010: 2). Yet the importance of agency was clear in the judgement that the success of NDC/Beacons resulted from ‘the considerable hard work and enthusiasm of a number of officers and residents’ (Roberts, 2010: 2). The freedom which NDC/Beacons enjoyed was a consequence of its Chief Executive advancing in harmony with MCC’s preferences and the fact that he enjoyed the trust of key players in the local authority. The Commonwealth Games also assisted NDC/Beacons’ legitimacy (Roberts, 2010: 20). A dilemma in evaluating ABIs is that while a geographical area may be in decline the problems are most acute for particular parts of the area. The report concluded that the programme had ‘secured a good balance between securing improvements across the whole Beacons’ population as well as providing more intensive support to significant numbers of individuals’ (Roberts, 2010: 2). NDC/Beacons had in fact over-­performed in securing funding and producing its outputs. Yet agents operate in circumstances, and the congratulatory tone was attenuated by the report’s stress upon the favourable economic circumstances which prevailed until 2008 (Roberts, 2010: 25). Residents make their judgements on the basis of their total experience; yet for individuals priorities will vary over time. This complicates evaluation. While there is no suggestion that the evaluation perceived one aspect as being fundamental, the report stated that the fate of the economy and related issues of worklessness were influential, because it was the collapse of the traditional economy in the 1970s and 1980s which had precipitated the original decline. The report stated that without increasing the numbers in work and better-­paid employment, ‘sustainable regeneration could not be secured’ (Roberts, 2010: 44). The report credited NDC/Beacons with providing £4.2 m, or 8.2% of its budget, to removing barriers to work, incorporating employment support activities at outreach venues and focusing particularly on those furthest from the labour market. It also praised the Skills



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for Life provision, the Aspire programme, adult literacy and numeracy provision including one-­to-­one tuition and ESOL courses. This emphasised input measures, but the report pointed out that over 2,000 people had been helped and that there was evidence of such positive outcomes as people moving into work, learning, or volunteering (Roberts, 2010: 44). Recognising the vulnerability of these gains to the recession, the report concluded that NDC/Beacons had reversed the long-­term contraction of jobs by a mixture of ‘inward investment and indigenous jobs growth’ and that while manufacturing jobs had continued to decline there were 20% more jobs in 2007 than there had been in 2001, and the gap between the number of those on unemployment ­benefit compared to the city as a whole had narrowed. In 2001 there were 44% claimants but this had fallen to 33% in 2007 (Roberts, 2010: 48). The fall in the workless total, resulting from NDC/Beacons’ integrated approach, had achieved the fourth highest fall in all NDC areas. This reinforced the effectiveness of tailored intensive support (Roberts, 2010: 96). The report was realistic, however, when it commented that tackling ‘the long-­term culture of worklessness and the impact of the recession remains a major challenge’ (Roberts, 2010: 50). This is reinforced by the head of The Grange, a voluntary sector site which runs much of the community support work inherited from NDC/Beacons, who praised the legacy of NDC/Beacons but still argued that it was the culture of unemployment which was so deep it could not be extirpated. Others cited examples of residents refusing jobs in the nearby city centre on the grounds of distance unless a taxi was provided (Interview, 17/09/2010). For many residents, housing and physical development were the most controversial issue. NDC/Beacons’ contacts with residents facilitated the process of housing demolition but the report did suggest unhappiness with the HMRP (Roberts, 2010: 710). This demonstrates the difficulty of grafting a major new programme on to an existing strategy. It was an aim of both NDC/Beacons and NEM to lever in private investment, and they had succeeded, with the bulk of the investment coming from private sector housing. The report argued that the high level of private sector contributions, ‘is particularly noteworthy in an area which historically had seen very little private sector investment’, although it was doubtful about the capacity of the private sector to step into the gap left by reduced state funding (Roberts, 2010: 17). The evaluation made the ideological assumption that social housing was best tackled by social landlords rather than the local authority and it specified some benefits of stock transfer. It argued that the transfer of 2,899 homes to Eastlands enhanced the quality of housing management and it was beneficial that the number of social landlords had been reduced. Eastlands was praised for completing a £45 m improvement programme a year earlier than expected and spending an average of £16,000 on each home. The report also stressed the increasing satisfaction of residents with their accommodation, which rose from 36% in 2004 to 50% in 2007, with an even bigger rise in satisfaction with repairs and maintenance (from 33% to 57%). It noted that more open spaces had been created, housing increased by about

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10% between 2002 and 2008 and population growth fostered. Yet it observed that there remained both vacant land and disquiet that green land was being developed. House prices had also risen by 387%, the second highest increase nationally, which while demonstrating the extent of the collapse which had occurred previously suggested that a housing market was emerging. A local MCC councillor would have felt vindicated in his view that the housing market was sovereign and regeneration had to work with it (Interview, 14/07/2006). This argument looked less appealing in the collapsing housing market after 2008. The report also expressed a concern that there was no sustainable private rented sector and that this intensified the problems of rapid population turnover (Roberts, 2010: 102). The report was optimistic about crime and community safety, although the situation remained fluid. The contrasting data, drawn respectively from 1999 and 2008, revealed that residents felt safer. It praised the EMBRACE programme for its innovative approach to dealing with prolific offenders and also NDC/Beacons for close working relationships with GMP in advancing neighbourhood policing. Such good relations emanated from the continuity of core staff at NDC/Beacons. Ekosgen focused on the work of the EAZ and noted increased expectations among both children and parents. Both attainment and attendance levels had improved and ‘the gap has narrowed’ between educational outcomes and those of Manchester. It adduced a number of reasons for the improvements, including thirty-­two pyramid clubs for after-­school activities, the rise in the number of classroom assistants, SureStart, childcare, early learning provision, the new Primary School at Ashbury Meadow, the Youth Street Work programme to target young people at risk and increased adult education facilities (Roberts, 2010: 35–39). The increase in adult provision was the reason for the drop in poor literacy from 12% to 8% and of numeracy from 10% to 6%. Data on entry into Higher Education demonstrated an increase of 6% between 1999 and 2007 (Roberts, 2010: 37). There was concern about the lack of progress in health, although this was attributed to extraneous factors within the NHS. Ekosgen recognised that key health indicators change slowly and admitted that its access to appropriate neighbourhood data was difficult, but it was certain that momentum should be maintained and spending protected. Balancing such positives as the discovery of 35% of adults exercising five times each week and 47% of those surveyed reporting in 2008 that their health was good (as against 34% in 1999) it also noted that mortality rates were stagnant, lung cancer rates and disability levels remained high and access to general practitioners was difficult (Roberts, 2010: 50–55). The report’s summative evaluation was a satisfactory basis for making definitive judgements. It concluded that NDC/Beacons had successfully met its objectives and that the area had improved significantly compared to 1999. Yet the situation was insecure given future challenges. There were two further cautions: a danger in the statistical data of double-­and even triple-­counting of beneficiaries and the possibility that some targets had been set too low.



What works in east Manchester? Evaluation in theory and in practice 97 Evaluating NEM

The European Institute for Urban Affairs delivered an NEM-­sponsored evaluation exercise which reported in 2006. In 2000, its authors had been optimistic about Manchester’s experience of conducting large-­scale regeneration projects and the partnership relationships established between the Chief Executives of MCC and NEM. Yet it also detected certain risks that were appearing as a result of the scale and complexity of the problem and the large number of initiatives already in the area which NEM would have to co-­ordinate and add synergy to. Further risks included the danger of NEM’s ‘hype’ inflating land and property values and the inevitable slowness of any impact because of the area’s entrenched difficulties. On the positive side, however, it noted that property developers were pleased with NEM’s drive, its innovative multi-­agency work and its holistic strategy which recognised that property values would only be increased if the quality of schools, transport and the environment was raised, crime reduced and employment opportunities enhanced (Parkinson and Robson, 2000: 4.3–4.39). Although the 2006 evaluation was not a summative assessment, it enabled NEM to undertake a stocktake. NEM adopted the recommendations and revised its SRF and MCC’s Executive Committee acknowledged the importance of such a mid-­ term evaluation. The report assessed policy instruments and delivery vehicles in urban regeneration more widely and so could claim national significance. Echoing the New Labour mantra about the importance of ‘what works’, it asserted that by evaluating ‘the experience of one particular vehicle, [NEM] which during the past five years has been regenerating one of the largest areas of economic, social and physical dereliction in one of the most dynamic cities in Europe’, it could draw lessons to provide advice to Government and its local agents. Critiquing evaluation in general, the report argued that in the past, in ‘the search for novelty, government policy has moved from one regeneration initiative to another without learning from or building upon the achievements of existing approaches’. The evaluation of NEM was appropriate for addressing this problem in that it was ‘the latest version of a well practised regeneration vehicle’ (NEM, 2006: 1). NEM’s Chair put a ‘spin’ on the report by stressing that the company was on an upward trajectory (NEM, 2006: Foreword). The report was clear that NEM should be evaluated against both the specific goals that it had set itself and the national factors indicated by ODPM. These were the involvement of key partners; ‘close and effective working relationships with the local authority’; producing the right local strategy and communicating it effectively; appointing an effective Chair, Board and Chief Executive; clear implementation arrangements; collaboration with the investment decisions of the private and public sectors; integrating with other initiatives and establishing an early momentum, with high-­profile projects being well delivered. The overall verdict was that ‘NEM is a good news story’ for meeting its outcomes and targets, improving the area and adding value, although it was unclear

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whether the gains could be sustained (NEM, 2006: 2-­4). As the report concluded ‘there is still a long way to go before the area is transformed and NEM and its partners do need to do some things better or differently in future if the gains that have been made so far are to be sustained’ (NEM, 2006: 50). The report argued that the same criteria should be used for judging future regeneration vehicles. In considering the issue of ‘deadweight’, it concluded that NEM had added value, engaged the private sector, conducted effective partnership working and secured resources from outside and inside the URC area, although it also had further to go to make it an automatic investment area. It was to be commended for establishing a housing market and for increasing house prices to make them closer to the Manchester average (NEM, 2006: 15, 35). The overall balance sheet was that NEM had performed well against the Government’s definition of a successful URC. URCs were distinctive in adapting to particular local needs. These were translated into aspirations in the SRF, which offered yardsticks against which success could be measured. The more specific goals were discussed in Chapter 4 but in summary they were to increase the population of east Manchester by 30,000, to build 12,500 new homes, to improve 7,000 existing homes, to develop a 160 ha new business park, to complete the Sportcity complex of world-­class sporting facilities, to develop a new town centre, to develop an integrated public transport system and to raise educational attainment above the city average (NEM, 2006: 4). So far as the overall progress against targets was concerned, the outcomes were encouraging. The construction of new homes had begun slowly but by 2006 a cumulative total of 3,406 had been constructed and 1,500 new builds were expected in order that NEM could achieve its target by 2016. Since the recession, however, this target may be more difficult to achieve given that development of new homes has slowed–for example, between December 2010 and March 2012, only 262 homes had been constructed. The modernisation of homes had been achieved by the process of stock transfer. NEM was credited with having created 3,131 jobs by 2006 and the numbers employed had increased by 7.8% in the original NEM area and by 13.2% in the extended area. This shortfall, exacerbated by the recession, served to confirm NEM’s own recognition of ‘a risk that the progress of the last six years will slide back’ (NEM Board Minutes, 14/12/2006). By August 2011, east Manchester still had the highest rate of worklessness, with 24.2% of residents claiming out of work benefit compared to 17% in the city (MCC, 2012e). This necessitated stakeholders making a long-­term commitment and could explain MCC’s response to the revised SRF concerning the need for a long-­term regeneration strategy when it endorsed the framework to run until 2018 (MCC, 2007a). The methods adopted to judge the success of NEM included impact, the differential contribution of individual partners, added value and the attraction of overall resources. The report noted the work done to acquire and remediate the land for the establishment of Central Park and calculated that thirty-­nine jobs had been created and over 1,000 saved. NEM added value by making the case, engaging in negotia-



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tions especially with the major tenant Fujitsu and minimising project costs. While a business park would have emerged without NEM’s intervention it would have been ‘nothing like the same scale or quality of central park and NEM’s persuasion of NWDA to use its CPO powers ensured that the development was not piecemeal. The Chief Executive had unblocked problems and overseen critical negotiations which instilled private sector confidence’ (NEM, 2006: 6). The report praised the transformation resulting from Sportcity. We challenge, however, its claim that ‘the new town centre next to the sports and leisure facilities to increase retail provision and give the area a new focus has been crucial to the project’s success’ (NEM, 2006: 6). A major road, Ashton New Road, cuts between Sportcity and the town centre and the attractiveness, location and commercial success of the centre is ­questionable. The longitudinal surveys undertaken by Kwest, an independent, although Manchester-­based company, in 2002, 2005 and 2008, provide a source of information on the progress of east Manchester’s ABI. While technically these were initiated by NDC/Beacons rather than NEM they later covered the wider NEM area. The residents were surveyed as consumers about their attitudes to the regeneration process: 1,357 residents were interviewed and the accuracy level of the data ranged from ± 4.48% in the NDC/Beacons’ area to ± 5.95% in Gorton. The results indicate progress and satisfaction among residents against the 1999 baseline. Once again the problem of differentiating the original as against the extended boundary area was encountered, as only the last two surveys included the wider area. The area was perceived to have improved, but with four provisos. The first is methodological, in that the respondents differed each time (as a panel survey would not have been feasible given population transience), and the questions were not identical. In particular, it is difficult to trace unemployment levels or dependency on benefits, as the questions on this issue altered in the three surveys. The other three provisos relate to substance. First, there was a disparity between the improvement displayed in the original NDC/Beacons and Ancoats area and that in Gorton and Newton Heath. Secondly there were geographical disparities in the responses even between the original neighbourhoods, although the precise nature of these differences was not consistent. Finally, the progress was not entirely linear. The biggest gains came between 1999 and 2002, and to a lesser degree between 2002 and 2005, but tailed off between 2005 and 2008. Ultimately it is the view of residents in the final report in 2008 which is most significant. The most meaningful conclusion is that residents felt that their area ‘is changing for the better’, although again the improvement had been front-­loaded (NEM, 2008: 1). In 1999 in the NDC/Beacons’ area only 17% felt that their area was getting better, as against 52% in 2002 and 60% in 2005 (NEM, 2005: 20). By 2008 the detailed figures were 44% judging the area was getting better, 22.5% responding it was staying the same and 28.4% claiming it was getting worse. The similar question, three years earlier in 2005, had suggested that 64% were happy with their local

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neighbourhood, which suggested a minor, if not statistically significant, decline between 2005 and 2008. Such improvement as there was appeared to have occurred in the original NEM area. Satisfaction with the neighbourhoods, in which people lived levelled off between 2005 and 2008. These results demonstrate limited enthusiasm, although the percentage of residents who were satisfied with the local area as a place to live improved steadily from 65.9% in 2009 to 69.9% in 2011 although this compared negatively to the Manchester percentage of 77.1% (MCC, 2012e). Nor did the Kwest results suggest a major improvement in living standards in the area. Only a fifth of residents had a savings account in 2008, which represented a drop since 2005, when the figure had been 26% (NEM, 2005: 47), and nine out of ten of those who possessed such an account had less than £100 deposited. Four out of ten households received earnings from employment and six out of ten were not in receipt of any state benefits so there was some improvement from 2005 when a majority of residents were in receipt of state benefits and allowances and regarded them as their main source of income (NEM, 2008: 6). By 2011/2012, however, residents’ median income for all the wards in east Manchester remained below the Manchester average of £23,657 although Ancoats and Clayton were the closest, at £22,811, and Miles Platting and Newton Heath were the furthest, at £19,738 (MCC, 2012e). The difficulty of regenerating east Manchester is underlined by the statistic that even by 2008 a third of residents said that the overall reputation of the area and the quality of shops and local facilities had got worse. This disappointing result was partly compensated by positive responses about the area’s appearance and improved transport links, which had increased between 2005 and 2008 when a high level of satisfaction was registered. In response to the question about transport links in 2008, 33% recognised improvements against 11% who reported a decline. In 2005 there was a little improvement in resident perceptions on housing compared to 2002, with 80% expressing overall satisfaction with their property and a significant increase in those aspiring to buy their own home (NEM, 2005: 39). On the appearance of the area by 2008, 45% of respondents reacted favourably as against 29% who perceived a deterioration. With regard to the quality of local shops and facilities, a higher percentage perceived a decline (33%) than an improvement (27%). Yet it was the response to the reputation of the area which was most disappointing, with the largest group of 41% believing that the situation was stagnant as against 22% arguing that it had been enhanced and as many as 37% that it had deteriorated (NEM, 2008: 14). The most positive views in 2008 were expressed about schools and health care, as few thought that these aspects required further improvement. Evaluating the ‘added value’ of NEM and NDC/Beacons is difficult given the funding available through New Labour’s Building Schools for the Future programme, but NEM’s co-­ordinating role and NDC/Beacons’ emphasis on community meant that greater attention was paid to providing community facilities in schools than would otherwise have been the case. In the case of health, one in three had long-­standing health problems, a figure which was little changed from that of



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30% in 2005, but in terms of mental health 73% of residents did not feel anxious or depressed in 2005. Lifestyle behaviour in 2005 was also favourable, with half of those surveyed eating at least six portions of fruit or vegetables weekly, only 40% smoking and the majority of those aspiring to give it up, and 44% not indulging in alcohol (NEM, 2005: 45). Yet education, transport and health are policy domains that for much of the time after 1999 structures other than NEM and NDC/Beacons were responsible, although HAZ and EAZ were absorbed into the regeneration initiative. There were three areas where the need for improvement was thought most necessary in both 2005 and 2008. They were ‘facilities for young people’, ‘the general level of crime and anti-­social behaviour’ and ‘local shops and supermarkets’ (NEM, 2008: 170). In 2005 40% of residents felt safer than in 2002 but this was most marked in the original NDC/Beacons and Ancoats area, possibly because of the Warden scheme. The concerns about anti-­social behaviour remained strong, with particular mention of abusive language and noise levels. The finding on crime and anti-­social behaviour was consistently negative and supported by an NEM official, who was uniformly positive about NEM’s and NDC’s work but in 2008 argued that crime and anti-­social behaviour was undermining all that had been achieved (Interview, 12/05/2008). This conflicted with research undertaken in other ABIs where crime had declined and residents’ perceptions of crime had also improved (Coleman, 2004) and also with the final evaluation of NDC/Beacons, referred to earlier, which argued that the situation on crime had improved, although it remained fluid. Once more the importance of when a ‘snapshot’ is taken is underlined. The better summative judgement must be in 2010, when Ekosgen concluded that despite remaining pockets of crime hotspots such as Higher Openshaw, reductions in both actual and perceived crime and a more visible neighbourhood approach to policing ‘have generated greater trust and respect between residents and the police than existed in the late 1990s’ (Roberts, 2010: 34). Nevertheless, crime rates in the NDC/Beacons’ area remained higher than both Manchester and nationally, so demonstrating the ongoing scale of the challenge. The Kwest resident surveys yield useful data. As the 2005 report expressed it, the NEM team can draw general satisfaction (NEM, 2005: 6). Yet progress has been jagged, the initial impact from 1999 to 2002 was when much of the advance occurred, issues like crime and anti-­social behaviour remained problematical and the gains were unevenly achieved with a question over the wisdom of extending the boundaries and adding the HMRP well into the project External recognition East Manchester also received awards which should be acknowledged, most notably the accolade of the regeneration agency of the year for 2007, in the first-­ever awards given by the Regeneration and Renewal on-­line journal. At the event at which

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NEM was presented with the award, there was also the presentation of the prize of top training agency to NEM for its regeneration assistants project (NWDA, 2007). Other awards included the Institute of Structural Engineers’ Special Award for 2003 and the Business Insider Award for regeneration, including Sportcity (NEM Board Meeting, 17/09/2003). The new Roundhouse Centre obtained two awards in 2010 from RIBA and RICS, respectively. The Institute of Monetary Advisers recognised NEM as Debt Counsellors of the year in 2010. The Waterways Trust named NEM twice, once in 2009 and again in 2006 for its Waterways Regeneration Award. In 2009, NEM won the Landscape Institute Award for the design and masterplanning of the Ancoats Public Realm. The AC recognised Eastlands as one of the top ten HAs. Eastserve was awarded the Intelligent Communities’ Award in 2006. The Considerate Constructors’ Award went to NEM in 2008 for its work in Beswick. In 2003 the British Urban Regeneration Association (BURA) award for an outstanding contribution to regeneration was allocated to NEM for its work on Sportcity and the Ashton Canal, and in the same year the Royal Town Planning Institute (RTPI) for the North-­West presented NEM with the award for an urban regeneration project which made a difference. (www.east-­manchester.com/awards/index. htm). National government also distinguished NEM and NDC as contributing towards securing Manchester the title of ‘Regeneration Capital’ (BBC, 2006). At an individual level, the NEM’s Company Secretary Bernstein was knighted for his service to the city, partly for his key role in east Manchester (MEN, 2002). A local activist, Elaine Wright, was awarded an MBE for her services to the area (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 22/10/2007) and Tom Russell was shortlisted for the Individual Contribution to Regeneration award (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 22/07/2008). Conclusion A number of harsh judgements have been delivered by academics on the east Manchester initiative which have not sufficiently understood the spatial constraints. For example, the view that east Manchester became ‘the most “policy-­thick” area in Britain, something which has made it a rather unreal place, the creation of the imagination of local and regional politicians rather than of local communities’, makes a grounded evaluation even more difficult (Ward, 2003: 123). The improvements which have been achieved are inescapable, although NEM is prone to publishing evaluative data itself, to affect the way in which positive results are fed into the political arena and stating the need for an assertive ‘selling’ of east Manchester (NEM, Board Meeting, 21/11/2007). Added to caution on this presentational matter, we consider the scale of the progress achieved against cost, disruption and deadweight factors. Many of the aims of the 2000 SRF have been accomplished, although the aim of increasing the population substantially was unobtainable in the short term and the unemployment rate has gone back to where it was in 2002 (NEM



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Board Meeting, 18/11/2010). This demonstrates the problem of setting fixed targets against changing circumstances, and the recession of 2008 put paid to employment and housing targets. Yet even if the outcome is mixed, east Manchester could scarcely have been left to decline further. The situation in the late 1990s has been described, but the anguish of residents is sufficient to explain why intervention was needed. The decline was such that an area-­based approach possessed rationality to ­policy-­makers and the protests by residents made a response politically imperative. Evaluation is difficult but NEM, NDC/Beacons and MCC commissioned evaluative research and, invigorated by the results, used them to enhance their project. Despite ambivalent evaluative criteria, the methodological problems in undertaking this type of research and the complex structural landscape in east Manchester, it is apparent that the area was improved, although it has not been transformed. A complete transformation was never feasible given the spatial and temporal constraints. The impact of regeneration has not been consistent, with some indicators being more favourable than others. Unemployment remains unsatisfactory, although credit should be given to those jobs directly created through the regeneration process in construction, the Ehtiad Stadium, supermarket development and even the creation of regeneration apprentices in NEM itself. The indicators sometimes require more drilling down than is provided–for example, gender-­specific evidence has not been gathered, even though women tended to be more active than men among residents. Yet the charge that marginal age groups like children and older citizens are neglected (Brownhill 2000; Gosling, 2008: 607–626) is unjustified, as there were particular projects such as the Generation Project and Recycled Teenagers which addressed the needs of older people, and the construction of schools and the encouragement of SureStart to support children shows the inclusion of these groups. In the same way, improved house prices had been welcome for the NEM officials and some residents because of their anger at the value of their houses collapsing before 1999. Yet even NEM officials were worried that house prices were being inflated due to speculation rather than genuine demand. Other residents who were among the losers had their houses demolished and found the replacement properties beyond their means. The promotion of gentrification fulfilled an aspiration to attract new, prosperous residents to reduce the stigma associated with east Manchester, but some feared being dispelled from the area by young professionals. Some long-­term residents also argued that having prosperous and poor people living in close proximity highlighted the disadvantage that poorer residents already felt. Nor had NEM and MCC achieved a great deal for the high number of private tenants. The scheme which MCC promoted to become national legislation, the RSL licensing of private landlords, did not produce the anticipated results. While NEM was not indifferent to these issues they were less glamorous to handle than new-­build accommodation or the stock transfer of social housing. Unfortunately, the transient nature of the investment generated by ABIs has

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been exacerbated by reductions in public spending and the new structural landscape. The exceptional compensation for east Manchester which is flowing from MCFC’s intention to be at the heart of continuing regeneration may ensure a continuity which would otherwise have lapsed. Also, house building has not completely ceased in east Manchester. Even with MCFC’s contribution, however, full sustainability is difficult to envisage. A definitive evaluation of the MCFC-­related project is premature, but NEM and MCC officials are highly enthusiastic. One proviso is required. The heart of the regeneration initiative in east Manchester tended to be in the neighbourhoods close to the Commonwealth Games Stadium, which also reinforced the impact of the NDC/Beacons’ and NEM work in those same districts in the early years, and again the main beneficiaries of the MCFC project are likely to be unevenly spread. One recommendation from the evaluations between 1999 and 2012, therefore, is that the focus of most future investment in east Manchester, other than that provided by the Abu Dhabi-­based owners of MCFC, should include Gorton and Newton Heath. When evaluations are conducted in east Manchester in 2020 it may well be that the positive indicators will be reversed. As one expert expressed it ‘nobody can doubt that [since the 2010 General Election], there has been “a seismic shift in the funding environment for regeneration”’ (Branson, 2011). The same observer asserted that the demise of funding arrangements was leading to a widening gap in economic outputs between the north and south of the country. Examples of the impact of reduced funding are that the numbers of police are falling, the Warden experiment has ended and as well as these front-­line jobs disappearing the nEM office is a place where residents no longer feel welcome. Some regeneration experts predict that the riots of August 2011 are likely to recur if community cohesion reduces (Hann, 2011). A more diverse population and a re-­balancing of tenure towards home ownership was seen as improving social interaction, uplifting the area and exerting pressure for better local services, but the arrival of new residents appears limited. The most methodologically sound and balanced evaluations which have been undertaken are the mid-­term evaluation of NEM in 2006 and the review of NDC/ Beacons in 2010. They point to an area remaining blighted, a problem of sustainability which underlines the temporally confined nature of all evaluations, but note the considerable successes achieved in reviving a deprived area of Manchester by, respectively, 2006 and 2010. The interim evaluation in 2006 was convincing in arguing that the, ‘NEM rock is half way up the hill . . . If support is not maintained it could just as easily roll back down the hill as reach the sunny uplands’ (NEM Board Meeting, 03/10/2006). ABIs can work but they should not be aborted in those cases where evaluation suggests progress is being achieved. There is a danger of ‘little evidence of learning from the extensive and detailed evaluations of regeneration practice in the past two decades’ (Brown, 2011b). Ultimately, scepticism is justified about these exercises, however, without an analysis of whether they achieve ‘bang for their bucks’ and that is impossible to evaluate. Some regeneration professionals



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regard the plethora of structures which New Labour established for urban regeneration as wasteful, but they also acknowledge that the withdrawal of funds and interest by the Coalition Government is not the answer (Interviews, 16/12/2010). The improvements in east Manchester might suggest that ABIs should be continued but that two dualisms should be overcome. First, national and local programmes should coincide, as local initiatives lack the capacity to solve deep-­rooted social inequalities and national government lacks the detailed local knowledge to respond to the spatial issues; second, that both people and places, or individual and neighbourhood needs, must be addressed. There is also the basic issue of measuring absolute improvement against relative performance and in all political projects there will be winners and losers. ABIs can never provide a fully equitable experience for all.

The ideology of urban regeneration initiatives

6 The ideology of urban regeneration initiatives

The creation of NEM and its role in working with regeneration partners was no isolated whim, but was related to the ideological climate of British politics in the 1990s and specifically to New Labour’s political goals. Since Britain remains a relatively centralised state it is essential to include an excursus upon the ideological intentions of national policy-­makers in this central aspect of public policy. In addressing this, it is desirable to consider the ideological motivations of New Labour in establishing NEM and NDC/Beacons, together with an account of the ideological approach of the Coalition Government which has led to NEM becoming a mere ‘brand name’ and simply one of various regeneration projects across Greater Manchester. The chapter concludes with a discussion of the ideological basis of the way in which regeneration policy is mediated by MCC. To illuminate this, we offer an interpretation of the term ‘Manchester Labour’. ­ The inevitability of ideology Some, including many active in politics, are reluctant to discuss ideology, regard it pejoratively and deny its role in policy-­making. It is often considered extremist, dogmatic, truth-­excluding and manipulative (Seliger, 1976:29–62). ­Common-­sense and evidence-­based empiricism are assumed to be the basis of governmental decision-­ making. A senior civil servant denied the existence of ideology in government, arguing that policy-­making is rational and evidence-­based; his greatest concession was that there were occasional ministerial whims (Interview, 11/10/2011). Some politicians claim that policy-­making is pragmatic, concerned with results– ‘what works–’ and shaped by circumstances and negotiation between conflicting interests (Heywood, 2012: 72). While it would be equally unrealistic to disregard pseudo-­ rational elements in the policy-­making process, and naïve to disregard electoral



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motives, all policy decisions are rooted in political and social values. The view that pragmatism can replace ideology rests on the implausible idea that ideology can end. Even an assumption that broad neo-­liberal principles prevail within a pragmatic approach neglects the impure outcomes that can result (McLellan, 1995: 78). Some decline in revolutionary politics in the West in favour of a more civil approach does not signify the ending of ideology (Seliger, 1976: 46–47). Ideology should be defined inclusively so that all political values are conceived as ideological. There is a superficial attraction in Marx’s conception that only those ideas which conceal the contradictions in society in the interests of the ruling class constitute ideology (Larrain, 1979: 210). This definition, however, ignores the fact that politics is a field of contestation in which power relations are both sustained and challenged (Thompson, 1990: 10). All political decisions have an orientation towards the status quo and so policies which reaffirm, modify or overthrow it are equally ideological. Had New Labour, for example, perpetuated the Major Government’s urban policies that would have been as much an ideological choice as a desire to extend or abandon them. Equally, the Coalition Government’s willingness to replace New Labour’s urban regeneration strategy has ideological roots. The promotion of individualistic, collectivist or partnership strategies for tackling urban regeneration are all ideological. Even during the 1990s, when the approaches between Major and Blair on regeneration were similar, this represented ideological convergence rather than an absence of ideology. For successive governments to share a perspective that public–private partnerships (PPPs) are the way to address economic and social decline is itself an ideological policy stance. Ideology is about rejections as well as positive precepts. Regardless of the precise approach of any government to urban problems, to reject a dirigiste method of dealing with urban issues is as ideological as it is to advance such methods. All such ideologies offer an account of circumstances as they are, advance a model of how they should be and explain what, if anything, should be done (Heywood, 2012: 11). Policy-­makers believe that their policies are not ideologically driven but are merely ­evidence-­based, although they consider the electoral consequences of their decisions. Yet, patently, they operate within a framework of values, even when these value-­judgements are not articulated. It is enticing to categorise the ideological impulse behind the urban regeneration policies of all governments since 1997 as neo-­liberal. Writers such as Stuart Hall would subscribe to the argument that both the role of NEM and the different emphasis in policy since the election of the Coalition Government can be encompassed within the tenets of neo-­liberalism. There are grounds for arguing that there has been a cross-­party movement away from Keynesian and welfare state policies in the post-­war era and to that extent Hall is correct, and he would also recognise that neo-­liberalism is not entirely homogeneous and that it develops and diversifies (Hall, 2011: 12). Yet Hall’s interpretation is problematic. First it confuses n­ eo-­liberalism with classical liberalism. Classical liberalism is about weak

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government, the ­individual, the free market and international free trade, while neo-­ liberalism is a post-­1970s reaction which emphasises privatisation, deregulation and market fundamentalism, including the use of market mechanisms in the public sector and the free flow of capital (Berry, 2011: 5–8). Secondly, this chapter asserts that ‘neo-­liberal’ is an unsatisfactory term to encompass the totality of British urban policy from the early 1990s to 2013, unless applied in a Procrustean manner. ‘Neo-­ liberal’ is a reductive term, which sacrifices the policy nuances between the British political parties. New Labour, ideology and urban regeneration New Labour was ideologically pluralist and was devised to attract the voters of ‘middle England’ (Campbell, 2007: 14–19). Pro-­free market and interventionist, top down but embracing active citizens, neither traditionally left-­wing nor right-­wing, ABIs and the east Manchester initiative were quintessentially New Labour. The use of ABIs, which were hybrid in character, left open the question of whether it was the market, the state or the local community which had degenerated. A concentration on the regeneration of deprived, economically underperforming and spatially confined parts of urban Britain was an appropriate policy, therefore, to express New Labour’s ideological purposes. It is curious that some of the main monographs on Blair and New Labour fail to mention this preoccupation, and Blair’s autobiography has only one reference.1 Yet Blair and other ministers made frequent visits to observe and promote the east Manchester project, and Peter Mandelson considered urban policy to be central to New Labour. Blair launched New Labour in his 1994 speech to the Labour Party Annual Conference, when he referred to ‘New Labour, New Britain’ (Blair, 1994). New Labour assumed that established social democracy was incompatible with globalisation. It is possible to identify different interpretations of the relationship between globalisation and traditional social democratic ideology at an abstract level, but they essentially claim that social democracy at the state level is defunct and that progressive politics depends on adopting a globalist approach. Social democracy has always been adaptable and seeks out pretexts to deny the contradiction between capital and labour. A related element in New Labour’s thinking was the acceptance of the concept of the ’glocal’, requiring countries to promote economic competitiveness but less through national planning and more by locally focused efforts of public–private collaboration. New Labour revealed little appetite for state economic planning and its ‘brand of intervention extended only to micro-­economic policy’ (Berry, 2011: 200) It is debatable whether New Labour’s conversion to aspects of neo-­liberalism was a cause or consequence of its accepting the imperatives of economic globalisation. 1

  There is no reference in Blair (2010); Bryson and Fisher (2011); Seldon (2007).



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It is argued that a mélange of ideas and values underpinned such initiatives as the regeneration of east Manchester. This is not an issue confined to New Labour, as ideology always contains contradictory elements (Eagleton, 1991: 222). There was an element of simple continuity with the policies of the Major Government for pragmatic reasons and this led to an incrementalist approach which had the advantage of providing reassurance to the electorate and major interests in society, symbolised by New Labour’s commitment to maintaining the previous government’s spending plans during their first two years in office (Butler and Kavanagh, 1997: 49). The AC was only slightly exaggerating when it asserted that New Labour’s urban policy was not ‘a radical departure’ from previous policy since ‘for many at the local level it appears to mean “more of the same”’ (AC, 2002: 10). A related idea was New Labour’s aspiration to capture the centre ground of British politics. New Labour was influenced by the arguments of the ‘Third Way’ (Giddens, 1999). This centrist political strategy involved the simultaneous embracing of social reform and the free market; for New Labour, it was a sustainable hybrid. Urban regeneration policies implemented through ABIs involved a mix of the private and the public, as the Third Way advocated. Yet the policies could also draw elements from the social democratic tradition by addressing poverty and deprivation and by seeking to narrow the gap between the wealthiest and the most deprived urban areas. Holistic conceptions of urban regeneration were ideal to endorse Blair’s view about the simultaneous pursuit of economic growth and social justice as they focused on both economic and social goals. This enabled New Labour to build on the ethical traditions of social democracy in the context of a mixed and managerialist economy. ABIs could also simultaneously promote the interests of disadvantaged residents and yet, through the ostensibly progressive method of community engagement, pass responsibility for improving the well-­being of these same people partly to themselves. Giddens (1999: 88) referred to ‘the freedom to achieve’. Much of the ethos underpinning the NDC initiative was about people identifying their own problems and solutions. The spirit of such initiatives was less about helping the deprived but more about raising aspirations and fulfilling the Blairite vision of equality of opportunity rather than equality of outcomes. The inclusion of combating crime as a major objective in east Manchester also coalesced with the ideology of New Labour. In a regeneration area an emphasis on combating crime and a­ nti-­social behaviour matched both aspects of Blair’s ‘tough on crime and tough on the causes of crime’ soundbite, and retrieved law and order as a Labour issue while reasonably claiming that it is the poorest in society who gain most from the reduction of crime. New Labour also considered that its task was to remove barriers to the success of local communities and crime, like low skills levels, constituted such barriers (Kearns, 2003: 53). Yet New Labour’s ideological development in seeking out centrist, third-­way politics was eclectic. It drew from stakeholding, which was promoted by the creation of partnerships which embraced public, private and voluntary sectors and

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professionals and residents and the local, regional and national arms of the state. At its simplest, the idea was that in a stakeholder society everybody feels part both of society and of the community in which they live (Jones, 2007: 143).The ideas of stakeholding waned after 1997 but a penchant for partnerships, as exemplified in NDC/Beacons and NEM, continued. Will Hutton argued for economic and social stakeholding, the management of markets, a welfare state and social citizenship (Hutton, 1996: 341). Modernisation was another idea which avoided socialist associations but sounded progressive. Blair was keen to promote modernisation, and ABIs conveniently combined programmes to reform local government with apparently non-­Old Labour centralist solutions. New Labour also wanted to provide local government with a greater role than simply being a local version of central government, but only on condition that it signed up to the modernising agenda (Cochrane, 1993: 116). Participation in ABIs enabled local government to signal its commitment to modernisation. As part of New Labour’s desire to differentiate itself from Old Labour, it committed to evidence-­based policy-­making. For this reason New Labour ministers had a vested interest in visiting their urban ABIs for evidence to reaffirm their commitment (Figure 6.1). From a socialist perspective, therefore, New Labour degenerated into a

6.1  Tony Blair meets residents



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loosely social democratic approach which involved an uneasy marriage between Thatcherite neo-­liberal economics and a concern with social exclusion or, as Blair expressed it, a combined pursuit of equity and economic efficiency (Hinnfors, 2006: 5). Yet there was a need for New Labour to demonstrate differentiation with earlier Conservative urban polices and so it shifted the balance between physical renewal and economic growth towards assisting deprived people and communities. Some even argue that while the previous Conservative Government had focused on regeneration as a means of combating degeneration, New Labour aimed more positively at an urban renaissance which, instead of stressing economic growth and property development by the private sector, aimed to combine public and private sectors to re-­invigorate cities to make them more environmentally sustainable places to live. The attack was on the malaise of city life and not simply its degeneration and this had consequences for inclusion, wealth creation, health, welfare, crime and design (Hastings, 2003: 66). It also suggests that the shift towards an urban renaissance involved the state-­led gentrification of neighbourhoods, or a ‘cappucino cave-­in’ (Hastings, 2003: 66), although there is a notable lack of coffee shops in east Manchester today. New Labour’s ideological pluralism can be portrayed as an example of a ‘thin’ ideology in which ideas lack overall theoretical coherence. A better interpretation is that New Labour was a conventional ideology in which, in Freeden’s (1996) characterisation, there is a mix of core, adjacent and peripheral concepts, which collectively retain tenuous links with social democracy. Having won office by an electoral landslide in 1997, New Labour’s focus shifted to achieving continuing electoral success. Ideological eclecticism was a means to achieve this end and urban regeneration initiatives were a ‘third leg’ to complement New Labour’s commitment to both market and state. The remnants of New Labour’s social democratic policies were evident in Blair’s commitment to benefiting ‘the many not the few’. Yet simultaneously it accepted that the private sector was the means to create wealth and that central and local government should co-­operate with business. Furthermore, New Labour’s conception of the public services was that they required reform and should provide value for money. While New Labour ministers referred to modernisation rather than to post-­modernism, they evinced the post-­modernist idea that the boundaries between public and private had blurred to the point where partnership politics was the favoured modus operandi. New Labour considered that a partnership between business interests, the local state, the voluntary sector and local people was the optimum way to revive declining inner cities and that there was no contradiction between promoting economic growth through enticing the private sector and simultaneously combating poverty. Regeneration structures addressed both ­objectives. The economic and social objectives for urban regeneration policies were stated in the Rogers Report (DETR, 1999), which New Labour commissioned, and the URCs, which were its concrete outcome, intended to ‘co-­ordinate investment plans

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from both the public and private sectors, and attract new investment’ through the ‘imaginative’ methods they were equipped to employ (http://webarchive.nation alarchives.gov.uk/20110201224230/http://www.urcs-­online.co.uk/companies/, accessed 08/01/2010). By 2008 URCs had proclaimed their success in attracting £18.6 bn of investment (URC, 2008). It was apparent in the Rogers Report and New Labour’s subsequent White Paper that the stakeholders of local and central government, and the private and voluntary sectors were crucial (DETR, 1999). Another major New Labour regeneration intervention, the HMRP, a key funding stream in east Manchester, also aimed at facilitating a housing market. The Treasury’s concern was clear and it was evidently the leading stakeholder as New Labour’s aim was that the regenerated citizen was not simply a contented individual but a good consumer. However, one regeneration expert commented that the HMRP was an Old Labour product and came from Old Labour councils along the M62 (Interview, 03/02/2012). For some commentators the abandonment of Old Labour was compensated by New Labour’s adoption of Communitarianism (Driver and Martell, 1997: 27). The problem with this view is that Communitarian thought is amorphous and includes many varieties. Prima facie there are strong grounds for claiming that New Labour’s urban regeneration policies are derived from Communitarian thought because of the focus on communities of place, the invocation of local partnerships, the desire to activate residents and even the title of initiatives such as New Deal for Communities. Hale asserts that New Labour’s policies are not Communitarian. She acknowledges the multiplicity of Communitarian theories but argues that New Labour’s policies are not compatible with any of them (Hale, 2006). Her argument neglects the fact that New Labour produced a distorted type of Communitarianism which drew eclectically and uncomprehendingly from Communitarian thinkers and that New Labour practised a form of liberal Communitarianism. She convincingly claims that New Labour’s policies were authoritarian, with an emphasis upon responsibilities alongside rights and on community as a ‘force to make people aware of their reciprocal responsibilities as citizens’ (Hale, 2006: 78). While she cites ‘welfare to work’ as an example, she does not examine urban regeneration initiatives, where it might be possible to detect a more genuine Communitarian element. She could also discover, however, in east Manchester, evidence of efforts to create responsibility in both individual and community behaviour which demonstrate the divergence between the actual views of Communitarian thinkers and the practice of New Labour. It is not argued that Communitarianism is at the core of New Labour’s ideology, it is rather an ‘adjacent’ concept which has the merit of substituting community for the concept of class (Hall, 2011: 15). The argument that New Labour’s urban regeneration was essentially a product of Communitarian theories, which guides such major studies as those of Imrie and Raco (2003), is over-­played. They disregard the fact that community can be used so that people who live close to each other



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can come together for constructive purposes and in a fixed social, spatial functionally bounded area, often an established administrative unit. A further case can be advanced, as the behaviour of people in a neighbourhood affects everyone else who lives there and householders depend on the actions of others for the prestige value of their street and so ‘an efficient allocation of property rights would require all property owners in the street to have a claim on the value of every other property’ (Webster, 2003: 2065). Communitarianism is not a provocative word to the political mainstream, but still carries a sense of the collective to help legitimise the role of regeneration professionals and business interests. The focus on communities was about adopting a geographical area in which to apply a technocratic solution while facilitating an element of community self-­actualisation. The claim that the east Manchester ABI was truly Communitarian is challenged by the suggestion that the policy was pursued, ‘on terms which have already been defined and set outside the community’ (Diamond, 2001: 277). The stress on the role that the local community should perform had the additional benefit of neglecting the roots of deprivation, and diverting attention away from the underlying issues by compensatory activity (Ho, 1999: 242). This was not a new device as ‘renewal projects have long served the purpose of keeping housing problems in check’ (Hubbard, 2000: 38). A New Labour ideological perspective, not always popular with community professionals, is the encouragement of Faith Communities (Cabinet Office, 2001: 52). These groups were praised by the Rowntree Foundation because of their support for poor communities and particularly for ‘people living on the edge’ and because it was concerned that regeneration professionals, who commonly have secular liberal values, rebuff religious organisations (Farnell et. al., 2003: 11). Certainly in east Manchester the Reverend Tim Presswood was an active NEM Board member and the Reverend Roy Chow and the Reverend David Gray were engaged, if often critical of NEM in the early years of the initiative; an NEM official also considered the contribution of Faith Groups to be important (Interview, 04/09/2004). Their role was not central, however, but a view that faith groups contribute to community cohesion was espoused by New Labour and the Coalition Government alike. Blair’s theory of socialism stressed community, ‘a sense of mutual obligation and a recognition that people are social beings’ (Blair, 2010: 79). A leading New Labour thinker also provided support for the view that Communitarianism, or at least New Labour’s liberal version, was fundamental. Mandelson described ‘the deeply complex problems of urban and neighbourhood disintegration’, ‘the endemic fears that crime is rising and that criminals go unpunished’, and that ‘responsibility to others and common decency are under threat and that families are breaking down’. These problems undermined social cohesion and inclusion. In urging a culture of civic leadership and self-­help, Mandelson argued that the challenge was ‘to address not just the poverty of individual expectations for families trapped on welfare benefits, but the poverty of hope that comes from broken and demoralised communities’ (Mandelson, 2001: xxv). His claim that this policy marked a radical departure from

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the centralising policies of the past can be regarded as pious, but that one of the founders of New Labour chose to describe the policy as a distinguishing element of his Government cannot be disregarded. Yet there are characteristics of the policy which do affirm New Labour’s application of Communitarianism. It exploited the benefit of community when its Working Group on the Active Community promoted activity at a communal level (Cabinet Office, 2001). It also supported voluntary activity– and there were examples in east Manchester, such as clearing litter (NEMA, 01/10/2004)– as an economic resource and a socially worthwhile activity. New Labour was disinclined to regard deprived people and communities as hapless victims of society and regarded deprivation as partly self-­inflicted, a view that many traditional social democrats would regard as pathologising the poor. The Urban Programme of 1968 was an activist state solution by the Labour Party to address urban poverty. By the late 1980s, however, Thatcher assumed that the inadequacies of people in inner cities required self-­help (Crick, 1997: 334). Some argue that New Labour shared the conviction that urban communities contained many with individual deficiencies who were deviant (Imrie and Raco, 2003: 24), welfare dependent (Laurie and Bondi, 2006: 160) and culturally inferior (Burns, 2000: 965). The combination of Communitarian and neo-­liberal ideas is apparent: NEM and NDC/Beacons did their utmost to work with business and employers and a principal NEM aim was ‘to engage the private sector in a sustainable regeneration strategy’. However, they were also aiming to change local populations by programmes for the workless, active community engagement for residents to improve their own neighbourhoods, and raised educational standards and healthier living. The implication was that poverty was less the product of capitalist maldistribution but was an endemic phenomenon and the root causes were localised. In east Manchester, however, there was a consensus among the key players that the source of the problems lay in the de-­industrialisation of the 1970s and the resulting collapse of employment. It is important not to homogenise the views of all ministers, but there was a consensus that micro-­initiatives were necessary to solve the problems of social exclusion which involved people being encouraged to improve their own lives, assisted by an inter-­agency process of policy imple­mentation. New Labour’s version of Communitarian thought, with its emphasis on responsibility, bears a close relationship to governmentality. This is a more sinister version of New Labour’s use of Communitarian ideas, suggesting that urban regeneration has been about moral geography, a spatial approach to reforming social conduct and a diminution of the responsibility of the state for the individual. Governmentality is at the simplest level about managing people to act, think and behave as the political authorities would desire without a resort to force or coercion. The suggestion that ‘government at a distance’ can strengthen central and local government, albeit that it is practised through arms-­length structures such as NEM, is discussed in Chapter 7. It is a second application of the concept of governmentality which is relevant here,



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and which suggests that citizens can be enticed to behave and act in ways desired by the state, for example, by encouraging people to take responsibility for providing services for themselves (Isin, 2000). Foucault (1979) developed this conception of power, which refers not only to overtly coercive forms of power but to forms characterised by ‘techniques of normalisation and consensus’ which work ‘through the exercise of freedom’ (Abrahamsen, 2004: 159, cited in Blakeley, 2010: 131). Yet a more negative application of governmentality is discernible in the ­re-­moralisation of local people implicit in the creation of Anti-­Social Behaviour Orders (ASBOs), policing by wardens and good-­neighbour surveillance schemes, although NEM and NDC/Beacons’ officials deny this motivation. It is true that New Labour’s expectation that deprived residents should become active in solving their own problems is not demanded in more affluent suburbs. In prosperous parts of Manchester, voluntary work is about choice, while in east Manchester it has been about compensating for the deficiencies of mainstream public services upon which residents depend. In east Manchester, the burden is placed on an already multiply disadvantaged population. The good-­neighbour policy, and the award as ‘Good Neighbour of the Year’ in east Manchester are potentially examples of governmentality where people are invited to ‘snitch’, while in leafier suburbs Neighbourhood Watch schemes are about excluding intruders. It can be demanding to ask residents to ‘act as “eyes and ears” on their estates’ or ‘to keep diaries of what’s happening’ to address entrenched crime. It is also the case that consultants acquire fees and councillors allowances, while the poor are expected to simply donate their own time. Governmentality neglects the fact that residents are beneficiaries of improved investment and that there is no compulsion on their being active local citizens in order to gain from such improvements. It is also dangerous to intellectualise the motives of residents and policy-­makers alike. Both simply aim to provide ‘a decent place to live, somewhere kids can play and grow up safely and the buses to run on time’ (Interview, 31/03/2010). When General Secretary of the Trades Union Congress (TUC), John Monks, visited east Manchester in 2006, as a former resident, he praised the innovative work and argued that east Manchester ‘had a desperate twentieth century’ marked by depression, war and the exodus of businesses and the middle classes. From the 1970s to the 1990s ‘life here was very grim with low paid jobs’, but observing the changes in east Manchester in 2006 gave him ‘a very moving experience’ (NEMA, 07/072006). Yet government seeks more positivistic and quantifiable outcomes and Treasury-­inspired evaluations make it difficult entirely to dismiss the governmentality argument (Ho, 1999: 212–216). David Harvey (1973, 1982) suggests that urban regeneration is a global phenomenon which particularly addresses the needs of capitalism, and he regards cities as necessarily products to benefit elites and to dispossess the poor. He perceives regeneration through the prism of the entrepreneurial city which emphasises business investment and wealth creation, pursued competitively with other cities.

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This has become ‘the received wisdom’ on urban governance (Leary, 2008: 225). Citing the work of Engels, Harvey argues that the spatial structure of cities remains essentially unchanged and that the concentric patterns of city life remain linked to economic class. There remain similarities with ­nineteenth-­century Manchester as evidenced by the description that ‘all Manchester proper, all Salford and Hulme . . . are all unmixed working peoples’ quarters, stretching like a girdle, averaging a mile and a half in breadth, around the commercial district’ (Harvey, 1973: 132). The specific connection between the growth of capitalism and the emergence of the city is the requirement of capital to concentrate a large proletariat in urban centres (Harvey, 1982: 418). Harvey does not clarify whether city life simply reflects the inequalities of capitalism or whether it creates a new form of capitalist exploitation and concludes that there is a role for spatial considerations in the process of capital accumulation (Harvey, 1982: 242). It is valid to recognise that social processes are mediated in specific conditions, as while the city reflects wider social divisions the specific spatial conjunctures where these are played out matter (Saunders, 1986: 119–120). The city is a source of new inequalities, like those which result from the world of work, as some people cut their costs by living near work while others cannot, and some live near shops and parks while others live near gasworks and motorways. Two people, in short, cannot occupy the same space (Pahl, 1970). It is apparent that in east Manchester some are compelled to live near gasworks, derelict buildings and semi-­motorways such as Alan Turing Way, and suffer ‘positional disadvantage’, but the capacity of urban managers to ameliorate conditions is clear in the improvements to parks and the provision of shopping centres and community facilities. Harvey ultimately rejects an artificial split between the processes of work and production, on the one hand, and community and consumption, on the other, and urges the essential unity of both conflicts (Harvey, 1978: 35). Harvey develops a Marxist-­inspired theory about the role of space in capital accumulation. The relentless drive for profits leads capital to seek outlets for investment and when industry fails to provide sufficient opportunities capital seeks new outlets, such as property and urban infrastructure development. Echoing some contemporary ‘think tanks’ but in a critical mode, Harvey states that the ‘social geography shaped to capital’s needs at one moment in history is not necessarily consistent with later requirements’ (Harvey, 1982: 258). Yet the operation of market forces can be dismal for the poor and self-­defeating for capital as the price of land increases once new areas become a magnet for investment. Presciently, Harvey highlights the fictitious nature of the credit which can fuel such developments, and the unfortunate consequences include over-­investment, empty buildings, bankrupt cities, new urban wastelands and popular resistance (Harvey, 1978). East Manchester is not immune from Harvey’s criticism that when regeneration becomes associated with consumer wants the needs of residents are sidelined and regeneration acts to serve the needs of capital. The beneficiaries of regeneration, and its superficial manifestations such as smart apartments, are not for residents but for the exploitative inter-



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ests which control the process. The question of ‘whose cities?’, therefore, remains as valid in 2013 as in the 1840s. Harvey’s arguments can be challenged in east Manchester. At a theoretical level he omits human agency and assumes that everything is the product of the needs of capital, ignoring the fact that urban infrastructure, such as transport improvements and leisure centres, can be of enduring value, and that it is not always areas that are disadvantaged but the people who reside there. He also neglects the ‘relative autonomy of the state’ which, in responding to the needs of capital, is also more than a mere appendage. In arguing that the built environment is a central feature of contemporary capitalism he commits the ecological fallacy of assuming that spatial configurations are all-­determining, disregarding the role of urban managers. As Saunders (1986: 126) says, the state both manages the needs of private capital and has its own independent purposes. If Russell and McGonigle, for example, were fully aware of the need to incentivise capitalist developers, they also perceived the need to satisfy residents, recognising the possibility of popular resistance to the imposition of private capital in neighbourhoods. The views of residents are also important, and while recognising that their expectations were lower than those of residents in wealthier Didsbury, they did want their area rescuing from decline (Focus Group, 24/04/2006). Also, as well as responding to the interests of capital and the market, NEM and NDC/Beacons had to satisfy local and national levels of government, as they were structures operating within other structures. Local policy-­makers operate within the constraints of local and national public policy as well as the pressures from regional, national and international capitalism. In delivering jobs, houses, facilities, educational opportunities and lower crime rates, less illness and a cleaner environment, NEM and NDC/Beacons had an agenda other than simply responding to capital, even if the two are linked. Harvey might argue, however, that New Labour’s business-­friendly ethos, NEM’s mission to lever in private capital, the needs of capitalist property developers for new investment opportunities and the capacity to recruit from a more employment-­ready population delivered more to capital than to labour. Ultimately, the debate about whether a functionalist view that all parts of the programme in east Manchester coalesced for the benefit of the ‘many’ rather than the ‘few’ depends on individual judgement. MCC, NDC and NEM officials would deny the existence of a contradiction in their project, although they profess the difficulty of reconciling the ­multiple interests and stakeholders involved. Coalition Government, ideology and urban regeneration Those involved in Manchester politics refer to the ‘philosophical core’ which propels the Coalition Government (Interview, 10/04/2012). Certainly, its arrival changed policy on urban regeneration, with some claiming it resulted in a policy vacuum. The Liberal Democrat participation in government has had little evident

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impact; it was soon apparent that the centrality of deficit reduction ensured that the idea of an active and well-­resourced local state in partnership with private business, and launching holistic ABIs was contrary to the Government’s ideology. The new policy on urban regeneration was expressed in Regeneration to Enable Growth. This explicitly denied the virtue of top down ABIs, implicitly including the initiatives which the previous Conservative Government had introduced in favour of ‘community-­led regeneration’ (DCLG, 2011a, 2011b). This was part of the aim of weaning local government away from relying on central grants and of siphoning off state funding in favour of private sector investment. Yet in the private sector there is concern that the monies on offer are inadequate, and the view is expressed that the Coalition Government offers localism without public money (Fyson, 2011: 17). This distinctive ideological approach is suggested by the contrast with the policy of the Scottish Government, which announced £8 m funding for two of its six URCs to provide stability up to 2014 (Marrs, 2011b). Yet there is some policy confusion, with Government proclaiming the aim of shifting the impetus towards the private sector while claiming that it is still spending on cities. The Deputy Prime Minister, Nick Clegg, argues that his disagreement with the previous Government is not that they spent ‘well-­intentioned’ money on cities but that funds had ‘not all [been] well-­targeted and did not achieve value for money’ (Fyson, 2011: 17). The difference is that there is a consolidated growth fund for cities drawn from diverse Government departments, rather than earmarked funding. A further confusion is that the Housing Minister, Grant Shapps, differentiated the Government’s direct regeneration spending of approximately £4 bn from other expenditures which, while focused on economic growth, also indirectly promote regeneration (House of Commons, 2011: 26). The Coalition Government seeks to occupy a strategic role by providing incentives, removing barriers, reforming public services and targeting investment to strengthen the infrastructure for growth and regeneration, arguing that this represents the most effective means of supporting the most vulnerable. It aims to increase local control over public finance, enable the local pooling of previously ring-­fenced budgets and help communities to influence policy. Localism is promoted by setting up focused LEPs to encourage civic, business and voluntary sector organisations to drive economic growth. Government income streams are provided, such as the NHB, tax increment financing which funds infrastructure projects by borrowing against future revenue growth, £4.5 bn for new affordable homes, £2 bn for the Decent Homes programme, £1.3 bn for the HCA and a £1.4 bn RGF. This amounts to £20 bn central government investment in infrastructure to support regeneration. The claim for this strategy is to permit variation so that in some disadvantaged places the emphasis could be upon transport and community development, while in others the stress would be upon attracting employers and inward investment. The aim is to shift the power to drive regeneration to residents, civic and business leaders.



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This regeneration strategy represents an ideological shift, although Shapps claims three other motives for it. First, the policy is based upon an analysis of the failures of inherited policies. This is contestable: the relevant Parliamentary Select Committee criticised the Government for ignoring the evaluative lessons which could be drawn from existing policies and ‘in the feverish pursuit of change’ throwing ‘the baby out with the bathwater’. Second, regardless of its preferences, the Coalition Government is compelled to emphasise its deficit reduction strategy. Third, the policy had elements of continuity and bipartisanship because Ed Miliband had indicated before the General Election that cuts to the funding of urban regeneration would feature as part of Labour’s deficit reduction strategy (House of Commons, 2011). There are elements of a ‘phoney populism’ in supporting community projects given the absence of funding and of the necessary local political infrastructure to develop such projects. The Government’s invitation to Lord Heseltine to oversee the allocation of the RGF hinted at some suggestion of disagreements on regeneration policy among Conservatives. Some predict that his voice in favour of a more proactive policy and a readiness to understand the need for public finance to promote the housing market will ultimately prevail as the Government recognises that its existing tools are inadequate to foster economic growth (Interview, 10/04/2012), although Heseltine attempted to conceal disagreement when he appeared before the House of Commons Select Committee. His previous role as sponsor of the City Challenge initiative might support this prediction. In his evidence to the Committee, Heseltine appeared to disentangle economic growth from urban regeneration polices, although that separation was blurred by Shapps when he gave evidence to the same Committee. When Heseltine was asked about his current view of the regeneration initiatives he had supported in the 1990s, such as the regeneration of Hulme, he sought both to justify what he had done then and to argue that the time had come to move to a new approach. He argued that City Challenge was the high watermark of regeneration, and the Committee concurred, perhaps because its members had visited Hulme as an exemplar of ABIs. Heseltine argued that it was time to ‘move on’ and to emphasise the idea of directly elected mayors, although he sounded nostalgic about the previous policy focus on discrete underprivileged parts of cities. Unlike Shapps, he asserted that regeneration was about tackling uncompetitive parts of cities and stated that the RGF had no relationship to regeneration and could not compensate for the removal of the HMRP. He attempted to avoid opposing the Coalition Government by stressing that he had not read Regeneration to Enable Growth, and that out of government had no wish to create critical headlines. He had no answer to a Committee member’s comment that deprived parts of cities would not be supported by current policy and while prosperous parts might flourish, that would ‘leave the areas that are deprived just as they are’ (House of Commons, 2011: Questions 287–316). The consistency between the Heseltine regenerator of the 1980s and 1990s and his evidence to the Parliamentary committee

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in 2011 is his continuing commitment to economic competitiveness rather than the more socio-­economic focus of New Labour. The LEPs which the Coalition Government established allow for local ­government/business partnerships to bid for funds, but the scale of such income streams as RGF is small, although increased to £1 bn in 2011 (Gillman, 2010). This did not materially alter the Government’s faith in the capacity of the market and the private business sector to bring about economic renewal. The LEPs reject the Government policy of an elected mayor for Manchester, arguing that the post would bring no advantages to the city-­region and would be disruptive to the arrangement already in place for a GMCA (Smullian, 2012). Senior political figures in Manchester are sceptical of an elected mayor for the city but recognise the case for such a role for the wider city-­region (Interview, 10/04/2012), a view endorsed by other commentators who highlight the lack of a fit between elected mayors and ‘functional economic areas’ (Branson, 2012a). The Coalition Government, in abandoning centrally targeted ABIs, still professes a commitment to localism and encourages organisations which promote aspects of regeneration to seek out sources of income, whether from the state or charities, but with an emphasis upon private investment. There is evidence from east Manchester that private developers only invest when economic circumstances are favourable and where financial returns are likely. Investors are also more likely to respond when there are douceurs from the public sector to enhance profitability. Nowhere is this more evident than with the volume house builders in east Manchester. They could not be enticed until they were certain of the state’s commitment to regeneration, at which point they fell over themselves to gain a seat on the NEM Board (NEM Shadow Board Minutes and Meeting, 28/10/1999). Their enthusiasm for east Manchester lasted as long as the economic boom and government commitment endured and vanished once the recession hit and government commitment waned. The opportunities for private investment in east Manchester are unusual and again emphasise the importance of the spatial context, as with small-­scale investments such as the Hallé Orchestra in Ancoats and large-­scale investments such as the Etihad Stadium. Yet the direct impact on improving the daily lives of Mancunians can be questioned. The Coalition Government’s localism legislation plans to allow communities to build homes, shops and other facilities without traditional planning permission to encourage more building in areas requiring regeneration by removing obstacles, but there are objections to this as a means of assisting the most deprived. First, it is the state of the local economy and demand which determines private development, so changing planning laws does not alter those considerations. Second, developers left to themselves and without the steer of structures such as NEM will build profitable houses for wealthier clients rather than the more varied housing which occurred in east Manchester from 1999 to 2008 and the mixed housing which MCC favours. Third, developers will construct social



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housing only if funded and most of the 5 m people languishing on the housing list cannot be accommodated by this approach (Townsend, 2010a). The relationship between their proposals and the ideas of the Coalition appears in such ideological commitments as working with the grain of the market, reforming planning procedures and rejecting New Labour’s physical regeneration ABIs as rarely successful. The Centre for Cities proposes that urban regeneration policy should respond to economic circumstances and changing population levels, and that where decline occurs it is pointless to counteract market forces. To increase business space and housing where there is limited demand does not improve outcomes for residents. New Labour’s strategy of one-­size-­fits-­all and top down programmes failed. No city or part of a city is on a fixed growth or decline trajectory, but overall between 1971 and 2009 nearly 20% of England’s city-­regions lost population (Webber et al., 2010: Preface). It is futile to combat tides of change which shift people and economic activity away from areas (Webber et al., 2010: Executive Summary). The Centre for Cities advocated working with the new structures which the Coalition Government had established, but added that the LEPs should develop city-­region spatial development plans to identify areas of growth and urban blight. It urged the application of the pots of money which the Coalition Government was making available such as RGF, the NHB, the ERDF and HCA budgets to compensate for the abolition of the HMRP, and in the longer term set up a Transformation Fund which would be disbursed on the basis of need in response to competitive bidding in areas of urban decline. The NHB, ERDF and HCA monies should promote growth strategies in towns like Cambridge, Oxford, Reading and London, while the Transformation Fund would be for declining areas. The compatibility of the proposals with the attitudes of the Coalition Government was apparent because they did not increase public expenditure, as even the Transformation Fund was only proposed for 2014–2015 and the new funding streams should be directed to where they could enhance existing growth patterns. Citing Manchester, the Centre for Cities stated that the Industrial Revolution had occurred because housing grew up to sustain it. In the same way, public money should incentivise urban areas with high growth potential and Manchester had built too many houses in the Labour years to attract new residents. Yet the Centre had to respond to those evaluations which had supported the effectiveness of ABIs and offer solutions for the residents in areas of urban decline. In responding, it questioned the claim by the NAO that £3 had been generated for every £1 spent on regeneration projects, and accused the RDAs and many local authorities of an optimism bias. The Centre had to recognise that there had been successes, but preferred to stress DCLG research that under New Labour, in 48% of regeneration neighbourhoods, fewer than 40% of the jobs which had been sought were achieved. Instead, for those left behind in declining areas with few employability skills it proposed greening over land, extending gardens, demolishing houses and abandoning attempts to increase the population (Webber et al., 2010: 2–29). Land in deprived

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areas should be reconfigured to shift ‘plans from building a science park to creating a public park’ to improve the area for residents (Townsend, 2010b). The Centre for Cities convincingly questioned the ‘pervasive optimism bias’ of ABI projects, but displayed equal faith in its market-­led private sector strategy. The Policy Exchange, in Cities Unlimited, broadly endorsed this strategy (Leunig, Swaffield and Hartwich, 2007: 12). Given the sponsorship of leading Conservatives such as Francis Maude MP, the Cabinet Office Minister, this report is likely to have influenced the Party’s approach to regeneration. It endorsed the view that economic geography and market forces should be encouraged but instead of writing off the towns which had been the targets during the high tide of regeneration it proposed that regeneration monies be combined and given to powerful local authorities who would know how best to spend them (Leunig, Swaffield and Hartwich, 2007). It noted that Labour ministers represented inner-­city constituencies while Conservatives represented suburbs and rural areas, which explained the attempts by the Labour Government to buck the market. Local authorities in areas of decline could use their regeneration monies to help people to relocate, or just to make their localities greener. New Labour’s regeneration policy was expensive and failed to transform local housing markets. Waves of regeneration funding had not prevented such areas from losing 5% of their population in the period from 1997 to 2007 (Leunig, Swaffield and Hartwich, 2007: 11). Manchester had been the right place when Cotton was King but financial services had made London the country’s growth point. The Policy Exchange’s solution was to allow local authorities leeway in expenditure, overseen by their greater accountability to well-­informed citizens, by the extension of local powers, the oversight of the AC and vigilant local newspapers (Leunig, Swaffield and Hartwich, 2007: 61). The Coalition Government duly shifted its focus away from major schemes to locally led initiatives competing for centrally provided funds but some of those funding streams were likely, through the criteria for bids, to benefit the south-­east and the London mega-­region rather than ‘re-­balancing’ the economy (Marlow, 2011: 1). The only significant deviation of Coalition Government policy from the Policy Exchange’s recommendations was the removal of the RDAs when the report had urged that they be retained as advisers to local government (Leunig, Swaffield and Hartwich, 2007: 61). Yet there is some evidence that not all local authority officials mourn the loss of the NWDA, with senior officials in MCC describing it as ‘the custodian of Quality Street’ which spent ‘all its time handing out the toffees’ (Interview, 10/04/2012). Yet like all Governments the Coalition has to respond to events and the inadequate economic growth which was evident by the Autumn of 2011 led to the addition of an emergency GPF (DCLG and DT, 2011). While ostensibly couched in localist terms, it is a top down programme in which the funds are predetermined centrally rather than in response to local bids and is so loosely linked to any narrative that it comes across as ‘another piece of ad hoc patronage for LEPs from a government who is making it up as it goes along’ (Marlow, 2011: 1). The bias in the



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formula for allocating money is evidence of a pursuit of a London and south-­east orientation, as the London region commands around 40% of the funds (Marlow, 2011: 1). Much of the criticism of the new Coalition Government’s ideology can be challenged as coming from structures which had gained from New Labour’s polices, but they illuminate the nature of the change since 2010. The removal of the RDAs was driven by the Conservative Party component in the coalition.2 The RDAs argue that effective regeneration requires long-­term, well-­resourced, joined-­up, holistic and partnership-­based interventions to provide certainty. They argue that early business buy-­ins, incentivised by public sector investment in site assembly, ensures the delivery of projects which maximise private sector investment and returns. NWDA’s experience in east Manchester is suggested by the case of private sector collaboration in the Ancoats Regeneration programme which aimed to create a sustainable mixed-­use community which levered in around ‘£330 million of private sector investment on a return of £69 million invested by the NWDA’ (England’s Regional Development Agencies, 2011). More generally, RDAs experienced good relations with URCs in deprived areas to achieve transformational change. The biased nature of the RDAs’ evidence is apparent even when they question the localism agenda of the Coalition Government of which LEPs are an expression, because LEPs will need to work with national bodies and joint working across administrative boundaries is necessary to address infrastructural requirements (England’s Regional Development Agencies, 2011). Partnerships continue under the Coalition Government, but they are being fundamentally reconfigured. The Urban Renewal Officers’ Group (UROG) described the Coalition Government’s ideology as ‘blinkered’ for placing faith in locally driven growth with business and residents in the driving seat (UROG, 2011). It argued that the Coalition Government is neglecting housing needs in poor communities, and particularly the private sector housing stock where owners lack income to repair houses, and that local authorities are forced to curtail the RSL landlord accreditation schemes which were beginning to raise standards. While the east Manchester initiative was never simply housing-­oriented, it was in housing that UROG bewailed the neglect of cross-­tenure housing repair and improvement which would overlook the needs of vulnerable people and feared that unregulated private rented sector properties would have a deleterious effect on regeneration. Some smaller funds could be accessed, but UROG stressed their inadequacy compared to the withdrawal of multi-­million-­pound programmes such as the HMRP initiative and the RDAs (UROG, 2011). There was also criticism of the Coalition Government from more disinterested 2   When the Business secretary, Vince Cable, visited the north-­west in the first month of the life of the Government, he indicated that those RDAs which were in poorer areas would continue (Interview, 20/05/2010).

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sources. The Communities and Local Government House of Commons Select Committee deplored the ending of the HMRP. The Chair, Clive Betts MP, asserted that the £250 m which had been withdrawn left many people stranded occupying houses in areas of dereliction in abandoned streets (BBC, 2011b). More significantly, private sector companies such as Igloo, who were involved in sustainable regeneration projects, critiqued the Coalition Government’s policy and ideology. This is significant given the policy that the private sector should step in to take up the ‘slack’ left by the withdrawal of public money. Igloo’s Chief Executive argued that the ‘ball park’ figure of a reduction in government subsidisation of regeneration from £11 bn to £3 bn meant that the private sector would not be able to fill the gap for a long time. He argued that urban regeneration was needed where there was market failure, adding that the majority of those convicted for urban rioting and looting in the summer of 2011 were drawn from such deprived areas (BBC, 2011c). It might betray bias to suggest that City Challenge was the apogee of regeneration, given that even Conservative Party ‘think tanks’ describe the years until 2007 as the high tide of ABIs (Leunig, Swaffield and Hartwich, 2007: 21). The critics of the Coalition Government’s policies recognise the fundamental question: should sparse public monies be applied to the most competitive or the most deprived areas, or to those ‘middling’ neighbourhoods where decline can be most effectively addressed with a small intervention so as to become self-­sustaining? One critic asserts that the consensus favouring ABIs had ended but that the Coalition Government’s lack of understanding was revealed by ‘a raft of sometimes contradictory policies’ which favoured ‘wealthier areas at the expense of the less competitive’. For him, the Coalition Government’s belief ‘that the most deprived neighbourhoods can regenerate themselves through Localism and [the] Big Society without external support suggests a lack of understanding of the issues’(Brown, 2011b). The criticisms of government policy vary between rejecting its underlying ideology and complaining about the lack of a coherent narrative. Senior MCC officials argue that the Coalition Government’s strong philosophical core remains at ‘a higher level’ and that the Government ‘is still working out how to deliver its programme’ (Interview, 10/04/2012). The Coalition Government appears confused, like previous governments, about the role that it desires for local government. It seeks to transfer certain powers to local government but at other times to other structures whether Quangos or community-­based. This reflects differences between specific departments. The one example of ideological clarity is an enthusiasm for devolution to the market and a preference for sub-­government units which endorse that objective. Under New Labour, but accelerated under the Coalition Government, public officials become entrepreneurs and the voluntary sector becomes politicised. Public values may have become downgraded under New Labour but that has been fetishised since 2010. The voluntary sector was ambivalent towards the changing ideology on regeneration. It welcomed the Coalition Government’s adherence to decentralisation, on



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the one hand, and was concerned about the its reduced role for public investment, on the other. The sector represents over 600 groups concerned with community-­led regeneration. It supports locally driven growth and community engagement, rejects a ‘one-­size-­fits-­all’ approach and upholds the policy of the ‘Community Right to Challenge’ and the ‘Community Right to Buy’. Yet the concerns of the voluntary sector may over-­ride its enthusiasm. Their concerns are captured by the statement that ‘government must ensure that financial investment and support to initiate regeneration projects is provided’ so as to guarantee that the voluntary sector has the capability and resources to take part effectively’ (Locality, 2011: Introduction). For example, Locality argues for significant investment, technical support, a fair implementation of policy to ensure that those who are ‘investment ready’ are not favoured over those who are not, for progress made on regeneration not to be lost, for the most deprived communities to receive sufficient investment and for the retention of the Future Jobs Fund and the HMRP; it warns that ‘private and social enterprise sectors often rely on . . . public sector spend’ (Locality, 2011: 1.1–1.4). The rhetoric of community and localism, which unites New Labour and the Coalition Government, has appeal for the voluntary sector, but it is unlikely that the full logic of localism will be followed through by the Coalition Government; and for New Labour it was always more rhetorical than real. It is in the area of ‘community’ that New Labour had a stronger commitment as it adapted elements of Communitarian theory. Yet whatever the substance of the concept of community, both governments since 1997 have advanced it as a panacea. New Labour made community engagement a prerequisite of its support for specific ABIs and the Coalition Government seeks to defer to communities on planning issues. Leaving aside the objection that neither government adequately defined what constitutes a ‘community’, the concept serves the purpose of ideological legitimation. ‘Community’ is a saccharine word, as is ‘volunteering’, with which it is associated in government pronouncements. From New Labour’s desire that residents should have a voice in the implementation of ABIs to David Cameron’s claimed transfer of planning powers, the community has been generally lauded. Yet the maxim of ‘follow the practice and not the rhetoric’ is appropriate here. Under New Labour, power rested with the central state, although a skilful local authority such as Manchester maximised its role, and under the Coalition Government the impetus is likely to be with the private sector. Under both Governments, however, the level of resourcing will be the key to policy. Yet the merits of community and volunteering are difficult to contest. It would be unduly cynical to suggest that there are no policy outcomes from the rhetoric of community, and MCC’s NP and ward co-­ordination methods have brought some benefits in identifying and responding to local issues. For the Coalition Government ‘the proof of the pudding will be in the eating’, but it is not offering the prerequisites of money and structures. Some organisations welcome the emphasis on community as ‘a refreshing break’ from previous practices, but one research group for the voluntary sector poses

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questions for government if there is to be any successful community input (Leslie Huckfield Research, 2011: 2). First, it stresses the need for five years’ community development before residents can be fully involved; second, it fears a managerialist approach to the inclusion of communities in which there is a denial of real ownership and control over buildings and services; and, third, it asserts a continuing need for substantial local funding (Leslie Huckfield Research, 2011: 4–5). It is unlikely that the Coalition Government accepts these prerequisites for the role it claims to allocate to communities. If the use of the term ‘community’ has to carry such weight, other than as empty symbolism, then its effects require evaluation. The realities of government under New Labour and the Coalition alike are that they move from advocating radical reform of the state, including the devolution of power to communities, only to envelop themselves in ‘the comfort blanket of asymmetric executive power’ (Richards, 2011: 50). Regeneration officials pose further questions. If a community is a place, what is its optimum size? Will residents have unrealistic expectations, or identify the wrong priorities? And will the interest of community activists, often unrepresentative particularly of ‘hard to reach’ groups, retain their enthusiasm? As Sean McGonigle expressed it concerning NDC/Beacons, ‘people move out of the area . . ., people fall out with us or each other, decide that they’re not interested any more or that they’ve got a life after all’ (Lawless, 2011). The view that power has transferred to residents is empirically false, but also undesirable. As Amin argues, there is ‘the right to engage freely, the right not to agree, the right not to play community, the right not to resolve your own affairs’ (Amin, 2005: 630). The resort to community as the key to successful regeneration must be questioned. The ideology of Manchester Labour There is ample evidence that Manchester has been a ‘vanguard city’ in the field of urban regeneration, and has even developed a distinctive Labour ideology which is well encapsulated by this policy domain. Manchester had acquired the tag of the ‘Regeneration capital’, and although the city’s leaders were prone to promoting themselves as neither Old nor New Labour, but simply Manchester Labour, there was much in their methods that was sufficiently pioneering to appeal to New Labour. Some of the visions which MCC leaders expressed about their regeneration projects may appear redolent of top down Fabianism with a faith in planning, holistic strategies and an orientation to consulting and informing local people rather than following their wishes. These Fabian and statist impulses run deep among Labour Party leaders, but they were greatly diluted by the post-­Thatcherite climate in which they were operating. Manchester has been governed for decades by an alliance between a strong Chief Executive with a vision of what local government can achieve and a Labour Party which, since the late 1980s, has adopted a ‘can do’ attitude compatible with



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social democratic policies, but with a commitment to flexibility in promoting the perceived well-­being of the city. The political dimension is important but the role of ‘a managerial city mode’ led by the local bureaucracy has also been influential (Leary, 2008). Political and managerial leadership alike has readily accepted the need for formalised partnership working, which is less novel than many claim, but has acquired an almost mandatory character in recent decades. Manchester Labour promotes a vision of advancing the city, and seeks to retain a strong oversight of its implementation. Manchester Labour was compatible with New Labour nationally, even to the point of acting as an exemplar in the field of urban regeneration. Most notably, Manchester Labour was already thinking in more international and globalist terms in its interest in urban regeneration policies. There is scope to challenge Manchester’s claim that it was a model for Barcelona’s regeneration (Interview, 30/09/2004) although there was undoubted policy transfer in both directions. Manchester had European and international goals as a competitive city before New Labour came to power and adopted that strategy nationally. Lord Rogers visited Manchester in the process of preparing his report (DETR, 1999) and the city provided him with the model of regeneration programmes with diverse aims advanced by joint efforts between business and local government. Even in 2011 Labour, under Ed Miliband’s leadership, was subscribing to the old doctrine that ‘what Manchester does today the world does tomorrow’, when he advocated a ‘something for something’ strategy in allocating social housing which MCC had been piloting (Telegraph, 27/09/2011). While the aim of New Labour’s urban regeneration policies had been to remediate the deprivation in poorer and Labour voting areas, there was also an element of a modernising and Europe-­facing agenda of emulating the model of vibrant continental cities. This was exemplified by the reform of licensing hours for the sale of alcohol in 2005 with the aim of introducing a continental style of alcohol consumption to tackle the phenomenon of binge drinking. In a similar vein, an aspect of New Labour’s urban regeneration vision was to beautify and restore cities so that regeneration became entangled with a policy of urban renaissance. Partly because the URCs such as NEM were recommended by Lord Rogers, New Labour‘s ensuing White Paper focused on the idea of an urban renaissance which would produce resurgent cities (DETR, 2000a). The flagship Chips Building in Ancoats in east Manchester exemplified the aim of providing a new style of fashionable urban living, aping the earlier developments in the city centre appealing to childless ‘twenty-­somethings’ (Mace, Hall and Gallent, 2007: 59). The Millennium Project, the housing innovations of Urban Splash and the opening of coffee shops in the Ancoats neighbourhood also reflected this aspiration, as did the aim of improving the parks, exploiting the canals and improving the public realm. It also denotes a middle-­class view of regeneration involving ‘new, crisp architectural flourishes’ seeking to extend its grip on at least parts of Ancoats (Franklin, 2010: 143). This reflects a further hybridity in MCC’s conceptions, as in

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parts of east Manchester the focus was on renaissance and in other parts on regeneration. The Manchester approach to regeneration was inevitably affected by the cultural strategy, which in the 1980s included the support given to the Gay Village in the Canal Street area of the city centre and the now mythological Manchester music scene. (Haslam, 2012) This extended to a quest to change the old industrial image of the city to attract new residents (Seo, 2002: 114). Yet the regeneration professionals implementing the east Manchester strategy on behalf of MCC and its partners were fully aware that many east Manchester residents chose to remain because they were ‘born in the area’ or had ‘relatives in the area’. A rare example of ideological incompatibility between New Labour and Manchester Labour is illustrated by the case of the Casino. MCC were strongly of the view that the establishment of a Casino was central to continuing regeneration, despite some local opposition, only for the New Labour Government in 2008 to abandon the project. MCC leaders were outraged at the Government decision and defended the amount of money spent by the council on the bidding process, arguing ‘We haven’t let east Manchester down, it is the collective will of Parliament which has done that’ (NEMA, 29/02/2008). Ultimately, the relationship between Manchester Labour and the New Labour Government was restored. Gordon Brown promised a regeneration taskforce of eight cabinet ministers to work on a Casino alternative to provide similar employment opportunities while MCC dropped its threat of legal action over the promised £265 m investment a Casino would have provided. Leese summed up the relationship thus: ‘The city council will do everything it can to protect the interests of the city and its residents and we are convinced that there is more to be gained for Manchester by working with the government than from confronting them in the court room’ (NEMA, 13/06/2008). The origins of the idea of Manchester Labour can be traced back to the strategy of the Manchester Labour Party in 1984, although that shift concealed a previous split between the Left and Right of the Party which did not immediately disappear thereafter. The shift was one of moving from a left-­wing oppositional strategy against the Thatcher Government’s policies to one of seeking to extract as much support from central government by a more collaborative approach. Urban regeneration was a policy domain in which cross-­party co-­operation was possible, and in which a focus upon renewing deprived areas could be portrayed as compatible with social democratic values of addressing poverty and inequality. A policy convergence with the Conservative Government at the time, and until 1997, was feasible for four main reasons. First, government was troubled by the dangers of urban riots as a result of the inner-­city riots of 1981 and 1985, and by the collapse of the Conservative vote in inner-­city areas. Second, the ideology of the Thatcher and Major Governments was less disturbed by local regeneration strategies to tackle poverty than it was by national redistributive policies. Third, in Heseltine, the Conservative Government possessed an ambitious minister who determined to be an energetic advocate of



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urban regeneration. Fourth, the ambiguity in the precise nature of urban regeneration facilitated some ideological blurring, as some on the political left could focus on supporting people while those on the right could be more interested in physical and property-­based renewal in the interests of promoting the business sector. The simultaneous emergence of business groups in Manchester anxious to improve the image of the city was the final piece of the jigsaw which attracted a ‘pragmatic’ Labour Council to work together with local and national Conservatives. Yet this was not value-­free pragmatism but one that was related to Labour Party values and, at a time when national political power was monopolised by Conservatives, urban regeneration in Manchester provided an opportunity to lever in finance to the city and for the local political elite to exercise power rather than practice futile oppositional behaviour. Once MCC and the Government had worked together in a series of initiatives, success was achieved, and by 2011 the Communities and Local Government Select Committee was able to take the success of the project in Hulme to demonstrate the benefits of the more proactive strategy embraced by New Labour (House of Commons, 2011). The ideology of Manchester Labour comprised social democratic ideas at a local level with a concern for the quality of life for residents by providing better public services, together with improving economic performance and enterprise. This has been the tenor of Manchester Labour since ‘the entrepreneurial turn of 1987’ and the resulting centrist political project (Quilley, 2002: 84). It has involved a coalition of public agencies and private interests (Mellor, 2002: 235). In response to the demands of specific Governments there are signs of some shift from the holistic approach to regeneration, as in the Manchester Sustainable Community Strategy (MCC, 2006d) to satisfy New Labour with a more strictly economic focus in some of the GMCA publications to coalesce with the policies of the Coalition Government. By 2012 MCC’s long-­standing concern with improving economic competitiveness through satisfying the needs of investors and ending the high welfare dependency of the workless was more strongly emphasised (Interview, 10/04/2012). This interpretation is contestable, but throughout the years from 1997 social democracy and neo-­liberal strategies have merged, with the emphasis changing over time.3 The pragmatic style of MCC and its post-­1987 willingness to collaborate with Conservative Governments in order to benefit the city is becoming apparent again under the Coalition Government, particularly at the city-­region level. This may be intensified by political control of the boroughs of Trafford and Stockport, which are not in Labour hands. In its evidence to the Select Committee, AGMA supported the Government’s approach to community-­led regeneration. AGMA 3   This can be alternatively conceptualised as combining the business and economic emphasis of the entrepreneurial (Harvey’s (1989) ‘entrepreneurial city’ as cited in Leary (2008)) with a stress upon local social improvement and quality public services (Leary’s (2008) ‘managerialist city’).

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expressed its confidence that Greater Manchester could drive forward private sector growth and resulting job creation while adding that there remained pockets of ‘persistent deprivation’ to be addressed if all parts of the conurbation were to benefit. AGMA stressed their continuing desire to work with central government and specified examples such as establishing a strong LEP, putting business in the driving seat, making submissions to RGF and setting up an assessment framework to align investment which, working with the market, would deliver growth for communities currently dependent on the state (AGMA, 2011: 2–3). AGMA reveal some signs of endorsing the Coalition Government’s regeneration strategy to re-­assign it towards the objectives which it favours, but the extent of the compromise with the Government is palpable. It urges a jointly agreed approach with central government to address the skills shortfall in Greater Manchester, and couches it in the language of the Coalition Government by defining it as removing a ‘key barrier’. As described earlier, New Labour’s style of urban regeneration was characterised by some as ‘removing barriers’ to community success as well as providing direct assistance. AGMA’s submission requests government to work with MCC so that the LEP can improve the national delivery model and urges direct meetings between the ­all-­party leadership in Greater Manchester and its LEP with ministers to ensure that a ‘natural fit’ with the new approach set out in Regeneration to Enable Growth is effectively delivered to boost economic growth (AGMA, 2011: 4). AGMA also accepts that the economic environment is one of resource constraint (AGMA, 2011: 50). The leadership of MCC is also seeking as much harmony as possible with the Coalition Government. This is apparent in its endorsement of a focus on economic growth and an end to welfare dependency through job creation and skills development; its desire to work with the re-­balancing of the economy so that even in Manchester the trading position is improved and the focus is not simply on attracting inward investment; and on housing policy it is interested in making land available for private sector development rather than providing more social housing (Interview, 10/04/2012). MCC actors also remain adamant that they are leading rather than simply following Government policy, citing as an example that they were already looking at how to drive economic growth and cut spending before 2010 (Interview, 10/04/2012). This is not to suggest that MCC seeks to abandon the role of NEM, or that it necessarily considers that the Coalition Government has everything in place to deliver even where it agrees with Government overall ideology. But the needs of Manchester and the city-­region take precedence over party ideology although, contrary to Jones and Ward (1998), it is an exaggeration to describe MCC as essentially grant-­grabbing. Less publicly, some regeneration officials criticise the Coalition Government for lacking a regeneration policy, although they argue that the Government will eventually realise the need for such a policy in order for their economic growth strategy to work. Throughout, MCC has been involved in facilitating the initiatives that it favours in collaboration with the private and voluntary sectors. It was sometimes criti-



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cal of the public sector in its desire to improve mainstream public services, urged residents to become active by raising expectations and increased the offer to the private sector, especially when the housing market threatened a downturn (NEM Away Day, 22/07/2004). NEM subsequently sought new ways of working with the private sector than ‘development subsidies of various kinds’ (NEM Board Meeting, 03/10/2006). Yet even when the market conditions for housing developments declined, for example, developers could be enticed to proceed with particular schemes. This happened with the Toxteth Street development in 2009 when developers were willing to continue their work because the proximity of the Openshaw District Centre was an incentive (NDC/Beacons’ Board Meeting, 22/01/2009). Manchester Labour had always straddled social democratic and managerial regeneration led by the public sector and the concept of the entrepreneurial city supporting business, a hybrid approach which enabled it to adjust to two different ideologies emanating from two different governing parties (Leary, 2008: 231). There is a clear ideological continuity in Manchester in cultivating central government to promote the economic interests of the city and, since 2010, compromising with top down policies but re-­directing them to an inclusive concern with the needs of residents in deprived areas. So the ‘Manchester’ must be stressed as much as the ‘Labour’ in the ‘Manchester Labour’ sobriquet. This approach is only likely to alter if Labour loses control of either MCC or a majority of the participating local authorities in the city-­region. The Minister for Cities in the Coalition Government, Greg Clark, continues to advocate a system of elected mayors (Marlow, 2012). Heseltine argued that the Council leader is not accountable to the people of Greater Manchester and that his and the Chief Executive’s powers are too limited. The Manchester LEP opposes an elected mayor for Manchester, but the administrative and political leadership of MCC prefers the idea of a city-­region mayor, as that is the unit they now promote to generate more economic growth and a rebalanced economy. If that is not permitted by the central state it remains to be seen how it will affect Manchester Labour’s strategy. Manchester Labour remains consistent in seeking to derive as much public and private support for the local and regional causes it cherishes, and is prepared to modify its ideological stance to achieve that end. Conclusion An objective judgement about the respective ideologies of New Labour and the Coalition Government is impossible, although the policy consequences can be analysed by utilising the evaluations which have taken place and by scrutinising the arguments advanced by those involved in the field. Even here there are no neutral actors, as the professionals represent the interests of the sectors with which they are engaged. There are undoubtedly trade-­offs between top down and local solutions to the problems of regeneration, and the way forward is to discover the right ­balance

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rather than to polarise the policy debate. New Labour’s ideology was a hybrid between public and private which was difficult to operate and was highly centralist, even if some local authorities such as MCC were able to manipulate the implementation of policy locally. MCC was itself content to operate a hybrid strategy. Yet there remains top down control by the Coalition Government. Commentators disagree about whether the Government has a clear narrative in practice as it responds to events. If New Labour was unduly holistic in its regeneration strategy, which overburdened the local delivery agencies and sought solutions to problems such as unemployment which were essentially subject to macroeconomic forces, the Coalition Government is likely through its focus on economic growth rather than social questions to adopt too partial an approach. The ideological tenets of New Labour and the Coalition Government cannot be  aggregated under the simple label of ‘neo-­liberalism’. The convergence of attitudes, particularly between the Major and Blair Governments cannot be dismissed, but for New Labour neo-­liberal ideas are one source for policies while for the Coalition Government they are the over-­riding influence. While all three political parties in Britain share a belief in the private and voluntary sectors as key policy deliverers, New Labour has a stronger focus on attacking deprivation and on including an element of urban renaissance, while the Coalition gives greater priority to economic growth and physical development. The Coalition government also, despite some internal strains, is less inclined to consider that substantial market failure occurs which needs to be ameliorated by public policy. Yet senior MCC officials claim that there is a need for policies which address market failure (Interview, 10/04/2012); it remains to be determined how far the Coalition allows areas of decline to be left to market forces. Ultimately, the main impact of the Coalition Government is to end holistic ABIs, although it is apparent that while New Labour would have allowed a gentler decline of these projects, after 2010 their heyday was already past. Their final partial fling in east Manchester may yet be as a result of Manchester Labour’s adaptability to new circumstances and its skill in engaging new sponsors such as MCFC. This serendipitous investment may prove, however, to be exceptional rather than a precursor to a new era of privately sponsored urban regeneration.

7 Who governs east Manchester?

This chapter utilises the experience of the urban regeneration of east Manchester as a case study to illuminate the debate on whether the concept of governance should prevail over the more traditional concept of government. The concept of governance recognises structural complexity and permits consideration of the array of structures involved in policy implementation. Governance theories challenge the idea of powerful central and local states and present a more distributed interpretation of power. The argument here is that such accounts of the locus of power too readily discard the traditional view of government. Government retains potency in contemporary society; the appearance of dispersed power conceals a continuing reality of concentrated power which remains valid even under a Conservative/ Liberal Democratic Coalition. To understand both the course of events and the structures in east Manchester it is necessary to reflect on the exercise of power and the style of government which has prevailed there and to do so in the context of the literature on the nature of the contemporary national and local state. In recent times some have asserted that the state has changed fundamentally and that instead of there being a single hierarchical and authoritative centre of power, government has become more fragmented, with complex partnership networks involved in the implementation of policy at a local level. Governance The concept of governance as applied to policy-­making and implementation in contemporary Britain is not, despite its ubiquitous usage, accompanied by definitional clarity (Bache and Flinders, 2004: 35). ‘Governance’ was traditionally an interchangeable term with ‘government’, but a separation occurred in the 1980s as the

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term ‘governance’ acquired a distinctive meaning. The key question is: has the role of the state changed or declined? In this context, the question applies particularly to the local state, and can be redefined as ‘who governs east Manchester?’. The penchant for referring to governance rather than government during the 1980s was broadly the result of the emergence of New Public Management (NPM), the influence of Osborne and Gaebler’s (1993) book advocating the re-­invention of government and the policies of many governments, including those of both Thatcher and Major.1 The processes of privatisation, agentification and deregulation, the transfer of private sector management techniques to the public sector, an orientation towards results, the funding of outcomes, customer orientation, empowering rather than serving and the use of civil society organisations to deliver public services were changes in the process of government which emanated from NPM theories (Lane, 1996). These changes aimed to realise NPM goals of economy, efficiency and effectiveness. It was almost a case of art imitating life, as commentators observed the increase in the plurality of actors and inferred a trend towards the fragmentation of political systems and the reduced capacity of the central state. Theorists of the rise of governance argue that central and local states have altered their function from one of governing directly in a hierarchical manner to that of steering other structures. There are two different schools of thought, however, among governance theorists. The dominant school argues that the role of the state is now negligible. There is a smaller school of governance theorists which argues, more subtly, that while the state is now less powerful than a few decades ago, it still modifies governance by controlling some critical resources of power (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 1). In light of the experience of regeneration in east Manchester, it is argued here that while the second, ‘thin’ or more cautious theory of governance has greater plausibility than the dominant school, this second interpretation also exaggerates the change by aggrandising the past role of the central and local state. It is an error to ignore the constraints on state power that existed before the 1980s. Even the ‘thin’ theory of governance, which lies between the extremes of state hierarchical control on the one hand, and ‘network’ theories of governance, on the other, is based upon the mistaken judgement that there was a ‘golden age’ of local government before 1979 and it does no justice to the complexity of sub-­national politics to claim that local government was ever ‘stable and autonomous’ (John, 1997: 254). Scepticism about the theory of governance and the decline of the role of the state is warranted, often in the terms advanced by its advocates, as being too epochal a narrative (Newman and Clarke, 2009: 11). While theorists of the ‘hollowed-­out’ state can be readily confounded by the evidence of this case study, the argument that the modern state exercises its considerable powers in the domestic sphere in 1   Books discussing these trends include: Day and Klein (1987); Evans (1999); Evans and Taylor (1997); Lane (1996); Osborne and Gaebler (1993).



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a different way from earlier times has merit, provided it is recognised that local authorities have long collaborated with other structures. The statement that the modern central and local state operate differently from the past properly recognises the impact of co-­production of policy by many agencies and an ostensible shift from hierarchical and bureaucratic forms to a greater use of markets and networks. But vitally it is the state which brings new relationships into being and manages the processes of ‘multi-­level’ politics. For these reasons, the terms ‘governing’ – or at least, as mentioned below, ‘meta-­governance’ – are to be preferred. Over-­arching theories of how the state functions are best tested by local studies, as wider trends are put into practice differently in specific local sites at particular times. The case study of east Manchester’s regeneration casts doubts on the ‘thick’ version of governance theories. Governance theorists who assume that the role of the central and, correspondingly, the local state, have declined irretrievably are represented by Rhodes. He asserts that governance in contemporary Britain takes the form of self-­organising, inter-­ organisational networks characterised by interdependence, resource exchange, rules of the game and significant autonomy from the state (Rhodes, 1997). This interpretation of governance leads Rhodes to argue that the resulting transformation of the public sector requires less government – rowing, and more governance – steering. Governments are reduced to little more than providing a legal framework for the activities of others. Yet extreme though this ‘thick’ version of governance is, others endorse Rhodes’ dominant account. For example, Bache (2003: 301) defines governance as a ‘complex set of state–society relations in which networks not hierarchies dominate’. Dunsire (1997: 27) sees governance as about co-­directing in a network with many separate actors who have opposing interests. Kooiman (1993: 14) stresses the role of social networks in governing and regards the state as simply one actor in a horizontal distribution of power. This radical conception of governance has tended to penetrate textbooks, which argue that the era of government extended from 1945 until the end of the 1970s, to be replaced by an era of governance, although some texts concede that there was a great deal of ‘fuzziness and overlap’ between the two periods (Richards and Smith, 2002: 3–4). A simplistic portrayal of a transition from government to governance can be criticised because the state is patently alive and imposing its will as enthusiastically under the post-­2010 Coalition Government as under New Labour before it. It is valid for advocates of governance to claim that in the policy-­making process, and particularly in urban regeneration, the boundary between state and civil society becomes blurred. Patently there is a network of structures involved in east Manchester, and some horizontal interactions and negotiations occur between them. It is also valid for some governance theorists to recognise that the implementation of major regeneration projects requires more than a list of the public sector institutions involved, and a greater focus on the powers, processes and outcomes

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of the project. Yet understanding the interplay of social and governmental action should not lead to the conclusion that central and local institutions are bereft of power. It is necessary to interrogate the behaviour and the performance of the public sector structures engaged in east Manchester, rather than hastily concluding that the complexity of the regeneration project renders the idea of government by the central and local state inconceivable and that the process lacks any hub of power. Many structures–public, private and voluntary–are engaged, but which provides momentum and direction? The need to co-­ordinate the activities of various agencies and structures, if any outcomes from the project are to be obtained, raises the issue of who is fitted to provide this co-­ordination. Nor is the need for co-­ordination the only role for which state structures are required, an activity characterised as one of ‘steering’; there is also the need for setting priorities, organising the necessary funding and wielding the necessary legal and political powers. The advocates of the ‘thin’ theory of governance present a case that is harder to reject. They argue that governance simply recognises the need to govern with more than just government (Kjaer, 2004: 44). Despite a tendency to argue for a fundamental change in the process at the end of the 1970s, Richards and Smith (2002: 2) present a useful definition of governance when they urge sensitivity ‘to the ever-­increasing variety of terrains and actors involved in the making of public policy.’ Gamble (2000: 11) is also cautious in endorsing the idea of governance when he defines it as denoting ‘ the steering capacities of a political system, the ways in which governing is carried out, without making assumptions as to which institutions or agents do the steering’. In the context of urban regeneration, it is possible for the local state to abnegate its role within the network of organisations involved, and it has been suggested that some local authorities did so, with the result that such projects faltered badly. Gamble’s formulation however, permits the local authority to become the agency which undertakes the ‘steering’.2 It is argued here that the power structures are such that MCC operates in far more than a mere steering capacity. Pierre and Peters offer an account of the ‘thin’ theory of governance, yet they conclude that government ‘remains a central, if not the central, actor in the process’(2005: 133). Urban regeneration is a response to the issues of urban economic decline and social deprivation, and Pierre and Peters correctly contend that society has become more complex and less governable. They equally stress, however, that the focus should be on how governments deal with that complexity and argue that governments are most apt at co-­ordinating in the face of complexity than either 2   In the case of an NDC initiative in another borough in Greater Manchester, the network was allowed to be self-­steering, resulting in awkward local activists securing a central role in the process. Little was achieved and so the local authority not only stepped in to take over the project, but on behalf of the central state the regional GO ordered it to do so. Had the project not been rescued in this manner, the ODPM would have retrieved the funding (Interview, 11/05/2005).



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networks or partnerships. Pierre and Peters even assert that the powers of government are ‘awesome’, given its legal, financial and administrative resources, and warn that ‘checks and balances against the modern Leviathan are required’, (2005: 137). Arguing that contemporary states are located along a continuum which runs from the étatiste and state-­centric, to the liberal and fragmented, Pierre and Peters appreciate that many European states, unlike the United States where there is a tradition of a weaker state, are state-­centric in character. This means that the state experiences a centralised and institutionalised relationship with social actors, evinced in various ways. These include selecting the representatives of those social actors, with whom it negotiates, enjoying the statutory authority to select goals, setting the agenda and possessing the power to displace some of the costs of resource mobilisation to others. In other words the state can offer its partners in the network a choice between powerless autonomy or incorporation (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 30–36). This picture is apt, but in the light of east Manchester it exaggerates the impact of the constraints upon the local and national states through their ‘institutionalised exchange with organised interests’ (Pierre and Peters, 2005: 36). Pierre and Peters capture the reality that central government requires MCC and its partners to carry out regeneration, with MCC required to work formally with local partners. At an informal level of the exercise of power, MCC is more dominant and creates a vertical pattern of inter-­organisational relationships than even the ‘thin’ version of governance allows. The line between this ‘thin’ school of governance and the account of the power relationships which is argued for here is fluid in the real world of political behaviour. The argument that the ‘thin’ school of governance advances neglects the centralising characteristics of the Thatcher/Major and Blair/Brown Governments. The Cameron/Clegg Government uses the rhetoric of localism but has a clear conception of the role of the state which it wishes to impose. New Labour, too, formally claimed to promote a ‘new localism’ in managing neighbourhoods and services (NDC/Beacons’ Board Meeting, 26/01/2004). With the exception of formal devolution to Scotland and Wales, however, the capacity of the Westminster and Whitehall model of the distribution of power remains potent. Where the exponents of theories of governance point to the growth of agencies and the heterogeneity of Quangos, they fail to see that these developments have more to do with the shift of responsibility than the modification of power relationships; the purpose of the organisational changes which have taken place is that ministers need not resign when policy failures occur (Garnett and Lynch, 2009: 19). There is an argument that undue centralisation can make central government carry the entire responsibility when disaster occurs (Moran, 2011: 15), as with the banking crisis in 2007/2008, but this leads to attempts by the central state to shift responsibilities rather than powers. Garnett and Lynch (2009: 226–228) argue that the Government or the Westminster/Whitehall model endures and that newly created government structures must meet state-­driven targets. The state can always reassert control ‘when

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it so chooses’. For example, the Public Service Agreements (PSAs) enabled New Labour to produce the type of public service improvements it favoured. Targets were ‘a source of considerable political power in so far as they give the Treasury an opportunity to determine spending priorities within individual government departments’ (Hindsmoor, 2005: 279). Under New Labour the Treasury’s grip tightened, with the use of earmarked funding (Bache, 2003: 312).The precise tools of central government control vary over time, but NEM was a Government-­created regime and was given explicit targets to achieve. The Coalition Government professes to abandon centralised targets, but it has the power through controlling the total expenditure of MCC to challenge the very survival of the ABI in east Manchester. While theoretically MCC has the discretion to pursue its east Manchester project, the dramatic reductions in the grant which the city received and the requirement to ‘front-­load’ its financial cuts limits its choice. MCC was required to make £109 m of savings in 2010/2011, rising to £170 m in 2012/2013. Leese claimed that ‘Manchester is the fourth most deprived local authority area in the country but is among the top five hardest hit local authority’ (BBC News, 2011a). As many of the services in the area were being cut–for example, Miles Platting SureStart, Library and Swimming Baths, the Openshaw Library and leisure centres in Clayton and Newton Heath–and with MCC leaders describing the cuts as ‘the worst since the war’, preserving the staff and structure of NEM becomes difficult to justify (Linton, 2011). The conclusion must be that either the concept of governance should be abandoned as a tool to explain the operation of the regeneration of east Manchester, or that the role of MCC should be re-­defined as one of ‘meta-­governance’. If partnerships, networks and policy communities have displaced traditional central and local government, it still leaves state organs with the ability to engage in ‘meta-­governance’. Jessop’s (2002; 2004: 49–74) conception of meta-­governance can be defined as the ‘governance of governance’. He suggests that the process of meta-­governance can question the claims of governance theorists that there has been a diminution of state capacities and that, to the contrary, it allows the view that the state can enhance its powers to secure its interests to the point of ‘providing states with a new (or expanded) role in the meta-­governance (or overall coordination) of different governance regimes and mechanisms’ (Jessop, 2008: 78). ­Meta-­governance is concerned with the strategic activities of the state (Somerville, 2005: 118). It can be effective as a means of control, and the requirement for a structure like MCC to colonise NEM and its partners in the regeneration initiative can be judged as ‘a response to governance failure’ (Jessop, 2008: 218). MCC continues this role as, in its diminished financial capacity, it can determine how far it retains a focus on regeneration, as central government ‘washes its hands’ of the issue as no longer being a priority for the central state. The role of MCC can be defined, therefore, given its capacity to manage the process of regeneration despite the proliferation of structures and partnerships, as either the continuation of traditional



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local government, or as a type of meta-­governance through seizing on the need for co-­ordination. Yet what is empirically beyond dispute is that there was a developing penchant from the 1980s, exacerbated after New Labour in 1997, for ‘partnerships’. This tendency was observable internationally although the exact nature of the partnerships varied according to the context. The debate about the changing nature of governance is not about the growth of such partnerships but about the precise implications of their existence for the extent and nature of state control. Challenging governance theories: the case of east Manchester The dominance of MCC Partnership is a relational concept, and the viability of any such partnership must depend upon good inter-­organisational relations or be assisted by an asymmetrical relationship in which one structure takes the lead. The ubiquity of partnerships in east Manchester’s regeneration process is incontestable. In 2004 Sir Howard Bernstein estimated that about half of his time was focused upon making partnerships and networks function effectively (Interview, 30/04/2004). Research by the London School of Economics stresses the role of Chief Executives, and underwrites their importance. Some Chief Executives lead by networking, negotiation and ‘local governance’ and others administer councils in traditional ways (Travers, Jones and Burnham, 1997: 1). Bernstein appears to operate in both modes. Significantly, however, the same research revealed that in relation to the more plural local structural landscape, many Chief Executives ‘thought their own position had been strengthened’ and there was ‘a widespread distaste for unelected bodies’ (Travers Jones and Burnham, 1997: 1). The record suggests that MCC had initially to recognise the formality of partnership working, but that the virtual capture of NEM and NDC/Beacons was determined by the need for swift results. The aim of the URCs as defined by Rogers (DETR, 1999: 147) to ‘support innovation and to act swiftly’ chimed with MCC’s desire to accelerate progress. It was this imperative which encouraged MCC’s leadership to become proactive in guiding the process. Nevertheless, the Rogers Report was Janus-­faced in its description of the role which local government should play in the URCs, as it offered opportunities and constraints on local authority control. The creation of URCs was a central government initiative, and the Rogers Report emphasised that the Government would be ‘closely monitoring the progress of the new companies and will be developing new regeneration policies in response to the issues raised’ (NEM Board Meeting, 16/07/1999). NEM was patently a creation of central government. Councils might actually have been discouraged from exercising control by some elements of the Report; for example, it commended Coventry, which in 1998 had transferred a large operational budget to a partnership company to regenerate the city centre and appointed only two out of thirteen members of

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the relevant Board. The Report also urged that URCs attract private investment and employ professionals as a corporate executive. Yet the same Report supported the principle of URCs working with ‘the objectives of a wider local strategy which has been developed by the local authority and its partners’, for local government to remain the planning authority and for URC staff to be temporary secondees. It also stressed a strategic role for local authorities and specifically commended Manchester for becoming ‘a genuine regional capital winning investment for itself and its hinterlands’ (DETR, 1999: 269). The local political process of NEM, even allowing for its work with a range of partners, was never comparable to the ‘self-­organising institutional network’ referred to by Rhodes. (1996: 653–658) The involvement of Bernstein as NEM Company Secretary until 2009, and the membership of Leese on the NEM Board, signified the importance of MCC. The Minutes of NEM and NDC/Beacons both reveal that the meetings were led by officials, except in the early years when both Bernstein and Leese were more ‘hands on’. In 2002, for example, Bernstein was walking the streets around the Stadium when he was pleased to notice a woman busily scrubbing her doorstep and she told him that it was important to present a good appearance to the visitors who were coming from all over the world to watch the Commonwealth Games (Linton, 2012). While the Board Minutes reveal the growing tendency for Bernstein, and even Leese, to stop attending Board meetings, this signified to officials that they, on behalf of MCC, were content with the direction that NEM was pursuing. Naturally, there are different accountabilities which NEM Board members bring to the table as a direct result of the need to report back to constituencies with distinct functions, yet the partnership, despite some internal steers from members, acquired homogeneity and an awareness of structural interdependence. Greer and Hoggett (1997: 1) concluded that the diversity of unelected Boards did not prevent a tendency ‘to see disagreement as something to be avoided’. In this specific case, only once between 1999 and 2005 was there sufficient disagreement to warrant a vote on the NEM Board. This was the issue of whether there should be a newspaper to communicate regeneration news to the area; the proposal was supported (Interview, 01/09/2004).The centrality of MCC to the Board was consistent with the other partnerships advocated by the New Labour Government. Government was relaxed, for example, that the chairmanship of MP was also held by Leese and he subsequently became the Vice-­Chair of the city-­region in 2011. This centrality was evident in the New Labour years, although the impact of the LEPs, the manner in which GMCA develops, the effect of public expenditure cuts upon the resources and staffing of MCC and the GMCA alike will determine the specific future role of MCC. Both ‘thick’ and ‘thin’ theories of governance can derive support from the reality that the Coalition Government still favours the role of partnerships, since in creating LEPs to engage local councils with the businesses in their area they are building on the polices of the Thatcher Government’s TECs(Evans, 1992). Yet



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even here there are signs that Leese’s specific responsibilities may enhance MCC’s multi-­tiered co-­ordinating role. One regeneration expert affirmed that although LEPs are relatively independent of local authorities, ‘MCC will get a hold on the LEP’ (Interview, 04/02/2012).There is similar evidence from the fact that in 2010 Manchester councils were named as preferred bidders to run a £300 m European Regeneration Fund. Leese applied on behalf of AGMA, Cumbria, Cheshire and Lancashire Councils (Marrs, 2010). It is true that some NEM officials questioned the dominance of MCC even before 2011. One argued that the NWDA and HCA would object if their influence was considered slight and another ventured that the NEM Board has been successively chaired by Sir Robert Hough and Sir Alan Cockshaw, both from the private sector, and that these individuals ensured that commercial and private sector issues were raised (Interviews, 18/09/2005). Moreover, there was a formal equality of influence implicit in the agreement that MCC, NWDA and EP would each contribute £250,000 per annum and that the first Chief Executive would be Marianne Neville-­Rolfe from NWDA. NWDA’s input was considerable, particularly in Ancoats and Central Park where it exercised its CPO powers. NEM’s Chief Executive characterised the relationship as ‘both closer and more complex than with DCLG or EP’ (NEM Board Meeting, 03/10/2006). By 2006 the relationship had become ‘frustrating’ owing to the ‘unwillingness or the inability or the urgency to delegate greater authority to NEM to get on and manage the programme that we agree with NWDA annually’ (NEM Board Meeting, 03/10/2006). He complained of NWDA’s ‘cumbersome approval mechanisms’. This development reflected central government’s promotion of greater regionalism, but it is significant that MCC endured after 2010, unlike the RDAs, and that it was central government which determined the role of each. A few other staff were initially drawn from structures other than MCC, for example, David Taylor, the former Chief Executive of EP, was employed to lead the Ashton Canal corridor project (NEM Board Minutes, 19/05/2000). Observers of Board Meetings argue that because of the importation of private enterprise procedures, Chairpersons emphasised value-­added and the need to establish firm milestones towards the achievement of targets. It is difficult to pronounce in a precise manner on the internal operation of a Board. While corporate governance has been researched there is little knowledge of how public sector boards function. Farrell (2005: 89–99) suggests that it is unclear how they represent stakeholders or respond to social interests, and it is difficult to determine whether they ­rubber-­stamp managerial preferences or shape strategic decisions. The Minutes of the Board suggest that MCC’s role was intensified through a growing capture of the proceedings by MCC officers during the course of NEM’s first year of operation. The early meetings of NEM signal a subtle but effective capture of NEM by MCC, partly as a response to the failure of the partnership to produce the ‘early quick wins’ which the project required without more vigorous leadership. It was not difficult, as

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the Shadow Board met in the Town Hall and central government had invited MCC to bid for a URC partnership to set up a joint venture, which would, ‘co-­ordinate all the existing initiatives in the area’ (NEM Board Meeting, 16/07/1999). The Minutes of the same meeting record that ‘The Council will also ensure that its statutory functions are delivered in a co-­ordinated manner’. The initial Board was stated as having nine members, three to be selected from the local community and from business but with the deputy Chairmanship to be vested in the Council leader, a further one of the nine to be a Councillor from the east Manchester area and MCC’s Chief Executive, Bernstein, to be Company Secretary. The growing influence of MCC was precipitated not just as a bid for power or a concern about the lack of co-­ordination and linkages, but because of the imminence of the Commonwealth Games in the Summer of 2002. This led to the concern that real progress should be made in improving the appearance of the area surrounding the Stadium. It was forcibly expressed that the Commonwealth Games required big improvements which meant that the Ashton Canal corridor, the Ancoats neighbourhood and a general ‘Gateways and Corridors’ programme were of prime importance (NEM Board Minutes, 16/03/2000). Quite apart from the imminence of the Games, Neville-­Rolfe acknowledged the need to ‘ensure early successes in order to build confidence and momentum.’ (NEM Board Minutes, 16/03/2000). The growing concern over the lack of effective co-­ordination during the short period of the Neville-­Rolfe leadership was suggested by the Board’s decision to form a Regeneration Executive Group in which Neville–Rolfe was joined by Steve Mycio of MCC and Sean McGonigle from NDC/Beacons (NEM Board Minutes, 19/05/2000). At the last meeting which she attended as Chief Executive, Neville–Rolfe admitted that NWDA’s Planning Guidance, ‘could be more supportive of the principles of urban renaissance and sustainable development’, and that NEM ‘will support Manchester City Council in making a number of comments to this effect on the latest draft.’ She undertook to discuss with MCC the planning guidance to redevelop east Manchester, including its guidance on specific sub-­areas (NEM Board Minutes, 19/05/2000). An NWDA official later admitted that east Manchester was but one of many projects in which it had an interest compared to the central interest that MCC evinced (Interview, 09/05/2005), but whether the issues were personal or structural, MCC sought the role of Chief Executive for one of its own. Neville-­Rolfe stepped down in the Summer of 2000 and MCC seconded Tom Russell from the Town Hall to become Acting Chief Executive. The Chair stressed that during the interim absence of a Chief Executive Bernstein, Russell and others in the NEM team had ‘worked hard’, but stated that ‘the current position was not sustainable without clear executive leadership, and a quick solution to the problem was necessary for the success of the Company to be continued’. It was agreed to second Russell for twelve months but a permanent appointment was needed. Bernstein produced the press release (NEM Board Minutes, 09/11/2000). A year later Russell’s appointment was extended for a fur-



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ther twelve months provided he acted on a full-­time basis (NEM Board Minutes, 28/11/2001). The need for this strong type of leadership was apparent when Russell listed all that needed to be achieved to transform the Ashton Canal corridor before the Games. He proposed that MCC endorse NEM’s Action Plan and that the DETR support the public transport initiative. Successful implementation also depended on the collaboration of the British Waterways Board, the Greater Manchester Transport Executive (GMPTE), and NWDA and EP (NEM Board Minutes, 09/11/2000). Russell also acknowledged input from the Manchester TEC, GONW and external consultants while urging ‘a more settled and stable basis’ (NEM Board Minutes, 09/11/2000). He was implicitly e­ mphasising the case for strong co-­ordinating leadership. A sign of Bernstein assuming a more activist approach were the reports which he personally presented to the Board in the August 2000 meeting, by which date Neville-­Rolfe appears to have departed. Bernstein’s reports indicated a desire to achieve some early wins for the NEM initiative, a desire to make progress with projects which would have a bearing on the Commonwealth Games and a sense that MCC’s input was required to ‘build confidence and momentum’ if regeneration was to succeed (NEM Board Minutes, 16/03/2000). He stated that MCC would co-­ordinate the development of the area around the Eastlands Stadium and Sportcity. He advocated an early agreement between AMEC developers and Asda Wal-­Mart for an 180,000 ft2 store, a petrol station and a triangular car park so that the store could open in time for the Games. The relevant planning application would be determined by MCC. In case the Metrolink tramway was not ready for the Games he urged a fast bus link to Piccadilly. He asserted that the regeneration of the Canal corridor was ‘critical to east Manchester’s success’. The need was for a ‘complex package of environmental works, transport and infrastructure improvements and land assembly’, although early action was required if progress was to be made by the opening of the Games in July 2002. Bernstein was equally anxious to promote progress on the idea of a Business Park. This involved encouraging private investment, an educational partner and a Metrolink stop and heavy rail interchange, and he asked that the NEM Board formally seek MCC’s support for this ­development (NEM Board Minutes, 31/08/2000). Russell advanced these concerns in the November Board meeting. He presented a progress report on the Ashton Canal corridor, Sportcity, the new Beswick town centre, the Business Park and the Cardroom Estate in Ancoats, which was on the route from the city centre to the stadium. He stressed the need for an implementation team of all the affected partners including MCC, adding that such initiatives would ‘need to be co-­ordinated and managed in a very “hands on” manner’. The continuing importance of MCC locally, and of the DETR nationally, was signified by his statement that MCC would have to employ its CPO powers and the DETR support the public transport initiatives (NEM Board Minutes, 09/11/2000). He also took up the concerns over co-­ordination expressed at previous Board meetings

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by highlighting the need ‘to maximise the benefit for the whole area’ through ‘synergy between these initiatives’ (NEM Board Minutes, 09/11/2000). An important proviso must be entered at this stage in the argument, however, which is that while MCC basically operated NEM and NDC/Beacons, these two arm’s-­length structures developed practices which MCC accepted and even learned from. While some suggest that NEM was regarded as an importation into the area, both it and more particularly NDC/Beacons developed good practice, which would not otherwise have occurred. Yet these structures also acted as shield for MCC, since MCC was able to utilise them to implement its own policies. The relationship meant that they could act more independently of ward backbench councillors and respond to the wishes of the Council leaders. If local councillors wished to exert influence, they were obliged to work within the regeneration structures. This denoted a challenge to traditional conceptions of representation and accountability and a reliance on formal managerial accountability to central government regionally and nationally. While most recognised the dominance of MCC a tiny minority denied its heavy involvement, but deeper questioning revealed that this was based upon a dislike of the Council, rather than an analysis of its role in east Manchester (Interview, 23/06/2012). In questioning MCC’s dominance others, however, point to such counter-­examples as EP’s management of the Millennium Village project at New Islington in Ancoats in partnership with private companies and the continuing oversight of this work by its successor body, the HCA. Yet the project was approved by MCC Board members and EP officials acknowledged that MCC wielded the statutory power as the Planning Authority in order to assemble the land (Interview, 21/11/2004). Moreover, in March 2012 the HCA transferred to MCC the management of the Cutting Room and Canalside Squares in Ancoats (MCC, 2012c). The launch of the HMRP in 2004 might have threatened the dominance of MCC and even the focus on east Manchester might have been disrupted by the creation of the Manchester and Salford partnership as the structure to implement it. The HMRP ‘provided vital and large-­scale resources to tackle the problem of existing housing in east Manchester’, but in welcoming the assistance in refurbishing or demolishing old terraced housing MCC was aware that the level and durability of the funding was unknown (NEM Board Meeting, 03/10/2006). Yet again the influence of MCC was apparent. NEM formally administered the programme, provided the headquarters in its own premises (Elizabeth House in Openshaw) (NEM Board Meeting, 12/02/2004), the staff were employed by MCC and a senior member of NEM’s management liaised with the HMRP and ensured what an official described as ‘joint working’ (Interview, 03/08/2008). One NEM official defined the HMRP as simply a ‘funding stream’ within NEM. ‘It was a means to an end and didn’t have an identity on its own’ (Interview, 16/12/2010). Other NEM officials corroborate MCC dominance. One suggested that ‘NEM is the regeneration arm of MCC’ and another drew the image of a pantomime



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horse with MCC at the front (Interview, 22/10/2010). He added that MCC is the Accountable Body at a formal level and that the informal interactions between the elected and unelected officials in MCC and NEM are frequent, and he defined a central aim of NEM as being ‘to knit east Manchester into the city economy’ (Interview, 22/10/2010). Residents implicitly affirmed the reality of MCC leadership despite also noting that NEM and NDC/Beacons were players. In the words of one, partners have ‘enough autonomy to not just do the Council’s bidding’ but MCC’s support is needed as ‘they [partners] cannot do it [their work] without it’ (Interview, 31/05/2008). It was in response to MCC’s preference that NEM boundaries were extended to include those parts of Gorton which were excluded from the outset, as well as the neighbourhoods of Abbey Hey and Newton Heath. MCC decided in October 2003 that the regeneration frameworks for the city should be reviewed because confusion resulted from the designation of NEM’s original boundaries which meant that it covered parts of six different electoral wards. Clearly, extending the boundaries of NEM was a rational decision but problematical for NEM, which would have to take account of natural physical boundaries, re-­align its work with that of other agencies, stretch its resources, engage new residents and alter the baseline for the measurement of its performance (NEM Board Minutes, 12/02/2004). Yet the MCC Executive requested a consideration of the regeneration frameworks for the city to cover those areas not presently covered by such a framework. MCC was now focusing on a city-­wide strategy for regeneration, which culminated in its publication The Connected City in 2005 (MCC, 2005a). A number of concerns were expressed by non-­MCC members of the NEM Board at the January 2004 meeting, with the Chair stating that ‘nothing can be progressed until NEM know how to implement’ the changed boundaries. Russell clearly was ready to work with MCC and pointed out that NEM could formalise the relationship with the HMRP work in Newton Heath and seek guidance from MCC on how to proceed (NEM Board Minutes, 01/04/2004). Despite these concerns, the NEM boundaries were extended as MCC desired. The central role that MCC has always played in the regeneration process in east Manchester can be explained from insights in the literature about modern urban governance, although in this case MCC seized initiatives rather than having formal powers.3 Local government has always been subordinate in Britain to the central state and its very existence was challenged by the Government’s Widdicombe Report of 1986 (HMSO, 1986). Some scholars have been unduly influenced by the concept of the ‘enabling authority’ as advocated by Nicholas Ridley, a minister under Thatcher who suggested that local councils should simply fund a framework 3   There has been a growing passion for isolating ‘urban governance’ from the more traditional term of ‘local government’. The term ‘governance’ can conceal the continuing role of the local state and it is hard to determine why the term ‘urban’ has replaced ‘local’. Even if not all politics is local, urban and city government remain local in character.

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in which private companies and voluntary associations delivered local services (Garnett and Lynch, 2009: 227–228). This interpretation disregards the capacity of local government to assert itself by the skilful use of the political resources which it possesses, although the working out of relationships between the strategy of the Coalition Government and local government in the years after 2010 may raise some possibility of a return to the ‘enabling authority’ conception. John (cited by Isaac-­Henry, 2003: 89) argues that ‘The politics of decentralisation, networks, participation, rapid policy change and central intervention need powerful creative figures to give direction to policy-­making’. Effective local government rests on strong personalities. Leese and Bernstein were initially prominent but were said by NEM officials to leave Russell to his work when he provided vigorous leadership for NEM from 2000 to 2008, while sometimes discussing issues with him informally (Interviews, 01/09/2004). Bernstein may have lessened his direct intervention in NEM’s affairs over time but he and Leese provided a potent diarchy within a wider network of local influentials. While there is little doubt that the central state prevails over the local state, MCC has resources which it can employ to flex its muscles within its own terrain. For example, the structures with which it operates are physically closer than is the central state. In addition, MCC enjoys a continuity which governments do not. One regeneration expert claimed that ‘MCC is experienced compared to government which is young and inexperienced. Manchester now runs rings around them’ (Interview, 04/02/2012). More importantly, however, and particularly under continuing Labour single-­party rule, MCC has a clear purpose. In contrast, inter-­departmental competition, or the conflicting views of dominant ministers within central government, can reduce the central state’s impact. Participants in east Manchester are convinced that stable Labour Party rule and the continuity of the Chief Executive (Hatchett, 2005: 22), have been vital, confirming Ostrom’s (1999: 317–9) judgement that single-­party control offers greater opportunities than fluctuating or uncertain party political control (Ostrom, 1999). Governments need to manage the functions that they devolve from the centre, and MCC assists in this exercise of vertical control while simultaneously managing the horizontal power relationships within the regeneration partnership. To this end New Labour utilised MCC and its partners, such as NEM, GO and the NWDA, as ‘intermediate organisations’ (Evans and Taylor, 1994: 552). These intermediate structures facilitated a greater degree of monitoring and ultimate control than is possible by direct intervention from the centre and so strengthens the capacity of the state within a complex and diverse institutional constellation. This structural function is neglected by the advocates of fragmented governance.4 The centre 4   Evans and Taylor (1994) examined institutions in the labour market and arts sectors where the intermediate organisations which ensured that government policy was carried out as desired were, in the case of the labour market, the TECs in the 1990s, and in the case of the arts sector, the Arts Council and the Regional Arts Boards (RABs).



Who governs east Manchester? 147

enjoys pre-­eminence within the network, and the dependency relationship is apparent (Evans and Taylor, 1994: 557). It is essential to recognise the importance of the meso-­level of government which serves to strengthen vertical power relationships. While formally the ‘meso-­level, structures which New Labour created were the GONW and the NWDA’ (Hansard 1993; OPSI, 1998).5 MCC also provided a further conduit through which successive government departments and individual ministers scrutinised NEM and its partners. Central government obtained independent evaluations of progress, as discussed in Chapter 5, but New Labour Ministers still visited MCC to observe the progress of regeneration; when this occurred, MCC served as a surrogate for the entire partnership. Despite the power of the central state in Britain, ministers in successive governments are keen to enunciate the rhetoric of localism. For example, when the Major Conservative Government set up the SRB initiative and the GOs they signalled ‘an important shift from the centre to the localities’, and ensured that ‘local needs will be prime considerations’ (Hansard, 1993). In 2006, the Government White Paper advocated the voluntary involvement of citizens in running services (DCLG, 2006: 26). The Coalition Government since 2010 blazons localism as its key objective. Ministers such as Bob Neill and John Clarke refused to ‘tone down’ their ­commitment to such policies (Garlick, 2011). Yet the sceptical comments of observers must carry weight. One recognised the ‘ambiguities and contradictions’, arguing that the ‘appeal to a new localism rings hollow to many local politicians’ (Stewart, 1994: 142). The accession of the Coalition Government has not silenced these doubts. Despite one professional recognising that elected mayors can add to the political kudos of LEPs, provided the relationship is clear, he expressed scepticism about whether central government departments are ready to lose responsibilities (Carter, cited in Marrs, 2011a: 13). One regeneration expert argued that central government does not see localism as taking powers away from it but as transferring some hassle to local authorities and shifting powers from local authorities to neighbourhoods (Interview, 03/02/2012). Moreover, the mere existence of legislation does not signify change in itself. The same expert argued that there will legislation related to localism, but that it will be too difficult to use (Interview, 03/02/2012). The same reluctance for the central state to relinquish its powers is evident in the provisos around which the Coalition Government evinces its intention to devolve to cities. To win the powers, cities must demonstrate strong and accountable leaderships, an agenda for the economic 5   Originally referred to as Integrated Regional Offices (IROs) they have become Government Offices for the Regions (GOs). They were established by the Conservative Government to systematise departmental relationships with the regions, and oversight of urban regeneration was one of their roles. When New Labour sought to strengthen its regional policies under the aegis of the RDAs such as the NWDA there was a ­perceived threat to the GOs. Both structures continued under New Labour, however, and the GOs retained some intermediate responsibilities while NWDA had a specific role regarding economic development and employment.

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future of their area, good decision-­making structures and private sector leadership. There is also the implied device for central control that those cities which opt for elected mayors, a panacea favoured by the Coalition Government, may acquire increased power (Marrs, 2011a: 12). Despite the invocation of localism and even of ‘double devolution’ by both the Coalition Government and its predecessors, the  onus is still on local government to prove that it deserves more power (Walker, 2007). While Rhodes exaggerates reciprocity in intra-­governmental relations, central government was not immune to pressure from MCC in the New Labour years. When the Metrolink extensions through east Manchester to Ashton-­under-­Lyne and Oldham were threatened by central government in July 2004 MCC objected, and with the support of local MPs made its discontent public. This led to the Government restoring the grant of £520 m for phase three of the project. There are natural tensions between the encouragement of local innovation and the drive to impose national standards (Stoker and Wilson, 2004: 9). GONW officials suggest that different government departments have diverse practices on ‘letting go’. Even New Labour’s ideas of new localism, including devolution to groups of residents, reflected a by-­passing rather than an empowerment of local government. Were this type of localism, to materialise it would provide support for the more radical theories of governance, although it would require a structure such as local government to operate strategically. The reality is better expressed by a Manchester MP, who complained that governments never really decide what they wish the role of local government to be, so little changes in practice (Interview, 07/04/2006). In the aftermath of the launch of the ‘Big Society’ in 2010 and the abandonment of major centrally funded ABIs, MCC sought to maintain its central role. Significantly, as NEM was losing staff and its operations being reduced as the spending cuts began to bite, MCC remained central to a new regeneration partnership embracing MCC, MCFC and NEM to develop land around the City of Manchester Stadium (Wilding, 2011). While this is a private sector investment, MCC’s Chief Executive, NEM’s Chief Executive and the City Treasurer are members of the key governing bodies and fulfil the meta-­governance role in managing the Eastlands Advisory Board to include all key stakeholders (MCC, 2012b). Still adamant that new ideas continue to emanate from Manchester, Leese also claimed that the ‘architecture’ of LEPs was ‘something we have been making a case [for] for a long time’. Yet he expressed the concern that ‘because of centralisation and cuts, LEPs have neither the resources nor the right powers to do what they are required to do’ (Carpenter, 2010). It is possible that the scale of the cuts imposed on MCC from April 2011, and the accusations between MCC and the Coalition Government which followed, inaugurates the growth of a less happy relationship than was the case from the 1980s to 2010. With the growing strength of the city-­region, however, a more co-­operative relationship is likely to emerge. AGMA is seen to be operating effectively and the subsequent creation of GCMA is the Government’s spatial choice; one regenera-



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tion official recognised that AGMA’s lack of criticism towards the Government is a deliberate political strategy. It is likely, however, that MCC will strongly influence GMCA. Bernstein’s longevity in power means that key people leave MCC but that they go to neighbouring authorities rather than further afield. According to one regeneration expert ‘that strengthens GCMA – they’re all “Howard’s boys”’ (Interview, 03/02/2012). It is apparent that MCC provides continuity and co-­ordination over its local terrain. Under the Coalition Government, relationships are being negotiated, but MCC’s skills will ensure its continuing importance. The asymmetry evident in the hierarchical relationship between the Government and MCC, apparent in the central state’s grant reductions, is mitigated by the acceptance by the central state of MCC’s role in the city-­region. The skills of the leadership of MCC in working with governments of all parties should not be under-­estimated (Interview, 15/04/2011). Despite a more confrontational relationship than existed previously, MCC can continue to relate to the government more easily than can the communities encouraged by the localism agenda. Even within the very different role for local government which is likely to result from the governing strategy of the Government, it is likely that MCC has the wherewithal to provide stability and co-­ordination to ensure that regeneration work continues (Interview, 22/10/2010). Yet standing above MCC, in what is a hierarchical relationship, resides the ultimate sovereignty of the central state. There are limits to MCC’s influence. If MCC under New Labour engaged in meta-­governance, or acted as a traditional local authority, then the scope of the central government in controlling the complex relationships in society can be described as ‘multi-­level metagovernance’ (Jessop, 2004: 27). Structures like NEM exemplify growing complexity, but the central state until 2010 utilised old and developed new mechanisms to co-­ordinate local policy. Even under the new LEPs which are meant to symbolise localism, decisions on allocations from the RGF are to be made by a team including the Deputy Prime Minister, the Chief Secretary to the Treasury and the Secretary of State for Business, Innovation and Skills (DBIS, 2010).The central state strongly influences the local partnerships. MCC and its partners The business sector has the opportunity for a strong voice, and it is apparent that any strategy concerned with economic development, whether overseen entirely by a local authority or not, must collaborate with business interests. As in the United States local government needs to follow policies which assist business in order to attract inward investment and to prevent the outward migration of capital. Yet it was through informal contacts and ad hoc groupings that businesses exerted influence over MCC, although the NEM Board Minutes demonstrate the importance of contracting property developers and consultants for many aspects of the work (Ham and Hill, 1984; Lindblom, 1977; Peterson, 1981). The Chief Executive once

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suggested ‘a degree of overdependence on external consultants’ (NEM Board Minutes, 16/01/2002) and in all regeneration projects MCC and NEM had private ‘development partners’. In the case of the redevelopment of the Gorton District Centre in 2006, for example, it was ASK which performed that role and a new Tesco superstore was a central component in the initiative (MCC, 2006a). Yet if the private sector undertook the work and reaped the profits it required MCC to authorise CPOs. There was also an MCC business partnership in 2006 when MCC nominated the Renaissance Consortium to act as the preferred partner in implementing the Miles Platting PFI to refurbish Council properties (MCC, 2006b). The New Islington proposal, which included a new marina and walkways linking to the city centre, while funded by the NWDA, was undertaken in a partnership between MCC and Urban Splash and improving the land around the Manchester City Stadium was undertaken by a partnership between the football club, NEM and Apollo Resorts and Leisure Ltd (Maher, 2010). Lovell was a major partner in the redevelopment of parts of Clayton, Beswick and Openshaw. After the collapse of the property market in the aftermath of the 2008 recession NEM turned to the foreign business interests represented by the ownership of MCFC to enhance some of the developments needed in the immediate area surrounding the Stadium. It is in the interest of local officials to respond to business concerns, perhaps even more than to electoral demands, although MCC recognises the inability of the market to realise regeneration without public sector intervention.6 A central task of NEM officials has been to attract business and commerce to provide employment and growth. The developments have been supermarket-­led, but there were other ventures, for example, the location of Fujitsu at Central Park or the Sharp project, which attracted businesses operating in the multi-­media and digital industry. Incentives were offered but Bernstein himself became involved in attracting inward investment from major companies (Interviews, 10/10/2010). The relationships which MCC has with the business sector did not constitute the Urban Growth Coalitions apparent in American urban regeneration, as the partnerships were either contractually based or took the form of grant-­seeking partnerships in which the private, public and voluntary sectors collaborated in pursuit of public funding. The attempt to argue that such relationships with the private sector were Urban Growth Coalitions reveals the danger of cross-­cultural transferences (Wood, 2004). It is superficially attractive to define the business relationships which emerged in the city centre in the 1990s and the vigorous efforts of Sir Bob Scott to win the Olympic Games for Manchester as evidence of an American-­style ‘Urban Growth Coalition’. Yet the American scene is profoundly different and entails a central role for business, philanthropy supported by incentivising tax regimes, a subordinate role for politicians and the imposition of regimes in regeneration 6   In the Toxteth CPO Report, it was stated that ‘There is no prospect of the market realising a comprehensive regeneration of the area without intervention’ (MCC, 2006c: 15).



Who governs east Manchester? 151

h­ ousing projects where there are formal contracts which minutely regulate the conduct of residents under threat of expulsion (Evans, 2009). Conservative and Labour politicians alike have declined to adopt these projects.7 Business involvement in regeneration projects in the United States also involves far greater risk-­taking and profit maximisation than has yet occurred in Britain. In the more cautious entrepreneurial climate in Britain it is more appropriate to regard the cross-­sectoral groups that emerged in Manchester in the 1990s as ‘grant-­seeking’ groups. These more traditional horizontal and vertical connections better capture the political reality than do attempts to characterise urban politics as a distinctly different activity than local politics generally. The specific socio-­economic issues confronting cities do not yet in practice require a different analysis from that considered in the general literature on local government and this case study demonstrates that each city has unique characteristics. Importing concepts from American urban studies does not alter the current asymmetry between the central state and local government, or the capacity of local authorities such as MCC to prevail over its partnership networks. The groups which emerged in the 1980s and 1990s, the individuals who became involved in the heyday of NEM activity and the businessmen who maintained some involvement as the Manchester LEP emerged were only sporadically engaged. There was little of the dependency relationship witnessed in the Urban Growth Coalitions in the United States and there is rather ‘a national state project to restructure local government on neo-­liberal lines’ in which business people are ‘selected’ to join partnerships (Wood, 2004: 2108). Yet in Britain and the United States alike public officials at the spatial level do not require to be bribed, duped or pressurised to take business needs and interests seriously (Lindblom, 1977). Perceptions in the voluntary sector on relations between voluntary organisations and MCC vary. The national situation suggests that local authorities prevail over the voluntary sector. There was a perception in the early years of ‘an apparently widespread reservation about the commitment and understanding of local authorities and others to treat them as full and equal partners’ (Dale, 2002: 29). For example, the Community Chest in Manchester, which offers funds to community organisations, felt constrained by its relationship with MCC (Interview, 14/10/2004). In later years of the regeneration of east Manchester other organisations, such as 4CT, expressed contentment with the relationship and aimed to provide some of the services which NEM and NDC/Beacons had originally delivered (Interview, 14/02/2011). Yet in Manchester and elsewhere, the representatives of voluntary organisations are too busy coping with their own responsibilities and the impact of spending cuts to exercise a detailed influence on policy-­making. New Labour’s idea of local authorities as Community Leaders charged with 7   One of the authors was invited to submit a report to Government following a field trip to Atlanta proposing the emulation of a specific urban regeneration project in Britain. Leading Conservative and Labour ­politicians did not consider the report’s proposals relevant to Britain.

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The regeneration of east Manchester

delivering a Community Strategy (ODPM, 2001) had the potential to enhance the role of the voluntary sector, but in practice enhanced the role of MCC. As Prime Minister, Blair was clear that local authorities had a leading role to play, but with the important proviso that they should share the New Labour Government’s agenda of modernisation. He argued that as the Community Leader, local government should promote the economic, social and environmental well-­being of its area, and act as a political institution, not simply a provider of services (Blair, 1998: 22). This leadership power was formalised in 2000 (DETR, 2000b: 2). MCC had the personnel and the political efficacy to take the lead in regeneration. MCC, in fulfilling its remit as ‘Community Leader’, appointed Ward Co-­ordinators to engage with the NP processes which had originated in east Manchester. The main role of Ward Co-­ordinators was to solicit views on the plans for each ward and the Ward Performance Plans delivered to each household. In later years of NEM’s existence there was overlap in the east of the city with, in some instances, NEM employees also acting as Ward Co-­ordinators. The intimacy of the link between MCC, NEM and, in their lifetime, NDC/Beacons and the HMRP, was signified by these inter-­connected roles. These personal interactions assisted co-­ordination and upheld the centrality of MCC. Academic commentators have advocated the potential for local government to fulfil the role of Community Leaders. For example, it is argued that Councils can be, the champions of citizens, community and consumers and should play the lead role. Partnerships should fit in, and be subordinate to the council’s community plan; Councillors should also head up partnership boards (Jones and Stewart, 2001: 14). The role of Community Leadership carries proactive connotations, and Stoker and Wilson (2004) note that local authorities took a key role in bidding for funding for partnerships, providing the staff and the resources to manage the bidding process, bringing all the prospective partners round the table and subsequently managing the funding streams and reporting responsibilities. Local government then manages any competitive jurisdictions which arise. This was confirmed in east Manchester. It was Sean McGonigle, bringing with him the experience of managing regeneration in Hulme, who was seconded to develop and implement the NDC/ Beacons’ bid. He arrived at a time in 1998, when active residents were seeking to improve the area with small-­scale regeneration bids, and it was he who advised them that there were bigger opportunities and urged residents to work with him to prepare to bid for an NDC grant. It was through the contact that he and the MCC leaders had with the then local government minister, Hilary Armstrong, that they knew that the Government was anticipating a larger project. Yet again MCC had the skills to anticipate funding opportunities. As one regeneration professional expressed it ‘MCC have always been great at grabbing the money. They are very politically savvy’ (Interview, 03/02/2012). McGonigle arranged meetings to enthuse residents, and provided the professional competence to bring the bid to fruition. The arrival of the new localism agenda and the Coalition Government’s



Who governs east Manchester? 153

White Paper on Public Services in 2011 changed matters, however, to the point where local government could now best be defined as a ‘Community Facilitator’ rather than a Community Leader.8 This is still being worked out in practice, but the role of government at local and central level remains potent. Conclusion Although theories of governance possess heuristic value in investigating changes in political and governmental practice, they are undermined by the experiences of east Manchester. Our case study of regeneration refutes the claim of some governance theorists that the role of the central and local state has substantially diminished but does provide some evidence that the role of the state has altered, although this should not be exaggerated. Despite the partnership-­based structures locally, MCC maximised the political resources that it possessed, and the slight enhancements it derived from New Labour enabled it to become the instrument of meta-­governance. The introduction of a single consolidated capital fund, in 2012, instead of multiple funding streams from different departments increased this trend, although the allocation was now to the city-­region (Marrs, 2011a: 12). MCC’s leadership role, with reference to both vertical relationships with the central state and its horizontal relationships with the structures in its regeneration partnership, is apparent. The plethora of structures and interests in the regeneration of east Manchester requires an effort for MCC to maintain its ultimate control of the process. Equally, MCC was required to observe the cultural distinctions between the corporate nature of NEM, with its focus on the holistic regeneration process, and the more ­people-­focused character of NDC/Beacons. In both cases, however, its overall control of the secondment of staff and its formal inclusion in the respective Boards enabled it to prevail. NEM, as a URC, had certain legally binding duties, and the appearance of its arms-­length relationship with MCC was sometimes valuable in enabling it to fulfil those duties. Its increasing inseparability from MCC, its common staffing and its dependence on MCC’s monopoly as the Planning Authority (although NWDA controlled the compulsory purchase of some assets in Ancoats) demonstrates that even if its existence challenged older ideas about the power of local government, MCC was at least able to control NEM through a process of meta-­governance. Voluntary organisations contribute to the regeneration activities in east Manchester, and despite the decline in state funding, will maintain their contribution. As the regeneration officials pursue their objectives they will continue to seek private investment, and it is only businesses’ self-­perceived priority, of maintaining profitability that prevents them from exercising a more fundamentally entrenched role in the regeneration structures themselves. MCFC has become a 8   The Chief Executive of Calderdale Metropolitan Council characterised it as such at the penultimate meeting of Calderdale Forward (LSP) (26/01/2010).

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The regeneration of east Manchester

serious ­regeneration partner since 2009, and while the centrality of the Stadium and  Sportcity always made this likely, it was the purchase of the Club by new, wealthy owners which precipitated this relationship. Yet MCC remains an essential participant in the policies which flow from this most recent collaboration. The subsidiarity of the regeneration project to the decisions of central government is also apparent. NEM, NDC/Beacons and the entire regeneration framework rose and declined in significance depending upon the processes of the central state. The specific characteristics of Manchester, however, sometimes enabled MCC to wield pressure against the central state, particularly under New Labour, although the relationship was asymmetrical in nature. It is not the intention here to judge the merits of MCC’s dominant role. Yet this case study reveals that the world of partnerships would not be productive without effective co-­ordination and leadership, and at a practical level the scale, urgency, energy and commitment required to deliver the targets of regeneration would not have been available without one structure adopting the role which MCC performed. Other structures might have been capable of providing this function, but the elected local authority with the legitimacy, infrastructure and relative permanence which it possesses is best placed. If that is not universally the case, then it is patently so in east Manchester.

8 Who participates in regeneration?

This chapter evaluates the nature and extent of resident involvement in regeneration in east Manchester without any a priori assumption of what constitutes ideal democratic practice. Nevertheless, participation does not happen in an ideological vacuum, and we acknowledge that there were several drivers behind resident involvement. The temporal theme is evident in various ways. First, any snapshot view of resident involvement would not do justice to the types and extent of involvement which occurred from 1998 onwards. Our research presence in the area over an extended time period enables us to present a ‘moving picture’ of citizen involvement. This relates to a second point referred to by residents and regeneration officials, namely, that there is a cycle of participation, with peaks and troughs at different points in the regeneration process. Finally, the chapter focuses inevitably on the New Labour years, as this was when most regeneration activity took place, but we also discuss changes resulting from the recession and the election of the Coalition Government in 2010. Resident involvement and regeneration Resident involvement was not an optional extra: it was a key element of the process for various reasons. First, even before NDC/Beacons and NEM were established, residents had been campaigning for attention to be paid to east Manchester. Many had been involved in Tenants’ and Residents’ Associations (TARAs) before the NDC process and had built up prior experience. Residents told us that they had sent a video to Tony Blair when he was elected documenting the decline into which the area had sunk and they had lobbied their local MP Tony Lloyd (Focus Group, 24/04/2006). Residents from the fifteen existing TARAs had been part of

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the unsuccessful Estates Renewal Challenge Fund (ERCF) bid and they formed the core of residents who would bid successfully for NDC monies. These TARAs were subsequently brought together under the umbrella of the East Manchester Residents’ Forum (EMRF), which met for the first time in August 1998. The second meeting of the EMRF, which coincided with the launch of NDC, selected three residents to join the NDC bid team which oversaw the development of the SRB Round 5 bid and the NDC delivery plan. According to MCC (2009a): ‘These key concepts of working with recognised residents’ groups, bringing groups together through the Residents’ Forum and the Forum selecting resident representatives on decision-­making structures have remained constant in the 10 years since.’ Second, both NDC/Beacons and NEM were required to involve residents. The NDC programme was made responsible by Government for Community Capacity Building, which meant that community engagement was central to its activities. When the NDC initiative was launched in 1998, residents in east Manchester were consulted on a name for the programme, resulting in the choice of Beacons for a Brighter Future. URCs were recommended to involve residents, but as the only URC which covered extensive residential areas NEM had to take that responsibility seriously (DETR, 1999). Third, the Labour Government had emphasised the need for democratic renewal. Bodies like the Local Government Association (LGA) and the Improvement and Development Agency (IDeA) had long urged local engagement, and these ideas had been translated into manuals for practitioners (Goss, 1999) and advocated by academics who saw an active participatory democracy as strengthening, but not replacing, representative democracy (Beetham and Weir, 1999; Pratchett, Durose and Lowndes, 2009). New Labour’s solution to local democratic renewal in the 1990s was two-­fold: on the one hand, the reform of local government structures to make local government more open and accountable and, on the other, innovative forms of participation to motivate people to participate in politics between elections (DETR, 1998a). Democratic renewal was a key element of the White Paper Modernising Local Government: Local Democracy and Community Leadership (DETR, 1998a), which was translated into law via the Local Government Act of 2000. Yet New Labour’s enthusiasm for ‘people power’ should not be exaggerated. Participatory democracy was the least mandatory part of the 1998 White Paper, the main thrust of which concerned service delivery (Leach and Wingfield, 1999: 464–49). A government official commented that central government lacked a holistic approach to community involvement; the political rhetoric in favour of community involvement did not marry with what actually came out of discrete government departments (Interview, 27/02/2006). Nevertheless, the 2000 Local Government Act made it a statutory duty on local government to consult people as part of the Best Value process, and this became a criterion against which individual local authorities were assessed (Rao, 2000: 37). The importance paid to democratic renewal waxed and waned but it remained a



Who participates in regeneration? 157

theme of Government White Papers throughout Labour’s terms of office (ODPM, 2001; DCLG, 2006). The White Paper Communities in Control: Real People, Real Power (DCLG, 2008) led to the Duty to Involve Act of April 2009, which placed a statutory responsibility on local authorities and other statutory services ‘to inform, consult and involve local people or representatives of local people on issues that they are affected by or interested in’ (Manchester Partnership, 2011a: 22). Nor could the Coalition Government ignore the trend. The passing of the Government’s Localism Bill paved the way for local communities to take decisions on planning issues. For Murray (2011: 396) this meant that ‘The public has gained a more powerful voice and neighbourhoods must now have a say in the way proposals go forward and people can accept or reject ideas’. Finally, MCC recognised its error in not involving residents in past regeneration initiatives and learned from earlier mistakes. The widespread housing demolition through CPOs from the 1940s to the 1960s and the arbitrary relocation of communities to outer suburbs had occurred without consultation. While MCC was in the vanguard of urban regeneration through partnerships with the private sector after 1987 it actually ‘retreated from citizen involvement’ during this period (Diamond, 2004: 181). A key figure in Manchester politics concurred that ‘the city council has not historically been good at participation’ (Interview, 07/03/2005), but as one official argued, ‘Manchester really learnt from the Hulme disaster of the 1970s and really wants to take communities with them’ (Interview, 10/12/2004). It is against this background that attempts to involve residents in east Manchester occurred. Resident involvement in east Manchester Many of the models to evaluate participation make use of ‘ladder’ metaphors which derive from Arnstein’s (1969) classification of participation. Building on Arnstein’s metaphor, Goss (1999) devised a continuum of participation, McLaverty (1999) proposed a matrix of participation and Smith and Beazley (2000) formulated a circular diagrammatic representation which contrasted limited with strong participation. Tested against the realities of east Manchester, these models were found wanting in two ways, although the matrix/diagrammatic models are less flawed. First, imposing order as these models seek to do by a classification of involvement means forcing diverse participatory experiences into categories which can never be as nuanced as reality. They cannot present a typology which can offer an overall characterisation of resident involvement throughout the regeneration process. Their ‘static’ nature prevents them from capturing how mechanisms such as neighbourhood planning may move from rung to rung or along the continuum at ­different points in the process. In contrast, we acknowledge the dynamic nature of participation and the lack of linear progress in east Manchester, as good community engagement initiatives were punctuated by setbacks. We also focus on the ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ methods

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The regeneration of east Manchester

of involving residents in their communities. Chanan (2003: 6) argues that formal ‘vertical involvement’ which, because of its labour-­and time-­intensive nature will only ever attract a minority of participants, neglects ‘horizontal involvement’, comprising participation in a wide range of community groups, activities and networks including simple one-­to-­one acts of neighbourly kindness. It is important to heed context and the diversity of ways in which residents may become involved without judging a priori these different forms of involvement. Our second criticism of these approaches is that their normative purpose is to present a hierarchy of types of involvement in which those placed higher up the ladder are to be particularly valued. Arnstein (1969) proposes seven ladder rungs in ascending order of her approval through manipulation, therapy, informing, consultation, placation, partnership, delegated power and citizen control. Goss (1999: 7) presents a continuum and it is apparent which devices are particularly recommended among the range from information-­giving to delegating. McLaverty (1999: 11) offers a matrix with four quartiles and it is hard to avoid the conclusion that the ultimate form of community engagement is represented by the holistic/ collectivistic box. Smith and Beazley’s (2000: 863–865) ‘wheel’ evaluates involvement using the criteria of the distribution of power, access to resources and the potential for empowerment in decision-­making, which implies normative assumptions about what is considered ‘strong’ as opposed to ‘limited’ participation. This chapter rejects these normative assumptions. There is little point in imposing an ideal type of participation if it does not address the situational realities of east Manchester, a deprived community undergoing an MCC-­led regeneration programme demanded by central government and required to make a substantial and early impact. The structural constraints imposed on such programmes should not be under-­estimated, nor should the ideological underpinnings of the New Labour government which, while recognising the need to tackle poverty, often placed the responsibility for doing so on to individuals themselves. In contrast to earlier attempts at democratic renewal in the 1970s and 1980s, involving experiments in local democracy in areas such as Islington and Tower Hamlets (Burns, Hambleton and Hogget, 1994), ‘democratic renewal in the 1990s was firmly linked to increasing societal responsibility rather than extending state provision’ (Blakeley and Evans, 2008: 103). We advocate a contextual analysis which takes account of the local environment and the constraints upon community engagement. This approach is akin to Saward’s argument (2003) which pays attention to issues of temporality, spatiality and complexity when evaluating citizen involvement. Saward argues that democratic principles (such as participation) gain their meaning through the devices, mechanisms and institutions which enact them. He outlines how ‘Democratic principles come alive (are “lived”) through the medium of formal decisional mechanisms or devices which are designed to activate them and which come to be justified in terms of them’ (Saward, 2003: 166). This reflexive approach is ‘sensitive to context, open-­



Who participates in regeneration? 159

ended, productive and adaptable’ (Saward, 2003: 161) and therefore enables types of participation to be evaluated against the real circumstances in which people act. This means there is no a priori judgement about which types of participation are more ‘genuine’ but it allows the principle of participation to be enacted through ‘distinctive combinations of devices, sequenced differently – in different times and places’ (Saward, 2003: 169). Saward’s contingent approach could be criticised for allowing too limited democratic involvement to be acceptable and for endorsing processes which theorists such as Arnstein would consider deficient. We argue, however, that it is valuable to build on what exists in practice rather than to proceed on the basis of theoretical ideals (Blakeley and Evans, 2010: 327–328). NDC/Beacons and resident involvement NDC/Beacons did not start de novo in terms of resident involvement. Residents were involved in the Bid Team and NDC/Beacons knew they had to engage with the fifteen existing TARAs. Resident involvement, however, was not uniform across the NDC area. Some areas had Homewatch or Tenants’ Associations; other areas had little if any self-­organisation. Beswick, for example, was quite organised at the start compared to Openshaw, where resident involvement consisted of individuals working in isolation (Interview, 27/07/2010). This patchiness of resident involvement continued throughout regeneration, with the NDC/Beacons’ area being more heavily involved than the wider NEM area. In turn, Gorton and Newton Heath, added to NEM in the autumn of 2004, were less involved than the NEM area in general. In the year between the launch of NDC/Beacons as an initiative and the submission of a Delivery Plan to Government setting out the proposals for the ten-­year programme, ‘a significant amount of consultation was undertaken to inform the community about the initiative, get their views on issues and potential solutions and generate greater resident involvement’ (MCC, 2009a). Leaflets, posters, newsletters and a double-­decker ‘Information Bus’ spread the word. Such information-­ giving was accompanied by community planning and youth consultation events, perception surveys and visits to existing structures such as voluntary sector organisations and traders’ associations (MCC, 2009a). NDC/Beacons had community-­ led regeneration as its remit so community capacity and cohesion was ‘designed to be a cross-­cutting theme with influence over the whole Programme and embedded in delivery structures and processes’ (Roberts, 2010: 81). Activities specifically supported under Community Capacity and Cohesion accounted for £3.78 m of NDC funding (7.3% of the total NDC budget) and £1.4 m of SRB funding (5.5% of the overall SRB budget) (Roberts, 2010: 82). Emphasis was given to training those wanting to get involved. But, although NDC/Beacons had community involvement at its heart, engaging residents didn’t just happen: considerable time and effort went into it. As one participant commented, ‘NDC/Beacons met a lot of

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The regeneration of east Manchester

resistance at first. NDC/Beacons was quite unfocused on residential involvement in the first 12 months. NDC/Beacons wanted to do it but didn’t know how to but quickly we realised we were on the same side’ (Interview, 17/09/2010). One of the first steps taken to include residents was to make the Bid Team the NDC/Beacons’ Board in late 1999, with six out of the twelve places occupied by residents elected by the EMRF. Eligibility to stand and vote was restricted to those TARAs who had attended at least four out of twelve forum meetings during each year. From April 2007, a young resident, nominated through the Bang of the Voice young people’s forum, became a Board member to try to increase the involvement of young people. Despite this extended membership, both residents and NDC/ Beacons’ officers felt that more could have been done to include young people and black and ethnic minority (BME) representatives on the Board. Lowndes and Durose (2010: 354) similarly voiced concerns about the inclusiveness of NDC/ Beacons. Nevertheless, the desire for greater diversity in membership conflicted with the decision to keep the Board deliberately small to allow it to operate ­strategically (Roberts, 2010: 86). Below the Beacons Board were six thematic Task Groups, established during the process of preparing the Bid, and beneath them were various sub-­groups and steering groups. The Task Groups, which drew together the relevant public agencies, were open to any resident and were generally held in the evenings to maximise attendance. The NDC/Beacons’ final evaluation stated that the task groups ‘have been extremely effective. They provided a very valuable channel for generating resident input to considering problems and developing solutions’ (Roberts, 2010: 86) According to one resident, ‘The Crime and Community Safety Task Group and the Housing Task Group were always the best attended, which shows you which issues were the most important to people’ (Interview, 31/07/2006). The influence of such groups is difficult to measure but in 2002 Sean McGonigle reported that the Queen’s Speech had included a draft Housing Bill which gave local authorities powers for the selective licensing of private landlords in areas of low housing demand. He claimed that the proposals had been brought forward in part because of local activity (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 25/11/2002). Opinions regarding residents’ influence over NDC/Beacons’ Board decisions were mixed: one resident Board member said ‘the Board was good but we didn’t influence how money was spent’, while another claimed that ‘resident membership was not just a formality, [we were] taking decisions on people’s requests for money. Nothing went through without us picking the bones off it’ (Interviews, 27/07/2010). The NDC/Beacons’ final evaluation recognised that ‘In some cases decisions were not fully open to challenge but it was understood that there was a need to balance resident influence with the need to progress the strategic programme’ (Roberts, 2010: 86). While there is no objective measurement of resident influence, the minutes suggest it was taken seriously. The Chair or Deputy Chair was a resident member; training was provided to support resident members in their roles as



Who participates in regeneration? 161

Chair/Deputy Chair or as ordinary Board members; and there was evidence of funding for initiatives being rejected by the Board (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 18/08/2003). One resident-­activist said that the free training offered by NDC/ Beacons was a ‘really positive experience’ (Interview, 27/07/2006). Resident Board members attended regularly and the minutes detail their significant contributions, suggesting confidence in airing their views. The quality of their interventions was also evident. In June 2002, one of the resident members questioned statistics from JobCentre Plus and wanted to know if the Asda recruitment process had affected the statistics and if data was available on 16-­18-­year olds. It was agreed to provide new figures omitting the Asda recruitment process and any short-­term impact from the Commonwealth Games (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 10/06/2002). NDC/Beacons also strengthened the number and quality of TARAs, which increased from twenty-­one in 1999 to fifty-­six in 2002. By the end of 2006, there were sixty-­one. An NDC/Beacons’ Resident Liaison Team of three officers supported these associations and the EMRF. Each TARA elected two members to attend the EMRF which, in turn, elected representatives to the NDC/Beacons’ Board. The support from the Resident Liaison Team for these structures included financial resources and training. There was a particular focus on linking groups to new community facilities such as The Grange and the Wells Centre. Caution should be exercised, however, in assessing the effectiveness of some of the TARAs, as there was evidence to suggest that some had little more than a paper existence. One resident-­ activist suggested that the number of effective associations was much lower than the number of actual groups. She declared ‘As soon as somebody came into NDC/ Beacons with a query, they were signed up for a Residents’ Group. But once some groups got what they wanted, then they finished it’ (Interview, 27/07/2010). If some TARAs had a short shelf life, the EMRF lasted from 1998 until it was replaced by new structures in 2009. For one local councillor, the importance of the EMRF resided in the fact that ‘it is a learning process where individuals from local groups learn about generalities of the area by meeting other groups’ so that it ‘helps people to see there is a wider agenda’ (Interview, 06/02/2007). The number of residents involved in these formal structures was small. This had both positive and negative aspects. The involvement of a small core of residents throughout provided continuity and built up expertise, but they were unable to secure a broader range of resident involvement. One NDC/Beacons’ official recognised that ‘One of the things we might have got wrong is that it was only ever a few activists who turned out. We talk about community engagement but we’re really talking about a few people’ (Interview, 30/03/2010). It has long been recognised that active local political involvement is a minority sport and that there are a variety of types and different levels of participation (Parry, Moyser and Day, 1992). More residents were involved in various informal activities. Such activities are often omitted from ladder and continuum accounts of participation but they are important for community capacity building. In a context where,

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The regeneration of east Manchester

as residents themselves noted, ‘some people do nothing but drink all day’, activities such as Hot Pot Suppers, Fun Days, Parties in the Park and Bingo nights were valuable ways of engaging an otherwise largely disengaged community. Parties in the Park were introduced as part of the local Commonwealth Games celebrations in 2002 and their success and popularity lead to their repetition each year in Philips, Delamere, Bradford and Openshaw parks. In summer 2004, 3,500 attended the Party in Philips Park, 800 attended Openshaw, 1,000 attended Bradford and 600 attended Delamere (NEM Board Minutes, 16/09/2004). NEM recognised that ‘These events provide an ideal opportunity for the broader partnership to meet and engage with residents’ (NEM Board Minutes, 17/07/2007). One resident-­activist commented that ‘regeneration did bring a lot of people together and many have remained friends to this day’ (Interview, 17/09/2010). NDC/Beacons often used events for the dual purpose of building good social relations and providing opportunities for residents to make their preferences known. Sean McGonigle, NDC/Beacons’ co-­ordinator, asserted that ‘by making the consultation fun we hope more people than ever will participate, giving us a true picture of people’s views’, and that such activities backed up more formal participation (MCC, 2006e). Typical of such an approach was the ‘washing line consultation at a family fun day in Philips Park in which residents were asked to hang on a washing line those regeneration projects they regard as “tops” and those they regard as “pants”’. Such ‘fun’ consultations can produce a strong response and test opinion in a format and setting in which marginalised residents can join in. The issues that locals could specify are not predetermined. As a local activist expressed it this exemplified the ‘quirky nature of the consultations’ (Interview, 27/07/2006). A survey conducted by residents under the authors’ supervision in 2006 revealed considerable percentages involved in Parties in the Park (55.1%), fun days (51.1%), clean-­up days (26.1%) and helping with community gardens and alleygating (20.3%)(Figure 8.1). NDC/Beacons’ and later NEM’s concentration on supporting these ‘fun’ activities acknowledges that various interactions with residents are required which include both ‘formal’ and ‘informal’ devices of participation. Such ‘fun’ activities acknowledge the constraints within which residents are asked to participate. As the Community Development Foundation argues, ‘a strategy for strengthening communities should . . . address first and foremost people’s ability to relate to each other’ (quoted by Chanan, 2003: 27). The regeneration partners, through activities like Parties in the Park, sought to expand and exploit existing networks of neighbourliness. NDC/Beacons also presented its annual report in innovative ways. The magazine format of the 2002/2003 Annual Report proved popular so the GO sent copies to other NDCs and the Neighbourhood Renewal Unit (NRU) as an example of best practice (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 15/09/2003). The 2003/2004 Annual Report was distributed as a postcard, highlighting key messages, with the full report available on request (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 20/09/2004).



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8.1 Alleygating

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The regeneration of east Manchester

Another year a tea towel with messages from the Annual Report was distributed. In 2006, NDC/Beacons sent out 10,000 tea bags with a pocket-­sized copy of its Annual Report to motivate residents to read it while enjoying a brew (NEMA, 28/09/2006). The 2006/2007 Annual Report was produced as a colouring book and was distributed to primary schools. It was highlighted in the local and national press for ‘its innovative approach providing information to the local community’ (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 22/10/2007). The close working relationship between NDC/Beacons and residents was evident in its ‘open-­door policy’ at Grey Mare Lane. Residents praised this approach. One resident-­activist said ‘I used to be in NDC four times a week and I could solve 20 problems in 20 minutes’ (Interview, 17/09/2010). The neighbourhood location of NDC/Beacons also provided residents with access to key contacts and the ability to obtain information on service delivery and to raise concerns. The final NDC/ Beacons’ evaluation highlighted this open-­door policy as ‘successful in generating ownership of the Programme among residents’, although it acknowledged that this kind of policy was not commonplace and was in fact amended towards the end of the Programme as a result of security concerns (Roberts, 2010: 85). NDC/Beacons’ open-­door policy contrasted with what residents perceive as the corporate approach of NEM, who shared the Grey Mare Lane offices. The common perception among residents now that NEM is the sole occupier of the building is that they are less welcome. Residents now sign in at Reception before entering the offices and, according to one NDC/Beacons’ official, ‘residents feel it is no longer our building, our money’ (Interview, 30/03/10). As the NDC/Beacons’ final evaluation commented ‘Some residents feel that this amendment is symbolic and reflects a wider cultural change in NEM’ (Roberts, 2010: 85). Eastserve also helped cement a close working relationship between the regeneration structures and residents. A key component of the project was the development of locally focused content and interactive services delivered via a website. One resident said ‘you felt safe using it because it had a familiar look’ (Interview, 31/07/2006). Originally conceived as a link between MCC and residents, Eastserve provided local community information, on-­line access to a database of local jobs, the ability to produce a professional CV and access to an ‘In work/benefit’ calculation. NDC/Beacons reported that the discussion forums enabled service providers to assess opinion and provided opportunities to make direct contact. For example, the Police took residents out on patrol after identifying an issue of concern through the website (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 18/08/2003). NDC/Beacons and NEM also used it for on-­line consultation processes and discussion forums. The Wired Up Communities initiative allowed the expansion of Eastserve from the original 450 to 4,500 homes in the area. Locally based ICT Centres were also developed. Taken together, the NEM Board estimated that these initiatives ‘Will make East Manchester the most “connected community” in the UK’ (NEM Board Meeting, 28/02/2001). According to one interviewee, Eastserve was the only thing



Who participates in regeneration? 165

she really felt involved in because she was an owner-­occupier. This particular resident was passionate about Eastserve because it helped a whole community, not just one street, and gave lots of opportunities to people. She ‘was proud of Eastserve because it didn’t differentiate between communities’ (Interview, 31/07/2006). The issue of sustainability, however, is important. The project tried to achieve sustainability by examining support through advertising and sponsorship and the development of local skills and knowledge through the Residents’ Panel (who took responsibility for monitoring content) and community champions (NDC/ Beacons’ Board Minutes, 22/07/2002). By 2009 over 5,000 residents had received a subsidised computer and had been on training courses, and 1,500 residents had received broadband. NEM created a partnership with the private sector firm Symera Technologies in 2009 to take the project forward and to roll it out across the city (NEM Board Minutes, 17/03/2009). Some NDC/Beacons’ monies were also used to support The Advertiser to disseminate local news. East Manchester had no local newspaper as the area’s profile was unattractive to advertisers, so there was no vehicle to provide information to residents, businesses and public agencies. The newspaper was funded by monies from NEM, NDC/Beacons, North Manchester Regeneration, the EAZ, Ancoats Urban Village Company and the SAZ. In 2004, NEM’s Household Survey revealed that The Advertiser was the second most important source of information after word-­of-­mouth: 80% saw a copy (NEM Board Meeting, 12/02/2004), although one resident complained in 2007 that it had changed from being a genuine instrument for residents to a more cautious publication propounding official views (Interview, 31/07/2009). There were also problems about some houses not receiving copies which Kwest was invited to investigate (NEM Board Meeting, 20/11/2002). Resident involvement was of cross-­cutting importance in that it added to other aspects of regeneration. For example, Very Important Parent (VIP) Days involved parents in the education of their children while ‘an important element of the EAZ’s success had been the EAZ Forum that contained the involvement of residents’ (NEM Board Minutes, 23/07/2003). The NDC/Beacons’ Arts and Culture Programme aimed to maximise opportunities for engagement with residents and the East Manchester Voluntary Sector Consortium was established at the start of the NDC/Beacons’ Programme, comprising residents and representatives from voluntary, community and faith groups (Roberts, 2010: 83). Also of importance was the investment of over £4 m of NDC/Beacons’ funding in community facilities from which a variety of projects and improved services could be delivered. Without NDC/Beacons’ funding, for example, the neighbourhood-­based delivery of services at The Grange, Roundhouse and Sporting Edge would not have been possible (Roberts, 2010: 78). A particular success was the development of 4CT, a community organisation which now manages The Grange and Sporting Edge. Both these centres provide a vital base for many voluntary and community groups. It is worth remembering

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The regeneration of east Manchester

that the purpose of engaging residents was not inspired by abstract democratic ideals but by the requirement for a better relationship between the community and service providers so that the community could demand better services. Of key importance in improving trust between residents and service providers was the Public Agency Forum which, under the aegis of NDC/Beacons, improved communication between mainstream service providers, NDC/Beacons and residents. The scope to challenge service providers through the Public Agencies Forum helped to rebuild trust between residents and providers. At the same time, however, it is worth noting that NDC/Beacons’ emphasis on building the capacity of residents to raise their expectations and to challenge service providers was motivated by a key ideological characteristic of NDC/Beacons which, as discussed in Chapter 6, was as much about promoting the interests of disadvantaged residents as it was about passing responsibility for improving their situation to individuals themselves. When measured against its own targets for community capacity and cohesion, NDC/Beacons outperformed in every respect, although it also noted that many of the forecast outputs were unrealistically low and that there was the possibility of double, even multiple, counting in the numbers of people estimated to have benefited. Nevertheless, the table reproduced below from the NDC/Beacons’ final evaluation suggests good performance. Indicator Training weeks’ delivered Voluntary organisations supported Community groups supported Individuals involved in voluntary work Capacity building initiatives Number of consultation exercises undertaken

Forecast

Actual

4,966 304 416 454 58 45

16,032 1,086 1,464 2,259 344 230

Source: Roberts (2010: 25)

The NDC/Beacons’ final evaluation highlighted various examples of good practice linked to their approach to community engagement, namely–starting consultation early (by involving residents in the bid process); a culture of openness (facilitated by an open-­door policy and employing residents as co-­workers); the development of effective and diverse means of communication (including Eastserve, innovative ways of presenting the Annual Report and a two-­day conference at Manchester Town Hall); and, the Social Inclusion Toolkit (Roberts, 2010: 84). The Social Inclusion Toolkit, based on local good practice, aimed to engage hard-­to-­reach groups. Examples of good practice included ‘approaches to engaging with different vulnerable groups (such as homeless people and asylum seekers) and community evaluation and community transport projects’ (Roberts, 2010: 83). NDC/Beacons tried to encourage different groups to get involved by



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developing channels to target groups such as the Young People’s Forum and the Over-­50s Forum (Roberts, 2010: 85). Finally, the number of residents saying that they felt closely involved with their community remained at least twice the baseline figure since 2002 although there was a slight downward trend, perhaps a sign of the ‘cycle of participation’ phenomenon described below. In 1999, the figure was 25%, reaching a high of 56% in 2002 and declining slightly to 50% in 2008 (Roberts, 2010: 84). It is also worth emphasising that NDC was not viewed positively by all residents. A former co-­ordinator of the EMRF, for example, cited the NDC’s desire ‘to control everything’ as evidence of a lack of democratic accountability (NEMA, 11/07/2003). NEM and resident Involvement Resident engagement was not the sole preserve of NDC/Beacons, and NEM engaged residents primarily through the NP process but also right from its inception through consultations. Moreover, like NDC/Beacons, residents formed part of the Board, filling four positions as Community Directors: three are residents, two of whom are elected through the EMRF with the fourth representing the faith/ education community. In one of the early Shadow Board meetings, Bernstein stated that ‘to align with current government policy, it is essential that the community representatives are seen to be truly representative of the local area and have been chosen by the community in east Manchester’ (NEM Shadow Board Minutes, 16/07/1999). Residents claimed, however, that they felt less able to influence NEM Board decisions than the NDC/Beacons’ Board. NEM’s Chief Executive, Tom Russell, acknowledged at a Board Away Day in November 2005 that ‘There has been very limited contribution from community directors’ and few opportunities other than Away Days for Board members to meet and develop working relationships outside of Board meetings, hence ‘the Board has not really developed as a team’ (NEM Board Minutes, 15/11/2005). Another NEM Board member, however, felt that the community representatives ‘act as a very good “reality check”’ and they are ‘useful in telling the board how it’s really working on the ground’. Thus, the community representatives were a ‘good discipline’ for the Board and helped force NEM to be outcomes-­focused in terms of what difference any project would make to the people of east Manchester (Interview, 01/09/2004). According to another official, although the ability of community representatives to contribute at a strategic level was minimal, that contribution was symbolic in terms of legitimacy and reporting back to the community. For this official, the gap between community involvement at neighbourhood and NEM Board level didn’t matter as the former was much more effective because NP took place in an overall strategic framework and not in a vacuum (Interview, 03/12/2004). The difference between NEM and NDC/Beacons relates to the purpose of each organisation. One activist/official argued that ‘There is something structurally

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The regeneration of east Manchester

different about each organisation which makes people like one and not the other. NEM was a delivery company, there to provide a platform, to make things happen and thus less tangible for people to grasp. NDC was front of house’ (Interview, 17/09/2010). Interpreting what this difference meant for community engagement is not straightforward but it suggests that some issues are removed from public discussion under the guise that they are matters for the individual, the market or private ownership (Fraser, 1992: 131). The question then becomes less the extent to which resident members were able to influence decisions at Board meetings and more the extent to which strategic decisions affecting regeneration were taken in arenas with no resident involvement. MCC acknowledged the difference between the ‘community focused approach to regeneration’ of NDC/Beacons and the ‘strategic focus’ of NEM. The original 2001 SRF ‘recognised that it was the NDC/Beacons initiative rather than NEM that was taking responsibility for building the capacity of local residents’ (MCC, 2009a). One NEM Board member argued that ‘what NEM has done successfully is actively engage citizens in the regeneration of their neighbourhoods but the NEM Board and Chief Executive have a very clear idea of the strategic direction needed for NEM which focuses on the economic basis and repopulating the area’. If the process had been resident-­led, then ‘they wouldn’t have set their aspirations at the level of the NEM Board’ (Interview, 03/12/2004). This difference might also relate to the distinction drawn by Lowndes and Durose (2010: 355) between city-­ level actors who emphasise ‘economic rationales’ for neighbourhood working and neighbourhood-­level actors who focus on ‘civic rationales’, although it is possible that the distinction is overdrawn and neglects the fact that some key individuals were both city-­level and neighbourhood-­level actors. Another resident-­activist highlighted a further difference between NDC/Beacons and NEM: ‘the former is local people, but NEM isn’t.’ This resident-­activist, who had been involved in many processes, said that the difference with this regeneration process, especially NDC/Beacons, is ‘that local people are involved. It’s local people who live in the area, talk the same language, don’t talk correctly. [This] clearly lends legitimacy – nobody can say that the local people working on it haven’t suffered, that they don’t know what it’s like’ (Interview, 26/01/2007). Not all regeneration officials agreed with this view of the distinctions between NEM and NDC/Beacons. One NDC/NEM official didn’t see a separation between NEM and NDC/Beacons ‘partly because MCC provides the overarching link and because Beacons was always part of a broader regeneration programme’ (Interview, 14/04/2010). There is also a temporal factor at work here. By the time NEM began, NDC/Beacons had already been working with residents and so had had time to foster relationships. NEM was a relative latecomer to the process, and appeared to find it more difficult to convince residents of its good intentions. When up-­dating the Board on the consultation exercise for the Draft Regeneration Framework, for example, the Chief Executive emphasised the importance of impressing upon resi-



Who participates in regeneration? 169

dents the fact that the Company was independent of MCC (NEM Board Minutes, 9/11/2000), while the community representatives advised the Board on the outcome from the consultation process that ‘the majority of views conveyed were positive and interested, however, residents were still sceptical and would “believe it when it happened”’ (NEM Board Minutes, 11/12/2000). Nevertheless, NEM regularly discussed how to engage residents at its Board meetings. The first consultation undertaken by NEM concerned the initial masterplanning exercise. To assist in the final selection of a masterplanning team ‘the Board felt that the community of east Manchester should be consulted on the choice of the most appropriate team to move forward to the detailed preparation of a strategic masterplanning framework’ (NEM Board Minutes, 28/10/1999). To this end, the presentation boards accompanying the final stage submissions were put on public display and members of the evaluation team briefed community representatives and collected comments for the Board (Figure 8.2). Once the Urban Strategies/ GVA Grimley Consortium had been appointed, NEM continued consultation, in conjunction with the NDC/Beacons’ and SRB team, as the masterplanning proceeded. NEM’s Chair emphasised that ‘It was important for all to know that this was not going to be a top-­down masterplan, people had to feel part of it and

8.2  Resident consultation on masterplans

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The regeneration of east Manchester

understand it’ (NEM Board Minutes, 16/03/2000). Information and consultation on the draft Regeneration Framework began with presentations, workshops and Q and A sessions followed by a ‘roadshow’ of area-­based activities in Clayton, Beswick, Ancoats/Cardroom Estate, Lower and Higher Openshaw and Miles Platting. A mobile exhibition, including a video box, audio box and other feedback activities, toured the area and linked into various local events. This was supported by a phone line/help line and visits to local groups and facilities to target harder-­to-­ reach groups (NEM Board Minutes, 13/07/2000). Open days were held to present the issues which had emerged from the baseline analysis (the first step in the ­masterplanning exercise) and ‘to give the opportunity for residents to express their objectives for change in the area’ (NEM Board Minutes, 6/04/2000). NEM Open Days stressed two messages: ‘one, all of east Manchester must be looked at; and, two, they need to tackle the hard problems of housing and employment which NDC/Beacons cannot address’ (NEM Board Minutes, 16/03/2000). These Open Days were followed by consultation on the proposals emerging from the masterplanning work. In addition to resident consultations, businesses were invited to attend Open Days and/or to comment by email or on paper, with around twenty-­five of the larger businesses (Seamark, GEC, Wormalds, Sharpe, Friends Provident, GEC) invited to attend dinners hosted by the Chairman or to engage in one-­to-­one discussions with NEM. NEM’s Chief Executive estimated that over 2,500 people had attended a presentation or event; twenty-­five presentations had been given to individual groups; twelve drop-­in community events and four drop-­in business events had been held, 200 written responses had been received, ­eighty-­four of which were from individually named east Manchester residents, and all of the comments received were reviewed (NEM Board Minutes, 11/12/2000). There was some evidence that NEM emerged from the exercise with a better understanding of the major issues. Changes were made to the Draft Regeneration Framework in light of this. NEM’s Chief Executive reported that “The text and plans have been substantially revised in light of the consultation exercise undertaken’ (NEM Board Minutes, 10/01/2001). For example, one of the key concerns of residents was to retain existing communities. The Regeneration Framework was strengthened to emphasise that NEM would make the retention of the existing community of east Manchester a priority. In the section on housing, the following new sentence was added: ‘The existing communities are the bedrock on which the objectives of the regeneration strategy can be realised, and the housing strategy clearly recognises the need to maintain and support them through the renewal process’ (NEM Board Minutes, 11/12/2000). Similarly, there was significant rewriting of the sections on Crime and Community Safety to reflect the fact that crime and the fear of crime was a major concern of residents and local businesses. In the Area Proposals, a proviso was added: ‘As with all local proposals, detailed consultation with residents will take place.’ This was in response to the concern over the lack of detail contained in some of the Area Proposals and the desire by residents



Who participates in regeneration? 171

to maintain a detailed dialogue with NEM as regeneration proceeded (NEM Board Minutes, 11/12/2000). Consultation was repeated for the revision of the Regeneration Framework in 2007 which was ‘subject to an intensive consultation process to ensure that the widest number of residents, partners and agencies have their say on the draft SRF’. NEM Board members welcomed the long period of time over which consultation would occur, given the complexity of the issues (NEM Board Minutes, 24/09/2007). The exercise lasted three months and 30,000 households were consulted by post. There were also ‘drop-­in’ sessions, widespread leafleting to invite residents to meetings, which were attended by over 800 people, and over 1,000 detailed survey forms were completed. The then Acting Chief Executive of NEM, Eddie Smith, asserted that changes ensued as a result of the consultation process: land use was altered to allow more open spaces and allotments; the profile of tackling crime was raised; and steps were taken to increase the opportunities for ­inter-­generational contact (NWDA,  2008). In 2011, consultation continued with regard to the Eastlands Regeneration Framework (which built on NEM’s 2008/2018 SRF) and the Eastlands Community Plan as part of the new deal between MCC, NEM and MCFC (MCC, 2012b). NEM’s commitment to consult on the SRF was evident, but the SRF is not a binding document. As one key NEM official opined ‘SRFs are not blueprints but flexible documents which move with the vagaries of the market, they set out a direction of travel which you might get to in five to ten years’ (Interview, 30/03/2010). This echoes the opinion of many residents that ‘consultation can affect the smaller details but not the larger, strategic direction where things go ahead anyway’ and fits with Fraser’s (1992: 132) claim that certain matters are shielded from resident involvement. NEM and neighbourhood planning NEM engaged with residents primarily through NP. Following publication of the SRF in March 2001, a commitment was given that detailed NP would ensure residents’ full involvement in neighbourhood regeneration. According to NEM’s Chief Executive, ‘The extensive consultation exercise on the framework reinforced the need for more detailed planning at neighbourhood level to provide a greater degree of certainty for residents and businesses in the area’ (NEM Board Minutes, 06/06/2001). Leaflets, individually targeted at each neighbourhood, informing residents about the development of neighbourhood plans, were finalised in July 2001 and distributed in three phrases with a covering letter setting out the NP areas, the process for consultation and development of local Area Plans and a broad timetable (NEM Board Minutes, 18/07/2001). Housing symbolised the move from a high-­level SRF to a more detailed area-­based framework (NEM Board Minutes, 18/07/2001). The

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NEM Board agreed two general principles through which local area strategies for all residential neighbourhoods would be developed. First, a comprehensive approach to the planning of local areas to ensure that community facilities – schools, health centres, shops – and infrastructure were planned in parallel with housing proposals. Second, ‘local communities need to participate in the development of those strategies. The SRF is clear in its aspiration to retain and build on the existing community in east Manchester, and this objective can best be served by ensuring that plans for local neighbourhoods are informed by the detailed experience, knowledge and views of residents’ (NEM Board Minutes, 06/06/2001). For NEM, the principles for NP were to: maximise participation – engaging with all members of the community; plan comprehensively – improving the quality of life for all; create clear and strong partnerships; be managed and appropriately resourced; be simple, effective and transparent; be flexible – to allow for early opportunities; and be time limited – to enable the delivery of the NP at the earliest opportunity (NEM Board Minutes, 27/09/2005). NP aimed to focus on the needs of local communities and was, in contrast to previous regeneration efforts in the city, underpinned by the development of a ‘Right to Remain, Right to Return’ guarantee which was ‘intended specifically to support existing residents across all tenures who wish to remain in east Manchester to be afforded the opportunity to do so’ (NEM Board Minutes, 21/03/2003). For a key figure in Manchester politics, the difference between the slum clearance of the 1950s and 1960s and NEM development was ‘the right to remain’ to keep communities there and together. For him, NP was crucial as ‘involvement helps people to stay’ (Interview, 03/09/2004). Nevertheless this same official stated that ‘the issue of consultation worries me greatly’ because of ‘the risk of putting models and options before people which were not practicable or deliverable’ (NEM Board Minutes, 16/03/2000). Each NP process establishes a Residents’ Steering Group (RSG) whose members participate in the selection of development partners, attend design workshops, visit other locations where redevelopment has taken place and training sessions to ensure an awareness of the processes necessary to implement neighbourhood plans such as CPO and planning procedures (NEM Board Minutes, 21/03/2003). The purpose of the RSG is to provide a ‘residents’ view’, to be consulted on the consultation process and to be involved in the appointment of development partners/­ masterplanners. It is not a decision-­making body, as all decisions require more detailed consultation across the community and, where necessary, the approval of NEM and MCC’s Executive (NEM Board Minutes, 27/09/2005). Leese argued that once all the NPs had been completed they would form part of MCC’s ward plans and would be reviewed annually (NEM Board Minutes, 21/05/2003). It is important to note, however, that despite the centrality of NP to resident involvement, NEM did not carry out NP processes itself. While NEM was the ‘strategic custodian’ of NP, other organisations with their own agendas to further, such as NDC/Beacons, MCC Housing Department, developers or consultants, often car-



Who participates in regeneration? 173

ried out the process albeit under the direction of NEM (Interview, 30/03/2010). The HMRP funding was also used to advance NP in key areas. This ‘hands-­off’ approach contrasted with that of NDC/Beacons, which participated directly in community events and therefore had a closer relationship with residents. Beswick NP Beswick illustrates both the successes and difficulties of NP. Part of Beswick was included in the LSVT of council-­owned properties while another part was designated for comprehensive redevelopment. Community consultation was a vital ingredient of both. MCC’s Housing Department undertook a consultation exercise for the proposed LSVT, with a tenants’ steering group overseeing the process. A door-­to-­door survey of every affected household was completed in September 2001 and a ballot of all eligible tenants held in September 2002. There was a 76% turnout. Of those tenants who voted, 90% voted ‘yes’, meaning that overall 68% of all tenants voted in favour of the transfer. The transfer involved a £60 m investment programme over five years to improve 3,000 of the former council-­owned houses. Community engagement was a central element of the agreement to transfer stock to Eastlands Homes, and this was made clear by the NDC/Beacons’ Board which repeatedly sought assurances that resident involvement would be at the heart of Eastlands Homes’ activities. Apart from the need to improve and maintain the properties being transferred, a key objective of the transfer for NDC/Beacons was for Eastlands Homes to establish channels for tenant and resident participation and to take responsibility for delivering neighbourhood management services. The Eastlands Homes’ Board comprises twelve members, of whom five are tenants while others are councillors, MCC officers and various independent members such as the Principal from the Manchester College of Advanced Technology (MANCAT) and senior staff from MCFC (NEM Board Minutes, 18/07/2001; 29/01/2003). Additionally, the Eastlands Tenants’ Forum, made up of TARAs recognised by Eastlands Homes, held regular themed meetings to consider service developments while investment groups consisting of tenants, owner-­occupiers, local councillors, contractors and staff met on a six-­weekly basis to review progress on the investment programme (NEM Board Minutes, 08/02/2005). The Tenants’ Forum meetings were public and all tenants had the right to go and ask questions of Eastlands Homes. Eastlands Homes’ Board members reported back to NDC/ Beacons. One Chairman of Eastlands Tenants’ Forum said that residents have a little bit of say at every level but they obviously don’t change key financial issues. He was able to point to changes as a result of resident influence, such as setting up a facility to pay by direct debit; being able to get hold of people after 5 p.m.; the changing of wording on certain policies, for example, they didn’t want the phrase ‘black and ethnic minority’ included in policies because they argued they were all the same paying customers (Interview, 27/07/2006).

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With a second transfer of stock in March 2009 of a further 5,300 council homes to Eastlands Homes, three area assemblies replaced the Tenants’ Forum and took over its functions (Interview, 12/01/2012). The Assemblies meet every six weeks and are made up of Eastlands Homes’ customers, TARAs and Service Improvement Panel members. Eastlands Homes also runs two Youth Forums (the Bang of the Voice which represents young people from Beswick, Openshaw, Clayton and Miles Platting and the Ultimate Voice for young people from West Gorton, Longsight, Levenshulme, Ardwick and Rusholme) and supports two Community Houses. It also took on the neighbourhood warden and neighbour nuisance service. The ­difficulties of sustaining services, however, also became apparent. A reduced warden service which mainly attends to issues on Eastlands Homes’ estates and the transfer of responsibility to MCC for private sector neighbour nuisance away from the innovative cross-­tenure neighbour nuisance service were seen as a backward step by some residents. In addition to the LSVT, another part of Beswick was earmarked for comprehensive redevelopment. The aim was to build 1,100 new homes, consisting of a mix of houses for sale, social housing for rent from Eastlands Homes and shared ownership with the Manchester Methodist HA. NEM committed to liaise closely with existing TARAs ‘to refine the consultation process to ensure it is as comprehensive as possible . . . as this will set the tone for later phases’. NP began in late 2001. Residents, community organisations including churches and businesses interested in forming a Beswick Neighbourhood Planning Steering Group were invited to put their names forward in order to establish the RSG by the end of October. Social surveys were undertaken to understand views of the area, to comment on the consultation methods to be used and to assess aspirations for change to support the long-­term sustainability of Beswick. The RSG met approximately every six weeks and RSG representatives were involved in the selection process to appoint development partners Lovell and Gleeson. It then worked with them to produce a detailed masterplan and to finalise the proposals for the Phase 1 Housing. RSG members visited other developments in Manchester and beyond and attended design workshops to increase awareness of the design and planning process and to ensure that their comments were incorporated into the plan. The Design Workshops focused on the detailed design of the houses and the Green Route which linked the site east to west. An information-­ gathering exercise was carried out to identify residents’ housing needs (NEM Board Minutes, 29/01/2003). NEM recognised the need to translate the neighbourhood up-­date leaflet for the Chinese and Vietnamese community in Beswick, together with any other consultation information, which was posted to appropriate households. In addition, the Tung Sing HA worked with the RSG to ensure the adequate representation of this section of the community (NEM Board Minutes, 17/10/2001). In parallel with the selection process for a development partner, a brief to appoint consultants to facilitate participation throughout the whole of Beswick was issued. The consultants were charged with working with the RSG to co-­ordinate the



Who participates in regeneration? 175

consultation activities (NEM Board Minutes, 28/11/2001). PEP were appointed as consultants to work with the RSG to undertake community consultation (NEM Board Minutes, 16/11/2002). Drop-­in sessions were held in July 2003 to enable residents to discuss the new housing designs, the public realm strategy, the new primary school and to allow residents to arrange appointments with housing staff to complete an assessment of their individual needs (NEM Board Minutes, 23/07/2003). Comments from these two drop-­in events were positive, with a high level of enthusiasm for the early commencement of redevelopment. According to NEM, approximately 97% of existing residents and tenants requiring relocation had been visited and their housing requirements assessed by September 2003 (NEM Board Minutes, 17/09/2003). The ‘Right to Remain/Right to Return’ guarantee provided all existing residents, regardless of their tenure, with the opportunity to access a new home within Beswick, to provide one move only where appropriate and to enable communities to live together (NEM Board Minutes, 17/09/2003). NP in Beswick, however, did not always proceed smoothly and difficulties arose with plans for the new east Manchester High School. Following a £300,000 facelift to houses in Sarah Street, which included installing new windows, roofs, chemically cleaned walls and a communal garden, residents were astonished to receive ­hand-­delivered letters from NEM informing them that their houses were designated for demolition because plans for a new 900-­pupil school in Beswick were being extended. Residents (owner-­occupiers and HA tenants) were furious both about the decision and the absence of consultation (MEN, 2004). Residents held demonstrations, picketed NEM Board meetings and turned up at NEM headquarters to harass Tom Russell, the then Chief Executive.1 There were significant costs for displaced residents as some of the houses that were demolished were less than ten years old (NEM Board Minutes, 30/11/2004), and the anger of the residents in Sarah Street forced NEM to undertake a new door-­to-­door consultation process which took many months (NEM Board Meeting, 30/11/2004). A newsletter outlining four options was distributed across Beswick in m ­ id-­January 2005. Houses were still to be demolished but the number varied. Feedback forms and pre-­paid envelopes were included. The newsletter was followed by a drop-­in event at NEM on 31 January. At the NEM Board meeting in February 2005, it was reported that forty-­one people had attended the drop-­in event at NEM and sixty-­ three feedback forms had been returned (NEM Board Minutes, 08/02/2005). Following analysis of resident feedback, agreement was reached between NEM and residents about which option to pursue (NEM Board Minutes, 8/02/2005). MCC’s Executive Committee of April 2005 reported that 47% had voted for the option which it approved, even though it was unhappy that the chosen option sanctioned the smallest release of land (MCC, 2005b). One local councillor cited the Beswick school as ‘the best example of where a 1

  One of the authors witnessed an example of the persistent pursuit of Tom Russell (04/12/04).

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The regeneration of east Manchester

change has occurred through a community process’ although he recognised that there were particular factors involved – namely, that houses which had recently had money spent on them were up for demolition (Interview, 13/02/2006). NEM officials admitted to having learned a lesson from the episode about the need to consult residents (Interview, 27/05/05), and a key figure in Manchester politics admitted that extending the school site had been handled very badly between NEM and MCC’s Housing Department (Interview, 03/12/2004). This could denote ‘a ­deep-­seated cynicism regarding citizen participation’ among city-­level actors (Durose and Lowndes, 2010: 351). Alternatively, this might highlight the consequences of NEM delegating responsibility for consultation rather than taking a hands-­on approach itself. It also reflects the importance of temporality in assessing resident engagement and shows the difficulties of co-­ordinating different programmes which had different start dates and of aligning local needs and aspirations with changes in central government guidelines (the Beswick school issue arose because of changes in the Department of Education (DoE) guidelines on playground size, and eventually a solution for this size issue was found which meant less housing had to be abolished (Interview, 14/07/2006).) NDC/Beacons ‘played a valuable and significant role in advancing elements of the HMRP’ by undertaking surveys to identify priorities and delivering complementary projects, but it was also recognised that it was often difficult to align HMRP efforts with the NDC/Beacons’ programme, partly because it was established later. Roberts (2010: 71) cites as an example a community garden which was funded through NDC/Beacons but later identified for clearance through the HMRP, which antagonised some residents. Beswick residents also raised concerns about the affordability of housing. Even when NP is conducted successfully, the requirement for MCC to implement the HMRP intensified a tendency for developers to gain greater profits by demolishing and rebuilding rather than maintaining older terraces which, despite the doubling of property values, created problems for locals when earnings did not keep pace. A community representative reported residents’ concerns to the NEM Board in November 2004 that the CPO in Beswick would not truly reflect the value of their homes. The Chief Executive undertook to examine valuations and added that NEM had been looking at financial packages (to be determined on an individual basis) to help residents buy new homes and stay in east Manchester. Councillor Battle commented that residents perceived that future housing developments would not be for the community (NEM Board Minutes, 30/11/2004). The NEM Board acknowledged that rising property prices in the area made NEM’s commitment to ‘Right to Remain/ Right to Return’ guarantee difficult to implement, but NEM worked closely with MCC colleagues to translate this commitment into an effective policy. MCC Executive endorsed the new Regulatory Reform Order (RRO) policy in mid September 2005 which changed the level at which the value of new homes could be purchased to support relocation from



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£88,000 to £100,000 (MCC, 2007b). For NEM, ‘this now provides a clear policy framework in which regeneration proposals can be developed and evaluated by NEM and by local residents’ (NEM Board Minutes, 27/09/2005). One official argued that the Lovell involvement in the NP process for Beswick was ‘a real learning curve for the private sector in terms of how to involve communities’ and although ‘it was a good process . . . it did leave something to assumptions, i.e. building homes that people couldn’t afford’ (Interview, 10/12/2004). The same official argued that Lovell illustrated the difficulties caused by different organisational cultures – Lovell is private sector so it is there to maximise profit. The lesson for this official from private involvement in the Beswick NP process was that consultation is an on-­going process: ‘you can’t take your eye off the ball as it’s very easy to lose community trust’ (Interview, 10/12/2004). NEM Board members stressed the need for NDC/Beacons to ensure the centrality of residents owing to ‘the difficulty of reconciling the different objectives of residents and developers’ (NEM Board Minutes, 01/06/2006). Residents are well aware of the scope given to private property developers. The housing market is sensitive to market not political forces, but residents complain that while regeneration may solve problems of negative equity it increases their rents, relocation costs, mortgages and Council taxes (Interview, 14/07/06). Other concerns related to the delivery phase, and NEM recognised the need for continued support to residents. For residents moving into new homes in Beswick, for example, ‘there is a continued need to consider the role of the developer and NEM, particularly in the early phases of development where residents will still be living in a building site’ (NEM Board Minutes, 27/09/2005). A New Beswick Homewatch Resident Survey in September 2007 demonstrated resident dissatisfaction with their new homes and the response of Lovell to redressing any ‘snags’ with the properties and their overall customer care service. It was reported to the Board that ‘The results clearly demonstrate how dissatisfied the majority of residents are not only with their homes but the quality of the overall scheme itself and the developers’ overall performance on its delivery’ (NEM Board Minutes, 24/09/2007). One of the community directors reported that residents were concerned that Lovell might be awarded more contracts for new homes in Beswick following their completion of snagging work on their existing contracts. NEM’s Chief Executive responded that local MPs and ward councillors were aware of the problems, some of which related to individual properties and some of which related to general design issues. Discussions with Lovell were on-­going to put in place a process that would be to the satisfaction of all concerned (NEM Board Minutes, 24/09/2007). Review of NP By 2005, NEM recognised that NP had served well, but was time-­consuming. The Board undertook to review NP in order to streamline the process but ‘without in any

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way compromising the principles of citizen participation and comprehensive planning which have served the area well’ (NEM Board Minutes, 27/09/2005). The main concern arising from the review was timing. The existing process was taking longer than originally anticipated and this imposed a strain on both local residents and staff. The former ‘may feel that they have been over consulted’, while the l­atter ­struggle with limited resources to continue the consultation process, ‘frustrating residents who feel that little is being achieved’ (NEM Board Minutes, 27/09/2005). The crux of the issue was how to streamline NP so that once the planning process had begun residents would see rapid delivery while ensuring that consultation remained central. It was recognised, for example, that ‘whilst there is no doubt that there is presently a high level of resident consultation taking place, this is often centred on the need to respond to residents on an ad hoc basis and to service and support the RSG rather than keeping focused on completing the NP for the benefit of all residents, within a reasonable timescale.’ One of the problems was the six-­weekly RSG meetings. While such regularity in the early months ‘has proved valuable to enable people to understand the scale of the task and the often complicated issues which help to drive the planning process forward to delivery’ it is also apparent that they ‘raise the expectations of residents about the speed at which progress can be achieved on many issues’. Six-­weekly meetings can often be ‘very time-­consuming without much progress, often with the focus of the five weeks in between being on preparing for the next RSG’ (NEM Board Minutes, 27/09/2005). Thus, NEM proposed that meetings take place quarterly but within a defined work programme because ‘It is apparent that the key issue for residents is to have a completed plan and for it to be delivered as soon as possible.’ (NEM Board Minutes, 27/09/2005). To produce a plan within twelve–eighteen months rather than two years, NEM proposed that consultation should focus on three stages: initial ideas/scoping – key principles to be contained within the NP; a draft plan following ideas and issues from the initial scoping stage, which outlines proposals for the area; and a final plan for comment before approval. Following approval of the final NP, NEM proposed that the RSG be replaced with an agreed delivery-­focused consultation/­ information strategy (NEM Board Minutes, 27/09/2005). Not all agreed. It was reported to the NEM Board, for example, that resident members on the NDC/ Beacons’ Board argued that community consultation through RSGs was falling and it should continue throughout the redevelopment process and not stop once developers had been chosen (NEM Board Minutes, 11/04/2006). Residents had mixed views about NP. On the positive side, one resident said of the Toxteth Street NP process that ‘Lovells showed a commitment to keeping the community together’ while Councillor Curley, a member of the MCC Executive at the time, stated that ‘locals will have a part to play in drawing up a comprehensive NP’ (NEMA, 11/07/2003). Residents from the Cardroom Estate were ‘involved in the development plans from the beginning and even helped create the name’ of New Islington for the new development. EP, responsible for running the project,



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argued that ‘the residents had an unusual level of input and worked with architects and Manchester Methodist HA for suitable homes to be built in the area for them’ (NEMA, 19/11/2004b). On the negative side, other residents in Toxteth Street complained of the decision taken to ‘marginalise the existing community in favour of the commercial interests of the development partners’ (NEMA, 03/11/2006). In Beswick, some residents said they were victims of ‘ethnic cleansing’ because they were ‘being priced out of the market in a bid to clear the local community out’ (NEMA, 22/12/2004). One resident felt that people were too interested in their own private agendas and were only concerned about what would happen to their own house rather than being concerned about the whole process (Interview, 31/07/2006). The challenge of helping residents to see the bigger picture was identified by a key regeneration official (Interview, 14/07/2006). Another resident-­activist said that she had gone out of her way to find out about NP in her area but she had not been invited to participate. In fact, she had followed the people hired to post the NP leaflets one day and they were only posting them in every fourth house (Interview 31/07/2006). This seemed to occur in more than one area. NEM’s Chief Executive reported that the development company in Miles Platting and Ancoats had been ‘badly let down by the company employed to distribute notices which has limited the reach’ of the consultation (NEM Board Minutes, 19/05/2000). Another resident-­activist criticised the closed meetings of the RSGs which gave the impression to many people that the outcome was predetermined because people could not just drop in (Interview, 31/07/2006), while another felt that NP ‘doesn’t really get people involved’ because people haven’t really understood the process or how to get involved. Nevertheless, the same resident acknowledged that ‘some people are interested and do get training and go on courses’ (Interview, 27/07/2006). Mixed views on the effectiveness of NP are unsurprising, not the least because of the sensitivity of the housing issue, but they do highlight the difficulty of classifying this engagement mechanism. The static nature of classificatory schema is unable to capture the way in which NP evolves over time, with successes accompanied by setbacks. The cycle of participation Residents and regeneration officials described the cyclical nature of participation, although reasons furnished for this cyclical feature were different. All agreed that, at the start, residents were angry and suspicious of MCC and other service providers. The area was characterised by ‘widespread apathy and a feeling of having been neglected by MCC and other service providers’ (Roberts, 2010: 82). One local councillor acknowledged that a lot of resident groups were oppositional, but they became engaged more constructively because real community capacity building had gone on via NDC/Beacons while another official acknowledged that ‘the process of building credibility has taken time’ because people who are now key

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The regeneration of east Manchester

advocates of east Manchester ‘were at the beginning incredibly hostile’ (Interview, 07/03/2005). The difficulties of sustaining participation were also recognised. As early as 2001, NDC/Beacons’ Board members expressed the need to encourage participation in both the LSVT and the general initiative. It was agreed that many TARAs may be satisfied with the programme and were therefore not in contact as frequently as before (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 24/09/2001). A conference on w ­ idening community participation was held in 2001 to generate new ideas for involving residents and ways of rewarding participation (for example, linking participation to accredited qualifications that could help people get into the job market) were discussed (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 24/09/2001). MCC recognised the changing level of involvement over time and described the cycle of participation thus: The first couple of years were characterized by a significant amount of activity that sought to provide information, ensure widespread consultation and build resident involvement from a very low base. This included a lot of work around building trust and forming relationships to overcome a significant level of apathy and mistrust. The following three or four years saw the fruits of this work as the level of involvement across all elements of the programme increased significantly and residents helped to shape not only the regeneration programme but began to directly challenge service delivery. (MCC, 2009a)

Attendance dipped over time at EMRF meetings. The peak years were 2000–2004 when the average attendance for each of these years was 19, 18, 23, 18 and 19, respectively. In 2005, average attendance dipped to 13 and then a low of 10 in 2006. 2008 saw a rise to 14, but this reflected the expansion of the Forum in December 2007 to absorb the new NEM areas (MCC, 2009a). Residents recognised the importance of the temporal in evaluating participation. A focus group for the final NDC/Beacons’ evaluation divided the period into two and argued that from 1999 to 2004 resident participation was meaningful and effective: ‘Staff have the initial idea but residents are involved in every step of the planning and implementation: their views are considered and they are involved in taking the decisions’ (Roberts, 2010: 88). However, from 2005 onwards, participation became ‘more tokenistic’. Survey data supports this two-­fold division and shows a decrease in the extent to which residents thought they could influence decisions about their area. ‘In 2002, 38% responded positively to this question but the figure had dropped to 28% by 2008’ (Roberts, 2010: 88). Analysing this decrease in participation is not straightforward. Specific reasons sometimes explain why participation declines in certain structures. Attendance at the EMRF, for example, dropped because of the growing size of the NEM area. This had two effects. First, the size of the NEM area and the distance residents had to travel to attend meetings in Beswick was off-­putting. Second, the agenda was



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dominated by issues affecting the whole of the NEM area while neighbourhood issues were more rarely discussed (MCC, 2009a). It is also the case that many residents did not identify with the artificially defined community. Communities of choice rather than of fate are more likely to create participation and friendship is ultimately the best foundation for political association (Barnes, Newman and Sullivan, 2007: 160). For MCC, the decline in resident involvement suggested ‘a combination of burn out or change in personal priorities concerning resident activists but also satisfaction that the highest priorities of residents have been tackled and the normalisation of the NDC areas that was a key aim of the initiative has been achieved’ (MCC, 2009a). A similar view is the ‘natural cycle of engagement’, whereby participation tails off once monies have been spent and problems solved. To some extent, participation follows the money: participation through NDC/Beacons began to fall as its monies were defrayed early on in its ten-­year life and participation changed to NP processes particularly as the HMRP monies came in. Others argue that residents became more involved with other agencies, associations and providers. MCC notes that one consequence of the NDC/Beacons’ process is the increased capacity of local groups such as Ward Co-­ordination Groups, Friends of Parks Groups, school governing bodies and the Boards of local social housing providers (MCC, 2009a). One key regeneration official recognised a decline of interest in 2006. People had a wider range of community activities to get involved in and there was a greater acceptance of how things had developed. He did recognise, however, that there was now a big push for youth participation because this was one of NDC/Beacons’ weaknesses (Interview, 13/02/2006). Some residents agreed that ‘Participation has started to decline because a lot has been achieved – people have got what they want’ (Interview, 19/07/2007). One NEM official argued that ‘It’s a success that people have moved from screaming and shouting to being more part of management structures’ although for others, this ‘incorporation’ was perceived negatively as ‘going native’ (Interviews, 14/04/2010). Falls in participation can represent a success – problems are solved, the area stops being ‘problematic’ and residents can get on with their lives – or a failure – community involvement cannot be sustained because it is too arduous and ­time-­consuming for all concerned and strategic decisions are taken in arenas away from resident engagement. Nevertheless, the NDC/Beacons’ final evaluation concluded that the legacy from the emphasis on building community capacity is that ‘Local residents have an increased appetite to help change the area for the better and raised expectations of, and trust in, service providers’ (Roberts, 2010: 89–90). To some extent, this represents the ideological thrust of the NDC programme to place responsibility for solving problems of deprivation on to the residents themselves. It is important, moreover, to avoid painting too linear and smooth a picture of resident engagement. Not all residents went from anger to inclusion within formal structures. Some residents turned to protest as regeneration proceeded,

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demonstrating that residents made use of both voice and exit strategies depending on temporal and contextual factors. One MP suggested that MCC is responsive but only to political pressure (Interview, 27/02/2006). Protest may be a useful form of participation. Major housing projects, encouraged by the Government’s HMRP and involving the demolition of older terraces, were sometimes pursued forcefully. These projects have produced examples of transient and sustained protest. The Beswick High School example was not unique. A controversy arose during 2006 in Miles Platting involving housing demolition affecting 250 residents. This episode occurred because an MCC housing official ignored the established procedures and neglected the hearing required by NP. An MCC Executive Committee member apologised for criticising residents as ‘whingers’ and Russell, NEM’s Chief Executive, reiterated his commitments to allow people to remain in the area to reap the benefits of regeneration and maintain a dialogue (NEMA, 18/08/2006). In addition to transient protest, a sustained oppositional style also became evident. C4S (Communities for Stability) coalesced in opposition to two issues: the demolition of housing and the proposal to locate a regional Casino in east Manchester. C4S operated from the BESSARA community house and united new resident-­activists unhappy about the outcomes of NP negotiations in such areas as Toxteth Street and Miles Platting with members of BESSARA, the Ben Street group whose early activities in resisting the destruction of houses in Clayton were acknowledged by a local MP (Wainwright, 2003: 74). C4S was assisted in its opposition to demolition by advice from lawyers linked to the Empty Homes Agency which advocates refurbishment rather than demolition.2 An official from the Agency helped C4S to improve communications with the media and he described the successes which the Agency was achieving elsewhere (Interview, 07/05/09). The Agency encouraged C4S to engage in a rebuttal process with MCC when residents were confronted with CPOs. This was done in a case involving residents whose only language was Mandarin Chinese, and although MCC responded to them, it did so only in English (C4S meeting, 12/05/2008). There was evidence of some success. C4S contributed to a decision by MCC that ‘they are not doing any more Compulsory Purchase Orders in east Manchester, due to the opposition from residents as it is too much hard work for them’ (C4S meeting, 07/05/2009). C4S challenged specific CPOs, including those in the Toxteth Street and Miles Platting developments, and formal public inquiries were held in July and November 2008. MCC revised their initial ideas and subsequently decided to withdraw from issuing CPOs (NEM, 2007/2008). A victory was also secured through demonstrations and petitions in conjunction with residents to preserve a Doctor’s Surgery which was ­earmarked for demolition in Miles Platting (Interview, 29/05/2008). 2   Established in 1992, this independent charity campaigns to address the issue of empty homes in order to better meet housing needs.



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C4S also opposed MCC’s support for a Casino as part of the regeneration process. When Blair heard that an American company wished to build vast leisure complexes and that Manchester was seeking one, he was enthusiastic. But he was disappointed when the House of Lords voted to have only one such development nationally, and it came down to the ‘ludicrous choice of Blackpool or Manchester’. His government selected Manchester, but Blair regretted that his successor, Gordon Brown, abandoned the idea (Blair, 2010: 635). MCC had been promoting a Casino, despite vociferous opposition from Liberal Democratic Councillors, one of whom was informed by Leese that ‘she wants her head looking at’ for challenging it (NEMA, 19/03/2004). C4S believed the Casino would produce undesirable outcomes and that this was another instance where MCC was disingenuous in its portrayal of resident views. An earlier example of residents simply being given information and their views then not being accurately portrayed was the B of the Bang sculpture. MCC was adamant that a piece of public art, the B of the Bang, be erected in the Bradford neighbourhood but not only did the residents object, the sculpture was eventually declared unsafe. C4S felt that MCC was similarly manipulating community voices with regard to the Casino. NEM and MCC (2006) confidently claimed that ‘Our approach to regeneration and to community engagement ensures that our proposals have not just been understood but are positively welcomed by the communities in which the regional casino will be located’. Yet, resident opinions were divided. While some activists recruited by the regeneration structures did support the proposal to locate a Casino in the neighbourhood, they still sought assurance that all options should be reported on and urged continuing resident involvement (NEM Board Minutes, 03/10/2006). Others were opposed and stressed that there was an alternative to the Casino and advocated a revival of the Belle Vue fairground as a Leisure Park which, they asserted, would provide superior employment and leisure opportunities (C4S meeting, 27/02/2008). Despite some success in opposing CPOs and their claim that their over-­ 50s group had succeeded in altering NEM’s 2008/2018 SRF to include more inter-­generational activities (C4S Meeting,12/05/2008), C4S faced difficulty in sustaining its activities. At the Annual General Meeting in May 2009, only two individuals turned up although they discussed a strategy to keep C4S going (C4S meeting, 07/05/2009). Despite these difficulties, the micro-­achievements of groups like C4S should not be dismissed. As McLaverty (2003: 47) asserts, ‘small scale initiatives may be all that seem possible at the moment’. The fluctuating fortunes of C4S exemplify the deficiency of evaluating participation through snapshots of resident involvement at specific times. The recession has led some developers ‘to walk away’, suggesting that it is the extraneous impact of external economic factors which is much more profound than the activities of residents, whether acting with or in opposition to the regeneration structures (Interviews, 07/05/2009).

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The regeneration of east Manchester Challenges of participation

Residents and regeneration officials recognised that participation could be both an opportunity and a burden. For Macpherson (1977: 100), citizens were trapped in a vicious circle because ‘we cannot achieve more democratic participation without a prior change in social inequality and in consciousness, but we cannot achieve the changes in social inequality and consciousness without a prior increase in democratic participation’. By the 1990s the constraints Macpherson identified had not disappeared but more attention was being paid to the agency of community activists and local authorities. On the one hand, Gains, John and Stoker (2005) claim that the readiness of residents to participate is affected by their perceptions of their local authority while Lowndes, Pratchett and Stoker (2006) adopt the concept of ‘rules-­in-­use’ first applied by Ostrom (1999), to argue that local government can over-­ride the constraints posed by the socio-­economic environment. On the other hand, Diamond (2001: 277) argues that ‘communities and community representatives have often been viewed by local government as passive and antipathetic to change or hostile or unrepresentative of their localities’. Coulson (2005b: 161) equally complains that local authorities bypass and undervalue residents. Our research supports the importance of agency exercised by regeneration and MCC officials and by residents. One resident-­activist argued that ‘Sean McGonigle made NDC . . . Can’t fault what he put in, his enthusiasm and the way he involved residents.’ She continued ‘we were the fag-­ends, Sean McGonigle and Steve Mycio were the book-­ends’ (Interview, 27/07/2010). Nevertheless, our research also highlighted the need to recognise the structural limitations on participation. Social and economic inequality structures how societies interact (Mani, 2005: 736). The economic, social and family problems of many residents leave little space for participation. Disengagement from community life can be total. It is therefore paradoxical that those people least equipped to solve social and economic problems are charged with the task, assisted merely by the injection of time-­limited pump priming funding. Many of the activists we interviewed identified various problems, which bundled together we might label the ‘burden of participation’. Survey respondents highlighted the main reason for their lack of engagement as being the lack of time due to family or work commitments (29%) and only 8.7% said it was because the opportunities to get involved were not available (Blakeley and Evans, 2008). Divisions between different groups of residents can also hinder participation. There was evidence of tensions between different TARAs, often due to the perception that some areas were benefiting more than others. This was exacerbated by the different geographical reach of some programmes, which meant that only certain neighbourhoods benefited from specific programmes. There were divisions between the NDC/Beacons’ area and the wider NEM area, and these were exacerbated when NEM extended its boundaries. In a report to the EMRF in 2009, some expressed concern that a lot of information just concerned the NDC/



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Beacons’ area and that ‘areas which are only recently part of the programme have different problems than the first group of participants’. Similarly, some commented that they had been deterred from attending the EMRF because it was too NDC/ Beacons’ focused. The ‘special’ status of the NDC/Beacons’ area was highlighted in MCC’s Review of Community Engagement in 2009, with some arguing that the wealth of expertise gained by NDC/Beacons’ residents over the duration of the NDC/Beacons’ programme should be exploited: ‘[The] Beacons area should be the Leader and have more say because of the amount of experience residents on the Forum and Board have – this needs to be used and sustained’ (EMRF, 2009). There appeared to be little division among white residents and residents from BME groups. The Beswick NP process was careful to include the Chinese and Vietnamese population by ensuring that information was translated and by working with existing Chinese and Vietnamese associations. Divisions were apparent, however, between new and longer-­term residents and these were exacerbated by the easy availability of rental property, population churn, vulnerable and sometimes disruptive households and the poor management of properties, particularly by private landlords. Measures such as the cross-­tenure neighbour nuisance team and RSL landlord licensing, however, helped to ease these problems. One regeneration official recognised that ‘participation can cause stress: asking people to take on responsibility by participating in regeneration is a stress that is not placed on middle-­class communities’ (Interview, 07/02/2005). Another official stated that a tension within neighbourhood renewal is that disadvantaged communities are asked to do everything simultaneously. They are exposed to every government directive from stopping smoking to getting involved in their communities (Interview, 27/02/2006). Residents also mentioned suffering ‘burn out’. One resident-­activist commented that it ‘sometimes seems quite a lonely business, hard to get the community involved and some people see you as a “grass”. You can be for ever attending meetings, . . ., very exhausting and people get fed up with it’ (Interview 27/07/2006). Residents also were often treated as an unpaid resource. For example, they act as ‘eyes and ears’ on estates to help Eastlands Homes to solve problems (Interview, 27/07/2006). This tendency was clear when NEM introduced Key Individual Networks (KINS), in 2007/2008 whose members act as ‘the eyes and ears of the community’ to identify issues around crime and anti-­social behaviour (NEM, 2007/2008: 20). That the report refers to these networks as a ‘community engagement tool’ is telling. It is an unfair burden placed upon deprived residents to engage them in tackling crime and anti-­social behaviour and solving long-­term intractable social problems (Atkinson and Flint, 2004: 334). Ward (2003: 122) refers to the increasing responsibility placed upon citizens to help the police in their work of targeting ‘problem’ individuals and families as being part of a wider strategy of ‘civilising’ the area of east Manchester. In these circumstances, residents face a ‘triple whammy’ of inequality: the reality of relative poverty, expectations of participation and the burden of helping government agencies to carry out their

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responsibilities, including law enforcement’. We have concluded elsewhere that ‘Given the structural limitations on participation by local residents, the burdens that such engagement imposes and the few and ambiguous benefits that it can provide, it is interesting that so much engagement actually occurs, particularly among those people who have the fewest resources’ (Blakeley and Evans, 2008: 111). Future of participation Sustaining participation is challenging and it became especially difficult once NDC/ Beacons ceased its activities in the area (Durose and Lowndes, 2010: 354). Residents were generally positive about NDC/Beacons and suggested that they were ‘the right people in the right place at the right time’ (Interview 27/07/2006). The feeling that NDC/Beacons was creating something special was also echoed by many working there. One NEM/NDC official argued that ‘There was a little bit of magic at the start of NDC but the euphoria of the early days cannot be sustained and people move on’ (Interview, 14/04/2010). Regeneration officials and residents were also of the view that a ten-­year programme was not long but whereas regeneration officials felt that by the end of the programme residents needed to be able to demand better mainstream services on their own, residents were less confident in their ability to do so and many worried about what would happen ‘when NDC moves out and [we return] to the dark old days of council bureaucracy’ (Interviews 27/07/2006 and 31/07/2006). Residents felt that NDC acted as a ‘real communication channel between people and housing and the police’ and they were worried about what would happen in the future (Interview, 31/07/2006). Other ­resident-­activists felt more confident and were not worried about what would happen when NDC/NEM left because ‘they’ve made the contacts now which last. It’s all about making contacts and helping each other out’ (Interview, 19/07/2007). This view was echoed by a former NDC/ Beacons’ official, who argued that ‘people no longer need to get involved to the same extent but now people know who to come to if they’ve got a problem’ (Interview, 30/03/2010). Moreover, there was recognition that ‘The nature and level of participation changes over time – it should be the whole range of partners, not just NEM, which provides opportunities for participation’ (Interview, 14/04/2010). An immediate challenge was how to sustain community engagement once NDC/Beacons merged with NEM. Resident NDC/Beacons’ Board members felt that NEM had not yet (in 2002) embraced the ‘bottom up’ approach to working and hoped that closer ties would help to overcome this and encourage NEM to take seriously the social and community aspects of regeneration (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 28/01/2002). NEM’s interim evaluation recognised NDC/Beacons ‘as significantly contributing to NEM’s community engagement and this influence must continue’. The benefits of staff who originally worked on the NDC/Beacons’ programme and subsequently extended their remit to cover the wider area ‘will help contribute to the continuation of the approach’, but NDC/Beacons recognised in



Who participates in regeneration? 187

2006 that its remaining three years ‘must be used to develop the local infrastructure so that it has community engagement at its heart’ (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 17/10/2006). It was also agreed that structures and services that would remain in the area in the longer term must be identified and consideration given to the potential future role they could play in ensuring community engagement. Concern over how NEM would build on NDC/Beacons’ legacy with regard to resident involvement continued, with resident NDC/Beacons’ board members calling in 2009 for ‘clarity on how NEM intend to embed the Beacons’ approach to participation within NEM structures and ensure that the wealth of experience built up over the past nine years is not lost’ (NDC/Beacons’ Board Minutes, 22/01/2009). One NDC/Beacons’ official commented that ‘Residents feel the organisation has changed and the NDC legacy is being slowly eroded but NDC won’t happen again’ (Interview, 30/03/2010), while another asserted that ‘Residents want to be able to feed their views into key people in NEM, but the NEM Board is very formal, very private-­sector, so it’s a difficult environment for residents to operate in’ (Interview, 30/03/2010). The demise of NDC/Beacons coupled, with a decline in resources, led to a more streamlined and formalised approach to resident engagement but ‘NDC cannot be replicated’. For one former NDC/Beacons’ official ‘residents previously just used to drop in, make a cup of tea and talk to whoever they wanted, [there is] no longer the same feel, now it is more corporate and formal’. Nevertheless, another NDC/NEM official argued that ‘NDC processes were very resource-­heavy, you can’t sustain that level of time/money. We now don’t have the resources to fund the engagement structures that NDC put in place, but there are other ways of doing this and things are very different now to ten years ago’ (Interview, 14/04/2010). In 2009, a review of community engagement in east Manchester was undertaken in light of a number of factors: the merger of NDC/Beacons’ with NEM in October 2007, the proposed extension (at the time the review was taken) of NEM, notable divergences in resident satisfaction and levels of involvement between the NDC/ Beacons’ area and the new NEM areas of Newton Heath and Gorton and changes within the city and national context not least of which was the reduction of staffing and resource after 2010 as NDC funding came to an end (MCC, 2009a). The review of community engagement in east Manchester led to the proposal to split the EMRF into three community partnerships with a broader representation than just TARAs. Their role was to comment on regeneration projects in their area and on where money should be targeted. A community partnership was proposed for each of the three geographical areas, with each being responsible for one resident place on the NEM Board: Newton Heath, Ancoats and Miles Platting; Beswick, Openshaw and Clayton; and Gorton, including West Gorton (MCC, 2009a). Another proposal was to hold an annual East Manchester Resident Conference to bring together all residents’ groups from across the area. By 2012, however, the NEM Board no longer functioned and the community partnerships were being reviewed with a view to linking them into the development of a c­ ity-­wide approach

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to community engagement (Interview, 29/06/2012). However this develops, it is certain that the particular focus on east Manchester has disappeared. A subsequent, arguably more difficult, challenge was how to sustain community engagement in the transition from NEM to the mainstream. NEM recognised that projects currently undertaken by its social, education and economic teams would become the responsibility of mainstream public agencies once the various funding streams underpinning these programmes ceased to be available beyond 2010. At this point, it would be the responsibility of mainstream public agencies ‘to consider and absorb (or not) the innovation, good practice, community engagement and service improvement that has developed in east Manchester since 2000’. For NEM, it was therefore essential to retain a small team of staff ‘whose remit will be to work with the main public agencies on the mainstreaming agenda, and to champion the socio-­economic needs and aspirations of existing communities’ in order to ‘ensure that continuing physical renewal remains sensitive to local communities and also that improvements and good practice are not lost in the transition from NEM to the mainstream’ (NEM Board Minutes, 17/07/2007). At the city-­level, the context for citizen engagement also changed as a result of funding cuts brought about by the recession and the election of the Coalition Government in 2010, and because of the growing focus of MCC on regeneration in the context of the city and city-­region as whole. Community engagement became linked to city-­wide ward co-­ordination. In east Manchester, the key became how to manage expectations in the new context of reduced resources and following an ‘exceptional’ period (Interview, 26/07/2010). MCC was committed to a ‘­ whole-­city approach’ to regeneration with a number of regeneration teams covering the whole of the city and one of their tasks was to support and promote community engagement although it recognised that ‘the lower level of resources available has meant that this is not as intensive or as innovative as in east Manchester. The approach and the success of the east Manchester model is not comparable’ (MCC, 2009a). Yet, for residents used to being involved in NDC/Beacons’ structures, ward ­co-­ordination designed to facilitate resident input into service delivery, is ‘perceived to be a poor substitute for a Residents’ Forum’ (Roberts, 2010: 87). In the autumn of 2009, the MP Community Engagement Task Group was established to develop: a community engagement strategy; a community engagement toolkit; and a community engagement website. The resulting Community Engagement Strategy for 2011/2015 focused on enabling Manchester Partnership (MP) staff to engage with communities. The following support the strategy: an annually up-­dated delivery plan to show how the strategy is being implemented; a Community Engagement Guide to support MP members who engage with communities and a Community Engagement Website to help co-­ordinate engagement activity across the city (MP, 2011b: 6). On 23 March 2011, an event – ‘Your Manchester: working together to improve services’ – was held to launch the Community Engagement Strategy, Guide and Website.



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Such mechanisms suggest MCC’s continuing commitment to some form of community engagement, albeit in a changed context. Doubt must be cast, however, over the single approach to community engagement being developed across the city. Nor should the impact of the reduction in funding be underestimated. Initiatives like ‘U Decide’, an MCC approach to participatory budgeting whereby each ward decides how to spend the £10,000 allocated to this purpose, illustrate the problem well. They are carried out on a ward basis and use funding from cash grant budgets in order to encourage residents to decide which project proposals to improve their local area should be supported. In Abbey Hey in Gorton, a ‘U Decide’ event was carried out on December 2010. Nine project proposals were submitted by voluntary and community groups to the value of £12,200. Forty-­two people attended the event and thirty-­one people voted on spending priorities. Projects such as new benches, a luncheon club, replanting of barrels and planters, equipment for a junior and senior youth club, exercise classes and an art project were among those funded (Abbey Hey Community Conversation and U Decide Evaluation, 2010–2011). As important as such projects are, allocating funding of £10,000 will do little to tackle the decline of a neighbourhood which lacks investment, has a poor physical environment, a lack of community facilities, increased population transience, the over-­saturation of private landlords with little or no stake in the community and the perception by many of its residents that it has largely been forgotten (North West Together We Can, Short Application Form, 2010 for Targeted Support Funding). Conclusion Despite recognising the utility of ladder or continuum approaches to evaluating participation, we maintain that they are inappropriate for our purposes given the need to analyse participation against the existing realities of the deprived community of east Manchester, with its spatial constraints and barriers to participation. The spatial context is the deprivation and social problems of east Manchester, which are framed by deindustrialisation and a declining inner-­city area on the periphery of a regenerated urban centre. This is, in turn, located within a national and global context in which economic factors, not local pressure, are key drivers. Ladder or continuum approaches are also rejected because they judge participation at a given moment in time and therefore pay insufficient attention to the cycle of participation which we have described. The temporal factors to consider when evaluating participation are the history of an area in which resident involvement has largely been absent and the changing character of the regeneration project itself. Snapshots of resident involvement at specific times neglect the changing patterns of behaviour by elites and residents alike and do a disservice to an interactive, reflexive and dynamic process. Both temporal and spatial factors suggest that a reflexive approach to understanding practice on the ground is important, as is Saward’s

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(2003) idea of sequencing, so that different devices to enact participation can be used at different times and for different issues as appropriate. Such devices might include protest, and we have described moments of ­discontent and even anger during regeneration particularly when residents felt that MCC was ignoring their concerns or was insincere in its approach to participation. There is clearly a role for protest as well as formal and informal forms of participation within regeneration. It is often the case that it is the moments of protest, such as those against the controversial rehousing programmes in Ancoats in 2003 and Miles Platting in 2006, or the demolition of terraces for the construction of a school in Beswick in 2004, which most clearly influenced decision-­making. Our purpose is not normative but we conclude that the structural barriers to participation are such that it is surprising that any participation takes place at all. In recognising the importance of structural barriers, however, we do not ignore agency. Committed individuals, both those within regeneration agencies and residents, became involved because they were motivated by a genuine desire to halt the decline of an area, and often it is the commitment of such dedicated individuals which sustains participation. There was a distinction between NDC/Beacons and NEM in their approach to participation. NDC/Beacons worked with residents from the start and was innovative in its approach. Despite a deliberate NDC/Beacons’ strategy to build community capacity, however, the evidence suggests that only a small minority became involved and it was particularly difficult to involve certain groups such as young people. It is hard to avoid the conclusion that participation remains a minority activity, but individuals did come and go and the data do suggest a good awareness of residents of the opportunities to engage. In such deprived communities, moreover, involvement can take many forms and participating in Parties in the Park and hot-­pot suppers may be just as important, if not more so, for community capacity building as becoming a representative on the boards of regeneration agencies. Although NEM had a different strategic purpose from NDC/Beacons, it also took resident involvement seriously through NP. By delegating responsibility for NP to others, however, NEM was unable to prevent MCC officials from spoiling the process at times and housing developers or consultants in charge of NP varied in the sincerity with which they engaged with residents. But, in contrast to earlier slum clearances, there was a commitment on the part of MCC and the regeneration structures to involve residents in regeneration, even if there were undeniable shortcomings in the ways in which many processes of involvement were carried out. Advocates of participatory democracy must accept that for many residents it is the outcomes of the regeneration process which is their concern, not an active local democracy. These outcomes, however, are frequently shaped by events rather than by political dialogue. The impact of the global recession and the subsequent election of the Coalition Government hold more sway over the future of east Manchester than any amount of resident involvement ever can.

9 Conclusion

In recognising the constraints of a capitalist, free-­market economy and the prevalence of neo-­liberal ideology, it is tempting to arrive at a sterile conclusion that there is little to be done to arrest the decline of deprived areas by national and local political action. We resist this conclusion and argue that politics still matters, and that it does so particularly for deprived residents in areas like east Manchester. Notwithstanding the difficulties of evaluation, we claim there have been substantial gains for east Manchester’s residents from the range of New Labour initiatives. This is not to deny, however, that capital, particularly in the form of property development companies, also benefited, or indeed that the project created winners and losers among residents. The regeneration initiative in east Manchester is far from unique as there have been national precedents and it represents a commonplace response to urban decline at international level. Government ministers and local officials interact with their international counterparts and draw comparisons from urban regeneration experiments elsewhere and there are international linkages among regeneration professionals. Urban regeneration has become a national and international phenomenon but this case study suggests that each example is sui generis. We argue that the temporal, spatial and agency considerations specific to each initiative must be explored. This requires caution when extrapolating general conclusions about the effectiveness of ABIs from one single case study, but it does not render such conclusions entirely meaningless. There are lessons to be learned from the east Manchester experience. Temporal factors matter. It is important to review the historical context to see what has changed fundamentally and to discern parallels with the past in terms of both problems and solutions. Policy continuity is important: urban regeneration programmes do not come out of the blue but build on previous initiatives. Some

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regeneration officials see City Challenge as representing the high watermark of urban regeneration and the numerous New Labour initiatives certainly built on this. Local actors also do not operate in a vacuum and learn from past shortcomings. Both officials and residents recognised that current regeneration initiatives were preferable to the wholesale slum clearances of the 1960s and 1970s. Though shortcomings still remain and MCC can often be perceived as being high-­handed, residents increasingly feel that regeneration is no longer something which is done to them but rather is something which is done with them. The causal links between different events also illustrate the importance of temporality. The launch of the east Manchester initiative was assisted by the location of the Commonwealth Games there and the Stadium, which was later transferred to MCFC, encouraged the purchase of the club by new owners in 2009. The decision by MCFC to invest heavily in the area, building upon its long-­established CITC programme, should provide substantial investment which will provide an alternative source of income to the depletion of public funding which would otherwise have undermined the strength of the regeneration project. Correspondingly temporal considerations must influence the manner in which the east Manchester initiative is evaluated. Whether the issue is one of the effectiveness of partnerships, the measurement of indices of deprivation, or the impact of resident participation, any evaluation is a snapshot of a particular point in time and this limits its validity. The ‘static’ nature of evaluations can also mean they miss the cyclical nature of some phenomena. This was noticeable, for example, in resident involvement where a cycle of participation was apparent, but it was also evident in areas such as population stability and unemployment where there was turnover and churn. In particular, the impact of external forces is considerable, as the reduction of regeneration activity after the recession of 2008 patently demonstrates. Many were conscious of problems of sustainability, even when regeneration activity was at its peak, but these were brought dramatically to the fore with the recession, the election of the Coalition Government and the subsequent cuts in public spending. Officials in east Manchester stressed that regeneration needed to be a long-­term project and frequently mentioned time periods of up to thirty years in order to turn around a deprived area. Regardless of whether holistic regeneration projects are the most effective means of addressing urban poverty, the case study reveals that once such projects are embarked upon, it is desirable to sustain them. Governments, however, prefer quick wins for electoral purposes and are diverted by other events. Major events like the Iraq War can focus attention away from domestic policy. MCC, however, still take the view that regeneration is a thirty-­year journey and that in year twelve ‘to stop now would be a failure’ (Interview, 10/04/2012). There is some truth in the well-­known statement that ‘all politics is local’. This spatial consideration is apparent in two ways. Since it was often remarked to us that east Manchester was ‘a basket case’ in the 1990s, any evaluation of progress must be measured against this reality. Similarly, the nature and extent of resident involve-



Conclusion 193

ment in regeneration should be evaluated in the context of the structural constraints faced by residents rather than against any democratic ideal. Second, ABIs always impose an arbitrary boundary around the area to be regenerated and this causes difficulties for the immediate areas excluded. Even for those areas included within an ABI, those closest to its centre might experience more attention than those on the periphery and there are internal divisions within neighbourhoods. Subsequently, the existence of NEM was itself called into question by the growing focus of MCC’s leaders on more ambitious targets for regeneration across the city, and ultimately city-­region, which culminated in the formation of the GMCA. Another major conclusion is that agency matters in terms of both officials and residents, but individuals operate in structures which are often national and global in character, and these constrain local capacity. Nevertheless, this local capacity can differentiate those ABIs which are successful from those which are less so. Within NEM and NDC/Beacons, there were individuals who committed wholeheartedly to making regeneration succeed, but again the issue of sustainability is important. Residents suffered burn out or were concerned only with achieving short-­term, limited gains. Regeneration officials moved on to other projects. Nevertheless, there was a core of committed individuals who stayed the course and contributed to that ‘little bit of magic’ in the air which, for some residents and regeneration officials, characterised the early years of regeneration. It is also indisputable that MCC played a key leadership role, and its political skills in linking the local and central state were crucial. These political skills are enhanced by the dominance of Labour in the city and the strong partnerships between elected and non-­elected officials. The diversity of structures involved in the regeneration of east Manchester appears prima facie to endorse the governance perspective and does suggest some waste and over-­bureaucratization, but it worked in east Manchester because of MCC’s skills in co-­ordination and leadership, signified particularly by its control over appointments to NDC/Beacons and NEM and its statutory powers of CPO. Partnerships can add value because they offer different perspectives, can allow space for innovation and can provide a different face to residents suspicious of local authority dominance, but the case of east Manchester suggests a key flaw in the concept of multi-­agency partnerships because it showed clearly that they work best when one partner has sufficient power, ­political ­know-­how and authority to impose its will. MCC exploited to the full its partisan connection to the New Labour Government and there were early protests against the savage expenditure cuts in the Coalition Government’s first CSR. Nevertheless, MCC soon reverted to its ‘can-­do’ attitude and collaborated with the Coalition Government in order to maximise the resources it could attract for the city and city-­region, even claiming in some instances that it had anticipated central government policy. Regeneration is no longer a central government priority, but astute local authorities like MCC and regeneration professionals are able to use individual initiatives and programmes to further regeneration aims.

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Politics is inherently ideological, and urban regeneration is itself not immune from ideological influences. Continuity is evident in urban regeneration policy but there are sometimes key changes in direction, of which the Coalition Government is one. It is arguable that within a broad framework of neo-­liberalism there are fundamental differences between a New Labour version, tempered as it is by residual social-­democratic and liberal communitarian elements, and the more classical neo-­liberalism practised by the Coalition Government. New Labour’s readiness to use state power and public investment in regeneration has consequently been replaced by a fundamentalist faith in free-­market solutions. This is clear at a national level in the contrast between New Labour’s commitment to the HMRP and its denigration by the Coalition Government as having done more damage to homes and communities than the Luftwaffe in the Second World War (Branson, 2012b). The impact of this ideological shift is marked in east Manchester where only a small number of regeneration staff remain and NEM’s Chief Executive now combines this role with a city-­wide regeneration brief. The difficulties which ensued from the recession have affected the pace of regeneration but progress is still possible in the view of NEM officials since they have created a strong platform for development which is proving valuable in maintaining progress, especially in housing development, and ‘a lot of heavy-­lifting has already been done’. Nevertheless, progress will now be more limited than in the buoyant housing market in the south of England and the entire regeneration initiative may be more narrowly focused on housing. It remains to be seen to what extent private investment compensates for the decline in public expenditure but it is questionable whether the fragmented financial initiatives introduced by the Coalition Government will be sufficient to revive the enthusiasm of private developers to resume their activities. The market approach is tested in times of recession, when there is little profitability in housing development and developers are reluctant to commit without public inducements. The invisible hand of the market turns out to be the hand of government. It is possible, however, that the combined impact of the investment by MCFC’s owners and the pragmatic approach of MCC and its results-­oriented focus will maintain some regeneration momentum but with a more limited scope in terms of its benefits to residents and a less holistic conception of regeneration. Our analysis is inductive in proceeding from practice to theory rather than testing reality against theory and finding the latter wanting. By working from the temporal and spatial realities of east Manchester, the evidence questions the academic analyses of governance, democratic theory and neo-­liberalism. With regard to governance, the mere existence of partnerships and the variety of structures involved in regeneration should not obscure from view the power of MCC to control and bend these to its will, although MCC is in turn in an asymmetrical relationship ­vis-­à-­vis the central state. It may be too early to judge the impact of City Deals but the rhetoric of localism, which central governments of different ideological hues like to invoke, will not easily alter the continuing reality of centralism in British



Conclusion 195

politics. The replacement of intervention by a free-­market philosophy is imposed by the central state. In turn, ideal theories of democracy were challenged by the structural constraints to participation–such as time poverty, family and caring responsibilities–which residents often faced. Participation is often a burden imposed on poorer communities who are required by Governments to compensate for shortfalls in public provision. Ideal theories of democracy which posit the need for greater participation ignore this burden and too readily assume that participation is worthwhile in its own right. It is wrong to assume that residents want to participate, or that participation is simply an end in itself. For residents, the need to rescue east Manchester from the depths to which it had sunk was more important than any conception of active citizenship. Finally, we suggest that to classify all public policy since the 1970s, and particularly in the field of urban regeneration, as neo-­liberal is lazy. Neo-­liberalism itself is not a homogeneous body of thought, but to collapse the distinction between New Labour’s ideologically pluralist strategy with the free-­market doctrine of the Coalition Government, which Liberal Democratic participation scarcely dilutes, is again an example of moving from theory to practice rather than interrogating practice and modifying theory in light of it. Manchester is described as the ‘regeneration capital’ and it is the ‘Manchester’ element of the label ‘Manchester Labour’ which is as significant as the ‘Labour’ part. Manchester’s Labour Council cannot be categorised as either neo-­liberal or as traditionally Labour, which suggests that a simplistic neo-­liberal interpretation of urban policy since 1997 is inadequate. We have not attempted to offer a definitive evaluation of the east Manchester initiative. There have been a number of evaluations of the NDC/Beacons’ and NEM initiatives which have demonstrated various substantial improvements in aspects of the life of east Manchester. We claim that evaluating this specific situation can only be done against the inherited situation of the 1990s, and with allowance made for the effect of the global recession. Against this backdrop there were gains in economic development through the attraction of inward investment and the location of business in the area, although ultimately it is the wider economic context which will determine the long-­term success of these gains. The conviction of MCC officials that they have successfully repositioned east Manchester as a place to live encourages them to replicate much of what has been achieved in north Manchester. There are many visible legacies of regeneration–for example, housing improvements, the East Manchester Academy, Sportcity, the New Islington Millennium Village, Central Park, green spaces and renovated parks. This does not entirely offset continuing evidence of urban blight, remaining fears of crime and disorder and the difficulty of increasing the population. It is arguable that of the various problems which regeneration sought to tackle, worklessness remains the most entrenched. Despite some successes in assisting residents to gain work, including those with multiple barriers to employment, unemployment is too entrenched

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and too dependent on external forces for it to be solved by such an initiative. East Manchester was successful in addressing some of the symptoms of poverty, if not the fundamental underlying inequalities which lacerate such a multiply deprived area. Our conclusion is optimistic in recognising what has been achieved, but is realistic in acknowledging that these are micro-­achievements owing to the limitations of national policy and the context of global capitalism.

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Index

agency 16, 94, 117, 136, 184, 190, 191 alleygating 45, 61, 93 Ancoats 8, 9, 10, 12, 37, 39, 43, 54, 57, 59, 67–70, 99, 100, 101, 102, 120, 123, 127, 141, 143, 170, 178, 179, 187, 190 New Islington Millennium Community 43, 59, 67, 144, 150, 195 anti-social behaviour 46, 72, 101, 115 Area Based Initiatives (ABI) 19, 26, 78, 82, 103–5, 108, 109, 110, 113, 118–120, 124, 125, 132, 148, 193 evaluation of 84–85, 99 Association of Greater Manchester Authorities (AGMA) 26, 129–130, 141, 148, 149 awards 101–102 B of the Bang 65, 86, 183 Bang of the Voice 160, 174 Bernstein, Howard (Sir) 16, 26, 29, 52, 71, 102, 139, 140, 142, 143, 146, 149, 150, 167 Beswick 10, 11, 12, 30, 43, 44, 49, 50, 51, 53, 57, 64, 143, 150, 159, 170, 174, 179, 187, 190 neighbourhood plan 173–177, 185 Big Society 33, 124, 148 Blair, Tony 71, 108, 109, 155, 183 Bradford 9, 12, 30, 45, 46, 51, 162

capitalism 116, 117, 196 casino 63, 76, 86, 128, 182–183, central government 28, 29, 71, 73, 75, 79–80, 83, 86, 87, 109, 115, 137, 138, 141, 146, 147, 156, 176, 194 Central Park 39, 41, 52, 54, 56, 61, 98, 99, 141, 150, 195 City Challenge 18, 19, 71, 119, 124, 192 City Deal 27, 194 city-region 22, 26, 27, 36, 73, 75, 120, 131 Clayton 12, 30, 44, 45, 49, 51, 56, 57, 64, 100, 138, 150, 170, 174, 182 Coalition Government 21, 27, 28, 36, 41, 74, 75, 78, 81, 105, 106, 107, 113, 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, 137, 140, 146, 147, 148, 152, 188, 190, 193, 194, 195 Regeneration to Enable Growth 118–19, 130 Commonwealth Games 17–18, 33, 39, 61, 62, 65, 76, 94, 104, 142, 143, 162, 192 Communitarianism 112–114 Communities for Stability (C4S) 182–183 community 3–4, 76, 125, 126, 181 Community Chest 32, 151 community facilities 62–65 Conservative Governments 18–19, 107, 111, 118, 128, 134, 137 crime 57–59, 101, 170

220 deprivation 10, 15, 40, 59, 70, 92, 114, 132 East Manchester Academy 35, 49, 175–176, 182, 195 East Manchester Landlord Information Scheme (EMLIS) 46 East Manchester Neighbour Nuisance Team (EMNNT) 57 East Manchester Residents’ Forum (EMRF) 156, 160, 161, 167, 180, 184–185, 187 Eastlands Community Plan 50 Eastlands Development Partnership (EDP) 64, 148 Eastlands Homes 34, 44, 57, 95, 102, 173, 174, 185 Eastlands Tenants’ Forum 173 Eastlands Regeneration Framework 171 Eastserve 63, 93, 102, 164–165 economic decline 14, 51, 56 education 48–51, 96 Education Action Zone (EAZ) 48, 96, 101, 165 employment 51–57, 98 Engels, Friedrich 10, 116 English Partnerships (EP) 4, 23, 25, 36, 143–144, 178 evaluation 2, 65, 76, 119, 192 complexity of 78–84, 87, 92, 94, 97, 103 generic 84–86 impact of boundary changes on 90 NDC/Beacons 86, 92–96, 166–167 NEM 88–89, 90, 92–101 specific 86–88 Four Communities Together (4CT) 31–32, 33, 62, 151, 165 Gorton 9, 12–13, 26, 28, 30, 46, 49, 50, 53, 56, 57, 70, 74, 83, 92, 99, 104, 145, 159, 174, 187, 189 Gorton Monastery 65, 67 governance 2, 133–139 meta-governance 135, 138, 148, 153 Government Office North West (GONW) 143, 146, 147, 149, 162 governmentality 114–115 Grange (The) 62, 71, 161, 165

Index Greater Manchester Combined Authority (GMCA) 16, 26, 27, 120, 129, 140, 148, 149, 193 Greater Manchester Police (GMP) 58, 76, 96 health 59–61, 96 Health Action Zone (HAZ) 59, 101 Heseltine, Michael (Lord) 16–17, 18, 119 Holt Town 10, 70 Home and Communities Agency (HCA) 37, 41, 121, 144 Hough, Robert 40 housing 42–48, 75, 95, 96, 98, 123, 160, 176, 189 Housing Market Renewal Pathfinders (HMRP) 30, 44, 46, 72, 81, 90, 101, 112, 119, 124, 144, 176, 181, 194 ideology 2, 75, 81, 84, 181, 194 Coalition Government 117–126 inevitability of 106–108 Manchester Labour 126–131, 195 New Labour 108–117 Igloo 47, 124 industrial revolution 8, 9, 121 information and communications technology (ICT) 52, 55, 62, 164 JobCentre Plus 51, 53, 56 Kaufmann, Sir Gerald 55 Key Performance Indicators (KPIs) 88–92 Labour Party 11, 15, 76 Leese, Sir Richard 7, 11, 26, 27, 28, 61, 71, 73, 90, 128, 138, 140, 142, 146, 172, 183 Liberal Democratic Party 11–12, 56, 117, 183 Liberal Party 11 Lloyd, Tony 45, 55, 155 Local Economic Partnerships (LEPs) 36, 118, 120, 121, 122, 130, 131, 147, 148, 151 Local Strategic Partnerships (LSPs) 27–28 Manchester Partnership (MP) 24, 27–28, 140, 148, 188 localism 118, 120, 123, 124, 125, 137, 147, 148, 157 McGonigle, Sean 31, 70, 93, 117, 126, 142, 152, 160, 162, 184

Index 221 Manchester City Council (MCC) 8–9, 15, 16, 17–18, 22–27, 29, 41, 50, 57, 60, 63, 72, 73, 74, 75, 85, 94, 96, 97, 117, 120, 122, 130, 132, 136, 137, 138, 139–153, 154, 157, 158, 172, 179, 180, 181, 182, 183, 184, 189, 190, 193 Manchester City Football Club (MCFC) 12, 13, 32, 33–34, 41, 50–51, 63, 104, 148, 153–154, 192 City in the Community (CITC) 13, 34, 62, 192 Metrolink 40, 61, 63, 148 Miles Platting 33, 44, 50, 56, 57, 59, 100, 138, 150, 170, 174, 179, 182, 187, 190 neighbourhood planning 61, 125, 167, 171–179, 190 Beswick 173–177, 185 Residents’ Steering Group (RSG) 172, 174, 178 review of 177–179 neo-liberalism 107–108, 114, 129, 132, 194, 195 Neville-Rolfe, Marianne 29, 87, 141, 142, 143 New Deal for Communities (NDC/Beacons) 23, 30–31, 43, 44, 45, 50, 51, 54, 55, 60, 85, 86, 101, 104, 109, 117, 126, 139, 140, 144, 151, 154, 155, 156, 179, 180, 181, 184, 193 Exit Strategy 31 resident involvement 159–167, 168, 172, 186, 187, 190 New East Manchester (NEM) 23, 28–30, 40, 41, 43, 48, 50, 54, 58, 60, 63, 69, 72, 83, 85, 88, 104, 114, 117, 120, 131, 138, 139, 140, 141, 144, 145, 148, 150, 151, 153, 154, 155, 164, 165, 180, 184, 193 Maintaining Momentum Strategy 69, 75 masterplanning 169–170 resident involvement 167–171, 171–179, 186, 187, 188 New Labour Governments 19, 20, 21, 26, 27, 36, 38, 46, 61, 74, 97, 100, 105, 106, 107, 122, 123, 124, 125, 126, 127, 129, 130, 131, 132, 135, 137, 138, 139, 147, 148, 191, 192, 193, 194, 195 democratic renewal 156 modernisation 110, 111, 152 Third Way 109 New Public Management 134, 138

Newton Heath 9, 13, 28, 39, 45, 50, 56, 57, 70, 83, 92, 99, 100, 104, 138, 145, 159, 187 North East Manchester Advertiser (NEMA) 165 Openshaw 9, 13, 30, 44, 45, 57, 58, 59, 62, 64, 101, 131, 138, 150, 159, 162, 170, 174, 179, 182, 187 participation, challenges of 184–185 cycles of 167, 179–186 future of 186–189 protest 182, 190 structural constraints and 158, 161–162, 184–186, 190, 195 theories of 157–159, 189, 195 Parties in the Park 65, 162 partnerships 2, 22, 26, 29, 35, 36, 37, 39, 52–53, 58, 80–81, 107, 110, 111, 123, 138, 139, 140, 151, 154, 193 Philips Park 8, 45, 65, 162 physical environment 42–48, 61, 127 Prescott, Lord John 70, 74 private sector 95, 99, 112, 118, 120, 132, 149–151, 187 property developers 34, 47, 120, 174, 177, 194 Public Agencies Forum 35, 93, 166 recession 40–41, 46–47, 56, 69–70, 72, 74, 91, 95, 98, 103, 120, 150, 183, 188, 190, 192, 194 Regional Development Agencies (RDAs) 27, 123, 141 North West Development Agency (NWDA) 24, 36, 41, 45, 52, 69, 72, 93, 99, 122, 123, 141, 143 Regional Growth Fund (RGF) 36 Registered Social Landlords 34 residents’ surveys 99–100 riots 14, 15, 16, 104 Rogers, Richard (Lord) 28, 74, 112, 127 Russell, Tom 29, 31, 65, 71, 73, 102, 117, 142, 143, 145, 146, 167, 175 Scott, Bob (Sir) 17–18, 19, 150 Single Regeneration Budget (SRB) 18–19, 39, 40, 94

222

Index

Smith, Eddie 33, 93, 171 social democracy 108, 129 spatial dimension 3, 38–39, 50, 67, 70, 76, 82, 83, 84, 102, 103, 105, 116, 117, 120, 189, 191, 192 sport 62–63 Sportcity 39, 43, 56, 61, 63, 76, 98, 99, 102, 143, 154, 195 stakeholding 109, 110 Strategic Regeneration Framework 28, 41, 48, 64, 170–171, 172 Stringer, Graham 11, 15, 16–17 supermarkets 52–53 SureStart 49, 103 sustainability 85, 86, 98, 104, 165, 174, 180, 188, 192, 193 temporality 3, 7, 8, 21, 27, 34, 36, 38, 57, 67, 70, 71, 72, 76, 82, 83, 84, 94, 101, 102, 155, 157, 168, 176, 180, 189, 191 Tenants’ and Residents’ Associations (TARAs) 155, 159, 160, 161, 174, 180, 184 Thatcherism 10, 14, 15, 51, 114, 128, 134, 137, 140, 145

Towards an Urban Renaissance 28, 80–81, 139, 140 transport 61–62 Urban Development Corporations (UDC) 17 Urban Growth Coalitions 150–151 urban regeneration 1, 16, 71, 129, 136, 191 holistic 31, 38, 41, 43, 47, 48, 51, 55, 57, 59, 74, 76, 82, 84, 97, 109, 129, 132, 156, 194 Urban Regeneration Companies (URC) 28–30, 98, 111–112, 123, 139, 153, 156 urban renaissance 19, 69, 76, 111, 127 Urban Splash 34, 43, 47, 69, 127, 150 voluntary sector 31–33, 112, 124–125, 132, 151–152 faith groups 113 ward co-ordinators 28, 152 wardens 44, 57, 71, 93, 101, 174 Wells Centre 49, 56, 71, 161 worklessness 51, 56, 91, 102, 103