The Question of Being in Western and African Analytic Metaphysics: Comparative Metaphysics Using the Analytic Framework (Synthese Library, 438) 3030696448, 9783030696443

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Synthese Library 438 Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science

Grivas Muchineripi Kayange

The Question of Being in Western and African Analytic Metaphysics Comparative Metaphysics Using the Analytic Framework

Synthese Library Studies in Epistemology, Logic, Methodology, and Philosophy of Science Volume 438

Editor-in-Chief Otávio Bueno, Department of Philosophy, University of Miami, Coral Gables, USA Editorial Board Members Berit Brogaard, University of Miami, Coral Gables, USA Anjan Chakravartty, University of Notre Dame, Notre Dame, USA Steven French, University of Leeds, Leeds, UK Catarina Dutilh Novaes, VU Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands Darrell P. Rowbottom, Department of Philosophy, Lingnan University, Tuen Mun, Hong Kong Emma Ruttkamp, Department of Philosophy, University of South Africa, Pretoria, South Africa Kristie Miller, Department of Philosophy, Centre for Time, University of Sydney, Sydney, Australia

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Grivas Muchineripi Kayange

The Question of Being in Western and African Analytic Metaphysics Comparative Metaphysics Using the Analytic Framework

Grivas Muchineripi Kayange Chancellor College University of Malawi Zomba, Malawi

ISSN 0166-6991 ISSN 2542-8292 (electronic) Synthese Library ISBN 978-3-030-69644-3 ISBN 978-3-030-69645-0 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69645-0 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. This Springer imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface

What is being? This work investigates the question of being in Western and African thought using insights from the analytic philosophy. It is an attempt to discuss the problem of being, which is evident in works such as Mellor D.H & Alex Oliver (1997), Anita Avramides (2000), Peter Simons (2013), Baptiste Le Bihan & Adrien Barton (2018, 1-17), and Ross & Ladyman (2007). The analytic tradition is associated with the sciences’ demarcation into meaningful and meaningless (Alfred Jules Ayer 1936; Rudolf Carnap 1939). Verifiable empirical evidence was a determining factor of meaningful (scientific) and useless (pseudo-science). The availability of this evidence excluded all sciences that purported the existence of a world beyond sense-experience. The empirical evidence requirement created significant problems that have affected the theoretical sciences such as classical metaphysics, the normative theory of value, and theology, which ended up being meaningless or useless/ nonsensical (unsinnigen). Some analytic philosophers question the value of metaphysics in general, such as Alfred Jules Ayer 1936 and Rudolf Carnap 1939. Others debate on the best way of doing analytic metaphysics (see Le Bihan & Barton 2018, 1-17; Ross & Ladyman (2007).1 In both continental and analytical thought, ontology as the ‘study of being in general,’ has evolved differently. I believe that influential thinkers such as Gottlob Frege, Bertrand Russell, and Peter Frederick Strawson kept producing valuable insights into analytic metaphysics. Simons (2013, 2) agrees with this idea by noting that, Whichever philosophers are the parents or progenitors of analytic philosophy, whether Russell and Moore, Frege, Bolzano, or even Leibniz, all of them were fully engaged in metaphysics. In Leibniz and Bolzano we have a monadology of mental or physical atomic substances, in Bolzano and Frege we have a timeless Platonic realm of abstract objects guaranteeing the objectivity of logic and meaning, in Moore and Russell we have a world of many material objects existing independently of minds.

1 One of the earliest books on analytic metaphysics is Bergmann’s work (1954), The Metaphysics of Logical Positivism.

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I, therefore, argue that the anti-metaphysics works in analytic philosophy were fundamental in shaping its content. Regardless of the divergent views, analytic metaphysics suggests a revolutionary philosophy that reduces the study of being to language, natural science, and logic/ mathematics. It is also a way of underlining the method of analysis as orthodox in metaphysics. There is a movement from abstract and creative metaphysics (creation of concepts through reason, intuition, and revelation) that claims reality beyond sense experience; to descriptive metaphysics, (that describes things in the empirical world through language and logic/mathematics). In descriptive metaphysics, I am not sure how far we can dispense reason and intuition in a study of abstract properties of ‘being’ in the absence of observation. The fact is that both metaphysics and natural science use reason and intuition, and they develop concepts whose content may be unobservable (see also Grivas Muchineripi Kayange 2008). Nevertheless, analytic metaphysics provides a better framework for describing reality in both Western and African thought. It further guarantees the theorisation of different issues without necessarily creating a reality beyond sense experience that is possibly not there. Although I seem to support this approach, I believe that any form of metaphysics is just a step towards a more comprehensive understanding of ‘being,’ given that there is much to the question of being than what philosophy can say. This book will mainly approach being in both Western and African analytic traditions by studying language and meaning. In line with the analytic tradition, it will get insights from logic/mathematics and the philosophy of natural science. The study will also analyse some beliefs in traditional African society, fundamental in this metaphysical discourse. I first base my developments on a common assumption in analytic thought in my ratiocination, which states that philosophy is a universal activity of reason, such that geographical boundaries are mere political demarcations. Secondly, I believe in the existence of a world independent of our mind (a kind of realism). Thirdly, I support the idea that the human description of being or ‘what exists’ (which is an outcome of ‘universal activity of reason’ in its particularised form) is a partial representation of reality. This description is from a perspective (Kayange 2018; 2019). Note that perspective-based conception follows from the nature of languages and human ways of acquiring and interpreting knowledge in a context (see Giere 2006). Despite this perspectival nature of experience and knowledge, some generalisations represent the common (or dominant) interpretations in a specific perspective, as determined by language use and other factors. Any dominant interpretation theorised in this work as representing African thought does not necessarily exclude different possible explanations that may equally hold in this context. How will this work discuss the question of Being? This book’s structure is as follows: Chapter 1 introduces the problem of being in both Western and African thought, with a specific interest in insights from the analytic philosophy. The main objective is to introduce the reader to developments that respond to questions such as, ‘what is being?’ ‘What is the method for studying being?’ and ‘What are the main studies on being in both Western and African philosophy?’

Preface

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Chapter 2 responds to being by offering the classical conceptualisation through the study of the subject-verb-object language structure. The basic assumption is that the conception of language based on subjects, verbs (action/relation), and objects leads to a static and fragmentary approach to reality. The chapter discusses the developments, which focus on the particulars, universals, and their relations. This approach is equally present in continental and analytic philosophy in both Western and African thought. Chapter 3 provides an alternative response to ‘the question of being,’ based on the structure of ‘action language,’ mainly the rheomodic language structure. The word ‘rheomodic’ comes from the Greek word ‘rheomode,’ a combination of ‘rheo’ and mode, meaning flow and way, respectively. A new verbal language captures the element of action or flow relative to being. ‘Action language’ goes beyond Austin Langshaw’s speech acts; it reflects the study of the question of being in thinkers such as David Bohm (1980) in the Western thought and Mogobe B. Ramose (1998) in the African philosophy. Different from the subject-verb-object language structure, this approach leads to a holistic and dynamic conception of being. Whether one holds a fragmentary and static view or a holistic and dynamic view, the next focus is an attempt to discuss the question of being relative to space and time. For this reason, Chap. 4 considers the concepts of space and time, which are generally studied based on insights from natural science (mainly physics) and geometry/trigonometry. It explores the meaning of the concepts’ space’ and ‘time,’ focusing on some important insights in Western and African thought. I want to note that the chapter formalises the traditional African concept of space and time by providing ‘African Sun-Shadow’ mathematical model.2 After space and time, I turn to a reflection on mode of being. I focus on some questions that follow from the mode of being, such as, ‘Is being atemporal or temporal?’ ‘Is it necessary or actual?’ and ‘Does it have one form of existence or many?’ In response to related questions, Chap. 5 investigates the concept of modality (modes of being). While considering the various ways of being, the chapter focuses on concepts such as actuality, necessity, and possibility. Assuming that being has different modes of existence, I turn to the question, ‘how can we explain the element of change?’ Similar questions include, ‘Does the principle of sufficient reason entail the reality of the relations of cause and effect?’ What is the meaning of the terms ‘cause’ and ‘effect,’ ‘Who or What caused human subjects?’ In response to similar questions, Chap. 6 considers the concept of causation in the Western and African analytic frameworks. In Western philosophy, this is a topic in natural science and logic, where sometimes it is a relation and, at times, a logical/metaphysical principle. In African philosophy, the study of Being is often through a particular group’s reflection on language, such as the Akan concept of cause. A survey of the Chewa language use and beliefs will also help clarify the

2

I have developed this mathematical model in collaboration with Associate Professor Jimmy Namangale, who is a mathematician and logician. Namangale is from the University of Malawi, Chancellor College, Zomba, Malawi.

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African idea of causation. Other studies include Tempel, John Mbiti, and Alexis Kagame’s insights on ‘modality’ in the African philosophy. If causation is factual, does this mean that everything, including human actions, is determined? If causation is false, does this imply that human subjects are totally free? If both scenarios are valid, does it mean that human subjects are not responsible for their actions? Following the reflections above, Chap. 7 investigates freedom of actions relative to ‘indeterminism and determinism.’ The main question is whether human beings are free because of free will (freedom of choice) or determined by other factors, such as natural laws. This question has attracted other significant developments, such as compatibilism and incompatibilism. Adherents of compatibilism argue that assuming that free will and determinism are compatible, humans are free (Ayer 1969). Proponents of incompatibilism believe that free will and responsibility are incompanionable; hence, humans are not free (Paul Holbach 1770; Ted Honderich 1993)). Assuming that causation and free will are true in human subjects, how can we conceive a human being? ‘Is he/she a body only with processes?’ ‘Is he/she only mind or spirit?’ ‘Is he/she both mind and body?’ Chapter 8 discusses the existence and relation of mind and body. The chapter focuses on dualism, physicalism (materialism), and immaterialism in Western and African thought. I believe that a better grasp of the above areas prepares a human being to adequately engage in a meaningful discourse relative to the question of being, which remains fundamental in any philosophical study. While one goes through the various debates around the question of being, he/she starts appreciating that this is relevant but, at the same time, complex. There are no categorical answers in most cases relative to this fundamental question of being. Whether a philosopher takes the flag of analytic philosophy or continental philosophy, the problems around the meaning of ‘being’ continues to haunt the human mind. Human experience and knowledge complicate matters because true beliefs may change to become false. Human knowledge remains fallible regardless of the many efforts to acquire certainty. Zomba, Malawi

Grivas Muchineripi Kayange

Acknowledgments

I want to thank my students in analytic metaphysics and African philosophy class at Chancellor College, University of Malawi, for their support during this manuscript’s development. I also acknowledge my assistant lecturer Manuel Kasulu and other lecturers for their critical engagement with me during this manuscript’s development. I want to thank Associate Professor Jimmy Namangale for discussing space and time and the collaboration in developing the African Sun-Shadow Mathematical Model. Secondly, Professor Louis Caruana has continuously supported me in understanding analytic philosophy since I was a BA, MA, and Ph.D. student at the Gregorian Pontifical University in Rome. His book, Nature: Its Conceptual Architecture adds value to some of my reflections in this work. Lastly, thanks to my wife Memory Thindo Kayange, daughter Bethel Kayange and son Mishael, Loveness White, Nick Kayange, Grace Mateya, Stain Mateya, Steve Lupale, Brian Thindo, and Mtisunge Thindo for their support and patience during the development of this work. Special thanks and respect to my late Mum and Dad. I also thank Kayange’s extended family.

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Contents

1

General Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.1 Question of Being in General . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1.2 Question of Being in Western Analytic Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . 1.3 The Question of Being in African Analytic Metaphysics . . . . . . . 1.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .

1 1 3 13 19

2

Subject-Verb-Object Ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.2 Subject-Verb-Object Ontology in Western Analytic Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.3 Subject-Verb-Object Ontology in African Philosophy . . . . . . . . . 2.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2.4.1 Shortcomings of Subject-Verb-Object Approach . . . . . . .

. .

21 21

. . . .

23 36 43 44

. . .

49 49 50

. .

52 58

Space and Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2 Western Analytic Philosophical Tradition on Space and Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.1 Does Space and Time Exist? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.2 If Space and Time Exist, Are They Absolute or Relative? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.2.3 If Space and Time Exist, Then What Is Their Geometry? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

61 61

3

4

Action-Language Ontology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.2 Action Language in Western Analytic Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . 3.3 Action Language-Based Ontology in African Analytic Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

63 63 71 74

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Contents

4.3

4.4

African Concept of Space and Time . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4.3.1 What Are Space and Time in African Thought? . . . . . . . . . 4.3.2 What Is the Traditional African Model of Space and Time? Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

78 78 82 88

5

Modality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.2 Modal Language in Western Analytic Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . 5.3 Modality in African Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. 89 . 89 . 90 . 103 . 107

6

Causation in Analytic Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.2 Causation in Western Analytic Philosophy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.3 Causation in African Thought . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

. . . . .

109 109 110 120 131

7

Determinism and Indeterminism: Freedom of Actions . . . . . . . . . . 7.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7.2 Determinism and Indeterminism in Western Metaphysics . . . . . . 7.3 Determinism and Indeterminism in African Metaphysics . . . . . . . 7.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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133 133 135 141 148

8

Mind and Body . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.1 Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.2 Western Conception of Mind and Body Problem . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.3 Mind and Body in African Metaphysics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8.4 Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

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149 149 150 158 164

9

Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 167

Bibliography . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 171 Index . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 181

List of Figures

Fig. 4.1 Fig. 4.2 Fig. 4.3

Object in three-dimensional space and time .. . .. . .. . .. . .. . .. .. . .. . .. . Minkowski’s four-dimensional view . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A complete view of past, present and future space-time . . . . . . . . . . . .

74 76 77

Fig. 6.1

Plurality of causes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 128

Fig. 8.1

Dots and perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 152

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List of Tables

Table 1.1

Statement and analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

6

Table 2.1

Kagame’s Bantu categories . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

42

Table 3.1 Table 3.2

Rheomodic structure of language . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . -Li ontology . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . . . . . . . .. . . . . . . .. . .

51 55

Table 6.1 Table 6.2

Causation and figurative expressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 126 Chakanza’s figurative expressions under causality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129

Table 7.1 Table 7.2

Exemplifying determinism and indeterminism through a conditional . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 141 Figurative expressions on human actions and responsibility . . . . . 147

Table 8.1

Body and mind figurative expressions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 160

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Abbreviations and Acronyms

⊥ ∠ √ □
⊃ & _ 2 ∃  2 = ⋄ ffi 8

Absurdity/contradiction/nor Angle Square root Necessity Bi-conditional Conditional Conjunction Disjunction Element of Existential quantifier Negation Not-element of Possibility Similarity Universal quantifier

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Chapter 1

General Introduction

Abstract This chapter introduces the question of being in both Western and African philosophy. After giving a general idea of the study of being in Aristotle and others, the chapter focuses on the Western analytic metaphysics. It considers the historical development of the study of being in analytic philosophy, with a special emphasis on philosophers such as G.E. Moore and Bertrand Russell. It considers the question of the relevance of metaphysics as suggested by philosophers such as Alfred Ayer and Rudolf Carnap. The chapter also introduces some studies that used insights from the analytic tradition in their analysis of the meaning of being (insights from natural science, language and logical analysis). It considers developments in African thought with philosophers that build on analytic tradition, such as Sodipo, Hallen and Kayange. It investigates elements of analytic metaphysics that form part of diverse developments of African philosophers on the concept of being, such as Kagame, Ramose and Gyekye.

1.1

Question of Being in General

What is being? This question calls for the determination of the meaning of ‘Being’. Aristotle, in his Metaphysics, inquires on this concept in three main ways. Firstly, metaphysics is the study of the first causes or principles of things. Commenting on this component, Aristotle writes, ‘all men suppose what is called wisdom (sophia) to deal with the first causes (aitia) and the principles (archai) of things’ (Aristotle, Metaphysics, 981b28). The ancient Greek philosophers were among the first to study the principal cause of everything, the arché. The general assumption is that one can adequately respond to the question of being through identifying the principal cause. The principal cause links metaphysics as a universal science with particular sciences such as theoretical physics. Secondly, metaphysics is the study of being qua being. Aristotle comments on this in the following: There is a science which studies Being qua Being, and the properties inherent in it in virtue of its own nature. This science is different from any of the so-called particular sciences, for none of the others contemplates Being generally qua Being; they divide off some portion of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. M. Kayange, The Question of Being in Western and African Analytic Metaphysics, Synthese Library 438, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69645-0_1

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1 General Introduction it and study the attribute of this portion, as do for example mathematical sciences. (Metaphysics 1003a21–22)

The citation refers to the general study of being, insofar as it is, and its different attributes or properties. It extends the inquiry from the first causes and principles to various properties that define and constitute being. For Aristotle, the general investigation of being and its inherent properties is equivalent to the study of ‘substance’. The linkage between substance and properties relates metaphysics with the natural sciences such as biology and chemistry. Thirdly, the ‘question of being’ studies objects that are unchanging and that have separable existence. The focus on the ‘unchanging object’ with ‘separate existence’ means that metaphysics is the study of God. The assumption is that God has different attributes such as ‘eternal’ and ‘unchanging’. Similarly, the attribute of ‘separate existence’ is related to the view that God is causa sui (God is the sole explanation of his Being) and eternal (unchanging and timeless). Baruch Spinoza comments on the attributes of God in the following passage, ‘By God I understand a being absolutely infinite, i.e., a substance consisting of infinity of attributes, of which each one expresses an eternal and infinite essence’ (Baruch Spinoza 2016, Part 1). The history of the study of being since ancient times often depends on the three criteria, namely, (i) universal study of being, (ii) an analysis of being and its properties and (iii) the study of the unchanging entity with separable existence. For example, this history may cover the theory of arché (the essential elements such as water, air and fire), the Pythagorean theory of numbers, Plato’s idealism, Aristotle’s substance, Thomistic substance, Spinoza’s substance, Kantian philosophy, Hegelian idealism and Heidegger’s Being and Time. It may also cover more general themes, such as universals and particulars. All this is a way of responding to the perennial question of being and its properties. Although the study of the question of being continues up to this day, Martin Heidegger thinks otherwise: This question has today been forgotten. Even though in our time we deem it progressive to give our approval to ‘metaphysics’ again, it is held that we have been exempted from the exertions of a newly rekindled γιγαντoμαχíα περì της oυσíας. Yet the question we are touching upon is not just any question. It is one, which provided a stimulus for the researches of Plato and Aristotle, only to subside from then on as a theme for actual investigation. What these two men achieved was to persist through many alterations and ‘retouchings’ down to the ‘logic’ of Hegel. And what they wrestled with the utmost intellectual effort from the phenomena, fragmentary and incipient though it was, has long since become trivialized. (Heidegger 1962, 20)

While Heidegger thinks that philosophers forgot the question of being in his time, he acknowledges its presence through the various ‘alterations and retouchings’ of Plato and Aristotle’s ideas. Although Heidegger’s position begs further questions, I contend that there has been a continuous attempt to clarify the problem of being throughout philosophy development. Philosophers continue to ask questions around being, such as, where did human beings come from? Besides, what is the purpose of life? These questions are continuously becoming relevant in the study of ‘being’ due

1.2 Question of Being in Western Analytic Metaphysics

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to technological advancement in the modern world. There is, therefore, no doubt that the investigation of ‘being’ continues its role as a central element in this discipline. Although different philosophers study the question of being, there are a series of inconclusive debates, disagreements and continuous creation of new concepts and theories. These developments lead to the formation of different schools of thought and mixed feelings on the relevance of the study of being, and in some circumstances, these render this discipline obsolete. For example, some critical debates include whether a substance exists or only properties; whether there are two substances, material and spiritual or only one; whether universals are only names or have real existence; whether human subjects have free will or not; etc. A significant disagreement concerns the determination of a proper method for the inquiry of being. Some rationalists (continental philosophers) resort to reason as the only way of accessing the nature of reality (e.g. Plato, Rene Descartes and Spinoza). In most cases, this leads to creating idealism forms (such as Platonic idealism and German idealism of philosophers such as Johann Gottlieb Fichte, Arthur Schopenhauer and Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling). On the contrary, the empiricists claim that, if there should be the study of being at all, we must start from ‘what is better known to us through the senses’. The claim is in line with Aristotle’s suggestion that the study of being must start from ‘what is better known to us’ to ‘what is better known in themselves’.1 A difficult question that troubles philosophers regards the possibility of knowing things in themselves. In this book, I intend to investigate being in the analytic philosophy, a modern empiricist version. This reflection continues the tradition of the different fathers of analytic metaphysics, such as Gottfried Wilhelm von Leibniz, Bernard Bolzano, George Edward Moore, Friedrich Ludwig, Gottlob Frege and Bertrand Russell. It further considers a similar project in African thought with philosophers, such as John Olubi Sodipo, Barry Hallen and Kayange. It also investigates elements of analytic metaphysics that form part of African philosophers’ various writings such as Alexis Kagame, Mogobe Ramose and Kwame Gyekye. In this regard, the focus is on developments that discuss ‘being’ using standard methods in the analytic tradition, for example, studies that explicate ‘being’ through the analysis of language, natural science and logic/mathematics.

1.2

Question of Being in Western Analytic Metaphysics

The question of being in analytic metaphysics may follow the three related approaches, namely, (I) historical approach, (II) methodological approach and (III) relevance-based approach.

1 This methodology is discussed in Posterior Analytics 71b32; Prior Analytics 68b35–7; Physics Α.1, 184a16–20; Metaphysics Ζ.3, 1029b3–12; Topics Ζ.4, 141b2–142a12.

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1 General Introduction

(I) In the historical approach, the focus is on the evolution of the notion of being in the analytic tradition. The modern practice starts with philosophers such as Moore (1873–1958) and Russell, some of the analytic philosophy’s fathers. Some thinkers such as Fraser MacBride (2018) believe that the primary source of analytic philosophy is Immanuel Kant, and later, Gottlob Frege, who partly influenced thinkers such as Moore and Russell. Similarly, one may argue that thinkers such as Aristotle and Leibniz are equally fathers of the analytic philosophy; hence, their ideas may likewise be crucial in conceptualising the notion of being in this realm.2 Russell and Moore investigate language with the scope of clarifying its logical structure and removing the inconsistencies. These philosophers did not deny the reality of metaphysics, but they found their ways of studying being in general. For instance, Russell created a way of understanding the universe based on facts, utilising logical atomism. The idea of developing a solid foundation for mathematical principles led Russell and Alfred North Whitehead to build ontology in the context of analytic metaphysics. It is important to note that both philosophers searched for an alternative to the twentieth century Hegelian idealism, with its abstract metaphysical systems. Samuel E. Stumpf (1966/2003, 423) indicates that the main Hegelians promoting this idealism were F. H. Bradley (1846–1924), Bernard Bosanquet (1848–1923) and John E. Mc Taggart (1866–1925). Russell was questioning the meaning of the universe’s metaphysical systems in these idealist philosophers’ theories. Apart from individuals who may indicate the historical evolution of the analytic philosophy, two historical events can guide the conceptualisation of ‘being’ in this context. The first event was the Vienna Circle in the twentieth century. This was a club of logical empiricists belonging to Moritz Schlick, involving scientists, linguists, philosophers, mathematicians, logicians, etc. These members were regularly meeting to discuss and resolve philosophical problems in the sciences. The leader Schlick, a physicist, had a solid philosophical background, and he qualifies as one of the fathers of modern logical positivism. The Vienna Circle further calls for a link with Ernst Mach Society, promoting a scientific conception of the world. What is fundamental is promoting a scientific conception of the world through the Vienna Circle’s manifesto, Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung: Der Wiener Kreis. In a presentation at Konstanz Colloquium in the philosophy of science in 1991, Carl Gustav Hempel argues that there were two forms of the Vienna Circle. The first group was under Schlick’s influence and the logician Rudolf Carnap and the second group under Neurath. Commenting on this aspect, Hempel notes that: When people these days talk about logical positivism or the Vienna Circle and say that its ideas are passé, this is just wrong. This overlooks the fact that there were two quite different schools of logical empiricism, namely the one of Carnap and Schlick and so on and then the quite different one of Otto Neurath, who advocates a completely pragmatic conception of the philosophy of science. He says: we must look to how science proceeds in reality. And this

2

Note that the ancient philosophers who concentrated on nature and logic/mathematics may similarly be considered as influential in the development of analytic thought. This may include thinkers such as Thales, Leucippus, Democritus and Pythagoras.

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form of empiricism is in no way affected by any of the fundamental objections against logical positivism. . . . (quoted in Wolters 2003, 117)

Although Hempel’s idea supports Neurath’s logical empiricism with pragmatism, both directions of the Vienna Circle are informative of a novel way of discussing the question of being in logical positivism.3 The different studies by these members of Vienna Circle signal an orientation of being, rooted in natural science, logic/mathematics and language. Karl Popper and Albert Einstein had a connection with the Vienna Circle, although this is not in Popper’s interest. He prefers being a critic of this dogmatic group rather than being one of its members (Popper 1974; Kayange 2008). Another important event that can help in the study of being is the Berlin Society for Empirical Philosophy in 1929, under Hans Reichenbach and Carl Hempel. The name of the society already suggests the Berlin Circle’s passion for providing a philosophy founded on natural science. Although this group shared with the Vienna circle in promoting a scientific conception of the world, Berlin Circle preferred to be associated with ‘logical empiricism’. This shows a slight difference with the logical positivism of the Vienna Circle of Schlick and Carnap. The elaboration above explains Hempel’s sympathy towards Otto Neurath, who, as mentioned earlier, favoured pragmatism. Nevertheless, both circles’ common aspects are the centrality of language, natural science and logic/mathematics to analyse reality. The decline of the Vienna Circle, the analytic philosophy hub, led to another historical event of spreading this thought worldwide. Popper claimed that one of the main reasons for the Vienna Circle’s end was his demonstration that some central teachings, such as verification, were faulty. However, the disintegration of the members of this group follows the evolution of the Second World War. For example, Carnap, a leading figure, immigrated to the USA in 1936, Neurath to Holland and later to the UK 1940, Ayer went to the UK. This movement meant the spread of the analytic philosophy across Europe, America and later in parts of Africa (such as South Africa). The murder of Schlick, a passionate leader of the Vienna Circle in 1937, further contributed to the decline of this philosophy in Vienna. The spread of the Vienna Circle members to different parts of the world coincides with the important developments in analytic metaphysics departing from the 1950s. Worthy mentioning is the ordinary language philosophers such as early Wittgenstein, Austin and Gilbert Ryle, who became influential with their analytic philosophy. Early Wittgenstein was influential in the Vienna Circle because of his Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus of 1922. Members of this group were discussing his ideas. In 1960 and beyond, different philosophers such as Saul Kripke and Richard Quine studied ‘being’, creating various themes.

3

Other philosophers that are associated with the Vienna Circle include Hans Hahn (mathematician), Philipp Frank (physicist), Olga Hahn-Neurath (mathematician), Victor Kraft (philosopher), Theodor Radakovic (mathematician), Gustav Bergmann (mathematician), Herbert Feigl, Marcel Natkin, Friedrich Waismann, Karl Menger, Kurt Gödel, Kurt Reidemeister and Edgar Zilsel (see also Bergmann 1954).

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1 General Introduction

Table 1.1 Statement and analysis Statement: Chikondi is a girl Subject: Chikondi Predicate: Is a girl Proper noun: Chikondi Verb: is Indefinite article: a Object: girl Single letters of the alphabet as below C h i k o n d i i s a g i r l Consonants: c, h, k, n, d, s g, r and l Vowels: i, o, i, i, a, i Capital letters: C Small letters: h, k, n, d, s g, r, l, i, o, i, i, a, i. Chikondi is a Chichewa word and may further develop into parts such as chi – ko – ndi.

(II) In the methodological approach, the focus is on aspects that define philosophy as analytic. These aspects are tools for the determination of the meaning of being. In terms of doing philosophy, what qualifies an individual or a theory of being a part of the analytic tradition is primarily logical analysis. This qualification explains why this philosophy introduced the concept of ‘analysis’ as an important component that gives it an identity. The ‘analysis’ is not a mere concept, but it is fundamental for giving direction to the type of philosophical activity taking shape in this framework. Traditional philosophy is suggestive of understanding the concept of analysis as ‘decomposition analysis’. The analytic framework refers to the rational activity that focuses on the whole’s movement to its constituent parts. It concerns the breaking of something into smaller pieces for easy comprehension. For instance, using decomposition analysis, one may approach a statement such as ‘Chikondi is a girl’ by dissecting it into different constituent parts. This statement has constituent parts at various levels as below Table 1.1. In analysing these different parts, an individual studying ontology focuses on reference and meaning. Therefore, we may question the meaning/reference of parts on their own and with the other parts. Moore, who was noted earlier as one of the founders of modern analytic philosophy, endorsed the decomposition analysis. According to Moore, a thing becomes intelligible only when the constituent parts are clear. It follows that the analysis of the matter at hand makes knowledge possible. For example, a detailed map of Zomba city in Malawi provides a better understanding of it. I can claim to know this city when I have grasped these parts and how they relate to each other. For Moore, defining a thing requires decomposition analysis, which clarifies the various properties of an item. This aspect comes in clearly in the Principles of Ethics where he wrote: You can give a definition of a horse, because a horse has many different properties and qualities, all of which you can enumerate. But when you have enumerated them all, when you have reduced a horse to his simplest terms, then you no longer define those terms. They are simply something which you think of or perceive, and to anyone who cannot think of or perceive them, you can never, by any definition, make their nature known. (Moore, PE, 7.)

The analysis is already indicative of property-based conception in discussing being in the analytic metaphysics. Only simple concepts such as ‘beauty’ and ‘good’ are problematic in terms of definition. Moore shows how the concept of good is a simple

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term in ethics but views it as indefinable in the decomposition analysis. In this regard, ‘conceptual analysis’ seems to be a better way of conceptualising simple concepts. In the analysis, the process ends when one deduces a simple term. One cannot go beyond a simple term, which is the end of the inquiry. The study of the question of being may adequately fit in the context of conceptual analysis. For instance, if the concept substance makes sense in this philosophy, its constituent parts’ investigation leads to a simple term. If this is not possible, then the concept of substance is meaningless. Although decomposition analysis is standard in the analytic philosophy, its identity comes from logical analysis. A version of the analysis that appears mainly in Frege’s works is commonly the function-argument analysis. In studying a statement, the focus is on the argument (as a part) and function (as another part). The function in the example above is ‘is a girl’ (assume that this is F); the argument is ‘Chikondi’ (assume that this is x). The form of the sentence will be F(x). For example, when Chikondi substitutes x in ‘x is a girl’, it yields a truth-value that such is the case. This analysis is already generating a form of studying being and its properties in the analytic tradition. The study will lead to the analytic metaphysics that builds on the theory of quantification. A good example is Quine’s elaboration of ontological commitment, which follows this analysis (Quine and Orman 1969). A simple example of predicate logic analysis is transforming the universal or existential statements about things and their properties. For example, in the word ‘Every human is rational’, the parts may be ‘every’ representing a universal quantifier 8 (for all), and ‘human’ means a class or set H of humans, while ‘is rational’ (R) stands for a property of x (predicate). This analysis in predicate logic suggests a form such as, 8x 2 H, RðxÞ: For every x element of H, it is the case that R(x) is true. An example focusing on an existential quantifier is the analysis of the statement, ‘Some humans are metaphysicians’. The first part is ‘some’, which needs an existential quantifier (∃), which means that something exists. That something is x; hence we say, ∃x (Exists x). The existent is an element of H (set of humans) but only a subset of humans, who have the property M of being metaphysicians (a predicate). The following visualises this aspect, ∃x 2 H, RðxÞ: Russell’s theory of descriptions developed further the concept of logical analysis, which almost became orthodoxy in the early development of analytic philosophy. He was sure that logical analysis was a way of doing philosophy, which assured progress towards understanding and knowledge relative to a particular phenomenon. He confirmed that ‘Ever since I abandoned the philosophy of Kant and Hegel, I have sought solutions of philosophical problems employing analysis; and I remain firmly

8

1 General Introduction

persuaded, despite some modern tendencies to the contrary, that only by analysing is progress possible’ (Russell 1959). Russell indicates that he left the speculative philosophy (idealism) of Kant and Hegel to a more concrete way of philosophising. For him, genuine or sound philosophy must focus on analysing propositions (Russell [1900], 1975, 8). The centrality of language analysis is already suggesting the appropriate method and the content of philosophy. Language analysis confirms the technique used by Frege in consideration of function-argument analysis noted above. Russell’s analysis moves from a definite description, which has no meaning ‘in itself’, but gets it through transformation into a different form (a proposition). A definite description is put in a logical form using the quantification theory. The best example that explains analysis is how one moves to formalise an expression (a definite description) ‘The present King of France is bald’. (Russell 1959). The analysis stage gives meaning to this expression as referring to the existing one and only one King of France, such that King of France is bald. The analysis ends with the construction of a formal structure reflecting this meaning. For example, the parts of ‘The present King of France is bald’ are as follows: (i) ∃ (an existential quantifier) and ∃x indicating that there exists x. (ii) Another part is that x has the property of being king (K); hence we say Kx. (iii) The other part indicates that for all elements y, where y is the King of France, then there is the situation of identity (y ¼ x). (iv) The last part shows that property B (being bald) is predicated of x. Using symbolic logic, the different parts are in one expression as follows, ∃x½Kx&8yðKy ⊃ y ¼ xÞ&Bx: The statement makes sense, but it has a problem in the context of reference. For example, now, there is no King of France (referent). Nevertheless, my interest in this section is that there are different parts from the above statement. Therefore, the analysis clarifies the formal structure of a proposition, hence making its reference clear—the question of being surfaces by analysing the different individuals and what is predicated. A slightly different form of logical analysis comes from early Wittgenstein in his work, the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. What is fundamental is the interest to link ordinary language with things directly. Wittgenstein’s analysis goes straight to demonstrating ordinary language structure, which represents reality through isomorphic relation. In this regard, analysis reveals the constituent structure of a proposition that leads to the structure of the natural world. The ideas of early Wittgenstein, Frege and Russell are developed further by Carnap, with his concept of quasi-analysis. Carnap in his work The Logical Structure of the World and Pseudo Problems in Philosophy. stresses and applies analysis and quasi-analysis methods. In ordinary language usage, this is an extension of analysis, a form of synthesis. In some circumstances, Carnap uses terms such as

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‘rational reconstruction’ and ‘explication’, which capture both analysis and synthesis. Commenting on this, Carnap wrote: The main problem concerns the possibility of the rational reconstruction of the concepts of all fields of knowledge on the basis of concepts that refer to the immediately given. By rational reconstruction is here meant the searching out of new definitions for old concepts. The old concepts did not ordinarily originate by way of deliberate formulation but in more or less unreflected and spontaneous development. The new definitions should be superior to the old in clarity and exactness, and, above all, should fit into a systematic structure of concepts. Such a clarification of concepts, nowadays frequently called "explication," still seems to me one of the most important tasks of philosophy, especially if it is concerned with the main categories of human thought.

Here, the idea indicates concepts that refer to the empirical world, which are ordinary concepts, not created through philosophical reflections. The original concepts that refer to the world of experience are spontaneous. This reflects how ordinary language develops among individuals, without particular interventions from human subjects. The analysis involves a planned or rational clarification and organisation of these everyday concepts into more formal ones, which are in a systematic structure of concepts. This reorganisation is a structure of concepts known as reconstruction or synthesis. Carnap uses analysis-synthesis, especially in the theory of relations, following insights from Frege, Russell and Whitehead, and reduces reality to the given (Carnap 1967, 7–8). Firstly, the above discussion of analysis shows that language is fundamental and indispensable to metaphysics debate. Language is a vehicle for the development of claims about reality and the formulation of formal structures. While the language is a fundamental tool for doing philosophy as demonstrated above, there are some other reasons why this was central. One such development is the belief that philosophical problems are a consequence of misuse or abuse of language. Alfred Ayer (1910–1989) points out that this language abuse causes us to ‘draw false inferences, or ask spurious questions, or make nonsensical assumptions’. In avoiding this problem, philosophy concentrates on clarifying language (see Ludwig Wittgenstein 1922; 1953; Bob Hale and von Wright, C. 1997). Although the analytic philosophy members differ in their stance towards traditional philosophy, they agree on this central claim. According to Wittgenstein (1889–1951), philosophy’s object is logical clarification of thoughts (Wittgenstein 1922). Accordingly, the result obtained in philosophy is not creating philosophical propositions but making propositions clear. This is suggesting a static view of philosophy. This philosophy is no longer busy constructing concepts, doctrines and systems, as was the case with rationalism/idealism. This is even beyond Kantian philosophy, which was engaged in constructing new concepts such as nuomena. Philosophy is now busy describing issues through the analysis of language.4

4

The study of language has taken us to the various studies in philosophy of language, for instance, studies by J. L. Austin (1962), who tried to discuss issues regarding language and meaning in reference to ordinary language. His famous work is How to Do Things with Words. Wittgenstein

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1 General Introduction

Secondly, natural science is central in the development above; hence what is fundamental is viewing the concept of philosophy as an analysis of natural science (see Hitchcock, C. 2004). This is the belief that it provides true or solid knowledge that follows from the method of induction. Before the theories such as relativity and quantum, Newtonian mechanics provided universal truths (see also Popper 1974). They had the same value as the mathematical axioms, which are true beyond any doubt. The idea of induction comes from empiricism that natural science offers valid evidence because of its inductive methods. Of course, this idea has led to a debate between empiricists and rationalists on whether natural science uses the inductive method or the deductive method. Empiricists have preferred the former while rationalists the latter. Nevertheless, in the analytic framework, the inductive approach is the method of natural science. This second point shows that scientists report their findings through language. This means that a philosopher must further study science’s language, ensuring that inconsistencies are no longer there. It is part of logical analysis, which Carnap believed among others to analyse all knowledge and science assertions.5 (III) In the relevance-based approach, the primary question is, ‘Is analytic metaphysics a relevant science?’ Following this question is, ‘Is the study of being relevant?’ Although different philosophers studied the question of being in the analytic tradition, it is also associated with the denial of metaphysics’ relevance. This critique led to the contention that metaphysics was a nonsensical/useless subject, requiring elimination. Alfred Jules Ayer and Rudolf Carnap6 were among the champions calling for this elimination of metaphysics. I contend that the origin of their problem comes from a general critique of transcendental metaphysics, which purported the existence of objects beyond sense experience (nuomena). One of the philosophers who criticised metaphysics and influenced most of the developments after him was Kant. He questioned the possibility of the human mind going beyond the limits of possible experience and knowing objects in themselves. He argued that this is impossible, given that human beings cannot have access to this abstract world, which is beyond human reason and experience. This thinking of Kant led to a big revolution in the study of being in metaphysics, which will also affect thinkers in the analytic tradition. In the general studies in metaphysics, the first revolution shifted from transcendental metaphysics to a philosophy that focuses on objects within human sense experience limits. A notable school of thought will develop within the continental

will also be fundamental due to his work noted earlier, Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. Today there are many works that are studying further language, for instance, semantics, syntax, etc. 5 A multiplicity of studies in philosophy of science and logic responded to this idea of doing philosophy. The earliest was the Received View supported by thinkers like Hempel. Other later models of this understanding developed under the hypo-deductive approach to theories. In general this view considered scientific theories as statements and approached philosophy from that direction (see Karl Popper 1959, Mary Hesse, 1966; 2000). For the Semantic View, scientific theories are models or structures. 6 From here I will use, Ayer and Carnap.

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tradition in Western philosophy, which will construct metaphysics based on what appears (phenomenology). One of the leading developers of this study of being is Husserl,7 who focuses on the conscious experience of what appears in the study of being. This was a better option than the abstract metaphysics of philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas, Descartes and Spinoza. Phenomenology and existentialism will focus on the human condition in the world of experience. This philosophy also attracted French philosophers such as Gabriel Marcel, Jean-Paul Sartre, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, Simone de Beauvoir and Albert Camus.8 The anti-metaphysics philosophers limit Kant’s problem of being in transcendental metaphysics to an issue of language. It is a language with authority to judge ‘what can’ and ‘what cannot’ be known or ‘what is’ and ‘what is not’ reasonable. Ayer’s work, Language Truth and Logic (Chapter on ‘The Elimination of Metaphysics’), confirms this transformation of Kant’s problem to language: Our charge against the metaphysician is not that he attempts to employ the understanding in a field where it cannot profitably venture, but that he produces sentences which fail to conform to the conditions under which alone a sentence can be literally significant Nor are we ourselves obliged to talk nonsense in order to show that all sentences of a certain type are necessarily devoid of literal significance (Ayer 1946, 35).

The citation shows that the main concern in analytic philosophy is not the Kantian problem of human reason failing to access the noumenal world. Still, it is a new problem of the meaning of sentences. This suggests that the shift leads to the reduction of the study of being in metaphysics to semantics. Metaphysics will, therefore, be the study of the meaning of statements and concepts regarding being. While this is a simple idea, what is problematic is the criterion for determining whether sentences are meaningful or not. This issue of assessing the validity of statements is the problem of verification. Verification is a criterion that helps an individual ascertain the validity of a statement on whether it refers to facts. Commenting on this principle, Ayer writes: The criterion which we use to test the genuineness of apparent statements of fact is the criterion of verifiability. We say that a sentence is factually significant to any given person, if, and only if, he knows how to verify the proposition which it purports to express – that is, if he knows what observations would lead him, under certain conditions, to accept the proposition as being true, or reject it as being false. (Ayer 1946, 35)

In this citation, Ayer underlines the importance of observations in determining the meaning of a statement. This principle affects the study of the question of being in transcendental metaphysics, which has different non-observable statements and concepts. The whole world of objects that are beyond sense experience is meaningless. For Ayer, verification is a criterion for demarcating scientific subjects from non-scientific ones. Metaphysics is among the pseudo-sciences, and thus it is

7 Husserl is a prominent figure who is one of the fathers of phenomenalism. His most famous work that is a pillar of phenomenalism is The Idea of Phenomenology (1906–1907). 8 Note that existentialism is often associated with the ideas of Kierkegaard.

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1 General Introduction

meaningless or nonsensical, hence irrelevant. For this reason, metaphysics and its study of the question of being was one of the useless subjects. Carnap also argued for the elimination of metaphysics using his method of logical analysis of statements. In his view, the logical analysis helped clarify different sciences, mainly the empirical sciences, but disadvantaged metaphysics and its study of being, the theory of normative value, theology, etc. He argued that metaphysics’ statements are in a strict sense meaningless. They are pseudo-statements (Carnap 1932, 61). These statements are either problematic because they have meaningless words (they do not refer to anything in the world and are pseudowords) or because of the constituent parts that make the whole statement meaningless. A word in this context is meaningful if it refers to a concept; otherwise, it is a pseudo-concept. Carnap argues that it must have a fixed occurrence in its elementary sentence for a word to be meaningful (Carnap 1932, 62). He demanded that a sentence in which a word appears must be verifiable (observational sentence); hence, he follows Ayer’s position. For example, a sentence, ‘God created the world’, requires observation for the word ‘God’ to make sense. In showing the uselessness of metaphysics, Carnap demonstrates this by considering the word ‘principle’, which is common in the study of being. For instance, this is in the context of the ontology of the arche. He denies the metaphysical explanation, which states that ‘y is the principle of x’, meaning that x exists because of y. His problem with this interpretation is that a metaphysician does not refer to an observable process where x follows from y. Due to this lack of observation process and verification, Carnap dismisses the idea of principle as meaningless. The denial that ‘x exists because of y’ puts in crisis the universal concept of causation, where x (effect) has as its explanation y (cause). This also affects theology, where we may think of y as God and x as the universe. Carnap denies the meaning of the word ‘God’ as lacking its empirical reference as he writes: In the metaphysical use, on the other hand, the word God refers to something beyond experience. The word is deliberately divested of reference to a physical being, or a spiritual being that is immanent in the physical world. And as it is not given a new meaning, it becomes meaningless. (Canarp 1932, 66)

The example of the notion ‘God’ puts into a crisis not only metaphysics but also theology, which qualifies as a pseudo-science, hence calling for its elimination. Here what collapse is the Aristotelian conception where God is a possible object of metaphysics and Christian and other philosophies, which promote this conception of God as the first principle or the uncaused cause of everything that exist. Ayer’s logical empiricism is worrying because it falls victim of some criticisms. For example, the belief in protocol statements (observational statements) as a determinant for what is scientific creates the idea of natural science, which is subjective. This is because a protocol sentence will report an observer’s experience, which cannot be intersubjectively testable. This implies that these statements cannot be true for everyone. The implication is that natural science is not scientific, but it forms a collection of subjective opinions about reality. Apart from this subjective

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element, this logical empiricism fails further because of the logical failure to confirm the validity of universal science statements, as was noted in Popper (1959). A further challenge is that observation required in Ayer has some aspects that are not observable (non-observable framework). The ideas of both Carnap and Ayer led to anti-metaphysics thinking in some philosophers in the analytic philosophy. I will not explain how different thinkers responded to Ayer and Carnap, but I underline that the question of being is problematic in the Western analytic tradition. Despite this negative attitude towards metaphysics, I emphasise that philosophers such as Strawson, Bertrand Russell and Quine engaged in a profound reflection on the question of being in metaphysics. I also indicate that the denial of metaphysics forms part of a review on ‘being’ in the analytic tradition.

1.3

The Question of Being in African Analytic Metaphysics

What is the situation of the question of being in African analytic metaphysics? A discourse on being in African analytic metaphysics requires a demonstration of the presence of analytic philosophy in the African context. Kayange (2018) introduced African analytic philosophy to build a conception of meaning and truth through language study. Unfortunately, it is challenging to develop a comprehensive survey of African analytic philosophy because of the lack of adequate developments that focus on the philosophy of natural science and logic/mathematics.9 Analytic framework is in different studies that attempt to construct philosophy on insights and methods from this context. Different thinkers vary on the status of the African analytic framework. A flexible group of thinkers acknowledges this philosophy’s presence and practice (Jason van. Niekerk 2007; Hallen 2001; Kayange 2018). A more radical group of analytical philosophers may argue that philosophy is universal; hence, it is problematic to endorse a particular thought in Africa. Safro Kwame (1992) was uncomfortable with analytic philosophy and other Western philosophies, foreign to the African thought system. Similarly, Polycarp Ikuenobe (2004) argues against analytic philosophy in the African thought, mainly because of its criticism against ethno-philosophy. This author is worried about some of the conclusions by some thinkers who argue that ethnophilosophy distorts African thought’s image. For this work, I will focus more on ideas that attempt to demonstrate analytic philosophy in the African thought. Thinkers who are pro-Analytic philosophy in African thought tend to identify some methodologies as analytical in African philosophy’s evolution. For instance, Niekerk echoed this aspect in the following passage:

9 These are the areas of research that I am currently exploring, as they will make complete developments in analytic metaphysics

14

1 General Introduction Having pointed to the features of an Analytic style of philosophy, I turn now to a strand of argument drawn from the history of African philosophy, which I take to be congruous with this Analytic style. I choose the term ‘congruous’ carefully. I want to point to those features which I, as a philosopher trained in the Analytic tradition, first (and enduringly) found appealing in the history of African philosophy, and to suggest that philosophers who consider the description of an Analytic style appealing have reason to recognise this strand as appealing for the same reasons. (Niekerk 2007, 519)

Niekerk demonstrates the congruence by appealing to the arguments of professional philosophers such as Paulin Hountondji, Kwasi Wiredu, Peter Bodunrin, Kwame Anthony Appiah and Dismas Masolo, who are critics of ethno-philosophy. For instance, they question collective philosophy (collective voices) and favour cultural specific philosophies, propositions and concepts. This seems to support the denial of generalisations that are common among philosophers. Culturally specific philosophies may still be problematic to some analytic philosophers, given that within a particular culture individuals may develop different interpretations and systems of thought. The critiquing of ethno-philosophy supports the understanding that most philosophers mentioned above were sympathetic with analytic philosophy in their various works. Polycarp Ikuenobe (1997) points out Hountondji’s interest in using this framework in African philosophy in the following words: The important point to note about Hountondji’s characterization is that African philosophy must be the same with the other known and documented philosophies, especially the Western analytic philosophy, which has become ‘dominant’ and used as the paradigm. In other words, like Western analytic philosophy, African philosophy should involve both the study of individual works and ‘confrontation’ in terms of logical argumentation, intellectual discussion, and debate.

Hountondji uses the analytic framework that formed part of his academic formation, and he regards both individual works and logical argumentation as fundamental in the development of African thought. This importance of individual works is going against the generalisations, as noted earlier. These are dangerous because they ignore the universal nature of philosophy, which allows a diversity of perspectives. Logic is a central feature in analytic philosophy, where philosophy is about logical analysis. This leads to the conclusion that philosophy is substantially a logical activity. I would like to acknowledge some philosophers such as Eze (2001), who support the importance of analytic philosophy in African thought. Nevertheless, Eze is very conscious of the requirement of universality that is common in the analytic philosophy. Commenting on the possibility of speaking about analytic tradition in Africa philosophy, Eze (2001, 205) noted that: The formulation implies, first of all, that not all of the African philosophy belongs to the ‘analytic tradition’ and that perhaps we ought to specify what the African traditions of philosophy have contributed to the analytic tradition, or how the analytic tradition has paid or not paid attention to African philosophy. The problem with this assumption, however, is that most analytic philosophers do not—and perhaps cannot—even speak about ‘African philosophy’, although some may be able to think or write about, say, philosophies of Africa, philosophy for Africans, philosophy in Africa, or even’ philosophy and the study of Africa’.

1.3 The Question of Being in African Analytic Metaphysics

15

Eze’s assumption that ‘not all of the African philosophy belongs to the analytic tradition’ entails acknowledging the existence of analytic philosophy in this context. The citation shows with caution that what is required is showing elements that form part of the analytic tradition in the African philosophical tradition. The author seems to suggest a comparative philosophy between African philosophy and the analytic tradition. In both historical and methodological approaches, it is quite challenging to establish a proper trajectory of thinkers that fall under the analytic framework, mostly because they use insights from both continental and analytic traditions. Despite this, an attempt to establish philosophy by analysing how people use language is typical in African thought. Kayange (2018) indicated this development in early thinkers such as Tempels (1959), Kagame (1956) and Mbiti (1969), who, in some respects, focused on language use in determining the indigenous philosophy. In this regard, African metaphysics elements are present in works such as Placide Tempels’ work Bantu Ontology and Alexis Kagame’s La philosophiae BantuRwandaise de l’être in 1956. Given that this framework was mainly common in the Anglo-Saxon countries, I will limit my brief presentation of the modern historical development of an analytic framework to thinkers in such nations. One of the products in the 1960s that used a mixed method between the analytic method and the ethnographic method was Willie Abraham (1962). Commenting on this author, Hallen wrote, ‘There is a place for language analysis, but there is also a place for the study and interpolation of oral literature and the beliefs and values enshrined in Africa’ (Hallen 2001, 15). Apart from language use, African thought writings show that analysis/logical analysis guides most academics in their philosophical endeavour. In this analysis, various scholars such as Hallen, Sodipo and Kayange exclusively use the analytic tradition, more especially the ordinary language approach, drawing insights from thinkers such as Wittgenstein, Austin and Ryle. Similar techniques are in different academics, such as E. C. Eze, Thaddeus Metz, Gyekye, Kwasi Wiredu and Ramose, who analyse concepts, statements and beliefs in their respective study areas. For instance, Wiredu considered the Akan concept of truth by analysing language use and meaning. This development led him to develop a generalised concept of truth. I am aware that language does not necessarily qualify a study as belonging to the analytic philosophy; however, some studies clearly show this framework’s influence. Below, I will focus on this nature’s works, mainly Hallen’s writings (some of them done together with Sodipo) and Kayange. Hallen is one of the African philosophers who explicitly promoted the use of the ordinary language approach analysis to do philosophy in this context. The promotion of everyday language is in The Good, the Bad and the Beautiful (2001), where: One of the convictions underlying much of this book is that the systematic analysis of ordinary, everyday language usage in non-Western, particularly African, cultures can prove to be of fundamental philosophical value. The methodological inspiration for this kind of analysis derives, most obviously, from ordinary language philosophy as enunciated by Anglophone philosophers during the mid-twentieth century. In my own case, how this

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1 General Introduction inspiration came to be transferred to sub-Saharan West Africa is a story that perhaps deserves telling in some detail. (Hallen 2001, 1)

The citation shows the preference of the analytic method in Hallen (2001). The author follows Western analytic philosophy methods but believes that they may equally lead to the development of philosophy in Africa. Hallen in The Good, the Bad and the Beautiful starts with explaining the ordinary language approach and proceeds to do African philosophy in the chapters. Apart from themes directly relevant in the study of being, such as individuality, me, myself and destiny, the author has tackled areas such as aesthetics, moral philosophy and epistemology using the same framework. Kayange (2014, 2018, 2020), while acknowledging that philosophy is a universal activity in all human subjects, supports the localised development of analytic thought in Africa. This is through a reflection on language, logic/mathematics and natural science. Issues that affect ‘being’ in Kayange (2018) are in Meaning and Truth in African Philosophy: Doing African Philosophy with Language. This work uses language to discuss important themes in philosophy, such as counterfactuals, beauty, truth, individual and the community in Africa. The author uses the ordinary language approach and insights from the pragmatic approach to meaning. The main contention is that it is possible to build philosophies of individual speakers of language by focusing on language use. The focus on language use avoids dogmatism, where particular thought systems define the essence of being African. Kayange (2018) demonstrates how various philosophies sometimes conflict with part of the African thought systems. In this line of thought, African thought is not limited to certain tribal generalisations common in academic circles. Kayange (2020), in Rethinking African Analytic Philosophy: A Perspectival Approach’, uses a use-theoretical framework (ordinary language approach) and introduces a version of perspectivism. Thinking in this realm, he noted that: In this paper, I put together insights from the ordinary-language approach (use-theoretical approach) and perspectival realism, and use them in developing and clarifying themes in African philosophy. I, therefore, appeal to language and how African individuals are using it in a particular context. . . . I will demonstrate the abstraction of philosophical themes using the perspectival approach through the analysis of how Africans are using language. It is argued that this approach leads to the development of African philosophy from the grassroots and helps in opening up a multiplicity of philosophical themes on the African continent. (Kayange 2020, 40)

In an attempt to create a version of analytic philosophy, various interesting elements are in this article. There is a presentation of analytic thought evolution in Africa’s Anglo-Saxon context (focus is on English-speaking nations, such as Ghana, Kenya and Zambia). This tradition’s commonly accepted developments are often obscured by communitarian dogmatism, making philosophers fail to imagine this thought beyond the community focus. Kayange shows the richness of African thought by embracing different interpretations, reducing this thought to diverse themes. These interpretations are a consequence of the method of analysis and abstraction. Analysis and abstraction of African philosophy themes, as per this book, will follow insights from the syntactic components and semantics. On syntactic elements,

1.3 The Question of Being in African Analytic Metaphysics

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the book will focus on the analysis of parts of terms such as mu + nthu in munthu. The idea is to investigate how these parts inform the African metaphysics. For example, studying different things that reflect –nthu as their main stem will guide this work on understanding the concept of being and various categories. On semantics, this work will build metaphysics reflecting on issues of meaning. The central concern is to understand meaning through the ordinary language framework. This framework focuses on the idea that meaning is a consequence of how African individuals use words and expressions in their life experiences. On the analysis of expressions in semantics, this work will abstract themes in African philosophy from both literal expressions and figurative expressions. Since this forms an integral part of this work, I will briefly clarify the aspect of building philosophy from literal and figurative expressions. The literal expressions are about facts, such that what they claim is often observable through experience. For example, we can analyse the Chichewa literal expression such as ‘Munthu waba chimanga, (A person has stolen maize)’ by appealing to facts. This statement suggests the structural relation aRb, where a is an object and ‘waba’ (stolen) is a verb and b (chimanga) is predicated of a. We can further claim a relation of correspondence between this literal expression and facts, hence creating a framework for discussing meaning. A richer development of philosophy in the African context comes from the analysis of figurative expressions underlining the way they are used (ordinary language approach). These do not provide direct meaning as in literal expression above but require figurative meaning analysis. Kayange (2018) comments on figurative expressions and meaning focusing on the work of Bredin (1992) in the following words: In fact, it is argued by Bredin (1992) that there are four figures that are dependent on the four first level order rules and conventions, which are, phonetic figures, syntactic figures, semantic figures and discourse figures. This is suggestive of the idea that figurative utterance may be said relative to phonetic figures, or any of the other figures above. For example a rhyme, has a pattern that determines the phonetic nature of words, hence a rhyme as a phonetic figure is a figurative utterance. Similarly utterances such as metaphor, proverb, hyperbole, meiosis, andirony provide a semantic figure, they thus qualify as figurative utterances that necessitates a figurative meaning.

The citation suggests that meaning in this context is dependent on grasping and interpreting the symbolic meaning. In getting to the symbolic meaning, the analysis is dependent on different factors such as the speaker, intention of the speaker to communicate x, the hearer, hearers grasp of the intended meaning by the speaker, and context. In this regard, my interpretation of meaning concerning figurative expressions partly follows the pragmatic approach to meaning (Grice 1957; Sperber and Wilson 2008) and the ordinary language approach (Austin 1962 and Wittgenstein 1953). While this book will use more proverbs, I would like to clarify some slight differences with metaphors, common in African thought (Kayange 2018). Proverbs, metaphors and analogies are part of the semantic figure, given that they require grasping the symbolic meaning. However, a proverb is often known as a saying

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1 General Introduction

(wisdom saying) that carries particular teaching or truth in the community. Traditionally this gives the truth or advice in the relation between the speaker and hearer. In the pragmatic framework of meaning, people use them for different purposes, such that Kayange (2018) noted that they are also part of speech acts in their everyday use. For example, people may use them to advise, warn, command, etc. On the other hand, metaphors also offer the semantic figure, given that they are symbolic. Unlike proverbs, their difference is that they use information from one context to discuss issues in another context. For example, ‘Love is a journey’ uses the context of ‘journey’ as a source domain to talk about issues in the target domain of ‘love’. This shows that metaphors are symbolic and, at the same time, they use analogies (similarities and differences between the domains of journey and love). I want to argue that proverbs share the element of being symbolic with metaphors. It is common to say that proverbs provide a metaphorical meaning (not literal meaning), implying that the words metaphorical and symbolic are used interchangeably. On using analogies, most of the proverbs, if not all, tend to work using analogy logic. For example, Ukaipa nkhope, dziwa nyimbo (gule) (If you have an ugly face, learn how to sing (dance)) combines different source domains to talk about a particular target domain. It targets the domain where people compensate for what they don’t have by doing something excellent in another field. Another example is where I may utter, Nyalugwe mchepsa kanzake, mkuzakake akapha chiwala (pinji, piko) achita chokoka (The leopard slights the work of others, but when he kills a grasshopper, he drags it). The use of this proverb shows that it is metaphorical, given that what happens in one domain is used to explain humans’ behaviour. Looking at how close some metaphors, analogies and proverbs are, I prefer to concentrate more on the general semantic figure (figurative expressions). My interest is on both the figurative expressions and use-meaning. I share with philosophers such as Hermes Chidammodzi and Didier Kaphagawani (1983) and Jonathan Okeke Chimakonam (2020) on the relevance of studying figurative expressions in the African conception of things. They believe that expressions such as proverbs and metaphors are an essential source of African philosophy. Interest in these expressions is rooted in the idea that the way African individuals use figurative expressions is indicative of a collective philosophical perspective. For example, the figurative expression Mutu umodzi susenza denga (One head does not lift a roof) suggests a way of looking at work in the community. It encourages thinking that people work better when working as a group, not as individuals. This shows a perspective of communitarianism in the context of work. This does not entail a generalisation that Africans are communitarian in everything they do. It is just one of the many perspectives of viewing things that is present in the African society. Similarly, individualism is deducible in the African context when looking at figurative expressions such as Chuluke Chuluke ndi wanjuchi, umanena iyo yakuluma (Moving in groups is a characteristic of bees, but you say the one that sting you). This indicates that when there is an issue, responsibility goes to an individual and not to the community. It is a way of thinking that supports individual responsibility in the community.

1.4 Conclusion

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The understanding in this work is that we can develop different branches of philosophy, such as metaphysics and logic, by studying how people are using figurative expressions. For example, a perspective of the question of being may be developed by analysing the meaning of figurative expressions such as Kali kokha nkanyama ali awiri ndi anthu (The one who is alone is an animal, those that are two are human beings). The idea is that this figurative expression may lead to a perspective of a human person within the African communities. In this perspective, being human is being with others. It does not mean that this is the only perspective of a person in the African society. It is one of the perspectives of traditional African culture. It is the use-meaning of figurative expressions in the community that different themes follow, representing traditional African metaphysics in the analytic tradition. The book will show some examples showing how metaphysical themes are deducible through the analysis of figurative expressions.

1.4

Conclusion

I conclude with a comparison table below, which shows some common elements and differences between Western and African analytic philosophies. Comparative table A. Similarities Comparison area Western analytic philosophy Historical The history of modern analytic tradiapproach tion is clear, and it runs from the early 1920s (history is possible). Methodological The concept of analysis and focus on approach natural science, language and logic/ mathematic are characteristic of this thought. The role of experience is central. Content

B. Differences Development and role of natural science

Content is in the relation between the structure of the physical world versus the logical structure/meaning of language. Western analytic philosophy is supported by natural science’s notable advancement, with theories such as Newtonian mechanics, general relativity and quantum theory.

African analytic philosophy The history of elements of analytic tradition may run from the 1950s (history is possible). The concept of analysis and focus on natural science, language, and logic/ mathematic are equally promoted in this thought. The role of experience is central, although not in some cases. Content is in the relation between the structure of the physical world versus the logical structure/meaning of language. African analytic philosophy lacks outstanding support from the evolution of natural science and mathematics within this continent.a (continued)

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1 General Introduction

Comparative table A. Similarities Comparison area Western analytic philosophy Existence of the Western had a strong group of phiprincipal cause losophers who questioned the exisas God tence of God. Anti-metaphysics tendency

The demarcation of sciences disqualifies metaphysics as a science. There is an exception in those that do metaphysics as relevant.

African analytic philosophy African analytic tradition does not concentrate on a project that denies God’s existence and other objects beyond sense experience. The issue of demarcation does not arise in this area. Metaphysics is generally accepted as something given.

a

The politics of natural science shows that it is dominated by the Western thought rather than African.

The African and Western analytic philosophy agree in the most fundamental elements, including methodology and content. The history of African analytic philosophy is rooted in the Western philosophical tradition. In my view, the academic African analytic philosophy is a continuation of the studies developed in Western thought. This does not necessarily imply that Africans were not using aspects of this philosophy before the coming of the colonials. Deducing that African people have always used language, analytic thought has always prevailed in this context. I acknowledge differences between the Western and African analytic philosophy, which mainly come in the demarcation of the sciences and the attitude towards transcendental metaphysics. Western thought has elements of denial of the validity of metaphysics and calls for a revolution in studying the question of being. Despite the similarities and differences, the positive element of analytic metaphysics is that it shows that it is possible to access the world and thought through language structure and logic analysis. Apart from this access into thought and the physical world, this philosophy has been central in clarifying most of the metaphysical problems. The problems are in the misuse of language, as noted earlier. It is also interesting to explore further how natural science and logic/mathematics are continuously influencing studies in the analytic tradition. While analytic metaphysics is highly advanced in various thinkers, there is still a need to further reflect on the question of being through the study of language. In the following chapter, I will explore the subject-verb-object conception of being in the analytic tradition.

Chapter 2

Subject-Verb-Object Ontology

Abstract In this chapter, I argue that a great part of the study of the question of being (classical view of metaphysics) in both African and Western philosophy is influenced by and dependent on the subject-verb-object language structure. My basic assumption is that the conception of language based on subjects, verbs (action/ relation) and objects is indicative of the structure of things. Philosophers can study this structure of language through the analysis of ordinary language- use and infer actual and possible things that exist. It is argued that this approach often leads to a static and fragmentary ontology. This is where being is conceived based on the relation between the subjects or particulars that act and the objects or universals that are acted upon. In terms of the nature of things, the main approaches in both Western and African thought include the substratum theory and the bundle theory. The former builds its ontology on ‘substance’ as the basic category and the related categories such as space and time, while the latter views things as a set of properties bound together by a particular relation.

2.1

Introduction

What is being in subject-verb-object ontology? This chapter will argue and demonstrate that the most significant part of Western and African ontology is subject-verbobject ontology. I start by noting that language shift in the study of the question of being in analytic metaphysics primarily concentrated on clarifying the relation between the structure of language and the world’s structure. The dominant conception of the structure of language was the traditional ‘subject-predicate structure’, which has led to ‘subject-predicate ontology’ (subject-object ontology or subjectverb-object ontology). In this structure of statements, the subject was the main or fixed actor, and the predicate was that which was ‘acted upon’. In this regard, the conception of a predicate was dependent on the subject. A predicate is in fact ‘that which is said of the subject’. The clarification of a subject and predicate in a sentence led to a series of philosophical problems, such as reference, particulars, universals and categories. Through these issues, analytic philosophy continued to engage in the old metaphysical problems despite the denial of its existence but at the same time © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. M. Kayange, The Question of Being in Western and African Analytic Metaphysics, Synthese Library 438, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69645-0_2

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giving it a new life through insights from language, logic/mathematics and natural science. Strawson’s work of 1919, Individuals, shows the shift from the emphasis on reason to language. In this seminal work, he discusses the metaphysics of particulars or individuals by analysing the traditional subject-object structure of language. While Kant’s Copernican Revolution in epistemology and metaphysics placed the mind and its categories at the centre, hence the subject as the foundation of knowledge and existence, the revolution in analytic philosophy takes language as a source of thought and reality. As noted earlier, apart from the language shift, analytic philosophers have maintained the centrality of logic in conceptualising the relation between language and reality. In the Kantian and Aristotelian traditions, the role of logic in understanding the world has been evident in the categories’ logic. What is particular in the modern analytic tradition is the use of modern techniques in logic (by logicians such as Frege, Leibniz and Boole) that determine the structure of language and how it is related to the structure of reality. For example, as noted, early Wittgenstein in the Tractatus relates the atomic structure of statements (atomism) with the logical structure of reality, using modern logic/ mathematics and language techniques. In short, there are various developments in different traditions in analytic philosophy that clarifies the structure of language and the reality they refer to, such as the traditions of Russell, Wittgenstein, Carnap, Quine and Ayer. Developing metaphysics based on language analysis has been highly criticised by different philosophers. For example, one of the prominent critics has been Bohm (1980), who accused the subject-predicate structure of language as responsible for a pluralistic conception of reality. Individuals see fragments such as subjects and objects and their actions or relations. This hinders individuals from conceptualising a holistic conception of reality. Ramose, in his development of ubuntu ontology, also forwarded similar criticism.1 In a different setting, Austin (1962) criticised the reduction of language to statements that correspond to reality. The argument was that language is not only about statements, but there are also other functions, which help in understanding nature and its systems. This led to the suggestion of a philosophy that focuses on speech and actions (Austin 1962). Another criticism against scientific statements describing the world comes from the model-theoretical approach, which attempted to explain reality based on non-linguistic entities and a theory’s models or structures. In the African framework, the influence of the subject-verb-object structure is also evident in most of the studies that build on the question of being. For example, the earliest studies in this thought have debated on the ‘subject’ and ‘what is said of it’ (Tempels 1959; Kagame 1956, 1976; Mbiti 1969). Although philosophers have speculated on what being is, a reflection on language use has been critical in these studies. The use of language may be reflected in the following comment of Tempels (1959, 22), ‘Africans are constantly using certain words. They are those which express their supreme values; and they recur like variations upon a leitmoti present

1

The will be discussed later in this work

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in their language, their thought, and in all their acts and deeds’. The subject-verbobject language structure influenced Tempels’ conception that there are entities that have various forces. The centrality of the idea of substance and qualities are indicative of things that are subjects acting on others and those that are predicates—‘acted upon’, etc. The developments that followed early African thinkers such as, Tempels, Kagame and Mbiti, were equally influenced by subject-verb-object thinking (e.g. Menkiti; Wiredu 1994; Kaphagawani [1998]2004; Gbadegesin 1998). Most of the studies will reflect on language structure’s components and build different philosophies representing some African tribes. For example, Kaphagawani ([1998] 2004) in ‘African conceptions of a person: A critical survey’ summarised different studies that focus on the concept ‘person’, noting the physical and spiritual properties. Menkiti (1984) and Masolo (2010) focused on the relation between the self and person (individual) and the community (individuals). Gyekye (1992) in ‘Person and community in African thought’ further confirms interest in subjects and various relations. Different studies on concepts such as causation, mind, body and truth indicate a fragmentary approach to reality, typical of subject-verb-object. Although there are problems with the language revolution, it is essential to note that this ontology approach has discussed the world’s structure relying mostly on scientific language. There has been a fine line between ontology and philosophy of nature in the analytic philosophical tradition. Themes in these two areas are mixed up in most of the developments. Generally, the scientific statements constitute the structure of language that was about the physical world. For this reason, different developments have provided the structure of scientific language as representing the structure of the world. I will not take this root of scientific language, but I will limit the discussion on the language revolution in analytic metaphysics. In fact, in this methodology, language greatly determines most of what is (or can be) thought and described as existing in the world of experience. Therefore, in this chapter, I will discuss some fundamental aspects of the Western language-structure-based ontology. In Sect. 2.2, the focus will be on the study of subject-verb ontology in the Western analytic philosophy. In Sect. 2.3, I will concentrate on subject-verb-object studies of the question of being in the Africa context.

2.2

Subject-Verb-Object Ontology in Western Analytic Philosophy

A great part of traditional (continental) and modern analytic studies in ontology form part of the subject-verb-object ontology (see also Bohm 1980, 37–39). Below, I will clarify the general meaning of subject-verb-object ontology in section (a), and in

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section (b), focus will be on ‘subject and its relations’ (particulars) and in section (c) on the ‘object’, mainly, what is commonly said of or shared by subjects (universals). In my view, these three sections will provide a general view of analytic ontology. (a) What is the subject-verb-object? It is a study of the question of being focusing on the relation between the world and the structure of language. The assumption is that the subject-verb-object structure of language reveals the ontological structure of thought and reality. In other words, this ontology studies the nature of subjects and objects and their relations. It is an ontology founded on the belief that the universe is filled with individual elements that affect or are affected by other individuals. For example, in a sentence ‘A mango is a sweet fruit’, ‘A mango’ is a subject and ‘is a sweet fruit’ is object/predicate. Given that subject-verb-object is a structure of a sentence, the assumption is that sentences of this kind were statements and they refer to the state of affairs in the ontological world. The subject-verb-object ontology is in Strawson’s work, Individuals, which in my view already confirms that the world has subjects, objects and relations. Strawson (1959, 138) summarises the subject-verb-object ontology using common language when indicating his intention as providing ‘an understanding of the general distinction between reference and predication and its connexion with the distinction between particular and universal’, through the study of language. The words ‘particular’ and ‘universal’ refer to subject and object (they lead to metaphysics of particulars and that of universals), while ‘referent’ and ‘prediction’ are about relations. Before I consider the questions ‘What is a particular?’ and ‘What is an object or universal?’ I want to note that Strawson (1959) clarifies the structure of language and relations by demonstrating that the relation between the subject and object occurs at different levels. For example, let’s consider the tautological statement, ‘A triangle is a three-sided figure’, the subject ‘A triangle’ maybe investigated from different levels, such as functional level (reference) and at a level of its status as the primary object in a statement. For example, philosophers may view a statement’s structure as having two fundamental functions at the functional level, one concerning the subject and the other regarding the object or predicate. I will begin with the functions under the subject: reference function, naming function, indicating function, designating function and mentioning function (see Strawson 1959 for a comprehensive discussion). These functions are important in that they link a constituent part of a statement with the ontological world. These functions suggest that there are things in the world. This is in line with Strawson’s pronouncement in the introduction that, we conceive this world as comprised of particulars (Strawson 1959). For example, the function of referring to something shows the subject represented by the word ‘A triangle’ in a statement referring to something in the world. In the analytic philosophy tradition, this has often been considered the relation between ‘word meaning’ (symbol or signifier) and its ‘reference’ (thing or signified). One of the pillars of the modern developments in analytic philosophy, Frege, discussed this relation thoroughly in his work, On Sense

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and Reference. Similar developments are in the current elaborations in works in the analytic tradition such as Putnam (1973). In short, all functions under the subject part show that they are symbols that are in a relation of ‘standing for’ something. Words such as ‘name’, ‘indicate’, ‘designate’ and ‘mention’ reflect the link between a word and a thing or a fact. I will not enter in details explaining these, but I would like to note the function of naming. Different philosophers discuss this function in the analytic tradition (e.g. Russell [1903]1963; 1912). This is mainly the question of reference concerning proper names (specific names) and common names (general names). The functions in the predicate term suggest a relation of dependence on the subject or a thing. Strawson gives the five functions under a predicate as describing it, characterising it, ascribing something to it, predicting something to it and saying something about it. These functions qualify further a subject in a sentence, conceived as something fixed and primary. It is that primary thing, which is ‘described’, ‘characterised’, ‘ascribed something to’, ‘predicating things of it’ and ‘something is said of it’. For example, in a statement ‘A bull is charging’, the subject is ‘A bull’, described by the predicate ‘is charging’. The relation between the subject and predicate in the structure of statements plays a fundamental role in building the metaphysical discourse in analytic metaphysics. This is present at the linguistic level, which deals with linguistic terms that correspond to the functions noted earlier. For example, Strawson suggests that the functions that go with the subject include singular terms, referring expressions, subject terms and subject expressions. All these terms establish the subject as the fundamental entity in analytic metaphysics, of which everything ‘can be said of’. This has led to various debates and developments in analytic metaphysics such as the nature of the subject, the subject terms and the subject expression and the relation between referring expressions and reality. The functions that go with the predicate lead to various linguistic expressions including predicative expression, predicate expression and predicate and ascription expression. The linguistic level further leads to the meaning of the sentence, hence going beyond linguistic terms. Traditionally, the meaning of a sentence is in a proposition, which is in some circumstances used interchangeably with a statement. In this context, the subject-predicate ontology leads to a distinction between two parts of a sentence’s meaning. The first constituent part of the meaning is from the subject and its different linguistic representations. Strawson suggests that this leads to the subject just as in the linguistic level but also the subject term and the ‘term referred’. Similarly, the predicate part of the linguistic function leads to different constituent meanings or propositions. Some of these meanings include predicate and ascribed terms. Although I cannot go to further details about this metaphysics due to this chapter’s scope, there is a non-linguistic level showing the relation between subject and predicate. This characterisation leads to the distinction between object and concept. The object represents the part of the subject in the structure of a statement. The concept represents the part of a predicate in a statement. This object and concept discourse further translated into the object’s conception in the subject part as

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representing a particular while concept in the predicate part as representing a universal. This link with a particular led to the understanding of analytic metaphysics as grounded in particulars and universals’ ontology. This explains most of the influential classics in modern analytic metaphysics such as Loux’s Metaphysics: A Contemporary Introduction (1998), which is fundamentally building metaphysics of particulars and universals. Based on definitions of what particular or universal is, this has led to further elaborations of metaphysics of properties or qualities in the analytic tradition (see Mellor and Oliver 2002). Below I will indicate some of the developments that concentrated on particulars and universals. (b) What is a particular? The study of particulars in the analytic tradition primarily came in as a problem of its nature. The two theories that followed specific definitions of a particular are the substratum theory and the bundle theory. In the substratum theory, a particular has an underlying subject/substance that holds the various qualities or properties. Loux (1998, 101) notes that the substratum theory: [t]akes a concrete particular to be a complex whose constituents are the various attributes associated with it and an underlying substratum that is the literal bearer or subject for those attributes.

The substratum theorists continued the tradition of the Aristotelian metaphysics of the categories. As is well known, Aristotle in his attempt to respond to the question ‘What is being?’ indicated that ‘being is said in many ways’ but with one focal point (substance). In his work Categories, he listed ten categories, namely, (1) substance; (2) quantity; (3) quality; (4) relatives; (5) somewhere; (6) sometimes; (7) being in a position; (8) having; (9) acting; and (10) being acted upon (Categories, 1b25–2a4). The substance is, for example, a man or horse. Quantity may refer to elements such as two cubits and three cubits. Quality may refer to what is white, or that which is grammatical. ‘Relation’ may refer to double, half or greater than. Place may be in the Lyceum or the Agora. Time may refer to yesterday, today or a year ago. Position: sits, lies. Possession may refer to having shoes on or having Armor on. Action may refer to cut or burn. Being acted upon is to be cut, to be burned, etc. (Aristotle, Categories 2a). Preference is on the concept of substance, hence to the division between a subject and a predicate. What reflects more the developments in analytic metaphysics is Aristotle’s distinction between primary substance and secondary substance. The idea of a primary substance refers to a particular or individual. This is ‘neither said of’ a substrate nor ‘present in’ a substrate. Aristotle defines a substrate as ‘that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else’ (Metaphysics, 1028b36). Aristotle gives three candidates to this matter (bronzematerial substance), form (shape-formal substance) or the combination of matter and form (statue-concrete thing). The combination is hylomorphism (hyle, matter; and morphe, form). For example, ‘This given man’ (named Mr. Phiri), ‘This given goat’ (named Tonde) and ‘This given dog’ (named Tami). Evidence showing that a particular or an individual is primary substance is in the following passage:

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Every substance seems to signify a ‘this’. Now in respect to primary substances, it is indisputably true that they signify a ‘this’: for what is made evident is individual and one in number (Categories 3b).

What is ‘predicated of’ the category substance is a secondary substance, which refers to species and genera. This particular dog is in the species dog. The genus of this species is animal. This refers to a group of individual species. For instance, the animal is a genus, where humans and other species such as monkeys belong. Similarly, universal as a secondary substance refers to the substantial forms that are common to different individuals. For example: Socrates and Callias are different because of their matter . . . but they are the same in the form. (Metaphysics, 1034a6–8)

Universals such as green and goodness are ‘predicated of many’ (De Interpretatione 17a37).2 The substance is the essence in the language of Aristotle. Essence, or to ti ên einai in Greek and essentia in Latin. The essence is ‘that which is said to be per se’. It is what ‘something is said to be’ of its nature. For example, it is common to define a human being’s nature based on rationality (Man is a rational animal). This defines what man is, as opposed to other elements in the genera of animals. Although the problem of understanding particulars in the substratum theory is in the Aristotelian logic of the categories, an influential conceptualisation is in the empiricist Locke (1690). In his substance development, he takes a position showing a lack of knowledge by arguing that qualities became one because of the substrate, ‘what one knows not what’. As an empiricist, he acknowledges a lack of evidence defining substance, but he uses intuition to accept a substrate’s existence. Commenting on this aspect, he writes: The idea then we have, to which we give the general name substance, being nothing, but the supposed, but unknown support of those qualities, we find existing, which we imagine cannot subsist, sine re substante, without something to support them, we call that support substantia, which, according to the true import of the word, is in plain English, standing under or upholding. (Locke 1690, 185)

The citation suggests the understanding of substance concerning a particular, which is a set of seen qualities. The function of substance, a substrate, is to hold together the various qualities (although unknown). Locke further suggests categorizing the substance into two, namely, pure substance and particular sorts of substance. A pure substance, the unknown, is the real essence, while particular kinds of substances are observable. Locke echoes this understanding in his explanation of simple ideas in us, representing individual things in the world. For example, if I see an orange, I see an individual thing because of the observable properties (qualities). Although I have this simple idea, I understand that they are together because of something I do not know/am ignorant of. It is this

2

This will be studied further in the topic on universals.

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something that is substance holding simple ideas together as Locke (1690, 220) indicates: Because, as I have said, not imagining how these simple ideas can subsist by themselves, we accustom ourselves to suppose some substratum wherein they do subsist and from which they do result, which therefore we call substance.

Apart from this Aristotelian-Lockean description of a particular, which still influences some developments in the analytic tradition (see Loux 1998, 129), different thinkers have argued that a particular as a subject is a collection of properties or qualities (Hume 1748; Berkeley 1713; Russell 1967; CastaŇeda 1974; Williams D.C. 1953; Hochberg 1964). The qualities are together because of relations, such as compresence, coinstantiation, collocation and consubstantiation. Below I will comment on selected developments, relative to the study of the question of being in a subject-predicate framework, that have influenced various developments in the analytic tradition. Hume was a renowned empiricist and sceptic who studied the question of being and supported a version of properties or qualities (bundle theory). For example, in the Humean version in A Treatise of Human Nature (Hume, 1748), the mind is not substance. He further argues, ‘We have no idea of substance of any kind since we have no impression of any substance either material or spiritual. We know nothing but particular qualities and perceptions’ (Hume 1748,3 135). Hume suggests a relation of qualities about both physical objects and minds. The citation starts by denying the substratum theory, which defends the existence of a substance that holds the qualities together. The denial of ‘substance’ is based on an epistemological basis that ‘we do not know’ and that ‘we have no idea’ of ‘substance’. What is not clear in Hume is the elaboration of the concept of the category known as ‘relation’, which explains how qualities are held together. A similar trend of thought about the relation of qualities forming a particular was in Berkeley (an empiricist and idealist of some sort). He concentrated on a bundle of accidents about the physical objects and not minds (as was the case with Locke). In his work, A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge Berkeley (1713 [1837]), he equates a particular with its accidents. For example, what makes a human subject are the modes or accidents together in a particular context. In clarifying this aspect, Berkeley gives the example of a die. According to him, this is nothing but a set of accidents. He further continues that, ‘And to say a die is hard, extended and square, is not to attribute those qualities to a subject distinct from and supporting them, but only an explication of the meaning of the word die (Berkeley 1713 [1837], 17). In this text, Berkeley denies the presence of a subject to which different qualities are attributed. This is against the substratum theory. The clarification of the relation that holds the accidents together is not evident in his writings; however, he recognises a set of things that characterises a particular object.

3

Note that this is 1993 edition edited by Eric Steinberg.

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The philosophy of Russell clarifies the category of relation as fundamental for holding together qualities. In Russell on Metaphysics, he reflects the subject and predicate relation concerning the categories of substance and qualities in the following passage: One traditional debate in metaphysics is whether substances are merely bundles of qualities or underlying substrata that hold such qualities together. The issue is discussed by Locke (1690: Book II, ch. 23). In the first view, if the properties of being black, furry, four-legged, smelly, of a certain height and appearance, and so on, are collected together, then this is all that is required for there to be a dog at the place where the properties are gathered. (Russell 1946, 3)

In several writings, Russell indicates his adherence to the understanding that a thing is made of a collection of qualities that share a particular relation, hence conceived as a particular. In The Problem of Universals where he wrote, ‘For my part, I hold that a “thing” is nothing but a bundle of qualities, and that, therefore, two different things cannot be exactly alike’ (Russell 1946, 147). On clarifying the category ‘relation’ that holds the qualities together, he contends that it is a special relation, which is ontologically primitive, hence explained informally. Russell explains it using the category under relation, known as compresence. He offers an interpretation of this relation using everyday experience in terms of psychological compresence. He noted that different activities are compresent when they are simultaneous, for example, hearing, seeing and remembering something at the same time. In this sense, compresence is simultaneity in one’s experience. A subject can simultaneously view qualities as compresent. A complete group of compresent qualities constitutes a single complex whole, which is an instance of the qualities. For example, in the physical world, the shade of colour C is one of the rainbow colours, which occurs when there is a rainbow or solar spectrum.4 Each occasion of appearance is an instance of C. In my vision, what I see is a complex (complex stimuli). I see objects because of physical causation they cause on me. An instance of quality is a complex of compresent qualities of which the quality is one. For example, a man who has other qualities besides humanity: white, black, French, English, wise, foolish, etc. height is also in other things. Man is an assemblage of qualities, of which humanity is only one. A group of qualities must have the following characteristics for them to qualify as compresent: (i) All members of the group are compresent. (ii) Given anything that is not a member, there is at least one member of the group with which it is not compresent. Russell opted for the category ‘relation’ substituting ‘substance’, which according to him is not a genuine concept in metaphysics. Arguing against substance, he indicated, ‘“Substance”, in a word, is a metaphysical mistake, due to transference to the world-structure of the structure of sentences composed of a

4

Rainbow is believed to have seven colours.

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subject and a predicate’ (Russell 1946, 257). Therefore, he sees Aristotle as the father of metaphysical errors in some modern metaphysicians, who look at particulars as having a substance. Another error that he tries to correct with the category of ‘relation’ is that of species. For example, the statement ‘All Men are Mortal’ pronounces mortality as a quality of the human species. According to him, this is a misuse of the subject and predicate relation, thinking that subject matter is substance. Although the concept of ‘relation’ is a category, Russell criticises the very notion of category, which, according to him, does not make sense: What, exactly, is meant by the word ‘category’, whether in Aristotle or in Kant and Hegel, I must confess that I have never been able to understand. I do not myself believe that the term ‘category’ is in any way useful in philosophy, as representing any clear idea. There are, in Aristotle, ten categories: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action and affection. The only definition offered of the term ‘category’ is: ‘Expressions which are in no way composite signify’—and then follows the above list. This seems to mean that every word of which the meaning is not compounded of the meanings of other words signifies a substance or a quantity or etc. There is no suggestion of any principle on which the list of ten categories has been compiled. (Russell 1946, 255)

The category ‘substance’ comes clearly in this citation as a notion for linguistic convenience, as a way of talking about the world. It was noted as referring to something that is ‘neither predicated’ ‘nor present’ in a subject. All the problems with subject and predicate are, according to Russell, only grammatical issues. Apart from linguistic convenience, Russell dismisses the issue of substance as problematic. He argues that this is problematic properly because it is difficult to talk about a thing when we remove the properties (Russell 1946, 256). In the earlier understanding of substance, essence is a possible candidate of substance in Aristotle, but Russell argues against this. Essence refers to those properties, which cannot change in a person. Any change of these properties means the loss of identity of a particular thing. The essence is a definition. He denies this conception by indicating, ‘It is, in my opinion, a hopelessly muddle-headed notion, but its historical importance requires us to say something about it’ (Russell 1946). The issue of essence is only a linguistic aspect and cannot necessarily be the case when dealing with things. ‘Substance’ is merely a convenient way of collecting events into bundles. When we look at John as a human being, we see a collection of events or occurrences, instances of qualities such as colour, nose, blue shirt, etc. This explains why Russell takes us to the bundle theory. (c) What is a universal? In the study of being through the language structure, the distinction between subject and predicate justifies various developments clarifying the universal, in the predicate part of a sentence (Ramsey 1927; Russell 1967). Analytic philosophers revived the traditional problem of ‘what is predicated’ of things (secondary substance or universals). The main question is, ‘Can we say that predicates/universals exist in particular things or they have a separate existence?’ Philosophers differ in solving this problem of the universals. Some of them, known as metaphysical realists, argue that universals are real things independent of our

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minds. Philosophers like Plato, Aristotle, Boethius, Odo, Guillaume,5 Anselm, Bertrand Russell, Ramsey, etc. believed in this existence. The nominalists believed that universals do not exist as independent entities but are just names. Nominalism was also the position of various thinkers, including, Roscellinus of Compiegne, Abelard of Le Pallet, Quine, etc. Although the analytic philosophers discuss universals’ problem, it was central in Plato’s philosophy (who influenced Russell and Popper) and various philosophers after him. This doctrine of universals is in the theory of forms or ideas. As is well known, this theory suggests that there are two worlds, that is, the real world and the physical or world of appearances. What Plato calls the real world is the abstract world of ideas. Yet, for him, this world is what we can accept as real. Instead, although it appears so, the physical world is not real; it is the world of shadows, becoming or the verisimilar world. Universals are forms or objects belonging to the real world. They are changeless, eternal and non-material essences, incorruptible, etc. The things that we see in the physical world are copies of these forms. For instance, the idea of goodness is universal in the real world of ideas; it has copies in the physical world in good things. For example, a good man participates in the idea of goodness. The concept of a triangle is universal in the real world, and this triangular figure in front of me is its manifestation. A beautiful person participates in the universal known as beauty. I suppose that an ugly person participates in the universal ‘ugliness’. In short, Plato indicates the relation between the universals and the physical world objects and exemplars, based on the notion of participation, instantiation, reflection or manifestation. The idea is that greenness as a universal is instantiated in particulars like this green shirt, green socks, etc.6 Accordingly, Plato notes in the Symposium that we first realize a universal like beauty in a particular. After this experience, we realize that one form’s beauty is similar to another, hence realising it is one. In the Republic, he discusses the idea of universals concerning knowledge. According to him, a true philosopher wants to know the essential nature of things. For instance, he is not satisfied when he knows various examples of beautiful things in the world of particulars. The problem is that this physical world is the world of becoming. Knowledge must be stable, not changing as it happens in this world. The philosopher asks further what is the essence of all this. This is because knowledge deals with being, not becoming; it belongs to things’ essential nature. In other words, knowledge is about knowing ‘being’. Being is, therefore, essence. According to him, the essences are the universals. They are an explanation of why beauty is in various particular objects. The

5

Philosophers like Boethius, Odo, Guillaume, etc. belong to the early middle ages. The philosophy that developed in this period revived more the problem of universals. This was based on their belief that a solid solution to this problem may lead to the removal of most of the philosophical problems that troubled various philosophers. 6 The ideas of Plato will be developed further by the philosophy of Bertrand Russell who will claim that his aim is to polish up this theory.

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mind apprehends the universals and not by our senses, which produce mere opinions. Universals do exist in the world independent of our minds. This idea suggests that Plato holds a form of metaphysical realism. They are concrete things. There is sometimes a misunderstanding of Plato, where the universals are in the mind. This is not the case because they do exist not in the mind, but they have their independent existence. Samuel E. Stumpf ([1966] 2003: 56–57) explain further this aspect of independent existence as follows: Forms have an independent existence. But there are three additional ways in which Plato emphasizes this. For one thing, Plato argues that, before our souls were united with our bodies, our souls preexisted in a spiritual realm; and, in that state, our souls were acquainted with the forms. Secondly, Plato argues that, in the process of creation, the God used the Forms in fashioning particular things; this suggests that the Forms seem to have originally existed in the ‘mind of God’ or in the supreme principle of rationality.

This citation suggests that universals are eternal to the extent that God utilised them in creation. They are not in God but outside. This idea of creation is different from the conceptions present in Christianity. In these doctrines, God created things out of nothing. Unlike Plato’s ideas, Aristotle, his student, will bring a different theory from his. In his metaphysics, he will deny the separate existence of forms and matter. According to him, in nature, we cannot find them separated. We find matter and form as a composite. For instance, the form of a rectangular table exists together with the rectangular table in front of me. Although he criticized his master, Aristotle accepted the existence of universals. In the context of knowledge, they are essential in letting us know the essences of things. For instance, various tables have table-ness as their essence. This essence or universal is substance, just as matter is also substance. In short, universals and matter are both responsible for the existence of particulars. In this same line of Aristotle, Anicius Manlius Severinus Boethius (480–524) read Porphyry’s commentary in his Introduction to Aristotle’s Categories and wanted to discuss the question of universals. The issue came in the relationship between generic and specific notions. The questions include: (i) Do genera exist in nature, or are they merely constructions of our minds? (ii) If they are realities, are they material or immaterial? (iii) Do they exist apart from sensible things or somehow in them? Boethius attempted to respond to these questions set by Porphyry by utilising Aristotle’s theory of universals. Similarly, in the early middle ages, Odo and Guillaume dealt with the existence of universals. They argued that genera exist in reality. They further indicated that the particulars do participate in their being. While most of the above-discussed philosophers supported metaphysical realism, the middle ages demonstrated various thinkers who saw this realism as an extreme. They, therefore, suggested nominalism as an option. In this view, Roscellinus of Compiegne is one of the champions. According to him, particulars exist in nature; but we cannot say the same thing about genera. A universal such as beauty is just a

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word (voces) or name (nomen); it does not refer to anything in the world. The words or names have letters that come out through the voice.7 Abelard (born in 1079) follows a moderate form of realism, where universals must primarily be words. For a word to qualify as such, it is the case to many individuals. For example, whiteness qualifies as a universal because this word is true of various individuals. Its function is, therefore, that of denoting many things. According to him, we develop these concepts because we conceive a certain likeness in particular objects. In The Problems of Philosophy (1967), Russell defended the idea that universals are real and exist independently of our minds. These universals are, according to him, predicates and relations that ‘have being’. Russell believed that Plato solved the problem of universals in the theory of ideas. His objective was, therefore, to develop further the ideas of Plato in a new environment. In his development, the concept of ‘justice’ is an excellent example of a universal. When there is the question ‘What is justice’, people will typically indicate those acts that are just. All the actions that are just participate in a common nature or essence. Similarly, the concept ‘White’ is a universal expressing the common nature or essence shared by various objects, for example, your white jacket, white shirt, white T-shirt, etc. You can immediately see that the notion of essence, which was so crucial in Aristotle and his followers’ metaphysics, is coming back. It now refers to the universal. It is pure essence, which is an idea or form in the philosophy of Plato. For Russell, a universal has some characteristics: it is not fleeting or changeable; it is eternally itself, immutable, indestructible, etc. He further indicated that they are different from particulars, which are linguistically proper names. On the contrary, universals are common nouns, substantives, adjectives, propositions, verbs, etc. Adjectives and common nouns express the qualities or properties of single things. Russell argues that the mind apprehends the universals. This does not justify the argument that they exist in the mind. For example, the relation, x is north of y. Being ‘north of’ is a relation, which exists in reality. We cannot say that being north of exists only in mind. It exists somewhere, although it does not exist in space and time. It is neither material nor mental, yet it is something. Russell criticises Berkeley that he was wrong when he thought that universals like whiteness exist in the mind. As indicated earlier, Berkeley’s system claimed that there is a process of perception, through which we develop an idea in the mind. For him, ‘to exist is to be perceived’ with senses. In this ontology, we cannot acknowledge a world outside the mind, as claimed by realists. The only thing that we can recognize in the mind is that there is an act of thinking. The mind is for thinking, not for hosting universals. Russell suggested a fascinating relation between being and existence to explain what he meant when he claimed that universal is real. Accordingly, universals ‘have being’ instead of ‘existence’. Having being implies that they subsist. They are not in space and time. The idea of existence instead refers to that which is in space and time.

7 The council of Soissons in 1092 declared Roscellinus a heretic with this doctrine. In order to save his life, he decided to deny it. He was convincing the church that this is not his doctrine.

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The world of universals is the world of being. Being in Russell’s context is unchangeable, rigid and exact; it is delightful to mathematician, logician, metaphysician and all those who love perfection than life. This idea of loving perfection than life suggests that it is more oriented towards those who admire the abstract and or theoretical world of concepts rather than those who support mere experience. The opposite of the world of being, as noted earlier, is the world of existence. This is the world of particulars. It is fleeting, vague, without sharp boundaries, without any clear plan or arrangement. It contains thoughts and feelings, all data of sense, physical objects, everything that can do harm or good, anything that makes any difference to the value of life and the world. The explication of the physical world’s idea seems to be very negative in the context of Russell. This explains why he was sceptical towards the physical world. For instance, he was sceptical about the possibility of knowledge about the physical world. This attitude comes in because he loved more mathematics, which is abstract, similar to metaphysics. Interestingly, Russell does not explicitly say that we must follow the universals’ world but notes that the choice is on our temperaments. For Quine, the question of universals is whether there are such entities as properties (attributes), relations, classes, numbers, functions, etc. He was aware of those philosophers like Russell above who believed in the subsistence or existence of these elements. Quine argued that no individual qualifies as a universal. For instance, there is no such thing as redness representing an individual. He discusses the idea of universals further by appealing to the idea of meaning. When we are dealing with meaning, some thinkers claim that universals represent abstract entities. Other thinkers view meaning by arguing that a linguistic utterance is meaningful when there is an ultimate and irreducible matter of fact. For Quine, we can use singular terms significantly in sentences without presupposing that there are the entities, which those terms purport to name. Similarly, the general terms apply without conceding them to be names of abstract entities. We can view utterances as significant and as synonymous or heteronymous with one another, without countenancing a realm of entities called meanings. These statements suggest a powerful criticism of the belief that language makes sense when it refers to something (referential theory). Quine denies the abstract entities’ existence, those that lack causes, effects and spatiotemporal location. Universals are synonymous with abstract entities. Quine criticizes the two common ways of looking at the existence of abstract entities: Firstly, a philosopher known as McX, who believes that a statement, ‘Pegasus is a flying horse’, is an idea if it does not exist in reality. This suggests that he accepts a form of idealism (metaphysical realism); concepts can exist as forms or ideas in the mind. The second thinker is Wyman, who believes that Pegasus is a possible being, but it is not an actual thing. Quine (2002, 75) notes Wyman’s position in the following words, ‘Pegasus, Wyman maintains, has his being as an unactualized possible’. The belief that it is possible shows some prudence in what one thinks. It shows that one is not very sure about something, but at the same time, he is open-minded about the possibility of its being in space and time. Of course, now one has not enough

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evidence to support its existence, but he will accept it as an actual or a real being when that evidence is there. For universals to make sense, there is a need for what he calls ‘ontological commitment’, which unfortunately is not there in the above individuals. In other words, for a statement or linguistic expression to be true about the world, there must be ontological commitment. Discussing the idea of ontological commitment, Quine argues that a sentence satisfies this relative to an entity (or a kind of entity) if and only if that entity (or kind) must exist for the sentence to be true. According to him, to be an entity ‘is purely and simply, to be reckoned as a value of a variable’. Ontological commitment is expressed by the word ‘something’, represented by the existential quantifier ∃. For instance, the statement ‘Something is mortal’ becomes (∃x)Mx. In this statement, x represents something, and M means ‘mortal’. This statement shows an ontological commitment. One is committed to the existence of x in the physical world, and he is further committed to the status or condition of x, that is, the reality that it is mortal. The letter x belongs to the domain of quantification, for instance, this domain could be a set of human beings that must have the aspect of being mortal as its characteristic. One may still have reservations on the ontological commitment with respect to the quality ‘mortal’. Can any individual observe the quality of being mortal on x? In brief, the basic idea of Quine is that universals have no referents in the physical world. This idea implies that universals are just names. The terms that we call universals are not entities, but they are informative about the individuals or objects. The property ‘mortal’ informs us about individual x. Similarly, Fa, F is universal, and it has no ontological commitment; it is just informative of a. According to him, to claim that the term red as applied to houses, roses, shirts, etc. implies that these things have something in common is misleading. In this regard, it is not necessary for an abstract entity to exist so that it makes a universal true. On the contrary, a universal is true of a particular where it applies. It is enough for us to say that some houses are red, without necessarily claiming that red exists. It is through indicating a particular house that the colour red becomes a ‘something’. Some philosophers in the analytic tradition prefer to see universals as particulars and not as predicates representing names. One of the theories that developed in this direction is the trope theory. This is associated with philosophers related to the analytic tradition such as Williams D.C. and Keith Campbell, who argue that universals are not substances but particularised properties and relations. This view implies that when there are two objects a and b, which have the property ‘tall’ in statements, (i) ‘a (John) is tall’ (ii) ‘b (Mary) is tall’ The predicate ‘tall’ is a particularised property such that its appearance in a is independent of b; hence these are not common. This is contrary to the traditional conception of universals, whereby a universal such as ‘tallness’ is common in different individuals. I will not enter into details on tropes, but it is important to

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note that further debates will focus on whether they exist in the world or they are just complex terms (see Daly 1997, 140–159).

2.3

Subject-Verb-Object Ontology in African Philosophy

A significant part of African philosophy develops within the limits of subject-verbobject ontology (Tempels 1959; Mbiti 1969; Oruka 1988), except studies that build on rheomodic language (Ramose 1998). This implies that most of the studies in ontology focus on subjects, objects and relations. Below I will focus on insights from Tempels-Mbitian ontology in section (a). While this ontology reflects language use, it focuses on subjects, objects and relations such as individuals and objects having forces, acting, ‘being acted upon’, etc. In section (b), the focus will be on the –ntu ontology, which builds on the semantics of the –ntu root representing things. Kagame mainly develops this in his works La Philosophie Bantu-Rwandaise de l’etre (1956) and later works (1976). The examples relate to the theories of subjects, objects and relations and/or properties. (a) Tempels-Mbitian ontology as part of Bantu ontology studies the nature of objects and relations through language use and belief structures. In his study of language, Tempels recognise the concepts8 such as ‘life, force, to live strongly, or vital force’ as forming a fundamental part of Bantu ontology. An analysis of the Bantu languages shows that these words are present even in invocations during prayers and in other circumstances. For example, commenting about the expression of these words in prayers, Tempels wrote: Force, the potent life, vital energy are the object of prayers and invocations to God, to the spirits and to the dead, as well as of all that is usually called magic, sorcery or magical remedies. The Bantu will tell you that they go to a diviner to learn the words of life, so that he can teach them the way of making life stronger. In every Bantu language it is easy to recognize the words or phrases denoting a force, which is not used in an exclusively bodily sense, but in the sense of the integrity of our whole being. (Tempels 1959, 31)

The citation seems to make a categorical claim that the study of prayers, incantations and the Bantu languages, in general, reveals the concept of wholeness of being around the idea of force. Temples further uses language in his development of Bantu ontology when he considers the way people greet each other. According to him: We need not be surprised that the Bantu allude to this vital force in their greetings one to another, using such forms of address as: “You are strong”, or “you have life in you”, “you have life strongly in you”, and that they express sympathy in such phrases as “your vital force is lowered”, “your vital energy has been sapped” (Tempels 1959, 23).

Note that Tempels indicated that ‘Certain words are constantly being used by Africans. They are those which express their supreme values; and they recur like variations upon a leitmoti present in their language, their thought, and in all their acts and deeds’ (Tempels 1959, 22).

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The idea of being is here in the context of greeting. Another relevant extract is, ‘In their languages, too, are words like “kufwa” and “fukwididila”, which according to him are all linked with the idea of ‘the progressing stages of loss of force, of vitality, and the superlative of which signifies total paralysis of the power to live’’ (see Tempels 1959, 23). The above analysis of language use among the Bantu people led Tempels to develop a thesis where the substrata is ‘force’, hence the force theory of being. He argues, ‘The fundamental notion under which being is conceived lies within the category of forces’. He argued that ‘force’ in the Western philosophy is an attribute separable from the transcendental concept of being, but this cannot happen among the Bantu. The concept of force is inseparable from that of being. This makes him conclude that force is being. Commenting on this aspect, Tempels concludes: I believe that we should most faithfully render the Bantu thought in European language by saying that Bantu speak, act, live as if, for them, beings were forces. Force is not for them an adventitious, accidental reality. Force is even more than a necessary attribute of beings: Force is the nature of being, force is being, being is forces. (Tempels 1959, 35)

The attribution of the idea of force to the Bantu people leads to the conception that this idea of being is dynamic compared to the Western concept, which, according to Tempels, is static. It seems that he is not interested in the Greek/Western philosophy in his comparison, given that he completely ignores the dynamic conception of being which different philosophers such as Heraclitus and Whitehead held. Aristotle also partly alludes to a dynamic concept of being in his discourse on the idea of being as act and potency (dunamis and energeia). Nevertheless, from the study of language, Tempels concluded that being is ‘force’ among the Bantu inhabitants. The conception of force shows that it is the substance in terms of genera, the relational ontology of particulars, essence and substrata. In terms of genera, Tempels alludes to what is common to all things. Force is a necessary universal in all that exists. This provides a holistic conception of things, given that they all belong to the same genera because of the necessary attribute and force, which is being. Similarly, when talking about things, Tempels alludes to the idea of independent forces existing in a relation. A human being is a force. This is a way of accepting the existence of particulars but conceived in terms of relation, ‘This concept of separate beings, of substance (to use the Scholastic term again) which find themselves side by side, entirely independent one of another, is foreign to Bantu thought. Bantu hold that created beings preserve a bond one with another, an intimate ontological relationship, comparable with the causal tie which binds creature and Creator’ (Tempels 1959, 40). In his discourse of what is being, he suggests force as a defining character of being, hence its essence. The idea of being may refer to the essence of a thing. Tempels’ considers this aspect in the following passage: In the category of visible beings, the Bantu distinguish that which is perceived by the senses and the “thing in itself”. By the “thing in itself” they indicate its individual inner nature, or, more precisely, the force of the thing. (Tempels 1959, 36)

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The citation suggests a distinction between the world of appearances and the world beyond the senses. Force as substance is ‘that which is beyond the senses’. This suggests that force among the Bantu people is substance. Although the developments by Tempels seem to suggest the idea of force as substrata, essence, etc., something that is stable, his conception of dynamism of force from either strong to weak or vice versa tends to accommodate his conception of dynamism of being. Further analysis of the concept of force among the Bantu people leads Tempels to consider the hierarchy of forces, a form of metaphysics that reflects the Aristotelian and Thomistic metaphysics, with which he was well acquainted with. The first category of being is God, who is the creator in most of the Bantu languages. Commenting on the creator, he writes, ‘Above all force is God, Spirit and Creator, the mwine bukomo bwandi. God is a being that has force, or power, as part of its essence. He gives existence, power of survival, and increases, to other forces. With other forces, he is “He who increases force”’ (Tempels 1959, 29). It is quite suspicious that Tempels brings a theological conception of God as he who has force and power, in himself, which is a Western interpretation. While the idea of giving existence to other powers may be accepted as representing the Bantu people based on the study of God’s names, this having force in himself leaves a lot to be desired. The second rank in the hierarchy of being is given to the ancestors, who, according to Tempels (1959, 29), are the ‘After him come the first fathers of men, founders of the different clans. These archipatriarchs were the first to whom God communicated his vital force, with the power of exercising their influences on all posterity’. Not everyone falls in this category but only those good individuals who played a significant role in a particular clan. After these, ancestors come the dead, who are forces. After the dead, the other level consists of the living individuals. Human beings living in this world play an essential role as after them; there are also some different categories, ‘But man is not suspended in thin air. He lives on his land, where he finds himself to be the sovereign vital force, ruling the land and all that lives on it: man, animal, or plant’ (Tempels 1959, 43). He further considers living human beings as the centre of humanity, including the living, the dead and the ancestors. The living human being is conscious of being in a relationship with other forces, ‘The Bantu cannot be alone being. It is not a good enough synonym to say that he is a social being. No: He feels and knows himself to be a vital force, at this very time to be in an intimate and personal relationship with other forces acting above him and below him in the hierarchy of forces’ (Tempels 1959, 103). In this citation, Tempels shows that the African individual has first self-awareness or self-consciousness of being a force, the consciousness of being in relation to the other human forces and those ‘acting above and below’ shown in the discussion above. The centrality of the consciousness of the category ‘relation’ led to a common conceptualisation of being in an African setting, where ‘being’ cannot be conceived independently of relations. Most of the works that will follow Tempels’ in African philosophy will adopt this relational ontology. For example, John Mbiti (1969) will

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further develop this relational ontology and argue using his famous dictum that ‘I am because we are’. I have indicated elsewhere (see Kayange 2018) that this is often a parallel to Western ontology, which is in the Cartesian dictum that ‘I think therefore I am’. ‘Relation’ has tended to consider the ‘essence of being’ in the African context as the ‘We’ (community). On the contrary, the idea of the essence concerning the Western Ontology is in the ‘thinking I’ (a combination of individualism and rationality). The Cartesian dictum is therefore responsible for fragmentary ontology comprised of independent entities, while the concept of relation builds a holistic ontology in the African setting. Both Tempels and Mbiti will give birth to two related communitarian ontology forms, namely, vitalogy and extreme communitarianism. Extreme communitarianism will build on the understanding of essence in terms of community. A large part of this thesis’s support is from ethnological studies, which give evidence of African life’s strong communitarian structure in the traditional setting. Further support is from different communitarian expressions such as proverbs, for example, Kalikokha nkanyama ali awiri ndi anthu (The one who is alone is an animal and two are human beings). This metaphysics has gone beyond the Bantu context as it reflects other tribes even beyond the people studied by Tempels and Mbiti. For instance, philosophers such as Menkiti (1984) have strongly supported extreme communitarianism in African philosophy. This way of viewing has resulted in further consequences in Bantu ontology; for instance, in understanding self-awareness/consciousness, philosophers have argued that this occurs only in the community and cannot happen beyond this. The community, therefore, determines individuality. Apart from this orientation towards the community against the individual, this ontology has given birth to Ubuntu philosophy, a version of extreme communitarianism. This considers the universal ‘ubuntu’ as referring to the conception of being as relational. Apart from the extreme communitarian ontology, the pro-Bantu ontology theorists have forwarded a strong cause in support of vitalogy (vital force thesis), a view that follows from the idea that life is a vital force. Tempels captured the concept of vitalogy by indicating that, ‘He is also explicit about the fact that the human being, for the Bantu, never “appears as an independent entity. Every man, every individual form a link in the chain of vital forces, a living link, active and passive, joined from above to the descending line of his ancestry and sustaining below him the line of his descendants”’ (1959: 108). This citation puts together two central ideas in the Bantu ontology: the idea of vital force and community. There is a strong bond in the Bantu context that involves living human beings, those who are not yet born and those dead. The critical concept is that of the living dead, known as the ancestors. All the metaphysics of life after death seems to support the centrality of life in the African thought. This is also in the importance of the aspect of fertility in the African communities. Individuals want to give birth to siblings to continue living even after death; this seems to place importance on the centrality of passing on life to the young ones, which will keep the lineage alive. This is in the value of life for Africans in different areas. For example, there is a common interest in dynamic music in various

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African cultures. On the contrary, contemplative music has not attracted interest among most of the Africans. Contemplative music seems dull and it lacks the rhythmic aspect required in African music. Both vitalogy and extreme communitarian ontology provide a holistic ontology that is suggestive of different metaphysical interpretations. For example, a strong monism is in the following: Furthermore, African metaphysics is holistic in nature. Reality is seen as a closed system so that everything hangs together and is affected by any change in the system. Withaar (1986: 169) echoes Tempels (cf. More 1996: 152) in arguing that African metaphysics is organized around a number of principles and laws which control so called vital forces. (African Reader 196)

This holism seems to align Bantu ontology with different monists such as Spinoza, whose metaphysics led him to a form of pantheism, where things are strict, related such that everything becomes God (Everything is in God). Apart from monism, the vital force element suggests a dynamic metaphysics similar to that of Heraclitus and Whitehead. This shows that while being is one, there is a continuous flow of life. Secondly, the explication of vital force suggests a version of the substratum theory in the African context. Vital force becomes the substance that holds everything together in the universe. Thirdly, God’s discourse as the source of other forces’ existence suggests that he is the primary substance (force) and the rest of creation is ‘being’ in the secondary sense. The question that remains unexplored regarding ‘force’ as substance, is ‘What is the bearer of the ‘force’?’ On this matter, African philosophers may part ways, as some may embrace the bundle theory, while others maintain the substratum theory. I will not engage further on this because up to now philosophers have not realised serious issues on the matter. Below I will shift to Kagame’s ntu ontology. (b) Ntu ontology: Ntu ontology elaborates on the notion of being departing from the analysis of language syntactic structure. It further deduces both the structure of thought (categories) and the world (being). Bantu philosophy reflected this ontology in the 1950s and 1960s in Kagame (1956, 1976). It forms part of the ontologies that build on the belief that statements and words are the true carriers of both the people’s thoughts and the physical world. The study of Bantu languages leading to this ontology departs from recognising similarities in these languages; hence studying them may give a general picture of a common ontology. Kagame recognises the studies that led to this ontology by indicating that Wilhelm Heinrich Immanuel Bleek, as early as 1851, presented a doctoral thesis that studied the similarities of these languages in Central Africa (Affix-based languages). Before considering the ontology that developed from the study of the structure of Bantu languages, it is essential to note that Karl Barth, who studied the prefix plural of muntu, which means a human being (also used for a man), noted the earliest study of the structure of these languages. This word has mu- as a singular prefix and ba- as a plural prefix. The plural is, therefore, Bantu, which means human beings. The ba led to categorisation of the sub-Saharan and related tribes as the Ba-Sprechen group (Ba-speaking group). The use of Bantu became common in academic circles. The

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explanation is the limitation of the prefix Ba in capturing a human subject’s plural in different sub-Saharan regions. These variations include the Chichewa prefix a-, which replaces Ba- forming the plural Anthu, which is equivalent to Bantu. The Ba- is also not comprehensive enough in ontology as its scope is limited to a class of human subjects. While the study of the prefix Ba- led to a categorisation of a group of human beings, the comprehensive ontology study was through the root word -ntu. Grey primarily suggested this in 1952. Commenting on this aspect, Kagame wrote, ‘However, it is G. Grey who was the first to note that all bantu languages use the stem syllable -ntu, which is at the root of the word for “man” (mu-ntu) and consequently called them Bantu languages’ (Kagame 1976, 1). The ethnologists and ethnophilosophers adopted this term in their discourse of the Bantu people. Nevertheless, the word comes from the analysis of language. However, what becomes crucial for this study is ntu, which is a foundation of the –ntu ontology. Responding to the general question, what is being? Bantu languages’ analysis reveals that –ntu or the equivalent -nthu in Chichewa language is a common denominator. It is present in different terms that refer to the prefix mu- + suffix nthu (muntu meaning ‘human being’) and prefix chi- + suffix -nthu (chinthu meaning ‘a thing’). Based on this typical appearance in terms that refer to something, one may deduce different Bantu ontology propositions. The first proposition, which is associated with Kagame, states that: (1) –ntu designates being in general Showing this generality of –ntu in referring to being in general, Kagame (1976) wrote: The root syllable –ntu means being, a signification that acquires meaning only with the addition of the prefix mu- (man). Similarly, when it comes to the word a-ha-ntu, space and time is given by the simple addition of the syllables a and han to the root or stem –ntu. Hantu, therefore, expresses the Being-spaced-timed. As such, it expresses the unity of space and time.

This passage has the root –ntu as being in general, which acquires signification when different prefixes are before it. The –ntu is being in terms of substance, which underlies all things in the Bantu context. This substance cannot be defined or known as it requires going beyond experience. The –ntu as the substance is deducible from language, but its real reference is difficult to know with certainty. –ntu is a node where different modes of existence find expression. This node is a fundamental point that explains the holistic conceptualisation of being, given that everything is, based on its relation to the –ntu. The second proposition follows: (2) The categories are responsible for giving expression to –ntu.

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Table 2.1 Kagame’s Bantu categories Reasoned being Mu-ntu (human being) Bantu (human beings)

Unreasoned being Ki-ntu (thing) Bintu (things)

Spacing-temporising being Aha-ntu (place and time)

Modal being Kuntu (forces) Contingency

Determination

Kagame elaborates this proposition through four logical categories of being, departing from studying the structure of language relative to the root –ntu. The categories are from the following analysis of four terms that represent things. The first term has a prefix mu- and the suffix –ntu forming the mode of existence known as muntu, a class of human beings. The second combination is the prefix ki- and the suffix –ntu leading to kintu, a category of things. The third category adds the prefix ha- and the suffix –ntu, forming the mode expression of being in hantu, about space and time. The fourth combination is between the prefix ku- and –ntu, creating the presentation of being in kuntu, referring to forces. Ramose recognises this categorisation as correct in the following words, ‘Kagamé correctly suggests that muntu, kintu, hantu, and kuntu are the four categories of African philosophy’ (Ramose 1998, 380). Building on these different modes of expression of –ntu, Kagame suggests what makes these beings belong to various categories as is shown in the following Table 2.1. In this table, Kagame defines the essence of the category of muntu in terms of reason, ‘reasoned being’. Kagame follows the classical conceptualisation of the essence of a human being through rationality. This class differs from the second class of things (kintu), which comprises all non-rational beings. It is dubious if this definition of the essence of muntu as rational and other beings, kintu, as non-rational reflects the Bantu people’s ontology. The introduction of these definitions of essence moves the debate of Bantu ontology from language to speculative metaphysics. The third category has as its essence spacing and temporising elements. Interestingly, Kagame considers the traditional categories of space and time together, reflecting modern ontology/physics, which combines these in a four-dimensional space and time continuum. The Bantu people claim that these two dimensions are inseparable, as is the case in ahantu. The fourth category defines the way things are or may be different from the way they are (contingency and determination). Ramose comments further on the categorisation of being following the root –ntu as follows, ‘the enumeration is neither complete nor sufficient without the inclusion of the category ubuntu. Ubuntu is the fifth basic category of African philosophy. It is the normative ethical category that prescribes and, therefore, should permeate the relationship between muntu, kintu, hantu, and kuntu’ (Ramose, 380). Ramose used this reflection in developing his ubu- ontology, as will be discussed in the next chapter.

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The above discussion shows that this development of ontology led to the static conception of being fixed by the root -nthu. Similarly, the categories of being above lead to the fragmentation in understanding being. Kagame’s development of a root – ntu to represent being in an African context shows the interest of building a substance theory. In fact, -nthu becomes being in terms of substance with different categories. It is a common denominator that unites various things, which have ‘being’ relative to the substance.

2.4

Conclusion

In conclusion, the studies on being following the subject and object structure of language are comparable in Western and African studies in the analytic philosophy. Below is a table that shows some of the similarities and differences: Comparative table A. Similarities Comparison Western analytic philosophy area SubjectLanguage structure leads to a concepobject tion of the world as comprising indelanguage pendent objects, some act and others acted upon Particulars Some recognition of the existence of particulars Universals Some recognition of universals or properties B. Differences The concep- The general view is that the universe tion of the has separate entities, hence a fragmenUniverse tary view of existence Substance There is a division between those that support substance and those that do not Particular

Universals

There is a division between those that see a particular as a bundle of properties and as a relation between substance and properties Divided on the existence of universals, whether as things or as names

African analytic philosophy Language structure leads to a conception of the world as comprising independent objects, some act and others acted upon Some recognition of the existence of particulars Some recognition of universals or properties There is a general holistic view of the universe where things are related The general view is that there is substance, mainly, force, creating space for a dynamic conception of being There is a common consensus that a particular is a substance (force) with properties Universals seems accepted as attributes or properties of things

The chapter shows that a significant part of Western analytic metaphysics and African metaphysics follows from the subject-verb-object structure of language. The structure of the world and thought is in this structure of language. While this structure gives access to thought and reality, it is at the root of a fragmentary approach to reality. Metaphysics has generally considered terms such as subjects,

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individuals, objects, properties, predicates, universals, forces, attributes, qualities, categories and relations. In trying to make sense of the fragments in nature, most of the studies have attempted to present different categories of being, representing a framework for understanding things. Other fundamental debates have focused on describing the nature of particulars and universals. For example, the work has discussed the substratum theory, which recognized a substance holding together other qualities forming a particular. The chapter has diverse ideas on universals, such as metaphysical realism and nominalism. Therefore, being is the same as what are subjects, objects and relations. It is the question about individuals or particulars and relations. Below, I will first indicate the doctrine of fragmentation and demonstrate its problems, hence clarifying the reason for this shift in the analytic tradition. I will mainly build on insights mostly from the recent study of Kris McDaniel (2017), who defended fragmentation, and Bohm (1980), who supported wholeness. Secondly, I will indicate the static versus the dynamic problem ontology. This will justify a shift to a different form of ontology in Western and African ontology, making sense of the presentation that follows in Sect. 3.2 (Western action-language ontology) and 3.3 (African action-language ontology).

2.4.1

Shortcomings of Subject-Verb-Object Approach

Fragmentation (i) The subject-verb-object structure of language is responsible for fragmentations: The subject-verb-object ontology makes individuals perceive separate entities in the universe. This becomes part of human thinking and leads to various arguments in support of fragmentation. This thinking is present in a recent book The Fragmentation of Being; Kris McDaniel (2017) defends the thesis of fragmentation, which is strongly visible in the history of metaphysics. In this work, the author argues that ‘one of the oldest questions in metaphysics concerns not the various natures of beings, but rather the nature of being itself: is being unitary or does being fragment? The primary aims of this book are (i) to explain being as fragments, (ii) to show the impact of the fragmentation on other extant philosophical disputes, and (iii) to defend the tenability and fruitfulness of the idea that being fragments’ (McDaniel 2017, 1). The discussion in Chap. 2 above has provided different thinkers who are in this line of thought. The chapter goes against fragmentation and offers a different version of being that focuses on unity rather than this fragmentation. Other thinkers, such as Bohm, have taken this route of defending unity at the cost of fragmentation. The basic thesis behind the notion of fragmentation is that there are different modes of existence; hence it is counterintuitive to think that being in one. Firstly, fragmentation seems to be a common-sense theory since there are many kinds of being. Aristotle was one of the philosophers who partly strengthened the different ways of being, as was shown in Chap. 2 (‘being is said in many ways’). Metaphysicians who

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purports that there is a supreme being (God) find it difficult to talk about God’s mode of existence at par with that of the things that came into being out of his act of creation. Secondly, history seems to be in favour of the defenders of fragmentation; some of these include philosophers such as Thomas Aquinas, Immanuel Kant and Descartes for recognizing the existence of different modes, such as being in the sense of empirical and being regarding the transcendental. However, we have seen that ‘being’ beyond sense experience creates problems in the context of epistemology. The fathers of analytic philosophy such as G.E. Moore, Bertrand Russell and Frege all seem to justify the importance of fragmentation in nature. Tradition seems to go against the shift towards a unitary approach to being, leaving us only with univocity’s theory in Duns Scotus and probably the unitary views of Spinoza’s pantheism and partly the aspects of process philosophy in Whitehead. McDaniel (2017, 5) argues for three dominant motivations for endorsing ontological pluralism in metaphysics’ history, namely, theological, phenomenological and logical reasons. The theological argument builds on God’s nature, who is different from other beings as noted above, hence justifying different modes of being. The phenomenological argument, is where being appears to conscious subjects as separate modes. He has in mind the pluralism of Heidegger, Husserl and other defenders of phenomenalism. These ways may include being in the world as the conscious subject - existenz, ‘readiness-to-hand (the kind of being enjoyed by equipment), presentness-at-hand (the kind of being enjoyed by bits of matter), subsistence, and subsistence (a kind of being enjoyed by abstract objects)’ (McDaniel 2017, 7).9 The logical motivation is through the Aristotelian differentiation of things based on genera and species’ relations’ specific characteristics. Although ontological pluralism seems the orthodox way of approaching being, modern studies in physics and language support the unitary view rather than the fragmentary view. Bohm (1980) discusses the problem between fragmentary view and unity (wholeness) and favours the later. The idea of fragments is a consequence of confusion on how human subjects view things in the world. He noted that ‘The notion that all these fragments are separately existent is an illusion, and this illusion cannot do other than lead to endless conflict and confusion’ (Bohm 1980, 2). The illusion of fragmentation became an orthodox way of interpreting life in its different dimensions. For example, there has been a shift towards various specialisations over the past 30 years in education. This has created experts who just know a part of a particular discipline. There has been a shift towards pluralism in the political realm, under the idea of a multiparty system. It is a total shift from the unitary view of things (as a community) to individualism. What is the cause of this triumph of pluralism in the conception of being? Firstly, this is a necessity coming from human beings as conscious subjects, who tend to isolate things to know them. Bohm (1980, 2) comments on this aspect in the following passage, ‘Indeed, to some extent, it has always been both necessary and proper for man, in his thinking, to divide things up, and to separate them, so as to

9

Kris McDaniel (2017). The Fragmentation of Being. Oxford University Press: Oxford.

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reduce his problems to manageable proportions; for evidently, if in our practical technical work we tried to deal with the whole of reality all at once, we would be swamped’. This human mind activity is a consequence of the method of analysis, where things are deliberately broken into smaller parts so that they may be understood well. This is the method also engaged in the analytic tradition in the study of philosophy through language. Fragmentation is, therefore, a consequence of a logical approach to understanding reality. For example, assuming that I have never been to Chambo village in Malawi, the first day I visit this, my perception separates things that appear to me. I see things that I name, goats, sheep and other human beings in this separation. This is the way I have known the things that are present in Chambo village. The problem that arises is, is this representative of the objective reality in Chambo village, or is it a consequence of my mind’s method to separate things to know them better, or is it because of the factors that affect perception? This takes us to involve the scientific conception of the physical world. Secondly, human subjects transfer the fragmentary approach from the content of their thought to reality, creating a world model in natural science. Bohm argues that this is a consequence of an ‘almost universal habit of taking the content of our thought for ‘a description of the world as it is.’ Or we could say that, in this habit, our thought is regarded as in a direct correspondence with objective reality’. The introduction of thinking that is already affected by breaking things into smaller parts also affects the physical world and other processes. The thought which is ‘pervaded with differences and distinctions’ creates a physical world in which fragmentations are real. These fragmentations are evident in scientific theories, which were traditionally thought to correspond to the facts (objective truth). The fragmentation is also affected by human perception, which entails an interpretation of facts. This creates the truth between what thought and perception impose on the physical world and what the things are. Mistrusting what our thought opposes on nature, and aware of the complexity of the physical world, we have resorted to viewing scientific theories as false, instruments for partially accessing reality, approximations to reality, models of reality, etc. This confirms that fragmentations do not help human beings in grasping the real nature of things. Nevertheless, fragmentation influenced natural science development in its different theories, such as atoms and particles’ theory. Thirdly, fragmentation is a consequence of language in its relation with thought. If we follow Piaget’s theory, thought comes first and then language, entailing that the fragmentation has its source, thought as noted above. This implies that the study of language may reveal the structure of thought. If we follow Vygotsky, thought and language are interdependent such that the later can give shape to the former in children and vice versa. In this regard, both language and thought are responsible for the fragmentary approach to reality. In this work, the intention is not to solve the problem between what comes first between language and thought but to recognize that they are both a source of fragmentary approach to being. For example, if I learn the Italian language today, it already directs me on how to think (thought) about certain things and what terms represent things in the physical world. The link between language and thought, and language and reality, confirms that through the

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study of language, I may end up with thought (in this case fragmentary approach of things) or the structure of things in the world (in this case a fragmentary world). Suppose we take language as our point of departure. In that case, there are fragments, but there is also language referring ‘wholeness’ or ‘oneness’. This justifies that we can move from the language perspective of fragments to another that builds on wholeness of thought and wholeness of objective reality. For Bohm, this shift must be based on the idea that fragmentation is wrong, confusion and an illusion. He writes, ‘So fragmentation is in essence a confusion around the question of difference and sameness (or one-ness), but the clear perception of these categories is necessary in every phase of life. To be confused about what is different and what is not, is to be confused about everything. Thus, it is not an accident that our fragmentary form of thought leads to such a widespread range of crises, social, political, economic, ecological, psychological, etc. in the individual and society as a whole’ (Bohm 1980, 21). Bohm’s alternative is a conception of being founded on action and wholeness. Static Versus Dynamic Ontology (ii) The movement from subject-verb-object language to action language in the study of being is motivated by the problem between the static and dynamic metaphysics. Traditionally, this was between Parmenides and Heraclitus and their disciples. The static conception of ontology relative to Parmenides is to view being as stable; ‘being is’. The word static in this sense refers to being that does not go through change. The opposite of this view was held by Heraclitus, who saw everything as in the process of becoming. Aristotle invoked both static and dynamic aspects of being in his theory of actuality with words such as energeia which calls for the possibility of becoming a something and entelechia something complete. Although the traditional relation between static and dynamic started as a conflict between permanence and change, the modern development distinguishes the two between the particularist ontology and the process philosophy. The former focuses on particulars and their properties as guided by subject-verbobject ontology, while the latter focuses on wholeness and process. The subject-verb-object ontology does not adequately explain action relative to wholeness. Action is often a parochial experience connected with the static subject as its source. Commenting on this, Bohm (1980) writes, ‘A cursory examination shows that an essential feature of this kind is the subject-verb-object structure of sentences, which is common to the grammar and syntax of modern languages. This structure implies that all action arises in a separate entity, the subject. In cases described by a transitive verb, this action crosses over the space between them to another separate entity, the object. (If the verb is intransitive, as in “he moves”, the subject is still considered to be a separate entity, but the activity is either a property of the subject or a reflexive action of the subject, e.g., in the sense that “he moves” may be taken to mean “he moves himself”.)’. Another example of transitive is ‘Jean pushes the chair’. Jean acts and the chair is acted upon. If it is ‘Jean pushes’, she is still a separate entity that acts. Briefly, interest is to understand ‘being as action’ but relative to wholeness, not fragments. This will develop from a different way of viewing language from the fragmentary view to an action-based holistic view.

Chapter 3

Action-Language Ontology

Abstract This chapter argues that the ‘rheomodic language structure’ or ‘action language structure’ is an alternative approach to the question of being in both Western and African thought. The contention is that being can be studied by focusing on the verbal root of concepts. It is believed that this verbal root of words leads to a holistic and dynamic conception of being. This approach to the question of ‘being’ follows the tradition of Heraclitus who viewed ‘being’ as in a continuous flux, and it goes against the static conception of being in Parmenides. This dynamic conception of being is mainly represented by thinkers such as Bohm in Western philosophy and Ramose in African philosophy. The chapter also suggests a dynamic concept of being in the African context using the verb root –li in the Chichewa language.

3.1

Introduction

The chapter follows from the shortcomings in the conclusion of Chap. 2 and proposes a shift from the subject-verb-object ontology to the ‘action-language ontology’. Why this shift? As per the conclusion of Chap. 2, the shift from the subject-verb-object to action language in conceptualising ‘being’ is an attempt to resolve mainly two related problems. The main problem regards the pluralistic way of viewing being (ontological pluralism), also known as the question of ‘fragmentation of being’. I argued in Chap. 2 that subject-verb-object language is the main responsible cause of this fragmentation. The second problem concerns whether being is static or dynamic. I take the subject-verb-object as leading to most of the static ontology in both Western and African thought. Below I will present ‘action language in Western analytic metaphysics’ in Sect. 3.2 and in Sect. 3.3 the African views around action language metaphysics. In the Western context, this work will discuss David Bohm, whose ideas qualify in the analytic tradition. Bohm is an excellent choice because he builds on insights from language (rheomode language) and natural science (mainly physics). In African thought, the work will firstly select Mogobe Ramose, because he builds on insights

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. M. Kayange, The Question of Being in Western and African Analytic Metaphysics, Synthese Library 438, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69645-0_3

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from Bohm. Apart from Ramose, I will suggest a reflection on Chewa language that equally allows for action-language ontology.

3.2

Action Language in Western Analytic Metaphysics

In modern philosophy, the metaphysics of action and wholeness follows from an analysis of action language in Bohm’s philosophy, mainly in 1980. As per the above introduction, the starting point is the desire to explore a different form of language that avoids fragments, which has its source in classical language analysis and its grammar. Apart from the problems noted earlier, various statements also show that the fragmentary approach conditions human subjects to misinterpret some facts. “For example, consider the sentence ‘It is raining.’ Where is the ‘It’ that would, according to the sentence, be ‘the rainer that is doing the raining’? It is more accurate to say: ‘Rain is going on’. Similarly, we customarily say, ‘One elementary particle acts on another’, but, as indicated in the previous chapter, each particle is only an abstraction of a relatively invariant form of movement in the whole field of the universe. So it would be more appropriate to say, ‘Elementary particles are on-going movements that are mutually dependent because ultimately they merge and interpenetrate.’” (Bohm 1980, 37). In avoiding unnecessary conditioning from the subject-verb-object fragmentary approach, the shift will in this case be appropriate. Bohm suggests a shift is from the subject-verb-object structure above to a structure that builds on a verb. The interest in a verb is due to its centrality in accommodating the concept of action. This is in line with the understanding that ‘a verb is a doing word’. Introducing a verb-based language will capture movement (action) and dissolve the pluralism in the fragmentary approach. Bohm argues that one of the verb-focus languages was ancient Hebrew, where the other forms, such as the adverbs, adjectives and nouns, follow from the verbs (Bohm 1980, 38). The ontology of action could have come from this, but unfortunately, this old language is often sidelined. Bohm embarks on an experimental language, the rheomode, which comes from the Greek word rheo, meaning flow. This is thinking about the conceptualisation of being as becoming, as was the case in Heraclitus’ pantarei (everything is in a flux). Rheomode language, as verb language, departs from the verbal root of a word, which provides the root meaning in terms of action/flow. Then there is a movement to a verbal form, whose meaning is in the root verb. Then the act of perception is introduced to see whether it fits the observed content. Besides verbal form, adjectives and nouns follow from a verbal basis. Bohm gave the example of the verb ‘to relevate’. This is where we derive the adjective ‘relevance’. The root of ‘to relevate’ follows from ‘to levate’ meaning to lift (or elevate). The lifting concerns ‘lifting into attention certain content. In rheomode context, Bohm proposes the root ‘to levate’ as meaning, ‘The spontaneous and unrestricted act of lifting into attention any content whatsoever, which includes the lifting into attention of the question of whether this

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Table 3.1 Rheomodic structure of language Verbal root Levate Vidate Di-vidate Ordinate Verrate

Verb Re-levate Re-vidate Redividate Reordinate Reverrate

Adjective Re-levant Re-vidant Redividant Reordinant Reverrant

Adjective Irre-levant Irre-vidant Irredividant Irreordinant Irreverrant

General act Leviation Vidation Dividation

Context specific Re-leviation Re-vidation Re-dividation

Ordination

Re-ordination

Verration

Re-verration

Irre-leviation Irre-vidation Irredividation Irreordination Irre-verration

content fits a broader context or not, as well as that of lifting into attention the very function of calling attention which is initiated by the verb itself’ (Bohm 1980, 44). There is too much happening in this definition of ‘to levate’’; for clarities sake, I will break this in different focus areas. Firstly, this is suggesting that it is an act, hence justifying the aspect of action language. Secondly, it is proposing a relation of fit between content and the world (context). This is not a relation of truth, between statements and fact, as is often the case in the fragmentary language. Thirdly, it enacts the function of calling attention. Introducing the verb ‘to re-levate’ implies ‘to levate again’ as per thought and language. Perception plays an important role in seeing if there is a fit between content and the intended scope. If this relation holds or fits again, then ‘re-levate’ leads to ‘re-levant’; otherwise, the act of ‘re-levate’ is irre-levant. Bohm demonstrates this action language with different words as below Table 3.1. The above discussion shows a different way of looking at the structure of language departing from its root, as per the first column. The rest of the words derive from the verb root. There is a particular interest in the last column (verrate) in analytic philosophy because of the relation between language/thought and reality. I will, therefore, focus on Bohm’s analysis of this concept. The Latin word for truth, verus, is used in Bohm, but he transforms it into rheomode language by underlining its root form as to verrate. Like the above discussion, to verrate is conceived as an act of perceiving the truth and attending to what truth means. It puts together the element of perception, which reflects the importance of empiricism in this metaphysics and the aspect of semantics (relative to meaning). The second level of thought and language is where we call attention again to a particular truth. This calls for an addition of re- to verrate, hence the word to re-verrate. The relation between content and the context of interest is a perceived relation of fit. If this relation yields, then ‘to re-verrate is re-verrant’. The focus in this consideration of truth is in the general act varration, in a specific context at time t, re-verration or, does not read to the truth, ire-verration. There is some shift from the commonly endorsed theory of truth as correspondence to the facts, where a statement x is true, not necessarily because there is an

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individual A who has observed the truth. In the correspondence theory, truth is exclusively a property of the statement. Bohm seems to agree that truth is a property of content, which may be a statement, but goes beyond this aspect by accommodating other bearers, such as gestures, etc. and the element of apprehension (observation). For instance, thinking in this line of thought, he wrote: Thus, the truth or falsity in content of a statement is apprehended by observing whether or not this content fits a broader context which is indicated either in the statement itself or by some action or gesture (such as pointing) that goes together with the statement. (Bohm 1980, 53)

Although this seems to be a theory where truth is conceived as an action of verration, it has a robust subjective aspect because the apprehension is dependent on the observing subject. In the old conception of truth in the correspondence theory, we could demand clarifying the context of interest as ‘facts’; however, in rheomode language, even ‘fact’ is interpreted based on a root verb, hence undergoes a similar explanation as above. The interpretation of everything based on action language, including facts, concludes that ‘being’ is a movement. Commenting on a similar aspect, Bohm writes: It has become evident in this chapter that the world view implied in the rheomode is in essence that described in the first chapter, which is expressed by saying that all is an unbroken and undivided whole movement, and that each ‘thing’ is abstracted only as a relatively invariant side or aspect of this movement. It is clear, therefore, that the rheomode implies a worldview quite different from that of the usual language structure.

The above citation leads to the view that being is ‘unbroken and undivided whole movement’. Pluralism, which led to fragmentation in the subject-verb-object language, disappears because being in things, such as a ‘this’, is only an aspect of the general movement.

3.3

Action Language-Based Ontology in African Analytic Metaphysics

(a) Ubuntu action language Ramose in the section ‘Philosophy of Ubuntu’ uses language analysis in developing his idealistic version of action or rheomodic language ontology in the sub-Saharan region. He borrows from Bohm and calls his language ‘The philosophical language of ubuntu’. Using his philosophical abstraction, he suggests dividing the word ubuntu into two parts, namely, ubu and ntu. The justification of this division is that the former is a prefix while the latter is a stem. Ramose recognises the language analysis as a possible way of dealing with the notion of ubuntu, but he opts for

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approaching it ‘philosophically’. I think that he uses this to mean that he will use a form of idealism in trying to make sense of the word ubuntu. In his idealism, Ramose posits that ubu is being in general, which seems to be a form of abstract substance. This deduction follows from his view that ubu is ‘enfolded being before it manifests itself in the concrete form or mode of existence of a particular entity’. An analysis of the word ‘enfolded’ shows that this abstract substance is ‘hidden’. Similarly, ‘before it manifests’ suggests that this being is hidden. Before reading Ramose’s ideas that follow, it becomes clear that ‘before it manifests’ already entails the potential to come out from the status of ‘hidden’. He suggests this aspect of becoming a ‘something’ as a characteristic of ubu, which ‘is always oriented towards unfoldment’. This happens relative to ntu, which is substance relative to what appears in the world, the concreteness of being. Ramose views it as ‘having become’. The fact that ‘ubu’ is always oriented towards unfoldment (having become) shows that being is active, becoming, hence the notion of ubu as being-becoming. Ramose takes ubu as the world of being qua being, while its concretisation in ntu is the epistemology realm. Epistemology is a context where ‘being’ is known as something; an area that makes us conscious of the manifestation of being in concrete things. Given that ubu manifests in ntu, Ramose argues that the way we know being in this concreteness entails the inseparable relation between ubu and ntu. Therefore, he contends one-ness and whole-ness as distinctive features of being as per the notion of ubuntu. The use of ubuntu in his idealism departs from the general thinking, where it refers to humanness. The departure is justified because the specificity of human beings is given through the word umuntu. He comments on this by indicating that ‘Umuntu means the emergence of homoloquens who is simultaneously a homo sapiens’ (Ramose 1998, 272). A similar word in Chewa language is umunthu, which in this suggestion has two parts, umu and nthu. In Chewa language, a better distinction is threefold, u, mu and nthu. In this case, ‘mu’ indicates a class of humans, while ‘u’ is general (may be used in front of the class of humans or other things). Nevertheless, in Ramose, umu manifests in ntu, which is the unfolding of human beings as concrete things. In both ideas, ubuntu and umuntu, Ramose shows that being is dominated by the aspects of being and ‘motion’ (being-becoming). It sounds like the Aristotelian conception of being as act and potency since ‘it is’, but at the same time, ‘it is becoming concreate’. However, Ramose wants to portray a conception of being similar to Bohm. He notes that: On this reasoning, ubu- may be regarded as be-ing becoming and this evidently implies the idea of motion. We propose to regard such incessant motion as verbal rather than the verb. ntu may be construed as the temporarily having become. In this sense -ntu is a noun. The indivisible one-ness and whole-ness of ubu-ntu means, therefore, that ubuntu is a verbal noun.

The continuous motion of ubu towards ntu justifies his proposal of considering ubu as verbal, while ntu as the having become is a noun. The relation between verbal

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element and noun leads to the suggestion that ‘ubuntu’ is a gerund (verbal noun). He, therefore, concludes that ‘Ubuntu then is a gerund. But it is also a gerundive at the same time since at the epistemological level, it may crystallize into a particular form of social organization, religion, or law. Ubuntu is always a -ness and not an –ism’ (Ramose 1998, 272). Does Ramose manage to present the notion of being representing the Bantu people? His assumption of unity as fundamental in the African context seems to represent the life of the people. My concern is on his interpretation of ubu and the related umu. Firstly, I find it challenging to view ubu as representing being in general. In my view, this does not apply in other Bantu languages such as the Chewa language. Secondly, ubu or umu does not suggest a movement towards ntu. This movement is a creation of Ramose, forcing the interpretation of ubu and ntu as verbal. I contend that Ramose’s problematic aspect is using ideas from phenomenology to claim the motion of ubu towards ntu. I can agree with Ramose if his ideas are a version of idealism, similar to Bohm’s idealism. This idealism aims to address the fragmentation of being in African thought, following from the subject-verb-object language (Ramose 1998, 273–274), and the interest of developing ubuntu dynamic philosophy instead of static ontology. Nevertheless, Ramose’s reference to life experience in terms of relations, unity, wholeness, etc. makes his idealism quasi-true of certain aspects among the African people. (b) -li action language ontology In Chichewa language, there is a verbal root -li (Ngoma and Chauma 2011, 95), a candidate of a version of the action-language ontology. A close look at the verb root li in ordinary language use shows that it is used in different forms such as ali (someone has or is somewhere), a-na-li (someone had or was somewhere), chi-li (a thing has or is somewhere), Kali (a small thing has or it is somewhere) and mu-li (you have or you are somewhere). This use of the root verb -li in Chewa language inspired me to develop a complementary ontology to ntu or nthu ontology, capable of capturing the element of be-ing becoming and wholeness. This is further to show that interpreting -li using rheomodic language supports the -ntu ontology to achieve the flow (dynamic conception of being) rather than the static conception (characteristic of ntu or nthu ontology). Below is an analysis of the structure of the verb root ‘-li’ and how it is combined with different prefixes to develop different terms in ordinary language use (Table 3.2). The above table shows that when the prefix a- is added to verb root –li, forming the term ali, it refers to something (a particular), such as a human being. The tense of ali is present tense, but the aspect shows that someone is in a specific state. For example, when a speaker utters ‘Jane ali ndi mimba’ (literal translation ¼ Jane is pregnant), the aspect of ali shows that Jane is in a state of pregnancy (present

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Table 3.2 -Li ontology

Verb root -li

Prefix class 1 A-

Being: present continuous tense Ali

I-

Ili

U-

Uli

Ndi-

Ndili

Mu-

Muli

Ka-

Kali

Ku-

Kuli

Ti-

Tili

Chi-

Chili

Li-

Lili

Pa-

Pali

English translation Somebody is there or has It is there or it has You are or you have I am there or I have You are there or you have It is there (something small) There is (far place) We are there or we have It is there (a thing or big thing) it has It is there or it has There is (near location)

Prefix 2 -na-

Being: past continuous tense Anali

-na-

Inali

-na-

Unali

-na-

Ndinali

-na-

Munali

-na-

Kanali

-na-

Kunali

-na-

Tinali

-na-

Chinali

-na-

Linali

-na-

Panali

English translation Somebody was there or had It was there or it had You were or you had I am there or I have You were there or you had It were there (something small) There was (far place) We are there or we have It was there (a thing or big thing) it had It is there or it has There was (near location)

continuous tense). Another example, ‘Mary ali mnyumba’ (Mary is in the house),1 shows that she is in the house (in the state of being in the house). When a middle language marker -na- is introduced in anali, the tense changes to past tense, while the aspect shows continuity, hence showing being in a state even in the past. This may imply that ‘becoming’ continuously occurred in the past in a particular place. For example, in ‘Mateyu adali kuchikwati’ (Mateyu has been at the wedding), this is past tense. There is a continuous presence of Mateyu at the wedding (state) in terms of aspect. In some cases, -na- as tense change marker is replaced by -da- forming adali, which gives the same sense as anali (past tense and aspect-continuity in the past). When the vowel I- (prefix) is added to the verb root -li, the word becomes ili. This refers to a particular thing. The tense of ili is present tense, while it is a continuous act in terms of aspect. It refers to the understanding that something is continuously 1

Ali may as well be used for other living beings in the class of animals, such as dogs, as in Galu ali ndi bala translated as ‘a dog has a wound’. This cannot be used for other animals such as cows and goats.

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present (time) in a particular place. For example, in Mbuzi ili M’munda (A goat is in the garden), the aspect shows that this goat is continuously present in the garden. The plural is through adding a prefix zi- to the verb root -li forming zili. The aspect of zili shows that there are things that are ‘continuously present’. For example, in Ziwiya zili panja (Utensils are outside), it shows the aspect of being continuously there relative to the present tense. When a prefix marker -na- is added, the past tense becomes zinali. In terms of aspect, this shows the continuity of being in the past relative to a particular situation. The aspect, in both zili and zinali, confirms a conception of being in terms of a process, whether in the past or present. Adding prefix u- to verb root -li, the reference becomes the second person singular; this differs from ali and ili in the sense that these latter refer to thirdperson singular. Uli is similarly in the present tense, and the aspect shows the continuous presence in the past, hence suggesting the conception of being in terms of a process.2 For example, in Mnsokhano uli pano (The meeting is here), uli as an aspect shows the continuity of being in a particular place. When prefix marker -naor -da- is added between u- and -li, then there is a past tense unali or udali, whose aspect shows the continuous presence in the past. For example, when a speaker utters a sentence Udali munthu iwe (literal translation ¼ You were a human being) to a hearer, it shows that the speaker refers to being human in the past (a continuous state in the past). Metaphorically being human in this sentence indicates that one was very important or rich. Similarly, Mtengo unali ndi zipatso (A tree had fruits) is in the past tense, but in terms of aspect, it means that the tree was in a state of continuously having fruits in the past. The prefix ndi- added to verb root –li refers to the first person singular ‘I am’ in the present tense; however, the aspect shows the continuity of being or having something. The past tense of ndili is ndinali, and the aspect shows continuity of being or having in the past. Similarly, mu- plus –li gives muli, which is present tense, and the aspect shows that you are continuously present. The past tense will be munali or mudali, and the aspect indicates that you were continuously present or having some property in the past. When the prefix chi- is added to -li, there is a present tense chili, which shows that something ‘is’ or has in the present. The aspect of chili shows that something continuously is or has. Here the relation should be more of ‘Is’ (present tense) and ‘Is’ continuously present (aspect). In ordinary speech, chili represents something that is not human (a thing) and, in some cases, shows that what is referred to is big, for example, in a statement Chimwala chili ndi fumbi (A big stone has dust). When prefix middle marker -na- is introduced with -li, then there is the abstract aspect of

2

Although uli is commonly used for human beings in terms of second person, an exception comes when it is used as third person with reference to things, such as in mtengo uli ndi minga translated as ‘a tree has thorns’.

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past tense and continuity in the past. This leads to words such as chi-na-li, which implies that it was continuously present in the past. Similarly, a-na-li means that something was always present in a particular context. Prefix ka- combined with verb root -li gives kali, which refers to being there in the present tense. This kali shows that something that is there is small. This captures its (particular being) dimension of being in a place and the present tense showing time. The aspect of kali shows the element of continuity of being in a particular place. Adding prefix middle marker –na- or –da- between ka- and –li leads to kanali or kadali, which is past tense, as the aspect shows state of being and continuity in the past. For example, in Kamwana kali ku mudzi (A child is at the village), the aspect shows that the child is continuously present at the village. Ku-li gives the idea of being copulated with time and place. This combines the dimensions of place and time, as is the case in ‘there is’. Kuli is present tense, and the aspect shows being-place-time as a process that goes on. Adding prefix -na- or -da- between ku- and -li, the past tense is in kunali, and the aspect shows the process of being-place-time in a continuous past. While ku- shows ‘being-place-time’ at a distance, pa- shows the idea of closeness (similar to here). The prefix pa- added to -li becomes pa-li, which is present tense. The tense shows the word ‘being’, as ‘there is’ but in present continuous tense. This also captures the idea of being-place-time, hence capturing the concept of a process. The past continuous tense requires adding na- or da- between pa- and -li, forming panali or padali. This shows the process of being-place-time in the past. The prefix li- plus –li gives lili, which is present tense, and the aspect indicates that it is continuously present. The plural linali is past tense, and the aspect shows that it was continuously present in the past. The above discussion suggests that being in general is ‘-li’, a verb root in the -li ontology. Being a verb root, it suggests that being is dynamic. The meaning of ‘being’ in this ontology is in the past tense or present tense, and the aspect indicates the continuity of act of being in either the past or present. The verb root -li does not accommodate any word that captures remote future tense or future aspect. This ontology’s remote future is implied from the present continuous part (becoming), but it cannot come from the ordinary language use of the verbal root -li. This discovery leads to trivial results concerning the concept of time in African philosophy. It seems to confirm Mbiti’s contention that there is no concept of remote future time in the African thought (Mbiti 1969). This has been a point of disagreement in African philosophy as some individuals tried to prove the existence of remote future time. I do not want to argue that there is no remote future time in the general African thought, but it is only implied in the present in the ‘-li’ ontology. I just argue that I have not found any word with the verbal root ‘-li’ that shows the future time in my analysis. My interpretation is that it is typical of the concept of being as a process, where the past and present matter most.

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Conclusion

I conclude with a summary in a comparison table to show some similarities and differences in orientation in building ontology using action language. Below is a table that shows some of the similarities and differences: Comparison table A. Similarities Comparison Western analytic philosophy area Language Language reveals a unitary structure of thought and reality Being Being is becoming Characteristics Dynamic, wholeness, oneness. of being B. Differences Language and The root of different verbs shows the structure of the construction of other forms of words and reveals the structure of thought and reality. Conceptualising Bohm focuses more on the role of being natural science in clarifying being.

Orientation

Although fragments are not accepted, the orientation is more towards a mechanistic view endorsing materialism.

African analytic philosophy Language reveals a unitary structure of thought and reality Being is becoming Dynamic, wholeness and oneness.

Verbal language reveals a word for being (ubu + ntu or –li), which gives the structure of thought and reality. Ramose uses more insights from African culture and idealism, while in my development, I concentrated on language analysis. Recognition of extension of being in the world of the dead suggests going beyond mechanistic view of reality, entertaining both materialism and immaterialism.

A perspective of being as becoming based on ‘action’ is present in both Western and African thought. In both, this is a reaction against the subject-verb-object conception of language as the sole mode of viewing things. The presentation of an alternative view rooted in rheomodic conception of language refutes the subjectverb-object conception as the only way of analysing language. In African thought, the -li ontology is a parallel conception of being to both the -ntu and ubuntu ontology. I conclude by noting that all these ontological perspectives have their focus. Therefore, they are ways of thinking about ‘being’ in Africa by different philosophers (focusing on African people in the sub-Saharan region). Finally, the verb root li, noun root -ntu and the abstract noun ubu-ntu are equally being; however, ‘-li’ is being as a process in time, ‘ntu’ is being as fixed substance and ‘ubu-ntu’ is being as an abstract. In -li ontology, ubuntu gets its motion in the verb root, while in ubu-ntu ontology, movement cannot come from this abstract noun root but platonic speculation. After the two dominant approaches to the question of being in the analytic philosophy, below focus will be on the fundamental themes in metaphysics that

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continue to attract attention of different thinkers. I have in mind topics such as ‘space and time’, ‘modality’ and ‘causation’. These topics will clarify further this comparative approach to metaphysics relative to Western and African analytic philosophy.

Chapter 4

Space and Time

Abstract This chapter discusses the question of being relative to the concepts of space and time. In the analytic tradition, these concepts are generally studied based on insights from logic/mathematics and natural science (mainly physics). The chapter explores different views on space and time such as substantivalism, reductionism or relational theory and the African concept of time as reflected in different studies. On the African concept of time, the focus is on the debates on dimensions of time, where different thinkers question Mbiti’s argument that there is no remote future dimension of time in African thought. The chapter builds visual and mathematical models of space and time in the African context. It also argues that studying space and time in the framework of -li ontology confirms the existence of only past and present dimensions. While this partly vindicates Mbiti’s claims, it is argued that this is one of the many interpretations or perspectives of time that are present in African thought. The chapter offers visual and mathematical models of traditional African conception of space and time.

4.1

Introduction

In Chaps. 2 and 3, the focus was on conceptualising being in the analytic tradition, building on the subject-verb-object language ontology and the action-rheomodic language ontology. This chapter investigates the ‘being-ness’ of ‘space’ and ‘time’ in the Western and African analytic frameworks. The fundamental question is, ‘Does space and time exist?’ In the analytic tradition, the expectation is either to respond that it exists or not. The response that it exists in the physical world may lead this investigation to consider space and time on either the substratum theory or the bundle theory. This may further entail describing the nature or structure of space and time within these theories. The other possible investigation may follow the route that they exist but in the sense of subsisting (as universals – relations). This may further require clarification of space and time as universals. Assuming that the response is that they do not exist, this requires explaining why there are concepts ‘space’ and ‘time’. This may entertain the interpretation that these are just names

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. M. Kayange, The Question of Being in Western and African Analytic Metaphysics, Synthese Library 438, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69645-0_4

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(nominalism); they are human creations (conventionalism) needed only for theoretical purposes (instrumentalism). I want to note that many thinkers have dealt with the issues above, but this work’s scope does not allow the comfort of discussing them all. For instance, there are works in idealistic philosophy such as McTaggart (1908), phenomenology (Hermann Weyl, Bergson, Husserl, Heidegger), psychology (Helmholtz), etc. Similarly, theologians focus on the concept of time to clarify the theories of creation and the universe’s end-times. If one looks at the history of philosophy, it is clear that space and time are essential topics in philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, Aquinas, Descartes and Kant. Looking at these developments, it is impossible to exhaustively present the ideas of space and time in this chapter. A possible way out is to focus only on works in the analytic philosophy that study space and time using insights from mathematics/logic, language and natural science since the Vienna Circle’s development in the early 1920s. There is no consensus of a theory of space and time representative of the analytic philosophy. Some thinkers, such as Willard Quine and Reichenbach, prefer conventionalism, some substantivalism following Newton and others relationalism following Leibniz. Unfortunately, these views do not provide the whole philosophical or scientific picture of space and time. While this is a possible way of presenting ideas of space and time in the analytic thought, I will not only embark on these theories, which may condition and limit this comparative study, but I will also consider other views on this topic. Going through different thinkers in analytic philosophy, such as Moritz Schlick, there is an intersection of ideas mainly involving philosophy, physics and mathematics. For example, in his work, Space and time in contemporary physics: an introduction to the theory of relativity and gravitation (Schlick 1920), Schlick incorporates elements from physics, mathematics and philosophy in presenting ideas of space and time from Newton to Einstein. Schlick refers to ‘space and time’ ideas from philosophers such as Berkeley, Locke, Kant, Schopenhauer and Poincare; mathematicians such as Minkowski, Lobatschewsky and Gaus; and physicists such as Lorentz, Mach and Copernicus. Schlick also incorporates ideas beyond Newton; for example, he discusses Euclid’s insights on various pages (Schlick 1920, 34–36, 46). Although the interest of Schlick is contemporary physics, his work shows that the direction of space and time in analytic philosophy requires considering insights from various angles as long as these matter for this tradition of thought. In this work, I will limit this presentation to works that I believe are very informative in responding to metaphysical questions in the analytic tradition. I will build my content following the questions: ‘Does space and time exist?’ ‘If they exist, are they absolute or relative?’ ‘If they exist, what is their structure (geometry)?’ In both Western and African analytic philosophies, the focus will be on works that reflect on language, natural science and logic/mathematics. These will be in Sects. 4.2 and 4.3, respectively. In Sect. 4.3, after considering developments on the

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existence and nature of space and time, the section will formalise the African conception through the provision of visual and mathematical models.

4.2

Western Analytic Philosophical Tradition on Space and Time

What is the conception of space and time in the Western analytic tradition? There is no single view of space and time, but a diversity of ideas. I will discuss the scattered ideas on space and time with a particular interest in fundamental ideas/figures in the history of philosophy that attracted analytic philosophers.

4.2.1

Does Space and Time Exist?

The narrative of space and time in the Western thought departs from ideas from the prescientific era. Einstein supports the view that this prescientific conception informs the scientific understanding of space and time. We can agree with Einstein and indicate that there are different myths and other religious beliefs that have contemplated aspects such as spiritual intervention, void, creation of space and time and the flow of time in the ancient Western cultures. In the context of mythology, John Potts (2015) in The New Time and Space comments on the mythological aspect that, ‘The conceptualisation of time and space in mythology entails a dual focus: there is the time and space experienced by the social group, but also, more profoundly, there is the time and space of the spirit-world’. It is essential to note the Jewish conception before the different philosophies known today in the religious tradition. There is an aspect of God creating everything, including space and time, from nothing. The assumption in these premodern developments is that space and time are real; they exist in the physical world. While the religious accept creation, there are issues around God’s existence relative to time. Is God before time? Religion does not compromise this because God has no beginning or end, implying that he is beyond time. Another concern is whether the time is linear (past, present and future) and the cyclic conception that sees a circular occurrence. A significant part of Western philosophy will be influenced by the Jewish view of space and time, mainly with Christianity’s coming, hence the Judeo-Christian idea of time. For a metaphysician in the analytic tradition, the Judeo-Christian view creates a further difficult question about God’s existence. Before questioning this conception of space and time, the question is, therefore, does God exist? This work will not take this route that may be adequately discussed in theology and not fit for this work’s interest. The premodern scientific view lays a foundation that space and time are objects in the world, but another philosophical input that will condition most thinkers will

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come from the ancient Greek thought. An analytic philosopher will be interested in the ancient Greek philosophy because of shifting the Western conception of space and time from the spiritual/mythical realm to the natural or physical interpretation. Already the idea of the existence of change (Heraclitus) presupposes the flow of things in time (eternity). A similar denial of the reality of time is in Parmenides’ idea that things cannot come from anything; hence, there is no change. This seems to contradict the Judeo-Christian conception that God created everything from nothing. An exciting area concerns the relation between basic material of reality as atoms and void. The ideas that will be recurrent in modern analytic conception start taking shape with atoms moving (motion) in an infinite void (space). The motion in absolute void is already suggesting the existence of absolute space. The motion of atoms indicates a change from place A to place B. The relocation indicates a relation between objects in space and time. The other movements that show a change in things result from the rearrangement of atoms (or their addition) to form a body. Western philosophy’s history will grapple for years with problems raised here, such as the existence of void. Outside the analytic tradition, one can remember idealists such as Hegel, who accept the existence of nothing. Being and movement are also in the writings of Heidegger in Being and Time. Newton also draws from the relation of motion of objects in space (absolute space). Western analytic philosophy learns substantially from the importance of creating thought experiments that clarify the rational grasping of space and time, with the related concepts such as the motion of things from A to B or movement in time t. This will be true of Einstein’s thought experiments in the modern analytic tradition, but I have in mind Zeno’s criticism of the reality of motion in space. Zeno gives the infamous paradox of Achilles and the tortoise. The paradox says that if the tortoise’s slower mover starts ahead of the fast mover, Achilles, he will never overtake it. For example, the table below shows the race: a stands for Achilles’ position, b that of tortoise and d for distance. Position Starting point First movement Second movement Third movement Fourth movement

Achilles a0 a1 ¼ b0 a2 ¼ b1 a3 ¼ b2 a4 ¼ b3

Tortoise b0 b1 ¼ b0 + d1 b2 ¼ b1 + d2 b3 ¼ b2 + d3 b4 ¼ b3 + d4

The paradox shows that the moment Achilles moves to reach the place where the tortoise is, it would have moved to the next position. Aristotle criticises this thinking as influenced by wrong reasoning where time is indivisible (Physics 239b5–7). Ancient philosophy also suggests a version of conventionalism regarding space and time, as is the case with Protagoras. Conventionalism is in the maxim, ‘Man is a measure of all things, those that are and those that are not’. The expression shows that space and time theories have their source and end the human subjects. Therefore, what one can say about space and time is a subjective interpretation of how things are in the world but does not necessarily entail access to the objective world.

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The basic ideas that influenced some of the thinkers in the debates on the existence of space and time may be seen in the philosophies of Plato and his student Aristotle. We have seen in Chap. 2 that for Plato, there is the world of forms and the world of appearance (experience). Space and time in this context refer to abstract forms instantiated in the world. They exist in the abstract world, which Plato calls the real world. The qualities of the forms noted earlier, such as eternal/unchanging, are equally applicable to the forms of space and time. In Timaeus, Plato connects time with the motion of heavenly bodies, while ‘space’ is something through which things come into being. The physical world of experience is where human subjects experience the instantiation of the forms of space and time. The book of Plato, known as Parmenides, also prepares a way of conceptualising space and time. What does Aristotle say about the semantics of space and time? In Physics, Aristotle indicates that space and time are difficult, partly because there are many possible answers but also because his predecessors did not adequately consider this issue (Physics 208a33–208a26). Aquinas, in his commentary on the physics of Aristotle, explains these problems by indicating that, ‘One cause is due to place itself. For not all properties of place lead to the same opinion about a place, but from some properties of place, it seems that place is one thing, and from other properties, it seems that place is something else’ (Aquinas 1961, 204). The citation affirms the diversity of definitions of space, depending on an individual’s perspective. The unfortunate part of this pluralism is that objects have infinite properties, making it difficult to determine which of the properties capture the space’s essence. The second cause noted above is straightforward; the ancients lacked a serious reflection on space. Does space exist? Aristotle starts by building arguments that are pro-existence of space. He first responds using the existence of things that occupy a place and argues that their movement makes other objects to take their place (the replacement theory or transmutation of objects). For example, I leave this chair, and immediately another element occupies it. Following this replacement of places by objects, for Aristotle, space is a container. For example, Coca-Cola occupies a bottle, but the air takes its place when its fluid is absent. Secondly, he shows that locomotion provides evidence showing that space has potency and power over objects. Potency/power is that objects behave following the properties of space, such as right, left, before, behind and down. For instance, lighter ones such as fire will go upwards, while heavy ones will tend to fall downwards. Nature is responsible for determining these properties’ behaviour, but human experience may affect our perception of these attributes of space (Aquinas 1961, 205). Space exists, given that void also exists. The expression reminds of the ancient Greek philosophers, such as the atomists, who believed in the existence of two basic principles in nature, that is, void and atoms. The essence of ‘void’ is that it is a place that is deprived of a body. This, by implication, shows that there is the existence of the place. Aristotle clarified arguments that may indicate that space does not exist. For example, space has three dimensions, namely, length, breadth and depth. According to Aristotle, this is controversial because objects in space would also

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have the same dimensions, hence the problem of identity. Aquinas (1961, 207) reflects this in the following words: If place is something, it must be a body, for place has three dimensions-length, breadth, and depth. Moreover, a body is determined by these dimensions, because everything that has three dimensions is a body. But it is impossible for place to be a body. For since place and that which is located in place exist together, it would follow that two bodies exist together, which is impossible. It is, therefore, impossible that place be something.

There are different ideas that Aristotle discusses to show the problem of considering space as existent, such as the argument that space cannot be a cause of anything (regarding Aristotle’s four causes); hence, it is non-existent. This argument follows from the idea that a cause is such because of something (its effect). Another argument is that space does not qualify as a thing given that it is neither an element nor a composition of elements (Aquinas 1961, 208). A further objection comes from Zeno’s understanding that whatever is, is in a place. The claim means that place A is in Place B, and this further implies that B is in C and C is in E up to infinity. This is problematic because it is difficult or impossible to define place as a thing in a thing. What is space? After discussing the ideas on the pro-existence and the antiexistence of space, Aristotle explores the question ‘what is space?’ He developed arguments to show the reality of space and its matter (Physics 292). This combination of form and matter makes it difficult to image space without matter or vice versa. This takes us back to the metaphysical problem of the unity of form and matter or their distinctiveness. However, Aristotle forwards different arguments to show the difference between form and matter and explains why space is neither form nor matter. Aquinas (1961, 213) notes this aspect in the following, ‘Thus by the fact that place is separable, it is shown that place is not formed. However, it is shown that place is not matter not only by the fact that place is separable, but also by the fact that place contains. Matter, however, does not contain, but is contained’. The citation is already indicative that space is what contains things, a form of a container. In clarifying the notion of space, Aristotle focuses on discussing what it means to be in something. This is important because it clarifies the idea that space is what contains things, as noted above. There are different forms of being in something such as a part in a whole, whole in its parts, species in the genus, the genus in the species, etc. However, being in something relative to space is expressed in Aristotle as noted by Aquinas (1961, 216), ‘The eighth mode in which something is said to be in something is as in a vase, and universally as that which is located is in place’. Space in Aristotle’s physics comes out clearly as a container, as also Aquinas puts it in his commentary, ‘place is the immobile terminus of that which contains primarily’ (see also Physics 213b32–214a17). This implies ignoring some explanations such as: (a) A place is the shape of a thing. (b) A place is a matter of a thing. (c) A place is an interval stretching between the inner extremities of the container of a thing. On the contrary, he embraces the proposition that:

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(d) A place is the extremities of the container of a thing (the surface that contains that thing). Aspect (d) is exclusively about the object, hence denying the existence of void. Therefore, the universe is a plenum, receiving objects (subjects and predicates-cumparticulars), confirming vacuum non-existence. The discourse on time in Physics takes a similar trajectory to that of place. Aristotle questions whether time exists, then considers what it is, etc. (Physics 217b29–32). The question of the existence or non-existence of time raises different problems. For example, he notes on the dimensions of time (past-before, now-present and future-going to be): To start, then: the following considerations would make one suspect that it either does not exist at all or barely, and in an obscure way. One part of it has been and is not, while the other is going to be and is not yet. Yet time-both infinite time and any time you like to take-is made up of these. One would naturally suppose that what is made up of things which do not exist could have no share in reality. (Physics 217b32–218a3)

Aristotle is raising fundamental problems in this section since time has a past dimension, which is now not real; it is difficult to accommodate this as forming part of the time. This also applies to the future, which is not real now. It is because of these parts that it is impossible to claim that time exists. After excluding past and future as not good candidates of time, what remains is ‘now’. Unfortunately, ‘now’ is connected to both past and future; it is difficult to tell whether the now remains or continuously changes. What is the nature of this time? He first considers the common conception, whether time is the whole movement or that it is the sphere itself. Aristotle refutes the idea of time as movement or revolution. Aquinas’ comments on the part of the argument of Aristotle in the following words, ‘If time is a revolution, it would be necessary that part of a revolution is a revolution since a part of the time is time. But part of a revolution is not a revolution. Therefore, time is not a revolution’ (see Aquinas 1961, 276). He also denies the identification of time with the sphere. He acknowledges time as linked with a motion but at the same time underlined that time is not motion. Although these are different elements, our perception confirms the presence of time also implies motion (time pertains to motion). Aristotle further considers the link between before and future with the concept of time with motion (Physics 219b9–12). Firstly, he noted that motion is a perpetual succession, and given that time is conceived relative to motion, it also qualifies as such. In this succession, ‘now’ measures time relative to before and after, and it is viewed as a substratum. The link between motion and time further shows that motion is continuous because it has magnitude, while time is continuous because it has motion. A further instructive study on space and time for this work is in Aristotle’s Categories. In this context, as in Chap. 2, space (place) and time are considered in Aristotle as categories (Categories, 1b25–2a4); however, in 4b24–5a14, he views them as quantities. This comes in considering different types of quantities, where some are discrete and others are continuous. He noted that ‘Discrete are number and language; continuous are lines,

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surfaces, bodies, and, besides these, time and place’. Space and time are, therefore, part of the continuous quantities. For Aristotle, they are like a continuous line: Time also and place are of this kind. For present time joins on to both past time and future time. Place, again, is one of the continuous quantities. For the parts of a body occupy some place, and they join together at a common boundary. So the parts of the place occupied by the various parts of the body, themselves join together at the same boundary at which the parts of the body do. Thus place also is a continuous quantity, since its parts join together at one common boundary.

A fundamental answer to whether space and time exist or not gives rise to a series of views in the Kantian conception. Kant, in his transcendental idealism, regards space and time as a priori forms of sensible intuition (A26/B42, A33/B49–50). Intuition is, in this case, passive reception of data as it appears to the human subject. Experience is possible because of these forms. For example, when I see a triangular object, the triangular shape is a priori form that gets content in what appears. This is not the level of conceptualising what is in the experience but the reception of what appears. Space is the outer intuitions of what appears, while time is about the inner intuitions. ‘Time is the a priori formal condition of all appearances in general. Space, as the pure form of all outer intuitions, is limited as a priori condition merely to outer intuitions. . . .under the formal condition of inner intuition, and thus time’. While we have objects in space and time as per the idea of three- or four-dimensional existence of things, in transcendental idealism, it is impossible to know them in themselves. All we know is our experience of these things. Kant notes on this idea: We have therefore wanted to say that all our intuition is nothing but the representation of appearance; that the things that we intuit are not in themselves what we intuit them to be, nor are their relations so constituted in themselves as they appear to us; and that is we remove our own subject or even only the subjective constitution of the senses in general, then all constitution, all relations of objects in space and time, indeed space and time themselves would disappear, and as appearances they cannot exist in themselves but only in us. What may be the case with objects in themselves and abstracted from all this receptivity of our sensibility remains entirely unknown to us. (A42/B59–60)

The above citation questions the existence of space and time from an epistemic angle, where we cannot know their objective experience in themselves. We can admit their existence at a subjective level, as a consequence of appearances. Apart from denying the acknowledgement of space and time as things in themselves, the passage above also dismisses relations. The dismissal questions the idea in Leibniz, where space and time are relations. The idea that removing the subject entails removing objects, including space and time, seems to open the way to the belief that existence and knowledge of things depend on experience (Kant A26/B42, A32–33/B49). What confirms this conclusion is that human subjects’ disappearance also entails that of space and time. When we talk about space and things in themselves, we only assume such in abstract terms but not in real terms. Nevertheless, what appears in human experience entails existence (A28/B44, A34–35/B51). Space and time are therefore necessary grounds for the possibility of the existence of objects.

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After Kantian philosophy of space and time, different ideas were around the conventional nature of human theories regarding space and time (conventionalism). Conventionalism refers to the idea that space and time do not exists as facts in the physical world. Conventionalism calls for the relation between principles or theories and reality. The fundamental aspect is that we cannot have absolute truth regarding some phenomena in reality. What the human mind is capable of producing are only interpretations or conventions. For example, scientific theories such as the Newtonian theory of gravity and Einstein’s theory of general relativity are different conventions that attempt to describe gravity. Newtonian convention leads to a view of reality where gravity is a force that pulls objects. In contrast, Einstein’s gravity is a consequence of the curvature of space and time by objects. Karl Popper attempted to compare these two theories to show which convention is a better approximation to the truth (reality), focusing on semantics and epistemology. The semantics problem regards what it means to say that Newton’s gravitational convention is a better approximation than Einstein’s or vice versa. The epistemological problem regards how do we know that one convention is better than the other. This route of discussing conventions led to the understanding that these theories are incomparable, hence calling for attention to the context where a theory is applicable. In response to the question above (“Are space and time real?”), theories of space and time are conventions that attempt to present these phenomena. In the analytic tradition, the conception of space and time theories as conventions is in philosophers such as Reichenbach, Riemann, Poincare, Eddington and Grünbaum. In clarifying the position held by these philosophers, Richard Swinburne (1980, 255) discusses the views of Riemann, Poincare, Reichenbach and Grünbaum by contrasting them with realism as was the case with the substantivalism. In most of the claims by the substantivalist, space is a matter of fact. Swinburne (1980, 255) notes that ‘A matter is factual if a factual statement expresses it. A factual statement is one which, if true, would state a fact. I suppose that something is a fact for these writers if it truly or holds if it is an objective feature of the world. If a factual statement is true, its negation is false; and converse’. The assumption is that space and time qualify for the idea of truth as correspondence between a statement and facts. In empiricism, this suggests that space and time are observable objects in human experience. The assumption here is that individuals can experience or observe space and time in the physical world. On the contrary, conventionalism, a statement about facts, is an interpretation from a perspective. The interpretation of Swinburne is that a conventional statement does not refer to facts in the physical world. In this way, it has no truth-value (Swineburne 1980, 255). Of course, one wishes to argue that the truth-value may still be viable through a perspective, where I can say that a statement or interpretation is true or false within its context (Kayange 2008). Nevertheless, conventionalism leads to the understanding that all interpretation of space and time is a matter of convention; hence the context must matter rather than the objective truth or reality.

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Discussions on conventionalism relative to space and time in analytic philosophy generally link with the French philosopher Poincare’s ideas. The ideas of space and time are primarily in Poincare’s general framework of conventionalism. In his philosophy, conventionalism is traceable in various areas, such as epistemology, where Poincare acknowledges that science focuses on ‘hard facts independent of the human mind’. While this seems to suggest some realism, in terms of believing in the existence of a physical world independent of us, the aspect of getting access is through our senses. It is the area of describing that scientists create conventions and agree on different factors. Scientists agree on these conventions and tend to represent how they look at things in the world. His conventionalism is in his critique of empiricism in natural science, where he noted that ‘Experiments only teach us the relations of bodies to one another; none of them bears or can bear on the relations of bodies with space, or on the mutual relations of the different parts of space’. This reduces the findings in experiments only to conventions that are only for human subjects to learn the possibility of such relations of bodies. The citation shows that these relations are not real; that is, they do not correspond to the facts. The area of conventionalism that directly links with the discourse of space and time is geometry. The basic conception is that geometry consists of conventions. Yemima Ben-Menahem (2006, 19) summarises this view in the following, ‘Poincare’s conventionalism has two focuses: the idea that the axioms of geometry should be viewed as definitions in disguise rather than necessary truths, and the argument for the empirical equivalence of different geometries under all possible observations’. This citation calls for the conventionalism relative to abstract statements of geometry and its applied aspect. Max Black interprets this into two forms of conventionalism regarding (1) pure geometry, which builds on the understanding that the axiomatic theory may translate into its contrary, and (2) applied geometry, where there is a physical interpretation of the axioms in a particular area. The applied conventionalism in Poincare in the expression, ‘I challenge anyone to give me a concrete experiment which can be interpreted in the Euclidean system, and which cannot be interpreted in Lobatschewsky’s system. As I am well aware this challenge will never be accepted, I may conclude that no experiment will ever be in contradiction with Euclid’s postulate, but on the other hand, no experiment will ever be in contradiction with Lobatschewsky’s postulate’ (Poincare [1902]1952, p.75). It shows that the question of interpretation matters, such that we cannot underline that something is true in a particular area. The use of one type of geometry or another is a question of convenience. The implication is that the axioms represent space and time as conventions at an abstract level in space and time. There is no real space and time to claim existence beyond our experience, which is a realm of abstract conventions. In the physical realm, the geometry that interprets space and time comprises conventions that may equally apply in different settings. For Reichenbach, whose ideas often link with Grünbaum’s conventionalism relative to geometry, space and time are equally conventions (see also Reichenbach

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1956). Hilary Putnam (1975 notes that he often started his lessons on space and time with questions showing that these concepts are paradoxical, making a case for conventionalism. The questions were epistemic, and any answer is question begging. For instance, one of the questions is relative to two objects’ size: ‘How do you know that one is bigger than the other?’ The answers, such as we can measure the distance between the objects, attracted further questions. Even when this is answered with an appeal to observation, other questions are raised on the objectivity of perception given the different factors involved in this process. Now assuming that our answer to Reichenbach is that we can measure the distance in geometry, using the well-known axioms, the argument is that applying these measures in different geometries is a convention. Assuming that metric (M1) is part of the Euclidean geometry, this does not exclude the possibility of metric (M2) used for a different geometry, such as Lobachevskian geometry. The whole idea of conventionalism consists in that the choice of M1 to represent Euclidean space is conventional, so is choosing M2 to represent the Lobachevskian space. Putnam attributes to Grünbaum the idea that truth is relative to the metric selected for a specific space and time. This seems to exclude the possibility of absolute truth, where metric M1 is the only valid measure for all the geometric space. This is well captured in the following passage from Putnam, ‘If we adopt a convention according to which M1 is the metric for space S, then the statement “S is Euclidean” will be true. If we adopt a convention according to which M2 is the metric for the space S, then the statement “S is Lobachevskian” will be true’ (Putnam 1975, 27–28). This shows that metrics are conventional, but they are the determinant of the type of geometry that holds in an interpretation. This shows that conventionalism leads to perspectivism in the area of truth, where x is true explanation of y in a particular context. This does not exclude many other truths that explain y in different perspectives. If an interpretation determines truth, then this does not deny the possibility of truth, but allows for truth relative to a perspective, but excludes the absolute truth, where x is true in all the worlds. The discussion suggests conventions common in the analytic philosophy, such as the Euclidean, Minkowiskian and Lobachevskian conceptions.

4.2.2

If Space and Time Exist, Are They Absolute or Relative?

Another fundamental figure that influences ideas on space and time in the analytic philosophy is Isaac Newton. Newton’s ideas, mainly in his work Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica (Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy) (1687), are a version of the substantivalism view. He wanted to clarify the preconceptions that human subjects have through the perception of quantities such as time, space, place and motion. The problem with preconceptions is that they tend to provide a diversity of explanations relative to these quantities. Newton argued that some of these preconceptions require correction, which is possible by distinguishing these quantities into ‘absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and

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common’ (Newton 1687, 77). It is interesting to see that Newton wants to differentiate between the real conception of these quantities and what is just verisimilar (resemblance). Although Newton is developing in natural science, one may suspect a conception of entities partly influenced by the Platonic world of forms. Nevertheless, building on the distinction of quantities, the Newtonian substantive view suggests absolute space, absolute time, true space, true time, mathematical space and mathematical time. It is further suggestive of relative space, relative time, apparent space, apparent time, common space and common time. The attributes ‘absolute’, ‘true’ and ‘mathematical’ are descriptive of the same real type of time or duration. Commenting on this time, Newton wrote, ‘Absolute, true, and mathematical time, of itself, and from its nature flows equably without regard to anything external, and by another name is called duration’ (Newton 1687, 77). This passage builds a metaphysical conception of space, which has an independent existence. Space is substance, in terms of an individual thing existing in and of it. Newton is indicating that absolute space is not predicated of anything. Apart from this characteristic of being a thing (individual), it uniformly flows. The absolute time attributes are opposed to verisimilar time, which is relative, apparent and belonging to common perception. What is relative is not objectively or absolutely true. Similarly, what is apparent may, in some cases, be deceptive, and its true nature is not known. Commenting on this type of time, Newton (1687, 77) in Scholium noted that, ‘relative, apparent, and common time, is some sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration by the means of motion, which is commonly used instead of true time; such as an hour, a day, a month, a year’. While the above attributes of absolute time are linked with that which exists in and for itself and continuously flows, the same properties confirm absolute space. It is something that exists independent of external things; however, it is constant and immovable. Newton (1687, 77) noted that ‘Absolute space, in its nature, without regard to anything external, remains always similar and immovable’. Therefore, it is the case that absolute space is an immovable individual in the context of ontology. Here, with the notions of homogenous and immovable, Newton is making abstractions beyond natural science. If one thinks in terms of Platonic forms, with the abstract attributes ‘immovable, absolute, true, and mathematical’, the idea of absolute space shows idealism elements in Newton’s physics. While absolute space is not dependent on human experience, for Newton (1687, 77): Relative space is some movable dimension or measure of the absolute spaces; which our senses determine by its position to bodies; and which is vulgarly taken for immovable space; such is the dimension of a subterraneous, an aereal, or celestial space, determined by its position in respect of the earth.

The discourse on space is connected with the idea of place, which is a space occupied by an object. This occupied space may be absolute or relative. Going by the definition above, I may refer to the perceived place occupied by Nora as relative. Newton will use the same thinking of absolute and relative to argue for the existence of absolute motion with the absolute place and relative motion with a relative place.

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A reductionist or relational view is associated with ideas that deny the notion of absolute space and time and propose aspects that show relative space, time and motion. While it may be simplistic to reduce Leibniz’s philosophy as wholly dependent on this view, various ideas suggest this view. Therefore, I will isolate some of the ideas in his writings that suggest fundamental aspects forming the relational view of space and time. A good passage that captures this view reads as follows: As for my own opinion, I have said more than once that I hold space to be something merely relative, as time is, that I hold it to be an order of coexistences, as time is an order of successions. For space denotes, in terms of possibility, an order of things which exist at the same time, considered as existing together, without entering into their particular manners of existing. And when many things are seen together, one perceives this order of things among themselves. (Leibniz 324–325)

This passage comes from Leibniz’s third letter to Samuel Clarke, a friend to Isaac Newton. The passage reacts to the substantive view discussed above, which defended absolute space and time. Leibniz’s problem is that space as an absolute may entail that it has characteristics similar to God, hence absolute space, maybe God himself. Leibniz noted that ‘These gentlemen maintain, therefore, that space is a real absolute being. But this involves them in great difficulties, for it appears that such a being must be eternal and infinite. Hence some have believed it to be God himself, or one of his attributes, his immensity. But since space consists of parts, it is not a thing which can belong to God’. As indicated above, Newton and his friend Clarke enter abstract metaphysics when they attempt to explain space’s nature, which led them to different problems. The nature of space and time leads to various metaphysical assumptions and concerns; for instance, absolute space could entail that things are in God and everything is God (some sort of pantheism). Other problems that easily associate space with God are in other Leibniz’s letters. For instance, Leibniz (Leibniz 320), in the first letter to Clarke, noted that ‘‘Sir Isaac Newton says that space is an organ which God makes use of to perceive things. “But if God requires an organ to perceive things by, it will follow that they do not depend altogether on him, nor were produced by him”. And in the second letter to Clarke, ‘I find, in express words in the Appendix to Sir Isaac Newton’s Opticks, that space is the sensorium of God’. But the word ‘sensorium’ has always signified the organ of sensation’’. These ideas link space with God, disadvantages the ‘absolute space and time’ of Newton, which sounds like mere speculation that mixes the physical quantities with some spiritual substance as an explanatory theory. Although letters between Newtonians and Leibniz substantially show two opposite positions on space and time, substantivalism and reductionism, the arguments are affected by the focus on the similarity of attributes with God. Nevertheless, Leibniz’s central idea is that space, time and motion are relative.

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Fig. 4.1 Object in threedimensional space and time

4.2.3

If Space and Time Exist, Then What Is Their Geometry?

Euclid’s geometrical conception of space and time is another central figure that influences analytic metaphysics developments. Students study the ideas through the consideration of a plane and solid objects geometry. The main concern is identifying points (objects), the coordinates/vectors, and measuring distances from other points. The imagination in this view is that things are points distant from each other. An essential notion in Euclid, therefore, is the measures of distance from one point to the next. The general conception of Euclid’s ideas is the following three-dimensional space and time (Fig. 4.1).1 This illustrates an object in the Euclidean geometrical space lying on the three coordinates, (x, y and z). The diagram above reminds of the philosophy of Rene Descartes, where x, y and z are the Cartesian coordinates. Euclid describes this space and time using a system of axioms. The basic classical axioms of the distance between two objects or points are as follows (see Kayange 2008; Ilkka Niiniluoto 1986, 1–2): (i) 0  Δij  1

1

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This first axiom has its limits 0 and 1 and entails the distance between two objects i and j within these limits: (ii) Δij ¼ 0 if and only if i ¼ j The second axiom shows the case of an identical distance between two objects: (iii) Δij ¼ Δji for all i, j 2 I The third axiom suggests the commutative characteristic of distance concerning two points: (iv) Δij  Δik + Δkj for all i, j k 2 I The fourth axiom suggests the ‘triangle of inequality’: (v) Δii ¼ 0 The fifth axiom may state that the distance between two points i and j is zero; then there is the relation of self-identity. Popper (1972, 150–151) as a philosopher related with the Vienna circle expresses these relations as follows: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv) (v) (vi) (vii) (viii) (ix)

d(a, b) ¼ d(b, a) d(a, a) ¼ 0 d(a, b) + d(b, c)  d(a, c) if a ¼ b then d(a, b) ¼ 0 d(a, b)  0 d(a, b) ¼ d (a0 , b0 ) d(a0 , b0 ) ¼ d (b0 , a0 ) ¼ 1  d(a, b) d(a, a0 ) ¼ 1 d(a, b)  1

Although Euclid provides more of geometrical space, Descartes links geometry with some metaphysical reflections. He builds on a conviction that extension is the essence of a body. The definition of a body takes space and bodies as inseparable, as it is apparent in his work, Principles of Philosophy: Thus, we cannot conceive figure unless in something extended, nor motion unless in extended space, nor imagination, sensation, or will, unless in a thinking thing. But, on the other hand, we can conceive extension without figure or motion, and thought without imagination or sensation, and so of the others; as is clear to anyone who attends to these matters. (Descartes [1644] 1982, 24)

A more extensive citation that clarifies his ideas of space reads: Nor in fact does space, or internal place, differ from the corporeal substance contained in it, except in the way in which we are accustomed to conceive of them. For in fact the extension in length, breadth, and depth, which constitutes the space occupied by a body, is exactly the same as that which constitutes the body. The difference consists in the fact that, in the body, we consider its extension as if it were an individual thing, and think that it is always changed whenever the body changes. Attribute a generic unity to the extension of the space, so that when the body which fills the space has been changed, the extension of the space itself is not considered to have been changed {or transported} but to remain one and the same; as long as

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Fig. 4.2 Minkowski’s fourdimensional view

it remains of the same size and shape and maintains the same situation among certain external bodies by means of which we specify that space. (Descartes [1644] 1982, 43)

Objects are in space, but the essence or definition of space is dependent on the objects. The extension of a body, hence space, is defined by length, breadth and depth, which are identified by the coordinates x, y and z. The extension of both the body and space is characterised by length, breath and depth. Descartes ([1644] 1982, 45) further notes that the external place and space are not different from a body. What makes things different are their sizes. The existence of a void in this context is questionable since it is only an abstract negation of space (Descartes [1644] 1982, 45). Minkowiski further improves the extension of conceiving space and time relative to coordinates with the four-dimensional geometrical conception. It is an ideal understanding that considers other dimensions independent of Newton’s gravitational theory. This geometrical conception of space and time also deals with distances but relative to events. The summary of this theory is in the expression, ‘the impossibility to discover absolute motion experimentally unequivocally implies that observers in relative motion have different times and spaces, which in turn implies that what exists is an absolute four-dimensional world’ (Minkowski papers, 30). In this citation, space and time are relative to an observer’s particular framework in relative motion. Minkowski shares his view with Albert Einstein, who developed his theory of relativity on this framework; he notes, ‘It appears, therefore, more natural to think of physical reality as a four-dimensional existence, instead of, as hitherto, the evolution of a three-dimensional existence’ (Einstein 1952). Below is a diagram showing the original representation of Minkowski’s dimensions relative to a particular event O at the centre (Fig. 4.2). Relative to the present event O, the upper part with a straight-line arrow t (time) represents the future flow. The right-hand side is positive, while the left-hand side is negative. The thinking was that of a light beam from O, which has a central trajectory of the middle straight-line. The left edge of the beam representing event O is the last straight-line on the left, while the right edge is the line from O passing through B. This beam has a cone’s shape, representing the new understanding of events in space and time. When we consider event O’s experience downwards, there is a shape as the above, representing the past experience.

4.2 Western Analytic Philosophical Tradition on Space and Time

TIME

Fig. 4.3 A complete view of past, present and future space-time

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x,y,z,t

B

Space-like future FUTURE LIGHT CONE

cΔt

Time-like future

OBSERVER

Δy

Δx A

CE

SPA

SP

AC

E

Time-like past

Space-like past

PAS

T LIG H T C O N E

We can, therefore, have a complete idea of future, present and past time relative to any event as per the model below (Fig. 4.3)2: The diagram is in the shape of a cone representing the past, present and future directions relative to a particular event. Using the ‘four-dimensional space and time’, most studies follow Albert Einstein’s geometrical conception. This concerns his general theory of relativity, which viewed space-time as curved by events. Like Minkowski’s ideas, time is an added dimension to x, y and z. The idea is that the cone represents the speed of light, and the understanding is that nothing can go beyond this speed. An object in space and time is a point within the inside of the speed of light. Beyond this, no experience can occur. Einstein’s ‘distance and time’ by an object moving from point A to B depends on the observer’s framework. An object moves from O to location P in space and time as in the earlier diagram and covers Δx on the surface place and the time which is given by Δt. If I am traveling, then I have moved in space and time represented by Δx and Δt. A different observer moving at velocity v observes me in motion and will have a different localisation of my movement, represented by Δx’ and Δt’. These two observers may therefore disagree on my distance and time from O to P. The only aspect that will make the two observers agree is the formula of locating events in space and time, given by the equation:

2

Retrieved from, https://www.pinterest.com/pin/540150549050706592/

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S2 ¼ x2 þ y2 þ z2  ðCt Þ2 S represents space-time interval; C for the speed of light, which is the same for all observers; and t is for the time, while the x, y and z are the Cartesian coordinates. It is clear that the introduction of the speed of light as a constant, and the element of time, differentiates this conception from identifying objects in the earlier Euclidean geometry. For instance, the old localisation of an object would require the formula: Δ 2 ¼ x2 þ y2 þ z 2 While in the Newtonian development of space and time, objects are pulled downwards by force known as gravitational force, in the context of Einstein, objects are affected by the curvature of space and time. In other words, gravity is not a force but a consequence of the curvature of space and time. In our African context in explaining gravity, I have in mind a cloth (chitenje), which is held by two people from the edges. The chitenje tends to form a curve because of air. When an object is placed in the limits of the cloth, it tends towards the centre.

4.3 4.3.1

African Concept of Space and Time What Are Space and Time in African Thought?

(a) Ideas on space and time in African ontology suggest the distinction between physical space and time and spiritual space and time. In the discussion on the early African philosophers such as Tempels and Kagame, the discussion is around forces. ‘Being’ was equated with force, but these were on different levels. The spiritual space and time belong to God, ancestors and other spirits, which are forces. The element of force shows the idea of living in space but not as static. The spiritual realm where these forces inhabit is in a continuous dynamism since these are forces. For instance, objects in the spiritual space move beyond the speed of light or anything. The spiritual space is for God, ancestors and spirits, but human subjects may operate in the spiritual space and time, subject to the acquisition of some properties. A good example is that those who practise witchcraft may leave the physical space and time and enter the spiritual one. There are beliefs that people who enter this spiritual space and time can move in few seconds one continent to the other. The understanding is that their bodies may be in a different nation and they may decide to move back to their original position. These spiritual space and time ideas are dismissible, but they may give insights into the possibility of certain objects traveling at speed beyond that of light. It is difficult to confirm the scientific validity of spiritual space and time realm given that it is beyond our human experience.

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Nevertheless, no one can impede people from imagining in the conceptualisation of space and time, since some things are beyond human reach. Although there may be a lot of speculation relative to space and time’s spiritual conceptualisation, these elements’ physical notion is highly shared. This constitutes the understanding that forces such as human subjects occupy space (mainly the notion ‘land’ is used to reflect this). In the Tempelsian framework, human beings are related to other forces that occupy land. While humans are related to other beings, they have authority over other forces. The land issue as something that is occupied by things and passed on to the different generations becomes crucial in understanding the African conception of space. It is where human subjects find themselves and own as their location. The idea of forces underlines the element of motion on a particular land in the physical land. Human individuals flow in the time given that they are born in a particular place, which they own and move in different stages until they enter the spiritual space and time. The stages have events such as birth, initiation, marriage and death. When an individual moves from one stage to the next, the understanding is that there is the process of change in time. In this regard, time is transforming from one stage to the next, characterised by human growth in different areas, such as moral, physical and spiritual dimensions. Time is, therefore, becoming a grown-up in a particular land/space (community). I will discuss further issues on space and time as I theorise in Sect. 4.3.2. The human subjects may move from the physical to the spiritual space and time, and similarly God and the spirits may move vice versa. Certain places are the dwelling space of the spirits. For example, some of such places are graveyards and some forests. When one dies, a graveyard represents the dead’s land/space, whose conception of time is eternal (unlimited time). (b) What are African philosophers saying above space and time? In African philosophy, the first idea of space and time is within the framework of forms like Kant and Plato. Space and time are forms where things in the world (facts and events), motion and change have an explanation. The idea of forms was in Kagame’s philosophy, where space and time are part of the African categories of being. As indicated earlier, in his study of language, Kagame argued for the four categories of being in the African context. According to him, these categories are as follows: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Reasoned being (man) Unreasoned being (thing) Spacing-temporising being (space-time) Modal being (contingency or determination) (Kagame 1976)

Through an analysis of language, he identified the word Ha as capturing space and time, as is expressed in the following passage: The third category, which is the focus of this essay, can be understood in Bantu cultures with the expression “here-there,” whose signification is given here as spacing-temporizing. This Bantu “here-there” is expressed by what grammarians have rightly reserved for locative cases, which in Central East Africa, is expressed with the syllable Ha. Ha thus gives a-hantu, which means space, place, or location. (Kagame 1976, 2)

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The citation suggests that space and time among the Bantu is ‘here-there’. The -ntu qualifies -ha- into space, place and location. Space is land, and place is associated with things that occupy it and location where it may be identified (where it is). Chapter 2 noted that the noun root –ntu represents being in general; a-ha-ntu therefore suggests that here and there exists in the sense that they have being. This fourth category makes sense about the question of being. It is for this reason that space and time subsist as one category. Similarly, being is inconceivable without the category of space and time. The link between being and the category of space and time makes Kagame consider further its association with the idea of existence. The idea of ‘existence’ or ‘to be’ is in the following: The verb “to be” is formed with one of two roots: li and ba. The first, expresses neither achievement nor future potential. It is tied to the present tense. The second, by contrast, can refer to all three times: past, present, and future.

The lack of the future concept of time seems to resonate with Mbiti’s conception of time in the African context. The ‘ba’ challenges the contention that there is no future time in African thought; it refers to the past, present and future. (c) Debates in African philosophy have often been around the conceptualisation of time as either two- or three-dimensional. The debate was around the developments from Mbiti. In his response to the nature of time, Mbiti suggests two concepts of the Akamba people, namely, tene and mituki. Tene refers to the remote past, while mituki the immediate past/present and the immediate present/future. What is not present among the Akamba, hence generalised to the Africans, is the concept of remote future. Similarly, Mbiti uses the Swahili terms Zamani to represent the remote past and Sasa immediate past/present/future. Commenting of Sasa he writes, ‘In the Sasa dimension must be either about to occur or in the process in realization, or recently experienced’ (Mbiti 1969). The concepts Zamani and Sasa are inseparable, only that the latter is absorbed in the former. This supports further his generalisation of African time. These two dimensions represent language as playing a vital role as Mbiti attempts to justify his contention of time. He appeals to the study of grammar, understand the tenses and support his argument. Therefore, he studies the verb tenses relative to the concept of time in the Kikuyu and Akamba Bantu languages. Summarising these dimensions of time, Mbiti writes: According to traditional concepts, time is a two-dimensional phenomenon, with a long past, a present and virtually no future. The linear concept of time in Western thought, with an indefinite past, present and infinite future is practically foreign to African thinking. If however future events are certain to occur, or if they fall within the inevitable rhythm of nature, they at best constitute only potential time, not actual time. What is taking place now no doubt unfolds the future, but once an event has taken place, it is no longer in the future but in the present and the past. Actual time is therefore what is present and what is past. It moves “backward” rather than “forward,” and people set their minds not on future things, but chiefly on what has taken place. (Mbiti 1969)

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This confirms that there is the past dimension, showing that history is fundamental in African communities. It is a context where tradition is remembered, conserved and passed on to future generations. The present is also essential for an African, as this is the context of experience. In the book Meaning and Truth in African Philosophy, Kayange (2018) argued that most of the tribes among the Bantu people, such as the Chewa, underline the importance of experience (they have a form of empiricism when dealing with several issues). The acknowledgement of the long past and the dynamic present time dimensions suggests a conception of time that regresses to the infinite past. The future comes to the present through the blood relations, whereby individuals continue living through the children they begot. The centrality of history in Mbiti’s conception is from the understanding that time is different events that succeed each other. An African categorises the past time by referring to various events that occur. For example, the event of famine that occurred in a particular environment becomes an important marker of the past time. Children or other fixed assets have names such as ‘famine’ or drought to remember this time. Names and language, in general, become an important element for remembering the past dimension of time. For this reason, the semantics of traditional African names reveal a set of events that occurred over time. The two-dimensional understanding of time has raised various criticisms from other African thinkers. For example, most of the critics have been followers of the traditional linear conception of time, where there are three dimensions of time, namely, the past, the present and the future. This traditional conception considers the past and the future as infinite, while the present is definite. This time is often present in the form of an arrow that points to the future. Human beings can access the past up to a certain point, beyond which no one can know anything. The future is unknown, but there are predictions about this dimension. Gyekye (1987) goes against Mbiti and argues that there are three dimensions of time in the African traditional culture. Similarly, Edwin Joseph Mohatlan (2013) argues that time is three-dimensional for the Basotho; hence, this view is against Mbiti’s generalisation. Mohatlane further argues that time is connected to the life view and social view. Mbiti attempted to defend his position about the future dimension of time by indicating that he acknowledged this dimension’s presence but argued that an African does not project his everyday life towards a remote future. Language or ordinary life cannot capture the remote future; let us say 5 years to come. Mbiti supports this difficulty of accessing remote future as he writes: In traditional African thought there is no concept of history moving “forward” toward a future climax, or towards the end of the world. Since the future does not exist beyond a few months, the future cannot be expected to usher in a golden age. . . .the notion of a messianic hope, or a final destruction of the world, has no place in traditional concept of history.

The debate on the dimensions of time may further be considered by studying various figurative expressions that represent space and time among the Chewa

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people. For example, a proverb Linda madzi apite ndiye uziti ndadala (Allow the storm to go and then say that you are a lucky person) represents both present and future events. It warns an individual not to celebrate victory in the present before the problems are entirely over. It further anticipates success as a future event when the storm is gone. Dyeratu zamawa sizidziwika (Eat everything today because nobody knows about tomorrow) acknowledges the present as a moment of doing particular activities and shows that the future is uncertain. Zonse ndi nthawi (Everything is time) suggests that being is an occurrence of events. It shows that everything has its specific period to happen. The language analysis gives a further understanding of space and time that suggests that there are different perspectives within the Bantu culture. The first conception comes from the -li ontology as in Chap. 3. The verb root -li in the Chewa language yields a two-dimensional view of space-time, namely, the past and present dimensions. The words that develop from this root show that there is no future tense. For example, the present is through the terms such as, ali (he/she is), chili (it is or it has) and muli (you are or you have). This conception partly supports Mbiti’s earlier contention that there is no distant future in the African concept of time. The second conception accommodates the three-dimensional conception of time by introducing space-time indicators in a word or sentence. While the -li ontology accommodates the present and the past, the future uses the space-time indicator, dza-. For example, a-dza-bwera (he/she will come), the verb bwera means to come, representing an individual. At the same time -dza- indicates that this act will occur in the indefinite future. In case the person came and will come again, then -nso shifts at the end of this word, forming adzabweranso (x will come again).

4.3.2

What Is the Traditional African Model of Space and Time?

G. M. Kayange and Jimmy Namangale The section presents visual and mathematical models as an attempt to formalise the traditional African view of space and time. Before this presentation, below are the preliminary ideas that are common in African cultures, more especially in Malawi. We worked together with Jimmy Namangale3 to get insights on traditional African

3 This section follows a collaboration with Jimmy Namangale, a mathematical scientist currently working at the University of Malawi, Chancellor College, Zomba.

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understanding of space and time and formalise some of the ideas into a mathematical model. We develop our ideas in two stages, starting with the abstraction of general assumptions of space and time from the ordinary people’s views (in Malawi and other parts of Africa), and then concentrate on formalising ‘sun-shadow model’. The ordinary people’s views on space and time are identified in language use (mainly Chichewa language), common views from informal interaction and from the writings of anthropologists on the traditional African populations (Braugel 2001; Chakanza 2000). On formalising the ‘sun-shadow model’, we get most of the insights from trigonometry and various distance measures. (A) General Assumptions (A1) Assumptions on African View of Time The first assumption is that time is infinite, it had been there with no beginning and it will be there forever. The assumption follows from the belief system common among the African tribes. The first belief comes from the conception of the gods. For example, in the names attributed to God in the African communities, God is known as the creator or Namalenga in Chichewa, who is infinite (Braugel 2001). He was there before creation, and everything exists because of his act of creation. The second belief comes from the understanding of the spirits as immortal entities. They came into being in a different form, but after their death, they enter the spirits’ world, which is eternal and infinite (Mbiti 1969; Braugel 2001). From the first and second assumption above, we argue that there is indeed an infinite view of time among the African communities. The second assumption is that length of time is measured through some observed regular natural phenomena. The assumption follows from regular phenomena such as the rainy season, moon, sun (and shadows) and a cock. Firstly, in tropical Africa, the rainy season comes regularly at a period (season). Some central African people use the word mvula, which apart from referring to rain refers to ‘year’. Secondly, we observe that the moon is another regular phenomenon for measuring time. It is a measure for a month, and the moon’s name, mwezi, means month. For example, in a statement, Ndibwera mwezi uno (I will come this month), interest is on ‘this month’. Thirdly, the sun is another natural existence with some pronounced common occurrences, where the day length definition comes from a complete revolution. The sun’s position tells about time, and the shadows it generates with other objects would show an African time of the day in a non-absolute manner due to seasonal differences.

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On the sun’s position, most Africans day-time starts when the sun emerges in the morning (sunrise), and night begins with sunset. For example, people will set village meetings by indicating the position of the sun. The length of the day is not fixed but follows darkness and light. On the shadows, the length of the shadow or the position of the edge of the shadow produced by sunlight helps people to measure time. Individuals know that it is near noon and start preparing for lunch by just looking at a shadow’s position. Fourthly, cock-crow moments measure time, more especially from dawn to sunrise. Although the above regularities are essential in different cultures, we want to underline that they form part of the traditional African conception of space and time. (A2) Assumptions on African View of Space The fourth assumption is that space has a linear form; it is two-dimensional in some respects and three-dimensional in other respects. The traditional African measure of space is not absolute but mostly relative. For example, when sharing a fluid like water, the number of draws or cuplike objects would tell them comparatively equal or different volumes – the counting tally of objects like seeds or markings. The length of items could be measured using straightline objects such as taut-string (such as chilambe string in Chichewa language), stretched arms or counting steps. Likewise, the area would be compared or measured relative to some smaller portion of the surface area as a guide to imagine or try to count the number of times it would cover some bigger area. The fifth assumption is that space is infinite in some respects, and in other respects, it is finite. The universe’s size is infinite, while spaces on earth such as land are finite. Objects in the universe occupy land; hence space is similar to the Aristotelian container where things inhabit. (A3) Assumptions on the African View of Space and Time Integration The sixth assumption is that there is an integration of space and time in the traditional African conception. An African space and time would integrate these views of the world. If before rains, the water gathering source was low and later after rains be higher, people deduce that there is more water volume than before. Thus, some regular creatures’ resurfacing would also inform them of the season or time for events. Most of the consciousness of time and space related to their experience was far much lower than thinking in terms of the speed of light. This shows that their space and time thinking was not related to Einstein’s theory of relativity. Nevertheless, light, in both modern science and African experience, played an important role in conceptualising time and space. The sun and its shadows linked space and time in different African communities. For example, consider the questions below:

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(i) How long does it take to move from position x to y? (ii) What is the distance from x to y? The reference point for answering both questions is the position of the sun when a human being starts moving from point x and when he/she arrives at point y. This motion relative to the sun determines where the distance is very far or near but also shows the duration of time. Although light plays a fundamental role in understanding space and time in both Western and African thoughts, we have observed that sound would equally relate to space and time. Traditional Africans know the depth of a particular cave by measuring it through sound and its intensity.4 Though sound suffers resistance in some media and dies out quickly, so does light encounter opaque material. Regardless of this, light in science was convenient when it passes different transparent media. We note that an African perception of time was relative to someone on earth only. So in the new theory of black holes, where everything collapses, to African experiences on earth, implies that space and time in the universe are constant as infinite and eternal regardless of whether there is complete darkness elsewhere. (B) African Sun-Shadow Observer Model (Kayange-Namangale Model) Although there are many interesting ideas on space and time in traditional African communities, we opt for developing a model that focuses on light, shadow and an African observer(s) (hence African Sun-Shadow Observer Model (ASOM)). We select these because they commonly explain time, space and space-time in African communities. Below, we present ASOM as a visual model through diagram in (B1). Secondly, present the basic rules in (B2), these will help the reader in understanding the mathematical elaboration of the model below. We will proceed with a mathematical interpretation of ASOM. (B1) ASOM as a Visual Model Model of Space and Time Founded on Sunlight, Shadow and Observers S

At Equator A

b Shadow.

P

4 Another possible mathematical model of traditional African space and time may come from the analysis of sound in this setting.

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In the diagram above, we have selected an example of a traditional house. The sunrays will create a shadow, whose position indicates time. The observer uses the tip of the shadow to know the time of the day. Recording time by tracking position of the sun, following the shadow position, is equivalent to tracking the angle β. The angle β is absolute on specific days, although not in some months, due to the changes in the sun (and seasons). Shown below is a complete model where the observer is at the Equator during an equinox, with the assumption of the earth terrain being a smooth curvature. (B2) Mathematical Model of Space and Time 2 Perceived path of the sun, S S

DAY TIME

D

b

P E

q

A SUNRISE

DES

O

NIGHT TIME

B SUNSET

Equator (Path of the Sun at equinox)

A ¼ Sunrise position (centre of the sun) B ¼ Sunset position O ¼ Centre of the earth (stationary) E ¼ Radius of the earth DES ¼ Distance from the centre of the earth to that of the sun ¼ OA ¼ OS ¼ OB P ¼ Observed position of the shadow on the ground θ ¼ Angle of the sun position on the equator plane from the line joining centres of the earth and the sun β ¼ Observed angle of the shadow relative to sunrise or sunset (i.e. ground) S ¼ Sun (spotted/observed sun position) (B2.1) Basic Rules in Our Model (a) c2 ¼ a2 + b2 – 2ab.cos(θ) where a, b and c are the lengths of three sides of a triangle where the angle between the sides corresponding to a and b is θ. qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi (b) From part (a) above, c ¼ a2 þ b2  2ab:cosðθÞ:

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(c) If the interior angles formed by a triangle ABC are denoted as A, B and C with opposite sides as a, b and c, respectively, then from sine rule, we have sin ðAÞ=a ¼ sin ðBÞ=b ¼ sin ðC Þ=c: (d) Sin(x) ¼ cos(90 –θ). (B2.2) ASOM Interpretation (i) The angles θ and β are dependent on each other as the sun moves. (ii) ∠AOP ¼ ⊥ qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi (iii) ∴ AP ¼ D2ES þ E2 by Pythagoras theorem (iv) SO ¼ DES (radii of same circle) (v) ∠ POS ¼ 90  θ Distance of the sun from observer P qffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi (vi) SP ¼ SO2 þ OP2  2:SO:OP: cos ð90  θÞ from rule (b) pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi (vii) That is SP ¼ DES 2 þ E 2  2E:DES cos ð90  θÞ pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi (viii) Hence SP ¼ DES 2 þ E 2  2E:DES sin ðθÞ from rule (d) From sin rule   sin Sb P0 90θÞ (ix) ¼ sin ðSP SO   (x) sin Sb P0 ¼ SO SP . sin(90 - θ)   SO: cos ðθÞ (xi) ∴ sin Sb P0 ¼ pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi DES 2 þE 2 2E:DES sin ðθÞ   SO: cos ðθÞ (xii) ∴ Sb P0 ¼ sin 1 pffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi 2 2 DES þE 2E:DES sin ðθÞ

and (xiii) Sb P0 ¼β + Ab P0   b Pθ ¼ DAPES (xiv) SP0 ¼ β + sin 1 DAPES since sin Sb   P0 and AP are given at (xii) and at (iii) (xv) ∴ β ¼ Sb P0 – sin 1 DAPES where Sb We want to observe that the closest to an absolute measure of time in Africa would be ‘day-time’ from sunrise to next sunrise. This is the basic unit of measurement on African time. An activity that takes all night would be a relative proportion of the night to the whole day as ½ day. A challenge comes when one has to follow the activity over many months, where day and night may vary considerably or when

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one is far off from the tropical of Cancer and Capricorn. However, most of the African continent is not far off from the tropics. The 11 pm in summer in Alaska, where the sun appears in the sky, would classify as day-time and not night.

4.4

Conclusion

I conclude with a summary in a comparison table to show some similarities and differences in understanding space and time. Below is a table that shows some of the similarities and differences: Comparison table A. Similarities Comparison Western analytic philosophy area Space and Divided views such as absolutism, relativism, time realism and conventionalism B. Differences Language and Conventionalism structure of the Conception of Past, present and future dimensions time Conception of More towards physical space or the traditional space Western influence from the Juedo-Christian views may accept spiritual space

African analytic philosophy Absolutism, relativism and realism are common I didn’t observe conventionalism yet; it is dominated by realism Mbiti’s version denies the remote future as inexistent Physical and spiritual space

The chapter investigated the question of being relative to the elements of space and time. There are various views on the reality of space and time. It is challenging to come with one theory representing Western analytic philosophy or African analytic thought. The standard view is realism, which recognises space and time as existing independent of things. The most shared common sense theory is where space is a container and time is related to motion. In early modern philosophy, the leading theory in realism is absolutism, which contends that space and time are absolute. In the late modern period, the theory of relativity of space and time took over as the top view. Both absolute and relative views of space and time are present in Western and African philosophy. It is only conventionalism that I have failed to trace in African philosophy, yet it forms part of various scholars’ views in the Western analytic tradition.

Chapter 5

Modality

Abstract This chapter investigates ‘modality’ through the analysis of different modes of being and modal notions such as actuality, necessity and possibility. Modern analytic metaphysics has summarised modality in the study of possible worlds, where interest is on actual world and other possible worlds. For example, philosophers such as Leibniz attempted to propagate a theory of possible worlds founded on God’s existence and his power to create ex nihilo (from nothing). The chapter analyses different theories of modality such as modal realism and ersatz realism, which attempted to clarify the various modes of being. In African philosophy, the chapter reflects on scholars who suggested a theory of modality such as Kagame. His interest was on reflecting on modality through the analysis of the word kintu (modal being), which was utilised to discuss the aspects of contingency and determinacy. The chapter further suggests an African theory of modality through the analysis of language and how it is used in a traditional setting.

5.1

Introduction

What is being in terms of modality? The study of different modal concepts such as actuality, necessity and possibility has attracted many scholars’ attention in analytic and continental traditions. The main interest is understanding various modes of being, hence having a better grasp of existence. For instance, in African philosophy, Kagame (1976) argued that modality (modal being – contingency and determination) is a fourth category kintu, a way of being. Similarly, in Kant ([1798] 1998), modality reflects as one of the major categories, which refer to concepts such as possibility and existence. Recently, Kayange (2018) investigated modality elements relative to counterfactual conditionals among the Chewa speakers of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique. In the Western analytic tradition, some of the fundamental works include Lewis (1973), who in his work Counterfactuals developed a theory of modal realism, Kripke (1972) in Naming and Necessity analysed modality relative to propositions and Plantinga (1974) also followed a similar study in work titled, The Nature of Necessity. In all these and many other studies, the theme of modality

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. M. Kayange, The Question of Being in Western and African Analytic Metaphysics, Synthese Library 438, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69645-0_5

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makes analytic philosophers to reflect on being, beyond what is evident in the empirical world. Section 5.2 builds modality in the modern analytic metaphysics focusing on modal realism and moderate realism (ersatz modal realism). Section 5.4 considers aspects of modal realism in African philosophy; this will further reflect and analyse modal language among Chichewa speakers in Malawi, Zambia, and Mozambique.

5.2

Modal Language in Western Analytic Metaphysics

(a) In traditional Western metaphysics,1 the ordinary preliminary conception shows that this word comes from the Latin term modus, which means ‘measure’, ‘manner’, ‘way’, etc. These meanings show that modality deals with the way things are or may be. For instance, the statement, ‘It is raining at Chancellor College’. This is a proposition that is representing the state of affairs. Similarly, the proposition, ‘It might rain tomorrow at Chancellor College’. This gives us the way things may be. The proposition, ‘Jane is tall’. This shows the way Jane is. The proposition, ‘Jane would have been short’, shows the possible way things could have been. Philosophers have used terms such as ‘possible’, ‘necessary’, ‘actual’, ‘impossible’, etc. to represent how things are or may be. Two philosophical concepts summarise studies on the modality in traditional metaphysics, namely, ‘modality de dicto’ and ‘modality de re’.2 In modality de dicto, attention is on the study of the way propositions are. Philosophers have mainly focused on the relation of correspondence (truth) between what is said (propositions or statements) and the state of affairs. These are declarative statements such as ‘x is in this way’ (let’s say x cannot fail metaphysics’), which may or may not correspond to the facts (state of affairs).3 Aristotle considered the relation between propositions and state of affairs in his expression on truth as follows, ‘To say that what is is not, or that what is not is, is false; but to say that what is is, and what is not is not, is true’ (Aristotle, [Met.], 1011b, 26). Further, propositions are studied with an attempt to understand whether they fall under the category of necessary, contingency, etc. (see William of Ockham [(1285–1349), 1990], 20 ff.). Modality de re refers to the way of being relative to things in the world. Debates have focused on existence-related terms such as necessary being or thing, contingent

1 The term ‘Traditional Metaphysics’, refer to metaphysics as done by various continental philosophers. This officially starts with Aristotle all the way to the medieval with philosophers like; Boethius, Thomas of Aquinas, to the modern metaphysics with Descartes, Leibniz, Kant, etc. up to the present day. 2 See also Kripke (1972, 39 ff) and Plantinga (1974, 14–36). 3 Note that the idea of truth as correspondence to the facts constitutes a realist understanding. There are many other ways of defining the truth such as the coherence theory, constructivist theory, pragmatic theory, etc.

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being, etc. (see Aristotle, Book Delta, V; Kant [(1788), 1829], 284 ff.; Leibniz [(1898), 2008], 10–11). All this philosophical interest in investigating modality and its related terms show this concept’s centrality in metaphysics. Although there are many interesting developments, I will focus on Leibniz’s conception of modality, mainly because he is one of the philosophers who has significantly influenced modern analytic metaphysics in different areas of his thought. In Leibniz (1664–1716), the issue of modality is more in his theory of possible worlds, in his writings such as Monadology (1714) and Theodicy (1710). He believed that there is an infinite number of possible worlds in God’s mind and that our actual world is the best among them. His doctrine of the worlds departs from the traditional conception of creation. For Leibniz, God is the creator of all, that is, God had infinite possibilities concerning creation, but he selected the world we inhabit to be actual or to contain the simple substances. It pleased him with his wisdom; that is, God was free to develop this one. Creation is, therefore, a free act of God (Leibniz [(1710), 1985], 378 ff.). He is thus responsible for all; that is, he is a necessary being in the sense that his essence involves existence and potentiality involves actuality. He is causa sui (cause of the self); that is, no one makes him to be but himself. God creates things from nothing, that is, ex nihilo, this makes him different from finite beings like human beings who can produce things but only from some other things. Commenting on a similar fact and stressing that the term creation is appropriately attributed to the act of God from nothing, Leibniz wrote: As for the so called creation of accidents, who does not see that one needs no creative power in order to change place or shape, to form a square or a column, or some other parade-ground figure, by the movement by the movement of the soldiers who are drilling; or again to fashion by removing a few pieces from a block of marble; or to make some figure in relief, by changing, increasing or decreasing a piece of wax? The production of modifications has never been called creation, and it is an abuse of terms to scale the world thus. God produces the substances from nothing, and the substances produce substances by the changes of their limits. (Leibniz [(1710), 1985], 360 ff.)

Apart from God’s seemingly magical power in creating ex nihilo, Leibniz defines him as ‘the perfect being’, and his existence follows directly from this aspect. Leibniz, just like Anselm of Canterbury and others like Thomas Aquinas, believed in the possibility of giving a priori proof of the existence of God from the idea of ‘a perfect being’; this is called the ontological argument of the existence of God.4 Since Leibniz considers God as having attributes such as omniscient, omnibenevolent, omnipotent, etc., he had his sufficient reasons to select this world. Building from the fact that God is supremely good, knowing, powerful, etc., and because he had reasons for choosing this world, the actual world is the best possible world ever. While the possible worlds have a possible state of affairs in God, the actual world is composed of simple substances, known as the monads (Leibniz [(1914), 2008], 4 We will not enter into details with the ontological argument but indicate only that it develops from the idea of a perfect being and claims that notion implies the existence of such a being. Those who are interested to deepen this for personal purposes can see St. Anselm’s work known as Proslogion and Leibniz’s Theodicy.

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67–77).5 The term monad derives from the Greek term monas (μoνασ), implying one that is a unit which cannot be divided further. A simple substance is, therefore, indivisible or inseparable.6 God created these monads as noted above, and they end only through the process of annihilation (Leibniz [1714] 2008, 67 ff.). Things are sorted through their status as either ‘compossible’ or ‘incompossible’ in the various worlds. Compossibles are as follows: (i) Simple substances S and S0 are compossible when they belong to the same possible world Φ. In other words, S and S0 can exist together. Leibniz captures this fact by saying that compossibles mirror each other in their mutual accommodation. It may be deduced that, given that they exist together, the compossibles necessarily follow the same laws of nature (general laws), and, for example, in our actual world, all the objects are thought to obey the general laws of motion.7 Incompossibles are definable by the negation of (i) above: (ii) Simple substances S and S0 are incompossible when they do not belong to the same possible world Φ. This implies S 2 Φ and S02 = Φ or vice versa.8 Incompossibles can therefore not exist together; they must belong to two different worlds. It’s like saying in the Chewa language, Awiri amenewo sangakhalire limodzi apwetekana (These two cannot stay together because they are incompatible). These two monads will, therefore, not be under the same natural laws. In conclusion, a possible world Φ has as its components all those elements which are compossible as explained, similarly worlds Φ1, Φ2, etc. The compossibles in these worlds have their various histories. For example, the actual state of the universe has its history; for instance, Malawi as part of this world reflects a long history. One may think about the subjects that existed, but today they are not or those that will exist. Similarly, one may think about the politics of the country, which changes with time. Every day, individuals are writing history in whatever they do. Again, the

5 Leibniz started using the term monad in his late philosophy starting from 1696. In the earlier years, like in 1685 in his writing, Discourse on Metaphysics, he used terms like individual substances, substantial form, entelechy, etc. 6 This definition is similar to that of an atom; in this sense, a monad is an atom. 7 Newton’s three laws of motion are commonly known and discussed: the first says that an object remains in its state of rest or constant motion unless it is compelled to change its state by an external force. The second law states that force causes objects to accelerate. It is usually expressed in a form of an equation F ¼ ma, where F is for force, m is for mass and a is for acceleration. The third law says that if object A (a student) applies a force to object B (a computer desk), an equal and opposite force is applied by B on A. The universal law of gravity instead says that objects have a force of attraction, which is related to the masses of these objects and their distances of separation. We can thus say that they hold among various compossibles. 8 2 stands for element 2 = not element of.

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possible worlds are undergoing various (infinite) histories. Below I will focus on Leibniz’s clarification of possible worlds through a graphical view. In his writing Theodicy (Leibniz [(1710), 1985], 371 ff.), Leibniz explains modality concerning a subject named Sextus, who goes to Jupiter and makes his sacrifice to understand his fate. Jupiter commands him to go to Athens, where he meets Pallas Athene. He enters a huge palace with innumerable rooms. In each room, there is a cosmos. In cosmos 1 named Corinth, Sextus buys a garden and spends his life there happily as a wealthy and respected person. In cosmos 2 termed Thrace, he discovers that his fate is marrying the daughter of the king. Further, he is destined to become the successor of the throne as king, etc. This story shows that there are many possible ways of being for Sextus. If he decides to stay in cosmos 1, Corinth will stand for the actual world: how things are for him? Indeed, this does not exclude the possibility that he could choose Thrace or any other world. The story suggests that there are various states of affairs in the possible worlds; there are objects, events, relations, etc. making up the world’s content. Further, the possible worlds have a history, for instance, Sextus buys land in a certain period, works on it, becomes a wealthy man, etc. Similarly, in Thrace, he marries, inherits the throne, etc.; various events happening to him form a history in the different worlds. The idea of possible worlds connects well with modality de dicto more specifically in Leibniz’s discussion of the concept of truth. In Theodicy, he discusses the terms ‘possible’ or ‘impossible’ and ‘necessary’ or ‘contingent’ in various places. Below I will discuss modality based on the necessary and contingent propositions concerning the idea of truth. There are two kinds of truths in Leibniz, namely, those of reasoning and those of facts. The truths of reasoning are necessary, and their opposite is impossible. Those of facts, however, are contingent, and their opposite is possible. When the truth is necessary, analysis can find the reason; this refers to resolving it into more straightforward ideas and into simpler truths until we reach those that are primary (Leibniz [(1714), 2008], 74). Necessary propositions: A proposition x is necessary if it cannot be contradicted, often because it follows from its premises. These propositions have their validity in reasoning, and they include statements from logic and mathematics. For example, the statements based on the principle of identity, the principle of non-contradiction, geometry, etc. may be considered as belonging to the set of necessary propositions: for example, the statement that ‘

A is or A is not’ :

The truth of such propositions is verifiable through the analysis of the premises. About the truth and possible worlds, a necessary proposition is true in every possible world. In other words, they hold in all the worlds. For example, the principle of non-contradiction will be expected to hold in all the worlds, such that a thing in the world one cannot ‘be x’ and ‘not-be x’ in that world, at the same time and in the same

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respect. Similarly, mathematical truth such as, given two points A and B, there is point C dissecting line AB into two halves, such that AC is equal to BC (Euclidean geometry), is a necessary truth. Contingent propositions: These state the facts or state of affairs. For instance, the statement, ‘Jane kicked the ball, and it broke the window’. This shows that what happened, such as the breaking of the window, has a reason or cause, in this case, the kicking of Jane’s ball. The principle of sufficient reason claims that whatever happens has a cause or a reason for its existence or occurence. This is why in some African languages like Chewa, it is sometimes said: – Umanena chatsitsa dzaye kuti Njovu ityoke nyanga (Say the cause of the breaking of an Elephant’s horn).9 This shows the belief that there must be a cause behind each occurence. In short, all statements about facts or the state of affairs leads to the factual truth. The statements are opposed to the necessary ones in that they are true only in some possible world. In this case, they are true only in the actual world. For example, ‘Memory, a girl from Blantyre, is a good singer’. This is a true statement, but it is contingent and thus true only for a world. The idea of possible worlds seems very fertile in doing analytical metaphysics and logic, as various current studies have shown (Lewis 1973; Plantinga 1974; Kripke 1972). Indeed, it does not seem an intellectual scandal for a realist to agree with Leibniz on the fact that our possible world exists as actual; it is independent of our minds and that there may be some other worlds. Despite this, there are many perplexities concerning this form of metaphysics. Firstly, the idea that our actual world is the best possible world based on the principle of sufficient reason, etc. is question-begging. Why did God choose to create this one? Why not select another one from the set of infinite possibilities in God’s mind? I am afraid we cannot question Leibniz further since he builds on his subjective faith in God’s existence. Such a God we can guess is all-knowing that this world is the best, a position that is very hard to digest for most of the analytic philosophers. After all, our daily experience does not automatically support this fact that our world is the best. There are still some places where violence reigns (such as Syria), making it difficult to understand why it is the best.10 Recently, there is also a rapid spread of coronavirus and other diseases such as Ebola and HIV. Unless we rationalise, everything that looks evil is good when we have a holistic view of things.11

9

Note that the translation here is not exact. Note that Leibniz brings in the idea of the best world created by God to discuss further the problem of evil. This problem consists in the question: If God is supremely good, why is it that there is evil? 11 The aesthetic notion of evil in Augustine of Hippo serves the purpose. 10

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Secondly, what is worrying in Leibniz’s system is the point of departure of his reasoning. He takes for granted that God exists and then claims that there are infinite possibilities of creation (possible worlds) in his mind. If God does not exist, it may imply that this way of thinking does not make sense. In other words, for empiricists, there is no evidence, and this is a matter of faith. Thirdly, one may extend further this reflection by questioning how he knows that there are all these possibilities in the mind of God. Is this through logical reasoning, or it starts from a presupposition? Nevertheless, Leibniz influenced many modern philosophers, as per below. It seems that reason is not enough for Leibniz’s system to make sense in the analytic tradition. One also requires a component of faith, which may justify the existence of a being beyond human experience. (b) Western analytic metaphysics: In Western analytic metaphysics the common views of modality are classifiable into modal realism and moderate realism. (b1) Modal realism: In this section, we shall discuss an understanding of modality based on a system normally known as ‘modal realism’. One of the adherents to this position is an American philosopher David Lewis (1941–2001). Other philosophers who worked in the same line of thought include Robert Stalnecker, etc. This section will discuss the concept ‘modal realism’ as a system of talking about modality. Possible worlds: In the introduction, modality deals with various terms, such as necessity, possibility, etc.; in this section, we shall discuss the term ‘possibility’ and how it developed in the construction of a form of realism about the plurality of the worlds. Modal realism is the view that there exists a plurality of worlds independent of our minds. Basic to this view is that there are many ‘possible’ ways of being (existence of things) and this world is one of such ways (Lewis 1973, 84). The various ways things could be constitute the possible worlds. The worlds have as their content a set of concrete objects. For instance, our world is an agglomeration of various things such as the earth, stars, comments, etc. The possible worlds are spatiotemporally and causally isolated from each other, such that the relation of cause and effect does not bind the worlds A1 and A2. The worlds may be identical with the difference that a subject x has a way of doing things in the world A1, which is different from x’s way of doing in world A2. For instance, Dr. Lazarus Chakwera won the elections in 2020 and became the president of Malawi in this actual world, but in another possible world, the counterpart of him lost the elections and did not become the president.12 The prominent exponent of this view is David H. Lewis (1973). Lewis develops his pluralistic views in several writings, such as Counterfactuals (1973), which discussed the idea of possible worlds based on the counterfactuals, and The Plurality of Worlds (1986), which defended further the idea of possible worlds in general. The other minor writings are Counterpart Theory and Quantified Modal Logic (1968),

12

The above gives the general understanding of modal realism; below we will consider the case of Lewis.

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Anselm and Actuality (1970) and Counterparts of Persons and Their Bodies (1971), which proposes his theory of possible worlds, etc. His general understanding of a plurality of possible worlds, which we will explain further, is explicit in the following passage from Counterfactuals: I believe that there are possible worlds other than the one we happen to inhabit. If an argument is wanted, it is this. It is uncontroversially true that things, might be otherwise than they are. I believe and so do you, that things could have been different in countless ways. But does this mean? Ordinary Language permits the paraphrase: there are many ways things could have been besides the way they actually. On the face of it this sentence is an existential quantification. It says that there exist many entities of certain description, to wit ‘ways things could have been’. I believe that things could have been different in countless ways; I believe in permissible paraphrase of what I believe; taking the paraphrase at its face value, I therefore believe in the existence of entities that might be called ‘ways things could have been’. I prefer to call them ‘possible worlds’. (Lewis [1973], 84)13

From this act of faith, Lewis departs from a belief in the possible worlds. One of the arguments in the Counterfactuals in support of this is the ‘counterfactual conditional’. Lewis believes that what makes an idea such as ‘If James had not kicked the ball, the window would not have been smashed’ true is that there is a world in which such a statement is true. Of course, this statement is a condition because it shows us what would not be the case if the action were not the case. We think about various practical sentences, such as ‘If I had not smoked that cigarette, I would not get this cancer’. All that we can claim in metaphysics is the possibility of the existence of such statements in the various worlds.14 However, this is not the case with Lewis; he argues that, just as the counterfactual conditionals show that things may be different, there exists a multiplicity of worlds, as concrete as ours (Lewis 1973, 85; 1986, 1 ff.). This is clear when one thinks about the world we inhabit, what you need to do is accept that the other worlds are like this one. We call this world actual not in the sense that it is different, but this is meant to emphasise that this is where we live, this is home (Lewis 1973, 85 ff.). In other terms, our world has an indexical term of ‘being actual’. Looking at our world, the content of Lewis’s possible worlds is the entities that are the concrete objects, as noted earlier. However, how can we understand this when we are trying to consider various worlds like ours? The biggest issue of having entities in different worlds W comes from what is commonly known as ‘trans-world identity’ of entities in W. This is the doctrine that an individual or entity may exist in more than one world. This develops from the fact that other worlds, like our actual world, may have the same individuals. For example, Alice will be in a world we inhabit, but she will also be in another world. Against this idea, Lewis brings in the

13

This sound more like an act of faith in the actual worlds just like people have faith in the existence of God or other subjects like Jesus, Muhammad, Buddha, etc. 14 The counterfactual conditionals are important for other things, such as helping as to take precautionary measures, explain reality, decision-making, etc.

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theory of counterparts in different worlds to discuss the modality de re (Lewis 1973, 40–42; 1986, 5 ff.). Literarily, the term counterpart refers to a duplicate or that which takes the place of x. The counterpart theory claims that an entity, for instance, in our actual world Φ, has counterparts satisfying how different ways things are in different worlds W.15 The most difficult problem is how are these counterparts going to behave in relation to how things are in different worlds? Below are some examples of this idea of counterparts and satisfaction. (a) Starting from our world Φ, we may give, for example, the entity x as Dr. Lazarus Chakwera relative to world W. The statement that ‘x wins the presidential elections of 2020’ is satisfied in world Φ. Of course, this is unproblematic if we consider that we all know the truth about this actual world. We may thus say that in some world W, x wins elections in Φ. Therefore, the state of affairs satisfies counterpart’s role. (b) Considering all the possible worlds W, we may say that there are other roles satisfied by all the counterparts of an entity x. For example, for Dr. Lazarus Chakwera’s counterparts, they all satisfy the statement that ‘x is human’. We thus say that x necessarily satisfies ‘x is human’ if and only if in all the worlds W, a counterpart of x is human. We thus expect that in all the worlds W, x will imply that Dr. Lazarus Chakwera is human (this is of necessity). Different concrete objects satisfy the way things are or may be in worlds W. Is modal realism a true theory? Although it reflects the highest human experience, there are various difficulties regarding some of its claims. Firstly, one of the criticisms is that the explication of possible worlds in this view leads to the conclusion that everything is ‘actual’ and one may wonder why we must have various worlds like ours.16 In the different possible worlds, we have existing things, that is, the concrete things. Rightly, the mind questions why we do not just say that all that is is the actual world instead of using this as a blanket term for our world in which we inhabit. Of course, for Lewis, the worlds are causally spatiotemporal isolated, but this does not make sense because the term causally or spatiotemporal isolated begs a further explanation. Lewis risks falling into a form of monism; nevertheless, he is not a monist but a pluralist as he claims. What worsens the situation is that the modal realists such as Lewis believe in the non-actual worlds. However, this will lead us to reconcile this idea of non-actual worlds and the actual world. Either we abandon the idea of existence as uniform in all the possible worlds, or we abandon the idea of the non-actual world. Lewis denies this objection by emphasising that he uses the term actual as an indexical term. It shows our world in which we live. He is a defender of common sense (metaphysical conservative) based on the understanding of three theses: (1) Everything is actual,

Φ is just utilised to represent the world we inhabit, but it is one of the Ws. This was also forwarded and was developed by van Inwagen (Plantinga on Trans-World Identity). 15 16

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(2) Actuality is about all that is spatiotemporally related to us and (3) Possibility is an alternative of the actual. These statements threaten modal realism, but they lose their weight if actual is a mere index. The ‘possibility’ will, therefore, not be an alternative to the actual, but actual will be one of the tags (like when we are sorting various books in the library) given to a possible world; probably in this way, he can get away with it. The question remains, ‘why are other worlds like ours’, in other words, ‘how do we know there are worlds like ours?’ Secondly, another problem refers to the unqualified combination principle as in Armstrong and Forrest. This principle is described in the example that our world is a patchwork quilt such that the individual patches exist distinctly. Any combination of such patches thus gives as a possible world. ‘Recombination’ of patches here can be taken to include. . .the ‘indefinite reduplication of any patch’, such that the world copies possible individuals from each other. The problem is that the idea of participating may lead to a situation where an entire possible world is a complete duplicate of another world. Hence, there is a problem with Leibniz’s law of indiscernibles, whereby, when two or more entities are identical, they have the same properties. This implies that we may precipitate in the confusion of having many identical worlds or are just the same.17 Further duplication can be of any size and number, hence leading to infinite possible worlds. Lewis goes against the unqualified principle of combination in favour of the qualified principle of combination. This refers to an arbitrary way of combining or duplicating objects; in this way, we may run away from the danger of making the same sets or worlds. The idea is that when we have a set A of individuals, there is a possible world that participates in that set size and shape. However, why must we combine things arbitrarily when formulating different worlds? Thirdly, the big problem I see in Lewis’s development still lies in the question of trans-world identity mentioned above. I do not see the counterpart theory as a sufficient alternative. While trans-world identity is a big threat to modal realism, counterpart theory still explains why a subject x must duplicate himself in these different worlds. It remains that in some of the worlds, the identity problem will come, as is the case above. Unless Lewis had a convincing way to deal with this problem, the system remains question-begging. An alternative system is moderate realism as below. (b2) Moderate modal realism (ersatz modal realism): Ersatz modal realism represents the third approach to studying Western thought’s possible worlds. This view is equally the ‘moderate’ or ‘actualist’ modal realism. The philosophers such as Plantinga, Forrest, Kripke and Quine are some of its supporters. On possible worlds: I depart from the idea that there exists only one actual world (our world), and the possible worlds are just the abstract possible ways regarding

17

Imagine a world which is an image of our world. It will have a class of metaphysics just like ours, with weekly assignments, etc. It will have a person like you with your family, friends, etc. You will have all the things you like and those you have, etc.

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how our world could have been different. Basic to this view is the understanding that the possible worlds are sets of representations concerning the state of affairs and the possible state of affairs. There are various representations, such as state of affairs, sentences, properties, universals, idealisations or the mathematical representations (Lewis in Possible Worlds takes this as Quine’s position). Propositions18 are abstract representations, which stand for our world. In this sense, the world comprises sets of propositions, thus abstract entities representing things. A proposition like ‘clay soil is red’ represents things or ‘state of affairs’. This may represent the actual world, and one can deduce further propositions on how things may be different from the way they are in the actual world. For example, ‘clay soil would have been blue’ represents a proposition stating how things could be different. While modal realism goes against common sense with its allegiance to the existence of other concrete worlds, ersatz modal realism recognises a clear distinction between abstract and concrete worlds. According to common sense, the actual world is the only concrete world; instead, the possible worlds belong to the abstract realm. They are the opposite of what is real or actual. Therefore, we may see the possible worlds as a universe of abstract worlds and our world as actual among them. Plantinga and Kripke are some of the protagonists who developed a moderate view of modal realism concerning the idea of possible worlds. For both, the possible worlds are the abstract entities; however, they differ slightly in their systematic explications. The following development will consider some of their ideas on this topic, mainly from Plantinga’s work, The Nature of Necessity (1974) and Kripke’s Naming and Necessity (1972). In explicating possible worlds, Plantinga notes: In exploring and explaining the nature of necessity, Leibniz turns to the idea of the possible worlds; we can do no better. So we must ask initially what sort of thing a possible world is. The first and rough answer is that it is the way things could have been; it is a way the world could have been; it is a possible state of affairs, of some kind. (Plantinga 1974, 44)

In his book Nature and Necessity, Plantinga discusses at length the issue of possible worlds. He defines them above as ‘a way things could have been; it is the way the world could have been; it is a possible state of affairs of some kind’ (Plantinga 1974, 44). This definition suggests that we may reduce the worlds into ‘state of affairs’ or ‘propositions’. Now the state of affairs may obtain or they may fail to do so. For example: (i) Dr. Lazarus Chakwera became the president of Malawi in 2020, is a state of affairs stating a fact (how things are), and this obtains. (ii) ‘Ulemu is the current Vice-Chancellor of Chanco’. The state of affairs (ii) does not obtain because Ulemu is not the current ViceChancellor at Chanco. (iii) ‘Grivas can eat 15 cows in two minutes’.

18

The term ‘proposition’ refers to statements but as an abstract object.

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This form of ‘state of affairs’ is possible, but it is naturally impossible compared to our actual world. Human experience shows that it is impossible for an individual to eat 15 cows in 2 min. The examples above suggest that the state of affairs may fall in various categories, that is: • The actual state obtaining as in (i) • The possible state but not actually as in (ii) • The impossible state as in (iii) This last one is impossible relative to the actual and its incumbent natural laws.19 Plantinga argues that not all states of affairs qualify as possible worlds and suggests that for one to qualify, it must be maximal and complete (Plantinga 1974, 44). Completeness is definable based on the following statements: (i) State of affairs S includes S0 if it is not the case that S obtains and S0 fails. This condition suggests two related ideas; it states that inclusion holds when preclusion is not the case. In other words, the reasoning behind the concept of inclusion may follow from the idea in set theory that if the conjunction: (i.i) S \ ~ S0 of state of affairs holds, then (i.ii) it is the case that S \ S0 does not hold (impossible). This shows inclusion between S and S0 if and only if (i.i) is not the case. Preclusion is in the fact that both (i.i) and (i.ii) cannot occur together. Otherwise, ~S0 and S0 will belong to S, which is a contradiction. Let us clarify this condition further by giving an example. A set of state of affairs Φ may contain the elements of the sentence, ‘Alice kicked the ball and broke the window on the second floor’. This implies that: (a) ‘Alice kicked the ball’. (b) ‘Alice broke the window’. (c) ‘Alice’s ball went to the second flow’. All these states of affairs are in Φ but not a statement that (d) ‘Alice did not break the window’. Statements (b) and (d) go against or preclude each other, and (d) cannot be part of Φ. Based on the relationship between inclusion and exclusion, Plantinga defines completeness in the following way: (ii) A state of affairs S is complete or maximal if and only if for every state of affairs S, S includes S0 or precludes S0 . In conclusion, a possible world, such as our actual world considered a state of affairs, qualifies only because of its affairs0 completeness. Similar to Plantinga’s ideas noted above, in his work Naming and Necessity, Kripke discusses at length the idea of ‘possible worlds’ and defines it as referring to ‘the total ways the world may have been’ or states and histories of the entire world 19

This last aspect is my further reconsideration of the idea above.

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(Kripke 1972, 18). The possible worlds are for him ‘abstract entities’, occupying the logical or sample space. This idea of sample space (U ) is from the notion of probability, where U is the set (universe) of all the possible outcomes. For example, when tossing a coin with the head of Kamuzu on one side and a Cock (Tambala) on the other side, U will be a set of the possible outcomes (Kamuzu or Cock).20 In this logical space, we, therefore, have various logical entities. The entities of Kripke concerning the actual world are not as in Lewis. Commenting about the actual world, Kripke stresses that the ‘actual world’ (preferably ‘actual state’) does not necessarily refer to the scattered objects in the universe; it may refer to the state of affairs at a small scale, like in the case of throwing a dice. Therefore, the possible worlds are not necessarily a duplicate of the whole universe of objects but are similar to the many possible outcomes in a situation. Commenting on possible worlds in general in his work Naming and Necessity, he wrote: “Possible worlds” are the total “ways the world might have been”, or state or histories of the entire world. To think of the totality of all of them involves much more idealization, and much more mind-boggling questions than the less ambitious elementary school analogue. Certainly a philosopher of the “possible worlds” must take care that his technical apparatus not push him to ask questions whose meaningfulness is not supported by our original intuitions of possibility that gave the apparatus its point. (Kripke [(1972), 1981], 18)

Apart from this understanding of the possible worlds, since the 1950s, Kripke utilised this understanding of worlds to discuss semantics. Semantics usually deals with meaning regarding statements or propositions. Central to this idea is the relation of truth between statements and their referents. Possible worlds deal with claims about modality for the terms, ‘possibility’ and ‘necessity’; this is common is the study of modal logic. A possibly true statement x, ‘Lilongwe is a city in Malawi’, is true at least in one possible world. A statement ‘2 plus 2 is equal to 4’is necessarily true if it is the case in all possible worlds or the entire logical or sample space. Modal logic being a formal field presents its statements by working on the logical operators □ standing for necessity and ⋄ for possibility. The statement □x refers to ‘necessarily x’, which shows that it is necessary that x. Similarly, ⋄x says ‘possibly x’. The two operators are definable on the relation of negations as follows (as also noted in Kayange 2018): (i) □φ $ ~ ⋄ ~ φ (ii) ⋄φ $ ~ □ ~ φ The proposition (i) uses a biconditional and shows that it is not possible that not-φ, and it thus follows that φ is necessary. Similarly, the proposition (ii) used a biconditional and indicates that it is not necessary that not-φ, and it thus follows that φ is possible. The idea of truth refers to the relations concerning the idea of possible worlds. For instance, informally, the statement □φ is necessarily true if φ is true at

20

Note that Kripke discusses possible worlds based on the notion of probability where we toss a dice for several times. He thus considers the possible outcomes as their equivalent.

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all possible worlds W. Similarly, ⋄φ is possibly true if it is the case that it is true at some possible world w a subset of W.21 Moderate realism with respect to the possible worlds sounds very close to common-sense knowledge as compared to modal realism above; however, this does not dispense it from various criticisms. David Lewis is one of the notable philosophers who criticised the ersatz modal realism in several ways. Aware of the fact that there are various theories in this context, he divides ersatz modal realism into small groups. One example consists of linguistic ersatz realism, representing the possible worlds using statements or language, which he calls ‘World-Making Language’. In this form, statements like ‘pigs fly’ belong to some linguistic world. Of course, this does not commit us to believe in a concrete world somewhere, where pigs fly. In this case, the problem is that the way sentences represent follows from the meaning of the words, such as ‘pigs fly’. I think that this suggests further that the possible worlds will, therefore, be a game of language where we may use some fantasy and combine terms to make real worlds. In this way, things that do not exist are affirmed as the case. But to construct, a language for worlds, Lewis wonders what type of natural language will fit the purpose. This is because natural languages like English are limited and have many ambiguities and, in most cases, incomplete; hence they may lead to various inconsistencies. The solution would be to clean our language from these ambiguities and enrich it, but still more it will lack adequate descriptive resources. For instance, our natural language will find it difficult to talk about extra-natural beings. The second criticism goes to the pictorial ersatz modal realism; this represents possible worlds with pictures or scale models that are isomorphic to the structure of the world.22 Isomorphism is a mathematical generalisation of similarity relations between two structures A (model in our case) and W (world). Using models to represent is problematic in metaphysics and in the philosophy of science, where the possible worlds are also of great interest (more especially the actual world). Let us take, as an example, the scientific theories considered based on either syntax (as sets of statements or propositions) or semantics (as a universe of models). Studies in the philosophy of science have shown that it is not easy to capture how theory’s statements and models represent the world. The language used tends to generalise, modify (idealise, view planets as point masses), interpret things, etc. Further, some terms like atoms, genes, quanta, etc. represent the actual world, but it is challenging to show them by appealing to our physical world. In short, the relation between models and things is question-begging and can hardly solve representation in this context. 21

This idea of true in a world may be developed further in modal semantics by defining the truth of statement based on a Kripke model or frame M ¼ hW, R, (i, where the first element W is a set of all possible worlds, R is a binary relation between the worlds, ( (Note that I cannot find the commonly used operator on the computer utilised.) is a truth-value operator (for the various ways of discussing this frame and the conditions of truth, see as examples Chellas (1980)). 22 Isomorphism was explained in a simple way in class; please refer to your notes.

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Thirdly, the criticism goes to magical modal realism where undefined candidates (commonly known as the primitives) represent the possible worlds such as state affairs, properties, etc. The main difficulty with this realism is finding a criterion for the arrangement of state of affairs or properties in various worlds. Lewis sees some sort of magic for how these representations are in multiple worlds; this follows from the fact that we do not know how and why things occur and are in the way claimed by the primitives.

5.3

Modality in African Metaphysics

The discourse of the question of being through various modes of being has been common among African individuals. There is a version of modal realism in studying concepts such as creation, necessity and contingency in different cultures. The conceptualisation of these modal terms is present by studying some philosophical works and everyday language use in some selected African languages. For example, there are different narratives among the Bantu people that present the modal concepts, for example, the myths. Apart from language, different Bantu scholars such as Mbiti, Kagame and Kaphagawani have incorporate modal elements in their philosophical developments. Created actual world: I argue that the writings of Mbiti (1969, 1975) show elements of African traditional modal realism, such as the belief in a created actual world. He contends that in most African cultures, God created the world. He first traces this creation from God’s name, which is equivalent to the creator in most tribes. Commenting on this idea, he writes: It is generally believed all over Africa that the universe was created. The creator of the universe is God. There is no agreement, however, on how the creation of the universe took place. But it seems impossible that the universe could just come into existence on its own. God is, therefore, the explanation of the origin of the universe, which consists of both visible and invisible realities. (Mbiti 1975, 32)

Mbiti’s contention of a ‘created universe’ is common among the Bantu tribes of Malawi, where God is Namalenga or Mlengi, meaning the one who creates or the creator. The relation between the creator and things (created) suggests distinguishing between necessary being and contingent being. Therefore, the Bantu God is a necessary being because of being the potential that creates other things. The other beings created by him are contingent, as they are dependent on the creator. Although God’s understanding as a creator is a common belief among Africans, the citations confirm that his nature is not very clear and often differs from tribe to tribe, for example, a study of the actual world through what the Chewa people of Malawi are doing when they are narrating some stories to the community members, more especially to the youth. One of such stories that portray the actual world is as below:

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When there was yet no living thing here on earth, Chiuta made a man and a woman, and sent them down. They alighted on a rock called Kaphirintiwa at the Dzalanyama. That rock was still soft and they left their foot prints on the rock when they alighted. These footprints can be seen still today. The same day Chiuta sent rain to germinate the seeds which had been placed there already, in order to provide food for man. (Braugel 2001, 34)

What does it mean to narrate this story among the Bantu population using the Chewa language? Elders often tell this story to the youth to clarify the idea of creation. The myth suggests that creation is quasi a given fact. It shows that God created living things, starting with human beings. The story does not create problems like the creation story in the bible, where a man comes first and then woman. The footprints on a rock in Kaphirintiwa at the Dzalanyama range in Malawi seem to support this creation story.23 This narrative shows that God made man and woman together and does not specify how. The location seems to be heaven because after making them, God sent them on earth. Human beings come before other living things including plants. God put some plants in the soil and made rain to fall. The story suggests that actuality is God’s act of creation. God is the one that provides for human beings, and rain is categorised as a blessing. Only rocks are already present in the narration, although not in the current solid form. An extension of a created actual world and its content is also in another narration among the Chewa speakers of Malawi, which indicates that: With the first man and woman came pairs of all animals as well as Chiuta Himself, who was accompanied by the first rains. During this first period Chiuta, men and animals, lived together in peace. This condition, however, was completely destroyed when man invented fire which set the grass ablaze and made the animals flee full of rage against man. Chiuta was rescued by the spider, who spun a thread along which He climbed to the sky. Thus driven away by the wickedness of man, God proclaimed that man would die and join Him in the sky where he would have to make rain clouds in order to quench the fires which he had invented. (Braugel 2001, 35)24

When people narrate this extension of the Kaphirintiwa story, they indicate that harmony is the foundation of the actual world. The actuality is holistic, that is, as one 23

Archaeologists found footprints on the rock at Dzalanyama. A similar story attributed to another Bantu group of Malawi the Yao is narrated by Werner as follows: ‘At first man was not, only Mulungu and the beasts. One morning, on visiting his trap, Chameleon found two unknown beings in it, no other than the first man and woman, who had somehow blundered into it during the night. He consulted Mulungu as to what he should do with them, and was told, ‘place them here, they will grow’. They did grow and developed various activities, among others that of making fire by twirling a hard stick on a bit of soft wood, as is done to this day. But in the end, they set the grass alight and thus drove Mulungu from his abode on earth. The Chameleon escaped by climbing a tree, but Mulungu was on the ground, and he said, ‘I cannot climb a tree’. Then Mulungu set off and went to call the Spider. The Spider went on high and returned again and said, ‘I have gone on high nicely’, and he said, ‘You now, Mulungu, go on high’. Mulungu then went with the Spider on high. And he said, ‘When they die, let them come on high here’. And behold, men on dying go on high in order to be slaves of God, the reason being that they ate his people here below. That is, as soon as they had found out the use of fire, they began to kill and cook buffaloes and other animals’. 24

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community of various entities sharing the same environment. A male human being disturbed actuality. He started becoming scientific by inventing fire, which unfortunately destroyed the primordial harmony. The story tries to respond to the issue of coming into being (actuality) and ceasing to be (death), where when human subjects die, they join God and become part of the heaven where he dwells. In both Chewa people’s narrations and Mbiti’s speculation, there exists the actual world/universe, which is as containing both visible and invisible things. Most of the Bantu philosophers believe that these things have vital force as their essence (Mbiti 1969; Kagame 1976), as alluded to earlier. Actual world of kintu class: A further consideration of the actual world and the possible worlds, Kagame’s philosophy provides a good background for discussing modality.25 As noted in Chap. 2, in his Bantu metaphysics, he considered modality a category of being. This category is the kuntu, which refers to a modal being. As indicated earlier, being is captured by -ntu at the end of this term, and ku- represents this class. Kagame argues that modal being is in contingency or determination. Given that in Kagame, being is a vital force, and modal being is modal force. Kintu is a modal force concerning other categories of being, as discussed in Chap. 3. The characteristic of kintu is that it cannot be touched as is the case with other beings and it is also not invisible or abstract, as is the case with the spiritual beings. Kintu has various effects, such as beauty and laughter. Kagame seems to understand that universals such as beauty exist in the sense of subsisting in other categories of being. Kayange (2018) argued for a form of modal realism through a study on counterfactuals. The basic argument was that the use of some figurative expressions among the Chewa people of Malawi reveals the existence of the various possible state of affairs. In this context, possible worlds are conceivable, firstly through the study of literal language use and secondly through an analysis of figurative expressions such as taboos. Based on the literal language, some propositions in everyday language refer to the state of affairs. For instance, x akudya nsima (x is eating nsima (hardporridge)) refers to the actual state of affairs. The other possible state of affairs about x is that he/she is not eating, hence x sakudya nsima (x is not eating nsima). The simple use of literal language in everyday discourse shows no difference in an account on the state of affairs and possible state of affairs between the Western world and Africa. Similarly, literal statements are true if they correspond to the facts (Truth as correspondence to the facts). The only particular element in the Bantu concept of truth is that it underlines the importance of evidence, showing that it is the case that ‘x is eating nsima’. This is developed further in the earlier book on Meaning and Truth in African Philosophy: Doing African Philosophy with Language (Kayange 2018). In this work, ‘A proposition p is true if and only if the claimed correspondence between a statement and facts is observable as such’ (Kayange 2018, 102).

25

I will not develop his ideas in details because they were already discussed in Chap. 3 of this work.

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While the above may refer to contingent truth dependent on an observable relation of correspondence, Bantu languages have some statements that yield necessary truth. For instance, some expressions are used in Chewa language such as Kumwamba ndi kumwamba, pansi ndi pansi (Heaven is heaven, earth is earth). This expression suggests the idea of identity. It shows that A is A and B is B (thus we have (A ¼ A) & (B ¼ B). When the expression above is considered based on the first part alone (A is A) or the second part alone (B is B), it suggests the principle of identity, but when the whole expression is a whole, it has the message of the principle of non-contradiction. It confirms that ‘A is A’, and one cannot mistake it with ‘B is B’. Sometimes in ordinary language use, people say Munthu ndi munthu, galu ndi galu (A human being is a human being, a dog is a dog). This confirms that these two things are different, such that one cannot be a human being and be a dog simultaneously and in the same respect. Kayange (2018) argued that the above expressions indicate a correspondence theory of truth among the Bantu people. This structure is similar to the Aristotelian or Tarskian theory of truth. For instance, the copula ‘is’ in ‘a human being is a human being’ shows that there is some tautological truth similar to ‘snow is white if and only if snow is white’ or in ‘a triangle is a three-sided figure’. Based on the interpretation given in Leibnizian modal realism, this is suggestive of the necessary truth. The assumption thus, ‘a dog is a dog’, will be true in all the possible worlds. Apart from using literal language, an area that shows the existence of possible worlds/state of affairs is in the context of belief-related figurative expressions such as the taboos. A taboo is generally an expression that states a particular action (mainly forbidden action) and announces the related punishment. The general contention is that they are not true, as they purport to express a cause-and-effect relation, which is not real. Nevertheless, Kayange (2018) demonstrated some taboo figurative expressions among the Chewa people as taking the form of counterfactuals, indicating a possible state of affairs. For example, a taboo expression such as Kudumpha musi sudzabereka (jumping over a pestle, causes impotence) shows the relation of cause and effect between ‘jumping a pestle’ (action) and the punishment ‘impotence’ (effect). This refers to the state of affairs. If this is expressed as a counterfactual of the form, ‘If A had not occurred, E would not have occurred’, then it gives another possible world/state of affairs expressed as: If jumping a pestle had not occurred, impotence would not have occurred.

This presence of counterfactual conditionals in the Bantu languages such as Chewa language above has led me to develop the truth’s counterfactual concept (Kayange 2018, 104). It was indicated that ‘p ⊃ q ¼ T/e at world w: If there are p-worlds, then there is a p & q world observed as closer to w than any p & ~q-world’. The importance of evidence in this conception of truth led to my conclusion that a proposition’s necessary truth cannot be determined with certainty. In fact, one requires an observation of the validity of a proposition in all possible worlds. I, therefore, concluded that the truth of the statement p □ ⊃ q/e is unattainable, while p ⋄ ⊃ q/e is attainable (observable).

5.4 Conclusion

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Conclusion

I conclude with a summary in a comparison table to show some similarities and differences in modality between Western and African philosophies. Comparison table A. Similarities Comparison area Modal realism Ersatz realism Necessary and possibility B. Differences Concrete worlds

Western analytic philosophy Possible worlds Abstract worlds Necessary and possibility

Concrete possible worlds

African analytic philosophy Possible worlds Abstract worlds Necessary and possibility

Concrete and supernatural possible worlds

The above discussion considered the question of being through its various modes in the analytic tradition. The chapter has shown many similarities in the Western and African developments in the analytic framework. For instance, the belief in the actual world is common in both contexts. One of the ideas that have been very close is the belief in the universe as an actual world created by a God. Similarly, the concepts of necessity and possibility are common in these two philosophical contexts. The chapter has also focused on the modern developments of modal realism in analytic metaphysics and argued for similar developments building of Bantu thinkers such as Kagame (1976, 1956) and Kayange (2018). The developments of Kayange have mainly considered modal realism focusing on both literal and non-literal (figurative) expressions and narratives in the Bantu languages, mainly, the Chewa language.

Chapter 6

Causation in Analytic Metaphysics

Abstract This chapter discusses the concept of causation in the Western and African analytic frameworks. In Western analytic philosophy, this is discussed by drawing insights from the philosophy of natural science and logic, where it is sometimes viewed as a relation and at times as a logical/metaphysical principle. While most of the philosophers agree with the existence of causes and effects, there are differences in a number of areas, such as on whether causation is a relation of particular events or properties and on whether causal relations are logically valid or mere human creation (also known as Hume’s problem of causation). The chapter further reflects on some basic theories of causation such as the counterfactual theory, the property-based theory and the classical theory. In African thought, the study uses language analysis in studying causation as suggested in philosophical works such as Sogolo’s presentation of the Akan concept of cause. The chapter presents a reflection on causation in African thought through the analysis of the Chewa language and beliefs. This shows that most of the ideas on causation are similar to the Western conception of this concept.

6.1

Introduction

What is the nature of causation? This chapter investigates the nature of causation in central studies in both Western and African analytic traditions. There are mixed views in the different writings on the concept of causation. The standard view is where analytic philosophers have attempted to clarify this concept, mainly focusing on its nature and the causal laws. The various opinions follow the Aristotelian causal theory, Hume’s insights on causal laws and John Stuart Mill’s ideas on causes and the scientific methods. This has led to an engagement in causation in thinkers such as Moritz Schlick, Lewis, Reichenbach, Sosa and Tooley, Braithwaite, Hempel, Hart, Nagel, Taylor, etc. For example, one of the books, Causation (Sosa and Tooley 1993), summarises works in this realm. Some of the areas discussed include the nature of causation, causal laws, probability and causation, causation and counterfactuals. The other view that is substantially shared is that causation is an irrelevant concept which must be eliminated in the advanced sciences. One of the defenders of © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. M. Kayange, The Question of Being in Western and African Analytic Metaphysics, Synthese Library 438, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69645-0_6

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this view is Bertrand Russell, who noted in Mysticism and Logic that causality is no longer central in advanced sciences. Commenting on this, he noted that, ‘The law of causality, I believe, like much that passes muster among philosophers is a relic of a bygone age, surviving, like the monarchy, only because it is erroneously supposed to do no harm’ (Russell 1913 (2010), 143). For Bertrand Russell, the concept of cause is not only irrelevant due to its lack of appearance in advanced sciences, mainly in physics, but it is also an obsolete notion. This is a useless concept, only kept because people are used to it and think it is important, just as is the monarchy’s case. Some other thinkers that questioned causation include Collingwood, who noted that theoretical sciences eliminated this concept. Myles Brand doubted an analysis of natural laws using causation, and John Norton (2003) in ‘Causation as Folk Science’ dismisses this concept’s value in science. I still remember a colloquium (headed by Nancy Cartwright) at the London School of Economics that discussed causation, where Norton’s ideas questioned the value of this concept and were different from all other presenters, including Nancy Cartwright, who tended to be sympathetic towards causation and causal pluralism.1 In this chapter, I will not concentrate on whether causation is useful or useless, but on the nature of this concept in various studies in the analytic philosophy in both Western and African analytic thoughts. Section 6.2 will discuss causation in the Western analytic tradition. Section 6.3 will focus on causation in the African thought. Section 6.4 is the conclusion, which will also summarise some commonalities and differences between Western and African thoughts.

6.2

Causation in Western Analytic Philosophy

(a) The importance of causation in the natural sciences, language and logic makes Aristotle a better starting point for this elaboration. This is because this philosopher developed his ideas with a particular reference to nature and its behaviour. In his different writings, such as Physics, Metaphysics and Posterior Analytics, he uses the Greek word aitia, translated either as ‘cause’ or ‘reason for’, and analyses its nature. For example, in Physics (194b16-23), the discourse on cause comes in the context of knowledge; he noted that ‘Knowledge is the object of our inquiry, and men do not think they know a thing till they have grasped the “why” (which is to grasp its primary cause)’. The mention of ‘why’ suggests that causality has its objective giving reason(s) of why things are in the way they are. In this case, a cause may be considered a reason that explains why a being is in the way it is.

1 I attended this colloquium as a visiting PhD student working on the logical notion of verisimilitude.

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I would like to note that the link between causes and knowledge of things is in Plato’s Phaedo (96a6-10), where scientific inquiry searches for each thing’s cause, the reason (why) for existing and going out of existence. This view of inquiry shows that Plato is also interested in explaining being. However, the ideas of attempting to find whys relative to coming into and out of being, makes the whole concept of causation complicated, and at times beyond man’s grasp. Similar thinking is seen in Aristotle’s Posterior Analytics (94a20) as follows: Since we think we understand when we know the explanation, and there are four types of explanation (one, what it is to be a thing; one, that if certain things hold this must do; another, what initiated the change; and fourth, the aim), all these are proved through the middle term.

This passage is already classifying the causes into four, which is also the case in Physics (194b16-23). In Physics (194b16-23), Aristotle notes the first type of causes as, ‘that out of which a thing comes to be and which persists, is called “cause”, e. g. the bronze of the statue, the silver of the bowl, and the genera of which the bronze and the silver are species’. What fits this type is a material cause. Bronze is the material used in making a statue, so silver is used in making a bowl. The second cause is ‘the form or the archetype, i.e. the statement of the essence, and its genera, are called “causes” (e.g., of the octave the relation of 2:1, and generally a number), and the parts in the definition’. The citation suggests the formal cause, which defines what a particular thing is. For instance, what defines a triangle is the form made of three sides. The three equal sides define an isosceles triangle. According to traditional philosophy, rationality defines a human being. Aquinas commented on this cause in the following words, ‘Secondly a cause is said to be the species and exemplar. This is called a cause insofar as it is the quidditative nature [ratio] of the thing, for this is that through which we know of each thing “what it is”’ (Aquinas, 94). This cause is about the essence of a thing. The third cause in Physics (194b16-23) is, ‘Again the primary source of the change or coming to rest; e.g. the man who gave advice is a cause, the father is the cause of the child and generally what makes of what is made and what causes the change of what is changed’. This refers to what initiates change leading to the formation of a particular thing. The example of a father as the cause of a child suggests that the reason or the explanation of a child’s existence is the father. A father is, in this case, an efficient cause of a child. Just as a father explains a child, efficient cause explains by what a particular thing is made. For instance, a sculptor’s work explains why we have a statue, or in other words, it is the efficient cause of a statue. Aquinas further explains this cause in four subtypes, namely, ‘the perfecting, the preparing, the assisting, and the advising causes’. Commenting on these sub-clauses under efficient causes, he wrote: The perfecting cause is that which gives fulfillment to motion or mutation, as that which introduces the substantial form in a generation. The preparing or disposing cause is that which renders matter or the subject suitable for its ultimate completion. The assisting cause is that which does not operate for its own proper end, but for the end of another. The advising cause, which operates in those things which act because of something proposed to them, is that which gives to the agent the form through which it acts. (Aquinas 94)

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The acting verbs ‘perfecting’, ‘preparing’, ‘assisting’ and ‘advising’ are action verbs, which emphasise that the efficient cause is what initiates change. Aristotle inspired many theologians such as Aquinas, who tend to apply these attributes to the necessary efficient cause, explaining everything that exists. In this regard, God’s creation is a continuous act of perfecting, preparing, assisting and advising ‘being’ towards its completion. Therefore, God is the efficient cause insofar as he exists as a necessary being or cause. The fourth cause is, ‘Again in the sense of end or “that for the sake of which” a thing is done, e.g., health is the cause of walking about’. This is the final cause or the end of which something is made. For instance, making a hoe in our village is because of it becoming an instrument. The end of this piece of chalk is writing on the board, etc. This focus on end leads to the view that Aristotle suggests a teleological theory of causation regarding the purpose of a particular thing. The Aristotelian classification of causality sets a standard in most of the studies in the analytic and other traditions. Causation became the explanation of things in general; this mainly influenced studies in natural sciences and philosophy. In this direction of thought, Caruana (2014, 84) notes: I have presented this well known Aristotelian theory as four distinct ways of giving reasons for a thing to be what it is and thereby gain genuine knowledge of it. I did so because seeing Aristotle’s theory in this way helps us appreciate its relevance to contemporary discourse in the natural sciences.

Caruana has in mind the relation (parallelism) between causation and explanation, which are both about giving ‘reasons for’. While Caruana (2014, 84–85) acknowledges some similarities and demonstrates them, he noted some slight differences. In this aspect, he writes, ‘moreover, we need to recall that Aristotle’s concept of cause was intimately linked to the concept of the nature of the thing under consideration. Explanation, on the contrary, is a concept related primarily to understanding. It refers to our making sense of the world around us’. Despite this difference, they both give reasons to things, regardless of whether our scope is understanding or mere knowing. Similarly, Aristotle’s discussion of relations between a thing and its cause or potential cause influenced different logicians to concentrate on relations. This idea of relations is mainly obvious when considering the efficient cause. The history of natural science shows that more emphasis was on studying these causes relative to things. (2) Apart from concentrating on causal relations, different studies in the analytic tradition focused on clarifying causal laws. The debate on causal laws is present in Hume, who questioned the validity of these laws. In his work, An Inquiry Concerning Human Understanding (1748), Hume suggests the following definition of the relation between cause and effect: ‘We may define a cause to be an object, followed by another, and where all the objects similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second’. This shows an aspect of similarity in the relation between an event C that we call cause and another E that we call effect. The more we observe the similarities in our experience, the more we claim that cause-and-effect

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relation holds. However, does it mean to say that there is a relation between C and E as experience suggests? According to Hume, primarily, experience suggests the relation of contiguity, that is, C is closer to E and vice versa. Secondly, there is the relation of priority, which implies that E always (based on our experience) occurs after event C. You can immediately see that here we have the element of time. Thirdly, common sense suggests the relation of necessity. We think that there is a necessary connection between two events C and E. For example, an Anopheles mosquito carrying malaria (cause) beats x; then, one suffers from malaria (effect). We see a plasmodium in the blood of y, and then we think that there is a necessary connection with his condition of being a malaria patient (effect). If I am right, we can probably go beyond common sense and think of abstract relations, like in a statement, ‘By virtue of being a bachelor (cause), Alex lives without a wife (effect)’. This relation seems to suggest that the condition of not having a wife is necessarily the case of being a bachelor. Unfortunately, this relation is just tautological; it is not informative since the predicate (or effect) is in the subject or cause. Nevertheless, Hume denies any necessary connection between events C and E. All we can say is that experience is responsible for these relations or connections that we presuppose. We have the habit of connecting occurrences. We see lightning; experience tells us that we will hear a sound. We see some dark clouds; we conclude that rain is coming and immediately start preparing our gardens. In fact, in our villages, we do not even need weather forecasts.2 (b) What are philosophers saying about causation in the analytic framework? In analytic philosophy, there has been considerable interest in the concept of causation, mainly relative to areas such as philosophy of science, philosophy of language, philosophy of mind and logic. In terms of theories, philosophers have concentrated on providing the semantics of causation mainly by presenting its nature. They question the type of approach that is appropriate for conceptualising causation, such as physicalism, occasionalism or Humean supervenience. Questions have also focused on whether to follow the conception of causation as dealing with the relation of events or regard it as a relation of properties. Other thinkers have preferred the logical form of singular causal statements, as in Davidson’s case. In the African context, further studies have focused on clarifying the meaning of African concepts relative to causation (see also Sogolo 1991, 177–185).

2 Hume has probably discouraged the hopes of some of you, who thought that Leibniz’s explanation of the relation of cause and effect was genuine. Immanuel Kant will try to mend the damage that came with Hume’s interesting skepticism. We will not discuss Kant in details, but remember that cause and effect will come under the consideration of categories on the column of relations. Cause and effect in the structure of reason give us the conditions for possibility of this relation in the physical world.

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Firstly, some philosophers in the analytic framework discuss the nature of causation by analysing necessary and/or sufficient conditions. For instance, Sosa and Tooley (1993, 1) suggest one of the commonly discussed causes based on sufficiency’s logical relation. In elementary logic the statement, ‘If x is a human being, then x is a mammal’, expresses this relation. The logical structure of this statement is: ‘

If AðxÞ, then BðxÞ:’ or AðxÞ ⊃ BðxÞ:

This implies that the existence of x is enough for there to be a mammal. However, this does not mean that it is the only thing that constitutes a class of things known as mammals. Application of the idea of sufficient condition in discussing sufficient cause has been common in the analytic tradition and in empiricism in general, where the ideas of John Stuart Mill have been highly influential but also very controversial.3 We can start this discussion with simple clarification of what people say in the context of cause. For example, people may say that drinking poison is the cause of death. All that is implied is that drinking is a sufficient condition for death to occur; however, it can equally occur because of other things such as choking, suffering from malaria, affected by coronavirus, etc. This common way of viewing certain relations leads to the understanding that drinking poison is a sufficient cause of death. It means that without poison, death can still occur with other means. Similarly, Sosa and Tooley (1993, 5) noted a version of understanding causes relative to sufficient condition as in the statement: C is a cause of E if and only if C and E are actual and C is ceteris paribus sufficient for E.

In this expression they indicated that C is a sufficient cause for E; however, they have added the component that C and E are actual. The interest in introducing the ‘actual’ is probably to underline that this is enough for this effect in this particular situation. This is to consider that there may be other sufficient causes that may lead to this effect in different situations. Nevertheless, Sosa and Tooley (1993, 5–6) noted other philosophers who developed a similar conception of sufficient cause in the absence of the temporal constraint above, such as Mill, Braithwaite, Hart and Honoré, Hempel and Karl Popper. A different formulation from the above is where it may be said that: A is a sufficient condition for B whenever occurrence of A is all that is needed for the occurrence of B. (Hurley and Watson 2013, 24)

Mill is generally known because of using causality as a method in scientific research. The five famous methods include method of agreement, method of difference, joint method of agreement and difference, method of residues and method of concomitant variation.

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This version does not underline the word actual as above. Another important concept is the necessary condition. The common understanding is that: A is a necessary condition for B: B’s occurrence requires A’s occurrence. (Hurley and Watson 2013, 561)

The statement means that B cannot occur without property A. The ‘logical structure’ of a necessary condition reflects the relation of dependence: (i) If A(x), then B(x). (ii) If ~B(x), then ~A(x). In (ii), this shows that A(x) cannot occur without B(x), as is in (i). There may be other conditions needed for B(x) to be the case, but what is important is that A(x) must also be present. In applying this conception of ‘necessary condition’, in the context of causation, we can start from Hurley and Watson (2013, 561), who noted that, ‘when we say that the presence of clouds is a cause of rain; we mean “cause” in the sense of necessary condition. Without clouds, rain cannot occur, but clouds alone are not sufficient. Certain combinations of pressure and temperature are also required’. This shows that without clouds, then there is no rain. Clouds must, therefore, be there, together with other conditions. Sosa and Tooley (1993, 6) acknowledge the presence of formulations of necessary causes in analytic philosophy and suggests their version: C is a cause of E if and only if C and E are actual, and C is ceteris paribus necessary for E.

This only confirms the idea of necessary condition, such that the absence of C implies that of E. What is apparent added to the general formulation in the temporal constraint is also introduced in the sufficient cause above. Sosa and Tooley (1993, 5–6) indicated that Ernest Nagel’s view in his work, The Structure of Science, does not present this version. The last view standard in the analytic framework is influenced by reflecting the relation between sufficient and necessary conditions. For example, in the conditional statement: AðxÞ ⊃ BðxÞ, (i) If interest is that of getting a B(x), then A(x) is a sufficient condition for B(x). (ii) If the interest is that of getting A(x), then B(x) is a necessary condition for A(x). Similarly Sosa and Tooley (1993, 6) suggest a sufficient-necessary causal relation in the following: C is a cause of E if and only if C is ceteris paribus both sufficient and necessary for E.

(2) The approach based on sufficient and necessary is commonly discussed in the writings of John Mackie (1974). He defines and discusses the meaning of cause in the following passage:

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Asked what a cause is, we may be tempted to say that it is an event which precedes the event of which it is the cause, and is both necessary and sufficient for the latter’s occurrence; briefly that a cause is a necessary and sufficient preceding condition. (Mackie 1974, 35)

Mackie focuses on different properties that contribute towards a particular effect, such as the cause of a fire in a particular place. In this regard, Mackie suggests an interpretation of necessary, unnecessary, sufficient and insufficient using a fire situation with a set of conditions. At least part of the answer is that there is a set of conditions (positive and negative), including the presence of inflammable material, the absence of a suitably placed sprinkler and no doubt quite several others, which combined with the short circuit constituted a complex condition that was sufficient for the house’s catching fire, but not necessary for the fire that could have started in other ways. Also, of this complex condition, the short circuit was an indispensable part: the different parts of this condition, conjoined with one another in the absence of the short circuit, would not have caused the fire. The short circuit that has caused the fire is an indispensable part of a complex sufficient (but not necessary) condition of the fire. A simple example is the analysis of a case of a fire in a village house thatched with grass, relative to a match, and other conditions. (i) A match is insufficient for starting a fire on its own, but it will need other factors such as oxygen, dry grass, wind, etc. This confirms that a match on its own cannot start a fire. It could sound absurd to say that a match started a fire, which burned a grass house. (ii) A match is a necessary part of starting a fire with other conditions; however, this set of conditions is unnecessary for causing the fire. The understanding is that other possible conditions in which a match is absent may equally start a fire. (iii) It is sufficient because it can start a fire with other factors. This implies that it also qualifies as a sufficient cause. Based on the analysis that a match as a cause of the fire has various interpretations, together with other conditions equally crucial for the event, Mackie suggests the concept of INUS condition. This implies that a match is an insufficient, necessary, unnecessary and sufficient condition as per the above interpretation. Mackie’s developments are clarified further and formalised in the ontological framework, as suggested by Jaegwon Kim (1993). I will not enter into details with Kim’s discussion; I want to indicate that this analysis opened a way of considering causation focusing on different properties in a particular event with its various constituent properties and times. Below I will focus on some developments around Mackie and Kim, mainly in the work of Shoemaker. In a book known as Properties, a summary of writings in analytic metaphysics, Shoemaker developed a property-based conception of causation in ‘Causality and Properties’ (Shoemaker 2002, 228–254). He criticises both the Humean experience-

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based explanation and other thinkers on the causation of events and underlines properties’ relation. For instance, he suggests an event C of drinking some medicine and E developing a rash. We automatically claim that there is a cause-and-effect relationship between the two such that C is the cause and E is the effect. If we consider the constituent objects of events, event C will have as some of its constituent objects ‘man and pills’, the effect will have ‘man and rash’. The constituent parts of an event have properties that join them together, making the cause-andeffect relation possible. The verb takes refers to the property that we can claim in our example. We, therefore, say in C as equivalent to ‘man takes a pill’. This is a relational property between a man and a pill. Similarly, in E, man is related to a rash based on the relational property, such as ‘man breaks into a rash’. This context implies that breaks into is a relational property that links the two. Shoemaker suggests further an understanding of a property. According to him, the claim that x has a property F may lead to numerous properties such that the study of causation relative to x may be a tedious one. For example, if I am x, there are infinite relations that belong to x. The issue is that most of these properties are irrelevant to the action that I have done. For instance, assuming that I am standing 54 km away from Liwonde, this is irrelevant to my action m. To avoid the fact that some of the properties are irrelevant in a particular context, Shoemaker argues that properties are classified into genuine and non-genuine properties. Genuine property is such if and only if acquisition or loss constitutes a change in the object. On the contrary, we can say that it is not genuine if there is no change or loss in the object. The idea of change seems to be fundamental in this definition. Following Peter Geach, the notion of change is as follows: The thing called x has changed if we have ‘F(x) at time t’ true and ‘F(x) at time t+1’ false, for some interpretation of F, t, and t+1. (quoted in Shoemaker 2002, 229)

According to Shoemaker, changes are (i) mere changes, which are the ‘mere Cambridge changes’, and real changes, regarded as ‘Cambridge changes’. Given the link between changes and properties established above, we can say that properties are either mere Cambridge properties or Cambridge properties. These properties will define a causal relation in a particular context. Property-based causation promulgated by Shoemaker will further build on ideas from the philosophy of John Locke. Accordingly, Locke argued that our minds are blank (tabula rasa) at birth and it is through experience that we fill the mind with ideas. In the realism of Locke, objects are existing independently of our minds. These objects have what we call qualities. These are classifiable into primary and secondary qualities.4

Some talk about the tertially qualities, but these perfectly fit as a special form of secondary qualities.

4

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The primary qualities are the defining characteristics of a particular, without which it seizes to be. For instance, in the Cartesian framework, extension is a primary quality without which a body cannot be. The secondary qualities are dependent on primary qualities and other factors. For instance, warmth and pain are secondary qualities. Think of men who gather around a fire in our villages in June. When the fire is too much, they will experience pain, and they will all move away from it. When it is not strong, they will enjoy the warmth, hence protecting their bodies from cold weather. This experience is fundamentally dependent on the primary qualities of the fire and other elements such as distance. What is essential for Shoemaker is the definition of quality in the context of Locke. Locke says, ‘the power to produce any idea in our mind, I call quality of the subject wherein that power is’. The interpretation of Shoemaker is that Locke meant to say that the properties of objects are causal powers. Of course, this is because they produce in us some effects. This leads him to the idea of causation by claiming that: X has power if its presence in circumstances of particular sort will have some effects.

The issue of power relative to poison: we say that poison has the power to cause death. Apart from having this power to cause death, different poisons have other different powers. For example, poison A may have the ability to cause death by attacking the heart, poison B may have the spower by attacking the nervous system and poison C may have the power over the intestines. Properties have conditional capabilities: knife-shaped object made of steel has the conditional power of cutting wood, although it is not purposively meant for that. The wood outside there has the conditional powers of being a chair, although it is not the chair (Shoemaker 2002). (3) Other common studies in the analytic tradition have focused on understanding the nature of causation in relation to counterfactuals and probability. One of the works that document elements of both approaches is Causation and Counterfactuals (Collins et al. 2004). I will briefly introduce the idea of counterfactuals and then show some insights on its link with causation. Collins et al. (2004, 2) define a counterfactual in the following words, ‘A counterfactual is a conditional sentence in the subjunctive mood. The term “counterfactual” or “contrary-to-fact” conditional carries the suggestion that the antecedent of such a condition is false’. For example, the sentence, ‘If Maria was examined four questions, then she would fail’, has an antecedent, which is contrary to the fact that Maria was not examined four questions. The consequent is also contrary to the fact, whereby Maria passed. In the analytic framework, Chisholm (1946) was one of the philosophers who analyses these statements in ‘The contrary-to-fact conditional’. These statements were analysed by different philosophers such as Goodman (1947, 113–128), Stalnaker (1968, 98–112) and Lewis (1973) who became the main theorists because of his famous book, Counterfactuals.5 The fundamental idea that links causation and counterfactuals is that:

5

Other important works include Stalnaker (2003, 2007) and Hall (2004) (see Kayange 2018).

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A certain glass is struck and shatters. To say that the striking of the glass caused the shattering of the glass is to say that if the glass had not been struck then it would not have shattered. The striking caused the shattering in virtue of the fact that the shattering was counterfactually dependent on the striking. (Collins et al. 2004, 6)

The passage shows that the idea of causation between events occurred because the contrary fact did not take place. This implies that if the contrary fact had happened, then the causal relation question would not be the case. This suggests that through the study of counterfactuals, it is possible to understand causation and vice versa. This connection between causation and counterfactual is in John W. Carroll and Ned Markosian (2010:38), in the following words: C causes E if and only if, if C weren’t to occur, then E wouldn’t occur.

The left-hand side shows causation (C causes E) as the case, and the equivalent on the right-hand side is a counterfactual that shows that C occurred and E occurred. Lewis (1986, 193ff.) argued for counterfactual causation after analysing Hume’s definition of causation. Hume, as noted above, defined a cause as ‘an object followed by another, and where all the objects, similar to the first are followed by objects similar to the second. Or, in other words, where, if the first object had not been, the second never had existed’ (see Hume; Lewis 1986, 193). From this passage, he claimed that the first idea of causation focuses on the regularity of events that occur in succession. The second part is taken as a “promising alternative”, calling for a counterfactual analysis of causation. (Lewis 1993, 194). It is this second part that shows that there is causal dependence between causation and counterfactuals. Lewis (1986, 200) implicitly defines causation by noting that, ‘Causal dependence among actual events implies causation. If c and e are two actual events such that e would not have occurred without c, then c is a cause of e’. This defines causation relative to the idea of counterfactual dependence. The first part of the dependence, ‘e would not have occurred without c’, seems to suggest a strong conditional relation, such that e is dependent on c. One of the conditions that he gives on his idea of causation is that it ‘must always be transitive’. The intransitivity allows that a relation that holds on successive members in a sequence also applies to any element in the sequence in a particular order. For instance, (i) A is longer than B (ii) B is longer than C implies that A is longer than C. This relation shows the idea of transitivity, which is demanded by Lewis in causation. Commenting on this relation, he noted that, ‘Let c, d, and e be three actual events such that d would not have occurred without c and e would not have occurred without d. Then c is a cause of e even if e would still have occurred (otherwise caused) without c’ (Lewis 1986, 200). Lewis is taking c as a sufficient cause, given that he acknowledges that e would still have occurred even in the absence of c. Studies that focus on causation with counterfactuals discuss further the truth of counterfactual statements. Similarly, the question of probability, which is closer to the idea of truth, is discussed concerning counterfactuals and the world. The above discussion does not exhaust the different approaches in studying causation in the analytic tradition but affirms this concept’s centrality in this framework. Below, I

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will reflect on African philosophy’s causation, focusing on some works and some local languages such as Chichewa.

6.3

Causation in African Thought

Causation in African thought is one area that attracts various philosophers such as Edwin Sogolo, Kwame Gyekye, Segun Gbadegesin, Kwasi Wiredu and Robin Horton. Most of the theories tend to support a pluralistic conception of causes within the traditional African setting. This includes the presence of the ultimate or primary causes and the immediate or secondary causes. There is also a common view that the conception of causation in African philosophy goes more towards teleological theory than the Western thought that is often mechanistic. Some African philosophers look at this division with suspicion because both mechanic and teleological views are present in both Western and African thoughts. Another contentious area in African theories of causation is the relation between the supernatural causes (spiritual causes) and the natural causes, where the former is beyond the natural explanation. At the same time, the latter is dependent on the physical world. For example, this is present in the debate between Sodipo, who gives preference to the supernatural interpretations, and Wiredu who is suspicion about these categories (see Segun Gbadegesin 108). Below, I will focus on some African thinkers who have suggested their theories of causation. The first philosopher will be Gyekye, who develops his ideas in the context of moderate communitarianism. The second is Sogolo, who calls for pluralism in the area of causation. I have selected these philosophers because they represent most African theories that attempt to outline the causation. I further selected these philosophers because their ideas properly fit in the interpretation present in African analytic philosophy. (1) Gyekye outlines elements of the theory of causation in African thought in his works, such as An essay on African philosophical thought, Tradition and modernity, and other writings. The first conceptualisation of causation is Gyekye’s view that the Akan people follow a universal causation doctrine. This is in the following: ‘Everything has a cause (asêm biara wô ne farebae)’.

Interestingly, Gyekye appeals to African proverbs to support the presence of the ideas on causation. For instance, the proverb: ‘Whanever the palm tree tilts it is because of what the earth has told it’ (se abê bô ne mu ase a, na êwô nea asase ase no);

He further shows the idea of causation in general through an appeal to a counterfactual statement present among the Akan people: ‘If Birebire had not come, there would have been no calamity’ (Birebire amma a, amene mma).

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In the first expression above, through ‘Everything has a cause’, Gyekye is concurring with the general logic principle, the principle of sufficient reason as present in African philosophy. This aspect comes clearly in his book chapter (Gyekye 150) in the following passage: Suppose a child playing with a loaded gun pulls the trigger accidentally and kills a promising young man. The gross mechanics of the situation does not elude the African mind, but why this particular young man and at this particular juncture of his life? If this question is answerable, it will be only in terms of reasons, purposes, intentions, etc. Our traditional African assumes that it can be answered, since he considers that everything has a sufficient reason, either by way of mechanical causation or by intelligent (or quasi-intelligent) design. This can be questioned, but that does not belong to our present purpose, which is to give some idea of the reverberations in African culture of the resultant mode of explaining what is taken to be anomalous death.

Understanding the causes relative to this principle of sufficient reason suggests a mechanistic theory of causation or non-mechanistic causation. The second expression also supports a natural relation between causes and effects. The last expression is counterfactual and confirms the dependence of calamity on the fact that Birebire came. It purports the truth of the contrary fact, where the absence of Birebire means the absence of calamity. This supports the presence of counterfactual causation in the African philosophy, which was also the case in Kayange’s work, Meaning and Truth in African Philosophy (2018). Following the principle of sufficient reason, Gyekye acknowledges natural causation but notes that the Akan people do not explain this type of cause-and-effect relation. My view is that this may be so because most of these actions may seem obvious. A more complicated reason could be the thinking that even the natural events they may have a supernatural explanation; it may be superficial just to observe the natural causes. Nevertheless, Gyekye explains that ‘such events are held by them to be part of the order of nature established by the omnipotent creator, Onyame; they are part of Onyame’s arrangement (Onyame nhyehyêe), and, as a previously quoted proverb has it, ‘The order Onyame has established, no living man can alter’. Thus they, ‘seem to say that there is a “necessary” causal connection between such events’ (Gyekye 1987, 77). The necessary causal relation follows from the view of God as an omnipotent being. There is a strong sense of determinism here that things that happen must do so because of God’s determination. This is as good as believing in the existence of natural laws in things, whose origin is God the creator. Although the causation above is not of high interest in Gyekye’s discussion, what is essential and requires explanation regards the occurrences outside what is a natural phenomenon. He views these as extraordinary or contingent, and they have no explanation in the natural or physical world but the supernatural realm. Some of the characteristics of these events include those that ‘[a]re infrequent and hence are considered “abnormal”; they are discrete and isolated; they appear to be puzzling, bizarre, and incomprehensible; they are not considered subsumable under any immediately known law of nature’ (Gyekye 1987, 78). Clarifying the concept of these supernatural or extraordinary causes, Gyekye uses the terms ‘ultimate causes’

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and ‘immediate or secondary causes’. The ultimate causes explain the extraordinary causes; they are behind the secondary causes. For example, X enters the house, and the roof falls, injuring him; the secondary cause will be the falling of a roof. This will be an immediate explanation of his injury. On the contrary, the idea of ultimate cause answers why X entered the house at time t and why the roof fell at time t. The explanation of the concept of ‘ultimate cause’ in Gyekye refers to ‘lesser spirits or ancestral spirits’. He excludes the involvement of the supernatural being relative to the ultimate or real cause of something. The target of these actions may either concern things such as drought or concern a human individual. In his view, these are not accidents, where it happened unwillingly, but here it seems there is the involvement of the intention of the supernatural forces to intervene in the physical world. The other African conception of causation is in Sogolo’s works, mainly, ‘the concept of cause Godwin Sogolo (2003) argues for the concept of causality in African traditional culture, which is different from the Western thought. The difference is that the African conception follows the teleological conception of causation, while the Western is more mechanistic as above. In his work, “the concept of cause in African thought”’ (Sogolo 2003, 288ff), he focuses on the two models of causation in the African context departing from the distinction between the primary causes (non-mechanistic) and the secondary causes (mechanistic). The loose meaning of the term non-mechanistic is that the explanation does not depend on natural laws, while mechanistic is explainable through nature’s rules. Sogolo notes that, ‘Primary causes. . .are those predisposing factors not directly explicable in physical terms. Some of these take the form of supernatural entities such as deities, spirits, witches; others are stress-induced either as a result of victim’s contravention of communal morality or his strained relationship with other persons within his community’ (Sogolo 1991, 215). As the example above, the secondary cause is that the roof’s falling is the immediate cause, what people see, resulting in the injury on X. The primary cause is discovered through questioning further, the underlying cause for X to be a victim at time t. In this conception of primary and secondary causes, Sogolo shares Gyekye’s distinction between the ultimate causes and the immediate or secondary causes, as in Gyekye above. In this case, the ultimate cause is the same as the primary cause, while the immediate cause refers to the secondary cause. (2) In Sogolo’s work, he seems to follow a pluralistic view of causation, by noting that ‘The more crucial point about the issue of success or failure of an explanatory model depends, as we said earlier, on the nature of the event to be explained and our interest in that event’ (Sogolo 2003, 231). The interpretation of a fire’s story expresses that depending on a perspective, one may focus on a particular explanation as the main cause (children playing with a match or ignited match). His interest is that there are many possible explanations of an event and maybe complementary and non-mutually exclusive. He argues for causal pluralism in the discussion of illness or disease, which has several causes. There is a link between the secondary causes and the primary causes:

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It could be said that a healer in tropical Africa, attending to a patient suffering from, say, severe cerebral malaria, is aware (if only vaguely) that the patient’s ailment is caused by a parasite (secondary cause). But in a culture where almost everybody suffers repeatedly from bouts of malaria and where the disease in normally not severe, it is obvious why the patient’s consultation is bound to move beyond the ‘how’ question to the ‘why’ question: ‘Why such a severe attack and why me and not someone else?’. (Sogolo 2003, 236)

The quest for understanding why something happened to X leads to searching for the primary cause. The secondary and primary causes work together in defining something. Sogolo avoids the use of natural as referring to secondary and supernatural as referring to the supernatural. The plurality of causes is further in the following citation, ‘An African healer may attribute a disease to a successful natural cause not dissimilar to the germ theory of modern medicine. Yet the healer may also believe that the same disease is caused by supernatural forces, and would then proceed to cure the disease in these two seemingly incompatible ways’ (Sogolo 2003, 182). The same disease has two different possible interpretations; one is similar to a scientific explanation, while the second is calling for some supernatural element. (3) Segun Gbadegesin (1991) acknowledges the differences between natural and supernatural causes in philosophers such as Sodipo and Wiredu, indicating complexities in African thought. However, he embarks on building ideas of causality in the African thought. He departs from clarifying the notion of explanation, which is fundamental in terms of understanding the causes. Through the analysis of a story of people trying to establish the boy Aina’s poor performance in school, Gbadegesin introduces a pluralistic conception of possible causes. The author argues for a level 1 interpretation of this event as referring to the natural causes. In this aspect, he notes, ‘As I also mentioned, the first level of explanation [Level I] is to look for appropriate natural events that could be responsible. Why is Aina not doing well? Is it hunger? Is it fear? Is it ill-health?’ (Gbadegesin 1991, 115). In this regard, the African thought may call for an explanation by looking at the natural causes, which were secondary causes, according to Sodipo and Gyekye. Level 2 causes refer to the supernature or supernatural. For example, a person who has evil forces, such as witchcraft, may explain Aina’s poor school performance due to supernatural causes. The relation between the natural causes and the supernatural causes is in the following passage: This is how the supernatural features in the causal explanation of events: ordinary natural powers are necessary and sufficient for the explanation of ordinary events: an attack of fever that leaves in the normal time; a general, bad harvest for lack of rain; the financial ruin of an extravagant person. Extraordinary events are explained by appeal to powers beyond nature, also necessary and sufficient causes: fever attack that refused to go despite all medication; long period of drought -- the community gets worried about the intervention of a god; a son’s recklessness and extravagance bothers the parents and it gets explained, thanks to the diviner, by appeal to witchcraft power or as a last resort, an uncooperative destiny. (Gbadegesin 1991, 116)

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The citation above suggests an interpretation of natural powers in the African thought as qualifying as necessary and sufficient in explaining the ordinary events. This implies that to interpret the natural events, all that is needed is to appeal to the natural causes. Gbadegesin claims that natural powers satisfy both logical conditions below: (i) If natural power A(x), then the explanation of ordinary events B(x). Or expressed as ðAðxÞ ⊃ BðxÞÞ: (ii) If the explanation of ordinary events B(x) is true, then natural power A(x). The thinking on (ii) is ðAðxÞ ⊃ BðxÞÞ BðxÞ

==Given ==Is the case

∴AðxÞ The first case (i) is showing that A(x) is a sufficient condition for B(x), or written as A(x)~B(x), and the second A(x) is necessary for B(x), or written as B(x) then A(x), or ~A(x) ⊃ ~B(x). Gbadegesin is, therefore, claiming the existence of a biconditional relation between natural powers and ordinary events. Thus the natural powers and ordinary events take form: AðxÞ if and only if BðxÞ, or AðxÞ $ BðxÞ: In case of disease as above, the natural powers explain the natural events, implying that a natural remedy for a condition such as malaria eliminates a natural cause. The interpretation above also applies to the powers beyond nature necessary and sufficient for explaining the extraordinary events. The explanation of the meaning of extraordinary circumstances is not far from Gyekye and Sodipo, given that African questions why a particular incident happened to individual x and time t. In this case, where the natural event does not hold, the event qualifies for the supernatural. Aina’s situation that is not solved by a traditional doctor with a natural remedy is indicative that the explanation is in the supernatural realm. Apart from the discourse of necessary and sufficient causes relative to the natural and the supernatural explanatory causes, non-supernatural causes of illness are sought when a case is presented first. Any adult person knows that specific germs cause fever and that to get rid of it, one should do something about the germs. Such diagnosis is natural and empirical. The cause of an illness is traced to nature. Of

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course, this may be only an immediate cause. A further question is why the person is bitten by the mosquito, causing malaria. But this is not generally raised. The traditional herbalist knows the immediate causes of some illness and how they come about (Gbadegesin 1991, 129). The passage suggests the concept of immediate cause which reminds of the secondary cause. The claim is that the traditional herbalists are aware of these causes, and this is what they want to treat at first glance when a person is ill. Where Gbadegesin notes that ‘A further question may be raised as to why the person is bitten by the mosquito which caused the malaria’, suggests the other category of causes. In the discussion on Gyekye above, this refers to the ultimate cause of this illness. The above discussion shows that the African theory of causation is mainly between natural causation and supernatural causation. The former has an explanation in nature or natural powers, and the later in supernatural powers. The other common aspect is that causes may be either primary or secondary. The latter is immediate and may refer to the natural (what is observed), and the former mainly refers to what is beyond physical observation. The other common element is that there seems to be a belief in the pluralistic conception of causes, such that an event may have different explanations. This is because the same event, such as Malawi’s suffering, may qualify in physical causation if the event is interpreted as extraordinary. The same event may be eligible as natural if interpreted differently. The last common element is accepting the principle of sufficient reason as fundamental in the traditional African setting. (4) Causation through language analysis in Malawi: While I appreciate the different studies in causation, below, I will develop this concept in African analytic metaphysics through language study. I follow the ordinary language approach, which was earlier announced in the introduction. What the nature of causation in an African setting is as revealed in figurative expressions? Different anthropologists such as Chakanza (2000) have collected figurative expressions and related stories, which form a fundamental part of the content that informs the concept of cause and the general idea of causation. (i) The first set of figurative expressions is represented in Chakanza (2000), referring to the concept of cause. While they refer to this concept, the expressions also refer to other meanings/concepts. This confirms the richness of language and the fact that language use and meaning are contextual. The context of use in this section is only that which is indicative of causation (Table 6.1). I will start my analysis with figurative expression 5, which is very instructive in theory and understanding various causes. I would like to note that Chakanza, whose interest was in anthropology, does not put the figurative expression five (5) under cause, but the issue of truth. This is understandable because of the link between explanation and truth in his literal translation and meaning (see Chakanza 2000, 321). In my interpretation, this figurative expression falls under the area of causation. The importance of explaining the cause is that it is a reason for some effect, as was

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Table 6.1 Causation and figurative expressions S/ N 1

Figurative expression Katadzola fumbi kalekeni kali ndi nyimbo/kalowa m’bwalo

2

Ng’oma siilira yokh. Nsawa yowola ilavulitsa zolimba

3

Literal meaning Though he has smeared himself with dust, let him go on, he still has some songs coming/whatever entered the dancing ground has a song A drum does not sound on its own One rotten groundnut makes one spit out many good ones

4

Uko kulire n’kumtsukwa

Where it rings, it is the pointed part of the hoe

5

Umanena chatsitsa dzaye kuti njovu ithyoke mnyanga

You should explain (say) what brought down the fruit (dzaye) so that the elephant broke its tusk

Causal reference Know the objectives behind people’s actions before voicing opinions and objections

There is always a reason/cause behind any complaint One man’s mistake can affect many people (single cause but multiple effects) What embitters your feelings most constitutes the problem (plurality of causes and main cause) Go straight to the point or main issue that explains the rest (explanation and causal chain)

the case in Aristotle indicated above. The figurative expression is also introducing a set of possible interpretations, some of which are not fundamental relative to the effect. It underlines that at least there is one that is a primary cause. The other causes qualify as an explanation, but in this case, they are secondary. The use of figurative expression (5) in the ordinary language has a story behind, which clarifies the idea of a chain or series of causes, one of which is primary and the rest secondary. Chakanza (2000, 321) indicates the story in the following words, ‘The Bwampini mouse was up a dzaye tree shook down a dzaye fruit which broke, in turn, a small branch. This too broke and displaced a bigger branch which fell on an elephant’s tusk, which finally broke it’. Structure of a chain of causes: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

Causal action1 [Shakes dzaye and it falls (mouse)] Causal action2 [Breaks a small branch (dzaye)] Causal action3 [Falls and displaces a bigger branch (small branch)] Causal action4 [Falls on and breaks elephant’s tusk (bigger branch)]

The structure has a sequence of causes and effects of the following: (i) (ii) (iii) (iv)

Causal relation1 [C (mouse) and E (dzaye falls)] Causal relation2 [C (dzaye) and E (small branch breaks)] Causal relation3 [C (small branch) and E (bigger branch falls)] Causal relation4 [C (bigger branch) and E (falls on and breaks elephant’s tusk)

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This sequence has different implications on the understanding of causation in the African context. Firstly, it shows that an object in effect becomes a cause of the following event in this chain of causes and effects. For example, in C1 the object in the effect is dzaye, which is transformed into a cause in C2. As a cause in 2, it still carries the power in the first cause in this transformation. The understanding is that together with this power from the first cause, the first cause has its power from its properties added to the earlier power. Interestingly, the story shows an increase in the powers, from small fruit to a small branch to a bigger branch and then to breaking a big animal (elephant). The figurative expression suggests that it is fundamental to identify the primary cause in the study of causes. In this case, C1 is the primary cause. I am tempted to note that the traditional African society suggests a scientific approach to events, where individuals must go straight to the primary causes rather than start with the secondary causes. There are different reasons for this, one of which is that the truth of a matter lies in the primary cause. Another reason is that it is a waste of time to focus on secondary causes alone, which do not provide true knowledge of a particular event. It seems also that the structure of causes and effects above is showing the presence of transitivity in the African conception of causes. Since event C1 causes event C2 which causes event C3, it is the case that event C1 causes event C3. Another figurative expression that is very informative in this study is, ‘One rotten groundnut makes one spit out many good ones’. The figurative expression focuses on a single cause, which leads to a multiplicity of effects. Generally, in the propertybased conception of causation, the focus is on one different property and powers (causes) responsible for a particular situation. It is different in this context because it is one cause with its properties leading to many problems. For example, a single cause such as rape can lead to a plurality of causes as below (Fig. 6.1). This type of thinking is also common in the traditional African context when considering a system of beliefs and causes. Although the above explanation has focused on a plurality of effects, the use of the expression ‘Where it rings, it is the pointed part of the hoe’, is suggestive of a diversity of causes, where one is a fundamental cause. It differs slightly from figurative expression 5 in terms of focus, because it is not underlining a chain of causes leading to one effect, but it focuses on the real cause. Despite this aspect, figurative expressions 5 and 4 show the presence of primary cause, and the importance of identifying it, either relative to a chain of causes (as in 5) or relative to other superficial causes (as in 4). The figurative expression 2, ‘A drum does not sound on its own’, literarily shows that every sound of a drum has an explanation. There is a subject that is the reason for such a sound. In the traditional setting, different sounds of a drum and the ways of drumming were sending a message to the people. For example, when there was a funeral, a particular way of drumming was done. When people were invited to a

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Fig. 6.1 Plurality of causes

celebration, there was also a different way of drumming. All this suggests that while there is a subject responsible for a particular sound, there is also a reason for a particular way of drumming. The message in the context of causation is that whatever is, there is an explanation. Figurative expression 1, ‘Though he has smeared himself with dust, let him go on, he still has some songs coming/whatever entered the dancing ground has a song’, is mainly referring to human actions, whereby there are reasons behind every action. However, it implies that every causation is best considered in the next chapter on free will and human actions. (ii) There are other figurative expressions that Chakanza (2000) classifies under the concept causality, which will be discussed below (Table 6.2). The figurative expression, ‘What has passed swiftly has made the hunter wonder/ what has passed swiftly has frightened the hunter’ (Chati deru chadabwitsa mlenje/ kati deru kaopsa mlenje) (Chakanza 2000, 43), links the wonder of a hunter (effect) to a particular cause, which is not very clear. The interpretation of Chakanza is that, ‘Any action, story or conflict, no matter how insignificant it may look, has its source, root or cause. It does not begin from thin air’. The author is holding that African thought has a sufficient reason for anything that happens. This figurative expression also shows that there is a relation between events. The figurative expression ‘Did you ever see a tree without a stem’ (Kodi mtengo wopanda tsinde mudaupenya?) is classified under causation, and it may be in the form, ‘Every tree has a stem’. Chakanza noted that this expression means that ‘Everything has a beginning’. The word beginning refers to causality (Chakanza

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Table 6.2 Chakanza’s figurative expressions under causality S/ N 1

2 3 4

Figurative Chati deru chadabwitsa mlenje/kati deru kaopsa mlenje Kodi mtengo wopanda tsinde mudaupenya? Kwaloza phazi sikusowa

6

Mapundi amadya (akudya) n’chika Mayendayenda mapha miyendo/mapazi Mtima wake waika pa mfuti

7

Nthunzi sifuka pachabe

8

Palira mbirira pali khwawa

5

Literal translation What has passed swiftly has made the hunter wonder

Causal reference Any action has its cause

Did you ever see a tree without a stem You cannot miss where the foot has pointed Reckless people eat a longmouthed rat Running around kills the legs/feet His heart is set on the gun

Everything has a cause

Steam does not rise from nowhere Where waterfalls roar, there is also a river bed

Every action has a reason A consequence follows the antecedent Continued bad practices cause self destruction Ruddiness has an explanation in what one has There is a necessary link between cause and effect Somethings are indicative of certain effects

2000, 117). It implies that whatever is has a cause or reason, whereby ‘beginning’ is a cause or a reason. Kwaloza phazi sikusowa (You cannot miss where the foot has pointed). Chakanza indicates that people use this figurative expression to mean, ‘whatever we do must have a reason for it’. This also suggests causation in the context of human actions. It is indicative of a form of determinism, where human actions are linked with an end (cause as end – teleology) (Chakanza 2000, 153). Litsipa lomva choso (kasire) mphini adatema kadzidzi (The headache hurt the sparrow, but the owl got incised). This figurative expression focuses on causes but relative to human actions (it may fit well in discussing human actions, causes and responsibility). In this context, it wants to show that an action done by one individual may have effects on other innocent members of society. This is why he links this also with justice and punishment (Chakanza 2000, 747). Mapundi amadya (akudya) n’chika (Reckless people eat a long-mouthed rat). This is put under causality and recklessness and interpreted as ‘one reaps what one sows’. The link here is that ‘If one is reckless, then he/she faces bad consequences’. It means that recklessness causes bad consequences. Mayendayenda amapha miyendo/mapazi (Running around kills the legs/feet). Chakanza indicates that it means that continued evil practices cause personal disaster. Causation in this framework has the time factor. This shows that a cause may mature as such after a certain period t. These are practices that take place gradually, and when the conditions fully mature, disaster follows. For example, assuming that smoking cigarettes cause cancer, many experiences slowly end in cancer. The gradual maturity of cigarette and smoke event goes, (i) ‘x smokes cigarette’, which becomes a condition that starts building conditions for cancer in x. This

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continues to similar events (ii), (iii). . . (n) where x starts suffering visibly from cancer. Mtima wake waika pa mfuti (His heart is set on the gun). This expression either refers to dependency or causality. In the context of causality, the idea is that rudeness in this expression is caused by what one has. In this case, the cause is the gun (Chakanza 2000, 216). This figurative expression is similar to Wosaona akati ndikugenda waponda mwala (When a blind person says I will stone you, it means that he/she has stepped on a stone). This does not necessarily mean that someone is rude, but it shows that the cause of boldness in a person, who cannot see stones, is indicative that he/she has a stone. This implies that certain forms of boldness are expressive that the individual has something that he/she is relying on. Nthunzi sifuka pachabe (Steam does not arise from anywhere). This is similar to ‘there is no smoke without a fire’. It shows that a visible effect is indicative of a hidden cause. It also calls for the principle of sufficient reason (Chakanza 2000, 261). This is similar with Pafuka utsi pali moto (where the smoke rises, there is fire). Palira mbirira pali khwawa (Where waterfalls roar, there is also a river bed). This is suggestive of a necessary cause, which when the present one is very sure that there is a river bed. (iii) There are other figurative expressions in the African context that indicate the presence of the linkage between causation and counterfactual. Kayange (2018) discusses a list of Chewa causal statements that are sometimes expressed in the form of counterfactuals and argued for a link with causation. In this section, I will not focus on different elements in this work, but the focus will be on figurative expressions that are used in everyday language use using the form of counterfactuals. One of such figurative expressions which are of interest in this work because of its link with causation is: ‘Ndikanadziwa ndikadaphika therere’ (If I had known, I would have cooked okra).

Being a figurative expression, the cause-and-effect relationship on the literal level does not provide the real meaning. I would like to clarify this expression further before demonstrating the causal link. The story behind this expression is that ‘A woman got disappointed when her husband could not bring some kill from the hunting expedition. Regretting that one’s expectations have not turned the way one wished they would. Blast it! What now’ (Chakanza 2000, 241). The woman in this story did not cook the locally present vegetables (therere), because of a lack of knowledge of the outcome of hunting. She counted on hunting, thinking that it will bring food for the day. The story creates two events, (i) the event of hunting to bring meat for the day. Consequently, this raises the hope of having food for the day. (i) The counter-event is that of going for hunting but coming back without meat for the day. These two situations may be summarised into two different worlds as follows: (i) World1: x goes hunting and brings meat to his home. (ii) World2: x goes hunting but doesn’t bring meat to his home.

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If world1 is the actual state of affairs, then world2 cannot hold, and vice versa if world2 holds, then world1 cannot hold. The probability of the world2 being the case is dependent on world1 not being the case. The figurative expression refers to the consequences of (i) and (ii). It shows that the consequence of (i) obtaining is that the family has food for the day; therefore, there is no need to find other alternatives (in this case, cooking therere). On the contrary, (ii) the consequence is that the family has no food, hence requiring therere as an alternative. The expression above shows that lack of knowledge (If I had known) that (ii) will be the case led to the thinking and trusting that (i) will be the case; consequently, a wrong decision of staying idle followed. The decision to trust and act based on (i) is justified by the whole expression ‘If I had known, I would have cooked okra’. This expression shows that lack of knowledge is the cause of wrong decisions (staying idle), which leads to different effects.

6.4

Conclusion

I conclude with a summary in a comparison table to show some similarities and differences on causation. Comparison table A. Similarities Comparison Western analytic philosophy area Cause-andAcknowledgement of cause-and-effect relation effect relation Physical causation Creation

Physical causation

Counterfactual causation B. Differences Physical and spiritual Causation focus Reality of causation God’s creation

Counterfactual causation

God as a cause of all things

Physical causation Mechanistic causation Causation is a question of habit that one action occurs after another but there is no real connection Creation ex nihilo

African analytic philosophy Acknowledgement of cause-and-effect relation Physical causation God is the cause of all things Counterfactual causation Physical and spiritual causation Teleological causation Causation is a true relation between C and E Creation as artistic work of God out of his will

The chapter attempted to discuss the nature of causation in both African and Western analytic frameworks. It is difficult to generalise that conception of causation

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x represents the whole Western or African thought. The reason is that there are different views of causation within these traditions. In Western thought, despite Bertrand Russell’s challenge on the nature and usefulness of causation, this work has shown that there are notable works that focus on necessary and sufficient conditions as fundamental in this context. They assume that causation is fundamental and that some causes are necessary and others fall in the category of sufficient for a particular event to occur. Other thinkers have tended to question the logical validity of explanations around necessary and sufficient causes, which do not adequately capture the idea of causation. It was noted that different conditions are involved for causation to take place. This led to the discussion of pluralism in the context of causation. Studies in causation have also shown that causation is linked with other concepts such as counterfactuals, truth, laws and probability. The study has selected the link between causation and counterfactual, which has encouraged a long debate in the analytic tradition. The chapter has flagged various ideas on causation in the African analytic philosophy through language, mainly figurative expression. These have shown that the nature of causation suggests different causes such as sufficient causes, necessary causes, multiple causes and effects, causation and counterfactual dependence, singular causes and knowledge-cause relation. The study of language just confirms the universality of philosophy by showing that the developments present in the Western analytic framework are equally current in the African context.

Chapter 7

Determinism and Indeterminism: Freedom of Actions

Abstract This chapter investigates freedom of actions in relation to ‘indeterminism and determinism’. The main question is whether human beings are free in view of having free will (freedom of choice) or whether they are determined by external factors, such as natural laws. In fact, this has attracted different important developments, such as compatibilism, which assumes that free will and determinism are compatible, hence arguing that ‘human beings are free’, and incompatibilism, a view that they are not compatible, hence ‘human beings are not free’. Apart from presenting the studies on this issue in Western analytic philosophy, the chapter explores issues relative to freedom of actions, determinism and indeterminism in the African thought through the study of language. This will show that language use in African thought reveals that there is a multiplicity of interpretations that accommodates these views in the traditional setting.

7.1

Introduction

The chapter will focus on a component of determinism and indeterminism,1 which concerns human actions relative to freedom and responsibility. The relation between freedom and responsibility has attracted inconclusive debates in different thinkers in 1

Note that in history of philosophy, some rationalist philosophers relate this notion to reason and they see man as imprisoned by his senses and for him to achieve true freedom, there is a strong need to leave the deceptive senses and live according to reason. Right from Plato, one of the strongest rationalists who ever existed, freedom is possible in the society only if reason is at the centre of all the politics in a given community. Reason therefore determines the essence of this concept. On the contrary some empiricists such as John Locke believed that the state of freedom is natural to all men regardless of how they look or what they are, etc. He further indicates that they are also in the state of equality. The relation between the two is that natural freedom is derived from natural equality. This suggests that we are free firstly because we are all the same and no one has the privilege to oppress other. Although freedom is natural, Locke indicates that nature has its own laws. This suggests that our freedom as human subjects must be subjected to nothing but to the law of nature on which it is based. In fact in the Second Treatise of Civil Government (§ 22), Locke underlines that the natural liberty of man must not be ‘under no other restrain but the law of nature’. Nature as accessible through senses determines the essence of this concept. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. M. Kayange, The Question of Being in Western and African Analytic Metaphysics, Synthese Library 438, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69645-0_7

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both continental and analytic frameworks. For instance, some notable modern discussions focus on the compatibility or incompatibility of freedom and responsibility within the conflict between the determinism and indeterminism of human actions (see, e.g. Ayer et al. 1982, 1984; MacKay 1967; Chishom). Roderick M. Chishom formulates this conflict in his work Human Freedom and the Self, as follows: The metaphysical problem of human freedom might be summarized in the following way: Human beings are responsible agents; but this fact appears to conflict with a deterministic view of human action (the view that every event that is involved in an act is caused by some other event); and it also appears to conflict with an indeterministic view of human action (the view that the act, or some event that is essential to the act, is not caused at all).

The citation shows that human beings are responsible for their actions; for instance, I decide to move with my bicycle and hit a free-range chicken. I have to take responsibility for this action. However, the first point raised is that putting together this responsibility with another view that everything is conditioned or caused (determinism), I cannot take responsibility for hitting a chicken with my bicycle. The action of hitting a chicken entails causation. Similarly, responsibility plus the idea that no event is caused by anything (since it happens randomly), implies that I cannot take responsibility for hitting this chicken. This problem may be summarised as follows (see also Feinberg and Shafer-Landau 2005, 387): (i) If determinism is true, we can never do other than we do; hence, we are never responsible for what we do. (ii) If indeterminism is true, then some events – namely, human actions – are random, hence not free; hence, we are never responsible for what we do. Another way of formulating this problem is to express free will and responsibility. While the word free will has a long history of what it entails, it was traditionally a faculty for making decisions in a human person. In modern studies, attention is not necessarily on faculty, but on free will understood as ‘freedom of action’ (see McFee 2000, 1–5). The question is, can we embrace the freedom of action and determinism at the same time? Or can we embrace the freedom of action and indeterminism at some time? Section 7.2 will focus on Western philosophy developments, with a particular interest in the analytic framework. This will concentrate on the main approaches that address freedom and responsibility: compatibilism and incompatibilism. Section 7.3 builds the question of freedom and action relative to determinism and indeterminism in the African context. After conceptualising determinism and indeterminism in African thought, the section reflects ubuntu as a soft determinism version.

7.2 Determinism and Indeterminism in Western Metaphysics

7.2

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Determinism and Indeterminism in Western Metaphysics

Before discussing philosophers’ views regarding these questions, I would like to note on determinism and indeterminism, which are general terms (not only discussed relative to human actions). The general area that discusses determinism is ontology/ study of being and its related subject, philosophy of nature. The main ontological version follows from the argument that things happen because of other things. In other words, this refers to the idea that nothing happens without a reason or cause. In this framework, everything has an explanation in line with scientific laws or laws of nature. Everything happens out of necessity e.g. philosophers such as Leucippus and Democritus; Baruch Spinoza, Paul Holbach (1723–1789) and Ted Honderich (2001) argued for determinism. Indeterminism holds the opposite view by claiming that things in nature happen randomly, such that we cannot predict anything with certainty (Popper 1959; William James). Going back to the issues above: (i) The question becomes, can we embrace the freedom of action and determinism at the same time? (ii) Can we embrace the freedom of action and indeterminism at the same time? Studies in Western philosophy mainly respond to these questions based on two theories, namely, compatibilism and incompatibilism. (1) Compatibilism is a belief that freedom of action and determinism are compatible. This implies that while one may hold some form of determinism as true, freedom of action is also true. Compatibilism is sometimes viewed as soft determinism, as was suggested in William James. Compatibilism is a doctrine that has gone through various revisions, starting from ancient Greek philosophy to medieval and modern developments. I will not give details on this but isolate some influential thinkers in developing the analytic tradition. Here I have in mind the classical thinkers in empiricism such as Hume, Hobbes and John Stuart Mill. I will comment on Hobbes as one of the early supporters of compatibilism and then consider some aspects in other thinkers such as Ayer. Hobbes suggests a form of compatibilism in his work Leviathan, mainly in the section on ‘Of liberty of subjects’. For instance, Hobbes commented on free will relative to human actions that: Lastly, from the use of the words free will, no liberty can be inferred of the will, desire, or inclination, but the liberty of the man; which consisteth in this, that he finds no stop in doing what he has the will, desire, or inclination to do. (Hobbes [1651]1998,129)

The citation shows that liberty is not in the will, desire or inclination, but in the responsibility of a human subject to act based on a particular inclination. It seems that will is neutral since it is independent of human decision to act in a particular way.

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The link between free will and determinism in Hobbes is in the discourse on the link between liberty and necessity (this also reflects the work of Ayer’s freedom and necessity). The definition of the word liberty in this philosopher refers to the absence of opposition or constraints. Hobbes puts the link between liberty and necessity in the following passage: Liberty and necessity are consistent: as in the water that hath not only liberty, but a necessity of descending by the channel; so, likewise in the actions which men voluntarily do, which, because they proceed their will, proceed from liberty, and yet because every act of man’s will and every desire and inclination proceedeth from some cause, and that from another cause, in a continual chain (whose first link is in the hand of God, the first of all causes), proceed from necessity. (Hobbes [1651]1998, 130)

Hobbes brings in determinism through the conception of the element of necessity by connecting the ‘act of man’s will’ and ‘desire and inclination’ to God, who is a necessary cause. He uses a causal argument, where the current cause implies an earlier cause, which has, in turn, another cause, up to something that is not caused, in this case, God. This shows that, in principle, there is a chain of causes leading us to the necessary being. Although God is the necessary being, there is still a component of free will in human subjects, but the moment one decides and acts, then the causal element enters into play. While the above discussion seems to place the compatibility between free will and determinism in nature in general, Hobbes makes an application of this relation in society. In my opinion, this discussion avoids a situation of negative freedom, where individuals may enter into conflict as they attempt to exercise their freedom. Here I have in mind those situations where my actions may not necessarily lead to the necessary cause. These are the circumstances wherein living together as human subjects may, at times, be a threat towards self-conservation and peace. Hobbes noted that: But as men, for the attaining of peace and conservation of themselves thereby, have made an artificial man, which we call a Commonwealth; so also have they made artificial chains, called civil laws, which they themselves, by mutual covenants, have fastened at one end to the lips of that man, or assembly, to whom they have given the sovereign power, and at the other to their own ears. These bonds, in their own nature but weak, may nevertheless be made to hold, by the danger, though not by the difficulty of breaking them. (Hobbes, [1651] 1998, 130ff).

The agreement above controls the exercise of freedom (agreement also becomes a factor of determinism). Nevertheless, Hobbes makes it clear that humans have free will but also are determined. Walter T. Stace (1886–1967) was concerned with the crumbling of objectivity as caused by the triumph of natural science as a genuine interpretation of reality and the disappearance of religious understanding of reality. This orientation towards scientific explanation was earlier a fundamental component of the analytic tradition. A threat was in the context of morality and human responsibility towards different actions. The fact that religion was generally not credible in explaining things in the world, the clarification of free will with moral foundations was necessary for the analytic tradition. Stace will, therefore, agree with the reality of determinism but, at

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the same time, justify the existence of free will regarding everyday human actions, hence the related responsibility. Commenting on this issue, he summarises the problem of free will in the following words: Throughout the modern period, until quite recently, it was assumed, both by the philosophers who denied free will and by those who defended it, that determinism is inconsistent with free will. If a man’s actions were wholly determined by chains of causes stretching back into the remote past, so that they could be predicted beforehand by a mind which knew all the causes, it was assumed that they could not in that case be free. This implies that a certain definition of actions done from free will was assumed, namely that they are actions not wholly determined by causes or predictable beforehand. Let us shorten this by saying that free will was defined as meaning indeterminism. This is the incorrect definition which has led to the denial of free will. (1952, 248-258)

In this passage, Stace indicates that the denial of free will by different philosophers has its root in a misrepresentation of the meaning of this concept (free will as a semantic problem). This misrepresentation constitutes an interpretation of the meaning of free will as indeterminism. The author sees a discrepancy between meaning and action, even in those that deny free will. This is seen in that while they deny free will, their actions show that there is a level of free will (Stace 1952, 248–258). Here is an exciting citation in Religion and Modern Mind (1952): It is to be observed that those learned professors of philosophy or psychology who deny the existence of free will do so only in their professional moments and in their studies and lecture rooms. From when it comes to doing anything practical, even of the most trivial kind, they invariably behave as if they and others were free. They inquire from you at dinner whether you will choose this dish or that dish. They will ask a child why he told a lie and will punish him for not having chosen the way of truthfulness. All of which is inconsistent with disbelief in free will.

To a certain extent, Stace supports the philosophy of William James on the aspect of free will. This argument is somehow problematic because one can argue that free will is a creation of man to deal with the problem of morality. Man wants to avoid chaotic behaviour and punish any presumed misconduct; free will is created to attribute the subject’s responsibility in question. In proving the point that free will has a problem of meaning, Stace appeals to the ordinary language approach to meaning. Meaning is a consequence of how people are using language in an everyday context. For example, the meaning of the word ‘dog’ is given by how the English language speakers use it in a particular context. Indicating this method concerning free will, Stace (1952) wrote, ‘This shows the common usage is the criterion for deciding whether a definition is correct or not. And this is the principle which I shall apply to free will. I shall show that indeterminism is not what is meant by the phrase “free will” as it is commonly used’. Stace is sharing a methodology similar to Austin and Wittgenstein of the Philosophical Investigations. This ordinary language use of free will leads to situations where people indicate that they have done something out of their choice (hence free acts) and situations where they were compelled by external factors (unfree acts). For example, in the statement, ‘I have withdrawn from the college out of my free will’, it implies that this is a free act, hence supporting free will. On the contrary, the statement, ‘I have given the

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student a distinction because she threatened to report my private life to my wife’, shows that this is not a free act; hence the individual was conditioned. There was a psychological threat that influenced the individual in this decision. According to Stace, the common element in statements about actions done out of free will is that, ‘The free acts are caused by desires, or motives, or by some sort of internal psychological states of the agent’s mind’; on the other hand, the unfree acts share in that there is an external physical force or condition that influences the acting subject. This ordinary explanation leads to the idea that free will is real, and it deals with free acts as influenced by internal psychological factors. For this reason, the denial of free will is only academic and does not reflect ordinary people’s use of terms. In other words, the denial of free will is nonsensical as it does not reflect how things are in the world of experience. In Freedom and Necessity, Alfred Ayer an opponent to this position argues that determinism is true, but he similarly accepts free will and responsibility. We make choices in life that support free will; for instance, we can decide to run or walk, sit down or stand up, sing or remain silent, etc (see also Perry 1961). On free will, Ayer writes, ‘When I am said to have done something of my free will it is implied that I could have acted otherwise, and it is only when it is believed that I could have acted otherwise, that I am held to be morally responsible for what I have done’. The idea that ‘I could have acted otherwise’ shows that I was free to choose from another alternative, but the fact that I acted in a certain way confirms that I was free to have done otherwise regardless of determinism. This puts together the possibility of determinism and freedom in a particular action. Ayer is, therefore, holding a kind of compatibilism, hence holding individuals responsible for their actions. Although Ayer’s position builds on the theory of counterfactuals as a justification of freedom, philosophers have mixed feelings. For example, Harry Frankfurt argues that the fact that one could have done otherwise is not a necessary condition that justifies the presence of free will. Having a different alternative course of action does not necessarily imply that an individual has a choice. For example, Frankfurt is trying to show that I may have two alternatives A and B; in case I am not sure which one to follow, an external influence (machine) x may be imposed on me without my knowledge to chose B. Assuming that I decided for B before x entered into action, x was unnecessary. Although I have acted based on free will, it doesn’t justify that I am free because x would have caused me to chose B. This shows that the ability to do otherwise is unnecessary; hence, it cannot support the argument for determinism and free will. (2) Incompatibilism: Is the view that free will and determinism are incompatible. Firstly, the incompatibilist thesis is hard determinism, which considers determinism as true but completely excludes free will as inexistent and a mere illusion. Secondly, on the other hand, there are the libertarians, who do not accept a connection between free will and determinism, by arguing that free will is true, while determinism is false. Below, I will first consider some hard determinism ideas in (a) and later focus on libertarianism in (b). (a) In hard determinism, everything, including human actions, is determined or has a cause. Given that everything is determined, there is no free will, and freedom is

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just an illusion. The assumption is that there is no relationship between human action and free will. Some of the determinists in this tradition include Paul Holbach and Ted Honderich. Hard determinism is presented by Paul Henri Holbach (1723–1789) in the Illusion of Free Will (1770[2005]:392–397), where human beings belong to nature, which has its scientific laws for all its elements to follow. Human beings can, therefore, not escape its dictates. For instance, the law of nature suggests that any massive object is left free in the air; it will fall to the ground. Whether a human being wants it or not, he is determined to obey. Commenting on this helplessness of man, Paul Holbach writes: He is born without his consent; his organization does in nowise depend upon himself; his ideas come to him involuntarily; his habits are in the power of those who cause him to contract them; he is unceasingly modified by causes; whether visible or concealed, over which he has no control, which necessarily regulate his mode of existence, give the hue to his way of thinking, and determine his manner of acting.

Holbach wonders why this conditioned man is free. For Honderich, the claim that man is free when he is not is problematic. Where is freedom, when in a true sense, nature is imposing on us the way forward? It tells us that now it is time to be born, time to become old, time to die, etc. Some philosophers defend that despite all these problems, man possesses what is known as free will. For Holbach, this is a consequence of some personal motives and experiences. In this context, free will is seen as a mere ‘modification of the brain, by which it is disposed to action, or prepared to give play to the organs’. One can argue against this position by indicating that what happens naturally to human beings suggests that he can choose whether to do something or not; hence there is free will. For example, when one is thirsty, he can decide whether to drink water or not. One can decide whether to stay without eating food or not, etc. According to Holbach, the human body conditions him/her to act in most of the circumstances. In other cases, other motives make a human being act in a certain way. There is, therefore, always a motive why we do things. You can decide to go to Mulanje Mountain or Lake Malawi for your holidays. Although it seems that you are free to choose, your choice to go to the Lake is based on some motivations. This suggests that human actions are under the influence of some motivations; human subjects are not free beings but determined. The determinists’ significant criticism is that traditional philosophy misleads in thinking that we are free due to its consideration of the will as primum mobile. This means that it is the original motive of all the actions done by man. In other words, the will is responsible for all human actions. This is a mistake because there is a diversity of causes accountable for our actions or our choices. In brief, determinism can be summarised as triumphing in the following words: ‘In short, the actions of man are never free; they are always the necessary consequence of his temperament, of the received ideas, and of the notions either true or false, which he has formed to himself of happiness; of his opinions, strengthened by example, by education, and by daily experience’.

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In the empiricist tradition, hard determinism is in the British philosopher’s writings known as John Stuart Mill as early as the nineteenth century. While accepting the conditioning of our actions by past events, he sees it possible to predict how a man will behave in the future. Prediction follows from the information that we acquired in the past. For instance, if in the past John was choosing to go farming rather than to war, in the next war, he will most likely go farming again. John’s behaviour follows from various factors; probably he is afraid of fighting or he likes farming, etc. (b) Libertarian: Libertarianism is a position that supports the existence of free will and, consequently, human freedom and responsibility in actions. Corliss Lamont in ‘Freedom of choice and human responsibility’, makes a case for libertarianism by indicating that, ‘It is my thesis that a man who is convinced he possesses freedom of choice or free will has a greater sense of responsibility than a person who thinks that total determinism rules the universe and human life’. The citation entails that free will is indicative of responsibility, given that this individual makes decisions to act in a way, and therefore has to own any effect that follows. For instance, I kick a ball, and it breaks a window; I have done this out of my free will, and I must take responsibility for the outcome. While free will makes an individual own his actions, the author indicates that this is not the case with universal determinism. The implication is that all actions have a cause, which does not allow for my responsibility. Lamont provides different arguments that support free will, hence the libertarian contention of incompatibility thesis. The first indicator is the common-sense intuition ‘that freedom of choice is real’. Another indicator is that while determinism in nature is apparent, liberty supersedes this because human subjects are still capable of making decisions. Lamont gives the example of a car where human subjects decide where to take it. The third argument follows from the presence of contingency and chance in the universe. An excellent example of this chance is where one gets involved in an accident without any calculation. For instance, a one-tone car MN4198 moved from Lilongwe to Zomba and another truck BE4040 from Zomba to Blantyre. The driver of BE4040 decided to stop at a weightbridge for 15 minutes. The moment he decided to enter the road at 9.30 pm collided with MN4198. The existence of such accidental circumstances supports indeterminism, which makes a case for freedom. Lamont further makes a case for contingency by appealing to the logic of implications or conditionals. A conditional in elementary logic is a statement of the form if. . .then. . .. For example: If salt is in water, then it will dissolve.

Formally represented as: P ⊃ Q: The argument is that deterministic scientific laws may be present in this form. However, the presence of this form shows the element of contingency. Lamont

7.3 Determinism and Indeterminism in African Metaphysics Table 7.1 Exemplifying determinism and indeterminism through a conditional

S/N A B C D

P 1 1 0 0

141 Q 1 0 1 0

P ⊃ Q 1 0 1 1

noted that ‘The if factor is conditional and demonstrates the continued co-existence of contingency with determinism’. The if. . .then confirms that different possibilities may be the case in this situation. The truth table of a conditional below clarifies that any outcome may be the case. ‘If P’ at any point in Table 7.1 is both deterministic since it can lead to the truth as its truth-value after adding a then. However, it is also indeterministic in terms of the outcome since it can yield falsity as a truth-value. Lamont can also make a similar observation with a non-exclusive or exhaustive statement form of either. . .or. . . (e.g. in P _ Q) suggesting the presence of different alternatives in logic. Nevertheless, interest in a conditional is due to its linkage with most of the scientific laws, often used by determinists as the primary support in their arguments. The other arguments include potentiality; for instance, a child is potentially a father, indicating possibilities. Potentially also connects with the human mind’s potential to think and develop solutions to different puzzles. Lamont continues with many other arguments in support of the libertarian thesis while denying determinism. The conclusion is as follows: Finally, I do not think that the term moral responsibility can retain its traditional meaning unless freedom of choice exists. From the viewpoint of ethics, law and criminal law, it is difficult to understand how a consistent determinist would have a sufficient sense of personal responsibility for the development of decent ethical standards. But the question remains whether there have ever been or can be any consistent determinists or whether free choice runs so deep in human nature as an innate characteristic that, as Jean-Oaul Sartre suggests, ‘We are not free to cease being free.

Libertarianism indicates that the only true determinism is that human beings are determined to be free. Nature is dictating that freedom of action is a fundamental component; after all, human responsibility and social order are dependent on this aspect. Nevertheless, I want to agree with Ayer, Strawson and others that the question of freedom of action remains a challenge to philosophers in the Western analytic thought.

7.3

Determinism and Indeterminism in African Metaphysics

Can we talk about determinism and indeterminism relative to freedom of actions in African analytic metaphysics? Before I focus on freedom of action, I would like to clarify the traditional African society regarding determinism and indeterminism. For determinism, the African traditional culture fits in this view at different levels.

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(1) Firstly, determinism is in the conception of nature, whereby everything is created or caused by God. In the earlier consideration, I noted that God has names such as Namalenga, which confirm a creation theory. This, in turn, supports determinism. Secondly, the study of language in the previous chapter has confirmed different views on causation, supporting determinism. Thirdly, there is a robust belief system in the traditional African context, which supports a view of the world in terms of cause and effect. In Kayange (2018), there is an example of this belief system, which tends to strengthen the understanding that actions have a cause. The study gave an example of taboos, such as ‘jumping a pestle leads to barrenness’. There is an unusual connection between things in the traditional setting. This is true of the tendency to explain most diseases and occurrences with specific supernatural causes such as witchcraft (see Schofeeleers 102–132; Braugel 2001). The language use in the sub-Saharan region, such as the Chewa language use, suggests a high determinism presence. Briefly, the whole system tends to mean determinism, even in the context of human actions and freedom. The traditional African society surprises us further because of the strong presence of prediction in natural and unnatural phenomena. For example, there is a strong sense of foresight in the communities. Fascinating is also the tendency to predicate the various seasons and events, such as when the rain will come and when the moon will appear or disappear. The presence of different figurative expressions that show the element of foresight, departing from the experience, confirms further. The centrality of experience in traditional African society also helps in making predictions. Determinism is also in the idea of destiny relative to human beings. When an individual comes into this world, the conception of life is determined to go through different stages until that person passes from this world to a different world of the ancestors. It is a wish of every individual to continue living in this life and the next life (Braugel 2001, 73–93). One continues living after death through his/her children. Living a good life is a condition for becoming one of the ancestors in the new world. Among most of the Bantu tribes, when one has not yet completed his/her journey, there is a possibility of reincarnation. For example, among the Chewa people of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique, a child that dies before completing its journey of life comes back and enters the womb of one of the relatives to properly complete the journey. Braugel (2001, 93) comments on a similar situation in the following words: Small children who die before their parents have performed a special ritual called kutenga mwana (to take a child), by which a child is incorporated into the family, are not considered to be human beings. Their spirits do not enter the world of mizimu, because they lack something essential. On the contrary a child who is ‘taken’ will be received into spirit world; however young it is. The spirit of a child who has not been ‘taken’ has to await rebirth in another child who its own mother, or her close relative conceives. In the meantime, it is considered a chiwanda (singular of ziwanda).

(2) Is indeterminism present in the traditional African context? The presence and everyday use of concepts such as ‘chance’, ‘fortune’ and ‘misfortune’ are very

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informative of the indeterministic concept of reality in the traditional African setting. In Kayange (2018), this is in the reward and punishment attached to certain beliefs. The standard interpretation is that some actions bring misfortune to the whole society. For example, sleeping with a neighbour’s wife is an abomination that may bring misfortune to the community. Similarly, when a girl and a boy have sex before marriage, they will misfortune the whole community. Many beliefs support indeterminism relative to fortune or misfortune; however, this suffices as an indicator of indeterminism. Different expressions confirm the presence of indeterminism relative to the future. This is often in the epistemic context, where individuals indicate a disinterest in the future, which cannot be known with certainty. One example is the Chewa proverb, which states that Dyeratu zamawa sizidziwika (Eat everything now because you do not know about tomorrow). This underlines the idea that the future is unpredictable, hence calling for a version of indeterminism. This is also present in the figurative expression, which states that papsya tong’ola siudziwa mtima wamoto (Eat immediately where the maize is ready while roasting because you don’t know the behaviour (heart) of fire). It equally shows that you cannot know the future with certainty; therefore, it is vital to enjoy or concentrate on what you have now. The other fundamental aspect that requires noting is the idea of free will in the traditional African system. Tempels’ ideas are suggestive of the understanding that ‘free will’ is a faculty in a human subject. The faculty is firstly in decision-making before one engages in a particular action. This is an independent decision that a subject makes relative to his/her course of action. Decision-making involves understanding various alternative actions and their consequences towards the individual and the entire community. Secondly, this faculty chooses between ‘greater good and a lesser good, or between good and evil’ (Tempels 1959, 70). The above discussion shows that the Bantu people categorise actions as either good or bad. In Tempels’ vitalogy, where life is a fundamental force among the Bantu people, the good is related to what he calls ‘life-giving will’, and the bad is ‘life-destroying will’. According to Tempels, a human subject has a will that may be ‘life-giving’ or a source of death/destruction. Commenting on human will and its connection to the centrality of life among the Bantu people, Tempels (1959, 70) writes: They think that a man may have a “life-giving will”, or a “destroying will”. A man’s will may be determined in the same sense that, in respect of life and the hierarchy of forces, he wills in accordance with that ordering of forces that has been willed by God. It is by acting in this way that the patriarch or the chief of the clan, the chief, the “nganga” (medicine man) is able to act as a life-giver indeed, as a preserver and protector of vital force. A man can, however, be equally actuated by a will to destruction, a wicked will. His evil will (hatred, envy, jealousy) will have repercussions upon the vital force of weaker beings through his mere willing a reduction of their vital power. This wicked influence proceeding from the will to destruction of certain men is known as “bufwisi”. When acting with external forces this will to destruction is known as “buloji”, or “kulowa” among the Baluba people.

The passage suggests that God already determined life and a hierarchy of forces when he created this universe, as discussed earlier in Chapters 2 and 6. This is an

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expression of the will of God. A human subject must live according to this will of God, hence aligning his/her will with the respect of life and the hierarchy of forces. The understanding is that the gravity of goodness or evil in one’s actions as directed by the human will is dependent on the nature of a vital force. When an individual commits evil acts, the subject is a threat to human life. In some circumstances, this person is a witch or wizard and will be label as unwanted in a community. If one does the right actions towards this category, then he/she is doing a greater good by investing in life at a higher level. Below I will focus on relative human actions to determinism and indeterminism in the African context. (a) The first investigation concerns hard determinism, which I will argue that it is deducible in the conception of human actions in radical communitarian philosophy. I will mainly be interested in an extreme communitarian version of ubuntu.2 (b) I will secondly consider soft determinism which will be argued based on the restoration of ubuntu as an autocentric virtue-phronesis theory (Kayange 2020), which is a comprehensive theory of ubuntu. In (c) I will investigate whether a libertarian version is possible or not. (a) Human actions in ubuntu: Are human actions determined or not in African ethics? There is a version of a theory of human actions known as ubuntu, an understanding of African ethics’ determinism. I have commented and criticised this theory’s common development founded on radical communitarianism as constituting the view that an action is right if it leads to achieving the community’s common good (summum bonum). One of the main developments of this theory was suggested in Metz (2007), where: An action is right just insofar as it positively relates to others and thereby realises oneself; an act is wrong to the extent that it does not perfect one’s valuable nature as a social being.

This is one of the autocentric accounts of moral normativity (see van Niekerk 2007, 364), which means that self-realisation is possible through the practice of otherregarding virtues. The community’s centrality and the importance of self-realisation open a way to several reflections regarding determinism/indeterminism and freedom relative to our actions. An understanding of human actions in ubuntu requires connecting this discussion with ontological determinism concerning the community. Ubuntu’s radical communitarian version suggests a form of ontological determinism in the conception that to be a person is to be in a relationship with others. This view is deterministic in the sense that it is the nature of Africans to be communitarian. This is suggesting a strong biconditional relation whereby: x is African if and only if x is communitarian: Or AðxÞ  CðxÞ:

2

Some of the aspects of ubuntu were discussed earlier in this work.

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Different versions of ontological determinism are in expressions such as ‘a person is a person through other people’ (Tutu 1999, 35). A similar version is where Tutu (1999, 35) noted that ‘I am human because I belong’. This second formulation suggests that my being human is determined by belonging to the community. The definition of ontological determinism focuses on a moral framework of a human subject. ‘Being a person’ refers to being a moral subject. There is no clear line that distinguishes a human person as an ontological subject and a moral subject. These two aspects are interchangeable in the definition of being a person above. The existence of ontological determinism immediately entails the existence of moral determinism. Any action I do, if it follows from my being human, is determined by my nature. For example, my action of helping my neighbour during a funeral ceremony follows from my nature. The action of solidarity with my neighbours that are suffering also follows from my nature. Similarly, when I do a bad action, such as stubbing another individual with a knife, the action is bad because it is not in line with human nature. The role of community as a determinant of human actions in terms of ontological status, quality of actions, motivation (reason) of human actions, cause of human actions, etc. leads to the qualification of an explanatory theory of human actions. All human actions done by Africans refer to the community. This raises another problem, if human nature and actions in the moral context depend on the category ‘community’: are human beings free and responsible for their actions? One possible way of solving this problem is to follow a version of compatibilism where the community is necessary, but at the same time, individuals chose either to act based on its dictates or on individual interests. The community is necessary because it follows from human nature, but the responsibility is possible because Africans have possible alternatives to agree or disagree with the community. A difficulty in terms of freedom comes in this context concerning the consequences of acting contrary to the community. In other words, while there are alternative actions, if an individual chooses an option parallel to the community, then the same community becomes a constraint. Another problem with determinism based on the community is that it may sometimes be a source of actions that may threaten human life. For instance, I have in mind where an individual does a bad action to reflect what the community wants. This happens where an individual or a group of individuals misbehave towards another community or strangers. A good example is in the case of xenophobia in most African countries, such as South Africa. This shows that the community is, in some cases, a source of lack of responsibility in actions. It is also a cause of a lack of freedom in some circumstances. Based on the possible lack of freedom and responsibility rooted in the extreme communitarian conception of ubuntu, different thinkers have attempted to provide alternative systems reflecting the African culture. Philosophers such as Gyekye

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(1992), Kayange (2018) and Eze (2008) have tried to develop the foundations of African culture on moderate communitarianism. Moderate communitarianism refers to a system whereby both the self and the community are the African society’s mutual foundation. Consequently, self-regarding and other-regarding virtues are fundamental in this society. Individuals practise these virtues towards communal as well as individual well-being. Is this individual free and responsible? This individual is determined by either the community or the self, depending on the type of virtues practised. The further question is, what makes this individual to either practise other-regarding virtues or self-regarding virtues in his/her actions? Kayange (2020) provided an ubuntu theory that can respond to the above questions and show how freedom of action is present. The theory acknowledges the determinants of human actions in the ubuntu: community, individual and practical wisdom. For the community, it fits in this context because individuals may choose to act based on community-oriented virtues (other-regarding virtues) depending on a situation. And individual may decide to act generously towards the other, as motivated by the desire to achieve communal good. In other circumstances, the African individual may act inspired by the desire to fulfil individualoriented virtues (self-regarding virtues) such as self-control. This is the same African individual who is acting in this manner guided by self-good. This reality starts complicating the questions of actions in the African setting, given that an individual can decide to sacrifice a community-oriented virtue to fulfil a self-regarding virtue. The question that follows is, what makes an African individual to act either in favour of the community or individual in a situation?

Kayange (2020) argued for practical reason (phronesis) in African individuals, which guides decision-making. The basic idea is that individuals reflect or deliberate on issues before acting in a particular way. Kayange (2020) argued that this aspect of deliberation in decision-making before acting is central in traditional African society. There is a very high value given to practical reason-based sages, the African phronimos. These are individuals with experience in terms of deliberation and decision-making. They are a guide to other individuals when they want to make decisions in different situations. Because of this practical reason, individuals have the power to decide even against the community in some circumstances. Each African individual uses practical wisdom, which develops through experience, education in the community and other means. The presence of practical reason central in deliberation makes me make a bold claim of soft determinism in the African context. The idea is that an African individual is free, given that she/he can deliberate and decide before acting. For example, an African individual can decide that now I do not want to continue drinking beer. This comes in because of the potential to reflect and decide what is better for individual well-being. When there is a conflict between individual interests and collective interests, the individual is also free and capable of reflecting on a

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situation and acting either way, depending on gain or loss. All this confirms that the individual is free to reflect and choose despite alternatives that are determining factors. Individuals are, therefore, responsible agents since they deliberate and decide the course of action. The element of individual responsibility that flows from the freedom to choose what to do leads to the centrality of being responsible not only for the good of the community but also for one’s well-being. Below, I will show the centrality of responsibility through an analysis of some figurative expressions. The understanding is that African individuals transmit to others the importance of responsibility in using some symbolic expressions; it is these that can give guidance in terms of theory (Table 7.2). The above-stated figurative expressions show that freedom of action present in the traditional African setting calls for individual responsibility towards society’s various actions. Some of these selected figurative expressions are very clear that the responsibility under consideration is not communal but personal responsibility.

Table 7.2 Figurative expressions on human actions and responsibility S/ N 1 2 3 4 5

6 7 8 9

10

Figurative expression Moyo wanga ndi mbiya ndisunga ndekha Idakula Nyanga poopa malunje Kudya nkuika

Literal translation My life is like a clay pot; I take care of it myself The horn grew very long because the animal feared the thick grass Consuming in contributing

Kupenya kumwamba ndi kukhala ndi nkhuku Mafulufute akamatuluka usamawatsinire ku dzenje Mbumba ndi kudyetsa

You look up when you have chickens When the black flying ants are coming out of a hole, do not nip them on the whole

Mfuti yolasa woombera Mnyanga sulemera mwini Njuchi zikachuluka siziika

A gun that hits the owner

Chuluke chuluke ndi Wa njuchi umanena Iyo yakuluma

Having a family is feeding it

A tusk is not heavy to the owner What bees are many, they don’t make honey Being many is for bees; you identify the one that stung you

Responsibility Be responsible of your own life Take your responsibility in life Be responsible and don’t depend on others You become responsible for what you have When others support you, be responsible (accountable) Be responsible for your family Be responsible; otherwise, your actions may harm you Be responsible to those around you Individual responsibility is better than communal responsibility Be responsible for your actions; don’t hide behind the community

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Conclusion

I conclude with a summary in a comparison table to show some similarities and differences in causation. Comparison table A. Similarities Comparison area Compatibilism – free will and responsibility Determinism in nature B. Differences Incompatibilism Determinism and indeterminism in nature

Western analytic philosophy Compatibilism is present relative to human actions Some believe in determinism in nature Incompatibilism Some believe in indeterminism in nature

African analytic philosophy Compatibilism is present Determinism following from creation Incompatibilism is rare Determinism

I note that thinkers are divided towards determinism and indeterminism relative to freedom of actions in both Western and African philosophies. In Western thought, this has led to the development of compatibilism and incompatibilism. The main difference is that the former argues that free will and determinism are compatible. It was shown that it implies that an individual can act out of free choice but be determined. Different ideas, such as those of Hobbes and Ayer, have been discussed under compatibilism. This was followed by a discussion of incompatibilism, with its various versions. The first supports hard determinism and denies the existence of free will as a mere illusion. The second one supports free will as the basis of freedom and responsibility and is known as libertarianism. In the African context, there is the presence of both determinism and indeterminism. After examples of experiences that show these aspects, it discusses the problem of human actions, freedom and responsibility, etc. within ubuntu philosophy. It was argued that the radical communitarian version of ubuntu could not adequately accommodate other relevant elements in terms of individual freedom and responsibility. There is a bias on the community, and this leaves out the individual and the element of deliberation and decision-making, which is made possible through practical reason. These forgotten elements were introduced, and the author argued for a version of compatibilism as present in the traditional African society.

Chapter 8

Mind and Body

Abstract The chapter discusses the problem of the existence of mind and body. It considers the traditional philosophical views such as dualism, a view holding that they both exist; physicalism (materialism) which accepts only the material aspect; and immaterialism, which supports a form of idealism. The chapter demonstrates that while the study on body and mind in Western thought is represented in all these views, most of the African studies mainly support dualism and partly a form of physicalism known as quasi-physicalism. It may be noted that a total adherence to immaterialism is currently not common in the main studies on body and mind in the African thought. The chapter clarifies the various views in the African thought that use language and beliefs in determining the conception of body and mind. It also provides a study of the ideas of body and mind among the Chewa language speakers through the analysis of language.

8.1

Introduction

The question of mind and body characterises most of the studies in both traditional metaphysics and analytic philosophy. This is an ancient problem on human beings’ ontological status, whether they are only material entities or have a spiritual component. Some of the questions that characterised debates in this context include the following: Does the mind exist as a particular thing? Is it a spiritual thing that we cannot see with our eyes, or is it physical? Is the human body distinct from this spirit or mind? Is this mind corruptible or not? Many other questions follow as we attempt to discover what this mind is, and how it is related to the body and other things in the world. To respond to the relation between body and mind, the first common set of theories fall under dualism. In general, Descartes is associated with dualism, because he recognised the existence of both mind and body. This has different sub-theories, such as (i) parallelism, which considers the mind as existing parallel to the body, (ii) interactionism that recognises mutual collaboration and (iii) epiphenomenalism, which gives preference to the mind. These theories have been questioned by those

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. M. Kayange, The Question of Being in Western and African Analytic Metaphysics, Synthese Library 438, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69645-0_8

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that radically follow the demands of analytic philosophy relative to natural science, logic and natural science. The second common view in the analytic tradition is materialism, which is mainly discussed as physicalism. The word physicalism was used in works of the members of the Vienna Circle, mainly Otto Neurath (1931) and Rudolf Carnap (1959/1932), to represent the reductionist view that recognises only the existence of the body (matter). Natural scientists mainly influence this view, and it has been supported by many notable thinkers such as William Van Orman Quine and David Davidson. The third view is immaterialism, which has put more emphasis on the existence of the immaterial, such as spirit (Berkeley). Below, I will discuss the Western conception of the mind and body problem in Sect. 8.2. This will mainly focus on selected theoretical developments related to dualism, materialism/physicalism and immaterialism. In Sect. 8.3, I will attempt to develop the African conception relative to the mind and body. Given that this issue is debated in works that consider the concept of the person in African philosophy (Molefe 2018), I will build the case of body and mind through the study of a person among the Chewa language speakers of Malawi, Zambia and Mozambique.

8.2

Western Conception of Mind and Body Problem

Dualism: The first conception of mind and body problem in Western thought is dualism. This is the position that, A human person has two related components: body and mind/form. In modern philosophy, it is a problem between matter and mind. The assumption is that both components exist in the world independent of our minds (a form of mind-body realism). The body is a material thing existing in space and time (in a four-dimensional space and time). While this problem and belief exist in some adherents of the analytic tradition, it is proper to primarily consider dualism in the general philosophical context. Dualism is present in the Ancient Greeks, where the acceptance of both mind and body, was a common belief. For example, in his writings, Phaedo and the Republic, Plato recognises the body but, at the same time, questions the fate of the soul after death. Generally, the soul lives in a body as a prison. The soul, therefore, strives every day to acquire its freedom. The common belief in Plato’s environment was that there is separation at death. In this separation, the body ceases to be, but the spirit just dissolves. The soul is immortal, meaning that after its separation from the body, the soul lives forever. It goes on to another life; hence it is free from its bodily prison. A discourse on dualism is often incomplete without mentioning the JudeoChristian environment, which has positively influenced both continental and analytic traditions. This environment is responsible for the dualism between spirit and body. The soul is immortal, while the body belongs to the natural world until it is transformed to something else during Parusia (End of the Universe). In Christianity, this is in the Pauline theology in his discourse on the rapture and the end of times. Some religions believe that there will be a day of resurrection when the dead will rise

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again. Some believe that the same bodies will come back to life, and some believe that there will be new bodies. This tradition of dualism informed by the JudeoChristian environment dominated developments in both Catholic and Protestant theologies and continues up today. These doctrines were many when drawing closer to 2000 AD when some thought this was the time for this world’s end.1 In philosophy, the climax of the development of dualism is present in Descartes’s philosophy. He argued for a separate existence of body and mind. In fact, in his Meditations of the First Philosophy, there is a clear distinction between the body and the thinking thing, the mind. This apparent truth follows from the thinking thing, which can be trusted with certainty as it is the foundation of science; hence it can never be doubted. This Cartesian dualism has given rise to various philosophies in the analytic metaphysics. Some of these philosophies include epiphenomenalism, parallelism and interactionism. Parallelism advocated by Leibniz and others defends the idea that the spirit and body work together, but they are parallel. In other words, they are the same aspects of the same human person. They are like the two rail lines that hold a train but, at the same time, remain parallel. I will not focus on parallelism because it is not a common position in the modern analytic metaphysics. It takes for granted that the spirit exists, which is difficult to reconcile with modern natural science and its demands for observation. I will focus more on interactionism and epiphenomenalism. Interactionism, which has been very close to the Cartesian discussion of body and mind, is the view that the physical and the mental or spiritual components function together. This is a form of dualism that underlines unity rather than diversity. C. E. M. Joad, in the wok, How minds Work (1972:264–269), suggested various arguments supporting the interaction between mind and body. Of course, the interest here is to underline the existence of mind, but the body is also essential. Accordingly, several arguments provide some biological considerations. The first argument develops from the understanding of purposiveness. Explicating this idea Joad (1972:265) wrote: Purposiveness implies the capacity to be influenced by and to work for a purpose; thus in its turn involves the apprehension, whether conscious or unconscious of some object which lies in the future and which the purpose seeks to achieve; it, therefore, necessitates the extension of a mind. If, therefore, purposiveness is a true characteristic of living creatures, then we have established a good starting point for our mental approach to psychology.

This is the idea that living creatures work for a purpose. For instance, students gather in a classroom as influenced by an end they want to achieve. I assume that their way of behaving follows from an end, such as obtaining a degree. Usually, the way students do things every day reflects the end. The apprehension of the end shows that there must be something in us wanting to achieve the end, whether

1

Note that other religions are also well known for following dualism, such as the Islamic religion, but my interest is the Judeo-Christian environment which I believe substantially influenced philosophical developments pertaining to this issue in Western thought.

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conscious or not. According to Joad, this aspect necessitates the existence of the mind. Apart from the desire to achieve an end or act as influenced by an end, in response to the existing situations, a subject may also act to make actual what is not. It is a spontaneous way of behaving to meet specific needs, and this is also known as connotation. For instance, humans may feel the need to preserve the species. This aspect is about the creature’s impulse to safeguard the species despite all the obstacles it may come across. It is difficult to explain this purposive behaviour in the materialistic understanding of impulses. The idea of purpose above is related to foresight and expectation relative to the state of affairs or situation such as passing exams. As subjects, we are conscious or aware of the purpose which inspires our behaviours. A subject is pulled by and, at the same time, pulls the end he/she wants to achieve. According to Joad, this behaviour cannot follow from appealing to the stimulus-response mechanism. The second argument is as follows: ‘Human subjects can apprehend meaning, and this capacity implies that we are not only bodies, but we have a mind responsible for meaning’. Another activity that suggests the mind’s existence is human subjects’ capacity to apprehend the meaning of words, symbols, etc. For instance, the words ‘Do not run-beware of dogs’ change our behaviour. If we were running at that moment, we immediately put a break, fearing that we would provoke the dogs to harm us. In some instances, we become afraid, etc. Whatever the meaning grasping faculty must be, the mind is not a physical stimulus. The idea here is that the mind is immaterial. The issue of meaning is interesting because, as subjects, we understand the meaning behind words or symbols. In the case of words, when we translate them into another language, we expect that the interpretation will occur in that perspective. Apart from this capacity of grasping the meaning of things, the aspect or capacity of synthesising sensations or things elucidates the existence of the mind. For instance, look at a series of dots below (Fig. 8.1). What do these dots mean? Looking at these dots above, some individuals conclude they represent the heart, depending on their perspective. Some will take further this by saying that this symbolizes love. Indeed, to receive a symbol like this one on Facebook or WhatsApp from a friend, you immediately feel that, that person loves you. This symbol may, therefore, provoke feelings in your life at that moment. If you do not like that person, this symbol may provoke the feeling of anger, and you

Fig. 8.1 Dots and perspectives

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may wonder what he/she is up to. In short, the mind can grasp the meaning by joining things together in a context. It builds a synthesis from an agglomeration of things by identifying what goes with what and, at the same time, captures the meaning behind. Similarly, a sequence of chords, G with time value two, E minor with time value one, A minor with value one and D with time value two, may provoke in us the aesthetic pleasure. This is possible because of the perceived wholeness existing in this sequence when played one after the other. The moment the togetherness ceases, the aesthetic pleasure is not the same. Arguing based on this capacity to unify things, Joad (1972:268) wrote: We must conclude, then, that we possess the power of realizing the external objects not merely as collections of physical stimuli, which of course they are, but as wholes in which the actual sensory elements are combined to form a single object of higher order. This faculty of combining or putting together seems to involve the existence not only of mind, but of a mind of an active, creative type which is able to go out beyond the raw material afforded by our bodily sensations, and to apprehend ideal objects as wholes which are more than the collection of physical events which compose their constituent parts.

The mind is independent of the brain, although related in some respects. It directs and controls the material aspects of the body and uses them to carry out its purposes in relation to the external world of objects. Dualism is one of the most shared philosophical views; we leave the issue open regarding the spirit’s existence. The body does not create any difficulty as far as materialism is concerned but the spirit. One of the problems comes from our tendency to look for empirical evidence. Of course, some philosophers such as Bertrand Russell (1872–1970) attempted to offer proofs demonstrating other minds’ existence, for instance, the evidence by analogy in Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (1948). Nevertheless, we can opt to take a rationalistic demonstration of Descartes’s thinking thing as proving the mind that thinks; otherwise the acceptance of the existence of the spirit remains problematic. Epiphenomenalism regards the various mental states or events, which have no causal link with the individual’s physical states. In other words, mental states do not cause a physical effect. Firstly, mental states are often studied in the context of propositional attitudes. A propositional attitude is a mental state relative to a statement. It expresses one’s thoughts or beliefs towards a particular state of affairs, often verbs such as belief and thinking. Modern debate on mental states’ expression considers these attitudes by studying what is known as a that-clause proposition (see Mark Richard 1990).2 Secondly, apart from propositional attitudes, mental states come under conscious individual physical experiences, namely, qualia.

2 Note that various studies on propositional attitudes have mainly focused on the problem of truth. For example, in a statement that ‘Maggie thinks that Odile is tired’ is viewed as true in a particular context provided its ‘that’-clause (or t-clause) represents the state of affairs capturing Maggie’s thoughts. This theory has been recently defended by Giulia Felappi (2014, 581–603) against the criticisms of Alonzo Church (1950) and Stephen Schiffer (2003) who objected the sententialist core doctrine as is reflected in Richard’s quotation above. As a theory, sententialism is presented in

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While a mental state does not cause a physical effect, it is a physical state responsible for the mental state. In case one claims that a physical effect is a consequence of a mental state, the mental state in question has a physical explanation. This results from the brain’s physical processes or the biochemical processes that have resulted in a physical consequence. The prevalence of physical state implies that the toothache pain that I feel indicates a physical problem of my teeth, which have an infection. The joy that I have now implies there is a physical cause. Similarly, the various moods that people have entail that there is a physical world. There is nothing like, ‘he changes moods without a reason’. There is always a cause relative to a certain mental state. In the modern pluralistic conception of causation, epiphenomenalists may argue further that there is a plurality of causes and properties that may explain a mental state. The pain that I feel after hitting a stone is a consequence of the properties of stone such as hardness but also the properties of my feet, such as softness and so on. Nevertheless, whatever causal interpretation possible, in all the versions of epiphenomenalism prevalence is given to physical states as the cause of the mental states. Physicalism: Physicalism or materialism as a philosophical theory refers to the belief that material substance is the only thing we can claim to exist. In other words, the basic argument is that what exists is only matter. Different philosophers such as Parmenides, Epicurus, Empedocles, Leucippus, Democritus, Thomas Hobbes, Karl Marx, Hugh Elliot, etc. were adherents of materialism. Related to analytic metaphysics, some philosophers like William Van Orman Quine, David Davidson and many others support this materialism’s importance. In Chapter 2, Quine denied the abstract entities’ existence to which universals refer. In other words, he denied the existence of the world of forms captured by abstract concepts. The spirit has the same characteristics as the universals; therefore, it may experience the same fate as universals. Building ideas very close to Quine and related thinkers, it is essential to remember some physicalists like Han Berger, the inventor of the electroencephalograph (an instrument for recording the brain waves). He identified the psychic energy with physical energy. This suggests materialism because everything regarding the mind is explained in terms of physical energy; hence the denial of the spirit is

different versions such that ‘There are various, incompatible, theories of what sentences and propositions are, but they are generally considered as entities of a very different kind’. The commonly held forms of sententialism with respect to how a that-clause represent include semantic sententialism and psychological sententialism (Richard 1990, 37–57). Semantic sententialism refers to the position that what a that-clause utterance refers to is a sentence, which constitutes both expression and objects. It is these that stand in a correspondence relation with reality. Psychological sententialism is the understanding that the psychological states of our attitudes have and may be transcribed in a structure of a sentence. What unites the two is the centrality of a sentence and the referential theoretical conception of representation (see also Grossmann 1960, 301–312).

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responsible for psychic energy. All extra-sense experiences will not make sense in this context since they all have a scientific explanation. Similarly, Nian Marshall explains the extra-sense experience between two subjects as possible through resonance. For instance, in telepathy, the two individuals a and b can influence each other, and their experience has its explanation through resonance. This suggests that what we tend to attribute to the material world is explainable utilising natural science. Another example of materialism in science is in the study and application of medicine. As is known, William James reported the experience of the medical materialists in the twentieth century. They explained every religious experience in terms of scientific knowledge in medicine. For instance, there is an explanation for all those circumstances where one claims that God’s spirit or the supernatural has intervened. Hugh Elliot (1881–1930), in his work Modern Science and Materialism, suggested the three main arguments on which the supremacy of materialism lies. The first argument follows from the uniformity of law, as reflected in the following: Science discloses the uniform of law in the procedures of nature; we can, therefore, explain the processes of nature materialistically that is, without claiming or appealing to the spiritual. The basic idea is that science discloses nature as behaving following a certain pattern, which repeats itself in various moments. In other words, when the conditions holding in a certain situation repeats, the results obtained will likewise be the same.

Elliot gives as an example, the gravitational theory of Isaac Newton. Two bodies A and B attract each other at a certain distance and strength. When these conditions are the same, our continuous measurements may lead us to obtain the same results. This uniformity suggests that we can write a law that explains the behaviour of objects A and B in those conditions. In the relation of these objects, another aspect that shows uniformity is that the force of attraction diminishes and increases with distance. When the distance is longer, the force decreases. When the distance is closer, the force increases; based on this uniformity, we have a strong conjecture that distance affects gravity between two bodies. Building on these and other ideas, we develop a formula that explains gravity: GF ¼

M1  M2 r2

Gravitation force ¼ M1M2/r squared, where m is for mass and r is for distance. The second argument supporting materialism is based on the denial of teleology as formulated below: There is no teleology act as an explanation of things. Teleology is a combination of two Greek words, telos meaning end and logos meaning science or study. In this context, the idea is that there is nothing like purpose in the universe. This is the doctrine that things or events have a goal to which they tend. Of course, the idea that things happen or flow towards an end is rooted in most of us. The current events are affected by an inevitable end to which they live as a limiting step. In other words, they point us towards the end or purpose. By excluding this idea of telos, scientific materialism follows from the doctrine that:

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[a]sserts that all events are due to the interaction of matter and motion acting by blind necessity in accordance with those invariable sequences to which we have given the name laws. (Hugh 1972, 255)

The third argument is in the following statement: Nothing is existing beyond matter. Therefore, the principle is the denial of any existence apart from what has material characteristics and qualities. This aspect leads to the exclusion of everything spiritual. In a more general sense, there are no spirits, no witches, ancestors, ghosts, souls, etc. Similarly, there is no mind, consciousness, UFO (unidentified flying objects), etc. For Elliot, we can explain everything, including the mental processes based on matter and motion or energy. Commenting on this aspect, Elliot (Hugh 1972, 256) wrote: The existing universe all things and events therein may be theoretically expressed in terms of matter and energy, undergoing continuous redistribution in accordance with the ordinary laws of physics and chemistry. If all manifestations within our experience can thus be expressed, as has for long been believed by men of science, what need is there for the introduction of any new entity of spiritual character called mind?

This last argument supports a form of monism that clearly vindicates matter at the cost of the mind or anything spiritual. The scientific materialism discussed above looks very interesting, but it is perplexing. Firstly, the fact that there are uniformities in nature leading to the formulation of laws does not justify materialism as a privileged view of the universe against spiritualism, which accepts the existence of spirits, or against dualism, which agrees with both. The faith in laws and the relation of cause and effect common in materialism are worrying too. A scientific law may be considered as a universal statement and will require infinite statements to make a law true. This will hardly be practical as Popper illustrated in the Logic of Scientific Discovery. Before Popper, Hume also showed that the relation of cause and effect is problematic because there is no logical justification. The only foundation is the repetition of this relationship, as in causation. Secondly, we cannot prove in any way that teleology as a theory is wrong or, on the contrary, that it is right. For example, if the telos is a perfect being called God, we cannot show in any reasonable or logical way or defend his existence or deny it. In short, both the denial and acceptance of the end imply having some evidence in both ways. I am confident that it is hard to give convincing evidence or reasons for denying or accepting any purposive argument. For now, the issue of God’s existence is faith. Related to the above, the third point is that one can claim that material existence does not give us grounds to deny the spiritual. There is a very common reasoning disease among materialists who exclude the existence of anything in the absence of evidence. Is this not a fruit of giving up any attempt to go beyond what can be known beyond our world of experience or senses? Can we still save materialism? Probably one of the ways is to see everything as undergoing material processes. Matter undergoes various processes in its contact with other forms of matter. For instance, my big foot stepped on a lady, and she screamed with pain. The pain will thus be a

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process. But does this justify the denial of the spirit as an entity? Below I will further develop the non-materialistic view, which is contrary to the materialist view. Immaterialism In this section, we will discuss a position known as non-materialistic view or immaterialism. In this view, what exists is only the spirit or mind (the only mind exists). Consequently, matter does not exist independently of the mind, or rather there is no matter in the world independent of our minds. As far as the history of philosophy is concerned, one of the best examples representing this view is the British philosopher known as Berkeley (1685–1753).3 This philosopher belongs to the British empiricism, whereby sense experience is determinant for knowledge. Among these philosophers, John Locke accepted the material world in his realism. On the contrary, Berkeley accepts idealism, which embraces idealism. As noted earlier for Berkeley, to say that a pen exists implies that there is a subject perceiving it; otherwise, it does not. We should not be deceived here with the term to exist as indicating a realist understanding where this pen is a ‘thing in itself’. What is perceived is not this independent object in front of me, but the idea. The self, spirit or mind perceives nothing but the idea. To know a pen, therefore, implies to have an idea of it. This applies to all things in nature; we only claim knowledge when the mind perceives an idea. Commenting on this fact, Berkeley wrote: For as to what is said about the existence of unthinking things without any relation to their being perceived seems perfectly unintelligible. Their esse is percipi, nor is is possible they should have any existence, out of the minds or thinking things which perceive them.

This citation reflects idealism by supporting the fact that things exist not in reality but in our minds. It completely excludes any realism and, at the same time, excludes the possibility of existence outside the mind of the one perceiving them. This affirms that what exists as far as knowledge is concerned is the idea in mind. Berkeley discussed three kinds of ideas as the object of human knowledge: Firstly, he talks about the ideas which are imprinted on the senses. In other words, he intends those ideas that are perceived with the help of the senses. For instance, this whiteboard marker in my hand is perceivable through the sense of touch and sense of sight. The sound of my guitar is perceivable when there is a tension exerted on the strings. I do perceive students in a class through the sense of sight. Secondly, I perceive the ideas formulated by attending to the passions and operations of the mind. Thirdly, I perceive the ideas which come from my memory and imagination, for example, the ideas I have about secondary school days when I was playing football. I can live those days again in my mind through the sweet memories which recreate the ideas. Berkeley’s system is complicated further by introducing what he calls the governor of nature, responsible for affecting our sense with the natural world, hence leading to the development of ideas in us. Understandably, Berkeley is a bishop in a 3 One of his fundamental writings of interest was written in 1910 titled A Treatise Concerning the Principles of Human Knowledge.

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Christian church, and he is trying to bring in God to explain further why we have ideas coming from the senses. The fact that he is talking about the governor or author of nature suggests that he has in mind that God created nature, governs it and causes ideas on us through the senses. The ideas that are a fruit of this author of nature are what we normally consider as real things. This gives the impression that they are real because God is real and he cannot deceive us. Berkeley’s system is a reaction against various traditional ideas as well as common sense. He goes against Locke’s primary qualities; hence nothing exists in the objects themselves, and this refutes the notion of substance. Berkeley is against both realism and rationalism. For a realist of some sort like me, Berkeley’s idea seems like madness. Can you deny the students’ existence in the next room as subjects or objects existing independent of our minds? Furthermore, when you close your eyes, you will think that there is nothing in this room. Try to walk and see what will happen. You will surely hit tables and chairs. The central position of perception in the system above strongly considers existence as dependent on the perceiving subject. I will call this aspect subjectivism which develops in twofold direction, namely, (a) ontological subjectivism and (b) epistemological subjectivism. In the former, when I perceive a dog behind my house, I will say that the dog exists as an idea for me. You who is not aware of this dog cannot claim its existence as an idea. Similarly, on the epistemological view, I know that there is the idea of a desk in my room because I have perceived it. You do not know because you have not perceived it. All this suggests that we cannot trust knowledge as claimed by anyone without our subjective experience.

8.3

Mind and Body in African Metaphysics

In African philosophy in general, the dominant developments in mind and body may be classified either under dualism (Gyekye) and quasi-physicalism. For instance, dualism is present in Gyekye’s study of a person’s conception among the Akan. Commenting on the Akan he wrote, ‘The Akan conception of the person, on my analysis, is both dualistic and interactionist. It seems to me that an interactionist psychophysical dualism is a realistic doctrine’. (Gyekye 1992, 86). In this understanding, African communities’ interest is on both the physical and spiritual components (psyche). The concept quasi-physicalism is in Kwasi Wiredu (1987), who represents the view that there exist quasi-physical objects, and classifies a human subject as having this component and the physical aspect. In this regard, recognising a form of dualism does not embrace it entirely, but partially. Although different studies attempt to respond to mind and body problems in African philosophy, mainly through the study of person, I would like to reflect on this by studying language and relevant beliefs among the Chewa language speakers. Section (1) focuses on the study of the meaning of certain terms and expressions used in ordinary language use. In Section (2) the focus will be on figurative expressions that have terms that are referring to body and mind issues.

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Section (3) will focus on some beliefs that are reported by some anthropologists on the question of mind and body. In Section (4) I will attempt to theorise the concept of mind and bodybuilding on insights from 1, 2 and 3. 1. In the Chewa language, the word for body is thupi and for mind or spirit is mzimu. The term thupi is for the category of human beings. In normal usage of this word, it refers to the material component of a thing. For example: (i) Ndaona thupi la galu (I have seen a Dog’s body). (ii) Thupi la Malemu lafika (The body of a dead person has arrived). This use shows that there is something, and the body is its property. Similarly, mzimu seems to refer only to human subjects, although in some circumstances this may refer to certain bad spirits somewhere. Just as is the case in most of the traditional cultures, the Chewa language speakers believe that body and spirit have different characteristics. For instance, the body is corruptible, which implies that it can change or it can die. There are many characteristics of the body, for instance, it has desires. In Chewa language, this refers to Zilakolako za thupi (bodily desires). These are meant for personal satisfaction or gratification and do not benefit the community or other individuals. These belong to a body it owns them. Due to the influence of foreign religions, these desires are negative, as they enslave or destruct the human spirit. Another term that represents desires is Zikhumbokhumbo. The only difference with the earlier translation of desires is that the heart is the centre in this latter meaning. We usually say that the heart of a man is responsible for this commitment. Of course, desiring does not imply that we will get what we want. This is why there is the Chichewa expression that, ‘the heart is never dressed in rags’, that is, mtima suvala nsanza. The heart is, therefore, a seat of desires. The spirit has as its fundamental characteristic, incorruptibility. This means that it cannot die or decompose like a body. An abstract concept in relation to desires is the word chibaba (plural zibaba). This shows that there is an intense craving for something. It shows that an individual is a slave of a particular habit. This has often deterred his/her faculty of pronouncing judgement. This word is often associated with tobacco smoking, where it is said, John ali ndi chibaba cha fodya (John has a strong desire for tabacco). This may also apply to a person who has repetitive sexual desire. In modern psychology, the word chibaba suggests that there is an addiction. The other important concept that recurs in the decision of the body’s presence is the senses, mainly the word kumva (literal translation, hearing). This concept indicates feelings among the Chewa language users. The above development suggests four terms that are key to understanding the mind and body in the Chewa ordinary language use. These terms include: • • • •

Thupi (body – physical element) Mzimu (soul-spiritual element) Moyo (life principle) Mtima (heart – determinant of character)

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Table 8.1 Body and mind figurative expressions S/ N 1

Figurative expression Anditame anasupula mtembo wa eni Angatero ndi maliro

Literal meaning Let them recognise me bruised a corpse of the neighbours Even though he is proud, he is a corpse

3

Moyo kunyenga

Life is deceptive

4

Moyo saika pachiswe Moyo wanga ndi mbiya ndisunga ndekha Mtima suvala nsanza Mtima uli ngwizi, kadziwe ka mu Likuni Mtima uli kuperewera chapita patali Mtima wamzako ndi tsidya lina Phukusi la moyo sakusungira wina

Life is not put on termites My life is a pot, I will take care of it myself

2

5

6 7

8

9

10

Mind-body use meaning Mtembo as a body (physical element) without life principle Mtembo as a body (physical element) without life principle Life principle is deceptive Physical life principle

Meaning of figurative expression Do not interfere in other people’s affairs Discouraging pride

Don’t be deceived by things in life Take care of life

Physical life principle

Take care of life

The heart does not wear rags The heart is case down like a dam in Likuni

Physical seat of desires

Desires are never real Express- anger

The heart is failing because it has gone far

Physical seat of desires

The heart of your friend is the other side of the river Principle component

Physical seat of desires

When the heart fails to get what it desired, it gives up Don’t be deceived

Physical element

Self-protection

Physical seat of desires

Below, I will trace these terms further through the study of their use in some selected figurative expressions. The idea is that this use may clarify further certain characteristics that are connected with these terms before any further philosophical endeavour. 2. Figurative expression may indicate the meaning, values and further clarification of a particular entity (Table 8.1). The figurative expressions 1 and 2 have introduced the word mtembo, which is used to mean a dead body. This suggests that a body is corruptible and it changes its form from being alive to being lifeless. The figurative expressions 3, 4 and 10 introduce a life-giving principle or element known as moyo. In the figurative expressions above, it is connected with the physical body, and it refers to life. Its absence leads to the situation of mtembo, which is a body without a life-giving principle.

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The figurative expressions 6, 7, 8 and 9 bring in the heart (mtima), which is represented as the centre of desires and emotions, as also noted earlier. It seems that mtima further determines the quality of way of being in terms of behaviour. 3. The issues of mind and body are also commonly addressed in language relative to life and death: Conceptualisation of death is evident in metaphorical conceptualisation or various beliefs in both language (stories) and other studies. In metaphorical conceptualisation death is reflected in the following passage by a story of an ethnographer who studied the Chewa traditional culture. When a person is on the point of dying, some of the people present, especially his mother or wife, start weeping softly (kusisima), lamenting and repeating over and over again the words mayi ine (alas). For a child, a mother will say, ‘mayo ine’ (alas) . . . mwana wanga ine (my child) . . . ndilowe kuti ine (where can I go) . . . ndiyende bwanji ine (how can I walk) . . . ndinalakwanji ine (what did I do wrong) . . . mwana wanga wandisiya ine (my child has left me alone) . . . ndapalamula chiyani (what did I do to provoke this?). For a husband, a wife will say, ‘mayo ine’ (alas) . . . ndakhala ine ndekha (I stay behind alone) . . . mwandsiya ine ndekha (you leave me alone behind) . . . andithandiza ndani (who will help me) . . . mwamuna wanga wandisiya ine (my husband has left me alone) . . . ndilira chotani ine (how can I cry). (Braugel 2001, 98). A study of the language suggested by the ethnographer above has three fundamental phrases that conceptualises death as a passage from one state of being (having a body with life and spirit) to a different one, where life is gone. These phrases include mwandisiya ine ndekha (you have left me alone), mwamuna wanga wandisiya ine (my husband has left me) and mwana wanga wandisiya ine (my child has left me). The idea here is that death is metaphorically a journey from one state of being to another state. An important observation on this journey calls for an understanding of what moves from one state to another. The body passes from the state of being active, like a person who has woke up and is performing daily duties. The body of the dead enters the state of sleep. It is for this reason that the body is prepared to be in the form of sleep. The eyes and the mouth of the dead are closed. The idea is that they want to make sure that the body is prepared in a state of sleep. The element of a journey is in dressing the body of the deceased and on some occasions cleaning his face and, if male, cutting the beards. Generally, best and clean clothes are prepared for the dead to dress, and some of the important belongings are buried together with him/her so that they are used in the next. Although the body enters eternal sleep, the Chewa language speakers believe that what passes on to the next life and continues living is the spirit. Commenting on this aspect Braugel (2001, 78) noted that, ‘The Chewa believe that the mzimu survives the body after death (mzimu utsala wamoyo munthu akafa)’.4 This confirms the doctrine of dualism, in a way that when one is alive, both body and spirit are present.

Moyo is a property of soul and a property of the body – its existence in the body is limited with respect to a body but eternal with reference to a spirit (property-substance).

4

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It is only after death that the body remains and the spirit is escorted to the spirits’ world. Some of the spirits do not go to the ‘spirits world’ because of the bad life the individual was living before dying and these often-become evil spirits (ziwanda). The evil spirits may enter certain animals such as lions, hyenas and snakes, and they become dangerous for the community. Good spirits may occasionally visit the community through some non-harmful animals, such as a snake known as chilele, which does not bite. Children are advised not to kill it because it represents the spirits. For some spirits of tiny children who die before birth, their spirits move around waiting for another pregnant woman to enter her. But what is the spirit in this context? The text below may help in clarifying the conception of the spirit among the Chewa language speakers: After death the mzimu is as it were an image (chithunzithunzi). It is not the same but remains similar to the person it was before. It is also said that a mzimu is like the wind (ngati mphepo). The wind is present and although one cannot see it, one can experience it. When the wind stirs up small whirlwinds of dust (kabvulubvulu), the mzimu is said to be there. The mzimu is like the shadow which follows a person everywhere. When he dies, he has no shadow anymore. It has gone to the world of the shadows (i.e. spirits). (Braugel 2001, 80)

The above passage suggests three fundamental notions that partly define the spirit among the Chewa speakers: image, shadow and wind. All the terms indicate that something exists; however, it is not perceived by the senses. In terms of an image and shadow, a spirit is a reflection of an individual. The conception of the spirit as a shadow among the Chewa language speakers shows that this understanding is similar to Kagame’s philosophy who suggested the shadow theory in the African context. The idea of spirit as the wind brings the Chewa language speakers close to the spirit’s Christian-Judaic idea as wind. 4. How can the above theory be formalised? The above development shows that the African conception of a human subject suggests a form of dualism. This dualism’s main parts are body and mind (spirit), which are linked by two fundamental properties. The first property is the life-giving principle which as noted in (1) and (2) as Moyo. Being is determined by this life-giving principle, which is a special form of substance. Firstly, moyo is a primary property with respect to a limited ‘being in the world’. Limited being in the world refers to a body’s presence at a particular moment. In this regard, a human subject exists from t1 to t2 because of this principle’s activity. Although the body of a person depends on this to exist in the world, this principle disappears. This disappearance may be caused by various factors, such as individual lack of care and external factors (such as natural death or intervention by other individuals). This leads to the change of status from a living body (thupi) to a corpse (mtembo). Secondly, moyo is a property of mzimu concerning the permanent existence of a particular person. In (3) above, the spirit continues to live but in a slightly different form as compared to what it was when a person was alive. Interestingly, there is some similarity between what the spirit was, when it co-existed with the body and what it becomes after the extinction or separation from the body. Braugel shows the

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Chewa idea that when the spirit is in the body it is similar to the form of a person (image). The idea is that wherever a person goes, the image is there, meaning that the body and the spirit are inseparable when alive. This inseparability is only possible because of the life-giving principle working in both. When this principle stops working in the body, it continues to live in the spirit. This suggests that moyo is a substance which remains constant in a human being, while the body is the secondary substance given that it gets extinct after separation. The spirit also seems to be the primary substance since it remains after death. It remains inseparable with the lifegiving principle. The problem that remains is, if the spirit is substance, how can change be accounted for? This is the change that occurs when being separated from the body. While the body is temporal and spirit is atemporal, their relationship may be affected by the property noted above as mtima. This was mentioned above as a seat of desires and emotions and is classifiable either as good or bad. It is in this context that the idea of values and human actions come into play. The heart has many desires and emotions, but for them to be transformed into actions, a human subject has to decide. It is this decision leading to certain actions that make an individual be responsible for them. Interestingly, in the traditional African context, practical reason becomes fundamental in decision-making (see also Kayange 2020, 1–12). I will not enter into details with practical wisdom, but note that the actions that follow from one’s decisions qualify him/her as good or bad. The heart is also associated with a human person’s quality, where he may be seen as good or bad (good heart or bad heart). This suggests that heart is linked with character or personality. A person with a good heart is classified as such because of actions that are regarded as aimed at communal as well as individual wellbeing. Communal wellbeing is related to actions that reflect the practice of other-regarding virtues such as solidarity. Individual well-being is related to the practice of selfregarding virtues such as self-control. The link between heart and character mainly touches human life before the separation between the body and spirit. After death, the spirit’s effect continues, given that it is believed that a good spirit joins the world of the spirits/ancestors, while bad ones are isolated (Braugel 2001). Nevertheless, the role played by the heart in the African context seems to be similar in certain respects to the mind in the modern Western philosophy. The heart is also a fundamental component of a human subject in other studies done among the Bantu people of the sub-Saharan region. For example, Kagame (1956, 1976) in the shadow thesis endorsed a form of dualism where a human being is viewed as a complete animal but at the same time a being with intelligence. Apart from this dualism, Kagame also acknowledges the presence of a heart. The difference between intelligence and heart is that the former is central for deliberation/ reflection (similar to what I called earlier as practical reason/wisdom), while the heart is important in that it ‘integrates all that the interior man is; it harmonises the operations and acquisitions of intelligence, by adding to them the acts which other cultures attribute to the will’ (Kagame 1989, 36). In my view, the Chewa conceptualisation is closer to this, given that the heart is also a will. It is further

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responsible for an individual’s character, which is indicative of its role in directing the course of action (of course, in terms of human behaviour, this direction is given after the heart considers the outcome of reflection using practical reason). Kaphagawani ([1998]2004, 399) criticises Kagame’s idea of the heart relative to the above citation, where he indicates that: Kagame’s remark is, as it stands, quite misleading, because physiologically humans cannot be said to be more in possession of heart than say, pigs. However, precisely because he claims that the Bantu regard this human “heart” as the being in charge of the operations of the intelligence, then pigs definitely are to be denied possession of such a “heart.”

The comment of Kaphagawani does not do justice to Kagame’s use of the word heart in the African context. In my view, the word is used metaphorically and not literally, as Kaphagawani is trying to make us believe. The literal interpretation makes him conclude that the idea of heart does not apply to the pigs. I think that for Kagame the common practice in various cultures is to take the heart symbolically as representing certain functions in a human subject. Surprisingly, while criticising Kagame, Kaphagawani (339) attempts to give a shared conception of the heart among the Bantu, where it is seens as ‘the personality of man’. He further noted that it is what characterises a person as unique. Based on the four elements (body, spirit, heart and life principle) discussed above, I indicate that this view is a version of interactionism. It recognises the existence of body and mind, yet it seems they are inseparable when an individual is alive. They interact mainly by sharing the life-giving principle and the heart, which has various essential functions, such as harmonising different activities of the intellect and shaping the character of a particular individual. The link between heart and intelligence in Kagame is crucial in the issue of body and mind. It implies that the heart while being a seat of operations of the physical body (seat of desires and emotions) is equally a controller of the spiritual (intelligence).

8.4

Conclusion

I conclude with a summary in a comparison table to show some similarities and differences on mind and body debates. Comparison table A. Similarities Comparison Western analytic philosophy area Dualism Two elements forming a human being are body and spirit Physicalism Physicalism Immaterialism Immaterialism B. Differences Dualism

Interactionism and parallelism

African analytic philosophy Two elements forming a human being are body and spirit Physicalism I have not traced any serious form of immaterialism. Interactionism

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The chapter has attempted to present conceptions on the mind and body problem, which has characterised most of the metaphysics studies. In Western philosophy, there are three theories, namely, dualism, physicalism and immaterialism. In the African context, it was noted that there is a unique form of dualism that is embraced by Chewa language speakers. This dualism acknowledges the existence of body and spirit (soul) but also the life principle (moyo) and heart (mtima). It was shown that at death, body and spirit separate. It was argued that the Chewa conception of dualism may be regarded as a form of interactionism. Although this interactionism which is mainly dependent on the heart is interesting, one may question the validity of the belief in the spirit, as a thing that exists. This problem comes in the analytic tradition mainly because of trusting more the empirical evidence. Is there enough evidence to lead to the acceptance of the spirit? Unfortunately, in most of the African cultures, this is taken as a given; hence its existence is taken for granted. I cannot exhaust this topic in this chapter, but indicate that further study on evidence relative to spirit, among the Chewa and other related tribes may help clarify this topic.

Chapter 9

Conclusion

Abstract What is being? The perennial question of ‘being’ has been a primary focus of studies in continental and analytic philosophy. Although metaphysics is generally associated with continental philosophy, the book has argued for its significant presence in analytic philosophy despite various controversies. In this framework, philosophers investigate the meaning of being through (i) the subject-verbobject language and the Action-language (rheomodic language), (ii) natural science, and (iii) logic/mathematics. The comparison of different modes of being and relations was of paramount interest in this work. For this reason, it studied notions of causation, space/time, modality, determinism/indeterminism, and mind/body. While the work has offered different insights from Western and African analytic traditions, ‘the question of being’ remains the most intriguing and challenging in philosophy. Future work may compare analytic metaphysics in different cultural settings, hoping to confirm that philosophy (metaphysics) is a universal discipline; hence the outcome is similar elsewhere.

What is being? In the preface and general introduction, this work departed with a promise to investigate being in both Western and African philosophies, with a special focus on insights from the analytic tradition. In the second chapter, this work has clarified and confirmed the common conceptualisation of being, which builds on the subject-verb-object language structure. This has interestingly led to a general theory in metaphysics, characterised by a fragmentary and static conception of reality. The relation between subjects and objects has been viewed as that of acting and being acted upon. A great part of Western and African metaphysics has come as a consequence of reflecting on this subject-verb-object relations. The general metaphysics of categories from Aristotle to Kant and the modern developments from Frege to Bertrand Russell, Moore and many others are trapped or influenced in their thought by this subject-verb-object language structure. Similarly, the investigation on particulars and universals that is fundamental in both medieval philosophy and modern analytic metaphysics confirms that human subjects are continually influenced by this fragmentary approach to reality. While the subject-verb-object approach to reality is widely shared, the main problem remains the unification of the fragments at different levels. For instance, © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. M. Kayange, The Question of Being in Western and African Analytic Metaphysics, Synthese Library 438, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69645-0_9

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philosophers have grappled with the unifying element for a particular conceived as a set of properties. This work has mainly considered the two leading solutions, the substratum solution and the bundle theory, both of which have failed to produce convincing arguments of what unites a particular. Traditional metaphysics has been vague of the meaning of substance when questioned in line with analytic metaphysics. Similarly, the analytic philosophers’ alternatives using the primitive concept of relation have been equally devastating. The Lockean position, which accepted ignorance on what a substance is, seemed very attractive, but it also remained non-informative. The alternatives suggested by African philosophes such as Tempels and Kagame have been very close to the developments in Western thought, hence equally lacking. I want to confirm that, while the subject-verb-object approach is very illuminating in understanding different aspects of being, its failure to clearly describe being confirms that ‘the question of being’ is complex and it is impossible to completely exhaust it. In other words, the absolute truth of what being is cannot fully be acquired; in this case, the subject-verb approach is one of the perspectives and a step towards a more comprehensive theory of being, which in my view cannot be fully obtained. I feel vindicated with the conclusion above given that there is another perspective studied in this work in Chap. 3, which is also a step towards a comprehensive theory of being. This was argued as presenting a holistic picture of reality (wholeness), which is also dynamic (process). The approach in this context shifts from subjectverb-object language structure to action language (verb). Thinkers such as Bohm and Ramose have speculated on being using the rheomodic language in this framework. While this perspective seems interesting, the passage from the root verb to the conclusion of wholeness leaves a lot to be desired. In my view, this leap is often explained simplistically, and often it is assumed. This may be true in Ramose’s work who utilised the relation between ubu- and -ntu to demonstrate the aspects of being as dynamic and wholeness in the African context. Nevertheless, this is a perspective, which is also a step towards a comprehensive understanding of being. In principle, I don’t even think that this view has to be compared with the subject-verb-object view, given that they are all perspectives that make sense in a particular context. An attempt to compare the two in terms of ‘better approximation to the true description of being’ cannot lead to any fruitful result. This study may have the same fate as Karl Popper’s attempt to compare Newtonian gravitation theory with Einstein’s general relativity theory under the idea of better approximation or verisimilitude (see Kayange 2008). Although Chaps. 2 and 3 represent alternative perspectives of approaching the question of being, several related issues require clarification. For this reason, the following themes were discussed: space and time, modality, causation, free will in relation to determinism and indeterminism, mind and body. I will not go in details on these themes, but I would like to note that the developments from Chaps. 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 confirm that there are various perspectives that individuals hold and defend. This confirms that being is a very rich philosophical concept and maybe tackled from different angles. While we can accept this perspectival approach as different themes are being discussed, the problem that puts in crisis this thinking is, ‘does this imply

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embracing relativism?’ If yes, does it mean that every perspective is right? I cannot fully respond to this difficult question apart from indicating that in various writings, I have suggested perspectival realism as a way of introducing the element of partial truth and correspondence to the facts in a perspective. By implication, theories of being and its related elements such as causation and modality may be regarded as partially true descriptions of reality in a particular context (see Kayange 2008, 2018, 2019). I conclude by affirming once again that the question of being remains the most complex but, at the same time, an urgent issue. It is complex because the human mind is limited and cannot fully grasp and describe being in its entirety. Similarly, language is limited, such that it cannot fully represent how things are. It is urgent because the environment, human life and meaning/survival depend on the understanding of being.

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Index

A African analytic metaphysics, 13 Aitia, 1, 110 Aposterior Analytics, 111 Aquinas, 66 Archai, 1 Arché, 1 Aristotle, 65 Austin, A.L., 22 Ayer, A.J., 9

B Bantu ontology, 39 Being qua being, 1 Berkeley, 28 Bohm, D., 22

C Carnap, 9 Categories, 26 Causation, 109 Communitarians, 39 Contingent propositions, 94 Counterfactuals, 96 Counterpart, 95, 97

D Decompositional analysis, 6 De dicto, 90 De re, 90 Determinism, 133

E Efficient cause, 111 Elimination of metaphysics, 12 Ersatz modal realism, 98 Essentia, 27

F Factual truth, 94 Final cause, 112 Formal cause, 111 Freedom and Necessity, 138

G Gbadegesin, S., 123 Gyekye, K., 3, 15, 23, 81, 120–125, 145, 158

H Hallen, B., 15 Hard determinism, 138, 139 Historical approach, 4 Hountondji, P., 14 Hume, D., 28 Hylomorphism, 26

I Ikuenobe, P., 14 Immaterialism, 157 Incompossibles, 92 Indeterminism, 133 Individuals, 24

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021 G. M. Kayange, The Question of Being in Western and African Analytic Metaphysics, Synthese Library 438, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-69645-0

181

182 K Kagame, A., 41, 79 Kayange, G.M., 16 Kripke, S., 101

L von Leibniz, G.W., 91 -Li, 54 Libertarianism, 140 Locke, J., 27 Logical analysis, 7

M Material cause, 111 Materialism, 154 Mbiti, J., 80, 81 Meaning and Truth in African Philosophy, 16 Metaphysical realists, 30 Methodological approach, 6 Mituki, 80 Modality, 90 Modal realism, 95, 105 Moore, G.E., 6 Mzimu, 159

N Namalenga, 142 Necessary condition, 115 Necessary propositions, 93 Necessary/sufficient conditions, 114 Nomen, 33 Nuomena, 10

O Ontological commitment, 35

P Particulars, 24, 26 Parusia, 150 Phaedo, 111 Phronesis, 146 Phronimos, 146 Physicalism, 154 Plato, 31 Popper, K., 5 Possible worlds, 95

Index Q Quine, R., 34

R Reductionist, 73 Reichenbach, H., 5, 62, 69, 70, 109 Relevance-based approach, 10 Russell, B., 29, 30

S Sasa, 80 Schlick, M., 5 Sogolo, G.S., 113, 120, 122, 123 Sophia, 1 Space and time, 65, 68 Spinoza, 2 Strawson, P.F., 24, 25 Subject-verb-object ontology, 21, 23 Substratum, 26

T Tempels, P., 15 Temples, 36 Tene, 80 Theodicy, 93 Three dimensions, 65 Thupi, 159 Tractatus Logico Philosophicus, 8 Transcendental metaphysics, 10

U Ubuntu, 39 Universal, 27, 30

V van Niekerk, J., 13 Verification, 11 Vienna Circle, 4 Voces, 33 Void, 65

W Wittgenstein, L., 5

Z Zamani, 80