The Quest for Peace Since the World War [Reprint 2014 ed.] 9780674428775, 9780674428065

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THE QUEST FOR PEACE

LONDON : H U M P H R E Y MILFORD OXFORD UNIVERSITY PRESS

THE QUEST FOR PEACE SINCE THE WORLD WAR BY

WILLIAM E. RAPPARD Director

of the Graduate Institute

of International

Professor at the University

CAMBRIDGE,

Studies,

Geneva

of Geneva

MASSACHUSETTS

HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS 1940

COPYRIGHT, 1 9 4 0 BY T H E PRESIDENT AND FELLOWS OF HARVARD COLLEGE

ALL

RIGHTS

RESERVED,

INCLUDING

THE

RIGHT

REPRODUCE THIS BOOK OR ANY PART THEREOF IN FORM.

PRINTED AT T H E HARVARD UNIVERSITY PRESS CAMBRIDGE, MASSACHUSETTS, U.S.A.

TO ANY

To A . LAWRENCE LOWELL

this book is dedicated as a token of highest esteem and most grateful friendship

La justice sans la force est inpuissante, la force sans la justice est tirannique. La justice sans force est contreditte, parce qu'il y a toujours des medians, la force sans la justice est a c c i ^ e . II faut done mettre ensemble la justice et la force, et pour cela faire que ce qui est juste soil fort, ou que ce qui est fort soit juste. P E N S E E S DE P A S C A L .

rerace

T H I S BOOK, B E G U N L O N G B E F O R E T H E

PRESENT

war, will, I fear, be published long before the return of peace. It grew out of a highly flattering invitation I was privileged to receive from President A . Lawrence Lowell in the spring of 1 9 3 9 . H e was good enough to suggest that I come to Boston a year later to deliver a series of lectures under the auspices of the Lowell Institute. A s a title for these lectures, I ventured to propose " T h e Quest for Peace in Post-War Europe."

This

was readily accepted. Before my preparations had been completed, however, it had become ambiguous.

The title was

therefore slightly modified to meet the tragically altered circumstances. But the subject of the lectures remained the same. It was and is my intention to describe the birth, the growth and the mournful destiny of the idea that lasting peace should result from the World W a r . T o seek to understand how this idea originated, how its authors and their successors sought to realize it, how and why they failed, that, it seemed to me, was an undertaking both historically interesting and perhaps politically useful. T h a t it was not an easy nor an entirely pleasant enterprise I fully appreciated from the start. N o t only were the technical difficulties of the task most baffling, but the subject was hardly one which could be expected to delight any audience.

A novel that begins with courtship and ends with

divorce is not apt to be a best-seller, in success-enamored

χ

PREFACE

America perhaps less even than elsewhere! However, divorces are not only sad, they may also be profitable and even salutary if their lessons are understood. But, in order properly to understand the lessons taught by the recent divorce of peace and Europe, the facts which led up to it must be fearlessly faced, dispassionately analyzed and lucidly considered. The historical interest of this task soon exceeded even my keen anticipations. Of the possibilities my study offered for public lectures, on the other hand, I kept seeking, somewhat uneasily, to persuade myself, when suddenly, by the same mail, I received two unexpected messages from the United States. Simultaneously and quite independently of each other, two American publishers informed me that they happened to be interested in my subject and had for some time been looking for an author willing to discuss it in a book. Having chanced upon the announcement of my Lowell Lectures, they wondered whether I would undertake the job. As, from personal experience and otherwise, I was, in Europe, far more familiar with the quest of scholars for publishers than the reverse, I felt duly elated. I promptly agreed to accept one of the two proposals, whose only disadvantage was that it obliged me to decline the other! I was encouraged by this adventure not only because it showed that my interest in my subject was shared by those whose professional business it is to gauge that of the reading public, but also because it made me more certain of my own purpose. To spend months of labor, in the summer, autumn and winter of 1939, in the heart of Europe, on the preparation of lectures to be delivered the following spring, beyond the stormy seas, on the peaceful shores of America, was not an altogether exhilarating task. I could not help asking myself whether there would be a following spring, whether the seas would not be all too stormy and even whether the shores of America would still be peaceful. Furthermore, to compress the tale of the Euro-

PREFACE

xi

pean peace efforts of the last twenty-five years into the framework of a series of lectures is distressingly difficult. To write more fully, with a view to certain publication, was therefore much more satisfactory than to prepare a more concise oral exposition, especially since the possibility of presenting the latter depended and still depends, as I pen this preface, upon unforeseeable contingencies. As, moreover, there is no better preparation for a brief series of lectures than the writing of a long book on the same subject, I was doubly grateful to my publishers for their offer. About this book, for the publication of which they thus deserve the whole credit, without of course being in any way responsible for its all too obvious inadequacies, I shall here make but three observations. First, although appreciably longer than the lectures which gave rise to its composition, my story is still appallingly brief, considering the variety and the complexity of the topics with which it deals. How not to be superficial without being interminable, how to neglect neither significant particulars nor synthetic considerations, how to lose sight neither of vivid detail nor of general proportions, are difficulties with which all writers on contemporary history are familiar. I have sought, in a measure at least, to overcome them by leaving in the dark many aspects of my subject, in order to concentrate attention on those parts of it which struck me as most important. In order to associate the reader as closely as possible with the events and discussions recalled — and that is my second preliminary remark — I have not hesitated to quote very copiously from official reports and debates. I fully realize that I have thereby rendered his task more difficult, but I am convinced that I have also rendered it more profitable. Is it not the repeated experience of all thoughtful students that what is least entertaining perhaps in a work of history, but surely most enlightening, is the presentation of historical facts, in their own language, so to speak, and not the commentaries and opin-

xii

PREFACE

ions of the author? Of the drama staged in the following pages, my ambition was therefore to be neither the playwright nor the leading actor, but merely the modest producer. That is why the text is filled — perhaps one may say unduly loaded — with quotations. And that is why also these quotations are drawn not from other writers but, whenever possible, from the original official sources themselves. Thirdly and finally, let it be observed that my main and almost my sole purpose was to recall and to explain what happened in the past, not to predict what course the evolution of the international community would, nor to say what course it should, take in the future. It is difficult enough to ascertain and to explain the knowable past! Therefore, although constantly tempted to vaticinate about the unknowable, or to plead for the best future, I have deliberately resisted the temptation. Almost, but not quite always, with success. Thereby — I know it by previous experience — I shall not fail to disappoint many of my readers. All of us are of course more vitally interested in the future than in the past, in what will, and also in what should, happen, than in what has happened. But I am firmly of the opinion that what is the privilege and the duty of the statesman and indeed, in democratic countries in which every citizen is to some degree a statesman, of us all, is for the scientific historian, whose search is or should be for truth alone, at best a side issue and too often an evasion. I cannot bring this preface to a close without addressing at least a word of acknowledgment to all those who, directly or indirectly, have assisted me in the preparation of this book. Indirectly, my most helpful collaborators have been my colleagues and my students at the Graduate Institute of International Studies in Geneva. Without our intellectual intimacy and our constant association one with another and all with the problems of international relations, it would have been impossible for me to write this book. My particular thanks are due also to President Lowell for asking me to deliver the Lowell

PREFACE

xiii

Lectures, to the Harvard University Press, to the librarians in charge of the Rockefeller Library of the League of Nations and of that of the International Labor Organization, whose competence and kindness combine to make of their institutions a true paradise for the scholar, to the staff of our Graduate Institute and especially to Mrs. A. Goldenberg-Goebel, without whose intelligent assistance, tireless efforts and stimulating devotion I should never have been able to complete my task within the prescribed limits of time. W. E. R. GENEVA, M A R C H

I,

1940.

CONTENTS INTRODUCTION

3 CHAPTER

I

P E A C E AS A W A R A I M D U R I N G T H E W O R L D I. Definition and preliminary observations

.

.

.

WAR .

6

Definition, 7 ; preliminary observations, 10.

II. Origins of the World War

14

III. Evolution of peace as a war aim

18

E a r l y British w a r aims, 18; Sir E d w a r d Grey and the United States, 22; President Wilson's crusade for a league of nations, 25; the position in Great Britain, 33; in France, 36; in Russia, 38; in Italy, 39; in G e r m a n y , Austria and H u n g a r y , 39; the Papal appeal of August 1917, 4 1 ; political freedom as a condition of peace, 42.

IV.

Factors influencing this evolution

45

A . Factors promoting this evolution, 45; 1. the general stress of the war, 45; 2. the influence of the United States, 46. B. Factors opposing this evolution, 50; 1. national interests, 50; 2. distrust of G e r m a n y , 5 1 ; 3. fear of jeopardizing victory, 52; 4. political psychology, 56.

V. Conclusions

57 CHAPTER

II

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE A T T H E PEACE

CONFERENCE

I. The double task of the Peace Conference: the settlement of national claims and the establishment of an international order

60

II. Two examples of the settlement of national claims under international influence:

62

A . T h e F r a n c o - G e r m a n territorial settlement, 62; T h e French territorial w a r aims, 63; Alsace-Lorraine, 70; the Saar, 7 1 ; the left bank of the Rhine, 77.

xvi

CONTENTS Β. The colonial settlement, 86; Colonies and the World War, 86; the chronology of the conquest, 87; the Fifth of the Fourteen Points, 92; the claims of the conquerors, 95; the solution, 97.

III.

T h e quest for an international order

99

A . The general problem, 99; President Wilson and his European partners, 99; the Fourteen Points, 103; the three fundamental policies, 103. B. The pacific settlement of international disputes, 107; The Anglo-French initiative, 107; the Phillimore proposals, 108; the Bourgeois plan, 109; the House-Wilson proposals, 112; the solution, 114. C. The principle of collective security, 1 1 8 ; The Wilsonian idea of mutual guarantees, 118; the tragedy of Articles 10 and 19, 120; the British idea of sanctions, 124; the French idea of an international army, 127. D. Disarmament, 129; President Wilson's proposals, 129; the suggestions of General Smuts, 1 3 1 ; the platonic results, 131. E. Conclusion, 133. CHAPTER I I I TWENTY

I.

YEARS

OF

ARBITRATION

T h e general situation

134

The post-war atmosphere in Europe, 134; peace in Europe and the United States, 136.

II.

T h e Permanent Court of International Justice .

.

.

137

The establishment of the advisory Committee of Jurists, 137; their "draft scheme," 138; compulsory or optional jurisdiction, 142; the revision of the scheme by the Council, 146; the 1920 Assembly and the adoption of the Statute, 149; the subsequent history of the Court, 153.

III.

T h e ex-neutrals and arbitration

155

The Scandinavian proposals of 1920 and their consequences, 155.

IV.

T h e Geneva Protocol of 1924

156

Arbitration as a condition of security and disarmament, 156; the ideal and procedure of absolute and universal arbitration, 157; the Protocol repudiated by the British Government, 159.

V.

T h e Locarno Treaties of 1925 The Protocol of 1924 and the Locarno Treaties of 1925, 162; Locarno and arbitration, 163.

162

CONTENTS

xvii

VI. The General Act for the peaceful settlement of international disputes of 1928

165

T h e pluralistic liberalism as opposed to monistic rigidity, 165; the effort and its result, 167.

VII. The Briand-Kellogg Pact of 1928

168

Its French origins, 168; its American character, 169; its terms and significance, 170; the Kellogg Pact and the League of N a tions, 172.

VIII. The will and the way to peace

174

T h e judge and the policeman, 1 7 4 ; international legislation, 1 7 5 ; w a r and peaceful change, 176; the will more at fault than the means, 176.

IX. The Aaland Islands dispute

177

A n example of peace maintained in spite of undeveloped pacific procedures, 1 7 7 ; the origins of the dispute, 1 7 8 ; a question of domestic jurisdiction?, 1 7 9 ; the Commission of Rapporteurs, 182; the limits of self-determination, 183; the solution, 187.

188

X . The Italo-Ethiopian dispute T h e contrasts between 1920 and 1935, 188; some antecedents, 190; Italian will to conquer, 194; the W a l W a l incident, 196; the arbitration, 199; the Italian indictment, 202; the inevitable w a r , 204.

XI.

205

Conclusion T h e possibilities and limitations of unsanctioned 205. CHAPTER

arbitration,

IV

T H E F L U C T U A T I N G D E S T I N I E S OF C O L L E C T I V E SECURITY I. Collective security and the United States

.

.

.

.

II. The destiny of Article 10

208 209

Its American origins, 209; the origins of Canadian hostility, 209; the resolution of the Second Assembly, 210; the Canadian amendment of 1922, 2 1 1 ; the debates of the Fourth Assembly, 214; the vote on the interpretative resolution, 219.

III. The whittling down of Article 16 T h e attempt to implement Article 16, 219; L o r d R o b e r t Cecil's optimistic " N o t e s on economic pressure," 222; the Scandinavian d r a f t amendments of 1920, 224; the debates at the First A s sembly, 225; the International Blockade Committee, 228; the debates at the Second Assembly, 230; f o u r points of difference,

219

xviii

CONTENTS 1

233> ί ) the "state of w a r , " 2 3 3 ; (2) the cooperation of "all Members of the League," 234; (3) the severance of all relations, 236; (4) the automatic character of sanctions, 2 3 7 ; the interpretative resolutions, 238; their devastating effect on collective security, 242.

IV.

The Treaty of Mutual Guarantee of 1 9 2 3 .

.

.

.

243

The original link between disarmament and collective security, 2 4 3 ; the Permanent Advisory Commission in 1920, 244; the position of France, 244; the Franco-British dialogue, 246; the Temporary Mixed Commission, 248; the Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, 249; its failure, 2 5 1 .

V.

The Geneva Protocol of 1924

252

The Franco-British political situation in 1924, 252; the P r o tocol essentially an instrument of collective security, 254; its success and failure, 259; the Protocol of 1924 and the PolishBritish treaty of 1939, 260.

VI.

The Locarno Rhine Pact of 1 9 2 5

261

Locarno and the Protocol, 2 6 1 ; Sir Austen Chamberlain on British commitments, 263; Locarno and French security, 264.

VII.

The aftermath of Locarno

265

The contagion of regionalism, 265; the model treaties of 1928, 268; the General Convention of 1930, 268; the disintegration of collective security, 270; miscellaneous other attempts to develop collective security, 272; the Finnish proposal of financial assistance to States victims of aggression, 272; the Convention on Financial Assistance of 1930, 274.

VIII.

Collective security as an historical fact

277

The anatomy and the physiology of collective security, 2 7 7 ; the League of Nations and its failure to apply sanctions, 277; the reasons of this failure, 278.

IX.

The application of economic sanctions in the ItaloEthiopian dispute The end of arbitration, 279; Great Britain and sanctions, 280; the philosophy of China, 283; the position of France, 284; the last attempt at conciliation by the Council, 285; the proclamation of Italian aggression, 286; the Assembly debate of October 9 - 1 1 , 1935, 287; the three allies of Italy, 288; Switzerland, 290; France and Great Britain, 2 9 1 ; the U.S.S.R., 293; Latin America, 294; the half-heartedness of the operation, 297; the conquest of Ethiopia, 298; the Assembly is reconvened at the request of the Argentine Republic, 299; the Italian case as presented in Count Ciano's letter of J u n e 29, 1936, 3 0 1 ; the speech of the Negus, 302; the views of the Argentine convener, 3 0 5 ; f o r and against the cessation of sanctions, 307; against, the

279

xix

CONTENTS Union of South Africa, 307; for, the U.S.S.R., 308; Latin America, 3 1 1 ; three British Dominions, 3 1 1 ; the European neutrals, 312; the United Kingdom, 314; France, 315; the Assembly resolutions and the confession of failure, 316.

X.

The final disintegration of collective security .

.

.318

T h e Geneva aftermath of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict, 318; the task of the special Committee on the application of the principles of the Covenant, 318; the Australian suggestion of April 20, 1936, 319; the Assembly of July 1936, 320; the position at the end of 1936: the ex-neutrals, 322; Latin-America, 323; the faithful, 324; the position in September 1938: the ex-neutrals' return to neutrality, 327; the backsliders, 329; the British attempt at compromise, 329; the remains of the sanctionist front, 330; the final confession of corporate impotence, 333. CHAPTER

V

T H E T R A G E D Y OF D I S A R M A M E N T I. Introduction

335

Arbitration, security, disarmament, 335; the struggle for disarmament, 337; the three periods in this struggle, 339.

II. The Franco-British period, 1920-1926

.

.

.

.

340

The Covenant and the Peace Treaties, 340; the creation of the Permanent Advisory Commission, 342; the first disarmament offensive by the Assembly of 1920, 34s; the creation of the Temporary Mixed Commission, 352 ; the first political alignment, 353; disarmament and collective security, 353 ; the Washington Naval Conference, 355; the plan of Lord Esher, 356; the hopes of Locarno, 358.

III. The preparations 1926-1932

for the Disarmament

Conference, 358

The Assembly of 1925, 358; the establishment of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference, 361; its task as defined in the so-called questionnaire, 363; its first meeting on M a y 18, 1926, 365; the general debate, 366; the first session, 373; the 1926 Assembly, 374; the second session of the Preparatory Commission, 376; the position at the end of 1926, 378; the third session of the Preparatory Commission, 380; its results, 386; the advent of the U.S.S.R. in November 1927, 389; the London Naval Conference of 1930, 391; the session of 1930, 392; its results, 395; the attitude of four groups of States, 396; the summoning of the Disarmament Conference, 403.

IV. The Disarmament Conference Its importance and composition, 405; its principal phases, 407; the first phase, the "general discussion," 407; Sir John Simon

405

CONTENTS

XX

defines the British position, 409; M. Tardieu and the French proposals, 412; Mr. Gibson and the United States, 415; Chancellor Brüning and the German rejoinder, 416; Mr. Dino Grandi's anti-French stand, 419; Japan, Manchuria and disarmament, 421; Mr. Litvinoff and his anti-militaristic philosophy, 422; the end of the "general discussion," 426; the "General Commission" and its technical committees, 427; President Hoover's proposals of June 1932, 428; the resolution of July 23, 1932, 429; the second phase, 432; the resolution of December 12, 1932, 433; the third phase, 434; the discussion of the French memorandum on disarmament and security, 434; the British proposal of January 30, 1933, 439; the fourth phase, Mr. MacDonald's speech of March 16, 1933, 441; the debate to which it gave rise, 447; the German reply, 450; an unanimous resolution, 453; the voice of America, 454; the resolution of June 8, 1933, 459; the meeting of the General Commission of June 29, 1933, 462; the reunion of October 1933, 466; the wire of Baron von Neurath, 469; the fifth and final phase, 469.

V. The responsibilities for failure

470

Disarmament and aggression, 470. CHAPTER V I A

RETROSPECT

AND

A

PROSPECT

I. The dual purpose of this chapter II. Recapitulation

.

.

.

.

472 473

Summary of chapter I, 473; the origin and development of organized peace as a war aim in the World War, 474; summary of chapter II, 476; justice and the peace settlement of 1919, 477; the purposes of the League of Nations, 481; summary of chapter III, 482; the Permanent Court of International Justice, 483; the legislator, the judge and the policeman, 485; summary of chapter IV, 486; collective security and the abstention of its American promoter, 486; collective security and the conquest of Ethiopia, 488; summary of chapter V, 490; national armaments and international insecurity, 490; the technical difficulties of disarmament, 492; the responsibility for its failure, 494.

III. Why and whither Why was the quest for peace unsuccessful, 496; four types of peace, 497; the peace of the future, 499.

49 S

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

Introduction

TO A D D R E S S A N A M E R I C A N A U D I E N C E ON T H E quest for peace in post-war Europe today may seem bold. Such were the first words I drafted over a year ago when I set out to prepare what were then to be lectures. Since then events have transformed post-war into what might be called inter-war Europe and thus increased the boldness of my enterprise. To some it may even seem paradoxical and impertinent. Was not the World War of European origin? Did it not spring from the rivalries, suspicions and hatreds of European peoples and governments? Had they not for centuries lived in a state of mutual hostility, sometimes latent, sometimes actual, but always real? Had they ever succeeded in subordinating their national ambitions and irreconcilable aspirations to a common ideal of peace and justice? Had they ever even tried to do so? Were not the American people dragged into the World War against their will? Had not their neutral rights been disregarded by both groups of belligerents from 1 9 1 4 to 1 9 1 7 with equal ruthlessness? Had they not then been ensnared and cajoled into taking sides by a crafty appeal to their self-interest combined with an hypocritical appeal to their idealism? Had they not, from the outset of their own belligerency, entertained some suspicion that they had fallen into the doubtful company of associates whose professed aims they were not

4

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

far from sharing, but whose real purposes were utterly foreign both to their own patriotism and to their conception of a fraternal universe? Were not these suspicions, which, as a result of the revelations and disillusions of the Peace Conference, gradually ripened into convictions, at the bottom of the attitude of the United States towards the League of Nations? Did not the American people turn their backs upon this American institution, not so much because they repudiated its ideals, but because they deemed the nations of Europe unworthy of them and unfit to cooperate in their realization? Were not finally these suspicions and convictions confirmed by the whole subsequent course of events? Peace treaties, sufficiently severe in their terms to arouse the indignation of their victims, yet too difficult of execution to assure the fruits of victory to their authors and to create security for all; war debts, excessive when imposed on the defeated, repudiated when due to American creditors, irritating and paralyzing to all, but never fully collected by any; new tensions, new rivalries, new armaments, new threats to peace and renewed appeals for assistance by the same exasperating and incorrigible Europeans to the same still generous but no longer unsuspecting Americans! And now, here, one of these Europeans emboldens himself again to address these enlightened and disillusioned Americans on Europe's quest for peace! In asking these questions, I do not wish to imply that I should answer them all in the affirmative. My purpose was merely to show that I am not ignorant of the moral background of those to whom I am addressing myself, nor therefore unconscious of the temerity of my undertaking. Need I add that it was not in the least a desire to provoke, to challenge or to defy which led me to select this topic, but merely its inherent interest and, as it seems to me, its undoubted timeliness? I truly know of none, the study of which could more usefully

INTRODUCTION

5

help us to understand the recent past and perhaps also to prepare for the near future. Admittedly the World W a r was essentially European both in its origins and in its consequences. European statesmanship cannot therefore escape the primary responsibility both for its occurrence yesterday and for its recurrence today.

More-

over, as peoples may justly be held responsible for the policies of their governments, one may well be tempted to lay the blame for the past as well as for the future at the door of the peoples of Europe. Y e t no one who has followed the developments of the last quarter of a century can seriously pretend that the overwhelming mass of the peoples of Europe were warlike in 1 9 1 4 , or have become warlike since. On the contrary, it must be obvious to all enlightened and impartial observers that, in Europe as in the rest of the civilized world, war is looked upon as a curse and dreaded, hated, combated and submitted to as such. Still it must be recognized that it is for mankind an internal and self-inflicted curse, human in its authorship as well as in its victims, and not an external accident of nature against which there could be no protection. W h y then this tragic paradox of a continent whose rulers all claim faithfully to represent the will of their respective peoples, whose peoples all yearn and clamor for peace, but whose rulers are none the less constantly exposing their peoples to the horror of armed conflict and, when they are not actually engaged in it, straining every political nerve and every technical muscle to organize them with a view to it? Surely, of all the riddles surrounding and confronting the destiny of mankind, none is more worthy considering. In these chapters I do not propose to consider it as a whole and in the abstract.

Rather do I intend to examine in detail

some of the main efforts made by contemporary statesmanship to secure a lasting peace and incidentally to inquire into the reasons of their failure.

1. P e a c e as a ^ ^ a r A i m during the W o r l d W a r I. DEFINITION AND PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS INTERNATIONAL

RELATIONS

IN

THE

LAST

twenty-five years were largely conditioned by, and built up upon the foundations of, the so-called Peace Treaties of 1 9 1 9 . And these treaties were largely the work of the statesmen who, having led their respective peoples to victory, sought to impose upon their defeated foes terms which would conform to the promises they had made and to the war aims they had formulated in the course of the hostilities. In order to understand the quest for peace since the World W a r , it is therefore necessary first to consider these treaties, and before all the promises and war aims of which they were the professed expresssion and fulfillment. Of course, there can be no question of critically examining here all the ends pursued by all the belligerents from 1 9 1 4 to 1 9 1 8 , and all the clauses of all the treaties of 1 9 1 9 . A s we must and as we may, we shall limit ourselves to the quest for peace in the specific sense which we shall define presently. Our first task is then to ascertain in how far the belligerents in the World W a r had peace as their objective throughout its course and by what means they hoped to achieve it.

Before

considering peace as a war aim, that is before approaching this important but strangely neglected phase of the political history of the World W a r , I think a definition and at least two preliminary observations are called for.

PEACE AS A WAR AIM

7

First the definition. As is well known, peace has a variety of meanings. For all, peace is always the aim of war. Even Herr Hitler — we have it on his own authority — does not propose to wage war for war's sake. As he declared in a speech made in Kassel on June 4, 1939: No people and no government will wage war for war's sake. That any one could go to war just for the pleasure of killing and shedding blood is an idea which could germinate only in the brain of perverse Jewish men of letters.1 Herr Hitler's knowledge of Jewish literature and Jewish philosophy is doubtless far more extensive than mine. Personally I must confess that I have never in my readings come across any statement to that effect by any Jews, perverse or not, men of letters or not. It is true that in past and even in very recent times war has often been held to be inevitable and sometimes even declared to be beneficent and therefore desirable. There is in fact quite a long tradition behind this view. Professed throughout the nineteenth century, notably by outstanding philosophers and historians of a nation very dear to the heart of Herr Hitler, it has as its most prominent exponent today another contemporary statesman who in many important matters has followed the Führer's lead, even to the point of persecuting Jews in one of the few countries in Europe where anti-Semitism was and is unknown! However, war for war's sake may possibly be a game for a few youthful professional soldiers, but it has never been a national policy anywhere. All belligerents ever and everywhere necessarily aspire to peace. But that does not mean that they all and always have the same war aims. There are at least three types of peace which we can distinguish in the statements of belligerents during the World War. There is first that which identifies peace with military victory. That simple definition of peace was quite naturally that 1

Frankfurter

Zeitung, June 5, 1939, No. 281.

8

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

of the man in the trenches, whatever his uniform. But it was also that of certain generals and even of certain politicians, who could never very well see far beyond the trenches. Thus General Ludendorff, for instance, in his memoirs, published after his resignation, tells us that he was of the opinion that one thing, and one thing only mattered in the last war, and that was victory. He writes: It was only by waging war powerfully that we sought to attain the great goal of peace. . . . In Berlin they took another road. Instead of enlisting and straining to the utmost all available forces for the war, in order to reach peace on the field of battle, as is required by the spirit of war, they were there constantly speaking of reconciliation and mutual understanding, without at the same time inspiring their own people with a warlike impulse. . . . The idea of attaining peace became stronger than the will to fight for victory. In view of the desire to annihilate (Vernichtungswille) which animated the enemy, this road did not lead to peace.2 We find very much the same rudimentary conception of peace in the mind of various Allied statesmen. Take the most perfect representative of that political philosophy, Clemenceau. When, having ever since August 1 9 1 4 brutally attacked all his predecessors, he was finally put into power late in 1 9 1 7 , he read to the Chamber of Deputies, as is the habit in French parliamentary practice, a ministerial declaration setting forth the policies he intended to pursue. To his opponents of the Left, who deplored the absence in his statement of any well defined conception of peace, he replied on November 20, 1 9 1 7 : " Y o u ask me about my war aims. I answer: my aim is to be victorious." 3 Now, there is a second definition of peace, which although less simple than the first, is not unrelated to it. According to it, peace is identical not only with immediate and temporary vic2 Erich Ludendorff, Meine Kriegserinnerungen igi4~igi8, 9th ed., Berlin, 1926, pp. 3, 4. 3 Journal Officiel, Debats parlementaires, Chambre des Deputes, 1917, p. 2973, reprinted in Georges Clemenceau, Discours de guerre, Paris, 1934, p. 172.

P E A C E AS A W A R A I M

9

tory, but it implies a state of lasting superiority of the victors. Thus M r . A. J. Balfour wrote, in a memorandum which as First Sea Lord he submitted to the War Committee of the British Cabinet on October 4, 1916: T h e principal object of the W a r is the attainment of a durable peace, and I submit that the best w a y of securing this is by the double method of diminishing the area from which the Central Powers can draw the men and money required for a policy of aggression, while at the same time rendering a policy of aggression less attractive b y rearranging the map of Europe in closer agreement with what we rather vaguely call 'the principle of nationality.' 4

That, as a definition of peace, of course goes beyond mere victory, but it can hardly be retained as satisfactory for our purposes. Does not history clearly show that no interruption of war can be durable, if based only on the inevitably temporary superiority of force of one State or of one necessarily unstable group of States? It is peace taken in a third and far more ambitious sense which alone is of interest to us in this inquiry. It is peace defined as a state of international relations based on the legal organization of the world of nations, peace which is not merely the cessation of war as a result of the victory of the stronger, peace which is not merely the interruption of war assured temporarily by the superiority of one Power or group of Powers, but peace which is to the international community what order is to a national community: the result of certain habits, certain principles, certain institutions, certain procedures and sanctions which are intended to prevent the outbreak of violence. As an example of this conception of peace, let me quote from President Wilson's speech of January 22, 1917, in which he declared: Mere agreements may not make peace secure. It will be absolutely necessary that a force be created as a guarantor of the permanency of the settlement so much greater than the force of any nation now en4

879.

David Lloyd George, War Memoirs, 6 vols., vol. II, London, 1933, pp. 878-

ΙΟ

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

gaged or any alliance hitherto formed or projected that no nation, no probable combination of nations could face or withstand it. If the peace presently to be made is to endure, it must be a peace made secure by the organized major force of mankind.5 T h a t is the sense in which I here take peace as a war aim in the World War. Now for my two preliminary observations. First, war aims are not always what they seem. How can the true aims of the belligerents be discovered? How can we say that Great Britain, Germany, France, had such and such a war aim? I think that that question resolves itself into two others. First, who can speak on behalf of a country? Even in the unifying process which goes on whenever and wherever war is declared, one finds in every country a multiplicity of views. Which can be taken as that of the national community as a whole? Perhaps that professed by the constitutional authority? N o doubt, in free countries, policies are authoritatively stated by governments which can count on the support or at least on the acquiescence of a representative body. When, for instance, at the beginning of the war, Mr. Asquith, in Great Britain, or M . Viviani, in France, defined their respective war aims to the applause of well-nigh unanimous parliaments, what they said could be taken as a definition of the policies of their countries. But the position is not always quite as simple as that. There is no doubt that in pre-war Germany, for instance, according to all constitutional writers, power rested with the Emperor and with the Chancellor, who stayed in office as long as he enjoyed the confidence of his imperial master. As a matter of fact, however, quite soon after the beginning of the war, neither the Emperor nor the Chancellor could any longer authoritatively speak on behalf of Germany. As the Austrian Foreign Minister Czernin, whose memoirs are particularly enlightening because they are so delightfully indiscreet, deE

President

Wilson's

State

Papers and Addresses,

N e w Y o r k , 1918, p. 351.

PEACE AS A WAR AIM

II

clared: "During the last period of the war, there was only one decisive will in Germany, and that was the will of Ludendorff." 6 General Ludendorff was not even the titular head of the army, but he had created for himself a situation in which he really, and he alone, could speak with finality for Germany. This was so because not only the Chancellor, not only Field Marshal Hindenburg, but even the Emperor himself backed down when General Ludendorff declared: " I will resign if you oppose such and such a step." History shows that, whatever the constitutional truth, it was not the Kaiser, it was not Herr von Bethmann Holl weg, it was not his successor Dr. Michaelis, but General Ludendorff who solely expressed, in the latter half of the war and until his retirement, the true war aims of Germany. A very embarrassing question is that of President Wilson. There is no doubt that, throughout the war, he spoke as the chief magistrate of the United States. But it is no less true that when it came to the actual realization of his constantly professed war aims, he was disavowed by the American Senate. All we can say is that if President Wilson was therefore not entitled to speak on behalf of the United States, nobody was. As there was no articulate, no organized protest against the formulation of the American policies, at least while the war was on, I think it is fair to say that President Wilson did speak on behalf of his country. But it proved sadly obvious, and there is no greater tragedy, that the war aims which he had placed before his own people and before the whole world were repudiated by a sufficient number of Senators to prevent their full achievement. But, in a query such as ours, it is not sufficient to know who has the right to speak authoritatively on behalf of a nation. When we have discovered such a spokesman, we have still to ascertain whether he means what he says. In publicly formulating their war aims, the statesmen of the Great War were ' Ottokar Czernin, Im Weltkriege, 2nd ed., Berlin and Vienna, 1919, p. 99.

12

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

certainly never actuated by the sole desire of expressing the truth. N o politician, even the most honest, ever is, when he addresses his constituents. Fortunately we have today so many memoirs, so many diaries, and so many volumes of correspondence that we may usefully read in their light official declarations and diplomatic exchanges of views. M y second preliminary observation is perhaps too obvious to be useful. It is that war aims fluctuate in the course of a prolonged war. T h e case of a belligerent who goes to war to achieve a given end, who throughout the war pursues only that end and finally gains that end is quite exceptional. For military and political reasons, governments are almost necessarily deviated by events from their originally planned course. For military reasons first. Consider the aggressor. If the aggression succeeds, it is very probable that the aggressor will demand more, once he occupies the enemy's territory, than before. That was the case of Germany after 1914. There is no reason to believe that Germany went to war to pursue the aims which General Ludendorff formulated on her behalf once he was in possession of an appreciable part of his neighbors' territories. On the other hand, if for the aggressor things go badly, his aims become more modest. T h a t was the case of Austria. T h e ministers of the Emperor Franz Joseph went to war not only to humble Serbia, but to annex territory. But those of the Emperor Charles would have been only too happy to make peace on the basis of the status quo ante. Likewise for the victims of aggression, war inevitably suggests aims that had not been contemplated in times of peace. N o one who knew the state of mind prevailing in France in July 19x4 believed that that country went to war for the purpose of reconquering Alsace-Lorraine. But no one who knew the state of mind of France in August 1914 could ignore that France was determined to fight until Alsace-Lorraine had been reannexed. Such examples could be indefinitely multiplied. This is a point I wish to stress, because it is of very great im-

PEACE AS A W A R AIM

13

portance for the understanding of the past and perhaps of the future. When an aggressor A attacks a victim B , the chances are that being an aggressor, he is better prepared and will have initial successes. Now, at the end of a few months of war, if peace discussions arise, A will say: "Although of a very moderate and conciliatory disposition, I cannot of course consider the reestablishment of the status quo as an acceptable peace. I would be making a great concession if I ceded half of the territory which I have at great sacrifice occupied." But B, who, being the victim, was less well prepared, and having been less well prepared has therefore reason to believe that time is working in his favor, says: "Of course I shall not be content with the status quo. I must have reparations for the past and guarantees for the future." A few days after the outbreak of the war, President Wilson offered the belligerents his good offices to secure a cessation of the hostilities. Recalling that all the replies received were negative, Poincare, in his memoirs, adds: The aggressors do not want to lose the benefit of their sudden offensive; the others fear that by accepting the intervention of a third party they might encourage the audacity and the hopes of the assailants.7 That is one of the reasons why it is so much more difficult to make than to maintain peace. Furthermore, especially in wars of coalition, political circumstances inevitably lead belligerents to change their war aims, in the desire to gain allies, or to placate possible enemies. The best example of the working of what might almost be called a historical law is the case of the Treaty of London of 1915, by which the Allies, in order to secure the cooperation of Italy, made various pledges quite incompatible with their previously professed war aims. In Mr. R a y Stannard Baker's book, such secret treaties are denounced as proof of the wickedness of the European belligerents and 7

Raymond Poincare, Au service de la France, 10 vols., vol. V, Paris, 1928,

p. 28.

T H E QUEST FOR P E A C E

14

of their hypocrisy. T o these accusations M r . Winston Churchill replied with characteristic vigor in his World

Crisis when he

wrote: It is at once silly and unjust to pretend that these partitions of possible war gains had any substantial relation to the causes for which the Allies were fighting the war. When wars begin, much is added to the original cause of quarrel and many results follow never aimed at or cared for at the beginning. When the United States in 1898 declared war upon Spain, it was with no thought of taking the Philippine Islands and subjugating the Philippine Islanders; yet both these events followed inevitably or incidentally from their victory. It is no less a calumny upon France and England to say that they fought 'for the booty of Turkey' than to say that the United States picked a quarrel with Spain in order to annex and conquer the Philippines.8 II. O R I G I N S O F T H E W O R L D W A R

L e t us now, in the light of these considerations, very briefly recall the origins of the war. M y intention is not of course to reopen the war guilt question, but it is both important and possible to establish a few facts which, I think, are today if not y e t quite beyond controversy, at least beyond dispute among those who are well informed, unprejudiced and honest. T h e first fact is that in July [914 Austria-Hungary, feeling threatened in her imperial integrity b y South Slav aspirations within and without her frontiers, wished to humble Serbia and to annex Serbian territory. T h e second is that Austria-Hungary, realizing that this policy might bring upon her the hostility of Russia, would not proceed with it before being assured of German support. T h e third is that the German political authorities, expressly questioned as to whether that support would be forthcoming, expressly stated that it would. 9 It is quite obvious that Austria-Hungary and Germany were sincere in their pro8

Winston S. Churchill, The World Crisis:

The Aftermath,

London, 1929,

P. 133· ' These three facts are nowhere more unequivocally stated and more irrefutably proved by documentary material than in the fourth volume of Conrad von Hotzendorf's memoirs, Aus meiner Dienstzeit, Vienna, 1923.

PEACE AS A WAR AIM

15

fessed hope that the war might be localized. In so far they are not, and Russia is, responsible for the World War. AustriaHungary and Germany are therefore no more and no less responsible for the war of 1914 to 1918 than Germany is responsible for the present war. W h y should we doubt Herr Hitler's sincerity when he declares that he would have preferred to settle his accounts with Poland without the intervention of Great Britain and France? In 1914, Russia refused to stand by if Serbia was crushed. Germany refused to stand by if Austria-Hungary was attacked by Russia. France refused to stand by if Russia was attacked by Germany. And Great Britain refused to stand by when Belgium was attacked. 1 0 If we examine the declarations of war which were exchanged in the fateful midsummer days of 1914, we will find that they were justified almost exclusively on purely national grounds. 11 It is only in the British Foreign Office's instructions of August 4, 1914, to Sir Edward Goschen in Berlin that there is something more. There we read that "His Majesty's Government feel bound to take all steps in their power to uphold the neutrality of Belgium and the observance of a Treaty to which Germany is as much a party as ourselves." 1 2 W e have here another element. It is the defense of the sanctity of treaties, to which we shall revert presently. But throughout the war, each one of the belligerents asserted national territorial ambitions either openly or in secret treaties. France concluded secret treaties with Russia, calling for not only the reannexation of Alsace-Lorraine, but the annexation of the Saar and the establishment of a neutral State on the left bank of the Rhine. Russia, in exchange for her promise to continue the war until France had achieved her aims, secured from 10 C f . Ch. X I I of vol. II of S. B. Fay, The Origins of the World War, New York, 1928. u These declarations can be conveniently compared in the second volume of Professor Bernadotte E. Schmitt's admirable The Coming of the War, 2 vols., New Y o r k and London, 1930. 12 Ibid., vol. II, p. 404.

16

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

France the guarantee that France would not make peace until Russia had obtained control of the Straits. Likewise all the other belligerents except the United States during the war made special agreements among themselves regarding peace terms. These agreements all reveal the existence of purely national war aims, but in none of them is any provision made for the general organization of lasting peace. It was not until the eve of the Armistice that the major members of the Entente formally endorsed President Wilson's proposal for a league of nations as formulated in the last of his Fourteen Points. When and where then do we find peace, in the sense in which I have defined it, first emerging as a war aim among the belligerents? In the speech of Herr Hitler to which I referred a moment ago, we find a very strange course of argument. Germany, declared Herr Hitler, was innocent of the war. Why? Because the responsibility for war is revealed in the war aims of the belligerents. Now Imperial Germany was never able to formulate any real war aims, whereas the Allies dictated the Treaty of Versailles, which revealed the true aims of the British and French encirclers. Therefore France and Great Britain, and not Germany, were responsible for the war. All the terms of this argument are questionable, to say the least. First, as we have seen, realized war aims do not necessarily coincide with initial war aims. Moreover Germany had war aims which were not only clearly formulated, but were also in fact momentarily realized when Germany was victorious, as at Brest Litovsk. Finally the Treaty of Versailles was the expression of many other policies besides that which Herr Hitler refers to as one of Germany's encirclement. What is true is that Germany never formulated any real world peace aims. That is not only admitted, but explained, by the German War Chancellor. Herr von Bethmann Hollweg, who, in spite of the "scrap of paper" episode, was an extremely honest man, in his memoirs makes this extraordinarily interesting and enlightening statement:

PEACE AS A W A R

AIM

17

T h e way in which we Germans sought to assert ourselves against foreigners is perhaps characteristic of a people that has risen as fast as we. A people which spiritually and nationally has not y e t grown together could not set up a world thesis. T h i s inferiority could not be compensated. Paris is a world concept in view of the strong unified spiritual tradition and the organic form of French culture. Even political opponents bow before the genius of French culture. T h e English, on the other hand, had, in the course of centuries of political domination, created a type, inwardly consolidated and externally polished, of enormous suggestive power. In three quarters of the world, the language of British power politics had so penetrated the spiritual sensitiveness of mankind that humanitarian and cultural slogans, which in a German mouth would have sounded forced, seemed natural and self-evident on English lips. T h e hypocrisy of such slogans was universally accepted because it had become part of the unconscious make-up of the Englishman. If anyone felt a doubt, it was silenced b y British might. T h u s the hostile formulae of a struggle for right and justice, for the suppression of autocracy and militarism, for the freedom of small States, for the self-determination of all peoples, was credulously accepted b y the world. Appealing to feelings of general humanity and promising a golden age, this war cry enjoyed a force against which our defensive arguments were helpless. 13 A s f o r the A l l i e s , it w o u l d be a c h i l d i s h m i s r e a d i n g of o b v i o u s f a c t s to b e l i e v e t h a t t h e y w e r e u n a n i m o u s in p u r s u i n g as their m a i n w a r a i m the e s t a b l i s h m e n t of a p e a c e f u l u n i v e r s e .

But

t h e r e w a s one f e e l i n g w h i c h , in the c o u r s e of the w a r , b e c a m e w e l l n i g h u n i v e r s a l on t h e A l l i e d side, a n d t h a t w a s the f e e l i n g v e r y c l e a r l y d e s c r i b e d b y M r . L l o y d G e o r g e in an r e l a t e d in his War Memoirs.

anecdote

O n S e p t e m b e r 28, 1 9 1 6 , h e w a s

interviewed b y an American journalist, who after

inquiring

about Great Britain's war weariness, asked: '. . . what of France? . . . Is there the same determination there to stick to the end; the same idea of fighting until peace terms can be dictated by Germany's enemies?' ' T h e world at large has not yet begun to appreciate the magnif13 T h . von Bethmann Hollweg, Betrachtungen lin, 1922, pp. 59-60.

zum Weltkriege,

vol. II, Ber-

18

T H E QUEST FOR P E A C E

icence, the nobility, the wonder of France,' I replied. Ί had the answer to your inquiry given me a few days ago by a noble Frenchwoman. This woman had given four sons — she had one more left to give to France. In the course of my talk with her I asked if she did not think the struggle had gone far enough. Her reply, without a moment's hesitation, was: "The fight will never have gone far enough until it shall have made a repetition of this horror impossible." That mother was voicing the spirit of France.' 1 4 I think that was the spirit not only of France, but of a large part of the Allied, especially of the Anglo-Saxon world.

The

feeling of "never again," which is of course not itself sufficient to inspire peace as a war aim, is certainly an impulse which very powerfully favors the formulation of such an aim. A s Colonel House wrote President Wilson on June 25, 1918: Everywhere the most popular slogan is, 'This is a war to make future wars impossible,' and I believe that sentiment animates not only the people but the soldiers as well. 15 III. EVOLUTION OF P E A C E AS A WAR A I M

If we seek to discover the first origins of this sentiment and at the same time to understand the difficulties which it encountered, it is interesting to compare the statement of Sir E d w a r d Grey of August 3, 1914, in the House of Commons, before it had been made quite certain that the neutrality of Belgium was violated and therefore before it was quite certain that Great Britain would enter the war, with a statement made in the same place three days later b y M r . Asquith. O n the former occasion, Sir E d w a r d Grey, obviously pleading for British intervention, declared: If it be the case that there has been anything in the nature of an ultimatum to Belgium, asking her to compromise or violate her neutrality, whatever may have been offered her in return, her independence is gone if that holds. If her independence goes, the independence " L l o y d George, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 854-855. 15 Charles Seymour, ed., The Intimate Papers of Colonel don, vol. IV, 1928, p. 21.

House,

4 vols., Lon-

P E A C E AS A W A R A I M

19

of Holland will follow. I ask the House from the point of view of British interests, to consider what may be at stake. 16 N o t e the words: " f r o m the point of view of British interests." O n A u g u s t 6, 19x4, Great Britain having become a belligerent, M r . Asquith said in the H o u s e : If I am asked what we are fighting for I reply in two sentences. In the first place, to fulfill a solemn international obligation, an obligation which, if it had been entered into between private persons in the ordinary concerns of life, would have been regarded as an obligation not only of law but of honour, which no self-respecting man could possibly have repudiated. I say, secondly, we are fighting to vindicate the principle which, in these days when force, material force, sometimes seems to be the dominant influence and factor in the development of mankind, we are fighting to vindicate the principle that small nationalities are not to be crushed, in defiance of international good faith, by the arbitrary will of a strong and overmastering Power. I do not believe any nation ever entered into a great controversy — and this is one of the greatest history will ever know — with a clearer conscience and a stronger conviction that it is fighting, not for aggression, not for the maintenance even of its own selfish interest, but that it is fighting in defense of principles the maintenance of which is vital to the civilisation of the world. 17 I do not mean to compare these two statements in order to denounce British hypocrisy but merely to show that while it was necessary to plead for G r e a t Britain's cooperation, the stress was laid on British interest, while when that had been won, the selfish national interests were repudiated in favor of a world interest. M y purpose is thus to illustrate the psychology and the logic of national policies. A government, even in the freest and most generous country, cannot call upon its own citizens to m a k e a great national sacrifice except in the interest of the national State itself. Once that sacrifice is made, there is nothing to prevent more general and broader

conceptions

to be superimposed upon purely national considerations. u Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol. L X V , House of Commons, 8th vol. of session 1914, col. 1822. 17 Ibid., col. 2079.

20

T H E QUEST FOR P E A C E A few weeks later, M r . Asquith — and I think that is the

best proof of his sincerity — went still further in the sense of formulating peace as a real war aim. Speaking on the origin and objects of the war in Dublin, on September 25, 1914, he said: I should like, beyond this inquiry into causes and motives, to ask your attention and that of my fellow-countrymen to the end which, in this war, we ought to keep in view. Forty-four years ago, at the time of the war of 1870, Mr. Gladstone used these words. He said: 'The greatest triumph of our time will be the enthronement of the idea of public right as the governing idea of European politics.' Nearly fifty years have passed. Little progress, it seems, has as yet been made towards that good and beneficent change, but it seems to me to be now at this moment as good a definition as we can have of our European policy — the idea of public right. What does it mean when translated into concrete terms? It means first and foremost, the clearing of the ground by the definite repudiation of militarism as the governing factor in the relation of States and in the future moulding of the European world. It means next that room must be found and kept for the independent existence and the free development of the smaller nationalities each with a corporate consciousness of its own. Belgium, Holland, and Switzerland, and Scandinavian countries, Greece and the Balkan States — they must be recognized as having exactly as a good a title as their more powerful neighbours, more powerful in strength and in wealth, to a place in the sun. And it means finally, or it ought to mean, perhaps by a slow and gradual process, the substitution for force, for the clash of competing ambition, for groupings and alliances and a precarious equipoise, of a real European partnership based on the recognition of equal right and established and enforced by a common will. A year ago that would have sounded like a Utopian idea. It is probably one that may not or will not be realized either to-day or to-morrow. If and when this war is decided in favour of the Allies it will at once come within the range and before long within the grasp of European statemanship.18 T h i s statement, I submit, does already very clearly foreshadow not only the establishment of institutions for the maintenance of peace as a war aim, but, as its author truly observes 18 Speeches by the Earl of Oxford and Asquith, 217-218.

K.C., New Y o r k , 1927, pp.

PEACE AS A WAR AIM

21

in his Memories and Recollections, the creation of the League of Nations itself. 19 More than four terrible years separate the British Prime Minister's Dublin speech from the conclusion on November n , 1918, of an armistice based on the general agreement to create " a general association of nations . . . for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike." It would be quite impossible to show, indeed it would be entirely unhistorical to claim, that the words uttered by Mr. Asquith in 1914 were comparable to a seed, planted on a given day, slowly germinating in the blood-sodden soil of the war and finally blossoming into a flower of peace at the Armistice. Nothing less resembles a gradual biological evolution than the destiny of organized peace as a war aim throughout the World War. If it were to be compared to a seed, it might more properly be said to have fructified in America, where it was transplanted with assiduous care by British gardeners and whence it was later carried back to Europe in countless specimens upon the wings of President Wilson's eloquence. Instead of attempting step by step to follow this interesting development, let us be content first to recall its principal phases and then to examine the factors which on the one hand favored, and on the other hindered, the general adoption of this war aim by all the belligerents. The creation of some institution for the lasting maintenance of peace was from the outset in the minds of some of the members of the British Liberal Government and particularly of the Prime Minister and of the Foreign Secretary. In Mr. Asquith's first war speeches, as we have already seen, this purpose was clearly set forth in general terms. Still more perhaps than his chief, Sir Edward Grey had, ever since his unsuccessful efforts in late July 1914 to secure a ie

2 vols., L o n d o n , 1928, vol. I I , p. 39.

22

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

European conference to prevent the outbreak of hostilities, been constantly considering the possibility of collective international security for the future. In his somewhat dreamy reflections

on the subject, the cooperation of the United States

had always appeared essential.

A letter he wrote

former

President Theodore Roosevelt on October 20, 1914, affords an interesting insight into his state of mind. correspondent for an article in the Outlook

T h a n k i n g his

in which an ener-

getic policy of pacific action had been urged, he continued: Your idea, that the United States might have come forward on the eve of the outbreak of war to uphold Treaty rights, makes me glow at the thought of what might have been achieved. I see all the difficulty there would have been in getting American public opinion to endorse such action. . . . But, if the United States had taken action, they might possibly have stopped the war. . . . The result might have been an agreement between France, Germany, Russia, and England that none of them would attack another; that they would keep their armaments within certain bounds; that, on any dispute arising on this or any other question between any of them, it would be referred to arbitration, possibly the arbitration of the United States; and that, if any one Power refused arbitration, the others would all join forces against it. . . . I still think it possible that the United States Government may play a great part in the making of the peace at the end of this war, and in securing permanent peace afterwards. 20 Well informed of American public opinion during the first two years of the war and of President Wilson's steadfast advocacy of a policy of strict neutrality, Grey realized the futility of seeking to press the issue. However he never abandoned either the ideal of active international solidarity for the maintenance of peace or the hope of America's association with it, which alone could make of it a reality. O n August 10, 1 9 1 5 , we find him writing to Colonel Ε . M . House as follows: M y own mind revolves more and more about the point that the refusal of a Conference was the fatal step that decided peace or war 20 Viscount Grey of Fallodon, Twenty-Five vol. II, pp. 140 et seq.

Years, 2 vols., London, 1925,

P E A C E AS A W A R A I M

23

last year, and about the moral to be drawn from it: which is that the pearl of great price, if it can be found, would be some League of Nations that could be relied on to insist that disputes between any two nations must be settled by the arbitration, mediation, or conference of others. International Law has hitherto had no sanction. The lesson of this war is that the Powers must bind themselves to give it a sanction.21 T h a t Sir Edward, in thus writing the confidential adviser of President Wilson, was pursuing a very positive political purpose is clearly shown b y what followed. On September 7, 19x5, the American Minister in the Netherlands, who had just returned from a brief vacation in England, wrote the American Secretary of State: . . . At a private dinner of six friends on September 1, Sir William Tyrrell, secretary to Sir Edward Grey, talked with me apart and confidentially, with such evident intention that I feel that you should know what he said. . . . He thought that a 'league of nations' should be formed to prevent the recurrence of such a war as this, to guarantee the respect of established neutrality and the maintenance of the general principles embodied in the Hague conventions . . . and to punish future infractions and violations. He said that in his opinion, if America were favorable to an idea of this kind, her good offices, mediation (call it what you like), would be welcome when the consideration of terms of peace became possible.22 Shortly afterwards Sir Edward, abandoning all diplomatic reticence, in another private letter to Colonel House, bluntly inquired as to America's attitude. H e wrote, on September 22, 1915: To me, the great object of securing the elimination of militarism and navalism is to get security for the future against aggressive war. How much are the United States prepared to do in this direction? Would the President propose that there should be a League of Nations binding themselves to side against any Power which broke a treaty; which broke certain rules of warfare . . . or which refused, S e y m o u r , op. cit., v o l . II, L o n d o n , 1926, p. 87. Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United plement, The World War, Washington, 1928, p. 64. 21

22

States,

191s Sup-

24

T H E QUEST FOR P E A C E

in case of dispute, to adopt some other method of settlement than that of war? 23 T h u s a little more than a y e a r after the World W a r had started, we find the Foreign Secretary of Great Britain inquiring whether the United States would consider the possibility of cooperating in the establishment of a league of nations. Colonel House immediately transmitted the message to President Wilson, who instructed him to answer encouragingly. 2 4 M r . R a y Stannard Baker, for whom President Wilson's innermost thoughts have less secrets than for any other living man, tells us that: " I t is difficult to make out from the documents exactly what followed."

25

But, judging b y his public utter-

ances, this, I think, is the real starting point of the great crusade on which President Wilson was about to engage. Although he had since 19x4 been actively interested in promoting among the American Republics the idea of a mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence, his main energies had been devoted to defending the neutrality of his country against both provocations from without and pressure within.

from

From now on, however, as will be obvious to every

careful student of President Wilson's successive statements, his ideas underwent a gradual change. In the early stages of his war philosophy, he proposed that his country should serve the cause of peace b y its example only. T h u s on M a y 10, 1915, he declared to a large gathering of foreign-born American citizens after naturalization ceremonies at Philadelphia: The example of America must be a special example. The example of America must be the example not merely of peace because it will not fight, but of peace because peace is the healing and elevating influence of the world and strife is not. There is such a thing as a man Seymour, op. cit., vol. II, p. 88. Ibid., pp. 90 et seq. 25 Ray Stannard Baker, Woodrow New York, 1937, p. 126. 23

24

Wilson, Life and Letters, 8 vols., vol. VI,

P E A C E AS A W A R A I M

25

being too proud to fight. There is such a thing as a nation being so right that it does not need to convince others by force that it is right. 26 A fortnight later, at a Pan-American Financial Conference held at Washington on M a y 24, 1 9 1 5 , he declared: If there is any one happy circumstance . . . arising out of the present distressing condition of the world, it is that it has revealed us to one another: it has shown us what it means to be neighbors. And I cannot help harboring the hope, the very high hope, that by this commerce of minds with one another . . . we may show the world in part the path to peace. It would be a very great thing if the Americas could add to the distinction which they already wear this of showing the way to peace, to permanent peace. 27 O n October 1 1 , 1 9 1 5 , addressing the v e r y nationalistic b o d y of the D a u g h t e r s of the American Revolution, he said: We stand apart, unembroiled, conscious of our own principles, conscious of what we hope and purpose, so far as our powers permit, for the world at large, and it is necessary that we should consolidate the American principle. . . . Believing that America stands apart in its ideals, it ought not to allow itself to be drawn, so far as its heart is concerned, into anybody's quarrel. . . . Peace can be rebuilt only upon the ancient and accepted principles of international law, only upon those things which remind nations of their duties to each other, and, deeper than that, of their duties to mankind and to humanity. America has a great cause which is not confined to the American continent. It is the cause of humanity itself. 28 A s we see, President Wilson's ideas are gradually broadening from a narrow view of the traditional policy of the strict neutrality of the United States, first to an active conception of Pan-American solidarity, and

finally

to a world philosophy.

T h i s evolution w a s hastened both b y the increasing danger resulting from German military successes and submarine warfare and doubtless also b y the British suggestions which could not but appeal to a pacific democrat of his intellectual and President Wilson's State Papers and Addresses, Ibid., p. 120. 28Ibid., pp. 124-125. 26 27

op. cit., p. 1 1 7 .

26

T H E QUEST FOR P E A C E

moral constitution.

On November 4, 1915, abandoning his

previous hostility to the preparedness campaign which some of his political opponents had been waging and frankly admitting the intellectual evolution he was undergoing, he told the members of the Manhattan Club of N e w Y o r k : . . . Our thought is now inevitably of new things about which formerly we gave ourselves little concern. We are thinking now chiefly of our relations with the rest of the world — not our commercial relations — about those we have thought and planned always — but about our political relations, our duties as an individual and independent force in the world to ourselves, our neighbors, and the world itself.29 Whereas in the summer of 1914 his policy had been one not only of the strictest neutrality, but also of almost complete isolationism with regard to the Old World, internal and external events were now leading him to adopt an attitude of active concern in the affairs of Europe and of anxious uncertainty as to his country's interest and duty. T o be sure, he had not y e t openly declared his readiness to advocate the creation of and American participation in a league of nations. Furthermore and especially, he still remained utterly opposed to American armed intervention in the war. T h e first of these two steps he took firmly and deliberately in his famous address before the League to Enforce Peace delivered on M a y 27, 1916. T h i s League had been founded in Philadelphia a y e a r previously b y Ex-President T a f t , President Lowell of Harvard University and other public-spirited American citizens, mainly Republicans. Its statutes called for the participation of the United States in a league of nations for the pacific settlement of international disputes and for the collective use of economic and military force against all aggressors. E v e n before the Philadelphia League had been formally founded, Ex-President T a f t had, on M a y 12, 1915, publicly declared: 28Ibid,.,

p. 127.

27

P E A C E AS A W A R A I M

I am aware that membership in this League [of Nations] would involve, on the part of the United States, an obligation to take part in European and Asiatic wars, it may be, and that in this respect it would be a departure from the traditional policy of the United States in avoiding entangling alliances with European or Asiatic countries. But I conceive that the interests of the United States, in view of its close business and social relations, with the other countries of the world, much closer now than ever before, would justify it, if such a League could be formed, in running the remote risk of such a war in order to make more probable the securing of the inestimable boon of peace to the world, an object of desire that now seems so far away. 30 T h e very fact that President Wilson should have accepted, after a first refusal on April 14, an invitation to address a company in which such views prevailed, was in itself significant. But the statements he made before it, which were admittedly influenced b y the Grey-House correspondence and b y British speeches, 31 were infinitely more so. N o t only did he in this speech, which, as he wrote Colonel House while preparing it, might be the most important he ever made, call for the creation of " a n universal association of the nations . . . to prevent any war begun either contrary to treaty covenants or without warning and full submission of the causes to the opinion of the world — a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence," but he added: I am sure that I speak the mind and wish of the people of America when I say that the United States is willing to become a partner in any feasible association of nations formed in order to realize these objects and make them secure against violation. 32 It is obvious from all President Wilson's private and public utterances that, until the spring of 1 9 1 7 , he earnestly hoped to be able to bring about the creation of such a league of nations " T h e o d o r e Marburg, ed., Taft papers on League 1920, p. 46.

of Nations,

New York,

Baker, op. cit., vol. VI, pp. 216 et seq. Cf. also Seymour, op. cit., vol. IV,

31

P- 332

President

Wilson's State Papers and Addresses, op. cit., p. 274.

28

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

not as a victorious belligerent, but as a neutral and impartial mediator. One of his last important acts as such was the dispatch of the Lansing note, on December 18, 1916, to the belligerent Powers, suggesting a statement of peace terms. With more wishful imagination than historical accuracy he therein declared that: . . . The objects, which the statesmen of the belligerents on both sides have in mind in this war, are virtually the same, as stated in general terms to their own people and to the world. . . . Each would be jealous of the formation of any more rival leagues to preserve an uncertain balance of power . . . ; but each is ready to consider the formation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world.33 T h e replies received from the Central Powers and from the Entente, however different their inspiration, were almost identical on two important points. On the one hand, they welcomed in equally vague terms what was referred to in the German note of December 26, 1916, as the "noble initiative of the President looking to the creation of bases for the foundation of a lasting peace," 34 and in the Entente reply of January 10, 1917, as "the project for the creation of a league of nations to insure peace and justice throughout the world." 35 On the other hand they also concurred in the view that "the great work for the prevention of future wars can first be taken up only after the ending of the present conflict," as Herr Zimmermann put it in the German note, or, as was said in the Allied reply, " a discussion of future arrangements destined to insure an enduring peace presupposes a satisfactory settlement of the actual conflict." Undaunted by the German refusal to specify peace terms, the Entente refusal to meet the enemy in conference, and the joint refusal to consider plans for a league of nations before the end Ibid.., pp. 345-346. Official Statements of War Aims and Peace Proposals Scott, Washington, Carnegie Endowment, 1921, p. 22. "Ibid., p. 35· 33

34

. . . prep, under J. B .

P E A C E AS A W A R

AIM

29

of the hostilities, President Wilson in his address to the Senate on January 22, 1917, declared: In every discussion of the peace that must end this war it is taken for granted that that peace must be followed by some definite concert of power which will make it virtually impossible that any such catastrophe should ever overwhelm us again. E v e r y lover of mankind, every sane and thoughtful man must take that for granted. 3 6

This was a bold assumption since none of the European governments was as yet committed to the constitution of such a "concert of power." The rest of this famous speech was not less bold. First, President Wilson offered the world the participation of the United States in this concert of power. Secondly, he added that his offer was conditional upon the peace being, by reason of its terms, "worth guaranteeing and preserving." Thirdly and finally, he suggested that only a "peace without victory" would satisfy these conditions. That President Wilson was not unconscious of the extraordinary nature of these statements and particularly of the last is clearly shown by the momentous words which follow, words which cannot be read without emotion by anyone interested in the quest for peace in Europe during the last twenty years. He said: . . . peace without victory. It is not pleasant to say this. I beg that I may be permitted to put my own interpretation upon it and that it may be understood that no other interpretation was in my thought. I am seeking only to face realities and to face them without soft concealments. Victory would mean peace forced upon the loser, a victor's terms imposed upon the vanquished. It would be accepted in humiliation, under duress, at an intolerable sacrifice, and would leave a sting, a resentment, a bitter memory upon which terms of peace would rest, not permanently, but only as upon quicksand. Only a peace between equals can last. Only a peace the very principle of which is equality and a common participation in a common benefit. T h e right state of mind, the right feeling between nations, is as neces39

President

Wilson's

State

Papers

and Addresses,

op. cit., p. 349.

30

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

sary for a lasting peace as is the just settlement of vexed questions of territory or of racial and national allegiance.37 Whatever the philosophic historian m a y think of the merits of a "peace without victory," it did not commend itself to either of the belligerents in January 1 9 1 7 . T h e y were as y e t too evenly matched to abandon the hope of victory and of those exclusive advantages which victory alone could bring. T h e strategic position, that is the past and the present, appeared to favor the Central Powers. T h e y therefore would not consider any settlement which did not improve their pre-war status. T h e Entente, on the other hand, which felt that it had been the victim of aggression, which knew that it had been less well prepared for war in 1914, but which enjoyed the mastery of the sea and looked forward with confidence to a gradual increase of its power, counted upon the future. Moreover, peace without victory would, in the eyes of the Allied peoples and of their spokesmen, have deprived them of those compensations and guarantees to which they felt entitled. President Wilson's last attempt at mediation as a neutral was therefore fruitless. Less than three months later, having been forced into the ranks of the belligerents himself, he could not but discard "peace without v i c t o r y " as a war aim. However when, on April 2, 1 9 1 7 , declaring the German submarine warfare against commerce to be " a warfare against mankind," he advised that the Congress of the United States "formally accept the status of belligerent," 3 8 he in no w a y repudiated his former purpose. On the contrary. A s if to allay the misgivings of his pacific conscience, he insisted, in the very speech b y which he brought his country into the war, that his "own thought has not been driven from its habitual and normal course." H e added that his object, as a belligerent no less than as a neutral, was to "vindicate the principles of peace and justice in the life of the world as against " Ibid·., p. 352. 38

Ibidp.

376.

PEACE AS A WAR AIM

31

selfish and autocratic power and to set up amongst the really free and self-governed peoples of the world such a concert of purpose and of action as will henceforth ensure the observance of those principles." 3 9 From now on and until the Armistice, he consistently pursued his advocacy of a lasting peace, to be based upon an impartial settlement of the war and to be guaranteed by the organized forces of democracy. As our primary concern is with Europe and not with America, it cannot be our purpose here to analyze his thought in detail. Three points, however, to which he steadfastly adhered throughout America's belligerency, should be noted on account of their influence on European developments. First, with increasing emphasis as the war dragged on, he stressed the impossibility of concluding an enduring peace with the military masters of Germany. T h a t political freedom within States is a condition of peaceful relations between them, was one of his main democratic tenets. Secondly, he held and repeatedly declared that peace, in order to be lasting, must rest upon the foundations of justice. This in his political language was not a mere phrase. Just peace was in his view one which left no people subjected to the rule of masters other than those of their free choice. Furthermore, it was one in which this principle of self-determination was applied with absolute impartiality to friend and foe, to great and small, alike. The American Government which, as its chief never tired of repeating, had no exclusive national interest to serve, was concerned solely with seeing to it that justice prevailed for, and also against, all. Thirdly and finally, President Wilson, while constantly insisting on the necessity of securing lasting peace by means of some international organization, deliberately refrained from any precise description or definition thereof. When he referred to it in his speeches, it was always in some such somewhat 33

Ibid., p. 378.

32

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

nebulous terms as a "concert of power," a "force . . . greater than the force of any nation," a "community of power," a "community of interest and of power," a "partnership of democratic nations," a "league of honor," a "general association of nations," "covenants . . . backed by the united forces of all nations that love justice," a "new international order," and so forth. Perhaps the clearest indication of what he had in mind is to be found in his address at Mount Vernon, on July 4, 1918, where he demanded an organization of peace which shall make it certain that the combined power of free nations will check every invasion of right and serve to make peace and justice the more secure by affording a definite tribunal of opinion to which all must submit and by which every international readjustment that cannot be amicably agreed upon by the peoples directly concerned shall be sanctioned.40 This reluctance to enter into details, this preference for terms distinguished by their literary flavor more than by their legal precision, such as "community of power" or "tribunal of opinion," may in fact and in part at least have been due to a quality of the American President's mind. But it was due also to deliberate policy. On the one hand, he did not believe in the desirability of setting up any elaborate machinery for the settlement of international disputes and for the prevention of war, such as was contemplated by those to whom, in his private correspondence, he ungraciously referred as the "woolgatherers" and "butters-in" of the League to Enforce Peace. 41 On the other hand, he feared that by committing himself to any specific project and by encouraging other governments to compare their plans with his, he might prematurely arouse dangerous international controversy. 42 40 41

Ibid., pp. 500-501. Seymour, op. cit., vol. I V , p. 8, and Baker, op. cit., vol. V I I I , N e w Y o r k ,

I939> P· 38. 42

Baker, op. cit., vol. V I I I , pp. 17, 74 et seq., 124, 334.

PEACE

AS A W A R

AIM

33

In the summer of 1 9 1 8 , President Wilson's dilatory tactics began seriously to worry not only his would-be associates of the League to Enforce Peace, but also the friends of the League idea abroad and even his closest personal advisers. Thus we find Colonel House writing him on June 25, 1 9 1 8 : T h e sentiment is growing rapidly everywhere in favour of some organized opposition to w a r and I think it essential that y o u should guide the movement.

I t will not w a i t for the P e a c e Conference a n d ,

while I can understand that y o u would not w a n t to commit yourself to a n y plan until the w a r is ended, y e t there are other w a y s b y which y o u can direct it. T h e trouble that I see ahead is that the English, F r e n c h , or the groups here m a y hit upon some scheme that will appeal to people generally and around it public opinion will crystallize to such

an

extent that it will be difficult to change the form at the Peace C o n ference.

I t is one of the things with which y o u r name should be

linked during the ages. T h e whole world looks upon y o u as the c h a m pion of the idea, but there is a feeling not only in this country b u t in E n g l a n d and F r a n c e as well that y o u are reluctant to take the initiative. 4 3

It was this letter which seems finally to have led President Wilson to consider the ideas contained in the official British report which had been communicated to him, and to ask Colonel House to revise the draft convention contained therein.44 The further story of the Anglo-American cooperation in the preparation of the first drafts of the Covenant has been so fully and so ably told by Mr. David Hunter Miller that it would be useless to repeat it here. 45 Let us rather inquire briefly into the position of organized peace as a war aim in Europe. In Great Britain the position was in some respects the very reverse of that prevailing in the United States. Whereas we 13

Seymour, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 20. "Ibid., vol. IV, p. 22. 45 David Hunter Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, 2 vols., New York, 1928. Cf. also Chap. I, II and I X of Seymour, op. cit., vol. IV.

T H E QUEST FOR P E A C E

34

have seen President Wilson stressing the creation of a league of nations as the principal war aim of his country but deprecating any analytical discussion thereof, in Great Britain, the coalition Cabinet which had succeeded the Asquith-Grey Ministry, while decidedly skeptical about the main idea, had not hesitated to set up an advisory committee, under the chairmanship of Sir Walter Phillimore, to study it. 46 A s is recalled in the opening statement of the report of this committee submitted to the British Government on M a r c h 20, 1918, its terms of reference were to enquire particularly from a judicial and historical point of view into the various schemes for establishing by means of a League of Nations, or other device, some alternative to war as a means of settling international disputes, to report on their practicability, to suggest amendments, or to elaborate a further scheme if on consideration it should be deemed possible and expedient. . . ,47 Although the d r a f t convention suggested b y the Phillimore Committee is more than any other document the real foundation of what became the Covenant of the League of Nations, it cannot in any w a y be looked upon as a pronouncement of the British Government.

British historians have been the

first

to recognize that before 1918 their country, in spite of the early declarations of Asquith and of G r e y which we have recalled, was in no w a y committed to any scheme of organized peace. T h u s we read in the invaluable History Conference

of Paris,

of the

Peace

edited b y the lamented H . W . V . T e m -

perley: Of none of the Entente Powers were the war-aims less clearly defined than in the case of Great Britain. Even on subjects of capital importance their statesmen did not always seem agreed. Thus Mr. Bonar Law had spoken as if the German Colonies were to remain English, and General Smuts had hinted at some kind of international control. Mr. Bonar Law had suggested as late as the 12th Decem" David Lloyd George, The Truth don, 1938, vol. I, pp. 60s et seq. " Miller, op. cit., vol. I, p. 4.

About

the Peace

Treaties,

2 vols., Lon-

P E A C E AS A W A R A I M

35

ber 1917, that an economic League might be formed against Germany; other ministers had seemed to deprecate this project. Sir Edward Carson had spoken contemptuously, and General Smuts enthusiastically, of the League of Nations. T o put an end to these flagrant anomalies, a systematic outline of war-aims was authoritatively given by M r . Lloyd George on the 5th January 1918. 4 8

This famous address to the British Trade Unions, delivered three days before the still more famous Fourteen Points speech of President Wilson of January 8, 1918, is of the greatest interest and importance. No one can read it without being struck by the influence exercised on the British Premier's views or at least on his declarations by the American President's political doctrines. Whatever his own convictions on the feasibility and the desirability of the conversion of Germany to democracy, on the application of the principle of self-determination, and on the establishment of a league of nations — British friends of the League have always been extremely critical of Mr. Lloyd George on this latter score — his Caxton Hall speech, as it is called, is entirely orthodox when judged by Wilsonian standards. Its author had consulted not only his ministerial colleagues, but also Mr. Asquith and Sir Edward Grey on his statement and, as he writes in his Memoirs, "with some slight alterations, entirely in the wording, they approved its terms." 49 After stating the British war aims as regards territorial adjustments in words in which the most dubious clauses of the secret treaties to which the British Empire was a party were cleverly made to appear as the expression of a philosophy of pure humanitarian idealism, he summed up his general views in the following conclusion: I f , then, we are asked what are we fighting for, we reply, as we have often replied: W e are fighting for a just and lasting peace, and we believe that before permanent peace can be hoped for three conditions must be fulfilled. 48 H . W . V . T e m p e r l e y , A History of the Peace Conference of Paris, 6 vols., vol. I, L o n d o n , 1920, p. 189. " L l o y d George, War Memoirs, op. cit., v o l . V, L o n d o n , 1936, p. 2485.

36

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

First, the sanctity of treaties must be re-established; secondly, a territorial settlement must be secured based on the right of self-determination or the consent of the governed; and, lastly, we must seek by the creation of some international organisation to limit the burden of armaments and diminish the probability of war. 50 A t this date, President Wilson had said no less and not much more. A s a matter of fact, the British Government of the day counted few League enthusiasts among its members and its leading spirits were hardly lukewarm on the subject. 5 1 However, the advocacy of such men as Lord Robert Cecil, Lord B r y c e and General Smuts, and particularly the pressure of the masses, obviously more interested in the future of peace than in the aggrandizement of the Empire, sufficed to commit Great Britain to the legal organization of peace as a war aim. In France, the situation was, if anything, less favorable still to that cause. France had been brought into the war b y her fidelity to her alliance with Russia. On the very first days of August 1914, she had been brutally invaded and ever since some of her most peopled provinces were occupied and vast areas devastated b y the same enemy who, in 1871, had annexed Alsace and Lorraine. Little wonder then that the first and almost all-absorbing concern of her people was to repulse the aggressor, the second to redeem the lost provinces and the third, if possible, to secure adequate guarantees against the repetition of an invasion which was the second in the lifetime of the older generation. F o r these guarantees the average Frenchman, harassed b y immediate material worries and temperamentally not addicted to seeking relief therefrom in far-reaching political reforms, looked to such tangible and realistic measures as territorial expansion, defensive alliances, perpetuated military superiority and the Ibid., vol. V, p. 2526. The repeated, violent protests of M r . Lloyd George against this view in his most recent book are hardly convincing. Cf. Lloyd George, The Truth, etc., op. cit., vol. I, pp. 634 et passim. 10 61

P E A C E AS A W A R

AIM

37

general weakening of the enemy, more than to such newfangled, untried experiments as collective security. Accordingly, the war aims of France were restitution, reparation and ambitious territorial plans, going far beyond the mere reannexation of the lost provinces, but modestly disguised under harmless formulae such as, "lasting safeguards for the future." T o be sure, in France as well as in Great Britain, there were circles, especially among the intellectuals and the politicians of the left who, seeing beyond the purely military aspects of war and peace, enthusiastically welcomed President Wilson's messages. T o be sure also, there were resolutions favorable to the idea of a league of nations voted in private as well as in political meetings, and even in the French Parliament. 52 Thus on June 5, 1917, the French Chamber of Deputies adopted by 453 votes against 55 a resolution approved by the government, in which, after recalling the French claims concerning Alsace-Lorraine and just reparations, it declared: Far removed from any idea of conquest and of subjection of foreign populations, it (the Chamber) confidently expects (compte) that the efforts of the armies of the Republic and all the Allied armies will make it possible, Prussian militarism having been overthrown, to obtain lasting guarantees of peace and independence for peoples great and small, in an already prepared organization of the League of Nations. 5 3

There was also in France as in Great Britain an extra-parliamentary committee to prepare a draft constitution for a league of nations. It was set up on July 22, 1917, under the government of M . Ribot, and placed under the chairmanship of M . Leon Bourgeois, who had proposed it. This influential statesman, who had represented his country at the two Hague Conferences, had already, in the summer of the preceding year, brought together a certain number of politicians and lawyers 52 Leon Bourgeois, Le Pacte de IQJQ et la Societe des Nations, Paris, 1919, pp. 33 et seq. 53 Journal Officiel, Debats parlementaires, Chambre des Deputes, 1917, pp. 1329 et seq. Cf. also Andre Tardieu, La paix, Paris, 1921, p. 90.

38

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

to discuss peace terms and especially arbitration, much to President Poincare's alarm. 54 A t the end of 1 9 1 6 , he had begun an active campaign in favor of the League of Nations, of which he was to be and to remain until his death the outstanding champion in his country. But in spite of his efforts and those of his associates, official France remained reticent. 55 Although M . Briand and M . Ribot, as successive Prime Ministers, had made official statements in favor of the legal organization of the international community, the driving force of the French Government had never been behind the idea. 56

This

was so even before M . Clemenceau, on assuming power in November 1 9 1 7 , seized the first opportunity openly to deride it. The French historian, A . Aulard, in an essay published in 1 9 1 9 on French public opinion and the League of Nations, wrote: " T h e Franco-Wilsonian idea of a League of Nations encountered but one opponent and skeptic in France: M . Clemenceau."

Georges

57

E v e n if this were not, as it obviously is, a strangely exaggerated statement, the opposition and the skepticism of Clemenceau during the last year of the war would have sufficed to paralyze all efforts made in France effectively to promote the idea. His will was all-powerful and, what is more, his fiery, magnetic personality was so popular that any political project which he ridiculed was thereby condemned to appearing impracticable. In the two other great European member States of the Entente, Russia and Italy, organized peace was of course never important as a war aim. From 1 9 1 4 to 1 9 1 6 , czarist Russia struggled, first for her prestige and her position in the Balkans, then for the possession "Poincare, op. ext., vol. VIII, Paris, 1931, p. 302. Cf. Bourgeois, op. cit., pp. 12 et seq. 55 Cf. Ε . Milhaud, Plus jamais!, Geneva, 1919. See in P. Munch, ed., Les origines et l'oeuvre de la Societe des Nations, vol. I, Copenhagen, 1923, the articles by Chr. L. Lange, pp. 30 et seq., and by A. Aulard, pp. 225 et seq. 67 '"Bourgeois, op. cit., p. 35. Munch, op. cit., p. 226.

P E A C E AS A W A R

AIM

39

life. 58

of the Straits, and finally for her The idea of a league of nations was no more familiar to Kerensky and to the bolshevist regimes than it had been to their imperial predecessor. From the March revolution onward, in 1917, the political tide in Russia flowed gradually away from territorial ambition towards the will for peace at any price. A t no time during this flood was the organization of the international community a vital issue. As for Italy, her war aims were clearly and fully defined in the Treaty of London of 1915, in which she set the price for her intervention. These aims were purely national and territorial, as might well be expected in view of the fact that those Italian statesmen whose policies were most pacific had favored her continued neutrality and had therefore taken no part in the negotiations which led to her entry into the war. As we have already seen above, organized peace as a war aim was completely absent from the political philosophy prevailing in German and, we may add, in Austrian-Hungarian governmental circles, at the outbreak of the war. On July 19, 1917, it is true, the German Reichstag adopted its well known "peace resolution" which contained the following declaration: T h e Reichstag aspires to a peace of understanding and of durable reconciliation of the peoples (einen Frieden der Verständigung und der dauernden Versöhnung der Völker). Forced territorial acquisitions and imposed political, economic and financial measures are incompatible with such a peace. T h e Reichstag deprecates all plans tending to perpetuate after the war economic blockade and hostility between the peoples. T h e freedom of the seas must be guaranteed. Economic peace alone can pave the w a y for a friendly coexistence of the peoples. T h e Reichstag will effectively promote the creation of international organizations of law. 5 9 S. Sazonov, Les annees fatales, souvenirs, Paris, 1927, pp. 260 et seq. Georg Michaelis, Für Staat und Volk, 2nd ed., Berlin, 1922, pp. 325 et seq.; Ludendorff, op. cit., pp. 362 et seq.; Karl Helfferich, Der Weltkrieg, vol. II, Berlin, 1922, pp. 132 et seq. 68 59

40

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E T h i s statement, approved b y a great majority of the mem-

bers of the Reichstag, itself elected on the basis of manhood suffrage, could prima facie well be taken to commit Germany to organized peace as a war aim.

However, when we know,

as we now do b y the writings of all the interested parties, in what spirit it was drafted and adopted, with what reticence it was received b y the German Government and in what contempt it was held b y the German High Command, who, at that time, were the truly responsible exponents of the German policy, we cannot see in it more than a political manoeuver. In spite of such Reichstag resolutions, voted with the reluctant and insincere acquiescence of successive Chancellors from the end of 1916 onward, and in spite of the ardent League of Nations speeches unexpectedly made b y Count

Czernin

during his foreign secretaryship in Austria, 8 0 it is obvious that the ideal of a peacefully organized international community was foreign to governmental and even to popular opinion in the Teutonic world until it appeared as a possible means of averting the worst consequences of the threatening military defeat. A s Professor Hans Wehberg wrote of his fellow-countrymen in 1923: One can say that on the whole the (German) Government and the ruling classes were at one in their attitude of reserve towards pacifism. When the German Chancellor declared on November 9, 1916, that Germany was ready to take her place at the head of a League of Nations, that was in the nature of a fine gesture and not a confession of its inner thoughts. The majority of the German people — sad as it is to admit it — entered upon their march to Canossa in this respect only on the day when the German front began to give way before the onslaught of the enemy. It was only then that one seized upon the idea of right as upon a life belt. 81 Although, in effect, nothing came of it, our hasty examination of peace as a war aim in Europe would be all too in60 81

Cf. Czernin, op. cit., pp. 236 et seq. Munch, op. cit., vol. I, p. 440.

P E A C E AS A W A R

AIM

41

complete if we did not at least mention the Pope's appeal for peace made on August 1, 1917. Declaring that he had "no personal political aim" and that he listened "to the suggestions or interests of none of the belligerents," His Holiness Benedict X V addressed the rulers of all the States at war inviting them "to arrive at an agreement on the following points which seem to offer the basis of a just and lasting peace leaving it to them to make them more precise and complete." Of these points, which on the whole were based on a general return to the territorial status quo ante and the "principle of entire and reciprocal condonation," the first alone is of interest to us here. It is worded as follows: First, the fundamental point must be that the material force of arms give way to the moral force of right whence a just agreement of all upon the simultaneous and reciprocal decrease of armaments, according to rules and guarantees to be established, in the necessary and sufficient measure for the maintenance of public order in every state; then, taking the place of arms, the institution of arbitration with its high pacifying function, according to rules to be drawn in concert and under sanctions to be determined against any state which would decline either to refer international questions to arbitration or to accept its awards.

T h e papal appeal, which had been preceded by some diplomatic activity in Vienna and Berlin, was well received in Catholic circles there. But, while the Allied Powers were unanimously suspicious although unequally hostile, for that very reason and because they were in no mood to negotiate with a victorious military autocracy, General Ludendorff would hear nothing of a peace which would have deprived him of the territorial prizes to which he felt entitled by reason of his military successes in the field. It is noteworthy that whereas all the replies received in Rome stressed the impossibility of accepting the suggested stalemate peace, the Pope's first point received very little attention. As

42

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

a matter of fact, it was dealt with more sympathetically in the replies received from Berlin and especially from Vienna than in those of the Allies. However, as the latter suspected at the time and as we now know positively, the German High Command, the real masters of the Central Powers, as also the German Emperor, were utterly opposed to a peace based on the principle of international arbitration and disarmament, in which they did not in the slightest share the faith of the Pope. 62 Thus we see that while organized peace as a war aim was more or less actively discussed in most countries and ardently advocated in some by individual statesmen or minority groups, it was nowhere in the forefront of the national policies of the European belligerents. The interest in it was keenest in the neutral countries. Of these we have not to speak here, since, being neutral, they pursued no war aims. 63 This interest was keener in the United States than in Great Britain, keener in Great Britain than in France, and keener in France than in any other of the European Great Powers. There was one more aim, however, which although not identical with organized peace, was closely connected with it, and on which the European Powers were wellnigh unanimous after the downfall of czarism in Russia. All the leading statesmen in Great Britain and France, as in the United States, were from start to finish convinced that lasting peace could not be achieved unless political liberty 82 T h e Pope's appeal and the relevant diplomatic correspondence w i t h W a s h ington are published in Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, op. cit., 1 9 1 7 , Supplement 2, v o l . I, Washington, 1932, pp. 1 6 1 et seq. Cf. also Michaelis, op. cit., pp. 3 3 7 et seq.; Helfferich, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 164 et seq.; Ludendorff, op. cit., pp. 4 1 1 et seq.; the same, Kriegsführung und Politik, 3rd ed., Berlin, 1923, pp. 278 et seq.; Otto Hoetzsch, Der Krieg und die grosse Politik, vol. III, Leipzig, 1918, pp. 499 et seq.; Pierre R e n o u v i n , La crise euroieenne et la grande guerre, Paris, 1934, pp. 461 et seq. 63 See in M u n c h , op. cit., vol. I, the chapters d e v o t e d t o the League idea in these countries b y Chr. L. Lange, pp. 15 et seq., P. M u n c h , pp. 161 et seq., Α. Struycken, pp. 267 et seq., Μ . Η . Lie, pp. 345 et seq., W . E . Rappard, pp. 361 et seq., E. Trygger, pp. 428 et seq.

P E A C E AS A W A R A I M

43

superseded political autocracy in the principal European States. T h e fact is so well known and so easily understood that it needs no proof.

T h e following wire sent b y M r . L l o y d George to

Prince Lwoff, the new Russian Premier, on M a y 24, 1 9 1 7 , on the morrow of the overthrow of czarism, will suffice to illustrate it, while recalling the embarrassment which the Russian alliance had in this respect previously been for the Western democracies: It is with sentiments of the most profound satisfaction that the people of Great Britain and of the British Dominions across the seas, have learned that their great Ally Russia now stands with the nations which base their institutions upon responsible Government. Much as we appreciate the loyalty and steadfast cooperation which we have received from the late Emperor and the Armies of Russia during the last two and a half years, yet we believe that the Revolution whereby the Russian people have placed their destinies on the sure foundation of freedom, is the greatest service which they have yet made to the cause for which the Allied peoples have been fighting since August 1914. It reveals the fundamental truth that this War is at bottom a struggle for popular Government as well as for liberty. It shows that through the War the principle of liberty, which is the only sure safeguard of Peace in the world, has already won one resounding victory. It is the sure promise that the Prussian military autocracy which began the War and which is still the only barrier to Peace will itself before long be overthrown. Freedom is the only warranty of Peace. 64 A s after the Russian revolution all the peoples on the Allied side could be called politically free, whereas their enemies could not, as, furthermore, the war cry of political freedom could be expected to have effects as deleterious on the morale of the enemy as they were certain to be exhilarating for the democratic nations, and as therefore internal liberty meant not only lasting peace but immediate victory for the Allied cause, it was natural that this ideal as a war aim should have been stressed on all occasions. N o one stressed it more consistently and with more telling " L l o y d George, War

Memoirs,

op. cit.,

vol. I l l , London, 1934, p. 1636.

44

T H E QUEST FOR P E A C E

results than President Wilson in his crusade to make the world safe for democracy. A s a matter of fact, he did succeed to an extraordinary extent in overthrowing the autocracies of Central and Eastern Europe, in apparently converting their peoples to his creed and in thus winning the war not only militarily but also ideologically. 6 5 While this process was being pursued, one vital and allimportant fact seems to have been overlooked, namely that, b y associating the ideals of political freedom and democracy with their victory, the Allies were, in the minds of their foes, associating them with the latter's defeat. T h e anti-liberal and antipacific reaction Europe is undergoing today is in a sense the price of the triumph of liberty and peace celebrated twenty years ago. W a s it not some such development that M r . Balfour was apprehending when, in his far-sighted wisdom born of his philosophic detachment, he wrote in his memorandum of October 4, 1 9 1 6 : . . . there are some projects advocated by those who believe in the complete victory of the Allies which I regard with great suspicion. Among these perhaps the most important are the projects for breaking up or reconstituting the German Empire. If I had my way, I should rule out any attempt to touch the internal affairs either of Germany or of Austria. It may be that, under the stress of defeat, ancient jealousies — forgotten in the hour of victory — will revive. South may be divided from North, Roman Catholic from Protestant, Württemberg, Bavaria and Saxony from Prussia, or from each other. A revolution may upset the Hohenzollerns, and a new Germany may arise on the ruins of militarism. Any or all of these things are possible, but I would certainly deprecate any attempt on the part of the victorious enemy to bring them about. One of the few recorded attempts to crush militarism in a defeated State was Napoleon's attempt to destroy the Prussian Army after Jena. No attempt was ever less successful. As everybody knows, Napoleon's policy compelled Prussia to contrive the military system which has created modern Germany. It may be — I hope it will be — in the power of the Allies to strip Germany of much of 62

Cf. my Crisis of Democracy,

Chicago, 1938, pp. 98 et seq.

P E A C E AS A W A R A I M

45

her non-German territory; but, whatever be the limits of the new Germany, I hope no attempt will be made to control or modify her internal policy. The motto of the Allies should be 'Germany for the Germans — but only Germany.' ββ IV.

FACTORS INFLUENCING THIS EVOLUTION

In order to understand the position as we have sought to outline it, let us now consider the factors which on the one hand favored and on the other hand hindered the pursuit of lasting peace during the World W a r . T h e r e were, we believe, two main factors which tended to promote M r . Asquith's conception of the war as being destined to establish the idea of public right in Europe and in the world. T h e first of these factors was the stress of war itself and the necessity of maintaining the morale, not only of the soldiers in the trenches, but also of the great body of the people on the home front. N o w , a French soldier would perhaps fight in the face of great odds in the hope that victory might bring AlsaceLorraine back to his country. A British soldier certainly would not. N o r would a French soldier eagerly l a y down his life in order that the czar instead of the sultan should rule in Constantinople. I t was necessary, therefore, in all countries, to propose to the masses, on whose active cooperation success depended, war aims sufficiently general and sufficiently generous to be inspiring. It was in this spirit that M r . L l o y d George began his great address to the T r a d e Union Congress on January 5, 1918, when he said: When men by the million are being called upon to suffer and face death . . . they are entitled to know for what cause or causes they are making the sacrifice. It is only the clearest, greatest and justest of causes that can justify the continuance even for one day of this unspeakable agony of the nations.67 ea 87

Lloyd George, War Memoirs, Ibid., vol. V, p. 2515.

op. cit., vol. II, pp. 882-883.

46

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

That is, I think, the broad basis on which organized lasting peace was constantly, albeit with unequal insistence and sincerity, being propagated as a war aim by the various leaders of the Allied cause. Not conquest, not revenge, not reparation for past injustices in the narrow national interest of some, but world security for the future in the broad general interest of all, such was the only purpose which could induce free peoples, especially when they were not themselves the immediate victims of aggression, month after month to send their youth to die on the battlefields of Europe. As the Serbs, the Belgians and the French were fighting for their very homes, they did not need such an inducement as much as those for whom the danger was less pressing and therefore might seem less real. There, and in the absence of any territorial ambitions, I see the main even if not the only reason why the establishment of an ordered international community was stressed more constantly by the Anglo-Saxon belligerents than by their Continental allies. " I assert," declared Mr. Asquith on September 26, 1917, in a public address commenting on the German reply to the Pope's message, "that we are waging, not only a war for peace, but a war against war." 68 The second factor operating in favor of this war aim was the hope of enlisting the support of the United States. It was obvious from the outset that the United States, whose attitude might well prove decisive, would not fight to allow France to get back Alsace-Lorraine, nor even to protect Serbia against Austria-Hungary. It was obvious that the United States, if they were to intervene at all, would do so only for some such purpose as that which President Wilson formulated when he spoke of "making the world safe for democracy" by setting up "some concert of power" for the protection of peace and justice. As we have seen in our historical sketch, it was the Asquith Cabinet, and particularly Sir Edward Grey, who, at the begin68

Official Statements

of War Aims and Peace Proposals,

op. cit., p. 146.

PEACE AS A WAR AIM

47

ning of the war, first appealed to this sentiment. We have seen also how successful this appeal turned out to be. It is not to be unduly cynical to surmise that in this action, British diplomacy was actuated by a variety of motives. It is Mr. Lloyd George himself who, in the introductory chapter of his recent work, tells us that: Allied statesmen were all conscious of the fact that a time would come when America could intervene with irresistible effect and that it would be unwise to antagonise its rulers and its peoples by an exhibition of greed or vindictiveness. Their peace aims were framed in such a way as to convince America, and especially the pacific and anti-Imperialist American President, that their objectives were fundamentally just.69 T o be sure, organized peace was always an ideal in itself, but, were it only to hasten the day of Allied victory, held to be a necessary stage on the road leading to its realization, this ideal was exalted also in the hope that it might inspire the democracy of America and thus facilitate its military cooperation. Now when this hope was fulfilled, it was as if British official interest in the creation of a league of nations had become less vital. It so happened, it is true, that American intervention followed shortly upon a change of government in London, in which Mr. Lloyd George succeeded Mr. Asquith, and Mr. Balfour, Sir Edward Grey. This change, intended to make for a more effective pursuit of the war, did certainly not make for a more ardent pursuit of organized peace. However, if the latter ideal had contributed to change President Wilson from a pacific mediator into a belligerent crusader, he from now on relentlessly kept impressing upon his new associates the importance of what had become a common purpose. Whereas, in the first months of the war, we have seen British policy seeking to win over President Wilson to the cause of a league of nations in order to secure the benefit of 60

Lloyd George, The Truth etc., op. cit., vol. I, p. 22.

48

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

American cooperation in the reestablishment of peace, from the middle of 1916, and especially from April 1 9 1 7 , onwards, we see President Wilson pressing organized peace as the chief and indeed as the only truly worthy war aim on reluctant and even hostile belligerents. B u t his support was so indispensable and his advocacy so convincing that we feel fully justified in counting them, besides the stress of the war itself, among the most potent factors operating in its favor. Convinced or not of the possibility and of the desirability of the creation of a league of nations — from the first the reaction in Europe to his League of Nations crusade had been far more favorable in liberal opposition circles than in the various foreign o f f i c e s 7 0 — European politicians could henceforth openly oppose it only at the risk of losing the good will and of forfeiting the support of the American Government. T w o examples, one drawn from France and the other from Great Britain, m a y suffice to show how President Wilson's stand influenced the policies of the Allies. If we examine the definition of war aims as formulated b y the leading French statesmen before 1916, we shall find, besides the unanimous demand that Alsace-Lorraine be returned to France and that Belgium and Serbia be restored, only the most general phrases in favor of a peace of justice and freedom. 7 1

When, however, on M a r c h 21, 19x7, M . Alexandre

Ribot succeeded M . Aristide Briand as Prime Minister, he hastened to include the following statement in his ministerial declaration: What makes our strength is that our alliances are not only based on interests, but are inspired by a common ideal, by this spirit of liberty and fraternity which the French Revolution has had the immortal honor of proposing to the world and which, by becoming a reality all over Europe, will be one of the best guarantees of that Baker, op, cit., vol. VI, pp. 223 et seq. See for instance the countless speeches and declarations of all kinds published in Raymond Poincare, Messages, discours, allocutions, etc., 2 vols., Paris, 1919. 70 71

PEACE AS A WAR AIM

49

peace between the peoples which the President of the great American Republic recently called for and one of the conditions of the organization of the League of Nations.72 In order to note the influence of the Wilsonian advocacy of the League of Nations as a war aim on British professed policy, it is interesting to compare Mr. Balfour's memorandum of October 4, 1916, to the letter he wrote three months later, as Foreign Secretary, to the American Government, as a comment on the Allied joint reply of January 10, 1917, to President Wilson's peace note of December, 1916. In the former document, limited, it is true, to what he calls the most important questions which will come before the Peace Conference, there is no mention whatever of a league of nations and no discussion of disarmament and revision and sanctions of international law. 73 In his note to the American Government, he expressly stresses, as one of the three conditions for a durable peace, "that behind international law and behind all the treaty arrangements for preventing or limiting hostilities some form of international sanction should be devised which would give pause to the hardiest aggressor." Mr. Balfour, as if incidentally, added that "this policy was in harmony with the President's declared ideas." 74 In his most recent work, Mr. Lloyd George, commenting on this same final passage of M r . Balfour's letter, writes: By this was meant, of course, the establishment of a League of Nations to guarantee world peace by collective action against the threat of disturbance by any aggressor.75 W e have above quoted a letter of June 25, 1918, in which Colonel House urges President Wilson to assert his leadership in the drafting of a constitution of the League of Nations, lest Journal Offlciel, Debats parlementaires, Chambre des Deputes, 1917, p. 783. " L l o y d George, War Memoirs, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 877 et seq. " Ibid., vol. I l l , p. 1114. 76 Lloyd George, The Truth etc., op. cit., vol. I, p. 58. 72

SO

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

the control over the movement escape him. Could anything better show the success of the Wilsonian propaganda than this apprehension? If we now turn to the consideration of the factors opposing the general proclamation of organized peace as a war aim, I believe we may distinguish the following four: i . The reluctance to jeopardize purely national aims and interests by accepting an international philosophy which might prove incompatible with them. " T h e first reason . . . why the British general mind has not firmly got hold on a league," wrote Ambassador W . H. Page to President Wilson on March 17, 1918, "is the instinctive fear that the formation of any league may in some conceivable way affect the Grand Fleet." 76 Moreover, everyone realized more or less clearly that peace could be lasting only if it were based on the foundation, of justice. But justice, especially in international relations, is a very elusive thing about which there may be many an honest difference of opinion, not to speak of those differences which could not be so considered! Would not the enemy, would not the neutrals, would not perhaps even the Allies at the peace table defend other notions of justice than those which one intended oneself to propound? Was not military occupation of a coveted area, for instance, a safer method of attaining one's national war aims than any third-party verdict? When the German peace offer of December, 1916, was debated in the House of Commons, Mr. Arthur Ponsonby, who favored a policy of negotiation, declared: " A country that enters a war with clean hands should come out of the war with empty hands." 77 76 Burton J. Hendrick, The Life and Letters of Walter H. Page, 3 vols., London, 1926, vol. II, p. 356. 77Parliamentary Debates, 5th Series, vol. X C , House of Commons, ist vol. of session 1917, col. 1184. The text of this debate was reproduced with a slightly different wording on the basis of the account in the Manchester Guardian in Holland News, Review of the Nederlandsche Anti-Oorlog Raad, Leiden, undated, vol. I, p. 57.

PEACE AS A WAR AIM That was hardly a popular doctrine with the British Government of the day, whose spokesman, Mr. R. McNeill replied that the hon. member was "confusing the objects with which we went to war with the results that will follow from our victory." He proceeded to show that territorial rearrangements might be the only guarantees of future security against the militarism which was to be destroyed. He therefore saw no inconsistency between recent declarations of Ministers and their professions at the beginning of the war. 78 Is it not obvious that a conception of peace in which territorial rearrangements, not necessarily welcome to the populations concerned, might be the only guarantees of future security, was not identical, nor even compatible, with a Wilsonian peace of justice? On the whole one can say that the wider the purely national ambitions of individual statesmen and governments and also the more vindictive their peace terms, the greater their opposition to anything resembling a league of nations. 79 2. Perhaps more important still as an opposing or at least as a retarding influence was the profound distrust of Germany and of Germany's willingness to be bound by her word. This comes out very clearly in the following statement of Clemenceau, made in the course of the discussion of his ministerial declaration on November 20, 1 9 1 7 : The President of the Council: I do not believe the League of Nations to be the necessary conclusion of the present war. I shall give you one of my reasons: if you should suggest tomorrow that Germany should enter this League of Nations, I should not consent to it. (Warm applause.) M. Raffin-Dugens. •—One should then cultivate germs of hate and prepare future wars? (Noise.) Parliamentary Debates, vol. cit., col. 1185. H o w could a man like President Poincare, f o r instance, be expected to f a v o r a league of nations w h e n w e find him, on M a r c h 20, 1916, w r i t i n g M . R i b o t , the head of the G o v e r n m e n t , to express his regret that the latter in his ministerial declaration had limited his territorial ambitions to Alsace-Lorraine and had stated that France w a s pursuing the w a r in no "spirit of c o n q u e s t " ? C f . Poincare, Au service de la France, op. cit., vol. XX, Paris, 1932, p. 78. m

79

52

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

The President of the Council. — And what guarantee could you offer me? The guarantee of a signature? Go and ask the Belgians what they think of the signature of Germany.80 If to make real a league of nations, Germany's cooperation was necessary, then, to Clemenceau and perhaps to most of his political associates in the Allied countries, the creation of such a league could not be a war aim. For any idea of a pacific association with an unreformed Germany was to most Allied statesmen out of the question. 3. T h e third objection, if not to a fair peace as an ultimate war aim, at least to its immediate discussion, was the fear of favoring an unbeaten Germany's ambitions and of weakening the morale of the Allies b y entering upon negotiations with her. O n M a y 25, 1916, on the morrow of a particularly unrelenting and bellicose speech of Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, the American Ambassador in London wrote Colonel House: " E v e r y o n e says, ' W e must fight to a finish.' T h e more sensational press intimates that any Englishman who uses the word 'peace' ought to be shot." 81 In order to understand this state of mind, which was no less uncompromising in France, 8 2 it should be remembered that the months separating President Wilson's great League of Nations speech, in M a y 1916, from America's entrance in the war in April 1917 were peculiarly critical for the Allied cause. Germany was at the height of her military power and her strategic situation was very favorable. On the other hand, her internal resources were held to be nearer exhaustion than those of her enemies. This double circumstance explains both w h y Germany was at the time impatient successfully to end hostilities and w h y the Allies would listen to no peace proposals. T h i s is well shown b y the following report of a conversation 80 Journal Officiel, Debats parlementaires, Chambre des Deputes, 1917, p. 2972, reprinted in Clemenceau, Discours de guerre, op. cit., pp. 169-170. 81 Hendrick, op. cit., vol. II, p. 158. 82 See for instance Poincare, Au service de la France, op. cit., vol. I X , pp. 39 et seq.

P E A C E AS A W A R

AIM

S3

w h i c h t h e A m e r i c a n A m b a s s a d o r in L o n d o n h a d o n J u l y 1916, with Lord Bryce.

31,

M r . P a g e relates:

H e (Lord B r y c e ) reminded me that a little group of men here, of whom he was one, early in the war sketched substantially the same plan that the American League to Enforce Peace has worked out. I t had not seemed advisable to have any general public discussion of it in England till the war should end: nobody had time now to give to it. 8 3 T o w a r d s the e n d of the y e a r , w h e n G e r m a n y ' s p e a c e p r o p o s a l s h a d b e e n m a d e p u b l i c , t h e r e w a s a d e b a t e a b o u t t h e m in t h e H o u s e of C o m m o n s .

B o t h the h o p e s of the f r i e n d s of

a

l e a g u e of n a t i o n s in the o p p o s i t i o n a n d the r e s i s t a n c e of t h e B r i t i s h C a b i n e t a r e w e l l i l l u s t r a t e d b y the f o l l o w i n g e x c h a n g e of v i e w s b e t w e e n M r . L e e s S m i t h , a L a b o r m e m b e r w h o h a d b u t r e c e n t l y f o u g h t o n the f r o n t , a n d M r .

Bonar Law,

the

C h a n c e l l o r of the E x c h e q u e r : M r . Lees Smith — I believe security can only be obtained by a scheme b y which the nations of Europe and outside agree together that all will guarantee each and each will guarantee all. One of the most important events in the history of this W a r , and, indeed, in the history of the world, has been the fact that this scheme has now been officially adopted by the Government of the United Kingdom, b y the Government of Germany and b y the Government of the United States in their acceptance of the proposals that they should band themselves together into a league of nations. T o my mind, therefore, we shall achieve the purposes of this war not according to whether or not we obtain a military decision, but whether or not there is created out of it a league of nations and a league of nations which begins without being burdened by a legacy of unremoved grievances which might stifle it at its birth. I therefore think that the purpose of this war is to secure terms of settlement which, on the one hand, will put an absolute and decisive veto on any more aggression, and, on the other hand, will give consideration to any legitimate claims which any of the countries engaged in the W a r will be able to make good. If we can secure a peace of that sort, then I think a military decision becomes unimportant, because without it we shall have removed as far as human foresight can, the causes of war. ""Hendrick, op. cit., vol. II, p. 165.

54

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

I have found, in speaking on this matter to my friends and others, that it has seemed to them that the very notion that we are in this war in order to create a league of nations is fantastic and unpractical and Utopian. It might be so if we were living in ordinary times, but we are not. We are standing upon the threshold of a new order of the world. We are living in a moment in history when mankind never so clearly had held its own fate for good or for ill in its own hands. If Christian Europe does not now make up its mind to make an end of war, I do not see how civilisation as we have known it can go on. 84 T o this remarkable plea for the immediate consideration of a league of nations, M r . Bonar L a w , Chancellor of the E x chequer, replied on behalf of the Government: In regard to the speech of the hon. Member who has just sat down, I at least, who have run vicarious risks, have no right to throw taunts at a man who has had his place in the fighting line. A t the same time I am compelled to say that if the spirit of the speech to which we have just listened were to permeate this country then, in my belief, all the blood and treasure which have been spent in this War will have been spent in vain. 85 W h e n President Wilson addressed the L e a g u e to E n f o r c e P e a c e in M a y 1 9 1 6 , and indeed as late as his "peace without v i c t o r y " speech to the A m e r i c a n Senate on J a n u a r y 22, 1 9 1 7 , he manifestly intended the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s to be born of a negotiated peace settlement in which he as President of the United States w a s to p l a y the part of a mediator. T h i s placed even the most pacific of the Allied statesmen in an extremely a w k w a r d dilemma.

Either they welcomed President Wilson's

proposal and thus appeared to be abandoning all hope of victory, thereby encouraging G e r m a n resistance and demoralizing their own forces. O r they insisted on the paramount importance of v i c t o r y and thus adopted an attitude of apparent hostility towards the whole A m e r i c a n policy. M Parliamentary Debates, Jth Series, vol. L X X X V I I I , House of Commons, 9th vol. of session 1916, col. 1728 et seq. 85 Ibid., col. 1730.

P E A C E AS A W A R A I M

55

N o t h i n g could show this more dramatically than A m b a s s a dor P a g e ' s account of his reception b y L o r d R o b e r t Cecil, acting Foreign Minister of Great Britain, on D e c e m b e r 26,

1916,

shortly after the communication of President Wilson's inquiry as to the w a r aims of the belligerents: 'There is nothing that the American Government or any other human power can do,' he (Lord Robert Cecil) remarked slowly and solemnly, 'which will bring this war to a close before the Allies have spent their utmost force to secure a victory. A failure to secure such a victory will leave the world at the mercy of the most arrogant and the bloodiest tyranny that has ever been organized. It is far better to die in an effort to defeat that tyranny than to perish under its success.' . . . Ί have always been almost a Pacifist,' Lord Robert continued. 'No man has ever hated war worse than I. No man has ever had a more earnest faith that war can be abolished. But European civilization has been murderously assaulted and there is nothing now to do but to defeat this desperate enemy or to perish in the effort. I had hoped that the United States understood what is at stake.' 8 6 If President Wilson had not fully recognized what was at stake during the first two y e a r s of the war, he never, even a f t e r he had been coerced to lead his people into it, considered an Allied victory to be b y itself a sufficient and satisfactory issue. Such a victory might or might not be necessary as the corner-stone of the temple of permanent peace which he hoped to set up, but as we have seen, his attitude in this respect underwent a complete change in the spring of 1 9 1 7 .

N e c e s s a r y or

not, it was the temple and not the corner-stone in which he was primarily interested. I t is on this essential point that his views were misunderstood, not only b y the Allied Governments b u t also b y m a n y of his own people. T h u s on April 1, 1 9 1 7 , when America's intervention in the w a r had become certain, Ambassador P a g e , who had for m a n y months struggled nobly to bring it about, wrote a member of the A m e r i c a n C a b i n e t : " W e mustn't longer spin MHendrick,

op. cit., v o l . I I , pp. 209, 2 1 1 .

56

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

dreams about peace, nor leagues to enforce peace, nor the Freedom of the Seas. These things are mere intellectual diversions of minds out of contact with realities." 87 4. This leads us to consider the fourth factor operating against the proclamation of organized peace as a war aim: the psychological factor. A war such as the World War inevitably calls for and produces a type of energetic, dynamic, ruthless belligerent leadership. Such leadership is hardly to be expected of the same minds, of the same characters, of the same temperaments as the conception of the world as a family of nations. In Great Britain Mr. Lloyd George superseded Mr. Asquith because he was a better warrior. But was he, could he at the same time have been an equally convinced apostle of international peace? M . Clemenceau, who saved France, superseded Viviani, Briand, Ribot, Painleve, all of whom were more accessible to the ideal of a league of nations, but who, for the very reason that they were men of that type, were not the best qualified to win the war. As the hostilities dragged on, as all belligerent countries were ever more obliged to sacrifice everything to victory, they placed ever greater powers in the hands of the very men who were the least apt to be the founders of a league of nations. That was one of the great obstacles to the universal and sincere proclamation of organized peace on the basis of justice to all as the object of the World War. Suppose the United States had become a belligerent in 1914. D o you think that President Wilson, after two years of war, would have been reelected on a platform of "peace without victory"? Never. If the United States had gone to war in 1914, either President Wilson would have propounded an entirely different international policy, or he would have been thrown out of office by a rival of the Theodore Roosevelt type, who, on October 24, 1918, expressed the following views in a telegram addressed to Senators Lodge, Poindexter and Hiram Johnson: 87

Ibid., vol. II, p. 227.

PEACE AS A WAR AIM

57

As an American citizen I most earnestly hope that the Senate of the United States, which is part of the treaty-making power of the United States, will take affirmative action against a negotiated peace with Germany and in favor of a peace based on the unconditional surrender of Germany. I also earnestly hope that on behalf of the American people it will declare against the adoption in their entirety of the fourteen points of the President's address of last January as offering a basis for a peace satisfactory to the United States. Let us dictate peace by the hammering guns and not chat about peace to the accompaniment of the clicking of typewriters. . . . 88

It is something of a miracle that the United States should have gone to war late enough not to prevent the previous exposition by President Wilson of the philosophy of which the League of Nations was born, but still soon enough to secure the victory of the democratic Allies, which alone could assure its birth. And it surely is an extraordinary tragedy that the product of this American creative effort should have been sterilized by American action. V.

CONCLUSIONS

Do we mean to imply that President Wilson alone was responsible for the creation of the League of Nations? Of course not. He found very warm support not only in the masses everywhere, but also in certain political quarters in his own country, as well as in Great Britain and in France. But in both the latter, it should be noted, his friends were far more numerous and articulate in the ranks of the opposition than on the benches of the government. One cannot therefore read without surprise M. Andre Tardieu's statement in his brilliant but clearly tendentious book on the peace settlement, for which his chief, Clemenceau, had written the preface: . . . all the European Allies after three years of war were in agreement . . . in demanding for themselves and for all, the right of self88

Baker, op. cit., vol. VIII, p. J i o .

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

58

determination, restitutions, reparations, guarantees and the League of Nations. 89 On the whole, the fact that the L e a g u e of Nations was essentially an American w a r aim was well appreciated, not only in Europe, 9 0 but also in President Wilson's personal entourage. T h u s when, a f t e r long and heated discussions, the Allies

finally

with reluctance consented to m a k e peace on the basis of his speeches, Colonel House, on N o v e m b e r 5, 1918, wired him from P a r i s : I consider that we have won a great diplomatic victory in getting the Allies to accept the principles laid down in your January eighth speech and in your subsequent addresses. This has been done in the face of a hostile and influential junta in the United States and the thoroughly unsympathetic personnel constituting the Entente governments. I doubt whether any other heads of the governments with whom we have been dealing realize how far they are now committed to the American peace programme. . . . Both French Prime Minister and George wanted to make the League of Nations an after consideration, and not . . . a part of the Peace Conference. . . , 91 W h e n President Wilson arrived in Europe, he w a s acclaimed as a popular hero b y the crowds in all the capitals he visited. 88 Tardieu, op. cit., p. 91. Cf. also the following pages in which M . Tardieu, in an effort to silence his French critics who accused him and his fellow-delegates of subordinating their views to those of President Wilson, makes the extraordinary claim that the war aims of all the Allied and Associated States had always been identical! 80 Cf. M r . Lloyd George's brief remarks on the subject in his The Truth etc., op. cit., vol. I, p. 147. 81 Baker, op. cit., vol. VIII, p. 554. Already on October 14, 1918, Mr. R a y Stannard Baker confided the following significant comment to his personal notes: "The papers this morning contain the great announcement of Germany's acceptance of Wilson's terms. The real trouble is now about to beginl," and a few days later he added: "When we come to the Peace Table, Wilson is not going to be bluffed and wheedled in his demands for right and just terms even for Germany and Austria. If the German people only knew it, this stern man is their best friend. He will be no less bold with greed, arrogance, and the spirit of revenge on the side of the Allies." Ibid., p. 480.

The story of Colonel House's persistent and finally successful efforts to obtain the agreement of the Allies to the Fourteen Points is well told in ch. V I or vol. IV of his Intimate Papers, edited by Ch. Seymour.

PEACE AS A WAR AIM

59

But this of course did not improve the feelings of marked reserve with which he was considered by his foreign colleagues. President Wilson's historical title to the fatherhood of the League of Nations is based on the undoubted fact that, of the most convinced believers in the League ideal, he was by far the most influential politically, and that of the most influential statesmen of his day, he was by far its most ardent protagonist. It was this combination of faith and power that, with the support of public opinion, created the League of Nations as a result of the World War. When we consider that the quest for organized peace during the World War was really led by only one statesman of the first rank; when we consider further that this one leader, although supported by the hopes of the inarticulate masses everywhere and by the ardent convictions of a relatively small group of devoted followers in various countries, met with indifference and skepticism on the part of all his major colleagues; when we consider, finally, that this one leading statesman was alone disavowed by his own people and denied the ratification, by the constitutional authorities of his country, of the treaties in which was enshrined the Covenant of the League of Nations — when we consider all these circumstances, which could hardly have been less favorable, what will surprise us will certainly not be the present failure of this quest, but the fact that it showed so much promise and came so near to succeeding in the years following the World War.

2. X k e Quest f o r P e a c e at tke P e a c e Conference I. THE DOUBLE TASK OF THE PEACE CONFERENCE

AS W E H A V E S E E N I N O U R F I R S T C H A P T E R , T H E World War had broken out for reasons that were purely national and it had been waged in the pursuit of aims which were, for most of the belligerents, exclusively, and for the others, mainly, national. It had ended, however, with the acceptance by all of armistice terms which were both national and international. These terms were national in that they called for the transference of territories from one sovereignty to another and for the payment of reparations by the defeated to the victorious nations. But they were clearly international also in that they called for a change in the traditional methods of diplomacy, for the recognition, with express reservations, of the principle of the freedom of the seas, for the general adoption of liberal commercial policies, for internationally guaranteed disarmament, for an impartial settlement of all colonial claims and for the formation of " a general association of nations . . . under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small States alike." Of the Fourteen Points, on which the peace was to be based, eight dealt with matters that were of primary concern to certain specific nations, and six with topics of general interest. In President Wilson's subsequent declarations which, together with the Fourteen Points speech of January 8 , 1 9 1 8 , constituted

QUEST FOR PEACE AT PEACE CONFERENCE

61

the agreed gospel of all the belligerents, international objectives and principally that of self-determination occupied a relatively still more important place. Accordingly the Peace Conference, which met in January 1 9 1 9 , doubly deserved its name. Its task was, on the one hand, by the settlement of certain specific national claims, to substitute a state of immediate peace for the state of war which had prevailed over the larger part of the world in the preceding months. But on the other hand, it had also, by the establishment of a new international order, to substitute a state of permanent peace for the anarchy which had prevailed over the whole world during the preceding centuries. Although we are in this study concerned only with this latter task, that of the general organization of lasting peace, it is impossible entirely to disregard the former, to which it was intimately related. Even before the Conference met, everyone believed and no one had emphasized with more force than President Wilson that only a just peace could endure. If international relations were to be so reformed as to preclude further international conflicts, it was obviously essential that the lot of no nation be rendered so intolerable that its armed revolt would sooner or later become inevitable. To prevent explosions, cautious engineers fit their boilers with safety valves. But only very rash engineers rely on their safety valves to the point of disregarding the pressure that is generated within the boilers for which they are responsible. Moreover there were at least two other close ties between the national and the international elements of the peace settlement. On the one hand, the League of Nations, by far the most important of the international agencies set up, was called upon to cooperate in the solution of various territorial, that is primarily national, questions, such as those to which the Saar, Danzig, the minorities and the former German colonies gave rise. And on the other hand, although there was not much enthusiasm for this agency among the heads of the principal European

62

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

delegations at the Conference, Mr. Ray Stannard Baker is truly right in remarking "Everyone wanted a good strong league of nations to guarantee a treaty in which each first got all he wanted!" 1 Thus none of the points of the program of peace which was to be carried out in 1919, even when it apparently concerned only one or two nations, could be neglected by those, like President Wilson, whose primary interest was with the effective organization of peace as a whole. Time and space of course forbid our examination of all these special topics here. In this chapter I shall deal primarily with the quest for organized peace at the Peace Conference. Before doing so, however, and in order to show the interplay and the conflict between national aspirations and this general quest, I shall briefly consider two of these topics. As examples I have selected the Franco-German territorial settlement and the disposal of the German oversea possessions. I have chosen them both on account of their intrinsic interest and of their importance for subsequent developments, and because they particularly well illustrate my point. II. TWO EXAMPLES OF TERRITORIAL SETTLEMENTS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INFLUENCE

A.

The Franco-German

territorial

settlement.

The World War, as the name commonly given to it in all languages clearly indicates, was much more than a struggle between two nations or even two groups of nations. It was, however, in so far as a very complex phenomenon may be defined in a very simple formula, primarily a struggle for and against German domination or at least political prepotency in Europe and in the world. As the military power of France was in 1914 the most formidable single obstacle to the assertion of this prepotency on the continent of Europe, as moreover the armies of the 1

Ray Stannard Baker, What Wilson Did at Paris, New York, 1922, p. 69.

QUEST FOR P E A C E AT P E A C E C O N F E R E N C E

63

British Commonwealth of Nations, of the United States of America and of various European States all came to fight side by side with the French on French soil, it is not surprising that the World War was finally decided on the Franco-German front and that President Wilson could, in his speech of February 3, 1 9 1 9 , in the French Chamber of Deputies, speak of the Rhine as "the frontier of freedom." France did most certainly not go to war for any purposes of territorial expansion at the expense of her neighbor to the east. But the German invasion had no sooner begun than the restitution of the provinces lost in 1 8 7 1 emerged in the minds of most Frenchmen as a natural war aim. In a speech delivered at the foot of the monument of the town of Strasbourg at the Place de la Concorde, in Paris, on November 1 7 , 1 9 1 8 , that is six days after the Armistice, President Poincare declared: In their memorable meeting of August 4, 1 9 1 4 , the French Chambers, patriotically grouped around the Government of the Republic, took the solemn oath that arms would not be laid down before Alsace and Lorraine were reinstated in the mother country. They have kept their word. 2 A careful perusal of the French Official Journal does not bear out this statement, the accuracy of which was doubtless sacrificed to its eloquence. A t the meeting of August 4, 1 9 1 4 , the French Chamber of Deputies had heard a speech of its President, M . Paul Deschanel, a message from M . Poincare, the President of the Republic, read by the Prime Minister M . Viviani, and a speech of the latter. M . Deschanel, in the course of his eulogy on Jean Jaures, who had just been assassinated, spoke of "the French, who for forty-four years had made all sacrifices to the cause of peace and who today are prepared to make every sacrifice for the holiest of causes: the salvation of civilization, the liberty of France and of Europe." 3 M . Poin2 3

Poincare, Messages etc., op. cit., p. 3 0 1 . Journal Officiel, Debats parlementaires, Chambre des Deputes, 1 9 1 4 , p. 3 1 1 0 .

64

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

care in his message had said that "for forty years, the French people in their sincere love of peace had repressed in their hearts the desire for legitimate reparations." 4 As for M . Viviani, the only allusion he made to his country's war aims in his famous speech was to the effect that "France had often, under less favorable conditions, shown herself to be a formidable opponent when fighting, as she did today, for liberty and for right." 5 T o conclude from the applause which these declarations doubtless aroused that the French Parliament was from the outset pledged to the return of Alsace-Lorraine is a poetic license, to say the least. What does seem to be true, although we have no other authority for it than M . Poincare's memoirs, is that on the following day, August 5, 1914, he himself, Prime Minister Viviani and Foreign Minister Doumergue agreed that the restitution of the lost provinces should take precedence over certain territorial claims which the Russian Government was already putting forward on behalf of Italy, in an attempt to secure the latter's cooperation. In this connection, M . Poincare wrote: Until the war had been declared on us, we continued to submit in silence to the consequences of the spoliation of which we had been the victims. But today that the Treaty of Francfort has been annulled by the aggression of the Imperial Government, there is not, I believe, a single Frenchman who is not willing to pursue the struggle until the complete reparation of the past. The President of the Council, the Minister of Foreign Affairs and I are in entire agreement on this point.® From now on, the French position, official and unofficial, was constantly hostile to the conclusion of any peace with Germany which would not sanction the return of the lost provinces. On December 22, 1914, M . Viviani, still Prime MinisLoc. cit. Ibid., p. 3113. ' Poincare, Au service 4 5

de la France,

op. cit., v o l . V , p. 15.

QUEST FOR PEACE AT PEACE CONFERENCE

65

ter, publicly declared that "France will lay down arms only . . . when the provinces torn from her have been rejoined to her for ever." 7 This, however, did not imply any French unanimity on the general question of the Franco-German territorial settlement. There was divergence first as to the method by which the return of the lost provinces should be effected. The successive French Governments insisted that it should be by reannexation pure and simple. The opposition of the Left, on the other hand, and especially the Socialist party, were inclined to favor the institution of a plebiscite, so that the change of sovereignty would not result merely from military victory, but appear as an application of the principle of self-determination. 8 There was divergence secondly as to the frontiers of the provinces which were to be returned. Were they to be the frontiers of 1870 or earlier and wider ones? The former alone existed in the mind of the average Frenchman, who, as attached to the idea of restitution as he was opposed to that of territorial expansion, repudiated all ulterior claims. There were, however, patriots in high places whose ambitions were less moderate. Not only did President Poincare in his dealings with French politicians constantly insist on the desirability of reverting to the frontiers of 1790 and of 1814, 9 but the Quai d'Orsay obviously shared his views. Thus the secret agreement reached between the French and the Russian Governments in February 1917 provided not only for the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine to France, but also for the extension of the frontiers "at least up to the limits of the former principality of Lorraine" and for their delimitation "at the discretion of the French Government so as to provide for the strategic needs and for the inclusion in Temperley, op. cit., vol. I, p. 169. Poincare, Au service de la France, op. cit., vol. V, p. 92, vol. VI, Paris, 1930, pp. 69 et seq., vol. I X , pp. 12, 177, 184, 234, vol. X , Paris, 1933, pp. 22 et seq. 9 Poincare, Au service de la France, op. cit., vol. VIII, p. 314, vol. I X , pp. 78, 90, 144. 7

8

66

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

French territory of the entire iron district of Lorraine and of the entire coal district of the Saar valley." 10 In public, however, the French Government had never committed itself to this more ambitious claim, as M . Andre Tardieu ruefully admits in his exposition of the difficulties he encountered in defending the French point of view about the Saar at the Peace Conference. 1 1 Besides these two questions concerning the method of effecting the restoration of Alsace-Lorraine and the frontier of the lost provinces, there was, in the Franco-German territorial settlement, a third and still more important issue on which French public and political opinion was divided throughout the war. T h a t was the so-called problem of the left bank of the Rhine: what was to become of the territory, unmistakably German in every respect, which lies between France and the great river which French strategists have always regarded as her natural frontier to the east? Here again, there was an appreciable gap, not to say an abyss, between what the average Frenchman thought and what his Governments secretly did on his behalf. T h a t the opinion of the vast majority of the French people was hostile to any ambitious annexationist plans is clearly shown by the public statements of their successive ministers and b y all relevant parliamentary resolutions. But that certain of their diplomats, with the constant support of the nationalist press and with the active encouragement of President Poincare, were seeking to extend the frontiers of their country towards the Rhine, is no less certain. Thus when in the autumn of 1914 and in the spring of 1915, the Czar of Russia and his Foreign Minister Sazonov sought " M a u r i c e Paleologue, La Russie des Tsars, 3 vol., Paris, 1921-1922, vol. I l l , p. 193. The text of this agreement has been widely quoted, so, for instance, in Temperley, op. cit., vol. I, p. 430; Lloyd George, War Memoirs, op. cit., vol. I l l , pp. 1598 et seq.·, R. S. Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, 3 vols., New York, 1922, vol. I, p. 58. " T a r d i e u , op. cit., p. 278.

QUEST FOR PEACE A T PEACE C O N F E R E N C E

67

to obtain assurances of French support for their designs on the Straits and Constantinople, the representatives of France countered by inquiring about Russia's attitude as regards their own designs on the Rhine. On March 3, 1 9 1 5 , the Czar replied to a question of Ambassador Paleologue on this point: I desire France to come out of this war as great and as strong as possible. I endorse in advance all claims which your Government might raise. Take the left bank of the Rhine; take Mainz, take Coblenz; go further still if you deem it useful. I should be happy and proud of it for you. 1 2

On receiving a report about this conversation, President Poincare writes that he was "astounded." However, when M. Doumergue was sent on a special mission to Russia in January 1 9 1 7 , he was instructed by the government of M. Briand to obtain a written assurance from the Czar that he would support the French policy concerning the left bank of the Rhine which tended to separate it from Germany. 13 M. Poincare warmly welcomed the conclusion of the secret Franco-Russian agreement of February 1 9 1 7 , which, after providing for the inclusion of Alsace-Lorraine and of the Saar in French territory, as we have seen, contained the following additional clauses: The rest of the territories situated on the left bank of the Rhine which now form part of the German Empire are to be entirely separated from Germany and freed from all economic and political dependence upon her. The territories on the left bank of the Rhine outside French territory are to be constituted an autonomous and neutral State and are to be occupied by French troops. 14

This, it should be noted, is not annexation, such as that suggested by the Czar. But it is dismemberment of enemy terri12 Paleologue, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 3 1 4 et seq.; Poincare, Au service de la France, op. cit., vol. VI, pp. 90 et seq.-, Lloyd George, War Memoirs, op. cit., vol. Ill, pp. 1596 et seq. 13 Paleologue, op. cit., vol. Ill, pp. 176, 183. "Ibid., vol. Ill, pp. 193 et seq.

68

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

tory and as such conquest. W e have it on his own authority that President Poincare was fully conscious of this, but personally harbored no prejudice whatever against conquest. When, after the resignation of M . Briand in M a r c h 1 9 1 7 , he had entrusted M . Ribot with the constitution of a new Cabinet, the latter came to inform him of the ministerial declaration he was to present in Parliament on the following day. A f t e r M . Ribot had left the Elysee, the President sent him the following letter, which we quote in its entirety from his memoirs because of its direct relevance to our problem and of the interesting light it throws on French political practice: My dear President, Will you allow me to inform you of a scruple which came to me as an afterthought about a passage relating to war aims in your declaration of which you spoke to me yesterday? You said, if I remember aright, that you intended to state that we should pursue hostilities until complete victory, so as to retake AlsaceLorraine and to secure the necessary reparations and guarantees. You added, I believe, that we were waging war without any spirit of conquest. This phrase would certainly satisfy those who in no case would consent to the annexation of an inch of territory beyond Alsace-Lorraine. On the other hand, it would shock all those, in the House and in the country, who are of opinion that more or less extensive territorial guarantees are desirable for the security of France. The other day, at the Sorbonne, both cases were presented to a very heterogeneous and numerous audience. The first, for AlsaceLorraine only, by M. Ferdinand Buisson, 15 the other, for additional territorial guarantees, by Barres 1 6 and by Henri-Robert 17 and slightly less emphatically but still clearly by Deschanel. 18 The first opinion was received with marked coolness by the public; the second aroused hearty applause. You know that Dubost 1 9 also is very warmly attached to the idea that to refuse, if possible, to extend the frontiers to the Rhine would be to betray the interests of the country. Finally A Radical Socialist, educator and former deputy. The well-known Nationalist novelist and politician. 17 One of France's leading lawyers. 18 Then President of the Chamber of Deputies and later President of the Republic. 19 The President of the Senate. 15

16

QUEST F O R P E A C E A T P E A C E C O N F E R E N C E

69

Babelon,20

the recent book of which incidentally is very remarkable, has been well received in Paris. Would it not be incautious on the part of the Government publicly to take sides on an issue on which Frenchmen are divided, particularly at a time when it is more necessary than ever to unite all the forces of the nation? The problem itself we have often discussed, and I do not deem it impossible that solutions may be found which, when the time comes, will conciliate both tendencies. That is moreover the direction in which Doumergue negotiated with the late Russian Government, but at a time when the enemy, while withdrawing, burns down our villages and our towns, is it expedient to say to our soldiers: we in no case desire to make any conquest? I am afraid that we should thereby damp enthusiasms and discourage salutary hopes. Is it necessary openly to take issue as no other government has done heretofore? Could one not today pass over the question in silence and reserve it for the peace negotiations? Or at least, should it not be possible to use a less explicit formula than 'without any spirit of conquest' and to say, for instance: 'We have not undertaken a war of conquest; we have been attacked; we are therefore obliged to fight until we secure a victory which will ensure the return of our provinces with the necessary reparations and guarantees.' I submit these reflections to your consideration and beg you to see therein only a proof of my keen desire to help you in the heavy task which you have undertaken with so much courage. Yours . . . R. Poincare. 21 Whether or not M . Ribot followed the advice thus tendered him b y M . Poincare is not quite clear from the words he ultimately used.

T h e text of his ministerial declaration on the

point in question, as officially reported in the debates of the House, is the following: . . . this terrible war . . . which we are determined to pursue with every energy until victory, not as our enemies in a spirit of domination and of conquest, but with the firm intention of recovering the provinces which were formerly torn away from us . . 22 A well-known French historian and numismatist. Poincare, Au service de la France, op. cit., vol. I X , pp. 78 et seq. 22 Journal officiel, D6bats parlementaires, Chambre des Deputes, 1917, p. 783. 20 21

70

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

W h a t is more interesting to note than the degree of influence which the President of the Republic may have exercised on the President of the Council is the fact that the former deemed it both wise to press his annexationist views and to disguise them from the public eye. On the eve of the Armistice, the French position as regards the Franco-German territorial settlement was accordingly as follows: there was national unity as regards the restitution of the Alsace-Lorraine of 1870 and an apparent popular majority for restitution without a plebiscite. As for further territorial claims with respect to the Saar Basin and the left bank of the Rhine, they had been combated by those politicians who were most favorable to the creation of a league of nations; they had never explicitly and publicly been put forward by any of the French war Cabinets, but they had been raised in the course of secret official negotiations in Russia. T o the criticism that in this the French Government had acted in a manner incompatible with its professed war aims, it could always reply that these specific claims were covered by such general formulae as guarantees for security, which had commonly been used in public statements. B y accepting to conclude peace on the basis of the Wilsonian speeches, the French had consolidated their claims on AlsaceLorraine, as the Eighth of the Fourteen Points called for the righting of "the wrong done to France by Prussia in 1871 in the matter of Alsace-Lorraine." But they had clearly weakened their case with respect to the Saar and to the left bank of the Rhine. Of the Allies of France, Imperial Russia was the only one which had undertaken to support her wider claims and, in 1918, Imperial Russia was no more. Great Britain had never even been officially informed of them and Mr. Balfour, as Foreign Secretary, had expressly deprecated them in the House of Commons on December 19, 1917. 2 3 Mr. Lloyd George, re2,1

T e m p e r l e y , op. cit., v o l . I , p. 184 η.

QUEST FOR PEACE AT PEACE CONFERENCE

71

ferring in his War Memoirs to what he calls a "clandestine and underhanded transaction," writes that "when the Revolutionaries later on revealed the existence of this secret Treaty between two Allies, the French Government explained privately to our Ambassador that Doumergue had exceeded his instructions on this occasion." 24 As far as Alsace-Lorraine was concerned, on the other hand, the French demand had not only been endorsed by Great Britain, Italy and the United States, with more or less reluctance, it is true, but it had been accepted by the Germans themselves when they invoked President Wilson's speech of January 8, 1918. The only two points therefore on which the Franco-German territorial settlement gave rise to controversy at the Peace Conference were those arising out of the French claims to the Saar and to the left bank of the Rhine. But as these were deemed vital by their authors, who were obviously more immediately concerned than their foreign colleagues, and as they were none the less combated with tenacity by the British and the Americans, the controversy over them was one of great importance and more than once endangered the success of the Conference itself. What interests us in this debate here are its relations to the general problem of organized peace which, as we shall see presently, were immediate and intimate. Although the grounds on which the French based their claims concerning the Saar and the left bank of the Rhine were not the same, the grounds on which their associates based their opposition to them were very similar. Clarity demands however that the two questions be examined separately, as they were discussed independently one of the other and as they received two entirely different solutions. What was first the real claim put forward by the French concerning the Saar and how was it justified? For an answer " L l o y d George, War Memoirs,

op. cit.,

vol. I l l , p. 1599.

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T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

to these questions, we may turn with confidence to M . Clemenceau's chief lieutenant, M . Andre Tardieu. Although far from impartial, his book on the Peace Conference is a v e r y able defense of the action of the French delegation which we have here to consider. E v e n though M . Tardieu, in his book, publishes most of the official documents in which he, as their author, formulated and sought to j u s t i f y the original French claim, we do not find it defined in very clear terms. W h a t is obvious is that France demanded on the one hand the annexation of that part of the Saar which had been French territory for two centuries before 1815, but which possessed little or no mines, and on the other hand the ownership in perpetuity of the mines situated in the rest of the territory, as well as the establishment therein of an autonomous political regime exclusive of German domination.

Although not explicitly formulated, it seems at least

probable that at bottom the French would willingly have demanded the complete annexation of the whole Saar, if they had not realized how contrary such action would have been to the professed common war aims of the Allied and Associated Powers. A s it first stood, M r . L l o y d George, in his recent work on the Peace Treaties, declares that " a plan was put forward which

was

France."

indistinguishable

in effect from

annexation

to

20

T h e reasons advanced in support of the territorial claim to the former part of the Saar were historical and sentimental. T h e y are summed up as follows: All this territory, which has long been French, which never complained of French sovereignty, which was torn away from France by force without its inhabitants being consulted, has, in spite of the Prussian immigration, kept the memories of the past, and, in spite of successive partitions which recall those of Poland, remains at least partially French at heart.26 25

Lloyd George, The Truth etc., op. cit., vol. I, p. 401. Tardieu, op. cit., p. 281.

2®

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73

As for the other part of the territory, it was to be detached from Germany in order that its coal mines might be worked by and for the French Government and thus yield material compensation for the losses sustained as a result of the wanton destruction by the German armies of the coal mines in the north of France. 27 Besides these historical and economic arguments, which were fully and very ably presented and as plausibly as the case allowed, the strategic arguments, of which a great deal was to be heard later on, were kept in the background. 28 When, on March 28, 1919, M . Tardieu was called upon with his colleague, M . Loucheur, to put their case before Messrs. Lloyd George, Wilson and Clemenceau, the British Prime Minister, while inclined to accept it in its economic aspects, was absolutely hostile to any territorial annexation. M . Tardieu writes: He could not admit that we should have both the territories (note the plural 29 ) and the coal. And he kept repeating the formula so often heard in the course of our discussions: — Let us not renew the error committed by Germany in 1871 in the name of an alleged historical right. Let us not create any new Alsace-Lorraine .30 President Wilson went even further than his British colleague. He would hear neither of annexation of territory nor of perpetual ownership of mines. As quoted by M . Tardieu he said: Never, in any public document, has France demanded the frontier of 1814. In the bases of peace which she has accepted, reference is made to righting the wrong done her in 1871 and not in 1815. Ibid,., pp. 283 et seq. In his excellent study on "The New Boundaries of Germany," Professor Charles H. Haskins rightly stresses the strategic factor; cf. Ε. M . House, ed., What Really Happened in Paris, New York, 1921, p. 57. The remark is mine. 30 Tardieu, op. cit., p. 290; cf. Lloyd George, The Truth etc., op. cit., vol. I. pp. 399 et seq. 27

28

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T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

These bases bind the Allies. The historical argument which Germany employed against France to steal Alsace-Lorraine away from her is dangerous. Let us avoid using it. 31 T h u s from the very outset of the discussion, we see opposition to a national claim springing from the desire not to create conditions which might jeopardize the peace of the future. And we see this opposition most adamant there where concern about this peace of the future was strongest. A f t e r this first tilt, M . Tardieu realized that his annexationist plans would have to be abandoned. H e writes: Frontier of 1814: we were alone, therefore without hope of success. Ownership of the mines and creation of an autonomous State: we had the support of Great Britain, but without as yet sufficient guarantees either for the working of the mines, or especially for the liberation of the Sarrois of French race. An already long experience had taught us that historical reasons had but little hold on President Wilson's mind: he feared that they contained the germ of renewed wars.32 Thereupon the French sought to attain both their economic and their political ends b y less direct methods. A s the British agreed to grant them the ownership of the mines, they built up their new proposals primarily around this concession. T h e mines could not, they submitted, be worked b y the French Government in a German territory administered b y German officials. Furthermore, if self-determination, which had been denied the inhabitants of the Saar a century ago, when they presumably would have wished to remain French, was invoked today, when they presumably might wish to remain German, was it not fair that their feelings should be tested within a relatively short period of fifteen years b y means of a plebiscite? A n d in order that this plebiscite might be equitably organized and administered, and incidentally in order that the mines might immediately be worked b y and for the French Government, could not this territory be, at least temporarily, separated 31

Tardieu, op. cit.,

32

Tardieu, op. cit., pp. 293-294.

p. 291; cf. Seymour, op. cit.,

vol. IV, pp. 205, 411 et

seq.

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75

from Germany without being incorporated into France? In a new memorandum, M. Tardieu therefore suggested, doubtless with a view to placating President Wilson: "Temporarily it shall be placed neither under the sovereignty of Germany, nor under the sovereignty of France. It shall be placed in the safe-keeping of the League of Nations." 33 M. Tardieu's idea was that pending the plebiscite, the Saar should be administered by France under a mandate of the League. President Wilson first agreed, on March 31, to allow the transfer of the ownership of the mines, but in spite of the sop of the League of Nations, he could not see his way to consenting to any forced change in the sovereignty of the territory. Even after the unanimous report of a small expert committee, on which the United States were represented by Professor Charles H. Haskins, to the effect that the working of the mines by France necessitated the establishment of "a special administrative and political regime," President Wilson still held out. On April 8, he beseeched his colleagues not to allow the peace of the world to be blocked by the problem of the Saar. Μ. Clemenceau is alleged to have replied that the peace of the world first required that justice prevail among the Allies. The tension was acute. A major crisis was threatening. Rumors were abroad about the President's being on the point of returning to America in disgust and despair.34 Finally, on April 9, having obtained a concession on the administration of the Saar, which instead of being carried on by France as a mandatory, would be entrusted to an international commission reporting to the Council of the League, he yielded on the question of sovereignty. The result was clearly a compromise which at first satisfied no one and against which the German delegation protested violently when they were informed of it. 35 Ibid.., p. 295. Ibid., p. 300; Seymour, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 421; Baker, Woodrow and World Settlement, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 58 et seq. 35 Temperley, op. cit., vol. II, London, 1920, pp. 277 et seq. 33

34

Wilson

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T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

It seemed at first as if France had in the main secured a victory. The mines were transferred to her in full ownership and German sovereignty over the territory was suspended. A regime was established of which the French hoped and expected that it would lead to annexation, as the result of a favorable plebiscite after fifteen years of League administration, in which their own influence would, doubtless, be preponderant. As a matter of fact, French influence in the League administration was preponderant, especially in the early years, when the chairman of the Governing Commission was a French prefect. But by 1935 the influence of France, which had already been limited by the combined action of the international commission and of the Council of the League, was more than counterbalanced by the rising force of Nazi Germany. The plebiscite of January 13, 1935, organized and administered under conditions of almost perfect technique, impartiality and freedom, under the expert advice of Dr. Sarah Wambaugh, showed that the overwhelming majority of the population were firmly attached to their German nationality. Most of them were Catholics or Socialists and, therefore, probably not convinced National-Socialists. But they were Germans above all. As the war communiques which we hear and read daily as I am drafting these pages remind us, the Saar is today again German territory. President Wilson was of the opinion in 1919 that the interests of international peace and justice demanded that it should remain so. In striving for this end, he was momentarily defeated. But after sixteen years he was vindicated by the action of the League of Nations which he had set up to maintain, and if necessary to reestablish, peace and justice. In Professor Temperley's History of the Peace Conference, it is truly stated that: The Saar Territory probably provides the best justification of President Wilson's insistence that the League should form an integral part of the Treaty. It is very difficult to see how the conflicting interests involved could have been reconciled without some serious

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violation of justice, if the machinery of the League had not been available for a solution.36 Thus the historian can truly say about President Wilson, with respect to the Saar today, what he may well be in a position to say about him with respect to still more important matters tomorrow: he may have lost the battle, but he won the war. The Saar was a relatively small territory which France wished to annex in whole or at least in part. The reasons put forward to justify this flagrant violation of the Armistice terms were primarily sentimental and economic and only accessorily strategic. T h e left bank of the Rhine, on the contrary, was a large area whose population of over five million inhabitants was greater than that of many independent European States. France had no desire to annex any part of it, but, for reasons essentially strategic and only accessorily historical and economic, she wished to separate it politically from Germany, to neutralize and to subject it to permanent interAllied military occupation. The French claims regarding the Saar and those regarding the left bank of the Rhine were, therefore, alike neither in substance nor in alleged purpose. T h e y were alike, however, in that they were officially unknown to any of the Allied and Associated Powers at the time of the Armistice and in that they were intended to inflict upon Germany a very appreciable loss of territory, of power and of prestige. This loss was all the more certain to be resented as an intolerable injustice as nothing, either in France's publicly professed war aims or in President Wilson's speeches, could have led her to expect it. T h e British Foreign Secretary, Mr. Balfour, seems to have been informed of the French "desire to see the territory to the west of the Rhine separated from the German Empire and erected into something in the nature of a buffer State" through M

Op. cit., vol. II, p. 183.

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T H E QUEST FOR P E A C E

the French Ambassador in the latter half of 1917. But, as M r . L l o y d George, who is our authority on this point, assures us, this desire was never communicated either to him or to the W a r Cabinet, nor was it even alluded to in the course of any "subsequent discussion on peace terms at the W a r Cabinet or the Imperial Cabinet." 37 T w o successive statements made b y M r . Balfour in the House of Commons in November 1917 were taken b y the French to indicate that their claims did not and would not enjoy the support of their British allies. T h e soundness of this view was confirmed in the course of all the repeated conversations which took place between their various representatives and British statesmen from the conclusion of the Armistice until the final signature of the T r e a t y . These conversations began under rather extraordinary circumstances. On November 30, 1918, M . Clemenceau and Marshal Foch arrived in London for the first time since the Armistice to attend an inter-Allied conference for the preparation of the ensuing negotiations. A f t e r receiving a tremendous popular welcome, Marshal Foch, accompanied b y General W e y gand, were on the same evening taken to Downing Street. There they met M r . L l o y d George and one or two of his colleagues and military advisers. 38 M . Clemenceau did not attend, prevented, writes M r . L l o y d George, b y " a social engagement." H e adds, however: When I discovered the real topic which was to be raised, I realised why he was absent. The wily old politician, knowing our partiality for Foch and the debt of gratitude we owed him, deemed it advisable that the first introduction of French ideas as to the future of the Rhineland should be left to him. Lloyd George, The Truth etc., op. cit., vol. I, pp. 384 et seq. In Mr. Lloyd George's account of this meeting, on which this summary is based, it is said that he was accompanied by Mr. Balfour. But in the following report of the conversation, the only speaker referred to besides himself and the French Commander-in-Chief is not Mr. Balfour, but Mr. Bonar L a w . Cf. Lloyd George, The Truth etc., op. cit., vol. I, pp. 132 et seq. 37

38

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79

I have no other information about the circumstances which explain the French Prime Minister's absence at this gathering. But when we read in M . Tardieu's book that, although informed of Marshal Foch's views by a first note dated November 2 7 , 1 9 1 8 , it was only after considering the latter's second memorandum of January 10, 1 9 1 8 that M . Clemenceau decided to support its conclusions, we may well believe that he preferred not to be drawn into the discussion of an extremely important and difficult matter before having finally made up his mind on the policy he was going to adopt with respect to it. 39 The proposals made by Marshal Foch on November 30, 1 9 1 8 , were briefly the following: Germany was limited to the right bank of the Rhine.

The

Rhenish provinces to be detached from Germany might enjoy a certain measure of self-government, but they were to be included in an economic system with France, and in a military alliance with France, Luxemburg, Belgium and Great Britain, constituted to withstand any German invasion.

The object

was not conquest, but military strategic protection. When M r . Lloyd George asked him "how he reconciled his proposals with President Wilson's Fourteen Points," he "thought it could be arranged." When M r . Lloyd George inquired as to "what would be the position if the inhabitants of the left bank of the Rhine did not like this scheme and declared in favour of being joined to Germany," he spoke of the double attraction "of our economic organisation" and of being "on the side of the victors." When finally M r . Lloyd George asked whether he "did not fear the danger of creating a new AlsaceLorraine on the other side, which would in course of years result in a new war of revenge," his answer was to the effect that "he would take precautions to conciliate the feelings and interests of these people." 4 0 This conversation, as reported by Mr. Lloyd George, is ex^ T a r d i e u , op. cit., pp. 162 et seq. 10 Lloyd George, The Truth etc., op. cit., vol. I, p. 1 3 5 .

8o

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

tremely revealing. Of what account are such matters as national preferences and international undertakings to the military mind when compared with a large river as a strategic frontier? T h e real nature and diplomatic significance of Marshal Foch's memorandum of January 10, 1919, were at the time and still remain today somewhat uncertain. M . Tardieu, who quotes only a brief extract from it, states that the Marshal communicated it to the Commanders-in-Chief of the Allied armies, presumably at the date which it bears. H e adds, as we have seen, that M . Clemenceau, who until then had not committed himself, decided to support its conclusions. 41 M r . L l o y d George, who discusses it at length and quotes from it freely, declares that the memorandum was laid before the plenipotentiaries on January 10, 1919, b y its author. 4 2 A s for the American delegation, they seem to have been left in ignorance of the document until M a r c h 14, 1919, when the M a r s h a l sent President Wilson a copy of it expressing regret " t h a t it should have been delayed in reaching h i m . " 4 3 In Colonel House's Intimate Papers it is not mentioned at all and in M r . B a k e r ' s work on the Conference, in the third volume of which it is reproduced in full in an English translation, it is stated: On March 14, the very afternoon of the President's arrival 4 4 the first ponderous gun was fired. This was a memorandum of Marshal Foch setting forth the first of the French projects: the military programme. This classic presentation of the French demand for the military frontier of the Rhine . . . had actually been prepared on January 10 and bears that date, but Foch, like the strategist he was, withheld his fire until the enemy was weakest. 45 Although it cannot be part of m y task here to elucidate any obscure points of diplomatic history, I have dwelled on this Tardieu, op. cit., pp. 163 et seq. Lloyd George, The Truth etc., op. cit., vol. I, pp. 386 et seq. " B a k e r , Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, op. cit., vol. I l l , p. 227. 44 In Paris, on his return from America. " Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, op. cit., vol. II, p. 8.

a

42

QUEST FOR PEACE AT PEACE CONFERENCE

81

one because the uncertainty prevailing about it strikes me as most significant. Is it not a highly revealing symptom of the conflict between two radically opposed conceptions of the peace which was to be concluded? For those engaged in the quest for organized, lasting peace, Marshal Foch's proposals were bound to be entirely unacceptable. Obviously contrary to the spirit and to the letter of the pre-Armistice agreements, calculated to subordinate the general interests of the international community to the national interests of the victors and particularly of one of them, and destined inevitably to provoke the justified resentment and revolt of the defeated, they could not be approved by President Wilson, nor by Mr. Lloyd George, except as a disavowal of all previously proclaimed ideals. Those, on the other hand, who, believing in force alone, were convinced that Germany could in no case be appeased and must therefore be held down, favored the Marshal's proposals, just because they were skeptical about and indeed hostile to any attempt at impartial justice. Marshal Foch himself was clearly a man of the second type, as were also President Poincare and perhaps most French higher officers and diplomats. M. Clemenceau at heart of course also belonged to this school, but he had personally agreed to the pre-Armistice undertakings. Furthermore he was in daily contact with the Americans and the British whose confidence and good will he could not afford to forfeit. That is why he secretly promoted the military plans concerning the left bank of the Rhine, but hesitated to come out openly in their favor. Having however approved the conclusions of Marshal Foch's memorandum of January 10, he asked M. Tardieu, who certainly was in sympathy with them, to formulate them in terms least calculated to give offence to his American and British partners. This he did in his memorandum of February 25, 1 9 1 9 , which he reprinted in his book under the title "Memorandum of the French Government about the establishment on the

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THE QUEST FOR PEACE

Rhine of the western frontier of Germany and about interAllied occupation of the bridges over the Rhine." 4 6 While M. Tardieu presents his own memorandum as being the real basis upon which his Government wished to see the problem discussed, the British and the Americans seem to have attached greater importance to that of January 10 of Marshal Foch, supplemented by another which the Commanderin-Chief of the Allied armies issued on February 18, 1919. 47 Some personal difficulties between M. Clemenceau and his faithful lieutenant on the one hand, and Marshal Foch supported by President Poincare, on the other, seem to be at the bottom of this strange diplomatic dualism. An echo of these difficulties may be found in a passage of Mr. Lloyd George's work in which he informs us that, in reply to a question as to what the Marshal's plan really meant, M. Clemenceau had said: "There was a good reason why he had not explained it; it was because he did not understand it himself." 4 8 However, in the main, the successive French proposals were not very dissimilar. They always involved the renunciation by Germany of national sovereignty over all the territories on the left bank of the Rhine and their occupation, together with that of bridge-heads on the opposite bank, by inter-Allied contingents. In M . Tardieu's draft, the duration of this regime was not expressly defined, but implicitly it was intimated that it was to be permanent. 49 As for the political and administrative organization to be applied to the ceded territories, M . Tardieu indicated that France would welcome the suggestion of her Allies. In an additional memorandum he proposed that the Rhineland should " T a r d i e u , op. cit., pp. 165 et seq. " L l o y d George, The Truth etc., op. cit., vol. I, pp. 386 et seq.; Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 8 et seq. " L l o y d George, The Truth etc., op. cit., vol. I, p. 287. 49 This was later denied by M . Tardieu in his futile attempt to show that the French had made no essential concessions to their Anglo-Saxon opponents. Tardieu, op. cit., p. 220.

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be set up as an independent republic under the protection of the League of Nations. 50 In drafting his statement, M . Tardieu was of course fully conscious of the opposition it was bound to arouse. He therefore took great pains to insist, with almost irritating reiteration, that the proposals were not selfish, that they were not in the exclusive interest of France, that they involved no annexation of German territory and no territorial aggrandizement of his own country. With truly prophetic vision he declared that they "provide for an indispensable protection for the new States which the Allies have called to life to the east and to the south of Germany," and added: Suppose Germany, mistress of the Rhine, wishes to attack the republic of Poland or the republic of Bohemia while definitely established on the Rhine, she will (for how long?) hold in check the Western peoples coming to the help of the young republics and the latter will be crushed before it will have been possible to assist them. 5 1

While showing that neither the disarmament of Germany nor the League of Nations could truly protect the Western democracies, M . Tardieu, in his obvious desire to curry favor with President Wilson, went so far as to declare that the joint guarantee arising out of the occupation of the bridges over the Rhine is in accord with the general interest of the League of Nations and with the League's pacific ideals in that this guarantee destroys a certain number of permanent factors of war which it is both its interest and its duty to eliminate. 52

T h a t in spite of such blandishments the French proposal could not and would not commend itself to the British and the Americans was a foregone conclusion. W e have no time here, nor would it serve our purpose, to recall the countless objections and the grave crises to which its discussion gave rise. T h e y are well summed up by Mr. Lloyd George when he writes: mIbid., 51Ibia!.,

™Ibid„

p. 185. p. 171. p. 179.

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T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

The formal demand set forth in the Foch and Tardieu documents created a grave situation in the Peace Conference. At one time a serious rupture between France and her Allies was threatened. The most powerful leaders in France — Poincare, Clemenceau, Tardieu, Briand and Barthou — were in full sympathy with the claim and the sentiment expressed in these Memoranda. The heads of the Army were unanimously behind the proposal. As far as they were concerned it represented the only fruit worth snatching from the tree of victory. President Wilson had left for a short visit to America. But I had talked the matter over with him repeatedly and we were both resolutely opposed to the plan. We regarded it as a definite and dishonourable betrayal of one of the fundamental principles for which the Allies had professed to fight, and which they blazoned forth to their own people in the hour of sacrifice. We were also convinced that any attempt to divide Germany into two separate communities would ultimately fail, and that meanwhile it would cause endless friction and might provoke another war. We therefore unhesitatingly declined to entertain the proposition. Thus a serious deadlock appeared inevitable and imminent. 53 A s is well known, this deadlock was finally broken b y the general acceptance of a compromise. A l t h o u g h the French, b y agreeing to this compromise, conceded more than they gained, they had at the signature of the P e a c e T r e a t y no reason to be dissatisfied with their diplomatic achievement. T o be sure, in spite of all their insistence and of all the various intrigues of certain of their generals and others, there was to be no Rhenish Republic, the German frontier was not to be withdrawn to the R h i n e and the Allied military occupation w a s to be temporary and not permanent.

B u t , on the other hand, had they not

secured the permanent demilitarization of the Rhineland and the offer of a tripartite Franco-Anglo-American treaty of guarantee which was to protect them against a n y possible aggression? U n f o r t u n a t e l y for them, Herr Hitler deprived them of the first

of these securities b y the action of his troops and the

American

Senate of

the second b y

its failure to

the treaty. Lloyd George, The Truth etc., op. cit., vol. I, pp. 39s et seq.

approve

QUEST FOR PEACE AT PEACE CONFERENCE

85

Through the Treaty of Versailles, France obtained AlsaceLorraine, which had already unanimously been granted her before the Armistice. Of her ulterior territorial claims against Germany, there remains nothing but the memory of a long series of diplomatic defeats and disappointments.

There re-

mains also the loss of prestige sustained by the League of Nations before its very birth by the lack of confidence displayed by its founders in the efficacy of its protective action, and the loss of confidence and good will sustained by France herself in formulating and presenting demands incompatible with her previous undertakings.

Had she been content with

what she had obtained at the Armistice, she would have enjoyed the protection of a stronger League of Nations and of more faithful allies.

Had she, on the other hand, succeeded

in obtaining what Marshal Foch demanded on her behalf, she would have enjoyed the advantage of an improved strategic position. A s it is, France lost both the imponderable but none the less certain benefit of a policy of national generosity and of complete international solidarity and the more tangible although none the less precarious profits of temporary military superiority. T o d a y certain critics of Clemenceau blame him for having demanded too much and others for having obtained too little, whereas his defenders blame their former allies for not having granted him more and his successors for not having been able to keep what he had given them.

Whatever view one may

take of this controversy, one thing is certain: France, who had been the innocent victim of an aggression in 1 9 1 4 , of all the Great Powers the most tortured prey during four long years of war and the principal artisan of victory in 1 9 1 9 , reaped neither the compensation due to her sufferings nor the benefit due to her efforts. The heroism which her people are displaying today is all the more admirable because it is profoundly disillusioned.

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THE QUEST FOR PEACE B.

The colonial

settlement.

As a second example of national questions with international bearings and repercussions which the Peace Conference had to solve, I have chosen the problem of the disposal of the German colonies. This problem is one of those whose dual character, national and international, is most manifest. As the German colonies had been conquered by individual belligerents, most of whom wished to annex the territories they held in military occupation, their ultimate disposal gave rise to outspoken national claims. According to the pre-Armistice agreement, however, there were to be no annexations except those specifically mentioned in one or another of the Fourteen Points. Moreover there was among the Allied and Associated Powers a rather striking unanimity of view contrary to the restoration of these territories to their former German masters. Finally it was generally recognized that colonies — is that not in fact their best definition?—being territories inhabited by peoples unable to administer their own affairs, could not be disposed of according to the principle of self-determination. Now, if these German colonies were not to be left under the rule of their former sovereign, nor annexed by their conquerors, nor abandoned to themselves, it was obvious that they could not be administered without some measure of international intervention or control. The solution finally adopted therefore resulted from an attempt to satisfy the national claims of the conquerors without too openly violating the spirit and indeed the letter of the Wilsonian declarations on the basis of which the Armistice had been signed. Let us inquire briefly into the origins and nature of this solution. The World War has been attributed to a great variety of different causes. To my knowledge, however, no reputable historian has ever intimated that it might even partly have been due to the desire of those who today administer the former

QUEST FOR PEACE AT PEACE CONFERENCE

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colonial possessions of Germany to wrest them from her. If any nation was dissatisfied with the distribution of colonies prior to 1914 and was intent upon enlarging its oversea possessions, it was surely Germany herself and not any of her victorious enemies. T o deprive Germany of her colonial empire was therefore a war aim for none of the Allied and Associated Powers. T o seize the various units of this far-flung empire, however, became a natural and legitimate objective as soon as the war broke out. The chronology of this conquest and of the preliminary agreements among the conquerors with which the delegates to the Peace Conference were confronted, when they met in Paris in January 1919, is summarily the following: German Togoland, on the west coast of tropical Africa, a small colony of 33,700 sq. miles, counting a native population of something over a million inhabitants, was attacked on the morrow of the outbreak of the war. Lying between the British Gold Coast to the east and French Dahomey to the west, it was, in spite of an offer of neutrality by its governor on August 3, 1914, invaded from both sides and quickly conquered. On August 27, 1914, its few defenders surrendered unconditionally to a small Franco-British force. The leaders of the latter, the two governors of the neighboring colonies, drew up an agreement on the spot. Under this agreement, concluded, without prejudice to the future negotiations and arrangements between the Allied Governments, Togoland was divided into two spheres, to be administered under martial law by British and French officials respectively. This agreement was subsequently ratified by the two Governments concerned. 54 54 Report on the British mandated sphere of Togoland f o r 1920-21, C m d . 1698 ( L o n d o n , 1922), pp. 4 et seq.; Report b y His Britannic M a j e s t y ' s G o v e r n ment on the British sphere of the m a n d a t e d territory of Togoland f o r the y e a r 1923, C o l o n i a l N o . 3 ( L o n d o n , 1924), p. 3 ; R a p p o r t au Ministere des Colonies sur ['administration des territoires occupes du T o g o , de la conquete au i e r juillet 1921. Extrait du Journal Officiel de la Republique Frangaise du 25 aoüt 1921, pp. ι and 7.

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THE QUEST FOR PEACE

The conquest of the Cameroons, the other much more important German colony of tropical West Africa, was not as readily achieved. Lying between British Nigeria to the northeast and French Equatorial Africa to the west, it had an area of 290,000 sq. miles and a native population of over 3,500,000 inhabitants. It was invaded on August 6, 1914, by a FrancoBritish expeditionary force under the orders, first of a British, and later of a French, general. This force, having experienced varied military fortunes, took over a year and a half to obtain its objective. The conquest of the Cameroons was only completed on February 18,1916. On September 24,1915, a FrancoBritish condominium over the territory had been established by an agreement reached in Paris between the French Foreign Minister and the British Ambassador. After some hesitation, this was superseded by a provisional partition agreement between the two Governments, which came into force on April 7, 1916. 55 Further south on the west coast of Africa lay the large but thinly peopled German colony of Southwest Africa. Although of an area of 322,450 sq. miles, it was estimated that its native population did not appreciably exceed 230,000 inhabitants. But these were dominated by over 12,000 German civil and military officials and planters. The conquest of this vast and largely barren territory, which was undertaken by the British Union of South Africa, was rendered difficult not only by natural obstacles and by the resistance of its German defenders, but also by the treasonable attitude of a part of the Boer population of the invading State. After nearly a year, the campaign of the latter, conducted by Generals Botha and Smuts, finally came to a successful conclusion. 56 The only other African possession of Germany was East Africa, with its area of 384,000 sq. miles and its native population estimated at over 7,500,000 inhabitants. It was by far 66 Rapport au Ministere des Colonies sur l'administration des territoires occupes du Cameroun, de la conquete au ier juillet 1921. Journal Officiel de la Republique Frangaise, 7 septembre 1921, annexe, pp. 415 ei seq. M Temperley, op. cit., vol. II, p. 224.

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the most important of all the German colonies. Its conquest was undertaken by Belgian troops from the Congo to the west, and by British, South African, Indian and native troops from the north and south. Although conducted with vigor, especially during 1916 when General Smuts was in command of the British forces and when General Tombeur, at the head of the Belgian contingent, took the war capital of Tabora on September 19, the conquest was only completed after the conclusion of the Armistice in Europe. The parts of the territory occupied by the British were administered under martial law by a British administrator. Without, it would seem, any formal agreement between the two Powers concerned and their agents on the spot, General Tombeur assumed on behalf of his king the government of those districts in which he had established himself. On January 1, 1917, he was superseded by a Royal High Commissioner appointed in Brussels. 57 Besides her African possessions, Germany had acquired sovereignty over a large number of islands in the Pacific Ocean. Shortly after the outbreak of the war, on August 16, 1914, the British Government informed the Governors-General of Australia and New Zealand that the Governments of these Dominions would render a great imperial service by seizing various German wireless stations situated in some of these islands. The dispatch from London added: " Y o u will realize, however, that any territory now occupied must at conclusion of war be at the disposal of the Imperial Government for purposes of an ultimate settlement." As a result of this suggestion, New Zealand forces occupied German Samoa in August 1914 and an Australian contingent, after a brief campaign, occupied New Guinea, hoisted the 57 Report on Tanganyika T e r r i t o r y covering the period f r o m the conclusion of the Armistice to the end of 1920, C m d . 1428 ( L o n d o n , 1 9 2 1 ) , pp. 35 et seq.·, Rapport sur l'administration beige des territoires occupes de l'Est Africain allemand et specialement du Ruanda et de l'Urundi presente aux C h a m b r e s par le Ministere des Colonies, seance du 27 septembre 1921, Bruxelles, 1921, pp. 1 et seq.

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THE QUEST FOR PEACE

British flag at Rabaul on September 12 and concluded an agreement with the Acting Governor of Deutsch-Neu Guinea on September 17. Although this German official declared he had no power to surrender, he promised the cessation of all military resistance. The island of Nauru surrendered to an Australian warship on September 14, 1914, and was occupied by Australian troops on November 6 J58 Thus, before the end of 1914, all the German possessions in the Pacific Ocean south of the equator had been occupied by Australian and New Zealand troops and were being administered under martial law in the name of His Britannic Majesty's Government. As for the islands, numbering several hundred, over which Germany exercised sovereignty in the Pacific Ocean north of the equator, they were seized by Japanese naval forces. When the Japanese Government became cognizant of the agreements which had been reached between France and Russia about their territorial claims, it believed, as is expressed in a letter addressed by the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs to the Russian and French Ambassadors in Tokyo, on February 19, 1917, "that the moment has come for it also to express its desires relative to certain conditions of peace essential to Japan." Considering that in order "to guarantee for the future the peace of oriental Asia and the security of the Japanese Empire . . . it is absolutely necessary to take from Germany its bases of political, military and economic activity in the Far East," the Japanese Government requested the Russian and French Governments to support its claims against Germany to "Shantung and the islands situated north of the equator in the Pacific Ocean." The Russian Government agreed to give its support without condition. The French Government gave its consent in exchange for a Japanese pledge to aid in persuading China 58 Report of the Minister of State for Defence on the military occupation of the German New Guinea possession, Melbourne, 1921, pp. 3 et seq.\ Report on the administration of Nauru during the military occupation and until 17th December 1920, Melbourne, 1922, p. 3.

QUEST FOR PEACE A T PEACE CONFERENCE to b r e a k off diplomatic relations with G e r m a n y .

91

T h e Italian

Minister of Foreign Affairs, w h o was later approached on the same subject, stated orally that his Government had no objection to these arrangements. W h i l e conversations and correspondences were being carried on between the Japanese, Russian, French and Italian Governments on this matter, the Japanese Foreign Minister also approached the British Ambassador at T o k y o on the same subject.

In reply to a previous oral request, the British A m -

bassador, on F e b r u a r y 16, 1 9 1 7 , communicated to the Japanese

Minister

Majesty's

the

following

message

from

His

Britannic

Government:

His Britannic Majesty's Government accede with pleasure to the request of the Japanese Government for an assurance that they will support Japan's claims in regard to the disposal of Germany's rights in Shantung and possessions in the islands north of the equator on the occasion of the Peace Conference; it being understood that the Japanese Government will in the eventual peace settlement treat in the same spirit Great Britain's claims to the German islands south of the equator. O n F e b r u a r y 21, 1 9 1 7 , the Japanese Minister for Foreign Affairs informed the British Ambassador that his Government was " f u l l y prepared to support in the same spirit the claims which m a y be put forward at the Peace Conference b y H i s Britannic M a j e s t y ' s Government in regard to the German possessions in the islands south of the equator."

59

T h e only other positive agreement relating to the colonial settlement which had been concluded b y a n y of the Allied Powers was that contained in Article 13 of the famous P a c t of London of April 26, 1 9 1 5 , between France, Britain and Italy.

Russia,

Great

T h e wording of this much-discussed

Ar-

ticle 13 is the following: In the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, those two Powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation, 5eTemperley,

op. cit., vol. V I , L o n d o n , 1924, pp. 376, 634 et seq.

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T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

particularly as regards the settlement in her favour of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya and the neighbouring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain. 60 T h u s on the eve of the Peace Conference, the whole of the German colonial empire, except a small area in East A f r i c a , had been conquered b y one or another of the victorious belligerents and was being administered b y them under martial law. M o s t of these conquerors had staked out their claims — if that expression be allowed — and certain agreements had been concluded between them, but no final solution had as yet been generally adopted. A s a matter of fact, the attention of the European belligerents was so absorbed b y the military struggle nearer home that colonial happenings were for them topics of quite minor importance. T h u s when, on A u g u s t 9, 1914, M . Poincare was informed of the occupation of Togoland b y British troops, he jotted down in his diary: M. Maurice Raynaud (the French Colonial Minister) has instructed the Governor of Dahomey amicably to cooperate with Great Britain in the conquest of this German colony. But a telephone call from Belfort quickly makes us forget this far-away victory. 61 Officially and publicly, the victorious Entente was committed only in the words of the F i f t h of President Wilson's Fourteen Points to a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined. T h r e e days before these somewhat sibylline words were uttered before the American Senate b y President Wilson, M r . 6 0 Temperley, 01

op. cit., vol. V, London, 1921, p. 390. Poincare, Au service de la France, op. cit., vol. V, p. 53.

QUEST F O R P E A C E A T P E A C E C O N F E R E N C E L l o y d George had declared, before the British Congress, on January 5, 1918, that the German to be "held at the disposal of a Conference whose have primary regard to the wishes and interests inhabitants of such colonies." 62

93

T r a d e Union colonies were decision must of the native

Although not much clearer than the American utterance on this point, M r . L l o y d George's speech did indicate greater reluctance to restore the colonies to Germany and greater faith in the possibilities of self-determination as a method of disposing of them. T h i s reluctance was certainly not due to any desire on the part of Great Britain herself to annex them. W e know that, far from seeking a further extension of the British Empire, officials in the Foreign Office in London, in 1916, had not shrunk from the idea, in case military necessities imposed a stalemate peace, of buying Germany out of Belgium b y concessions at the expense of British territories overseas. T h e memorandum prepared and signed b y two prominent officials of the Foreign Office and submitted to the Cabinet without any comment from Sir E d w a r d Grey, ends b y the following words: We have said enough to indicate that whatever concessions will be necessary in the event of a draw will have to be made by this country. Such concessions can only be made by the sacrifice of our colonial possessions. But this would have to form the subject of enquiry and report by a committee on which the Colonial Office would be represented, so as to enable His Majesty's Government to decide what price they could afford to pay for such a peace.63 T h e unwillingness of the British Government to press for the annexation of the German colonies was still very apparent in the statement made b y M r . L l o y d George on M a r c h 20, 1 9 1 7 , when he opened the Imperial W a r Cabinet he had summoned " t o consider urgent questions affecting the prosecution of the W a r , the possible conditions on which, in agreement with our 02 03

Lloyd George, War Memoirs, op. cit., vol. V, p. 2524. Lloyd George, The Truth etc., op. cit., vol. I, p. 50.

94

THE QUEST FOR

PEACE

Allies, we could assent to its termination, and the problems which will then immediately arise." 64 In this opening statement, the British Prime Minister enumerated, presumably in the order of their importance in his own mind, the British war aims as he saw them. As such he mentioned : 1. The evacuation of the territories in Europe overrun by the German armies and the restoration of the independence of their inhabitants; 2. compensation for the damage done to the ravaged countries; 3. the effective condemnation, through a league of peace, of all wars of aggression; 4. the democratization of Europe; 5. the disruption of the Turkish Empire; 6. the improvement of conditions of life in Great Britain; 7. "and finally a greater solidarity of aims and actions as far as the British Empire is concerned." It is only after this apparently exhaustive recital of the British war aims that he added: I do not know that I should at this stage say anything about the German colonies which have been conquered so very largely, and in some cases entirely, through the efforts of our self-governing dominions. All I would like to say at this stage would be this — that I hope we will treat this question as part of the whole problem of the settlement of the W a r , and not consider it merely from the point of view of any particular part of the Empire. W e shall consider it, I trust, not merely as members of the same Empire, but also in reference to the great Alliance into which the Dominions as well as ourselves entered when they embarked with us upon this war. T h e extent to which we can establish permanently our dominion in those colonies must depend very largely upon the measure of success we achieve in the War, because if the success were partial we could not expect our Allies to bear their share of the sacrifice whilst we were enjoying practically the whole of the advantage. 6 5 The same, War Memoirs, op. cit., vol. IV, London, 1934, pp. 1734-1735. ®/6irf„ vol. IV, p. 1776. 64

QUEST FOR PEACE A T PEACE CONFERENCE

95

The terms of this important statement clearly indicate that the British Prime Minister was aware of the fact that the moderation of his own colonial aims was not shared by all his colleagues in the Dominions. This became obvious when the matter was referred to the territorial sub-committee of the gathering, which recommended "that so far as the British Empire was concerned, territorial settlement after the War should leave in British hands the German colonies and Turkish territory that we had captured or occupied." Commenting on this recommendation, which was accepted by the Imperial War Cabinet, against the dissenting opinion of Mr. Henderson on behalf of the British Labor Party, Mr. Lloyd George wrote: T h i s was the first occasion on which any indication was given that Britain meant as a condition of peace to retain its conquests in the German Colonial Empire. So far the British Government had formulated no such demand. It was mainly due to the insistence of the Dominion representatives. T h e y made it quite clear that they had no intention of restoring to Germany after the W a r the territories they had conquered. T h e British members of the Sub-Committee took the same view concerning German East Africa and Mesopotamia. I t was agreed that British delegates to a Peace Conference should take these proposals as a guide, but it was pointed out that if peace were negotiated while Allied territory was still held by the Central Powers, it might prove necessary to hand back some of our gains to secure satisfactory terms for our Allies. 66

The views which prevailed in the British Imperial War Cabinet in the spring of 1917 were confirmed at the meetings held by that body shortly after the conclusion of the Armistice and before the opening of the Peace Conference. The three Dominions whose forces had conquered the German colonies adjacent and near to their territories were determined to annex them. Canada, through the organ of her wise Prime Minister, Sir Robert Borden, was opposed to all policies which might justify the suspicions entertained in the United M

Ibid.,

vol. IV, pp. 1749-1750.

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THE QUEST FOR PEACE

States that the British Empire was intent upon territorial aggrandizement. Mr. Lloyd George himself, conscious of that danger, would have been happy to see his American associates assume part of what he liked to refer to as the new burden or responsibility of colonial administration. No one at this stage seems to have suggested the restoration of the colonies to Germany. The representatives of Great Britain, of Canada and of the Union of South Africa favored the solution which finally prevailed. General Smuts, however, the intellectual author of the mandates scheme, did not, originally, intend it to be applied to colonies and especially to Southwest Africa. 67 The French Colonial Office was contemplating the annexation of the parts of the Cameroons and of Togoland occupied by French troops. As for President Wilson, whose Fifth Point was obviously susceptible of the most divergent interpretations, he confided to his associates on board the George Washington, in the first days of December 1918, that "the German colonies should be declared the common property of the League of Nations and administered by small nations. The resources of each colony," he pursued, "should be available to all members of the League." 68 The discussions which took place in Paris among the victors, soon after the opening of the Peace Conference, were exactly such as what we now know of these preliminary conversations would have led us to expect. No one proposed the restoration of the German colonies to their former masters. The British Dominions and the French Colonial Office, but not M . Clemenceau, spoke in favor of annexation. President Wilson violently opposed the latter course as contrary to all pre-Armistice pledges. He urged a policy of mandatory administration under League of Nations supervision. Mr. Lloyd George, most helpfully and cleverly supported by Mr. Balfour, saved what threatLloyd George, The Truth etc., op. cit., vol. I, pp. 114 et seq. " S e y m o u r , op. cit., vol. IV, pp. 292-293.

07

QUEST FOR PEACE A T PEACE CONFERENCE

97

ened to become a critical situation by suggesting a compromise which gave a sufficient measure of satisfaction to all parties. President Wilson was placated by the repudiation of annexation and by the vindication of the mandatory principle. The Dominions and France were persuaded to renounce annexation in favor of a regime under which, while technically trustees for the world at large, they would in fact enjoy full powers of administration over the territories which they refused to relinquish. 69 B y the terms of the Peace Treaty, Germany was accordingly obliged to cede her colonial empire to the five principal Allied and Associated Powers. The former, long before the Treaty came into force and even before it was drafted, had already allocated the mandates over the various parts of this empire to those who were their conquerors. T h e conditions under which the so-called Mandatory Powers were to administer their respective territories on behalf of the League of Nations were formulated in general terms in what became Article 22 of the Covenant. The rules and standards laid down in this article were those of disinterested trusteeship and solicitude for native welfare, such as were suggested by the most approved colonial practice. T h e article was not drafted by the international constitution-makers who drew up the other provisions of the Covenant, but by British experts under the mandatory supervision of the Council of Ten. T h e solution thus adopted was the result of delicate and often heated negotiations first in the British Imperial delegation and then between President Wilson and the interested parties. T h e former insisted on the rights of humanity, as represented by the League, and the latter on the rights of conquest, which they represented themselves. If these rights had proved to be incompatible, it is highly 6 9 M i l l e r , op. cit., vol. I, pp. 101 et seq.; L l o y d George, The Truth etc., op. est., vol. I, pp. 540 et seq.; S e y m o u r , op. cit., vol. I V , pp. 305 et seq.; Baker, Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 253 et seq.

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THE QUEST FOR PEACE

probable that here, as elsewhere, the national interests would have prevailed over those of the international community. In point of fact, however, there proved to be no such incompatibility. The experience of the last two decades has shown conclusively that the Mandatory Powers lost nothing, and it suggests that they perhaps may even have gained something appreciable, by administering the former colonies of Germany, not as sovereigns, but as trustees on behalf and under the supervision of the League of Nations and in accordance with the principles laid down in the Covenant. Their native wards, on the other hand, as well as their fellow-members of the League of Nations itself, have certainly all profited by the regime which was instituted in their interest and which, more perhaps than any other of the Geneva institutions, has justified the wisdom of its founders. The dissatisfaction of Germany with this solution, both at the time of its adoption and ever since, strikes me as not only natural, but also as perfectly legitimate. The solution, whatever its intrinsic merits and however successful the practical operation of the institutions created, was certainly not the "free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all colonial claims" the Fifth Point called for. Nor was it "based upon a strict observance of the principle that . . . the interests of the populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable claims of the government whose title is to be determined." No, the settlement was manifestly partial, imposed by the conquerors, and not uninfluenced by the traditional ideas of spoils and security. However, had there been no opposition to these ideas at the Peace Conference and no League of Nations to provide for international supervision, the result would undoubtedly have been still more one-sided and entirely vindictive and national. When, on receiving the peace terms of their enemies, the Germans protested that they and not their victors should be

QUEST FOR PEACE AT PEACE CONFERENCE

99

entrusted with the mandates over their former colonies, they were on very sound ground. Nevertheless the measure of international fairness and of concern for the welfare of native populations, attested by the creation of the mandates system, represented a limited, but still a real, triumph for those whose quest at the Peace Conference was for peace and justice for all. T o be sure, the solution adopted was far from being free from hypocrisy. But not only did it imply, as hypocrisy always does, a tribute of wrong to right, but it was in itself a step in the direction away from narrow and exclusive nationalism toward world organization. This step, as well as the experience gathered in the course of the last twenty years along the road then chosen, may well prove to have had a most valuable significance for the general settlement which still awaits the colonial problem of the future. III. THE QUEST FOR AN INTERNATIONAL ORDER

A.

The general problem

The settlement in 1919 of rival territorial claims in two specific cases has been outlined here merely as an illustration of the fact that the international interest was never absent from the minds of the peace-makers, even when their agenda called for the solution of problems which seemed to involve only national interests. We have seen how and why neither the Franco-German frontiers nor the liquidation of Germany's colonial empire were and are what they would have been if the decisions relating to them had been uninfluenced by the quest for enduring peace for the benefit of all the members of the world community. Important as it is for our purposes here fully to appreciate the nature of the very intimate relations which bound together what I have called the national and the international tasks of the Peace Conference, it is the latter only which are the true objects of our investigations.

IOO

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

For President Wilson the establishment of a new regime of organized peace was the primary duty of the Peace Conference. To this duty the settlement of all purely national aims was to be correlated and subordinated, if not as means to an end, at least as incidentals and accidentals to the essential. For all his major colleagues of the Conference, the terms of the problem were reversed. For them the primary duty of the Peace Conference was to satisfy the national claims of which they were the authorized spokesmen. In so far as the attempt to organize peace for all by the establishment of certain general principles and by the creation of a league of nations favored and promoted their national aims, they were of course willing and indeed eager to cooperate. In so far however as such an attempt interfered with their national ambitions, it was to be resisted or deflected. This obvious contrast between what one might call the New and the Old World conception of the peace settlement has led some of the American historians who noted, without perhaps fully understanding, it, to see in it an opposition and a struggle between American idealism and what they were tempted to denounce as European cynical materialism. To a lesser degree and, I believe, for similar reasons, British commentators are apt to take somewhat the same view when they compare the policies of their own country with those of their Continental allies. Now, as I see it, without the slightest anti-Anglo-Saxon prejudice and while fully taking into account the real contrasts between the personalities of the Presbyterian intellectual who represented the United States, the Non-Conformist Welshman who spoke on behalf of the British Empire and the sturdy old Voltairian who fought for France, that view strikes me as somewhat unfair, because it does not seem to make due allowance for the variety of the national interests which came to clash. President Wilson's political and international philosophy,

QUEST FOR PEACE AT PEACE CONFERENCE

ΙΟΙ

when compared with that of his Old World partners, appeared lofty and disinterested, not so much because he had been a university professor and therefore — I should be the last to question it — represented a superior morality, but because his country really had and could have no selfishly nationalistic aims. But this, I venture to submit, was due to reasons far more geographical than ethical. Again Mr. Lloyd George could plead with M. Clemenceau for moderation and generosity in the treatment of Germany, not so much because he was of a more humane disposition than his colleague, nor even because the British are naturally more sportsmanlike than the French, but merely because the British Channel, while not as broad as the Atlantic Ocean, was appreciably broader than the Rhine. Is it not an obvious fact that the United States, however grasping their leader might have been or however nationalistic their people, could, as a result of the World War, advance no claims which were not those of all peace-loving men everywhere? The only real dangers for America were those lurking in international anarchy. The only peace aim which had any attractions for the American people was the establishment of durable peace. The only national interest of America was therefore international. The same was true, although to a lesser extent, for Great Britain, once the German navy had been sunk and the German colonies placed in safer hands! But for France, for Italy, for Belgium, for Serbia and for the other European victors, the immediate proximity of a momentarily prostrate, but potentially mighty and almost necessarily vindictive Germany was the great menace. It was this menace that made strategic frontiers, military superiority and defensive alliances appear so much more real, beneficent and necessary than a general organization of peace, based upon principles of abstract justice and guaranteed by an ideal league of nations. These remarks are submitted in no contentious spirit. My purpose is not to plead the cause of the Continent against Great

I02

T H E QUEST FOR P E A C E

Britain, nor that of Europe against America. Still less is it to belittle British or American generosity. M y aim is neither to extol nor to condemn, but merely to explain. When judging of the quest for peace in Europe during and after the Peace Conference, let my American readers imagine what their own and what the European position would have been under reversed conditions. Suppose the World W a r had been fought in the heart of the North American continent against an almighty Japan, whose frontiers were on the Mississippi as far down as, say, St. Louis, and which from there extended eastward to include parts of Illinois, Kentucky, Tennessee and the whole of Alabama. Suppose further that the war had been launched by Japan and waged for over four years in Georgia, Indiana and Ohio, which the same enemy had already invaded three times before within a century. Suppose that the Japanese invaders had been contained for over thirty months by the costly heroism of a weaker, more pacific and less populous United States, which only a world coalition had finally saved from defeat.

Suppose, finally, the peace conference had met

in Washington and that the Americans had been urged by their European allies, whose armies were impatient to return home, to forego any territorial aggrandizement and to seek security in a disarmed league of nations, which placed its trust more in moral guarantees than in hard-and-fast undertakings for mutual support. Is it not, under such assumptions, probable that the American government and the American people would have preferred to rely for their national future on something more tangible than on an untried league of nations? And is it not probable also, I hasten to add, that the isolationists would not have been found mainly on the west banks of the Atlantic? Let us now return from these, fortunately for America, imaginary battle fields and peace parleys to the Paris Peace Conference of 1 9 1 9 .

Meeting on the morrow of the, essentially

European, World W a r of 1 9 1 4 - 1 9 1 8 , what, beyond the settlement of national frontiers, guarantees and indemnities, was it

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103

to achieve for the establishment of a general and enduring peace? B y the acceptance of President Wilson's First, Third, Fourth and Fourteenth Points, it was committed to the following propositions: i . Open covenants of peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in the public view. 3. T h e removal, so far as possible, of all economic barriers and the establishment of an equality of trade conditions among all the nations consenting to the peace and associating themselves for its maintenance. 4. Adequate guarantees given and taken that national armaments will be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety. 14. A general association of nations must be formed under specific covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.

The story of how these principles, supplemented by various others, came to be enshrined in the twenty-six articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations has been so often and so ably told, especially by American authors, that it would be unnecessary, even if it were possible, to repeat it here. 70 Rather would I now inquire into the genesis of three fundamental ideas, whose destiny in the course of the last twenty years I shall seek to retrace in our later chapters. These three ideas, essential in the quest for peace, are those of the pacific settlement of international disputes, of collective security, and of disarmament. Considered logically as well as historically, war is a method of settling conflicts of interests and ambitious between sovereign States. It is obvious that such conflicts are bound to arise 7 0 1 refer in particular to the o f t quoted w o r k s of D a v i d H u n t e r Miller, R . S. B a k e r , to the Intimate Papers of Colonel House edited b y S e y m o u r , as well as to m a n y other memoirs and treatises.

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THE QUEST FOR PEACE

in future, as long as men and nations remain such as the past and present show them ever to have been and to be today. I f , therefore, war is to be eliminated from international relations, a pacific method of settlement must be substituted for it. A s between individuals, whose conflicts also seem to be willed by biology itself, such a substitute for violence has been found in the establishment of two distinct institutions: courts of justice, to settle conflicts in accordance with existing law, and legislatures, to lay down and to modify the law. Tribunals and legislatures there have been since the dawn of civilization, although their varieties have been countless and although their functions have often been exercised by one and the same authority.

Sometimes, as in primitive society and in contem-

porary dictatorships, which may be considered as a survival of or as a relapse into primitive society, the chief is both the supreme judge and the supreme legislator.

For long periods

also, tribunals have been called upon both to apply and to create the law. In fact the judge is always in some measure also a legislator. N o w , as between sovereign nations, there are neither any supreme judges nor any supreme legislators. T h a t is why we call them sovereign.

And that is why also they have never

enjoyed any secure peace.

If therefore peace is to be made

secure between nations, their sovereignty must be curbed and subordinated to some superior authority. This authority must be competent first to settle disputes arising between them according to a generally recognized law, and also, if necessary, to secure the adaptation of law to modified circumstances. These propositions, which would seem logically self-evident, have been amply borne out by historical experience. In their quest for organized peace, the statesmen in Paris, in 1 9 1 9 , while more or less dimly perceiving their obvious truth, felt unable or unwilling to draw from them their natural conclusions. It is because of this vague perception that they attempted, as we shall see presently, to provide both for some methods

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of pacific settlement and for some measure of international legislation. And it is because they felt unwilling or unable to draw the necessary conclusions that they failed to establish a secure peace. . The second idea inherent in any quest for peace is that of collective security. T o avoid war it is, as we have just seen, necessary to provide for the pacific settlement of all possible international disputes. Necessary, but insufficient. If indeed, such methods having been made available, any State resorts to force and not to them, or, having resorted to them, refuses to abide by the decisions rendered by the competent authority, there must be some effective means of protecting the victim of what will be either aggression or injustice. A s between citizens in any organized community such means are represented by the police power of the State. A s between sovereign States, there can be no such superior power because, if there was, the State would cease to be sovereign. Again we are faced with a proposition which is both logically evident and historically proven.

And again the statesmen in

Paris in 1 9 1 9 , seeking to establish a new order of enduring peace and realizing the necessity of protecting the international community against the aggression or lawlessness of any recalcitrant member, endeavored, as we shall see, to provide for some measure of mutual protection.

But again, unwilling or

unable to subordinate the States they represented to the international community they were out to establish, they failed in their attempt adequately to arm that community for the protection of its members. The third idea of which I propose to study the origins in the Paris Conference is that of disarmament. In a w a y the reduction of national armaments below the level at which they may be held to threaten the peace of the international community is also a logical consequence of the establishment of a pacific order as outlined above. It was not exactly as such, however, that it was considered by the peacemakers of 1 9 1 9 .

This is

io6

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

already shown b y the fact that disarmament was divorced from the League of Nations in President Wilson's Fourteen Points. It was considered desirable and indeed necessary in itself. Excessive national armaments were generally recognized to be a curse, because they were generally experienced as intolerable burdens and generally feared as dangerous threats.

It

may be said and, as we shall see, it was in fact constantly stressed that national armaments are a consequence more than a cause of war. It is not so much because nations are armed that they resort to war as because they fear war that, in the absence of any adequate other protection, they resort to national armaments. However it was also realized that, quite apart from their economic disadvantages and from the danger they represented for the supremacy of the international community, excessive national armaments tended to maintain an order of psychological tension between nations which was in itself an obstacle to the establishment and maintenance of pacific relations. Of these three essential ideas of pacific settlement, collective security, and disarmament, only the last two were specifically mentioned in President Wilson's Fourteen Points. On the other hand, open diplomacy and liberal trade policies, referred to in the First and Third, I shall, for lack of space, but mention here. However great their significance, their bearing on the quest for peace, with which I am exclusively concerned in this book, was indirect. T h e demand for open diplomacy formulated in Point One is at the root of Article 18 of the Covenant, which provides for the publication of international treaties. It may also have had something to do with the adoption, b y the organs of the League of Nations, of policies of public debate which were certainly novel in diplomatic practice. 7 1 71 Cf. my study "What is the League of Nations?" in The World Crisis, by the Professors of the Graduate Institute of International Studies, London, 1938, pp. 45 et seq.

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A s for Point T h r e e calling for the removal of economic barriers, it also underwent a process of attrition in the course of the drafting of the Covenant. A l l that is left today of President Wilson's bold demand for freer trade is the clause in Article 23 (e) relating to "freedom of communications and of transit and equitable treatment for . . . commerce."

72

Leaving aside these interesting, important but only indirectly relevant matters, let us see now how the three principal weapons in the struggle for organized peace came to be forged. B.

The pacific settlement

of international

disputes.

T h e creation of institutions and methods for the pacific settlement of international disputes formed no part of President Wilson's original conception. Neither in his address before the League to Enforce Peace, on M a y 22, 1916, nor in his Fourteen Points speech before Congress, on January 8, 1918, nor in any intermediary utterances, did he express or refer to the need for any specific machinery for the peaceful adjustment of disputes. For the establishment and maintenance of permanent peace, he looked first and foremost to an improvement in international morality. This, he held, should in future avoid such conflicts as had in the past broken out as the result of dishonorable dealings, of selfish ambitions and diplomatic intrigue. For the defense of peace, if war was nevertheless resorted to, he relied on the collective action of all pacific nations, whose combined power would be sufficient to intimidate and, if necessary, to repress the aggressor. T h e absence of any reference to arbitration or to any other specific method of settlement of international disputes in President Wilson's war speeches is all the more surprising as he openly championed such procedures for the settlement of industrial conflicts and as he had, on December 2, 1913, warmly 72 On this point also I m a y be allowed to refer to a brief study of mine entitled "L'origine de la clause dite 'de l'equitable traitement du commerce' dans le Pacte de la Societe des N a t i o n s , " Melanges Edgard Milhaud, Paris, 1934, pp. 277-295.

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urged the American Senate to ratify the international arbitration treaties then pending before it. It was doubtless due in part to his lack of sympathy with the elaborate plans of the League to Enforce Peace and to his often stressed reluctance to enter into any detailed discussion of peace machinery which might disunite the supporters of his more general aspirations in America and abroad. It may also, in part, have resulted from his instinctive fear of becoming involved in the entanglement of international conferences and from his personal prejudices against lawyers, legalism, and what may be called the Hague tradition of international arbitration. Whatever its cause or causes, the fact is certain. In the quest for organized peace, during the World War, the elaboration of methods for the pacific settlement of international disputes was a distinctly European and not a Wilsonian contribution. Although such methods had often been discussed in private circles such as the League to Enforce Peace and indeed applied by governments before and during the war, both in the Old World and in the New, the first official war documents to refer to them were the British Phillimore plan of March 18, 1918, and the draft of the French Ministerial Commission for a league of nations, of June 8, 1918. When one compares the relative provisions of the Phillimore plan with the corresponding clauses of the Covenant of the League of Nations as finally adopted by the Peace Conference, one cannot help being struck by their similarity. 73 In both documents it is provided that the parties to a dispute should undertake not to resort to war before having submitted their case, when it had proved incapable of solution b y diplomatic negotiations, either to arbitration or to the consideration of a political body. In both documents also, arbitration is recommended as the most effective method of settlement in so-called justiciable disputes. But in neither is it made compulsory on any party that saw fit to reject it. In both documents, further73

Cf. Miller, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 9 et seq.; vol. II, pp. 3 et seq.

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more, provision is made for some form of collective sanctions against a party which resorts to war in violation of its undertaking to submit its dispute to one or the other form of thirdparty judgment. But in neither is there more than a negative sanction against the State which refuses to comply with the award or judgment rendered. These very significant analogies suffice to show that some of the most fundamental provisions of the Covenant were born of the suggestions of the Phillimore Commission. T h e French plan went further still in providing for the compulsory settlement by pacific methods of all international disputes. Elaborated, as we have seen, under the chairmanship of M . Leon Bourgeois, who had been a delegate to the two Hague Conferences of 1899 and 1907, it clearly bore the trace of that tradition. 74 The purpose of the Societi des Nations, according to that plan, was the maintenance of peace b y the substitution of "Right for Might as the arbiter of disputes." This purpose was to be achieved by the action of an "International Body composed of the responsible heads of the Governments or of their delegates." The first duty of this body was to be the constitution of an International Tribunal, or Permanent Court, by the development of "the international legal institutions created at T h e Hague." In case any dispute between States should have failed of settlement by negotiation, the International Body, constituted for the purpose "in the form of an International Council," should "at the demand of the parties or at the instance of a third State" take the matter in hand. It should, in the first place, "proceed either by means of good offices and of mediation (preceded, if necessary, by an enquiry in the terms of the First Hague Convention of 1907), or by reminding the disputant States that the Permanent Court is open to them." 74 The original text of the French plan is to be found in Miller, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 403 et seq., and an English translation ibid., pp. 238 et seg.

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If these hortatory means should prove sterile, the International Council should then make itself responsible for the settlement of the dispute. It should decide whether or not the question was "of a legal nature" ("d'ordre juridique"). If it be found that it was, the parties would be referred to the Hague Tribunal whose decisions would be final. If the International Council held that the question was not of such a nature, it should settle the dispute itself, if possible, by promoting an amicable agreement, if not, by defining "the terms according to which the dispute shall be settled in a manner which shall respect the rights of each State and the maintenance of peace." The French plan then provides expressly that: The decision shall be notified to the States concerned, it being intimated to them that as from such date the dispute no longer exists between the contestant States, but between the entirety of the associated States and the State which, by refusing to accept such decision, violates the very principles of the Covenant. Should the State concerned refuse to accept the decision after having been summoned to do so, the International Council shall notify to it the coercive measures of a diplomatic, legal, economic, or military nature to be taken against it within a specified time.

Thus, whether the dispute be of a justiciable or of a political nature, it would be finally settled by pacific means, supplemented, if need be, by collective action. It will be seen from this brief summary of the French plan that by providing for the absolute suppression of war, it was far more ambitious in theory than either that of the Phillimore Commission or the Covenant itself. Unfortunately, as the legislative products of the logical French mind so often do, it suffered from the fundamental defect of being practically unworkable. It was entirely built upon the assumption that the International Council would be in a position to reach executive decisions. As that body, however, was to be composed of the responsible representatives of all member States, that would

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be possible only in one or another of two hypotheses: either it could reach such decisions by an unanimous vote, which was hardly to be expected, or it could be empowered to act according to the will of the majority. As, however, the plan provides that the traditional principles of equality and sovereignty of all national States should be respected, no majority decision could be valid. Thus even in the unlikely event of an unanimous decision, and still more in that of a majority decision, the French plan, had it been adopted, would inevitably have come to grief on the rocks of national sovereignty. As it is impossible to assume that its very learned and intelligent authors could have been unconscious of this difficulty, one cannot but doubt whether they really had complete faith in their own project. A curious clause, which is to be found in the latter half of their plan, seems to throw some light on their state of mind, and to indicate that they were perhaps less ambitious than their scheme in itself might lead one to believe. Wishing to reassure the conventional prejudices of the public, and perhaps bowing to the will of their chief, the nationalistic head of the French Government, M. Clemenceau, they therein declared: There is no question of making of the Society of Nations a superState, or even a Confederation. The respect of the sovereignty of the States, the diversity of national traditions and of political and legal standards, the diversity of administrative systems and the opposition of economic interests, lead one to discard the idea of such a creation ("ecartent l'idee d'une telle creation"); but public opinion among the free nations would be disappointed if the present crisis did not give rise to the institution of an International Body capable of contributing, by constant vigilance and the exercise of sufficient authority, to the maintenance of peace.

It would no doubt be interesting to pursue our comparative examination of the other original drafts of a constitution of a league of nations, to discover how their various authors dealt with the problem of pacific settlement. Such an examination would be very extensive, as all the leading belligerent States,

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including Germany, as well as several of the neutrals, put forward drafts towards the end of the World W a r . It would however lead us too far afield. Moreover it would be only partly relevant to our main purpose. A s we shall see, the Covenant, as it emerged from the deliberations of the Peace Conference, was on this point, as on most others, based entirely on British and American ideas. Only here and there will it be possible to note the trace of some other influence. Thus with respect to the pacific settlement of international disputes, the Permanent Court of International Justice may fairly be placed to the credit of the French since, of the three principal original drafts, theirs was the only one which called for the creation of such an institution. It had, of course, been considered also by the British and the Americans, but both the Phillimore

Commission and President Wilson had at

first

rejected it. Although it was also recommended in almost all the other drafts, including the Italian, and although the principle of compulsory arbitration laid down in the French draft was finally set aside by the authors of the Covenant, the Permanent Court may well look to M . Leon Bourgeois as to its true father. When in the early summer of 1 9 1 8 President Wilson requested Colonel House to prepare a rough draft for what he liked to think of as a "covenant," the Phillimore and the Bourgeois plans had both been communicated to him. Although Colonel House considered the British draft too timid, he based his own very largely on it.

He substituted, however, com-

pulsory arbitration, with a right of appeal to a political body, for the alternative reference to arbitration or to the Council and expressly set up an international court. T h e latter innovation may have been suggested to him by the members and friends of the League to Enforce Peace, with whom he had had several conferences, or he may have been won over to it by his perusal of the French draft. 7 5 Seymour, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 5 ; Miller, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 12 et seq., vol. II, pp. 7 et seq.

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His most original contribution was, however, a clause which, like his own person, was very modest in appearance but which, like he himself also, was called upon to exercise a very real influence on the course of events. It read as follows: " A n y war or threat of war is a matter of concern to the League of Nations, and to the Powers, members thereof." 76 Slightly amended and expanded by President Wilson, it became Article 11 of the Covenant. Without having given rise to any considerable discussion, as such, its provisions have perhaps been more often invoked in later years in efforts to secure the peaceful settlement of disputes than those of any other article of the Covenant. Having worked out his draft between July 13 and 16, 1918, Colonel House submitted it to President Wilson. The latter, while accepting most of his adviser's suggestions, shortened the clauses relating to judicial procedure and struck out all mention of an international court. On August 15, 1918, after a conference with the President, Colonel House wrote in his diary: " H e has cut out the Court. We were in absolute disagreement about this. . . . The balance of the document is about as I wrote it." 77 Thus the draft which President Wilson brought to Europe with him much resembled the Phillimore plan. T h e provisions concerning the pacific settlement of international disputes, while slightly less detailed and intricate than those put forward by Colonel House, were still appreciably more so than those of the British model and, in opposition to it, retained the principle of obligatory arbitration. T h e latter President Wilson was to abandon, in favor of the British scheme, only after he had studied " T h e League of Nations, a Practical Suggestion" of General Smuts in Europe. He then, in his second draft of January 10, 1919, adopted a general policy which still more closely approximated the British. This very much facilitated ™ Miller, op. cit., vol. II, p. 7. 77 Seymour, op. cit., vol. I V , p. 48.

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the presentation of the common Anglo-American proposals, which served as the basis of discussion by the League of Nations Commission under President Wilson's chairmanhip. As the British and the Americans, although differing on some minor points, were in agreement on all essentials, and as they were more vitally interested in the whole idea of the League of Nations than the other delegations, their views prevailed on all important points. In the course of the informal discussions with the British, President Wilson, on January 3 1 , 1 9 1 9 , rather reluctantly agreed to the proposal of an international court of justice. Together with the British, however, he no longer supported the idea of compulsory arbitration on justiciable matters, in spite of the earnest pleadings of the French, the Belgian and the Portuguese delegates, whose views were generally favored also by the neutrals. Thus the Covenant became a political rather than a legal document. According to its provisions for the pacific settlement of disputes, the parties were urged, but not forced, to submit their justiciable conflicts to arbitration. If either of two contestants refused, he was bound to accept the inquiry of the Council of the League. If the Council, which could thus be called upon to examine justiciable as well as non-justiciable disputes, agreed on an unanimous report, the parties were urged, but not forced, to accept its conclusions. The resort to war was discouraged but not forbidden, as most of the Continental European delegations would have preferred. It remained possible and indeed legally permissible in several cases, notably for both parties if the Council was unable to present an unanimous report, and for the successful party against his opponent if the latter refused to carry out an unanimous recommendation of the Council. At bottom, the procedures proposed remained essentially voluntary. While the parties were bound to carry out "in full good faith" the award of arbitrators, they were always free not to submit their case to them. And while, if they refused, they

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were bound to submit their case to the Council, they were always free not to carry out its recommendations. Thus, if a State felt strong enough both to impose its will on another and to disregard all third-party judgment, there was nothing in the Covenant to prevent it from pursuing its nationalistic course. If that course led it to formulate demands incompatible with the existing international law, it could refuse to submit them to any arbitration. And even if it should fail to obtain from the Council an unanimous recommendation implying a modification of that law in its favor, it could always hope to prevent the formulation of an unanimous decision against it. In the former case, it would enjoy the moral support of the League. In the latter, it would not have to fear its opposition. It was therefore only if the weaker State could secure an unanimous decision in its favor that it could, at least theoretically, count on the positive protection of the League. Thus the authors of the Covenant, while offering the contestants every inducement to settle their disputes peacefully and every judicial and political facility therefor, stopped short of an absolute prohibition of war. T h e y believed in temperance, but they were not teetotallers. Their attitude had been accurately foreshadowed and indeed justified in advance by General Smuts, who, in his famous pamphlet published on December 16, 1918, had written: As long as members of the league submit their disputes for inquiry and report or recommendation or decision by some outside authority, their obligation to the league will be satisfied, and thereafter they will be free to take any action they like, and even to go to war. This may appear a weak position to take up; and yet it is not deemed expedient to go farther. T h e utmost that it seems possible to achieve in the present conditions of international opinion and practice is to provide for a breathing space before the disputants are free to go to war; to create a binding moratorium or period of delay, during which the parties to the dispute agree not to proceed to extremes but to await the results of the inquiry or hearing to which their case has been referred. T h e general opinion is that states will not be prepared

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T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

to bind themselves further; and even if they do, the risk of their breaking their engagements is so great as to make the engagement not worth while and indeed positively dangerous. The common view is that, if such a period of deliberation and delay is established, there will be time for extreme war passions to cool down, and for public opinion to be aroused and organized on the side of peace. And in view of the enormous force which public opinion would exert in such a case, the general expectation is that it will prove effective, and that the delay, and the opportunity thus given for further reflection and the expression of public opinion, will in most cases prevent the parties from going to war. Thus, although the engagement of the disputants is only to delay action pending the inquiry into or hearing of their case and the issue of a decision or report, the actual effect of the delay will in most cases be more far-reaching, and the threatened war may be prevented altogether.78 T h e procedure provided b y the Covenant for the pacific settlement of international disputes thus represented no real challenge to the principle of national sovereignty. On this point, as on many others, the main task of the authors of that document had been to appraise the rival claims of the mutually exclusive principles of national sovereignty and of international solidarity. And on this point, as on most others, they had clearly decided in favor of the former. T h a t , while reluctant to admit it, some of them were at least fully conscious of the true nature of the case before them is shown for instance b y the statements made b y Signor Orlando after the provisional adoption of the Covenant, on February 14, 1919. Speaking at the plenary meeting of the Peace Conference, that eminent professor of law, who had cooperated in the drafting of the Covenant in his capacity of Prime Minister of Italy, declared: The task was incomparably difficult. We started from two absolute principles which a -priori it might seem dialectically impossible to reconcile with one another. On the one hand the principle of the sovereignty of States, which is supreme and brooks no comparison or relation, and on the other the necessity of imposing from above a restraint on the conduct of States so that the sphere of their rights should harmonize with that of the rights of all the others, in order "Miller, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 52-53.

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that their liberty should not include the liberty to do evil. We were able to effect a reconciliation between these two principles on the basis of 'self-restraint,' a spontaneous coercion, so that states will in future be brought, under the control of the public opinion of the whole world, voluntarily to recognize the restraint imposed on them for the sake of universal peace. I know that even the possibility of such a transformation is the object of attacks by sceptics, who are by turns sad or ironical, according to their temperament. Towards these sceptics I will act like a Greek philosopher who, when a Sophist told him that he could not move, answered by getting up and walking.79 Whether or not this official optimism, which was shared by most of Signor Orlando's colleagues and was expressed with still less reserve on the same occasion by President Wilson himself, has in any measure been justified by the events of the last twenty years, we shall see in our later chapters. Before proceeding to the consideration of the means devised by the Peace Conference for the security of the law-abiding against the onslaughts of the law-breakers, I should like here at least to refer to the efforts made to provide for the peaceful revision of that law which was to be administered in favor of the former and protected against the latter. Although not technically part of the procedure for the pacific settlement of disputes, and although historically connected with the idea of collective security, in the consideration of which I shall be led to revert to it presently, the possibility of peacefully amending the rules and principles in the light of which disputes are to be settled is an essential factor in the substitution of law for war. It is not for one from Continental Europe to remind AngloSaxon readers of the fact that such a possibility exists wherever courts have been set up to administer the law. In administering the existing law, the judges are bound to amend it and to adapt it to the changing needs of the times. But that such judicial legislation has in all countries proved insufficient, is 70

Ibid., vol. II, pp. 567-568.

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THE QUEST FOR PEACE

shown by the universal existence of national legislatures. As long as the international world remains under the domination of the principle of national sovereignty, international legislation will remain a cumbersome process. As each sovereign State claims the right to obey only the laws of which it approves, laws can be amended only by the concurrent will of those to whom they apply. In the drafting of the Covenant, it was Colonel House who first felt the need of departing from this time-honored principle. If the Members of the League were to assume each with respect to all others the higher though unheard of responsibility of preserving their territorial integrity and political independence, he realized that the international community must be endowed with correspondingly extended powers. The law was bound to break if it could not be made to bend. We shall see in a moment, in dealing with the origins of Article 10 of the Covenant, how it was proposed to combine collective security with peaceful change and what became of this attempt. C.

The principle of collective

security.

While the establishment of pacific methods for the settlement of international disputes was the main European contribution to the quest for peace at the Peace Conference, the principle of collective security was formulated earlier and with greater force by President Wilson than by any of his foreign associates. The application of this principle is provided for by two ditinct articles in the Covenant. The former, Article 10, is distinctly and exclusively Wilsonian in origin. The latter, Article 16, was first clearly foreshadowed in the report of the Phillimore Commission. On November i , 1917, I had the honor of a long interview with President Wilson at the White House. M y main purpose had been to seek his personal support in favor of my country, whose fate depended entirely on American food supplies. How-

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ever, the conversation rapidly turned to a consideration of the League of Nations, of which he was already the principal champion and in which the Swiss Government was also actively interested. After an allusion to his lack of faith in the machinery proposed by the League to Enforce Peace, he declared that "he would like to do for the whole world what he had unsuccessfully attempted to do for the American continent." This — as I must confess to my shame I understood only shortly afterwards — was a reference to the steps he had undertaken in the winter of 1914 to 1915 to sound some of the South American republics as to the conclusion with the United States of a treaty for the "mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and of political independence under republican forms of government." 80 These very same terms are thereafter constantly to be found in President Wilson's oral and written utterances. In his speech before the League to Enforce Peace of M a y 27, 1916, he proposed to the world " a virtual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence." In his Fourteen Points speech of January 8, 1918, he urged the creation of "a general association of nations . . . for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike." His partiality for such a measure was so well known that we are not surprised to find, in Colonel House's draft of July 16, 1918, a clause to the effect that "the Contracting Parties unite in several guarantees to each other of their territorial integrity and political independence." When President Wilson redrafted Colonel House's suggestions, he characteristically promoted the clause from Article 20 to Article 3 and gave it the following wording: " T h e Contracting Parties unite in guaranteeing to each other political independence and territorial integrity." A t the request of Colonel House, Mr. 80

Cf. John Bassett Moore, Principles

1918, p. 406.

oj American

Diplomacy,

New York,

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T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

Miller, between January 12 and 18, 1919, subjected the whole of President Wilson's proposals to a critical examination.

In

his comments on this projected mutual guarantee, he declared it to be destructive of the Monroe Doctrine and generally contrary to the interests of the United States. H e wrote: . . . any guaranty of independence and integrity means war by the guarantor if a breach of the independence or integrity of the guaranteed State is attempted and persisted in. What the United States has done, is doing and will do for Europe, is enough, without making an unasked sacrifice of her interests and those of Latin America, by giving up a policy which has prevented the countries south of the Rio Grande from being like Africa, pawns in the diplomacy of Europe. That each Power should covenant for itself to respect the integrity and independence of every other Power in the League of Nations, and that failure to observe such a covenant should subject the covenantbreaking Power to the sanctions of the League of Nations is undoubted. That policy looks toward the peace of the world and accords with the spirit of a community of nations. But the general policy of a guaranty against the acts of other States looks toward intervention and war by one or more of the guarantors, and is in accord only with the spirit of the old diplomacy. 81 In spite of these weighty observations of his trusted legal adviser and in spite of the later opposition of Lord Robert Cecil to a positive guarantee, President Wilson was adamant in his defense of what was perhaps his only own personal contribution to the wording of the Covenant. T h e following notes taken b y M r . Miller at the fourth meeting of the League of Nations Commission, on February 6, 1919, at which the d r a f t of the future Article 10 was first considered, are the best evidence available of the President's persistent advocacy of his bold proposal: Cecil suggests as to the extent of the obligation which means war if it means anything. Wilson thinks the words add little to the implied obligation of the whole Covenant. 81

Miller, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 70-71.

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Orlando supports the Article. Larnaude thinks it imports only a principle. Wilson thinks the obligation is central but recognizes its serious character. Smuts thinks it goes further than anything else in the document. Wilson thinks a matter of right can go through the Senate. He thinks there must be a provision that we mean business and not only discussion. This idea, not necessarily these words, is the key to the whole Covenant. Vesnitch: He speaks of the psychological and political effect of the provision which he supports. Cecil thinks that things are being put in which cannot be carried out literally and in all respects.82 From then until the final adoption of the Covenant, the wording of what became Article 10 did not undergo any important modifications. In spite of the misgivings of the British who, doubtless to placate President Wilson, had embodied his idea with some qualifications in their draft of January 20, 1919, 83 and of several of President Wilson's own advisers, the principle of the mutual guarantee of territorial integrity and political independence was maintained. President Wilson could rightly argue that it was already agreed to in the pre-Armistice acceptance of the Fourteen Points. As for the French, the Italians and other Continental victors, they could but welcome a provision which in fact went much further than even any of their own suggestions towards the creation of an active international solidarity for the mutual protection of all by all. If every member of the League was to be pledged not only to respect, but also to preserve as against external aggression, the territorial integrity of each of his fellow-members, and if no pacific method for the alteration of frontiers had been expressly provided for, the result would have been an obviously impossible perpetuation of the status quo. Therefore Colonel 82

Op. cit., vol. I, pp. 168-169.

83

Ibid., vol. II, pp. 106-107.

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House, while embodying the favorite idea of his chief in his first draft, had added to the guarantee the saving clause: subject, however, to such territorial modifications, if any, as may become necessary in the future by reason of changes in present racial conditions and aspirations, pursuant to the principle of self-determination and as shall also be regarded by three fourths of the Delegates as necessary and proper for the welfare of the peoples concerned; recognizing also that all territorial changes involve equitable compensation and that the peace of the world is superior in importance and interest to questions of boundary. 84 T o explain this clause, Colonel House wrote: . . . it would not do to have the territorial guarantees inflexible. It is quite conceivable that conditions might so change in the course of time as to make it a serious hardship for certain portions of one nation to continue under the government of that nation. 85 President Wilson had in his successive drafts adopted the same reservation, while slightly modifying Colonel House's formulation. The British delegation in Paris and in particular Lord Robert Cecil, whose misgivings about this guarantee we have already noted, seem, in the course of a few days, several times to have changed their minds about the most expedient way of dealing with this troublesome matter. They first proposed to separate the guarantee from its qualifying clauses. In their draft convention of January 20, 1 9 1 9 , they proposed, after having adopted the Wilsonian guarantee as one of the fundamental duties to be placed upon the High Contracting Parties under Article 1 (i), (ii), to insert a distinct clause in Article 2 to the following effect: If at any time it should appear that the boundaries of any State guaranteed by Article 1 (i), (ii) do not conform to the requirements of the situation, the League shall take the matter under consideration and may recommend to the parties affected any modification which 84 86

Ibid., vol. II, p. 10. Seymour, op. cit., vol. IV, p. 35.

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it may think necessary. If such recommendation is rejected by the parties affected, the States members of the League, shall, so far as the territory in question is concerned, cease to be under the obligation to protect the territory in question from forcible aggression by other States. . . . 8e T h e n , in the Cecil-Miller d r a f t of J a n u a r y 27, 1 9 1 9 , the guarantee and the q u a l i f y i n g clause were again reunited in one and the same article. 8 7

Finally, on F e b r u a r y 1, 1919, on the

eve of the first meeting of the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s Commission, the British legal expert, w h o was to prepare a joint d r a f t with M r . Miller, proposed the total elimination of the q u a l i f y i n g clauses. T o this M r . Miller, w h o disliked these clauses almost as much as the guarantee itself, promptly agreed. 8 8 T h u s the d r a f t Covenant which came before the Commission at its first meeting of F e b r u a r y 3, 1 9 1 9 , contained no other reference to this whole matter than w h a t was said in its Article 7, worded as follows: The High Contracting Parties undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all States members of the League. 89 W h e n , on F e b r u a r y 6, this provision came to be discussed, L o r d R o b e r t Cecil moved to delete the words " a n d preserve as against external aggression."

B e a t e n on this point, he sub-

mitted a proposal to the effect that The Body of Delegates shall make provision for the periodic revision of treaties which have become obsolete and of international conditions, the continuance of which may endanger the (peace of the) world. 90 T h i s provision, which was adopted without much further discussion, became Article 19 of the final C o v e n a n t relating, Miller, op. cit., vol. II, pp. 106-107, 1 1 7 - 1 1 9 . Ibid., vol. II, p. 134. s6Ibid., vol. I, p. 71. 89 Ibid., vol. II, p. 233. 00 Ibid., vol. II, pp. 264, 288-289, 316· 88

87

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in terms which have made it impossible of practical application, to the peaceful revision of treaties. Thus ends the strange story of President Wilson's endeavors to endow the League of Nations with a clearly formulated principle of collective security. The story is both strange and tragic, because it was the most exclusively American provision of the whole Covenant which was to constitute the principal objection of the American Senate to the League itself. And it is strange and tragic also because the objection was foreseen and indeed shared by President Wilson's closest advisers, who unsuccessfully sought to guard him against it. A little less haste and confusion in the final stages of the drafting of the Covenant might perhaps have saved the League from the greatest blow it has sustained through American abstention, and the world from the consequent loss of what would otherwise have been an infinitely more effective shield against the onslaughts of war. The reserve with which the British delegates from the start received President Wilson's suggestions of mutual guarantees of territorial integrity did not indicate any general hostility to the idea of collective security. What they objected to in the American proposal was less its boldness than its vagueness. They feared not that it would prove too effective, but rather that its very boldness, combined with its indefiniteness, would render it impracticable. That the Phillimore Commission meant business and had no intention of submitting plans for a mere international debating society, is shown both by the terms of their draft convention and by the comments of their interim report. In the latter we read: The primary object of the proposed alliance will be that whatever happens peace shall be preserved between members of the alliance. The secondary object will be the provision of means for disposing of disputes which may arise between the members of the alliance. Our draft treaty, therefore, divides itself into four parts; Articles ι and 2,

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which stand very much by themselves, are to provide for the avoidance of war. . . . T h e mutual covenant not to go to war is contained in Article 1. . . . Article 2 contains the sanction proposed. W e have desired to make it as weighty as possible. W e have, therefore, made it unanimous and automatic, and one to which each State must contribute its force without waiting for the others, but we have recognized that some States may not be able to make, at any rate in certain cases, an effective contribution of military or naval force. W e have accordingly provided that such States shall at the least take the financial, economic, and other measures indicated in the Article. 9 1 A l t h o u g h I f u l l y realize the d i s a d v a n t a g e s of e x c e s s i v e q u o t a t i o n , it is n e c e s s a r y to p l a c e b e f o r e t h e r e a d e r the c o m p l e t e t e x t of the s a n c t i o n s a r t i c l e of the P h i l l i m o r e d r a f t . I t is o n l y b y c o m p a r i n g its t e r m s w i t h t h o s e of the w e l l k n o w n p r o v i s i o n s of A r t i c l e 16 of the C o v e n a n t of t h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s t h a t one c a n t r u l y a p p r e c i a t e their d e c i s i v e i n f l u e n c e o n s u b s e q u e n t discussions. A r t i c l e 2 of the P h i l l i m o r e d r a f t r e a d s a s f o l l o w s : If, which may God avert, one of the Allied States should break the covenant contained in the preceding Article, this State will become ipso facto at war with all the other Allied States, and the latter agree to take and to support each other in taking jointly and severally all such measures — military, naval, financial, and economic — as will best avail for restraining the breach of covenant. Such financial and economic measures shall include severance of all relations of trade and finance with the subjects of the covenant-breaking State, prohibition against the subjects of the Allied States entering into any relations with the subjects of the covenant-breaking State, and the prevention, so far as possible, of the subjects of the covenant-breaking State from having any commercial or financial intercourse with the subjects of any other State, whether party to this Convention or not. For the purpose of this Article, the Allied States shall detain any ship or goods belonging to any of the subjects of the covenant-breaking State or coming from or destined for any person residing in the territory of such state and shall take any other similar steps which shall be necessary for the same purpose. 91

Miller, op. cit., vol. I, pp. 4 et seq.

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Such of the Allied States (if any) as cannot make an effective contribution of military or naval force shall at the least take the other measures indicated in this Article. 92 In Colonel House's draft, which, as we have seen, was directly inspired b y the Phillimore model, the provisions on sanctions were appreciably toned down and all reference to the use of military force was omitted. President Wilson, however, in his first draft, added to Colonel House's proposed economic sanctions a reference to the use of military force in so far as it might be necessary to enforce the suggested blockade. Further, when he arrived in Europe and took cognizance of the d r a f t prepared b y General Smuts, he added to his original provisions concerning sanctions those proposed in that draft. A s General Smuts had obviously been guided by the recommendations of the Phillimore Commission and as his particular contribution thereto brought them into still closer analogy with the terms of Article 16 of the present Covenant, it is unnecessary to quote them here. It is interesting to note, however, that when M r . Miller was requested to comment on President Wilson's second draft, he not only declared that the original American proposals had become superfluous in view of the adoption of those of General Smuts, but that the latter appeared entirely unacceptable. H e wrote: A substantial objection to such a provision is that it would be void if contained in a treaty of the United States, as Congress under the Constitution has the power to declare war. A war automatically arising upon a condition subsequent, pursuant to a treaty provision, is not a war declared by Congress.93 Accordingly M r . Miller proposed that the relevant words President Wilson had taken over from General Smuts, to the effect that a covenant-breaking State would "ipso facto become at war with all the members of the L e a g u e , " be modified so as to read that a breach of the Covenant "shall constitute and 92 03

Ibid., vol. II, pp. 3-4. Ibid., vol. II, p. 80.

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be deemed an act hostile to all other contracting Powers." Mr. Miller's constitutional point was obviously well taken and his suggestion was not lost sight of in the final drafting of Article 16. While thus the two principal British drafts, that of the Phillimore Commission and that of General Smuts, were endowed with more and sharper "teeth" than the first American proposals, the suggestions of the French Commission were practically all "teeth." Of the five chapters of which it was composed, one was entitled "diplomatic, legal and economic sanctions" and another "military sanctions," while the three others, dealing with the structure and functions of the League, also contained many references to its coercive duties. The sanctions provided for were to be not only preventive, but punitive. And they were to be applied not only to the aggressor State itself, but also to its nationals. A permanent international staff was to be set up in time of peace and charged with the duty of organizing an international army and of inspecting the national contingents of which it was to be composed. If and when it became necessary to mobilize this army, it was to be placed under the orders of a commanderin-chief appointed by the International Body responsible for the government of the League. Thus while for reasons of political opportunism, no doubt, the Commission presided over by M. Leon Bourgeois expressly repudiated, as we have seen, any intention of creating a superState or even a confederation, it did, in fact, in its military proposals, postulate the existence of such a body. Although the French draft was not discussed in detail by the Commission of the League of Nations, M. Leon Bourgeois devoted the larger part of his diplomatic endeavors, which were pertinacious, and of his eloquence, which was inexhaustible, to winning over his colleagues to his conception of a coercive and punitive peace-enforcing league. He received a certain

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measure of verbal satisfaction.

B u t as the British and the

Americans were determined not to be drawn into what might have become a permanent military alliance, and as he himself was only formally supported in his demands b y M . Clemenceau, he had to rest content with the immortality of which his oratorical efforts assured him through the publication of

his

speeches. Although it was obvious that the state of mind prevailing at the Peace Conference did not allow for the realization of his military plans, no more than his own professed conception of the intangibility of the dogma of national sovereignty, we m a y in our own modest measure contribute to that immortality b y quoting a paragraph from the last impassioned and sadly timely oration he delivered at the plenary session of April 28, 1919. H e then declared: What we would most fear is that our international institution should one day appear ineffective and impotent. It is impossible to judge it fairly at the present minute. Today the League of Nations is the hope and the desire of all generous spirits. Today all hearts beat with indignation at the horrible sight of the unprecedented and merciless war which is just ending. One can say that, on all points of the globe, the human soul aspires to the certainty that such horrors may never be renewed. For those who would mightily arm the tutelary institution to which we are confiding the defence of civilization, the present moment is therefore propitious. But the generations which will follow us and which will not have witnessed the atrocious sufferings from which a part of mankind is only just emerging will be less sensitive than we are ourselves. The idea of war will perhaps not be as odious to them who, not having experienced its frightful disasters, may again be allured by ideas of ambition, conquest and glory; it is then that the danger can again arise and a new catastrophe descend upon mankind. Let us not forget that any conflict between two states, breaking out on any point of the globe, is henceforth likely to spread as the last war to all and thereby to endanger the whole world. What a responsibility would be ours, as authors of the new Magna Carta, if by some lack of caution, by failing to provide for some readily

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created guarantees, by refusing to consent to some sacrifices, we had increased by however little the risk of such a catastrophe! 94 D.

Disarmament

The last of the three principal methods for the organization of peace to be considered at the Paris Peace Conference was that of a general reduction and limitation of national armaments to which, for brevity's sake, I shall henceforth refer by the improper, but convenient term of disarmament. It proved to be by far the most difficult to apply and indeed to define. B y accepting the Fourteen Points as the basis of the peace, the belligerents had pledged themselves to give and to take adequate guarantees that national armaments would "be reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic safety." The latter term had, with President Wilson's approval, been interpreted to imply "not only internal policing, but the protection of territory against invasion." 95 President Wilson, when consulted by Colonel House in October 1918, also agreed that "what guarantees should be given and taken, or what are to be the standards of judgment have never been determined." When he arrived in London, Mr. Lloyd George questioned him about his views on this matter. Reporting the conversation to his colleagues of the Imperial Cabinet, the British Premier said that the President, while urging "that a definite decision should be arrived at before the Conference separated, and before the League of Nations was actually constituted," had "admitted, however, that the intricate problems involved in relative disarmament all round could not be settled during the Conference." 96 And well might he make this admission! The fundamental facts of the situation were, briefly recalled, the following: The war had been won by the Allies, on land, thanks to the " ' M i l l e r , op. cit., vol. I I , pp. 7 1 1 - 7 1 2 . oä S e y m o u r , op. cit., vol. I V , pp. 157 et seq., 200. 96 L l o y d George, The Truth etc., op. cit., v o l . I, p. 186.

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combination of the French, the British and the American armies, and on the sea, thanks to the supremacy of the British navy. The British and Americans were equally impatient to demobilize their armies. The French would therefore shortly be left en tete-a-tete with the Germans, whose numbers were almost twice their own, whose industrial equipment was far greater than theirs, whose spirit was bound to be vindictive and whose presence on the French frontier could not therefore be looked upon otherwise than as a terrible potential threat. While the French were therefore insistent on military alliances, strategic frontiers and as complete and as lasting a disarmament of Germany as was practicable, they could not be expected to be equally eager to disarm themselves. Nor could the British, who had just once more owed their national salvation to their mighty navy, be expected lightheartedly to scrap it or to reduce it to a level similar to that of their defeated foes. And still a unilateral disarmament of Germany was neither what the Fourteen Points called for, nor what common sense and common foresight could contemplate as a lasting regime and as a possible basis for organized peace. What, then, could be done? The Phillimore draft had been mute on the subject of disarmament. And the Bourgeois proposals contained no more than a laconic statement to the effect that "the question of the limitation of armaments in each of the member states (of the League) will be dealt with in a special chapter." Colonel House had inserted in his proposals an article 21 which was worded as follows: The Contracting Powers recognize the principle that permanent peace will require that national armaments shall be reduced to the lowest point consistent with safety, and the Delegates are directed to formulate at once a plan by which such a reduction may be brought about. The plan so formulated shall not be binding until and unless unanimously approved by the Governments signatory to this Covenant.

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The Contracting Powers agree that munitions and implements of war shall not be manufactured by private enterprise and that publicity as to all national armaments and programmes is essential.97 President Wilson had taken over these provisions in his first draft with minor verbal amendments and with one substantive addition. National armaments, he held, were to be reduced to the lowest point consistent not "with s a f e t y , " but "with domestic safety and the enforcement b y common action of international obligations." In this matter as in that of the mutual guarantee of territorial integrity, the Americans were therefore pioneering. The first ally they found in Europe was, characteristically enough, not a European but a South African. General Smuts, in his Practical Suggestion, had dealt at length with the topic of disarmament, of which he declared that it "bristled with difficulties." A s a possible solution or at least as positive recommendations, he submitted "the abolition of conscription or compulsory military service," the fixing b y the Council of the League of the numbers, training and armament of each national army, the nationalization of "all factories for the manufacture of direct weapons," and the supervision over the international traffic in munitions of war b y the Council of the League. 9 8 President Wilson added these suggestions to his own in his Paris drafts, which provided that the decision of the Council on national armaments should be binding only when approved b y the governments signatory to the Covenant. W h e n these proposals came to be discussed in the League of Nations Commission of the Peace Conference, they gave rise to the most animated and prolonged debates. Neither France nor I t a l y would hear of the abolition of conscription, which M . Bourgeois defended on grounds of democracy and Signor Orlando on grounds of economy. T h e relevant clauses were •"Miller, op. cit., vol. II, p. 10. "Ibid., vol II, p. 52.

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consequently deleted. On the other hand, President Wilson would no more hear of the organization of an international army, which M . Bourgeois repeatedly urged in connection with the military clauses of the Covenant. Articles 8 and 9, which finally emerged in their present form, after having given rise to more oratory perhaps than any other, do no more than enunciate a few abstract propositions and l a y down a program for future action. T h e members of the League recognize, in language clearly reminiscent of the first Wilsonian draft, " t h a t the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement b y common action of international obligations." T h e y also "agree that the manufacture b y private enterprise of munitions and implements of war is open to grave objections," and "undertake to interchange full and frank information as to the scale of their armaments." A s for actual disarmament, nothing is provided for except that the Council, taking account "of the geographical situation and circumstances of each State, shall formulate plans for such reduction for the consideration and action of the several Governments." M u c h more important than the establishment of this very modest program was the effective disarmament of Germany and the moral and political responsibility it laid upon the League of Nations. W h e n the German delegation in Versailles protested against this unilateral treatment of what, under Point Four of the Fourteen Points, was a general problem, the Council of Four, as M r . L l o y d George recalls, officially replied: The Allied and Associated Powers . . . recognise that the acceptance by Germany of the terms laid down for her own disarmament will facilitate and hasten the accomplishment of a general reduction of armaments; and they intend to open negotiations immediately with a view to the eventual adoption of a scheme of such general reduction." 89

Lloyd George, The Truth etc., op. cit., vol. I, p. 602.

QUEST FOR PEACE A T PEACE CONFERENCE Unfortunately this accomplishment, to which public in many countries was perhaps more attached than other item on the agenda of organized peace, was of activities of the League the most delayed and of all its the most resounding. E.

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opinion to any all the failures

Conclusion

In spite of all concessions, equivocations and disappointments to which the drafting of the Covenant gave rise at the Peace Conference, the creation, in 1919, by the concurrent will of all the world's major governments, of a League of Nations committed to the organization and maintenance of peace was an event of the first historical magnitude. Its significance was far greater by reason of the unprecedented opportunities it presented for the future prosecution of the quest for peace, than by reason of the immediate security it offered its member States. W e have now to see how European statesmanship availed itself of these opportunities in the course of the two decades which followed the coming into force of the Covenant on January 10, 1920.

3- Twenty Y e a r s of Arbitration I. THE POST-WAR ATMOSPHERE IN EUROPE

W E HAVE S E E N , THUS F A R , F I R S T HOW T H E I D E A L of an organized peace gradually, painfully, most imperfectly, but still really emerged from the terrible years of the World War. And then how no less painfully and imperfectly, but still no less truly, that ideal was translated into rules of positive law during the hardly less terrible months of the Peace Conference. We have now, against this double background, to consider in what directions, by what methods and with what measure of success the quest for organized peace was pursued during the following two decades. While the days of the Armistice were a period of blind and boisterous enthusiasm in the Allied and Associated countries, of frantic internal strife and bitter humiliation for their defeated foes, and of wild excitement everywhere, the atmosphere on the morrow of the peace negotiations was very different. In the Allied and Associated countries, the enthusiasm of victory had soon spent itself. The feelings of mutual confidence, comradeship and gratitude which, while never without reserve, had dominated the soldiers on the front and the masses at home during the brief summer months of triumphant strategic advance in 1918, had given way to recrimination and disappointment. The Americans felt exploited and misunderstood. The French, abandoned and almost betrayed. The

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13 5

British, impatient to return to their imperial interests, to restore their shattered commercial and financial supremacy and to reestablish normal relations with their former enemies. The Italians, the Belgians and the other victors, none of whom had achieved all their national aims, all had grievances which led them to forget or, in any case, to minimize the value of the fruits of their common victory. Whereas the victors were disappointed in each other and disillusioned over their common achievements, their defeated foes were naturally still more bitter.

For the Germans, the

blow was bound to be crushing. Had not their leading thinkers long taught them that might alone created right? H a d they not been educated to believe their emperor supreme and their armies invincible?

Had they not in the end, while their un-

beaten regiments were still occupying enemy territory, given up everything, not excluding their sovereign and their traditional institutions, to secure tolerable peace terms? And now they were obliged to submit to the vindictive exigencies of a merciless foe. T h e y felt duped by their victors, who had respected neither the spirit nor the letter of the Fourteen Points.

T h e y felt duped by their former rulers who, in

spite of all the freely made sacrifices of blood, treasure and even of personal dignity, had not spared them the humiliation of defeat. And they felt duped by their philosophers, according to whose traditional teachings it was the enemy and not the German people who were right, since it was the enemy and not the German people whose might had prevailed. Therefore, either their own burning sense of injustice was unjustified, or they had always been misled in their ways of thinking. Such were the moral foundations upon which the newly established German Republic rested.

Is it very surprising that it

did not well bear the strain of the subsequent years?

Who

could expect the German people indefinitely to resist the temptation to tear up the peace treaty to which they had subscribed under such conditions?

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It was not, however, the German, it was the American people who dealt the peace structure of Versailles the first of the many blows it has sustained in the last score of years.

B y refusing

to ratify the Peace Treaty, the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Tripartite Agreement which France had reluctantly

accepted in lieu of territorial guarantees on the

Rhine, the Senate of the United States revived all the forces of European nationalism which President Wilson had sought to appease by harnessing them to the chariot of the international community. On the League of Nations, the abstention of the United States, to which Europe was not yet definitely resigned by the end of 1 9 2 0 , was to exercise a particularly dissolving and paralyzing influence. In our previous chapter, we have seen in what sense and to what degree the Geneva institution was the personal child of President Wilson. It would have been bad enough if France or Great Britain, even if Italy or Japan, had repudiated the Covenant immediately after their statesmen had helped to draft it. It was infinitely worse when Washington said no to what London, Paris, Rome and T o k y o had said yes, mainly in the hope of thereby pleasing Washington. N o symphonic concert can be a complete success if, just before it opens, some of the violinists, or of the trumpeters, or even of the flutists, go on strike. But when the composer himself, who was to conduct the orchestra, is suddenly prevented from appearing, it takes some courage not to call off the performance. The Geneva concert was not called off, even after it had become obvious that the American composer-conductor would never again compose or conduct. But the program had to be shortened and altered. In our previous chapter we have seen the origins of the three principal numbers of the Paris peace program. Our next three chapters will be devoted each to the execution of one of these numbers.

I shall deal first with the peaceful settlement of

international disputes, which, of the three topics to be con-

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sidered, was certainly the least affected by the absence of the United States. As I have shown, throughout the war and the Peace Conference, America had displayed less interest in arbitration than in collective security and in disarmament. As we shall see presently, American cooperation was not to prove indispensable in the construction of institutions and the adoption of methods and procedures intended to perfect and to supplement those provided in the Covenant for the pacific settlement of international conflicts. II. T H E P E R M A N E N T COURT OF INTERNATIONAL J U S T I C E

Considering first the measures by which the League of Nations sought to complete those institutions, methods and procedures, we are immediately faced with the problem of the World Court. The framers of the Covenant had decided that a Permanent Court of International Justice was to be set up according to plans to be formulated by the Council and submitted to the Members of the League of Nations for adoption. The Court, they had further provided by the terms of Article 14, was to "be competent to hear and determine any dispute of an international character which the Parties thereto submit to it." It might "also give an advisory opinion upon any dispute or question referred to it by the Council or by the Assembly." The League of Nations came into legal existence on January 10, 1920, with the entering into force of the Treaty of Versailles. Six days later, the Council met for the first time in Paris under the chairmanship of M. Leon Bourgeois. In opening the session, this veteran French statesman, having declared that "January 16, 1920, will go down to history as the date of the birth of the new world," proceeded to define the tasks of the League. First among them he placed "the definite foundation of international justice." 1 At its second session, in London, on February 1 3 , 1920, 1

League of Nations, Official Journal, Number 1, 1920, pp. 18 et seq.

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE M . Leon Bourgeois, w h o as w e h a v e seen w a s the real father of the idea of an international tribunal, presented to his colleagues a report on the organization of the Permanent C o u r t of International Justice. H e said: The League of Nations, like a group of individuals, can only exist if the rights of each member are scrupulously respected. Its aim is to establish a reign of Justice in a world which has been convulsed by the most murderous of wars; the League must be founded on Justice. If Justice is to reign, it must have a permanent instrument to its hand — it must take some tangible form which will make its existence felt among the peoples and give the support of its powerful, impartial and supreme authority to those whose weakness is only too often undefended. In each State private individuals know where to find judges to whom they can submit their grievances, and who will settle justly the questions on which there is conflict. In addition to national Courts of Law, whose duty it is to administer the laws of each State within its territorial limits, there is room for an international tribunal entrusted with the important task of administering international law and enforcing among the nations the cuique suum which is the law which governs human intercourse. This international tribunal will take the form of a Permanent Court of International Justice, the early establishment of which is provided for in the Covenant. 2 M . Bourgeois proposed that the task of formulating the plans for the organization of the C o u r t be entrusted to a group of jurists drawn f r o m various countries and including M r . Elihu Root.

T h i s proposal having been approved, the

selected jurists met at T h e H a g u e on June 16, 1920, and a f t e r six weeks of discussion produced a " d r a f t s c h e m e " in sixtytwo articles. 3 T o analyze this scheme here is as impossible as it would be superfluous for our purposes. W h a t we are most interested in is to determine the place which, in the opinion of the Committee, the Permanent C o u r t w a s to occupy in the general League of Nations, Official Journal, T h e minutes of their meetings are titled: Permanent C o u r t of International Proces-verbaux of the Proceedings of the 2 3

N u m b e r 2, 1920, published in an Justice, A d v i s o r y Committee, The

p. 33. official document enC o m m i t t e e of Jurists, H a g u e , 1920.

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quest for peace in which the League of Nations was engaged. The Covenant provided that all conflicts between Member States which diplomacy had failed to settle were to be submitted either to arbitration or, if one of the parties or both refused arbitration, to the Council. What was to be the position and what the functions of the Court in the League machinery for the pacific settlement of disputes? Was it merely to offer a third possibility to the contestants who, fearing both the uncertainties of arbitration and the possibly capricious rulings of the Council, would prefer the judgment of a legal court? Or was it to receive compulsory jurisdiction for all or for certain specified disputes? If so, was it to be the sole judge of its own competence or the servant of the Council ? The issues thus raised were of the greatest possible importance. If the Permanent Court of International Justice was to be endowed with compulsory jurisdiction over all such cases as, on the application of one of the contestants, it deemed justiciable, the whole character of the League would be altered. The range of permissible war would be appreciably narrowed and that of automatic sanctions correspondingly extended. The Court might thus become the principal organ of the League and the final arbiter of peace and war. When, on June 16, 1920, M. Leon Bourgeois addressed the Committee of Jurists on behalf of the Council at their opening meeting, his eloquent speech showed that he was fully aware of the crucial nature of these fundamental questions. He was, however, reluctant definitely to answer them. On the one hand, he emphasized the importance of the task of the Committee and urged its members to assume it boldly. On the other, he uttered certain words of caution pointing to the limitations implied in the Covenant itself and to undefined possibilities of future development. His personal opinions were probably favorable to the most ambitious solutions, whereas in his capacity of representative of the Council and of his Government, he felt obliged somewhat to temper his hopes and to

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T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

subdue the enthusiasm of his hearers. Expressly raising the question of the probable limits of the competence of the future Court, to whose creation he had so effectively contributed ever since the First Hague Conference, he declared: On this last point the Covenant itself and the different treaties which have been lately signed not only give you a certain number of indications, but bring you precise decisions, and if some of the dispositions of these treaties and of the Covenant appear to you to imply regrettable restrictions, it must not be forgotten that without necessarily envisaging any amendment of the Covenant, the Council and the Assembly, inspired by your labours and in virtue of Articles 12 and 15, can considerably increase the field of activity of the Court. . . . It is fair to say that progress in normal life, in the interior of States, has always followed an enlargement of the domain of judicial authority, and it is for that reason that the independence of the judicial authority vis-ä-vis the political power appears more and more one of the essential guarantees of liberty and internal peace. Gentlemen, we can foresee then that it will be the same in the case of States themselves. They have up to now one towards another uncertain modes of contact, the nature of which is badly defined, the laws of which are still at the mercy of endless differences of opinion, or of arbitrary chance, just as it was between the citizens of each country in the first ages of civilisation. The precise object of the League of Nations is just this new and more complete definition of the largest possible number of relations between States, in such a way as to give an always increasing competence to the supreme power of justice. I know that, in the minds of certain people, the view is that what must be organised before everything is international justice itself. There are no real opponents of the project of setting up a Court of Justice, but there are certain eminent jurists who would prefer to reserve, until some fresh arrangement, the organisation of the League of Nations specially so-called. May I be permitted to say why the Council of the League of Nations consider the two institutions as complementary the one to the other, as of necessity being organised at the same time and as being unable, as long as they wish to preserve their existence, to do without each other? . . . You are about, Gentlemen, to give life to the judicial power of humanity. Philosophers and historians have told us of the laws of

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the growth and decadence of Empires. We look to you, Gentlemen, for laws which will assure the perpetuity of the only empire which can show no decadence, the empire of justice, which is the expression of eternal truth. 4 A s was foreshadowed already in the opening address of the Belgian B a r o n Descamps, w h o had been entrusted with the chairmanship of the Committee, the question of the jurisdiction of the Court w a s to be the most important of all those which were to be discussed and answered. H a v i n g recalled the efforts made in the past in favor of the compulsory arbitration of international disputes, and a f t e r expressly alluding to the letter addressed b y M r . Elihu Root, on M a r c h 29, 1919» to the N a tional Republican Committee, in which the principle thereof was approved and recommended, B a r o n D e s c a m p s continued: The Committee of Jurists, entrusted with the preparation of a plan for a Permanent Court of International Justice, fully realises the great difficulties which are attached to a task in the accomplishment of which numbers of statesmen and jurists have failed since the Conference of 1907. Inspired, however, by the urgency and grandeur of the work to be accomplished, it will undertake the task, hoping to profit by the obstacles experienced in the past many of which have not yet disappeared, and to see in them, not a reason to doubt an ultimate successful solution but a method of reaching it. 5 Of its thirty-one sittings, the Committee devoted the

first

eight and an appreciable part of the others to a discussion of the composition of the Court and of the mode of election of the judges. I mention the fact only because of the relations existing between these administrative matters and the Court's compulsory or optional jurisdiction. I t v e r y soon became apparent that the Committee w a s overwhelmingly and perhaps unanimously in favor of the more ambitious solution.

B u t , declared L o r d

Phillimore, the British expert on the Committee, this implied as a necessary consequence that the Great Powers should al4 Ibid., pp. 7 et seq. 'Ibid., p. 18.

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w a y s be represented on the bench. H i s argument, stated in his own words, w a s the following: . . . the Committee's task is to prepare plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of Justice which should be a Court of Justice in the true sense of the word, a Court before which it should be possible to call States having broken the law of Nations, without having to obtain their consent in advance. From the principle so stated, there arose two essential consequences: 1. It is necessary to have good judges; . . . 2. The Court must have behind it a material force to ensure the execution of its decisions. Governments must not be able to evade complying with the judgments of the Court. With this in view the Court must be so constructed that it includes representatives of the 'Great Powers,' an expression to which Lord Phillimore gave at the moment only the common and narrow meaning of the word, — States of large territory and great population. If the Court did not include representatives of these among its members, it would lack what in England is called 'back-bone.' β I t was to reconcile this demand with the principle of the equality of States that M r . E l i h u R o o t w a s led to propose the election of judges b y the concurrent vote of the A s s e m b l y and of the Council of the L e a g u e .

I t is interesting to recall that

this h a p p y solution was suggested to him b y an American precedent.

O n June 18, at the same meeting at which L o r d

Phillimore had put forward his claim on behalf of the G r e a t Powers, M r . R o o t declared that the United States had found itself in 1787 confronted by a problem exactly analogous to that which the Committee now had to solve. The larger and more populous States were not disposed to accept the principle of equality, while the small States did not wish to recognise the supremacy which was due to the great States by reason of their importance and of their wealth. The way out of the difficulty was by creating two chambers, the composition of one based on the principle of equality of States and the other on the population. 7 "Ibid.,

pp. 104-105.

''Ibid.,

p.

108.

T W E N T Y Y E A R S OF A R B I T R A T I O N

143

A s is well known, M r . R o o t ' s ingenious suggestion prevailed and enabled the L e a g u e to overcome w h a t had heretofore proved an insuperable obstacle to the constitution of an international court. T h u s not only the L e a g u e itself, but also its Permanent C o u r t of International J u s t i c e owe their essential elements and perhaps their existence to A m e r i c a n influence. A f t e r the first tentative decisions had been reached on these matters of organization, the Committee tackled the v i t a l question as to whether the jurisdiction of the C o u r t should be rendered compulsory or whether it should depend on the concurrent will of the contestants.

T h e r e w a s , a s a f o r e s a i d , unanimity

among its members as to the desirability of the f o r m e r solution. A g a i n no one stressed the importance of substituting impartial l a w f o r political expediency, that is the C o u r t f o r the Council, in the promotion of peace through justice, more strongly than the A m e r i c a n member. On J u n e 26, 1 9 2 0 , M r . E l i h u R o o t declared : Articles 12 and 1 3 of the Covenant create the obligation for Members of the League to submit their disputes to trial or to the Council. The Council is not under the honourable obligation to apply principles of law; it follows rather the principles of political expediency. These principles are not suitable for the settlement of differences of a legal nature. However, the choice between a judicial settlement and a political settlement of the dispute should not be given to a nation which had injured another. The hopes of the world rested upon the realisation of the rule of law. The creation of institutions with this object contains the germ of future development. Legal decisions based on previous decisions of the same kind, it is this way that progress is possible. The world would become accustomed to act according to law. This does not apply to decisions taken by the Council. The Committee therefore should try to induce the nations to agree to a provision by which every question relating to the interpretation of a contract or a principle of law must be settled by judicial means; the choice between a judicial procedure and the decision of the Council should only be possible in cases of a political nature. This disposition should be accompanied by a recommendation to the Council and to the Assembly to the effect that the work of the Hague Peace Conferences should be continued with the least possible delay. A new

144

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

Conference on international law should be called together as soon as possible; it would have the task of examining what actually are the rules of international law. The Conference should meet periodically. If this idea could be realised, the Court would apply not only general principles but positive law; the Committee would have created an institution whose value would increase more and more throughout the centuries. The decision of the Court would act as a brake upon the uncontrolled use of political powers; it is just this point which makes so singularly important the development of justice and its coming as the principle which must govern the activity of men.8 Whereas, however, all the members of the Committee were agreed on the aim to be pursued, there was considerable divergence as to method. T h e more conservative members, of whom M r . Adatci, of Japan, was perhaps the most definite on this point, were of the opinion that the principle of compulsory arbitration was not only not provided for, but had been deliberately put aside b y the framers of the Covenant. Therefore the Committee, under its terms of reference, was bound to base the competence of the Court on the agreement of the parties. T h e opposite view was held b y several other members, of whom M r . Loder, of the Netherlands, was the most outspoken. In a note he presented on June 29, he explained that the very fact that the authors of the Covenant provided for a court of justice while recognizing the existence and legitimacy of organs of arbitration, implied their acceptance of the principle of compulsory jurisdiction. H e declared: The difference between arbitration and justice is not to be found in the nature of the decision rendered. In both, law and equity may be protected. . . . But in arbitration the consent of the opposing party is necessary before justice can be done; his concurrence on the definition of the disputed point is necessary, as well as his agreement to the choice of judges which he may rule out if by chance they do not please him. Arbitration means a combat before the combat. The Covenant did not intend to abolish arbitration, but it wished to place beside it a Court of Justice. 8Ibid.,

p. 230.

T W E N T Y Y E A R S OF A R B I T R A T I O N

145

T h e latter must be permanent, it must be open to all who present themselves before it for a decision in all cases which come within the bounds of its competence. T h e gracious consent of the adversary is no longer required: one can do without him. 9 A s , in spite of t h e s e c o n f l i c t i n g i n t e r p r e t a t i o n s of t h e C o v e n a n t , all the m e m b e r s of t h e C o m m i t t e e w i s h e d to a t t a i n the s a m e e n d , t h e y w e r e h a p p y to a c c e p t a n i n g e n i o u s proposed b y Lord Phillimore.

solution

In submitting a draft according

to w h i c h all S t a t e s a d h e r i n g to t h e S t a t u t e of the C o u r t " s h a l l b e d e e m e d to h a v e a g r e e d " t o its c o m p u l s o r y j u r i s d i c t i o n in l e g a l m a t t e r s , h e e x p l a i n e d his p r o p o s a l in a b r i e f note in w h i c h he wrote: In my view, and that, I think, of most of my Colleagues, no power is given to the Court by Article 14, unless the parties submit the dispute to it. Even if they were bound (which I doubt) to submit any dispute to the Court (except those provided in the Treaties of Versailles) unless, in fact, they submit, there would be no jurisdiction. B u t the Court can only be established by a Convention, to which the Members of the League must be parties, and b y that Convention they can give the Court any jurisdiction which they please, though it was not given by the original Covenant. 1 0 I t is on this c o m p r o m i s e t h a t the solution r e c o m m e n d e d b y the u n a n i m o u s C o m m i t t e e of J u r i s t s f i n a l l y rested.

It could

n o t b e m o r e c o n c i s e l y nor m o r e c l e a r l y s u m m a r i z e d t h a n in t h e w o r d s of the final r e p o r t to t h e e f f e c t t h a t : There is no question of binding States to submit to arbitration without their consent. T h e competence of arbitral jurisdiction is dependent upon the existence of a convention. In this case the convention establishing compulsory arbitration is the constituent Statute of the Court. 1 1 A c c o r d i n g l y , the C o m m i t t e e i n c l u d e d i n its d r a f t s c h e m e the following two articles: 9

Ibid.., p. 250. p. 252. Ibid., p. 727.

10Ibid., 11

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T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

Article 33. When a dispute has arisen between States, and it has been found impossible to settle it by diplomatic means, and no agreement has been made to choose another jurisdiction, the party complaining may bring the case before the Court. The Court shall, first of all, decide whether the preceding conditions have been complied with; if so, it shall hear and determine the dispute according to the terms and within the limits of the next Article. Article 34. Between States which are Members of the League of Nations, the Court shall have jurisdiction (and this without any special convention giving it jurisdiction) to hear and determine cases of a legal nature, concerning: a. the interpretation of a treaty; b. any question of international law; c. the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation; d. the nature or extent of reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation; e. the interpretation of a sentence passed by the Court. The Court shall also take cognisance of all disputes of any kind which may be submitted to it by a general or particular convention between the parties. In the event of a dispute as to whether a certain case comes within any of the categories above mentioned, the matter shall be settled by the decision of the Court. 12 H a d the solution thus recommended b y the Committee of Jurists finally prevailed, the Permanent C o u r t of International Justice would have become b y f a r the most important part of the L e a g u e machinery for the pacific settlement of international disputes. T h e frontiers of international law and order would have been greatly extended and those of international politics and disorder correspondingly narrowed.

B u t it w a s

not to be. W h e n the Council received the recommendations of its advisory Committee, it circulated them to all the States M e m b e r s of the L e a g u e for their information. 1 3 12 13

Ibid., pp. 679-680. League of Nations,,

Official

Journal,

A l t h o u g h the replies

N u m b e r 6, 1920, pp. 318 et

seq.

T W E N T Y Y E A R S OF A R B I T R A T I O N

147

received were not published, some at least m u s t h a v e critical.

been

I n a n y c a s e , w h e n M . L e o n B o u r g e o i s p r e s e n t e d his

r e p o r t to the C o u n c i l , on O c t o b e r 2 7 , 1920, h e s i n g l e d o u t t h e p r o v i s i o n s r e l a t i n g to t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of t h e C o u r t as b e i n g i n c o m p a t i b l e w i t h the C o v e n a n t a n d , i n c i d e n t a l l y , as t e n d i n g to lessen the C o u n c i l ' s o w n c o m p e t e n c e .

O n his p r o p o s a l , the

C o u n c i l a p p r o v e d a n a m e n d m e n t l i m i t i n g t h e j u r i s d i c t i o n of the C o u r t to c a s e s e x p r e s s l y r e f e r r e d to it b y t h e c o n t e s t a n t s . 1 4 H i s a r g u m e n t s a g a i n s t the p r i n c i p l e of c o m p u l s i o n , w h i c h he h a d h i m s e l f c h a m p i o n e d in 1 9 0 7 , w e r e d o u b t l e s s i n s p i r e d b y the f e a r t h a t c e r t a i n i m p o r t a n t g o v e r n m e n t s , i n c l u d i n g h i s o w n , w o u l d n o t a d h e r e to the S t a t u t e if it w e r e m a i n t a i n e d .

T h i s is

h o w he f o r m u l a t e d his o b j e c t i o n s b e f o r e the C o u n c i l : T h e innovation involved in the Hague Scheme may be summed up as follows: — T h e decision of the Permanent Court is being substituted for the decision which the Council should take on the question whether diplomatic methods of settlement have or have not been exhausted between the two parties before their dispute comes before the Council, and a decision of the Permanent Court is substituted for the free choice allowed to the parties by the Covenant with regard to the question whether they shall lay their dispute before the Court, before another International Tribunal, or before the Council of the League of Nations. This freedom of choice is given to Members of the League of Nations by Article 12 of the Covenant. W e do not think it necessary to discuss here the advantages which would result from the system of compulsory jurisdiction proposed by the Committee of Jurists with regard to the good administration of international justice and the development of the Court's authority. But as in reality a modification in Articles 12 and 13 of the Covenant is here involved, the Council will, no doubt, consider that it is not its duty, at the moment when the General Assembly of the League of Nations is about to meet for the first time, to take the initiative with regard to proposed alterations in the Covenant, whose observance and safe keeping have been entrusted to it. If, on a particular point, whose importance is clear to everyone, it were to propose such alterations, it would also be obliged to express its views with regard to 14

League

of Nations,

Official Journal,

N u m b e r 8, 1920, pp. 12 et seq.

148

T H E QUEST FOR

PEACE

many other alterations in the Covenant, which certain Governments have already stated that they intend to lay before the Assembly. A t the present moment it is most important in the interests of the authority of the League of Nations that differences of opinions should not arise at the very outset with regard to the essential rules laid down in the Covenant of the 28th April, 1919. I propose, therefore, that we should adopt as the starting-point of our subsequent deliberations the following resolutions: — 'Whereas, the text proposed by the Hague Jurists tends to modify the principle which gives to the parties the right to choose between the two alternatives of judicial procedure or appeal to the Council for the settlement of a dispute which has arisen between them; 'Whereas, this would constitute a modification of Article 12 of the Covenant; 'Whereas, at the present time there should be no question of considering modifications to this Covenant, but rather of applying it; 'The Council proposes to substitute in the draft scheme of T h e Hague, in place of Articles 33 and 34, the following Articles: 'Art. 33. — T h e competence of the Court shall be governed by Articles 12, 13 and 14 of the Covenant. 'Art. 34. — Without prejudice to the freedom given b y Article 12 of the Covenant to the parties in a dispute to submit it either to judicial procedure or arbitration or to the consideration of the Council, the Court shall, without a special agreement, deal with disputes whose settlement is entrusted to it, or to the Court established by the League of Nations under the terms of the Treaties now in force. '. . . B y adopting this wording the Council does not in any w a y wish to declare itself opposed to the actual idea of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court in questions of a judicial nature. T h i s is a development of the authority of the Court of Justice which may be extremely useful in effecting the general settlement of disputes between nations, and the Council would certainly have no objection to the consideration of the problem at some future date. In upholding the wording which we have the honour to submit to it, it will confine itself to declaring that at the present time it cannot undertake to propose any modification in the provisions of the Covenant, since such modifications, whatever may be their particular value, can only be introduced without danger when they receive the entirely unanimous approval of the Members of the League of N a t i o n s . ' 1 5 15

Ibid.,

pp. 14-15.

TWENTY YEARS OF ARBITRATION

149

When the First Assembly of the League met, on November 15, 1920, its agenda included an item entitled "plans for the establishment of a Permanent Court of International Justice." The proposals of the Committee of Jurists, as amended by the Council, were referred to and discussed by a commission and a sub-committee before being debated by the Assembly in plenary session. T h e solution adopted by the Assembly was that proposed by the Council with an amendment. Jurisdiction of the Court was to remain optional in accordance with the scheme of the Covenant itself. But provision was made to render it compulsory as between those States which so desired. The so-called optional clause, which had already been suggested in 1907 by the Swiss delegate, Mr. M a x Huber, was adopted on the proposal of the Brazilian lawyer, Mr. Raoul Fernandes. On the whole, the debate before the First Assembly revealed an indisputable opposition between the Great Powers and the other States. Of the nineteen speeches delivered in plenary session, seventeen were more or less critical of the concessions made to the opponents of the compulsory jurisdiction of the Court and two only were favorable. These two were the speeches of the representatives of the British Empire and of France, and the latter, again M . Leon Bourgeois, was apologetic more than enthusiastic. None of the British Dominions were heard in the debate, in which the Latin-Americans were the most outspokenly hostile. As was expressly admitted in the report of the Committee, the majority had given way to the minority not because they were convinced, but because unanimity was necessary. 16 T h e y preferred an emasculated court, with France and Great Britain, to a more perfect court without them, or rather to no court at all. T h e attitude of France and Great Britain aroused all the more criticism as it seemed to imply the repudiation of their pre-war and pre-victory policies. As the Roumanian delegate, M

League

of Nations,

Records

of the First Assembly,

Plenary Meetings, p. 463.

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E M r . Negulesco, tauntingly recalled in the course of the debate: To the eye of a jurist this work appears imperfect. At the Hague Conference in 1907, France (through its two eminent representatives, M. Leon Bourgeois and M. Louis Renault), together with England and America, made every effort to obtain the institution of a Permanent Court of Justice with compulsory jurisdiction for all legal questions of an international nature. No result could be reached owing to the resistance of the Central Powers. 17 T h e bitterest critics of the Franco-British position were M r . Loder, of the Netherlands, and M r . Raoul Fernandes, of Brazil. Both had been not only members of the advisory Committee of Jurists, but perhaps its boldest representatives. M r . Loder, a learned judge, well advanced in years — he was to be the first president of the future Court — presented his remarks in a spirit of almost jovial sarcasm. H a v i n g recalled the history of the Hague Conference of 1907, he proceeded: The ten jurists thought that twelve years after the vote of 1907 the idea of compulsory jurisdiction was now at last about to be realised. They examined Articles 12, 13 and 15 of the Covenant, which only provided for arbitration; they read Article 14, which constituted a Court; they observed that this Article no longer spoke of arbitration but of international justice, and they deduced from this that the great step forward had now been made. They believed that henceforth men could be sure that in the last resort justice would always be done, even against the will of those who might desire to impede it. They were mistaken. We, younger and more impetuous, have found ourselves at issue with the great States in the Council, older and perhaps wiser than we. They have deleted our Articles 33 and 34 and replaced them by the Articles that are before you; they have eliminated compulsory jurisdiction, even in the form we suggested, restricted and surrounded as it was by special safeguards. What have we done in the Committee? What are we about to do? We have yielded to your desires. We have yielded because we saw that fundamentally everyone was agreed on the third principle also. It has not been said that we were mistaken, that our system was 17

Ibid., p. 454.

T W E N T Y Y E A R S OF A R B I T R A T I O N

151

wrong, that it was worthless, and that compulsory jurisdiction between States was impracticable. On the contrary, we were told, and I heard it in our Committee from Lord Robert Cecil and from Sir Cecil Hurst: ' D o not be anxious: we agree on principles; we hope that the day will come when your desires will be realised. But that day has not yet come; the time is not yet ripe to take such an important step forward. A t present it would be dangerous to cite a State before the Court against its will.' Arguments based on Article 14 of the Covenant accompanied these assertions. I will not waste your time with juridical arguments which now are of secondary value. T h e real argument is the political one. ' T h e time is not yet ripe.' W e replied by yielding our position. W e said: ' Y o u think that we are going too fast, and you have laid your hand on the reins to restrain us and to make us go more slowly. Well, we will go more slowly if you desire, even to the point of almost losing an opportunity of going forward. Y o u desire that to-day shall be yours; to-day, therefore, shall be yours; but to-morrow will be ours.'18

Mr. Fernandes, the other leader of the attack on France and Great Britain, displayed less reserve and more bitterness than his older Dutch colleague. In an impassioned and disillusioned speech he declared: I will do this [express opinions or wishes which are universal in Brazil] as simply as possible. I cannot do otherwise, for I am speaking a language which is not my own and which I hardly know. I will also do it as frankly as possible. In this I will follow the example which has been given us here by the best-qualified members of this Assembly. T h e y cannot blame me for following the same method, which is always the best, because we are associates, and among associates frankness is a sort of loyalty. I cannot associate myself with the enthusiastic words which you have just heard. I was once enthusiastic; to-day I am barely confident. I am waiting. A t the Hague, a resolution was passed concerning compulsory recourse to international justice on a very limited number of disputes. I should like to state that M r . Root, who was entirely outside the political considerations which influence the League of Nations, since his State is not a Member of the League, defended this solution with 13

Ibid., pp. 444-445·

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

152

an energy and a clear-sightedness which won unanimous approval. He told us that it was time to take this last step for which we had been waiting so long, that the world was ripe to settle a certain class of disputes by legal means, that this was a propitious opportunity. If, as I think, Mr. Root expressed the prevailing opinion in his country, this would be one more reason to appeal with all our hearts to America. May she come among us to sweep away by her vigorous breath the obsolete prejudices which are at present preventing the realisation of international justice. 19 A s his whole past could be quoted against the policy he was now obliged to advocate, M . Leon Bourgeois in his speech could be no more than apologetically hopeful for the future. I t therefore remained for M r . Balfour alone to defend the position of the two hostile Great Powers.

H e did so with all his accus-

tomed talent and Olympian serenity. H e said: . . . I do not think any defence is required for the attitude which we have taken up in this matter. It is quite true that we are ardent supporters of the idea of an International Court of Justice. It is quite true that we desire to see the applications to that Court made voluntarily and not compulsorily. That is not because we desire to discourage the movement in which we have taken part, not because we desire to check its extension to the furthest practicable fields, but because we are convinced, as the eloquent speaker who has just preceded me [Mr. de Aguero, Cuba], and others, have pointed out, that if these things are to be successful they must be allowed to grow. If they are to achieve all that their framers desire for them, they must be allowed to pursue that natural development which is the secret of all permanent success in human affairs, and not least in that part of human affairs which deals with politics. Remember that this Court is set up to administer a system of international law. International law itself is a changing and a growing subject. There is no provision — fortunately, perhaps — within the limits of the Covenant, for changing and reforming international law, and this Court is brought into existence not to change it or to reform it, but simply to administer it. Therefore you may find yourselves, or some nation in the course of time may find itself, in the position that a rigid interpretation of what may be an antiquated system of international law, which would never be accepted or embodied in any 19

Ibid.,

p. 449.

T W E N T Y YEARS OF A R B I T R A T I O N

153

authoritative code or authoritative work if all the circumstances were understood, nevertheless has to be administered by a Court which, in administering it with strict regard to the laws with which it has to deal, but without any power of achieving that larger vision which is sometimes given to statesmen and politicians may affect interests so profoundly concerning the very existence of that State, that your whole machine would be destroyed before that State would submit itself voluntarily to legal destruction. I do not think such cases are likely, but who among you will venture to say that they are impossible? Who among you will venture to say that if this system be made compulsory such a case as I have indicated might not occur? T h e very thought that it might occur will throw discredit on your system, unless you allow some possible safety-valve. Proceed, therefore, in this case as in all other cases, with care and with caution. Look back upon the past, and take encouragement from the past for the future. W h a t does the past show you? More and more new classes of cases are being brought within the jurisdiction of such a Court as that which you wish to establish. W h y not leave that natural wholesome process to develop itself? More and more y o u will find that as this Court gains the public confidence, the confidence of nations in all parts of the earth, more and more classes of cases will be brought within its jurisdiction; more and more readily will the various countries of the world be glad to put their disputes before it, whereas if in a spirit too hasty and too impetuous you try and force into this mould, as yet imperfectly framed, the whole fabric of what you conceive to be a completed and perfect system, the result will be that the mould itself will break under the stress of new circumstances and changing conditions. So far from having served the interests of international justice, you will have inflicted what may prove to be a fatal blow upon the greatest instrument which the world has ever yet been able to contrive for seeing that international justice is carried out. 20

The subsequent history of the Permanent Court of International Justice will not long detain us. When the. Second Assembly met, in 1921, the Statute, approved by the First having been ratified by the majority of the Members of the League, had come into force. The first election of judges took place on September 14, 1921, and on January 30, 1922, the Court held 20 Ibid.,

pp. 488-489.

154

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

its first session in the Carnegie Peace Palace at T h e Hague, for the purpose of drawing up its rules. Since then, the judges have been reelected only once, in 1930, the elections which normally should have taken place in 1939 having been postponed on account of the general situation. The Court has held 46 sessions, in the course of which it delivered 31 judgments and 27 advisory opinions. 21 B y M a y 1930, 42 States had adhered to the Statute and 29 were bound by the optional clause to which they had subscribed. On June 15, 1939, the corresponding figures are 59 and 49. 22 With all its limitations and in spite of all the criticism to which it has been subjected from various quarters, the establishment of the Permanent Court of International Justice remains one of the most constructive steps taken in the quest for peace since the World War. As all other League bodies, it suffers today both from the paralyzing consequences of the European war and from the discredit which attaches to everything international and super-national in the present mood of frantic nationalism. Whenever and wherever the attempt is made to substitute law for war as a method of settlement of international disputes, an impartial tribunal will be found indispensable. And as the judges of such a tribunal will almost necessarily be drawn from the States whose conflicts they will be called upon to adjust, the creation, organization, composition, procedure, jurisdiction and jurisprudence of the Permanent Court of International Justice will always be studied with interest and profit. It is to be hoped that the Court may survive the present years of strife and turmoil and at their close again grow in vigor, usefulness, prestige and authority. But even if it should be washed away in the storms of today and tomorrow, its experience will not be lost for future generations. 21 Fifteenth Annual Report Leyden, 1939, pp. 63 et seq. 22 Ibid., pp. 31, 40.

of the Permanent

Court of International

Justice,

TWENTY YEARS OF ARBITRATION

155

III. T H E E X - N E U T R A L S A N D A R B I T R A T I O N

In various quarters, and particularly in the smaller States which had been able to remain neutral throughout the World War, the opinion prevailed that the first and foremost duty of the League of Nations was to provide for peaceful substitutes for war as a method of settling disputes. We have seen that the Covenant as framed by the Peace Conference was a political more than a legal document. It was natural therefore that those ex-neutral States which had been only hastily consulted in the feverish process of the drafting of the Covenant in Paris and which wished the juridical character and activities of the League to be stressed and developed, should make their wishes known by the submission of constitutional amendments. Several such draft amendments, intended to strengthen the authority of the League in the field of conciliation, mediation and judicial settlement, were tabled by the Scandinavian Governments before the meeting of the First Assembly. With the consent of their authors, these draft amendments were, however, not immediately considered. They were referred to the Council with the request that a special committee be appointed to report on them and on such other amendments as might be proposed. 23 I mention this incident here merely as the first symptom of a persistent desire to improve the peace machinery of the League and, if possible, so to perfect it as to do away with the possibility of those wars which, under the original Covenant, were still tolerated as permissible. The first positive achievement in this direction was the adoption, by the Third Assembly, on September 22, 1922, of a detailed resolution recommending the conclusion between States of conciliation conventions and the constitution of conciliation commissions.24 23

League of Nations, Records of the Third Assembly, Plenary Meetings, pp. 195 et seq. 24 Cf. P. J . Noel Baker, The Geneva Protocol for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, London, 1925; David Hunter Miller, The Geneva Protocol, New York, 1925.

156

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

Although this recommendation was followed by many States and bilateral conciliation commissions running into several hundreds were set up, their results have been practically nil. T h e experience of the last fifteen years seems to show that the relations between individual States in Europe are either too friendly or too strained to allow for the useful intervention of such bodies. IV.

T H E GENEVA PROTOCOL OF

1924

Far more ambitious than the resolution of 1922 in favor of these platonic conciliation commissions was the famous Geneva Protocol for the pacific settlement of international disputes. T h e Fifth Assembly recommended it "to the earnest attention of all the Members of the League" on October 2, 1924. 25 Although this important draft treaty was the direct outcome of the discussions on disarmament and security which I intend to consider in the next chapters, it is, as its name indicates, primarily an attempt to stop the gaps in the provisions of the Covenant relating to the peaceful settlement of international disputes. As was explained by the principal authors of the Protocol, Messrs. Politis, of Greece, and Benes, of Czechoslovakia, in their general report to the Fifth Assembly, the elaboration of this interesting document was the result of " a logical and gradual process." 26 T h e aim was a general reduction of armaments. T h e immediate means, the reinforcement of international security by mutual guarantees. T h e means towards this secondary aim, the development of arbitration. Stated in more concrete terms, the situation was briefly as follows: the victorious Continental States, France in particular, refused to proceed with their disarmament unless they received sufficient guarantees of security from their neighbors and particularly from Great Britain. These neighbors, however, were reluctant 25 28

League of Nations, Ibid., p. 481.

Records

of the Fifth

Assembly,

P l e n a r y M e e t i n g s , p . 228.

T W E N T Y YEARS OF A R B I T R A T I O N

157

to g r a n t s u c h g u a r a n t e e s unless the S t a t e s c l a i m i n g t h e m w e r e p r e p a r e d to s u b m i t all their d i s p u t e s to w h i c h their p o l i c i e s m i g h t g i v e rise to t h i r d - p a r t y j u d g m e n t .

T h u s the d e m a n d f o r

d i s a r m a m e n t led to the d e m a n d f o r s e c u r i t y , a n d the

latter

to the d e m a n d f o r a r b i t r a t i o n . A s w e r e a d in the a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d g e n e r a l r e p o r t : T h e reduction of armaments required by the Covenant and demanded by the general situation of the world to-day led us to consider the question of security as a necessary complement to disarmament. T h e support demanded from different States by other States less favourably situated had placed the former under the obligation of asking for a sort of moral and legal guarantee that the States which have to be supported would act in perfect good faith and would always endeavour to settle their disputes by pacific means. I t became evident, however, with greater clearness and force than ever before, that if the security and effective assistance demanded in the event of aggression was the conditio sine qua non of the reduction of armaments, it was at the same time the necessary complement of the pacific settlement of international disputes, since the non-execution of a sentence obtained by pacific methods of settlement would necessarily drive the world back to the system of armed force. Sentences imperatively required sanctions or the whole system would fall to the ground. Arbitration was therefore considered by the Fifth Assembly to be the necessary third factor, the complement of the two others with which it must be combined in order to build up the new system set forth in the Protocol.21 I t is w i t h this " t h i r d f a c t o r " o n l y , a r b i t r a t i o n in the s o m e w h a t p e c u l i a r sense a t t r i b u t e d to the t e r m in t h e d e b a t e s of 1 9 2 4 , t h a t w e are at p r e s e n t c o n c e r n e d . vide

f o r the p a c i f i c s e t t l e m e n t

of

I n t h e i r desire to p r o -

all p o s s i b l e

international

d i s p u t e s , the f r a m e r s of the P r o t o c o l , w h i c h w a s in f a c t if n o t in n a m e a r e v i s e d C o v e n a n t , m o d i f i e d the s c h e m e of the l a t t e r in f o u r e s s e n t i a l r e s p e c t s : i.

T h e p r o h i b i t i o n to resort to a g g r e s s i v e w a r w a s

unconditional 27

Loc. cit.

and

absolute;

made

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T H E QUEST FOR P E A C E

2.

T h e jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International

Justice was rendered compulsory in all legal disputes; 3.

T h e procedure before the Council, under Article 1 5 of

the Covenant, was so defined as necessarily to lead to a peaceful settlement; and 4.

T h e signatory States undertook to " c a r r y out in full

good faith any judicial sentence or arbitral award that may be rendered" and to "comply . . . with the solution recommended by the Council." In a word, the prohibition of war and the duty peacefully to settle all disputes were laid down as fundamental principles of international polity.

The scheme designed to secure such a

peaceful settlement, whatever the nature of the dispute or the dispositions of the contestants, was extremely ingenious.

We

can but outline it here in the briefest and therefore grossest terms. A s the signatory States were to undertake to recognize the compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, all so-called justiciable disputes would, as a rule, be finally settled at The Hague. All disputes not adjusted by the Court or by voluntary arbitration would come before the Council. If the Council failed to settle them by conciliation, it would use its influence to induce the parties to resort to judicial settlement or to arbitration. If it again failed, the dispute would be referred to a Committee of Arbitrators to be set up, if possible, by agreement between the parties and, if not, then by the action of the Council. In every case, whether the decision were reached by the Permanent Court of International Justice, by a court of arbitration, by the Committee of Arbitrators, or by the Council itself, it would be final. Thus, under the Protocol, every dispute would necessarily be settled either by agreement or by third-party judgment. A s furthermore collective sanctions would be applicable against a recalcitrant State which refused either to submit its case to such judgment or to carry it out in good faith, the system, of

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159

which these are of course only the main features, seemed absolutely water-tight. In the hopes of the framers of the Protocol, it was truly to revolutionize international relations.

Through arbitration

it offered the opportunity, more, it imposed the obligation, of peaceful settlement. Through collective security based on arbitration, it was to prevent and if necessary to repress any armed revolt against the pacific will of the world community.

And

through disarmament based on arbitration and security, it was intended to relieve the nations of an intolerable burden, to dissipate international suspicions and to make possible a general and enduring peace. T h e memorable Fifth Assembly, which gave birth to this remarkable document, had been presided over by M . Motta, then as in 1 9 2 0 already and until the beginning of this year, when he died, Foreign Minister of my country. In his closing address, having outlined the achievements of his colleagues, he added, with that cautious realism which has always characterized his political judgment more than his idealistic eloquence: Or are we merely dreaming? Are we in very truth doomed to admit that war weighs on humanity as a fatal heritage, that the law of violence is inherent in human nature, and that we, poor frail reeds, on whom God has yet shed some reflection of His eternal attributes — intelligence and love — shall never see the end of bloodshed and of violence? If we examine under the magnifying glass every provision of the Protocol which we have decided by a unanimous and solemn vote to refer to the various Governments for their earnest attention, we shall no doubt find much material for controversy. I imagine that those Governments and Parliaments which are engaged during the next few months in discussing the work accomplished at Geneva, uninfluenced by the circumstances in which it came to birth, will experience doubts and scruples. These doubts and scruples will be wholly natural, and they should cause us no surprise. Conflicting interests, divergent attitudes of mind, prejudices too, will seek to prevent a sublime endeavour. It will be the duty of all of us who are delegates to this Assembly to try

l6o

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

to bring our own national circles to realise that, despite the imperfections inseparable from a scheme drawn up in so short a time, the Protocol is none the less the outcome of a collective effort of exceptional grandeur. If the Geneva resolution fails to bring about a Disarmament Conference, or if the Conference is eventually doomed to failure, will not one of mankind's most cherished hopes perish? It would be held that the confidence of the peoples had been betrayed. Might there not be a feverish and terrible race to build up armaments? Tragic, indeed, would be the fate of mankind if it were merely left to speculate, horror-stricken, on the hell to be prepared for it by the next armed conflict, in which the physics and chemistry of war — those baleful powers — would rival one another in the work of carnage and destruction. Have we been too ambitious? Have we mistaken the measure of our strength? The moral seed that is sown is never wholly lost. 28

These words were uttered on October 2, 1924. In the same month, a general election was held in Great Britain. It resulted in a great Conservative victory and in the appointment, on November 5, 1924, of Mr. Stanley Baldwin as successor to Mr. Ramsay MacDonald. As it was largely to the cordial cooperation of the British Labor Government with the French Radical administration under M. Her riot that the success of the drafting of the Protocol had been due, it was not altogether surprising that that document should not have been hailed with equal enthusiasm by Mr. MacDonald's Conservative opponents and successors. After having, on November 15, 1924, requested that, "owing to their very recent accession to office," the consideration of the Protocol by the Council be postponed,29 the British Government, on March 12, 1925, made known to the world that "His Majesty's present advisers, after discussing the subject with the self-governing Dominions and India, see insuperable objections to signing and ratifying the Protocol in its present shape." 30 These objections, as Mr. Austen Chamberlain, the League of Nations, League of Nations, 30 Ibid., p. 446· 28 29

Records of the Fifth Assembly, Official Journal, 1925, p. 127.

Plenary Meetings, p. 230.

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161

Conservative Foreign Secretary, explained to the Council at the meeting in which this statement was made, were twofold. First, they disbelieved in the unlimited possibilities of arbitration. M r . Chamberlain declared: It was, of course, well known to the framers of the Covenant that international differences might conceivably take a form for which their peace-preserving machinery provided no specific remedy; nor could they have doubted that this defect, if defect it was, could in theory be cured by insisting that every dispute should, at some stage or other, be submitted to arbitration. If, therefore, they rejected this simple method of obtaining systematic completeness, it was presumably because they felt, as so many States Members of the League have felt since, that the objections to universal and compulsory arbitration might easily outweigh its theoretical advantages. In the second place and far more important in the British Government's view, was the fact that the Protocol appreciably widened the scope of collective sanctions. N o w , far from wishing to see the possibilities of coercive action increased, the British Empire held that a League of Nations weakened b y the absence of certain Great Powers should lighten and not aggravate the duties with which the Covenant had burdened its Members when it was hoped that its membership would be universal. On this point M r . Chamberlain remarked: As all the world is aware, the League of Nations, in its present shape, is not the League designed by the framers of the Covenant. They no doubt contemplated, and, as far as they could, provided against, the difficulties that might arise from the non-inclusion of a certain number of States within the circle of League membership. But they never supposed that, among these States, would be found so many of the most powerful nations in the world; least of all did they foresee that one of them would be the United States of America. 31 It was obvious to all that, without the cooperation of the British Empire, the Protocol was like a motor without petrol. It was therefore promptly scrapped. A s M . M o t t a had hoped, 31

Ibid., p. 447.

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THE QUEST FOR PEACE

however, the "moral seed" that had been sown by its authors was not wholly lost. I t produced first an abundant harvest of bilateral arbitration and conciliation treaties between Members of the League of Nations but not confined only to them. 32 V. T H E L O C A R N O T R E A T I E S O F 1925

It also indirectly gave rise to the famous Locarno Treaties. As we have seen, the Geneva Protocol was an offspring of the League negotiations tending to the general reduction and limitation of national armaments. If such a homely simile be allowed, it was the grandchild of disarmament and the child of security. The Locarno Treaties of October 1925, to which I now turn for only a brief reference, as I intend to revert to them in my next chapter, can be looked upon as its younger stepbrother by another and more humble mother. They also were engendered by security, but they were born not of the League of Nations, but of a regional group of Powers among whom the demand for security was peculiarly pressing. Their main purpose was to increase confidence between these States by reinforcing their mutual security. 33 In the pursuit of this aim, arbitration was only an incidental, but still an important, means. The Locarno Treaties between Germany, Great Britain, France, Italy, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Poland, were initiated by a note of the German Government handed to M . Herriot in Paris on February 9, 1925. After renewing a previous offer of a Rhine pact to be concluded between the four Great Powers of Western and Central Europe, it continued: A comprehensive arbitration treaty, such as has been concluded in recent years between different European countries, could be amalgamated with such a pact. Germany is also prepared to conclude 32 Cf. C. A. M a c a r t n e y and others, Survey of International Affairs, 1925, London, 1928, pp. 75 et seq. 33 Final Protocol of the Locarno Conference, 1925, C m d . 2525, London, 1925.

T W E N T Y YEARS OF A R B I T R A T I O N

163

analogous arbitration treaties providing for the peaceful settlement of all judicial and political conflicts with other States as well. . . . It would be worth considering whether it would not be advisable so to draft the security pact that it would prepare the way for a world convention to include all States along the lines of the 'Protocole pour le reglement pacifique des differends internationaux' drawn up by the League of Nations. 3 4

This extract clearly shows the historical relation connecting the negotiation of the Locarno Treaties to the Geneva Protocol. Throughout the spring and summer of 1925, continuous diplomatic conversations were carried on at Paris, London, Berlin, Geneva and elsewhere, to consider the exact object of the agreements to be concluded. In these conversations, devoted mainly to the political conditions of the Conference, to the possible inclusion of Germany's eastern neighbors, to Germany's relations with the League of Nations, and to the nature of the mutual guarantees that were to be given and taken, the discussion of arbitration occupied only a very secondary position. This was not so, however, in the Locarno Treaties themselves, since of the five conventions initialled on October 16, 1925, to which Germany was a party, four were bilateral arbitration conventions between her and four of her neighbors, viz. France, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Poland. As for the fifth, the so-called Rhine Pact, which was in reality the first and the most important, it also contained a provision under which Germany and Belgium and Germany and France respectively agreed to settle " b y peaceful means . . . all questions of every kind which may arise between them and which it may not be possible to settle by the normal methods of diplomacy." The four other treaties are devoted almost exclusively to the definition of these "peaceful means." T h e procedure provided for is complicated and in some respects novel. As in other similar documents, a fundamental distinction is made between justiciable and other disputes. The former are here defined 34

Papers respecting

the Proposals

for a Pact of Security

made by the

Government on February p, 1925, Cmd. 2435, London, 1925, p. 4.

German

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THE QUEST FOR PEACE

as such "with regard to which the parties are in conflict as to their respective rights." These disputes, in so far as they cannot be otherwise settled, shall be submitted "either to an arbitral tribunal or to the Permanent Court of International Justice." Before such action, the dispute may, at the request of either party or of both, be submitted to a so-called "Permanent Conciliation Commission." This body, which is immediately to be set up, is to be composed of five members, two being nationals of the contestants chosen by their respective Governments, and the three others appointed by common agreement "from among the nationals of third Powers." If the contestants fail to agree on the selection of these neutral commissioners, the choice shall be made by the President of the Swiss Confederation. If no amicable agreement is reached between the parties before the Permanent Conciliation Commission, the dispute shall be brought before the Permanent Court of International Justice, unless the two parties agree to submit it to an arbitral tribunal. Whereas, in the case of justiciable disputes, the resort to the Permanent Conciliation Commission may be avoided if the parties agree immediately to submit their conflict to the judgment of a tribunal, for all other disputes it is compulsory. The functions however of the Commission are never more than advisory. If the parties fail to agree before it, the non-justiciable dispute shall "at the request of either party, be brought before the Council of the League of Nations, which shall deal with it in accordance with article 15 of the Covenant of the League." In all cases, the contracting parties agree to carry out the decisions reached by a court or by the Council of the League. This summary description of the procedure for the peaceful settlement of disputes provided for in the Locarno Treaties may suffice to show that it represents a form of compulsory arbitration somewhat different from, but chiefly inspired by, that of the Geneva Protocol.

TWENTY YEARS OF ARBITRATION

165

VI. THE GENERAL ACT FOR THE PACIFIC SETTLEMENT OF INTERNATIONAL DISPUTES OF 1928 Another fruit that grew out of the seed of the Geneva Protocol was the General A c t for the pacific settlement of international disputes of 1 9 2 8 .

Perhaps it would be more proper

to speak of this A c t as of another flower that blossomed on the grave of the ideals of 1 9 2 4 . In spite of all the ardor and all the talent that was embodied in this lengthy and able document, it has in fact remained an ornament, more than an effective servant of the cause, of peaceful international relations. H a v i n g learned b y the sad experience of the Protocol that, even if the representatives of the States gathered together in Geneva could, in the enthusiasm of a common endeavor, agree on d r a f t provisions for the universal adoption of compulsory arbitration, the States represented or at least some of them would not fail to disavow their spokesmen, the leaders of the movement sought to attain their ends b y slower, less spectacular, more circuitous and partial but, they hoped, safer methods. Therefore, after prolonged debates, a special Committee on Arbitration and Security, which had been set up in N o v e m ber 1 9 2 7 , under the chairmanship of M r . Benes and which enjoyed the active cooperation of M r . Politis, elaborated nine different model conventions, of which six dealt with conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement, and three with

security.

Of the former six, which alone interest us here, three were intended to serve as multilateral, and three as purely bilateral, treaties. T h e idea underlying this pluralistic liberalism was that, since all States would not agree on one and the same d r a f t providing for the pacific settlement of all international disputes, every State should be urged to go as far as it could and would on the common road leading to that goal.

T h e Ninth

Assembly,

combining the three collective drafts into what is called a General A c t and approving also the three model bilateral con-

ι66

THE QUEST FOR

PEACE

ventions, on September 26, 1928, adopted a resolution of which the following extract may suffice to indicate the intentions and the spirit: T h e Assembly, Having considered the work of the Committee on Arbitration and Security; 1. Firmly convinced that effective machinery for ensuring the peaceful settlement of international disputes is an essential element in the cause of security and disarmament; 2. Considering that the faithful observance, under the auspices of the League of Nations, of methods of pacific settlement renders possible the settlement of all disputes; 3. Noting that respect for rights established by treaty or resulting from international law is obligatory upon international tribunals; 4. Recognising that the rights of the several States cannot be modified except with their consent; 5. T a k i n g note of the fact that a great number of particular international conventions provide for obligatory conciliation, arbitration or judicial settlement; 6. Being desirous of facilitating to the greatest possible degree the development of undertakings in regard to the said methods of procedure ; 7. Declaring that such undertakings are not to be interpreted as restricting the duty of the League of Nations to take at any time whatever action may be deemed wise and effectual to safeguard the peace of the world; or as impeding its intervention in virtue of Articles 15 and 17 of the Covenant, where a dispute cannot be submitted to arbitral or judicial procedure or cannot be settled by such procedure, or where the conciliation proceedings have failed: 8. Invites all States whether Members of the League or not, and in so far as their existing agreements do not already achieve this end, to accept obligations in pursuance of the above purpose either b y becoming parties to the annexed General A c t (Annex I ) or b y concluding particular conventions with individual States in accordance with the model bilateral conventions annexed hereto (Annex 2) or in such terms as may be deemed appropriate: 9. Resolves to communicate the annexed General Act and the annexed model bilateral conventions to all Members of the League of

T W E N T Y YEARS OF A R B I T R A T I O N

167

Nations and to such States not Members of the League as may be indicated by the Council.35 T h e annexed documents, far too complicated to be analyzed here, are drafted on the general lines of the Locarno Treaties. T h e General Act comprises four chapters dealing, the first with conciliation, the second with the judicial settlement and arbitration of disputes of a legal character, and the third with the arbitration of non-legal disputes. The fourth chapter contains, together with many other general provisions, special clauses regarding the reservations which the States might add to their signatures. Thus a State could adhere to the General Act in whole or in part, with or without reservations, according to its preferences. A State could also, should it fear the uncertain entanglements of a collective act, resort only to the bilateral method, by concluding, with as many or as few similarly-minded other States as it liked, agreements, as far-reaching or as limited as it wished, in the fields of conciliation, arbitration and judicial settlement. As an intelligent and generous effort in favor of the substitution of peaceful methods for war, the General Act and the accompanying bilateral model conventions are certainly impressive. T h e y have supplied material for countless articles, books and doctors' dissertations. But if the intellectual achievement was admirable, the political results were disappointing. It was soon, to be sure, brought into force by its ratification by several of the signatory States. But although it may have stimulated the general movement in favor of arbitration and indirectly contributed to multiplying bilateral treaties and general adhesions to the optional clause of the Permanent Court of International Justice, it cannot be said effectively to have made for European appeasement. 35League 16-17.

of Nations,

Official Journal, Special Supplement Number 63, pp.

T H E QUEST FOR

ι68

PEACE

VII. THE BRIAND-KELLOGG PACT OF 1928 M u s t not the same be said also of the last of the measures intended to promote the pacific settlement of

international

disputes which we shall mention here, the famous Pact?

Kellogg

In an interesting and in retrospect particularly enlight-

ening book about it, m y friend Professor J a m e s T . Shotwell, who had an important hand in its preparation and promotion, wrote in 1 9 2 9 : On the sixth of April, 1927, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the entry of the United States into the World War, Monsieur Briand, Foreign Minister of France, issued a statement which has now become the opening of a new chapter in the world's history. 36 Is there today, ten years after the publication of Professor Shotwell's book, a single reader in A m e r i c a or in E u r o p e who, if questioned, would not have candidly to admit that he failed to understand the meaning of these words?

T h i s goes to show

not only how quickly times are moving, but also how deceptive were the hopes raised b y the well-meant but strangely nebulous document to which the Foreign Ministers of F r a n c e and of the United States had attached their names. T h e history of the origins of the Kellogg Pact, which P r o fessor Shotwell has lucidly told with much detail, is extremely curious. On April 6 , 1 9 2 7 , the French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand issued a statement to the Associated Press.

I n this

statement, inspired primarily, it would seem, b y the desire to counteract the tendencies in American public opinion to attribute France's admitted reluctance to disarm to some militaristic sentiment, Briand proposed that his country should "subscribe publicly with the United States to any mutual engagement to outlaw war, to use an American expression, as between these two countries."

H e added: " T h e renunciation

of war as an instrument of national policy is a conception al36

James T. Shotwell, War as an Instrument of National Policy, New York,

1929, p. 41.

T W E N T Y Y E A R S OF A R B I T R A T I O N

169

ready familiar to the signatories of the Covenant of the League of Nations and of the Treaties of Locarno." T h e reception in America of this statement was indifferent. In spite of the active efforts of some American friends of peace in Columbia University and elsewhere, public interest was at first only mildly aroused and somewhat surprised and the State Department remained mute. Feeling in France was all the less enthusiastic about Briand's suggestion as in America even his friends expressed the preference for a multilateral pact open at least to all the Great Powers and as this suggestion had aroused a suspiciously sympathetic interest in Berlin as well as in Rome. In early June 1 9 2 7 , Briand communicated a draft bilateral treaty to the Government of the United States providing for the renunciation of war and the pacific settlement of all disputes between the two republics. In the course of the correspondence which ensued between Washington and Paris, the American State Department, while expressing its willingness to take such a step as suggested by the French Government, insisted that it be taken simultaneously by as large a number of States as possible. The Quai d'Orsay, in which the influence of the more nationalistic President of the Council, Poincare, seemed often to outweigh that of his more world-minded Minister, agreed to this enlargement of the original French proposal but only on condition that it be revised so as expressly to provide for the legitimacy of wars undertaken in self-defense or in order to safeguard the sanctity of all existing treaties of mutual guarantee, such as the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Locarno agreements.

A s this seemed to conjure up the

spectre of international entanglements, the American Government, on January 1 3 , 1 9 2 8 , addressed an identical note to the other Great Powers Members of the League, to inquire whether they were "in a position to give favorable consideration" to a draft treaty very similar in its apparent simplicity to that which was finally adopted.

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THE QUEST FOR PEACE

It would take us too far afield to recall all the negotiations which led to the signing, on August 27, 1928, in Paris, of the strange document officially known as the General Act for the Renunciation of War, but more familiarly as the Briand-Kellogg, or Kellogg, Pact, by the name of its two main authors. The original high contracting parties were all the Great Powers, with the exception of the Soviet Union, but including all the British Dominions and India and, in addition, Belgium, Czechoslovakia and Poland, as signatories to the Locarno agreements. The treaty remained open " f o r the adherence by all the other Powers of the world" and has in fact been adhered to by practically all of them. Its terms were as brief and as simple as the negotiation of which they were the outcome had been long and involved. Under Article 1 , the parties solemnly declared their condemnation of "recourse to war for the solution of international controversies" and the renunciation of war "as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another." Under Article 2 they agreed "that the settlement or solution of all disputes or conflicts of whatever nature or of whatever origin they may be, which may arise among them, shall never be sought except by pacific means." The historical significance of this treaty, if it can still be said ever to have possessed any, resided exclusively in the association of the United States in the campaign for the maintenance of peace through the substitution of arbitration for war as a means of settlement of international disputes, which the other signatories had been conducting at Geneva and elsewhere throughout all the preceding years. In substance, nothing whatever was added to what had already been internationally agreed to prevent war. Even the terms "renunciation of war" had already been embodied in a resolution unanimously adopted by the Eighth Assembly of the League on September 24, 1927. To be sure, it had been expressly stated that what was branded as "an international

T W E N T Y Y E A R S OF A R B I T R A T I O N

171

crime" to be renounced and prohibited, was "war of aggression," whereas the Kellogg Pact is more indefinite and therefore may seem more ambitious. A n y such interpretation would, however, be clearly misleading. The American Secretary of State had, in a note of June 23, 1928, informed all the prospective parties to the document which bore his name that, in his opinion: There is nothing in the American draft of an anti-war treaty which restricts or impairs in any way the right of self-defense. T h a t right is inherent in every sovereign state and is implicit in every treaty. Every nation is free at all times and regardless of treaty provisions to defend its territory from attack or invasion and it alone is competent to decide whether circumstances require recourse to war in selfdefense. 37

What the States renounced by adhering to the Kellogg Pact was therefore merely the resort to self-styled aggressive war. N o wonder then that even such Governments as the Japanese and the Italian felt no more inhibitions about signing it than they did, a few years later, about invading Manchuria and Abyssinia in defense of their overpopulated countries. Had not the pacific President Coolidge himself advocated increased naval appropriations in a speech delivered on November 11, 1928, that is in the midst of the discussion on the ratification of the Pact, with the following argument: T o be ready for defense is not to be guilty of aggression. . . . We do not need a large land force. . . . When we turn to the sea the situation is different. W e have not only a long coast line, distant outlying possessions, a foreign commerce unsurpassed in importance and foreign investments unsurpassed in amount, the number of people and value of our treasure to be protected, but we are also bound by international treaty to defend the Panama Canal. 3 8

Now if the protection by naval means of citizens and even of investments abroad is compatible with the renunciation of " Q u o t e d in Shotwell, op. cit., p. 297. f r o m W . E . R a p p a r d , Uniting

38Quoted

Europe,

N e w H a v e n , 1930, p. 162.

172

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

war as an instrument of national policy, then the distinction between aggression and defense is even more difficult than several years of debate in Geneva had already shown it to be. The fact is that the framers of the Kellogg Pact, by their refusal both to define and to punish the sin of war, in fact did no more than denounce what they professed to renounce. As Professor Shotwell wisely remarked in the body of his book, in the over-enthusiastic conclusions of which he seems to have disregarded the promptings of his own critical mind: Unfortunately, a complex problem cannot be made simple by ignoring its complexities. . . . There is no final way of settling this question of peace and war which does not involve the definition of aggression and defense, for the one is prohibited and the other is retained, and we must know which is which. This is exactly what Mr. Kellogg refused to do. 39

Much as it left to be desired in point of precision and therefore of real significance, the Kellogg Pact was at first hailed in Geneva as a great forward step in the quest for organized peace. At last, it was felt, the United States had abandoned the position of complete aloofness it had adopted ever since the morrow of the World War. An American Government had been found that was ready, if not indeed to join in a common effort to define and to repress aggression, at least to agree that the settlement of all international disputes "shall never be sought except by pacific means." Was that not, in fact, a great triumph for the principle of compulsory arbitration in the broadest sense of that term? The position of those States — soon the great majority of the international community — which had signed both the Covenant of the League of Nations and the Kellogg Pact, without being contradictory, was somewhat ambiguous. Under the former treaty, they were bound effectively to prevent some wars, but not to outlaw them all. Under the latter, while the renunciation was supposedly general, there was no attempt 38

Shotwell, op. cit., p. 139.

T W E N T Y Y E A R S OF A R B I T R A T I O N

173

whatever at prevention. Accordingly, on September 24, 1929, the Assembly of the League, after a long debate initiated b y the British delegation, warmly supported b y various others, adopted the following resolution: The Assembly, Taking note of the resolution submitted to it on September 6th on behalf of various delegations to the effect that, in view of the large measure of acceptance obtained by the Pact signed at Paris on August 27th, 1928, whereby the parties renounced war as an instrument of national policy in their relations with one another, it is desirable that Articles 12 and 15 of the Covenant of the League of Nations should be re-examined in order to determine whether it is necessary to make any modifications therein; Taking note also of the resolution proposed by the Peruvian delegation on September 10th recommending that a report should be obtained as to the alterations which were necessary in the Covenant of the League in order to give effect to the prohibitions contained in the Pact of Paris: Declares that it is desirable that the terms of the Covenant of the League should not accord any longer to Members of the League a right to have recourse to war in cases in which that right has been renounced by the provisions of the Pact of Paris referred to above.40 Furthermore, the Secretary-General was b y this resolution instructed to communicate to all the Members of the League some d r a f t amendments to the Covenant proposed b y the British Government and the Council invited "to appoint a Committee of eleven persons to frame a report as to the amendments in the Covenant of the League which are necessary to bring it into harmony with the P a c t of P a r i s . " This decision was the starting point of prolonged and repeated investigations and debates which dragged on from Assembly to A s s e m b l y 4 1 and then from the Assembly to the Disarmament Conference. 4 2 40 League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement Number 74, pp. 18-19. 41 League of Nations, Records of the Eleventh Assembly, Plenary Meetings, pp. 223 et seq.; ibid., Twelfth Assembly, Plenary Meetings, pp. 127 et seq., 221 et seq.\ ibid., Thirteenth Assembly, Plenary Meetings, p. 28. " Cf. e.g. the Report to the General Commission presented on behalf of the special committee on security etc., Conf. D / C . G . 169 ( 1 ) , 1934.

174 THE QUEST FOR PEACE The investigations were learned and ingenious and the debates often spirited, but both finally proved fruitless. It was not found possible to reach agreement between those States which wished to level the provisions of the Covenant relating to the prohibition of war up to those of the Pact and those others which wished to level its provisions relating to sanctions down to those of the Pact. VIII. THE WILL AND THE WAY TO PEACE

With the final abandonment of this attempt to combine these two tendencies, or at least with the indefinite postponement of its final results, we reach the end of the prolonged efforts to perfect the procedures for the pacific settlement of international disputes. These efforts have certainly not all been vain. The arsenal containing the arms and ammunitions for conciliation, mediation, arbitration and judicial settlement at the disposal of all peace-loving States is infinitely better stocked today than it was twenty years ago. What has been lacking for the preservation of peace has assuredly not been either the number or the variety of instruments for that purpose, but solely the universal will to use them. In many cases in which national diplomacy had proved unable to settle disputes between States, the judicial and the political machinery set up under the provisions of the Covenant and perfected by its signatories has been efficient and effective. Even in the tragic cases of Manchuria and Abyssinia, in which war and the triumph of illegal aggression were not prevented, it was not that part of the League machinery which had been destined for the pacific settlement of disputes which broke down, but only that which was intended to provide for collective security. In both those cases, the failure was that of the policeman and not of the judge. The judge was regularly appealed to and after mature consideration handed down his sentence against the aggressor. But, as we shall see in our next chapter,

T W E N T Y YEARS OF A R B I T R A T I O N

175

the policeman, refusing to face the risks of his trade, allowed the culprit to escape and thereby to spread all over the world the violence and anarchy from which it is now suffering. The best proof of this statement is supplied by the fact that the three Great Powers which were responsible for the major wars of the last ten years all left the League, whose fundamental law they were unwilling to respect. T h e y left it not so much damning the judge whose sentence had gone against them, as it had in the cases of Japan and Italy, or whose judgment they feared, as in that of Germany. But they left it defying the policeman whose impotence they had well appraised before embarking on their aggressive undertakings. Could it have been otherwise? Given the spirit which animated the aggressors, on the one hand, and the feebleness of the League, on the other, weakened as it was by the absence of certain pacific States and by the lack of solidarity among its Members, could any form of pacific settlement have prevented the catastrophe? There is no denying that the machinery which existed for the purpose had always suffered from one great defect. While everything had been done to perfect the administration of international law, nothing or at most very little had been achieved to confirm, to revise and to develop it. T o be sure, international law was bound to be enriched by the countless conventions concluded under the auspices of the League, by the jurisprudence of the Court and even by the rulings of the Council. It must be recalled also how Article 19 had been inserted in the Covenant with the purpose of permitting "the reconsideration by Members of the League of treaties which have become inapplicable and the consideration of international conditions whose continuance might endanger the peace of the world." 4 3 W e have seen how, in the process of the drafting of this article, the original flexibility of the relevant provision in Colonel House's first draft had given way to the rigidity of 13

See p. 123 supra.

176

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

the article as it stands today. As was to be expected, it has proved entirely inoperative. Reverting to my question, I cannot however see any real connection between the rigidity and consequent impracticability of Article 19 and the wars which have been waged against Members of the League in the course of the last years. No matter how generously the framers of the Covenant might have provided for the pacific revision of international treaties, they could not have made legally possible such events as the rape of Manchuria, Abyssinia, Czechoslovakia, Albania and Poland. If one can barely conceive of a form of communism so thoroughgoing and so exclusive of all private property as to make theft impossible, one cannot at all conceive of a form of international organization so far-reaching and so destructive of all national rights as to allow for the pacific absorption of one nation by another against the will of the former. Nor can one, after the events of 1939 in Albania and Czechoslovakia, believe that anything short of absorption would have satisfied Japan, Italy and Germany in China, Abyssinia and Poland. When the thirst for expansion is coupled with the lust of conquest, it obviously cannot be stifled by any bloodless procedures. In order peacefully to settle a dispute, international or other, two things are necessary: the will thereto and the means thereof. In considering the quest for organized peace since the World War, we cannot but note a striking contrast between the former and the latter of the two decades which separate us from 1919. In the former, while the means for the pacific settlement of disputes were still undeveloped, the will to avoid war generally prevailed and peace was maintained. In the latter, on the contrary, whereas the means had been multiplied and perfected far beyond the achievements and even the dreams of all previous generations, the will seemed to become less resolute and successive wars broke out. Now it would of course be puerile and stupidly paradoxical

TWENTY YEARS OF ARBITRATION

177

to attribute the recent recrudescence of violence in international relations to the improvements recently effected in the means of preventing it. But it would be most unrealistic not to conclude that in this matter of peace and war, as in fact in all other political and human affairs, the will is infinitely more important than the means. Where there's a will to maintain peace, there's always a way of preventing war. But it is not sufficient to devise such ways in order to inspire the will to peace. This was fully appreciated in Geneva and elsewhere after 1920. In fact, it was the fear that the bellicose would resort to war once their restored power allowed them to do so with some hope of success that was back of most of the efforts of the pacific to facilitate the resort to peace. But it was soon found that to clear the way for peace was far easier than to block the road for war — far easier but not nearly as effective. IX. THE AALAND ISLANDS DISPUTE

T o illustrate this contrast between will and means, let me, before closing this brief survey of the quest for peace through discussion and third-party judgment, rapidly recall two incidents. What was politically and technically one of the most difficult disputes that was ever brought before the League of Nations was that which opposed Finland and Sweden over the Aaland Islands. It was politically one of the most difficult because it arose over rival claims to a territory which was held to be of vital interest by both contestants. And it was technically one of the most difficult because, when it was brought before the Council of the League of Nations, neither of the two parties was represented thereon and one had not even yet been admitted to membership in the League. Moreover the Permanent Court of International Justice had not yet been set up. The contestants were bound by no non-aggression pact and by no conciliation and arbitration treaty. Neither the Geneva Protocol nor the General Act for the pacific settlement

178

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

of disputes had yet been dreamt of. War had not yet been either condemned as a crime nor renounced as an instrument of national policy. But, in spite of all these unfavorable circumstances, peace, which had not yet been organized, was maintained, and war, which had not yet been outlawed, was avoided. How and why? That is the question I shall now briefly examine. On June 19, 1920, Lord Curzon, as British Foreign Secretary, had "in exercise of the friendly right conferred by Article 1 1 of the Covenant of the League of Nations," brought to the attention of the Council "the case of the Aaland Islands, as a matter affecting international relations, which unfortunately threatens to disturb the good understanding between nations upon which peace depends." 4 4 Accordingly, the matter was considered by the Council on July 1 1 , 1920, in the presence and with the cooperation of official delegates from Sweden and Finland, although the former had no regular representative on the Council and although the latter was not even yet a Member of the League. In order to understand the problem which thus confronted the Council, it is necessary to recall a few of the most important relevant facts. The Aaland Islands, an archipelago of some three hundred islands, form a bridge across the mouth of the Gulf of Bothnia, between Sweden and Finland. They lie nearer to the Finnish than to the Swedish mainland and in winter they are connected with the former, but not with the latter, by a traversable ice field.45 The inhabitants of the archipelago, about 22,000 in number, are of Swedish tongue, as are those of the neighboring parts of the Finnish mainland. Until the year 1809, except for a short period of Russian domination at the beginning of the eighteenth century, the 44

League of Nations, Official Journal, Number 5, 1920, pp. 246 et seq. A. J . Toynbee, Survey of International Affairs, 1920-1923, London, 1927, pp. 234 et seq. 45

T W E N T Y Y E A R S OF A R B I T R A T I O N

179

Aaland Islands, together with what is today Finland, were part of the Kingdom of Sweden.

T h e y were then conquered by

Russia and, on September 1 7 , 1809, the King of Sweden, by the Treaty of Fredrickshamm, renounced all his rights and titles to the Islands in favor of the Emperor of all the Russias, as well as his rights to continental Finland.

Since then, the

Islands have shared the destiny of Finland. When, however, in December 1 9 1 7 , that country declared its complete independence of Russia, the Aaland Islanders took all possible steps to become subjects of Sweden. Such are the main facts of the case, which were not contested either by Sweden, whose Government was prepared and indeed eager to welcome home the people of the Islands, nor by Finland, whose Government wished to retain them under Finnish allegiance. Already in November 1 9 1 8 , the Swedish Government had addressed a formal request to the Finnish Government to arrange for a plebiscite in the Islands, a request to which the latter had replied in the negative in June 1 9 1 9 . Before the Council of the League, the Swedish Government demanded "that the Aaland Islands population shall be allowed to determine immediately by plebiscite whether the Archipelago shall remain under Finnish sovereignty or be incorporated with the Kingdom of Sweden." T o this, the Finnish representative replied "that the Republic of Finland was an independent and sovereign country; its independence having been recognised without reservation by several Powers, including Sweden, and that the Aaland Islands formed part of the Republic." Consequently, he opposed the Swedish request as conflicting with the sovereignty of his country and as raising a "matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of Finland." T h e case, submitted to the Council of the League by the British Government, thus arose out of a conflict between national sovereignty and the right of self-determination of a

i8o

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

linguistic minority, surely one of the most explosive of possible disputes in the whole field of international politics. T h e Council, a f t e r hearing both parties, was of opinion that before endeavouring to effect a settlement of the dispute in the interest of international peace, and of the good understanding between nations, a decision must be arrived at on the claim made by Finland that the case of the Aaland Islands arose out of a matter which by international law is solely within the domestic jurisdiction of Finland. This preliminary question which is connected with that of the applicability of the 8th paragraph of Article 15 of the Covenant would have been placed by the Council before the Permanent Court of International Justice for its advisory opinion, had that body already been established. The Council being desirous that a solution should be reached as quickly as possible, decided that this particular question should now be submitted for an advisory opinion to a Commission of three International Jurists, the Council reserving further action in the case. 46 Accordingly, with the consent of the parties, the Council unanimously resolved: That a Commission of three International Jurists shall be appointed to give to the Council on the following questions an advisory opinion with the least possible delay. i . Does the Swedish presented by the Council, on the question of the Aaland Islands, arise out of a matter which by International Law is solely within the jurisdiction of Finland, within the meaning of paragraph 8 of Article 15 of the Covenant? . . . 47 T h e Commission appointed b y the Council was composed of a French chairman, Professor L a r n a u d e , the D e a n of the L a w F a c u l t y of Paris, and of a D u t c h and a Swiss international l a w y e r , Professors A . S t r u y c k e n and M a x Huber.

After a

month's deliberation, in the course of which the Commission heard representatives of Finland, of Sweden and of the Islands, it submitted to the Council a learned opinion, of which the following propositions constitute the main conclusions: **League of Nations, Official Journal, Number 5, 1920, p. 249. Loc. cit.

47

T W E N T Y Y E A R S OF A R B I T R A T I O N

181

1. T h e dispute between Sweden and Finland does not refer to a definitive established political situation, depending exclusively upon the territorial sovereignty of a State. 2. On the contrary, the dispute arose from a de facto situation caused by the political transformation of the Aaland Islands, which transformation was caused by and originated in the separatist movement among the inhabitants, who quoted the principle of national self-determination, and certain military events which accompanied and followed the separation of Finland from the Russian Empire at a time when Finland had not yet acquired the character of a definitively constituted State. 3. It follows from the above that the dispute does not refer to a question which is left by International L a w to the domestic jurisdiction of Finland. 4. T h e Council of the League of Nations, therefore, is competent, under paragraph 4 of Article 15, to make any recommendations which it deems just and proper in the case. 48 A t its m e e t i n g of

September

20, 1920, the C o u n c i l

took

c o g n i z a n c e of t h e r e p o r t of the j u r i s t s o n this p r e l i m i n a r y q u e s tion of its o w n c o m p e t e n c e . I n his s t a t e m e n t , t h e B r i t i s h m e m b e r o n the C o u n c i l , M r . H . A . L . F i s h e r , d e c l a r e d : A f t e r a careful consideration of all the arguments adduced on both sides, I have come to the conclusion that the question of the fate of the Aaland Islands cannot be considered entirely as a domestic question with which Finland, and Finland alone, is concerned, but that it presents an international aspect which brings its consideration within the competence of the League. Quite apart from the juridical aspect, I consider that it is to the public interest of Europe, that this question, which has long been a source of dispute between two neighbouring States, should be peaceably adjusted. T h e Council will no doubt accept to the full the doctrine that it belongs to the sovereign rights of a definitely constituted State to accord or refuse to a fraction of the population the right of determining its political destiny by plebiscite or otherwise. I am, however, of opinion that the doubts expressed b y the Commission of Jurists as to whether Finland was such a legally constituted State during the recent period of revolution are justified, and that there is at least a sufficient degree of uncertainty attaching to the matter as, taken in connection with the public interests of Europe, to justify the intervention of the League. "League

of Nations,

Official Journal, Special Supplement Number 3, p. 14.

THE QUEST FOR

i82

PEACE

I therefore propose to my colleagues that, in view of the considerations which have been touched on, the Council should declare itself competent to deal with the question under paragraph 4 of Article 15. 49 T h e C o u n c i l , the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e s of t h e p a r t i e s n o t

taking

p a r t in the v o t e , u n a n i m o u s l y r e s o l v e d to d e c l a r e itself

com-

p e t e n t " t o m a k e a n y r e c o m m e n d a t i o n s w h i c h it d e e m s j u s t a n d p r o p e r in the c a s e . " who had

firmly

T h e r e u p o n t h e r e p r e s e n t a t i v e of F i n l a n d ,

and consistently, b u t a l w a y s with moderation,

c o n t e s t e d the c o m p e t e n c e of the C o u n c i l , m a d e the f o l l o w i n g declaration: T h e Council has declared its competence to examine the question of the Aaland Islands without the representatives of Sweden and Finland having taken part in the vote. According to the terms used by the President of the Council and the Rapporteur, this declaration of competence does not prejudge in any way the fundamental question at issue. I have the honour to declare that my Government cannot accept any other interpretation of the words of the President of the Council than the following: — T h e Council, in declaring itself competent, does not intend to prejudge in any w a y the statements contained in the Report of the Jurists, which I have contested in numerous observations. M y acquiescence in the procedure to be followed by the Council is accordingly accompanied by an express stipulation that my Government reserves to itself the right, in prosecuting the case, to uphold the point of view it has from the first maintained, namely, that the legitimate interests of Finland are bound up with its right of sovereignty over the Aaland Islands, and that consequently Finland alone is entitled to take a decision on the subject of a plebiscite. 50 T h e C o u n c i l t h e r e u p o n d e c i d e d , w i t h the c o n c u r r e n c e of the p a r t i e s , to a p p o i n t a n o t h e r c o m m i s s i o n of t h r e e m e m b e r s to furnish the Council, in the shortest time required for the necessary consultations, and having regard to the legitimate interests of all parties concerned, with a report which will enable it to frame a final or provisional settlement of the question and to establish conditions favourable to the maintenance of peace in that part of the world. 5 1 49 60 51

League of Nations, Official Journal, Ibid., pp. 392-393Ibid., p. 396.

N u m b e r 7, 1920, p. 395.

TWENTY

YEARS

OF A R B I T R A T I O N

183

This Commission was appointed by Mr. Balfour on behalf of the Council and was made up of Baron Beyens, a former Foreign Minister of Belgium, as chairman, and Messrs. Felix Calonder, a former President of the Swiss Confederation, and Abram J . Elkus, a former American diplomat, as members. After prolonged hearings of all the interested parties and after a visit to the Islands, the Commissioners submitted their report to the Council, on April 16, 1921. 5 2 In its conclusions, the Commission held against the right of secession of the Islanders, but in favor of a regime of far-reaching and internationally guaranteed autonomy. It was of opinion that recourse should be had to a plebiscite only in the unlikely event of a refusal by Finland to grant the Aaland Islanders a large measure of protection to their minority rights and of local self-government under the supervision of the League. 53 The report of the Commission contains some extremely interesting considerations on the principle of self-determination and on its application both to Finland itself and to the Aaland Islands. In view of the general importance of this matter, which has rarely been discussed in official documents, I believe the reader will appreciate the following extracts from the report, which itself received only a restricted circulation: I t is just this principle of free determination (or self-determination) which is . . .

at the bottom of the A a l a n d question.

T h i s principle is not, properly speaking, a rule of international law and the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s has not entered it in its C o v e n a n t . . . . I t is a principle of justice and liberty, expressed b y a v a g u e and general formula which has given rise to the most varied interpretations and differences of opinion. I t is no p a r t of our d u t y or pretentions to treat these interesting theoretic discussions exhaustively.

W e shall

confine ourselves to stating the considerations which arise out of its application to the A a l a n d problem. 52 League of Nations, Proces-verbal of the Tenth Session of the Council, pp. 156 et seq.·, Pierre Maury, La question des lies d'Aland, Paris, 1930, pp. 77 et seq. 53 League of Nations, The Aaland Islands Question, Report submitted to the Council of the League of Nations by the Commission of Rapporteurs, Council doc. B . 7, 1921.

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE First of all, we must eliminate an analogy which cannot be pleaded justly. The Aaland Islanders and the Swedes are wrong in citing the example of Finland, which, in determining her own fate, has succeeded, thanks to the results of the great war, in freeing herself from her dependence on Russia. . . . No one will dispute the natural right of the Finns, born of inherent justice, to proclaim their independence; but this right which Finland possessed does not provide any evidence in support of the demand of the Aalanders. The Aaland Archipelago is only a small part of the Finnish territory, and the Aaland population a small fraction of the Finnish nation. Now it is evident that one cannot treat a small minority, a small fraction of a people, in the same manner and on the same footing as a nation taken as a whole. . . . Is it possible to admit as an absolute rule that a minority of a population of a State, which is definitely constituted and perfectly capable of fulfilling its duties as such, has the right of separating itself from her in order to be incorporated in another State or to declare its independence? The answer can only be in the negative. T o concede to minorities, either of language or religion, or to any fractions of a population the right of withdrawing from the community to which they belong, because it is their wish or their good pleasure, would be to destroy ordered stability within States and to inaugurate anarchy in international life; it would be to uphold a theory incompatible with the very idea of the State as a territorial and political unity. The idea of justice and liberty, embodied in the formula of selfdetermination, must be applied in a reasonable manner to the relations between States and the minorities they include. 54 T h e report w a s considered b y the Council of the L e a g u e a t its meeting on June 2 0 - 2 7 , 1 9 2 1 , which was attended b y representatives of Sweden and Finland, sitting as members, and which also heard a delegation of inhabitants of the Islands. 5 5 As

the Finnish representative had protested against

the

opinion of the jurists to the effect that the question transcended the domestic jurisdiction of Finland, so now M r . Branting, on behalf of Sweden, rejected the recommendations of the R a p porteurs. H e did not think, he declared, that it "contained the germ of a solution or even of a tolerable compromise." 54 M

Ibid., p p . 27-28. League of Nations,

Official Journal,

N u m b e r 7, 1921, pp. 691 et seq.

T W E N T Y YEARS OF A R B I T R A T I O N

185

His weighty statement in defense of the Aalanders' right of self-determination ended with the following words: Great as was the authority of the League, it was not great enough to overrule Nature herself. T h e League must not impose an unnatural solution, which would effect nothing and would only give rise to fresh conflicts. He begged the Council to consider what would be the effect throughout the world if the first settlement of a political dispute arrived at by the League of Nations should result in a whole population being bound, against its unanimous desire, to a country with which it is not at present united by any legal tie, and to which its sentiments are strongly opposed. 56

In spite of Mr. Branting's earnest and energetic pleadings, the Council, on June 24, 1921, decided, on the recommendation of its British member, Mr. Fisher: 1. T h e sovereignty of the Aaland Islands is recognised to belong to Finland; 2. Nevertheless, the interests of the world, the future of cordial relations between Finland and Sweden, the prosperity and happiness of the Islands themselves cannot be ensured unless (a) certain further guarantees are given for the protection of the Islanders; and unless (b) arrangements are concluded for the non-fortification and neutralisation of the Archipelago. 3. T h e new guarantees to be inserted in the autonomy law should specially aim at the preservation of the Swedish language in the schools, at the maintenance of the landed property in the hands of the Islanders, at the restriction, within reasonable limits, of the exercise of the franchise by new comers, and at ensuring the appointment of a Governor who will possess the confidence of the population. 4. T h e Council has recognised that these guarantees will be more likely to achieve their purpose, if they are discussed and agreed to by the Representatives of Finland with those of Sweden, if necessary with the assistance of the Council of the League of Nations, and, in accordance with the Council's desire, the two parties have decided to seek out an agreement. Should their efforts fail, the Council would itself fix the guarantees which, in its opinion, should be inserted, by means of an amendment, in the autonomy law of M a y 7th, 1920. In any case, the Council of the League of Nations will see to the enforcement of these guarantees. 5 7 MIbid„

p. 703.

™Ibid.,

p. 699.

186

T H E QUEST F O R PEACE

After the disinterested members of the Council had unanimously accepted this view, Mr. Branting made the following statement: It is with a feeling of profound disappointment that the Swedish nation will learn of the Resolution of the Council of the League of Nations. In supporting the cause of the people of the Aaland Islands before Europe and the League of Nations, Sweden was not influenced by the desire to increase her territory. She only wished to support noble and just aspirations and to defend the right of an absolutely homogeneous island population to reunite itself to its mother-country, from which it had been detached by force, but to which it is still united by the ties of a common origin, a common history and a common national spirit. This population has declared to the whole world its unanimous wish not to be bound to a country to which it had been joined by force of arms alone. The Swedish Government had hoped that an institution, which was established to assist in the realisation of right in international relationships, would have favoured a solution of the Aaland question in conformity with the principle of free self-determination, which, although not recognised as a part of international law, has received so wide an application in the formation of the New Europe. It had hoped that the Aalanders would not be refused the rights which have been recognised in respect of their Slesvig brothers, who belong, as do the Aalanders, to the Scandinavian race. I t had hoped that, in the very special case under consideration, in which right appears so evident, and in which the wishes of the population have been expressed with such unusual unanimity, the League of Nations would have filled, at least on this occasion, the role of the champion and defender of right, and thus, by its first decision, would have proclaimed the dawn of a new international order. To-day, when the decision of the Council has frustrated that hope, the Swedish Government is obliged to express the fear that the Council has grievously shaken the confidence that the peoples, particularly those who, like the Swedes, have long been striving to establish international law, have had in the League of Nations — an institution brought into being to make that law supreme in the world. If the League is to fulfil the great task entrusted to it by the Covenant, it is absolutely necessary that it should possess that confidence. The Swedish Government is not of opinion that the settlement of

T W E N T Y Y E A R S OF A R B I T R A T I O N

187

the Aaland question which is suggested by the Council is likely to confer upon the Baltic area the peace that is desired. Nor y e t is it of opinion that a population as homogeneous as that of the Aaland Islands, of whose wishes so little account has been taken, can add to the strength of a country to which it is attached against its unanimous desire. Sweden is ready loyally to recognise that the decision of the Council has the force given to it by the Covenant. But Sweden will not abandon the hope that the day will come when the idea of justice shall have so permeated the conscience of the peoples, that the claims inspired by such noble motives and a national feeling as deep as that of the population of the Aaland Isles will be triumphantly vindicated. Thus it will make its voice heard, and will at last have justice done to it. 58 T h e Finnish representative was content to accept the Council's decision. I n the c o u r s e of the n e x t f e w d a y s , b o t h p a r t i e s , m e e t i n g u n d e r the c h a i r m a n s h i p of sentative

on

the

Council,

M.

Hymans,

reached

an

the B e l g i a n

agreement

by

reprewhich

F i n l a n d " r e s o l v e d to assure a n d to g u a r a n t e e the p o p u l a t i o n of t h e A a l a n d I s l a n d s the p r e s e r v a t i o n of their l a n g u a g e , of their c u l t u r e , a n d of their l o c a l S w e d i s h t r a d i t i o n s " a n d

to

g r a n t t h e m a v e r y l a r g e m e a s u r e of l o c a l s e l f - a u t o n o m y . T h e a g r e e m e n t of the t w o p a r t i e s , u n a n i m o u s l y a p p r o v e d b y the C o u n c i l , e n d e d w i t h t h e f o l l o w i n g c l a u s e w h i c h p l a c e d it u n d e r the s u p e r v i s i o n of the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s : T h e Council of the League of Nations shall watch over the application of these guarantees. Finland shall forward to the Council of the League of Nations, with its observations, any petitions or claims of the Landsting of Aaland in connection with the application of the guarantees in question, and the Council shall, in any case where the question is of a juridical character, consult the Permanent Court of International Justice. 59 T h u s ended w h a t

might have been a v e r y dangerous

in-

t e r n a t i o n a l conflict. A s to the f a i r n e s s of the solution, o p i n i o n s 58

Ibid.,

wIbid.,

pp. 699-700. p. 702.

188

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

have differed and may well differ. The discussion of the limits of self-determination, which we have quoted above in the report of the Rapporteurs, may well have been somewhat influenced by the fact that two members of the Commission represented small countries with linguistic minorities. However this may be, the fact remains that a difficult and delicate international conflict was peacefully settled thanks to the good offices of the Council of the League, on the one hand, and thanks mainly, on the other, to the attitude of both contestants and especially of Sweden. Whether Finland today still has reason to be jubilant over what her nationalists hailed as a great diplomatic triumph and what was certainly a political victory, may well be doubted. Diplomatic triumphs and even political victories are often more dangerous for small nations than reverses. But what both Finland and Sweden gained in the course of these negotiations was the respect of the world. Both their peoples and their Governments displayed a form of international civilization which all friends of peace must admire and which, unfortunately, it has not been within the power of some larger States to emulate. In 1920 and 1921, a newly born League, whose court of justice had not yet been established and whose efforts towards improving its machinery and procedures for the pacific settlement of disputes had not yet been initiated, considered and solved a political conflict between two States, only one of which had as yet acceded to the Covenant, and which were bound by no special legal ties. X. THE ITALO-ETHIOPIAN DISPUTE

Fifteen years later, in 1935 and 1936, after all the progress described in the first part of this chapter had been effected, the League was obliged to witness, to condemn, feebly to react against, and finally to condone the illegal results of, a war between two of its Members, undertaken in violation of all international law. Of the two belligerents, one had sponsored the

TWENTY YEARS OF ARBITRATION

189

admission of the other to the League in 1923, and had concluded with it, in 1928, a bilateral arbitration treaty. Moreover, both had signed the optional clause of compulsory jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice, both had adhered to the Kellogg Pact and both were signatories to the General Act for the pacific settlement of disputes. How can one note the striking contrast between the two cases without subscribing to our previous remarks about the relative importance of the will and the way to peace? In the first case, peace prevailed, because there was a will to peace and although the ways had yet to be discovered. In the second case, war ensued, in spite of a great variety of ways which had been cleared in the meanwhile to prevent it, because the will of one of the contestants was for war and not for peace. The story of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict is today fully known in almost all its details. Thanks to the legal procedures instituted by Ethiopia and by the peace-loving international community, represented by the League of Nations, every step, military, judicial and diplomatic, taken by the aggressor and by his victim, every statement made and every argument and every pretext invoked have been noted and published in official documents available to all and commented on by men of science, publicists and by journalists the world over. In fact, that is the only real satisfaction that Ethiopia and the international community owe the procedures and institutions resorted to in a vain attempt to avoid the use of force. Had these procedures and institutions been unknown, the results for Ethiopia would probably not have been very appreciably different. There is no valid reason to believe that she would not have forfeited her independence in favor of Italy, who would presumably have had the same ambitions with respect to her territory. But, not being able to count on the same measure of sympathy and assistance from the outer world; Ethiopia might perhaps have accepted some compromise. If not, she would probably have been overpowered with much less ado.

I go

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

Great Britain and France might have protested against the Italian action and, if unwilling to make the necessary sacrifices to prevent it, would doubtless have claimed and accepted some compensation. The result would have been a tripartite division of the spoils instead of an unilateral conquest. In that case, however, the searchlights of world publicity, instead of playing on the northeastern part of Africa, as they did from December 1934 to the summer of 1936, would doubtless have been turned in some other direction. Ethiopia would still have lost her independence, but the world might have retained some illusions and we should certainly not be as well informed as we are about the end of the Queen of Sheba's kingdom. M y purpose is of course not to summarize this whole story. It is merely to recall the unsuccessful attempts made to avoid war between Ethiopia and Italy from 1934 to 1936. But even on this special topic the wealth of information available is almost as embarrassing as it is enlightening. To find my way without undue loss of time through the maze of official documents on which the following brief survey is based, I was glad to accept the guidance of my colleague Professor Pitman B. Potter and of Professor Charles Rousseau, of the University of Rennes. The former has drawn on his personal experience to tell, in very lucid terms and in the light of official documents, the story of the Wal Wal arbitration. 60 The latter's recent book on the Italo-Ethiopian conflict is a model of thorough, intelligent and dispassionate scholarship. 61 In order to understand Italy's policy with respect to Ethiopia in 1934 and 1935, it is indispensable to recall a few previous events. The first is the Italo-Abyssinian war of 1895-1896, whose inglorious outcome had always left a sting in Rome. It had been concluded by the Treaty of Addis Ababa of October 26, 1896, 60 Pitman B. Potter, The Wal Wal Arbitration, Washington, Carnegie Endowment, 1938. 61 Charles Rousseau, Le conflit italo-ethiopien devant le droit international, Paris, 1938.

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191

b y which " I t a l y recognized the absolute and unreserved independence of the Ethiopian E m p i r e as a sovereign and independent State." T h e second relevant event w a s the conclusion, on December 13, 1906, of a tripartite agreement between France, Great Britain and Italy. Concerning this agreement, we read in the report of the Council of the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s of October 7, i93S: The representatives of the signatory Powers of that treaty, who have participated in the drafting of the present report analyse the aforesaid treaty as follows: The three Powers observe that it is their 'common interest' to 'maintain intact the integrity of Ethiopia' and accordingly 'agree to maintain the political and territorial status quo in Ethiopia as determined by the state of affairs at present existing' and by the agreements concluded by those Powers; these agreements are enumerated in Article 1, which adds that they 'do not in any way infringe the sovereign rights of the Emperor of Abyssinia, and in no respect modify the relations between the three Powers and the Ethiopian Empire as stipulated in the present agreement.' In case any events should disturb the status quo — and the events contemplated at the time of the conclusion of the treaty were internal events — the three Powers agree to 'make every effort to preserve the integrity of Ethiopia,' and add that, 'in any case, they shall concert together . . . to safeguard' the interests of Great Britain, Egypt, and France in certain specified zones, and 'the interests of Italy in Ethiopia as regards Erythraea and Somaliland (including the Benadir), more especially with reference to the hinterland of her possessions and the territorial connection between them to the west of Addis Ababa.®2 A l t h o u g h the Italian Government claimed that the real intentions of the framers of the tripartite agreement were to prepare a partitioning of Ethiopia, the French and the British, in 1935, categorically denied it. T h e third diplomatic act which had perhaps not a direct political, but certainly an indirect psychological, bearing on 62

League of Nations,

Official Journal,

1935, pp. 1614-1615.

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the Italian attitude towards Ethiopia was the famous Treaty of London of April 26, 1915. Article 13 of this Treaty, in which is stipulated the price to be paid by Great Britain and France for Italy's cooperation in the World War, is worded as follows: In the event of France and Great Britain increasing their colonial territories in Africa at the expense of Germany, those two Powers agree in principle that Italy may claim some equitable compensation, particularly as regards the settlement in her favour of the questions relative to the frontiers of the Italian colonies of Eritrea, Somaliland and Libya and the neighbouring colonies belonging to France and Great Britain.

On September 28, 1923, Ethiopia was admitted to the League of Nations. The admission, although brought about by an unanimous vote in the plenary Assembly, had taken place under very strange conditions. France had openly sponsored the candidature of the African kingdom. Great Britain had made express reservations and would have preferred to postpone it. Italy's delegate, who in a private session had first opposed Ethiopia's admission, when it had become apparent that it might take place in spite of his protest, welcomed it in public. He did so not without some critical references to the socially backward state of the country, where slavery still prevailed despite the enlightenment of the princes who had succeeded one another on the Ethiopian throne during a long succession of years, more especially . . . Ras Tafari, the present heir to the throne, a broad-minded prince, in touch with modern ideas, to whose credit must be placed the decree of November 1918, enforcing with greater severity all previous edicts for the punishment of those engaging in slave traffic. 63

In spite of these observations, there is no doubt that officially Ethiopia's admission was not opposed by Italy as she finally 63 League of Nations, C o m m i t t e e , p. 18.

Records

of the Fourth

Assembly,

M i n u t e s of the S i x t h

T W E N T Y YEARS OF A R B I T R A T I O N

193

voted for it and as her delegate had begun his above-mentioned speech with the following words: Count Bonin-Longare (Italy) considered that Abyssinia's request constituted a tribute to the League of Nations. This tribute was of great value as coming from a distant nation which had hitherto remained outside the great international movements, but which, by the remarkable tenacity with which it had been able to preserve its religious faith and national character throughout the ages, had acquired titles of nobility to which due justice must be paid here.64 On August 2, 1928, finally, Italy and Ethiopia concluded a treaty of friendship, conciliation and arbitration in which the following clause was inserted: Both Governments undertake to submit to a procedure of conciliation and arbitration disputes which may arise between them and which it may not have been possible to settle by ordinary diplomatic methods, without having recourse to armed force. Notes shall be exchanged by common agreement between the two Governments regarding the manner of appointing arbitrators. On the part of Fascist Italy, this promise of conciliation and arbitration made to a weaker State, whose territory she was known to covet, may possibly have been a proof of generosity. But, far more likely, it was a piece of sharply clever diplomacy. B y providing for conciliation and arbitration in a bilateral treaty, Italy shielded herself against other less uncertain forms of third-party judgment to which she would otherwise have been exposed. And by providing for these pacific methods of settlement in such summary and ambiguous terms, she secured for herself, as by far the stronger State, a freedom of diplomatic movement and possibilities of temporization of which her representatives, as we shall see presently, were not slow to avail themselves to the full. When the conflict which we are about to examine broke out, the position of Italy and Ethiopia can, on the basis of previous " Loc. cit.

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events, of which we have just recalled some of the most important, briefly be defined as follows: Italy had not forgiven Ethiopia the humiliation of the defeat of 1896.

Ethiopia had long been the battle ground of rival

Italian, French and British influences.

Italy felt that the

colonial price stipulated b y her future allies for her cooperation in the World W a r had never been fully paid.

She therefore

felt, if not legally authorized, at least morally justified and certainly politically able, to secure b y diplomacy and if need be b y force what, in the light of her fascist philosophy, was due to her virtues of boldness, to the exigencies of her expanding population and to her military prowess. I t is difficult to know exactly when the head of the Italian Government decided on the conquest of Ethiopia. In his preface to Marshal D e Bono's book on the preparation of the campaign, Signor Mussolini writes that, until 1925, the Fascist Government was absorbed in the pacification of L i b y a and that it was only when it became clear that Ethiopia was violating the treaty agreements of 1928 that the attention of Rome was once more drawn to Asmara. When Emilio De Bono disembarked at Massawa, the preparations which had been made before his arrival were absolutely inadequate for their purpose, which was, to settle once and for all the great account which had been left open since 1896. The equipment of Eritrea, in respect of harbors, roads, economic organization, and military strength, had to be multiplied a hundred-fold, and not by an indefinite date, but within a very brief space of time, specified and established almost as a dogma: October, 193 5.65 Marshal D e Bono himself writes that it was only after the final repression of the revolt in North Africa, in 1931, that effective measures for the protection of Eritrea could be undertaken. For this purpose he was sent b y his chief to Eritrea in 1932. Reporting on the conversation he had with the D u c e in the autumn of 1933, he writes: 85 Emilio De Bono, Anno XIIII, p. xiv.

the Conquest

of an Empire, London, 1937,

T W E N T Y Y E A R S OF A R B I T R A T I O N

195

It had been my proudest dream to end my public career as a soldier on active service. Of course, it was not yet possible to say in 1933 — the year in which we began to consider what practical measures must be taken in the event of war with Ethiopia — whether there would or would not be war in that country; but I made up my mind to lose no time, and one day I said to the Duce: 'Listen: if there is war down there — and if you think me worthy of it and capable — you ought to grant me the honor of conducting the campaign.' The Duce looked at me hard, and at once replied: 'Surely.' 'You don't think me too old?' I added. 'No,' he replied, 'because we mustn't lose time.' From this moment the Duce was definitely of the opinion that the matter would have to be settled no later than 1936. . . . It was the autumn of 1933. T h e Duce had spoken to no one of the coming operations in East Africa; only he and I knew what was going to happen, and no indiscretion occurred by which the news could reach the public. 66 M a r s h a l B a d o g l i o , in his War of A byssinia,67

writes, w i t h o u t

c l e a r l y indicating the period to w h i c h he is r e f e r r i n g : The war towards which events were thus impelling us must, therefore, be suddenly begun, and must have as its objective the utter destruction of the Abyssinian armed forces and the complete conquest of Ethiopia. . . . It was thus that thought, impelled by necessity, came gradually to move away from the idea of defense towards a new standpoint decisively directed to the offensive. Its basis and origin lay throughout in the necessity of defense; defense, that is, of the ownership of our colonies, against which the attitude and the military preparations of the Negus constituted a continual and ever-increasing menace; defense, above all, of the prestige of a great Power compromised by a barbaric, arrogant, and presumptuous people. T h u s it was that, somewhere about January 193s, 68 after the Wal Wal incident, study and action began, on this new basis, to take a new direction. When the documents come to be published, all Italy will see — and it will be a fresh motive for admiration, for devotion, for gratitude, for pride — how great was the foresight of the Duce in his interpretation of history, how exactly he foresaw coming events, how Ibid., pp. 12 et seq. T h e italics are those of the text quoted. Pietro Badoglio, The War of Abyssinia, L o n d o n , 1937. 68 T h e corresponding terms of the Italian original are "verso il gennaio 1935." " t o w a r d s the J a n u a r y 1935." La Guerra d'Eliopia, Milan, 1936, p. 10. w

67

196

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

firmly he controlled the situation, with what wisdom he issued timely instructions by which all — in every field of action, in plan and preparation, in the development and the conduct of the war — were guided.69 In the conclusions of his book, Marshal Badoglio repeats that "after the Wal Wal incident . . . our previous modest, I might almost say timid, plan of defense gave place rapidly to an offensive orientation. Its objective: destruction of the Ethiopian army and the conquest of the Negus's Empire." 70 Whether the W a l W a l incident of December 5, 1934, to which reference is made, was the first aggressive step on the part of the Power which had long resolved to conquer the country whose frontiers had already been crossed, or whether it served as a pretext to release the forces which had previously been only longing for action, one thing these quotations make absolutely certain: Italy had decided on war before the League of Nations, on behalf of Ethiopia, had initiated its efforts for peace. Wal Wal is a watering point possessing some three hundred wells, situated in a desert country in the southeast of Ethiopia. According to all former maps available, including the Italian, it was well within Ethiopian territory. 71 Since 1930, however, the Italians had established a fortified point there. This occupation, although never officially recognized b y the Ethiopian Government, had not elicited any official protest on its part. In the course of the proceedings we are about to examine, Ethiopia constantly claimed sovereignty over the W a l W a l area. Italy no less persistently, but more successfully, refused to have this vital question submitted to any third-party judgment. T h e question was obviously of paramount importance Badoglio, The War of Abyssinia, op. cit., pp. 7 et seq. Ibid., p. 167. 71 It is amusing to note that, in the English translation of Marshal De Bono's above quoted book, the publishers, doubtless not without the consent of the author, have reproduced a Daily Telegraph map, in which Wal Wal is a good 60 miles within Ethiopian territory. ββ

70

T W E N T Y YEARS OF A R B I T R A T I O N

197

for the determination of the responsibility of the events which took place there on December 5, 1934. Even if all the other evidence available had not been overwhelmingly in favor of the Ethiopian claim, Italy's stubborn opposition to its consideration by any impartial body would have sufficed to establish it in the eyes of all fair-minded observers. It was therefore in this frontier region of southeastern Ethiopia, at a point which Italian armed forces had without any legal title occupied for the preceding four years, that fighting occurred on December 5, 1934, between Ethiopian and Italian, mainly native, troops. In this encounter, more than 100 Ethiopians and about 30 Italians lost their lives. Before the attacks of Italian planes and tanks, the Ethiopians withdrew. T h e incident gave rise to an immediate protest by Ethiopia, on December 6, and two days later to a demand for apologies and reparations by Italy. On December 9, the Ethiopian Government, in a note to the Italian Charge d'Affaires, "invoked Article 5 of the treaty of friendship, conciliation and arbitration of August 2, 1928." On December 14, the Italian Government replied, refusing arbitration and repeating its previous demands. Thereupon the Ethiopian Foreign Minister wired Geneva to inform the League of Nations of the gravity of the situation. 72 While the exchange of telegrams continued between the two capitals and Geneva and renewed military incidents took place in Ethiopia, the date of an ordinary meeting of the Council was approaching. When it met at Geneva, on January 11, 1935, its members were faced with a request from the Government of Addis Ababa, based on Article 11 of the Covenant. On January 15, the Ethiopian delegate formally demanded that the matter be placed on the agenda of the Council. 73 This was done on January 17. The Italian Government, however, in its desire to avoid a discussion in Geneva, now declared that: 72 78

League of Nations, Ibid., pp. 87, 124.

Official

Journal,

1935, pp. 248 et

seq.

198

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

The Royal Government, conscious of its good right and prepared as it is and always has been to seek, in conjunction with the Ethiopian Government, for a satisfactory solution of the question — which for its part it does not regard as likely to affect the peaceful relations between the two countries — considers that the discussion of the Abyssinian request would not facilitate in any way the continuance of the direct negotiations with a view to an understanding. The settlement of the incident might be advantageously pursued in accordance with Article 5 of the Treaty of 1928.74 The Ethiopian Government accordingly agreed that the consideration of the question be postponed to the next session of the Council. From now until the final meetings of the Assembly of the League, on October 9, 10 and 11, 1935, in which Italy's aggression was recognized as such, the Italo-Ethiopian dispute continued to occupy the attention of international diplomacy and increasingly to worry all lovers of peace the world over. During that whole period, Ethiopia was constantly protesting against the growing menace of Italian invasion and suggesting, offering and clamoring for conciliation, arbitration, impartial investigations into her case and third-party judgment. Italy, on the other hand, while mobilizing and shipping to Africa an appreciable part of her army, was blocking where she could all attempts at pacific settlement, delaying where she could not block, and evading the main issues where she could no longer secure postponement of their consideration. Thus, after her first refusal to hear of the treaty of 1928, she then, in order to avoid discussion before the Council, invoked it, but delayed appointing her arbitrators. When, in order to ward off further outside interference, she finally, in M a y 1935, appointed two of her diplomats to sit on a commission of conciliation and arbitration, she raised difficulties about the appointment of two foreigners by Ethiopia. When the two Italian officials and the two foreign professors whom Ethiopia had selected were finally to meet, in the uncertain capacity 74

Ibid.., p. 1607.

T W E N T Y Y E A R S OF A R B I T R A T I O N

199

of conciliators and/or arbitrators, she arranged for the

first

session to take place in an Italian city with the cooperation of a staff of Italian diplomats.

W h e n , after this preliminary

gathering in June, the commission adjourned to Holland in July, the Italians refused to sit in T h e H a g u e , where all facilities were available in the P e a c e Palace, but insisted on meeting in their hotel at Scheveningen.

W h e n the representative of

Ethiopia, in presenting her case, came to discuss the political status of W a l W a l , which was of course absolutely essential for the determination of the responsibilities of the conflict which had taken place there, the Italians protested, contesting both the jurisdiction of the commission in this matter and its competence to pass on this jurisdiction. A s agreement proved impossible, and as the Italians declined to consent to

the

appointment of a fifth member to sit as a neutral chairman, the meeting b r o k e up. T h e question of the competence of the commission was then referred to the L e a g u e of Nations, whose Council considered it on A u g u s t 3, 1935. A s the Italian attitude became more and more

intractable — Signor

Mussolini had himself

signed

a

telegram, on July 27, to define her position suggesting that I t a l y might not be represented at the Council — the Council, fearing her withdrawal from the L e a g u e and the outbreak of war, hoped to placate her b y deciding that "frontier questions" or "legal interpretations of the agreements and treaties concerning the frontier" did not fall within the province of the commission. 7 5 T h u s deprived b y the Council, at I t a l y ' s urgent request, of the right of taking into account a most essential factor of the case, it was, as if in compensation for this mutilation, allowed to "designate," but not, as the Italians argued, therefore immediately to " a p p o i n t , " a neutral president. A f t e r three further sessions in Paris, in Berne and again in Paris, the commission, under the chairmanship of M r . N i c o l a s 73

Ibid.,

p . 968.

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T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

Politis, finally reached an unanimous decision to the effect that neither Ethiopia nor Italy had been proven guilty of having launched an attack on December 5, 1934. Italy was thus declared to be no more and no less guilty than her victim of an incident which had taken place on a spot generally held to be under Ethiopian sovereignty, in which her losses were appreciably less than those of her enemy and which proved to be the prelude to the conquest of the whole of Ethiopia. In fact, when one reads the essential passage of the decision with an absolutely open mind, one almost gains the impression that of the two contestants the less innocent, in the eyes of the unanimous commission, was Ethiopia. They therein declared: 1. That neither the Italian Government nor its agents on the spot can be held responsible in any way for the actual Wal Wal incident; the allegations brought against them by the Ethiopian Government are disproved in particular by the many precautions taken by them to prevent any incident on the occasion of the assembling at Wal Wal of Ethiopian regular and irregular troops, and also by the absence of any interest on their part in provoking the engagement of December s ; and 2. That although the Ethiopian Government also had no reasonable interest in provoking that engagement, its local authorities, by their attitude and particularly by the concentration and maintenance, after the departure of the Anglo-Ethiopian Commission, of numerous troops in the proximity of the Italian line at Wal Wal, may have given the impression that they had aggressive intentions — which would seem to render the Italian version plausible — but that nevertheless it had not been shown that they can be held responsible for the actual incident of December 5. 76

Commenting on this decision, my friend and colleague Pitman B. Potter, who had signed it, wrote with that comforting desire to make the best of things which is one of the most likable traits of his optimistic native land: . . . the result was very definitely a victory for Ethiopia. It was a verdict of acquittal or of not guilty in circumstances where a powerful 79

Potter, op. tit., pp. 181-182.

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201

plaintiff was pressing vigorously for a verdict of condemnation against a weak and helpless defendant. 7 7

W e cannot help wondering whether Signor Mussolini, on reading the verdict, could possibly have been so ungrateful as to share this feeling. How a commission, whose chairman was neutral, on which Ethiopia was represented b y two foreign professors, whom she had selected and whose opposite numbers were two Italian officials, could be expected to do more in Italy's favor than to declare "disproved" the allegations of the Ethiopian Government and to admit that its "local authorities . . . may have given the impression that they had aggressive intentions," it is truly difficult to conceive. Personally, I cannot help seeing in this verdict a true diplomatic victory for Italy. After refusing to hear of arbitration and after denouncing the choice of her opponent's arbitrators, after organizing and running the commission under circumstances which offered every appearance of partiality, and after excluding from its competence the one matter which more than any other was directly relevant to the true issue of political responsibility on which it was to find, Italy, through her two representatives, succeeded in wringing from their three colleagues a verdict which, to say the very least, was not at all unfavorable to her case. If, given the circumstances, that can be called a victory for Ethiopia, then why not call the subsequent application of sanctions a success for the League, and the subsequent military campaign a failure for Italy? T h e fact, as must be obvious to all who consider this story in retrospect today, is that Geneva and the world were, from the start, terrified at the thought that Italy, if her susceptibilities were offended, might go to the extremes of waging war on Ethiopia and of withdrawing from the League of Nations. Fascist Italy, on the other hand, was determined to achieve her aims, cost what it may. For her the machinery set up b y others 77

Ibid., p. 32. See also p. 19.

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T H E QUEST FOR P E A C E

for the pacific settlement of disputes served the purpose not of maintaining peace, but of gaining time, in order the better to prepare the conduct of a war of aggression and conquest. It served also the purpose of preventing or at least of postponing the effective resistance of the friends of peace. Therefore every concession by the latter to her demands and every inducement offered to deter her from violence were bound to be vain.

As

she was determined to march in her self-chosen direction and as the rest of the international community were above all anxious that her march should not lead to war, roads and bridges were built for her in the hope that, built by pacific hands, they would lead to peace. After the verdict of the commission of arbitration, Ethiopia continued to impress on the Council and finally on the Assembly of the League the gravity of the situation, to call for impartial investigation and then for assistance, and to welcome any pacific decision that might be reached. France and Great Britain, within and without the League, sought to deter Italy from her aggressive designs, which had become ever more manifest, by offering her all conceivable satisfactions and advantages. All was in vain. Finally, on September 4, 1 9 3 5 , Italy presented to the Council of the League and to the world a detailed memorandum in which were expounded her grievances past and present against Ethiopia. In an obvious effort to justify in advance the aggression against, and the conquest of, the State whose territorial integrity and political independence Italy was, under Article 10 of the Covenant, pledged to respect and to preserve, her Government

argued

her unworthiness,

that

its prospective

forfeited all

Member of the League.

victim

had,

through

the rights pertaining

to

a

I cannot refrain from quoting the

conclusions of this extraordinary document, by which a mighty Power sought to discredit a weaker backward people before depriving it of its guaranteed rights of national independence:

T W E N T Y Y E A R S OF A R B I T R A T I O N

203

The Covenant has set up among the Members of the League a system of obligations and rights which are interdependent. N o Member of the League can invoke rights arising from the Covenant when it has not fulfilled its own obligations — that is to say, when it has shown that it has not fulfilled the conditions laid down by the Covenant as essential for a State having the status of League membership, and when it has failed to fulfil the general and special obligations incumbent upon it through membership of the League. Moreover, it would be contrary to every principle of law and justice to claim that Members of the League are bound to observe the rules of the Covenant in their relations with a State Member which has placed itself outside the Covenant through a breach of its undertakings. The admission of Ethiopia to the League was a political act based on the belief that, through participation in the system of international cooperation represented by the League, Ethiopia could be led to make by herself the efforts necessary to approach, even though only gradually, the level of civilisation of the other peoples belonging to the international community. The idea that the League is in itself a system that promotes the progress of the nations belonging to it is not in accordance with historical facts, except on the essential condition that the countries entering the League are capable of guiding themselves towards civilisation. The position in this respect is not the same for all peoples. The League has to remember what the facts of history are and how they vary. Ethiopia has shown that she does not possess the qualifications necessary to enable her to obtain, through participation in the League, the impulse required to raise herself by voluntary efforts to the level of the other civilised nations. The League would be defeating its own ends and its own mission if it did not take to heart this lesson of experience. Ethiopia has systematically violated all the treaties concluded with Italy. She has rendered impossible any pacific and friendly economic and civilised collaboration with Italy. On the contrary, inspired by deliberate and particular hostility towards Italy, devoid of any adequate organisation, and incapable of controlling her own people or the populations subject to her, Ethiopia constitutes an immediate and constant danger to Italy, inasmuch as she imperils the security of the Italian colonies in East Africa. This danger has increased now that the Ethiopian Government has used the Italo-Ethiopian Treaty of Amity of 1928 as a means of arming itself against Italy, as it has been doing to a disquietingly increasing extent. These arms include some which Italy herself — showing the complete absence of any ag-

204

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

gressive intention on her part — had supplied to the Negus to enable him to ensure internal order. By her conduct, Ethiopia has openly placed herself outside the Covenant of the League and has rendered herself unworthy of the trust placed in her when she was admitted to membership. Italy, rising up against such an intolerable situation, is defending her security, her rights and her dignity. She is also defending the prestige and good name of the League of Nations. 78 T h e s e final words well characterize the spirit of the whole document. E v e r since Signor Mussolini had assumed power in Italy, he had missed no opportunity to display his contempt for the League and for all its works, but previous to 1934 he had sought no opportunity to denounce the alleged failings of his prospective victim. N o w that he was on the point of dealing the League a fatal blow b y violating the fundamental provisions of its Covenant, b y defying its authority and thereby b y ruining its prestige, he suddenly pretended to feel the utmost concern for its reputation. W i t h the publication of this document, which was in reality an appeal to the League to abandon one of its members to I t a l y ' s tender mercies, war had become inevitable. T h e sacrifice b y the League of Nations of dignity, of honor, of justice itself on the altar of peace had been of no avail. Europe, however, was as attached to her young peace as Ethiopia to her age-old independence. Therefore the war which ensued was to be an unequal contest between a great European Power and a poor A f r i c a n State, and not the general operation of an international police force which a faithful application of Article 16 of the Covenant would have called for. T h e head of the Italian Government had rightly assessed the possibilities of the situation. D e f y i n g the world, he conquered Ethiopia. Incidentally, he contributed to the downfall of the League, discredited the machinery for the peaceful settlement of international disputes and humbled the States which had been the staunchest supporters of both. 78

League of Nations, Official Journal, 193S) P- 1416.

TWENTY YEARS OF ARBITRATION

205

T h e r e b y he awakened other imperialist ambitions and paved the w a y for other aggressions.

B u t thereby he also reawak-

ened the solidarity of the peace and justice-loving nations and paved the w a y for future reactions and, let us hope, for the reconstruction of the international community. XI.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have examined first the attempts made in the course of the last twenty years to set up and to perfect the institutions and the procedure for the peaceful settlement of international disputes. I have then briefly recalled two historical cases, in which the international community sought to prevent war b y the application of some of these methods. T h e first of these cases arose on the morrow of the birth of the League of Nations, when its machinery was still as rudimentary as was its experience. T h e second, on the other hand, was dealt with b y the League after it had, in the intervening decade, been endowed with much machinery and gained appreciable practical experience. And still the success in the first case was as complete as the failure in the second. T h e facts recalled in the second half of the chapter might therefore well lead the reader to condemn as useless the efforts described in the former. T h e presentation of these facts, I admit, was deliberately challenging. B u t it was not tendentious and even if it might suggest, it would not to my mind j u s t i f y , such a pessimistic conclusion. Anyone who will survey the activities of the League of Nations with the open but critical mind of the impartial student and without any prejudices, either favorable or hostile, must recognize that in the first ten years of its existence, while its peace machinery was still in its infancy, it was singularly more effective and more fortunate in its settlement of disputes than since that machinery has been perfected. In fact, all its major successes, such as the settlement of the Aaland Islands conflict in 1 9 2 0 - 1 9 2 1 , the Greco-Bulgarian dispute in 1925, the Mossul

2O6

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

affair of 1 9 2 4 - 1 9 2 6 , fall within the former period, and all its major failures, in relation with the Chaco war, the Sino-Japanese conflict, the German, the Polish and the Italian unchallenged territorial conquests, within the latter. T h e lesson to be drawn from this experience is not, I submit, that of the futility of conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement and third-party judgment as substitutes for war. It is, however, that of the limited possibilities of these methods in the present state of international relations. Between the two extreme cases of differences readily adjusted by the ordinary methods of diplomacy and of conflicts which lead to war if one of the contestants refuses to comply with the demands of the other, there is, I believe, an intermediate zone, where third-party judgment is the most appropriate and may be the sole substitute for violence.

It may well happen

that a government, unwilling or unable, on account of parliamentary and popular opposition, to make to its adversary some unpalatable although fair concessions in the course of a bilateral negotiation, will accept, and perhaps welcome, an impartial decision as a shield against internal criticism.

On

issues of insignificant importance, diplomacy is usually preferable to arbitration as a method of adjusting conflicting claims. On issues of vital national importance, arbitration, unaccompanied by collective security, will be of no avail. But between the insignificant and the vital, there may always arise issues suitable for and susceptible to third-party judgment. In its quest for peace since the World W a r , mankind has come to realize that organized arbitration, although sometimes useful as a medicament, is not a panacea. A s I have already observed, for the establishment and maintenance of enduring peace, something more is needed than a judge who may be called in or dismissed, obeyed or disobeyed, at the discretion of the parties. There must be a policeman competent and able both to bring to the bar all recalcitrants, no matter how powerful and unruly,

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207

and to oblige them to respect the findings of the judge, whether they agree with them or not. Having in this chapter considered the duties, the limitations, the advantages and the failures of the international judiciary since the World W a r , we shall see in the next the steps taken to organize and to disorganize the police force provided for under the Covenant.

4- T k e R i s e a n d F a l l of Collective Security

I. COLLECTIVE SECURITY AND THE UNITED STATES

IN CONSIDERING T H E QUEST FOR ORGANIZED peace at the Peace Conference, we saw how decisive was the part played by President Wilson in the drafting of Article 10. W e saw also how readily he supported the British in defending Article 16, of which they were the authors. The idea of the League of Nations as an association for the protection of its members, by its members and for its members was essentially American, or at least Wilsonian. This circumstance alone would have sufficed to explain the reaction against this conception of collective security which the refusal of the United States to ratify the Covenant immediately brought with it. The debates before the Foreign Affairs Committee of the American Senate and in the Senate itself had been closely followed in Europe. It had not escaped the attention of careful observers that the very article which alone in the whole Covenant was purely Wilsonian in origin was the one on which the opposition in America had concentrated its attacks. Nor did they fundamentally disagree with President Wilson who held the American guarantee essential for European peace. The following words he had addressed to the Quadrennial Jackson D a y Dinner on January 8, 1920, made ominous reading in Europe at the beginning of 1920. He had said: The maintenance of the peace of the world and the effective execution of the treaty depend upon the whole-hearted participation of the

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United States. I am not stating it as a matter of power. The point is that the United States is the only Nation which has sufficient moral force with the rest of the world to guarantee the substitution of discussion for war. If we keep out of this agreement, if we do not give our guarantees, then another attempt will be made to crush the new nations of Europe. 1 II.

T H E D E S T I N Y O F A R T I C L E 10

Disavowed b y its parents, Article 10 lost many of the sympathies it had before enjoyed as their child. B u t the United States, b y their negative attitude, weakened the idea of collective security for another and still more potent reason. A s a consequence, Article 10 seemed not only less effectively to protect the possible victims of aggression, but also more dangerously to expose those whom it obliged to come to their assistance. Disavowed b y its American father, the child had forfeited something of its social standing. Unsupported b y him, it threatened to become a public charge. It was not from Europe, however, but from America, that the first attack on Article 10 was launched. On December 4, 1920, when the first session of the Assembly of the League of Nations was more than half over, a Canadian delegate, M r . Doherty, suddenly tabled a motion calling for an amendment to the Covenant to the effect "that Article 10 of the Covenant of the League of Nations be and is hereby struck out." 2 T h a t Canada should take such a step was not in the least surprising. A l r e a d y at the Peace Conference, Sir Robert Borden, the Canadian Prime Minister, had, in a memorandum of M a r c h 13, 1919, submitted to the Commission on the League, proposed the deletion of Article io. 3 H e had criticized the mutual guarantee of territorial integrity mainly on the ground that it might lead to an impossible attempt to prevent the modification of unjust and untenable frontiers. 1 W o o d r o w Wilson, Messages and Papers, 2 vols., N e w York, 1924, vol. II, p. 1162. 2 League of Nations, Records of the First Assembly, Plenary Meetings, p. 275. 3 Miller, The Drafting of the Covenant, op. cit., vol. I, p. 358.

2 ΙΟ

THE QUEST FOR

PEACE

Since then, Article 10 had served to estrange from the League, of which Canada was a loyal member, her mighty and only immediate American neighbor. Thereby she was forced into a most embarrassing position. The Canadian proposal of 1920 was therefore not unexpected. However when, instead of being adopted, it was, together with all the other suggested amendments to the Covenant, referred for further consideration to a special committee to be set up b y the Council, Mr. Doherty yielded, "as gracefully as may be, to the inevitable." In June of the following year, the Canadian Government again presented its case to that committee. In a further memorandum they added to the objections already put forward in 1919 those based on the hostility of the United States. 4 In 1921 the Assembly had before it a recommendation of the special Committee on Amendments which had considered the Canadian proposal in the light of this memorandum. In accordance with these recommendations, the following resolution, in which Canada again, although somewhat impatiently, concurred, was adopted by the Second Assembly on October 4, 1921: Whereas a motion has been submitted b y the Canadian Delegation for the striking out of Article 10 of the Covenant; Whereas widely different opinions have been expressed with regard to the legal bearing of this Article and its relationship to the other Articles of the Covenant, especially to Articles 12 to 1 7 ; A n d whereas the legal and political arguments made both in favour of and against the striking out of Article 10 are of great weight; T h e Assembly postpones the continuation of the examination of the proposal and the decision until its next Session, and recommends that this proposal be decided before any other amendment. 5

When the Assembly met for its third session on September 4, 1922, there had been a change of government in Canada. Mr. Lapointe, the new Canadian delegate, no longer pressed for 4 Α. A. H. Struycken, La Societe des Nations et l'integrite territoriale, Bibliotheca Visseriana, t.I, Leyde, 1923, p. 117. 5League oj Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement Number 6, p. 12.

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211

the deletion of Article 10, as Mr. Doherty had done from the start. Realizing no doubt that even such a drastic measure could hardly bring the United States back into the fold of the League, but no less anxious than his predecessor about the consequences which a strict application of Article ι ο as it stood might have for the whole world and particularly for his country, he proposed to amend it on two important points. The draft amendments he put forward took the shape of two additions to the original text. In the first place, while maintaining the mutual guarantee against external aggression, he proposed to add to the second sentence of Article 10, which reads: In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression the Council shall advise upon the means b y which this obligation shall be fulfilled,

the words: "taking into account the political and geographical circumstances of each State." Secondly he proposed the addition of a new paragraph to read as follows: T h e opinion given by the Council in such cases shall be regarded as a matter of the highest importance, and shall be taken into consideration by all the Members of the League, which shall use their utmost endeavours to conform to the conclusions of the Council; but no Member shall be under the obligation to engage in any act of war without the consent of its Parliament, Legislature or other representative body. 6

In this amended form, the Canadian proposal was open to less objections on the part of the determined friends of the principle of collective security, who had formerly opposed the deletion of Article 10. And Article 10 thus amended would also have been open to less objections on the part of the no less determined foes of the unconditional and automatic sanctions to which a strict application of its terms would seem to 0 League of Nations, Committee, p. 24.

Records

of the Third

Assembly,

Minutes of the First

212

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oblige all the States Members of the League. However, it was again found impossible to reach unanimous agreement. T h e Third Assembly, like its two predecessors, was therefore once more obliged to postpone the consideration of the matter. It did so by adopting, on September 23, 1922, the following resolution : The Assembly decides that the Canadian proposal with regard to Article 10 of the Covenant shall be adjourned until the fourth Assembly, in order that the subject may be considered in all its bearings. The Assembly leaves it to the Council to decide on the steps to be taken to provide for a detailed study of the Canadian proposal before the meeting of the fourth Assembly.7 In an almost desperate attempt once and for all to settle this difficult matter, the Council, on January 29,1923, addressed a circular letter to the Governments of all the States Members of the League, requesting their views on the Canadian amendment. T h e answers to this circular, as well as the debates which took place at the Fourth Assembly in September of the same year, afford an exceptionally interesting insight into the state of mind prevailing on the general question of collective security in the various capitals nearly five years after the end of the World War. T h e first observation suggested by an analysis of the official documents is that, as might well be expected, the question attracted much more attention in Europe than in the rest of the world. Of the twenty-five replies to the circular of the Council, eighteen were sent in by European Governments. It is noticeable that no Member of the British Commonwealth of Nations except Canada took any part in this written consultation. T h e replies were overwhelmingly negative. T h e only three European States which welcomed the Canadian proposals were, characteristically enough, Hungary, Austria and Bulgaria. But whereas the three Members of the League which had belonged ''League

of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement Number 9, p. 9.

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213

to the group of the defeated Powers in the World War thus indicated their assent, all the former victors and all the new States, which felt their territorial integrity threatened by a possible war of revenge, were hostile to what they obviously looked upon as a weakening of the general guarantee. Quoting from the replies of the States which have since lost either their territorial integrity or their political independence, or which today feel imperilled in either, we note that: for Albania, Article 10 was the "corner-stone of the Covenant and the very foundation of the League"; 8 for Finland, it was the "cornerstone of the whole structure of the League"; for Greece, "one of the foundations of the League of Nations" constituting "one of the most essential guarantees for world peace"; for Denmark, "an essential part of the system established by the Covenant"; Latvia attached "special importance to the retention of Article χ ο in its present form"; the Chinese Government declared itself in favor "of maintaining this article exactly as it stands"; Roumania declared it to be "the most effective guarantee against all attempts at aggression with the object of modifying the territorial position established under the Treaties of Peace"; the reply of Jugoslavia, which was then still known as the Kingdom of the Serbs, Croats and Slovenes, was briefer but clearly negative; that of Poland, finally, contained the following interesting conclusions: It is indisputable that the Covenant of the League of Nations imposes upon its Members certain obligations which de facto constitute important restrictions upon the exercise of their sovereign rights. . . . T h e States which constitute the League of Nations would probably never have consented to all these restrictions if they had not believed that they would find a compensation and a makeweight in the mutual guarantee of their territorial integrity and political independence. 9

Do not these notes tragically remind one of the above-quoted words of President Wilson, according to which "if we do not "League of Nations, Records C o m m i t t e e , p p . 44 et seq. 9 Ibid., p. 51.

of the Fourth

Assembly,

M i n u t e s of the First

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THE QUEST FOR PEACE

give our guarantees, then another attempt will be made to crush the new nations of Europe"? The only answer favorable to the Canadian proposal, besides her own and those of the three vanquished States of the World War, was a laconic note from Uruguay. As a matter of fact, several other States, such as my own and doubtless also the other Members of the British Commonwealth of Nations, were not all opposed to the interpretation which Canada wished to see put upon Article 10. But, for one reason or another, they felt it unnecessary or unwise to carry the public discussion of this troublesome matter any further. Unnecessary, because, in the existing state of international solidarity, it seemed only too obvious that the very ambitious construction placed upon Article 10 by those who hoped that it implied an automatic and mutual guarantee would inevitably be disproved by practical experience. Unwise, because, as real agreement was out of the question, nothing was to be gained and something might well be lost by repeated debates serving only to reveal and to stress the existing disagreement on fundamentals prevailing among Members of the League of Nations. At the Fourth Assembly, the same opposition of views was again obvious. The States which felt threatened and which counted on the protection of the League for their security were opposed to any step which might weaken the guarantee of Article 10. They of course would not hear of its deletion nor even of its amendment. As Canada was, however, both extremely tenacious in her desire to clear up the uncertainties of the article and no less conciliatory in her methods of discussion, everyone felt, in the autumn of 1923, that, after four years of persistent argument, she was entitled to some measure of at least verbal satisfaction. When, therefore, on September 12, 1923, Sir Lomer Gouin, the new Canadian Minister of Justice, who had been sent to Geneva to represent his country, again submitted the proposal his predecessor, Mr. Lapointe, had put forward in 1922, he

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215

met with a very sympathetic reception. T o be sure, as the answers to the circular of the Council had shown irrefutably, the great majority of the Members of the League were opposed to the Canadian draft amendment. He recognized it himself in his opening speech before the First Committee. 10 But the wish to spare his country a new disappointment led to the suggestion that the main idea of his draft be embodied in an interpretative resolution. This suggestion, which had already been contained in the reply of the Belgian Government to the circular of the Council, was renewed by M . Henri Rolin, its delegate, to the First Committee of the Fourth Assembly. As, at the first meeting of that Committee, it found the support of the Greek, Dutch, Chilian and other delegates, it was adopted by a sub-committee of that body. Sir Lomer Gouin himself, realizing that he could not put through his draft amendment and hoping to secure, if not an unanimous, at least a majority vote in favor of the interpretative resolution, supported it. He declared in the Assembly of September 25, 1923, just before the final vote was taken: . . . we should have preferred an amendment, but we bow before the decision of the First Committee and we shall accept that of the Assembly. . . . W e were asked to give time for reflection, and we agreed with a good grace. As a loyal Member of the League we call upon you to give us, after four years of discussion, a clear interpretation of Article 10, in order that we may know what obligations we have undertaken b y signing the Covenant which has united us. W e have been open to reason, but our opinion remains unchanged. W e have exercised patience, but at the same time we have shown tenacity and perseverance in the pursuit of our object. 1 1

The resolution which the Assembly was called upon to adopt, after undergoing several alterations, was finally couched in the following terms: 10Ibid., 11

League

p. I i . of Nations,

Records

of the Fourth

Assembly,

Plenary Meetings, p. 81.

2l6

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

It is in conformity with the spirit of Article 10 that, in the event of the Council considering it to be its duty to recommend the application of military measures in consequence of an aggresson or danger or threat of aggression, the Council shall be bound to take account, more particularly (notamment), of the geographical situation and of the special conditions of each State. It is for the constitutional authorities of each Member to decide, in reference to the obligation of preserving the independence and the integrity of the territory of Members, in what degree the Member is bound to assure the execution of this obligation by employment of its military forces. The recommendation made by the Council shall be regarded as being of the highest importance and shall be taken into consideration by all the Members of the League with the desire to execute their engagements in good faith. 12 Comparing this resolution with the Canadian draft amendment, one readily recognizes the reasons why it could be deemed acceptable by the authors of the latter. What actuated the Canadian Government, once it had abandoned its original idea of striking out Article 10, was the wish to be freed from any obligation of sending troops abroad to preserve the territorial integrity and political independence of any European State against aggression. This result its draft amendment was calculated to achieve by two methods. First, the Council was to be expressly invited to take into account the political and geographical conditions of each State in advising upon the means of securing the execution of the international guarantee. Secondly, it was to be made obvious that the Council could do no more than advise, that is, recommend, and not command or order, so that the final decision would clearly rest with the constitutional authorities of each Member State. On the first point, Canada received almost complete satisfaction under the terms of the interpretative resolution. On the second, her satisfaction was only partial. It would be difficult to put the point at issue more clearly than was done by 12League

of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement Number n , p. 34.

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217

M . Rolin in a speech he delivered on September 17, 1923, as Rapporteur of the sub-committee.

H e said:

It was stated in Article 10: 'The Members of the League Undertake' . . . , and a little further on: 'In case of any such aggression or in case of any threat or danger of such aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means by which this obligation shall be fulfilled.' Article 10 thus implied both undertakings and international obligations. The text submitted by the Sub-Committee emphasised the legal nature of these international obligations. On the other hand, it had been repeated many times that the League of Nations was not a super-State, and that its Members had not surrendered their sovereignty. It followed, therefore, that the Members of the League who had, in virtue of the Covenant, contracted various engagements were, in accordance with the tradition of international law, the proper judges of those engagements. Unless any special exception was made, they retained the right to estimate the extent of their obligations. 13 T h e text submitted was thus clearly a compromise between those whom we might call the minimalists and the maximalists of collective security. A s a minimalist, C a n a d a would h a v e preferred to minimize its international obligations and to stress the right of its national parliament to judge of the nature of these obligations. T h e maximalists, on the other hand, who favored the idea of an automatic, unconditional mutual

guarantee,

would have preferred not to mention the rights of national parliaments and to emphasise the absolute character of the international

obligations.

W h e n it finally came to a vote, at noon on September 25, 1923, the minimalists were all in favor of the resolution, which gave them a large measure of satisfaction. A s minimalists could be counted such States as the M e m b e r s of the British Commonwealth of Nations, Austria, Bulgaria, H u n g a r y , Sweden and Switzerland. T h e maximalists, on the other hand, were divided. Some, such as France, Belgium, China, voted with the minimal13 League of Nations, C o m m i t t e e , p. 15.

Records

of the Fourth

Assembly,

M i n u t e s of the First

2l8

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

ists in the hope that unanimity might thereby be secured. T h i s view was vividly expressed for France b y her delegate, Professor Joseph-Barthelemy, who, in explaining the vote he was about to deliver, declared: At the third Assembly I had the honour, on behalf of the French delegation, of urging that Article 10 should remain intact. I pointed out that this article was an essential and fundamental part of our constitution. I illustrated my views with a number of metaphors, which though, perhaps, mutually inconsistent, none the less presented a profound truth. Article 10 is, I said, the standard, the pediment, the pillar, the foundation of the League of Nations. It is the cornerstone, the sign-post which shows the way to be followed by the new international law which is most nobly and most completely realised in the League of Nations. France has not abandoned the convictions which she expressed here last year. From the outset she has consistently endeavoured to give practical force to the decisions of the League and to ensure their execution. . . . Speaking quite frankly, France would have preferred that there should have been neither amendment nor interpretation. If to-day she accepts an interpretation, it is because certain new facts have arisen of which I propose to give you an account. 14 T h e end of this speech is a eulogy on Canada and the Canadians, of which it would be disobliging both to France and to her delegate to admit that it was the expression of any new f a c t ! T h e simple truth was that, for reasons of general policy, the French Government had instructed its delegate not to antagonize Canada and her friends and to accept what was obviously a rather painful compromise. M o s t of the maximalists, on the other hand, expressed their dislike of the compromise b y abstaining from voting for it. Among them were Albania, Czechoslovakia, Esthonia, Finland, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Jugoslavia and most of the LatinAmerican States. Persia alone, as the most maximalist of the maximalists, 14 League pp. 81-82.

of Nations,

Records

of the Fourth

Assembly,

Plenary

Meetings,

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219

voted against the resolution. Her delegate, the Emir ZokaedDovleh, clearly defined her position and her reasons when he said: W h y is it that Persia cannot accept any modification of this article? . . . She is surrounded by States such as Russia, T u r k e y and Afghanistan, which are not yet Members of the League. She entered the League to safeguard her independence and the integrity of her territory, and to co-operate in the work of civilisation and peace, in order that a neutral country like ours should not again suffer the consequences and evils of such a scourge as the late war. 1 5

T h e result of the voting was as follows: for the resolution, 2 9; against the resolution, 1; absent or abstaining, 2 2. Technically the resolution was therefore lost on account of Persia's negative vote. As an expression of opinion, it showed that Article 10, in its original form, still commanded the loyalty of many and perhaps even of most Members of the League. But after this vote, its authority as a constitutional provision could of course no longer be regarded as intact. III. THE WHITTLING DOWN OF ARTICLE 16

As I recalled when considering the quest for organized peace at the Peace Conference, collective security is provided for by two distinct articles of the Covenant of the League of Nations. We have just seen how the Fourth Assembly dealt with Article 10, the Wilsonian contribution. T h e destiny of Article 16, the British contribution, was different, but the general outcome of the first debates to which it gave rise before the Council and the Assembly of the League was appreciably the same. T h e League had hardly been organized that efforts set in successfully to relieve its members of part of the burden which Article 16, as Article 10, placed upon them as guarantors of the general peace. W e have now to consider how and why this came about. A t its eighth session, in the summer of 1920, the Council "ibid.,

p. 85.

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T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

of the League had before it a memorandum b y the SecretaryGeneral entitled "Preparatory measures to give effect to Article 16 of the Covenant of the L e a g u e . "

16

T h e purpose of

this memorandum and the spirit in which it was prepared are well shown b y the following preliminary paragraph, in which we read: Many people think that the League is founded more upon good intentions than upon a cool consideration of the stern realities of international trouble. It is, therefore, desirable on general grounds that while the first meetings of the Council and of the Assembly should give the world the positive hope of removing misunderstandings and promoting international co-operation, they should also show quite clearly that the Members of the League as a whole are determined, if necessity arises, to enforce their will by effective action on any particular country which, in the circumstances contemplated by the Covenant, defies the general verdict of the world. In order to provide for this "effective action," the SecretaryGeneral suggested " t h a t an International Blockade Commission . . . be appointed under the authority of the first Assembly for the purpose of studying the problem and settling the general plan of action, the organisation of the more permanent machinery required and the principles on which it should w o r k . " On the basis of this memorandum, a report was presented b y Signor Tittoni, the Italian representative on the Council, and adopted on August 3, 1920. 17 Especially in view of the fact that the only attempt at wielding the so-called "economic weapon" of the League was made in the Ethiopian dispute and bitterly resented b y the country of him who first forged it, it is interesting to note his remarks on the subject. He declared in his report to the Council: The application of this weapon is intended to safeguard the peace of the world, and the League of Nations may have recourse to this 18 League of Nations, Records of the First Assembly, Meetings of the C o m mittees, vol. I I , pp. 334 et seq. 17 League of Nations, Proces-verbal of the Eighth Session of the Council, pp. 2J et seq., 125 et seq.

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2 21

means of coercion without employing other means of constraint or it may at the same time employ military force. As soon as the League has decided, in principle, to have recourse to the application of Article 16 of the Covenant, the various measures should be taken immediately by all the States, and the question, therefore, is rather one of a series of similar measures to be taken simultaneously than of collective and united action. From what precedes, it is clear that the measures to be taken must, in order to be efficacious, in the first place be decided by common agreement, and applied simultaneously in all the different countries. In the second place, they should be closely co-ordinated, and this co-ordination can only be realised if the States come to a previous agreement as to the necessary legislative and executive steps which must be taken. Thirdly, organisations must be established which can ensure this immediate and perfect co-operation between the different countries, as soon as the measures laid down in Article 16 have to be taken. . . . In the fourth place, these organisations should be able to take all useful steps to enable the Members of the League to give each other mutual support in the general interest, and at the same time to minimise the loss and inconvenience which the blockade might entail for each of them. . . . In my view, it should be clear that the States Members of the League of Nations who declare the blockade have the right to render it effective against all States, including those who are not Members of the League, but they have not the right to force the States who do not form part of the League to declare the blockade themselves. Further, this question will no longer be of importance when all the States, without exception, belong to the League of Nations. This is the final end which we endeavour to attain and which will give to us all the moral authority which should be our principal strength and of which measures of coercion should only constitute an auxiliary and strengthening support. It is obvious that all the measures to be taken and the means of putting Article 16 into execution must be considered in advance. If the line of action to be taken is considered in advance, without waiting for the moment when action becomes necessary, the measures to be taken will clearly be more efficacious, and will have a speedier effect. Since, however, the solution of the problem which I have thus briefly outlined is of supreme general interest for all the States Members of the League of Nations, I think that the Assembly would

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be better qualified than the Council to deal with this question, and I have the honour to submit to you the following proposals :— The Council decides to place upon the Agenda of the first Assembly of the League of Nations the consideration of the necessary measures to ensure the application of Article 16 of the Covenant. With this aim in view, it will propose to the Assembly that, as a preliminary measure, an International Blockade Commission should be appointed under the authority of the first Assembly for the purpose of studying the problem and settling the general plan of action, the organisation of the more permanent machinery required and the principles on which it should work. The Council proposes that a Committee composed of an equal number of Members of the Council and of the Assembly be set up to examine the question of the constitution of this international Commission and its duties. 18 In accordance with the recommendation contained in this report, the topic w a s placed on the agenda of the First Assemb l y under the title "Preparations required to enable the economic weapon of the L e a g u e to be used in case of necessity." In the Sixth (Political) Committee of that A s s e m b l y , to which it was referred, the matter was first considered on N o v e m b e r 27, 1920. 1 9 A t the request of the chairman, M r . Branting, L o r d R o b e r t Cecil, who as former British B l o c k a d e Minister had had practical experience of economic w a r f a r e , submitted a brief report. T h i s report, entitled " N o t e s on economic pressure," m a k e s extremely interesting reading today.

I t reveals the optimism

with which the possibilities of Article 16 were considered on the morrow of the W o r l d W a r .

H a d not the Entente P o w e r s

achieved victory largely through the application of economic pressure on the enemy?

H a d they not succeeded in spite of

their l a c k of technical preparation, in spite of the difficulties created b y the existence of troublesome neutrals, and in spite of the size, composition and might of the coalition of Central League of Nations, Official Journal, N u m b e r 6, 1920, pp. 308 et seq. League of Nations, Records of the First Assembly, Meetings of the C o m mittees, vol. I I , pp. 261 et seq. 18

10

RISE A N D FALL OF C O L L E C T I V E S E C U R I T Y

223

Powers arrayed against them? Now that everything was to be arranged beforehand, that there were to be no more neutrals and that the enemy, if ever there was again to be an enemy, could only be an occasional misled and isolated aggressor, was not the problem to be solved by the League of Nations infinitely simpler? This is how Lord Robert Cecil considered it. He wrote: It is only where one of the neighbours of the blockaded State is not a Member of the League that any great complication arises, apart from questions of indirect financial pressure, which are much more difficult. It seems, therefore, that there is no reason why a very considerable amount of economic pressure could not be applied by the League to almost any offending State, even as things stand, without the creation of an International Commission. All that seems necessary is machinery by which the Members of the League can be informed that an occasion for the exercise of economic pressure has arisen, and that they are, in consequence, bound to take the necessary measures for that purpose, and this machinery might be, as far as I can see, of the simplest kind. For instance, take the case of one Member making war upon some other State in defiance of its obligations under Article 15. A s soon as that fact actually occurs the obligation arises for each of the other Members of the League to prevent its nationals having any intercourse with those of the Covenant-breaking State. All that is required, therefore, is to create sufficient machinery to enable the Members of the League to know that such an emergency has arisen. For this purpose it would not seem to be necessary to do more than charge a special department or even a special official of the Secretariat with the duty of watching for the occurrence of such an emergency, and to entrust him with the duty of immediately calling the attention of the Members of the Council to the fact that it had arisen. T h e Council would then hold a meeting summoned with the least possible delay, and if they were satisfied that the emergency had arisen, they would be bound so to inform the Members of the League, and call upon them to fulfil their obligations under Article 16. Whether this particular machinery will be thought by the Committee to be all that is wanted or not it is for them to decide, but I certainly hope that they will take this aspect of the question suggested

224

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

to them into their consideration, because if they agree with the general line of this reasoning much can be done to put the economic weapon into a condition for effective action, without waiting for the creation of any such complicated machinery as an International Commission with its reports and so on.20 T h e simple optimism reflected in these words was, however, not shared b y all the States represented even in the Assembly of 1920, which as y e t included none of the defeated Powers. T h e three Scandinavian neutrals had already submitted draft amendments to Article 16. In favor of such Members of the League " f o r whom the application" of economic

sanctions

"might entail serious danger," they proposed that certain facilities and exceptions be provided. In submitting its draft amendment to that effect, the Swedish Government added a note in which it observed: The economic blockade, which by virtue of this Article threatens any State which violates the Covenants of the League, constitutes the most effective coercive weapon of the League; and it is clearly of the utmost importance that the blockade should be enforced in the most rapid and effective fashion possible. In the view of the Swedish Government, however, the fact should not be ignored that, for certain States of secondary importance—whose situation owing to the vicinity of other and more important States, is specially exposed — a complete rupture of economic relations with such powerful neighbours would present grave dangers. It can, indeed, be imagined that in such a case the Great Power in question might be tempted to occupy the territory of the smaller Power, so as to protect the very important economic interests which, as a result of the blockade, would be at stake. For this reason the Swedish Government is of opinion that it would be desirable in cases of this nature to leave to the Council the option of modifying in some measure the obligation upon a Member of the League to take part in the blockade. 21 In presenting his above-mentioned report, on November 27, 1920, Lord Robert Cecil, who therein had made no reference to these draft amendments, added in an oral statement: 20

Ibid., pp. 329-330.

21

Ibid., p. 332.

RISE A N D FALL OF C O L L E C T I V E S E C U R I T Y

225

. . . that there were two other matters which would have to be considered by the proposed International Commission: — (1) The case of those countries which would incur grave danger by enforcing a blockade, and the support to be given by Members of the League to one another in financial and economic measures to minimise the loss and inconvenience resulting from such action. (2) The question of how far it would be possible to issue licences to certain Powers allowing them to derogate from the duties imposed upon them by the Covenant. 22 T h e discussion which followed already showed that the problem of collective security to be realized through the application of economic sanctions was not quite as simple as it at first appeared. M r . Millen, of Australia, pointed to "the danger of discrepancies in legislation on this subject between individual States." M r . Lange, of N o r w a y , "drew attention to the word 'nationals' in Article 16 of the Covenant, and asked what measures were to be taken in the case of nationals of the blockading State domiciled in the blockaded territory." M . M o t t a , of Switzerland, observed that his country "would be ready to participate in a blockade provided that it . . . did not prejudice her military neutrality." M r . F o c k , of the Netherlands, "insisted that every State should have the right to decide for itself whether the facts were really such as to j u s t i f y the Council in instituting economic measures, and to refuse to take part in such measures if they appeared to be unjustifiable." 23 T h e s e objections and observations, as y e t very timidly formulated, brought forth energetic replies from the representatives of France, Great Britain and Italy. Of these, the latter, Signor Schanzer, went furthest b y declaring "that there was some danger in allowing each State to decide for itself whether or not to carry out the blockade, when ordered b y the Council to do so." 24 22 23 24

Ibid., p. 261. Ibid., p. 262. Ibid., p. 263.

226

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

That the Council could "order" a State to take part in a blockade which seemed unjustifiable and which, even if justified, might imperial its very national existence, was an entirely novel conception of the League of Nations. After this preliminary skirmish, a sub-committee was set up which reported to the Political Commission, which in turn reported to the plenary Assembly on December 10, 1920. T h e debates to which the preparation and the presentation of these reports gave rise immediately revealed that the complexities and difficulties of the problem were far greater and more numerous than Lord Robert Cecil seemed to have suspected. T h e most important point of conflict was one relating to the interpretation of Article 16. Here, exactly as in the case of Article 10 and for exactly the same reasons, there were disagreements between maximalists, who stressed the powers of the League represented by the Council, and minimalists, who minimized those powers in order to safeguard the rights of national sovereignty. W e have already seen Signor Schanzer advocating the power of the Council to order the States not represented on it to participate in the blockade. His view was shared, with certain reservations, by Lord Robert Cecil and more unqualifiedly by M . Leon Bourgeois and Mr. Benes, of Czechoslovakia. T h e latter, on December 7, 1920, declared that " the Council alone had the authority to decide whether a breach of the Covenant had taken place, and to order the Members of the League to resort to a blockade." 25 Against this maximalist view, minimalists, such as Mr. Fock of the Netherlands, held "that the Members of the League should be free to judge for themselves whether a violation of the Covenant had taken place." This opinion, which was shared b y M . Motta of Switzerland, also received the support of Mr. H. A. L . Fisher, who happened to be the spokesman in this debate of the Lloyd George Government, far less international in its out26

Ibid.,

p . 266.

RISE A N D FALL OF C O L L E C T I V E S E C U R I T Y

227

look t h a n the South A f r i c a n administration of General Smuts, w h i c h L o r d R o b e r t C e c i l w a s representing. 2 6 A g a i n , as in the case of A r t i c l e 10, a compromise a g r e e m e n t w a s r e a c h e d and on the same basis.

E a c h State M e m b e r of

the L e a g u e w a s to be r e g a r d e d a s the final j u d g e of the emergence of the casus

foederis.

B u t it w a s n o t f r e e to w i t h h o l d

its cooperation if it recognized that a violation of the C o v e n a n t h a d t a k e n place. by

T h e r e l e v a n t p a s s a g e of the report a d o p t e d

the p l e n a r y A s s e m b l y

of

December

10, 1920, reads

as

follows: (a) It shall be the duty of the Secretary-General to call the attention of the Council to any facts which in his opinion show that a Member of the League has become a Covenant-breaking State within the meaning of Article 16; (b) Upon receiving such an intimation, the Council shall, on the request of any of its Members, hold a meeting with the least possible delay to consider it, and shall send a copy of the proces-verbal of the Meeting to all the other Members of the League; (c) As soon as a Member of the League is satisfied, in consequence of the communication of the proces-verbal of the Council, that a breach of Covenant within Article 16 has occurred, it is its duty to take measures for the purpose of carrying out the first paragraph of Article 16. 27 A n o t h e r point on w h i c h a g r e e m e n t p r o v e d difficult w a s that raised b y the S c a n d i n a v i a n a m e n d m e n t s . I n the p l e n a r y A s s e m b l y , M . L a f o n t a i n e , of B e l g i u m , m a d e a speech specifically to a t t a c k these proposals. O n behalf of his delegation he s a i d : Denmark, Sweden and Norway ask that those countries which will find themselves endangered should they take part in the blockade should not be obliged to do so. Belgium thinks, that, however great the peril which a country might have to undergo under the system which we seek to establish here, that country ought to do its duty. It was thus that Belgium understood her obligations in 1914, and she has resolved to adopt the same attitude in future, whatever the danger may be to which 20

Ibid.,

27

League

p . 267. of Nations,

Records

of the First

Assembly,

P l e n a r y M e e t i n g s , p . 409.

228

T H E QUEST FOR

PEACE

she may find herself exposed. {Applause.) W e think that all countries should interpret their duty in this manner. W e think, too, that here is the duty of international solidarity, a duty before which every interest, whatever it may be, must give place. W e fully admit that, in circumstances of this nature, powerful countries may take certain general measures, but in our opinion it would be impossible, on the pretext that they would suffer more than others, for some countries to hold aloof from the sacred task of defending justice, even at the peril of their own existence. 'Fais ce que dots, advienne que pourra.' 28 T h e matter w a s not settled b y the First A s s e m b l y . I t merely d e c i d e d to r e f e r t h e q u e s t i o n f o r f u r t h e r c o n s i d e r a t i o n to the I n t e r n a t i o n a l B l o c k a d e C o m m i t t e e w h i c h it r e q u e s t e d the C o u n cil to set u p . I t d i d s o in the f o l l o w i n g t e r m s : It is . . . desirable to consider, in accordance with the proposals made by Denmark, N o r w a y and Sweden, what measures, if any, should be taken in the case of Members of the League which, from smallness of their resources and their geographical position, might be in serious danger if they carried out to the full their obligations under the first paragraph of Article 16 against a powerful Covenantbreaking State. This is a matter which may have to be considered at any moment from a practical point of view if the necessity for coercion of a Covenant-breaking State should arise. In that case the Council would have to take whatever measures it thought suitable for the emergency. 2 9 O n the w h o l e , t h e F i r s t A s s e m b l y did n o t d o m u c h m o r e t h a n o p e n the d i s c u s s i o n o n the possibilities of the p r a c t i c a l a p p l i c a tion of A r t i c l e

16.

I n the c o u r s e of this d i s c u s s i o n ,

certain

difficulties h a d b e c o m e a p p a r e n t w h i c h s e e m e d to h a v e e s c a p e d the a t t e n t i o n of the f r a m e r s of the C o v e n a n t or a t l e a s t to have been underestimated b y them.

T h e feverish atmosphere

w h i c h h a d p r e v a i l e d in P a r i s d u r i n g t h e first m o n t h s of

1919,

the a b s e n c e of t h e d e f e a t e d P o w e r s a n d of the n e u t r a l s a n d the r e c e n t m e m o r i e s of the final s u c c e s s of the i n t e r - A l l i e d b l o c k a d e h a d all c o n t r i b u t e d to c r e a t e c e r t a i n illusions a s to the e a s e 28

Ibid.,

p. 401.

29

Ibid.,

p. 409.

RISE A N D FALL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

229

with which even an incomplete League of Nations could organize and work an effective scheme of collective security. Since then, the difficulties had begun to be appreciated. Furthermore, they had in themselves of course very appreciably increased by reason of the negative attitude of the United States. It is therefore not surprising that, after a fortnight's discussion at Geneva, Lord Robert Cecil should, in his final speech on the subject, have adopted a much more cautious tone than in his above-quoted preliminary notes. On December 10, 1920, in submitting the report of the Sixth Committee to the plenary Assembly, he declared: The present position in the Covenant is not very satisfactory. You have that provision in Article 16. It is indeed one of the vital, the cardinal, provisions in the whole Covenant, without which you would not have the final material guarantee which in human society is no doubt necessary for the enforcement of even the most beneficent code. Though you have got that solemnly enacted in the Covenant, no means, no machinery, is provided for carrying it into execution.30 It was with a view to the setting up of such machinery that the Assembly, following the lead of the Council, recommended the institution of an International Blockade Committee. On February 22, 1921, the Council acted on these recommendations. 31 It decided to request the Governments of Great Britain, France, Italy, Japan, Cuba, Spain, Norway and Switzerland to appoint experts to constitute the International Blockade Committee. A t the same time the Secretary-General was instructed to secure from all the States Members of the League the official information considered necessary for the work of that Committee. It was not before June 15, 1921, however, that the SecretaryGeneral was in a position to make known the final composition of that body. 32 T h e States which were to be represented thereon "Ibid., p. 396. 31League of Nations, Official Journal, N u m b e r 2, 1921, pp. 1 1 6 - 1 1 7 . '"Ibid,., N u m b e r 5 - 6 , 1921, p p . 430 et seq.

230

T H E QUEST FOR

PEACE

had been selected by the Council with a view to allowing the most divergent national interests to be considered. In asking Spain, Cuba, Norway and Switzerland to participate in a preliminary discussion on economic sanctions, the Council was obviously animated by the desire to be informed of the feelings and of the wishes of those Members of the League who had the least to expect and the most to fear from an international blockade. Of these four States, three had been neutral throughout the World War. For them, to participate in a system of collective security was therefore to abandon a regime of complete national independence, which had protected them against the worst effects of the international catastrophe in the past, in favor of an untried experiment which might well, in the future, involve them in dangerous complications. Furthermore, these three States, and to no less a degree Cuba also, were geographically so located, politically so weak and economically so dependent upon their neighbors that, while inevitably pacific themselves, they felt extremely vulnerable in case of general hostilities. In the balance sheet of their national security, Article 16, strictly interpreted, might therefore well be listed as a liability more than as an asset. Thus constituted, the International Blockade Committee met for a week's session at the end of August 1921 in Geneva. The information with which it had been supplied by the Members of the League was scanty. Most of the latter had not replied at all to the Secretary-General's request and even the material sent in by the nineteen States which had, did not contain much that proved useful. The report of the Committee was transmitted by the Council to the Second Assembly, which referred it to its Third Committee. It was found so involved by the members of this latter body that, on its first consideration on September 9, 1 9 2 1 , Lord Robert Cecil moved That the members of the International Blockade Committee who are also members of this Committee, be requested to formulate and

RISE A N D FALL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

231

submit to this Committee the definite recommendations contained in the report of the International Blockade Committee. 3 3

Accordingly Messrs. Schanzer, of Italy, Oka, of Japan, de Aguero, of Cuba, and M a x Huber, of Switzerland, who had represented their countries in the Blockade Committee and to whom were added representatives of France and of Belgium, were constituted into a sub-committee. Three days later this sub-committee presented to the Third Committee a document entitled " T h e Conclusions of the Report of the International Blockade Committee." 34 It was on this document that all the ensuing discussions were to be based and it was through this channel that the principal suggestions of the Blockade Committee finally came to be embodied in the resolutions of the Assembly. Before quoting these resolutions, the general tendency of which is so clear that they call but for very little comment, let us see how they came to be adopted. When the conclusions of the International Blockade Committee were submitted to the Third Committee of the Second Assembly, it was very obvious that they were deeply to disappoint the staunchest friends of the principle of collective security. Lord Robert Cecil, who was at the head of these, who had not been called upon to cooperate with the Blockade Committee, but who was present at the Second Assembly as a delegate from South Africa, did not disguise his feelings. A t the very first meeting of the Third Committee, when the question of the publicity of its debates arose, he spoke in favor of complete publicity and declared: T h e Committee had very difficult questions to consider, and since a satisfactory solution of them was opposed by the official classes, it was essential that the Committee should be supported by public opinion. On the other hand, certain problems would perhaps prove 33 League of Nations, Records mittees, vol. I, p. 289. 34Ibid., pp. 291, 3SS et seq.

of the Second

Assembly,

M i n u t e s of the C o m -

232

THE QUEST FOR

PEACE

insoluble, and it was desirable that the public should realise the real obstacles in the way of the success of the efforts made for their solution. Finally, if recommendations were made by the Committee, they would only be of value in so far as they were supported b y the public opinion of the world. 3 5 As

no

adopted.

one

opposed

this

suggestion,

it w a s

immediately

T h a n k s to this c i r c u m s t a n c e , w e a r e a b l e to f o l l o w

the d e b a t e s of the C o m m i t t e e in all its d e t a i l s . A f t e r L o r d R o b e r t C e c i l h a d p r e s e n t e d his first r e m a r k s on the w o r k of the B l o c k a d e C o m m i t t e e , r e m a r k s w h i c h , in spite of their d i p l o m a t i c Schanzer

replied.

form, were u n m i s t a k a b l y critical, T h i s Italian

Signor

delegate, who had played

a

l e a d i n g p a r t in t h e w o r k of t h a t C o m m i t t e e , w a s to i n t e r p r e t a n d to d e f e n d its w o r k b e f o r e the S e c o n d C o m m i t t e e as r a p p o r t e u r b o t h of the s u b - c o m m i t t e e

a n d of the T h i r d

Com-

mittee : In reply to Lord Robert Cecil, he stated, first, that the International Blockade Committee realised that Article 16 constituted an effective weapon, but one which might be turned against the nation which applied it; it was for this reason that it had thought necessary to interpret it with certain reservations, and to leave certain questions unanswered. According to the Blockade Committee's interpretation, Article 16 referred particularly to economic pressure for the purpose of avoiding war, and not to the traditional naval blockade. T h e Blockade Committee wished, above all, to put forward two fundamental principles: respect for the sovereignty of each State in the interpretation of facts which might give rise to the application of Article 16, and the centralisation, by the Council, of the measures employed in the use of the economic weapon. A s to the possibility of conceding to certain States the right to apply this measure only in a partial degree, M . Schanzer recalled the fact that this question was settled by the Blockade Committee in such a w a y as to exclude all exemptions, except in specific cases. A s regards the case of a blockaded State neighbouring on a State which was not a Member of the League of Nations, M . Schanzer 35

Ibid.,

p. 284.

RISE A N D

FALL OF COLLECTIVE

SECURITY

233

a d m i t t e d t h a t the C o m m i t t e e h a d not arrived a t a n y definite solution. 3 6

These opening remarks suffice to show how Signor Schanzer, who a year before had spoken of the Council's "ordering" States not represented on it to take part in the blockade, had been led to temper his views. The latter, which were those of the Blockade Committee itself, differed from those of the original authors of Article 16 on four main points. Before considering them in turn, it may be useful here to recall the exact terms of the first paragraph of Article 16, on which the discussions were principally to turn. This paragraph is worded as follows: Should a n y M e m b e r of the L e a g u e resort to w a r in disregard of its c o v e n a n t s under A r t i c l e s 12, 13 or 1 5 , it shall ipso facto be deemed to h a v e c o m m i t t e d a n a c t of w a r against all other M e m b e r s of the L e a g u e , w h i c h h e r e b y u n d e r t a k e i m m e d i a t e l y to s u b j e c t it to the s e v e r a n c e of all trade or financial relations, the prohibition of all intercourse b e t w e e n their nationals and the nationals of the c o v e n a n t b r e a k i n g S t a t e , a n d the prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the c o v e n a n t - b r e a k i n g State and the nationals of a n y other State, w h e t h e r a M e m b e r of the L e a g u e or not.

The first observation which an unprejudiced reading of these provisions seems to suggest is that in the intention of their framers, a violation of Articles 12, 13 or 15 of the Covenant by any Member of the League was automatically to create a state of war between that Member and all others. On this point, the comment of the Blockade Committee was to the effect that T h e unilateral action of the d e f a u l t i n g State does not create a state of w a r ; it merely entitles the other M e m b e r s of the L e a g u e to declare t h a t a state of w a r exists between them a n d the C o v e n a n t b r e a k i n g State. 3 7

This interpretation, whether faithful or not, was undoubtedly wise, as it prevented, to use M . Motta's words in the Assembly ss

Ibid.,

p. 287.

37Ibid.,

p. 355-

THE QUEST FOR

234

PEACE

of September 26, 1921, "the Covenant-breaking State" from letting "loose, by its action, a general state of war in the world." 38 On the second point, of still greater importance, there is no doubt that the proposals of the Blockade Committee were not in full harmony with the text of Article 16. In the case of a resort to war in violation of the Covenant by a Member of the League, this Article called for action on the part of "all other Members of the League, which hereby undertake immediately to subject it" etc. T o this the Blockade Committee remarked: All States alike must apply the measures of economic pressure, with the following exceptions: (a) It may be necessary to assign certain special duties to States whose territory immediately adjoins the defaulting State, and to States in a position to contribute the forces necessary for taking naval, military, or air measures. (b) T h e Council may, at the request of a Member, which can show that the facilities demanded are essential for its economic or political security, grant such exemptions as in the opinion of the Council will not conflict with the aims of Article 16. . . . Financial measures should, above all, include the forbidding of all access to the money markets in countries of the League, subject to exception, if facilities subsequently as good could be obtained on some market of a country not a Member of the League. 3 9

We have here an echo of the draft amendments presented by the Scandinavian States to the First Assembly in favor of those for whom the application of sanctions "might entail serious danger." But Sweden, Denmark and Norway were not the only Members of the League who felt threatened by a drastic application of Article 16. On September 16, 1921, Mr. Pfliigl, the representative of Austria, stated that immense difficulties would supervene for Austria if she were forced rigidly to apply Article 16 of the Covenant. Owing to 38

League

of Nations,

Records

of the Second

Assembly,

Plenary

Meetings,

P· 413· 30 League of Nations, Records mittees, v o l . I, pp. 356, 357.

of the Second

Assembly,

M i n u t e s of the C o m -

RISE A N D FALL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

235

her peculiar geographical situation, she was unable to exist without her neighbours. In particular, she was entirely dependent upon foreign sources for her coal supply. M . Pflügl therefore supported the amendment of the Scandinavian countries, which laid down that certain derogations in the application of Article 16 of the Covenant should be allowed. 40 M r . de A g u e r o , on b e h a l f of C u b a , a d d e d t h a t " h e , l i k e the A u s t r i a n R e p r e s e n t a t i v e , h a d b e e n i n s t r u c t e d b y his

Govern-

m e n t to s u p p o r t the a m e n d m e n t of the S c a n d i n a v i a n tries."

coun-

41

O n b e h a l f of C a n a d a , Sir G e o r g e P e r l e y m a d e similar reservations.42 was M r .

T h e m o s t o u t s p o k e n of all d e l e g a t e s on this p o i n t Manini

R i o s , the r e p r e s e n t a t i v e

of

Uruguay,

who

b e f o r e the p l e n a r y A s s e m b l y d e c l a r e d , o n S e p t e m b e r 26, 1 9 2 1 : W e all know that the Scandinavian amendments were actuated by quite legitimate considerations. M y country is also one of those which is the neighbour of nations far more powerful and consequently it is inevitably bound to them from an economic point of view while enjoying cordial and friendly relations in the political and moral fields. Uruguay is situated in a corner of South America, hemmed in between the Argentine Republic and Brazil; it is separated from the former by a narrow river, and it has an almost open frontier of 500 kilometres contiguous to the latter; and it would be unable to carry out its duties as a Member of the League of Nations, and maintain a blockade against either the Argentine or against Brazil should either of these countries fail in their international duties. 43 M . M o t t a , of S w i t z e r l a n d , w h i l e a l l u d i n g to his o w n c o u n t r y o n l y b y i n f e r e n c e , s t a t e d in g e n e r a l t e r m s w h a t w a s t h e o b v i o u s t r u t h a n d one to w h i c h S i g n o r S c h a n z e r h a d a l r e a d y

alluded

in his first r e p l y to L o r d R o b e r t C e c i l , n a m e l y t h a t : one of the indispensable conditions for rendering the blockade really effective is the universality of the League of Nations. It is, indeed, "Ibid., p. 295. Ibid., pp. 366-367. 43 League of Nations, p. 4 1 1 .

"Ibid.,

p. 296.

12

Records

of the Second

Assembly,

Plenary

Meetings,

236

T H E QUEST FOR P E A C E

difficult to imagine how a blockade could operate completely as long as the United States do not participate in it, or have not recognised it. This principle of the universality of the League is, in theory, proclaimed by everyone; unfortunately, it has not yet taken root in the conscience of the whole world. It is important to note that the International Blockade Committee has understood that this universality is of vital importance, and that it is not only a postulate of pure reason, but, above all, a postulate of practical reason.44 Article 16 called for "the severance" and the "prevention of all financial, commercial or personal intercourse between the nationals of the covenant-breaking State" and the nationals of all other countries. Nothing could more explicitly define complete ostracism than the terms deliberately used b y the authors of that article. T h e Blockade Committee, on the contrary — and that was the third very important point of difference — were v e r y reserved and v e r y discriminating in their recommendations on this point. T h u s we read in their conclusions: . . . those relations, the severance of which is not provided for by Article 16, may continue to exist between the defaulting State and the other Members of the League. Measures which would not be calculated to exercise a decisive influence on the economic resisting power of the defaulting State should not be included among the measures which have to be taken by virtue of this Article. . . . For the same reasons, the Committee considers that the cutting off of the food supplies of the civil population of the defaulting State should be regarded as an extremely drastic measure which should only be applied if the other measures employed have been found to be inadequate.45 Although the T h i r d Committee of the Second Assembly, at the insistent demands of Lord Robert Cecil, M . Reynald, of France, and M . Poullet, of Belgium, finally consented to show less leniency to the Covenant-breaking State than the Blockade Committee, the measures it recommended were far less drastic than those contemplated b y the framers of Article 16 in 1919. " Ibid.., p. 414. League of Nations, mittees, v o l . I, p. 355. 45

Records

of the Second

Assembly,

M i n u t e s of the C o m -

R I S E A N D F A L L OF C O L L E C T I V E S E C U R I T Y

237

The texts which they proposed were less intended to secure the complete isolation and blockade of the aggressor than to exercise upon him a gradual restraining pressure.

Here also

the reluctance of the former neutrals and of other States to be drawn into a general struggle, combined with the lack of universality of the League, led to a distinct blunting of the teeth of Article 16, if that expression be allowed. Here as elsewhere, therefore, the desire to reassure the law-abiding Members of the League as to the nature and extent of their obligations suggested concessions which were at least equally reassuring for any would-be aggressor. Fourthly and finally, the automatic and therefore immediate action contemplated under Article 16 made way, in the conclusions of the Blockade Committee, for a policy of eclectic, gradual and consequently often deferred intervention by the League. It is in the following terms that that Committee outlined the procedure which it recommended against the Covenant-breaker: It is the duty of the various Members of the League to decide whether violation of the Covenant has been committed, and whether they ought, in consequence, to adopt the measures laid down in the Covenant. All cases of violation of the Covenant should be referred to the Council as a matter of urgency, at the request of any Member of the League. The Secretary-General would communicate to the Members events which might possibly lead to a violation of the Covenant. Upon receipt of such communication, the Council would convene. When convening, the Council would summon representatives of the parties to the conflict, and all States which are neighbours of the defaulting State, or which normally maintain close economic relations with it, or whose co-operation would be especially valuable for the application of Article 16. The selection of the States which would have to be summoned would be made provisionally by the Acting-President of the Council, subject to the decision arrived at bv the Council. The Council's decision that there has been a violation of the Covenant shall be immediately communicated to all the Members of

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the League, with a statement of reasons, and with an invitation to the Members to give it their support. I t should be made public. In decisions of the Council as to whether the Covenant has been violated, the votes of the States which are parties to the conflict shall not be counted. T h e Council should be assisted b y a Technical Committee at the moment when Article 16 has to be applied, and in view of the putting into force of the sanctions. T h e composition of this Committee, which will sit permanently as soon as the action decided on has been taken, will be subject to modification, and will include, as the case may require, representatives of the States most especially affected. T h e Council should fix a date on which the measures are to be taken, and should intimate that date to all the Members of the League, without prejudice to the right for any State to take preliminary measures. 46

On this point, the advice of the Blockade Committee was followed by the Third Committee and by the Assembly itself. After prolonged debates, the latter finally, on October 4, 1 9 2 1 , recorded its views on the economic weapon of the League by adopting four draft amendments to Article 16 and nineteen interpretative resolutions which "shall, so long as the amendments have not been put in force in the form required by the Covenant, constitute rules for guidance which the Assembly recommends, as a provisional measure, to the Council and to the Members of the League in connection with the application of Article 1 6 . " 47 As the draft amendments in question have never secured the ratifications which would have been required in order to put them into force, we shall be content here to quote the most significant of the nineteen interpretative resolutions. They read as follows: 3. T h e unilateral action of the defaulting State cannot create a state of war: it merely entitles the other Members of the League to resort to acts of war or to declare themselves in a state of war with 10

Ibid., pp. 355-356· League of Nations, Records of the Second Assembly, Plenary Meetings, p. 803. 47

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239

the Covenant-breaking State; but it is in accordance with the spirit of the Covenant that the League of Nations should attempt, at least at the outset, to avoid war, and to restore peace by economic pressure. 4. It is the duty of each Member of the League to decide for itself whether a breach of the Covenant has been committed. T h e fulfilment of their duties under Article 16 is required from Members of the League by the express terms of the Covenant, and they cannot neglect them without breach of their T r e a t y obligations. 5. All cases of breach of Covenant under Article 16 shall be referred to the Council as a matter of urgency at the request of any Member of the League. Further, if a breach of Covenant be committed, or if there arise a danger of such breach being committed, the Secretary-General shall at once give notice thereof to all the Members of the Council. Upon receipt of such a request by a Member of the League, or of such a notice b y the Secretary-General, the Council will meet as soon as possible. T h e Council shall summon representatives of the parties to the conflict and of all States which are neighbours of the defaulting State, or which normally maintain close economic relations with it, or whose co-operation would be especially valuable for the application of Article 16. 6. If the Council is of opinion that a State has been guilty of a breach of Covenant, the Minutes of the meeting at which that opinion is arrived at shall be immediately sent to all Members of the League, accompanied by a statement of reasons and b y an invitation to take action accordingly. T h e fullest publicity shall be given to this decision. 7. For the purpose of assisting it to enforce Article 16, the Council may, if it thinks fit, be assisted by a technical Committee. This Committee, which will remain in permanent session as soon as the action decided on is taken, may include, if desirable, representatives of the States specially affected. 8. T h e Council shall recommend the date on which the enforcement of economic pressure, under Article 16, is to be begun, and shall give notice of that date to all the Members of the League. 9. All States must be treated alike as regards the application of the measures of economic pressure, with the following reservations: (a) It may be necessary to recommend the execution of special measures by certain States; (b) If it is thought desirable to postpone, wholly or partially, in the case of certain States, the effective application of the economic sanctions laid down in Article 16, such postponement shall not be

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permitted except in so far as it is desirable for the success of the common plan of action, or reduces to a minimum the losses and embarrassments which may be entailed in the case of certain Members of the League by the application of the sanctions. 10. It is not possible to decide beforehand, and in detail, the various measures of an economic, commercial and financial nature to be taken in each case where economic pressure is to be applied. When the case arises, the Council shall recommend to the Members of the League a plan for joint action. 11. The interruption of diplomatic relations may, in the first place, be limited to the withdrawal of the heads of Missions. 12. Consular relations may possibly be maintained. 13. For the purposes of the severance of relations between persons belonging to the Covenant-breaking State and persons belonging to other States Members of the League, the test shall be residence and not nationality. 14. In cases of prolonged application of economic pressure, measures of increasing stringency may be taken. The cutting off of the food supplies of the civil population of the defaulting State shall be regarded as an extremely drastic measure which shall only be applied if the other measures available are clearly inadequate. 15. Correspondence and all other methods of communication shall be subjected to special regulations. 16. Humanitarian relations shall be continued. 17. Efforts should be made to arrive at arrangements which would ensure the co-operation of States non-Members of the League in the measures to be taken. 48 Commenting on these resolutions, which were adopted practically unchanged, the T h i r d Committee, in its report of September 21, 1 9 2 1 , declared: There is no doubt that Article 16 is one of the most important and fundamental Articles contained in the Covenant. As Lord Robert Cecil pointed out, in the speech which he made on this question at the First Assembly, the most powerful weapon possessed by the League of Nations is the public opinion of the world, which will force the Members of the League to respect the Covenant. In the domestic affairs of States, however, it is sometimes necessary to use force in order to compel certain individuals to respect the law, and in the 48 League et seq.

of Nations,

Official Journal,

Special Supplement N u m b e r 6, pp. 24

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241

same way it may, in certain cases, be necessary to resort to the economic weapon in order to compel Members of the League to fulfil their obligations. It follows, therefore, that Article 16 is one of the principal elements of the legal system embodied in the Covenant, and this system would be altogether incomplete were no provision made for the enforcement of effective sanctions against States which did not fulfil their obligations. On the other hand, there is no doubt whatever that the application of Article 16 involves many complicated questions which it is very difficult to solve. The starting point of the argument and of the conclusions arrived at by the Blockade Committee has been as follows: •— The authors of the Covenant had considered the League of Nations as an organisation embracing all or nearly all States, and capable of prompt action in the event of breach of the Covenant. In the view of the International Blockade Committee, the application of Article 16, even had the League been universal, might have formidable consequences either for the League of Nations in general or for some of its Members. But the aforementioned Committee was of the opinion that as the League of Nations had not yet attained a world-wide or nearly worldwide character, a very rigid application of Article 16 would not only meet with very great obstacles, but might also place the States Members of the League in very difficult situations. That is why the International Blockade Committee has seen fit to recommend solutions which, in the present stage of the League of Nations, will, so far as possible, make allowance for the facts as they are. Your Committee, therefore, considered that it must proceed cautiously and by degrees; hence the texts which it ventures to submit to you. 49 T h e report of the T h i r d Committee w a s finally adopted b y an unanimous vote of the A s s e m b l y . A s h a s o f t e n been the case in the L e a g u e of N a t i o n s , this f o r m a l unanimity w a s , h o w e v e r , a n y t h i n g but a true indication of the real sentiments of the various delegations. T h o s e States, such as the f o r m e r neutrals, the B r i t i s h Dominions and others, which looked upon Article 1 6 as a liability more than as an asset, w e r e relieved when the 10 League of Nations, mittees, vol. I, p. 3 8 1 .

Records

of the Second Assembly,

Meetings of the Com-

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T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

Assembly interpreted it almost into insignificance. B u t those, such as France and Belgium, for instance, who felt threatened and would have been happy to place their trust in collective security, either openly deplored the action taken or pretended to favor it b y putting upon it a most misleading construction. T h u s , for example, M . Poullet, of Belgium, who had throughout struggled for a stringent interpretation of Article 16, declared in the plenary Assembly, when the report of the T h i r d Committee was presented: I wish to register the complete agreement of my delegation with the thorough, lucid and complete report submitted by M. Schanzer, and with the draft resolutions which follow it. Indeed, Committee No. 3 had only one aim, which directed all its work — that was, not to weaken the scope of Article 16.50 It would be difficult to imagine a more perfect example of official optimism or of wishful thinking. In fact, it was generally recognized that, after the Assembly of 1921 had ended its labors, the sanctions provided for in Article 16 of the Covenant had been seriously limited in their possible efficacy. Confidence in collective security, which had never been complete anywhere, especially since the United States had decided to remain aloof from the League, was so shaken b y these decisions that, as we shall see, international disarmament was rendered impossible. Lest I be accused of misreading these developments and of judging them less in the light of the contemporaneous situation than in that of later happenings which clearly showed the frailty of Article 16, I m a y perhaps be allowed to recall the opinion I ventured to express on them as far back as 1925. Speaking on the then recent history of Articles 10 and 16 before the much lamented Williamstown Institute of Politics, I declared, in the late summer of that y e a r : By the various interpretations adopted, these articles have been so appreciably weakened, that to-day no responsible European ™ League p. 409.

of Nations,

Records

of the Second

Assembly,

Plenary

Meetings,

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243

statesman would venture to stake his reputation and the security of his country on the potential protection of the League in case of international disturbance.61 In order to restore confidence and to promote the disarmament which the Covenant called for, new guarantees had to be created. It is to the efforts made to reconstruct the edifice of collective security, shattered b y the debates on Articles 10 and 16 in the first years of the League's existence, that we shall now direct our attention. IV.

T H E T R E A T Y OF M U T U A L

GUARANTEE

These efforts were so intimately connected with those made immediately after the World W a r to promote disarmament that, although the latter subject will be dealt with in our next chapter, it is impossible not to allude to it here. I t will be recalled that, according to President Wilson's Fourteen Points, national armaments were to be "reduced to the lowest point consistent with domestic s a f e t y " which implied "the protection of territory against invasion." 52 N o w it is obvious that "domestic s a f e t y " thus interpreted depends upon a variety of factors, of which mutual assistance is one of the most important. If any State, even the most powerful and the least vulnerable, can depend only on its own national armaments for its domestic safety, the lowest point to which it will reduce them will remain high. I f , on the contrary, any State, even the weakest and most exposed, can absolutely count upon the protection and support of its neighbors, it will be safe for it to disarm very thoroughly. T h e link between collective security and disarmament was both expressly recognized and materially strengthened in Article 8 of the Covenant, under which the " M e m b e r s of the League recognise that the maintenance of peace requires the reduction of national armaments to the lowest point consistent 51 William E . R a p p a r d , International H a v e n , 1925, pp. 143-144. 62 See a b o v e p. 132.

Relations

as Viewed

from Geneva,

New

244

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

with national safety and the enforcement by common action of international obligations." This logical connection became apparent as soon as the practical problem of the reduction of national armaments was considered by the bodies set up for the purpose by the League of Nations. Thus, as early as December 1920, the Permanent Advisory Commission for Military Questions which had been created by the Council reported "that it does not consider that the reduction of armaments can be profitably considered and effectively assured in the present state of the world and with the actual composition of the League of Nations." Among the conditions upon the fulfillment of which that reduction depended, they mentioned, beside the faithful execution by the defeated Powers of the disarmament clauses of the Peace Treaties, "the practical and early organisation of cooperative action on the part of the League of Nations." 53 The dependence of disarmament on the organization of collective security was again often emphasized in the course of the following years. In spite of all proposals and discussions, the burden of national armaments remained crushing. France in particular, which was the dominant military Power of Europe, obstinately refused to disarm. After four and a half years of war, she had repelled the German invader and disarmed him. She had finally succeeded in doing so, after sustaining terrible losses, mainly thanks to the valor of her own troops and to the assistance of their British and American comrades-in-arms. N o w the latter were fast leaving the Continent. France, which had received neither the territorial guarantees she had demanded nor the military alliance of the United States and of Great Britain which she had been promised in exchange, was left alone, face to face with a vindictive foe, whose population outnumbered hers by more than three to two 53 Report of the Permanent Advisory Commission on military, naval and air questions to the Council of the League of Nations, Geneva, December 4, 1920, p. 4. (This report remained unpublished by order of the Council.)

RISE A N D FALL OF C O L L E C T I V E S E C U R I T Y

245

and whose industrial resources were infinitely greater. attitude

of

France

was

clearly

explained

and

The

justified

by

M . N o b l e m a i r e in one of t h e m o s t m o v i n g s p e e c h e s e v e r d e l i v e r e d in G e n e v a .

A d d r e s s i n g the S e c o n d A s s e m b l y , on O c t o -

b e r i , 1 9 2 1 , this F r e n c h d e p u t y , w h o h a d s e r v e d as a c o l o n e l in the w a r , d e c l a r e d , in r e p l y t o v a r i o u s c r i t i c a l a l l u s i o n s to French

"militarism":

. . . we desire guarantees. W e desire the guarantees that everyone desires, and rightly desires. W e desire the guarantees which are due to us from the observance of treaties — the complete and loyal observance of treaties, which is one of the most essential and fundamental elements in our Covenant. Our attitude is completely in harmony with the spirit and the letter of our common charter when we declare that each one of us must demand such guarantees, and insist upon securing them both for himself and for his neighbours. . . . W e cannot regard our guarantees — which, I would have you note, are guarantees for the whole of Europe — we cannot regard them as reliable and complete, as they must be both for our own security and for that of Europe, until the day comes when the German Republic is firmly established, and has attained to a regime of stable democratic institutions, thus assuring the final triumph in Germany of the principles of justice, honour and liberty, which are the ideals of the League of Nations. . . . Is it our fault that circumstances compel us to act, and to act almost alone, as the guardians of the T r e a t y throughout the world? Is it our fault if we have to maintain outside our frontiers an army of 200,000 men to act as sentinels of the peace in every quarter? Is it for our pleasure that our shoulders are bent — though not broken, I assure you — beneath the burden of military expenditure? For the moment, it is true, France is compelled to remain military, because she does not wish to see another war; because she does not wish that the million and a half of her sons who have died shall have died in vain. 5 4 T h i s w a s the F r e n c h r e p l y to the v i e w s w h i c h h a d formulated b y Lord Robert Cecil a few days previously. 54 League of Nations, pp. 642-643.

Records

of

the

Second

Assembly,

Plenary

been Al-

Meetings,

246

T H E QUEST FOR P E A C E

though speaking as a delegate for South Africa, the latter had surely expressed the general opinion of the British Empire when he had declared that "without some form of limitation of armaments, no organisation, however well constructed, can hope permanently to ensure the peace of the world."

65

T h e Franco-British dialogue on the relations between international sanctions and international disarmament, which had, as a matter of fact, already begun at the Peace Conference, was pursued throughout all the first decade of the life of the League of Nations.

"Organize collective security," said the French,

"and we shall be only too delighted to disarm."

"Disarm,"

replied the British, "and thus restore confidence without which no measure of coercion can ever create security." T h e conflict was primarily one of geography and of military organization.

T h a t Great Britain, with a navy unrivalled in

Europe, with no neighbors on land and no large conscript army, should have shown more confidence in her more distant neighbors and less patience with the armies of others than France, whose territory bordered on that of two large and at least potentially very powerful rivals, was but natural. But besides these external circumstances and perhaps not without a subtle connection with them, there was a constant psychological misunderstanding between the two nations. In order to explain it, I cannot do better than to quote an even more than usually brilliant saying of m y delightful friend Salvador de Madariaga, who was long a witness and a victim of this misunderstanding. In his remarkable book on disarmament, the former Director of the Disarmament Section of the League of Nations Secretariat wrote, in 1 9 2 9 : The whole difficulty comes from the particular region in which the centre of gravity of their respective psychologies is situated, which in the Frenchman is above, and in the Englishman below, the neck. The Frenchman thinks with his head, and with nothing but his head; the Englishman thinks — or rather, as he himself says, 'feels somehow' ™Ibid., p. 66.

RISE A N D FALL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

247

— with everything but his head, and, provided he does not allow his head to meddle with it, he is generally right. T h e Frenchman, trusting thought, is apt to distrust life, and therefore he endeavours to imprison future life in present thought by foreseeing every case and regulating every action in advance; while the Englishman, who trusts life but mistrusts thought (his own and still more so the Frenchman's) refuses to foresee, and is content to cross the bridge when he comes to it — even at the risk of having to ford the river on finding there is no bridge at all. 5 6 O f the t w o o p p o s i n g v i e w s , the F r e n c h w a s g e n e r a l l y

that

also of h e r C o n t i n e n t a l allies, t h a t is, of m o s t of the S t a t e s b o r dering on G e r m a n y , Austria and H u n g a r y .

T h e British view,

on t h e other h a n d , w a s s h a r e d b y L a t i n A m e r i c a a n d b y the f o r m e r n e u t r a l s , w h o w e r e n a t u r a l l y a n x i o u s as soon a s p o s sible to s e c u r e t h e e f f e c t i v e a n d f r i e n d l y c o o p e r a t i o n of

the

d e f e a t e d P o w e r s . A s the n e e d f o r c o m p r o m i s e w a s f e l t o n b o t h sides, t h e T h i r d A s s e m b l y , a f t e r m a n y p r e p a r a t o r y

debates,

f i n a l l y s u c c e e d e d in s e c u r i n g t h e u n a n i m o u s a d o p t i o n of

the

f o l l o w i n g r e s o l u t i o n , in w h i c h its a u t h o r s h a d s t r i v e n to d o j u s t i c e to b o t h of t h e m : ι . N o scheme for the reduction of armaments, within the meaning of Article 8 of the Covenant, can be fully successful unless it is general. 2. In the present state of the world many Governments would be unable to accept the responsibility for a serious reduction of armaments unless they received in exchange a satisfactory guarantee of the safety of their country. 3. Such a guarantee can be found in a defensive agreement which should be open to all countries, binding them to provide immediate and effective assistance in accordance with a pre-arranged plan in the event of one of them being attacked, provided that the obligation to render assistance to a country attacked shall be limited in principle to those countries situated in the same part of the globe. In cases, however, where, for historical, geographical, or other reasons, a country is in special danger of attack, detailed arrangements should be made for its defence in accordance with the above-mentioned plan. 4. As a general reduction of armaments is the object of the three preceding statements, and the T r e a t y of Mutual Guarantee the " S a l v a d o r de Madariaga, Disarmament,

London, 1929, pp. 20-21.

248

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

means of achieving that object, previous consent to this reduction is therefore the first condition for the Treaty. This reduction could be carried out either by means of a general Treaty, which is the most desirable plan, or by means of partial treaties designed to be extended and open to all countries. In the former case, the Treaty will carry with it a general reduction of armaments. In the latter case, the reduction should be proportionate to the guarantees afforded by the Treaty. The Council of the League, after having taken the advice of the Temporary Mixed Commission, which will examine how each of these two systems could be carried out, should further formulate and submit to the Governments for their consideration and sovereign decision the plan of the machinery, both political and military, necessary to bring them clearly into effect. The Assembly requests the Council to submit to the various Governments the above proposals for their observations, and requests the Temporary Mixed Commission to continue its investigations, and, in order to give precision to the above statements, to prepare a draft Treaty embodying the principles contained therein. 57 T h e T e m p o r a r y M i x e d Commission, of which mention is made in this resolution, w a s a consultative b o d y in which politicians and other representative professional soldiers.

civilians sat together

with

A s the purely technical M i l i t a r y C o m -

mission, made up exclusively of the latter, had not unnaturally shown little impatience to promote disarmament, the T e m p o rary M i x e d Commission had been set up b y the Council at the request of the First A s s e m b l y on F e b r u a r y 25, 1921, " f o r the purpose of submitting to the Council in the near future all evidence and proposals connected with the question of the reduction of armaments contemplated b y Article 8."

58

Its pre-

vious labors had led the T e m p o r a r y M i x e d Commission to realize the impossibility of obtaining a n y appreciable reduction of national armaments as long as the individual States could not count upon each other's support for their own security. T h a t is w h y it had been led to suggest the drafting of the m League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement Number 9, pp. 26-27. 68League of Nations, Official Journal, Number 2, 1921, p. 148.

R I S E AND FALL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

249

Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, which the Third Assembly now instructed it to proceed with. The task was exceptionally difficult, as it involved harmonizing the conflicting tendencies of the two above-mentioned clearly defined groups of States. The one, represented notably by the British Empire, had just, by cooperating in the process of attrition to which Articles 10 and 16 were being subjected, shown their reluctance to assume any duties of collective security. For this group, disarmament and especially the military disarmament of France and of her Continental allies was the chief end to be pursued. The general Treaty of Mutual Guarantee was an unwelcome but inevitable means to that end. As for the special treaties, which unpleasantly smacked of exclusive alliances, they were the price demanded by the French for their disarmament, a price which the British considered with the utmost reluctance. For the other group, on the contrary, national security was the end to be pursued. As a means to that end, a general treaty was insufficient. That end could, if at all by international conventions, be attained only by hard-and-fast special military agreements. As for a reduction of armaments, it could be seriously considered and proceeded with only in exchange for a truly equivalent international guarantee of security and assistance. The draft Treaty of Mutual Guarantee, as it emerged from the deliberations of the Temporary Mixed Commission, was the result of the fusion of a British proposal by Lord Robert Cecil and a French proposal by Colonel Requin, a distinguished officer who had been one of Marshal Foch's Junior staff assistants. This draft was, in September 1923, considered by the Third Committee of the Fourth Assembly. It was not, however, adopted by the plenary Assembly. In view of the divergencies of opinion that its discussion had revealed, it was decided merely to request "the Council to submit the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance to the Governments for their con-

250

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

sideration, asking them to communicate their views in regard to the aforesaid draft T r e a t y . " 59 The draft was a composite document. 60 It was, first of all, a non-aggression pact, since its Article ι contained the following words: " T h e High Contracting Parties solemnly declare that aggressive war is an international crime and severally undertake that no one of them will be guilty of its commission." This declaration, although it had no complete equivalent in the Covenant, could all the more readily be concurred in by all, as "aggressive w a r " was not defined. In the second place, the draft Treaty maintained the principle of general assistance of all to all, but it also provided for the conclusion of complementary defensive agreements of a regional character. These agreements, which France considered with particular favor and Great Britain with undisguised suspicion, were to come into force if and when approved by the Council of the League as compatible with the principles of the Covenant. In the third place, the draft Treaty endowed the Council with executive powers extending far beyond those of the Covenant. It could organize sanctions such as those provided for in Article 16 even before war had broken out. It could call upon the various States for financial and military assistance, fix the forces of each of the guaranteeing Powers, appoint the higher command of the League army and in general act as the government of a coalition. It could also, if hostilities broke out, decide on the aggressor, propose an armistice, negotiate the establishment of demilitarized zones, and take various other measures of the same nature. All these provisions recall those of the original French constitution for a league of nations 69 League of Nations, Records of the Fourth Assembly, Plenary Meetings, P· 154· °° It can conveniently be consulted with its official commentary in the Report of the Third Committee to the Fourth Assembly, League Doc. C.659.M.262.1923. I X , reprinted in League of Nations, Records of the Fourth Assembly, Minutes of the Third Committee, pp. 197 et seq.

RISE A N D FALL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

251

drafted during the World War by the Committee presided over by M . Leon Bourgeois. Fourthly and finally, the draft Treaty contained provisions concerning the disarmament duties of the High Contracting Parties, who were to receive the above-mentioned assistance only if they had faithfully carried them out. In reply to the request for comments formulated by the Council at the suggestion of the Assembly, twenty-eight governments sent in communications. 61 Only about half accepted the draft in principle, while suggesting various amendments. It is surprising neither that France and her Continental allies, the Balkan and the Baltic States, should have approved a draft of which they hoped that it would bring them increased territorial protection, nor that Great Britain, her Dominions, and the ex-neutrals should have repudiated it as involving them in unwelcome entanglements. Thus Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, then British Prime Minister, deemed it to be too complicated, too fertile in new and uncertain obligations of guarantee and too sterile in assurances of disarmament. 62 In an early and courteous reply, the Government of the United States of America made its position very clear. On the one hand it was "most desirous that appropriate agreements should be reached to limit armament and thus to reduce the heavy burdens of expenditure caused by unnecessary and competitive outlays in providing facilities and munitions of war." In this connection it pointed with pride to the achievements of the Washington Naval Conference. On the other hand, however, it noted that the "fundamental principle" of the draft Treaty was "to provide guarantees of mutual assistance and to establish the competency of the Council of the League of Nations with respect to the decisions contemplated." It added that therefore "in view of the constitutional organisation 61 League of Nations, Records Committee, pp. 130 et seq. 62 Ibid., pp. 143 et seq.

of the Fifth

Assembly,

M i n u t e s of the T h i r d

252

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

of this Government and of the fact that the United States is not a Member of the League of Nations, this Government would find it impossible to give its adherence." 63 What is more surprising than this opposition is the fact that such a draft should ever have reached the stage of even preliminary agreement. A t a time when the same governments, represented by the same politicians in the same Assemblies of the League, had voted resolutions weakening the principle of collective security provided for by Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant, it is not easy to understand how they could even have considered the possibility of extending and of reenforcing this principle by the creation of new obligations. The explanation is to be found solely in the fact that the desire to promote disarmament was particularly strong in the very countries which were most hostile to collective action by the League. The representatives of these countries, who deprecated coercive action as a means of preventing war, were prepared at least to discuss it as a means of promoting disarmament. As a matter of fact, however, none of their governments did more than discuss these proposals, which were in reality stillborn. A t the beginning of 1924, therefore, the League, whose Covenant had been emasculated by the discussions concerning Articles 10 and 16 and whose draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance had been repudiated, seemed further removed than ever from the ideal of collective security which had been that of its principal founder. V. THE GENEVA PROTOCOL

In truth they were on the contrary on the very eve of the boldest attempt to realize this ideal that has ever been made either before or since in Geneva. In Great Britain, a Labor Government, headed by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, took office on January 22, 1924, as a successor to the Conservative administration of Mr. Stanley Baldwin. 63

Ibid.,

pp. 141-142.

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253

As the Labor Cabinet enjoyed no parliamentary majority of its own, it could govern only with the support of the Liberals, who were far more in favor of its international policies than of its socialistic schemes. M r . MacDonald was therefore forced to subordinate the latter to the former. This change in Great Britain, while it ruined the chances of the original Treaty of Mutual Assistance, proved very propitious to its revision. This was all the more true as, in France, M . Herriot had, in June 1924, succeeded M . Poincare, with whom a British Labor Cabinet would doubtless have found it far more difficult to cooperate. Thanks to this favorable coincidence and to the general political circumstances which were improving, the famous Geneva Protocol was born at the Assembly of 1924. As my irreverent friend Salvador de Madariaga, who was then Director of the Disarmament Section of the League of Nations, wittily wrote a few years later: When the T r e a t y of Guarantee had thus been drafted, and its grammar very carefully revised in both languages, the government which might have considered it with sympathy (since they were of the same political complexion as Lord Cecil) fell in England, and another Government came into power. This new Government, of course, would not look at it. T h e y refused to have anything to do with it, but they suggested that something very fine might be done by combining, not guarantee, disarmament, and arbitration, a thing they would never look at, but arbitration, security, and disarmament, which was quite a different idea. W e therefore had a meeting of the Assembly which discussed the Protocol. If you can imagine a table with three legs — guarantee, disarmament, and arbitration — turned round so that instead of the leg guarantee, the leg arbitration comes to the front, you have the change from the T r e a t y of Guarantee to the Protocol. 6 4

While this somewhat flippant statement by one who had been very active in promoting the Treaty of Guarantee is perhaps not quite fair to the Protocol, it points to an essential 94 Salvador de Madariaga, "The Preparation of the First General Disarmament Conference," in Problems of Peace, Second Series, London, 1928, pp. 132-

133·

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T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

truth. A s we have seen when considering the history of postwar arbitration in our last chapter, the Protocol was an ambitious and complex document. If I m a y be allowed to compare it not to a three-legged table, but to a three-storey building, I should say that between the basement of arbitration and the loft of disarmament, it contained a second floor in which collective security was housed. A s we have seen above, all international disputes were to be settled b y peaceful means. If any State either declined to submit its case to third-party judgment or refused to carry out the award of the arbitrators, it was to be coerced b y the application of sanctions. These sanctions were planned to be so effective that they would never have to be applied and that their threat alone would suffice to maintain peace, to secure the triumph of justice and thus to promote disarmament. In order to organize collective security on a sound basis, the authors of the Protocol were naturally led to subordinate the parts to the whole, that is the Members to the League. T h e y were led therefore to enhance the powers of the Council and to curtail the sovereignty of the individual States, that is, to revive and even to fortify Article 10 and especially Article 16 which, as we have seen, had just been killed or at least paralyzed b y the action of the First Assembly. Of the twenty-one articles of the Geneva Protocol, it is Article n which most interests us here. In order to facilitate the understanding of the comment made upon it b y M r . Benes in his report to the F i f t h Assembly on behalf of its T h i r d Committee, I shall first quote its main provisions: As soon as the Council has called upon the signatory States to apply sanctions . . . the obligations of the said States, in regard to the sanctions of all kinds mentioned in paragraphs ι and 2 of Article 16 of the Covenant, will immediately become operative in order that such sanctions may forthwith be employed against the aggressor. Those obligations shall be interpreted as obliging each of the signatory States to co-operate loyally and effectively in support of the Covenant of the League of Nations, and in resistance to any act

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of aggression, in the degree which its geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments allow. In accordance with paragraph 3 of Article 16 of the Covenant the signatory States give a joint and several undertaking to come to the assistance of the State attacked or threatened, and to give each other mutual support by means of facilities and reciprocal exchanges as regards the provision of raw materials and supplies of every kind, openings of credits, transport and transit, and for this purpose to take all measures in their power to preserve the safety of communications by land and by sea of the attacked or threatened State. 6 5

In presenting this clause to the Assembly, Mr. Benes made the following statement, which clearly explains the meaning of sanctions as provided for under the Protocol in its relation to the original Covenant of the League: According to Article 10 of the Covenant, Members of the League undertake to preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League. In case of aggression, the Council shall advise upon the means b y which this obligation shall be fulfilled. According to Article 16, should any Member of the League resort to war in disregard of its engagements under Articles 12, 13 or 15, all other Members of the League undertake immediately to apply economic sanctions; furthermore, it shall be the duty of the Council to recommend to the several Governments concerned what effective military, naval or air forces the Members of the League shall severally contribute to the armed forces to be used to protect the engagements of the League. A t the time when they were drafted at the Peace Conference in Paris in 1919, these articles gave rise to keen controversy as to the exact scope of the engagements entered into in these provisions, that is to say, as to the nature and extent of the obligations referred to in Article 10, the exact moment at which such obligations arose, and the legal consequences of the Council recommendations referred to in Article 16, paragraph 2. This controversy continued, as is well known, in the debates here in Geneva, where the question has been discussed in previous years. Article 11 is intended to settle this controversy. T h e signatories of 65 M i l l e r , The Geneva Protocol, op. cit., p . 1 4 7 . League of Nations, of the Fifth Assembly, M i n u t e s of the T h i r d C o m m i t t e e , p . 192.

Records

256

THE QUEST FOR

PEACE

the present Protocol accept the obligation to apply against the aggressor the various sanctions laid down in the Covenant, as interpreted in Article 11 of the Protocol, when an act of aggression has been established and the Council has called upon the signatory States immediately to apply such sanctions (Article 10, last paragraph). Should they fail so to do, they will not be fulfilling their obligations. T h e nature and extent of this obligation is clearly defined in paragraph 2 of Article 1 1 . According to this paragraph, the reply to the question whether a signatory to the Protocol has or has not fulfilled its obligation depends on whether it has loyally and effectively co-operated in resisting the act of aggression to an extent consistent with its geographical position and its particular situation as regards armaments. T h e State remains in control of its forces, and itself, and not the Council, directs them, but paragraph 2 of Article 11 gives us positive material upon which to form a judgment as to whether or not the obligation has been carried out in any concrete case. This criterion is supplied by the term: loyally and effectively. In answering the question whether a State has or has not fulfilled its obligations in regard to sanctions, a certain elasticity in the obligations laid down in Article 11 allows of the possibility of taking into account, from every point of view, the position of each State which is a signatory to the present Protocol. T h e signatory States are not all in possession of equal facilities for acting when the time comes to apply the sanctions. T h i s depends upon the geographical position and economic and social condition of the State, the nature of its population, internal institutions, etc. Indeed, during the discussion as to the system of sanctions, certain delegations declared that their countries were in a special situation b y reason of their geographical position or the state of their armaments. These countries desired to co-operate to the fullest extent of their resources in resistance to every act of aggression, but they drew attention to their special conditions. In order to take account of this situation, an addition has been made to paragraph 2 of Article 11 pointing out this state of affairs and laying stress on the particular situation of the countries in question. Moreover, Article 13 of the Protocol allows such countries to inform the Council of these matters beforehand. I would further add that the obligations I refer to are imperfect obligations in the sense that no sanctions are provided for against any party which shall have failed loyally and effectively to co-operate in protecting the Covenant and resisting every act of aggression. I t

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should, however, be emphasised that such a State would have failed in the fulfilment of its duties and would be guilty of a violation of engagements entered into. In view of the foregoing, the gist of Article 1 1 , paragraphs 1 and 2, might be expressed as follows: Each State is the judge of the manner in which it shall carry out its obligations but not of the existence of those obligations, that is to say, each State remains the judge of what it will do but no longer remains the judge of what it should do. Now that the present Protocol has defined more precisely the origin, nature and extent of the obligations arising out of the Covenant, the junctions of the Council, as provided in Articles 10 and 16, have become clearer and more definite. Directly the Council has called upon the signatories to the Protocol to apply without delay the sanctions provided in Article 1 1 , it becomes a regulating, or rather an advisory, body, but not an executive body. The nature of the acts of aggression may vary considerably; the means for their suppression will also vary. It would frequently be unnecessary to make use of all the means which, according to paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 1 1 , are, so to speak, available for resisting an act of aggression. It might even be dangerous if, from fear of failing in their duties, States made superfluous efforts. It will devolve upon the Council, which, under Article 13 can be put in possession of the necessary data, to give its opinion, should need occur, as to the best means of executing the obligations which arise directly it enjoins the application of sanctions, especially as to the sequence in which the sanctions must be applied. The practical application of the sanctions would, however, always devolve upon the Governments; the real co-operation would ensue upon their getting into touch, through diplomatic channels — perhaps by conferences — and by direct relations between different General Staffs, as in the last war. The Council would, of course, be aware of all these negotiations, would be consulted and make recommendations. The difference between the former state of affairs and the new will therefore be as follows: According to the system laid down by the Covenant: 1. The dispute arises. 2. In cases where neither the arbitral procedure nor the judicial settlement provided for in Article 13 of the Covenant is applied, the Council meets and discusses the dispute, attempts to effect conciliation, mediation, etc. 3. If it be unsuccessful and war breaks out, the Council, if unan-

258

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imous, has to express an opinion as to which party is guilty. The Members of the League then decide for themselves whether this opinion is justified and whether their obligations to apply economic sanctions become operative. 4. It then has, by a unanimous decision, to recommend military sanctions. 5. If unanimity cannot be obtained, the Council ceasing to take action, each party is practically free to act as it chooses. According to the new system defined in the Protocol, the situation is as follows: 1. The dispute arises. 2. The system of peaceful settlement provided for by the Protocol comes into play. 3. The Council intervenes, and if, after arbitration has been refused, war is resorted to, if the provisional preventive measures are not observed, etc., the Council decides which party is the aggressor and calls upon the signatory States to apply the sanctions. 4. This decision implies that such sanctions as the case requires — economic, financial, military, naval and air — shall be applied forthwith, and without further recommendations or decisions. We have therefore the following new elements: (a) The obligation to apply the necessary sanctions of every kind as a direct result of the decision of the Council. (b) The elimination of the case in which all parties would be practically free to abstain from any action. The introduction of a system of arbitration and of provisional measures which permits of the determination in every case of the aggressor. (c) No decision is taken as to the strength of the military, naval and air forces, and no details are given as to the measures which are to be adopted in a particular case. None the less, objective criteria are supplied which define the obligation of each signatory; it is bound, in resistance to an act of aggression, to collaborate loyally and effectively in applying the sanctions in accordance with its geographical situation and its particular situation as regards armaments. That is why I said that the great omission in the Covenant has been made good.w O n October 2, 1924, a f t e r a memorable debate, a resolution was submitted to the F i f t h A s s e m b l y , under which it w a s prom Miller, The Geneva Protocol, op. cit., pp. 197 et seq. League of Nations, Records of the Fifth Assembly, M i n u t e s of the T h i r d Committee, pp. 208 et seq.

R I S E A N D F A L L OF C O L L E C T I V E S E C U R I T Y

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posed, not indeed there and then to adopt the famous Protocol with its extraordinarily ambitious provisions, but to recommend its acceptance "to the earnest attention of all the Members of the League." This motion was unanimously carried by the forty-eight delegations present, including those from all parts of the British Empire and those of all the ex-neutral States. 67 As we have seen in our review of the recent history of arbitration, the enthusiasm aroused by this decision was to be as short-lived as it had been ardent. The Conservative Cabinet which came into power in Great Britain shortly after the close of the Fifth Assembly lost little time in repudiating and thus in killing the Geneva Protocol. That Cabinet was doubtless actuated by various motives, of which it may be suspected that hostility to its predecessors in office was perhaps one. However, it was far less surprising that a British Government, in 1925, should have refused to assume the international obligations which the Protocol would have placed upon it, than that, in 1924, another British Government should even have considered the possibility of undertaking them. As we have already noted above, it was not its insistence on compulsory arbitration and still less the promise it held out of favoring and of promoting disarmament which led the British and many other governments to withdraw their support from the instrument their delegates had drafted in Geneva in 1924. It was essentially the rigid scheme of collective security which it sought to organize. As Mr. Austen Chamberlain, to whose lot it had already fallen to repudiate the Protocol before the Council on March 1 2 , 1925, 68 declared before the Assembly on September 8, 1925, in explaining his hostility towards it: The fresh emphasis laid upon sanctions, the new occasions discovered for their employment, the elaboration of military procedure, insensibly suggest the idea that the vital business of the League is not so much to promote friendly co-operation and reasoned harmony '"League of Nations, Records 68 See above p. 1 6 1 .

of the Fifth Assembly,

Plenary Meetings, p. 225.

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

200

in the management of international affairs as to preserve peace by organising war, and it may be war upon the largest scale.69 That speech of the British Foreign Secretary made a very deep impression upon all those who heard it. According to the views he then expressed, collective security, as provided for in the Geneva Protocol, was contrary not only to the expediency of the moment and to the possibilities of a League deprived of the cooperation of several Great Powers. It was contrary also to all wisdom, to all common sense and to all British political experience. Indeed Mr. Chamberlain went so far as to declare, on behalf of the whole British Empire, that "in the very elasticity which our want of logic and our want of precise definition afforded, lay the secret of our unity and our concord." When one recalls how, thirteen years later, under the stress of the menacing spread of Hitlerism over the center of Europe, Austen Chamberlain's half-brother, who doubtless, as a Conservative politician, shared his views in 1925, was driven to conclude with Poland alone a hard-and-fast treaty which in fact placed all the economic and military resources of the Empire at the disposal of a government in Warsaw which was not even popular with its own people, one cannot but wonder with what feelings the late British Foreign Secretary would read his speech today! In 1925 the Geneva Protocol, whose sanctions could not have been brought into operation against the will of London and then only with the combined might of the major part of the international community, was deemed dangerous in that it seemed to link up the destinies of Britain too closely with those of the Continent. In 1939 a bilateral Anglo-Polish treaty was concluded, which exposed Great Britain to the danger of fighting Germany single-handed at the request of Colonel Beck. How light the ounce of prevention, then held to be intolerably burdensome, must appear to those who have been obliged to shoulder the tons of cure under which they are staggering today! 69

League of Nations,

Records

of the Sixth Assembly,

Plenary Meetings, p. 38.

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261

VI. THE LOCARNO RHINE PACT

T h e Geneva Protocol of 1924 was, in the eyes of its framers, a mighty weapon of collective security at least as much as an ingenious instrument for the pacific settlement of international disputes. However, although dashed to pieces by the British onslaught, both as a weapon of general security and as an instrument of international arbitration, its shatters served to build up the Locarno Treaties. These were not only, as we have seen in our last chapter, bilateral conventions for the pacific settlement of disputes between their signatories. T h e y included also a multilateral treaty of mutual assistance and security. In fact, Locarno was more than anything else, in origin, in substance and in its hoped-for consequences, an attempt to pacify the relations between Germany and her neighbors by creating amongst them a sense of mutual security. That this was so in origin is shown by the German note to Great Britain of January 20, 1925, of which the Rhine Pact was born nine months later. In this note we read: T h e present acute questions of disarmament and evacuation are frequently considered in France from the standpoint of security against possible aggressive intentions on the part of Germany. For that reason it would probably be easier to find a solution for them if they were combined with an agreement of a general nature, the object of which would be to secure peace between Germany and France. Germany is perfectly ready to take this point of view into consideration. She is anxious to see the problems arising between her and France dealt with by no other method than that of friendly understanding, and is accordingly interested, for her part, in the establishment of a special treaty foundation for such a peaceful understanding. In considering the various forms which a Pact of Security might at present take, one could proceed from an idea cognate to that from which the proposal made in December 1922 by D r . Cuno sprang. Germany could, for example, declare her acceptance of a pact by virtue of which the Powers interested in the Rhine, above all, England, France, Italy and Germany, entered into a solemn obligation for a lengthy period (to be eventually defined more specifically),

202

THE QUEST FOR

PEACE

vis-ä-vis the Government of the United States of America, as trustee, not to wage war against a contracting State. . . . Furthermore, a pact expressly guaranteeing the present territorial status ("gegenwärtiger Besitzstand") on the Rhine would also be acceptable to Germany. T h e purport of such a pact could be, for instance, that the interested States bound themselves reciprocally to observe the inviolability of the present territorial status on the Rhine, that they, furthermore, both conjointly and individually (conjointement et separement") guaranteed the fulfilment of this obligation, and finally, that they would regard any action running counter to the said obligation as affecting them jointly and individually. In the same sense the treaty States could guarantee in this pact the fulfilment of the obligation to demilitarise the Rhineland which Germany has undertaken in Articles 42 and 43 of the T r e a t y of Versailles. 70 C o m m e n t i n g o n this n o t e L o r d d ' A b e r n o n , w h o a s

British

" A m b a s s a d o r of P e a c e " in B e r l i n , w a s o n e of its p a t r o n s , w r o t e in his d i a r y , u n d e r t h e d a t e of J a n u a r y 2 1 , 1 9 2 5 : T h i s German initiative is of the utmost importance. I have long thought the question of mutual security between France and Germany infinitely more important than the minor discussions on which we have been engaged and less difficult of solution than the smaller issues. 71 T h a t Locarno w a s primarily an attempt to create security b y m u t u a l a n d t h i r d - p a r t y g u a r a n t e e s of t e r r i t o r i a l i n t e g r i t y

is

s h o w n b o t h b y the f a c t t h a t the " T r e a t y of m u t u a l g u a r a n t e e between G e r m a n y , Belgium, France, Great Britain and I t a l y , " the s o - c a l l e d R h i n e P a c t , is m e n t i o n e d first in the F i n a l P r o t o c o l of t h e L o c a r n o C o n f e r e n c e , a n d b y its c o n t e n t s . I n the p r e a m b l e , t h e s i g n a t o r i e s define the m o t i v e s of

the

t r e a t y as " t h e desire f o r s e c u r i t y a n d p r o t e c t i o n w h i c h a n i m a t e s the p e o p l e s u p o n w h o m f e l l the s c o u r g e of t h e w a r of

1914-

1 9 1 8 " a n d its o b j e c t t h a t " o f g i v i n g to all t h e s i g n a t o r y P o w e r s c o n c e r n e d s u p p l e m e n t a r y g u a r a n t e e s w i t h i n t h e f r a m e w o r k of the C o v e n a n t of t h e L e a g u e of N a t i o n s a n d the t r e a t i e s in 70 71

Lord d'Abernon's Ibid., p. 126.

Diary, vol. I l l , London, 1930, pp. 276-277.

RISE A N D FALL OF C O L L E C T I V E S E C U R I T Y

263

force between them." In order to realize these designs, the framers of the Rhine Pact provided first for a non-aggression undertaking between the immediately interested parties, secondly for a mutual guarantee of territorial integrity between them, thirdly for a promise to settle peaceably "all questions of every kind which may arise," and fourthly for a supplementary guarantee by Great Britain and Italy, who, in case of the violation of the above provisions, "severally agree that . . . they will each of them come immediately to the assistance of the Power against whom the act complained of is directed." In his memoirs, first published in 1935, Sir Austen Chamberlain, who had been knighted after Locarno, discusses the objections to which Great Britain's participation in the Rhine Pact was giving rise in England. He tells us: T h e people of this country are being invited in certain quarters to repudiate the T r e a t y of Locarno. T h e invitation is addressed to them in the name of Peace: Locarno, it is said, places the direction of British policy in the hands of France and our army and n a v y at the service of French policy. It involves us — so the argument goes — in quarrels in which Britain has no conceivable interest, and exposes us to dangers from which, but for this unhappy entanglement, we should be completely immune. T h e integrity of France or Belgium, it is urged, is no concern of ours; we are not interested in the existence of the demilitarized zone; we will not stir a finger to save the Polish Corridor. These are not British interests, y e t for each and all of these the T r e a t y of Locarno would oblige us to fight. T h u s our new Mentor in article and speech. Before examining these assertions, it may be well to recall briefly the circumstances which gave rise to the series of treaties negotiated at Locarno in October 1925, and signed two months later in London, after being submitted to and approved by the Parliaments of all the countries concerned in them. 7 2

Sir Austen then goes on to recall France's efforts for security since the Peace Conference and through the various Assemblies of the League of Nations. He tells the story of the drafting of " A u s t e n Chamberlain, Down

the Years, 4th ed., L o n d o n , 1935, p. 151.

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THE QUEST FOR

PEACE

the G e n e v a P r o t o c o l a n d h o w h e a n d his B r i t i s h

colleagues

" d e c i d e d its f a t e , " a d d i n g : . . . for it was recognized on all hands that the Protocol could not survive refusal b y this country to assume the obligations and undertake the liabilities which it would have imposed upon us. Without the British N a v y the Protocol was useless to those who had devised it. 7 3 S p e a k i n g t h e n on t h e a b o v e - m e n t i o n e d G e r m a n p r o p o s a l s of J a n u a r y 1925, the former British Foreign Secretary remarks: It was in these proposals, if properly developed, that the British Government saw the necessary alternative to the Protocol. T h e guarantee, which they were not prepared to extend to every country and every frontier, might properly be given in respect of a part of the world close to their own shores, which had been the cause and the scene of all our greatest struggles. For a purpose so limited and in a sphere so circumscribed, Great Britain might rightly, and as a measure of self-defence, undertake a responsibility which would be intolerable and inexecutable if extended to the whole world. T h e German proposals went far beyond anything which they had previously suggested. B u t it was certain that they would be as barren of result as their earlier suggestions unless Great Britain was prepared to give her guarantee for the observance of the pact in the West. His M a j e s t y ' s Government decided to offer that guarantee. 7 4 I h a v e n o t h e s i t a t e d h e r e to q u o t e t h e s e r e m a r k s of British statesman who more than any other was

the

responsible

f o r t h e f a i l u r e of the P r o t o c o l a n d f o r the s u c c e s s of L o c a r n o , b e c a u s e t h e y c l e a r l y s h o w the i n t i m a t e c o n n e c t i o n b e t w e e n t h e t w o . T h a t t h e L o c a r n o c o n v e n t i o n s a n d p a r t i c u l a r l y the R h i n e Pact,

in C h a m b e r l a i n ' s

excellence,"

words "the Treaty

of L o c a r n o

par

w e r e e s s e n t i a l l y i n t e n d e d to s a t i s f y F r a n c e ' s de-

m a n d s f o r s e c u r i t y , is s h o w n also b y a s t a t e m e n t m a d e on t h e air b y H e r r S t r e s e m a n n , his G e r m a n p a r t n e r .

S p e a k i n g to his

o w n p e o p l e in f a v o r of the T r e a t i e s of L o c a r n o o n t h e m o r r o w 73 74

Ibid., p. 154. Ibid.., pp. 159-160.

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265

of their initialling, the former German Foreign Secretary declared: For France the problem of security remained. It is not easy for us Germans to realize that and we ask what a France so powerfully armed can fear of a disarmed Germany. But the fact of this demand for security exists and every politician and we also must take it into account. W e must do so if for no other reason but that other Powers, as especially England, recognize the French claim to security. If Germany had remained passive, England would finally have been driven to solve the problem of security with France against Germany. 7 5

Thus its origin, its substance and the aims pursued by its framers all go to show that the work of Locarno was primarily a work of collective security. Less ambitious in scope than either the draft Treaty of Mutual Assistance and the Geneva Protocol, it was intended to create regional security in the heart of Europe by the promise of mutual military and other assistance in case of unprovoked attack. VII. T H E A F T E R M A T H OF L O C A R N O

After the Locarno Treaties had come into force and, as a consequence, Germany had been admitted to the League of Nations, the main attention of European statesmanship was for a time diverted from the problem of collective security. France realized that she could not hope to obtain later from Geneva what she had been refused there in 1925 and what she had been at least partly granted in Locarno. Moreover, Germany's neighbors to the east realized that they could hardly except to secure from the League what they had obtained neither in Geneva nor in Locarno, that is, a promise of British support in the case of an unprovoked attack by Germany. T o be sure, the problem of collective security was not suddenly dropped from the agenda of the League after 1925. On the contrary, studies, debates and proposals on the subject were 75

Gustav Stresemann, Reden und Schriften,

vol. II, Dresden, 1926, p. 212.

266

THE QUEST FOR

PEACE

renewed and pursued for several y e a r s in various forms.

I

shall h e r e m e n t i o n o n l y t w o of t h e m . F i r s t , the L e a g u e , w i t h w h i c h t h e L o c a r n o T r e a t i e s

were

c l o s e l y b o u n d u p in their origin, as w e h a v e seen, a n d in their c o n s e q u e n c e s , s o u g h t to e n c o u r a g e t h e c o n c l u s i o n of a g r e e m e n t s a m o n g o t h e r s of its M e m b e r s .

similar

T h u s , on Septem-

b e r 25, 1 9 2 6 , t h e S e v e n t h A s s e m b l y u n a n i m o u s l y a d o p t e d

a

long resolution f r o m which w e extract the following characteristic q u o t a t i o n s : T h e Assembly, . . . Emphasises . . . the importance of the Treaties of Locarno, the coming into force of which has been rendered possible b y the admission of Germany into the League of Nations and the principal object of which is to ensure peace in one of the most sensitive regions of Europe; Sees in the last-mentioned Treaties a definite step forward in the establishment of mutual confidence between nations; Considers that agreements of this kind need not necessarily be restricted to a limited area but may be applied to different parts of the world; Asserts its conviction that the general ideas embodied in the clauses of the Treaties of Locarno . . . may well be accepted amongst the fundamental rules which should govern the foreign policy of every civilised nation; Expresses the hope that these principles will be recognised b y all States and will be put into practice as soon as possible by all States in whose interest it is to contract such treaties; And requests the Council to recommend the States Members of the League of Nations to put into practice the above-mentioned principles and to offer, if necessary, its good offices for the conclusion of suitable agreements likely to establish confidence and s e c u r i t y . . . . 7 β A s the p r a c t i c a l results of this r e s o l u t i o n w e r e d i s a p p o i n t i n g a n d as t h e P r e p a r a t o r y C o m m i s s i o n of the D i s a r m a m e n t C o n f e r e n c e , w h i c h h a d b e e n set u p b y the C o u n c i l i n D e c e m b e r 1925, again encountered the demand for increased

collective

s e c u r i t y as a n e c e s s a r y c o n d i t i o n f o r the r e d u c t i o n of n a t i o n a l ™League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement Number 43, p. 16.

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267

armaments, the Assembly of 1927 recommended further steps in the same direction. It provided for the constitution of a special Committee on Arbitration and Security, which was to be an emanation of the Preparatory Commission, and defined its task as follows: . . . Its duty would be to consider . . . the measures capable of giving all States the guarantees of arbitration and security necessary to enable them to fix the level of their armaments at the lowest possible figures in an international disarmament agreement. In its resolution the Assembly further considered that these measures should be sought: In action by the League of Nations with a view to promoting, generalising, and co-ordinating special or collective agreements on arbitration and security; . . . In agreements which the States Members of the League may conclude among themselves, irrespective of their obligations under the Covenant, with a view to making their commitments proportionate to the degree of solidarity of a geographical or other nature existing between them and other States. 7 7

In this suggestion, that by special agreement collective security should be regionalized and proportioned to the various needs and possibilities of different States as determined by their political and geographical position, we must see the result of all the previous developments. First, the weakening of the sense of collective security, which resulted from the whittling down of the provisions of Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant, then the failure of the efforts to restore that sense b y the repudiation of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance and of the Geneva Protocol, and finally the relative success achieved at Locarno, all tended in the same direction. A more modest but, it was hoped, more realistic conception of regional, differentiated security was being substituted for the grander ideal of an universal mutual guarantee, which had been that of President Wilson. This undoubtedly implied a step backwards towards 77League 24-25.

of Nations,

Official Journal,

Special Supplement Number 53, pp.

2 68

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

the traditional device of defensive alliances.

B u t it was gen-

erally felt that a less exalted, but more accessible, objective was preferable to one which, without the cooperation of the United States, whose spokesman had been its principal champion, was as y e t beyond the reach of practical statesmanship. T h e Committee on Arbitration and Security struggled valiantly and persistently in its desire to meet the wishes of the Assembly and to create the foundations of collective security upon which the edifice of disarmament was to rest. In 1928, they submitted to the Assembly three model treaties, of which the first provided for an undertaking in regard to mutual assistance should one of the contracting parties be the victim of aggression b y another contracting party after the Council had established the aggression and designated the aggressor. T h e Assembly of 1928 approved the terms of this and the accompanying non-aggression and arbitration treaties without much amendment.

Declaring its conviction that "their adop-

tion b y the States concerned would contribute towards strengthening the guarantees of security," it recommended them " f o r consideration

by

States Members

or non-Members

of

the

League of N a t i o n s " and expressed the hope "that they m a y serve as a basis for States desiring to conclude treaties of this sort."

78

A year later, the Tenth Assembly again considered the matter of collective security in connection with disarmament, in which, in spite of all efforts, progress was discouragingly difficult and slow.

On September 4, 1929, on the recommendation of its

T h i r d Committee, it adopted the following resolution: The Assembly, Recognising the importance of the model Treaty to strengthen the Means of preventing War approved by the Assembly at its ninth session; Convinced that the maintenance of peace would be facilitated by the acceptance by as many States as possible of obligations of the kind contained in that Treaty; 78

League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement Number 63, p. 18.

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269

Invites the Council to request the Committee on Arbitration and Security to consider the possibility of establishing a draft General Convention on the general lines of the T r e a t y , which could be referred to the Governments in time to enable the latter to indicate, at the eleventh ordinary session of the Assembly, whether they are prepared to accept it. 79

The Committee on Arbitration and Security accordingly, in April and M a y 1930, drew up such a "preliminary draft General Convention to Strengthen the Means of Preventing W a r . " As the Eleventh Assembly recognized, however, in a resolution adopted on September 30, 1930, "the transformation of the 'model treaty' into a General Convention" had given rise to "numerous and delicate problems." While noting "the degree of progress already made in reconciling the different points of view in regard to the preparation of the text of a 'General Convention,'" it requested the Council "to appoint a special Committee to draw up a report in sufficient time for submission to the twelfth ordinary session of the Assembly." 80 This request was acceded to so that finally, on September 26, 1931, the Twelfth Assembly could express its thanks to the "Special Committee for the admirable work it has done towards the framing of the draft general Convention to improve the Means of preventing W a r . " In the same resolution, the Assembly of ι 9 3 ι Decides to open the Convention for signature by the States Members of the League and by those non-member States to which the Council of the League shall have communicated a copy of the Convention for that purpose; Earnestly trusts that a large number of States will sign the Convention before the opening of the forthcoming General Disarmament Conference. 8 1

When we read the terms of that Convention today, we realize how great and indeed how immediate the danger of war already 79 80 81

League of Nations, Official Journal, League of Nations, Official Journal, Ibid., N u m b e r 92, p. 24.

Special Supplement N u m b e r 74, p. 27. Special Supplement N u m b e r 83, p. 23.

2 70

T H E QUEST FOR

PEACE

was in the eyes of its authors. Designed, as it is stated in its preamble, to develop "mutual confidence by increasing the efficacy of the means of preventing war," 82 it tends to endow the Council of the League of Nations with extensive powers to keep apart States which are on the point of flying at each other's throats. As the product of untiring negotiations constantly hampered by international suspicions, but still inspired by true idealism, the Convention to improve the Means of preventing War can indeed be considered admirable. As an effective measure for achieving its purpose, however, it proved entirely worthless. Not only did it never come into force, but before it had finally been drafted, the States had forfeited what confidence they ever had in paper guarantees. Stresemann was in his grave, Chamberlain out of office, and Briand had lost his grip on the affairs of the League and on public opinion in his own country. The Locarno scheme was disintegrating. The world was in the throes of the greatest economic depression it had ever experienced. National-socialism in Germany was fast becoming a dangerous factor in international affairs. And the week before the draft Convention had been opened for signature, Japanese troops had occupied Mukden. Sir Alfred Zimmern writes that: T h e period from 1 9 3 0 onwards was characterised by a play of power in the course of which Europe rapidly slipped back from the 'new order,' not into the nineteenth century but into the eighteenth. Geneva became an immense chessboard on which not only the Great Powers but knights and bishops and multitudinous pawns practiced the art of manoeuvre. 83

In August 1 9 3 1 , on the very eve of the Assembly which hailed the framing of the General Convention, the fiery young Belgian delegate M. Henri Rolin, who ever since the drafting of the Covenant in Paris in 1 9 1 9 had been one of the most 82

Loc. cit. Alfred E. Zimmern, The League of Nations and the Rule of Law, 2nd ed., London, 1939, p. 417. 83

RISE A N D FALL OF C O L L E C T I V E S E C U R I T Y

271

active and enthusiastic supporters of the League and of the principle of collective security, delivered a lecture before the Geneva Institute of International Relations on the Disarmament Conference, which was to meet some months later. Having recalled the preparatory efforts tending to create the hoped-for spirit of confidence through the development of international arbitration and security, he declared: In my opinion, having co-operated in the drafting of most of the treaties to which I referred, I have come to the conclusion that we cannot create security b y any means whatever until we have a first convention on disarmament. I t is impossible for French and Italian people to feel safe as long as troops do practise on both sides of the Alps a slight distance apart; and they will continue to feel unsafe until we do away with the maintenance of strong permanent armies and competition between States. 84

Nothing could more clearly than this statement show the radical disappointment which had generally come to be felt in Geneva at this time about the possibilities of contractual collective security as a basis for disarmament in the quest for peace. No one had believed in these possibilities more ardently and no one had more persistently striven to realize them than the virile young jurist who had been through the World W a r as a Belgian officer, through the Peace Conference as a personal assistant to M . Hymans, the Belgian Foreign Minister, through the Assemblies of the League before and after Locarno and through the Conference of Locarno itself as a delegate of his country. The logic of the situation had remained the same. Without mutual confidence, there could be no disarmament and without security there could be no confidence. But without a measure of subordination of national sovereignty to international solidarity, there could be no collective security. As, after twelve years of post-war efforts, it had been found impossible to secure this necessary subordination, friends of peace such 84 Henri Rolin, "The First General Disarmament Conference," in Problems of Peace, Sixth Series, London, 1932, p. 60.

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THE QUEST FOR PEACE

as M . Rolin were driven b y sheer despair to hope that the converse method of creating a sense of security b y the direct promotion of disarmament might prove more successful.

It

was in a w a y a triumph of the original British over the French conception, but it was less a triumph b y persuasion than b y discouragement and exhaustion. T h e other attempts made b y the League of Nations after 1925 to develop collective security will not detain us long. T h e studies, proposals and recommendations made to increase the efficacy of the action of the Council in defense of peace, especially under Article 11 of the Covenant, were m a n y and ingenious. In view of subsequent happenings, however, the interest they present is greater for the legal historian of the past and, let us hope also, for the reformer of the future, than for him who would understand the political steps actually taken in the quest for peace since the W o r l d W a r . Although of no more practical significance, I shall briefly recall the proposal, made in 1926, for a scheme of financial assistance to States victims of aggression. I do so mainly because its Finnish origin and patronage lend it a peculiarly timely interest today. A t the very first session of the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference at Geneva, in M a y 1926, the Finnish delegation moved that the Council of the League be invited to "undertake the examination of special arrangements whereby a reduction of armaments agreed to b y States unfavourably placed, owing to geographical or other exceptional circumstances, might be compensated in order to meet their requirements for security." 85 This proposal, which was approved b y the Preparatory Commission, was elaborated and explained b y its authors in an interesting memorandum communicated to the SecretaryGeneral on June 5, 1926. In this memorandum we read: 80 League

of Nations, Official Journal, 1926, p. 1001.

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T h e Finnish Government has repeatedly expressed its sincere approval of the endeavours of the League of Nations to reduce the burden of armaments. A t the same time, however, it has deemed it necessary to underline the decisive importance of corresponding guarantees, especially to States which, for historical, geographical or other reasons, stand in need of security. T h e efforts of the League to solve the problem of guarantees, e.g. the draft T r e a t y of Mutual Assistance, the Geneva Protocol . . . have clearly proved to what an extent the League is aware of the necessity of compensating b y special means a reduction of armaments and military expenditure. H a v i n g r e c a l l e d the a b o v e - q u o t e d p r o p o s a l , t h e a u t h o r s of t h e m e m o r a n d u m then p r o c e e d to r e v e a l their real p u r p o s e in the f o l l o w i n g w o r d s w h i c h , in the l i g h t of r e c e n t e v e n t s , one reads with peculiar interest today, nearly

fifteen

years after

they were penned: A certain number of small States, having practically no raw material for the production of war supplies, and, furthermore, having consequently no war industry, must in peace-time either: (a) B u y stocks of war material to meet all emergency needs; or ( b ) K e e p large stocks of raw materials stored and, in addition, create an industry, capable of providing the army with sufficient supplies. If a small State exposed to special danger has taken none of these precautions, it is bound, when attacked, immediately to import from abroad the stocks necessary for a successful defence. However, it goes without saying that such purchases surpass the financial capacity of perhaps most of the small States of the League. Mobilisation, and other measures necessitated by the various requirements of national defence, will more or less at once exhaust the financial resources of the country. T h e additional supplies of war material required for the mobilised forces of the country must therefore be purchased by means of foreign loans. Experience, however, has proved in only too many cases that, even in ordinary circumstances, it is a very difficult task for small States rapidly to raise a loan in foreign countries; how much more difficult it will be for them in time of war to place bonds in foreign banks. T h e r e f o r e , a r g u e d the F i n n i s h G o v e r n m e n t , if the L e a g u e w i s h e s F i n l a n d , as a s m a l l e x p o s e d S t a t e w i t h o u t f o r e i g n c r e d i t ,

274

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

to reduce its military establishment in peace time, it must be prepared to facilitate the financing of its mobilization should it be attacked.

This might be accomplished in various ways.

T h e authors of the memorandum proceed: It might be possible for the League to make arrangements beforehand which would enable the Council to provide immediate financial assistance to any small State which was the victim of aggression. If, for example, the Members of the League, or some of them, were prepared, under certain conditions and within the limit of a maximum sum, to offer their guarantee in different proportions, the Council would, when the emergency occurred, be able to arrange for the issue of an immediate loan, of such amount as might be needed within the maximum.86 A f t e r four years of discussion before successive Assemblies and their committees, before the Council, the Committee of the Council, the Financial Committee of the League, the Committee on Arbitration and Security and a joint committee consisting of members of the two last bodies, and after full consultation of all interested governments, this suggestion gave birth to the "Convention on Financial Assistance," of which, b y a resolution unanimously adopted on September 29, 1930, the Eleventh Assembly expressed "the earnest hope" that it would "be signed and ratified b y all the Members of the League of Nations." 87 T h e diplomatic instrument, which was the outcome, in 1930, of the Finnish proposal of 1926, was an elaborate convention consisting of no less than thirty-six articles. Without attempting to analyze them here, I shall endeavor, in a few words, to indicate the general principles underlying the scheme. T h e y are as follows: 88 88 League of Nations, Records of the Seventh Assembly, P l e n a r y Meetings, p. 288. 87 League of Nations, Records of the Eleventh Assembly, P l e n a r y Meetings, p. 142. m Ibid., pp. 501 et seq., f o r t h e text of the C o n v e n t i o n and the report u p o n it.

RISE AND FALL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

275

First, the Convention was declared to be open to the signature of all States, Members or not of the League of Nations, which were prepared to assume the obligations of High Contracting Parties. Secondly, the entry into force and the maintenance in force of the Convention was made conditional upon the entry into force and maintenance in force of a plan for the general reduction of armaments. T h i r d l y , every State signatory to the Convention was entitled to the

financial

assistance provided for therein under

certain conditions. If a signatory State was victim of an aggression despite the efforts of the Council of the League in favor of the maintenance of peace, it was to receive this assistance, unless the Council unanimously decided otherwise. In case of a mere threat of aggression, it might also receive such assistance if it complied, whereas its opponents refused to comply, with the decisions of the Council and if the Council considered "that peace cannot be safeguarded otherwise." Fourthly, the financial assistance in point was provided for in the shape of guarantees b y the signatory States of the service of loans issued b y the victim of the aggression or threat of aggression. These guarantees were of two types according to the importance of the signatory States. F i f t h l y , the conditions of issue of loans enjoying these guarantees were to be submitted b y the borrowing State to the approval of the Council of the League or of " a person or persons appointed b y it for the purpose." Sixthly and finally, upon entry into force of the Convention, the Council of the League was to appoint five Swiss citizens, habitually resident in Switzerland, to act as trustees of loans issued under the Convention.

These trustees were to receive

the sums required for the service of the loan from the borrowing State, upon which they were primarily a charge, and from the guaranteeing States in case of default of the former. This summary review of the main features of the Convention

276

T H E QUEST FOR P E A C E

may suffice to illustrate its essential character.

O n the one

hand, it was, in accordance with the intentions of its Finnish originators, destined to offer States exposed to aggression the financial

assistance of their fellow-signatories.

But, on the

other hand, its coming into force was made dependent upon the success of the general disarmament scheme — this had been the constant demand of the British Government — and its operation upon the pacific and law-abiding attitude of the State which claimed its advantages. T h u s the Convention was intended to become an effective instrument of international solidarity.

This was eloquently emphasized b y M r .

Politis

before the Eleventh Assembly, on October 2, 1930, in his capacity as chairman of the T h i r d Committee. A f t e r twentyseven States, including two Great Powers, Great Britain and France, and most of the minor States of Europe, had signed the Convention, he declared: The Convention for Financial Assistance takes its place among the great international instruments. It forms one of the corner-stones of the edifice which the League is slowly but systematically erecting for the safeguarding of peace and the security of nations.89 A l a s ! Although the Convention was well and indeed enthusiastically received b y most peace-loving States, it fell a victim, with so many other hopes and schemes, to the general movement of international disintegration which characterized the years following its completion. A s its destiny had been linked to that of the Disarmament Convention, it has no more than the latter ever come into force. And that is w h y Finland, when what she had long feared happened towards the end of 1939, could rely only on her own national resources and on the voluntary aid of her friends to meet the terrible emergency with which she was faced and which her statesmen had so wisely foreseen fifteen years before. Fortunately for her and for the world, her admirable people had in the meanwhile so 89 Ibid..,

p. 192.

RISE AND FALL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

277

enhanced her wealth and her credit that she has so far been able to weather the financial storm almost as brilliantly as she has withstood the military aggression. VIII. COLLECTIVE SECURITY AS AN HISTORICAL FACT

We have so far, in this chapter, considered collective security only in the abstract, as an object of diplomatic negotiation and legal definition. We have considered it as the anatomist considers the human body or the constitutional lawyer the body politic. Would it not be more enlightening to study it as a concrete fact, as an historical and social reality, that is, with the eyes of the political physiologist? It would indeed, and that is what we propose to do in the following pages. It will not be a long inquiry because, as a matter of fact, collective security has failed to work. In their quest for peace between the two great wars of the first half of the twentieth century, the statesmen of the world have devoted a great deal of time, effort and skill to the elaboration of schemes of mutual protection against aggression. But when aggression took place, they felt unable or unwilling to put these schemes into operation. Most of them, it is true, as we have seen for instance of the Treaty of Mutual Assistance, of the Geneva Protocol and of the Convention on Financial Assistance, were not in legal force when the emergency arose. But others, such as the Covenant and the Rhine Pact, were, even if badly out of repair as a result of disuse, disregard or repeated but unsuccessful amendment. From the coming into force of the Covenant, on January 10, 1920, until the present day, there have been at least eight or nine cases in which the provisions of Articles 10 and following have been transgressed at the expense of, and most often by, Members of the League. There have therefore been at least eight or nine cases in which, as a consequence, a strict application of the principles of mutual defense and assistance proclaimed

278

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

in Articles 10 and 1 6 should have assured the victims of the protection of their fellow-members.

B u t in only one was an

attempt truly made to apply the sanctions provided for by Article 16, and then only partially, haltingly, temporarily and therefore unsuccessfully. Neither against Poland in favor of Lithuania in 1 9 2 0 , nor against Italy in favor of Greece in the Corfu dispute of 1 9 2 3 , nor in the Greco-Bulgarian conflict of 1 9 2 5 , where indeed it fortunately proved unnecessary, nor in the Gran Chaco dispute between Bolivia and Paraguay from 1 9 2 8 to 1 9 3 5 , nor in the two Sino-Japanese conflicts from 1 9 3 1 , and again from 1 9 3 7 , on, nor in the operations which led to the disappearance of Austria in 1 9 3 8 , of Czechoslovakia, of Albania and of Poland in 1 9 3 9 , nor in the most recent attack on Finland, was international violence avoided or punished and territorial integrity and political independence preserved against aggression. The excuses given to explain the passive attitude of the League, that is of those of its Members who were neither artisans nor victims of aggression, varied somewhat from case to case: the victim was not blameless, or he was unwilling to be defended, and unable to defend himself, or he was geographically so located that he was beyond the reach of the States Members; or, on the other hand, it was urged that the aggressor might be placated if he were not defied, or that the strict application of the Covenant would bring about the dissolution of the whole League and that thus the cure would be more dangerous than was the disease of the patient, even if he were left to die of a natural death. A l w a y s and everywhere, however, it was obvious that international solidarity, as represented by the League, was either too hesitant to face or too feeble to overcome the aggressive will of the law-breaker.

In the most recent cases,

the offenders were not even brought to court.

Before 1 9 3 8 ,

however, they usually were, but the accusation was not pressed and judgment was suspended.

In the two Sino-Japanese dis-

putes, the verdict was indeed pronounced, but it led to the

R I S E AND FALL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

279

dispatch, not of policemen to seize the aggressor, but of ambulances to help his victim. The only case in which there was at least an attempted application of the economic sanctions under Article 16 of the Covenant was that of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute. I shall therefore devote the next section of this chapter to a brief consideration of this dispute, or rather of its last phase. I X . T H E A P P L I C A T I O N OF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS IN T H E ITALO-ETHIOPIAN DISPUTE

With the origins of this dispute and with the first diplomatic and legal procedures to which it gave rise I have already dealt briefly at the end of the last chapter. I am here concerned only with that final phase of the conflict which began when those procedures had broken down before the openly asserted will to aggression of one of the parties. In my consideration of the previous phase of the conflict, I was guided partly by the writings of my colleague Professor Pitman B. Potter. In my inquiry into its last stage, I shall have the benefit of two excellent doctoral dissertations, published one by a Danish 9 0 and the other by an American 9 1 student of the Graduate Institute of International Studies. We have seen how, on September 4, 1935, after nearly a year's military preparations and diplomatic procrastinating manoeuvres, Italy in a long memorandum called upon the League of Nations to abandon her victim to his fate. 92 Instead, the Council, on September 6, in reply to Ethiopia's urgent request "to exercise the powers enumerated in Article 15 of the Covenant," decided "to appoint a Committee of the Council to make a general examination of Italo-Ethiopian relations and to seek for a pacific settlement." 93 90 Axel Serup, L'article 16 du Facte et son interpretation dans le confi.it italoethiopien, Paris, 1938. "Albert E. Highley, The Actions of the States Members of the League of Nations in Application of Sanctions against Italy, 1935-1930, Geneva, 1938. 92 See above, pp. 201 et seq. 93 League of Nations, Official Journal, 1935, pp. 1 1 4 1 , 1145.

28ο

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

W h e n this decision was taken, the Italian

representative,

who refused to concur in it, had l e f t the Council table.

Before

this Committee, composed of the representatives of the United Kingdom, of France, Poland, Spain and T u r k e y , had been able to work out and to submit its proposals of settlement to the parties, the representatives of

fifty-four

States had met

in Geneva for the sixteenth ordinary session of the League Assembly. T h e extreme gravity of the situation was fully realized b y all.

I t was expressly recognized and indeed emphasized

by

the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Samuel Hoare, who, on opening the general debate before the Assembly, on September i i , 1935, made the following weighty statement: I do not suppose that in the history of the Assembly there was ever a more difficult moment for a speech and a discussion. When the world is stirred to excitement over the Ethiopian controversy and feeling runs high upon one side or the other, it is easy to say something that will make the situation more critical and the task of the Council more difficult. None the less, I feel that we should be shirking our responsibilities . . . if those of us who hold strong views as to the League and its future did not frankly and boldly express them. We are here as the representatives of individual Governments, each of us faced with the individual responsibility of considering its own interest and security. We are also here as members of a collective organisation, each of us pledged by certain obligations and each of us anxious to safeguard the future of the world by collective action in the cause of peace and progress. . . . I will begin by reaffirming the support of the League by the Government that I represent and the interest of the British people in collective security. . . . British public opinion was solidly behind the League when the League was founded. . . . The British people supported the League for no selfish motives. They had seen the old system of alliances unable to prevent a world war. As practical men and women, they wished to find a more effective instrument for peace. After four years of devastation, they were determined to do their utmost to prevent another such calamity

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281

falling, not only on themselves, but upon the whole world. T h e y were determined to throw the whole weight of their strength into the scales of international peace and international order. T h e y were deeply and genuinely moved by a great ideal. I t is the fashion sometimes today . . . to scoff at such ideals. W h a t is the use, say the modern critics, of collective action when individual action is simpler and swifter to apply and more direct in its appeal to national sentiment? W h a t is the good of working for peace when the whole history of the world shows that war is the only w a y of settling great issues? These questions ring every day in our ears. T h e events of recent history have made it impossible for us to ignore the strength of the argument behind them. None the less, in spite of the grim experiences of the past, in spite of the worship of force in the present, the British people have clung to their ideal and they are not prepared to abandon it. . . . I t is because, as practical people, they believe that collective security, founded on international agreement, is the most effective safeguard of peace that they would be gravely disturbed if the new instrument that has been forged were blunted or destroyed. . . . Collective security, by which is meant the organisation of peace and the prevention of war b y collective means, is, in its perfect form, not a simple but a complex conception. It means much more than what are commonly called sanctions. I t means, not merely Article 16, but the whole Covenant. It assumes a scrupulous respect for all treaty obligations. . . . T h e two principal conditions in which the system of collective security is designed to operate are, first, that the Members of the League shall have reduced their armaments to the lowest point consistent with national safety and the enforcement b y common action of international obligations; and, secondly, that the possibility is open, through the machinery of the League, for the modification, by consent and by peaceful means, of international conditions whose continuance might be a danger to peace. Finally, to complete the system, there is the obligation to take collective action to bring war to an end in the event of any resort to war in disregard of the Covenant obligations. Underlying these obligations was the expectation that this system would be subscribed to by the universal world of sovereign States, or b y far the greatest part of it. 94 "* League of Nations, pp. 43 et seq.

Records

of the Sixteenth

Assembly,

Plenary Meetings,

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In reading this majestically ample introduction to a political statement on a specific controversial issue, for which everyone was waiting with almost breathless anticipation, one must remember that British politicians are not given to prefacing their practical remarks by the exposition of their general philosophy, Conservative British politicians perhaps even less so than their more imaginative opponents. One must further note that the philosophy of collective security here outlined was hardly that to which British politicians had accustomed their foreign audiences, again especially British politicians belonging to the party on whose behalf Mr. Austen Chamberlain had, ten years previously, killed the Geneva Protocol. If, therefore, Sir Samuel Hoare felt called upon to strike such tones in considering the Italo-Ethiopian dispute before the Assembly of the League, it was obviously because the government of Mr. Baldwin, in which he was Foreign Secretary, had decided to cross the plans of the Duce and to use the collective force of the League for that purpose. Whether, as Sir Samuel asserted rather too strongly to be entirely convincing, Britain's stand was entirely selfless, or whether British imperialism in the Near East and in Africa had reasons of its own for deprecating new European conquests in that sphere, or whether the extraordinary recent success of the Peace Ballot movement in Great Britain had led the Conservative Government to take a leaf out of their more advanced opponents' book in their attitude on the League in general and in collective security in particular, the fact remains: before the die was finally cast, the United Kingdom had pledged itself publicly to a policy of organized international resistance to the Italian campaign. Having recalled all the circumstances which enhanced the risks and difficulties of the task — the spirit of war abroad in certain quarters, the relatively disarmed state of the pacific nations, the lack of universality of League membership — Sir Samuel Hoare solemnly concluded:

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283

On behalf of His M a j e s t y ' s Government in the United Kingdom, I can say that, in spite of these difficulties, that Government will be second to none in its intention to fulfil, within the measure of its capacity, the obligations which the Covenant lays upon it.

Sir Samuel Hoare's speech was the first in the traditional debate on "the work of the League since" the previous Assembly. But even when other speakers touched upon other questions, the minds of all remained concentrated on the ItaloEthiopian dispute. A f t e r the British Foreign Secretary, M r . Yen, the first delegate of China, spoke. H e would have been less than human had he not made the most of the opportunity at least discreetly to hail Great Britain's conversion to the ideals of collective security which had been so sadly neglected at his country's expense ever since it had fallen a victim to Japanese aggression. He declared: I t is, to China, specially gratifying to note that the Powers which form the pillars of the League have, in face of the grave and disquieting situation in Europe and elsewhere, at last come to the realisation that the peace of the world depends on their efforts to put new life into the League, and that for the League again to fail to assert its authority would irretrievably ruin its efficacy as an instrument of peace between nations. . . . In speaking of the League, the phrase "collective security" has, of late, become almost a household word. T o my mind, to understand it correctly, the phrase ought to mean that every State Member of the League, great or small, wherever it be situated, should be guaranteed security, by the collective action of the other States Members, against aggression. 95

In spite of the political interest of this and of many other statements made in the course of this memorable debate, the only other speech to which it is possible to allude here was that delivered two days later by M . Pierre Laval, Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs of France. For the last fifteen years, hardly a French delegate had spoken in Geneva without stressing his country's belief in collective security and 95

Ibid.,

p. 46.

THE QUEST FOR

PEACE

often his regret that this belief should not be generally shared b y all others. On the other hand it was known that M . Laval had, at the beginning of the year 1935, been to Rome and had there concluded with Signor Mussolini a general agreement concerning French and Italian interests in Africa. Did it deal with the Ethiopian question and, if so, did it limit France's freedom of action and hamper her traditional loyalty to the League? M . Laval's brief speech enhanced more than satisfied the general curiosity on this point. It was divided into three parts: First, he reiterated France's loyalty to the League. He said: France is loyal to the Covenant. She cannot fail to carry out her obligations. . . . . . . the representatives of France have constantly sought to increase the moral authority of this supreme international institution. . . . From the 1924 Protocol to the Conference for the Reduction and Limitation of Armaments, they have supported with the same zeal the doctrine of collective security. T h a t doctrine is and will remain that of France. 9 6

Secondly, M . Laval, as was but natural, welcomed with significant and perhaps slightly ironical emphasis Great Britain's adoption of that doctrine. He said: In a speech reflecting great loftiness of thought, and imbued with the liberal tradition of England, and her sense of the universal, Sir Samuel Hoare told us, the day before yesterday, that it was the desire of the United Kingdom to associate itself unreservedly with the system of collective security. H e affirmed that this desire was, and would continue to be, the guiding principle of the United Kingdom's international policy. His words have nowhere been received with more satisfaction than in France.

Thirdly and finally, the French Prime Minister recalled his friendly cooperation with the head of the Italian Government and somewhat laconically added: "Ibid.,

p. 65.

RISE A N D FALL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

285

We all desire to reach an understanding, and, in the supreme effort being made by the Council, I shall have the satisfaction of once more fulfilling my duty as the representative of a Member of the League and that dictated to me by friendship.97 " W e all desire to reach an understanding," declared M . Laval. The statement was doubtless entirely sincere and it was almost equally true. Almost, because the members of the Council and of the Assembly, not excluding the representatives of Ethiopia, had no more ardent wish than to be spared the necessity of choosing between peace and justice. Almost, but not quite, however. Is it not obvious from all we know today that Italian fascism was in no mood for conciliation? What Signor Mussolini was determined to achieve was not only colonial expansion at the expense of the Empire of the Negus, but also military vengeance for the national humiliation of 1896. On September 26, 1935, Mr. de Madariaga, as chairman of the Council Committee appointed on September 6 "to seek for a pacific settlement" was obliged to report to the Council that it had failed in its efforts. It had been officially informed that the Italian Government considered its proposals "unacceptable, inasmuch as they did not offer a minimum basis sufficient for conclusive realisations which would finally and effectively take into account the rights and the vital interests of Italy." 98 Thereupon the Council decided to "take steps forthwith to draft its report under paragraph 4 of Article 15." Having failed in its efforts as conciliator, it now assumed the role of judge. On October 5, the Council met to take cognizance of the report which, sitting as a committee, it had drafted in the meanwhile without the cooperation of the two parties." This report contained information to the effect that Italian troops had crossed the Ethiopian frontier and that war had broken Ibid., p. 66. League of Nations, Official Journal, 1935, pp. 1201-1202, 1621. 99Ibid., pp. 1209 et seq., 1605 et seq. 97

98

286

THE QUEST FOR

PEACE

out between the two contestants. Both of them admitted the facts, each accusing the other of aggressive intentions. The conclusion of the report was couched in the following terms: H a v i n g thus stated the facts of the dispute, the Council should now, in accordance with Article 15 of the C o v e n a n t , make known 'the recommendations which are deemed just and proper in regard thereto.' T h e facts brought to its knowledge since its last meeting b y the two parties make it first and foremost the urgent d u t y of the Council to draw attention to the obligation of conforming to the provisions of the Covenant. For the time being, the only recommendation which it makes is that a n y violation of the C o v e n a n t should immediately be brought to an end. T h e Council reserves the right to m a k e subsequently such other recommendations as it m a y consider advisable. 1 0 0

In his reply to the report of the Council, the Ethiopian representative, pointing to the aggression of which his country was a victim while the dispute was being considered b y the League, declared: T h e Ethiopian Government respectfully b u t firmly asks the Council to declare: ( ι ) T h a t these indisputable facts constitute resort to w a r b y I t a l y within the meaning of Article 16 of the C o v e n a n t ; ( 2 ) T h a t this resort to war has, ipso facto, brought about the consequences laid down in Article 16, paragraph i . 1 0 1

T w o days later and in spite of the protest of the Italian representative, the Council considered a new brief report drawn up by its Committee. It concluded "that the Italian Government had resorted to war in disregard of its covenants under Article 12 of the Covenant of the League of Nations." 102 This conclusion was approved by all the Members except the Italian. In bringing these dramatic proceedings to a close, the President declared: Ibid., p. 1619. Ibid., p. 1213. 102Ibid., p. 1225. 100 101

RISE A N D FALL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

287

I take note that fourteen Members of the League of Nations represented on the Council consider that we are in presence of a war begun in disregard of the obligations of Article 12 of the Covenant. Accordingly, the report of the Council Committee and the Minutes of the present meeting will be sent to all the Members of the League of Nations. As the Assembly stated in its resolution of October 4th, 1921, 'the fulfilment of their duties under Article 16 is required from the Members of the League by the express terms of the Covenant, and they cannot neglect them without a breach of their treaty obligations.' T h e Council has now to assume its duty of co-ordination in regard to the measures to be taken. Since the Assembly of the League of Nations is convened for the day after to-morrow, October 9th, 1935, my colleagues will doubtless feel it desirable to associate the Assembly with their task. T h e report of the Council Committee and the Minutes of the present meeting will therefore be communicated to the President of the Assembly. 1 0 3

The action of the Council was in itself legally decisive. Politically more important still, however, was the attitude of the Assembly. Let me therefore briefly consider this attitude in the light of the nineteen speeches delivered in the course of its historical sittings of October 9, 10 and 11, 1935. In opening what was not to be a true debate but rather a series of national statements by authorized spokesmen of each country represented, the President of the Assembly declared that "it is desirable that the delegates of the States Members of the League be given an opportunity to make declarations on the questions before the Assembly." He first called upon "those delegations which have expressed a desire to speak, either to record an opinion contrary to that expressed by the fourteen Members of the League sitting on the Council or to request that note be taken of their abstention or reservations." 104 103 101

Ibid., p. 1226. League of Nations,

pp. 100, 101.

Records

0) the Sixteenth

Assembly,

Plenary Meetings,

288

T H E QUEST F O R P E A C E

T w o delegations immediately responded to this appeal, the Austrian and the Hungarian. Both represented small and weak States, heavily dependent upon Italy for their economic life and bound to her b y ties of peculiar political intimacy.

As

they felt neither able nor willing to take part in the application of sanctions to Italy, but as they could not honestly deny the obvious violation of the Covenant b y that Power nor their no less obvious duty to draw the legal consequences therefrom under Article 16, their statements could but betray their embarrassment. Although situations in which nations find themselves caught between their juristic obligations and what they deem to be their national necessities are hardly more pleasant to consider than those in which individuals

unsuccessfully

struggle to reconcile the dictates of their conscience with the promptings of their self-interest, they are no less revealing. T h u s the statements made before the Assembly, on October 9, 1935, on behalf of Austria and of H u n g a r y , each significantly enough b y the third delegate of his country, are extremely instructive in the light they throw not only on the position of these two countries but on the general difficulty of organizing collective security in the present state of Europe. Speaking first, Herr Emerich Pflügl said: In placing before you certain considerations arising out of the particularly delicate situation in which the communications of the President place Austria, I desire, first, acting upon instructions from my Government, to re-assert before the Assembly Austria's firm and loyal attachment to the principles of the League of Nations. The communications made by the President refer to a Member State, our great neighbour and trusted friend, for whom, in these bitter circumstances, our country feels the deepest sympathy. Austria will never forget that, at a fateful moment in her history, it was Italy which, in the truest spirit of the Covenant, helped, by her attitude, to safeguard the integrity of another Member of the League. A f t e r this allusion to Signor Mussolini's open hostility to N a z i Germany's first attempt on Austria's independence, Herr Pflügl continued:

RISE A N D FALL OF C O L L E C T I V E S E C U R I T Y

289

Austria feels sure that, in embarking upon the course of sanctions, an act without precedent in its annals, the League of Nations will always keep in view its principal task, which can be none other than the maintenance of peace. . . . L o y a l t y towards the League makes it incumbent upon my Government at once to draw your attention to the serious dangers which sanctions will inevitably entail in the economic life of Europe, in particular for those smaller States whose capacity for economic and financial resistance has been considerably reduced b y the unfavourable conditions imposed upon them. M y Government is not thinking only of Austria, but also of its creditors. 1 0 5 T h u s t h r e e r e a s o n s a r e p u t f o r w a r d b y A u s t r i a to e x p l a i n her

abstention

gratitude

from

for Italy,

sanctions: which

feelings

of

friendship

render them distasteful, a

and sense

of c a u t i o n , w h i c h m a k e s t h e m a p p e a r d a n g e r o u s , a n d d o u b t s a s to their e f f i c a c y f o r the m a i n t e n a n c e of p e a c e . T h e H u n g a r i a n d e l e g a t e , M r . de V e l i c s , t o o k m u c h the s a m e line.

H e insisted less, h o w e v e r , t h a n his A u s t r i a n

colleague,

on p u r e l y n a t i o n a l c o n s i d e r a t i o n s and m o r e on the l a s t p o i n t , on which he declared: T h e League of Nations, as an institution, and the Covenant of the League were created and exist for one sole purpose: the maintenance of peace. T h e maintenance of peace means an effort to eliminate all the causes that might lead to war. Obviously, the lives of the various nations cannot be confined for ever within a static and immovable framework; they must develop according to the rule of nature itself, which is a rule of perpetual change. It is a fundamental duty of the League to see that these movements shall take place under proper conditions, after the ground has been prepared and made ready by the League itself. A f t e r this d i p into the d e e p w a t e r s of p o l i t i c a l

dynamism

and international biology — a dip hardly allowed for b y

the

tenets of L e a g u e o r t h o d o x y — M r . de V e l i c s , r e e m e r g i n g into the c l e a r a t m o s p h e r e of n a t i o n a l interest, m o r e m o d e s t l y a d d e d : T h e exclusion of Italy from Hungary's restricted and limited trade outlets would completely upset our economic and financial equilib106

Ibid.,

p. 1 0 1 .

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T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

rium, which has hitherto been preserved at great cost, largely by means of exports to Italy. 108 Two days later, the representative of Albania made the following statement, which in its brevity pointed to a position of dependence upon Italy still more paralyzing than were those of Austria and Hungary. Incidentally this statement shows also that when, in the spring of 1939, Albania was forcibly annexed to Italy, the national independence which she then forfeited was already seriously reduced. Mr. Frasheri, of Albania, said: The Albanian Government remains faithful to the Covenant of the League of Nations and highly appreciates the importance attached to the observance of the Covenant; but, in view of its political relations as determined by a treaty of alliance with Italy and of the capital importance of the economic relations existing between the two allied countries, the Albanian Government regrets that it cannot endorse the decision reached by the Assembly with regard to the application of sanctions against Italy. 107 B y their statements or by their silent assent, all the other States Members of the League concurred in the Council's resolution establishing Italy's aggression. It will be remembered, however, that Japan was no longer a Member of the League and that Germany, who also ceased to be a Member on October 2 1 , 1935, took no part in the proceedings. M y own country, Switzerland, made her position known on October 10, 1935. It was undoubtedly somewhat ambiguous. In an effort to reconcile her loyalty to the League with the defense of her military neutrality, which had expressly been recognized before she joined the League in 1920, M . Motta, her Foreign Minister, declared: The Swiss delegation . . . has tacitly associated itself with the finding of the States Members of the Council. This opens the way to the sanctions provided for by Article 16 of the Covenant. Hitherto, p. 102. Ibid., p. 114.

106 Ibid., 107

RISE A N D FALL OF C O L L E C T I V E S E C U R I T Y

291

no one, apart from one of the parties directly concerned, has alluded to sanctions involving the use of force in the strict sense of that term. T h e Swiss delegation takes note of this important fact. T h e other category of sanctions is that of economic and financial sanctions. B y their nature and purpose, such sanctions are not designed to be and, in our eyes, do not constitute hostile acts. T h e y aim at exercising moral and, particularly, material pressure on one of the parties in order to induce it to restore peace. 1 0 8

M . Motta, having thus hoped to reassure Switzerland's close neighbor and friend, then went on to recall his country's well-established military neutrality, her "duty of solidarity with the other Members of the League of Nations" as regards economic and financial sanctions, and concluded: T h e limits of our obligation are determined by our neutrality, which, in our opinion, constitutes a fundamental principle and at the same time a vital interest. W e do not consider ourselves bound to take part in sanctions which, by their nature and effect, would expose our neutrality to real dangers — dangers which we must judge in the full exercise of our sovereignty.

This argument seemed to imply that Switzerland's obligation to take part in economic and financial sanctions against an aggressor was determined by the danger of his reactions thereto. If presented before a court of law, such an argument would doubtless have struck its members as extremely bold. Whatever its juristic justification, it could hardly be resented by the Assembly of the League, some of whose leading members were in fact adopting a very similar attitude without being able to invoke in its favor any guarantee of military neutrality. M . Laval, of France, who had preceded M . Motta on the platform, had, in very brief and somewhat mysterious terms, declared: M y country will observe the Covenant. Friendship also lays a duty on me. W e are not repudiating our faith in the authority of the 108

Ibid.,

p . 106.

292

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

highest international institution if, simultaneously with the application of its law, we continue to seek a solution by conciliation.109 Mr. Anthony Eden, whose desire to see the Covenant faithfully and fully applied seemed to be more uncompromising than that of his French colleague, was however instructed not to allow the United Kingdom to be drawn into regions where France would refuse to follow. He also, therefore, declared that his country was "at all times prepared wholeheartedly to co-operate" in the task of securing "an early and peaceful settlement." Was it not clear that, as long as the application of sanctions was accompanied by such declarations, it was in fact to be subordinated to the desire of reaching some friendly agreement with the culprit? Thus the application of sanctions against Italy tended to resemble a tariff war waged in the hope and with the purpose of securing a favorable treaty of commerce and had but little in common with the grim operations punitively to enforce peace which the authors of Article 16, based on their experience of the World War, had undoubtedly contemplated. Military measures were out of the question, as M . Laval, speaking publicly at Clermont-Ferrand, on October 12, assured his audience. He added, on November 27, that all measures liable to lead to a naval blockade had been excluded and that the closing of the Suez Canal had never been envisaged. 110 Loyalty to the League was manifestly being subordinated to what he liked to call France's "duties of friendship" towards Italy and what was in fact her not unnatural desire not to add an implacable enemy south of the Alps to the ever more threatening neighbor beyond the Rhine. T h e British attitude was that of a "brilliant second" who, under more favorable circumstances, would not have shrunk from taking more energetic measures but who, as Sir Samuel Hoare frankly explained to the House of Commons on his 109

Loc.

cit.

110Highley,

op. cit., p. 193.

RISE AND

FALL

OF COLLECTIVE

SECURITY

293

return from Geneva, on October 22, was not prepared and did not intend "to act alone." He added: F r o m the beginning of the present deliberations at G e n e v a until now, there has been no discussion of military sanctions, and no such measures, therefore, had formed a n y part of our policy. . . . N o b o d y in this House can believe that a n y b o d y in E u r o p e desires w a r . 1 1 1

True, doubtless, nobody but Italy. And Italy herself, who had every reason for preferring her own private little war against a primitive African people to major operations on her frontiers and in the Mediterranean against the greater part of Europe, was not slow to make the most of the League's so openly professed pacific intentions. Although it was inevitable that the attitude of the whole League should be decisively influenced if not absolutely determined by that of the two Great Powers who alone were in a position to impose their will on recalcitrant Italy, it is not without political interest to note also the stand taken by the other States, whose representatives defined it before the Assembly. The only Great Power, besides France and Great Britain, which at the time was still an active Member of the League was the U. S. S. R . Its spokesman was Mr. Vladimir Potemkine, then as faithful a servant of his leader, Mr. Maxime Litvinoff, and as undaunted a champion of collective security, of the indivisibility of peace and of hostility to Nazi Germany as he was until the spring of 1940 of Mr. Molotoff and of the opposite policies. He nobly declared, on October 10, 1935: T h e Soviet delegation . . . considers it to be its d u t y to reaffirm its determination to honour, in common with all the other M e m b e r s of the L e a g u e , the undertakings which the C o v e n a n t imposes upon all of them without exception. U n i t y of action will constitute the most effective means of settling a conflict which has had its source in a desire for colonial expansion, 111 Parliamentary 1935, p. 29.

Debates, 5th Series, vol. 305, House of Commons, London,

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

294

which infringes the territorial integrity and national independence of a Member of the League and which constitutes a threat to mankind. This unity of action will serve as an earnest of the necessary realisation of collective security, of the system which will put a check on all future attempts — from whatever quarter they may come — to disturb peace by attacks on the world's most crucial spots. 112 Less grandiloquent but all the more impressive in its firm laconism was the brief statement of Mr. Pouritch, of Jugoslavia, made "on behalf of the three Governments of the Petite Entente:" In half a dozen lines he declared: In our view, the main issue is the application of the Covenant. We have followed all the discussions, without wishing to go into the details of the conflict, which has now become further extended. Having said already that we remain faithful to the Covenant, we shall scrupulously apply its provisions.113 The only other speech which expressed equal unqualified determination was that of the first delegate of Haiti. Although the speaker bore a military title and although, as all his fellowcountrymen whom I have heard in Geneva in the course of the last twenty years, he was a most eloquent and impassioned orator in French, he could hardly hope to intimidate the Italian aggressor. I shall quote only the first and last words of the address of General Nemours: The black Republic of Haiti, realising the gravity of the hour, is ready to shoulder its responsibilities. . . . Let us remember those thrones which we believed to be firmly established, but of which the fragments are now strewn over the soil of all Europe; woe betide us if our pusillanimity prevents us from playing the part that it is our sacred duty, at the dictate of our conscience, to fulfil; great or small, strong or weak, near or far, white or coloured, let us never forget that one day we may be somebody's Ethiopia. 114 112

League

of Nations,

p. 107. 113 114

Ibid., Ibid.,

p.

no.

pp. 107-108.

Records

of the Sixteenth

Assembly,

P l e n a r y Meetings,

RISE A N D FALL OF C O L L E C T I V E S E C U R I T Y

295

I wonder if these wise words were ever recalled, as well they might have been, in subsequent years, in Vienna, in Prague, in Tirana, in Warsaw, in Helsinki and in the other Baltic capitals. Let us hope, in any case, that I shall not have to prolong this enumeration at least before these pages are through the press! T h e other Latin-American republics, whose delegates, be it incidentally remarked, display their continental solidarity by never allowing one of them to speak on behalf of the others in Geneva but by inevitably all following suit if one of them mounts the platform, were far less uncompromising. Most of them were bound to Italy by the demographic ties of Italian immigration. None had any special interest in Ethiopia. All were far removed from the scene of conflict. Although by international tradition hostile to aggression and to all forms of violence and strongly committed to the principles of pacific settlement, they looked upon collective security and the coercive measures it now entailed with regret and with undisguised reluctance. Their unanimous opinion was perhaps best expressed by Mr. Guani, then first delegate of Uruguay and now her Foreign Minister, who declared: . . . I feel it my duty to reaffirm in the Assembly the attachment of my country and my Government to the principles of justice which must govern relations between States. Uruguay, which was one of the first to sign the Covenant of the League, remains true to the spirit of co-operation and collective international action. Unless there is strict observance of the legal provisions which must henceforth be recognised as an effective rule of conduct for Governments, there is the risk that the organisation of human society as conceived in 1919 may collapse and be replaced by anarchy and disorder. . . . In conclusion, allow me to express the ardent hope of my Government and my country that this deplorable conflict may soon be settled in the true atmosphere of Geneva — that is to say, in a spirit of peace, conciliation and friendship. 1 1 5 115

Ibid.,

P. Ι JO.

296

T H E QUEST FOR

PEACE

S i m i l a r l y b u t still more stressing the need f o r conciliation a n d his dislike of c o e r c i v e m e a s u r e s , M r . de P o r t o Seguro, of C h i l e , a f t e r r e f e r r i n g to the " t i e s of age-long f r i e n d s h i p . . . d e e p s y m p a t h y . . . a n d interests of e v e r y k i n d " w h i c h b o u n d his c o u n t r y " t o the g r e a t a n d noble I t a l i a n n a t i o n , " d e c l a r e d : M y Government, in the present conflict, will consider with the closest attention all measures that may be contemplated with a view to putting an end to the war and terminating the state of breach of the Covenant. It is, nevertheless, its conviction that the measures to be taken will be only provisional and designed simply to bring about the restoration of peace. . . . M y Government firmly hopes that these measures will not be necessary for long and that the League of Nations, energetically supported by the Powers most directly concerned, will discover a just and equitable solution of the conflict, thus fulfilling its true aim, which is to ensure the maintenance of peace and justice between the nations. 1 1 6 T h e o n l y L a t i n - A m e r i c a n s p e a k e r w h o o p e n l y , a l t h o u g h not w i t h o u t deep regret, w e l c o m e d the application of A r t i c l e

16

to I t a l y w a s the delegate of B o l i v i a w h o h a d in v a i n p l e a d e d for its application to P a r a g u a y in the still unsettled

Chaco

conflict. M r . C o s t a d u R e i s s a i d : Bolivia, which is deeply attached to the Covenant, asked for its full application at a painful crisis in her national history. To-day she notes with satisfaction that the Assembly intends to take action which will henceforward put an end to what I have ventured to call a policy of two weights and two measures which seems to vary from season to season. The American countries, some by tacit acquiescence, others by explicit declarations, have agreed to the principle of the application of the Covenant, drastic though this may be. Without distinction, without reference to individual cases, and stifling their feelings of sincere sympathy for a great nation to which the whole world is spiritually indebted, they will do their duty, however painful it may prove. T h e y are well aware that severity, when mitigated by regret, is perhaps one of the most far-sighted forms of friendship. 117 ue

Ibid.

Ibid., p. 112.

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297

Such then was the moral climate in Geneva on the morrow of Italy's premeditated attack upon a helpless African State which, with her support, had become her fellow-member in the League of Nations twelve years before. T h e violation of the Covenant was so flagrant that the question, once frankly put to the Council and to the Assembly by the aggrieved party, could only be answered in the affirmative. Moreover, in contrast to the previous case of the almost equally flagrant breach of the Covenant by Japan, it was one which, on purely geographical and strategic grounds, was clearly susceptible of a successful solution by concerted action on the part of the lawabiding Members of the League. Had they been unanimously and unqualifiedly determined to carry out their full obligations under Article 16, Italy's capitulation would have been certain. A complete economic blockade and the severance b y naval means, if necessary, of Italy's communications with her troops in the far-off theater of operations beyond the Suez Canal could have had no other result. This was especially so as the United States had made it clear to all within and without Italy that, from that quarter, the League would not have been exposed to any interference and might indeed have enjoyed some measure of support in any legal action it might have undertaken in favor of Ethiopia. On the other hand Japan and Germany were no longer Members of the League and would doubtless have looked upon its success with more displeasure than satisfaction.

Furthermore

France was most reluctant to forfeit the good will of Italy, to whom she had recently made important and ill-defined concessions in Africa. This good will seemed all the more precious to France as Germany, under Herr Hitler's aggressive leadership, was fast becoming a menace to her security.

Great

Britain, in spite of the relatively weak position to which her policies of disarmament had reduced her navy, was still supreme in the Mediterranean.

This supremacy, however, was

no longer unchallenged and she was unwilling to assert it un-

298

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

less assured of complete French support. As this support was not forthcoming, Great Britain, and with her all the other loyal Members of the League, felt, if not unable at least unwilling, to do more than to bring a certain measure of pressure to bear on Italy. Had Italy been completely isolated or had she been governed by a weak or by a truly pacific government, this would doubtless have sufficed to bring about a negotiated settlement with Ethiopia. As it was, the action of the League, sufficiently unfriendly to arouse the national pride of the Fascist Kingdom, yet insufficiently drastic and determined to deter her daring but realistic leader from the undertaking on which he had set his heart, hastened rather than impeded the conquest of Ethiopia. This conquest was achieved in less than a year. For Italy, the months from October 1935 until M a y 1936 were marked by tremendous administrative and military exertions against a country which distance, size, topography and climate protected more than its valorous but small and ill-equipped army. For the League, these months were spent in active negotiations among its Members, cooperating in the organization of economic sanctions and by some of them in hardly less active attempts to bring Italy to moderate her ambitions. The sanctions finally agreed to and applied were extremely mild. T h e y in fact merely tended to hamper Italy's foreign trade, to limit her imports of war materials, not including oil, and to weigh on her balance of payments. With these negotiations and with these attempts it is impossible for us here to deal. T h e y have been closely studied by several scholars and the official documents about them are extremely full and readily available to all. 118 Although some important points concerning the Franco-British-Italian relations still remain obscure, for our purposes the story of the 118 C f . in particular League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplements N u m b e r s 145-150, in w h i c h the principal official documents h a v e been reprinted. A n index to this collection w a s published in 1937 as Special Supplement N u m ber 164.

RISE AND

F A L L OF COLLECTIVE

SECURITY

299

first and sole real endeavor made by the League to apply sanctions against a violator of its Covenant is quite sufficiently well known to teach some very clear lessons. Before attempting to formulate them briefly, I will recall not the course of the action taken by the League, but merely its conclusion. On May 9, 1936, Italy, having in all essentials achieved the military conquest of Ethiopia, whose emperor had fled from his country, proclaimed her sovereignty over it. On the day preceding, Germany had denounced the Treaty of Locarno and her army reoccupied the demilitarized Rhineland in spite of France's vain appeal to the guarantors of its demilitarization. And thus the principle of collective security had suffered another grave set-back in a situation which was not without directly weighing on that of the League in the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. Three days later, the representative of the Argentine Republic on the Council had protested against the postponement of the discussion on the dispute between Italy and Ethiopia which he and others had proposed to initiate. On June 2, 1936, Mr. E. Ruiz Guinazu, the permanent delegate accredited to the League, on behalf of the Argentine Government, addressed a letter to the Secretary-General requesting that the Assembly be summoned forthwith. It added: T h i s request is based upon the conviction that it is essential that all the States Members of the League of Nations, which is founded upon the principle of equality, should have an opportunity of considering the problems arising out of the dispute between Italy and Ethiopia, which are of such overwhelming importance in the present international situation, thus assuming their responsibilities and expressing their judgments upon the course to be followed in accordance with the fundamental principles of the Covenant. M y Government is of opinion that for this purpose it will be sufficient to reopen the Assembly which . . . was not closed but adjourned, out of consideration for the state of public opinion in the various countries; a fact which, in m y Government's view, would in itself justify the matter's being submitted to the Assembly's consideration.

300

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This attitude should be considered in the light of Article 10 and other articles of the Covenant, the principles of which are in keeping with the unchanging tradition on which Pan-Americanism has for half-a-century been based in the mutual relations of all the peoples of America — a tradition which has been brought down to the most recent times in international declarations and documents. It is my Government's view that the purpose of the Assembly, the summoning of which it requests, should be to consider the situation brought about by the annexation of Ethiopia and also the position in regard to sanctions enacted by the League. 119 In compliance with this request, the Assembly met in Geneva from June 30 to July 4, 1936, for what was the most depressing but also, in my opinion, by far the most enlightening session in the twenty years' history of the League. As a preparation for these pages I have, in the course of the last twelve months, carefully read and often reread thousands of pages of official documents and non-official commentaries relating to events most of which I had been privileged to witness at close quarters. Of this mass of material, some was very dull, some was less dull and much was not dull at all. But nothing was comparable in intense historical and political interest with the stenographic records of the nine plenary meetings in which nearly forty States, from all parts of the world, expounded their views on the past, present and future of international relations. The Assembly was attended by fifty-one national delegations, including H . M . the Emperor of Abyssinia, the Prime Ministers of France, Belgium and the Irish Free State, and the Ministers of Foreign Affairs of almost all other European countries, most of whom took part in the debates. In point of form, the Assembly was but a continuation of that of the sixteenth session, which had begun in the autumn of 1935 and which had been presided over by Mr. Benes, then Czechoslovakian Foreign Minister. Inasmuch, however, as he had in the meanwhile been elected to the presidency of his 119 League of Nations, Records Meetings, pp. 97-98.

of the Sixteenth

Assembly,

Part II, Plenary-

R I S E A N D F A L L OF C O L L E C T I V E S E C U R I T Y

301

country in succession to President Masaryk, when the Assembly met again, on June 30, 1936, it had to choose a new chairman. It did so by electing M. Paul van Zeeland, Prime Minister of Belgium. After delivering a brief presidential address, M. van Zeeland opened the proceedings by reading a long letter, of June 29, 1936, from the Foreign Minister of Italy, which country was not represented at Geneva. In this curious letter, Count Ciano recalled the main events in the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, including the rejection by the Negus, on December 12, 1935, of the famous Hoare-Laval proposal. Narrating the conquest of the country, the flight of the Negus in M a y 1936 and the collapse of what was termed "the rudimentary organisation of the Ethiopian State," the letter then adds: Italy was therefore compelled to accept such responsibilities as were entailed by the situation and in order to comply with the wishes and requirements of the populations obviously needful of a new order capable of assuring progress and peace.

Having thus briefly sought to justify the Italian annexation, the letter explained how, on June 9, 1936, "nearly all the civil notables, including some former Ministers and the religious authorities, beginning with the Abouna and comprising the representatives of the monasteries, which are the depositories of national traditions, took their oath of allegiance to the King of Italy, Emperor of Ethiopia." In his letter, Count Ciano then declared that "Italy views the work she has undertaken in Ethiopia as a sacred mission of civilisation, and proposes to carry it out according to the principles of the Covenant of the League of Nations." The letter ends with the following statements, of which one cannot but wonder how their author expected them to be received and interpreted in Geneva: The Italian Government is fully convinced that loyal and effectual cooperation between countries meets the aspiration of all peoples towards a better and higher future.

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While expecting the League of Nations to appraise the situation now existing in Ethiopia in a spirit of fair understanding, the Italian Government declares itself ready to give once more its willing and practical cooperation to the League of Nations in order to achieve a settlement of the grave problems upon which rests the future of Europe and of the world. . . . The Italian Government expresses the conviction, generally held elsewhere, that the League of Nations requires adequate reform, and it is ready to participate in the study and enactment of such reform. The Italian Government is fully aware of the röle which devolves upon Italy and of its own responsibility in the solution of problems which concern the future of all peoples; it has, therefore, no preconceived ideas or prejudicial reservations as to the international formulae or instruments to be used to this end, while intending to appraise them merely in the light of their efficiency in attaining the common aim. Nevertheless, the Italian Government cannot but recall the abnormal situation in which Italy has been placed and the necessity for the immediate removal of such obstacles as have been and are in the way of the international cooperation which Italy sincerely seeks, and to which she is prepared to give a tangible contribution for the sake of and the maintenance of peace. 120 In brief, b y this letter I t a l y offered the L e a g u e to resume her place in G e n e v a and indirectly tendered F r a n c e her support against G e r m a n y if only sanctions be raised, Ethiopia dismissed and the prodigal

son welcomed as the

triumphant

conqueror and therefore rightful sovereign of the territory of a former fellow-member of the L e a g u e . A f e w minutes later the N e g u s in person addressed the Assembly of the L e a g u e , from which I t a l y held that he should be expelled.

I n perhaps the most moving speech which has

ever been delivered from the platform of the A s s e m b l y and one which cannot but have made a deep and lasting impression even on the minds of the most cynical, he first explained his presence in Geneva. H e said: There is perhaps no precedent for a head of a State himself speaking in this Assembly. But there is certainly no precedent for a 120

Ibid.,

pp. 19 et

seq.

RISE A N D FALL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

3 03

people being the victim of such wrongs and being threatened with abandonment to its aggressor. N o r has there ever before been an example of any Government proceeding to the systematic extermination of a nation b y barbarous means, in violation of the most solemn promises made to all the nations of the earth that there should be no resort to a war of conquest and that there should not be used against innocent human beings the terrible weapon of poison gas. It is to defend a people struggling for its age-old independence that the Head of the Ethiopian Empire has come to Geneva to fulfil this supreme duty, after having himself fought at the head of his armies.

The Negus then went on to describe the course of the conquest, due mainly, he claimed, to the barbarous methods of warfare of the invader and in particular to his use of mustard gas, sprayed from aircraft. Then, having recalled once more the various episodes of the diplomatic struggle between his Government and that of the aggressor, he proceeded and ended as follows: In that unequal struggle between a Government commanding more than forty-two million inhabitants, having at its disposal financial, industrial and technical means which enabled it to create unlimited quantities of the most death-dealing weapons, and, on the other hand, a small people of twelve million inhabitants, without arms, without resources, having on its side nothing but the justice of its own cause and the promise of the League of Nations, what real assistance was given to Ethiopia b y the fifty-two nations who had declared the Rome Government guilty of a breach of the Covenant and had undertaken to prevent the triumph of the aggressor? Has each of the States Members, as it was its duty to do in virtue of its signature appended to Article 16 of the Covenant, considered the aggressor to have committed an act of war personally directed against itself? I had placed all my hopes in the fulfilment of these undertakings. M y trust had been confirmed b y the repeated declarations made in the Council to the effect that aggression must not be rewarded, and that, in the end, force would be compelled to bow before law. . . . T h e Ethiopian Government never expected other Governments to shed their soldiers' blood to defend the Covenant when their own immediately personal interests were not at stake. Ethiopian warriors asked only for means to defend themselves. On many occasions

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

304

I asked for financial assistance for the purchase of arms. That assistance was constantly denied me. What, then, in practice, is the meaning of Article 16 of the Covenant and of collective security? . . . I assert that the issue before the Assembly to-day is . . . not merely a question of a settlement in the matter of Italian aggression. It is a question of collective security; of the very existence of the League; of the trust placed by States in international treaties; of the value of promises made to small States that their integrity and their independence shall be respected and assured. It is a choice between the principle of the equality of States and the imposition upon small Powers of the bonds of vassalage. In a word, it is international morality that is at stake. . . . The Assembly will doubtless have before it proposals for reforming the Covenant and rendering the guarantee of collective security more effective. Is it the Covenant that needs reform? What undertakings can have any value if the will to fulfil them is lacking? It is international morality that is at stake, and not the articles of the Covenant. On behalf of the Ethiopian people, a Member of the League of Nations, I ask the Assembly to take all measures proper to secure respect for the Covenant. I renew my protest against the violations of treaties of which the Ethiopian people is the victim. I declare before the whole world that the Emperor, the Government and the people of Ethiopia will not bow before force, that they uphold their claims, that they will use all means in their power to ensure the triumph of right and respect for the Covenant. I ask the fifty-two nations who have given the Ethiopian people a promise to help them in their resistance to the aggressor: What are they willing to do for Ethiopia? I ask the great Powers, who have promised the guarantee of collective security to small States — those small States over whom hangs the threat that they may one day suffer the fate of Ethiopia: What measures do they intend to take? Representatives of the world, I have come to Geneva to discharge in your midst the most painful of the duties of the head of a State. What answer am I to take back to my people? 1 2 1 T h u s to the thesis of R o m e , demanding that sanctions be raised, Ethiopia expelled from the L e a g u e and her annexation to I t a l y recognized b y its M e m b e r s , A d d i s A b a b a opposed an 121

Ibid.,

pp. 22 et seq.

RISE A N D FALL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

305

antithesis appealing for assistance against the aggressor and demanding the reestablishment of peace on the basis of the status quo ante. It was between these two opposite poles that the debates were to range for three full days at Geneva. T h e very lame compromise that was finally reached, as we shall see presently, not only satisfied no one of those who agreed to it, but it also almost equally exasperated both the warring parties. When the latter had thus defined their antagonistic attitudes, with perfect clarity if not with equal frankness, the judges before whom they laid their conflicting claims, that is, the representatives of the other States Members of the League, began publicly to consider them. They did so after listening to a preliminary speech in which Mr. Cantilo, the first Argentine delegate, sought to explain the reasons which had prompted his Government to request the summoning of the Assembly. These reasons, in so far as it is possible to extract them from the extremely involved statement in which they were hidden rather than expounded, were the following: First, the desire, in accordance with the democratic spirit and with the principle of equality of States which had always been that of Latin-America, to enable and indeed to oblige all the Members of the League to consider a situation with which they were all confronted and which had previously been dealt with too exclusively by the Council. Secondly, to recall that Latin America, ever committed to the principle of uti possidetis as a basis for the settlement of all territorial claims, had recently, by an historical declaration of August 3, 1932, ratified by nineteen American States, made it clear that they unanimously refused to recognize any international arrangement "which has not been obtained by peaceful means, nor the validity of the territorial acquisitions which may be obtained through occupation or conquest by force of arms." Thirdly, as this principle applied by the League seemed to

306

THE QUEST FOR

PEACE

postpone the reestablishment of peace and to endanger the life of the international institution itself, to raise the question of its possible reform. T h e final conclusion of the whole speech was in fact a confession of embarrassment more than the firm proclamation of a set purpose, as the following, its final words indicate: T h e proceedings upon which we are entering will therefore be of the highest importance. If American ideas cannot be harmonised with the manner of applying the Covenant, if we cannot secure the practical universality of a principle of justice, and if the attempt to do so might create a danger to peace or might prove incompatible with the forms devised to secure it, the Argentine Republic would be obliged to reconsider the possibility of continuing its collaboration. In any case, you can be sure that, in calling for the meeting of this Assembly, we have acted with the highest intentions and inspired by a spirit of sincere co-operation. W e considered that it might constitute a new and a great effort towards peace, imbuing all its Members with the same desire for conciliation and harmony in order that they may hasten on the solutions which still have to be sought. T h e world is calling for peace; it is suffering from the absence of peace; and on the endeavour, so often unsuccessfully repeated, to ensure its final stability depends the welfare of innumerable peoples all over the earth. 1 2 2

T h e embarrassment displayed in this declaration was in fact much more enlightening than was the declaration itself. Shared in various degrees by all the delegations in Geneva, it was nothing but the dumb expression of the age-old conflict between the ideals of peace and of justice. How, in the final stage of the Italo-Ethiopian dispute, could local peace be achieved and general peace be safeguarded except at the expense of the undoubted justice of the cause of the Negus? And how could the justice of this cause be upheld except at the expense of peace? As all the nations and almost all the governments represented in Geneva in 1936 demanded peace, but as none of their 122Ibid.,

p. 22.

RISE AND

F A L L OF C O L L E C T I V E

SECURITY

307

spokesmen were prepared quite openly to repudiate justice, the result was a debate in which words were used sometimes to suggest, often to disguise, very rarely to express the true intentions of the speakers.

These speakers were unanimously

frank only when they gave vent to their feelings of dissatisfaction with the situation in which they were placed. M r . Eden, the British Foreign Secretary, was surely speaking the mind of all his colleagues when he began his speech of J u l y 1, 1 9 3 6 , with the following delightfully characteristic example of British understatement: " N o t one of us here present," he said, "can contemplate, with any measure of satisfaction, the circumstances in which this Assembly meets on this occasion."

123

Three definite questions were in everyone's mind and had at all cost to be settled: first, were the sanctions to be raised; secondly, was Italy's illegally won sovereignty over Ethiopia to be recognized; and thirdly was the Covenant to be reformed and if so how? F o r the sake of clarity, I shall defer the consideration of this third double question to the final section of this chapter and here inquire only into the reply given to the first two. Of all the thirty-four speeches, only one, besides that of the Negus himself, expressly favored the continuation of the policy of economic sanctions against Italy.

T h a t speech was

delivered by the delegate of the Union of South Africa, the only white State of the Black Continent.

In an impassioned ora-

tion, M r . te Water, who was bitterly conscious of his isolation, declared: It is being widely questioned: W h a t can sanctions achieve now? H a v e they not failed in their object which, it is claimed, was the preservation of Ethiopian sovereignty? T o continue sanctions in the face of the destruction of that sovereignty b y Italy, would not that in effect be an illegal attempt b y the League of Nations to punish the successful aggressor? Of those who question thus, m y Government would ask in turn: Can it be said, can it be justly claimed, that the triumph of the or121

Ibid.,

p. 3 4 .

308

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

ganised might of Italy over the undisciplined and ill-equipped black armies of Ethiopia was not foreseeable? Did the fifty nations, when they solemnly bound themselves to collective action under the Covenant of the League, make the successful resistance of Ethiopia a condition precedent to the fulfilment of their collective obligation? M y Government has again examined its own conduct in this matter scrupulously and conscientiously. It can find no new factor in the present situation which did not in fact, or potentially, exist when it announced its decision from this place to honour its obligations and to participate in collective action against the aggressor nation. On the contrary, the destruction of Ethiopian sovereignty by Italy and the annexation of the territory of a country which at no time menaced the safety of Italy creates now the exact state of affairs which this League was designed to avoid, and which we are all still pledged to prevent by every agreed means in our power, and to refuse to acknowledge. If the League were to refuse that vindication to any one of its Members, it would disclose itself a mere pretender; should Italy be held to have succeeded in retaining her spoils, not in spite of the authority of the League, but because of the abdication of that authority, what else, then, can this League mean? If the great Powers, in whose hands in the last resort lies the safety of nations, accepting success as the yardstick by which the acts of the Covenant-breakers are to be measured, can rebuild on the broken pledge, if these are policies of realism, let them be demonstrated, so that we may know whether we may continue to collaborate with them in the maintenance and organisation of peace. And so I beg to announce the decision of my Government that it is still prepared to maintain the collective action legitimately agreed upon by the resolution of this Assembly of the League of Nations on October ioth, 1935. 124 N o less f r a n k in his criticism of the past, b u t more resigned provisionally at least to submit to the inevitable, M r . Litvinoff as usual made the most of the opportunity of denouncing the failings of his capitalist fellow-members of the L e a g u e .

As

usual also, since he suffered f r o m none of the diplomatic inhibitions of his more cautious colleagues, he made some extremely revealing statements. wibid.,

p. 33.

T h u s he declared:

R I S E A N D F A L L OF C O L L E C T I V E S E C U R I T Y

3 09

. . . sooner than might have been expected, the moment came when the necessity for reconsidering the measures adopted at Geneva, from the angle of their serving any useful purpose, became absolutely clear. That moment was when the resistance of the valiant Ethiopian troops was broken, when the Emperor and Government of Ethiopia left their territory, and when a considerable portion of their territory was occupied by the Italian army. It appeared then indubitable that, by economic sanctions alone, it would be impossible to drive the Italian army out of Ethiopia and restore the independence of that country, and that such an objective could only be attained by more serious sanctions, including those of a military nature. Such measures could only be considered if one or several States could be found which, in virtue of their geographical position and special interests, would agree to bear the main brunt of a military encounter. Such States were not to be found among us; and, even if they had been found, the other States, before deciding on any particular degree of co-operation in serious measures, would require guarantees that similar co-operation could also be counted upon in other cases of opposing the aggressor. Such guarantees were all the more necessary because some actions and statements of one European State, whose aggressive intentions leave no room for doubt — indeed, are openly proclaimed by that State itself — indicated an accelerated rate of preparations for aggression in more than one direction. The attitude of some countries to these actions, and the lenient treatment accorded to their authors, shook the belief that those guarantees which I have just mentioned could be immediately secured. In view of these circumstances, I came to the conclusion, even during the M a y session of the Council of the League, that the further application of economic sanctions was useless, and that it was impossible to afford any practical aid to Ethiopia in this way. It seems that this conclusion was reached by nearly all Members of the League. H a v i n g thus v e r y clearly explained w h y the experiment of a p p l y i n g Article 1 6 h a d f a i l e d , he turned on those w h o concluded that therefore the policy of sanctions a n d collective security w a s generally impracticable and

continued:

I assert that Article 16 equipped the League of Nations with such powerful weapons that, in the event of their being fully applied, every aggression can be broken. Moreover, the very conviction that

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE they may be applied may rob the aggressor of his zeal to put his criminal intentions into practice. The melancholy experience of the Italo-Ethiopian conflict does not contradict this assertion: on the contrary. In this particular case, whether because this was the first experiment in the application of collective measures; whether because some considered that this case has particular characteristics; whether because it coincided with the preparations elsewhere for aggression on a much larger scale, to which Europe had to devote special attention; whether for these or other reasons, it is a fact that, not only was the whole terrible mechanism of Article 16 not brought into play, but from the very outset there was a manifest striving to confine the action taken to the barest minimum. Even economic sanctions were limited in their scope and their function, and even in this limited scope sanctions were not applied by all Members of the League. Four Members of the League, from the very beginning, refused to apply any sanctions whatsoever. One Member of the League bordering on Italy refused to apply the most effective sanction — namely, the prohibition of imports from Italy; while, of those countries which raised no objections in principle to sanctions, many did not in actual fact apply several of them, pleading constitutional difficulties, the necessity of 'study,' etc. Thus, even the embargo on arms was not applied by seven Members of the League, financial measures by eight countries, prohibition of exports to Italy by ten countries, and prohibition of imports from Italy by thirteen count r i e s — i.e. 25% of the total membership of the League. It may be said that the Latin-American countries, with a few exceptions, did not apply in practice the more effective sanctions at all. I am not in any way making this a reproach against anyone; I am simply illustrating the point I have been making. Furthermore, the proposal to deprive some non-members of the League of the possibility of counteracting sanctions, or to limit their opportunity of so doing — a proposal which could have been applied in practice — was not approved by the Co-ordination Committee. Given all these restrictions, sanctions could have been effective only in the event of their more prolonged application side by side with the military resistance of Ethiopia herself. The latter, however, was broken down much sooner than our most authoritative sources of information anticipated. In such circumstances, it may be said that Members of the League of Nations, for one reason or another, refrained from bringing Article

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311

16 completely into play. But it does not follow from this that Article 16 itself is a failure. 125 T h e Latin American States, whom the People's Commissary for Foreign Affairs thus specially singled out, adopted on the whole a very uniform attitude. M o s t of their representatives stressed the Latin American "unshakable devotion to principles" and in particular their strict "adherence to the principles of non-recognition of territorial acquisition or special advantages obtained b y force."

M a n y of them recalled the

memory of Simon Bolivar and the more recent resolutions adopted at Pan-American gatherings in favor of law and in denunciation of

violence.

But, having thus satisfied

juristic conscience b y fervent declarations of

fidelity

their to ab-

stract principles, they either, as the spokesmen for Uruguay, Ecuador, Peru and Venezuela, expressly announced that they were opposed to continuing the application of economic sanctions to Italy, or, as most of the others, tacitly implied that they were not hostile to a more realistic policy. Several sought evasion from the conflict between abstract principle and practical politics b y suggesting various regionalist reforms.

They

hoped that thus Latin America would be allowed to cultivate both peace and justice on its own continent while limiting its responsibilities abroad to encouraging the rest of the world to emulate its happiness b y imitating its virtues. Less oratorical but certainly no less distressed, the speakers of the three Dominions of Australia, N e w Zealand and Canada, announced that their Governments had instructed them to oppose the continuance of sanctions for, as the Hon. Vincent Massey put it, "continuance of the ineffective economic pressure would not secure the original objective and would be worse than useless."

126

T h e Right Hon. S. M . Bruce, of Australia, whose speech 125

Ibid.,

pp. 35 ei seq.

128

Ibid.,

p. 34·

T H E QUEST FOR

312

PEACE

was perhaps the most penetrating of the three Dominion utterances, declared: W e have to recognise . . . that the experience of the last few months has made abundantly clear that the imposition of economic and financial sanctions, limited to such sanctions as will not provoke retaliatory hostile action, is a futile and ineffective application of Article 16. Only the imposition of the maximum practical financial and economic sanctions, backed b y a readiness to accept full responsibility in meeting retaliatory military action with armed force, would enable the financial and economic sanctions contemplated b y Article 16 to be applied effectively. In my opinion, economic and financial sanctions, so applied, would probably prove effective even in a non-universal League. 1 2 7

The small neutral governments of Europe and particularly the Scandinavian States, Holland and Switzerland, were equally outspoken in favor of the suppression of sanctions and in fact in their impatience to see them abandoned. Thus Mr. Munch, the Danish Foreign Minister, declared: I do not wish to revert to the question whether the maintenance of sanctions might have led to that equitable peace which the Council has, on several occasions, proclaimed to be the object of our efforts. In any case, we are now faced b y the fact that a number of States for which sanctions might have far-reaching political and economic consequences have announced their determination to abandon them. It would therefore be a pointless demonstration if other States, for which the consequences of sanctions are comparatively unimportant, decided to continue them. I t is perfectly clear that the desired result could not be achieved by this means. From another point of view, it is undeniable that the w a y in which sanctions have been applied, and especially their abandonment without their object having been achieved, constitute a precedent which clearly establishes that States are entitled to decide for themselves, in every case, whether the situation is such that they are bound to establish and maintain economic and financial sanctions. As to the recognition of a situation created by force, we cannot but support the declarations of principle we have heard, in the first place, from the Argentine representative and, later, from the repre127

Ibid.., pp. 39-40.

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313

sentatives of other Powers. We cannot allow a country to cease to exist as a State simply because it is partly or wholly occupied b y a foreign army, even though the occupation has led to the departure of its Government. 1 2 8

M. Motta, of Switzerland, went even further, since he was not only in favor of abolishing sanctions but, with a haste that was deemed indecent by some critics, shortly after recognized Italy's sovereignty over Ethiopia. On the first point, which he alone mentioned in his speech, he declared: T h e object of sanctions was to prevent, if possible, and to stop the war. T h a t object has not been achieved. There are two main reasons why it could not be achieved. T h e first is that the League of Nations is far from being universal; the second is that, from the outset, there was a tacit or explicit agreement to avoid military sanctions or economic sanctions the effects of which would ultimately have merged into military sanctions. There was no desire that the war in E a s t Africa should develop into a European or perhaps a world w a r . 1 2 9

Without reviewing the attitude of all the other minor States, we must note the absolute silence of the Little Entente. For these, the most ardent and insistent of all the champions of collective security, the tragedy of the League's first attempt to apply Article 16 was peculiarly painful. As, however, they could obviously not prevent it and as, on account of their geographical and economic position, they had suffered acutely from the application of sanctions, they decided to remain mute. I have considered the position of all the above-mentioned States first because it struck me as interesting in itself. But it would hardly have been so if examined in the shadow, so to speak, of the policies of the United Kingdom and of France. The two Western Powers, the first of which had been the real leader in the imposition of sanctions, and the latter the real protector of Italy against them, were represented by statesmen of the first rank. 128

Ibid., p. 41.

120

Ibid., pp. 42-43.

314

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

T h e R i g h t H o n . A n t h o n y E d e n , w h o had succeeded Sir Samuel H o a r e as Foreign Secretary a f t e r the latter had fallen a victim to popular indignation over his attempt, in D e c e m b e r 1935, to sacrifice justice to peace, was known to be personally favorable to the strict application of the principles of collective security to the Covenant-breaking aggressor. T h e r e f o r e , when he repeated " w i t h infinite regret" his and his Government's opinion "that, in existing conditions, the continuation of the sanctions at present in force can serve no useful purpose," everyone k n e w that his regret was as sincere as his opinion. H e said also: Had His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom any reason to believe that the maintenance of existing sanctions, or even the addition to them of other economic measures, would re-establish the position in Ethiopia, then it would be prepared, for its part, to advocate such a policy and, if other Members of the League agreed, to join in its application. In view of the facts of the present situation in Ethiopia, His Majesty's Government finds it impossible to entertain any such belief. In our view it is only military action — military action — that could now produce this result. I cannot believe that, in present world conditions, such military action could be considered a possibility. T h i s w a s clearly the language of a man who, had his G o v ernment followed him and had other governments

followed

his Government, would have been prepared to see the matter through whatever the cost.

T h a t , in advocating the cessation

of sanctions, he w a s not actuated b y any desire to curry favor with Italian fascism was also shown, months before his steadfastness in the matter led to his resignation as Foreign Secretary, b y this further declaration: At the same time, it is the view of His Majesty's Government that this Assembly should not in any way recognize Italy's conquest over Ethiopia. Moreover, if the harsh realities of the situation must determine our attitude towards the maintenance of the measures we have adopted they cannot, in our judgment, involve any modification

RISE A N D FALL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY of the view of I t a l y ' s action expressed b y L e a g u e last a u t u m n . 1 3 0

fifty

M e m b e r s of

315 the

Very different from this attitude of uncompromising, even if perhaps somewhat impolitic, hostility to Italy, whose military success was, however grudgingly, admitted but whose triumph was not to be legitimated by recognition, was that of the two French statesmen who spoke one before and the other after Mr. Eden. T h e first was M . Leon Blum, the Socialist Prime Minister who had succeeded M . Laval after the victory of the French Popular Front at the polls in April 1935. It is generally admitted that it was not M . Laval's foreign policy of friendship at all cost with Italy, but his deflationist measures, which had brought about the downfall of his more conservative administration. Accordingly M . Blum did not at all dissociate himself from M . Laval's peace policy. In the longest speech of any delivered in the course of the debate, after that of Mr. Litvinoff, M . Blum devoted but very little space to the Italo-Ethiopian conflict. His main concern was to show that the French people were unanimously pacific and that, given the refusal of the guarantors of the demilitarization of the Rhineland in March 1936 to resist Germany's aggressive action, France could not be expected to extend to Ethiopia a protection she was herself denied at home. It is only in the following brief statement that M . Blum indicated that his country's policy was, like that of Great Britain, although hardly in the same spirit, favorable to the cessation of sanctions but hostile to the l e g a l r e c o g n i t i o n of t h e fait

accompli.

He

declared:

T w o breaches of international law have been committed: the breach of the C o v e n a n t and the breach of a solemn T r e a t y . Both have resulted in a de facto situation that is contrary to law. T h e Rhineland question has not been settled with the passage of time. T h e Ethiopian question m a y be settled in A f r i c a , but it is not settled at Geneva. 130

Ibid., p. 34.

3i6

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

France will endeavour to reconcile her loyalty to law and her will for peace. She does not wish to pronounce, upon acts that are contrary to law, any absolution that would amount to encouragement. She does not wish to call for war to provide reparation for right. But, above all, she is thinking of the Europe of to-morrow, and her ambition, her bold ambition, is to draw from the present disputes a contribution to real peace, organised peace, indivisible peace, disarmed peace. She sees only one sure method of wiping out the past, and that is to create a new future. 1 3 1

The conciliation of loyalty to the Covenant with friendship for Covenant-breaking Italy which was M . Laval's policy was not essentially different from M . Blum's endeavor to reconcile France's loyalty to law and her will for peace. Both led from Rome, through Geneva, to Munich, and from Munich to war. T h a t is the danger of such policies. Their advantage, however, was, in the long run, to create national unity within pacific nations and international solidarity between them. Towards the end of the debate, M . Y v o n Delbos, M . Blum's Foreign Minister, made a briefer speech to indicate, as he said, "the conclusions of an immediately practical character that may, in our opinion, be drawn from this discussion." 132 As his conclusions related not to the solution of the ItaloEthiopian problem, but solely to the strengthening of the Covenant for the future, they will not delay us here. The session of this memorable Assembly ended on July 4, 1936, by a vote on two sets of resolutions. T h e first was submitted to the Assembly by its General Committee, that is, by its principal delegations. In conformity with the conclusions formulated by M . Delbos, they dealt mainly with the future. In these resolutions the Assembly recommended that the Council should invite the Governments of the Members of the League to send to the Secretary-General, so far as possible before September ist, 1936, any proposals they may wish to make in order to improve, 131 Ibid.., p. 29. ""Ibid., p. 59·

RISE A N D F A L L OF C O L L E C T I V E S E C U R I T Y

317

in the spirit or within the limits laid down above, the application of the principles of the Covenant. 133 Secondly and almost incidentally and shamefacedly, the resolutions of the General Committee called upon the Co-ordination Committee, which had organized the collective action of sanctions, to " m a k e all necessary proposals to the Governments in order to bring to an end the measures taken b y them in execution of Article 16 of the Covenant." These two resolutions were adopted b y a public vote the results of which were as follows: Number of votes cast. . . .49 Votes in favor Votes

against

Abstentions

44 1 4

134

A s for the second series of proposals, moved b y the Ethiopian delegation, they called upon the Assembly to declare its "faithful adherence" to Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant, to proclaim "that it will recognise no annexation obtained b y force," and to recommend the guarantee of a loan of £10,000,000 to Ethiopia to enable it to "defend its territorial integrity and political independence."

T h e result of the vote on these pro-

posals was almost sadder still than that on the first, as the following figures show: N u m b e r of votes cast . . . . 49 Votes

in favor

1

Votes against

23

Abstentions

25

T h u s the Assembly of the League of Nations had officially recognized the failure of its first and only attempt to enforce the principles of collective security. 133 131

Ibid., Ibid.,

p. 66. p. 68.

3 i 8

X.

t h e

THE

q u e s t

f o r

p e a c e

FINAL DISINTEGRATION OF COLLECTIVE

SECURITY

As we have seen, the Italo-Ethiopian conflict was the occasion of the only attempted application of the principles of collective security by the League of Nations. The failure of this experiment naturally tended to discredit both these principles and the League. A t the same time it suggested various proposals destined in some way to reconcile the theory of the Covenant and the practical policies of the States Members of the League. It is to a brief consideration of these proposals and of their destiny that I intend to devote the final paragraphs of this chapter. If this consideration were to include an exhaustive review of all the relevant documents, it would take more pages than I can give it lines. T h e matter was dealt with at the three successive ordinary Assemblies of 1936, 1937 and 1938, both in their plenary meetings 135 and in committee. 136 It was dealt with also at the three sessions of the special committee of twenty-eight members set up by the Sixteenth Assembly under a resolution of October 10, 1936. 137 It further gave rise to a very enlightening written consultation of governments in 1936. 138 Finally it was considered also by the Council on various occasions and in particular at its 101st session, on M a y 11 and 14, 1938. 139 The terms of reference of the special Committee of Twentyeight were very broad. It had been set up to consider "all the proposals which have been, or may be, made b y Governments regarding the application of the principles of the Covenant 130 League of Nations, Records of the Seventeenth, Eighteenth and. Nineteenth Assemblies, Plenary Meetings. 186 League of Nations, Official Journal, Special S u p p l e m e n t s N u m b e r s 162, 180. 137 League of Nations, Records of the Seventeenth Assembly, Plenary Meetings, p. 1 4 1 .

League of Nations, seq. ls° League of Nations, et seq., 3 7 s et seq. 138

Official

Journal,

S p e c i a l S u p p l e m e n t N u m b e r 154, p p . 5

et

Official

Journal,

1938, p p . 309, 3 1 1 , 3 1 9 et seq.,

368

RISE AND

F A L L OF C O L L E C T I V E

SECURITY

319

and the problems connected therewith" and both in its debates and in those to which its reports gave rise before the Assembly, many problems concerning the League and its Covenant were discussed. The central question before it, however, was always that of collective security. Collective security was the fundamental principle of the League. It was because this principle had failed to protect one Member of the League, while its attempted application had constituted an embarrassment and a danger for the others, that its discussion was revived after 1936. And it was also because it was the main obstacle to the universality of membership in the League, which never seemed more desirable than on the eve of what appeared to threaten the world in Europe and in the Far East. Long before the constitution of the Committee of Twentyeight, long before even the Assembly of July 1936 of which it was born, the League had been made aware officially of the doubts and apprehensions to which the scheme of collective action it was applying against Italy was giving rise. On April 20, 1936, at the committee of the Council at which the Committee of Thirteen reported on the renewed failure of its attempts at conciliation between the parties, the President, Mr. Bruce, speaking as representative of Australia, made an extremely important statement. While opposing any relaxation of the collective system, which "would mean the destruction of a new-born hope in men's minds and lead to an atmosphere throughout the world of almost despair as to the future," he declared: I think we have . . . got to face the weaknesses, the difficulties and the dangers that have been shown to us during these past seven months, when the first attempt has been made to impose the sanctions which are contemplated under the Covenant for the prevention of aggression and for the maintenance of peace. I think the result of that experience is to show that it is now imperative that there should be a re-examination of the whole of the collective system that has been built up. These weaknesses are very great; they are creating doubts in the minds of all nations and all

320

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

peoples, and it is no use our ignoring them. If we truly believe in this system, we should face these weaknesses and try and find a solution for all those which have been disclosed; and I believe that men's minds in all countries are moving to the point of demanding that re-examination, which, I trust, will lead to a reassurance with regard to the whole collective system; and I suggest that to allow nations to be lulled into a false belief of security where, in fact, there is no security, and to allow them to rely upon assistance which will not be forthcoming, is not a contribution to the peace of the world but is a menace to it.140 Again on June 26, 1936, on the eve of the Assembly which decided the cessation of sanctions against Italy, the Chilian representative had urged the immediate study of the question of the reform of the Covenant. Considering "the universality of the League . . . an indispensable pre-requisite of the League's effectiveness," he suggested "the desirability of restricting the field of conflict to the countries directly concerned, and putting an end to the system of world wars — military or economic — which the Covenant proposed as a sanction in the event of the violation of its provisions." 141 In the discussion which followed, although the representatives of the U. S. S. R., of Roumania, of France, of Spain and of Turkey all declared themselves to be opposed to any weakening of the Covenant, everyone in the bottom of his heart felt that, as Mr. Monteiro, the Portuguese Foreign Minister curtly said: "Failing reform, the League was dead." 142 Already in the Assembly of July 1936, as we have seen, Articles 10 and 16 of the Covenant had been the main target of the Latin American critics, while they had been defended by others and notably by Mr. Litvinoff as the bulwark of international peace. On that occasion M. Leon Blum had commented upon collective security in terms which seemed to show that France was inclined to exchange her traditional position for one much resembling that which, from the first, had been 140 141

League of Nations, Official Journal, 1936, p. 386. Ibid.., p. 752.

142

Ibid., p. 754.

RISE A N D FALL OF COLLECTIVE SECURITY

321

adopted by the British. In the course of his speech, he had made the following statement: Undoubtedly, collective security is the condition of disarmament, since no State would agree to disarm unless mutual assistance offered it a degree of certainty; but the converse is equally true. Disarmament is the condition of full collective security, for States must be substantially disarmed if arbitral awards are to be imposed and pacific sanctions are to exert their constraining power. 1 4 3

While this view was perhaps that of M . Leon Blum rather than that of his country, it had never before been publicly expressed by a French Prime Minister. T h e only uncompromising defenders of collective security in the debate which had led to the abandonment of sanctions were the sovereign of Ethiopia and the representatives of the U. S. S. R. and of South Africa. Latin America was generally, although not outspokenly, hostile. As for the seven European States which had been neutral during the World War, they had publicly intimated that they did not any longer feel bound by the coercive provisions of Article 16. T h a t was the true significance of the concerted declaration which the Foreign Ministers of Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway, Spain, Sweden and Switzerland published in Geneva on July i , 1936, and in which they inserted the following vague but still significant words: T h o u g h not forgetting that rules for the application of Article 16 were adopted in 1921, we would place it on record that, so long as the Covenant as a whole is applied only incompletely and inconsistently, we are obliged to bear that fact in mind in connection with the application of Article 16. 1 4 4

From July 4, 1936, when the Sixteenth Assembly decided to recommend the cessation of sanctions, until September 30, 113 League of Nations, Records of the Sixteenth Assembly, P a r t II, Plenary Meetings, p. 29. 114 N o t e reprinted as an annex to the Swedish answer to the inquiry made in execution of the Assembly resolution of J u l y 4, 1936. League of Nations, Official Journal, Special Supplement N u m b e r 154, p. 19.

322

THE QUEST FOR PEACE

1 9 3 8 , when the Nineteenth Assembly silently buried the question of

collective security, it was

constantly

discussed

at

League of Nations meetings as well as in many national parliaments.

If one compares the attitude of the various States

Members of the League at the beginning and at the end of this period, one notes less a change of front on the part of many of them, than an increasingly determined and outspoken hostility on the part of its foes, and a more disillusioned and disheartened advocacy on the part of its friends. In 1 9 3 6 the States which led the fight against Article 16, if such a pugnacious term can properly apply to their very discreetly

critical

attitude, were

the so-called

ex-neutrals.

W h a t they felt and said among themselves can well be surmised: in a League that was intended to be universal but that, in spite of our hopes and entreaties, is in fact ever further removed from that ideal; in a League in favor of which we abandoned our neutrality to enhance and not to jeopardize our national security; in a League whose members, instead of disarming, are all feverishly increasing their military preparations, our small, weak and eminently pacific nations cannot be expected to expose their territorial integrity and their very existence by taking sides in quarrels not their own. T h e y can the less be expected to risk everything in defense of the literal interpretation of one of the clauses of the Covenant as the Great Powers have only intermittently applied this and other provisions and as they are constantly acting in complete disregard of its whole spirit. Such was the real meaning, if not the expressed definition, of the line taken by the seven signatories of the concerted declaration of J u l y i , 1 9 3 6 , which we have just quoted.

Finland

was the only one of them which had not been neutral in the World W a r , but her general policies were very similar to those of the others. T h e following extract from the reply she sent the Secretary-General of the League on August 3 1 , 1 9 3 6 , will be read with particular interest today:

R I S E A N D F A L L OF C O L L E C T I V E S E C U R I T Y

323

With respect to the application of Article 16 of the Covenant, reference may be made to the declaration on the subject made at Geneva on July ist, 1936, by Finland, Denmark, etc. . . . in which it is pointed out that, since the Covenant forms an indivisible whole, some of its articles, such as Article 16, may be difficult to put into effect until certain other articles, such as Article 8, have been adequately applied. As to the possibilities offered by regional associations, it need hardly be pointed out that such associations could only be formed in accordance with the principles of the Covenant, and could only operate under League control. The four Northern countries, for their own part, are already in constant co-operation in various spheres, and in matters affecting the League they have often acted in conjunction with the Netherlands, Spain and Switzerland, and are ready to co-operate with any other countries whose views may coincide with their own. The Finnish Government regards the setting of a limit to the competition in armaments which is now taking place, more especially among the great Powers, and the strict application of the principles laid down in Article 8 as one of the League's most urgent duties. 143 Besides these smaller European States, all the Latin American Governments which replied to the Secretary-General's circular letter, except the Colombian, expressed views contrary to a strict application of the principle of collective security. T h e y always did so, however, with such an insistence on their devotion to international law in general and on their respect for treaties in particular that the true meaning of their statements is not always easy to discover. Thus the reply of the Argentine Government, of August 28, 1 9 3 6 , contained, intermingled with declarations in favor of the universality of the League, the democratization of the Council, the equality of States, the sanctity of treaties and the harmonization of the Covenant with the Kellogg Pact and the Saavedra L a m a s Pact, the following statement: It should be considered what provisions of the Covenant have been shown by experience to be no longer in keeping with the real145

Ibid., pp. 2 2 - 2 3 .

T H E QUEST FOR

324

PEACE

ities of international life, and these provisions should be given an optional character instead of the character of strict obligations. It is desirable not to enter into undertakings going beyond those which all the Members of the League are in a position to observe, in order that in future no article of the Covenant should fail to obtain simultaneous and collective execution. 1 4 6

In the reply from Hungary of September i , 1936, the wish, in accordance with her revisionist ambitions, is expressed that punitive clauses of the Covenant should be brought into equilibrium with those provisions — such as, more particularly, Articles 1 1 , 1 3 and 1 9 — - w h i c h afford pacific and preventive means of settling disputes that may arise between States Members and offer possibilities of remedying situations, the maintenance of which might imperil world peace. 1 4 7

Except for the United Kingdom and Poland, who wished to postpone their final replies, thirteen other States whose governments defined their position were all more or less in favor of strengthening rather than of weakening the provisions of the Covenant relating to sanctions, often with some insistence on the desirability of regional developments. The States in question were France, the U. S. S. R., China, Bulgaria, the three Baltic Republics, Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, Liberia, Colombia and New Zealand. The last-named Government was the first to reply and the one which, in its statement, displayed the most robust optimism. This may have been due both to the fact that New Zealand is furthest removed from the hotbed of European troubles and that she enjoyed the enthusiastic leadership of a young Labor Government. In her reply we read the following edifying profession of faith: W e believe in the first place that there is no material fault in the existing provisions of the Covenant and that the difficulties that have arisen, and that m a y arise in the future, are due to the method and the extent of its operation. 146

Ibid.,

p. 13.

147

Ibid.,

p. 25.

R I S E A N D F A L L OF C O L L E C T I V E S E C U R I T Y

325

We believe that the Covenant has never yet been fully applied and that it cannot be characterised as an ineffective instrument until it has been so applied. We are prepared to reaffirm with the utmost solemnity our continued acceptance of the Covenant as it stands. We believe, nevertheless, that the Covenant is capable of amendment, which should take the form of strengthening rather than of weakening its provisions. We are prepared to accept, in principle, the provisions proposed for the Geneva Protocol of 1924 as one method of strengthening the Covenant as it exists. We are prepared to take our collective share in the application, against any future aggressor, of the full economic sanctions contemplated by Article 16, and we are prepared, to the extent of our power, to join in the collective application of force against any future aggressor. We believe that the sanctions contemplated by the present Covenant will be ineffective in the future as they have been in the past — ( 1 ) Unless they are made immediate and automatic; (2) Unless economic sanctions take the form of the complete boycott contemplated by Article 1 6 ; (3) Unless any sanctions that may be applied are supported by the certainty that the Members of the League applying the sanctions are able and, if necessary, prepared to use force against force. It is our belief that the Covenant as it is, or in a strengthened form, would in itself be sufficient to prevent war if the world realised that the nations undertaking to apply the Covenant actually would do so in fact. We are prepared to agree to the institution of an international force under the control of the League or to the allocation to the League of a definite proportion of the armed forces of its Members to the extent, if desired, of the whole of those forces — land, sea and air. We consider that there can be no certainty of the complete and automatic operation of the Covenant unless the Governments of all Members of the League are supported, in their determination to apply it, by the declared approval of their peoples. We propose, therefore, that all the Members of the League, and as many non-members as may be persuaded to adopt this course, should hold immediately a national plebiscite with the object of taking the opinion of their peoples on the following points:

326

T H E QUEST FOR PEACE

( ι ) Whether they are prepared to join automatically and immediately in the sanctions contemplated by Article 16 of the Covenant against any aggressor nation nominated as such by the Council or the Assembly; (2) Whether in such case the armed forces of their country (or such proportion as may previously have been fixed by the League) should be immediately and automatically placed at the complete disposal of the League for that purpose. We do not accept the desirability of regional pacts, but, if Members of the League generally approve of such pacts, we should be prepared to support a collective system in which all Members of the League, while accepting the immediate and universal application of the economic sanctions contemplated by Article 16, nevertheless, if they desired to do so, restricted, to defined areas, their undertaking to use force. In such a case, we consider that the question of the use of force in defined areas should also be made the subject of national plebiscites. We believe it improper to enforce a system of preventing war without at the same time setting up adequate machinery for the ventilation and, if possible, rectification of international grievances, and we would support the establishment of an acceptable tribunal for that purpose. 148 M r . M . J. Savage, the Prime Minister of the N e w Zealand Government, seems to have had some misgivings a f t e r dispatching this letter, since it w a s communicated to the Secretary-General with a note f r o m the H i g h

Commissioner

in

London to the following effect: Since the letter now enclosed was signed by my Prime Minister, I have received a direction from him to add that, in the event of the proposals being generally regarded as not immediately practicable, the Government of New Zealand will not demur to the consideration of progress by stages, or indeed of alternative proposals. 149 None

of

the other

replies,

except

possibly

that

of

the

U . S. S. R . , displayed a similar hopefulness. M o s t of the others were drafted in a far more subdued and realistic tone. l"Ibid.,

pp. 6-7. 1