The Psychology of Prejudice [3 ed.] 1462553230, 9781462553235

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THE PSYCHOLOGY OF PREJUDICE

The Psychology of

PREJUDICE

Third Edition

Todd D. Nelson Michael A. Olson

THE GUILFORD PRESS New York  London

Copyright © 2024 The Guilford Press A Division of Guilford Publications, Inc. 370 Seventh Avenue, Suite 1200, New York, NY 10001 www.guilford.com All rights reserved No part of this book may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, microfilming, recording, or otherwise, without written permission from the publisher. Printed in the United States of America This book is printed on acid-free paper. Last digit is print number: 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data Names: Nelson, Todd D., 1966– author. Title: The psychology of prejudice / Todd D. Nelson, Michael A. Olson. Description: Third edition. | New York : The Guilford Press, [2024] |   Includes bibliographical references and index. Identifiers: LCCN 2023020560 | ISBN 9781462553235 (paperback) |   ISBN 9781462553365 (cloth) Subjects: LCSH: Prejudices. Classification: LCC BF575.P9 N45 2024 | DDC 303.3/85—dc23/eng/20230802 LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2023020560 This book was previously published by Pearson Education, Inc. Guilford Press is a registered trademark of Guilford Publications, Inc.

To my children, Brandon, Logan, Jaden, and Ezra. I love you. —T. D. N.

To Suzanne, Max, and Emi, for their patience. —M. A. O.

About the Authors

Todd D. Nelson, PhD, is Professor of Psychology at California State University, ­Stanislaus. His research focuses on prejudice and stereotyping, with special emphasis on ageism. A Fellow of the Society for Experimental Social Psychology, Dr. Nelson has authored or edited a number of books on social psychology, prejudice, and ageism. Michael A. Olson, PhD, is Professor of Psychology at the University of Tennessee. Much of his research centers on implicit bias, measures of implicit cognition, prejudice reduction, and intergroup relations. He also advocates for and conducts training sessions on diversity, equity, and inclusion. Dr. Olson is past associate editor of the Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin and the Journal of Experimental Social Psychology.

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Preface

Newly hired professors have little say in which courses they teach. So it was with

Michael back in 2004, but after several years of covering “service courses” he was excited to offer one on the psychology of prejudice. His first decision: Which textbook to use? He collected copies of various books, pored over them, and decided on Todd’s (second edition). Todd’s text covered “core principles” of prejudice in true social psychology fashion, but it also included rich content on the different kinds of prejudices out there. It was scholarly, relying on up-to-date empirical research, but conversational, with generous humor and an easy-to-read flow. Michael contentedly taught from Todd’s book for years. But fields advance and so authors update their texts with new editions. It had been a few years since the second edition was published, and Michael wondered whether a third was forthcoming. He reached out to Todd, who replied that life had been busy, a lot had happened, but he was working on it. After a few more years (and more happening), Michael somehow got the idea that it might be fun to write a textbook himself. Should he write his own? That seemed daunting. And Todd’s (and others’) were already out there; he didn’t want to reinvent the wheel. So in January 2020 he asked Todd whether he might like a partner for the third edition. Todd eagerly agreed. Michael remembers thinking at the time that it would be a busy few years. He had no idea! We started writing the third edition during the worst pandemic the world had seen in over a century, when millions died, professors were scrambling to figure out how to teach online, students were scrambling to manage coursework, social life, and mental health challenges (and their professors’ sometimes spotty online teaching). Enter the summer of 2020; the murders of George Floyd, Breonna Taylor, and so many others; and the birth of the Black Lives Matter movement. Add Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and the mass migration of refugees fleeing violence from Central America, the Middle East, and elsewhere, often facing suspicion and hostility at their destinations. Perhaps relatedly, add still the rise of “alt-right” and other nativist and often explicitly racist, sexist, and heterosexist populist movements. It was an interesting time to be writing a textbook on prejudice.

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Preface

Still, writing became a sort of respite from the chaos of current events. There’s something cozy and comforting (at least to a college professor) about a stack of journal articles, a cup of coffee, and several hours of good writing in a little office away from the world at large. And it was a good use of time—the product of our quarantine is an up-to-date approach to some of the most pressing questions of the day: Why do prejudice and intergroup conflict seem to have increased in recent years? At the same time, what has led to such progress (admitting there’s still a ways to go) in attitudes toward sexual minorities? What exactly are “implicit bias,” “structural racism,” and all the other prejudice-related concepts that have found their way into news headlines and social media feeds? The third edition continues to cover core questions about prejudice: its origins, manifestations, and possibilities for change. New chapters covering implicit prejudices and prejudice against sexual minorities have been added, along with extensive updates to existing chapters with the most relevant, recent, and insightful research. And the third edition retains its conversational style, humor, and integrative approach. But perhaps most important, at its heart this is an evidence-based book of science. With so much popular discourse about intergroup relations and conflict, so much mis- and disinformation in the world, and a great number of well-intended folks wishing to address these and other social problems, it has never been more critical to be well informed. Ultimately, our hope is that students use the science herein to make wise decisions about their social and political lives, that change agents consider our evidence-based approaches to reducing prejudice and intergroup conflict, and that future scholars of prejudice be inspired to address the puzzles and challenges laid out in these pages.

Acknowledgments

T

here are many people who were instrumental in the production of this book, and we would like to thank them here. First and foremost, words cannot express our gratitude and appreciation for the wonderful vision and support we had from the beginning from Seymour Weingarten, cofounder of Guilford Publications. Through endless requests for extended deadlines from Todd, he has shown superhuman patience and understanding. We are forever grateful for having his leadership in this project. It was the best publishing experience imaginable. We are also grateful to Carolyn Graham, who shepherded this project through the final publishing process. She has been a fantastic professional and a delight to work with in these last months of putting the book together. A number of excellent reviewers helped us immensely as we revised our initial manuscript for the final production: Leslie Ashburn-Nardo, Angela Bahns, Jazmin BrownIannuzzi, Drew Christopher,  Chris Crandall, Sam Gaertner, Dawn Goel, Jeff Hunger, Gordon Moskowitz, Ashby Plant, Michael Sargent, and Kevin Zabel. Their wisdom, insight, and suggestions were very helpful, and we attempted to incorporate many of their suggestions into this third edition. We want to thank each of them for helping us make this book even better. As we noted in the Preface, writing a textbook like this is a long but rewarding journey. We knew it would take a while, but it has ended up taking years. I (Todd) should clarify that I slowed the process for various reasons. When Michael came on board, he really brought so much energy, new insights and perspective, and wonderful scholarship to his half of this project. He is the reason this project made it over the finish line, and I am very grateful to have had such a tremendous coauthor.

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Contents

 1. Introduction to the Study of Stereotyping and Prejudice

1

Defining Stereotyping 4 Lippmann’s “Stereotype” 4 Stereotyping: From Bad to Neutral  4 The Social‑Cognitive Definition  5 Cultural and Individual Stereotypes  6 Is a Stereotype an Attitude?  6 Positive versus Negative Stereotypes  7

Defining Prejudice 7 Prejudice as Negative Affect  7 Prejudice as an Attitude  8 Prejudice as a “Social Emotion”  9

The Link between Stereotyping and Prejudice  11 Early Perspectives in Stereotyping Research  12 Measurement 12 Individual Differences in Stereotyping  12 Group‑Level Explanations 14

The Social‑Cognition Revolution  15 Cognitive Consistency Theories  15 Attribution Theory 16

The Social‑Cognition View of Stereotyping and Prejudice  18 Categorization 18 The Cognitive Miser  20 The Motivated Tactician  21

Why the Emphasis on African American–White Intergroup Relations?  21 Summary 22 Glossary 23 Discussion Questions 24 References 24 xi

Contents

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 2. Origin and Maintenance of Stereotypes and Prejudice

32

The Formation of Social Categories  32 Categorization 32 Why We Categorize  33 Types of Categorization  34 How Children Learn Social Categories  35

From Social Categories to Ingroup Favoritism  37 Ingroups and Outgroups  37

The Development of Prejudice and Stereotypes  41 Social Learning 41

Stereotypes and Prejudice in the Media  44 Stereotype Accuracy 46 Implicit Theories 46 The Efficiency of Stereotypes  47

How and Why Stereotypes Are Maintained  49 Selective Attention to Stereotype‑Relevant Information  49 Subcategorization 51 Illusory Correlations 53 Motivation 54

Intergroup Dynamics and the Origins of Prejudice  57 Social Identity Theory  58 Optimal Distinctiveness Theory  59 Scapegoat Theory 60 Relative Deprivation 61 Realistic Conflict Theory  62

Summary 65 Glossary 65 Discussion Questions 66 References 67

 3. Feeling versus Thinking in the Activation and Application of Stereotypes

79

Mood 80 Types of Intergroup Affect  81 Influence of Positive Affect  87 Effects of Negative Affect  87 Motivational versus Cognitive‑Capacity Deficits  88

Cognition 89 Stereotype Suppression 89 Who Is Motivated to Suppress Stereotypes?  93 The Neuroscience of Prejudice  94

Issues for Further Research  96 Glossary 97 Discussion Questions 98 References 98

 4. Implicit Stereotyping and Prejudice Implicit Cognition 107 Implicit Cognition and Addiction  108 Implicit Cognition and Suicide  108 Subliminal Messages 109 Implicit Memory 109

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Implicit Prejudice and Stereotyping  111 Documenting Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes  112 Origins of Implicit Prejudice and Stereotypes  117 The Implicit Association Test  119 Dual‑Process Perspectives 120 Implicit Gender Stereotypes  127 Who Is Responsible?  128 The Stubbornness of Implicit Prejudice  130 Glossary 131 Discussion Questions 132 References 133

 5. The Prejudiced Personality: Are Some People More Likely to Feel Prejudice?

140

Psychodynamic Perspectives 141 Authoritarianism 141 Character‑Conditioned Prejudice 142 Problems with the Psychodynamic Approach  142

Right‑Wing Authoritarianism 143 Religion 145 Committed versus Consensual Religiosity  145 Extrinsic versus Intrinsic Religious Orientation  146 Religion as Quest  148

Need for Cognition  151 Need for Structure  152 Need for Cognitive Closure  153 Social Dominance Orientation  155 Summary 160 Glossary 161 Discussion Questions 162 References 162

 6. Old‑Fashioned versus Modern Prejudice Where Have All the Bigots Gone?  169 From Katz and Braly (1933) to Civil Rights, and Beyond  171 Are Low‑Prejudice People Really Low Prejudiced?  172

Modern Racism 174 Symbolic Racism 176 Aversive Racism 178 Summary of Contemporary Theories of Prejudice  179 Measures of Stereotyping and Prejudice  180 The Self‑Report Questionnaire  180 The Bogus Pipeline  183 Measuring Stereotyping 185 Measuring Prejudice 186 Implicit Measures: The “True” Measures?  188

Summary: Is There Such a Thing as Modern Prejudice?  191 Coda: Resurgence in Old‑Fashioned Racism  191 Glossary 193 Discussion Questions 194 References 195

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 7. Experiencing Prejudice

201

Social Stigma 202 Group Identification 203 Stereotype Threat 204 Self‑Esteem 212 Denial of Discrimination  214 Self‑Fulfilling Prophecy 215

Intergroup Interactions 216 Dynamic Nature of Interactions  217 Expectations 220 Intergroup Anxiety 220 Metastereotypes 222

Attributional Ambiguity 223 The Paradoxical Effects of Affirmative Action  228 Perceived Controllability of the Stigma  230

Summary 231 Glossary 232 Discussion Questions 233 References 233

 8. Ageism Why Ageism? (and What about Other “‑Isms”?)  243 Does Ageism Really Exist?  245 Age Stereotypes: Content and Use  247 Positive Attitudes and Positive Stereotypes  248 Effects of Pseudopositive Attitudes  249 Patronizing Language 249 Patronizing Behavior 250 Effects of Pseudopositive Attitudes on Older People  251

Ageism in the Helping Professions  253 Origins of Ageism  255 Age Grading of Society  255 From Sage to Burden  256 Modernization 257 Idealism 257

Maintenance of Ageism  258 Functional Perspective 258 Conflict 259 Self‑Threat, Self‑Esteem, and Terror Management  259

Juvenile Ageism 261 Beliefs and Expectations about Old Age  262 Beliefs and Expectations of Young People about Aging  262 Expectations of Older People about Aging  262

Age Discrimination 264 Prominence of Age as a Variable in Social Perception  266 Contact with Older People  269 Negative Expectations about Intergenerational Contact  269 Negative Schemas about Older People  269

Cross‑Cultural Differences in Ageism  271 Eastern versus Western Views  272

Reducing Ageism 273 Issues for Future Research  273 Measurement 274

243

Contents xv You’re Really as Old (or Young) as You Feel  274 Stereotype Knowledge or Stereotype Belief?  275 Evaluating Prejudiced Attitudes  275

Glossary 276 Discussion Questions 276 References 277

 9. Sexual Prejudice

287

A Brief History  288 Origins of Heterosexism  290 Socialization 290 Perceived Value Violations  291 Intergroup Emotions 292

Born This Way?  294 Manifestations of Sexual Prejudice  296 Old‑Fashioned and Modern Heterosexism  296 Implicit Heterosexism 298 Internalized Heterosexism 299 Concealment and Disclosure  301

Contact and Prejudice Reduction  302 Contact 302 Essentialism‑Based Interventions 303 Intergroup Emotions 304

Summary 305 Glossary 306 Discussion Questions 306 References 307

10. Sexism Gender Stereotypes 316 Measurement of Gender Stereotypes  317 Origin of Gender Stereotypes  319 Religion 319 Social Learning 320 Cultural Institutions 321

The Consequences of Violating Gender Stereotypes  327 Evolution versus Social Roles  328 Power 330

Accuracy of Gender Stereotypes  331 Sexist Language 333 Types of Sexism  334 Old‑Fashioned versus Modern Sexism  335 Neosexism 336 Benevolent versus Hostile Sexism  336

Effects of Sexism on Women  340 Gender Discrimination 342 Distancing Behavior 343 Job Opportunities 344 The Glass Ceiling  346

Summary 348 Glossary 349 Discussion Questions 350 References 351

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11. Anti‑Fat Prejudice

364

Origins of Anti‑Fat Prejudice  366 Perceptions of Overweight People  366 Controllability 367 Implicit versus Explicit Anti‑Fat Bias  368

Influence of Anti‑Fat Stereotypes on Overweight Persons  368 Social Interactions 368 Media 369

Anti‑Fat Stereotypes 369 Anti‑Fat Humor 369 Anti‑Fat Prejudice in Children  370 Effect of Anti‑Fat Prejudice on Overweight Children  371 Discrimination against Overweight Persons  371 Cross‑Cultural Attitudes toward Overweight Persons  372 Reducing Anti‑Fat Prejudice  372 Summary 374 Glossary 374 Discussion Questions 374 References 375

12. Reducing Prejudice

380

The Contact Hypothesis  381 Allport’s Contact Hypothesis  382 Tests of the Contact Hypothesis  383 Pettigrew’s Reformulated Contact Theory  384 Good Contact and Bad Contact  386

Sherif ’s Robbers Cave Study: The Superordinate Goal  387 Common Ingroup Identity  388

Confrontation 389 The Jigsaw Classroom  391 Education, Empathy, and Role Playing  393 Colorblind versus Multicultural Approaches  394 Contemporary Approaches to Prejudice Reduction  397 Functional Approach 398 Normative Influence 399 Self‑Regulation 401 Implicit Approaches 404

Going Beyond the Person  406 Summary 407 Glossary 408 Discussion Questions 409 References 410



Author Index

421

Subject Index

445

CHAPTER 1

Introduction to the Study of Stereotyping and Prejudice

T

hroughout time, humans have had a tendency to form groups (Brewer & Miller, 1996). Membership in a group can be restricted on the basis of special skills, family relations, gender, power, and a host of other factors. By forming such groups, humans have found that it is possible to construct their environment such that their daily lives are easier (e.g., through division of labor among various groups in the society). Through specialization of skills and order within the society imposed by the power given to certain groups over the larger society (e.g., government), people found that they could each live longer, happier, and more fulfilling lives than if everyone were to fend for themselves or only for their own group. Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that “groups are the basic building blocks of society” (Forsyth, 1999, p. 2). Groups are not unique to humans. Some researchers theorize that the tendency to form groups is such a basic part of the nature of animals (and humans) that it has survived throughout time and evolution due to the survival benefits (e.g., fighting off predators, raising offspring successfully) of group life (Buss, 1995). However, in addition to the tremendous benefits for individuals in groups, there are some disadvantages and complications that group life brings, such as mate competition and mate retention. There is something else that tends to happen when people form groups. They tend to form closer ties to members of their own group, and they tend to be suspicious and rejecting of members of other groups (Fiske, 2002), that is, group members tend to favor their own groups (called ingroups) over other groups to which they don’t belong (termed outgroups). Even when group membership is based on the most arbitrary criteria (e.g., randomly assigning people to group “A” or to group “B”; an example of a minimal group), people tend to show preferences for their own group members over other group members (Brewer, 1979; Hong & Ratner, 2021; Tajfel & Turner, 1986). While such preferences may have adaptive utility from evolutionary and practical perspectives, they form the basis for feeling negatively about other groups (prejudice) and believing that certain characteristics are associated with other groups (stereotyping), 1

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The Psychology of Pre judice

often because the outgroup members are perceived to be antithetical to the ingroup’s welfare or values (Neuberg, Smith, & Asher, 2000; Stroessner & Scholer, 2008). Moreover, such ingroup preferences may underlie more severe negative behavior toward other groups, such as intergroup hostility and violence. The above discussion certainly paints a pessimistic picture of the nature of prejudice and stereotyping. If, as evolutionary psychology suggests, ingroup preferences and hostility toward outgroups are adaptive, and therefore innate, there is little we can do to avoid prejudice and stereotyping. Are prejudice and stereotyping unavoidable? Are they part of our human nature? We explore these and many other questions throughout this book. A logical analysis of intergroup hostility suggests that there is no rational basis for disliking others simply because they belong to another group. Other groups, like our ingroups, comprise people who have the same right to life and the pursuit of their dreams as we do. Unfortunately, humans are often far from logical in their thinking (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Kahneman, 2011; Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Plous, 1993; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974) and ingroup favoritism, and negative attitudes toward members of other groups remain a pervasive aspect of human society today. Why is the study of prejudice and stereotyping important? Aside from understanding the negative influence such thinking has on the thoughts, feelings, and behavior of people in their daily lives, and how they relate to the targets of their prejudice, it is important to understand that such negative attitudes form the basis for subsequent negative intergroup behavior. Virtually all of history’s wars, battles, and other acts of group violence have been driven by some form of prejudice, stereotyping, and/or discrimination (Eidelson & Eidelson, 2003). For example, in the Spanish Inquisition, the American Civil War, the American slave trade, the Holocaust, and the genocide in Rwanda and Yugoslavia, the prejudice and intergroup hostility that groups had toward one another has led to unparalleled bloodshed. There are those who believe that prejudice and stereotyping are no longer a problem in the United States. For example, some suggest that racism has declined dramatically as a result of desegregation, the Civil Rights Voting Act of 1965, and affirmative action policies in hiring (McConahay, 1986). However, those with these perceptions of the demise of racism tend to be White people. An example can be found in a recent US News and Harris poll, which asked a sample of Americans “Do you believe there is systemic racism in America?” Results showed that 67% of Hispanic respondents said yes, 73% of Asian or Pacific Islanders said yes, and 81% of African Americans said yes. However, only 53% of Whites said yes (Johnson, 2022). While it is the case that overt expressions of racial prejudice and intergroup hatred have declined dramatically, racial prejudice and stereotypes have by no means disappeared. Virtually any group (racial, age, gender, religious, etc.) one can imagine has others who have formed prejudices and stereotypes about it. Our country (indeed, the world) has a long way to go to fully address its prejudices. Sadly, one only need look at newspaper headlines for examples of intergroup violence, purely driven by prejudice:

• In 2021, a Santa Cruz man was convicted of a federal hate crime after he used a knife to slash at a Black man crossing the street, while calling him a number of racial slurs. The perpetrator was on probation for a similar hate crime conviction in 2018. • On May 14, 2022, a 19-year-old White man drove several hours to a Buffalo, NY

Introduction to the Study of Stereotyping and Prejudice 3

supermarket because it was in a predominantly African American neighborhood. His social media posts indicated that he had specifically selected this type of location as a destination because he wanted to “kill as many African Americans as possible” (Morales, Tucker, & Sanchez, 2022). He shot and killed 10 people and wounded 3 others. He was sentenced to life in prison without parole at the state level and still faces 27 felony charges with hate crime enhancement in federal court (Franklin & Hernandez, 2023). • In Laramie, Wyoming, in 1998, two young men savagely beat Matthew Shepard, an openly gay college student, because he was gay. They tied his battered body to a fence in freezing temperatures and left him for dead. Although he was found by a passerby about 30 hours later, he slipped into a coma and died days later. • In Jasper, Texas, in 1998, three White men offered a ride to James Byrd Jr., a Black man, who was walking on the side of the road. The men drove Byrd to a remote location, where they severely beat him and tied his feet to a logging chain and then tied the chain to the back end of their pickup. They then dragged the still-­ conscious Byrd behind their truck down a remote country road, where Byrd’s body quickly disintegrated, and he was decapitated as his body hit a storm drain in a ditch near the road. • Note: On October 28, 2009, President Obama signed into law the Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act. It gives “funding and technical assistance to state, local, and tribal jurisdictions to help them to more effectively investigate and prosecute hate crimes” (Department of Justice, 2009). In the following chapters of this book, we examine the past and present research and theory on the motivations (the why), the situations and contexts (the when), the individual difference variables and traits (the who), and the affective and cognitive processes (the how) that lead to stereotyping and prejudice. The intent of the present book is to provide an advanced-­level undergraduate or first-year graduate student with an in-depth and broad-­ranging analysis of stereotyping and prejudice. The text focuses on helping the student understand the issues, theories, and important empirical experiments that bear upon each problem in stereotyping and prejudice, and to understand the most up-to-date research, theories, and conclusions of the leading researchers in the field. Stereotyping and prejudice are indeed complex in their origin, and one of the main goals of this book is to provide a coherent picture of the conditions under which stereotyping and prejudice are more (or less) likely to occur. Another primary focus of this book is to examine whether (and how) stereotyping and prejudice can be reduced or eliminated. Are such ways of thinking innate, and therefore unavoidable? Or are they examples of faulty thinking or “lazy” thinking? Could we just eliminate prejudice and stereotyping if we all decide to heed L.A. riots’ beating victim Rodney King in his famous quote, “Can’t we all just get along?” As we will see in the coming chapters, the answer is not that simple, because some evidence suggests that people can simply decide to not use stereotypes (Bargh, 1999), whereas other evidence suggests that the automatic activation of prejudice and stereotypes is not automatic at all, and is dependent on a number of context and motivational factors (Blair, 2002). We begin our discussion with a look back to understand the origins of the concepts “stereotype” and “prejudice,” and their various definitions. We then examine some

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famous classic studies of intergroup prejudice and stereotyping. Finally, we conclude with a discussion of how the rise of social cognition changed the way researchers understand prejudice and stereotyping.

DEFINING STEREOTYPING Lippmann’s “Stereotype” What is a “stereotype”? Interestingly, the word “stereotype” originally derives from a term to describe a printing process in which fixed casts of material are reproduced (­A shmore & Del Boca, 1981). This term was adopted by social scientists when journalist Walter Lippmann (1922) used the word “stereotype” to describe the tendency of people to think of someone or something in similar terms (as having similar attributes) based on a common feature shared by each. He said that we all have “pictures in our heads” (p. 3) of the world outside and that these representations are more like templates into which we try to simplify the sometimes confusing information we receive from the world. Lippmann (1922) was prescient in two respects. First, he was remarkably accurate in his speculation about the origin of stereotyping, when he wrote, “We pick out what our culture has already defined for us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture” (p. 55). In other words, stereotypes tell us what social information is important to perceive and to disregard in our environment. This process tends to confirm preexisting stereotypes by paying attention to stereotype-­consistent information and disregarding information that is inconsistent with our stereotypes. Subsequent research has shown that indeed, the content of stereotypes is largely determined by the culture in which one lives (Fiske & Durante, 2016; Hwang & Matsumoto, 2018; Jones, 1997; Stephan & Rosenfield, 1982; Triandis, 1994). We discuss this further in the next chapter.

Stereotyping: From Bad to Neutral As with most concepts in psychology, there are a number of ways that researchers have defined stereotype over the decades. Though Lippmann (1922) didn’t express any particular evaluation of the nature of stereotyping, researchers soon began to regard stereotyping as a negative, lazy way of perceiving social groups. In other words, stereotyping was seen as an outward indicator of irrational, nonanalytic cognition (Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Some researchers (e.g., Adorno, Frenkel-­Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950) characterized stereotypes as examples of rigid thinking. Many regarded stereotyping as an external sign of the stereotyper’s moral defectiveness (Jones, 1997). However, researchers began to move away from the inclusion of assessments of the morality or correctness of the stereotype or the stereotyper (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Stephan & Rosenfield, 1982). In his pioneering work, The Nature of Prejudice, Allport (1954) was ahead of his time in moving away from including evaluative assessments of the “goodness” of stereotyping or those who stereotype. He defined a stereotype by writing, “A stereotype is an exaggerated belief associated with a category” (p. 191). Other researchers presaged the social-­cognition revolution movement in social psychology (e.g., Brown, 1965; Fishman, 1956; Vinacke, 1957) in that they argued that stereotyping ought to be examined as a normal psychological process.

Introduction to the Study of Stereotyping and Prejudice 5

The Social‑Cognitive Definition In the early 1970s, with the birth of social cognition, researchers came to regard stereotyping as a rather automatic process of categorization, which many cognitive and social psychologists believe is inherent in the very nature of the way humans think about the world (Dovidio & Gaertner, 2010; Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). Below, we consider a few of the more popular definitions of stereotyping by researchers in the area. Brigham (1971) defined stereotyping as “a generalization made about a . . . group concerning a trait attribution, which is considered to be unjustified by an observer” (p.  31). A problem with this is the last half of the definition: “which is considered to be unjustified by an observer.” A stereotype is any generalization about a group whether an observer (either a member of the stereotyped group, or another observer) believes it is “justified” or not. By definition, a generalization about a group is bound to be “unjustified” for some portion of the group members. The question of the “justification” of a stereotype is virtually synonymous with the question of the accuracy of a stereotype (Jussim et al., 2016). This is a controversial issue—one that we explore later. Other researchers have adopted Hamilton and Trolier’s (1986) definition of a stereotype: “a cognitive structure that contains the perceiver’s knowledge, beliefs, and expectations about a human group” (p. 133). Yet, this definition tends to be too broad to accurately capture the true meaning of a stereotype. While Hamilton and Trolier have included within their definition the notion that a stereotype is the association between a group and one’s beliefs about the group, the definition also includes one’s knowledge and expectations about the group. A problem with the inclusion of these components is that it makes the definition too broad, and inconsistent with traditional definitions of a stereotype (Fiske, 1998). Hamilton and Trolier’s definition sounds more like a definition of a schema rather than a stereotype. Judge for yourself by examining Fiske and Taylor’s (1991) definition of schema: “a schema may be defined as a cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, including its attributes and the relations among those attributes” (p. 98). Schemas are therefore broader cognitive structures that contain our knowledge of a stimulus, our expectations for the motives or behavior of the stimulus (if a living being), and our feelings toward the stimulus (Stangor & Schaller, 1996; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). Stereotypes are much more specific, and are subsumed within a schema. For example, one’s schema of librarians may contain knowledge about that occupation (they work with books), expectations for the motives of librarians (they are there to help you locate books and other information within the library), how to feel about librarians (feel positively because they are helping you), and one’s beliefs (stereotypes) about librarians (all librarians are introverted, and have poor fashion sense). Another popular definition of stereotypes, by Ashmore and Del Boca (1981), defines stereotypes as “a set of beliefs about the personal attributes of a group of people” (p. 16). This definition is more consistent with the essence of many past definitions of stereotype by restricting the meaning of stereotype to a generalization about a group of people. Most social-­cognition researchers define stereotype in this fashion (e.g., Gardner, 1994; Jones, 1997; Kunda, 1999; Schneider, 2004; Stangor, 2016; Wilder, 1993; Worschel & Rothgerber, 1997; Wright & Taylor, 2003). Therefore, this book uses Ashmore and Del Boca’s definition of stereotype.

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The Psychology of Pre judice

Cultural and Individual Stereotypes A useful, but infrequently used distinction must be made when discussing the definition of stereotype. Specifically, it is important to differentiate between cultural and individual stereotypes (Allport, 1954; Ashmore & Del Boca, 1979, 1981). A cultural stereotype describes “shared or community-­w ide patterns of beliefs” (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981, p. 19), whereas an individual stereotype describes the beliefs held by an individual about the characteristics of a group. This difference is important both theoretically and methodologically. Ashmore and Del Boca (1981) suggest that adjective rating scales, such as those used by Katz and Braly (1933; discussed later in this chapter) tend to assess cultural stereotypes. Any other measure of stereotype content in which the respondent’s answers are restricted to the stereotype content choices of the measure tends to provide an inaccurate measure of the person’s stereotype of the group. This is important because one’s cultural stereotype about a group may not be the same as one’s individual stereotype about the group. In these cases, assessing a person’s knowledge about the stereotypes of the group in their culture yields no information on whether the individual personally believes the stereotype, or whether there are other ideas about the group that may tend to drive one’s attitude toward the group (Devine, 1989). The question is, which of these two—­c ultural versus individual stereotypes—­tend to predict future behavior and attitudes toward a given group? Whereas early thinking, exemplified by Lippmann (1922), suggested that we “tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the form stereotyped for us by our culture” (p. 15), contemporary researchers tend to be primarily interested in assessing individual stereotypes, because many experiments have demonstrated that these are most directly related to that person’s specific thoughts, feelings, and behavior toward the group (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Fazio & Olson, 2003; Kunda, 1999; Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991).

Is a Stereotype an Attitude? There is some debate concerning the nature of stereotypes. Some researchers believe that a stereotype is similar to an attitude. An attitude is a general evaluation of some object (Albarracin, Zanna, Johnson, & Kumkale, 2005; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). Any attitude is usually viewed as falling somewhere on a good–bad, or favorable–­unfavorable dimension. For example, you may have a favorable attitude toward soccer, but an unfavorable attitude toward ping-pong. Researchers have traditionally viewed attitudes as comprising three components: a behavioral component, an affective component, and a cognitive component (Breckler, 1984; Eagly & Chaiken, 1998). Thus, some theorists define stereotypes as intergroup attitudes, partitioned into these three components. However, the majority of researchers in this area agree that stereotypes represent only the cognitive portion of any intergroup attitude (Dovidio et al., 1996; Fiske, 1998; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). The other two components of an intergroup attitude—­affect and behavior—­correspond to prejudice and discrimination, respectively. Discrimination is defined as any negative behavior directed toward an individual based on their membership in a group. We define and discuss prejudice in more detail below. In sum, while a stereotype is not an attitude, an intergroup attitude is composed of one’s thoughts or beliefs about, feelings toward, and behavior toward a particular group.

Introduction to the Study of Stereotyping and Prejudice 7

Positive versus Negative Stereotypes You may have noticed that the above definition of stereotype does not indicate anything about the affective valence (positive or negative) of the stereotype. When most people think of stereotypes, they think of a “bad” characteristic associated with a group of people (e.g., having undesirable traits, such as laziness). However, researchers do not regard stereotypes as “bad” or “good” (Allport, 1954). Rather, they are merely generalizations about a group. You no doubt are aware of many more negative stereotypes about various groups than positive stereotypes associated with those groups. Positive stereotypes are simply beliefs that attribute desirable or positive characteristics to a group. For example, such a stereotype exists in the United States about Asians and their intelligence. Specifically, this positive stereotype states that “all Asians excel at mathematics and science.” The stereotype suggests that the whole group has a very desirable characteristic. So, why would people resent being the object of positive stereotyping? We explore this question, and we discuss the major factors that lead to the formation of positive and negative stereotypes throughout this book.

DEFINING PREJUDICE To have prejudice about something can mean many things, depending on one’s frame of reference for the term. As Gardner (1994) suggests, the word “prejudice” can be taken literally to indicate a prejudgment about something. At a further level of specificity, prejudice can suggest an evaluation, either positive or negative, toward a stimulus. For example, you might be prejudiced in favor of your favorite football team when it is playing another team (i.e., you have a preformed positive evaluation of your team, relative to the other team). Finally, Gardner specified another definition of prejudice, in which the individual has a negative evaluation of another stimulus. As you read these different perspectives on prejudice, you may notice that the last two use the term “evaluation.” Essentially, an evaluation is an attitude, as we discussed earlier. This brings us to a controversial point in the prejudice literature.

Prejudice as Negative Affect Early theorists tended to define prejudice in terms of its affective basis. In his influential book, The Nature of Prejudice, Allport (1954) defined prejudice as “an antipathy [intense dislike] based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization. It may be felt or expressed. It may be directed toward a group as a whole, or toward an individual because he is a member of that group” (p. 9). From this classic perspective, prejudice is seen as a strong negative feeling about someone based on a generalization one has about that person’s group. This view corresponds most clearly with the traditional view of an intergroup attitude as composed of beliefs, affect, and behavior, as discussed earlier. In such a model, prejudice is the affective component of the intergroup attitude. However, most (but not all; see Fiske, 1998; Schneider, 2004) researchers soon abandoned the prejudice-­as-­ emotion definition, in favor of more complex definitions of prejudice (Dovidio et al., 1996; H ­ amilton, Stroessner, & Driscoll, 1994; Stephan & Stephan, 1993). Why the move

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The Psychology of Pre judice

toward defining prejudice as an attitude? We consider this below, and then we arrive at a working definition of prejudice for our purposes in this book.

Prejudice as an Attitude During the 1960s, and especially with the rise of social cognition in the early 1970s, researchers started regarding prejudice as an evaluation of a stimulus (usually, a social group). As such, prejudice is essentially an attitude. Like an attitude, therefore, prejudice is seen by most researchers to have cognitive, affective, and behavioral components (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Dovidio et al., 1996; Harding, Proshansky, Kutner, & Chein, 1969; Jones, 1997). One problem with the earlier definitions of prejudice concerns the focus on the negative affect toward the outgroup. This unnecessarily limits the definition of prejudice, because prejudice can also refer to positive prejudice in favor of one’s ingroup (ingroup favoritism; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Jones, 1997). However, most research tends to focus on the more familiar negative type of prejudice. Prejudice can be based on affective (e.g., anger), cognitive (e.g., beliefs linking hostility to the outgroup), or behavioral (e.g., avoidant or hostile) sources, and can result in cognitive, behavioral, or affective expressions of prejudice. However, it seems that affect is a common, influential basis upon which most prejudice is based. Stangor et al. (1991) found that the best predictor of negative outgroup prejudice is not negative feelings about the outgroup but a lack of positive emotions. Based on these findings, some have suggested that stronger, more obvious forms of prejudice are more likely to be based on strong negative emotions, whereas more subtle types of prejudice may be based on an absence of positive feelings about the outgroup (Brewer, 1998; Pettigrew & Mertens, 1995). In an interesting study, Jackson et al. (1996) assessed the cognitions, affect, and behaviors of 869 White college students toward various minority groups. They found that affect and behavior were the strongest predictors of group attitudes. The authors suggest that the quality of an intergroup interaction therefore is most dependent on “how good people feel, not how well they think of group members” (p. 314). An interesting approach by Eagly and Diekman (2005) suggests that prejudice should be regarded as an “attitude in context.” According to this model, prejudice is not inflexible but rather depends on the match (or lack thereof) between the social role into which the stereotyped individual is trying to fit and the beliefs of the perceiver about the attributes that are required for success in that role. If the role is highly valued, the prototypical member (e.g., White) in that role will tend to be viewed only slightly more positively than a role-­incongruent (e.g., African American) individual in that position. Eagly and Diekman argue that prejudice is most likely to be displayed toward a disadvantaged group when that group tries to move into roles for which they are believed (by the majority group) to be unqualified (Eagly & Karau, 2002). This is an interesting conceptualization of prejudice, and one that deserves further empirical and theoretical attention. There have been some critics of the prejudice-­as-­attitude approach, however. Criticism centers around a couple of core problems. First, some theorists assert that an attitude (or evaluation) is not the same as affect (Fiske, 1998; Zanna & Rempel, 1988). If prejudice is an affectively based reaction to a stimulus group (as Allport, 1954; Brehm

Introduction to the Study of Stereotyping and Prejudice 9

et al., 1999, suggest it is), then it cannot be the case that an evaluation of the group is the same thing as prejudice. Second, Devine (1995) notes that the notion that prejudice has affective, cognitive, and behavioral components is problematic because research shows that the three components are not always consistent. For example, Devine (1989) found that low-­prejudice individuals know about the stereotypes of their outgroups, and LaPiere (1934) found that people’s expressed attitudes did not match their behavior toward the outgroup.

Prejudice as a “Social Emotion” In an insightful paper, Smith (1993) draws upon appraisal theories of emotion (and self-­ categorization theory) to suggest a new conceptualization of prejudice. Self-­ categorization theory (Turner, 1987) states that people view themselves as members of a social category or group (e.g., racial, national, ethnic, religious). According to this theory, intergroup interactions make salient (or bring to conscious awareness) particular group categorizations, depending on the nature of the group interaction. For example, when we interact with someone of a different religious belief, our religious self-­categorization may be most salient. Or, if we interact with a French citizen, our self-­categorization as a U.S. citizen may be most salient. These distinctions serve to enhance the perception of the outgroup as homogeneous (see Chapter 2 for further discussion). Turner also suggests that these self-­categorizations tend to be strongly linked to one’s self-­identity, and as such, when they are salient, any self-­relevant information in the interaction has affective and motivational consequences (Smith, 1993). According to Smith and Ellsworth (1987), an appraisal is a set of cognitions that are attached to a specific emotion. Emotion, in appraisal theory, is triggered by an assessment of the adaptive significance and self-­relevance of the people and events in one’s environment. For example, the emotion of fear might be elicited when one perceives that a situation or individual is out of one’s control, unpleasant, and blocks the person from attaining their goals (e.g., to stay alive, stay healthy). Smith (1993) suggests that appraisals invariably involve the self, because they have relevance to one’s goals in some fashion. There are two key differences in Smith’s conceptualization of prejudice that make it a unique and useful model of prejudice. First, he says that it is too vague to say that prejudice is a positive or negative feeling about another group. Our emotional reactions to other groups are quite specific, such as anger, fear, disgust, excitement, happiness, or serenity (Bodenhausen, 1993; Tapias, Glaser, Keltner, Vasquez, & Wickens, 2007). Second, the traditional conception of prejudice suggests that if we are prejudiced against another group (e.g., lawyers), then we should react with the same negative affect to all members of the group every time we encounter them. However, this does not fit with reality. Many prejudiced people can dislike the group as a whole, and most of its members, but genuinely have positive attitudes and affect toward a specific member of that group (e.g., friend, neighbor, celebrity). Some have suggested that this reaction can be explained in terms of subtyping, whereby the prejudiced individual maintains a negative affect toward the group, but creates a separate category (e.g., friend, coworker) for specific members, thereby allowing the perceiver’s stereotypes to persist in the face of what would otherwise be a stereotype-­ disconfirming case (Reik, Mania, & Gaertner, 2013; Weber & Crocker, 1983). However,

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The Psychology of Pre judice

Smith (1993) contends that this obscures the fact that how we react to another person does not depend on the type of group member they are but who that person is, in what context, and how we appraise that individual in terms of our goals. So, how we react to any given outgroup member depends on (1) what self-­category is salient for us at that moment (e.g., Nelson & Wischusen, 1999), (2) in what context the interaction occurs (competitive, cooperative, etc.), and (3) how that person helps or hinders our movement toward salient personal or group goals at that time. This is a much richer conceptualization of prejudice than has been proposed in the past, and it goes a long way toward capturing the complexity of affect, cognition, behavior, and motivation in intergroup interactions (Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2016). We return to this further when we discuss social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). If all of these approaches to defining prejudice seem a bit confusing, you are not alone. Among prejudice researchers, there is little consensus and much debate over how precisely prejudice should be defined. Definitions differ on several issues, as discussed above. An important consideration is how to measure prejudice. Some suggest that concepts such as “affect,” “emotion,” or “feelings” presuppose a physiological reaction (Oatley, 1993; Zajonc, 1998). As such, our ability to measure feelings, or affect, toward outgroups is not as precise as our measurements of people’s evaluations, attitudes, or beliefs about other groups (Walter Stephan, personal communication, June 7, 1999). It is not practical to have a definition of prejudice that contains a concept that is not easily measured. Thus, in addition to the aforementioned theoretical reasons for conceptualizing prejudice as an attitude, the movement to view prejudice in this way was also strongly initiated by the practical constraints of how to measure prejudice. Currently, prejudice is most commonly measured by standardized self-­report measures that assess the endorsement of statements about the characteristics of a group, feelings about the group, and behavior toward the group and its members (Dovidio et al., 1996; Olson, 2016). Given the myriad of definitions of prejudice, how should prejudice be defined? Before we address this question, it is important to note that there really is no single “correct” definition of prejudice. The way one defines prejudice often depends on the specific questions one is looking at in their research, as well as the way the investigator intends to measure prejudice. However, researchers can generally agree upon a few points (Devine, 1995; Jones, 1997). Prejudice: 1. 2. 3. 4.

Occurs between groups. Involves an evaluation (positive or negative) of a group. Is a biased perception of a group. Is based on the real or imagined characteristics of the group.

Therefore, for the purposes of this book, we define prejudice as a biased evaluation of a group, based on real or imagined characteristics of the group members. Note that this definition allows for both positive and negative prejudice, such as the favorable attitudes one has for one’s ingroups, compared to the negative attitudes one has toward outgroups. While the definition of prejudice as encompassing an evaluation (attitude) does not resolve the debate over whether prejudice ought to be considered an attitude, an emotion, or a social

Introduction to the Study of Stereotyping and Prejudice 11

emotion, we use this definition to be consistent with the majority of the contemporary researchers in the area.

THE LINK BETWEEN STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE It seems rather intuitive that stereotypes should be strongly related with prejudice, and with discrimination. Thinking about a group elicits from memory the schema about the group, including the stereotypes, affect, and behavioral tendencies toward members of that group (Collins & Loftus, 1975). As you will recall, this is based on the notion that an intergroup attitude comprises one’s beliefs about, evaluations of, and behavior toward a group. The representations of these concepts tend to be grouped together, and linked together in memory under the organizing structure of a schema. The idea that stereotypes and prejudice should be strongly related was also supported by balance theory (Heider, 1958), as well as Fishbein and Ajzen’s (1975) theory of reasoned action (Stroebe & Insko, 1989). According to balance theory, one’s attitudes, behavior, and evaluation (and affect) toward another person should be cognitively consistent, or else one experiences a state of “imbalance,” which is an aversive state of cognitive arousal. Festinger (1957) called this “cognitive dissonance.” One way to think of this is that when we say one thing and do another, we feel foolish, or hypocritical. Balance theory says that it does not make sense for one to have positive attitudes toward—­for example—­lawyers, but tell negative jokes about lawyers. According to the theory of reasoned action, our beliefs about a group are determined by our attitudes toward a group. So, in this model, it could never be the case that the beliefs (stereotypes) about the group would not be consistent with one’s attitudes (or prejudice) toward the group. However, there were some researchers who said that beliefs, attitudes, and behavior were weakly or inconsistently related. In the late 1960s, Wicker (1969) published a seemingly devastating criticism of the attitude–­behavior relationship. He reviewed 42 studies and concluded that there was virtually no evidence that people have stable attitudes that guide their behavior. Though this criticism aroused a lot of attention among social scientists, causing others to question the validity and utility of the whole field of attitude research (Elms, 1975), researchers showed that the explanation for Wicker’s results was simple. Wicker examined the relation between attitudes and single acts. However, much research has shown that actions are multiply determined by a number of other factors besides attitudes (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). Thus, Fishbein and Ajzen argued, the relationship between an attitude and subsequent attitude-­relevant behavior is much stronger if one “aggregates” multiple behaviors into a single behavior measure. In this way, the behavioral measure is much more likely to show a consistency around a true behavioral tendency (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). However, more criticism existed concerning the specific relation between ethnic atittudes and behavior toward members of ethnic groups. In Brigham’s (1971) comprehensive review of the literature, he concluded that the relationship between stereotypes of a group and behavior toward that group was quite weak. According to Dovidio et al. (1996), Brigham reached that conclusion based on an imprecise consideration of the methodological variations between all the studies he reviewed for his paper. Dovidio and his colleagues performed a sophisticated statistical analysis called a “meta-­analysis”

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The Psychology of Pre judice

on a dozen studies and found that not only were stereotyping and prejudice related but they were strongly related.

EARLY PERSPECTIVES IN STEREOTYPING RESEARCH Like other subfields within psychology, social psychology has gone through a number of evolutions in the foci of its theories, methodology, and phenomena under investigation. In this section, we discuss some of the major approaches to understanding stereotyping and prejudice, and we conclude with a discussion of the current dominant approach: the social-­cognitive perspective.

Measurement In the early 1900s, when social psychology was in its infancy as a scientific discipline, researchers were primarily concerned with understanding and cataloging the content of stereotypes. The Katz and Braly (1933) study was a prime example of this empirical focus. In what has been widely acknowledged as the first empirical study of stereotyping, Katz and Braly investigated the content of the stereotypes that Whites had about 10 different ethnic groups (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Hamilton et al., 1994; Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Princeton University students were given a list of adjectives and asked to specify which adjectives were associated with various ethnic groups. The content of the stereotype, therefore, comprised those adjectives that were most frequently indicated for a particular group. Research was focusing on refining ways to assess, through various attitude measurement techniques (e.g., Likert type, Thurstone scale, Guttman attitude scale), the way people evaluated their world. Attitude research was an important cornerstone of social psychology, and it remains so today. The reason for this is straightforward. If, as social psychologists believe, the best way to predict someone’s actions in a given context is to know how they think about that context and the stimuli within it (i.e., their attitude), then knowing the individual’s attitude ought to allow the researcher to predict with a fair degree of accuracy, the individual’s behavior in that context. For example, if we know that John has a positive attitude toward Bruce, but a negative attitude toward Bill, we would likely be accurate in predicting that John’s verbal and nonverbal behavior toward Bruce would be characterized as friendly, while his behavior toward Bill would likely be cold, aloof, or even rude. While such a prediction seems fairly obvious, the assumption upon which it rests—that attitudes predict, and are related to subsequent attitude-­relevant behavior—­has been a contentious one, as we just discussed earlier in this chapter. After much controversy, researchers do agree that attitudes can allow one to predict subsequent attitude-­relevant behavior with a fair degree of accuracy, depending on the person, situation, and attitude being measured (Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). The next question for the researcher then becomes What is the best way to measure stereotyping and prejudice? We discuss this in detail in Chapter 6.

Individual Differences in Stereotyping From the 1930s through the 1950s, a popular approach to understanding stereotyping was to examine the factors that lead individuals to stereotype others—­t hat is, what

Introduction to the Study of Stereotyping and Prejudice 13

sort of enduring personality characteristics or motivations would cause one person, but not another, to stereotype other people? The influential research of Hovland, Janis, and Kelly (1953) on factors that enhance persuasion was indicative of this approach. Among the results from their extensive program of research, Hovland et al. found that persuasion messages were more likely to be successful when directed toward a certain type of audience. Specifically, people who were less educated, were distracted, and who were lower in self-­esteem tended to be persuaded more easily, compared to other people. Research on attitude formation and change during this time was dominated by assumptions from theories of learning and reinforcement (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993). The theories of Hull (1943), Skinner (1953), Miller and Dollard (1941), and other learning theorists suggested that a primary reason that certain attitudes are formed and maintained is that the expression of such attitudes were followed by reinforcing events (e.g., social approval). Recall that during this period in American history, the racial climate was deeply divided, and society was segregated. African Americans had very few rights that Whites enjoyed. Indeed, other groups, such as women and members of the communist party, were stereotyped, and given unequal status in society. The motivational–­reinforcement theories suggest that the prevalence of prejudice and stereotyping at that time was due to the need for social approval and self-­esteem. If one felt poorly about themselves and their lot in life, all the person needed to do was to publicly derogate a particular stereotyped group, and they could find ready allies in complete strangers who felt the same motives and negative attitudes. Thus, stereotyping can be explained by Thorndike’s (1911) law of effect, which says that any behavior that is followed by a positive event is more likely to be performed again in the future. From this perspective, then, Hovland et al.’s (1953) findings about the susceptibility to persuasion among lower-­educated and lower-­esteem individuals seems to fit nicely with the motivations such individuals have to attempt to enhance their self-­esteem. Other researchers suggested that prejudice and stereotyping arose out of feelings of aggression (Dollard, Miller, Doob, Mowrer, & Sears, 1939). In their “frustration–­ aggression” theory, Dollard et al. suggest that frustration leads to aggression, and a special type of aggression is feelings of prejudice toward others. There is some interesting indirect evidence that bears on this theory. Hovland and Sears (1940) reported a negative correlation between the price of cotton and the number of lynchings of African Americans in the southern states of the United States (from 1882 to 1930)—that is, as the price dropped (meaning worse economic times), the greater the number of lynchings. Hepworth and West (1988) later reanalyzed these data and confirmed Hovland and Sears’s conclusions, with one specification: that the rates of lynching were highest when hard economic times followed a period of positive growth in the economy. However, Green, Glaser, and Rich (1998) found problems with Hepworth and West’s analyses, and they made a compelling case that, in fact, there is no relation between economic downturn and rates of lynching. They suggest that this is because frustration as a result of hard economic times tends to dissipate fast. Also, in the absence of a strong political figure directing that frustration toward a scapegoat outgroup, the frustration is not focused into outgroup hostility (e.g., hate crimes) before it dissipates. Another problem with this “scapegoat theory of prejudice” (Jones, 1997) is that it suggests that frustration leads to aggression (and prejudice) toward any salient stimulus or group, not necessarily African Americans. However, the evidence in support of

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The Psychology of Pre judice

the theory focuses primarily on hostility toward African Americans, and little evidence has been reported that would show such displaced frustration against other groups. Another problem is that subsequent research has shown that all frustration does not lead to aggression (or prejudice), and not all prejudice is caused by frustration. Berkowitz (1989) reformulated the frustration–­aggression theory to better account for such situations by stipulating that any negative affect (not just a frustrating event) is likely to elicit aggressive feelings. This is especially the case when the negative affect results from an unanticipated thwarted goal. A recent study (published June 15, 2023) reported the results of a meta-­analysis of neuroimaging studies of participants who were exposed to frustrating events while they were in a brain neuroimaging scanner. The purpose was to ascertain the neural correlates of both frustration and subsequent anger behaviors (what they refer to as ‘retaliation’; Dugre & Potvin, 2023). The results of their analysis showed that, indeed, there is a frustration–­aggression connection in the brain that can be seen via neuroimaging. When frustrated, we see increased activity in the midcingulo-­insular regions, and the accompanying retaliation behavior is associated with activity in the left fronto-­insular and anterior midcingulate cortices, dorsal caudate, and the primary somatosensory cortex. In addition to the motivational approaches, other research has investigated the question of whether some people have “prejudiced personalities.” Exemplifying this perspective was the research by Adorno and his colleagues (1950) on the “authoritarian personality.” Adorno et al. believed that in some people, their personality characteristics caused them to be prejudiced. According to this view, a child’s early experiences with their parents determine whether the child will develop a prejudiced personality. Driven by unconscious impulses created out of these early child–­parent interactions, the child (and later as an adult) tends to seek out and adopt prejudiced attitudes. If this sounds psychodynamic, you are not alone. Most researchers characterize this view of prejudice as having strong psychodynamic roots (Altemeyer, 1996; Fiske, 1998; Hamilton et al., 1994). What characterizes the authoritarian individual is a rigid adherence to middle-­ class values, submissiveness to authority, closed mindedness, black-and-white thinking, preoccupation with power relationships (e.g., leader–­follower, strong–­weak), cynicism, and condemnation of those who are perceived as violating traditional values. Interestingly, while the distribution of authoritarian personalities varies within a given country, factors that threaten one’s values increase the tendency of the individual to display authoritarian characteristics (Sales, 1973). In essence, then, people with an authoritarian personality are strongly attached to the status quo (Simonton, 1990). Anything that threatens this will be met with hostility and prejudice. We discuss the supportive evidence and criticisms of the authoritarian personality approach to the origin of prejudice in much more detail in Chapter 5. The authoritarian personality explanation generated much research, but with the rise of group-level approaches to stereotyping and prejudice, the focus on individual-­level factors receded into the background.

Group‑Level Explanations At the close of the 1950s to the early 1970s, researchers began to focus on cultural and broader group-level explanations for stereotyping and prejudice (Duckitt, 1992). Duckitt describes the shift from an individual-­differences focus to a group-level focus as originating in two factors. First, individual-­level explanations were unable to adequately

Introduction to the Study of Stereotyping and Prejudice 15

explain why there was much more prejudice and racism in the southern states of the United States. The fact that prejudice existed on such a large scale could not be accounted for by authoritarian personality, or frustration. Second, the rise of the civil rights movement in the late 1950s highlighted the institutionalized nature of racism in the United States, and showed that low-­prejudice people were condoning racism right alongside of the more blatant racists. This meant that there must be something else, something on a larger scale that better accounts for why Whites were prejudiced against African Americans. A popular approach was to explain prejudice and stereotyping as a result of a perceived group threat. In other words, if one perceived that a member of an outgroup (and, by association, that person’s whole outgroup) impeded one’s goals, such an event may evoke in the perceiver the idea that that outgroup poses a threat to one’s ingroup generally, not just to one’s personal goals (Fiske & Ruscher, 1993). Such a perception could arise from the view that the outgroup’s goals are incompatible with the goals of one’s ingroup, or that those goals interfere with one’s ingroup goals. Anything that blocks one (or one’s group) from reaching a desired goal should elicit a reaction of frustration, anxiety, anger, and so on, directed toward the blocking agent. Another group-level approach was the explanation of prejudice as the result of competition for scarce resources. This was the prediction from realistic conflict theory (Campbell, 1967; Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). According to this theory, prejudice and stereotyping of outgroups arises when groups compete against one another for scarce resources (e.g., jobs, food, land). Much research supports the notion that such competition enhances prejudice against and stereotypes about one’s competing outgroups (Brown, 1995). We discuss realistic conflict theory in detail in Chapter 2. As the 1960s ended, theoretical developments in cognitive and social psychology converged to give rise to the current approach to understanding stereotyping and prejudice: the social-­cognitive perspective.

THE SOCIAL‑COGNITION REVOLUTION Toward the end of the late 1950s, psychology as a field began to shift from the emphasis on learning theory and behaviorism to embrace a more cognitive approach to understanding the causes of behavior. Many prominent researchers have even agreed on the date of birth for this “cognitive science”: September 11, 1956 (Gardner, 1985). On that date, researchers met at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology for a symposium on information theory. Seminal talks were delivered by Herbert Simon, George A. Miller, and Noam Chomsky. These researchers and others (e.g., Von Neumann, 1958) noted that the computer provided a useful analog of how the mind processes information (i.e., it takes in information, does something with the information, and produces an output). This information-­processing model of cognition soon dominated all areas of psychology. These advances had a tremendous impact on social psychology.

Cognitive Consistency Theories During the late 1950s and throughout the 1960s, researchers focused on cognitive consistency theories of behavior. The most notable of these was Festinger’s (1957) cognitive

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The Psychology of Pre judice

dissonance theory. Dissonance theory suggested that people are motivated to maintain consistent cognitions (or consistency between cognitions and behaviors), and that the lack of cognitive consistency led to an aversive physiological state (dissonance). Festinger proposed that people are strongly motivated to reduce this drive state (either by changing their behavior, or their cognitions). Festinger used the example of a smoker to illustrate dissonance. Suppose a smoker knows that smoking is bad for her health, but she smokes anyway. These behaviors are cognitively inconsistent, and should produce dissonance, motivating her to either change her behavior or the way she thinks about it. Many behavioral tendencies, especially addictive habits like smoking, are very difficult to abandon. Thus, the easiest route for the smoker to reduce her dissonance is to change her attitude toward smoking (from thinking about its harmful effects to convincing herself that it hasn’t been proven to be harmful). It should be noted that the cognitive inconsistency didn’t need to be an exact, true inconsistency to arouse dissonance. Even perceived inconsistencies aroused the same negative drive state. This is a major point to which we return in a moment. Some saw cognitive consistency theory as a way to reduce prejudice and stereotyping. It seems quite elegant in its simplicity: all one needs to do is to show the prejudiced person that there is an inconsistency between how they think of themselves (i.e., as a good, fair person) and the person’s negative attitudes and behavior toward outgroup members, and dissonance will be aroused. The dissonance will cause the person to change their attitude and behavior toward the outgroup. Unfortunately, cognitive consistency theories fell out of favor with social-­cognitive researchers (and stereotyping researchers in particular) because it could not account for many instances of blatant inconsistency in attitudes and behavior (Fiske & Taylor, 1991, 2017). It became clear that people often behaved in ways that were inconsistent with their attitudes, and they did not appear to be bothered by that fact.

Attribution Theory In the late 1960s and throughout the 1970s, social psychologists embraced attribution theory as a model of much of social information processing (Jones, 1985; Jones et al., 1972). The central question in attribution is To what do we attribute the causes of another person’s (and our own) behavior? The causes are either attributed to internal characteristics of the person (e.g., personality traits) or to the situational pressures or other environmental factors external to the individual (e.g., the constraints of a job). According to this perspective, we are all “naïve scientists” (Heider, 1958), testing our own theories of the causes of other people’s behavior. From the standpoint of attribution theory, stereotyping and prejudice emerge as a result of cognitive processes that lead people to disproportionately suspect negative (threatening) motivations or causes for the behavior of outgroup members. At the heart of attribution theory, like cognitive dissonance theory, was a core notion that was to become the cornerstone of the social-­cognitive approach to social psychology, and to theories of stereotyping and prejudice in particular: that the best predictor of an individual’s behavior or attitudes in relation to a stimulus is the individual’s construal of the stimulus, not from the influence of the objective qualities of the stimulus on the perceiver (Fiske & Taylor, 2017; Jones, 1985; Kunda, 1999). Behaviorism suggests that if one can understand the lawful relationships between an organism and its environment, then one will be able to predict the organism’s behavior from

Introduction to the Study of Stereotyping and Prejudice 17

an assessment of the characteristics of the environmental stimuli present at any given moment. This perspective suggests that we all react to the same stimuli in the same way. However, humans do not react the same way to a given stimulus. If 10 people stand in Chicago’s Art Institute looking at Seurat’s famous painting A Sunday on La Grande Jatte, their perceptions of that stimulus (and their reactions to it) may likely be different for each person. It is the same for any stimulus in the environment: the way we think about it determines our reactions to it. Let me (T. D. N.) give you an example I use in my classes (silly as it is—­students love to see me act this out) to illustrate this point before we move on. Suppose you and I are on an elevator, with no one else on the elevator with us. You are minding your own business as the elevator doors close and it begins to move, when suddenly I walk over to you and step on your foot. How would you react? Most people would become quite angry at such an unprovoked attack. But why? Because in quickly ascertaining the most likely cause of my behavior, they see no obvious external force (environmental factor) that made me do what I just did. Thus, the only attribution left is a personality explanation (and a hostile personality I must have to do such a thing!). Now, suppose we are on a crowded elevator, and you are standing behind me, and I back up to let others get in the elevator. In the process, I step on your foot. Would you react with the same anger? Likely not, because you have noticed that the most likely explanation for my behavior is the fact that others forced me to step back, and I accidentally stepped on your foot as I stepped back. The interesting point here is a powerful one: objectively it is the same act (stepping on your foot), but your behavior, affect, and attitude toward me are quite different depending on your construal, or interpretation, of the reasons for my behavior. We explore this in further detail throughout the book. The “naïve scientist” approach suggested that people will use a rational thought process to arrive at an accurate assessment of the causes of another’s behavior. A problem with this view soon emerged as more attribution research was conducted. There were many instances where people had plenty of access to information, and plenty of time to arrive at a thoughtful attributional judgment, and yet their judgments reflected something else. Research revealed that people are often irrational, inefficient thinkers, and they allow biases and shortcuts to influence their thinking (Nisbett & Ross, 1980). For this and other reasons, research in attribution theory declined by the end of the 1970s, supplanted by an ever-­sophisticated view of the biases, tendencies, and limitations cognition can contribute to reliable phenomena that enhance the tendency to form and maintain stereotypes and prejudice about others. Before we conclude this brief history of the cognitive revolution in social psychology, it is important to make something clear about the nature of this revolution. It is not the case that social psychology was devoid of any emphasis on cognition prior to these theoretical shifts in the late 1950s and 1960s. To the contrary, Zajonc (1980) has rightly noted that social psychology has always been strongly interested in cognition. At the infancy of the field, the dominant area of research was the study of attitudes (Allport, 1935). The study of social influence, altruism, and attraction all have heavy emphases on how people think about their environment. So, rather than going from no cognitive emphases to a strong cognitive emphasis, it is more accurate to say that the field went from a moderate to heavy emphasis on cognition, with alternating periods of waxing and waning interest in cognitive explanations of social behavior (Jones, 1985).

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THE SOCIAL‑COGNITION VIEW OF STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE In 1969, Tajfel published a landmark paper entitled “Cognitive Aspects of Prejudice.” In it, he suggested that the origin of stereotyping and prejudice cannot be adequately understood unless one considers the cognitive aspects. He preceded the social-­cognition movement in social psychology by a few years, and was one of the first to assert that stereotyping originates from a process of social categorization. Tajfel showed that social categorization had a major impact on how a perceiver views others, and this was a fundamental principle for the social-­cognitive approach (Ashmore & Del Boca, 1981; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). This also marked a significant shift in the way stereotyping was viewed. If it was the case that stereotyping was a product of the inherent limitations of the nature of our cognitive systems (as suggested by Tajfel), then the view of stereotyping as an external sign of an individual’s moral failings was not entirely correct. Rather, Tajfel asserted that stereotyping was a result of an adaptive, efficient categorization process of cognition (Rothbart & Lewis, 1994).

Categorization That the brain had limitations on the amount of information processing it could handle was not news to psychologists. Indeed, about 15 years earlier, Miller (1956) showed this with his famous paper on the limited capacity of short-term memory. What was novel was the connection between categorization and stereotyping, and that categorization was an inevitable aspect of human cognition. At any given second, there are hundreds, even thousands, of different stimuli that can be perceived in our immediate environment. If we had to constantly think carefully about every one of those stimuli (or even a small subset thereof), in order to understand its nature and function, we would never get anything done! Instead, we learn about different stimuli, and tend to group them in terms of common features, attributes, or functions. This categorization process then becomes so well practiced as to become automatic, and it frees up our consciousness to attend to things that are novel in our environment, or to our current task (Fiske & ­Neuberg, 1990; Fiske & Taylor, 2017). Thus, categorization helps us reduce the complexity of the stimuli in our social environment. Many researchers agree that the primary way we categorize other people is in terms of who is like us, and who is not like us (Jones, 1982; Tajfel, 1969)—that is, we group people into “us” and “them” (Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990). While we can categorize people on the basis of virtually any real or perceived feature, most categorization takes place with the fastest, and most immediately available ways of categorizing others: in terms of race, gender, and age. These have been termed basic or primitive categories (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990) to denote the notion that they seem to occur rather automatically, without conscious effort to initiate such categorization (Smith, 1990). There is an important difference between the categorization of physical objects and the categorization of people, however. With physical objects, such as a pencil, there is usually only one way to categorize the object (i.e., a pencil is a writing instrument). However, there are many ways to categorize a person (e.g., by race, gender, occupation, hair color, style of clothes, religion), and the way we categorize the target individual depends on the involvement, motivations, and interests of the perceiver (Kunda, 1999;

Introduction to the Study of Stereotyping and Prejudice 19

Spears, Oakes, Ellemers, & Haslam, 1997). Bodenhausen and Macrae (1998) suggested that when we are confronted with multiple ways of categorizing another person, we usually focus on one primary categorization, and inhibit information that makes us think of other categories for that person. The stereotypes we have for another person, and the biasing effects of that initial categorization, are often determined by chance factors. For example, research by Macrae, Bodenhausen, and Milne (1995) investigated how people would categorize a Chinese woman in a short videotape. When participants saw her in a context that made salient her race (i.e., she was eating with chopsticks), they recognized Chinese stereotypical words faster than female stereotypical words on a subsequent reaction time assessment. When these researchers showed another group of participants the same woman, this time in a video clip in which she was applying makeup, participants were faster at recognizing female stereotypical words than they were at recognizing Chinese stereotypical words. Other research indicates that how we categorize someone (e.g., based on a role, gender, occupation, or race) is determined by the fit between these categories and the knowledge that is accessible in memory at that moment. Thus, if the characteristics “educated,” “logical,” and “competitive” are accessible when one is forming an impression of a particular target, we may tend to use the category “lawyer” to guide our further impressions of the target, as opposed to the individual’s gender, race, or other possible categories of membership (Stapel & Koomen, 1998). Additionally, the relationship of the two individuals in the social context is an important factor that determines how the target person is perceived. As Spears et al. (1997) note, the involvement of the perceiver in the social context invalidates the idea that there is a theoretical fixed point of reference for the perceiver to view other individuals. In other words, it is incorrect to say that the perceiver does not influence, but is influenced by, the target person, and from that alone they categorize the target. This is an important point, and one to which we return shortly, in our discussion of the “motivated tactician.” Perhaps you’ve caught the use of the words “at that moment” above. The social categorization process is not a slow, deliberative process whereby one thoughtfully considers the available information and comes up with a rational judgment. Rather, the empirical evidence suggests that social categorization is a dynamic, shifting process that is anything but rational (e.g., see Tversky & Kahneman, 1974). Our social judgments and categorizations are a moment-­by-­moment mix of our learning history, motivations, target characteristics, and cultural norms (Kawakami, Hugenberg, & Dunham, 2021). Categorizing people in this way makes it easy to develop stereotypes about them. If we categorize a group of people on the basis of a similar characteristic they share (e.g., that they are all women), one thing that begins to happen is that we start to infer (or guess) that because they share one characteristic, they share a number of other characteristics as well. That seems like a reasonable assumption, because things and people in categories do indeed often share not one, but many attributes (e.g., tables, dogs, men, police officers all have a number of similar features to other members of their category). However, the problem comes when these inferences are based on faulty or no evidence at all. For example, suppose I infer that because I know so much about my sister, I believe I know what most women are like. I know what their interests, abilities, tendencies, emotions, personalities, and social skills are like. How do I know all this? Because I know one of those category members (my sister) very well. Thus, I am making the following syllogism: I know what my sister is like. My sister is a woman. I know what women are like. I

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am inferring characteristics about the whole group based on information about one of the specific group members. Is such an inference accurate? Of course not. Is it efficient? You bet it is. But wait. Why would someone sacrifice accuracy for efficiency? Isn’t it better to be correct in one’s assessments of others? Let’s explore this in more detail below.

The Cognitive Miser As research on the influences of the cognitive system on social perception developed throughout the 1970s a recurring theme emerged in the data: people overwhelmingly embrace efficiency rather than accuracy in their perceptions of the social world. This view of the perceiver is often referred to as the “cognitive miser” model (Taylor, 1981). The essence of this view is that people are much more concerned with developing ways of thinking about the world that are fast and efficient (Fiske & Taylor, 2017; Stanovich, 2021). Slow, yet more accurate cognitive processes are not valued as highly by individuals. The main goal seems to be to arrive at the fastest judgments or evaluations possible. There are a couple of reasons for this. First, if one is able to form a fast impression, the anxiety associated with not knowing how to behave toward, or what to expect from, the target individual is eliminated. Second, there are few, and often no negative outcomes for arriving at inaccurate assessments of others. For example, walking down the street, you rather automatically categorize virtually everyone you notice (i.e., people who receive even the most minimal attention in your perceptual field). Those dozens of categorizations have no discernable effect on the others because you don’t interact with them, and indeed may never see most of them again in your life. So the benefits of thinking that you know a lot about those categorized persons, and what you might expect from them, far outweighs the remote possibility that such an inaccurate categorization would lead to a negative consequence (i.e., getting into a hostile confrontation with the target individual who found out about your inaccurate assessment of them). However, as we see throughout the remainder of this book, merely thinking of someone in terms of stereotypes can indeed have strong effects on one’s behavior and attitudes in that context and in future intergroup situations. The cognitive miser model of social perception heavily emphasizes the role of cognition and does not include other factors, such as affect or motivation. This aspect of the model symbolizes a problem that many critics had with the social-­cognition movement in social psychology. Many said that social cognition was almost entirely cognition, and very little social in the theories that were being developed (Spears et al., 1997). The role of the self, affect, motivation, and other factors receded into the theoretical background in favor of explanations that attempted to understand how the cognitive system worked, and the limitations of that system. However, this criticism isn’t really a fair one to level at social cognition, because it suggests that researchers were not looking at the whole system (the social and the cognitive together) in understanding how we categorize and stereotype others. Yet, this is the nature of scientific progress (Kuhn, 1970). Specifically, in order to understand the influence of a particular factor on a system, scientists must first understand the nature of the factor itself, uninfluenced by other factors. Once that is established, it is introduced to other factors in varying combinations in different situations to understand how it interacts with other elements in the environment. This was precisely what was happening with the cognitive revolution in social psychology. As researchers began to understand the limitations and extent of cognitive influences in

Introduction to the Study of Stereotyping and Prejudice 21

social categorization, the scientific pendulum swung back to once again spotlight the roles of affect and motivation in categorization.

The Motivated Tactician This view of the social perceiver incorporates the cognitive perspective but also includes the motivational and affective factors into an understanding of how intergroup social interactions and social categorization influence the attitudes, affect, and behavior of the perceiver (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Pendry & Macrae, 1994). According to this perspective, the perceiver is an integral part of the social context, with motivations that vary depending on the dynamic nature of the context. These motivations can bias how the person perceives any other individual, depending on how it best suits the perceiver’s salient needs, values, or goals at that given time. This perspective also describes how individuals actively try to manage the impressions of themselves that their social interaction partners may develop (Ruscher, Fiske, & Schnake, 2000). This view reflects the richness of the research on affective and motivational states that had developed while social cognition dominated social psychology and intergroup research, in particular. Once the parameters and limits of the cognitive factors in social perception were becoming clear, researchers returned to their earlier emphases on motivation (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950; Festinger, 1957) and affect (e.g., Dollard et al., 1939). From the cognitive–­motivational approach, categorization elicits the need to view one’s ingroups positively relative to one’s outgroups (Duckitt, 1992; see Chapter 5 for a more detailed discussion of this point). Thus, the social perceiver may sometimes think about the target individual in a considered manner in order to enhance accuracy, and sometimes they may elect to consider the other person in a heuristic fashion to maximize speed, or enhance one’s self-­esteem (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Researchers have been increasingly interested in understanding the role of motivation (Bamberg & Verkuyten, 2022; Kruglanski, 1996) and affect (Mackie & Hamilton, 1993; Mackie et al., 2016) in intergroup perception. Prejudice researchers generally agree that motivation plays an important role in social cognition, and in outgroup perception specifically (Geen, 1995; Gollwitzer & Moskowitz, 1996). In their review of the literature on motivation and stereotyping, Kunda and Sinclair (1999) concluded that people are more likely to apply a stereotype to a target when it supports their desired impression of the person. Thus, motivation is defined in this research as the impetus to do some behavior (or avoid doing some behavior) and to keep doing it, in order to meet one’s goals. Interestingly, the authors also argue that people can be motivated to inhibit the activation of a stereotype when they believe it will hinder their personal goals or social interactions. Indeed, there is much evidence to suggest that stereotype inhibition can occur with sufficiently motivated persons (Bodenhausen & Macrae, 1998; Moskowitz, 2010). We discuss stereotype inhibition in greater detail in Chapter 2.

WHY THE EMPHASIS ON AFRICAN AMERICAN–WHITE INTERGROUP RELATIONS? Throughout this text, most of the studies, experiments, and theories we discuss feature the specific stereotyping and prejudice history between two specific groups: African

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Americans and Whites. Some readers will no doubt wonder why this is the case, and may even conclude that it reflects a biased view of prejudice and stereotyping research. However, we assure you that this emphasis reflects no such bias, and instead, there are several reasons why we (and other researchers) tend to draw heavily upon the theory and data concerning African American and White intergroup relations. First, the vast majority of the empirical and theoretical literature on prejudice and stereotyping has examined prejudice between African Americans and Whites (Dovidio et al., 1996; Jones, 1997; Plous, 2003). Thus, there is a wealth of scientific information available that gives the researcher a more complete picture of the various factors that contribute to the development and maintenance of prejudice and stereotyping. Second, many agree with Jones (1997) that relations between African Americans and Whites tend to evidence stronger, more intense psychological and emotional reactions compared to the relations among other groups. As a result, racial attitudes tend to be stronger, less susceptible to change, and they tend to be consensual (Dovidio et al., 1996). Finally, the political, social, and cultural history of the United States is such that the relationship between African Americans and Whites has played a major role in shaping the course of wars (e.g., the Civil War), legislation (e.g., Brown v. Board of Education, the Civil Rights Act of 1965, affirmative action, antidiscrimination), and public policy. It is important to understand how the relations between these groups has affected, and still affects, the United States (Dovidio et al., 1996; Pettigrew, 2008; Plous, 2003). It is important to note that the emphasis of prejudice researchers on African American/White relations does not assume that the processes, factors, and findings that follow from this research generalize to prejudice and stereotyping between all types of groups (racial, age, religious, etc.). Indeed, our text focuses on the ways that prejudice and stereotyping are similar and different for various stereotyped groups. One of the aims of this text, however, is to start with the broad database culled from the research on Whites and African Americans, and attempt to ascertain to what degree the basic cognitive, affective, and behavioral factors that lead to prejudice between these two groups will likely generalize to the ways people think about other stereotyped groups. In so doing, we may begin to have a better understanding of how prejudice and stereotyping arises, how they are maintained, and hopefully, how we can reduce or eliminate prejudice and stereotypes.

SUMMARY The study of stereotyping and prejudice has come a long way, from its early beginnings in the 1930s, to the very sophisticated theoretical models of present-­day researchers. Since the “cognitive revolution” in social psychology, the number of theoretical and empirical articles published in journals on stereotyping and prejudice has grown tremendously. A search of the literature indicates that from 1806 to 2023, approximately 4,159 articles have been published on prejudice. This interest in prejudice keeps growing among researchers for both theoretical and applied reasons. Because it is the nature of humans to belong to various groups, the way we think about and behave toward members of our own and other groups has important implications for our lives and the lives of others in our community (and, more generally, the world). Kurt Lewin (1948), who many regard as the “father of modern social psychology,” believed passionately that

Introduction to the Study of Stereotyping and Prejudice 23

good science and theory should have clear applications to addressing society’s problems. Because stereotyping and prejudice often have a strong, negative impact on social life, researchers are continually attempting to address these problems through research and theory. Over the last 90 years, research in stereotyping and prejudice has illuminated the content of stereotypes, improved the ways we measure stereotyping and prejudice, and investigated the individual and group-level factors that contribute to the formation and maintenance of prejudice. We have also learned much about how to conceptualize the roles of personality, emotion, cognition, and motivation in understanding the nature of stereotyping and prejudice. In the remainder of this book, you will read about the important issues, theories, and problems that have been addressed by research, and you will also learn about enduring problems that continue to challenge investigators today. This book presents the major (and some interesting minor) theories that have been proposed over the decades, and we attempt to put them into historical and empirical context, in order to discern the utility of these theories to present-­day research and “realworld” problems. An aim of this book is to present an extensive treatment of the field of stereotyping and prejudice research, highlighting the classic theories and studies, along with the most up-to-date research. Another goal we have for this book is to convey the excitement one can get at understanding prejudice, and how that understanding can be applied to address existing social problems that arise from prejudice. One of the goals of our teaching, and for this book, is to show the student how fascinating social psychology is. When we were undergrads in college (a long time ago!), we were intrigued and interested in the ways researchers in psychology addressed the complexity of social life. Today, we are continually excited by a myriad of research domains within our profession, and we hope you too will find that excitement as you read this book.

GLOSSARY Appraisal—­A set of cognitions that are attached to a specific emotion. Attitude—a general evaluation of some object. This evaluation usually falls along a good–bad or favorable–­unfavorable dimension. Basic Category—categories into which people are grouped rather automatically upon perception. These categories are race, gender, and age. Cultural Stereotype—consensually or widely shared beliefs about a group. Discrimination—negative behavior toward someone based on one’s membership in a group. Individual Stereotype—the beliefs held by an individual about the characteristics of a group. Ingroup—any group with which one affiliates oneself. Any group to which one belongs. Minimal Group—groups formed on arbitrary or random criteria (e.g., random assignment).

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Motivation—the impetus to do some behavior (or avoid doing some behavior) and to keep doing it, in order to meet one’s goals. Outgroup—any group with which one does not affiliate oneself. Any group to which one does not belong. Prejudice—a biased evaluation of a group, based on real or imagined characteristics of the group members. Realistic Conflict Theory—states that prejudice and stereotyping arise from the competition between groups for scarce, valued resources. Schema—a hierarchically organized, cognitive structure that represents knowledge about a concept or type of stimulus, and its attributes and the relations between those attributes. Stereotype—a set of beliefs about the personal attributes of a group of people. Subtyping—process whereby a new category is created to accommodate stereotype-­ inconsistent members of a group about which one holds negative stereotypes.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. Why do humans form groups? What are the ways that human versus animal groups are different in function or origin? 2. Is it possible for humans to form groups and not categorize other groups of humans? If so, how can societies eliminate the tendency to categorize and generalize other groups? 3. How are cultural stereotypes maintained and transmitted to members of the culture? 4. Do you believe that prejudice is primarily an affect or cognition-­based concept (or both)? Why? 5. How are stereotyping and prejudice linked? Is it possible to be prejudiced toward another group and not have stereotypes about that group (or vice versa)? 6. What is it about the early childhood environment of the “authoritarian personality” adult that would lead that individual to develop prejudice toward others? 7. Why do you suppose that a strong motive like the motivation for consistency (e.g., as the basis for cognitive dissonance theory) is routinely violated by those who are prejudiced toward other groups? Are prejudiced people behaving inconsistently? If not, how are they avoiding dissonance?

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Introduction to the Study of Stereotyping and Prejudice 25 and scope. In D. Albarracin, B. T. Johnson, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), The handbook of attitudes (pp. 3–19). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Allport, G. W. (1935). Attitudes. In C. Murchison (Ed.), A handbook of social psychology (pp. 798– 844). Worcester, MA: Clark University Press. Allport, G. W. (1954). The nature of prejudice. Reading, MA: Addison-­Wesley. Altemeyer, B. (1996). The authoritarian specter. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Ashmore, R. D., & Del Boca, F. K. (1979). Sex stereotypes and implicit personality theory: Toward a cognitive-­social psychological conceptualization. Sex Roles, 5, 219–248. Ashmore, R. D., & Del Boca, F. K. (1981). Conceptual approaches to stereotypes and stereotyping. In D. L. Hamilton (Ed.), Cognitive processes in stereotyping and intergroup behavior (pp. 1–35). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Bamberg, K., & Verkuyten, M. (2022). Internal and external motivation to respond without prejudice: A person-­centered approach. The Journal of Social Psychology, 162(4), 435–454. Banaji, M. R., & Heiphetz, L. (2010). Attitudes. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (5th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 353–393). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Bargh, J. A. (1999). The cognitive monster: The case against the controllability of automatic stereotype effects. In S. Chaiken & Y. Trope (Eds.), Dual-­process theories in social psychology (pp. 361– 382). New York: Guilford Press. Berkowitz, L. (1989). Frustration–­aggression hypothesis: Examination and reformulation. Psychological Bulletin, 106, 59–73. Blair, I. (2002). The malleability of automatic stereotypes and prejudice. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 6(3), 242–261. Bodenhausen, G. V. (1993). Emotions, arousal and stereotypic judgments: A heuristic model of affect and stereotyping. In D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.), Affect, cognition and stereotyping: Interactive processes in group perception (pp. 13–37). New York: Academic Press. Bodenhausen, G. V., & Macrae, C. N. (1998). Stereotype activation and inhibition. In R. S. Wyer (Ed.), Advances in social cognition (Vol. 11, pp. 1–52). Mahwah, NJ: Erlbaum. Breckler, S. J. (1984). Empirical validation of affect, behavior and cognition as distinct components of attitude. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 47, 1191–1205. Brehm, S. S., Kassin, S. M., & Fein, S. (1999). Social psychology (4th ed.). Boston: Houghton, Mifflin. Brewer, M. B. (1979). In-group bias in the minimal intergroup situation: A cognitive–­motivational analysis. Psychological Bulletin, 86, 307–324. Brewer, M. B. (1988). A dual-­process model of impression formation. In T. K. Srull & R. S. Wyer (Eds.), Advances in social cognition (pp. 1–36). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Brewer, M. B. (1998). Intergroup relations. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 554–594). New York: McGraw-­Hill. Brewer, M. B., & Miller, N. (1996). Intergroup relations. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. Brigham, J. C. (1971). Ethnic stereotypes. Psychological Bulletin, 76, 15–38. Brown, R. (1965). Social psychology. New York: Free Press. Brown, R. (1995). Prejudice: Its social psychology. Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Buss, D. M. (1995). Evolutionary psychology: A new paradigm for psychological science. Psychological Inquiry, 6, 1–30. Campbell, D. T. (1967). Stereotypes and the perception of group differences. American Psychologist, 22(10), 817–829. Collins, A. M., & Loftus, E. F. (1975). A spreading-­activation theory of semantic processing. Psychological Review, 82, 407–428. Department of Justice (2009). The Matthew Shepard and James Byrd Jr. Hate Crimes Prevention Act. Retrieved from www.justice.gov/crt/matthew-­shepard-­and-james-byrd-jr-hate-­crimes-­ prevention-­act-2009-0. Devine, P. G. (1989). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their automatic and controlled components. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 56, 5–18.

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Devine, P. G. (1995). Prejudice and out-group perception. In A. Tesser (Ed.), Advanced social psychology (pp. 467–524). New York: McGraw-­Hill. Dollard, J., Miller, N. E., Doob, L. W., Mowrer, O. H., & Sears, R. R. (1939). Frustration and aggression. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Dovidio, J. F., Brigham, J. C., Johnson, B. T., & Gaertner, S. L. (1996). Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination: Another look. In C. N. Macrae, C. Stangor, & M. Hewstone (Eds.), Stereotypes and stereotyping (pp. 276–319). New York: Guilford Press. Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (Eds.). (1986). Prejudice, discrimination, and racism. San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Dovidio, J. F., & Gaertner, S. L. (2010). Intergroup bias. In S. T. Fiske, D. T. Gilbert, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (5th ed., Vol. 2, pp. 1084–1121). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley. Duckitt, J. (1992). Psychology and prejudice: A historical analysis and integrative framework. American Psychologist, 47(10), 1182–1193. Dugré, J. R., & Potvin, S. (2023). Neural bases of frustration-­aggression theory: A multi-­domain meta-­a nalysis of functional neuroimaging studies. Journal of Affective Disorders, 331, 64–76. Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1993). The psychology of attitudes. New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich. Eagly, A. H., & Chaiken, S. (1998). Attitude structure and function. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 1, pp. 269–322). New York: McGraw-­Hill. Eagly, A. H., & Diekman, A. B. (2005). What is the problem? Prejudice as an attitude-­in-­context. In J. F. Dovidio, P. Glick, & L. A. Rudman (Eds.), On the nature of prejudice: Fifty years after Allport (pp. 19–35). Malden, MA: Blackwell. Eagly, A. H., & Kauau, S. J. (2002). Role congruity theory of prejudice toward female leaders. Psychological Review, 109(3), 573–598. Eidelson, R. J., & Eidelson, J. L. (2003). Dangerous ideas: Five beliefs that propel groups toward conflict. American Psychologist, 58(3), 182–192. Elms, A. C. (1975). The crisis of confidence in social psychology. American Psychologist, 30(10), 967–976. Esses, V. M., Haddock, G., & Zanna, M. P. (1993). Values, stereotypes, and emotions as determinants of intergroup attitudes. In D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.), Affect, cognition, and stereotyping: Interactive processes in group perception (pp. 137–166). New York: Academic Press. Fazio, R. H., & Olson, M. A. (2003). Implicit measures in social cognition research: Their meaning and uses. Annual Review of Psychology, 54, 297–327. Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Palo Alto, CA: Stanford University Press. Fishbein, M., & Ajzen, I. (1975). Belief, attitude, intention, and behavior: An introduction to theory and research. Reading, MA: Addison-­Wesley. Fishman, J. A. (1956). An examination of the process and function of social stereotyping. Journal of Social Psychology, 43, 26–64. Fiske, S. T. (1998). Stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination. In D. T. Gilbert, S. T. Fiske, & G. Lindzey (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (4th ed., Vol. 2, pp.  357–411). New York: McGraw-­Hill. Fiske, S. T. (2002). What we know about bias and intergroup conflict, the problem of the century. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 11(4), 123–128. Fiske, S. T., & Durante, F. (2016). Stereotype content across cultures: Variations on a few themes. In M. J. Gelfand, C. Chiu, & Y. Hong (Eds.), Handbook of advances in culture and psychology (pp. 209–258). New York: Oxford University Press. Fiske, S. T., & Neuberg, S. L. (1990). A continuum of impression formation, from category- based to individuating processes: Influences of information and motivation on attention and interpretation. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 23, pp.  1–74). New York: Academic Press.

Introduction to the Study of Stereotyping and Prejudice 27 Fiske, S. T., & Ruscher, J. B. (1993). Negative interdependence and prejudice: Whence the affect? In Mackie, D. M., & Hamilton, D. L. (Eds.), Affect, cognition, and stereotyping: Interactive processes in group perception. (pp. 239–268). San Diego, CA: Academic Press. Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (1991). Social cognition (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-­Hill. Fiske, S. T., & Taylor, S. E. (2017). Social cognition: From brains to culture (3rd ed.). Thousand Oaks, CA: SAGE. Forsyth, D. R. (1999). Group dynamics (3rd ed.). Belmont, CA: Wadsworth. Franklin, J., & Hernandez, J. (2023, February 15). The Buffalo tops shooter has been sentenced to life in prison without parole [National Public Radio]. www.npr.org/2023/02/15/1156996712/ buffalo-­tops-­shooting-­new-york-­sentencing. Frijda, N. H. (1988). The laws of emotion. American Psychologist, 43, 349–358. Gardner, H. (1985). The mind’s new science: A history of the cognitive revolution. New York: Basic Books. Gardner, R. C. (1994). Stereotypes as consensual beliefs. In M. P. Zanna & J. M. Olson (Eds.), The psychology of prejudice: The Ontario symposium (Vol. 7, pp. 1–31). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Geen, R. (1995). Human motivation: A social-­psychological approach. Pacific Grove, CA: Brooks/Cole. Green, D. P., Glaser, J., & Rich, A. (1998). From lynching to gay bashing: The elusive connection between economic conditions and hate crime. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75, 82–92. Gollwitzer, P. M., & Moskowitz, G. B. (1996). Goal effects on action and cognition. In E. T. Higgins & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of principles (pp. 361–399). New York: Guilford Press. Hamilton, D. L., & Sherman, S. (1994). Stereotypes. In R. S. Wyer & T. K. Srull (Eds.), Handbook of social cognition (2nd ed., Vol. 2, pp. 1–68). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Hamilton, D. L., Stroessner, S. J., & Driscoll, D. M. (1994). Social cognition and the study of stereotyping. In P. G. Devine, D. L. Hamilton, & T. M. Ostrom (Eds.), Social cognition: Impact on social psychology (pp. 291–321). New York: Academic Press. Hamilton, D. L., & Trolier, T. K. (1986). Stereotypes and stereotyping: An overview of the cognitive approach. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, and racism (pp. 127–163). New York: Academic Press. Harding, J., Proshansky, H., Kutner, B., & Chein, I. (1969). Prejudice and ethnic relations. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), The handbook of social psychology (2nd ed., Vol. 5, pp.  1–76). Reading, MA: Addison-­Wesley. Heider, F. (1958). The psychology of interpersonal relations. Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Hepworth, J. T., & West, S. G. (1988). Lynching and the economy: A time-­series reanalysis of Hovland and Sears (1940). Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55, 239–247. Hong, Y., & Ratner, K. G. (2021). Minimal but not meaningless: Seemingly arbitrary category labels can imply more than group membership. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 120(3), 576–600. Hovland, C. I., Janis, I, & Kelly, H. H. (1953). Communication and persuasion. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Hovland, C. I., & Sears, R. (1940). Minor studies in aggression: VI. Correlation of lynchings with economic indices. Journal of Psychology, 9, 301–310. Hull, C. L. (1943). Principles of behavior: An introduction to behavior theory. New York: Appleton-­ Century-­Crofts. Hwang, H. C., & Matsumoto, D. (2018). Culture and social behavior. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), Getting grounded in social psychology: The essential literature for beginning researchers (pp. 343–359). New York: Routledge. Jackson, L. A., Hodge, C. N., Gerard, D. A., Ingram, J. M., Ervin, K. S., & Sheppard, L. A. (1996). Cognition, affect, and behavior in the prediction of group attitudes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22(3), 306–316.

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Johnson, S. R. (2022, November 16). U.S. News-­Harris poll survey: As Americans aim for equity, many believe systemic racism doesn’t exist. U.S. News. Retrieved from www.usnews.com/news/ health-­news/articles/2022-11-16/poll-many-­americans-­dont-­believe-­systemic-­racism-­exists. Jones, E. E. (1985). Major developments in social psychology during the past five decades. In G. Lindzey & E. Aronson (Eds.), Handbook of social psychology (3rd ed., Vol. 1, pp. 47–107). New York: Random House. Jones, E. E., Kanouse, D., Kelley, H. H., Nisbett, R. E., Valins, S., & Weiner, B. (1972). Attribution: Perceiving the causes of behavior. Morristown, NJ: General Learning Press. Jones, J. M. (1997). Prejudice and racism. New York: McGraw-­Hill. Jones, R. A. (1982). Perceiving other people: Stereotyping as a process of social cognition. In A. Miller (Ed.), In the eye of the beholder: Contemporary issues in stereotyping (pp. 41–91). New York: Praeger. Jussim, L., Crawford, J. T., Anglin, S. M., Chambers, J. R., Stevens, S. T., & Cohen, F. (2016). Stereotype accuracy: One of the largest and most replicable effects in all of social psychology. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination (2nd ed., pp. 31–63). New York: Psychology Press. Kahneman, D. (2011). Thinking, fast and slow. Farrar, Straus and Giroux. Katz, D., & Braly, K. (1933). Racial stereotypes in one hundred college students. Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology, 28, 280–290. Kawakami, K., Hugenberg, K., & Dunham, Y. (2021). Perceiving others as group members: Basic principles of social categorization processes. In P. Van Lange, E. T. Higgins, & A. W. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of basic principles (3rd ed., pp. 411–429). New York: Guilford Press. Kruglanski, A. W. (1996). Motivated social cognition: Principles of the interface. In E. T. Higgins & A. Kruglanski (Eds.), Social psychology: Handbook of principles (pp.  493–520). New York: Guilford Press. Kuhn, T. S. (1970). The structure of scientific revolutions (2nd ed.). Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Kunda, Z. (1999). Social cognition. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Kunda, Z., & Sinclair, L. (1999). Motivated reasoning with stereotypes: Activation, application, and inhibition. Psychological Inquiry, 10, 12–22. LaPiere, R. T. (1934). Attitudes vs. actions. Social Forces, 13, 230–237. Lewin, K. (1948). Resolving social conflicts. New York: Harper & Row. Lippmann, W. (1922). Public opinion. New York: Harcourt, Brace Jovanovich. Mackie, D. M., & Hamilton, D. L. (Eds.). (1993). Affect, cognition, and stereotyping: Interactive processes in group perception. New York: Academic Press. Mackie, D. M., Maitner, A. T., & Smith, E. (2016). Intergroup emotions theory. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (2nd ed., pp. 149–174). New York: Psychology Press. Macrae, C. N., Bodenhausen, G. V., & Milne, A. B. (1995). The dissection of selection in person perception: Inhibitory processes in social stereotyping. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 397–407. McConahay, J. B. (1986). Modern racism, ambivalence, and the Modern Racism Scale. In J. F. Dovidio & S. L. Gaertner (Eds.), Prejudice, discrimination, and racism (pp. 91–125). New York: Academic Press. Miller, G. A. (1956). The magical number seven, plus or minus two: Some limits on our capacity for processing information. Psychological Review, 63(2), 81–97. Miller, N. E., & Dollard, J. (1941). Social learning and imitation. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Morales, M., Tucker, E., & Sanchez, R. (2022, December 9). Buffalo grocery store mass shooter willing to plead guilty to federal charges if death penalty off the table, attorneys say. CNN.

Introduction to the Study of Stereotyping and Prejudice 29 Retrieved from www.cnn.com/2022/12/09/us/buffalo-­tops-­g rocery-­shooting-­payton-­gendron-­plea/ index.html. Moskowitz, G. B. (2010). On the control over stereotype activation and stereotype inhibition. Social and Personality Psychology Compass, 4(2), 140–158. Nelson, L. J., & Wischusen, J. (1999, June). Mortality salience and intergroup bias: Nationalism versus racism. Which worldview is defended in a situation of multiple group identities? Poster presented at the annual meeting of the American Psychological Society, Denver, CO. Neuberg, S. L., Smith, D. M., & Asher, T. (2000). Why people stigmatize: Toward a biocultural framework. In T. F. Heatherton, R. E. Kleck, M. R. Hebl, & J. G. Hull (Eds.), The social psychology of stigma (pp. 31–61). New York: Guilford Press. Nisbett, R. E., & Ross, L. (1980). Human inference: Strategies and shortcomings of social judgment. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-­Hall. Oatley, K. (1993). Social construction in emotions. In M. Lewis & J. M. Haviland (Eds.), Handbook of emotions (pp. 341–352). New York: Guilford Press. Olson, M. A. (2016). Measures of prejudice. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination (2nd ed., pp. 175–211). New York: Psychology Press. Pendry, L. F., & Macrae, C. N. (1994). Stereotypes and mental life: The case of the motivated but thwarted tactician. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 30(4), 303–325. Perdue, C. W., Dovidio, J. F., Gurtman, M. B., & Tyler, R. B. (1990). “Us” and “them”: Social categorization and the process of intergroup bias. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 59, 475–486. Pettigrew, T. F. (2008). Still a long way to go: American Black-White relations today. In G. Adams, M. Biernat, N. R. Branscombe, C. S. Crandall, & L. S. Wrightsman (Eds.), Commemorating Brown: The social psychology of racism and discrimination (pp. 45–61). Washington, DC: American Psychological Association. Pettigrew, T. F., & Meertens, R. W. (1995). Subtle and blatant prejudice in Western Europe. European Journal of Social Psychology, 25, 57–75. Plous, S. (1993). The psychology of judgment and decision making. New York: McGraw-­Hill. Plous, S. (2003). Understanding prejudice and discrimination. New York: McGraw-­Hill. Reik, B. M., Mania, E. W., & Gaertner, S. L. (2013). Reverse subtyping: Effects of prejudice level on the subtyping of counterstereotypic outgroup members. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 35, 409–417. Rothbart, M., & Lewis, S. (1994). Cognitive processes and intergroup relations: A historical perspective. In P. G. Devine, D. L. Hamilton, & T. M. Ostrom (Eds.), Social cognition: Impact on social psychology (pp. 347–382). New York: Academic Press. Ruscher, J. B., Fiske, S. T., & Schnake, S. B. (2000). The motivated tactician’s juggling act: Compatible vs. incompatible impression goals. British Journal of Social Psychology, 39(2), 241–256. Sales, S. M. (1973). Threat as a factor in authoritarianism: An analysis of archival data. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 28, 44–57. Schneider, D. J. (2004). The psychology of stereotyping. New York: Guilford Press. Sherif, M., Harvey, O. J., White, B. J., Hood, W. R., & Sherif, C. W. (1961). Intergroup conflict and cooperation: The robber’s cave experiment. Norman: University of Oklahoma, Institute of Group Relations. Simonton, D. K. (1990). Personality and politics. In L. A. Pervin (Ed.), Handbook of personality: Theory and research (pp. 670–692). New York: Guilford Press. Skinner, B. F. (1953). Science and human behavior. New York: Macmillan. Smith, C. A., & Ellsworth, P. C. (1987). Patterns of appraisal and emotion related to taking an exam. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 52(3), 475–488. Smith, E. (1990). Content and process specificity in the effects of prior experiences. In T. K. Srull & R. S. Wyer (Eds.), Advances in social cognition (pp. 1–59). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Smith, E. (1993). Social identity and social emotions: Toward new conceptualizations of prejudice.

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In D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.), Affect, cognition, and stereotyping: Interactive processes in group perception (pp. 297–315). New York: Academic Press. Spears, R., Oakes, P. J., Ellemers, N., & Haslam, S. A. (1997). Introduction: The social psychology of stereotyping and group life. In R. Spears, P. J. Oakes, N. Ellemers, & S. A. Haslam (Eds.), The social psychology of stereotyping and group life (pp. 1–19). Cambridge, MA: Blackwell. Stangor, C. (2016). The study of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination within social psychology: A quick history of theory and research. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (pp. 3–30). New York: Psychology Press. Stangor, C., & Schaller, M. (1996). Stereotypes as individual and collective representations. In C. N. Macrae, C. Stangor, & M. Hewstone (Eds.), Stereotypes and stereotyping (pp. 3–37). New York: Guilford Press. Stangor, C., Sullivan, L. A., & Ford, T. E. (1991). Affective and cognitive determinants of prejudice. Social Cognition, 9(4), 359–380. Stanovich, K. E. (2021). Why humans are cognitive misers and what it means for the Great Rationality Debate. In R. Viale (Ed.), Routledge handbook of bounded rationality. (pp. 196–206). Routledge/Taylor & Francis Group. Stapel, D. A., & Koomen, W. (1998). When stereotype activation results in (counter)stereotypical judgments: Priming stereotype-­relevant traits and exemplars. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 34, 136–163. Stephan, W. G., & Rosenfield, D. (1982). Racial and ethnic stereotypes. In A. Miller (Ed.), In the eye of the beholder: Contemporary issues in stereotyping (pp. 92–136). New York: Praeger. Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (1993). Cognition and affect in stereotyping: Parallel interactive networks. In D. M. Mackie & D. L. Hamilton (Eds.), Affect, cognition, and stereotyping (pp. 111–136). New York: Academic Press. Stroebe, W., & Insko, C. A. (1989). Stereotype, prejudice, and discrimination: Changing conceptions in theory and research. In D. Bar-Tal, C. F. Graumann, A. W. Kruglanski, & W. Stroebe (Eds.), Stereotyping and prejudice: Changing conceptions (pp. 3–34). New York: Springer-­Verlag. Stroessner, S. J., & Scholer, A. A. (2008). Making things better and worse: Multiple motives in stereotyping and prejudice. In J. Y. Shah & W. L. Gardner (Eds.), Handbook of motivation science (pp. 576–590). New York: Guilford Press. Tajfel, H. (1969). Cognitive aspects of prejudice. Journal of Social Issues, 25(4), 79–97. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. Austin & S. Worschel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/ Cole. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worschel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), Psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson-­Hall. Tapias, M. P., Glaser, J., Keltner, D., Vasquez, K., & Wickens, T. (2007). Emotion and prejudice: Specific emotions toward outgroups. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 10, 27–39. Taylor, S. E. (1981). A categorization approach to stereotyping. In D. L. Hamilton (Ed.), Cognitive processes in stereotyping and intergroup behavior (pp. 88–114). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Taylor, S. E., & Crocker, J. (1981). Schematic bases of social information-­processing. In E. T. Higgins, C. P. Herman, & M. P. Zanna (Eds.), Social cognition: The Ontario symposium (Vol. 1, pp. 89–134). Hillsdale, NJ: Erlbaum. Thorndike, E. L. (1911). Animal intelligence: Experimental studies. New York: Macmillan. Triandis, H. C. (1994). Culture and social behavior. New York: McGraw-­Hill. Turner, J. C. (1987). Rediscovering the social group: A self-­categorization theory. Oxford, UK: Blackwell. Tversky, A., & Kahneman, D. (1974). Judgment under uncertainty: Heuristics and biases. Science, 185(4157), 1124–1131. Vinacke, W. E. (1957). Stereotypes as social concepts. Journal of Social Psychology, 46, 229–243. Von Neumann, J. (1958). The computer and the brain. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

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CHAPTER 2

Origin and Maintenance of Stereotypes and Prejudice

I

n the introduction, we discussed the various ways researchers have defined the concepts “stereotype” and “prejudice.” In this chapter, we explore in greater detail the nature of stereotyping and prejudice, and in particular, we focus on how each begins and what factors facilitate their maintenance in our culture, in our memories, and in our daily social interactions. Questions about the origin and maintenance of stereotyping and prejudice have generated perhaps the most empirical and theoretical work among researchers, and there is a clear reason for this disproportionate focus on the origin issue (and the length of this chapter)—that is, if we can understand how stereotypes and prejudice originate and are maintained, we will be in a much better position to discover effective ways to reduce or even try to eliminate their often harmful effects. This is a specifically applied focus, in the tradition of some of the best research in social psychology. Indeed, the individual who most social psychologists regard as the “father of modern social psychology”—Kurt Lewin (1951)—suggested that social science, and psychology in particular, ought to have a strong applied focus with the aim of addressing social problems and informing social policy and legislation toward the goal of improving the welfare of humanity. We now turn to an in-depth examination of the fruits of this research over the last 100 years, to begin to understand the origin of stereotyping and prejudice.

THE FORMATION OF SOCIAL CATEGORIES Categorization As you will recall from our discussion of the history of research on stereotyping in Chapter 1, the way researchers and indeed society regarded stereotypes has changed dramatically over the decades. Specifically, stereotyping was once thought to be a sign of the moral deficiency of the stereotyper, or even as an indicator of repressed unconscious hostility or a “fragile ego” (Allport, 1954). However, developments in cognitive psychology in the 32

Origin and Maintenance of Stereotypes and Prejudice 33

1950s and 1960s led to some changes in our understanding of how the mind perceives and processes information. In short, cognitive psychologists found that the human mind seems to almost automatically classify or categorize similar objects in the environment (Gardner, 1985). This tendency is pervasive and is present early in life (Ramsey, Langlois, Hoss, Rubenstein, & Griffin, 2004). Indeed, infants as young as 3 months can categorize sounds (Ferry, Hespos, & Waxman, 2010) and determine the gender of a speaker (Levy & Haaf, 1994). By age 6, girls are less likely to think that someone who is “really, really smart” is a girl (Bian, Leslie, & Cimpian, 2017). At about the same age, White children show automatic prejudice against Black individuals on par with adults (Baron & Banaji, 2006). Such evidence of very early categorization and internalization of stereotypes led researchers to change their conceptualization of the nature of stereotyping. Stereotypes were no longer regarded as the product of “lazy” thinking by the uneducated or those with “moral deficiencies.” Instead, most researchers have taken Allport’s lead and now regard prejudice and stereotypes as at least partly a natural consequence of cognition (Nelson, 2016). Let us turn now to a more in-depth consideration of the reasons we categorize people and the influence of categorization on person perception.

Why We Categorize At this point you may be wondering, “Why do we categorize at all? Why can’t we just treat people as individuals?” The reason is that humans have a limited-­capacity cognitive system that cannot simultaneously process all of the available information in our social environment. Because we have a need to understand and even anticipate the behavior of others, humans have developed ways around our limited cognitive system. One of the best ways is categorization. We categorize people (and objects, ideas, etc.) on the basis of shared features, or even shared time and space (Gillespie, Shropshire & Johnson, 2023). Based on Aristotle’s principle of association, we assume that things that are similar on the basis of one feature (or occur together) will likely have other notable similarities on a number of dimensions (Lundin, 1979). In other words, we are motivated to understand people, and categorizing them can serve this goal when we can’t get to know them as individuals. Consider the category of “blonde-­haired people.” In the United States, there are a number of assumptions about blonde-­haired people, and these assumptions suggest that one’s hair color leads to some similarity in behavior, personality, or attitudes among the category members—­t hat is, once we know that someone is blonde, we believe we can infer other information about them—for example, that “Blondes have more fun.” This assumes that people with this similar feature are either (1) fun people; (2) tend to attract fun people; or (3) are more likely to be involved in fun activities, or any combination of the three. But, why would we categorize people on the basis of their hair color? It doesn’t seem to be a useful way of categorizing people. We might just as well categorize people on the basis of the length of their right thumbnail. The basis for categorizing people can be informative (e.g., according to their support of a particular political candidate, we would assume these category members share other attitudes on social and political issues) or can be uninformative (as in the case of categorizing people according to their thumbnails). As we see throughout this text, far from being geared toward perfect rationality and accuracy, human cognition is often geared toward “good enough” (i.e., “satisficing”; Kahneman, 2011; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). We may want to get

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to know someone, but may lack the time or opportunity, leaving us with a relatively limited impression based largely on their social identities. Or perhaps we’re disinterested in getting to know them, or even motivated not to get to know them. In the social perception process, there are many factors that influence the way we perceive and evaluate other people. Although it’s likely that we categorize most people we perceive most of the time, this isn’t always the case (Bargh, 1989). Specifically, upon perceiving more abstract category labels (e.g., Hispanic, woman, accountant), stereotypes for that category are often automatically activated. Yet when seeing a member of one of these groups, we do not always think of all of the stereotypes for the groups (racial, gender, age, and so on) to which the person belongs (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, & Castelli, 1997). Macrae and his colleagues suggest that the way the person categorizes an individual depends on the perceiver’s motives, cognitions, and affect. For example, if you’re buying ice cream at 2:00 A.M. and someone happens to be standing in the way of the ice cream cooler, you may see the individual only as an obstruction, not a person of a race, gender, and so on. Nevertheless, psychologists generally agree that categorizing people is more often the rule than the exception. We turn now to a discussion of how categorization influences our perception of social information.

Types of Categorization When we perceive an individual, we tend to automatically classify that person along a few categories: race, gender, and age (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). These are the major ways we first categorize someone partly because these are the most immediate and obvious features of an individual, and because these categories yield information about useful distinctions in social behavior between those in different groups. These categories—­often referred to as “primitive” or “privileged” categories—­have been accorded special status by researchers because they have strong influences on how the perceiver interprets other information about the perceived individual (Fiske, Lin, & Neuberg, 1999; Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). This process occurs so quickly that with repeated use, the categorization of an individual can become virtually automatic and nonconscious (Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Gilbert, 1989). Primitive categories are used so often in perceiving people that they are central points around which stereotypes develop. Some research has suggested that merely being exposed to the face of a White or Black person (Banaji & Greenwald, 1994; Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, & Williams, 1995), or words associated with a gender group (e.g., “nurse,” “mechanic,” “Black,” “White”; Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Dovidio, Evans, & Tyler, 1986), for example, can instantaneously (i.e., within milliseconds) evoke the associated cognitions, beliefs, and feelings one has for that group. This research implies that any attempts to ignore social categories and be “colorblind,” however well intended, are likely futile. Why do race, gender, and age attract such attention and have such an influence on impressions? Although speculative, evolutionary psychology provides some possible reasons (Cosmides, Tooby, & Kurzban, 2003). Throughout human history, survival and reproduction were paramount concerns, and disease, starvation, and violence posed persistent threats. To the extent that early humans evolved the capacity to tell—from some distance—­whether an approaching human posed a threat, they would have had more time to respond to it. Regarding age, a young child would be unlikely to pose a serious

Origin and Maintenance of Stereotypes and Prejudice 35

threat, but an adult might. Regarding gender, men have, throughout history, been the primary originators of violence. Regarding race, things get a little more complicated. Given the relatively late development of what we refer to today as race, it is unlikely that early humans had any conceptualization of it. However, they did have concepts of family and tribe, and anyone who “looked different” was more likely to be foe than friend; any evolved predisposition to identify such a person would have survival benefits, not only to avoid (or have the upper hand) in conflict but also to avoid contagious disease to which one’s group may lack immunity (Neuberg & Schaller, 2016). Thus, although it cannot be said that “racism is part of human nature,” a suspicion of those who appear different from one’s own groups likely is. This may partly explain why infants as young as 3 months old, who have little to no experience with social groups beyond their own caregivers, prefer to gaze at faces of their own race (Liu et al., 2015). Of course, most of us have more stereotypes than those based solely on race, gender, and age, so there is more to the story than what evolutionary theory has to offer. Moreover, people also often develop stereotypes at the intersection of these primitive categories. For example, your stereotype of young men is probably different from your stereotype of older men, just as your stereotype of White women is probably different from that of Black women. Only relatively recently have researchers begun studying the development of intersectional stereotypes, which incorporate more than one basis of categorization, often regarding lower-­status and marginalized identities (Crenshaw, 2017; Kang & Bodenhausen, 2015). Some work suggests that one basic category (e.g., race) can influence how people process information about another category (e.g., gender). For example, starting at around age 5, seeing that someone is Black makes people less likely to categorize them as a woman (e.g., in a speeded categorization task, both children and adults are quicker to identify a Black individual as a man than as a woman, and are more likely to miscategorize a Black woman as a Black man; Lei, Leshin, & Rhodes, 2020). From this work it appears that racial stereotypes influence gender perception. Other work suggests that stereotypes of basic categories alone (based only on race, gender, and age) are often sufficient to explain the different stereotypes people have and how they treat people based on these intersecting identities (Hester, Payne, Brown-­Iannuzzi, & Gray, 2020).

How Children Learn Social Categories Developmental psychologists have illuminated the active role children take in learning about their social worlds (Killen & Smetana, 2015). According to Bigler and Liben (2007), children’s social categories develop in three stages, each of which involves active attention and learning. First, children readily notice obvious physical differences between people, including skin tone, body shape and size, and group size (i.e., rare groups tend to stand out). Whether or not they hear about it from parents or teachers, they notice that nearly all of their teachers are women, and nearly all of the U.S. presidents are White men. As we’ve described, there may be an evolved, genetic basis for people to attend to the primitive categories of race, gender, and age. Probably not coincidentally, children’s sensory systems are remarkably adept at detecting a person’s race, gender, and approximate age, starting as early as 3 months (e.g., Levy & Haaf, 1994). Second, as a part of natural category learning, children begin to group individuals according to these characteristics—­that is, they start developing social categories.

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Third, after noticing differences between people and lumping them into social categories, children start to attend to any differences they observe between them (or learn what others tell them about the categories), and hence start to develop stereotypes and prejudices. Later in the chapter we discuss in more detail the roles of parents, peers, media, and other socialization processes in the development of prejudice. The point we wish to emphasize for now is that starting at a very young age, children attend to and reason about difference between social groups whether or not the adults in their lives ever broach these topics. One interesting theory suggests that children develop social categories when society emphasizes group differences, numeric differences between groups, and presents the importance of group membership. As such, society has greater control over the activation of these prejudices than previously believed (Bigler & Liben, 2006, 2007). Children notice when adults make distinctions between groups (e.g., when a teacher separates students by gender or academic performance). When adults make functional use of social categories, often so will children. For example, in one study teachers separated their elementary school students into two groups, with one group donning yellow shirts and the other group donning blue shirts (Bigler, Jones, & Lobliner, 1997). In some conditions of the study, that’s all teachers did: They essentially ignored the shirt colors and conducted class as usual. In other conditions, teachers made functional use of the categories: The yellow group might work on some assignment while the blue group worked on another. Only when teachers made this functional distinction did children start to categorize their classmates as “yellow shirts” and “blue shirts.” There’s an additional “essential” thing that children readily learn about the nature of social categories. Very young children often have amusing ideas about how people become members of primitive social categories: They may believe that a careful application of paint or dye could change their race, or that playing with certain toys might change their gender (Slaby & Frey, 1975). Eventually, they begin to develop category constancy, which is the idea that people are generally stuck with their race and gender. Such essentialist thinking can develop based on subtle differences in the ways adults around them speak about social groups. For example, in one study, 4-year-old children who were read books that discussed individuals from a fictitious group in generic terms (e.g., “Zarpies are scared of ladybugs”) were more likely to develop essentialist notions of the group compared to children who were read a book with more specific language (e.g., “This Zarpie is scared of ladybugs”; Rhodes, Leslie, & Tworek, 2012). Once they develop category constancy, children generally start to think that there is something deep and meaningful about many of the social categories they’ve learned, that there is some inner “essence” to being a boy or a girl, or a Black or a White person (Pauker, Ambady, & Apfelbaum, 2010). The notion of racial group constancy develops around age 6, and after it does, the acquisition of prejudices and stereotypes about race accelerate (Rutland, Cameron, Bennett, & Ferrell, 2005). Troublingly, when younger children observe differences between groups (e.g., different class performance between Black and White students), their default attributional tendency is to explain those differences in terms of essential difference between the groups (e.g., that “Black kids are just naturally not as good at school”), and not in terms of how those groups are treated (Hussak & Cimpian, 2015). In fact, both children and adults tend to err on the side of explaining people’s outcomes in

Origin and Maintenance of Stereotypes and Prejudice 37

terms of their inner traits instead of their social contexts, a judgmental bias that social psychologists call the fundamental attribution error (Ross, 2018). Interestingly, this process of making meaningful distinctions based on race does not happen similarly for minority groups and majority groups. White majority-­g roup children in the United States, for example, tend to learn about the social category “Black” before “White.” In a sense, their Whiteness is “invisible.” This is less true for minority-­ group children, who tend to learn about both majority and minority social categories as they develop (Pauker et al., 2010). Later we discuss the implications of majority and minority status for the development of prejudices. However, there is one critical distinction that all children (and adults) make, with vast implications for prejudice, and that is between who is “us” and who is “them.”

FROM SOCIAL CATEGORIES TO INGROUP FAVORITISM Ingroups and Outgroups People tend to form groups for a variety of reasons and motivations, to satisfy a variety of purposes, and these groups are formed on the basis of a virtually limitless array of membership criteria. One of the most basic ways we partition people in our social environment is into ingroups (groups to which we believe we belong) and outgroups (groups to which we believe we do not belong; Allport, 1954). One’s ingroups can be quite numerous. For example, ingroups for Todd would include males; males in California; professors; psychology professors; male professors; 56-year-olds; people of Norwegian descent; people who grew up in Minneapolis, Minnesota; and so on. How you partition people in these groups depends on your current motives, fears, goals, and expectations (Allport, 1954). When at work, the most salient ingroup for Todd (and Michael) may be fellow professors. When at a concert, the most salient ingroup may be fellow concert attendees. This has implications for information processing about a given individual in a particular environment. At the concert, we may be most cognizant of being a member of the group “concert audience,” and the concert environment provides certain expectations for how we perceive the behavior of ingroup concert-­goers. For example, at the concert, jumping up and down is seen as normative behavior. As such, an individual performing this behavior likely wouldn’t grab attention, and thus would not be very memorable. However, at the workplace, seeing a colleague jump up and down would be very unusual, it would capture attention, and we would remember that incident (and that strange professor!). Indeed, research by Taylor and her colleagues (Taylor, 1981; Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978) demonstrated the effect of one’s salient groups on perception and memory for social information. These researchers found that when participants were exposed to a discussion group of Black and White individuals, participants were more accurate at recalling the race of the person who made a particular comment, but were less accurate at specifying the particular individual who said the statement. Thus, when ingroups and outgroups are salient, it appears that people tend to perceive and remember information in terms of social categories, and not in terms of individuals (Crawford, Sherman, & Hamilton, 2002). Dividing people into groups to which we either belong or do not belong has a number of implications for how we think about a given individual. Individuals who are part

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of an outgroup are perceived to share similar characteristics, motives, and other features. However, when it comes to our own ingroups, we like to think that our groups comprise unique individuals who happen to share one (or two) common features (e.g., one’s occupation). Thus, we think that the outgroup members are “all alike,” while our ingroup members are all different and nuanced. The tendency to think in these terms has been referred to as outgroup homogeneity (Hamilton, 1976; Ostrom & Sedikides, 1992). Perceiving outgroups as all alike, and our ingroups as diverse, helps us satisfy two major goals. First, we greatly simplify our social environment by categorizing others in that way. Second, we enhance our self-­concept by thinking that we do not belong to a homogeneous, cookie-­c utter type of group by attributing great individuality to our ingroup members (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986). In addition to outgroup homogeneity, individuals tend to ascribe a host of positive attributes to ingroup members (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986), a tendency referred to as ingroup bias (or ingroup favoritism; Buttelmann & Bohm, 2014). One question among researchers historically has been whether ingroup favoritism necessarily leads to outgroup negativity. The reasoning used to be that thinking favorably about one’s group meant, in part, that one was motivated to distinguish one’s group favorably relative to other groups, and this provided the basis for not merely outgroup homogeneity but also outgroup derogation (Devine, 1995). In other words, in favoring our ingroups, we also tend to put down or attribute negative characteristics to outgroups. However, research has shown that the assumption that we necessarily derogate outgroups based on ingroup favoritism is not always supported (Brewer, 1979, 1999; Perdue, Dovidio, Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990; Quattrone & Jones, 1980)—that is, contrary to what used to be a prevailing assumption in the prejudice literature, later research indicates that just because we may favor our ingroups, it does not mean that we also must inevitably dislike outgroups. One factor that may mediate the need or motivation to derogate an outgroup is whether one’s ingroup is in the majority or minority. Data from Moscatelli, Hewstone, and Rubini (2017) indicated that while majority members engaged in ingroup favoritism, they didn’t show outgroup derogation. However, minority-­g roup members engaged in both ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation (an interesting dynamic we return to later in the chapter). What else might lead to outgroup derogation stemming from ingroup favoritism? One study suggests that those who are more religious may be more likely to engage in outgroup derogation (Johnson, Rowatt, & LeBouff, 2012). This is consistent with other research that shows that the more orthodox one is in one’s religion, the less tolerant the person is of others who are different (see Chapter 5 for further discussion of religion). In another study, researchers examined the facilitative/inhibitory impact of trait descriptors of one’s ingroups versus outgroups (Perdue et al., 1990, experiment 3). Participants’ reaction times to positive person descriptors (e.g., “friendly”) were faster when preceded by a prime word that denoted one’s ingroup (i.e., words like “us,” “we,” and “our”). Their reaction times were slower to negative person descriptors when preceded by those ingroup primes. These findings indicate that ingroup words automatically activate primarily positive concepts, as evidenced by facilitated categorization to later positive traits while inhibiting categorization to later negative traits. When participants were presented with outgroup prime words (i.e., “they” “them”), their reaction times to negative person descriptors was not facilitated. So, thinking about outgroups does not necessarily lead one to be prone to readily process and accept negative information about

Origin and Maintenance of Stereotypes and Prejudice 39

that outgroup (Brewer, 2017). On the other hand, it should be noted that the more an outgroup is seen as homogeneous, the greater the likelihood for perceivers to use group or stereotype labels to process information about the outgroup (and its members). This thinking can then lead to outgroup derogation and discrimination (Miller & Brewer, 1986). Exposure to members of a stereotyped outgroup can lead to either a more homogeneous (and more stereotypical) or heterogeneous (and more positive) view of the outgroup, depending on the valence of the exposure (i.e., negative or positive). Specifically, when the outgroup member does something bad, or has negative characteristics, one’s stereotypes of the outgroup will be reinforced, and the interaction reduces the likelihood that the perceiver will wish to interact further with the group, and the perceiver’s evaluation of the group becomes more negative (Rosenfield, Greenberg, Folger, & Borys, 1982). In one study, Henderson-­K ing (1994) examined how White men would react to a White or Black couple having an argument or a neutral conversation. Henderson-­K ing specifically wanted to find out how this reaction would affect their interaction with a subsequent White or Black confederate who asked him for directions. Results indicated that, after watching the Black couple argue, participants interacted with the Black confederate for a shorter period of time (showing avoidance behaviors). Similarly, Henderson-­K ing and Nisbett (1996) found that when White participants were exposed to a Black individual being rude to the experimenter, they were more likely to negatively stereotype Black Americans and avoid further contact with a Black individual. Interestingly, even hearing about a Black American committing a crime can lead White individuals to reinforce their stereotypes of Black Americans and to perceive them as more homogeneous (Henderson-­K ing, 1999). In contrast, positive encounters with members of a negatively stereotyped group tend to lead perceivers to (1) show more sympathetic beliefs about the group (Bodenhausen, Schwarz, Bless, & Wänke, 1995; Hayward, Tropp, Hornsey, & Barlow, 2017), (2) be open to further interactions with the outgroup (Rosenfield et al., 1982), and (3) be less affected by negative intergroup interactions in the present (Paolini et al., 2014). Such “good contact” between groups can lead to durable prejudice reduction, which we address in Chapter 12. Research has revealed an even more fundamental element of ingroup versus outgroup categorization: The dimension on which people are viewed as ingroup or outgroup members does not need to be a meaningful one (e.g., racial, political) in order for ingroup and outgroup biases to occur (Tajfel, Billig, Bundy, & Flament, 1971). In a classic series of experiments, Tajfel and his colleagues asked people to estimate how many dots were on a page. He then assigned people to groups ostensibly based on their ability to correctly estimate the number of dots (or to come as close as possible to the correct number). Unknown to the participants, their scores on the task were not recorded, and they were arbitrarily assigned to their group. They were then asked to allocate resources given to them to either a fellow group member (e.g., an “overestimator”), or a member of the other group (e.g., an “underestimator”). Results showed that participants tended to allocate more resources to their ingroup members in a manner consistent with ingroup favoritism. These results have been taken to imply that even groups that have no meaningful basis for their membership, termed minimal groups, would exhibit the same ingroup favoritism found in more meaningful ingroups (i.e., groups based on race or gender; Brewer, 1979; Otten, 2016).

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Minimal groups are called “minimal” because they have none of the usual features of group structure: a coherent group structure, interaction, a set of norms for the group members, interactions with other groups, and so on (Brown, 1995). Researchers have found that even when people are arbitrarily, but not explicitly, assigned to a group (e.g., when the experimenter flips a coin to determine group membership), they display ingroup favoritism and outgroup homogeneity (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Rabbie & Horwitz, 1969). These data are interesting in that they suggest that the basis for ingroup favoritism may be neither a perceived dispositional similarity nor mere arbitrary categorization, but the common fate of one’s group members that seems to be the catalyst for ingroup favoritism and outgroup homogeneity (Rothbart & Lewis, 1994). Specifically, being grouped together with others tends to make salient the generalized norm of preference for group members over others, and this seems to be a plausible, parsimonious explanation for the pervasive ingroup favoritism found among virtually any group (Horwitz & Rabbie, 1989)—preferring our ingroups is so ingrained that we do it even when the groups are relatively meaningless. Ingroup favoritism and outgroup negativity tends to be initiated and perpetuated by our motivation to see our groups as special, and better than other groups. Two experiments reported by Sherman, Klein, Laskey, and Wyer (1998) suggest that we rather implicitly (i.e., without our conscious awareness) remember positive information about our ingroups and negative information about outgroups. We tend to explain away or otherwise conveniently forget negative information about our ingroups and positive information about outgroups. Again, this tendency is so pervasive and well learned that it becomes automatic early in life, and perpetually influences the way we remember ingroup and outgroup relevant information. Some research suggests that after initial minimal group categorization, one’s self-­esteem becomes linked to the group. It is this association between the self and the group (Gawronski, Bodenhausen, & Becker, 2007) that strengthens our identification with the group (Roth & Steffens, 2014). Research by Boldry and Kashy (1999) indicates that outgroup homogeneity tends to be strong, but that ingroup favoritism may not be as universal as we thought. Their data suggest that group status moderates the tendency to engage in ingroup favoritism, such that high-­status groups showed ingroup favoritism only on one (of several) dimension, and low-­status groups sometimes show outgroup favoritism. Early evidence for outgroup favoritism comes from Clark and Clark’s doll studies (Clark, 1963; Clark & Clark, 1947), where Black children often preferred to play with White dolls (in Chapter 7 we discuss these studies and the phenomenon of outgroup favoritism in greater detail). Among low-­status children, sometimes no preference for one’s ingroup is observed (e.g., Setoh et al., 2019), and occasionally outgroup favoritism is observed (e.g., Newheiser, Dunham, Merrill, Hoosain, & Olson, 2014). These data are more interesting because they were collected not from artificially created groups (e.g., minimal groups) in the laboratory but from naturally existing groups. However, and despite these observations that low-­status groups sometimes fail to show ingroup favoritism, there is evidence that such individuals from low-­status groups creatively compare themselves to high-­ status groups to retain a positive ingroup evaluation. For example, they may choose non-­status-­related traits to create ingroup-­favoring comparisons with the high-­status group (e.g., “They may have more power and status, but we’re more kind and creative.”; Boldry & Gaertner, 2006). These and other findings suggest that ingroup favoritism is still generally the rule.

Origin and Maintenance of Stereotypes and Prejudice 41

THE DEVELOPMENT OF PREJUDICE AND STEREOTYPES Social Learning Once we establish social categories, we learn about them. Through direct or observational learning of the rewards and norms that one’s society (and one’s parents, or other significant others) offers for believing and behaving in certain ways, children begin to acquire attitudes and beliefs about the world. In the search for clues as to the origin of stereotypes and prejudice, much research has focused on the role that parents and other influential adults play (Clark, 1963; Katz, 1983; Pettigrew, 1958; Pirchio, et al., 2018; Rosenfield & Stephan, 1981). In preferential looking tasks (where infants are shown pairs of images and eye-­t racking devices determine what the infants prefer to look at), newborns—­whose eyesight is poor—do not show an own-race preference. However, by 3 months they do (Kelly et al., 2005), and this tendency has been shown across cultures (Kelly et al., 2007). By age 2, children prefer to play with toys associated with their own gender (Todd, Barry, & Thommessen, 2017). By age 5, they show distinct recognition of, and preferences for, some groups over others (including race and gender preferences; Goodman, 1952). Allport (1954) suggested, and later research confirmed (Miklikowska, 2016), that there is a link between the prejudiced attitudes of the parent, and the development of such attitudes in their children, although we see later that the link is complicated. Allport supported the idea that children of parents who were authoritarian (i.e., parents who expected obedience, deference, and who punished harshly) were more likely to develop prejudiced attitudes. Allport also argued that it is important to distinguish between active teaching and passive development of stereotyped attitudes and prejudice. Some parents explicitly teach their children rather directly about their attitudes and values, and specifically communicate their stereotypes and prejudices to the child. Other children develop prejudiced attitudes as a result of observation of the stereotyped attitudes and behaviors of their parents. In these instances, Allport suggests, “prejudice was not taught by the parent, but was caught by the child from an infected atmosphere” (p. 300). In a moment, we return to the influence of authoritarian parents and the taught versus caught distinction.

Childhood Intergroup Contact Some interesting research by Wood and Sonleitner (1996) suggests that childhood interracial contact is a good predictor of adult stereotyping and prejudice. The authors had White adults indicate whether, when they were growing up, they (1) lived in a neighborhood in which Black individuals also lived, (2) belonged to any clubs or churches in which Black individuals were also members, and (3) ever attended a school where Black students also attended. They found that people who had more interracial contact were significantly less prejudiced than those who were rather isolated from Black individuals when they were children. While these results are interesting, they raise important questions. At what age does interracial contact start to matter? And does the nature of the contact matter? Does casual and fleeting contact have any impact on prejudice reduction, or must that contact be close and personal? There’s also the concern of memory biases: Did adults misremember their past experiences based on their current attitudes? Some researchers have addressed a few of these questions. For example, Bar-Haim, Ziv, Lamy, and Hodes (2006) examined the same- and other-race looking preferences

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of 3-month-olds as a function of their social environments. Whether Black or White, infants in homogeneous environments (where most of the people they encountered were of their own race) preferred to look at same-race photos. However, infants in more heterogeneous racial environments did not show a preference for one race or another in their looking behavior. Other work suggests that childhood contact with outgroups appears to have a positive impact, at least for majority-­g roup children. In one study, White children ages 7–10 who attended racially heterogeneous schools showed less racial prejudice than White children who attended mostly White schools (McGlothlin & Killen, 2010). However, among minority children, contact does not necessarily lead to reduced prejudice (Tropp & Pettigrew, 2005). This could be for a number of reasons. Minority children tend to have greater exposure to outgroups than majority-­g roup children do. The nature of that contact could be different as well. For example, minority children may be exposed to a more diverse set of majority-­g roup individuals. And, as we see next, majority and minority families differ in how they discuss race.

Transmission of Values in Families We’ve seen that prejudice is not necessarily inborn, but neither is it the case that race is irrelevant to a child’s perception of the world until they’re much older. We have discussed research that racial attitudes gradually develop in the first years of life (Bigler & Liben, 2007; Clark, 1963). Indeed, research repeatedly has shown that most 3- and 4-year-olds show an awareness of racial cues, and even show a preference for one race over others (Katz, 1983; Dunham, Chen, & Banaji, 2013). As children get older, their attitudes about racial groups become more coherent and complex. Indeed, there is little difference between the racial attitudes of sixth graders and those of high school students or even adults (Baron & Banaji, 2006; Clark, 1963). So, children clearly learn prejudiced attitudes and stereotypes about others. But where do they learn these attitudes? Parents are an early source of information about the world, and children are influenced by this information. Recall that Allport (1954) suggested that children develop stereotypes and prejudice either directly “taught” to them by their parents (or other family members) or these attitudes are “caught” in a family environment that promotes such negative outgroup attitudes. Indeed, research supports this assertion. Overt instruction in prejudiced attitudes, as in the case with highly prejudiced individuals (e.g., White supremacists), certainly has a strong impact on the intergroup attitude development of young children (Blee, 2002), leading a child to espouse with the same fervor and conviction the negative beliefs and feelings toward the outgroups as those voiced by the parents. On the other hand, meta-­analyses reveal that the simple correlation between parental prejudice and child prejudice is only moderate at best (Degner & Dalege, 2013). Some studies show very little correspondence between parental prejudice and child prejudice, at least among majority-­g roup members (Aboud & Doyle, 1996). Why might this be? Primarily it is because majority-­g roup parents rarely, if ever, discuss matters of prejudice with their children. In fact, they often actively discourage it, to the point where White children tend to avoid broaching the topic of race by the time they are 10 or 11 (­Apfelbaum, Pauker, Ambady, Sommers, & Norton, 2008). In one study, for example, White parents were randomly assigned to have conversations about different topics (including race and racism) with their White children (Vittrup & Holden, 2011). When

Origin and Maintenance of Stereotypes and Prejudice 43

instructed to talk about race, only 10% of White parents complied! So perhaps it’s not surprising that, when prodded, White parents and their children are remarkably bad at guessing each other’s racial attitudes (Pahlke, Bigler, & Suizzo, 2012). However, parents still impact their children’s prejudices, and they can do so without even talking about it (i.e., prejudice is caught rather than taught). And remember, children are motivated to learn about and make sense of the world—they pick up on things. Jokes, overt and subtle intergroup behavior, derogatory labels (or slang words), and even subtle nonverbal cues used by parents in reference to other groups can influence the attitudes the child develops about those groups (Katz, 1983; Rohan & Zanna, 1996). In one study, for example, preschoolers showed a preference for groups they had earlier observed being treated with more positive nonverbal behavior and avoided group members whom they’d observed treated more negatively (Skinner, Olson, & Meltzoff, 2020). So, it seems that when a child sees a respected adult frown at, avoid, or exclude members of certain groups, they not only notice, they also come to dislike that group themselves. Under what conditions, then, do parents’ influence their children’s prejudices? One simple and intuitive finding is that children’s prejudices are similar to their parents’ prejudices when the children identify more with the parents (Sinclair, Dunn, & Lowery, 2005). Rohan and Zanna (1996) also discovered that an important factor is whether the parents exhibited those harsh parenting styles discussed earlier (i.e., right-wing authoritarian [RWA]), but not as simply as Allport (1954) earlier predicted (see Chapter 4; A ­ ltemeyer, 1996; Fraley, Griffin, Belsky, & Roisman, 2012). In this research, adult children of lowRWA parents were similar in attitudes to their parents. The relationship between the intergroup attitudes of high-RWA parents and those of their children was a bit more complex, depending on whether the child saw the parent as responsive (e.g., encouraging discussions, explaining the reasons behind requests). Those who viewed their high-RWA parents as responsive were much more attitudinally similar to their parents, compared to those who viewed their parents as unresponsive. While more research is needed to clarify these findings, it appears that children adopt attitudes and values similar to their parents, except when they perceive their parents as both demanding (a major feature of high-RWA adults) and unresponsive—­t hat is, the lack of attention and consideration of the unresponsive high-RWA parent seems to make the child much less willing to adopt similar attitudes and values (perhaps because there is little incentive for doing so). In sum, it seems likely that a child’s prejudices will most derive from the child’s parents when the (1) child is identified with their parents, (2) parents are clear in communicating their prejudices, and (3) parents are responsive to that child. However, children still encode nonverbal cues directed at outgroups that can also lead to prejudice (Skinner et al., 2020). Parents with more extreme attitudes tend to communicate more about their prejudices to their children, leading to a stronger child–­parent prejudice correspondence (Blee, 2002). Finally, it is also important to acknowledge that parents choose the neighborhoods in which they raise their children; the social events they attend; and hence, the kinds of intergroup contact their children have—all of these can impact intergroup attitudes.

Influence of Stereotypes on Cognition in Children Stereotypes have a strong influence on a child’s perception of their ingroups and outgroups (Aboud, 1988). Corenblum, Annis, and Young (1996) and Aboud (2003) found

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that majority children held more positive attitudes toward their own group, and more negative attitudes toward outgroups. Interestingly, minority-­g roup members also held more positive views of the majority group than even their own ingroup (see also Setoh et al., 2019). When asked to explain successful performances of majority-­g roup members, both majority-­g roup children and minority-­g roup children made positive, internal, and optimistic attributions. However, both groups explained successful performances of minority-­g roup members as due to luck. Majority- and minority-­g roup members tend to remember more positive and fewer negative behaviors about the majority group, and more negative and fewer positive behaviors about the minority group (Corenblum, 2003). McKown and Weinstein (2003) found that between ages 6 and 10, majority children move from being virtually oblivious to others’ stereotypes about their own ingroup, to being able to infer others’ stereotypes. These researchers also found that children from stigmatized groups are aware of stereotypes about their group from a very young age, and they tend to show stereotype threat effects (see Chapter 7) on stereotype-­relevant tasks such that anxiety about confirming stereotypes about their group impedes their performance. Stereotypes also influence overall cognitive performance in children in much the same way that they do in adults. Ambady, Shih, Kim, and Pittinsky (2001) found that activation of negative stereotypes of children’s own ingroups impeded, but positive stereotypes facilitated, performance on a math test in young children (kindergarten–­g rade 2) and older children (grades 6–8).

STEREOTYPES AND PREJUDICE IN THE MEDIA Before continuing, please take a moment to reflect on the innocent days of your youth, before you became jaded and suspicious of information on the internet. Earlier we discussed how a first major influence, parents, plays a role in the development of stereotyped beliefs and negative outgroup affect. As children internalize the values of their parents, they are also paying attention to the overt and covert messages about intergroup relations they receive from social media, movies, television, and video games. When we consume media, rarely do we scrutinize its veracity; mostly we just want to be entertained. We tend to use the media as a tool to help us decide the pervasiveness and acceptability of our beliefs and attitudes. If one routinely sees stereotypes portrayed in the media, then that individual may come to believe that these attitudes represent the “normal” or mainstream view of society. Stereotypes are portrayed in all types of media. As one example, try to count all the times you saw a show in which a man is shown cleaning the house. Although we suspect the situation has improved (it’s hard to find data on this question), you may have difficulty thinking of examples. That is just one way in which media portray (and seem to endorse) sexist gender roles (see Chapter 8 for a more extensive discussion of sexism in the media). Another example of the intergroup beliefs that people can form from the media is the portrayal of crime in the United States. Specifically, a common belief among many Americans is that African Americans (more than other racial groups) are more likely to engage in criminal activity. One reason this belief exists is that African Americans are disproportionately represented in the news and other media as the perpetrators of crime, and White individuals are more likely to be portrayed as the victims of such crimes (Gaur, 2020; Ruscher, 2001). But, if the media merely report the news, and it

Origin and Maintenance of Stereotypes and Prejudice 45

happens to be the case that African Americans are more often identified as the perpetrator of the crime, then shouldn’t it be reasonable to assume that African Americans are indeed more likely to engage in criminal activity? To answer that question, we need to be clear on the assumptions upon which the question rests. It assumes that the media are objective reporters of news and are not selectively leaving out some news stories or are otherwise biased in their portrayal of the news (specifically, crime reports). In other words, if the media were mere unbiased conduits of the actual statistical frequency of the crimes committed by all racial groups, then if one saw a disproportionate number of one group as the perpetrators’ crime, it would be entirely reasonable to suggest that that group (for whatever reasons) was more likely to engage in criminal activity. However, several studies suggest that the media is often less than objective in reporting the incidence of crimes committed by African Americans relative to other racial groups (Dixon & Williams, 2015; see van Dijk, 1991, for a review). In an analysis of the portrayal of persons of color and White individuals in three local television newscasts, Romer, Jamieson, and deCoteau (1998) found that, over 14 weeks of newscasts, persons of color were much more likely to be presented as perpetrators of crimes, and White individuals were more likely to be shown as the victims of those crimes. Romer et al. also found that the frequency of crimes by persons of color, which were reported on the newscasts, were about 20% higher than what would be predicted based on actual statistics compiled by the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). A study by Media Matters for America (2015) found that in New York City, African Americans were arrested in 54% of murders, 55% of thefts, and 49% of assaults. However, when the four major TV station news reported about murders, 74% were African American. The TV stations reported that 84% of theft suspects were African Americans. Seventy three percent of the assault suspects were reported to be African American. Certainly, this indicates that there is some bias, and that the actual frequency with which African Americans commit crimes is far lower than is portrayed in the media. Indeed, using FBI crime statistics, Beck (2021) reports that 59% of single-­offender violent crimes are committed by White individuals (compared to 22% for Black individuals). Such biased portrayals of African Americans in the media can indeed lead to the formation of an artificial (or “illusory”; see section on illusory correlations later in this chapter) correlation between African Americans and criminal behavior, and this of course tends to lead to the formation and maintenance of negative stereotypes about African Americans. A study by Dixon and Maddux (2005) found that heavy news viewers (compared to those who only occasionally watch the news) were more uncomfortable being exposed to a dark-­skinned perpetrator of a crime, and they were more likely to remember the perpetrator if he was a dark-­skinned Black male. The heavy news viewers also had more favorable views of the victim when the perpetrator was Black. Unfortunately, it is easy to see how the very real bias in the media can perpetuate stereotypes of racial groups. The way groups are portrayed in the media can influence prejudices and stereotypes in subtle and insidious ways, and, importantly, those portrayals need not be consciously considered to have impact. A compelling example is found in work by Sarah Lamer and her colleagues (e.g., Lamer & Weisbuch, 2019). Through content analyses of various media (e.g., internet news sites, magazines), they noticed a pattern in the way men and women were portrayed: Men tended to appear higher on the page. In follow-­up studies, they showed naïve participants these depictions, and found that when people repeatedly

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viewed men appearing higher up on webpages than women, they were more likely to believe stereotypes that men were more powerful and dominant. Other work shows that in television, White actors are more likely to exhibit nonverbal negativity to Black relative to White coactors, and that exposure to this bias increases viewers’ racial prejudice, despite the fact that they did not even consciously notice it (Weisbuch, Pauker, & Ambady, 2009). Thus, much evidence points to negative depictions of certain groups in the media affecting the development of prejudice.

Stereotype Accuracy You may have thought, based on some of the statistics cited above, “Well, Black individuals are still more likely to commit violent crimes based on their proportion of the population.” You wouldn’t be wrong. It is also true that men tend to have greater upper-body strength than women, and women are more likely to enter into caring professions, like teaching and nursing. On one hand, some researchers have argued that stereotypes are always inaccurate because they are overgeneralizations: One can believe that men are taller than women on average, which is true, but there is considerable overlap between the genders in terms of height (Stangor, 1995). Hence, assuming any random man is taller than any random woman is more likely than not to be correct but it always risks oversimplification and hence, inaccuracy. A more accurate approach would be to avoid stereotyping and seek information about the individual (e.g., actually measure the person’s height). In fact, a multicultural orientation (which we discuss in greater detail in Chapter 12) implores us to recognize actual differences between groups, because ignoring the importance of group membership (as a colorblind orientation entails) can exacerbate discrimination. In short, stereotypes can be accurate, and differences between groups can be important to acknowledge. As you might imagine, there is considerable controversy about research on stereotype accuracy (e.g., Jussim et al., 2016). There is risk that such research might be used to justify discrimination (which in fact, does happen: Young men pay more for car insurance than do young women). When there appears to be some truth to a stereotype, we would encourage you to dig deeper and ask “Why?” questions. For example, in Chapter 6 we discuss the common stereotype among modern racists that Black people are lazy; this belief provides an explanation for relatively high unemployment among Black individuals. Another explanation is employment discrimination and lack of access to education and employment opportunities. Similarly, when we discuss sexism in Chapter 8, we examine the commonly held stereotype that women are more nurturing than men; there may be some truth to the stereotype, but why? When you run across a stereotype that might have a “kernel of truth,” it is good practice to remember that stereotypes are nearly always overgeneralizations, examine evidence regarding whether the stereotype is accurate, and perhaps most importantly, consider why the stereotype might be accurate.

Implicit Theories We all have our own ideas of what personality characteristics seem to “go together” in people, and we also have our own ideas about the nature of personality. Researchers refer

Origin and Maintenance of Stereotypes and Prejudice 47

to these beliefs as implicit theories, because these beliefs and heuristics guide one’s processing of social information, and help us to evaluate (and sometimes stereotype) others (Jones, 1982). Once we have categorized someone as having a certain characteristic, we are more likely to assume that that person has a whole host of related characteristics, the specifics of which are determined by the content of one’s implicit theory of personality (Jones, 1982; Scheffer & Manke, 2018; Schneider, 1973). Moreover, people form their own beliefs about the nature of personality. Specifically, research indicates that some people, termed “entity theorists,” believe that one’s personality traits are fixed and cannot be changed, while others, termed “incremental theorists,” believe that one’s personality traits are flexible and can be modified (Levy, Plaks, & Dweck, 1999). Entity theorists tend to believe that because traits are fixed, they are stable indicators of behavior. They also believe that behavior is consistent. As a result, they should also be more likely to infer a host of related target personality characteristics based on an isolated behavior by the target. On the other hand, incremental theorists should be less likely to make such an inference, because they are more cognizant of the belief that behavior (and personality) is less predictable based on just one sample of behavior. In five experiments, Levy, Stroessner, and Dweck (1998) found that, compared to incremental theorists, entity theorists did indeed tend to use stereotypes more often in their judgments of outgroups, they formed more extreme judgments about the outgroup, and tended to attribute stereotyped characteristics to inborn qualities within the outgroup individual. Thus, one’s implicit theories about the content and nature of personality can have a profound effect on one’s subsequent beliefs (i.e., stereotypes) about other groups.

The Efficiency of Stereotypes Ever since Lippmann (1922) coined the term “stereotype,” researchers have noted the utility of stereotypes for simplifying the way we think about our complex social environment (Allport, 1954; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Jones, 1997; Taylor, 1981). Stereotypes enable the perceiver to quickly arrive at an evaluation of a target individual on the basis of very little information (i.e., race, gender, age) about the target. This is useful because we can then devote more energy to other demanding cognitive tasks. But why would we be willing to make inaccurate assessments of others, in order to move on to other types of thinking? One could argue that to succeed in life, it is important, perhaps most important, that one make more accurate assessments of others in one’s social world. That is indeed a compelling, logical argument, but it is largely impractical, and here is the reason: Humans have a strong need to have a predictable, somewhat-­ordered world (Maslow, 1970). To think carefully about every person one encounters, reads, or thinks about, in an effort to form an accurate evaluation of the person would require an enormous expenditure of cognitive energy (to say nothing of time!). While a careful social perceiver would be much more likely to be accurate in their assessments of others, they would get little else accomplished that day. Instead, we tend to reserve our considered cognitive efforts for those instances where we are motivated to be accurate in our assessment of a select other person (e.g., a prospective employee, a prospective mate, a teammate). For the rest of the population, we play the odds that the stereotypes we use will yield at least some accurate information about the target individual, or (and here’s an important point) at least give us the feeling that we know a lot about the target person.

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Instead of assuming that our instant impressions of others (largely based on some stereotypes) were fact, we would do well to consider recasting our stereotyped impressions as “hunches to be verified” (Newcomb, 1959, p. 214). With this in mind, Newcomb suggests that people would be more likely to have the advantages of efficiency and accuracy in their evaluations of others. So, stereotypes are an integral part of cognitive life. But do they really save us cognitive energy? In a series of clever experiments, Macrae, Milne, and Bodenhausen (1994) examined the assumption that stereotypes function as cognitive resource-­preserving tools. They examined the ability of participants to do two cognitive tasks at one time: form an impression of a target individual while also monitoring a prose passage. For some participants, the impression-­formation task also included a stereotype label of the target, and for others, no stereotype label was provided. If stereotypes facilitate fast judgments of others, and conserve cognitive energy for other resources, one should find that those who were given the stereotype label would be able to devote more cognitive effort to the prose-­monitoring task (a paragraph describing Indonesia) and the impression-­ monitoring task, compared to those who did not get the label. Indeed, the results indicated that those who were provided with the stereotype label were able to recall twice as many personality descriptors for the target and recalled more of the paragraph information compared to those given no stereotype label. Macrae, Milne, et al. suggest that the stereotype label enabled participants to devote less attention to forming an impression of the target and more attention to remembering stereotype-­associated personality descriptors and the paragraph information in the prose-­monitoring task. These results suggest that stereotypes do in fact function as energy-­saving tools in social perception. In general, much research shows that when we are confronted with a lot of information about a target, and we are required to make a social judgment about that individual, stereotypes are more likely to influence our impressions of them (Bodenhausen & ­L ichtenstein, 1987; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). On the other hand, when our cognitive task is simple, we are much less likely to rely on stereotypes because our cognitive capacity to think carefully about the other person’s attributes is not taxed by the need to process a lot of information about the person to arrive at an evaluation (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987). Research by Sherman and Bessenoff (1999) also indicates that people use stereotypes to guide their memory retrieval about an individual. These researchers assigned their participants to either a high- or low-­cognitive-­load condition while doing a task. Those in the high-­cognitive-­load condition were asked to hold an eightdigit number in their mind while simultaneously deciding which trait-­related behaviors (from three lists of behaviors) described the target they were told about at the beginning of the study (either a priest or a skinhead). Sherman and Bessenoff found that when an individual’s cognitive capacity was constrained by the simultaneous cognitive tasks, the person was less able to accurately recall the episodic memories (target behaviors), and instead relied on stereotypes about the target to help them decide which target behaviors were associated with the target. Thus, when our recall for individuating behavioral information about a person is compromised by a limited cognitive capacity, we may tend to rely on stereotypes in our social judgments. Stereotypes therefore help simplify the cognitive task before us, and they enable us to quickly come to an evaluation about another person. As we see in Chapter 4, implicit prejudices (automatic gut feelings we have about groups) perform some of the same functions.

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HOW AND WHY STEREOTYPES ARE MAINTAINED Because stereotypes enable the perceiver to make a judgment about another individual extremely quickly, they nicely satisfy a major goal of cognitive life: to arrive at the fastest judgments possible, using the least amount of cognitive effort. The issue of whether the judgments are accurate is secondary to the utility of the stereotype in helping the person quickly evaluate another individual and move on to devote more thought and time to other cognitive tasks—that is, for most people, most of the time, it is more important to arrive at any evaluation, even if it isn’t very accurate. Thus, stereotypes are difficult to give up, even though most people agree that they are undesirable. Indeed, they can promote inaccurate evaluations of others, and they can lead to strained relationships between groups of people. People are therefore confronted with the cognitive dissonance aroused by the thought that one has stereotypes of others that guide one’s social judgments, and the thought that one is a good, fair, and rational thinker. According to dissonance theory, one of these cognitions must change in order for dissonance to be alleviated. Which one changes? It is almost always the cognition that is most amenable to change (i.e., the most weakly held conviction), and in this case it is—you guessed it—one’s cognitions about stereotyping. Rather than think that we use stereotypes to evaluate others, we simply do not allow ourselves to come to such a conclusion, and we instead convince ourselves that we are indeed a fair, logical thinker by making our social judgments after a considered assessment of the information about the target individual. In other words, we often either do not realize, or do not consciously acknowledge, that we do indeed stereotype others, or that our stereotype-­derived impressions of them might be inaccurate. This self-­delusion helps us maintain our stereotypes while reducing the possibility for cognitive dissonance related to our self-­concept. How then do we continue to use stereotypes without being consciously aware of their influence? How are stereotypes maintained in the face of stereotype-­disconfirming evidence? Below we discuss the various ways that people maintain their stereotypes of others, and we review the research on the factors that facilitate stereotype maintenance in daily social judgments.

Selective Attention to Stereotype‑Relevant Information We are constantly exposed to a wide variety of information that pertains to our stereotypes of others. Some of the information is consistent with our stereotypes, and other information is stereotype inconsistent. Stereotype-­inconsistent information can be perceived as dissonance arousing, because it is threatening to one’s self-­concept (though people usually do not consciously perceive such information as threatening). In other words, if I learn that the way I think about others, and the way I interpret and categorize others is unsound, I may feel foolish. Rather than do that, I will change the way I think about the validity of the stereotype-­inconsistent information. One way to do this is through confirmation bias: only pay attention to information that confirms what I already believe (my stereotypes), and pay no attention to stereotype-­inconsistent information. Indeed, research indicates that this is in fact what most people do, and this explains how they maintain their stereotypes in the face of stereotype-­inconsistent information (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Dijksterhuis & van Knippenberg,

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1996; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Rothbart, Evans, & Fulero, 1979; Wigboldus, Dijksterhuis, & van ­K nippenberg, 2003). One of the functional features of stereotypes is that they help us anticipate likely motives, attitudes, and behaviors of others, and they therefore provide us with a comfortable sense of what to expect in our daily social interactions. These expectations certainly guide our behavior, and they also guide our perceptions of social information. In a meta-­analysis of 54 experiments, Stangor and McMillan (1992) reviewed the literature on the influence of such expectations on memory for expectancy-­consistent and expectancy-­inconsistent information. Their results indicated that memory tends to be better for expectancy-incongruent than for expectancy-­congruent information. This is in line with much of the cognitive literature on memory, which shows that our attention is grabbed by unusual or surprising information, and therefore, we are more likely to remember that information. However, Stangor and McMillan found that when it comes to strong expectancies, which describes most stereotypes, we are more prone to remember expectancy- (or stereotype-) consistent information (see also Bodenhausen, 1988). Research by Bastian and Haslam (2007) suggests that the preference for stereotype-­ consistent information may be especially strong among those whose implicit theories of personality include the belief that human attributes are unchangeable (i.e., entity theorists). Interestingly, when it comes to stereotypes about our own group, we remember things differently. Koomen and Dijker (1997) presented participants with stereotype-­ consistent and stereotype-­inconsistent information about their own groups (Dutch vs. Turkish) and about an outgroup. Their memory for this information was then tested for accuracy. With regard to stereotype-­relevant information about an outgroup, the results indicated that participants remembered more stereotype-­confirming information than disconfirming information. However, when it came to stereotype-­relevant information about their own group, participants were more likely to remember stereotype-­inconsistent information. This supports earlier research (e.g., Park & Rothbart, 1982), and suggests that we like to think of our own groups as comprising unique individuals, and other groups as comprising people who share common characteristics who are more similar than they are different. Koomen and Dijker’s findings show that one way we can do this is by focusing on stereotype-­inconsistent (stereotype-­disconfirming) information about our group, and stereotype-­consistent information about other groups. On the other hand, research by Sherman, Stroessner, Conrey, and Azam (2005) found that high- (but not low-) prejudice persons pay more attention to stereotype-­inconsistent behaviors—­ but only in order to explain them away as due to external factors—­and they attribute stereotype-­consistent behaviors to internal (personality) factors. Human memory and cognition are nothing if not flexible and adaptive to the challenges presented by an ever-­c hanging world. If we are to survive, we need to develop flexible cognitive mechanisms for processing and remembering important information related to how we interact with the world and others in it. Consider then, the adaptiveness of a cognitive system that rather blindly processes only one kind of information, and ignores all other information, when there is really no good reason to do so. Such is the case with stereotypes. Recall that some research has shown that stereotypes facilitate the processing of stereotype-­consistent, but not stereotype-­inconsistent, information (Rothbart et al., 1979). For example, Macrae, Stangor, and Milne (1994) found that

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people who had stereotypes activated in their memory were subsequently able to more efficiently process stereotype-­relevant (specifically, stereotype-­consistent) information. However, some research suggests that this may not represent the full picture of how we process stereotype-­relevant information. Sherman, Lee, Bessenoff, and Frost (1998) argued that our cognitive system must be more adaptive and flexible in processing social information than is characterized by past research that suggests that we perceive and remember only stereotype-­consistent information. In a series of experiments, Sherman and his colleagues found that stereotypes are indeed efficient because they facilitate the processing of both stereotype-­consistent and -inconsistent information when cognitive capacity to process information is low. Sherman et al. found that when we are under a cognitive load (due to any number of factors, such as information overload, parallel tasks, etc.), stereotypes enable us to process stereotype-­consistent information more quickly, and to devote more cognitive resources to stereotype-­inconsistent (and thus, surprising and attention-­getting) information. As a result, less attention is given to stereotype-­consistent information, and this information is thus weakly encoded in memory. Because most of our attention is given to stereotype-­inconsistent information, this information is encoded in greater detail, and our memory for the specifics of this information is better. In a follow-­up series of experiments, Sherman and Frost (2000) replicated these findings, and suggested that while perceivers have stronger stereotype-­ consistent impressions of a target, their memory for the specific stereotype-­relevant information may be poor. This can lead perceivers to be easily misled (and often inaccurate) in their recollections of the target’s behavior or characteristics. Indeed, there is a compelling argument to be made for the idea that the act of categorizing something (or someone) can reduce one’s openness to revision of that initial categorization, even in the face of evidence that the initial assessment was incorrect. Von Hippel, Sekaquaptewa, and Vargas (1995) suggest that stereotypes lead perceivers to encode social information in ways that facilitate the maintenance of the stereotype. This is a different perspective on how stereotypes influence our social judgments, because it suggests that stereotypes have their strongest influence at the actual perception of the social information, and not later when one is trying to recall that social information. As evidence for this hypothesis, Von Hippel et al. cite research by Wyatt and Campbell (1951) in which participants saw a series of blurred pictures and were asked to generate guesses as to what the pictures might be. Later, participants were shown the pictures in gradually increasing focus, and were asked to modify, if they felt it necessary, their initial guesses. Results indicated that the initial guess about the picture interfered with an individual’s ability to accurately perceive (and identify) the subsequently presented clear picture. Von Hippel and his colleagues recount the results of their own program of research on this issue, as well as a number of other studies, which all support the idea that once we categorize an ambiguous (or even unambiguous) stimulus, our later perception of categorization-­inconsistent information is impaired, thus facilitating the perpetuation of the initial stereotype in the perceiver’s memory.

Subcategorization Most researchers agree that stereotypes have a basic hierarchical structure in which the category information tends to become more complex and differentiated as time goes on

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(Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Sherman, 1996; Stangor & Lange, 1994; Stephan, 1989; Taylor, 1981; Weber & Crocker, 1983). The information about the group tends to be initially stored in terms of superordinate abstract stereotypes that apply to all group members. But sometimes counterstereotypic information really stands out and activates further processing to explain it (e.g., let’s say you have a strong stereotype that older adults are sluggish and grumpy, but you meet an older adult who is especially spritely and cheerful). When such stereotype-­discrepant information confronts us, we often form subcategories (also known as “subtypes”), which are separate categories for the deviant individual (Weber & Crocker, 1983). We do this because the stereotype-­inconsistent member of the stereotyped group is seen as unrepresentative of the whole group, so stereotypes that apply to the group do not appear to apply to the particular group member. Because we have such a strong motivation to keep our stereotypes (for cognitive simplicity and efficiency), we are motivated to keep our stereotypes intact and safe from the threat presented when we encounter an outgroup member who does not fit the group stereotype. Subcategorization allows stereotypers to “have their cake and eat it too” by maintaining cognitively efficient stereotypes and the perception that those stereotypes are accurate. It also enables one to think of oneself as not prejudiced toward that particular group. As most (but not all) stereotypes are predominantly negative, it is likely that deviant (stereotype-­disconfirming) group members represent positive qualities and characteristics not typically associated with the outgroup. As a result, we are more likely to have positive affect for, and evaluate positively, those individuals for whom we have created subcategories. For example, a White individual may create subcategories for Neil deGrasse Tyson, Oprah Winfrey, an African American friend and coworker, and others. In this way, people can convince themselves that they are not prejudiced because “some of my best friends (or people they admire) are Black.” While much research has been devoted to understanding how high-­prejudice persons subcategorize atypical (positive) members of a stereotyped group, one obvious question that hasn’t garnered similar empirical attention is “Do low-­prejudice persons subcategorize, and if so, how do they subcategorize?” Research by Riek, Mania, and Gaertner (2013) found that low-­prejudice persons do subcategorize, but they do so only for negative outgroup members. Remember, high-­prejudice persons have a negative view of the outgroup, so the unusual, positive outgroup member would need to be subcategorized. Similarly, it makes sense that for low-­prejudice persons, the outgroup is viewed positively, and in this case, the atypical outgroup member is one who presents with negative traits, and thus that person would need to be subcategorized, in order for the low-­prejudice person to maintain their positive view of the outgroup. When an individual is otherwise seen as a good fit or as “representative” of a group but who nevertheless shows stereotype-­inconsistent characteristics, it may be more difficult to subtype the person. In these situations, people may actually modify their stereotypes about that group and perceive more variability among group members (Rothbart & Lewis, 1988). In this way, the group is seen as more heterogeneous and comprises individuals, and less of a homogeneous (“they-are-all-alike”) collective. To the extent that this happens, the stereotypes of the group are less useful for the perceiver because they are less applicable for the target group. However, when the perceived individual is not otherwise seen as representative of the group, then it is easier for perceivers to regard that person as a deviant, and any of the individual’s stereotype-­inconsistent characteristics are less likely to influence (i.e., dispel) the stereotypes the perceiver has about the group

Origin and Maintenance of Stereotypes and Prejudice 53

as a whole. Research indicates that when we can explain away a member of a stereotyped group who doesn’t fit the stereotype as a fluke, we do so (Kunda & Oleson, 1995). When we can explain the person’s stereotype-­inconsistent characteristics as being attributable to some aspect of the situation, or to vague stereotype-­relevant information, or otherwise have a ready variable that would allow us to explain the origin of the group-­deviant characteristic, we use it as a way to subtcategorize the group member (Garcia-­Marques & Mackie, 1999; Kunda & Oleson, 1995; Rothbart & Lewis, 1988). Research also suggests that the terms one uses to think of the outgroup member has implications for whether and how they subcategorize the person. In one study, the researchers showed that Whites tend to view a target categorized with the label as “Black” more negatively, with a lower socioeconomic status, and more prone to criminal activity than someone labeled “African American” (Hall, Phillips, & Townsend, 2015). As such, a negatively categorized label target is much less likely to be seen as unusual and thus subcategorized. Rather, that person is likely to be perceived as another example of the overall negatively stereotyped outgroup (in this instance, “Black people”).

Illusory Correlations In our attempt to make sense of the social world, we often try to notice when events cooccur, or covary (Kelley, 1967)—that is, we try to figure out what things are correlated. In so doing, we can develop a sense of what to expect, and even predict when events should occur. If we know that variable A is present, and we know that variable A is highly correlated with variable G, then we can make a prediction that variable G should also be present in that situation. For example, police and insurance companies tend to be aware of a correlation between a driver’s gender and age, and the tendency to break the speed limits (or get into an accident). They assume that being a young male (ages 16–28) is highly correlated with the tendency to drive fast and get into auto accidents. This is a legitimate assumption (i.e., at least a somewhat accurate stereotype) because indeed, statistics support the notion that these factors are positively correlated (U.S. Department of Transportation, 1999). However, we often perceive a relationship between variables that are only weakly correlated or not correlated at all. Researchers call these perceived relationships illusory correlations (Fiedler, 2017; Hamilton & Gifford, 1976; Hamilton & Rose, 1980). Illusory correlations can lead to both the formation and maintenance of stereotypes. When one perceives a distinctive group (e.g., an outgroup, or a minority group) doing an undesirable behavior (e.g., committing a crime), the person is more likely to notice that event, because it is an unusual occurrence. In other words, we tend to link rare to rare. The co-­occurrence of the distinctive group and the undesirable behavior can lead to the perception of a link between the group and the “natural” tendency to do the undesirable behavior. The more cognition and attention devoted to this co-­occurrence makes this illusory correlation more accessible in memory, and hence more likely to influence subsequent judgments of the target group (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). This is the beginning of a stereotype for that outgroup. Illusory correlations also form as a result of the influence of one’s existing stereotypes of others. Recall that stereotypes tend to bias our perception of stereotype-­relevant information, such that we pay attention to information that confirms our stereotypes, and we pay less attention to information that is inconsistent with the stereotype. Therefore, when making an assessment about a member of a stereotyped outgroup, one

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draws upon one’s knowledge, beliefs, expectations, and stereotypes of that group. As an example, suppose you believe that older people are grumpy. You will tend to notice and remember only those examples of grumpy older persons who you met (or were exposed to via other means: media, friends, relatives, etc.), and not those examples of happy older persons, or grumpy younger persons. In this way, stereotypes lead you to perceive a strong (illusory) correlation between “grumpiness” and being old. Interestingly, some research also suggests that a motivation to perceive order and predictability in the world can enhance the likelihood of forming illusory correlations. Lieberman (1999) asked participants to describe what would happen to them when they die and how they feel thinking about their death, and others were asked to describe what would happen to them if they watched television. The first group had their mortality made salient, and the second group did not. According to terror management theory (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991), when we think about our mortality, it arouses a need for stability, predictability, and order in the world. Then Lieberman presented participants in each condition with either ambiguous or unambiguous information about a target group. The need for order is more easily satisfied when we have clear information. When presented with ambiguous information, however, Lieberman predicted that those in the mortality-­salient condition should be more likely to form illusory correlations between the negative behaviors listed and the minority group than those who did not have their mortality made salient. This is exactly what he found, suggesting that the motivation for order and predictability (in this case, initiated by mortality salience) led participants to attempt to fashion order from the ambiguous target group information by forming illusory correlations. Forget that it is an inaccurate way of thinking of a group—these participants were more interested in obtaining a predictable sense of what the minority group was like. As we mentioned in the first chapter, all people tend to be cognitive misers, tending to be more interested in the cognitive efficiency and speed of judgments, rather than the accuracy of their evaluations. However, it appears that under certain conditions (e.g., mortality salience), this tendency can be “supercharged,” and this increases the chances for heuristic, stereotypical thinking about other groups. Finally, Jeff Sherman and colleagues (2009) provide insight into the mechanics of how illusory correlations occur when learning about groups. They point out that we tend to learn about our ingroups first. And, for most of us (thankfully), our ingroups are generally seen as good. As we move our attention outward and learn about outgroups, we look for ways to distinguish “us” and “them.” Since “we” are generally good, any information that “they” are also good would not help us to distinguish the two groups, resulting in a bias against seeing them as good. So, sadly, we humans tend to have an information-­processing bias against seeing outgroups as good.

Motivation Stereotypes and prejudice have many different sources. In addition to the many cognitive biases, heuristics, and other capacity limitations of our cognitive system, we also form and maintain prejudice on the basis of motivations to do so—that is, we may have a specific interest in perceiving another group as inferior to our own group, and our efforts and energy directed at meeting that goal is what most researchers would refer to as motivation. Motivation is a nebulous concept, and has a myriad of definitions. It

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is hard to pin down, but for our purposes, we define motivation as those processes that energize and direct behavior toward a goal (Reeve, 1997). When we are motivated to do something, we have a goal (or more than one goal) in mind, and we find that goal of sufficient import to initiate actions to attain that goal. For example, if you are reading a book, and your roommate comes home and asks you whether you want to go out to a party with them, you may not feel sufficiently motivated to do all the behaviors necessary for going out (i.e., getting cleaned up, putting on nicer clothes, etc.). However, if an important goal of yours (e.g., to meet a potential significant other) can be pursued (i.e., your roommate says that the person you’re interested in is going to be at the party), then you may suddenly find yourself with more than enough energy to get ready to go out with your roommate. Similarly, some people tend to be more motivated than others to form accurate impressions of others, and to not rely on stereotypes in their social perceptions. Stangor and Ford (1992) have suggested that people can be identified as either perceiving others in an “accuracy-­oriented” or “expectancy-­confirming” manner. Some people are concerned with arriving at the most accurate perception of individuals they perceive, based on the target person’s qualities, characteristics, interests, and so on. Such individuals are motivated then to avoid any bias in their evaluations of others. Research indicates that these accuracy-­oriented individuals tend to be much less likely to rely on stereotypes in their evaluations of others, compared with those who are not motivated to be accurate in their social perceptions (Hilton & Darley, 1991; Pendry & Macrae, 1996). Fehr, Sassenberg, and Jonas (2012) found that the motivation to not behave in a prejudiced manner is effective in helping the person disregard activated stereotypes. Interestingly, this effect applies to both people who have this motivation as part of their personality and also those who were randomly assigned to pursue the nonprejudiced goal. It should be noted that these findings, specifically with regard to those with an external motive to respond without prejudice (i.e., they avoid prejudice only to avoid social scorn), are in contrast with Butz and Plant’s (2009) review of the literature on both types of motivation. Butz and Plant conclude that those with an external motive to respond without prejudice fail at regulating difficult-­to-­control prejudice and respond with anxiety and avoidance—­and sometimes later backlash. Why the different findings about those with an external motive to respond without prejudice? Looking closer, those in the Fehr et al. study were given a primed goal that was important to them to achieve, and the more they believed that goal would be helped by responding in a nonprejudiced way, the less prejudice they showed. Those externally motivated persons in the studies reviewed by Butz and Plant were motivated to respond without prejudice only in order to avoid social sanction. It is thus apparent, as Butz and Plant write, that “in order to fully understand how motivation to respond without prejudice impacts the quality of interracial interactions, it is crucial to consider not only whether people are motivated to respond without prejudice but also the reasons underlying their motivation” (emphasis added; p.  1312). For example, people with internal motivation to respond without prejudice have an egalitarian self-image, and put forth greater effort to rid themselves of prejudice, often with success. Other people are motivated to perceive people according to expectations they may have of that individual (i.e., expectations for the target person’s behavior based on stereotypes about the target’s group; Neuberg, 1994). These individuals attend to expectancy-­confirming behavior in the target, and they disregard (forget) instances of

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expectancy-­disconfirming behavior in targets. Chaiken, Giner-­Sorolla, and Chen (1996) suggest that this latter group is acting from a “defensive” orientation, because these individuals are seeking to defend their prejudices and preexisting beliefs. The defensive motivation stems from the need to maintain one’s belief in the current societal system of group hierarchy (and inequality) and the predictable structure of the social status quo (Jost, 2020). For example, majority-­g roup members may recognize their relatively better deal overall and try to convince themselves that the system is fair, and that it was their hard work, and not their privilege, that led to their positive outcomes (Phillips & Lowery, 2020). Of course, people are sometimes accuracy oriented and sometimes expectancy oriented, and it is rarely the case that a person is only one or the other. However, it turns out that, in general, accuracy-­oriented people are in short supply. Indeed, Taylor (1981) made the point that most people are not motivated to think very carefully about others, individuating each person they perceive, because to do so would require more cognitive energy than they are willing to devote. Additionally, perceivers reason that there is no harm done in using heuristic strategies (such as relying on stereotypes) in evaluating others, and that, for example, if one categorizes a person they pass in the mall on the basis of their ethnic group, and associated stereotypes, it is not a problem because no one will know of this evaluation. Thus, many people are not motivated to avoid using stereotypes in social perceptions because there is usually little motivation to think carefully about others and expend that much cognitive energy in our social evaluations. Research by Kunda and her colleagues (Klein & Kunda, 1992; Kunda, 1990) suggests that people do not merely believe whatever they want (or expect) to believe about outgroups. To convince themselves that they are objective in their evaluations of others, people attempt to construct justifications for their evaluations and beliefs. They do this by searching their memory for belief-­supporting target information, and they pass over target-­relevant information that does not support their beliefs. Thus, their objectivity is illusory, because their search was motivated by a biased goal. For example, when Klein and Kunda told participants that they were about to interact with an individual with schizophrenia, the participants expressed more positive stereotypes about people with schizophrenia compared to the nonmotivated participants (who were told they would merely view an interaction with an individual with schizophrenia). In this way, participants who have a self-­interest to view another person positively (because they would like the upcoming interaction to go well, and not be uncomfortable) will generate more positive information about the target. Kunda and Sinclair (1999) further suggest that the activation, application, and inhibition of stereotypes tends to be guided by motivated reasoning. In other words, if one has a goal of disparaging a particular group, then one may activate negative stereotypes (that they may or may not normally activate when thinking about others), apply them to people to whom they might not have otherwise applied those stereotypes, and inhibit information in their memory that is incompatible with the goal of forming a negative impression of the group members (i.e., positive information about that individual, or positive stereotypes). Unfortunately, being motivated to avoid stereotyping others may not be sufficient to actually individuate others in one’s social judgments. Pendry and Macrae (1994) examined the influence of processing goals and attentional capacity on an individual’s use of stereotypes in judgments of others. They reasoned that when one’s outcomes were dependent upon another individual (i.e., the person would win a cash prize if they

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worked well with another participant, an older woman, to generate the best solutions to some word problems), one would be less likely to rely on stereotypes in an assessment of the other person. If one is to do well on a task with a partner, it is important to have an accurate sense of one’s partner’s capabilities. Relying on cognitive shortcuts, such as stereotypes, would be an impediment to that goal in this situation, which is why participants should be motivated to think carefully about their older partner, with the goal of forming an accurate impression of her. Other participants were told that they may win a cash prize based on their performance alone, and thus their outcomes were independent of the performance of their older partner. In these conditions, Pendry and Macrae (1994) predicted, participants would not be motivated to think carefully when forming an evaluation of their partner, and they would thus be more influenced by stereotypes in their perceptions of their older partner. Results indicated support for these predictions. However, something interesting happened when the attentional capacity of participants was manipulated. When Pendry and Macrae had half of the participants read the self-­description of their partner (a precompleted demographic sheet, ostensibly filled out by their older partner) while simultaneously doing a digit-­rehearsal task, their attentional capacity reached its limit. They were then asked to complete an evaluation of their partner’s personality. The other half of the participants did not have their attentional capacity depleted. They read their partner’s information at their leisure and then completed an evaluation of their partner’s personality. Results indicated that when outcome-­dependent participants’ attention was depleted, they were equally likely to rely on stereotypes in their evaluation of their partner as those who were in the outcome-­independent condition. The results of the Pendry and Macrae experiment, as well as those of similar other studies (e.g., Moreno & Bodenhausen, 1999), suggest that if we are to avoid stereotyping others, we need both the motivation and the (cognitive) ability to do so. We see in Chapter 4 how theories of implicit prejudice (or “implicit bias”) make similar claims.

INTERGROUP DYNAMICS AND THE ORIGINS OF PREJUDICE Our discussion of motivation as it relates to creating and maintaining stereotypes provides a nice bridge to the next section of this chapter on the origin of prejudice. Recall from Chapter 1 that stereotyping and prejudice are almost always integrally related (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996). Feelings of prejudice nearly always encompass stereotypical beliefs about outgroups, and endorsement of stereotypes usually carries an accompanying negative affect and evaluation of the outgroup in question. Note that stereotyping and prejudice are almost always related. This is because there are some instances where one may not have prejudice toward the outgroup in question and may have knowledge of (but not personally endorse) stereotypes (Devine, 1989). Because stereotyping and prejudice are linked in our social perceptions, it is important therefore to understand the origin of prejudice, how it interacts with stereotyping in ways that maintain the stereotype, and how stereotypes can promote the maintenance of prejudice toward outgroups. Most researchers conceptualize prejudice as originating out of a motivational impetus (Brown, 1995; Fiske, 1998; Jones, 1997)—that is, the reason one endorses stereotypical beliefs and holds negative feelings toward another group is to attain one’s own psychological goals. More specifically, we tend to dislike others in

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order to feel better about ourselves. Let us turn now to an examination of the various theories that discuss the genesis and structure of prejudice through the lens of pursuing one’s goals.

Social Identity Theory In the last 30 years, perhaps no other theory of prejudice has had as strong an impact on the field of prejudice research than social identity theory (SIT) by Tajfel and Turner (1979, 1986). According to SIT, we all have a need for positive self-­regard, and this need fuels motivational and cognitive biases in social perception aimed at helping us feel good about ourselves. The theory says that there are essentially two ways we can obtain positive self-­regard: by one’s own achievements, and by the groups to which one belongs. If I create, accomplish, or achieve some goal, I should feel good about myself and my abilities. My self-­esteem should naturally be high as I bask in the glow of my accomplishment. However, in those instances where one hasn’t particularly achieved or accomplished something to one’s satisfaction, positive self-­regard may be obtained by thinking about one’s social identity—the part of one’s self-­concept that is based on one’s membership in social groups. In other words, if I feel like my self-­esteem is a bit low (if I don’t have any personal achievements to boost my self-­esteem), I may try to restore my self-­regard by considering that I belong to one or more groups that are highly regarded in society. By doing so, I can bolster my deflated self-­esteem and thus meet the strong need (that we all have, according to the theory) for high self-­esteem. SIT is premised on the notion we discussed earlier that people naturally partition their social environment into “us” (ingroups) and “them” (outgroups). It further states that people are motivated to perceive their own groups as superior to other groups on important, valued dimensions. This creates a bias in favor of their own group, and against outgroups. The theory suggests that one way one can increase one’s positive feeling about one’s ingroup is to derogate (or evaluate negatively) outgroups. What happens when one’s ingroup is one that has been traditionally of lower status, or was high status but now that high status is being questioned (or is fading)? SIT says that in these instances, we tend to highlight the unique, or distinctive nature of our group (Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997) in order to shield our group from the potential for a decline in status. Another way we maintain the perceived high status of our group is by derogating deviant or stereotype-­confirming ingroup members (so-­called black sheep), or others that reflect poorly on the ingroup, in an effort to maintain the status of one’s ingroup. So SIT says that we are highly motivated to show ingroup bias (favoritism) for our ingroups, and we are also motivated to negatively evaluate outgroups (and members thereof). According to SIT, this intergroup bias is the core reason that prejudice toward outgroups emerges. However, empirical scrutiny lends support to only parts of SIT. Research has shown, for example, that while we do tend to favor our ingroups, and this bolsters our self-­esteem (e.g., Chin, 1995; Hirt, Zillman, Erickson, & Kennedy, 1992), there is less evidence that we also regularly engage in outgroup derogation (but see Fein & Spencer, 1997, for evidence that prejudice emerges solely from outgroup derogation) as a way of enhancing self-­esteem (Branscombe & Wann, 1994; Brewer, 1979; Jetten, Spears, & Manstead, 1996). Thus, we can be prejudiced toward outgroups even if we do not derogate those outgroups, because we are favoring our own ingroups (Jones, 1997). Recall from our definition of prejudice (in Chapter 1) that prejudice does not only mean

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negative affect directed toward an outgroup—­it can also refer to a preference for favoring of one’s ingroups. In other words, prejudice is more about ingroup love than outgroup hate. The main tenet of SIT, that people engage in group comparisons to enhance their self-­esteem, has also been the subject of increasing criticism in the last few decades (Abrams & Hogg, 1988; Hogg & Abrams, 1990; Swann & Bosson, 2010). Critics of the self-­esteem-­enhancing motive proposed by SIT point to the finding that people who have low self-­esteem sometimes identify more with their embattled ingroup, rather than seek a higher-­status group (Brewer & Brown, 1998; Long & Spears, 1997). Other research indicates that it is those with high self-­esteem who show a greater identification with low-­status groups than those who have low self-­esteem. Thus, while self-­esteem may not be a prime motive in the dynamics of social identity and ingroup–­outgroup relations, it remains an important part of the motivations that drive social identity processes. The theoretical and empirical issues with self-­esteem, and the lack of empirical support for the derogation of outgroups as a self-­esteem enhancement strategy, led some researchers to turn to other theories of motivation that may better explain the origins of prejudice. Despite these critics, SIT remains an influential theory of intergroup relations. It continues to provide a useful model of the origin of prejudice (Swann & Bosson, 2010). Some research even suggests that neuroscientific methods (e.g., functional magnetic resonance imaging [fMRI]) support SIT and help modify the model by identifying more subtle forms of intergroup prejudice (Scheepers & Derks, 2016).

Optimal Distinctiveness Theory Recall that SIT suggests that people sometimes feel a need to identify strongly with a particular group in order to enhance their self-­esteem. Brewer (1991) suggests that our social motives are governed by an alternating tension between our need to be unique and our need to belong. In her optimal distinctiveness theory (ODT), Brewer (1991; Leonardelli, Pickett, & Brewer, 2010) suggests that it is aversive for people to be too extreme regarding the needs for uniqueness and belongingness. In these cases, an individual’s sense of worth and security is in jeopardy, and this motivates the individual to find groups that can help provide a balance between these opposing needs. ODT therefore predicts that we will feel isolated and alone if we too extremely fulfill the uniqueness need, and this comes with the cost of a diminished sense of belongingness. However, too much enmeshment of one’s social identity into a group can also have negative consequences, such as a diminished sense of a unique personal identity. Indeed, there is evidence that if one’s social identity is strongly salient (i.e., one’s personal identity recedes into the background in favor of belongingness), there is an increased tendency to evaluate outgroups in terms of shared ingroup stereotypes about the outgroups (Haslam, Oakes, Reynolds, & Turner, 1999). Therefore, one reason that exclusive groups are so valued is that they tend to provide just the right balance between uniqueness and belongingness (Brewer & Brown, 1998). This theory then nicely accounts for the findings discussed earlier that sometimes people more strongly identify with low-­status groups. Specifically, ODT says that when the need for uniqueness is strong, people value membership in minority groups (because these groups can fulfill the need for uniqueness) more than membership in a majority group. They value such allegiance irrespective of any gulf in status between the

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minority and majority. So, according to ODT, if we want to be able to predict when and with what group an individual will identify, we need to know more than the status of the individual’s ingroups relative to their outgroups. To be more accurate in our prediction of intergroup behavior, we need to understand the balance between the belongingness and uniqueness motives in the individual. This theory has much intuitive appeal, and it elegantly addresses some of the criticisms that dogged SIT. While only a few studies have tested ODT, most have indicated support for the predictions of ODT (Brewer, Manzi, & Shaw, 1993; Comello, 2011; Hornsey & Hogg, 1999; Leonardelli & Brewer, 2001; Slotter, Duffy, & Gardner, 2014), while others do not support ODT (Hiel & Mervielde, 2002). More research is needed if we are to have a better understanding of the extent to which ODT allows us to predict general intergroup behavior, and group identification and prejudice in particular.

Scapegoat Theory Some theorists have suggested that the likelihood of intergroup conflict is often tied to economic conditions, and that when the times get tough economically, people are more likely to take their frustration out on outgroups. In one of the earliest studies of this idea, Hovland and Sears (1940; see also Hepworth & West, 1988) analyzed the relationship between the number of lynchings of Black individuals (most of which occurred in the southern United States) and the economy of the south. They operationalized “economy” by measuring the farm value of cotton, and the per-acre value of cotton, because cotton was a major product of the south, and it would therefore be a good index of economic impact for the population studied. Hovland and Sears charted the economy from 1882 to 1930, and found, in line with their predictions, that lynchings were more frequent during hard economic times (i.e., when cotton prices were low), and lynchings were more infrequent during times of prosperity (see Chapter 1 for some complications to these findings). Why would people be motivated to dislike another group when that outgroup had nothing to do with the source of their frustration/anger? In Hovland and Sears’s (1940) study, why would White individuals commit such violence against African Americans when the price of cotton fell? One explanation that has empirical support is known as scapegoat theory (Allport, 1954; Berkowitz & Green, 1962). This theory postulates that when an individual becomes thwarted from a particular goal, they may feel anger, irritation, or disappointment. In general, we tend to feel negatively when something prohibits us from attaining what we want. The anger or hostility we feel toward that frustrating agent may be, in many ways, similar to the negative emotion associated with one’s views of a disliked outgroup. What happens then, according to the theory, is that because both the frustrating agent and the outgroup arouse similar emotions, they tend to become associated in the individual’s memory. As Berkowitz and Green suggest, “There is an acquired equivalence between the frustrater and the minority group which mediates the generalization of the aggressive responses from the former to the latter” (p. 295). Some have suggested that the scapegoat theory may be one contributing factor to wars, and conflict between groups, from the beginning of human history (Allport, 1954). For example, throughout the last several thousand years, an often-­scapegoated group has been Jewish persons (Allport, 1954). Many scholars suggest that Hitler was able to rally his country around his ideas because, in part, he introduced a common scapegoat—­t he

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Jews—for Germany’s economic plight after its defeat in World War I (e.g., see G ­ oldhagen, 1996). While the scapegoat theory has intuitive appeal, it has received mixed empirical support. A problem with the theory has been the fact that many studies have shown that when people are frustrated they are no less and no more prejudiced toward disliked outgroups than they are toward other, liked outgroups (Brown, 1995). Another problem with the theory is that it cannot explain the choice of targets (scapegoats). For example, the theory is not able to predict which disliked outgroup the Germans in the 1930s would choose as their scapegoat (Stroebe & Insko, 1989). As a result, researchers have turned to another approach to understanding intergroup prejudice, called “relative deprivation.”

Relative Deprivation People are routinely comparing themselves to others, in order to assess how their attitudes, cognitions, feelings, or behaviors compare to others in their environment (Festinger, 1954). We also tend to compare our situation to that of others—­t hat is, we are interested in knowing whether the things we have (status, power, wealth, possessions, employment, etc.) are equal to, lesser than, or greater than other individuals (and outgroups) in our society. For example, suppose every one of your classmates has unlimited data on their cell phone, and you have a paltry 5-gig limit. In comparing yourself to your classmates, you may experience what Davis (1959) called “relative deprivation”—that is, your situation is lesser than that of others (you are deprived of an important quality, Z, relative to a particular group). In his formal statement of relative deprivation theory, Davis suggests that if people (1) decide that they want Z, (2) compare themselves to similar others who have Z, and (3) feel entitled to Z, then they will feel deprived. In the intergroup context, then, the theory suggests that feelings of prejudice and hostility toward outgroups arise out of a feeling of relative deprivation with regard to that outgroup in terms of an important goal (e.g., good educational opportunities, jobs, housing). As with the scapegoat theory, the empirical literature on relative deprivation has yielded only intermittent support. Bernstein and Crosby (1980) note that this may be due, in large part, to the fact that relative deprivation is defined differently by different researchers. While four versions of the theory (including Davis’s 1959 version) have been popular, they adhere to the basic elements of Davis’s model. Despite the mixed empirical support, the theory continues to generate substantial interest among researchers (Pettigrew, 2016; Smith & Pettigrew, 2015). This research has also suggested a further refinement in Davis’s original formulation. Runciman (1961) suggested that it is important to distinguish between “egoistic relative deprivation” and “fraternal (or collective) relative deprivation.” The former is the type of situation in which an individual compares their life to that of other individuals (as in the example of comparing your cell phone data to your classmates’). Collective relative deprivation, however, involves a comparison of how one’s ingroup fares relative to an outgroup with regard to a desired goal (Shteynberg, Leslie, Knight, & Mayer, 2011). Subsequent theory (Crosby, 1976) and research (e.g., Guimond & Dube-­Simard, 1983; Vanneman & Pettigrew, 1972) have supported this distinction (with some exceptions; see Osborne, Sibley, Huo, & Smith, 2015) and the data indicate that while collective relative deprivation is strongly related to negative outgroup perceptions, egoistic relative deprivation does not appear to be related to negative outgroup evaluations. For example, Vanneman & Pettigrew found the most

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anti-Black prejudice among White Americans who felt they (as a group) were worse off than others. More recently, White Americans living in rural parts of the United States have seen jobs and incomes decline over the past few decades, which has led many to demonize Black Americans and recent immigrants for their woes (Hochschild, 2018). Thus, feelings of prejudice emerge when one’s group is perceived to be at a disadvantage in comparison to another group. As research on the notion of relative deprivation suggests, it only appears to be the case that we develop feelings of hostility and prejudice toward another group if we believe that our ingroup as a whole is at a disadvantage, relative to an outgroup, with regard to an important goal. But why do you suppose we don’t feel outgroup hostility and prejudice toward other groups when we feel that our own situation is worse than that of other individuals? One possibility is that it may arouse greater feelings of helplessness and threat to believe that one’s ingroup is at a disadvantage relative to another group. As individuals, there’s not much we can do to control or affect the standing of our group compared to an outgroup, and that sense of powerlessness may be a strong contributor to the prejudice that arises between groups when those groups vie for similar goals. In other words, if we cannot change the disadvantaged status of our group relative to an outgroup, one way we can vent this frustration and also try to equalize the two groups is by bringing down the other group by directing feelings of prejudice toward the outgroup. However, we have much more control over our own situation, and a feeling of relative deprivation compared to other individuals (in one’s ingroup or outside of one’s ingroup) would tend to arouse in oneself either a sense of increased motivation to reduce that discrepancy, or a sense of dejection (if one believes they cannot reduce that discrepancy). In this situation, it wouldn’t make any sense to foster prejudice toward an outgroup for the feelings of deprivation one feels at the egoistic (and individual) level, because railing against outgroups wouldn’t really better one’s individual situation.

Realistic Conflict Theory Closely related to relative deprivation are our feelings toward outgroups against whom our group is competing for a scarce resource. Notice, here the goal is not just similar, it is scarce, and that may mean that one group gets the goal, and the other one doesn’t. In this instance, the goal is thus a finite, “zero-sum” scenario (i.e., there is only one winner, and there must be a loser; two cannot share or each get the prize). Campbell (1965) suggested that these cases represent “realistic” conflicts, because they are based on competition for real resources. In his realistic conflict theory (RCT), Campbell suggested that when two groups are in competition for scarce resources, feelings of hostility and prejudice toward the other group will emerge. Zárate, Garcia, Garza, and Hitlan (2004) demonstrated that realistic conflict-­induced prejudice tends to emerge when people perceive an outgroup as having similar work-­related personality traits and abilities. Interestingly, however, when perceivers were asked to evaluate an outgroup’s similarity to themselves on non-work-­related traits, they were less prejudiced against who were rated as more similar. In a classic demonstration of Campbell’s (1965) prediction, Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, and Sherif (1961) conducted an experiment with a group of twenty-­t wo 11-yearold boys who were going to a summer camp at Robbers Cave State Park in Oklahoma.

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Sherif had designed the whole camp experience as a study of RCT and had obtained permission from the boys’ parents and school administrators to include the boys in this experiment. The boys were selected on the basis of similar (above-­average) IQ scores (median score of 112); good school performance; and no physical, psychological, or emotional problems. Of course, the boys were unaware that their camp experience was designed to examine the tenets of RCT. Sherif trained the camp counselors, and essentially, they were to remain fairly nondirective (within reason), allowing the boys to choose what activities they would like to do, and so on. Sherif ’s plan was to have 11 boys ride to camp on one bus, and set up camp at the other end of the park, unaware of the other group of 11 boys at the opposite end of the park. During Phase 1, which lasted about a week, the boys were oblivious to the existence of the other group. Sherif wanted them to form an ingroup identity, and each group chose a name for their group (one called themselves the “Eagles,” and the other boys called themselves the “Rattlers”), and to do activities to foster friendships and group unity and loyalty (such as pitching tents, serving meals, climbing on dams, making signs, etc.). After this initial phase, the two groups were introduced to each other. During Phase 2, Sherif brought the two groups together to compete in a series of sporting events, and the winning team would receive a team trophy, money, and medals and pocket knives for each member of the winning team. Thus, the boys were competing for a scarce resource. As RCT would predict, the boys during this stage started to show a great deal of outgroup prejudice. They referred to the other team members as “sneaky” and “stinkers,” while they described their own group members as “brave” and “friendly.” They raided each other’s cabins, stole items from the other group, and their dislike for the outgroup members was evident in their prejudiced feelings about and stereotypes of the outgroup members. When asked who their friends were, the boys invariably listed only ingroup members as their friends. At the end of Phase 2, the winning team (the Rattlers) was announced, and that team was given their prizes. During the final phase of the camp experience (Phase 3), Sherif wanted to reduce the prejudice that had been produced through competition. He first decided to test the contact hypothesis, which suggests that prejudice can be eliminated (or reduced) if two groups are brought into contact with each other (Allport, 1954). The idea here is that because prejudice is often born out of ignorance and fear, then having people get together with outgroup members (with whom they normally have little contact) would result in them forming intergroup friendships, and their prejudices would subside (we discuss the contact hypothesis in greater detail in Chapter 12). To test this prediction, the boys were asked to sit among the outgroup members at the camp cafeteria, alternating every seat with an ingroup member, an outgroup member, an ingroup member, and so on. Unfortunately, this did not result in decreased prejudice, but a food fight between groups. Prejudice was still high between groups. Sherif then decided to test another prediction made by RCT. Campbell (1965) speculated that when the goals of two groups are compatible, the attitudes of one group toward the other group should be more tolerant, if not outright friendly. Sherif introduced two situations where the goals of the two groups were compatible. In each instance, the goal could not be accomplished without the assistance of the other group. So, all of the boys needed to work together to solve what Sherif referred to as a superordinate goal. In theory, the superordinate goal should work to reduce ingroup/outgroup distinctions and cause the individuals to reconceptualize their group

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affiliation in terms of a unified, inclusive group (and thereby abandoning—­or at least relegating to a lesser role—their former separate group affiliations). In one situation, the camp’s water supply malfunctioned (a paper sack had clogged the faucet of the camp water supply). The boys worked together to brainstorm ideas on how to clear the faucet of the obstruction, and they were successful. In the other situation, Sherif arranged for the bus that was to take them home from the camp to break down. Specifically, the boys were told it wouldn’t start. The boys again worked together to think of a way to get it to start (manually, by getting the bus to move and the driver would then try the ignition). They decided to hook a rope to the bus, all of the boys pulled the bus, and the driver was able to start the bus. After these events, Sherif and the counselors noticed a dramatic decline (if not absence) in hostility between the groups. Indeed, each group started regarding outgroup members in positive terms, and some even formed outgroup friendships. As an epilogue to this classic experiment, on the way home, the boys chose to ride on one bus (not two separate buses), and the Rattlers decided to spend their $5.00 for ice cream for all of the boys. Subsequent lab and field research on RCT has yielded data supportive of the theory (Brown, 1995; Jones, 1997; Krosch, Tyler, & Amodio, 2017). However, critics have noted a couple of problems with the theory (Brewer & Brown, 1998). One is that subsequent research has indicated that ingroup identification is harder to eliminate than the Sherif et al. (1961) data would lead one to believe. Thus, even though two groups may be motivated to work together on a superordinate goal, they still tend to identify themselves along their separate group identities, and not as a larger, single group. As such, it becomes more difficult to not think in terms of “us” and “them,” and the associated prejudices and stereotypes about the outgroup therefore become that much more difficult to eliminate. However, Hornsey and Hogg (2000) contend that maintaining one’s separate group identity is not only OK but essential to intergroup harmony. These researchers suggest that as long as groups can maintain their important group identity and successfully locate these identities within the “context of a binding superordinate identity” (p. 143), the likelihood of intergroup tension will be greatly reduced. A second problem is that, even before the Rattlers and Eagles were to formally compete for the prizes, they expressed a desire—­almost immediately upon learning of the other groups’ existence—­to compete and win against “them.” Recall that such a finding doesn’t fit with RCT, because according to RCT, feelings of hostility toward an outgroup will emerge only when one’s group is competing for a scarce resource with that outgroup. Some researchers (e.g., Fiske & Rusher, 1993; Perdue et al., 1990) have suggested that it may be the case that merely seeing someone else as an “outgroup” member can arouse negative affect in a perceiver. Such a possibility would nicely explain the anomalous findings in the Sherif et al. study and speak to the growing literature on the automaticity of stereotyping and prejudice (see Chapter 4 for our discussion of implicit stereotyping). Finally, there is a long-­standing debate about whether the threat posed by an outgroup stems more from a realistic threat (e.g., over jobs, housing, educational opportunities) versus a symbolic threat (Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios, 2016). The latter includes perceived threats to a group’s value system, their “way of life,” and other cherished beliefs. For example, it is unlikely that allowing gay and lesbian couples to marry will be a threat to anyone’s livelihood, yet many people believe that it does pose a threat to the “traditional family.” We examine symbolic threats more deeply in Chapters 6 (racism), and 9 (heterosexism).

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SUMMARY In this chapter, we have examined research and theory on the factors that contribute to the formation of prejudice and stereotypes, and the reasons why stereotypes and prejudice persist, even in the face of stereotype-­inconsistent information. Research in social cognition has led to great advances in our understanding of the nature of stereotyping, showing, for example, that stereotyping is the result of the mind’s normal tendency to categorize stimuli in the environment, and is not—at least for most of us—the product of a deviant mind, or maladjusted personality. Of course, such a conclusion does not in any way suggest that we ought to condone the endorsement of stereotyped beliefs. Rather, it clarifies that stereotyping is an outgrowth of the innate tendency of the human brain to categorize the world, in order to greatly simplify the amount of information it must deal with at any given moment. With this perspective, researchers have been able to identify the cognitive tendencies and processes (such as illusory correlations, subcategorization) whereby we maintain the simplified view of the world, and we maintain the cognitive efficiency (and frequent inaccuracy) that stereotypes afford us in our daily lives. These tendencies tend to be somewhat automatic, and as such are difficult to control. However, because one knows of stereotypes does not imply that one endorses them, and this is an important distinction in our understanding of the difference between high- and low-­prejudice persons (and we discuss this in detail in the next chapter). We then explored the reasons why some people dislike other groups, and our discussion focused on the motivational factors that lead to the development and maintenance of such prejudices. Motivational theories for prejudice have tended to implicate the self, self-­esteem, and group identity as factors that lead one to actively dislike other groups, in order to feel better about oneself or one’s ingroups. Current researchers are focusing on motivational explanations of prejudice, as they have the most explanatory power and theoretical promise as a tool for understanding the nature of prejudice, and we explore this further in the final chapter in our discussion of future trends and unanswered questions in prejudice research.

GLOSSARY Contact Hypothesis—the prediction that intergroup prejudice will diminish (or be eliminated) when the two groups are brought into contact with each other. Illusory Correlation—the overestimation of the association between two variables (e.g., a group and a trait/behavior) that are either weakly or not related at all. Implicit Theories—our individual beliefs about the nature of personality, and the behaviors, attitudes, and values associated with certain types of individuals. Ingroups—those groups to which we believe we belong. Ingroup Bias—the tendency to favor, and have positive affect for, members of one’s own group, and to attribute more positive characteristics to one’s ingroups than to outgroups. Minimal Groups—groups formed on the basis of some (sometimes trivial) criteria, and which are otherwise devoid of the normal aspects of group life, such

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as face-to-face interaction, group norms, interactions with other groups, and a group structure. Optimal Distinctiveness Theory—suggests that our social motives are governed by an alternating tension between our need for uniqueness and our need to belong to groups. We are therefore motivated to find and affiliate with groups that can help provide a balance between these opposing needs. Outgroups—those groups to which we believe we do not belong. Outgroup Homogeneity—the belief that members of outgroups are more similar to one another than are members of one’s ingroups (“they all look alike”). Realistic Conflict Theory—a theory of intergroup conflict, which states that when groups are competing for scarce resources, prejudice and hostility between the groups will result. Relative Deprivation Theory—states that when groups perceive that they are at a disadvantage relative to an outgroup in their attainment of important group goals, the group that feels disadvantaged (or deprived) feels prejudice and resentment toward the other group. Scapegoat Theory—postulates that when an individual becomes thwarted from a particular goal, the person may feel anger, irritation, or disappointment. That anger is similar to the negative affect people feel toward disliked outgroups, and eventually, the outgroup is blamed for the ingroup’s failure to attain their goal, and the ingroup feels prejudice toward the outgroup. Social Identity Theory—states that the need for positive self-­esteem motivates individuals to perceive people in the environment in terms of ingroups and outgroups. Suggests that people can get positive self-­esteem either by their own accomplishments, or by affiliating with high-­status groups. Subcategorization—the tendency to create a special, separate cognitive category for deviant (i.e., stereotype-­disconfirming) members of a stereotyped outgroup, leading the original stereotype to remain intact; also referred to as “subtyping.” Superordinate Goal—a task that, if it is to be completed successfully, requires the cooperative efforts of two (or more) groups.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. After reviewing the research on the automatic nature of stereotyping, what do you think about Macrae et al.’s (1997) suggestion that seeing a category word will evoke the associated stereotypes, but seeing a member from that category may not necessarily evoke stereotypes (because the perceiver may categorize the individual on another salient dimension)? 2. How do your salient ingroups change as you go from one social situation to another, and as you go from one social interaction to the next? How do you

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think this influences (or does not influence) your tendency to perceive others according to their category membership (and to evoke various stereotypes about other persons)? 3. In your own experiences, what sources of stereotypes (e.g., parents, television, magazines, friends) have been most prevalent and influential? When do you think you started noticing different social groups and developing attitudes toward them? 4. Can you identify some major stereotypes that are communicated in today’s media (movies, social media, television)? What are some specific examples of prejudiced or stereotypical messages or portrayals of a group? 5. How much do feelings and thoughts of relative deprivation contribute to prejudice in the United States today? 6. How would realistic conflict versus symbolic threats explain anti-­immigrant attitudes?

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CHAPTER 3

Feeling versus Thinking in the Activation and Application of Stereotypes

Suppose you have a stereotype about people who live in the upper Midwest (the Dako-

tas, Minnesota, Wisconsin). Based on your extensive knowledge of Midwesterners (you watched the movie Fargo once), you believe you have a pretty good idea of what people in that strange land are like. Among many of your firmly held convictions about Midwesterners are the beliefs that they all have a strange accent, and their speech is peppered by funny words and phrases like “youbetcha,” “yah,” “shuure,” and “oh geeez.” Having spent the first 22 years of my (T. D. N.) life in Minnesota (Minneapolis, to be exact), and having been to the Dakotas and Wisconsin, I can assure you that Midwesterners are nothing like your stereotype (OK, maybe some are). You’ve developed a stereotype, and it leads you to a number of assumptions, beliefs, expectations, and perhaps negative feelings about Midwesterners. When I meet you, and tell you where I was raised, will you react to me on the basis of your stereotypes or your negative feelings (prejudices) about people from the midwest? In other words, when we have stereotypes about other groups, are our behaviors, thoughts, and feelings guided primarily by our beliefs or by our affect associated with the group? This is a difficult question to address, and one that has intrigued prejudice researchers for decades. When you are in a certain mood, are you more or less likely to rely on stereotypes when you are evaluating outgroup members? Can we just decide to not stereotype? What are the cognitive and affective factors that lead us to be more likely to stereotype others? In this chapter, we explore these and many other questions in detail, and attempt to understand the complex interaction of mood and cognition as they enhance or inhibit our ability to carefully evaluate other individuals in our environment. Unfortunately, we won’t be able to explain why, after a 5-minute phone conversation with my sister, who lives in Fargo, I find myself saying “youbetcha” for the rest of the day.

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MOOD Since the early 1970s, research on stereotyping has been dominated by a social-­cognitive perspective, which focuses on how people think about others and about themselves (Hamilton, 1981; Stephan, 1985). Discussions of stereotyping during the 1970s and early 1980s centered on understanding the processes involved in the way perceivers processed social information, and how breakdowns or biases in this information processing increased the reliance of the individual on stereotypes for making social judgments (Brewer & Kramer, 1985; Hamilton & Trolier, 1986; Taylor & Crocker, 1981). A major benefit of the cognitive approach to stereotyping has been the demonstration of the important influence of expectations about social groups on social judgments and attitudes and behavior toward outgroups. Examples of this type of theorizing include research demonstrating that intergroup discrimination can originate from categorization (e.g., Tajfel, 1970), that the context-­based salience of outgroup members (e.g., a woman in a group of all men is more likely to be perceived according to gender stereotypes and assumptions, rather than any other characteristics) can affect how those persons are perceived (e.g., Taylor, Fiske, Etcoff, & Ruderman, 1978), and that biases in the way distinctive information about outgroup members is perceived can lead to an increased tendency to stereotype outgroup members (e.g., Hamilton & Gifford, 1976). During this period of cognitive dominance in the social-­psychological investigation of stereotyping, the investigation of the influence of affect on stereotyping (an area of research pursued with much less vigor) continued. Yet, amid the emphasis on cognition, a few researchers called for the examination of the role of affect in stereotyping (e.g., Fiske, 1982; Hamilton, 1981). Toward the end of the 1980s, researchers began to take a closer look at the influence of affect on cognitive processes (e.g., Forgas, 1990; Isen, 1987; Schwarz, 1990). This change was precipitated by the development of several theoretical perspectives concerning the nature and structure of emotion (e.g., Frijda, 1988; Ortony, Clore, & Collins, 1988). In an influential article, Zanna and Rempel (1988) argued that attitudes toward different attitude objects might be more or less determined by affective, rather than cognitive, sources (see also Zajonc, 1984). Researchers soon began investigating more directly the effects of positive versus negative moods on the tendency to stereotype others in social judgments (Mackie & Hamilton, 1993). In addition to the growing empirical basis for returning to the investigation of emotion’s effects on stereotyping, there were theoretical and intuitive reasons for such a renaissance of emotion experiments in intergroup perception. Traditionally, emotions were thought to contribute importantly to the development and endurance of stereotypes (Allport, 1954; Lippmann, 1922). The history of intergroup relations is replete with evidence that intense emotions guide the thoughts and actions of people in intergroup contexts (Katz, 1981). Affect plays a major role in the way that information about social groups and group members is processed. Affect influences the accessibility of constructs in memory and thus may determine which of many social representations are primed, and which characteristics in a given representation become activated (Forgas, 1992; ­Keltner & Horberg, 2015; Stangor, 1990). Affect may also influence the extent to which the individual exerts information-­processing effort (Avnet, Tuan, & ­Stephen, 2012; Schwarz, 1990, 2012; Stangor & Lange, 1994). Affect also becomes associated with social group labels through learning processes (Bower & Cohen, 1982; Clark, Milberg,

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& Erber, 1988). In a fascinating series of experiments, Cottrell and Neuberg (2005) predicted that outgroups provoke distinct emotional reactions in the perceiver, depending on their unique perceived threat to the perceiver’s ingroup. But this unique reaction is lost on general measures of prejudice. Their results confirmed these predictions: Different groups evoked different emotional “profiles” (a unique set of emotional responses) that were unique to the specific outgroup. When affect and physiological arousal are associated with group members, they influence how information about the outgroup member is interpreted, how the perceiver responds to the outgroup member, and whether the perceiver tends to interact with members of the target group in the future. Below, we consider the findings reported thus far in this rapidly growing area of investigation.

Types of Intergroup Affect In one step toward specifying further the nature of affect in the intergroup context, Bodenhausen (1993) has introduced the useful distinction between incidental and integral affect. The former is defined as affect that is elicited by situations unrelated to the intergroup context, while the latter is affect that is elicited within the intergroup context involving the stereotyped outgroup. Integral affect can also arise from merely thinking about the outgroup. Bodenhausen notes that much research on stereotyping has utilized incidental affect, but surprisingly few studies have examined the influence of integral affect on judgments of members of stereotyped outgroups. It is useful to make a further distinction regarding integral affect. It is reasonable to suggest that individuals should have a rather stable feeling toward the outgroup as a whole, which may be termed chronic outgroup affect. In addition, people can also have an affective reaction within an interaction with a specific outgroup member, and this can be termed episodic outgroup affect. Below, we consider the research evidence on chronic and episodic racial affect, as well as incidental affect.

Chronic Outgroup Affect Attitudes have traditionally been viewed as stable, enduring evaluations of an attitude object (Banaji & Heiphetz, 2010; Fishbein & Ajzen, 1974; Petty & Cacioppo, 1981). An attitude object is defined as anything about which one forms an attitude (e.g., idea, person, object). This idea certainly holds true for the notion of outgroup attitudes. In his classic treatise, The Nature of Prejudice, Allport (1954) defined a stereotype as “a fixed idea that accompanies a category” (p. 191). Because one’s outgroup attitude was believed to be a stable evaluation of the outgroup and its members, it was assumed that any evaluation of the outgroup member in the future, regardless of the context, would be a direct result of the simple recall of the perceiver’s stored evaluation of the outgroup member. Because any attitude (or “evaluation” of the attitude object) has incorporated within it both a cognitive and affective component (Breckler & Wiggins, 1989; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993), it is reasonable to suggest that the affect associated with the attitude is also an enduring feature of the evaluation of the attitude object. In other words, each time the attitude object is perceived or remembered, the evaluation will trigger beliefs and other information associated with the object, as well as enduring feelings associated with the attitude object (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993; Fiske & Pavelchak, 1986). This process also

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holds when considering enduring intergroup attitudes. The affect that one feels toward the outgroup, as a result of one’s enduring attitude toward the outgroup, can be termed “chronic outgroup affect.” This affect is distinct from affective reactions to an interaction with a specific member of the outgroup. In order to better understand the affect that accompanies this enduring outgroup attitude, it is useful to examine further the nature of the enduring outgroup attitude. The attitudes of White Americans toward African Americans have been increasingly liberal and egalitarian since the mid-1960s, suggesting to some that prejudice in this country has decreased, and that over the decades, Whites’ attitudes toward Blacks are becoming less prejudiced (Welch & Sigelman, 2011). However, much research suggests that while the overt form of hostility and prejudice toward African Americans may be much less prevalent, prejudice continues to exist in a more subtle form (Crosby, Bromley, & Saxe, 1980; Devine & Elliot, 1995; Gaertner, 1976; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1977, 1981; McConahay & Hough, 1976; O’Brien, Crandall, Horstman-­Reser, Warner, Alsbrooks, & Blodorn, 2010; Perry, Murphy, & Dovidio, 2015; Sears & Allen, 1984). Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) use the phrase aversive racism to describe the prejudiced attitude toward African Americans that characterizes many White Americans. Aversive racists, according to Gaertner and Dovidio (1986), truly believe they are egalitarian and regard themselves as nonprejudiced (Gaertner, Dovidio, & Pearson, 2017). However, they may also be more likely to have negative feelings about African Americans. If they can do so in a subtle, easily rationalizable fashion, these individuals may express negative attitudes toward African Americans, yet feel no affective consequences (i.e., guilt, shame, sadness) of doing so, thereby preserving the self from threatening conflict-­related negative affect (Monteith, 1996). Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) suggested that this anti-Black affect has a number of possible sources. Basic social categorization (i.e., “us” and “them”) between Whites and African Americans can fuel this negative affect (e.g., Margaret Mead’s statement that people “must be taught to hate, but the appreciation and fear of difference is everywhere” [as cited in Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986, p. 63]). The multiple effects of mere categorization of people into ingroups and outgroups has biasing effects for the perceiver on the perception and evaluation of people, irrespective of objective evaluations of the individual being perceived (Billig & Tajfel, 1973; Otten, 2016). People in the ingroup are (1) assumed to be more similar in beliefs, (2) evaluated more favorably, (3) the recipients of more positive behavior by the perceiver than are members of outgroups, and (4) found to be more attractive by the perceiver (Brewer, 1979). There is evidence that aversive racism may bias how news stories are processed, both by the journalists and by the public at large. One study varied the role of the person in a news story (victim or perpetrator), and the race of the individual (Black vs. White), and looked at how subjects who are low or high in “social dominance orientation” (SDO; Sidanius, 1993) perceive the individual in the story (Johnson & Hong, 2017). The results indicated that those high in SDO expressed the most empathy toward Black perpetrators in homicide news stories. On the other hand, and in keeping with aversive racism, subjects high in SDO who read stories about perpetrators also were more likely to express negative Black stereotypes compared to those who read about victims. Some suggest that social and cultural factors also contribute to the anti-Black affect felt by aversive racists. These anti-Black feelings are fostered by traditional cultural stereotypes of Blacks in the United States as lazy, ignorant, poor, and more likely to commit

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crimes (Karlins, Coffman, & Walters, 1969). Finally, some research suggests that Whites tend to see Black culture in the United States as promoting values that are at odds with the Protestant work ethic (e.g., hard work, discipline; Jackson et al., 1996). Central to low-­prejudice individuals’ self-­concept is their belief that they possess egalitarian values. Their negative feelings about African Americans are often kept out of awareness so that such feelings do not threaten their view of their self as egalitarian and nonprejudiced. When a situation threatens to make these negative feelings salient, the low-­prejudice individual tries to dissociate themselves from these feelings, and often acts more positively in ways that will convince oneself and others that they are not prejudiced (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Monteith, 1993). Because much affect in intergroup contexts involving stereotyped groups tends to be negative, empirical attention has been devoted to the influence of such affective states on judgments of the members of the stereotyped outgroup. In general, when people feel negative affect, they are especially likely to describe racial outgroups using unfavorable characteristics (Esses & Zanna, 1995). The particular negative affective state that has been investigated the most is anxiety, because it is commonly experienced by individuals in an intergroup interaction (Amodio & Hamilton, 2012; Dollard, Doob, Miller, ­Mowrer, & Sears, 1939; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Schultz, Gaither, Urry, & Maddox, 2015; Stephan & Stephan, 1985; Wilder, 1993). Stephan and Stephan (1985; Stephan, Ybarra, & Rios, 2015) developed a theoretical model of intergroup anxiety. In this model, anxiety has a disruptive effect on the behaviors, thoughts, and feelings of the minority-­outgroup member and the majority-­g roup perceiver. This anxiety can also lead to increased stereotyping by the perceiver, and an avoidance of future intergroup interaction, and attempts by the perceiver to control others (Fiske, Morling, & Stevens, 1996). According to Stephan and Stephan, the amount and conditions of intergroup contact are crucial determinants in whether the individual will experience anxiety prior to, or during, interactions with the outgroup. When there has been minimal contact, and/or the contact has been characterized by conflict, the individual tends to feel more anxiety prior to or during the intergroup interaction (Stephan, 2014). Research by Wilder (1993; Wilder & Shapiro, 1989) and others (e.g., Rankin & Campbell, 1955) supports the notion that anxiety may be a common emotion felt among interactants in the intergroup contexts. Moreover, anxiety may promote stereotyping of outgroup members by an affective consistency process (cuing more negative cognitions) or through increased reliance on expectancies (and schemas) regarding outgroup members as a result of a reduction in cognitive capacity (Bodenhausen, 1993). Stereotyping may also occur through a combination of each of these two processes. Interesting recent research suggests that the negative effect of intergroup anxiety on outgroup attitudes can be significantly attenuated by being “mindful” (Price-­Blackshear, Kamble, Mudhol, Sheldon, & Bettencourt, 2017). What is “mindfulness”? According to Smalley and Winston (2010, as cited in Price-­ Blackshear et al., 2017), mindfulness “is neither expressive nor repressive per se; the mindful approach is to recognize your emotions, feel them fully, and then let them go so that they don’t control you or lead you to act in ways that are harmful to others” (p. 111). Research by Dijker (1987) suggests that an important determinant of the type of chronic racial affect that the perceiver feels in the intergroup context is the degree to which the outgroup member is culturally dissimilar from the perceiver. Dutch participants in Dijker’s research were surveyed about the way they believe they would feel and behave in response to various scenarios involving various forms of contact with different

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ethnic groups. Dijker identified four types of emotion that appeared to be strongly related to ethnic attitudes: positive mood, anxiety, irritation, and concern. More personal forms of contact were associated with decreased anxiety and more positive mood with an ethnic group that is culturally similar (Surinamers) to the Dutch perceivers. On the other hand, close contact tended to be more negative with a group that is more culturally dissimilar from the Dutch perceivers (Turks). Some research also suggests that intergroup affect is a better determinant of attitudes and behavior toward ethnic groups than are cognitions about the ethnic group (Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1993; Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1991). However, others suggest that our cognitions about members of the outgroup influence how we feel about the outgroup. For example, Dijker and Frijda (1988, as cited in Esses et al., 1993) reported evidence that supports the notion that the characteristics (positive traits, ethnic appearance) that we attribute to members of an ethnic group may influence how we feel about that group and our attitudes toward that ethnic group. In other words, many of the reported causes of emotions in the intergroup context were related to perceived characteristics of members of the ethnic outgroup. Many theories of emotion highlight its informational and motivational value (Ekman, 1992; Keltner & Haidt, 2001). In other words, feelings provide information about where to direct attention and how to prepare for action. For example, anger signals maltreatment and motivates confrontation, sadness signals vulnerability and motivates support seeking, fear signals threat and motivates avoidance, and so on (researchers tend to emphasize the functions of negative emotions more than positive ones; see Fredrickson, 2013, for ideas about the functions of positive emotions). And just as one feels emotion as an individual (e.g., “I am afraid something might hurt me”), one can also feel emotion as a group member (e.g., “I am afraid something might hurt us”). This should not be surprising; in Chapter 2 we discussed social identity theory’s argument that people self-­categorize as individuals and as group members. So, just as you can think and feel as your individual self, you can think and feel as a group member. For groups we strongly identify with, those emotions can be as real and impactful as emotions we experience as individuals, such as the pride Americans felt after landing on the moon or their shared fear and anger after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. How does this relate to prejudice? In their theory of intergroup emotions, Mackie and Smith (2015) argue that people’s feelings as members of their ingroups are often about other groups. This is a critical difference from how prejudice has historically been considered, and how we’ve considered it so far in this book. Prejudice is typically thought of as existing along a single evaluative dimension from dislike to like. Intergroup emotions theory, on the other hand, considers the unique emotions group members share that result from functional relations between their own group and other groups. So instead of merely disliking “them,” we might fear, be angered or disgusted by, or even envy them. This perspective does a better job of addressing all of the diverse ways in which groups relate to one another: Some groups trigger disgust, which motivates us to avoid them or shun them. Others generate anger, which motivates aggression toward them. We discussed aversive racism and intergroup threat theory above; for aversive racists, a common concern is appearing racist to others—­here, the primary emotion is anxiety because it suggests that something negative might happen (i.e., that one might appear racist), but that the source of that anxiety is unclear. This is the primary difference

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between a specific fear and anxiety; in the latter case, the threat is not as easily identified (i.e., if you’re an aversive racist, part of the problem is that you’re not sure how your racism might show itself!). Further tests of intergroup emotions theory provide additional support. For example, groups that evoke disgust and anger, trigger avoidance and attack; groups that evoke fear, trigger avoidance and distancing; and, interestingly, groups that evoke guilt, trigger apology and reconciliation. As we see in Chapter 9 on sexual orientation prejudice, homophobia, the fear of being in close quarters with LGBTQ individuals, might come about from fear of the spread of same-­gender attraction itself, which can then trigger extreme avoidance of those thought to be gay. Thus, understanding the unique emotional responses one group has to another tells us about both the nature of the intergroup relationship and also how the groups behave toward each other. Evolutionary perspectives on prejudice argue that humans evolved a “threat-­ detection” system in response to the unique threats posed by outgroups in our ancestorial past, one that has carried over to modern humans (Neuberg & Schaller, 2016). Basically, the argument is that we—­modern humans—­are the descendants of people who were able to quickly and effectively identify and avoid threats to survival and reproduction. Intergroup emotions may have helped us to do that. What were some of these threats and the emotional responses associated with them? One such threat is the loss of resources (e.g., food, shelter) through intergroup conflict. Here, if one believes one’s group can effectively address the threat directly, anger is the activated emotion. If the ingroup appears weaker than the outgroup, the emotional reaction is fear. Another is the risk of infectious disease, which prompts disgust and avoidance. Also, women in particular had to (and still have to) consider the sexual threat of men, both from ingroups and outgroups, prompting a range of emotions, including anger and fear. Indeed, men are the primary perpetrators of aggression, which may explain why people are quicker to learn prejudices against outgroup men versus women, and why those prejudices are more difficult to reduce (Neuberg & Schaller, 2016). As each of these threats may have meant life or death, evolutionary perspectives suggest that a “better-­safe-than-sorry” approach would have likely evolved. In other words, humans may tend to over- instead of underreact to threats posed by outgroups. For example, because early humans had little understanding of contagious disease, any evidence of human abnormalities (e.g., a facial blemish or rash)—no matter how minor— may have prompted disgust and avoidance. Similarly, as we see in the next chapter, people have a tendency to overperceive anger in outgroup faces, particularly outgroup men (Navarrete et al., 2009). Indeed, our ancestors were less likely to die if they misperceived a neutral man as angry versus an angry man as neutral. Contextual cues can also ramp up the threat-­detection system, including features of the environment that suggest novelty or uncertainty. In an interesting laboratory analogue of this, people showed more prejudice toward outgroups when the lights in the laboratory were off compared to when they were on (Schaller, Park, & Mueller, 2003). Thus, like a trigger-­happy kitchen smoke detector, early humans erred on the side of caution when it came to potential threats, a trait we may carry with us today. In sum, there appears to be a solid empirical basis for the notion that the intergroup context brings with it an emotional component for the interactants, and that factors such as proximity and degree of personal contact in the intergroup context, stereotypes of physical and personality characteristics of the outgroup members, and the perceived cultural similarity of the outgroup to the perceiver’s ethnic group tends to influence the

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strength and valence of the emotion felt by each individual in the intergroup interaction. This emotion then has various disruptive/biasing effects on the individual’s perception of information, and it tends to increase reliance on the use of stereotypes in processing information about the outgroup member in the intergroup context.

Episodic Outgroup Affect One’s intergroup-­related affect can also be a result of a specific interaction with a specific individual member of the outgroup. This affect can also result from the imagined interaction with an individual from the outgroup. This intergroup-­related affect, termed “episodic outgroup affect,” can be similar or different in valence from one’s chronic outgroup affect toward the outgroup. The reason researchers have been interested in what is here termed “episodic outgroup affect” is that it can often have a strong impact on an individual’s chronic, enduring outgroup affect, and, it is believed, the individual’s enduring attitudes toward the outgroup. In this way, researchers have theorized, it may be possible to change negative chronic outgroup affect (and, hence, negative outgroup attitudes) toward the outgroup by the opposing impact of positive episodic outgroup affect (Bodenhausen, 1993).

Incidental Affect Feelings that have no origination associated with the outgroup can be characterized as “incidental affect.” A pervasive theme in the extant literature has been that affect in one context can influence social judgments in another context (e.g., Isen, 1987; Wyer & Srull, 1989). Thus, it is reasonable to suggest that incidental affect (arising in a context having nothing to do with intergroup attitudes) can subsequently influence an individual’s proclivity to use stereotypes in social judgment. There is some research evidence that supports this assertion. Stroessner and Mackie (1993) induced incidental happiness or sadness in participants by having them watch amusing or depressing 5-minute clips of television programs. Participants were then asked to estimate outgroup variability (i.e., the degree to which one perceives an outgroup through stereotypes—­as in “they are all alike”—or as a varied group, like one’s ingroup). Results indicated that both incidental sadness and happiness significantly reduced the perception of outgroup variability. In research reported by Esses and her colleagues (1993), incidental happy or sad affect was induced (via the Velten procedure and recall-­of-­events procedure; Izard, 1972), and this affect had an impact on participants’ subsequent judgments of characteristics associated with six different ethnic groups. Specifically, incidental sad affect increased the tendency of participants to use negative stereotypes in descriptions of Pakistanis and Native Americans. Interestingly, participants who felt incidental happiness were more likely to provide especially favorable stereotypes of their own ethnic ingroup. Research also indicates that incidental anxiety seems to facilitate the use of stereotypes in making social judgments (Baron, Inman, Kao, & Logan, 1992; Baron, Logan, Lilly, Inman, & Brennan, 1994; Stephan, 1985), as well as increase the perception of outgroup homogeneity (Wilder & Shapiro, 1989). In sum, it appears that affect induced in a context unrelated to the outgroup can have an impact on attitudes toward and judgments about the outgroup.

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Influence of Positive Affect Research has focused on the effects of positive affect (usually happiness) and negative affect on social judgments. First, let us consider how positive affect seems to influence intergroup perception. Positive affect appears to influence how people categorize others. In a wide range of cognitive processing tasks, positive affect has been shown to reduce the extent of systematic processing (Hamilton, Stroessner, & Mackie, 1993; Isen, Means, Patrick, & Nowicki, 1982). People who are happy tend to process information less analytically, and they rely on heuristic cues, initial judgments, decisional shortcuts, and other simplifying strategies (Bless, Hamilton, & Mackie, 1992; Mackie & Worth, 1991), and are more likely to rely on stereotypes in their judgments of others (Curtis, 2013; Park & Banaji, 2000). An exception to this general finding is that when happy people are confronted with an outgroup individual who radically diverges from the outgroup, the happy person has no problem giving up their reliance on stereotypes in making judgments about that target (Krauth-­Gruber & Ric, 2000). This research supports the contemporary notion in social-­cognition research that people are more likely to stereotype when they are under increased cognitive constraints due to influences like distraction, or demands brought on by other complex simultaneous cognitive processing (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Fiske & ­Neuberg, 1990; Wigboldus, Sherman, Franzese, & van Knippenberg, 2004). However, some research suggests that this view may need to be revised somewhat. Results from a series of experiments investigating the effects of happiness on stereotyping led Bodenhausen, Kramer, and Süesser (1994) to conclude that there is “little support for the idea that happiness promotes stereotypic thinking by constraining the perceiver’s capacity for more systematic thought” (p. 628). These researchers suggest that happy people are just not very motivated to expend the cognitive effort required to avoid using stereotypes in intergroup judgment. However, according to Bodenhausen et al., if such an effort were to have an effect on the individual’s well-being, then the individual would likely not stereotype (a conclusion supported by Forgas, 1989). The question then remains: Do people stereotype when they are in a good mood because they don’t want to think carefully about the other individual (i.e., a motivational issue), or because the positive affect cognitively clogs their finite cognitive resources to individuate the target individual (a cognitive-­capacity issue)? We explore this issue below.

Effects of Negative Affect Unfortunately, the pervasive affect that is felt among interactants in an interracial context is often decidedly negative (Allport, 1954; Bodenhausen, 1993). This is true even for those who think of themselves as egalitarian (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Thus, it is important for researchers to understand the specific effects that different negative emotions can have on the way individuals think about and behave toward members of ethnic outgroups. In research on the effects of anger and sadness on stereotyping, Bodenhausen, Sheppard, and Kramer (1994) found that angry participants tended to make more stereotypical judgments, while participants who were sad did not differ from participants wirh neutral affect in their use of stereotypes. In fact, research on the effects of sadness on subsequent social judgments has often found that mildly sad individuals

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engage in more systematic, careful cognitive processing of information, and are less likely to rely on stereotypes than angry and happy individuals (Bodenhausen, 1993). Incidental anger and anxiety tend to lead to increased use of stereotypes in social judgments, while sadness (for persons who are mildly depressed; see Bodenhausen, Sheppard, et al., 1994) does not lead to an increased tendency to stereotype others (Park & Banaji, 2000). Research has also examined the effects of various negative affective states on people’s tendency to stereotype others. Unlike the research on the effects of positive affect on stereotyping, the data from research investigating negative affect yields a picture that is less clear. On the one hand, research in the persuasion literature indicates that people who are sad tend to seek and consider more information and process persuasive messages more completely (Bless, Bohner, Schwarz, & Strack, 1990; Sinclair, 1988). In contrast, some have found that sad subjects exhibit no decrements in memory performance, and this is especially true when the task is resource intensive (Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988). Similarly, subjects in a negative mood have been found to do less attributional processing (Sullivan & Conway, 1989) and generate fewer complex hypotheses (Silberman, Weingartner, & Post, 1983). The most common negative moods that have been investigated are sadness and anger, because these are most likely to occur naturally in the intergroup context. Bodenhausen (1993) suggests that while it is likely that other negative emotions (such as guilt, embarrassment, anxiety, and fear) may have a similar influence on the tendency of individuals to stereotype, it is important that researchers investigate the influence on stereotyping of these different negative moods (the same suggestion is made for the various positive moods, such as joy, serenity, and elation). A case in point, a study by Skitka, Bauman, and Mullen (2004), found that tolerance for different political views appears to be differentially influenced by anger versus fear. When people feel fear or anger, they are less tolerant of others’ political views. However, the routes to the decreased tolerance are different for each emotion. The effect of fear appears to be mediated by personal threat and ingroup enhancement. The influence of anger is mediated by moral outrage and outgroup derogation. Much more work is needed to uncover the specific mediating variables that influence the effects of various emotions on prejudice and stereotypes.

Motivational versus Cognitive‑Capacity Deficits Do people stereotype when they are experiencing happiness, sadness, or anger because they are not motivated to expend the cognitive energy that it takes to individuate members of a stereotyped outgroup, or is it the case that people simply cannot think carefully about others because of a decreased cognitive capacity? The answer is that it depends. There is a good basis for positing each of these possibilities. Regarding positive moods, Schwarz and his colleagues (Clore, Schwarz, & Conway, 1994; Schwarz, 2012; Schwarz & Bless, 1991; Schwarz & Clore, 1988) have suggested that positive mood conveys the message that because “all is well” with their environment, they do not need to focus on new information. Thus, these people may be motivated to maintain their good mood and avoid activity that negates it (Worth & Mackie, 1987). Other researchers suggest that positive moods may activate the abundant positively valenced material in memory, and this material then consumes the cognitive capacity of the individual (Bower, 1981; Isen, 1987; Mackie & Worth, 1989).

Feeling versus Thinking in the Activation and Application of Stereotypes 89

A similar debate is occurring in the literature over whether there is a cognitive-­ capacity limitation imposed by negative moods or whether negative moods reduce the motivation to process social information in a systematic fashion. Mackie and Worth (1989, 1991) have reported several experiments that support the idea that negative moods create a diminished cognitive capacity in the individual. An equally impressive array of experiments support the idea that negative moods affect the individual’s motivation to process information systematically (Bless et al., 1990; Innes & Ahrens, 1991; Smith & Shaffer, 1991). If it seems that this brief review of the controversy surrounding the debate between proponents of the diminished capacity notion versus those who support the reduced motivation hypothesis does not present a resolution of the debate, it is because there is no resolution (Hamilton, Stroessner, & Mackie, 1993). Indeed, many researchers agree that it is likely the case that investigating the separate effects of these two factors on the influence of mood on stereotyping may be fruitless because they are inexorably linked together (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, et al., 1994; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993; Mackie, Asuncion, & Rosselli, 1992; Pendry & Macrae, 1994). In an interesting paper, Martin, Ward, Achee, and Wyer (1993) presented data to suggest that moods do not have stable implications (as is implied in the above research). Rather, they have different meanings depending on the person’s interpretation of the mood. The authors suggest that with different interpretations, the same mood can have different effects. Positive moods tell people to continue their tasks (or cognitive processes) if the mood reflects the individual’s enjoyment (having a good time), but the positive mood tells people to stop what they are doing if the mood reflects the level of goal attainment (goal attained, so stop and relax). On the other hand, negative moods tell people to stop when the mood reflects the level of enjoyment (not having fun), but to continue when it reflects the person’s level of goal attainment (goal not attained, keep working). It may be the case that the investigation of the dynamic interplay of the motivational, cognitive-­capacity, and hedonic contingency processes will yield further insight about the influence of affect on the tendency to stereotype (Pendry & Macrae, 1994).

COGNITION Stereotype Suppression In this chapter, we have been reviewing the research on the ways various cognitive and affective processes enhance the likelihood of using stereotypes in social judgment. Why then are we talking about suppressing stereotypes in this chapter? That’s a good question because we cover the theory and research on ways to control, or even eliminate, stereotyping and prejudice in Chapter 12. There is a good reason for talking about stereotype suppression when speaking of stereotype activation. As researchers have learned, it appears that when we try to not think of something (e.g., thinking about someone in terms of stereotypes about their group), in many cases the unwanted thought springs back to mind even more frequently and with greater strength compared to those people who do not try to suppress the thought. In other words, the very act of trying to inhibit thoughts of stereotypes makes them even more likely to intrude upon your thoughts! Sometimes, thoughts intrude upon our consciousness that are disturbing or just plain unwanted. How can we avoid such unpleasant experiences? When we don’t want

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to think of something, a simple solution is to just try to “not think of it.” Can this work with stereotyping? If you think of or see a member of a minority group, can you just tell yourself not to think of stereotypes that are associated with that group? Some of you may think you can do this; other readers may believe it to be a difficult task. Research in social cognition has been addressing these questions for the last 30 years or so, and we have learned much about our ability to control unwanted thoughts (including stereotypes). Below, we briefly review the rapidly growing research on this intriguing question, and attempt to discover the limits (if any) to such cognitive control over stereotyping.

Thought Suppression Don’t think of a pink elephant. This (very difficult) task illustrates the heart of the problem we encounter when we try to control unwanted thoughts. We need to think of the thing we are supposed to not think of so we can know what we’re supposed to not think about. (Huh? What did he say?) To clarify this further, let’s take a step back for a second to briefly review the theory behind thought suppression. In a pioneering series of experiments (Wegner, 1989, 1994; Wegner & Erber, 1992; Wegner & Pennebaker, 1993), Wegner and his colleagues have shown that, ironically, when we try to not think of a concept, it actually becomes even more available to our conscious awareness (Follenfant & Ric, 2010). The reason is that normal mental control works by the joint function of two processes. One is an intentional operating process that scans our consciousness for mental contents that will bring about a desired mental state (i.e., no unwanted thoughts of X). The other is an ironic monitoring process that searches for mental contents that indicate the failure to reach that desired state. So, to use our elephant example, the intentional process searches for information pertinent to pink elephants, and the ironic processes search for indications that we have not avoided thinking about pink elephants. The intentional process is our consciousness in trying to suppress the unwanted thought. This process takes a lot of cognitive effort. The ironic process operates in the background to check for instances when we need to exercise mental control. This process requires less effort, and runs consistently and rather independently of conscious control. The consistent nature of the ironic monitor is the source of the “hyperaccessible” nature of the unwanted thought—­t hat is, because it searches for signs of the unwanted thought, it increases the accessibility of the unwanted thought to conscious awareness. Normally, however, this hyperaccessibility does not impinge on our consciousness because the intentional operating process prevails. However, when mental capacity is compromised in some fashion (e.g., when we are busy, or when several tasks demand our attention), that leaves less cognitive capacity to devote to the intentional operating process, and then the ironic process prevails, making the unwanted thought hyperaccessible to our consciousness. Across a number of experiments, Wegner (1994) showed that his theory of mental control nicely models what happens to unwanted thoughts under cognitive loads. However, hyperaccessibility of unwanted thoughts has been demonstrated in the absence of cognitive loads, as we examine in the next section (Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, & Jetten, 1994). It appears that we can’t always think what we want. Of course, such a finding has tremendous implications for intergroup stereotypical perception, prejudiced attitudes, and discriminatory behavior, because it suggests that even the most well-­intentioned perceiver can still think stereotypically about another person if they are cognitively busy (Pendry &

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Macrae, 1994). Next, we examine the research on stereotype suppression, to determine the conditions under which stereotypes may become hyperaccessible, and the implications of such a consequence on social perception.

Suppressing Stereotypes There are a number of things that we would rather not think about, including stereotypes of others. For most people, thinking about others in terms of stereotypes is a negative experience because it brings about feelings of discomfort, guilt, and shame (Allport, 1954). This is especially true in those individuals who pride themselves on their egalitarian attitudes (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991). In an effort to avoid these negative feelings, people may try to recognize when they are beginning to stereotype and quickly “push it out of mind”—that is, they put forth a concerted conscious effort to not think about someone in terms of a stereotype (to engage in stereotype suppression). This seems to be a reasonable solution to the problem of stereotyping: If one is truly motivated to avoid stereotyping, one can do just that with enough conscious effort. However, Wegner’s (1994) thought suppression research mentioned earlier should give the reader reason to be skeptical about such a simple (and intuitively appealing) solution to stereotyping. Research by Bodenhausen and Macrae (1998) suggests that suppressing stereotypes is a difficult task indeed. They argue that the attempt to banish stereotypical thoughts from one’s mind may be successful for a short while, but soon the unwanted stereotypical thoughts tend to return with more intensity and frequency to influence the individual’s thoughts, feelings, and behavior. This ironic result occurs due to the mechanics of the process of thought suppression. Specifically, Bodenhausen and Macrae suggest that this rebound effect is due to the repeated activation of the unwanted stereotype by the monitoring process, and therefore, the residual activation of the concept dissipates more slowly in the stereotype suppressor’s mind, compared to those who did not engage in stereotype suppression. To test this hypothesis, Macrae et al. (1994) showed a picture of a male skinhead to male and female participants. Participants were asked to spend 5 minutes writing about a typical day in the life of that target individual (the skinhead). Half of the participants were told about the negative influence of stereotypes and how these thoughts may bias one’s perceptions of another person. These participants were asked to try very hard to avoid thinking (i.e., suppress any stereotypical thoughts that may arise) about the target in stereotypical terms. The other half of the participants were given no instructions to avoid stereotyping the target. All participants were then shown another photo of a different skinhead. Participants were again asked to spend 5 minutes in writing about the typical day of this individual. This time, no instructions to avoid stereotyping were given to the subjects. The stories were rated for their degree of stereotypicality. Results for the stories about the first target indicated that, as hypothesized, stereotype suppressors were successful in greatly reducing the degree of stereotypical content in their thinking (as revealed in their stories) compared to nonsuppressors (who showed more stereotype content in their stories). However, the content of the stories for the second target revealed quite a different pattern. While the nonsuppressors showed virtually the same degree of stereotype content in their stories, those who were previously suppressing their stereotypical thoughts now showed significantly more stereotypical thinking

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than nonsuppressors! These data support the idea that suppressing stereotypical thinking may work in the short term, but later those thoughts come back (rebound) with even more strength, and can influence attitudes and behavior. A paper by Gordijn, Hindriks, Koomen, Dijksterhuis, and Knippenberg (2004) extends these findings by showing that the suppression rebound results not only in hyperaccessibility of the specific suppressed stereotype but in a greater tendency to use stereotypes in general in subsequent social judgments. Moreover, Gordijn et al.’s data suggest that the hyperaccessibility of suppressed stereotypes seems to occur only in those who have a low motivation to suppress stereotypes. On the other hand, a paper by Newman, Caldwell, Chamberlin, and Griffin (2005) suggests a different route by which prejudice emerges in suppressing cognition. When participants were told that their ingroup had negative characteristics, and they were told to suppress thoughts about one of these attributes, they subsequently projected that attribute to an outgroup. In other words, thinking favorably about one’s group entails suppressing the shortcomings of one’s group, and this suppression tends to be expressed in one’s evaluations of outgroup members. These data are provocative and highlight the need for more research to explicate the influence of motivation on stereotype suppression (Fiske, 2004). Another interesting irony of stereotype suppression is that it appears to not only affect the accessibility of stereotypes but also counterstereotypes. Galinsky and ­Moskowitz (2007) found that after the stereotype is suppressed, both the stereotype and the counterstereotypes were hyperaccessible. Stereotype suppression also has interesting behavioral effects. In one study, those who suppressed a stereotype of an inventor showed greater creativity compared to those who merely described inventors. Similarly, those who suppressed the stereotype of mathematicians showed greater performance on measures of logic compared to nonsuppressors (Wyer, Mazzoni, Perfect, Calvini, & Neilens, 2010, study 2). Research by Follenfant and Ric (2010) found that when people were asked to suppress stereotypes about older adults, they subsequently walked slower than those who didn’t suppress their older adult stereotypes. Several experiments have demonstrated the reliability of these stereotype-­ suppression experiments, indicating that when people are reminded to think in egalitarian ways (i.e., to avoid thinking of stereotypes), they are able to do so (for a short while at least). However, what happens when people are not explicitly asked to avoid stereotyping others? Do they suppress their stereotypical thoughts on their own? Some research indicates that some people do indeed do this (Macrae, Bodenhausen, & Milne, 1998). Macrae and his colleagues found that when people were made to feel self-­focused (directing their attention and thoughts toward themselves), they were much less likely (compared to non-self-­focused individuals) to describe others in stereotypical terms. Macrae et al. relied on a substantial amount of data on self-focus effects that suggest that when people think of themselves as the object of attention (by others or themselves), they are more likely to think of their own values, attitudes, morals, and standards for the behavior they are engaging in at that instant, and to attempt to bring their behavior in line with these standards (Deiner & Wallbom, 1976; Duval & Wicklund, 1972). It is important to note, however, that increased self-focus reliably leads to spontaneous stereotype-­suppression efforts only among those who have egalitarian values and standards for interpersonal perception (Macrae et al., 1998). What happens when self-focus is enhanced in high-­prejudice people? The results are mixed. Some data suggest that the self-focus enhances adherence to the social norms

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(i.e., do not stereotype, don’t break laws) rather than personal beliefs (Deiner & Srull, 1979). In other words, high-­prejudice people would tend to adhere to the social norms (e.g., don’t be prejudiced) rather than their own prejudiced personal beliefs. Support for this comes from research by Monteith, Spicer, and Tooman (1998). They found that when social norms against stereotyping others were salient, high-­prejudice persons did not experience stereotype rebound effects. Other researchers (e.g., Froming, Walker, & Lopyan, 1982) propose that the type of self-focus is crucial in determining the degree to which people adhere to their personal beliefs or social norms when they are self-­ focused. Froming et al. suggest that private self-­focusing devices (e.g., a mirror, or hearing one’s own voice) promote adherence to personal standards, whereas public enhancement of self-focus (i.e., being in front of an audience, or the subject of evaluation by other people) leads the individual to follow social norms. Thus, it appears that more research is needed before we are able to make conclusions about the effects of self-focus on high-­prejudice individuals. So far, we have reviewed several studies that suggest that avoiding stereotyping is very difficult, and even when we are able to do so, it lasts only a short time and the stereotypical thoughts come back even more strongly and more frequently! Is it really that dire? Are we just doomed to stereotype one another? Research suggests that this is a bit of an exaggeration, and that some people are able to avoid the rebound effects of stereotype suppression (Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001). Monteith et al. (1998) found that low-­prejudice persons did not show stereotype rebound. They concluded that when people are motivated to not use stereotypes, and have well-­practiced, alternate ways of thinking about other individuals, they are able to avoid stereotypical thinking and do not suffer stereotype rebound effects (see also Sherman, Stroessner, Loftus, & Deguzman, 1997, for a similar argument). There is substantial empirical evidence to support this contention (Devine, 1989; Monteith, 1993). Dunn and Spellman (2003) suggest that, for people who don’t believe in stereotypes, thinking about a stigmatized individual’s characteristics tended to inhibit access to stereotypical information, and they were much less likely to stereotype that individual. Interestingly, the inhibition process works the other way as well: Thinking about stereotypical traits decreases the likelihood of thinking about the outgroup member as an individual. Indeed, Macrae et al. (1994) agree with the idea that, like many things, practicing nonprejudiced responses can help one create a dominant nonprejudiced way of thinking, “If stereotype activation can become routinized, automated, and triggered by external stimulus cues, then there is no compelling reason why stereotype inhibition should not take a similar course” (p. 815).

Who Is Motivated to Suppress Stereotypes? Instead of thinking in terms of “low-­prejudice” versus “high-­prejudice” persons in terms of who is more likely to stereotype others and feel prejudice against outgroups, Crandall and his colleagues (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003; Crandall, Eshleman, & O’Brien, 2002) suggested a new conceptualization: those who are highly motivated to suppress, and those low in motivation to suppress. You may be thinking, “Isn’t this the same thing but a different label?” Not quite. In this conceptualization, people are seen as either especially motivated to identify with or not identify with certain social groups. If they are highly motivated to identify with that group, they also take their cues from that group on norms for the expression of certain prejudice and stereotypes. Those low in

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identification with such social groups feel less bound by their social norms, and thus operate on their own ideas of if and when to express their prejudices. So, in this conceptualization, what determines whether one expresses prejudice and stereotypes is not necessarily determined by one’s own level of prejudice but more importantly, the degree to which one identifies with their social groups, and the norms that those groups have for the expression of prejudice. Thus, one could be highly prejudiced against a group, but if they strongly identify with a group that has prohibitions against expressing such prejudices, then that person would be much less likely to express those prejudices. This is a fascinating idea, and Crandall et al. conducted seven experiments that show compelling support for this conceptualization.

The Neuroscience of Prejudice As with any other scientific field, advances in psychology occur at the pace of the methodology available to researchers at the time. For example, many of the concepts that William James wrote about in his landmark 1890 volume, The Principles of Psychology, went unverified empirically until 100 years later (Buck, 1990). Long before psychology became a recognized field back in the late 1800s, scientists were busy trying to understand the structures and functions of the various parts of the brain. Yet, these approaches did not fully reflect the dynamic, interactive nature of each component with how we think, and how we behave. So researchers were left with just a small piece of the whole picture, like the proverbial blind men touching various parts of the elephant, and proclaiming what they feel (“This beast is a trunk!” “No, this beast is a leg!”). Then, research on “social neuroscience” began to capture the interest of others, largely due to the pioneering work by John Cacioppo (1982; Cacioppo, Berntson, & Crites, 1996). Cacioppo and others showed that we have much to gain by understanding how the brain, cognition, and behavior affect and are affected by one another from moment to moment.

Social‑Cognitive Neuroscience As neuroimaging techniques matured, researchers began to see that a new, multilevel analysis could be conducted regarding human behavior, thought, and feeling. Social psychologists are interested in understanding social behavior. Cognitive psychologists want to understand information processing in the brain, and neuroscientists want to understand the neural substrates to human cognition. In their influential 2001 paper, Ochsner and Lieberman proposed that these three approaches to understanding human thought and behavior be merged together into an interdisciplinary field called “social-­ cognitive neuroscience” (SCN). The goal of this approach is to develop and empirically test new theories that refer to all three levels of analysis. In so doing, social psychologists can, for example, make use of the vast cognitive neuroscience database to explore questions about social phenomena. For example, are different parts of the brain activated when one employs different cognitive heuristics or does one part of the brain handle those varied (but conceptually similar) cognitive tasks? Either answer would be interesting and help researchers further refine their existing theories concerning social-­ psychological concepts.

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Perhaps the most popular neuroimaging method in this interdisciplinary research is functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI; Ochsner & Lieberman, 2001; Phelps & Thomas, 2003). Like positron emission tomography (PET) scans, fMRI scans involve measuring blood flow to parts of the brain. However, unlike PET scans, fMRI scans are much more precise, and can yield a more detailed image and location of activity levels of the brain. Both PET and fMRI assess blood flow to the brain, because when the brain is called upon to do a task, it requires more blood. fMRI assesses the amount of blood volume, blood flow, and oxygen use, referred to collectively as the blood-­oxygen-­ level-­dependent (BOLD) signal. The MRI machine is essentially a very powerful magnet. When an individual lies inside the machine, and the MRI is turned on, the protons in their brain become aligned. Then, a short radio wave is sent through the chamber, knocking the protons out of alignment, and the protons become realigned. Parts of the brain that are more active, with greater concentrations of oxygenated blood, send out a stronger signal. The fMRI measures the realignment, and this is able to pinpoint (within about 3–6 millimeters) which part of the brain is most active at a given moment (Cabeza & Nyberg, 2000; Watson, 2011). Below, we examine the relevant studies using fMRI to examine prejudice. How does the brain react when we perceive or think about people from stereotyped outgroups? What insights about social perception, intergroup interaction, and prejudice can we obtain when we understand the neural substrates of such cognitive activity?

fMRI Studies Related to Prejudice When researchers want to examine the neural substrates and structures associated with racial prejudice, a traditional starting place has been to examine the activity of the amygdala, since it is implicated in processing new, novel stimuli, as well as emotions, specifically, fear (Cheng, Knight, Smith, & Helmstetter, 2006; Kubota & Phelps, 2016; Phelps & LeDoux, 2005; Scheepers & Derks, 2016). The idea here is that if prejudice is primarily born out of the fear of an outgroup, then we should be able to measure activity in the amygdala when the person is exposed to the concept or image of an outgroup member. Indeed, this is the case. Much research shows that the amygdala is activated when an individual sees the face of an outgroup member (e.g., Cloutier & Correll, 2014; Cunningham et al., 2004; Izuma, Aoki, Shibata, & Nakahara, 2019; Ronquillo et al., 2007; see Amodio & Cikara, 2021; Amodio & Lieberman, 2009, for reviews). A critique that has been aimed at some popular implicit measures of prejudice (which we discuss in detail in the next chapter) is that they don’t measure one’s personal prejudices, but rather one’s knowledge of stereotypes in their culture. The same critique could be applied to research on the meaning of the link between elevated amygdala activity and prejudice levels in the subject. Chekroud, Everett, Bridge, and Hewstone (2014) suggest that this link may better be explained in terms of the subject’s learned cultural stereotypes and their perceived threat, and less as a personal endorsement of those cultural stereotypes. Other fMRI research not focusing specifically on the amygdala suggests that our ability to control the feeling and expression of prejudice may erode with age and declining cognitive capabilities. Krendl, Heatherton, and Kensinger (2009) conducted fMRI research with younger and older subjects, examining their reactions to images of

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stigmatized members of outgroups. They found that younger people were able to feel more empathy with the outgroups than older people (as evidenced by increased medial prefrontal cortex activity), and that older people with decreased cognitive function and emotion regulation (i.e., the lateral prefrontal cortex) were more likely to show bias against stigmatized persons.

ISSUES FOR FURTHER RESEARCH There is much we do not yet know about the interface between affect and cognition as they influence stereotyping and prejudice. Below, we briefly describe four important research domains that require more study. First, investigators should consider the physiological arousal of the individual. As Bodenhausen (1993) argued, “A useful place to begin considering the impact of emotions on the use of stereotypes in social judgment may be with their physiological aspects” (p. 17). Research has indicated that when physiological arousal is either too high or too low, people increasingly rely on stereotypes in social judgment (Bodenhausen, 1990). Others have also found that high arousal is associated with increased stereotyping (e.g., Kim & Baron, 1988). Bodenhausen (1993) has suggested that those associated mood states with happiness (such as joy, elation, contentment, and serenity) may likely be variations on the same happiness theme. Research, using sophisticated physiological measures (Cacioppo & Tassinary, 1990a; Cacioppo & Tassinary, 1990b) can (and should) be conducted to discover whether these various moods are associated with different levels of physiological arousal, and therefore different tendencies to be associated with stereotypical thinking. A similar procedure should be taken with various negative moods, such as fear and anxiety. A second issue for researchers to consider when they are investigating the influence of affect on stereotyping is the following important distinction: that between “integral” and “incidental” affect (Bodenhausen, 1993). Many researchers agree that affect that arises in one context can affect social judgments in another context (e.g., Forgas & Bower, 1988; Schwarz & Clore, 1988). Although much is known about the influence of moods on information processing, comparatively little is known about the impact of everyday mood states in intergroup contexts, such as guilt (see Devine et al., 1991; Nelson, 1996, for exceptions), fear, and pride (Stangor & Lange, 1994). These different mood states should be investigated within the intergroup context to assess the effects of integral affect on stereotyping. The degree of the impact of affect on the individual’s tendency to stereotype another person is greatest in the actual intergroup contact situation. As an example, consider the following suggestion for future research in this area. Third, the fascinating research program of Wegner, Erber, and Zanakos (1993) on the ironic processes in the mental control of mood and mood-­related thoughts is worthy of the attention of researchers investigating the processes whereby integral affect leads to stereotyping. Specifically, Wegner et al. found that when people attempted to control mood-­related thoughts under a cognitive load, they tended to show increased accessibility of those thoughts in the opposite direction of intended control. What does this mean for affective processes in stereotyping? To the extent that individuals are aware of their usually negative emotional moods (whether this is negative depends on the degree of hostility/prejudice the person feels toward members of stereotyped outgroups) when in contact with members of stereotyped outgroups (and is trying to suppress these feelings),

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and to the degree that the individual is under an increased utilization of their cognitive capacity (for whatever reason: task involvement, distraction, etc.), they may be susceptible to the ironic result that the undesired mood and mood-­related thoughts are even more accessible. Bodenhausen and Macrae (1996) have conducted some research that generally confirms these ideas. However, the complex interactions between the influences of mood, cognitive capacity, and memory certainly necessitate further research in order to begin to flesh out some of the separate and interrelated effects each of these has on the relation between moods and stereotyping. Fourth, researchers should continue work on the influence of dispositional characteristics associated with mood on stereotyping. For example, Basso, Schefft, and Hoffman (1994) investigated the moderating effect of the characteristic “affect intensity” (AI) on the influence of positive and negative affect on cognitive tasks. Given the same emotion-­eliciting stimulus, people who are low in AI experience a much weaker affective arousal than those who are high in AI. High-AI people tend to be susceptible to more frequent mood shifts. The researchers found that the cognitive performance of those low in AI was enhanced by positive mood and disrupted by negative mood. The performance of those high in AI was disrupted by positive mood and facilitated by negative mood. Whereas the empirical examination of the affect–­cognition interface as it bears on stereotyping and prejudice is a relatively recent occurrence, we have learned much about how our moods and the way we think can influence how we feel about members of outgroups. While much more research is needed to help complete our understanding of the affect–­cognition influence, this domain of research inquiry is certainly proving to be an exciting field in which to work.

GLOSSARY Attitude Object—any idea, object, or person about which one forms an attitude. Aversive Racism—type of racism whereby one believes oneself is nonprejudiced, but still harbors negative feelings about the outgroup. Chronic Outgroup Affect—one’s stable feeling toward the outgroup. Episodic Outgroup Affect—one’s affective reaction to a specific member of the outgroup. Incidental Affect—affect that arises in situations unrelated to the intergroup context. Ingroup—any group (racial, occupational, gender, social, etc.) to which one belongs. Integral Affect—affect that originates within the intergroup situation involving the stereotyped outgroup. This type of affect can also arise from merely thinking about the outgroup. Outgroup—any group to which one does not belong. Stereotype Suppression—the conscious effort to avoid thinking about stereotypes. Results in stereotype rebound in some low-­prejudice persons.

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DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. Do you think that when you are interacting with a member of an outgroup, your reaction to that person tends to be based on integral affect, or incidental affect? Why? 2. What percentage of Whites in the United States do you believe would be classified as “aversive racists”? Why? 3. Why do you suppose happiness enhances the tendency to think about others in terms of stereotypes? Do you favor the motivational or cognitive-­capacity explanations? 4. Do you think that most people would have an easy or difficult time suppressing a stereotype? What other factors would help one to suppress a stereotype (a certain type of personality, motivation, etc.)?

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CHAPTER 4

Implicit Stereotyping and Prejudice

For nearly 100 years, the science of prejudice and stereotyping was limited to what

people were able and willing to express, in either words or actions, to researchers. Cognitions, emotions, or actions that people were either unaware of, or were reluctant to disclose, essentially remained inaccessible to science. With advances in experimental techniques and measurement tools in the latter years of the 20th century, researchers were finally able to look “under the hood” and address questions like the following: Are there prejudice and stereotypes about which people are unaware? Can prejudices and stereotypes affect how people see, think about, and treat others, without their intentions? What happens when people’s hidden “gut feelings” about a stereotyped group are at odds with their values and beliefs? In addressing these and related questions, much of the work we discuss in this chapter rests on a now well-­established distinction in human cognitive processes between two basic modes of thought (Sherman, Gawronski, & Trope, 2014). These two modes differ a bit among the various theories that discuss them, but they all boil down to thinking that is fast, efficient, unintentional, affective, and maybe even unconscious (which we refer to as implicit or automatic cognition), versus thinking that is slow, inefficient, effortful, propositional, and conscious (which we refer to as explicit or controlled cognition). As we see, this distinction has proven useful in understanding when and how prejudice affects perceptions, thoughts, and actions.

IMPLICIT COGNITION It comes as no surprise to researchers within psychology that cognition can occur outside of awareness and/or intentional control, and that these processes can influence behavior and overt cognitive processes. For centuries, philosophers have speculated upon the existence of such processes, and the birth of American psychology also saw several advocates for the proposition that humans have what James (1890) termed “sub-­ conscious,” and Freud (1900/1953) termed “unconscious” cognitive processes. What may be surprising is the revitalized interest in the notion of cognitive processes occurring 107

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outside of conscious awareness. Researchers in cognitive and social psychology have found compelling evidence for the idea that cognitive processes do function outside of conscious awareness and intentions, and these processes can influence overt thoughts and behaviors (Schacter, 1992). Does this mean that uncontrolled, unconscious cognition can affect our behavior and attitudes? More specifically, will people who believe they are low in prejudice still stereotype others and show prejudice as a result of unconscious cognitions? Below, we examine the evidence from other areas in psychology that suggests the existence of unconscious and unintentional cognition.1 We then explore the implications of these findings for research on stereotyping and prejudice.

Implicit Cognition and Addiction A traditional view of addiction had at its heart an assumption that the individual would be making rational decisions designed to yield the best outcomes and avoid negative consequences. However, research has indicated that individuals with an addiction do not use this process (Wiers & Stacy, 2006a). Rather, they continue to consume drugs and alcohol when they know it is harmful to themselves. Advances in implicit cognition suggest that one reason why is that their behavior may be governed by automatic (or implicit) processes out of their conscious control or awareness, like implicit associations, which are simple associations in memory connecting two objects (e.g., drugs–good; Wiers & Stacy, 2006b). An analysis of 89 effect studies showed compelling support for the influence of implicit cognition on addictive behavior (Rooke, Hine, & ­Thorsteinsson, 2008). Going forward, the task for researchers in this area is to understand the cognitive and brain changes that occur with sustained substance abuse, and how those changes impair one’s ability to control impulsive drug/alcohol-­related thoughts and tendencies (Wiers & Stacy, 2006b).

Implicit Cognition and Suicide Psychological science is all about explaining and predicting future behavior. One of the most difficult behaviors to predict is suicide. The reason is that those who die by suicide often do not give any indication of their intentions. One novel approach to beginning to address this problem comes with research on implicit cognition differences between those who attempt suicide and those who do not. In an interesting study by Nock and colleagues (2010), the implicit association between thoughts of one’s self and death/ suicide were measured in 157 patients with psychiatric issues. Results showed that those who attempted to die by suicide held much stronger implicit self-death associations compared to those patients who did not attempt suicide. Moreover, patients who had this negative implicit association were six times more likely to make another suicide attempt in the next 6 months compared to those without that association. Such a measure and discovery may provide clinicians with a meaningful way to assess and predict patients’ future risk of suicide (see also Glenn et al., 2017; Olson et al., 2022). 1 It

is important to note that use of the word “unconscious” is strictly a generic use of the word, and it implies no psychoanalytical theoretical usage. We’ve elected to use “unconscious cognition” to describe the cognitive processes below the level of awareness because of its simplicity (very strictly, the phrase implies cognition that is not conscious—unconscious).

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Subliminal Messages Have you ever seen a now-­famous vodka advertisement that features a close-up picture of a drink of vodka on ice (see Figure 4.1)? For decades, people have sworn that there is a tiny picture of a woman’s breasts hidden subtly in the recesses of the ice and liquor. The rumor suggests that the advertisers and makers colluded to plant the picture in the advertisement so that it subliminally (to perceive something without being consciously aware of the perception) influences people to purchase that brand of vodka. In other words, even though viewers of the advertisement may not consciously realize the presence of the subliminal stimulus, their attitudes and behavior can still be influenced by the perception of the stimulus below the level of awareness. For decades, the concept of “subliminal messages” has been part of American culture (a craze fueled by a popular book entitled Subliminal Seduction, published in 1974, the cover of which made famous the aforementioned image). People have readily believed that their behavior can be altered (e.g., weight loss, quitting smoking, even self-­esteem enhancement) via the presentation of a message below the level of awareness. But, can subliminal messages really work? Are we subject to the subtle mind influences of the proverbial Orwellian big brother? Researchers have addressed the degree to which “subliminal” perception can actually occur. Subliminal self-help recordings (which feature messages that are supposedly presented below the level of conscious recognition) that claim to have tremendous effects on attitudes and behavior were (and in some places, still are) big business. In a compelling study, Greenwald, Spangenberg, Pratkanis, and Eskenazi (1991) examined the effectiveness of subliminal self-­esteem and memory-­enhancement audiotapes. Unknown to participants in the study, the labels of the tapes were switched, so that people who thought they were getting the memory tape were in fact getting the self-­esteem tape, and vice versa. Participants completed brief measures of self-­esteem and memory tasks. After 2 weeks, participants came back to the lab and were tested on their self-­esteem levels and memory abilities once again. Participants who believed they had the self-­esteem tapes truly believed that their self-­esteem increased as a result of the tapes. Those who thought they had the memory-­enhancement tapes believed that their memories were improved. In fact, their second testing showed no difference in self-­esteem or memory abilities compared to their scores before the tapes. Greenwald and his colleagues concluded that complex subliminal messages (i.e., sentences with a propositional or logical structure) cannot be detected below the level of awareness. However, this is not to say that subliminal influences don’t exist. Simple symbols, sounds, words, and associations may be perceived below the level of awareness (Jones, Fazio, & Olson, 2009; March, Gaertner, & Olson, 2022; Murphy & Zajonc, 1993). Thus, while we may not be vulnerable to complex persuasive messages or subliminal “mind control” by others, the fact that we can perceive simple symbols, faces, or words below the level of conscious awareness, and form associations between them, has some interesting and surprising implications for research on stereotyping and prejudice. As you will soon see, a new area of research shows that it is very hard to avoid prejudice and stereotyping.

Implicit Memory Why can researchers use the term “unconscious” today without blushing with embarrassment? In large part, this is due to the research by neurologists on patients with amnesia.

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FIGURE 4.1.  Subliminal mind control? Since the 1950s, Americans have believed in the power of subliminal messages to influence their attitudes. Some have charged that certain advertisers have constructed print ads that contain a subliminal symbol or message that subtly influences a reader’s attitude to be more favorable toward the product. Taking advantage of this common belief, the American Association of Advertising Agencies created this clever public-­service message, which attempts to debunk the myth of subliminal advertising. Copyright © American Association of Advertising Agencies. Reprinted with permission.

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For decades, it was believed that individuals with amnesia were unable to transfer verbal information from short-term memory to a long-term memory store. But a study by Warrington and Weiskrantz (1970, experiment 2) dramatically showed that the performance of patients with amnesia on “implicit” tests of memory (i.e., tests such as word fragment identification and word stem completion—­considered implicit because they tap priming from a previous study of the words by asking subjects to simply produce the first words that come to mind) is often virtually identical to that of controls. Yet, on explicit tests of memory (such as free recall—­e xplicit because subjects are actively trying to recall specific words to which they were recently exposed) individuals with amnesia consistently showed inferior performance relative to controls. These findings have been replicated a number of times with other patient populations and different tasks (Roediger, 1990), and have wide-­ranging implications for researchers. Implicit measures of retention reflect unconscious or at least unintentional learning because the patient with amnesia is almost always unaware that they know the material when tested with explicit measures, but the subject performs similar to those without amnesia on tests that implicitly tap memory. Thus, the individual with amnesia shows normal retention if the test of memory is an implicit one (Schacter, 1987). Until the mid-1980s, these phenomena were discussed in terms of a unified explicit memory system. But a paper by Graf and Schacter (1985) can be regarded as a watershed in the current study of “unconscious cognition.” In this paper, citing findings from several studies with people with amnesia, the authors made an important distinction between what they termed implicit memory (unintentional or nonconscious forms of retention) and explicit memory (conscious or intentional recollection of previous experiences). This distinction, while similar to the unconscious–­conscious and automatic–­controlled distinctions, was different in that it was based upon several systematic empirical demonstrations, using new methods that allowed such access into the implicit memory (we discuss some of these methods below). It appears then that research with individuals with amnesia, using explicit and implicit tests of memory, shows that when implicit (but not explicit) measures are used to tap previously studied words, the memory performance of the patients with amnesia is equal to that of controls. Again, the crucial point to be made here is that the type of measure one uses (implicit or explicit) determines whether one will gain access to an implicit memory. What does this mean for people with normal (nonamnesic) memory? Do they also have an implicit memory system? They do—that is, normal subjects show a dissociation between explicit and implicit memory on implicit and explicit tasks (Jacoby & Dallas, 1981; Jacoby & Witherspoon, 1982; Smith & Branscombe, 1988; Srinivas & Roediger, 1990). These results are impressive considering that in those with normal memory systems, explicit memory retention may exert opposite effects on the two types of memory tests, rather than affecting performance on one and not affecting performance on the other (as is the case with individuals with amnesia).

IMPLICIT PREJUDICE AND STEREOTYPING For over 30 years, social cognition research has emphasized the dichotomy between cognitive processes that are intentional versus those that are not intended by the actor. This dichotomy has alternatively been labeled the difference between cognitive processes

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that are automatic versus controlled (Devine, 1989; Fazio & Olson, 2014), unconscious versus conscious (Kihlstrom, 1990), intended versus untended (Uleman & Bargh, 1989), aware versus unaware (Lewicki, Hill, & Czyzewska, 1992), and mindful versus mindless (Langer, 1989). As Abelson (1994) has rightly noted, these various dichotomies may belie more the theoretical inclinations of the researcher than reflect distinct subsystems within cognitive activity—­t hat is, perhaps these diverse research domains may be subsumed under a broad “dual-­process” distinction between what have come to be known as implicit and explicit processes (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995; Sherman et al., 2014). Such a characterization avoids any accompanying theoretical interpretations and ties the study of unconscious cognition to the work on implicit versus explicit memory processes. Some research has shown that whether one is influenced by stereotypes in their judgment or behavior may be influenced by previous exposure to information—­information that the subject is unable to report at the time of the judgment or behavior. This process is referred to as implicit stereotyping (or implicit prejudice if the response is simply a positive or negative reaction to a group member). As Greenwald and Banaji (1995) explain, “Implicit stereotypes are the introspectively unidentified (or inaccurately identified) traces of past experience that mediate attributions of qualities to members of a social category” (p. 15). In their influential theory of “implicit social cognition,” Greenwald and Banaji (1995) made two important points about implicit cognition (and this applies to implicit prejudice and stereotyping as well). First, implicit cognition is demonstrated only when a past experience (such as an attitude formation, or exposure to a cognitive priming procedure, or another type of biasing information, such as the chronic accessibility of self-­esteem) affects some future behavior or thought without the awareness or intention of the subject that this experience has influenced their thoughts or behaviors. Second, the measure of implicit cognition should not be an explicit measure of the type discussed above (e.g., any type of self-­report measure, or recognition or recall measure that involves a deliberate response to a question or prompt; see Olson & Zabel, 2016, for a more detailed discussion of implicit measures). This second point requires a bit of elaboration. In virtually all studies on stereotyping, self-­esteem, and attitude measurement, researchers have often implied a consciousness in their operational definitions of these constructs. As discussed above, much research has shown that implicit cognition differs from self-­ reportable (conscious) cognition (Roediger, 1990). To the extent that this is true, then those measures that presume introspection (such as self-­report measures) are not appropriate for the study of implicit cognition effects on thought and behavior. Researchers must instead rely on measures that provide evidence of the operation of implicit cognition, such as word fragment identification, or various reaction-­t ime tasks.

DOCUMENTING IMPLICIT PREJUDICE AND STEREOTYPES To reveal evidence of implicit stereotyping or prejudice, researchers often employ a priming methodology. In the prototypical priming task, a prime stimulus (a word or image) is presented briefly to the participant, immediately followed by a target word. Participants are asked to judge the target word as quickly as possible (e.g., the participant may be simply asked to judge whether the target character strings are real words, or simply strings of letters, or to identify the meaning of the target word) in reaction-­t ime

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measures (such as response latency measures on a computer—­how fast one can hit the appropriate keys in response to the stimulus presented on the screen). According to the spreading activation model of memory (Collins & Loftus, 1975), when one thinks of a concept, related concepts are automatically activated in memory, and the time it takes to access those related concepts is markedly reduced as a result of the spreading activation (e.g., seeing “doctor” increases the accessibility of “patient”). On a reaction-­time task, the faster the participant’s response to the target word, the greater the facilitative effect of the prime on the target word, and, we infer, the stronger the association between the prime and the target word in memory (so, the quicker someone is to identify the word “patient” following “doctor,” the stronger the two words are linked in memory). Because the spreading activation effect Is an automatic process, reaction-­t ime measures can give researchers a window to the participant’s cognitive network, unimpeded by psychological defenses or social desirability concerns (Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983). Using a priming methodology does not necessarily mean one has evidence concerning implicit cognition. Recall that implicit processes are indicated only when we are reasonably certain that the participant was influenced by exposure to prior stimuli but shows no awareness of such influence, or intention to use that information (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). Therefore, if one uses a priming task, it is important to verify that the participant was exposed to the stimulus, but is not aware of (or at least cannot control) the influence of the stimulus on their later judgments or behavior. Below, we explore some studies that have used priming methods to assess implicit stereotyping and prejudice. In one of the first experiments to use a priming task to examine stereotypes, ­Dovidio, Evans, and Tyler (1986) presented White participants with a prime of the word “Black” or “White” for 2 seconds, and asked participants to respond as fast as they could to the question about the target traits (i.e., whether the trait could ever be true—yes or no—of the prime category) that followed the prime and remained on the screen until the participant responded. Participants underwent many such trials, and the primes and targets varied throughout. Dovidio and his colleagues found that participants had faster reaction times to positive stereotyped trait words (e.g., “ambitious,” “practical”) that followed the prime “White.” When the prime was “Black,” participants responded faster to negatively stereotyped words (e.g., “lazy,” “imitative”). These results are interesting in that they establish a facilitative effect for the activation of an outgroup (Black) and the recognition of negative, stereotyped words associated with that group. However, these data may not demonstrate an implicit stereotyping effect, because the presentation of the prime was too long and the task was explicit (participant made judgments about the applicability of the trait to the prime). Recall that to establish an implicit stereotyping effect, the individual must not be aware of the influence of the prime (or must not be able to control the influence of the prime) on their responses to the subsequent words. In the Dovidio et al. procedure, participants were not only aware of the prime category, they were asked to consciously make decisions about the relationship between the target characteristics and the prime category. A later paradigm addressed these concerns. Fazio, Jackson, Dunton, and Williams (1995) presented primes to participants much more briefly, for about a third of a second. These primes were images of Black or White individuals. After a prime appeared, a target adjective that was either positive (e.g., “awesome,” “wonderful”) or negative (e.g., “terrible,” “worthless”) immediately followed. Participants were instructed to categorize the

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target adjective as positive or negative as quickly as possible by pressing one of two buttons on a keyboard. They had no idea that the experiment was about implicit prejudice, and during debriefings no participant expressed any awareness that the primes of Black and White individuals might have affected their responses to the target adjectives. Yet, they did. Among White participants, responses to negative target adjectives were quicker when they were preceded by Black primes, and responses to positive target adjectives were quicker when they were preceded by White primes. This research demonstrates implicit prejudice, rather than implicit stereotyping, because facilitation was to positive and negative concepts instead of specific stereotypes. Further research along these lines has shown that this implicit prejudice effect occurs even when primes are presented subliminally, and that about 60% of White participants exhibit this implicit prejudice toward Black individuals (see Fazio & Olson, 2003). In a striking and disturbing demonstration of implicit prejudice, Goff, Eberhardt, Williams, and Jackson (2008) primed participants with images of either Black or White faces subliminally—­for 3/100ths of a second. Participants were then shown degraded images of various kinds of animals, and were asked to press a button when they were able to identify what kind of animal it was. Participants who were primed with Black faces were quicker to identify the animals, but only if those animals were apes. That’s right; Black Americans have long been associated with animalistic qualities in American culture, apes in particular. In fact, police reports of Black individuals convicted of violent crimes are more likely to contain ape-like references compared to reports of White individuals convicted of similar crimes. Further, Goff and colleagues’ participants who showed especially strong Black–ape associations in memory were more likely to recommend violence against Black but not White criminal suspects. These researchers describe their findings in terms of implicit dehumanization, the idea that people sometimes see Black individuals as less human than White individuals at an implicit level. Some priming measures of prejudice and stereotypes present category labels as primes (e.g., “African American” and “European American”) and others present individual faces as primes (e.g., pictures of actual Black and White individuals). However, there may be fundamental differences in the activation of stereotype-­related concepts in each instance. Macrae, Bodenhausen, Milne, Thorn, and Castelli (1997) presented participants with a prime photograph for 255 ms, and then had them judge whether a letter string was a word or nonword (a lexical decision task). The prime was either a picture of a woman’s face or a household item (e.g., chair). The words to be judged were either stereotypically associated with women (e.g., “caring,” “tender”), or counterstereotypical (e.g., “assertive,” “decisive”), or pronounceable nonwords. Macrae and his colleagues theorized that it is only when one thinks semantically about the prime stimulus that the related concepts to the stimulus are activated. He and his colleagues wanted to investigate the long-held notion that thinking about group labels (or seeing a member of that group) automatically activates related concepts. To test this, participants were assigned to one of three processing conditions. In the “feature-­detection” condition, participants were asked to attempt to detect the presence or absence of a white dot on the prime photo. In the “semantic judgment” condition, participants were to indicate whether the stimulus was an animate or inanimate object. Those in the “exposure” condition were asked simply to report the detection of a prime stimulus. Results indicated that facilitation for stereotypical words only occurred in the semantic-­judgment condition. Simply being exposed to the prime (as in the feature-­detection and exposure conditions) did

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not facilitate recognition of stereotype-­consistent words. Other research supports this finding (e.g., Gilbert & Hixon, 1991). We are thus in a dilemma. How can one reconcile the very different conclusions reached by Macrae et al. (1997) with the dozens of other priming studies? Macrae et al. suggest one explanation. Many of the other priming studies have presented a category label as a prime (e.g., “Black,” “men”). The evidence from these studies suggests that this is sufficient to activate stereotypes and their related concepts. However, when we perceive people (either photos, or in person), Macrae and his colleagues suggest, stereotype activation is not necessarily automatic because we must detect the stimulus and make a categorization. This cognitive activity precludes activation of the stereotype unless one pays more attention to the stimulus at a deeper level of processing (i.e., a semantic level). Only in that instance does the perception of a person activate the stereotype. However, such an explanation cannot adequately explain why Chen and Bargh (1997) found significantly higher hostile behaviors (as rated by coders) among those exposed to a subliminal prime (26 ms) photo of a Black face compared to those exposed to a subliminal prime photo of a White face. Clearly, being implicitly primed with a photo activated associated negative feelings about Black individuals among the non-Black participants, and these negative feelings influenced their behavior (made them feel more negatively and behave in a more hostile fashion). Thus, the explanation that Macrae et al. offer for why their findings differ from other prime studies does not appear to be well-­founded in light of the evidence that suggests that one does not need to semantically consider the stimulus individual in order to activate associated stereotypes and prejudices about that person (Bargh, 1999). Fazio and colleagues (Michael being one of those colleagues; Fazio & Olson, 2014) argue that categorization (by race, gender, etc.) is generally automatic but is particularly so among people with strong prejudices and stereotypes: Such individuals see a Black man or a woman as opposed to an individual (or an “animate object”) in these priming tasks. This is perhaps why most (but not all) of the participants in their priming tasks show automatic prejudice. Afterall, we generally tend to categorize individuals into primitive (i.e., age, race, and gender) categories unintentionally. Research on implicit stereotyping and prejudice has revealed its influence in a number of areas. Much of this research has focused on the very early influences that implicit prejudice and stereotypes have on basic perception. For example, Hugenberg and Bodenhausen (2003) constructed videos of computer-­generated faces that would gradually change their expression from angry to happy (or happy to angry). The participants’ task was simply to view the video and press a button when the face no longer looked angry (or happy). There were two versions of the video: one of a Black male and the other of a White male, and participants were randomly assigned to view one or the other. Importantly, the facial expressions in the videos were identical in every way; they only differed in skin tone and hair. Yet, participants were slower to press the button indicating the face no longer looked angry (and quicker to press the button to indicate the face no longer looked happy) when they viewed a Black versus a White face. The effect was most pronounced among those with stronger implicit prejudices. Implicit prejudice caused anger to appear to linger longer on a Black face relative to an otherwise identical White face, despite their expressions being identical. A study by Moskowitz, Stone, and Childs (2012) examined the impact of implicit stereotype activation in physician decision making. When primed with an African American face, physicians reacted faster with a stereotypical diagnosis, revealing an

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implicit association in their mind between African Americans and certain diseases (not only genetically associated with African Americans, but socially/culturally/stereo­ typically associated, such as obesity or drug abuse). This research suggests that some doctors may perceive African Americans through the lens of an implicit diagnostic bias. Several studies have now documented that implicit prejudices can affect the medical care people receive, particularly when it comes to provider–­patient interactions (Hall et al., 2015). Recall that implicit prejudices and stereotypes are thought to exist as simple associations in memory between a social category and some evaluation or trait (e.g., Black–­ aggressive; women–­caring). As the priming studies above demonstrated, these simple associations can be activated unintentionally and affect judgments and behavior more quickly than can more careful, deliberate reasoning that considers causality and other complex relationships between concepts (Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2014). Because they are represented as simple associations without any directionality, activating one of a pair tends to activate the other. Jennifer Eberhardt and colleagues (Eberhardt, Goff, Purdie, & Davies, 2004; Eberhardt, 2020) provide compelling demonstrations of this bidirectionality in a series of studies involving both undergraduate and law enforcement participants. In one study, they subliminally primed White participants with images of Black versus White faces, which were then followed by degraded images of objects that gradually became clearer. Some of those objects were crime relevant (e.g., guns, knives) and some were not (e.g., a penny, a camera). Participants were told to identify the object when it became clear to them. Crime-­related objects were identified sooner than other objects, but only if participants were subliminally primed with a Black face first, which implies that perceiving a Black face activates stereotype content and affects perceptions (see also Correll, Park, Judd, & Wittenbrink, 2002; Payne, 2001). In follow-­up studies, Eberhardt and colleagues showed that priming people with Black stereotype-­relevant content (e.g., crime, basketball) biased their attention toward Black faces. Thus, activating the category can activate its associated traits, and activating the traits can activate their associated category. Perhaps because of their early impact on perception and construal, implicit stereotypes can also affect more thoughtful, downstream judgments. For example, Wilson, Hugenberg, and Rule (2017) followed up on their work on biased perceptions of Black versus White faces with a set of studies that may help to explain why Black men are subject to greater use of force in police encounters. They asked participants to judge the height and weight of Black and White men from images of their faces. Regardless of whether the faces were of actual men or computer-­generated men, and despite the researchers’ either controlling for or equating the actual height and weight of the men, participants consistently perceived Black men as larger and more formidable than White men. Moreover, these distorted perceptions influenced participants’ judgments of how capable a given man was of causing physical harm, which in turn influenced their judgments of how justified a police officer would be to use force if the officer thought the man was acting aggressively. Such distortions of perception might have been operating in the mind of Minneapolis police officer Derek Chauvin in late May of 2020. After being arrested for suspicion of using a counterfeit bill, George Floyd, an African American man, died after Chauvin kneeled on Floyd’s neck for over 9 minutes. When confronted by witnesses, officer Chauvin said, “We had to control this guy because he’s a sizeable guy” (CNN, 2021).

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Research on implicit stereotyping also suggests that law enforcement or other security officers are not adequately trained to avoid their own biases when it comes to ascertaining criminal behavior in specific individuals. Research by Dabney, Dugan, Topalli, and Hollinger (2006) found that when trained observers deviated from their clear random selection protocol, their “default” was to target shoppers on the basis of race, gender, and age (thus the adage, “shopping while Black”). We are also more likely to implicitly stereotype an outgroup when we perceive that the outgroup is threatening our ingroup (Gonsalkorale, Carlisle, & von Hippel, 2007). As we discuss later, counteracting implicit prejudice and stereotyping through more motivated, controlled processing can help police officers and people in general avoid unfair treatment of marginalized groups (Zabel, Zabel, Olson, & Carlson, 2016).

ORIGINS OF IMPLICIT PREJUDICE AND STEREOTYPES The term “implicit” has seen skyrocketing use in recent years, so much so, in fact, that some researchers believe its meaning has become too diffuse and vague (Corneille & Hütter, 2020). Do we mean “implicit” as the unconscious or unintentional impact of prejudice and stereotypes on perception? Do we mean it as the output of an implicit measure (e.g., priming)? Or do we mean it in terms of how prejudices can form? The term has been used to refer to each of these, so it’s important to specify just what we mean when we say something is “implicit.” In discussing the origins of implicit prejudice, the question is whether prejudice and stereotypes can be acquired without either awareness or intention. It appears that they can. In her consulting work with the Oakland, California, City Police Department, ­Jennifer Eberhardt (2020) observes: MALE BLACK. MALE BLACK. MALE BLACK. MALE BLACK. This is what officers in Oakland hear, booming from their police radios, hundreds of times every day. It’s the inescapable background track to the chaos of crime-­saturated streets. On a typical day, an officer on patrol might hear that dispatched description three hundred times—or twelve hundred times a week, fifty thousand times a year. . . . It’s implausible to believe that officers—­or anyone else—can be immersed in an environment that repetitively exposes them to the categorical pairing of Blacks with crime and not have that affect how they think, feel, or behave. (pp. 80–81)

We suggested that implicit prejudice can be conceptualized as simple associations in memory between social categories and traits. Can people learn these associations unconsciously, or at least unintentionally? Evaluative conditioning is one way such learning might occur. Evaluative conditioning is much like classical conditioning: It involves exposing people to systematic pairings (or “covariations”) between two things. In the case of prejudice, one of those things is a social group, and the other is traits (e.g., “aggressive,” “caring”) or simple evaluations (e.g., “good,” “bad”). The question is, when exposed to such pairings, do people learn them? And, do they sometimes learn them without awareness or intent? We discussed some of this work in Chapter 2, including Lamer and Weisbuch’s (2019) research showing that people are consistently exposed to men being placed higher on webpages than women, which in turn causes people to

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associate men with dominance. This is a good example of implicit stereotyping because people are unlikely to notice the positioning of men and women on webpages, and they are particularly unlikely to be aware that such positioning can influence their stereotypes. Many an internet meme has been made with a message amounting to “people are not born racist.” Certainly, prejudice can be learned, but, as we observed in Chapter 2, they may be born with a tendency to be suspicious of unfamiliar people, and that suspicion may generalize to groups. But are humans also naturally “prepared” to learn negative information about outgroups? Olsson, Ebert, Banaji, and Phelps (2005) examined this question using evaluative conditioning. They showed Black and White American participants images of White and Black individuals. For some participants, members of their racial ingroup were presented alongside a mildly unpleasant electric shock; for others, members of their racial outgroup were presented with the shock. After a delay, Olsson and colleagues then measured participants’ skin conductance—­a measure of physiological arousal associated with a fear response—­while participants viewed more images of ingroup and outgroup members. Participants showed a persistent fear response to members of their outgroup who had been paired with shock, but they eventually stopped showing (extinguished) a fear response to members of their ingroup who had been paired with shock. So, it seems that people are “prepared” to retain negative associations with outgroups. In Chapter 12, we examine whether people can unlearn prejudices through evaluative conditioning (spoiler alert: they can). Whether evaluative conditioning can happen implicitly—­t hat is, without awareness or intent—­is a hotly debated issue (e.g., Moran et al., 2021). But there is at least some evidence that it can. For example, Weisbuch, Pauker, and Ambady (2009) surveyed a number of television shows and documented a tendency for White actors to express more negative nonverbal behavior to Black coactors than White coactors. Exposing naïve participants to these patterns increased negative implicit prejudice toward Black individuals, despite participants not consciously noticing these patterns. Recall in Chapter 2 how media and other forces of socialization tend to depict minority groups in stereotypical ways, which contributes to the formation of prejudice and stereotypes. One open question is the extent to which people—­particularly children—­actively attend to these stereotypical depictions, and whether active attention is necessary for stereotype encoding to occur. Children are not mere passive vessels of culture. They interrogate, question, and even challenge information they are presented with, at least some of the time. And although we have shared research that suggests that conscious attention to stereotypical depictions is not necessary for stereotypes to be encoded, we still have very little insight into how children consciously consider—­or not—the stereotypes to which they’re exposed. Whether attention and awareness are required, there is ample evidence that media, including video games, has the power to create implicit associations that have impact on real-world behavior (Williams & Steele, 2019). In a couple of experiments, Yang (2016) examined these questions. In one study, she found that when subjects played as a violent male (as opposed to a violent female), they developed a stronger implicit association between males and violence, and that directly primed aggressive behavior in the subject. In another study, subjects who played as a violent Black character (as opposed to a violent White character) also developed a strong implicit association between Blacks with violence, and this also primed aggressive behavior in the subject.

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THE IMPLICIT ASSOCIATION TEST In addition to the priming measures discussed above, the Implicit Association Test (IAT; Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) is another means of measuring implicit prejudice. This measure has captured the interest and imagination of researchers worldwide, and it has generated a tremendous amount of empirical and media attention. The IAT can be found online (https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/demo/index.jsp), and it can also be adapted for use offline in lab experiments (e.g., see Sekaquaptewa, Vargas, & von Hippel, 2010). The IAT works like this: Participants are presented with a target concept (a category, such as Black, White, old, young, male, female, etc.) paired with an associated attribute (e.g., pleasant, unpleasant, or good, bad). Suppose the first pairing is Black/good, and White/bad. Thus, participants are led to understand that anytime they see a photo of a Black American, or a positive trait word (e.g., “intelligent,” “honest”), they are to press the appropriate key on the computer keyboard (as designated in the instructions) as soon as possible; they press a different key if they see a photo of a White American or a negative trait word. Partway through, the keys switch meanings for one of the categorization tasks, such that they are to press one key if they see a Black American or a negative word, and the other key if they see a White American or a positive word. Thus, it is a reaction-­t ime measure, intended to discern the degree of association one has between target categories and various traits. In other words, if the individual has a lot of positive characteristics strongly associated in their memories with the category Black, they will be especially quick to react (show the shortest response latency) to the Black/good pairing test, and should be much slower to react to the Black/bad pairing test items. At the end of the test, the response latencies are calculated to give an overall preference that the individual holds for one category or the other—this is computed by comparing how quickly one makes the categorizations when one category (e.g., Black) is paired with positive and the other (e.g., White) is paired with negative versus when one category is paired with negative and the other is paired with positive (we know this is all sort of confusing—­t his is why we recommend taking the test yourself online to get a better feel for it). The results can show a slight, moderate, or strong preference for one category or the other, or the results can be inconclusive (for a number of reasons). Again, a “preference” for one category over the other suggests that, for that person, the category is relatively more associated with positivity and relatively less associated with negativity. What does this mean? If, for example, the results indicated that the individual shows a moderate preference for women versus men, does it mean the person is prejudiced against men? Not necessarily. It merely suggests that, for that person, there is a stronger association between certain evaluations (or traits) and the category. As we’ll see, sometimes this association manifests as prejudice, but sometimes it does not. While the IAT and priming measures discussed earlier are similar, they are different in some important respects. Most notably, the IAT measures associations to a category, while priming measures assess the average responses to individual category exemplars (i.e., individual photos); the IAT gives an estimate of the strength of the association between the category as a whole and positivity/negativity (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Research by Olson and Fazio (2004) has found that a priming procedure, such as that used by Fazio et al. (1995), has little correspondence to the results of an IAT taken by the same participant. However, when people are told to explicitly categorize exemplar faces in the priming procedure according to their racial category, the results of the priming

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measure and the IAT were correlated. Olson and Fazio argue that people normally don’t always categorize by race (e.g., they may categorize by gender or attractiveness); the priming procedure used by Fazio et al. may be a superior measure of judgments and behavior toward individuals, and the IAT may be a better measure of associations between the category and trait descriptors. This implies the interesting possibility that people may have separate attitudes toward social categories and members of those categories (e.g., a person may be prejudiced toward Jewish people but like most of the individual Jewish people they know). The IAT has been shown to have good convergent and discriminant validity, and good reliability (Gawronski, 2002; Greenwald & Nosek, 2001; Kawakami & Dovidio, 2001; Nosek, Greenwald, & Banaji, 2007; Rudman, 2008). It has been shown in some studies to be related to explicit attitude measures and to predict attitude-­relevant behavior (McConnell & Leibold, 2001). However, there are a number of caveats. For example, Nosek and Smyth (2007) suggest that explicit and implicit measures assess different but related attitudes—­that sometimes they align and sometimes they do not. Other studies have shown that the stimulus items used can greatly affect what the IAT reveals (e.g., Govan & Williams, 2004) and that responses on the IAT are sometimes unstable across situations (Steffens & Buchner, 2003). Others have claimed that potential confounds influence IAT performance independent of actual evaluations (e.g., slower cognitive processing leads to higher IAT prejudice scores and lower IAT self-­esteem scores; McFarland & Crouch, 2002). The test definitely has critics who argue that the IAT does not measure prejudice (e.g., Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2001; Ravenzwaaij, van der Maas, & Wagenmakers, 2011) and is a poor predictor of behavior (e.g., Oswald, Mitchell, Blanton, Jaccard, & Tetlock, 2013). As of this writing, the debate continues to rage (e.g., ­Schimmack, 2021). As with any measurement tool, it is important that researchers who wish to use the IAT are fully aware of what it is measuring, and that they are addressing the limiting factors, moderating variables, and confounds that could influence their results with the IAT. It is also important to recognize that measures of implicit prejudice and stereotypes, like the IAT and priming, should not be expected to always predict judgments and behavior. As we see next, dual-­process theories argue that implicit prejudice and stereotypes exert their influence only under certain conditions.

DUAL‑PROCESS PERSPECTIVES So far, we’ve documented the origins and impact of implicit prejudices and stereotypes on people’s perceptions and actions, but as we have seen, implicit prejudice only sometimes seems to matter, so it can’t be the whole story. And what about more explicit processing? People are not always operating on autopilot, following whatever whim their implicit processes produce. Sometimes we do think carefully about how we see, judge, and treat people. And, more interestingly, sometimes the ways we want to treat people are at odds with our implicit prejudices. Take, for example, a White individual who both harbors implicit prejudice against Black individuals but doesn’t want to: How do people navigate situations when their “heart” (i.e., their implicit prejudices) and their head (i.e., their consciously held beliefs and values) disagree? Dual-­process theories tackle such questions and describe when judgments and behaviors are driven by more implicit versus more explicit processes.

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In an influential paper, Devine (1989) investigated stereotype activation in White participants who had high or low self-­reported (explicit) prejudice toward African Americans (as measured on McConahay’s [1986] Modern Racism Scale [MRS], which we discuss further below and in Chapter 6). Results indicated that both high and low explicitly prejudiced individuals showed automatically activated stereotypes about African Americans. But Devine did not interpret this to mean that everyone is prejudiced. Rather, she argues that people in a given society have knowledge of the cultural stereotypes for various groups (Lepore & Brown, 1997), and this knowledge is automatically activated when the person thinks about the group. Devine’s results make the important distinction between knowledge of cultural stereotypes and personal beliefs about outgroups (personally believing the stereotypes). When presented with target characteristics that are associated in memory with a stereotype of a particular group, people then automatically think of that stereotype. What was especially interesting about this research was that while the automatic activation was equally strong and inescapable in both groups, only the explicitly low-­prejudice individuals were motivated to engage in controlled, effortful cognitive processes designed to inhibit the effects of the automatic stereotype activation. Therefore, according to Devine’s dissociation model of prejudice, there is no correlation between self-­reported/explicit measures of prejudice (i.e., the MRS) and the degree of implicit stereotyping in low-­prejudice individuals. Of course, high-­prejudice persons should (and Devine’s results confirmed this) show a high correlation between their self-­reported prejudice and measures of their implicit stereotyping. Devine’s (1989) seminal work made the distinction between automatic/implicit and controlled/explicit forms of prejudice. Later research clarified when and how people are able to prevent the impact of automatic prejudice on controlled judgments and behaviors, as well as just what sorts of cues activate stereotypes in the first place. For example, Lepore and Brown (1997) found that while both high and low explicitly prejudiced White persons were aware of negative stereotypes of Blacks, there was a difference in how high and low explicitly prejudiced White persons respond to being exposed to either stereotypical traits (e.g., “musical”) or a category label (e.g., “Blacks”). They found that when a stereotype of Blacks was primed (e.g., “musical”), participants were more negative in their ratings of a target person (see Figure 4.2). However, when the category label was primed (e.g., “Blacks”), only high-­prejudice persons gave negative ratings of the target, while low-­prejudice persons tended to have more positive impressions (see Figure 4.3). Lepore and Brown (1997) suggest that the reason Devine (1989) found no difference between low- and high-­prejudice White people in automatic stereotype activation was because Devine’s experiments incorporated a mixture of both stereotype and category primes. Thus, according to Lepore and Brown, high-­prejudice people have strong stereotypical associations with the category label that is activated when primed with the label or a stereotypical-­associated concept. On the other hand, low-­prejudice people, they suggest, do not have such associations at the automatic level, and therefore when they are primed with the category label, they do not have automatic access or activation of stereotypical concepts. Lepore and Brown (1997) suggested that Devine’s (1989) model of a conscious inhibition of automatic stereotyping needs greater specificity in light of these data, and the weight of other studies suggesting that stereotypes are a functional mechanism to conserve cognitive resources (e.g., Macrae, Milne, & Bodenhausen, 1994; Snyder & Meine, 1994). However, in a compelling investigation, Fazio and Dunton (1997) showed that

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such conscious inhibition is precisely how low-­prejudice persons operate. Their data showed that for many people (e.g., high-­prejudice and some low-­prejudice persons), categorizing an individual by race is a highly automatic process. This makes later similarity judgments for high-­prejudice persons fast and efficient (one of the main benefits of stereotyping, as discussed in Chapter 2). However, for low-­prejudice persons who are highly motivated to control prejudiced responses, such categorization needed to be overridden by a time-­consuming, controlled search for other attributes by which to classify the target individual (by gender, hair color, etc.). In a related set of experiments, Blair and Banaji (1996) found that implicit stereotyping effects can be overridden when perceivers have an intention to think about counterstereotypical information, and when they have sufficient cognitive resources available (e.g., when they are not distracted, tired, or in a hurry). Data obtained by Wyer (2004) mirrors the conclusions of Fazio and Dunton, and Blair and Banaji, and in fact shows that low-­prejudice persons not only seek out stereotype-­disconfirming evidence, but are sometimes able to do so even when their cognitive resources are constrained. Therefore, these data, along with Devine’s results, show that for some low-­prejudice persons, the conscious inhibition of automatic racial categorization (and possible prejudiced responses) is indeed possible, and it may be the means by which they maintain their view of themselves as nonprejudiced. Inhibition 7 Legend 6.5

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FIGURE 4.2.  Influence of priming a stereotype on ratings of a target person. In their research, Lepore and Brown (1997) found that high- and low-­prejudice participants tended to respond to an ethnically nondescript target individual in essentially the same ways when they were primed with a stereotype about Blacks (e.g., musical). From Lepore, L., & Brown, R. (1997). Category and stereotype activation: Is prejudice inevitable? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72(2), 275–287. Copyright © 1997 American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

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FIGURE 4.3.  Influence of priming a category on ratings of a target person. Conversely, Lepore and Brown (1997) found that priming participants with a category (i.e., Blacks) had a differential effect on high- versus low-­prejudice participants. High-­prejudice participants rated the target more negatively compared to low-­prejudice participants (see far right side of the figure). From Lepore, L., & Brown, R. (1997). Category and stereotype activation: Is prejudice inevitable? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72(2), 275–287. Copyright © 1997 American Psychological Association. Reprinted by permission.

of prejudiced responses may not be entirely efficient, at least not at first, but it works in certain situations, and can become automatic over time (Moskowitz & Stone, 2012). Devine’s (1989) model has been qualified in another respect. Wittenbrink, Judd, and Park (1997) presented participants with a brief prime (15 ms) that was not consciously perceptible. The prime was either the word “Black,” “White,” or a neutral nonword (e.g., “xdofger”), or a filler noun (e.g., “lemon,” “table”). Participants were asked to judge whether subsequent adjectives were words or nonwords. The adjectives were positive or negative stereotypical adjectives that were characteristic of either White or Black Americans. Results revealed evidence of implicit stereotyping and implicit prejudice. Implicit stereotyping was demonstrated in that there was a greater facilitation when the stereotypical words matched the prime that preceded it—that is, people recognized the stereotypical words about Whites faster when they followed the prime “White” than when the words followed the other primes. Implicit prejudice was shown in that positive stereotyped words were facilitated more following the “White” prime than the “Black” prime. However, negatively stereotyped words were facilitated more following the “Black” prime than the “White” prime. These data suggest support for the idea that group labels facilitate access to stereotype-­consistent traits, and inhibit access to

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stereotype-­inconsistent traits (Blair & Banaji, 1996; Dijksterhuis & Knippenberg, 1996). The data reported by Wittenbrink et al. challenge Devine’s dissociation model in that they found that implicit prejudice scores were correlated with explicit measures of prejudice (in this case, the MRS). According to Devine, there should be little or no correlation between explicit measures of prejudice and implicit measures in low-­prejudice persons. To shed some further light on these divergent opinions, we briefly examine the evidence concerning the centerpiece of this issue, the MRS, perhaps the most-used measure of prejudice of all time. McConahay (1986) formulated the MRS, a self-­report measure of prejudiced attitudes toward Blacks. He found good reliability and validity for the scale, and found that it represented a nonreactive measure of racial attitudes. The MRS was designed to measure subtle expressions of negative feelings about Blacks, contrasted with traditional overt hostility in “old-­fashioned” measures of racism (which we discuss further in Chapter 6). To complete the scale, participants indicate their agreement with statements like “Discrimination against Blacks is no longer a problem in the United States” and “Blacks are getting too demanding in their push for equal rights”). The scale was very popular, and still is to this day. However, mounting evidence over the years has led many researchers to abandon the MRS as a measure of prejudice (Migetz, 2004). Some suggest that it confounds prejudice with political conservativism because conservatives tend to emphasize individualism and small government (Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986). Others have found that it is a highly variable, highly reactive measure, and is highly correlated with traditional (old-­fashioned) measures of racism (Dovidio, Kawakami, Johnson, Johnson, & Howard, 1997). In a compelling programmatic series of experiments, Fazio et al. (1995) found that the MRS was uncorrelated with an implicit (priming) measure of prejudice, and it was a highly reactive measure in that White participants responded in a less-­prejudiced manner when the experimenter who administered the survey was Black. Fazio et al. concluded that researchers ought to utilize implicit procedures (like priming and the IAT) to accurately assess prejudiced attitudes. These problems with the MRS may account for the variability between Devine’s (1989) and Wittenbrink et al.’s (1997) conclusions. Thus, the MRS can best be thought of as a measure of one’s willingness to express prejudiced attitudes, rather than a true measure of a person’s intergroup attitudes. A low score on the MRS may mean a person is truly not prejudiced, or it might mean that they are prejudiced but unwilling to admit it. Another dual-­process model of prejudice, the motivation, opportunity as determinants (MODE) model, addresses these problems. The MODE model (Fazio & Olson, 2014; see Figure 4.4) recognizes that although implicit prejudice is pervasive, individuals vary in the extent to which they harbor it, and that some people are also more or less willing to express it. Importantly, the MODE model also attempts to explain when implicit prejudice will affect judgments and behavior. The MODE model explains the relationship between implicit attitudes and downstream judgments and behaviors. Let’s unpack that. We’re trying to determine when and how implicit prejudices influence judgments and behavior; as we’ve seen, sometimes they do and sometimes they don’t. Inconsistent relationships between implicit prejudice and downstream judgments and behaviors implies a role for moderators—­t hat is, factors that determine when one variable has an impact on another. The MODE model proposes two moderators—­motivation and opportunity—­t hat determine when implicit prejudices impact judgments and behavior and when they don’t. Motivation can include a motivation to be accurate, as well as a specific motivation to avoid being prejudiced.

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FIGURE 4.4.  The MODE (motivation and opportunity as determinants) model of the attitude–­ behavior relationship.

Opportunity is anything that allows for the influence of more careful thinking (i.e., opportunity to do something other than go with your implicit prejudices). Opportunity could come from having enough time to think about how you react to someone, being well rested, or not being distracted by other tasks. On the other hand, being rushed, tired, or distracted (or, as we shall see, intoxicated) implies low opportunity to think carefully. According to the MODE model, one needs both motivation and opportunity to prevent implicit prejudices from affecting judgments and behaviors. When either opportunity or motivation is absent, the MODE model predicts that judgments and behaviors will be determined by implicit prejudices: People with high levels of implicit prejudice will act prejudiced, and people with low levels of implicit prejudice will not. When opportunity is high, people’s motivations will be a bigger determinant of their judgments and behaviors; People who are motivated to avoid prejudice will succeed in overcoming their implicit prejudices and choose more egalitarian responses. A study that Michael conducted on how we form first impressions provides an example of the MODE’s predictions about when implicit prejudice affects us (Olson & Fazio, 2004). We showed participants images of people of different races in different occupations—­teachers, mail carriers, doctors, electricians, and so on—and participants were asked to ponder and then report their impressions of them—how intelligent, honest, likable, and so on they guessed each person to be. Because they reported their impressions of a number of Black and White individuals, we could derive an average of how positive their impressions of Black individuals were relative to their impressions of White individuals. Before they did any of this, however, we measured their implicit prejudice using the priming measure described earlier. We also measured their motivation to avoid prejudice using Dunton and Fazio’s (1997) Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale. This scale includes items such as “I feel guilty when I have a negative thought or feeling about a Black person,” and “If I were participating in a class discussion and a Black student expressed an opinion with which I disagreed, I would be hesitant to express my own viewpoint.” Participants simply indicate how much they agree with each statement, and we derive a score for each person across the items that provides a sense of how motivated they are to avoid being prejudiced (you may note that

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the first item asks about one’s personal values, and the second item asks about people’s adherence to social norms; as we shall see in Chapter 12 on reducing prejudice, this distinction is often important). Overall, we knew how implicitly prejudiced the participants were, how motivated they were to avoid prejudice, and how positive their first impressions were of Black relative to White individuals. It’s also important to note that participants were given plenty of time to form their impressions of the individuals, so the opportunity variable was high in this experiment. According to the MODE model, implicit prejudice should predict the participants’ first impressions if those participants are low in the motivation to avoid prejudice. That was just what we found: Participants with implicit anti-Black prejudices formed more negative impressions of Black relative to White individuals, and participants with relatively pro-Black implicit prejudices formed more positive impressions of Black relative to White individuals. What about those participants who were motivated to avoid prejudice? As predicted, because they were both motivated and had the opportunity to correct for their implicit prejudices, they did. Interestingly, they tended to overcorrect: Implicitly prejudiced participants who were motivated to avoid prejudice reported more positive impressions of Black relative to White individuals. What about cases where opportunity is more limited, when people don’t have the time or resources to overcome their implicit prejudices? Again, the MODE model predicts that any motivation to avoid prejudice will be impotent without opportunity. Some research has investigated the opportunity variable in creative ways. For example, when people are under time pressure, they are more likely to express their implicit prejudices on explicit measures like the MRS (Ranganath, Smith, & Nosek, 2008). Aging also reduces one’s ability to inhibit implicit prejudices—­for example, Stewart, Von Hippel, and Radvansky (2009) showed that older adults aren’t necessarily more prejudiced (as they are sometimes stereotyped to be). Instead, older adults are less able to inhibit the expression of whatever implicit prejudices they have. Researchers have also investigated how alcohol consumption can reduce the opportunity to correct for prejudice. In one study, participants who had consumed alcohol were less able to correct for their implicit prejudices in their verbal statements (Loersch, Bartholow, Manning, Calanchini, & Sherman, 2015). Finally, there are certain behaviors that people have less control over, and hence, less opportunity to monitor and correct. Certain kinds of nonverbal behavior like voice pitch and nervous fidgeting are relatively difficult to control, and these sorts of behaviors can be particularly revealing in social interactions. Several studies have examined how implicit prejudices may “leak” into nonverbal channels of communication in interracial interactions. For example, McConnell and Leibold (2001) had White participants complete both implicit (IAT) and explicit measures of prejudice, and also had them interact with White and Black partners. The implicit measure tended to correlate best not with what people said but how they said it: To the extent that participants harbored implicit anti-Black prejudice, they tended to speak and smile less and commit more speech errors and hesitations when interacting with a Black versus a White partner. Similar results were reported by Dovidio, Kawakami, and Gaertner (2002). Dovidio and colleagues also noted that among their White participants, explicit prejudice was a better predictor of what people actually said in the interaction, but implicit prejudice was a better predictor of nonverbal behaviors. These nonverbal effects of implicit prejudice are a likely source of microaggressions, which are brief, subtle, and presumably

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unintentional acts that are perceived as derogatory from the perspective of the target (Sue, 2010). Finally, it’s important to mention that even among those most motivated to avoid prejudice, they will sometimes be tired, distracted, or perhaps drunk, and so it is likely that whatever implicit prejudice they have will leak into their nonverbal behavior over time. This becomes relevant in the context of long-term relationships, including college roommates, which is what Towles-­Schwen and Fazio (2006) examined. These researchers took advantage of the natural random assignment that Indiana University once used in their assigning of dormitory roommates. Among White students, some were randomly assigned a same-race roommate, and some were assigned a Black roommate. Towles-­Schwen and Fazio measured the implicit prejudice of the White roommates and tracked the relationships over the course of an academic year. Sadly, overall Black–White roommate relationships dissolved (e.g., one or the other roommate requested a change in roommate) more often than same-race relationships. However, greater implicit prejudice among White roommates led to earlier roommate conflict and dissolution. It’s also worth mentioning that the White roommates’ motivation to avoid prejudice did not matter, suggesting that their Black roommates were more attuned to the impact of implicit prejudice than any motivation to avoid it. Hence, implicit prejudice can have insidious effects despite the best intentions when opportunity is lacking. These results also confirm the importance of considering stereotyping in a dynamic interaction context, rather than simply (as has traditionally been the case in prejudice research) assessing the attitudes of the majority about the minority (Devine, Evett, & Vasquez-­Suson, 1996). In other words, social interactions are not unidirectional processes whereby one individual influences, but is not influenced by, the other. Each person contributes information in a moment-­by-­moment, bidirectional, dynamic interaction. The subtle cues in the overt and nonverbal behavior of one individual are detected by another and reacted to, and this reaction can be taken as evidence by the first individual that may confirm or disconfirm stereotypes, prejudices, or other thoughts about their partner. While this makes much intuitive sense, it is an unconventional approach to understanding prejudice, and we discuss it in greater detail in Chapter 7. As we’ve seen, there’s been great debate among both social scientists and the general public about just how impactful implicit prejudice is. Instead of getting stuck on questions surrounding whether implicit prejudice is pervasive and impactful, dual-­process conceptualizations like the MODE model more precisely address the question of when— that is, under what conditions—­implicit prejudice impacts peoples’ perceptions and actions. In short, it is when people are either unmotivated or lack the opportunity to correct for them that they exert their impact.

IMPLICIT GENDER STEREOTYPES Implicit stereotyping has also been demonstrated concerning gender stereotypes (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Ellemers, 2018). In an experiment by Banaji, Hardin, and Rothman (1993), subjects were assigned to either a dependence or aggression condition. Some subjects were then primed (in what was described as a separate experiment) with trait behaviors. The subjects were asked to unscramble 45 four-word sentences that were either neutral in meaning or contained 30 trait-­relevant behaviors (such as “N

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abuses an animal” for the aggressive trait). Then, in the second supposed experiment, the subject read about a man or woman performing slightly trait-­relevant behaviors. Then the subject rated the person on the target trait and other traits. Results indicated evidence of implicit gender stereotyping. Those who were primed with a dependence prime judged the woman as more dependent than the man. Likewise, those primed with the aggressive trait rated the man as more aggressive than the woman. Similar implicit ­gender‑stereotyping effects have been reported by Banaji and Hardin (1996). Interestingly, some evidence suggests that some people can resist the influence of implicit gender stereotypes on their behavior. In a fascinating study by van Breen, Spears, Kuppens, and de Lemus (2018), researchers found that women who strongly identified with feminists were able to counteract exposure to subliminal gender stereotypes by persisting in their counterstereotypical domains, showing a greater willingness to sacrifice men, and having an ingroup bias.

WHO IS RESPONSIBLE? A crucial issue is whether people should be held responsible for the effects of their implicit prejudice and stereotyping. If implicit stereotyping and prejudice occur (and we have reviewed the solid evidence that suggest that they do), and—by definition—­they occur without the control or intention of the individual, then are they still responsible for stereotype-­consistent behavior or feelings that arise in response to implicit stereotyping? This is an interesting question. Banaji and Greenwald (1995) take the controversial position that the implicit stereotyping data support the idea that society should rethink the issue of personal responsibility when it comes to stereotyping in everyday situations (see also Greenwald et al., 2022). They argue that it is unwise to blame or punish individuals who have shown implicit stereotyping because it is potentially out of the person’s control. Instead of focusing on individual (and—they suggest—­f utile) efforts to control one’s implicit stereotyping, Banaji and Greenwald propose a public health solution to implicit stereotyping. They suggest that society ought to instead “modify environments such that the operation of implicit stereotypes is inhibited” (p. 197). Other researchers (e.g., Fiske, 1989; Olson & Gill, 2022) are critical of a position that removes all personal responsibility for implicit stereotyping. Fiske argues that if society adopted the position that people “just can’t help” stereotyping, it would remove any pressure, incentive, and sanctions that would promote stereotype reduction. To avoid such a perspective, Fiske suggests that researchers refocus their energies on understanding stereotype reduction as a combination of knowledge and motivation (see also Allport, 1954). People who have self-­insight about their prejudices, and know these are undesirable, can be motivated to avoid using them (or allowing them to influence their thinking). On one hand, some research attests to the failure of even highly motivated individuals to avoid stereotypical thinking (e.g., Bargh, 1999; Banaji & Hardin, 1996; Pendry & Macrae, 1994). On the other hand, there is some evidence that chronic egalitarian goals can prevent the automatic activation of prejudice and stereotype (Moskowitz, 2010). Awareness and some power over their activation implies that perhaps people might be held responsible for the effects of implicit prejudice and stereotypes. Might people have some awareness, and hence, perhaps some responsibility for the effects of their implicit prejudices? We have seen that when people are motivated and

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have the opportunity, they can reduce the impact of implicit prejudice on their judgments and actions (e.g., Olson & Fazio, 2004). But this seems to assume that they in fact do have some level of awareness. Do they? A quick internet search reveals a host of news stories, academic articles, and intervention workshops aimed at the insidious problem of “unconscious bias.” Is there empirical support for the claim that implicit prejudices are, in fact, unconscious? The short answer is “no.” In fact, there is ample evidence to the contrary (Hahn, Judd, Hirsh, & Blair, 2014). For example, we (Phillips & Olson, 2014) asked participants to complete explicit (questionnaire) measures of prejudice after completing an IAT measure of their implicit prejudice. Some participants completed the explicit measures with no special instructions but others were implored to be honest (Study 1) or “listen to your gut” (Study 2) before completing the explicit measures. Both when instructed to be honest or to listen to their guts, implicit and explicit measures strongly correlated, which suggests that people do have access to their implicit prejudices and can report them on explicit measures if they so choose. We can conclude from Phillips and Olson’s (2014) research that implicit prejudices are not unconscious, and instead that people are aware of them and experience them as gut feelings. The fact that implicit prejudices are experienced this way is worth noting. For example, negative gut feelings about an outgroup can be used to infer information about that group’s traits (“I have a bad feeling about them, therefore they must be dangerous”; Kurdi, Mann, Charlesworth, & Banaji, 2019). When deciding whom to befriend, avoid, hire, or fire, people do often listen to their guts because they often believe their guts can be trusted (Schwarz, 1990). Particularly when it comes to ambiguous judgments like whether a given job candidate would be a good “fit” with an employer, implicit prejudices often leak out into real-world hiring decisions (e.g., Agerström and Rooth, 2011; Rooth, 2010). Some argue that gut feelings are often a valid source of information and should be generally trusted (Dijksterhuis & Nordgren, 2006; Gigerenzer, 2007). But that all depends on the origins of our gut feelings. When it comes to prejudice and stereotyping, our guts are often being “fed” distorted information about historically marginalized groups (e.g., in the form of media biases). Therefore, when it comes to gut feelings about members of outgroups, we should probably interrogate them, ponder their origins, and perhaps distrust them. And our work shows that people have the capacity to do just that. There is also an important distinction to be made between being aware of implicit prejudice through gut feelings and awareness of the influence of that prejudice. Take, for example, Wilson and colleagues’ (2017) research indicating that participants with relatively high levels of implicit prejudice misperceive Black men as more angry and formidable. In our view, these participants were probably aware of their implicit prejudices, but they may not be aware that their implicit prejudices distort how they perceive Black men. Therefore, raising awareness of the effects of implicit prejudice should be a key component to antiprejudice education. Some research has examined how implicit prejudice awareness can help mitigate its effects (e.g., Perry, Murphy, & Dovidio, 2015), but very little work has investigated how we might go about increasing that awareness (see Perry, Skinner, & Abaied, 2019, for an example with children). So, should people be responsible for their implicit stereotyping? This is not exactly a scientific question. It appears that people are aware of their implicit prejudices, and can be made aware of their effects. And, according to the MODE model, with ample motivation and opportunity they have the power to counteract their influence. Hence, we would not entirely absolve individuals of responsibility.

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THE STUBBORNNESS OF IMPLICIT PREJUDICE As we’ve seen, implicit prejudices appear to form relatively early in life and can (sometimes) have an insidious impact on perceptions, judgments, and actions. Other research has shown that despite reductions in explicit prejudice over the past few decades, implicit prejudice has remained relatively stable (Schmidt & Nosek, 2010). Interestingly, there appears to be some recent reductions in implicit racial and sexual orientation prejudices, but implicit ageism and implicit disability prejudices have not budged much in recent years, and implicit anti-fat prejudices have actually increased (Charlesworth & Banaji, 2019). Whence the stubbornness? One perspective argues that the stubbornness resides in our individual heads—as we’ve discussed, since implicit prejudices are so overlearned and efficient, we seem to be stuck with them, much like any overlearned habit. This individual-­level approach is perhaps the most intuitive way to understand implicit prejudice; after all, this is a book about the psychology of prejudice. There’s also evidence to support it: As we have seen, there are meaningful individual differences in implicit prejudice, and those individual differences meaningfully relate to judgments and behavior. Additionally, there is at least some stability in implicit prejudice: The test–­ retest reliability of measures of implicit prejudice, though not ideal, does reveal at least some consistency within a person when they complete a measure at two different time points (Cunningham, Preacher, & Banaji, 2001). Another perspective, which hearkens to sociological approaches, suggests that the stubbornness of implicit prejudice resides more in our environments (Payne, Vuletich, & Lundberg, 2017). An early demonstration of the effects of environmental information on implicit prejudice comes from Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001). These authors reasoned that implicit prejudice might depend on recent exposure to members of different groups. For example, if you have just watched a movie with positive depictions of Black individuals (say, Black Panther), would you become—­at least temporarily—­less implicitly prejudiced? Dasgupta and Greenwald tested just this question in an experiment where they first showed participants pictures of either admired Black (e.g., Martin Luther King) and disliked White (e.g., Jeffrey Dahmer) individuals, or disliked Black (e.g., O. J. ­Simpson) and admired White (e.g., Tom Hanks) individuals, before having them complete an IAT. As expected, implicit prejudice was temporarily reduced among those who saw admired Black and disliked White individuals. Wittenbrink et al. (2001) investigated the impact of the physical environment on implicit prejudice. Instead of using a relatively “context-­f ree” priming measure like those described so far (where primes were presented against a blank background), Wittenbrink and colleagues primed participants with images of Black and White individuals against background images, including a city street corner and a church. Participants exhibited implicit prejudice when Black individuals were depicted in the former context, but not the latter. Does this imply that people’s implicit prejudices depend on the context? Possibly. It is also possible that different contexts activate different subtypes stably stored in people’s memories. Demonstrations of the effects of context on implicit prejudice quickly accumulated (Blair, 2002), further raising the possibility that it is the environment, not just the individual, that supports implicit prejudice. After all, as we’ve seen in earlier chapters, the subject of prejudice is not one that most majority-­g roup members enjoy discussing. Many choose not to think about it all and try to be “colorblind,” which suggests that maybe their prejudices aren’t as well entrenched in their heads as psychologists

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might think. More recently, researchers have considered the immediate geographical environment as the source of implicit prejudice. Consider the following findings, which consider geographical area (either county or zip code): More negative implicit prejudices among White residents relate to higher death rates of Black residents (Leitner, Hehman, Ayduk, & Mendoza-­Denton, 2016), and more disproportionate use of lethal force by police officers against Black residents (Hehman, Flake, & Calanchini, 2018). Many of these geographical-­level effects of implicit prejudice do not appear when considered at the level of the individual, which supports the idea that environments reinforce implicit prejudices more than individuals do (Payne et al., 2017). Others have challenged these findings, claiming they go too far by essentially leaving out the individual (e.g., Gawronski & Bodenhausen, 2017; Kurdi & Banaji, 2017; Olson & Gill, 2022). They remind us that implicit prejudice of individuals does, in fact, show constancy across contexts so long as context is taken into account (e.g., Gawronski, Morrison, Phills, & Galdi, 2017). For example, a person’s implicit prejudice of a particular group (e.g., Arab Muslims) in a particular context (at a mosque) shows impressive stability over time. This debate is an example of the classic tension in social psychology: that a person’s beliefs, attitudes, and behaviors are typically a function of both the person and the context (based on Kurt Lewin’s (1936) famous equation, B = ƒ(P, E)—that is, that behavior is a function of the interaction of a person and their environment). Perhaps the most comprehensive way to understand implicit prejudice is to consider individuals as being “nested” within communities that are themselves “nested” within large geographical areas, like counties and states. Certainly we all know of individuals within our own communities who are more and less prejudiced. And some specific contexts and broader communities are, on average, likely to be more prejudiced than others. Individuals make up communities and communities influence individuals within them. In short, implicit prejudice in particular, and prejudice in general, should be considered a “syndrome,” involving person, context, and social structure (Pettigrew, 2021). As we see in Chapter 12, the question of whether to focus prejudice reduction efforts on individual minds versus contexts is a central one, and as we are all individuals in contexts, both perspectives have merit. And while implicit stereotypes are difficult to change, the task is not impossible. Research by Rudman, Ashmore, and Gary (2001) found that when people are exposed to a class on reducing prejudice and conflict, their scores on explicit and implicit measures of prejudice are reduced; interventions like these target both the context and individual “hearts and minds.”

GLOSSARY Dissociation Model of Prejudice—Devine’s model of prejudice, which states that there is no relationship between explicit (i.e., self-­report) measures of prejudice (like the Modern Racism Scale) and the degree of implicit stereotyping in low-­prejudice persons. Low-­prejudice persons are able to inhibit their stereotypical thoughts soon after such thoughts are activated, resulting in no correlation between explicit measures of prejudice and measures of the automatic activation of stereotypes in low-­prejudice persons.

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Evaluative Conditioning—formation and change of attitudes based on pairings of objects (e.g., social groups and positive/negative objects) in the environment. Explicit Cognition—processing that is slow, inefficient, effortful, propositional, and conscious; also referred to as controlled cognition. Explicit Memory—conscious recollection of memories. All of the episodic and general information that is in long-term memory, and that is available for conscious recollection. Implicit Cognition—cognitive processing that is fast, efficient, unintentional, affective, and possibly unconscious; also referred to as automatic cognition. Implicit Memory—an unintentional, nonconscious form of memory. Stimuli can be perceived without awareness, and this information can later influence thoughts, feelings, and behaviors. Implicit Stereotyping and Prejudice—the introspectively unidentified (i.e., nonconscious) traces of past experience that influence perceptions and judgments of outgroup members. Exposure to prior stereotype-­relevant information or positive/negative information below the level of awareness can later influence one’s attitudes, feelings, and behavior toward the relevant outgroup. Microaggressions—brief, subtle, and presumably unintentional acts that are perceived as derogatory from the perspective of the target. MODE Model—a theory of attitude–­behavior relations that posits motivation and opportunity as moderators of the relationship between implicit evaluations and later judgments and behaviors. Priming—the automatic activation of concepts in memory via perception of a related stimulus or “prime.” Subliminal—perception of a stimulus without conscious awareness of perceiving the stimulus.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. What are the implications of the research on implicit stereotyping for efforts to understand the origin of prejudice and stereotyping? 2. How would you explain to someone what implicit memory or implicit stereotyping is? How would you explain what the Implicit Association Test is? 3. Do you think that subliminal advertising can work? To what extent, and how would it be most effective? 4. What are the pros and cons of “going with your gut” versus “thinking before acting”? How do you reconcile instances when your “heart” and your “head” disagree? 5. Who should be held accountable for implicit prejudice and stereotyping?

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6. Should implicit prejudice be considered more of an individual problem or a problem of social contexts? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each perspective?

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CHAPTER 5

The Prejudiced Personality

Are Some People More Likely to Feel Prejudice?

I

n the early 1970s television sitcom All in the Family, Carroll O’Connor played the character Archie Bunker, a working-­c lass man who was a cab driver, and lived a modest life. One of the reasons the show was so popular with American viewers was that Archie was a stubborn, ignorant, prejudiced, and selfish man, who was also portrayed as sometimes very vulnerable, sensitive, sentimental, and caring toward others. Archie was an “equal opportunity bigot.” He was prejudiced toward anyone who was different from himself (i.e., his narrow ingroup was White, middle-­c lass men who were Protestants). He was indeed a complex man, and American viewers embraced the show because it addressed important social issues (e.g., prejudice, women’s rights, abortion) and showed how ridiculous prejudice is. You may know some people like Archie, people who are prejudiced toward several groups. They seem to dislike most everyone who is different from themselves and their own groups. In these instances, it is intuitive to think that there is something about the personality of these persons that makes them dislike other groups so much. We arrive at such a conclusion because we think, “What are the odds that someone will find faults with so many different groups?” (“What are the odds that all these groups will truly have these shortcomings?”). The more likely explanation is that there is something about the perceiver that colors the way they view the groups, such that fault is found with all of the groups. Explanations for the prejudice exhibited by Archie Bunker, and often found in society in general, attribute prejudiced attitudes to a flaw in the perceiver’s personality. In this chapter, we explore the ways that psychologists have sought to describe and understand the “prejudiced personality.” A primary question that we address is “Is there such a thing as a prejudiced personality?”—that is, is there a definite constellation of characteristics or traits that can be identified that, when they co-occur in an individual, can predict prejudiced behavior, attitudes, feelings, and thoughts with good reliability? We also examine the many other individual difference variables that tend to influence the tendency to use stereotypes or hold prejudiced attitudes. We conclude with a 140

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discussion of the current state of inquiry into the prejudiced personality, and the direction of future research on individual differences in prejudice. Indirectly, one of the major influences on theory and research in psychology was the terrible reign of the Nazis in Germany from 1933 to 1945. Many brilliant and creative intellectuals (most notably, Gestalt psychologists from Germany—­who had a tremendous influence on American psychologists’ research and theory) within psychology fled Germany to the United States (and elsewhere) as the grip of Nazi rule became tighter in Europe in the late 1930s. In addition, much research and theory was initiated to attempt to explain the unexplainable: the horror of the genocide of Jewish, homosexual, Romani, and physically challenged individuals at the hands of the Nazis. When the allies discovered and freed the prisoners in the German death camps, the world was stunned at the barbarism and cruelty of the Nazis to commit millions of innocent people to death. Up until that time, psychologists had explained prejudice as a psychodynamic process of unconscious defense mechanisms (Duckitt, 1992). This approach fit well with the perceived ubiquity of prejudice because psychological defense mechanisms were also believed to be a common aspect of every person’s mind. Prejudice was therefore seen as a defensive projection of one’s frustrations, fears, and hostility outward against innocent outgroups. With the full realization of the horror of the Nazi regime, psychologists began to examine how it was that a whole society could allow such an atrocity to take place. Theorists reasoned that no normal person could be capable of such horrific behavior, so there must be some sort of mass hysteria, or other characterological flaw within the Nazis (and, more generally, the Germans themselves; see Goldhagen’s [1996] controversial book on this point) that would account for such behavior on this scale. Thus, research into the prejudiced personality began in earnest.

PSYCHODYNAMIC PERSPECTIVES Authoritarianism One of the first examinations of the prejudiced personality was put forth by Adorno, Frenkel-­Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950), with their description of what they called the “authoritarian personality.” According to Adorno et al., some people have personality structures that are flawed in such a way that they are conditioned to be especially likely to adopt prejudiced attitudes. Adorno and his colleagues interviewed and tested hundreds of individuals, and found that for a subset of these persons—­the authoritarians—­certain patterns of prejudice, childhood upbringing, and relationships with parents tended to be quite common. Specifically, authoritarians tended to grow up in houses where the parents (or guardians) were strict disciplinarians, often using harsh discipline to keep the children from misbehaving (and to punish them when they disobeyed the parent). Authoritarians were more likely to be submissive to authority, to adhere strictly to middle-­c lass traditions and values, and to think very rigidly (i.e., either–­or, all-or-­nothing thinking—­t here is no gray area; Fiske, 1998). Adorno et al. (1950) also found that authoritarians, more than other individuals, tended to hold prejudices against not just one group but many groups (essentially, anyone who is different from the authoritarian). Adorno et al. believed that authoritarians hated deviant impulses (e.g., fear, aggression, sex), and were also more likely to

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externalize these unacceptable impulses to others via projection (Harding, Proshansky, Kutner, & Chein, 1969). In other words, this psychodynamic approach to understanding the nature of the prejudiced personality suggests that these unacceptable impulses are displaced to stereotyped groups. Thus, the authoritarian person doesn’t believe they have these negative qualities, but these undesirable characteristics are attributed to various minority groups. In sum, the authoritarian’s fear of and dependency on the parents, coupled with their hatred and suspicion of them, tends to be the impetus to displace or channel these unacceptable parent-­related impulses and their own negative impulses into hostility toward minority groups. Authoritarian personality characteristics can also be found in some minority-­ group members (Harding et al., 1969). For example, Jewish persons who are high on a measure of antidemocratic values and attitudes (called the F [for fascism] Scale) are not only prejudiced toward other groups but they are more likely to be anti-­Semitic. While much evidence points to a strong correlation between the way the parents raise the child and the child’s subsequent tendency to evidence prejudice, it is unclear what process accounts for the correlation. Specifically, is the correlation a result of the child developing the authoritarian personality characteristics and hence a greater intolerance of minority groups, or is it simply due to the child internalizing the parents’ values and ethnic attitudes (Harding et al., 1969)?

Character‑Conditioned Prejudice In his classic treatise on prejudice, Allport (1954) elaborated on Adorno et al.’s (1950) theory of authoritarian personality, and suggested that such a personality is a strong contributor in developing prejudiced attitudes. Like Adorno et al., Allport discussed the prejudiced personality in psychodynamic terms. Allport believed that the prejudiced personality emerged out of a “crippled” ego (p. 396). Specifically, this individual feels threatened, insecure, and fearful of virtually everything. In trying to overcome these insecurities, the person develops a prejudiced view of others as a way of projecting their fears and self-­doubts onto others. In addition to projection, Allport suggested that people with a prejudiced personality tend to repress their fears and insecurities so that they can avoid facing their anxieties and shortcomings. This repression leads to the development of many of the same characteristics as the authoritarian individual: ambivalence toward parents, moralism, a need for definiteness, and dichotomization (categorical, black or white thinking).

Problems with the Psychodynamic Approach After enjoying much prominence and garnering a tremendous amount of research attention, interest in the psychodynamic explanation for a prejudiced personality waned. There were four main reasons for the decline of empirical interest in the theory (Fiske, 1998; Monteith, Zuwerink, & Devine, 1994). First, researchers became more and more critical of psychoanalytical approaches to personality. For example, Smith and Rosen (1958) found an inverse correlation between authoritarian personality scores (higher scores on the F Scale) and a measure of what they termed “world-­mindedness.” World-­ mindedness is a concept that indicates one’s international attitudes (i.e., acceptance of people from other countries; low scores indicate greater intolerance). Smith and Rosen

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suggest that their scale and the F Scale measure essentially the same personality characteristics, and yield similar results (i.e., the high F scorer tends to score very low on the World-­Mindedness Scale, and vice versa). In another line of inquiry, Martin and Westie (1959) suggested that prejudice may be a result of an “intolerant personality.” These individuals tended to be suspicious of politicians, were intolerant of ambiguity (i.e., they were prone to categorical, rigid thinking), and were more superstitious and inclined to believe in mystical and bizarre definitions of reality. Additionally, those with an intolerant personality scored lower on measures of compassion, sympathy, and trust, and higher on measures of conservatism than those who have a tolerant personality. These findings mirror many of those reported by Adorno and his colleagues (1950) concerning the authoritarian personality type. However, the important point about both the world-­mindedness and the tolerant personality approaches is that each nicely measures the same constellation of personality characteristics, and uncovers the same findings as those of Adorno et al., but they do so without assuming the psychodynamic processes that were the supposed causal force in creating the authoritarian personality. Second, methodological and other conceptual problems with the authoritarian personality caused many researchers to conclude that the approach was unsatisfactory under scientific standards. The primary measures of authoritarianism—­the F Scale (facism), the A-S Scale (for “antisemitism”), and the E Scale (ethnocentrism)—were worded in such a way that it was unclear whether high scores indicated agreement with the authoritarian beliefs (an example item from the F Scale is “obedience and respect for authority are the most important virtues children should learn”) or an acquiescence bias (agreeing with most or all items on a measure; Devine, 1995). Third, the theory explained the presence of prejudice in only a small subset of the population, and did not explain why many people who did not have an authoritarian personality did show prejudice toward at least one other group. Similarly, it could not account for the fact that prejudice was stronger in some regions (e.g., anti-Black prejudice has typically been stronger in the southern United States than in other parts of the country) than others (Pettigrew, 1959). Fourth, the authoritarian personality perspective suggests that there is little hope of changing an authoritarian individual to be more accepting of others (Eberhardt & Fiske, 1996). This is because authoritarians are not introspective, they do not believe there is anything about their personality that needs to be changed or improved, and they will resist attempts by others to convince them of the error of their authoritarian views of the world. By the late 1960s, research on authoritarianism was so contradictory and confusing that researchers abandoned work on the concept.

RIGHT‑WING AUTHORITARIANISM Science has a funny way of sparking new lines of research on old concepts. Such was the case with a renewed look at authoritarianism by Altemeyer (1981). In 1965, Altemeyer was asked in his PhD candidacy exam to explain the problems with the F Scale and response sets with regard to measuring authoritarianism. His answer to the question was not sufficient, and he had to write a paper on the subject to demonstrate his knowledge of authoritarianism. Thus, began what Altemeyer (1994) calls “a case study in overcompensation” (p. 132)—that is, he sought not just to show that he knew the essentials

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of authoritarianism but he really wanted to master the research literature on authoritarianism. In his research on the authoritarian personality, Altemeyer (1981, 1994, 1996) found that the Adorno et al. (1950) definition of a “fascist” personality (i.e., the authoritarian) was quite vague. Adorno and his colleagues believed it was based upon a constellation of nine related traits that were in fact very ill defined. An example is “superstition and stereotypy”—which was supposed to refer to “the belief in mystical determinants of the individual’s fate; the disposition to think in rigid categories” (Adorno et al., 1950, p. 228). Superstition and stereotypy are not the same thing, and therefore such a definition that has the two representing one trait results in an ill-­defined and conceptually “messy” construct. It is perhaps no wonder that Altemeyer found little correlation and covariance between these nine “traits.” However, Altemeyer did find that three of these traits seemed to show a strong relationship with one another. These traits, which Altemeyer conceptualizes as “attitudinal clusters,” are authoritarian submission, authoritarian aggression, and conventionalism. Authoritarian submission indicates a strong degree of submission to perceived legitimate authorities in one’s society. Authoritarian aggression suggests a general aggression and hostility directed toward outgroups, and which is viewed as acceptable by recognized authorities. Finally, conventionalism is defined as a strong adherence to social norms and traditions that are perceived as sanctioned by recognized authorities (Altemeyer, 1994). Altemeyer termed this constellation of attitudes right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) to denote its difference from Adorno et al.’s (1950) Freudian-­based authoritarianism, and its basis in at least part of Adorno et al.’s theory (see Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010, for another view of the structure of RWA). In his extensive research over the last 25 years on RWA, Altemeyer has found that people who are identified as high RWAs (as measured by the RWA Scale—­developed by Altemeyer, 1981) tend to be conservative politically, wish to restrict personal freedoms (e.g., they tend to endorse the notion that the Bill of Rights ought to be abolished!), are more punitive toward criminals, and tend to hold more orthodox religious views. Research also indicates that certain characteristics of the outgroup can trigger prejudice in RWA individuals. Outgroups that are low in status and perceived to be socially threatening tend to evoke prejudice in RWAs due to their concerns about social cohesion, security, and stability (Asbrock, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2010; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007). When the outgroup is described as posing a social threat, posing a threat to collective security, RWAs are more prejudiced against the outgroup, and oppose immigration by the outgroup into the RWA’s land and culture (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010; Mayer, Berning, & Johann, 2020). They are also very prejudiced toward their outgroups. Scores on the RWA Scale correlate highly with measures of ethnocentrism, and hostility toward homosexuals (­Crawford, Brandt, Inbar, & Mallinas, 2016; Lee, 2013). Interestingly, high RWAs tend to show more prejudiced attitudes when their answers on the questionnaires are anonymous. Much research has shown that people who are high RWAs tend to be prejudiced toward virtually everyone. In summarizing this research, Altemeyer (1994) quipped that RWAs are “equal-­opportunity bigots” (p. 136). RWA individuals are both fearful and self-­r ighteous. Altemeyer (1988) has found that these two factors account for the strong link between RWA scores and prejudice. Where do these tendencies originate? Altemeyer (1994) speculates that most children form rather authoritarian attitudes, but for most kids, these attitudes and beliefs are

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modified with experience, and they tend to be low on RWA when they enter college. High RWAs, however, may not get these experiences, and because they tend to have circles of like-­minded high-RWA friends, they do not appreciate the extent of their prejudice and RWA attitudes. Unfortunately, this lack of self-­insight is a major reason why it is not easy to change the rigid attitudes and prejudices of high-RWA individuals. However, RWAs might respond to information that indicates that they are violating their cherished ideals (i.e., that shows them how their prejudiced attitudes contradict their strong belief in values, such as equality or freedom). Faced with this information, they might be willing to change their beliefs, in order to feel more attitudinally consistent (and to reduce cognitive dissonance that would surely arise with such a realization). However, recent research suggests that it is important to account for the prevailing social norms when considering the potential impact of RWA on prejudiced attitudes. Gorska and colleagues (2021) found that when the dominant social norms were tolerant of outgroups, the connection between RWA and prejudice was reduced and even reversed. However, in social contexts where the social norms were intolerant of others, the RWA–­prejudice link is strengthened.

RELIGION If one forgets for a moment all of human history’s examples of religious intolerance and prejudice (e.g., the Spanish Inquisition; the Catholic–­Protestant “troubles” in Northern Ireland; and more recently, evangelical Christian intolerance of LGBTQ persons), then “on paper,” it seems rather counterintuitive to think that religious beliefs and attitudes could be associated with intolerance and prejudice. If anyone would be nonprejudiced, one would think it would be someone who is religious. We think this because the vast majority of religions place great emphasis on compassion for one another, peace, tolerance, and love for others (Batson & Burris, 1994). But, we know that human history is rife with examples of religious intolerance and prejudice, and psychological research suggests that there is a positive correlation between being more religious and having less tolerance and more stereotyped cognitions about others (Adorno, et al., 1950; Allport & Kramer, 1946; Batson & Ventis, 1982; Deslandes & Anderson, 2019; Gough, 1951; Ng & Gervais, 2017; Rowatt & Franklin, 2004). Some have suggested that the reason for this correlation is that, with greater adherence to the strict tenets of religious scripture (e.g., literal readings of the Bible, Torah, Koran) comes an increase in the tendency to think in rigid, “either–­or” terms that partition the world into a basic good–bad dichotomy (Adorno et al., 1950). As we have been learning throughout this book, much social cognition research suggests that anything that works to inhibit the considered processing of information about other individuals increases the likelihood that one will rely on heuristics (e.g., stereotypes) when evaluating others (Kunda, 1999). This early research suggested that there was a strong link between the type of thinking fostered with greater religiosity and prejudice and intolerance.

Committed versus Consensual Religiosity On the other hand, there are a number of studies that found little correlation between religion and prejudice (Evans, 1952; Martin & Nichols, 1962; Parry, 1949). What might

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account for these divergent conclusions? In an attempt to address this question, Allen and Spilka (1967) suggest that these different findings result from using different methods to assess religiosity. Specifically, they argue that much of this early research has tended to rely on measures of religiosity that are too simplistic, such as church attendance, membership, or denominational preference. These indices tell us nothing about the crucial factor that underlies the particular connection between an individual’s social attitudes and one’s religious beliefs. In other words, Allen and Spilka suggest that it is important to assess how each individual participant focuses and organizes their religious beliefs. By doing this, we can get a much more accurate understanding of the relationship between religion and prejudice. In their research, Allen and Spilka (1967) assessed religiosity on not one, but eight different measures, and they obtained participant attitudes on various social issues via six different measures of social opinion. They also conducted an interview with each participant and coded the responses according to five cognitive components: content, clarity, complexity, flexibility, and importance. Based on these codings, participants were classified as having either “committed” or “consensual” religious beliefs. Essentially, a committed religious orientation is one that allows an individual to hold a wide range of categories about which one can evaluate the world, and one’s ideas about the world and others tend to be more complex and open-­minded. Committed individuals show a greater tolerance for diversity, and they are more likely to thoughtfully consider different ideas, beliefs, and opinions. Consensual religious individuals tend to interpret religion more literally and concretely, tend to make more generalizations about religious topics (i.e., more likely to make broad characterizations, and think in categorical terms), and they are relatively unreceptive to different ideas and opinions. As you might imagine, the results indicated that the distinction between committed and consensual religious individuals is a useful one, because it provides a more specific articulation of the relationship between prejudice and religious beliefs. In particular, the data showed that consensual religiosity was highly associated with prejudiced attitudes, and committed religious beliefs were strongly associated with greater tolerance and nonprejudiced attitudes.

Extrinsic versus Intrinsic Religious Orientation In another attempt to examine the relationship between religion and prejudice, Allport and Ross (1967) examined two different types of religious individuals. Allport and Ross suggested that it is useful to differentiate between an “extrinsic” and an “intrinsic” religious orientation. The extrinsic person uses religion for their own purposes, attends church infrequently, and tends to be more prejudiced toward others. The intrinsic person is one who has internalized the values of their religion, and lives life according to these beliefs, attends church regularly, and tends to be more egalitarian. While Allport and Ross found supportive evidence for the extrinsic–­intrinsic dichotomy, other researchers have been critical of the distinction (Hunt & King, 1971), and some data suggest that the Religious Orientation Scale (ROS; devised by Allport & Ross [1967] to measure intrinsic or extrinsic religious orientation) is not useful in assessing the religious beliefs of nontraditional religions (e.g., Unitarian; Strickland & Weddell, 1972). Contrary to what would be predicted of intrinsic and extrinsic individuals, Strickland and Weddell

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found that Unitarian individuals scored more extrinsically than a traditional religious denomination (Baptists), but they were less prejudiced. The intrinsic–­e xtrinsic distinction came under scrutiny again in a study by Batson, Naifeh, and Pate (1978). Batson and his colleagues noted that the measures of religious orientation (the ROS) and prejudice were self-­report measures. As much research has shown, the accuracy of self-­report measures is often questionable due to the social desirability concerns of the respondent (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993)—that is, people tend to respond to attitude questionnaires in ways that avoid social disapproval and gain social approval (i.e., by responding how they think they “ought” to respond, not how they really think about an attitude issue). This is especially likely to occur on measures of sensitive topics, such as religious beliefs and prejudiced attitudes. Batson et al. suggested that the association between the intrinsic religious orientation and prejudice was influenced by social desirability. They gave a measure of racial prejudice, a measure of social desirability, and six measures of religious orientation to 51 White participants. Participants were led to believe that they would be discussing their religious and racial attitudes later with either a White or African American interviewer. Participants were asked to indicate their ratings of how much they would like each interviewer (White or African American, as indicated by photos of the interviewer attached to the interviewer’s personal information sheet) to interview them. To the degree that people rated the White interviewer higher, these ratings were used as an index of racial prejudice. Results indicated that as predicted, an intrinsic religious orientation was strongly associated with high scores on measures of social desirability, and negatively associated with racial prejudice. Interestingly, when the effects of social desirability were statistically controlled in the analyses, the negative correlation between intrinsic orientation and racial prejudice nearly disappeared. This result supports the conclusion that being intrinsically oriented does not necessarily mean that one is nonprejudiced but instead, that one is more concerned with presenting oneself as more religious and egalitarian than one actually is. In another examination of the relationship between religious orientation and prejudice, Morris, Hood, and Watson (1989) suggested that it is important to further specify religious orientation in terms of intrinsic, extrinsic, indiscriminantly antireligious, and indiscriminantly proreligious. Their results suggest that indiscriminantly antireligious and intrinsic persons were lower in racial prejudice compared to extrinsic and indiscriminantly proreligious individuals. This pattern was unchanged when accounting for social desirability concerns. Morris et al. suggest that the high scores on the social desirability measure for an intrinsic orientation differ in meaning from indiscriminantly proreligious persons. For intrinsic individuals, they suggest that the high social desirability scores indicate that the person is reporting something that is actually true (i.e., that the person genuinely—­for example—­rarely lies), and is not concerned with appearing socially desirable, but is in fact desirable socially. Indiscriminantly proreligious individuals, on the other hand, may indeed be concerned with responding according to how they think they should respond to gain social approval. This is an interesting interpretation, and we revisit the social desirability issue below in our discussion of religion as quest. While Batson and his colleagues (1978) showed that not all intrinsically oriented religious individuals are low in prejudice, research by Herek (1987) indicates that intrinsic individuals are tolerant of only certain types of individuals. Herek gave measures of

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religious orientation, racism, and attitudes toward homosexuals to White heterosexual undergraduate students. The data indicated that an intrinsic orientation was not positively correlated with racism, while an extrinsic orientation was positively correlated with racism. Thus far, the data support Allport and Ross’s (1967) theorizing and findings. Unfortunately, Herek did not measure social desirability concerns, so it is likely that the results may be subject to that bias. However, the novel contribution of this study was the findings with regard to attitudes toward a much less acceptable group for religious individuals: homosexuals. Herek found that intrinsic were more prejudiced than extrinsic persons toward homosexuals. Herek suggests that having an intrinsic religious orientation does not foster greater tolerance toward all others, but unequivocal acceptance of only specific others who are accepted by Judeo–­Christian teachings.

Religion as Quest In the Batson et al. (1978) study discussed above, Batson and his colleagues examined the relationship between another religious orientation and prejudice. They called this other orientation a “quest” orientation (measured with Batson’s 1976 Interactional Scale). This orientation sees religion as a “process of questioning, doubting, and reexamination in response to the contradictions and tragedies of life” (Batson et al., 1978, p. 33). Results indicated that the quest orientation did not correlate positively with social desirability, and higher scores on the quest orientation were negatively correlated with prejudice. Batson et al. (1978) suggested that a quest orientation may correlate more positively with prosocial behavior, such as compassion for others. A later study by Batson, Denton, and Vollmeccke (2008) showed empirical support for the idea that those with a quest orientation were more compassionate and open-­minded than others. Batson and his colleagues (2008) suggest that one reason those with a quest orientation are less likely to be prejudiced against others is that even while they can recognize differences between themselves and those who hold different views, they still regard those other individuals with respect and care, as they would with someone with whom they share similar views. Thus, there is no real “us versus them” for quest individuals. Some researchers have been skeptical of the utility and validity of the quest orientation (Griffin, Gorsuch, & Davis, 1987; Morris et al., 1989). For example, Griffin et al. examined religious orientation in Seventh-­Day Adventists in the Caribbean (measuring prejudice against Rastafarians). Because both participants and targets of prejudice were Black, the study examined cultural influences on prejudice. While strength of commitment to the church, church attendance, and an intrinsic orientation were significantly correlated with prejudice, extrinsic and quest orientations were not related with prejudice (neither positively nor negatively correlated). Griffin et al. suggest that it is too simplistic to measure a broad religious orientation and correlate it with prejudice, and that a more accurate assessment of the relation of prejudice and religious beliefs must take into account the influence of the cultural and religious context—­t hat is, Griffin et al. suggest that in this culture and context, the Seventh-­Day Adventist church promoted an intolerant attitude among its members toward the Rastafarians, whom they regarded as a cult at odds with the church teachings. Therefore, being highly religious also meant that one was very intolerant toward the group that was regarded negatively by one’s church, even if one’s thinking was characterized by a quest orientation. These results are

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quite consistent with and supportive of Herek’s (1987) findings that religion fosters both tolerance of groups accepted by the church, and intolerance of groups not acceptable to the church. On the other hand, support for the quest orientation, and its relationship to nonprejudiced attitudes, has been growing among a number of prejudice researchers (e.g., Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; Hunsberger, 1995; McFarland, 1989). Altemeyer and Hunsberger found that while religious fundamentalism (the belief that there is only one unchanging truth about humanity and God, that these truths must be followed strictly, and that only those who follow these truths have a special relationship with God) and prejudice were highly correlated, people who had a quest orientation showed little or no prejudice toward a wide variety of groups. These results are especially interesting because Altemeyer and Hunsberger used a different (yet valid and reliable) measure of quest orientation than what was used in Batson’s (1976) and most others’ studies. This bolsters the argument for the validity of the quest orientation, and our confidence in the quest–­prejudice association, because two different measures of quest have shown the same negative correlation with prejudiced attitudes. Not surprisingly, these data also showed that high RWAs tended to be more prejudiced, and were more likely to score high on measures of religious fundamentalism. Returning to the issue of religious orientation, social desirability, and prejudice, ­Batson et al. (1978) found data to suggest that the low-­prejudice scores of intrinsically oriented individuals were merely an artifact of social desirability concerns, and when social desirability scores were accounted for in the analyses, the negative correlation between prejudice and intrinsic orientation disappeared. Before we reject the oft-­reported support for Allport and Ross’s (1967) negative correlation between intrinsic orientation and prejudice, more studies are needed. To that end, Batson, Flink, Schoenrade, Fultz, and Pych (1986) designed a conceptual replication of the Batson et al. (1978) study, with a specific focus on examining prejudice via overt and covert measures. Batson et al. (1986) used an attributional ambiguity procedure to examine the prejudice of intrinsic-, extrinsic-, and quest-­oriented individuals. The basic procedure (first used by Snyder, Kleck, Strenta, & Mentzer, 1979) examines prejudiced responses to situations where it is obvious that prejudice is the basis for one’s behavior (the overt, unambiguous context) and where there is a ready alternative explanation for one’s behavior (the covert, ambiguous context). White participants completed measures of religious orientation in a pretesting session. They were contacted 3–4 weeks later to participate in the ostensibly separate experiment (participants were not told that their religious orientation scores were related to their selection for the study). Participants were told that the main experiment was concerned with reactions to movies. They were led to a large theater, where they were seated in a chair near the entrance. The middle of the theater had a partition, forming two smaller theaters, each with screens and chairs, and participants were told that they could select the theater in which they would like to watch the movie. In each of the theaters, participants could see another subject (who was a confederate) filling out a questionnaire prior to the start of the film. In one of the theaters, the confederate was African American, and in the other theater, the confederate was White. Half of the participants were told that one of the movies had broken, and they could only show the same movie in each theater (this was the overt, unambiguous condition).

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The other half of the participants were told that there would be different movies in each theater, and they were given a brief description of each movie, to help them choose which movie they would like to see (the covert, ambiguous condition). The experimenter left the subject and confederate, and 5 minutes later the film ended, and participants completed questions about the movie, and then were debriefed. If Batson and his colleagues (1986) were correct, we would expect that intrinsic individuals would show no prejudice in the overt condition, because they are very concerned with appearing nonprejudiced. Thus, they would be more likely to choose to sit with the African American confederate than opt to sit in the other theater with the White confederate, because to sit with the White person would indicate only one reason for such a choice: prejudice (they didn’t want to sit with the African American student). In the covert condition, however, Batson et al. predicted that intrinsic individuals would tend to choose not to sit with the African American confederate but to sit in the other theater with the White student. Here, their intolerant attitudes can be expressed without concern for being seen as prejudiced, because the choice to sit in the other theater can be explained as an interest in the other movie, and not as an expression of prejudice. Batson et al. also predicted that the choice to sit with a White confederate would be negatively correlated with a quest orientation, regardless of the overt or covert nature of the situation. Results indicated that, as predicted, intrinsic individuals tended to choose to sit with the African American confederate in the overt condition. However, they chose to sit with the White confederate in the ambiguous, covert situation. Also as predicted, those who scored high on the quest orientation tended to sit with the African American confederate in both the overt and covert conditions. Indeed, they were significantly more likely to sit with the African American confederate in the covert condition. Batson and his colleagues (1986) suggest that, taken together with the results of the Batson et al. (1978) study, these results show that an intrinsic religious orientation is less related to tolerance and low prejudice, and more related to the desire to appear nonprejudiced. In sum, the available evidence from a number of studies indicates that people who have an intrinsic religious orientation score lower on self-­report measures of prejudice, but they do not tend to score lower on these measures compared to nonreligious persons (Batson & Burris, 1994). While the evidence suggests that religion does not stimulate prejudice (though it may foster intolerance toward certain, unacceptable outgroups; Herek, 1987), it does not curtail prejudice either. This conclusion does not appear to apply, however, to those who have a quest religious orientation. Much evidence suggests that these individuals do indeed tend to be low prejudiced and show a greater tolerance of outgroups, regardless of the self-­presentation aspects of the situation. A paper by Rowatt and Franklin (2004) makes the case that as agreement with orthodox Christian beliefs increases, scores on measures of implicit racial prejudice actually decrease. The key here is that Rowatt and Franklin specify that the Christian beliefs need to emphasize tolerance and acceptance of others. Another important finding is that this association (more Christian beliefs leading to more less prejudice) happens only when one controls for the moderate effects of RWA on prejudice. These results suggest that lowering RWA attitudes could reduce implicit prejudice. Recent research is fine-­tuning our understanding of the religion–­prejudice link, and highlighting the importance of taking cultural factors into account. A study by Van ­A ssche, Bahamondes, and Sibley (2021) found that the strong general link between

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religion and prejudice tends to become weak or nonexistent in cultures low in power distance, low in uncertainty avoidance, low in masculinity, and low in collectivism. Results like these remind us that much more research is needed in this area to further clarify the complex interrelationship between religious orientation, fundamentalism, RWA, and prejudice toward various groups, and this research should utilize more behavioral measures of prejudice (to avoid the social desirability problem inherent in earlier research). Experiments of this sort can clarify the nature of the quest orientation, for example, and begin to clarify the development of the nonprejudiced and prejudiced religious individual. Of further empirical interest, it would be useful to begin to examine whether various religious orientations and personality traits allow one to be more receptive to changing one’s religious intolerance toward more tolerant views of others.

NEED FOR COGNITION Some people tend to dispositionally enjoy cognitive activity. Others find effortful cognition aversive. The rest of the world falls somewhere between these extremes. This is the basic notion behind Cacioppo and Petty’s (1982) concept of “need for cognition.” Cacioppo and Petty suggest that the need for cognition (NC) describes an individual difference variable that refers to the motivational state of an individual to think about the world. Those high in the need for cognition (HNC) tend to think about, seek, and ponder information relevant to the relationships among people, events, and objects in their environment. Low need for cognition (LNC) individuals, on the other hand, are neither motivated to think, nor excited by thinking, about their environment. They prefer to avoid extensive cognition, and instead they rely on more heuristic types of thinking that allow them to make quick judgments with the least cognitive effort (Bruinsma & Crutzen, 2018). Much of the extant work on NC has been applied to the question of susceptibility to various persuasion contexts. Overall, dozens of studies indicate that HNC persons are least susceptible to distraction or other heuristic cues that would lead to biased (or nonrational) conclusions about the persuasion message. LNC persons, on the other hand, are indeed susceptible to these peripheral cues in persuasion messages, and tend to be equally persuaded by weak and strong rationales for changing one’s attitude in the direction intended by the persuader (Petty & Wegener, 1998). To the degree that the need for cognition causes an individual to seek more information about the world and avoid fast and (often inaccurate) heuristic judgments, that person should be less likely to rely on stereotypes when thinking about others. Interestingly, very few studies have addressed this question. A paper by Crawford and S­ kowronski (1998) reported the results of four experiments on the relationship between NC and memory for stereotype-­consistent and stereotype-­inconsistent information. Contrary to what one would expect, their data do not support the simple prediction that HNC persons would be less likely to use stereotypes in social judgments. HNC individuals remembered more stereotype-­consistent information about a target than did LNC persons, but they were unaffected by target-­relevant stereotypes when forming impressions of a given target. In contrast, LNC persons tended to rely on stereotypes when forming impressions of a target, but when they were later recalling information about that target,

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their recollections tended to be unaffected by stereotypes. Yet, data reported by Florack, Scarabis, and Bless (2001) found support for the idea that people are more likely to base their social judgments on automatic associations between traits and categories (implicit stereotypes) if they are LNC. So, at present, more research is needed to attempt to further explicate these divergent results, to give us a better understanding of the influence of the NC on the tendency to use stereotypes in social judgments. These data are also consistent with the now rather substantial literature on the influence of situational and person variables on behavior (e.g., Ross & Nisbett, 1991) that suggests that behavior is a function of both situation pressures and individual personality characteristics (Lewin, 1951). More specifically, this research indicates that it is important to note that there are some situations that impose a stronger influence on the cognition and behavior of the individual (termed “strong situations”) and some situations exert very little influence on the individual’s thoughts and behavior (termed “weak situations”; Mischel, 1977). When the situational forces are strong—­for example, when it is important to think carefully about another person, in order to form an accurate evaluation of them, then both HNC and LNC individuals tend to demonstrate more extensive and careful cognition. Similarly, when the influence of the situation is minimal in an evaluation context, then HNC and LNC persons show equally minimal levels of cognitive elaboration in their evaluations. The difference between HNC and LNC individuals in levels of careful cognition is greatest when the situation exerts a moderate level of influence (Cacioppo, Petty, Feinstein, & Jarvis, 1996).

NEED FOR STRUCTURE People also differ in the degree to which they desire clear, certain, or unambiguous knowledge (i.e., structure; Jamieson & Zanna, 1989). In this conceptualization, knowledge can refer to norms, emotions, attitudes, and any other information that is accessible to an individual. Kruglanski (1980, 1989) suggests that people with a high need for structure (HNS) prefer to halt the acquisition of further information about the world with regard to a particular aspect of knowledge—­t hat is, these individuals seek a definite, clear answer, and the process of further information gathering would pose a threat to the stability and clarity of one’s current state of thinking, because such information might contain knowledge-­inconsistent, or challenging information. Much research has supported the validity of the need for structure construct as an individual difference variable that influences social judgments (Kruglanski, 1996; ­Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). Need for structure is conceptualized as both a stable characteristic of one’s personality and as a situationally induced motivational state. Thus, some people have a consistent tendency to prefer a definite, clear state of knowledge about the world, whereas others do not show such a preference, and in fact are comfortable (and may welcome) inconsistent, ever-­c hanging information about the world (Kaplan, ­Wanshula, & Zanna, 1993; Kunda, 1999; Webster, 1993). A number of studies have shown that the need for structure can influence social judgments (Moskowitz, 1993; Neuberg & Newsom, 1993). In one such experiment, ­Neuberg and Newsom (study 4) asked participants who were either HNS or low in the need for structure (LNS; as assessed by the Personal Need for Structure Scale) to read a brief paragraph about either a male or female student who was having difficulty both

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in a math course and with their boyfriend or girlfriend. Participants were then asked to give their evaluations of the target on different dimensions assessing traditional female sex-­stereotyped characteristics (e.g., emotionality, irrationality, gullibility). Results indicated that HNS participants were more likely than LNS participants to stereotype a target, and they were more likely to ascribe female characteristics to a woman target than to a male target. LNS participants showed no difference in their ratings of the male and female targets. These data suggest that HNS persons may be more likely to use a stereotype to help them arrive at a social evaluation in ambiguous situations. Schaller, Boyd, Yohannes, and O’Brien (1995) found that HNS persons were more likely than LNS individuals to form stereotypes about other groups. However, just because one is HNS, doesn’t mean that person is doomed to always think heuristically about others. Schaller et al.’s data also indicated that the effects of need for structure on stereotyping are diminished when the individual perceiver is motivated to form an accurate impression of the target person. Similarly, when the situation is unambiguous, HNS and LNS persons tend to form similar impressions of others (Newberg & Newsom, 1993). Need for structure can be enhanced by conditions that restrict one’s ability to consider information relevant to a judgment. Such factors include emotions, distraction, too much information, and time pressure to arrive at a judgment (Kaplan et al., 1993). In the lab, need for structure has been experimentally induced by telling participants that they have very little time in which to do the task. The judgments and performance of these participants are compared with those of participants who were not time restricted in their tasks. Researchers using this manipulation have found that increased time pressure leads participants to rely on stereotypes in making their evaluations of a target (Jamieson & Zanna, 1989; Kaplan et al., 1993; Kruglanski & Freund, 1983). The research on the need for structure suggests that the degree to which one uses stereotypes as a judgmental heuristic in their social judgments depends, in part, on the extent to which that individual has a need for certainty (Kaplan et al., 1993).

NEED FOR COGNITIVE CLOSURE As an individual difference variable, the need for cognitive closure has also been regarded as an influential factor in the process by which we make social judgments. The need for cognitive closure has been defined as the “need for and answer on a given topic, any answer, as compared to confusion and ambiguity” (Kruglanski, 1990, p. 337). According to Kruglanski, the need for cognitive closure is proportionate to the perceived costs for not attaining closure, and the perceived rewards for getting cognitive closure. For example, one reward could be the ability to act on one’s decision/answer about the topic, while a cost for failing to get cognitive closure might entail missing a deadline for a decision (Kruglanski, 1990). Kruglanski notes that the need for cognitive closure appears to be a similar construct to authoritarianism and dogmatism, in that they too deal with intolerance for ambiguity. However, those constructs are tied to politically conservative attitudes, whereas the need for cognitive closure is viewed as a content-­f ree motive. The need for cognitive closure directly influences two tendencies in the individual: an “urgency” tendency, in which the person has a desire to “seize” on closure rapidly; and a “permanence” tendency, in which the individual wishes to preserve (or “freeze”)

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a certain state of knowledge, and block out subsequent information (that might negate or invalidate the belief; Kruglanski & Webster, 1996). This motivational state has significant effects on the way that the individual processes information, and leads the person to think more heuristically, make more errors in social judgments, and to rely on any salient cues to make a fast judgment. One of the pernicious aspects of this need is the “permanence” tendency. The need for cognitive closure delivers a “double hit” to the social perceiver by (1) leading them to an often erroneous judgment, and then (2) motivating the individual to avoid seeking further information relevant to the accuracy of that assessment. The need for cognitive closure can be conceptualized as a need that varies with the specific demands of the situation. This is one reason why, for example, researchers have been successful in experimentally inducing heightened need for cognitive closure in subjects by introducing a time constraint for the subject to perform the required experimental tasks. Need for cognitive closure is thus enhanced when a judgment on the issues is required. It can be reduced by the fear of making an invalid evaluation, as in the case of forming an accurate impression of another individual (especially one who has power over your outcomes). Research has also demonstrated that the need for cognitive closure represents a dimension of individual differences that functions as a stable personality characteristic that affects our thoughts and behavior across situations (Dijksterhuis, Knippenberg, Kruglanski, & Schaper, 1996; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994). Like the need for structure, the data support the contention that the effects of a situational enhancement of the need for cognitive closure are virtually identical to the effects obtained with those with a characteristically high need for cognitive closure (Kruglanski & Webster, 1996; Webster, 1993). While the need for closure has a significant effect on the information processing of the individual in a range of cognitive tasks (see Kruglanski & Webster, 1996, for a more detailed discussion), we are interested in how this need influences stereotyping tendencies. Generally, those who are high in the need for cognitive closure tend to rely on stereotypes to a greater extent in their social judgments compared to those low in the need for cognitive closure (de Dreu, Koole, & Oldersma, 1999; Dijksterhuis et al., 1996; Shah, Kruglanski, & Thompson, 1998; Webster & Kruglanski, 1994; W ­ ebster, ­K ruglanski, & Pattison, 1997). For example, research by Dijksterhuis et al. found that participants who were high in the need for cognitive closure tended to recall more stereotype-­consistent information about a target group, while those low in the need for cognitive closure recalled more stereotype-­inconsistent information. Their results also showed that individuals high in the need for cognitive closure evaluated the target group more stereotypically and were more likely to see the target group as homogeneous (i.e., “outgroup homogeneity bias”) than those low in the need for cognitive closure. In a related vein, experiments by Webster et al. and Shah et al. support Dijksterhuis et al. in that they suggest that the enhanced tendency of individuals who are high in the need for cognitive closure to rely on stereotypes in social judgments may be due to an increased tendency to favor one’s ingroup, and to derogate outgroups. Some researchers have argued that the cognitive style that Allport (1954) suggested is present in prejudiced persons is best captured by the need for cognitive closure construct (Roets & Van Hiel, 2011). Need for cognitive closure is independent of intelligence in how each is associated with prejudice. De Keersmaecker, Bostyn, Fontaine, Van Hiel, and Roets (2018) presented data supporting the idea that those high in the need for cognitive closure are

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more likely to endorse ethnic prejudice. These researchers also presented data showing that those who are more intelligent are less likely to endorse ethnic prejudice. Looking at the NC, need for structure, and the need for cognitive closure, one might be tempted to argue that they are all essentially measuring a general tendency to avoid ambiguity, and that the distinctions between them are really conceptually insignificant. However, let us carefully examine that conclusion. In order to claim that one has identified a construct that is unique from another psychological construct, one needs data that speak to the distinctiveness of the construct (i.e., data on the discriminant validity of a concept) from already-­e xisting constructs. Webster and Kruglanski (1994) set out to provide evidence for the distinctiveness of the need for cognitive closure and need for structure from each other and compared to the NC. They first compared the two primary scales designed to assess the need for structure and the need for cognitive closure. They noted that each scale shares two common aspects: items that tap a preference for order and a preference for predictability. So, scores on each scale should be slightly correlated, but not highly correlated, because each scale also assesses different characteristics that comprise each construct. Results indicated that indeed the two scales showed a small correlation (r = .24). The data also showed that the NC scale was slightly negatively correlated with the need for cognitive closure (r = –.28). As one’s need to think about a concept increases, the need to close off information processing about that concept decreases. Thus, it is evident that the NC and need for cognitive closure scales do not reflect the same construct. Webster and Kruglanski conclude that while the need for cognitive closure and need for structure scales are partially related (in that they both share overlap in their measurement of preference for order, and preference for predictability), they are indeed assessing different constructs.

SOCIAL DOMINANCE ORIENTATION Some people exhibit a preference for inequality among social groups. Specifically, these individuals have a preference for hierarchy (Ho et al., 2015; Kteily, Ho, & Sidanius, 2012). Such individuals are regarded as posessing a high social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). SDO is an attitude toward intergroup relationships, which says that groups are different and organized into a hierarchical structure within society, and thus some groups are subordinated and of lesser status than others (Duckitt & Sibley, 2010). High-SDO persons seek to maintain this structure by promoting group inequality and policies that promote the hierarchy of groups in society. Low-SDO persons seek to reduce group inequality and eliminate the hierarchical structure of society’s groups. A study by Levin and her colleagues (2012) found that high-SDO persons are more likely to endorse hierarchy-­enhancing ideologies (e.g., assimilation) and low-SDO individuals are more likely to endorse hierarchy-­attenuating ideologies (e.g., multiculturalism and racial colorblindness). Along the same lines, Crawford and Pilanski (2014) found that those high in SDO were more politically intolerant of hierarchy-­attenuating groups. Research by Pratto et al., suggests that SDO has good discriminant and predictive validity, and is a reliable index of an individual’s attitudes and affect toward outgroups, and toward minority outgroups in particular. Their data showed that SDO was strongly correlated with anti-Black racism and sexism. Pratto and her colleagues found evidence to support the idea that a high SDO is strongly correlated

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with conservative political views, and opposition to programs and policies that aim to promote equality (such as affirmative action, laws advocating equal rights for homosexuals, women in combat, etc.). However, it is important to remember that SDO does not only refer to those who are high in SDO. Like any other individual-­difference variable, there are those who are less extreme on this dimension. Individuals who are low in SDO tend to hold attitudes that attenuate social hierarchies. In other words, they favor programs and policies that promote equality, and more liberal political views. It should be noted that social dominance theory (Sidanius, 1993), upon which SDO is based, does not make any specifications about the foundation of prejudiced attitudes (i.e., genetics, fairness, political conservativism, etc.), just that the ideology behind the outgroup prejudice describes groups as unequal. Such a foundation provides a “legitimizing myth” and these beliefs tend to be highly correlated with SDO (Cantal, ­Milfont, Wilson, & Gouveia, 2015; Pratto et al., 1994; Quist & Resendez, 2002). To have an impact, legitimizing myths must be widely accepted in a society. They stabilize oppression by providing a “self-­evident truth” about the rationale for the differential status of certain groups within society. In this way, legitimizing myths help society minimize group conflict by promoting the superiority of one group over another (Crandall, 2000; Pratto et al., 1994). Below, we examine in some detail the relevant empirical findings on SDO, and attempt to come to some conclusions about the utility of considering SDO as an individual-­difference variable that predicts prejudice and stereotyping. Who tends to be high on measures of SDO? According to Sidanius (1993), the answer can be found in a fundamental dichotomy of society: in organizations that favor the strong over the weak (promote the dominance of one group over another, termed “hierarchy enhancers”), and those that promote the interests of the weak over the strong (“hierarchy attenuators”). People in institutions/organizations that are hierarchy enhancing should be more likely to hold high-SDO attitudes and beliefs. Those in hierarchy-­attenuating institutions should hold attitudes that are consistent with a low SDO. In the United States, one such system that nicely embodies both ends of the SDO is the criminal justice system. In order to examine the predictions of social dominance theory in this context, Sidanius, Liu, Shaw, and Pratto (1994) gave a questionnaire assessing social status, social and political attitudes, SDO, and other demographic information to police officers, public defenders, jurors, and university students. Based on social dominance theory, Sidanius, Liu, et al. (1994) predicted that police would tend to have the most conservative, hierarchical attitudes (consistent with a high SDO), and public defenders would have the lowest scores on a measure of SDO, owing to the nature of their position in the criminal justice system (defending the “weak” [individual] against the “strong” [the state]). They also predicted that average citizens (the jurors) would have the next-­highest SDO scores, and university students would have low (but slightly higher than public defenders) SDO scores. They made these predictions due to the fact that university students tend to hold more liberal, equality-­favoring social and political attitudes compared to the general public. Results indicated support for these predictions. It should be noted that the differences between these individuals on SDO may not solely be attributed to the influence of the institution or occupational role on the individual—­t hat is, while some occupations clearly do foster attitudes that promote or attenuate social hierarchies, it is important to remember that there is a subject self-­ selection issue in these data. Specifically, it may be the case that those people who have

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a high SDO are drawn to positions that favor those attitudes, and those who have a low SDO wish to work in positions that foster their social attitudes. Indeed, results reported by Sidanius, Pratto, Martin, and Stallworth (1991) found that students who were preparing for careers in hierarchy-­enhancing positions tended to have significantly higher SDO scores than those preparing for hierarchy-­attenuating careers. Research on SDO also shows reliable differences between men and women in the degree to which they have an SDO. Throughout history, most societies have accorded special status to males, and granted them most (in some cases, all) of the political, social, economic, and legal power in society. Thus, it seems reasonable to predict that, to the degree that these cultural and societal traditions are present in a given society, men should prefer to maintain their special status, and should support policies, legislation, and attitudes that promote the dominance of men over women (see Christopher & Wojda, 2008, for supportive data). Data reported by Pratto, Stallworth, and Sidanius (1997) suggest that, indeed, men hold more conservative political views, compared to women, who tend to be more liberal politically and supportive of programs concerned with equal rights. While the United States has made long strides toward equality among men and women, and is far more egalitarian toward women compared to other countries, women in the United States still face discrimination, prejudice, and stereotyping due to the lingering patriarchal sexism in American society (Swann, Langlois, & G ­ ilbert, 1999). Based on the history of the unequal status of men and women in the United States, Sidanius, Pratto, and Bobo (1994) predicted that men should have a higher SDO than women. Sidanius, Pratto, et al. (1994) conducted a survey of a large (N = 1,897) sample of men and women in Los Angeles, asking respondents for their demographic information, political attitudes, and attitudes on a number of social issues. They found that, indeed, men had significantly higher SDO scores than did women. Interestingly, this difference did not vary when accounting for cultural, situational, and demographic factors. The sexism prevalent in U.S. society, coupled with traditional gender beliefs about men and women, also affects the occupations women attain in the United States. Pratto, Stallworth, Sidanius, and Siers (1997, study 1) asked college students to rate what types of jobs they would prefer to have after they graduate. They found that men tended to prefer hierarchy-­enhancing positions and women favored hierarchy-­attenuating occupations, and this was correlated with the higher scores of men compared to women on measures of SDO. Results indicated that these preferences still hold even among men and women who have the same SDO levels (study 2). Pratto, Stallworth, Sidanius, and Siers (1997) also had students rate the appropriateness of six applicants (based on their résumés) for different occupations (half the subjects read about three jobs that were hierarchy enhancing and two were hierarchy attenuating, and the other half read about three hierarchy-­attenuating and two hierarchy-­enhancing positions; study 3). The résumés differed in that three had prior experience in hierarchy-­enhancing positions, and the other three had prior hierarchy-­attenuating job experience. The data showed that people filled the hierarchy-­attenuating positions with hierarchy-­attenuating applicants, and the hierarchy-­enhancing positions were filled with hierarchy-­enhancing applicants. However, a gender bias was also clearly evident in the hiring decisions of the student participants. They tended to hire more women (about 50% more) for the hierarchy-­attenuating positions and more men (also about 50% more) for the hierarchy-­ enhancing occupations. A replication of study 3 was conducted with a sample of actual

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businesspersons who made hiring and personnel decisions (study 4). The results were similar to those of study 3; businesspersons hired more people with hierarchy-­attenuating job experience for hierarchy-­attenuating positions, and more people with hierarchy-­ enhancing job experience for hierarchy-­enhancing positions. They also showed the same-­gender bias in their hiring decisions, in that they hired more women for hierarchy-­ attenuating positions, and more men for the hierarchy-­enhancing positions. What is also interesting is that both men and women respondents showed these hiring biases. This latter finding may be due to the prediction of social dominance theory that people are socialized to believe in the legitimacy of the status differences between groups, and this helps maintain the social hierarchy by quelling desires of the subordinate groups to question or attempt to change the social order (see Pratto et al., 1994; Sidanius, 1993, for more details). Recall that those high in SDO tend to oppose programs that are designed to eliminate, or reduce inequality between groups. Research by Pratto et al. (1994) showed support for this aspect of social dominance theory. High-SDO persons did indeed oppose a wide range of political and social programs that would attenuate the social hierarchy. Pratto et al. also found that high-SDO scores were also strongly correlated with measures of sexism and anti-Black prejudice. This brings up an interesting question of how to interpret these findings. Does opposition to programs that promote social/economic equality, and that reduce the hierarchy between groups in society, indicate racism or sexism? Moreover, what is the relation between SDO and racism? One explanation suggests that opposition to these programs is not based on racism or sexism but on a “principled conservatism” (Sidanius, Pratto, & Bobo, 1996). This perspective suggests that opposition to such programs is based not on racism but on a “concern for equity, color-­ blindness, and genuine conservative values” (p. 476). Furthermore, some principled conservatism theorists have suggested that racism and conservatism are independent, and only very weakly correlated among the highly educated, who truly understand the concepts of conservative values and attitudes. In an effort to examine the relationship between education, SDO, and racism, Sidanius and his colleagues (1996) asked approximately 4,600 European Americans to complete a survey in which they were asked about their political and social attitudes, and their SDO was assessed. Results indicated partial support for the principled conservatism position that opposition to affirmative action cannot be completely understood by racism or SDO. However, the data suggest several problems for the principled conservativism position. Contrary to what conservatism theorists would predict, correlations among SDO, political conservatism, and racism were strongest among the most well educated, and weakest among the least well educated. Political conservatism and racism are related, according to Sidanius et al., because conservatives tend to be more invested in the hierarchical structure of society and maintaining the inequality of the present status quo in society. These results are therefore supportive of the explanation that SDO, not political conservativism, is a better predictor of racial attitudes among the highly educated. Sidanius et al. conclude that racism can be conceptualized as a special case of an SDO. A study by Pratto and Shih (2000) found that people high in SDO do not differ from those low in SDO on measures of implicit group prejudice. When primed with the word “our,” high- and low-SDO persons were equally likely to respond faster to recognizing positive adjectives, and slower to recognize negative adjectives. When primed with

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“them,” both groups were faster to recognize negative adjectives, and slower to recognize positive adjectives. This mirrors findings by other researchers (e.g., Perdue et al., 1990). However, two interesting things happened when the researchers conducted another similar experiment, this time preceded by a threat to the participant’s group status (these student participants read an essay about the declining prestige of their university): HighSDO individuals were significantly more likely to show implicit outgroup discrimination and prejudice than those low in SDO. Moreover, recall that most research on social identity theory has not indicated that people derogate outgroups to enhance their self-­ esteem. However, Pratto and Shih found that under group threat, high-SDO persons responded with strong forms of ingroup favoritism and outgroup derogation. Similar results were reported in a study by Quist and Resendez (2002). This fascinating result speaks to the fascinating models of prejudice, concerning the importance of contextual or situational variables in determining whether an individual will show prejudice (Duckitt, Wagner, du Plessis, & Birum, 2002; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002). It should be emphasized again that RWA and SDO do not describe personality traits, but rather, they are better conceptualized as ideological beliefs (Duckitt et al., 2002) that influence personality traits and intergroup attitudes. One interesting study confirmed what SDO theory predicts about high-SDO persons: that they believe they are superior to others. Cichocka, Dhont, and Makwana (2017) found that those high in SDO are narcissistic and that this inflated self-­evaluation is what drives their prejudice and views of the ideal structure of society. An analysis by Guimond, Dambrun, ­Michinov, and Duarte (2003) found that a dominant social position influences prejudice, and that SDO is a mediator of that relationship. In other words, people who find themselves in a dominant social position are more likely to adopt higher SDO beliefs (to justify and solidify their status), and these beliefs are what influence prejudice toward outgroups (and those who would threaten or compete for that desired social position; Cohrs & Asbrock, 2009). These results are perhaps the strongest yet in support of the idea that whether one adopts RWA or SDO-like attitudes or shows prejudice is largely due to social contextual (social position) variables. Because people move in and out of these positions daily (and at a more macro level, in their lives, moving up or down socioeconomically, for example), the salience and type of one’s particular social identity (e.g., age, nationality, personal, gender) or social context at a given moment is likely to be the key determinant of whether SDO or RWA attitudes will be evoked and whether the person will display prejudice (Reynolds, Turner, Haslam, & Ryan, 2001). Finally, if you’re thinking that many of these personality traits, individual difference variables, needs, and ideological beliefs seem to have a common thread somehow, a meta-­analysis supports your hunch. Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, and Sulloway (2003) did an analysis of 88 studies, from 12 countries, with over 22,000 subjects, and found that death anxiety (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991), intolerance of ambiguity, openness to experience, uncertainty, needs for closure and structure, and threat of loss of position or self-­esteem all contribute to the degree of one’s overall political conservativism. Jost et al. suggest that these results show that political conservatives stress resistance to change, justification of inequality, and are motivated by needs that are aimed at reducing threat and uncertainty. These data are compelling, and provide fertile ground for further theoretical refinements about the connections between individual difference variables and prejudice.

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SUMMARY At the outset of this chapter, we sought to address the question of whether people can have a prejudiced personality. If we define prejudiced personality as a certain group of traits that lead the individual to be more likely to dislike outgroups, the available research evidence suggests that there is no support for the concept of a prejudiced personality. As research on the prejudiced personality concept waned in the late 1960s, the field turned its attention to different ways of examining prejudice. As a result, most researchers tend to view prejudice in cognitive terms, and an inevitable product of social categorization (Duckitt, 1992). In much research on prejudice, attempts to identify a prejudiced personality have been virtually nonexistent (Monteith et al., 1994). One reason this is the case is that personality approaches underestimate the powerful impact of situational forces on behavior and attitudes (Brown, 1995). As we have discussed earlier, much research attests to the power of the situation in influencing our behavior (see Ross & Nisbett, 1991). Another problem with the personality approach is that it cannot account for why different groups become targets of prejudice, or why different cultures show differing levels of prejudice toward outgroups (Stroebe & Insko, 1989). Finally, such approaches cannot account for what Brown (1995) calls the “historical specificity of prejudice” (p. 34)—that is, Why is it the case that prejudice toward certain outgroups has rather suddenly erupted in society, only to recede again (i.e., Nazi antisemitism, American anti-­Japanese attitudes in World War II)? If some people had prejudiced personalities, we would expect a constant level of prejudice from them throughout their lives, and toward all outgroups (as in the authoritarian and RWA individuals). While these criticisms have rightly been leveled at the prejudiced personality approach, it is still worthwhile to examine individual differences in the tendency to stereotype others and develop prejudiced attitudes. As we have seen, there is much evidence to support the idea that people differ on several important trait-like dimensions that lead them to be more or less likely to think of others in a heuristic way, and to be more prejudiced toward others. As an example, a paper by Graziano, Bruce, Sheese, and Tobin (2007) found strong correlations between the trait dimension of agreeableness and prejudice (see also Lin & Alvarez, 2020). People high in agreeableness are motivated to maintain positive relationships with others. Graziano and colleagues reported data from several studies that showed that people low in agreeableness were more prejudiced than those high in agreeableness. These results are supported by data from Carter, Hall, Carney, and Rosip (2005) that shows a strong correlation between low agreeableness and a greater acceptance of stereotyping. Graziano et al. speculate that this may be explained by low-­agreeable persons having a bias toward negativity and not being willing to suppress it. Much more research is needed to better understand the influence of trait dimensions on expressions of prejudice. Research on the NC, need for structure, and need for cognitive closure has demonstrated solid evidence for the validity and reliability of these constructs, and has shown that when people who are low in the NC, or high in the need for structure or cognitive closure, they are more susceptible to making stereotyped social judgments. Similarly, people who are motivated to keep their ingroup superior and dominant over other groups are more likely to endorse stereotypes and be prejudiced toward those outgroups. Altemeyer’s (1988) work on RWA suggests that those who are submissive, aggressive, and

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conventional, and who are also fearful and self-­r ighteous, tend to be more likely to be prejudiced toward anyone who is different from them. Finally, research on religious attitudes shows that even the most religious individuals (intrinsic religious orientation) can be prejudiced toward others, especially groups that are unacceptable to the church (e.g., homosexuals), and that only those who have a quest religious orientation (and those who are nonreligious) are truly nonprejudiced. It is important that further research in this area be continued, in order to help us gain a better understanding of the stable trait-like characteristics that make people more or less likely to be prejudiced toward, and stereotype, others.

GLOSSARY Authoritarian—rigid personality characterized by categorical thinking, submissiveness to authority, and adherence to middle-­c lass values. These individuals tend to dislike anyone who is different from themselves, thus they tend to have stereotypes and prejudice toward many groups. Committed Religiosity—religious viewpoint that allows an individual to hold a wide range of categories about which one can evaluate the world, and one’s ideas about the world and others tends to be more complex and open-­minded. Consensual Religiosity—religious viewpoint in which the individual tends to interpret religion more literally and concretely, make more generalizations about religion, and tends to be unreceptive to different ideas and opinions. Extrinsic Religious Orientation—individual who uses religion for one’s own purposes, attends church infrequently, and tends to be more prejudiced toward others. Intrinsic Religious Orientation—person who has internalized the values of one’s religion and lives life according to these beliefs, attends church regularly, and tends to be more egalitarian. Need for Cognition—an individual difference variable that describes the dispositional motivation of an individual to think about the world; the higher this motivation is, the more the individual enjoys thinking about, seeking, and pondering problems and information about the world. Need for Cognitive Closure—an individual difference variable in which persons who have this motivation tend to need an answer—­any answer—­on a given topic, so that they may arrive at a conclusion (and not have confusion or ambiguity about the topic), even if the conclusion is incorrect. Need for Structure—individual difference variable in which those who have a high degree of this motivation tend to desire clear, certain, or unambiguous knowledge (structure) about a topic. Right-Wing Authoritarianism—personality style in which the individual tends to be politically conservative, is more punitive toward criminals, more likely to endorse orthodox religious views, and is very prejudiced toward outgroups.

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Social Dominance Orientation—an attitude toward intergroup relations in which the individual believes that groups are different, are organized hierarchically in society, and that some groups naturally are higher in status than others. These individuals strongly prefer and seek to maintain inequality among groups.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. In your opinion, what is it about some people that makes them seem to hold prejudices against virtually all outgroups? Is there something about their personality (e.g., the authoritarian personality) that predisposes them to think about others in terms of stereotypes? 2. Do you know any people who could be classified as a right-wing authoritarian? Can you name any famous people who might fit this profile? Do you think that the number of RWA individuals tends to fluctuate with trends in the political and/or economic landscape? Why? 3. Why do you think that having an intrinsic religious orientation leads one to be tolerant toward some groups, and prejudiced against other groups (e.g., homosexuals)? 4. Do you think that it would be possible to reduce prejudice through parents, teachers, and society encouraging children to develop an appreciation for the ambiguity and uncertainties of life—thus developing a high need for cognition, low need for structure, and low need for cognitive closure? 5. What are some “legitimizing myths” you can think of that provide the rationale for the different status (power, legal, economic, wealth, social, etc.) of groups in the United States and in the world?

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The Prejudiced Personality 167 attainment: A social dominance approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72, 37–53. Quist, R. M., & Resendez, M. G. (2002). Social dominance threat: Examining social dominance theory’s explanation of prejudice as legitimizing myths. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 24(4), 287–293. Reynolds, K. J., Turner, J. C., Haslam, S. A., & Ryan, M. K. (2001). The role of personality and group factors in explaining prejudice. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 37(5), 427–434. Roets, A., & Van Hiel, A. (2011). Allport’s prejudiced personality today: Need for closure as the motivated cognitive basis of prejudice. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20(6), 349– 354. Ross, L., & Nisbett, R. E. (1991). The person and the situation: Perspectives of social psychology. New York: McGraw-­Hill. Rowatt, W. C., & Franklin, L. M. (2004). Christian Orthodoxy, Religious Fundamentalism, and Right-Wing Authoritarianism as Predictors of Implicit Racial Prejudice. International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 14(2), 125–138. Schaller, M., Boyd, C., Yohannes, J., & O’Brien, M. (1995). The prejudiced personality revisited: Personal need for structure and formation of erroneous group stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68(3), 544–555. Shah, J. Y., Kruglanski, A. W., & Thompson, E. P. (1998). Membership has its (epistemic) rewards: Need for closure effects on in-group bias. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(2), 383–393. Sidanius, J. (1993). The psychology of group conflict and the dynamics of oppression: A social dominance perspective. In W. McGuire & S. Iyengar (Eds.), Current approaches to political psychology (pp. 183–219). Durham, NC: Duke University Press. Sidanius, J., Liu, J. H., Shaw, J. S., & Pratto, F. (1994). Social dominance orientation, hierarchy attenuators and hierarchy enhancers: Social dominance theory and the criminal justice system. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 24(4), 338–366. Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., & Bobo, L. (1994). Social dominance orientation and the political psychology of gender: A case of invariance? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 67(6), 998–1011. Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., & Bobo, L. (1996). Racism, conservatism, affirmative action, and intellectual sophistication: A matter of principled conservatism or group dominance? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 70(3), 476–490. Sidanius, J., Pratto, F., Martin, M., & Stallworth, L. (1991). Consensual racism and career track: Some implications of social dominance theory. Political Psychology, 12, 691–721. Smith, H. P., & Rosen, E. W. (1958). Some psychological correlates of worldmindedness and authoritarianism. Journal of Personality, 26, 170–183. Snyder, M. L., Kleck, R. E., Strenta, A., & Mentzer, S. J. (1979). Avoidance of the handicapped: An attributional ambiguity analysis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 37(12), 2297– 2306. Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1991). Terror management theory of self-­esteem. In C. R. Snyder & D. R. Forsyth (Eds.), Handbook of social and clinical psychology: The health perspective (pp. 21–40). New York: Pergamon Press. Strickland, B. R., & Weddell, S. C. (1972). Religious orientation, racial prejudice, and dogmatism: A study of Baptists and Unitarians. Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion, 11(4), 395–399. Stroebe, W., & Insko, C. A. (1989). Stereotype, prejudice, and discrimination: Changing conceptions in theory and research. In D. Bar-Tal, C. F. Graumann, A. W. Kruglanski, & W. Stroebe (Eds.), Stereotyping and prejudice: Changing conceptions (pp. 3–34). New York: Springer-­Verlag. Swann, W. B., Langlois, J. H., & Gilbert, L. A. (Eds.). (1999). Sexism and stereotypes in modern society. Washington, DC: American Psychological Association.

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CHAPTER 6

Old‑Fashioned versus Modern Prejudice

WHERE HAVE ALL THE BIGOTS GONE? In the early 1900s, White individuals were comfortable with openly expressing prejudiced racial attitudes in nearly any context because the culture in American society was such that overt hostility toward other races, discrimination, and segregation of other races from the White-­dominated culture were the norm. Thus, it was not until the late 1920s that serious attention was paid to the problem of prejudice and stereotyping. Though it took American society over 30 more years to acknowledge its deep racial prejudice, researchers in the 1920s and 1930s were beginning to tackle questions, such as “What is a stereotype and how does it form?” (Lippmann, 1922), “What is the content of racial stereotypes?” (Katz & Braly, 1933), and “How strongly do prejudiced attitudes correspond to behavior in interracial interactions?” (LaPiere, 1934). Implicit in these questions (and the answers the researchers were obtaining in their data) were the beginnings of a shift in the way prejudiced people were viewed. As Jones (1997) describes it, “There was a tendency to consider individuals who answered a question in a certain way not only as prejudiced, but as morally inferior human beings” (p. 42). As a result in this shift in perspective, prejudice and stereotyping were no longer viewed as a “normal” part of being human, but rather, were beginning to be seen as problems to be understood and reduced or eliminated whenever possible—­t hat is, prejudice was no longer a “natural” thing but it signified that the individual chose that negative view of certain others, either through a moral defect, mental laziness (as first discussed by Lippmann and later developed by social-­cognition researchers), or both. Eventually, as we’ve already seen, researchers came full circle to understanding prejudice as a natural by-­product of a limited information-­processing system. In that way, prejudice went from normal (i.e., normative) to abnormal (i.e., a moral shortcoming) to normal (i.e., a by-­product of the mind) again. It is an interesting chronology that we tackle in this chapter. As we contrast “old-­fashioned” to modern forms of racism in this chapter, it’s important to pin down definitions of both. What do we mean by old-­fashioned racism? One component is a normative one: It’s the widely accepted belief in differences among .

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groups—­people (at least majority-­g roup people) simply assumed a consensus among themselves about the legitimacy of different positions groups hold in society (e.g., that Blacks are subordinate to Whites; see Figure 6.1). Another critical component has to do with the basis of those different positions: Old-­fashioned racism often includes the notion that biological differences between groups explains their different positions in society. Biological racism (sometimes called “scientific racism”), which stems from a distorted understanding of Darwin’s theory of evolution, involves the belief that different groups of humans are different species or subspecies, and that any differences between their outcomes in life are based in inherent differences in their biologies. Biological racism was common even among scientists well into the 20th century (e.g., ­Herrnstein & Murray, 2010). For example, the anthropologist Samuel George Morton measured cranial capacity and claimed that “Negro” brains were smaller than “Greek” (i.e., White) brains, and that the two subspecies had diverged thousands of years ago. Such biologically based beliefs provided ready explanations for the differences observed in the life outcomes of individuals of different races. Hence, early studies of racism included questionnaires that assessed how much respondents believed in the biological inferiority of certain races. For example, a well-used measure of prejudice from 1950 (Adorno, Frenkel-­Brunswick, L ­ evinson, & Sanford) asked respondents to indicate their agreement with items like “There is something inherently primitive and uncivilized in the Negro, as shown in his music and his extreme aggressiveness.”

FIGURE 6.1.  “Old-­fashioned” racism is the type of openly hostile prejudice that characterized much of the segregated southern United States prior to the landmark Supreme Court rulings of the 1950s and the civil rights movements of the 1950s and 1960s. Such prejudice led to state-­ sanctioned segregation of Blacks and Whites in all public places, based on the belief that Blacks were inferior and Whites deserved the privileged status in society, as evidenced here in this photo of segregated drinking fountains. (Image title: Wilmington, North Carolina, 1950. Copyright © 1950 Elliot Erwitt. Permission granted by Magnum Photos.)

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As beliefs gradually changed throughout the 20th century, prejudices and stereotypes came to be understood not as simple reflections of racial superiority/inferiority but as attitudes (negative evaluations, rather than “pictures in our head”) that some people endorse but others do not (Jones, 1997). Here was a turning point in understanding prejudice and stereotyping. If the basis of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination was a negative attitude (and not something inherent about human group differences), then we would be in a better position to reduce or eliminate stereotyping and prejudice. Why were some people prejudiced and others not prejudiced? Is it even possible to not have prejudice? These questions (and many more) began to occupy the thoughts of researchers in the early 20th century. In the sections below, we examine how stereotyping and prejudice have changed form over the decades. We also examine whether stereotyping and prejudice seem to be more or less prevalent today than they were in the past, and why it appears that there has been a resurgence of “old-­fashioned” racism in recent years. Because measures of prejudice are so intimately connected with theories of how prejudice has changed, we examine the major avenues of measuring prejudice and stereotypes, highlight how the measures relate to one another, and the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. We conclude with a discussion of the recent resurgence in old-­fashioned forms of racism.

From Katz and Braly (1933) to Civil Rights, and Beyond With Katz and Braly’s (1933) landmark study, researchers obtained their first view of the content of racial stereotypes that Whites held about Blacks in the United States. Recall from our discussion of this classic study (in Chapter 1) that White college students were asked to indicate whether various traits (84 in all) described White and Black Americans. Those early data suggested that Whites held very negative views of Blacks, and very positive views of Whites. For instance, Blacks were viewed by the White respondents as “superstitious,” “lazy,” and “ignorant,” while they viewed Whites as “industrious,” “intelligent,” and “ambitious.” Few respondents were willing to attribute positive qualities to Blacks or negative qualities to Whites. However, over the years, data have been gathered using the adjective checklist procedure to attempt to gauge whether and how Whites’ stereotypes of Blacks are changing. These data indicate that these attitudes have become less negative and increasingly positive (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996; Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991; Galinsky, Hall, & Cuddy, 2013; Madon et al., 2001). Certainly, the changes in the latter half of the 1900s in the social, legal, and political climate of the United States seemed to correspond to the changes in Whites’ self-­ reported stereotypes of Black Americans. John McConahay (1986) remarked that “the racial climate in America has changed dramatically since Hitler gave racism a bad name” (p. 91). The changes in society, mentioned earlier, have been quite dramatic in the area of race relations. Segregation and discrimination were outlawed. Laws (e.g., the Civil Rights Act of 1965) and social programs (e.g., Affirmative Action) were created to advance the economic status and job prospects for groups that had experienced discrimination. Movies (e.g., Amistad), television (e.g., Roots), and music were beginning to deal with stereotyping, prejudice, and race relations. Black Americans were being accepted into White American society on many levels. While most researchers will agree that White Americans have indeed reduced their negative views of and prejudice toward

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Black Americans, there is compelling evidence to suggest that the extent of this attitude and prejudice change is not as dramatic as was once believed (Fiske, 1998; Mellor, 2003), and that there has even been recent reversions in racial attitudes (e.g., Crandall, Miller, & White, 2018). Next, we examine this evidence. We also review criticisms of the Katz and Braly (1933) study and studies like it that rely on the adjective checklist methodology for assessing stereotypes.

Are Low‑Prejudice People Really Low Prejudiced? Some have questioned the adjective checklist procedure of Katz and Braly (1933) as a misleading measure of the stereotyping landscape. For example, Niemann, Jennings, Rozelle, Baxter, and Sullivan (1994) point to several problems with the Katz and Braly procedure, including (1) the subjects were predominantly White, upper-class men, which limits the generalizability of the findings; and (2) the method requires the participant to rely on a rather controlled, cognitive process in which the individual is actively thinking about whether a particular trait “fits” into their schema for the group in question (Devine, 1989; Devine & Elliot, 1995; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Jones & Sigall, 1971). This is a limitation because, as we discussed in Chapter 4, much research suggests that stereotypes are activated automatically upon encountering a person (including the group label), and can hold a wealth of affective and other cognitive information that drives the stereotype that cannot be represented on the adjective checklist (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990; Stangor & Lange, 1994; see Lepore & Brown, 1997, for an exception). Thus, as Niemann et al. suggest, “results using the checklist method may provide stereotypes that are more a function of the words presented on a list than of the schematic content of the respondents’ stereotypes” (p. 380). Consider the following experiment: Ehrlich and Rinehard (1965) administered the Katz and Braly (1933) adjective checklist to half of their participants, and asked the other half to simply provide their own list of all the words, traits, and characteristics they needed to adequately describe the groups in question. The results showed that the words that participants used in the “open-ended” method were different from the words the participants checked in the Katz and Braly procedure, where the traits were provided to respondents. Subsequent research by Allen and colleagues (Allen, 1971; Potkay & Allen, 1988) expanded the “open-ended” procedure to include values assigned to the words generated, and these values are analyzed to indicate the degree of favorability and unfavorability of the characterizations of the target. This technique, termed the “adjective-­generation technique,” is a good way to ascertain the content of stereotypes at a given point in time (Allen, 1996). The differences in words generated from Time A to Time B can indicate how stereotypes of the target group may be changing. Other researchers suggest that the Katz and Braly (1933) procedure does not, as commonly believed, measure knowledge about stereotypes, but rather, personal beliefs about the truth of the stereotype. This position is exemplified by Devine and Elliot (1995), in their analysis of the decline in racial stereotypes. Devine and Elliot suggest that it is important to distinguish between personal beliefs about stereotypes, and knowledge about the stereotypes, and their analysis of the participant responses to the adjective checklist data accumulated over the years (e.g., Gilbert, 1951; Karlins, Coffman, & ­Walters, 1969) suggests that some participants construed the task as an assessment of

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their stereotype knowledge (i.e., what people in general think) and others thought it was a measure of their personal beliefs about Black and White Americans. Devine and Elliot compared these earlier data to more contemporary adjective checklist data on racial attitudes (i.e., Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986). Their analysis supports the notion that the adjective checklist, as it has been administered over the decades, is actually measuring personal beliefs (or willingness to publicly state those beliefs) about the truth of racial stereotypes. Thus, as we have seen earlier in this chapter, it is not surprising—­g iven the change in American society on racial issues over the last several decades—­t hat the personal beliefs of Whites (or willingness to publicly state such beliefs) about stereotypes of Black Americans indicates a strongly diminished belief in those stereotypes. So, this analysis would suggest that some progress has been made in reducing the negative personal beliefs that Whites have about Black Americans. But what about the negative stereotypes of Black Americans that used to be common in America? Have they diminished? According to Devine and Elliot (1995), the answer is, unfortunately, no (see also Galinsky et al., 2013; Crandall et al., 2018). Their data suggest that when Whites are asked about their knowledge (not personal beliefs) about the stereotypes of Black Americans, their responses indicate pervasive negativity. These contemporary ratings are virtually identical to the negative adjective rating findings collected since 1933. This suggests that while personal beliefs in negative stereotypes of Black Americans appears to have decreased, knowledge of the cultural stereotype of Black Americans has remained the same. In other words, Whites rather unanimously know about the negative traits (and few positive traits) that are stereotypically associated with Black Americans via their early learning from parents, or other exposure to such information in society. Yet what has seemed to change is their willingness to personally believe or overtly express such negative racial attitudes. On the other hand, research by Madon et al. (2001) suggests that between the Katz and Braly (1933) study and the turn of the 21st century, almost all of the stereotypes of ethnic groups have changed in content, and the content of those stereotypes has become more positive. Moreover, this study found that there was an overall increase in the number of traits others use to characterize each group (suggesting that peoples’ representations of various social groups have become more complex), and that the stereotypes became more favorable. In sum, some evidence suggests that stereotypes themselves have not changed much over the last century. Other data suggest that the stereotypes have changed significantly. One thing these disparate findings have in common is that they both suggest that the form in which stereotypes are expressed has changed. Before the social, legal, and political climate of the United States changed dramatically with the civil rights movement of the late 1950s and 1960s, stereotypes and prejudice were fairly easy to assess—­you just asked. Researchers could use simple self-­report measures (e.g., Katz and Braly’s [1933] adjective checklist procedure) to understand the content and extent of negative affect directed at other groups. However, the civil rights movement (and legislation) changed the social landscape (and thus the social norms) with regard to stereotyping and prejudice. Stereotyping and prejudice “went underground.” The negative affect and stereotypes were still there, but in a more subdued, subtler form. This “new form” of prejudice was not adequately conceptualized by models of stereotyping and prejudice that were applied prior to the 1960s. Researchers needed different theories that could better address these contemporary expressions of prejudice.

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The theories had to account for the ambivalence that seemed to characterize the attitudes of Whites toward Black Americans in the post-civil rights environment. On the one hand, most Whites seemed to have an underlying association between Black Americans and undesirable characteristics and values, and on the other hand, many Whites overtly embraced egalitarianism, the values of equality for all, and nondiscrimination. Another way to think about this fundamental ambivalence that characterizes current expressions of racism and prejudice is the “trouble with equality.” The hard sort-of-won fight for the civil rights of Black Americans in society was an easy rallying point for most justice-­minded Americans, because the overt discrimination, prejudice, and segregation of one group of people in a democratic society violated all standards of morality, ethics, and justice. Thus, that fight was for the freedom of Black Americans. However, the post-civil rights era can be thought of as the struggle for the equality of Black Americans. Below, we discuss three major theories of contemporary forms of prejudice and racism that attempt to explain the origins of the ambivalence that Whites experience in their attitudes toward Blacks. We examine the basic tenets of each, as well as the empirical support for each theory. Keep in mind as you read that there is considerable overlap among these theories, and distinguishing them is not always easy (or possible); there are also perspectives that are very similar to the ones we discuss (e.g., subtle vs. blatant prejudice; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995) and overt versus covert prejudice (Sigall & Page, 1971), but we chose to focus on theories that, in our view, have had the greatest impact. Following this, we move into a discussion of ways to measure stereotyping and prejudice. As the endorsement of negative stereotypes and expressions of prejudice have changed over the decades, researchers have had to modify the methods and instruments they use to assess prejudice.

MODERN RACISM According to McConahay (1983, 1986), the theory of modern racism asserts that some Whites feel ambivalence toward Black Americans, due to the conflict between their antiBlack feelings and their beliefs that racism and discrimination is wrong. For modern racists, the issue is not whether Black Americans should be equal, but why inequality persists, and to what extent equality should be implemented in policy, law, and employment. As with the symbolic racism perspective (discussed below), the theory of modern racism suggests that modern racists have a problem with giving “special treatment” (e.g., hiring preferences, as in affirmative action) to Black Americans, because they believe it violates the work ethic that says that one only advances in life based on their own achievements and hard work, not on “unfair” shortcuts. Modern racists generally believe that (1) discrimination is a thing of the past; (2) Black Americans are too pushy, trying to get into places where they aren’t welcome; (3) the demands of Black Americans are unfair; and (4) their gains (due to social programs that provide economic, housing, and other opportunities to African Americans) are undeserved (McConahay, 1986). Modern racists do not consider themselves to be racists for two reasons. First, they regard racism as associated with the pre-civil rights, “old-­fashioned” racism in which open hatred and feelings of superiority are centered (McConahay, 1986). Second, their subtle negative feelings toward Black Americans are disguised (to prevent the dissonance

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associated with acknowledging the hypocrisy of prejudice and egalitarian values) as negative attitudes toward anyone who violates what they believe are traditional American values (McConahay & Hough, 1976). We suspect that examples of this logic can be found when someone begins a sentence with “I’m not racist, but. . . . ” It is worth scrutinizing the claim that “discrimination is a thing of the past” because it is a pervasively held belief among White Americans (Pew Research Center, 2019). In fact, discrimination against Black Americans (as well as other marginalized groups) persists in employment, education, health care, and in the legal system, and is worsening in some cases. For example, when employers received equivalent résumés from fictitious job candidates with ethnically identifiable names over a 25-year period, Black and Latino candidates received fewer invitations for interviews than White candidates and the extent of this discriminatory behavior by employers hasn’t changed over time (Quillian, Pager, Hexel, & Midtbøen, 2017). Black and White individuals report using marijuana at equivalent rates, but Blacks are four times as likely to be charged with a marijuana offense (American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], 2013). Black children with asthma received medical treatment only a third as often as White children with asthma (Bryant-­Stephens, 2009), and Black women wait about twice as long as White women for breast cancer treatments (even when controlling for access and insurance; Gerend & Pai, 2008). And incarceration rates for Black men have skyrocketed in recent decades, landing the United States in the dubious position of being the most incarcerated country in the world (Hartney, 2006). Experimental studies show that Black defendants are more likely to be convicted and given longer sentences than matched White defendants, particularly if they have relatively dark skin (Kovera, 2019). Thus, the claim that discrimination is a thing of the past is not supported by evidence. To further scrutinize the claim that discrimination is no longer a major problem, is it possible that many majority-­g roup members are simply naïve in thinking that society is generally fair and equal now? There is evidence for this view (Kraus, Rucker, & Richeson, 2017). For example, if we asked you to guess, for every $100 in wealth (including savings, home and car value, etc.) the average White American family has, how much wealth does the average Black American family have? $95? $75? $50? $5? It may surprise you to learn that the correct answer is around $5—that is, the average White family has about 20 times the wealth of the average Black family in the United States. Across this and many other measures, higher-­income White Americans in particular tend to underestimate racial inequality (Kraus et al., 2017). Given the reluctance of many majority-­ group members to engage with issues of racial inequality (e.g., including their reluctance to even talk about race, as discussed in Chapter 2), it is likely that simple unawareness of continued inequality and the belief that things have improved over time contributes to modern racism beliefs. What about those who are aware of continued inequality and also exhibit modern racism? Are they perfectly content with inequality? Not necessarily. For many modern racists, the prevailing view is that Blacks and other disadvantaged minorities are simply not trying hard enough; that they need to embrace the American values of hard work and individualism, and if they did, they’d be just as well-off as Whites. In this way, modern racists can maintain a nonracist identity and blame minorities for their plight. As you may suspect, this is starting to sound a little like the old-­fashioned racist belief that there is something wrong with “them,” but there is a difference: Instead of attributing

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the cause of inequality to biological differences between groups (i.e., biological racism), they attribute the cause to cultural differences. Some theorists (e.g., Bonilla-­Silva, 2006, 2020) argue not only that modern racists are generally aware of continued inequality but also that their goal is to maintain the racial status hierarchy. In this view, it is not so much that Whites actually believe in the inferiority of non-­Whites, but that they want to maintain their privileged position in society, and do so through exclusionary hiring practices, overpolicing of Black communities, voter disenfranchisement, and so on. Evidence in support of this perspective comes from research on social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994), which focuses on peoples’ beliefs about social hierarchy; people high in SDO tend to believe that it is right and good that certain groups have more privilege and power in society (we discuss this concept in greater detail in Chapter 5). SDO and the Modern Racism Scale (MRS) are moderately positively correlated (r = .53), suggesting that at least among some Whites, modern racism may indeed be in service of maintaining the status and power differences between groups. Overall, the theory of modern racism has good empirical support (e.g., M ­ cConahay, Hardee, & Batts, 1981), and the self-­report scale, the MRS, that McConahay (1986) devised to measure this subtle prejudice has fair reliability and validity. For example, higher scores on the MRS predict preferences for White over Black political candidates, opposition to school desegregation (McConahay, 1983), less interest in interracial interactions (Carr, Dweck, & Pauker, 2012), approval of racist humor (Hodson, Rush, & MacInnis, 2010), and opposition to the Black Lives Matter movement (Miller, O’Dea, & Saucier, 2021). Interestingly, being confronted with “White privilege” can also increase modern racism (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Schiffhauer, 2007). For several decades, the MRS was one of the most widely used measures of contemporary prejudice toward African Americans. However, recall from Chapter 4 that there are a number of criticisms of the MRS, including social desirability (Fazio, Jackson, ­Dunton, & Williams, 1995), that led researchers to search for better ways to measure racial attitudes (Biernat & Crandall, 1999; Sears & Henry, 2005). Perhaps the strongest criticism is that modern racism is not conceptually distinct from old-­fashioned racism. For example, to the extent that a modern racist individual is aware of continued inequality, and attributes that inequality to “cultural differences” like a lack of a strong work ethic among Black communities, they are essentially subscribing to old-­fashioned stereotypes (e.g., “Blacks are lazy”). Indeed, measures of old-­ fashioned racism and the MRS are typically highly correlated (Olson & Zabel, 2016). We discuss these criticisms in more depth, and the new measures a little later in the chapter. Next, we turn to the theory of “symbolic racism.”

SYMBOLIC RACISM Kinder and Sears (1981; Sears, 1988; Sears & Henry, 2005) offer a related approach to understanding the origins of the prejudice of contemporary White Americans toward Black Americans. They suggest that old-­fashioned racism has been replaced with what they term symbolic racism. This is defined as a “blend of anti-Black affect and traditional American moral values embodied in the Protestant Ethic” (Kinder & Sears, 1981, p. 416). According to this view, Whites who would be classified as symbolic racists tend

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to resist changing the racial status quo (i.e., White dominance) in all areas of life—­ economically, socially, and politically. The use of the term “symbolic” is used to describe this resistance that originates not out of self-­interest but out of the belief that Blacks violate traditional American values (like self-­reliance, individualism, hard work, and obedience). Symbolic racists can also deny holding racist attitudes (and they may in fact believe that they are not prejudiced) because, in their view, a racist is one who exhibits “old-­ fashioned” racist beliefs of the inherent superiority of one race over another. The negative affect and negative attitudes that symbolic racists may hold toward another group are converted into derision for groups that do not seem to value traditional American values. According to this position, then, symbolic racists would have no problem with other groups if those other groups were self-­reliant, hardworking, and individualistic. However, because their prejudices distort their view of how closely the minority group is adhering to those values, that group may never be seen as living up to them. In this way, symbolic racists are able to keep their negative affect and stereotypes of people of color, and even express these sentiments overtly, while still claiming that the source of such negative evaluations is the “objective difference” between Whites and the outgroup in their support of traditional American values. For example, a symbolic racist might claim to oppose affirmative action solely because of their beliefs about the role of government in hiring, and that their position has nothing to do with race or racism. Critics of the symbolic racism concept argue (1) it is an ill-­defined concept (Bobo, 1988; Eagly & Chaiken, 1993); and (2) other explanations, such as realistic group conflict (Bobo, 1983) and social dominance theory (Sidanius, Devereux, & Pratto, 1992), can just as easily explain Whites’ opposition to social programs that reduce the inequity between Whites and other groups. Similar to modern racism, perhaps the most damaging attack on symbolic racism comes from numerous studies suggesting that it does not appear to be a distinct concept from old-­fashioned racism (Lea, Bokhorst, & Colenso, 1995; Raden, 1994; Schuman, Steeh, Bobo, & Krysan, 1997; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986; Weigel & Howes, 1985). However, the debate is not settled on the symbolic racism concept. Indeed, Eagly and Chaiken (1993) and Wood (1994) have noted that one of the redeeming qualities of the theory is that it rightly highlights the importance of the link between values and racial attitudes. For example, research by Katz and Hass (1988) indicates that value conflict in Whites leads to ambivalent attitudes toward Blacks and other groups, such that many White Americans harbor both pro- and anti-Black sentiments (see also Thompson, Zanna, & Griffin, 1995). A paper by Sears and Henry (2005) presented results from several studies designed to further refine the theoretical and conceptual underpinnings of symbolic racism. Their research showed that symbolic racism is grounded in what they called “Black individualism,” which is a concern that Blacks do not live up to conservative values (such as those embodied in the Protestant work ethic), specifically the value of individualism. These data represent the first empirical test of the basis for symbolic racism, and make the compelling argument that symbolic racism is indeed distinct from the similar aversive and modern racism constructs. Building on these ideas, Brandt and Reyna (2015) reported results of their research that Black individualism and anti-­equality attitudes are independent predictors of symbolic racism. These researchers argue that symbolic racism doesn’t serve a unitary function—­rather, it serves a hybrid of two different motives: the

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expression for Whites of a more modern, symbolic form of racism as discussed by Sears and Henry, and also a convenient mask for socially unacceptable attitudes (e.g., their support for inequality) and older forms of prejudice.

AVERSIVE RACISM According to Gaertner and Dovidio (1986), the racist history of American culture combined with the cognitive tendency to categorize information (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) results in subtle, yet commonplace racist beliefs and feelings in White Americans. Aversive racism is a term Gaertner and Dovidio use to describe White Americans who possess these racist beliefs and feelings, as well as strong egalitarian values. Thus, aversive racism reflects an ambivalence in Whites between their learned negative attitudes (from early childhood to adulthood) toward Black Americans, and their commitment to egalitarian values and beliefs. Because egalitarian ideals and beliefs are central to aversive racists’ selves, they may deny conscious awareness of their negative attitudes and prejudice toward Black Americans. Indeed, they take great pains to not do or say anything that appears to be prejudiced, because they truly believe that they are not prejudiced. However, their underlying biases may be expressed as pro-White behaviors, such as ingroup favoritism, rather than the old-­fashioned prejudicial expressions of outgroup derogation. When it is unclear whether there are social prohibitions against expressing negative racial beliefs, the aversive racist’s negative feelings about Black Americans may be expressed in subtle, easily justifiable (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003) and perhaps unintentional ways. Thus, in these ambiguous contexts where behaving properly or improperly is unclear (e.g., not holding the door open when a Black student is several feet behind you as you enter a building, as you might if that person was White), you could treat a Black student unfavorably relative to a White student but believe that you didn’t do anything inappropriate—­reassuring you that you are not prejudiced. However, because it wouldn’t be clear to you that you violated some social convention by not holding the door open for a Black student so far away, you could leave the situation without ever challenging your nonprejudiced self-image. Whereas, if either a Black or a White student was a few feet behind you, not holding the door open for either of them would clearly be inappropriate and consequently you would likely hold the door open for each of them (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986). Thus, when the social norms are clear, then the aversive racist does not behave in a racist fashion, and they may even appear strongly egalitarian (Aberson & Ettlin, 2004; Katz, 1981; McConahay et al., 1981). In contrast to “old-­ fashioned” racism, in which the racist openly displays hatred for, and beliefs of superiority to, Black Americans, aversive racists experience more subtle feelings of “discomfort, uneasiness, disgust, and sometimes fear” in the presence of Black Americans (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986, pp. 62–63). A paper by Dovidio and Gaertner (2000) analyzed data from 1988 to 1989 on the hiring decisions of White participants regarding Black and White job applicants, and compared those data with similar data gathered in 1998–1999. The aversive racism theory suggests that self-­reported expressions of prejudice should decline over time, but that subtle, underlying prejudice should remain constant. Consistent with the theory, results of the analysis found that self-­reported prejudice levels of the 1998–1999 participants

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were indeed lower than their counterparts a decade earlier. When presented with a clearly superior Black or White applicant, participants did not show any underlying prejudice against the Black applicant or preference for the White applicant, and tended to hire the well-­qualified White and minority candidates equally. However, when the qualifications of the applicants were rather ambiguous, their subtle, underlying negativity toward Black applicants emerged, in that White participants preferred to hire the White candidate more frequently than the Black candidate. In the context of aversive racism theory, when the candidate’s credentials were moderately qualified, participants could decline to hire a Black candidate—­believing that race had nothing to do with their decision, since they could perceive their role as trying to hire only candidates with excellent qualifications. A meta-­analysis of helping studies showed support for aversive racism. Whites showed no discrimination in helping Whites versus Blacks. However, when they could rationalize their decision to not help to reasons unrelated to race (e.g., if helping would entail more time, risk, or effort), Whites gave less help to Blacks than Whites (Saucier, Miller, & Doucet, 2005). In sum, aversive racists tend to be avoidant of any situation that might cause them to become aware of their prejudices and potential unequal treatment of Black individuals.

SUMMARY OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF PREJUDICE Symbolic and modern racism differ from aversive racism in that they are found primarily in political conservatives, while aversive racism is associated with liberals (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1996; Gaertner, 1973), although in other respects these theories are similar. For example, Ward (1985) found support for the common argument made by modern, aversive, and symbolic racism theories that negative racial attitudes are acquired early in childhood, and that this forms the basis for a rather stable bedrock of anti-Black affect beneath later egalitarian beliefs learned in school, from peers, and society. The theories of modern, symbolic, and aversive racism also suggest that because Whites’ negative affect toward Blacks manifests itself subtly in terms of opposition to social programs and voting behavior that are aimed at bringing about equality, they actually may have little awareness of their negative feelings toward Blacks (Dovidio et al., 1996). On the other hand, there continues to be disagreement about the extent that people are aware of their prejudices. For example, more research discussed in Chapter 4 (Phillips & Olson, 2014) suggests that Whites are relatively aware of their prejudices, but may be unaware of their impact, or the manner in which their attitudes guide their behavior. Another important feature is the common thread of racial ambivalence that runs through these contemporary theories of prejudice. By virtue of growing up in America, Whites learn, via American society, culture, parents, and peers, what stereotypes are associated with various groups and feelings of negative affect get attached to these groups in their memory. However, society also teaches values of equality, freedom, and nondiscrimination, and values that embody the “Protestant work ethic” (hard work, independence, and self-­sufficiency), which many Whites also tend to embrace. The clash between these values with regard to perceptions of how various racial outgroups violate cherished values that embody the Protestant work ethic leads White individuals to feel ambivalence (conflicted) toward Blacks. For example, greater valuing of individualism predicts anti-Black attitudes, and greater valuing of egalitarianism predicts pro-Black

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attitudes, and people may be high or low in both pro- and anti-Black sentiments (Katz & Hass, 1988). The stronger their ambivalence (i.e., the more individuals feel both proand anti-Black), the more inconsistent their behavior is toward Black individuals. The determining factor in whether negative attitudes toward Black individuals may be displayed tends to hinge on the context. Relatively minor aspects of the situation can influence which affective component of a person’s racial attitude is aroused and whether their behavior is correspondingly positive or negative toward Blacks (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Fiske, 1998). The similar motivational and behavioral manifestations of prejudice in modern, aversive, and symbolic racists suggests support for the underlying theme of racial ambivalence that characterizes many Whites’ racial attitudes in contemporary American society. However, as we have seen, there is much disagreement over whether some of these theories (e.g., modern and symbolic racism) are really identifying distinct forms of racism, or whether they are simply “old wine in new bottles” (relabeling old-­fashioned racism). Clearly, the expression of racial prejudice and stereotyping has changed over the decades. But, has the form of prejudice changed?—that is, are the contemporary theories of prejudice describing a conceptually distinct type of prejudice from “old-­fashioned” prejudice? We take up this question later in the chapter. First, let us consider the ways that researchers attempt to assess prejudice and stereotyping. Afterall, these are empirical questions that require proper measurement to address.

MEASURES OF STEREOTYPING AND PREJUDICE One of the biggest challenges for researchers studying prejudice and stereotyping involves the question of how best to accurately measure prejudiced attitudes. This is a formidable obstacle for researchers. Consider the questions that must be addressed in order to devise a sound measure of prejudice. What is the nature of the motivation, affect, and cognition that underlies the expression of prejudice and stereotypes about others (Allport, 1954)? Are people being honest in their responses? Is the prejudiced attitude more likely to be expressed under certain conditions (Mackie & Hamilton, 1993)? Are some personality types more likely to be prejudiced (e.g., Adorno et al., 1950)? Once the nature of the prejudice, and its relation to personality and situational influences (e.g., under distraction or strong social norms) have been identified, the researcher can then attempt to create a self-­report measure to determine a person’s level of that particular type of prejudice. Below, we examine the various ways researchers have attempted to measure prejudice and stereotyping. We address the criticisms and supportive evidence for each approach. Last, we examine the current state of the science of measuring prejudice, and discuss the future trends in measuring it.

The Self‑Report Questionnaire There is an old saying among social scientists: “If you want to know how someone feels about something, ask them.” Indeed, if someone tells you they are racist, you should probably believe them. This practical approach to ascertaining the attitude of an individual has guided psychologists, sociologists, opinion pollsters, and other researchers for over 75 years. Sometimes, as in opinion polls or interviews, respondents are asked

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about their attitudes on a variety of topics and the researcher records the reply on their questionnaire or computer database. However, this is not the most popular method of obtaining attitude data, because of its labor-­intensive nature. Interview methods such as this require an interviewer, and the attitudes of individuals can only be ascertained one person at a time. A much more efficient way to find out how people feel about something is to have them complete a questionnaire themselves (hence the term “self-­ report”). In this method, a researcher can administer unlimited numbers of questionnaires simultaneously to an unlimited number of participants. The self-­report quickly became the most popular method of attitude assessment in psychology. The big advantage of self-­report questionnaires is their efficiency: one can obtain lots of attitude data from lots of people very quickly. For example, the researcher could send out hundreds (or thousands) of questionnaires to potential respondents, or they might bring an equal number of questionnaires to various classes on a college campus, and obtain the data from student volunteers. Sometimes, the researcher does not even need to be present: The potential participant can log onto any number of social science research websites like Amazon’s Mechanical Turk and even earn (very little) money completing surveys. However, self-­report measures have some serious drawbacks. First, the responses to the questions are usually restricted to the response alternatives provided on the questionnaire (unless it is a free-­response, open-ended answer format in which the individual can write anything they want in response to the question). For example, you might be asked to pick a number on a –3 to +3 scale to indicate how positively or negatively you feel toward a given group. Thus, the researcher gets a general, if somewhat imprecise, measure of the respondent’s attitudes. Second, and perhaps more important, people don’t always provide their “true” attitudes on self-­report measures. This may be due to a couple of reasons. People may not have conscious awareness of their true, underlying attitudes toward an issue, due to the sensitive nature of the issue. A good example of this is racial attitudes. In the past, stereotyping others and holding prejudiced attitudes were the norm, and there were no legal or societal prohibitions against overtly displaying such negative attitudes. Over time, this has changed dramatically, and it is less tolerated in mainstream society. However, old habits die hard, and research on modern racism, aversive racism, and symbolic racism suggests that for many people, their negative feelings toward other groups may not have been eliminated but are just hidden more carefully. Even some people who believe they are low in prejudice still harbor underlying negative racial attitudes. Consider the following quote by Pettigrew (1987, as cited in Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991, p. 817): “Many Southerners have confessed to me, for instance, that even though in their minds they no longer feel prejudice toward Blacks, they still feel squeamish when they shake hands with a Black [individual]. These feelings are left over from what they learned in their families as children.” Research supports this anecdotal evidence: Nail, Harton, and Decker (2003) found that only White liberals (who presumably are less comfortable admitting prejudice) and not White conservatives, showed increased heart rate and skin conductance when touched by a Black versus a White experimenter. Thus, the anxiety and cognitive dissonance that are aroused with awareness of the underlying attitude may motivate such individuals to shut off those feelings from awareness, to deny their existence, in order to maintain a desired image of their self as a person with no prejudice (as is likely the case for someone who is an aversive racist). Other individuals may be aware of their negative feelings toward other

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groups but they don’t express these attitudes due to the negative social (and sometimes legal) consequences for such behavior (as is likely the case for a modern or symbolic racist). Thus, interpersonally and on questionnaires, they express little or no prejudice, while they may indeed harbor negative attitudes toward certain groups. This tendency to present oneself in a positive light is termed social desirability, because the respondent’s goal is to create a socially desirable impression of themselves, a strategy that presents a big obstacle for the attitude researcher. In these situations, the person who is providing their attitudes is concerned with presenting responses that are socially acceptable, and hiding any attitudes that are socially unacceptable. Because the researcher wants to get only the honest, accurate responses from the individual, they must take extra measures to enhance the likelihood that the respondent will provide their true attitudes, even if they are unpopular. There are several ways that the researcher can decrease the influence of social desirability in the subject’s responses. For a majority of experiments investigating attitudes, the researcher can tell the subjects that their responses will be completely anonymous. If it cannot be anonymous, the next best thing is to make the responses confidential (i.e., only the principal investigator—­or other responsible professionals—­w ill have access to the data, and for research purposes only). This helps alleviate any anxiety that the subjects may have about their responses being associated with them. Another instruction researchers give to subjects when asking for their attitudes on various issues is that it is important that subjects provide their honest responses, not how they think they should respond (i.e., the socially desirable response). Honesty in responding to the questionnaire or the researcher’s questions is emphasized as paramount, in the hope of appealing to the participant’s desire to be a “good subject” by correctly following directions, and helping the researcher. Finally, virtually all respondents to attitude measures are tempted to try to “figure out” the purpose of the attitude questionnaire (i.e., what it is measuring—­e.g., whether the person is prejudiced against gay men). Aspects of the questionnaire and the testing situation that encourage the subject to make their own hypotheses about what answers are expected (or what is being measured) are called demand characteristics, and these represent an unwanted bias in the research. If the subjects are responding to their own ideas of what the questionnaire is measuring, or what the researcher wants them to say, then they are not providing their truthful opinions on the items. In these instances, the researcher may use “filler items” in the questionnaire in order to make the purpose of the questionnaire less obvious to respondents (to “throw them off the scent”). Filler items are those items that have no relation to the hypotheses under investigation, and are included in the questionnaire as a way to distract respondents from the hypotheses of the researcher. For example, one may only be interested in responses to seven items dealing with attitudes toward sexual minorities, and there may be 43 other items that examine other issues (such as attitudes toward recycling). This often has the intended effect of making it difficult for the respondent to formulate hypotheses of what is under investigation in the questionnaire, and without the bias of that potential demand characteristic, participants should therefore be more likely to provide their honest responses to the items. The problem with these techniques is that they are not a guarantee that there will be no social desirability or other biases in the participant’s responses. In fact, research suggests that these techniques that are designed to enhance the validity

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of self-­report measures are only partially effective (Schuman & Kalton, 1985). Thus, researchers have developed other methods of getting attitude information.

The Bogus Pipeline This technique, devised by Jones and Sigall (1971), was in part inspired by a paper by Karlins and colleagues (1969). Karlins et al. reported that Whites in the United States reported more favorable attitudes toward Blacks during the 1900s, and showed little prejudice and little stereotyping, according to their responses on questionnaires. Jones and Sigall believed that such a shift in how Whites viewed Blacks was unlikely, especially given the turbulent interracial climate of the 1960s. Jones and Sigall suspected that attitudes had not changed dramatically, but people’s willingness to express overt negative racial attitudes was diminishing. Thus, they reasoned that some of the respondents in the Karlins et al. study were more likely reporting socially appropriate attitudes about other races, and keeping their prejudices to themselves. Sigall and Page (1971) designed a study to examine this, using an apparatus that subjects were led to believe could assess their true attitudes. The subject is told that the experimenter will have a direct reading—­a “pipeline”—to their attitudes on the issues under examination. The apparatus looks much like a polygraph machine, with dials, lights, buzzers, and electromyographic (EMG) electrodes attached to the person’s arms. The procedure for the bogus pipeline study is as follows. One half of the participants are assigned to a rating condition in which they indicate their attitudes on the issue in question (e.g., racial attitudes) aloud when the experimenter asks the question. The other half are assigned to an EMG condition, in which they are asked to provide their ratings by turning a wheel, attached to a computer, that moves a dial to the left or right, corresponding to more negative or more positive attitudes. Participants in the rating condition were asked to turn the wheel to move the pointer to the number (from a range of –3 to +3) corresponding to their attitude toward the issue or agreement with a statement. For half of the rating condition participants, the experimenter read a list of 22 traits (e.g., “superstitious,” “ambitious”) and asked the participants to indicate on the wheel how much they agreed or disagreed that each trait was characteristic of “Americans.” The other half reported the same judgments, but for “Blacks.” Typically, these ratings indicated that participants (in the Sigall & Page [1971] study, all participants were White, and were all males) rated both Americans and Blacks positively. In the EMG condition, participants were told that the intent of the study was to further validate the EMG machine. Participants in this condition were first given a fiveitem questionnaire asking their attitudes toward relatively neutral topics, such as music, sports, movies, and so on. The experimenter then took that completed questionnaire and led the participant into the room with the EMG machine at the wall opposite the door. The experimenter casually placed the completed questionnaire on a table by the door as they both entered and left the door slightly ajar. The subject was seated at the machine with their back to the door. As the experimenter explains the EMG machine and procedure, another researcher silently takes the questionnaire, copies the answers, and returns it to the table. After the experimenter has explained the procedure, electrodes are attached to the participant’s forearm. The experimenter explains that the machine can assess their

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“implicit muscle movements,” and reveal the strength with which the participant is about to turn the wheel (thus indicating the participant’s true attitude). In order to convince the participant of the accuracy of the machine, the experimenter asks the participant to hold the wheel and concentrate on their answers to the five-item questionnaire they just completed. The experimenter reads the question, flips a switch on the machine, which then buzzes and then falls silent as the needle (controlled by the researcher’s associate in the other room, who had copied the participant’s answers) moves to a number (the same number the participant reported on the questionnaire). On the fourth item, the experimenter asks the participant to try to “trick” the machine by pretending to have the opposite attitude and move the wheel accordingly. The machine is not “fooled,” and the needle reflects the same number the subject had indicated earlier on the questionnaire. After the fifth item, the experimenter retrieves the subject’s questionnaire from the table and compares it with the machine’s readings, and shows the subject that the machine was extremely accurate. The participant is then asked about the 22 traits, and asked to provide their honest attitudes about each of them. As with the rating condition, half of the participants in the EMG condition are asked about the typicality of the traits for “Americans,” and the other half are asked how well these traits describe “Blacks.” When the results from the rating and EMG conditions were compared, some very striking differences emerged. Generally speaking, EMG participants were more confident that “Americans” had more positive traits, and fewer negative traits. For example, ratings (non-EMG) participants thought that the trait “honest” was not very typical (–.27) of Americans, but EMG participants thought it was more typical (+.60). Ratings subjects thought that Americans were not lazy (–.40), and EMG participants were even more adamant that this was the case (–.80). However, the results were different for perceptions of Blacks. Generally, while ratings participants evaluated Blacks rather favorably, EMG participants rated Blacks as having more undesirable and few desirable traits. For example, ratings participants thought that the trait “unreliable” was not indicative of Blacks (–.67), while EMG participants believed that it was characteristic of Blacks (+.27). On the trait of “honest,” ratings participants believed that it was characteristic of Blacks (+.60), while EMG participants believed that it was not very typical of Blacks (–.33). These results supported Jones and Sigall’s (1971) suspicions that the dramatic decline in prejudiced attitudes that was reported by Karlins et al. (1969) did not reflect a revolution in the attitudes of Whites toward Blacks. Many Whites were not as low prejudiced as their egalitarian responses on self-­report measures of prejudice would suggest. Thus, negative attitudes of Whites toward Blacks had not declined dramatically; what had changed was the willingness of Whites to overtly express these negative racial attitudes. As Sigall and Page (1971) describe the results, the EMG participants expressed more negative attitudes toward Blacks (compared to those in the ratings condition) because they believed that the machine could accurately assess their attitudes, and if they attempted to portray themselves as those in the ratings condition (i.e., as nonprejudiced), the machine would show to the researcher that they had lied. Thus, rather than risk being seen as a liar, the subject indicates (via negative responses about Blacks) that they are prejudiced! Does the bogus pipeline technique work, and is it a viable means to accurately assess prejudice? While Schlenker, Bonoma, Hutchinson, and Burns (1976) were unable to completely replicate Sigall and Page’s (1971) findings, and others found no

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differences between self-­reported attitudes and attitudes provided via the bogus pipeline (­Broverman, Bloom, Gunn, & Torok, 1974; Cherry, Byrne, & Mitchell, 1976), the bulk of the research suggests that it does indeed reduce attitude distortion (due to social desirability and other self-­presentational goals; Page & Moss, 1975; Plant, Devine, & Brazy, 2003; Quigley-­Fernandez & Tedeschi, 1978; Riess, Kalle, & Tedeschi, 1981). A comprehensive meta-­analysis of 31 bogus pipeline studies also showed that the technique does indeed work to reduce socially desirable responding and leads to more truthful responses from the participants (Roese & Jamieson, 1993). Interestingly, other research, in which the subject is led to believe that their self-­reported attitude will be later validated for accuracy, shows similar reductions in attitude distortion (e.g., Evans, Hansen, & ­Mittelmark, 1977; Hill, Henderson, Bray, & Evans, 1981). While the bogus pipeline (and variations) is a particularly accurate measure of attitudes, it is almost never used in modern prejudice research. The reason is simple: It is labor-­intensive. The experiment involves elaborate deception and extensive training of the experimenters, and the experimenter needs to devise an accurate replica of the “EMG” machine (the bogus pipeline) and convince today’s more psychologically savvy subjects that the machine is valid, and that the experimenter is being upfront with the subject. Plus, implicit measures, like priming and the Implicit Association Test (IAT; discussed in Chapter 4), can circumvent social desirability problems without all the fuss.

Measuring Stereotyping Though it was once a useful gauge of stereotypes, the Katz and Braly (1933) adjective checklist is rarely used in contemporary research, due to the aforementioned problems associated with the measure. Other researchers have used a “diagnostic ratio” measure of stereotyping (McCauley & Stitt, 1978). This procedure asks the participant to provide estimates of the percentage of the target group that possess a given characteristic (e.g., honesty), and also what percentage of “people in general” possess the given characteristic. To the degree that participants’ responses for the target group differ from those they indicated for the general population, positive or negative attributes (depending on the perceived differences on the trait/s in question) are thus attributed to the target group. Perhaps due to its perceived complexity, the diagnostic ratio measure of stereotyping has not been a very popular method to assess stereotyping (Allen, 1996). In the last few decades, some researchers have returned to open-ended or “free-­response” approaches, exemplified by the adjective-­generation technique described earlier (Potkay & Allen, 1988), as a robust and accurate measure of the stereotypes individuals hold about outgroups at a given time (e.g., Devine, 1989; Esses, Haddock, & Zanna, 1994). Free-­response measures more accurately predict later prejudice-­related behavior toward the outgroup (Stangor, Sullivan, & Ford, 1992). The downside to free-­response measures of stereotyping is that (1) they are not always better predictors of prejudice and discrimination, and (2) the task of coding the free-­response data generated by the participants is often time-­consuming and requires lengthy reliability analyses that some researchers might consider too labor-­intensive (Stangor & Lange, 1994). Nevertheless, if the goal is to understand the content of stereotypes toward a certain target at a particular time, free-­ response measures are an excellent method to achieve that end. A primary approach to research in stereotyping and prejudice is to ascertain the conditions that facilitate and inhibit the use of stereotypes in making judgments about

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others. In other words, when are we more or less likely to use a stereotype when thinking about, or forming an impression of, another person? One useful approach to assess the proclivity to use stereotypes in social judgments is to examine the degree to which participants in a study use the category membership of the target as a heuristic in helping them arrive at conclusions about that target. Though a variety of measures exist, a popular version has been Bodenhausen’s (1990) Student Court Questionnaire (SCQ). Participants are asked to read a short description about a disciplinary hearing that will be held against a student on campus involving either academic dishonesty or possession of drugs. The paragraph presents a brief outline of the offense and the evidence that implicates the defendant. However, the information is ambiguous as to the guilt or innocence of the defendant (i.e., there is equal evidence that suggests they are innocent, and that they likely committed the offense). Participants are then asked, on eight Likert-­ type items, about the likelihood that the defendant is guilty, severity of punishment if guilty, and so on. There are two versions of the SCQ. One names the defendant in the paragraph with an “ethnically nondescript” name, such as “Dan Jensen.” The other version is identical to the first except for the name of the defendant, which is an “African American-­sounding” name, such as “Darnell Jackson.” Within all experimental conditions, half of the participants get the nondescript version, and the other half get the African American version. To the degree that responses on the two versions of the questionnaire differ significantly in terms of judgments of greater guilt, more severe punishment deserved, and so on for the African American defendant, the researcher can then conclude that the independent variable for that condition either increased, or had no effect upon, the tendency to use a stereotype in social judgments. The SCQ is popular because it is nonreactive, easy to administer and score, very brief, and has little or no demand characteristics associated with it. Using this measure (and variants thereof), researchers have found that when people are happy (Bodenhausen, Kramer, & Süsser, 1994) they are more likely to use a stereotype in their judgments about a target. Research also indicates that people are more likely to stereotype others when they are angry, but not when they feel sad (Bodenhausen, Sheppard, & Kramer, 1994). Research also indicates that when people are cognitively busy they are more likely to use stereotypes when thinking about a target (Bodenhausen & Lichtenstein, 1987; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990).

Measuring Prejudice In addition to discovering the conditions under which stereotyping is likely to occur, researchers have been equally interested in understanding the relation between negative intergroup affect (prejudice) and subsequent attitudes and behavior toward outgroups. To this end, there has been a considerable amount of effort directed toward devising self-­report measures of prejudice. Recall that a good self-­report measure must be fairly nonreactive, reliable, relatively short, valid, and be easy to score and interpret if it will be useful to the research community. Questionnaires on sensitive issues like prejudice have an additional burden of overcoming inevitable biases in responding due to social desirability, demand characteristics, reactivity, and unawareness of one’s underlying attitudes (as in the case of aversive racists, and to a lesser extent, modern and symbolic racists). As a result of these difficult measurement obstacles, some theorists have suggested that contemporary forms of prejudice cannot be measured via self-­report questionnaires (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986).

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Nevertheless, many researchers have devised self-­report measures of prejudice, with varying degrees of success. While there are far too many to discuss in this chapter (see Biernat & Crandall, 1999; Olson & Zabel, 2016, for a comprehensive review of published prejudice measures), we focus on a few of the most popular measures of prejudice, starting with the MRS (McConahay, 1986; McConahay et al., 1981), which we mentioned earlier. McConahay designed the MRS to measure less overt forms of anti-Black prejudice. The scale comprises seven statements to which the respondent indicates their agreement or disagreement on a 5-point Likert scale. Agreement with the items indicates the presence of modern racist beliefs, such as the belief that discrimination is no longer a problem in the United States, that Blacks get unfair special treatment in government policy, and they should not “push themselves where they are not wanted.” The inability to empathize with the plight of Blacks is also an indicator of modern racism (as in the reverse-­scored item “It is easy to understand the anger of Black people in America”). In order to avoid reactivity, social desirability, and demand characteristics, most researchers also include many more filler items (that tap similar social attitudes) randomly interspersed between the seven MRS items, in order to conceal the true purpose of the measure. The reader will note that the basis for the items is quite similar to the underlying beliefs that underlie the symbolic and aversive racism theories. For that reason, many researchers have used the MRS as a measure of general subtle prejudice that characterizes some Whites’ attitudes toward African Americans in contemporary American society. Of course, one of the first questions researchers ask about any measure is “Is it valid and reliable?” McConahay (1986) reported that the test–­retest reliability was between .72 and .93 (meaning that when people took it twice, the scores correlated fairly highly), and that it showed fair convergent validity (meaning it related sensibly to similar measures; Biernat & Crandall, 1999). The problem with the MRS is that it does not show good discriminant validity. Specifically, it correlates with measures of old-­fashioned racism, the very construct from which it was purported to distinguish itself. For example, McConahay reported correlations between old-­fashioned and modern racism between .33 and .66. Other researchers have found similar high correlations (.86: Swim, Aikin, Hall, & Hunter, 1995; .65: Weigel & Howes, 1985). Another problem with the MRS is that, contrary to McConahay’s (1986) assertions, it does appear to be reactive. Jackson and Fazio (1995) found that when high-­prejudice individuals (as indicated by earlier MRS scores) completed the MRS again with an African American experimenter, they shifted their responses on the MRS to appear less prejudiced. Those who were given the MRS by a White experimenter showed no significant attitude shift. The researchers suggest that the shift in the African American experimenter condition indicates the reactivity of the scale, and that subjects respond in socially desirable ways in certain situations. Another problem with the MRS is that it appears to confound political conservativism with prejudice (Olson & Zabel, 2016; Sniderman & Tetlock, 1986). For example, respondents are asked to indicate their agreement/disagreement with the item “Over the past few years Blacks have gotten more economically than they deserve.” Principled conservatives are generally opposed to government meddling in economics and would be opposed to the government offering an economic advantage to any group. This item, and other items on the MRS, do not make it possible to indicate disagreement with government intervention without also appearing prejudiced. Hence, a principally conservative person would have a hard time not appearing prejudiced on the MRS even if they do not harbor antipathy toward Black individuals.

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A more recent addition to the measurement mix, the Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale (SR2K), takes a different tack (Henry & Sears, 2002). Instead of attempting to disentangle conservativism and racism, it acknowledges the inherent linkages between the two. However, its scale items resist asking about politics per se, and instead tap into what its authors refer to as “a blend of racial antipathy and traditional conservative values” that are “more than simply the sum of those parts” (p.  269). The SR2K includes items like “How much of the racial tension that exists in the United States today do you think Blacks are responsible for creating?” Even when researchers take into account respondents’ preferences for small versus larger government, scores on the SR2K predict attitudes toward policies aimed at serving Black communities, which lends support to the argument that the scale gets at a prejudice that isn’t merely conservativism or racial antipathy alone.

Implicit Measures: The “True” Measures? Researchers have investigated the merits of reaction-­t ime methods for measuring prejudice, including priming and the IAT, as discussed in Chapter 4. Recall that reaction-­t ime measures are desirable in assessing racial attitudes because they bypass the controlled cognitions that may mask underlying negative racial affect (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1996). For example, research by Gaertner (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1993; Gaertner & McLaughlin, 1983) found that White participants were more likely to associate positive characteristics with the racial category word “White” than with the word “Black,” and Fazio and colleagues (1995) similarly found that White participants were quicker to identify positive words as positive when they were preceded by a prime of a White individual, and quicker to identify negative words as negative when they were preceded by a prime of a Black individual. Also recall research by Phillips and Olson (2014; also discussed in Chapter 4), which found that when people were strongly encouraged to be honest and listen to their “gut feelings,” implicit measures (in this case, the IAT) and explicit measures (including the MRS), were correlated. This suggests that people have conscious access to their implicit prejudices, and that social desirability concerns prevent many from expressing what we might call their “true” attitudes. While all of this discussion of measurement may seem a bit tiring, the advent of implicit measures, coupled with a plethora of existing explicit measures, has allowed for a number of advances in our understanding of modern forms of prejudice. Many studies have included both implicit measures (like the IAT and priming) and explicit measures (like the MRS) to examine the interrelations, as well as their relations to judgments and behavior. This research has helped refine the concepts of modern, symbolic, and aversive racism. When Gaertner and Dovidio (1986) were developing their theory of aversive racism, they reasoned that “effective questionnaire measures of aversive racism, in our opinion, would be difficult if not impossible to develop” (p.  67). This is because aversive racists put forth great effort to avoid appearing prejudiced, either to themselves or others. Admitting prejudice on a questionnaire would do just that. Similar points can be made about aversive and both modern and symbolic racists, except that aversive racists deny to themselves or others that they have any negative feelings, such as resentment toward Blacks, believing, for example, that they get unfair special treatment in government

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policy, which could be readily endorsed by modern and symbolic racists. Nevertheless, among each of these types of racists, there is a reluctance to admit to personally being prejudiced. Enter implicit measures. As implicit measures can circumvent social desirability, they arguably do get at something possibly closer to the truth, and, in conjunction with explicit measures, can be used to identify these more contemporary forms of prejudice. As depicted in Table 6.1, we can imagine someone being high or low in implicit prejudice, and high or low in explicit prejudice. Take those who are high in both: They exhibit prejudice at the automatic “gut” level, and, explicitly, they are readily willing to express that prejudice; because they don’t seem conflicted about their prejudices and are readily willing to admit them, these individuals could be characterized as old-­fashioned racists. On the other hand, those showing little to no prejudice at the implicit level might be considered “true” nonracist individuals. What about when implicit and explicit measures disagree? Let’s first look at those characterized by low-­implicit prejudice, but high-­e xplicit prejudice, the so-­called principled conservatives. How might such individuals exist? Conservatives tend to believe in small government, and generally oppose government intervention in employment, education, health care, and so on. Yet, the MRS (and similar measures) do ask about government intervention, particularly in employment and education. So, you might be opposed to affirmative action or school desegregation, not because you are antiBlack but because you believe the federal government should not be so interventionist (­Sniderman, Tetlock, Glaser, Green, & Hout, 1989). Does this logic stand up to scrutiny? Not really. First of all, there are very few people who score relatively high in explicit prejudice but low in implicit prejudice (Fazio & Olson, 2003). Second, even those who claim principled conservativism often do not apply those conservative values equally, regardless of race. Instead, they tend to apply them in ways that disadvantage racial minorities (e.g., Reyna, Tucker, Korfmacher, & Henry, 2005). In Chapter 12, we observe a similar pattern of attitudes among religious conservatives who claim principled opposition to same-sex marriage. Another reason to be suspicious of the claim that opposition to affirmative action, school desegregation, and so on is “not about race” is because implicit measures of prejudice do, in fact, predict opposition to government programs that would potentially help Blacks. For example, Knowles, Lowery, and Schaumberg (2010) gauged opposition to the Affordable Care Act, which is often referred to as “Obamacare,” as it was one of his most noteworthy acts while president. After completing an IAT measure of implicit prejudice, as well as measures of political orientation and explicit prejudice, participants read a brief overview of the Affordable Care Act. Cleverly, these researchers made it “about race” or not by attributing the plan to Obama, who is Black, or to former president Bill Clinton, who is White. Participants with greater anti-Black IAT scores were more likely to

TABLE 6.1.  Relationships between Implicit, Explicit, and Modern Forms of Racism

High-­e xplicit racism

Low-­e xplicit racism

High-­implicit racism

Old-­fashioned racism

Modern/aversive racism

Low-­implicit racism

Principled conservatives

“True” nonprejudice

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oppose the Affordable Care Act, but only if they believed it was Obama’s plan. Implicit prejudice did not predict opposition when the plan was attributed to Clinton. A final note from this research: Those with more anti-Black IAT scores were also less likely to vote for Obama in the 2008 election. Thus, consistent with the theories of modern and symbolic racism, implicit prejudices reflect the operation of prejudice even when people deny it. Often, it is about race. As these and other studies show, people’s political and policy attitudes are often influenced by their prejudices, whether or not they either know it or are willing to admit it. However, the perspectives of White and Black Americans are very much at odds here, with White Americans tending to deny the relevance of race, and Black Americans tending to view various news events and public policies as race relevant. For example, after the police shooting of Michael Brown, an African American teenager, 80% of Black Americans reported that the incident “raises important issues about race,” compared to only 37% of White Americans (Pew Research Center, 2014). Whether in education, employment, health care, criminal justice, or even everyday acts like driving, shopping, and dining, Black Americans see much more of the social world as being race relevant than White Americans do (Pew Research Center, 2019). And what of those with high-­implicit and low-­e xplicit prejudice? First of all, this combination is the most common, given how pervasive implicit prejudice is (somewhere between 60 and 90% of Whites show anti-Black bias on implicit measures; Olson & Zabel, 2016), and people are generally reluctant to express prejudice explicitly. Son Hing, Chung-Yan, Hamilton, and Zanna (2008) proposed a two-­dimensional model of prejudice much like the one in Table 6.1, and argue that modern/aversive racists fit squarely in the high-­implicit, low-­e xplicit category. But are they modern or symbolic racists, or are they aversive racists? According to Son Hing and colleagues, that depends on how explicit prejudice is measured. Those scoring high in implicit prejudice and high in conservativism can be characterized as modern racists. Those scoring high in implicit prejudice and high in egalitarianism can be characterized as aversive racists. And the distinction matters: In their studies, modern racists were more likely to discriminate against a minority job candidate when there was an excuse to do so (e.g., ambiguous performance on a skills test). Aversive racists were less likely to do so. However, when it comes to less controllable behavior, aversive racists aren’t off the hook. As reviewed in Chapter 4, implicit negativity is likely to “leak” out of nonverbal channels among aversive racists, particularly in interracial interactions, despite their intentions to act nonprejudiced. The result? There is a disconnect between the relatively negative nonverbal and relatively positive verbal behavior of their White partners, leading their Black partners to be less trusting of them (Dovidio, Kawakami, & Gaertner, 2002). A field study examined how Black patients react to White physicians who fit the aversive racist prototype (low-­e xplicit bias, high-­implicit bias; Penner et al., 2010). Following predictions, the data showed that Black patients had more negative perceptions and interactions with White doctors who were perceived to fit the aversive racist profile compared to those physicians who were either low in both explicit or implicit bias or high in both. Implicit measures were first introduced in Chapter 4, and modern forms of prejudice, typically assessed with explicit measures, were introduced here. The use of both implicit and explicit measures has helped clarify the nature of modern forms of prejudice and improved both theorizing and prediction of discriminatory behavior. However,

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some measures may be considered indirect—in that they don’t ask people directly to report their prejudices—­w ithout being implicit in terms of being based on reaction times. In fact, such measures harken some of the “projective” measures of psychological syndromes championed by psychodynamic theories (think of those Rorschach or “inkblot” tests) in the middle of the 1900s. One move in this direction is a measure called the Racial Argument Scale developed by Saucier and Miller (2003). The scale asks people to indicate how well arguments support conclusions that are either supportive or negative toward Black individuals. The scale is an indirect measure of prejudice because respondents don’t feel defensive about giving their impression about the strength of pro- or anti-Black arguments. The scale has been shown to have good reliability and validity because it can predict positive or negative behavior against Black targets. Thus, it looks like a promising measure of prejudice for future research (e.g., McManus, Saucier, O’Dea, & Bernard, 2019).

SUMMARY: IS THERE SUCH A THING AS MODERN PREJUDICE? Earlier in this chapter, we left unanswered the question of whether current expressions of prejudice differ in form from the prejudice expressed in the past, —that is, are theories of “modern prejudice” describing a qualitatively different type of prejudice from old-­fashioned prejudice, or are they describing new ways to measure the more subtle contemporary versions of old-­fashioned prejudice? This is a difficult question, and one that researchers are still attempting to answer. One step in this direction comes from a paper by Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn (1993). They suggest that when one looks at the components of attitudes toward ethnic groups (such as stance on segregation, rights for outgroups, threat from outgroup members, and adjustment of outgroups), people can be reliably distinguished along a continuum of attitudes toward ethnic groups, —that is, the nonracist represents the absence of negative attitudes toward other ethnic groups, followed (in increasing order of negativity toward ethnic outgroups) by aversive racists, symbolic and modern racists, and biological (old-­fashioned) racists. Given the consistent findings of strong correlations between the various measures of “modern” prejudice and “old-­fashioned” prejudice, Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn’s model accounts for the correlations by suggesting that these measures should be correlated to some degree because they are all assessing various degrees of prejudice toward ethnic outgroups. Kleinpenning and Hagendoorn suggest that today’s prejudice is not independent of, but rather is a first step back toward, old-­fashioned prejudice (which we elaborate on below). Whether old-­fashioned, overt, and openly hostile, or covert, subtle, and virtually undetectable, research shows that each type of prejudice still results in negative behavior, affect, and cognitions about the stereotyped target, and that of course can have negative influences on the individuals who are the targets of such prejudice.

CODA: RESURGENCE IN OLD‑FASHIONED RACISM Our coverage of modern, symbolic, and aversive theories of racism was premised on the notion that old-­fashioned forms of prejudice have declined, marking some modicum of progress, at least insofar as prejudice has become less violent and vitriolic. Indeed,

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scholars and the public alike are often tempted by narratives of progress, a sense that prejudice, inequality, and intergroup conflict are all gradually diminishing (Seamster & Ray, 2018). Even the Reverend Martin Luther King often communicated a generally optimistic outlook, as indicated in his famous quote (1968), “The arc of the moral universe is long, but it bends toward justice.” Such optimism was also apparent when Barack Obama became the first Black president of the United States in 2009: At that time, over 75% of Americans reported a positive outlook on race relations (Dann, 2017). It did not take long for the mood to sour. By 2016, only 44% of Americans thought race relations were “good or somewhat good,” and most Americans believed race relations were, in fact, getting worse (Gallup, 2020). They weren’t wrong: shortly after Obama was elected, old-­fashioned racism began increasing its impact on voting behavior (Tesler, 2013). In 2019, 65% of Americans claimed it has become more common to hear “racist or racially insensitive views” (Pew Research Center, 2019). Indeed, politicians and laypeople alike seemed increasingly emboldened in expressing old-­fashioned racist sentiments. And, according to the Southern Poverty Law Center (2019), hate groups and hate crimes have been steadily increasing since the early 2000s. It seems that old-­fashioned racism has resurged. But why? A few words of caution are in order before we proceed: As of this writing, these are relatively recent trends, and, at the risk of understating it, there is a lot going on in the world: mass migration both in Europe and North America, growing income inequality, high-­profile cases of police killings of unarmed Black individuals highlighted by the Black Lives Matter movement, racial uprisings in major cities, and the COVID-19 pandemic. With so many variables at play, it’s difficult to pin down the causes of the increase in old-­fashioned racism. But recent research provides some tentative insights. As we have discussed throughout this chapter, much of the decrease in old-­fashioned racism during the 20th century was due to changes in social norms: There was some reduction in actual prejudice, but there was also some reduction merely in the expression of prejudice due to normative pressure spawned by the civil rights movement. Research by Crandall and colleagues (2018) suggests that normative pressure against the expression of certain prejudices has recently weakened. Crandall and colleagues tracked people’s perceptions of “how OK it is to express negative feelings” toward a variety of groups before and after the 2016 presidential election. Donald Trump’s campaign included regular overt attacks on women, immigrants, people with disabilities, and Muslims, along with other groups. After he won the election, people reported believing that it was now more socially acceptable to openly express prejudice toward these particular groups. Thus, major social institutions (like the U.S. presidency) can have an impact on people’s perceptions of social norms, and, in the case of Donald Trump’s election, people with prejudices toward these groups could now feel freer expressing them. As we see in Chapter 12 with the U.S. Supreme Court’s marriage-­equality decision, normative pressure from major institutional changes has also recently decreased the acceptability of expressing anti-LGBTQ prejudice. A second factor that may be contributing to the recent rise in old-­fashioned racism is an increase in perceived threat among majority groups. Recall from Chapter 2 that threats can come in many forms (Stephan & Stephan, 2013): realistic (e.g., economic) threat, physical threats, and values or symbolic threats, as well as a sense that one is relatively less well-off than one expects—­t hat is, a sense of relative deprivation. Despite their continued advantages in terms of wealth, employment, education, and so

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on, White Americans have in fact experienced a decline in quality of life in recent years (e.g., in terms of real wages, educational attainment, both mental and physical health, and even life expectancy) and rising income inequality. Thus, among many White Americans, there is likely to be a strong sense that “we’re not doing as well as we should,” even if they are, on average, still doing better overall than other groups. Further, the news media often reminds its viewers that Whites as a racial group will become a numeric minority in the coming decades (due primarily to Latin American immigration). Recent work suggests that it is not so much one’s own sense of economic vulnerability (e.g., potential loss of income) that predicts anti-­immigrant attitudes and support for maintaining racial hierarchy (Mutz, 2018; in fact, lower-­income individuals were more likely to vote for Clinton over Trump in 2012). Instead, it appears that threat to the high status of White Americans as a group has driven many individuals toward anti-­ immigrant attitudes and political candidates. This finding is consistent with work on relative deprivation theory showing that it’s not so much one’s own economic fears but a sense of the vulnerability of one’s group (e.g., “White Americans”) that increases prejudice (Walker & Pettigrew, 1984). Consistent with this logic, Danbold and Huo (2015) argue that a looming minority status has created a “prototypicality threat” among many White Americans, where Whites will no longer be considered the default picture in people’s heads when they think of Americans. These authors demonstrated that when White Americans are reminded of their looming majority status loss, many become resistant to diversity (see Craig & Richeson, 2017, for similar results). Thus, a sense of collective relative deprivation, coupled to the threat that losing their majority status poses, is likely contributing to the rise in old-­fashioned racism among White Americans. We should also add that this recent rise in nationalistic, anti-­immigrant populism (and the racism that it entails) is not unique to the United States; it has also been observed in Canada (e.g., LeBlanc, Beaton, & Walker, 2015) and in many European nations (Greven, 2016). What these movements toward old-­fashioned racism have in common is a sense of group-­relative deprivation, often in response to an influx of immigrants, and suspicion of the “elite” ruling class. Whether through a sense of group threat or increased relative deprivation, the disruptive effects of climate change and the economic crisis brought about by the COVID-19 pandemic is likely to further contribute to an increase in old-­fashioned racism. For example, growing income inequality contributes to a greater appeal of authoritarianism (Sprong et al., 2019) and economic downturns generally increase racial prejudice (Bianchi, Hall, & Lee, 2018). As this all sounds rather pessimistic, we hasten to add that efforts at intergroup contact and cooperation, as we discuss in Chapter 12, have the potential to mitigate these effects. In the next chapter, we turn to an in-depth examination of how prejudice, both overt and subtle, affects those who are targets of it.

GLOSSARY Aversive Racism—anti-­A frican American prejudice in individuals who believe they are egalitarian, but who also have negative feelings and attitudes toward African Americans. This prejudice is more likely to be expressed as ingroup favoritism, rather than outgroup derogation.

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Biological Racism—a belief in natural superiority of some races and the inferiority of others based on a false understanding of evolutionary theory. Bogus Pipeline—technique for assessing attitudes that reduces social desirability, but is labor-­intensive. The participant is connected to a device similar to a lie detector, and the participant is led to believe that the device will give the experimenter an accurate reading of the participant’s true attitudes. Demand Characteristics—aspects of the experimental situation that lead participants to form their own hypotheses about what the experiment is about (and what behavior the experimenter would like them to show). Modern Racism—a subtle form of prejudice that is expressed only when the individual believes it is safe, acceptable, or easily rationalizable. Old-­Fashioned Racism—a blatant, intentional form of prejudice presumed to be normatively acceptable. Social Desirability—presenting oneself and one’s attitudes as very positive, in order to give the most socially acceptable attitude/behavior, even if it deviates from one’s true attitudes. Symbolic Racism—anti-­A frican American prejudice originating out of the belief that African Americans violate traditional norms of behavior symbolic of American values.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. Do you believe that stereotyping and prejudice (any type, racial, ethnic, gender, age, etc.) has declined or increased over the last century? What do you think accounts for the increase/decrease? 2. What are the legitimizing myths that modern racists hold about African Americans? In what ways do they rationalize their prejudice toward African Americans? 3. What, in your opinion, is the best way to measure prejudice and endorsement of stereotypes? 4. What are the strengths and weaknesses of Fazio’s reaction-­t ime measure of prejudice? 5. In your opinion, will prejudice and stereotyping always be a part of our society, and not decrease, but merely change focus or form? Why? 6. Is old-­fashioned versus modern prejudice a useful distinction? 7. Why do you think there has been a recent rise in old-­fashioned forms of racism?

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CHAPTER 7

Experiencing Prejudice

In the search for understanding the processes that lead to the formation, maintenance,

and reduction of stereotypes and prejudice, researchers have taken the view that prejudice originated and was maintained within the majority perceiver of the minority target. It is a fairly intuitive notion to think that if a perceiver holds prejudice toward a target, and if we want to understand the processes that lead to the formation, maintenance, and reduction of that prejudice, we need to understand more about that perceiver. Indeed, this is how much of the research literature has approached prejudice and stereotyping. We know much about how various personality characteristics are more likely to foster prejudice (Adorno et al., 1950), and how various affective states (Bodenhausen, 1993; Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2016), expectancies (Devine, Evett, & Vasquez-­Suson, 1996), cognitive capacity (Mackie & Worth, 1991), and motivational (Isen & Simmonds, 1978) deficits can lead to increased reliance on stereotypes in social judgments. However, as Devine et al. note, this literature only gives us an incomplete picture of the context in which stereotyping occurs. Stereotyping and prejudice are not processes that involve a perceiver regarding an inactive target of stereotyping. Rather, stereotyping and prejudice occur in a dynamic social context involving the perceiver and target reacting to each other. It is a two-way street, involving feedback from the target that often confirms the expectations of the perceiver, and the perceiver’s behavior then often confirms the expectations of the target. This is discussed in detail below, but suffice it to say that it is important that if we want to more thoroughly understand stereotyping and prejudice, that we consider the perspective of the target in this social interaction. In this chapter, we explore what it means to be the target of prejudice and stereotyping. What effect does it have on one’s motivations, expectancies, self-­esteem, and on one’s approach to interactions with members of the stereotyping majority? We also explore how the target’s expectations influence the perceiver in the social context, and how each individual’s expectations bias the way they view the social interaction, such that they emerge from the situation with their stereotypes of the other newly confirmed, and their prejudices strengthened. 201

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SOCIAL STIGMA Suppose I (T. D. N.) asked you, “Have you always been ‘normal’?” Your reply may likely be “What do you mean by ‘normal’?” By “normal” I mean “mainstream” in your attitudes, dress, appearance, and personality. Normal in that these aspects of yourself are not extreme in any respect, such that you “fit in” with the majority of society at any given point in your life. When I put it that way, it is likely that you might have a difficult time answering my initial question in the affirmative. At some point in our lives, it is likely that we have all been unusual in some respect. Perhaps you had a leg brace as a child, or wore glasses, or wore a funny-­looking hat during winter (because it was the only one you had), or you had a bad case of acne. Perhaps you were quite short, or your pituitary gland was active early, and you were significantly taller than your peers, or maybe you were brighter or less bright compared to your peers. The examples are endless. It is important to note that some people experience rather fleeting “stigmatizing conditions” (e.g., the kind we just discussed above), while for others, the experience of stigma is something they have their whole lives. While the basic experiences of stigma we examine here in this discussion apply to both types of stigmatized persons, the experience of transient stigma versus long-term stigma is different in many important ways (Miller & Kaiser, 2001). The point, for our purposes in this chapter, is to think back to those times, to remember as vividly as you can, how people regarded your “uniqueness.” How were you treated, and how did it make you feel? How did others’ treatment influence your self-­esteem, and your attitudes toward those others? It is likely that the treatment from others wasn’t especially positive, and this probably made you feel negatively toward those others, and negatively about yourself. No one likes to be the subject of such negative evaluations from others. That is precisely why so many people try to “fit in” with the majority, so they won’t be singled out for ridicule, or treated negatively by others. Such treatment is fairly overt among children, who—not learning socially sophisticated methods of expressing disapproval—­have no compunction about telling everyone and the individual in question about the target’s deficiencies (sometimes entailing laughter, cruel jokes, and/or physical hostility). Among adults, those negative evaluations may take the form of subtle negative comments, rude behavior, or other subtle expressions of prejudice. Noted sociologist Erving Goffman (1963) referred to the unusual characteristics that engender negative evaluations as being indicators of stigma. The stigmatized person is one who is “reduced in our minds from a whole and usual person to a tainted, discounted one” (p. 3). Stigmas are characteristics that “mark” the individual as “deviant, flawed, limited, spoiled or generally undesirable” (Jones et al., 1984, p. 8). The reader will note that stigma encompasses all the more familiar situations where prejudice is shown (i.e., racial, religious, gender, age, sexual orientation), but it also covers any physical, behavioral, or psychological marker that elicits negative evaluation from society. Goffman denoted three types of stigmas: “abominations of the body” (e.g., physical deformities, being overweight; Crandall, 1994); “blemishes of individual character” (e.g., drunkenness); and “tribal stigmas of race, nation, and religion” (e.g., prejudice against another race; p. 4). While researchers know much about how nonstigmatized persons view stigmatized individuals (e.g., Heatherton, Kleck, Hebl, & Hull, 2000; Jones, 1996), comparatively

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little research has been conducted on the experiences of the stigmatized person, and how stigmatized and nonstigmatized individuals regard each other in social interactions. In this chapter, we explore in some detail the extant research that has addressed the problem of understanding how the stigmatized are influenced by prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination. We also address ways to understand how prejudice is maintained and, indeed, reinforced as a result of intergroup interactions. Finally, the chapter concludes with a look at unanswered questions and empirical challenges prejudice researchers should address in the future.

GROUP IDENTIFICATION Previous research indicates that individuals faced with external threats (such as prejudice) show stronger ingroup identification (Janis, 1968). Research has confirmed this general effect with Jewish persons (Dion & Earn, 1975; Radke, Trager, & Davis, 1949; Rollins, 1973), African Americans (Cross & Strauss, 1998), and women (Swim & Hyers, 1997, as cited in LaFrance & Woodzicka, 1998). However, subsequent research has indicated that whether or not the individual has already strongly personally identified with their stigmatized group will have a major impact on the degree to which that individual disassociates from the group. Doosje and Ellemers (1997) found that people differ in the degree to which they identify with their stigmatized group. “High identifiers” are much more likely to associate themselves with their group, even when (and especially when) it has a negative image. High identifiers derive much of their self-­esteem from their identification as a group member. They are much more likely to seek collective strategies to group threat. They tend to make it clear that they are fully committed, loyal group members, who are (to coin a phrase) in it for the long run. “Low identifiers,” on the other hand, are much more likely to disassociate themselves from the group, especially when the group has a negative image. They feel no special affinity toward, or self-­esteem from, their group. Doosje and Ellemers conclude that low identifiers “seem quite prepared to let the group fall apart” when the group is threatened or has a negative image (p. 271). Low identifiers are thus much more individualistic and opportunistic in that they will identify themselves with the group only when it would positively affect their social identity. How minority groups are perceived by the majority has implications for the wellbeing of the minority members. One study examined how ethnic minority-­ g roup members would respond to being treated with outright discrimination, tolerance, or acceptance (Cvetkovska, Verkuyten, & Adelman, 2020). Results showed that when minority-­g roup members were accepted, they showed the best outcomes in terms of overall well-being. Interestingly, being “tolerated” does not yield as strong of a national identification, or feelings of well-being. Worst of the three, as you might guess, is the experience of discrimination, which results in the poorest national identification and overall well-being. These results highlight the experience of minority groups that “being tolerated” by the majority group is better than being discriminated against by them, but it still has some inherent negative implications (i.e., that the minority group doesn’t “fit in” with the majority, and has negative qualities that must be “tolerated” by the majority).

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STEREOTYPE THREAT For most groups, there exists a few (perhaps more) widely known stereotypes. From early on, children learn these stereotypes (Jones, 1996; Ollis et al., 2022) and are aware of how their own group and other groups are sometimes negatively viewed by others (Rosenberg, 1979). In addition to the negative implications that stereotypes of one’s group have for one’s self-­concept and self-image, such stereotypes represent another problem with which one must contend. Specifically, individuals in stereotyped groups often find themselves ever vigilant to not behave in ways that confirm stereotypes about one’s group. Doing so would appear to lend evidence to support the legitimacy of the stereotype in the eyes of others, and even in the individual’s view of themselves. Occasionally, individuals in stereotyped groups engage in performance-­limiting behavior (e.g., practicing less before an athletic event, or not studying prior to an exam), in order to provide them with a ready excuse for their expected poor performance on the stereotype-­ relevant dimension (Stone, 2002). Steele and Aronson (1995; Shapiro, Aronson, & McGlone, 2016; Steele, Spencer, & Aronson, 2002) refer to this situation as stereotype threat. On the face of it, it would seem that if you were aware of the stereotype, and you decided to behave in ways that disconfirm the stereotype, you would behave in that counterstereotypical fashion, and that would be it. No problem, and no hassle. However, research indicates that for many stereotypes, the negative implications of confirming the stereotype are important enough that they can impair one’s ability to behave in a counterstereotypical way (Aronson, Quinn, & Spencer, 1998; Baumeister, 1984; Brown, 2018; Steele, 1997; Steele & Aronson, 1995). In other words, the anxiety that one feels in thinking about possibly confirming the stereotype can be so debilitating that it actually impairs one’s performance on the stereotype-­ relevant dimension, thereby having the paradoxical effect of confirming the stereotype. Some research suggests that stereotype threat has its effect through the mediating influence of a drop in working memory capacity (Schmader & Johns, 2003). Stereotype threat has also been shown to impair declarative knowledge acquisition and results in less efficiently organized knowledge structures (Grand, 2017). Stereotype-­t hreat effects can also be activated in perceivers who watch a member of their stereotyped group engage in stereotype-­confirming behavior. Taylor, Garcia, S­ helton, and Yantis (2018) found that when African American perceivers saw another African American person confirm stereotypes about African Americans, the perceivers felt greater anxiety, a motivation to disprove the stereotype, and less interest in interracial contact. Stereotype-­t hreat effects are especially likely to occur in people who strongly identify with the group about which the stereotype exists (Craemer & Orey, 2017; Nosek, Banaji, & Greenwald, 2002; Pronin, Steele, & Ross, 2004; Schmader, 2001), and for individuals who are self-­conscious of their stigmatized status (Brown & Pinel, 2003; Pinel, 2002). Research shows that people under stereotype threat actually fare worse physiologically than their nonthreatened counterparts (Blascovich, Spencer, Quinn, & Steele, 2001). Specifically, Black participants in a threatened condition showed significantly higher blood pressure than their nonthreatened counterparts. The researchers suggest that this may help explain the higher incidence of coronary heart disease and high blood pressure among Black persons. In the research on this area of inquiry, most of the attention has focused on stereotypes that revolve around intellectual ability and performance. For African Americans, a

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common stereotype suggests that African Americans perform poorly compared to others on measures of intellectual ability (Steele, 1992). As Cose (1993) describes, In some places, things are much as they were when I was a schoolboy and heard one teacher say that Blacks had “lazy tongues,” and another announce that he didn’t care whether anyone learned anything since he was getting paid anyway, and yet another explain, when challenged over handing out brain-­deadening assignments, that kids like us were incapable of handling difficult material. Scholastic attainment may not generally be discouraged in so brutal a manner, but legions of Black kids still have it instilled in them that they are not particularly intelligent; and at least partly as a result of such indoctrination, many give up on academic achievement at a very young age. (p. 162)

In fact, statistics on the results of standardized aptitude and intelligence tests over the decades suggest that African Americans consistently average about 15 points less on such measures compared to Whites (Loehlin, Lindzeg, & Spuhler, 1975). Most researchers agree that some of the reasons for this gap are the socioeconomic disadvantages that African Americans experience that affect their academic environment, cultural biases embedded into standardized intelligence tests, and discrimination and prejudice that they face from others (Schiele, 1991). However, this does not explain the finding that even when African Americans and Whites have the same preparation, African Americans still achieve less (i.e., poorer subsequent grade point average [GPA], time to graduation, etc.; Brown, 2018; Steele & Aronson, 1995). Steele and Aronson (see Figure 7.1) suggest that the debilitating effects of stereotype threat may account for the gap in subsequent achievement between similar-­scoring African Americans and Whites. They found that when African American participants believed that a difficult verbal test was a measure of their intellectual ability (compared to those who were not told this), they underperformed compared to Whites in the ability–­diagnostic condition (intellectual ability) but performed as well as Whites in the nondiagnostic condition. They also found that just making the stereotype salient impaired the performance of African Americans on the task, even in nondiagnostic conditions (see Figure 7.2). An intriguing meta-­analysis of the literature by Walton and Cohen (2003) suggests that this disparity may also be due to what they term “stereotype lift”—that is, nonstigmatized persons seem to experience a performance enhancement when they engage in a downward comparison between themselves and a member of a stereotyped outgroup. So, even with a Black person and a White person who are similarly prepared educationally, both having the same abilities, the influence of stereotype lift may be a contributing factor that might explain continued performance discrepancies between the Black individual and the White individual. Being a member of a stereotyped group can also impact the degree of one’s self-­ confidence about performance on the stereotype-­ relevant dimension. Research by ­A ronson and Inzlicht (2004) found that among those who were higher in “stereotype vulnerability” (the tendency to expect, perceive, and be influenced by stereotypes about one’s social category) tended to be the least in touch with the quality of their performances on a stereotype-­relevant task. They were not able to accurately predict what they knew relative to the demands of the test. As a result of this inaccuracy, their academic (stereotype domain-­related) self-­confidence was subject to a stronger fluctuation (see also Mendoza-­Denton, Downey, Purdie, Davis, & Pietrzak, 2002).

The Psychology of Pre judice Mean Items Solved (Adjusted by SAT Score)

206 20

Black participants

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Diagnostic

Nondiagnostic

FIGURE 7.1. Stereotype threat and performance on a difficult verbal test. When Steele and ­ ronson (1995) presented Black and White students with a test of verbal ability, the way the test A was introduced had an impact on the Black students’ performance. Steele and Aronson told half of the participants that the test was diagnostic of intellectual ability (stereotype-­t hreat condition) and the other half were told that it was a problem-­solving task unrelated to intellectual ability. This graph shows that after statistically controlling for participants’ SAT verbal scores, Blacks and Whites performed equally in the nondiagnostic condition. However, when Blacks believed there was a danger that their performance on the test potentially could confirm a stereotype about Blacks (the diagnostic condition), the anxiety associated with that belief impaired their performance relative to Whites in the same condition. From Steele, C. M., & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of African Americans. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69(5), 797–811. Copyright © 1995 American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.

Research with women reveals similar results, implicating the stereotype-­threat effects. For women, a commonly held stereotype has been that they are less capable in science and mathematics (Aronson et al., 1998; Casad, Hale, & Wachs, 2017; Kapitanoff & Pandey, 2017; Smith & White, 2002; Thorson, Forbes, Magerman, & West, 2019). Quinn and Spencer (1996, as cited in Aronson et al., 1998) manipulated the diagnosticity of a math exam (i.e., by telling participants that the math exam was either diagnostic or not diagnostic of their math ability) for male and female participants with matched math backgrounds and skills (as measured by their Scholastic Aptitude Test [SAT] scores and calculus grades). Results indicated that when women believed that the exam was diagnostic, they performed poorly compared to their male counterparts. When women believed it was not diagnostic, they performed as well as the other male participants. Simply completing a math test in a group in which she is the sole woman (with two other men) seems to make salient the stereotype of women’s poor math performance, and women in these situations do indeed perform poorly compared to women doing a math test in a group of two other women (Inzlicht & Ben-Zeev, 2000; Sekaquaptewa & Thompson, 2003). The awareness of this prevalent stereotype about women may be a major reason why women feel less confident about

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Mean Items Solved (Adjusted by SAT Score)

pursuing careers in the science, technology, and engineering fields (Cadaret, Hartung, Subich, & Weigold, 2017). In addition to race and gender, researchers have also examined the stereotype threat that is attached to being older (Hess, Auman, Colcombe, & Rahhal, 2003). One of the most common stereotypes about older people is that their cognitive abilities get worse with age. The worry about confirming this stereotype can easily provoke stereotype-­ threat effects in older adults (Jordano & Touron, 2017). In one such study, Fresson, Dardenne, Geurten, and Meulemans (2017) exposed older adult participants (ages 59–70) to a stereotype-­t hreat condition and half of the participants were exposed to a positive condition (where negative stereotypes were presented to be invalidated). The results indicated that only those who expressed high “dementia worry” tended to underperform on executive cognitive tasks (relative to those in the positive condition). Interestingly, stereotype threat had no influence on memory or attention. This last result may be an anomaly, in light of the meta-­analysis of 23 studies by Armstrong, Gallant, Patel, and Wong (2017). The researchers found that the data from these studies all indicate a strong stereotype-­t hreat effect in older adults on both executive and working memory. A study by Brubaker and Naveh-­Benjamin (2018) adds to these findings by showing a strong stereotype-­t hreat effect on associative memory in older adults.

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Race Prime

No Race Prime

FIGURE 7.2.  The slightest prime unleashes stereotype threat. Steele and Aronson (1995) found that it does not take much priming at all to activate feelings of stereotype threat. In one variation of the study described in Figure 7.1, Steele and Aronson did not tell participants anything about the diagnostic nature of the verbal test. However, they primed half of the participants to think about their race merely by having the participants indicate their race in a demographic questionnaire. That simple difference was enough to cause Black participants to feel stereotype threat when doing the verbal test, and, as can be seen in this graph, their performance suffered compared to that of Whites who also had their race primed. From Steele, C. M., & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of African Americans. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69(5), 797–811. Copyright © 1995 American Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.

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Very young children can identify stereotype threats, and experience the limitations it imposes on their beliefs about performance and their future. In one study (Wegmann, 2017), children in stereotyped groups respond like adults do. When one 8-year-old Latina girl was exposed to a negative stereotype about African Americans (that African American children cannot write as well as other children), and was asked how a little African American boy would feel about his ability to write, she replied that he was probably sad because “his skin doesn’t match what he wants to do” (p. 619). The stereotype threat is subject to change, however. Aronson, Fried, and Good (2002) told African American participants that the characteristic under study, and about which there was a stereotype about their group’s performance—­in this case, intelligence—­was a malleable, and not a fixed, characteristic. This led participants to be more resistant to the influence of stereotype threat, and they showed better performance on the intelligence tests and their GPAs were higher. However, the ability to be unaffected by a stereotype against one’s group becomes much more difficult to the degree that one’s identity is closely tied to one’s membership in that group (Schmader, 2002). Other research has shown that stereotype-­t hreat effects can be significantly reduced when people from the stereotyped group are individuated (i.e., making one’s own abilities salient, and distancing oneself from the group)—they outperform their nonindividuated counterparts (Ambady, Paik, Steele, Owen-Smith, & Mitchell, 2004). One study found that simply reminding women about great achievements that other women had made tended to significantly reduce the stereotype threat on their mathematics test scores (McIntyre, Paulson, & Lord, 2003). In an interesting twist on the stereotype-­t hreat research, Cheryan and Bodenhausen (2000) examined the influence of salient positive stereotypes on one’s task performance—­ that is, if the stereotype about your group is that you do especially well on a task, could that stereotype potentially enhance or impair one’s performance? Cheryan and ­Bodenhausen focused on the stereotype that Asians have a special aptitude for mathematical problems. Asian American women were exposed to an “identity salience” manipulation, in which they were to complete a survey about either their ethnic group (e.g., “Overall, my race is considered good by others”), their gender, or their individual identity. They then completed a test of math skills. The results revealed that when participants’ ethnic identity was made salient, their math performance was significantly worse compared to when their personal identity or gender identity was made salient. However, research by Ambady and her colleagues (Ambady, Shih, Kim, & Pittinsky, 2001; Shih, Pittinsky, & Ambady, 1999) found just the opposite: When Asian American women had their ethnic identity made salient, they performed better on a math test than when no identity or their gender was made salient. Thus, more research is needed to identify the specific additive and individual effects that stereotypes about one’s various ingroups can have on one’s cognitions and behaviors. The evidence accumulated to date indicates support for the notion that stereotypes about one’s group can impair one’s performance on salient-, ego-, and identity-­relevant tasks (Stone, Lynch, Sjomeling, & Darley, 1999). Paradoxically, while stereotype-­ threatened individuals are motivated to do well on the tasks, they tend to be inefficient in their work, due in large part to the fact that their attention is split between their alternating assessment of the correct answers to the task, and their worry that their performance may confirm a stereotype for their group (Steele & Aronson, 1995). It is important to remember that the results from experiments by Steele and ­A ronson (1995) and others, demonstrating stereotype-­threat effects, do not show that

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reducing stereotype threat eliminates differences in performance between stereotyped groups and nonstereotyped groups. In these studies, recall that the groups were matched for equivalent stereotype-­task (e.g., a math test) ability prior to the experiment. Introducing the stereotype threat impaired the performance of members of the stigmatized group. When the threat was not present, their performance matched that of their nonstigmatized counterparts. However, this shows only the debilitating effects of stereotype threat, and in no way should be misinterpreted as suggesting that eliminating stereotype threat therefore eliminates group differences on stereotype-­relevant task performance (Sackett, Hardison, & Cullen, 2004). So, why do stereotype-­t hreatened individuals who score similarly to non-­stereotype-­ threatened persons (e.g., European Americans) on intelligence and aptitude tests achieve less than their European American counterparts? Steele (1992, 1997) suggests that the answer may lie in a process called disidentification. In disidentification, individuals disengage their identity from the achievement domain in question, such that their self-­ esteem and sense of self-­competence is preserved and shielded from the negative effects of associating identity with performance on a stereotype-­relevant dimension (Aronson et al., 1998). In practical terms, then, a woman may disidentify with achievement in science and mathematics (Deemer, Lin, & Soto, 2016; Peters, Ryan, Haslam, & Fernandes, 2012), and African Americans, Latino(a)s, and other minorities may disidentify from academics (Cokley, McClain, Jones, & Johnson, 2011; Major, Spencer, Schmader, Wolfe, & Crocker, 1998; McClain & Cokley, 2017; Osborne, 1995; Woodcock, Hernandez, Estrada, & Schultz, 2012; Yip, 2016). Again, the disidentification process allows the stigmatized to retain their self-­esteem. This is an interesting point that bears some elaboration. Intuitively, it would seem clear that people who are stigmatized should have lower overall self-­esteem compared to nonstigmatized persons. Yet, much research suggests that this is not the case. In fact, research suggests that African Americans, for example, show self-­esteem that is as high or higher than European Americans (Crocker & Major, 1989; Porter & Washington, 1979). Interestingly, while the stigmatized are more likely than nonstigmatized to show disidentification, they are less likely to see the stereotype-­t hreat dimension (e.g., academics) as unimportant (Crocker & Major, 1989; Major & Schmader, 1998). Thus, while disidentified stigmatized individuals agree that the stereotype-­threat dimension is important, it is not important for them and for their self-­identity. What might trigger disidentification? Major and Schmader (1998) suggest that, by either devaluing the importance of the stereotype-­t hreat domain or discounting the validity and self-­diagnosticity of outcomes on the stereotype-­t hreat dimension, the stigmatized can psychologically disengage from the stereotype-­threat dimension and protect their self-­esteem. Indeed, some disenchanted African Americans may devalue academic achievement by derogating other African Americans who pursue achievement in academics by saying they are “acting White” (Fordham, 1988; Fordham & Ogbu, 1986). In other words, the belief is that achievement in academics is something that Whites can accomplish, and African Americans who aspire to academic achievement are “selling out” and disidentifying themselves from their African American identity. Indeed, some academics have suggested that African Americans who achieved academic success did so by adopting behaviors and attitudes that distanced themselves from their culture of origin, and that this results in increased depression, anxiety, and identity confusion (Fordham, 1988; Fordham & Obgu, 1986). In a careful examination

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of these predictions, Arroyo and Zigler (1995) found that academically achieving African Americans were indeed more likely to experience feelings of depression and anxiety compared to their peers who were not academically successful. However, it appears that achievement in academics does not necessarily lead to racial identity confusion. Arroyo and Zigler found that both high- and low-­achieving African Americans were more likely to negatively evaluate and psychologically distance themselves from their racial group when they believed that their group was negatively evaluated by others. Thus, paradoxically, achieving academic success can have important psychological consequences for African Americans. There is some evidence to suggest that these processes may arise in the individual’s early teen years. Osborne (1995) found that the correlation between African Americans’ self-­esteem and academic outcomes remained strong until about eighth grade. Then, Osborne writes, “something happened to weaken their identification. . . . It is probable that the African American students . . . may begin to see the academic environment as discriminatory and lacking in rewards, and begin disidentifying” (p. 453). Steele (1997) suggests that the “something” that happened is stereotype threat. In one experiment (cited in Steele, 1997), he varied the strength of the threat that female subjects were under by telling some subjects that the differences between men and women in mathematics ability was due either to genetic differences (in other words, an innate limitation of being female) or to social/learned causes (i.e., discrimination, social roles). Participants’ identification with mathematics and math-­related careers was measured either before or after taking a difficult math test. Results indicated that women under stronger stereotype threat (i.e., the genetic limitation females have in mathematics) tended to disidentify more with math careers than women under weak stereotype threat (see Figure 7.3). Stereotype threat has implications for how one perceives one’s ingroup, and, importantly, one’s relation to the ingroup. Lee and Ottati (1995) investigated how one’s social identity may be affected by stereotype threats that are either consistent or inconsistent with self-­perceived stereotypes about one’s ingroup. According to Tajfel and Turner’s (1986) social identity theory (SIT), we derive our identity and self-­esteem through two avenues. One is through our own accomplishments, and the other is through our group membership. SIT suggests that when one belongs to a devalued or threatened group, continued identification with the group threatens one’s self-­esteem. Threatened individuals may therefore disidentify with their ingroup in order to protect their self-­esteem. Lee and Ottati (1995) examined how Chinese participants would respond to negative stereotypical threats that are inconsistent or consistent with one’s ingroup perceptions. They found that negative stereotypes that are inconsistent with the ingroup stereotype lead ingroup members to increase their perceptions of ingroup homogeneity, or solidarity/unity—that is, participants’ identification with their ingroup increased. However, when participants were exposed to a negative stereotype-­consistent threat (i.e., partially consistent with stereotypes about Chinese), the participant had a more difficult time denying the validity of the stereotype expression. Participants protected their social identity by emphasizing that not all members of their group are characterized by the negative stereotype. In doing so, participants were emphasizing more ingroup heterogeneity, which may reflect a weakening identification with their ingroup as a whole (Arndt, Greenberg, Schimel, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 2002; Spears, Doosje, & Ellemers, 1997).

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Score Corrected for Guessing

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FIGURE 7.3.  The experience of stereotype threat for women. Steele (1997) examined stereotype threat among women. As with the experiment procedure for Figure 7.1, Steele invited males and females who were good at math, and who considered math ability to be an important part of their identity, to take a difficult math test. For half of the participants, the test was described as generally showing gender differences in performance on the test. As can be seen in this graph, when women believed the test did not show gender differences in performance, they performed just as well as men. However, when women were led to believe that males and females perform differently (activating the stereotype about women not being as adept as men at math), their performance on the test was much worse than men in the same condition. From Steele, C. M. (1997). A threat in the air: How stereotypes shape intellectual identity and performance. American Psychologist, 52(6), 613–629. Copyright © 1997 American Psychological Association. Reproduced with permission.

While this psychological disidentification may be a temporary response to a particular situation (Markus & Kunda, 1986), continued exposure to stereotype threat may lead stigmatized individuals to chronically disengage psychologically from the stereotype-­t hreat dimension (Major & Schmader, 1998). What are the consequences for the stigmatized individual who has disidentified from the stereotype-­threat domain? Disidentification can be both adaptive and maladaptive. On the one hand, due to the prejudice, discrimination, and disadvantage the stigmatized person may encounter in the stereotype-­t hreat domain, disidentification can be viewed as a healthy, effective coping response that allows the individual to protect their self-­concept and self-­identity (Crocker, Major, & Steele, 1998; Major & Schmader, 1998). However, Steele (1997) and Major and Schmader note that the paradox of disidentification is that while it saves the self-­esteem, it imperils the individual’s chances for success and achievement in domains that society may regard as important. There are ways to reduce stereotype threat. Steele (1997) suggests that it is not enough to merely prevent disidentification of stigmatized students. It is important to simultaneously enhance the individual’s identification with the stereotype-­threatened domain. Techniques such as Aronson and Bridgeman’s (1979) “jigsaw classroom” can

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be an effective way to help students enjoy school and can lead to higher self-­esteem and higher exam scores (Wolfe & Spencer, 1996). Steele suggested some additional useful strategies: optimistic student–­teacher relationships, challenge instead of remediation, stress that intelligence is expandable, affirm domain belongingness, value multiple perspectives, have visible successful role models, and build self-­efficacy. Some evidence suggests that such an approach may work (Steele et al., 1998, as cited in Aronson et al., 1998). Steele et al. implemented a program for the reduction of stereotype threat and enhanced domain identification for African American college freshmen at the University of Michigan. The researchers used three ways to reduce stereotype threat: (1) students were “honorifically recruited” for the program by emphasizing that they were bright enough to be admitted to the University of Michigan (this taps into domain belongingness), (2) students participated in weekly seminars to get to know one another and share common problems, and (3) participants attended subject-­matter workshops that exposed them to advanced material outside the material discussed in class. Results after 4 years of the program indicated that participants had GPAs about 4/10 higher than nonprogram peers, and they were more likely to finish college. Interviews with participants indicated that the program did in fact reduce stereotype threat and increased domain identification, and that led to better grades (Aronson et al., 1998). Another study showed promising results in reducing the impact of stereotype threat on athletic performance (Rees & Salvatore, 2021). In several samples of athletes, the researchers compared the performance of participants who were reminded of the stereotype about their group’s performance levels in their sport to those of the participants who were encouraged to question such stereotypes. The data showed that the performance of those athletes encouraged to question their group stereotypes actually performed much better than the group that were reminded about their group stereotypes (stereotype-­t hreat group). The researchers found this effect regardless of the type of athlete measured. They suggest that the encouragement to question the stereotype stops them from worrying about confirming the stereotype, and thereby it short-­c ircuits the whole stereotype-­t hreat effect. Finally, a meta-­analysis (Liu, Liu, Wang, & Zhang, 2021) of stereotype-­t hreat intervention research indicates that the best way to design interventions against stereotype threat is to focus on changing the typical stereotypes about the group, and also to focus on multiple identities, not just—for example—­race, gender, or age. Another interesting finding is that such interventions did not weaken over time. Finally, it should be noted that the analysis by Liu and colleagues showed that some stereotype-­t hreat interventions may work well for one group, but not other groups (and may even increase the threat for other groups), so it is important to be aware of the specific nature of the intervention, and who is receiving that intervention, for it to be most effective.

SELF‑ESTEEM It seems intuitive that those who are stigmatized quickly become aware of the negative way that many in society view them. This should have a negative effect on the self-­esteem of the stigmatized. However, the data are mixed on this issue. Some research concludes that stigmatized persons suffer no damage to their self-­esteem, and in some cases, their

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self-­esteem is higher than that of nonstigmatized counterparts (Porter & Washington, 1979; Rosenberg, 1979; Simmons, Brown, Bush, & Blyth, 1978). In fact, studies have failed to show a decreased self-­esteem for such stigmatized groups as African Americans, the physically challenged, developmentally disabled, or mentally disabled (see Crocker & Major, 1989, for a review). On the other hand, other studies have indicated that some stigmatized individuals (e.g., overweight persons; Crocker, Cornwell, & Major, 1993) do suffer lower self-­esteem. What seems to account for why some stigmatized individuals are able to protect their self-­esteem and others seem to feel miserable about themselves has much to do with the perceived controllability (and hence, the justifiability) of the stigma (Crocker et al., 1998). One factor may be the degree to which the individual has been both prepared for prejudice against themselves, and whether they have been socialized with pride for their race from their parents. One study found that the greater such socialization, the less likely that discrimination will have an effect on the self-­ esteem of African American youth (Harris-­Britt, Valrie, Kurtz-­Costes, & Rowley, 2007). Those individuals who believe that their stigmatizing condition is controllable (and thus indicates some personal flaw on their part) may be more likely to feel that negative evaluations of themselves are justified, and will be more likely to feel lower self-­esteem. However, believing that one’s stigma is uncontrollable leads the stigmatized individual to resist the “blame” for the stigma, to attribute negative evaluations to prejudice, and to maintain self-­esteem (Crocker & Major, 1994). A comprehensive meta-­ analysis of 261 comparisons of self-­ esteem differences between Whites and African Americans revealed that, in general, African Americans tend to have higher self-­esteem than Whites (Gray-­L ittle & Hafdahl, 2000). A separate meta-­ analysis by Twenge and Crocker (2002) came to the same conclusion. While this finding has been reached in earlier studies, Gray-­L ittle and Hafdahl note that past researchers would disregard the findings as flawed, because of the assumption that members of a stereotyped group had to have lower self-­esteem as a result of how the larger society held negative views of African Americans, but not of Whites. Gray-­L ittle and Hafdahl further suggest that the reason for the higher self-­esteem of African Americans lies in the fact that they do not (as was assumed) base their self-worth on the way others view them. If they did, it might be the case that they would feel more negatively about themselves. However, Gray-­L ittle and Hafdahl found that the reference groups for African Americans are other African Americans, and not society. They are a distinctive minority group, and by embracing that distinctiveness and their positive ethnic/racial identity, they maintain as high, and often higher, self-­esteem relative to their White counterparts. Another explanation for the inconsistent findings concerning the influence of prejudice on the self-­esteem of the target of prejudice centers on a problem with the way researchers have conceptualized and measured self-­esteem. For example, some argue that, due to the unique nature of the self-­esteem of African American women (as targets of both racism and sexism), common measures of self-­esteem (e.g., the Rosenberg Self-­ Esteem Scale [Rosenberg, 1979]) may not be valid for this specific population (Hatcher, 2007). In another analysis, Crocker and Quinn (2000) argued that researchers assumed that self-­esteem was a stable aspect of personality, and that when the target of prejudice would experience prejudice, stereotypes, or discrimination, they would internalize the shame or psychological pain, and this then would damage the individual’s self-­esteem. However, the literature on self-­esteem does not support these assumptions. Crocker and

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Quinn make the compelling case that it is more accurate to conceptualize self-­esteem as a kind of “working self-­esteem,” which is multiply determined and constructed by the situational, motivational, and interpersonal factors in a given situation, and by one’s salient beliefs and values at that time. Such a conceptualization would account well for the inconsistency in the self-­esteem studies, and it is important to continue research on this intriguing perspective to examine whether it holds up to empirical and theoretical scrutiny, and to ascertain its parameters with regard to the data.

Denial of Discrimination Other research has revealed another way by which stigmatized individuals maintain their self-­esteem. Researchers have found that, often, stigmatized persons are able to deny that they have been personally discriminated against, or that (because of their stigma) they have suffered prejudice, discrimination, or other mistreatment (Crosby, 1984). This denial of personal discrimination has been found in African Americans (Abeles, 1976) and women (Crosby, 1984; Hodson & Esses, 2002), in addition to other minority groups. What is especially interesting about these data is that the stigmatized person acknowledges that their group suffers discrimination and prejudice in society, but they have not personally had such negative experiences. Such a disconnect (or cognitive distortion) allows the stigmatized person to avoid the uncomfortable reality that the world may not be a just, or fair world (Lerner, 1980), and that their life may be negatively (and seemingly unavoidably) affected by their stigma (Crosby, 1984). Some research suggests that making an attribution to discrimination also helps protect one’s self-­esteem (Major, Kaiser, & McCoy, 2003). However, other studies on the effects of such attributions show greater stress responses and decreased self-­esteem (e.g., King, 2003). Thus, the data on this issue are mixed, and more research is needed (Major, Quinton, & McCoy, 2002). Given the negative implications of believing the latter two statements about the world, it is easy to understand why stigmatized persons would deny personal discrimination. Such a perspective appears to hold no negative psychological, emotional, or adjustment consequences, and it may indeed be an adaptive way to deal with the unfair treatment one often receives as a result of being a member of a stigmatized group. What determines whether a member of a stigmatized group perceives the behavior of a nonstigmatized person as discrimination or prejudice? Research by Major and her colleagues 2002) makes a compelling case that the degree to which the stigmatized individual believes in an ideology that legitimizes existing status differences between groups affects whether the individual attributes the behavior of others toward themselves as due to prejudice or discrimination. The more an individual does not endorse such an ideology, and instead believes in individual mobility of group members, then negative behavior/evaluations from the nonstigmatized individual are much less likely to be interpreted as instances of discrimination or prejudice. Another factor that can influence whether a stigmatized group member attributes the behavior of a nonstigmatized individual to prejudice and/or discrimination is the social cost involved with doing so. Miller and Kaiser (2001; Kaiser & Miller, 2003) found that stigmatized individuals who make such attributions to discrimination are perceived as complainers, and were generally less favorably evaluated by others.

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Self‑Fulfilling Prophecy Attributing negative feedback from a nonstigmatized individual to prejudice often, but not always, works as a technique for the stigmatized to protect their self-­esteem. Sometimes, the ubiquity of the stereotype about one’s stigmatized group can indeed influence one’s self-­concept. For example, Stephan and Rosenfield (1982) analyzed several studies and literature reviews of the attitudes of Blacks and Whites toward their own groups and toward the other group, and found that Whites’ views of their own group was largely positive (with the exception of the characteristic “materialistic”), and their view of Blacks was very negative (with the exception of “musical,” “peace loving,” and “proud”). Blacks tended to view Whites in very negative terms as well (with the exception of attributing the positive characteristics “intelligent” and “industrious” to Whites). Finally, while Blacks viewed their own group in positive terms, they also believed some negative stereotypes about their group (they attributed the characteristics “lazy” and “superstitious” to Blacks). What might explain the process whereby a stigmatized group comes to accept and believe some negative stereotypes about itself? One possible mechanism whereby this may occur is through a self-­f ulfilling prophecy. The self-­fulfilling prophecy refers to the phenomenon whereby a perceiver’s expectations about a target eventually lead that target to behave in ways that confirm those expectations (Rosenthal & Jacobson, 1968). Thus, some researchers have hypothesized that one reason for the finding that some stigmatized groups view themselves as having a small number of stereotypical, negative characteristics is that the group members have internalized the negative views of the group that the majority members (and, to a large extent, society) directly and indirectly communicate to them (Word, Zanna, & Cooper, 1974). Allport (1954) believed that this may occur in minority groups because if the minority group acknowledged that one’s group had as much worth as other groups in society, it would bring about tremendous psychological discomfort in that it causes the stigmatized individual to question the structure of social reality (Crosby, 1984). The process works as follows. The majority member’s stereotype influences how they interact with the member of the minority group. These behaviors elicit behaviors that fit the majority member’s initial expectancies (Hamilton & Trolier, 1986). This may be difficult to ignore, if you are a member of the stigmatized group. If you find that your fellow stigmatized colleagues are demonstrating the stereotyped characteristics (in response to the expectancies of the nonstigmatized group; see Snyder & Swann, 1978), and you recall yourself acting the same way, it is not surprising then that you accept as valid that your group (including you) tends to demonstrate that characteristic. In other words, faced with the evidence from within and outside the stigmatized group that points to that conclusion, the stigmatized individual may be likely to internalize that stereotype for their group. However, it is important to note that self-­f ulfilling prophecies do not occur when the target is aware of the perceiver’s expectations (Hilton & Darley, 1985). While the self-­ fulfilling prophecy is a robust phenomenon (Rosenthal & Rubin, 1978), some research indicates that its effect in maintaining stereotypes and eliciting stereotypical behavior in stigmatized individuals is limited. Jussim and Fleming (1996) reviewed the literature on self-­f ulfilling prophecy effects in intergroup interactions, and found that most

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of the naturalistic studies show that the effect of the stereotyped expectations on the stigmatized tends to be quite small (correlation of .2, and a .2 regression coefficient). Thus, while the idea that self-­f ulfilling prophecies may elicit more stereotype-­consistent behaviors in the stigmatized (and may even lead the individual to believe their group possesses some negative stereotyped characteristics), and while it is an interesting explanation for the data reported by Stephan and Rosenfield (1982), there are little data supporting it as a factor in the stereotype-­relevant behavior of the stigmatized. In sum, Major and her colleagues (Crocker & Major, 1989; Major & Schmader, 1998) suggest four ways the stigmatized can maintain their self-­esteem: (1) they may attribute the negative evaluations and reactions of others to prejudice; (2) they may devalue outcomes on which their group compares poorly with other groups (recall the discussion on stereotype threat, above); (3) comparing one’s stigmatized ingroup with other stigmatized groups, rather than to nonstigmatized groups; and (4) they may psychologically disengage their self-­esteem from feedback in domains in which their group is at a disadvantage. Self-­esteem in stigmatized individuals seems to be fairly resilient against the negative influence of prejudice and stereotyping from others.

INTERGROUP INTERACTIONS Research has yielded little information on how the expectations and affective states of majority and minority groups in actual intergroup interactions influence their perceptions of the behavior of their interaction partner. Past research has attempted to understand the perceptions of an imagined intergroup interaction partner (e.g., Bagci, Piyale, & Ebcim, 2018; Devine, Evett, & Vasquez-­Suson, 1996; Islam & Hewstone, 1993; Stephan & Stephan, 1985). In one such experiment, Langer, Fiske, Taylor, and Chanowitz (1976) found that people experience discomfort and a desire to avoid interactions with physically different (pregnant women and physically challenged) persons, due to their conflict over whether to stare at the individual. They found that the tendency to stare at an outgroup member is primarily due to curiosity about a group with whom the subjects infrequently come into contact. Interestingly, people did not derogate the physically different persons, so staring (and avoidance behavior) was not due to feelings of disgust or dislike. Staring and avoidance were reduced when people had more time to get accustomed to the physically different person (via simple habituation). However, prior research has tended to only address majority and minority groups separately. Research on the majority groups (e.g., Whites, the young, heterosexuals) has explored how stereotypes and prejudices arise in these individuals (in order to reduce or even eliminate such negative intergroup attitudes). Investigations with minority groups (e.g., African Americans, homosexuals, older adults) have examined how minority-­g roup members feel about their stigma, and how the stigma influences their self-­perceptions and behavior toward others (Devine et al., 1996). However, in order to assess how affect, perceptions, and expectations influence how one perceives the outgroup member in an intergroup context, it is important to understand the dynamics of the intergroup interaction. Some interesting research by Bergsieker, Shelton, and Richeson (2010) shows that Whites and Blacks have very different impression management goals going into an intergroup interaction. They found that Whites are much more concerned with being

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perceived as likable and moral, while Blacks are more concerned with being respected and being perceived as competent by others. Unfortunately, these divergent goals led to more negative other-­directed affect following the interaction, and increased the chances for misunderstanding the other person. Research by Bergsieker et al., and more recent data from LaCosse and Plant (2020), suggests that knowledge of these divergent goals can enable individuals and institutions to create contexts that are best suited to meet the different goals, and thus reduce any negative outcomes from intergroup interactions.

Dynamic Nature of Interactions Devine et al. (1996) make the compelling argument that researchers must turn their attention toward understanding the dynamic live interactions between majority- and minority-­g roup members, and how their thoughts, feelings, and behavior both change the interaction, and are changed by their perception of the interaction on a moment-­ by‑moment basis. As we have mentioned throughout this text, much research suggests that the typical intergroup interaction is characterized by some (or a significant degree of) anxiety (see Fiske, 1998; Stephan & Stephan, 1985). The potential causes for the anxiety are different for each member in the intergroup interaction. For high-­prejudiced majority members, their anxiety may be due to their discomfort (sometimes driven by strong negative feelings, such as disgust or anger) with the minority group, and their preference to avoid the minority group altogether (Devine, Monteith, Zuwerink, & Elliot, 1991; Monteith, 1993). The behaviors of the minority-­g roup individual in response to the high-­prejudice majority member are likely to be seen by the latter as supportive evidence for their stereotypes. For low-­prejudice individuals, however, it is important to distinguish between those who have had many intergroup experiences (“intergroup skilled”) from those who have had little intergroup interactions (“intergroup unskilled”). Both groups are highly motivated to indicate to the minority-­g roup individual that they are not prejudiced. For the intergroup-­skilled majority members, they have a good idea of how best to present their low-­prejudice self to the other individuals, and they feel little or no anxiety in the interaction. This is conveyed to the minority member through a relaxed behavior and demeanor. The model contends that in this situation, the minority member is thus less likely to misinterpret the behavior of the low-­prejudice majority member as an indication of underlying prejudice. Rather, the minority-­g roup member is likely to respond in similar fashion. In the case of the low-­prejudice, intergroup-­unskilled majority member, Devine and her colleagues (1996) suggest that the intergroup context holds the potential for much misunderstanding, due to the different motivations, expectations, and perceptions the majority and minority individuals bring to the interaction. The intergroup-­unskilled individual is in a very difficult spot. Because they have had little intergroup contact, they do not know what behaviors are appropriate, what might (unintentionally) communicate prejudice where it doesn’t exist, and what to expect from the minority member. This uncertainty leads to anxiety. This anxiety is evidenced in more avoidant nonverbal behaviors, such as decreased eye contact, nervous laughter, and increased interpersonal distance (Word et al., 1974). These behaviors often result in conveying precisely the opposite impression to the minority-­g roup member: that the majority member is nervous because they are uncomfortable around minorities (due to feelings of prejudice toward the minority). According to Devine and her colleagues, and depending on the minority

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individual’s own prejudice level toward the majority member (Ashburn-­Nardo, Knowles, & Monteith, 2003; Dasgupta, 2004; Rudman, Feinberg, & Fairchild, 2002), at this point in the interaction, the minority member may respond with withdrawal, dismissal (being indifferent to the majority-­g roup member), or hostility. Next, if the majority individual does not perceive that the minority member’s reaction is in response to perceived prejudice, they may perceive the minority’s behavior as an indicator of prejudice toward the majority. Thus, intergroup interactions can often be fraught with misunderstandings, misperceptions, and reaffirmed prejudices. As is the case in social interactions in general, the perceived motives and expectations can often affect one’s behavior toward the other person, and this often results in confirmed expectations, and behavior confirmation (Snyder & Swann, 1978). An experiment by Weitz (1972) shows that it is easy to see why minority-­g roup members might be suspicious about the true attitudes and motives of the majority-­g roup interaction partner. She asked 80 White males to participate in an interaction with another individual. Racial attitudes were measured earlier (all participants selected for the study were low in self-­reported prejudice toward African Americans) and then the experimenter asked the partner to read some information about the partner with whom the male would interact. Among this information, the participant read that the interaction partner was either African American or White. Measures of anxiety in the participant’s voice (participants recorded a brief taped message) and behavior (participants were asked to choose how long and how closely they would like to work on the task with the partner, whether they would like to wait with the partner, and how far apart they should sit during the task) were taken to assess whether there was any discrepancy between attitudes and behavior. Results indicated that very favorable racial attitudes were strongly correlated with avoidant, unfriendly behavior. Thus, while they claimed to be low in prejudice, their nonverbal behavior indicated otherwise. This certainly represents a confusing situation for the minority at the receiving end of this behavior. Weitz suggests that because vocal and behavioral cues are more illustrative (more trustworthy), the minority would more than likely pay attention to these cues and respond in like fashion (i.e., negatively toward the White individual). Unfortunately, this would likely contribute to the White person’s unease and confirm their negative feelings about the minority group, and prejudice and misunderstanding would thus be perpetuated by both interactants. What if one’s stigmatized status was not obvious (e.g., being on welfare), would that individual’s interaction with the nonstigmatized person differ in important ways from interactions between visibly stigmatized persons and nonstigmatized individuals? It is an interesting question. One might imagine that, due to the immediacy and obvious nature of some stigmas (e.g., race, gender, physical characteristics), stigmatized persons in these groups would tend to be more defensive, and more alert to signs that they are being treated unfairly by others. This could most assuredly influence how that person approaches interactions with a nonstigmatized person. In an experiment to examine this question, Frable, Blackstone, and Scherbaum (1990) found that, indeed, whether one’s stigma is visible or “invisible” makes a big difference in that person’s interaction with a nonstigmatized person. Forty-four pairs of women were unobtrusively videotaped while they waited for the experimenter to begin the study. Their interpersonal behavior, attitudes toward their interaction partner, and memory for the interaction and environment were measured. Some participants had invisible stigmas (they had been raped, they were bixesual, or they were victims of incest), and others’ stigmas were

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visible (being more than 60 pounds overweight, they were African American, or they had severe facial acne). Stigmatized persons were always paired with a nonstigmatized person. Results indicated that invisible and overtly stigmatized persons reacted differently to the interaction. Individuals with invisible stigmas were more likely to take their partner’s perspective, to remember what occurred in the interaction, and to remember details about what the partner said. Those with visible stigmas were much less likely to remember the interaction details, but remembered details about the partner’s appearance and the room. Frable et al. suggest that invisible deviants need to pay close attention to all information that might be relevant to exposing their condition. In that respect, paying attention to what was said is very important. Those with visible stigmas have a “spoiled identity” (Goffman, 1963), and are engaged in “damage control” in that they are more vigilant about nonverbal behavior in an effort to ascertain the true attitude of the nonstigmatized person toward their stigmatized group. Interestingly, an analysis of the participants’ perceptions of the interaction and their attitudes toward their partner indicated that nonstigmatized participants showed a lot of effort, encouraging their partners to participate and tended to talk, smile, and initiate conversation. While the stigmatized persons participated, nonstigmatized individuals didn’t remember their contributions, and in fact reported that they disliked their stigmatized partner. Because the nonstigmatized person tended to devalue the contribution (or distort the extent of their own contribution and effort in the interaction), their negative preconceptions and stereotypes of the stigmatized group were more likely to be confirmed. These findings again illustrate the difficulty of overcoming stereotypes and the potential for misunderstanding in intergroup interactions. To put it simply: If you enter a social interaction expecting it to go poorly, it is likely to turn out poorly. A study by Ickes (1984) supports this conclusion. Ickes examined the unstructured interactions of intergroup dyads composed of Blacks and Whites. Results revealed that while White dyad members displayed more smiling, gazing, and talking relative to their Black partner, they also perceived the interaction as more stressful and uncomfortable. Ickes concluded that these results are likely due to differences between Blacks and Whites in terms of intergroup contact experiences. By virtue of their minority status, Blacks are much more likely to have contact with Whites (and thus should feel more comfortable in interactions with Whites) than Whites are to have contact with Blacks. Thus, the lack of intergroup experience can lead to anxiety about the intergroup interaction. The more anxiety one feels, the more one is likely to perceive the reaction of an interaction partner to oneself as more negative (Pozo, Carver, Wellens, & Scheier, 1991). Devine et al.’s (1996) model of the dynamic nature of intergroup interactions is an important contribution to the extant prejudice and stereotyping literature. It clearly articulates how expectations, motivations, and prejudices can influence and be influenced by the perceptions of the other individual’s behavior. The model is also unique in attempting to explain how moment-­to-­moment changes in social interactions influence both interactants. In addition, the model is unique in considering the perspective, expectations, motivations, and behavior of the minority individual in the intergroup context in an analysis of how these factors influence and are influenced by the majority individual. Understanding this dynamic process is an important next step to understanding the complexity of intergroup interactions. However, testing a dynamic model such as this in an experimental setting poses daunting challenges for the researcher.

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First, in a typical social psychological experiment, there usually are clearly defined causal variables, and the researcher is interested in examining the effects on participants when this variable is manipulated. In other words, there is a unidirectional linear cause and effect implicit in the experiment. While this makes life easy for the experimenter, such experiments represent an incomplete picture of how natural social interactions affect (and are affected by) the interactant’s behavior. As we have seen, the behavior of the majority (or minority) member in the intergroup context does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, behavior, expectations, and perceptions change and are changed by the other’s behavior. Second, this dynamic model suggests that there is no single clear cause and effect in a continuous interaction, but that there are many, many mini cause–­effect sequences all encompassed in a dynamic feedback loop (see Nelson, 1993, for further discussion). For these reasons, we know very little about how the dynamics of the intergroup interaction influence the interactants. We revisit this discussion of the dynamic nature of intergroup interactions in greater detail in Chapter 12. Below, we explore how expectations, intergroup anxiety, and metastereotypes affect intergroup interactions.

Expectations Another factor that fuels the negative expectancies for the intergroup interaction is the notion that the majority and minority have different perspectives from which they approach an understanding of the world. As Gates (1995, as cited in Jones, 1996) suggests, people arrive at an understanding of themselves and the world through narratives—­ narratives purveyed by schoolteachers, newscasters, “authorities,” and all the other authors of our common sense. Counternarratives are, in turn, the means by which groups contest the dominant reality and the network of assumptions that supports it . . . much of Black history is simply counternarrative. (p. 57)

Thus, the narratives and counternarratives define reality for various individuals. Jones suggests that often the reason why the minority approaches contact with the majority with negative expectations is that the majority “are strongly biased toward their own experiences, values, beliefs, and the products of their culture” while the minority “who have so often been victimized by those very beliefs and cultural outcroppings, mistrust them and ultimately dislike them” (p. 257).

Intergroup Anxiety Most of the past research on reactions to the outgroup has typically involved imagining (or reading) an intergroup scenario, and how you might think and feel about the outgroup in such a situation. Typically, what researchers are focusing on here is what is referred to as intergroup anxiety. This is the degree to which one’s thoughts, feelings, and physiological reactions about or interactions with an outgroup yields negative outgroup attitudes, fear, and negative outgroup behavior (Stephan, 2014). Interestingly, one study found that the degree to which one is aware of their own bias against an outgroup (termed “bias awareness”), the stronger the relationship between prejudice and intergroup anxiety (Perry, Dovidio, Murphy, & van Ryn, 2015). Moreover, the higher

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the intergroup anxiety, the greater the effect on one’s implicit stereotypes about that outgroup (Amodio & Hamilton, 2012). Curiously, this effect happens only for White people about to interact with an African American, but not for African Americans about to interact with a White person. Ideally, we would like data that speak to how people react in an actual intergroup interaction (in order to compare the data for how we think we would react, to how we actually react). Unfortunately, there exist few studies that compare anticipated with actual behaviors in the intergroup context. However, the direction of the research in stereotyping seems to be changing to answer Devine et al.’s (1996) call to explore the uncharted waters of expectations and impressions of other individuals in live intergroup interactions. In one such experiment, Hyers and Swim (1998) examined the reactions of minority and majority members in an actual intergroup interaction. African American or European American women participated in triads where they were either the sole representative of their ethnic group (i.e., one African American and two European Americans) or they were a non-solo member. The female subject was covertly videotaped while they worked on a group task. Each group consisted of one subject and two confederates. They were told that they were to decide on 10 best occupations that would be useful for starting a new society on a desert island. They were to provide their suggestions to the group with justification for their responses. After the group task was completed, the participants were ostensibly interviewed separately (however, only the subject was interviewed, the confederates—­unknown to the subject—­were not interviewed). The subject was told that the purpose of the study was to examine how the group interacted, and told that she was videotaped. After the subject agreed to authorize the use of the videotape for the study, they viewed their reactions on the videotape, and wrote down their thoughts and feelings about different points of the group task. Hyers and Swim expected that, because European American women likely did not have as much intergroup experience, they would feel more negative affect than African American subjects. However, this hypothesis was not supported. Also, whether or not the subject was the sole representative of her ethnic group did not influence her reactions to the intergroup encounter. Results did indicate that European American women showed decreased task attention. The authors suggested that African Americans showed little affective, cognitive, or behavioral negative experiences in the intergroup interaction due, in large part, to their greater intergroup experience. Fear of the unknown may perpetuate intergroup anxiety. In other words, lack of intergroup contact may perpetuate stereotypes, fears, and anxiety, and it tends to lead to the avoidance of future intergroup contact (Crowson & Brandes, 2010; Finchilescu, 2010; Lackey, 2012; Voci & Pagotto, 2010). Encouragingly, the tendency to avoid intergroup contact can be greatly reduced if one changes the way they think about whether the outgroup members can change. Halperin and her colleagues (2012) exposed half of their subjects to the notion that an outgroup was flexible/open-­minded, and the other half were not given such a belief about the outgroup. Intergroup anxiety and motivation for future intergroup contact was then assessed. Results showed that if one believes the outgroup is malleable, they have less intergroup anxiety and are much more motivated to interact with the outgroup in the future. One important factor that can affect whether one is anxious about contact with an outgroup is the degree to which the individual has formed intergroup relationships with members from the outgroup. Turner, Hewstone,

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and Voci (2007) found that the more cross-group friendships one had, the less they experienced anxiety about interacting with that particular outgroup. Personality characteristics can also aid in the reduction of intergroup anxiety. Turner, Dhont, Hewstone, Prestwich, and Vonofakou (2014) found that intergroup anxiety was lowest among those with the characteristics of openness to experiences, agreeableness, and being extraverted (Turner et al., 2014).

Metastereotypes Sigleman and Tuch (1997) introduced the term metastereotype to refer to one’s perceptions of another group’s stereotypes of one’s group. For example, what do Whites believe that Blacks believe about Whites? Similarly, what stereotypes about Blacks do Blacks believe Whites endorse? If minorities share a common experience in their stigmatization at the hands of the majority, it seems logical that the majority might have a common view of how the minority group views them. Perhaps not surprisingly, research indicates that the greater the degree one holds prejudiced attitudes and negative metastereotypes about the outgroup, the higher the intergroup anxiety the person will feel (Finchilescu, 2010). To examine metastereotypes, Vorauer, Main, and O’Connell (1998) examined White Canadians’ perceptions of how Aboriginal Canadians viewed them. Results indicated that White Canadians have a common negative stereotype about how they are viewed by Aboriginal Canadians, and that the belief in these metastereotypes was associated with more negative affect and expectancies regarding potential intergroup interactions. Additionally, when the White Canadians endorsed these metastereotypes, they experienced decreased self-­esteem and worsened self-­concept clarity. While there is a substantial literature on the stereotypes that majority members have about minorities, we know relatively little about the perceptions of minorities of the majority members, and little to nothing about their metastereotypes. To address this issue, Sigleman and Tuch (1997) examined data gathered from the National Opinion Research Center (Davis & Smith, 1990) on Blacks’ perceptions of Whites’ views of Blacks. The attitudes of Blacks and Whites toward each other were also examined. Finally, the degree of stereotype endorsement for each group was examined. The authors uncovered some surprising data. Two-­t hirds of the Black participants in the survey indicated that they believed that Whites endorsed every stereotype about Blacks. This is not as alarming when one considers that the researchers also found that most Whites in the survey did in fact view Blacks in very stereotyped terms! It appears, therefore, that the metastereotypes of the Black participants were largely accurate. However, not all Blacks were as strong in their belief that Whites endorsed stereotypes about Blacks. The data from the survey revealed that Black women, younger Blacks, and higher-­income Blacks were less likely than their older, male, and lower-­income counterparts to view Whites as holding positive stereotypes (positive views) about Blacks. Paradoxically, according to Sigleman and Tuch, it seems that those who have more contact with Whites are least likely to believe that Whites hold positive views of Blacks. The metastereotypes that Blacks have about Whites also has implications for how Blacks view their own ingroup. Specifically, when Blacks believed that Whites had negative stereotyped views of Blacks in general, they had lower levels of identification with their own ingroup. When Black participants believed that Whites had positive stereotyped views of Blacks, the Black participants were more inclined to positively identify with their Black ingroup (Owuamalam & Zagefka, 2011).

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Intergroup interactions are also doomed when the interactants are prejudiced against one another’s groups. Pettigrew (1979) suggested that the prejudice of the individual taints their perception of both positive and negative behavior on the part of the disliked outgroup member. When the outgroup member does something that is perceived as negative, the prejudiced perceiver is more likely to attribute the action to internal, genetically determined factors, compared to the same act committed by an ingroup member. When the prejudiced perceiver views a positive action from the outgroup member, they will most likely attribute it to luck, exceptional effort, or the “exceptional case” (in other words, subtyping; Weber & Crocker, 1983).

ATTRIBUTIONAL AMBIGUITY One of the most fundamental components of our social lives concerns the attempt to understand the behavior of other people. As Heider (1958) phrased it, we are all “amateur scientists,” trying to arrive at reasonable explanations (theories) for the data (behavior) that confront us. In trying to understand others’ behavior toward us, we are trying to decide whether the individual’s actions were caused by some internal force or stable characteristic about the individual (e.g., an enduring personality trait), or a situational force (e.g., a role the individual is playing, or that the person was forced to behave in some fashion). This is the basic problem of attribution. To which of these two major causes do we attribute others’ behavior? For most people, there are always various individuals and situations that make it difficult to arrive at a clear answer to the attribution question. Yet, there is a difference between the stigmatized and the nonstigmatized in terms of their daily experiences in understanding the causes of others’ behavior toward them. Most of the time, for most nonstigmatized individuals, this task is fairly straightforward: other people behave toward them based on the personality or performance of the nonstigmatized individual. Stigmatized individuals, on the other hand, face a different set of circumstances. In attempting to understand the reasons for others’ behavior toward them, the stigmatized are confronted with another possible causal explanation for the others’ behavior: their reaction (often based on stereotypes and prejudices) to the individual’s stigma. Thus, because the stigmatized are well familiar with the stereotypes and prejudices that exist about their group (Jones, 1996), they are continually faced with deciding whether to attribute others’ behavior toward them as a reaction to their stigma (and thus, to stereotypes and prejudice), or to their reaction to the aspects of the stigmatized individual that are not associated with the stigma (i.e., the stigmatized person’s personality). This constant attributional calculus has been termed attributional ambiguity (Crocker & Major, 1989; Major & Crocker, 1993). Major and Crocker suggest that the chronic uncertainty that the stigmatized experience regarding the causes of others’ behavior toward them has important consequences for the self-­esteem, mood, motivation, and interpersonal behavior of the stigmatized. For example, it is one thing to believe that the store manager told you that the job they listed in the want ads has been filled, but quite another to believe that the manager told you that because of the color of your skin (or your gender, age, or the fact that you are in a wheelchair, etc.). For many stigmatized individuals, self-­esteem can be protected by regarding the negative behavior of others toward them as a reflection of underlying prejudice, and

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not as a consequence of their personal traits (Goffman, 1963; Jones et al., 1984). Some readers who are members of nonstigmatized groups might respond, “That sounds like an awfully cynical way to go about life.” Before you rush to such an assessment, consider the following. If you had a noticeable stigma, one that is associated with a number of negative stereotypes, you likely would come to learn, as you grew up, that this stigma was universally noticed by others. Given this, you are faced with the difficult task of understanding what the motives are for the behavior of the nonstigmatized outgroups toward you. Given the pervasiveness of prejudice and stereotypes in American society, it is likely that most people are aware of, and some percentage of them believe, stereotypes about your group. The assessment you need to make is a probability assessment (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Kahneman, Slovic, & Tversky, 1982). Specifically, what is the likelihood that the nonstigmatized individual with whom I am interacting is behaving according to some stereotypes they have about my group? In answering this question, trying to understand the (potential) stereotyper and the context in which the behavior occurred is helpful. It is useful to attempt to find out whether the stereotyper had the ability and motivation (and background learning history) that would enable them to behave in nonstereotyped ways. What the stigmatized person is attempting to understand here is the intent of the stereotyper (Fiske, 1989). The reasons for the behavior of the nonstigmatized person may be clear with an assessment of the context in which the negative intergroup behavior occurred. If it is nondominant, then other persons surrounding the stereotyper are thinking and acting in nondiscriminatory terms, and in this instance, the behavior of the stereotyping majority member is especially likely to be regarded as caused by prejudice of the individual (due to a basic perceptual contrast effect). However, if the context is such that everyone else is emitting similar stereotyping behaviors as the individual in question, the question of intent becomes cloudier, and the context holds a fair amount of attributional ambiguity for the stigmatized individual. One way to avoid the frustration of trying to ascertain the true motive behind the others’ behavior is to just assume that no behavior that others exhibit toward you is related to your stigma. This is an “innocent-­until-­proven-­g uilty” approach. While apparently logical and reasonable, this perspective has some self-­relevant pitfalls that make it unattractive. You know that such a perspective is a fair way to view others, but American society is—more often than not—­unfair in the way your stigmatized group is viewed (Fiske, 1998; Swim & Stangor, 1998). Given that conclusion, your conclusion is likely to be that most (but not all) nonstigmatized outgroup members will react to you based in some part on their stereotypes and prejudices about your stigmatized group (the “guilty-­ until-­proven-­innocent” approach). In a fascinating experiment, Kleck and Strenta (1980) investigated the effects of having negatively valued characteristics on one’s perceptions of an interaction partner. Women participants were told that they would be interacting with another participant (who was a confederate) in a brief discussion of the tactics people use to make friends. Participants were randomly assigned to one of three characteristics conditions: allergy, epilepsy, or facial scar. Participants were told that the experimenter wanted to assess whether the partner’s behavior would be affected by the participant’s physical condition. Participants were asked to complete a biographical questionnaire, and indicate their condition on the second page (unknown to the participant, the partner/confederate was not shown the second page). Those in the scar condition had a fake scar applied

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to their face, which was quite noticeable. Participants confirmed the presence of the scar with a mirror, and were asked not to touch it or discuss it unless the partner mentioned it. Before the participant interacted with the partner, the experimenter informed her that he needed to moisturize the scar so that the adhesive would not crack. While doing so, he removed the scar, without the participant’s knowledge! The experimenter then brought the participant’s biographical information to the partner in the other lab room, and then the two were brought together and seated in a room. After a 6-minute discussion, they went back to their separate lab rooms, and the participant evaluated the partner’s behavior, and provided her attitude toward the partner. Results indicated that participants who were in the negative stigma conditions (scar and epilepsy) believed that their conditions had a strong impact on the behavior of the partner. Those in the allergy condition did not have this belief about their partner. Specifically, scar and epilepsy participants were more likely to perceive that their partner was tense and patronizing. Additionally, they believed that their partner liked them less and found them less attractive. These data highlight the strong influence of expectancies in clouding our perceptions of others’ reactions to us. Even though there was no stigma presented to the confederate, and the confederate’s behavior toward the participant was virtually the same for all participants, those who believed that their partner was regarding them as negatively stigmatized perceived their partner’s behaviors as reflecting tension and derision toward the participant (see Santuzzi & Ruscher, 2002, for similar findings in experiments). Our expectancies about someone can cause us to regard that person’s normal, innocuous behavior as symptomatic of the attributed motive, characteristic, or personality of the other individual (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Rosenhan, 1973). With this assessment, it would be difficult to take the “innocent-­until-­proven-­g uilty” perspective, because you are making your self-­esteem and self-­identity vulnerable to the negative effects of others’ behavior (which is likely based on unfair evaluations of you due to stereotypes about you). In short, you may perceive that you are treated fairly, when in fact, the probability is that you are not being treated fairly. In that instance, you may feel foolish, gullible, and hurt. To protect the self, the stigmatized individual may take a “guilty-­until-­proven-­innocent” approach to interacting with nonstigmatized individuals (Jones et al., 1984; Major & Crocker, 1993; Swim, Cohen, & Hyers, 1998). Research also indicates that positive feedback from nonstigmatized individuals to the stigmatized can present an attributionally ambiguous situation (Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, & Major, 1991). To what does the stigmatized person attribute the positive evaluation they have received? Is it due to a patronizing and artificial positive evaluation of the person that is related to the individual’s stigma, or is it due to purely the performance or personal characteristics of the stigmatized person? In other words, the stigmatized individual may ask themselves, “Did this person give me this positive feedback because I am Black (or a woman, or Hispanic, Asian, etc.) and they don’t want to appear prejudiced, or is it because they really like me (or what I did) for who I am as a person?” This is a difficult question to answer in most instances. Consider the following illustration of the problem. Several studies have demonstrated that nonstigmatized individuals give more positive ratings to stigmatized (compared to nonstigmatized) individuals in impression-­formation experiments (e.g., Carver, Glass, Snyder, & Katz, 1977). This led some researchers to explain the findings in terms of a “sympathy” effect. However, further analysis indicates that there could be three possible explanations for these findings. They may reflect true positive biases of

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the majority members, or they may reflect unconscious distortions of true negative feelings, or, finally, they may represent conscious distortions of true negative feelings, due to social desirability effects (Carver, Glass, & Katz, 1978). In a clever experiment, Carver et al. (1978) investigated how White females evaluated Black and physically disabled target individuals. Participants were asked to read a transcript of an interview with the target individual (either a White male, or a Black male, or a physically disabled male) who was described as of lower-­socioeconomic status, who had no plans for the future, and who had few friends. Basic demographics of the target individual and their group identifier (if any, e.g., “disabled” or “Black”) were provided at the top of the interview transcript. Participants in the control condition read the transcript, and then provided their ratings of the target individual. The other half of the participants were given a “bogus pipeline” procedure (recall our discussion of this method in Chapter 6). Participants were hooked up to what appeared to be a very real physiological measuring device to their arms, chest, and fingertips. It was explained that this device would allow researchers a direct assessment of the participant’s reaction to the interview transcript, and hence, the researcher would know what the participant’s true attitudes were toward the target. As a measure of “reliability,” however, participants were asked to complete the rating sheet (as the control condition participants had) so that the investigator could compare the two types of attitude information. Results indicated that participants in the control and bogus pipeline conditions were identical in their ratings of the individual with a disability. They also agreed in their ratings of the White male. As predicted, ratings of the person with a disability were significantly higher than ratings of the White person. Control condition participants who read about a Black interviewee rated him as positively as the ratings that the individual with a disability garnered. However, participants who were in the bogus pipeline condition rated the Black target significantly lower than those in all other conditions. Carver et al. (1978) explained these data as suggesting that perceptions of stigmatized individuals are not homogeneous. It appeared that the favorable ratings of individuals with a disability reflected a true underlying positive attitude toward those with a disability. However, the favorable ratings of the Black target seemed to reflect an attempt to cover underlying negative feelings toward Blacks. The authors explain the difference in reaction to the two targets as possibly due to different perceptions of the degree to which each target has hurdles in life that they must overcome. They speculate that perhaps participants gave persons with a disability more “credit” (consistent with Kelly’s [1971] “augmentation principle”) for having to overcome physical, mental, and social difficulties. They may have conversely regarded the Black individual as not facing as many difficult challenges in life as the individual with a disability. Another possible explanation may be that observers viewed the negative life circumstances of the Black person as due to a lack of motivation, whereas the situation for the individual with a disability could have been attributed to circumstances beyond their control (Carver et al., 1978). If we could experimentally manipulate the situation, such that sometimes the nonstigmatized person’s reaction (positive or negative) to the stigmatized person is based only on an evaluation of the stigmatized person’s character (and not the stigma), and other times, it was less clear, we might be able to more clearly understand the consequences for the self-­esteem of the stigmatized. Well, just such an experiment has been published (you knew I [T. D. N.] was going to say that, didn’t you?). Crocker, Voelkl, Testa, and Major (1991, experiment 2) asked African American students to participate

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in an experiment ostensibly on friendship. When each participant arrived at the lab, they were told that another participant had arrived earlier and was seated in an adjacent room (there really was no other participant). The experiment room in which the African American participant was seated had a one-way mirror (obscured by closed blinds) in the wall to the adjacent room (where the other participant was supposedly seated). The African American participants were told that the experimenters were interested in samerace and cross-race friendship formation, and in this instance, the participant would be paired with a White participant. Participants were asked to complete a self-­description questionnaire (that did not indicate their race) and a measure of self-­esteem. Participants were told that their responses would be shared with the other participant, and that they would use it to determine whether the two of them could become friends. Participants were next told that either the blinds would be raised so their partner could see them (but they could not see their partner) and use this information in their judgment of whether they wanted to be further acquainted with the participant, or they were informed that the blinds would not be raised so that the other person would not be biased by appearance of the participant. The experimenter brought the African American participant’s self-­description to the next room, ostensibly to let the “other participant” evaluate it. The experimenter then brought back either a positive or negative evaluation and gave it to the participant. Participants read it, and then completed a few questionnaires, including another measure of their self-­esteem and a measure of their current mood. The results were quite interesting. When African American participants received positive feedback, their self-­esteem increased when they believed they could not be seen, but for those who were in the “blinds-­up” (seen) condition, positive feedback from the White partner brought about a decrease in self-­esteem. In the not-seen condition, the positive feedback can only be attributed to information about the participant that was on their self-­description. Thus, the conclusion the African American participant may make is “The White person likes me because I have a good personality, and may have similar interests.” Of course, we all like to be liked by others, and this type of feedback about our personality makes us feel good about ourselves. However, in the “seen” condition, the African American participant is faced with attributional ambiguity. It is unclear why they received positive feedback from the White partner. In this instance, African American participants attributed the positive feedback to a patronizing, false positive feedback that was probably given so the White participant wouldn’t appear prejudiced. Such an attribution (that it is likely that their stigma determined another’s evaluation of themselves) led African American participants to feel worse about themselves. Negative feedback from the White partner had different effects on the self-­esteem of African American participants. When participants believed they were seen, their self-­ esteem remained unchanged. When they believed they were not seen, their self-­esteem decreased. These data indicate that when a stigmatized individual believes that others have evaluated them negatively solely on the basis of a self-­description (and not on race, as in the unseen condition), the only possible attribution for such an evaluation is that there is something unlikable about the individual, which naturally makes the stigmatized individual feel negatively (and results in a decreased self-­esteem). On the other hand, when a stigmatized person receives negative feedback from a nonstigmatized person who can see them, the person is presented with an attributionally ambiguous situation. Here, participants resolved this ambiguity in a way that protected their self-­esteem,

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and in terms of the most likely probable cause of the negative evaluation: They attributed the negative evaluation to the prejudice of the nonstigmatized participant. Unfortunately, while such an attribution may protect the self-­esteem of the stigmatized individual, it may also result in feelings of helplessness and depression (Major & Crocker, 1993), and a discounting of positive feedback (Hoyt, Aguilar, Kaiser, B ­ lascovich, & Lee, 2007). A related study by Britt and Crandall (2000) examined whether Black and White participants accepted positive and negative feedback from an evaluator after they were informed not only about the race of their evaluator but also about the motive of the evaluator: whether the evaluator was pro- or anti-Black/White. Results indicated that Black and White participants discounted (were not affected by) positive feedback when they were seen by a pro-Black (or pro-White, respectively) evaluator. Similarly, participants tended to discount negative feedback from an anti-Black (or anti-White) evaluator. The attributional ambiguity of positive and negative feedback may also have consequences for the motivation of the stigmatized individual. Because it is unclear why the stigmatized individual received the feedback, they thus have little information about their true ability/characteristics on that dimension, and this uncertainty may lead the stigmatized person to be more likely to engage in self-­handicapping behaviors (e.g., drinking and staying out late the night before an important morning exam) that are designed to provide a ready excuse for anticipated poor performance on that dimension (Arkin & Baumgardner, 1985; Berglas & Jones, 1978; Major & Crocker, 1993). This uncertainty may also result in a decreased motivation to engage in behaviors on the relevant domain (e.g., academics; see the earlier discussion of stereotype threat).

The Paradoxical Effects of Affirmative Action Members of stereotyped groups, such as racial and ethnic minorities, women, and older adults, are sometimes the beneficiaries of programs and regulations that are designed to help them economically, occupationally, or educationally. For example, affirmative action programs are designed to overcome the effects of past discrimination and current stereotypes and help these underrepresented minorities get good employment in the workplace. One analysis of job hiring from 1973 to 2003 shows that affirmative action programs have had their intended effects, bringing more women and minorities into the workplace (Kurtulus, 2012). However, critics of affirmative action regard such programs as mere “reverse discrimination,” charging that they represent an unfair attempt to place preference on minority status above job qualifications in hiring decisions (Blanchard & Crosby, 1989; Kravitz et al., 2000; Resendez, 2002). Such programs have been demonstrated to increase prejudice in Whites against Blacks, and to decrease Whites’ support for affirmative action programs (Ramasubramanian, 2011). Research indicates that when both the beneficiaries and critics of affirmative action programs perceive the program as unjustified, they each react negatively to the program (Taylor & Dube, 1986). Opposition to affirmative action may be especially likely from those who support an unequal, hierarchical social status differential that favors their group over the stigmatized outgroup (i.e., those higher in social dominance; Federico & Sidanius, 2002). Aside from any potential limitations in the program’s ability to fulfill its purpose, another concern has been voiced by critics. Specifically, some argue that affirmative action may have psychological costs for those who benefit from the program. Steele (1990) suggests that it implies that the recipients of affirmative action are, a priori, inferior and in need of

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help from society (i.e., the majority; van Laar, Levin, & Sinclair, 2008). However, other research reveals the opposite. For example, affirmative action doesn’t negatively affect the self-­perceptions of women. One study found that White women who are the beneficiaries of affirmative action programs feel better about themselves, and they suffer no negative self-­conceptions as a result (Unzueta, Gutierrez, & Ghavami, 2010). There is some evidence to support this argument. Schneider, Major, Luhtanen, and Crocker (1996) reasoned that because minorities are more likely to be stereotyped as having lesser abilities, they are more susceptible to the potential negative psychological effects of offers of help from members of the majority. The idea here is that it is likely that, due to the attributional ambiguity of the situation (Is this majority member offering me help because they are a nice person, or because they think I am incompetent due to my minority status?), the minority member may be more likely to attribute helping behavior to veiled prejudice and stereotypes (Major, Feinstein, & Crocker, 1994). Such an attribution would clearly have implications for the minority member. Schneider et al. further hypothesized that if the minority believes that others see them as incompetent, it may negatively affect the individual’s self-­esteem and views of their own work competence. Heilman, Block, and Lucas (1992) reported data to support this idea. They found that just mentioning that a woman was an affirmative action hiree led perceivers to view her as less competent and less qualified than a non-­affirmative action female hiree or a male hiree (see also Leslie, Mayer, & Kravitz, 2014). On the other hand, in research where beneficiaries of affirmative action were told that their ability, as well as their group status, was taken into consideration in hiring them, they did not suffer the same negative effects (e.g., self-doubt) as those who were hired solely based on their status as a member of a minority group (Brown, Charnsangavej, Keough, Newman, & Rentfrow, 2000; Heilman, Rivero, & Brett, 1991). In the Schneider et al. (1996) study, White and Black participants were assigned to either a help or no-help condition. Black students who received help from a White student reported lower self-­esteem compared to Blacks in the no-help condition. Blacks who received help also reported more depressed affect than those who did not receive help—­however, they did not evaluate the helping majority member negatively. In a related investigation, Nacoste (1985) found that when women perceived that they were given membership in a group primarily based on their category membership, they felt that the admission procedure was less fair, and they displayed fewer positive emotions compared to those women admitted based on their qualifications. These results are consistent with other research that suggests that being the recipient of help can negatively influence one’s self-­esteem and feelings of competence (Blaine, Crocker, & Major, 1995; Fisher, Nadler, & Whitcher-­A lagna, 1982; Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio, & Piliavin, 1995). The prognosis is not as bleak as it may appear for minorities who are the beneficiaries of affirmative action. Pratkanis and Turner (1996) acknowledge that while much research suggests that the stigma attached to individuals who benefit from affirmative action is real, and is quite negative (Colarelli, Poole, Unterborn, & D’Souza, 2010), further analysis reveals that the pernicious consequences for the recipient’s self-­esteem and competence evaluations can be short-­c ircuited. Pratkanis and Turner suggest that when help is given to a minority individual (i.e., an affirmative action hiring decision) who appears not to conform to societal values and suggests that the recipient lacks competence or qualification, nonminorities feel defensive and hostile, while the minority recipient tends to experience decreased self-­esteem. However, if the same help is framed

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such that it is aimed at removing past discriminatory barriers, the minority and nonminority perceivers do not experience negative reactions to such help. When help is presented in this way, it is less threatening, and is seen as social support and an indicator of societal concern for overcoming the negative effects of stereotypes and past discrimination (Crosby, Iyer, Clayton, & Downing, 2003). While affirmative action programs have certainly been controversial, and have been shown to have unintended negative effects on both the recipients of the program and majority members, it appears that overall, there is general agreement between Blacks and Whites on the goals of the program (equality), and that conditions were much worse in the past in that regard (DeBell, 2017). However, Whites differ with Blacks on the level of current inequality and how much change is still necessary. Blacks believe there is much more inequality between Whites and Blacks than Whites do. On the other hand, when Whites are asked to adopt the perspective of a Black or Latino person in an interracial encounter, they are much more favorable toward affirmative action policies, more sensitive to discrimination, and they feel more closely identified with the minority outgroup (Todd, Bodenhausen, & Galinsky, 2012).

Perceived Controllability of the Stigma Some stigmas are seen as controllable (e.g., homelessness, substance abuse, being overweight), while others (e.g., race, gender) are not perceived as controllable or reversible. This has tremendous implications for the affect, self-­esteem, and motivation of the stigmatized individual, as well as their reactions to the nonstigmatized. If one receives negative feedback, and believes that it is due to the nonstigmatized person’s reaction to the individual’s observable, but noncontrollable stigma, the stigmatized person tends to attribute the negative reaction to prejudice, and they do not suffer any loss of self-­esteem (Crocker et al., 1991). However, individuals with perceived controllable stigmas face a different set of circumstances. First, the nonstigmatized are likely to have less sympathy for, and feel more derision toward, the stigmatized person because the stigma is believed to be due to lack of effort, ability, or will (Crocker et al., 1998; Hebl & Kleck, 2002; Weiner, Perry, & Magnusson, 1988). Second, when those with perceived controllable stigmas receive this negative feedback from the nonstigmatized, they are more likely to feel decreased self-­esteem and more negative affect. However, they do not blame the nonstigmatized person for the negative evaluation. It is as if the stigmatized person says, “Yes, I know I have this negative, controllable condition. I feel bad about it. I don’t blame you for noticing it, and telling me I should change it.” Third, prejudice toward those who have a controllable stigma is seen as more justifiable than prejudice toward those who have an uncontrollable stigma (Rodin, Price, Sanchez, & McElligot, 1989). To examine this unique reaction of those with (perceived) controllable stigmas, Crocker et al. (1993) investigated the attributions of overweight and “normal weight” women when they received positive and negative feedback from nonoverweight males. Women were led to believe that another male participant in an adjoining room was also participating in the study (in actuality, there was no other participant). The study was ostensibly about how dating relationships form, and what things people look for when they have a limited amount of information. Women were weighed and their height was measured. On a self-­description sheet, the women were to indicate these measurements, and a number of other demographic and personality characteristics, as well as other

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self-­descriptions. Men would ostensibly do the same. The experimenter took the women’s self-­descriptions to the male, and exchanged the sheets. Women read that the male was fit, unattached, and was a premed major. Overweight women were shown either a positive or negative evaluation from the male, which either did or did not indicate a strong desire to date her. The self-­esteem of the female subjects before and after the feedback was measured, as well as her mood and attributions for the male’s feedback. Results indicated that when overweight women were rejected, they attributed it to their weight, and they did not blame the male for the negative feedback (one problem that Crocker et al. [1993] note is that measuring the subject’s weight and height may have made this a salient reason for any feedback she may later receive, and this may be a possible confound). In addition, the women felt significantly more (compared to their “normal weight” counterparts) negative affect, depression, hostility, and lower self-­esteem, as a result of attributing the negative feedback to their weight. Thus, the literature suggests that the perception by others and oneself of the controllability of one’s stigma can have tremendous implications for how one is actually regarded by the nonstigmatized (e.g., with sympathy or anger), and how one feels in response to such feedback. Those with uncontrollable stigmas may be energized, in the face of negative feedback, to fight prejudice and overcome obstacles in society to achieve their goals. They do not blame themselves for their “stigma” (they rarely regard their situation as a stigma). Rather, they protect their self-­esteem in response to negative feedback from the nonstigmatized via an attribution of prejudice. However, the data indicate that those with controllable stigmas not only feel worse about about themselves and their abilities, they hold no malice toward the negative evaluator, and blame themselves for their condition (Crocker & Major, 1994). They are also more likely to try to change their stigmatizing condition, and regard themselves as a failure when they fail to do so (Crocker et al., 1998).

SUMMARY Being a member of a stigmatized group has important and lasting effects on one’s self-­ concept, self-­esteem, intergroup interactions, motivation and achievement, expectations, attributions, and affect. This chapter has illustrated how the nonstigmatized treat those with stigmas, and has attempted to highlight many (but not all) of the ways that the stigmatized react to their group status and its influence on their self-­identity. While self-­reported prejudice toward the stigmatized has declined dramatically (Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986), much evidence suggests that what has declined is not necessarily prejudiced attitudes, but the willingness to publicly state those (now socially inappropriate) negative attitudes (McConahay, 1986). The research we reviewed in this chapter shows that prejudice is alive and well in America, and this has important implications for the future of intergroup relations. If we are to better understand prejudice, and ways we can reduce prejudice, we need to understand more fully the perspective of those who experience prejudice and discrimination in large and small ways every day of their lives. We know much about how majority members think, feel, and behave toward minority members, but little empirical attention has been devoted to understanding prejudice from the minority’s perspective (see Swim & Stangor, 1998, for a notable exception).

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Much more attention is needed in this neglected area of prejudice research. Finally, a more three-­dimensional view of prejudice will likely be obtained when researchers begin to take Devine et al.’s (1996) challenge to tackle the methodologically and theoretically complex problem of prejudice in actual, dynamic intergroup interactions. When we consider how motives, behavior, expectancies, feelings, and attitudes all interact in response to the context and the perceptions of a partner on a moment-­by-­moment basis, we will have a much richer understanding of how prejudice and stereotypes are maintained and reinforced. Hopefully, we will also be closer to understanding how to reduce prejudice.

GLOSSARY Attributional Ambiguity—situation in which it is difficult for the perceiver to ascertain whether the target’s behavior was due to the influence of the situation or to the individual’s personality or attitudes. Disidentification—individuals disengage their identity from an achievement domain, such that their self-­esteem and sense of self-­competence is preserved and shielded from the negative effects of associating identity with performance on a stereotype-­relevant achievement domain. Intergroup Anxiety—the degree to which one’s thoughts, feelings, and physiological reactions about or interactions with an outgroup yields negative outgroup attitudes, fear, and negative outgroup behavior. Metastereotypes—a person’s beliefs regarding the stereotype that outgroup members hold about their own group. Self-­Fulfilling Prophecy—process by which a perceiver’s expectations about a target lead that target to behave in ways that confirm those expectations. Self-­Handicapping—a way to protect one’s ego and self-­esteem when one perceives they are about to fail on a task. Prior to the task, the person engages in behavior designed to provide a ready excuse for failure. When the “inevitable” failure on the task occurs, the person can point to the other excuse as the cause, and not their inability, thus saving their self-image (for example, partying instead of studying the night before an important exam). Stereotype Threat—situation in which negative expectations about ability (due to stereotypes about the group’s ability on that dimension) lead the stigmatized person to experience anxiety at the thought of performing poorly and confirming the stereotype. This anxiety often has the unfortunate effect of inhibiting performance and confirming the stereotype. Stigma—the possession of a characteristic or attribute that conveys a negative social identity. Subtyping—cognitive process whereby a perceiver with a stereotype has a positive attitude toward a member of a stereotyped group, but the perceiver still maintains a negative attitude toward the stereotyped group.

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DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. In your opinion, why do people tend to single out people who are different from themselves, treat them negatively, and form prejudices and stereotypes about them? Have you ever been the target of ridicule? If so, how did it make you feel? 2. Are there any ingroups of yours with which you feel especially strongly identified? Why? 3. What are some stereotypes about any of your ingroups? Do you think you make deliberate efforts to avoid confirming those stereotypes? 4. In what ways might increased intergroup contact reduce feelings of anxiety among individuals in an intergroup interaction? 5. In dealing with the attributional ambiguity related to their stereotyped group, how do you think members of that group interpret the behavior of others toward themselves: with a predominantly “guilty-­until-­proven-­innocent,” or “innocent-­ until-­proven-­g uilty” approach? Why?

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Experiencing Prejudice 241 Simmons, R. G., Brown, L., Bush, D. M., & Blyth, D. A. (1978). Self-­esteem and achievement of Black and White adolescents. Social Problems, 26, 86–96. Smith, J. L., & White, P. H. (2002). An examination of implicitly activated, explicitly activated, and nullified stereotypes on mathematical performance: It’s not just a woman’s issue. Sex Roles: A Journal of Research, 47(3–4), 179–191. Snyder, M., & Swann, W. B. (1978). Behavioral confirmation in social interaction. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 14, 148–162. Spears, R., Doosje, B., & Ellemers, N. (1997). Self-­stereotyping in the face of threats to group status and distinctiveness: The role of group identification. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(5), 538–553. Steele, C. M. (1992, April). Race and the schooling of Black Americans. Atlantic Monthly, 68–78. Steele, C. M. (1997). A threat in the air: How stereotypes shape intellectual identity and performance. American Psychologist, 52(6), 613–629. Steele, C. M., & Aronson, J. (1995). Stereotype threat and the intellectual test performance of African Americans. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69(5), 797–811. Steele, C. M., Spencer, S. J., & Aronson, J. (2002). Contending with group image: The psychology of stereotype and social identity threat. In M. P. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology, Vol. 34. (pp. 379–440). Academic Press. Steele, S. (1990). The content of our character. New York: St. Martin’s Press. Stephan, W. G. (2014). Intergroup anxiety: Theory, research, and practice. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 18(3), 239–255. Stephan, W. G., & Rosenfield, D. (1982). Racial and ethnic stereotypes. In A. Miller (Ed.), In the eye of the beholder: Contemporary issues in stereotyping (pp. 92–136). New York: Praeger. Stephan, W. G., & Stephan, C. W. (1985). Intergroup anxiety. Journal of Social Issues, 41, 157–175. Stone, J. (2002). Battling doubt by avoiding practice: The effects of stereotype threat on self-­ handicapping in white athletes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(12), 1667–1678. Stone, J., Lynch, C. I., Sjomeling, M., & Darley, J. M. (1999). Stereotype threat effects on Black and White athletic performance. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 77(6), 1213–1227. Swim, J. K., Cohen, L. L., & Hyers, L. L. (1998). Experiencing everyday prejudice and discrimination. In J. K. Swim & C. S. Stangor (Eds.), Prejudice: The target’s perspective (pp. 37–60). New York: Academic Press. Swim, J. K., & Stangor, C. S. (Eds.). (1998). Prejudice: The target’s perspective. New York: Academic Press. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. C. (1986). The social identity theory of intergroup behavior. In S. Worchel & W. G. Austin (Eds.), The psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 7–24). Chicago: Nelson-­Hall. Taylor, D. M., & Dube, L. (1986). Two faces of identity: The “I” and the “we.” Journal of Social Issues, 42, 81–98. Taylor, V. J., Garcia, R. L., Shelton, J. N., & Yantis, C. (2018). “A threat on the ground”: The consequences of witnessing stereotype-­confirming ingroup members in interracial interactions. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 24(3), 319–333. Thorson, K. R., Forbes, C. E., Magarman, A. B., & West, T. V. (2019). Under threat but engaged: Stereotype threat leads women to engage with female but not male partners in math. Contemporary Educational Psychology, 58, 243–250. Todd, A. R., Bodenhausen, G. V., & Galinsky, A. D. (2012). Perspective taking combats the denial of intergroup discrimination. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 48(3), 738–745. Turner, R. N., Dhont, K., Hewstone, M., Prestwich, A., & Vonofakou, C. (2014). The role of personality factors in the reduction of intergroup anxiety and amelioration of outgroup attitudes via intergroup contact. European Journal of Personality, 28(2), 180–192. Turner, R. N., Hewston, M., & Voci, A. (2007). Reducing explicit and implicit outgroup prejudice via direct and extended contact: The mediating role of self-­disclosure and intergroup anxiety. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 93(3), 369–388.

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Twenge, J. M., & Crocker, J. (2002). Race and self-­esteem: Meta-­a nalyses comparing Whites, Blacks, Hispanics, Asians, and American Indians and comment on Gray-­L ittle and Hafdahl (2000). Psychological Bulletin, 128(3), 371–408. Unzueta, M. M., Gutierrez, A. S., & Ghavami, N. (2010). How believing in affirmative action quotas affects White women’s self-image. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46, 120–126. van Laar, C., Levin, S., & Sinclair, S. (2008). Social identity and personal identity stereotype threat: The case of affirmative action. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 30(4), 295–310. Voci, A., & Pagotto, L. (2010). Mediated moderation in the relation between contact and prejudice reduction: The role of intergroup anxiety and prototypicality. TPM-­Testing, Psychometrics, Methodology in Applied Psychology, 17(1), 37–49. Vorauer, J. D., Main, K. J., & O’Connell, G. B. (1998). How do individuals expect to be viewed by members of lower status groups? Content and implications of meta-­stereotypes. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(4), 917–937. Walton, G. M., & Cohen, G. L. (2003). Stereotype lift. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 39(5), 456–467. Weber, R., & Crocker, J. (1983). Cognitive processes in the revision of stereotypic beliefs. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 45, 961–977. Wegmann, K. M. (2017). “His skin doesn’t match what he wants to do”: Children’s perceptions of stereotype threat. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 87(6), 615–625. Weiner, B., Perry, R. P., & Magnusson, J. (1988). An attributional analysis of reactions to stigmas. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55(5), 738–748. Weitz, S. (1972). Attitude, voice, and behavior: A repressed affect model of interracial interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 24, 14–21. Wolfe, C. T., & Spencer, S. J. (1996). Stereotypes and prejudice: Their overt and subtle influence in the classroom. American Behavioral Scientist, 40(2), 176–185. Woodcock, A., Hernandez, P. R., Estrada, M., & Schultz, P. (2012). The consequences of chronic stereotype threat: Domain disidentification and abandonment. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 103(4), 635–646. Word, C. O., Zanna, M. P., & Cooper, J. (1974). The nonverbal mediation of self-­f ulfilling prophecies in interracial interaction. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 10, 109–120. Yip, T. (2016). To be or not to be: How ethnic/racial stereotypes influence ethnic/racial disidentification and psychological mood. Cultural Diversity and Ethnic Minority Psychology, 22, 38–46.

CHAPTER 8

Ageism

One of my (T. D. N.) pet peeves is people who drive too slowly. After a few seconds of

trailing behind a pokey vehicle, while the rest of the traffic whizzes by, I start to think that the hapless driver ahead of me really has no conception of the written “rules” (and unwritten “rules”—like giving a wave to people who let you pull in front of them) of the road. In these instances, I may think (and I suspect many others have these same thoughts): “That person must have either just got their license (typically, we think of a young—and inexperienced—­teenager), or got it 50 years ago” (we think of an older— and slow—­person). No, this is not a “call for revolution” against the slow drivers of the world (an interesting idea though!). Rather, this nicely illustrates some stereotypes people have about others based on the perceived or actual age of the target individual. Butler (1969) coined the term ageism to refer to stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination based on age. Typically, we refer to ageism with respect to stereotyping and prejudice against older people. Our society tends to be decidedly proyouth, and antiaging. As evidence bearing on this assertion is the finding that both young and older people seem to have easy access to aging stereotypes, but access to young stereotypes appears to be much more limited (Chasteen, Schwarz, & Park, 2002). However, we certainly have stereotypes about young people (as my example shows), and this chapter discusses what is sometimes referred to as “juvenile ageism” (Montessori, 1974; Westman, 1991, 2019). In this chapter, we discuss the origins of ageism; cross-­c ultural differences in attitudes toward older persons (and young people); effects of ageism on the target individual; accuracy of age stereotypes; and finally, ways to try to reduce “ageist” thinking about others (Nelson, 2016b, 2017).

WHY AGEISM? (AND WHAT ABOUT OTHER “‑ISMS”?) According to the United States Census Bureau (2020), between 2010 and 2020, the number of people over age 65 went up 16.8%. This is the fastest increase since 1890– 1900. The main reason? The “baby boomers” (those born from 1946 to 1964) are getting 243

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older. In many ways, ever since the explosive growth of the U.S. population at the end of World War II, the U.S. society and its economy have been influenced by the largest segment (approximately 77 million) of its population: the baby boomers. Ever since the baby boomers started retiring in the mid-2000s, society is again responding to the needs of the baby boomers. Researchers, physicians, and policymakers are moving to address the mushrooming of the population of older adults (Abeles, 1987; Hewson, Kwan, Shaw, & Lai, 2018; Nelson, 2017). This is not to say that, because a special chapter is devoted to it in this book, prejudice and stereotyping based on age is more important than other types of prejudice (e.g., religious prejudice). That is certainly not the case. The reasons ageism is given a special chapter are threefold. First, ever since 1946, academicians, policymakers, and politicians have focused on the baby boomers because of the unique phenomenon they represent. The baby boomers are a large spike, if you will, in the gradual rise of the American population. As a result, it has been easy to focus on this segment of the population as a sort of litmus test to gauge what society as a whole ought to be concerned with at any given time. In other words, what are the baby boomers’ interests, buying habits, special needs, and so on? In general, during the 1960s, the boomers were at the center of a “counterculture” movement, changing politics, music, art, and society. In the 1980s, the boomers were trading in their bell-­bottom jeans and beads for Armani power suits, BMWs, and corporate careers. They were in their 40s, living in the suburbs, concerned with acquiring material possessions, and providing for their families. Society again changed with them, catering to these trends. Now, as this large segment of the population retires from work and enters their “golden years,” societies across the globe are moving (with mixed success) to address the issues and concerns of older baby boomers (Parmar, 2018). Second, and perhaps more important, ageism is given its own chapter because of the relative lack of attention it has received from researchers who specialize in the study of stereotyping: social psychologists (Montepare & Zebrowitz, 1998; Nelson, 2017; Pasupathi, Carstensen, & Tsai, 1995). Specifically, social psychologists have typically been concerned with the effects of sexism and racism, to the virtual neglect of what some researchers refer to as the “third -ism”: ageism (Barrow & Smith, 1979; Nelson, 2005). Consider the coverage of aging in introductory and advanced psychology textbooks. Whitbourne and Hulicka (1990) found that in general, most undergraduate textbooks in psychology (including developmental psychology) either do not discuss the aging process in any detail, or when it is discussed, many authors present the aging process in an inaccurate or condescending fashion. Why might this be the case? One would think that psychologists would be sensitive to the psychology of aging, and ageism in particular (unfortunately, this is not always true, as we learn later in the chapter). Is it possible that Levenson (1981) is correct in pointing to the ageist attitudes of the researchers and text authors as the cause for the lack of coverage of aging? That might explain some of these cases. However, another more parsimonious explanation is that age as an important factor influencing social behavior is not salient to many psychologists because the majority of them are aging baby boomers themselves (Montepare & Zebrowitz, 1998). Third, the aging process represents a unique set of factors for researchers in prejudice and stereotyping. The way most research has addressed prejudice is from the standpoint of the perceptions, attitudes, and beliefs of the minority and majority members toward each other, and the factors that contribute toward, maintain, and reduce prejudice. By definition, each individual is a permanent member of various groups (racial,

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socioeconomic, religious, sexual orientation, gender, etc.). We permanently belong to some groups (e.g., race) and other groups (e.g., religion) are more interchangeable. Aging is an interesting, and altogether much-­overlooked, process in social psychology. We all will (if we are fortunate) grow old ourselves someday. Aging is different, therefore, from examining racism and sexism, because the members of an outgroup (the young) will eventually become part of an ingroup (older adults; Nelson, 2016a; Snyder & Meine, 1994). As you read below, there is clear, strong evidence that our society fosters negative stereotypes about older persons. But why are many young people prejudiced against a group to which they will inevitably join? We address this and other questions when we discuss the origins of and motivations for ageism. Whatever the reasons for the lack of attention paid to aging and ageism, it is clear that much more attention needs to be focused on the influence of age prejudice on social perception, policy, health care, and the target of such prejudice. This chapter discusses in some detail the research and theory on ageism. We begin with a discussion of what ageism is, the origins of ageism, and cross-­c ultural differences in age prejudice. The chapter then addresses the impact of ageism on the victim of age prejudice, and concludes with suggested ways to reduce age prejudice.

DOES AGEISM REALLY EXIST? It might seem more than a bit obvious that the answer to this question should be an unequivocal yes. We all know of examples of prejudice toward people based on their age group membership. However, social scientists approach such questions with an empirical focus. In order to address whether ageism is a prevalent phenomenon in society, researchers have conducted dozens of experiments and surveys over the last several decades in order to measure the attitudes of society toward its older citizens. The results have been mixed, with some data suggesting that ageism is not a valid, reliable phenomenon, while other results suggest quite the opposite. Below, the possible reasons for these divergent conclusions are explored. Ever since the 1950s, researchers have had data that indicate that society as a whole has a negative view of aging and older people (e.g., Tuckman & Lorge, 1953). A number of scholars since that time have concluded that the available evidence suggests a strong presence of ageism in the United States (Barrow & Smith, 1979; Falk & Falk, 1997; Levy, 2022; Nuessel, 1982; Palmore, 1982; Sargent-­Cox, 2017). However, some researchers have found little evidence for pervasive ageist attitudes in America (Bell, 1992; Crockett & Hummert, 1987; Green, 1981; Lutsky, 1980). Which conclusion is “correct”? Before we address that question, consider your own attitudes toward older people. You may say, “Most people may be prejudiced toward older people, but not me. I have older grandparents (or parents), an older boss, and an older professor, and I really like all of them.” This statement highlights the heart of the conundrum that has plagued attitude research among gerontological and psychological studies of ageism over the decades, and serves to clarify why we have two separate literatures (with two different conclusions) on attitudes toward aging (Chu, Lay, Tsang, & Fung, 2020; Cook, 1992; Nelson, 2005). Specifically, researchers have typically used two approaches in dealing with the issue of how to measure ageism. Some have asked participants to indicate their attitudes toward “older people” in general. Most often, these researchers find solid evidence

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for ageist thinking about older people. However, those studies that ask participants to indicate their attitudes toward specific older individuals most often find very positive attitudes toward older persons (sometimes more positive than attitudes toward younger individuals). Why the different results? The way the question is asked has a major impact on the type of answers people give. This is especially the case with attitude research in general, and research on all types of prejudice in particular. It turns out that different conceptions of “older people” are evoked when one accesses a generic prototype of older people (often a vague, negative impression, formed by years of exposure to subtle and pervasive stereotypes about older people). Conversely, if you are asked to give your impression of a specific older person, it is usually more difficult to see/recall confirmatory evidence of a negative stereotype (and this is especially the case when people are asked to give their attitudes about an older friend, coworker, or relative), thus the overall impression is often a positive one (Crockett & Hummert, 1987). If it seems a bit strange that people would endorse two opposing impressions of older persons, recall our discussion of subcategorization (see Chapter 2). Remember that stereotypes are wonderfully fast cognitive mechanisms, allowing great speed and efficiency (but not accuracy) in the processing of information and in impression formation. Because people are “cognitive misers” (Taylor & Fiske, 1991), they are often reluctant to abandon stereotypes (even though the individual is often faced with repeated instances of stereotype inaccuracy as a judgmental heuristic) because stereotypes require little effortful cognition but they still get the job of social perception done fast. When faced with the cognitive dissonance of having a negative attitude toward “older people” and having an older friend, loved one, relative, and so on, people may be inclined to create a subcategory for their friend or relative. This allows people to have the best of both worlds: no dissonance about their older friend, and they get to keep their stereotype of older people as a group. Indeed, Americans have a number of subcategories for older people (Braithwaite, Gibson, & Holman, 1986; Braithwaite, Lynd-­Stevenson, & Pigram, 1993; Brewer, Dull, & Lui, 1981; Hummert, 1990; Schmidt & Boland, 1986). In a series of careful experiments, Brewer and her colleagues found that people have a generally negative view of the superordinate category “older people,” but they have several subcategories of older people (which Brewer et al., 1981, term “basic categories”) based on Rosch and Lloyd’s (1978) theory of natural categories. Brewer et al. found that when one encounters an older individual, information about the older person tends to be organized in terms of these subcategories, and not according to the superordinate age category. However, it appears to be the case that age does influence how we perceive another person. We first sort the world according to general categories (e.g., race, age, gender), and that categorization limits (or influences) how subsequent person perception occurs, and the impressions one has of the target individual. According to Brewer et al., when we don’t have further specific information that allows us to place the individual in a subcategory, the superordinate category is used as a “default” for thinking about (and stereotyping) the individual. It appears that people not only think about older people in specific ways but in many specific ways. Schmidt and Boland (1986) had university students sort out 99 personality traits into groups. Participants were told to place into each group all of the traits that would be found within the same older person. They were told that they could use any number of groups, and to put traits that didn’t seem to belong into any group into a

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“miscellaneous” pile. Participants generated from two to 17 groups (M = 6.46), indicating that people have a number of subcategories for older people. These subcategories were organized in a hierarchical structure, with a cluster of negative subcategories, positive subcategories, and general traits (e.g., “retired,” “poor eyesight”) at the top of the hierarchy. Consistent with prior research, Schmidt and Boland found a mixture of negative subcategories and positive subcategories of older adults, with twice as many negative as positive subcategories. The negative subcategories were “despondent,” “mildly impaired,” “vulnerable,” “severely impaired,” “shrew/curmudgeon,” “recluse,” “nosy neighbor,” and “bag lady/vagrant.” The positive subcategories were termed “John Wayne conservative,” “liberal matriarch/patriarch,” “sage,” and “perfect grandparent.” Hummert (1990) found support for eight of Schmidt and Boland’s (1986) 12 subcategories (perfect grandparent, liberal matriarch/patriarch, vulnerable, despondent, severely impaired, shrew/curmudgeon, recluse, and John Wayne conservative). However, participants in Hummert’s research used different traits to arrive at several of the subcategories, indicating that while there was a good deal of cross-­sample agreement in the subcategories themselves, there was less agreement about what constituted each subcategory. Hummert’s participants also included two other subcategories not found in Schmidt and Boland’s research: flexible senior citizen and self-­centered older person. In sum, perceptions of older people are much more complex than was once thought. Overall, people have a more negative attitude toward older people than toward younger people (Kite & Johnson, 1988; Tasdemir, 2020). However, this conclusion must be qualified with the strong evidence for the idea that people have multiple, often contradictory, views of older people (Brewer et al., 1981; Hummert, 1990; Kite & Johnson, 1988; Schmidt & Boland, 1986). This research indicates that one’s attitude toward older people depends in large part on how the attitude is solicited. People have mostly positive views of specific older persons (i.e., their older relatives, friends, coworkers, etc.), but more negative, stereotyped views of older people as a group. While we have many specific ways of subcategorizing older people, it appears that we have many more negative subcategories than positive subcategories.

AGE STEREOTYPES: CONTENT AND USE Duffer, blue hair, old fart, coot, geezer, old fogy, spinster. These are just a few of the many negative slang terms we have for older people (Andreoletti, 2010; Barber, 2020; Nuessel, 1982). As Nuessel (1982) points out, the fact that American society has far fewer positive terms for older people (e.g., mature, veteran, venerable) indicates the presence of a strong individual and institutional ageism (Coupland & Coupland, 1993). A number of research reviews support Nuessel’s argument (Bytheway, 1995; Levin & Levin, 1980; McGuire, Klein, & Chen, 2008; Palmore, 1982). Butler (1980) has distinguished two types of ageism: benign and malignant. Benign ageism is a subtle type of prejudice that arises out of the conscious and unconscious fears and anxiety one has of growing old. Malignant ageism is a more pernicious stereotyping process in which older people are regarded as worthless. Like “old-­fashioned” racism (see Chapter 6), one is less likely to see blatant examples of malignant ageism in society today. Because of its subtle nature, benign ageism is much more common. In the following sections of this chapter, we explore the origins, maintenance, and reduction of both types of ageism.

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In American society, old age is perceived as virtually synonymous with decline and loss of physical and mental capacities. Stereotypes about older adults suggest that an older person is tired, slow, ill, forgetful, uninformed, isolated, and unproductive (­Nelson, 2016). Research suggests that Americans regard older adults as “warm but incompetent” (Cuddy & Fiske, 2002; Vale, Bisconti, & Sublett, 2019). Such perceptions lead them to treat older people with pity, but not respect. Television, movies, and books convey to children from a very young age a predominant stereotype of older people as isolated, inactive, asocial, poor, and disagreeable (Sorgman & Sorensen, 1984). Ageism is one of the most unnoticed and socially condoned forms of prejudice (Ansello, 1978; Falk & Falk, 1997; Nelson, 2005; Palmore, 1990). One needs to look no further than their local greeting card store to find such ageism. A pervasive theme in birthday cards is some variant of a sarcastic, negative comment about being another year older, or “over the hill.” Ageism is fostered by the focus on youth and all the characteristics of youth in American society. Billions of dollars a year are spent by people seeking to mask the signs of their aging through cosmetics, wigs, hair pieces, and plastic surgery. The clear message is that it is undesirable to be old.

POSITIVE ATTITUDES AND POSITIVE STEREOTYPES Some research suggests that society’s attitude toward older people is changing for the better. Bratt an Fagerstrom (2023) surveyed older adults and found that most older adults perceived society’s attitude toward them as neutral. So, these data indicate some movement from very negative to at least neutral attitudes. Bell (1992) found that media and, in particular, television portrayals of older people have changed in positive ways over the decades. Although television is in no way an accurate mirror of society at any given time, it does provide a glimpse into accepted images of groups, including older people. Many times, of course, these images are rife with stereotypes and negative connotations. Bell found that in the past, older people were portrayed as stubborn, eccentric, foolish, and comical characters. However, older lead characters in 1989’s most watched programs by the older (age 55 and over) demographic (i.e., Murder She Wrote, Matlock, Jake and the Fatman, In the Heat of the Night, and The Golden Girls) were portrayed as active, admired, powerful, affluent, and sexy. Bell concludes that these positive views—what he terms “positive stereotypes”—of older people are an improvement, and they help to reverse the past negative stereotypes of older people. Do positive stereotypes reverse negative ones? Are there any negative effects of such positive stereotypes? Potentially, yes there are. Palmore (1990) suggests that such positive stereotypes are indicative of what he calls “positive ageism,” which is prejudice and discrimination in favor of older adults. Positive ageism assumes that older people are in need of special care, treatment, or economic assistance. However, like the debate with affirmative action, some researchers suggest that because older people are better off medically and economically than they were in the past, special programs and policies that are geared toward older people should be made available to people of all ages (Neugarten, 1982). Essentially, any special discounts, benefits, or treatments that are available only to older persons and not to younger individuals constitutes age discrimination. Palmore identified eight common positive stereotypes people have of older people. Specifically, older people are believed to be kind, happy, wise, dependable, affluent,

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politically powerful, enjoying more freedom, and trying to retain their youth. However, there is little evidence to support the factual basis for any of these stereotypes. The reality is that older people are as likely as younger people to have these characteristics. If people do believe that older persons have these positive characteristics, why focus on this “positive stereotyping” as an undesirable thing? Doesn’t it lead to more positive attitudes? Not really. The majority of the research evidence suggests that people generally have more negative than positive views of older people and of aging (Kite & Johnson, 1988). Although there is no research that indicates that positive stereotyping leads to negative attitudes toward older people, there is much evidence to suggest that well-­ intentioned, positive stereotypes of older people—­what Palmore (1990) terms “pseudopositive attitudes”—can lead to patronizing language and behavior toward older people, and a loss of self-­esteem in older persons.

EFFECTS OF PSEUDOPOSITIVE ATTITUDES Patronizing Language Like the old saying goes, the road to hell is paved with good intentions. Oddly enough, people with very positive attitudes toward older people often seem to communicate with older people according to negative stereotypes about older persons. Two major types of negative communication have been identified by researchers: overaccommodation and baby talk (Bugental & Hehman, 2017). In overaccommodation, younger individuals become overly polite, speak louder and slower, exaggerate their intonation, have a higher pitch, and talk in simple sentences with elders (Giles, Fox, Harwood, & W ­ illiams, 1994). This is based on the stereotype that older people have hearing problems, decreasing intellect, and slower cognitive functioning. Overaccommodation also manifests itself in the downplaying of serious thoughts, concerns, and feelings expressed by older people (Grainger, Atkinson, & Coupland, 1990). Older adults are regarded by younger persons as “warm but incompetent” (Sublett, Vale, & Bisconti, 2022). In one study (­Kemper, 1994), caregivers at a nursing home were found to speak in simple, short sentences. They repeated their sentences and spoke slower to older adults. Interestingly, this pattern did not vary as a function of the cognitive state or physical health of the individual. What seemed to trigger this overaccommodating speech style was simply the age of the individual—­that is, all older persons were treated this way, which indicates a strong influence of a negative stereotype influencing the behavior of these caregivers. Later research has supported Kemper’s results with oncology physicians and medical students (Schroyen et al., 2018). A more negative, condescending form of overaccommodation is what is termed “baby talk” (Caporael, 1981). Baby talk is a “simplified speech register . . . [with] high pitch and exaggerated intonation” (Caporael & Culbertson, 1986, p.  99). As the term implies, people often use it to talk to babies (termed “primary baby talk”) but such intonation is also used when talking to pets, inanimate objects, and adults (termed “secondary baby talk”). In one of the first experiments on this phenomenon, Caporael filtered out the content of secondary baby talk directed to adults and had young adults attempt to differentiate it from primary baby talk. Participants were unable to distinguish between the two types of baby talk, which indicates that the only thing that distinguishes secondary baby talk from primary baby talk is the content. The exaggerated tone, simplified

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speech, and high pitch of the talk is virtually identical. Caporeal, Lukaszewski, and Culbertson (1983) found that older people who have lower functional abilities preferred secondary baby talk to other types of speech because it conveys a soothing, nurturing quality. This is interesting because older persons who have higher cognitive and social functioning regard secondary baby talk as disrepectful, condescending, and humiliating (Giles et al., 1994). In addition to these features, secondary baby talk is ageist and insulting because it connotes a dependency relationship (i.e., the target of the secondary baby talk is dependent on the speaker; Caporael & Culbertson, 1986). The use of this type of speech appears to be associated with the stereotype of all older persons as having deficits in cognitive abilities, and therefore needing special communication at a slower, simpler level. Cross-­c ultural research also indicates that both primary and secondary baby talk appear to be universal, occurring in small preliterate societies, as well as modern industrialized cities (Caporael & Culbertson, 1986).

Patronizing Behavior Because many physical changes happen to the body as we get older, appearance often provides a cue to trigger stereotypes of older people. As we get older, our movement and reflexes may become slower, our hair turns gray (or we may lose our hair), our skin becomes more wrinkled, and our sight and hearing may begin to worsen. Therefore, many people regard old age as a time of decreased function and ability, and any positive changes (in intellect and health) lie in one’s past, rather than the future (Lieberman & Peskin, 1992). In this very pessimistic view, then, life (and growth and vitality) lies behind the individual, rather than in front. We all show some physical signs of aging as we get older. Some individuals also show some mental signs of aging. It is the individuals who are more extreme in the signs that indicate physical and mental aging that are more likely to get noticed, remembered, and confirm stereotypes about old age (Montepare & Zebrowitz, 1998). Infantilization, one of the more pernicious stereotypes about older people, is the belief that elders are like children because of their inferior (to young and middle-­age adults) mental and physical abilities (Gresham, 1973; Marson & Powell, 2014). How do we treat children? We talk slowly to them, we use simple words, we help them with many things (assuming they can’t do the task by themselves), and we don’t consider their thoughts/opinions as seriously as those of another young (or middle-­age) adult. Older people are often treated in much the same way. Think of your images of boy (or girl) scouts. Now think of a busy intersection in a large city. Now think of an older man or woman standing waiting for the light to turn green to cross the street. It is likely that your next thought was “well, boy/girl scouts always try to do ‘good deeds,’ and helping an older person across the street is a great example of a good deed. So, they probably helped the older individual to cross the street.” Why would you think that? I never told you that the older person needed (or wanted) help, so why would it be “good” to try to help the person with a simple task like crossing the street? To many people, it seems self-­evident that most older people would welcome such an offer. However, many experiments in the altruism literature suggest that the reason the offer to help another can be misconstrued is that the offer implicitly suggests to the target that they need help (Newsom, 1999; Schroeder, Penner, Dovidio,

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& Piliavin, 1995). In other words, the recipient of the offer to help believes they are perceived as incompetent, unable, or otherwise impaired in their ability to perform the task. You say to yourself, “That’s strange, why would someone think that?” Try this. Think about how you might feel if you were the person waiting to cross the street, and someone else came up to you and offered to help you cross the street. You might feel angry, hurt, and maybe a loss of self-­esteem. This is precisely how many older adults feel when they are treated like children. In a society (such as the United States) that constantly reminds older persons that they are not highly valued, the older adult must struggle to maintain their self-­esteem and sense of dignity. Being offered help by others can undercut one’s self-­esteem and sense of competence and freedom. Of course, if one does not already have high self-­esteem, it would stand to reason that threats to self-­esteem wouldn’t be perceived as such. The research supports this idea. People with high self-­esteem are much less likely to request help than those with lower self-­esteem (Nadler & Fisher, 1986). In sum, patronizing behavior and even well-­intended offers of assistance can have negative consequences for the self-­esteem of the older individual.

Effects of Pseudopositive Attitudes on Older People According to Arluke and Levin (1984), infantilization creates a self-­f ulfilling prophecy in that older people come to accept and believe that they are no longer independent, contributing adults (they must assume a passive, dependent role; Butler, Lewis, & Sunderland, 1991). The acceptance of such a role and loss of self-­esteem (that one derives from feeling like a useful, valued member of society) in an older individual occurs gradually over their life, as they are continually exposed to society’s subtle and not-so-­subtle infantilization of older people (Ansello, 1978; Rodin & Langer, 1980). When older people come to believe and act according to these age myths and stereotypes, it then reinforces the maintenance of such stereotypes and treatment of older persons (Golub, Filipowicz, & Langer, 2002; Grant, 1996). The following is just one example of many cited by Arluke and Levin as evidence of the infantilization of older people: In a suburban small town newspaper, an article reported that the patients at a local nursing home “held their very own Christmas party.” The article went on to indicate that patients “planned the party, made the invitations, decorated the cookies made by the chef, and took part in the entertainment, which included a group singing Christmas carols.” The article thanked a local drugstore for supplying “Santa’s gifts.” The intentions were admirable, but the message rang loud and clear: Old people are like big children. (p. 9)

Arluke and Levin (1984) argue that by accepting such a role and the child-like behavior that accompanies such acceptance, older people are faced with three negative consequences. First, the social status of older people is diminished through the decrease in responsibility and increased dependency. Second, when society sees child-like behavior in an older person, it may feel “justified” in its use of psychoactive medication, institutionalization, or declaring legal incompetency. Finally, the political power of older people is reduced when older people come to believe their ability and impact on society is limited.

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The cumulative effect of hearing from others that one is “old” will eventually bring about “older” behavior and an “older self-image” in the older individual via a basic self-­fulfilling prophecy effect (Levy, 2003). This negative self-­perception about aging can have a strong connection to one’s overall physical health and longevity. A study by Levy, Slade, Kunkel, and Kasl (2002) found that older people with more positive self-­ perceptions about aging lived about 7.5 years longer than those with a more negative self-­perception of aging. In a series of studies, Giles and his colleagues (1994; Giles, Fox, & Smith, 1993) found that older adult targets of overaccommodation appear (to independent raters) to “instantly age” in that they look, talk, move, think, and sound older than control participants (those with no overaccommodation). Harris, Moniz, Sowards, and Krane (1994) reported that when undergraduates believed they were making a teaching video for an older partner (in another room), they were more overtly anxious, and showed signs of withdrawal and negative affect. Students who watched this videotape answered fewer questions correctly, rated the teacher less positively, and felt worse about their own performance. Older people who are the target of ageist attitudes report more feelings of depression and lack of purpose in life (Kim, Thyer, & Munn, 2019). They are less likely to engage in preventative healthy behaviors, longevity is decreased, cardioreactivity to stress is increased, and their recovery from illness is impaired (Mikton, de la Fuente-­Nunez, Officer, & Krug, 2021; Nelson, 2016c). These data represent indirect evidence for the notion that anxiety and negative expectancies directed toward an older target lead that target to also feel anxiety, generalized negative affect (about oneself and one’s young interaction partner), and suffer performance deficits as a result. This makes sense if we consider what Cooley (1902) said about the self. A major part of who we are, who we believe our “self” is, is derived from our social interactions (Cooley called this the “looking-­glass self”) and the feedback about our self that others give us. If you hear from your family, friends, society, and even professionals in overt and subtle ways that you are an older person with decreased abilities, you may start to believe it yourself. After all, what is the likelihood that they are all wrong and you are right? This is the insidious effect of ageism on the self-­concept of older individuals. Patronizing talk also affects the way older adults view other older adults. Giles and his colleagues (1993) also found that the older victim of patronizing talk was seen by older (but not young) raters as helpless, weak, and less alert. Why would older persons be harsher judges of one of their own than younger individuals? According to social identity theory (Tajfel & Turner, 1979), part of one’s self-­esteem is derived from the group memberships. Much research has shown that it is uncomfortable to have a member of one of those core groups verify negative stereotypes about that group. When that happens, the easiest way to protect one’s self-­esteem is to keep that group in high regard, and the best way to do this is to derogate the unusual member and distinguish them from the group as a nonmember (or a rare aberration). While it is certainly true that ageism can have a negative effect on one’s self-­esteem, it is fortunately not the case that all older persons have low self-­esteem. As a matter of fact, research suggests that the self-­esteem scores of older people living independently in the community tend to be almost double the scores found in high school students (­Cottrell & Atchley, 1969)! Why would this be the case? According to Atchley (1982), aging affects the self in three ways. First, one develops a stable self-­concept. The longer one has lived, the more opportunities one has had to test their self over various

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situations. Snyder’s (1987) research on self-­monitoring (the tendency to present different “selves” to others depending on the self-­presentation concerns of each situation) confirms this point. ­Snyder has found that as one gets older, one’s self-­monitoring scores drop, indicating a more stable, coherent self. Second, the reduction in the social roles one has as one gets older reduces the possibility for conflict between various aspects of the self. Third, aging is not a difficult period of working to develop oneself, but to simply maintain one’s self, roles, and abilities. Therefore, it appears that most older people have positive self-­images that are quite resistant to change or damage from others. So, what predicts a vulnerability to ageism, resulting in lower self-­esteem among some older persons? Atchley suggests that a likely factor is the lack of adequate defenses for the self. The more times one has confirmed one’s self, the stronger the negative information needed to make a dent in one’s positive self-image. However, some people never develop a firm concept of their self, and they are left feeling confused and acting inconsistently. These people can’t test who they are, and therefore are vulnerable to negative information about their self. Atchley also notes two other factors that contribute to a low self-­esteem among some older adults: loss of physical capacity, and loss of control over one’s environment.

AGEISM IN THE HELPING PROFESSIONS One might think that if there was any person who would be least likely to hold stereotypes about and be prejudiced against older persons, it would be those whose job it is to help older persons. Sadly, research has shown that counselors, educators, and medical professionals are just as likely to be prejudiced against older people as other individuals (Friedman & VanPuymbrouck, 2021; Kagan, 2017; Troll & Schlossberg, 1971). For example, Reyes-Ortiz (1997) suggested that many physicians have a negative or stereotypical view of their older patients. Specifically, older patients are often viewed by doctors as “depressing, senile, untreatable, or rigid” (p. 831). Physicians may feel frustrated or angry when confronted with cognitive or physical limitations of older people, and may approach treatment with a feeling of futility. Some researchers have argued that this ageist perspective among medical professionals may have resulted in the neglect shown to older patients in some nursing homes during the COVID-19 pandemic, and why some even regarded the physical vulnerability of older people to the COVID-19 virus with open hostility (e.g., #boomerremover; Monahan, Macdonald, Lytle, Apriceno, & Levy, 2020). Levenson (1981) argued that “medical students’ attitudes have reflected a prejudice against older persons surpassed only by their racial prejudice” (p. 161). He suggests that the medical community implicitly trains its doctors with an age bias against older patients, putting little value on geriatrics in the medical school curriculum, and approaching the treatment of older people with a noticeable degree of apathy or even disdain. Research supports Levenson’s contention. Madan, Aliabadi-­Wahle, and Beech (2001) found that medical students were significantly more likely to recommend breast-­conserving and reconstruction therapeutic options for younger than older patients. According to Levenson, doctors all too often think that because old age is unstoppable, illnesses that accompany old age are not that important, because such illnesses are seen as a natural part of the aging process. Schroyen and colleagues (2018) examined how physicians and medical students spoke

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to a fictitious older versus younger patient. The results showed that when the health care professionals spoke to the older patient, they used shorter sentences, repeated their sentences, and spoke slower, compared to how they spoke to the younger patient. Some research shows, however, that these negative attitudes about older patients can be reversed in medical professionals. Rababa, Alhawatmeh, Al Ali, and Kassab (2020) trained nurses via cognitive-­behavioral therapy to have more positive attitudes toward their older patients (and older people in general). Results showed, that compared to a control group, the nurses who underwent the therapy showed higher self-­esteem, and a greater reduction in their own death anxiety and greater reduction in ageism. Such promising results demonstrate a good potential solution to add to the training of health professionals working with older patients, to prevent the negative effects of ageism in their treatment of older patients. Curiously, the perpetuation of the myth of aging as a state of continual physical and cognitive decline leads to the continued treatment focus on disease management, versus prevention, and to decreased optimism about the prognosis of medical problems in old age (Madey & Gomez, 2003). Much evidence suggests that many of the “usual” disease processes associated with aging (e.g., osteoporosis, diabetes, blood pressure) can be changed and addressed proactively (Grant, 1996). Indeed, the expectation that older people have cognitive and physical deficits can be debilitating to the older individual in terms of self-­esteem and performance. However, age stereotypes don’t appear to impact the decision by older persons to use health and self-care information (Wagner & Wagner, 2003). calls a “reluctant therapist” when it comes to older clients, because of many pervasive stereotypes therapists may have about older people (e.g., older people don’t talk much, or they talk too much; Garfinkel, 1975; Lederman & Shefler, 2023). Even when presenting with the same symptoms, older persons are less likely than younger clients to get referred for psychiatric assessments (Bouman & Arcelus, 2001; Hillerbrand & Shaw, 1989). As an indicator of the presumption of a poorer prognosis for the older client, Ford and Sbordonne (1980) found that psychiatrists were more likely to recommend drug therapy rather than psychotherapy for the treatment of depression. Where do these ageist attitudes among mental health professionals come from? Nelson (2005) suggested that ageism may derive from our own anxiety about aging. Research by Caskie, Patterson, and Volkner (2022) supports this. They found that the higher one’s own anxiety about aging, the more likely they were to hold ageist attitudes and make age-­biased clinical decisions about their older clients. Gatz and Pearson (1988) suggest that this may not reflect “professional ageism,” but rather a tendency to exaggerate the competency and excuse the failings of older clients (in an effort to be nondiscriminatory). Because of methodological problems and mixed evidence for ageism in psychological services to older people (e.g., Dye [1978] found no ageism in diagnoses of depression, while Dobbin [2014] found that ageist psychology doctoral students held little interest in working with older adult clients), it is unclear whether there is a strong ageist bias among mental health professionals—­rather, it may be the case that therapists are more influenced by misconceptions about normal aging processes, and as such, ageist thinking can be addressed in clinical training with an increased emphasis on understanding the normal and abnormal aspects of the aging process (Fullen, 2018; Gatz & Pearson, 1988; Kane, 2002; Myers, 2007). The mixed data on the issue of ageism among psychological and medical therapists has led some researchers to the conclusion that the bias observed in the delivery of

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psychological services indicates not ageism but a “healthism” (stereotypes about individuals who are in poor physical health; Gekoski & Knox, 1990; James & Haley, 1995; Wyman, Shiovitz-­E zra, & Parag, 2019). In their national survey of doctoral-­level psychologists, James and Haley found that psychologists continue to rate the psychological prognosis of older individuals as worse than younger clients presenting with the same symptoms. These authors also found that psychologists gave worse interpersonal ratings for persons with poor physical health than those with no health problems. In a similar design with undergraduate raters, Gekoski and Knox found that only people in poor health were rated negatively on personality measures. This is a problem, however, because there is no reason why, for example, people in poor physical health should be rated worse on personality dimensions (i.e., generous–­selfish). Because older adults frequently present with health problems, this may bias psychologists in assessing the presence and extent of any mental health problems (Grant, 1996; James & Haley, 1995). Grant suggests several ways that elements of age bias (and healthism) among medical and psychological health care providers can be changed. Professionals need to (1) continually assess their own attitudes toward older people (Lederman & Shefler, 2023), (2) confront ageism and healthism where it arises, (3) institute geriatrics programs in hospitals and mental health practices, and (4) integrate into their training an increased moral sensitivity and a thorough knowledge of healthism and ageism (Arhiri, Gherman, & Holman, 2022), as well as become well versed on what happens when humans age. Related to this last point, professionals need to understand the flexibility of aging and the heterogeneity of older people as an age category (i.e., older people do not fit into one stereotype).

ORIGINS OF AGEISM A contributing factor to stereotyping and prejudice against older people is what Bunzel (1972) refers to as gerontophobia. This is defined as an irrational fear, hatred, and/or hostility toward older people. It is a fear of one’s own aging and of death. Because older persons are often associated with aging and dying, people displace their fear of death into stereotypes and prejudice toward older people, in an effort to distance themselves from death (Levin & Levin, 1980). Ageism may also be due to the increasing quality of medical care. Atchley (1977) suggested that because the life expectancy in industrialized societies has increased greatly over the centuries, death no longer appears to strike randomly at any age. Rather, we are much more likely to die later in life. As a result, old age has come to be associated with death.

Age Grading of Society Western society (the United States in particular) has developed to separate the generations in a way that is “contrary to the natural state of living” (Peacock & Talley, 1984, p. 14). In school, we learn to play only with children our own age. We learn that we need to be a certain age to vote, drive a car, drink alcohol, get married, and retire. This age grading (also called “age stratification”) of society communicates implicit and explicit expectations (i.e., age norms) about behaviors that are expected and appropriate at various ages (Palmore, 1990). Age grading has tremendous implications for the attitudes we

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have toward members of society, and for the opportunities and quality of life people enjoy. In some cultures, older people are held in the highest regard and hold positions of power and leadership (these are often—but not always—­more primitive cultures). Such societies are referred to as gerontocratic societies (Palmore, 1990). In the United States, however, middle-­age individuals are more likely to hold such respect and power, compared to younger and older persons.

From Sage to Burden Older people haven’t always been perceived in a negative light. In most prehistoric and agrarian societies, older people were often (but not always) held in high regard, holding positions of power, respect, and high social status. Elders were the teachers. They passed on norms, culture, traditions, values, and religious beliefs to the younger members of their society. In such societies, older people were almost universally accorded some prestige (Branco & Williamson, 1982). During biblical times, people who lived to an old age (i.e., age 50 or older was old at that time) were said to be given a long life by God to fulfill a divine purpose (Branco & Williamson, 1982). In prerevolutionary America, attitudes toward older people were also positive. Living to old age was still a fairly rare event (only 2% of the population lived to age 60 or older), and older people were respected as sage and powerful individuals (power due to a greater likelihood of land ownership and positions of power as a result of their elder status; Secouler, 1992). However, the time period between 1770 and 1850 heralded a changing attitude toward older people. With great advances in medicine, people lived longer, and this created a new, large population of older adults that the younger society was not prepared to deal with. Society began to associate old age with negative qualities and older people were seen no longer as wise teachers, but as nonproductive burdens, to be marginalized into the fringes of society. This negative view of older people as burdens also has an associated negative effect for the perceiver: a greater risk of becoming depressed (Bai, Lai, & Guo, 2016). As a result of the change toward a youth-­oriented culture that coincided with the industrial revolution, older people no longer had a productive, valued role in society. Society institutionalized this ageism in forced retirement at age 65 (McCann & Giles, 2002; McDonald, 2013). Consider this for a moment. Much research indicates that a large part of how we define ourselves is tied to what we do for our career (Deaux, 1996). We are what we do, and when our occupation is suddenly gone, it can be a very difficult process to learn new roles for oneself. Before retirement, an older person can feel that they are a valued member of society because they are contributing and producing for society. For many older individuals, depression often sets in when they believe that because they are no longer employed, they are a worthless burden to society (Wigdor, 1983). Indeed, this depression can exact a severe toll. As Wigdor explains, “The grief associated with loss of work and the loss of power in our society for men who identified closely with their positions in the corporate structures, and its relation to depression, is evidenced by the relatively high suicide rate in White males over 65” (p. 53). Related to this line of research is an interesting model of the origins of ageism proposed by North and Fiske (2012, 2013a, 2013b, 2015). According to this view, young people develop negative attitudes and prejudice toward older adults because those older adults violate society’s expectations of succession, identity, and consumption (SIC). In succession, the researchers refer to “succession of enviable resources.” With identity,

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North and Fiske refer to “avoiding symbolic identity invasions,” and consumption entails “limiting consumption of shared resources” (North & Fiske, 2013a, p. 270). In other words, younger people come to dislike older people who are perceived to be selfishly holding on to resources (e.g., not passing on their assets to the next generation, or working past the age of retirement, thereby denying a job to a younger person; Munnell & Wu, 2012); acting in age-­inappropriate ways that threaten the identity of younger persons; and using valuable, finite resources (e.g., taxes spent on programs for older adults, social security, or money spent on health care for older adults; Binstock, 2010). In a number of studies, North and Fiske (2012, 2013a) have shown that younger people have more positive attitudes toward older adults who are perceived to adhere to cultural prescriptions for behavior along the SIC model. Those older adults who violate the SIC prescriptions are viewed quite negatively by younger persons. In an interesting series of experiments, Martin and North (2022) found that egalitarian younger people are often still quite ageist. The authors found that while subjects were less prejudiced toward (and more supportive of) women and minorities, they were more prejudiced against, and less likely to advocate for, older people. The authors further show results that support the notion that this effect is driven by the SIC model. Specifically, the subjects tended to agree that older people block younger people from receiving necessary resources and opportunities. The SIC model has been a fruitful area of research on the question of the origins of ageism, and it represents an interesting area of research that deserves further exploration.

Modernization According to this theory, older people have lost prestige and respect due to the modernization of society. Before modernization, there was a strong emphasis on close ties with an extended family, but after modernization, the fundamental structure of society changed. The close bonds were likely to be severed and the normal family unit was changed from an extended family to a nuclear family (parents and children, no grandparents living in the same household). Tradition, culture, and values were valued and passed on by older adults before modernization. Older people no longer were a rarity (due to improvements in medicine), so their status diminished. Retirement became popular and part of society as a way of focusing the efforts of society on youthful, strong, and fast workers. Finally, experience in a position was not as valuable as being able to adapt to new approaches, new technologies, and to conceptualize new approaches for the future (Branco & Williamson, 1982). While modernization is an intuitively appealing theory, research investigating its explanatory power has yielded mixed results. More on this in the cross-­c ultural section later.

Idealism According to idealism, the increasingly negative attitudes toward older people did not come about with the industrial revolution (circa 1850), but between 1770 and 1840, when the American and French revolutions took place (Branco & Williamson, 1982). While before this period older people were revered and respected, the revolution sparked a social and political change that demanded equality and liberty. No longer were elders held in superior status and higher regard by virtue of their age—­rather, as the constitution

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stated, the new philosophy for the government and the new American society was that “all men are created equal.” The moral authority of older people to dictate what happened to their families was eliminated in the emphasis on personal liberty (Branco & Williamson, 1982). No longer did the society value tradition (and, by association, its elders, who represent the past and traditions). Instead, there was a high value placed on innovation, change, and new ideas (Branco & Williamson, 1982). According to an idealist perspective then, a change in values and beliefs, not social structures, was the most influential force leading to the negative change in attitudes toward older people. Like modernization, idealism also holds much utility as an explanatory mechanism for understanding the change in attitudes toward older people. However, there are some aspects of this theory that are not supported by the research literature. For example, idealism suggests that within any historical period, it is unlikely that a society will hold both positive and negative views of older people. Yet, the bulk of the research literature suggests that Americans and Japanese (for example) hold very mixed attitudes toward elders.

MAINTENANCE OF AGEISM Functional Perspective A popular approach to understanding stereotyping is to examine the motivations that underlie the formation and use of stereotypes. In other words, what are the motivations that drive stereotyping? Perhaps by understanding the motives that are served, researchers can investigate techniques aimed at reducing the prevalence of stereotypes. Because young persons eventually (in the normal course of life) become members of the outgroup “older persons,” it would seem to be a threat to one’s self to hold negative attitudes about older people (Snyder & Meine, 1994). The reasons for maintaining negative attitudes are questions of motives. One way researchers have tried to understand motives for ageist thinking is through the understanding of the functions of the ageist attitudes. Examining the functions of a motive entails looking at the needs, goals, reasons, and purposes that influence a person’s thoughts, feelings, and behaviors (Edwards & Wetzler, 1998; Snyder, 1993). Snyder and Meine suggest that, in order to understand the function of a particular stereotype, it is important to ascertain the role of the target of the stereotype, the context in which the stereotype was formed and applied, and the role of the person applying the stereotype. With regard to the functional basis of stereotypes of older people, some data suggest that such stereotypes serve an ego-­protective function for the individual—­that is, while other dominant functional interpretations have been offered (i.e., cognitive economy, and the social/cultural orientation function of stereotypes), it appears that a more likely (but not the only) function for stereotypes of older people is that they help individuals deny the self-­t hreatening aspects of old age (i.e., that one will lose status and self-­esteem, become physically frail, and eventually die). This is accomplished by blaming the older individuals themselves for their condition, rather than the aging process itself. Thus, the young perceiver can hold on to the illusion that they will not go through the same aging process. Edwards and Wetzler (1998) found evidence to support Snyder and Meine’s (1994) functionalist perspective on ageism. Their evidence suggests that when people encounter others who represent threats to their self (i.e., for younger persons, the older outgroup

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represents such a threat in that their undesirable attributes represent a possible future for the young perceiver), their perceptions of and behaviors toward the threatening individual (or that individual’s group as a whole) are more likely to be negative. Edwards and Wetzler discuss this in terms of Markus and Nurius’s (1986) notion of “possible selves.” Specifically, we all have perceptions and images of possible future selves that represent what we might become, and (importantly for the purposes of this discussion) what we are afraid of becoming. Thoughts about the salience of any of those possible selves can induce certain moods, motivate goal-­directed behavior, or influence attitudes toward those possible futures. Edwards and Wetzler suggest that, by reacting negatively to older people, their young participants were able to reduce the anxiety associated with considering older people as a future ingroup, and therefore they were able to psychologically distance themselves from older people and reduce the perceived threat to their self (and self-image as a young person) (See also Frazier et al., 2000). These results support the functionalist perspective that thoughts of future ingroups can exert a strong influence on one’s behavior, thoughts, and feelings in the present social context.

Conflict According to this perspective, parts of society are not seen as working for the greater whole of society. Conflict theory views society as composed of competing groups (racial, religious, rich vs. poor, etc.). The question conflict theorists ask about some societal phenomenon is “Who benefits from this social phenomenon?” Conflict theory proposes a different perspective on the existence of institutions such as retirement. There are definite pluses and negatives for retirement. Most negative, however, is the loss of the status as a working (contributing) individual. People who don’t work are assumed to be lazy, incompetent, or unintelligent. Stereotypes of older people are seen as serving the interests of the young and upper class (Branco & Williamson, 1982).

Self‑Threat, Self‑Esteem, and Terror Management “The average elderly person experiences a series of ‘little deaths of the spirit’“ (Secouler, 1992, p. 197). Secouler’s view suggests that almost every older person experiences some form of humiliation. The literature on aging supports this view. The aging process in the United States certainly seems to subject the aging individual to negative expectations, lowered status, discrimination and stereotyping, infantilization, and, unfortunately not surprisingly, declining self-­esteem. While research has explored in some detail gender and ethnic identity, little empirical attention has been devoted to understanding how aging affects our self-­concepts (Montepare & Zebrowitz, 1998). Just as possible selves (roles) have implications for how the young view older people, so too do they influence how older people view themselves. Linville (1987) found that the more possible selves one has, the more easily that person can handle challenging or threatening self-­relevant information. Some research has indicated that young and older persons are more likely to stereotype young people in terms of a variety of features, whereas elders are primarily stereotyped in terms of their age (Bassili & Reil, 1981). Taken together with the loss of the various selves one has as one gets older, this certainly can adversely influence the older individual’s self-­esteem. In other words, as one ages, they lose various roles, the self-­conceptions from which self-­esteem can be

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derived. As discussed earlier, much of our self-­concept is tied into our work-­related self and our feelings of “usefulness” or contribution to society (Markus & Herzog, 1991). The experiences of retirement, bereavement, and other physical changes associated with old age may impair one’s sense of control over one’s life and surroundings (Rodin & Langer, 1980), and negatively influence one’s self-­esteem. To the degree that other possible selves are available (i.e., losing the work role at retirement, but maintaining active community involvement; parent/spouse role), self-­relevant threatening information should have a diminished impact. However, it appears that older persons often have few possible selves with which to deflect self-­threatening information, and therefore they are more susceptible to diminished self-­esteem and depression. Some research suggests that older persons tend to adaptively preserve their current self, and they do not really engage in fearing what they might become (i.e., worrying about a feared future possible self), and they also do not strive for unattainable possible selves (Frazier, Hooker, Johnson, & Kaus, 2000). In this way, balance, continuity, and stability help the older individual maintain a better-­adjusted psychological, emotional, and even physiological state (e.g., greater perceived—­and in some cases, actual—­control over their body’s health and susceptibility to illness; see Taylor, Helgeson, Reed, & Skokan, 1991). Another perspective that has addressed the issue of the relationship between self-­ esteem and aging is terror management theory (TMT; Greenberg, Pyszczynski, & Solomon, 1986; Pyszczynski, Greenberg, Solomon, Arndt, & Shimel, 2004; Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1991a, 1991b). According to TMT, culture and religion are creations that impose order and meaning on the world, and this staves off the frightening thoughts of one’s mortality and the chaotic, random nature of existence. Self-­esteem is derived from the perception that one has a meaningful purpose in that world. As we go through childhood, we learn to associate being good with being safe and getting rewarded with parental approval. Being good (and feeling good about oneself as a result) means being protected. Self-­esteem therefore becomes an anxiety buffer in that it helps to deny one’s mortality. With this brief background, it should become apparent that TMT has implications for stereotyping and prejudice, and specifically how outgroups are viewed (Solomon, Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 2000). As mentioned above, an outgroup for the young is older people. Theory and empirical evidence discussed earlier suggest that one reason stereotypes of older people exist and are maintained is that older people are anxiety-­ provoking reminders to the young of their own impending mortality (Barnett & Adams, 2018; Galton, Hammond, & Stinchcombe, 2022; O’Connor & McFadden, 2012). As Solomon et al. (1991) suggest, when their mortality is made salient to them, young people will be especially negative in their reactions to outgroups (Bodner, Shrira, Bergman, Cohen-­Fridel, & Grossman, 2015; Boudjemadi & Gana, 2012). Bergman and Segel-­ Karpas (2021) found that, for middle-­age persons with greater levels of aging anxiety, depression, and loneliness, they also showed higher levels of ageism. Thus, from a TMT perspective, because older people remind the young of their impending mortality, they are regarded by the young negatively (cast as unusual, or defective persons who brought their own fate—age—upon themselves) in order to deny the intense anxiety that is brought about by thoughts of one’s mortality (Bodner, 2009). One interesting prediction based on the assumptions of TMT is that younger people who have death anxiety from their mortality being made salient should be more inclined

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to engage in behavior that makes them feel stronger and more invulnerable to death. To test this idea, Popham, Kennison, and Bradley (2011) measured ageist attitudes and behaviors in 408 undergraduates, along with their risk-­taking behavior. The researchers found that the more ageist the individual was, the greater the likelihood they were also engaging in risk-­taking behaviors, such as drug use. TMT represents a compelling, fascinating perspective on ageism (see Greenberg, Helm, Maxfield, & Schimel, 2017, for a review), and certainly much more research is needed on the specific relationship of the theory to the understanding of the origins, maintenance, and reduction of ageism.

JUVENILE AGEISM Just as young and middle-­age individuals can hold prejudices and stereotypes about older people, so too can middle-­age and older people stereotype the young. This reversal of the way people normally think of ageism has been referred to as juvenile ageism (­Westman, 1991). Juvenile ageism occurs in the “denial of personhood” of children, by adults who assume that children cannot make decisions for themselves, do not work, must be taught to learn, are not intelligent individuals, cannot cope with daily life without assistance, and do not know what is best for themselves (Bytheway, 1995). Although society has a much more difficult time perceiving such prejudice against the young, there is a fair amount of empirical evidence to suggest that it exists, and children are affected by it. For example, Giles and Williams (1994) found that young people perceive that older persons often speak to them in patronizing ways, which elicited feelings of annoyance and irritation. Young persons perceived three general types of patronizing speech: nonlistening, disapproving, and overparenting, with disapproval communicating the most negative intent. Giles and his colleagues (1994) found that patronizing speech from one direction (e.g., from a young person to an older person) is often matched by the recipient in the other direction in order to communicate their irritation at being spoken to in a patronizing way. It appears that we respect people more when they stand up to our patronizing speech. Harwood, Giles, Fox, Ryan, and Williams (1993) found that people who are assertive respondents to patronizing speech are rated as more controlling, of higher status, and less nurturing. So why would adults be prejudiced toward or stereotype young people? Do older adults dread young people, in much the same way as many researchers propose that ageism against older people is due to an underlying fear of aging? Perhaps ageism by older or middle-­age people against young persons may not be an indication of dread per se, but this sort of ageism may represent anger at the fact that they are no longer young (Butler, 1980). On the other hand, ageism against young people may also arise because young people remind middle-­age and older adults of the burden of the responsibility of children and their dependency on adults (Westman, 1991). Zebrowitz and Montepare (2000) suggest that the reason stereotypes about young people have received little empirical attention is that they are so widely accepted. Teenagers are seen as moody, irresponsible, and rebellious. Interestingly, even adolescents seem to endorse stereotypes about their age group. Despite the stereotypes about adolescents, and the stigma of being seen by society as “too young” for a number of roles and privileges, adolescents do not seem to suffer diminished self-­esteem (O’Malley & Bachman, 1983).

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BELIEFS AND EXPECTATIONS ABOUT OLD AGE Beliefs and Expectations of Young People about Aging Older people in society are perceived by younger people to possess undesirable mental, physical, and behavioral characteristics (Bennett, 1976; Robinson & Howatson-­Jones, 2014). Specifically, older people are often seen as being rigid in thought and values, slow in movement, aimless, a burden to family and society, behind the times, silly, and disagreeable (Barrow & Smith, 1979; Falk & Falk, 1997; Tuckman & Lorge, 1953). Meltzer (1962) asked 141 males (all under age 60) to name which years of life are the worst. The results indicated that 80.3% of the participants said that the worst time in one’s life is from age 60 on. Because these respondents weren’t in that age group, their answers communicate their strong negative expectations for life beyond age 60. In their study of adolescents’ views of aging, Kastenbaum and Durkee (1964) found that adolescents tend to focus on the present, and considered their distant future (i.e., their older adult years) as a negative time in their lives, with little promise, and little importance. These beliefs appear to be present from very early in a person’s childhood. Children (from nursery school to sixth grade) generally have few positive views of old age, have little contact with older people, and fear old age because of its association with death (Jantz, Seefeldt, Caalper, & Serock, 1976). As a result of the little contact many children have with older people, much of children’s knowledge of older people is gained through their school books. Unfortunately, these books can be (and often are) biased against elders. Ansello (1978) examined 656 books for grades K–3 and found that only 16.00% contained an older character. Only 4.00% of those books had an older person as the main character. Older people were often portrayed as retired, problem creators (rarely problem solvers), and dependent. Interestingly, children’s books mirror the ambivalence of society’s attitudes toward older people. Ansello’s data indicated that the most frequent personality descriptors for an older person were poor (17.30%), sad (6.77%), wise (4.51%), and dear (3.76%). Isaacs and Bearison (1986) found that children as young as 4 tended to speak less to older than to middle-­age adults, and they looked at older people less and initiated fewer conversations. Programs that bring children into more frequent contact with older people (such as foster grandparents) can have a strong impact on stereotypes about old age, thereby reducing the likelihood of negative attitudes toward older people as the child grows to adulthood (Glass & Trent, 1980; Murphey, Myers, & Drennan, 1982). Some data also suggest that a child’s relationship with their mother is predictive of whether they will be ageist. Specifically, Kennison and Byrd-­Craven (2020) found that children who have an avoidant attachment style and overall negative relationship with their mother are more likely to be ageist.

Expectations of Older People about Aging Rothbaum (1983) asked young (ages 30–45) and older (ages 55–70) participants to rate the degree to which older and young people possess various positive and negative characteristics. Results from three studies indicated that older persons had a much more positive view of the characteristics associated with older people than did younger respondents (see Wentura & Brandtstadter, 2003, for similar findings). Rothbaum suggests that this may reflect an attempt of older people to maintain their self-­esteem or to obtain

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higher status. This is indeed a possibility, as we examine later in a discussion of TMT (Greenberg et al., 1986). On the other hand, data collected by Brewer and Lui (1984) present a different view of how older people view themselves. Brewer and Lui found that older individuals (ages 70 and older) held the same negative stereotypes about the category “senior citizen” as did younger persons. However, when asked to assign personality traits to people in a “like-me” category, older participants made many complex and specialized trait assignments, suggesting a greater differentiation (individuation) for persons in the older individual’s own subgroup. These results fit well with what we know about the basic processes involved in the outgroup homogeneity bias. But wait, aren’t the results of Rothbaum’s studies and those of Brewer and Lui at odds? Rothbaum’s data suggest that older people have a positive view of older people, while Brewer and Lui found that older people have a negative view of the category “senior citizens.” Who is “right”? Before we address this question, consider the seminal work by Neugarten (1974) on the lack of homogeneity among older people. Neugarten (1974) made an important distinction between what she calls the “young-old” and the “old-old.” The young-old are those individuals between the ages of 55 and 75. A majority of the young-old are active, economically independent, healthy, and still working. Many still have living parents, which also contributes to their feeling of youthfulness. The old-old are those individuals who are 75 and older. Neugarten suggested that many of society’s negative stereotypes about older people (e.g., being sick, poor, slow, miserable, disagreeable, and sexless) are actually derived from perceptions of the old-old, and are especially inaccurate generalizations of the young-old. In one study designed to examine these differentiations between the types of elders, Hummert, Garstka, Shaner, and Strahm (1995) found that young, middle-­age, and older individuals tended to choose older ages (i.e., the “old-old”) for negative stereotypes (e.g., “severely impaired”), especially for stereotypes associated with health problems (indicating the healthism discussed earlier), and they associated younger age ranges (the “young-old”) with positive stereotypes (e.g., “activist”). Neugarten’s (1974) analysis helps us address the apparent divergent findings of Rothbaum (1983) versus Brewer and Lui (1984). Rothbaum asked participants to rate, on a Likert-­t ype scale, the degree to which the age-­stereotyped (positive and negative) traits were characteristic of 30- to 45-year-olds or 55- to 70-year-olds. There are a few problems with the design of Rothbaum’s study in particular that may explain the data he obtained. First, the older participants were asked to do a forced-­c hoice type of questionnaire, in which the trait had to be characteristic of either 30- to 45-year-olds or 55- to 70-year-olds (or equally characteristic of each group). This is a problem in that previous research suggests that positive and especially negative age-­stereotyped characteristics are associated with the old-old. The older participants were exactly in the young-old category, and yet had to associate the old-old age-­stereotyped older person characteristics with their ingroup. Given this design, it may not be surprising that when one is asked to rate the characteristics that one has just associated with one’s ingroup, the ratings will be positive. This is certainly consistent with an ingroup bias. It may very well be that Rothbaum would have obtained results similar to Brewer and Lui had he allowed his participants to associate the age-­stereotyped older person characteristics with an oldold outgroup (i.e., age 75 or older). In other words, the young-old persons likely would have endorsed negative stereotypes of the old-old outgroup and (as in Rothbaum’s 1983 studies) associated more positive characteristics with their own young-old ingroup. You

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may be thinking, “OK, but why did Brewer and Lui’s older participants (age 70 or older, in the young-old category) associate negative stereotyped characteristics with their own ingroup?” Good question, but consider the setup of the study (in particular, study 2) and the answer becomes clear. The older participants (all women) were asked to sort characteristics into piles on the basis of whether they were “like me,” “like other old people,” or “like young women.” As you can see, when deciding whether to associate stereotypical older person characteristics with oneself or “other old people,” people are much more likely (as Brewer & Lui and others, have found) to associate stereotypes with a general outgroup than with oneself. In other words, if the young-old participant had to choose whether some negative stereotypes about older people fit themselves personally, they tended to say they are not ‘like me.’ These respondents said they were characteristic of “other old people” because these young-old participants don’t think they are in the “old person” (specifically, the old-old) category. There is some evidence that suggests that those in the old-old age range view their experiences with ageism and their reactions to such treatment significantly differently from those in the young-old category. In one study, Nelson (2004) mailed 3,000 ageism surveys to older adult volunteers throughout California—852 surveys were returned, and an analysis of the responses showed that respondents in the young-old age range were significantly more likely to say that they have experienced ageism. Moreover, those who did report ageist treatment said that they reacted with anger at such prejudiced behavior. On the other hand, few if any respondents in the old-old range said that they had experienced ageism, and those that did report such experiences said that such treatment was not perceived as ageist. Nelson suggested that this difference in reactions lies in the degree to which older adults have internalized ageist stereotypes as “true” about themselves. Young-old people do not see themselves as old, which explains why they react with anger when treated like those about whom the stereotypes are really describing (the old-old). However, the old-old have “bought into” the “truth” of age stereotypes, believing that they are not stereotypes at all, but rather accurate statements about the actual state of being old. Thus, the old-old are less likely to identify ageist behavior as ageism, and when they identify such behavior, they don’t react with anger, because it is not perceived as pernicious, but simply young people treating older people based on how they “really” are (frail, confused, slow, grumpy, etc.). Research by Clarke and Korotchenko (2016) finds supporting evidence for this internalization interpretation in terms of differences between the two groups of older people in how they react to ageist treatment.

AGE DISCRIMINATION As a result of the stereotype of old age as a period of decline and decreased ability, and due to the increased youth-­oriented nature of Western society, older people in the United States find themselves a frequent victim of age discrimination when they apply for, or try to maintain, employment. Rosen and Jerdee (1976) found that business managers had a very negative view of older (age 60) workers compared to younger (age 30) workers. They believed that older people were less adaptable, less capable, and more rigid. They were seen as slower (physically and mentally) and less capable of learning new ideas. However, they were viewed as more trustworthy, reliable, and dependable.

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Berde and Mago (2022) sent out job applications from two fictitious applicants for two different positions. For each position, they had constructed essentially identical qualifications, active LinkedIn webpages, and active email addresses for correspondence with the hiring agent. The only difference in the applicants was the age: 34 versus 60. The researchers wanted to know who would be more likely to receive an invitation for an interview. Results showed that the younger applicant was 2.2 times more likely to be invited for an interview. In a meta-­ analysis of age discrimination studies, Finkelstein, Burke, and Raju (1995) found that younger participants (ages 17–29) tended to rate younger workers more favorably than older workers. The researchers also found support for Rosen and Jerdee’s (1976) results in that younger participants rated older workers as more stable than young workers. However, older raters (ages 30–60) showed no such ingroup bias: They did not show a bias against any age group. There are two major problems with these findings. First, the age groups were not as conceptually clear as we would like them to be. This is especially true for the “older” workers. In the study, young and middle-­age adults are lumped into the older person age group. A better solution would be to have the older workers limited to individuals ages 55–75 or 75 and older. Second, a major confound was the difference between the young and old participants. The young participants were all students, while the older participants were all business managers. This may be a likely explanation for why the older participants showed no preference in assigning personality traits to workers in each age group, and why they did not seem to rely on age stereotypes in their judgments. Finkelstein (1997) asked 324 managers from various companies to evaluate different job applications. She found that older workers (age 59) were perceived as less interpersonally skilled, less beneficial to an organization, and were less likely to be interviewed than younger applicants (age 28). Some research shows that this workplace ageism also harms the ageist individual. Paleari, Brambilla, and Fincham (2019) found that ageist attitudes worsened the quality of intergroup contact, increased counterproductive behaviors toward their coworkers, and reduced identification with the company. Frequently, older people are not hired, are not promoted to positions of more responsibility, or have their employment terminated due to stereotyped conceptions of the mental (and physical) abilities of older individuals. However, it is not inaccurate to say that people show varying degrees of cognitive decline as they age. Yet, many older individuals show great mental acuity and a sharp intellect. How is this possible? According to Hambrick, Salthouse, and Meinz (1999), the reason that the work performance of older people doesn’t decline even when there is some cognitive decline is that many jobs are based on knowledge and experience more than cognitively based skills, like reasoning. Other researchers have found research to contradict the old saying, “You can’t teach an old dog new tricks.” Czaja and Sharit (1998) found that older people were perfectly able to learn new computer tasks in their research. These experiments also revealed that while older people do tend to do their work slower than younger people, they tended to be very accurate in their work. Despite the fact that many older persons experience little if any declines in memory and other cognitive abilities, the stereotypes of older people and the feedback elders receive from others about expected declines in their physical and cognitive functioning lead many older persons to “buy into” the stereotype of old age. This, coupled with the negative view of old age that has pervaded American society, leads many elders to

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look to their future with grim resignation. How do older persons deal with information that they are getting older? There are three reactions older persons tend to have. First, older persons may accept their aging with confidence, optimism, and an active, vibrant lifestyle. Second, they may attempt to deny such information by cognitively identifying with a younger age group. Third, they may simply avoid the possibility of such age-­ related feedback altogether. As an example of this last reaction, consider the reactions of many older persons who were contacted by phone for a study of memory (and, unknown to potential participants, of test anxiety; Whitbourne, 1976). As Whitbourne writes, Nine of the forty persons who had been telephoned refused to participate altogether. Five of these said that they were refusing because they did not want to be tested on anything. Three more elders agreed to volunteer on the phone, but refused when they arrived for testing and saw that it was a memory task (the experiment had been referred to as a study on “adult learning” over the phone). Another five persons went partly through the first trial, but would go no further. They complained that they did not want their memory tested, that they were fatigued, and that the task was more difficult than they had expected. Four other elders managed to complete the experiment, but exhibited severe emotional reactions. (p. 207)

Clearly, it appears that many of these older individuals did not want information about their memory that had the potential to suggest that their abilities were declining. Moreover, there may be another motive behind their refusal to do the memory task. Some of these participants may have felt the threat of confirming a stereotype about older people (i.e., that older people are often confused, forgetful, and cognitively slower than younger persons). As discussed in Chapter 7, Steele (1995) has found that one reason members of stereotyped groups perform poorly on behavioral and cognitive measures of ability may be due to the increased anxiety felt in the testing situation. The anxiety experienced by the minority-­g roup member may be triggered by a fear of poor performance on the task, thereby confirming a negative stereotype about the individual’s ingroup.

PROMINENCE OF AGE AS A VARIABLE IN SOCIAL PERCEPTION Leading theories of social perception suggest that certain features about a person are more likely to be noticed than others, and as a result, these features form the basis for categorization of the individual (Brewer, 1988; Fiske & Neuberg, 1990). In other words, when we see an individual, the most immediately noticeable features are the person’s race, gender, and age group. Because these three variables are most consistently used to process information about another individual, some researchers refer to these as primitive categories (Hamilton & Sherman, 1994). There is some debate about whether researchers should accord such primary status to these variables, and not others (eye color, height, etc.). However, much research attests to the fact that when certain variables are consistently used in processing social information—­such as age, gender, and race— these variables are more accessible as a category for future categorization (Bargh, 1994). The more these categories are used, the more “automatically” they are activated to process social information. Is age as automatically activated as other salient characteristics of an individual, such as gender and race?

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Research by Perdue and Gurtman (1990) suggests that age is indeed an automatically activated category for processing social information. Participants were presented with a random sequence of positive and negative traits on a computer screen, and were asked to determine whether the trait was a “good” or “bad” quality to have, and indicate their decision by pressing an appropriate key on the keyboard. Immediately prior to the presentation of each word, participants were presented with a priming word. The priming word (either “old” or “young”) was presented for 55 milliseconds, and then “masked” (overwritten) with the target trait. The researchers wanted to discover whether the subliminal presentation of the prime would make that category more accessible for processing the traits, and if so, would it facilitate positive or negative traits? Before we find out, it is important to understand the basis for the hypotheses and the method. This experiment is based upon the popular “spreading activation network model” of memory (Collins & Quillian, 1969), which states that memory is organized into a network or web of associated concepts, called “nodes.” Each time a node is “activated” (thought about consciously or unconsciously), the related concepts are activated. The stronger the link, or association between the node and its related concept, the faster the related concept is activated. The question for our purposes here is Does thinking about “older person” make positive or negative associated traits more accessible? Simply put: Is the nature of our concept of older people predominantly negative, or positive? Now for the results (see Figure 8.1). The data indicated that when the old prime was presented, negative traits were much more accessible (faster reaction time for the trait judgment task) than when the young prime was presented. Conversely, when the young prime was presented, positive traits were much more accessible than when the old prime was presented.

Reaction Time (ms)

1100 1080 1060 1040

Positive traits

1020

Negative traits

1000 980

Old

Priming Word

Young

FIGURE 8.1.  Automatic ageism. When Perdue and Gurtman (1990) primed participants with the word “old,” they were faster at recognizing negative trait words, relative to the recognition of the same words among those primed with the word “young.” When people were primed with the word “young,” they were quicker to recognize positive trait words. Those primed with the word “old” were much slower to recognize positive trait words. These data support the notion that merely thinking about a category label can activate stereotype-­consistent (negative) information when the category describes an outgroup, and positive, ingroup-­f lattering information when the category is one’s ingroup. From Perdue, C. W., & Gurtman, M. B. (1990). Evidence for the automaticity of ageism. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 26, 199–216. Copyright © 1990 Elsevier. Reprinted with permission.

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These results indicate that when age categories are activated, even outside of conscious awareness, they have a strong influence on the way social information is processed. Perdue and Gurtman (1990) suggest that these data indicate an “automatic ageism” because the concept of “old” facilitates accessibility to negative traits in an unconscious and unintentional fashion. In other words, it appears to be the case that, for most people in the United States, when we encounter (or think of) an older individual, we are most likely to think of negative characteristics associated with that age group, and this may negatively influence how we perceive the individual. Maybe some of the participants in Perdue and Gurtman’s (1990) experiments were prejudiced toward older people. How do we know that their “automatic ageism” reflected an unintentional negative bias against older people? We don’t know that, because Perdue and Gurtman did not assess their participant’s consciously held attitudes toward older people. In an experiment by Hense, Penner, and Nelson (1995) on implicit stereotyping of older people, participants showed greater implicit memory for words consistent with negative stereotypes about older people, than for words inconsistent with such stereotypes. This supports Perdue and Gurtman’s findings. Additionally, Hense et al. found that there were no differences between those high and low in conscious prejudice toward older people with respect to the degree of implicit memory for negative stereotypes. These results support the assertion that implicit (or unconscious) cognition operates independently of conscious cognition with respect to stereotypes (Devine, 1989; ­Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). With respect to age categories, both high- and low-­prejudice individuals are more likely to have access to (or knowledge of) negative information about older people, so both groups appear “prejudiced” on implicit measures of stereotyping. However, on measures of more “controlled” (conscious) attitudes toward older people, some individuals (low prejudice) are able (or are motivated) to suppress these negative thoughts and allow only their egalitarian attitudes toward the elderly to be expressed. A review of the literature on age in social judgments by Montepare and Zebrowitz (1998) suggests that age is indeed a prominent variable in the processing of social information. As Brewer et al. (1981) suggested earlier, age (like gender and race) seems to greatly influence social categorization, stereotyping, and impression formation. Stereotypes about older people can be triggered not only by the categorization of the person as older but also by their physiognomical (facial features and structure) cues. Hummert (1994) found that undergraduates associated positive stereotypes (e.g., liberal, perfect grandparent) of older persons with physiognomical cues indicative of the young-old (e.g., little or no wrinkles or gray hair) and more negative stereotypes (e.g., inflexible, recluse) were associated with physiognomical cues indicative of the old-old (e.g., gray hair, wrinkled skin). In a study of voting behavior, Sigelman and Sigelman (1982) found that a candidate’s age had a significantly greater effect on voting behavior than did the candidate’s race or gender. Young voters preferred young candidates and disliked older candidates. Bassili and Reil (1981) found that young and old perceivers were more likely to stereotype young targets in terms of a variety of features, while older targets were stereotyped primarily on the basis of their age. On the other hand, other researchers have argued that it is rare that age alone is the predominant factor influencing person perception and stereotype formation (e.g., Braithwaite et al., 1986). Braithwaite and her colleagues argue that because we rarely form impressions of individuals solely on the basis of age, it doesn’t make sense to ask

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participants about their feelings about fictitious old and young people (i.e., to solely manipulate the age of the target person in a paper-and-­pencil measure of attitudes toward the target person and older adults in general). Such data are not generalizable to the “real world.” A meta-­analysis of the ageism literature by Kite and Johnson (1988) supports this reasoning. Kite and Johnson conclude that age-­related information does not influence attitudes in the most common situations where one individual is evaluating another person. Consistent with other research, Kite and Johnson assert that age information does influence attitudes toward older people when one is comparing an older and younger person on various dimensions. In sum, the available research evidence suggests that age information exerts a strong influence on social perception, social categorization, stereotyping, and self-­perceptions (Montepare & Zebrowitz, 1998).

CONTACT WITH OLDER PEOPLE Like other forms of prejudice, it seems logical that ageism could be short-­c ircuited by increased contact with older people. As we see in Chapter 9, however, this simple contact is a notoriously poor intervention in changing prejudiced feelings and reducing stereotypes. It may come as no surprise then, to learn that research on intergenerational contact has yielded mixed results (Lutsky, 1980). Some have found that more frequent contact with an older person is associated with more positive attitudes toward older people (Braithwaite et al., 1986; Gatz, Popkin, Pino, & VandenBos, 1984). An equal number of studies have found no relationship between contact frequency and attitudes toward older people (Ivester & King, 1977). However, most research supports the revisions of the contact hypothesis in that it is not the frequency with which one has contact with an older person but the type of contact that seems to be more powerful in reducing prejudice and stereotyping of older adults (e.g., Knox, Gekoski, & Johnson, 1986).

Negative Expectations about Intergenerational Contact A major determinant of the type or quality of contact between young and older people is the ways each age group talk to each other. Of course, we feel much better about an interaction with another individual if we believe it was an enjoyable experience for both parties, with no feelings of awkwardness or discomfort. In the intergenerational context, as well as in other interracial and cross-­gender interactions, our expectations often color how we perceive our interactions. Giles and Coupland (1991) found that older individuals believe that young people are skeptical about the value of talking (especially to an older person). The young responded with a much more negative perception of older people. Young people in this research saw older adults as placing a great value on small talk, and perceived a strong element of egocentricism and assertiveness on the part of the older person in dialogue. Older people also sound frail and vulnerable when they speak, according to younger perceivers (Giles et al., 1994).

Negative Schemas about Older People These expectations lead to biased schemas with which young individuals perceive information. In one experiment (Giles et al., 1994), young adult participants read the text

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of an interview of a motorist who was involved in an accident. The participants were to make a number of conclusions about liability and cause of the accident based on interviews and evidence. When participants believed the motorist was 62 years old, the use of an “older person” schema became apparent in the participant’s conclusions about the motorist’s statement “I didn’t know what to think” (i.e., the older motorist was “confused”). However, when other participants read the same scenario, but believed that the motorist was a young adult, they attributed the same quote to the participant “wishing to withhold judgment given the complexity of the issues at hand” (p.  133). In a follow-­up replication study, older motorists were viewed by younger perceivers as rambling, weak, and vague (Giles, Henwood, Coupland, Harriman, & Coupland, 1992). Carver and de la Garza (1984) did a similar experiment and found that when young participants believed the motorist was 84 years old, participants tended to seek more information about the auto accident in the passage pertaining to the physical, mental, and sensory state of the older motorist. When the motorist was believed to be age 22, participants focused their questions on speeding and alcohol consumption. Participants were ageist in their information seeking about the likely cause of the accident for the older motorist (i.e., the stereotype of older people as having mental and physical deficits), and also for the young motorist, in that the participants were more likely to attribute criminal behavior (drunk driving) to the younger—­but not older—­motorist. Both older and young people tend to make similar attributions for success and failure when it comes to an older or younger target. Specifically, when Banziger and Drevenstedt (1982) asked older and young participants to give the most likely reasons for success or failure of an older or younger target on a driver’s written examination, age was cited as the main cause for the older target’s failure. Conversely, age was perceived as the main reason for the younger target’s success. Do older people have poor communication skills, as the schemas and expectations of young people suggest? According to Boone, Bayles, and Koopmann (1982), there is no evidence to suggest that people over age 65 have more communication skills deficits than their younger counterparts. Research by Gold, Andres, Arbuckle, and Schwartzman (1988) supports this assertion. Gold et al. examined the stereotype that older people tend to include more “off-­target verbosity” in their speech. Essentially, this is the tendency to be “flighty” when speaking, often incorporating unrelated and increasingly irrelevant stories or topics that stray farther from the original topic of conversation. Results indicated that there was no association between age and off-­target verbosity. However, certain factors do seem to enhance the likelihood of this phenomenon. Older people who are extraverted, socially active, unconcerned with others’ impressions of them, or who may be feeling stress may be more likely to engage in off-­target verbosity. Other research has revealed a different picture of the ways older people interact with younger people. Research by Coupland, Coupland, Giles, Henwood, and Weimann (1988) indicates that older people tend to engage in what Coupland et al. (1988) term “painful self-­disclosure” (PSD) when talking with both older peers and younger people. Specifically, older people seem to spend about one-sixth of the conversation disclosing painful, very personal information (e.g., health problems, grief over a loss, accidents they had), whereas younger persons spend significantly less (a negligible amount) time talking about such intimate details in an intergenerational context. PSDs were most often initiated by older people, and were usually followed by older people

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discussing other unrelated PSDs. As you might imagine, hearing such painful, intimate information from another person is often an uncomfortable experience, and young interactants did indeed feel uncomfortable when older persons engaged in PSD. Such an interaction presents an awkward situation for the young participant, in that there isn’t a good “way out” of the topic: Changing topics is seen as rude, and asking more questions about the PSDs only prolongs the PSD. Giles and his colleagues (1994) found that most often, younger participants gave minimal responses (e.g., “hm”) in order to acknowledge the older person’s PSD, but to bring it to a polite halt. When interviewed after the interaction, most younger participants viewed the older person as “sad” and “underaccommodative,” in that they were selfishly talking about themselves and not being socially skilled and asking questions of the younger individual (Giles et al., 1994). Unfortunately, this is a common view of older people, as evidenced by the following response from a young research participant. Giles and his colleagues were interviewing participants about their reactions to audiotapes of young and older individuals talking. Results indicated that most of the young participants reacted negatively to evidence of PSD on the part of the older interactant. One individual summed it up this way: “They play for sympathy, they’re very much . . . like young children, they want to be the center of attention for as long as possible” (p. 140). Such a negative interaction certainly can contribute to negative stereotypes of older people and avoidance of future contact with older persons.

CROSS‑CULTURAL DIFFERENCES IN AGEISM According to Slater (1964), the past is riddled with ambivalent views of old age. The Greeks viewed aging as a calamity, as evidenced in a common saying of the period: “Whom the gods love die young.” However, the Middle Eastern view is that aging is a blessing, and much wisdom, prestige, and political influence accompanies the oldest members of the community. Great age was seen as a sign of divine blessing and virtue. Before a written language was used to transmit the stories, laws, and traditions of a society, people relied on their elders to teach these things to the next generation, thereby preserving their way of life. It is important to emphasize that much cross-­c ultural research indicates a diverse spectrum of attitudes toward aging. Ageism is not a universal phenomenon. Some research suggests that ageism isn’t even universal within America. For example, in native/indigenous peoples culture, older adults are considered “wisdom-­keepers” and are regarded with the highest respect and deference (NCAI, 2023). Primitive societies weren’t great places to get old. The nomadic nature of some tribes, and the hunter–­gatherer focus of others, left little room for individuals who did not contribute in some way to the survival of the group. Older people in these primitive cultures were often seen as burdens on the tribe: taking but not giving. Research shows that some of these societies practiced eldercide (and abandonment) to alleviate the burden of older people from the tribe (Simmons, 1945). Similarly, in industrialized cultures, older people are often not viewed as performing a valued function in society, and they suffer the consequences. Jensen and Oakley (1982) suggest that ageism in America can be regarded as a subtle form of abandonment, often more psychological

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than physical. Therefore, it appears that the prestige of elders is greatest in cultures with a moderate level of development, where older people are seen as performing a valuable function (often, wise teachers, village leaders, etc.). Slater (1964) found that older people enjoy the highest prestige in societies that are authoritarian, totalitarian, static, and collectivistic. Individual freedom is limited severely, and the society is usually governed by royalty or chiefs. Slater contends that societies that value change and innovation (such as the United States) will never accord high status to tradition, and to older people. Supporting this contention, Bergman, ­Bodner, and Cohen-­Fridel (2013) found that attitudes toward aging and older adults were significantly more positive among Israelis than in Arabs. In one study, Ikels et al. (1992) examined how people in Ireland, the United States, Hong Kong, and Botswana perceive aging. They found that age categorization of others is much less likely to occur in societies where there is little migration (in or out). However, in societies that experience a high rate of migration, age categorization is an often-used tactic in social perception.

Eastern versus Western Views How cultures view aging has a lot to do with how they view death. Eastern cultures have traditionally viewed the self, life, and death as intertwined within the person, and in this view, death is seen as a welcome relief from the suffering of life. Death is even seen as a step up in one’s spiritual journey to join one’s revered ancestors (Butler et al., 1991). Because Western culture puts a strong emphasis on individuality and personal control, death is unwelcome. A common belief among researchers and the lay public alike has been that, generally speaking, Eastern cultures have far more respect for, and positive attitudes toward, their elders than Western cultures (Levy & Langer, 1994). These are reinforced via stereotypes in books, movies, and other popular media. However, some research suggests that young people in Eastern cultures (specifically, Korea, Japan, China, and the Philippines) have more mixed, and sometimes more negative, views of older people than their Western counterparts (Bodner, 2017; Ng, 2002; Williams et al., 1997). Williams et al. found a tremendous variability in the attitudes of Eastern countries toward their elders. For example, respondents in Korea felt the greatest need to be polite and deferential in intergenerational conversations, followed by those in Japan, and then the Philippines. Those in China were the least likely to agree that it is important to be polite and deferential in intergenerational interactions. Williams et al. explain these counterintuitive findings in terms of increasing modernization of Eastern cultures, encroaching upon old traditions and past patterns of family hierarchy. However, research by Tien-Hyatt (1986) challenges this modernization explanation. According to the modernization explanation for cross-­c ultural attitudes toward older people, increasing modernization leads to more negative views of older people. Tien-Hyatt’s data show that Americans, who represent the highest degree of modernization, had the most positive views of aging. Respondents in China and Taiwan, societies that represent a lower degree of modernization, showed the least positive view of aging. These results also support Williams et al.’s (1997) findings that Eastern cultures show more negative views of aging than originally believed. Some data even show Americans having more positive attitudes toward older adults than the Chinese (Luo, Zhou, Jin,

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Newman, & Liang, 2013). A meta-­analysis by North and Fiske (2015) found that Eastern cultures tend to hold significantly greater negative attitudes toward older persons compared to Western cultures. Koyano (1989) also disabuses researchers of their belief that the Japanese have great respect and admiration for their elders. Koyano distinguishes between culturally mandated tatemae (how one ought to behave and feel) and honne (how one actually behaves and feels). The Japanese, Koyano suggests, have many traditions and even laws that mark tatemae respect for elders, but in practice, most Japanese regard their older adults with a negative honne, dismissing them as silly or infantile. To outsiders, then, Japanese culture still appears to strongly support the idea that elders hold high respect, but Koyano argues that such respect is often a feigned mask, and underneath lies indifference or negative feelings toward older people.

REDUCING AGEISM As with many prejudices, ageism is largely born out of fear of the unknown. Efforts to reduce ageism thus have centered on educating younger people about the aging process and the pernicious effects of seemingly benign ageist attitudes on older persons (Cottle & Glover, 2007; Lytle, 2017; Shannonhouse, Rumsey, & Mize, 2017). Recall that children tend to grow up learning negative stereotypes about older people from fairy tales, books, and popular media. These negative attitudes are sustained by the lack of intergenerational contact between children and older people. However, there is some recent evidence that suggests that the more intergenerational contact between children and older people, the greater the reduction in ageist attitudes in the children (Teater, 2018; Teater & Chonody, 2017). In another series of studies, researchers have shown that the combination of education about aging and positive intergenerational contact are very effective in reducing ageism among young adults (Burnes et al., 2019; Levy, 2018; Levy, Lytle, Monahan, Macdonald, & Apriceno, 2022; Lytle & Levy, 2019). Strangely, some research has found evidence to suggest that once a society has embraced stronger structures within it to support older people and to discourage ageism, it will show more age discrimination against younger people (Bratt, Abrams, & Swift, 2020). The authors of this study suggest that these interesting results support the need for better intergenerational cohesion, contact, and understanding. More research is needed on this finding to understand why reducing prejudice against older people is related to increased juvenile ageism.

ISSUES FOR FUTURE RESEARCH As in all of the chapters of this book, we have tried to present a fairly comprehensive (but not exhaustive) discussion of the research relevant to the chapter topic. When controversies or mixed results have occurred, we have tried to highlight the main issues of contention, and point to the currently favored conclusion. However, there are always unanswered questions, and there are bound to be critics of the research presented. Below, we present some of the more important criticisms of the research on ageism. We also identify areas of research and specific questions that need more empirical attention. As

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is the prerogative of all scientists, you can judge the merit of the research presented, and the criticisms leveled against that research, and arrive at your own conclusions. Grant (1996) suggests several ways professionals can help fight ageism. First, professionals ought to take personal responsibility to monitor their own use of age stereotypes and eliminate these stereotypes. Next, they ought to involve older persons in policy and program decisions that affect them. Then, through research and improved professional training, those in the helping professions can learn to recognize instances of ageist thinking and behavior. Finally, we should combat ageism in society as a whole.

Measurement A long-­standing issue for researchers of the aging process is how to best measure attitudes toward aging and older people. Braithwaite and her colleagues (1986, 1993) have suggested that the common method of comparing semantic-­differential ratings of the typical younger person with the typical older person usually yields evidence for more negative attitudes toward older people than younger people. However, this method may have a strong demand characteristic in it, making these data less reliable. Specifically, asking people to give a rating to younger people and compare it to older people indicates to the respondent that age is the salient dimension, and that the respondent is to separate them into distinct groups. Because most research indicates that the respondent usually has positive attitudes toward younger people, and the respondent wants to differentiate the groups as much as possible, their attitude toward older people may be more negative, or even very negative (to get the most distinction between their attitudes toward younger and older persons).

You’re Really as Old (or Young) as You Feel What does it mean to be “old”? What does it mean to be “young” or “middle-­age”? We usually think of some socially shared consensus on what chronological age ranges define each of these broad age groups. But, does being 55 years old mean the same thing to everyone? Highly unlikely. It is a truism (indeed, a cornerstone) of social psychology (specifically, social cognition) that it is not informative to measure the properties of an objective stimulus and assume that most people react to the stimulus in lawful ways (although behaviorists would suggest otherwise). People are “messy,” and don’t behave in rigid lawful patterns in response to stimuli. It is much more informative to understand how the individual perceives, or construes (thinks about), the stimulus (Markus & Zajonc, 1985). Why do two people react to the same stimulus in different ways? Because they perceive it differently. The same is true for chronological age. Different ages mean different things to different people. Thus, we need a new way to measure our attitudes toward age. Barak (1987) created a scale that measures “cognitive age” (an assessment of one’s perceptions of the age that one feels, looks, acts, and shares interests). The scale showed good reliability (.91) and validity. This gives a measure of the age with which one most identifies. For example, chronologically, you may be 22, but you may feel that you most identify with those in their 40s. Some general conclusions can be culled from the studies of cognitive (sometimes referred to as “subjective”) age. Most people in their teens and 20s report that their cognitive age is older, while those who are middle-­age and older report cognitive ages that are younger than their chronological age (Goldsmith &

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Heiens, 1992). It may be the case that discrepancies between one’s cognitive and actual age are associated with personal fears of aging. Montepare and Lachman (1989) found that greater discrepancies in middle-­age and older adults were associated with a stronger fear of aging, while greater discrepancies in younger persons were associated with the least fear of aging in self-­report measures. Interestingly, Montepare and Lachman’s data also indicated that those persons with the smallest discrepancies between their cognitive and actual age reported the greatest satisfaction with their lives. While Barak’s scale is a valuable contribution to age research, much more research is needed to develop scales that tap psychological age identity.

Stereotype Knowledge or Stereotype Belief? Because many studies of prejudiced attitudes toward older people have utilized a semantic-­differential scale in comparing older people to younger people on various attributes (e.g., satisfaction, adjustment, personality), precisely what is being measured has been called into question (Braithwaite et al., 1986; Kite & Johnson, 1988). Specifically, this method ignores the crucial distinction between knowledge of a cultural stereotype and the individual’s belief or acceptance of that stereotype (Braithwaite et al., 1986; Devine, 1989). Devine has shown that people have automatically activated cognitive processes, and controlled cognitive processes with regard to stereotypes and prejudice. When encountering a member of a stereotyped minority group, both high- and low-­ prejudice persons automatically think of stereotypes associated with that group. However, low-­prejudice persons do not personally endorse such stereotypes, so when they become aware of these automatically activated stereotypes, low-­prejudice individuals seek to inhibit these stereotypes and initiate new ways of responding to, and thinking about, the target individual. We all have fairly equal knowledge of the cultural stereotypes of various groups. What differentiates high- and low-­prejudice individuals is that low-­prejudice individuals do not endorse those stereotypes. However, when one is asked to compare “older people” to “young people,” on various dimensions, what is being measured? Most likely, these questions tend to force an artificial homogenization of each group, and indicate little more than the respondent’s knowledge of the stereotypes of each group. The questions need to assess one’s personal beliefs about members of the target group in order to approach a valid measure of prejudice.

Evaluating Prejudiced Attitudes The multifaceted nature of people’s attitudes toward older people has certainly created a challenge for researchers interested in assessing evidence of prejudice toward older people. In this chapter, we have learned that people have many views of older people. The question for researchers is twofold: (1) What constitutes one’s overall view toward elders (vs. a specific person)? and (2) How can researchers construct a better measure of attitudes toward older persons? Currently, the most promising approach to answering these questions is the functional analysis perspective—­t hat is, once we understand the motivations of the perceiver, and consider these motivations in specific contexts with the perceiver’s construal of his or her relationship to the older target, we may make great strides in understanding the origins, maintenance, and—­ideally—­t he reduction of ageism.

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GLOSSARY Age Grading—the implicit and explicit expectations of society that stipulate what behaviors, interests, privileges, and activities are appropriate at a given age of a person. Ageism—prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination directed at someone because of one’s age. Baby Talk—a simplified speech register with exaggerated intonation. When directed at pets, children, or inanimate objects, it is called “primary baby talk.” When directed at older persons, it is referred to as “secondary baby talk.” Benign Ageism—­a subtle type of prejudice that arises out of one’s conscious and unconscious fears and anxiety of growing old. Gerontocratic Societies—societies in which older people are held in the highest respect and hold positions of power and leadership. Gerontophobia—an irrational fear, hatred, and/or hostility toward older people. Infantilization—the belief that older persons are like children because of their perceived inferior mental and physical abilities. Juvenile Ageism—prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination directed at an individual based on one’s youth. Malignant Ageism—a more negative stereotyping process in which older people are regarded as worthless. Overaccommodation—a type of behavior by younger individuals toward older persons, in which the younger person is overly polite, speaks louder, and in simpler sentences. Primitive Categories—describes the idea that some means of categorizing others (age, race, gender) are so often used that they become rather automatic in social perception. These categories are the bases, then, from which we develop further attitudes about the target individual.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. What are the stereotypes you’ve heard about older persons, or teenagers? To what extent do you believe that these stereotypes hold a “kernel of truth”? Why? 2. Do you think that (as terror management theory would predict) if people were not afraid of death, then their attitudes toward older persons would be more positive, and there would be few stereotypes about older persons? 3. In what ways does the United States promote a bias in favor of the young? Do other countries do that as well, or are there some that respect older people? 4. In what ways might we, as a society, change the way that health professionals regard older persons, to reduce stereotyping and improve their attitudes toward older individuals?

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5. Do you think that, as idealism suggests, as our society continues to embrace change, innovation, and new ideas, that our attitudes toward older persons will grow increasingly negative, because they represent tradition, and the past? 6. Do you look forward to being an older person, or do you have some anxiety about it? Why?

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Ageism 285 Sargent-­C ox, K. (2017). Ageism: We are our own worst enemy. International Psychogeriatrics, 29, 1–8. Schmidt, D., & Boland, S. (1986). Structure of perceptions of older adults: Evidence for multiple stereotypes. Psychology and Aging, 1(3), 255–260. Schroeder, D. A., Penner, L. A., Dovidio, J. F., & Piliavin, J. A. (1995). The psychology of helping and altruism: Problems and puzzles. New York: McGraw-­Hill. Schroyen, S., Adam, S., Marquet, M., Jerusalem, G., Thiel, S., Giraudet, A.-L., et al. (2018). Communication of healthcare professionals: Is there ageism? European Journal of Cancer Care, 27, 1–10. Secouler, L. M. (1992). Our elders: At high risk for humiliation. The Journal of Primary Prevention, 12(3), 195–208. Shannonhouse, L., Rumsey, A., & Mize, M. C. (2017). Combating ageism. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), Ageism: Prejudice, stereotyping and discrimination against older persons (2nd ed., pp. 323–351). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. Sigelman, L., & Sigelman, C. (1982). Sexism, racism, and ageism in voting behavior: An experimental analysis. Social Psychology Quarterly, 45(4), 263–269. Simmons, L. W. (1945). The role of the aged in primitive society. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press. Slater, P. E. (1964). Cross cultural views of the aged. In R. Kastenbaum (Ed.), New thoughts on old age (pp. 229–236). New York: Springer. Snyder, M. (1987). Public appearances, private realities: The psychology of self-­monitoring. New York: Freeman. Snyder, M. (1993). Basic research and practical problems: The promise of a “functional” personality and social psychology. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 19(3), 251–264. Snyder, M., & Miene, P. (1994). Stereotyping of the elderly: A functional approach. British Journal of Social Psychology, 33, 63–82. Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1991a). Terror management theory of self-­esteem. In C. R. Snyder & D. R. Forsyth (Eds.), Handbook of social and clinical psychology (pp. 21–40). New York: Pergamon Press. Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (1991b). A terror management theory of social behavior: The psychological functions of self-­esteem and cultural worldviews. In M. Zanna (Ed.), Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 24, pp.  93–159). New York: Academic Press. Solomon, S., Greenberg, J., & Pyszczynski, T. (2000). Pride and prejudice: Fear of death and social behavior. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 9(6), 200–204. Sorgman, M., & Sorensen, M. (1984). Ageism: A course of study. Theory into Practice, 23(2), 117– 123. Steele, C. M. (1995). Stereotype threat and the intellectual performance of African Americans. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69(5), 797–811. Sublett, J. F., Vale, M. T., & Bisconti, T. L. (2022). Expanding benevolent ageism: Replicating attitudes of overaccommodation to older men. Experimental Aging Research, 48(3), 220–233. Tajfel, H., & Turner, J. (1979). An integrative theory of intergroup conflict. In W. G. Austin & S. Worchel (Eds.), The social psychology of intergroup relations (pp. 33–47). Monterey, CA: Brooks/ Cole. Tasdemir, N. (2020). Young group identification and motives as predictors of ageism, aging anxiety, and life satisfaction. Journal of Genetic Psychology: Research and Theory on Human Development, 181(5), 375–390. Taylor, S. E., & Fiske, S. T. (1991). Social cognition (2nd ed.). New York: McGraw-­Hill. Taylor, S. E., Helgeson, V. S., Reed, G. M., & Skokan, L. A. (1991). Self-­generated feelings of control and adjustment to physical illness. Journal of Social Issues, 47(4), 91–109.

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CHAPTER 9

Sexual Prejudice

Each of us is old enough to remember a time when “gay bashing” and abject violence

against people perceived as gay or lesbian was pervasive. We can easily recall our middle school days (or, as we called it, “junior high”) where being called “gay”—or worse—was an ultimate insult, particularly for boys, when bullying of those perceived to be gay was rampant. We remember Matthew Shepard, an undergraduate student at the University of Wyoming, whose brutal torture and murder in 1998 captured national attention, and the members of the antigay Westboro Baptist Church, who picketed his funeral. Now, marriage equality is the law of the land (at least in the United States), and in the news one morning was a heartfelt story about a lesbian couple being cheerfully crowned the royalty of a local high school prom (NBC News, 2021). In other news, however, was a story of an LGBT center at a major college campus being defaced and urinated on by a drunken, angry mob hurling antigay epithets (Pronczuk, 2021). Scrolling further into the international news section was a story about the growing number of “LGBTfree zones” in Poland (Jiménez & Fazio, 2021), which reminds us that same-sex sexual behavior is still illegal in dozens of countries, and punishable by death in several. It would be difficult to overstate just how much change the last few decades have seen in terms of how sexual identities have been constructed, and how attitudes and behaviors toward lesbian, gay, bisexual, and other sexual minority (LGB+) individuals have evolved (Rosenfeld, 2017). For example, on a “feeling thermometer” ranging from 0 (very cold) to 100 (very warm), Americans’ feelings toward gay people rose from a cool 31 in 1984 to a warmer 61 by 2016 (Paluck, Porat, Clark, & Green, 2020). In the mid1990s, only around a quarter of Americans believed that same-sex couples should be allowed to marry legally, but by 2019, it was a clear majority (over 60%; Pew Research Center, 2021). Of course, these latter figures imply that a sizable portion of the U.S. public would still prefer to deny the rights to LGB+ individuals that they afford others. Moreover, hate crimes against sexual minorities have remained relatively stable and high: In 2011, the Southern Poverty Law Center (SPLC) reported that hate crimes against LGB+ individuals were more common than for any other group, and they reported an over 40% rise in anti-LGB+ hate groups in 2019. What’s going on? 287

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The volatility of attitudes and actions towards LGB+ individuals presents challenges and opportunities for prejudice researchers. On the one hand, with such flux, researchers can examine real changes in attitudes and behavior in real time; on the other hand (and also with such flux), it can be difficult to determine the causes of such changes. In this chapter, we provide a brief history of how sexual identities have been constructed, and how once the concept of the “sexual minority” identity was established in people’s minds, it was connected to violations of cherished values. We discuss how anti-LGB+ prejudice has changed in recent years, including how it has been tied to “essentialist” ideas about the biology of sexuality within the “born this way” narrative. We also discuss how sexual identities, in being concealable, present challenges to LGB+ individuals in terms of whether and how they might decide to be “out,” and what implications this all has for the mental health of LGB+ individuals, as well as prejudice reduction. Our focus is on prejudice toward gay men and lesbian women, as these prejudices have received the vast majority of research focus. In so doing, we admit being at risk of contributing to bisexual invisibility, which is ignoring or dismissing bisexual people, often based on the belief that they are indecisive and “really” either gay or straight (Roberts, Horne, & Hoyt, 2015). We discuss prejudice toward bisexual individuals where we can, but more research is needed to understand the unique prejudices they face. In addition, the topics of prejudice based on gender identity in general and against transgender individuals in particular (the “T” in “LGBTQ”) are evolving at such a rapid pace that we decided to focus this chapter on prejudice against lesbian, gay, and bisexual individuals, about which much more is known.

A BRIEF HISTORY Sexual prejudice is a negative evaluation of someone based on real or perceived membership in a group defined by sexual attitudes, behaviors, or identities, and heterosexism is the specific case of that negative evaluation stemming from perceived same-sex attraction. For the term to have meaning (and for heterosexism to have real impact on people’s lives), it requires the concept of “heterosexual,” which then implies the existence of contrasting concepts like “homosexual,” “bisexual,” or “asexual,” among others. It’s important to note that these categories, like social categories in general, are constructed, and that things could be different. In fact, these terms entered into the popular lexicon only within the last few decades, and the notion that someone might have a sexual identity is a very recent invention indeed, at least within the United States. As you may know, homosexual attitudes and behaviors have been observed throughout both human and nonhuman animal history (Bailey & Zuk, 2009), and societies have varied in terms of how they looked upon them, with some being more and others being less accepting. Sexuality has been construed in too many varied ways throughout history for us to cover exhaustively, but suffice it to say that history is rich (and interesting!) with conceptualizations of sexual attitudes, relations, and behaviors (e.g., Estrada, 2011; Evans-­Pritchard, 1970). “Gay, straight, or bi” is just one set of categories that happened to be constructed by people living relatively near us in time and space. To keep our history concise, we focus on the development of these concepts within the United States. In reviewing the history, Herek (2010) points out that homosexual attraction and behaviors were not categorized separately from other sexual attitudes

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and behaviors until relatively recently. Instead, “acts of procreation” (involving penile–­ vaginal intercourse, just to be clear) were the only normatively approved sexual behaviors, and only then in the context of a traditional marriage. All other sexual acts, including anal, oral, masturbation, and any form of same-sex sexual behavior, were broadly enveloped under the socially scorned umbrella category of “sodomy.” In this way, there was nothing “special” about same-sex attraction or behavior. It was viewed negatively from a normative perspective, but it was just one of a number of sexual no-no’s in puritanical times. There was little normative or shared cultural notion of sexual identity (Chauncey, 2004). It was largely the fields of psychology and psychiatry that advanced the idea that (1) sexual orientation is a meaningful way to categorize people, and (2) homosexuality was deviant and unhealthy (Herek, 2010). By the early to mid-1900s, mental health theorists began to increasingly believe that heterosexuality was humanity’s healthy expression of sexual love, and that homosexuality could be best characterized as a phobia of different-­sex individuals (Bayer, 1987). In short, partly thanks to the field you’re currently studying, homosexuality came to be viewed not only as a meaningful social category but also as a mental illness, which was reflected in the first edition of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders (DSM) (American Psychiatric Association, 1952). These views were increasingly adopted by the U.S. military, which vigorously screened enlistees for any signs of homosexuality, lest their same-sex shenanigans interfered with fighting the enemy. As for other ways in which institutions sanctified heterosexism, it took only a quick gander at the pages of Leviticus and other biblical texts for many churches to align themselves with the heterosexist norms cultivated by psychology, psychiatry, and the military. In this way, heterosexuality came to be viewed as normatively correct, and homosexuality as deviant, disruptive, and sick, and this was all largely brought about by powerful social institutions, not individuals (in Chapter 12 we see how powerful social institutions can help decrease prejudice and stereotyping). Through these institutions, heterosexuality became the cultural default, and homosexuality pathological. Bisexuality was and still is often either overlooked or negatively judged by both straight and gay researchers and laypeople (Ross et al., 2018). Of course, not everyone jumped on the gay-­bashing bandwagon. Despite the major currents upholding heterosexism as normative and superior, homosexual subcultures thrived in same-­gender boarding schools, clubs, bars, and fraternal organizations, albeit most often surreptitiously (Edsall, 2006). The sex researcher Alfred Kinsey and his colleagues (1948, 1953) published research documenting remarkably common same-sex attraction and sexual behavior among mentally healthy individuals. Even Sigmund Freud (1951) argued that homosexuality should not be considered a mental illness. These findings, in conjunction with the increasing prevalence of prejudice and sometimes violent discrimination toward sexual minorities, may have prompted psychologist George Weinberg (1972) to coin the term homophobia, to describe an “irrational revulsion” or fear that heterosexuals often display in response to them (it is remarkable, really, that in a few decades “homosexuality” went from a noncategory to a strongly stigmatized identity to a target of prejudice and stereotyping). But is “homophobia” an accurate term? Is fear the intergroup emotion that best characterizes heterosexism, and if so, what causes it? As we see next in our discussion of the origins of heterosexism, phobia is only a piece of the puzzle, and fear is not the most common emotion associated with heterosexism.

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ORIGINS OF HETEROSEXISM In this section, we tackle the basic question of the causes of heterosexism. We go over three causes, the first of which you’ve heard in Chapter 2 (having to do with basic socialization processes). The second has to do with value violations, particularly among religious fundamentalists. The third addresses intergroup emotions, and in tackling the homophobia question, addresses why people might fear being in the presence of sexual minorities.

Socialization We established way back in Chapter 2 that prejudices and stereotypes develop early, even before one’s first birthday. Children attend to their parents, peers, teachers, and the myriad forms of media at their disposal, and, often without intention or awareness, take on the prejudices and stereotypes of their surroundings. Such passive socialization processes are particularly potent in the absence of direct experience with members of the stereotyped group. Our focus in Chapter 2 was mostly on the development of race and gender stereotypes, but is there any reason to suspect that those processes operate any differently when it comes to the development of heterosexism? We suspect not. When it comes to parents and peers, they appear to be a noteworthy source of heterosexism. Peer groups are particularly impactful during adolescence, and children are especially impacted by peer groups that exhibit clear dominance hierarchies—that is, a peer group that concerns itself with popularity and power is particularly likely to disparage sexual minorities and influence its members to become increasingly heterosexist (Poteat, Espelage, & Green, 2007). Parents also exhibit a small but substantial impact, and, unlike racial prejudices, fathers tend to have greater impact than mothers on their children’s heterosexism (O’Bryan, Fishbein, & Ritchey, 2004), although this is likely to depend on parenting styles and the quality of the parent–­c hild relationship (Klann, Wong, & Rydell, 2018). However, compared to other prejudices, there has been much less research examining the intergenerational transmission of heterosexism, and more work is needed. What role does media play in the development of heterosexism? It’s not as challenging as it once was to locate likable, relatable movie and television characters who are openly gay. Certainly, their portrayals have become more positive, right? In 2006, Raley and Lucas compared television shows’ depictions of straight versus gay characters and concluded that depictions had, to some extent, improved. They point out that from the 1960s until the turn of the century, “gay males, Lesbians, and Bisexuals have been stereotypically portrayed as funny clowns, flaming queers, queens, fairies, fags and flits; villainous criminals, mental patients, child molesters, and vampires; or victims of violence, HIV/AIDS, and gender/sexual identity disorder” (p.  23). By 2006, some of the more toxic portrayals had abated, but their survey found that gay male characters were still more likely to be depicted as a clown. Nevertheless, they found that compared to earlier years, sexual minorities were increasingly shown in happy, healthy, same-sex relationships, some even with children (which is significant given how frequently gay men have been depicted as child molesters). They noted, however, that bisexual characters continue to be relatively unseen. We were unable to locate an update to this research, and it would be interesting to see whether the situation has further improved. And unlike

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research reviewed in Chapter 2 on the effects of media portrayals of Black individuals and women, there also does not appear to be any research that experimentally examines the effects of media depictions of sexual minorities on people’s attitudes toward them.

Perceived Value Violations Stereotypes formed through socialization, including passive media exposure, contribute to prejudice and discrimination toward sexual minorities for some individuals, but interestingly, not so much for others. Specifically, what troubles some heterosexist individuals is not the negative stereotypes, but their perception that gay and lesbian individuals violate cherished values (Haddock, Zanna, & Esses, 1993), —that is, LGB+ individuals pose symbolic threats as opposed to realistic (e.g., economic) threats. So what are those cherished values, and who thinks sexual minorities are violating them? To paint a picture of these individuals, let’s first go over some research examining the sort of personality variables that relate to heterosexism. In study after study, heterosexism is associated with right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; discussed in Chapter 5), traditional gender role attitudes (TGRA), religious fundamentalism, conservativism, living in rural areas, being older, being male (particularly when it comes to prejudice against gay men), and having less formal education (Crawford, Brandt, Inbar, & Mallinas, 2016; Goodman & Moradi, 2008; Herek, 2009, 2016; Whitley, 2009). These variables are all interrelated themselves, but it is RWA and TGRA that appear to have the strongest relation to sexual prejudice (Goodman & Moradi, 2008). Recall from Chapter 5 that those scoring higher in RWA tend to like strong leaders and “traditional values,” and are fearful and suspicious of people they perceive to be social deviants. Those scoring higher on measures of TGRA believe in a strict division of labor, with women primarily involved in homemaking and nurturing/mothering roles, and men working outside the home as providers and protectors (as we saw in Chapter 6, TGRA are intimately connected with sexism). In a classic study, Haddock et al. (1993) found that among high RWAs, it was the belief that sexual minorities violate gender roles and other traditional values that most contributed to their sexual prejudices, whereas among low RWAs, it was the negative stereotypes of sexual minorities (perhaps cultivated through media exposure) that mostly determined prejudice. Another robust finding is that men tend to exhibit more sexual prejudice than women, particularly toward gay men. Why might this be? According to Herek and McLemore (2013), it’s because for many men (especially for those harboring TGRA), masculinity is consistently under threat and therefore must routinely be proven, and is bottled up with sexual prowess (i.e., a “real man” is virile). Indeed, when a man’s masculinity is threatened (e.g., when he is told he is effeminate, or performs poorly on a stereotypically masculine task), he is more likely to express hostility toward gay men (Talley & Bettencourt, 2008), particularly gay men who appear more effeminate (Glick, Gangl, Gibb, Klumpner, & Weinberg, 2007). Sadly, these heterosexist defensive reactions tend not to be moderated by sexual prejudice, meaning that it’s not just the heterosexist men who “gay bash” when their masculinity is threatened. Interestingly (and paralleling the sexism we discuss in Chapter 10), we’ve found that these hostile reactions in the face of masculinity threat can also be directed toward women (Hitlan, Pryor, Hesson-­McInnis, & Olson, 2009). Thus, a large chunk of heterosexism, particularly heterosexual men’s prejudices against gay men, is that gay men aren’t following the norms of masculinity.

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You may have observed that some of the most vociferous voices against sexual minorities’ perceived value violations come from people who are very religious. And although it is the case that religiosity is associated with sexual prejudice (Herek & McLemore, 2013), it’s not as simple as that—­plenty of religious organizations are decidedly pro-LGB+. So what kind of religiosity is most tied to sexual prejudice? The research indicates that it is religious fundamentalism (Hood, Hill, & Williamson, 2005). Fundamentalists tend to believe in biblical inerrancy (i.e., that the Bible is literally accurate and timeless), and that “one’s own religious ingroup [is] allied with an all-­powerful deity against the secular forces of evil” (Herek & McLemore, 2013, p. 317). Fundamentalist congregations have been known to actively preach against the perceived threat of homosexuality, organize social and political activism against pro-LGB+ legislation, and cultivate heterosexism among their congregants (an obvious example is the Westboro Baptist Church, mentioned earlier). Of course, those who are already relatively heterosexist and/or high in RWA and TGRA are also likely to join such congregations, resulting in a self-­sustaining cycle of heterosexism in these congregations. One can readily locate Bible passages, along with passages from sacred texts from other religions, that clearly condemn homosexuality. In that sense, the heterosexism exhibited by fundamentalists may be “rational” in that it is simply a matter of their following their religion, and it may not be hostile in the sense that they’re “loving the sinner but hating the sin.” Is it the case that religious fundamentalists are simply trying to follow their religion, and that their opposition to gay, lesbian, and bisexual behavior is strictly a disapproval of the behavior they believe to be harmful, and not a prejudice against a class of people? No. Compared to nonfundamentalists, religious fundamentalists are particularly likely to report hostile attitudes toward sexual minorities and to oppose laws that would prohibit discrimination against them (Bassett, Kirnan, Hill, & Schultz, 2005; Batson, Floyd, Meyer, & Winner, 1999). Thus, it seems that “loving the sinner but hating the sin” is too difficult a tightrope to balance for many.

Intergroup Emotions Recall from Chapter 3 that prejudice is often a more specific matter than merely liking (feeling positively toward) or disliking (feeling negatively toward) a group. Some prejudices can be further specified in terms of their integral affect—­the specific emotional response one has to a given group (Mackie, Maitner, & Smith, 2016). Some groups conjure fear, others anger, and still others sadness or pity. What kinds of integral affect is most associated with sexual prejudice? Although anger, fear, and pity are occasionally reported, the most common affective response to sexual minorities among the sexually prejudiced is disgust (Kiss, Morrison, & Morrison, 2020). Why might that be? Emotions are functional (Ekman, 1992; Scherer, 1984). Fear alerts us and focuses our attention on looming threats, anger motivates us to address a slight or injustice, and sadness beckons us to seek or offer care. Disgust, on the other hand, is often an avoidance response to a perceived contaminant (Rozin, Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). In the case of sexual minorities, what is the heterosexist hoping to avoid? According to work by Morrison and Morrison (2003), the primary disgust-­t riggering associates to gay men (more so than lesbian women) are sodomy (or, more specifically, anal sex), the belief that gay men spread disease, and the belief that gay men violate gender norms and flout religion.

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Evolutionary approaches to prejudice can provide insight and organization into the potential functions served by people’s emotional responses to outgroups. For example, Schaller and Neuberg (2012) argue that in our evolutionary past, outgroups generally posed one of two specific kinds of threats: one being the threat of interpersonal violence, which provokes a fear response, and the other being the threat of infectious disease, which provokes a disgust response. Schaller and Neuberg argue that the disgust response that is so associated with sexual prejudice is rooted in an evolved adaptation to avoid certain outgroups believed to be disease vectors. Consistent with this reasoning, they found that prejudice toward gay and lesbian individuals was mediated by disgust (Cottrell & Neuberg, 2005). Arguably, this is based on the historic association between gay men and HIV/AIDS (Herek & Capitaniato, 1999). Thanks to safer sex practices and advances in treatment, HIV/AIDS is a less serious public health threat than it was in the 1980s. However, those of us who lived through this period can readily recall the rampant fear it caused, which was associated with gay men. This may be partly why older Americans exhibit more sexual prejudice than younger Americans, but we don’t know of any research that has examined this question. Evolutionary approaches provide a general characterization of a species, and ascribe traits to it that are assumed to be present across members (i.e., all humans are capable of disgust). However, individual differences in propensity toward disgust (or disgust sensitivity; Haidt, McCauley, & Rozin, 1994) do exist—that is, some people are more easily disgusted than others. Interestingly, people who are more prone to experience disgust tend to exhibit more heterosexism (Tapias, Glaser, Keltner, Vasquez, & Wickens, 2007), particularly in their quick, gut reactions (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009). In fact, fear of contamination and disgust sensitivity are associated not just with heterosexism but an overall tendency to be socially conservative and suspicious of outgroups in general (Terrizzi, Shook, & McDaniel, 2013). In sum, an evolutionary approach suggests that people in general, and some people in particular, are inclined to avoid outgroups partly out of fear of disease, particularly those outgroups that have been previously associated with it. There is one final way we might make sense of contagion fears and disgust in response to sexual minorities. In addition to concern about disease, is it possible that some individuals fear the spread of homosexuality itself? In other words, do some people fear they might “catch the gay?” In fact, some research suggests so (which, incidentally, would imply that the term “homophobia” is appropriate here). In order to describe this research, we must first introduce you to the penile plethysmograph. A plethysmograph measures blood flow to a body part, and in the case of the penile plethysmograph, that body part is a penis. These devices can be used to measure sexual arousal in men (yes, vaginal plethysmographs exist, too). Adams, Wright, and Lohr (1996) convinced a number of men to don these devices and view various kinds of pornography (some involving heterosexual sex and some involving female homosexual sex and male homosexual sex) after completing a measure of their homophobia. All the men showed some amount of sexual arousal to the heterosexual and female homosexual sex, but it was only the men who reported the most homophobia who showed sexual arousal in response to male homosexual sex. In other words, the most homophobic men were most turned on by gay sex. This research suggests that some men may use heterosexism as a defensive reaction against their own same-sex attraction (see also Weinstein et al., 2012). On the other hand, others have argued that the arousal the homophobic men showed to the

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same-sex erotica may have been based in anxiety (Herek & McLemore, 2013), and other work suggests that the defensive reaction many men show to same-sex sexual stimuli is genuine avoidance, and not based on any latent same-sex attraction (Mahaffey, Bryan, Ito, & Hutchison, 2011). So, while latent same-sex attraction may underlie some people’s heterosexism, there is considerable debate about whether it is a significant source of sexual prejudice. Nevertheless, in what’s sometimes been called the “lavender scare,” the fear of the spread of homosexuality captured the hearts and minds of many individuals in the 20th-­century United States (Johnson, 2009). Among other strategies, individuals aiming to stop this supposed “movement” created conversion therapy, which attempts to alter a personal’s sexual orientation (Haldeman, 1994). For the record, conversion therapy is generally seen as harmful and is disapproved of by major mental health organizations. But among those who either wished to stop the spread of homosexuality or “cure” what they believed to be a mental illness, the assumption was that sexual orientation could be changed. In fact, according to a 2015 Pew survey, around 40% of Americans believe that sexual orientation is a choice. As discussed in Chapter 4 on anti-fat prejudice, the belief that someone chooses to acquire a stigmatized identity and has control over it can increase prejudice and victim blaming (Crandall & Eshleman, 2003). Because perceived choice of sexual orientation was being employed as a tool to both oppose a perceived homosexual movement and “cure” them, many sexual minorities and their allies converged around the position that sexual orientation was not a choice (Waidzunas, 2015). In this way, the “born this way” movement was, well, born. In the next section, we discuss the implications of “born this way” beliefs and their social scientific cousin—­ essentialism—­for sexual prejudice.

BORN THIS WAY? From intelligence to obesity to musical talent, people are increasingly looking to biology for answers to questions about diseases and aptitudes alike. Is there a gene for depression? Athletic skill? Sexual orientation? This tendency to seek the origins of traits, aptitudes, and behaviors in people’s biologies is a social phenomenon referred to as biomedicalization, and the hunt for the biological origins of sexual orientation is a part of this broader movement (Clarke, Mamo, Shim, Fishman, & Fosket, 2010). To say that someone is “born this way” is to refer to something about their nature—­t heir “essence”—that makes them the way they are and determines a number of their qualities; this is the notion of psychological essentialism (Rothbart & Taylor, 1992). Haslam and Levy (2006) discovered that people’s essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation can be separated into (1) how much people believe sexual orientation is biologically based, fixed from very early in life, and unchangeable; (2) how much people believe sexual orientation is universal across time and culture; and (3) how much categories of sexual orientation are discrete, nonoverlapping, and well-­defined. These researchers found that people who believed that sexual orientations are discrete and nonoverlapping (e.g., one is either clearly straight or clearly gay) were more likely to be heterosexist. Similar to Haslam and Levy, Arseneau, Grzanka, Miles, and Fassinger (2013) developed a measure of essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation and found four dimensions. Naturalness and discreteness corresponded well with Haslam and

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Levy’s research. Their two other dimensions were informativeness (how much knowing a person’s sexual orientation tells you about the person) and importance (how much impact one’s sexual orientation has on one’s life). Using their scale, Grzanka, Zeiders, and Miles (2016) found overwhelming endorsement of naturalness: most participants agreed that sexual orientation was biologically determined, regardless of how sexually prejudiced they were. But people who believed in the discreteness, informativeness, and importance of sexual orientation were more likely to be heterosexist. Thus, in both Haslam and Levy’s and in Grzanka and colleagues’ research, essentialism was associated with more, not less, sexual prejudice. What’s going on? There was a time not so long ago when believing that sexual orientation was biologically determined was associated with less sexual prejudice—­even in Haslam and Levy’s (2006) research (see also Hegarty & Pratto, 2001). That was, in fact, the whole point of the “born this way” movement, including the Lady Gaga (2011) song by the same name. Researchers and activists alike pleaded that to be prejudiced toward someone who “could not help” who they were was cruel and unfair. And for a while, it worked, at least for some. But this is a low bar: “They can’t help it” may promote tolerance, but probably not a lot of respect. So, it’s not surprising that while sexual prejudice declined in the early 2000s, it still persists. According to recent research, belief in the naturalness of sexual orientation no longer distinguishes those who harbor sexual prejudices from those who don’t (Grzanka et al., 2016). In fact, students of prejudice would be wise to be suspicious of essentialists’ arguments against sexual prejudice. Throughout history, supposed differences in biology have been used to justify prejudice, discrimination, and even genocide (e.g., Williams & Eberhardt, 2008; Yzerbyt, Rocher, & Schadron, 1997). Recall the concept of biological racism from Chapter 6, where supposed biological differences between Blacks and Whites were used to justify continued discrimination and segregation. Similar arguments about supposed biological differences between men and women have also been used as a basis for the exclusion of women and men from various occupations (Haslam, Rothschild, & Ernst, 2000). It seems that when people perceive some essential difference between two groups (whether that difference exists or not), they cannot help but then decide that one group deserves better treatment than the other. In sum, essentialist thinking about sexual orientation is a double-­edged sword. For some, and for a while, the belief that sexual orientation is fixed at birth and cannot be changed contributed to some amount of overall reduction in sexual prejudice. On the other hand, it appears to have taken us about as far as it can go on the road toward eliminating sexual prejudice, and may risk being used to justify further prejudice. For example, there is evidence that straight men use essentialist thinking to distance themselves from gay men (Falomir- Pichastor & Hegarty, 2014). There’s one lingering question we haven’t addressed: Are people born this way? It’s a question we hope this section has encouraged you to treat cautiously, because any answer can serve as justification for sexual prejudice. We also hasten to add that sexual attitudes, behaviors, and identities, like any complex social phenomena, are likely to have multiple determinants. So there is not likely to be a single, simple answer, and so far, there doesn’t appear to be one. Some work does suggest a biological origin—­for instance, having a gay sibling or a greater number of older brothers (in the case of men) increases the likelihood of one being gay, and genes appear to play an important role (Bearman, & Brückner, 2002; Långström, Rahman, Carlström, & Lichtenstein, 2010).

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Other work highlights that people’s sexual attitudes and behaviors can change over the lifespan, which challenges essentialist notions of discreteness—­that is, that there are clear, well-­marked boundaries separating sexual orientations (Rosario, Schrimshaw, Hunter, & Braun, 2006)—and underscores how complex sexual attitudes and identities are in the real world. In the next section, we address the various ways that heterosexism is expressed.

MANIFESTATIONS OF SEXUAL PREJUDICE As with other forms of prejudice, heterosexism can appear in obvious and blatant “old-­ fashioned” forms, as well as subtler, modern forms. Unlike other forms of prejudice (racism and sexism in particular) legal protections for sexual minorities (at least in the United States) are a patchwork that varies from state to state. Moreover, social norms regarding the social acceptability of sexual prejudice vary tremendously from place to place, which also affect how sexual prejudice manifests. Other research documents more subtle, implicit forms of sexual prejudice, not unlike the implicit prejudices we have discussed in earlier chapters. In this section, we also discuss the processes of internalized heterosexism, including its consequences for the mental health of sexual minorities.

Old‑Fashioned and Modern Heterosexism It’s a testament to the volatility surrounding sexual prejudice that at the same time sexual minorities are readily found to be publicly embraced and even celebrated, it is also easy to identify blatant and hostile forms of sexual prejudice, including hate crimes. There is ample evidence of old-­fashioned heterosexism, and little evidence that it is abating. For instance, the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) reported nearly 1,400 hate crimes targeting sexual minorities in 2021, most of them targeting gay men, and that number is rising. Moreover, the vast majority of hate crimes go unreported, so that number likely represents a small fraction of the total. Courts have often acquitted those accused of committing violence against sexual minorities on the basis of a “gay panic defense,” which entails the claim that the defendant’s violence was excusable as a reaction against supposed unwanted sexual advances from the victim (Lee, 2008). While there are federal laws protecting against discrimination on the basis of age, race, gender, and disability, there are no similar federal laws with respect to sexual orientation, and as of 2021, only about half of U.S. states provide such protections. In many places, discrimination against sexual minorities is still legally allowable in public accommodations (restaurants, businesses, etc.). Same-sex sexual behavior was illegal in many states until the early 2000s, openly gay individuals were not legally allowed to serve in the U.S. military until 2011, or be married until 2015 (and before then, many states passed laws against it), and the last state law banning same-sex couples from adopting children was overturned by federal courts in 2017. These and many other institutionalized forms of heterosexism are certainly of the “old-­fashioned” variety, and as we have learned (e.g., Tankard & Paluck, 2016), institutions can have tremendous impact on social norms and the perceived acceptability and expression of discriminatory behavior. Income inequality and employment discrimination toward sexual minorities appears to be underappreciated. Perhaps based on media portrayals, there appears to

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be a “gay affluence myth” that gay men, in particular, are relatively well-to-do, which undermines support for sexual minorities (Hettinger & Vandello, 2014). Nevertheless, employment discrimination against sexual minorities is well documented. Remember the résumé studies from Chapter 6, where employment applications are sent to actual employers, and researchers examine the number of interview invitations received for Black versus White applicants? Similar work has been conducted with sexual minority applicants (e.g., Mishel, 2016). Indicating sexual orientation on a job application can be tricky, however. In such studies, sexual orientation is typically disclosed by an applicant mentioning activity in LGBTQ-­serving organizations, but this may suggest other candidate features (e.g., political views), which introduces confounds to the study. Tilcsik (2011) addressed this concern by indicating sexual minority candidate involvement in LGBTQ-­serving organizations in capacities that were actually relevant to the jobs to which the individual was applying (i.e., the applicant was described as managing the finances of an LGBTQ-­serving organization when applying to a job that required financial skills); arguably, this is a pretty subtle way to hint at sexual orientation. Tilcsik also examined the geographical location of the job to investigate whether discrimination was more likely in regions of the United States where “traditional values” were more prevalent (e.g., southern and Midwestern states), and whether the jobs to which the applicants were applying sought applicants with more stereotypically masculine traits (e.g., some ads mentioned seeking a candidate who “makes decisions independently” or is an “aggressive self-­starter”; p. 603). As predicted, gay applicants received fewer callbacks on average. This was particularly true for jobs that sought more stereotypically masculine applicants, and in states with greater heterosexism and weak or nonexistent antidiscrimination laws (e.g., Texas, Ohio, Florida). Despite continued discrimination, blatant and institutional forms of heterosexism do appear to be on the decline, and as we mentioned at the beginning of the chapter, overt endorsements of heterosexism certainly are (Paluck et al., 2021). However, other manifestations of sexual prejudice that better fit the definition of “modern” (because they are indirect and subject to alternative, nonprejudicial explanations) also persist. For example, we (Howerton, Meltzer, & Olson, 2012) enlisted our research assistants to contact hundreds of bed-and-­breakfasts, posing as either a member of a straight or gay couple seeking accommodations for a weekend getaway. When contacted by phone, accommodations were offered to nearly every couple regardless of their sexual orientation. However, when contacted via email, heterosexual couples received replies and offers of accommodation 50% more often than did gay couples, and the email replies heterosexual couples received contained more positive language (incidentally, regardless of sexual orientation, men received more timely replies than women). Refusing accommodations to a person directly and in real time on the basis of their sexual orientation may be “too obviously” heterosexist. Emails, as we all know, can be overlooked, which provides a possible excuse for the discrimination many of these establishments exhibited against gay couples. Cowan, Heiple, Marquez, Khatchadourian, and McNevin (2005) argued that there may be parallels between racism and heterosexism in terms of its progression from older, more blatant forms to more modern and subtle forms—that is, they attempted to disentangle old-­fashioned and modern forms of sexual prejudice. For example, an old-­ fashioned heterosexist may support overt forms of discrimination against sexual minorities, and perhaps violence, whereas a modern heterosexist may claim nonprejudice

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but justify discrimination in other ways. The latter may, for example, believe that gay and lesbian couples should not be discriminated against but that marriage “should be between a man and a woman.” The measure of old-­fashioned heterosexism Cowan and colleagues employed included items tapping blatant and hostile forms of heterosexism, like “Homosexuality is a mental illness,” and “Two individuals of the same sex holding hands or displaying affection in public is revolting” (Kite & Deaux, 1986). They adopted their measure of modern heterosexism from McConahay’s (1986) original measure of modern racism. It included less overtly hostile items, like “Discrimination against gays and lesbians is no longer a problem in the United States,” and “Over the past few years, the government and news media have been showing more concern about the treatment of gays and lesbians than is warranted by gays’ and lesbians’ actual experiences.” This distinction between old-­fashioned and modern heterosexism may seem sensible, but like racism, the line between old-­fashioned and modern forms of sexual prejudice may be blurry at best. In their results, Cowan and colleagues found that measures of old-­fashioned and modern racism were highly correlated, suggesting substantial overlap between the two. Moreover, they found that both measures predicted approval of hate speech and hate crimes, and that the measure of modern heterosexism did little above and beyond the measure of old-­fashioned racism to predict approval of these acts of discrimination, suggesting that when it comes to discrimination, old-­fashioned heterosexism is the wolf in modern heterosexist clothing. Thus, just as with racism, there is some evidence that old-­fashioned forms of sexual prejudice are being replaced by more modern forms, but old-­fashioned heterosexism is still prevalent.

Implicit Heterosexism It wasn’t long after the advent of implicit measures that researchers began using them to examine heterosexism. Banse, Seise, and Zerbes (2001) were the first to develop a sexual prejudice Implicit Association Test (IAT), which involved rapid categorization of images of heterosexual and homosexual couples and positive and negative words using key presses. In one version of the task, heterosexual couples and positive words were categorized with one key, and homosexual couples and negative words with another key. In the second version, heterosexual couples and negative words were categorized with one key, and homosexual couples and positive words with another key. Participants performed both versions of the task, and to the extent that they were quicker to categorize the stimuli when the pairings were heterosexual positive and homosexual negative (vs. heterosexual negative and homosexual positive), they were inferred to have an implicit antigay bias. Banse and colleagues (2001) compared heterosexual and gay and lesbian participants, and found that the former (especially heterosexual men) showed an antigay bias, and the latter (especially lesbian women) showed a progay bias (see also Steffens, 2005). In other words, at the implicit level, people showed a preference for their own sexual identity. More noteworthy, they also found the same pattern with explicit measures of heterosexism, and the implicit and explicit measures were highly correlated. This implies that, unlike what is often found with racial prejudice (e.g., Devine, 1989), there does not appear to be a dissociation between implicit and explicit heterosexism—­in fact, Banse et al. concluded that they are basically the same thing. Why might this be? Recall from

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Chapter 4 that implicit and explicit prejudice tend to diverge when people’s motives and values differ from their automatic or implicit prejudices—­people may harbor implicit prejudice but disavow it at the conscious level. In other words, there is a conflict between people’s gut feelings and their values. With heterosexism, at least in 2001, and at least where this study was conducted (Berlin, Germany), people did not appear to experience much of this conflict: They either were prejudiced and willing to explicitly express it, or they were not prejudiced and so had nothing to express. This may be because at that time, social norms against heterosexism were not prevalent, and people felt free to simply express their gut feelings as their “true” attitudes. Jellison, McConnell, and Gabriel (2004) replicated this pattern in a U.S. sample, and extended it by showing that as heterosexual men showed more implicit heterosexism, they also subscribed to more traditional gender roles and claimed a stronger heterosexual identity. These findings both underscore the overlap between implicit and explicit heterosexism, and support the argument, described earlier, that heterosexism among heterosexual men serves to buttress their masculinity (Herek, 2016). Whether people’s hearts and heads are in conflict over their sexual prejudices, many people do subscribe to egalitarian values (as we covered in Chapter 6), and those values are arguably at odds with their prejudices: Egalitarianism implies that one should not discriminate based on group membership. Dasgupta and Rivera (2006) measured participants’ egalitarian values and their implicit heterosexism before having them engage in an interview with a research confederate they were led to believe was either gay or straight. Participants who were relatively low in egalitarian values went with their automatic gut responses (i.e., their implicit heterosexism): Low egalitarian participants who were implicitly heterosexist were less friendly toward the confederate when they believed the confederate was gay. However, participants who were more egalitarian overruled their implicit prejudices and were friendly with the supposed gay confederate. These findings are consistent with the motivation, opportunity as determinants (MODE) model (Fazio & Olson, 2014) discussed in Chapter 4, which argues that judgments and behaviors are driven by implicit prejudices unless one is motivated to be more egalitarian and has the opportunity to do so. So, like racial prejudice, sometimes people’s hearts and heads disagree when it comes to heterosexism but they need to reflect on those implicit prejudices, recognize their potential impact, and choose another course of action. And, of course, they need to care about being egalitarian to do all of this. As we also discussed in Chapter 4, research on other forms of implicit prejudice, especially racial prejudice, has documented its insidious impact on employment, health care, and other life domains. Research investigating similar effects of implicit heterosexism has yet to be conducted, but a study by Sabin, Riskind, and Nosek (2015) documents pervasive implicit heterosexism among medical providers, particularly among nurses, and particularly toward gay men. Future research should examine the impact of implicit heterosexism in these important domains.

Internalized Heterosexism You may be familiar with statistics indicating that sexual minorities are at greater risk of anxiety, depression, and suicide. This is largely true (Newcomb & Mustanski, 2010; Williams & Mann, 2017). At the risk of oversimplifying the issue, one might locate the

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cause of the problem in sexual minorities by arguing that there is something inherently flawed about being a sexual minority, as many opponents of sexual minorities have done (Russell & Bohan, 2006). One might also locate the cause in a social environment that is consistently unsupportive and hostile. To be clear, the research we describe indicates it’s the latter. When one is consistently confronted with messages that one’s attitudes, behaviors, and identity are undesirable at best and pathological at worst, it can eventually get in. In addition to the term “homophobia,” Weinberg (1972) introduced the term “internalized homophobia” to refer to the “self-­loathing” he observed among many sexual minorities as a function of their stigmatized status. Like homophobia, however, the term is probably too narrow (as we will see, “self-­loathing” is only sometimes observed, and there are many other negative effects of heterosexism on the psychology of sexual minorities). Moreover, in locating the phenomenon only within the individual, Weinberg (1972) arguably failed to appreciate social and institutional forces at work that contribute to it. Thus, we use the term internalized heterosexism to refer to the negative psychological effects of heterosexism on the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of sexual minorities, who, after all, are subject to the same social learning and institutional environments that produce and sustain “plain old” heterosexism (Szymanski, Kashubeck-­West, & Meyer, 2008a). There are a number of measures of internalized heterosexism, and a look at how it is measured may provide a good sense of how it is conceptualized. These scales include items like “I wish I were heterosexual,” and “I feel ashamed of my homosexuality” (Mayfield, 2001; Nungesser, 1983). Research shows that the majority of sexual minorities are affected by internalized heterosexism (Cody & Welch, 1997), particularly during adolescence (Mustanski, Andrews, & Puckett, 2016). The vast majority of research on internalized heterosexism has focused on its consequences. Not surprisingly, it is associated with a host of negative health effects (Newcomb & Mustanski, 2010; Szymanski, Kashubeck-­West, & Meyer, 2008b), including guilt and shame (Cody & Welch, 1997) and avoidance of other sexual minorities and reduced social support (Mayfield, 2001). Specific mental health problems can also arise as a function of internalized heterosexism, particularly depression (Lick, Durso, & Johnson, 2013; Piggot, 2004), and, more troublingly, suicidal ideation (D’Augelli, Grossman, Hershberger, & O’Connell, 2001). Some research suggests the negative health effects of internalized heterosexism are more severe for bisexual than for gay or lesbian individuals (Ross et al., 2018). Less is known about the determinants of internalized heterosexism, and more research is needed. Perhaps not surprisingly, some research suggests that less tolerant and supportive environments contribute to it. For example, internalized heterosexism is more common among sexual minorities whose socialization experiences included involvement in a fundamentalist religious congregation, an RWA environment, or included rigid gender roles (Warriner, Nagoshi, & Nagoshi, 2013), and is also more prevalent among political conservatives (Herek, Gillis, & Cogan, 2009). In other words (and harkening back to our earlier discussion of the origins of heterosexism), it seems that the same factors that contribute to heterosexism also contribute to internalized heterosexism. For example, we described earlier how sexual prejudice is more pervasive among heterosexual men than heterosexual women, arguably because of gay men’s perceived violation of rigid masculine gender roles. A parallel pattern is found among gay men: They tend to exhibit more internalized heterosexism than do lesbian women (D’Augelli et al., 2001).

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This implies that the mental health challenges experienced by sexual minorities are a function of hostile and unsupportive environments—­that is, external stressors (­Peterson & Gerrity, 2006). Indeed, it is important to recognize that a hostile environment can produce negative health consequences regardless of whether someone internalizes the messages of that environment. For example, Szymanski (2006) asked lesbian women to report instances of their being rejected, harassed, insulted, physically assaulted, or discriminated against as a function of their sexual orientation, and found that these events contributed to symptoms of depression, anxiety, and other negative mental health consequences. However, these negative health effects were not mediated by internalized oppression, meaning they occurred regardless of how much these respondents came to internalize their stigma. In other words, the health consequences of sexual prejudice need not involve internalizing those prejudices; people’s mental health can suffer directly from maltreatment itself. More general measures about how members of sexual minority groups feel about the self and their groups do not seem to be as affected by internalized heterosexism. Recall Crocker and Major’s (1989) point from Chapter 7 that people have a host of defenses against the effects of stigma on their self-­esteem, suggesting that stigma and self-­esteem should be only weakly related, if at all. Consistent with this reasoning, some studies show a negative relationship between internalized heterosexism and self-­esteem (e.g., Piggot, 2004), and some do not (e.g., Herek, Cogan, Gillis, & Glunt, 1998). Sexual minorities’ group esteem—­that is, how they feel about their social identities—­is also not consistently affected by heterosexism. As mentioned earlier, gay men and lesbian women showed positive evaluations of their sexual identity ingroups both explicitly and implicitly in Banse and colleagues’ (2001) research, as well as in our own studies (Olson, Crawford, & Devlin, 2009). However, some research does show outgroup favoritism, or a devaluing of the ingroup, among sexual minorities (Jost, Banaji, & Nosek, 2004). Thus, we still don’t have a clear conception of when and how internalized heterosexism affects self-­esteem or group esteem. As pervasive and detrimental as heterosexism and internalized heterosexism are, it is also possible that improvements we’ve observed in institutional and individual prejudices, as well as community and mental health resources, may lead to a gradual reduction in internalized heterosexism and its negative health consequences (e.g., Chaudoir, Wang, & Pachankis, 2017). As a discipline, psychology has taken clear steps toward undoing some of the damage it inflicted on LGB+ individuals by pathologizing them. Sexual minorities also regularly engage in the difficult work of challenging and critiquing the effects that sexual prejudice has on them, develop effective skills at coping with sexual stigma (Bieschke, Perez, & DeBord, 2007; Herek & Garnets, 2007), and arrive at healthy identities that integrate their sexuality within other aspects of the self (Cass, 1984). Finally, family acceptance and support can provide a critical buffer against the mental health risks faced by sexual minorities: LGB+ individuals with supportive families are at a much lower risk of depression, anxiety, and suicide (Ryan, Russell, Huebner, Diaz, & Sanchez, 2010).

Concealment and Disclosure Internalized heterosexism also reduces the likelihood that someone will be “out,” or disclose their sexual identity to others (Szymanski et al., 2008b). Sexual prejudice is

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unique compared to many forms of prejudice because it is a relatively concealable stigma (Pachankis, 2007); one can hide it or not, and generally choose when and to whom to disclose. This raises questions about why someone chooses to be out or not, and the costs and benefits of both concealment and disclosure. Coming out often implies progress toward overcoming internalized heterosexism, particularly guilt and shame, and achieving a healthy self-­concept (Ryan, Legate, Weinstein, & Rahman, 2017); indeed, being out is negatively correlated with internalized heterosexism (Frost & Myer, 2009). Being out can offer benefits, not the least of which is being freer from worry about hiding aspects of oneself to others and fearing discovery (Pachankis, 2007). The mental health benefits of being out include fewer anxiety and depressive symptoms (Pachankis & Goldfried, 2006), but this may be true mostly for higher-­socioeconomic status individuals (McGarrity & Huebner, 2014). Despite its benefits, sexual minorities regularly conceal their sexual identities, and for many reasons. Like targets of prejudice generally (discussed in Chapter 5), they may fear being the target of prejudice and stereotypes. Sexual minorities also report fearing loss of employment, family abandonment, loss of status in the community, and violence as a result of disclosure (D’Augelli, Hershberger, & Pilkington, 1998; McGarrity & Huebner, 2014). Thus, there are many reasons why an LGB+ individual would choose to conceal their sexuality.

CONTACT AND PREJUDICE REDUCTION A topic as critical as prejudice reduction deserves its own chapter (see Chapter 12), but here we want to highlight some prejudice reduction research unique to sexual prejudice. Moreover, because heterosexism has shown such declines over the past few decades, are their insights to be gleaned by “successes” here that might be applied to other prejudices? We describe some of this research and its implications for prejudice reduction broadly next. First, let’s get a simple finding out of the way. Older individuals tend to be more heterosexist than younger individuals, and there are a number of possible reasons for this. For example, there is evidence that it’s not so much that older adults are more prejudiced, but only that they are less able or willing to inhibit it (Von Hippel, Silver, & Lynch, 2000). There is also evidence for genuinely greater prejudice among older adults based on the reasoning that they grew up in less egalitarian times (Schuman, Steeth, & Bobo, 1985). Herek and McLemore (2013) argue that this may especially be the case for sexual prejudice—­t hat sexual prejudice was so rampant and normative in the mid-1900s that some reductions in the overall prejudice we’re seeing now are based on the simple fact that the oldest individuals tend to be the most heterosexist, and, as older people are more likely to do than younger people, they’re dying. This explanation likely accounts for some of the decline in heterosexism, but certainly not all of it.

Contact The contact hypothesis is the idea that prejudice and intergroup conflict can be reduced when members of conflicting groups come together and interact under the “right conditions” (Allport, 1954). We discuss those conditions in detail in Chapter 12, but according

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to Pettigrew (2021), contact is most likely to reduce prejudice when there is friendship potential—­t hat is, when members of different groups have a chance to truly get to know one another as individual persons over multiple encounters (as we’ll see, we tend to like people more when we see them as individual persons vs. as group members). One challenge for contact involving friendship potential is that people actively resist it: people fear interacting with one of “them” for a number of reasons, and generally avoid it. And because many social categories (like race, gender, body size, disability, age, etc.) are visibly discernable, you can tell whether it’s “one of them” from some distance and avoid them, thus depriving you and them of the kind of contact that might reduce prejudice. Because sexual attitudes and identities are concealable, it is possible that the kind of contact that leads to prejudice reduction occurs with sexual minorities without people initially knowing it. As we have discussed, there are a number of reasons why sexual minorities choose to conceal their sexual identities, and so a number of their friends, family members, and coworkers may have relationships with them without knowing their sexual identities. Regardless of your own sexual orientation, there are probably a number of people in your life—­people who you have known for a long time and feel close to—who are gay, lesbian or bisexual, and you just don’t know it. Imagine that for whatever reason you are heterosexist; perhaps you subscribe to negative stereotypes of sexual minorities, or believe that sexual minorities violate traditional values. Now imagine your best friend comes out to you as gay, as more and more sexual minorities are doing (Gallup, 2021). You are now forced into a situation of cognitive dissonance, an unpleasant psychological state brought about by discrepancies between beliefs (Cooper, 2007). On the one hand, you have a negative attitude toward gay and lesbian individuals. On the other hand, you have known and cared for this person for years. To resolve this dissonance, you must either like your friend less or like LGB+ individuals more. People do lose friends and family members over these conflicts; perhaps most troubling are those involving parental abandonment of gay and lesbian adolescents. But people also appear able to make the other choice too, actively resolving their prejudices and stereotypes to retain their relationships. It is likely that a number of individuals’ sexual prejudices are reduced through cognitive dissonance processes. For example, among fundamentalist Christians (who, as we’ve seen, tend to be particularly heterosexist), close contact with a sexual minority individual reduced the effect of their fundamentalist beliefs on their sexual prejudice (Cunningham & Melton, 2013; see also Smith, Axelton, & Saucier, 2009). However, we still don’t know a lot about how people reconcile their sexual prejudices and their close relationships when a close relationship partner comes out to them.

Essentialism‑Based Interventions As we mentioned earlier, essentialism is a double-­edged sword; the “born this way” movement may have helped lessen sexual prejudice for a time, but such beliefs no longer distinguish heterosexist from nonheterosexist people (Grzanka et al., 2016). Moreover, the belief that “they are biologically different” has a sordid history, and has been used to justify all sorts of discrimination. Thus, some recent interventions have attempted to weaken people’s essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation as a way to reduce sexual prejudice (Fry, Grzanka, Miles, & DeVore, 2020). This research is still in its infancy, and more work is needed to determine whether it will be an effective approach at curbing sexual prejudice.

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We, on the other hand, used heterosexual individuals’ existing essentialist beliefs about sexual orientation to reduce their prejudice (Fritzlen, Phillips, March, Grzanka, & Olson, 2020). We did this by convincing them that they might be a little bit gay. Our reasoning was premised on the well-­founded notion that people like being associated with valued groups, and avoid being associated with stigmatized groups, to maintain a positive view of the self (Greenwald et al., 2002; Pryor, Reeder, & Monroe, 2012). If they are forced to consider the possibility of membership in a stigmatized group, they are confronted with a cognitive dissonance-­inducing dilemma: They can either distance themselves from the stigmatized group, or they can start liking and valuing that group. If people believe that sexual orientation is biologically determined, and learn that they might be a member of this stigmatized group, they can’t readily distance themselves from the group because they’re stuck with it. Hence, they come to like the group more. How did we do this? We showed heterosexual participants photos of attractive, scantily clad men and women, and told them that we tracked their pupil dilation patterns with eye trackers (pupil dilation is, in fact, an indicator of attraction: Rieger & Savin-­Williams, 2012). We told some participants that they showed pupil dilation to same-sex others, suggesting same-sex attraction (control participants were told they had the expected heterosexual dilation pattern). Participants that were told they might be a bit gay showed reduced sexual prejudice on an IAT, but only if they subscribed to essentialist notions of sexual orientation—­t hey believed they were “stuck” with being a little bit gay. Those who did not subscribe to essentialism did not show any reductions in sexual prejudice. Of course, we debriefed all participants after the study and none had any complaints (incidentally, the intervention also reduced implicit racial prejudice among White participants who were falsely told they had a distant Black ancestor). In sum, essentialism colors how people see social groups, and while it has too often been used to justify prejudices, it appears it can also be used to reduce them.

Intergroup Emotions Recall that disgust is a common intergroup emotion heterosexists feel in response to sexual minorities. Although the research isn’t entirely clear, this reaction may be based on gay men’s historic associations with HIV/AIDS, and even perhaps unfounded fears that sexual orientation itself is “contagious.” However, disgust is not necessarily limited to things we think might physically contaminate us. It can also be a moral emotion—­a response to acts people believe are degrading or harmful but not immediately threatening (Haidt, Rozin, McCauley, & Imada, 1997; Schaller & Park, 2011). For example, people express anger when they themselves are wronged, but they express moral disgust when they observe someone else being wronged, which in turn can lead them to withdraw from others (Hutcherson & Gross, 2011). This raises the possibility that the disgust many heterosexists express toward sexual minorities may be based on their impression that sexual minorities are doing wrong to others. Lai, Haidt, and Nosek (2014) wondered whether coaxing people into feeling the opposite of disgust might decrease their sexual prejudice. What is the opposite of disgust? They reasoned that it is “moral elevation,” or “emotion that is elicited by witnessing acts of moral beauty such as charity, gratitude, generosity or loyalty” (p. 782). In their research, participants were randomly assigned to watch either morally elevating videos

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or control videos; the elevating videos included an interview with a man whose music teacher saved him from street gangs and a news story about someone saving another person’s life, among others. Their moral elevation induction reduced both implicit and explicit sexual prejudice. And as the authors’ predicted, the effect did not generalize to anti-Black prejudice, as anti-Black prejudice is not typically associated with disgust. However, other videos that promoted positive feelings, regardless of their “moral elevation,” also tended to reduce heterosexism, suggesting that positive affect in general can be an effective prejudice reduction tool. We explore this possibility further in Chapter 12.

SUMMARY Prejudice and stereotyping directed toward sexual minorities have seen extraordinary change in the early 21st century. The American public went from “mostly negative” to “mostly positive” toward gay and lesbian individuals, although bisexual individuals still suffer stigma from both the heterosexual and homosexual communities. Moreover, hate crimes directed at sexual minorities are not diminishing, which suggests parallels between racism and heterosexism: outward appearances and public professions have become more positive, but negativity is still pervasive. Comparisons between different targets of prejudice illuminate common themes that appear to underly prejudice as part of the human condition, but also highlight unique contributors to different forms of prejudice. For example, socialization, including peer, family, and media influences, passively impart prejudices into the mind for nearly all negatively depicted groups, but the content of those stereotypes (e.g., lazy vs. aggressive vs. promiscuous) varies. Similarly, many stereotyped groups are believed to violate traditional or symbolic values, but those value violations differ (e.g., hard work vs. personal willpower vs. gender roles). Based on differences in essentialism beliefs, some stigmas are thought to be more controllable than others (e.g., obesity is seen as highly controllable, essentialism beliefs about sexual orientation vary widely, and few would believe that one’s ethnicity is a choice). Finally, stigmatized identities differ in terms of their concealability, with implications for the effects of intergroup contact and prejudice reduction. How we conceptualize attraction, sexual behavior, and sexual identity has also changed remarkably over the years—­sexual orientation as a social category is a recent construction indeed. And the fact that what people find attractive, what kinds of sexual behaviors they engage in, and with whom, also vary tremendously and greatly complicates our understanding of social groupings having to do with sexuality and the prejudices and stereotypes we form about them. We expect further complications in our understanding of these dynamics as researchers increasingly consider the interactive impact of different identities through the lens of intersectionality (Grzanka, 2018). Indeed, as we have seen, how people conceptualize gender and gender roles is not independent of how they conceptualize sexuality, how they conceptualize race is not independent of how they conceptualize sexual orientation or gender (Collins & Bilge, 2020). The list goes on. What we cautiously suggest all prejudices have in common is the capacity for their reduction—­t hat is, regardless of the specific groups, prejudice, hostility, and conflict can be reduced, and we turn to that topic next.

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GLOSSARY Bisexual Invisibility—ignoring or dismissing bisexual people, often based on the belief that they are indecisive and “really” either gay or straight. Conversion Therapy—a therapeutic attempt to alter a person’s sexual orientation; largely ineffective and psychologically harmful. Heterosexism—a negative evaluation based on an individual’s perceived same-sex attraction; heterosexism also entails social and institutional biases in favor of heterosexuality. Homophobia—fear and dread from being in close physical proximity to someone perceived to be a sexual minority. Internalized Heterosexism—negative psychological effects of heterosexism on the attitudes, beliefs, and behaviors of sexual minorities. Psychological Essentialism—a belief in an “essence” of a social identity, often thought to be natural or biological, that determines a number of the identity’s perceived qualities. Sexual Prejudice—a negative evaluation of someone based on real or perceived membership in a group defined by sexual attitudes, behaviors, or identities.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. Sexual prejudice is still a problem despite improvements in people’s attitudes. How much of the remaining sexual prejudice is based on negative stereotypes versus the perception that sexual minorities violate traditional values? How much of sexual prejudice do you think is based on perceived gender role violations of sexual minorities? 2. How much responsibility do religious institutions bear for promoting sexual prejudice? What would you say to someone who says their sexual prejudice is justified because “it says so right in the Bible”? 3. What do you think has most contributed to the reduction in sexual prejudice over the past few decades? 4. Why do you think having a close friend or family member who is a sexual minority helps to reduce sexual prejudice? What do heterosexist individuals whose close friend or family member comes out to them think to themselves as they try to resolve their prejudice? 5. How much are your attitudes toward sexual minorities based on the “born this way” narrative? Is believing that sexual orientation is biologically determined problematic? 6. How is sexual prejudice psychologically similar to or different from racism, sexism, and anti-fat prejudice?

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Russell, G. M., & Bohan, J. S. (2006). The case of internalized homophobia: Theory and/as practice. Theory and Psychology, 16(3), 343–366. Ryan, C., Russell, S. T., Huebner, D., Diaz, R., & Sanchez, J. (2010). Family acceptance in adolescence and the health of LGBT young adults. Journal of Child and Adolescent Psychiatric Nursing, 23(4), 205–213. Ryan, W. S., Legate, N., Weinstein, N., & Rahman, Q. (2017). Autonomy support fosters lesbian, gay, and bisexual identity disclosure and wellness, especially for those with internalized homophobia. Journal of Social Issues, 73(2), 289–306. Sabin, J. A., Riskind, R. G., & Nosek, B. A. (2015). Health care providers’ implicit and explicit attitudes toward lesbian women and gay men. American Journal of Public Health, 105(9), 1831– 1841. Schaller, M., & Neuberg, S. L. (2012). Danger, disease, and the nature of prejudice(s). In Advances in experimental social psychology (Vol. 46, pp. 1–54). New York: Academic Press. Schaller, M., & Park, J. H. (2011). The behavioral immune system (and why it matters). Current Directions in Psychological Science, 20, 99–103. Scherer, K. R. (1984). On the nature and function of emotion: A component process approach. Approaches to Emotion, 2293(317), 31. Schuman, H., Steeth, C., & Bobo, L. (1985). Racial attitudes in America: Trends and interpretation. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press. Smith, S. J., Axelton, A. M., & Saucier, D. A. (2009). The effects of contact on sexual prejudice: A meta-­a nalysis. Sex Roles, 61(3–4), 178–191. Southern Poverty Law Center. (2011). Comparing the rate of victimization for gays and lesbians to that of other groups. Retrieved from www.splcenter.org/fighting-­hate/intelligence-­report/2011/ anti-gay-hate-­crimes-­doing-math. Steffens, M. C. (2005). Implicit and explicit attitudes towards lesbians and gay men. Journal of Homosexuality, 49(2), 39–66. Szymanski, D. M. (2006). Does internalized heterosexism moderate the link between heterosexist events and lesbians’ psychological distress? Sex Roles, 54, 227–234. Szymanski, D. M., Kashubeck-­West, S., & Meyer, J. (2008a). Internalized heterosexism: A historical and theoretical overview. The Counseling Psychologist, 36(4), 510–524. Szymanski, D. M., Kashubeck-­West, S., & Meyer, J. (2008b). Internalized heterosexism: Measurement, psychosocial correlates, and research directions. The Counseling Psychologist, 36(4), 525–574. Talley, A. E., & Bettencourt, B. A. (2008). Evaluations and aggression directed at a gay male target: The role of threat and antigay prejudice. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 38(3), 647–683. Tankard, M. E., & Paluck, E. L. (2016). Norm perception as a vehicle for social change. Social Issues and Policy Review, 10(1), 181–211. Tapias, M. P., Glaser, J., Keltner, D., Vasquez, K., & Wickens, T. (2007). Emotion and prejudice: Specific emotions toward outgroups. Group Processes and Intergroup Relations, 10(1), 27–39. Terrizzi, J. A., Jr., Shook, N. J., & McDaniel, M. A. (2013). The behavioral immune system and social conservatism: A meta-­a nalysis. Evolution and Human Behavior, 34(2), 99–108. Tilcsik, A. (2011). Pride and prejudice: Employment discrimination against openly gay men in the United States. American Journal of Sociology, 117(2), 586–626. Von Hippel, W., Silver, L. A., & Lynch, M. E. (2000). Stereotyping against your will: The role of inhibitory ability in stereotyping and prejudice among the elderly. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 26(5), 523–532. Waidzunas, T. (2015). The straight line: How the fringe science of ex-gay therapy reoriented sexuality. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press. Warriner, K., Nagoshi, C. T., & Nagoshi, J. L. (2013). Correlates of homophobia, transphobia, and internalized homophobia in gay or lesbian and heterosexual samples. Journal of Homosexuality, 60(9), 1297–1314.

Sexual Prejudice 313 Weinberg, G. (1972). Society and the healthy homosexual. New York: St. Martin’s. Weinstein, N., Ryan, W. S., DeHaan, C. R., Przybylski, A. K., Legate, N., & Ryan, R. M. (2012). Parental autonomy support and discrepancies between implicit and explicit sexual identities: Dynamics of self-­acceptance and defense. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 102(4), 815–832. Whitley Jr, B. E. (2009). Religiosity and attitudes toward lesbians and gay men: A meta-­a nalysis. International Journal for the Psychology of Religion, 19(1), 21–38. Williams, M. J., & Eberhardt, J. L. (2008). Biological conceptions of race and the motivation to cross racial boundaries. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 94(6), 1033–1047. Williams, S. L., & Mann. A. K. (2017). Sexual and gender minority health disparities as a social issue: How stigma and intergroup relations can explain and reduce health disparities. Journal of Social Issues, 73(3), 450–461. Yzerbyt, V., Rocher, S., & Schadron, G. (1997). Stereotypes as explanations: A subjective essentialistic view of group perception. In R. Spears, P. J. Oakes, N. Ellemers, & S. A. Haslam (Eds.), The social psychology of stereotyping and group life (pp. 20–50). Cambridge, UK: Blackwell.

CHAPTER 10

Sexism

A

s the scene fades in, we see a couple of young children impatiently waiting for their breakfast at the kitchen table. Their father is in an apron, putting the finishing touches on a massive eight-­course meal for the children’s breakfast. Satisfied, the father awaits the children’s expected delight at their good fortune, and at their father’s accomplishment. One of the children then says to her father, “Dad, Mom usually just makes us a bowl of cereal for breakfast.” The commercial ends with a display of the cereal product, and—the seller hopes—the viewer chuckling at the humorous scenario they just saw. While the main goal of advertising is to sell the product, there are other messages in this commercial that are subtly communicated to the viewer besides the overt message to buy that particular cereal. We find out that usually the mother prepares the children’s breakfast, and dad was not aware of the kids’ morning routine (presumably because he has left for work before the children have breakfast). The viewer is also led to infer that the mother is in charge of household duties (like preparing breakfast) and taking care of the children (making sure they eat breakfast, get dressed and ready for school, etc.). All this from a simple cereal commercial? Yes, and these subtle messages about male and female roles, expected and common gender behaviors in society, and—more broadly—­t he natural structure of the family unit, are subtly but clearly communicated to the viewer in this commercial and throughout other types of media (movies, magazines, books, and television shows) in society. As we learned in Chapter 1, people tend to immediately group other individuals according to the “basic” or “primitive” categories of gender, race, and age. Throughout the text, we have been discussing racism, and in Chapter 8, we discussed prejudice against older adults. In this chapter, we explore in some detail the factors that lead to the formation, maintenance, and reduction of prejudice against women. Negative attitudes and behavior toward someone on the basis of their gender is termed sexism. Though such prejudice can refer to prejudice against men, most researchers refer to “sexism” as prejudice against women. 314

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As with any prejudice and stereotype, a first question that arises when studying sexism is why would society, or individuals within that society, be motivated to create and maintain such gross generalizations about, and negative attitudes toward, women? In this chapter, we review the major theories and current empirical work that attempt to address this question. We also explore the content, structure, and accuracy of gender stereotypes. Finally, we discuss ways that sexism and sexist thinking can be reduced. By the end of the chapter, you will see that, like racism and ageism, sexism permeates American society. In subtle and overt forms, sexism influences our attitudes toward women, women’s views of themselves, women’s career choices, and countless other aspects of women’s lives (Ruble & Ruble, 1982). Stereotypes of women can also sabotage their performance on stereotype-­related tasks. For example, a prevalent stereotype about women is that they are less able to understand science and mathematics, and they perform poorly relative to men. As we learned in Chapter 7, Steele (1997) found that when such performance stereotypes are made salient to a member of that stereotyped group, the performance of that person suffers, relative to their peers. This phenomenon is called stereotype threat. The reason performance suffers in these situations is that the individual becomes aware that if they perform poorly on the relevant task, then that individual has just confirmed the salient stereotype about that group. This awareness becomes anxiety provoking, and the individual’s performance is thus hindered by the ensuing anxiety over doing well and avoiding confirming the stereotype. In a test of the aforementioned stereotype of women, Spencer, Steele, and Quinn (1999) found that, indeed, when the negative stereotype about the math and science abilities of women was made salient to women participants, their performance suffered relative to a group of equally qualified men. It is important to note that these men and women participants were equally matched on their mathematics ability (based on their math subsection scores on major college entrance exams). Thus, even though men and women had demonstrated equal talent for mathematics, when women were made aware of the stereotype about women performing poorly in math, the women participants performed significantly worse compared to their male counterparts. Thus, for members of groups about whom negative stereotypes exist, stereotype threat, and the pernicious effects of stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination can impair performance, limit opportunities, and affect one’s self-­concept (Walton & ­Spencer, 2009). In this chapter, we explore the various ways that gender prejudice can manifest itself. Sexism is often minimized, downplayed, or shrugged off by society as “harmless” or even “humorous,” and instances of sexist stereotypes and sexist behavior often go unrecognized as such. It may indeed be the case that people are not consciously aware of the presence of sexism in society, or when they are being sexist toward another. Some research suggests that gender stereotypes are so well learned that they automatically influence our perceptions and judgments, often without our conscious awareness of such bias (Banaji & Greenwald, 1995; Devine, 1989; Steegh, Hoffler, Hoft, & ­Parchmann, 2021). As we learn in Chapter 12, much research supports the idea that the links between a group and negative thoughts and feelings can be broken and substituted with more egalitarian responses (Devine & Monteith, 1993; Monteith, 1993, 1996). It is therefore beneficial to understand the nature of gender stereotypes in order to learn more about how to avoid such stereotyping.

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GENDER STEREOTYPES What are women like? What are men like? From a very young age, we begin to learn from society the answers to these questions (Ellmers, 2018). We learn that women are not aggressive, not independent, tend to be more emotional, more easily persuaded, dislike math and science, and tend to be passive (Broverman, Vogel, Broverman, C ­ larkson, & Rosenkrantz, 1972). We also learn that while women are seen as polite, gentle, nurturing, compassionate, neat, indecisive, concerned with their appearance, and quiet, men tend to be viewed as aggressive, independent, nonemotional, decisive, confident, rough, blunt, sloppy, and loud (Broverman et al., 1972). There are countless other gender stereotypes you can think of, and these are just a few. Interestingly, there seems to be a remarkable cross-­c ultural consensus in the content of gender stereotypes. Williams and Best (1982) examined data covering 30 nations and found that men tend to be viewed as stronger, more assertive, dominant, active, and aggressive. Women are usually viewed as primarily concerned with fostering relationships with others, nurturing, and give deference (Fiske & Tablante, 2015). Within the United States, college students have similar shared ideas about the physical appearance, clothes, and settings of specific stereotyped subgroups for men (e.g., “nerd,” “ladies’ man”) and women (e.g., “housewife,” “feminist”; Green & Ashmore, 1998). In research by Broverman and colleagues (1972), you may have noticed something interesting about the content of the characteristics that people used to describe men versus women—­namely, men and women were seen as complete opposites on virtually all of the traits and characteristics listed (hence the term the “opposite sex”). Men were seen as independent, and women were viewed as dependent. Men were rated as sloppy, aggressive, and decisive, whereas women were perceived as neat, nonaggressive, and indecisive. Why might that be the case? What incentive or reason does society have to view men and women as opposites on virtually any psychological dimension one can identify? There are many possible factors that may contribute to such a motivation, and we examine them below. You may be saying to yourself, “Self, these data were collected decades ago, and many of these stereotypes about the sexes no longer exist.” Unfortunately, such an assumption appears to be incorrect. Bergen and Williams (1989) compared the gender stereotypes about men and women in 1972 and in 1988, and found no differences in the content of the stereotypes. Thus, it appears that, despite the great political, economic, and social gains women have made toward more equal status over the last half-­century, people’s views of women still tend to be shaped by traditional gender stereotypes that persist today (Chatman, Sharps, Mishra, Kray, & North, 2022; Van Breen & Barreto, 2023). When we perceive that someone is a woman or a man, are those perceptions biased by general stereotypes about women and men, or are our perceptions of the individual guided by specific features of the person, leading to specific gender stereotypes (e.g., “career woman” or “jock,” respectively)? In three experiments by Deaux and Lewis (1984), participants were given information about the gender of a target individual, as well as role behavior or trait information, and they were asked to indicate the likelihood that the target person had gender-­related characteristics. Results demonstrated that gender stereotypes are best conceptualized as a set of components, such as traits, role behaviors, occupations, and physical appearance. Making features of a component salient can lead the perceiver to think of other components of the gender stereotype. Interestingly,

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Deaux and Lewis found that specific gender stereotype component information can outweigh the influence of gender in evaluations of the target. Therefore, it appears that if people just know that a target individual is a man or woman, they draw upon gender stereotype information in their inferences about the target. However, once the perceiver knows more specific information about the target (i.e., the components discussed above, such as physical appearance, traits, etc.), the influence of the gender category diminishes in the perceiver’s evaluation of the target, and the target is viewed according to the specific component information. Swim (1993) found similar results in her studies, and she suggests that these data indicate that while participants do use gender information in their evaluations of a target, the influence of this information is weak. The reason for the weak influence of gender, according to Swim, is that participants prefer to use specific case information in their assessments of a target, rather than simple gender category information (see also Swim, Borgida, Maruyama, & Myers, 1989).

MEASUREMENT OF GENDER STEREOTYPES Stereotypes about men and women suggest that people have different ideas about the behavior and personality characteristics of men and women. Indeed, the notion of the “opposite sex” suggests more than a distinction between a man and a woman, but it also implies that men and women are opposite (Deaux & Kite, 1993; Deaux & Lewis, 1984). The key word here is “opposite,” not “different.” Consider this point further. Men and women are merely different sexes. They are not “opposite” in the way that we usually refer to the term. Webster’s dictionary (Neufeldt, 1989) defines “opposite” as “1. set against, in a contrary direction; 2. entirely different, exactly contrary.” Thus, the word “opposite” suggests that men and women are as different as hot and cold, or positive and negative poles of a magnet. The notion that men and women are so diametrically opposite represents a bipolar assumption among both researchers and the lay public alike. This assumption states that a person has characteristics that are associated with either males or females, but not both (Ruble & Ruble, 1982). This assumption tended to guide the way researchers devised measures of gender stereotypes, and thus, their results were strongly tainted by the limitations of the instrument and the demand characteristics associated with such measures. For example, Broverman and colleagues (1972) presented participants with a list of dichotomous trait items. Each item listed two end points of a trait indicating the opposite ends of a given trait. For example, participants saw emotional and nonemotional, aggressive and nonaggressive, dominant and submissive, and so on. Participants could only indicate where on the trait the typical woman and the typical man fell. Participants could only indicate that women/men were, for example, either dominant or submissive, but not somewhere in between. Thus, it is easy to see how this type of inherent bias in the design of the questionnaire could lead participants to indicate opposite characterizations of men and women. Interestingly, when participants are asked, in an open-ended questionnaire, to list the characteristics of males and females, their responses mirror very closely those results obtained by ­Broverman et al. (Basow, 1992). The bipolar assumption has been strongly criticized, primarily due to the fact that little evidence supports the notion that men and women have either masculine or feminine traits, respectively, but not both, or that the presence of a number of “masculine

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traits” in an individual necessarily means that the individual cannot have a number of “feminine” traits (Bem, 1974; Spence & Helmreich, 1978). Indeed, Bem’s (1974, 1993) research on gender roles reveals that many people do in fact often possess traits that are typically associated with males and females. As a result of the inadequacy of the bipolar model, researchers have moved to a more dualistic view (Spence & Helmreich, 1978), which suggests that people can have some of both agentic and communal traits. Agentic traits are those that have traditionally been associated with men, traits that indicate task orientation, assertiveness, and a striving for achievement. Communal traits (sometimes referred to as “expressive” traits) are those that have traditionally been associated with women, such as the desire to foster relationships, to be sensitive, and to get along with others. An example of such a stereotypical dual view of women comes from Fiske and colleagues’ (Cuddy, Fiske, & Glick, 2008; Fiske, Cuddy, Glick, & Xu, 2002) stereotype content model, which shows that people tend to perceive female homemakers as low in competence, but high in warmth. Such beliefs about the genders are pervasive and persistent (Madera, Hebl, & Martin, 2009), and can have strong effects on the careers that adolescents choose for themselves (Tellhed & Bjorklund, 2018). Although much research suggests that people have generally less favorable attitudes toward women as compared to men (as exemplified in the Broverman et al., 1972, research discussed above; see also Burn, 1996; Deaux & Kite, 1993, for a more comprehensive discussion of gender stereotypes), research by Eagly and Mladinic (1989) suggests that people actually have quite favorable attitudes toward women. Eagly and Mladinic examined the research literature on people’s attitudes toward women, and noticed that researchers had been using Spence and Helmreich’s (1978) Attitudes Toward Women Scale (ATWS) to measure attitudes toward women, even though that was not the purpose of the scale, according to Spence and Helmreich. The name of the scale is a bit misleading, because the scale actually measures attitudes toward equal rights, and roles and privileges for women, as well as blatant sexism (harmful behavior toward women that is unequal, intentional, and unambiguous; Swim & Cohen, 1997). In order to get a better assessment of attitudes toward women, and the relation of those attitudes to attitudes about equality for women, Eagly and Mladinic (1989) administered the ATWS to 203 male and female college students, and also asked them to list the traits and attributes of men and women (i.e., to list their stereotypes of a typical man and a typical woman) in an open-ended questionnaire. Participants were also asked to indicate their attitudes toward the equality of women and men in terms of rights and roles in society. If the ATWS really was a measure of attitudes toward women, then the evaluative content of participants’ stereotypes should correlate highly with their scores on the ATWS. However, participants’ questionnaire responses (their stereotypes) were completely uncorrelated with ATWS scores. As predicted, participants’ scores on the ATWS were strongly correlated with their self-­reported attitudes toward equal rights and roles for women. Thus, these data suggest that the ATWS doesn’t measure attitudes toward women, but attitudes toward equal rights and privileges for women in society (compared to men). Interestingly, participants’ conceptions of the typical woman in their open-ended responses show that people have quite favorable views of women. In sum, it appears that past research using the ATWS had suggested that people have negative views of women, when in fact what was likely happening with the data was that they had negative views of the idea of equality for women (with men) in society. It is certainly interesting that people can have positive views of women (indeed,

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Eagly & Mladinic’s [1989] participants indicated more positive attitudes about women than men), but at the same time indicate negative attitudes toward equal rights, roles, and privileges for women. Why might that be the case? One explanation may be found in the differences between male and female participants’ scores on the ATWS. Eagly and ­Mladinic found that men had significantly more negative attitudes toward equal rights for women than did women participants. These data support the possibility that while men and women have positive attitudes toward women in general, men may react negatively to threats to their power dominance over women in society. We explore this notion in more detail below, in a discussion of the power differential between men and women, and how it might account for the persistence of gender stereotyping and discrimination against women.

ORIGIN OF GENDER STEREOTYPES To understand the nature of sexism, it is helpful to examine the causes of sexist thinking and beliefs. Why are there stereotypes about, and prejudice toward, women? To answer this question, one must consider that prejudice and stereotypes against women have not one, but many different contributing sources. Each of these sources serves to strengthen the “truth” of the stereotype, the legitimacy of the prejudice, and to communicate shared beliefs of a society about the relationship of women to men. Below, we consider several major factors that have led to the creation and maintenance of prejudice and stereotypes about women.

Religion Perhaps one of the earliest and strongest influences on the perception of men versus women has been religion. Bem and Bem (1970) found that many major religions in the world (e.g., Islamic, Jewish, Christian) have taught that women are different from, inferior to, and subservient to men. For example, the Bible reads in part, Let the woman learn in silence with all subjection. But I suffer not a woman to teach, nor to usurp authority over the man, but to be in silence. For Adam was first formed, then Eve. And Adam was not deceived, but the woman being deceived was in the transgression. (1 Timothy 2:11–14)

According to Christian teaching, because woman was derived from man, and man from God, woman was lesser than man (see the Bible, Genesis 3). In 1998, a major religious denomination—­t he Southern Baptists—­adopted the following into their statement of faith: A husband is to love his wife as Christ loved the church. He has the God-given responsibility to provide for, to protect, and to lead his family. A wife is to submit herself graciously to the servant leadership of her husband even as the church willingly submits to the headship of Christ. (adopted by the Southern Baptist Convention, June 8, 1998)

As a result of the church sanctioning prejudice against women, women came to be viewed as less than men in spirit and intellect (Albee & Perry, 1998; Ruble & Ruble,

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1982). Research also indicates that people who are more devoutly religious are more likely to hold stereotypical gender role attitudes (Morgan, 1987), and those attitudes tend to reflect a benevolent sexism (Glick, Lameiras, & Castro, 2002; Haggard, Kaelen, Saroglou, Klein, & Rowatt, 2019; Mikolajczak & Pietrzak, 2014). It should be noted that most religions today have made tremendous advances in their perspective on the status of women in relation to men. Specifically, many do not adhere so rigidly to the exact wording of the Bible in terms of the equality of men and women. Indeed, there are more and more churches and religions today that give equal status to men and women. However, in many churches, women still do not enjoy all the opportunities and privileges afforded to men. Thus, despite the progress religions have made with regard to reducing or eliminating sexist ideology, there is a long way to go toward full equality between men and women in the church. In sum, religion has had a tremendous influence on the attitudes of society toward women. Unfortunately, that influence has often resulted in a view of women as inferior and subservient to men (Howard, Oswald, & Kirkman, 2020; Rakow & Wackwitz, 1998).

Social Learning From a very young age, children are taught what it means to be a man or a woman in society. According to social learning theory (Bandura & Walters, 1963; Mischel, 1966), children learn (through reinforcement and modeling) the expectations, goals, interests, abilities, and other aspects associated with their gender. Children’s conceptualization of what their gender means to them is shaped by their environment, and most importantly, by their parents. Through rewarding “gender-­appropriate” behaviors and punishing or discouraging “gender-­ inappropriate” behaviors (differential reinforcement), parents teach the child about his or her gender. Children also learn about their gender by watching their parents and important others in their environment do behavior modeling. A boy gains information about being a man from observing his father’s behavior, and a girl learns about being a woman by watching her mother’s behavior. The child then can acquire complex new behaviors via this observational learning (modeling). Bandura’s classic experiments on modeling of aggression in children (Bandura, Ross, & Ross, 1961) showed that boys and girls were equally likely to learn to be aggressive with a toy if they previously saw a model (an adult) behave aggressively toward the toy. There is substantial evidence to indicate that the influence of the parent in shaping the child’s gender identity is substantial, and lasting (Eccles et al., 1993; Swim & Hyers, 2009). In American society, gender is a fundamental dimension upon which people are understood, and gender concepts and stereotypes permeate many aspects of one’s life. Additionally, Americans tend to adhere to the belief that men and women are “naturally” different in temperament, personality, and ability. As such, parents feel the responsibility to teach their children what it means to be a boy, and to be a girl. These expectations are communicated, in direct and indirect ways, through the parents’ interactions with the child. Even before they begin elementary school, children have learned quite a lot about boy’s versus girl’s toys, clothes, hobbies, personalities, and so on (Bem, 1981; Edelbrock & Sugawara, 1978; Frable, 1989; Serbin, Powlishta, & Gulko, 1993). As they get older, children’s gender stereotypes become more rigid and resistant to change (Cann & Haight, 1983). Some research suggests that, for girls, the way the mother (but not the father) responds to gender stereotypes about women can have a big impact on

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whether the performance of girls is susceptible to gender stereotype-­t hreat effects. Specifically, this research found that the math performance of girls was not affected by stereotype threat when their mothers rejected gender stereotypes about math (Tomasetto, Alparone, & Cadinu, 2011). Interestingly, a comprehensive review of the literature on differential reinforcement and socialization by parents for boys versus girls suggests that parents do not really differentiate between boys and girls in the things they teach their children (Lytton & Romney, 1991). Why have studies failed to find evidence for a different socialization by parents for boys versus girls? According to Jacklin and Baker (1993), a likely reason is that parents may indeed be more egalitarian in their socialization of children, and the stereotypical gender roles and characteristics may be acquired via other socialization agents, such as the child’s friends and teachers, and by the media. However, in her controversial book, The Nurture Assumption, Harris (1998) goes even further to state that the influence of parents in the socialization of their children is minimal at best, and that the child’s aforementioned nonparental socializing agents (especially friends) strongly shape the child’s personality and gender identity. It should be noted that Harris’s position is controversial and hotly contested, and it goes against a mountain of child development research that suggests the opposite: Parents are not only influential but are very influential in shaping the child’s personality (e.g., whether the child engages in drug use; see Pelham et al., 2022). Nevertheless, Harris is correct in noting that more empirical attention should be paid to understanding the underestimated influence of nonparental socializing agents on children.

Cultural Institutions In addition to the role of parents in the socialization of gender information, society plays a big part in communicating to the child similar gender roles and gender stereotypes. Through television, movies, magazines, and other media, society reinforces the notion that boys and girls are indeed different, and that each gender has gender-­ appropriate goals, interests, abilities, and roles in society. The child learns that violating these expected roles will invite negative attention, ostracism, and generally make it more difficult to get along with others and more difficult to succeed in life. These messages about men and women are communicated very early to the child, even in the most benign sources. An analysis of animated cartoons from 1975 to 1995 indicated that males and females were still portrayed in gender-­stereotypical ways in the 1990s, just as they were in the 1970s (Thompson & Zerbinos, 1995). Male characters tend to be given more prominence, talk more, and are given nearly all of the important behaviors in the cartoon. However, the researchers noted that there has been a significant change in the degree of stereotypical portrayal of each gender since the early 1980s. Today, there are more female lead characters, and female cartoon characters are more frequently portrayed as intelligent, assertive, strong, independent, and competent. Americans watch a lot of television. By some estimates, by age 78, an average person will have watched 11.9 years of television (Bureau of Labor Statistics, 2021). That amount of exposure to a particular source of information has a strong influence on a wide variety of our attitudes. Attitudes about gender are certainly influenced by such constant exposure to gender-­relevant information contained in television shows and commercials. Back when television emerged onto the American scene (in the late 1940s), the

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expectations and roles for each gender were highly divided. Men were the achievers, working at a career to support their family, while women were expected to stay at home and raise the children and maintain the house (and do all the housework and cooking). Shows like Leave It to Beaver, The Adventures of Ozzie and Harriet, and Father Knows Best reflected these expectations and communicated them to the viewer. Over the subsequent 70 years, society has undergone tremendous changes in the expectations, opportunities, and roles afforded to women. However, television unfortunately does not always reflect such advances. Think about any commercial that advertises a cleaning product for the interior of the house. Recall that such a task has traditionally—­and stereotypically—­been the province of women. Advertisers know that the most persuasive messages are communicated by individuals similar to the target audience (Hovland, Janis, & Kelley, 1953). So, if the advertisers believe that men and women today still adhere to traditional gender roles, then their commercials should feature a woman discussing the benefits of that particular cleaning product. Indeed, this is the case today. For example, according to television commercials, women are the only ones in the family that care about the foods their kids eat (“Choosy mothers choose Jif peanut butter” and “Kix cereal: kid tested, mother approved”) and the health of their family (“Ask Doctor Mom”). While perusing the meat section of my local supermarket, I noticed a box of hot dogs for children called “Fun Franks” by the Ball Park Franks company. The gimmick with the product was that each hot dog came in its own little bun, individually wrapped, ready for the microwave. What was amazing was the overt sexism on the front of the box. In a big white bubble, the box announced, “Hey Mom! Check out the cooking instructions on the side panel!” Apparently, fathers still do not cook in modern families. Whenever I ask my students to name the last commercial they saw in which a man was touting the wonders of a laundry detergent or other household cleaner, they are stumped. But much research indicates that they shouldn’t be surprised. Men and women still adhere to traditional divisions of labor in the household (Miller & Stassler, 2010). Women are primarily responsible for the care of the children and maintaining a clean house, while men are expected to fulfill their duty as father and husband by getting a good job to provide for the family (Crosby, 1991; Thoits, 1987). Even among couples who both work full-time, women report doing 51.50% of the household labor, while men perform only 13.33% of the housework (Brenan, 2020). Why would this still be the case today? According to Crosby and Jaskar (1993), men and women look to their parents as a guide for understanding the nature of the role of husband/wife in the household. Because their parents are more likely to have traditional gender roles in their marriage (which they learned from their—even more traditional—­parents, and so on back through one’s lineage), their conceptions of their roles in their marriage (i.e., What are wives/husbands supposed to do? How are tasks divided?) are also likely to reflect gender role stereotypes. While seemingly benign, advertisements such as these convey several implicit messages to the viewer about the interests, expected roles, and abilities of men and women in society (Banaji, Hardin, & Rothman, 1993). Often, these messages are portrayed in rigid, stereotypical ways, and this constant exposure to gender stereotypes in the media influences the attitudes that the viewer has about what it is to be a man or a woman in America today (Courtney & Whipple, 1983; Goffman, 1979; Gunter, 1986). Some research suggests that the depiction of men in advertisements may be changing from the

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traditional gender stereotype to a more egalitarian role in the household (Grau & Zotos, 2016). More and more, men are beginning to be portrayed in “softer” roles: caring for and interacting with their children, for example. However, advertisers have begun to implement strict rules prohibiting the perpetuation of gender stereotypes in advertising. In 2018, the United Kingdom’s Advertising Standards Agency issued new rules for advertisers banning ads that “are likely to cause harm, or serious or widespread offence” (p.  4). While this is an encouraging change toward eliminating gender stereotypes in advertising, it is important to remember that the advertisement needs to be directed toward its target audience (in this case, men) for that audience to learn from it and begin to understand that this is the “new normal.” This is what it is to be a man today. Unfortunately, research is showing that these commercials are not yet being directed toward men (e.g., commercials for household cleaning products), and thus they will be less effective in changing the male gender stereotype (Grau & Zotos, 2016). Another problem is that when offensive gender stereotypes are portrayed in advertisements, men do not get offended (Huhmann & Limbu, 2016). They see the commercial as depicting today’s “normal” society (and men’s roles in it). So, one reason for the slow change in reducing and eliminating male gender stereotypes in media is that (1) men don’t see a problem with the traditional (gender stereotypical) depiction of men and women in advertisements, and (2) when men are portrayed in non-­gender-­stereotyped roles, the advertisements are not targeted in media (shows, magazines) that men typically view. Another way that gender stereotypes in advertisements influence gender attitudes is through normative and informational influence (Deutsch & Gerard, 1955). When we wish to hold a particular attitude in order to be liked by others, we are adhering to normative influence. When we wish to be correct in our attitudes, we may be more susceptible to informational influence. In this circumstance, we may adopt an attitude held by others because we believe the shared attitude of many others is more likely correct than if we developed an attitude about the issue on our own. When we see the advertisement, we often implicitly infer two things: this attitude/message is correct (otherwise, why would it be published/broadcast on worldwide media?), and it is shared by many others (at least all those involved in creating the ad, and those consumers who view the ad). However, such inferences merely reflect a common heuristic about the media—“If it is in print/broadcast, it must be true” (Huff, 1954)—that illustrate the powerful, pervasive, and pernicious (there’s a tongue twister!) influence of repeated exposure to gender stereotypes on the attitudes of the public about men and women. Sexist portrayals of women in advertising take the form of pairing women and attractiveness. In a content analysis of over 4,000 television commercials, Downs and Harrison (1985) found that female performers on commercials are more likely to be associated with attractiveness stereotypes than are male performers. They also found that the pairing of a female performer and a male voice-over (what the authors suggest is the “voice of authority” in the advertising industry) seems to make the most persuasive advertisement. This finding may not surprise you, since you no doubt have noticed that advertisers today place beautiful women in advertisements that have nothing to do with the merits of the product. Why? Because women are associated with attractiveness, and attractive things evoke positive emotions, and the seller wants people to associate positive emotions with the product (Altman, 2021).

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In his in-depth analysis of print advertisements, Goffman (1979) found that print ads convey sexism in many subtle ways. Men were almost always pictured in an agentic, or instrumental act (doing something), while women were often pictured as peripheral to the action, looking on at what the man was doing. Women, far more than men, are featured in poses that draw attention to their body (even when the object being sold is not something worn—a camera, for example). Other things Goffman noted: Men tend to be placed higher in the ad, relative to women, conveying greater stature or importance; men have their arms around women, and hold the woman’s hand, not the other way around (indicating dominance in the relationship); and women are almost exclusively pictured with and are nurturing children in print ads. It is rarely the case that a man is pictured in such a fashion. The impact of sexist advertisements is strong. Research by Rudman and Borgida (1995) showed that men, even those who are nonprejudiced toward women, who are exposed to sexist advertisements tend to think of women in more sexualized roles, and sexist stereotypes of women are made more salient for them. It should be noted that, like the changes in the gender stereotyping and sexism present in children’s cartoons, print advertisements have changed with the times, and are becoming more nonsexist. It would be interesting to see what another in-depth analysis of print advertisements would reveal about the sexism and gender stereotypes portrayed in contemporary advertising. This objectification of women has been found in another line of fascinating research on what is termed face-ism. Face-ism is the greater facial prominence of depictions of men in the media versus women, and greater emphasis on the whole body of women (Konrath & Schwarz, 2007). Archer, Iritani, Kimes, and Barrios (1983) conducted a series of studies that found that men’s faces were given much more prominence in three contexts: American magazines, in publications from 11 different countries, and even in artwork over the last 600 years. Archer and colleagues also found that when facial prominence was varied experimentally, and when the faces of individuals in photos were more prominent, those individuals were rated by participants as more intelligent, more ambitious, and higher in “physical appearance” (a term the authors later admitted was vague in that they meant physical attractiveness, but people could have read it to denote neatness, for example). Archer et al. suggest that the face-ism in depictions of women versus men convey a message about the importance of various parts of the body for each gender. Because the head is the center of mental life (one’s character, intellect, personality, and identity are associated with the mind), and the data showed that people rated subjects in facially prominent photos as more intelligent and ambitious, men and women are viewed and portrayed in very different ways. Men are seen as the bright achievers, and women tend to be valued primarily for the physical attractiveness of their body. Recall that Archer et al. found that this symbolic message has been communicated in many different countries and over the last 600 years. Research has shown that this difference in depictions of men and women is pervasive in many forms of media, and results in those depicted with a portrait shot are perceived to be more competent than those presented in a full-body shot (Schwarz & Kurz, 1989). In addition to print media, face-ism exists in primetime television programs (Copeland, 1989). Interestingly, some evidence suggests that perhaps these patterns may be changing. Older persons are more likely to adhere to these traditional depictions of men and women, whereas among younger people, women are portrayed with greater facial prominence than men (Prieler & Kohlbacher, 2017).

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Not surprisingly, research indicates that gender-­stereotyped portrayals of women in advertisements have negative effects on women. Schwarz, Wagner, Bannert, and Mathes (1987) found that when women were exposed to advertisements that portrayed women in traditional roles as homemakers, they reported less positive attitudes toward political participation. These data suggest that activation of a common cultural stereotype (women as homemakers) may, for women, result in a suppression of achievement-­ related attitudes, or perhaps a depressed, pessimistic outlook on the woman’s own abilities and career possibilities due to the implied societal limits set forth in the traditional stereotype of women as homemakers. This interpretation is supported by an experiment conducted by Geis, Brown, Jennings, and Porter (1984). Men and women were asked to watch either sex-­stereotyped commercials or commercials with the sex roles reversed (e.g., a man talking about a product for cleaning his kitchen floors), or were asked to list their favorite television programs (control condition). They were then asked to write an essay in which they describe their lives 10 years from that date. The essays were analyzed and coded for achievement-­related versus homemaking themes. Results showed that women who viewed the stereotyped commercials reported less achievement imagery and more emphasis on homemaking compared to men and to those in the control and role-­reversed conditions (see Figure 10.1). Interestingly, the data also indicated that when women viewed the role-­reversed commercials, women’s essays contained many more achievement-­related themes compared to those women in the sex role-­stereotyped condition (see Figure 10.2). Taken together, these studies highlight the strong influence that the media has on the attitudes of women toward themselves and their future. The media doesn’t just reflect popular cultural stereotypes about gender, it perpetuates them and creates new gender stereotypes that negatively affect women’s self-­concepts and the way society views women. The environment and types of women to whom women perceivers are exposed can have a significant effect on their own tendency to engage in automatic gender stereotyping. Research by Dasgupta and Asgari (2004) found that when women are exposed to famous women who have made major contributions to various areas (e.g., law, politics, science), they are much less likely to automatically activate gender stereotypes in their subsequent judgments. Moreover, women who are exposed to more women leaders (e.g., women professors) in their daily environments are much less likely to automatically activate gender stereotypes. This suggests that a well-­entrenched, automatic cognitive process (gender-­stereotyping activation and endorsement) can be disrupted and perhaps eliminated by exposing the individual to women who occupy leadership (counterstereotypical) positions. The Geis et al. (1984) data present an optimistic picture in terms of career aspirations for women exposed to commercials in which women were depicted in roles and occupations that were contrary to traditional feminine stereotypes. Yet, more research suggests that the situation for women is not as rosy. Rudman and Phelan (2010) primed women with traditional gender roles (e.g., women nurses, or men surgeons) and found that they showed easier access to traditional gender stereotypes, and they also showed decreased interest in male (or more agentic) occupations. When exposed to nontraditional roles (e.g., female surgeon), female subjects indicated a decreased leadership self-­ concept and less interest in male (agentic) occupations. The researchers suggest that the

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latter results are due to women feeling somehow threatened by the thought of females in a traditionally male-­dominated occupation—­t hat is, instead of feeling inspired by the trailblazing female, the women in this study were intimidated by the pioneering female example, causing them to embrace traditional female roles and characteristics. It is clear that more research is needed to help researchers better understand the nuances of the specific conditions that inspire and threaten women to aspire to gender-­atypical occupations and characteristics.

Net Achievement Themes

More 1 Achievement

Male subjects

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Version of Commercials

FIGURE 10.1.  The influence of stereotypical and nonstereotypical commercials on women’s and men’s aspirations to achieve. Geis, Brown, Jennings, and Porter (1984) showed men and women either a series of gender-­stereotypical (“traditional”) commercials or gender role-­reversed commercials, and examined its effects on participants’ essays describing their views of themselves in the future. The achievement-­related themes in male’s essays were unchanged as a result of the type of commercial; they had more achievement-­related themes in their self-views. Women who saw the sex-­stereotyped commercials tended to see their futures in terms of those stereotypes: their essays revealed significantly more homemaking themes and less achievement imagery than those of men. (Note: This is not to say that being a homemaker is not an achievement—­it is to say that, in this experiment, what was being measured was traditional gender roles. So in that context, homemaker was a traditional female gender role, and “achievement” was a broad term for a stereotypical male gender role, having an “outside-­of-the-home work or career.”) However, when women viewed the gender role-­reversed commercials, their essays showed significantly more achievement-­related themes and very little gender-­stereotypical imagery. Interestingly, this type of commercial resulted in women having achievement aspirations that were nearly equal to those of men in that condition. From Geis, F. L., Brown, V., Jennings, J., & Porter, N. (1984). TV commercials as achievement scripts for women. Sex Roles, 10(7/8), 513–525. Copyright © 1984 Springer Nature. Reprinted with permission.

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Mean Numnber of Themes

5

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4

3

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FIGURE 10.2.  Buying into society’s gender stereotypes can influence one’s aspirations for the future. This figure shows another look at the basic effect presented in Figure 10.1. We can see that the actual number of homemaking versus achievement-­related themes in women’s essays shows a powerful influence of gender stereotypes. When women viewed commercials that promoted gender stereotypes, they tended to generate many more homemaking and few achievement-­related themes in their views of themselves in the future. Interestingly, viewing a gender role-­reversed commercial influenced women to think of their future in less stereotypical ways (more toward careers outside of the home, and equal to those of men) in their essays. From Geis, F. L., Brown, V., Jennings, J., & Porter, N. (1984). TV commercials as achievement scripts for women. Sex Roles, 10(7/8), 513–525. Copyright © 1984 Springer Nature. Reprinted with permission.

THE CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLATING GENDER STEREOTYPES When people fit a certain gender stereotype, or when they go along with (behave or perpetuate) a gender stereotype, society “rewards” them by treating them according to the expectations derived from those stereotypes, and there are therefore no social surprises, and interpersonal anxiety is kept low. But what happens when a man or woman acts contrary to our gender expectations and stereotypes? How is that person thought of and treated, and how does that treatment affect the individual? These are some of the questions explored by Rudman (1998) and her colleagues (Rudman & Fairchild, 2004; Rudman & Glick, 2001). This research has generally found that when women (or men) act in ways contrary to gender stereotypes, they face a backlash effect from society, by which they face social ostracism, criticism, and even prejudice and discrimination (Rudman & Fairchild, 2004). For example, women who violate the stereotype of modesty (e.g., by promoting their abilities as one would to get a job) risk being seen as not ideal for

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a job position (Rudman, 1998). Women seeking a job in management must violate the feminine stereotype of “niceness” and instead show an “agentic” drive in order to be seen as hireable, but in doing so they risk being seen as too cold and lacking interpersonal skills (Rudman & Glick, 1999, 2001). Why would people punish women for violating gender stereotypes? One possible reason is that the punishers are motivated to defend the patriarchical hierarchy in society, which gives men more power and status (Rudman, Moss-­R acusin, Phelan, & Nauts, 2012). What about men who violate gender stereotypes? Does the same “backlash effect” happen to them? The available evidence suggests that the answer is yes. Moss-­R acusin, Phelan, and Rudman (2010) found that men who were modest violated the proscription that men must be dominant and strong. As such, they did suffer from social penalties (prejudice against them) but interestingly, no economic penalties (no decrease in the likelihood of others to hire such men). A related study found similar results. When professionals (e.g., human resource managers) were asked to evaluate candidates for manager positions (internal promotions within the company), men applicants who described as “other advancing” (more concerned with helping team members than advancing his own career) were viewed as less agentic and less competent, and they were more likely to be penalized with job dismissal (Bosak, Kulich, Rudman, & Kinahan, 2018).

Evolution versus Social Roles Many people believe that men and women are different in terms of their personalities, interests, and abilities, and these differences are caused by their different biological makeup. In other words, men and women are “hardwired” differently, and this is why, for example, men are aggressive, and women are nonaggressive. According to this line of reasoning, then, the X or Y sex chromosome from the father (added to the mother’s X sex chromosome) determines a woman’s or man’s personality, abilities, and interests in regular ways that are not stereotypical, but are just a natural outcome of the person’s gender. Evolutionary psychologists (Buss, 1995, 1996, 2020; Kenrick, Maner, & Li, 2020; Simpson & Kenrick, 1997) suggest that such differences are the result of the Darwinian principle of natural selection. Specifically, natural selection is the process whereby those with “genetic fitness” are those who are most able to adapt successfully to the environment. Successfully adapted organisms are most likely to pass on their genes (i.e., to have offspring), and in this way, only the strongest, most adapted organisms in the species survive (Darwin, 1859). Evolutionary explanations for behavior assert that behavior and characteristics that are present today must necessarily have been adaptive, or else they would not have been passed down in the genetic code, to be observed in the organism today. More contemporary forms of evolutionary psychology have broadened the notion of genetic fitness, to “inclusive fitness,” which states that an organism is motivated to pass on its genes, either directly by producing offspring, or indirectly by helping a genetic relative survive and pass on its genes (Buss, 1996). How does this apply to gender stereotypes? What evolutionary psychology suggests is that the differences between males and females (in terms of personality, characteristics, etc., often labeled as stereotypes) are real, and they exist because the evolutionary processes of inclusive fitness favored certain behaviors for men, and different behaviors

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for women. While evolutionary psychology is the target of a number of criticisms (the erroneous belief that it is untestable, and therefore unfalsifiable), it is gaining popularity within mainstream psychology. A difference that many current gender researchers have with evolutionary theory is at the causal level of gender differences. Evolutionary theory suggests that gender differences today evolved out of the evolutionary drive to pass on one’s genes, while other researchers state that human biology evolved around different social structures and social roles (Caporael & Brewer, 1995; Eagly & Wood, 1999). In other words, social roles and societal structure have evolved throughout time, and with these changes, males and females have placed different emphases on qualities they seek in a mate. These social changes have thus influenced which genes and which characteristics are passed down in men and women. A bigger problem exists, however, when attempting to use evolutionary principles to explain current gender differences. It is a big leap to suggest that the specific social conditions that are present today (e.g., gender differences in behavior) were also present and adaptive in the early days of humankind (Eagly & Wood, 1999). Eagly (1987) has proposed an alternative to the evolutionary and biological explanations for gender differences in behavior. According to her social role theory, gender differences that are present today are due to the different social roles that men and women perform in society. Put simply, Eagly argues that it is not the case that the ability, interests, and characteristics of men and women are different because of genetics, but rather, we are different because society has taught us to do and be interested in different things, and to develop different aspects of personality more than other aspects. Social role theory states that: 1. Through a combination of biological and social factors, a division of labor between the sexes has emerged over time. 2. Since people behave in ways that fit the roles they play, men are more likely to wield physical, social, and economic power. 3. These behavioral differences provide a continuing basis for social perception, leading us to perceive men as dominant “by nature” and women as domestic “by nature,” when in fact the differences reflect the roles they play. We perceive gender differences in behavior and personality only because of the socialization of different behaviors and personality characteristics for boys and girls. Theoretically, then, if we socialized a girl as if she were a boy (i.e., teach her to be interested in traditional male activities and to develop “male traits,” such as aggressiveness and competitiveness), she would develop interests and personality characteristics that are more similar to those that we stereotypically associate with boys. Though social role theory has been criticized by evolutionary theorists as an unsatisfactory explanation for gender differences in behavior (e.g., Archer, 1996), the theory has received much empirical support (Eagly, 1987; Eagly & Steffen, 1986; Eagly & Wood, 1991, 1999; Moskowitz, Suh, & Desaulniers, 1994). In making the point that men and women are more similar than they are different, social role theory is consistent with much of the research literature that has arrived at the same conclusion (Basow, 1992; Deaux & LaFrance, 1998; Hyde, 2005). Thus, at present, social role theory provides the most parsimonious account for the observed differences between men and women in their social behavior (Eagly & Wood, 2012; Koenig & Eagly, 2014).

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Power Throughout the ages, societies have been based upon a strong partriarchical structure. This foundation represents a social structure that grants men power over women (Janssen-­Jurreit, 1982). In societies cross-­c ulturally, history has recorded a remarkable consistency in the subordination of women to men (Albee & Perry, 1998; Burn, 1996). Explanations for this disparity in equality range from the stronger male physique (i.e., power deriving literally from superior physical force), the province of men to be more agentic (or instrumental) compared to women (who needed to be more geographically stationary to raise and protect the children), and the legitimization of male dominance over women by religion (Basow, 1992; Bowman, 1984) and government (Albee & Perry, 1998; Benokraitis & Feagin, 1986). All of these influences have worked to keep societies male dominated in virtually every aspect of life. The question for the present discussion is How does this power differential lead to gender stereotyping of women? According to Fiske (1993; Fiske & Stevens, 1993), the initial difference between men and women in terms of power can be explained by the same reason that drives sexism and prejudice against women today: control. Fiske suggests that stereotypes are a form of control. They limit the target of the stereotype, and they legitimize discrimination and prejudice against the stereotyped group. Fiske argues that power fosters the development of stereotypes about the powerless (and not vice versa). People in power don’t need to think carefully about others, and they may not be personally motivated to pay attention to others, and therefore they are more likely to use rough stereotypes when thinking about others (Keltner, Gruenfeld, & Anderson, 2003). Whenever there is a power asymmetry, therefore, stereotyping of the powerless by the powerful is likely to occur, primarily because stereotyping serves the useful function of maintaining the power imbalance (Glick, 2006). The power differential between men and women is embedded and legitimized within organizational, societal, and interpersonal structures, and this serves to perpetuate gender stereotyping the control of women (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998; Haines & Jost, 2000; Vescio, Schlenker, & Lenes, 2010). Within such a power imbalance, the powerful (men) will adopt ideologies (including gender stereotypes) and beliefs that legitimize their dominance over the powerless (women), and these ideologies help stabilize the oppression of the powerless and minimize group conflict through their institutionalization within society (Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994; Sidanius, 1993). Interestingly, some research suggests that men who perceive that they are low in power in their relationship are more likely to endorse hostile sexism and aggression toward their relationship partners (Cross, Overall, Low, & McNulty, 2018). However, the researchers note that there is no indication that such a correlation was related to a desire for greater power in the relationship. More research is needed on these results to more clearly delineate the relationship between power, hostile sexism, and aggression in men. Stereotypes are both descriptive and prescriptive. According to Fiske (1993), the descriptive aspect of stereotypes tells how most people in a group behave, think, and feel. It describes the group’s motives, expectations, and other aspects of behavior (e.g., Asians are good at math and science). Stereotypes thus are controlling in that they provide a point from which the stereotyped individual must start, or from which they must break free. The prescriptive aspect of stereotypes is even more controlling. This suggests how stereotyped groups should think, feel, and act. This limits the range of behaviors open to the stereotyped individual, and it demands conformity to some or most aspects

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of the stereotype in order to maintain smooth interactions with the more powerful. Indeed, Fiske and Stevens (1993) suggest that gender stereotypes are a special type of stereotype in terms of their ability to exert control: They are more prescriptive than other stereotypes. The reason for this is that we have much more experience with gender groups than we do with other groups, and this provides a larger database from which to derive the prescriptive “shoulds” that make up gender stereotypes. Data from Gill (2004) show support for the idea that prescriptive stereotypes are influential. Gill found that prescriptive (and not descriptive) gender stereotypes predicted sexism, and this type of stereotyping is resistant to behavioral information that undercuts descriptive stereotypes.

ACCURACY OF GENDER STEREOTYPES Are stereotypes about men and women accurate? While most people would view such a possibility as preposterous, it is important to think carefully about what people mean by “accurate.” Consider the fact that, for most people, given a stereotype about a group, they can think of specific members of that group who have a number of characteristics that conform to that group stereotype. However, this of course does not make the stereotype accurate. Stereotypes, by definition, are broad generalizations of members of a group. A stereotype suggests that all members have similarity among themselves, and this unique constellation of characteristics sets them apart from other groups. Strictly speaking, therefore, stereotypes can never be accurate in terms of describing individuals within the group. However, what about the famous prejudice researcher, Gordon Allport’s (1954) contention that stereotypes contain a “kernel of truth”? This is the idea that stereotypes are based in some small fact. So, for some percentage of the group, the stereotype is an accurate reflection of reality, and accurately describes the characteristics of those members. The “kernel of truth” notion is one type of accuracy—­addressing the question of the actual accuracy of the stereotype in describing the characteristics of the entire group. A second part of the accuracy question is How accurate is the group stereotype in describing an individual group member (Deaux & Kite, 1993)? To illustrate these aspects of the accuracy of stereotypes, let us consider the following example of a gender stereotype. A common stereotype about women is that they are more emotional than men. Women seem to be more willing to express, talk about, and let themselves experience emotion compared to men. First, is this difference real, or is it a stereotype, and if the difference exists, what might account for the differences between men and women in terms of their emotionality? LaFrance and Banaji (1992) reviewed the scientific literature on this issue and found that women do indeed tend to express their emotions more than men, but in terms of the subjective experience of emotion (an index of emotion that typically relies on self-­report measures), women are more emotional if they are asked directly, the context is interpersonal, and the emotional domain is observable. This difference may be due to the finding that men and women rely on different information cues to define their internal state. Men use internal physiological cues, while women use external situational sources of information (Roberts & Pennebaker, 1995). Interestingly, however, physiological measures of emotion indicate that there are no differences between men and women in terms of physiologically felt emotion (LaFrance & Banaji,

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1992). A meta-­analysis of studies on gender stereotype accuracy concluded that generally, people don’t overestimate gender differences, and that gender stereotypes are more often helpful in accurately describing gender differences (Swim, 1994). The researcher suggests that one viable explanation for this is that people are more likely to come into contact with the opposite sex much more frequently than they would with members of other groups (racial, ethnic, etc.), and therefore their information and beliefs about the opposite sex are more likely to be accurate than would their judgments about other groups. Thus, the LaFrance and Banaji (1992) research has illuminated the question of the accuracy of the stereotype for the whole group (i.e., it is somewhat accurate with regard to subjective emotion only). However, the issue of the accuracy of a group stereotype in describing a group member is a more complex issue. Most researchers regard stereotypes as probability estimates when applied to individuals, rather than accurate characterizations (Deaux & Kite, 1993; McCauley, Stitt, & Segal, 1980; Nelson, 2016)—that is, for a given stereotype, there is a certain probability that the stereotype is accurate for the particular group member under consideration. Perceivers decide, based on their own information, past experiences, biases, and other heuristics, what those probabilities are for them in that social context, at that moment (Nisbett & Ross, 1980; Tversky & ­K ahneman, 1973). As we have seen throughout this book, some people are more likely to rely on stereotypes as accurate and may be more likely to inflate their estimates of the probability of stereotype accuracy (e.g., right-wing authoritarians). On the other hand, there is some evidence that people are more sensitive to actual group differences than once thought, and that their judgments about an individual may reflect both bias and accurate perceptions of distinctions between groups (Ottati & Lee, 1995). Despite this, much research suggests that people often apply group stereotypes that, while they may or may not be somewhat accurate in characterizing differences between groups, represent a “good enough” judgment about an individual that meets the cognitive demands of “fast judgment, least effortful thinking” that characterizes cognition (Fiske & N ­ euberg, 1990; Fiske & Taylor, 1981; Taylor, 1981). With regard to the accuracy of gender differences, surprisingly few sound studies have been conducted on the issue. Martin (1987) asked men and women to estimate the percentage of men and women who have various characteristics. Thus, she obtained a measure of a group’s own consensus on self-­perceived traits, and a measure of how that group perceives the other gender. Results indicated that males and females had very stereotypical images of each other, and they tended to exaggerate small real differences to match gender stereotypes. These results support what most stereotype researchers have concluded about stereotype accuracy: within-­g roup variability is usually larger than is perceived, and intergroup differences tend to be exaggerated in perception in ways that conform to expected stereotypes (Jussim et al., 2016; Lee, Jussim, Mcauley, 1995; Kunda, 1999). In a meta-­analysis of the accuracy of gender stereotypes, Swim (1994) concluded that males and females were quite accurate in their perceptions of the characteristics of the other’s group. Thus, according to Swim, gender stereotypes may not be overestimates. However, Allen (1995) replicated Martin’s findings, further supporting the idea that gender stereotypes are not accurate but are substantial exaggerations of small group differences. Though research on stereotype accuracy has been lacking, it is becoming a “hot” area of research (see Jussim et al., 2016, for a detailed discussion), and more research is needed to further clarify the nature and accuracy of gender stereotypes. One

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important focus in this area of research examines the extent to which researchers are objective and unbiased in their examination of the research literature on stereotype accuracy. Jussim, Stevens, and Honeycutt (2018) make the argument that one important reason why many papers and texts conclude that stereotype accuracy is quite low is due to a biased, selective review of the available research literature due to their own stereotypes about stereotype accuracy research! They make the compelling case that when one objectively looks at the literature, there is much more evidence to support stereotype accuracy than commonly reported and believed.

SEXIST LANGUAGE Just as we learn about the nature of our social world and our gender roles and expectations through culture and social learning, the structure and content of our language also communicates the patriarchal nature of society, and this affects the way we think about men and women (Carroll, 1956). Think about common terms for occupations: policeman, fireman, repairman, mailman, chairman, and so on. While the use of such terms for occupations has declined with the increased sensitivity to the sexist connotations of appending “man” to an occupation, many people still use the terms to refer to both men and women in those jobs. Such a usage has been termed the “generic masculine.” For decades, English textbooks and manuals on proper grammar and writing structure (e.g., Strunk & White, 1979) have taught that the use of the word “he” is understood to be a generic reference to men and women in the English language. Such a practice is rooted in the beginnings of the English language (Coates, 1986). So, saying the word “mankind” refers to men and women, just as the phrase “May the best man win” refers to both sexes. But does it really? How does the presence of masculine terms in the English language affect gender stereotypes, and how do women perceive their place in such a patriarchical system? In order to examine how the generic “he” affects interpretations of the subjects of various sentences, Gastil (1990) asked participants to read various sentences aloud and then describe whether the image of the subject was a male, female, either male or female, or neither (no human image). Results confirmed earlier research (e.g., MacKay, 1980; Todd-­Mancillas, 1981), which showed that the generic “he” tends to evoke a male image in a significant majority of the responses. Similarly, much research indicates that when children read sentences with the generic he, they generally do not understand that it is meant to denote male and female (Hyde, 1984; Wise & Rafferty, 1982). Use of generic masculine terms in job advertisements also affects how women perceive the appropriateness of the position for them. Research indicates that when jobs are described with masculine pronouns (e.g., “This position requires that the individual be required to show his mastery of X.  .  .  . He will be responsible for overseeing X”), women are rated as less competent than men to do the job (Shepelak, Ogden, & Tobin-­ Bennett, 1984), and female applicants lose interest in the position, assuming that they are not suited for the position (Briere & Lanktree, 1983; Gaucher, Friesen, & Kay, 2011). Sexist language can also change the course of one’s academic (and employment) future. When subjects were asked to evaluate a sexist (vs. antisexist) professor’s letter of recommendation for a college student, subjects attributed lesser ability to female than to male students (Biernat & Eidelman, 2007).

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Basow (1992) notes many other sexist aspects of the English language. Women tend to be described in the media by their appearance while men are rarely so described. For example, how many times have you heard a talk show host introduce a female (actor, singer, etc.) as “please welcome the beautiful. . . . ” No mention of her skills in what she does (presumably why she is there), but a focus on her physical appearance. Rarely do we see male actors/singers introduced as “the handsome. . . . ” Similarly, saying a “female doctor” or a “woman pilot” implies that the position is normally a male occupation (because we never hear “male doctor”—“doctor” implies male), and when a woman occupies such a position, it is unusual and thus must be signified as such by denoting “female. . . . ” This principle applies the other way, too, for primarily female-­dominated positions occupied by males, such as “male nurse” or “male model.” Finally, Basow (1992) notes that the English language is sexist in the tradition of women being referred to by their relationships. Traditionally, when a woman gets married, she loses her identity, and becomes “Mrs. John Doe.” She is Jane Doe, wife of John Doe. She also loses her original (“maiden”) last name, and takes the husband’s last name. What does that communicate to women? That their name is not important, and what is important is the male name, and that is what is “passed down” to the children (the children also take the husband’s last name). After the wedding ceremony, the couple was introduced as “man and wife.” These days, many of these sexist traditions are changing. Women are keeping their last names when married, and newly married couples are introduced in the ceremony in nonsexist ways, such as “John and Jane, husband and wife.” However, many sexist traditions remain rooted in religion (as noted earlier) and language. In sum, while research indicates that men and women agree that sexist language is a problem and can be detrimental to women, men are less likely than women to recognize sexist language as sexist (Stewart, Verstraate, & Fanslow, 1990). This suggests that much effort ought to be put into schools, the media, and businesses to help educate people about sexism, how to recognize instances of sexism, and how to avoid using sexist language.

TYPES OF SEXISM Just as the form of racial prejudice has changed from “old-­fashioned” to “modern” racism over the last six decades, so too have attitudes toward equality for women changed with the changing social climate. It seems strange to think that prior to 1920, women in the United States were not allowed to vote. Women were also not allowed to work in some jobs (such gender discrimination still exists, in subtle and not-so-­subtle forms, in today’s workplace). Indeed, they were discouraged from working, and encouraged to stay at home, raise children, and take care of household duties. Attitudes of men toward equality for women were openly negative, and women experienced discrimination and demeaning sexism in various forms. Society’s attitudes toward gender equality has been slowly changing since World War II, when women made up the majority of the wartime workforce, stepping in to do the jobs vacated by men serving in the war. After the war, women were expected to return to being homemakers, in order to make the workforce jobs available for the returning male soldiers (Friedan, 1963). But the road toward equal rights has been a slow one, and it is not complete. Sexism is unfortunately alive and well in the United States, and while it doesn’t often take an overt, openly hostile form, it is

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much more frequently expressed in subtle ways (Benokraitis, 1997). Below, we examine the various forms that sexism has taken in the last 50 years.

Old‑Fashioned versus Modern Sexism The late 1960s were a time of tremendous changes in the fabric of American society. War, civil rights for African Americans, assassinations of four prominent leaders (John Kennedy, Malcolm X, Martin Luther King, Robert Kennedy), and subsequent riots in cities all over the country were deeply divisive, contentious events that tested the status quo. Among these changes, women were beginning to be more vocal about their right to equality in society (Spence, 1993). There was a tremendous resistance to the “women’s liberation” movement in the early 1970s. Only 57% of those surveyed in a Gallup poll in 1976 supported the Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), which states that equal rights under the law cannot be denied by federal, state, or local government (Oskamp, 1991). Ever so slowly, however, attitudes toward equality for women have changed. Gallup polls taken in 1988 indicated that 73% of respondents supported the ERA (Oskamp, 1991). Despite that encouraging statistic, sexism is by no means a thing of the past. Persistent gender stereotypes and stubborn beliefs about the natural social order for men and women in society remain today, though today it is often unacceptable to express these stereotypes overtly. Accordingly, sexism has not really decreased, but the willingness to express sexist beliefs openly has declined sharply. Sexism has taken a new subtle form, termed “modern sexism” (Archer & Kam, 2020; Benokraitis & Feagin, 1986). Swim, Aikin, Hall, and Hunter (1995) suggest that there are two types of sexism: old-­fashioned sexism and modern sexism. Old-­fashioned sexism is characterized by “endorsement of traditional gender roles, differential treatment of women and men, and stereotypes about lesser female competence” (Swim et al., 1995, p. 199). Modern sexism is indicated by the denial of discrimination against women, a hostility toward equality for women, and nonsupport of programs and legislation designed to help women. In two experiments, Swim and her colleagues showed that old-­fashioned and modern sexism are distinct but related concepts. Swim et al. developed measures of old-­fashioned sexism and modern sexism. Their modern sexism was based on many of the items in McConahay’s (1986) Modern Racism Scale (MRS). Results indicated that people who hold beliefs consistent with modern sexism tend to be less sympathetic to the plight of women, and tend to be more likely to also endorse old-­fashioned sexist beliefs (e.g., an item on the Old-­Fashioned Sexism Scale assesses the belief that women are not as logical as men). As in the case of symbolic racism (Sears, 1988), scores on the Modern Sexism Scale correlate highly with a strong endorsement of the Protestant work ethic (to a much greater degree than the correlation between old-­fashioned sexism and the Protestant work ethic). Like Sears’s measure of symbolic racism, Swim et al.’s (1995) Modern Sexism Scale assesses attitudes toward policies designed to promote equality (e.g., affirmative action). Modern sexism, however, appears to be difficult to pinpoint, as both men and women don’t find expressions of modern sexism offensive, and as such, this type of prejudice often goes unchallenged (Barreto & Ellemers, 2005). Interestingly, some evidence suggests that men and women who hold modern sexist beliefs may benefit from that in the workplace (Watkins et al., 2006). Women and men who endorse modern sexist beliefs tended to rely on men more than women for work-­related advice, and as a

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result, obtained more promotions compared to men and women who did not support those sexist attitudes.

Neosexism At the same time that Swim et al.’s (1995) research was published, Tougas, Brown, B ­ eaton, and Joly (1995) reported the results of their research on what they termed neosexism. According to Tougas et al., neosexism is the “manifestation of a conflict between egalitarian values and residual negative feelings toward women” (p. 843). As a foundation for their research, Tougas and her colleagues made virtually identical arguments to those put forth by Swim et al., about the changing face of sexism over the decades, from a more overt, hostile prejudice toward women, to a more subtle, often imperceptible type of sexism. Tougas et al. also based their measure of sexism on wording found in several of the MRS items, as well as items from other measures of symbolic racism. An examination of the items that comprise the Neosexism Scale and the Modern Sexism Scale suggests that it is reasonable to conclude that the two scales are measuring the same construct. Moreover, though each scale has different items, the similarities and theoretical foundations of the constructs that are the foundation of each scale indicate support for the existence of a distinct type of subtle sexism that is substantially different from past expressions of sexism (which were more hostile, and based on beliefs about the inferiority of women). Tougas and her colleagues (1995) suggest that neosexism arises when one group (usually, men) believes that the interests of men are better served by a hierarchical view of the status of men and women, with men dominating society. According to Tougas et al., when neosexists perceive a threat to their preferred power advantage over women, they are more likely to resist policies aimed at promoting the equality of women, to deny the plight of women (to assert that discrimination against women is no longer a problem), and to view the world with a stronger promale bias. To test this idea, Tougas and her colleagues (Beaton, Tougas, & Joly, 1996) asked 123 male managers employed in a federal agency to participate in a study of their perceptions of women in management. The results indicated that as the men perceived that more and more women were entering positions of power (i.e., management), their self-­reported feelings of threat increased. This was strongly associated with neosexist beliefs. The more neosexist beliefs the managers reported, the more likely they evaluated the competence of a man and a woman with a promale bias, and the less likely the men were to support policies (such as equal pay for women) designed to promote equality for women (Beaton et al., 1996).

Benevolent versus Hostile Sexism As we discussed earlier in this chapter, the patriarchal nature of societies throughout history has had a strong influence on the power structure within the society. Men have controlled the political, economic, and legal institutions, and, according to some compelling research, this has led them to form certain beliefs about the nature of men and women, and their relationship to each other. In their theory of ambivalent sexism, Glick and Fiske (1996, 2012; Connor, Glick, & Fiske, 2017) suggest that individuals who hold beliefs consistent with ambivalent sexism hold positive (yet stereotyped, traditional) views of some women. This is termed benevolent sexism. These men and women (or individuals) also have negative attitudes toward other women, and this is called hostile

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sexism. Hostile sexism is a negative attitude toward women that encompasses beliefs about the inferiority of women to men, including beliefs about lesser intelligence and competence of women relative to men. Glick and Fiske (2012) define benevolent sexism as traditional beliefs about women that evoke positive feelings in the perceiver. However, this type of sexism is still stereotyping, and it limits the target (women) because it is based upon the assumption of male dominance (Austin & Jackson, 2019). Hostile sexism and benevolent sexism tend to be correlated because they are both based on similar beliefs about women. Both types of sexism assume women are a “weaker sex” and they should occupy the domestic roles in society. Individuals who hold beliefs consistent with benevolent sexism want to protect women, they respect and admire their roles as mothers and wives, and they idealize women as romantic love objects. Individuals who hold beliefs consistent with hostile sexism view women as unfit to hold positions of power are more tolerant of wife abuse (Glick, Sakalli-­Ugurlu, Ferreira, & de Souza, 2002), are more intolerant of women breastfeeding in public (Huang, Sibley, & Osborne, 2020), are more likely to endorse rape myths, and commit acquaintance rape and blame the rape victim for their rape (Abrams, Viki, Burt, 1980; Malamuth, 1989; Masser, & Bohner, 2003; Rollero & ­Tartaglia, 2019). Those who hold beliefs consistent with hostile sexism are more likely to cyberbully their romantic partners (Martinez-­Pecino & Duran, 2019). Within a relationship, men who have an avoidant attachment style (characterized by a separation from their mother, and a mistrust of others; Feeney & Noller, 1990) were more likely to seek to fulfill their relationship goals by endorsing hostile sexist attitudes toward their partner (Fisher & Hammond, 2019). Hostile sexism is also correlated with a trio of negative personality traits termed the “dark triad” (Gluck, Heesacker, & Choi, 2020; Paulhus & Williams, 2002). As Paulhus and Williams conceive of the triad, each of the three personality traits of narcissism, Machiavellianism, and psychopathy “describe a socially malevolent character with behavior tendencies toward self-­promotion, emotional coldness, duplicity and aggressiveness” (p. 557). Costa, Favero, Moreira, Del Campo, and Sousa-Gomes (2023) add a fourth element—­sadism (feeling enjoyment at inflicting pain on others)—and rename the triad the “dark tetrad,” suggesting that this cluster of personality characteristics are prevalent in those who have negative attitudes against women, endorse rape myths, accept violence against women, and are sexist. As we are learning, hostile sexism has a lot of very strong, negative energy and motives behind it, which makes it not only a negative experience for the female target but it can at times manifest as dangerous behavior directed toward women. Glick and Fiske (2012) suggest that both hostile and benevolent sexism serve to justify relegating women to traditional, stereotyped roles in society. What determines how ambivalent sexists will respond to a given woman? Generally speaking, if the woman violates traditional gender stereotypes (i.e., a “career woman” or a “feminist”), ambivalent sexists will react with hostile sexism. One study found that benevolent sexists reacted most harshly toward a rape victim if she was married (being unfaithful and then got raped) than if no information was given about her marital status (Viki & Abrams, 2002). The violation of the traditional role (wife) and values (marriage) resulted in benevolent sexists acting like hostile sexists in how negatively they regarded the victim. If a woman typifies a traditional domestic (mother, homemaker) or romantic (sex object) stereotype of a woman, they may feel benevolent sexism. Interestingly, benevolent sexists have a

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stronger need to appeal to women, and they did so by investing in romance and family (Good & Sanchez, 2009). Women who endorse benevolent sexist values and beliefs seek to perpetuate benevolent sexism by endorsing it in men during times of rising crime frequency (Phelan, Sanchez, & Broccoli, 2010). Kahn, van Breen, Barreto, and Kaiser (2021) found that women who endorse benevolent sexist beliefs tend to have more positive attitudes toward women who do not challenge sexism and traditional stereotypical gender roles. In six studies, Glick and Fiske (1996) demonstrated the validity of the hostile and benevolent sexism constructs, and they developed an instrument, the Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI), which had good psychometric properties as a measure of each type of sexism. It is important to note that individuals who hold beliefs consistent with ambivalent sexism don’t have negative attitudes toward all women. Indeed, as Eagly and Mladinic (1989) showed, most men have a positive attitude toward women. But what differentiates the ambivalent sexist from the nonsexist is that ambivalent sexists have strong negative reactions to some women, and positive, stereotyped reactions to other women, while nonsexists do not so categorize women and do not endorse such gender stereotypes. Glick and Fiske (2012) theorized that there may be two types of ambivalence that men experience upon encountering a woman. They may feel an “unconflicted” type of ambivalence, in which a target woman is classified into a favored group, or an unfavored group. They may also feel a “conflicted” ambivalence, in which a target woman evokes negative and positive feelings in the perceiver. Glick, Diebold, Bailey-­Werner, and Zhu (1997) conducted two studies to examine how males classify women into subgroups, and how those subgroups are evaluated by men. Glick and his colleagues predicted that ambivalent sexists would be more likely to generate a list of more polar opposite subgroups (e.g., whore, caring) while nonsexist men would generate lists of subgroups that were closer in evaluation and content (e.g., quiet, nice). Results indicated that, indeed, ambivalent sexist men tended to classify women into polar opposite categories (i.e., “saint or slut”). The data also further support Glick and Fiske’s results that indicated that hostile sexism is evoked by women who violate traditional gender roles, while benevolent sexism is elicited by women who fulfilled traditional gender roles. According to Glick et al. (1997), ambivalent sexists tend to choose to categorize women into either favored or nonfavored groups, in order to reduce any potential conflict in positive and negative attitudes they may have toward a given woman. However, there are certainly some women who don’t fit neatly into such simple categories. For example, how do ambivalent sexists deal with a homemaker who has feminist views? Glick and his colleagues suggest that when it is difficult to put a woman into one of the simple (favored/nonfavored) categories, sexists may try to split their evaluation of her in terms of various dimensions (e.g., competence vs. interpersonal), which would allow the conflicted ambivalence (and the cognitive dissonance) they feel to be reduced. Thus, they could dislike a career woman for her violation of traditional gender roles, but respect her competence and achievement (an agentic dimension that men value, and would therefore find it difficult to disparage or devalue). What determines whether a woman would be seen as competent and/or likable? The woman’s relative status would influence evaluations of competence, whereas cooperative or competitive interdependence of the male perceiver and the female target would determine whether the male finds the woman likable (Glick & Fiske, 1999). Additionally, the perception of the woman may be influenced by the personality of the male perceiver. In

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their research on attitudes toward women, Haddock and Zanna (1994) replicated Eagly and Mladinic’s (1994) findings that men have a positive attitude toward the general category of “women.” However, some men have more varying attitudes toward subcategories of women. Specifically, the data suggested that men who were high in “right-wing authoritarianism” (RWA) tended to have a very negative opinion of “feminists” and a more positive view of “housewives.” RWA individuals “maintain a strong acceptance of traditional social values and norms, possess a willingness to submit to established and legitimate authorities, and display a general willingness to aggress against others, particularly those who threaten conventional values and norms” (Haddock & Zanna, 1994, p. 28). The negative opinion that RWA males have of feminists appears to derive from the RWA males’ perceived discrepancy between their values and their perceptions of the beliefs of feminists. There is evidence that benevolent sexism is fueled by RWA, and that hostile sexism emerges from a motivation for intergroup dominance, as indicated by social dominance orientation (Sibley, Wilson, & Duckitt, 2007). How do women react to hostile and benevolent sexists? To address this question, Kilianski and Rudman (1998) asked 100 female participants to read profiles of a benevolent sexist, a hostile sexist, and a nonsexist male, and then provide their attitudes toward each of these men. The data indicated that women rated the nonsexist very favorably, the benevolent sexist slightly favorably, and the hostile sexist very negatively. Interestingly, Kilianski and Rudman also found that their participants did not believe that hostile and benevolent sexism could coexist within the same person. The investigators conclude that the underestimation of the coexistence of both types of sexism in men tends to lead to its continued resistance to elimination. In other words, if, as their data suggest, most women have a favorable attitude toward benevolent sexists, they are implicitly condoning the male’s beliefs about traditional gender roles, and (unknowingly) validating his other hostile sexist beliefs about male dominance and superiority over females. In a large cross-­c ultural study, with over 8,300 participants in 16 countries, Glick et al. (2004) found that men tend to be perceived with more negative traits (e.g., aggressive) but they are also seen as more powerful compared to the perceptions of women. This, the researchers suggest, is one reason gender inequality is perpetuated, and these different perceptions of men and women lead people to perceive men as being dominant and leaders due to their XY sex chromosome (i.e., men are genetically predisposed to be leaders and dominant). Benevolent sexism can also appear to be an indicator of relationship security for some women. Hammond, Overall, and Cross (2016) conducted a longitudinal study over a year in which women were asked about their endorsement of benevolent sexist beliefs and their perceptions of the degree to which their long-term relationship partners were benevolent sexists. Results indicated that women who thought their partner held strong benevolent sexist beliefs also grew stronger in their own endorsement of benevolent sexism. They were also more likely to believe in the security of their relationship, and that their partner values their relationship (see also Cross & Overall, 2018). Curiously, a series of experiments indicates that when women are exposed to benevolent sexism, they suffer worse cognitive performance than when they experienced hostile sexism (Barreto, Ellemers, Piebinga, & Moya, 2010; Dardenne, Dumont, & Bollier, 2007). Female job applicants are rated as less competent and are not hired when the interviewer is a benevolent sexist (Good & Rudman, 2010). Being exposed to benevolent and hostile sexism increases cardiovascular reactivity, and this elevated response

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is slower to recover to baseline following such treatment (Lamarche, Seery, Kondrak, Saltsman, & Streamer, 2020; Salomon, Burgess, & Bosson, 2015). Being exposed to benevolent and hostile sexism also leads women to consume more alcohol (Hamilton & DeHart, 2020). How can benevolent sexist beliefs be reduced or eliminated? One study suggests that simply educating people about the harmful effects of such treatment can cause people to be less likely to continue holding benevolent sexist beliefs (Becker & Swim, 2012).

EFFECTS OF SEXISM ON WOMEN Much research indicates that the tendency to stereotype oneself (Hogg & Turner, 1987; Lorenzi-­Cioldi, 1991) and others (Chiu et al., 1998) is more likely when one’s gender category is made salient (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998; Fiske, 1998). This is consistent with the notion that the categories of male and female are not separate stereotypes. Rather, activation of one category can make salient information about the stereotype components in the other category (Deaux & Lewis, 1984). When one is in a minority in terms of gender in a given setting, some researchers have predicted that the individual will have an increased tendency to define themselves in terms of their gender (McGuire & McGuire, 1981). Research by Cota and Dion (1986) supports this prediction. However, gender identity is complex, and it is not enough to state that one’s gender is simply male or female—­it is also closely tied in with other gendered aspects of social life, such as occupation and interests, to name a few (Burn, 1996). To the extent that gender is central to one’s self-­concept, it would stand to reason that the influence of sexism should be stronger for such individuals. However, the findings on this issue have been mixed (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998)—thus, we must turn to other areas of inquiry to examine the influence of sexism on women. Gender stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination have a pervasive influence on women in virtually all aspects of their lives (Lewis, 2018). It is beyond the purview of this chapter to examine all the research on the effects of sexism, so we cover just a sampling of some interesting areas of research on this issue. When women encounter instances of sexism, how do they react? This is a fundamental question that has not received enough empirical attention. The question is important because it asks (1) whether women notice instances of sexism; (2) whether they react privately (i.e., show no overt reaction) or publicly; (3) if they react publicly, what form that reaction takes; and (4) how instances of sexism makes women feel about themselves. To investigate this question, Swim and Hyers (1999) designed two interesting experiments to assess women’s public and private reactions to a sexist remark made by a male (Experiment 1), and to examine the reasons for the type of reactions women indicated they would have to the remark (Experiment 2). In the first experiment, women were pretested for their attitudes toward equal roles and privileges for women and men, for their sensitivity to sexism, for the degree to which they identify with other women, and for the degree of personal activism in reducing sexism. Women were then asked to participate in a discussion group with three other participants (who were all confederates). Sometimes there were no other women in the group (solo condition), and sometimes there would be two other females and one male in the discussion group (nonsolo condition). Participants were asked to select 12 of 15 people from a list of individuals who would be best suited for survival on a desert island,

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and to list their choices aloud and explain the reasons for their selections. Confederates’ responses were scripted, and in the sexist remarks condition, a male confederate gave three sexist rationales for his selection of various females on his list (e.g., “I think we need more women on the island to keep the men satisfied”). After this task, participants viewed a videotape of their discussion group, and were asked to indicate their thoughts and feelings at various points while watching the tape, as well as their perceptions of the prejudice level of the male confederate. The videotapes were then coded by the researchers for degree of confrontation (verbal expressions of displeasure with the comment) by the participant in reaction to the sexist comment. Confrontation was further coded for whether it was direct (telling the confederate that his comment was sexist, or telling him to refrain from being sexist) or indirect (all other verbal expressions of displeasure at the comment). Results indicated that while 45% of the participants confronted the male confederate in the sexist condition, only 15% of those participants directly confronted him. Interestingly, of the remaining 55% of the women (the nonconfronters), 91% later reported that they had negative thoughts and feelings about the male confederate after he made the sexist comment. The data also indicated that those who considered themselves activists were unaffected by the sexist comment, while those who were not activists and those who endorsed traditional gender roles reported a decrease in their self-­perceived performance, appearance, and in their self-­esteem. Interestingly, confronting the confederate did not make participants feel better about themselves. What affected the decision of women to respond or not respond to the sexist remark? The researchers hypothesized that confronting depended on the perceived costs for such behavior by the participant. There may be a social cost (such as rejection, or outright hostility) to confronting the sexist individual, and women may also be seen as impolite (violating the gender role for women that states that they ought to be polite to others). As in Experiment 1, participants in Experiment 2 were asked to read a scenario describing the group composition of a discussion group (solo or nonsolo) that did the same task and had the same sexist or nonsexist comment by the male confederate as in Experiment 1. Participants in this experiment rated the sexist and offensive nature of the comment, and indicated whether they would confront him, and how they think they would confront him (behaviors, thoughts, feelings). The results indicated that 81% of the women in this experiment said they would give at least one confrontational response. Factors that would inhibit their confronting the confederate included social pressures to be polite, to not respond, diffusion of responsibility for confronting (in the nonsolo condition), and worries about social retaliation. Indeed, the vast majority of the women who indicated they would confront the male confederate in Experiment 2 chose the politest form of confrontation (e.g., give a task-­related response, such as “That is not a good reason to choose someone. Make another selection”). Interestingly, when women do not confront sexism, it tends to create a cognitive dissonance that results in the unfortunate effects of leading the woman to be more tolerant and endorsing of sexual harassment and less supportive of other women survivors of sexual harassment (Mallett, Ford, & Woodzicka, 2021). Other factors may also guide whether and how women respond to sexism, such as the type of sexism and relationship of the sexist to the target female. Riemer, Chaudoir, and Earnshaw (2014) randomly assigned 248 female undergraduates to read a scenario that contained either hostile or benevolent sexism or objectifying comments. This was

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crossed with the variable of the type of man making the comment: boyfriend, boss, or stranger. The data showed that the women found the hostile sexism the most negative, and that if their boyfriend made the comment, the subject perceived it to be less sexist compared to the same comment made by a boss or stranger. A recent paper explains the results of two experiments, which suggest that women prefer to interact with a sexist or nonsexist person equally, as long as that individual is intelligent (Agadullina, 2020). This may be an analogy of the what-is-­beautiful-­isgood stereotype (Dion, Berscheid, & Walster, 1972). That classic finding indicated that people attribute most or all positive personality characteristics to attractive people. In the present study, it may be that when people perceive another to be intelligent, they may be willing to overlook negative qualities in that person (such as sexism). Or it may be the case that the positive aspect of perceived higher intelligence leads one to not put any credence in the possibility that the individual may be sexist. As another example of how socially condoned sexism is, relative to expressions of racism, one study found that when participants were told to imagine being confronted about being either gender or racially biased, the participants in the latter condition reacted with more guilt, and were apologetic (Czopp & Monteith, 2003). However, those who were accused of gender bias were much less apologetic, and instead they reacted with amusement. In sum, these data suggest that most women notice and think negatively about those who make sexist remarks, but less than half actually respond with some form of confrontation toward the sexist individual. Those who closely identify with women, and are more committed to actively ending sexism, are least personally affected (i.e., no drop in self-­esteem) and are more likely to confront sexist individuals. Swim and Hyers (2009) suggest that these data illustrate the conflict women have between their desire to confront sexism and the social pressures (conformity, diffusion of responsibility, avoiding social rejection, gender role behavior) that inhibit confrontation. An interesting question for future research in this area is How do the public reactions of women to sexist remarks affect those individuals who are the sources of the sexist comments?

GENDER DISCRIMINATION Gender stereotypes have a strong impact on how men and women behave toward each other. In this section, we discuss negative behavior directed toward an individual due to their gender. This type of behavior, termed “gender discrimination,” can be found in individuals, as well as organizations. We first discuss gender discrimination by individuals, and then focus on the nature of institutionalized gender discrimination in America today. Due to the long tradition of patriarchal structure within societies in America and indeed, all over the world, men have had a distinct political, economic, and legal advantage over women, and they have enjoyed many privileges that were denied to women (such as the right to vote). This imbalance in power relations between men and women tends to be a perfect breeding ground for prejudice of the powerful against the powerless. Research shows that people who prefer this power imbalance (i.e., men high in social dominance orientation) are more likely to discriminate against women (Case, Fishbein, & Ritchey, 2008; Wilkins, Flavin, & Manrique, 2018). Though prejudice and discrimination toward women today is no longer as overtly expressed as it was in

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the past, there is substantial evidence to suggest that many men still possess negative attitudes toward different types of women (Haddock & Zanna, 1994), and more often in some situations (e.g., at work) than others (Basow, 1992; Benokraitis & Feagin, 1986; Burn, 1996). For example, one study found that, among male participants studied, 33% of them reported positive attitudes toward violence against women (Polat, Aktas, Bakan, Bas, & Pasinlioglu, 2021). These negative beliefs about women help maintain the power and dominance of men over women, and this is a strong motivation for men to maintain gender stereotypes about women. Discrimination against women takes many forms. Below, we examine the factors that lead to interpersonal and institutional discrimination against women.

Distancing Behavior Much research indicates that gender stereotypes about women lead men to expect lower performance, lower motivation, and lower ability, relative to men (Basow, 1992; Deaux & Kite, 1993; Ruble & Ruble, 1982). As a result, men have tended to ignore, devalue, or behave in a patronizing manner toward women (Heilman, Martell, & Simon, 1988). In an interesting program of research, Lott (1989) and her colleagues (Saris, Johnston, & Lott, 1995) examined a measure of interpersonal sexist discrimination—­distancing behavior—­among men and women. Measures of distancing behavior in interpersonal interactions have a long history in psychology (e.g., Bogartus’s [1925] Social Distance Scale). Much research indicates that when people feel positive toward, and wish to interact with another person, they reduce the interpersonal distance between themselves and the other individual (Lott, 1989). Therefore, greater distance should indicate a lower interest in or more neutral/negative feelings toward another person. Lott and her colleagues reasoned that, to the degree that males or females show a gender bias in their interpersonal distancing behaviors, there would be evidence for interpersonal discrimination based solely on the target’s gender. To test this idea, males and females were asked to read about a hypothetical situation, and then indicate where they would like to sit in an array of chairs drawn on a sheet of paper. Some of the chairs were designated as occupied by a male or female. Participants’ attitudes toward egalitarian and traditional sex roles were measured by having them complete the Traditional Egalitarian Sex Role (TESR) Scale (Larsen & Long, 1988). Higher scores (possible range of 20–100) indicated more egalitarian attitudes. Results suggested that while both women (M = 86.03) and men (M = 77.10) indicated strong support for egalitarian beliefs about sex roles, the difference between these scores was statistically significant (p < .001). However, when the responses to the distancing measure were examined, a different picture emerged. Men tended to distance either toward or away from women. Women participants were not influenced by the gender of the seated persons. The data further indicated that the scenario dictated whether men would choose to sit near a woman. In scenarios where there were sexual cues (e.g., a bar), men participants indicated a stronger desire to be seated next to women. In these scenarios, women participants did not show a bias based on target gender for where they wished to be seated. However, in other scenarios, men tended to distance themselves from women. These results are consistent with other research that suggests that even men characters on television programs show greater distancing behaviors (any head or body movement away from another person) toward women

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than toward men, whereas women showed no evidence of gender bias in the amount of their distancing behaviors (Lott, 1989). Lott (1995) suggests that the data obtained in her interpersonal distancing behavior program of research support the often-­reported experience of women, that men tend to ignore them, either overtly, or in terms of their ideas, contributions, skills, or opinions.

Job Opportunities Because women are perceived as naturally likely to have more communal characteristics (e.g., compassion, caring, emotionality, nurturing), people tend to believe that women are therefore especially qualified for positions that rely on these characteristics (e.g., teacher, day care worker, nurse; Eagly & Mladinic, 1994). Unfortunately, these positions tend to have lower prestige and lower salary, compared to “male jobs” (Cejka & Eagly, 1999; Eagly & Karau, 2002). Most of the jobs that pay better salaries are those positions that have been traditionally regarded as “male jobs” (e.g., doctor, chief executive officer [CEO] of a company, or other top-level management positions; Glick, 1991; Glick, Wilk, & Perreault, 1995). Heilman et al. (1988) found that when women apply for these positions, they tend to be rated as less competent and their career progress was perceived in less favorable terms. Only when raters were provided with information that indicated that the female applicant had high-­performance ability did they rate the applicant equal to (and in some instances, better than) male applicants. These results are supported by research by Locksley, Borgida, Brekke, and Hepburn (1980) that indicated that when people have individuating information about a target individual, they tend to neglect gender stereotypes, and are more influenced by the personal and behavioral information about the target. Locksley et al. suggest that even a minimal amount of individual information about a target can help eliminate the effects of gender stereotypes in the perceiver’s judgments about the target. A study by Cuddy, Fiske, and Glick (2004) reveals that working mothers have a difficult time in the workplace, in no small part due to stereotypes that people have about working mothers. The researchers found that when working women become mothers, they lose perceived competence, but are rated higher in warmth. Interestingly, when men become fathers, they do not lose perceived competence, and they also gain perceived warmth. This drop in perceived competence has serious career implications for the working mothers, because evaluators in this study were significantly less likely to hire, promote, or educate working mothers. These findings were supported by another study (Fuegen, Biernat, Haines, & Deaux, 2004). Just looking masculine (e.g., shorter hair, strong jaw) is enough to be rated as more competent (and more likely to be considered a leader), and this holds for both men and women (Sczesny & Kühnen, 2004). Researchers have pointed to several factors that may contribute to the negative perception and devaluation of women’s competence in traditionally male-­dominated fields. A big part of the equation is that many of these positions are regarded as jobs where it is crucial to be agentic. Gender stereotypes of women as especially communal (and much less likely to be agentic) bias the perceptions of potential employers, or supervisors of women in such jobs. In other words, it is very difficult for women to break into such jobs (though it is becoming easier), and when they do get these jobs, their performance (past accomplishments and future potential) is seen through gender stereotypes, and hence they are regarded as less competent, less hardworking, and less committed to the company (Eagly & Mladinic, 1994).

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Women who apply for male sex-type jobs (e.g., construction worker, or executive management) are perceived as violating stereotypes, and as encroaching upon the power and dominance of men, and men tend to perceive such women as a threat (Basow, 1992; Glick & Fiske, 2001). Men who endorse more traditional sex roles are more likely to negatively perceive women who pursue nontraditional careers (Brabeck & Weisgerber, 1989). Finally, physically attractive women applicants for high-level executive positions tend to be seen as less serious than men are about the position (Heilman & Stopeck, 1985). While researchers have long found that the perceiver’s attributions for a target’s success vary depending on the gender of the target (i.e., the job performance of a woman is more likely to be attributed to luck or other external factors, rather than her own ability; e.g., Greenhaus & Parasuraman, 1993), an interesting meta-­analysis by Swim and Sanna (1996) found that the literature is quite mixed on this issue. In fact, their results suggest that there is virtually no difference in the attributions for the performance of a woman compared to a man on various tasks. Though the vast majority of sexist prejudice and discrimination is directed toward women, it is important to remember that sexism can apply to prejudice, stereotypes, and discrimination toward men. As we have been discussing, our society stereotypes women as having an inborn ability to be nurturing. Men are stereotyped as being much less nurturing and traditional stereotypes in fact tend to discourage men from developing personality traits (such as caring, compassion, nurturing) that have been typically associated with females (Aubé & Koestner, 1992). Consider the job of child care workers. Such a position has typically been strongly associated with women due to the traditional sex role for women of being the parent in charge of raising the child (while the man went to work), and due to the pervasive belief that women, by virtue of their genetic makeup as women, have an inborn ability to successfully nurture and care for children. Though there has not been much empirical attention devoted to gender prejudice against men in women-­dominated fields, a study by Murray (1999) sheds some light on the problem. Murray interviewed and observed male child care workers, and noted parent, child, and employer behavior and attitudes toward the male child care workers. She found that these men are often regarded with suspicion and hostility by parents, more positively by administrators, and quite positively by children. Male child care workers are viewed as more effeminate, or perverted, or simply incompetent. This often results in overt prejudice and discrimination from parents. In an unfortunately common case, a male child care worker told Murray that on more than one occasion, when parents find out that a male child care worker is working at the facility, they decide not to enroll their child. The evidence is mixed when considering jobs that are not considered sex typed (e.g., accountant, professor)—women experience discrimination based on their gender. Firth (1982) sent nearly identical résumés to accounting firms that were seeking applications for an accountant position in their firm, differing only in the applicant’s name, gender, marital status, and race. Responses to the applications indicated a significant degree of gender bias from the prospective employer. Men were significantly more successful than women in getting advertised jobs, even though they had the same level of experience and qualifications. More dramatically, women’s marital status had a strong impact on the employer’s reaction to the women’s—but not men’s—­applications. Women who were married with children were the least successful (i.e., least likely to be hired), followed by married women with no children, and the most successful group were women who were unmarried. This latter finding is evidence for the implicit assumption that a woman who has a family will put the family first, and she will not be a hard worker

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(whereas the assumption implies that men are always hard workers, whether or not they have families). In an experiment studying hiring for an assistant professor position, Henningsen, Horvath, and Jonas (2021) found that men and women making hiring decisions perceived the female candidate as more hireable, and more frequently ranked the female candidate first for the position over the male candidate. However, the data showed that in one particular condition, where the university job ad stressed its “commitment to excellence,” the male evaluators favored male candidates over females. Henningsen and colleagues suggest that this shows that males in these contexts still harbor a sexist stereotype associating “excellence” with men. Another factor that inhibits women’s advancement in the workplace is their expectations about careers. Jackson, Gardner, and Sullivan (1992) found that women tend to hold lower expectations about advancement, opportunities, and performance evaluations than men. Additionally, women may be discouraged by the perpetual gap in pay between men and women for the same jobs (Kay & Hagan, 1995). Since women have entered the workforce, they have been paid far less than men have for the same work, due to many factors, including individual and institutional discrimination, prejudice, and stereotypes about women. A 2020 report of the U.S. Department of Labor found that women earn about 82.3% of what men get paid for the same job (Jones, 2021). Some data suggest that a major reason for this disparity is a general undervaluing of any work performed by women (Lips, 2003). As a result, women may expect lower starting and maximum salaries than men receive. However, even when women have expectations of equal pay and opportunities when they apply for a position, and even when they negotiate with their prospective employer for these things, they may still be offered lower pay than men (Gerhart & Rynes, 1991). Because we tend to compare ourselves with similar others, men are more likely to compare themselves to other men and women to other women (Crocker & Major, 1989). Some researchers suggest that this can lead to a perpetuation of the gender pay gap (Aman & England, 1999). Specifically, when women compare their salaries and advancement opportunities to other women, they may believe that they are doing pretty well, and they are less likely to perceive any gender discrimination or pay gap (Major & Forcey, 1985). Perhaps not surprisingly, research has also demonstrated that sexism within the workplace has a negative effect on the female employee’s mental health and job satisfaction (Rubin, Subasic, Giacomini, & Paolini, 2017; Rubin, Paolini, Subasic, & Giacomini, 2019).

The Glass Ceiling While women are moving into high-­status, higher-­paying, and male-­dominated jobs with increasing frequency (Jacobs, 1992), the proportion of women to men in highlevel, executive positions is still remarkably low. In 2016, women comprised only 40% of managers (Torpey, 2017). What accounts for the disproportionate number of males in the upper levels of power in the workforce? In addition to the factors we have just discussed, researchers have identified another phenomenon, termed the glass ceiling, which limits the advancement of women into management (Weiss, 1999). The glass ceiling is defined as “those artificial barriers based on attitudinal or organizational bias that prevent qualified individuals from advancing in their organization into upper management positions” (U.S. Department of Labor, 1997). While the occurrence of overt

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discrimination against women is fairly rare today, there still exists many subtle forms of individual and institutional prejudice against women that limit their advancement opportunities in the workforce (Barreto, Ryan, & Schmitt, 2009; Business and Professional Women’s Foundation, 1995). This subtle discrimination comes in many forms. In their research, Ohlott, Ruderman, and McCauley (1994) found that women did not have as many developmental opportunities as men to gain crucial skills for upper-­management promotions. They were not given important assignments, were left out of critical communication networks, and female workers reported that they often had to exert extra effort to get recognition for their work. Lyness and Thompson (1997) reported that women were given less responsibility, received fewer stock options, and reported lower satisfaction about their prospects for advancement. Other research suggests that, ironically, as corporations “feminize” the role of managers, toward a more inclusive, participatory managerial style, women who are more agentic (and therefore “masculine” traits, like assertiveness) will be seen as a poor fit for management, and therefore they will be passed over in favor of those who have both agentic and feminine (so-­called communal) traits, even if these latter individuals are less competent (Rudman & Glick, 1999). Thus, the available research indicates that the glass ceiling is indeed a real phenomenon. In one study, 79% of top corporate executives admitted that there are identifiable barriers to the advancement of women into the upper echelons of corporate America (Catalyst, 1990, as cited in Burn, 1996). This is not confined to America, as you might guess. Discrimination against women in employment settings is also rampant in other countries. For example, a study of the percentage of women in top positions in the medical professions in Spain found that 87% of department chairs and 85% of department unit chiefs were men, and that those proportions had not changed over a period of at least 5 years (Santamaria, Merino, Vianas, & Arrizabalaga, 2009). Research suggests that women still perceive there to be a glass ceiling in the workplace (Strange, 2019), and that the glass ceiling has a negative effect on female workers. One study (Javadizadeh, Ross, Valenzuela, Adler, & Wu, 2022) found that when women perceived a glass ceiling in their workplace, they were more likely to lose hope about job advancement and to leave their job to seek employment elsewhere. To change this, society must change its stereotypes that women cannot lead, are more emotional, and are more indecisive (Basow, 1992). The research discussed in this chapter should convince those who hold such stereotypes about women to reconsider their positions. The results of a meta-­analysis of the literature on leadership styles by Eagly and Johnson (1990) revealed that there were insignificant differences between the ability of men and women to be leaders in the workplace. The data also showed that women tend to adopt a more democratic and participatory style, incorporating both masculine and feminine traits. Moreover, Eagly and Johnson found that women are just as capable of decisive leadership as are men. It turns out that such a leadership style is often more effective than the traditional autocratic, male leadership style (Cann & Siegfried, 1990). Research by LaFrance and Banaji (1992) showed that women are no more likely than men to be emotional, though they are more likely to express emotion. Thus, while women are just as effective and decisive as leaders as are men, stereotypes about women, and society’s expectations about sex roles, tend to influence the career choices and opportunities that women pursue, and they place barriers in front of women wanting to enter and advance in male-­dominated occupations (Deaux & LaFrance, 1998).

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SUMMARY The goal for society to eliminate stereotypes and prejudice based on gender is a significant challenge. This task is made even more difficult when many people do not know sexism, even when confronted with sexist material (Brant, 1999; Rudman & Borgida, 1995). Most research suggests that such a goal is somewhat unrealistic, given the entrenched nature of sexism within American culture, institutions, and among individuals (e.g., Deaux & Kite, 1993; Ruble & Ruble, 1982). However, some research has attempted to reduce sexist beliefs and endorsement of gender stereotypes. For example, Jones and Jacklin (1988) found that men’s and women’s sexist beliefs declined significantly after having taken an introductory women’s or men’s studies course. Research shows that women have to strike a balance in how they confront sexism, between direct confrontation and more subtle confrontation. Vaccarino and Kawakiami (2021) found that women were evaluated less positively when confronting a sexist comment, compared to women who were more passive. These results dovetail with research by Woodzicka and Good (2021), who found that when sexism is indirectly confronted, the sexist individual is more likely to respond nondefensively and the social interaction is much more positive. In the same vein, Riquelme, Carretero-­Dios, Megias, and Romero-­Sanchez (2021) found that subversive, but subtle antisexist humor is more effective in changing sexist attitudes in men and women targets. Men can also make a difference in reducing sexism, but it depends on how they approach the confrontation, both in terms of their effectiveness and how women perceive the men. Estevan-­Reina and colleagues (2021) found that when men were more egalitarian (vs. paternalistic) in their confrontation of the sexist, women responded with more positive feelings (empowerment and well-being), and women were more likely to confront sexism themselves in the future. O’Neil (1996) reports that men who attended a therapy group designed to help them identify and recognize their own sexist beliefs was successful in changing those stereotypes among the men and making them more egalitarian in their thinking about the sexes. Unfortunately, there are little data to suggest that these attitudinal changes are more than temporary, and that they also influence gender discrimination. Moreover, because gender stereotypes are so resistant to change, instances of stereotype-­ inconsistent individuals tend to be isolated as “special cases,” placed in a subcategory, thereby allowing the perceiver to maintain the gender stereotype, and not be confronted with dissonance-­provoking inconsistent information (Weber & Crocker, 1983). What can be done to reduce sexism? The consensus among most contemporary researchers is that sexism will be reduced only if changes occur on multiple levels (Albee & Perry, 1998; Basow, 1992; Baxter & Kane, 1995; Bigler, 1999; Burns & Granz, 2021; Deaux & Kite, 1993). Specifically, people need to be made aware of what constitutes sexism, and that it is important to avoid sexist thoughts, attitudes, and behaviors. Society needs to change the way it views men and women, and recognize that men and women are more similar than they are different (and that perceived differences are primarily due to differences in the way men and women are socialized), and they ought to be treated equally. Finally, institutions need to be changed within society. In other words, economic, political, and legislative power structures need to be reorganized such that women and men share power at all levels of society, so that the patriarchal structure of society is relegated to history. These changes are massive and complex, and extremely challenging, but they are not insurmountable goals. Change is already happening (albeit slowly) at

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all of the levels, and if and when its citizens want these changes to occur at a faster rate, more awareness, resources, and activism needs to be directed toward that end.

GLOSSARY Agentic Traits—traits are those that have traditionally been associated with males, traits that indicate task orientation, assertiveness, and a striving for achievement. Ambivalent Sexism—sexism in which the individual has both positive (yet traditional) attitudes toward women, and negative, hostile attitudes toward women. Backlash Effect—when women do not act according to traditional gender stereotypes, they may face social ostracism, criticism, and prejudice from others. Benevolent Sexism—sexism marked by positive attitudes toward, and positive stereotypical beliefs about, women. Bipolar Assumption—states that an individual has characteristics associated with either males or females, but not both. Communal Traits—traits that have traditionally been associated with women, such as the desire to foster relationships, to be sensitive, and to get along with others. Descriptive Stereotype—tells how most people in a group behave, think, and feel. It describes the group’s motives, expectations, and other aspects of behavior. Dualistic View—states that people can have some of both agentic and communal traits. Face-ism—the greater facial prominence of depictions of men in the media versus women, and greater emphasis on the whole body of women. Glass Ceiling—artificial barriers based on attitudinal or organizational bias that prevent qualified individuals from advancing in their organization into upper-­ management positions. Hostile Sexism—negative attitudes toward, and negative beliefs about, women. Informational Influence—a type of social influence that is exerted on the individual when the person wishes to be correct in one’s judgments, opinions, or perceptions. The individual will be more persuaded by information that is perceived to be accurate. Modern Sexism—sexism indicated by the denial of discrimination against women, a hostility toward equality for women, and nonsupport of programs and legislation designed to help women. Neosexism—sexism marked by a manifestation of a conflict between egalitarian values and residual negative feelings toward women.

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Normative Influence—a type of social influence that is exerted on the individual when the person wishes to get along with others. The individual will be more likely to conform to others’ opinions in order to establish and maintain a friendly relationship with other persons. Old-­Fashioned Sexism—sexism characterized by endorsement of traditional gender roles, differential treatment of women and men, and stereotypes about lesser female competence. Prescriptive Stereotype—suggests how stereotyped groups should think, feel, and act. Sexism—negative attitudes, prejudice, or discrimination directed toward someone on the basis of their gender. Social Learning Theory (SLT)—theory of learning which says that people acquire new behaviors by observational learning. Seeing other people (called ‘models’ in SLT) do a behavior helps us learn how to do something, why it is done, when to do it, and what rewards are gained by doing it. Social Role Theory—states that the reason for gender differences in social behavior is not due to biological differences between men and women but from the different socialization processes for men and women that lead them to perform different roles in society. Stereotype Threat—the fear that one may confirm negative stereotypes about one’s group.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. To what extent do you believe the average American adheres to the bipolar assumption with regard to gender? Do you believe that most Americans do not endorse the dualistic view? Why? 2. How are gender stereotypes communicated via television, movies, and magazines? Can you cite some examples? 3. Do you think there are some aspects of behavior or personality that are linked to the sex chromosome of an individual? Or do you believe that all behavior is learned, and there are no behaviors determined by the sex chromosome? 4. In what ways are stereotypes a form of control? How can gender stereotypes control women (and the attitudes and behavior of society toward women)? 5. Can you think of examples of sexist language that you’ve heard, or that are still used today? 6. To what extent do gender stereotypes affect career aspirations of women, and employment opportunities available for women in America today? What do you think accounts for why women still receive only 82¢ for every $1 a man earns for the same work?

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CHAPTER 11

Anti‑Fat Prejudice

Historically, humans have had a complicated attitude toward those who are overweight.

In medieval times, Japanese culture viewed being overweight negatively because it was seen as a sign of moral shortcomings in the Buddhist religion. Centuries of Christian religion taught that being overweight was the result of the sin of gluttony (Stunkard, LaFleur, & Wadden, 1998). But it wasn’t that long ago (a little over a century) that it was highly desirable to be overweight. The great painter Peter Paul Rubens achieved acclaim for his portraits of nude, overweight women. Back then, being overweight was a status symbol. In a time where most people were rather poor, and barely able to keep food on the table, it was unheard of to have too much food. It was thus regarded as a symbol of wealth, privilege, and higher status to be overweight, because it said to the world, “I not only can afford to eat my share, I can eat more than my share, if I so desire, because I am wealthy enough to buy lots of food.” With the increasing industrialization and growing economic wealth of various nations, being overweight was no longer the sole province of the wealthy. Indeed, working-­c lass persons were increasingly able to purchase more food than they needed, and many also became overweight as a result. Attitudes toward overweight persons have shifted quite dramatically since Rubens’s era. Today, there is a significant prejudice against overweight persons (Crandall, 1994; Elran-Barak & Bar-Anan, 2018). Nowhere is this more evident than in the most economically wealthy nation in the world: the United States (Crandall & Martinez, 1996). Americans seem to have a particularly strong aversion to persons who are overweight, and they are more likely to openly display their prejudice toward overweight individuals than toward other groups (Allon, 1982; Crandall, 1994). According to Allon, one reason this is the case is that an individual who is overweight violates the American ideal of self-­denial and self-­restraint. The ideal for society has shifted to an image of an athletic, or at least thin, person who shows restraint and self-­discipline in the face of the abundant food supply in economically rich countries like the United States (Owen & Laurel-­Seller, 2000). Much research indicates that prejudice against overweight persons is quite pervasive, and can have implications for the overweight individual’s life in a number of domains. For example, in study after study, researchers have found that overweight

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people are perceived as gluttonous, lazy, weak-­w illed, unintelligent, morally inferior, unattractive, unlikable, and having low self-­esteem (see Crandall, 1994, for a detailed discussion). Research has even concluded that overweight college students, particularly females (because the norms for being thin are stronger for females), have more difficulty paying for college, because they are less likely to get financial help for college from their parents (Crandall, 1991). In effect, parents are discriminating against their own children, believing, in part, that their daughter’s weight is the result of poor self-­control (Crandall, 1995). This effect is the strongest for those overweight students of politically conservative parents, who are more likely to endorse antioverweight attitudes compared to more politically liberal parents. As this research indicates, most of this prejudice is due to the attributions people make about the reasons for being overweight. The strength and depth of the intense stereotypes and prejudices against overweight persons in America is difficult to overstate. One study found that when perceivers were asked to evaluate a male target who was seated by an overweight person, he was consistently rated significantly more negatively compared to those seated near a normal-­weight person (Hebl & Mannix, 2003). This result held true despite the level of the perceived relationship between the seated individuals (from strangers to a closer relationship) and it was found in those low in anti-fat prejudice. Another study found that five out of 11 landlords would not rent to an obese person, whereas all 11 would readily rent to ­normal‑weight potential tenants (Karris, 1977). The strong anti-fat bias that people have in the United States (and other Westernized countries) is hard to counteract, even when the basis for the bias is directly being attacked. In one study, Teachman, G ­ apinski, Brownell, Rawlins, and Jeyaram (2003) measured implicit and explicit anti-fat attitudes and found in their participants no explicit anti-fat attitudes but very strong implicit anti-fat attitudes. When the researchers told the participants that the overweight target’s condition was a result of overeating (personal attribution), their implicit bias increased. When participants were told the target’s condition was a result of genetic factors (external factors), implicit anti-fat attitudes were not reduced. Moreover, when participants read stories designed to induce empathy for overweight targets (stories about prejudice and discrimination against overweight persons), their implicit anti-fat attitudes did not diminish. These implicit attitudes can also affect the quality of health care an overweight person receives. One recent study examined the implicit anti-fat bias in 5,671 occupational and physical therapy assistants (Friedman, Feldner, & VanPuymbrouck, 2022). Shockingly, the results showed that 82% of the respondents held implicit anti-fat biases. It should be noted that anti-fat attitudes differ when one makes the distinction between developing and developed countries. In their analysis of the research literature using this distinction, Sobal and Stunkard (1989) showed that in developed countries, obesity among women is an extremely stigmatizing characteristic. However, for men in such societies, being obese is not nearly the negative attribute it is for women. In fact, the researchers say it evokes “relative affective neutrality” (p. 267). For those in developing countries, obesity rates rise with an increase in socioeconomic status (SES; wealth). In developed societies, by contrast, rising SES is negatively correlated with obesity: The wealthier one becomes, the less likely one is to be obese. Presumably, wealth allows richer individuals the luxury of education to obtain jobs that allow them to afford healthier food and time to go to the gym, and to afford personal trainers, exercise equipment, and plastic surgery. Those lower in SES have more restricted or no access to those things, and are more likely to eat cheaper, more fattening foods.

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ORIGINS OF ANTI‑FAT PREJUDICE What is the motivation behind anti-fat prejudice? Is it a dislike of overweight people, or could it be a positive attitude toward thin body types (and thus a negative attitude toward overweight body types)? Unfortunately, the available empirical evidence on this specific question yields different results depending on whether one is measuring implicit attitudes or explicit attitudes. Roddy, Stewart, and Barnes-­Holmes (2010) found that an implicit measure (Implicit Relational Assessment Procedure) indicated that the perceiver’s negative views of overweight people was largely motivated by a prothin bias rather than an anti-fat bias. However, their data also show that explicit measures of antifat prejudice were the best predictors of behavior toward the overweight. This last point was supported in a study by Carels and Musher-­Eizenman (2010), who also found that anti-fat prejudice is more likely to be found among people who judge others based on physical features, and/or who view obesity as controllable.

PERCEPTIONS OF OVERWEIGHT PEOPLE We have reviewed much evidence thus far that tells us that in societies that emphasize lean body types, being overweight is negatively evaluated, and these negative evaluations tend to be implicitly and automatically activated (Bessenoff & Sherman, 2000; Brochu & Morrison, 2007). Moreover, people who are overweight are targets of all manner of rejection, prejudice, stereotypes, and ridicule (Crandall, Nierman, & Hebl, 2009). Adding further to this social isolation comes studies that suggest that thin people may not want to be seen near an overweight person (Hebl & Mannix, 2003). Before we discuss that research, let us first quickly recall a concept from intro psych or social psych. This is the concept sometimes referred to as a cheerleader effect (Walker & Vul, 2014). This proposes that people are seen as more attractive when in a group than when they are alone (van Osch, Blanken, Meijs, & van Wolferen, 2015; Walker & Vul, 2014). Why might this occur? The jury is still out. Walker and Vul suggest that it is due to a combination of the visual system representing objects as a group unit, and that perceivers are biased toward the group average. Others (van Osch et al., 2015) suggest that the effect arises from the perceptual system favoring a selective attention process whereby the perceiver largely attends to the most attractive person in the group and that attractiveness biases the perceiver’s evaluation of the “average” person. Fantastic, but what does this have to do with anti-fat prejudice? Research by Hebl and Mannix (2003) discovered that when it comes to overweight persons, the cheerleader effect doesn’t work. Rather, people seen in the presence of an overweight person are rated more negatively than when they were alone. Even when it was not clear whether the individual knew the overweight person, if the normal-­weight person happened to be sitting near the overweight person, perceivers thought of the normal-­weight person in terms of negative stereotypes. Interestingly, other researchers found this effect occurs only with female targets (when seated near an overweight person, they were rated negatively) but not males (Penny & ­Haddock, 2007a). Moreover, this study found that the negative evaluation of normal-­ weight targets occurs in perceivers as young as 5 years old. Who is more likely to be prejudiced against overweight persons? For women (but not men) who are concerned about their physical appearance, a feeling of disgust mediates their prejudice against overweight people (O’Brien, Danielsdottir, et al., 2013).

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People who report positive contact with overweight persons also report lower anti-fat prejudice, while those who had negative contact experience with overweight people were more likely to be prejudiced against overweight persons (Alperin, Hornsey, H ­ ayward, ­Diedrichs, & Barlow, 2014). Remember that this study is reporting a correlation, so we have no information on the causal relationship between these variables. For instance, rather than contact being the determinative causal agent here, it could just as easily be the case that one’s anti-fat attitudes (low or high) would influence how one approaches interactions with overweight persons. People higher in anti-fat prejudice tend to be politically conservative, favor capital punishment, are against same-sex marriage, and are racist (Crandall & Biernat, 1990). The thinner the individual, the greater their antifat prejudice (Schwartz & Nosek, 2006). Some data show that 30% of thin people report that they would rather be divorced than be obese, and 46% would rather lose 1 year of their life than be obese (Schwartz & Nosek, 2006).

Controllability A major determinant of whether one is prejudiced against overweight people is the degree to which one believes that weight is controllable, or whether (e.g., due to genetics or other physical condition) weight is not within one’s control (Crandall & Horstman Reser, 2005). People are more likely to have more positive attitudes toward, and be more supportive of, overweight people who are perceived to be overweight through no fault of their own (Hoyt, Burnette, Auster-­Gussman, Blodorn, & Major, 2017). If people believe that weight is entirely (or mostly) within one’s control, then being overweight is seen as a sign of weakness, laziness, poor character, lower intelligence, and a host of other negative characteristics (Crandall, 1994). In a study by Blaine, DiBlasi, and Connor (2002), the researchers manipulated the amount a target person weighed, and the amount of weight that target lost recently. They found that greater weight loss caused perceivers to view weight loss as controllable. Overweight persons were disliked more than the healthy weight targets, even if the overweight person had recently lost weight! Interestingly, it appears that anti-fat bias can be significantly attenuated if the perceiver believes that the overweight person is actively trying to lose weight (Beames, Black, & Vartanian, 2016; Black, Sokol, & Vartanian, 2014). It turns out that weight gain may have more to do with the genetics you inherit from your parents (and their parents, and so on) than the amount of willpower you have to avoid unhealthy foods. A review of relevant studies on this question concluded that, for example, the body fat of children is strongly associated with that of their biological parents, but there was no such association for adopted children and their adoptive parents (Stunkard et al., 1986). According to these data, the amount of body fat we each have is most significantly due to genetics, and not lifestyle or willpower or weak character. Some data suggest that adult perceptions of overweight adults and children varies as well, centering on beliefs about personal change and fault for their weight (Barnett, Jones, Schmitt, C ­ ordas, & Harrod, 2021). In this study, the adult participants tended to have more negative views of overweight adults compared to overweight children, because they believed that overweight adults are to blame for their overweight, and they are less likely to change to lose weight. Children were much less likely held to blame for their overweight, and their future held more hope for a change to more healthy eating behavior. Interestingly, research suggests that obesity is only slightly related to diet (i.e., eating bad foods, or eating too much), and is more significantly the result of a combination of metabolic and

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genetic factors (Stunkard et al., 1986). Indeed, research indicates that the genetic contribution to obesity is between 40 (Bouchard, 1997) and 80% (Echwald, 1999). As we learned earlier, the perceiver’s attributions of the controllability of the target’s stigmatized condition has a strong impact on the evaluations, attitudes, and feelings the perceiver has about the target (Hooper, Crumpton, Robinson, & Meier, 2018). Stigmatized conditions that are seen as uncontrollable tend to evoke sympathy and compassion. However, most people regard being overweight as entirely controllable, and an outward indicator of personal, intellectual, moral, emotional, and motivational deficiency (Crandall, 1994; Crandall et al., 2001). As a result, they are more likely to feel prejudice against such individuals. Seeing examples of overweight people who have recently lost a lot of weight has the effect of further reinforcing the idea that being overweight is a controllable condition, and, unfortunately, it further polarizes the perceiver’s negative attitudes against overweight persons (Blaine et al., 2002). The researchers in this study speculate that one reason the perceiver’s attitudes would be more negative is because seeing examples of overweight people doing things to successfully lose weight is threatening to their stereotypes about overweight individuals (low motivation/lazy, hedonistic, gluttonous, etc.), and the threat translates to a further entrenchment of the stereotype, and perhaps a dismissal (or a subcategorization) of the target as an aberrant outlier.

Implicit versus Explicit Anti‑Fat Bias Anti-fat prejudice is just like other prejudices in that it can be both implicit (outside awareness, but expressed in behavior) and explicit (attitudes on a self-­report questionnaire). In other words, one may consciously believe that they are not prejudiced against a group of people but unknowingly harbors negative attitudes toward that group (­Teachman et al., 2003). This disconnect is important to be aware of because those implicit negative attitudes can and often do influence thought and behavior (Greenwald & Banaji, 1995). In a study of implicit anti-fat bias between controls and those with a severe eating disorder (e.g., anorexia nervosa), both showed an implicit prothin bias, but only the clinical group showed a strong implicit anti-fat bias against their self (Parling, Cernvall, S­ tewart, Barnes-­Holmes, & Ghaderi, 2012). Explicit anti-fat attitudes, learned early in childhood, tend to remain stable with age, but implicit anti-fat bias tends to grow increasingly negative as the child ages (Hauser, 2011). Research shows there is a strong association between a parent’s anti-fat attitudes, and the development of eating disorders in the child (Robertson, Dempster, Doherty, & Sharpe, 2022). Unfortunately, some data suggest that implicit anti-fat bias is very strong, persistent, and unconnected to explicit attitudes about obese persons. A neuroimaging study (using event-­related potential; Schupp & Renner, 2011) found that implicit negative attitudes against obese people may be as automatic as a reflex, and we have little control over its activation.

INFLUENCE OF ANTI‑FAT STEREOTYPES ON OVERWEIGHT PERSONS Social Interactions How do overweight persons perceive and react to a social interaction with someone who they believe has an anti-fat bias? Intuitively, one would assume that it would not be pleasant to enter such an interaction from the standpoint of the overweight person.

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Some research supports this intuition. A study by Hunger, Blodorn, Miller, and Major (2018) found that when overweight women anticipated interacting with another woman who had explicit anti-fat attitudes, they anticipated being rejected; experienced poorer cognitive performance; lower self-­esteem; and increased negative emotions, rumination, and anxiety. Exposure to anti-fat stereotypes and related weight stigma has also been shown to bring on a stereotype threat type of impairment in cognitive and memory performance in adults (Guardabassi & Tomasetto, 2018) and children (Guardabassi & Tomasetto, 2020).

Media There have been many studies conducted showing the pernicious influence of media and advertising featuring anti-fat attitudes and stereotypes and their negative effects on overweight persons (Crandall et al., 2009). In a recent study by Connors, Spangenberg, Perkins, and Forehand (2021), when participants viewed an advertisement featuring thin models and a healthy product, both overweight and thin subjects viewed the advertisement more favorably. But when the advertisement featured an overweight model and unhealthy products, only overweight persons perceived that advertisement favorably. It appears that the healthy model and product is a positive aspirational goal for everyone, but only overweight persons view the overweight model and product favorably, indicating perhaps that they identify with the model and the unhealthy products, thus perpetuating bad eating habits, because such advertisements may appear to lend a stamp of social approval to those unhealthy products. Fat-­shaming events over an 11-year period in the media were studied by Ravary, Baldwin, and Bartz (2019) and their results revealed that fat shaming led to an increase in women’s implicit anti-fat attitudes, and a greater increase in anti-fat attitudes over time.

ANTI‑FAT STEREOTYPES In societies that value thin body types, people who are overweight are the target of negative stereotypes about their character, body shape, personality, and intelligence (Crandall et al., 2009). One early study (Harris, Harris, & Bochner, 1982) found that overweight men and women were evaluated by subjects quite negatively, and it turns out that those negative stereotypes have persisted over the ensuing 34 years. Grant, Mizzi, and Anglim (2016) found that, like those overweight targets in the Harris et al. study, overweight persons were rated as significantly less athletic, assertive, active, attractive, happy, hardworking, popular, and successful compared to normal-­weight people. Fat people are perceived as unhealthy, lazy, and more socially inept than their thin peers (Greenleaf, Chambliss, Rhea, Martin, & Morrow, 2006).

ANTI‑FAT HUMOR Just like our discussion in the sexism chapter about sexist jokes, the use of humor in perpetuating stereotypes and prejudice against overweight persons is common and overt in the United States (Puhl & Heuer, 2009). Overweight people are openly targeted for

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scorn and ridicule due to their perceived weak character, poor willpower, laziness, gluttony, and other assorted violations of American values. Humor is another method by which the prejudiced individual can attempt to “normalize” or “institutionalize” his or her antipathy by couching the prejudice in a seemingly harmless “good-­natured” kidding or joking manner. In reality, of course, the targets of this prejudice see nothing humorous about it, and the negative attitudes and hurtful sentiment behind the humor is perceived by the target, with negative psychological and emotional consequences for the overweight person (Crandall et al., 2009). One indicator of the institutionalization of this type of humor is the degree to which it permeates culture with seemingly little to no offense taken by the public. To that point, research shows that anti-fat humor is often perpetuated through movies and television, usually by male characters, and often openly in front of the overweight target (Himes & Thompson, 2007). How does the normal public view anti-fat humor? To address this question, Burmeister and Carels (2014) asked 501 subjects their attitudes about overweight people, beliefs about the controllability of one’s weight, and beliefs in the truth about stereotypes about overweight people. They then showed seven video clips from popular films and TV shows that depicted anti-fat humor. Participants were asked to rate their reactions to the video clips. Results showed that the stronger the subject’s preexisting anti-fat bias, the more positively they rated the anti-fat humor depicted in the clips. Moreover, if subjects believe that weight is controllable, they were much less likely to be offended by the anti-fat humor in the videos. Ford, Richardson, and Petit (2015) presented evidence to suggest that disparagement humor like this does not create prejudice in those who hear it, but rather, it releases their preexisting prejudice.

ANTI‑FAT PREJUDICE IN CHILDREN Prejudice is a learned attitude, and that learning starts very young. In societies that are prejudiced against overweight persons, children come to believe that they will be evaluated negatively if they are overweight, and that if they are overweight, they should feel negatively about themselves (Bissell & Hays, 2011). This prejudice shows itself even among preschool children, and even among overweight preschool children (Kornilaki, 2014). Where would kids get these negative ideas about overweight people? From their parents, or from the media? From peers? Bissell and Hays found that more television viewing in young children was associated with decreased anti-fat bias and more favorable views of overweight people, so it doesn’t appear that the media is the culprit. Interestingly, we have further evidence that the anti-fat prejudice is not innate. ­Ruffman, O’Brien, Taumoepeau, Latner, and Hunter (2016) found that infants around 11 months old prefer to look at photos of obese figures (vs. thin people). However, once those infants got older, their attitudes toward obese people mirrored the anti-fat attitudes of their mothers. So this evidence would suggest that anti-fat prejudice is learned early in the home, and that children tend to internalize their mother’s views (positive or negative) of obese people. Interestingly, research by Davison and Birch (2004) found no relation between girls and her parents’ endorsement of fat stereotypes. But, perhaps not surprisingly, girls were more likely to have negative attitudes about fat people when parents strongly promoted a lean body type, and when the girls’ interactions with peers and parents focused on body shape and losing weight (Farago et al., 2022).

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As we have seen, it appears that a child’s view of overweight people is learned very early and it changes and becomes more nuanced as the child ages. Consider the following experiment (Penny & Haddock, 2007b). In this study, seventy-­three 5- to 10-yearolds were read a number of short stories about children displaying either high or low athletic, social, artistic, and academic ability. They were then shown eight different pairs of cards, with each pair representing a normal weight and an overweight depiction of the same child. Subjects were then asked to indicate the card that belongs to the “good” and “bad” characters in the stories. The 5- to 8-year-olds showed strong ant-fat prejudice in that they were significantly less likely to choose an overweight photo to represent those who excel in the social, physical, and academic areas. The 9- to 10-year-olds showed the same prejudice, but only with regard to athletic ability. In fact, they were more likely to choose an overweight person as having the highest social skills. Overweight children are more likely to suffer at school. In one study of 2,055 children, ages 8–12, researchers found that these participants tended to be more likely to attribute negative characteristics to fat figures (compared to “normal” figures; Pereda-­ Pereda, Echeburua, & Cruz-Saez, 2019). When asked who they would prefer to interact with in social and recreational activities, “normal” participants were least likely to choose an overweight peer. Finally, teachers in this study reported that overweight children tended to have greater adjustment problems at school.

EFFECT OF ANTI‑FAT PREJUDICE ON OVERWEIGHT CHILDREN As with all targets of prejudice, children who are overweight must confront that prejudice from multiple sources, and the daily onslaught of stereotypes, prejudice, and discrimination directed at them tend to have very negative effects on their emotional and psychological well-being. In one study, girls ages 9–11 were assessed in terms of their height and weight and eating attitudes (Davison, Schmalz, Young, & Birch, 2008). They were also measured in terms of the degree to which they internalized anti-fat stereotypes, their global self-worth, their psychosocial well-being, and their perceived physical appearance. Results indicated that overweight girls who had internalized anti-fat stereotypes suffered significantly lower psychological well-being than all of the other girls in the sample. As U.S. children age, their belief in and endorsement of a thin ideal strengthens, and they are more likely to attribute internal causes for why a person is overweight (Klaczynski & Felmban, 2019).

DISCRIMINATION AGAINST OVERWEIGHT PERSONS As you might guess, anti-fat attitudes do not stop at the doorways of one’s workplace, and people treat job applicants and coworkers according to their anti-fat prejudice (O’Brien, Latner, Ebneter, & Hunter, 2013). A study of over 2,800 subjects showed that overweight participants were 12 times more likely, obese 37 times more likely, and very obese were 100 times more likely than normal-­weight participants to report weight-­related discrimination (Roehling, Roehling, & Pichler, 2007). Overweight job applicants tend to be perceived as less conscientious, less agreeable, less emotionally stable, and less extraverted than thin applicants (Roehling, Roehling, & Odland, 2008). Companies are less likely

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to hire an overweight person for a position that deals directly with the public because they are worried that customers’ strong anti-fat prejudice will then transfer to negative feelings toward the company, resulting in less profits (Cowart, 2012; Roehling, Pilcher, Oswald, & Bruce, 2008). Overweight people tend to be assigned to less desirable sales areas (Bellizzi & Hasty, 1998). Compared to normal-­weight people, overweight people are paid less, are more likely to be fired, and less likely to be hired solely because of their weight (Puhl & Heuer, 2009). In an effort to test a procedure to combat job-­related discrimination, Merrit and colleagues (2018) conducted an experiment featuring a simulated job interview in which a female applicant, either higher or lower in body fat, was rated by participants. Half of the participants were in a control condition, and the other half were taught how to imagine intergroup contact with overweight persons. Results indicated that overweight job applicants were rated just as competent (no discrimination) as their “normal” counterpart applicants.

CROSS‑CULTURAL ATTITUDES TOWARD OVERWEIGHT PERSONS As discussed at the outset of this chapter, we know that attitudes toward the overweight typically depend on how that society views the individual versus the community, how developed the society is, and the degree of income inequality within a community. One study looked at anti-fat attitudes in Australia, Poland, India, Turkey, the United States, and Venezuela (Crandall et al., 2001). Results showed that cultures that viewed being overweight as something one can control, and cultures that had a negative attitude toward overweight people, were more likely to have anti-fat prejudice. Another study of people in the United States, Canada, Iceland, and Australia found similar evidence about the origin of anti-fat bias (Puhl et al., 2015). Anti-fat bias was driven primarily by beliefs about the controllability of obesity, and beliefs about the lack of willpower and personal responsibility for one’s weight. Generally, research finds that an important factor in determining a culture’s attitudes toward overweight persons is the degree to which that culture has adopted Western attitudes (primarily negative) toward overweight persons (Crandall et al., 2009). Cultures that value the individual tend to look very negatively on overweight people, whereas collectivistic cultures have a much more positive view on the overweight (Crandall et al., 2001).

REDUCING ANTI‑FAT PREJUDICE As with all forms of prejudice, researchers are not only interested in what causes and maintains the negative attitude toward overweight people but what can be done to help reduce or eliminate this prejudice. Recall our earlier discussion of cross-­c ultural similarities in the factors that motivate anti-fat prejudice. Specifically, we noted that much evidence suggests that one will develop anti-fat prejudice when one believes that being overweight is something that is entirely under one’s own control. To that point, some research indicates that when people are told that weight is not controllable and that being overweight has no reflection on the person’s lack of willpower about overeating, subjects’ anti-fat attitudes diminished significantly, and their scores on a “fat phobia” scale decreased (O’Brien, Puhl, Latner, Mirr, & Hunter, 2010; Robinson, Bacon, &

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O’Reilly, 1993). On the contrary, when Teachman and her colleagues (2003) told some subjects that weight was controllable, and others were told it was genetically determined (not under our control), those in the “uncontrollable” condition did not show decreased anti-fat bias. Teachman et al. suggest that this may be due to the idea that in most studies, the target is a single person, while Teachman et al.’s subjects were just told that obesity in general is (or is not) controllable. As Teachman et al. suggest, “It may be easier to accept that a given person is blameless for his or her condition but more threatening to one’s worldview to believe that obesity in general is blameless” (p. 76). Sometimes a change of attitudes may require a change of perspective. Suppose you learned that the vast majority of others in your community have no negative attitudes toward overweight people. Now if you also were nonprejudiced, it wouldn’t have any big effect on you. There’s no reason to change. But now, what if you were prejudiced against overweight people and others knew of your negative views? Some research shows this contrast can create a strong social pressure to change one’s explicit attitudes about overweight people such that they are more positive (Harper, 2010). Education directed at helping people understand the nature of obesity, its causes, and efforts to increase empathy with overweight persons has also been shown to be effective in reducing anti-fat attitudes (Brownell & Rodin, 1994; Humphrey, Clifford, & Neyman, 2015; McHugh & Kasardo, 2012). These efforts to reduce anti-fat prejudice are especially important when studying anti-fat prejudice among health care professionals. Unfortunately, those studying to be health care providers (Darling & Atav, 2019; Yildiz & Baysal, 2019) and those already working as health care professionals also show strong implicit anti-fat attitudes (Kinavey & Cool, 2019; Robstad, Westergren, Siebler, ­Soderhamm, & Fegran, 2019; Teachman & Brownell, 2001; Yilmaz & Ayhan, 2019). Research shows that physicians’ anti-fat bias frames their approach to their patient’s physical test measures (Thille, 2019). When discussing a blood pressure result, for example, physicians tended to offer several interpretations about the causes of high blood pressure results. However, when discussing weight (with patients of all body types), physicians did not offer any interpretations. This, according to the study author, led overweight subjects to fill in the interpretation gap with a self-­failure narrative. These data highlight the negative influence that physician implicit and explicit anti-fat bias can have on overweight patients. The good news is that this anti-fat prejudice can be corrected by fairly simple approaches. For example, in a study of anti-fat attitudes among incoming medical students, Meadows and her colleagues (2017) found that the anti-fat attitudes of the students tended to be reduced significantly to the degree that the student had positive contact with overweight patients. Interestingly, the effectiveness of empathy training in these students depended on the degree to which the student was already egalitarian and somewhat empathetic at the beginning of his or her med school training. Another study with medical students showed that when they were asked to read a play about obesity, their prejudice against obesity significantly diminished (Matharu et al., 2014). Research has also focused on changing the perspective of overweight individuals toward themselves and others who are overweight, with the goal of developing greater self-­acceptance, healthier eating, and reduced anti-fat bias (Wilson, Marshall, Murakami, & Latner, 2020). Researchers randomly assigned 94 female university students to a nondieting intervention condition or a control condition. The intervention consisted of two, 2-hour group sessions in which subjects were encouraged to reject dieting, increase acceptance of their own bodies, and develop healthy eating habits. Results

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showed that the intervention subjects showed significant improvements in these areas (relative to those in the control condition), and also showed reduced anti-fat attitudes. Along similar lines, research indicates that when women observe an overweight model, they experience a significant reduction in their anti-fat attitudes (Smirles & Lin, 2018).

SUMMARY Prejudice against overweight persons, like a number of other prejudices, has morphed throughout time. At one time, it was desirable to be overweight, as it was an external sign of wealth or status. As the years went on, American attitudes about weight changed, and instead people started to regard excess weight quite negatively, and started attributing negative characteristics to those who were overweight. We have seen the extent to which these negative attitudes lead to stereotypes about and prejudice against overweight persons, and the negative effects that can have on the way overweight persons think about themselves. Beliefs about the controllability of weight often factor strongly into anti-fat prejudice, in that those who believe it is controllable then see weight gain as a sign of weakness, laziness, and other character flaws. However, if weight is seen as something largely out of our control, then being overweight is rarely viewed negatively. You may note that this also applies to other prejudices (e.g., prejudice against homosexuals). To the degree that people become educated about weight and its causes, and that they can empathize about what it is like for overweight persons in today’s society, their negative attitudes about overweight people can be attenuated or even eliminated.

GLOSSARY Cheerleader Effect—people are seen as more attractive when in a group than when they are alone. Relative Affective Neutrality—in developed countries, obese men do not experience the extreme stigma that obese women experience.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. Why would some parents be prejudiced against their own overweight children? 2. Do you think people see being overweight as a controllable condition or uncontrollable condition? Why? 3. What are some ways people could be educated about the nature of being overweight, so that it might change stereotypes people may have about overweight persons? 4. Is prejudice against overweight persons getting worse (more frequent, and blatant) as time goes on, or have attitudes toward overweight persons become more accepting and egalitarian?

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5. Why do some people have prejudice against overweight persons? Why do they care about the weight of another person? It has no bearing on their own life, does it? So for those who are prejudiced, why does seeing an overweight person evoke such a strong negative feeling? 6. Can anti-fat individuals ever be convinced they are wrong in their beliefs and negative attitudes toward overweight persons? Is trying to change the mind of a prejudiced person a futile endeavor?

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Cowart, K. O. (2012). Fat so? Managing the effect of obesity stereotypes on customer evaluations of service organizations. Dissertations Abstracts International, 72(9-A), 3389. Crandall, C. S. (1991). Do heavy-­weight students have more difficulty paying for college? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 17(6), 606–611. Crandall, C. S. (1994). Prejudice against fat people: Ideology and self-­interest. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 66(5), 882–894. Crandall, C. S. (1995). Do parents discriminate against their heavyweight daughters? Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 21(7), 724–735. Crandall, C. S., & Biernat, M. (1990). The ideology of anti-fat attitudes. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 23(3), 227–243. Crandall, C. S., D’Anello, S., Sakalli, N., Lazarus, E., Wieczorkowska, G., & Feather, N. T. (2001). An attribution-­value model of prejudice: Anti-fat attitudes in six nations. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 27, 30–37. Crandall, C. S., & Horstman Reser, A. (2005). Attributions and weight-­based prejudice. In K. D. Brownell, R. M. Puhl, & M. B. Schwartz (Eds.), Weight bias: Nature, consequences and remedies (pp. 83–96). New York: Guilford Press. Crandall, C. S., & Martinez, R. (1996). Culture, ideology, and antifat attitudes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22(11), 1165–1176. Crandall, C. S., Nierman, A., & Hebl, M. (2009). Anti-fat prejudice. In T. D. Nelson (Ed.), Handbook of prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (pp. 469–488). New York: Psychology Press. Darling, R., & Atav, S. A. (2019). Attitudes toward obese people: A comparative study of nursing, education, and social work students. Journal of Professional Nursing, 35(2), 138–146. Davison, K. K., & Birch, L. L. (2004). Predictors of fat stereotypes among 9 year old girls and their parents. Obesity Research, 12, 86–94. Davison, K. K., Schmalz, D. L., Young, L. M., & Birch, L. L. (2008). Overweight girls who internalize fat stereotypes report low psychosocial well-being. Obesity, 16(Suppl. 2), S30–S38. Echwald, S. M. (1999). Genetics of human obesity: Lessons from mouse models and candidate genes. Journal of Internal Medicine, 245(6), 653–666. Elran-Barak, R., & Bar-Anan, Y. (2018). Implicit and explicit anti-fat bias: The role of weight-­ related attitudes and beliefs. Social Science and Medicine, 204, 117–124. Farago, F., Savoy, S., Sanchez, E., Khaleghi, N., Evans, L., Adams, E., et al. (2022). Gender typicality, pressure to conform to gender norms, and anti-fat and appearance stereotypes in girls. Archives of Sexual Behavior, 51(4), 2183–2198. Ford, T. E., Richardson, K., & Petit, W. E. (2015). Disparagement humor and prejudice: Contemporary theory and research. Humor: International Journal of Humor Research, 28(2), 171–186. Friedman, C., Feldner, H., & VanPuymbrouck, L. (2022). Anti-fat biases of occupational and physical therapy assistants. Occupational Therapy In Health Care, 36(1), 63–83. Grant, S. L., Mizzi, T., & Anglim, J. (2016). “Fat, four-eyed and female” 30 years later: A replication of Harris, Harris, and Bochner’s (1982) early study of obesity stereotypes. Australian Journal of Psychology, 68, 290–300. Greenleaf, C., Chambliss, H., Rhea, D. J., Martin, S. B., & Morrow, J. R., Jr. (2006). Weight Stereotypes and Behavioral Intentions toward Thin and Fat Peers among White and Hispanic Adolescents. Journal of Adolescent Health, 39(4), 546–552. https://doi-org.lib.proxy.csustan. edu/10.1016/j.jadohealth.2006.01.013 Greenwald, A. G., & Banaji, M. R. (1995). Implicit social cognition. Psychological Review, 102, 4–27. Guardabassi, V., & Tomasetto, C. (2018). Does weight stigma reduce working memory? Evidence of stereotype threat susceptibility in adults with obesity. International Journal of Obesity, 42(8), 1500–1507. Guardabassi, V., & Tomasetto, C. (2020). Weight status or weight stigma? Obesity stereotypes—­not

Anti‑Fat Prejudice 377 excess weight—­reduce working memory in school-­aged children. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 189, 104706. Harper, J. C. (2010). Modification of weight bias: Examining the effects of social influence on the expression of anti-fat attitudes. Dissertation Abstracts International, 70(9-B), 5895. Harris, M. B., Harris, R. J., & Bochner, S. (1982). Fat, four-eyed, and female: Stereotypes of obesity, glasses, and gender. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 12(6), 503–516. Hauser, J. C. (2011). Understanding explicit and implicit anti-fat attitudes and their relations to other prejudiced attitudes, controllability beliefs, and social desirability in children, adolescents, and young adults. Dissertation Abstracts International, 71(9-B), 5842. Hebl, M. R., & Mannix, L. M. (2003). The weight of obesity in evaluating others: A mere proximity effect. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29, 28–38. Himes, S. M., & Thompson, K. (2007). Fat stigmatization in television shows and movies: A content analysis. Obesity, 15(3), 712–718. Hooper, N., Crumpton, A., Robinson, M. D., & Meier, B. P. (2018). A weight-­related growth mindset increases negative attitudes toward obese people. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 48(9), 488–493. Hoyt, C. L., Burnette, J. L., Auster-­Gussman, L., Blodorn, A., & Major, B. (2017). The obesity stigma asymmetry model: The indirect and divergent effects of blame and changeability beliefs on antifat prejudice. Stigma and Health, 2, 53–65. Humphrey, L., Clifford, D., & Neyman, M. (2015). Health at every size college course reduces dieting behaviors and improves intuitive eating, body esteem, and anti-fat attitudes. Journal of Nutrition Education and Behavior, 47(4), 354–360. Hunger, J. M., Blodorn, A., Miller, C. T., & Major, B. (2018). The psychological and physiological effects of interacting with an anti-fat peer. Body Image, 27, 148–155. Karris, L. (1977). Prejudice against obese renters. Journal of Social Psychology, 101, 159–160. Kinavey, H., & Cool, C. (2019). The broken lens: How anti-fat bias in psychotherapy is harming our clients and what to do about it. Women and Therapy, 42(1–2), 116–130. Klaczynski, P. A., & Felmban, W. S. (2019). Thin idealization and causal attributions mediate the association between culture and obesity stereotypes: An examination of Chinese and American adolescents. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 37, 14–32. Kornilaki, E. N. (2014). Obesity bias in preschool children: Do the obese adopt anti-fat views? Hellenic Journal of Psychology, 11, 26–46. Matharu, K., Shapiro, J. F., Hammer, R. R., Kravitz, R. L., Wilson, M. D., & Fitzgerald, F. T. (2014). Reducing obesity prejudice in medical education. Education for Health: Change in Learning and Practice, 27(3), 231–237. McHugh, M. C., & Kasardo, A. E. (2012). Anti-fat prejudice: The role of psychology in explication, education and eradication. Sex Roles, 66, 617–627. Meadows, A., Higgs, S., Burke, S. E., Dovidio, J. F., van Ryn, M., & Phelan, S. M. (2017). Social dominance orientation, dispositional empathy, and need for cognitive closure moderate the impact of empathy-­skills training but not patient contact, on medical students’ negative attitudes toward higher-­weight patients. Frontiers in Psychology, 8, 1–15. Merritt, S., Gardner, C., Huber, K., Wexler, B., Banister, C., & Staley, A. (2018). Imagine me and you, I do: Effects of imagined intergroup contact on anti-fat bias in the context of job interviews. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 48(2), 80–89. O’Brien, K. S., Danielsdottir, S., Olafsson, R. P., Hansdottir, I., Fridjonsdottir, T. G., & Jonsdottir, H. (2013). The relationship between physical appearance concerns, disgust, and anti-fat prejudice. Body Image, 10(4), 619–623. O’Brien, K. S., Latner, J. D., Ebneter, D., & Hunter, J. A. (2013). Obesity discrimination: The role of physical appearance, personal ideology, and anti-fat prejudice. International Journal of Obesity, 37(3), 455–460.

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O’Brien, K. S., Puhl, R. M., Latner, J. D., Mir, A. S., & Hunter, J. A. (2010). Reducing anti-fat prejudice in preservice health students: A randomized trial. Obesity, 18, 2138–2144. Owen, P. R., & Laurel-­Seller, E. (2000). Weight and shape ideals: Thin is dangerously in. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30(5), 979–990. Parling, T., Cernvall, M., Stewart, I., Barnes-­Holmes, D., & Ghaderi, A. (2012). Using the implicit relational assessment procedure to compare implicit pro-thin/anti-fat attitudes of patients with anorexia nervosa and non-­c linical controls. Eating Disorders, 20, 127–143. Penny, H., & Haddock, G. (2007a). Anti-fat prejudice among children: The “mere proximity” effect in 5–10 year olds. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 43(4), 678–683. Penny, H., & Haddock, G. (2007b). Children’s stereotypes of overweight children. British Journal of Developmental Psychology, 25, 409–418. Pereda-­Pereda, E., Echeburua, E., & Cruz-Saez, M. S. (2019). Anti-fat bias and school adjustment among primary school children in Spain. Annals of Psychology, 35, 75–83. Puhl, R. M., & Heuer, C. A. (2009). The stigma of obesity: A review and update. Obesity, 17(5), 941–964. Puhl, R. M., Latner, J. D., O’Brien, K. O., Luedicke, J., Danielsdottir, S., & Forhan, M. (2015). A multinational examination of weight bias: Predictors of anti-fat attitudes across four countries. International Journal of Obesity, 39, 1166–1173. Ravary, A., Baldwin, M. W., & Bartz, J. A. (2019). Shaping the body politic: Mass media fat-­shaming affects implicit anti-fat attitudes. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 45(11), 1580–1589. Robertson, M., Dempster, S., Doherty, L., & Sharpe, H. (2022). Exploring the association between parental anti-fat attitudes and restrictive feeding practices in a British and Irish sample. Appetite, 168, 105755. Robinson, B. E., Bacon, J. G., & O’Reilly, J. (1993). Fat phobia: Measuring, understanding, and changing anti-fat attitudes. International Journal of Eating Disorders, 14(4), 467–480. Robstad, N., Westergren, T., Siebler, F., Soderhamm, U., & Fegran, L. (2019). Intensive care nurses’ implicit and explicit attitudes and their behavioural intentions towards obese intensive care patients. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 75(12), 3631–3642. Roddy, S., Stewart, I., & Barnes-­Holmes, D. (2010). Anti-fat, pro-slim, or both? Using two reaction-­ time based measures to assess implicit attitudes to the slim and overweight. Journal of Health Psychology, 15(3), 416–425. Roehling, M. V., Pilcher, S., Oswald, F., & Bruce, T. (2008). The effects of weight bias on job-­related outcomes: A meta-­analysis of experimental studies. Paper presented at the annual meeting of the Academy of Management, Anahiem, CA. Roehling, M. V., Roehling, P. V., & Odland, L. M. (2008). Investigating the validity of stereotypes about overweight employees: The relationship between body weight and normal personality traits. Group and Organization Management, 33(4), 392–424. Roehling, M. V., Roehling, P. V., & Pichler, S. (2007). The relationship between body weight and perceived weight-­related employment discrimination: The role of sex and race, Journal of Vocational Behavior, 71, 300–318. Ruffman, T., O’Brien, K. S., Taumoepeau, M., Latner, J. D., & Hunter, J. A. (2016). Toddlers’ bias to look at average versus obese figures relates to maternal anti-fat bias. Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 142, 195–202. Schupp, H. T., & Renner, B. (2011). The implicit nature of the anti-fat bias. Frontiers in Human Neuroscience, 5, 1–11. Schwartz, M. B., & Nosek, B. A. (2006). The influence of one’s own body weight on implicit and explicit anti-fat bias. Obesity, 14(3), 440–447. Smirles, K. E., & Lin, L. (2018). Changes in anti-fat weight bias in women after exposure to thin and plus-sized models. Social Science Journal, 55(2), 193–197. Sobal, J., & Stunkard, A. J. (1989). Socioeconomic status and obesity: A review of the literature. Psychological Bulletin, 105(2), 260–275.

Anti‑Fat Prejudice 379 Stunkard, A. J., LaFleur, W. R., & Wadden, T. A. (1998). Stigmatization of obesity in medieval times: Asia and Europe. Journal of Obesity, 22, 1141–1144. Stunkard, A. J., Sorensen, T. I. A., Hanis, C., Teasdale, T. W., Chakraborty, R., Schull, W. H., et al. (1986). An adoption study of human obesity. New England Journal of Medicine, 314, 193–198. Teachman, B. A., & Brownell, K. D. (2001). Implicit anti-fat bias among health professionals: Is anyone immune? International Journal of Obesity, 25, 1525–1531. Teachman, B. A., Gapinski, K. D., Brownell, K. D., Rawlins, M., & Jeyaram, S. (2003). Demonstrations of implicit anti-fat bias: The impact of providing causal information and evoking empathy. Health Psychology, 22(1), 68–78. Thille, P. (2019). Managing anti-fat stigma in primary care: An observational study. Health Communication, 34(8), 892–903. van Osch, Y., Blanken, I., Meijs, M. H. J., & van Wolferen, J. (2015). A group’s physical attractiveness is greater than the average attractiveness of its members: The group attractiveness effect. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 41(4), 559–574. Walker, D., & Vul, E. (2014). Hierarchical encoding makes individuals in a group seem more attractive. Psychological Science, 25, 230–235. Wilson, R. E., Marshall, R. D., Murakami, J. M., & Latner, J. D. (2020). Brief non-­dieting intervention increases intuitive eating and reduces dieting intention, body image dissatisfaction, and anti-fat attitudes: A randomized controlled trial. Appetite, 148, 104556. Yildiz, M., & Baysal, H. Y. (2019). Prejudice against obesity in university students studying in health-­related departments. Perspectives in Psychiatric Care, 55(2), 170–174. Yilmaz, H. O., & Ayhan, N. Y. (2019). Is there prejudice against obese persons among health professionals? A sample of student nurses and registered nurses. Perspectives in Psychiatric Care, 55(2), 262–268.

CHAPTER 12

Reducing Prejudice

One of the nice things about teaching at a university is the academic freedom profes-

sors enjoy with respect to how their courses are structured. Suppose you heard that our courses are interesting, fun, and that we have a wacky sense of humor (all true! at least we think so!), and so you register for one of our classes. But this particular semester, in this class, we have an axe to grind. We are fed up with the proliferation of tattoos. We announce to the class that people with tattoos will (1) not be allowed to speak (for any reason, or they will be given an F for the semester), (2) cannot ask questions in class— they must submit all questions in writing, (3) are not eligible for extra credit, (4) must wait for all students with untainted skin to be seated before they may sit down (and must remain seated at the end of class until all nontattooed students have left the room), and (5) will be given a different—­more difficult—­standard against which their final grades will be determined. Day after day, we refer to tattooed students not by their names, but (in a derogating tone) as “tats,” and talk about how they are disruptive, undisciplined, and intellectually slower than the “untainted.” Now, if you are a nontattooed student, you might feel a little special (due to the special treatment), and may even be tempted to preserve the status quo (e.g., not talking to, eating lunch with, or interacting in any way with tattooed students. . . . we mean tats, and reminding the tats of their “place in society”). For a while (until the American Civil Liberties Union [ACLU], university administration, and student lawsuits intervene), our classroom is a model of fascist authoritarian rule, complete with arbitrary prejudice against half of the students in class. The tattooed students (or, “tats”) begin to disengage, with decreased self-­efficacy (indeed, this is reflected in their plummeting test scores), and they feel helpless, frustrated, anxious, and angry. Then, after about a month of this, we suddenly decide that we are fed up with the “untainted.” The privileges and status are given to the tats, with nontattooed students being the objects of discrimination, stereotypes, and prejudice. They begin to feel the same way the tattooed students used to feel in response to their plight. This all might sound a little contrived, but it is not. 380

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What does this bizarre social experiment teach us (other than perhaps we have some unresolved narcissistic power issues going on)? Before we answer that, would it surprise you to learn that a very similar experiment actually was conducted with elementary school children? In the late 1960s, Jane Elliott (1970) was teaching a third-grade class in rural Iowa comprising almost all White children (children with last names like “Nelson” and “Olson”). She wanted to teach them about prejudice, and what it felt like to be a target of it. She announced one day that students with blue eyes were “better than” students with brown eyes. Blue-eyed children were called on more often, were able to go back for second helpings at the cafeteria, and could stay outside on recess longer (Jones, 1997). Very few of the blue-eyed children voiced any resistance as the teacher explained the new arrangement, and some volunteered to adorn the brown-eyed children with the armbands the teacher provided so that everyone could tell from some distance who was superior and who was inferior. The brown-eyed students quickly became withdrawn and depressed, and their performance in class suffered. Some even got into fights with blue-eyed students. The next day, Elliott had students switch roles. Now the blue-eyed children were discriminated against and were the targets of prejudice. The following day, Elliott returned the class to its preexperimental state, much to the delight of the children, who now had a better understanding of what it was like to be the target of prejudice, and were more willing to accept people of different cultures, races, genders, and so on. Elliott’s (1970) demonstration highlights just one way that researchers have attempted to combat prejudice, reduce stereotyping, and improve intergroup relations. Her temporarily “disadvantaged” students learned empathy (through “perspective taking”) for victims of prejudice. They learned how much it hurts to be the target of stereotyping. In this way, they learned that, because they didn’t like anyone stereotyping and discriminating against them, they shouldn’t do it to others. Ever since Lippmann (1922) coined the term “stereotype,” researchers have been actively engaged in attempting to find the best way to reduce prejudice. In this chapter, we review the research in several domains, and show what does and does not seem to be effective in reducing prejudice. We start with an initial focus of early empirical efforts: the contact hypothesis.

THE CONTACT HYPOTHESIS It seems to be a truism that people fear the unknown; nearly all of us can recall an experience we’ve had with some unknown situation or thing that, at first, was a bit scary because we didn’t know what to expect. For example, taking the SAT or ACT college entrance exam is an unknown situation for millions of high school students each year, and they can probably tell you that they approached it with some degree of anxiety. As you recall from our discussion of the outgroup homogeneity bias in Chapter 2, people tend to make assumptions about groups with which they have little contact, or about which they have little knowledge (i.e., their outgroups). Because they have minimal contact with outgroups, they feel little motivation to be accurate in their assumptions, expectations, and generalizations, and little reason to care about those groups. These factors provide the perfect situation for the formation of stereotypes about, and fear of, the outgroup. Looking at the problem of stereotyping and prejudice, one might suggest

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a simple remedy: Eliminate the fear of the unknown by having the groups get to know each other—that is, why don’t we encourage more contact between (racial, religious, sexual orientation, etc.) groups? It seems very logical. In fact, one of the earliest solutions to the problem of intergroup stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination was the contact hypothesis (Williams, 1947). The contact hypothesis proposes that increasing exposure to members of various groups can increase positive evaluations of the outgroup and decrease prejudice and stereotyping. This idea is elegant in its simplicity and is an intuitively appealing notion of how society might reduce prejudice. The contact hypothesis was especially appealing at that time, due to the segregation of Blacks and Whites in the United States (Pettigrew, 1986).

Allport’s Contact Hypothesis At its most basic form, the contact hypothesis suggests that merely putting two groups together (i.e., “mere contact”) is sufficient to reduce stereotypes and prejudice. The idea is that people will naturally get to know one another and “work it out” when placed in contact with members of the outgroup. However, much research has shown that “mere contact” is ineffective in changing racial attitudes (Amir, 1969)—that is, it became apparent that in order to understand why the contact hypothesis only occasionally seemed to work well in reducing intergroup prejudice, it was necessary to ask not “Does intergroup contact reduce prejudice?” but rather, “In what types of contact situations, with what kinds of representatives of the disliked group, will interaction and attitude change of specified types occur, and how will this vary for subjects of differing characteristics?” (Cook, 1962, p.  76). The reason is that, upon perceiving a member of the outgroup, stereotypes and negative affect are elicited even prior to the interaction. The stereotype filters the perception of the interaction in ways that confirm expectations about the outgroup, and “By the time [the interactants] part, the offishness each has shown has confirmed the other’s suspicion. The casual contact has left matters worse than before” (Allport, 1954, p. 264). Early research indicated that in many mere contact situations, roughly about 50% of the interactants felt more positive about the outgroup, but about 50% of the time, people felt more negative toward the outgroup (Allport, 1954; Stephan, 1985; Wilner, Walkley, & Cook, 1955). Wilner et al. found that when White individuals had only casual contact with Black individuals, only about 33% of them developed positive attitudes. However, among those White individuals who had many interactions, and had many conversations with Black individuals, nearly 75% reported more positive attitudes. Perhaps one reason such externally imposed attempts to foster more tolerant outgroup attitudes often tend to meet with failure is that the majority group reacts to such real (or imagined) pressure by feeling angry, threatened, and (perhaps due to reactance) they then respond to the outgroup with even more negative attitudes (Plant & Devine, 2001). For example, Plant and Devine (2003) have shown that lack of intergroup contact experience leads to negative expectations and intergroup anxiety, which leads to hostility, which in turn leads to avoidance—­a vicious cycle. However, it is also possible that people’s contact experiences can get better, which in turn can reduce anxiety and avoidance (and ultimately prejudice) with practice (Pettigrew, 2021). Clearly, there must be more to making intergroup contact successful than mere contact. The person first credited for specifying the conditions under which contact should

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successfully reduce intergroup prejudice and stereotyping was Gordon Allport (1954). Allport recognized that a whole host of factors impact intergroup contact and influence whether participants emerge from the situation with more positive or more negative attitudes toward the outgroup. He insightfully noticed that “the effect of contact will depend upon the kind of association that occurs, and upon the kinds of persons who are involved” (p. 262). In order to fully understand any contact situation, and to make predictions about the outcome of such situations, it is important to know about the characteristics of the situation, such as the status of the members (are they equal, or who is superior?), the role (cooperative vs. competitive) of the contact, the social atmosphere (is prejudice prevalent, or is equality promoted?), the personality of the interactants (is the person high or low in prejudice toward the outgroup, and does the individual have an intolerant—­e.g., authoritarian—­personality?), and the situations in which the contact takes place. Knowing these things will help the researcher understand the dynamics of the intergroup contact and allow for better accuracy in predicting its outcomes (i.e., in terms of subsequent attitudes and behavior of members toward the outgroup). Allport specified that at least four fundamental criteria must be met in order for positive intergroup contact to occur: equal status of members of each group, common goals, intergroup cooperation, and the support of legitimate authority (i.e., government, teachers, or other institutional or cultural figures). Since Allport’s (1954) initial list of conditions necessary for positive intergroup interactions, other researchers have added more. In surveying the literature, Amir (1969) offered two more variables: there must be a favorable climate for intergroup contact, and the contact must be of an intimate rather than casual nature. Pettigrew (1998) adds just one factor to Allport’s four: that the contact situation have “friendship potential.” Stephan (1985) lists 13(!) variables that influence the outcome of contact situations. Below, we examine the research testing many of these propositions in an effort to specify the situations in which the contact hypothesis is (and is not) supported by the research evidence.

Tests of the Contact Hypothesis Some initial evidence provided support for basic contact theory and Allport’s (1954) specifications. When White and Black individuals were brought into contact in the work arena (after desegregation efforts began), each group reported more positive feelings about the other (Brophy, 1946). Deutsch and Collins (1951) found that in desegregated public housing, equal-­status contact between White and Black neighbors resulted in much more favorable attitudes of the White individuals toward equal-­housing policies. In one of the rare early studies investigating the attitudes of a minority toward a majority, Works (1961) found that Black residents in a desegregated housing project had more positive attitudes toward their White neighbors compared to attitudes of their segregated Black counterparts. Researchers also examined multiple contact situations over time. For example, an experiment by Cook (1969) suggests that contact over a period of time (2 hours a day for 20 days) can significantly change intergroup attitudes. In their research, White women who were selected because of their highly negative attitudes toward Black individuals interacted with a Black woman on a cooperative task. The contact was close, the

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interactants had equal status, and they had a superordinate goal that they were working toward. A comparison of the pre- and postinteraction racial attitudes revealed that 40% of the women in the experimental group showed a significant positive change in racial attitudes toward Black Americans. Not only did this research demonstrate how repeated contact over time can be effective at reducing prejudice, it also raises the possibility that even extremely prejudiced individuals, and those who are particularly suspicious of outgroups (i.e., those high in authoritarianism), can have positive contact experiences (see Kteily, Hodson, Dhont, & Ho, 2019, for more recent evidence). Indeed, recent work shows that in even such high-­conflict contexts as Israel, the right kind of contact (in this case, between Israeli Jews and Palestinian Muslims) can reduce prejudice (Walther, Hoter, Ganayem, & Shonfeld, 2015). Unfortunately, the contact hypothesis has grown into what appears to be an atheoretical laundry list of factors that facilitate the positive effects of ingroup–­outgroup contact. According to Pettigrew (1998, 2021), a key point of confusion is that some researchers have confused factors that are essential with those that are merely facilitative in intergroup contact. In fact, in a meta-­analysis of over 500 studies, Pettigrew and Tropp (2006, 2011) conclude that contact is, on average, effective at reducing prejudice, even when optimal conditions are not met, and that the laundry list may be reduceable to just a few key elements (which we’ll get to). For example, regardless of conditions, family support, or personality traits, children who come into regular contact with classmates from outgroups generally show lower prejudice than those who don’t (Raabe & Beelmann, 2011). Pettigrew and Tropp (2006, 2011) also highlight two other problems with the contact hypothesis research. One is that while research tends to focus on when and why contact will result in positive intergroup attitudes, it does not speak to how this change in attitudes occurs in the contact situation—­t hat is, how do people’s thoughts, feelings, and conceptions of the outgroup change during and after contact? Another issue is that the contact hypothesis doesn’t specify how positive feelings toward an outgroup member in the contact situation can generalize to one’s feelings for the whole outgroup, and research has shown that the member-­to-group generalization often does not occur (Brown & Hewstone, 2005; Paolini, Hewstone, Rubin, & Pay, 2004).

Pettigrew’s Reformulated Contact Theory Pettigrew (1986, 1998; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011) proposed a longitudinal model of how the optimal contact situation should proceed, and the changes that need to take place before individuals start to think of outgroup members as potential friends, and as members of a bigger ingroup. Pettigrew suggests that first, researchers need to be aware that individuals bring their own intergroup experiences and biases and their personality characteristics to the contact situation. The next element is that the situation must have Allport’s (1954) four necessary conditions, and Pettigrew’s additional necessary condition (the potential to become friends with the outgroup members) in order for any prejudice and stereotype reduction to take place. Next, when ingroup and outgroup members encounter each other in an initial contact situation, the group members will regard each other with initial anxiety, but then begin decategorization, in that they begin to see each other in terms of their individual personalities and characteristics, rather

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than their group membership. By individuating members of the outgroup, one realizes that they are unique persons, with varying opinions, with as much variability as one’s own ingroup. Thus, the outgroup stereotype becomes less useful in understanding an individual member of that category. Seeing outgroup members as individuals also helps because people generally feel more warmly toward individuals than toward groups (Sears, 1983). From here, established, prolonged contact (Tal-Or, Boninger, & Gleicher, 2002) facilitates salient categorization, whereby group members begin to think of the outgroup members as representative of the outgroup in general, and begin to change their negative view of the entire outgroup (Hewstone & Brown, 1986). This point in the model requires a delicate balance: on the one hand, people need to see outgroup members as salient members of the outgroup; otherwise, generalization is unlikely. On the other hand, people must also avoid seeing members of the outgroup in (negative) stereotypic terms; otherwise, stereotypes are unlikely to change (Brown & Hewstone, 2005). The last stage in the sequence entails recategorization. In recategorization, the intergroup context is configured to encourage a breakdown of “us versus them” distinct categories, and to form a broader “we” category, by making members of both groups aware that they have more in common on a number of other dimensions (i.e., arts, jobs, dreams, hobbies, values, etc.) that far outweigh their differences due to race, gender, or other broad category membership (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1999; Perdue, D ­ ovidio, ­Gurtman, & Tyler, 1990). Unfortunately, many intergroup contact situations never reach this stage. Additionally, there are scant data (see Nesdale & Todd, 1998, for an exception) on how the recategorization generalizes to attitudes toward the whole outgroup (­Pettigrew, 1998). Nevertheless, the empirical data gathered to date (e.g., Anastasio, Bachman, Gaertner, & Dovidio, 1997; Eller & Abrams, 2004; Gaertner et al., 2000; P ­ ettigrew, 1997; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2000, 2006) indicate that Pettigrew’s reformulation of the contact situation has considerable empirical support, and it also suggests new and interesting ideas about how contact reduces prejudice. Specifically, what are the avenues by which contact reduces prejudice? In other words, what are the mediating variables? In one meta-­analysis, ­Pettigrew and Tropp (2008) found that the mediators were (1)  reduced anxiety about the intergroup contact, (2) increased empathy and perspective taking, and a somewhat weaker mediator was (3) increased knowledge about the outgroup. Prejudice reduction can even take place if you don’t have direct contact with the outgroup member, a phenomenon known as extended contact. This research indicates that if you have a friend who has an outgroup friend, your prejudice is reduced (toward that outgroup) at levels comparable to if you had direct contact with the outgroup (­Pettigrew, Christ, Wagner, & Stellmacher, 2007; Zhou, Page-Gould, Aron, Moyer, & Hewstone, 2019). In a similar vein, data from a study by Pettigrew (2009) suggest that contact brings about a transfer effect to one’s attitudes toward other similar stereotyped groups, such that the decreased prejudice one feels for the direct contact group also causes one to feel more positively toward similar outgroups. Miles and Crisp (2014) analyzed over 70 studies of imagined intergroup contact and found that simply thinking about a positive interaction with an outgroup member can reduce one’s prejudice toward that outgroup. Imagined contact also appears to be effective in school children (Vezzali, Capozza, Giovannini, & Stathi, 2012). Consumption of media with likable depictions of outgroup members may play a role in imagined contact’s positive effects. Anyone who’s ever binge watched a show

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can attest to the genuine feeling of connection one can develop with its characters. Indeed, these “parasocial” relations can actually fulfill belongingness needs (Gabriel, Valenti, & Young, 2016). Thus, as in “real” relationships, getting to know an outgroup member through media does, in fact, appear to reduce prejudice and intergroup conflict (Tukachinsky, Mastro, & Yarchi, 2015). For example, straight participants assigned to regularly watch a television series with depictions of likable gay men (e.g., Six Feet Under, Queer Eye) showed reduced heterosexism over the course of several weeks (Schiappa, Gregg, & Hewes, 2005). In a fascinating field study, Paluck (2009) used media (in the form of a radio-­broadcast soap opera) to reduce conflict and increase empathy among the people of Rwanda, who had just emerged from a genocide and civil war. Some recent research has suggested that imagined and parasocial contact produces weaker effects than initially thought (Klein et al., 2014), but it’s important to properly situate these processes into a longitudinal approach: imagined and parasocial contact may warm people up to the idea of real contact, which, according to Pettigrew’s model, places people on the path to improved intergroup relations. As far as we know, no research has attempted to “warm people up” via imagined or parasocial contact, followed by “real” contact, to gauge their combined impact.

Good Contact and Bad Contact Pettigrew and Tropp (2008, 2011) argues that effective contact requires personal contact and friendship potential—­t he extent to which the contact experience facilitates people truly getting to know one another, first as individuals, and then as group members (see also Brewer & Miller, 1984). One might wonder: With communication technologies affording so much potential for contact, why is the modern world so replete with prejudice and intergroup conflict? It’s likely because a lot of the contact that is happening isn’t the good, friendship-­potential variety (as the comments on any social media illustrate). For example, Putnam (2007) found that more racially diverse communities were less trusting and cooperative. At the state and county levels, Rae, Newheiser, and Olson (2015) found that diversity was associated with increased implicit prejudice. Negative contact—­t he impersonal kind that doesn’t afford friendship—­can indeed increase prejudice (Barlow et al., 2012). When people are feeling vulnerable (whether economically or socially), seeing more of “them” can feel threatening, especially when there are a lot of them, they appear suddenly, and there are few opportunities to get to know them. Thus, in cities that are relatively diverse but where there is a lot of residential segregation and little opportunity for personal contact (as is the case in many American cities), a sense of threat prevails and prejudice is likely to increase (Dinesen, Schaeffer, & Sønderskov, 2020). But when you look more locally—­at neighborhood levels where people have the potential to actually get to know one another—­contact increases trust and reduces prejudice (Stolle, Soroka, & Johnston, 2008). As it turns out, we are kinder toward people and are less likely to discriminate against them when they are a real, in-the-flesh person right before us instead of a faceless mass across town, in some other state, or on the internet (Sears, 1983). The key, Pettigrew (2021) argues, is to create contexts where people have the opportunity for this more personal form of contact. Achieving more personal forms of contact can be a real challenge, however. In addition to the segregated lives we lead, people are reluctant to engage in more intimate conversations with outgroup members. White individuals, for example, report reluctance to

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engage in more intimate self-­disclosure with Black individuals (­Johnson, Olson, & Fazio, 2009). Intergroup interactions can be taxing (Richeson & Shelton, 2003), particularly when people try to avoid offending their interaction partner (Trawalter & Richeson, 2006), and particularly when they involve more intimate self-­disclosure (Zabel, Olson, Johnson, & Phillips, 2015). Nevertheless, self-­disclosure with an outgroup member can foster friendship (Ensari & Miller, 2002; Shelton, Trail, West, & Bergsieker, 2010), which can lead to the generalization of positive attitudes toward the group. Generalization is particularly likely if people enter the interaction with positive expectations and it goes well (Deegan, Hehman, Gaertner, & Dovidio, 2015). So, while initial intergroup interactions can be fraught at first, people can become more comfortable and skilled at them over time, leading to eventual reductions in prejudice and conflict (MacInnis & Page-Gould, 2015). Even among those who are especially anxious about intergroup contact (i.e., those high in “race-based rejection sensitivity”) show reductions in cortisol and anxiety when they gain (in this case, through an experimental manipulation) an outgroup friend; they even seek out more intergroup encounters (Page-Gould, Mendoza-­Denton, & Tropp, 2008). For a compelling example, remember that study from Chapter 4 (Towles-­Schwen & Fazio, 2006), where Black and White undergraduates who were randomly assigned to share a dorm room ended their roommate relationship sooner if the White student was implicitly prejudiced? In a follow-­up study, Shook and Fazio (2008) followed similar students for a full year, and even though Black and White students who shared a room reported less satisfaction with their roommates at first (compared to same-race roommates), by the end of the year their racial prejudices had diminished.

SHERIF’S ROBBERS CAVE STUDY: THE SUPERORDINATE GOAL Recall from our discussion of realistic conflict theory in Chapter 2 that when two groups compete for scarce resources, prejudice and stereotypes between the two groups will result (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood, & Sherif, 1961). Specifically, the theory suggests that when groups are in conflict, they think of the outgroup in stereotyped ways and begin to feel hostility toward them. The groups also feel greater loyalty to their ingroup as a result of this conflict. Remember that in his Robbers Cave study, Sherif had two groups of boys at a summer camp compete for a scarce resource. As predicted, prejudice erupted between them. Sherif then shifted the experiment to attempt to reduce prejudice. He reasoned that if intergroup competition increased prejudice, perhaps cooperation between groups would reduce it. So, he discontinued the competitions. He arranged to have two “problems” (a bus that was stuck that the boys pulled out with a rope and a broken water supply to the camp) the groups had to work together on to solve. These problems represented a superordinate goal, in that no group could remedy the situation alone. They needed to cooperate, to help one another, in order to solve the problem. They worked together, solved the crises, and the counselors (and Sherif) noticed a change in the boys. When the counselors asked the boys who their friends were, they were much more likely to include members of the other group. The name-­calling was virtually eliminated, and the winning group chose to split their money with the other group members at an ice-cream shop on the way home from the camp (almost sounds like a 1950’s sitcom script, huh?). Sherif ’s study nicely showed (in a very real setting)

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that prejudice and outgroup hostility can be caused by competition but can be greatly reduced (or even eliminated) via intergroup cooperation toward a superordinate goal.

Common Ingroup Identity What evidence since these early studies is there to bear on Sherif et al.’s (1961) very promising solution to the problem of reducing intergroup prejudice? As it turns out, there is good evidence to support the idea that prejudice can be greatly reduced through the encouragement of superordinate ingroup identities. Gaertner, Dovidio, Anastasio, Bachman, and Rust (1993) proposed that intergroup prejudice can be reduced by breaking down the salience of the groups’ category memberships and getting the groups to reconceptualize themselves as all members of a larger common ingroup, whereby members’ perceptions of “us” and “them” become “we.” The common ingroup identity model works through decategorization and recategorization (Anastasio et al., 1997), and fits within Pettigrew’s (2021; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011) reformulation of the contact hypothesis discussed earlier. Riek, Mania, Gaertner, McDonald, and Lamoreaux (2010) designed two experiments to test the model. In one, they had Black and White subjects conceive of themselves in terms of a common superordinate identity (e.g., same university, or both Americans) and they found that it led to decreased intergroup threat and increased positive attitudes toward the other group. In Experiment 2, the researchers had Democrats and Republicans conceive of themselves as Americans. When they did this, subjects felt less intergroup threat and, you guessed it, more positive attitudes toward the outgroup. In another experiment designed to test the common ingroup identity model, ­Dovidio, Gaertner, Isen, and Lowrance (1995) found that when participants in two separate groups felt more positive affect (via positive affect induction with free candy—a common experimental technique; see Isen & Daubman, 1984), and when groups were made to feel less distinct (through similar clothes, and similar goals), they were more likely to view their own group and the other group as members of one large group with shared goals. Prejudice, stereotyping, and outgroup bias were greatly diminished. This experiment showed that, paradoxically, the processes that lead to ingroup favoritism can actually be used to promote a superordinate ingroup identity, and reduce ingroup/ outgroup distinctions, thereby reducing prejudice. It should be noted that while the groups in this experiment were created via random assignment (i.e., they were “minimal groups”), critics (e.g., Billig, 1976) have suggested that the results may not generalize to “real” groups. However, other research (­Gaertner, Rust, Dovidio, Bachman, & Anastasio, 1994) has found support for the common ingroup identity model in the “real-world” settings of a multiethnic high school (thereby involving long-­standing racial attitudes, prejudices, and stereotypes; see also Cameron, Rutland, Brown, & Douch, 2006), in step-­families (Banker & Gaertner, 1998), the corporate world (Bachman, Gaertner, Anastasio, & Rust, 1993), and in Americans’ attitudes toward immigrants (Kunst, Thomsen, Sam, & Berry, 2015). The common ingroup identity model has been criticized in other ways. There is some evidence that holding two separate group identities (one’s ingroup, and the common ingroup identity) can actually lead to an increased likelihood of prejudice and discrimination toward outgroups. Wenzel, Mummendey, Weber, and Waldzus (2003) found that group members tend to perceive their ingroup as prototypical of the common

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ingroup identity, and this projection of their ingroup to the overall identity of the common ingroup led them to regard all other common ingroup members as even more different from them. This perception led group members to be more likely to hold negative attitudes to the other common ingroup members. A related concern is also based on the notion of ingroup projection. Specifically, members of minority groups often recognize this projection tendency, and fear a devaluing of their minority identities (Hornsey & Hogg, 2006). For example, if Black and White people are encouraged to foster a common ingroup identity as “Americans,” Black individuals may be threatened by the prospect of losing the valuable social identity functions served by their identification as Black Americans (indeed, there is evidence that many White Americans automatically assume that “being American” implies being White; Devos & Banaji, 2005). Hence, a potential solution is to encourage “dual identities” that maintain both minority and common ingroup identities (Dovidio, Gaertner, Schnabel, Saguy, & Johnson, 2010), or “cross-­ categorizations” that allow for complex and partially overlapping identities that include both one’s minority and common ingroup identities (Crisp, Turner, & Hewstone, 2010). In an interesting paper, Gaertner and his colleagues (2016) propose a “functional” approach to understanding common ingroup identity and prejudice reduction. The researchers suggest that majority and minority groups are drawn to endorse the representation that is best at promoting their own group’s goals. So, the majority group would tend to want a single-­g roup representation (“we’re all in the same group”) because it diverts attention away from existing inequalities between the majority and minority. According to this functional perspective, minority groups should be motivated to prefer a dual identity (“we are one group, but yet it is composed of minority and majority members”) because it recognizes the existing disparities between the groups. Perhaps this might motivate both groups to reduce the injustice of those disparities. This is an interesting perspective on the model, and it merits further empirical examination to confirm the motives underlying the majority and minority groups in their interactions with each other. It would be interesting to learn whether a common ingroup identity motivates majority group members to actively address inequality and discrimination, or whether it merely makes them feel better about minority outgroups.

CONFRONTATION Myrdal (1944) discussed what he termed the “American dilemma.” Many White Americans have egalitarian beliefs, but still harbor prejudiced tendencies, and therefore, they feel a moral conflict. According to Rokeach (1973), people should be dissatisfied with themselves (e.g., feel guilt) when they are made aware of this discrepancy within themselves. Once this occurs, people should be willing to revise their prejudiced attitudes in order to alleviate their moral conflict and its attendant negative affect. This follows classic cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), which states that when people experience inconsistent thoughts/behaviors, they will feel negative arousal. This arousal motivates them to choose the easiest factor to change (almost always, it is one’s attitude) to bring it in line with the other factor (usually, behavior; see Festinger & Carlsmith, 1959), and reduce the negative arousal. Rokeach empirically demonstrated support for the notion that when White subjects were made aware of the discrepancy between their self-views and their values, they changed their values (not an easy task!), and this value

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change led to attitude (and behavior) change in relation to their attitudes and behavior toward Black individuals. However, other researchers reported no significant changes in intergroup attitudes and behavior as a result of Rokeach’s value-­confrontation technique (Cook & Flay, 1978; Penner, 1971). Thus, the data are a bit mixed on the effectiveness of the technique to reliably reduce prejudice and stereotyping. Altemeyer (1994) used the confrontation procedure with individuals high in rightwing authoritarianism (RWA). Recall that RWA individuals are characterized by three main features: a high degree of submission, aggression, and conventionalism (traditionalism). As Adorno, Frenkel-­Brunswik, Levinson, and Sanford (1950) found in their pioneering research on authoritarianism, RWAs tend to be highly prejudiced against, well, basically everyone who is different from them. Correlations between high RWA scores and heterosexist attitudes range from .50 to .65 (Altemeyer, 1988), and from .53 to .69 for anti-Black attitudes (Duckitt, 1990). Altemeyer asked students to complete a scale measuring RWA, and to rank 10 values (e.g., friendship, wisdom, equality, freedom) in terms of their personal importance. Most low and high RWAs ranked freedom ahead of equality. He then came back to the classroom several weeks later to provide the results of the rankings, and to show (according to Rokeach’s [1973] technique) them the discrepancy between their value of freedom and equality and how they feel about others’ (minorities’) struggle for equality. In short, he pointed out how valuing freedom over equality implies valuing one’s own freedom but not others’ freedom. High-RWA participants’ attitudes toward minorities and minority-­related social issues, such as affirmative action, did not change as a result of the personal value-­confrontation technique (compared to high RWAs who were not confronted with the value discrepancy). Thus, while the technique tends to yield mixed results, Altemeyer is still optimistic that it can be useful in reducing prejudice. When the researcher is able to address the defensiveness sparked by the procedure, the technique can work with many high RWAs. Like most people, when high-RWA individuals realize a core discrepancy between their stated values and who they are (in terms of their RWA characteristics and tendencies), they usually show some willingness to change (if not motivated by benevolent insight, then at least by selfish desire to reduce their cognitive dissonance or the appearance of hypocrisy). What about direct forms of confrontation? When people are accused of discrimination, do they pause, reflect on their possible prejudices, and consider changing their minds? Or do they get defensive and deny it? Not surprisingly, there is no evidence that “calling out” a person’s prejudices is effective at reducing prejudice or discrimination, particularly when it is done publicly, and particularly in the harsh and condemning tones one can readily observe on social media. Even more benign confrontations can evoke defensiveness and reactance. For example, calling attention to the unearned advantages of “White privilege” tends to increase modern racism among White individuals (Branscombe, Schmitt, & Schiffhauer, 2007). Completing the Implicit Association Test (IAT) can be akin to a stereotype threat effect among White participants, which can lead them to avoid examining their results (Howell et al., 2013) and, true to stereotype threat, even increase their prejudice on the test itself (Frantz, Cuddy, Burnett, Ray, & Hart, 2004). Perhaps because nearly everyone has women in their lives who they know and love, people are particularly likely to trivialize and deny instances where they might have engaged in gender discrimination (Gulker, Mark, & Monteith, 2013). So why do people engage in confrontations and callouts even though they typically fail to reduce prejudice and discrimination? They may do it for other reasons, including signaling

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their group memberships and loyalties to others, as well as seeking status and approval within their groups (e.g., by appearing to be strongly antiprejudiced). But are there any situations where confrontation is effective at curbing prejudice and discrimination? There are. For example, Czopp, Monteith, and Mark (2006) engaged participants in a clever social perception task that “tricked” them into appearing prejudiced. In the task, participants were shown images and descriptions of individuals and asked to make inferences about them. One was of a Black man whose description read, “This person can be found behind bars.” Are you thinking, “Maybe he’s a criminal”? That might be racist. In fact, he is a bar tender; don’t you feel guilty now? After being confronted with their presumptuous responses, those participants were less likely to make stereotypical judgments of others later. Follow-­up work shows that confrontations of prejudice are better received by White versus Black confronters; the latter were more likely to be seen as “complainers” (Gulker et al., 2013). People are also more open to confrontation when it is accompanied by clear evidence that their judgments were, in fact, prejudicial, and produced real harm (Parker, Monteith, Moss-­R acusin, & Van Camp, 2018). Finally, it is important to note that confrontation may increase the salience of antiprejudicial social norms; as we discuss later, such norms can curb expressions of prejudice even among those who have not internalized them (Tankard & Paluck, 2016).

THE JIGSAW CLASSROOM In 1954, the Brown v. Board of Education decision by the U.S. Supreme Court ended segregation between Blacks and Whites. This presented an interesting, real-life situation for social psychologists studying intergroup relations. Specifically, how would Blacks and Whites get along, now that they would be intermingling in society? Would there be chaos? Or, would prejudice just disappear once people got to know members of the other group (as simple contact theory would suggest)? To examine how to reduce prejudice and stereotyping in the newly integrated schoolroom society, Aronson, Blaney, Stephan, Sikes, and Snapp (1978) conducted research in an Austin, Texas, elementary school to examine the effects of a new, cooperative learning environment, compared to the traditional competitive environment, on the performance of White and Black students, and on their feelings about members of the outgroup. Building on earlier work on cooperative groups by Deutsch (1949) and others (­Phillips & D’Amico, 1956; Stendler, Damrin, & Haines, 1951), Aronson et al. (1978) found that the typical elementary classroom environment in the United States is based upon competition between individual students for the attention and praise of the teacher. Students who are called upon frequently and who are correct in their answers feel better about themselves, and perform better than their classmates, yet are often resented by their peers (Aronson et al., 1978). When minority students were being bused to predominantly White schools, they were competing in an inherently unequal environment, because White students had a more advantaged educational experience, and were therefore much more likely to “win” in the competition for the teacher’s attention and praise (Cohen, 1980). When the racial tensions that existed between the two groups were added to this competitive atmosphere, the negative feelings each group had for the other were often exacerbated.

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Aronson and his colleagues (1978) wanted to attempt to eliminate competition, and structure interdependent cooperation between Black and White students in the classroom in order to examine the impact of such a structure on prejudice and stereotyping. They placed students into small groups of six students each. The new structure of the classroom was such that the teacher was no longer the omniscient repository of all the answers. Rather, students had to rely on one another as resources. The researchers made individual competitiveness incompatible with success and set up the classroom such that success only resulted from cooperation. Each student in the small group was given a unique skill or piece of information. In order to complete the task, each group member had to contribute to and rely on the contributions of other group members. Then, each child was tested over all of the material given to that group. Because of their mutual interdependence for task success, Aronson et al. referred to this model as the “jigsaw” system for intergroup cooperation. In this system, the interdependence reduces the need for competition, and it also discouraged ridicule of others in their group (on the basis of stereotypes, shyness, or being less knowledgeable than the others). Teachers informed students that such behavior would not help their group, and could only hurt their chances of success. Thus, students were motivated (and reinforced) to help one another, and in so doing, perhaps cultivate a common ingroup identity. Their preconceptions, fears, and stereotypes about the outgroup members slowly eroded in light of these positive experiences and newfound “groupiness.” Results from the study indicated that children in the jigsaw classrooms liked their group members more than others in the classroom. Black and White children began to like one another more, their self-­esteem increased, and their performance was as good or better than competitive classrooms. Aronson’s later research supported these findings (Aronson & Gonzalez, 1988). Indeed, much subsequent research has indicated that cooperative jigsaw settings are very effective in increasing positive intergroup attitudes and behavior, and decreasing stereotyping and prejudice (Cook, 1985; Desforges et al., 1991; Johnson & Johnson, 1987). Other researchers report data that suggest that the impact of jigsaw cooperative groups will be even stronger in situations where the participants focus on getting to know the individual personalities (i.e., to individuate the person) of their group members. In this way, they are more likely to think of their group members in terms of their attributes and characteristics, rather than in terms of their categories (Bettencourt, Brewer, Croak, & Miller, 1991; Perdue et al., 1990). There seems to be good empirical support for this point from the lab experiments discussed above, and from “real-world” cooperative groups (Warring, Johnson, Maruyama, & Johnson, 1985). Research has also demonstrated that the positive benefits of the cooperative group situation could be enhanced if additional factors were added to the mix. Specifically, cooperative groups foster more positive outgroup attitudes when (1) the group is successful (Sherif & Sherif, 1969; Wilson & Miller, 1961; Worchel & Norvell, 1980), (2) the outgroup members are seen as competent (Rosenfield, Stephan, & Lucker, 1981) when the group members self-­disclose to one another (Ensari & Miller, 2002), and (3) when the group members are seen as similar (Allen & Wilder, 1975; Blanchard & Cook, 1976). In sum, the available empirical data indicate strong support for the efficacy of cooperative learning groups in reducing intergroup stereotyping and prejudice (Nalls & ­Wickerd, 2022; see Bratt, 2008, for a contrary view). Especially promising is the finding by Bettencourt et al. (1991) and others (Grack & Richman, 1996) that positive attitudes and reduced prejudice generalize to members of the outgroup other than those who

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were involved in the cooperative group experience. Indeed, research supports the idea that outcome dependence, or interdependence between groups (and not only those who are engaged in cooperative learning, as in the jigsaw classroom), facilitates individuation of outgroup members, and reduces prejudice (Fiske, 2000). This may be the key to harnessing the full positive potential of cooperative groups, such as those modeled after the jigsaw system. Research has uncovered a few important factors that can facilitate generalization from one’s positive feelings about outgroup members in the small cooperative group to the entire outgroup. If the counterstereotypical information is spread across several outgroup members, they are less likely to be subtyped, and the perceiver is more likely to realize the variability of the outgroup, and therefore be less likely to think of the outgroup members in stereotyped terms (Weber & Crocker, 1983). If the counterstereotypical person in the small cooperative group is seen as typical of the outgroup, generalization to the outgroup is more likely to occur (Rothbart & Lewis, 1988). Finally, if people have time to consider the discrepancy between their feelings for the outgroup member in the cooperative group and their attitude toward the outgroup, they may be more likely to generalize their positive feelings toward the outgroup (Fiske & Taylor, 1991).

EDUCATION, EMPATHY, AND ROLE PLAYING If one assumes that prejudice is largely enhanced by the lack of information about the outgroup, fear of the outgroup, and an overall lack of understanding the perspective of the outgroup, then it would stand to reason that prejudice could be greatly reduced by educating people about outgroups (i.e., showing them that the outgroup members are more similar to them than they are different), helping them understand what it is like to be the target of prejudice (so that they wouldn’t be prejudiced toward others), and help them begin to understand that the outgroup individual is entitled to the same rights and respect as the perceiver. At the beginning of this chapter, we discussed one famous example (Elliott’s [1970] brown-eye/blue-eye demonstration) of role playing and perspective taking, which led to increased empathy and decreased prejudice. Below, we briefly discuss the research on the influence of education, role playing, and empathy on prejudice reduction. It seems intuitive that if ignorance is a breeding ground for prejudice and stereotypes, then education about outgroups ought to be a perfect antidote for such attitudes. For example, college students enrolled in a course on prejudice and intergroup conflict (perhaps like one you’re reading for now) showed reduced implicit and explicit prejudice at the end of the semester (Rudman, Ashmore, & Gary, 2001). However, the evidence appears to be mixed as to the effectiveness of various cultural training techniques, school courses, and the liberal (tolerance enhancing) effects the college experience should have on people (Devine, 1995; Hsieh, Faulkner, & Wickes, 2022). It is unclear why the data are so inconsistent. One problem is that many of the studies were not designed well and had no follow-­up data, so we are unable to examine the true impact (and any lasting impact) of such educational experiences. Another problem may be that past programs designed to reduce children’s racial and ethnic stereotyping may have failed because often they were based on simplistic models of attitude change (­Bigler, 1999). Aboud and Fenwick (1999) contend that prejudice reduction efforts in schools

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cannot expect children’s stereotypes to disappear as a result of the school merely promoting positive attitudes about stereotyped groups. Rather, evidence from their research (Study 2) suggests that when peers talk to one another in an open way to justify their racial evaluations, the prejudices of their fellow students tend to be reduced. Specifically, their data showed that when low-­prejudice students honestly discussed their positive and negative evaluations of their own group and the stereotyped group, and when they cited stereotype-­disconfirming examples (individuals) from the stereotyped group, and finally, when they asserted that all people can have positive and negative qualities, those students who were high in prejudice tended to attenuate their prejudice toward the outgroup. Thus, this research suggests that, under certain conditions, low-­prejudice students can act as peer socializers, and models of tolerance, and this can be an effective means of reducing prejudice in their fellow students. Techniques designed to enhance empathy (largely through role playing) for the target of prejudice have met with success (Stephan & Finlay, 1999; Tropp & Barlow, 2018). The Elliott (1970) brown-eye/blue-eye study is a prime example of such a technique. White students learned how it felt to be treated in a prejudiced manner and were much less likely to treat others (specifically those in minority outgroups) with prejudice, and they showed more positive attitudes toward the outgroup following the study. Experiments by Galinsky (Galinsky & Ku, 2004; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000) are also supportive of the benefits of empathy training in reducing intergroup bias. These researchers found that when people are asked to imagine life from a target individual’s perspective, they are much less likely to stereotype that individual, and they show a decreased ingroup bias, and more positive evaluations of the target person’s group. Unfortunately, some data indicate that in the absence of continued salient antiprejudice norms, endorsement by authority of continued nonprejudiced attitudes and behavior, and once people leave the role-­playing setting, people often revert to their preempathy (i.e., more prejudiced) attitudes and behavior toward the outgroup (Fiske, 1998; Jones, 1997; Stephan, 1985).

COLORBLIND VERSUS MULTICULTURAL APPROACHES Perhaps prejudice and stereotyping could be reduced greatly if people were asked to not consider one’s race (or age, gender, or other category information) when thinking about the person. The idea here is that people ought to be assessed according to their unique personality, talents, and contributions, and their group membership should not factor into one’s thoughts about others. This is the rationale behind what has been called the colorblind (CB) approach. It suggests that, for example, employers, or college admissions boards, should not ask for gender, race, or other group-­membership demographic information in their evaluation of whether an applicant should be hired/admitted. Thus, people would be assessed only on their merits and qualifications. In this way, according to this perspective, prejudice and stereotyping should decline greatly because it no longer would be considered by institutions and individuals in their evaluations of members from stereotyped groups. While perhaps well-­intentioned, the CB approach suffers from a number of problems, and has been heavily criticized (Jones, 1997; Mazzocco, 2017; Neville, Gallardo, & Sue, 2016; Rattan & Ambady, 2013). Jones argues that a major problem with the CB approach is that it fails to recognize the continuing significance of prejudice and

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discrimination in society. Moreover, critics argue, by saying that one’s race/age/gender/ and so on, doesn’t matter, when in fact it does, relegates the minority individual to a permanent position of diminished status. As we learned in Chapter 3 in our discussion of stereotype suppression research, one cannot simply not think about stereotypes and group labels, and expect that will be sufficient to eliminate prejudice. Research has demonstrated that attempts to suppress stereotypes and category information tend to fail quite dramatically. Even if such an approach were to be embraced, it is doubtful whether it could really be put into practice. Survey research from a number of studies indicates that while attitudes of White Americans toward the principle of racial equality have become more positive, they are much less supportive of the actual implementation of policies concerning equal treatment (e.g., Pew Research Center, 2022). One series of experiments set out to address the question of whether the CB approach can reduce stereotyping and prejudice. In their research, Wolsko, Park, Judd, and W ­ ittenbrink (2000) examined whether White participants would stereotype African Americans if the participants adopted either a perspective that emphasized the importance of embracing social diversity (the multiculturalism), or a perspective that de-­emphasizes differences and emphasizes the need to regard each person as a unique individual (the CB perspective). In their research, Wolsko et al. asked participants to read essays that were said to be the collective opinion of sociologists, psychologists, economists, and political scientists about ethnic relations in America. The half-page essay described how ethnic tensions, prejudice, and stereotyping still exists, and needs to be addressed. Participants were assigned to either a multicultural (MC) perspective or a (CB) condition. The essay for those in the MC condition stated that “intergroup harmony can be achieved if we better appreciate our diversity and recognize and accept each group’s positive and negative qualities” (p. 638). The CB people read an essay that suggested that “intergroup harmony can be achieved if we recognize that at our core we are all the same, that all men and women are created equal, and that we are first and foremost a nation of individuals” (p. 638). Participants were then asked a series of questions about the content, and accuracy of stereotypes of White and Black Americans. The results were quite interesting. The data from Experiment 1 showed that the CB and MC perspectives yielded judgments that reflected less ingroup positivity (less ingroup bias). However, the MC participants’ responses showed a stronger expression of stereotypes of Black Americans, relative to White Americans. The striking aspect to these findings is that while the MC individuals held more positive outgroup attitudes, they showed a heightened awareness of stereotypes about that outgroup. Experiment 2 revealed that MC participants were more accurate in estimating the real differences in prevalence of stereotypical and counterstereotypical attributes for Black and White Americans. In this accuracy task, the MC participants showed less ingroup favoritism than the CB participants. However, the MC participants believed there was a greater difference between the values of Whites and those of Blacks. Experiment 3 assessed the types of information participants used to evaluate target individuals. MC participants used both ethnicity and individual information, while CB participants used only individual information (and ignored category information) in their evaluations. These results suggest some intriguing conclusions about the best approach to reducing stereotyping, and promoting intergroup harmony. The MC perspective suggests that we need to appreciate and embrace the positive and negative aspects of our group and other groups. Wolsko et al.’s (2000) data showed that this has the effect of increasing the

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salience of negative stereotypes for the perceiver. However, the data also showed that the MC perspective results in increased positive affect for the outgroup, and decreased ingroup bias. Zárate and Garza (2002) reported the results of two studies that showed support for Wolsko et al.’s conclusions about the MC perspective. Their data showed that when people were directed to think about their self (via a self-­affirmation procedure), this created a heightened awareness of their ethnic identity, and when this occurs, participants’ perceptions of hostility or competition between their group and outgroups is greatly reduced. In other words, when people focus on themselves, and made to think about how their groups differ from outgroups, their outgroup prejudice tends to be significantly reduced. These fascinating results support the idea that embracing our differences results in real changes in our intergroup perceptions. This contention is borne out in research that showed significantly greater racial bias in people who take a CB perspective than those who adopted an MC perspective (Richeson & Nussbaum, 2004; Rios, 2022; Whitley & Webster, 2019). One reason for skepticism and opposition to the CB perspective is that CB is often seen as a system-­justifying viewpoint, and does little for prejudice reduction. One study made a distinction between two types of social dominance orientation (SDO), and examined differences in support for the CB perspective (Chow & Knowles, 2016). Some persons were measured to support a passive opposition to equality (SDO-E), whereas others were measured to have an active support for dominance (SDO-D) over other groups. When told that their hierarchy was under threat, Whites high in SDO-E increased their endorsement of CB. These results are even more disturbing in the current social climate whereby people of color feel increasingly unsafe around police due to questionable shootings and a litany of police confrontations the media have termed “living while Black, Brown, etc.” (Lockhart, 2018). One study measured the degree to which average people versus police (and police recruits) endorsed a CB perspective (Hughes, Hunter, Vargas, Schlosser, & Malhi, 2016). Results indicated that police and police recruits were significantly more likely to endorse CB views than the average person. The researchers suggest that police work attracts people who endorse CB racial beliefs. So, increased awareness of stereotypes does not necessarily lead to a negative evaluation of the outgroup member. The important ingredient here is that the MC perspective emphasizes that it is critical to appreciate and value negative and positive group differences, and by doing so, one will form more positive attitudes toward outgroup members (Plaut, Thomas, Hurd, & Romano, 2018; Whitley & Webster, 2019). This research showed that both the CB and MC perspectives were equally potent in eliciting greater positive affect for the outgroup, and decreased ingroup bias. Wolsko et al. (2000) suggest that the greatest ingroup harmony will likely be attained through both an appreciation of positive and negative group differences, as well as a concerted effort to disregard category information and evaluate each person as a unique individual. Steele (1991) summarized this approach nicely: “Difference can enrich only the common ground” (p. 148). It is also possible that the CB versus MC distinction is too simplistic, and that CB in particular might be carved into more specific types. Mazzocco (2017) suggests that there may in fact be four varieties of CB based on one’s awareness of racial inequality and degree of prejudice. He argues that protectionist CB results from low awareness of inequality and higher prejudice; such people believe inequality is largely a solved problem and, moreover, that Whites are in fact subject to discrimination as an alleged “new minority.” Antagonistic CB results from high awareness of inequality and higher prejudice. These

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individuals may resemble those discussed by Chow and Knowles (2016) above, who actively exploit CB to maintain racial hierarchy. Two more “well-­intended” forms of CB include egalitarian CB and visionary CB. People characterized by these forms of CB are argued to be lower in prejudice and seek racial equality. However, those of the egalitarian CB variety are thought to be naïve regarding the extent to which inequality persists; they earnestly believe that racism and inequality are minimal, and thus believe we have reached some point in social progress where group membership truly should not matter. Visionary CB individuals, in being more aware of inequality, are argued to subscribe to CB as an aspiration, not a current condition. Moreover, such individuals may believe that focusing on perceiving people as individuals and seeking commonality are most effective to reduce prejudice and achieve equality (this approach is, in fact, in line with the “good” forms of contact discussed earlier within Pettigrew’s (2021; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011) reformulation of the contact hypothesis). Thus, some manifestations of CB may be effective in prejudice reduction, but the jury is still out. Mazzocco’s analysis is interesting and provocative, but research has yet to determine whether the four forms of CB he discusses exist and operate according to his model. Finally, work in diversity science has considered alternatives to the somewhat bifurcated ideas of multiculturalism and colorblindness (Plaut, 2010). For example, recent evidence suggests that a polyculturalist mindset, which emphasizes the fact that cultures change, share, and influence one another over time, may avoid some of the problems of both multiculturalism and colorblindness (Osborn, Sosa, & Rios, 2020).

CONTEMPORARY APPROACHES TO PREJUDICE REDUCTION Contemporary research on prejudice reduction differs from past research and theory in a number of respects. First, Allport (1954) and his colleagues were dealing with a different time (late 1940s through the mid-1960s), and a different society. Racial prejudice was very overt, and even sanctioned by government laws and regulations that institutionalized segregation between Blacks and Whites. Thus, the contact hypothesis was an early attempt to identify the situations in which blatant forms of prejudice might be reduced. In other words, the reasoning was that if the two groups were merely brought together and got to know each other as human beings, they wouldn’t fear each other, and they would realize that their stereotypes and prejudices about the other group were unfounded. Other approaches focused on persuasion (attitude change), understanding the personality types that are associated with intergroup prejudice (i.e., work on the authoritarian personality by Adorno, Frenkel-­Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950), and Rokeach’s (1973) confrontation technique (discussed earlier; Monteith, Zuwerink, & Devine, 1994). As the social (and legal) climate changed in the United States, so too did expressions of racial prejudice. Overt expressions of prejudice were discouraged, White and Black individuals interacted more frequently (as a result of desegregation), and, over the decades, the attitudes of White Americans toward Black Americans have indeed become more positive, at least explicitly (Schuman, Steeh, & Bobo, 1985). This brought about another significant change in the focus of research in stereotyping and prejudice. Researchers, using subtle and indirect techniques to assess attitudes, such as the bogus pipeline technique (Jones & Sigall, 1971) and implicit measures (Olson & Zabel, 2016), found that there often was a dissociation between Whites’ self-­reported

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attitudes toward Blacks, and their implicitly assessed attitudes. In other words, a majority of Whites appeared low in prejudiced attitudes on direct measures of intergroup attitudes, yet on other, implicit measures of prejudice, they showed strong indications of lingering negative affect associated with the outgroup. A second way in which research on prejudice reduction is different from early empirical efforts is the shift toward identifying the measures that would help psychologists accurately assess the degree to which the individual’s underlying attitudes (including those attitudes that may be socially unacceptable) do not match their overt attitudes on self-­report questionnaires, as discussed in Chapters 4 and 6. As research on intergroup relations progressed, it became more sophisticated and specific. With the advent of the social cognition approach in social psychology, researchers began to focus on the cognitive processes that underlie intergroup prejudice, stereotyping, and discrimination (Fiske & Taylor, 1991; Hamilton, 1981). The cognitive approach to stereotyping yields much more precision in that it allows the researcher to understand the cognitive mechanisms, biases, errors, and structures that facilitate tendencies toward stereotypical thinking, and the conditions under which it is likely to occur (or flourish). A third way in which the present approach to reducing prejudice and stereotyping differs from earlier approaches is in the assumptions researchers have about what lies at the foundation of the stereotype held by the individual. Upon what is the stereotype based? As mentioned above, earlier research suggested that stereotypes were the natural products of how people of certain personality types (i.e., Adorno et al., 1950) think. Others suggested that stereotypes originated in fear and ignorance (stemming from lack of experience with the outgroup member). In an interesting resurgence of empirical activity, researchers today are examining the functional utility of stereotypes (Snyder & Meine, 1994).

Functional Approach Recall that the functional approach suggests that stereotypes exist and are utilized because they have a motivational foundation—­that they serve one or more important psychological functions for the individual, and therefore, they are resistant to change (or elimination). Prejudice reduction efforts are then directed at accurately assessing these functions, and providing the individual with different motivational bases that satisfy the old motivations, yet do not encourage the accompanying stereotyping of outgroups. Research is directed at understanding what needs, goals, and purposes are being met by the endorsement of the stereotype. Interestingly, this approach suggests that the same stereotypes may serve different psychological functions for different people (Snyder & Meine, 1994). For example, some research (Katz & Hass, 1988) suggests that stereotypes may serve an expressive function. Specifically, many forms of prejudice center around the belief that the outgroup violates or does not subscribe to the same values as the ingroup (for Whites, these have been traditionally labeled the “Protestant work ethic”: self-­reliance, hard work, obedience, and discipline). Derogating those who are perceived to violate these values allows the individual to reaffirm his or her sense of self and help solidify one’s values. Katz and Hass found increased expressions of prejudice and stereotyping among those for whom these values are made salient, compared to those who were not actively thinking about those values.

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Another function that may allow individuals to maintain their stereotypes and prejudices is what Snyder and Meine (1994) term the “detachment function.” Prejudice that serves this function allows the individual to disregard, or ignore (detach themselves from) the target of the prejudice. Such a function enables prejudiced individuals to disown any personal responsibility for the plight (and negative treatment) of the victim of the prejudice. The detachment function is particularly likely to underlie prejudice between two groups when one group is advantaged and the other is disadvantaged. In this way, the advantaged group justifies its status and does nothing to change the inequality (because they feel little or no responsibility for the victim’s situation). An extreme form of detachment might occur in dehumanization, when a target of prejudice is not afforded the status of being a person deserving of dignity and basic human rights (Kteily & Landry, 2022). Afterall, it’s easier to dismiss a person’s suffering if you don’t see them as a person at all. The functional approach to understanding the root of prejudice is a promising one. Though the functional perspective to prejudice has some empirical evidence to support it, more research is needed. It allows researchers to understand the processes that underlie the prejudice, and the theoretical perspective of the approach is a great advance over earlier prejudice reduction strategies, in that it represents a more broad-scope, multilevel focus on the problem of stereotyping and prejudice.

Normative Influence Believe it or not, there was a time when it appeared that virtually everyone smoked (M.  A.  O. still misses it after 20 years). Movie stars, politicians, all your friends, and coworkers enjoyed puffing on cigarettes, cigars, and even pipes (a particular rarity these days!). However, that pesky surgeon general started looking into whether this was a healthy practice (he suspected it wasn’t), and back in the 1960s, the government realized that there was a sufficient amount of evidence being accumulated that linked smoking with all manner of nasty health consequences (high blood pressure, coronary heart disease, lung cancer, death). The government enacted laws restricting tobacco advertising, and started restricting where people could smoke (i.e., no smoking on elevators, in hospitals, etc.). Then the big regulation: all tobacco companies were required by law to carry the surgeon general’s warning about the health risks of tobacco on all the tobacco packaging. Over the decades since this legislation was introduced, attitudes toward tobacco smoking have changed substantially. The United States is no longer a nation of mostly smokers, but of nonsmokers (National Center for Health Statistics, 1999). This leads to an interesting question: Can egalitarian attitudes be legislated (­A llport, 1954)? Put another way, can stereotyping and prejudice be made “against the law”? While this is already the case with respect to antidiscrimination legislation, can more be done? If so, would it have a significant impact on the country’s intergroup attitudes? There is compelling research to suggest that it might. This research focuses on changing the prevailing norms in the social context. The reasoning is that if social pressures existed that were strongly antiprejudice, social sanctions may be enough to slowly but significantly change the intergroup climate in the United States (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1991; Pettigrew, 1985). Several experiments have shown that if social norms are salient for a particular (nonprejudiced) behavior in a given situation, then expressions of prejudice and

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discrimination are much less likely to occur in those situations (­Dovidio & G ­ aertner, 1983; Gaertner & Dovidio, 1986; Murrar, Campbell, & Brauer, 2020). One way the social norms are made salient in a given situation is by members casually vocalizing their opinions about the outgroup. In the lab, a common technique has been to have confederates (posing as subjects) voice comments about the outgroup to one another, with the subjects overhearing their opinions. The question is how does this social norm (made salient by the confederates’ actions) affect the attitudes and prejudice of the subject toward the outgroup? Research by Greenberg and Pyszczynski (1985) and colleagues (Kirkland, ­Greenberg, & Pyszczynski, 1987) has established that when White individuals overheard ethnic slurs from White confederates (posing as subjects) about an African American target (also a confederate), their evaluations of the target were more negative. However, it should be noted that the social norm (the ethnic slur) had an effect on the subject’s evaluations only when the target’s performance was poor (i.e., when the Black confederate lost a mock debate). When the target performed well, the slur had no effect on participants’ evaluations of the target. Greenberg and Pyszczynski suggest that this evidence supports the notion that social influence processes (and the social norms in a given context) play a strong role in perpetuating prejudice and stereotyping. Given these data, a next logical question might be can we use the social influence process to decrease expressions of prejudice? In two experiments, Blanchard, Lilly, and Vaughn (1991) had research assistants interview White female students who were walking on campus between classes. Participants were interviewed with either one or two other White female confederates, who happened to walk up to the researcher at the same time. Participants expressed their opinions both orally (Experiment 1) and privately (Experiment 2) to five questions about anonymous racist email messages that had been sent recently on campus. Confederates provided their responses before the participant did, and these responses were prefaced with either antiracist, neutral, or racist views. In both experiments, participants who overheard antiracist views tended to express more strongly antiracist opinions compared to those who overheard neutral or racist views. Research by Monteith, Deenen, and Tooman (1996), using Blanchard et al.’s methods with attitudes toward gay men and African Americans showed similar results. These results do not seem be due to mere conformity effects, because participants’ private opinions (which should be harder to influence than publicly stated opinions) were also strongly affected by the normative influence of the confederates. Monteith et al. suggest that these results and those reported by Blanchard et al.’s study support the notion that hearing nonprejudiced opinions activates a strong social norm against showing prejudiced attitudes. In a recent set of studies, Murrar and colleagues (2020) tried a number of approaches to communicate antiprejudice social norms. They hung posters in classrooms demonstrating how students at their university practiced inclusive behaviors, and also constructed videos that were shown in classes of interviews with students talking about the importance of inclusivity. Majority-­g roup students who were exposed to the posters or the videos expressed less prejudice and greater appreciation for diversity. More impressively, compared to minority students from similar classes who didn’t receive the norm induction, minority students in these classes also reported feeling a greater sense of belonging, and their grades were higher! Importantly, the norms that were communicated in these studies were descriptive (i.e., communicating what people actually do), not

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injunctive (i.e., communicating what people should do). People often show reactance to injunctive norms, as they perceive their autonomy is being threatened (Legault, Gutsell, & Inzlicht, 2011). Thus, a normative approach may work best when it’s an example set by important others instead of an admonition about what one ought or ought not do. However, it is important to note that some research suggests that such norms against prejudice are not always naturally salient in people’s minds (even for low-­prejudice persons), and that, in order for these norms to affect the expression of stereotypes and prejudice, they need to be made explicitly clear and unambiguously salient (Zuwerink, Devine, Monteith, & Cook, 1996, experiment 1). Interestingly, in many of these studies, the impact of hearing a prejudiced norm is weaker than the impact of hearing an antiprejudiced norm, which may be due to the fact that norms promoting prejudice are weaker than those promoting antiprejudice (Dovidio, Brigham, Johnson, & Gaertner, 1996). An important question about normative approaches to prejudice reduction remains: What is the relationship between changes in norms, changes in people’s actual prejudices, and changes in their intergroup behavior (Crandall, Eshleman & O’Brien, 2002)? Classic research in social psychology demonstrates that people sometimes follow norms even if they don’t personally believe them (Asch, 1956), but also that sometimes they internalize those norms, which then can influence their behavior even when the norm is no longer salient (Sherif, 1936). Monteith et al.’s (1996) and Murrar et al.’s (2020) research suggest that changes in norms can sometimes lead to changes in actual prejudices, while other research shows that changes in norms can lead to improved intergroup relations even when people don’t internalize them. Recall Paluck’s (2009) research in Rwanda involving a radio soap opera aimed at improving intergroup relations in the civil war-­ravaged nation. Rwandans’ personal attitudes and beliefs about outgroups did not change after hearing stories of reconciliation, forgiveness, and healing. However, their perceptions of intergroup norms did: They came to believe that it was more normative to engage in empathy, trust, and cooperation with the outgroup. More recently, Tankard and Paluck (2017) showed that Americans’ perceptions of the social norms regarding same-sex marriage moved in a more accepting direction following the U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling that legalized same-sex marriage, even though their personal beliefs did not change. Tankard and Paluck (2016) make the important point that it is sometimes easier to change people’s perceptions of social norms than it is to change their “hearts and minds,” but that normative change can be an effective approach to improving intergroup relations because people do regularly act in accordance with norms, whether they believe them or not. On the other hand, sometimes people resist heavy-­handed norms. For example, when people are motivated to avoid prejudice only out of normative pressure, they often resent it, and express more prejudice later (Legault et al., 2011; Plant & Devine, 2001). How people might go from merely following a norm to avoid social scorn to the internalization of antiprejudice norms is a pressing question (Crandall et al., 2002).

Self‑Regulation Monteith (1993) and her colleagues (Monteith et al., 1994; Monteith, Parker, & Burns, 2016) suggested a model of how prejudice reduction might occur, based on self-­ regulation principles. According to various theories of self-­regulation (i.e., Carver &

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Scheier, 1981; Duval & Wicklund, 1972; Higgins, 1987), when behavior falls short of one’s standards for that behavior, self-­regulation tendencies may be engaged in order to attempt to match one’s future behavior with one’s standard. This notion of a real–ideal discrepancy can also be applied to intergroup attitudes and behavior. Monteith suggests that self-­regulation tendencies may be activated in low-­prejudice persons who experience a discrepancy between their thoughts/behavior and their egalitarian values and beliefs. According to Monteith (1993), when low-­prejudice persons perceive cues about group membership of another individual, the associated stereotypes for that group are also made salient. The activation of the stereotype should often lead to stereotype-­ consistent behaviors or thoughts. When individuals are made aware of the discrepancy between an important aspect of themselves (namely, their egalitarian values) and their thoughts or behavior in relation to the stereotyped outgroup, they should experience negative self-­directed affect. In this dissociation model (Devine, 1989; introduced in Chapter 4), as in many theories of self-­regulation, negative self-­directed affect (i.e., guilt) is key to the self-­regulation process in that it leads to heightened motivation to reduce prejudiced responses in the future. The salience of the discrepancy, along with negative self-­directed affect, make one self-­focused, and this, in turn, causes the individual to pay attention to discrepancy-­ producing cues in the environment (and within the individual), in order to prepare more appropriate responses in the future. The individual then seeks out further information about the prejudiced behavior/attitude in order to identify its impact. The end result of these steps is that the individual begins to build associations between cues present when the discrepant response occurred, the prejudice-­related behavior (or thought), and the guilty feelings that the low-­prejudice person felt as a result of the discrepancy. The model suggests that in the future, when the cues for the outgroup and the attendant stereotypes are made salient, punishment cues (i.e., negative affect, such as guilt) will be quickly activated, and these will cause the system to more carefully cognitively process the information, such that stereotypes can be inhibited and replaced with more low-­prejudice (egalitarian) responses (Devine & Monteith, 1993). Is this a valid model? Results of several experiments show that when low-­prejudice persons were made aware that they had violated their egalitarian beliefs (by stereotyping another person), they felt negative self-­directed affect (e.g., guilt), increased self-focus, and greater attention to the prejudice-­related response (Fazio & Hilden, 2001; ­Monteith, 1993; Monteith, Ashburn-­Nardo, Voils, & Czopp, 2002). Participants’ responses (to group-­ relevant cues) were slowed (i.e., slower—­ and presumably more careful, less stereotyped—­thinking about judgments of outgroup members) after the discrepancy between their egalitarian beliefs and their actions was made salient, which supports the notion that their prejudiced responses were beginning to be inhibited. It is important to note that later research has revealed that when low-­prejudice persons are not thinking about their personal (egalitarian) standards, their discrepancy-­associated negative affect is significantly diminished (Monteith, 1996). This speaks to the importance of the negative self-­directed affect (i.e., guilt) in initiating the self-­regulatory processes that would inhibit future prejudicial responses (Hing, Li, & Zanna, 2002). In fact, it may be the case that, in the absence of thinking about one’s personal (egalitarian) standards, and the discrepancy-­associated negative self-­directed affect that follows, prejudiced responses may continue unabated in low-­prejudice persons.

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Interestingly, it appears that only prejudice-­ related (as compared to prejudice-­ unrelated) discrepancies improved low-­ prejudice participants’ ability to inhibit the stereotype-­consistent responses. This suggests support for cognitive dissonance theory (Festinger, 1957), which states that dissonance resulting from inconsistent thoughts/ behavior in one domain can be alleviated only by changing one’s attitude or behavior in that domain. Changing unrelated attitudes, or affirming another part of the self, as posited by self-­affirmation theory (Steele, 1988; e.g., “I get nervous around Hispanics, and feel bad about that—­because I like to think I am not prejudiced—­but I am really a good person, because I help so many people at the homeless shelter”) did not decrease subsequent tendencies to respond with prejudice toward the outgroup. Monteith (1996) notes that becoming aware of such discrepancies just one time, and even many times, may not be enough to unlearn well-­entrenched prejudiced attitudes and behavior. However, with enough practice, and with enough motivation, people can drop prejudicial attitudes and beliefs associated with the outgroup, and learn more egalitarian associations with the outgroup, making the latter the automatic, default association with the outgroup (Fehr, Sassenberg, & Jonas, 2012; Plant, Peruche, & Butz, 2005). She speculates that even high-­prejudice persons value egalitarian ideals, and if the discrepancy between their values and their behavior and attitudes were made especially salient to them, they may be motivated to change their attitudes and behavior, in order to avoid the negative affect and cognitive dissonance that accompanies such blatant discrepancies between attitudes and behavior. Butz and Plant (2009) confirm the importance of internal motivation to respond without prejudice, and the power and effectiveness of that motivation. However, they make the argument that the empirical data call for us to further specify the conditions under which that motivation will be effective. In particular, when one is internally motivated to not be prejudiced, they will be most effective at controlling prejudice across situations, and will further aim to have positive intergroup interactions. On the other hand, if one’s motivation to not be prejudiced is external and largely driven by something outside of oneself (e.g. rules, laws, social sanctions), they will nearly always fail at regulating their prejudice, and will tend to avoid intergroup interactions. Thus, theory and empirical evidence suggest that prejudice and stereotyping are not inevitable; they can be changed, with a lot of practice and strong internal motivation to respond without prejudice (Blair, 2002; Devine, Plant, Amodio, Harmon-­Jones, & Vance, 2002). In a comparison between the efficacy of stereotype suppression and perspective-­taking methods in reducing stereotyping, Galinsky, Martorana, and Ku (2003) found that perspective taking appears to be a more effective strategy. Perspective taking (involving how you would feel in the target’s situation, or imagining how the target feels or is influenced by their situation) engages an implicit process of self–other overlap, in that the perspective of the target and that of the perceiver tend to merge. Interestingly, this process appears to be impervious to increased cognitive load. This compelling conclusion is very encouraging, and certainly more empirical attention is needed to better understand how we might exploit perspective taking in the reduction of prejudice. Finally, many of the approaches we’ve discussed in this section assume that people already care—at least a little—­about avoiding prejudice. Only recently has there been much work to uncover how to get people to care in the first place. Tropp and Barlow (2018) argue that the “good” forms of contact discussed earlier can increase empathy, humanization, and ultimately, concern for the well-being of minoritized groups.

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Implicit Approaches As implicit prejudice received increased focus starting in the early 2000s, researchers naturally turned to questions about how it might be reduced. Recall from Chapter 4 that implicit prejudices are thought to be simple associations (e.g., women–­caring, Black–­ aggressive) resulting from various socialization experiences that people often give little thought. Implicit prejudices aren’t best characterized as beliefs; instead, they are gut feelings activated automatically upon perception of a group or group member. Therefore, researchers reasoned, it makes sense that instead of trying to tackle implicit prejudice with facts, figures, evidence, and logic meant to disprove stereotypes, they have often attempted to changing the implicit associations through repeated exposure to counterassociations. And because these implicit associations are thought to be overlearned and deeply entrenched, researchers also reasoned that it would take a large number of counterassociations to make any dent in them. For example, Kawakami, Dovidio, Moll, Hermsen, and Russin (2000) instructed their participants to “just say no” to stereotypes (and “yes” to counterstereotypes) in a negation training session entailing nearly 500 trials. On each trial, a member of a group would appear along with a trait term that was either consistent with the group’s stereotype (e.g., a Black individual presented with the trait “lazy”; a White individual presented with the trait “exploitative”) or inconsistent with the group’s stereotype. Participants were told to negate stereotype-­consistent portrayals by pressing a button labeled “no,” and to affirm counterstereotypical portrayals by pressing a button labeled “yes.” After the lengthy and arduous session, participants showed reduced automatic activation of the stereotypes. Follow-­up studies included conditions where participants either “just said no” to stereotypes or “just said yes” to counterstereotypes (Gawronski, Deutsch, Mbirkou, Seibt, & Strack 2008). Interestingly, these studies showed that just saying no to stereotypes wasn’t enough; in fact, saying no did very little to reduce implicit stereotypes. This makes sense: seeing a stereotypical depiction of a group member is, in fact, the very sort of experience that contributes to implicit stereotypes. However, participants who were exposed to hundreds of counterstereotypical depictions did show reduced implicit stereotyping. One lesson from these studies is that ignoring or denying implicit stereotypes is not effective at reducing them. Chapter 4 described evaluative conditioning, the repeated pairings of groups with either positive or negative events, as one way that stereotypes and prejudices can form implicitly. We (Olson & Fazio, 2006) wondered whether evaluative conditioning could also be used to reduce implicit prejudice. In a page out of Aldous Huxley’s (1932) Brave New World, we had participants view a stream of random words and images, and subtly buried within that stream were systematic pairings of images of Black individuals with positive words and images and White individuals with negative words and images (in hindsight, M. A. O. is troubled by his decision to essentially try to make participants’ attitudes toward White people more negative). Because their task was to look for and respond to various items in the task (e.g., in one version, they were asked to press a response key whenever they saw an image of a man pumping gas), they remained mostly unaware of the systematic pairings involving White and Black individuals. Nevertheless, after the brainwash—­er, evaluative conditioning—­participants showed reduced implicit prejudice against Black individuals. We’ve often wondered whether it was the pairings of Black individuals with positive items or the pairings of White individuals with negative

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items that reduced their prejudice. Also, this study showed that it is possible to reduce implicit prejudice without participants’ awareness, just as these prejudices are thought to form without awareness. A major weakness of most of the research aimed at reducing implicit prejudice is the lack of longitudinal designs that would allow researchers to uncover how long these reductions in prejudice last (Paluck, Porat, Clark, & Green, 2020). The studies we just described are rare exceptions: Kawakami and colleagues (2000) showed that their prejudice reductions persisted for at least 24 hours, and Olson and Fazio’s (2006) effect persisted for 2 days. But that’s not very long. Is there any evidence that these implicit approaches can reduce prejudice for any longer durations? Unfortunately, the answer appears to be “no.” Calvin Lai and a large list of collaborators (2016) examined eight different interventions to reduce implicit prejudice (including those just described, along with exposure to counterstereotypical examples of outgroup members, creating a common ingroup, and several others). Although most of the interventions showed immediate effects, none of the implicit prejudice reduction effects lasted more than a few days. What made people’s implicit prejudices revert more or less back to their original states? On the one hand, the fact that implicit prejudices are so well learned means that changing them at all ought to be hard. On the other hand, these procedures did succeed in changing them, albeit temporarily. And recall from Chapter 4 that there have been many studies documenting temporary shifts in implicit prejudice, suggesting that the stubbornness of implicit prejudice may reside as much in our environments as in our heads. The fact is, the participants in all of the studies in Lai and colleagues’ research all returned to their normal environments, environments replete with negative stereotypes in media, parents, peers, and institutions, which arguably contributed to their implicit prejudices reverting to their preintervention states. It’s also important to note that changes in a social context can be temporary or long term, and there is no bright line that separates a temporary shift from a more lasting one. If short, single-­shot changes in context like those we described in Chapter 4 can temporarily reduce prejudice and stereotyping, can a more consistent, lasting change in context produce more lasting reductions? It appears so. Recall from Chapter 4 a study by Dasgupta and Greenwald (2001) that exposed participants to positive Black and negative White exemplars in a short intervention, producing a temporary reduction in race stereotyping. Stout, Dasgupta, Hunsinger, and McManus (2011) investigated the effects of a context that persisted for a full academic year. They examined gender stereotyping among women college students who had more versus less contact with women professors during their first year in college. Students who had more contact with women professors showed weakened gender stereotypes (involving gender and leadership), and this effect persisted for more than a year. So, while a short-lived change in context can produce short-term effects, it appears that long-term changes in contexts can produce long-term effects. More recently, researchers have taken a sort of “kitchen sink” approach to prejudice reduction that combines many of the elements discussed so far (e.g., Devine, Forscher, Austin, & Cox, 2012). Such approaches may combine elements of contact, self-­ regulation, empathy, social norms, or other approaches to reduce prejudice. Many have also answered repeated calls to go beyond single-­shot approaches and use longitudinal designs. For example, Devine and colleagues instructed their participants on a number of strategies, including stereotype replacement and counterstereotypical imagery (as in

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the “just say no” study described earlier), perspective taking, and seeking personal, individual contact situations over the course of several weeks. Participants were provided time and practice to generate ideas about how they implement these strategies in their daily lives, and were encouraged to use them regularly (control participants did none of these). At the end of the 12-week study, experimental participants showed dramatic reductions in implicit bias (as measured by an IAT), and increased awareness and concern about discrimination. A similar intervention with college professors yielded similar results (Carnes et al., 2015). Other kitchen sink approaches can be found in the “diversity training” that has become increasingly common in schools, businesses, and many other organizations (Gill & Olson, 2023). There is no standard method of diversity training, and much of it is conducted by nonexperts. It nearly always entails some kind of educational component, and may also include opportunities for empathy, contact, and practice at self-­regulation. But does diversity training work? The jury is decidedly out (Atewologun, Cornish, & Tresh, 2018; Bezrukova, Spell, Perry, & Jehn, 2016). It appears to increase awareness of inequality and discrimination, and there is some evidence that it reduces explicit prejudice. However, there is little evidence that it actually increases representation or retention of minorities. In a recent article, we (Gill & Olson, 2023) argue that for diversity training to be more effective, it should enlist approaches that are known to work based on some of the experimental work we’ve described here. For example, it should avoid shaming and blaming (to avoid defensiveness) and abandon any goal to reduce implicit bias in a single session. Instead, it should encourage empathy, foster personal intergroup contact, facilitate specific goal setting to foster more inclusive behavior, and make antiprejudice norms salient. Unfortunately, with all of these kitchen sink approaches that entail multiple components, it’s hard to tell which among the many components is most effective at reducing prejudice. These approaches are more oriented toward getting results than answering scientific questions.

GOING BEYOND THE PERSON To us, the fact that so many prejudice reduction efforts fail to produce lasting effects implies that prejudice cannot just be thought of as an individual psychological phenomenon. It suggests that genuine and lasting reductions in prejudice must take into account the social environment. Tom Pettigrew (2021), a former student of Gordon Allport with over 60 years of experience in prejudice reduction research, argues that a more complete understanding of prejudice, and ways to reduce it, must incorporate three critical spheres of human life. The first is the individual person, including personality traits, beliefs about groups (e.g., social dominance orientation), and orientation toward difference (e.g., authoritarianism, colorblind vs. multicultural worldviews). The second is the person’s relationships, including coworkers and families, and especially friends, as cross-group friendships can place people on a path toward more harmonious intergroup relations. The third is the broader social environment where that person lives and works, including neighborhoods, communities, and social institutions, like schools, churches, and places of employment. Here, what is most important is the opportunity to truly get to know people from different groups—­to learn about them as individuals and the customs of their groups, to see them as people, not as threats.

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As we have seen, much contact is good contact, and when people do make friends with members of their outgroups, more often than not their prejudices and conflicts diminish. Indeed, while humans find comfort in their homogeneous groups, over time they can and do adapt to more diverse social environments (Ramos, Bennett, Massey, & Hewstone, 2019). A key question for the future is how we can encourage ourselves to engage in the right kinds of contact experiences—­to get out of our own bubbles, social media echo chambers, and comfort zones, and into cooperative and close personal contact with our outgroups, to get to know them, their friends, families, and their communities, and create and cooperate in the pursuit of common goals, which will ultimately reduce conflict and prejudice.

SUMMARY We’ve discussed a number of early prejudice reduction approaches. Which seems to work best, and offer the most promise for moving attitudes away from stereotypes? Before we answer that, let us consider how to characterize these approaches. According to Jones (1997), these prejudice reduction approaches can be categorized in one of four ways. First, researchers looked at how prejudice could be reduced by changing the prejudiced individual. It seemed fairly obvious that because prejudice originated from the one who was doing the stereotyping, that if society wants to reduce or eliminate such behavior, it ought to direct its attention to changing that individual. Thus, we can characterize reduction efforts using education and role playing, propaganda (see Stephan, 1985), and Rokeach’s (1973) confrontation technique as examples (with varying degrees of mild to moderate success) of the attempt to reduce prejudice. Second, a few studies have looked at changing the target. The idea here is that if people are perceived in negative ways, or as otherwise deficient, society can reduce these stereotypes by helping to improve the situation of the prejudice target. In other words, government help with jobs (e.g., social policies, laws, such as affirmative action), housing, education, and child care would all work to help raise the status of the stereotyped group. As a result, the prejudiced individuals would have no reasons upon which to base any feelings of superiority over the outgroup, and (in theory) their prejudice would disappear once they come to the realization that the outgroup members were just like the individual’s ingroup members. Unfortunately, there is little if any evidence to support such a notion. Third, Jones (1997) suggests that some have argued that in order to reduce the tendency to think about others as outgroup members, which brings the danger of prejudice, society should attempt to be colorblind (Note: This term is used to refer not only to race but to all major ways people characterize ingroups and outgroups). The idea here is quite simple: think of others as humans, and as individuals, not in terms of their racial, sexual orientation, gender, age, and so on, category membership. In this way, there is no chance for prejudice to occur, because we are all a member of the same group. While this approach does seem to incorporate elements of Pettigrew’s (2021; Pettigrew & Tropp, 2011) recategorization notion, it falls short as an effective prejudice reduction strategy. First, it ignores reality, in that it is very difficult to avoid categorizing others, even in the most benign, general manner. Second, very little empirical evidence has been reported that tests this idea. Based on the data from Wolsko et al.’s (2000) experiments, it seems

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that a better approach to reduce intergroup prejudice may be to incorporate both a colorblind approach with a multicultural perspective. Fourth is an approach that Jones (1997) calls the transactional approach. Very simply, to transact is to conduct a negotiation, or business between individuals toward some goal. Sound familiar? Exactly. Both the Robbers Cave study and the jigsaw classroom study are prime examples of this type of approach. Of all the four approaches, the transactional approach, according to Jones, holds the most promise in future prejudice reduction efforts. Jones argues that the first two approaches are ineffective because they treat only one individual in the prejudice interaction. The third approach (colorblind) is unrealistic and has virtually no empirical support. The promise of superordinate goal techniques and the cooperative group interaction techniques is that they may incorporate a number of nonreactive prejudice reduction processes at many levels of the interaction, which explains why they are so successful. As Devine (1995) suggests, “the problem of intergroup prejudice is multifaceted, and as such, its solutions will have to be multifaceted as well” (p. 510). While the transactional approach is a promising perspective, it is largely atheoretical. Why is this a drawback? As Devine (1995) notes, though there have been several theories of how prejudice and stereotypes form, there has been little theoretical focus on how to reduce prejudice. As a result, the earlier approaches to prejudice reduction (discussed above) have had a “hit-or-miss” quality, seeking to define isolated aspects of the prejudice situation (i.e., the characteristics of the individual, the target, or the interaction between the two) that may influence prejudice in one context, but have little generalization to other situations or outgroups. Those approaches that are theory based, and seek to understand the processes that underlie the formation and maintenance of prejudice are more likely to yield more promising answers to the question of how to reduce prejudice.

GLOSSARY Cognitive Dissonance Theory—states that inconsistent thoughts (or thoughts and behaviors) bring about negative arousal. The arousal motivates the individual to change one (or both) of the inconsistencies in order to make them consistent, and reduce the negative arousal. Colorblindness—an approach to social life that de-­emphasizes social identities and group memberships and emphasizes seeing people either as unique individuals or as one unified group. Confrontation Technique—process whereby individuals are reminded of their endorsement of egalitarian values, yet confronted with the fact that they also hold attitudes that are inconsistent with egalitarian values (i.e., stereotypes). When individuals are faced with this discrepancy, they are motivated to change their attitudes (the more malleable, compared to changing values) to make them consistent with their values. Contact Hypothesis—the notion that bringing two outgroups together in a situation results in decreased prejudice and stereotyping.

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Dissociation Model—states that low- and high-­prejudice individuals automatically activate stereotypes of outgroups, but that low-­prejudice persons also inhibit these thoughts with their egalitarian personal beliefs. Functional Approach—says that stereotyping and prejudice serve various motivational functions for different individuals. To reduce prejudice, it is important to understand what functions the stereotype serve, and provide substitute psychological processes that do not entail stereotyping others, but that allow the functions to be served. Jigsaw System—technique for prejudice reduction in which outgroups are formed into small, cooperative and interdependent groups that work toward a common goal. Each group comprises equal numbers of ingroup and outgroup members who contribute equally to the task success. Multiculturalism—an approach to social life that emphasizes the importance of group memberships and social identities. Normative Influence—suggests that to reduce prejudice, it is important to make antiprejudice norms salient. Once people are made aware of the social sanctions against prejudice, they will be less likely to express (and endorse) prejudice. Realistic Conflict Theory—theory on the origin of prejudice that suggests that when two groups compete for scarce resources, prejudice will arise between them. Robbers Cave Study—Sherif et al.’s (1961) classic study, which found support for the realistic conflict theory, and also demonstrated that giving prejudiced groups a superordinate goal greatly reduced prejudice by blurring the lines between ingroup and outgroup membership. Superordinate Goal—a task which, if it is to be completed successfully, requires the cooperative efforts of two (or more) groups. Transactional Approach—suggests that prejudice reduction is most likely to occur when people interact cooperatively toward a common goal, and when they have motivation and opportunity to form friendships with outgroup members in that context.

DISCUSSION QUESTIONS 1. Is it possible to not categorize, and thus stereotype, others? Why or why not? 2. Why do you think that merely bringing two groups together doesn’t reduce prejudice between them? 3. Do you think that today’s educational environment is structured to foster competition, or cooperation, between the students? Have you had any experiences in your education with classes that are structured to foster cooperation, like Aronson et al.’s (1978) “jigsaw classroom”? What did you think of the jigsaw

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classroom method as a way of reducing racial prejudice? Do you think it can work in today’s classrooms? Why or why not? 4. Do you think that prejudice and stereotyping would be better reduced if people took a “colorblind” or a “multicultural” approach in their social judgments? 5. Can prejudice and stereotyping be legislated out of existence? Do you think that legislation on hate crimes, discrimination, and so on, is effective in changing attitudes of society toward more tolerance and egalitarian attitudes toward stereotyped groups? 6. Should implicit approaches (e.g., “just say no” or evaluative conditioning) be implemented in media to reduce prejudice? What are the pros and cons of such an approach? 7. Some people just don’t care (presumably you do, as you’re reading this book). How do we get people who do not care about prejudice, discrimination, and inequality to care about it? 8. What is the best way to reduce prejudice and stereotyping, in your opinion? Are there other methods, not discussed in this chapter, that you think work well in creating egalitarian attitudes in people?

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Author Index

Aatewologun, D., 406 Abaied, J. L., 129 Abeles, R., 244 Abeles, R. P., 214 Abelson, R. P., 112 Aberson, C. L., 178 Aboud, F., 43 Aboud, F. E., 42, 43, 393 Abrams, 337 Abrams, D., 59, 273, 337, 385 Achee, J. W., 89 Adams, C. M., 260 Adams, H. E., 293 Adelman, L., 203 Adler, T., 347 Adorno, T. W., 4, 14, 21, 141, 142, 143, 144, 145, 170, 180, 201, 390, 397, 398 Agadullina, E., 342 Agerström, J., 129 Aguilar, L., 228 Ahrens, C. R., 89 Aikin, K. J., 187, 335 Ajzen, I., 11, 81 Aktas, B., 343 Al Ali, N., 254 Albarracin, D., 6 Albee, G. W., 319, 330, 348 Alhawatmeh, H., 254 Aliabadi-Wahle, S., 253 Allen, B. P., 172, 185, 332 Allen, H. M., Jr., 82 Allen, R. O., 146 Allen, V. L., 392 Allon, N., 364

Allport, G., 142, 154, 215, 382, 383, 384, 397, 399 Allport, G. W., 4, 6, 7, 8, 17, 32, 37, 41, 42, 43, 47, 60, 63, 80, 81, 87, 91, 128, 145, 146, 148, 149, 180, 302, 331 Alparone, F. R., 321 Alperin, A., 367 Alsbrooks, A., 82 Altemeyer, B., 14, 43, 143, 144, 149, 160 Altemeyer, R., 390 Altman, M., 323 Alvarez, R. M., 160 Aman, C. J., 346 Ambady, N., 36, 42, 44, 46, 118, 208, 394 Amir, Y., 382 Amodio, D. M., 64, 83, 95, 221, 403 Anastasio, P., 385, 388 Anastasio, P. A., 388 Anderson, C., 330 Anderson, J., 145 Andreoletti, C., 247 Andres, D., 270 Andrews, R., 300 Annis, R. C., 43 Ansello, E. F., 248, 251, 262 Aoki, R., 95 Apfelbaum, E. P., 36, 42 Apriceno, M., 253, 273 Arbuckle, T., 270 Arcelus, J., 254 Archer, A. M., 335 Archer, D., 324 Archer, J., 329 Arhiri, L., 255 Arkin, R. M., 228

421

422 Arluke, A., 251 Armstrong, B., 207 Arndt, 260 Arndt, J., 210 Aron, A., 385 Aronson, 208 Aronson, E., 205, 211, 391, 392 Aronson, J., 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 212 Arrizabalaga, P., 347 Arroyo, C. G., 210 Arseneau, J. R., 294 Asbrock, F., 144, 159 Asch, S. E., 401 Asgari, S., 325 Ashbrook, P. W., 88 Ashburn-Nardo, L., 218, 402 Asher, T., 2 Ashmore, R. D., 4, 5, 6, 12, 18, 93, 131, 316, 393 Asuncion, A. G., 89 Atav, S. A., 373 Atchley, R., 252, 255, 525 Atkinson, K., 249 Aubé, J., 345 Auman, C., 207 Auster-Gussman, L., 367 Austin, A. J., 405 Austin, D. E. J., 337 Avnet, T., 80 Axelton, A. M., 303 Ayduk, O., 131 Ayhan, N. Y., 373 Azam, O. A., 50 Bachman, B., 385 Bachman, B. A., 388 Bachman, J. G., 261 Bacon, J. G., 372–373 Bagci, S. C., 216 Bahamondes, J., 150 Bai, X., 256 Bailey, N. W., 288 Bailey-Werner, B., 338 Bakan, A., 343 Baker, L. A., 321 Baldwin, M. W., 369 Bamberg, K., 21 Banaji, M., 34, 122, 124, 127, 128, 268, 315, 322, 331, 332, 347 Banaji, M. R., 12, 33, 42, 81, 87, 88, 112, 113, 118, 120, 128, 129, 130, 131, 204, 301, 368, 389 Bandura, A., 320 Banker, B. S., 388 Bannert, M., 325 Banse, R., 298, 301 Banziger, G., 270 Barak, B., 274 Bar-Anan, Y., 364 Barber, S. J., 247 Bargh, J., 112

Author Index Bargh, J. A., 3, 34, 115, 128, 266 Bar-Haim, Y., 41 Barlow, F. K., 39, 367, 386, 394, 403 Barnes-Holmes, D., 366, 368 Barnett, M. A., 367 Barnett, M. D., 260 Baron, A. S., 33, 42 Baron, R. S., 86, 96 Barreto, M., 316, 335, 338, 339, 347 Barrios, M., 324 Barrow, G. M., 244, 245, 262 Barry, J. A., 41 Bartholow, B. D., 126 Bartz, J. A., 369 Bas, E., 343 Basow, S. A., 317, 329, 330, 334, 343, 345, 347, 348 Bassett, R. L., 292 Bassili, J. N., 259, 268 Basso, M. R., 97 Bastian, B., 50 Batson, C. D., 145, 147, 148, 149, 150, 292 Batts, V., 176 Bauman, C. W., 88 Baumeister, R. F., 204 Baumgardner, A. H., 228 Baxter, J., 348 Baxter, J. C., 172 Bayer, R., 289 Bayles, K., 270 Beames, J. R., 367 Bearison, D., 262 Bearman, P. S., 295 Beaton, A. M., 193, 336 Beck, A. J., 45 Becker, A. P., 40 Becker, J. C., 340 Beech, D. J., 253 Beelmann, A., 384 Bell, J., 245, 248 Bellizzi, J. A., 372 Belsky, J., 43 Bem, D. J., 319 Bem, S. L., 318, 319, 320 Bennett, 262 Bennett, L., 36 Bennett, M. R., 407 Benokraitis, N. V., 330, 335, 343 Ben-Zeev, T., 206 Berde, E., 265 Bergen, D. J., 316 Berglas, S., 228 Bergman, Y., 260 Bergman, Y. S., 260, 272 Bergsieker, H. B., 216, 387 Berkowitz, L., 14, 60 Bernard, D. L., 191 Berning, C. C., 144 Bernstein, M., 61 Berntson, G., 94

Author Index 423 Berry, J. W., 388 Berscheid, E., 342 Bessenoff, G. R., 48, 51, 366 Best, D. L., 316 Bettencourt, B. A., 83, 291, 392 Bezrukova, K., 406 Bian, L., 33 Bianchi, E. C., 193 Biernat, M., 176, 187, 333, 344, 367 Bieschke, K. J., 301 Bigler, R. S., 35, 36, 42, 43, 348, 393 Bilge, S., 305 Billig, M., 40, 82, 388 Billig, M. G., 39 Binstock, R. H., 257 Birch, L. L., 370, 371 Birum, I., 159 Bisconti, T. L., 248, 249 Bissell, K., 370 Bizumic, B., 144 Bjorklund, F., 318 Black, M. J., 367 Blackstone, T., 218 Blaine, B., 229 Blaine, B. E., 367, 368 Blair, I., 3, 122, 124 Blair, I. V., 129, 130, 403 Blanchard, F., 392 Blanchard, F. A., 228, 400 Blaney, N., 391 Blanken, I., 366 Blanton, H., 120 Blascovich, J., 204, 228 Blee, K. M., 42, 43 Bless, H., 39, 87, 88, 89, 152 Block, C. J., 229 Blodorn, A., 82, 367, 369 Bloom, L. M., 185 Bloom, P., 293 Blyth, D. A., 213 Bobo, L., 157, 158, 177, 302, 397 Bochner, S., 369 Bodenhausen, 114 Bodenhausen, G. V., 9, 19, 21, 34, 35, 39, 40, 48, 49, 50, 57, 81, 83, 86, 87, 88, 89, 90, 91, 92, 96, 97, 115, 116, 121, 131, 186, 201, 208, 230 Bodner, E., 260, 272 Bogartus, E., 343 Bohan, J. S., 300 Bohm, R., 38 Bohner, 337 Bohner, G., 88 Bokhorst, F. D., 177 Boland, S., 246, 247 Boldry, J. G., 40 Bollier, T., 339 Bonilla-Silva, E., 176 Boninger, D., 385 Bonoma, T. V., 184

Boone, D., 270 Borgida, E., 317, 324, 344, 348 Borys, R., 39 Bosak, J., 328 Bosson, J. K., 59, 340 Bostyn, D. H., 154 Bouchard, C., 368 Boudjemadi, V., 260 Bouman, W. P., 254 Bower, G. H., 80, 88, 96 Bowman, M., 330 Boyd, C., 153 Brabeck, M. M., 345 Bradley, K. I., 261 Braithwaite, V., 246, 268, 269, 274, 275 Braly, K., 6, 12 Braly, K. W., 169, 171, 172, 173, 185 Brambilla, M., 265 Branco, K. J., 256, 257, 258, 259 Brandes, J. A., 221 Brandt, M. J., 144, 177, 291 Brandtstadter, J., 262 Branscombe, N. R., 58, 111, 176, 390 Brant, C. R., 348 Bratt, A. S., 248 Bratt, C., 273, 392 Brauer, M., 400 Braun, L., 296 Bray, J. H., 185 Brazy, P. C., 185 Breckler, S. J., 6, 81 Brehm, S. S., 8 Brekke, N., 344 Brenan, M., 322 Brendl, C. M., 120 Brennan, M., 86 Brett, J. F., 229 Brewer, M. B., 1, 8, 18, 34, 38, 39, 58, 59, 60, 64, 80, 82, 246, 247, 263, 266, 268, 329, 386, 392 Bridge, H., 95 Bridgeman, D., 211 Briere, J., 333 Brigham, J. C., 5, 6, 11, 57, 171, 401 Britt, T. W., 228 Broccoli, T. L., 338 Brochu, P. M., 366 Bromley, S., 82 Brophy, I. N., 383 Broverman, D. M., 316 Broverman, I., 316, 317 Broverman, I. K., 185 Brown, L., 213 Brown, M. L., 204, 205 Brown, R., 4, 15, 40, 57, 61, 64, 121, 122, 123, 160, 172, 336, 384, 385, 388 Brown, R. J., 59, 64 Brown, R. P., 204, 229 Brown, V., 325, 326, 327 Brownell, K., 373

424 Brownell, K. D., 365, 373 Brown-Iannuzzi, J., 35 Brubaker, M. S., 207 Bruce, J., 160 Bruce, T., 372 Brückner, H., 295 Bruinsma, J., 151 Bryan, A. D., 294 Bryant-Stephens, T., 175 Buchner, A., 120 Buck, R., 94 Bugental, D. B., 249 Bundy, R. P., 39 Bunzel, J., 255 Burgess, K. D., 340 Burke, M., 265 Burmeister, J. M., 370 Burn, S. M., 318, 330, 340, 343, 347 Burnes, D., 273 Burnett, M., 390 Burnette, J. L., 367 Burns, L., 184 Burns, M. D., 348, 401 Burris, C. T., 145, 150 Burt, 337 Bush, D. M., 213 Buss, D. M., 1, 328 Butler, R., 243, 247, 251, 261, 272 Buttelmann, D., 38 Butz, D. A., 55, 403 Byrd-Craven, J., 262 Byrne, D. E., 185 Bytheway, B., 247, 261 Caalper, A., 262 Cabeza, R., 95 Cacioppo, J. T., 81, 94, 96, 151, 152 Cadaret, M. C., 207 Cadinu, M., 321 Calanchini, J., 126 Caldwell, T. L., 92 Calvini, G., 92 Cameron, L., 36, 388 Campbell, D. T., 15, 51, 62, 63, 83 Campbell, M. R., 400 Cann, A., 320, 347 Cantal, C., 156 Capitaniato, J. P., 293 Caporael, L., 249, 250 Caporael, L. R., 329 Capozza, D., 385 Carels, R. A., 366, 370 Carlisle, K., 117 Carlsmith, J. M., 389 Carlson, J. H., 117 Carlström, E., 295 Carnes, M., 406 Carney, D. R., 160 Carr, P. B., 176

Author Index Carretero-Dios, H., 348 Carroll, J. B., 333 Carstensen, L., 244 Carter, J. D., 160 Carver, C. S., 219, 225, 226, 270, 401–402 Casad, B. J., 206 Case, K. A., 342 Caskie, G., 254 Cass, V. C., 301 Castelli, 114 Castelli, L., 34 Castro, Y. R., 320 Catalyst, 347 Cejka, M. A., 344 Cernvall, M., 368 Chaiken, S., 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 56, 81, 89, 147, 177 Chamberlin, B., 92 Chambliss, H., 369 Chanowitz, B., 216 Charlesworth, T. E., 129, 130 Charnsangavej, T, 229 Chasteen, A. L., 243 Chatman, J. A., 316 Chaudoir, S., 341 Chaudoir, S. R., 301 Chauncey, G., 289 Chein, I., 8, 142 Chekroud, A. M., 95 Chen, E. E., 42 Chen, M., 115 Chen, S., 56, 247 Cheng, D. T., 95 Cherry, F., 185 Cheryan, S., 208 Childs, A., 115 Chin, M. G., 58 Chiu, C., 340 Choi, H. D., 337 Chonody, J. M., 273 Chow, R. M., 396, 397 Christ, O., 385 Christopher, A. N., 157 Chu, L., 245 Chung-Yan, G. A., 190 Cichocka, A., 159 Cikara, M., 95 Cimpian, A., 33, 36 Clark, C. S., 287, 405 Clark, K. B., 40, 41, 42 Clark, M. P., 40 Clark, M. S., 80 Clarke, A. E., 294 Clarke, L. H., 264 Clarkson, F. E., 316 Clayton, S., 230 Clifford, D., 373 Clore, G., 88, 96 Clore, G. L., 80, 88 Cloutier, J., 95

Author Index 425 Coates, J., 333 Cody, P. J., 300 Coffman, T. L., 83, 172 Cogan, J. C., 300, 301 Cohen, E., 391 Cohen, G. L., 205 Cohen, L. L., 225, 318 Cohen, P. R., 80 Cohen-Fridel, S., 260, 272 Cohrs, J. C., 144, 159 Cokley, K., 209 Colarelli, S. M., 229 Colcombe, S. J., 207 Colenso, J., 177 Collins, A., 80, 267 Collins, A. M., 11, 113 Collins, M. E., 383 Collins, P. H., 305 Comello, M. L., 60 Connor, J. M., 367 Connor, R. A., 336 Connors, S., 369 Conrey, F. R., 50 Conway, M., 88 Cook, D. A., 401 Cook, F., 245 Cook, S., 392 Cook, S. W., 382, 383, 392 Cook, T. D., 390 Cool, C., 373 Cooley, C., 252 Cooper, J., 215, 303 Copeland, G. A., 324 Cordas, K. C., 367 Corenblum, B., 43, 44 Corneille, O., 117 Cornish, T., 406 Cornwell, B., 213 Correll, J., 95, 116 Cose, E., 205 Cosmides, L., 34 Costa, R., 337 Cota, A. A., 340 Cottle, N. R., 273 Cottrell, C. A., 81, 293 Cottrell, W., 252 Coupland, J., 247, 270 Coupland, N., 247, 249, 269, 270 Courtney, A. E., 322 Cowan, G., 297 Cowart, K. O., 372 Cox, W. L., 405 Craemer, T., 204 Craig, M. A., 193 Crandall, C. S., 82, 93, 156, 172, 173, 176, 178, 187, 192, 202, 228, 294, 364, 365, 366, 367, 368, 369, 370, 372, 401 Crawford, J. T., 144, 155, 291 Crawford, M. T., 37, 151, 301

Crenshaw, K. W., 35 Crisp, R. J., 385, 389 Crites, S. L., 94 Croak, M. R., 392 Crocker, J., 5, 9, 52, 80, 180, 209, 211, 213, 216, 223, 225, 226, 228, 229, 230, 231, 301, 346, 348, 393 Crockett, W. H., 245, 246 Crosby, F., 61, 82, 214, 215 Crosby, F. J., 228, 230, 322 Cross, E. J., 330, 339 Cross, W. E., 203 Crouch, Z., 120 Crowson, H. M., 221 Crumpton, A., 368 Crutzen, R., 151 Cruz-Saez, M. S., 371 Cuddy, A. J., 171, 390 Cuddy, A. J. C., 159, 248, 318, 344 Culbertson, G., 249, 250 Cullen, M. J., 209 Cunningham, G. B., 303 Cunningham, W. A., 95, 130 Curtis, G. J., 87 Cvetkovska, S., 203 Czaja, S. J., 265 Czopp, A. M., 342, 391, 402 Czyzewska, M., 112 Dabney, D. A., 117 Dalege, J., 42 Dallas, M., 111 Dambrun, M., 159 D’Amico, L. A., 391 Damrin, D., 391 Danbold, F., 193 Danielsdottir, S., 366 Dann, C., 192 Dardenne, B., 207, 339 Darley, J. M., 55, 208, 215 Darling, R., 373 Darwin, C., 328 Dasgupta, N., 130, 218, 299, 325, 405 Daubman, K. A., 388 D’Augelli, A. R., 300, 302 Davies, P. G., 116 Davis, A., 148, 205 Davis, H., 203 Davis, J., 222 Davis, J. A., 61 Davison, K. K., 370, 371 de Dreu, C. K. W., 154 De Keersmaecker, J., 154 de la Fuente-Nunez, V., 252 de la Garza, N. H., 270 de Lemus, S., 128 de Souza, M. A., 337 Deaux, D., 298 Deaux, K., 256, 316, 317, 318, 329, 330, 331, 332, 340, 343, 344, 347, 348

426 DeBell, M., 230 DeBord, K. A., 301 Decker, B. P., 181 deCoteau, N. J., 45 Deegan, M. P., 387 Deemer, E. D., 209 Degner, J., 42 Deguzman, G., 93 DeHart, T., 340 Deiner, E., 92, 93 Del Boca, F. K., 4, 5, 6, 12, 18 Del Campo, A., 337 Dempster, S., 368 Deneen, N. E., 400 Denton, D. M., 148 Department of Justice, 3 Derks, B., 59, 95 Desaulniers, J., 329 Desforges, D. M., 392 Deslandes, C., 145 Deutsch, M., 323, 383, 391 Deutsch, R., 404 Devereux, E., 177 Devine, P. G., 6, 9, 10, 38, 57, 82, 91, 93, 96, 112, 121, 123, 124, 127, 142, 143, 172, 173, 181, 185, 201, 216, 217, 219, 221, 232, 268, 275, 298, 315, 382, 393, 397, 401, 402, 403, 405, 408 Devlin, W., 301 DeVore, E. N., 303 Devos, T., 389 Dhont, K., 159, 222, 384 Diaz, R., 301 DiBlasi, D. M., 367 Diebold, J., 338 Diedrichs, P. C., 367 Diekman, A. B., 8 Dijker, A. J., 50 Dijker, A. J. M., 83, 84 Dijksterhuis, A., 49, 50, 92, 124, 129, 154 Dinesen, P. T., 386 Dion, K. K., 342 Dion, K. L., 203, 340 Dixon, T. L., 45 Dobbin, C. B., 254 Doherty, L., 368 Dollard, J., 13, 21, 83 Doob, L., 83 Doob, L. W., 13 Doosje, B., 58, 203, 210 Doucet, N., 179 Douch, R., 388 Dovidio, J., 385 Dovidio, J. F., 5, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 18, 22, 34, 38, 57, 81, 82, 83, 87, 113, 120, 124, 126, 129, 171, 173, 178, 179, 186, 188, 190, 220, 229, 231, 250–251, 385, 387, 388, 389, 399, 400, 401, 404 Downey, G., 205 Downing, R. A., 230 Downs, A. C., 323

Author Index Doyle, A. B., 42 Drennan, P., 262 Drevenstedt, J., 270 Driscoll, D. M., 7 D’Souza, G. C., 229 du Plessis, I., 159 Duarte, S., 159 Dube, L., 228 Dube-Simard, L., 61 Duckitt, J., 14, 21, 141, 144, 155, 159, 160, 339 Duckitt, J. H., 390 Duffy, C. W., 60 Dugan, L., 117 Dugré, J. R., 14 Dull, V., 246 Dumont, M., 339 Dunham, Y., 19, 40, 42 Dunn, E., 43 Dunn, E. W., 93 Dunton, B. C., 34, 113, 121, 125, 176 Duran, M., 337 Durante, F., 4 Durkee, N., 262 Durso, L. E., 300 Duval, S., 92, 402 Dweck, C. S., 47, 176 Dye, C., 254 Eagly, A. H., 6, 8, 11, 12, 13, 81, 89, 147, 177, 318, 319, 329, 338, 339, 344, 347 Earn, B. M., 203 Earnshaw, V., 341 Ebcim, E., 216 Eberhardt, J. L., 114, 116, 117, 143, 295 Ebert, J. P., 118 Ebneter, D., 371 Eccles, J. S., 320 Echeburua, E., 371 Echwald, S. M., 368 Edelbrock, C., 320 Edsall, N. C., 289 Edwards, K., 258 Ehrlich, H. J., 172 Eidelman, S., 333 Eidelson, J. L., 2 Eidelson, R. J., 2 Ekman, P., 84, 292 Ellemers, N., 19, 58, 127, 203, 210, 335, 339 Eller, A., 385 Elliot, A., 91 Elliot, A. J., 82, 172, 173, 181, 217 Elliott, J., 381, 393, 394 Ellis, H. C., 88 Ellmers, N., 316 Ellsworth, P. C., 9 Elms, A. C., 11 Elran-Barak, R., 364 England, P., 346 Ensari, N., 387, 392

Author Index 427 Erber, R., 81, 90, 96 Erickson, G. A., 58 Ernst, D., 295 Eshleman, A., 93, 178, 294, 401 Eskenazi, J., 109 Espelage, D. L., 290 Esses, V. M., 6, 83, 84, 86, 185, 214, 291 Estevan-Reina, L., 348 Estrada, G. S., 288 Estrada, M., 209 Etcoff, N. L., 37, 80 Ettlin, T. E., 178 Evans, M., 50 Evans, N., 34, 113 Evans, R. I., 145, 185 Evans-Pritchard, E. E., 288 Everett, J. A., 95 Evett, S. R., 127, 201, 216 Fagerstrom, C., 248 Fairchild, K., 218, 327 Falk, G., 245, 248, 262 Falk, U., 245, 248, 262 Falomir-Pichastor, J. M., 295 Fanslow, J. L., 334 Farago, F., 370 Fassinger, R. E., 294 Faulkner, N., 393 Favero, M., 337 Fazio, M., 287 Fazio, R. H., 6, 34, 109, 112, 113, 114, 115, 119, 121, 124, 125, 127, 129, 172, 176, 187, 188, 189, 299, 387, 397, 402, 404, 405 Feagin, J. R., 330, 335, 343 Federico, C. M., 228 Feeney, J. A., 337 Fegran, L., 373 Fehr, J., 55, 403 Fein, S., 58 Feinberg, J., 218 Feinstein, J., 229 Feinstein, J. A., 152 Feldner, H., 365 Felmban, W. S., 371 Fenwick, V., 393 Fernandes, H., 209 Ferreira, M. C., 337 Ferrell, J., 36 Ferry, A. L., 33 Festinger, L., 11, 15, 21, 61, 389, 403 Fiedler, K., 53 Filipowicz, A., 251 Fincham, F. D., 265 Finchilescu, G., 221, 222 Finkelstein, L., 265 Finkelstein, L. M., 265 Finlay, K., 394 Firth, M., 345 Fishbein, H. D., 290, 342

Fishbein, M., 11, 81 Fisher, J. D., 229, 251 Fisher, M. I., 337 Fishman, J., 294 Fishman, J. A., 4 Fiske, S., 216 Fiske, S. T., 1, 2, 4, 5, 6, 7, 8, 14, 15, 16, 18, 20, 21, 34, 37, 47, 48, 50, 52, 57, 64, 80, 81, 83, 87, 92, 128, 141, 142, 143, 159, 172, 178, 180, 186, 217, 224, 225, 246, 248, 256, 257, 266, 273, 316, 318, 330, 331, 332, 336, 337, 338, 340, 344, 345, 393, 394, 398 Flake, J. K., 131 Flament, C., 39 Flavin, E. L., 342 Flay, B. R., 390 Fleming, C., 215 Flink, C. H., 149 Florack, A., 152 Floyd, R. B., 292 Folger, R., 39 Follenfant, A., 90, 92 Fontaine, J. R. J., 154 Forbes, C. E., 206 Forcey, B., 346 Ford, C., 254 Ford, T. E., 6, 55, 84, 185, 341, 370 Fordham, S., 209 Forehand, M., 369 Forgas, J. P., 80, 87, 96 Forscher, P. S., 405 Forsyth, D. R., 1 Fosket, J. R., 294 Fox, S., 249, 252, 261 Frable, D. E. S., 218, 320 Fraley, R. C., 43 Franklin, J., 3 Franklin, L. M., 145, 150 Frantz, C. M., 390 Franzese, H. L., 87 Frazier, L. D., 259, 260 Fredrickson, B. L., 84 Frenkel-Brunswik, E., 4, 141, 170, 390, 397 Fresson, M., 207 Freud, S., 107, 289 Freund, T., 153 Frey, K. S., 36 Fried, 208 Friedan, B., 334 Friedman, C., 253, 365 Friesen, J., 333 Frijda, N. H., 80, 84 Fritzlen, K. A., 304 Froming, W. J., 93 Frost, D. M., 302 Frost, L. A., 51 Fry, K. M., 303 Fuegen, K., 344 Fulero, S., 50

428 Fullen, M. C., 254 Fultz, J., 149 Fung, H. H., 245 Gabriel, S., 299, 386 Gaertner, L., 40, 109 Gaertner, S., 385, 389 Gaertner, S. L., 5, 6, 8, 9, 52, 57, 81, 82, 83, 87, 113, 126, 171, 173, 178, 179, 186, 188, 190, 231, 385, 387, 388, 389, 399, 400, 401 Gaga, L., 295 Gaither, S. E., 83 Galdi, S., 131 Galinsky, A. D., 92, 171, 173, 230, 394, 403 Gallant, S. N., 207 Gallardo, M. E., 394 Gallup, 192, 303 Galton, N., 260 Gana, K., 260 Ganayem, A., 384 Gangl, C., 291 Gapinski, K. D., 365 Garcia, B., 62 Garcia, R. L., 204 Garcia-Marques, L., 53 Gardner, H., 15, 33 Gardner, P., 346 Gardner, R. C., 5, 7 Gardner, W. L., 60 Garfinkel, R., 254 Garnets, L. D., 301 Garstka, T., 263 Gary, M. L., 93, 131, 393 Garza, A. A., 62, 396 Gastil, J., 333 Gates, 220 Gatz, M., 254, 269 Gaucher, D., 333 Gaur, R., 44 Gawronski, B., 40, 107, 116, 120, 131, 404 Geen, R., 21 Geis, F. L., 325, 326, 327 Gekoski, W., 255 Gekoski, W. L., 269 Gerard, H. B., 323 Gerend, M. A., 175 Gerhart, B., 346 Gerrity, D. A., 301 Gervais, W. M., 145 Geurten M., 207 Ghaderi, A., 368 Ghavami, N., 229 Gherman, M., 255 Giacomini, A., 346 Gibb, S., 291 Gibson, D., 246 Gifford, R. K., 53, 80 Gigerenzer, G., 129 Gilbert, D. T., 34, 115

Author Index Gilbert, G. M., 172 Gilbert, L. A., 157 Giles, H., 249, 250, 252, 256, 261, 269, 270, 271 Gill, L. J., 128, 131, 406 Gill, M. J., 331 Gillespie, G. S. R., 33 Gillis, J. R., 300, 301 Giner-Sorolla, R., 56 Giovannini, D., 385 Glaser, J., 9, 13, 159, 293 Glaser, J. M., 189 Glass, C., 262 Glass, D. C.,, 225, 226 Gleicher, F., 385 Glenn, J. J., 108 Glick, P., 159, 291, 318, 320, 327, 328, 330, 336, 337, 338, 339, 344, 345, 347 Glover, R. J., 273 Gluck, M., 337 Glunt, E. K., 301 Goff, P. A., 114, 116 Goffman, E., 202, 219, 224, 322, 324 Gold, D., 270 Goldfried, M. R., 302 Goldhagen, D. J., 61, 141 Goldsmith, R., 274–275 Gollwitzer, P. M., 21 Golub, S. A., 251 Gomez, 254 Gonsalkorale, K., 117 Gonzalez, A., 392 Good, 208 Good, J. J., 338, 339, 348 Goodman, M., 41 Goodman, M. B., 291 Gordijn, E. H., 92 Gorska, P., 145 Gorsuch, R. L., 148 Gough, H. G., 145 Govan, C. L., 120 Goveia, V. V., 156 Grack, C., 392 Graf, P., 111 Grainger, K., 249 Grand, J. A., 204 Grant, L., 251, 254, 255, 274 Granz, E. L., 348 Grau, S. L., 323 Gray, K., 35 Gray-Little, B., 213 Graziano, W. G., 160 Green, D. P., 13, 189, 287, 405 Green, H. D., Jr., 290 Green, J. A., 60 Green, R. J., 316 Green, S. K., 245 Greenberg, 260 Greenberg, J., 39, 54, 159, 210, 260, 261, 263, 400 Greenhaus, J. H., 345

Author Index 429 Greenleaf, C., 369 Greenwald, A. G., 34, 109, 112, 113, 119, 120, 127, 128, 130, 204, 268, 304, 315, 368, 405 Gregg, P. B., 386 Gresham, M., 250 Greven, T., 193 Griffin, A. M., 33 Griffin, B. N., 43 Griffin, D. W., 177 Griffin, G. A. E., 148 Griffin, T., 92 Gross, J. J., 304 Grossman, A. H., 300 Grossman, E. S., 260 Gruenfeld, D. H., 330 Grzanka, P. R., 294, 295, 303, 304, 305 Guardabassi, V., 369 Guimond, S., 61, 159 Gulker, J. E., 390, 391 Gulko, J., 320 Gunn, S. P., 185 Gunter, B., 322 Guo, A., 256 Gurtman, M. B., 18, 38, 267, 268, 385 Gutierrez, A. S., 229 Gutsell, J. N., 401 Haaf, R. A., 33, 35 Haddock, G., 6, 84, 185, 291, 339, 343, 366, 371 Hafdahl, A. R., 213 Hagan, J., 346 Hagendoorn, L., 191 Haggard, M. C., 320 Hahn, A., 129 Haidt, J., 84, 292, 293, 304 Haight, J. M., 320 Haines, A. C., 391 Haines, E., 344 Haines, E. L., 330 Haldeman, D. C., 294 Hale, P., 206 Haley, W., 255 Hall, E. V., 53, 171, 193 Hall, J. A., 160 Hall, W. J., 116 Hall, W. S., 187, 335 Halperin, E., 221 Hambrick, D. Z., 265 Hamilton, D. L., 5, 6, 7, 12, 14, 18, 21, 34, 37, 38, 53, 80, 87, 89, 180, 215, 266, 398 Hamilton, H. K., 83, 221 Hamilton, H. R., 340 Hamilton, L. K., 190 Hammond, M. D., 337, 339 Hammond, N. G., 260 Hansen, W. B., 185 Hardee, B. B., 176 Hardin, C., 127, 322 Hardin, C. D., 34, 128

Harding, J., 8, 142 Hardison, C. M., 209 Harmon-Jones, E., 403 Harper, J. C., 373 Harriman, J., 270 Harris, J. R., 321 Harris, M., 252 Harris, M. B., 369 Harris, R. J., 369 Harris-Britt, 213 Harrison, S. K., 323 Harrod, S., 367 Hart, A., 390 Hartney, C., 175 Harton, H. C., 181 Hartung, P. J., 207 Harvey, O. J., 15, 62, 387 Harwood, J., 249, 261 Haslam, N., 50, 294, 295 Haslam, S. A., 19, 59, 159, 209 Hass, R. G., 177, 180, 398 Hasty, R. W., 372 Hatcher, J., 213 Hauser, J. C., 368 Hays, H., 370 Hayward, L. E., 39, 367 Heatherton, T. F., 95, 202 Hebl, M., 230, 366 Hebl, M. R., 202, 318, 365, 366 Heesacker, M., 337 Hegarty, P., 295 Hehman, E., 131, 387 Hehman, J. A., 249 Heider, F., 11, 16, 223 Heiens, R., 274–275 Heilman, M. E., 229, 343, 344, 345 Heiphetz, L., 12, 81 Heiple, B., 297 Heled, E., 144 Helgeson, V. S., 260 Helm, P., 261 Helmreich, R. L., 318 Helmstetter, F. J., 95 Henderson, A. H., 185 Henderson-King, E., 39 Henningsen, L., 346 Henry, P. J., 176, 177, 188, 189 Hense, R. L., 268 Henwood, K., 270 Hepburn, C., 344 Hepworth, J. T., 13, 60 Herek, G. M., 147, 149, 150, 288, 289, 291, 292, 293, 294, 299, 300, 301, 302 Hermsen, S., 404 Hernandez, J., 3 Hernandez, P. R., 209 Herrnstein, R. J., 170 Hershberger, S. L., 300, 302 Herzog, A. R., 260

Author Index

430 Hespos, S. J., 33 Hess, T. M., 207 Hesson-McInnis, M. S., 291 Hester, N., 35 Hettinger, V. E., 297 Heuer, C. A., 369, 372 Hewes, D. E., 386 Hewson, J. A., 244 Hewston, M., 221–222 Hewstone, M., 38, 95, 216, 222, 384, 385, 389, 407 Hexel, O., 175 Hiel, A. V., 60 Higgins, E. T., 402 Hilden, L. E., 402 Hill, M., 292 Hill, P. C., 185, 292 Hill, T., 112 Hillerbrand, E., 254 Hilton, J. L., 55, 215 Himes, S. M., 370 Hindriks, I., 92 Hine, D. W., 108 Hing, L. S. S., 402 Hirsh, H. K., 129 Hirt, E. R., 58 Hitlan, R. T., 62, 291 Hixon, J. G., 115 Ho, A. K., 155, 384 Hochschild, A. R., 62 Hodes, R. M., 41 Hodson, G., 176, 214, 384 Hoffler, T., 315 Hoffmann, R. G., 97 Hoft, L., 315 Hogg, 389 Hogg, M., 59 Hogg, M. A., 59, 60, 64, 340 Holden, G. W., 42 Hollinger, R. C., 117 Holman, A., 255 Holman, J., 246 Honeycutt, N., 333 Hong, S., 82 Hong, Y., 1 Hood, R. W., 147 Hood, R. W., Jr., 292 Hood, W. R., 15, 62, 387 Hooker, K., 260 Hooper, N., 368 Hoosain, L., 40 Horberg, E. J., 80 Horne, S. G., 288 Hornsey, 389 Hornsey, M. J., 39, 60, 64, 367 Horstman Reser, A., 367 Horstman-Reser, A., 82 Horvath, L., 346 Horwitz, M., 40 Hoss, R. A., 33

Hoter, E., 384 Hough, J. C., 82, 175 Hout, M., 189 Hovland, C. I., 13, 60, 322 Howard, A., 124 Howard, S., 320 Howatson-Jones, L., 262 Howell, J. L., 390 Howerton, D. M., 297 Howes, P. W., 177, 187 Hoyt, C. L., 228, 367 Hoyt, W. T., 288 Hsieh, W., 393 Huang, Y., 337 Huebner, D., 301 Huebner, D. M., 302 Huff, D., 323 Hugenberg, K., 19, 115, 116 Hughes, C. E., 396 Huhmann, B. A., 323 Hulicka, I. M., 244 Hull, C. L., 13 Hull, J. G., 202 Hummert, M., 263 Hummert, M. L., 245, 246, 247, 268 Humphrey, L., 373 Hunger, J. M., 369 Hunsberger, B., 149 Hunsinger, M., 405 Hunt, R. A., 146 Hunter, B. A., 187, 335 Hunter, C. D., 396 Hunter, J., 296 Hunter, J. A., 370, 371, 372 Huo, Y. J., 61, 193 Hurd, K., 396 Hussak, L. J., 36 Hutcherson, C. A., 304 Hutchinson, D., 184 Hutchison, K. E., 294 Hütter, M., 117 Huxley, A., 404 Hwang, H. C., 4 Hyde, J., 329 Hyde, J. S., 333 Hyers, L. L., 203, 221, 225, 320, 340, 342 Ickes, W., 219 Ikels, C., 272 Imada, S., 304 Inbar, Y., 144, 291, 293 Inman, M., 86 Inman, M. B., 86 Innes, J. M., 89 Insko, C. A., 4, 11, 12, 61, 160 Inzlicht, M., 205, 206, 401 Iritani, B., 324 Isaacs, L., 262 Isen, A. M., 80, 86, 87, 88, 201, 388

Author Index 431 Islam, R. M., 216 Ito, T. A.,, 294 Ivester, C., 269 Iyer, A., 230 Izard, C. E., 86 Izuma, K., 95 Jaccard, J., 120 Jacklin, C. N., 321, 348 Jackson, J. R., 34, 113, 176, 187 Jackson, L. A., 8, 83, 346 Jackson, M., 337 Jackson, M. C., 114 Jacobs, J. A., 346 Jacobson, L., 215 Jacoby, L. L., 111 James, J., 255 James, W., 107 Jamieson, D. W., 152, 153, 185 Jamieson, K. H., 45 Janis, I., 13 Janis, I. L., 203, 322 Janssen-Jurreit, M., 330 Jantz, R., 262 Jarvis, W. B. G., 152 Jaskar, K. L., 322 Javadizadeh, B., 347 Jehn, K. A., 406 Jellison, W. A., 299 Jennings, J., 325, 326, 327 Jennings, L., 172 Jensen, G. D., 271 Jerdee, T., 264, 265 Jetten, J., 58, 90 Jeyaram, S., 365 Jiménez, J., 287 Jin, E. J., 272–273 Johann, D., 144 Johns, M., 204 Johnson, B., 124 Johnson, B. T., 6, 57, 171, 249, 269, 275, 347, 401 Johnson, C., 124 Johnson, C. S., 387 Johnson, D. K., 294 Johnson, D. W., 392 Johnson, E. A., 269 Johnson, E. K., 82 Johnson, J., 389 Johnson, K. L., 33, 300 Johnson, M. K., 38 Johnson, P. M., 260 Johnson, R. T., 392 Johnson, S., 209 Johnson, S. R., 2 Johnston, I., 343 Johnston, R., 386 Joly, S., 336 Jonas, K., 55, 346 Jonas, K. J., 403

Jones, C. R., 109 Jones, E. E., 16, 17, 38, 172, 183, 184, 202, 224, 225, 228, 397 Jones, G. P., 348 Jones, J., 346 Jones, J. M., 4, 5, 8, 10, 13, 22, 47, 57, 64, 169, 171, 202, 204, 220, 223, 381, 394, 407, 408 Jones, L. C., 36 Jones, M., 209 Jones, R. A., 18, 47 Jones, T. L., 367 Jordano, M. L., 207 Jost, J. T., 56, 159, 301, 330 Judd, C. M., 116, 123, 129, 395 Jussim, L., 5, 46, 215, 332, 333 Kaelen, R., 320 Kagan, S. H., 253 Kahn, K. B., 338 Kahneman, D., 2, 19, 33, 224, 332 Kaiser, C. R., 202, 214, 228, 338 Kalle, R. J., 185 Kam, C. D., 335 Kamble, S. V., 83 Kane, E. W., 348 Kane, M. N., 254 Kang, S. K., 35 Kao, C. F., 86 Kapitanoff, S., 206 Kaplan, M. F., 152, 153 Karau, S. J., 344 Karlins, M., 83, 172, 183, 184 Karris, L., 365 Kasardo, A. E., 373 Kashubeck-West, S., 300 Kashy, D. A., 40 Kasl, S. V., 252 Kassab, M., 254 Kastenbaum, R., 262 Katz, D., 6, 12, 80, 169, 171, 172, 173, 185 Katz, I., 177, 178, 180, 225, 226, 398 Katz, P. A., 41, 42, 43 Kauau, S. J., 8 Kaus, C. R., 260 Kawakami, K., 19, 120, 124, 126, 190, 348, 404, 405 Kay, A. C., 333 Kay, F. M., 346 Kelley, H. H., 53, 322 Kelly, D. J., 41 Kelly, H. H., 13, 226 Keltner, D., 9, 80, 84, 293, 330 Kemper, S., 249 Kennedy, C., 58 Kennison, S. M., 261, 262 Kenrick, D. T., 328 Kensinger, E. A., 95 Keough, K. A., 229 Khatchadourian, D., 297 Kihlstrom, J., 112

432 Kilianski, S. E., 339 Killen, M., 35, 42 Kim, A., 44, 208 Kim, H., 96, 252 Kimes, D. D., 324 Kinahan, M., 328 Kinavey, H., 373 Kinder, D. R., 176 King, K., 269 King, K. R., 214 King, M. B., 146 Kinsey, A., 289 Kirkland, S. L., 400 Kirkman, M., 320 Kirnan, R., 292 Kiss, M. J., 292 Kite, M., 317, 318, 331, 332, 343, 348 Kite, M. E., 247, 249, 269, 275, 298 Klaczynski, P. A., 371 Klann, E. M., 290 Kleck, R. E., 149, 202, 224, 230 Klein, D. A., 247 Klein, O., 320 Klein, R. A., 386 Klein, S. B., 40 Klein, W. M., 56 Kleinpenning, G., 191 Klumpner, S., 291 Knight, A. P., 61 Knight, D. C., 95 Knippenberg, A., 124, 154 Knobe, J., 293 Knowles, E. D., 189, 396, 397 Knowles, M. L., 218 Knox, V., 255 Knox, V. J., 269 Koenig, A. M., 329 Koestner, R., 345 Kohlbacher, F., 324 Kondrak, C. L., 340 Konrath, S. H., 324 Koole, S. L., 154 Koomen, W., 19, 50, 92 Koopmann, C., 270 Korfmacher, W., 189 Kornilaki, E. N., 370 Korotchenko, A., 264 Kovera, M. B., 175 Koyano, W., 273 Kramer, B. M., 145 Kramer, G. P., 87, 186 Kramer, R. M., 80 Krane, K., 252 Kraus, M. W., 175 Krauss, S. W., 144 Krauth-Gruber, S., 87 Kravitz, D. A., 228, 229 Kray, L. J., 316 Krendl, A. C., 95

Author Index Krosch, A. R., 64 Krug, E., 252 Kruglanski, A. W., 21, 152, 153, 154, 155, 159 Krysan, M., 177 Kteily, N., 155 Kteily, N. S., 384, 399 Ku, G., 394, 403 Kubota, J., 95 Kühnen, U., 344 Kulich, C., 328 Kumkale, G. T., 6 Kunda, Z., 5, 6, 16, 18, 21, 53, 56, 145, 152, 211, 332 Kunkel, S. R., 252 Kunst, J. R., 388 Kuppens, T., 128 Kurdi, B., 129, 131 Kurtulus, F. A., 228 Kurtz-Costes, 213 Kurz, E., 324 Kurzban, R., 34 Kutner, B., 8, 142 Kwan, C., 244 LaBouff, J. P., 38 Lachman, M. E., 250, 275 Lackey, S., 221 LaCosse, J., 217 LaFleur, W. R., 364 LaFrance, M., 203, 329, 330, 331, 332, 340, 347 Lai, C. K., 304, 405 Lai, D. W. L., 244, 256 Lamarche, V. M., 340 Lameiras, M., 320 Lamer, S. A., 45, 117 Lamoreaux, M. J., 388 Lamy, D., 41 Landry, A. P., 399 Lange, J. E., 52, 80, 96, 172, 185 Langer, E., 112, 251, 260, 272 Langer, E. J., 216, 251 Langlois, J. H., 33, 157 Långström, N., 295 Lanktree, C., 333 LaPiere, R. T., 9, 169 Larsen, K. S., 343 Laskey, A., 40 Latner, J. D., 370, 371, 372 Laurel-Seller, E., 364 Lay, J. C., 245 Lea, S. J., 177 LeBlanc, J., 193 Lederman, S., 254, 255 LeDoux, J. E., 95 Lee, A. Y., 51 Lee, C., 296 Lee, I., 144 Lee, K., 228 Lee, S., 193 Lee, Y., 210, 332

Author Index 433 Legate, N., 302 Legault, L., 401 Lei, R. F., 35 Leibold, J. M., 120, 126 Leitner, J. B., 131 Lenes, J. G., 330 Leonardelli, G. J., 59, 60 Lepore, L., 121, 122, 123, 172 Lerner, M. J., 214 Leshin, R. A., 35 Leslie, L. M., 61, 229 Leslie, S. J., 33, 36 Levenson, A. J., 244, 253 Levin, J., 247, 251, 255 Levin, S., 155, 229 Levin, W., 247, 255 Levinson, D. J., 4, 141, 170, 390, 397 Levy, B., 272 Levy, B. R., 252 Levy, G. D., 33, 35 Levy, S. R., 47, 245, 253, 273, 294, 295 Lewicki, P., 112 Lewin, K., 22, 32, 131, 152 Lewis, L. L., 316, 317, 340 Lewis, M., 251 Lewis, S., 18, 40, 52, 53, 393 Li, L., 207 Li, N. P., 328 Li, W., 402 Liang, J., 272–273 Liben, L. S., 35, 36, 42 Lichtenstein, M., 48, 49, 87, 186 Lichtenstein, P., 295 Lick, D. J., 300 Lieberman, J. D., 54 Lieberman, M., 250 Lieberman, M. D., 95 Lilly, J., 86 Lilly, T., 400 Limbu, Y. B., 323 Lin, C., 160, 209 Lin, L., 374 Lin, M., 34 Lindzeg, G., 205 Linville, P. W., 259 Lippmann, W., 4, 6, 47, 80, 169, 381 Lips, H. M., 346 Liu, J. H., 156 Liu, P., 212 Liu, S., 35, 212 Lloyd, B., 246 Lobliner, D. B., 36 Lockhart, P. R., 396 Locksley, A., 344 Loehlin, J. C., 205 Loersch, C., 126 Loftus, E. F., 11, 113 Loftus, S. J., 93 Logan, H., 86

Lohr, B. A., 293 Long, E., 343 Long, K., 59 Lopyan, K. J., 93 Lord, C. G., 208 Lorenzi-Cioldi, F., 340 Lorge, I., 245, 262 Lott, B., 343, 344 Low, R. S. T., 330 Lowery, B., 43 Lowery, B. S., 56, 189 Lowrance, R., 388 Lucas, J. A., 229 Lucker, G. W., 392 Luhtanen, R., 229 Lui, L., 246, 263 Lukaszewski, M., 250 Lundberg, K. B., 130 Lundin, R. W., 33 Luo, B., 272–273 Lutsky, N. S., 245, 269 Lynch, C. I., 208 Lynch, M. E., 302 Lynd-Stevenson, R., 246 Lyness, K. S., 347 Lytle, A., 253, 273 Lytton, H., 321 Macdonald, J., 253, 273 MacInnis, C. C., 176, 387 MacKay, D. G., 333 Mackie, D. M., 10, 21, 53, 80, 84, 86, 87, 88, 89, 180, 201, 292 Macrae, 114, 115 Macrae, C. N., 19, 21, 34, 48, 50, 55, 56, 57, 89, 90, 90–91, 91, 92, 93, 97, 121, 128 Madan, A. K., 253 Maddox, K. B., 45, 83 Madera, J. M., 318 Madey, 254 Madon S., 171, 173 Magarman, A. B., 206 Magnusson, J., 230 Mago, M., 265 Mahaffey, A. L., 294 Main, K. J., 222 Maitner, A. T., 10, 201, 292 Major, B., 180, 209, 211, 213, 214, 216, 223, 225, 226, 228, 229, 231, 301, 346, 367, 369 Makwana, A. P., 159 Malamuth, N. M., 337 Malhi, R. S., 396 Malle, B., 155 Malle, B. F., 176, 330 Mallett, R. K., 341 Mallinas, S. R., 144, 291 Mamo, L., 294 Maner, J. K., 328 Mania, E. W., 9, 52, 388

434 Manke, B., 47 Mann, T. C., 129 Mann. A. K., 299 Manning, M., 126 Mannix, L. M., 365, 366 Manrique, J. A., 342 Manstead, A. S. R., 58 Manzi, J. M., 60 March, D. S., 109, 304 Mark, A. Y., 390, 391 Markman, A. B., 120 Markus, H., 211, 259, 260, 274 Marquez, C., 297 Marshall, R. D., 373 Marson, S. M., 250 Martell, R. F., 343 Martin, A. E., 257 Martin, C., 145 Martin, C. L., 332 Martin, J. G., 143 Martin, L. L., 89 Martin, M., 157 Martin, S. B., 369 Martinez, R., 364 Martinez-Pecino, R., 337 Martorana, P. V., 403 Maruyama, G., 317, 392 Maslow, A. H., 47 Masser, 337 Massey, D. S., 407 Mastro, D., 386 Mathes, L., 325 Matsumoto, D., 4 Maxfield, M., 261 Mayer, D. M., 61, 229 Mayer, S. J., 144 Mayfield, W., 300 Mazzocco, P. J., 394, 396 Mazzoni, G., 92 Mbirkou, S., 404 McCann, R., 256 McCauley, C., 185, 293, 304, 332 McCauley, C. D., 347 McCauley, C. R., 292, 332 McClain, S., 209 McConahay, J. B., 2, 82, 121, 124, 171, 174, 175, 176, 178, 187, 231, 298, 335 McConnell, A. R., 120, 126, 299 McCoy, S. K., 214 McDaniel, M. A., 293 McDonald, L., 256 McDonald, S. A., 388 McElligot, S., 230 McFadden, S. H., 260 McFarland, S. G., 120, 149 McGarrity, L. A., 302 McGhee, D. E., 119 McGlone, M. S., 204

Author Index McGlothlin, H., 42 McGuire, C. V., 340 McGuire, S. L., 247 McGuire, W. J., 340 McHugh, M. C., 373 McIntyre, R. B., 208 McKown, C., 44 McLaughlin, J. P., 113, 188 McLemore, K. A., 291, 292, 294, 302 McManus, J. L., 191 McManus, M. A., 405 McMillan, D., 50 McNevin, M., 297 McNulty, J. K., 330 Meadows, A., 373 Means, B., 87 Media Matters for America, 45 Meertens, R. W., 8, 174 Megias, J. L., 348 Meier, B. P., 368 Meijs, M. H. J., 366 Meine, P., 121, 398, 399 Meinz, E. J., 265 Mellor, D., 172 Melton, E. N., 303 Meltzer, A. L., 297 Meltzer, H., 262 Meltzoff, A. N., 43 Mendoza-Denton, R., 131, 205, 387 Mentzer, S. J., 149 Merino, A., 347 Merrill, A., 40 Merritt, S., 372 Mervielde, I., 60 Messner, C., 120 Meulemans, T., 207 Meyer, I. H., 302 Meyer, J., 300 Meyer, J. M., 292 Michinov, N., 159 Midtbøen, A. H., 175 Miene, P., 245, 258 Migetz, D. Z., 124 Miklikowska, M., 41 Mikolajczak, M., 320 Mikton, C., 252 Milberg, S., 80 Miles, E., 385 Miles, J. R., 294, 295, 303 Milfont, T. L., 156 Miller, A., 322 Miller, C. T., 179, 191, 202, 214 Miller, G. A., 18 Miller, J. M., 172 Miller, N., 1, 39, 83, 386, 387, 392 Miller, N. E., 13 Milne, 114 Milne, A. B., 19, 34, 48, 50, 90, 92, 121

Author Index 435 Mir, A. S., 372 Mischel, W., 152, 320 Mishel, E., 297 Mishra, S., 316 Mitchell, G., 120 Mitchell, H. E., 185 Mitchell, J. P., 208 Mittelmark, M. B., 185 Mize, M. C., 273 Mladinic, A., 318, 319, 338, 339, 344 Moll, J., 404 Monahan, C., 253, 273 Moniz, A., 252 Monroe, A. E., 304 Monteith, M. J., 82, 83, 91, 93, 142, 160, 181, 217, 218, 315, 342, 390, 391, 397, 400, 401, 402, 403 Montepare, J. M., 244, 250, 259, 261, 268, 269, 275 Montessori, M., 243 Moradi, B., 291 Morales, M., 3 Moran, T., 118 Moreira, D., 337 Moreno, K. N., 57 Morgan, M. Y., 320 Morling, B., 83 Morris, R. J., 147, 148 Morrison, M., 131 Morrison, M. A., 292, 366 Morrison, T. G., 292 Morrow, J. R., Jr., 369 Moscatelli, S., 38 Moskowitz, 394 Moskowitz, D. S., 329 Moskowitz, G. B., 21, 92, 115, 123, 128, 152 Moss, M. K., 185 Moss-Racusin, C. A., 328, 391 Mowrer, O., 83 Mowrer, O. H., 13 Moya, M., 339 Moyer, A., 385 Mudhol, V., 83 Mueller, A., 85 Mullen, E., 88 Mummendey, A., 388 Munn, J. C., 252 Munnell, A. H., 257 Murakami, J. M., 373 Murphey, M., 262 Murphy, M. C., 82, 129, 220 Murphy, S. T., 109 Murrar, S., 400, 401 Murray, C., 170 Murray, S. B., 345 Musher-Eizenman, D. R., 366 Mustanski, B., 299, 300 Mutz, D. C., 193 Myers, D. G., 317 Myers, J., 262

Myers, J. E., 254 Myrdal, G., 389 Nacoste, R. W., 229 Nadler, A., 229, 251 Nagoshi, C. T., 300 Nagoshi, J. L., 300 Naifeh, S. J., 147 Nail, P. R., 181 Nakahara, K., 95 Nalls, A. J., 392 National Center for Health Statistics, 399 Nauts, S., 328 Navarrete, C. D., 85 Naveh-Benjamin, M., 207 Neilens, H. L., 92 Nelson, D. L., 268 Nelson, L. J., 10 Nelson, T. D., 33, 96, 220, 243, 244, 245, 248, 252, 254, 264, 332 Nesdale, D., 385 Neuberg, S., 55 Neuberg, S. L., 2, 18, 34, 35, 47, 48, 50, 52, 81, 85, 87, 152, 153, 172, 186, 266, 293, 332 Neufeldt, V., 317 Neugarten, B., 248, 263 Neville, H. A., 394 Newcomb, M. E., 299, 300 Newcomb, T. M., 48 Newheiser, A. K., 40, 386 Newman, A., 272–273 Newman, L. G., 92 Newman, M. L., 229 Newsom, J. T., 152, 153, 250 Neyman, M., 373 Ng, B. K. L., 145 Ng, S. H., 272 Nichols, R. C., 145 Niemann, Y. F., 172 Nierman, A., 366 Nisbett, R., 332 Nisbett, R. E., 2, 17, 39, 152, 160 Nock, M. K., 108 Noller, P., 337 Nordgren, L. F., 129 North, M. S., 256, 257, 273, 316 Norton, M. I., 42 Nosek, B. A., 120, 126, 130, 204, 299, 301, 304, 367 Nowicki, G., 87 Nuessel, F., 245, 247 Nungesser, L. G., 300 Nurius, P., 259 Nussbaum, R. J., 396 Nyberg, L., 95 Oakes, P. J., 19, 59 Oakley, F. B., 271 Oatley, K., 10

436 O’Brien, K. S., 366, 370, 371, 372 O’Brien, L., 93, 401 O’Brien, L. T., 82 O’Brien, M., 153 O’Bryan, M., 290 Ochsner, K. N., 95 O’Connell, G. B., 222 O’Connell, T. S., 300 O’Connor, M. L., 260 O’Dea, C. J., 191 Odland, L. M., 371 Officer, A., 252 Ogbu, J. U., 209 Ogden, D., 333 Ohlott, P. J., 347 Oldersma, F. L., 154 Oleson, K. C., 53 Ollis, D., 204 Olson, K. R., 40, 43, 386 Olson, M., 291 Olson, M. A., 6, 10, 108, 109, 112, 114, 115, 117, 119, 124, 125, 128, 129, 131, 172, 176, 179, 187, 188, 189, 190, 297, 299, 301, 304, 387, 397, 404, 405, 406 Olsson, A., 118 O’Malley, P. M., 261 O’Neil, J. M., 348 O’Reilly, J., 372–373 Orey, D., 204 Ortony, A., 80 Osborn, H. J., 397 Osborne, D., 61, 337 Osborne, J. W., 209, 210 Oskamp, S., 335 Ostrom, T. M., 38 Oswald, D. L., 320 Oswald, F., 372 Oswald, F. L., 120 Ottati, V., 210, 332 Otten, S., 39, 82 Overall, N. C., 330, 339 Owen, P. R., 364 Owen-Smith, A., 208 Owuamalam, C. K., 222 Pachankis, J. E., 301, 302 Page, R., 174, 183, 184 Page, R. A., 185 Page-Gould, E., 385, 387 Pager, D., 175 Pagotto, L., 221 Pahlke, E., 43 Pai, M., 175 Paik, S. K., 208 Paleari, G. G., 265 Palmore, E. B., 245, 247, 248, 249, 255 Paluck, E. L., 287, 296, 297, 386, 391, 401, 405 Pandey, C., 206 Paolini, S., 39, 346, 384

Author Index Parag, O., 255 Parasuraman, S., 345 Parchmann, I., 315 Park, B., 50, 116, 123, 395 Park, D. C., 243 Park, J., 87, 88 Park, J. H., 85, 304 Parker, L. R., 391, 401 Parling, T., 368 Parmar, S., 244 Parry, H. J., 145 Pasinlioglu, T., 343 Pasupathi, M., 244 Pate, S., 147 Patel, K., 207 Patrick, R., 87 Patterson, S., 254 Pattison, D. A., 154 Pauker, K., 36, 37, 42, 46, 118, 176 Paulhus, D. L., 337 Paulson, R. M., 208 Pavelchak, M. A., 81 Pay, H., 384 Payne, B. K., 116, 130, 131 Payne, K., 35 Peacock, E., 255 Pearson, A. R., 82 Pearson, C., 254 Pelham, W. E., 321 Pendry, L. F., 21, 55, 56, 57, 89, 90–91, 128 Pennebaker, J. W., 90, 331 Penner, L. A., 190, 229, 250–251, 268, 390 Penny, H., 366, 371 Perdue, C. W., 18, 38, 64, 159, 267, 268, 385, 392 Pereda-Pereda, E., 371 Perez, R. M., 301 Perfect, T. J., 92 Perkins, A., 369 Perreault, M., 344 Perry, J. L., 406 Perry, M., 319, 330, 348 Perry, R. P., 230 Perry, S. P., 82, 129, 220 Peruche, B., 403 Peskin, H., 250 Peters, K., 209 Peterson, T. L., 301 Petit, W. E., 370 Pettigrew, 181 Pettigrew, T. A., 143 Pettigrew, T. F., 8, 22, 41, 42, 61, 131, 174, 193, 223, 303, 382, 383, 384, 385, 386, 388, 397, 399, 406, 407 Petty, R. E., 81, 151, 152 Pew Research Center, 395 Phelan, J. E., 325, 328, 338 Phelps, E., 95 Phelps, E. A., 95, 118 Phillips, B. N., 391

Author Index 437 Phillips, J. E., 129, 179, 188, 304, 387 Phillips, K. W., 53 Phillips, L. T., 56 Phills, C. E., 131 Pickett, C. L., 59 Piebinga, L., 339 Pietrzak, J., 205, 320 Piggot, M., 300, 301 Pigram, D., 246 Pilanski, J. M., 155 Pilcher, S., 371, 372 Piliavin, J. A., 229, 250–251 Pilkington, N. W., 302 Pinel, E. C., 204 Pino, C., 269 Pirchio, S., 41 Pittinsky, T. L., 44, 208 Piyale, Z. E., 216 Pizarro, D. A., 293 Plaks, J. E., 47 Plant, E. A., 55, 185, 217, 382, 401, 403 Plaut, V. C., 396, 397 Plous, S., 2, 22 Polat, S., 343 Poole, D. A., 229 Popham, L. E., 261 Popkin, S., 269 Porat, R., 287, 405 Porter, J. R., 209, 213 Porter, N., 325, 326, 327 Post, R. M., 88 Poteat, V. P., 290 Potkay, C. R., 172, 185 Potvin, S., 14 Powell, R. M., 250 Powlishta, K. K., 320 Pozo, C., 219 Pratkanis, A. R., 109, 229 Pratto, F., 155, 156, 157, 158, 176, 177, 295, 330 Preacher, K. J., 130 Prestwich, A., 222 Price, J., 230 Price-Blackshear, M. A., 83 Prieler, M., 324 Pronczuk, M., 287 Pronin, E., 204 Proshansky, H., 8, 142 Pryor, J. B., 291, 304 Puckett, J. A., 300 Puhl, R. M., 369, 372 Purdie, V. J., 116, 205 Putnam, R. D., 386 Pych, V., 149 Pyszczynski, 260 Pyszczynski, T., 54, 159, 210, 260, 400 Quattrone, G. A., 38 Quigley-Fernandez, B., 185 Quillian, L., 175

Quillian, M., 267 Quinn, D., 204 Quinn, D. M., 204, 206, 213, 315 Quinton, W. J., 214 Quist, R. M., 156, 159 Raabe, T., 384 Rababa, M., 254 Rabbie, J. M., 40 Raden, D., 177 Radke, M., 203 Radvansky, G. A., 126 Rae, J. R., 386 Rafferty, J., 333 Rahhal, T. A., 207 Rahman, Q., 295, 302 Raju, N., 265 Rakow, L. F., 320 Ramasubramanian, S., 228 Ramos, M. R., 407 Ramsey, J. L., 33 Ranganath, K. A., 126 Rankin, R. E., 83 Ratner, K. G., 1 Rattan, A., 394 Ravary, A., 369 Ravenzwaaij, D., 120 Rawlins, M., 365 Ray, H., 390 Ray, V., 192 Reed, G. M., 260 Reeder, G. D., 304 Rees, T., 212 Reeve, J. M., 55 Reik, B. M., 9 Reil, J. E., 259, 268 Rempel, J. K., 8, 80 Renner, B., 368 Rentfrow, P. J., 229 Resendez, M. G., 156, 159, 228 Reyes-Ortiz, C., 253 Reyna, C., 177, 189 Reynolds, K. J., 59, 159 Rhea, D. J., 369 Rhodes, M., 35, 36 Ric, F., 87, 90, 92 Rich, A., 13 Richardson, K., 370 Richeson, J. A., 175, 193, 216, 387, 396 Richman, C. L., 392 Rieger, G., 304 Riek, B. M., 52, 388 Riemer, A., 341 Riess, M., 185 Rinehart, J. W., 172 Rios, K., 64, 83, 396, 397 Riquelme, A. R., 348 Riskind, R. G., 299 Ritchey, P. N., 290, 342

Author Index

438 Rivera, L. M., 299 Rivero, J. C., 229 Roberts, T., 331 Roberts, T. S., 288 Robertson, M., 368 Robinson, B. E., 372–373 Robinson, M. D., 368 Robinson, S., 262 Robstad, N., 373 Rocher, S., 295 Roddy, S., 366 Rodin, J., 251, 260, 373 Rodin, M., 230 Roediger, H. L., 111, 112 Roediger III, H. L., 111 Roehling, M. V., 371, 372 Roehling, P. V., 371 Roese, N. J., 185 Roets, A., 154 Rohan, M. J., 43 Roisman, G. I., 43 Rokeach, M., 389, 390, 397, 407 Rollero, C., 337 Rollins, J. H., 203 Romano, C., 396 Romer, D., 45 Romero-Sanchez, M., 348 Romney, D. M., 321 Ronquillo, J., 95 Rooke, S. E., 108 Rooth, D. O., 129 Rosario, M., 296 Rosch, E., 246 Rose, T. L., 53 Rosen, B., 264, 265 Rosen, E. W., 142 Rosenberg, M., 204, 213 Rosenfeld, M. J., 287 Rosenfield, D., 4, 39, 41, 215, 216, 392 Rosenhan, D. L., 225 Rosenkrantz, P. S., 316 Rosip, J. C., 160 Ross, D., 320 Ross, J., 347 Ross, J. M., 146, 148, 149 Ross, L., 2, 17, 37, 152, 160, 204, 332 Ross, L. E., 289, 300 Ross, S. A., 320 Rosselli, F., 89 Roth, J., 40 Rothbart, M., 18, 40, 50, 52, 53, 294, 393 Rothbaum, F., 262, 263 Rothgerber, H., 5 Rothman, A., 127 Rothman, A. J., 322 Rothschild, L., 295 Rowatt, W. C., 38, 145, 150, 320 Rowley, 213 Rozelle, R. M., 172

Rozin, P., 292, 293, 304 Rubenstein, A. J., 33 Rubin, D. B., 215 Rubin, M., 346, 384 Rubini, M., 38 Ruble, D. N., 315, 317, 319–320, 343, 348 Ruble, T. L., 315, 317, 319–320, 343, 348 Rucker, J. M., 175 Ruderman, A. J., 37, 80 Ruderman, M. N., 347 Rudman, L., 328 Rudman, L. A., 93, 120, 131, 218, 324, 325, 327, 328, 339, 347, 348, 393 Ruffman, T., 370 Rule, N. O., 116 Rumsey, A., 273 Runciman, W. G., 61 Ruscher, J. B., 15, 21, 44, 225 Rush, J., 176 Rusher, J. B., 64 Russell, G. M., 300 Russell, S. T., 301 Russin, A., 404 Rust, M. C., 388 Rutland, A., 36, 388 Ryan, C., 301 Ryan, E., 261 Ryan, M., 209 Ryan, M. K., 159, 347 Ryan, W. S., 302 Rydell, R. J., 290 Rynes, S., 346 Sabin, J. A., 299 Sackett, P. R., 209 Saguy, T., 389 Sakalli-Ugurlu, N., 337 Sales, S. M., 14 Salomon, K., 340 Salthouse, T. A., 265 Saltsman, T. L., 340 Salvatore, J., 212 Sam, D. L., 388 Sanchez, D. T., 338 Sanchez, F., 230 Sanchez, J., 301 Sanchez, R., 3 Sanford, R. N., 4, 141, 170, 390, 397 Sanna, L. J., 345 Santamaria, A., 347 Santuzzi, A. M., 225 Sargent-Cox, K., 245 Saris, R. N., 343 Saroglou, V., 320 Sassenberg, K., 55, 403 Saucier, D. A., 179, 191, 303 Savin-Williams, R. C., 304 Saxe, L., 82 Sbordonne, R., 254

Author Index 439 Scarabis, M., 152 Schacter, D., 111 Schacter, D. L., 108 Schadron, G., 295 Schaeffer, M., 386 Schaller, M., 5, 35, 85, 153, 293, 304 Schaper, C, 154 Schaumberg, R. L., 189 Scheepers, D., 59, 95 Scheffer, D., 47 Schefft, B. K., 97 Scheier, M. F., 219, 401–402 Scherbaum, C., 218 Scherer, K. R., 292 Schiappa, E., 386 Schiele, J. H., 205 Schiffhauer, K., 176, 390 Schimel, J., 210, 261 Schimmack, U., 120 Schlenker, B. R., 184 Schlenker, K. A., 330 Schlossberg, N., 253 Schlosser, M. D., 396 Schmader, T., 204, 208, 209, 211, 216 Schmalz, D. L., 371 Schmidt, D., 246, 247 Schmidt, K., 129 Schmitt, K. A., 367 Schmitt, M. T., 176, 347, 390 Schnabel, N., 389 Schnake, S. B., 21 Schneider, D. J., 5, 7, 47 Schneider, M. E., 229 Schoenrade, P. A., 149 Scholer, A. A., 2 Schrimshaw, E. W., 296 Schroeder, D. A., 229, 250–251 Schroyen, S., 249, 253 Schultz, A., 292 Schultz, J. R., 83 Schultz, P., 209 Schuman, H., 177, 302, 397 Schupp, H. T., 368 Schwartz, J. L. K., 119 Schwartz, M. B., 367 Schwartzman, A., 270 Schwarz, N., 39, 80, 88, 96, 129, 243, 324, 325 Sczesny, S., 344 Seamster, L., 192 Sears, D. O., 82, 176, 177, 188, 335, 385, 386 Sears, R., 13, 83 Sears, R. R., 13, 60 Secouler, L. M., 256, 259 Sedikides, C., 38 Seefeldt, C., 262 Seery, M. D., 340 Segal, M., 332 Segel-Karpas, D., 260 Seibt, B., 404

Seise, J., 298 Sekaquaptewa, D., 51, 119, 206 Serbin, L. A., 320 Serock, K., 262 Setoh, P., 40, 44 Shaffer, D. R., 89 Shah, J. Y., 154 Shaner, J., 263 Shannonhouse, L., 273 Shapiro, J., 204 Shapiro, P., 83, 86 Sharit, J., 265 Sharpe, H., 368 Sharps, D., 316 Shaw, D., 254 Shaw, J. S., 60, 156 Shaw, M., 244 Sheese, B. E., 160 Shefler, G., 254, 255 Sheldon, K. M., 83 Shelton, J. N., 204, 216, 387 Shepelak, N. J., 333 Sheppard, L. A., 87, 88, 89, 186 Sherif, C., 387 Sherif, C. W., 15, 62, 392 Sherif, M., 15, 62, 64, 387, 388, 392, 401 Sherman, J. W., 34, 40, 48, 50, 51, 52, 53, 54, 87, 93, 107, 112, 126, 366 Sherman, S., 5, 6, 18 Sherman, S. J., 37 Shibata, K., 95 Shih, M., 44, 158, 208 Shim, J. K., 294 Shimel, 260 Shiovitz-Ezra, S., 255 Shonfeld, M., 384 Shook, N. J., 293, 387 Shrira, A., 260 Shropshire, J. L., 33 Shteynberg, G., 61 Sibley, C., 150 Sibley, C. G., 61, 144, 155, 337, 339 Sidanius, J., 82, 155, 156, 157, 158, 176, 177, 228, 330 Siebler, F., 373 Siegfried, W. D., 347 Siers, B., 157 Sigall, H., 172, 174, 183, 184, 397 Sigelman, C., 268 Sigelman, L., 82, 268 Sigleman, L., 222 Sikes, J., 391 Silberman, E. K., 88 Silver, L. A., 302 Simmonds, S., 201 Simmons, L. W., 271 Simmons, R. G., 213 Simon, M. C., 343 Simonton, D. K., 14

440 Simpson, J. A., 328 Sinclair, L., 21, 56 Sinclair, R. C., 88 Sinclair, S., 43, 229 Sjomeling, M., 208 Skinner, A. L., 43, 129 Skinner, B. F., 13 Skitka, L. J., 88 Skokan, L. A., 260 Skowronski, J. J., 151 Slaby, R. G., 36 Slade, M. D., 252 Slater, P. E., 271, 272 Slotter, E. B., 60 Slovic, P., 33, 224 Smetana, J. G., 35 Smirles, K. E., 374 Smith, C. A., 9 Smith, C. N., 95 Smith, C. T., 126 Smith, D. M., 2 Smith, E., 9, 10, 18, 252 Smith, E. R., 84, 111, 201, 292 Smith, H., 61 Smith, H. J., 61 Smith, H. P., 142 Smith, J. L., 206 Smith, P. A., 244, 245, 262 Smith, S. J., 303 Smith, S. M., 89 Smith, T., 222 Smyth, F. L., 120 Snapp, M., 391 Sniderman, P. M., 124, 177, 187, 189 Snyder, M., 121, 215, 218, 245, 253, 258, 398, 399 Snyder, M. L., 149 Sobal, J., 365 Soderhamm, U., 373 Sokol, N., 367 Solomon, 260 Solomon, S., 54, 159, 210, 260 Sommers, S. R., 42 Son Hing, L. S., 190 Sønderskov, K. M., 386 Sonleitner, N., 41 Sorensen, M., 248 Sorgman, M., 248 Soroka, S., 386 Sosa, N., 397 Soto, C., 209 Sousa-Gomes, V., 337 Southern Poverty Law Center, 192 Sowards, B., 252 Spangenberg, E. R., 109 Spangenberg, K., 369 Spears, R., 19, 20, 58, 59, 128, 210 Spell, C. S., 406 Spellman, B. A., 93 Spence, J. T., 318, 335

Author Index Spencer, S., 209 Spencer, S. J., 58, 204, 206, 212, 315 Spicer, C. V., 93 Spilka, B., 146 Sprong, S., 193 Spuhler, J. N., 205 Srinivas, K., 111 Srull, T. K., 86, 93 Stacy, A. W., 108 Stallworth, L., 157 Stallworth, L. M., 155, 157, 176, 330 Stangor, C., 5, 6, 8, 46, 50, 52, 55, 80, 84, 96, 172, 185 Stangor, C. S., 224, 231 Stanovich, K. E., 20 Stapel, D. A., 19 Stassler, S., 322 Stathi, S., 385 Steegh, A., 315 Steeh, C., 177, 397 Steele, 212 Steele, C., 180, 204, 211 Steele, C. M., 204, 205, 206, 207, 208, 209, 210, 211, 266, 315, 403 Steele, J., 208 Steele, J. R., 118 Steele, S., 228, 396 Steeth, C., 302 Steffen, V. J., 329 Steffens, M. C., 40, 120, 298 Stellmacher, J., 385 Stendler, C. D., 391 Stephan, C., 391 Stephan, C. W., 7, 83, 192, 216 Stephan, W. G., 4, 7, 41, 52, 64, 80, 83, 86, 215, 216, 217, 220, 382, 383, 392, 394, 407 Stephan, W. S., 192 Stephen, A. T., 80 Stevens, L. E., 83, 330, 331 Stevens, S. T., 333 Stewart, B. D., 126 Stewart, I., 366, 368 Stewart, M. W., 334 Stinchcombe, A., 260 Stitt, C. L., 185 Stitt, S. L., 332 Stolle, D., 386 Stone, J., 115, 123, 204, 208 Stopeck, M. H., 345 Stout, J. G., 405 Strack, F., 88, 404 Strahm, S., 263 Strange, K., 347 Strauss, L., 203 Streamer, L., 340 Strenta, A., 149, 224 Strickland, B. R., 146 Stroebe, W., 4, 11, 12, 61, 160 Stroessner, S. J., 2, 7, 47, 50, 86, 87, 89, 93 Strunk, W., 333

Author Index 441 Stunkard, A. J., 364, 365, 367, 368 Subasic, E., 346 Subich, L. M., 207 Sublett, J. F., 248, 249 Sue, D. W., 127, 394 Sugawara, A. I., 320 Suh, E. J., 329 Suizzo, M. A., 43 Sullivan, E., 172 Sullivan, L., 346 Sullivan, L. A., 6, 84, 185 Sullivan, M. J., 88 Sulloway, F. J., 159 Sunderland, T., 251 Süsser, K., 87, 186 Swann, W. B., 59, 157, 215, 218 Swift, H. J., 273 Swim, J., 317, 320, 342 Swim, J. K., 187, 203, 221, 224, 225, 231, 318, 332, 335, 336, 340, 345 Szymanski, D. M., 300, 301 Tablante, C. B., 316 Tajfel, H., 1, 10, 18, 21, 39, 40, 58, 80, 82, 210, 252 Talley, A. E., 291 Talley, W., 255 Tal-Or, N., 385 Tankard, M. E., 296, 391, 401 Tapias, M. P., 9, 293 Tartaglia, S., 337 Tasdemir, N., 247 Tassinary, L. G., 96 Taumoepeau, M., 370 Taylor, D. M., 5, 228 Taylor, M., 294 Taylor, S. E., 2, 5, 16, 18, 20, 21, 37, 47, 52, 56, 80, 178, 216, 224, 225, 246, 260, 332, 393, 398 Taylor, V. J., 204 Teachman, B. A., 365, 368, 373 Teater, B., 273 Tedeschi, J. T., 185 Tellhed, U., 318 Terrizzi, J. A., Jr., 293 Tesler, M., 192 Testa, M., 225, 226 Tetlock, P. E., 120, 124, 177, 187, 189 Thille, P., 373 Thoits, P. A., 322 Thomas, K. M., 396 Thomas, L., 95 Thommessen, S. A., 41 Thompson, D. E., 347 Thompson, E. P., 154 Thompson, K., 370 Thompson, M., 206 Thompson, M. M., 177 Thompson, T. L., 321 Thomsen, L., 388 Thorn, 114

Thorn, T. M. J., 34 Thorndike, E. L., 13 Thorson, K. R., 206 Thorsteinsson, E. B., 108 Thyer, B. A., 252 Tien-Hyatt, J. L., 272 Tilcsik, A., 297 Tobin, R. M., 160 Tobin-Bennett, D., 333 Todd, A. R., 230 Todd, B. K., 41 Todd, P., 385 Todd-Mancillas, W., 333 Tomasetto, C., 321, 369 Tooby, J., 34 Tooman, G. D., 93, 400 Topalli, V., 117 Torok, T., 185 Torpey, E., 346 Tougas, F., 336 Touron, D. R., 207 Towles-Schwen, T., 127, 387 Townsend, S., 53 Trager, H., 203 Trail, T. E., 387 Trawalter, S., 387 Trent, C., 262 Tresh, F., 406 Triandis, H. C., 4 Trolier, T. K., 5, 38, 80, 215 Troll, L., 253 Trope, Y., 107 Tropp, L. R., 39, 42, 384, 386, 387, 388, 394, 397, 403, 407 Tsai, J., 244 Tsang, V. H. L., 245 Tuan, P. M., 80 Tuch, S. A., 222 Tucker, A., 189 Tucker, E., 3 Tuckman, J., 245, 262 Tukachinsky, R., 386 Turner, J., 10, 21, 252 Turner, J. C., 1, 9, 58, 59, 159, 210, 340 Turner, M. E., 229 Turner, R. N., 221–222, 222, 389 Tversky, A., 2, 19, 33, 224, 332 Twenge, J. M., 213 Tworek, C. M., 36 Tyler, R. B., 18, 34, 38, 113, 385 Tyler, T. R., 64 Uleman, J., 112 United States Census Bureau, 243 Unterborn, K., 229 Unzueta, M. M., 229 Urry, H. L., 83 U.S. Department of Labor, 346 U.S. Department of Transportation, 53

Author Index

442 Vaccarino, E., 348 Vale, M. T., 248, 249 Valenti, J., 386 Valenzuela, M., 347 Valrie, 213 Van Assche, J., 150 van Breen, J. A., 128, 316, 338 Van Camp, A. R., 391 van der Maas, H., 120 van Dijk, T. A., 45 Van Hiel, A., 154 van Knippenberg, A., 49, 50, 87 Van Knippenberg, A., 92 van Laar, C., 229 van Osch, Y., 366 van Ryn, M., 220 van Wolferen, J., 366 Vance, S. L., 403 Vandello, J. A., 297 VandenBos, G., 269 Vanneman, R. D., 61 VanPuymbrouck, L., 253, 365 Vargas, P., 51, 119 Vargas, P. T., 396 Vartanian, L. R., 367 Vasquez, K., 9, 293 Vasquez-Suson, K. A., 127, 201, 216 Vaughn, L. A., 400 Ventis, W. L., 145 Verkuyten, M., 21, 203 Verstraate, C. D., 334 Vescio, T. K., 330 Vezzali, L., 385 Vianas, O., 347 Viki, 337 Viki, G. T., 337 Vinacke, W. E., 4 Vittrup, B., 42 Voci, A., 221, 221–222 Voelkl, K., 225, 226 Voelkner, A., 254 Vogel, S. R., 316 Voils, C. I., 402 Vollmecke, J. T., 148 von Hippel, W., 117, 119 Von Hippel, W., 51, 126, 302 Von Neumann, J., 15 Vonofakou, C., 222 Vorauer, J. D., 222 Vul, E., 366 Vuletich, H. A., 130 Wachs, F. L., 206 Wackwitz, L. A., 320 Wadden, T. A., 364 Wagenmakers, E., 120 Wagner, C., 159 Wagner, D., 325 Wagner, L. S., 254

Wagner, T. H., 254 Wagner, U., 385 Waidzunas, T., 294 Waldzus, S., 388 Walker, D., 366 Walker, G. R., 93 Walker, I., 193 Walkley, R., 382 Wallbom, M., 92 Walster, E., 342 Walters, G., 83, 172 Walters, R. H., 320 Walther, J. B., 384 Walton, G. M., 205, 315 Wang, K., 301 Wang, M., 212 Wänke, M., 39 Wann, D. L., 58 Wanshula, L. T., 152 Ward, D., 179 Ward, D. W., 89 Warner, R., 82 Warriner, K., 300 Warring, D., 392 Warrington, E. K., 111 Washington, R. E., 209, 213 Watkins, M. B., 335 Watson, P. J., 147 Watson, S., 95 Waxman, S. R., 33 Weber, R., 9, 52, 223, 348, 393 Weber, U., 388 Webster, D. M., 152, 154, 155 Webster, G. D., 396 Weddell, S. C., 146 Wegener, D. T., 151 Wegmann, K. M., 207 Wegner, D. M., 90, 91, 96 Weigel, R. H., 177, 187 Weigold, I. K., 207 Weimann, J., 270 Weinberg, E., 291 Weinberg, G., 289, 300 Weiner, B., 230 Weingartner, H., 88 Weinstein, N., 293, 302 Weinstein, R. S., 44 Weisbuch, M., 45, 46, 117, 118 Weisgerber, K., 345 Weiskrantz, L., 111 Weiss, A. E., 346 Weitz, S., 218 Welch, P. L., 300 Welch, S., 82 Wellens, A. R., 219 Wentura, D., 262 Wenzel, M., 388 West, S. G., 13, 60 West, T. V., 206, 387

Author Index 443 Westergren, T., 373 Westie, F. R., 143 Westman, J., 243, 261 Wetzler, J., 258 Whipple, T. W., 322 Whitbourne, S., 266 Whitbourne, S. K., 244 Whitcher-Alagna, S., 229 White, B. J., 15, 62, 387 White, E. B., 333 White, M. H., 172 White, P. H., 206 Whitley, B. E., Jr., 291, 396 Wickens, T., 9, 293 Wicker, A. W., 11 Wickerd, G., 392 Wickes, R., 393 Wicklund, R. A., 92, 402 Wiers, R. W., 108 Wigboldus, D. H., 50 Wigboldus, D. H. J., 87 Wigdor, B., 256 Wiggins, E. C., 81 Wilder, D. A., 5, 83, 86, 392 Wilk, K., 344 Wilkins, C. L., 342 Williams, A., 118, 249, 261, 272 Williams, C. J., 34, 113, 176 Williams, C. L., 45 Williams, J. E., 316 Williams, K. D., 120 Williams, K. M., 337 Williams, M. J., 114, 295 Williams, R. M., 382 Williams, S. L., 299 Williamson, J. B., 256, 257, 258, 259 Williamson, W. P., 292 Wilner, D. M., 382 Wilson, J. P., 116, 129 Wilson, M. S., 156, 339 Wilson, R. E., 373 Wilson, W., 392 Winner, A. L., 292 Wischusen, J., 10 Wise, E., 333 Witherspoon, D., 111 Wittenbrink, B., 116, 123, 124, 130, 395 Wojda, M. R., 157 Wolfe, C., 209 Wolfe, C. T., 212 Wolsko, C., 395, 396, 407 Wong, B. I., 207 Wong, Y. J., 290 Wood, J., 177

Wood, P. B., 41 Wood, W., 329 Woodcock, A., 209 Woodzicka, J. A., 203, 341, 348 Word, C. O., 215, 217 Works, E., 383 Worschel, S., 5 Worth, L. T., 87, 88, 89, 201 Wright, L. W., Jr., 293 Wright, S. C., 5 Wu, A. Y., 257 Wu, B., 347 Wyatt, D. F., 51 Wyer, N. A., 40, 92, 122 Wyer, R. S., 89 Wyer, R. S., Jr., 86 Wyman, M. F., 255 Xu, J., 159, 318 Y., Ziv, T., 41 Yantis, C., 204 Yarchi, M., 386 Ybarra, O., 64, 83 Yildiz, M., 373 Yilmaz, H. O., 373 Yip, T., 209 Yohannes, J., 153 Young, A. F., 386 Young, L. M., 371 Young, S., 43 Yzerbyt, V., 295 Zabel, K. L., 112, 117, 176, 187, 190, 387 Zagefka, H., 222 Zajonc, R., 274 Zajonc, R. B., 10, 17, 80, 109 Zanakos, S., 96 Zanna, M. P., 6, 8, 43, 80, 83, 84, 152, 153, 177, 185, 190, 215, 291, 339, 343, 402 Zárate, M. A., 62, 396 Zebrinos, E., 321 Zebrowitz, L. A., 244, 259, 261, 268, 269 Zeiders, K. H., 295 Zerbes, N., 298 Zhang, B., 212 Zhou, K., 272–273 Zhou, S., 385 Zhu, L., 338 Zigler, E., 210 Zillmann, D., 58 Zotos, Y., 323 Zuk, M., 288 Zuwerink, J. R., 91, 142, 217, 397, 401

Subject Index

Acceptance of others, 150 Accuracy of stereotypes, 331–333 Accuracy-orientation, 56 Achievement, 209–210, 211f. See also Performance Addiction, 108, 175 Adolescence, 210, 261. See also Children; Developmental factors Affect. See also Mood further research and, 96–97 heterosexism and, 292–294, 299–301, 304–305 influence of positive affect, 87 negative affect, 7–8, 87–88, 89, 252 overview, 201 prejudice as, 7–8 types of intergroup affect, 81–86 Affect intensity (AI), 97 Affective prejudice, 8 Affirmative action, 22, 228–230 African American–White American intergroup relations, 21–22, 82–83. See also Intergroup dynamics Age, 34–35, 264–266. See also Ageism Age grading, 255–256, 276. See also Ageism Ageism age discrimination, 264–266 age stereotypes, 247–248 beliefs and expectations about old age and, 262–264 contact with older people and, 269–271 defined, 276 existence of, 245–247 further research and, 273–275 in the helping professions, 253–255 juvenile ageism, 261

maintenance of, 258–261 origins of, 255–258 overview, 243–245 pseudopositive attitudes and, 249–253 reducing, 273 social perception and, 266–269, 267f Agentic traits, 318, 349 Aggression confrontation technique and, 390 gender stereotypes and, 330 implicit prejudice and stereotyping, 116–117, 118 microaggressions and, 126–127 overview, 13–14 personality and, 144, 160–161 right-wing authoritarianism and, 144 threat perception and, 85 Agreeableness, 160 Ambiguity tolerance, 143, 223–231 Ambivalence, 174, 178–180, 223–231 Ambivalent sexism, 336, 349. See also Benevolent sexism; Sexism Ambivalent Sexism Inventory (ASI), 338 Amygdala, 95–96. See also Neurological factors Anger, 60, 85 Antagonistic CB, 396–397. See also Colorblind (CB) approach Antidiscrimination, 22 Anti-fat prejudice. See also Overweight people; Prejudice anti-fat humor and, 369–370 anti-fat stereotypes and, 369 children and, 367–368, 370–371 discrimination against overweight persons and, 371–372

445

446 Anti-fat prejudice (cont.) influence of on overweight persons, 368–369 origins of, 366 overview, 364–366, 374 reducing, 372–374 Anxiety dynamic nature of interactions and, 217, 218, 220–222 intergroup anxiety, 220–222 measures of stereotyping and prejudice, 181–182 stereotype threat and, 204–212, 206f, 207f, 211f Appraisal, 9, 23 A-S Scale (anti-Semitism), 143 Attitude compared to stereotypes, 6 in context, 8 defined, 23 dynamic nature of interactions and, 218, 219 early perspectives and, 13, 14 Implicit Association Test (IAT), 120 measures of stereotyping and prejudice, 181–185 MODE model and, 124–126, 125f modern racism and, 174–175, 179–180 older people and, 248–249, 274–275 prejudice as, 8–9 pseudopositive attitudes towards older people, 249–253 self-regulation principles and, 401–403 towards overweight people, 364, 371–372 Attitude object, 81–82, 97 Attitudes Toward Women Scale (ATWS), 318–319 Attribution theory, 16–17 Attributional ambiguity, 223–231, 232 Authoritarian personalities. See also Authoritarianism; Personality defined, 161 early perspectives and, 14, 15 overview, 141–142 right-wing authoritarianism, 143–145 Authoritarianism, 141–142, 144, 153, 272. See also Authoritarian personalities; Submissiveness to authority Automatic ageism, 267–268, 267f Automatic cognition. See Cognition; Implicit cognition Aversive racism defined, 97 implicit measures and, 189–190, 189t overview, 82–83, 84–85, 178–180, 193 Baby talk, 249–250, 276 Backlash effect, 327–328, 349 Balance theory, 11 Basic categories, 18, 23, 34–35. See also Categorization Behaviorism, 16–17 Behaviors attributional ambiguity and, 224–225 behavioral prejudice, 8

Subject Index MODE model and, 124–126, 125f self-handicapping behaviors, 228 self-regulation principles and, 401–403 Beliefs about old age, 262–264, 275 gender discrimination and, 342–343 heterosexism and, 303–304 old-fashioned racism and, 172–173 Benevolent sexism, 336–340, 341–342, 349. See also Sexism Benign ageism, 247, 276. See also Ageism Bias African American–White intergroup relations and, 22 illusory correlations, 54 implicit prejudice and stereotyping, 115–116 intergroup anxiety and, 220–221 media and, 45 personality and, 157–158, 160 responsibility for implicit prejudices and, 129 social dominance orientation and, 157–158 Biological factors anti-fat prejudice and, 365, 367–368 “born this way” beliefs, 294–295 gender stereotypes and, 328–329 heterosexism and, 304 Biological racism, 170, 175–176, 194. See also Biological factors Bipolar assumption, 317–318, 349 Bisexual individuals. See LGBTQ individuals; Sexual prejudice Bisexual invisibility, 288, 306. See also Sexual prejudice Black individualism, 177–178 Black Lives Matter movement, 176 Black-and-white thinking. See also Cognition early perspectives and, 14 religion and, 145–151 right-wing authoritarianism and, 143–145 Blame, 213, 367–368 Blood-oxygen-level-dependent (BOLD) signal, 95 Bogus pipeline study, 183–185, 194, 226 “Born this way” beliefs, 294–296 Categorization ageism and, 246–247, 266–267 category constancy, 36–37 children’s learning of, 35–37 contact hypothesis and, 303 dissociation model of prejudice and, 122 ingroup favoritism, 37–40 mood and, 80 overview, 18–20, 32–33, 314 reducing prejudice and, 407–408 sexism and, 340 sexual orientations and, 294–295 subcategorization, 51–53 types of, 34–35 why we categorize, 33–34

Subject Index 447 Challenge (instead of remediation), 212 Character-conditioned prejudice, 142. See also Personality Cheerleader effect, 366, 374 Childhood intergroup contact, 41–42 Child–parent interactions, 14, 41. See also Children; Family; Parents Children. See also Developmental factors anti-fat prejudice and, 367–368, 370–371 categorization process and, 35–37 gender stereotypes and, 320–321 implicit prejudice and stereotyping, 118 juvenile ageism and, 261 social learning and, 41–44 stereotype threat and, 208, 210 transmission of values in families and, 42–43 Chronic outgroup affect, 81–86, 97. See also Affect Civil Rights Act of 1965, 22 Cognition. See also Cognitive capacity; Explicit cognition; Implicit cognition authoritarian personalities and, 141–142 further research and, 96–97 need for cognition and, 151–152 need for cognitive closure and, 153–155 overview, 89–96 religion and, 145–151 right-wing authoritarianism and, 143–145 stereotype suppression, 89–93 thought suppression, 90–91 Cognitive capacity. See also Cognition age discrimination, 264–265 older people and, 274–275 overview, 201 pseudopositive attitudes towards older people and, 249–251 Cognitive consistency theories, 15–16 Cognitive dissonance confrontation technique and, 389–391 contact hypothesis and, 303 effects of sexism on women and, 341 maintenance of stereotypes and, 49 measures of stereotyping and prejudice, 181–182 overview, 11 self-regulation principles and, 403 Cognitive dissonance theory, 15–16, 389–391, 408. See also Cognitive dissonance Cognitive miser model, 20–21 Cognitive prejudice, 8 Cognitive-capacity deficits, 88–89 Collective relative deprivation, 61–62. See also Relative deprivation theory Collectivist cultures, 272 Colorblind (CB) approach, 394–397, 407–408, 408 Committed religiosity, 146–147, 161. See also Religion Common ingroup identity model, 388–389. See also Ingroups Communal traits, 318, 349 Communication, 270–271, 333–334

Compassion, 143, 148 Concealment, 301–302 Conditioning, evaluative. See Evaluative conditioning Confirmation bias, 49–50 Conflict theory, 259 Conflicting groups, 302–303. See also Intergroup dynamics Confrontation technique, 389–391, 408 Consensual religiosity, 146–147, 161. See also Religion Conservatism anti-fat prejudice and, 365 heterosexism and, 291–292 implicit measures and, 189–190, 189t personality and, 143 social dominance orientation and, 158 Consumption, 256–257. See also Resources Contact hypothesis defined, 65, 408 heterosexism and, 302–303 jigsaw classroom study and, 391–393 overview, 63, 381–387 Contagion fears, 292–294, 304–305 Context-based salience, 80 Control, 330. See also Power Controllable stigma, 230–231, 367–368, 372. See also Stigma Controlled cognition. See Cognition; Explicit cognition Conventionalism, 144, 160–161, 390 Convergent validity, 120 Conversion therapy, 294, 306 Counterstereotypes, 92 Cross-cultural differences. See also Cultural factors ageism and, 271–273 anti-fat prejudice and, 365, 372 gender stereotypes and, 316, 330–331 Cultural factors African American–White American intergroup relations and, 22, 82–83 ageism and, 257, 260, 271–273 anti-fat prejudice and, 365, 372 baby talk and, 250 educating people about outgroups and, 393–394 gender stereotypes and, 316, 321–326, 326f, 327f, 330–331 modern racism and, 175–176 quest orientation and, 148 religion and, 150–151 Cultural stereotypes, 6, 23 Cynicism, 14 Dark triad and dark tetrad, 337 Decategorization, 384–385. See also Categorization Decision making, 115–116 Defensiveness, 390–391 Demand characteristics, 182–183, 194

448 Depression ageism and, 252 perceived controllability of stigma and, 231 stereotype threat and, 209–210 Deprivation, 192–193. See also Resources; Threats Descriptive stereotypes, 330–331, 349 Devaluing stereotype threat, 209. See also Stereotype threat Developmental factors. See also Adolescence; Children categorization process and, 35–37 gender stereotypes and, 320–321 heterosexism and, 290–291 implicit prejudice and stereotyping, 118 juvenile ageism and, 261 social learning and, 41–44 stereotype threat and, 210 Diagnostic ratio measure, 185–186. See also Measurement Direct learning, 41. See also Learning processes Disclosure, 270–271, 301–302, 386–387 Discounting stereotype threat, 209. See also Stereotype threat Discriminant validity, 120, 187. See also Validity Discrimination. See also Ageism; Racism; Sexism age discrimination, 264–266 aversive racism and, 178–179 confrontation technique and, 390–391 contact hypothesis and, 386 defined, 23 denial of, 214 effects of sexism on women and, 340–342 experience of prejudice and stereotyping and, 214 gender stereotypes and, 342–347 modern racism and, 175, 179–180 mood and, 80 overview, 6, 11 against overweight persons, 371–372 paradoxical effects of affirmative action programs and, 228–230 sexism and, 339–340 sexual prejudice and, 296–297 Disgust sensitivity, 292–294, 304–305 Disidentification, 209, 210–212, 232 Dissociation model of prejudice, 121–122, 131, 402, 409 Dissonance theory, 15–16 Distancing behavior, 343–344 Diversity, 386, 394–397 Diversity training, 393–394, 406 Dogmatism, 153 Domain belongingness, 212 Drug use, 175 Dualistic view, 318, 349 Dual-process perspectives, 112, 120–127, 122f, 123f, 125f. See also Explicit cognition; Implicit cognition E Scale (ethnocentrism), 143 Eastern cultures, 272–273

Subject Index Economic factors early perspectives and, 13 old-fashioned racism and, 192–193 scapegoat theory and, 60 wealth distribution and, 175 Education, 393–394 Efficiency of stereotypes, 47–48 Egalitarian CB, 397. See also Colorblind (CB) approach Egoistic relative deprivation, 61–62 Either–or thinking, 143–151. See also Cognition Empathy, 393–394, 403 Employment, 344–347. See also Discrimination Entity theorists, 47 Environmental factors attribution theory and, 16–17 gender stereotypes and, 325 stubbornness of implicit prejudice and, 130–131 Episodic outgroup affect, 81, 86, 97. See also Affect Equal Rights Amendment (ERA), 335 Equality confrontation technique and, 390 modern racism and, 175–176, 179–180 old-fashioned racism and, 174 paradoxical effects of affirmative action programs and, 228–230 Essentialism, 294–296, 303–304 Ethnic attitudes, 83–84 Evaluative conditioning, 117–118, 132, 404–405 Evolutionary perspectives evolutionary psychology, 34–35 gender stereotypes and, 328–329 heterosexism and, 293 intergroup affect and, 85 threat perception and, 85 Expectancy-confirming behavior, 55–56 Expectancy-congruent memory, 50 Expectancy-disconfirming behavior, 55–56 Expectancy-incongruent memory, 50 Expectancy-orientation, 55–57 Expectations about old age, 262–264 ageism and, 252, 256–257 attributional ambiguity and, 223–231 dynamic nature of interactions and, 220 gender discrimination and, 343 maintenance of stereotypes and, 55–56 overview, 201 self-fulfilling prophecy and, 215–216 sexist language and, 333 Experience of prejudice and stereotyping. See also Prejudice; Stereotypes and stereotyping attributional ambiguity, 223–231 group identification, 203 intergroup interactions and, 216–223 overview, 201, 231–232 self-esteem and, 212–216 social stigma, 202–203 stereotype threat and, 204–212, 206f, 207f, 211f

Subject Index 449 Explicit cognition. See also Cognition defined, 132 dual-process perspectives and, 120–127, 122f, 123f, 125f overview, 107 Explicit measures. See Measurement Explicit memory, 111, 132 Explicit prejudice anti-fat prejudice and, 368 heterosexism and, 298–299 implicit measures and, 189–190, 189t Expressions of prejudice, 8, 192 Extended contact, 385. See also Contact hypothesis Extrinsic religious orientation, 146–148, 149–151, 161. See also Religion F Scale (facism), 142, 143–144 Face-ism, 324, 349 Family. See also Child–parent interactions; Parents ageism and, 257 gender stereotypes and, 320–321, 322–323 transmission of values in, 42–43 Fat prejudice. See Anti-fat prejudice Favoritism, 37–40, 58–59 Fearfulness, 144–145 Fears, 275 Freedom confrontation technique and, 390 modern racism and, 179–180 older people and, 272 old-fashioned racism and, 174 Frustration overview, 13–14 scapegoat theory and, 60 threat perception and, 85 Frustration–aggression theory, 13–14 Functional approach, 258–259, 398–399, 409 Functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI), 95–96. See also Neuroimaging Functional utility, 398 Fundamental attribution error, 37 Fundamentalism, 149, 291–292. See also Religion Gay individuals. See LGBTQ individuals; Sexual prejudice Gender. See also Gender stereotypes; LGBTQ individuals; Sexism; Sexual prejudice categorization process and, 34–35 heterosexism and, 291–292 implicit gender stereotypes, 127–128 overview, 305 social dominance orientation and, 157–158 social learning and, 41 stereotype threat and, 206–207, 208, 211f Gender stereotypes. See also Gender; Sexism; Stereotypes and stereotyping accuracy of, 331–333 anti-fat prejudice and, 365 confrontation technique and, 390–391

consequences of violating, 327–331 effects of sexism on women and, 340–342 gender discrimination and, 342–347 measurement of, 317–319 origins of, 319–326, 326f, 327f overview, 316–317, 348–349 sexist language and, 333–334 Genetic factors, 295–296, 365, 367–368 Geographical environment, 131. See also Environmental factors Gerontocratic societies, 256, 276 Gerontophobia, 255, 276. See also Ageism Glass ceiling, 346–347, 349. See also Sexism Goals, 54–55, 60–61 Group identification experience of prejudice and stereotyping and, 203 group comparisons, 58–59, 203 group identification and, 203 metastereotypes and, 222–223 overview, 1–4 stereotype threat and, 204, 210 Group-level explanations, 14–15 Guilt confrontation technique and, 391 internalized heterosexism, 299–301 self-regulation principles and, 402 Health, 115–116 Healthcare ageism and, 253–255 anti-fat prejudice and, 365 implicit prejudice and stereotyping, 115–116 mental health and, 254–255, 301, 302 modern racism and, 175 Heterosexism. See also LGBTQ individuals; Sexual prejudice “born this way” beliefs, 294–296 contact and prejudice reduction and, 302–305 defined, 306 history of, 288–289 intergroup affect and, 85 internalized heterosexism, 299–302 manifestations of, 296–302 origins of, 290–294 overview, 287–288, 305 High-prejudice people dissociation model of prejudice and, 121–122 dual-process perspectives and, 121–124, 122f, 123f implicit measures and, 189–190, 189t motivation and, 93–94 stereotype suppression and, 92–93 Historical overview. See also Origins of prejudice jigsaw classroom study and, 391–393 older people and, 256–258 overview, 169–174, 170f sexism and, 335 sexual prejudice and, 288–289

450 Homophobia, 85, 289, 306. See also Heterosexism; Sexual prejudice Hostile sexism, 336–340, 341–342, 349. See also Sexism Hostility early perspectives and, 14 gender stereotypes and, 330 perceived controllability of stigma and, 231 relative deprivation theory and, 62 scapegoat theory and, 60 Humiliation, 259 Humor, 176, 369–370 Idealism, 257–258 Identity common ingroup identity, 388–389 gender stereotypes and, 320–321 group identification and, 203 identity confusion, 209–210 older people and, 256–257 sexism and, 340 stereotype threat and, 209–210 Illusory correlations, 53–54, 65 Imagined intergroup contact, 385. See also Contact hypothesis Impact of prejudice and stereotypes, 117. See also Prejudice; Stereotypes and stereotyping Implicit Association Test (IAT) confrontation technique and, 390 heterosexism and, 298, 304 overview, 119–120, 188 responsibility for implicit prejudices and, 129 stubbornness of implicit prejudice and, 130 Implicit cognition. See also Cognition; Implicit prejudices; Implicit stereotyping addiction and, 108 defined, 132 dual-process perspectives and, 120–127, 122f, 123f, 125f Implicit Association Test (IAT), 119–120 implicit associations, 108 implicit gender stereotypes, 127–128 implicit memory, 109, 111 microaggressions and, 126–127 MODE model and, 124–126, 125f overview, 107–111, 110f subliminal messages, 109, 110f suicide and, 108 Implicit heterosexism, 298–299. See also Heterosexism Implicit measures, 188–191, 189t. See also Implicit Association Test (IAT); Measurement; Priming approaches Implicit memory, 109, 111, 132 Implicit prejudices. See also Implicit cognition; Prejudice anti-fat prejudice and, 368 contact hypothesis and, 386 defined, 132

Subject Index documenting, 112–117 dual-process perspectives and, 120–127, 122f, 123f, 125f heterosexism and, 298–299 Implicit Association Test (IAT), 119–120 measures of stereotyping and prejudice and, 188–191, 189t microaggressions and, 126–127 MODE model and, 124–126, 125f origins of, 117–118 overview, 48, 111–112 reducing, 404–406 responsibility for, 128–129 right-wing authoritarianism and, 150 social dominance orientation and, 158–159 stubbornness of, 130–131 Implicit social cognition, 112. See also Implicit cognition Implicit stereotyping. See also Implicit cognition; Stereotypes and stereotyping ageism and, 268 defined, 132 documenting, 112–117 dual-process perspectives and, 120–127, 122f, 123f, 125f Implicit Association Test (IAT), 119–120 implicit gender stereotypes, 127–128 measures of stereotyping and prejudice and, 188–191, 189t microaggressions and, 126–127 MODE model and, 124–126, 125f origins of, 117–118 overview, 111–112 responsibility for, 128–129 stubbornness of, 130–131 Implicit theories, 46–47, 65 Impression management, 216–218, 225–226 Impulses, 141–142 Incidental affect, 81, 86, 97. See also Affect Incremental theorists, 47 Indirect measures, 191. See also Measurement Individual differences, 12–15, 159. See also Personality Individual stereotypes, 6, 23 Inequality modern racism and, 175–176 paradoxical effects of affirmative action programs and, 228–230 sexual prejudice and, 296–297 Infantilization, 250, 251, 276 Infectious disease, 85 Inferences, 19–20 Information processing, 16–17, 18, 145 Informational influence, 323, 349 Ingroup bias, 38, 58–59, 65 Ingroups common ingroup identity, 388–389 contact hypothesis and, 302–303, 381–387 defined, 23, 65, 97

Subject Index 451 group identification and, 203 ingroup favoritism, 37–40, 58–59 metastereotypes and, 222–223 overview, 1–2, 37 social identity theory (SIT) and, 58 social learning and, 41–44 stereotype threat and, 210 Inhibition, 121–122 Integral affect, 81, 97. See also Affect Integration of classrooms, 391–393 Intelligence, 155, 208, 209–210, 212 Intent, 224–225 Interactions, 216–223 Intergenerational contact, 269–271 Intergroup affect, 81–86, 96–97. See also Affect; Intergroup dynamics Intergroup anxiety, 220–222, 232. See also Intergroup dynamics Intergroup discrimination, 80. See also Discrimination Intergroup dynamics. See also African American– White American intergroup relations contact hypothesis and, 302–303, 381–387 experience of prejudice and stereotyping and, 216–223, 231–232 heterosexism and, 292–294, 302–305 jigsaw classroom study and, 391–393 overview, 57–64 self-fulfilling prophecy and, 215–216 social identity theory (SIT) and, 58–59 types of intergroup affect, 81–86 Internalized heterosexism, 299–302, 306 Interpersonal behavior, 223–225. See also Behaviors Interracial contact modern racism and, 176 social learning and, 41–42 stereotype threat and, 204 Intersectional stereotypes, 35 Interventions, 212, 303–304 Intolerant personality, 143. See also Personality Intrinsic religious orientation, 146–148, 149–151, 161. See also Religion Jigsaw system, 391–393, 408, 409 Job opportunities, 344–347. See also Discrimination Judgments MODE model and, 124–126, 125f need for cognition and, 151–152 need for cognitive closure and, 154–155 need for structure and, 152–153 Juvenile ageism, 261, 276. See also Ageism Knowledge, 172–173, 275 Language, 270–271, 333–334 Lavender scare, 294. See also Heterosexism Law of effect, 13 Leadership style, 347

Learning processes affect and, 80 age discrimination, 264–265 anti-fat prejudice and, 370 categorization process and, 35–37 implicit prejudice and stereotyping, 118 social learning, 41–44 Lesbian individuals. See LGBTQ individuals; Sexual prejudice LGBTQ individuals, 287–288. See also Heterosexism; Sexual prejudice Low-prejudice people dissociation model of prejudice and, 121–122 dual-process perspectives and, 121–124, 122f, 123f dynamic nature of interactions and, 217 implicit measures and, 189–190, 189t motivation and, 93–94 older people and, 275 old-fashioned racism and, 172–174 Machiavellianism, 337 Maintenance of stereotypes. See also Stereotypes and stereotyping ageism and, 258–261 functional approach and, 398–399 illusory correlations, 53–54 motivation and, 54–57 overview, 49–57, 65 selective attention and, 49–51 subcategorization and, 51–53 Malignant ageism, 247, 276. See also Ageism Measurement. See also Implicit Association Test (IAT); Priming approaches; Self-report measures ageism and, 274 gender stereotypes and, 317–319 implicit measures, 188–191, 189t measuring prejudice, 186–188 measuring stereotyping, 185–186 old-fashioned racism and, 174 overview, 180–191, 189f social psychology and, 12 Media influences anti-fat stereotypes and, 369 contact hypothesis and, 385–386 gender stereotypes and, 321–326, 326f, 327f heterosexism and, 290–291 implicit prejudice and stereotyping, 118 overview, 44–48 sexist language and, 334 Medical decision making. See Healthcare Memory age discrimination, 266 implicit memory, 109, 111 selective attention and, 50–51 Mental healthcare, 254–255, 301, 302 Metastereotypes, 222–223, 232 Microaggressions, 126–127, 132

452 Mindsets, 212 Minimal group, 1–2, 23, 39–40, 65–66 MODE (motivation, opportunity as determinants) model defined, 132 heterosexism and, 299 overview, 124–126, 125f, 127 responsibility for implicit prejudices and, 129 Modern racism and prejudice confrontation technique and, 390–391 defined, 194 heterosexism and, 296–298 implicit measures and, 189–190, 189t overview, 174–176, 179–180, 191 sexism and, 334–336, 349. See also Sexism symbolic racism and, 176–178 Modern Racism Scale (MRS) implicit measures and, 188 modern racism and, 176 overview, 121, 124, 126, 187 sexism and, 335 Modernization, 257 Mood. See also Affect attributional ambiguity and, 223 overview, 80–89 perceived controllability of stigma and, 231 types of intergroup affect, 81–86 Moral conflicts, 389–391 Motivated tactician model, 21 Motivation attributional ambiguity and, 223, 224–225 defined, 24 functional approach and, 398–399 intergroup affect and, 88–89 maintenance of stereotypes and, 54–57 MODE model and, 124–126, 125f motivational approaches, 13–14 overview, 21, 65, 201 responsibility for implicit prejudices and, 128–129 stereotype suppression and, 93–94 stereotype threat and, 204 Motivation, opportunity as determinants (MODE) model. See MODE (motivation, opportunity as determinants) model Motivation to Control Prejudiced Reactions Scale, 125–126 Multiculturalism, 395, 409 “Naïve scientist” approach, 16–17 Narcissism, 337 Need for cognition (NC), 151–152, 155, 160, 161. See also Cognition; Personality Need for cognitive closure, 153–155, 160, 161 Need for structure (NS), 152–153, 155, 160, 161. See also Personality Negative affect. See also Affect ageism and, 252 effects of, 87–88

Subject Index overview, 89 prejudice as, 7–8 Negative prejudice, 8, 174–175. See also Prejudice Negative stereotypes, 7, 174–175, 248–249. See also Stereotypes and stereotyping Neosexism, 336, 349. See also Sexism Neuroimaging, 94–96. See also Neurological factors Neurological factors fMRI studies related to prejudice, 95–96 neuroscience of prejudice, 94–96 overview, 14 social identity theory (SIT) and, 59 Nondiscrimination, 179–180. See also Discrimination Normative influence, 323, 350, 399–401, 409 Observational learning, 41. See also Learning processes Older people. See also Ageism age stereotypes, 247–248 beliefs and expectations about old age and, 262–264 contact with, 269–271 heterosexism and, 302 positive attitudes and stereotypes regarding, 248–249 pseudopositive attitudes towards, 249–253 social perception and, 266–269, 267f Old-fashioned racism and prejudice aversive racism and, 178 defined, 194, 350 heterosexism and, 296–298 implicit measures and, 189–190, 189t overview, 169–174, 170f, 179–180 resurgence in, 191–193 sexism and, 334–336, 350. See also Sexism symbolic racism and, 176–178 Old-old, 263–264, 274–275. See also Older people Open-mindedness, 148 Opportunity, 124–126, 125f Optimal distinctiveness theory (ODT), 59–60, 66 Origins of prejudice. See also Prejudice ageism and, 255–258 anti-fat prejudice and, 366 gender stereotypes and, 319–326, 326f, 327f heterosexism and, 290–294 implicit prejudice and stereotyping, 117–118 overview, 57–64, 65 realistic conflict theory (RCT) and, 62–64 relative deprivation theory and, 61–62 scapegoat theory and, 60–61 social identity theory (SIT) and, 58–59 Outgroup homogeneity, 38, 66 Outgroup negativity, 39–40 Outgroups contact hypothesis and, 302–303, 381–387 defined, 24, 66, 97 favoritism and, 37–40 group identification and, 203

Subject Index 453 metastereotypes and, 222–223 overview, 1–2, 37 selective attention and, 50 social identity theory (SIT) and, 58 social learning and, 41–44 Overaccommodation, 249, 276 Overweight people. See also Anti-fat prejudice anti-fat humor and, 369–370 anti-fat stereotypes and, 369 attitudes towards, 364–365, 371–372 discrimination against, 371–372 influence of anti-fat stereotypes on, 368–369 perceptions of, 366–368 Painful self-disclosure (PSD), 270–271. See also Self-disclosure Parent–child interactions. See Child–parent interactions Parents. See also Child–parent interactions; Family anti-fat prejudice and, 365 gender stereotypes and, 320–321 heterosexism and, 290 social learning and, 42–43 transmission of values in families and, 42–43 Patronizing language and behavior, 249–251, 261 Peer groups, 290 Perceptions of others. See also Social perception age discrimination, 264–266 anti-fat prejudice and, 366–368 attributional ambiguity, 223–231 categorization process and, 18–20 cognitive miser model and, 20–21 dynamic nature of interactions and, 217 expectancy-orientation and, 56 implicit prejudice and stereotyping, 115–117 metastereotypes and, 222–223 MODE model and, 124–126, 125f motivated tactician model, 21 perceived controllability of stigma and, 230–231 right-wing authoritarianism and, 390 subcategorization and, 52 Performance ageism and, 252 gender discrimination and, 342–347 stereotype threat and, 204–212, 205f, 206f, 207f, 211f Permanence tendency, 153–154 Personality attribution theory and, 16–17 early perspectives and, 14, 15 hostile sexism and, 337 implicit theories and, 46–47 need for cognition and, 151–152 need for cognitive closure and, 153–155 need for structure and, 152–153 overview, 140–141, 160–161, 201 psychodynamic perspectives and, 141–143 religion and, 145–151 right-wing authoritarianism, 143–145 social dominance orientation and, 155–159

Perspectives reducing prejudice and, 393–394 stereotype threat and, 212 Persuasion, 151–152 Physical ability, 264–265 Physician decision making. See Healthcare Pipeline study, 183–185 Police, 116–117 Political factors African American–White intergroup relations and, 22 ageism and, 251 anti-fat prejudice and, 365 implicit measures and, 189–190 modern racism and, 176 Positive affect, 87, 88. See also Affect Positive stereotypes and prejudice, 7, 8, 208, 248–249. See also Prejudice; Stereotypes and stereotyping Positron emission tomography (PET) scans, 95. See also Neuroimaging Power early perspectives and, 14 gender discrimination and, 342–347 gender stereotypes and, 330–331 neosexism and, 336 sexism and, 339 Prejudice. See also Ageism; Anti-fat prejudice; Experience of prejudice and stereotyping; Implicit prejudices; Origins of prejudice; Racism; Reducing prejudice; Sexism; Sexual prejudice African American–White intergroup relations and, 21–22 children and, 35–37 defined, 24 development of, 41–44 effects of sexism on women and, 340–342 impact of, 117 intergroup dynamics and, 57–64, 84 link between stereotyping and and, 11–12 measuring, 180–191, 189f media and, 44–48 overview, 1–2, 7–11, 22–23 positive prejudice, 8 prevalence of, 2–3 reducing, 405–406 Prejudiced personality. See Personality Prescriptive stereotypes, 330–331, 350 Priming approaches ageism and, 267–268, 267f defined, 132 dual-process perspectives and, 121–124, 122f, 123f gender stereotypes and, 325–326 Implicit Association Test (IAT), 119–120 implicit prejudice and stereotyping, 112–116, 117 overview, 112–113, 188 social dominance orientation and, 158–159

454 Priming approaches (cont.) stereotype threat and, 207f stubbornness of implicit prejudice and, 130 Primitive categories, 18, 34, 266, 276. See also Categorization Principled conservatives, 189–190, 189t. See also Conservatism Privilege, 176, 390–391 Privileged categories. See Primitive categories Projection, 142 Protectionist CB, 396–397. See also Colorblind (CB) approach Pseudopositive attitudes, 249–253 Psychodynamic perspectives, 14, 141–143 Psychological essentialism, 294–296, 306 Psychopathy, 337 Public policy, 22 Quest orientation, 148–151. See also Religion Questionnaires. See Self-report measures Race. See also Racism categorization process and, 34–35 social learning and, 41 stereotype threat and, 204–207, 205f, 206f, 207f Racial group constancy, 36–37. See also Categorization Racial prejudice and stereotypes, 2–3. See also Prejudice; Stereotypes and stereotyping Racism African American–White intergroup relations and, 21–22 early perspectives and, 15 overview, 244 perceptions of, 2–3 social dominance orientation and, 158 Reaction-time tasks, 112–113, 119–120 Realistic conflict theory (RCT), 15, 24, 62–64, 66, 387, 409 Recategorization, 385. See also Categorization Reducing prejudice. See also Prejudice ageism and, 273 anti-fat prejudice and, 372–374 colorblind and multicultural approaches, 394–397 confrontation technique and, 389–391 contact hypothesis and, 302–303, 381–387 contemporary approaches to, 397–406 educating people about outgroups and, 393–394 functional approach and, 398–399 implicit approaches, 404–406 jigsaw classroom study and, 391–393 normative influence and, 399–401 overview, 380–381, 407–408 Robbers Cave study and, 387–389 self-regulation principles and, 401–403 social environment level, 406–407 Relative affective neutrality, 365, 374 Relative deprivation theory, 61–62, 66

Subject Index Religion ageism and, 260 gender stereotypes and, 319–320 heterosexism and, 291–292 overview, 145–151 religion as quest, 148–151 sexual prejudice and, 289 Religious Orientation Scale (ROS), 146–147 Resources older people and, 257 old-fashioned racism and, 192–193 reducing prejudice and, 387 threat perception and, 85 Responsibility, 128–129 Retaliation, 14 Reverse discrimination, 228–230, 248–249. See also Discrimination Right-wing authoritarianism (RWA) confrontation technique and, 390 defined, 161 heterosexism and, 291–292 overview, 160–161 personality and, 143–145, 159 quest orientation and, 149 Rigid thinking, 143–151. See also Cognition Robbers Cave study, 387–389, 408, 409 Role models, 212 Role playing, 393–394 Sadism, 337 Salient categorization, 385. See also Categorization Same-sex couples. See LGBTQ individuals; Sexual prejudice Scapegoat theory of prejudice, 13–14, 60–61, 66 Schema, 5, 24, 269–271 Segregation contact hypothesis and, 386 early perspectives and, 13 jigsaw classroom study and, 391–393 Selective attention, 49–51 Self-confidence, 205 Self-disclosure, 270–271, 301–302, 386–387 Self-efficacy, 212 Self-esteem ageism and, 251, 252–253, 259–261 anti-fat stereotypes and, 368–369 attributional ambiguity and, 223–224, 229–230 early perspectives and, 13 experience of prejudice and stereotyping and, 212–216 group identification and, 203 Implicit Association Test (IAT), 120 infantilization and, 251 internalized heterosexism, 301 paradoxical effects of affirmative action programs and, 229–230 perceived controllability of stigma and, 231 social identity theory (SIT) and, 58–59

Subject Index 455 social stigma and, 202 stereotype threat and, 210, 212 Self-focus, 92–93 Self-fulfilling prophecy, 215–216, 232, 251 Self-handicapping behaviors, 228, 232 Self-image, 55 Self-monitoring, 253 Self-perception, 228–229, 299–301 Self-regulation, 401–403 Self-report measures, 147, 173, 180–183. See also Measurement Self-righteousness, 144–145 Self-threat, 259–261 Sexism. See also Gender; Gender stereotypes; Sexual prejudice defined, 350 effects of on women, 340–342 gender discrimination and, 342–347 overview, 244, 314–315, 348–349 sexist language and, 333–334 social dominance orientation and, 157–158 types of, 334–340 Sexual identity, 288. See also Heterosexism; Sexual prejudice Sexual prejudice. See also Heterosexism; LGBTQ individuals; Prejudice; Sexism “born this way” beliefs, 294–296 defined, 306 history of, 288–289 intergroup affect and, 85 manifestations of, 296–302 origins of, 290–294 overview, 287–288, 305 Sexual threats, 85 Shame, 299–301 SIC (succession, identity, and consumption) model, 256–257 Social categories. See also Categorization children and, 36 formation of, 32–37 to ingroup favoritism, 37–40 Social desirability concerns defined, 194 implicit measures and, 189 measures of stereotyping and prejudice, 182 modern racism and, 176 religion and, 147 Social dominance orientation (SDO) defined, 162 modern racism and, 176 overview, 82 personality and, 155–159 Social emotions, 9–11 Social factors, 22, 82–83, 406–407 Social group labels, 80 Social identity theory (SIT) defined, 66 older people and, 252

overview, 58–59 stereotype threat and, 210 Social information processing, 16–17 Social judgments. See also Judgments ageism and, 268 anti-fat stereotypes and, 368–369 need for cognitive closure and, 154–155 overview, 201 Social learning, 41–44, 320–321. See also Learning processes; Social learning theory (SLT) Social learning theory (SLT), 320–321, 350. See also Social learning Social perception. See also Perceptions of others age as a variable in, 266–269, 267f categorization process and, 18–20 cognitive miser model and, 20–21 mood and, 80 motivated tactician model, 21 Social psychology, 12–15 Social role theory, 328–329, 350 Social stigma, 202–203, 231–232. See also Stigma Social-cognitive neuroscience (SCN), 94–95. See also Neurological factors Social-cognitive perspective attribution theory and, 16–17 categorization process and, 18–20 cognitive miser model and, 20–21 motivated tactician model, 21 overview, 5, 15–21 of stereotyping and prejudice, 18–21 Socialization, 290–291. See also Developmental factors Spiritual belief systems. See Religion Spreading activation model of memory, 113 Static cultures, 272 Stereotype suppression, 89–93, 97 Stereotype threat defined, 232, 350 overview, 204–212, 206f, 207f, 211f, 315 reducing, 211–212 Stereotypes and stereotyping. See also Ageism; Experience of prejudice and stereotyping; Gender stereotypes; Implicit stereotyping; Maintenance of stereotypes; Negative stereotypes; Positive stereotypes and prejudice; Racism; Sexism accuracy of, 46 African American–White intergroup relations and, 21–22 children and, 35–37 defined, 24 development of, 41–44 efficiency of, 47–48 gender stereotypes, 316–317 impact of, 117 influence of on overweight persons, 368–369 link between prejudice and, 11–12 maintenance of, 49–57

456 Stereotypes and stereotyping (cont.) measuring, 180–191, 189f media and, 44–48 metastereotypes and, 222–223 overview, 1–2, 4–7, 22–23 perceptions of, 4, 32–33 prevalence of, 2–3 social learning and, 43–44 stereotype vulnerability, 205 Stigma attributional ambiguity and, 223–231 defined, 232 denial of discrimination and, 214 dynamic nature of interactions and, 218–219 group identification and, 203 internalized heterosexism, 301 overview, 202–203, 231–232 perceived controllability of, 230–231 self-esteem and, 212–216 self-fulfilling prophecy and, 215–216 stereotype threat and, 211–212 Stubbornness of implicit prejudice, 130–131. See also Implicit prejudices Student Court Questionnaire (SCQ), 186 Student-teacher relationships, 212 Subcategorization, 51–53, 66, 246–247. See also Categorization Subconscious, 107. See also Implicit cognition Subliminal messages, 109, 110f, 132 Submissiveness to authority, 14, 144, 160–161, 390. See also Authoritarian personalities Subtyping, 9–10, 24, 223, 232 Succession, 256–257 Suicide, 108 Superordinate goal, 63–64, 66, 387–388, 409 Suppression, stereotype, 89–93 Symbolic racism, 176–178, 179–180, 188, 189, 194 Symbolic Racism 2000 Scale (SR2K), 188 Sympathy, 143 Targets of prejudice and stereotyping, 201. See also Experience of prejudice and stereotyping Terror management theory (TMT), 259–261, 263 Theory of reasoned action, 11 Thinness valuation. See Anti-fat prejudice Thought suppression, 89–93. See also Cognition

Subject Index Threats contact hypothesis and, 386 detection of, 85 intergroup affect and, 85 older people and, 256–257, 258–259 old-fashioned racism and, 192–193 realistic conflict theory (RCT) and, 62–64 stereotype threat and, 204–212, 206f, 207f, 211f Tolerant personality, 143, 150. See also Personality Totalitarian cultures, 272 Traditional Egalitarian Sex Role (TESR) Scale, 343 Traditional gender role attitudes (TGRA), 291–292 Traditionalism, 257. See also Conventionalism Transactional approach, 408, 409 Transfer effect, 385 Transgender individuals. See LGBTQ individuals; Sexual prejudice Treatment, medical. See Medical decision making Trump, Donald, 192 Trust, 143 Unconscious processes, 107, 129. See also Implicit cognition Urgency tendency, 153–154 Validity, 120, 187 Values ageism and, 257 heterosexism and, 291–292 modern racism and, 179–180 transmission of in families, 42–43 Video games, 118. See also Media influences Visionary CB, 397. See also Colorblind (CB) approach Wealth distribution. See Economic factors Western cultures, 272–273 White American–African American intergroup relations. See African American–White American intergroup relations White privilege, 176, 390–391 World-mindedness. See Personality Younger people beliefs and expectations about old age and, 262 contact with older people and, 269–271 juvenile ageism and, 261 Young-old, 263–264, 274–275. See also Older people