The Prime Minister-Media Nexus: Centralization Logic and Application (Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership) 3031121511, 9783031121517

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PALGRAVE STUDIES IN POLITICAL LEADERSHIP

The Prime MinisterMedia Nexus Centralization Logic and Application Karl Magnus Johansson

Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership

Series Editors Ludger Helms, University of Innsbruck, Innsbruck, Austria Gillian Peele, Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Oxford, Oxford, UK Bert A. Rockman, Department of Political Science, Purdue University, West Lafayette, IN, USA

Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership seeks to gather some of the best work on political leadership broadly defined, stretching from classical areas such as executive, legislative and party leadership to understudied manifestations of political leadership beyond the state. Edited by an international board of distinguished leadership scholars from the United States, Europe and Asia, the series publishes cutting-edge research that reaches out to a global readership. The editors are gratefully supported by an advisory board comprising of: Takashi Inoguchi (University of Tokyo, Japan), R.A.W Rhodes (University of Southampton, UK) and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel (University of Luneburg, Germany).

Karl Magnus Johansson

The Prime Minister-Media Nexus Centralization Logic and Application

Karl Magnus Johansson School of Social Sciences Södertörn University Huddinge, Sweden

ISSN 2947-5821 ISSN 2947-583X (electronic) Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership ISBN 978-3-031-12151-7 ISBN 978-3-031-12152-4 (eBook) https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12152-4 © The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed. The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use. The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional affiliations. Cover image: © Tuomas A. Lehtinen/Moment/Getty Image This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature Switzerland AG The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Preface and Acknowledgements

The origins of this book go back quite some years. The themes and puzzles covered have been at the centre of my work over the past few decades, but the media factor has emerged as I have realized and sought to capture its importance for executive power. Nowadays prime ministers find themselves surrounded by press rooms and press officers, as a reflection of the need to respond to requests for information from all kinds of media. The proliferation of and pressure from media, different kinds of media, means that governments and prime ministers need to adjust to these environmental factors. That process of change, structural and longterm institutional change, and especially its effect in terms of distribution of resources and power, is what I wanted to capture in this book. The writing of The Prime Minister—Media Nexus was demanding because of the vast and ever-growing literature, but also highly stimulating given the theoretical and social relevance of the topic. The book reflects an effort to draw from different academic fields and literature. It is the product of research conducted within two different projects: one on the Swedish government offices, and the other, mainly, more recent and directed by me, a comparative project on leader—media relations in Finland, Lithuania, Poland and Sweden (www.polexmedia.com). I have been fortunate to have worked with two great groups of researchers. I would like to thank the Bank of Sweden Tercentenary Foundation and the Foundation for Baltic and East European Studies for backing the projects.

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PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I draw on some works produced in the first project, including those written by myself or co-authored. In the other project, in addition to the edited volume Close and Distant: Political Executive–Media Relations in Four Countries (Nordicom, 2019), co-edited by myself and one of the first fruits of this collaborative project, I have, among other works on which this monograph also draws in some places, co-authored articles with two project colleagues: Elena Johansson (Along the government– media frontier: Press secretaries offline/online, Journal of Public Affairs, 2021) and Tapio Raunio (Centralizing Government Communication? Evidence from Finland and Sweden, Politics & Policy, 2020). I am also grateful to Milda Malling, Ph.D. Candidate in the project and now a Ph.D. She conducted all interviews with journalists, together we carried out most interviews with Swedish press secretaries. My thanks also go to all the interviewees for their time and insights. Some of them have been particularly helpful. For insightful comments and suggestions, and support, I wish to thank the series editors and anonymous reviewers of Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership and the editorial team of Palgrave Macmillan. Stockholm, Sweden July 2022

Karl Magnus Johansson

Contents

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Introductory Framework 1.1 The State of the Art—And Beyond 1.2 Aim and Research Questions 1.3 Argument and Contribution 1.4 Research Design and Data 1.5 Overview of the Book Bibliography

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Theoretical Explanations of Prime Minister Empowerment: Towards a Unified Theory of Centralization 2.1 Reasons Behind Prime Minister Empowerment: Contingent and Structural Explanations 2.2 Media as an Important Reason Contributing to Institutional Change and Power Redistribution in Governments 2.3 The Drive for Unitary Government Communication 2.4 The Logic of Centralization Bibliography

1 6 13 14 15 19 20

27 29

34 43 49 53

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CONTENTS

The Swedish Experience: Reinforcement of Central Government and the Significance of Media 3.1 How the Swedish Prime Minister Has Been Empowered 3.2 The Emerging Government Communication System: A Movement Towards a Unified Approach Bibliography Conclusions

Index

61 63 73 85 91 99

CHAPTER 1

Introductory Framework

Systems of national governance are changing, as are the conceptions by which we explore them but maybe not enough. Whereas communication has long been a central function of national governments, the past decades have witnessed a gradual shift from fairly rudimentary forms to more complex forms of government communication. This book analyses the reasons behind, and consequences of, the evolving government communication system. It is an examination of how the executive, and especially the prime minister, responds to the pressures of media. This book explores this topic. The book also develops a logic of centralization, which points to a drive for control and coordination from the executive centre. Hence the sub-title of this book. A related trend is the upsizing of government communication systems. Recent decades have witnessed the spread of media platforms and the emergence, evolution, and adoption of institutional arrangements among governments for communication. While existing scholarship can tell us a lot about the specific trajectories of these arrangements in a few single cases, notably the Anglo-American systems of Australia, Britain, Canada, and the United States, we know less about their patterns, sources, and implications in a broader set of countries. Several themes run through this book but its central theme is framed around the nexus between the prime minister and the media. This is the major theme around which the book revolves. This nexus is conceptualized in the context of existing research and the broader research problems © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. M. Johansson, The Prime Minister-Media Nexus, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12152-4_1

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this book addresses. The book centres on the intersection of political institutions and communications in central government. Its major concern is the effect that the media has on governments in terms of organization and power. Governments are organizations and systems of communication and will change in interacting with the continually changing media environment. I look under the hood of the Swedish government. I explore the shape and the trajectory of its government communication system. The book documents a movement of communications towards the core of government. Increasingly, major communications of the government go through the executive centre. Human resources have increased gradually and a lot and now, since 2014, all government press secretaries are employed by the prime minister’s office. Over the course of several decades, the organization of government communication in Sweden, as in many other countries around the world, has changed significantly, reflecting a dominant logic of centralization. Beyond power concerns, a crucial motive has been to increase functional efficiency. Media has contributed to the permanent change in government. I identify an ongoing process of centralization. More broadly, these are not developments that have escaped students of government and political communication. Over the past decade, political science and political communication scholars have paid increasing attention to government communication in its different aspects.1 While I appreciate these efforts as a useful first stage in research on the topic, I find the existing state of the field unsatisfactory. Empirical research is still dominated by largely descriptive single-case studies of institutions, systems, or processes, while comparative and theory-driven contributions are in short supply. Most studies remain engaged in the exercise of mapping and describing the involvement of actors or structures, but few attempts have been made to systematically develop and test theoretical explanations or explain variation in government communications. The normative implications of empirical findings are not often spelled out. Growing out of this dissatisfaction with the present status of the field, this

1 Back in 2012, María José Canel and Karen Sanders proclaimed that government

communication was an emerging field in political communication research. By 2013, they described it as a curiously neglected field, especially as political communication as such was an expanding field. In 2016, they noted that scholarly work examining government communication as such was “extremely limited” (Canel and Sanders 2016: 452). Government communication is an ongoing area of research for them.

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book proposes a systematic exploration of how, why, and with what consequences prime ministers, as political chief executives, are empowered by media (each question is discussed in more detail in Sect. 1.2). The book reflects in part my quest for improved knowledge of government communication especially in its institutional aspects and effects. This also reflects an effort to advance a unified theory of government communication. The study also feeds into the debate on redistribution of power in executives. The rationale of government communication institutions, and the staff within them, is not just to provide information but also the political purpose they fill. Public communication, in the public eye, involves efforts to exert influence over news coverage. Government communication is not just about communication, it is also about politics. Therefore, any study of these phenomena should draw from different academic fields and literatures. This book revisits the classic relationship between politics and the media, and it is worth revisiting. As Street (2021: xviii) emphasizes, at its heart the relationship between politics and media “is a power relationship. There are two dimensions to this: there is the power over the media— what gets shown or reported—and there is power of the media—what gets changed by the media." Dealing with both power over the media and power of the media, with both dimensions, the literature on politics and the media is vast (and the same could be said of the comparative politics literature on governance/government).2 It includes works comparing institutional relationships between media and politics, or within government, and the effect of such relationships (e.g., Pfetsch 2008, 2014). Yet, in political communication scholarship interest lies more in the power of the media than power over the media and in the evolution of political communication in a changing media environment (e.g., Esser and Pfetsch 2020; Mazzoleni and Cepernich 2020). In one of his influential works, Castells (2009: 194) points out the fact that politics is essentially played out in the media does not imply that the media are the power-holders; they are not the Fourth Estate but “much more important,” as they are “the space of power-making” the media constitute “the space where power relationships are decided between competing political and social actors.” Castells (2009: 10) 2 One more recent contribution, and contributions therein, is the volume Media and governance edited by Schillemans and Pierre (2019), dealing with media and governance, the role of news media in complex systems of governance, broadly conceived.

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defines power as “the relational capacity that enables a social actor to influence asymmetrically the decisions of other social actor(s) in ways that favor the empowered actor’s will, interests, and values.” What is valued and institutionalized is defined by power relationships. Power (or influence) then is relational but may also be part of a broader discourse, whether or not through social networks. Discursive power—in contemporary media systems which are in transition—means impacts on political discourse (Jungherr et al. 2019). These relationships encompass dependencies between actors and institutions, including media organizations. But the question of how media influences government is not one dominating political communication research on media and politics. There is relatively little on the organizational dimension of government communication, on the processes by which these structures are derived and their effects on the distribution of resources and power. Media have a strong preference for high-profile senders and elite sources. They may be delegitimated but more likely legitimated. The media legitimizes political authorities. As Bourdieu (2011: 69–70) noted, it also works through the, he claimed exceptional, “symbolic power given to state authorities to define, by their actions, their decisions, and their entry into the journalistic field (interviews, press conferences, and so on), the journalistic agenda and the hierarchy of importance assigned to events.” Prime ministers are claimed to benefit from the extent to which media nurtures a focus on personalities in politics. To prime ministers, media serves a useful purpose as a leadership or power resource (e.g., Heffernan 2006; Helms 2005, 2008, 2012b; Seymour-Ure 2003). The prime minister is—literally and metaphorically—at the centre of it all. As Doyle (2020: 382) notes in an overview of the large amount of work that measures either presidential or prime ministerial power, the study of politics is, in its most basic form, the study of power. It is about the distributional battles that shape society and the relative power of different actors and groups to control and influence political outcomes. Central to such political conflicts is the head of government, or the executive…

To revisit the relationship between politics and the media is important not least because of what it says about the distribution of resources and

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power in government, as well as about the functioning of the government overall. Regardless of what kind of political system and what kind of media, whether traditional media or social media, those with the most power and resources are inherently newsworthy. In other words, “power leads to media access” (Wolfsfeld 2022: 8). Some political actors are more powerful than others and therefore receive more media attention (e.g., van Dalen 2012; Vos and Van Aelst 2018). This book uses previous research as a backdrop for re-examining the relationship between government and media. It joins other contributions in showing tendencies towards centralization through attempts at central control of government communication, involving tight message control, and how this development is driven by media (e.g., Garland 2021; Kolltveit and Shaw 2022; Marland et al. 2017). There are a large number of issues and areas that come together in the relationship between politics and media. The book deals with media to the extent that it does, or may, have effect on politics and implications for the question of prime ministerial power. I use the term media to denote the broad range of components of media communications. In the analysis, I do not differentiate among traditional or legacy media and social media but treat them all as “media.” I will continue this discussion in Chapter 2 (Sect. 2.2). This book has a particular focus on government communication. Based on a reading of the literature I define government communication broadly as the structures, practices, and processes of central government institutions in their communication aspects (cf., Canel and Sanders 2013: 4, 2014: 104, 2016: 450; see also Sanders 2009, 2020; more in Sect. 2.2). This definition includes both conceptual and functional aspects and with a focus on central executive government communication, which always has a political dimension and in this sense is always political communication. One key function is news management of political public relations (Arceneaux et al. 2020). The definition involves central governmental structures in the first instance, that is, state authority structures. This means that government communication by definition has an important organizational and hierarchical dimension. Hence, this study focusses on central government communication, encompassing the executive as the

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cabinet, the prime minister’s office, the line ministries, and all units for communication at this central governmental level.3 This introductory chapter proceeds in five steps. In the next section, I review the state of the art—seeing beyond—in three bodies of literature in political science and public administration. I briefly describe what one finds in terms of the three research questions of this book. In the subsequent section, I present the aim and research questions. Next, I introduce the argument and contribution. I then describe the research design and data. In the final section, I provide an overview of the book.

1.1

The State of the Art---And Beyond

In addition to political communication literature, the topic of this book, its major theme, and argument, relates to three bodies of literature in political science and public administration: political leadership, institutional design in government, and the role of advisers in politics. Studies of these strands of research should be closely connected. In none of them does prime ministerial power and the media constitute the central analytical concern, but in all three we can nowadays find contributions that speak to this topic. Below, I engage with these three bodies of literature in terms of how they expand the research agenda on how, why, and with what consequences media affects governments and particularly the standing of prime ministers.4 The first literature addresses political leadership; public leadership is occasionally more confined to executive leadership, in single cases or comparatively. Political leadership continues to be one of the most central questions in the analysis of politics. In any society or state, some shall be the leaders or rulers. The literature on political leadership is extensive, partly because—as Elgie (2015) notes—it deals with both personality and context, agency and structure or institutional, aspects of leadership (e.g., Bennister et al. 2017; Elgie 1995, 2015, 2018; Helms 2005, 2012a,

3 This excludes other public sector organizations, notably administrative agencies, and therefore also the literature on communications relating to such organizations. In Sweden, public sector administrative agencies are formally independent and not, as in most other countries, forming an integrated whole with ministries. 4 There is no space and in fact no need to enter a more detailed discussion of these three bodies of literature. I will return to core aspects of each in subsequent chapters.

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2014; Rhodes and ‘t Hart, 2014; Strangio et al. 2013).5 One type of factor has to do with the personal characteristics and ambitions of the individual leaders. Beyond the person of the leader, the study of political leadership also debates issues of structures and institutions, such as the importance of the institutional context in which leaders operate. There is also a strand of research that explores the studies of political leadership in a comparative perspective. Both empirically and theoretically contributions to this literature are predominantly influenced by questions of why some political leaders, including presidents and prime ministers, are stronger or more successful than others. That includes questions related to autonomy of leaders, whether there has been a trend in the direction of greater leadership autonomy within and across types of democratic system. Broadly speaking, leadership autonomy, a sub-dimension in the study of executive power and leadership, describes the extent to which a single government leader can act on behalf of the government. A special focus is on a possible “presidentialization” of political leadership— of party or executive (Elgie and Passarelli 2020; Poguntke and Webb 2005; Passarelli 2015). A recent study shows that governing parties have become more dependent on their prime ministers, and that the control of political parties over the process of government has been declining while political leaders have gained political weight (Müller-Rommel et al. 2022). Political leadership is shaped by a number of different circumstances. Political leadership is also shaped to a significant degree by environmental factors that are possible to influence. This includes the constitutional system. Compared to the parliamentary form of government, the scope for individual leadership is much greater in the presidential system, where the main political leader, the president, is in a direct relationship with the electorate. Parliamentary democracy is in practice a political government realized with the help of parties. In order to function well, it presupposes cohesion within the parties and that different representatives of one and the same party have the ability to submit to the common party line. This is especially true for the parties that hold government power. In general,

5 A good place to start is the wide-reaching volume edited by Rhodes and ‘t Hart (2014), The Oxford Handbook of Political Leadership. This Handbook—impressive as it is—contains references to media or mediatization, personalization, and presidentialization, but no systematic treatment of the theme of media and prime ministers. Yet we learn a lot about the challenges on political leadership and on the study of it.

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various parties have increasingly become identified with their leaders, rather than with their policies or ideas. The design of the electoral system also affects the character of political leadership. In a majority electoral system, the individual politicians appear as clear representatives of their parties. The electoral system is rather based on a kind of personification of politics. Leadership is impossible without communication. In a political communication context, as a political communication process, political leadership involves the leader–public opinion–media “triangle” (Barisione 2016: 636). And communication requires resources. Political leaders, among them prime ministers, exist in an environment necessitating media management and public relations. Regardless of what kind of political system they find themselves in, prime ministers have to handle and interact with the media and need to organize for media and public affairs. That requires prime ministers to possess resources for purposes of effective day-to-day media management. That is required of prime ministerial leadership. The institutional adaptation to the media makes the system of government more hierarchical, in particular, by building up the prime minister’s office at the centre. Prime ministers play an unavoidable communications role, partly out of choice and partly out of necessity, and participation in the media may enable them to enhance their power. While most of the literature have been focussing on the personality and other dimensions of leadership, less has been written about how political leaders organize for the media. The approach here, in this book, is mainly institutional. Political leaders work within institutions, which shapes how much room to manoeuvre these leaders have. Institutions, then, are the foundations on which the study of political leadership should be based. Political leaders have many levers of institutional power at their disposal and have the standing and resources needed to organize their campaigns and respond to opponents, the public, and the media. To that end, they rely on different kinds of media. Yet there is relatively little in the political leadership literature systematically on government communication in its different aspects. Similarly, we do not find a vast literature on how governments design their institutions for the media. The second literature centres on the topic of institutional design in government . I here use the term broadly to denote the organizing or the shape of the organizational structure of governments (cf., Blondel 1982). Whereas the early work on the organization of governments was

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largely descriptive, with some of it examining the preconditions for robust institutional solutions, researchers have turned their attention to issues of institutional design (e.g., Goodin 1996). Theoretically, most of this research is informed by a rationalist perspective, which suggests that governments create and design institutions in order to solve functional problems and certain dilemmas that impede coordination and decisionmaking and in order to achieve goals. These institutions may simply emerge and evolve naturally, or they can be the product of conscious design. Either way, there is a functional necessity demand. Empirically, this literature pays special attention to the delegation of authority within institutions and to the effects of variation in institutional design of governments. Several strands of research can be situated in this broad literature, such as research on central government administration and the “core executive” which encompasses all functions and structures of the government machine (Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990; Elgie 2011; Kolltveit and Shaw 2022; Peters et al. 2000; Rhodes 2008, 2011; Rhodes and Dunleavy 1995). Parts of the government communication literature are relevant here as well, but so far research in this area has largely refrained from addressing government communication as a dimension of institutional design. More specifically, we find a link between leadership and coordination; illustrated in the literature on institutional design in governments’ core executive. Coordination is a central function of government and across the machinery of government, either horizontally or vertically (Peters 1998). Coordination involves the extent of attempts at common action across different political levels and across different internal arenas. Coordination is related to centralization but thus extends to horizontal as well as vertical relations. Coordination can lead to centralization, but this is not an inevitable effect. Christensen and Lægreid (2020) describe a tendency towards enhanced coordination and note that hierarchical command is the most common coordination mechanism in central government, but network arrangements are also common. Executive coordination, involving mechanisms to encourage coherence, and central policy coordinating in its various aspects is examined in research (e.g., Blondel 1982; Bouckaert et al. 2010; Christensen and Lægreid 2020; Davies 1997; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017; Premfors and Sundström 2007; Rhodes 2008, 2011). Coordination can be seen as a process of managing dependencies. Components of coordination include resource allocation.

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Coordination may have an important power dimension in that it can privilege some structures or actors over others, thereby create or reinforce asymmetries. This research deals mainly with policy coordination, including the role of the administration, whereas there is relatively little on coordination of communications. This is despite the link between policy and presentation, including information processing, and how communications matter for the government and for the prime minister’s public communication (Seymour-Ure 2003: 11). Nowadays there is coordination machinery not just for policy but also for communications. Such coordination in the core executive is inherently political in nature. In the Swedish case, the government’s collective decision-making places high demands on coordination (Premfors and Sundström 2007: 203). This means that there must be an appropriate organization to correspond to the importance of coordination. In a political system with a ministerial government, there is normally not the same political pressure for the government to act uniformly on a specific issue. Here we have a difference between countries that can be important for governments’ communication as a structure and process. Further, research from Sweden shows that each policy field has its own basic organizational structure or “institutional design” in which the administration performs its daily activities (Jacobsson et al. 2015: 45). However, reforms and reformers typically stress that states need to behave as though they were controlled and coordinated, that they need to “speak with one voice” (ibid.: 38). Accordingly, changes in state structures and procedures are often made in order to increase the state’s capacity to control. It suggests that, amid tendencies towards fragmentation, more resources are linked to a growth of executive capacity. There are increasing pressures for centralization as chief executives confront functional pressure for organizational structures and coordination mechanisms. That involves the extent and distribution of resources including staff resources of individual governments and leaders. The way institutions are designed may have important consequences for the distribution of resources and power within organizations. We can expect such consequences to be common to executives in parliamentary government. Inevitably, there will be power asymmetries in a government. The third literature focusses on the role of advisers in politics, who are an important resource for political leaders. The question of whether advisers in politics matter, and, if so, how they matter, has generated

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growing interest over the past decades. Most of the literature on the role of advisers in the executive branch, on such professional nonelected political actors in government offices, usually addresses the relationship between political/special advisers and elected politicians and/or civil servants (Bakvis 1997; Blick and Jones 2013; Craft 2016; Eichbaum and Shaw 2008, 2010; Esselment et al. 2014; Hustedt et al. 2017; Hustedt and Salomonsen 2017; Müller-Rommel 1993; Ng 2018, 2020; Plowden 1987; Shaw and Eichbaum 2018; Svallfors 2020; Weller 1991; Yong and Hazell 2014). While communication is one aspect of the job, notably the presentation of policy, the media advisory role has received relatively little attention in this literature by media and communication scholars and political scientists alike. But media advisers have not gone unnoticed (see Johansson and Johansson 2021; Kolltveit 2021 and Marland 2016 for rare contributions; see also Figenschou et al. 2017, 2022 and Marland et al. 2017).6 As Ng (2020: 514) points out, there is less focus on the media–politics dimension, and “the roles of media advisers remain relatively understudied compared to their policy-based counterparts, with limited exceptions…” More specifically, a strand of research looks at prime ministerial advisory structures (for an excellent overview, to date, see Eichbaum and Shaw 2014). So far, however, research in this area has largely refrained from addressing communication or media advisers (but see Blick and Jones 2013; Müller-Rommel 1993; Plowden 1987; Seymour-Ure 1991, 2003; Tiernan 2006; Weller 1991).7 In general, the 6 Figenschou et al. (2022) conceptualize contemporary communication professionals in government ministries and develop two ideal types: the government information provider and government spin doctor. The study reported in the article shows that these nonpartisan communication professionals in Norwegian ministries for loyalties and reputational concerns resemble the government information provider and for interactions and tasks they resemble the government spin doctor. It illustrates how certain configurations will bring forth inbuilt tension in communication professionals’ role. In the Norwegian case, politicization pressure seems to be connected to professional interactions and relationships, as communication professionals work very closely with the political leadership and in the daily tasks pitch stories to selected reporters, by playing on news values such as personalization, conflict, and so on. These findings lead to improved knowledge of communication professionals, broadly categorized, and thereby help to advance an important research agenda. It also joins other recent contributions in showing attempts at central control of government communication. 7 The volume edited by Shaw and Eichbaum (2018) addresses advisory roles but, more below, media advisers are only mentioned in the chapter on Germany and, relatively little, in the chapters on Denmark and the UK. This is all the more surprising given the key role of media advisers in those executive systems. The Sweden chapter in that book does

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focus is on the ways in which advice to prime ministers is organized and how prime ministers’ advisory structures have changed, and often have undergone significant changes. Amid change, scholars point to substantial differences, and considerable variety, across national cases. One important source of advice for a prime minister is the media adviser. One element of the media advisory role concerns presentational advice. Media advisers are an obvious part of prime ministerial staff. That reflects the prime minister’s advisory needs. These are also signs of centralizing tendencies. In the UK, Seymour-Ure (1991, 2003) found that press secretaries as executive staffs, the institutionalization of the office of press secretary to prime ministers, contributed to the ongoing process of centralization. More recently, Ng (2020: 516) concludes, from an overview of the literature, “how chief executives can control the policy agenda through a process of centralization in their private offices, as well as the politicization of advice through the strategic appointment and deployment of political advisers.” Ng (2020: 516) further concludes that it is clear that political advisers “wield immense power and are now a permanent and enduring feature of executive government.” In Sweden, as in many other countries around the world, media advisers are integral to how each prime minister dealt with the media. This literature on advisers in politics yield many important empirical results but contribute less theoretically. I encourage more attempts at developing explanatory frameworks of how we may explain routinization and conditions for the influence of these advisers, including media advisers. We still know little about their influence over policy. The advisers are not all the same or equally influential. In summary, I can identify important contributions to research within a set of separate literatures. Yet, taken together, these literatures are not sufficiently connected. When it comes to the emerging field of government communication contributions are too few, too disparate, and too under-theorized to qualify as more than the first stage in research on this topic. The next stage, I suggest, maybe a systematic inquiry into how, why, and with what consequences media affects the government in its communication aspects. This book takes a step in that direction—empirically as well as theoretically. not refer specifically to media advisers but mentions, almost in passing, “press secretaries”; indeed, the survey does not include political advisers at the prime minister’s office because they were negative to the project.

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Aim and Research Questions

The major aim of this book is to explore the prime minister–media nexus; the nexus between media and prime minister empowerment and to explore how media may have such an effect. The book is guided by the overarching three-part question of how, why, and with what consequences prime ministers are empowered by media. Parts of that three-part question are not easy to answer, not least because there are other factors at play and because ongoing shifts in institutions and relationships may occur as I write. The study has descriptive or exploratory (how government communication is structured) and explanatory (which factors explain the degree of observed centralization) objectives. The book involves an ambition to both explore causal relationships, establish dominant patterns, and address broader implications. That in turn reflects an ambition to both introduce and develop relevant strands of research, separately or combined, and also to stimulate more interdisciplinary research among scholars particularly from political science, public administration, political communication, and especially government communication. The book also involves an ambition to learn more about causal mechanism and dynamics at work through an in-depth study of the Swedish case, and to learn more about the case itself. The analysis reveals a process of state restructuring. How do media empower prime ministers? We know from previous research that there are high levels of prime minister participation in media. Yet to what extent has this involvement translated into an institutional change in government? The changing nature of government communication, an underexplored area, is explored through the mapping of its structures and resources over time. Why do media empower prime ministers? Taking the step beyond descriptive mapping, this book introduces and assesses theories and hypotheses about the factors that shape institutions and particularly the office of prime minister within a national case, as well as over time. Do these patterns reflect the lessons from previous research and other cases, or are these patterns more the product of distinctive features of the national case? What are the consequences of prime minister empowerment for the political system and the legitimacy of democracy? Shifting from patterns and causes to effects, this book lastly discusses the normative implications of empirical research. Is the growth of capacity of national executive institutions to deal with media and communications and the centralizing

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tendency detrimental to the democratic legitimacy of the institutions of governance?

1.3

Argument and Contribution

A brief statement of three points will give a first look at the argument. First, governments are institutions. This means, among other things, that they have durability. But institutions may change. Second, cabinets consist of ministers and prime ministers (heads of government). Everywhere there is some degree of power asymmetry within cabinets. Third, prime ministers depend on a set of resources. As a result, there may be a centralizing tendency in the executive branch. I advance the argument that prime ministerial empowerment is partly driven by a centralizing logic that emanates from the functional and growing need for control of information and media management from the executive centre, the prime minister’s office. The media generates functional and continual pressures that consolidate the trend of centralization towards the executive centre. It involves the adaptation of procedures and practices to the functional prerequisites of media, with implications for institutional and power relations within the executive. The extent to which media generates functional pressures for institutional change, this book suggests, is a product of the conferral of authority, discretion and resources on prime ministers (more in Sect. 2.2). The result will be the centralization of the government and prime ministers reinforced by the media. The explanatory power of this argument is tested empirically through a case study of media-induced institutional change extending the prime minister’s power in Sweden. The academic study of prime ministers and the media in Sweden has not been extensive either (for a rare contribution, in historical perspective, focussing on former prime minister Olof Palme, see Björk 2006). This book offers a systematic analysis of the role of media in shaping the emergence of communication structures among governments and particularly the standing of prime ministers. It involves long-term change in institutions and in shifts in the institutional power balance within the executive branch. Several writers have argued that prime ministers have gained power. My book both introduces and challenges the established literature. As opposed to existing research heavily dominated by a focus on the individual and the personalization of the prime minister, my account centres on institutions and their link to media as well as the core

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of government. That sets this book apart from existing research. My book goes beyond existing research in two additional and central respects. First, it offers an analysis integrating assumptions and findings derived from several bodies of literature and also by combining disciplines. Second, it goes deeper into the specification and analysis of how media or communications may influence government institutions and redistribute power. It is here that the project also makes an important theoretical contribution to institutional change analysis.

1.4

Research Design and Data

In this section, I explain my data and research design including case selection. The Swedish case is not very well known internationally. As noted above, the academic study of prime ministers and the media in Sweden has not been extensive. The explanatory power of the argument is tested through this case study of prime ministerial empowerment in Sweden, drawing on a combination of primary and secondary material. I have chosen to study the Swedish case in-depth, for the purpose of tracing the operation of the causal mechanisms at a detailed level. The Swedish case presents two methodological advantages. To start with, Sweden is known for relatively open government with a tradition, also at cabinet and prime minister level, of openness vis-à-vis media actors. This means that additional resources are needed for governmental media relations and that potential transformative pressures of media on governmental institutional structures should be observable in Sweden, and institutional adaptation likely to have been gradual but identifiable. The case study offers an opportunity to isolate the effects of media, including access to the media arena, on institutional structures, while holding other contextual factors constant. In addition, Sweden presents a least-likely case for prime minister empowerment, partly because it has during the past several decades usually been, and is now from 2010, ruled by minority cabinets, which typically are more constrained than majority cabinets in relation to parliament, and partly because its executive by tradition operates according to norms of cabinet government, which prescribe collective decision-making, with more limited room for independent action by the prime minister than under prime ministerial government. Moreover, Sweden provides evidence that also historically strong state traditions are subject to far-reaching changes. Regarding media system

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or model of the media-state interaction, Sweden belongs to the democratic corporatist model (Hallin and Mancini 2004). One feature of this model is a strong public service tradition. It bears noting that today it is a radically different media environment from only a couple of decades ago. Yet in my analysis, I do not distinguish between traditional or legacy media and social media. While recognizing the role of social media, I prefer to keep my discussion of government communication at a more general level. In this book, the term government communication refers to all communication activities and media contacts of the prime minister’s office and the executive, social media included. From a government communication perspective, all kinds of media are (potentially) used as means to achieve certain goals. Given the growing political “personalization” of politics, a possible additional factor in greater communication centralization, the question arises if the contents that the prime minister’s office sends out relate more over time not to “policy” but rather to “personality” broadly speaking. In the final analysis, political communication is about the “content,” of government information and news items, which might be changing and may have changed with greater centralization of the communication process. As such, government communication is primarily about policy, not about the personalities or indeed about party policy. Hence, this is not a study of personalization which however is an essential part of the presidentialization of politics framework (see Sect. 2.1). I highlight those features of government communication that I consider most relevant in terms of potential empowerment of the prime minister. I use two empirical indicators: (1) the number and roles of media advisers in the prime minister’s office and (2) the organization of government communication, that is, whether it has become more centralized or not. The centralization of government communication is a good yardstick for whether the government more broadly is shifting into a centralization. More than that, it is a valuable indicator for observing relationships and how close staffers are to the top-level of the executive branch. The centralization of government communication is defined as the development of central administrative and political capacities tasked with managing and coordinating communications and media relations. It is a definition that recognizes the importance of structures and capacities, and may or may not encompass regular communication with audiences/citizens.

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In view of the empirical analysis, it is essential to explain how centralization or decentralization are measured.8 In his study of the communication structures of international organizations, Ecker-Ehrhardt (2018) emphasizes management tasks (primarily coordination and strategic planning of communication) and the establishment of specific organizational units or departments for carrying out communication.9 Adjusting his approach, I use two primary indicators. The first is the distribution of resources and division of labour between the prime minister’s office and the line ministries: whether the staff is de facto working for the prime minister’s office or the ministries,10 and how independent line ministries are vis-à-vis the prime minister’s office when carrying out communication duties. The second indicator focusses on professionalization and the extent to which the government and specifically the prime minister’s office utilizes (party-political) media advisers and other designated communication professionals and structures. The use of party-political media advisers is interpreted as a sign of professionalization and strategic planning or behaviour, as it indicates that the prime minister’s office and the cabinet as a whole are investing resources in news management and media relations. I explore these two indicators together. The more there is coordination and control by the prime minister’s office and the less line ministries carry out (important) communication, the more centralized the approach—and vice versa. A delegated communication structure where the line ministries have more important responsibilities can also qualify as a de facto centralized system, provided that there is active coordination from the prime minister’s office. It is also important to emphasize that it can be difficult to locate exactly where power lies or how much influence particular actors have, especially relating to developments over time. To maximize the reliability of the findings, to get behind the scenes, and to “go beyond plain numbers,” special attention was thus paid to the selection of the

8 Discussion based on Johansson and Raunio (2020: 1145–1146). 9 The study uses a novel data set on the organization of public communication in 48

international organizations between 1950 and 2015. To be precise, the measure of EckerEhrhardt (2018: 522–524) includes two dimensions: codification, the range of observed communication tasks assigned to central administration, and departmentalization, the degree to which these tasks are matched by organizational capacities. 10 In many countries, all or most government employees, including the communications staff, can work officially for the prime minister’s office/government, but most of them are nonetheless located in the line ministries.

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interviewees that, between them, possess considerable experience of how government communication has developed in Sweden. The case study summarizes a combination of existing secondary evidence and primary evidence drawn from official documents, archival material, memoirs or biographies, correspondence, and over 50 interviews with journalists, government press secretaries/media advisers, state secretaries, and high-level officials and politicians, among them a former prime minister and several former ministers.11 The interviewed press secretaries include both press secretaries connected to the centre-right governments from 2006 to 2014 and press secretaries to the social democratic–green government from 2014. Initially, a number of contacted persons were reluctant to stand for an interview. It may be due to tensions in the then coalition government, which took office in October 2014. But I had a series of interviews with press secretaries and also with state secretaries, all of whom were or had been state secretaries in the prime minister’s office. To supplement these data, the study also draws on a variety of governmental documents about communication structures, strategies, and coordination, particularly any information pertaining to the prime minister’s office. These documents were utilized to understand the formal structures of government communication and communication strategies of successive Swedish governments. The list of references includes only those official documents most relevant to my analysis. In addition, information requests were placed with the government of Sweden to obtain data concerning staff. Since the case study serves to provide a preliminary assessment of novel hypotheses, or relatively untested theoretical assumptions, it has the status of a plausibility probe (Eckstein 1975: 108–109; George and Bennett 2005: 75). It might be called an analytic narrative (Bates et al. 1998). Such analysis seeks to draw broad, applicable theoretical generalizations from specific historical examples or particular cases, from explanations of political outcomes in case studies. It uses close analysis of cases to illuminate important general issues. This case study allows me to engage in in-depth empirical analysis, while simultaneously isolating the influence of specific factors. At a more

11 All interviews were conducted by the author, most interviews with press secretaries together with then-PhD candidate Milda Malling who conducted all interviews with journalists. See Malling (2022).

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specific level, I engage in within-case analysis of media impacts on particular governmental institutions, within case, and across time. The case study is mainly limited to formal institutional design but captures informal aspects as well.

1.5

Overview of the Book

In concluding this introduction, an overview of the contents of the book might be in order in the context of the logic of the approach and analytical dimensions addressed and discussed earlier and through to the later part of the book. The overall organization of the book reflects this logic, the dimensions, and the research design described earlier. The book is based on the view that media-induced change in political organization and institutions, formal as well as informal, favours the development of a profound asymmetry in resources to the benefit of the executive centre. Therefore, the book is organized as a combination of analytical approaches and a dialogue between theory and data. The book is structured in four chapters that all reflect each other, each discussing the prime minister–media nexus in the conditions of institutional transformation and power shift. The three further chapters in the book extend from theoretical discussion through empirical analysis to concluding discussion. Chapter 2 returns to some of the concept specifications and continues the elaboration of the theoretical argument and analytical dimensions, specifying why and how media affects the organization of governments and intra-executive relations. I develop my theoretical argument about the link between the media and institutional change as well as the standing of prime ministers, with a particular focus on the authority, discretion, and resources of prime ministers. I discuss how these causal mechanisms work in combination, also with the factors of changing media structures, the logic of coalition governments, and horizontal coordination inside the executive branch. These causal mechanisms or factors, examined together, contribute to more centralized forms of communication in governments. I also discuss why we should expect government communication to be organized and developing in a particular way. Chapter 3, then, presents my case study of the effects of media on the government and on prime minister empowerment in Sweden. The focus turns to the country’s government communication system, its organization and resources. The chapter presents the results of the empirical analysis, which I underpin by using the qualitative interview data and

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other primary material, as well as secondary evidence. I examine how governments have been coping with the demands of media, and have adapted to meet the pressure from the media environment. The chapter ends with a discussion of why the Swedish government communication system is so centralized and why this dominant pattern is unlikely to change. I consider the consequences of the shift to a more centralized communications operation. Chapter 4 concludes the book by taking a closer look at the findings and by expanding on the broader implications of my results and argument. It returns to the major themes outlined in this introduction and discerns dominant patterns and the consequences of these patterns. In addition to summarizing the main findings in this book, I situate its contributions in terms of how they expand the research agenda on how, why, and with what consequences media affects governments and the standing of prime ministers. I identify lessons learned concerning theoretical approaches and their integration and pertinent new research questions. In doing so, I also identify areas in which additional work is most needed.

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CHAPTER 2

Theoretical Explanations of Prime Minister Empowerment: Towards a Unified Theory of Centralization

The position of prime ministers has always been an object of study in political science but has developed into an increasingly prominent theme of research (e.g., Doyle 2020; Goetz 2020; Müller 2020).1 Contributions to this literature broadly share the assessment that we have witnessed a growing concentration of power around prime ministers in recent decades, through a shift in the direction of the typical presidential mode of operation, implying greater executive power resources and autonomy for leaders (e.g., Peters et al. 2000a; Poguntke and Webb 2005a; Pryce 1997; Webb and Poguntke 2013). In this vein, Webb and Poguntke (2005: 332) conclude, on the basis of comparative case studies across 12 democracies, that there is ample evidence for a presidentialization of the executive in modern democracies.2 Although to a varying degree, this conclusion extends to all three faces of presidentialization: the electoral face, the executive face, and the party face. They further conclude that this seems to hold irrespective of regime-types, across consensus and majoritarian democracies and across both federal and unitary states, and 1 For necessary delimitation reasons, I have omitted the broader literature on political executives and chief executives, that is governments and government leaders. I have also chosen not to elaborate on the various objections to presidentialization research; either specific critique or more general criticisms of the presidentialization thesis (e.g., Bäck et al. 2009; Dowding 2013a, b; Heffernan 2013). 2 The volume includes a chapter on Sweden, by Nicholas Aylott; also offering support for presidentalization.

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. M. Johansson, The Prime Minister-Media Nexus, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12152-4_2

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even where parties are most strongly institutionalized (ibid.: 347). While the level of presidentialization will vary from face to face, and will certainly be constrained by institutional settings, they (ibid.) feel confident overall, in view of the evidence set out in the book, that it is reasonable to talk of the “presidentialization” of contemporary democracy. Beyond personalities, such presidentialization is structurally induced (Poguntke and Webb 2005b: 21). Everywhere, it seems, prime ministers have become more powerful as a result of the institutional resources and structures that have grown up around them. The reinforcement of the executive centre in contemporary parliamentary systems is likely to be irreversible, as a combination of factors perpetuate trends of centralization. This chapter is mainly connected to the “executive face” of Poguntke and Webb’s highly influential presidentialization concept (see also Doyle 2020; Elgie and Passarelli 2020). The chapter develops my theoretical argument about the link between the media and prime minister empowerment. I develop my argument in four sections. In the first section, I review contingent and structural explanations advanced in existing research that claims the position of prime ministers has been reinforced. In the second section, I then elaborate my argument about the effects of media on the standing of prime ministers, outlining the causal mechanisms through which media contributes to institutional change in government. In contrast to existing research on this phenomenon, I present the specifications of why media empowers prime ministers at the expense of other political actors, drawing mainly on variants of institutional theory (in political science). I explain why the media, in general and given its properties, may have generated such consequences. In the third section, I explain why the drive for unity in government communication in general and particularly in coalition governments, in conjunction with horizontal coordination, is a contributing reason for centralization. Complementary to the functional pressures, there are the political motivations pertaining to cabinet unity that also pushes government communication upward. To the extent that such unity in outward communications is a concern, it is also media-induced, at least partly. Finally, in the fourth section, I turn to a conceptual underpinning of the theoretical logic termed “logic of centralization.” This logic is then applied in the subsequent analysis of the Swedish case in Chapter 3.

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2.1 Reasons Behind Prime Minister Empowerment: Contingent and Structural Explanations In this section, I review contingent and structural explanations of presidentialization of politics or prime minister empowerment advanced in existing research. The explanations advanced to account for this phenomenon emphasize a range of contingent and structural factors best conceived of as complementary (Poguntke and Webb 2005b: 13–17; see also, e.g., King 1994; Kolltveit 2014; Peters et al. 2000b; Vercesi 2020). Contingent explanations centre on factors that are claimed to have reinforced the position of prime ministers, but are short-term and context-specific in nature. Accounts privileging the personality of prime ministers, government and state leaders, and their idiosyncrasies, suggest that the leadership styles of particular prime ministers explain their dominance on the political scene (e.g., Fabbrini 2011; Foley 2000; Helms 2005). This interpretation has frequently been advanced in relation to the influential positions of, for instance, Margaret Thatcher, Tony Blair, Silvio Berlusconi, Helmut Kohl, Gerhard Schröder, Angela Merkel, Anders Fogh Rasmussen, and Göran Persson (Sweden’s prime minister from 1996 to 2006, see Chapter 3). This explanation is closely linked to the media factor, expanded as below. Explanations favouring the domestic political context, including the party-political context, suggest that the powerful position of certain prime ministers can be attributed to the specific majoritarian environment in which they operate (e.g., Bergman et al. 2019, 2021; Bergman and Strøm 2011; Blondel and Müller-Rommel 1988, 1993; Müller-Rommel and Vercesi 2020; Müller and Strøm 2000; Strøm et al. 2003, 2008). Notably, prime ministers heading one-party majority governments are more likely to have powerful positions and dominate domestic politics than prime ministers either heading minority governments or relying on multi-party coalition majorities. Thus, the parliamentary basis is an important feature possibly affecting concentration of power in cabinet (Kolltveit 2014: 270; see also Kolltveit 2012, 2015).3 Prime ministerial 3 Kolltveit (2014: 268, 280) notes that “concentration of power” implies weakened collegiality in cabinet decision making, but also that the term indicates that not only prime ministers have become more important in cabinet decision-making. Between cabinet government and prime ministerial government are the examples where small groups of

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power certainly is related to if running a minority or majority government, if it is a government involving a single party, or is some sort of coalition. Research on coalitions in European parliamentary democracies suggests that coalition politics and corresponding variations in intracabinet decision-making procedures should be taken into account when studying the sweeping and large-scale trend of presidentialization. One reason is that the impact from short-term conditions can be difficult to distinguish from the long-term ones.4 Research shows how presidentialization, involving centralized power and increased autonomy, varies with coalition politics. Party politics is given a major role in explaining variation in intra-cabinet decision-making over time (Strøm et al. 2003). Yet there are also coalition governance systems that are heavily dominated by the prime minister (Bergman et al. 2019, 2021). Someone has to rule and arbitrate between conflicting positions in the cabinet. It must be the prime minister, the chief executive. And as I shall argue below, in the next section, coalition governance can in fact provide powerful incentives for centralizing government communication to the prime minister’s office. Moving beyond contingent factors, structural explanations centre on major societal change and long-term, deep-seated trends in society, state, and politics that are claimed to favour the position of prime ministers. Accounts privileging the internationalization of politics emphasize how governing through intergovernmental negotiations and leader-centred summitry shifts power to those actors with exclusive access to these arenas, typically, prime ministers and their key advisers, and, occasionally, other cabinet members (e.g., Andeweg et al. 2020; Helms 2008, 2012; Johansson and Tallberg 2010; King 1994; Moravcsik 1994; Peters et al. 2000a). By transforming issues that were previously subject to the principles of domestic politics into foreign policy, internationalization favours executives, and especially chief executives, at the expense of legislatures which can only ratify decisions taken elsewhere (Poguntke and Webb 2005b: 13–14; Webb and Poguntke 2005: 350). As suggested by Helms (2012: 666, n. 7), the increased visibility and prominence of political chief

ministers dominate the decision-making process. Concentration of power might thus imply that both prime ministers and core ministers, like finance ministers, foreign ministers and coalition leaders in cabinet, have increased their power in cabinet decision making at the expense of the full cabinet. 4 I owe this point to suggestion by Professor Torbjörn Bergman, who has written extensively on coalition governance. See also Kolltveit (2014: 279).

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executives is not exclusively a result of an altered logic of media reporting (or new self-promotion strategies of leaders and political parties), but in particular the rise of international summitry has “created new platforms and responsibilities for political chief executives, which add to their public prominence and visibility…” This media exposure may serve to elevate and aggrandize chief executives. At the regular EU summits, the chief executives are at the centre of media attention. The interaction with the media before, during, and after the summits has evolved into a normal routine.5 Explanations focussing on the growth of the state suggest that the reinforcement of prime ministers constitutes a response to demands for coordination from the centre, as the state becomes increasingly complex and fragmented (e.g., Dahlström et al. 2011; Peters et al. 2000b). Fragmentation of the public sector has increased the need to strengthen coordination in the executive centre (see Chapter 1). Hence, the question is not if it is still fragmented government or reassertion of the centre, but instead how fragmentation contributes to such reassertion. Prime ministers have acquired additional economic and personnel resources to steer the fragmented institutional structures. The growing complexity of policymaking contributes to the re-empowerment of the political executive (Andeweg et al. 2020: 7). This calls for more coordination of the state apparatus, and it falls to the political executive to provide this coordination, strengthening its role (Peters et al. 2000b: 9–10). Coordination is needed. Public administration scholars have documented a clear increase in horizontal coordination by governments around the world. Mainly to counteract “ministerial government” or departmentalization of decision-making, where each minister controls issues under his or her jurisdiction, governments have introduced mechanisms that improve coordination between ministries. Such instruments include various intersectoral policy programmes, strategy documents, budgetary frameworks, or midterm review sessions. The horizontal coordination processes are, in most cases, led by the prime minister’s office. And even without such horizontal programmes, governments have invested resources in the steering capacity of the prime minister. This provides further incentives for centralizing communication to the prime minister’s office (see, e.g., Dahlström

5 This is clearly under-researched, and so is journalistic coverage of the EU more broadly.

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et al. 2011; Kolltveit 2014, 2015). Rather than diffusing authority, expansion of state functions and growing sectoral specialization or sectorization strengthen the executive, in this view. And all communication needs to reinforce the challenges of complexity and the tendency to centralize. Further, a development which is claimed to empower prime ministers is related to changing party systems and political parties. Accounts that centre on the erosion of traditional socio-political cleavages emphasize how politics has become increasingly leadership-centred, as social group identities and voter loyalties have weakened (e.g., Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2022; Cross et al. 2018; Dalton and Wattenberg 2000; Dalton et al. 2011; Garzia et al. 2022; Panebianco 1988; Passarelli 2015; Rahat and Kenig 2018; Scarrow et al. 2017). Political parties, as a result, have been transformed from membership organizations into campaign organizations, becoming more like empty shells centred around party leaders. Theories of parties or presidentialization develop the idea that party leaders are becoming more autonomous of their activists and members (Farrell and Webb 2000; Mughan 2000; Passarelli 2015; Poguntke and Webb 2005b; Scarrow et al. 2017; Webb et al. 2012; Webb and Poguntke 2013). The transformation involves fragmentation of Western European party systems; their deinstitutionalization as a result of greater party system instability and unpredictability between voters and states, leading to the rise of new parties and the reshaping of party systems (Chiaramonte and Emanuele 2022). Panebianco (1988) described a movement to what he called the electoral-professional party. It was a movement that also reflected major societal changes, including in communications, affecting the division of power within parties, upwards. This type of political party in part reflects the increasing professionalization of party organizations in their communication functions, with parties internally more dominated by professionals and not least communication professionals. This development means a deinstitutionalization of political parties and that in turn would make it easier not only for party leaders to implement change in the parties, in their organization and policies, but also to increase their room for manoeuvre in general and then also when it comes to communication. Again, communication has become increasingly important and governing leaders need discretion also from their parties to respond to the media. From the evidence of the growing centralization of parties, it might also be tempting to conclude that party leaderships are becoming more autonomous from their parties. This is not a new phenomenon. Parties generally became increasingly controlled from the

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top, and power shifted upwards in the parties. As a result, the party leadership gained more autonomy. It is a development that is reinforced by different kinds of media. Add to that empirical evidence of the personalization of politics in a number of parliamentary democracies, as observed by a range of researchers (see below). Finally, along the same lines, explanations privileging the logic of modern media or the changing structure of mass communication (Poguntke and Webb), the media factor in its broadest terms, stress the extent to which media and especially electronic media and television nurtures a focus on personalities in politics, rather than on programmes and issues (e.g., Foley 2000; Holtz-Bacha et al. 2014; Karvonen 2010; Krauss and Nyblade 2005; Kriesi 2012; Langer 2007, 2011; Langer and Sagarzazu 2018; Mancini 2011; McAllister 2007; Balmas and Sheafer 2013, 2016; Mughan 2000; Peters 2019; Poguntke and Webb 2005b; Rahat and Sheafer 2007; Street 2021; Van Aelst et al. 2012; Webb and Poguntke 2005, 2013). This development is claimed to benefit political leaders, notably government leaders, who become natural foci of media attention and often reinforce this development themselves by cultivating personal images tailored for modern media and for purposes of exposure. In this way, prime ministers make themselves the centre of attention. And assisted by a press directorate, including “spin doctors” or “image makers” as they are called—a necessary resource—prime ministers should be well-placed to benefit. This means that political leaders are not only subject to media attention but able to shape it. Thus, political leaders themselves are an active part of this development. As Langer (2007: 372; see also Langer 2011) emphasizes, “in combination, although responding to different motivations, both leaders and the media complement and reinforce each others’ personalising instincts.” In the words of Poguntke and Webb (2005b: 15): To be sure, it works both ways: to a degree the media require and force politicians to adapt to their logic and their format. Much of this so-called mediatization of modern politics, however, may be the result of conscious choice by politicians to exploit the visual media’s potential for simplification and symbolism for their own ends. Thus, governmental leaders may use the potential of modern media communications techniques to bypass other executive actors in setting political agendas.

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In this way, the media link may strengthen a leadership’s hold over decision-making as well as over agenda formation and political communication. This is an important point. These leaders have agency and may seek to alter the context conditions, including their institutional environment, for their own ends. Prime ministers, as a result, have been elevated and more likely to dominate politics and government. They have strong incentives to control the flow of information and news also from individual ministers and ministries—urged to keep the line—vis-à-vis the media and the public. To prime ministers, media serves a useful purpose as a leadership or power resource and they are interested because they could use it when it suits them. Based on the national case studies in the volume, Webb and Poguntke (2005: 348) conclude that the “macro-societal factor” of the so-called changing structure of mass communications “has a causal impact on all three faces of presidentialization.” In other words, it has an effect on the executive face, the party face, and the electoral face. In all, evidence from the country chapters gives them “considerable confidence about the likelihood of the media playing a significant part in the process of electoral presidentialization” (Webb and Poguntke 2005: 350; see also, e.g., Mughan 2000). However, it is not clear if it has a greater impact on any of these faces and, if so, how this variation may be explained. The effects of media on prime minister empowerment through the executive face also work through institutions. The next section continues this discussion.

2.2 Media as an Important Reason Contributing to Institutional Change and Power Redistribution in Governments While sharing important analytical affinities with accounts that privilege media or communications as a source of prime minister empowerment, I am dissatisfied with the existing status of this explanation for two reasons. First, there is a strong tendency in existing research to refer broadly to communications or media, or the mediatization of politics, broadly conceived, without specifying in detail what it is about this factor or process that empowers prime ministers at the expense of other political actors. In the book The Presidentialization of Politics, edited by Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb, media receives attention, more or less also in different country chapters, but there is little in terms of differentiating

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media and specifying causal mechanisms behind media effects on political executives and leadership. Second, where accounts offer such specifications, for instance by emphasizing the growing and changing role of the electronic media, they centre primarily on the ways in which media contributes to “personalization” generally and in elections campaigns specifically (see above), and on the easily observable media coverage of leaders and their visibility. The focus on individual leaders highlights their exclusive access to media arenas and how that may expand the room for manoeuvre of prime ministers and allow them to promote themselves and specific political agendas. Yet, as I argue, partly drawing on a claim made by Seymour-Ure (2003), the contribution of media to prime minister empowerment goes further than that. Most importantly, it extends to long-term changes in executive institutions and institutional relations. Prime ministers have incentives to concentrate news management in their offices. Such approach entails prime ministers have centralized and personalized governments’ media relations and, to the degree that they succeed in this approach, they have heightened their leverage both over parliament and their cabinet colleagues. I conceive of the institutional position of the prime minister as defined by two relationships: (1) the balance of power between the executive and the legislature and (2) the balance of power within the executive, between the prime minister and other cabinet members. It is the second relationship that is at the centre of attention in the empirical analysis. It bears noting, however, that the media has contributed to a change in the first relationship. As the media expects prompt answers, prime ministers increasingly respond or make statements directly to the media. I hypothesize that media, especially when prevalent enough to promise an extensive audience, generates functional pressures for the conferral of authority, discretion, and resources on prime ministers. When acted upon, these pressures translate into institutional change, shifting power (1) away from legislatures and towards executives and (2) away from ministers and towards prime ministers. The combined effect of these shifts is a significant empowerment of prime ministers. In order to capture this effect, the shifting dynamics of intra-executive relations, I adopt a broad definition of institutions as involving formal and informal norms, rules, and procedures. In other words, institutions are manifested in a variety of forms and refer not only to systems that are organized formally, such as a national legislature or executive, but in a more general sense also to practices or routines, for example.

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Institutional theory has been criticized for tending to be static. This is the conventional critique of institutional analysis, at least in its political science variants. To some extent, it remains a valid critique, despite significant advances in institutional analysis. In other disciplines, institutional theory seems to be less static than it has traditionally been in political science. This debate mirrors a large body of literature concerning organizational change (e.g., Mahoney and Thelen 2010). Rather than being fixed entities institutions are always to some extent adapting or changing, becoming more or less institutionalized. Laying the ground for subsequent empirical testing, I will outline two alternatives, but potentially complementary, analytical approaches and specify theoretical expectations for each approach as regards effects on institutions and institutional change.6 Here is a quick look through these approaches. The first approach stresses concern about functional efficiency. This approach is informed by rational choice institutionalism, which looks at institutional design in functionalist terms, explaining the creation and form of a particular institution with the benefits it is expected to produce. In this view, the decision to create an institution is motivated by the expectation of distinct functional gains. Accordingly, the theoretical logic of this approach highlights the demand for these functions in governance. This explanation has been deployed to account for the demand for particular institutions, the delegation of power to institutions, whether national (e.g., Moe 1990, 2005) or international (e.g., Krasner 1983; Keohane 1984), and the design of institutions (see Sect. 1.1). The second approach, informed by power-oriented institutionalism, privileges concern about power distribution, conceiving of institutions as instruments in the exercise of power (e.g., Knight 1992). This powerdistributional approach to institutions and institutional change highlights dimensions of power and the distributional effects on power, for example, related to elite competition within the state or executive branch. It suggests that institutions are instruments for gaining additional leverage within political power games. It argues that institutions are best explained in terms of their distributional consequences. It underlines the role of power relations in institutional change. Political institutions are structures of power. How they are created and designed therefore have consequences for the distribution of power within

6 I draw here on Tallberg (2010).

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and among political actors. Yet concern about functional efficiency may spur the evolution of institutions, whether by design or necessity. I will expand on this in the concluding chapter of the book. The extent to which media generates functional pressures for institutional change in governments, I suggest, is a product of the perpetual coverage and demands of media, creating a continual need for a government communications infrastructure, which reflects the benefits the media offer to political power. However, more benefits are vested in some media than in others. Not all media are equally important. Some count for more than others. Some media give rise to strong functional pressures, others to only weak functional pressures and are unlikely to engender significant executive institutional change. However, where media involves large audiences and coverage across a broad range of issues, mundane or not, they are likely to generate substantial and consequential pressures for shifts in power in favour of prime ministers. While emphasizing the functional pressures generated for institutional change, I do not rule out that media may strengthen prime ministers through other logics as well. For instance, beyond press conferences and other forms of media appearances the media exposure generated by international high-level contacts and summits may translate into a special kind of political capital that can be used in domestic power games (see also Sect. 2.1). There might be such an effect, and this effect would be in line with the overall notion of the media strengthening prime ministers. However, this logic is quite different from the functional argument I present, and I therefore choose not to address this particular aspect further in this elaboration of the central theoretical argument. I will return to this discussion in the concluding chapter of the book. As introduced in Chapter 1, I hypothesize that these effects of media on institutions and intra-executive relations are translated through three causal mechanisms. First, under normal circumstances media in general reconfirms, and may lend weight to, the authority of prime ministers. This authority, I suggest, comes in two forms: external and internal. External authority involves the undisputed right of the prime minister as the highest representative of the executive to represent it in any media by presenting policies or answering questions and so on. Prime ministers must possess sufficient authority to represent the state or government across the full spectrum of issues. They must enjoy enough authority to speak on behalf of the state or government home or away, even on dossiers that normally are the responsibility of line ministers, and

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require parliamentary approval. Internal authority consists of the right of the prime minister to define the governmental line, by coordinating, aggregating, and adjudicating between alternative interests. Prime ministers must be able to decide the position on issues that stretch across multiple policy domains and ministries. Prime ministers must be granted the authority to engage in strategic planning and prioritization as regards policy and communications. Both forms of authority are functional prerequisites for effective participation in media, and the conferral of these forms of authority on prime ministers represents a shift in the intraexecutive balance of power, since other members of the executive are expected to present a united front (more in Sect. 2.3). At the same time, prime ministers, with the highest authority in government, can decline or pass on requests from the media. Chief executives are conferred gatekeeping power. Both forms of authority represent a reinforcement of the chief executive. Together, this results in the expectation that formal and informal confirmation of the prime minister’s authority to represent the government and present its positions in media is an important reason contributing to the centralization not just of policy formulation and coordination but also of communications. The extent of authority conferred on prime ministers is likely to be a consequence of the audience scope of and the perceived or potential impact of the particular media. The broader the audience scope and the greater the impact of a media, the broader the set of issues on which prime ministers require external and internal authority. By the same token, changes over time in the audience scope of media and in its impact should affect the authority of prime ministers in predictable ways. If the audience scope expands over time, or migrate to other media outlets, issues that previously were within the executive domain of line ministers should be moved into the domain of prime ministerial representation and coordination. The prime minister, the highest level of authority in the government, elevated above other cabinet members, must from time to time publicly announce the government’s line. There are different ways for prime ministers to be public and various forms of media they can take advantage of; which they choose at the time may depend on various considerations. Second, linked to the former mechanism, participation in media requires that prime ministers possess a degree of discretion vis-à-vis

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other cabinet members.7 Prime ministers require a sufficient degree of autonomy from their political bases, including political party, if they are to participate in media arenas in such a way as to represent the government as a whole. But that is not all: prime ministers also benefit from informational asymmetries. This can make them pursue messages to media that other cabinet ministers lacked knowledge of. In the case of media participation and presentation of positions, prime ministers inevitably enjoy an amount of discretion, as they are the highest authority in the government. For several reasons, prime ministers must possess sufficient discretion in relation to their delegated authority to represent the government in any media. Not only do they need discretion when engaged in media but there is usually a consistent thread when a prime minister addresses media, parliament, cabinet, and so on. That could mean that policy presentations to media come before policy formulation in cabinet. Other cabinet members, not to mention parliament or party, could then find themselves presented with a fait accompli over government policy. While there are mechanisms to prevent this from occurring, none can stop the prime minister from talking to media. Again, if other cabinet members would contradict the prime minister that would weaken the unity of the cabinet. This results in expectations of centralized government communications, and weak mechanisms for line ministers to control the chief executive when he/she is acting within their domain. Third, media participation and the demands of media in general require prime ministers to possess independent resources . For purposes of effectively representing the government in media, prime ministers need staff that can provide them with information about the form and content of that representation, about the subject matter to be discussed in media. Likewise, in order to effectively present a coherent line, a prime minister requires personnel for coordinating government policy and presentations, also in the preparation of summits in the EU and elsewhere, among other things. Prime ministers must possess sufficient resources to be able to do all that, and much more besides. Therefore, a reinforcement of 7 Principal–agent theory conceives of discretion as the sum of the authority or power delegated to an actor minus the control mechanisms instituted to oversee the exercise of this authority. The traditional mechanisms of oversight operated by legislatures in relation to executives has become weaker, not least as a result of international summits and negotiations where chief executives enjoy an amount of discretion. In the EU, this has led to various attempts to strengthen national parliaments in relation to the governments, with varying but still limited results.

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prime minsters’ offices in terms of personnel and coordinating as well as communicating responsibilities can also be expected. These three causal mechanisms work in concert to generate predictions as to long-term shifts in the institutional balance of power within the executive branch. There are observable implications in terms of the autonomy of political chief executives, in their communicating with the government’s line of action (or inaction) and through the independent resources they possess. Beyond that, prime ministers have gained autonomy vis-à-vis their political parties. This is a logical effect if my theory is correct, but not the outcome I focus on in this study. If the theoretical logic that I advance correctly captures the conditions under which media may empower prime ministers, I would expect such effects to be present everywhere but to a varying extent given variation across political and media systems. It should also be about something more than adaptation to the media and “media logic”—as mediatization research conceptualizes it—but about a profound and long-term form of institutional change, a big and long-lasting possibly even irreversible effect. Where the media system and the political system are highly integrated the functional demands on the organization of governments to adapt to media are also high, with implications for the depth of institutional change within executive systems. In contemporary so-called hybrid media or news systems, politics is increasingly defined by organizations, groups, and individuals who are best able to blend older and newer media logics (Chadwick 2011, 2017). It is a highly competitive media environment in which journalists operate. Moreover, politics must relate to a changing and high-choice information or media environments. One of the major social change processes in recent decades is the transformation from low-choice to contemporary high-choice information or media environments, which has resulted in an increasing supply of misinformation, disinformation, and fake news (Strömbäck et al. 2022). My own study with Tapio Raunio of centralization/decentralization among European countries—Finland and Sweden, with Lithuania and Poland as illustrative cases—revealed that the general trend towards more centralized, coordinated government communication, made necessary by growing pressure from a fragmented media environment and a polarized party landscape, was more pronounced in more strategically operating countries (Johansson and Raunio 2019; see also Johansson and Raunio

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2020).8 That study and our follow-up research showed the greater centralization of government communication (Johansson and Raunio 2019, 2020). But a question hanging in the air concerns the relationship between observed fragmentation of media and centralization of government communication. It generated a paradox, or a seeming paradox or contradiction, of a more decentralized or diverse media environment and at the same time greater centralization of government communication; and that can be explained by the dynamics of the more diverse media landscape (Johansson and Raunio 2020: 1155). The explanation is that in these more volatile circumstances, controlling information flows becomes even more important and challenging for the executive centre. The more there are media actors contacting the government, and the more channels also the politicians and civil servants inside the executive branch can utilize for disseminating information, the higher the need for the prime minister’s office to control information flows. It is probably unrealistic to expect any government (in a democratic system) to be able to fully control such flows, but centralization should make it easier. Amid fragmentation of the media landscape and of the news audience, and with newsrooms under pressure, struggling with limited resources, the government possesses greater resources for news management and for shaping the news agenda. Much of these resources and the management of the government communications operation are centralized in organizational structures in the office of the prime minister. “The advanced fragmentation of contemporary media systems,” Peters and Helms (2012: 46) note, “has led presidents and prime ministers to develop ‘pick and mix’ strategies designed to reach different target groups through different channels.” That illustrates how political chief executives may exploit the more decentralized media environment to their own advantage. It speaks for a centralized communications effort. As noted in Sect. 1.4 where I explain my research design and data, in my analysis I do not differentiate among traditional/legacy media and digital/social media as I prefer to keep my discussion of government communication at a more general level. That said, developments in government communication cannot be separated from broader developments in media, party politics, and administration structures. In particular, the three complementary factors of changing media structures, the logic

8 Summary formulation based on Esser and Pfetsch (2020: 346).

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of coalition governments, and horizontal coordination inside the executive branch contribute to more centralized forms of communication (Johansson and Raunio 2020). I will continue the discussion of the last two factors in the next section. Regarding “changing media structures,” there is a possible additional factor that influences government communication centralization (or lack of): diversity of media in that specific country, that is, a centralized or decentralized media environment. It is clearly harder for the prime minister’s office to send out a unified message when there are many media of different persuasions, which would be interested in receiving content from various ministries. The new media environment is precisely that sort of “decentralized” media situation. My theoretical framework, specifically “changing media structures,” the first factor facilitating the centralization of government communication, contains the argument about governments needing to respond to a more diverse media landscape, referring to the more decentralized media environment. To some extent centralization over time is a consequence of the past decentralization, the decline of traditional print sources and the rise of new digital sources as well as social media, and the growing complexity of the policy environment and in the polity.9 To distinguish between an internal drive to control and the external conditions, an external growing complexity of the media environment that has precipitated the centralization, is difficult insofar as they are likely to interact in such a way that one cannot tell them apart. There is an inevitable conflation between the two. In other words, it might be an endogeneity problem, that is, reciprocal causation between the media environment and the political imperative to control the narrative. Both of these factors are at work and interact and it might therefore be difficult to establish whether the media environment or the political imperative has causally triumphed. They shape one another. Hence both are needed for explaining the growth of centralization in regard to communications. This also illustrates the complex interplay of factors shaping political leadership. Addressing the relationship between the internal drive to control and the external media environment, I should like to emphasize that the seeming contradiction between the decentralization of the media landscape and the centralization of government communication might be

9 This paragraph draws from comments by Professor Bert A. Rockman.

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parallel processes. Whereas the decentralized media situation should be beneficial for government ministries, but may be more pronounced in some phases of the policy cycle or vary across policy sectors, the overall effect appears to be a drive towards central control of government news and information. While I focus on communications rather than policy as such, to be sure much communication is about putting a persistent and consistent gloss on policy. While I cannot exactly measure the importance of these causal factors (changing media structures, logic of coalition cabinets, horizontal coordination) that contribute to centralization, the main contribution here is to consider and provide evidence of causal factors overlooked by scholars (this applies particularly to the roles of coalition governance and increased horizontal coordination inside the executive branch).10 This research is supported by data on growing resources into government communication, including personnel working with media and communications particularly in the prime minister’s office. Together with documentary evidence such numerical indicators help in assessing forms of government communication, the extent to which they have become more hierarchical and centralized.

2.3 The Drive for Unitary Government Communication The discussion so far generates expectations that political chief executives will use their unifying power to bring about a unified communication. It points to strong political reasons for a centralized communications effort. It also suggests that when addressing how media is affecting government and intra-executive relations one should not only do so through functional or institutional analytical approaches. While these approaches vary in the extent to which they attribute any role for human agency, none really explores in any deeper sense what political and interactive dynamics within governments shape functions or institutions. The most extreme versions, the highly rationalist and functionalist explanation for the emergence of institutions, leave aside almost entirely the necessity for human agency. Beyond, or alongside, functional or institutional approaches to my

10 See Sect. 1.4 on research design and data for a definition and measurement of “centralization”.

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subject matter I will in this chapter emphasize politics and particularly the incentives for unitary government communication as a principal reason for its move upward in the executive branch. It follows that to explain government communication and its centralization, and what drives it, we need political science (and in part public administration). As discussed in the previous section, changing media structures— particularly the more fragmented or decentralized media environment, a more diverse media landscape—the logic (or conditions) of coalition governments, and horizontal coordination inside the executive branch, are complementary factors that contribute to more centralized government communication (Johansson and Raunio 2020). These factors present governments with incentives to control information flows. That facilitates the role of the executive centre in government communication. Approaching the equation from the perspective of the centre of government, prime ministers thus face the challenge of ensuring that governments behave in unitary fashion, speak with one voice—or with one mind. That generates pressures for the cabinet to hold up unity in communications. My argument in turn is that the empowerment of prime minister constitutes a response to demands for a unified message, reinforcing the pressure for coordination from the centre. In order to speak with one voice, government communication needs to be carried out by or at least tightly coordinated from the prime minister’s office. Regardless of the type of government but particularly in coalition governments, such pressure adds to tendencies towards central coordination and control. Calls for unity in government communication involve reasons to avoid conflict with the ministries and to give the government a sense of unity and purpose, a primary cause of coordinating both policy and communications. To that end, there are procedures involving inter-ministerial coordination (see Sect. 1.1). Given that media is looking for conflicts, governments, especially their leaders, have strong incentives to coordinate communication, trying to avoid a public image of an ineffective government. In a coalition government, rivalry between coalition partners is a constant source of conflict (Kolltveit 2014: 269–270). Therefore, policymaking is likely to be more conflictual in coalitions than in single-party cabinets. Conflicts in coalitions are often graver, insofar as they follow political party lines rather than ministerial lines. To keep a cabinet together, to encourage coherence, it is necessary to coordinate the different interests in cabinet, and to appear coherent and united (Davies

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1997: 132). To that effect, communication is indispensable and is inherently political. In coalition cabinets in particular, the drive to show unity provides an incentive to centralize communication to the prime minister’s office. As party systems have become more fragmented, with new cleavages and issues resulting in the formation of new parties, coalition governments are more likely to be ideologically heterogeneous and often include new parties that have no previous experience of leading the country (see, e.g., Wolinetz and Zaslove 2018). This presents a potentially serious dilemma for government communication. Prime ministers and their offices can be expected to strive for streamlined and cohesive communication, while individual parties or ministers may have their own needs for signalling their views to their electorates—particularly closer to elections or when the issue is highly salient for the party. This provides powerful incentives for central control and coordination, with the prime minister’s office increasingly responsible for government communication. Here, again, one needs to remember that political science scholars have noted a clear tendency towards the empowerment of prime ministers and their offices, or what Poguntke and Webb (2005a) have labelled the “presidentialization” of parliamentary democracies. As outlined in Sect. 2.1, several factors have contributed to this development. Hence, there is a need to look at the interplay between government communication and the broader empowerment of the prime minister. Turning to public administration, scholars have documented a clear increase in horizontal coordination by governments across the world (see Sect. 1.1). Mainly, to counteract “ministerial government” or departmentalization of decision-making, where each minister controls issues under her or his jurisdiction, governments have introduced mechanisms that improve coordination between ministries. Such instruments include various intersectoral policy programmes, strategy documents, budgetary frameworks, or midterm review sessions. The horizontal coordination processes involve and may be led by the prime minister’s office. And even without such horizontal programmes, governments have invested resources in the steering capacity of the prime minister. This provides further incentives for centralizing communication to the prime minister’s office (see e.g., Dahlström et al. 2011; Kolltveit 2015; Peters 2019). Returning now to coalition governments, while prime ministers usually are attracting a lot of attention and more than other cabinet ministers in coalition governments, there is the rivalry with ministers who are also

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party leaders and in a senior position such as finance or foreign minister. In any cabinet but especially in coalition, one aspect concerns the interplay between the goal of the communication effort, the selection of the audience to be addressed, and the assumptions of how the addressed audience will react and how this will lead to the intended effect. While this is not the primary focus of this book, it is a vital reflection of how explicitly the centralization of communication shifts not only its political goals but also the assumptions of targets and effects.11 Centralization of communication is appealing for coalition governments to demonstrate unity. At least the majority party, normally the prime minister’s party, may see it that way. Whether it is also true of other coalition partners, where such exist, who may wish to distinguish themselves and their own contributions is a different story. Sometimes an item of business can involve the areas of responsibility of two or more ministers. In that case, while prepared jointly by their staff, there may be clashes between ministries led by different parties working on shared files. Here the incentive is very clear for each minister to cater to their own (party-political) audience and to highlight the achievement of the parties in pursuing their own agenda. This becomes especially relevant when elections are approaching. How do such dynamics play out with more centralization? There is the possibility of coalition partners sending out different messages and to push them into unity this is a factor pushing for more centralization of government communication (Johansson and Raunio 2019: 128, 137, 146).12 While the prime minister may want to achieve unitary government communication, the coalition partners or individual ministers can have different objectives and strategies and even resist centralization (Johansson and Raunio 2020: 1155). Yet, the other party or parties in a government coalition may well succumb to the centralizing pressure because a coordinated communication operation is in the interest of the government as a whole. It makes it look more coherent and competent than it otherwise would. There might be continuing fissures between governing parties—or within them—but that only strengthens the drive for unity.

11 I owe these comments to suggestion by Colin Kuehnhanss, providing comments on the publication of Johansson and Raunio (2019). 12 I owe this response to my communication with Tapio Raunio.

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Here, the personality of the head of the government, the number of parties in government, and the parliamentary basis are factors that are claimed to affect the degree of central control. A coalition government composed of two or more political parties must reconcile different policies and goals of the parties. This requires compromises and will involve conflicts of interest. If cooperation in a coalition government breaks down, this could be punished in the next election. It therefore seems obvious that the coalition members have a strong incentive to act together—at the same time as the parties are dependent on demonstrating their uniqueness, for the sake of their own support. Researching political communication strategies of coalition parties, Sagarzazu and Klüver (2017: 333)13 point out: In order to successfully compete in elections, coalition parties need to differentiate from their partners to strengthen their own policy profile. Thus, while coalition parties govern together, they compete for votes alone. As a result, coalition parties have to reconcile two realities. On the one hand, they need to demonstrate unity, but at the same time, they have to maintain and emphasize their own profile.

In other words, coalition parties have to reconcile two competing logics: they need to demonstrate unity to govern together, but also have to emphasize their own profile to succeed in elections. They further note that day-to-day politics of coalition governments are not only about signalling unity but also about differentiation. The study therefore demonstrates the importance of political communication strategies. Sagarzazu and Klüver (2017: 346) conclude: Governing in coalitions often requires compromise between coalition parties. Due to the constraints set by governing with at least one other partner, political parties are often not able to enact the policies they promised to their voters. Rather than letting only the legislative record speak for itself, we have shown that political communication is an important instrument through which coalition parties can directly communicate with their voters. Coalition parties strategically use political communication

13 To test their theoretical claims, and to shed light on how political communication in coalition governments works, Sagarzazu and Klüver (2017) draw on a quantitative text analysis of more than 21,000 press releases published by coalition parties in the German Bundestag from 2000 until 2010.

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to transmit their policy priorities to their voters and to justify why policy decisions have been made by the cabinet.

They (ibid.) further conclude that the study “constitutes an important first step in understanding how political communication works in coalition governments.” Yet they raise unanswered questions and limitations, notably that it was limited to the study of German coalition governments. These, I note, tend to allow for more ministerial discretion compared to at least some coalition governments elsewhere. According to Sagarzazu and Klüver (2017: 333), in the German case coalition parties “choose independently what to communicate and when to communicate it which makes political communication an important instrument of party competition.” It bears noting that before taking office, the parties to form the coalition negotiate a substantive coalition agreement. This may contribute to ministerial autonomy within specific policy areas. Generally speaking, there is less room for such independent action in communication in cases of tightened or centralized government communication. It means more pressure from the executive centre on coalition parties to unite behind the government line. Sweden is a case in point where instances of coalition governments have been increasingly controlled from the centre, not least through coordination mechanisms applying to policy and communications (see Chapter 3). The literature on coalition governance offers important insights into the dilemmas that arise for political parties when entering a coalition government. In other words, the government should work well together to make the coalition capable of governing, but the parties in government are also competitors until the next election. State leaders, notably heads of government, can be expected to be less visible in coalitions as they must share attention with (other) party leaders (Langer and Sagarzazu 2018). When the media has weathered something politically sensitive, the demand for media management becomes all the greater. In a coalition government, we would expect coordinated patterns of interaction and behaviour to be particularly prominent. On issues where the coalition parties hold competing positions, conflicting policy demands or agendas, leaks to media may prompt an action from the prime minister’s office. Institutionally, it is the final arbiter in the executive and the highest level of authority. In summary, to really understand the nature of government communication functions as well as political factors must surely be part of the

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analysis. In the perspective of this chapter, more out of political than functional reasons political chief executives benefit from unitary communication that counteracts the exposure of political divisions and this is a factor pushing for more centralized government communication. In line with other causal mechanisms outlined in this chapter, this should be understood as part of the broader trend of empowerment of prime ministers. It can be understood as an integral part of the unifying power of the chief executive. It suggests that the effect will be government communication on an upward trajectory.

2.4

The Logic of Centralization

Participation and influence in media present a set of functional demands. These reflect requirements for a response to omnipresent media. They produce a general effect of centralization or, more precisely, a shift in communication towards the core of the government. That generates expectations of centralized government communication. In line with the rational institutionalist logic, stressing concerns about functional efficiency in institutional design, and the factors and causal mechanisms outlined in Sects. 2.1 and 2.2, I would expect media to affect the organization of the executive, notably the concentration of resources in the prime minister’s office relative to the line ministries. As issues are shifted to the highest level of authority in the executive and prime ministers gain in authority relative to other ministers, coordination responsibilities and resource allocation within the executive are likely to follow suit. As a result, existing differences between the prime minister’s office and ministries in power may become more pronounced. Such differential empowerment can be expected to increase as the executive will be under pressure to become more coordinated. But cross-nationally, existing differences between states in the organization of the executive may become less pronounced. Decentralized executives with only weak government-wide coordinating mechanisms will be under pressure to become more hierarchical, and already centralized executives with strong coordination mechanisms will find an increasing reason to sustain these structures. Further, the perceived need of governments to act decisively and in a unified manner has tended to drive power upward, reflecting the urgency of communicating quickly and providing information to the media and the public. And if you do media regularly and you have to communicate

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decisive decisions, you want the mechanisms, and once you are down that road, power is unlikely to devolve downwards again. By mechanisms, I mean authority and personnel in the prime minister’s office. It is a framework established by prime ministers—on their behalf—to give them a source of independent advice and execution. It is a policy and communications framework that aims to ensure that there is support throughout the government for its policies, communications, and other actions. The logic of centralization establishes a link between institutional change analysis and power-shift analysis, and recognizes the existence of machinery in a government dedicated to dealing with the demands of media, from print media and broadcast media to digital media, places on government. And there is little reason to think the burden should be lightened. The logic of centralization reflects what happens to organizations when they grow and become more complex. As Panebianco (1988: 185) observes in relation to political parties: “An increase in organizational complexity also leads to centralization of the decision-making process.” Similarly, the organization complexity of states is likely to lead to a movement towards centralized coordination and attempts at control. According to a cardinal rule of organization theory, a larger organization leads to specialization. There is a need for institutional or functional specialization, which reflects concerns about functional efficiency as argued in the previous section. Moreover, hierarchies within organizations may be created or reinforced through resource dependency. Scholarship on the organizational dimension of governance (Jacobsson et al. 2015) as well as on government communication (Sanders and Canel 2013) observe a tendency towards specialization (and professionalization). This generates the expectation that increasing complexity in organizations will lead to centralization, to a shift to a more hierarchical internal organizational structure. Examining how information is managed in public organizations, Graber (2003: 58) suggests that centralization, like hierarchy and specialization, is “inherent in the nature of complex organizations.” Communication between the various levels of the organization involves a hierarchy of roles in the organization. Issues may be referred to the top levels of an organization. Centralized control over external communications is an attempt to get public officials to speak with one voice. Lack of such centralized control of external communications explains why public officials in the United States often do not speak with one voice about major issues (Graber 2003: 228). This

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may result in structural reorganization of bureaucracies. Such reorganizations aim to promote efficiency and facilitate coordination necessary to achieve effectiveness. We would expect instruments of coordination to be centrally located in the organization, to meet the functional requirements. Given their complexity, states are to a degree always fragmented, with some diffusion or dispersion of authority. To alleviate this problem there are efforts at centralization. Centralization may thus be a response to fragmentation, a way of seeking to take control through central coordination. The theoretical logic that I advance might also be called functional centralization. It aims to capture the centralization of communications functions in the executive system; activities as well as the organizational structure. This logic represents an integrated approach to the study of government communication and institutional change. Part of what is going on is a response to specific needs which are the very purpose of the functions—an ongoing adjustment to realities of government in a media age that comprise institutions that perform certain functions (cf., Van Aelst and Walgrave 2017). If this analysis is valid, then we should expect a general centralization trend in government communication. If you want control, you are also likely to want the mechanisms. Even so, complete control is unlikely. And there is likely to be some opposition to centralization, not least by junior parties in governments and by line ministries and perhaps even by public agencies. It might be resisted by political actors who oppose an overcentralized communications approach and operation. Yet these centripetal tendencies are more likely than not to grow even stronger in the future. The reasons for centralizing government communication are both internal and external. While changes in media systems are more difficult to predict, it is plausible to predict that party systems continue to be characterized by volatility and fragmentation. Governments also face two external challenges, increasing international collaboration and the need to counter fake news, particularly regarding security matters, that call for unified messages (e.g., Johansson and Raunio 2020; Sanders 2020). Whereas researchers observe a fragmentation of media, I and others observe a centralization of government communication. As Johansson and Raunio (2020: 1155) note, the paradox or seeming contradiction of a more decentralized media environment and at the same time greater centralization of government communication can be explained by the

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dynamics of the more diverse media landscape. In these more volatile circumstances, controlling information flows becomes even more important and challenging for the executive centre. The more there are media actors placing requests with the government, and the more channels also the politicians and civil servants of the executive branch can utilize for disseminating information, the higher the need for the prime minister’s office to control information flows. While it is unrealistic to expect any government to be able to fully control such flows, centralization should make it easier. Johansson and Raunio (2020: 1155) further note that centralization also has normative implications: The observed patterns certainly facilitate unified government communication. This obviously serves the interests of the PM and it can also be defended on the grounds of accountability: the media and the citizens find it easier to evaluate government performance when the cabinet speaks with one voice. Yet, democracy and public debate might be better served by more decentralized arrangements allowing for diverse arguments instead of centralized political advisor-led communication. Perhaps, more troublesome is the withholding of information or the strategically timed press releases that might benefit the government but clearly do not facilitate societal debate about topical matters.

What emerges theoretically, from the discussion above, is a strong basis for an expectation of a movement of government communication in an upward direction. The term I am using here for such effects is logic of centralization. As a theoretical argument, it intends to capture key elements in the institutionalization of government communication. It denotes a pattern of centralized government communication systems, a movement upward of communication in political executives towards central coordination and control. It makes obvious the centralizing tendency and why centralization becomes not only a choice but a necessity. At the same time, it is important to point out that these theoretical expectations, like the empirical findings, are probabilistic and not deterministic. It is not possible to predict with complete certainty how different executive systems will develop in the future and what possible limitations may arise and become a reality. I now proceed to test the hypothesis that media has contributed to institutional change in the executive branch, by shifting authority, discretion, and resources in favour of prime ministers. I find support for my

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hypothesis where the evidence testifies to institutional change motivated by demands of media; instances of prime ministerial autonomy, in recognition of the need for prime minister discretion in all communications linked to media; and long-term shifts in resources in favour of the prime minister at the expense of other cabinet members, partly or entirely motivated by functional prerequisites of media. In the next chapter I turn to the case study of the Swedish experience, to an analysis of observable patterns in this one parliamentary democracy and governance system, and an application of the logic of centralization.

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Strøm, Kaare, Wolfgang C. Müller, and Torbjörn Bergman, eds. 2008. Cabinets and Coalition Bargaining: The Democratic Life Cycle in Western Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Strömbäck, Jesper, Hajo Boomgaarden, Elena Broda, Alyt Damstra, Elina Lindgren, Yariv Tsfati, and Rens Vliegenthart. 2022. From Low-Choice to High-Choice Media Environments: Implications for Knowledge Resistance. In Knowledge Resistance in High-Choice Information Environments, ed. Jesper Strömbäck, Åsa Wikforss, Kathrin Glüer, Torun Lindholm, and Henrik Oscarsson, 49–68. London: Routledge. Tallberg, Jonas. 2010. Transnational Access to International Institutions: Three Approaches. In Transnational Actors in Global Governance: Patterns, Explanations, and Implications, ed. Christer Jönsson and Jonas Tallberg, 45–66. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Van Aelst, Peter, Tamir Sheafer, and James Stanyer. 2012. The Personalization of Mediated Political Communication: A Review of Concepts, Operationalizations and Key Findings. Journalism 13 (2): 203–220. Van Aelst, Peter, and Stefaan Walgrave, eds. 2017. How Political Actors Use the Media: A Functional Analysis of the Media’s Role in Politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Vercesi, Michelangelo. 2020. Cabinet Decision-Making in Parliamentary Systems. In The Oxford Handbook of Political Executives, ed. Rudy B. Andeweg, Robert Elgie, Ludger Helms, Juliet Kaarbo, and Ferdinand Müller-Rommel, 438– 459. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Webb, Paul, and Thomas Poguntke. 2005. The Presidentialization of Contemporary Democratic Politics: Evidence, Causes, and Consequences. In The Presidentialization of Politics: A Comparative Study of Modern Democracies, ed. Thomas Poguntke and Paul Webb, 336–356. Oxford: Oxford University Press. Webb, Paul, Thomas Poguntke, and Robin Kolodny. 2012. The Presidentialization of Party Leadership? Evaluating Party Leadership and Party Government in the Democratic World. In Comparative Political Leadership, ed. Ludger Helms, 77–98. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. Webb, Paul, and Thomas Poguntke. 2013. The Presidentialisation of Politics Thesis Defended. Parliamentary Affairs 66 (3): 646–654. Wolinetz, Steven, and Andrej Zaslove, eds. 2018. Absorbing the Blow: Populist Parties and their Impact on Parties and Party Systems. London: Rowman & Littlefield International.

CHAPTER 3

The Swedish Experience: Reinforcement of Central Government and the Significance of Media

Following from the previous chapters, outlining the nexus between prime ministers and media and sources of prime minister empowerment, this chapter traces the dynamics at work through an in-depth analysis of the Swedish case. I put the theoretical argument in context through an application with attempts at explanations, and with particular attention to my three causal mechanisms: authority, discretion, and resources. The chapter explores the changing nature of governing and government communication and analyses the reasons behind, and consequences of, the increasing centralization of the government communication system. The chapter both describes and explains a crucial development for the executive branch: a shift in government communication from a decentralized to a comprehensively centralized system, epitomizing a general centralization trend. The empowerment of the Swedish prime minister follows the crossnational trend of “presidentialization” of politics, elaborated in the previous chapter. In the volume The Presidentialization of Politics, the editors conclude that there is evidence from Sweden of a shift in intraexecutive power to the benefit of the leader; a change in the expected direction (Webb and Poguntke 2005: 338–339). The Swedish country expert in that volume, Nicholas Aylott (2005), emphasizes the prime minister’s autonomy from his principals—parliament and party—as part of his position of power. Aylott (2005: 179) observes that the resources available to the Swedish prime minister for coordination have grown © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. M. Johansson, The Prime Minister-Media Nexus, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12152-4_3

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considerably and have been accumulated and concentrated in the prime minister’s office. This office of the prime minister has achieved greater coordinating capacity and control of the policymaking process. However, while there is a broad consensus that the prime minister has become more powerful within the Swedish political system, political scientists do not agree about the extent and causes of this development, some think the presidentialization thesis is overstated.1 Multiple forms of evidence suggest otherwise. In this chapter, I demonstrate that the Swedish government’s organization for media and communications has contributed to prime minister empowerment. The case study summarizes secondary evidence and presents new primary evidence drawn from official or unofficial documents, archival material, biographies or memoirs, and, in particular, over 50 interviews with journalists, politicians, and political appointees, among them several press secretaries based in the prime minister’s office or in line ministries (more on data in Sect. 1.4). This chapter includes observations over a period of seven decades, from the early 1960s to the early 2020s but mostly between the mid-1990s and mid-2022 (that is, before the general election in September 2022). While human agency partly explains why the prime minister’s office, including the organization for media, has been scaled up to expand capacity, my approach is more institutional or structural than actor-centred. As noted in the introductory chapter, Sweden presents a least-likely setting for prime minister empowerment, partly because it has often been governed by minority governments, as all governments from 2010 to present, and partly because its executive by tradition operates according to norms of collective cabinet government (rather than prime ministerial government). Because of these constraints, we would expect the Swedish prime minister to have quite limited power and room for independent action. Yet power has been centralized with the prime minister. Given the preference for a more decentralist approach of Swedish governments in the past—reflecting a norm of a slim prime minister’s office—it is striking how Sweden has adopted a comprehensive centralized approach to communications in the executive system.

1 For critique to the presidentialization thesis as such and in particular certain objections concerning the Swedish case, see in particular Bergman and Bolin (2011), Bäck et al. (2007, 2009, 2011), and Daléus (2012).

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The internal structure of this chapter reflects the link between intraexecutive relations, government communication, and media. Media and media change has made the need for a centralized government communications operation more urgent. Intense pressure from the media has presented the government with functional demands which shape institutional structures and resources in government, and intra-executive distribution of power. The next section both introduces and challenges the literature, with a particular focus on conditions for prime ministerial power in Sweden. Attention then turns to the country’s government communication system and outlines its structure and role, what resources are available and how they have changed, and addresses the extent to which it has become centralized. In the final section, I discuss why the Swedish government communication system is so centralized and is unlikely to shift downward. In this connection, I address the long-term consequences of this development for the Swedish parliamentary democracy.

3.1 How the Swedish Prime Minister Has Been Empowered A prominent development in Swedish politics over the past three decades or more is the empowerment of the prime minister (e.g., Arter 2006; Aylott 2005; Bergman and Bolin 2011; Johansson 2021; Johansson and Tallberg 2010; Ruin 2007; Sundström 2009). In support of the claim to presidentialization, Bergman and Bolin (2011: 272) recognize that the Swedish prime minister clearly has considerable agenda-setting power and the prime minister has a larger staff to initiate and coordinate policymaking. The prime minister’s resources for monitoring the activities of other ministers have increased quite dramatically (ibid.). As in other countries, the Swedish prime minister has been strengthened by the informational advantage over parliament and even over other parts of the government. The development of the politics and government of Sweden is one of gradual reinforcement of the executive centre and the prime minister. Step by step, authority and resources have been shifted to the prime minister’s office. A driving factor in this process has been the functional demands, not least for policy and communications coordination. The prime minister enjoys considerable powers. I begin by noting the constitutional powers. Constitutionally, the prime minister has a

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strong position in the Swedish system of government. The Instrument of Government provides the prime minister with extensive powers. I will not go into the details here. But by emphasizing the office and position of the prime minister the 1974 Instrument of Government, which took effect in 1975, not only strengthened the role of the prime minister but also anticipated the presidentialization (Ruin 2007: 239). In this analysis, the constitution provides favourable conditions for the exercise of the role of prime minister. But the new constitution, strengthening executive authority and the prime minister’s powers confirmed and reinforced what had already happened; the prime minister became the dominant political figure in Sweden. For their part, Bergman and Bolin (2011), observe a number of important changes in Swedish democracy, for instance, the budget reform; a new set of rules and principles for the handling of the state budget introduced in 1996 (Bergman and Bolin 2011: 266). It gives minority cabinets better control over the budget process. With regard to delegation within the cabinet, distribution of authority, and recruitment patterns of ministers, they (ibid.: 271) note that the constitution grants the prime minister broad powers of appointment and dismissal as well as authority over ministerial jurisdiction. The development towards a presidential prime ministerial role is part of the shift of power from parliament to the executive and which has been given a further impetus by Sweden’s membership in the EU (Johansson and Tallberg 2010). An additional reason is the growth of the state. To reiterate, there are contingent as well as structural factors determining the conditions for prime ministerial power and empowerment. In addition to contextual features, not least coalition politics, there are also different personalities and leadership styles. For example, Göran Persson, Sweden’s prime minister from 1996 to 2006, became very president-like (e.g., Aylott 2005; Ruin 2007; Sundström 2009). Persson took increasing control, also attested to in interviews with politicians and journalists. According to a long-time political journalist, Göran Persson “was used to having total control…” That comment refers to the former prime minister’s participation in interviews, nothing would come as a surprise and if it did, the prime minister could refrain from future participation. Former foreign minister and deputy prime minister Lena Hjelm-Wallén said that the role of the prime minister in Sweden has become more “presidential” (interview). According to her, it is clear that the prime minister increasingly determines issues that normally would fall under the authority of

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ministers and in that sense overrides the traditional preparation process. Another former minister, Pierre Schori, similarly said that it has become more of “presidential government” with Göran Persson as prime minister (interview). According to Schori, Göran Persson “wants full control, full control,” and is known to get involved in the appointment of political advisers and press secretaries. It must be “cleared” with the prime minister’s office. The same conclusion is advanced by Gunnar Lund, former state secretary and minister, who emphasizes that outwards the government keeps together as a collective and that ministers are subject to a certain “discipline”, whereas there is a diminishing collegiality and this has a lot to do with the “more presidential style” of Göran Persson (interview). The prime minister’s control of policy was further enhanced by his willingness to intervene in the appointment process, micromanagement (through appointment) down to the level of political adviser and press secretary. Persson was not comfortable having rambling policy discussions, reminiscent of an academic seminar, which was the way former social democratic prime ministers like Tage Erlander (1946–1969) and Ingvar Carlsson (1986–1991 and 1994–1996) liked to run the cabinet. Persson preferred an efficient and speedy process and was less inclined to the collegiate approach of his predecessor. That said, when Ingvar Carlsson again became prime minister in 1994, at a time of economic crisis, all government ministers had to formally pledge to loyally support the policy of a dramatic restructuration of public finances with both spending cuts and tax increases before they were appointed: “This gave the prime minister and the minister of finance an extra strong position for a while” (email).2 He pointed out that this was “a big exception” to his collegial leadership, with considerable ministerial discretion, and gives this as an example of the trend of “presidentialization.” The other but related trend is relations with the media, where Carlsson commented that while he often referred journalists to ministers, this irritated journalists who “demanded to talk to the prime minister, otherwise it had to be.” The “pledge” in 1994 also meant a strong drive towards unified government communication (more in Sect. 3.2). This exceptional measure, a formal contract (Statsrådsuppdrag) between the prime minister

2 The finance minister, Göran Persson, became prime minister in March 1996.

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and ministers, was modelled on the experiences in the Clinton administration in the US, according to its architect Allan Larsson (2015: 93–94), former finance minister, who further notes: “It was a way from the beginning to create coordination and high pressure in the internal work and give a cohesive message to the media and the general public.”3 These written loyalty requirements constitute a break with tradition and epitomize a clear shift to the executive centre. Despite the fact that the prime minister principally advocated a slim prime minister’s office, and engaged in strategic thinking and planning rather than day-to-day operations, he centralized resources and power to his office. According to a close observer of the government, with experience of working in the government offices, Christer Isaksson (1995: 183), the result was “highly centralized government offices.” The signs of an enhanced role of the prime minister included the recruitment of aides to ministers, who found themselves presented by a fait accompli. The centralization is mainly explained by the greater control the prime minister wanted at a time of decline in the Swedish economy. Ingvar Carlsson thus captures this shift in the role of the prime minister/prime minister’s office. While he was constrained by an organizational norm not to turn the prime minister’s office into a “mini-ministry,” if necessary, the prime minister was prepared to transfer responsibilities to his office and he established both a deputy prime minister and a minister for policy coordination in the prime minister’s office (Persson 2007: 217). An increase in staff included more press secretaries. The concentration of power in the prime minister’s office has taken place through gradual shifts in authority and resources since the mid1990s, in the shape of organizational reforms of the government offices. While, historically, the organization of the government offices has been governed by the principle that the prime minister’s office should be slim and not a fully-fledged prime minister’s department, these reforms have brought about a surrender of that model. Despite structural political conditions that worked against prime minister empowerment, the office of the Swedish prime minister was continuously strengthened over several decades. The organizational reforms involved shifts in authority, discretion, and resources in favour

3 See Larsson (1994), preparatory document in the archives of Ingvar Carlsson.

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of the prime minister, and were explicitly motivated by the perceived necessity demand. A major step was taken in January 1997, when all ministries were merged into one organizational entity, a single public authority, the government offices, with the prime minister as a head. The reform sought to create a single entity out of the ministries and other organizations that made up the government offices. The reform enhanced the role of the prime minister’s office in policy coordination, at the expense of the line ministries, including the traditionally powerful finance and foreign ministries (Elder and Page 2000: 149; Persson 2003: 260). The trend of centralizing power to the prime minister and his office over time was reinforced by this reform. Research shows that the driving actors acknowledge that the reform to a certain extent had to do with a centralization and that the prime minister got more formal powers (Erlandsson 2007: 133). This reform “was an almost necessary condition if, in the long run, a more centralized media management was desired”; ten years later, the most concrete result of the reform seems to be “a more regulated communication with the media” (Erlandsson 2008: 346). It also appears that the government offices’ forms of information are formalized—in essence, all contact with the media must go through the press secretaries (ibid.). In all, the reform contributed to a major change in Swedish government. A few months after his electoral victory in 1998, the prime minister made more institutional changes to the government offices and his office (Persson 2003). It is hard to escape the conclusion that there was a prime minister intent on centralizing policymaking. Sweden’s prime minister used to have few independent resources. But the increasing demand from media—together with the growing complexity of the state and government as well as EU membership—has changed all that. Notably, organizational reform in the government offices has reinforced the role of the prime minister’s office in policy and political coordination (Dahlström and Pierre 2011; Elder and Page 2000; Persson 2016). Formal and informal practices grant the core of the government a central role in potentially all policy areas. As one political scientist emphasizes: “Policy coordination is taking place to an increasing extent within the government, and to a diminishing degree within Parliament. This has reduced governmental transparency. To that extent, this trend represents a major challenge to democratic governance” (Persson 2016: 647). Issues referred from the ministries constitute an important part of the prime minister’s office’s agenda. Whereas specialized ministries enjoy

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formal authority within their respective policy fields, the prime minister’s office is frequently called upon to have an opinion or take decisions in these areas. This may happen because the specialized ministries have been unable to agree on themselves, or because issues cut across two or several ministerial configurations and require a centralized intervention, or because the issues drift to the top since they are of such a political magnitude that the decisions must be taken by the highest level of authority. In coalition governments, it is then the party leaders who get to agree, one of whom is usually the prime minister. Also, the functional demands of media mean that governments are pressured to compile a coordinated response. The need to adapt to media explains why the press department at the prime minister’s office was reinforced. What became known as the press department is now one of the fixtures in the prime minister’s office. Despite the importance of contingent factors, including the personality of prime ministers and political context, the development can mainly be explained by structural factors. More evidence has emerged regarding the shift of power to the prime minister and the strengthening of the prime minister’s office. Not least, as I show, resources have increased significantly for coordination and communication as the government has adapted to media. In Sweden, there are signs of presidentialization in all three faces: the party face, the electoral face, and the executive face. Existing research recognizes the media focus on party leaders, including the prime minister and his or her media strategy, and that media attention has intensified (e.g., Aylott 2005; Bergman and Bolin 2011; Ruin 2007; Sundström 2009).4 Yet research, like public debate, has focussed mainly on individual leader traits and on the electoral dimension of the presidentialization thesis, less on the executive face and institutional effects on the executive.5 4 For studies on how party leaders and prime ministers are covered in the media, see Bjerling (2012), Johansson (2008), and Olsson (2017). 5 But see Daléus (2012); a PhD thesis on the topic of leadership style with a particular focus on the interaction between personality and institutions in shaping the performance of individual Swedish prime ministers. Leadership style is discussed in light of the presidentialization thesis, which is considered as overstated. However, the “centralization thesis during crises is supported…” (ibid.: 284). Moreover, the thesis shows how the government offices and the prime minister’s office have significantly increased staff for communications and media relations (ibid.: 73–74). The dissertation presents evidence of a trend toward professionalization of communication, among other things.

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Moreover, to date, empirical research in Sweden testing presidentialization has mainly examined the easily observable and relatively easily measurable selection of cabinet ministers; the distribution of ministerial posts (Bäck et al. 2007, 2009, 2011, 2012), at the expense of exploring the less evident and discernible effects of other factors including the media on institutional structures and distribution of power. While it is entirely relevant to use ministerial selection as indicator, it is questionable whether it is a particularly appropriate indicator of the operationalization/assessment of prime ministerial empowerment or of executive autonomy vis-à-vis the legislature. It is difficult to shed the impression that ministerial selection is chosen as an indicator, not because it was the most valid of those available, but because it was the one most easily quantifiable. Concerning applications of the concept of presidentialization, Elgie and Passarelli (2020: 377) note that while we need specific indicators scholars should aim to find evidence for the presence of presidentialization broadly “rather than focusing on a small number of specific indicators.” Examples given are Bäck et al.’s (2011) study of Sweden which and Kolltveit’s (2012) study of Norway which “examine only particular features of their country’s political process.” Yet, Elgie and Passarelli (2020: 377) further note, for Poguntke and Webb presidentialization is a process that has an effect on three faces of politics, each of which comprises a number of different aspects of political life: “To test whether or not there is evidence for presidentialization in the way that they understand it, we need to have a broader sense of the political system.” New research shows that the Swedish core executive has faced more and more demands in recent decades from the internationalization of politics including EU membership and growing public sector complexities (Brinde et al. 2022). The governance system has changed in several respects: it has become more centralized; at the central level the government has sought to increase control through politicization; and government communication has become ever more mediatized. The result is greater centralization, not least because of increasing media pressure which has necessitated strengthening of the government offices. In a similar vein, Swedish political scientists observe how the resources of the central government offices “have increased sharply” in the past three or four decades: since the first half of the 1980s, the total number of employees in the central government offices has increased by more

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than 50% and the number of political appointees has doubled (Lindvall et al. 2020: 498). This means, they (ibid.) further conclude, that the government “has access to more resources and is able to fill many more positions than previously. This helps to explain why the opposition parties occasionally prioritise the struggle for office over constructive legislative work in parliament.” Evidence from the interviews I conducted with government representatives in Sweden, coupled with documentary evidence, lends additional support to findings in research about the centrality of the prime minister’s office in policy and communications coordination. Mats Andersson, previously state secretary for coordination and now state secretary in the prime minister’s office, and with experience of working for three social democratic prime ministers, said that everything binding the government politically shall be cleared with the coordination secretariat, all government positions and decisions (interview). That includes when a minister is to take part in media, for instance, give an interview and then present political news, such as a law, binding the government politically. The policy coordination secretariat handles questions of content but questions of who is to be in the television news and when to release a news is handled by the head of press, also at the prime minister’s office. There, contact is close between the state secretary for coordination and the head of press. This state secretary further explained how communications, how to communicate politically, has become ever more important for the government given the contemporary information society. In addition to issues, there are the effects on public opinion. In the enormously quicker pace in news coverage and in the media climate, the government has less flexibility than the opposition because of the coordination required in government. Andersson emphasized that the news cycles have changed, have become quicker, which has to do with changes in the media landscape, where new forms of media have appeared. These observations, from a vantage point at the top of the policymaking structure, illuminate the interplay between communications and policy; even the instrumental use of communications. Within the government, the link between policy and presentation is crucial for how the media, parties, and the public will react to the government’s proposals. Hans Dahlgren, former state secretary in the prime minister’s office, with experience of working for five Swedish prime ministers, observed

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how step by step there has been more and more common coordination (interview).6 He gave four reasons: the increased pressure, the need for coordination, the demand for accessibility, and that it was a coalition government and important to have good coordination and to avoid surprises. Concerning the development of the office of prime minister and the prime minister’s office from the 1970s, with more people working there, important changes have generally led to much focus on heads of government. They have to develop their own role, in relation to European politics and globalization as well as “the media world” with “24-hours news reports.” With constant questions and the media landscape, the prime minister has to have an answer as soon as he (she) is “public.” This state secretary added that there is media coverage in the context of the EU, the summits in particular, with the presence both of national and international media. The pursuit of joint action in the media field is perhaps the biggest change in government work in recent decades. In addition, continuous political coordination is driving centralization. It has increased sharply. The prime minister’s office’s sharply increased role in coordination and its expansion have meant increased control of various activities. For example, a political proposal in speech or media must be prepared with the coordination secretariat if it contains “new policy for the government” and is normally coordinated by press managers and press secretaries (Prime Minister’s Office 2014: 6). The political coordination, centrally controlled by the prime minister’s office, is primarily about the political content, but also has a communicative aspect when it comes to how this content is to be presented. Concerning prime minister empowerment, the long-term trend also varies somewhat over time and some prime ministers had more time and better conditions in general to strengthen both themselves and the office. Moreover, the Swedish experience certainly suggests that centralization may be more easily reached in countries less ruled by coalition cabinets. Other things being equal, the prime minister of a single-party government is likely to be more influential than the leader of a multi-party government, especially if, as is usually the case, the prime minister of the single-party government is also the leader of that single party.

6 In the new government formed in January 2019, Hans Dahlgren became minister for European affairs.

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In Sweden, “President Persson” (1996–2006) was more “president” than Fredrik Reinfeldt (2006–2014) or Stefan Löfven (2014–2021) and it largely depends on coalition politics.7 Both presided over coalition governments. This meant that both prime ministers and their staff had to devote a lot of time and energy to trying to create unity in the government. That in turn partly explains the reinforcement of the prime minister’s office through more and more institutional resources. Compared with single-party cabinets, prime ministers in coalition cabinets spend much more time effort consulting with the other party leaders in the coalition and ensuring cabinet coordination (Bergman and Bolin 2011: 276; see also Premfors and Sundström 2007; Sundström 2009). Similarly, Bergman and Strøm (2011: 369), seemingly ambivalent about the presidentialization thesis, note: “The media—not least the new electronic forms—have sharpened their focus on the prime minister and thereby heightened the importance of intracabinet coordination.” While originally established as an office for the prime minister, the prime minister’s office has evolved into the supreme political body of the government. A very concrete expression of this process of change is the significant expansion in the staff of the prime minister’s office over this period of time. Compared to a staff of only a few in the 1960s, while increasing slightly over the decade, and to a staff of 49 when Sweden joined the EU in 1995, at the end of 2021 the prime minister’s office consisted of a staff of 206 (Government Offices 2022). While, historically, the organization of the government offices has been governed by the principle or norm that the prime minister’s office should be slim and not develop into a ministry of its own, continual expansion and reforms have brought about a surrender of that model. In the next section, I will explain in more detail the organization of government communication, how and why it changed during these years.

7 Magdalena Andersson was approved on 30 November 2021 as Sweden’s 34rd prime minister since the office of prime minister was created in 1876 and the country’s first woman prime minister. The Green Party left the government with the defeat of the government’s budget bill. Thus, it became a one-party government, but still in the minority. Magdalena Andersson was finance minister in Stefan Löfven’s governments from 2014 to 2021.

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3.2 The Emerging Government Communication System: A Movement Towards a Unified Approach The ability of prime ministers to speak for the whole government is the test of their power. In this section, we will see how the prime ministers have prepared themselves to face the media. We will take a closer look at the communications fabric of Swedish government, and the centralization of the government communication structure. All levels of government have a role in its communication but it is an operation increasingly run from the top. Empirical studies of government communication are rare also in Sweden. That leaves a very limited treatment of its government communication system.8 The edited volume Government Communication (Sanders and Canel 2013) includes a country chapter on Sweden (Falasca and Nord 2013). It presents important developments but also leaves some ambiguities in interpretations which open up for further research. Sweden follows a general pattern of a move towards giving more relevance and importance to communication in terms of capacity—structures, processes, and knowledge (Sanders and Canel 2013: 309). In Sweden, controversy about inadequate communication at times of crisis, specifically the 2004 tsunami in the Swedish case, has been a spur to the expansion of capacity (Sanders and Canel 2013: 309; see also Falasca and Nord 2013: 33; Nord and Strömbäck 2009; Strömbäck and Nord 2006).9 Summarizing the chapter, Sanders and Canel (2013: 306) note that this is a case of the country with “a strong citizen focus,” scoring highly on the citizen-oriented axis, reflecting a distinctive political culture. Further, Sanders and Canel (2013: 306) note that Sweden “has not developed a high strategic capacity,” that the changes reported “have produced a government communication structure that is flat, decentralized and rather fragmented.” But the experience of Sweden’s government communication since 2013 suggests otherwise. In their country report, Falasca and Nord (2013: 40–42) note that government communication in Sweden is becoming “more politicized” 8 For rare contributions, see Falasca and Nord (2013), Johansson et al. (2019), and Johansson and Raunio (2019, 2020). For overviews of media and politics in Sweden, see Nord and Grusell (2021) and Strömbäck and Nord (2008). 9 Crisis communications tend to be centralized, necessitate a response from the centre and the prime minister (e.g., Daléus 2012).

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while concluding that it “has become professionalized to a considerable extent due to the expansion of the communication organization and the number of communication professionals as well as to the new emphasis on communication practices and strategies.” Observing the rapid development of communication capacities in all parts of government organization since the 1990s, Falasca and Nord (2013: 41) see this development from different perspectives: either as a natural reflection of the increased information demands from the media and the public, or as an independent expansion of capacities in order to maintain influence in the public debate and keep the initiative in the political agenda-setting process. Perhaps, the most accurate way to explain this development is as arising out of a combination of both external and internal driving forces.

They (ibid.: 41) note that the communication organization does not only deal with demands for information and communication, which largely reflects news practices but also the purposes of practicing strategic and effective communication. Accordingly, functions of government communicators include media management, news management, agendasetting, and coordination of messages. They further note that strategically planned communication is important both to be able to handle the increased media pressure, and to generate, produce and disseminate information successfully. Yet, they (ibid.: 41) conclude that, in the Swedish case, “the organization of government communication and its strategies is still rather fragmented. It is difficult to coordinate a unified communication strategy for the different ministries and departments as well as between politically employed and civil servant communicators.” At the same time, Falasca and Nord (2013: 42) observe how new functions and departments have been introduced to improve coordination and efficiency of communication activities, while further concluding that these developments will require further research “in order to be able to confirm that government communication in Sweden is in fact gaining strategic coordination.” This examination of government communication in Sweden provides valuable information on the government communication structure and resources, deployed in order to influence the media and also for political purposes. This points to a reinforcement of Swedish government

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communication, including gradual institutional change, and to a necessary development. In short, the media necessitates functions or structures in government for communications. Yet I should state clearly that my findings are quite different from those by Falasca and Nord. Also taking into account the time of the study, they underestimated the development towards a more hierarchical government communication controlled from the centre as well as the state-centredness of Swedish political culture.10 It appears that the changes are more fundamental than recognized in previous research (see also Strömbäck and Nord 2008). More recently, an exploration of media and politics, indeed political communication, in Sweden notes, drawing on Johansson et al. (2019), that in recent years “the combination of downsized newsrooms and more efficient government communication and news management may have changed the balance in favour of political sources” (Nord and Grusell 2021: 119).11 While that chapter encompasses a wide spectrum of issues, quite typically for political communication research in Sweden the focus is on the electoral campaign context. Beyond that and given the topic overall it is striking how little there is on the government and its structures for communication or other aspects of government communication. That reflects the general orientation of political communication as a field of study in Sweden. In addition to the media, the focus is particularly on political communication in election campaigns and on political parties, not governments. Given the reinforcement of government communication, it is surprising how little attention that has been paid to these structures and institutional dynamics and effects. Communication is one of the most important, and continuous, challenges facing governments. Much has happened over the past two decades. Notably, the continual reinforcement of the executive centre involves more coordination and

10 According to Jacobsson et al. (2015: 6), the political culture in Sweden is “statecentric”. 11 For example, research shows that during the financial crisis that erupted in September 2008 the government and governmental sources dominated the framing of the crisis (Falasca 2014). The results of the study show that powerful political actors were dominant sources and were able to influence frame-building and thereby limit press independence. In the words of Falasca (2014: 17), “as the crisis developed in the initial phase, the Swedish government stepped up their communication efforts and the Finance Minister gained the dominant role of the most frequently used source in news coverage.”

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control also of communications. This involves a significant shift of institutional and human resources into government communication. Government communication in Sweden has become more hierarchical and centralized, reflecting professionalized coordination from the centre; a paradigmatic example of professionalized and centralized government communication (Johansson and Raunio 2019, 2020). The case study reveals and explains how this pattern has emerged, and what drives the development. Below, I will outline the major changes in the system of government communication and (coordination) in Sweden. The central steps in this process are summarized in Table 3.1. The resources allocated for government communication have grown significantly over the past 50 years. A very concrete expression of this decades-long process of change is the significant expansion in staff, including staff for press and information, at the government offices and the prime minister’s office specifically over this period of time. In the 1960s, there was only one press secretary employed, and the first was then employed for the prime minister in 1963 (Hadenius 1990: 337). In 2022, the prime minister had several staff dedicated to press secretary work whether in this or any other title. The appointment of a government press secretary in 1963 was the first step towards government communication becoming a comprehensive prime minister-led operation with the prime minister’s office a sort of communications effort hub at the heart of the government. But it would take some time before that happened. When the Swedish prime minister in 1963 appointed the first ever government press secretary in Sweden, it was evidently more out of necessity than choice. Seemingly the press secretary institution was born out of necessity when the Swedish prime minister needed a press secretary. The immediate reason, also for the strengthening of the then small prime minister’s office overall, was a spy scandal that year which in turn revealed shortcomings in coordination and communication within the government. Allegedly, the prime minister at the time, Tage Erlander, was initially not kept informed and experienced leaks from the conversations in the government. This episode led to demands for better coordination (Elder and Page 2000: 137). In 1963, new positions at the prime minister’s office also included a state secretary to the prime minister. Ingvar Carlsson, former prime minister with experience of working for prime minister Erlander, points out that it would be wrong to conclude that the prime minister’s office expanded because the prime minister wanted to strengthen his position and give himself a more important

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Table 3.1 Major changes in the system of government communication and coordination in Sweden Date

Changes

1963

The first press secretary is employed by the government offices in the prime minister’s office Additional press or information secretaries are employed The non-socialist government speeds up the pace of “mediatization” with the appointment of additional press or information secretaries Press secretary becomes the title for all who do such work and are politically appointed in the government offices, ministries, and the prime minister’s office The Social Democrats return to power. Day-to-day policy coordination shifts from the ministries of the respective party leaders to the prime minister’s office Four non-socialist parties form a government. A head of press is appointed in the prime minister’s office. Day-to-day policy coordination by a new coordination secretariat in the prime minister’s office Social democratic one-party government. The position of head of press is proposed in the preparations for the change in government, but is not appointed. A strengthening of the prime minister and the prime minister’s office. Overall responsibility for policy coordination placed with a new position as minister for coordination in the prime minister’s office, where there is also a new position as deputy prime minister A major step towards central control by the prime minister’s office and an enhanced role of the prime minister through the merger of all ministries into one organizational entity, the government offices, with the prime minister as the head The position of head of press is re-established in the prime minister’s office and put in charge of media management and coordination, working closely with the prime minister. When this head of press in 2004 is appointed state secretary in the prime minister’s office a press secretary there becomes the new head of press Day-to-day EU policy coordination shifts from the ministry for foreign affairs to a new EU coordination secretariat in the prime minister’s office Government formed by four centre-right parties. The state secretary to the prime minister effectively undertakes the duties of a head of press. She resigns the following year and a head of press is appointed A state secretary for communication is established in the prime minister’s office The position of state secretary for communication in the prime minister’s office is abolished The government introduces a communication policy for government offices

1970s 1976 1980s

1982

1991

1994

1997

2000

2005 2006

2010 2011 2012

(continued)

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Table 3.1 (continued) Date

Changes

2014

The Social Democrats are back in power, now in coalition with the Green Party. All government press secretaries are employed by the prime minister’s office and are no longer at a specific ministry. Daily morning press meetings are held at the prime minister’s office with all press secretaries. Day-to-day policy coordination remains in the prime minister’s office A strengthening of central government communication with the appointment of an additional deputy head of press, the appointment of a new head of planning partly dealing with communication, strategic work including long-term communication, as well as the establishment of a new position as media strategist with media planning and strategic communication as the primary task The government introduces a checklist for the government offices’ use of social media for communication (revised 2018 and updated 2021, now called “Social media in the Government Offices—guidance”) A further strengthening of central coordination in the new government with the appointment of a second deputy head of press for the Social Democrats During the Covid-19 pandemic, continuous crisis communication strengthens the executive centre through the many press conferences and other forms of communication managed from there As the Greens quit, the new government is composed of a single party, the Social Democrats, which retains the structure for government communication. In addition to the prime ministerial staff for day-to-day management and operations of media relations, two former press secretaries to the new prime minister, who was formerly finance minister, become deputy chief of staff (also with experience of working for the former prime minister) and political adviser, respectively

2016

2016

2019

2020–

2021–

Source Adapted and extended from Eriksson et al. (2013), Erlandsson (2008), Falasca and Nord (2013), Hadenius (1990), Johansson et al. (2019), Johansson and Raunio (2019, 2020), Premfors and Sundström (2007), Ullström (2011), and Vallinder (1971)

role (Andersson 2002: 37). According to Carlsson, what prompted the personnel expansion of the prime minister’s office around the prime minister had instead to do with the new conditions and political challenges. One principal factor was the media (ibid.: 38). Journalists had the task of pressuring the prime minister, and did so, and it is clear that the difference is very large between the media coverage from very reverent 1946 to somewhat more confrontational in the 1960s, Carlsson (in Andersson 2002: 38) noted, adding that as a result even Tage Erlander “eventually felt the need to hire a press secretary. It was a big step.” Carlsson (in Andersson 2002: 40, my emphasis) concludes that during

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Tage Erlander’s time in power the office of prime minister did not really change: “The expansion of the organization around him was not an attempt by Erlander to change leadership style, to exercise relatively more power, but it was a necessary development for the prime minister to be able to play the role he wanted to play.” The media pressure on the prime minister was still moderate compared to what later prime ministers would be exposed to. Yet there was a need for a support structure in relation to media and communications. And the formal recognition through the title of press secretary can in itself be regarded as a sign of the institutionalization of the role. Things have moved on since Erlander’s day. Notably, the prime minister’s office grew bigger and more press or information secretaries were employed. The media landscape and the media outlets have changed dramatically. We have witnessed more commercialized and fragmented media, and changes to the journalistic profession. These changes follow cross-national trends. Pressure from media has been growing on prime ministers and therefore also the need for more staff. Another expression of the long-term process of change concerns the structure of government communication; that is, its elements and organization at different levels. This means the structure of information or communication management within the government—how different parts of the government are coordinating their communication efforts. As shown in Table 3.1, the system of government communication in Sweden has undergone a series of changes over time. These have strengthened the centre. Over the course of three decades, Swedish prime ministers have brought a shift to a more centralized structure of government communication.12 It is not the first country to do so. Pressure from media and the changing media environment has forced countries across the world to review their relationship with media. Whereas only one press secretary was employed in the government in the 1960s, for the prime minister, over the following decades the number of government press secretaries has continually increased to over 30 in 2022 (down since the shift from a coalition to a one-party government at the end of November 2021). In addition to the press secretaries, and the 12 The reorganization of EU policy coordination implemented in 2005, follows the same logic of centralization. The aim was to concentrate the overall responsibilities within the prime minister’s office, with Sweden definitely becoming one of the comprehensive centralizers as regards the domestic coordination of EU policy.

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press chief with deputy, the prime minister has other staff working with communication matters, strategic communication, and media strategy. They may have another title, political adviser. Added to them are all, over 100, other communication staff who are non-political. You find communicators at all levels of the administration. A major step in the organization of the Swedish government communication system was taken in 2014 when all press secretaries in the coalition government of the Social Democrats and the Greens became employed by the prime minister’s office and part of one organizational entity; the press department at the prime minister’s office, with the press chief as head directly under the prime minister. This change, also summarized in Table 3.1, enhanced the role of the prime minister’s office in news management and general communications coordination, at the expense of the ministries. There was a need for the prime minister’s office to have a clearer responsibility for government’s communications operation as a whole. That is reflected in the other novelty introduced in 2014 by the new government: morning meetings on a daily basis led by the press chief at the prime minister’s office. It serves as a daily line-of-the day meeting that sets the agenda for the people in this team, and throughout the government, then playing a major role in relationships with journalists. The meetings prepare statements and talking points. That is routine in the daily work. In terms of the government communication process, it is evident from interviews that the job of these staffers is to promote or hinder the publication of information and then use communication channels to the greatest effect. Coordination is strong with daily meetings. What follows is a clear tendency towards centralization of government communication as indicated in the interviews. Communication has been coordinated to maximize the attention for the issues the government wants to promote, or to divert attention from anything that may harm the government. The unit for news management and communications coordination located at the prime minister’s office has been upgraded with a strengthened position for the head of press, a position which has been given considerably stronger authority too. The position includes responsibility for the government’s overall communication and de facto media adviser to the prime minister. Altogether, there is the press chief with a deputy (previously two deputies), plus over 30 press secretaries and a staff of press

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assistants and press coordinators, and press communicators. Press assistants and press communicators are non-political but work closely with the press secretaries and the political staff. A special unit (RK Kommunikation) provides strategic and operative support for the head of communication at the government offices as well as technical and practical support. Its work is based on the document “Communication Policy for the Government Offices,” which regulates the internal and external communication and is the common basis for communication activities (Prime Minister’s Office 2012).13 The policy document contains objectives and core values and describes the division of responsibilities for communication activities in the government offices and the prerequisite of coordination for “good communication.” The “ultimate responsibility” for the coordination of both internal and external communication lies with the prime minister’s office. Another sign of centralization, at least potentially, is the policy document regulating how ministers should act on social media; that is, a kind of social media communication policy (Government Offices of Sweden 2021).14 In short, ministers’ social media presence could expose disagreements in the government. A review in 2018 of the development of the government offices’ communication activities more broadly aimed to “identify opportunities for increased uniformity and efficiency in the Government Offices’ communication activities” (Government Offices of Sweden 2018: 6). The review focussed on the forms and implementation of communication, not control and management of what is communicated, and found that communication activities in general are “well-functioning, but that there is potential for improvement.” One problem that was identified, as is well known, is insufficient horizontal inter-ministerial communication. The organization for communication remains a central aspect of efforts to streamline government offices. On 1 January 2020, the ministries’ communication activities were included in the joint RK Kommunikation. The purpose is, now as before, to make this activity and the work of the

13 It is issued by the office of the permanent secretary, which belongs to the prime minister’s office. 14 It is issued by the office for administrative affairs, to which the communications department of the government offices belongs. It also serves as the communications function of the prime minister’s office. The policy document pertaining to social media decided in 2018 was updated in 2021. It replaced the previous social media communications policy document from 2016.

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ministries more uniform. At the same time, there is a further development of authority with regard to, among other things, digitalization. In other words, a lot is happening in the direction of centralization. The politics of government communication stands out clearly in relation to the presentation of the state budget, epitomizing how the government through news management has taken control of at least parts of its media coverage. As one senior journalist said, “you are in their hands.” According to interviewed journalists, this is a typical example of how increased resources in government administration and stronger efforts to control the political news agenda are visible on a daily basis. This development was also confirmed by the press secretaries in their descriptions of their work. Attesting to the nature of government communication as intrinsically political, both journalists and journalists described an increase in resources on the political side with more press secretaries and more coordination. It is hard escaping the conclusion that there are more resources and efforts to influence news reporting and content. There is more control of information by press secretaries, according to the experienced journalists. A journalist with 20 years of experience in public service explained how press secretaries are being more active in limiting the possibilities to direct contact with politicians: “they are a filter all the time… not only in contacts with the government but also with members of parliament.” All the journalists confirmed this picture of increased information management. Experienced journalists talked about press secretaries as being more active and more controlling, and often present in interviews with ministers. Some ministers have press secretaries by their side in all kinds of communication. One senior journalist said that the press secretary, together with the state secretary, is the minister’s most important co-worker. Another journalist said that some press secretaries are like gatekeepers: “They see their work as protecting the minister.” Other journalists shared this impression. Among the press secretaries themselves, one of them suggested that the expansion in their numbers along with other communication staffers reflected “a kind of increased professionalization not to give a messy impression.” One press secretary emphasized the increased speed in media coverage as another explanation for more resources on communication and more coordination within the government: “Everything is much faster… when something is written on Twitter it can be a news article.” That reflects the need to respond to a 24-hour media environment.

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In interviews, press secretaries described what they do and the day-today routines, some also offered a wider perspective on the government communications machine and operation (see also Johansson et al. 2019; Johansson and Johansson 2021). According to one of the prime minister’s press secretaries (interview): I would say that it is more centralized and coordinated in general. But I would also say that it is a product of the spirit of the times and the demands placed on having better control over what the different parts do, the demands for answers and so on. [---] Paradoxically, it is still produced, I think, more news today, although there are fewer people working with it, but there are more news outlets, all newspapers also have TV channels, radio…news agencies…convey moving images, there is a lot of live reporting. So, a lot is produced and that is why it is required that we on our part have better control over what goes out. As just such a practical thing that we have a press meeting every day and most of it is about just organizationally and purely calendar-wise keeping control that there is no news at the same time... So much of the coordination is developed as a result of the fact that there is a demand as well, that we must be more organized, I think.

And actors on both sides told the same story about downsized newsrooms, greater demands to produce content for different platforms and less time for journalistic research. This includes how the newsrooms have changed, and the changed and more difficult work situation for many journalists today as they have to produce a lot themselves. One of the prime minister’s press secretaries explained: “I mean they should produce an insane amount but have fewer resources… they should produce more articles a day, they should also photograph themselves, they should record it themselves, so they should both film and print it, edit.” Regardless of whether it has any significance for the quality of the output that it goes faster and so on, this development can mean that journalists become more dependent on the press secretaries and their role in providing information. To that extent, power has shifted. This press secretary did not oppose this interpretation, and further explained: I mean, it is going insanely fast in the news today, now it is really a 24hour news cycle, it never ends… It is clear that the group that produces public news, it is clear that it is a vulnerable group. They will produce a lot of news in a short time. There is not the same time for fact-checking…

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It is a problem overall. [---] And that development is not likely to slow down, and social media contributes extremely much there, since they are the main news outlets after all. They convey the news that is shared and there is no fact-checking.

In other words, in social media, there is no editorial judgement over the content, not of anything. Press secretaries and journalists gave the same general picture of an increased level of planned communication in the government. There are many reasons, some political and some connected to media development, which have favoured the government communication operation as it often has the upper hand in relation to media. Among the political reasons are increased awareness of the role of communication in politics and a greater need for coordination in coalition governments. One of the things that marks out contemporary governments—whatever their composition—is the centrality of communications as part of the apparatus of the state. For several reasons, present-day governments and their leaders need to be better able than previous generations to conduct their own communications operations. It is a gradual institutional change and a cumulative process of adjustment. This development has progressed in all governments, certainly in somewhat different strengths but still continuously—especially in coalition governments, where the need for joint coordination is generally greatest. The push for unity is one reason for the centralization in government communication; both media and the political opposition search for every rift in the unity of government. Such a rift can be revealed through media. In sum, the emerging government communication system, spanning seven decades, reflects a movement towards a unified approach to government communication and an upward pressure to its organization. Corroborating theoretical expectations and logics outlined in the previous chapters, there are clear signs of centralized government communication and functional pressures for the government to be as well coordinated as possible to be able to assert themselves vis-à-vis the media and public—to speak with one voice—and this requires centralized news management and resources; a coherent approach. This is a way of sustaining the image of the state/government as coordinated, coherent, and controlled (Jacobsson et al. 2015: 38). There are functional pressures for the government to be as well coordinated as possible. That also reflects concerns about efficiency. I find a pattern of strengthened institutions

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and increased resources for communication. We find a similar development in other countries. Sweden’s case is illustrative. It is a paradigmatic example of centralized government communication, of central control and coordination. The Swedish case offers clear support for the centralization argument and logic. With Swedish government communication now seemingly on an ever-upward trajectory, the trend is likely to continue.

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CHAPTER 4

Conclusions

How, why, and with what consequences does media affect governments and the standing of prime ministers? This book has sought to advance an agenda of research organized around these three questions. Taking a step in that direction, this book has offered approaches and analyses that span and expand the boundaries of research on government, prime ministers, and media. Theoretically, it has served both to develop theories about government communication and the sources of institutional change and prime minister empowerment and to problematize the implications of such shift for theories about governing and democracy. Empirically, the book has provided a case study of prime minister empowerment in Sweden, with particular attention to how media has caused institutional effects in government communication. Both theoretically and empirically the book makes an important contribution to institutional change analysis. In this book, I use the term government communication to denote the structures, practices, and processes of central government institutions in their communication aspects. That encompasses the broad range of actors involved in these activities as well as the organizations through which they operate. And these structures and relationships have an important hierarchical dimension. This study expands the research agenda of government communication particularly with regard to how, why, and with what consequences media affects the government and the office of the prime minister. © The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. M. Johansson, The Prime Minister-Media Nexus, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12152-4_4

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This concluding chapter presents the conclusions reached as a result of my inquiry. I highlight the principal results as regards empirical research and analytical approaches. I identify dominant patterns. I summarize the central findings of this book under the three principal bodies of literature (outlined in Sect. 1.1). I identify new puzzles and research questions following the analysis reported in this book. The first body of literature addressed in the book pertained to political leadership. While existing research is rich in descriptions and analyses, most of the literature have been focussing on the personality and other dimensions of leadership than that of organizing for the media. In this book, I have identified and assessed patterns of prime ministerial leadership structures for communications in one state and over time. The second literature concerned institutional design in government . Again, there is rich literature but most of it deals with policy coordination and not communications coordination. This is despite the link between policy and presentation, and the need for institutions in processes of government communication. Moreover, the way these institutions are designed may have important consequences for the distribution of power in government. The third literature pertained to the role of advisers in politics. Existing research addresses issues of practice and influence, but to date, most of this literature has centred on other types of advisers than media advisers. Yet, as my research finds, these media advisers have not only become more and more, numerically, but also more important through the work they do and its significance. There is surprisingly little systematic research on communications coordination, whereas most of the literature deals with policy coordination and structures related to this. Likewise, much less has been written about media advisers than about other kinds of advisory functions. While media advisers are central to the government, existing research offers few insights into how they may have an influence. In their advisory role, they might be expected to influence policy, but we still know little about this. This too promises to be an interesting line of inquiry in future research. To recapitulate, I hypothesized that the media, through the institutionalization of government communication, is an important part of the explanation for the empowerment of prime ministers, who have benefited from this development. More specifically, I suggested that the media has presented governments with functional pressures for the conferral of authority, discretion, and resources on prime ministers. Each causal mechanism involves the adaptation of procedures and practices to the

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functional prerequisites of media, with implications for the balance of power within the executive. I then proceeded to the Swedish case. This book claims and finds that communications today is not only a key element in what the government is actually doing but also is moving upwards in the government, and that media is an important driver of institutional change. That in turn has reinforced the executive centre and the prime minister. These effects of institutionalization and empowerment are visible in the Swedish case. The analysis reveals a clear trend of centralization, a movement of communications upwards in the government, and that media is an important contributing reason to prime minister empowerment. Most evidence suggests this trend is continuing, not least via the day-to-day practices of dedicated communication professionals who ultimately serve the prime minister. I find a trend of increasing centralization over time. The analysis confirms a pattern of growth in resources and scale of government communication and confirms the expected pattern of centralization over time. How may these patterns be accounted for? In this book, I have introduced and tested a number of explanations. As I suggested in Chapter 2, an understanding of the power shifts requires an institutional change analysis. In conjunction with the literature on the presidentialization of politics, its dominant features, and sources, I offered two explanations for institutional change relating to government communication in its broadest terms. These explanations are variants of institutionalism. The first explanation, informed by rational choice institutionalism, stresses concerns about functional efficiency, highlighting the benefits to political actors and institutions of particular institutional arrangements. The second explanation, informed by power-oriented institutionalism, stresses concerns about power distribution, conceiving of organizations or institutions as instruments in political competition. The rational institutionalist logic, like the logic of centralization, receives strong support in the empirical analysis. This is certainly not to say that power-oriented concerns are unimportant, only that they appear less prominent in this study. However, these explanations may be difficult to isolate. Both may be true. For example, when prime ministers are keen on unity in government communication too then it may reflect both efficiency and power concerns. A fractious government makes it look less effective and has a political downside; it can weaken the prime minister and the entire government.

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The expectations of the rational institutionalist explanation well match observed empirical patterns in Sweden’s government communication system over time. My account suggests that the functional need for the resources—of support structures, of personnel, and what they do—drive the development. This development is also driven by institutional limits in ministerial independence, in recognition of the need for uniform communication from the government and of the need for the prime minister discretion in all communications linked to media. This feeds into the debate on redistribution of power in executives. Media generates functional pressures for institutional change. Media is changing how governments organize. Media has a big effect on governments which have adapted thoroughly by implementing effective news management strategies and organizational structures. These have emerged over the decades as a response to functional and growing demands from media for information and access to sources. Demand for government information is high. Analysis of how the government communication system in Sweden has evolved, over several decades and mainly in its institutional structures, suggests that these structures and the shift to centralization arose more out of necessity than choice; more out of concerns about functional efficiency than about power distribution. This supports rational functionalism. Adapting rationally or functionally to the media, governments have updated and refashioned procedures and practices to provide prime ministers with effective machineries for communications and coordination. This has involved the conferral of additional authority, discretion, and resources on prime ministers, with implications for the balance of power within the executive branch. Tracing this dynamic at work, I show how it has brought change to the way the government is organized and institutionally designed. These institutions are designed for a purpose. The prime minister needs them to be functional. These institutions evolved functionally, gradually, and naturally. In Sweden, all major government communications go through the prime minister’s office in some shape or form. This development has benefitted prime ministers. Despite structural political conditions that worked against prime minister empowerment and despite the traditional norm of a slim prime minister’s office, it was continuously strengthened over several decades. Government communication has been institutionalized, tightened, and centralized with the prime minister and has changed irreversibly. Having moved upward, these government institutions are

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unlikely to devolve downward. It is a very centralized system. The trend is clear: centralization. This development reflects a logic of centralization. What are the implications of centralizing government communication? The results point to long-term institutional change in government with important implications for intra-executive relations. This research alerts us to questions about how government communication, in its several aspects, is linked to the distribution of resources and power. These are questions that we must deal with in the analysis of communication, media, and political power. Perhaps more significant, however, are the implications of the empirical research for the democratic legitimacy of current arrangements. In many ways, the book is also a reflection on contemporary democracy in light of the significance of communications in the governing process. Many are those who have expressed concerns about the democratic implications of intensifying media management by politicians and governments. The development of centralizing impacts on executives entails very real implications for government and democracy. Questions remain about how the identified trend of centralization can be detrimental to transparency and accountability. There are important normative issues to address. Future research on prime ministers and the media should do more in integrating empirical studies and normative theory, looking closer into the democratic implications of centralized control of government news. Changing institutions might be creating new imbalances. The media not only legitimizes political authorities it also reinforces political hierarchies. That and the centralized control of government news in turn raise pertinent new questions about democratic governance. The shifts in power towards the core of government are real. This leads to a final, vital point relating to democracy in our time. Communication has become a primary instrument of government. Communications today permeate public institutions. Government communication is not just about communication, it is also about politics. Politics and communications are inevitably bound together. These findings have important implications for research on political communication, power, and executives. The findings also feed into ongoing debates about shifts in power in political systems. The empowerment of the prime minister is a crucial development for the distribution of power in the polity. Scholars continue to grapple with the extent and sources of this development. Media as a source of political (chief) executive empowerment is still understudied empirically. My results carry

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implications especially for research on government communication, core executives, and prime ministerial power; the presidentialization of politics in parliamentary democracies. Unlike studies of the presidentialization of politics existing research in government communication, while rich in descriptions of government communication systems, rarely tests or develops theoretical explanations. My findings also have important implications for research on the “mediatization” of politics. While an alluring concept, “mediatization” simplifies the analysis of media influence on politics by overlooking or underestimating important institutional implications of media on governments and political uses of media. My research suggests a less linear and more complicated or multifaceted picture. My findings challenge those who suggest that governments primarily adapt to rather than shape media. The relationship between politics and the media seems much more politics-driven than claimed in “mediatization” research. The combined effect of downsized newsrooms, on the one hand, and increasingly resource-strong and professionalized government communication identified in this study, on the other hand, results in the interpretation that political actors and structures have been strengthened through the instrumentalization of the media. Political actors possess instruments for trying to control information flows either through or bypassing traditional media. Rather than endorsing the notion of “mediatization” as a process that is media-led, I find that it redistributes power among political actors, to the advantage of prime ministers. My results endorse the notion that media serves to redistribute power rather than undermine government authority. Through my focus on prime ministers, I identify a form of institutional change that merits greater attention. This book and its results carry two broader implications. First, it suggests that there is an important shift in intra-executive relations and that this shift is partly because of media. My argument about the empowerment of prime ministers emphasizes that media redistributes political influence in favour of the (chief) executive because it shifts control over communications that creates informational asymmetries and new justifications for reinforcing the executive centre. However, I recognize that other factors may reduce this development. The transformative pressure and independent effect of media on the standing of prime ministers cannot be easily isolated and is likely to be mediated by pre-existing institutional and political conditions. I have in this book prioritized the theoretical

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and empirical mapping of causal mechanisms, rather than a full-scale assessment of alternative explanations. That said, I have shown that the media (and communications) in general has caused institutional effects in government, with variation across leadership personalities and domestic political conditions. It should be made clear that I by no means argue that a centralization of power with prime ministers is the only or inevitable effect of media on governments. My findings are not deterministic, even if there are general trends and dynamics. Beyond that caveat, I suggest that the media has presented governments with functional pressures for institutional change which have reinforced the executive centre. My argument and findings about the effects of media on intra-executive relations serve to advance this agenda. Second, this book opens up a new agenda of research. The theoretical explanations which I have advanced may be tested through a broader set of media, as well as a deeper analysis of changes in media structures and journalism. There are all kinds of media and while potentially influential I would expect some media to generate more pressures than others for the conferral of authority, discretion, and resources on prime ministers. In the analysis, I did not differentiate between traditional or legacy media and social media but treated them all as “media.” Strategic use of digital platforms gives political actors new possibilities to bypass the traditional media. The paradox or seeming contradiction of a more decentralized media environment and at the same time greater centralization of government communication can be explained by the dynamics of the more diverse media landscape. In more volatile circumstances, controlling information flows becomes even more important and challenging for the executive centre. That appears to be a paradox but my results are speaking in favour of complementarity. It also raises questions. While emphasizing the functional pressures generated by media that have centralized executive structures and power, media may strengthen prime ministers through other logics as well. Media exposure may translate into a special kind of political capital that can be used in the exercise of power. An effort to make their political capital as large as possible is something all prime ministers have in common. It is required for political purposes that may arise at any time. But how politicians prioritize and choose to invest their political capital varies. While media is also an unavoidable constraint, it is a resource that can be used to the advantage of the prime minister in being a leader. The link to media is an essential leadership and power resource for the prime minister.

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While it makes sense to be cautious in treating any single factor, including media and communications, as a major independent source of shifting intra-executive relations and power in favour of the prime minister, there is evidence for this development. The media matters both in a straightforward manner and more indirectly and these effects cannot be measured. This is not to suggest that other factors do not matter or are less important. There are other factors at work. There are, in short, contingent as well as structural reasons for prime minister empowerment and they are best conceived of as complementary. But the relative importance of media can only be assessed if it is systematically compared with alternative or complementary explanations. The factors or sources work in combination. We need to contextualize the media effect and isolate it by exploring its interactions with other sources of change. There is a final consideration. The limitations of this study should be acknowledged. While there is ample evidence for the causal mechanisms, it is difficult if not impossible to exactly measure the weight of the factors, especially as they are part of broader developments unfolding over time. As a result, I encourage further research on government communication. The theoretical explanations may be refined through a closer analysis of other factors, such as the domestic political context of prime ministers and government composition (majority/minority, coalition/one-party cabinets). The extent of centralization can be expected to vary according to formal arrangements—constitutions and institutions—and to political circumstances. The Swedish experience suggests that centralization may be more easily reached in countries less ruled by coalition cabinets. The results from the case study may well have a more general significance, but we need more studies comparing political systems in different governmental institutions. Such comparisons may yield interesting results and may also contribute to the discussion about what is related to a national context and what features are parts of a common political communication culture in Europe and beyond. The explanations advanced here may form the basis for inquiries into variation in levels of centralization and prime minister power across time and national cases.

Index

A Analytic narrative, 18 Andersson, Magdalena, 72 Andersson, Mats, 70 Asymmetry, 14, 19 Audience, 16, 35, 37, 38, 41, 46 Australia, 1 Authority, 5, 9, 14, 19, 32, 35, 37–39, 48–52, 61, 63, 64, 66–68, 80, 82, 92, 94, 96, 97 Autonomy, 7, 27, 30, 33, 39, 40, 48, 53, 61, 69 Aylott, Nicholas, 27, 61, 63, 64, 68

B Bergman, Torbjörn, 29, 30, 62–64, 68, 72 Berlusconi, Silvio, 29 Blair, Tony, 29 Britain, 1

C Cabinet, 6, 14, 15, 17, 28–30, 35, 38, 39, 43–46, 48, 52, 53, 64, 65, 69, 71, 72, 98 Cabinet government, 15, 29, 62 Canada, 1 Canel, Maria José, 2, 5, 50, 73 Carlsson, Ingvar, 65, 66, 76, 78 Case study, 14, 15, 18, 19, 53, 62, 76, 91, 98 Causal mechanism, 13, 15, 19, 28, 35, 37, 40, 49, 61, 92, 97, 98 Centralization, 2, 5, 9, 10, 12–14, 16, 17, 28, 32, 38, 40–44, 46, 49–52, 61, 66–69, 71, 73, 80–82, 84, 85, 93–95, 97, 98 Cleavage, 32, 45 Coalition, 18, 19, 28–30, 42–48, 64, 68, 71, 72, 78–80, 84, 98 Coalition agreement, 48 Communications coordination, 63, 70, 80, 92 Coordination, 1, 9, 10, 17, 18, 31, 38, 44, 45, 48–52, 61, 66–68, 70–72, 74–85, 94

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2022 K. M. Johansson, The Prime Minister-Media Nexus, Palgrave Studies in Political Leadership, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-12152-4

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INDEX

Core executive, 9, 10, 69, 96 Crisis communications, 73, 78

D Dahlgren, Hans, 70, 71 Democratic corporatist model, 16 Democratic governance, 67, 95 Digital media, 50 Digital platforms, 97 Discretion, 14, 19, 32, 35, 38, 39, 48, 52, 53, 61, 65, 66, 92, 94, 97 Discursive power, 4 Distribution of power, 36, 63, 69, 92, 95 Distribution of resources, 4, 10, 17, 95

E Electronic media, 33, 35 Empowerment, 13–16, 19, 28, 29, 34, 35, 44, 45, 49, 61–64, 66, 69, 71, 91–96, 98 Erlander, Tage, 65, 76, 78, 79 European Union (EU), 31, 39, 64, 67, 69, 71, 72, 77, 79 Executive, 1, 2, 4–7, 9–16, 19, 27, 28, 30–44, 48, 49, 51, 52, 61–64, 66, 68, 69, 75, 78, 93–98

F Fake news, 40, 51 Finland, 40 Fogh Rasmussen, Anders, 29 Fragmentation of media, 41, 51 Function, 1, 5, 7, 9, 32, 36, 43, 51, 74, 75, 81, 92 Functional centralization, 51 Functional efficiency, 2, 36, 37, 49, 50, 93, 94

Functional pressures, 10, 14, 28, 35, 37, 84, 92, 94, 97

G Germany, 11 Government, 1–20, 28–31, 33–35, 37–52, 62–82, 84, 91–98 Government communication, 1–5, 8, 9, 11–13, 16, 18–20, 28, 30, 37, 39–46, 48–52, 61, 63, 65, 69, 72–80, 82–85, 91–98 Growth of the state, 31, 64

H Hjelm-Wallén, Lena, 64 Horizontal coordination, 19, 28, 31, 42–45 Hybrid media system, 40

I Information environment, 40 Information management, 82 Institutional change, 13, 14, 19, 28, 34–37, 40, 51–53, 67, 75, 84, 91, 93–97 Institutional change analysis, 15, 50, 91, 93 Institutional design, 6, 8–10, 19, 36, 49, 92 Institutionalization, 12, 52, 79, 92, 93 Institutional theory, 28, 36 Institutions, 2–5, 7–10, 13–15, 19, 34–37, 43, 51, 68, 76, 84, 91–95, 98 Interministerial coordination, 44 Internationalization of politics, 30, 69 Isaksson, Christer, 66

INDEX

J Johansson, Elena, 11, 63, 83 Journalism, 97 Journalistic research, 83

K Kohl, Helmut, 29 Kuehnhanss, Colin, 46

L Larsson, Allan, 66 Legacy media, 5, 16, 41, 97 Lithuania, 40 Löfven, Stefan, 72 Logic of centralization, 1, 2, 28, 49, 50, 52, 53, 79, 93, 95 Lund, Gunnar, 65

M Majoritarian, 27, 29 Malling, Milda, 18 Media, 1–6, 8, 11–17, 19, 20, 28, 29, 31–35, 37–44, 48–53, 61–63, 65–75, 77–80, 84, 91–98 Media adviser, 11, 12, 16–18, 80, 92 Media attention, 5, 31, 33, 68 Media coverage, 35, 71, 78, 82 Media development, 84 Media environment, 2, 3, 16, 20, 40–42, 44, 51, 79, 97 Media landscapes, 41, 42, 44, 52, 70, 71, 79, 97 Media outlets, 38, 79 Media platforms, 1 Media structures, 19, 41–44, 97 Media systems, 4, 15, 40, 41, 51 Mediatization, 7, 33, 34, 40, 77, 96 Ministerial government, 10, 31, 45

101

N Necessity, 8, 9, 37, 43, 52, 67, 76, 94 News management, 5, 17, 35, 41, 74, 75, 80, 82, 84, 94 Newsrooms, 41, 75, 83, 96 Norway, 69

O Organization, 2, 4, 6, 8, 10, 16, 17, 19, 32, 40, 49–51, 62, 66, 67, 72, 74, 79–81, 84, 91, 93

P Palme, Olof, 14 Party systems, 32, 45, 51 Personality of the leader, 8 Personalization, 7, 11, 14, 16, 33, 35 Plausibility probe, 18 Poguntke, Thomas, 7, 27–30, 32–34, 45, 61, 69 Poland, 40 Policy coordination, 10, 66, 67, 77–79, 92 Policymaking, 31, 44 Political capital, 37, 97 Political chief executive, 3, 31, 40, 41, 43, 49 Political communication, 2–6, 8, 13, 16, 34, 47, 48, 75, 95, 98 Political context, 29, 68, 98 Political leadership, 6–8, 11, 42, 92 Political parties, 7, 31, 32, 39, 40, 44, 47, 48, 50, 75 Political public relations, 5 Political science, 2, 6, 13, 27, 28, 36, 44, 45 Power, 2–8, 10, 12, 14, 15, 17, 27, 29, 30, 32, 34–40, 43, 49, 50, 61–64, 66–68, 73, 77–79, 83, 93–98

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Power oriented institutionalism, 36, 93 Power shift, 19, 33, 93 Prime ministerial government, 15, 29, 62 Principal-agent theory, 39 Professionalization, 17, 32, 50, 68, 82 Public administration, 6, 13, 31, 44, 45 R Rational choice institutionalism, 36, 93 Rational functionalism, 94 Rational institutionalist explanation, 94 Rational institutionalist logic, 49, 93 Raunio, Tapio, 17, 40–42, 44, 46, 51, 52, 73, 76 Redistribution of power, 3, 94 Reinfeldt, Fredrik, 72 Resources, 2, 4, 5, 8–10, 13–15, 17, 19, 27, 28, 31, 33–35, 39–41, 43, 45, 49, 50, 52, 53, 61, 63, 66–70, 72, 74, 76, 82–85, 92–94, 96, 97 Restructuring, 13 S Sanders, Karen, 2, 5, 50, 51, 73 Schori, Pierre, 65 Seymour-Ure, Colin, 4, 10–12, 35 Social media, 5, 16, 41, 42, 78, 81, 84, 97 Specialization, 32, 50 Spin doctors, 11, 33 State, 2, 4–6, 10, 13, 15, 16, 18, 29–32, 36, 37, 48–51, 64, 65, 67, 70, 71, 75–77, 82, 84, 92 Structures of mass communication, 33, 34

Sweden budget, 64 communication policy, 81 communications department, 2, 18, 19, 73–76, 79, 91, 94 constitution, 64 covid-19 pandemic, 78 EU policy coordination secretariat, 70 finance minister, 66 financial crisis, 75 government, 12, 15, 18, 48, 63, 76 government communication system, 73, 74 government offices, 76, 81 Green Party, 78 Greens, 80 Head of press, 70, 80 instrument of Government, 64, 95 office of the permanent secretary, 81 parliament, 63 policy coordination secretariat, 67 press chief, 80 press conferences, 4, 37 press department, 80 press secretary, 12, 76 prime minister, 12, 14, 15, 19, 61–64, 67–70, 72, 76, 79, 80, 94 prime minister’s office, 2, 14, 17, 18, 30, 62, 63, 68, 72, 79, 81 public service tradition, 16 RK Kommunikation, 81 social democrats, 80 social media communications policy, 81 state-centric political culture, 75 tsunami, 73 T Television, 33, 70

INDEX

Thatcher, Margaret, 29 Traditional media, 5, 96, 97 24/7 media environment, 82 Twitter, 82 U United Kingdom (UK), 11, 12

103

United States, 1, 50

W Webb, Paul, 7, 27–30, 32–34, 45, 61, 69