The Pragmatics of Defining Religion: Contexts, Concepts and Contests 9004115447, 9789004115446

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THE PRAGMATICS OF DEFINING RELIGION

NUMEN BOOK SERIES STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF RELIGIONS EDITED BY

H.G. KIPPENBERG • E.T. LAWSON

VOLUME LXXXIV

THE PRAGMATICS OF

DEFINING RELIGION Contexts) Concepts and Contests EDITED BY

JAN G. PLATVOET AND

ARIE L. MOLENDIJK

BRILL LEIDEN . BOSTON' KOLN 1999

This book is printed on acid-free paper.

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data The pragmatics of defining religion : contexts, concepts, and contests / edited by Jan G. Platvoet & Arie L. Molendijk. p. cm. -- (Studies in the history of religions, ISSN 0169-8834 ; v. 84) Includes bibliographical references and indexes. ISBN 9004115447 (cloth: alk. paper) I. Religion-Philosophy. I. Platvoet,Jan. II. Molendijk, Arie I. III. Series: Studies in the history of religions ; 84 BL5I.P72 1999 200-dc21 99-33639 CIP

Die Deutsche Bibliothek - CIP-Einheitsaufnalune The pragtnatics of defining religion : / contexts, concepts and contests / ed. by Jan G. Platvoet & Arie L. Molendijk. - Leiden ; Boston ; Kaln : Brill, 1999 (Studies in the history of religions ; Vol. 84) ISBN 90-04-11544-7

ISSN 0169-8834 ISBN 9004 11544 7 © Copyright 1999

try Koninklijke Brill .NT'; Leiden, TIle Netherlands

All rights reserved. No part qf this publication may be reproduced, translated, stored in a retrieval system, or transmitted in arry form or try any means, electronic, mechanical, photocopying, recording or otherwise, without prior written permission .from the publisher. Authorization to photocopy items for internal or personal use is granted try Brill provided that the appropriate fees are paid direct!J to TIle Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Suite 910 Danvers MA 01923, USA. Fees are sufdect to change. PRINTED IN THE NETHERLANDS

CONTENTS Preface ............................................................................................ Notes on the contributors

IX Xl

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

L. MOLENDIJK In defence of pragmatism

ARIE

3 PART TWO

MODERN CONTEXTS A. BECKFORD The politics of defining religion in secular society: From a taken-for-granted institution to a contested resource ................

JAMES

23

MASSIMO INTROVIGNE

Religion as claim: Social and legal controversies

....................

41

DANIELE HERVIEU-UGER

Religion as memory: Reference to tradition and the constitution of a heritage of belief in modern societies JACOB A. BELZEN Paradoxes: An essay on the object of the Psychology of Religion ....................................................................................

73

93

PART THREE

CONCEPTUAL CHANGES ERNST FElL

'Religio' and 'religion' in the 18th century: The contrasting views of Wolff and Edelmann ...................... ARIE L. MOLENDIJK Shifting cargoes: Ernst Troeltsch on the study of religion

125 149

WOUTER W. BELlER

The sacred in the social sciences: On the definition of religion by the Annie sociologique group ......................................

173

CONTENTS

VI

DAVID M. WULFF

Psychologists define religion: Patterns and prospects of a century-long quest .............. ...... .............. ........... ........... ..............

207

PART FOUR

METHODOLOGICAL ISSUES HENDRIK JOHAN ADRIAANSE

On defining religion .................................................................. JAN

G.

227

PLATVOET

To define or not to define: The problem of the definition of religion .................................................................................. JAMES L. Cox Intuiting religion: A case for preliminary definitions .............. ANDRE F. DROOGERS The third bank of the river: Play, methodological ludism and the definition of religion .............................. ......................

245 267

285

JAN A.M. SNOEK

Defining 'religions' as the domain of study of the empirical sciences of religions .................................. ..................................

313

PART FIVE

DEFINITION PROPOSALS WOUTER

J.

HANEGRAAFF

Defining religion in spite of history

337

PETER BYRNE

The definition of religion: Squaring the circle

......................

379

What is religion? ........................................................................

397

MEERTEN B. TER BORG

JEPPE SINDING JENSEN

On a semantic definition of religion ................ ........................

409

HETIY ZOCK

Religion as the realization of faith: The conceptualization of religion in relational psychoanalysis ....................................

433

CONTENTS

VII

PART SIX

EPILOGUE JAN

G.

PLATVOET

Contexts, concepts & contests: Towards a pragmatics of defining 'religion' ...... ....... ....... ....... ....... ......... ............... ........

463

Index of names .......................................................................... Index of subjects ........................................................................

517 522

PREFACE The problem of the definition of religion is studied in this volume from many angles and by different disciplines. Apart from papers on the history of the concept of religion, methodological reflections on its definition are presented, as well as explicit definition proposals and their relation to research programmes. In addition, the volume contains analyses of the pragmatics and polemics of defining religion in modern societies, in both academic and extra-academic contexts. In the courts, for instance, the question is debated which groups may, or may not, count as 'a religion' and claim tax exemptions. Some of the contributions to this volume address such legal and political controversies. The focus of this collection is, however, on the pragmatic instrumentality and strategic intent of whatever concept of 'religion' is being proposed. We argue in favour of an anti-essentialist, anti-hegemonic and multi-dimensional approach, for religions are immensely varied and complex phenomena, which need to be studied by several academic disciplines from many different perspectives. A broad variety of definitions of religion may, therefore, be legitimately developed and proposed. This collective volume stems from a working group in the Leiden Institute for the Study of Religions (LISOR), in which scholars working in the fields of the Psychology, Sociology, Philosophy, and Anthropology of Religion, and the Science (or History) of Religions co-operated. Other scholars, representing these various disciplines as well as a large range of approaches, were invited to contribute to this research project too. The Leiden participants intensively discussed the drafts of the contributions on many occasions. That, we hope, improved the quality of the final articles. We thank all the contributors for joining this 'conference on paper', as it was once called, and the great efforts they spent in writing these chapters. We are especially grateful to Daniele Hervieu-Leger and Ernst Feil, who both-although it was agreed that they would write in their mother tongues-delivered their final contributions in English. The papers by non-native speakers were checked by Mrs. Sylvia Dierks-Mallett, and Dominique de Boer assisted in the

x

PREFACE

preparation of the manuscript. USOR supported the editorial expenses. Our gratitude goes to them all. Leiden, April 1999

Jan G. Platvoet, Arie L. Molendijk

NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

Hendrik Johan Adriaanse, born 1940, studied Theology and Philosophy at Leiden University where he now holds the chair of Philosophy of Religion and Ethics. His fields of interest are theology in the university context and religion in modern society. In his latest book, Vom Christentum aus (1995), he defends and elaborates the idea of a critical Philosophy of Religion. James A. Bedford, Professor of Sociology at the University of Warwick, was a Vice-President of the International Sociological Association from 1994 to 1998 and will be President of the International Society for the Sociology of Religion from 1999 to 2003. His research has been on new religious movements, church and state issues, sociological theory of religion, and prison chaplaincy. His books include The Trumpet if Prophecy (1975), Religious Organisation (1975), Cult Controversies (1985), Religion and Advanced Industrial Society (1989) and (with Sophie Gilliat) Religion in Prison: Equal Rites in a Multi-Faith Society? (1998). He has edited New Religious Movements and Rapid Social Change (1986); (with Thomas Luckmann) The Changing Face if Religion (1989); and (with E. Barker & K. Dobbelaere) Secularization, Rationalism and Sectarianism (1993). Wouter W Belier studied Theology and History at the University of Leiden. He earned his Ph.D. with a thesis on Dumezil, Decayed Gods: Origin and Development if Georges Dumezil's 'ldeologie Tripartie' (1991). The study of Dumezil led him on to Mauss and Hubert, who were regarded by Dumezil as his predecessors, and to the analyses of religion of the Annee sociologique group around Durkheim. This resulted in a book (De sacrale samenleving: theorievorming over religie in het discours van Durkheim, Maus, Hubert en Hertz, 1995) and several articles in journals and collective volumes. At the moment, he is working on a monograph on G. Simiand and H. Bourgin, the two economists in the Annie sociologique group. The author is a member of the International Advisory Panel of Durkheimian Studies/Etudes Durkheimiennes (published by the British Centre for Durkheimian Studies), and a High School teacher (Social Studies, History and Economics) at the Rembrandt Scholengemeenschap, Leiden.

XlI

NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

Jacob A. Belzen defended doctoral dissertations in the Social Sciences at Utrecht University in 1988, in History at the Free University Amsterdam in 1989, and in Philosophy at the University of Leuven in 1991. He currently holds the chair of Psychology of Religion at the University of Amsterdam. He is serving in several national and international organisations and media in the fields of the History and Psychology of Religion, and published many articles in leading journals. He authored and edited several books, among them: Portretten en landschappen: Tekeningen uit de geschiedenis der Nederlandse psychiatrie ('Portraits and Landscapes: Sketches from the History of Dutch Psychiatry', 1994); ,?prg voor de ziel ('Caring for the Soul', 1995); (editor, with Nils G. Holm) Sunden's Role Theory: an Impetus to Psychology if Religion (1995); (editor) Hermeneutical Approaches in Psychology if Religion (1997); (editor, with Owe Wikstrom) Taking a Step Back: Assessments if the Psychology if Religion (1997); (editor) Metabletica & Wetenschap: Kritische bestandsopname van het werk van].H. van den Berg ('Metabletica & Science: A Critical Evaluation of the Work of ].H. van den Berg', 1997); (editor, with]. Corveleyn) Crossing Boundaries in the Psychology if Religion: Case Studies in Cross-National and Cross-Denominational Contexts (1999); Godsdienstpsychologie in Nederland ('Psychology of Religion in the Netherlands', 2 vols., 1999); (editor) Aspects and Contexts: Studies in the History if Psychology if Religion (1999). Meerten B. ter Borg studied Philosophy and Sociology at the University of Amsterdam and is now Senior Lecturer in the Sociology of Religion at Leiden University. He is a member of the Council of the International Society for the Sociology of Religion and member of the editorial board of the journal Implicit Religion. He wrote several books in Dutch, on nihilism (1982), on the link between existential problems and religion (1991, 1996) and on the cultural meaning of death in modern society (1993). He just finished a book on pastoral care in prisons and hospitals. Currently he is working on a book on religion and power. Peter Byrne studied Philosophy at the universities of York and Oxford (UK). He has been Lecturer, and is currently Senior Lecturer, in the Philosophy of Religion at King's College London since 1975. He is editor of the journal Religious Studies. He has edited and authored books in ethics and in philosophy of religion. His publications include: Natural Religion and the Nature if Religion: The Legacy if Deism (1989) and

NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

Xlll

The Moral Interpretation if Religion (1998). He is presently engaged in a study of ethical issues arising out of mental handicap. James L. Cox earned his Ph.D. from the University of Aberdeen in Scotland. He has held academic posts in Alaska Pacific University at Anchorage, Alaska and was Senior Lecturer in the Phenomenology of Religion in the University of Zimbabwe. For six years, he lectured in African Religions and directed the African Christianity Project in the Centre for the Study of Christianity in the NonWestern World in the University of Edinburgh. Currently, he is Senior Lecturer in the Study of Religions in Westminster College, Oxford. Apart from his articles, he has published: The Impact if Christian Missions on Indigenous Cultures (1991); Expressing the Sacred: An Introduction to the Phenomenology if Religion (19921, 19962); Changing Beliifs and an Enduring Faith (1993); (editor, with J. Mukonyora and F J. Verstraelen) 'Re- Writing) the Bible: The Real Issues)· Perspectives from within Biblical and Religious Studies in Zimbabwe (1993); (editor, with J.P. Phiri and K.R. Ross) The Role if Christianity in Development) Peace and Reconstruction: Southern Perspectives (1996); (editor, with J. Platvoet and J. Olupona) The Study if Religions in Africa: Past, Present and Prospects (1996); (editor) Rites if Passage in Contemporary Africa: Interaction between Christian and African Traditional Religions (1997); Rational Ancestors: Scientific Rationality and African Indigenous Religions (1998). Andre Droogers is Professor of Cultural Anthropology of Religion in the Department of Cultural Anthropology and Sociology of Development, Faculty of Socio-Cultural Sciences, at the Vrije Universiteit, Amsterdam. He studied Human Geography and Cultural Anthropology at the University of Utrecht. He has done fieldwork in Zaire and Brazil, and has held academic positions in both countries. His thesis, on boys' initiation in a Zairean tribe, was defended at the Vrije Universiteit (1974, cum laude). He is the author of four books and more than seventy articles, and has served as editor or co-editor of seven collections. His current research interests include popular religion, syncretism and pentecostalism. He is a former President of the Dutch Association of Cultural Anthropologists. In 1996, students at the Vrije U niversiteit voted him Lecturer-of-the-Year. Ernst Feil is Professor at the Catholic Faculty of Theology of the University of Munich. He has written on Dietrich Bonhoeffer (Die

XlV

NOTES ON THE CONTRIDurORS

77zeologie Dietrich Bonhodfers: Hermeneutik-Christologie- Weltverstandnis (1977 1, 1991 4), and is well-known for his historical studies of concepts such as 'autonomy-heteronomy' and 'religion'. His publications include: Religio: Die Geschichte eines neuzeitlichen Grundbegriifs vom Friihchristentum bis zur Riformation (1981); Antithetik neuzeitlicher Vernurift: 'Autonomie-Heteronomie' und 'rational-irrational' (1987); Religio IL- Die Geschichte eines neuzeitlichen Gmndbegriifs zwischen Reformation und Rationalismus (ca. 1540-1620) (1997). He is preparing two more volumes on the history of the concept of religio. Wouter J. Hanegraqff (1961) studied Music, Cultural History, and Science of Religions. He is now working as Research Fellow at the Department for the Study of Religion of Utrecht University (The Netherlands), and specialises in the history of alternative and esoteric traditions in Western culture. He is the author of New Age Religion and Western Culture: Esotericism in the Mirror rif Secular 77zought (1996); editor (with Ria Kloppenborg) of Female Stereotypes in Religious Traditions (1995); editor (with Roelof van den Broek) of Gnosis & Hermeticism from Antiquity to Modern Times (1997); and editor (with Antoine Faivre) of Western Esotericism and the Science rif Religions (1998). He is presently working on a book on Western conceptualisations of 'magic'. Daniele Hervieu-Uger earned academic degrees in Political Science at the Institut d'Etudes Politiques de Paris, in Law at the Faculte de Droit de Paris, and in Sociology those of Docteur en Sociologie and Docteur d'Etat es Lettres et Sciences Humaines at Paris Sorbonne. She is Directeur d'Etudes (i.e., Professor) at the Ecole des Hautes Etudes en Sciences Sociales at Paris, Director of the Centre Interdisciplinaire d'Etudes des Faits Religieux, and Editor-in-chief of Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions. Her research has been on the relationships between religion and modernity, the rearrangements of religious beliefs and practices, the shaping of socioreligious identities in modern Western societies and the evolution of French Catholicism. Her books include: De la mission it la protestation: l'evolution des etudiants chretiens, 1965-1970 (1973); Le retour it la nature: au fond de la foret, ['etat (avec B. Hervieu) 1979; Le flminisme en France (1982); Des communautes pour les temps dijficiles (avec B. Hervieu, 1983); Vers un nouveau christianisme?: introduction it la sociologie du christianisme occidental (1986); (editor, with F. Champion) De ['emotion en religion (1990); (editor) La religion au Iycie (1991); (editor) Religion et ecologie (1993); La religion pour memoire (1993); (editor, with G. Davie) Identites religieuses en Europe (1996); Le pelerin et le converti: la religion en mouvement (1999).

NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

xv

Massimo Introvigne was born in Rome in 1955. A philosophy and law graduate, he has occupied teaching positions at the University of Turin and the Theological School of Southern Italy before joining Pontifical Athenaeum Regina Apostolorum in Rome, where he currendy teaches courses and seminars on the History and Sociology of New Religious Movements. He is also an attorney with a leading Italian law firm, and the executive director of CESNUR, the Center for Studies on New Religions in Turin, Italy. He is the author of twenty books in Italian, and the editor and co-editor of another ten, in the fields of Sociology of Religion and contemporary magic (some of them translated into French and German), including the encyclopedical Le nuove Religioni (1989), II cappello del mago (1990) and Indagine sui satanismo (1994). Jeppe Sinding Jensen (1951) is Senior Lecturer and Head of Department, Department for the Study of Religion, University of Aarhus, Denmark. He holds degrees in Arabic and Semitic Philology and in the History of Religions. His research interests include the history and theory of the Comparative Study of Religions and related issues in the Philosophy of Science. He is currendy working on a proposal for a reformulation of the taxonomic Phenomenology of Religion. He edited, with Luther H. Martin, Rationality and the Study if Religion (1997). Arie L. Molendijk (1957) gained degrees in Philosophy and Theology at the University of Leiden. He currendy he holds a position as a Research Fellow at the Leiden Faculty of Theology and is researching the emergence of the Science of Religion in the Netherlands at the end of the nineteenth century. His main research interest concerns the history of 19th and 20th century theology and philosophy in Germany and the Netherlands. His main publications are: Aus dem Dunklen ins Helle: Wissenschafl und Theologie im Denken von Heinrich Scholz (1991); Zwischen 77zeologie und Soziologie: Ernst Troeltschs 7jpen der christlichen Gemeinschaflsbildung: Kirche, Sekte, Mystik (1996); (editor, with Peter Pels) Religion in the Making: The Emergence if the Sciences if Religion (1998). Jan G. Platvoet (1935) studied Missiology and Anthropology of Religions at the R.C. University at Nijmegen, The Netherlands. He earned his Ph.D. in the Science of Religions at Utrecht University in 1982. He is currendy Senior Lecturer in the Comparative Studies of Religions at Leiden University and Vice-President of the Mrican

XVI

NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

Association for the Study of Religions. He has published on the traditional religion of the Akan of Southern Ghana, the Study of Religions in Mrica, spirit possession, the study of rituals, and the history and methodology of the Science of Religions, particularly in the Netherlands. Apart from articles, his publications include: Comparing Religions: A Limitative Approach; An AnalYsis if Akan, Para-Creole and IFOSananda Rites and Prayers (1982); (editor), AnalYsis and Interpretation if Rites; Essays to D.J. Hoens (1983); (editor, with K. van der Toorn), Pluralism and Identiry: Studies in Ritual Behaviour (1995); (editor, with J.L. Cox, & J.K. Olupona), TIe Study if Religions in Aftica: Past, Present and Prospects (1996).

Jan A.M. Snoek has lectured on Western Esotericism and Freemasonry in the Faculty of Theology at Leiden University (The Netherlands). He also taught in the Department of Religious Studies of the Theological Faculty of Tilburg (The Netherlands). He is an Associate Member of the Leiden Institute for the Study of Religions (LISOR). In 1996 he held the Theodore Verhaegen Chair in Freemasonry of the Universite Libre de Bruxel1es. He is the author of Initiations (1999), published several articles on the methodology of the Comparative Science of Religions as well as some forty on Freemasonry. He is co-editor of several periodicals in the field of the academic study of Western Esotericism and Freemasonry. David M. Wulff is Professor of Psychology at Wheaton College, Norton, Massachusetts, U.S.A. He has a Ph.D. in personality psychology from the University of Michigan and in 1993 received an honorary Doctor of Theology from the University of Lund, Sweden. He is the author of Psychology if Religion: Classic and Contemporary (1991 1; 1997 2), which was awarded the 1990 Quinquennial Prize by the International Commission for Scientific Psychology of Religion. His most recent contributions to edited works include 'A Century of Psychology of Religion: Where Does It Leave Us Today?', in J.A. van Belzen & O. Wikstrom (eds.), Taking a Step Back: Assessments if the Psychology if Religion (1997), 'The Psychology of Religion: An Overview', in E.P. Shafranske (ed.), Religion and the Clinical Practice if Psychology (1996), and 'Phenomenological Psychology and Religious Experience', in R.W. Hood Jr. (ed.), Handbook if Religious Experience (1995). In 1997-98 he served as president of the Division on Psychology of Religion of the American Psychological Association; and he is a Fellow both of

NOTES ON THE CONTRIBUTORS

XVII

the Division and of the Society for the Scientific Study of Religion. He is currently book review editor for the Journalfor the Scientific Study if Religion.

Hetty Zock (1957) studied Theology at Leiden University (with a major in Psychology of Religion), and worked for 10 years as a minister in the Dutch Reformed Church. She earned her Ph.D. with an analysis of Erik H. Erikson's psychology of religion in 1990. Her current research interests are object-relations theory and the worldview aspects of psychotherapeutical theory and practice. She has been teaching Psychology of Religion at the Faculty of Theology at Leiden University since 1994. Her major publication is A Psychology if Ultimate Concern: Erik H. Erikson's Contribution to the Psychology if Religion (1990).

PART ONE

INTRODUCTION

IN DEFENCE OF PRAGMATISM Arie L. Molendijk The theorizing mind tends always to the oversimplification of its materials. This is the root of all that absolutism and one-sided dogmatism by which both philosophy and religion have been infested. Let us not fall immediately into a onesided view of our subject, but let us rather admit freely at the outset that we may very likely find no one essence, but many characters which may alternately be equally important in religion. l

'Religion' and its Discontents The concept and definition of religion have occupied the minds of scholars for a long time. The American psychologist James H. Leuba could easily list 48 definitions of religion in an article published in the Monist almost a century ago. 2 His intention was to show the futility of defining religion. Nevertheless, on another occasion he defined the 'religious sense', as 'the feeling of unwholeness, of moral imperfection, of sin, to use the technical word, accompanied by the yearning after the peace of unity'. 3 Sometimes it seems inevitable that we should specifY precisely what we are talking about. The case of Leuba suggests that we should be suspicious of all universal definitions but, on the other hand, it also suggests that we cannot do without stipulative definitions, in order to demarcate the subject in a particular context. 4 This is not to say that we may simply define religion in any way we like, or should not discuss the usefulness of particular proposals. One might convincingly argue, for instance, that Salomon Reinach's definition of religion as 'the whole of scruples which constitute James 1902: 26. Leuba 190 l. 3 Leuba 1896: 309 (as quoted in James 1902: 201). 4 Robinson (1962: 19) gives the following, almost recursive, definition: 'by "stipulative definition" I mean establishing or announcing or choosing one's own meaning for a word'. Introductions into the various types of definition are to be found in manuals, such as Copi 1972: 108-145, and Kahane 1986: 271-285. I

2

4

ARIE L. MOLENDIJK

an obstacle for the free exercise of our [human] faculties'5 is not the best starting point for scholarly research. And Schleiermacher's characterization of religion as 'Sinn und Geschmack furs Unendliche' is probably not of much help in discussions of the public role of the churches. Debates about religion take place always in a specific context and refer to specific phenomena. This fact calls, according to the editors of this volume, for a pragmatical, contextualized, approach to the problem of defining religion. Before jumping to conclusions, however, we would be well-advised to take a look at the present-day debate concerning the definition of religion. There is more going on than the recurrence of old conflicts over the appropriateness of various definitions. At the beginning of this century Emile Durkheim had already suggested, for instance, that a religion is not so much the idea of gods and spirits, but should be defined as 'a unified system of beliefs and practices relative to sacred things, that is to say, things set apart and forbidden-beliefs and practices which unite into one single moral community called a Church, all those who adhere to them'.6 Recent debates go deeper and problematize the idea of defining religion as such. A good example is Talal Asad's critique of Clifford Geertz's attempt to come to a general, or even universal, definition of religion. 7 Geertz claimed that the anthropological study of religion is a two-stage operation: 'first, an analysis of the system of meanings embodied in the religious symbols which make up the religion proper, and, second, the relating of these systems to social-structural and psychological processes'.8 Asad suggests, that these two stages are actually one. 'Religious symbols .. , cannot be understood independently of their historical relations with nonreligious symbols or of their articulations in and of social life, in which work and power are always crucial'. 9 The separation of religion from power is a modern Western norm and must lead to failure, if applied to other traditions. One does not have to accept this critique in full to be conscious of the fact that the notion of religion has been constructed during 5 Reinach 1909: 4: 'Un ensemble de scrupu1es qui font obstacle au 1ibre exercice de nos facu1tes'. 6 Durkheim 1915: 47. 7 Geertz 1966; Asad 1993; cf. the contributions by Hanegraaff and Jensen to this volume. s Geertz 1966: 125. 9 Asad 1993: 53.

IN DEFENCE OF PRAGMATISM

5

the course of Western history. The entry 'Religion' in Eliade's En£)!clopedia if Religion starts in the following, self-critical, way: The very attempt to define religion, to find some distinctive or possibly unique essence or set of qualities that distinguish the 'religious' from the remainder of human life, is primarily a Western concern. The attempt is a natural consequence of the Western speculative, intellectualistic, and scientific disposition. It is also the product of the dominant Western religious mode, what is called the Judeo-Christian climate or, more accurately, the theistic inheritance from Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. [...J Even Western thinkers who recognize their cultural bias find it hard to escape, because the assumptions of theism permeate the linguistic structures that shape their thought. [...J Many practical and conceptual difficulties arise when one attempts to apply such a dichotomous pattern across the board to all cultures.1O

This does not make for very comforting reading. The notion of religion is fiercely debated among scholars these days. Does the notion not presume a one-sided-Schleiermacherian-focus on the inner religious sentiment as well? The alleged eurocentricity, especially, makes Western scholars feel uneasy. 11 Do we not need another vocabulary?12 On the other hand, however, most students of religion will doubt whether it will be helpful to reject the category of religion in its entirety. Will terminological changes really solve the problem of an adequate approach to the phenomena we want to research? Is it realistic to expect that we can clear the ground by simply replacing the notion of religion with another term? I would suggest that we cannot jump over our own shadow, and that we must work with the tools we have, however inadequate they may be. A better strategy probably would be to try to determine which assumptions actually influence our thinking. The sensitivity to this issue is heightened by the growing number of publications on the genesis of the concept of religion. 13 These studies show us, among other things, how Deists turned religion into 'a natural object constituted primarily by propositional knowledge', 14 and how inner beliefs and experiences became indicative of true religion in modern Christianity. Several contributions to this volume King 1987: 282 (emphasis in the original). Rudolph 1994. 12 Feil 1986, 1992, 1995; cf. W.C. Smith 1963. 13 W.C. Smith 1963; Despland 1979; Feil 1986, 1997; Wagner 1986; Despland & Vallee 1992; Dierse, et al. 1992; Bremmer 1998; Molendijk & Pels 1998. 14 Harrison 1990: 4; cf. also 7. IO

II

6

ARIE L. MOLENDI]K

(especially in Part III) address conceptual changes. This historical scholarship has contributed to a growing uneasiness among students of religion about the conceptualization of religion in general, and its 'reification' in particular. The clear-cut distinctions between a religious mode, on the one hand, and politics, science and aesthetics, on the other, between a transcendent sphere and a secular sphere of everyday life, between 'holy' and 'profane', are no longer evident, although they still inform much research. Vis-a.-vis non-Western cultures and new forms of 'inner-worldly' religiosity, scholars redefine their subject, in order not to overlook important developments that exceed traditional boundaries. Some opt for research on-what in earlier days was called-'functional equivalents' of traditional religion. Terms such as 'religiosity', 'spirituality' or even 'world views' and 'ways of giving meaning to life' are introduced in order to broaden the field of study. 15 This makes it hard sometimes to demarcate any more or less specific field of religion and the suggestion is even made that the term 'Science/Study of Religion' be replaced by 'Science/Study of Culture'.16 However, the intuition that the term 'religion' opens up a segment of our culture, which-although interrelated with other domains such as politics and ethics-is worthwhile investigating in its own right is hard to suppress. The recent flood of publications on the concept of religion, doubtless documents a rise of interest in the topic. 17 As has been remarked by various participants, the debate about the proper concept of religion is not a harmless affair. Institutional, methodological and even political commitments play an evident role here. The topic is not only of interest to the various scholars who research religion and compete for funds, but also e.g., to judges (who have to pronounce judgements on the question of whether a specific group or community really is religious, and is, therefore, eligible for tax exemptions) and to politicians (who discuss the role of religion in educational programmes). The definition of religion is even, to some extent, negotiated 'in the streets' of modem multiconfessional and multicultural societies all over the world. Students of religion cannot ignore how people define themselves in (non)religious terms. That is not to say that the general public decides what counts as religion, but that such developments do influence scholarship, and rightly so. 15

16 17

Cf. the contributions by Hervieu-Leger, Belzen, and Ter Borg below. Cf. Feil 1995: 510. Cf. the review article by McCutcheon (1995).

IN DEFENCE OF PRAGMATISM

7

How, then, is the growing focus on, and the uneasiness about, the concept of religion to be explained? The struggles between various approaches, varying from the proponents of an 'objective' 'Science of Religion' to those who demand a religious commitment in the study of religion,18 playa role here. Methodological presumptions do influence concepts, and vice versa. Among students of Comparative Religion, the awareness is still growing that their working categories are not so easily applicable to non-Western societies, where that which we define as their 'religion' is an integral part of their way of life, hardly separable from other social activities. There is something more going on than a longing for methodological sophistication. Perhaps too many scholars of religion deal in 'method and theory', but this fact alone does not account for the stream of publications on the concept and definition of religion. There are also external reasons. My guess would be that major developments, particularly in recent Western religious history, have enhanced the debate. The deinstitutionalization of religion and the emergence of new, more individualistic religiosities, such as New Age, call for a reconsideration of the concept of religion. It was the philosopher and early sociologist Georg Simmel who, at the beginning of the twentieth century, coined the German word monstrum 'Religioides' in order to enlarge, or better stil, to add to the traditional concept of religion. 19 Sociologists of religion devised new terms such as 'invisible religion' in order to research 'religion' outside the mainstream religions and established churches. 20 The need to reconsider the concept of religion is intimately related to the problem of how to come to grips with societal developments, and how to deal with the transformation(s) of religion(s) in (late) modernity. The idea that these processes could all be adequately described in terms of 'secularization', has lost much of its plausibility. The conceptualization of religion in modern times has, no doubt, been influenced by the rise, and the achievements, of modern natural science, which have brought forth a world view more convincing than traditional (Christian) religion. Yinger's influential handbook opens with Reinhold Niebuhr's question: 'Why has religious faith persisted for three centuries after the first triumphs of science?'.21

18 19

20

21

cr. Wiebe 1994. Cf. Tyrell 1992: 173. Cf. Luckmann 1967. Yinger 1970: I.

8

ARIE L. MOLENDIJK

Because, it seems, the old religious claims concerning the world and its origin could no longer be sustained, religion had, at least to some extent, to be relocated in a sphere 'beyond' the empirical, verifiable world of the natural sciences. The (new) definitions of religion in which words like 'trans-empirical', 'non-verifiable' or 'transcendent' (all terms that ascribe religion a status beyond the sciences) figure prominently, are numerous. 22

Once Again: the Difinition

if Religion

One way to explain the purpose of this volume is to tell its history. It all began with the foundation of the Leiden Institute for the Study of Religions (LISOR) within the Theological Faculty of Leiden in the mid-1990s. The aim of this research institute is to contribute to the 'un-prejudiced perception of the different religious traditions in today's plural societies'.23 It gathers within its circle scholars from various fields, such as Biblical Studies, Church History, Comparative Religion (Science/History of Religions), and Philosophy, Sociology and Psychology of Religion. And to further the interdisciplinary debate, a research programme called Methods & Theories in the Study of Religion (MTSR) was started. Representatives of the last four of the fields mentioned above participated in this group and they tried their hand at the old and famous subject of the definition of religion. Although initially there was still some hope of finding a common methodological and theoretical framework, it gradually became clear that mutual differences could not, and should not, be covered up, but ought to be articulated in open discussions. It was decided to extend the debate by inviting scholars from outside the research group (representing a large range of approaches) to contribute to our planned volume on the definition of religion. And to this end, we have succeeded in gathering articles from scholars working in the fields of Psychology, Sociology, Philosophy, Anthropology, and Science of Religion. Because we are convinced that the concept of religion one uses is always related to particular goals and contexts, we invited the contributors not only to reflect on the problem of defining religion, but

22 23

For an overview, see P1atvoet 1990. The quotation is from a document entitled 'LISOR's Scientific Mission'.

IN DEFENCE OF PRAGMATISM

9

also to give their own definition proposal (or to argue why they could not do so). Differences and similarities between scholars, disciplines, and approaches are brought into the open in this way. Our basic line of approach was developed and refined during our debates. Discussing the possibilities, the needs, and the uses of defining religion from our various disciplinary points of view and backgrounds, we realized even more strongly than before that a pragmatical approach would be the most appropriate, especially in the diffuse religious landscapes of late modernity or (if you like) postmodernity. This conviction was more or less forced upon us and was not so much the result of methodological reflection, although the pragmatical stance can certainly be substantiated by argument. 24 The most basic argument is, I think, that from a modern point of view, definitions of religion are not expected to describe its 'essence' as such, but are considered as proposals to use the term within a specific context. Nearly all methodologists have abandoned the idea that it is possible to give 'real definitions' of cultural phenomena such as democracy, religion, or criminal behaviour. They say, instead, that definitions are about words (and not about things),25 and that they determine the use of a term with regard to a specific context or goal. Mosdy, it is not enough to give just' a 'lexical definition', describing how a term is actually used. Apart from the difficulties involved in determining the actual usage of a term, and apart from the question of whether or not all definitions are ultimately prescriptive (even the lexicographer can hardly accept all-including 'wrong'-usages of a term), one often needs to focus terminology in order, for instance, to solve a specific legal problem or to conduct a fruitful research project. Definitions which specify the usage of a term for the sake of a specific undertaking are called 'stipulative' or 'regulative'26 definitions. They are introduced by phrases like 'by this expression we mean ... '. A proper definition of this kind has to take notice of the current meaning of the difiniendum. It is not very helpful to define the term 'car' by saying that it is a 'four-legged animal which barks'. But in the case of stipulative definitions, it makes no sense to ask whether the definition is true. Instead one asks: is it appropriate and useful in this particular context? This

24

25 26

Cf. especially Platvoet's concluding article in this volume. This is not to deny that many words do refer to the world outside. Cf. Adriaanse's contribution to this volume.

10

ARIE L. MOLENDIJK

methodological consideration suggests very strongly a pragmatical approach to definitions. Various other reasons~such as the difficulties in establishing an overall, general, definition of religion, the vicissitudes of the concept of 'religion', and the fragmented predicament of 'postmodernity'~ arouse scepticism with regard to 'essentialistic' and 'foundationalistic' approaches as well. Pragmatism~which was made famous by American thinkers such as John Dewey, William James and Charles Sanders Peirce~has now returned to the scene. Richard Rorty and Hilary Putnam are probably currently the most influential proponents of pragmatism. Rorty explained it as 'the doctrine that there are no constraints on inquiry save conversational ones~no wholesale constraints derived from the nature of the objects, or of the mind, or of language, but only those retail constraints provided by the remarks of our fellow-inquirers'.27 Although the formulation sounds rather 'idealistic' and 'constructivistic' (as if there are no 'real' constraints whatsoever), it can hardly be denied that scholarship moves on along 'conversational' lines and is, first of all, interested in 'what works' in a given situation. Even those who hold on to the idea of describing reality as it 'really' is, are mostly aware of the fact that our conceptual and instrumental apparatus changes over time, and that it plays a formative role in the process of knowing. In this loose sense, therefore, pragmatism has a hold on most contemporary scholars. The 'pragmatics' in the title of this volume, however, refers not only to the pragmatical approach, which looks for the usefulness (and not for the truth) of definitions, but also to actual practices, in which definitions are brought into play. Besides their use within scholarly research, definitions are also used in the public, political and legal spheres. The focus is on the pragmatic instrumentality of whatever concept of 'religion' is being proposed, or used, for both academic and non-academic purposes. One of our main aims is to investigate whether particular concepts of 'religion' serve well the purposes, political or cognitive, for which they have been developed, and whether they do so not only in the eyes of those who developed or used them, but also in the opinion of those who are confronted with them.

27

Rarty 1982: 165.

IN DEFENCE OF PRAGMATISM

11

Outline The contributions to this book are grouped according to the pragmatical point of view sketched above. Mter this introduction (part I), part II will focus on the extra-academic pragmatics of defining religion in modern Western societies. In her contribution, Daniele Hervieu-Leger suggests that it might be 'necessary to widen one's perspective in order to bring to light modernity's (invisible) religious logic, at the risk of the dissolution of the religious subject as such'. The contours of 'religion' are less evident than during the many centuries in which its connotation was determined by the model of established Christianity. The search for an adequate concept of religion is by no means a purely inner-academic affair. The articles dealing with the battles for the favours (access to the media) and freedoms (tax exemptions) connected with the social or legal recognition of a particular group as 'a religion', illustrate this very aptly. Part III groups the historical articles on the vicissitudes of the concept of 'religion' in modern Western thought. These contributions show the ways in which the notion has been (re)conceptualized in various fields in relation to the envisaged research programmes. Part IV consists of truly theoretical papers reflecting on the preliminaries of defining religion. What is a definition? Is it possible, and feasible, to define religion? Is it useful to define religion? And if so, what are its uses? Part V contains articles proposing specific definitional strategies. Definitions never come alone, but are always correlated to views about how to approach the subject of research. The book will conclude with an article in which the pragmatic approach to the definition of religion is further developed on the basis of the preceding contributions (part VI). Part II Modem Contexts: The paper contributed by James A. Bedford deals with the phenomenon of extra-academic definition of 'religion'. It shows that an increase in religious diversity can strengthen the tendency to draw the boundaries of acceptable expressions of religion more and more restrictively. Beckford examines the disputes which have arisen in the United Kingdom in recent years over the definition of religion in relation to Religious Education in schools and advertizing on television. These controversies can arise, because Church institutions are no longer taken for granted and Christianity, along with other religions, is becoming an optional 'cultural resource' to be used only when required. Massimo Introvigne examines a number

12

ARIE L. MOLENDI]K

of controversies that have arisen recently about 'cults' and their claim to be 'a religion'. Because, in the cases under consideration, this claim is advanced in order to obtain specific legal, fiscal and political advantages, courts and administrative agencies are often requested to determine whether or not a particular group can rightly claim to be a 'genuine' religion. Introvigne presents the problems involved. Is Scientology a religion, for instance? Some recent court decisions have concluded in the affirmative. On the other hand, the obviously fraudulent U.S. mail-order ministries, conceived as mere tax evasion operations, confirm that a group's self-definition of what constitutes a religion ('ethno-definitions') cannot always be accepted at face value. Introvigne concludes his article by giving some recommendations for scholars testifying as expert witnesses in such trials. The other two contributions to the second part of this collection, theorize about the transformations of religion in modernity. What does this mean for the study of religion, Hervieu-U:ger and Belzen ask from, respectively, a sociological and a psychological point of view. Daniele Heroieu-Leger focuses on the type of legitimization which supports the act of believing and suggests that there is no religion without the-explicit or implicit-invocation of the authority of a tradition. In this way, one designates as 'religious' all forms of believing which justifY themselves, first and foremost, upon the claim of their inscription within a heritage of belief. This is proposed as one approach within a sociology of religious modernity; an approach which puts special emphasis on transmission and the correlated type of mobilization collective memory undergoes. Jacob A. Belzen points to the fact that psychology of religion does not aim at a description of religion tout court, but is interested in specific aspects of it. Some psychologists of religion have suggested widening their field of study to include phenomena of 'meaning giving' as such. Van Belzen, on the other hand, argues that religion should not be abandoned as the intended object of the discipline, yet that it might be wise to compare it with similar phenomena in non-religious contexts. As the study of committed forms of religiosity (understood as the subjective-personal counterpart of religion) has traditionally been assigned to psychology of religion, it has been suggested that forms of non-religious 'spirituality' should also be investigated, in order to detect the similarities and differences in comparison with religious forms of spirituality. Part III Conceptual Changes: Ernst Feil contrasts in his contribution

IN DEFENCE OF PRAGMATISM

13

two mid-eighteenth century views on religion: those of Christian Wolff and Johann Christian Edelmann. Wolff closely adhered to the traditional use of religio, meaning the painfully accurate observance of obligatory practices, whereas Edelmann interpreted religion in terms of 'love' and 're-unification' (in line with mystical traditions). More recent problems of defining 'religion', especially in modern Protestantism, are taken as an indication that the modern experience and notion of 'religion' have dissolved. This does not mean the end of Science of Religion, although Feil has serious doubts as to whether Philosophy of Religion will continue to be regarded as a central task of philosophy. Arie L. Molendijk deals with the work of the German liberal theologian and philosopher Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923). This essay explores Troeltsch's penetrating analysis of the genesis of Science of Religion and his conceptualization of religion in relationship to this emerging field of research. To some extent Troeltsch defended a transformation of Theology into Science/Philosophy of Religion in a broad sense. One has to bear in mind, however, that boundaries between (emerging) disciplines such as Psychology of Religion, History of Religions, Philosophy of Religion, and Theology, were not clearly fixed at the time. This fact, however, did not hamper the development of 'religionsgeschichdiche' studies in the late Wilhelmine Empire. The contribution by Wouter W Belier focuses on the work of the Annie sociologique group and gives an overview of the various concepts of religion and magic developed by members such as Emile Durkheim, Marcel Mauss and Henri Hubert in early-twentieth century France. The conceptual shifts are traced and the variety of definitions and approaches related to divergent interests as well. In this way, a more differentiated view of these authors is emerging, than to be found in the current textbooks on the history of science and anthropology of religion. The last contribution to this part comes from David M. Wu!ff, who traces the vicissitudes of the concept of religion in psychology of religion. Largely in agreement that definitions of religion are more or less arbitrary, the earliest psychologists of religion were, nevertheless, committed to formulating adequate definitions that would be useful in their work. Conceived more often as an attitude than as a belief, religion was typically defined in the broadest possible terms and usually with an emphasis on its psychological elements and positive functions, notably the preservation of values. Two prominent exceptions were James Leuba and Sigmund

14

ARIE L. MOLENDIJK

Freud, who both defined religion in more conventional terms of belief in God, which they considered irrational. With the revival of the interest in the field following World War II, renewed efforts were made to define religion, mainly through the operational procedures of scale development and factor analysis. Fundamental problems with the scales involved suggest that operational procedures may, in fact, complicate rather than solve the definitional problem. Part IV Methodological Issues: Hendrik Johan Adriaanse's paper addresses the problem of defining religion from a philosophical point of view. On the basis of ideas from modern definition theories, he argues in some detail that there is no such thing as essential indefinability. Some distinctive features of the philosophical notion of religion are worked out, all of which may contain an explicitly normative tenet. (Philosophers of Religion may speak of 'superstition' in certain cases.) In order to integrate these features into the definition, the strategy of a so-called regulative definition is adopted. The lexical definitions, as given by several dictionaries, are taken as a rough orientation that can be refined by philosophical specifications and emendations. The contribution by Jan C. Platvoet covers some methodological preliminaries as well. The possibility of defining religion, with a view to the disciplines involved in our research project, is discussed. The various uses of defining religion are explored, and finally Platvoet offers an operational definition of religion as a tool of research. The article presented by James L. Cox seeks to define the parameters for the study of religion by positing the need for a preliminary definition, or prior intuition, into the nature of religion. The preliminary definition offered emphasizes beliefs about, and postulated experiences of, a non-falsifiable reality which can be traced and examined through the rituals, stories, specialists, morality and art of identifiable communities. The usefulness of this preliminary definition is tested against the light of the author's own fieldwork undertaken amongst the Inupiat people of northern Alaska. Cox claims to have outlined a methodology for constructing a rational research agenda for the study of religion. This contribution as well as the following by Andre Droogers, do not stop at methodological questions, but apply these to specific research programmes as well. According to Droogers, the attempt to define religion leads to basic tensions obviously related to religion but not confined to it. The thesis is that these tensions repeat themselves in the scientific study of religion. Droogers makes an effort to go beyond these frictions, and,

IN DEFENCE OF PRAGMATISM

15

subsequently, views religion as a field in which believers as well as scholars operate. Both groups, each in its own way, seek a solution to the tension between inexpressibility and representation, between diversitying identity and unifying identification. Notwithstanding the power mechanisms at work here, Droogers points to the human capacity for playas the most important asset to overcome these tensions. The last contribution to this part brings us back on firm methodological ground. Jan A.M. Snoek opens his paper with a series of methodological considerations concerning the process of defining such terms as 'religions'. He suggests looking at 'religions' as a technical term, which refers to those observable phenomena that comprise the domain of study of the empirical sciences of religions. After discussing definitions proposed by Meerten ter Borg, Martin Southwold, Frits Staal and Daniele Hervieu-U:ger, and explaining his own interest in a rather inclusive definition, Snoek builds up a stipulative definition. The core of this definition is that 'religions are all those, and only those, systems of symbols which consist of a religious doxis and a religious praxis'. Finally, Snoek discusses several advantages and consequences attached to the adoption of this definition. Part V Difinition Proposals: This part begins with a contribution by Wouter J. HanegraqfJ, who approaches the problem of the definition of religion by looking at existing definitions through a historian's eye. That means approaching them as intellectual artefacts, invented by certain persons for certain reasons and in certain socio-cultural and historical contexts. An analysis of the definitions of 'religion' and of 'the sacred' proposed by Durkheim, Geertz, Spiro, Yinger, Platvoet, Otto, Eliade, Sexson, and Bateson reveals an underlying, ideological subtext. By defining religion and the sacred, these authors really seek either to defend or criticize modern culture. The relation between non-secular and secular religion, therefore, needs to be thematised and analysed explicitly in a definition of religion. To that end, Hanegraaff proposes a threefold definition which distinguishes between 'religion', 'religions', and 'spiritualities'. The article by Peter Byrne begins by discussing scepticism about the very possibility of defining religion. The main problems he treats are: finding a definition that fits a variety of scholarly approaches to the phenomenon of religion, is neutral between theories of religion and is not over-dependent on Western attitudes and conceptions. He offers a moral definition to meet these problems. It centres on seeing religions as systems of symbols enabling human beings to cope with evil by grounding human

16

ARlE L. MOLENDI]K

life in a relation to a transcendent source of moral order. In this way, all religions are theodicies. The utility of this approach in various fields (such as philosophy and anthropology) is defended and its origins in Kant explored. In his article, Meerten B. ter Borg argues the case for a widening of the scope of the concept of religion in order to enlarge our understanding of religion as well as of human behaviour. He attempts to do so on the basis of clear and fundamental criteria. Religion, then, is defined as the function to over-come human finiteness by postulating something, or someone, assumed to be beyond this finiteness. From this viewpoint, religion is not to be examined as an organization or an institution that just happens to be there, but as a consequence of the human condition as such. The contribution by Jeppe Sinding Jensen begins with a critical presentation of Clifford Geertz's well-known definition of religion as 'a cultural system'. Several issues relevant for an attempt to construct and assess the productivity of a semantic definition of religion are discussed. Especially important to this purpose are: Karl Popper's notion of a 'World 3' of meaning, the holist semantics of Donald Davidson, Paul Ricoeur's theory of interpretation, as well as general structuralist and semiotic perspectives. Jensen's conclusion is that a religion as a communicative symbolic universe is characterized by the close relationship between this symbolic universe, certain action patterns and related forms of institutions. The only really demarcative criterion, however, is that of the existence of counter-intuitive supernatural entities as referents of these semantic universes, and that these entities are able to enter (it is believed) into reciprocal relations with humans. The final contribution by Hetty ~'pck is explicitly a plea for a pragmatic and contextual view of definitions. The case she analyzes is the conceptualization of religion in modern psychoanalysis. The new relational view of religion presented here is shown to be inextricably linked with a new relational model of the self. It is, further, argued that the concept of faith is crucial in relating self-development and religious development. Interesting parallels to the work of the historian of religion, W.C. Smith, are noticed here. After a discussion of the way in which the socio-cultural contexts may have influenced this new relational paradigm, Zock argues for the fruitfulness of defining religion in terms of 'the realization of faith', especially in the psychological study of religion in the modern Western world. The epilogue (Part VI) takes stock of our whole undertaking. On the basis of a brief analysis of the vicissitudes of the meaning of the

IN DEFENCE OF PRAGMATISM

17

word 'religion' in Western history since Latin Antiquity, on the one hand, and relevant data from the current academic study of religion, on the other hand, Jan Platvoet argues for a pragmatical approach to the definition of religion. 'The religions of mankind' are a much too indistinct collection of diverse cultural phenomena to be adequately defined in any essentialist, i.e., universally valid, way. Such substantive definitions have mainly served various hegemonic academic and extra-academic purposes in the past. We have to become aware of our own biases in this respect and recognize the limited instrumental value of any definition of religion. A pragmatics of defining religion, Platvoet argues, should not start from concepts of religion and from contests over them, but from the contexts in which the concepts function.

In Conclusion Where has this interdisciplinary venture brought us? Are there any lines to be drawn, or do we just have to accept the plurality of approaches and opinions voiced in this volume? The proposed contextual and pragmatic view, however, is not necessarily identical with 'anything goes'. However broad the concept of religion may be, in fact, there is still a critical discussion possible about its limits, and that, after all, is what 'definition' is all about. One thing is certain, however, this volume presents not only (and not primarily) the varieties of religious phenomena, but also a variety of the ways in which they may be approached. William James linked these two elements, when he wrote: 'Meanwhile the very fact that they [= the definitions of religion, ALM] are so many and so different from one another is enough to prove that the word 'religion' cannot stand for any single principle or essence, but is rather a collective name'.28 What is meant by 'a collective name' is not specified in this context, but it surely suggests that we take pragmatical routes in studying religions and leave behind us the ever-slumbering conviction that we shall ultimately reach the True Definition of Religion. As concepts are constructed by human beings and all knowledge is based on concepts, all we can hope for is piecemeal progress, rather than ultimate knowledge.

28

James 1902: 26.

18

ARlE L. MOLENDIJK

Riferences Asad, T., 1993, Genealogies rif Religion: Discipline and Reasons rif Power in Christianity and Islam. Baltimore, etc.: Johns Hopkins University Press. Bianchi, U., (ed.) 1994, The Notion rif 'Religion' in Comparative Research: Selected Proceedings rif the XVIth Congress rif the International Association for the History rif Religions, Rome, 3rd--8th September, 1990. Rome, 'VErma' di Bretschneider. Bremmer,J.N., 1998, '''Religion'', "Ritual" and the Opposition "Sacred Vs. Profane": Notes towards a Terminological "Archaeology''', in Graf 1998: 9-32. Byrne, P., 1989, Natural Religion and the Nature rif Religion: The Legacy rif Deism. London, etc.: Routledge. Copi, I.M., 1972, Introduction to Logic. ed. used: 4th ed. New York, etc.: MacmillanCollier Macmillan. Despland, M., 1979, La religion en Occident. Evolution des idees et du vecu. Montreal, etc.: Les editions Fides. Despland, M., & G. Vallee (eds.) 1992, Religion in History: The Word, the Idea, the Reality. Waterloo, etc.: Laurier University Press. Dierse, u., et al., 1992, 'Religion', in Ritter & Grunder 1992, vol. 8: col. 632-713. Durkheim, E., 1915, The Elementary Forms rifthe Religious Life, trans. by Joseph Ward Swain. London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd. ('Les formes elimentaires de la vie religieuse: Ie .rysteme totemique en Australie', 1912). Eliade, M., (ed.) 1987, The Encyclopedia rif Religion. New York, etc.: Macmillan - Collier Macmillan. Feil, E., 1986, Religio: Die Geschichte eines neu;:.eitlichen Grundbegriffi vom Friihchristentum bis ;:.ur Riformation. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. - - - , 1992, 'From the Classical Religio to the Modern Religion: Elements of a Transformation between 1550 and 1650', in Despland & Vallee 1992: 31-43. - - - , 1995, 'Zur Bestimmungs- und Abgrenzungsproblematik von 'Religion", in Ethik und So;:.ialwissenschqften: Streitforum fur Erwagungskultur 6,4: 441-455 [The whole issue is devoted to F eil's views on religion].

- - - , 1997, Religio: Zweiter Band: Die Geschichte eines neu;:.eitlichen Grundbegriffi ;:.wischen Reformation und Rationalismus (ca. 1540-1620). Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Geertz, C., 1966, 'Religion as a Cultural System', reprinted in Geertz 1993: 87-125. - - - , 1993, The Interpretation rif Cultures. Glasgow: Fontana Press (1973 1). Graf, F., (ed.) 1998, Ansichten griechischer Rituale. Stuttgart, etc.: Teubner. Harrison, P., 1990, 'Religion' and the Religions in the English Enlightenment. Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press. James, W., 1902, The Varieties rif Religious Experience: A Stu4J in Human Nature. New York, etc.: Longmans, Green (1903 5). Kahane, H., 1986, Logic and Philosophy: A Modem Introduction. ed. used: 5th edition. Belmont (Cal.): Wordsworth. King, W.L., 1987, 'Religion', in Eliade 1987, vol. 12: 282-293. Krech, V., & H. Tyrell (eds.) 1995, Religionsso;:.iologie um 1900. Wurzburg: Ergon. Leuba, J.H., 1896, 'A Study in the Psychology of Religious Phenomena', in American Journal rif P.rychology 7: 309-385. - - - , 1901, 'Introduction to a Psychological Study of Religion', in Monist II (Jan): 195-225. - - - , 1912, A P.rychological Stu4J rif Religion. N ew York: Macmillan. Luckmann, T., 1967, The Invisible Religion: The Problem rif Religion in Modem Society. New York, etc.: Macmillan - Collier Macmillan. McCutcheon, R.T., 1995, 'The Category "Religion" in Recent Publications: A Critical Survey', in Numen 12: 284-309. Molendijk, A.L., & P. Pels (eds.) 1998, Religion in the Making: The Emergence rif the Sciences rif Religion (Studies in the History of Religions: Numen Book Series, 80). Leiden: Brill.

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Morris, B., 1987, Anthropological Studies qf Religion: An Introductory Text. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. . Pinard de la Boullaye, H., 1929-1931, L'Etude comparee des religions, 3 Vols. ed. used: 3rd edition. Paris: Beauchesne. Platvoet, j., 1990 'The Definers Defined: Traditions in the Definition of Religion', in Method and 7heory in the Study qf Religion 2, 2: 180-212. Reinach, S., 1909 Orpheus: Histoire generale des religions, ed. used: 2nd edition. Paris: Picard. Ritter, j., & K. Grunder (eds.) 1992, Historisches Wiirterbuch der Philosophie, vol. 8, Basel: Schwabe. Robinson, R., 1962, Difinition. Oxford, etc.: Clarendon Press (1954 1). Rorty, R., 1982, Consequences qf Pragmatism. Minneapolis: University of Minneapolis Press. Rudolph, K., 1994, 'Inwieweit ist der Begriff "Religion" eurozentrisch?', in Bianchi 1994: 131-139. Smith, W.C., 1963, the Meaning and End qf Religion: A New Approach to the Religious Traditions qf Mankind. New York: Macmillan. Tyrell, H., 1992, '''Das Religiose" in Max Webers Religionssoziologie', in Saeculum 43: 172-230. Waardenburg, j., 1973-1974, Classical Approaches to the Study qf Religion: Aims, Methods and 7heories qf Research, 2 Vols. The Hague: Mouton. Wagner, F., 1986, Was ist Religion? Studien zu ihrem Begriff und 7hema in Geschichte und Gegenwart. Giitersloh: Mohn. Weber, M., 1922, Wirtschqft und Gesellschqft: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie. Tiibingen: j.C.B. Mohr (Studienausgabe, 1985 5). Wiebe, D., 1994, 'From Religious to Social Reality: The Transformation of "Religion" in the Academy', in Bianchi 1994: 837-845. Yinger, j.M., 1970, the Scientific Study qf Religion. New York, etc.: Macmillan - Collier Macmillan.

PART TWO

MODERN CONTEXTS

THE POLITICS OF DEFINING RELIGION IN SECULAR SOCIETY FROM A TAKEN-FOR-GRANTED INSTITUTION TO A CONTESTED RESOURCE

James A. Beckford

Introduction The philosophical aspects of definitions are complex and contested. Other contributors to this collection have demonstrated how difficult, but important, it is to produce workable definitions of social and cultural phenomena. Religion is no exception. It gives rise to the same general definitional problems as do other phenomena. In addition, religion is subject to some particular, if not unique, definitional difficulties of its own. I am not in a position to resolve these difficulties here: I merely recognise the challenges that they present to scholars who feel the need not only to conceptualise religion but also to demarcate it clearly from non-religion. I want to throw a different light on religion and its definitions by showing that, in certain circumstances, definitions have a broadly political significance in the sense of relating to struggles for power. I am not referring to disputes about the definition of religion for scholarly purposes but, rather, to the controversies which surround attempts to impose official meanings on, and boundaries around, religion in public life. The general thrust of my argument will be that definitions can have serious practical consequences: they can make a difference to people's individual lives and to their collective interests. Moreover, scholarly discussions about the definition of religion can sometimes feed into these political controversies. For example, scholars may be consulted on controversial questions such as 'Is a "cult" really religious?'. Alternatively, scholars' published views may be used without their knowledge in public disputes about the definition of religion. My illustrations of definitional controversies will be taken from the recent history of the u.K., although similar examples could easily be found in other countries. Indeed, a cross-national, comparative study of such controversies would provide valuable insights into some

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JAMES A. BECKFORD

of the sociological dynamics of religion. Such a study would be particularly useful if it were able to indicate the points at which religious 'boundary disputes' were prevalent, that is, the places where clashes occurred between competing criteria for defining religion for practical purposes. One of the advantages of examining the politics of official definitions of religion is that it is not necessary for me to stipulate a particular definition for my own purposes. I have the luxury of being able to work with definitions that are already given in public forms such as laws, regulations or educational syllabuses. It goes without saying, of course, that the utility of particular definitions of religion which are enshrined in official forms cannot be assumed or taken for granted. The fact that they are official has no implications for their value or usefulness. They are simply facts of social or cultural life. The task of the social scientist is to study the methods by which such definitions are constructed and the implications that they have for society and culture. Secularisation and Religious Controversies Before I can substantiate my claim that the definition of religion is contentious in the U.K. I need to sketch the broad outlines of the religious changes which have taken place there since about 1945. Many of my observations form part of the conventional account of secularisation 1 and of the privatisation of religion,2 but my interpretation of these high-level transformations is significantly different in at least two major respects. Firstly, I share the belief that religion is currently being restructured or re-positioned in many advanced industrial societies (as well as undergoing secularisation). The restructuring of religion 3 may be just as important to the future of these societies as to secularisation. For analytical purposes, however, these two processes of religious change should be kept separate. Secondly, I believe that social and cultural changes have made religion more contentious and controversial. This seems paradoxical, for one might have expected that secularisation would render the I

2 3

Dobbelaere 1981; Wilson 1985; Wilson 1992. Luckmann 1963, 1967. Hervieu-Leger 1986, 1989.

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surviving remnants of religion less, rather than more, contentious. Very few writers have commented on this aspect of religious change, and the literature on secularisation implies that the declining significance of religion would entail its declining capacity to excite controversy except possibly at the margins where exotic sectarian or cultic movements might still stir up some strong feelings. 4 My explanation for religion's continuing capacity to excite controversy is not confined to arguments about exotic movements on the fringe of mainstream religions in the U.K., however. Instead, I shall point to a number of other factors which combine to increase, rather than decrease, the likelihood that religion will continue to be a site of controversies for the foreseeable future. I shall begin by listing some of the uses to which religion is put which often give rise to friction and controversy even in so-called secular societies. In the first place, religion serves as a 'language' in which many people who may no longer be associated with any religious organisations still choose to express their strongest fears, sorrows, aspirations, joys and wishes. Secondly, religious symbols are still widely deployed as symbolic markers of personal and collective identity, although the attachment to orthodox creeds and rites may be greatly attenuated. Thirdly, some religious symbols serve as vehicles of challenging ideas about, for example, the fragility of the natural environment, the sacredness of human rights and the value of justice. What helps to make these persisting uses of religious symbols potentially controversial is that the symbols are no longer the exclusive property of religious organisations or faith communities. As so many people remain detached from these collectivities they are no longer subject to the control that clergy and other religious professionals would have tried to exercise over the use of these symbols in the past. Moreover, rising levels of educational attainment, increased rates of social and geographical mobility and growing exposure to the media of mass communication have further eroded the possibility that religious organisations could control the uses to which their symbols would be put. I characterised this situation as follows in an earlier publication: 4 Wilson has consistently argued that cults and sects might continue to thrive amidst general secularisation (Wilson 1976). Others, among whom Max Weber was the most notable, have identified the popularity of exotic religious innovations as evidence of secularisation in the sense of declining faith in the 'old gods' and the invention of 'ersatz deities' to replace them.

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Religion has come adrift from its former points of anchorage but is no less potentially powerful as a result. It remains a potent cultural resource or form which may act as the vehicle of change, challenge or conservation. Consequently, religion has become less predictable ... And the chances that religion will be controversial are increased by the fact that it may be used by people having little or no connection with formal religious organisations. The deregulation of religion is one of the hidden ironies of secularisation. 5 This situation may represent what Meerten ter Borg calls 'deinstitutionalisation' of religion, 6 but unlike him I detect signs of 'reinstitutionalisation' or at least of struggles to impose new boundaries around religion. To some extent the growth of religious diversity in the U.K. has helped to precipitate some of these struggles. In fact, one of the main reasons for the contentiousness of religion in the U.K. is that migration of Buddhists, Hindus, Jains, Muslims and Sikhs from the Caribbean, Hong Kong, South Asia and East Mrica since the early 1950s has sharply increased the degree of religious diversity in the country.7 Many British-born members of these faith communities are now children and young adults who are living in large and well established setdements, mainly in large cities, which are supported by numerous organisations for religious, cultural, political and social purposes. They are not so much communities of migrants as integral, but distinctive, parts of British society. Yet, their presence in the U.K. helps to ensure that the boundary between religion and non-religion remains contentious. For example, English common law makes it an offence (termed 'blasphemy') to ridicule, vilify or insult the tenets of the Church of England. 8 Since this law does not apply to any other churches or religions, those Muslims who were aggrieved by the publication in 1988 of Salman Rushdie's novel, The Satanic Verses, were unable to bring a prosecution for blasphemy. A campaign to extend the law on blasphemy to all religions was launched, with support from the leading representatives of various faith communities, including many Christians, but the British Government decided in 1989 that it had no intention of extending the legislation to cover Islam or any other Beckford 1989: 170~ 172. Ter Borg in this volume. 7 The settlement of large numbers of Jews and Roman Catholics in the U.K. from the 1840s onwards had created many heated controversies of a kind which is now being reproduced in the 1990s. 8 Bradney 1993. 5

6

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religion. Meanwhile, the controversy sparked off a different kind of campaign to rescind the law on blasphemy, in effect depriving all religions of legal protection against ridicule, vilification and insult. The Rushdie Affair brought to the surface of public life in the u.K. a series of issues not only about the relatively disprivileged status of Islam in English (and Scottish) law but also about the alleged bias of the law towards at least one form of religion. Non-religious beliefs received no such legal protection. This was unjust in the eyes of many campaigners against the law on blasphemy, although very few Muslims took this view. The main question was whether it was justifiable for the law to protect any form of religion in a society characterised by low levels of participation in religious activities and by growing diversity of religions. It was widely argued that, on grounds of equity, the law should offer protection to all religions or to none. Partly because of the difficulty of defining religion for legal purposes and partly because only two blasphemy cases had come to court in the twentieth century, the Law Commission9 had earlier recommended abolition of the law on blasphemy. Other parties to the debates about blasphemy wanted to abolish it as an offence because it represented an unwarranted restriction on the freedom of expression. All the varied arguments about extending or abolishing the law on blasphemy touched indirectly on questions about constituting religion as a single category for legal purposes. The fact that prosecutions for blasphemy have becn extremely rare in the twentieth-century only underlines the point that the increasing variety of faith communities in the U.K. after the mid-century was one of the factors which helped to create the controversy and to make it correspondingly more difficult to define religion in a non-controversial fashion. And, according to one of the commentators on the Rushdie Affair: The component of culture which tends to be the most problematic is that which has been pre-eminent in the Rushdie affair-religion. Different religious faiths are necessarily conflicting religious faiths and, because they concern the right and the true, a clash of beliefs offers little scope for accommodation or compromise. 1o

9 Law Commission Working Paper 1981, no. 79: 'Offences against religion and public worship'. !O Jones 1990.

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It is interesting that this quotation makes no reference to ethnicity or 'race'. The fact that defining religion for legal purposes has always been difficult in the U.K. seems strange at first glance. Mter all, most of the country's major social institutions have been directly or indirectly shaped by Christianity for more than one thousand years. Even the law ll which first formalised the legal and fiscal advantages accorded to charitable trusts neglected to define religion despite the fact that 'the advancement of religion' was identified at the end of the nineteenth-century as one of the four 'objects' eligible to be 'charitable in law'. On further reflection, however, this situation is less strange than it appears to be. The reason why a definition of religion was considered unnecessary was that Christianity was the only conceivable instance of the category at that time. Indeed, legal restrictions against Protestants other than Anglicans, against Roman Catholics and against Jews did much to ensure that the public life of England was moulded by Anglican values and institutions. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the majority of adults were active participants in the Church: it merely means that the institutions of, for example, marriage, education, social welfare, health care, the law, local government, the monarchy, Parliament and the military reflected the Anglican ascendancy. Various tax and financial advantages are accorded by English law to collectivities which meet the criteria for being deemed 'charitable in law'. These charities must be registered with the Charity Commission and must be administered by trustees in accordance with stringent regulations. The fundamental assumption underlying the law on charities is that that they must earn their privileges by serving the public good. As late as the mid-twentieth century it was still virtually taken for granted that only monotheistic religions could qualifY for charitable status. Today, charitable status is routinely denied to organisations based on non-theistic belief systems such as Scientology, secularism and paganism. The Charity Commissioners (who administer the register of charitable organisations) also have the power to refuse registration to any organisations which clearly qualify as religions but the purposes of which are not considered to be 'in the public interest'. In the circumstances, it is hard to disagree with the following judgement of a leading jurist in the field of religion and the law:

II

Charitable Uses Act 160 I.

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The need for reform is clear. At present the law is unjust because it distinguishes between different religious adherents in a manner which is arbitrary and incapable of rational defence. To clarifY the law in a manner which would promote religious freedom would be a difficult task involving ... the need to address the question of the definition of religion. .. [T]he present law of charity provides yet another illustration of the mixture of bias and muddle which characterises British law's attitude towards religions. 12

My point is that the origins of the 'bias and muddle' can be traced back to the late medieval and early modern tendency to equate religion with a particular form of Christianity and that the rapid growth of non-Christian faith communities and philosophies of life in the U.K. in the second half of the twentieth-century has exacerbated the original confusion. It is notoriously difficult to assess the size of, for example, the Buddhist, Hindu, Muslim and Sikh communities, but they probably constitute about 3 millions of the 58 millions population of the u.K. As in the case of the law of blasphemy, the level of dissatisfaction with the law of charity is reaching a point where many people are calling for the removal of 'the advancement of religion' from the list of criteria of charitable status in law. The dissatisfaction is apparent in the following plea from a prominent columnist in one of the U.K.'s good quality newspapers: Religion is ineffable, mysterious, an act of faith, a state of grace, a light inaccessibly hidden from our eyes-not, in other words, the sort of thing courts or charity commissioners should be expected to codifY and police. There is only one sane answer-and that is to de register them all. Our secular society, where only 35 per cent of people believe in a Supreme Being, should not be spending public funds, in tax forgone, to finance any of these curious beliefs. 13

The tone of Toynbee's article also reflects a feeling of exasperation with arrangements which tie religion and law closely together. This, in turn, is probably part of a wider frustration with what I shall call the juridification of everything'. It suggests that religion does not deserve the protection of the law if it needs to be juridified-again, harking back to an earlier era in which it was unnecessary to define religion because it was coterminous with Anglican Christianity. Bradney 1993: 131-132. Polly Toynbee 'A being that works in mysterious ways', The Independent, 15 July 1996. Her article's sarcastic sub-title was 'Who is to say what is a proper religion? That all-seeing judge of transcendental things, the Charity Commission'. 12 13

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In short, the position of religion in the u.K. is affected by several simultaneous developments. Firstly, many of the conventional indicators of secularisation are on the increase, although I also recognise that 'believing without belonging >l4 may be characteristic of the country as well and that privatised and implicit forms of religion may still be buoyant. 15 Secondly, the establishment of large communities of Hindus, Muslims and Sikhs (alongside smaller communities of Buddhists and Jains) has challenged the taken for granted view that it is unnecessary to define religion for legal purposes in such an overwhelmingly 'Christian' society. Thirdly, the combination of secularisation and diversification of religion in the u.K. is making questions about the definition of religion more contentious. The impact of these changes is magnified by the rapidity and intensity with which religious controversies are nowadays portrayed in the mass media. It would require a separate chapter to do justice to the role of the mass media in inciting and sustaining religious controversies, but it seems clear to me that religion is considered newsworthy only when it is controversial. I shall now analyse two instances of religious controversy which have recently occurred in the U.K., both of which revolve around 'boundary disputes' or disagreements about appropriate ways to define and categorise religion. Both disputes are still alive and have political implications. The first concerns Religious Education in state 16 schools; the second concerns religious advertisements on television.

'Religion' in Religious Education The main thesis of this Chapter, I repeat, is that secularisation and other simultaneous changes in religion have paradoxically rendered religion more, rather than less, controversial in the U.K. In particDavie 1990, 1994. See Ter Borg in this volume: 'A process of de-institutionalization [of religion] is taking place. Religion is still present, but in a diffuse way. It has taken on very much the characteristics of modern society in that it has become individualized, often this-worldly, very pluralistic and so on'. 16 I refer to 'council' schools, i.e., schools which are fully funded or 'maintained' by local authorities and answerable to locally elected Councils and to the national Department for Education and Employment (DfEE). The tide of this Government ministry has changed several times in the past two decades. It was the Department of Education; then the Department for Education and Science; and finally, since 1996, the Department for Education and Employment. 14

15

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ular, the definition of religion has become a site of political struggles. One of the clearest examples of this 'politicisation of religion' has occurred in the previously little-known and relatively uncontentious area of Religious Education (hereafter RE). Ever since the British state began to take responsibility for providing free and compulsory schooling for all children in the l870s there has been a place for what used to be called Religious Instruction in the school syllabus. The content of the syllabus was decided at the level of local government so that it could reflect the religious 'complexion' of each area. Schools were also required to begin each day with an 'act of collective worship' which, until the 1970s, was invariably Christian in character. The children of Jews, Roman Catholics, Jehovah's Witnesses and other denominations outside the Christian mainstream were allowed to be absent from RE classes and collective worship if their parents made a formal request to that effect. These arrangements were rarely contentious before the 1980s. The situation changed drastically, however, when the Education Reform Act of 1988 introduced the new principle that 'Any agreed syllabus . . . shall reflect the fact that the religious traditions in Great Britain are in the main Christian whilst taking account of the teaching and practices of the other principal religions represented in Great Britain'. At the same time, the long-standing requirement that each school day should begin with an act of collective Christian worship (with alternatives permitted for non-Christians) was also strengthened and re-specified. The new policy on the teaching of RE had been the goal of intense lobbying by politicians, educationalists and leading members of mainstream churches l7 who were insistent that secularisation and religious diversification had to be counteracted by instilling the virtues allegedly found in a 'common culture' deriving from Britain's Christian heritage. Prominent among the campaigners were the Christian Institute l8 and the Parental Alliance for Choice in Education (PACE). Both groups have continued to monitor implementation of the 1988 Act and responses to subsequent interpretations of its key concepts from the Government ministry responsible for education. l9 They have also distributed practical advice to parents on how to complain

17 18

19

Jackson 1992. Burn & Hart 1988. In particular, DfE Circular 3/89 and DfES Circular 1/89.

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effectively if they suspect that RE and collective worship do not conform with the current legislation, especially in respect of giving priority to Christianity. The advice appears to have been successful in enabling parents to frame complaints appropriately and to feed their complaints into the process of lobbying education authorities at all levels for more exclusively Christian RE syllabuses and more 'religious' collective worship. In view of the British Government's apparent concern with preserving a 'common culture' it is interesting to note that the stated reason why conservative Christian activists began lobbying for a greater Christian content of RE and school assemblies was their fear that multifaith or 'life-stance' orientations were undermining the religious basis for moral commitments. The implication was that only the Christian religion could fulfil this function in a predominandy Christian society and that pupils from non-Christian backgrounds needed exposure to Christianity in order to imbibe the common culture of the U.K. The advocates of the new policy on RE were fully engaged in a political struggle to frame Christianity as the only religion capable of instilling this common culture. Other religions should be included in the RE syllabus, according to the promoters of a common culture, but only for comparative purposes. Christianity should be the privileged source of moral and spiritual values. The then Minister of State for Education, Kenneth Clark, opted for a conservative interpretation of the Act when he circulated to LEAs in 1991 some of the legal advice that he had received about how a court of law might judge the extent to which any agreed syllabuses conformed with Section 8 (3) of the 1988 ERA.20 The advice was that syllabuses had to have sufficiendy detailed contents to demonstrate conformity with the Act, and this could mean that Government intended to take a keen interest in precisely how RE was to be taught. The advice also suggested that RE teaching should be extended to 'wider areas of morality including the difference between right and wrong'. Again, the implication is clear that, in the Government's view as represented in the 1988 Act, the teaching of religion is not expected to be independent from the inculcation of moral values presumably enshrined in the 'British way of life' or the 'common culture'.21 Indeed, the 1988 Act required schools to provide guidance on spirituality and morality. 20 21

Hull 1991. Esther Oxford concluded an article in Ike Independent (30 January 1994) on

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The new-found political sensitivity about RE in schools was again demonstrated during the parliamentary debates on the 1993 Education Act, which translated the 1992 White Paper on Choice and Diversity into practical effect. Attempts were made, for example, to restrict the coverage of syllabuses to no more than any two religions and to place in-depth study of Christianity at the heart of the subject because 'it is the main historical heritage of this land'. Baroness Cox, who championed some of these ideas in the House of Lords debates, had given an intimation of them in her writings nearly ten years earlier. The grounds for enforcing more strictly the provisions of the 1944 Education Act regarding collective worship and RE were that 'other ideologies' were allegedly filling 'the moral vacuum' left by the churches and that there was a danger that 'some of these ideologies could prove as inimical to true education and as harmful to our future as a nation as was the enforced adoption of the National Socialist ideology in the German schools of the 1930s and early 1940s'.22 It was also argued that churches should have made greater efforts to challenge the alleged politicisation of the syllabus and should have created a better 'appreciation of the moral arguments for the open liberal democratic societies of the West'23 and of the fate of religion in Eastern European state socialist societies. A strong plea was added for the continued support of independent religious schools. In the event, the DfE's 1994 Circular on RE and collective worship24 seemed to set narrower limits on acceptable forms of RE and school assemblies than those laid down in the 1993 Education Act. According to John Hull, 'The effect is to turn the school into a worshipping community and the assembly into a place of worship. Since participation (and not merely presence) is required of all pupils, the effect is that being registered on the school roll becomes an act of religious commitment'.25 There were also grounds for believing that new model syllabuses for RE with 'the Government hails religion as a barrier against moral corruption and intolerable anarchy'. Evidence for this opinion may have been drawn from the assertion of Lord Tebbitt, a prominent member of Mrs Thatcher's governments, that the members of a society must have in common 'laws, customs, standards, values, language, culture and religion' if instability in society were to be avoided'. Lord Tebbitt made this claim in the course of delivering the first Nicholas Ridley Memorial Lecture on 22 November 1993. 22 Cox & Marks 1984: 88. 23 Cox & Marks 1984: 88. 24 DfE Circular 1/94 'Religious Education and Collective Worship'. 25 His interpretation may seem far-fetched but it is at least consonant with the Minister for Education's personal preferences, as expressed in The Spectator on 2nd October 1993: 'I'd like more people to study science. I'd like more of them to show

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the Circular's insistence on the predominance of the Christian religion in schools, since it is central to the U.K.'s national heritage, would have the effect of persuading children from non-Christian backgrounds that they could not be part of that heritage except perhaps as colonised minorities. It was not just that Government policy seemed to involve greater control over religion in schools but also that an attempt was being made to draw the symbolic boundaries of the nation more tightly and exclusively. In short, a struggle was taking place for the use of religion for the purpose of generating social solidarity based on the Christian roots of a would-be common culture. Not surprisingly, some leading representatives of other faith traditions protested against the apparent policy of requiring all pupils to assimilate to the British and Christian common culture. Some Muslim parents rebelled against the new policy for RE and collective worship by withdrawing their children from these activities. In other places, Christian parents complained that schools were according too much importance to 'other faiths'. The result is a polarisation of extreme opinions over the appropriate place and character of religion in state schools, but the broader dispute is about the boundary between a dominant religion and other religions. As in most boundary disputes, however, the majority of the population remains indifferent towards, or ignorant of, the issues which seem to concern only people with extreme views.

Religious Advertising on Television The second instance of a 'religious boundary dispute' in the U.K. concerns a struggle between the Church of Scientology and its opponents over the former's eligibility to advertise its beliefs and activities on British television. The Broadcasting Act 1990 provided religious organisations with their first opportunity to place advertisements on terrestrial or satellite channels. 26 In keeping with the policy of successive Governments and broadcasting authorities on the appropri-

a bit more interest, too, in other academic disciplines with serious intellectual rigour. I'd also like more of them to believe in God and go to church, for that matter' (Hull 1994: 10). 26 But television stations are free to reject some or all religious advertisements. There is no compulsion to accept advertisements; and religious organisations have no right to demand that their advertisements should be broadcast.

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ate form of religious broadcasts, the 1990 Act and the regulatory body that it created took a very cautious approach to the topic of religious advertising. It is the statutory duty of the Independent Television Commission (ITC) to draw up and enforce a code governing the standards of advertisements on the country's two terrestrial commercial television channels and on all existing satellite and future channels. The code's general principles require that all television advertisements should be 'legal, decent, honest and truthful', but special rules apply to religious advertisements (as well as to advertisements designed to appeal to children, financial advertisements, advertisements relating to health and medicine, and charity advertising). The rules do not define religion as such but they apply to 'advertising which is submitted by or on behalf of any body with objects wholly or mainly of a religious nature or which is directed towards any religious end' as well as to 'systems of belief or philosophy of life which do not involve recognition of a deity but which can reasonably be regarded as equivalent or alternative to those which do'. 27 This is a highly inclusive approach which implies greater concern with the iffects of deistic and non-deistic belief systems than with the beliefs themselves. In fact, one of the rules explicitly forbids advertisers from expounding religious doctrine and belief or from appearing to involve viewers in acts of worship or prayer. Advertisers are also forbidden to appeal for funds for themselves, claim to represent the only true faith, play on fears, promote faith healing, offer counselling, direct advertisements specifically at viewers under eighteen years of age, offer gifts other than publications, and seek to exploit vulnerable categories of viewers such as the elderly or the bereaved. In fact, the only permissible purposes of religious advertising are: (i) to publicise events (ii) to describe an organisation's activities and ways of contacting it (iii) to offer publications or videos about the organisation. There is no doubt that this highly restrictive code is designed to protect viewers from exploitative or manipulative religious organisations. How does the advertising code identifY exploitative and manipulative organisations? The Guidance Notes which accompany the code specifY that advertisements are not acceptable from bodies 'whose 27

Independent Television Commission, 1995: 30.

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JAMES A. BECKFORD

rites or other forms of collective observance are not normally directly accessible to the general public'. In other words, public accessibiliry is the criterion by which the acceptability of would-be advertisers is to be judged. ITC acknowledges that this rule is far from perfect but claims that it is currently the best available means of reducing the likelihood that any organisation could exploit or manipulate viewers by placing religious advertisements on television. A similar test of acceptability exists in the Charity Commissioners' procedures for deciding whether collectivities qualifY for the benefits of charitable status in English law. The rationale for this criterion is presumably that religious organisations whose services and other activities are known to the public and are accessible to all who are interested in them are less likely than other religious organisations to put undue pressure on participants. I am not concerned with the plausibility of this rationale, but what interests me is the underlying implication that the only 'safe' or 'uncontentious' religion is available in meetings which are directly accessible to the public. The lTC's code introduces an implicit distinction between, on the one hand, religious organisations which are presumed to be innocuous because their activities are open to public scrutiny and, on the other, organisations whose advertisements are not acceptable because their activities are not sufficiently open to public scrutiny. This distinction was at the centre of a long-running dispute which followed the screening of an advertisement for the Church of Scientology on one satellite channel in the U.K. in 1993. The audience must have been quite small, but a conservative organisation campaigning to protect 'family values' complained officially to the ITC that the Church of Scientology was not suitable as a religious advertiser on television because public access to its meetings was not sufficiently direct. The ITC upheld the complaint, but the Church of Scientology then sought judicial review of their decision. Mter taking legal advice and consulting relevant experts, the ITC announced in the Spring of 1996 that it had reversed its earlier decision. There were no longer any grounds, in its opinion, to disqualifY the Church of Scientology from the status of an acceptable advertiser. This announcement drew protests from anti-cult groups and statements of their implacable opposition to any policy which would permit the Church of Scientology to advertise itself on television. Although, at

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this writing, the dispute seems to have been settled in the Scientologists' favour, it is extremely unlikely that this particular case and its underlying issues will not return to the headlines in the future. Turning to the wider implications of the case concerning the Church of Scientology, it seems to me that the lTC's advertising code makes it difficult for religious orders, brotherhoods, 'cults', sects, mosques, temples, mandirs, synagogues and gurdwaras which normally admit to their religious services only those people who are qualified to participate in them to advertise on television. To put this more provocatively, the more demanding a religious organisation's criteria of admission are, the less likely it is that such an organisation will be permitted to advertise itself. The long-term effect of the lTC's policy might be to encourage the standardisation of religious organisations in a relatively bland, non-challenging and noncontroversial form. 'High demand' and 'exclusive' religious organisations would be, by the same token, driven out of the 'religious market' because they would not have access to television-the most powerful medium of publicity. Of course, this is speculation on my part, but it is based on indisputable evidence about the long-standing policy in the U.K. of preventing controversial religious organisations from featuring in religious programmes, although news items and investigative documentary programmes often subject controversial religious organisations to examination and criticism. This categorical discrimination against religious organisations which depart from mainstream Christian norms might eventually become another cause of religious controversy. In short, the lTC's policy on religious advertising is a clear recognition of the fact that religion is already considered sufficiently controversial to require the imposition of exceptionally restrictive rules on religious advertising on television. Moreover, these rules help to institutionalise and to reinforce the categorical distinction between 'normal' or 'acceptable' religious organisations and others whose advertisements would be excluded from television. In time, it is possible that other excluded religious organisations will follow the Church of Scientology's example of challenging the lTC's ruling that it was not an acceptable organisation to advertise itself on television. This would signal a new phase in the paradoxical process whereby religion becomes more controversial as its host societies become more secularised.

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Conclusion

It is virtually taken for granted these days that advanced industrial societies are pluralistic in the double sense of being (a) diverse in terms of their religious composition and (b) tolerant of this diversity. I have tried to show that the appearance of pluralism may be more superficial than substantial in some respects. There has certainly been an increase in religious diversity in the U.K., but the tendency has also been for the boundaries of acceptable expressions of religion to be drawn more and more restrictively. As competition and mobility of members increases between religious collectivities, administrative and legal measures have been taken to establish progressively narrower notions of acceptable religion, that is, the forms of religion accepted by official authorities as eligible to benefit from tax concessions, a privileged position in the school curriculum and access to television advertising. The concern of officials is usually with criteria of religious authenticiry. They tend to ask the question, 'What is really religious?'. They tend to respond with criteria which identifY 'real' religion in terms of forms of organisation, collective practices and individual obligations which are entirely voluntary, subject to public scrutiny and unlikely to generate public controversy. It is common for public officials to deny that they have any concern with religious beliefs as such. This means that religion is implicitly defined by them in terms which favour established, mainstream religious institutions. 28 By contrast, it is still fashionable for social scientific students of religion to define religion broadly as a matter of beliifS and attitudes which, for example, evoke 'the felt whole' or which relate human beings 'to the ultimate conditions of their existence'.29 Alternatively, Hanegraaff (this volume), extrapolating from Geertz's (1966) well known formulation, defines religion as 'any symbolic system which influences human action by providing possibilities for ritually maintaining contact between the everyday world and a more general "meta-empirical" framework of meaning'. Byrne's 'moral definition' (this volume) has the advantage of associating symbols with 'appropriate actions', but his explication of the definition still gives more weight to cognitions and perceptions than to anything else. Similarly, 28 29

Wilson 1990: 86. Bellah 1970.

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39

Hervieu-Leger's attempt (this volume) to transcend both functionalist and substantive definitions of religion by focusing on the transformations of religious traditions offers and interesting way of understanding the mutations of religion in modernity, but it still gives pride of place to 'belief'-albeit construed in non-individualist terms. The public imposition of narrower limits of 'acceptable' forms of religion has been contested, however, by a wide variety of interest groups, thereby ensuring that the field of religion remains controversial in spite of growing indifference towards most religious organisations. The progressive erosion of the U.K.'s mainstream Christian monopoly throws the persisting expressions of 'serious' religion into even sharper relief. Consequently, disputes about the definition of religion for practical purposes remain heated in a so-called secular society. From a strictly sociological point of view there is less reason to look for a 'regulative' definition 30 which might solve these disputes than to study the ways in which they develop in relation to other social and cultural changes.

Riferences Adriaanse, H]., 'On Defining Religion', in this volume. Anderson, D., (ed.) 1984, 1he Kindness that Kills: 1he Churches' Simplistic Response to Complex Social Issues. London: SPCK. Banton, M., (ed.) 1966, Anthropological Approaches to the Study of Religion. London: Tavistock. Beckford, ].A., 1989, Religion and Advanced Industrial Society. London: Routledge. Bellah, R.N., 1970, Beyond Beliif. New York: Harper & Row. Borg, M. ter, 'What is religion?', in this volume. Bruce, S., (ed.) 1992, Religion and Modernization. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Bradney, A., 1993, Religion, Rights and the Law. Leicester: Leicester University Press. Burn, J., & C. Hart 1988, 1he Crisis in Religious Education. London: Educational Research Trust. Byrne, P., 'The Definition of Religion: Squaring the Circle', in this volume. Cox, C., &J. Marks 1984, 'Complaining about Education Cuts: Materialist Diversions from Proper Concerns', in Anderson 1984: 83-9l. Davie, G., 1990, 'Believing without Belonging: Is this the Future of Religion in Britain?', in Social Compass 37, 4: 455-69. - - - , 1994, Religion in Britain since 1945. Oxford: Blackwell. Dobbelaere, K., 1981, 'Secularization: a Multi-Dimensional Concept', in Current Sociology 29, 2: 1-216. Geertz, C., 1966, 'Religion as a Cultural System', in Banton 1966: 1-46. Hanegraaff, W., 'Defining Religion in Spite of History', in this volume. Hervieu-U:ger, D., 1986, Vers un nouveau Christianisme? Paris: Cerf.

30

Adriaanse in this volume.

40

JAMES A. BECKFORD

1989, 'Tradition, Innovation and Modernity: Research Notes', in Social Compass 36, 1: 71-8l. --~, 'Religion as Memory: Reference to Tradition and the Constitution of a Heritage of Belief in Modem Societies', in this volume. Hammond, P.E., (ed.) 1985, The Sacred in a Secular Age. Berkeley (CA): University of California Press. Hull, j., 1991, 'Mish Mash: Religious Education in Multi-Cultural Britain: A Study in Metaphor', in Birmingham Papers in Religious Education. Derby: Christian Education Movement. --~, 1994, 'A Critique of Religious Education Guidelines', in Islamia 23: 1O-1l. Independent Television Commission, 1995, The ITC Code of Advertising Standards and Practice. London: ITC. Jackson, R., 1992, 'The Misrepresentation of Religious Education', in Leicester & Taylor 1992: 100-113. Jones, P., 1990, 'Rushdie, Race and Religion', in Political Studies 37: 687-694. Leicester, M., & M. Taylor, (eds.) 1992, Ethics, Ethniciry and Education. London: Kogan Page. Luckmann, T., 1963, 'On Religion in Modem Society: Individual Consciousness, World View, Institution', in Joumalfor the Scientific Study of Religion 2,2: 147-162. --~, 1967, The Invisible Religion. London: Macmillan. Wilson, B.R., 1976, Contemporary Transformations of Religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press. --~, 1985, 'Secularization: The Inherited Model', in Hammond 1985: 9-20. --~, 1990, The Social Dimensions of Sectarianism. Oxford University Press. --~, 1992, 'Reflections on a Many Sided Controversy', in Bruce 1992: 195-210. --~,

RELIGION AS CLAIM SOCIAL AND LEGAL CONTROVERSIES

Massimo Introvigne

Ethno-Difinitions

if Religion:

Popular and Institutional

In October 1996, 15 leaders and members of the French Church of Scientology appeared before the Court of Lyon in a criminal case. The investigation, started after the suicide of a Lyon member of the Church, had evolved into a full-fledged probe into Scientology's activities in France. The Scientologists' defense team called, among many witnesses, a number of academics, including sociologists Bryan Wilson and Karel Dobbelaere (both former presidents of the International Society for the Sociology of Religion), and the undersigned. One of the main questions the defense lawyers wanted the presiding judge to ask l was whether or not Scientology was, indeed, a religion. The judge complied, and devoted a fair amount of time to the issue. The social scientists explained that there are a number of different scholarly definitions of religion. They also stated that, on the basis of some of the definitions most widely used in contemporary sociology, Scientology may indeed qualify as a religion. However, the decision rendered on November 22, 1996 made no mention at all of the viewpoints the social scientists had presented. 2 It mentioned, on the other hand, that a 1996 French parliamentary commission had produced a report on 'cults', and had classified Scientology as one of them, something different from genuine religion. The French press, by 1996 increasingly partisan on the issue of 'dangerous cults', did not appreciate that social scientists could accept to appear as witnesses for a 'cult'.3 Even some French social scientists were somewhat disturbed, and later remarked-not without reason-how unfortunate

I In France witnesses are not examined by counsels for the parties; only presiding judges can ask questions. 2 See Tribunal de Grande Instance de Lyon 1996. 3 I wrote a letter to the presiding judge in Lyon explaining that, although called by the defense, I would rather regard myself as a witness 'on' and not 'for' the Church of Scientology. The letter was mentioned by a limited number of media.

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it was that 'sociologist' had become a derogatory label in the heated French cult controversy. They also questioned whether 'the status of "religion" could allow Scientology, or any other group, to act outside the law'.4 The controversy following the first-degree decision was mild if compared with the storm that followed the decision of the Court of Appeal of Lyon of July 28, 1997. 5 Unlike the first-degree judges, the Court of Appeal obviously considered the arguments of the social scientists, and stated that 'the Church of Scientology may claim the title of "religion"'. It was, however, quick to add that 'a religious doctrine, although legitimate, may be used in service of fraudulent aims' and that 'irrespective of the doctrines of a religion, the means used may be unlawful'. 6 The idea that Scientology 'may claim the title of "religion'" caused a general commotion, and the Court of Appeal was criticized not only by the anticult associations and by a large part of the press, but by the government itself. The fact that, with minor amendments, the Court of Appeal confirmed the decision of the first-degree court, and pronounced a guilty verdict on the same individual Scientologists, went largely unnoticed. The Lyon case provides strong evidence for regarding 'ethnodefinitions', 'the working definitions that social actors themselves use in an attempt to make judgements in everyday life',7 as different in fact from scholarly definitions. They may, occasionally, interact with scholarly definitions, but the impact of theories advanced by scholars on ethno-definitions is dubious at best. In the Lyon case, the first-degree judges regarded scholarly definitions of religion as irrelevant, and the press described them as potentially harmful. When the appeal decision regarded the scholar witnesses as somewhat relevant, both the media and the government itself were swift to respond. This contribution will focus, precisely, on ethno-definitions of religion, and how they are negotiated in the course of social and legal interaction. As Greil has observed, 'when focus is on ethno-definitions, "religion" is examined not as a characteristic which inheres in certain phenomena, but as a cultural resource over which competing interest groups may vie. From this perspective, religion is not an

4

5 6

7

Champion and Cohen 1996: 15. Cour d'Appel de Lyon 1997. Cour d'Appel de Lyon 1997: 2l. Greil 1996: 48.

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43

entity but a claim made by certain groups and-in some cases-contested by others to the right to the privileges associated in a given society with the religious label'.8 Greil also proposed a distinction between 'popular' and 'institutional' definitions of religion. The popular definitions of religion in the West are normally based on Christianity, and appear to tolerate only a certain amount of deviation from the Christian paradigm. Institutional definitions of religion, by governmental agencies or courts of law, may try to mediate between popular and scholarly definitions, but-as the Lyon case shows-the process is difficult, and the results unpredictable. Religion is a claim, particularly in countries where there are definitive advantages in being a religion rather than a merely cultural or philosophical association (not to mention a for-profit corporation). In the United States the administrative, tax and other legal advantages attached to being classified as a religion are crucial. It is true that the establishment clause of the U.S. constitution also contains certain disadvantages to groups classified as religions. Transcendental Meditation is one example of a group which fought (and lost) in court for the privilege of not being regarded as a religion. The Indian group would like, in fact, to remain free of disseminating its courses in American public schools, an impossibility if it was to be recognized as a Hindu-based religion. However, the advantages of the religious label are more important than any possible disadvantages, and the label of 'religion' is normally regarded as a resource worth fighting for in the United States. As Robbins and Beckford observed, 9 the situation is different in European countries like France, but there are still advantages in being classified as a religion. A number of international conventions also protect freedom of religion in terms broader than the larger freedom of opinion, or of association. It should also be borne in mind that 'religion' is normally associated in popular discourse with something positive and benign, although this perception may have changed in recent years following the controversies about 'cults', Islamic terrorism, wars involving religious conflicts, and fundamentalism. From a legal point of view, very few if any legislative texts and international conventions even hint at a definition of religion. They enumerate the protected rights of religions, but do not explain what B 9

Greil 1996: 49. Robbins & Beckford 1993.

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a religion is (or is not). Recent laws-particularly in Eastern Europego to some detail in stating that the status of religion should be certified through an administrative process. They explain how the process should take place and which administrative bodies should be involved. Conspicuous by its absence, however, is any mention of the criteria to be adopted by such administrative bodies in determining whether a group is a 'genuine' religion. lo We also find, on the other hand, occasional efforts to define religion in U.S. Supreme Court case law. In the 1890s, for instance, the Court embarked on the task of defining what 'religion' was, and after due deliberation merely repeated the popular Christian definition: 'The term "religion" has reference to one's views of his relations to his Creator, and to the obligations they impose of reverence for his being and character, and of obedience to his will' .11 Later decisions, on the other hand, without elaborating any further on the earlier decisions, granted the status of 'religion' to non-Christian groups, including the controversial I AM Religious Tradition, a theosophical group which bases its thinking on alleged revelations from ascended masters. I2 Finally, in 1961, the Supreme Court abandoned the theistic standard, stating that the first amendment to the U.S. Constitution precluded government from favouring 'those religions based on a belief in the existence of God as against those religions founded on different beliefs'. The Court noted that 'Buddhism, Taoism, Ethical Culture, Secular Humanism and others' do not teach 'what would generally be considered a belief in the existence of God' but should, nevertheless, be regarded as 'religions' .13 This decision did not however explain which of the 'different beliefs', devoid of faith in the existence of God, would qualify as 'religion'. In other decisions in the 1960s, the Court was called to interpret the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, allowing military exemption for those conscientiously opposed to war on the grounds of their 'belief in a relation to a Supreme Being'.

10 See Fautre 1997 for an oveIView including Bulgaria, Annenia, Romania, Russia, and other countries. Most of these countries were influenced by the Bulgarian Amendment to the Law of Persons and Family, which was passed on February 3, 1994 and came into force on February 21, 1994. The Amendment states that, in order to be recognized as a religion, a group 'should be registered after the approval of the Council of Ministers'. II 'Davis v. Beason' 1890. 12 'United States v. Ballard' 1944. 13 'Torcaso v. Watkins' 1961.

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45

In the Seeger decision (1965) the Supreme Court reiterated that a 'relation to a Supreme Being' does not require an 'orthodox belief in God'.14 In 1970, with its Welsh decision, the Court went a step further and declared the military exemption applicable to persons whose beliefs 'are purely ethical or moral in source and content', and therefore perhaps not strictly 'religious', but which nevertheless 'function as a religion' and 'impose a duty of conscience'.15 A mere conscientious belief, however-the Court stated in 1981is not protected as 'religion'.16 Through these decisions, mostly concerned with conscientious objection, the Supreme Court tried to find a non-theistic definition of religion and was influenced by the views of the liberal theologian Paul Tillich (1886-1965). The 1965 and 1970 decisions on military exemption quoted Tillich's definition of religion as an 'ultimate concern', something a person is prepared to make great sacrifices for. Tillich's approach is not without its problems, however. Although concurring with the Welsh decision, Justice Harlan observed in 1970 that 'the first amendment should protect also the churchgoers who attend services only on Christmas or Easter', since 'common experience teaches that among "religious" individuals some are weak and others strong'.17 Harlan himself favored a test based on the degree of moral conviction with which a belief is held. A widely quoted decision, although not from the Supreme Court, is an old California case of 1957, which discussed four factors to be examined in the interests of determining whether or not a group could qualify for the title of 'religion':

'(1) A belief, not necessarily referring to supernatural powers; (2) a cult, involving a gregarious association openly expressing the belief; (3) a system of moral practice directly resulting from an adherence to the belief; and (4) an organization within the cult designed to observe the tenets of belief'.18 More recent decisions have also included 'sincerity' as a factor, although 'sincerity' is obviously difficult to assess. 19 14 IS 16

17 18 19

'United States v. Seeger' 1965. 'Welsh v. United States' 1970. 'Thomas v. Review Board' 198!. 'Welsh v. United States' 1970 (Harlan j., concurring). 'Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda' 1957. See Casino 1987 for a discussion.

4-6

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In the meantime, in 1978 the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) had developed a fourteen-point test to detennine whether, for tax purposes, an organization could justly claim to be a 'church'. The fourteen criteria are: (1) (2) (3) (4-) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14-)

a distinct legal existence; a recognized creed and form of worship; a definite and distinct ecclesiastical government; a formal code of doctrine and discipline; a distinct religious history; a membership not associated with any other church or denomination; an organization of ordained ministers; ordained ministers selected after completing prescribed studies; a literature of its own; established places of worship; regular congregations; regular religious services; Sunday schools for religious instructions of the young; and schools for the preparation of its ministers. 2o

Critics have objected that 'each of these criteria is fundamentally flawed': to give just one example, a 'recognized creed or fonn of worship' 'as a criteria immerses the IRS in intractable sectarian strife'.21 The IRS claims to still use these guidelines as a reference today, but in practice its decisions are not always consistent with them. Obviously, the reference to a 'Sunday school' should exclude any non-Christian (or, rather, non-Protestant) organization from taxexempt status in the United States, but in practice this is not the case. In 1993, the IRS finally granted tax-exemption to all and every Scientology entity in the United States, thus ending a 25-years dispute. The press insisted that the IRS Scientology decision came after a protracted secret negotiation, and involved a number of general legal and political considerations. 22 In fact, the Scientology case is perhaps unusual for its magnitude, but there is nothing unusual in negotiating a tax-exempt status with an organization, or in being influenced by a number of non-legal considerations. These comments only confirm that institutional definitions of religion do not occur in 20 21

22

Kurtz 1978: 820. Casino 1987: 14l. Frantz 1997.

RELIGION AS CLAIM

47

a vacuum, but are continuously negotiated as part of a political, cultural and social process. In the second part of the chapter, I will turn to a number of case histories which confirm that the label 'religion' is a politically negotiated claim.

Case Studies Thugs: Non-Benevolent Religion? On October 16, 1830, in a letter to the editor of the Calcutta Literary Gazette, William Sleeman (1788-1856) introduced the Thug problem to the English-speaking world. 23 Sleeman discussed the obscure cult of Thuggee, an Indian organization whose members killed entire caravans of (preferably rich) travellers by strangling them, disposing of their bodies and stealing their possessions. What made Thugs different from ordinary robbers was that they were largely perceived in India as a religious organization. The killings followed a ritualistic pattern and, although disturbed by the Thugs' activities, a number of Indians were persuaded that those ritually killed by them were thus delivered from the wheel of reincarnation. Sleeman, later entrusted with the repression of Thugs in India, disputed their religious claims as a mere facade to disguise purely criminal activities. 24 Things were, however, less simple. In their confessions, the Thugs arrested by Sleeman unanimously stated that their fraternity was once devoted to the religious purpose of delivering travellers from karma. They admitted that religion had in the meantime declined among them, and that greed prevailed. It was for this very reason that Thugs had lost the protection of their Goddess Kali, and had been delivered into the hands of their enemies (i.e., the British and Sleeman).25 Only after Sleeman had overseen the execution of 3,869 Thugs,26 and their organization had almost disappeared, did a cultural debate start to take place on what Thuggee was all about. Historians and

23 The letter was published anonymously: 'To the Editor' 1830; cf. Anonymus 1830. 24 Sleeman 1836. 25 For a fictionalized account of these confessions by the British officer Meadows Taylor (1808-1876), recently republished in France, see Taylor 1995. 26 See Van Woerkens 1995 for a discussion on statistics.

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ethnologists were able to determine that Thugs had probably existed in India from the early Middle Ages, and that the religious character of their movement had been widely assumed. This did not prevent Indian rulers, however, from instigating periodical waves of repression, involving the arrest and execution of thousands of Thugs (while other rulers occasionally tried to compromise with them).27 The Thugs made good copy for novels (and, later, movies), from the Italian novelist Emilio Salgari (1872-1911) to Indiana Jones. On the other hand, they created a problem for British public opinion because religion had long been regarded as something inherently benevolent. The Thugs were far from benevolent, but claimed nonetheless to represent a form of religion. India scholars pointed out that religious organizations systematically devoted to criminal activities were not confined to the Thugs on the Indian sub-continent. 28 Even to this day, the Pandas of Benares-a religious order which receives pilgrims who have decided to die in close proximity to the river Ganges-have been suspected of killing their guests and stealing their possessions. 29 Recent anti-colonialist Indian scholarship has argued that the Thugs may in fact have been innocent of most of the crimes ascribed to them, and that they were the victims of a larger British misunderstanding of Indian religious mores. According to Van Woerkens, this position is historically untenable and eludes the main issue. It fails, in fact, to address the question of received wisdom which necessarily connects religion with benevolence. For the 19th century British authorities, the Thugs were not 'really' religious. For some contemporary Indian scholars they were not 'really' criminal. Van Woerkens' view is that Thugs cannot be classified as a 'sect' in the sense usually applied among contemporary scholars of Indian religion, on the grounds that the Thug movement included both Hindus and Muslims. There is little doubt, however, that most Indians perceived Thug experience and Thug activities as religious. The same Indian public opinion was, nevertheless, fully persuaded of their criminal nature, and ultimately applauded their repression under Sleeman's authority. The lesson to be learnt from the Thug controversy, thus, is that-particularly in cultures other than the West-the label of reli-

27 28

29

See Van Woerkens 1995 for an extensive discussion and bibliography. For a review of the cases by a contemporary scholar see Lorenzen 1978. Mehotra 1977: 25~26.

RELIGION AS CLAIM

49

gion can at times be regarded as compatible with the systematic implementation of criminal acts. Although, in these cultural contexts, repression of criminal acts is considered to be appropriate, the group exposed as criminal and repressed may still claim the cultural label of religion.

Mormonism and the Origins

if the

Hypnotic Paradigm

From the establishment of the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints in 1830 up to at least the early part of the 20th century, Mormons were discriminated against, persecuted and (before they decided to move en masse to the Utah wilderness in 1847) occasionally killed by their fellow Americans. Writing in the Scribner)s Monthfy for July 1877, anti-Mormon author J.R. Beadle had to admit that 'Americans have but one native religion [i.e., Mormonism] and that one is the sole apparent exception to the American rule of universal toleration'. 'Of this anomaly'-Beadle wrote-'two explanations are offered: one, that the Americans are not really a tolerant people and that what is called toleration is only such toward our common Protestantism, or more common Christianity; the other, that something peculiar to Mormonism takes it out of the sphere of religion'.3o Beadle's astute observation effectively blackmailed American readers into concluding that Mormonism was not a religion. In fact, readers were presumably committed to an ideal of religious tolerance as part of a 'shared American mythology'. As Givens observed in a fascinating book devoted to the image of Mormonism in 19th-century fiction, 'it is precisely the casting of Mormonism in nonreligious terms that explains why anti-Mormonism is not an exception to the rhetoric of toleration; the dissociation of Mormonism from religion, in fact, reinforces the authority of tolerance as a value that constrains and shapes the terms of social conflict'. One should not believe, Givens says, that such labels as 'religion' 'are objective realities, outside of negotiation or manipulation, rather than the products of political conflict and ideological construction. The how and why of the process by which Mormonism came to be defined as something other than, or in addition to, a religion, tends to be elided in scholarly disputes about what that definition is'.31

30

31

Beadle 1877: 39l. Givens 1997: 21.

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The history of anti-Mormonism shows that Mormons, in order to be categorized as a deviant threat to the fabric of American society, were first excluded from the field of religion. Although polygamy was quoted as evidence that Mormonism could not conceivably be a 'genuine' religion (a bizarre but effective argument in 19thcentury America), anti-Mormonism was, in fact, underpinned by a number of political, cultural and economical considerations. When, in 1890, the Mormon Church renounced polygamy (and, with it, its dreams of establishing a national third party in American politics), American society felt safe in regarding Mormonism as a religion, but for decades still took great care to stipulate that it was not a Christian religion. 32 Separating Mormonism from Christianity is not difficult, if at the same time one applies an appropriately restrictive definition of Christianity. Separating Mormonism from religion, however, is a very different matter altogether. Although disapproved of by most 19thcentury Americans, polygamy, given its prevalence in a number of non-Christian religions, was hardly a discriminating factor. The main rhetorical tool used to claim that Mormonism was not a religion came from popular psychology. It subsequently became the trademark of anti-Mormon fiction. Anti-Mormons concluded that nobody joined Mormonism willingly. Becoming a Mormon was not the result of a conscious choice. 'Magnetic attraction, compulsion, captivity, enslavement, kidnapping-these words and images pervade virtually the entire gamut of works in which Mormons figure as characters'. 33 Accounts of being 'lured' by the Mormon Church, thus, turned into captivity narratives. This does not mean that Mormon converts were necessarily presumed to have been held physically captive. The fear of Mesmerism was used very effectively to persuade American public opinion that conversions to Mormonism could be reconstructed on the basis of a hypnotic paradigm. At first sight, Mormon seduction may well have been seen as witchcraft. Maria Ward, for example, an anti-Mormon author who claimed that her accounts were based on personal experience, had one of her female characters explain that Mormon founder Joseph Smith (1805-1844) 'exerted a mystical magical influence over me-a sort of sorcery that deprived me of the unrestricted exercise of free will'.34 However, in the more 32 33 34

See Introvigne 1994, 1995-1996 for a discussion. Givens 1997: 138. Ward 1855: 38.

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51

progressive climate of the 19th century, witchcraft was hardly an acceptable explanation of how respectable American citizens could be deprived of their 'free will'. Finally, Ward's heroine discovers that the Mormons' secret is what 'is now popularly known by the name of Mesmerism'. Joseph Smith 'came to possess the knowledge of that magnetic influence, several years anterior to its general circulation throughout the country'. The Mormon prophet 'obtained his information, and learned all the strokes, and passes and manipulations, from a German peddler, who, notwithstanding his reduced circumstances, was a man of distinguished intellect and extensive erudition. Smith paid him handsomely, and the German promised to keep the secret' .35 The idea of a German Mesmerist teaching to the Mormons what in the 20th century would be called brainwashing techniques is not confirmed by any historical source, but has been handed down for decades to succeeding generations in the pages of anti-Mormon literature. Although similar allegations were made even without any reference to mysterious German peddlers, the story illustrates very well how a group perceived as deviant can be denied the status of a religion. Since religion, by rhetorical definition, is an exercise of free will, it follows that a non-religion can only be joined under some sort of coercion. The hypnotic paradigm is connected with a form of 'otherness' (the Mesmerist is a foreigner-a 'German'), which mirrors the perceived 'otherness' of the Mormon worldview. And the argument is somewhat circular. Only Mesmerism, it seems, can explain why apparently normal Americans could join a group of such intolerable 'otherness'. We know, on the other hand, that Mesmerism is being used here (while it is not used by Baptist, Methodist and other 'respectable' preachers) precisely because this 'otherness' is so extreme that, by definition, it cannot possibly be embraced voluntarily.

Cult Wars and the Return if the Hypnotic Paradigm For almost a century Mormonism was the main target of hundreds of American Christian ministries devoted to exposing the 'danger of cults'. Although other groups, from Jehovah's Witnesses to the Theosophical Society, were also targeted, Mormons remained the

35

Ward 1855: 230.

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MASSIMO INTROVIGNE

'cult' perceived as by far the most dangerous. 36 Christian mInIStries, however, made no real claims that 'cults' were not religions. Their concern was to clarifY that 'cults' were not Christian, and that they were therefore part of a larger category of 'false religions'. Evangelical enemies of the 'cults' did not seek government support, nor did they claim that 'cults' should lose their tax-exempt status as religions. Their main concern was to warn fellow Evangelicals about the un-Christian character of the 'cults'. Social scientists usually call these Evangelical ministries 'counter-cult movements'37 in order to distinguish them from the secular anti-cult movement. The latter claims to care about deeds rather than creeds, and seeks the support of public authorities against groups perceived as deviant and subversive. Unlike the Evangelical counter-cult movement, the secular anticult movement (ACM) claims that 'cults' are not religions. Focusing on deeds rather than creeds,38 it concludes that 'cults' are not entitled to the privileged status of religion because they are guilty of a variety of criminal acts. The ACM, however, does not claim that legitimate religions should lose their status if their ministers are found to be involved in criminal activities. It suggests that the tenets on which 'cults' are founded are themselves criminal in essence, although regrettably they are not (yet) recognized as such in law. This crime was originally called 'brainwashing', but-in the wake of the label having been discredited by mental health scholars-has been renamed as 'mind control', 'mental manipulation' or 'mental destabilization'. The latter labels, in fact, simply cover 'second generation' brainwashing theories, in which the label 'brainwashing' is abandoned, but the substance remains. 39 Brainwashing narratives offer a powerful and user-friendly tool for distinguishing between religions and 'cults'. 'Cults' use brainwashing (or 'mind control', or 'manipulation') techniques. Religions-once again, by definition-respect freedom, and joining them therefore is an act of free will. The modern ACM was organized in the early 1970s in the United States by parents of young adult members of the Children of God (called today The Family). These parents were quickly joined by mental health professionals and lawyers who gave support to the Melton 1995. Introvigne 1995. 38 See Introvigne 1998 for some theoretical problems in keeping deeds and creeds really separate. 39 Richardson 1996. 36

37

RELIGION AS CLAIM

53

brainwashing accusations, but their success was limited. The suicides and homicides of more than 900 members of the People's Temple in Guyana (1978) projected the ACM into the national spotlight. Two umbrella organizations, the American Family Foundation (AFF) and the Cult Awareness Network (CAN), emerged, and for some years the ACM was taken seriously by both politicians and law enforcement professionals. In the 1980s, however, the American ACM slowly declined, largely as a result of academic opposition (which rejected the brainwashing models as barely disguised ideological tools). It found also opponents within mainline churches, where some came to feel that by focusing on deeds rather than creeds the ACM may easily end up attacking organizations within the churches as 'cults'.40 The ACM also had trouble in disassociating itself from the illegal activities of 'deprogrammers', self-styled 'rescuers' who kidnap members of new religious movements, subject them to a kind of private imprisonment in addition to a variety of 'counter-brainwashing' techniques. Having lost a court case connected with the deprogramming of a young Pentecostal, CAN filed for bankruptcy in 1996. Ironically enough, after the bankruptcy, a coalition of religious liberty activists including in a leadership position some dedicated Scientologists purchased the CAN trademark and telephone numberY The decision against CAN was in itself concrete proof of the ACM's decline in the United States. In fact the brainwashing and mind control theories had, in the meantime, been fully discredited. Social scientists never really accepted the distinction between 'religions' and 'cults' based on the alleged opposition between free will conversions and mind control. They observed that the most controversial groups dismissed as 'cults' (including Scientology, the Hare Krishnas, and Reverend Moon's Unification Church) have a significant membership turnover, a fact hardly compatible with their possessing 'magical' techniques for keeping members within the fold. 42 Mental health academics reacted more slowly. In 1983, the American Psychological Association (APA) asked Margaret Singer, the main 40 This in fact happened when the ACM started targeting Opus Dei, some communities of the Catholic Charismatic Renewal, and Evangelical organizations such as the Jews for Jesus or the Campus Crusade for Christ. 41 The deprogrammed Pentecostal later changed his mind and settled with the deprogrammer. By that time, however, CAN's trademark was gone, as confirmed by a U.S. Court of Appeal for the Seventh Circuit decision of July 30, 1998. 42 Barker 1984; Anthony & Robbins 1992.

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proponent of anti-cult mind control theories, to chair a working group called Task Force on Deceptive and Indirect Methods of Persuasion and Control (DIMPAC). The DIMPAC committee's final draft report was examined by the Board of Social and Ethical Responsibility for Psychology (BSERP) of the APA in 1987. This draft outlined, in its first part, the 'critical differences between cultic and non-cultic groups', based on the mind control model. A 'cult', as opposed to a genuine 'non-cultic' religion or group, was defined in the DIMPAC draft report as 'a group or movement exhibiting a great or excessive dedication or devotion to some person, idea, or thing and employing unethically manipulative (i.e., deceptive and indirect) techniques of persuasion and control designed to advance the goals of the group's leaders, to the actual or possible detriment of members, their families, or the community. Unethically manipulative techniques include isolation from former friends and family, debilitation, use of special methods to heighten suggestibility and subservience, powerful group pressures, information management, suspension of individuality or critical judgement, promotion of total dependency on the group and fear of leaving it, etc.'Y On May 11, 1987, BSERP rejected the report citing 'lack of scientific rigor'. The rejection memorandum included two reviews by external experts. One of them stated that 'lacking psychological theory, the [DIMPAC] report resorts to sensationalism in the style of certain tabloids', and that 'the term "brainwashing" is not a recognized theoretical concept, and is just a sensationalist "explanation" more suitable to "cultists" and revival preachers. It should not be used by psychologists, since it does not explain anything'.44 Although BSERP was cautious in adding that no 'sufficient information' was 'available' for taking a position on the larger issues of persuasion and influence, the results of the APA controversy were devastating for the ACM. Starting from the Fishman case (1990), in which a defendant accused of commercial fraud raised as a defense that he was not fully responsible since he was under the mind control of Scientology, American courts have consistently rejected testimonies about mind control and manipulation, stating that these were not part of accepted mainline science. 45 Margaret Singer, and her associate, sociologist Richard Ofshe , filed two suits against APA, the 43 44

45

DIMPAC 1987: 12-13. American Psychological Association 1987 (with enclosures). See, for a full discussion, Anthony & Robbins 1992: 5-29.

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American Sociological Association and a number of individual scholars. These suits were dismissed respectively by the United States District Court for the Southern District of New York on August 9, 1993, and by the Superior Court of the State of California in and for the County of Alameda on June 17, 1994. By 1996, mind control theories-although still voiced by a minority of scholars and by marginal anti-cult groups-had ceased to be an important factor in American court cases involving new religious movements. 46 A wellknown college textbook on the sociology of religion was able to list a number of reasons why the brainwashing and mind control theories had been rejected by the scholarly community. They included lack of empirical evidence, and exposure as a mere tool used to deny the status of religion to groups perceived as deviant or subversive. 47 An ACM was also active in Europe since the mid-1970s onwards: ADFI, the largest French, and perhaps European, anti-cult group, was founded in 1974. Given the different legal situation of minority religions in Europe, its success was somewhat greater than in the United States, but limited nonetheless. Things changed in 1994, with the suicides and homicides of members of the Order of the Solar Temple in Quebec and Switzerland. Repeated in 1995 in France and 1997 in Quebec, these tragedies played the same catalyst role Jonestown did in the United States. 48 The media, continuously fed by the ACM, started running lurid exposures of the 'danger of the cults', and Parliaments instituted enquiry commissions in several countries, including France, Belgium and Germany. In the French and Belgian commissions, politicians collaborated with anti-cult activists and vocal disgruntled ex-members of some new religious movements. Academics were given only a minimal audience, and the reports produced by the commissions in France and Belgium were largely based on information supplied by the ACM (while the German report was more moderate, and more critical of mind control theories).49 Although with different nuances, and dismissing the word 'brainwashing' as Melton 1996. Bainbridge 1997: 235-36. Interestingly enough, Christian scholars concurred claiming that brainwashing and mind control theories are 'anti-Christian' because they are incompatible with categories such as responsibility, choice, and sin (see Hexham & Poewe 1997: 10). 48 Due to the decline of the ACM in the United States, the incidents in Waco (1993) and Rancho Santa Fe, California (1997)-the latter involving the collective suicide of the UFO group Heaven's Gate-failed to re-energize the American anticult organizations. 49 Reports published before 1998 include Assemblee Nationale 1996 and Chambre 46 47

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inadequate and old-fashioned, the French and Belgian reports relied on the ACM distinction between religion and 'cults' on the basis of manipulation and mind control. The Belgian report quotes the deposition of the president of the French ADFI, implying that it was possible to distinguish a 'cult' from a religion because the former is 'a group where a mental and affective manipulation is present'.50 According to one militant anti-cult psychiatrist quoted in both the French and the Belgian reports, it is not difficult to distinguish between a religion and a 'cult'. Although some features may be similar, a religion is founded on 'free will' and there is no 'manipulation', while manipulation and mind control are 'cult' trademarks. 51 Absent from the reports is a discussion of the American scholarly criticism of the mind control model, and how this criticism was accepted by the courts of law following the 1987 APA rejection of the DIMPAC report and the 1990 Fishman decision. When U.S. case law is quoted at all, the reports only mention decisions rendered btfore 1990. 52 Scholarly criticism of reports has focused on the fallacy of the mind control criteria as tools for distinguishing between religions and 'cults'53 and on the selective use of narratives. Since, obviously, members of the parliamentary commissions have no direct experience of 'cults', they can select only from competing social narratives about each group and problem. They have chosen to take at face value narratives presented by the ACM and by vocal ex-members turned professional apostates (a minority within the larger category of exmembers),54 as the 'truth' on 'cults', rather than to compare them with different narratives produced by other social actors, including scholars and members of the movements themselves. 55 Criticism, not

des Representants de Belgique 1987. In Switzerland the Canton of Geneva obtained a similar report from a group of lawyers and law professors (Groupe d'experts genevois 1997). The German Commission published its final report in 1998. 50 Chambre des Representants de Belgique 1997, I: 138. 51 Abgrall 1996: 16. 52 Chambre des Representants de Belgique 1997, I: 123, includes what is introduced as a discussion of U.S. case law, but the most recent case mentioned dates back to 1983. 53 The French word 'secte' plays the same role as the English derogatory word 'cult'. It should not be translated as 'sect', a somewhat less derogatory term in contemporary English language. 54 See on this point Bromley 1998. 55 Introvigne & Melton 1996.

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only by scholars but by established churches as well,56 has also focused on the lists of 'cults' or movements included in the French and Belgian reports. These lists are evidence that distinguishing between religions and 'cults' based on the mind control model is less easy than the ACM claims. The lists have, in fact, included mainline Catholics (including the Office Culturel de Cluny, a church-sponsored theatrical and cultural group in France, and the Catholic Charismatic Renewal in Belgium) and Protestants (Pentecostal groups in both Belgium and France, and even the Young Women's Christian Association in Belgium), despite the protests of the Catholic hierarchy and the Protestant federations. Quakers, Baha'i, and Satmar Hasidic Jews are also listed in the Belgian report. In this latter document, words such as 'mental manipulation' and 'mind control' seem to function as a sort of mantra. It is enough to quote these termswithout elaborating on them further-to justifY the summary conclusion that a group is not a legitimate religion but a 'cult'. Although it did suggest a number of criteria, the French report concludes that 172 groups listed as 'cults' have in common their use of mind control or 'mental destabilization' techniques. 57 In countries like France and Belgium, the ACM currently enjoys an institutional and media legitimation unknown in the English-speaking world. Scholarly criticism of the ACM and of the Parliamentary reports is dismissed as the work of 'cult apologists', or as a misguided attempt to import into Western Europe 'American' ideas about religion. However, when international scholarly literature questioning the very existence of mind control becomes more well-known, both the European academic community and courts of law realize that the popular definition of the distinction between religion and 'cult' does not rest on anything more than the usual ACM rhetoric. This, of course, does not mean that new religious movements are always innocent of the illegal activities they are prosecuted for. In fact, it has been proved in the courts that they are, at least occasionally, guilty. But the fact that new (and old) religious movements use illegal means to pursue their aims does not mean that they are able to magically control their members according to the hypnotic paradigm, nor that the experience they offer is not 'truly' religious. Their illegal activities, when they occur, may be prosecuted more 56 57

See Secretariat general de la Conference episcopale frant;:aise 1996. Assemblee Nationale 1996: 76.

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effectively on a case by case basis, without trying to legislate on the elusive matter of mind control, or entering into endless debates about the 'true' definition of religion.

Scientology: The Ultimate Test Case The Church of Scientology has been one of the main targets of the ACM, and the focus of considerable controversies. In the United States, as mentioned earlier, the Internal Revenue Service has recognized it to be a religion, but only after a 25-year fight. Reasons quoted for denying Scientology the status of religion include: lack of ritual and prayer, financial structure resembling that of a rich multinational corporation, services sold for a quid pro quo fee, and the freedom Scientologists have of maintaining their allegiance to other religions or churches. The ACM insists that the religious features of Scientology are nothing more than a facade to hide a commercial operation. Also mentioned are the criminal convictions of a number of Scientologists in different countries. Some of these arguments are clearly flawed: the finances of Scientology, for example, are quite low-key and appear very simply structured when compared to those of the Roman Catholic Church, or even the Mormon Church. Other arguments deserve a closer look, and directly refer to how religion is defined. Some arguments seem to imply that the status of religion could be lost if a significant number of members are found guilty of a variety of criminal charges. Since this has been the case in a number of countries, critics argue that Scientology no longer 'deserves' the label of religion. The implied argument confirms that the label of 'religion' is, indeed, a resource and a commodity. To argue that it could be withdrawn should, theoretically, exclude it having any content at all. It is reduced to a sort of patent, granted or cancelled by the government or the courts. This is, of course, hardly compatible with the internationally guaranteed protection of religious freedom, and it is also a standard not normally applied to other organizations. Nobody would seriously deny the status of religion to the Roman Catholic Church simply because a number of priests have been convicted of pedophile activities in different countries. Critics of Scientology object that the Roman Catholic Church in no way condones, far less organises, pedophilia, although individual priests have been found guilty of this offence, while criminal or fraud-

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ulent techniques are part and parcel of what Scientology does in its normal course of business. However-parliamentary reports and public statements by certain German politicians notwithstanding-this conclusion is not sustained by the international case law on Scientology. There have been literally dozens of decisions, and-understandablyboth Scientology and its critics quote them selectively. An overall view would show, however,58 that an overwhelming majority of the negative decisions follow the 1997 pattern of the Court of Appeal of Lyon. They state that Scientology, as such, is not a criminal organization, and its aims could certainly be pursued through perfectly legal means. They add, however, that in single instances individual Scientologists have used illegal means to promote the aims of the organization. Courts, after all, do not put Scientology itself on trial, but rather one or more Scientologists. Negative decisions are, additionally, balanced by more positive ones. Finally, one should ask the question whether 'means' are inherent in a definition of religion. According to what definition exactly would even the systematic use of illegal means automatically change the nature of the aims pursued?59 Some other arguments add something new to existing definitions of religion, and may in the process deny the corresponding status to a number of religions, quite apart from Scientology. Scientology accepts dual membership of other religious organizations, and claims that one can become a Scientologist and remain a Catholic or a Protestant in good standing at the same time. While certainly foreign to Christian tradition, dual membership is common in the East; most Japanese belong to both Shinto and Buddhism, and criticize Christianity for its perceived intolerance. Quid pro quo fees are an obvious issue in the West. Paying a fee for single religious services (as opposed to donating or tithing to further the general aims of a religion) is not unheard of within Christianity: Catholics often pay stipends for special Masses, for instance. However, in the Christian tradition quid pro quo payments are rarely given the prime status they have in the life of a committed Scientologist. Here again, however, if we move from the Christian paradigm to other cultures, including traditional or shamanistic religions in Asia and Africa, we find religions in which the common practice is to visit the shaman Melton 1998. Once again, this does not mean that illegal means should be condoned simply because the aim is religious. 58

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or priest in order to obtain a specific service for a quid pro quo fee. Denying them the status of religion, for these reasons, would once have been perfectly acceptable in the West, but would certainly raise eyebrows and be denounced as ethnocentric by contemporary scholars. Additionally, the exclusion of dual membership, and of a quid pro quo fee, does not seem to be part of any known definition of religion proposed bifOre the controversies currently surrounding Scientology. Rituals and prayers are generally regarded as essential to religion, but even within the Christian tradition they may assume a variety of forms, including the Quaker silent prayer, and they could hardly be defined as worship or communion with a personal God in traditions such as Theravada Buddhism or Jainism. An interesting discussion about the religious nature of Scientology has taken place in Italian case law. As in other countries, there are a number of decisions of which three are particularly important. The activity of Scientology came to scrutiny before three of the most important Italian courts: Rome, Turin and Milan. Each examined the activities of Scientologists within its respective jurisdiction. On January 28, 1997, in a final decision, the Rome Court of Appeal pronounced that in its view Scientology was an 'applied religious philosophy'. Contrary to the first degree decision, it clearly concluded that the quid pro quo 'sale' of services was still 'intrinsically inherent to the institutional religious aim of the organization' and did not therefore place its religious status in jeopardy.50 On March 29, 1996, the Court of Justice in Turin, in yet another irrevocable decision, found 21 local Scientologists not guilty of ten charges of tax fraud for having claimed religious tax-exempt status for a nonreligious organization. The trial lasted for ten years, and the final decision involved a lengthy discussion of the status of Scientology. Criticizing a 1993 decision issued by the Court of Appeal in Milan, the Turin Court observed that unfortunately judges may not avoid the question of defining religion, since 'Italian law grants a number of rights and privileges to religious organizations, without defining in any way what a religious organisation is'. The Turin judges also commented that 'asking mere judges (who are certainly not religious experts) to decide in this field may sound unrealistic', bearing in mind that 'even among scholars there is no definition of religion accepted by all'.51 However, from a number of available definitions, 60 61

Corte d'Appelio di Roma 1997. Tribunale Ordinario di Torino 1996: 14.

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the court was able to select one which defined a religion as: 'a system of relations between human beings and the sacred, where humans feel and know that they depend on the sacred and reach to it with some form of cult or worship'.62 After a detailed discussion, the court concluded that, according to this definition, Scientology is a religion, although perhaps a 'syncretistic', 'hedonistic' or even a 'pagan' one. According to the Turin judges, therefore, Scientology is a religion even if it is not 'a church', because the term 'church' should be preferably 'reserved for communities sharing the values of the Christian tradition'. 63 A different conclusion was reached by the Court of Appeal in Milan. Overturning a first degree decision in favour of Scientology, on November 5, 1993 the Milan appeal judges found a number of Scientologists guilty of a variety of crimes, all allegedly committed before 1981, and in so doing they put aside the question of whether or not Scientology could be designated as a religion. On February 9, 1995, however, the Italian Supreme Court annulled the 1993 decision and returned the case to Milan, asking the Court of Appeal to reconsider whether Scientology was indeed a religion. The Milan Court of Appeal duly complied with this request on December 2, 1996, but came to the conclusion that Scientology was not a religion. Not unlike their Turin counterparts, the Milan appeal judges noted that 'there is no legislative definition of religion' and 'nowhere in [Italian] law is there any useful element with which to distinguish a religious organization from other social groupS'.64 Among a number of possible definitions, however, the Milan judges selected one defining religion as 'a system of doctrines centered on the presupposition of the existence of a Supreme Being, who has a relation with humans, the latter having· towards him a duty of obedience and reverence'.65 Additional criteria based on the case law of the Italian Constitutional Court were considered, but were clearly regarded as ancillary to the main definition. 66 Theoretically, the reference to a 'Supreme Being' could also be interpreted in a non-theistic sense. We have seen this interpretation in U.S. Supreme Court case law applied to the Universal Military Training and Service Act of 1948, Tribunale Ordinario di Torino 1996: 20. Tribunale Ordinario di Torino 1996: 17. 64 Corte d'Appello di Milano 1996: 30. 65 Corte d' Appello di Milano 1996: 31. 66 In fact the Court of Turin mentioned the same additional criteria and reached a contrary conclusion. 62

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which also included in its definition of religion a reference to 'a relation to a Supreme Being'. The Milan judges, however, interpreted 'Supreme Being' in a theistic sense. As a consequence, they had no difficulty in excluding the non-theistic worldview of Scientology from the field of religion. On October 9, 1997 the Supreme Court also annulled the Milan 1996 decision, again with remand (meaning that another section of the Court of Appeal of Milan would re-examine the facts of the case). The Supreme Court regarded the Milan theistic definition of religion as 'unacceptable' and 'a mistake', because it was 'based only on the paradigm of Biblical religions'.67 As such, the definition would also have to exclude Buddhism, the main Italian branch of which, the Italian Buddhist Union, had enjoyed official recognition as a 'religious denomination' in Italy since 1991. Buddhism, according to the Supreme Court, 'certainly does not affirm the existence of a Supreme Being and, as a consequence, does not propose a direct relation of the human being with Him'.68 It is true, the Supreme Court observes, that 'the self-definition of a group as religious is not enough to justifY giving it the status of a genuine religion'.69 The Milan 1996 decision quoted Italian Constitutional Court case law and its acceptance of 'common opinion' in deciding whether or not any given group warrants the title of 'religion'. The relevant 'common opinion', however, according to the Supreme Court is not so much 'public opinion' as 'the opinion of the scholars'. Public opinion tends to be hostile to religious minorities and, in addition, is difficult to ascertain: the Supreme Court wondered 'from what source the Milan judges knew the public opinion of the whole national community'.70 On other hand, most scholars-according to the Supreme Court-seem to prefer a definition of religion broad enough to include Scientology and, when asked, conclude that Scientology is in fact a religion because its aim is 'the liberation of the human spirit through the knowledge of the divine spirit residing within each human being'.71 The 48-page decision of the Supreme Court also examined some of the arguments put forward by Scientology critics (and by the Milan 1996 judges) to deny 67

68 69 70 71

Corte Corte Corte Corte Corte

Suprema Suprema Suprema Suprema Suprema

eli eli eli di di

Cassazione Cassazione Cassazione Cassazione Cassazione

1997: 1997: 1997: 1997: 1997:

28. 30. 32. 34-35. 36.

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it the status of religion. Five main arguments were discussed. Firstly, critics purport that Scientology is 'syncretistic' and that it proclaims no real 'original belief'. This, the Supreme Court argues, is irrelevant, since syncretism 'is not rare' among genuine religions,72 and many recently established Christian denominations exhibit very few 'original features' when compared to older denominations. 73 Secondly, it is argued that Scientology is presented to potential converts as science, not as religion. The Supreme Court retorts that, from at least the time of Thomas Aquinas, Christian theology has claimed to be a science. 74 On the other hand, science claiming non-empirical results such as 'a knowledge of God' (or 'of human beings as gods') may be both 'bad science' and 'inherently religious'.75 Thirdly, critics often draw on the words of ex-members (mostly militant apostates such as 'Atack and Armstrong', quoted in the Milan 1996 decision) who claim that Scientology is not a religion but merely a facade to hide criminal activities. The Supreme Court poses the question of how we may know to what extent the opinions of disgruntled ex-members are really representative of the larger population of ex-members. Less disgruntled ex-members have, in fact, appeared as witnesses for the defense, and at any rate, the number of ex-members of Scientology appears to be quite large. The opinion of two or even twenty of them is, thus, hardly representative of what the average ex-member believes. 76 Fourthly, texts by L. Ron Hubbard, the founder of Scientology, and early Italian leaders, seem to imply that Scientology's basic aim is to make money. The interest in money expressed in such texts is, in the view of the Supreme Court, 'excessive' but 'perhaps appears much less excessive if we consider how money was raised in the past by the Roman Catholic Church'. The Supreme Court quotes Ananias and Sapphira in the Acts of the Apostles (who died because they kept for personal use a part of what they had obtained from the sale of their property and lied to the bishop, rather than surrender everything to him), late Medieval controversies surrounding the sale of indulgences, and the fact that until very recently Italian Catholic churches used to attach 'a list of services offered [Masses and 72 73 74 75

76

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di di di di di

Cassazione Cassazione Cassazione Cassazione Cassazione

1997: 1997: 1997: 1997: 1997:

35. 41. 36. 42. 38-39, 47.

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similar] with the corresponding costs>77 to church doors. The Supreme Court was of the opinion that such comments confirm that quid pro quo services are more widespread among religions that the Milan 1996 judges seemed to believe. As far as Scientology is concerned, the Supreme Court went on to observe that Hubbard's more 'disturbing' texts on money are but a minimal part of his enormous literary production ('about 8,000 works'). They were also mostly circular letters or bulletins intended 'for the officers in charge of finances and the economic structure, not for the average member'. 7S Finally, even if one were to take at its face value the 'crude' comment published in a Scientology technical bulletin (not written by Hubbard), that 'the only reason why LRH [L. Ron Hubbard] established the Church was in order to sell and deliver Dianetics and Scientology', it would not, according to the Supreme Court, prove that Scientology is not a religion. What then is the ultimate aim of 'selling Dianetics and Scientology'? There is no evidence, the Supreme Court suggests, that such 'sales' are organized solely to assure the personal welfare of the leaders. If they are intended as a proselytization tool, then financial gain is but a secondary aim. The ultimate purpose is 'proselytization', and as such 'could hardly be more typical of a religion', even if 'according to the strategy of the founder [Hubbard], new converts are sought and organized through the sale and supply of Dianetics and Scientology'. 79 A fifth objection discussed by the Supreme Court is that Scientology is not a religion on the grounds of evidence supplied in the Milan case, that a number of Scientologists had been guilty of 'fraudulent sales techniques' or had abused vulnerable customers, when 'selling' Dianetics or Scientology. These illegal activities, the Supreme Court comments, warrant prosecution, although there is no evidence that they are more than 'occasional deviant activities' of a certain number of leaders and members within the Milan branch, and 'with no general significance' concerning the nature of Scientology in general. so The Italian Supreme Court 1997 decision on Scientology includes one of the most important discussions-so far, and at an international scale-on how courts may apply existing laws, apparently

77 78

79 80

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eli eli eli eli

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1997: 44~45. 1997: 43. 1997: 44. 1997: 46.

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requmng them to decide whether a specific group is, or is not, a religion. It argues that the non-existence of a legal definition of religion in Italy (and elsewhere) 'is not coincidental'. Any definition would rapidly become obsolete and would, in fact, limit religious liberty. It is much better, according to the Italian Supreme Court, 'not to limit with a definition, always by its very nature restrictive, the broader field of religious liberty'. 'Religion' is an ever-evolving concept, and courts may only interpret it within the framework of a specific historical and geographical context, taking into account the opinions of the scholars.sl In reviewing these decisions, one is left with two impressions. The first is that judges are genuinely perplexed, and somewhat disturbed, when asked to define religion without, at the same time, being supplied with any criteria in law. The 1997 opinion of the Italian Supreme Court that it is better not to have a legal definition, thus allowing more scope for religious liberty, is not apparently shared by many other courts. Secondly, it is difficult to avoid the impression that the selection of a set of criteria, among the many available, is really result-oriented, and governed by an initial feeling that an organization deserves protection or punishment. As far as Scientology is concerned, it is certainly true that scholars share no 'true' definition of religion. It is equally true, however, that academic scholars of Scientology have almost unanimously concluded that it does conform to most definitions of the term 'religion,.s2 These scholars normally define religion in broader terms, as a system of answers to the basic human questions about the origins and destiny of mankind. 83 Scientology provides a (gnostic) answer to such questions by teaching that each of us is a the tan, one of the creators of the world, and imprisoned in our self-made universes of MEST (Matter-EnergySpace-Time) where we forget our role as creators. The aim of human beings is to regain an awareness of their divine nature, and become 'operating thetans'. This modern gnostic myth is certainly not, in the current sense of the word, science, and should thus qualifY as religion. Corte Suprema di Cassazione, 1997: 44. See Wilson 1990: 267-288; Melton 1998. 83 I am not, of course, suggesting that this particular functional sub-type of orientation definition is unanimously accepted by scholars of religion. Only, that it happens to be favored by a number of scholars of new religions movements, including most of those who have written about Scientology. 81

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Sinceriry as a Factor: The Strange Saga

if Mail-Order-Ministries

English-speaking New Age magazines often carry offers to 'become a priest' or a 'minister' by simply sending twenty dollars, or less, to a more or less strangely-named 'church'. Sending the money and receiving a 'ministerial kit' would hardly seem to constitute a criminal activity. In the 1970s, however, the U.S. Internal Revenue Service became concerned that mail-order ministries may be involved in large-scale tax evasion schemes. IRS attention focused on three mailorder organizations: the Life Science Church, the Universal Life Church and the Basic Bible Church, all of which had a number of features in common. Firstly, their main organizers were lawyers (in the case of the Universal Life Church, a former New York assistant city attorney). Secondly, a sizeable proportion of the ministers ordained through the mail were airline pilots, a number of them employed by the then struggling Braniff Airlines. Thirdly, each local 'congregation' of these churches comprised no members other than the ministers and their families. The scheme worked in a very simple way, as evidenced by the first court case involving the Basic Bible Church, the so called Kageler case. Kageler, an airline pilot, came across a Basic Bible Church advertisement, and purchased a charter to establish a local congregation from its 'archbishop, president and pope', Jerome Daly (an attorney, later disbarred by the Minnesota Supreme Court). Having received its charter from Daly for US$ 1,000, Kageler assigned its income to the local congregation of the Basic Bible Church of which he was the sole member, and took a vow of poverty. He then received back the money from the congregation, allegedly for missionary work, and for making mortgage payments on his house (since converted into his 'parsonage'). In other cases, airline pilots turned ministers even converted their swimming pools into 'baptismal fonts'. In 1980 Kageler was sentenced to a 4-year imprisonment. In 1981 'archbishop' Daly and ten Braniff Airlines pilots followed suit and were also convicted. 84 In the 1980s and early 1990s American courts had to consider hundreds of cases involving the Universal Life Church and the Life Science Church. The schemes were similar to the Kageler case and, again, often involved airline pilots. By 1986 84 United States v. Daly, 1985. See Casino 1987: 123. Braniff and other airline pilots were, at that time, particularly concerned for their future because of the difficult situation of their employers (Braniff, in fact, later went bankrupt). Some pilots, thus, found tax evasion schemes particularly attractive.

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an exasperated judge would comment: 'This court has had scores, if not hundreds, of cases revolving around the Universal Life Church (... ). [This Church] has been at the center of highly abusive tax scams'.85 In fact, in the case of the Universal Life Church there was something more. Its founder, Kirby ]. Hensley, claimed that 'the Church was designed to force Congress to terminate the tax exemption of churches by exploiting its tax-exempt status'.86 Notwithstanding Hensley's anti-clerical and ideological stand, U.S. courts maintained that the main purpose of his and similar organizations was tax evasion. By the late 1990s, the IRS' effective prosecution strategy severely reduced the scope of mail-order ministries. They still exist, but it has become increasingly difficult for their ministers to obtain tax-exempt status for their congregations. The impact of the mail-order churches saga has been felt on the U.S. legal scene, and the result has been that 'sincerity' is now an additional test in assessing whether or not an organisation qualifies as a religion. 87 On the other hand, legal scholars and advocates of religious liberty have warned that the IRS, in the course of its usual battle to keep the number of tax-exempt religious organizations as low as possible, may unduly expand the definition of 'mail-order ministry'. This definition is used by the IRS for a number of organizations that, while operating mostly through the mail, are not primarily tax-evasion schemes comparable to the infamous Universal Life Church, and may indeed involve 'sincere' religious belief.88 An analysis in the American Criminal Law Review concluded in 1987: 'Most mail-order ministries are tax avoidance schemes that deserve a rigorous prosecution. This is not disputed. Unfortunately, whether out of zeal to protect the fisc or simple exasperation, IRS and the courts have developed a biased, highly subjective approach to evaluating religion-based tax claims. This approach threatens not only the few legitimate mail-order ministries, but other legitimate religions as well'. In the end, the IRS ethno-definition of religion seems to be comparable to the well-known old American definition of pornography: 'I know it when I see it'.89

'Brown v. Commissioner' 1986. 60 Minutes, CBS Television Broadcast of September 26, 1976, quoted in Casino 1987: 125. 87 See Casino 1987: 152 for a list of related cases. 88 Casino 1987: 153-163. 89 Casino 1987: 163. 85

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Conclusions Case studies confirm that ethno-definitions of religion are social constructions, produced by competing interest groups. They bear little resemblance to scholarly definitions of religion. Ethno-definitions are result-oriented in a particular way. Their function is not to increase knowledge about religion, but to solve specific legal, fiscal, political or social problems. Scholarly definitions are also result-oriented, but are aimed at solving cognitive (rather than practical) problems. When an organization is perceived as deviant, counter-subversive strategies are used to deny it the status of religion. There are two reasons for implementing these strategies. Firstly, in the usual rhetoric, and notwithstanding recent problems, a religious organization is perceived as basically good and benevolent. Secondly, constitutional laws and international conventions grant broader protection to religions. Countersubversive strategies are also aimed at preserving the idea that society is committed to religious tolerance and open to pluralism. The rhetorical tool used to achieve this aim-as early controversies surrounding Mormonism show-consists in denying that the deviant group is a religion. Once the group is excluded from the field of religion, it can be discriminated against without jeopardizing the principle of religious tolerance. The selection of a definition of religion by institutional actors is also result-oriented. Contemporary governments, parliamentary commissions and courts are more or less aware that competing scholarly and popular definitions of religion do exist. Confronted with a specific problem, they often shop for a definition which allows a reasonable exclusion of the group perceived as subversive. Scholars are taking an increasing part in this complex social scenario. Not only do they elaborate their own definitions of religion, but governments, courts, and new religious movements also call on them to sanction or dispute their own ethno-definitions. Scholarly influence, however, is limited, and scholars may be castigated by the media if they fail to sanction the most popular ethno-definitions perceived as socially useful. On the other hand, they may occasionally influence institutional definitions. The American Psychological Association's 1987 actions, implying that distinctions between religions and 'cults' based on the mind control model are not part of mainline mental health science, had a crucial impact on subsequent legal developments. Particularly when confronted with the contemporary cult wars,

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scholars face difficult problems. They should avoid being perceived as partisan, and other social actors should be made aware that scholars are not unanimous on issues such as 'cults', 'sects' or the definition of religion. They may share some methodological presuppositions, but their conclusions may differ widely in practice. 90 Scholars should also be able to perceive themselves as social actors, and their findings as culturally conditioned, at least by their interest in protecting their own field from amateurs and in claiming their social relevance. Scholars should, after all, be able to apply their sociology of knowledge to themselves. 91 With these provisos in mind, there are some unique contributions that scholars may offer to the ongoing process of producing meaningful institutional ethno-definitions of religion. 1. Scholars may advise institutional actors that there is not such a thing as a 'true' essentialist definition of religion, and any quest of it is, therefore, meaningless. Although some definitions may be more useful than others, they remain socially constructed and culturally negotiated tools. 2. Scholars could also tell institutions and the media that some shallow definitions of religion are less useful than others, and could well mislead. A case in point is the distinction between religions and 'cults' based on the contrast between free will and mind control. Although in the wake of the Order of the Solar Temple this may have become more difficult in Europe than in the United States, scholars may point out that 'crude' anti-cult brainwashing and mind control theories have been debunked by both social and psychological science. They should not be considered as empirically testable scientific theories, but rather as rhetorical tools used within the framework of counter-subversive political strategies. 3. Scholars could also promote a more sober reflection on aims and means. Definitions of religion should be concerned more with aims than with means. Religious aims can be pursued through illegal means, incidentally or systematically. Illegal means warrant prosecution and should not be condoned because the organization's aims are supposedly religious. On the other hand, the use of illegal means should not blind us to the religious nature of the aims. Skirmishes with the law may, in fact, persuade such groups to abandon their illegal practices and to pursue their religious aims in a law-abiding manner. 92 90 91

92

Champion & Cohen 1996. Bromley & Shupe 1993. This is not impossible even for such an extreme group as the Thugs. In

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4. Courts of justice, as we have seen, often complain that laws define the privileges to which religions are entitled, but offer no definition of what a religion is. Judges, called on to decide whether privileges associated with being a religion should be granted to a particular group, cannot avoid shopping for a definition. Perhaps scholars could suggest that, while no definition is 'true' in the popular sense, legislators would do well to provide guidelines to courts and administrative agencies by suggesting the use of a particular definition from among the many available. For scholars, it would surely be more simple to advise a court or an administrative agency, when asked, on whether an organization fits within a given definition of religion, rather than whether the group 'is a religion' (irrespective of the definition used, or on the basis of a supposed existence of a mythical universal definition). 5. It is certainly not for scholars to recommend which definition of religion (if any) is more socially or culturally acceptable. Scholars, however, are equipped to evaluate the likely results of the legal and administrative use of broader or narrower definitions. A broader definition of religion,93 while not more 'true' than others, is perhaps more consistent with the aims of religious liberty embodied in a number of national constitutions and international declarations and conventions. In a pluralist, multi-religious society, narrow definitions of religion (including those based on a theistic model) could often have the effect of discriminating against religions simply because they are 'foreign', new, small, or 'unusual', when compared to the prevailing paradigm.

Riferences Abgrall, J.-M., 1996, La mecanique des sectes. Paris: Payot. American Psychological Association, Board of Social and Ethical Responsibility for Psychology, 1987, 'Memo to the DIMPAC Committee'. Washington D.C.: American Psychological Association. Anonymus [W. Sleeman], 1830, 'To the Editor', in Calcutta Literary Gazette; Journal if Belles Lettres, Sciences and the Arts, October 16, 1830.

contemporary Bengala, groups of Kali-worshippers claim the heritage of the Thugs and have substituted symbolic for actual violence. 93 'Broader' definitions of religion, of course, are different from simply accepting at face value the claims of any and all groups (including the obviously fraudulent mail-order ministries) which declare themselves to be 'religious'.

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Anthony, D., & T. Robbins, 1992, 'Law, Social Science and the "Brainwashing" Exception to the First Amendment', in Behavioral Sciences and the Law 10: 5-30. Assemblee Nationale, 1996, Les sectes en France. Rapport fait au nom de la commission d'enquete sur les sectes. Paris: Documents d'Information de l'Assemblee Nationale. Bainbridge, W.S., 1997, The Sociology qf Religious Movements. New York, etc.: Roudedge. Barker, E., 1984, The Making qf a Moonie: Choice or Brainwashing? Oxford: Blackwell. Barker, E., & M. Warburg (eds.) 1998, New Religions and New Religiosiry. Aarhus, etc.: Aarhus University Press. Beadle,].H., 1877, The Mormon Theocracy', in Scribner's Month!J 14, 3: 391. Bromley, D.G., & L.F. Carter (eds.) 1996, The Issue qf Authenticiry in the Study qf Religion. Greenwich (Connecticut): JAI Press. Bromley, D.G., &].K. Hadden (eds.) 1993, Handbook qf Cults and Sects in America. Greenwich (Connecticut): JAI Press. Bromley, D.G., & A. Shupe 1993, 'Organized Opposition to New Religious Movements', in Bromley & Hadden 1993: 177-198. Bromley, D.G., (ed.) 1998, The Politics qf Religious Apostasy: The Role qf Apostates in the Transformation qf Religious Movements. Westport (Connecticut), etc.: Praeger. 'Brown v. Commissioner', 1986, 51 rc.M. (CCH): 1321-1322. Casino, B., 1987, '''I Know It When I See It": Mail-Order Ministry Tax Fraud and the Problem of a Constitutionally Acceptable Definition of Religion', in American Criminal Law Review 25,1: 113-164. Chambre des Representants de Belgique 1997, Enquete Parlementaire visant ii elaborer une politique en vue de lutter contre les pratiques illegales des sectes et le danger qu'elles representent pour la societe et pour les personnes, particulierement les mineurs d'flge. Rapport foit au nom de la Commission d'Enquete, 2 vols. Bruxelles: Chambre des Representants de Belgique. Champion, F., & M. Cohen, 1996, 'Les sociologues et Ie probleme des dites sectes', in Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 41, 96: 5-15. Corte d'Appello di Milano, Sez. IV Penale, 1996, Bandera e Attri. Unpublished decision of December 2, 1996. Corte d'Appello di Roma, 1997, Chiezzi. Unpublished decision of January 28, 1997. Corte Suprema eli Cassazione, Sez. VI Penale, 1997, Bandera e Altri. Unpublished decision no. 1329 of October 8, 1997. Daeniken, U. von, L. Walpen & ].-F. Mayer 1998, La Scientologie en Suisse. Rapport prepare ii ['intention de la Commission consultative en matiere de protection de [,Etat. Bern: Departement Federal de Justice et de Police. Cour d'Appel de Lyon, 1997, Veau et autres. Unpublished decision of July 28, 1997. 'Davis v. Beason', 1890, 133 U.S. 333. Deutscher Bundestag-13. Wahlperiode, 1998, Endbericht der Enquete-Kommission 'Sogenannte Sekten und Psychogruppen'. Bonn: Deutscher Bundestag. DIMPAC, 1987, 'Report of the Task Force on Deceptive and Indirect Techniques of Persuasion and Control' (last draft). Fautre, W., 1997, 'Overview of Religious Freedom in Eastern Europe: Right of Association: the Religious Dimension'. Paper read at the conference organized by the Rutherford Institute on 21st Century Challenges to Religious Liberry in Europe, Paris, August 2-3, 1997. 'Fellowship of Humanity v. County of Alameda', 1957, 153 Cal.App. 2d 673, 315 P.2d 394. Frantz, D., 1991, The Shadowy Story Behind Scientology's Tax-Exempt Status', in The New York Times, March 9, 1997. Givens, T.L., 1997, The Viper on the Hearth: Mormons, Myths and the Construction qf Heresy. New York, etc.: Oxford University Press. Greil, A.L., 1996, 'Sacred Claims: The "Cult Controversy" as a Struggle over the Right to the Religious Label', in Bromley & Carter 1996: 47-63.

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[Groupe d' experts genevois], 1997, Audits sur les derives secraires: Rapport du Groupe d'experts genevois. Geneva: Editions Suzanne Hunter. Hexham, I., & K. Poewe 1997, New Religions as Global Cultures: Making the Human Sacred. Boulder (Colorado), etc.: Westview Press. Introvigne, M., 1994, 'The Devil Makers: Contemporary Evangelical Fundamentalist Anti-Mormonism', in Dialogue: A. Journal if Mormon Thought 27,1: 153-169. - - - , 1995, 'Onwennige partners of toekomstige vijanden: Over de perikelen tussen de sektestrijders', in Religieuze Bewegingen in Nederland 30: 144-159. - - - , 1995-1996, 'Old Wine in New Bottles: The Story Behind Fundamentalist Anti-Mormonism', in Brigham Young Universiry Studies 35, 3: 45-73. - - - , 1998, 'New Religious Movements and the Law: A Comparison between Two Different Legal Systems (the United States and Italy)', in Barker & Warburg 1998: 276-29l. Introvigne, M., & J.G. Melton (eds.) 19963, Pour en finir avec les sectes. Le debat sur Ie rapport de la commission parlementaire. Paris: Dervy. Kurtz, J., 1978, 'Speech at the PLI Seventh Biennial Conference on Tax Planning (Jan. 9, 1978)" in Federal Taxes 54: 820. Lorenzen, D.N., 1978, '\¥arrior Ascetics in Indian History', in Journal if the American Oriental Sociery 98, 1: 61-75. Mehotra, R.R., 1977, Sociology if Secret Languages. Simla: Indian Institute of Advanced Studies. Melton, J.G., 1995, The Modem Anti-Cult Movement in Historical Perspective. Santa Barbara (California): The Institute for the Study of American Religion. - - - , 1996, 'Historique des associations modernes anti-sectes aux Etats Unis'. Paper read at the conference organized by CESNUR-France, Les controverses en matiere de 'sectes' ou nouveaux mouvements religieux: un regard sur les mouvements antisectes, Paris, Sorbonne, September 17, 1996. - - - , 1998, La Chiesa di Scientology. Leumann (Torino): Elle Di Ci. Richardson, J.T., 1996, 'Une critique des accusations de "lavage de celVeau" portees a l'encontre des nouveaux mouvements religieux: questions d'ethique et de preuve', in Introvigne & Melton 1996: 85-97. Robbins, T., & J. Beckford 1993, 'Religious Movements and Church-State Issues', in Bromley & Hadden 1993: 199-218. Secretariat general de la conference episcopale franc;:aise, 1996, L'Eglise Catholique et les sectes. Paris: Secretariat general de la conference episcopale franc;:aise. Sleeman, W., 1836, Ramaseeana, or A Vocabulary if the Peculiar Language Used by the Thugs, with an Introduction and an Appendix. Calcutta: G.H. Muttman Military Orphan Press. Taylor, M., 1995, Mimoires d'un Thug (fr.tr.). Paris: Phebus. 'Thomas v. Review Board', 1981, 450 Us. 707. 'Torcaso v. Watkins', 1961, 367 Us. 488. Tribunal de Grande Instance de Lyon, 1996, Mazier et autres. Unpublished decision of November 22, 1996. Tribunale Ordinario di Torino (Sezione IV Penale), 1996, Camerino e altri. Unpublished decision of March 29, 1996. 'United States v. Ballard', 1944, 322 US. 78. 'United States v. Seeger', 1965, 380 Us. 163. 'United States v. Daly', 1985, 756 F.2d 1076-1079 (5th cir.). Ward, M., 1855, Female Lift Among the Mormons. London: Routledge. 'Welsh v. United States', 1970, 398 US. 333. Wilson, B.R., 1990, The Social Dimensions if Sectarianism: Sects and New Religious Movements in Contemporary Sociery. Oxford: Clarendon Press. Woerkens, M. van, 1995. Le voyageur etrangli: L'Inde des Thugs, Ie colonialisme et l'imaginaire. Paris: Albin Michel.

RELIGION AS MEMORY REFERENCE TO TRADITION AND THE CONSTITUTION OF A HERITAGE OF BELIEF IN MODERN SOCIETIES

Daniele Hervieu-Leger

From the Decline qf Religions to the Dissemination qf the Religious: the Context qf a Theoretical Revision Until the end of the 1960s, the sociology of religion was governed by one principal objective: i.e., that of illuminating and analyzing the structural connection between the rise of modernity and the cultural and social repression of religion. The readings of the founding fathers of the discipline, dominant up to that time, furnished the theoretical underpinnings for this programme: Marx, Durkheim and Weber have certainly developed radically different approaches to the structures and functions of society, but each has, in his own way, contributed to establishing that the process of rationalization which characterizes the advance of modernity is identical to the approaching 'twilight of the gods'. The conquest of autonomy-that of the subject as well as that of society-is, from this perspective, effectuated through an ineluctable disintegration of the entirely religion-based societies of the past. This theoretical position has the advantage (especially welcome in the context of a French lafcite marked by a positivist tradition) of radically simplifYing the relationship, always difficult to establish, of sociologists to their object: for if the scientific enterprise consists, essentially, in measuring the processes of religion's fatal social eviction, the decisive questions concerning the proper makeup of the religious object and the nature of the critical reduction envisioned by sociology, can be opportunely dismissed as being of secondary importance. Placing this fundamental epistemological debate in parenthesis could seem all the more justified in that the hypothesis concerning the structural incompatibility between modernity and religion, has found ample confirmation in empirical studies of the evolution of the 'great religions' in all developed countries. It has, of course, been observed that the declining rate of actual observance of religious practices, the lessening of the political and cultural influence

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of religious institutions, or the disintegration of belief, do not manifest themselves with equal intensity, or take the same form, in all national contexts. However, there is clearly sufficient justification for the point of view that religion no longer subsists in so-called 'secular societies' except as an option of personal choice. In this case, the question of the transformation of religion in modern societies has tended to be confused with that of the progressive disintegration of the different religious traditions within the societies and cultures which they themselves helped to shape, but in which they can no longer even hope to play any active role whatsoever. Since the beginning of the 1970s, changes in the historical evolution of religion have profoundly modified this situation by breaking the continuity (postulated up to that time) between the rationalist hypothesis of religion's inescapable decline in modern societies and empirical observation of the loosening the hold religious institutions had on society. The long-standing rise of New religious movements, the growth of religious (neo)fundamentalisms, the multifarious reaffirmations in the West and elsewhere of the importance of the religious factor in public life, have all provoked a vast re-examination of the fundamental hypothesis of the sociology of religion. And this at the price, perhaps, of a new form of obscurantism which eclipses the fundamental problem raised by the construction of the religious object as an object of sociological investigation. The statement: 'Religion exists, we have seen it manifest itself', is as empty a proposition as that which, 20 or 30 years ago, affirmed (in diverse ways, none of which, of course, as caricatural as the following) that 'Religion is an ideological cloud: the proof is its ceaseless dissipation in our modern rational world ... ' Both statements are empty because, in effect, the religious object is disintegrating, but it simultaneously resurfaces, is reborn, circulates and displaces itself. The intellectual stakes of the present historical situation can be formulated in the following manner: How, from inside the scientific domain constituted by and within the affirmation of the incompatibility of religion and modernity, can one equip oneself with the means of analyzing not only the importance religion conserves outside of the Western Christian world, but of analyzing as well as the transformations, the displacements, even the revivals it undergoes in this Western world itself? This question recalls the fundamental debates concerning religion's future which were already present in the works of sociology's founders. The Marxist vision of religion's decline linked the realization of this

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decline to the total accomplishment of the communist society, and thus, in a way, pushed back its arrival to the end of time. The Durkheimian vision of a 'religion of man' capable of furnishing morality with its indispensable transcendent foundation, in this way maintains the social necessity of faith over the triumph of science. Both of these perspectives, in two totally different and even antinomical ways, recognize-to a certain point-the impossibility of sociologizing the rationalist hypothesis of the end of religion: the first, indeed, and up to a certain extent, against its own presuppositions; the second explicitly in the logic behind the definition given of religion as the expression society itself. The Weberian problematic of the disenchanted world separates the analysis of religious spaces in transformation from all prophecy concerning the meaning of history, and accentuates the displacements and resurgence of the religiosity characteristic of secular societies governed by a 'polytheism of values'. This has, in theory, provided the possibility of freeing the empirical study of the decline of religion's hold from the positivist prognosis of the death of the gods in modern societies. This problematic, at the same time, requires that one directly treat the question of the religious productions if modemiry itselj. Religions of substitution, religions of replacement, analogical religions, diffuse religions, 'surrogate religions': these terms express the difficulty of delimiting the obscure constellations which make up these religious productions of modernity. These latter are, in effect, as exploded, mobile and dispersed as the modern imagination in which they inscribe themselves: a loose conglomerate of patchwork beliefs, an elusive hodgepodge of reminiscence and dreams which individuals organize in a private and subjective fashion as a response to the concrete situation with which they find themselves confronted. 1 In the domain of Christianism, this atomized state of signifying systems is directly tied to the rupture of a stable link between belief and practice, a rupture which Michel de Certeau places at the heart of his analysis of the explosion of modern Christianity. 2 Modern Christian belief is-he says-less and less anchored to specific groups and behavioral patterns; it determines fewer and fewer associations and specific practices. The dissemination of modern phenomena of believing lOne finds a very suggestive reading of this dispersion, characteristic of the modern imagination, in Balandier 1985. 2 De Certeau & Domenach 1974.

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on the one hand, and the evaporation of the socio-religious link which once constituted long-term support for the construction of a religious culture encompassing aspects of social life on the other hand, are the two inseparable sides of the secularization process the historical trajectory of which is intertwined with that of modernity itself Nevertheless, beyond the obviousness of this disintegration of the religious in modern societies, one is forced to admit that religion still speaks. . . But it doesn't speak in those areas where one might expect. One discovers its presence, diffuse, implicit or invisible, in economics, politics, esthetics, in the scientific, in the ethical and in the symbolic. Instead of focusing one's interest on the relationship between the diminishing domain of the religious (that of its institutions and that of the 'historical' religions) and other social domains (the political, the therapeutic, the esthetic, etc.), one is here led to an investigation of the diverse surreptitious manifestations of religion in all profane and reputedly non-religious zones of human activity. But how far does one push this investigation? Does one stop after identifying the discrete but properly religious influences (Christianism, Judaism, Islam, etc.) at work outside of their usual spheres? Or does one investigate the entirety of believing, ascetic, militant or ecstatic phenomena which manifest themselves in the areas of economics, politics, arts and sciences? Will it be necessary to concentrate one's efforts on those 'indisputably' religious phenomena, at the risk of being blinded by their very obviousness, given that it is society itself which thus pre-defines them? Or, rather, will it be necessary to widen one's perspective in order to bring to light modernity's (invisible) religious logic, at the risk of the dissolution of the religious object as such, at the risk as well of giving to the researcher an exorbitant privilege in the selection of the significant facts? For a sociology of religious modernity, this situation gives true meaning to the operation of 'revising' the concept of secularization, an operation which at present preoccupies the work of researchers. 3 This operation no doubt consists in fine tuning the analysis of those processes whereby religious space shrinks or grows in society. But it implies first of all that one asks why the sociology of secularization, oscillating as it does between the problematic of the 'loss' of the religious and that of religion's 'dispersion', thus produces these circumstantially variable versions of religion. Without returning to all 3

See, for example, the critical assessment of this work in Seguy 1982.

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overused problematizations of both the 'loss' and 'return' of the religious, how can one at once grasp the movement whereby modernity continuously undermines the structural plausibility of all religious systems while simultaneously motivating new forms of religious believing? In order to advance in this direction, one cannot possibly limit oneself exclusively to the rationalist perspective which entirely links the contemporary religious 'revivals' to the de-modernizing pressures created by global crisis and the collapse of modernist ideologies of progress (these latter in their diverse liberal or Marxist variants). The religious paradox of modernity stems not from the failure of this modernity, but from the structural contradictions which modernity's expansion ceaselessly provokes. 4 It is therefore necessary to break with the paradigmatic incompatibility between religion and modernity, and to abandon, at the same time, the corollary idea of the strict opposition between traditional and modern societies. Above all, it is imperative that one return to the inescapable question of religion's definition.

Indefinite Religion: New Clothes for an Old Debate It is necessary to begin by defining what is meant by religion; for without this, we would run the risk of giving the name to a system of ideas and practices which has nothing at all religious about it, or else of leaving to one side many religious facts, without perceiving their true nature.

This recommendation, with which Durkheim opens his Elementary Forms qf the Religious Lift, 5 may seem all too evident for those who believe that the first and inescapable step in sociological research is to define the object of one's study. And yet, for the longest time sociologists of religion were inclined to consider, on the contrary, that methodological prudence required one to avoid all definition of religion as such and to leave the 'theorizing' to the philosophers. This reticence, justifiable given the impossibility of assigning precise limits to an object coextensive with the human phenomenon,6 was for them also a means of defence against the phenomenological temptation of grasping an impossible 'essence' of religion. The following

4

5 6

Cf. on this theme Willaime 1993. Durkheim 1915. Pou1at 1986: 400.

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consensus was reached: the domain of research of the sociologist of religion covered all objects which the society itself designated as 'religious'. It was admissible, should the need arise, to extend one's investigation to include the most apparent 'analogously religious' phenomena: civil and military rituals, revolutionary cults, etc. But in this case the relationship between 'religion' (in the strict sense of the variants of historical religions) and these so-called 'analogous' forms, remained carefully untreated. It is the case, however, that in order to simultaneously understand both the modern proliferation of belief and the de-regulation of the domain of institutionalized religion, it is no longer possible to maintain this prudent position. If one wants to study how religious beliefs are dispersed and distributed beyond the spaces of believing controlled by the great religious systems, one must be able to identify what, in the modern production of belief, stems from religion and what does not. It is necessary, in other words, to be equipped with a 'definition' of religion, one that allows for the ultimate essence of religion not to be grasped, but which simply allows for the classification of observable phenomena. To this end, two positions have clarified themselves in the last few years: - The first, illustrated in the thoughts of T. Luckmann on 'the invisible religion' of modern societies,? has recourse to an extremely extended definition of religion, one which encompasses the entirety of the imaginary constructs whereby society, groups within this society, and individuals within these groups, try to give meaning to their everyday experience and to represent to themselves their origin and their future. - The other position, resolutely restrictive, reserves, on the contrary, the designation of religion to those 'productions of meaning' which explicitly call into service the capital of references and symbols which belong to the traditions of the 'historical religions'. What is at stake in the act of choosing between these two perspectives is not an issue of abstract selection: this choice directly concerns the practice of research. This made itself particularly clear in the recent American (then European) sociological debate surrounding the rise of what we have come to refer to as the 'New religious movements'. It is well known that this term covers a great variety of phenomena: cults and sects which have recently come to com7

Luckmann 1967.

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pete with the historical religions (with the 'great churches' or longstanding minority groups), syncretic groups with an oriental influence, revival movements within the organized religions, all of them taking part in the construction of a 'mystico-esoteric nebulosity' characterized most notably by its ability to assimilate and re-employ all forms of available knowledge (from the 'official' state science to the most marginalized traditional and ancient savoirjaires) . . . and this to the end of the self-development of the individual adherent, both in the long and short term. 8 These highly diverse groups and networks may 'graft themselves onto the great oriental religions, take the form of a more or less antiquated esoteric syncretism, or of a new psychoreligious syncretism, or they may even gather individuals around the practice of this or that divinatory art (astrology, tarot, or the IChing)'. These groups maintain ties with revues, publishers, and booksellers; they hold expositions, offer training courses, and arrange conferences. Their followers go from one to the other, taking advantage of this 'self-service acculturation, particularly rich in all kinds of offers allowing for a highly personalized composition a la carte'.9 It is around these kinds of phenomena that the question of the boundary of the religious has been most directly raised; where the debate which provokes the growing dissociation between an 'intensive' sociology of religious groups and an 'extensive' sociology of phenomena of belief is most concentrated. For if these movements offer their followers a kind of 'interior fulfillment', one that can be interpreted as an individualized and secular (and therefore modern) road to salvation, is it necessary to see therein the figure of a new modern religion? Or, due to a lack of reference to any transcendence whatsoever, and because these movements are customarily lacking in a larger social project, must one deny them all the qualification of 'religiousness'? More recently still, this discussion of the 'limits of the religious' has been stimulated by research grouped around the so-called 'secular' or 'metaphorical' religions. This research is enriched by observations concerning the very general development of an 'invisible' or 'diffuse' religiousness which arises without the mediation of the specialized institutions. But it has no less gotten bogged down in the infinite re-hashing of the classical debate which opposes a 'substantive' (and restrictive) definition of religion (implying, as it 8 9

Champion 1989, 1990. Champion 1990: 52; Schlegel 1995.

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always does, belief in a supernatural power), and a 'functional' definition of religion (one which sees 'religion' as the entirety of 'ultimate' or 'fundamental' meanings which individuals or groups are inclined to produce in order to make sense of their lives). That is: on the one hand, religion is defined according to the content of its beliefs (belief in God, for example) and the type of ritualized activities linked with these beliefs-in which case it becomes impossible to say anything about the potentially religious nature of phenomena in which some see the modern forms of 'sacredness' (from packed football stadiums to outdoor rock concerts which unite these Durkheimian 'crowds in fusion', including as well all forms of 'secular religiousness'); on the other hand, one stretches the definition of religion to include everything in our societies which touches upon questions of sense and the search for an ultimate meaning of the world in which we live-in which case religious phenomena are diluted to the point of becoming indefinite nebulosities of 'systems of signification'. Nonetheless, beyond this explicit theoretical conflict, it is not certain that the substantivist and functionalist positions are as antinomical as they formally claim to be. For Luckmann, in whom we admittedly have the most extensive conception of religion, it appears in part that the pulverization of individually constructed meanings which characterizes modern consciousness tends to exclude the integration of these meanings into an organized system of beliefs, a system which would provide collective action with a coherent direction, a power of mobilization and a stock of imaginary resources. Without these elements which would testify to the exteriorization and projection of individually constructed meaning onto the universe as such, and in the absence of all possible aggregation and systematization of these individual collages of sense, it is difficult to see what remains of the process of 'cosmization' which would transform these phenomena of belief into a 'sacred modern cosmos'. 10 Thomas Luckmann himself considers it highly unlikely that the social objectivization of such themes as self-realization or personal fulfillment-themes which 10 The notions of 'sacred cosmos' and 'cosmization' are taken from Berger 1967, 1971. Religion is the 'human enterprise which creates a sacred cosmos' (Berger 1971: 56). The cosmization upon which religion rests permits mankind to project itself as far as possible outside of itself. It accomplishes this by imaginatively creating a universe of 'objective' meanings, and thus most effectively and completely imposes its own significations upon reality.

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have their origin in the private sphere-give rise to either the articulation of a sacred, well-founded and closed cosmos, or to the specialization of new religious institutions. He nonetheless notes that within this vague cloud of individual expectations and aspirations, representations that he designates as 'specifically religious' may perhaps survive. These 'specifically religious' representations are those which arise from historical and religious traditions and make reference to the 'great religions'. Their survival depends, according to Luckmann, on their ability to 'function', that is, to assure the subjective satisfaction of the individual. But the simple act of designating as 'specifically religious' those traditional representations which subsist within this sacred modernity, shows what little consistency Luckmann himself accords to the invisible 'religion', as well as the implicit weight of substantive criteria which determine that only the historical religions be considered as religion in the full sense of the word. A similar ambiguity is visible in the work of R. Bellah and other authors in their studies of the communally shared values of a given society, values which constitute the armature of so-called 'civil religion'.ll J. Coleman defines this latter as the 'set of beliefs, rites and symbols which links the role of man as citizen and his place in society, both temporally and historically, to the ultimate meanings of existence' .12 Is it a question here of religion 'in the full sense of the word', or is he merely speaking by analogy? For Bellah, this set of 'beliefs, rites and symbols' is 'religion' if one admits-as he himself does-that 'one of the functions of religion is to furnish a significant set of ultimate values which may serve as the basis for the morality of a society'.13 But he remains uncertain as to the possibility that these values, as such, could constitute the 'substantive core' of a religion in the same way that Christian, Judaic or Islamic values constitute the 'substantive core' of these historical religions. The substantive definition of religion exercises, paradoxically, its permanent attraction in the works of those same authors who would free themselves of the limitations it imposes upon both empirical research and theoretical elaboration.

II Bellah 1967, 1970, 1975,1980; for a comprehensive presentation of the debate around civil religion in the United States see Gehrig 1979. 12 Coleman 1970. 13 Bellah 1957.

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The distance, finally, between this vision of a 'sacred modern cosmos' (this haze of atomized significations), and the restrictive perspective incarnated by the work of B. Wilson is, therefore, less than one might suppose. This latter refuses to consider as 'religious', groups and personnel, associations and professionals whose sole function is to promote, on a case-by-case basis, the harmonization and elaboration of collages of meaning to the sole benefit of the individual. Although Luckmann would probably not refuse designating these same groups and persons as 'religious', he suggests that 'religion', thus broadened in its definition, has no effect beyond the subjective satisfaction of the individuals concerned. Yet it is equally conceivable that he could refuse, in the manner of Wilson, to designate as 'religious' the behaviour which consists the 'ritualistic' washing of one's car every Sunday morning! In both cases, the question raised is that of identifying universes of religious meaning within the modern kaleidoscope of available universes of signification. 14 One can again schematize the terms of this debate according to the archetypal positions of Luckmann and Wilson: - For Luckmann, the difficult point is the evanescent continuity between the modern universe of significations and the religion which is introduced therein through ultimate reference to a 'sacred cosmos'. - For Wilson, the problematic element is the discontinuity raised by reference to the supernatural and utopic. If one, in effect, admits that religious constructs are a part of the universe of meaning which society creates, one cannot fix a definition for these constructs, once and for all and in a substantive fashion, without reifying the historical (pre-modern) situation which led to the Western mode of religious believing based on an appeal to the supernatural and on a utopic 'Kingdom of Heaven'. The same objection can be made concerning the definition proposed by Y. Lambert which seeks to avoid the dissolution of the concept of 'religion' in the multitude of responses to so-called 'ultimate questions'. His definition, which is meant to be strictly functional, is based upon three discriminating features the presence of which is expressly prerequisite-according to him-in order to speak

14 An especially detailed presentation of what is theoretically at stake in this problem and the debate that it has solicited can be found in O'Toole 1984.

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of religion. The first is the 'postulated existence of beings, forces or entities which exceed the objective limits of the human condition, but which remain in contact with humanity'; the second is the existence of 'symbolic means of communication with them: prayer, rites, services, sacrifice'; the third is the existence of 'communalizing bodies such as a church, or other body'. The construction of a formal model of religion is here limited to the isolation of those traits which serve as the lowest common denominator of the historical religions. Within the scope of Y. Lambert's interest in the comparative sociology of historical religions, this definition is perfecdy adequate. But it considerably reduces the possibility of exploring, from the point of view of a sociology of religious modernity, the phenomena of recomposition, displacement and innovation which arise, in part, from the less plausible position which institutionalized religions now occupy in the modern world. 15 If the functional definitions of religion turn out to be incapable of mastering the unlimited expansion of the phenomena they try to account for, and thus become empty of all heuristic pertinence, the substantive definitions of religion, constructed around the gravitational attraction of the historical religions, condemn sociological thought to being the paradoxical guardian of the 'authentic religion' which these historical religions intend to incarnate. The former can do litde more than attest to the intellectually recalcitrant dispersion of religious symbols in contemporary societies. The latter are caught up in the indefinite reiteration of analyses revolving around the loss of religion in the modern world. Both are partial but radically limited responses to the question of religion's position within modernity. Religion is (tendentiously) nowhere or everywhere, both of which, in the final analysis, mean nothing.

Getting Out In order to oneself that of religious delimitation oneself with

15

if the

Circle: Religion as a Modality ('Mode')

if Beliif

escape this circularity, it is first necessary to persuade the major problem sociologists confront in the analysis modernity is not that of finding better criteria for the of the social space of religion. It is, rather, to equip the conceptual instruments which, given the impossibility

Lambert 1991.

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of satisfactorily localizing the contours of the religious 'domain', take into account this very delocalization itself.16 This perspective implies that one resists ontological definitions of religion by turning the act of definition itself towards the properly sociological perspective which necessitates it. What is of interest to sociology? It is not a question of knowing, once and for all, what religion itself is as such. It is a question of understanding the logic behind the transformations of the religious universe, concretely approached through its socio-historical manifestations. From this perspective, religion's 'definition' is required only as a tool, a practical instrument designed to aid the researcher in his attempt to think socio-religious change, as well to think the modern mutation of the religious. It is, therefore, necessary to give attention to the process of change itself: religion's 'definition' (if one can still, and without ambiguity, use this term) is a dynamic concept, an ideal-type which does not aim 'to fix' its object, but to designate the axes of transformation around which the object reconstructs itself. In order to grasp this process as a global dynamic of the recasting of the religious, one which encompasses, transforms and reorganizes the historical religions themselves, it is important that all analysis be focused not upon the changing contents of belief, but upon the mutating structures if believing which these changes in content partially reveal. Before going further, it is indispensable to define what one means here by 'to believe'. This term designates the totality of both individual and collective convictions which do not arise from verification, experimentation or, more generally, from isolation and control criteria which characterize scientific knowledge; convictions which have their basis in the fact that they give meaning and coherence to the subjective experience of those who hold them. If one here speaks of the act of 'believing' rather than 'belief', it is because the totality of these aforementioned convictions, in addition to the ideal objects of conviction (the beliefs themselves), incorporates the practices, languages, gestures and spontaneous automatisms in which these beliefs are themselves inscribed. 'To believe' is belief in motion, belief as it is lived. It is, according to the definition proposed by M. de Certeau, that which the individual or collective speaker does with the statement he claims to believe. 17 The notion of believing, thus widened, 16

17

Seguy 1989: 198.

De Certeau 1983.

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is able to include those 'practical beliefs' characteristic of populations which live within a monistic universe. For here, the notion of 'belief' alone-given the distance it implies between believer and object of belief-seems to make little sense. I8 The act of believing thus understood allows for the presentation of different structural levels of believing: it includes the variety of 'bodily states', treated by P. Bourdieu, which are inculcated during initial apprenticeship and of which the initiates themselves are so unconscious that they have the feeling of 'having been born with them'.19 Everything that seems to arise out of one's 'experience with the world as happening all by itself belongs to the domain of believing. At the other end of the spectrum, one finds all formalized and rationalized beliefs for which individuals are capable of accounting and which have practical influence upon their lives. In all cases, the actual act of believing, whether it arises from spontaneous evidence or theoretical conviction, escapes experimental demonstration and verification. At the very most one can affirm its existence from the point of view of those who believe, from the presence of a network of indices and signs. But from one moment to the next, to believe implies that both individuals and groups submit themselves (consciously or unconsciously) to an exteriorly imposed order, or to a kind of gamble or choice, more or less elaborated, more or less well-argued. To put the act of believing at the centre of one's thinking, is to preliminarily admit that believing does in fact constitute a major dimension of modernity. This idea is far from evident. It has often been remarked that scientific and technological rationality have reduced the space of believing in modern societies by displacing the demands for meaning (without which no human society is possible) away from the primordial question of why towards the practical question of how. But if advances in science and technology have in large part eroded the world's mysteries, it is still the case that they have not reduced the human need for securiry which is at the heart of the quest for intelligibility, a need which in effect constantly re-motivates 18 Pouillon 1979. Speaking, for example, of'margai, these genies whose place is so important in the individual life of Hadjerat', Pouillon insists that these latter 'believe in their existence as they do in their own, in that of animals, things, atmospheric phenomena [...]. Or, rather, they do not believe in them at all: this existence is a simple fact of experience: one needs no more belief in the margai than in the fall of a stone which one throws'. (Pouillon 1979: 49-50). 19 Bourdieu 1980: 113 sq.

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this question of why. All lived uncertainty, for both individuals and collectives, raises the spectre par excellence of, for the individual, death, for the society, anomy. P. Berger, following Durkheim, has reminded us that the sacred is nothing else but the eclifice of significations which mankind objectivizes as a power radically other than itself and which it projects upon reality in order to escape the anguish of being swallowed up by chaos. 20 Modernity breaks with the sacred to the extent to which mankind itself, with its own capacities, carries out the work of rationalizing the world in which it lives and of mastering, through thought and action, tendencies towards chaos. But the destabilization alone of 'sacred cosmizations' (P. Berger) occasioned by the process of rationalization does not efface the fundamental need to lessen the structural incertitude of the human condition. But neither does this need subsist as the residue of a now obsolete sacred universe. It arises out of modernity itself, redistributing itself throughout the multiplication of demands of sense. These demands are all the more exigent in that it is no longer a question, for the agents of society, of thinking their place in a stable world seen as the reflection of the natural order itself, be this latter understood as a creation, but of situating themselves in an open social space in which change and innovation are held up as the norm. At the very moment when modernity de constructs systems of signification (systems which, for the individual and the society, formerly expressed the ideal ordering of their world), even during the very movement itself whereby modernity demonstrates the possibility of controlling and manipulating this world, it develops, to an enormous and proportional degree, the social and psychological factors of incertitude. Modernity itself, therefore, motivates a rebound of the question of sense and the diverse expressions of protestation against the non-sense which is its counterpart. 21 The identification of the modern act of believing, is carried out through the analysis of these modes of resolving (or, at least, of hiding) incertitude; modes which are refracted in diverse forms of belief. In the mobile, 'fluid' universe of the modern act of believing, liberated as it is from the hold of global institutions of believing, all symbols are interchangeable, combinable and transposable one into the other. All syncretisms are possible, all recycling Berger 1971. One of these expressions is myth, which Claude Levi-Strauss expressly defines (in La Pensee sauvage) as: 'a vigorous protestations against non-sense'. 20 21

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imaginable. It is from this observation that one can clarifY the sociological definition of religion. The search for this definition, as we have already said, has no meaning outside of a specific point qf view: that which analyses the dynamic of modernity seen not as a thing, but as a process, as motion. One must add that this search is justifiable only insofar as it takes into account this specific mobility of the modern act of believing, an act in which the content of belief can no longer be, a priori, understood as religious, political or otherwise. This double petition imposes a radical 'desubstantialization' of the definition of religion. It further imposes that one admit, once and for all, that religious believing does not refer to the objects of a particular set of beliefs, to specific social practices, or even to representation of the origins of the world. Religious believing can be usefully defined-in an ideal-typical manner-as a particular modality qf the organization and fUnction qf the act qf believing. The identification of this modality of belief consists-classicallyof accentuating one or several of the traits which distinguish this modality from others. The voluntarist nature of this way of constructing a conceptual tool for the analysis of religious believing must not be dissimulated. But the only truly fundamental issue here is to know if this tool is useful. That is, if it permits one (among other possible usages) to grasp that which justifies, beyond the commonplace and obvious analogies between 'historical' and 'secular' religions, the simultaneous sociological treatment of their situation and evolution within modernity. The stated objective is not only to determine if the beliefs and practices of some ecological or political group, the emotional investment among the spectators of a football game, or the collective fervour of adolescents at a rock concert can be said to be 'religious'. One seeks to know as well if this or that modern expression of Christianity, Judaism or some other tradition that society qualifies as 'a religion', can be characterized according to our 'definition' as effectively being 'religious'. Such a perspective rests therefore upon the well-reasoned decision to place oneself-beyond the usual hallmarks of religion, i.e., the contents or functions proper to belief-within a perspective which permits one to simultaneously grasp these divers manifestations of belief in order to compare and classifY them. The perspective retained here is one that examines the type qf legitimization which supports the act of believing. At this stage of our research, the hypothesis which we are advancing is as follows: There is no religion without the explicit, semi-explicit, or

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entirely implicit invocation of the authority if a tradition; an invocation which serves as support for the act of believing. Within this perspective, one designates as 'religious', all forms of believing which justifY themselves, first and foremost, upon the claim of their inscription within a heritage if beliif. This proposition must not be taken as the enunciation of a definitive truth suggesting that religion is, exclusively and totally, this heritage. It is a working hypothesis, a perspective which allows for the creation of one sociological approach (among others) to the question of religion. This approach is chosen as a function of an intellectual objective: that of accounting for the mutations of religion within modernity. In order to grasp the effective range of this 'definition', it is necessary to thoroughly understand that this self-legitimization of the act of believing through reference to the authority of a tradition is much more than the simple assertion of a continuity of belief from one generation to the next. The 'religious believer' (individual or group) is not content to believe for the simple reason that 'it has always been that way': he considers himself, in the words of the Swiss theologian P. Gisel, as being 'engendered'.22 It is not the continuity itself which is of value here, but the fact that this continuity acts as the visible expression of a filiation which the individual or collective believer expressly claims and which integrates him into a spiritual community assembling past, present and future believers. The heritage of belief fulfills the role of legitimizing imaginary reference. It functions simultaneously as a principle of social identification, ad intra (through integration into a believing community), and ad extra (by differentiation from those who are not of the same heritage). From this angle, 'religion' can be seen as an ideological, practical and symbolic framework which constitutes, maintains, develops and controls the consciousness (individual or collective) of membership to a particular heritage of belief. From the same angle, religious institutions can be ideal-typically defined as 'traditional institutions', governed by the 'imperative of continuity'. This obviously does not mean that religious institutions are immobile and escape change. But this does mean that change imposes itself only to the extent that it is integrated into the collective representation, perpetually renewed, of a continuity which itself always remains intact. Thus it is that the enterprise of religious reform often presents itself as the return to an 22

'Croire, c'est se savoir engendre'; cf. Gisel 1990.

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authentic tradition which opposes the distortions of tradition apparent in present usage. Or, reform takes on the aspect of a deepened understanding of the tradition itself, an understanding which justifies its own innovation or renovation. The prophet himself, who direcdy contests the dominant religious order, regularly justifies his mission by declaiming the necessity of accomplishing what the religious institution has either neglected or forgotten. And the personal revelation of which he is the vessel gives rise to a 'religion' only to the extent that it is rendered immutable by becoming the starting point for a new heritage of belief. The imperative of continuity, which imposes itself in the religious domain as such, expresses the founding of the social and religious bond.

Transmission: a Central Qyestion for a Sociology

if Religious

Modemiry

One of the principal implications of this 'definition' is that it puts a particular emphasis on the specific type of mobilization collective memory undergoes, a mobilization which is characteristic of all religions thus understood. In traditional societies where the symbolicoreligious universe is structured entirely around an original myth, thus taking into account both the origins of the world and the origins of the group, collective memory is generally a given. It is, in fact, entirely manifest in the structures, organization, language and daily practices of societies governed by tradition. In the case of differentiated societies in which the prevalence of founded religions gives rise to self-designated communities of faith, collective religious memory becomes the object of constant re-evaluation in such a fashion that the historical event of the religion's founding can, at all moments, be grasped as a totality of meaning. To the degree that all present signification is presumably contained, at least potentially, in the founding event, the past is symbolically constituted as an unchangeable whole, situated 'out of time', i.e., out of history. In constant contact with this past, the religious group defines itself objectively and subjectively as a chain if memory, the continuity of which transcends history. The existence of this chain is attested to and made manifest by the specifically religious act which consists in the remembrance (anamnesia) of this past which gives meaning to the present and contains the future. As a result, religious transmission does more than just assure the passage of a given content of beliefs from one generation

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to another (through the socialization of newcomers within a community whose norms they accept and who share the community's orientations and values). Insofar as transmission is bound up within the processes of elaboration of this chain of memory whereby a group of believers becomes a religious group, transmission is the very movement itself whereby the religion constitutes itself in time as a religion: it is the continuing foundation of the religious institution itself. This proposition contains the possibility of a renewed approach to the religious dilemma of modern societies, and, more generally to the problem of 'secularization'. One can sum up this approach in the following manner: what becomes of the religious problematic of the continuity of belief in modern societies (and how does one assure the socialization of a universe which remains structured by this imperative of continuity) when these societies have as their distinctive trait, as emphasized by M. Gauchet, that of being governed by an 'imperative to change,?23 In these societies where the differentiation of institutions has reached its term, the different spheres of social activity exist with their own distinct and relatively autonomous logic. Individuals intervene in these milieux in which they come to terms with the complex 'rules of the house', as demonstrated in the work of F. Dubet, according to their own personal dispositions, memberships, interests, aspirations and experiences. 24 It is from the combined diversity of these interests and lived experiences that individuals construct-in a world of perpetual change and where memory, for the most part, has lost its organizing power-the meaning they give to their own existence. In the area of religion, as in all other areas of their personal experience, individuals are confronted by the lack of an organizational centrality capable of offering them a preestablished code of meaning. This being the case, individuals are incited to produce (if they produce it at all) the relationship to the heritage of belief in which they recognize themselves. One can finally ask: how, then, given the pluralization of processes which enter into the construction of religious identities (a construction in which the subjective work individuals carry out in order to make sense of their experience is the principal motor), how can collective representation of the continuity of a heritage (and its realization in society) still be 23

24

Gauchet 1985. Dubet 1994.

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assured? This question, stemming from the 'definition' of religion proposed above, sketches the 'bottom line' for a sociology of religious modernity. (Translated from the French by John A. Farhat)

Rqerences Balandier, G., 1985, Le Detour: Pouvoir et modernite. Paris: Fayard. Bellah, R.N., 1957, Tokugawa Religion. Glencoe: The Free Press. - - - , 1967, 'Civil Religion in America', in Daedelus 96 (reprinted in Bellah 1970). - - - , 1970, Beyond Beliif Essays on Religion in a Post-Traditional World. New York: Harper and Row. - - - , 1975, The Broken Covenant: American Civil Religion in a Time qf Trial. New York: Seabury Press. Bellah, R.N., & Ph.E. Hammond 1980, Varieties qf Civil Religion. New York: Harper & Row. Berger, P., 1967, The Sacred Canopy: Elements qf a Sociological Theory qf Religion. New York: Doubleday. - - - , 1971, La Religion dans la conscience moderne. Paris: Centurion. Bourdieu, P., 1980, Le Sens pratique. Paris: Minuit. Certeau, M. de, 1983, 'L'institution du croire. Note de travail', in Le Magistere: Institutions et flnctionnements (No. special de Recherches de Sciences Religieuse). Paris: no publisher. Certeau, M. de, & ].-M. Domenach 1974, Le Christianisme ielate. Paris: Seuil. Champion, F., 1989, 'Les sociologues de la post-modernite et la nebuleuse mystiqueesoterique', in Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 67,1: 155-169. - - - , 1990, 'La nebuleuse mystique-esoterique: Orientations psycho-religieuses des courants mystiques et esoteriques contemporains', in Champion & HervieuLeger 1990. Champion, F., & D. Hervieu-Uger (eds.) 1990, De remotion en religion. Paris: Centurion. Cipriani, R., & M. Macioti (eds.) 1989, Omaggio a Ferrarotti. Siares: Studi e recerche. Coleman,]., 1970, 'Civil Religion', in Sociological AnalYsis 31, 2. Dubet, F., 1994, Sociologie de l'experience. Paris: Seuil. Durkheim, E., 1915, The Elementary Forms qfthe Religious Life. London: Allen & Unwin. Gauchet, M., 1985, Le Desenchantement du monde: Une histoire politique de la religion. Paris: Gallimard. Gehrig, G., 1979, American Civil Religion: an Assessment. Storrs (CT): Society for the Scientific Study of Religion. Gisel, P., 1990, L'Exces du croire: Experience du monde et acces a soi. Paris: Desclee de Brouwer. Guillaume, M., (ed.) 1986, DEtat des sciences sociales en France. Paris: La Decouverte. Izard, M., & P. Smith (ed.) 1979, La Fonction symbolique. Paris: Gallimard. Lambert, Y., 1991, 'La "tour de Babel" des definitions de la religion', in Social Compass 38,1: 73-85. Luckmann, T., 1967, The Invisible Religion: The Problem qf Religion in Modern Sociery. New York: MacMillan. O'Toole, R., 1984, Religion: Classic Sociological Approaches. Toronto: McGraw-Hill Ryerson. Pouillon,]., 1979, 'Remarques sur Ie verbe croire', in Izard & Smith 1979: 43-51. Poulat, E., 1986, 'Epistemologie', in Guillaume 1986: 400.

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Schlegel, j.L., 1995, Religions a la carte. Paris: Hachette. Seguy, j., 1989, 'L'approche weberienne des phenomenes religieux', in Cipriani & Macioti 1989: 198. - - - , 1982, 'Religion, Modemite, Secularisation', in Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions 61, 2: 175-185. Willaime, j.-P., 1993, 'Croirc et Modemite', in Archives de Sciences Sociales des Religions no. 81: 7-16.

PARADOXES AN ESSAY ON THE OBJECT OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

Jacob A. Belzen

Rifiections on the Problem As is usually the case with problems of considerable interest, answering the question--in this case, what religion 'is'-is not easy. Until now, generations of scholars have failed to achieve a consensus on how to define it-although they obviously presuppose some reality to be common to the object of their sometimes conflicting discussions. Some armchair scholars have even spent their entire academic lives solely analysing the question of definitions as such. Outside their 'ivory towers', however, life goes on, and by the time these academics are ready to venture into public life to present their solutions, it turns out that the configurations have already changed significantly. Gasping for breath, Minerva's owl then sets out again on another flight .... This metaphor, however, is not as apposite as it may seem. After all, science does not direct history, but merely investigates that which has already taken place and so it must inevitably lag behind developments. Yet, in (large parts of) Western societies, science has become so important a social phenomenon that it is able to co-determine specific developments, or at least deeply influence them. This is also true in the case of religion. One may even hear some people assertin statements that seem somewhat too sweeping-that science has taken over the place of religion in society; that nowadays it is scientists rather than clergymen who deliver the worldview, legitimate the social order, safeguard the moral order, and perform many other functions which in former times were proper to the churches and religions. Can it be that science has perhaps also been turned into some sort of religion by these developments? As we are dealing with psychology in this chapter, however, let us try-with Fortmann 1to bring these questions 'closer to men': is not the scholarly preocI Han Fortmann (1912-1970) was the first to hold a chair for the psychology of religion in the Netherlands. The title of his inaugural address was Aan de mens nabij: over de situatie der godsdienstpsychologie en haar reden van bestaan ('Close to men: on the

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cupation with ultimate questions itself a kind of religiosity? Does not a fascination for the object of devotion play a role in the analysis of devotion? However relevant all these questions may be, they do not bring us closer to defining religion, indeed they only make us realise just how complex an undertaking this is. Taking the problem of the definition of religion seriously may function as a lever, as indeed any basic problem may, and it might even cause us to cast doubt on the whole business of science. There is, after all, something rather disturbing about academics having studied religion for centuries, but still leaving us with the question: What are we actually talking about? What is the object of our research? A paradoxical situation, to say the least. Does this constantly recurring problem mean that precisely those in our society, who have had the benefit of the highest and longest education, actually have no clue what their trade is about? Does it show that those receiving relatively high salaries to teach something worthwhile to would-be leading figures in the next generation, do not, despite all their years of study and research, themselves possess answers to such basic questions as how to define religion? Do we have to fear that 'scholars' do not know what they are talking about? The situation is, of course, not that dramatic. Scholars certainly possess knowledge, even though they are usually better at explaining how something should not be viewed, or at showing what it is not, than in constructing positive knowledge. Combating naivety and ignorance is undoubtedly a major task of scholarship, but even this playful probing into what religion might, or might not, be, gets us caught already in discussions on the nature of science. I shall not, however, dwell on this, except to remark that in the context of the late 20th century, the question of defining religion may itself provoke questions. For it is remiscent of the debate-usually considered outmoded-between essentialists and nominalists. Essentialism, as is well known, takes the position that a definition, as a general term, refers to a collection of traits common to every 'thing' to which the definition applies; together they are said to constitute the 'essence', present state of psychology of religion and its raison d'etre'). Fortmann was one of the most important opinion leaders in matters of morals, religion and mental health. In Westhof's recent (1996) history of a Roman Catholic organisation for mental health care, Fortmann is depicted as one of the 'spiritual liberators' who used psychology to rid Roman Catholic morals of their (what they considered to be) oppressive and unhealthy nature.

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or 'nature', of that 'thing'. Nominalism, on the other hand, rejects this progeny of Plato's doctrine of ideas; it considers a definition to be merely a word, a name. All '(constellations of) matters' to which the same term is applied have in common only that they are referred to by the same term. In the first half of the 20th century, the nominalist position, in particular, gained support from cultural scholars, mainly perhaps because they feared reification, and rightly so. The real way-out of the impasse was only found by Wittgenstein when, as he said himself, he started to clean out the intellectual Augean stables created by the beguilement of language, by the expressions in current use. He criticized the Western 'desire for generalization', the search for the 'essence' of a thing, especially among scholars, and he regarded it as the cause of numerous hopeless philosophical confusions. The alternative he proposed, i.e., his theory of family resemblances, can be, and has been, applied to 'religion'. Religion, then, appears to be yet another 'complicated network of overlapping and crisscrossing similarities, at times totally similar, at other times similar in details'.2 Wittgenstein regarded the preoccupation with the scientific method as one of the main sources of the desire for generalization. 3 The demand for a pre-given, ready-made definition of the religion that may direct fieldwork, reeks, therefore,-to use a few more scholarly terms of abuse-of scienticism, empiricism and neo-positivism. Is this demand not a manifestation of what Kant has termed the Wut des Verstehens, the 'frenzy for comprehension', which tries to force everything into the grip of the human intellect in order to control, make and manipulate it? And what about the categories which the West develops and imposes, at times by violence, on other cultures? As virtually each and every notion of religion, however differently conceived, has been developed in, and on the basis of, Western Christianity, is comparing it with, and testing it on, non-Western religions not a form of intellectual colonialism, even when it is done with some degree of reserve? But let us turn from the more playful as well as these more serious methodological queries, to the psychology of religion itself. Why should this discipline be involved at all in a project that aims at a Wittgenstein 1958: §§ 66-67. Scientific 'explanation' is to be understood here as the reduction of phenomena to the smallest possible number of causally related parts. 2

3

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definition of religion? Is the psychology of religion perhaps not affected by the critical considerations just phrased? On first inspection, one might indeed think so. William James, a philosopher and psychologist whom Wittgenstein greatly admired, is certainly regarded as a forerunner of those favouring a method not based on causality, but one which instead attempts to do justice to the observable relationships in each specific case. 4 In his Varieties if Religious Experience, the most widely read book in the psychology of religion, James refused to start from a 'precise definition of what [religion's] essence consists of'. The fact that there were already so many and such diverse definitions of religion, proved to him that the word 'religion' cannot stand for a single principle or essence, but is rather a collective name. The theorizing mind tends always to over-simplification of its materials. This is the root of all that absolutism and one-sided dogmatism by which both philosophy and religion have been infested. 5 Another patriarch of the discipline, Wilhelm Stahlin, founder of the Archiv fiir Religionspsychologie, also made no attempt to define religion. He recommended only 'that each researcher investigate that which he designates as religion'.6 And even today, in the introduction to a volume reporting very recent, modern and technical research, the editors still complain that 'a formal definition [of religion] can hardly be given at this place'. 7 Several similar verdicts could be quoted, but are unnecessary for reaching the conclusion that no specific definition of religion has ever been developed within the psychology of religion and that no single definition has ever found general acceptance within it. Although sociology of religion's protracted debates on substantive versus functional definitions of religion, have met with some response in the psychology of religion, most of its scholars seem to realise that 'any definition of religion is likely to be satisfactory only to its author'.8 In view of the diversity of phenomena that may be regarded as religious, it remains highly unlikely that they will ever

Cf. e.g., Blok 1975. James 1902: 26. 6 Stahlin 1914: 2: 'dasz jeder Forscher das untersucht, was er als Religion bezeichnet' . 7 Moosburger et alii 1996: 5: 'eine [onnale Begriffsbestimmung kann an dieser Stelle kaum gegeben werden'. 8 Yinger 1967: 18. 4

5

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be comprehended under one conclusively and universally valid definition of religions. 9 Perhaps, then, the psychology of religion is merely making a virtue out of a need by pragmatically allowing any theory to state in its own terms what it researches and how it does so? Deeply marked by pluriformity, psychology is perhaps sensible enough to realise, that no single theory or definition will ever suffice to conceptualise religion? Perhaps. One may seriously doubt, however, whether psychology is really guided by such irenical considerations, just as one might seriously question whether, in spite of all tolerance, this kind of pragmatism is really desirable. Whatever all of this may be, one cannot conclude from these considerations that psychology of religion could claim any special competence for defining religion. Do all these preluding considerations, then, put the entire project of this volume into jeopardy? Not necessarily. Scholarship is perhaps more about de-schooling than about schooling, for progress-as Critical Rationalism has claimed-might be manifested in rejecting past answers or in refining them. Much would be gained if only we learned to formulate basic problems more accurately, and succeeded in recognising complexity, thereby, may we hope, doing greater justice to the object of study we started with. Having been warned by what Heidegger said about the 'happening of truth', I will not attempt to describe how in the past psychologists of religion have applied (not: developed or widely accepted) different definitions to indicate the intended object, the object scholars wanted to deal with: 'religion' (always placed between inverted commas from this point onwards).l0 Firstly, I will attempt to open a window on psychology's specific perspective on religion and to assess how much this has contributed to the notion of what 'religion' is in modern Western societies. I shall then argue that the influence of psychology's perspective on the modern Western conception of 'religion' is much bigger than can be accounted for by psychological research. (In that sense, one may say, that 'scholarship', i.e., 'psychology', is misunderstood and overestimated.) And, lastly, as the understanding of religion has currently 9 See the first part of Platvoet's contribution to this volume for arguments in support of this position. 10 Cf. Wulff's contribution to this volume for such an historical survey, from which it is also clear, that psychology of religion does not develop its own or specific definitions of religion as such, but offers a number of specific perspectives for understanding and analysing (aspects of) religion.

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become problematical due to psychology's influence also, I shall, along a different route, try to develop a recommendation with respect to the object of research for the psychology of religion. We will encounter several other paradoxes in the course of that attempt, but will start with the following: there is both too much, as well as too little, psychology of religion.

The 'Abundant Shortage'

if P~chology if Religion

As in all disciplines which study 'religion', the question of what 'religion' is, is being debated time and again within the psychology of religion, albeit always in a manner particular to it. This problem is usually dealt with when the question of the object of the psychology of religion arises. The question of what psychology of religion is, the object of its research, and how it should be studied, is constantly being raised in handbooks as well as in basic contributions to journals and on congresses. In order to forestall too circuitous a disquisition, it should be stated immediately that the major problem here is not to define what 'religion' is, but to determine what psychology itself is. And, in order to cut short also all sorts of time and space consuming processes of question and answer, however much they might serve a well-conceived didactic purpose, it should also be stated at once that there is no consensus about the object of psychology. The differences in approach in the chaotic conglomerate of major approaches and minor theories into which modern psychology in general has developed, are so big that psychologists of different orientations can barely, and sometimes only with great difficulty, meet and accept each other as colleagues. E.g., what does neuro-surgery have in common with an examination of the social structures of Western societies in the Middle Ages, with research into the interaction between a mother and her child, and with psychotherapy studying narcistic factors in autobiographies? And these are only a few examples of the very diverse types of research which are nonetheless all regarded as part of psychology and and such find their way into psychological journals and books (Although, of course, 'tribal wars' are also fought out among psychologists, and some colleagues would certainly like to 'excommunicate' others). Attempts to establish, once and for all, e.g., the soul, consciousness, mind, or behaviour, as the object of psychology and to indicate the angle from which it should be approached, have been numerous, but without much lasting impact.

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Let me, therefore, try to find some minimal circumscription as a basis for consensus, by stating that psychology deals with humans or with the human realm. Psychology attempts to understand humans, how they function in different ways (their brain activity, fantasy, emotion, etc.) and in very different situations (e.g., when dreaming, in groups, as children and as adults). In addition, psychology endeavours to develop this wide range of research options in numerous fields, such as education, organisations, sport, the arts, war, 'religion', and many more besides. Let me give a few examples to clarify this point. Psychologists have, for instance, investigated why human beings wage wars, how the enemy can be influenced, what is known about the personality of the enemy leader, how humans cope with violence and fear, etc. A few concrete examples: psycho-biographical research received quite a boost because the Pentagon wished to have 'psychogrammes' of Hider; psychotherapies had to be developed in order to help soldiers returning from the war front to cope with the traumas they had suffered, etc. All of this combined, and much more, could be termed the psychology of 'war'. Let us now turn to quite a different field: psychologists investigate which articles appeal to potential customers, why they are attractive to them, and how this knowledge can be used in commercials, and in what kind of commercials. Evidendy, such research is usually aimed at developing commercials which will promote the sales of a particular product, and the manufacturer of the articles to be sold will usually finance the research. It is clear, that science is not carried out in a vacuum and is not value-free, but is determined by socio-economic and other interests. One could point out many more restraints on 'science'this enterprise which has been placed on so high a pedestal in Western societies. When it comes to 'religion', psychology may propose just as many research topics and questions as with war and commercials. Psychologists might, for instance, investigate why people are religious; to what extent their representations of god(s) have been co-structured by their experiences and representations of 'significant' others in daily life (e.g., primary caretakers); how 'religion' functions, or may function, in coping with loss or with trauma; and which religious motives may play a role in the adoption of a particular profession (including a scholarly discipline). Psychologists may study the conditions under which religious experiences occur; how they are facilitated or obstructed, etc., etc. Much depends on which interest is to be served: e.g., churches in the West are interested in facilitation, whereas the

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former Communist governments of Eastern Europe have commissioned scholars to do research on obstruction. 11 As soon as one realises that 'religion', like other cultural phenomena, is always an affair involving human subjects, the field of research is virtually limidess and psychology is one of the most important disciplines in its study. As soon as it is recognised that any 'religion'-whatever its origin, nature or value-has always been shaped and handed down by humans, it follows that all manifestations of 'religion' can be subjected to investigation, from the point of view of human involvement in them. Let us employ the term 'religiosity' to indicate this human involvement in religion; it may help to bear in mind that psychology does not investigate the whole of religion, but only its psychic aspects. And let us also remember, that all liturgies, scriptures, symbols, and representations have been made and transmitted by human beings. The 'human factor' in them can, therefore, always be studied. Of course, much more can be said about all these matters than that they were produced by humans: texts, symbolic representations and actions have been influenced by many other factors. Their study should, therefore, involve many disciplines apart from psychology. History, anthropology, sociology, semiotics, economics and many other disciplines may contribute to the study of 'religion' (just as each of these disciplines may, in turn, contribute to the study of 'man', or 'the human realm', which was earlier in this chapter presented as the common denominator of psychology). This may seem a truism, but it must be stated, because problems arise time and again, either because one of these disciplinary approaches is overestimated as the only one by which research into 'religion' can be validly conducted, or because, perhaps for fear of such reductionism, one (or more) of these approaches is obstructed at whatever cost. I will return to this in greater detail later. At this point, it is important to keep in mind that the psychological perspective on 'religion' is eminendy important-or better still, it ought to be important, for psychology has still a long way to go before it assumes its 'logical' and rightful place in the study of 'religion'. Let us take a closer look at this. The psychology of religion certainly is a subdiscipline which has a considerable tradition to draw on, as well as a fairly a respectable literary arsenal, as is apparent 11

Cf. Kaariainen 1989.

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from the number of comprehensive handbooks and survey publications which have so far been produced in its name. 12 Following up on what has been said above, however, at least two comments have to be made to qualifY this statement. One is that the psychology of religion has so far dealt only with a very few of the many research options open to it. At the risk of overly generalising, it might be stated that most attention has been devoted to research into religious experience ('conversion' especially) and into the possible relations between 'religion' and mental health. Though studies of, e.g., the psychological factors involved in the production of sacred texts (dogmas and theologies included) have not been entirely absent, they constitute only a small part of the total field. The same is true of rituals, and the institutional structures of religious organisations. And if the research perspective is inverted-i.e., when it comes to studies into, e.g., the effects these texts, rituals, and structures have had on those confronted by them-, we have to conclude that these questions have hardly even been posed, and that, until today, large parts of the scope and research options of the psychology of religion have hardly been developed at all. The other comment is that whatever psychological research has been undertaken into religiosity, has been directed virtually exclusively to Western Christianity. Most manifestations of religiosity have hardly been approached. This means that although there has been a considerable amount of psychology of religion research, and although special infrastructure and organisations have been established, there is, at the same time, really far too little psychology of religion. This may sound paradoxical, but should be clear from what has been said so far.

TIe Modesty

if Science

All in all, it may seem that psychology is not capable of contributing much to a definition of 'religion', as it has not even achieved clarity even about its own object and task. Moreover, what it claims to have found out about 'the human' may well turn out to have very limited validity, as a greater part of its researches have been conducted with white, Western, middle class students. One might

12

Cf. e.g., Hood et alii 1996; Wulff 1997; Spilka & Mcintosh 1996.

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reasonably assume, that psychology in fact has very little of value to say about such a multidimensional phenomenon as 'religion'. That would, however, and in all fairness, be too hasty and too malicious a conclusion. Instead of accusing psychology of numerous defects, one might just as well ask whether the questions addressed to it, and the expectations entertained about it, have been justified. Psychology has already contributed much to our knowledge on all kinds of (Western Christian) 'religion', but it is highly questionable whether this contribution could, or should, justify giving psychology a voice in the quest for a definition of 'religion'. This is not customary either in the numerous other fields which psychology is studying. Let us glance at some of the examples mentioned already. Although psychology is engaged in the study of many areas of social practice such as politics, language, art, commercials or sport, does anyone consult psychology in order to define these fields? 'Religion' is for psychology as much a pre-given cultural phenomenon of the symbolic order constituting mental reality, as are these other examples. Lacan's well known example illustrates the point: just as masculinity and femininity cannot be reduced to an anatomical or biological basis, but are being founded in a position toward the symbolic realm, so too is being religious 'not in our genes'.l3 Whether and how, a human being becomes religious is due primarily to a cultural dictate-or, to put it more mildly, to a culturally offered possibility-to what extent ever the individual shaping of religiosity may be connected with, and determined by, an individual's personal biography. Precisely for that reason, cultural psychologists of religion have a predilection for falling back on Clifford Geertz in matters of 'religion'.14 Although 'religion' obviously and necessarily involves individual presuppositions, religion-like sports, commercials or polits-can not be reduced to them. To suppose such a thing, is tantamount to reductionism.

Cf. Lewontin et alii 1987. Geertz's well-known definition runs as follows: religion is 'a system of symbols which acts to establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic' (Geertz 1973: 90). References to this definition may be found amongst others in Vergote 1984, Van Belzen 1997, and Popp-Baier 1998. We will see below that this definition, however valuable it may be, at least for the West, is not without its problems. Even so, Geertz's definition in combination with Wittgenstein's theory of family resemblances, to which I alluded above, seems the most fertile one for empirical research. 13

14

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Psychology is not competent to determine what art is, for instance. Its task is to try to understand why a particular artist made a particular work of art in a particular way. Psychology also studies why the public, or the connoisseur of art, or the art 'market', appreciates a work of art in one way, and another art item in another way. Or it investigates, e.g., what cognitive, emotional, biographical processes, as well as many other processes subjected to psychological study, play a role in the production, appreciation and interpretation of a piece of art, and in what manner they do so. Why did someone decide to become an artist? And so on. Innumerable questions may be asked, and investigated, by psychologists about politics, art, sport, etc. (though never answered exclusively by psychologists). Their research, however, is always directed at a concrete subject, asking questions of limited extent that can be investigated empirically. Nowadays, psychology, as an experiential science, can hardly be seduced anymore to make pronouncements on such issues as 'man as such' or 'art as such'. It is even doubted presendy whether statements of this kind are the aim of an enterprise like psychology at all, for the object of study, the research question, and the researcher, are all conditioned by specific contexts. The result of any researchpsychological or otherwise-can never amount to anything more than knowledge acquired within specific contexts and is thus valid for those contexts only. Many scholars of psychology, therefore, prefer to engage in idiographic research: they opt for a limited object of research, and to explore it as thoroughly as possible, rather than remain superficial on a very broad subject. Whereas psychology is not expected to define its pre-given object of study in the cases of art, commercials, professional organisations, etc., it is apparendy different when it takes 'religion' as the subject of study. Or so it seems, for whether it really, and logically, is the case is brought very much into question after what has been said above. The examples given above make aware, perhaps, that just as psychology is not competent to define 'man as such', or 'art as such', it also lacks the authority and the competence to define what 'religion' is. Psychology may raise numerous empirical research questions in respect of 'religion', just as it may in respect of art. Numerous psychological aspects of religious actions and experiences have been investigated in as divergent manners as mark psychology as a whole. That research has brought to light many pieces of the puzzle of human involvement in religion. Just think of research into religiosity

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as 'reinforced behaviour' (it la Skinner),15 as a path to 'human excellence' (it la James)16 or to 'wholeness' (it la Jung),17 as 'infantile wish fulfilment' (it la Freud),18 or as a 'coping device' (it la Pargament).19 These notions obviously demonstrate the theoretical backgrounds from which they stem and always present a 'partial truth' only. Some of them have even been explicitly constructed in order to combat and replace earlier definitions of religiosity, as is customary in the business of scholarship. (Sometimes it was also forgotten that religiosity, thus conceptualized, is not yet identical with 'religion'.) These theories can consider religiosity only after their own manner which, by necessity, is not only a limited one, but also one that constructs its own object of research. Their application to religious behaviour is in part also trivial, for religiosity as a human enterprise shares all of the human fate and is evidently characterised by the many and limited aspects on which each of these different psychological theories focus. It should be borne in mind, however, that the psychological study of the diverse religious expressions has yielded interesting and valuable additional insights into 'religion'. Enthusiasm should, however, not lead to complacency nor to overestimation of what psychology, or any other discipline, may contribute to our knowledge of religion-scholarly modesty must be sustained, for not even the sum-total of answers to all the questions which psychology may raise in respect of art, will deliver a definition of the nature of art. Before arriving at that, one would certainly first have to consider the final conclusions in respect of 'religion' drawn by the historians, economists, sociologists, and so on. Even then, the question of whether the conglomerate of the positive sciences is capable of delivering that answer, would remain.

Has Religion Been Psychologized? This may sound very confident, and indeed nothing needs to be retracted from it. Yet, this is not all that can, and should, be said. Surely these possible psychological researches into 'religion' must

15

16 17

18 19

Skinner 1953. James 1902. Jung 1938. Freud 1913, 1927. Pargament 1997.

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have given us some sort of knowledge about, and insight into, their indended object: 'religion'. This is indeed the case. Let us take note of the following. Since Kant's 'anthropocentric turn', man has increasingly become the centre not only of epistemology, but even of theology and more general public reflections. Several psychology of religion historians place its (pre-)history with the Romantic theologian Schleiermacher, as it was he who anchored 'religion' no longer in supernatural god(s), but in human beings instead. He viewed 'religion' as the 'sense and taste for the infinite' and as a 'feeling of dependency on god'.20 In general, psychological categories have become increasingly important since the 19th century. Nowadays, psychological points of view are proffered on numerous phenomena, from job satisfaction to institutions for public mental health care, as also in respect of 'religion'. Whereas, e.g., children (within some denominations) earlier in the Protestant West were ordered to learn the Heidelberg catechism by heart, one now tries to take into account the stages of the cognitive and emotional development of the different age groups of children and to use child-friendly materials in teaching them. Whereas conversion used to be seen solely in terms of God's work in man, attention is now paid to the role of the convert's social environment and to other factors, such as the quest for identity or the compensation for a loss. One may confidently assert that the focus on subjective-empirical factors in 'religion' has increased considerably in the 20th century. Although, for obvious reasons, psychology has restricted itself primarily to studying factors which operate in a time-space, and also biographically specific experience of 'religion', the perspectives it has opened and the knowledge gained on religiosity, have added a new dimension to the insight we now have into the all-encompassing phenomenon that is termed 'religion' (in which, in addition, many other aspects may be discerned which are increasingly studied by other scholars of religion). At times, it even seems as if psychology supplies the main perspective for the interpretation and evaluation of not only 'religion', but of many other aspects of society and life as 20 Schleiermacher 1799/1991: 51,1799/1958: 39: 'Religion ist Sinn und Geschmack fUr das Unendliche'; Schleiermacher 182111980: § 9: 'Das gemeinsame alier frommen Erregungen, also das Wesen der Frommigkeit ist dieses, daB wir uns unserer selbst als schlechthin abhangig bewuBt sind, das heiBt, daB wir uns abhangig fUhlen von Gott'.

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well, by asking, for instance, whether something contributes to the wellbeing of people, how they 'feel' about it, whether it is harmful to public mental health, etc. With regard to religion, people have also tried to argue in favour of its benefits, using psychological terminology. Sometimes, this might even be understandable as a reaction against the attacks on 'religion' from former psychoanalytic quarters, for no believer likes to be branded as 'infantile', 'neurotic', and in search of a fathersubstitute. A diligent search for arguments showing that one's own religion is not affected by such vices has been very much in vogue in recent years. Admitting that there are, of course, some authoritarian religions, people try to establish that their religion deserves to be understood in a very different, in a 'humane' way. And they will use every trick in the book to demonstrate that popular concepts such as those of Maslow and kindred psychologists, can be adequately applied to their own religion by conducting research into 'religion' as a 'peak experience' and as a contribution to 'selfactualisation'. From whatever angle one may view or appreciate this development, it cannot be denied that psychological discourse has had an enormous impact on the way Westerners in the 20th century speak about religion. This process has not been without its problems, however. Once it had become possible, early on in the 20th century, to discern and study that personally experienced dimension of religion, sometimes also referred to as 'religiosity', reactions were not always brimming with enthusiasm. Moreover, some representatives of the psychological perspective seem to have made every effort to antagonise believers, priests and theologians. A number of psychologists recognized correctly that psychological research need not be restricted to the subjectivities of believers in the here and now. Figures from history might be subjected to re-examination from a psychological perspective. Likewise, it became also an option to study the 'subjective dimension' of all kinds of religious customs, stories and symbols. Especially the controversial branch of psychology, known as psychoanalysis, began to apply its own perspective to all kinds of cultural phenomena, including 'religion'. These psychoanalysts were at the same time often the most fiercely atheist, or at the least anticlerical, of scholars. Their at times excessive reductionism provoked a deep sense of distrust and enmity on the part of the ecclesiastical establishments. Although some church leaders and theologians expected

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psychology to provide academic knowledge about 'religion' which could even be used in e.g., pastoral counselling and spiritual guidance, many others found the research into the all:;;u menschliche (Nietzsche: 'all too human') dimension of the holy to border on defamation. Usually, it were the so-called 'liberal' theologians who hoped for a contribution from psychology, while their so-called 'conservative' counterparts preferred to maintain a complete 'closed door' policy, in some cases even up to the present day. The scope of this essay does not allow me to digress on this; I refer to Zock's contribution to this volume for a further analysis of it. However, at the risk of making a sweeping statement, but for the sake of avoiding a long disquisition, it is worth noting that all attempts to thwart the progress of psychology have proved futile. At present, psychology is active in numerous fields, and one meets psychologists everywhere. Psychological thinking and terminology have become part and parcel of the standard vocabulary of the 20th century Westerner. One speaks, not without reason, of the 'psychologisation' of society, and terms our time the 'age of psychology'.21 Setting aside the question of how this should be evaluated, it must be noted, that popularised psychological notions have strongly influenced the concept of 'religion' now current in Western societies. There is even talk of the psychologisation of theology, the traditional stronghold of Christian religious thought. One should think in that connection not only of the kind of tendencies pointed out above with Schleiermacher, but also of processes on a much more down-to-earth level. There is an increasing tendency to incorporate psychology into the curricula of Faculties of Theology. In addition, quite a number of Western systematic theologians, such as Tillich, Schillebeeckx and Pannenberg, as well as philosophers of religion, such as Ricoeur, are seeking to dialogue with the viewpoints and conclusions currendy emerging from the human sciences. 21 1992 saw the centenary of psychology in the Netherlands. It provided a suitable occasion for discussing the psychologisation of Western society. Its several aspects have been investigated in a collective volume entitled 100 jaar pfYchologie in Nederland ('A century of Psychology in the Netherlands') (Utrecht: Lemma; special issue of PfYchologie en Samenleving 16, 3 [1992]). It is relevant to point out one of the outcomes of that discussion: although it was found that psychologisation occurred in many provinces of society, the question remained unresolved as to what part psychology as a discipline had played exactly in that psychologisation. Did its flourishing instigate and foster it, or did it on the contrary profit from the psychologisation of society?

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One could even add a somewhat more grim observation: these thinkers, trying to establish a dialogue with psychology, have so far failed. It is not a too broad generalisation to say that psychologists have little or no regard for the learned discourses of these theology professors. There is no professional group which is more a- and antireligious than psychologists. Virtually no attention is paid to 'religion' in psychology,22 however strange this may seem, bearing in mind that 'religion' is a domain in which a considerable number of persons are, sometimes deeply, involved. Psychology has had an impact on religion in modern Western societies to an extent which psychologising theologians like Schleiermacher would probably not have deemed possible and which tends to make the search for a dialogue look more like a rearguard action. Whereas 'religion' was for centuries equated by Westerners with the Christian churches, it has now been shown that secularisation-for the legitimisation of which vulgarised psychological notions were ofted used-has left modern people with no more than a residue of psychological notions about 'religion'. To explain this statement, just one more remark. The opposition to 'religion' in the 20th century, from whatever quarter and inspiration, has obviously made full use of vulgarised psychological notions, such as 'religion' as the projection of human fear, as infantile, as wishful thinking, and such like. These notions, of course, have not been developed primarily and exclusively by psychologists, for they have a long pre-history, dating from Xenophanes to Feuerbach. But having been substantiated to a greater or lesser degree by popularised psychological notions, they have reached a much larger audience than in earlier ages, when they were articulated only philosophically. Meanwhile, much of the opposition to 'religion' has been shown to have been closely connected with criticism of the legitimisation which 'religion' had provided for social structures that were being challenged, such as those between employers and employees, and hierarchical relationships in general, as well as for certain cultural views and practices, e.g., in the domains of sexuality, education and gender relations. The changes which have occurred in the meantime in these relationships and notions, have also had repercussions on the criticism of religion, which has abated. This does not mean,

22

Cf. Lehr & Spilka 1989.

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however, that it did not leave its marks. On the contrary, or, to state it in a grim way once again: there seems to be very little criticism of religion at present because the need for it has diminished almost to extinction. Criticism of religion has become redundant since the 'religion'-as presented in the West by churches and theologians-is disappearing. 23 Whether this is really the case remains still to be seen, but it is clear nonetheless that the traditional conceptualisations of 'religion', church-bound and based on the Christian 'religion', are no longer the only adequate ones, not even in the Western world. Contemporary sociological research confirms a trend which has been visible in private conversations and in the media for some time, namely that 'religion' is making a comeback, thanks neither to nor despite the churches, but rather independently of them. Quite a sizeable section of society no longer attends church and in some cases lacks even an elementary knowledge of Christianity, yet regards itself as 'religious' in some way or other, nonetheless. Whereas in former times sociologists and social psychologists could 'measure' the 'variable' 'religion' by having people mark the denomination to which they belonged, or where researchers attempted to operationalize 'religiosity' by asking research subjects to indicate how frequently they went to church, these traditional instruments have since become useless for research into the 'religion' of large sections of the population of modern Western societies. At the same time, we are witnessing an upsurge in esotericism (again), a spectacular increase in the sale of New Age books, a growing interest in related courses and all kinds of alternative 'therapies', plus the emergence of phenomena such as thousands of Dutch people attending Jomanda's healing services in Tiel. 24 When asked about it, a growing number of people are apparently quite prepared to be registered as 'religious' but refuse any

23 Cf. publications with titles expressing concern such as Do Churches have a Future? (Goddijn et alii 1981). I should point out that this type of title in no way expresses the sarcasm of outsiders, but rather the worries of insiders. For instance, Goddijn e.a. 1981 was published by a Dutch Roman Catholic academic association, Thijmgenootschap. 24 For a number of years, the Dutch paranormal 'medium' Jomanda has organized 'healing sessions' in a small town in the middle of The Netherlands. These sessions draw some 25,000 people a month (according to the Dutch newspaper De Gelderlander, March 13th, 1996). Her style and message is a mixture of elements found in traditional sites of Christian pilgrimage (like Lourdes, France), in the (Christian) charismatic movement and in spiritistic circles.

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suggestion of being church-bound. What 'religion', or being 'religious', means in these cases remains fairly vague: for some it is the recognition of a deeper dimension in life, or the desire to get in touch with the universe or with cosmic powers; others want to consider the bestowal of whatever kind of meaning as religious. Even (humanist) psychological theories and therapeutic strategies are regarded by some as (secular) ways to salvation. 25 The present state of affairs in 'religion' has become so extremely complex and confused, that sociologists complain that they can no longer chart it. 26 Scholars with a theoretical interest in 'religion' reflect anew on how to define 'religion'-witness this volume. These last sentences need to be understood correctly-they are by no means intended as criticism or derision. But what they show is that, time and again, Minerva's owl is called to spread its wings and to set out for another flight, as the situation is different now from what it was only a few decades ago, and the knowledge which scholars think they have about religion is perhaps no longer valid. To repeatedly question one's own knowledge and (putative) achievements, should not be taken as a sign of scholarly impotence. It is, on the contrary, one of science's few marks of heroism. Leaving completely aside now how the situation sketched so far should be evaluated, and by whom, and whether 'religion' as such has changed and that in response to it a (new) scientific difinition of 'religion' should be developed, it cannot be denied that in Western societies at least, there is a new popularised conception of 'religion' emerging. Although it must be still investigated to which extent this new notion of 'religion' has so far developed and by what processes it has been enabled to do so, it seems certain that psychology has played a role in it. Behold therefore another paradox: although psychology as an academic discipline has no vocation or competence whatsoever to define a phenomenon like 'religion' (it has enough problems already in determining how to investigate it), it has, in those societies where it is found, contributed considerably to the ways in which 'religion' is conceptualised.

25 26

cr. cr.

Vitz 1994. e.g., Felling, Peeters & Schreuder 1986.

THE OBJECT OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

Debating the Object

if the

Psychology

III

if Religion

Do all these deliberations yield anything, one might ask? To answer this question, I will review a recent 'debate' about the object of psychology of religion, held at the conference for European Psychologists of Religion in 1985. From the reactions of the participants at the conference and from the reviews of its proceedings, it was clear that the debate was considered an important event. At issue was the question: 'Is it the task of psychologists of religion to study behaviour related to worldview systems in general, or should, on the other hand, the discipline's object be restricted to revelational systems only?' Let me try to summarise the two points of view proposed on this question. Professor Vergote, from Leuven University (Belgium), asserted that the psychology of religion ought to study 'religion', there is, he contended, no need to replace its object by 'worldview'. (I will show below that Vergote's virtually tautological assertion is not without its problems.) He did not define 'religion' in his contribution, but spoke about a 'universal religious consciousness [that] typifies religion'. He held that all religions are convinced that knowledge of 'the divine or supernatural entities', and rituals and ethics that go with it, is not man-made but has been handed down to humans by 'supernatural agencies and their mediators'. His opponent, Van der Lans, from Nijmegen University (The Netherlands), opened his presentation by remarking that he, too, wished to maintain a substantive definition of 'religion', and that he did not wish to replace it by 'worldview'. Even so, he adduced arguments to support his thesis that research into 'meaning giving', be it religious or not, should be at the centre of the psychology of religion. Viewed from a critical distance, the two scholars seem to be talking at cross-purposes. My intention is neither to try to reconcile their different views nor to steal a march on them. On the basis of what has been said above, however, the following may be worth noting. Van der Lans' argument was at times too irresolute and defensive. His statement, that he intended to understand religion in the same way as Vergote is curious, as he was obviously unwilling to regard 'religion' as the material object of the psychology of religion. Therefore, what sounded like a tautology from Vergote, i.e., that 'the psychology of religion deals with religion', was denied by Van der Lans. The latter, however, adduced arguments, in line with what I have

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argued in the previous paragraph, which show why 'religion' should no longer be taken as the object of study in the psychology of religion. 'Religion', as we have always known and understood it, is becoming increasingly rare in Western societies; our students no longer understand what we are talking about; as a professional group, we are in danger of busying ourselves with a fossil. We will, therefore, be unable to maintain our position in the competitive academic market. For the sake of our salaries, we will have to investigate something else, or at least something more, than 'religion'. Contrary to what one might expect, however, Van der Lans did not move on to propose an alternative material object for the psychology of religion. Instead, he emphasised a psychological variable, or an element of the formal object of psychology of religion, namely, the attribution of meaning. Indeed, the search for meaning counts as a psychological characteristic of human beings.v But one would be equally justified in holding that perception~which is equally a basic category in psychology~should henceforth be the central object of study in the psychology of religion. In either case, however, by operating from one possible psychological perspective or category only~be it emotion, memory, perception, meaning giving, or whatever~one would, a priori and disastrously, restrict the full range of research questions that may be formulated by psychology in any area of social practice, such as 'religion', sport, arts, or whatever. Van der Lans seems to commit some sort of 'category mistake' here. He replaces 'religion', which is an element in the category of the material object of psychology of religion, by meaning giving, which is an element in the category of the formal object of psychology. Vergote seems less concerned about the decline of the Christian 'religion' than Van der Lans. 28 If 'religion' disappears, the psychology of 'religion' will, of course, also disappear, or continue as a historical discipline only, investigating the psychological aspects of e.g., Hellenistic religions. 29 Perhaps Vergote is not so concerned as Van

27 Though Van der Lans writes about meaning giving in 'limit-situations' in his contribution to the 1985 conference, he seems to have in mind more specifically meaning giving in crisis situations. See also Van der Lans (1991: 313-323), in which he returns to his discussion with Vergote and sets forth his viewpoint again. Whether a person does, or does not 'use', religion in a situation of crisis, is termed a 'coping problem' by Van der Lans (1991: 316). 28 He also writes in a similar vein in other publications; cf. e.g., Vergote 1987. 29 Vergote & Van der Lans 1986: 71.

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der Lans about the survival of the psychology of religion as a subdiscipline of psychology? Vergote's viewpoint, however, is also not without its problems. Indeed, Van der Lans puts his finger on a particular aspect related to them. Vergote seems to take the position that, like other disciplines studying 'religion', the psychology of religion should turn to 'religion' 'as we know it', to the main, established religions, to what 'a pre-given cultural consciousness considers as religion'.3o Overlooking for the moment the different objections which may be made against this position, I would like to point out only that Vergote seems to ignore that his 'argument from authority' is increasingly loosing validity. For what is considered by the pre-given culture as 'religion' is becoming less and less clear. Vergote would certainly not wish to regard as 'religion' all the vagueness that is, precisely in the wider framework of culture, increasingly characterizing the contemporary concept of 'religion' (and includes witchcraft, visits to paranormal fairs, 'positive thinking', and many other things). His appeal to a culturally pre-given concept of 'religion', therefore, is either no longer tenable or dishonest. In the latter case, it obscures the fact that he really has additional motives for using the concept of religion which he actually uses-whichever concept that may be. 31 It has hopefully become clear that, as indicated above, Vergote and Van der Lans are on different wave-lengths. They do not really enter into a dialogue, nor do their arguments really conflict, although it is also clear that they argue from very different positions. Van der Lans intends, also as a psychologist of religion, to deal with something concerning all human beings, he is critical of a psychology that restricts itself to one particular 'religion', or even to one particular denomination. In his opinion, psychology of religion should deal with something general, namely meaning giving, of which 'religion' is then a subcategory, just as a denomination is a subcategory of some religion. That brings Van der Lans very close to the position which Vergote attacked so vehemently, to wit that 'religion', or 'religiosity', be considered as an element of 'human nature', i.e., as an anthropological constant. This position is inspired by apologetic

Vergote & Van der Lans 1986: 7l. As may be evident, this analysis implies no verdict on the quality or value of Vergote's motives, nor on the choice he based them on. To disagree with him in this respect, one would need additional arguments. 30

31

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motives which endeavour to argue in favour of 'religion' by presenting it as a general and necessary human feature. Vergote, on the contrary, prefers to keep an open mind on at least the theoretical possibility that a human being is either not religious or does not wish to be. Meanwhile, however, Vergote's research topics as well as his way of arguing show that he is dealing mainly with a type of religiosity with which he is himself most familiar: the fairly enlightened Roman Catholicism of Flanders. This quite justifiable limitation does not, however, prevent him from occasionally jumping to some very broad statements on 'human beings as such', and 'religion as such', and to be litde bothered by the developments in, and diversity, of religion occuring around him. For the cultural pre-understanding in respect of 'religion', to which he appeals, is far from being as Roman Catholic as he suggests. He tends perhaps too easily to dismiss attempts at counter-argument using new religious movements, for instance, on the grounds that in his view they do not (as yet) constitute 'religions' in his view. If one had the stomach to fight that view, one might ask him how he regards the handful of early Christians in, say, 40 AD? ... Did their group also not (yet) constitute a religion?

Spirituality as an Object

if Research for

Psychology

if Religion

Let us try, however, to continue in a serious manner the argumentation presented so far. It seems that one should change tacks in order to arrive at a viewpoint of potential use in contemporary research. We saw that the psychology of religion has not by any means investigated everything which might logically be regarded as part of its domain. As is the case with psychology in general, certain topics or aspects have received more attention than others. This is true especially of subjects which relate to psychopathology, public health, or personal experience. One might say, at the risk of proposing too general a statement, that it is the subjective experience aspect, in particular, that has been assigned to the psychology of religion within the conglomerate of scholarships studying 'religion'. (Inner) Experience, conversion and mysticism especially, belong to the oldest and most researched topics in the sub-discipline. Much attention has also been devoted to glossolalia, ecstasy, (seemingly) psychopathological phenomena, 'sects',

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messiahs and innovators, etc. The distinction between the so-called intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity has for decades been a focal point of study in international research in the psychology of religion. Following up on studies by Gordon Allport, attempts have been made to determine the marks of a religiosity 'intrinsically' motivated by, and oriented to, religion. 32 Bracketing for the moment all the objections which may be raised-on several levels-against this type of research, it does nevertheless again show that here too psychology looks for the 'inner experience' aspect of 'religion'. The implication here being that intrinsic religiosity is much more relevant to the believers personally, is more deeply experienced, and belongs to the core of their personalities, far more than does extrinsic religiosity. In brief, and whether righdy or wrongly from a more encyclopaedic perspective on psychology, it seems that the aspect of 'inner involvement', or 'commitment', has been especially allotted to psychology of religion. Psychology, therefore, studies, for example, how people internalise and subjectively experience 'religion'? How, and when, does religion become the core and the direction of a human life? Even using contemporary profane parlance, the expression 'religious (or mystical) experience' has connotations of something 'very intimate', 'touching a person's innermost core', and of 'being of concern in an unspeakable way'. It is this aspect, in particular, that the psychology of religion would have to investigate. Now, one might at this point want to follow Vergote's suit-and righdy sol-in criticising such terminology for inflating the meaning of words such as 'religion' and mysticism. One may also, however, join Van der Lans in questioning whether we might not profit from such connotations, and in wondering whether they perhaps express a state of affairs to which the psychology of religion needs to relate, like it or not. If one would stipulate, theoretically, the object of psychology of religion as 'all the psychic in as far as it has been moulded and articulated within a religious framework', one would indeed be taking a position that is both correct and unequivocal. By taking it, however, we would, equivocate on precisely the subject matter of this volume. (For one would then have to ask: when is a framework 32 It may be clear that a priori viewpoints and apologetics played their part in this research too, for the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religion comes dangerously close to that between true and false religion. It would take us too far, however, to deal with this matter in detail in this contribution.

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religious?) Let us, therefore, try to take a different path, an emplTIcal one. Intense involvement, e.g., conversion, mysticism, intrinsic religiosity, etc., has clearly been one of the most investigated subjects in the psychology of religion. However, such forms of intense involvement, which give meaning and direction to (individual) life, are not only found within a religious framework. No more than any other part of religious activity and experience, is 'surrender', 'dedication', or 'commitment' limited to only a religious meaning system. On the contrary: anyone who 'lives and dies' for an ideal, for a cause, for something transcendent that surpasses her and constitutes the meaning of her life, is-I propose to define-living spiritually. One does hear in daily life casual remarks to that effect, such as: he is dedicated to his work, she is devoted to a political cause, or she is adoring that pop star with an 'almost religious zeal'. Such metaphors do not, however, deliver the clarity we strive for in academic work, but may lead us astray in a comparativist mist in which everything resembles everything else. I will, therefore, first of all, consider such a dedication or commitment as religious only when they are enacted within a religious framework; but, secondly, I would wish to study any such dedication or commitment systematically under the concept of 'spirituality'; and thirdly, I propose taking such broadly conceived 'spirituality' as one object par excellence of the psychology of religion in the West, currently in the process of becoming post-modern. More concretely: I would like 'spirituality' to be understood as the operationalisation of commitment to transcendence. Spirituality is present wherever humans reflect upon the limits of their existence and where they draw conclusions, of whatever kind, from it for the way they live their lives. In order to be understood correctly, I want to stress that I am talking about factual human conduct. I am not commenting on incidental or exceptional experiences of meaning, but on life as it is lived concretely every day, and more particularly on a subcategory of potentially meaningful living, whereby we are concerned with a more or less conscious insertion into a greater whole which makes life appear as meaningful. Although, by definition, it is impossible for us to get a grip on the transcendence (sensu Jaspers) which gives human life its meaning, this does not imply that human beings are completely unfree in relation to it or that they can only be taken by surprise by it. Again, therefore: one should use the term 'spirituality' to refer to that subcategory of human life which, more

THE OBJECT OF THE PSYCHOLOGY OF RELIGION

11 7

or less consciously and articulatedly, enters into a relationship with transcendence and gives shape to this relationship. Note the modest and profane character of this minimal circumscription. It does not postulate that humans are by nature spiritual; on the contrary, not everyone will want to acknowledge transcendence and certainly not everyone will want to observe the possibility of cultivating the relationship that is intended here. Further, the circumscription leaves completely open the question of whether it may perhaps be assumed that every human being-even when he is not conscious of it or refrains from giving content to it-relates to something denoted by such terms as 'the absolute', 'the unconditional', 'the sum of reality'. The proposed circumscription refers precisely to those cases in which there is such a more or less consciously realised relationship. Note, too, that the word transcendence is not defined here, nor is it assumed that maintaining a relationship to it is a superior form of being human. Against the imperialism of many definitions and systems, this circumscription attempts, as it were, to put into words that which can be observed time and again: the maintenance and cultivation of a relationship to what is recognised as transcendent, can be a form of living meaningfully; it does not state, however, that this is the only form of living meaningfully, nor do I claim that this form of living meaningfully is always filled with the experience of meaning. Included in this minimal circumscription is the idea that the (desired) manner of conceptualising transcendence and of realising a relationship to it, differs or may differ in accordance with the tradition, culture, and period in which it occurs. The circumscription aims at protecting spirituality against being monopolised by a religious content; spirituality is by no means synonymous with religiosity. There seems no objection to those forms of 'spirituality', which are not religious in themselves, but are analogous to religious spirituality, being studied also in the psychology of religion. E.g., someone for whom a particular political party, or sport, is her one and all in life, will not necessarily consider herself a religious person. Some such people may even be virulently anti-religious. They should, therefore, not (yet) be referred to as religious persons. The different 'religions' known to us from the past, or those that exist today, are phenomena on a cultural level and order. They include, in different constellations, such aspects as rituals, rules, organisations (and at times hierarchies), history, doctrines, and much more. Each 'religion'

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presupposes, i.e., maintains or prescribes, a particular form of spirituality (usually in several forms), that nevertheless constitutes only a subcategory of religiosity. Religiosity as the subjective correlation of (parts of) religions need not be 'spiritual' at alp3 Now, much may be learned from a comparative study of religious and non-religious forms of 'spirituality'. Such a comparison could, for instance, assist us in disclosing more clearly the distinct traits a religious spirituality may have, and could thus, as if by a detour, produce additional insights into religiosity and into 'religion'. What sounds a bit paradoxical again, is a comparative method which is actually employed in many branches of scholarship: in the present context, it means that in studying the intended object, 'religion', the psychology of religion should also include non-religious phenomena into its research. Let me state again that this is not an attempt to either put everything on the same level, or to single out one of the several aspects distinguishable in 'religion' and religiosity as its most essential one, as Ter Borg seems to do in this volume. Unlike him, I do not reduce 'religion' to a particular general human function, in Ter Borg's case, that of creating order (because humans are symbolic animals). And here we have another paradox: the whole controversy about functional versus substantive approaches to religion, proves in the end to have been but a seeming contradiction, once the imperialist claim is relinquished. For do scholars who intend to consider a multidimensional phenomenon exclusively from one specific viewpoint, not deserve a priori not to be taken seriously? Any scholar who sees 'religion' as no more than, e.g. consolation, reduction of fear, or as the 'opium of the people', fails to do justice to the complex empirical phenomenon facing him. Religion, after all, is also an economic force, a political factor, and much more. Scholars who reduce 'religion' to having but one, e.g., sociological or psychological, function only, have failed to understand their own scholarship. On the other hand, there are and always have been, those who deny that people seek consolation in 'religion', or that it serves as the 'opium of the people', or that 'religion' is used to reduce anxiety (and, for that matter, to foist fear onto people ... !). By doing so, 33 This is illustrated quite well by the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity: the latter is usually not (regarded as) spiritual. On the other hand, no connection needs to exist between the many aspects of religiosity that may be studied in psychology of religion~such as the stages along which faith develops, the representation of God, and many others~and spirituality as a category of action.

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they have closed their eyes to the legitimacy of a scholarly, methodologically modest, comparative approach, also in the study of 'religions'. Those who maintain that 'religion' is a phenomenon sui generis may perhaps be right, but if that is taken to imply that 'religion' cannot be compared with anything else, they have closed the door to all potential research of it. 34 To compare is not to reduce, at least, not necessarily. Freud's comparison of 'religion' (considered without any differentiation, by the way) to a neurosis, was no reduction of religion, but rather a clarification of some of its aspects (The representatives of 'religion' have certainly taken that clarification to heart).35 Father-representations have, of course, been used in psychological research on representations of God, but by no stretch of the imagination could it ever imply that representations of God consist entirely of father-representations; the results of past psychological research show a very different state of affairs. 36 However unique 'religion' may perhaps be, as an empirical phenomenon it is also multidimensional and precisely because of that, it may be compared under a specific aspect with something else that is analogous to it (but which need therefore not be identical with it). Such a comparison will cause the possibly unique qualities of religion to stand out more clearly. Just as a church may be researched after the aspect of its being an organisation, but with the understanding that it is much more than that; and just as the religious representation of god as father may be compared with the non-religious representation of a personally experienced father without implying that 'religion' consists in representations of god only; so too may religious spirituality be compared with other forms of spirituality. The last statement is meant to be a cautious one: it in no way suggests that 'spirituality' is the heart of 'religion', or that it is an anthropological constant, or a basic category of psychology. I lean more towards the assumption that most people are not spiritual at all, that they do not, therefore, take any steps to cultivate a 34 Approaches from the perspective of, e.g., history or literary studies have then become equally impossible. At present, these hardly meet with resistance anymore. However, at the time these disciplines developed, they had to fight the same battle to establish their rightful status as branches of scholarship that could also be legitimately applied to 'religion', as psychology and sociology seem at times to have to fight this battle, even now. 35 There is no logical relationship between Freud's comparing religion to a neurosis and the animosity towards religion he manifested in later publications. 36 Cf. e.g., Rizzuto 1979; Vergote & Tamayo 1983.

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relationship with (whatever kind of) transcendence, or at least do not usually operationalize the commitment which they may possibly (claim to) have with it. But I do think that something (i.e., 'spirituality') in the lives of religious humans is usuallY allocated to the psychology of religion as its material object which does show structural similarities with-but is not identical to-forms of spirituality with non-religious individuals. For the sake of clarity, it must be stated that I have no wish to suggest either that 'spirituality' is, or should be, the only research object in the psychology of religion. Far from it! As I indicated in the first sections of this contribution, I hold that the psychology of religion should cover a much wider field. Yet, I do think that in an era in which 'religion' and 'religiosity' have become diffuse concepts in the 'cultural pre-understanding' of the Western world, and in which they may be applicable to an ever decreasing number of people, the psychology of religion would do well to make comparisons with those forms of human activity, knowledge and experience that are also considered to be central to 'religion'. In a situation in which religious traditions have themselves become diffuse, and categories derived from the Christian traditions such as prayer, representation of god, conversion, etc., are evident in fewer and fewer people, the psychology of religion will be well advised to put the category of 'spirituality', more often on its research agenda. There is, I hope, no need to re-emphasize that I am not so foolish as to propose redefining 'religion' or religiosity as spirituality, nor to consider all spirituality as religious or as religionY I do, however, hope to have pointed out a category if activiry found with some human beings, which does not occur in a religious form only, but which has always been considered to be an important category in the religions of humankind generally. Finally, I make no claim to proposing something extraordinary by this contribution. It has long been customary since long in the study of mysticism, for instance, to acknowledge the existence of non-religious mysticism and to integrate it into the psychological study of religious 3i This kind of foolishness is often found when one has understood one of the many functions which religions may have and one then proceeds to invert this relationship by qualifying the function itself as 'religious'. A well known example of this folly in psychology is Fromm's opinion that 'any system of thought and action shared by a group which gives the individual a frame of orientation and an object of devotion' is religion (Fromm 1950: 26). Politics, work, pop music, perhaps even chasing after money, or caring about the body, could then also be called religion.

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mystIcIsm. For psychology cannot possibly determine what is 'true' or 'real' mysticism, as might be possible from a religious or theological viewpoint. By the same token, it is not psychology's business to define 'religion', although psychology has every right to study empirical phenomena such as conversion, education, mysticism, madness, spirituality, experience, be they or be they not articulated within a religious framework. That will also permit the psychology of religion to try to determine the similarities and differences between phenomena occuring within and outside a religious frame of meaning. However slightly, such a contribution to knowledge of these partial aspects of potential human functioning may result in some additional perspective on spirituality-with what others have stipulated to be spirituality-with 'religion'. Some may think that more than this modest contribution could have been expected from psychology after a whole 'century of psychology'. However, logic and the modesty of science do not permit more, for the prestige psychology has gained in the recent decades is not primarily the result of well-founded knowledge, but rather the result of psychology's eager reception and proliferation in Western societies. This being so, however, psychology has had a share in making many human phenomena appear in a different light. And 'religion' is but one of them.

Rqerences Belzen, JA., 1997, 'The Historicocultural Approach in the Psychology of Religion: Perspectives for Interdisciplinary Research', in Journal for the Scientific Stu4J if Religion 36, 3: 358-371. Belzen,].A., &].M. Van der Lans (eds.) 1986, Current Issues in the Psychology if Religion. Amsterdam: Rodopi. Blok, A., 1975, Wittgenstein en Elias: Een methodologische richtlijn voor de antropologie. Assen: Van Gorcum. Felling, B.,]. Peters & O. Schreuder 1986, Geloven en Leven: Een nationaal onder::;oek naar de invloed van religieu::;e overtuigingen. Zeist: Kerckebosch. Fortmann, H.M.M., 1957, Aan de mens nabij: Over de situatie der godsdienstpsychologie en haar reden van bestaan. Nijmegen, etc.: Dekker & Van de Vegt. Freud, S., 1913, Totem and Taboo, in The Standard Edition if the Complete Psychological works if Sigmund Freud, Vol. 13: 1-161 (transl. & ed.]. Strachey). London: Hogarth, 19644. - - - , 1927, The Future if an Illusion, in The Standard Edition if the Complete Psychological Works if Sigmund Freud, Vol. 21: 1-56 (transl. & ed. ]. Strachey). London: Hogarth, 1961. Fromm, E., 1950, Psychoanalysis and Religion. New Haven: Yale University Press. Geertz, C., 1973, The Interpretation if Cultures: Selected Essays. New York: Basic Books. Goddijn, W., et al., 1981, Hebben de kerken nog toekomst: Commentaar op het onder::;oek 'Opnieuw: God in Nederland'. Baarn: Ambo.

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Hood, R.W., B. Spilka, B. Hunsberger & R. Gorsuch 19962, The Psychology qf Religion: The Empirical Approach. New York: Guilford Press. james, W., 1902, The Varieties qf Religious Experience: A Study in Human Nature. Cambridge (Mass.): Harvard University Press, 1985. jung, C.G., 1938, Psychology and Religion, in Collected Works, Vol. 8 (2nd ed.), 1969, pp. 3-105. London: Routledge & Kegon Paul. Kaariainen, K., 1989, Discussion qf Scientific Atheism as a Soviet Science, 1950- 1985. Helsinki: Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia. Lans, J.M. van der, 1991, 'What is Psychology of Religion About?: Some Considerations Concerning its Subject Matter', in Maloney 1991: 313-323. Lehr, E., & B. Spilka 1989, 'Religion in the Introductory Psychology Textbooks: A Comparison of Three Decades', in Journal for the Scientific Study qf Religion 28: 366-371. Lewontin, R.C., S. Rose & LJ. Kamin (eds.) 1987, Genetica, eifelijkheid en ideologie: Nieuw Rechts en het biologisch determinisme. Berchem: EPO; Breda: de Geus (= original title: Not in our genes, 1984). Maloney, H.N., (ed.) 1991, Psychology qf Religion: Personalities, Problems, Possibilities. Grand Rapids (Mich.): Baker. Moosburger, H., C. Zwingmann & D. Frank (eds.) 1996, Religiositiit, Personlichkeit und Verhalten: Reitrage zur Religionspsychologie. Munster: Waxmann. Pargament, K.L., 1997, The Psychology qf Religion and Coping: Theory, Research, Practice. New York, etc.: Guilford Press. Popp-Baier, u., 1998, Das Heilige im Prqfanen: Religiose Orientierungen im Alltag; eine qualitative Studie zu religiosen Orientierungen von Frauen aus der charismatisch-evangelischen Bewegung. Amsterdam, etc.: Rodopi. Rizzuto, AM., 1979, The Birth qf the Lving God: A Psychoanalytic Study. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. Schleiermacher, F.D.E., 1799, Uber die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Verachtern. Gbttingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht, 1991; On Religion: Speeches to its Cultured Despisers, translated by john Oman, with an introduction by Rudolf Otto. New York: Harper & Row, 1958. Schleiermacher, F.D.E., 1821, Der christliche Glaube nach den Grundsatzen der evangelischen Kirche im Zusammenhang dargestellt. Berlin: De Gruyter, 1980. Skinner, B.F., 1953, Science and Human Behavior. New York: Macmillan. Spilka, B., & D.N. McIntosh (eds.) 1996, The Psychology qf Religion: Theoretical Approaches. Boulder (Colorado): Westview Press. Stahlin, W., 1914, 'Zur Einftihrung', in Archiv fur Religionspsychologie. I: 1-9. Vergote, A, 1984, Religie, geloof en ongeloqf Psychologische studie. Antwerpen: De Nederlandse Boekhandel. - - - , 1987, Het meerstemmige leven: Gedachten over mens en religie. Kapellen: DNBI Peickmans; Kampen: Kok Agora. Vergote, A., & J.M. van der Lans 1986, 'Two Opposed Views Concerning the Object of the Psychology of Religion: Introductory Statements to the Plenary Debate', in Van Belzen & Van der Lans 1986: 67-81. Vergote, A., & A Tamayo 1981, The Parental Figures and the Representation qf God: A Psychological and Cross-Cultural Study. The Hague: Mouton. Vitz, P.C., 1994, Psychology as Religion: The Cult qf Self-Worship. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. Westhof, H., 1996, Geestelijke bevrijders: Nederlandse katholieken en hun kerkelijke beweging voor geestelijke volksgezondheid in de twintigste eeuw. Nijmegen: Valkhof Pers. Wittgenstein, L., 1958, Philosophical Investigations. Oxford: Blackwell. Wulff, D.W., 1997, Psychology qf Religion: Classic and Contemporary Views. New York: Wiley (1991 1). Yinger, J.M., 1967, 'Pluralism, Religion and Secularisation', in Journal for the Scientific Study qf Religion 6: 17-28.

PART THREE

CONCEPTUAL CHANGES

'RELIGIO' AND 'RELIGION' IN THE 18TH CENTURY THE CONTRASTING VIEWS OF WOLFF AND EDELMANN

Ernst Feil For Friedrich Card. Wetter on the occasion of his 70th birthday, February 2, 1998

Introduction: the Expectation

if a

'Completely Religionless Time'

At the end of the 1960s, 1 when I tried to understand Bonhoeffer's statement that 'the time of inwardness and conscience, which is to say the time of religion as such', had come to an end and that we were 'proceeding towards a time of no religion at all', 2 I certainly did not expect that I would ever become deeply involved in the study of the term religio. Moreover, I must admit that, most probably because of my Roman-Catholic background, the concept of 'religion' seemed to me to be the very opposite of faith rather than fundamental to the proper understanding of that notion. I was content at that time to find what Bonhoeffer exactly meant by those statements in his letters from prison. I was by no means inclined to go along with Karl Barth's view that Bonhoeffer had 'left us on our own with those enigmatic statements in his letters'.3 On the basis of my analysis of Bonhoeffer's texts I was led to the conclusion that, viewed systematically, Bonhoeffer understood 'religion' to be a historical category; that he regarded both the '''religious a priori'" of mankind' and 'religion' itself as a mere 'historically conditioned and I I am grateful to my wife, Mechthild Feil, for accomplishing, with the help of others, the difficult task of translating my German text into English. 2 Bonhoeffer 1970: 305; letter to Eberhard Bethge dated 30 April, 1944. 3 Karl Barth, in a letter to Landessuperintendent P.W. Herrenbriick dated 21 December, 1952, in Barth 1955: 121. In this letter, Barth strongly expresses his concern when (p. 122) he admits that 'we would have to resign ourselves to being left behind somewhat bewildered', and states that Bonhoeffer 'did not leave us with anything concrete in this respect'. These sentences are often used to argue that the fragmentary character of Bonhoeffer's statement should serve as the very principle on which it is to be interpreted. Even so, the writers who maintain that his letters can no longer be interpreted properly, seem to know how they should be interpreted.

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transient human form of expression', just a 'garment of Christianity', and a temporary 'Western form'4 which is now coming to an end. It is very probable that Bonhoeffer derived his view of 'religion' as a category in intellectual history, from his analysis of Wilhelm Di1they whom he studied thoroughly during his imprisonment. 5 The main reason why Bonhoeffer, and especially his letters from prison, met with such a surprisingly widespread response, lies in the fact that he foresaw, as the reverse side of this 'freedom from religion',6 the emergence of a new way of living as a Christian in a 'world come of age'.7 With Dilthey (although he did not quote him), Bonhoeffer held the view that this new Christian way of life had been heralded by the 'movement towards human autonomy which began around the thirteenth century'. 8 To this very day, I am not sure whether the meaning and importance of this interpretation of 'religion', as opposed to 'religion' in the sense of an 'a priori', i.e., as an anthropological datum, can be grasped without having first studied in depth the biographical testimonies of people who have themselves experienced this 'religion', which they have often described as an emotional experience (GifUhl). An understanding of 'religion' as conditioned by modern times was already apparent in Bonhoeffer's 1931/32 lectures on Systematic Theology, in which we read that it is only in the post-Copernican world [...J that instead of 'faith' the word reli-

gio (coming from the English deists) appears.9

When I first came across this statement,1O I did not yet know that Bonhoeffer was quoting Paul Anton de Lagarde (1827-1892) with-

Bonhoeffer 1970: 305; letter to Eberhard Bethge dated 30 April, 1944. Cf. Feil 1971, 1991 4 ; 355-368. 6 Bonhoeffer 1970: 307. 7 Bonhoeffer 1970: 357; letter to Eberhard Bethge dated 8 June, 1944. 8 Bonhoeffer 1970: 356; letter to Eberhard Bethge dated 8 June, 1944. 9 Bonhoeffer 1931-1932: 145. This statement is preceded by a hint at Schleiermacher as the 'builder of the temple of humanity' and to individualism as the destroyer of the Protestantism of the Reformation. It is followed by the interpretation of the word religio as 'the final and finest of man's abilities', by which man can reach God by himself. This constitutes a fundamental contradiction to the central aims of the Reformation. 10 Cf. Feil 1977: 233, where I refer to the only edition of the notes of this lecture that was available at the time, i.e., the one printed in the appendix to Eberhard Bethge's Bonhoeffer biography. 4

5

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out, in the least, endorsing his concept of'religion'.lI It is quite illuminating, that de Lagarde even then stated resolutely that the word religion [...] was introduced in utmost contrast to the word faith as commonly used in the Lutheran, Reformed and Catholic Churches [and that it] everywhere presupposes the Deist criticism of the common Christian notion of revelation. 12 In this light, the modern understanding of 'religion' implies, therefore, that it is firmly opposed to 'revelation' and 'church'. The recourse to a 'faith' passed down by church tradition has evidently become obsolete in modern times. And in this sense de Lagarde also represents a concept of emancipation that recurs in a somewhat modified form in Bonhoeffer's expectation of a 'religionless Christianity'. I have become increasingly interested meanwhile in the, as yet, unanswered question as to how de Lagarde arrived at this statement. I am not entirely certain that it can be answered, but it does seem to be a fundamental one: 'religion' has gained a new meaning in a double sense since the beginning of the 'modern era' (Neuzeit): it is no longer synonymous with the classical religio, and it has acquired, in close connection with that development, such an extraordinary importance that it has actually displaced 'faith'-at least in the eyes of its advocates. If the assumption of de Lagarde can be verified, then we have a terminus a quo for the modern understanding of 'religion'. It follows that the question of the terminus ad quem must be raised again and even more urgently than occurred so far, most explicitly by Wilfred Cantwell Smith. 13

7he Origin

if my

Research Prqject

I had come across representatives of 'religion' as early as the 1960s, in the context of my work on my Bonhoeffer thesis. These representatives included Friedrich Daniel Ernst Schleiermacher (1768-1834), Wilhelm Dilthey (1833-1911), Friedrich Naumann (1860-1919), Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) and Paul Tillich (1886-1965). It was certainly

II The first reference to Paul de Lagarde is found in the new edition of the lecture notes, in Bonhoeffer 1972: 158(; c( de Lagarde 1878: 55. 12 De Lagarde 1878: 55. 13 Smith 1964.

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not Karl Barth's cntlclsm (1886-1968), or even that of Bonhoeffer, that led me to consider them as theologically unacceptable. A little later, in the context of a critical analysis of the increasing use of the word 'religion', I was able to take a closer look at these representatives and it became clear to me just how strongly and vividly they had experienced 'religion'. I investigated not only Schleiermacher, Dilthey and Troeltsch, but also Tomas G. Masaryk (1850-1937), as well as Romain Rolland (1866-1944), whom Sigmund Freud (18561936) dismissed so laconically by saying that he, Freud, could not even discover this 'feeling' in himself.14 Shortly after that, I came across Albert Einstein (1879-1955)15 and much later also Rudolf Otto who had written about his own religious experience. 16 As a result of these studies, my understanding of 'religion' became considerably enhanced. I saw that 'religion' was much more than a theoretical concept and that it not only served the seemingly sober separation of 'inwardness' (Innerlichkeit) from outward worldliness in the sense of the (neo-Protestant) theory of the 'Two Realms'; but also that 'religion' for these scholars was one of the most meaningful experiences they had ever encountered in their lives. 17 The way this experience manifested itself can best be illustrated by an autobiographical account left to us by Ernst Troeltsch: Religion is fluid and full of life, at every moment drawing on the direct touch of God; it is extremely inward, personal, individual and abrupt. The most lively times of religion are those farthest from the church. They are the most enthusiastic; they cause an individual's deepest heartfelt urges to surface. 18

Though I have, so far, not been able to drop my reservations against such positions (perhaps because of my Catholic background to which I have already referred), I can however no longer deny them my respect. After all, such testimonies reflect a personal experience of such intensity that they deserve to be accepted as such. 19 As a result, 14 Cf. Feil 1974: 676-688. This article was a critique on the paper on religious instruction in schools which the Synod of the dioceses of the Federal Republic of Germany was about to accept. 15 C£ Feil 1978a; 1978b: 137f. on 'Erlebte Religion in der Tradition'. 16 C£ Colpe 1990: 42, referring to Otto 1911: 709; quoted in Feil 1995a: 442f.: 'Neuzeitlich-erlebte "Religion" der protestantischen Tradition'. 17 Cf. von Weizsacker 1975: 595; Pannenberg 1988: 12. 18 Cf. Feil 1974: 678, with reference to Troeltsch 19222: 148. 19 I do not want to deny that there may also be experiences of this kind in the future, nor that there have been mystical experiences in the history of the Christian

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I have attempted since 1980 to investigate the history of the meaning of 'religion', and the corresponding experience, throughout the modern era. I am still convinced, however, that the 'time of religion' is over. The purpose of my research project was not to add another critical theory to the many that have already been proposed, and to attempt to reject the now common recourse to 'religion' by means of such a theory, but to describe its history from religio up to 'religion', of which above all Schleiermacher, as also Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1749~1832), gave eloquent testimony. My concern, then, was not to add yet another theory to the many already formulated, and which would in no way bring to an end the discussion on the pro and contra 'religion'. My aim instead has been to further our knowledge and comprehension of the history that has led to the present situation, and bring to light, and discuss, new facts and insights. The initial aim of my research project was to clarify the relationships between 'faith-reason-religion'. It would, I hoped, contribute to the current attempts at examining the basis of social and political realities, which are often related to 'religion' (c£ 'civil religion'). I soon realised that the history of the meaning of 'religion' was particularly unclear and I assumed that I would quickly find the needed clarity when I embarked on a study of the history of the term religio from early Christianity onwards. Having published the first 20 and the second parts 21 of my study, I am now trying to explore the period up to 1830. Because my studies have shown that there was no continuous development in the meaning of the word 'religion' from the classical Roman and Christian religio to modern, specifically Protestant 'religion', my concern now is to discover how this transformation, or change, in the meaning of the term actually occurred. On the basis of the results which this project has delivered so far, the views of two authors on 'religion' will now be presented, to wit those of Christian Wolff and Johann Christian Edelmann. If I am not mistaken, it is precisely these two scholars who occupied such prominent positions in terms of our problem, in the first half of the faith and beyond the Christian realm. However, whether such experiences in themselves constitute 'religion', is a question which cannot be answered here. Christian mystical experiences have certainly not been described so far within the (interpretative) category of 'religion'. 20 Feil 1986. 21 Feil 1997.

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18th century. This contribution will be concluded by presenting some conclusions that may justifiably be drawn from my analyses of Wolff's and Edelmann's views on 'religion'.

Christian Wolf's Use

if the

Word 'Religio'

I shall outline against the background of the political, social and intellectual transitions of his time,22 just how Christian Wolff (16791754) understood 'religion'.23 I have chosen to discuss this philosopher in particular, who suffered much from being accused of rationalism by the Pietists of his time, because he had developed a philosophical school that had a stabilising effect on a concept of philosophy based on reason. At the same time, while in Halle and elsewhere, Pietism gradually declined, a new radical form of Pietism flourished in several other places. Wolff was born in Breslau where he also spent his youth. Having studied theology, philosophy, and later mathematics and the natural sciences in jena, he began to teach mathematics at the university of Halle in 1707, then changed to philosophy, the entire field of which he taught until 1723, when he was dismissed and banished by Wilhelm I. Mter intermittent teaching at Marburg, he was called back to Halle and re-instated in his post by Friedrich II, King of Prussia. Wolff's aim was to develop a philosophical system on the model of mathematics with special recourse to Leibnitz. For that purpose, he wrote numerous and extensive works, among which three are of special interest to our subject: Theologia naturalis (1736/37, 17392), Jus naturae (1740-1748), and Philosophia moralis sive ethica (1750-1753). Wolff begins his Theologia naturaliJ24 by emphatically stating that his 22 A few dates must suffice to illustrate these transitions. The deaths of Louis XIV of France (1643-1715, regent since 1660) and of Charles XII of Sweden (1682-1718, monarch since 1697), brought an end to the two wars they caused: the Spanish War of Succession and the Nordic War. At the same time, the danger posed by the Turks to Europe right up to the relief of Vienna in 1683, had been definitively averted by the capture of Belgrade in 1717. During the period of peace that followed, far-reaching changes took place. The Seven Years War (1740-1747) between Friedrich II of Prussia (1712-1786) and Maria Theresia (1717-1780) brought about new political and social constellations. These changes resulted in new possibilities for the middle classes whose growing influence finally led to the French Revolution. 23 The results of my research on Wolff are summarized here and will be published in greater detail in Feil forthcoming/a, forthcoming/b. 24 Wolfius 1739, l741.-In the following, cited as Wolfius 1739, respectively 1741, and referred to by paragraphs.

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aim is to further 'the sincere reverence towards God' (sincera in Deum pietas)25-i.e., not religi~, and to demonstrate the insufficiency of the natural religio and the superiority and necessity of the revealed religio.26 It is quite amazing that he never explicitly discusses the issue of religio in these disquisitions. Even in the second part, in which he deals with atheistic and heterodox positions, he mentions 'to give honour to God' (Deum eolere) as the most fundamental mark of the actions that man owes to God; and in this context, he characterises religio as 'the way in which God must be honoured' (modus eolendi Deum),27 This shows that Wolff, though he does not explicitly refer to either of the two traditional etymologies of the word 'religion',28 retains its traditional meaning, because he uses the term precisely as not directly referring to God. Thus 'religion' is not for him a 'rebonding to God'; he sees it as designating the careful observance of what man is bound to do towards God, i.e., the duty of every human being. Those, however, who have professionally dedicated their lives to the task of devoutly performing such actions in God's honour, have, from the High Middle Ages onwards, been referred to as members of an 'order'. The word 'order' is derived directly from the 'ordering' of special rituals due to God at specific times of the year and moments of the day. Instead of ordo, the word seela (from the Latin sequor--to follow) was also used to denote religious communities. Wycliffe, for instance, refers to the seeta Sancti Franeisei in the sense of a group of followers. In our context, it is of particular interest that the word religio is also used to refer to those who ensured that the services, prayers and rites were properly performed. This notion, which we also find in Cicero, and which Thomas Aquinas incorporated into a perfect system, recurs in its full sense in the writings of Christian Wolff. For Thomas Aquinas, religio is not one of the theological virtues of faith-hope-charity, by which alone salvation is possible and which man can attain only by the grace of God; it belongs instead to the cardinal virtues of wisdom, bravery, moderation and justice which are bestowed upon man, and demanded of him by nature. And among these, religio is related to justice: it is Wolfius 1739, Dedicatio, b 2 r, cf. [a 4 v]. Wolfius 1739, Praefatio [c 4 v]. 27 Wolfius 1739: § 511( 28 The main classical etymologies go back either to religere, i.e., 'to reread exactly, observe exactly' (Cicero, De natura deorum II 72), or to religarelreligari, i.e., 'to bind backwards/to be bound backwards' (Gellius, and later esp. Lactantius, Divinarum institutio IV 28)-With respect to these traditions, c( Feil 1986: esp. 41, 47, 63f, 72( 2S

26

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a virtus annexa, as Thomas calls it, a 'virtue bound to' justitia. It belongs thus not to the theological virtues, but to the natural moral virtues. To pay due respect to persons of rank is to comply with justice, and this is true above all of God, who is the highest being. To direct proper attention to what man owes to God is exacdy what religio means. Now we can understand precisely why this virtue of 'religion' is not of foremost importance for Wolff in his 1heologia naturalis. If we do look for a virtue, however,-and again a natural one-which is to be practised especially in direct relation to God, then it is above all 'reverence', or pietas, that emerges. 29 In the light of these findings we need not be surprised that Wolff attaches no great importance to religio in his book Ius Naturae either. 30 When he refers to a moral virtue of man independent of the theological virtues-namely faith, hope, and charity, which are bestowed only by the grace of God-and so to a virtue which man must practise on the basis of his very nature, it is again 'reverence' (pietas) that Wolff names. 31 Reverence, pietas which is often, and not quite correcdy, translated as piety, or in German as Friimmigkeit, is again a virtue that man owes to higher beings. 32 It is again this virtue of 'reverence', therefore, that Wolff regards as the decisive one in this context. Only here he points out that subjects have to honour God, adding that the 'way in which God is honoured' (modus colendi Deum) is what constitutes religio.33 This religio actually proves to be the religio naturalis, a virtue which, therefore, all human beings are bound to nurture. 34 Religio does not belong to 'faith', fides, the virtue by which man is justified and which is rooted in the fact that God has revealed himself Religio has to be practised in every society,35 and its practice makes it manifest. It consists, as tradition holds, of visible actions. It denotes See above, including footnote 26. de Wolff 1748. 31 de Wolff 1748: VIII § 457. 32 This virtue has, we might say, once and for all been represented in Vergil's Aeneis, in which Aeneas saved his father and the images of the gods from the burning city of Troy. To do so was a matter of the respect due to them, and in doing so Aeneas proved to be singularly pius (which does not have the same meaning as the modern 'pious'). 33 de Wolff 1748: VIII § 459. 34 Cf. de Wolff 1748: VIII § 460. 35 de Wolff 1748: VIII § 472. 29

30

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the careful observance of such necessary actions as church seIVlces which cannot be practised in the privacy of the home. According to this concept, which was developed mainly by Protestant theologians and jurists in the 16th century, the sovereign, therefore, has jurisdiction over all sacred matters' (ius circa sacra).36 This right is founded on the need for order and peace to ultimately prevail in a society. Wolff, therefore, more than others before him, distinguishes between 'outer' and 'inner worship' (cultus extemus and cultus intemus).37 He leaves the latter to the individual,38 but the former must be regulated by the sovereign, and should not be performed secredy within a society. Furthermore, this outer reverence must be regulated because God demands that we honour him, and humans have to respond to this in their societies. 39 What exacdy is meant by the term 'inner reverence' remains open. Intemus does not necessarily mean the 'innermost' of one's heart; it may equally well refer to the reverence expressed in private prayer, possibly without assuming a prayerful posture or perhaps only by reciting prayers or reading Scripture. A further question is whether the prayers said joindy by a family in their own home would also constitute 'inner reverence'. Wolff clearly holds that there is a 'truth' to religio, and that there is a 'true religio'.40 He does not, however, explain which one is truethough he implies that the true one could, of course, be no other but his own. For him, the 'truth' depends upon the 'divine attributes of perfection',41 and it is from them that the quality of goodness rooted in morals is derived. Morals have their foundation in the 'law', especially the 'natural law'. Thus knowledge of God leads to knowledge of the kind of behaviour that natural law requires from human beings, particularly in the context of a human society.42 In addition to this natural law, there are rules which people living in any given society have agreed upon. Before they did so, they would have lived in a state of (pure) nature,43 with all its advantages

36 37

38 39

40 41 42

43

de Wolff 1748: VIII § 946. de Wolff 1748: VIII § 947, cf. 949. de Wolff 1748: VIII § 947f., 950ff. Cf. de Wolff 1748: VIII § 475, 950. de Wolff 1748: VIII § 475. Cf.Wolfius 1741: § 521, and passim. de Wolff 1748: VIII § 456, 458. de Wolff 1748: § 953.

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and disadvantages. A society comes into being because people gather in order to found it and determine its structures, i.e., establish laws according to which they choose to live as a community.44 This fundamental law (lex fUndamentalistS may prescribe that only one particular 'outer worship' is to be practised,46 and that the leader of that society (Rector civitatis) has no legal right to introduce a new (i.e., a different) religioY On the other hand, it may be permitted that in a given case, and as long as it is not expressly excluded, this leader may belong to a different religio from that prevailing in the society he leads. How closely Wolff adheres to the traditional use of the word religio, meaning the painfully accurate observance of obligatory practices, is evident from a unique text in which he uses the term in a profane context. (A parallel might be that pietas has to be practised with respect to parents as well as to the gods.) In his discussion of the right of the sovereign to inflict the death penalty, the 'right of the sword' (jus gladii) as it was called, Wolff states that this right must be practised with the highest degree of religio.48 This statement can only mean that the sovereign is stricdy obliged to keep to the procedures regulating the imposition of this extreme penalty. It is in classical juridical language especially that this-by no means frequent-secular use of religio can be found, for here the religio of the judge is mentioned without any god being involved. This concept of religio, in the sense of meticulous care in manifest actions, is also maintained by Wolff in the third work under review, his Philosophia moralis. 49 In that treatise also, he deals first and foremost with 'reverence' (pietas).50 He makes it plain that pietas is not a matter of theology, or faith, by using the tide Philosophia, which is a classification that has so far not been found elsewhereY On the other hand, the certain knowledge, and acknowledgement, of God constitutes the fundament of his ethics, and from that basis Wolff is able to derive the actions that correspond to natural law. 52 44

45 46 47

48 49 50

51 52

de Wolff 1748: § 950. de Wolff 1748: § 956ff. cr. also de Wolff 1748: § 952. de Wolff 1748: § 956. de Wolff 1748: § 841. de Wolff 1751. de Wolff 1751: § 226, 337, 366, 495, and passim. de Wolff 1751: § 103. de Wolff 1751: cf. § 109-113.

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To the-very detailed-volume of his Ethics, Wolff adds a short and very illuminating chapter on religio naturalis. His ethical understanding of it becomes very clear here. Wolff characterises religio naturalis as the guarantee that man will fulfil his duties towards God and that man's will be directed towards fulfilling his obligations towards himself and others. 53 As our obligations are derived from the divine attributes, they are to be fulfilled in a disposition of obedience towards God. In this context, Wolff repeats the definition of religio as the 'way to honour God' (modus colendi Deum). He does not, however, discuss the cultus extemus and cultus intemus here, but instead enumerates inward dispositions of man such as the recognition of, obedience to, and love for, God, and others which include the invocation of, and spiritual thanksgiving to, God. All human actions inspired by these dispositions and in accordance with the natural law, pertain to religio, because the fulfilment of duty springs from knowledge of God and thus belongs to the way how God must be honoured. The ethical nature of religio becomes fully evident here. Knowledge of God, derived as it is from natural theology and from the book of nature, serves as a source of this religio, insofar as it is natura1. 54 Religio is also as unchangeable and universal as natural law. 55 The 'worship of the divine' (cultus divinus) , that follows from the natural religio, is identical with the worship of the revealed religio, because the former remains present in the latter. 56 Revealed religio can only be supplementary to the natural religio, in that it adds elements that are inaccessible to natural religion. 57 And here we see the appearance of a contrast between faith and reason. There is, however, no corresponding contrast between religio and 'reason', because for Wolff it is intelligible by natural reason that God exists and that he must, therefore, be revered. Wolff explicitly specifies this 'veneration' (cultus?8 by differentiating between 'public' and 'private worship' (cultus publicus and cultus privatus), and he again subdivides private veneration into 'outward' and 'inward' (cultus extemus and intemus). Cultus denotes any way in which any individual worships God, and cultus privatus the worship that a 53 54

55

56 57 58

de Wolff 1751: § 505 (pertains also to the rest of the paragraph). de Wolff 1751: § 505. de Wolff 1751: § 506f. de Wolff 1751: § 517; cf. 507. de Wolff 1751: § 517: 'Fides superaddit rationi impervia'; cf. § 507. Cf. de Wolff 1751: § 509-512.

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person performs alone in private. 59 In a way, 'domestic veneration' (eultus domestieus) is also at play here, when it involves the members of a household gathering together with the pater Jamilias to worship God. Like eultus as such, eultus privatus comprises more than ritual practices alone, because it denotes the 'performance of all obligations towards God' (praestatio omnium rffieiorum erga Deum) , from the 'vivid acknowledgement of God' to 'reverence' for Him (reverentia) and 'prayer' to Him. 60 Wolff adds that it comprises the fulfilment of all the other obligations we have towards ourselves and others. 51 A problem arises in this connection when Wolff lays emphasis on the fact that 'ceremonies' also belong to the eultus privatus, arguing that every human being has by nature the right to establish such practices,52 which means that he must also perform them privately, for himself But what about the eultus intemus? It seems basically to concern man's desire to honour God. 53 Only once does Wolff deal in detail with this inner veneration of God, i.e., where he states that it was the persecutions against the early Christians that helped to develop the eultus intemus, in view of the fact that the eultus extemus had to be practised as inconspicuously as possible at the time and devoid of all splendour. 54 Wolff, therefore, does not treat the question of eultus intemus very explicitly and is mainly concerned with the eultus extemus. He still holds nonetheless that the two depend upon each other and belong together, just like the body and the sou1. 65 It is striking and certainly not incidental that the differentiation between 'outward' and 'inward' is applied only to 'worship' (eultus) and in no single case to religio. The expression religio intema is not found in any of the works studied. On the contrary, Wolff explicitly points out that religio cannot do without rites and ceremonies, i.e., without visible and manifest actions. It should be noted that Wolff regards these rites or ceremonies as belonging solely to the realm of nature. For example, he points out

59

'Quoniam cultu privatu unus quisque solus per se Deum colit' (de Wolff 1751:

§ 510, cf. 509). 60 61

62 63 64

65

Cf. e.g., de Wolff 1751: § 512, and passim. Cf. de Wolff 1751: § 513. de Wolff 1751: § 510. de Wolff 1751: § 512. Cf. de Wolff 1751: § 518. Cf. especially de Wolff 1751: § 512.

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that baptism was introduced by the Jews in order to establish a sign for the reception of the Proselytes. Christians then took over this natural practice, which by 'faith' alone became a sacrament. 66 This explains Wolff's statement that heathens and Christians enact the same 'rites'Y Only by the grace of God does a rite transcend being merely a sign and a ceremony, and attain the efficacy of sanctification, whereby it becomes a sacrament. 58 But for Wolff this specification, too, lies within the realm of cultus and thus is part of the wider framework of religio, which cannot dispense with 'ceremonies'.69 Religio thus remains basically, and in these texts always and entirely, related to 'veneration'. This usage of the word illustrates its traditional, classical meaning which is: to conscientiously pay heed to the correct practice of 'veneration'. That Wolff remains in this classical tradition, and the degree to which he does so, is evident from the last two paragraphs on religio, in which he states that religio means doing )ustice to God' (justitia erga Deum).70 This then is the cardinal virtue to which religio belongsa virtue appropriate and accessible to man by his very nature, and possessing the quality of a moral virtue. By expressly referring to Cicero and Thomas Aquinas, Wolff emphasises that religio represents a 'special virtue' (virtus specialis), that is part of the virtue of )ustice' (justitia).71 This, he argues, is why he deals with it within his ethical framework,72 and it means that whoever acts against religio does not infringe upon the love of God but violates justice. This justice is based on God's right to oblige man to perfonn certain actions, and on the obligation of all human beings to serve him according to his will. 73 By worshipping God with religio, we give him only that which is his due. Thus, in keeping with classical tradition, Wolff unmistakably counts religio among the natural virtues, which means that all human beings have to practise it. It means, too, that it is an attitude which man must acquire: it is not given to him by nature and he does not

66 67 68 69 70

71 72 73

de de de de de de de de

Wolff Wolff Wolff Wolff Wolff Wolff Wolff Wolff

1751: 1751: 1751: 1751: I 751: 1751: 1751: 1751:

§ § § § § § § §

517. 51 7. 517. 518. 519f. 519. 519. 519.

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simply possess it on the grounds of his existence. Consequently, Wolff does not take it upon himself to decide whether or not any and every human being has it. He repeatedly refers, without further comment, to the opinion, common at his time, that God had been unknown in ancient China. 74 In the writings of Wolff, there is as yet no indication of a shift in the meaning of religio towards denoting something inward, let alone innermost, to man.

Johann Christian Edelmann on 'Religion' Mter surveying Wolff's views on 'religion', it comes as quite a surprise to analyse those of Johann Christian Edelmann (1698-1767), a man just a few years younger than Wolff. Edelmann studied theology in Jena and worked as a private tutor in Austria before he moved to Herrnhut in 1734. Gottfried Arnold and his Unparthayische Kirchen- und Ketzer-Historie, as well as the physicotheological poetry of Berthold Heinrich Brockes, inspired him to turn to a more radical logos-doctrine. This heterodox position forced him to move several times until he finally found refuge in Berlin in 1749, but only after he had agreed to abstain from publishing any further writings. He remained a radical Pietist who opposed all institutions, whilst, at the same time, sustaining a special way of relying on reason. His allembracing framework, however, was his total belief in the apokatastasis pantoon, the 'restoration of all things'. In an early, anonymously published work, Edelmann has two people discuss the 'equal validity of the religions', the Gleichgiiltigkeit der Religionen, as expressed in the titles of the first two conversations on 'innocent truths', Unschuldige Wahrheiten. 75 We can safely conclude, therefore, that 'equal validity'76 of the religions has been the subject of debate from at least that time onward. The present debate about 'religious pluralism', therefore, is by no means new. One participant, namely the representative of one of the Christian 'factions' (Partheyen) , holds that true 'religion' exists primarily in the 'three main religions',

Cf. Wolfius 1714: § 513, 517, 523. Edelmann 1735a, 1735b. Edelmann 1735b is erroneously dated as 735; its title page is misplaced between pp. 70 and 71. The quotations from these two discussions will be cited below only by page number. 76 I have not been able to verifY whether the German word Gleichgiiltigkeit carried the pejorative sound in the 18th century as it does today. 74

75

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i.e., in the 'Roman, Lutheran, and Reformed' persuasions;77 the other representative, the philosopher searching for the truth representing Edelmann himself, sees salvation wherever God, who is love, is at work. Edelmann answers the question of whether 'every religion can effect salvation' by saying that 'God can make everyone in any religion a Christian'. 78 It is necessary, therefore, to relinquish the single 'religions', or 'sects' (in the sense of followers),79 and no longer show allegiance to a 'faction' (Parthey), but to live instead in love, which alone constitutes 'true Christian religion'. 80 In the last of his fourteen inquiries, Edelmann, still anonymous, lays bare his concept of 'religion'. He begins by distinguishing between 'religion' and 'worship' (Gottesdienst). The latter is already practised by all things created, material as well as animal, whereas 'religion' comprises the ore-unification' and ore-connection with God' (Gott).81 Edelmann transcends the common meaning of 'religion' here in two ways. Firstly, he separates it from any kind of service and interprets it as love. Secondly, however, he modifies the etymology handed down from classical times by replacing the idea of Riickbindung, i.e., ore-bonding' to God, with Wiedervereinigung, ore-unification' (in which the 're-' means 'again'). He interprets this term, which comes from the mystical tradition, within the framework of a definite theory, that of the apokatastasis, i.e., the 'bringing back again of all things' (Lehre von der Wiederbringung alter Dinge).82 He calls this the Grund-Articul alZer Religion, 'the fundamental article of all religion'. Because it is verified by the testimonies of reason, Scripture and church tradition, Edelmann concludes 'that no other article of Christianity can do without it'.83 Apokatastasis, therefore, is also the fundamental assumption upon which Edelmann's concept of 'religion' is based. He accepts this apokatastasis, however, because the word of Scripture that God is all in all cannot be fulfilled without it. 84 This is also the basis on which the 'equal validity of the religions' is built.

Edelmann 1735a: 15, cf. 19; 1735b: 72f., and passim. Edelmann 1735a: 24, cf. 49. 79 Edelmann 17 35a: 51. 80 Ibid. 77, cf. 81£ 81 Edelmann 1738: 262. Discussions nos. 13 and 14 are counted separately in this volume. The following citations refer to discussion no. 14. B2 Edelmann 1738: V. B3 Thus in the tide of the 14th discussion. 84 Edelmann 1738: 280, 282£ 77

78

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A few years later, probably towards the end of his career as a writer, Edelmann again drastically sharpened his position in a book that he significantly entitled GlaubensbekenntnifJ, 'confession of faith'.85 He sharply criticises any kind of 'religion', arguing, that if even the ancient druids are commonly severely blamed for their practice of human sacrifice, then Christians must also be condemned, and even more severely, for murdering many more people in far more cruel ways and for doing so, moreover, to 'render service to their God'.86 Edelmann repeats his understanding of 'religion' as 'rebonding again/ or re-unification' (Wiederzusammenbindung /oder eine Wiederoereinigung) ,87 and proceeds beyond it by stating that 'there can be no re-unification, nor so-called religion, between God and ourselves', because there has never been a separation; to support this, Edelmann refers to the word of Scripture (Acts 17,28) which states that we live, and move, and have our being, in God. 88 Love alone possesses a 'unifYing strength',89 upon which the so-called 'religions' have infringed far too much. 90 This love, which is as old as the world, was not created by Jesus, but renewed by him. 9l This is why Christians could still speak of themselves as belonging to a 'religion' in the beginning, for they practised this love which 'alone is the religion by which a person is saved' (die allein selig machende Religion).92 Edelmann strongly underlines this concept by his extremely sharp rejection of any kind of 'faith': there is 'no greater enemy of true religion by which alone one may be saved [...J than faith'.93 He adds that 'faith does neither effect salvation nor does disbelief cause damnation'.94 'Faith' has led to nothing but the further separation of human minds (Gemiither) 'which were already divided more than enough'.95 By thus contrasting 'faith' and 'religion' and by completely rejecting 'faith', Edelmann offends, in an unprecedented way, genuine

85 86 87 88 89 90 91 92 93 94 95

Edelmann Edelmann Edelmann Edelmann Edelmann Edelmann Edelmann Edelmann Edelmann Edelmann Edelmann

1746. 1746: 1746: 1746: 1746: 1746: 1746: 1746: 1746: 1746: 1746:

310. 313. 313. 314. 317. 317. 317[. 318. 319. 320.

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Protestant tradition and conviction. At the same time, his wntmgs offer the earliest proof so far of the thesis of the resolute opposition between 'faith' and 'religion' in Early Modern Times which Paul de Lagarde has formulated. The direct influence of the English Deists, though, of which de Lagarde also speaks, cannot be explicitly verified from Edelmann's writings. His partiality for 'religion', however, is clearly evident, although the term no longer has the specific meaning it had in the classical occidental tradition. On the contrary, he contends that all 'religions' should be rejected because they have all been rent asunder by priestly interests in particular. They all stand under the verdict of 'equal validity' as opposed to the one true 'religion' which is 'love'. Edelmann's position sharply contrasts with that of Wolff. The two authors do not differ in their appraisal of reason, but they do differ in their assessment of institutions insofar as they concern 'religion'. By seeking a 'religion' of 'love', Edelmann turns out to be more modern than Wolff, or, more precisely, to be an early representative of modernity.

Consequences for the Difinition

if 'Religion'

The outcome of my studies of Wolff and Edelmann must, of course, still be tested and confirmed against the research of other authors. So far, however, my studies have produced several interesting surprises. On the one hand, there is as yet in Wolff, as late as the middle of the 18th century, no trace of a start to the modern understanding of 'religion' as it came to be held by Schleiermacher as well as Goethe and others, including Ernst Troeltsch. Even Wolff's opponent Christian August Crusius (1715-1765) does not differ from Wolff in this respect. On the other hand, a decidedly different position is discernable in Edelmann's work. Although he also does not yet really emphasize the inner 'emotion' (GifUhl) , he does relocate 'religion' as something completely inward. He even go so far as to totally transcend religion by basically stating the 'reunion' of man with God and, transcending even that, by suggesting their permanent union. When he speaks about 'religion', he designates it as 'love' (Liebe). In his view, the 'unifying power' proper to it causes man to become one with God, and whatever may seem to block this union in this life is overcome by the apokatastasis.

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The rational version of such a 'religion' which has shifted inward, is evident in Kant's 'religion within the limits of mere reason'. In that notion of 'religion'-the precise relationship of which with 'rational belief' (Vemurifiglauben) still has to be determined-Kant conceived 'religion' as an ethical category. But, in contradistinction to Wolff, Kant transferred 'religion' to inwardness (Innerlichkeit), because he wanted to keep it free from all heteronomy.96 Kant would have turned in his grave if he had known that his concept of 'religion' would be blended with that of Schleiermacher according to the New-Kantian philosophy of Paul Natorp (1854-1924) who explicitly qualified 'religion' as a 'feeling'.97 The two-seemingly or presumably-opposing positions of Kant and Schleiermacher are thereby fused. All things considered, it cannot be denied that in the 18th century a new concept of 'religion' emerged and that, as can be seen from Natorp, it was clearly Schleiermacher's version that won the day. It was this notion that-despite differing facets-was to dominate for a century and a half, even though the classical Roman understanding was never entirely forgotten, e.g., in the Catholic tradition. 98 One might even question whether, within the Roman Catholic church, one ever became fully aware of the new features of the term 'religion', because of the very common (though incorrect) etymology, derived from Lactantius in particular, of religio as 're-bonding' to God. It can be said in consequence, that: (1) If the meaning of religio had remained the same as it had done with remarkable continuity from classical times up to Wolff, we would For an exact definition of 'autonomy' and 'heteronomy', cf. Feil 1987: 25-112. Natorp 1975: 116: 'Religion stands for a distinct fundamental form of consciousness, namely feeling, and more specifically, feeling in its highest degree, in its claim to represent the universal power comprising and unifying all the other [powers], the original, inexhaustible living source of all consciousness.' This definition shows in no way that it is of Neo-Kantian origin. 98 It is revealing that the notion of religio as a 'feeling' cannot adequately be translated into Latin, as the Catholic documents against the Modernists show, particularly the encyclical Pascendi dominici gregis (1907) and the 1910 oath against the Modernists, cf. Feil 1996. Very interesting is the use of the word 'religion' in Emile Durkheim's writings; it can denote 'convictions and practices', but mostly it means a 'direct feeling'; this latter term can be traced back to Friedrich Max Miiller and to his father Wilhelm Miiller, a writer of romantic songs (e.g., 'Am Brunnen vor dem Tore'); cf. Feil 1996: 577ff. 96 97

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not have any serious problems in defining the term today, nor in going on to use it, for instance, in the 'science of religion', because the classical word religio simply means the careful attention given to practices performed in due reverence to the gods, God, or the 'Infinite'. Nor, with the old meaning retained, could a discipline called 'Philosophy of Religion' or 'Psychology of Religion' ever have developed, because the word pietas, which Wolff still preferred in order to define everything that later came to be associated with 'religion', would have been far more appropriate than religio. But the word pietas had possibly become unsuitable for expressing the comprehensive and fundamental anthropological datum of a deep inward 'feeling of the Infinite' (Schleiermacher) in the 18th century, because it had become associated with the Pietist movement as a whole. It was neither expected nor plausible, even as late as the first half of the 18th century, that a new meaning would be given to 'religion' by authors like Wolff. There was simply no direct path leading from religio as a virtus specialis of iustitia to 'religion' as the 'sense and taste of the Infinite' (Schleiermacher). In philological terms, we might say that the word 'religion' underwent a development that ultimately became far more than the enlargement of a given meaning: there is no doubt that the term was given a completely new meaning. I hope soon to be able to show the stages99 through which the word 'religion' gained this new meaning. It can be assumed that there were strong influences at work from Pietism as well as from French Quietism. But it is precisely the term religio or 'religion' which neither movement would have applied to themselves. Thus far, I have been able to find testimony to such experience and sentiment in the work of Friedrich Gotdieb Klopstock (1724-1803) and Karl Philipp Moritz (1756-1793).100 (2) That 'religion' denotes an experience, an emotion, a feeling, proves to be an indisputable fact during a particular period of time. This specific 'religion', therefore, belongs to the particular epoch in which it took shape. For this reason, we may indeed speak of a (specific) 'time of religion'. For a great number of people, especially intellectuals, this era was basically characterised by the fact that revelation and church were no longer even of minor importance, but had 99 Cf. the section on Johann Christian Edelmann in this article. The results will be published in full in Feil forthcoming/a, forthcoming/b. 100 Feil 1996.

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become superfluous; and it was this 'religion' which they felt united all human beings. Romain Rolland gives convincing testimony to this. 101 It is against this background only that we can understand Rudolf Otto's demand at the beginning of his book Das Heilige, that we 'recall a moment of strong religious agitation, and one that is as one-sided as we may possibly achieve', as well as his admonition that: Whoever is unable to do so, or never has such moments, is asked not to go on reading. 102

I do not wish to belittle Otto whom I have come to respect and to understand on the basis of his personal experience, but I cannot deny that I am still rather amazed at his vehemence. The results of my studies so far, however, support more than ever before my conviction that the 'time of religion', along with its important representatives, has come to an end. It means that I do not only retain the time named by, for instance, de Lagarde as its terminus a quo, but that I also agree with Bonhoeffer about its terminus ad quem. I03 I maintain, therefore, that 'religion', which developed in this form shortly before 1800, had more or less come to an end by the middle of the present century. I would not expect that anybody can use the word 'religion' today in the way Rudolf Otto or Ernst Troeltsch did; nor could one assume that today's generation could experience it as they did. I do not need to prove that their positions are theologically untenable and that they are certainly incompatible with a Lutheran understanding, especially when the idea of revelation is totally disregarded. The manner in which a dichotomy between 'faith' and 'religion' was created by Otto and Troeltsch, devaluating, or even eliminating, the first in favour of the latter, constitutes a total contradiction to genuine Christian conviction. 101 Cf. Sigmund Freud's very instructive text, Das Unbehagen in der Kultur (1930) in Freud 1972: 421ff. 102 Otto 1917/1963: 8. I shall not quote the reference which Otto then made about people who are capable only of remembering their bodily and social feelings, because I do not want to be blamed again for another cutting remark, as I was by Greschat (1995: 462); cf. about this, Feil 1995b: 506. 103 The fact that, against this background, I regard the 'new religious movements' and the so-called Jugendreligionen not as 'religions' but rather as surrogates, need not be explicitly argued here. However, I would like to emphasise that I do not want to disparage anyone searching for the meaning of life and happiness.

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(3) As for the possibilities of precise definitions, we find that the classical Roman meaning of religlo, later adopted by the early Christians, reflects the same sense of careful attention to obligatory practices, One finds that meaning only very rarely in juridical usage; it was usually specifically applied to the realm of man's dealings with the gods, or God, The modern, or more precisely, the neuzeitlich-Protestant, 'religion' can also be accurately defined as a natural inner endowment (the 'religious a priori') that relates man directly to God (who was later, and more anonymously, called the 'Infinite', the 'Universe', the 'Absolute', or the 'Transcendence'), and was specifically experienced through, or felt to exist as, a 'feeling', This 'religious feeling' was considered to be an anthropological datum, Where 'religion' is described as 'perceiving, contemplating the Universe', 104 it carries the implication that it may even may surpass 'God': God is not All in religion but One, and the Universe is more,IOS

I interpret the present problems of defining 'religion', therefore, as an indication that the modern experience, and notion, of 'religion' has dissolved and no longer exists as such. This does not, of course, mean that I presume that experiences like those testified to by Isaiah, St. Paul, Teresa of Avila, or Pascal, which are evidently found only among mystics, in the narrow sense of the word, did not occur in times prior to the 'time of religion'.I06 They did not, however, use the word religio for those experiences. And, in contrast to modern 'religion', those mystical experiences were not considered as something inherent in human nature, a reality they could achieve on their own; what the mystics described was regarded as a special gift from God.107 Moreover, these mystic experiences cannot be separated from respectively the Old Testament or the Christian tradition of faith, or from revelation and the community of those sharing that faith. Schleiermacher 1958: 70 (with reference to the original page number 126). Schleiermacher 1958: 73f. (original page number 132). 106 The frequendy quoted Karl Rahner statement, that the Christian of the future will either be a mystic or not exist at all, seems to me to strain the word 'mystic' to unhelpful limits. 107 With respect to the non-Christian experiences of contact with God, as for example in Islam, and the Far-Eastern experiences of enlightenment, I would like to say that I do not deny them but rather respect them. It must be said, though, that they neither had, nor have, a term or notion corresponding to religio or 'religion'. 104

105

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In contrast to the Christian tradition of faith, modern 'religion', according to a great number of significant authorities, is not based on divine revelation as the source of inspiration. A great number of those who have experienced this 'religion', identify themselves as belonging to the culture that was initiated by, and had passed through, the period of Enlightenment. The Kantian version (of humanism) seems to have offered to those who did not have access to special experiences of the 'Absolute', the possibility of living as members of this culture. Attempts to define 'religion' encounter almost insurmountable difficulties today, because the very experience, as it was formerly expressed, no longer occurs in the same way. The character of experiences, sentiments and 'feelings' also changes with time. We may either welcome or regret this, but we cannot deny it. To state this is not to disparage it, but, on the contrary, to take those epochbound experiences seriously. It is not, therefore, a matter of depreciation when limitations and shortcomings of a past period are focused on, but a question of a realistic diagnosis, combined with appropriate respect. I am sure also that the scientific research of the type which we now call 'Science of Religion' will continue to study this field in the future. Whether or not the 'Philosophy of Religion' will continue to be regarded as a central task of philosophy remains to be seen. It has already ceased to be generally accepted as one of its main concerns, and is certainly no longer regarded as its summit. 'Faith', however, will continue to come 'from hearing' (Rom 10, 17; Gal 3, 2.5). It has its own innovative potential for developing new forms. That, however, is not the subject of this contribution.

Rqerences Barth, K, 1955, Die miindige Welt (1): Dem Andenken Dietrich Bonhoiffers; Vortrage und Briife. Miinchen: Chr. Kaiser (1959 3). Bonhoeffer, D., 1931-1932, 'Geschichte der Systematischen Theologie des 20. Jahrhunderts', in Bonhoeffer 1994: 139-213. - - - , 1970, Widerstand und Ergebung: Brie.fe und Aufzeichnungen aus der Hofi (edited by Eberhard Bethge; new edition). Miinchen: Chr. Kaiser. - - - , 1972, Seminare-Vorlesungen-Predigten, 1924-1941. Miinchen: Chr. Kaiser (= Gesammelte Schriften, V). - - - , 1994, Okumene, Universitat, Iforramt: 1931-1932 (edited by Eberhard Amelung and Christoph Strohm). Miinchen: Chr. Kaiser (= Dietrich Bonhoeffer Werke, 11).

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Colpe, c., 1990, Ober das Heilige: Versuch, seiner Verkennung kritisch vorzubeugen. Frankfurt: Anton Hain. [Edelmann, ].C.], 1735a, Unschuldige Wahrheiten Gespriichs-weise abgehandelt zwischen Doxophilo und Philaletho, Worinnen von aller Hand, theils veifallenen, theils gegenwiirtig unterdriickten, theils noch unbekannten Wahrheiten, Nach Einleitung der Bibel, Auf eine freymiithige und aujrichtige Art geredet wird. Erste Unterredung Von der Gleichgiiltigkeit der Religionen, Nach Einleitung der Worte Joh. XVIII. 38. Was ist Wahrheit?, in Edelmann 1969, vol. I: I-56. --~, 1735b, von Unschuldigen Wahrheiten Zweyte Unterredung, In welche die Materie Von der Gleichgiiltigkeit der Religionen etwas eigentlicher abgehandelt, und zugleich von Toleranz der Meinungen zu Diskutieren angifangen wird, Nach voriger Art freymiithig vorgestellt, bey Betrachtung der Worte Pauli Eph. IV 2. vertraget einer den anderen in Liebe, in Edelmann 1969, vol. I: 57-127. --~, 1738, Unschuldige Wahrheiten Vierzehende Unterredung, in welcher Die Lehre von der Wiederbriugung aller Dinge, als der Grund-Articul aller Religion, aus unumstiflJlichen ZeugnijJen der Vernunjfi, der Heil. Schrijt, und dem Beyfall der iiltesten und reinsten Kirchen-Lehre betrachtet, und handgreifJlich gewiesen wird, dajJ kein Einiger-Articul vom Gantzen Christentum bestehen kan, wo dieser Grund geleugnet wird . .. , in Edelmann 1969, vol. V. --~, 1746, AbgeniJ1higtes Jedoch Andem nicht wieder aufgeniithigtes Glaubens-BekentnijJ. Aus Veranlassung Unrichtiger und verhuntzter Abschriflen Desselben, Dem Druck iibergeben, Und Vemiiriffiigen Gemiithem Zur Priifong vorgelegt, in Edelmann 1969, vol. IX. --~, 1969, Siimtliche Schriflen in Einzelausgaben (edited by Walter Grossmann). Stuttgart-Bad Cannstatt: Friedrich Fromann-Giinther Holzboog. Eisas, C., (ed.) 1975, Religion. Ein Jahrhundert theologischer, soziologischer und psychologischer Interpretationsansiitze. Miinchen: Kaiser (= Theologische Biicherei, Systematische Theologie, 56). Feil, E., 1974, 'Zur Problematik der gegenwartigen Renaissance des Religionsbegriffs', in Stimmen der Zeit 99: 672-688. --~, 1977, 1991" Die 1heologie Dietrich Bonhoiffers: Hermeneutik-Christologie- Weltverstiindnis. Miinchen: Chr. Kaiser (= Gesellschaft und Theologie, Abt. Systematische Beitrage 6). - - - , 1978a, 'Zur Wiederkehr der Religion: Ein kritischer Problembericht', in Herder-Korrespondenz 32: 30-38. --~, 1978b, 'Religion und Erfahrung in der neueren protestantischen Tradition: Anmerkungen zu einem iikumenisch meist unterschatzten Problem', in HerderKorrespondenz 32: 137-141. --~, 1986, Religio: Die Geschichte eines neuzeitlichen Grundbegriffi vom Friihchristentum bis zur RifOrmation. Giittingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht (= Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, 36). --~, 1987, Antithetik neuzeitlicher Vernunfl: 'Autonomie-Heteronomie' und 'rational-irrational'. Giittingen: Vandenhoeck und Ruprecht (= Forschungen zur Kirchenund Dogmengeschichte, 39). - - - , 1995a, 'Zur Bestimmungs- und Abgrenzungsproblematik von "Religion''', in Ethik und Sozialwissenschqften: Streitforum for Erwiigungskultur 6: 441-445. --~, 1995b, 'Replik', in Ethik und Sozialwissenschqften: Streitforumfor Erwagunskultur 6: 503-513. - - - , 1996, "'Religion" als Phanomen der Neuzeit: Anmerkungen zu ihrer Auspragung in der protestantischen Tradition', in Olivetti 1996: 569-581. --~, 1997, Religio II- Die Geschichte eines neuzeitlichen Grundbegriffi zwischen RifOrmation und Rationalismus (ca. 1540-1620). Giittingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht (= Forschungen zur Kirchen- und Dogmengeschichte, 70). - - - , forthcoming/a, Religio III. Giittingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. --~, forthcoming/b, Religio IV Giittingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Freud, S., 1972 5 , Gesammelte Werke, XIV Frankfurt: S. Fischer.

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Greschat, H ..]., 1995, 'Religionsbegriff und Religionsgeschichte', in Ethik und Sozialwissenschafien: Streiiforum for Erwiigungskultur 6: 462-464. Lagarde, P. de, 1878, 'Uber das Verhaltnis des Deutschen Staates zu Theologie, Kirche und Religion', in de Lagarde 1924: 45-90. ~~-, 1924, Schrjjten for das deutsche Volk, /. Deutsche Schrjjten. Miinchen: ].F. Lehmann. Natorp, P., 1975, 'Religion innerhalb der Grenzen der Humanitat' (1908), in Elsas 1975: 116-129. Olivetti, M.M., (ed.) 1996, Philosophie de la religion entre ethique et ontologie. Padova: CEDAM [Casa Editrice Dott. Antonio Milani] (= Biblioteca dell' Archivo di Filosqfia, 14). Otto, R., 1911, 'Vom Wege', in Die christliche Welt 25: 705-7l0. ~~-, 1917/1963, Das Heilige: Uber das Irrationale in der Idee des Giittlichen und sein Verhiiltnis zum Rationalen. Miinchen: C.H. Beck. Pannenberg, W., 1988a, 'An autobiographical sketch', in Pannenberg 1988b: 11-18. -~~-, 1988b, The Theology if Woifhart Pannenberg (edited by Carl E. Braaten & Philip Clayton). Minneapolis: Augsburg. Schleiermacher, F.D.E., 1958, Uber die Religion: Reden an die Gebildeten unter ihren Veriichtem. Hamburg: Felix Meiner (1799 1; = Philosophische Bibliothek 255). Smith, W.C., 1964, The Meaning and End if Religion: A New Approach to the Religious Traditions if Mankind. N ew York: The New American Library of World Literature (1962 1; = Mentor Book, 575). Troeltsch, E., 'Religion und Kirche', in Troeltsch 19222: 146-182. ~~-, 1922 2, Gesammelte Schriflen, II. Aalen: Scientia (= new imprint, 1981). Weizsacker, C.F. von, 1975, 'Selbstdarstellung', in von Weizsacker 1977: 553-597. ~~-, 1977, Der Garten des Menschlichen: Beitriige zur geschichtlichen Anthropologie. Miinchen: Carl Hanser. Wolff, C. 1968, Gesammelte Werke (edited by Jean Ecole et alii) II 24. Hildesheim: Georg Olms. ~~-, 1970, Gesammelte Werke (edited by Jean Ecole et alii), II 14. Hildesheim: Georg Olms. ~~-., 1978-1981, Gesammelte Werke (edited by Jean Ecole et alii), II 7, 1-2, and 8. Hildesheim: Georg Olms. Wolff, C.L.B. de, 1748, Jus naturae methodo scientifica pertractatum, VIII.· de imperio publico, seu jure civitatis in qua omne jus publicum universale demonstratur et verioris politieae ineoneussa fondamenta ponuntur, in: Wolff 1968. ~~-, 1751, Philosophia moralis sive Ethiea, methodo seientifiea pertraetata III, in qua agitur de virtutibus, quibus praxis qffieiorum erga Deum et omnis religio naturalis eontinentur, in: Wolff 1970. Wolfius, C., 1739, Theologia naturalis methodo seientifiea pertraetala, /.. integrum systema complectens, qua existentia et attributa Dei a posteriori demonstrantur, editio nova, in: Wolff 1981. ~~-, 1741, Theologia naturalis Methodo seientifica pertractata, II.- qua Existentia et Attributa Dei ex Notione Entis perfictissimi et Natura Animae premonstrantur, et Atheismi, Deismi, Fatalismi, Naturalismi, Spinosismi aliorumque de Deo Errorum Fundamenta subventuntur, Editio Secunda, in: Wolff 1981.

SHIFTING CARGOES ERNST TROELTSCH ON THE STUDY OF RELIGION

Arie L. Molendijk The actual history of religion knows nothing of the common character of all religions.!

Introduction The concept of religion is something of a schibboleth in the history of twentieth century Protestant theology. In the influential work of Karl Barth, the term 'religion' meant a human enterprise and was consequently utterly unsuitable to capture the divine revelation of the Christian God. The uniqueness of the 'Word of God' forbade classification under the heading of 'religion'. Barth made a clear-cut distinction between Christian religion and the somewhat elusive 'Word of God'. This move enabled him to criticize severely, if necessary, actual forms of Christianity. It opened a gulf not only between the true revelation and religion(s), but also between Christian theologyor, more precisely, his way of practising theology-and the (scientific) study of religion. 2 By implication, the endeavour of scholars like Ernst Troeltsch, who took the 'religionsgeschichtliche' point of view and who considered philosophy of religion in a broad sense, including relevant parts of the science of religion, to be the core of modern theology, was thought bound to end in deadlock. The relevance of (the study of) 'religion' for theology, therefore, was disputed, and Religionswissenschqfl or Religionsgeschichte-as the discipline is often called in German speaking countries-had a hard time establishing itself within the German theological faculties. 3 Ernst Troeltsch (1865-1923) was one of the leading liberal Protestant theologians of the late Wilhelmine Empire. At first he taught in Heidelberg, and from 1915 onwards he occupied the old Friedrich

1

2 3

Troeltsch 1923: 43. Barth 1938: section 17. Rudolph 1962.

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Schleiermacher chair in Berlin which had been transferred to the philosophical faculty. Troeltsch was considered to be the systematician of the 'History of Religions School',4 which supported a thoroughly historical way of doing theological research. This attempt to transform theology into a scientific enterprise made him a controversial figure in ecclesiastical and traditional theological circles. Outside theology, he was held in high esteem. He was deemed to be the greatest philosopher of history after Hegel, and his magnum opus 'The Social Teachings of the Christian Churches and Groups'; is one of the classics of early sociology of religion. Because of the dominance of Barthian theology in the twentieth century, Troeltsch's work did not get the attention and appraisal it deserved. However, with the establishment of the 'Ernst Troeltsch Foundation' in 1980 and the recent preparation of a critical edition of his works, the climate seems to be changing in favour of a more historically and empirically oriented way of theologizing. His work is a fine example of a reflexive approach to science of religion within a theological context. 6 The topic of this essay will be his view on the scholarly study of religion. According to Troeltsch, theology must be based on such study, and one can even say, that he defended a transformation of theology into science/philosophy of religion as he understood it. The boundaries between (emerging) disciplines-especially between philosophy of religion and science of religion-were not yet fixed. There was a good deal of debate going on around 1900 on the question of what cargo should be handled by which discipline; a fact that has to be taken into account by the historian. Just criticizing Troeltsch for not making the necessary (i.e., our present-day) distinctions will not bring us very far, although a bit more terminological rigour would have done him no harm. This said, it has to be acknowledged that present-day notions of what the various disciplines are about, do interfere with the historical analysis. There are several good studies on Troeltsch's philosophy of religion, which remained more or less programmatic because he had difficulties following the original design. Nevertheless, the broad out-

Murrmann-Kahl 1992: 353-364; Ludemann & Schroder 1987. Troeltsch 1912b. 6 Good short introductions to the whole of Troeltsch's thought are: Rendtorff & Graf 1985; Graf & Ruddies 1986. 4

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lines are clearly visible. 7 Relatively little research, however, has been done into the ways insights of early science of religion, as we concieve it today, functioned within Troeltsch's own theology (philosophy of religion).8 Of special interest here is his handling of some core ideas of Religionswissenschqft. This topic cannot be treated in extenso here. Troeltsch's reading of literature, also in the field of science of religion, was impressive. 9 I restrict myself, therefore, to a few comments. In order to understand what science of religion meant for Troeltsch, one has to look firstly at his view of its genealogy. Secondly, I want to go in some detail into the question of in what ways Troeltsch conceptualized religion. This is done with an eye to the third point: How are these conceptualizations related to the normative stance Troeltsch wanted to take? To avoid possible misunderstandings with regard to what I intend to do, let me say that this essay is not meant as an apology of Troeltsch's way of doing things. My point of view is that of the historian of science/philosophy of religion, who admittedly thinks he has stumbled upon a particularly interesting piece of material. Because Troeltsch can show us a thing or two, I will not hesitate to make some evaluative remarks, mainly in a postscriptum. An appraisal of Troeltsch from the perspective of the present state of the art, however, is beyond the scope of my contribution. 10 Graf 1984; Apfelbacher 1978; Becker 1982: 298-344; Pye 1977; Dyson 1976. The strict distinction between philosophy of religion and science (history) of religion is somewhat anachronistic, but it makes sense, no doubt, to ask such a question from the present-day perspective. 9 His review articles, Troeltsch 1896-1899, document this fact abundantly. An extensive discussion of Troeltsch's relationship to the science of religion and its contemporary representatives is, notwithstanding the growth of the TroeltschForschung in recent decennia, still a desideratum, although there are some studies that deal with his relationship to the History of Religions School: Graf 1982; Murrmann-Kahl 1992; Ludemann & Schroder 1987; Ludemann 1996; Claussen 1997. [0 Recent attempts in this respect are: Russell 1989; Waardenburg 1992; Richard 1992. The critical stance taken by Waardenburg seems justified to me. However, an appraisal of Troeltsch depends, at least to some extent, on the material taken into account. I will restrict myself here-as did Waardenburg-to Troeltsch's view on science (philosophy) of religion. The very explicitly normative tenet of it seems reproachable from our present point of view. Seen from a wider perspective, one could very well claim that Troeltsch's main contribution-also to science of religion (including the study of the Christian religion)-lay in his sociohistorical work on the history of Christianity. In the present essay, however, I will focus on the bearing science of religion-taken as the (comparative) study of religions (in the plural)-had on Troeltsch. 7

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Tracing the Genesis

if Science if Religion

The question of where and when the science of religion originated is a contentious issue to this very day. Several intellectual and cultural movements, among which Deism, the Enlightenment, and the Romantic Movement are perhaps the most obvious candidates, are held to lie at the basis of the new field. 11 In my opinion, it is regrettable that contemporary historians of comparative religion hardly draw on Troeltsch's historiographical work. He dealt with the question on several occasions and, what is more, he made some penetrating remarks on the rise of the modern scholarly approach of religion. One of the reasons for this neglect, I guess, is that he did not focus on the evolving of a new, autonomous discipline called Religionswissenschrift or Religionsgeschichte,12 but always treated the development of the science of religion in relation to that of theology.13 Theologytaken as the cultural study of Christian religion l4-has to keep in touch with general cultural, scientific, and scholarly developments, especially if they pertained to this field, as was obviously the case with the rise of comparative religion as such. Moreover, the fact had to be taken into account that the break-through of modernity in the West during the Enlightenment fundamentally changed the conditions, under which theology operates. Modernity-in Troeltsch's use of the term-is essentially the breach with society and culture dominated by church power. Although the consequences of this major change became only gradually apparent in various fields, it implied the end of the old 'supranatural' theology and the beginning of the free scholarly study of religion. 15 II Preus 1987; Byrne 1989; Harrison 1990; Kippenberg & Luchesi 1991; Molendijk 1998. 12 I cannot unfortunately go here into terminological technicalities, that in my view matter. On the term 'Religionsgeschichte' cf. Murrmann-Kahl 1992: 353f.; Rudolph 1962. 13 Cf. Troeltsch 1902; Troeltsch 1903. 14 Cf. Troeltsch's dissertational theses (1891), number I: 'Die Theologie ist eine religionsgeschichtliche Disziplin, doch nicht als Bestandteil einer Konstruktion der universalen Religionsgeschichte, sondern als Bestimmung des Inhalts der christlichen Religion durch Vergleichung mit den wenigen groBen Religionen, die wir besser kennen', in: Renz & Graf 1982: 299f. 15 Troeltsch 1903: 32: 'Das sogenannte Mittelalter ist in Wahrheit die Periode kirchlicher Kultur, die im Gebiet des hlg. romisch-deutschen Reiches oder der Papstmonarchie, im Gebiete des byzantinischen Kaiserthums und im Gebiete des Islam durch allbeherrschende kirchliche Lebensideale und durch eine konzentrirte kirchliche Zentralmacht Denken und Leben wesentlich bestimmte. Dem gegenuber ist

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From the very start of his career, Troeltsch published numerous studies and articles, especially in the 'big mass grave'16 of the 'Realencyclopadie fur protestantische Theologie und Kirche', which dealt with the presuppositions of the new science of religion. Although Troeltsch constantly revised and refined his earlier work, he generally discerned two main tendencies, which made the rise of the science of religion possible: on the one hand, he noted shifts in the conceptual apparatus of philosophy, theology, and scholarly thought in general, and on the other hand, he charted the emergence of powerful religious movements, striving for individualization and interiorization of religion. Various groups including J ansenism, Puritanism, Quackers, the Baptist Movement, Protestant Spiritualists like Sebastian Franck, Pietism, and 'big names' like Pascal, Jean de Labadie, Fox, William Penn, Bbhme, Spener, Gottfried Arnold and Zinzendorf are all mentioned in this contextY I will not delve here into these fascinating historical analyses,18 but I would like instead to focus on the conceptual presumptions which, in Troeltsch's view, underlie science of religion. The first hallmark of the transition to the scientific study of religion mentioned is, what one might aptly call, the subjective turn. Religion is no longer primarily located in objective matters such as dogmas or church institutions, but in human subjectivity. This means a psychological approach to religion, taking religion essentially as religiosity and faith as an act of the believer. Along these lines, religion is seen as a psychic way of being and behaving common to all mankind. Apart from this psychological way of looking at religion, a second, very important prerequisite for the rise of the science of religion highlightened by Troeltsch is what we nowadays call the process of globalization. The European wars of religion in the seventeenth century had already led to some scepticism about the unique truth die Neuzeit ... zu charakterisiren als die Zeit einer prinzipiell kirchenfreien, auf dem Nationalstaat und aufintemationaler Vereinigung beruhenden Kultur der freien Ausgestaltung der humanen Lebenszwecke. Es ist selbstversUindlich, daB eine freie wissenschaftliche Arbeit an der Religion und tiber die Religion erst in dieser neuen Kulturgestaltung moglich wurde, die damit die Religion ja nicht fUr weniger wichtig erklart, sondem nur ihrer kirchlichen Organisation die Einschrankung auf das speziell religiose Gebiet vorschreibt und dane ben die Freiheit der weltlichen Lebenszwecke zur Bewegung nach ihren eigenen Gesetzen fordert'. 16 Troeltsch 1922: 9. For bibliographical information, see Graf & Ruddies 1982. 17 Cf. Troeltsch 1903: 50. 18 Cf. Molendijk 1996: 85-115.

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of Western Christianity, but it was the discovery of foreign cultures and religions by explorers, colonialists, and missionaries, which, in Troeltsch's view, enormously strenghtened the process of relativization. Besides the psychological approach to religion, a comparative one ('vergleichende Religionsgeschichte') also emerged, and together they re-enforced the belief in the similarity of human religions. The idea of 'the essence of religion' and the concept of 'natural religion', developed by the Deists, were born. Christianity, it is true, was still viewed as the absolute religion, but not because of the inspired character of the Bible or the godly authority of the Church, but because of its (perfect) correspondence with 'natural religion'. Does this all mean that, according to Troeltsch, the Deists were the first scientists of religion? To some extent, yes, although he preferred to see them as forerunners. The actual founders were men like Hume, Kant, Schleiermacher, and Hegel. 19 Nonetheless the moral one-sideness of Kant's theory of religion was badly in need of correction, as Troeltsch emphasized. 'Philosophers of religion' like Hamann, Herder, Schleiermacher, and the Romantic Movement, played an important part in discerning the distinctiveness of religion. The Romantic criticism of the Enlightenment view on religion, always and everywhere essentially the same, opened up the space for the 'real study of religion'.2o Here Troeltsch mentions a further important condition for the rise of the science of religion properly spoken, i.e., the awareness of the diversity and the individuality of religions. Apart from this particularization in the study of religions which enabled a more accurate perception of differences, another transformation is put forward, and this concerns the so-called 'independence' ('Selbstandigkeit') of religion. According to Troeltsch and other contemporary theorists, modernization involves the differentiation of spheres such as religion, the arts, politics, and economics. The coming into being of a more or less autonomous sphere of religion, as marked for instance by the separation of state and church, is the ultimate prerequisite for the rise of the science of religion. Troeltsch does not deny that religions are actually tangled up with scientific, ethical, artistic, legal, political, social, and other interests, but the conse19 Troeltsch 1898a: 653. On Deism see Troeltsch 1898b: 433; cf. Troeltsch 1925: 846: 'Der Deismus ist in Wabrheit der erste Versuch zur Bildung eines allgemeinen Religionsbegriffes, zur Beurteilung wie ErkHirung der historischen Religionen von diesem aus und zur Bestimmung des Religionsideales ihnen gegeniiber'. 20 Troeltsch 1895-1896: 367.

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quence of the proposed view is obvious: the first and foremost task of the science of religion is to study religion as such, separate from all sorts of 'admixtures'. Troeltsch himself did some major research into the interaction between (Christian) religion and non-religious factors, be they economical, political, or societa1. 21 But the stress put on the autonomy of religion seems to favour a somewhat one-sided approach of religion, as if it were possible to peel off~so to speak~ actual religious phenomena, thus getting at their core. Troeltsch, however, seriously warned not to 'essentialize' the 'essence of religion', but to discern various aspects of the question. 'The modern science of religion is usually said to be an enquiry into the essence (Wesen) if religion. The expression is correct and accurate, if it is intended to imply a methodological shift frOl'..1 the attempt at a metaphysical determination of religious objects or of the idea of God to an enquiry into religion as a phenomenon of consciousness'.22 Modern readers will feel a little uneasy about Troeltsch's way of expressing himself here, because he suggests that it is the inner religious experience that really counts. 23 A lot more could be said on this topic, but I want to move on to another implication of Troeltsch's emphasis on the autonomy of religion: it has, in his view, to be analyzed in its own terms! 'It must be examined at least provisionally as a completely independent phenomenon, which it claims itself after all to be'.24 The next step in the argument goes without saying: 'It must not be made subject from the start to general theories which prescribe in a prejudicial way what in religion is justifiable and what is not. Such would be a violation of the analysis right at the beginning, and such a violation is affected by the positivistic theory. According to this theory one knows to begin with what religion is and what it can only be: namely, an intellectual error of the primitive mentality which has managed to survive so long because of its great importance for social cohesion and its connection with t11e human need for happiness'.25 Although Troeltsch acknowledged the possibility and, to some extent, the merits Troeltsch 1912b. Troeltsch 1909a: III (emphasis in the original). 23 See Pye 1977 for some perceptive remarks on the (broad) scope of Troeltsch's 'psychology of religion', one of the main branches of the overarching science of religion; cf. below. 24 Troeltsch 1909a: 85. 25 Ibid.; Troeltsch had here (among others) Auguste Comte and John Stuart Mill in mind; cf. Troeltsch 1895-1896: 402. 21

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of the POSItIVIStIC way of practising science of religion, he strongly preferred an 'idealistic' approach. In the cultural sciences, in general, positivism and idealism are the two main alternatives. Troeltsch described this opposition in a global manner with some evident Kantian overtones and with an eye to the metaphysical assumptions involved. 26 'In more modern terms it is the contrast between Kant and Hume, and to relate it even more to the present, it is the contrast between the positivism of the Comte and the Spencer School against the interpretation of mind offered by Hegel and those akin to him' Y Troeltsch had more to say on the different types of science of religion,28 but the opposition mentioned above remained fundamental. In Troeltsch's view, Kant and Schleiermacher were key figures in the new discipline. 29 From the present point of view, therefore, he underestimated the contribution of the late nineteenth century science of religion and he did not perceive clearly the emergence of a more or less autonomous discipline of that same kind. 30

Conceptualizing Religion According to Troeltsch, the use of definitions was rather limited. He would probably have agreed with his friend Max Weber who, at the beginning of the section on the sociology of religion in 'Society and 26 Troeltsch 1909a: 82: 'In the first [sc. idealistic, AIM] case we have before us mysterious, unconditioned tendencies and impulses of the reason, appearing constandy in new forms, out of whose autonomous spontaneity spring up the great cultural formations of family, state, society, law, art, science, religion and morals. In the second [Sc. positivistic, AIM] case we have above all the regular and homogeneous linkage of the objective facts of the external world, and in the inward world no mystery other than the ability to recognise the laws of nature and to use them for maintaining the life of the species. The first is the position of idealism, which not merely conceives of reality as being grounded in mind to begin with, but also considers mind to be furnished with qualitatively creative powers for the production of specific spiritual values. The second is the position of positivism, which in the first instance recognises only assured facts and the ordered connections between them, and then turns these facts over to be processed by the will, for which processing the only criterion is the assertion and completion of human existence itself'. 27 Troeltsch 1909a: 82£ 28 T roeltsch 1909a: 102-110. 29 Troeltsch 1909a: 110-111; Troeltsch 1905. 30 Cf. Troeltsch 1909a: 120: 'Its [= the science of religion, ALM] most important principle ideas were set out in the old literature of the great leading systems [i.e., critical idealism (Kant), Hegelianism and positivism, ALM] and present-day work is not very original or creative in this field. The only characteristic and important contributions of the present are antiquarian and anthropological-ethnographical studies of the primitive forms of religion'.

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Economy', stated that such a definition cannot stand at the start, but possibly at the end of research. 31 According to Troeltsch, the 'old view' from which we could characterize the essence of religion by means of a scientific definition is misleading. 'The scholastics still carried on today with such definitions are all out of date'.32 Definitions are essentially instruments of power, which have to be used with great care, because they tend to push their subject in one particular direction, thus overlooking possible varieties. This does not mean, however, that the science of religion could do without 'a clear idea of what religion really is'.33 And in addressing this question Troeltsch puts much weight on a psychological approach of religion. The primary phenomenon of all religion is the belief 'in the presence and influence of supernatural powers and the possibility of an inner connection with them'.34 On the premise of critical idealism, religion has to be located, apart from moral judgement and aesthetic appreciation, in the inner self, as a simple basic fact of the human psychic make Up.35 It is against this background that Troeltsch's concept of the religious a priori (apart from the cognitive, ethical and aesthetic a priori) has to be understood. This is, to quote Michael Pye, 'an extremely vexed and confusing subject'36 and will not be pursued here. 37 The qualitative distinctiveness of religion is what matters in this context, because without this presupposition 'one is tied down in advance to the impossibility of an epistemological or cognitive value in religion, whereas with it the possibility of establishing such a value is left open'.38 Weber 1922: 245. TroeItsch 1909a: 113; Troeltsch 1907a: 468: 'Freilich ware es hier von vornherein ein scholastisches MiBverstandnis, wenn man eine fur alle Falle passende Definition der Religion suchen wollte, wie das zum UberdruB oft geschehen ist und durch Farblosigkeit, Einseitigkeit oder Oberftachlichkeit der Definitionen sich urn allen Kredit gebracht hat. Es handelt sich vielmehr darum, den oder die wesentlichen Punkte zu finden, welche alle personlich fiihlbare Religion charakterisieren und in diese Bestimmungen zugleich die Variabilitat des religiosen Urphanomens aufzunehmen'. 33 Troeltsch 1907a: 463. 34 Troeltsch 1909a: 115. 35 TroeItsch 1897: 339: 'Dann enthullt sich uns als tiefster Kern der religiosen Geschichte der Menschheit ein nicht weiter zu analysierendes Erlebnis, ein letztes Urphanomen, das ahnlich wie das sittliche Urteil und die kunstlerische Anschauung eine einfache letzte Tatsache des Seelenlebens, von beiden aber wieder ganz charakteristisch verschieden ist'. 36 Pye 1977: 241. 37 Cf. TroeItsch 1909b; Apfelbacher 1978: 132-139. 38 T roeItsch 1909a: 87. 31

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Of course, Troeltsch saw that there is more to religion than religious experience or-to put it in metaphysical terms-communication with the divine. Worship, cults, traditions, institutions, and so on, are an integral part of religion, but its specificity cannot be found in them. There have, nevertheless, been attempts to get the various elements into one picture: Das Ganze bleibt immer das Gleiche: die Vorstellung tibermenschlicher, zu verehrender Machte oder Wirklichkeiten, die ihrer Bedeutung entsprechend von starken Gefuhlen begleitet ist, aus denen sich mancherlei Willenshandlungen kultischer und meist auch moralischer Art ergeben; das Ganze in Tradition und Sitte herrschend tiber eine Mehrzahl von Menschen und dementsprechend in allerlei auBeren Formen sich verfestigend. 39

The concept of power is central to Troeltsch's notion of religion. 40 Although the intellectual aspect (human beliif in the reality of a superhuman power) is stressed, the emotional aspect is not neglected in any way either: The actual religious praxis, the emotional impression ('Gefiihlseindruck'): 'die schauervolle Empfindung eines unergriindlichen ... Mysteriums',41 is decisive. Referring to Albert Reville's manual, Troeltsch discerns two elements of religious feeling in particular: awe ('Scheu') and confidence ('Zutrauen').42 This way of formulating had became current under the influence of the work of Robert Ranulph Marett, who criticized E.B. Tylor's definition of primitive religion as a belief in souls, as too narrow and too intellectual. He talked instead of the experience of power. Marett, of course, is famous for his pioneering article on 'tabu-mana',43 and is considered to be the initiator of a 'dynamist', 'pre-animistic' concept of religion. 44 The roots of this psychological way of looking at religion need further investigation, but it is obvious that Troeltsch was in line with major developments in the science and anthropology of religion. Another reason why Troeltsch brought in the notion of

Troeltsch 1895-1896: 381. Cf. Troeltsch 1895-1896: 179: 'Das Wesen des religiosen Objektes besteht ja eben darin, daB es nicht bios als Voraussetzung des BewuBtseins, sondem als eine an dieses mit ganz bestimmten idealen Forderungen herantretende Macht sich geltend macht'. 41 Troeltsch 1895-1896: 422. 42 Reville 1881: 104: 'la crainte' and 'la confiance'. 43 Marett 1909. 44 Kippenberg 1994: 38lf. 39

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power, was his own preference for a volitional image of the divine, more specific for the concept of the Christian God who appeals to the moral conscience of the believers. Connected with the concept of (divine) power and will, is the emphasis on the irrational aspect of religion-a very complicated and multifacetted topic indeed in Troeltsch. It should be noted that there is always a mysterious element in religion, which cannot possibly be rationalized. 45 'Die Religion ist etwas Unberechenbares und Mysterioses, dessen innere Bewegungsgesetze niemand vollig zu durchdringen imstande ist, hat gerade ihren Zauber in diesem sie umwehenden Hauche einer rein personlichen, undurchdringlichen U rsprunglichkeit'. 46 Religion is fluid, flexible and lively in contrast to the fixed forms of church institutions. Basically, religion was conceptualized by Troeltsch as a free force opposed to attempts to canalize it or to adjust it to outer-cultural or churchly-demands. This view is also theologically grounded, because, according to Troeltsch, the ultimate source of these dynamics lies in God, whose moves cannot be fully known by human beings. Troeltsch's main concern, however, was not to describe but to evaluate religion. Under modern conditions, the superiority of the Christian religion could no longer be claimed on the basis of its alleged 'supernatural' character, but had to be shown by way of historical comparison. At the beginning of his career, Troeltsch certainly held the conviction that the modern scientific point of view does not exclude the claim that Christianity is the highest form of religion. In order to vindicate this claim, classifications have to be made. One of the main distinctions at the end of the nineteenth century, made fashionable by the 1882 Hibbert Lectures of the Leiden Old Testament scholar Abraham Kuenen, was that between national and (universal) world religionsY In this way all kinds of polytheistic and local forms of religions were blocked out, and only a limited number of 'world religions', the most obvious candidates being Islam, Buddhism, and Christianity, were considered to be relevant for ultimate comparison. Troeltsch praised Kuenen's book several times 48 and he even

45 The concept of the religious a priori is used to outline the rational part of religious experience, but the very core of it resists total rationalization. 46 Troeltsch 1895: 149. 47 Kuenen 1882. 48 Troeltsch 1895-1896: 321, 173; Troeltsch 1923: 48.

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went so far as to range Judaism, Zoroastrianism and Islam under 'national religions'.49 The harsh judgements pronounced by the 'History of Religions School' on Judaism and especially on so-called 'late Judaism' are well known,5o but Troeltsch was equally blatant and negative in his evaluation of Islam as a war-minded sort of nationalistic Arab religionY It was Buddhism, therefore, with its emphasis on the inner religious life and redemption, which proved to be the main obstacle for Troeltsch and many of his contemporaries, in establishing the primacy of the Christian religion. An obviously important characteristic of world religions is that religious goods are no longer identical with those of the tribe or nation. God's relevance is not seen as limited to specific areas or communities, but as extended to the whole world, and that is the reason why a missionary tendency is bound to develop. Transcending local or national communities ultimately requires the foundation of translocal (church) institutions. This development, Troeltsch claims, goes hand in hand with a process of 'spiritualization' and 'moral development/ growth' ('Ethisierung') in history, that relocates religion and transfers it from nature and the natural world to a spiritual power beyond this world. 52 The natural religion of the tribe is contrasted with the ethical, spiritual, and personal character of world religions. In this way religion is not only located in the inner personal self, which strives for salvation, but includes a moral aspect as well, that obviously helps to single out Christianity as the top of the bill. The Christian God appeals to the conscience of the believer, altogether different from Buddhism, that is described by Troeltsch as quietistic or even egoistic, because of its lack of ethical power. 53 All in all, the very difficult matter of deciding which is the highTroeltsch 1923: 48. For an example in the work of Troeltsch, see Troeltsch 1895: 155-157. 51 Cf. Troeltsch 1923: 48. 52 Troeltsch 1912a: 109: 'It is these religions [= the big universal religions, ALM] that free themselves from the natural confinement of religion to state, blood, and soil [German: 'Ort'], and from the entanglement of divinity in the powers and phenomena of nature. It is in them that the world of the senses is solidly confronted by a higher, spiritual and eternal world, and it is in them, therefore, that the full, all-embracing power of religion first arises'. 53 The problem of the tension in Troeltsch's view on the development of religion as a process of ongoing differentiation, that turns it into a specific domain (apart from politics, science, ethics, etcetera) and his framing of the superiority of Christianity in terms of its religious-ethical character, is only to be noted in passing, and will not be pursued here. 49

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est form of religion lies between Christianity and Buddhism, because they both put redemption at their core. Although, according to Troeltsch, the dialectics of all religions lead to this notion of redemption ('Erlosung'),54 the two religions mentioned realize it most perfectly. On certain occasions, Troeltsch contrasted these two 'religions of redemption' ('Erlosungsreligionen') with 'religions of law' ('Gesetzesreligionen') like Judaism and Islam. 55 The contrast is probably not a very happy one, because, as said, 'redemption' in Troeltsch's thinking amounts almost to a religion-defining characteristic. The difference then is that in the case of 'religions of law' redemption is connected with something the believer has achieved; they are more legalistic, therefore, than Christianity, which is presumed to have preserved a distinct religious-ethical relation between human beings and God. Things get rather complicated along these lines of classification,56 but one has to bear in mind-Hans G. Kippenberg has shown this very clearly-that redemption was a notion of crucial importance in the philosophy/science of religion of those days.57 The underlying conceptualization of religion in terms of denial of the world ('Weltverneinung'), and with that the emphasis on the ascetic aspect of religion, were especially influential. Troeltsch pointed often to the tension between 'the world' and (Christian) religion,58 and Max Weber wanted

54 Troeltsch 1907b: 481: 'AIle Religionsgebiete, denen es vergonnt ist, einen tiefen und reichen ethisch-religiosen Gehalt auszuleben, munden in irgend einer Weise in den E[rlosung]sglauben aus. Je starker und einheitlicher die Gottheit emporsteigt zum Inbegriff alles Guten und Vollkomenen und zum Inbegriff aller wahern [= wahren, ALM] und ewigen Realitat, urn so mehr steigert sich der Abstand des Menschen und die Sehnsucht nach Dberwindung dieses Abstandes'; cf. Troeltsch 1895-1896: 196f. 55 Cf. Troeltsch 1912a: 109f. (German edition: p. 86f.). For the background of the term 'Erlosung(sreligion)' in Hellenistic thought Troeltsch (1917: 91) referred to the work of Paul Wendland. The philosophical and theological use of this term to characterize Christian religion was traced back to Schleiermacher. Probably Troeltsch had the Glaubenslehre (Schleiermacher 1831: 76ff.) in mind here. 56 By the way, Troeltsch made even more distinctions, that could be used to exemplifY the superiority of Christianity. For instance, it can be constructed as a synthesis of Semitic and Aryan religion; cf. Troeltsch 1895-1896: 168. 57 Kippenberg 1993; Kippenberg 1995. 58 To give one of my favourite Troeltsch quotes: 'Die GroBe der Religion besteht gerade in ihrem Kulturgegensatz, in ihrem Unterschiede von Wissenschaft und sozial-utilitaristischer Moral, in ihrer Aufbietung uberweltlicher und ubermenschlicher Krafte, in ihrer Entfaltung der Phantasie und ihrer Richtung auf das, was jenseits der Sinne ist. Die mit der Kultur versohnte Religion wird meistens nichts als eine schlechte Wissenschaft und oberftachliche Moral sein, verliert aber gerade ihr religioses Salz' (Troeltsch 1911: 100).

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to give a 'sociology of the doctrines of redemption and of the religious ethics'. 59 The above shows, that the concepts and terms used by the emerging science of religion were instrumental in Troeltsch's own project. Without those tools the construction of the primacy of Christian religion would, in his view, have been impossible or, in scientific terms, irrelevant.

Reshaping Theology In my view, Troeltsch's interest in science of religion was ultimatelywhat I would call-theologically motivated. This being said, one must not forget that the theological character of his work was hotly disputed at the time. Colleagues saw in Troeltsch's procedure the end of theology, and even his being a Christian was called into question. The first reproach is to some extent understandable, because he did indeed opt for a transformation of theology into-what would most aptly be called-philosophy of religion, the main task of which was to prove the superiority or, at least, the validity of the Christian religion. The classical 'dogmatic' task of giving an exposition of the Christian doctrine was for Troeltsch not the primary consideration, and there was no way that it could be realized in a scientifically acceptable way. Because of the terminological problems involved and Troeltsch's somewhat sloppy way of demarcating the various disciplines and tasks, it is difficult to summarize his position. The following includes a few comments-using Troeltsch's essay on the essence of religion and the science of religion as a starting point. The subsection 'naive and scientifically treated religion' ('naive und wissenschaftlich bearbeitete Religion') of this essay, begins with a helpful summary of Troeltsch's view on the relationship between religion and science of religion: The science of religion. . . does not produce religion or give birth to true religion, but it analyses and appraises religiosity as a datum. In order to treat religion scientifically in this sense, it is necessary above all to attain a view of religion which is still independent of scientific interpretation and processing. As far as possible, the object of study should itself be our informant, without being distorted by our scientific classifications, comparisons, explanations and interpretations. Against 59

Kippenberg 1995: 150; Schluchter 1988: 24ff.

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this is admittedly the difficulty that religion in its own real life is luxuriantly tangled up with scientific conceptions and interests and points of contact. 60

Troeltsch was searching for the essence of religion as not corrupted or distorted by science, although he acknowledged the fact that realiter both are interwoven. In contrast to the 'self-alienation of religion in theology', as he once called it,61 Troeltsch expected the new science of religion to uncover the lively piety which forms the core of religion and, in the last resort, of theology as well. 62 Science of religion can thus be of help in the struggle against wrong kinds of theology. It distinguishes between central and peripheral phenomena, and the basic discipline of science/philosophy of religion, i.e., psychology of religion, will 'probably indicate that the primary phenomenon of all religion is mysticism, that is, belief in the presence and influence of supernatural powers and the possibility of an inner connection with them'.63 Apart from (a) psychology of religion, Troeltsch discerns (b) epistemology of religion, that has to validate the rational aspect of religion, (c) philosophical history of religion, that has to carry out the comparison of religions and, lastly, (d) metaphysics, that reflects on the object of faith and is a philosophical treatment of the idea of God. These four disciplines are part of the overarching 'science of religion', which in other instances is identified as 'philosophy of religion'. The last term can, however, also be reserved for the fourth-metaphysical-task. Dogmatics or Glaubenslehre is not part of this whole. 64 However uncertain disciplinary boundaries and distinctions may have been at the time, Troeltsch had, interestingly enough, few difficulties demarcating 'psychology of religion'. William James, Starbuck, A. George Coe, Murisier, Flournoy, Leuba,

Troeltsch 1909a: 89. Troeltsch 1898a: 652. 62 By the way, it would be a misunderstanding to think that Troeltsch wanted to restore a 'naive' or 'primitive' kind of religion. Although strongly influenced by the Romantic Movement as far as an appreciation of phenomena in their own individual right is concerned, he had no nostalgic view on-religious-history. On the contrary, some remnants of an evolutionistic, even Hegelian view are clearly present in his work. The Hegelianism in Troeltsch is a contentious issue; cf. Graf & Ruddies 1986: 143-148. 63 Troeltsch 1909a: 115; cf. Molendijk 1999. 64 For a more elaborate presentation of these disciplinary distinctions, see Apfelbacher 1978. 60 61

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E. Kock, Wilhelm Wundt, Friedrich von Hugel, Georg Simmel, and Hoffding were all mentioned as outstanding in this field. Of course, we would not agree completely with this listing, but the contours are probably acceptable. 65 At a closer look, Troeltsch was also aware of a growing distinction between the philosophy of religion and the empirical study of religion. The compendia of Jastrow and Tiele are, according to Troeltsch, weak in philosophical substance (because of their empirical orientation), whereas in the work of Hermann Siebeck and John Caird the philosophical side of the problem is emphasized. 66 Troeltsch was not in a particularly good position to make a sharp distinction between philosophy of religion and science of religion, because he saw the 'appraisal' ('Wertung') of religious phenomena as belonging to the main tasks of science/philosophy of religion. 67 And it is precisely at this point that many modern contemporary philosophers and scientists of religion see the prime difference between their two fields. Taking a normative stance is seen by an influential stream in today's science of religion as a cardinal sin, whereas many philosophers of religion are much less uptight in this respect, claiming that evaluation is part and parcel of their work. In my opinion philosophers of religion are well advised to restrict themselves somewhat. The way in which Troeltsch qualified and, thereby, disqualified religions, for instance, no longer seems proper to most of us today. We should not forget, however, that Troeltsch was one of the more sensible scholars of his day and that he generally took care not to overstate his case. Philosophers of religion, in my opinion, ought not to stick to a narrow empirical point of view; they should, ideally, keep in touch, as well as they can, with science of religion in its broadest sense (that is, the scholarly study of religion, including Christianity, be it in a historical, philological, or social scientific manner). But ex prrftsso, they may develop more tentative and speculative views and hypotheses, which a scientist would not dare to venture. The normative or-more generally speaking-practical character of science went very deep with Troeltsch. In this respect he was miles away from a positivistic understanding of science which has become so dominant in the twentieth century. Within the humanities, especially, he felt one cannot restrict research to the presumed unbiased

65 66 67

Cf. Wulff 1997. Cf. Troeltsch 1909a: 120-123. Troeltsch 1898a: 652; Troeltsch 1909a: 87.

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description of structures or events, because research influences the matter it studies. Over and above this, the historical sciences (including the science of religion) have to discuss the question of what could be a fruitful development for the future and what not. As far as the science of religion is concerned, its task is not only to investigate religion, but to harmonize (Christian) religion with other cultural interests as well. 68 The reshaping of theology into philosophy/science of religion meant for Troeltsch the application of prevailing scientific standards and procedures to theology. In a famous article, he spoke of the (new) historical versus the (old and old-fashioned) dogmatical way of doing theology.69 The success of the historical method impliedwhat one could call-an 'empirical turn' of theology. An appeal to 'supernatural' miracles is no longer plausible under modern conditions. In contrast to the prevailing view nowadays, however, Troeltsch shared the historicist assumption that historical research lays the foundation for normative appraisal.7° Of course, historical reason alone does not show us (in a direct sense) what we should do. Troeltsch acknowledged that an element of 'decision' ('Entscheidung') is involved, but there is no escape from the dialectical relationship between factual research and normative appraisal (including normative presumptions).71 Without going any further into these very complicated matters, I want to point to a major consequence of this view, and it concerns Troeltsch's standpoint in the debate on whether or not the theological faculties have to be transformed into religious studies departments. In a famous lecture, the outstanding church historian and most influential scholar of the late Wilhelmine Empire, Adolf Harnack, had voted against such a transformation. 72 For him, Christianity was the paradigm of religion as such and consequently it was considered superfluous (and also counter-productive, because of the overwhelming mass of material) to dedicate much time to the study of 'other religions'. In the preface to the first edition of the 'Absoluteness of Troeltsch 1909a: 92f.! T roeltsch 1900. 70 Troeltsch 1912a: 47 (German edition, p. 31): '[T]he modern idea of history is no longer merely one aspect of a way of looking at things or a partial satisfaction of the impetus to knowledge. It is, rather, the foundation of all thinking concerning values and norms. It is the medium for the self-reflection of the species upon its nature, origins, and hopes'. 71 Cf. Troeltsch 1916. 72 Harnack 1901; c( Rollmann 1983. 68 69

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Christianity' (1902), Troeltsch declared himself to be largely in agreement with Harnack. In his opinion, what mattered was not science of religion as such, but to gain normative knowledge in the field, and any member of a theological faculty should have developed a point of view on this issue. This does not mean that all has to be settled from the very beginning, but it is does mean that there is no room for those who deny the validity of the Christian religion. It comes as no surprise to us today that demonstrating the superiority of Christianity turned out to be a difficult undertaking. On what basis exactly can religions be compared? Are (religious) phenomena not to be judged in their own right and context? Is not the absoluteness of Buddhism or Brahmanism equally as genuine as that of Christianity? Such questions did not lead, it is true, to full-blown scepticism, but the superiority claim of Christianity became doubtful. In one of his later pieces, Troeltsch wrote that the profound religious experience 'is undoubtedly the criterion of its validity, but, be it noted, only its validity for US'.73 True historical research leads to an appraisal of the unique importance of individual phenomena, which according to Troeltsch could never be reduced to general principles. What is more, the original attempt to establish religious superiority by worldwide comparison was based on the possibility of universal history. During his research on the history of Western Christianity, however, Troeltsch's scepticism about 'Universalgeschichte' continued to grow, until in the end the original project all but evaporated. What was left was his conviction that somehow or other the Divine Life manifests itself in history in new and particular forms. 74 Postscriptum

General scientific classifications of religions and of religious phenomena tend to obscure the specific historical context that determines what such phenomena are about. Religion is best studied contextually, in its actual historical setting. A volume on the definition of religion suggests the usefulness of defining. The history of science/philosophy of religion shows the thoroughly historical character of all previous definitions. The historian~asked for a definition

73 74

Troeltsch 1923: 55 (emphasis in the original). Cf. Troeltsch 1923: 44, 63.

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of religion-has no better strategy than to retreat to the level of observation: Religion is what scholars of religion define (say) it to be. In case this latter remark seems evasive, let me add that a transhistorical definition does not seem viable to me, because religious symbols or rituals (or whatever) 'cannot be understood independently of their historical relations with nonreligious symbols or of their articulations in and of social life'.75 Obviously this is an old lesson, that has been taught by historicist thinkers for some time. 76 I do not want to deny the possibility of definition by enumeration (religion is either aI, a2, a3, or ax), but are such definitions of much help? Definitions have to do with identity and mostly with identity problems. It is no coincidence, therefore, that the volume of which this essay is a part, represents the fruits of a working group set up by the Leiden Institute for the Study of Religions (LISOR) at its inception. One of the aims of this group was to look for common methodological and theoretical elements within this heterogeneous ensemble of New and Old Testament scholars, Church Historians, Philosophers of Religion, Scientists of Religion, and Social Scientists with an interest in religion. This proved to be no easy task. My hunch would be that if individuals in our (post)modern era have to learn to live with multi-dimensioned 'patchwork identities', then the onus to do the same is even more pressing for multi-disciplinary research institutes. Exactly what cargo LIS OR has on board is, in my view, not a matter to be decided by definition. That would boil down to determining what is in the ship before looking at the type of cargo it is actually carrying. Self-critical research-as distinct from definitions-can perhaps bring us a step further in this regard. A historical awareness of the conceptual developments and of the boundary disputes between (emerging) disciplines is necessary to preserve us from the dangers of a presentist triumphal self-consciousness, that detects only minor progress in the history of its own field and glorifies the status quo. Around 1900 'science/history of religion' was to some extent part of theology, and this proved to be no impediment to its development. 75

Asad 1993: 53.

76 C[ Troeltsch 1923: 44: 'History cannot be regarded as a process in which a

universal and everywhere similar principle is confined and obscured'; ibid.: 52: 'The inference from all that is, however, that a religion, in the several forms assumed by it, always depends upon the intellectual, social, and national conditions among which it exists' (German version, p. 75: 'die Religion ist jedesmal von dem Boden und den geistigen, sozialen und nationalen Grundlagen abhangig').

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On the contrary, the 'History of Religions School', with scholars like Hermann Gunkel and Wilhelm Bousset, represents research of the highest quality. Discussing German science of religion solely in terms of the-to a large degree-unsuccessful emancipation from theology, does not get the picture right. Apparendy, the flourishing of this kind of research did not depend upon clear disciplinary boundaries. In this sense 'cargoes'-which were dealt with by various disciplines and by scholars working in that almost boundless field that is nowadays cut into handy pieces such as philosophy of religion, history and science of religion, psychology and sociology of religion (etcetera)were shifting. Disciplinary differentiation does not necessarily lead to more fruitful research programmes, one is tempted to think. All in all I am a litde sceptical about the 'major progress' that is expected to come from clear-cut boundaries and sharp definitions. One should not expect too much from such efforts. But if definitions are used carefully, with an awareness of the limitations and dangers involved, definitions are fine. They can open up new perspectives, as did the Durkheimian definition of religion. But more often than not, as is my impression, they are used instead to lock up the precious cargo. This is probably not a very helpful attitude. Shifting cargoes are doubdess a real danger at open sea, but within the community of scholars of religion and within the LISOR, I would not be too afraid of change or intruders.

RifCrences Apfelbacher, K.-E., 1978, Frommigkeit und Wissenschaft: Ernst Troeltsch und sein theologisches Programm. Miinchen, etc.: Schoningh. Asad, T., 1993, Genealogies oj Religion: Discipline and Reasons oj Power in Christianity and Islam. Baltimore, etc.: Johns Hopkins University Press. Barth, K., 1938, Die Kirchliche Dogmatik, Vol. I, 2. Miinchen: Kaiser. Becker, G., 1982, Neu::,eitliche Sulijektivitiit und Religiositiit: Die religionsphilosophische Bedeutung von Hermgkurift und Wesen der Neu::,eit im Denken von Ernst Troeltsch. Regensburg: Pustet. Byrne, P., 1989, Natural Religion and the Nature oj Religion: The Legacy oj Deism. London, etc.: Roudedge. Claussen, j.H., 1997, Die Jesus-Deutung von Ernst Troeltsch im Kontext der liberalen Theologie. Tiibingen: j.C.B. Mohr. Clayton, JP., (ed.) 1976, Ernst Troeltsch and the Future oj Theology. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. Despland, M., & G. Vallee, (eds.) 1992, Religion in History: The Word, the Idea, the Reality, Waterloo, etc.: Laurier University Press. Dyson, A.O., 1976, 'Ernst Troeltsch and the Possibility of a Systematic Theology', in Clayton 1976: 81-99.

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Gisel, P., (ed.) 1992, Histoire et TIzeologie chez Ernst Troeltsch. Geneve: Labor et Fides. Graf, F.W., 1982, 'Der "Systematiker" der "Kleinen Gattinger Fakultat": Ernst Troeltschs Promotionsthesen und ihr Gattinger Kontext', in Renz & Graf 1982: 235-290. - - - , 1984, 'Religion und Individualitit: Bemerkungen zu einem Grundproblem der Religionstheorie Ernst Troeltschs', in Renz & Graf 1984: 207-230. Graf, F.W., & H. Ruddies, (eds.) 1982, Ernst Troeltsch Bibliographie. Tubingen: ].C.B. Mohr. - - - , 1986, 'Ernst Troeltsch: Geschichtsphilosophie in praktischer Absicht', in Speck 1986: 128-164. Harnack, A. von, 190 I, 'Die Au(~abe der theologischen Fakultaten und die allgemeine Religionsgeschichte', in Harnack 1996, Vol. I: 797-824. - - - , 1996, Adolf von Harnack als Zeitgenosse: Reden und Schriften aus den Jahren des Kaisserreichs und der Weimarer Zeit, ed. by K. Nowak, 2 vols. Berlin, etc.: W. de Gruyter. Harrison, P., 1990, 'Religion' and the Religions in the English Enlightenment. Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press. Kippenberg, H.G., 1991, 'Einleitung: Religionswissenschaft und Kulturkritik', in Kippenberg & Luchesi 1991: 13-28. - - - , 1993, 'Max Weber im Kreise von Religionswissenschaftlern', in Zeitschrifi for Religions- und Geistesgeschichte 45: 348-366. - - - , 1994, 'Rivalry Among Scholars of Religions: the Crisis of Historicism and the Formation of Paradigms in the History of Religions', in Historical Rifiections 20, 1: 377-402. - - - , 1995, 'Max Weber und die vergleichende Religionswissenschaft', in Revue internationale de philosophie 49: 127-153. Kippenberg, H.G. & B. Luchesi, (eds.) 1991, Religionswissenschafl und Kulturkritik. Beitriige zur Konftrenz 'TIze History qf Religions and the Critique qf Culture in the Days qf Gerardus van der Leeuw (1890-1950)'. Marburg: diagonal-Verlag. Kuenen, A., 1882, National Religions and Universal Religions. London: Williams & Norgate. Ludemann, G., (ed.) 1996, Die 'Religionsgeschichtliche Schule': Facetten eines theologischen Umbruchs (Studien und Texte zur Religionsgeschichtlichen Schule, 1). Frankfurt a.M., etc.: Peter Lang. Ludemann, G., & M. Schrader, (eds.) 1987, Die Religionsgeschichtliche Schute in Giittingen. Gattingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Marett, R.R., 1909, 'The Tabu-Mana Formula as a Minimum Definition of Religion', in Archiv for Religionswissenschafl 12: 186-194. Molendijk, A.L., 1996, Zwischen TIzeologie und Soziologie: Ernst Troeltschs Typen der christlichen Gemeinschaflsbildung: Kirche, Sekte, Jvfyslik (Troeltsch-Studien, 9). Gutersloh: Gutersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn. - - - , 1998, 'Introduction', in: Molendijk & Pels 1998: 1-27. - - - , 1999, 'BewuBte Mystik: zur grundlegenden Bedeutung des Mystikbegriffs im Werk von Ernst T roeltsch', in Neue Zeitschrifi for Systemalische TIzeologie und Religionsphilosophie 41: 39-61. Molendijk, A.L., & P. Pels, (eds.) 1998, Religion in the Making: TIze Emergence qf the Sciences qf Religion (Studies in the History of Religions: Numen Book Series, 80), Leiden: Brill. Murrmann-Kahl, M., 1992, Die entzauberte Heilsgeschichte: Der Historismus erobert die TIzeologie 1880-1920. Gutersloh: Gerd Mohn. Preus, ].S., 1987, Explaining Religion: Criticism and TIzeory from Bodin to Freud. New Haven, etc.: Yale University Press~New Haven University Press. Pye, M., 1977, 'Troeltsch and the Science of Religion', in Troeltsch 1977: 234-252. Rendtorff, T., & F.W. Graf, 1985, 'Ernst Trocltsch', in Smart et at. 1985: 305-332. Renz, H., & F.W. Graf, (eds.) 1982, Untersuchungen zur Biographie und Werkgeschichte:

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Mit den unverifffentlichten Promotionsthesen der 'Kleinen Giittinger Fakultdt' 1888-1893 (Troeltsch-Studien, 1). Giitersloh: Giitersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn. - - - , (eds.) 1984, Protestantism us und Neuzeit (Troeltsch-Studien, 3), Giitersloh: Giitersloher Verlagshaus Gerd Mohn. Reville, A, 1881, Proligomenes de l'histoire des religions. Paris: Fischbacher. Richard, J., 1992, 'Le concept de religion chez Ernst Troeltsch: pour un depassement du positivisme et de l'empirisme', in Despland & Vallee 1992: 71-91. Rollmann, H., 1983, 'Theologie und Religionsgeschichte', in Zeitschrififor Theologie und Kirche 80: 69-84. Rudolph, K., 1962, Die Religionswissenschofi an der Leipziger Universitat und die Entwicklung der Religionswissenschofi: Ein Beitrag zur Wissenschofisgeschichte und zum Problem der Religionswissenschofi. Berlin: Akademie-Verlag. Russell, J.M., 1989, 'Troeltsch's Science of Religion: an Epistemic Response', in Journal qf Religious Studies 15: 70-86. Schleiermacher, F.D.E., 1831, Der christliche Glaube, zweite Ausgabe (1831), ed. by M. Redeker. Berlin: W. de Gruyter 1960. Schluchter, W., 1988, Religion und l.ebensfohrung; Vol. 2: Studien zu Max Webers Religionsund Herrschofissoziologie. Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp. Smart, N., et aI., (eds.) 1985, Nineteenth Century Religious Thought in the West, Vol. 3, Cambridge, etc.: Cambridge University Press. Speck, J., (ed.) 1986, Grundprobleme der grossen Philosophen: Philosophie der Neuzeit, Vol. 4. Gottingen: Vandenhoeck & Ruprecht. Troeltsch, E., 1895, 'Religion und Kirche', in Troeltsch 1913: 146-182. - - - , 1895-1896, 'Die Selbstandigkeit der Religion', in Zeitschrifi for 7heologie und Kirche 5: 361-436; 6: 71-110, 167-218. - - - , 1896-1899, 'Religionsphilosophie und prinzipielle Theologie', in 7heologischer Jahresbericht 15: (1896) 376-425; 16: (1897) 498-557; 17: (1898) 531-603; 18: (1899) 485-536. , 1897, 'Christentum und Religionsgeschichte', in Troeltsch 1913: 328-363. - - - , 1898a, 'Zur theologischen Lage', in Die Christliche Welt 12: 627-631, 650-657. - - - , 1898b, 'Der Deismus', in Troeltsch 1925: 429-487. - - - , 1900, 'Uber historische und dogmatische Methode in der Theologie', in Troeltsch 1913: 729-753. - - - , 1902, 'Theologie und Religionswissenschaft des 19. Jahrhunderts', in Jahrbuch des fteien Deutschen Hochstifls 1902. Frankfurt a.M.: Knauer, 91-120. - - - , 1903, 'Religionswissenschaft und Theologie des 18. Jahrhunderts', in PreuJ3ische Jahrbucher 114: 30-50. - - - , 1905, Psychologie und Erkenntnistheorie in der Religionswissenschofi: eine Untersuchung uber die Bedeutung der Kantischen Religionslehre for die heutige Religionswissenschofi. Tiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr. - - - , 1907a, 'Religionsphilosophie', in Windelband 1907: 423-486. - - - , 1907b, 'Erlosung: II. Dogmatisch', in Religion in Geschichte und Gegenwart, Vol. 2: 481-488. - - - , 1909a, 'Religion and the Science of Religion' ('Wesen der Religion und der Religionswissenschaft', 1906, 19092), in Troeltsch 1977: 82-123. , 1909b, 'Zur Frage des religiosen Apriori', in Troeltsch 1913: 754-768. - - - , 1911, 'Die Kirche im Leben der Gegenwart', in Troeltsch 1913: 91-108. - - - , 1912a, The Absoluteness qf Christianity and the History qf Religions. London: SCM Press, 1971; German edition: Die Absolutheit des Christentums und die Religionsgeschichte (1902, 1912 2 , 1929 3), ed. by T. Rendtorff, Miinchen, etc.: Siebenstem 1969. - - - , 1912b, Die Soziallehren der christlichen Kirchen und Gruppen (Gesammelte Schriften, 1). Tiibingen: J.C.B. Mohr, 1912; The Social Teaching qf the Christian Churches, 2 Vols, London, etc.: George Allen & MacMillan, 1931.

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, 1913, Zur religiosen Lage, Religionsphilosophie und Ethik (Gesammelte Schriften, 2). Tubingen: j.C.B. Mohr. - - - , 1916, 'KonselVativ und Liberal', in Die Christliche Welt 30: 647-651, 659-666, 678-683. , 1917, 'Die alte Kirche', in Troeltsch 1925: 65-121. - - - , 1922, 'Meine Bucher', in Troeltsch 1925: 3-18. - - - , 1923, 'The Place of Christianity among the World Religions', in Troeltsch 1957: 33-63. - - - , 1925, Atifsatze zur Geistesgeschichte und Religionssoziologie (Gesammelte Schriften, 4, ed. by Hans Baron). Tubingen: j.C.B. Mohr. - - - , 1957, Christian Thought: Its History and Application (edited with an introduction and index by Baron F. von Hugel). New York: Meridian Books (19231). - - - , 1977, Writings on Theology and Religion (translated and edited by Robert Morgan and Michael Pye). London: Duckworth. Waardenburg, j., 1992, 'L' histoire des religions et Ie caractere absolu du christianisme', in Gisel 1992: 213-241. Weber, M., 1922, Wirtschqfi und Gesellschqfi: Grundriss der verstehenden Soziologie (Studienausgabe). Tubingen: j.C.B. Mohr, 19855. Windelband, W., (ed.) 1907, Die Philosophie im Beginn des Zwanzigsten Jahrhunderts. Fs. Kuno Fischer (zweite erweiterte Ausgabe). Heidelberg: Carl Winter. Wulff, D.M., 1997, Psychology rif Religion: Classic and Contemporary. New York etc.: John Wiley & Sons (199P).

THE SACRED IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES ON THE DEFINITION OF RELIGION BY THE

ANNEE SOCIOLOGIQ.UE GROUP

Wouter W. Belier Durkheim's US formes elementaires de la vie religieuse [1912] is deservedly reputed to be a classic of its kind, in not only Sociology and Anthropology, but also in the Science of Religions. The book has fascinated a very diverse group of scholars, although perhaps no one more than Stephen Lukes who, after reading it for the first time, became an ardent promoter of many studies on Durkheim's oeuvre. He confessed: 'I went and read The Elementary Forms if the Religious Lift and had my mind blown, and as a result I just became totally immersed in Durkheim'. I Pickering, who mainly published on aspects of Durkheim's oeuvre related to the Science of Religions, was even more outspoken in his praise of it: It now stands as one of the classics, not only in the sociology of religion but in sociology itself [...J In many respects it remains the classic in the sociology of religion, for no other book has supplanted it. The contributions of Max Weber are considerable, but he never produced a book on religion which dealt with the subject in the broad sweep, or raised as many issues as Durkheim did, in what, as events turned out, was his last book. But besides being a classic in the sense that it is the cornerstone of a discipline, TIe Elementary Forms is also a classic in that it is constantly read and reread. It is published and republished. It is a fountain from which one continually gains academic refreshment and insight. It is a book that goes on living. 2

Even though the praise of Durkheim's oeuvre is unanimous, an attitude of critical reserve is also in order, bearing in mind that the theories which he and the members of the Annee sociologique group expressed in it, and based on it, are diverse and divergent. Lukes remarked that Durkheim, as we shall see in greater detail below, advanced a number of fertile explanatory hypotheses, but they all referred to very different types of relations between social realities 1 2

Clark 1979: 13I. Pickering 1984: XIX.

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and religious phenomena. Lukes stated, for instance, that although Durkheim was not explicit about it, and probably not even aware of it, he did nonetheless define religion as a social phenomenon in three separate ways: 'as socially determined, as embodying conceptions (in two senses) of social realities, and as having functional social consequences'.3 These 'two senses' represent the cognitive, or conceptual one, by which social relations can be grasped and understood, and the expressive, or symbolic one, by which these relations are made conscious. 4 Morris pointed out, in addition, that one may well distinguish on the one hand between the analyses presented by Durkeim in 'symbolist terms', and on the other hand those in which he detailed the psychological and functional aspects of religion. 5 Likewise, Pickering discussed the various theoretical interpretations which us formes elementaires de fa vie refigieuse has given rise to since it appeared in 1912. In his view, this diversity is, in itself, proof of the 'classical' stature of Durkheim's magnum opus: That there have been so many different encapsulations of The Elementary Forms points to its classical nature. All classics have to be interpreted: that they are thought worth interpreting makes them classics. 6 This interpretation expresses Pickering's eulogistic appreciation of Durkheim's last book. Such an hagiographic approach, however, is far from satisfactory, because it does not adequately cope with the problem as posed by the book's interpretational diversity. This diversity also contrasts markedly with the high degree of unanimity in interpretation to which the earlier work of Durkheim, such as his studies on the division of labour and on suicide, have given rise. Another major problem we are bound to face in the study of the us formes is its relation to Durkheim's earlier publications on religion. There are, for instance, significant differences between his formal definition of 1899 7 and the essentialist one he proposed in 1912.8 It is difficult to explain this shift, because Durkheim produced no publications on the sociology of religions between 1899 and 1912. To solve this problem, Isambert proposed, in his study on the genesis

3 4

5 6

7 8

Lukes 1985: 462. Lukes 1985: 465. Morris 1987: 119-120. Pickering 1984: 90. C£ Durkheim 1899. C£ below and Durkheim 1912: 65.

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of the sacre-prqfane concept,9 that the publications of Hubert and Mauss, two scholars with whom Durkheim cooperated closely during this period, be examined for traces of clues which might explain this shift in Durkheim's approach to the study of religion(s). It certainly makes sense to take a close look at publications produced by other members of the Annee sociologique group in this period in order to investigate Durkheim's intellectual development. We know, after all, that he maintained strong and intimate ties with this group of fellow-scholars who were very devoted to him and knew him intimately. In my opinion, these publications should not only be used to elucidate the sacred-profane opposition, but also to investigate other aspects of Durkheim's theory. The structure of my investigation into the history of the Durkheimian definition of religion is as follows. I shall firstly briefly outline the political developments in France, against the background of which Durkheimian sociology emerged in the late 19th century. Its rise was closely connected with a widely felt need for an academic analysis of society. I shall then provide data on the Annee sociologique group of academic 'clients' which Durkheim, as academic patron, gathered around him, following the tradition of the French universities then and now. I shall next analyse Durkheim's Les Formes elementaires de la vie religieuse. This will be by a comparison of the theoretical positions which Durkheim took in 1912, with his earlier work and that of other members of the Annee sociologique group, in the interest of developing a history of the Durkheimian definition of religion. I shall end by presenting my own conclusions.

The Rise qf Sociology in France The defeat of Napoleon III in the war against Germany in 1870 caused the so-called Second Empire to topple and the Third Republic (1870-1946) to be ushered in. Analysis of a number of developments in this Third Republic is crucial for an understanding of the rise and development of the social sciences in France. The very conservative Assemblee nationale which met in Bordeaux to conclude peace with Germany, reacted fiercely against the Paris communards. Despite its strong monarchistic leanings, however, it appointed the republican 9

Isambert 1976.

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Grevy as President and charged Thiers with the task of forming a government, in which republicans ultimately occupied the posts of minister of Foreign Affairs, the Interior, and Education and Science. Having concluded peace with Germany at the expense of the Alsace, in addition to heavy war indemnities, the Assembtee got to work on its second task, namely the reorganisation of the State, which, after the death of Napoleon III in 1873, was torn by struggles between Bonapartists, whose aim was to restore the Empire; several competing groups of monarchists, each with its own pretender to the throne, bent on restoring the monarchy; and the Republicans, who themselves were divided between moderates and radicals. In the elections of 1877, the Republicans won a clear majority of 326 parliamentary seats over the right-wing parties which gained only 207 seats. Grevy once again became President of the Third Republic, the distinctive history of which developed from this point in time onwards. One of the most important issues of the right-wing propaganda had been religion and the defeat in 1871 had caused a huge upsurge of religious sentiment: The nation was called to repentance by the Church for the sins that had brought disaster on it. There was a general fear of social revolution, and religion was, perhaps more than ever before, seen as a social sanction. The identification of the Church with the protection of the interests of birth, wealth and social status became almost total with the Third Republic. The noblesse were now practising Catholics almost to a man~and even more woman~and the bourgeoisie, at least since 1848, had come to feel that religion was necessary both to protect the virtue of their daughters and to keep the socially dangerous classes at bay.lO

Education, relief for the poor, and the care of the old and sick had until then been firmly the province of the Church, as a result of which a considerable number of people were drawn to the monasteries and convents which ran such institutions. The solemn laying of the foundation stone of the Sacre-Coeur, that symbol of the Roman Catholic counter-offensive, in 1873 provocatively displayed the, as yet, massive status and power of the Church in French society. Throne and Altar were the main political issues: 'The restoration of the monarchy to France and the Pope to his temporal domains became the joint aims of French Catholicism'. 11 The reform of the 10

11

Cobban 1965: 19. Cobban 1965: 20.

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French educational system took centre stage in the political struggle between the republicans and opposition parties. It required that the hold of the Church on the school system in France, which barred its reform, be broken. Most clergymen, moreover, were staunch supporters of the monarchist parties. Jules Ferry, Minister of Education and Science since 1879, was a confirmed advocate of secular education and of educational reform in line with the German model. In order to remove schools from Church control, he made education not only compulsory but also free to pupils attending public schools in which religious education was banned. Graduation from school became an affair of the state, and a civic ritual. Finally, the clergy were removed from the Conseil Superieur de l'Instruction Publique, the body supervising the French school system, which until then they had dominated. Despite these legal reforms, however, the struggle between religious and secular education remained a burning political issue during the period of the Third Republic, which in addition was in constant political turmoil as a result of several other major political upheavals, such as the bankruptcy of the Compagnie du canal de Panama, increased social unrest, which gready strengthened the positions of the labour unions and socialist parties, in addition to the major outburst of anti-Semitism known as the Dreyfus affair. It caused a polarisation between the dreyJusards and the anti-dreyJusards which further exacerbated the struggle for political power in the Third Republic between the left and the right wings in the political arena, as well as between the republicans and the royalists, and between the anticlerical section of the nation and the Catholic Church, to such a degree in fact, that the Dreyfus affair brought France to the brink of civil war in the late 1890s. Even in 1899, when the case was reopened, Dreyfus was sentenced to a ten years imprisonment and was finally acquitted only in 1906. All these struggles contributed to a pervasive sense of ideological disorientation in French society which, in its turn, 'produced a strong public demand for sociological expertise'.12 Not surprisingly, there was a marked increase in social-scientific activities in this period. In 1872, the Societe de sociologie was founded by Littre, a pupil of Comte. In the same year, the Revue d'anthropologie was founded by Broca, who also went on to found the Ecole d'Anthropologie in 1876. It was followed 12

Karady 1983: 73.

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in 1885 by the foundation of the Institut International de Statistique and by the foundation of the Revue internationale de sociologie and the Institut International de Sociologie by Worms in 1893; sociological columns were introduced into the Revue de metaphysique et de morale and in the Revue philosophique in 1895, with the foundation of sociological academies, viz. the College des Sciences Sociales, occuring in that same year; and finally the Ecole des Hautes Etudes Sociales was established in 1900. Likewise, one may regard the emergence of Durkheimian sociology as one of the many attempts to provide solutions to the problems of French society of his day.

The Annee Sociologique Group Most sociological activities mentioned remained marginal to the French academic establishment during the latter part of the 19th century. In the France of that time, a new academic discipline could be successfully established in the universities only if its leading scholar held a post at a leading university, such as the Sorbonne, and used that position to become the academic patron of a closely-knit cluster 13 of scholars. It meant that Durkheim had to obtain a chair at the Sorbonne. This proved to be perfectly attainable because of the rapid secularisation of education and the prevailing vacuum in academic research into morality caused by the dismissal of the clergy from the public universities. Durkheim was appointed to the chair for Sociology and Pedagogy at the University of Bordeaux, the first of its kind in France, in 1896, and in 1902 to the chair for 'Science of Education' at the Sorbonne. His most important achievement, however, was the establishment of the famous Annee sociologique researchgroup which he formed for the purpose of consolidating the position of sociology within the French academic world. In retrospect, Mauss emphasised that the growth of sociology between 1893 and 1914 'was only possible because we were a group working together' .14 He also described (probably in 1930) how he became immersed in the Annee sociologique group and completely identified himself with it: I cannot divorce myself from the work of a school. If there is any individuality, it is immersed within voluntary anonymity. Perhaps what 13 14

cr.

Clark 1973: 66-92. Mauss 1983: 140.

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characterises my scientific career, even more today than formerly, is the feeling of working together as a team, and the conviction that collaborating with others is a drive against isolation and the pretentious search for originality. IS

BougIe, whose 1908 study of the Indian castes, was severely criticised by the Annee sociologique group, labelled it the 'taboo-totem clan', and derisively referred to it as the 'United Sociological Party' .16 The most important point of reference for this group was the Annee sociologique annual. It originated from the Revue de metaplrysique et de morale which Xavier Leon had founded in 1893. One of its sections was entided DAnnee sociologique; it was edited, between 1895 and 1898, by Lapie, a member of the Annie sociologique group. In 1898, Durkheim persuaded the influential editor Alcan of the need to publish the Annie sociologique as a separate periodical, the first edition being published in 1898. The first ten numbers were published on schedule, one per year. Three years elapsed, however, between the numbers ten and eleven and between the numbers eleven and twelve, these last two numbers being restricted to reviews only. In this periodical, the group of sociologists connected with Durkheim, published articles and reviewed the literature which they deemed sociologically relevant. This resulted in a broad insight into the international developments in this young discipline. The diversity of the sections into which the reviews were classified and the variety of the subjects on which articles were written, testifY to the wide range of subjects being studied in the Annie sociologique group at the time. The group around Durkheim was, however, not a unified clan. Besnard has rejected this 'commonly received image of the group of Annee collaborators as forming a kind of sociological clan, homogeneous in its personnel and tighdy knit around one man and one doctrine',17 and points, as evidence, to the fairly critical reviews of Durkheim's publications published by Fauconnet, Richard and Sirniand in the Annee sociologique itself. This, Besnard says, proves that Durkheim 'was not in any way a master gathering around himself zealous disciples burning to follow and honour him' .18 Besnard distinguishes several factions in the Annie sociologique group. One was formed by

15

16 17 18

Mauss 1983: 139. Besnard 1983: 3l. Besnard 1983: 11. Besnard 1983: 17.

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BougIe, Lapie and Parodi; another by Levy and Huvelin; a third by Vacher and Demangeon; and a fourth by Simiand, Halbwachs and G. and H. Bourgin. They were satellite groups around the core group which consisted of Durkheim, Mauss, Hubert, Hertz and Fauconnet. 19 Durkheim, Mauss and Hubert were the most productive scholars, indeed they wrote twelve of the eighteen articles published in the twelve volumes of the Annie sociologique. They also wrote nearly half (783) of the (1,767) published reviews. All in all, 47 scholars contributed to the Annie.

Les Formes ilimentaires de la vie religieuse

In 1912, Durkheim published his Les formes ilimentaires de la vie religieuse. Its subtitle, Le systeme totimique en Australie, is significant, because it indicates that Durkheim refused to build a theory on what he considered to be a motley collection of facts gleaned from very different cultures, as, in his view, the English anthropologists (among others Tylor, Frazer) had done. He countered that to establish a 'law', it is not necessary to pursue wide comparative studies, holding that a 'law' may also be established on the basis of one well-executed experiment. Durkheim, therefore, regarded, and presented, his study on Australian totemism as one such well-executed experiment. 20 The experimental nature of Durkheim's study, however, is highly questionable. There is every reason to doubt whether his book really did draw on the findings of an experiment by which the validity of his hypotheses was tested. It seems much more likely that he merely illustrated his theory with ethnographic data derived from a specific field of ethnological study which seemed most likely to give him some measure of control over the validity, or usefulness, of his theory. The term ilimentaire, as used in the title, has two meanings between which Durkheim failed to distinguish. On the one hand, ilimentaire referred to 'the most primitive religious system', i.e., to what happened 'at the outset of history'.21 Durkheim held that if we could grasp the 'origins of the beliefs' in totemism, we would also be able to discover 'the causes that caused the religious sentiment to bud in Besnard 1983: 27. Durkheim 1912: 594. 21 'Le systeme religieux ... Ie plus primitif' [...J 'aux debuts de I'histoire' (Durkheim 1912: 1,2). 19

20

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mankind'.22 He likewise proposed that the Intichiuma ritual contained 'the germs of the sacrificial system' (of the religions of mankind).23 This fitted in well with the 19th century evolutionist model (which Durkheim ostensibly rejected, but secretly followed). On the other hand, iibnentaire referred to that which he deemed to be 'the most simple', and it allowed him to postulate a causal relationship between the conceptions of the impersonal power postulated for mana on the one hand, and the soul on the other. He added, however, that the development of the idea of the soul from that of mana was 'a secondary one, in the logical, and not in the chronological meaning of the word'.24 He also held that just as one might conduct research into the essence of 'life' by a study of protoplasm, likewise one might establish the nature of religion by a study of totemic religion. 25 Durkheim wanted to demarcate the field of research of sociology of religion by defining his subject of study in order to avoid the errors which, in Durkheim's opinion, Frazer and others had made, by confusing magic and religion. 26 To Durkheim, religion was not merely the theoretical notion which the researcher used to classifY facts in a way that was scientifically appropriate and useful, but an object of research which existed independently of the stipulation by which it was constituted by scholars: 'it is [the] reality [of religion] itself that must be defined'.v He held that the 'external marks'28 of this object of study must be determined in order that religious phenomena may be distinguished from non-religious phenomena. The content of that objectively given 'reality', was already known to Durkheim, however. After having first discussed the validity of the 'idea of the mysterious' as a criterion for identifying 'religion',29 he remarked: 'One cannot therefore make [the mysterious] the characteristic [mark] of religious phenomena without excluding from the definition most of the facts to be defined [as religious]'. 30 In like 22 'Les causes qui firent eclore Ie sentiment religieux dans l'humanite' (Durkheim 1912: 239). 23 'Les germes de systeme sacrificiel' (Durkheim 1912: 489). 24 'II s'agit d'une formation secondaire au sens logique, et non chronologique du mot' (Durkheim 1912: 382). 25 Durkheim 1912: 594. 26 Durkheim 1912: 31. 27 'C'est a la realite meme qu'il s'agit de definir' (Durkheim 1912: 32). 28 'Signes exterieures' (Durkheim 1912: 32). 29 Durkheim 1912: 33-40. 30 'On ne peut done en faire la caracteristique des phenomenes religieux sans exclure de la definition la majorite des faits a definir' (Durkheim 1912: 39-40).

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manner, he refuted the belief in 'divinity' as the valid criterion for distinguishing 'religion' from 'non-religion', because he included Buddhism among human religions. 31 Belief in god, or gods, could not serve as a valid criterion for discriminating between 'religion' and 'non-religion', therefore, on the grounds that in Buddhism, or in Theravada Buddhism at least, gods, he held, did not exist. Having discussed a few other criteria which he deemed invalid, Durkheim then drew up his own definition. To him, the most general and distinguishing feature of 'religion' appeared to be the 'absolute distinction' made in religions between 'the sacred' (le sacre) and 'the profane'.32 In the next section, Durkheim noticed, however, that this absolute distinction was characteristic of magic also, and it meant that the definition of religion would also have to indicate how magic differed from religion. He then demarcated 'religion' from 'magic' by proposing that the 'properly religious beliefs' belonged to a 'specific community',33 whereas this was not so for magic, for after all 'a magic church does not exist'. 34 On the basis of these distinctions, he drew up his well-known definition of religion: A religion is a unified system of beliefs and practices about sacred things (i.e., about things that are set apart and forbidden), which beliefs and practices unite all those who adhere to them into one single moral community termed Church. 35

In a separate note, Durkheim commented on the difference between this definition and the one he had proposed in 1899. He explained that he had come to reject the latter, because it was too far removed from the 'reality of religious life'. Moreover, the discriminating distinction which he had used at that time-the obligatory nature of the belief notions-had not produced a set of objects of research marked by clear-cut boundaries, but rather one which we would now term a 'fuzzy set'. A great deal of theory, and opposition against other theories, was implicit in this 1912 definition, which enabled Durkheim to refute Durkheim 1912: 40-49. Durkheim 1912: 53. 33 'Une collectivite determinee' (Durkheim 1912: 60). 34 'II n'existe pas d'Eglise magique' (Durkheim 1912: 61). 35 'Une religion est un systeme solidaire de croyances et de pratiques relatives a des choses sacrees, c'est-a-dire separees, interdites,. croyances et pratiques qui unissent en un meme communaute morale, appelee Eglise, tous ceux qui y adherent' (Durkheim 1912: 65). 31

32

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the animistic theories of Tylor and Jevons who had explained religion as a smooth transition from profane dream images to the sacred conceptions of the soul. His own definition, Durkheim claimed, showed that there was 'no common ground' between these two,36 and he refuted an explanation of the origin of religion from the human perception and experience of natural phenomena in the same way.37 These conclusions drawn from his definition, made his theory look all the more inevitable: 'As neither man nor nature possess a sacred character by themselves, they must have acquired it from another source'.38 This other source turned out to be society, and it meant that he could seamlessly match the definition of religion which he had formulated in the first part of his book, to the sociological theory of religion which he developed in the latter part.

Sacred-prqfane The conceptual sacred-profane dichotomy, which served as the distinctive feature of religious phenomena for Durkheim, goes far beyond the sociological discourse of the Annie sociologique group. Otto and Eliade made frequent use of it, for instance, although the way they used it and the explanations they derived from it, differed radically from those of Durkheim and his group. What did the distinction, as used by Durkheim c.s., consist of? Durkheim enumerated as examples of 'things sacred': 'beliefs, myths, proverbial sayings, legends',39 etc. For Durkheim the content of the sacred actually consisted of everything which he associated traditionally with religion, whereas the content of the profane consisted of everything which is not sacred, i.e., those things which he traditionally did not associate with religion. However, other things had to be incorporated as well, or the sacred-profane distinction would be of the same tautological kind as those against which Durkheim had already warned in 1899. 40 The sacred-profane opposition might, at first sight, be regarded

36

87).

'Entre les uns et les autres, il n'y a pas de commune mesure' (Durkheim 1912:

Durkheim 1912: 121. 'Puisque ni I'homme ni la nature n'ont, par eux-memes, de caractere sacre, c'est qu'ils Ie tiennent d'une autre source' (Durkheim 1912: 124). 39 Durkheim 1912: 51. 40 Durkheim 1899: 17. 37 38

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as a merely complementary one, Durkheim said. Just as light presupposes dark, so does the sacred imply the profane. They could not be studied separately, therefore. Durkheim also gave other examples of such conceptual bipartitions in religions. In totemic religions, for example, every individual is subdivided into two aspects: 'Humans believe that they are at the same time a human being, in the usual meaning of the word, and an animal or plant of the totemic species'.41 Many religions make a similar distinction between the body and the sou1. 42 In Durkheim's view, however, such bifurcations proceeded from our own conceptions 'of two different species that cannot be reduced to each other'.43 In his view, these conceptions were either 'related to the external and material world', or to 'an ideal world to which we attribute a moral superiority over the [material] one'.44 In the third part of his book, in which Durkheim discussed the rites of the Aborigines in Australia, he remarked that everything which had to do with 'normal life' was forbidden as long as 'religious life' prevailed. 45 The equation of the sacred-profane conceptual opposition with that of society to the individual was theoretically of particular importance to Durkheim. As a matter of fact, he maintained that the 'ideal beings at which the [religious] cult is addressed' are conceptually opposed to 'us ourselves and [....] our empirical interests', just as the 'community' is opposed to our 'egoism'.46 Not only did Durkheim discuss the content of the opposition sacred-profane, but he also stressed the antagonist nature of that opposition: 'Indeed, the world of the sacred maintains an antagonist relation with the world of the profane'Y The dichotomy was also an 'absolute' one,48 in that he believed that the sacred and the profane 'have always and everywhere been conceived as two separate genres, as two worlds [apart] that have nothing in common'49 and that the 41 ' ••• I'homme croit etre, en meme temps qu'un homme au sens usuel du mot, un animal ou une plante de l'espece totemique' (Durkheim 1912: 190). 42 Durkheim 1912: 375. 43 'De deux especes clifferentes et irreductibles l'une a I'autre' (Durkheim 1912: 377). 44 'Les unes se rapportent au monde exterieur et materiel; les autres, a un monde ideal auquel nous attribuons une superiorite morale sur Ie premier.' (idem) 45 Durkheim 1912: 437f. 46 Durkheim 1912: 453. 47 'Or Ie monde sacre soutient avec Ie monde profane un rapport d'antagonisme' (Durkheim 1912: 453). 48 Durkheim 1912: 53. 49 'Ont toujours et partout ete con