The Practices of Crusading: Image and Action from the Eleventh to the Sixteenth Centuries (Variorum Collected Studies) 9781409454243, 140945424X

Citation preview

I

I Also

ίn

the

Varίorum

Collected Studίes

Serίes:

DENYS PRINGLE Churches, Castles and Landscape

ίη

the Frankish East

ROBERT IRWIN Mamluks and Crusaders Men ofthe Sword and Men ofthe Pen

JONATHAN RILEY-SMITH Crusaders and Settlers in the Latin East

LUTTRELL

ΑΝΤΗΟΝΥ

Studies οη the Hospitallers after 1306 Rhodes and the West

JAMES

Μ.

POWELL

The Crusades, The Κingdom of Sicily, and the Mediteπanean

BENJAMIN

Ζ. ΚEDAR

Franks, Muslims and Oriental Christians Studies in Frontier Acculturation

ίη

the Latin Levant

JEAN RICHARD Francs et Orientaux dans le monde des croisades

DAVID NICOLLE and their Weapons around the Time of the Crusades Relationships between Byzantium, the West and the Islamic World

Waπiors

NORMAN HOUSLEY Crusading and Warfare in Medieval and Renaissance Europe

BERNARDS.BACHRACH Warfare and Military Organization in Pre-Crusade Europe

DENYS PRINGLE Fortification and Settlement in Crusader Palestine

PETER W. EDBURY Kingdoms of the Crusaders From Jerusalem to Cyprus

I

VARIORUM COLLECTED STUDIES SERIES

The Practices of Crusading

Christopher Tyerman

I

Christopher Tyennan

The Practices of Crusading

Image and Action from the Eleventh to the Sixteenth Centuries

1~ ~~o~;~;n~~;up LONDON AND NEW YORK

First published 2013 by Ashgate Publishing Published 2016 by Routledge 2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Οχοη ΟΧ14 4RN 52 Vanderbilt Avenue, New York, ΝΥ 10017 Routledge

ίs

an

ίmprίnt

of the Taylor &

Francίs

Group, an

ίnforma busίness

This edition © 2013 by Christopher Tyenηan Christopher Tyenηan has asserted his moral right under the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act, 1988, to be identified as the author of this work. ΑΙΙ rights reserved. Νο part ofthis book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any fonη or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in any infonηation storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing from the publishers.

Notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.

British Library Cataloguing ίη Publication Data Christopher. The practices of crusading : image and action from the eleventh to the sixteenth centuries. - (Variorum collected studies series ; CS 1027) 1. Crusades. 1. Title ΙΙ. Series 909'.07-dc23

Tyenηan,

ISBN 9781409454243 (hbk)

The Library of Congress has cataloged the printed edition as follows: 2012955101 ISBN 13 : 978-1-4094-5424-3 (hbk)

VARIORUM COLLECTED STUDIES SERIES CS 1027

I

CONTENTS Preface

νιι

Acknowledgements

χ

Abbreviations

ΧΙ

SECTION Α: EARLY FOURTEENTH CENTURY CRUSADLNG

Ι

Marino Sanudo Torsello and the lost crusade: lobbying in the fourteenth century Transactίons

57- 73

of the Royal Hίstorical Society, 5th serίes, 32,

1982 ΙΙ

Philip V ofFrance, the assemblies of 1319- 20 and the crusade Bulletίn

]5- 34

of the Instίtute of Historίcal Research 57, no. 135,

1984 ΠΙ

Sed nihil fecit? The last Capetians and the recovery of the Holy Land War and Government in the Middle Ages, eds J. and J C. Holt. Woodbrίdge: Boydell, 1984

IV

170- 181

Gillίngham

Court, crusade and city: the cultural milieu ofLouis duke of Bourbon

Ι

49- 63

Soldiers, Nobles and Gentlemen: Essays in Honour of Maurίce Keen, eds Ρ. Coss and C. Tyerman. Woodbridge: Boydell, 2009

V

Philip VI and the recovery ofthe Holy Land

25- 52

The English Hίstorical Revίew 100, 1985 SECTION Β: ΤΗΕ NATURE OF CRUSADI NG

VI

Were there any crusades in the twelfth century? The English Historical Review 11 Ο, 1995

553- 577

I CONTENTS

νι

VII

Henry ofLivonia and the ideology of crusading

23-44

Crusading and Chronίcle Wrίtίng on the Medίeval Baltic Frontier, eds L. Kaljundί, Μ Tamm and C.S. Jensen. Farnham: Ashgate, 2011

VIII

Some English evidence of attitudes to crusading in the thirteenth century

168- 174

England 1, eds Ρ. Coss and S. Lloyd. Woodbridge: Boydell and Brewer, 1986

Thίrteenth Centuιy

ΙΧ

The Holy Land and the crusades of the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries Crusade and Settlemenl, ed. College Cardiff Press, 1985

χ

Cardiff:

Lίnehan

105- 112

Unίversίty

What the crusades meant to Europe The Medίeval World, eds Ρ. London: Routledge, 2001

ΧΙ

Ρ. W Edbuιy.

131- 145

and J. Nelson.

Holy War, Roman popes, and Christian soldiers: some early modern views on medieval Christendom

293- 307

The Medίeval Church: Universίlίes, Heresy and ιhe Relίgίous Life, eds Ρ. Biller and Β. Dobson (Sιudίes ίn Chιιrch Hisloιy: Subsίdia 11). Woodbridge, Boydell, 1999 SECTION C: ΤΗΕ EXT'ERlENCE OF CRUSADfNG

ΧΙΙ

'Principes et Populus': civil society and the First Crusade

1- 23

Cross, Crescent and Conversion. Studίes on Medieval Spaίn and Christendom in Memoιy o/Rίchard Fletcher, eds S. Barton and Ρ. Lίnehan. Leiden: Brill, 2008, pp. 127- 151 ΧΙΙΙ

Who went οη crusades to the Holy Land?

13- 26

The Horns ο/Ifa!fϊn, ed. Β.Ζ. Kedar. Jerusalem: Yad Izhak Ben-Zvί, 1992

XIV

Paid crusaders. 'Pro honorίs vel pecunίe'; 'stίpendίarίί contra paganos': money and incentives οη crusade

1-40

Previously unpublished

1- 6

Index This volume contains xii + 274 pages

I

PREFACE Who knows crusading who only crusading knows? The focus of my work the crusades collected in this volume places the wars of the cross in their social, politica\, economic and intel\ectua\ contexts, reflecting the ambient material and mental resources of western Europe in the middle ages. These are not studies of the Near East, Muslim al-Andalus, the eastern Baltic or other faith frontiers . Rather they investigate aspects of the crusades as a product of the culture of western Christendom, exploring the relationships between action and perception, ambition and practice, propaganda and support. They are grouped into three rough categories that inevitably intersect and overlap. The first section concentrates οη the role crusading played in the politics and elite culture of the early fourteenth century, with a concentration οη the participation in crusading plans of the court of France. When most of these articles appeared, in the 1980s (Ι, ΙΙ , ΠΙ, Υ) , acceptance that \ater medieval governments and people took crusading seriously remained a minority view. Although historians' attitudes have now shifted to accommodate the reality of continued interest, commitment and enthusiasm for the crusade, much ofthis has been led by what could be termed the ideological turn of cuπent historiography, not confined to medieval scholarship. This approach emphasises that ideas presented by participants as coherent justifications for actions determine the actions themselves: thus political or religious ideas become the sum ofpolitics and religion. By contrast, Ι have been more interested in the pragmatic rather than the idealistic and do not assert what may be artificially sharp distinctions between the two. Close study of French official archival evidence (II- V) and a study of one propagandist and his contacts (Ι) illustrate both the seriousness and complexities of reactions to a cultural norm. Α final piece (IV), like the first (Ι) , looks at the wider cultural milieu of an individual politician's concern with crusading as only one aspect ofhis public and pήvate life. These close-up examples shed light οη wider discussions of crusade involvement, testing the generalisations of contemporary and modern observers while illustrating the actual processes of converting aspirations into deeds or, in these cases, nonevents, which can be as instructive. Α second group of papers looks tangentially at a feature of crusade studies popular ίη the last quarter of the twentieth century, especially in Britain, which may be called the 'what were the crusades?' question, the nature of the phenomenon. Ι have tended to pursue this through exploring the evidence οη

I V111

PREFACE

of those receiving the message as much as those initiating or delivering it. The contrasts between official, literary and public or popular responses are examined to see how crusading was variously understood by contemporaήes and promoted by apologists ίη England (VIII), the Baltic (VII) and western Europe more generally (VI, ΙΧ and Χ) . The suggestion (ίη VIII and ΙΧ) that non-Holy Land crusades, even where legally constituted ίη identical fashion, were perceived as less numinous, less universally appealing than Holy Land crusades, attracted some hostility from the British crusader nouvelle vague at the time. Recently, however, a number of younger scholars of papal policy ίη the thirteenth century have come to similar conclusions. Αη attempt to place twelfth century crusading ίη a less monolithic or anthropomorphic conceptual frame (VI) generated similarly vigorous reactions. Many of these disagreements rest on perceptions of how the middle ages worked, the levels of uniformity, deference to papal authority, the effectiveness of official church prescriptions and the personal and collective negotiation between belief and behaviour. By locating crusading activity and attitudes ίη their temporal and cultural context (as ίη Χ), a picture may emerge stripped of contemporary or modern preconceptions and not hobbled by artificial insistence on the exclusivity of motive or intent. This malleability is reflected in the subtle and contested confessional interpretations of the crusades offered by scholars and polemicists in the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries (ΧΙ). Α third cache of studies looks at crusades in practice, the personal and institutional structures of the expeditions. The emphasis rests οη secular realities in conjunction with, not as opposed to spiήtual impulses. Scrutinising the collective decision-making οη the First Crusade (ΧΙΙ) exposes an army or armies run less as religious communities under arms than as political ones. Α survey of evidence ofthe sociology ofthe crusaders themselves (ΧΙΙΙ) confirms the centrality of access to material resources. This point finds re-emphasis and retuning in a final, previously unpublished essay (XIV) that charts the importance ofpay as an incentive and cohesive force for crusader armies from their very beginnings in the 1090s. This also points to an unexpected unity that runs through the whole co\lection: rational crusade organisation; political and social context; the conceptual precedence ofthe Holy Land; an avoidance of over-schematic views of ideology, its reception and implementation; an acknowledgement of diversity of motive and inspiration. Most of these pieces reject ήgid adversarial typologies of piety and mateήalism, sinceήty or compromise. People, as individuals or groups, are regarded as agents, but within defining social and economic structures. Windows into their sou\s are largely shuttered, except (in I and IV) where scraps of tantalising if inconclusive personal evidence survive. Finding out medieval people's innermost thoughts is a foo\ 's eπand. Only by their deeds can they be known. These include

I PREFACE

ίχ

external acts of piety such as crusading. Thus, instead of what has become a fashionably definitive religious approach, here is offered a contingent cultural and material analysis. It is hoped that this collection makes its own contribution to the study of crusading. Inevitably, with articles conceived and published over so long a period, with the first delivered as long ago as 1981 , there is the temptation to recast them ίη the light of subsequent scholarship. This has been resisted as these collections serve a historiographical as well as historical purpose which would be diluted or obscured by alteration. Only a couple of particularly egregious eπors have been noted below. Otherwise these pieces stand as written. Confronting such academic detritus from one 's past is both intriguing and sobering: intriguing for what one forgot one said and sobering for what one once knew and thought. However, it has also been instructive in that there are few conclusions that I would now seriously dispute, even ifl would adjust the tonal balance of some arguments (for example over the optimism and popularity behind Philip Vl's plans ίη the 1330s ίη V) and revisit the occasional rhetorical flourishes that have appeared to others as pivotal arguments (the final sentence of VI for instance, where the qualifying clause seems to have been largely ignored.). Such retrospective agreement with myself I had not expected. 1 can only conclude, as I have done often ίη the past three decades, that I was extraordinarily fortunate in the intellectual as well as academic direction I was given at the very start of my researches. For that, as much as for supervising the thesis οη which a number of the older articles were based, some ofwhich he read in draft and one (1) he heard delivered, to Lionel Butler, who died tragically early in November 1981, shortly before his fifty-eighth birthday, my debt remains incalculable. Thanks must also be recorded to Peter Biller for proposing this enterprise, as well as long encouragement, and to John Smedley of Ashgate for his care and generosity ίη seeing it to fruition . CHRISTOPHER TYERMAN

Oxford October 2012

I

ACΚNOWLEDGEMENTS

Gratefu\ acknowledgement is made to the following persons, institutions, journals and publishers for their kind permission to reproduce the papers included in this volume: Cambridge University Press (for article Ι); John Wiley and Sons, Inc. (11); Boydell and Brewer, Woodbridge (111, IV, VIII, ΧΙ); Oxford University Press (V, VI); Professor Peter Edbury, University ofCardiff (ΙΧ); Taylor and Francis Group (www.tandfonline.com) (Χ); the Ecc\esiastica\ History Society (ΧΙ); Koninklijke Brill N.V., Leiden (ΧΙΙ); and Yad Ben-Zvi Press, Jerusa\em (ΧΙΙΙ). Every effort has been made to trace a\l the copyright holders, but if any have been inadvertently overlooked the publishers will be pleased to make the necessary aπangement at the first opportunity.

PUBLISHER'S The

ΝΟΤΕ

volume, as ίn all others ίn the Varίorum Collected Studίes have not been given α new, contίnuous pagίnatίon. In order to ανοίd confusίon, and to facίlίtate theίr use where these same studίes have been referred to elsewhere, the orίgίnal pagίnatίon has been maίntaίned wherever possίble. Artίcle ΧΙΙ has necessarίly been reset wίth α new pagίnatίon, and wίth the orίginal page numbers gίven ίn square brackets wίthίn the text. Each artίcle has been gίven α Roman number ίn order of appearance, as lίsted ίn the Contents. Thίs number ίs repeated on each page and ίs quoted ίn the ίndex entrίes. artίcles ίn thίs

Serίes,

I

ABBREVIATIONS Annales Monastίcί, ed. Η. R. Luard, RS (London 1864- 9) of the 1nstίtute ofHίstorίcal Research Crusade and Conversίon on the Baltίc Frontίer 1150- 1500, ed. Alan V. Muπay (Aldershot, 2001) CCR Calendar of the Close Rolls Preserved ίn the Publίc Record Office CLR Calendar of Lίberate Rolls Preserved ίn the Publίc Record Office CPR Calendar of the Patent Rolls Preserved ίn the Publίc Record Office Close Rolls of the Re ίgn ofHenry 111 Preserved ίn the Publίc CR Record Office, 1227- 1272 DD Diplomatarίum Danίcum , eds Niels Skym Nielsen et al. (Copenhagen, 1957- ) EHR English Hίs torίcal Revίew HCL Heinrίcί Chronίcon Lίvonίae, eds Leonid Arbusow and Albert Bauer, MGH rer. Germ. ίn usum scholarum ex separatim editί (Hanover, 1955) LUB Lίν, Esth- und Curlandίsches Urkundenbuch , eds Friedrich Georg νοη Bunge et al., 12 vols ίη 2 series (Reval, 1853- 1914) Monumenta Germanίae Hίstorίca MGH MGHrer. Germ MGH Scrίptores rerum Germanίcarum ίn usum scholarίum Patrologίa Cursus Completus, Serίes Latίna, ed. JacquesPL Paul Migne, 221 vols (Paήs, 1844-64) RHC Recueίl des historίens des Croisades (Paris, 1841- 1906) RHCArm. RHC Documents Armeniens RHC(H)Occ. RHC Historίens Occidentaux Recueίl des hίstoriens des Gaules et de la France (Paris RHF 1738- 1876) Rolls Series: The Chronicles and Memorίals of Great Britain RS and 1reland durίng the Middle Ages (London 1858- ) Transactions ofthe Royal Historίcal Socίety TRHS Ann. Mon. B1HR CCBF

Bulletίn

I

I

I

MARINO SANUDO TORSELLO AND ΤΗΕ LOST CRUSADE: LOBBYING ΙΝ ΤΗΕ FOURTEENTH CENTURY

ΑΤ Avignon οη 24 September 1321, a wealthy, middle-aged, wellconnected and widely travelled V enetian merchant, Marino Sanudo, called Torsello, presented to Pope John ΧΧΙΙ a book which he had been composing over the previous fifteen years, the Liber Secretorum (or Secreta) Fidelium Crucis, the book of the secrets of the faithful of the Cross. The full title explained the subject matter: the protection ofthe faithful, the conversion and destruction of the infidel and the acquisition and retention ofthe Holy Land in peace and security. 1 The crusade remained a live political issue in the early fourteenth century. ln 1305, Philip IV of France offered to exchange his crown for that of Jerusalem. 2 Clement V asked for advice οη the crusade, from the masters ofthe Hospital and Temple and an exiled Armenian prince, prior to authorising a crusade under the Hospitallers in 1308. The council ofVienne in 1311 attracted written advice fromjames ΙΙ of Aragon, Henry ΙΙ of Cyprus, the mystic Ramon Lull, the bishop of Angers and, in intention ifnot fact, the keeper ofthe Seal ofFrance, Guillaume de Ν ogaret. 3 The council announced a new crusade and instituted ecclesiastical tithes to pay for it. Large numbers of French nobles and burgesses took the Cross in 131 3 and 13 16. 4 Successive ρopes were bombarded with plans for a new military passagium to Outremer. The promise of a crusade suffused diplomacy between France and England and between France and Flanders. 5 Ships were 1 J. Bongars, Gesta Dei per Francos (Hanover, 1611 ), ΙΙ, 1- 2, 8, & 1- 288 for the complete Secreta. 2 Η. Finke, Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens ( Mίinster, 1907), ίί, p. 118; in general, J. Delaville le Roulx, La France en Orient au χiυ' siέcle (Paris, 1885 - 6), & Α. S. Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages (London, 1938). 3 Nogaret's first draft (Archives Nationales, Paris, [Α.Ν.] J 456, ηο. 36/2bis) was savagely modified and rendered bland (Α.Ν. J 456, ηο. 36/2 ). 4 Chronographia regum Francorum (ed. Η . Moranville, Paris 1891), 1, 211; Chroniqueparisienne anonyme de 1316-39 (ed. Α. Hellot), Mέmoires de la sociιftιf de l'histoire de Paris et de ΖΊΖe de France, χί ( 1884), 25 - 6. •E.g., A.N.,JJ 49, nos. 50- 52 (Edward Ι1 ίη 1313);] 561a, ηο. 24;J 562a, ηο . 8;J 562b, ηο. 30 (Flanders 1316- 9); Rotuli Parliamentorum, Il, 64 ( 1332).

I

collected in Mediterranean ports in readiness to sail east, by the Hospitallers in 1310-11 and by the French in 1319, 1323 and 13356. 6 In 1334, a combined Franco-papal fleet joined an allied Christian campaign against Turkish pirates in the Aegean as a preliminary to a general crusade to Palestine. 7 Ιη 1335, Cilician Armenia was invaded by the Mamluks in a pre-emptive strike οη the news of a fresh crusade from the west. 8 Οη a flood-tide of cultural and political hegemony, the French, self-conscious heirs of St. Louis, led the calls for the recapture ofOutremer. ln the late 1330s, the French failure to achieve this ambition provided Edward ΙΙΙ ofEngland with a potent weapon in the verbal sniping at the beginning ofthe Hundred Years War. 9 The failure to launch a crusade was keenly felt. Those who promised action which never materialized became the objects of ήdicule, obloquy, even political opposition. There were ugly scenes in Paris at Easter 1326 when crowds of would-be crusaders learnt that Louis, count of Clermont, a grandson of St. Louis, was not, as expected, intending to embark for the east that year. 1 For the townsmen who joined Louis of Clermont's confraternity of the Holy Sepulchre in 13 17, or the pastoureaux in 1320 or the magnates who committed themselves to accompany Philip VI to the Holy Land, the crusade still offered a chance of self-fulfilment and salvation. 11 The crusading tradition was kept alive in romances, poetry, and chronicles. The young Philippe de Mezieres was inspired by reading stories of the past. 12 Personal links persisted. Ιη Lent 1 320, Philip V of France assembled crusade veterans to give him advice οη how to conduct a campaign in the east. 13 Memories of Outremer were sustained by individuals. Jean de Joinville, St. Louis' companion in the east in 1248- 54, wrote his Life ofthe saint in 1309 and died in 1319. Othon de Grandson, follower ofEdward ofEngland's crusade in 1270, hero of the defence of Acre in 1291, habitue of the courts of France and England, may have attended Philip V's assembly of 1320 and died in

°

6 Delaville le Roulx, Fτance en Oτient, ίί, p. 5 (Villaret's letter of 11 Jan. 1311 ); C. de la Ronciere, 'Une escadre franco-papale', Mέlanges d'aτchiologie et d'histoiτe, χίίί ( 1893), 397- 418. 1 Ρ. Lemerle, LΈmiτat d'Aydin, Byzance et l'Occident (Paήs, 1957), pp. 75-101 . 8 James of Verona, Libeτ peτegτinationis (ed. R. Rohήcht), Reυue de l'Oτient Latin, ίίί (1895), 250. • Canon of Bήdlington, Gesta Edwaτdi Teτtii, Chτonicles ιif the τeigns ιif Edwaτd / & ΙΙ (ed. W. Stubbs, Rolls Seήes), 11, (London, 1883), 125- 26, 131-33; Τ. Rymer, Foedeτa (London, 1704- 35), IV, 709,710, 804- 5. ιο Gτandes chτoniques de Fτance (ed.J. Viard), ΙΧ (Paris, 1937), 49- 50. 11 Chτonique paτisienne anonyme, 29-30, 46-47; Α.Ν., Κ 1246 (for Guy ofBlois' deal ίη 1333), and Le tτέsοτ des chaτtes d'Albτet, ed.J. -Β. Marquette 1, (Paήs, 1973), 459- 60, ηο. 400 (for Amaury ofLautrec's deal) . 12 Ν. Iorga, Philippe de Mέz:,iέτes (Paήs, 1896), pp. 71 (& η. 1), 73-4. ιa A.N.,JJ 58, ηο. 439.

I MARINO SANUDO TORSELLO AND

ΤΗΕ

LOST CRUSADE

59

1328. 14 Jean de Vignay, Philip VI's court translator in the 1330s, revealed that his father had been with St. Louis in Egypt over eighty years earlier. 15 Ιη 132 1, Philip V employed one Pierre d'Acre to translate some Arabic documents οη the leper scare. 16 Marino Sanudo embodied just such a contact with Christian Outremer. Ιη his youth, Sanudo travelled to the east οη family business. He visited Acre when it was still in Christian hands and acted as his father's agent in dealings with his cousins, the dukes ofN axos. Ιη 1300, when he was about thirty, Sanudo attached himself to the household of Cardinal Ricardo Petroni of Siena. Petroni, a canon lawyer of distinction, possessed a life-long interest in the state of the Holy Land. 17 The period spent in contact with Petroni may have been crucial in determining Sanudo's future career. It was only after leaving Rome in ι 304 that Sanudo began to write and to travel with the furtherance of the crusade as his ultimate object. As late as 1309, Sanudo still regarded himself as under Petroni's patronage. 18 It is possible that the scheme of writing about the crusade and the eastern Mediterranean came from the cardinal. Ιη the lstoria del Regno di Romania, written in the early 1330s, Sanudo reveals that some of his detailed information about the diplomacy ofBoniface VIII was given him by 'patron mio' Cardinal Petroni (the pun being, ηο doubt, deliberate) . 19 The intelligent, sophisticated, cosmopolitian and inquisitive Venetian may have learnt much from the cardinal. One side-light οη Sanudo's connection with Petroni displays how small and tightly knit were the social, political and personal milieux of crusade writers. At Anagni in 1303, Petroni, in attendance οη Boniface VIII, made contact with the kidnappers led by Nogaret. When the tables were turned, Petroni was forced to flee, disguised as one of his own servants. 20 The dramatis personae is revealing. Petroni, with an abiding interest in the crusade, had Sanudo as one of his intimates at this precise time. Nogaret later wrote a pamphlet οη crusade finance. One of Nogaret's appointed associates, Thierry de Hireςon, later worked in the household of Mahaut, countess of Artois 14

15

18.

A.N.,JJ 58, no. 441 for the summons to Ήoute de Granφn' in 1320. Ρ . Meyer, Documents manuscrits de l'ancienne littέrature de France (Paήs, 1871 ), pp. 17-

Musέe des archives nationales (Paris, 1872), no. 328. Bongars, Gesta Dei, 11, 21; for Sanudo's career in general, Α. Magnocavallo, Marino Sanudo il Vecchio e il progetto di crociata (Bergamo, 1901 ), passim, & F. Frankfort, Marino Sanudo Torsello, α Social Biography (unpublished Ph.D., University ofCincinnati, 1974), pp. 62 - 130. 18 Α. Magnocavallo, Ί codici del Liber Secretorum Fidelium Crucis', Rendiconti del Istituto Lombardo di sciem:,e e lettere, ser. 2, χχχί ( 1898), p. 1115. 19 Κ. Hopf, Chroniques Grico-Romanes (Berlin, 1873), p. 169. 20 Τ. S. R. Boase, Boniface VIII (London, 1933), pp. 341-51. 16

17

I 60 and had, as colleagues, Pierre Dubois, author of numerous works οη the crusade, and Thomas le Myesier, the disseminator of the works, including the crusade works, ofRamon Lull. The crusade was in the air. Politicians were exposed to crusade theories and propaganda at close quarters. Sanudo was attached to Petroni. Petroni had contacts with Nogaret. Nogaret was a companion ofHireς:on. Hireς:on was to become a colleague ofDu bois and le Μ yesier. Le Μ yesier was a pu pil of Lull. Lull had presented a crusade petition to Boniface VIII. Boniface had been the patron of Petroni. Ι t was a small world. 21 Sanudo began to write on the crusade in 1306. 22 His first work, the Conditiones Terrae Sanctae, contained what was to become the central feature of his plans to recover the Holy Land. Egypt, the key to Palestine, depended on commerce. Remove her position as an entrepόt, prevent the imports of vital raw materials, and the Sultan's power would be broken. This was to be achieved by a permanent fteet of galleys to blockade all trade routes in the eastern Mediterranean. The idea of an economic embargo on Islam dated back to the ninth century. 23 Since the second council of Lyons it had been a constant theme of crusade writers. Sanudo's contribution, however, was the only one to examine the precise reasons why and how a commercial embargo would be so destructive of Mamluk power. Το deny the Sultan the materials for war, wood, iron, pitch, etc., was an obvious course to follow. But Sanudo specified the most useful and profitable commodities which passed to and from Egypt. Some observers feared commercial depression in the west if the Egyptian trade ceased. Sanudo allayed such anxieties by indicating different sources of some goods and alternative trade routes for others. He argued for the power of market forces: 'for just as water will naturally ftow into valleys, so goods will be attracted to places where they are most required.' 24 After 1306, Sanudo travelled extensively and learnt much. He met Foulques de Villaret, master of the Hospital, witnessed the battle of the River Cephissus and stayed for a time in the Peloponnese. 25 In 1321, a visit to ports οη the Ν orth Sea and Baltic enabled Sanudo to compare maritime techniques from different parts of Europe and to decide which would be most suited to an attack οη the Nile Delta. 26 21 For Countess Mahaut's household, see J. Ν. Hillgarth, Ramon Lull & Lullism in Fourteenth-Century France (Oxford, 1971), pp. 169- 70, & chs. iv-vi for le Myesier. 22 Bongars, Gesta Dei, ΙΙ, 21; for the Conditiones, Magnocavallo, Ί codici', pp. 111518. 23 Η. Pirenne, Mahommed and Charlemagne (trans. London, 1939), p. 1 79. 24 Bongars, Gesta Dei, ΙΙ, 23. This was taken from ch. 1 of the Conditiones (Magnocavallo, Ί codici', p. ι 115). 25 Magnocavallo, Sanudo, p. 82; Hopf, Chroniques, p. 167; Α. Cerlini, 'Nuovere lettere di Marino Sanudo il Vecchio', La Bibliojilia, xlii ( 1940), 352; Bongars, Gesta Dei, ΙΙ, 34. 26 Bongars, Gesta Dei, ΙΙ, 3, 71-3.

I MARINO SANUDO TORSELLO AND ΤΗΕ LOST CRUSADE

61

Ιη spite of the death of his father around 1318 and the inevitable increase in his business and political commitments, Sanudo continued his researches for the Secreta. The Secreta was divided into three books. Book One, the expanded Conditiones, concerned the first stage of the crusade, the economic and commercial blockade. Book Two dealt with the primum passagium designed to conquer Egypt. Once this had been achieved, the general crusade to Palestine would be a formality. Book Three comprised a history ofthe Holy Land. There was nothing vague about the plans to attack Egypt. Leadership, manning, training, equipment, tactics, victualling and payment were considered in detail. Sanudo was as much at home narrating the history of the Near East as in describing the sort of ship, soldier or even biscuit which would best ensure the reconquest ofOutremer. Ιη June 1322, the need for western action in the Levant was emphasised by the news of the Mamluk invasion of Armenia and the threat to the port of Ayas. 27 This invasion prompted Charles IV of France to prepare detailed plans for a relief expedition to Armenia as a preliminary to a crusade aimed at destroying the power of the Mamluk empire. Sanudo was not content to leave the planning to others οη the chance that they would heed his written advice. Ιη Avignon in the spring of 1322, he made contact with French ambassadors and with Robert, king of Naples. Both King Robert and Louis of Clermont, leader ofthe French embassy, received copies ofthe Secreta. 28 Throughout the summer of r 322 negotiations were pursued at Avignon over the terms of papal aid for any French campaign in the Levant. 29 Ιη December, the pope authorized the granting of indulgences to those who went to the assistance of Armenia and the Holy Land. 30 But it was up to the French to produce concrete proposals beforejohn would grant any church money. Attention shifted to Paris, whither the French ambassadors returned, accompanied by envoys from Cyprus, Robert ofNaples and Sanudo himself. 31 Ιη latejanuary r 323, the Cypriot ambassadors presented their case 27 lt reached Ανίgηοη οη Trinity Sunday, 6 June (Η. Finke, Acta Aragonensia (Berlin and Leipzig, 1908-66), ΙΙΙ, 400). 28 F. Kunstmann, 'Studien ίiber Μaήη Sanudo', Konigliche Bayeτische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Abhandlungen Phil-Historische Classe, νίί ( 1855), 787; Cerlini, 'Lettere', 359; Bongars, Gesta Dei, 11, 296. 29 J. Viard, Lesjournaux du tτisoτ de Charles IV le Bel (Paήs 1917), p. Ινί; Jean ΧΧΙΙ: Lettres secretes et curiales relatives ά la France, ed. Α. Coulon et al. (Paήs 1900- ), ηο. 1562 30 lbid., nos. 1571 - 72; Jean ΧΧ//: Lettres communes, ed. G. Mollat (Paήs, 1904- 46), nos. 18142- 49. 3 'J. Petit, Charles de Valois (Paήs, 1900), p. 2οι; Lettres secretes, no. 1575; Lettres communes, no. 18153.

I

for western help. At a formal gathering in Paήs, tears were shed, hearts stirred and minds outraged at the litany ofwoes suffered by the Christians in the Levant. 32 There followed a seήes of pήvate meeetings between experts, amongst whom the official account made especial mention ofmerchants. 33 There evolved from these talks a plan for an emergency relief expedition to depart for Armenia in May under the command of Amaury, viscount of Narbonne, with Berengar Blanchi as admiral. This fleet was to compήse 20 galleys, two transport ships and four huissiers, for the horses. Α voluntary subsidy was instituted οη the laity and clergy alike, to be administered by Bishop Guillaume Durand ofMende. Α small crusade of 1 ,οοο knights, to be led by Louis of Clermont and Gaucher of Chatillon, the constable, was suggested for 1324 to be followed, in 1325, by a general crusade under either Charles IV or his uncle, Charles ofValois. For this, funds were to be raised by a la y gabelle and ecclesiastical tithes. 34 Ιη Apήl 1323, 24,000 livres parisis were borrowed from the Scali and Peruzzi banking houses for Viscount Amaury's campaign. 30 The May deadline had to be ignored because of the sluggishness of administration, but duήng the summer ships were hired by Blanchi along the coast ofLanguedoc and Provence.36 Ιη the event, nothing came ofany of these schemes. The French took three months to produce their complete proposals, the Cypriot and Armenian ambassadors at Avignon were sceptical and the cardinals voiced doubts about the financial arrangements.37 John himselfprevaήcated until after a truce had been agreed by the Armenians and Mamluks. 38 John was more concerned with papal interests in Italy. Franco-papal crusade haggling was finally brought to an end by the collapse of Anglo-French relations after the Saint-Sardos incident in October 1323. Sanudo spent six months at the French court where he met and talked with the most powerful men in the kingdom.39 He had already composed a memorandum for John ΧΧΙΙ οη how to tackle the Armenian cήsis. Now he wrote another for Charles IV.40 Sanudo Chronique parisienne anonyme, 77. Lettres secretes, no. 1685. u lbid., nos. 1683, 1685; Bibliotheque Nationale, Paήs, [Β.Ν. ], MS nouvelle acquisition franς:aise 7600 fos. 13or- 136v; Ordonnances des rois dι France de la troisieme race (Paήs, 1723-), 1, 810-12; Β.Ν . , Collection Doat 16, fos. 141r- 146r; Α.Ν., Κ 41. no. 22. 35 Viard, Journaux du trίsor, nos. 2755-6, 2897. 36 Β.Ν., nouv. acq. fr. 7373, fos. 12v, 148r- ν; C. de la Ronciere, Histoire de la marine frαTlfαίse, ί (Paήs, 1889), p . 228 n. 1. Blanchi ran into trouble at the hands ofa devious hirer in Marseilles (Β. Ν . , nouv. acq. fr. 7373, fos. 15r-17v). 31 Lettres secretes, nos. 1690- 1709 & n. 34 above. 38 lbid., no. 171 ο; if. no. 1848 for the autumn negotiations. 39 Kunstmann, 'Studien', 788. • 0 Bongars, Gesta Dei, ΙΙ, 5- 6, 7. lt was presented to Charles IV in the presence of John ofBohemίa, an active Baltic crusader (Kunstmann, 'Studien', 788). 32 33

I MARINO SANUDO TORSELLO AND ΤΗΕ LOST CRUSADE

63

discussed the crusade and the prospects for a rapprochement with Byzantium with Robert ofNaples, Gaucher ofChatillon, William, count ofHainault, and Bishop Durand. 41 Charles IV received a copy ofthe Secreta and Louis ofClermorit was given a selection of maps. 42 Sanudo's reception was enthusiastic. He received money from the king and his advice was, apparently, highly valued by Durand, Louis ofClermont and Viscount Amaury. They invited Sanudo to accompany Amaury's expedition and pressed him to stay longer at the French court. 43 Sanudo may have remained long enough to attend the council at Gisors early in July which discussed more details of the proposed passagia. 44 What effect, if any, did Sanudo's influence have οη the French plans of 1323? 45 The general shape ofthe schemes was that outlined in the Secreta. But Sanudo was not oήginal in proposing such a strategy. Ιη detail there may be a closer connection. Ιη the memorandum given to Charles IV, Sanudo proposed that a flotilla of ten galleys should embark immediately to 'guard the seas' and to transport a garήson to Armenia. The French proposed to the pope that Amaury's fleet should guard the seas so that 'the power of the Sultan would be curtailed and make the recovery of the Holy Land easy'. The one doubt expressed by the French had been that Sanudo's projected fleet was too small. 46 Ιη spite ofSanudo's assurances that reinforcements would be available from Cyprus, Rhodes and Romania, the French multiplied Sanudo's figures: 20 galleys instead of I ο and a 3,300 strong garήson instead of Sanudo's Ι ,300. The French did not trust the locals, a traditional crusade problem. Although accepting Sanudo's strategy, their inflation of his figures rendered the tactics considerably less practical. When speed was of the essence, to suggest the collection of what, in the fourteenth century, constituted a medium-size army, was foolish, especially as this force was only to be the first of three planned to be raised in rapid succession. Ι t was in tones of'I told you so' that Sanudo wrote to Durand in 1 326 reminding him that the French plan had been too large and too expensive to succeed.47 Crusade history had taught Sanudo that small was effective. He was not very interested in the military leviathans conjured up by Lull Bongars, Gesta Dei, 11, 294, 296, 299, 300. lbid., 11, 296. 43 lbid., 11, 296, 300. 44 A.N.,J ιο26, nos. 34, 34bis. •• Sanudo made one convert ίη Avignon. Ιη 1323, Cardinal Stefaneschi, a correspondent ofSanudo, alone of all his colleagues advocated Sanudo's scheme for an immediate flotilla of ιο galleys (Lettres secrέtes, no. 1703; Bongars, Gesta Dei, 11, 315-16 for the cardinal's later links with Sanudo) . 46 lbid., 11, 5; if. Lettres secrέtes, no. 1685. 47 Bongars, Gesta Dei, 11, 297. •1

42

I or Dubois. Sanudo's particulare passagium against Egypt was to be a paid, professional force, reliant οη money raised from the redemption of crusade vows and the sale of indulgences. Sanudo wanted the crusade to work. Thus he advocated a series of limited objectives which, taken singly, were not over-ambitious, yet, when taken cumulatively, amounted to the total destruction of Mamluk power in the Near East. Sanudo never lost interest in French attempts to launch a crusade. Ιη the winter of 1331 - 2, Sanudo was in Naples discussing the need for an anti-Turkish alliance, first aired by him in Avignon in 1322. 48 Whilst at Naples, Sanudo heard of Philip Vl's announcement of his intention of going οη crusade. Sanudo wrote to Philip offering advice. 49 Time had not altered the central elements ofhis policy towards Egypt. The economic blockade, conducted by ten to fifteen galleys, was to be followed by an attack οη Egypt by 15,000 infantry and 300 knights. Ιη making constant reference to the Secreta, Sanudo was assuming that Philip had access to a copy. The letter to Philip also included information οη the Turkish threat to the Negroponte. But Sanudo found that what he now saw as the greater need, the defence ofRomania, failed to inspire the French nobility. The French renewal of the crusade in 1331 was prompted by hostility to the Mamluk Sultan. 50 Ιη the sermons of Archbishop Roger of Rouen during the negotiations οη the crusade tithes at Avignon in 1332-3, the image of the Holy Land burned fiercely. 51 The forward march offourteenthcentury crusaders was conducted with the crusaders looking backwards. St. Louis was the paradigm even if Emirs U mar and Osman were the enemy. Philip VI was not convinced ofthe need for a preliminary crusade. 52 Jean de Cepoy's fleet of 1334 was seen as peripheral to the main thrust of the crusade. The time had not yet come for the Turk to replace the Mamluk as the chief object of hostility. Philip VI was reluctant to dissipate his military effort and be drawn into conflict in the Aegean. The French insisted to the pope that a single, general crusade was preferable to a plan incorporating a preliminary campaign. 53 The preparations for Philip VI's crusade were the most elaborate since 1270. Perhaps they were too elaborate, involving the coincidence Kunstmann, 'Studien', 791 -2, 797-8; Bongars, Gesta Dei, ΙΙ , 299- 300. Kunstmann, 'Studien', 791-8. • 0 Guillaume de Nangis, Chronique latine avec les continuations, ed. Η . Geraud (Paris, 1843), ΙΙ , 130. • 1 E.g., Β . Ν . , MS latin 3293, fos. 162r-163r, 242r- 243r. 52 L. de Mas Latrie, 'Commerce et expeditions', Melanges historiques (Paris, 1873- 86), iii, 101 - 2. 53 Lettres communes, ηο. 61324, p. 224. 48

49

I MARINO SANUDO TORSELLO AND ΤΗΕ LOST CRUSADE

65

offortune ίη too many theatres of government and diplomacy. Α new grant of tithes was secured ίη 1333. Α separate committee of the council and a distinct trέsor administered the crusade. Ships, horses and corn were collected. Nobles committed themselves by oath and contract. Recruits were attracted by indulgences, wages and cash hand-outs.54 Unfortunately, the conflicts ίη Scotland, Gascony, the Empire and Italy persuaded the new pope, Benedict ΧΙΙ, to cancel the crusade ίη March 1336. 55 The fig-leaf of European politics once removed, naked aggression could begin. As Sanudo had so often argued, the lack of peace ίη Christendom was fatal to the crusade. Sanudo died ίη 1343, a disappointed man. His will displays a sad defiance ίη his pleas for his work always to be available for consultation. 56 The success of the Chήstian alliance of 1334 was a considerable achievement for which Sanudo must take some credit. 57 But Sanudo's work had failed to achieve its purpose. However, if his mission was unsuccessful, it was certainly not for the want of endeavour. Sanudo prided himself οη his contacts. The list is a roll call of the great ofthree kingdoms. Those who received copies ofSanudo's writings included Clement V,John ΧΧΙΙ, Charles IV, Philip VI, Edward 11, Robert ofNaples, Louis ofClermont, Bishop Durand, William of Hainault, Robert of Boulogne and numerous other unnamed cardinals, bishops and French lords. Apart from these, his correspondents included Cardinal du Poyet, papal legate in Italy, the archbishop of Capua, chancellor ofNaples, the duke ofCalabria, the duke ofLimbourg, the king of Armenia and the emperor ofByzantium.58 Two ofhis contacts reveal how close Sanudo came to the process of planning a crusade. Louis ofClermont had taken the Cross in 1316. Ιη 13 18, Philip V had appointed him captain of the preliminary crusade. Louis obtained detailed advice from Marseilles οη ·the best 54 For Philip VI's plans and preparations mentioned here, Lettres secretes, nos. 520727; Delaville le Roulx, France en Orient, ίί , pp.7- 11; Mas Latrie, 'Commerce', 99, ιο1; J . Viard, Lesjournaux du trέsor de Philippe VI ( Paήs, 1899), p. !χ; Α. Ν . , ΚΚ 5, passim; Μ . Jassemin, 'Les papiers de Mile de Noyers', Bulletin historique et philologique ( 1918), 22023; Α. Merlin-Chazelas, Documents relatifs au Clos des Galέes de Rouen, ίί (Paris, 1978), pp. ιο- 11; Β.Ν., nouv. acq. fr. 7603, fos. 145r- 146r; Α. Huillard-Breholles, Titres de la maison ducale de Bourbon (Paris, 1867- 74), 1, ήοs. 2041, 2082 - 3 and η . 10, above. 55 Benoft Χ//: Lettres closes et patentes intirίssant les pays autres que la France, ed. J. Μ. Vidal ( Parίs, 1913- 50), no. 786. 56 Magnocavallo, Sanudo, pp. 150- 4. 57 Α . Laiou, 'Maήno Sanudo Torsello, Byzantium & the Turks'. Speculum, χlν ( 1970), 374- 92. 58 For those who received Sanudo's works and his correspondents, Bongars, Gesta Dei, 11, 289- 316 (Epistolae); Kunstmann, 'Studien', 753- 819; Cerlini, 'Lettere', 321 - 59; L. Dorez & C. de la Ronciere, 'Lettres inedites de Maήno Sanudo', Bibliotheque de l' Ecole des Chartes, Ιvί ( 1895), 21 - 44.

I 66 strategy and equipment for a successful crusade. Ιη 1319-20, Louis was prominent in a seήes of conferences of crusade experts. Founder of the confraternity of the Holy Sepulchre in 1317, Louis proposed a permanent garrison for Armenia in 1322, built a church for his crusading confraternity in 1325-7, took the Cross again in 1333, discussed crusade shipping with a Venetian ambassador ίη 1334, offered himself as commander of the fleet planned against the Turks for 1335, and spent money οη recruiting for Philip VI's crusade. Sanudo kept ίη close touch with him throughout the 1320s and 133os. 69 Bishoρ Durand, 'procurator' for Charles IV's crusade, had attended an assembly ίη January 1313 to discuss the crusade. Ιη 1317-18, he offered himself as crusade legate and patriarch of Jerusalem. John ΧΧΙΙ turned him down. Α major figure ίη the crusade conferences of 1319-20, Durand wrote a report ofthe advice gathered then. Ιη 1330, he led an embassy to the Sultan to discuss the establishment of a Christian/Moslem condominium ίη Palestine. Sanudo maintained a respondence with Durand for some years and was well-informed ofthe 1330 mission. 60 These two were, perhaps, the most significant ofSanudo's contacts as they were most involved in organizing a crusade. Sanudo insisted that the spoken word was the 'lingua viva', the written word being 'quasi lingua mortua'. 61 Aware that letters and books could be put aside unheeded and unread, he often complained about the mis-laying or lack of acknowledgement of his letters. 62 Ιη 1327, to ensure that a letter reached the bishop of Pozzuoli ίη Naples, Sanudo despatched a number of copies so that at least one would arrive. 63 Furthermore, Sanudo had considerable confidence ίη his powers of verbal persuasion which, if his own descήptions of his talks in Paris ίη 1323 and Ν aples in 1331 are to be believed, was fully justified. Throughout his caι·eer, Sanudo gathered his information and argued his case most effectively ίη personal conversations. His influence οη the plans of 1323, when he was personally engaged with the pήncipals, forms a stark contrast with Philip VI's rejection of his • 8 For the details of Louis and the crusade, Chronique parisienne ano'!)'me, 25- 6, 29-30, 102-3, 154; Α. de Boislisle, 'Projet de croisade du premier duc de Bourbon', Extrait de l'Annuaire Bulletin de la Sociίtl delΉistoire de France ( 1872), 248- 55; A.N.,JJ 56, no. 413;JJ 58, nos. 396-8; Lettres secretes nos. 1354, 5485; S. J aillot, Recherches sur la υille de Paris, ί (Paris, 1772), pp. 22-3; Mas Latήe, 'Commerce', 106-9; Huillard-Breholles, Titres de Bourbon, 1, nos. 2041, 2082-3. •• J. Roucaute & Μ. Sache, Actes de Philippe le Bel relatifs au pays de Glυaudan (Mende, 1896), p. 141; no. 762; A.N.,JJ 58, nos. 396- 8; Β.Ν., MS latin 7470, fos. 117r-123r; G. Golubovich, Biblioteca bio-bibliographica della Terra Santa, ΠΙ (Quaπachi, 1919), 366-7 (the Moslem account ofthe 1330 mission); Kunstmann, 'Studien', 765-66. 81 Kunstmann, 'Studien', 798. 82 Bongars, Gesta Dei, ΙΙ, 289-90, 294; Cerlini, 'Lettere', 355, 357. 83 lbid., 356.

I MARINO SANUDO TORSELLO AND ΤΗΕ LOST CRUSADE

67

general strategy when, despite his request to be summoned by Philip, he had to rely οη letters alone. 64 But personal interviews were rare. Given the impossibility of being everywhere at once, Sanudo was forced to depend οη the written word. The main disadvantage of the 'lingua mortua' was that the writer, to save time, had to anticipate the questions the reader wanted to ask. 65 Thus many of Sanudo's letters were comprehensive and discursive, and accompanied with as much literature as possible. With his advice to Philip VI in ι 332, Sanudo included an extract from the Secreta describing the ideal qualities necessary for a crusade leader, the account of the 1321 presentation of the Secreta to the pope and copies to the Armenian memoranda of ι 322-3. The inclusion of these last was, Sanudo admitted, slightly de trop given that Armenia was temporarily at peace with the Sultan. lt might, however, reftect, even explain, Philip's initial intention of taking his crusade to Armenia rather than Egypt. 66 One inevitable consequence ofSanudo's method was that he had to have copies of everything he wrote. So he compiled a register of his letters as well as numerous copies ofhis books. 67 He used copies ofhis letters to indicate, in other letters, how far his ideas had matured. At least twice he included letters he had written to the pope in letters to other people. 68 His short memoranda were sent with letters to display the fullest range ofhis thought and he gave away large numbers ofcopies ofthe Secreta. But the size of the Secreta was a drawback. So, to Cardinal du Poyet and tojohn, duke ofLimbourg, Sanudo sent only the rubrics of the Secreta to whet the appetite. 69 The package despatched to Philip VI in 1332 was described as the 'marrow or briefcompendium' ofthe Secreta. 70 Ιη just the same way, Pierre Dubois had written his Oppinio for Philip IV in 1308 as an abstract, synopsis and introduction to the ι 308 revision of his very substantial De Recuperatione Terrae Sanctae because he 'wished briefty to set forth his ideas'. 71 Each manuscript ofthe Secreta was intended to illustrate all features ofSanudo's life-work. This was true ofthe copy given to Robert, count Kunstmann, 'Studien', 798. E .g. Bongars, Gesta Deί, 11, 290-1, 294- 7,297-8.· 66 Kunstmann, 'Studien', 796; C. du Fresne, seigneur du Cange, Familles d'Outremer, ed. Ε. G. Rey (Paris, 1869), pp. 142- 3. Ιη 1330, Sanudo sent the French memorandum to Cardinal du Poyet (Kunstmann, 'Studien', 788). 67 Dorez & Ronciere, 'Lettres', 44; Cerlini, 'Lettere', 322-4. 68 Bongars, Gesta Dei, 11, 297; Cerlini, 'Lettere', 349. 69 Bongars, Gesta Dei, 11, 303, 3 ιο. 7°Kunstmann, 'Studien', 791, η. 1. 71 Pierre Dubois, The Recoυery ιif the Holy Land, ed. W. 1. Brandt (New York, 1956), p. 1 99· 64

65

I 68 ofBoulogne, probably in Paris in ι 323. 72 Robert, a powerful influence in French politics, had been an arnbassador to the council ofVienne, had taken the Cross in ι 3 ι 3 and had led an ernbassy to John ΧΧΙΙ to discuss the crusade in Septernber ι 323. 73 Sanudo had transcribed in Robert's rnanuscript the Arrnenian rnernoranda, the account of the ι 32 ι presentation and the report of the papal scrutineers, as well as four rnaps for essential reference. 74 Sanudo's rnaps, even if not drawn by hirn, were irnportant. He had rnade a separate present of thern to Louis of Clerrnont in ι 323 and he urged their preservation by the Dorninicans of SS Giovanni e Paulo in Venice in his will. 75 Count Robert's Secreta was rnade rnore attractive by elaborate rniniatures, enticingly placed towards the beginning of the work. 76 By the ι 330s, the nurnber ofSanudo's books and rnernoranda in the libraries ofwestern Europe rnust have been legion. 77 Ιη one sense, the rneticulous attention to giving the fullest possible package of advice was a hindrance. Ιη ι 331-2, in order to cornpile a suitably representative collection of rnernoranda for Philip VI, Sanudo had to return to V enice frorn Ν aples. Ιη V enice were his collection of docurnents, his register of letters, his copyists, scribes and cartographers. 78 Ιη his will, Sanudo referred to the 'books concerning the business ofthe Holy Land which I cornpiled and ordered to be written'. 79 The letter to Philip VI was, as a consequence, written alrnost six rnonths after Sanudo rnust have heard of Philip's plan to go οη crusade. Why did Sanudo indulge in this extravagant and repetitive bornbardrnent, the rnechanics of which were curnbersorne and liable to delay? By ι 332, the French court alone rnust have been littered with bits of Sanudoana. Sanudo's works were stirnuli to thought, bases for discussions, sources of reference and answers to questions as well as plans for action. When business or illness prevented Sanudo frorn leaving Venice, he certainly relied οη rnessengers to supplernent the Bodleian Library, Oxford, MS Tanner 190. Finke, Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens, ίί, p. 277; Geo/froi de Paήs, Chronique Rimee, Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ΧΧΙΙ, 135; Viard, Journaux du tresor, p. Ινίί; Lettres secretes, ηο . 1848. 74 Bodleian Library, MS Tanner 190, fos. 2ν - 3ν, 203v- 207r, 209r- 2 ιον. 75 Bongars, Gesta Dei, ΙΙ, 296; Frankfort, Sanudo, p. 275. Prawer, ίη his introduction to the Toronto 1972 reprint of the Bongars edition of the Secreta, argues (p. χνίίί ) that Sanudo commissioned cartographers to draw his maps, including the Genoese, Pietro Vesconte. 76 Bodleian Library, MS Tanner 190, fos. 4r, 13v, 14r, 15r, 17v, 18r, 20v, 22r, 32v etc. 77 At least 19 manuscripts survive (Frankfort, Sanudo, p. 213) . 78 Kunstmann, 'Studien', 798. 79 Frankfort, Sanudo, p. 275. From the alterations and additions ίη MS Tanner 190, it may be surmised that Sanudo also took a scribe with him οη his travels. But the corpus of documents remained ίη Venice. 72

73

I MARINO SANUDO TORSELLO AND ΤΗΕ LOST CRUSADE

69

written word either from their own expertise or from Sanudo's briefing, men such asjerome, bishop ofCaffa,Jean Musaut and Guillaume Badin, both contacts of Louis of Clermont, a French ambassador, Theobald Barbason, Philip Lombard of the Imperial household, Joachim ofCremona, Guillaume de Bellais, Damian Nadali andjean de Hainault.80 Sanudo's correspondents themselves had a role to play. Durand was to communicate Sanudo's advice to his colleagues. 81 Sanudo expected the bishop of Pozzuoli, who had been one of the papal scrutineers ofthe Secreta in 1321, to relay information to the king of Naples and the duke of Calabria.82 Cardinal du Poyet was to persuadejohn ΧΧΙΙ to work for peace. 83 Ιη 1327, Sanudo even tήed to recruit Charles IV's confessor. 84 Informality was the key. But the literary works still held a central position. Their object was to convince the recipient and to be used by the recipient to convince others. Crusade propaganda, as seen by Sanudo, moved in a cellular manner. The information and theories came from Sanudo and his writings, but the influence and persuasion could proceed via his correspondents. Νο technique of polite persuasion eluded Sanudo. Formal presentations, news letters, memoranda, books, informal conversations, personal messages and messengers, rhetoric, flattery and bombast were all in his armoury. His command of Italian, French and Latin was complemented by his open-mindedness in adapting the Secreta to changing circumstances and the advice of critics. The general sobriety of his style may indicate that, unlike some of his contemporaries, Sanudo either wrote his book out in full or based it οη extensive written notes, in marked contrast to the Armenian Hethoum, for example, who dictated his Flowers of the History of the East in 1307 to a scribe without, so he claimed, a single note. 85 Sanudo wrόte vividly and perceptively. The problem ofthe security ofthe Negroponte was likened to a live coal, difficult to handle and a danger to the neighbourhood.86 Ιη the analysis ofthe -loss ofthe Holy Land, Charles of Anjou rather than Michael Paleologos was cast as 80 Bongars, Gesta Dei, 11, 299; Kunstmann, 'Studien', 799, 812, 815 - 16; Dorez & Ronciere, ' Lettres', 34, 35, 43, 44. Badin, for instance, visited Greece, Constantinople, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Cilician Armenia, Crete, Cyprus (where he enlisted the help of the king), Egypt (where he may have met the Sultan) , Palestine and Syήa before meeting Sanudo ίη Venice οη his return ίη 1334. Sanudo sent Badin back to the French court to brief Louis of Clermont of affairs ίη the east. Badin was a sort of spy (Kunstmann, ' Studien', 81 2, 8 ι 5- ι 6) . 81 Bongars, Gesta Dei, 11, 294. 82 Cerlini, 'Lettere', 355- 6. 83 Kunstmann, 'Studien', 755- 89. 84 Cerlini, 'Lettere', 354- 5. 80 Recueil des historiens des cτoisades : Documents Armhιiens, 11 (Paris, 19ο6), 253. 86 Cerlini, 'Lettere', 348-9.

I 70 the villain. Sanudo wrote this to Philip VI, a sign he was ηο toady. 87 He admitted to the bishop of Caffa, who was to relay the information to Andronicus ΙΙ, that there were some in the west who planned to attack Byzantium. 88 Honesty bred trust. Ιη Paris in 1323, Sanudo had argued for an alliance with Byzantium despite the presence ofthe king of Ν aples, Gaucher of Chatillon and Charles of Valois who all had family interests hostile to the Greeks. 89 Sanudo was alert to the tastes ofhis audience. History was popular. When Sanudo appended the third book to the Secreta and when he sent a copy ofthe Istoria ofFrankish Greece to the count ofHainault, he was οη safe ground. 90 History could teach and edify, as well as entertain. Sanudo used a famous story from the legend/life ofSt. Louis, that of the conversion of Saracens at Acre, to persuade Philip VI of the preferability of converting rather than conquering the Greeks. The impact ofthe story was probably greater as it figured in the recent Office of St. Louis. 91 As a negotiator, Sanudo was flexible. Το a French audience, he never ruled out an attack οη Greece. But to the Greeks, he appeared as the champion of the need for the union of the churches. When dealing with the French, he thought that the Greeks were expendable to the greater cause of saving Christendom from the Moslems. But he was careful to whom he said this. Suitably for a lobbyist, Sanudo was a compulsive name-dropper, claiming to have been everywhere and met everyone. He managed to call himself the devoted and humble servant of most of the rulers with whom he came in contact. 92 The gifts from the pope and the king of France illustrate that he was held in favour and, perhaps, esteem. 93 But why was Sanudo admitted to the counsels of the great in the first place? Ι t has been suggested that Sanudo was a representative of Byzantium or Naples. 94 Magnocavallo, Prawer and Laiou argue that it was unofficially in the interests of Venice that Sanudo acted. 95 Beyond Kunstmann, 'Studien', 799-808. Bongars, Gesta Dei, 11, 299. 89 lbid. 90 Dorez & Ronciere, 'Lettres', 43. 91 Kunstmann, 'Studien', 806; M.J. Epstein, 'Ludovicus Deus Regnantium: Perspectives οη the Rhymed Office', Speculum, liii ( 1978), 322. 92 E.g. Bongars, Gesta Dei, ΙΙ, 301-2. 93 Μ. Faucon, 'Μaήηο Sanudo a Avignon', Melanges d' archiologie et d'histoire, ίί ( 1882), 222 - 3 (for papal gifts of money and clothing ίη 13-22); Viard, Journaux du tresor, no. 3177 (for 16 livres parisis given by Charles IV). 94 Petit, Charles de Valois, p. 201. 95 Magnocavallo, Ί codici', p. 1113; Prawer's introduction to the Secreta (Toronto, 1972), pp. νί-νίίί; Laiou, 'Sanudo, Byzantium & the Turks', 374 & passim. 87

88

I MARINO SANUDO TORSELLO AND

ΤΗΕ

LOST CRUSADE

71

his advocacy of church union, there is ηο evidence, either from his letters or itinerary, that he was an agent ofByzantium. Sanudo desired the posi tion of plenipotentiary for the crusade, the moulder of opinion, the confidant and adviser of kings, pήnces, popes and cardinals, and his flirtation with the Greeks displayed his desire to be the ultimate contact man. But he remain.ed an outsider, ploughing his own furrow. The connection with Naples was strong but hardly formal. Sanudo was a useful source of information and ideas, as in 1331. He made himself almost indispensable because ofhis uniquely extensive contacts throughout Chήstendom. But he remained his own man. His expenses came out ofhis own pocket. 96 He knew people because he was who he was, a Venetian and a Sanudo, had lived the life he had and had dwelt in the places he had. Sanudo denied that he was employed by anybody except himself. 97 He did not have to be. He could aflΌrd not to be. lt was ηο coincidence that he emerged onto the international scene after the death ofhis father. Only then did he begin to write the full version of the Secreta. As he rose in the Venetian hierarchy, he could devote more energy and money to the crusade. Ιη the end it ruined him. 98 His career as a merchant was of direct use to his projects. He was familiar with the mechanics ofinternational exchange of goods and money as well as ideas. Ιη 1327, he used the organisation of the Peruzzi to send a letter to the archbishop of Capua. 99 How different his methods were to the almost amateuήsh and old-fashioned approach adopted by Lull or Dubois. If Sanudo's views were Venetian in bias, it was because he was a Venetian and Venice was crucial to the success of any crusade. 100 His independence allowed Sanudo to be useful to more than one ruler at once. He was beholden to none. Robert ofNaples,John ΧΧΙΙ and Charles IV all extended material patronage to him, but as a guest not a servant. Their common interest in Sanudo confirms their common interest in his cause. Whether Sanudo bought or charmed or argued his way into the corridors ofpower, once there he made it his business to meet as many people as possible and to impress οη them his value as an expert. His contacts and experience were so extensive that he felt that he could speak with great authority to those who wielded great power. Sanudo's influence depended upon his cause, •• Bongars, Gesta Dei, ΙΙ, 98, 301. 97 Laiou, 'Sanudo, Byzantium & the Turks', 374. 98 Kunstmann, 'Studien', 816 (Sanudo writing to the count ofHainault ίη 1334) 'multa alia haberem explicare, si haberem subsidium expensarum ... sed mea indigentia executionem impedit voluntatis'. •• Cerlini, 'Lettere', 350. 100 Note the miniatures ofthe Lion ofSt. Mark ίη MS Tanner 190, fo. 4r, at the head of the Secreta.

I 72 the crusade, rather than οη any specific patron or employer. It was his devotion to this cause which led to his appointment as one of the savii in the Venetian senate to advise οη the Turkish menace in r 333. 101 Sanudo was not a propagandist in the sense that Lull was before him or Philippe de Mezieres was to be after him. He was less exhortatory and less apocalyptic. His purpose was not to preach but to advise and inform. As a private individual, he was in a position to float his own policies and to deal evenly with the many interested parties. Ιη one respect, Sanudo was eminently traditional. He saw the papacy as the focal point in his plan. All his early contacts had been with and through and at the Curia. He began his quest there. Only the papacy matched the supra-national nature of the crusade. Supported by golden opinions, Sanudo devoted the last twenty-five years ofhis life to the crusade. His milieu was the ante-chamber rather than the throne-room. He was influenced by his position at the top of V enetian society where the crusade was not a chivalric adventure but public policy. Sanudo saw in the Turkish advances a threat to Europe and to V enice and, hence, to his family's livelihood. But he never forgot Outremer and dissipated his fortune in its service. Destroy Egypt to win the trade routes for Venice. This may have been a motίve. But he rallied to the cause of Armenia in 1322 and to the French initίative of Ι 33 1. There was more than civic or personal selfinterest behind the work of Sanudo. The continuation of his labours, so carefully planned in his will, had a purpose. After describing in detail the dίsposition of copies of his crusade writings and maps, and having urged that, at the opportune moment, they should be brought to the attention ofthe Doge, the pope and the master ofthe Teutonic knights, Sanudo concluded: 'et haec pro anima mea faciant'. 102 The crusade was good for Venίce, good for Christendom, but it was also good for the soul. Sanudo was ηο mere propagandist. The advice he offered was practical, designed to be implemented. He would have been comforted to know that the Secreta was available in the library of the king of France thirty years after his death. 103 Υ et Sanudo sometimes betrayed a tetchiness born of disappointment. io 4 Νο crusade embarked. Sanudo could be depressed and desperate. The gloom of his will is foreshadowed in many of his letters, especially those dealing with the Turks. But ηο man who desired to influence others could afford to be a purveyor of doom and gloom alone. Sanudo was an optimist because Frankfort, Sanudo, p. 128. Magnocavallo, Sanudo, pp. 150- 4. ιο3L. Delisle, Le cabinet des manuscrits de la Bibliotheque Nationale, p. 162. 10• Bongars, Gesta Dei, Π, 297. 1ο 1

ιο 2

ΠΙ

(Paris, 1881),

I MARINO SANUDO TORSELLO AND

ΤΗΕ

LOST CRUSADE

73

he had to be. Thus in ι 326, the French failure was accepted, but a new idea for a smaller ftotilla was started. 105 Sanudo's optimism infected his realism. Both can show the historian how it could have appeared to Sanudo that the crusade was imminent. Sanudo and his audience inhabitated the same world. It was a world where the crusade was always about to begin, the next thing to be done, the focus for Christian idealism. Sanudo's career as a lobbyist reveals a network of crusaders, linked by blood and enthusiasm, Louis ofClermont, Robert ofBoulogne,John ofBohemia, Charles ofValois, GaucherofChatillon, Charles IV, Philip VI, RobertofNaples, William ofHainault and Guillaume Durand. They were the men who intended to write a new chapter of the 'gesta Dei per Francos', the men whom Sanudo had identified as the 'fideles Crucis' and for whom he had composed the Liber Secretorum. 10 •

Bongars, Gesta Dei, 11 , 297.

II

II

Philip V of France, the Assemblies of 1319-2 ο and the Crusade 1 Ν τ Η Ε thirteenth century, the ascent of the Capetian kings of France to a dominant position ίη western Europe was, ίη part, both a cause and a function of their consistent enthusiasm for the defence and, after 1291, the recovery of the crusader strongholds ίη the Holy Land. 1 The crusade provided a driving force for Louis ΙΧ and continued, almost as an inherited responsibility, to supply his successors with an ample harvest of rhetoric, not least for Philip IV and his sons with their passionate devotion to the memory of their saintly crusading ancestor. Although the crusade could be turned against political rivals ίη Europe, as ίη 1285, it was οη the Holy Land, especially after the fall of Acre, that devotion was concentrated. As self-professed leaders of Christendom, the French kings could do ηο less than appear as champions of the crusade. Practical advantages were many, notably easy access to ecclesiastical tithes and a moral superiority which so irritated others, especially the kings of Aragon, but which was an undoubted diplomatic asset. Α dual culmination of such French propaganda was seen at the council of Vienne ίη 13 1 1-1 2 and at a ceremony ίη J une 1313 when Philip IV, his family and a large number ofhis nobles took the Cross ίη Paris. Unfortunately, the apparent enthusiasm for the crusade was not matched by coherent plans or concerted military efforts to recover the Holy Land. Ιη the quarter of a century after the loss of Acre, the only western Christian advances ίη the eastern Mediterranean had been at the expense of the Greeks, ίη particular the occupation of Rhodes by the Hospitallers between 1306 and 1310. The complicated internal political feuds ίη Cyprus, the uncertainty of the Roman sympathies of the Armenian church and the distractions of Frankish Romania, as well as the obstinate problems ίη Scotland, Italy, Gascony and the Empire, hindered western crusade planning. Yet the cause of the Holy Land itself and of Jerusalem and the Holy Sepulchre ίη particular had been returned to the centre of the rhetorical and theoretical debate and, whatever the prosaic realities, Cilician Armenia and Cyprus were paraded as threatened symbols of Christian resistance to Islam, appealing to every Christian for his aid. But by 1316, ίη spite of their brave words, the French kings had achieved almost nothing either to relieve Armenia from the pressure of the attacks of the Mamluks of Egypt or to regain Outremer from the Mamluk sultan of Cairo. Was this laziness, accident or perfidy? Any attempt at an answer must cast aside assumptions, contemporary and modern, and concentrate οη what individual kings and governments said and did for the negotium Dei. Responses to the crusade reveal much about political aspirations and attitudes beyond the particular issue of the recovery of the Holy Land. One example cannot be taken for all, but it may serve as an opening οη to a somewhat neglected feature of French political life ίη the early fourteenth century. 1 1 owe much to the late Dr. Lionel Butler for his comments οη a draft of this arιicle and ιο Dr. Maurice Keen and Professor Kenneth Fowler for their criticisms of an earlier presentation of ιhis maιerial. The opinions expressed here and the errors which obstinately remain are, however, entirely my own responsibility.

II

II 16

PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

Writing to his nephew, Cardinal Gaucelin-Jean Dueze, ίη March 1319, Pope John ΧΧΙΙ commented οη the 'ingentem et ferventem affectum' which Philip V of France possessed 'ad negotium Terre Sancte'. Later historians have been less charitable, yet recent research into Philip's domestic policies has revealed a rich vein of crusade rhetoric running through Philip's pronouncements and actions which may indicate a more than formal interest ίη the subject. 2 One characteristic of Philip V's regime was the use of national and provincial assemblies, lay and ecclesiastical, to further the formulation and propagation of royal policy. Ιη the attempts to reconcile dissidents and reform royal finances by such consultation and co-operation with the more influential elements ίη French political society, the crusade played its part, ίη the spring of 1317, the winter of 1319-20 and the summer and autumn of 1321 . For the use of the crusade at the assemblies ίη 131 7 and 13 21 ulterior motives have been suggested. But the series of meetings at Paris between December 1319 and March 1320, summoned to discuss the crusade, present unusual features of purpose and composition.g Α closer examination of these assemblies and their crusading context may help expose a dimension of late Capetian rule which is today too casually and cynically dismissed. For example, ίη a recent article devoted to the rising of the pastoureaux ίη 1320, Dr. Malcolm Barber asserts that the crusade plans of Philip V were Ίittle more than a means of raising revenue, just as they had been under his father'. 4 This general argument begs many questions. 5 Philip V certainly requested financial help from the pope ίη the context, and οη the pretext, of a hoped-for grant for the crusade itself. But both Philip andjohn were open about the king's needs and the purpose of the papal grants.6 If the promise of a crusade helped create an atmosphere within which the pope granted money to the king for other, apparently preliminary purposes, the distinction ίη the object of the grant should nevertheless be recognized as important. Α tithe not merely ίη the context of a crusade but for the crusade as such was an important event, the grant being the subject of tortuous negotiations and constrained by innumerable conditions. John ΧΧΙΙ agreed to giving Philip V a tithe specifically for the crusade only once, injune 1321, just a couple ofmonths before the onset ofthe king's long final 'Lettres secretes et curiales du papejean ΧΧΙΙ, 1316-34, relatives ιi la France, ed. Α. Coulon and others fascicules, Paris, 1900-72, ίη progress), ηο. 800; Paris, Archives Nationales (hereafter Α.Ν.), J 562a ηο. 2. For some modern assessments, see Ε. Α. R. Brown, 'Subsidy and reform ίη 1321: the accounts of Najac and the policies of Philip V', Traditio, χχνίί (1971), 399-430; C. Η. Taylor, 'The composition of baronial_assemblies ίη France, 1315-20', Speculum, χχίχ ( 1954), 433-59; idem, 'French assemblies and subsidy ίη 1321 ', ibid., xliii (1968), 217-44 . 'Taylor, 'Baronial assemblies', pp. 448-50 . • Μ. Barber, 'The pastoureaux of 1320',jour. Eccles. Hut., χχχίί (1981), 143-66 (p . 162 for the (ιο

quotaιion) . 5 Dr. Barber ciιes the papal grant of tithes ιο Philip of 21 March 1318 (Lettres secrίtes, no. 512) as evidence for his ιhesis. Υeι ιhis grant was not for the crusade but was, rather, ιο assist Philip with unavoidable expenditure, specifically the household expenses ofQueenjeanne and Louis X's widow, Clementia, and the unpaid debts resulιing from the wills of Philip IV and Louis Χ. This help was, it is true, requested so that crusade preparations could proceed more freely and quickly, but it was not a grant of crusade tithes as such, and the pope was careful to pοίηι this out. When ιalking of ιhe cross-taking ceremony ίη Paris οη 23July 1316, Dr. Barber conflates Pieπe de Courpalay, the abbot of Saint-Germain-des-Pres, with Pierre de Pleine Cassagne, patriarch of Jerusalem. Ιη facι boιh preached sermons ('Chronique Parisienne Anonyme de 1316 a 1339', ed. Α. Hellot, ίη Mίmoires de !ο. Sociίtί de l'histoire de Paru et de l'lle de France, χί (1884), pp. 1-207, esp. pp. 25-6) . The date of intended departure of the proposed 'passagium' is 1318, not 1317 (Barber, pp. 159-60; cf. η. 9 below). 6 Barber, p. 161; Lettres secrέtes, no. 512. See also Lettres secrέtes , nos. 47 1, 47 5; Acta Aragonensia, ed. Η. Finke (3 vols. ίη 2, Berlin and Leipzig, 1908-66), ί. 472-3.

II PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

illness effectively cancelled his crusade schemes. 7 J ohn was always alert to suggestions of misappropriation of crusade money and, generally, was more interested ίη Italy than ίη large-scale crusade plans. Ιη any case, the pope did not necessarily need the crusade as an excuse to grant tithes. Philip V was able to collect ηο new ecclesiastical tithes specifically granted to him for a crusade. 8 Ifhis talk of a crusade made him a more respectable recipient of the church money for other purposes, then it must be established, before any accusations of deceit or cynicism can be levelled, whether that talk was supported by desire and action. Α crucesignatus since 1313, Philip of Poitiers rarely missed an opportunity to protest his devotion to the crusade. Ιη J uly 1316, his seizure of the regency was marked by a reaffirmation of his support for a crusade at a crowded ceremony ίη the Sainte-Chapelle at which a plan was launched for a preliminary expedition to embark ίη 1318 (and not 1317 as most historians assert). 9 This plan formed a major element ίη Philip's proposals presented to the new pope ίη September 1316. It was politically and diplomatically important that the regent of France should be seen to be maintaining the Capetian role as champion of Christendom. The plans, however, probably pre-date the death ofLouis Χ injune. 10 Ιη January 1317, Philip declared that once peace had been established throughout his realm he would press for a successful conclusion of the crusade schemes of his father and brother. 11 Ιη March 1317, he issued a summons for a large assembly of nobles and prelates to meet ίη Paris ίη May to discuss the

Lettres secrέtes, ηο. 1262. Ιη Sept. 1316, John ΧΧΙΙ reseIΎed the lasι two years (as yeι uncollected) of Clement V's sexennial tithe of 131 • for the crusade and, in 1318, he set aside 100,000 /lorins from the 131 7 yield of Clement's tithe for a ' particulare passagium'. The rest went to Philip V for his own purposes (Lettτes ,ecretes, nos. ,3, 515; Α. Ν. , Κ 40, ηο. 30). Now, οη relations betweenJohn ΧΧΙΙ and Philip V, see the vigorous Guelph apologia by Ν. J. Housley, Tht Italian Crusades (Oxford, 198• ), esp. pp. 73-5, 84-5 . 'Ρ. Lehugeur, Histoire de Philippe le Long, roi de France, 1316-11 (, vols., Paris, 1897-1931), i. 196; Taylor, 'French assemblies and subsidy' , p. 2Ζ1; G. Tabacco, La Casa de Francia nell'azione politicia di pαpα Gioνanni ΧΧ/1 (Rome, 1953), p. 64; Barber, pp. 159---{io. There has been much unnecessary confusion about this date. The continuaιion of the chronicle of Gerard de Frachet reports that all ιhe crusaders had to prepare themselves for departure 'post annum ίη festo Pentecostes' (Recueil des historiens de Ια France ( hereafιer R.H.F. ), χχ. 46). Nangis's continuator says that the date of departure was 'ίη festo Pentecostes ab eodem festo immediate post annum futurum' (Chronique latine de Guillaume de Nangis de 1113 ά ηοο aνec les continuations ... de ηοο ά η68 , ed. Η. Geraud (, vols. , Paris, 1843), ί. 4,8). The Grandes Chroniques puts it 'a la feste de la Penthecouste apres l'an' (Les Grandes Chroniques de France , ed. J. Viard (10 vols., Paris, 19,0-53), viii. 3,9 ). Whitsun fell οη 30 May in 1316, therefore the date of departure (i .e. a year from the next Whitsun after July 1316) was to be 1318 not 131 7. The fullest account by the anonymous Parisian chronicler confirms this: 'a la feste de Penthecouste en l'an ... m.ccc.xviij.' (' Chronique Parisienne', p. ,6). The confusion may be explained by the patriarch of Jerusalem's letter to the French church of •3July 1316 which uses the formula of the Saint-Denis chronicles in fixing 1318 as ίhe departure date, but which also required each diocese ιο report οη the response to the crusade call by the week before Whitsun 131 7 so that the organizers could know how many ships and supplies ιhey needed (Biblioteca bio-bibliogra.fica della Τeπα Santa e dellΌriente Francescauo, ed. G. Golubovich, 1st ser. (5 vols., Florence, 1906-27), iii. 147-8). Ιη Sept. 1316 an Aragonese envoy at Avignon confirmed that the date of Louis of Bourbon's departure was to be 'ad duos annos' (Acta Aragonensia, ί. 2Ζ3-4 ) . See also Ε. Α. R. Brown, 'The ceremonial of royal succession in Capetian France: the double funeral ofLouis Χ' , Traditio, χχχίν (1978), 250-1 . ιο Acta Aragonensia, i. 2Ζ3-4; Lettres secretes, no. 23. The patriarch had arrived in France from Cyprus by March 1316 carrying a recommendation to the king from the master of the Hospital that the king help the patriarch οη account of the crusade (Α.Ν ., J 368, ηο. 5; Biblioteca bio-bibliogra.fica, ίίί. 146). Louis ofClermont made a will inJune 1316 which referred to his desire to assist the Holy Land (see below, η . 36). 11 Α.Ν., JJ 55, ηο . 3; Registτes du Ττisοτ des Chartes, Inνentaire analytique, ιι. ί, ed. J. Guerout (Paris, 1966), ηο. 1458. 1

8

II 18

PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

crusade. 12 There, Philip publicly reconciled himself with Charles of Valois and Charles of La Marche. ιg The king reinforced his display of devotion by issuing a ban οη tournaments and jousts οη 1 April, οη the grounds that they impeded preparations for the crusade, although his targets were most likely provincial leagues of nobles who, under the guise of jousters, could train and conspire. Anyone breaking the ban was to be arrested. 14 Ιη the summer of 1317, the arrival of Armenian ambassadors ίη France apparently stimulated the beginning of concerted crusade planning. 15 Ιη the autumn of 1317, an embassy to Avignon was prepared which tried and failed to secure ecclesiastical tithes for the crusade. 16 Ιη September, Louis, sire of Bourbon, a grandson of St. Louis, founded the confrarie of the Holy Sepulchre to encourage unity and fellowship among the French crucesignati of 1313 and 1316. 17 It could be argued that the crusade negotiations of 1316, 1317-18 and 13i1 had ίη view the state of the trέsor royal rather than the Teπe Sainte. The employment of the crusade for other purposes could be seen as characteristic of late Capetian government and it is not intended to suggest that Philip V always held aloof from playing the crusade card to win political, financial and diplomatic advantage elsewhere. But was the crusade merely a vehicle used to establish a position of moral superiority from which to demand church tithes and lay taxes and which allowed him to bully his political opponents? Let Flanders provide an example. From the beginning of the regency of Philip of Poitiers, the consistent publicized concern of the French during the negotiations with the Flemish had been for the 'sainz voiage d'outremer qui par les guerres se pourroit grossement empescher' . One of the terms of the French proposals ratified ίη Paris οη 1 September 1316 was that the count ofFlanders would accompany the regent οη crusade. 18 Philip's envoys at Avignon ίη early 1318 were more or less forced to accept papal proposals for a compromise with Flanders because peace was considered more important than honour ίη the self-imposed context of the crusade. But the crusade was a flexible tool. By establishing the Flemish as 'impeditores passagii transmarini', the French could suggest the idea of a crusade against them.19 The threat of Flemish excommunication became explicit ίη Paris during April and May 1318, at a meeting between a number of bishops and the king, and ίη some inflammatory sermons preached by a royal chaplain and by the new papal mediator ίη the Franco-Flemish dispute, Pierre de la Palud. 20 The exercise badly misfired. Flemish hostility was aroused to a pitch which forced Palud publicly to contradict any suggestion that he had a hostile or even 12 Α. Ν. , JJ 54a, nos. 191-2 ; Regίstre, du Tresor des Chartes, 11 . ί , nos. 855-6, 1466, 1473-8; for the replies of those unable to attend, see Α . Ν ., J 443 , ηο . 4 ; J 444, nos. 5-6; Archives historiques de la Saintongeet de /Άunis , χχίίί (1894), 215-16; Taylor, 'Baronial assemblies', pp. 435-7. " 'Chronique Parisienne', pp . 2 7-8; here the details of the accord are wrong. 14 Α.Ν ., JJ 55, ηο. 12; Registres du Tresor des Chartes, 11 . ί, ηο. 1468 ; Ordonnances des roys de France de la troisieme race, ed. E.J. de Lauriere and others (23 vols., Paris, 1733-1849), ί. 643-4 . 15 Lettres secr,tes , no. 238; R.H.F., χχίί. 7 7 1. 16 Lettres secretes, nos. 238 η . 1, 330 η. 2; Acta Aragonensia, i. 4 70--5 . 11 'Chronique Parisienne', pp. 29-30. 18 Α.Ν ., J 561a, ηο. 24 fo. 9v. For the influence of the crusade οη French acceptance of a compromise over F1anders ίη 1318, see Acta Aragonensia, i. 475; Lettres secretes, no. 491; A.N. , J 562a, ηο .

8.

Chroniquelatine, iί. ι ι. Lehugeur, ί. 132, 134. The details emerged during the papal inquiry into Palud's mission ( Ε . Baluze, Miscellaneorum (4 vols., Paris, 1678-83), ί. 165-95). 19

20

II 19 towards the Flemίsh. Palud's attempt to salvage his credentίals as an ίmpartial wίtness served only to brίng the wrath of the French govemment down οη hίs head, Phίlίp's chief adviser, Henrί de Sully, denouncίng Palud as a frίend of the Flemish and a potential enemy of the kίng. For the moment the French had been wrong-footed and the idea of a crusade agaίnst the Flemish was temporarίly dropped. Nevertheless, the crusade remaίned integral to Francopapal-Flemίsh dίplomacy, providing the back-drop to the negotiations at Royallieu ίη October 1318. 21 The final terms ofthe treaty agreed οη 22 August 1319, based οη those of 1 September 1316, ίncluded the clauses concernίng Flemish participation ίη the crusade and this treaty was ratified ίη January 1320 ίη the midst of the round of crusade conferences and assemblies.22 The prospect of a crusade was a justification for French pressure οη Flanders as well as a threat to the Flemίsh ίf they persίsted ίη what the French regarded as contumacious disobedience. The test of French sincerίty came after August 1319. Οη 13 September 1318, the eve of the day especially sacred to crusaders, the Feast of the Exaltatίon of the Cross, Louis of Bourbon, now count of Clermont, was appointed head of the crusade advance-guard whίch was to embark before Phίlίp V's own 'generale passagίum'. 23 The appoίntment left ηο doubt that Louis's admίnίstrative authorίty over raίsίng troops and money was vice-regal. 24 Louis took soundίngs οη condίtίons of hίre and equίpment requίred for his expedίtίon from Marseίlles and asked the cίty council to advίse hίm οη general strategy. 25 Although ίη 1318 John ΧΧΙΙ had agreed to a partίcular pa.ssagium, ecclesίastίcal funds were made avaίlable only for a Franco-papal flotίlla of ten galleys whίch, ίη the event, were dίrected, by the pope, to help the Angevins at the sίege of Genoa ίη 1320, an enterprίse completely separate fi-om that of Count Louis. 26 Louίs was badly ίη need of guaranteed sources of funds . ln the summer of 1319, Louίs suggested to the royal councίl that the kίng put pressure οη the pope to supply sufficient 'pourveance'. 27 Louίs wanted the same 'ίndulgences, graces et prίvίleges que le papa Climent otroya aus hospίtalίers pour la Terre Saίnte'. Although Clement's prίvίleges to the Hospίtaller crusaders ίη 1308 had been standard (full remίssίon of sίns, legal protectίon, exemptίon from payment of ίnterest οη debts etc.), they could neίther be taken for granted nor assocίated with sίmilar prίvίleges reserved for the general pa.ssagium. 28 Louίs asked also for the use of all crusade legacies of 3,000 livres or less and for 3,000 livres from all crusade legacies of a greater sum as well as 'toutes les aides et PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

crίtical attίtude

21 Α.Ν., Κ 562b, ηο. 30 fo. 1. "Lehugeur, ί. 152-3, 155 η. 6; A.N.,J 563a, ηο. 39. "Α.Ν., JJ 56 , ηο. 413; Regi,tre, du Tri,or des Charte,, 11. 1, ηο. 2040; Titres de la mai,on ducale de Bourbon, ed. Α. Huillard-Breholles (2 vols., Paris, 1867-74), ί , ηο. 1509. Louis had founded his confrarie 14 Sept. 1317 . "Titres de la mai,on de Bourbon, ηο. 1509. "'Projet de croisade du premier duc de Bourbon', ed. Α. de Boislisle, Extrait de lΆnnuaire Bulletin de la Sociiti de l'hi,toire de France ( 18 72), 248-55. "C. de la Ronciere, 'Une escadre franco-papale', Milanges d'archiologίe et d'hi,toire , χίίί (1893), 397-418. Pace Ronciere, there is ηο demonstrable connection ofintention or finance between Louis of Clermont's plans and the 1319-20 flotilla. Οη this see C.J. Tyerman, 'The French and the crusade, 1313-36' (unpublished Universiry of Oxford D.Phil. thesis, 1981), pp. 63-7, 80. "A.N.,JJ 59, ηο. 767 , re-registeredJJ 60, ηο. 100; Regί,tre, du Tri,ordes Chartes, 11. ί, nos. 2796, 3470; Titres de la mauon de Bourbon, nos. 1526, 1633. Ιη 1316 it was suggested that Louis should embark with 5,000 men ίη 1318 (Acta Aragonen,ia, i. 223-4) . The advice from Marseilles suggested that he should use large ships with capacity for 50 crew, 400 passengers and 120 horses as well as hui,,ier,. Such preparations were not cheap (' Projeι de croisade', pp. 248-55). "Regestum Clementi, Papae V(10 vols. ίη 8, Rome, 1885-92), ί , ηο. 2988.

II 20

PHILJP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

subsides qui doivent estre baillees pour la defense de la terre d'Ermenie et de la Terre Sainte'. Ιη reply, the king and his grand conseil made ίt clear that the problem of Flanders still dominated French policy. 29 The king expected peace within the next two months, but he could not guarantee it. If a treaty were achieved Philip would then pursue his own ambition to go οη crusade, but as he believed ίη the efficacy of a preliminary expedition to soften up the Mamluks, he agreed that once peace had been established, he would press Louis's plans οη the pope. If, οη the other hand, there was ηο peace with Flanders, the king, rather optimistically ίη view of John XXII's attitude ίη 1318, expected the pope to support a war against the Flemish 'comme contre desobeissons a la sainte Eglise et nous [i.e. the king] aidera espirituelment et temporelment'. The threat of a crusade against Flanders was relit. Even so, Philip promised Louis that he would ask the pope to extract from any papal grant to fight the Flemish funds for Louis's campaign. Peace or not, Louis would get his money. Ιη the event, the Flemish treaty of August 1319 presented Philip with the opportunity to honour his pledges. Sully was sent to Avignon to discuss Count Louis's proposals and to open negotiations οη the details of a general pωsagium. 30 Precisely as he had always insisted, Philip, having apparently secured a treaty with Flanders, was turning to the crusade. The pope, ever reluctant to sign blank cheques, demanded ίη response to the French embassy ίη the autumn of 1319 that the French provided clearer, more detailed and more sober crusade proposals than they, possibly deliberately, had hitherto been prepared to furnish. 31 But John's request had been anticipated, for it is unlikely that the pope's letter could have reached Paris by 8 October when the royal summons went out to a small number of prelates, barons and nobles to meet ίη Paris at Christmas to achieve a 'finable deliberacion' οη the crusade. 32 Ιη the royal register, the list of prelates summoned to attend this crusade assembly was headed by Bishop Guillaume Durand ofMende, that oflay nobles by Louis of Clermont.33 Οη the same day, 8 October, a separate summons was sent to twelve clerics and knights to meet eight days before the Christmas assembly. These men were said to have particular knowledge of the crusade. At the top of this list ίη the register a different hand has added the names 'Mess. de Mende, evesque; Clermont, conte'. 34 Evidently, it had been assumed that Durand and Count Louis, now clearly regarded as controlling the pursuit of Philip V's crusade, would attend the pre-Christmas conference of experts and only later, for the sake of completeness, were their names added to the register list. Durand had been associated with crusade plans since 1313. He had been a member of the embassy to Avignon ίη 1317-18 during which he had offered himself for the position of papal legate for the crusade and patriarch of Jerusalem. He continued to play a central role ίη crusade planning and organization until his death ίη Cyprus ίη 1330 returning from a mission to

"Philip's reply and Louis's proposals are contained ίη ιhe same document (see η. 27 above). "Lettres secretes, nos. 933, 946. "Ibid., no. ι 227. For a possible reference ιο this ίη a papal letter of 6 Feb. 1320, see ibid., ηο. 914 η.

3·

"Archives historiques du Poitou, xiii ( 1883), 67-8. "Α.Ν. , JJ 58, ηο. 396 for the summons ιο the bishops; ibid., no. 398 for the summons ιο ιhe nobles; Regίstres du Tresor des Chartes, 11. i, nos. 2652, 2654. "Α.Ν .,JJ 58, ηο. 397; Registres du Tresor des Chartes, 11. i, ησ. 2653.

II PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

21

Egypt. 35 Louis of Cleπnont's traceable interest ίη the crusade dates from his will of June 1316 and his assumption of the Cross the following month. 36 Α companion of Durand οη the Avignon embassy of 1317-18, Louis remained at the heart of French crusade plans and ambitions for the next two decades, as prospective leader of any preliminary passagium and as founder and patron of the confrarie of the Holy Sepulchre. 37 The enregistered lists of those summoned to the crusade conferences permit a detailed glimpse at the men upon whom the French government relied for support, advice and assistance. Of the twenty-four prelates summoned to the Christmas meeting (five archbishops, thirteen bishops and six abbots), all but three, Bourges, Clermont and Mende, came from sees or abbeys ίη northern France. 38 This overwhelming emphasis is significant of more than a desire that those summoned should be able to attend a meeting ίη Paris.39 Ιη the north lay the basis of Capetian power. Whatever its claims to nationa\ authority, and however much it recruited from the south, Capetian government was created and maintained ίη the north. With the exception of the five metropolitans and four of the six abbots, all the prelates called to the Christmas assembly had, ίη recent years, acted as royal agents, οη the counci\, ίη parlement, as enquiteurs or as commissioners. They represented the cream of the clerical administrators who had already left the royal household to receive their rewards ίη the shape of episcopal sees. Bishops Pierre de Levis Mirepoix of Cambrai, Robert de Fouillay of Amiens, Guillaume de Brosse of Meaux and Alain de Lambale of Saint-Brieuc were described by the register as royal councillors.40 Of even greater stature were Foucaut de Rochechouart of Noyon and Raoul de Rousselet of Laon. 41 Pierre de Guez, bishop of Auxerre, had been chancellor to Louis Χ before he became king. 42 The bishop of Beauvais was Enguerrand de Marigni's brother. The bishop of Chalons-sur-Marne, Pierre de Latilly, had been Nogaret's successor as keeper of the great seal and had only recently been rehabilitated. 43 The Christmas assembly was not intended to authorize subsidies. Only "Actes de Philippe 1, Bel relatifs αu pays de Givaudan, ed. J . Roucaute and Μ. Sache (Mende, 1896 ), p. 141; Lettres secretes, ηο. 762; Biblioteca bio-bibliograjιca, ίίί. 366-7 (the Muslim account of the 1330 mission); F. Kunstmann, 'Studien iiber Marin Sanudo der Alteren' , Konigliche Bayernche Akademie der Wissenschaften, Abhandlungen Phil-Historische Classe, νίί ( 1855), 765-6. "'Projeι de croisade' , p. 230 η. 2; Titres de Ια maison de Bourbon, ηο. 1419; 'Chronique Parisienne', pp. 25-6. "For the detail of Louis and the crusade, see 'Chronique Parisienne', pp. 25-6, 29-30, 102-3, 154; ' Projeι de croisade' , pp. 230-6, 246-55; Α.Ν., JJ 56, ηο. 413; ibid., JJ 58 , nos. 396-8; Lettres secretes , nos. 1354, 5485; J. Β. Μ. Jaillot, Recherches ... sur /α ville de Paris (20 parιs ίη 5 vols., Paris, 17 72-5), ί. 22-3; L. de Mas Latrie, 'Commerce eι expeditions', Milanges historiques (5 vols., Paris, 1873-86), ίίί . 106-9; Titres de lα maison de Bourbon, nos. 2041 , 2082-3. "Α.Ν .,JJ 58, ηο. 396; RegίJtres du Trisor des Chartes, 11. ί, ηο. 2652. " Ιη 1316 ιhe bishops of Clermont and Mende were also the only southern bishops summoned ιο ιhe inquiry οη Pierre de Laιilly (F. Τ. Pegues, Lawyers ofthe Last Capetians (Princeton, 1962), pp. 72-3). For ιhe bishop of Cambrai, see Α.Ν., JJ 59, nos. 24, 116; Registres du Trisor des Chartes, 11. ί, nos. 2744, 2836; for the bishop of Amiens, see Lehugeur, ίί. 46, 49, 84, 147 , 154, 174 ; for the bishop of Meaux, see ibid., ίί. 22, 25, 32, 52, 80, 154, 240, 300, 301; for the bishop of Saint-Brieuc, see ibid., ίί. 83, 182; and Pegues, pp. 72- 3 for his role ίη Philip IV's administration. 41 For Roussele t, see Lehugeur, ίί. 52 and passim; Regi.stres du Trisor dεs Chartεs, Inventairε analytique, 1, ed. R. Fawtier (Paris, 1958), πο. 107; Pegues, pp. 69, 208; lor the bishop of Noyon, see Lehugeur, ίί. 51, and, as councillor, ibid., pp. 16-1 7, 23-6. The bishop ofNoyon, with the bishop ofMeaux, had been appoinιed ιο scruιinize the uses ιο which the king put the March 1318 grant of tithes (Lettτes

•°

.secrίtes, ηο. 512 ).

!η 1308 (Pegues, p. 1 75; cf. Lehugeur, iί. 46, 49, 52, 84, 148 ). "Pegues, pp. 67-73, 82 , 120 for his trial.

42

II PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

22

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

twenty-four prelates and thirty-eight nobles were summoned. It was to be consultative οη administrative details. Α number of prelates summoned possessed specific qualifications for this task. Durand had attended a similar assembly ίη 1313. The bishops of Meaux and Laon had been with Durand οη the Avignon embassy of 1317-18. The bishop of Auxerre and the abbot of Saint-Denis, Gilles de Pontoise, were two of the three collectors of Clement V's crusade tithe. 44 Pierre de Courpalay, abbot of Saint-Germain-des-Pres, had preached the Cross at the ceremony ίη the Sainte-Chapelle injuly 1316.45 The nobles summoned to the Christmas assembly betrayed similar characteristics. 46 The list included members of the extended royal family, royal officials, members of the royal household and those nobles who served, regularly or otherwise, as royal agents, centrally or locally. 47 Pierre de Galart, master of the crossbowmen, who had been at Avignon ίη 1317-18, the two marshals, Mathieu de Trie and Jean des Barres, and the veteran constable, Gaucher de Chatillon, were all summoned ίη their official capacities. The household was also represented by Adam Heron, Robillart and Guillaume de Ceris, 'nos chambellans' . Most impressive is the list of nobles who assisted the royal administration. Although the later Capetians notoriously relied οη lawyers or parvenu lesser nobility for their chief ministers, they nevertheless depended heavily οη the established lay aristocracy to conduct their policies. The co-operation of such men was the barometer of effective royal power. This group was led by the butler of France, Henri de Sully, Anseau de J oinville, seneschal of Champagne and son of the chronicler, and Robert, count of Boulogne. 48 It also included Hugh de Chalon, sire d'Arlay, 49 Gui, sire de Bauς:ay, 50 John, viscount of Melun, 51 Amaury, seigneur de Craon, 52 Bouchart de Montmorency, 58 Miles de Noyers, 54 Guy, count of Blois, 55 and even, rather surprisingly ίη view of his dispute with Sully and subsequent disgrace, the ex-seneschal of Beaucaire, John, count of Sancerre.56 Besides these, there was a group of knights attached to the royal household, Emart de Poitiers, Andre de "Lettre, secτέtes, nos . 265, 300, 449; Lettres Commune; dejean ΧΧΙΙ, ed. G. Mollaι and others (16 vols. ίη 19, Paris, 1904-47), ί, ηο . 5355. "Courpalay delivered another crusade sermon before Charles IV aι an assembly ίη Jan. 1323 ('Chronique Parisienne', pp. 25-6, 77; Lehugeur, ίί. 150, 152-4, 159, 170, 182, 195). For the abboι of Saint-Denis ίη parlement, see Lehugeur, ίί. 147ff. •• Α.Ν., JJ 58, ηο . 398; Regi,;tre, de Trίsor des Chartes, 11. ί , ηο. 2654. " One, aι leasι, of ιhose summoned was ιο have personal experience of the Levant. The count of Bar, the duke of Burgundy's brother-in-law, was sent to Athens ίη 1337 ίη an attempt ιο expel the Catalans. Winds drove him ιο Cyprus where he died aι Famagusta (LΆrt de vίτifier les dates (1787 edn. ), ίίί . 49). "Lehugeur, ii. 13-29. Sully has been described as Philip V's Enguerrand de Marigni (Pegues, p. 240). •• Ρ . Anselme and oιhers, Histoire gίnίalogi,que de la maison royale de France (3rd edn., 9 vols. ίη I ο , Paris, 1726--1881), νίίί. 420-1 ; Lehugeur, ίί. 20, 72 . His father had received indulgences from Clement V ίη 1309 ιο accompany ιhe Hospitallers οη crusade (Regestum Clementis V, ί, nos. 441 ο, 441 1 ; ibid., ίί , ηο. 7227). 50

Lehugeur, ίί. 13, 24.

Anselme, νίίί. 443-4. Ιη 1318 he became one of Philip V's chamberlains (see also Lehugeur, ίί. 12 , 17 , 22,26, 90). 52 Anselme, νiίί. 569; Lehugeur, ίί. 13, 15, 21, 24,325. 53 Lehugeur, ii . 53, 325. "R. Cazelles, La societe politique et la crίse de la royaute ;ou; Philippe de Valois (Paris, 1958), pp. 113-29; Lehugeur, ίί. 30-3, 51, 215. 55 Anselme, νί. 96. Son-in-law of Charles of Valois, he almost certainly took ιhe Cross himself ίη 1313 when he was knighted. He did take the Cross ίη 1333 (Α.Ν., Κ 1246, ηο. 342). 56 Anselme, ίί. 851; Lehugeur, ίί. 178, 277. 51

II PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

Chauvigny and Pierre de Varenciennes.57 The nobles also came overwhelmingly from the north of France. Many were veterans of the Flemish campaigns which, even if they did not always provide extensive experience of battle, involved these men ίη the process of raising an army and maintaining it ίη the field. The preponderance of curial prelates and nobles, reinforced by household officials, the chancellor, Pierre Chappes and Giraud Gayte, the chief royal treasurer, was further emphasized by the absence of some of those summoned .58 The archbishops of Rouen and Tours, the abbot of Premontre, the bishops of Langres (possibly vacant) and Clermont, the duke of Brittany, the counts of Joigny and Bar and the seigneur de Coucy, all stayed away as, hardly surprisingly, did the disgraced count of Sancerre.59 Of the members of the household, Galart and two knights, Emart de Poitiers and Andre de Chauvigny, failed to attend and Bishops Rousselet, Lambale of Saint-Brieuc and Brosse of Meaux, all leading servants of the Crown, were also absent. Το the gathering planned for the week before Christmas were summoned, apart from Durand and the count of Clermont, six knights, one canon, four Hospitallers and one burgher. 60 It is possible that more were expected to be invited, as the foot of the page ίη the register is blank. 61 Those asked were thought to possess special knowledge οη the crusade, hence the call to Simon le Rat, Hospitaller prior of France, and to Fulques de Villaret, the recently deposed master of the order. Villaret was reputedly the best informed crusader ίη Europe.62 He was involved ίη producing two tracts οη the subject. 6 g He had organized the abortive Hospitaller crusade of 1308-11 and had presided over the successful occupation of Rhodes. Almost alone of those consulted, he had had personal experience of trying to launch an international expedition to the Levant. Two veteran royal servants were included, Raoul Herpin d'Erqueri, panetier of France, and Bertrand de Roquenegarde. 64 With them was Bernard Vital of Narbonne, probably there to provide information οη ship-building, maritime affairs, methods of hiring vessels or the availability of shipping and equipment, and from a port where the French had been building galleys destined for the Levant ίη the previous year. Bernard can possibly be identified with the Bernard Vital who was a consul of Narbonne ίη 1318. 65 The rest were secular Lehugeur, iί. 20, 27, 52; Anselme, ίi. 189. Both Chappes and Gayιe were wiιnesses ιο the ratification of the Flemish treaιy ίη Paris οη 7 Jan. 1320 (A.N .,J 563a, ηο. 39; Lehugeur, ί. 155 η. 6). •• Ιη the register, to the right of both the clerical and lay lists, there is a column containing the letters ' Ν' or ' F' against most of the names. Guerout suggests that these sιand for 'Νοη ' and 'Fait', which might serve ιο indicaιe either whether ιhe summons had been sent or wheιher the summons had been accepted. Given that all but one of the prelates marked by a 'Ν ' were sent a re-summons ίη January (Α.Ν., JJ 58 ηο. 437; Registτes du Ττέsοτ des Chaτtes, 11. ί, ηο. 2694) which assumed a previous summons, the latter alternaιive seems more probable. 60 Α . Ν .,JJ 58, ηο. 397; Registτes du Ττέsοτ des Chaτtes, 11. ί, ηο . 2653. 61 A.N .,JJ 58 fo. 37. 62 Marino Sanudo once described Villaret as the most knowledgeable man ίη the world ίη warfare againsι the Turks (Chroniques gτέco-romanes, ed. Κ. Hopf (Berlin, 18 73 ), p. 167 ). "J. Ρeιiι, 'Memoire de Foulques de Villaret sur la croisade', Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Chaτtes, Ιχ (1899), 603-10; Β. Ζ. Kedar and S. Schein, 'Un projet de "passageparιiculier" propose par l'ordre de l'Hόpital , 1306-7', ibid., cχχχνίί (1979), 211-26. 64 Lehugeur, ίί. 80, 116, 117 & η. 7, 123, 190, 315; for Herpin, see Regi,stτes du Ττέsοτ des Chaτtes, ,, ηο. 1407; for Berιrand, see Lehugeur, ίί. 52, 152,174, 176, 185,213,254,301 , 304, 342-3. 65 Ιη a letter addressed ιο Philip V οη 18 Οcι. 1318 from Narbonne, one ofthe consuls ofthe city is called 'Bernardus Vitalis aluderius' Unνentaiτe des archiνes communales de Naτbonne antέrieuτes ά τ 790: Annexes de lα Sέrie ΑΑ, ed. G. Mouynes (Narbonne, 1871 ), p. 239 ). For the 1319 Narbonne flotilla, see η. 26 above. 57

58

II 24

PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

knights and Hospitallers. 66 The strong Hospitaller representation may indicate respect for their knowledge and expertise and an awareness of the realitites of warfare and politics in the eastern Mediteπanean, but also may reflect the close contact between the court and the order in recent years over the dispersal of the Templar goods and the desire of the French to use Hospitaller funds for Louis of Clermont' s campaign. 67 These experts may have been joined by the luminaries of the royal household to produce some sort of agenda, or bases for the discussions to be held a week later over Christmas itself. The pope had asked for practical proposals, not enthusiastic rhetoric. Philip V and his ministers were trying to oblige. Indeed, when Sully and Matthew of Varennes, the organizer of the 1319 Narbonne flotilla, went to Avignon in 1321 to seek crusade tithes, they took with them two of these crusade experts, Herpin d'Erqueri and Sauς:ay de Boucay. 68 Despite, or perhaps because of the concentration of political and administrative talent, the Christmas assemblies were unproductive. Νο proposals were forthcoming. By February, the pope had still not received a French reply to his letter outlining papal attitudes to the crusade. 69 It may be that the Christmas assembly was always intended to be preliminary, although the summonses had emphasized finality. More probably, the assemblies over Christmas suggested, or demonstrated, the need for further, wider, consultations before considering what stand to take with the pope. Seven prelates and ten nobles who had failed to attend the Christmas meeting were re-summoned to an assembly which was to gather οη 24 February 'pour avoir plus plaine deliberacion'. 70 The duke of Lorraine and the count of Hainault were summoned for the first time. 71 All were now expected to attend ίη person. Also summoned for 24 February were forty-three prelates (eleven bishops, the rest abbots and priors), all of whom came from Normandy with the exceptions of the bishops of Chartres, Angers, Poitiers, Le Mans, Autun and Therouanne. 72 Thus the men previously summoned for the Christmas assembly were to be supplemented by a leavening of clerics. The concentration οη Normandy is peculiar and may be the result of proximity, incomplete book-keeping or a government intention to negotiate an ecclesiastical subsidy οη a provincial basis. At the same time as these clerics were summoned, a list of nobles received rather different instructions. 78 Ιη their letters the nobles were informed of the decision to hold the February assembly. But the king's letters continued: The full list of experts summoned is as follows: Bishop Durand; Louis of Clermont; Herpin Brother Simon le Rat; Brother Foulques de Villaret; Kalle de Neuville, chevalier; Brother Thierry de Leigue; Brother Eudes de Montaigu; Bertran de Soyoles, chevalier; Sauςay de Boucay; Bertran de Quillon, chevalier; Bernard Vital ofNarbonne; Aubert Revel, canon ofLe Puy; Bertrand de Roquenegarde. 67 For Louis's proposals ofthe summer of 1319, see η. •7 above. Ιη 133,-3 Philip VI's negotiators tried to force the pope ιο consign unlimited Hospitaller funds towards the crusade (Lettres communes, χίί, ηο. 613,4, item ίχ). John ΧΧΙΙ preferred ιο leave the amount and method of contribution ιο ιhe Hospitallers ιhemselves (Lettres secrίtes, nos. 5096, 5,9,). •• R.H.F., Documentsfinanciers, i, ed. C. V. Langlois (Paris, 1899), p. 364. 69 Lettres secrίtes, ηο. 914 η. 3 for the French embassy ιο Avignon ofJan. 13,0. 70 Α.Ν., JJ 58, nos. 437, 440; Registres du Trέsor des Chartes, 11. ί, nos. ,694, ,697. The duke of Brittany and the count ofBar received duplicate summonses. 71 A.N.,JJ 58, ηο. 440; Registres du Trisordes Chartes, 11. ί, ηο. ,697. 72 Α.Ν ., JJ 58, ηο. 438; Registres du Trisor des Chartes, 11. ί, ηο. •695. Their names are lisιed ίη JJ 58 fos. 49-50; Registres du Trisor des Chartes, 11. ί, ηο. ,696 bi.s. "Α.Ν ., JJ 58, ηο. 439; Registres du Trisor des Chartes, 11. ί, ηο. ,696. 66

dΈrqueri;

II PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

ayons entendu que il a plusieurs nobles en vostre terre qui sont ancien, qui bien serent aviser sus le dite besoigne, nous vous prions, requirons et mandons que vous deus ou trois des dites personnes, lesquelles vous savez miex estre avisez de ce fait nous envoiez a Paris ... 74

These veterans were to attend a meeting eight days before the assembly of nobles and clerics οη 24 February. They were to consult with 'plusieurs autres personnes les queles nous avons deputees pour ordener dudit passage', presumably the royal officials led by Durand and Louis of Clermont supplemented, almost certainly, by the committee of experts consulted before Christmas. The ninety recipients of these letters were not themselves required to attend. They were only intermediaries. The net had been spread wider than for the clerics, and included the Saintonge, Poitou, Bourges and Lyons as well as Normandy, Vermandois, Senlis, Orleans, the Vexin, Touraine, Sens and Amiens. 75 Apart from this general summons for the provision of up to 250 old soldiers, four nobles received individual summons to attend this preliminary assembly. 76 They were probably called to strengthen the group of crusade experts already ίη Paris. These four were veteran soldiers as well. Guillaume, seigneur de Rochefort, Geoffroi de Vend.δme and Mignot de Viez Pont possessed many years' combined service ίη Flanders. 77 More tantalizing is Ήoute de Granςon'. Could this be Othon de Grandson? Αη habitue of the French court, one of the most renowned veterans of the last years of Outremer and defender of Acre, he had, οη 16 June 1319, received papal absolution from his crusade vow οη the grounds of old age and infirmity, although this was clearly a temporary indisposition and he lived until 1328. 78 Nothing would have been more appropriate than for such a renowned crusader to attend this reunion of veterans. The assumed availability of veterans with crusading experience is significant. Ιη 1320, Acre had been lost for less than thirty years. Some ofmiddle age had, when young, lived ίη Outremer. 79 Ιη some cases the crusades of St. Louis were a single generation away. 80 The Hospitallers were not the sole guardians of the crusade tradition. How many ex-Templars lived οη ίη provincial obscurity, such as Etienne Varroquier, a former Templar who enjoyed a pension from both Philip IV and Louis Χ? 81 Such veterans gave tangible form to the pervasive atmosphere of commitment to the crusade. The failure to summon the number of nobles usually attending Philip V's assemblies to the Lenten gatherings, as to the Christmas meetings, is striking. Professor Taylor has observed that the documents suggest that 'the adArchiυes hi,toriques du Poitou, χίίί ( 1883), 68-g. this assembly ίη general, see Taylor, 'Baronial assemblies' , pp. 449-50. 76 A.N .,JJ 58, ηο. 441;Regi,tresdu Trέ,ordes Chartes , 11 . ί , ηο. 2698. 77 R.H.F., χχίίί . 791g, 804d (Rochefort); 789c, 802n (Vendόme ) ; χχίί . 551c; χχίίί. 8o8c; Lehugeur, ίί. 325,327 (Mignot de Viez Pont). 78 Lettre, commune,, ii, ηο. 9566; Ε. R. Clifford, Α Knight ofGreat Renoum: the Life and Time, ofOthon de Grand,on (Chicago, 1961), pp. 275-7. He visited the Channel Islands, ofwhich he was Warden, ίη 1323, when ίη his mid-eighties (Clifford, p. 266). 19 Marino Sanudo was one, for example. Ιη 1321 , Philip V himself employed one Pieπe d'Acre ιο translate some Arabic documents οη the leper scare. Pierre had to swear to the accuracγ of his translation ίη front of the bailli of Macon (Μωίι des Archiυes Nationales: Document, originaux de IΉi,toire de France , [ed. L. F. Α. Maury and others] (Paris, 1872 ), ηο. 328). 80 Ιη the 1330s this was true of Philip VI's translator, Jean de Vignay, whose father had been with St. Louis ίη Egypt (Ρ. Meyer, Document, manu,crit, de l'ancienne littέrature de la France (Paris, 187 1), pp. 17-18 ). 81 Lettrej secrites , no. 1181.

"lbid.; 75

Οη

II PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

ministration wished to make it unmistakably clear that this was something other than what such a meeting ordinarily connoted'. 8~ The purpose of this Όther something', at least as regards the laity, was to discuss a unique issue, the crusade, and for the government to obtain counsel and informal consent. The insistence οη the presence of such as the dukes of Burgundy, Brittany and Lorraine points to the need to secure the widest political and territorial approval for what, inevitably, would be an elaborate, lengthy and costly exercise. The gathering of the veteraω, instead of the local magnates who customarily attended Philip V's assemblies, would have been fatuous unless the king had a serious desire to organize a crusade, and wished to make a serious investigation of the possibilities for one. Only this determination could have provoked the king to have hit upon such a novel and eccentric expedient. The sole account of what transpired at the assemblies ίη February 1320, by the anonymous Parisian chronicler, is worth reproducing ίη full: ... en cest an [1319, Old Style], Philippe le roy de France et de Navarre assembla a Paris au moys de Mars, barons, prelaz et chevaliers de ses royaulmes, pource que le pappe luy avoit devant escript et mande, de l'an m.cc.xviij, que lez Sarrasins estoient venus et acourrus es parties de la Terre sainte d'oultre mer, et pris et saisi, par la permission divine, le roy de Georgie et le roy de Cyppre et menez en la prison du soudanc de Babilone, et avoit vaincu lez Crestiens; et yce leur dist begninement et devotement le roy a ce que la promesse Philippe le Beaux son pere, Louys son frere jadiz roy de France, et le voyage de la Terre sainte feussent faiz et acompliz. Ει lors fut illec ordonne de cesser de superfluitez ... , de vesturez reprendre et regarder, et especialement dez princez de son royaulme et de tous ses seneschaux et balliz et tous aultrez officiers, et que guerres feussent ram[en )ez a paix. 83

Brief as it is, this description contains much of significance. The royal registers confirm that the king remained ίη Paris for most of March and, given the nature of such assemblies, a delay ίη the arrival of the participants and a protraction of the discussions of the veterans' assembly and the subsequent, and possibly combined, meeting of nobles and clergy, might be expected .84 The description of those who attended, 'barons, prelaz et chevaliers', has been challenged by the chronicle's editor as being the fifteenth-century copyist's mistake. The editor pointed out that the word chevalier Ίe chroniqueur n'emploie jamais en pareille circonstance'. 85 But ίη the light of the deliberate summoning of aged knights from the provinces, ίt would seem more likely that the chronicler was being absolutely precise. The 1320 assembly (or assemblies, the chronicler's conflation probably reflecting what actually happened more realistically than the registered summonses) was unlike any other of Philip V's assemblies ίη calling together a large number of otherwise undistinguished old soldiers. If anything, the unusual description by the chronicler reinforces the authority of what he wrote. The chronicler's justification for the assembly bears little exact relationship to the reasons expressed ίη the official documents. Yet rumours of events ίη the Levant, and especially of Christian defeats by the sultan of Egypt were commonplace ίη Paris during these years. The chronicler absorbed this atmosphere of rumours, legends and scares which fuelled enthusiasm for the

Taylor, 'Baronial assemblies', p. 450. 'Chronique Parisienne' , p. 43. For the author, see ibid., p. 7. 84 R.H.F., χχί. 482. 85 'Chronique Parisienne' , p . 43, para. 40 η. 2.

82

83

II PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

crusade and were echoed ίη numerous crusade sermons. 86 The specific reference to the papal concern ίη 1318 is obscure. It is possible that the chronicler's superior, the abbot of Saint-Denis, who was one of the col\ectors of Clement V's crusade tithe, retained copies of some of Popejohn's letters of 1318-19 referring to the need for a crusade. The chronicler consulted a range of sources when he came to compose his chronicle. These papal letters may have been among them. 87 Philip V's re-affirmation ofhis devotion to the crusade, to the fulfilment of his father's and brother's vows and to the cause of peace was precisely what the king had been proclaiming since 1316, as the writer had not failed to notice. The final section of the chronicler's account is more illuminating. Νο crusade decisions are mentioned but only the issue of ordinances to end official and royal extravagance and the pointed reference to hopes for peace, possibly an al\usion to the Flemish treaty which was confirmed ίη Paris injanuary 1320. Self-imposed government austerity certainly suited the season ofLent. But there was more to it than that. Extravagance, especial\y ίη the habits of courtiers, long a familiar complaint of tax-paying non-courtiers, was regarded as a potential hindrance to the crusade, materially and morally. It was a point made by St. Louis and by Joinville to Philip ΙΙΙ and ίη his memoirs. 88 John ΧΧΙΙ had warned Philip V himself against prodigality ίη March 1318. 89 Public retrenchment was obviously a useful prerequisite for any subsequent appeals for new taxes. But, equal\y, if Philip wished to tread ίη the footsteps of St. Louis, he had to maintain and restore not only the saint's administrative practices but also his style ofliving. Further evidence for the crusade assemblies of 1319-20 ίη general, and for the two gatherings ίη Lent 1320 ίη particular, may possibly be found ίη Bishop Durand's own Informacio Brevis on the crusade. It has usually been assumed that Durand's Informacio was written to advise a council Philip IV convened ίη Paris ίη January 1313 to discuss the crusade, although the sole supporting evidence for this dating is Durand's summons to the council. 90 Alternatively, Durand could have composed the work for Charles IV. 91 This would fit the date of the surviving Latin manuscript. 92 But, alone, the manuscript evidence fails to prove that the Informacio Brevis was written for Charles IV. Both the Latin copy and the French " For example, the extravagant story of the miraculous conversion of the son of the Mamluk sultan after he had insulted a priest in the church of the Holy Sepulchre during mass and the accounι of ιhe resulting assault by the sultan on Armenia whose king had witnessed the miracle. This story was circulating in Paris about this time and was placed by the Parisian chronicler (' Chronique Parisienne', p. 29) ίη 1317 , the year of the Armenian embassy to Paris. Scare-mongering was a feature of crusade rhetoric and was prominent in the sermons ofCourpalay and the patriarch ofjerusalem in July 1316 (ibid., pp. 25-6), in Courpalay's sermon in Jan. 1323 (ibid., p. 77) and in Pierre de la Palud's passionate outburst in 1331 (Chronique latine , ίί. 130; Bibliotheque Nationale (hereafter Β.Ν. ), MS. Latin 3293 fo. 164, col. 1 for Archbishop Roger's description given to the pope some months later). 87 'Chronique Parisienne' , p. 6. 88 Jean de Joinville, Histoire de St. Louis, ed. Ν. de Wailly (Paris, 1868), ch. cxlv (for Louis's own advice to his son), pp. 6-13 (for Louis's lifestyle) and pp. 8-9 (for Joinville's account of how he himself upbraided Philip 11! for possessing embroidered tabards costing 800 livres parisis ). 89 Lettres secτ(tes, no. 513. 90 Α. S. Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages ( 1938), p. 68; Actes de Philippe k Bel relatifs au pays de Gιivaudan, p. 141; Tyerιnan, 'The French and the crusade', pp. 237-44 for a fuller discussion. 91 Lehugeur, ί. 196 n. 2. 92 Β.Ν., MS. Latin 7470 fos. 117-23. Notice in the miniature on fo. 117 the heraldry on the gown of ιhe king to whom Durand is presenting his work. This proclaims the recipient as king of France and Navarre, i.e. Louis Χ, Philip V or Charles IV. This indicates that this manuscript, at least, dates from 1314-28. There is an edition ofιhe Latin text in G. Dϋrrholder, Die Kreuιιugspolitik unter Papstjohann XX/J(Strasburg, 1913), pp. 104-10.

II PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

translation of the Informacio are probably derived from a common, lost Latin original. 93 The extant Latin version was probably copied for Charles IV, but the compendium ίη which it appears contains works which date from various times ίη the previous half-century. 94 The manuscript gives a terminal date for composition, the reign of Charles IV, but that is all. There ίs another possibility. Durand was a central figure at the 1319-20 crusade meetings. He would be expected to have ideas, to offer and to receive suggestions. The proposals ίη the Informacio were practical rather than polemic. The attention to the details of the preliminary crusade, the size, the route, the mechanics of raising men, the possible use of annual passagia to the Levant complemented Louis of Clermont's proposals of July 1319 which dealt with indulgences and central ecclesiastical finance, neither of which Durand discussed. The Informacio's suggested use of the Hospitallers as allies could reflect the influence of Simon le Rat, Fulques de Villaret and their colleagues. 95 The details of clerical involvement in the crusade and of resistance to secular taxation by crucesignati are consonant with the presence of prelates and nobles at the full Christmas assembly 1319 . 96 Most striking is the emphasis ίη the Irιformacio on the techniques of warfare, portable siege engines, trained cavalry, fit horses, arms and crossbowmen. 97 Crusade tracts inevitably covered such subjects, often by reference to classical precept, notably the theories of Vegetius. 98 Nevertheless, Durand's career is nowhere marked by an interest in military details. Perhaps these passages indicate Durand's contact with military experts, the small committee and/or the collection of veterans. The strangest moment in the Informacio is when the author suddenly turns οη the greed and rapacity of royal officials and the weight of taxation through which 'dominus rex perdit corda prelatorum baronum et aliorum'. 99 The money was said to be wasted οη luxuries. The cry goes up that officials 'quasi hodie immortales sunt ίη Francie et alibi' .10° Coming from a man closely involved with the central government who was organizing a royal crusade οη behalf of the king, such remarks are somewhat surprising. However, his remarks may be compared with the anonymous chronicler's reference to Philip V's ordinance condemning the extravagance of royal princes and royal officials. Durand picked out extravagance 'in vestibus', while the chronicler mentioned the 'superfluitez . . . de vesturez'. 101 The coincidence is compelling. Towards the end of the Informacio there is a call for measures aimed at achieving a stable currency. The ghost of St. Louis is, perhaps predictably, invoked. Monetary reform was a key issue during Philip V's reign, one which the govemment repeatedly attempted to harness to the question of the crusade. More than anything else, the references to government extravagance and monetary reform suggest Philip V's reign as the date of the Informacio. During that reign, the assemblies of 1319-20 provide the obvious occasion. "The French translation survives ίη Bibliotheque Ste. Genevieve, MS. 1654 fos. 139 ff., also ofthe 14th century ( Ρ. Viollet, 'Guillaume Durant lejeune, eveque de Mende', Histoire littiraire de la France, xxxv (1921 ), 130 η. 5). "E.g. the 'De Statu Saracenorum' ofWilliam ofTripoli, Β.Ν., MS. Latin 7470 fos . 131ff. 95 /bid. fos. 117v-118. 96 Ibid. fos. ι 19-120v. 91 Ibid. fo s. 12 1-2. 98 Jbid. fos. 12 1-2. 99 Ibid. fo . 12 2v. 100 Jbid. fo. 122r-v. 101 Ibid. fo. 122v; 'Chronique Parisienne', p. 43.

II PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

29

It is possible that Durand was entrusted with the task of sifting through the opinions garnered at the various crusade meetings. He then forged them into a coherent report of what was generally agreed to be the best methods of conducting a crusade, what military preparations were necessary and what reactions there were to suggestions of a crusade subsidy. This would help explain the attack οη royal officials and the call for a return to 'good' money. Such problems had been made, by the government, inseparable from the crusade. The question of the currency was to be tackled ίη 1321. The issue of government extravagance, as the chronicler reported, was dealt with at once ίη the ordinance regulating the administration of the chambτe des comptes, which had been prepared inJanuary but was issued only ίη April 1320. 102 The general impression left by the four related and cumulatίve crusade meetings ίη the winter of 1319-20 is of a government feeling its way towards presenting concrete proposals to the papacy and to the Estates concerning the crusade, even if other fiscal, administrative and diplomatic issues, possibly including Philip of Valois's assistance for the Angevins ίη Italy, were also οη the agenda. If the centrality of the crusade is accepted, then a certain reappraisal of Philip V's ambition may be necessary. Support for the crusade by king and court is undeniable. Even the pastoureaux of 1320 received or anticipated the patronage ofLouis ofClermont, were given food and shelter by the church and, ίη some cases, absorbed into Philip of Valois's army at Genoa. The movement began ίη those areas of northern France where the summonses to the crusade assemblies were concentrated. The Parisian chronicler who saw the pastoureaux pass through Paris described them as 'aucuns simples des parties de Normendie' . 103 Of the ninety nobles asked to discover and to send veterans to the February assembly, twenty-four were from Normandy and the Vexin and of the forty-three clerics summoned in person, thirty-seven (including two from the Vexin) came &om the duchy.104 The penetration of news of Philip V's crusade plans ίη the provinces resulting from the summoning of the veterans, nobles and clerics, brought the crusade close to the people and made ίt a topic for speculation, gossip and debate. The crusade was again paraded before the people during a series of central and local assemblies, lay and ecclesiastical, ίη 1321 . It is misleading to assert that ίη the 'attempts to raise money ίη 1321 in France itself he [Philip V] did not link this with the idea of the crusade' . 105 He did. Ιη February 1321 the king instituted an inquiry into Giraud Gayte's conduct ίη the chambτe des comptes. One stated reason for this was that Philip required an accurate assessment of his finances prior to preparing a crusade. 106 Later ίη the year, Philip was to ask the pope for crusade tithes and, pace Taylor, Brown and Barber, the negotiations with the pope, the crusade and the 1321 assemblies were 102 'Chronique Parisienne', p. 43; Ordonnances des roys de France, i. 703-6, esp., ίη this context of frugality and honesty, items 1, χ1ν. 10 ' 'Chronique Parisienne', p. 46. Οη the pastoureaux, see Barber, passim, and p. 148 for their appearance before Genoa. Οη their carrying of Louis of Clermont' s arms, see 'Chronique Parisienne', p . 47, with which cf. Blanche of Castile's patronage of the 1251 pastoureaux (Matthew Paris, Chronica MaJora, ed. Η. R. Luard (7 vols., Rolls Ser., 1872-83), ν. 248; Chronique latine, i. 436). For the clerical assistance, see Ε. Baluze, Vitae Paparum Aυenionensium, ed. G. Mollat (4 vols., Paris, 1914-27), i. 191 and Bernard Gui, Ε Floribus Chronicorum, R.H.F., xxi. 730. 10 • A.N.,JJ 58 fos. 49-50; Registres du Trisordes Chartes , 11. i, ηο. 2696 . 10 ' Barber, p. 161. 10 • Α.Ν ., JJ 60, nos. 65-7; Registres du Trisor des Chartes , 11. i, nos. 3435-7 .

II PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

intimately linked. 107 The appeal for domestic funds was implied ίη the appeal to the papacy and vice veτsa . 108 The crusade was emphasized as the context for royal financial policies ίη the instructions issued pτίοτ to the summer assemblies to royal agents whose task it was to persuade provincial towns to subsidize Philip's financial reforms, such as the recovery of alienated royal lands, the purchasing of baronial coinage rights and the reform of the currency. 109 The leader of the crusade organization, Bishop Durand, played a prominent part ίη the Paris assembly injuly. 110 The failure to raise a subsidy ίη the summer led to a new government offensive ίη September. Both the clergy and the representatives of the nobles and burgesses were to be asked to grant subsidies to support the financial reforms which were, the government argued, 'bonne et profitable a pays et au chemin de saint veage'. 111 Aubert de Roye was specifically told to present the crusade as the prime aim of royal policy, including the financial reforms under debate, to the church council of Sens. 112 As a result of this deliberate use of the crusade to justify financial requests, many thought that the king was ίη fact asking for a crusade subsidy. This was clearly demonstrated by the almost identical reactions ofboth clergy and laity to the royal demands. According to the Saint-Denis chronicler, the clergy repondirent que le passage d'outre mer n'estoit pas prest pour que il convenistja donner le disieme; mais quant il [Philip V] le seroit, il Ιί otroient volentiers ou ίΙ iroient avec Ιί . '"

The proctors of the towns assembled at Orleans ίη October adopted the classic medieval taxpayer's position when taxation was often linked to commutation or substitution of personal war-service. They refused to pay the king any money, but ilz estoient tous prestz d 'aller avec le roy, bien appareillez, en ost, en chevauchee, ou la il luy plairoit aller, fut oultremer ou ailleurs. 114

οίι

The unity of the rejection of the government's attempts to extract subsidies during peacetime for non-military purposes was final. Philip V's ministers had moved too quickly. The attitudes adopted by the clergy and burgesses were not accidental. Philip V was unable to fulfi!John XXII 's conditions ofJune 13z ι because he was dying. Although his ministers proceeded, perhaps ίη less than calm fashion, to implement existing policies, the essential ingredient of a fixed timetable for the 101 Cf. Taylor, 'Fre nch assemblies and subsidy', pp. 220-3, and ίη general, pp. 217-44 ; Brown, 'Subsidy and reform', p. 419, and ίη general, pp. 399-429. Taylorand Browndiscuss Philip's crusade intentions and their role ίη 1321, but the French evidence may shift their emphasis. Their implication that the crusade was pushed to the fore only afler the summer of 1321 ίη response to urban opposίtίon, cannot be sustained ίη the lίght of the assembly memorandum or the Gayte ίnquίry . See ηη. 109 below and 106 above. 108 Cf. Lettres ,ecrίtes , no. 122 7 (autumn 1319) for the papal demand to know how much the French would conιribute and ibid. , ηο. 1262 (summer 1321 ) for the French request to know what the church could supply prior to the consultations with the Estates. 10• J. Petit a nd others, E;;ai de restitution des plw ancien, mίmoriaux de la Chambre des Comptes de Pari, (Paris, 1899), p. 147 ; Taylor, 'French assemblies and subsidy', p. 228. 110 'Chronίque Parίsίenne ', pp. 60-2. 111 Archives admini,tratives .. . de la ville de Reim;, ed. Ρ. Varίn (8 vols ., Parίs , 1839-53), ιι. ί. 273. For the Orleans assembly ίη general, see ibid., pp. 272-4; 'Chronique Parisienne', p. 62 . For the ecclesiastical gatherings of 1321 , see Grandes Chroniques, νίίί. 361-2. 112 L. d'Achery, Spicilegi.um ,ive collectio veterum aliquot ,criptorum (3 vols., Paris, 1723), ίίί. 710-11. 113 Grandes Chronique,, νίί. 361-2. 114 'Chronique Parίsίenne', p. 62 ; Archives de Reim;, ιι. ί. 273-4 .

II PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

31

crusade preparations was missing. Inevitably, the autumn assemblies were suspicious, and maybe saw the whole appeal for subsidies and reform as preliminaries to a crusade as a less than credible bluff, especially as Philip V took ηο opportunity to conceal his malady. Ενeη ίη the codicil to his will of January 1322, the king remarked 'que nous estans, en bonne memoire, malades'. 115 By October 1321, ίt was obvious that Philip V, like his father and brother before him, was not going to honour his crusade vow. Therefore the lay and clerical assemblies took the line that they would believe ίη a crusade only when they saw one. Paying obligatory royal taxes indirectly or even directly for the crusade earned nobody salvation. It was expressly emphasized at Orleans that the burgesses were willing to go οη crusade ίη person or, failing that, they would be prepared to donate money 'pour faire le salvation de leur ames'. 116 Ιπ this sense, the government had become over-sophisticated. Ενeη a professional crusader needed the support that only the unique nature ofthe crusaders' privileges could bring. The crusade could not be reduced to another lay tax-paying expedient, or be subsidized by ordinary taxation, however much the government associated the needs of the crusade with other, secular policies. Throughout Philip V's reign as regent and king the pressure for a new crusade and for new crusade tithes came from France. John ΧΧΙΙ remained suspicious. If the bulk of Clement V's crusade tithe could be misdirected, what guarantee could be secured for any new grants? In any case, papal priorities ίη the first decade of John ΧΧΙΙ's reign concerned crusades ίπ Italy rather than the Levant. John was prepared to subsidize the defence ofCyprus and Armenia, but he was at cross purposes with the French whose interest was often as much emotional as ίt was political or strategic. For the French to press for a crusade solely for the rewards such an approach would bring ίη other spheres of political operation, for them to conduct negotiations with the pope ίπ a cynical frame of mind, would have been counter-productive. More than once J ohn ΧΧΙΙ reminded Philip of the dangers of the 'murmur vulgaris' if the crusade promises were broken. 117 If Philip had needed any reminding, the clergy and burgesses obliged ίπ 1321 . Ιη July 1319 Philip himself had explicitly recognized the problem by warning Louis of Clermont that if the count failed to embark οη crusade 'il seroit desplaisir a dieu et acqueroit la honte du monde'. 118 The prevalent attitude of modern historians shows how right he was. Philip V never forgot his crusade vow of 1313. 119 Ιη his will he bequeathed 100,000 livres for a future passagium as well as confirming the potentially crippling crusade legacies of his father and brother. 120 His concern is hardly surprising. Philip lived ίπ an environment where the crusade, its history, its forms and its appeal were familiar. His formidable mother-in-law, Mahaut of Artois, kept, ίπ her castle at Hesdin, a statue of St. Louis, a 'romans des faiz d'Outremer' and a copy of Marco Polo's Travels. 121 In March 1317, the royal library at the Louvre 11 5 Α.Ν., J 404, ηο. Ζ7; Grandes Chroniques, νίίί. 362 & η. 1; Chronique latine , ίί. 37-8. Ν . Β. the papal postponement of the tithe timetable ίη 132 ι (Lettressecrέtes , no. 13 ιο ) . 116 ArchίνeJ de Reims , ιι. i. 2 74. 117 E.g. Lettres secrέtes, no s. 364, 667. 11 • A.N. ,JJ 60, ηο. ιοο. 119 Lehugeur, ί. 196-7. 120 Α . Ν .,J 404, ηο. 26; cf.J 403, ηο. 18 (Philip IV' s codicil ) andJ 404 , ηο. 22 (Louis X' s will ). 12 1 Le Roux de Lincy, Ίnventaires des biens, meubles et immeubles de la comtesse Mahaut d'Artois', Bibliothέque de l'Ecole des Chartes , 3rd ser. , ίίί (1851 ), 60 ηο. 3, 63 ηο. 56.

II 32

PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

contained a life of St. Louis (Primat? Joinville?) and two copies ofWilliam of Tyre or his continuators. 122 Philip's own household attracted literary figures and was noted for its cultivated atmosphere. 123 His court became a forum for crusade theorists as seen ίη the advice of Durand and the citizens of Marseilles. Philip himself had been one of those who had asked Pierre Dubois ίη 1313 to write De Torneamentis to refute the papal ban οη tournaments which had been made ostensibly ίη the cause of the projected crusade, Dubois probably being approached because of his employψent by Mahaut of Artois. 124 It is likely that it was to Philip's wife, Queen Jeanne, that Mahaut's doctor, Thomas le Myesier, presented his Breviculum of the works, including some crusade plans, of Ramon Lull . 125 This atmosphere was underpinned by family interests, traditions and rights, of, for example, the Capetians themselves, the Briennes or the Burgundian Capetians, who, along with numerous others, possessed recent or present links with Frankish Greece and ancestral memories of campaigns ίη the Holy Land. The problem is that very little was actually prepared for the crusade in Philip's reign. Because of the various delays 1316-22, can Philip V be accused of special pleading and disingenuo'usness? Certainly, royal interests were never sacrificed. Priorities were clear: peace with Flanders and a restoration of royal finances. But even if he had wanted to, Philip could not ignore the crusade. Το be king of France and maintain the lustrous position of France ίη Christendom, Philip had to be champion of the crusade, the more so, perhaps, because of the doubts and debate surrounding his succession. The crusade was just as much a part of royal self-interest as were the Flemish war-subsidies. That Philip benefited financially from crusade tithes granted to his predecessors and that further non-crusade grants were made ίη the context ofhis professed intentions should not impose οη historians a primly disapproving or dismissive view ofhis ambitions. But if the attendant circumstances were indeed impossible for a crusade to be prepared, surely talk of launching a passagium was tinged with deceit? This may not necessarily be true, because it did appear to contemporaries, especially, perhaps, to those very people who criticized the French most bitterly for inactivity, that some sort of crusade was possible despite the problems. The French were not criticized for wasting their time championing a lost cause, but for failing to grasp practical opportunities and for their inability to translate words into deeds. At the same time as Philip V was trying to persuade his subjects to contribute money ίη the autumn of 1321, a Venetian expert οη Romania, the Levant and the crusade, Marino Sanudo, was lobbying the papal Curia and all ίη attendance there for a new passagium. Sanudo never considered the crusade to be impractical. 126 Today ίt may be possible to argue that his optimism was misplaced, but contemporaries may have thought that if an acknowledged expert did not know what he was talking about, who did? Papal doubts were fierce, but dictated partly by interests, not excluding the crusade, elsewhere ίη Europe. It could easily have seemed to Philip and his entourage that a crusade was as possible as it was popular. His delay, when 122 L. Delisle, Le Cabinet des manuscτits de la Bibliothέque Impέriale (Nationale ) (3 νols. , Paris, 1868-81 ), iii. 323-4. 123 Lehugeur, i. 15-16. 124 C. V. Langlois, 'Un memoire inedit de Pierre Du Bois, 1313', Revue hi,torique, xli (1889), 86; De Recuperatione Teπe Sancte, ed. idem (Paris, 1891), p. χίν. 125 J. Ν . Hillgarth, Ramon Lull and Lullismin 14th-Century France (Oxford, 1971), pp. 175-8. 126 Οη Sanudo and the French crusade, see C. J. Tyerman, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello and ιhe lost crusade: lobbying ίη the 14th century', Trans. Royal Hist. Soc., 5th ser., xxxii ( 1982 ), 57-73.

II PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

33

examined closely, does not seem extravagantly long. Philip had suppressed internal opposition ίη 131 7, but Flanders remained recalcitrant until 1319. Tithes were agreed ίη 1321 and departure was fixed for 1325. It had taken even St. Louis four years from taking the Cross to embarkation ίη the twelve-forties. Nevertheless, the failure to pursue the crusade initiative of 1319-20 until more than a year later must be recognized . One explanation may be found ίη French attempts to achieve what all, and particularly the pope, saw as the necessary prerequisite for a crusade, namely peace. !η 1320, the pastoureaux had to be contained and suppressed . !η Italy, Philip of Valois's expedition to Genoa had exposed the futility of direct French involvement with the Angevin papal cause. As the Capetians themselves had learnt ίη Flanders and the Plantagenets ίη Scotland, some political rivalries were not open to military solutions. French disengagement from papal policy in north Italy began with the first inglorious campaign of Philip of Valois, but, obviously, the pope needed delicate and cautious handling. Elsewhere, Philip V tried to mediate between England and Scotland. But there were other problems to cloud the scene. The spring of 1320 saw an ominous straw ίη the wind when Philip was struck down with an illness severe enough to elicit papal congratulations οη his recovery. If Philip's health was delicate, a papal annulment of the marriage of his heir, Charles of la Marche, to the adulterous Blanche of Burgundy became more urgent and consuming of diplomatic effort. Even so, some sluggishness over the crusade ίη 1320 can hardly be denied. 127 What a study of Philip V' s crusade policy ίη general and of the 1319-2 ο assemblies ίη particular may suggest is that, within the context of his broad political objectives, Philip V translated amorphous longings to live up to the past into administrative and political action . This may have been conducted οη a narrow front. The effort may have achieved little. It may have been designed ίη part to impress the pope. The crusade itself may not have been Philip's most urgent priority. But he had always declared that, once the problem of Flanders was solved, he would tackle the crusade. The assemblies of 1319-20 showed that he meant what he had said and that he was prepared to risk obloquy and revived popular enthusiasm and consequent disruption to keep his word. The least he could do? Perhaps, but, arguably, ίη the circumstances, the most as well . Philip V's crusade policy demonstrates something of what he thought he should be doing as both king and Christian even if he never did it. The policy was adaptable, flexible, deliberately and inevitably related to almost every other significant domestic and foreign political issue. But whilst the crusade was not and cannot be viewed ίη isolation from these other political ambitions, it is also revealed as important ίη its own right, emotive and popular for king, noble, burgess and peasant. Some historians talk of the 'moral bankruptcy' of the upper classes revealed by their attitude to the crusade ίη this period and of the 'morbid mental state' induced by such leadership. 128 Yet after the 1319 Flemish treaty Philip V returned half the war subsidy. 129 Even supposing that this was dictated by the stern political experience of 1313-14, ίt does not conform to any pattern of mendacity and moral penury. Neither do the crusade assemblies of 1319-20 . Honesty and 127 For ιhe disengagement from papal policy ίη Italy, see Acta Aragonen,ia, ί. 4 76. For Durand's mission to England and Scotland aι ιhe end of 1320, see Lesjournaux du Ττe,οτ de Charles IV le Bel, ed. J. Viard (Paris, 1917), nos. 396, 512, 3920, 4015, 5016. For the king's illness, see Lettres secretes, ηο. 1020 and for Cl1arles of La Marche's diplomatic efforts ίη 1320 and 1321, ibid., ηο. 1005 η. 1. 128 Barber, p. 162. 129 J. Β. Henneman, Royal Taxation in ι 4th-Century France (2 vols., Princeton , 197 1), ί. 33.

II 34

PHILIP V OF FRANCE AND

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADE

idealism may seem, probably wrongly, to be at a premium ίη politics, medieval or modern, but the historian should beware imposing such assumed standards οη the past. Then, as now, what at first glance appears malicious or deceitfu\ may often be revealed as accidental or incompetent. This may well be the case with Philip V's crusade. It is above al\ worthy of note that Philip was not at al\ reticent about what he was doing with Clement V's tithe and for what he required more ecclesiastical funds from the pope. Both ίη public and ίη the itemized accounts of the chambre des comptes nothing was concealed. 130 We must try to understand that the popularity of the crusade imposed constraints οη royal policy as well as providing opportunities. Philip V certainly milked the opportunities for self-justification, diplomatic pressure and political bul\ying. He continuously associated the crusade to all aspects ofhis rule. But to do that successfully, Philip had also to heed the resonances which the crusade set off within men's souls, his own included. As the accounts of the numerous Cross-taking ceremonies ίη this period ηο less than the weight of crusade legacies testify, the material privileges of the crusader were of undiminished popularity ίη the early fourteenth century, and the salvatory properties of the crusade are not susceptible to destruction or dismissal by modern cynicism or disbelief. 131 It is necessary and overdue for historians to seek a subtler interpretation of the later Capetians than that offered by recent orthodoxy, be ίt ίη the hands of Malcolm Barber or Maurice Druon. Morality and idealism should not be disregarded. 132 ΑΙ\ rulers are influenced by what they and their contemporaries deem respectable and honourable. Some are compelled to refashion political respectability and honour to suit their novel purposes. Philip V was not one of these. Tradition under the late Capetians dictated policy as well as rhetoric. Upon the recognition of the opposing driving forces of past and present must a fresh analysis of the late Capetians be founded . One key to this new approach may be the study of the French court's muddled but at root sincere response to the still potent siren call of the crusade.

1

'° Tyerman, 'The French and the crusade', pp. 354-5.

Jbid., paHim, esp. ch. viii. Ε. Α. R. Brown, 'Cessante Causa and the taxes of the last Capetians', Studia Gratiana, χν, Ρωt Scripta (1972 ), 563-87; idem, 'Taxation and morality ίη the 13th and 14th centuries', French Historical Studies , νίίί (1974), 1-28; idem, 'Royal salvation and the needs ofthe state ίη late Capetian France', Order and Innovation in the Middle Ages, ed. W. G. Jordan, Β. McNab and Τ. F. Ruiz (Princeton, 1976), pp. 365-83. More narrowly, see Μ. Barber, 'The world picture of Philip the Fair' ,jour. Medieval Hist., νίίί (1982 ), 13-27. 131

137

III

III

SED NIHIL FECIT? ΤΗΕ LAST CAPETIANS AND ΤΗΕ RECOVERY OF ΤΗΕ HOLY LAND

Looking back on attempts of the previous fifteen years to recover the Holy Land, an anonymous historian writing in 1328 for Philip VI of France commented: 'the pope had the money ... and the king and the others who had taken the cross did not set out, and the saracens are still there in peace and 1 think they may sleep on undisturbed' . 1 In similar vein the author of the Vίta Edwardί Secundί remarked that the council of Vienne, which ίη 1312 had proclaimed a new crusade and ordered the collection of a new crusade tithe, 'profited the Holy Land nothing at all'. 2 Α source close to the French court was even more brusque. Philip IV may have declared this crusading purpose 'sed nihil fecit' . 3 How true was this? From 1305 when Philip IV offered to exchange his throne for that of Jerusalem, the French had made most of the running for a new passagίum, ίη public at least. 4 Yet the period of highest-blown theory coincided with the period of least action, under Philip IV. Practical planning flourished only in a more prosaic setting. Philip IV's court had attracted ideas for the recovery of the Holy Land which bristled with solutions to the great issues of world history, the total defeat of Islam, the re-ordering of Christendom, the reformation of the church and the apotheosis of the line of St. Louis. 5 The extravagant and extreme ideas of Ramon Lull, Pierre Dubois and Guillaume de Nogaret were suited to a government which pitched its rhetoric and ambition high and loud. The years after the council of Vienne imposed more sober thoughts. Royal power was successfully challenged in 1314-15. After 1316, papal priorities centred οη the anti-Ghibelline alliance in Italy and the restoration of curial finances. Any plans to help Cyprus and Armenia or recover the Holy Land had to be less comprehensive but more comprehensible. Planners began to confront the problems of logistics, men, money and ships. Advice was more expert. Whereas Dubois had had ηο experience of the east, increasingly sources which had, such as the citizens of Marseilles or the Venetian merchant Marino Sanudo, were consulted. 6 1 J.N. Hillgarth, Ramon Lu/1 and Lullism in Fourteenth Century France, Oxford 1971, 83 and note 136. 2 Vita Edwardi Secundi, trans. Ν. Denholm Young, London 1957, 46. 3 Guillaume de Nangis, Chronique latinede 1113 ά 1300aνec les continuationsde 1300ά 1368, ed. Η. Geraud, Paris 1843, ί, 392. 4 Η. Finke, Papsttum und Untergang des Templerordens, Mϋnster 1907, ίί, 118. 5 Hillgarth, 46-134; A.S. Atiya, The Crusade in the Later Middle Ages, London 1938, 47-94. 6 C.J. Tyerman, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello and the Lost Crusade', TRHS, 5th ser. χχχίί, 1982, 57-73; Α . de Boislisle, 'Projet de croisade du premier duc de Bourbon', Extrait de l'Annuaire Bulletin de Ια Societe de /'Histoire de France, χίν, 1872, 248-55.

III 171

Sed Νίhίl Fecit?

But whatever their personal interest ίη crusading, the last Capetians pursued the recovery of the Holy Land for a variety of other political motives. The crusade was deliberately refracted into areas of the greatest political sensitivity and importance. Boniface VIII was accused of hindering the crusade. 7 The suppression of the Templars was clearly staked out in relation to the needs of the Holy Land, Philip IV's suggestions for a new military order and a new crusade. For example, the bulls for the Hospitaller crusade in 1308 were issued the day before the bulls against the Temple and the summoning of the council of Vienne. 8 The Hospitaller expedition itself, for which Philip IV promised but did not deliver funds, was seen as preparing the way for a French crusade. 9 Ιη secular politics, Philip of Poitiers' candidacy for the Empire in 1312 was urged οη the pope ostensibly because of the crusade opportunities his election would provide. 10 Disputes with Edward II of England oνer Gascon jurisdiction were settled in 1313 οη the pretext that Edward and Philip IV were fellow crucesignati. 11 Frequently, the turbid and acrimonious Franco-Flemish negotiations were hitched to the fate of the crusade. Ιη 1313 Cardinal Freauville was both papal mediator between France and Flanders and chief preacher of the crusade. One of the French terms in the negotiations of 1316 was that Count Robert should join the next passagium as a punishment for failing to honour earlier treaties. ln 1318, another papal envoy, Pierre de la Palud, publically hinted that a crusade might be launched against the contumacious Flemings as 'impeditores negotii Terrae Sanctae', an idea still current during the discussions οη the final settlement of 1319-1320. 12 Even the planned restoration of the Frankish position in Greece, to be led by Philip of Taranto, was presented firmly as preparatory to the French crusade to Outremer. 13 Nearer home, the crusade harnessed support to the Capetian regime. Men from Gascony and Languedoc, as well as the more traditional areas of Capetian influence, trooped to Paris in 1313 to take the cross, the ceremony providing both a symbol and a practical bond of community, obligation and mutual self-interest. 14 Money was inνested ίη Mediterranean ports. Galleys were built and hired at Narbonne, Montpellier, Marseilles and other ports along the coast ίη 1319 and 1323. Marseilles was consulted about the crusade by Louis de Clermont and a consul of Narbonne discussed the crusade in Paris 7 C.V. Langlois, Les derniers capetiens directs 1226-1328, Paris 1911, 159. 8 Regestum Clementis Papae V, Rome 1885-92, nos. 2986, 2988 and 3626. 9 Regestum Clementis V, nos. 2986 and 7893 . 10 J. Schwalm, 'Beitrage zur Reichsgeschichte', Neues Archiv der Gese/lschaft fur a/tere deutsche Geschichtskunde χχν, 1899-1900, 564-5 . 11 R. Fawtier, Registres du tresor des chartes, Inventaire analyιique, i, Paris 1958, nos. 1970-2, 1975, 2002, 2005-6, 2009, 2011, 2018, 2020, 2024, 2026-32 and 2174. 12 Regestum Clementis V, nos. 9941-62; Archives nationales MS J 560, nos. 3 and 5 and MS J 561a no. 24; Ε. Baluze, Misce/laneorum i, Paris 1678, 166-7 and 173; Nangis ίί, 11. 13 Archives nationales MS J 411, no. 42; Regestum Clementis V, nos. 1604, 1605 and 7759; Ρ . Topping, 'The Morea 1311-64', History of the Crusades, general ed. Κ. Setton, iii, Wisconsin 1975, 104-116. 14 F. Ehrle, 'Process ίlber den Nachlass Clemens V', Archiv fur Literatur und Kirchengeschichte des Mitte/alters ν, 1889, 7; J.P. Ludewig, Reliquae manuscriptorum omnis αeνί diplomatum ac monumentorum ineditorum adhuc χίί, Frankfort 1741, 48-60; Geoffroi de Paris, Chronique rimee, Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de /α France, ed. Μ. Bouquet etc., Paris 1738-1876, χχίί, 135-7.

III 172 late in 1319. 15 Ship owners and port authorities stood to gain from this royal interest. Οη each occasion the recovery of the Holy Land was proclaimed the objective, yet involving the nobility of the south ίη the crusade and filling the pockets of influential southern merchants and bankers had their own rewards for rulers based οη the geographically and culturally distant Ile de France. The last Capetians saw the recovery of the Holy Land as their and their subjects' God-given duty. The crusade 'communiter omnes tangit', 'specialiter illis de regno Francie quod pro defensione fidei catholice peculiari sibi Dominus per sui gratiam noscitur elegisse ... ' 16 At the council of Vienne, Philip IV promised to lead a general passagium to the east and this decision was confirmed a year later when he took the cross. 17 Throughout all crusade discussions, with Clement V, the Hospitallers, Philip of Taranto, John ΧΧΙΙ, Robert of Naples, the ports of Marseilles or Narbonne, the Cypriots or the Armenians, one feature was constant. As the crusade was peculiarly a French obligation, the recovery was to be overwhelmingly a French campaign. Some theorists could argue for alliances with Aragon, Naples or Venice, but the Capetians insisted οη prime and overall control of plans, strategy, tactics, ships, men and money, a proprietary attitude harmful to crusading prospects because it was so fiercely opposed by other rulers, notably James of Aragon and John ΧΧΙΙ. Α crusader king could hope for ecclesiastical tithes to subsidise his efforts. But such revenue was not merely a bonus to swell the Capetian war-chest. By 1314, and especially after the cancellation of the Flemish war tax, clerical tithes saved the Capetian monarchy from financial collapse. Α half-yearly account of 1316 records total royal receipts of 169,579/. Os. 6d. parisis of which 112,086/. 6s. tournois (or just under fifty per cent) came from church taxes. 18 Clerical tenths continued to provide the largest single contribution to the revenue of the last Capetians. But the French clergy were as reluctant as the laity to agree to royal fiscal demands. 19 Royal coercion needed the assistance of papal approval so pressure οη the pope could never flag. The crusade was one of the chief pretexts for securing the desperately important tithes. Small wonder that Franco-papal crusade finance at times brought the business of the curia to a halt. 20 The entanglement of the crusade with other secular policies provides an obvious explanation for crusading inactivity. But it is not a wholly convincing one. Philip 111, Philip IV and the papacy found adequate money, men and morale to fight crusades in Spain and ltaly. Philip IV was able to wage an extended and expensive war with England ίη the 1290s. Financial and military assistance was available for Frankish Greece. lt is evident that the financial, political and administrative effort expended οη the recovery of the Holy Land 15 C. de la Ronciere, 'Une escadre franco-papale', Melanges d'archeologie et d'histoire χίίί, 1893, 397-418; Boislisle, 'Projet', 248-55; Archives nationales MS JJ 58, πο. 397. 16 J. Roucaute and Μ. Sache, eds. Actes de Philippe le Bel re/atifs au pays de Gevaudan, Mende 1896, 141; ΒΝ MS Doat 16, fol 123 recto-125 recto. 17 Finke, Papsttum ίί, 292-4; Nangis, ί, 396. 18 R. Fawtier, Comptes du tresor, Recueil des historiens de France, Documents financiers ίί, Paris 1930, ποs. 543-551 and p. Ινίίί. 19 Α. Artonne, Le mouvement de 1314, Paris 1912, 79-89. 20 Η. Finke, Acta Aragonensia, Berlin and Leipzig 1908-66, ί, 489.

III 173

Sed

Νίhί/ Fecίt?

did not compare with the Jabours of the Capetians over Flanders, Gascony, the Templars, the papacy, extending their frontiers or asserting royal power over their subjects. Resources did exist, but were either not applied or applied inefficiently. Nevertheless, the administrative investment in the crusade for its own sake was not entirely negligible nor measurable solely in livres, sous and deniers. As a barometer of international magnanimity, responsiblity and respectability, the crusade occupied a political position not dissimilar to modern programmes for overseas aid. But the crusade was also more than that. It provided a justification for French assertiveness and a moral safety-valve as the expression of the self-image of the ruling elite, public policy combining with personal obligation. Was the chronicler right in saying that nothing was achieved for the Holy Land? Ιη one sense he was. Νο French crusading expedition embarked. But this begs more questions. Why did the French kings continue to protest their devotion to the cause of recovering the Holy Land despite the acknowledged possibility and reality of public and political obloquy? 21 Was it simply a device to raise clerical funds? If so, it was hardly successful as none of Philip IV's sons received fresh grants of tithes specifically for the crusade. If crusade inertia is identified, what caused it and was it constant? Το answer such questions ίt is necessary to look away from the rhetoric of high policy and examine secondary administrative activity, of diplomats, agents and officials. The last Capetians usually allocated the crusade a subsidiary role ίη discussions with the papacy. At Vienne it was overshadowed by the fate of the Templars and the case of Boniface VIII. When Philip of Poitiers visited John ΧΧΙΙ in September 1316 the crusade provided only the context for earnest discussions of the diversion of large amounts of the Vienne tithe to pay off royal debts. Fifteen months Jater the agenda of the embassy to Avignon Jed by Henri de Sully found the crusade jostling for attention with attempts to solve the Flemish problem. Ιη 1321, despite the extraction of a conditional papal offer of crusade tithes, the central issues were Italy and Charles de Ja Marche's annulment. 22 This dispersal of concentration οη the crusade and the continual admission by the French of other problems into debates οη crusade planning and funding suited the pope whose sights were focussed οη Italy and not beyond. It allowed the pope more easily to identify all the internal divisions and intractable problems in Christendom which precluded any immediate general crusade to the east and, hence, any immediate grant of general crusade tithes. 23 But the autumn of 1319 saw the beginnings of a new French approach when, as he had often promised, Philip V started to concentrate οη the crusade after the draft treaty with the Flemings had been agreed. Louis de Clermont's plans were encouraged and over a period of six months experts and crusade veterans were consulted. 24 Charles IV adopted an even more positive approach. For 21 Archiνes nationales MS JJ 60, ηο. 100 for French fears of Ίa honte du monde'. 22 Οπ Philip V and the crusade, C.J. Tyerman, 'Philip V of France, the Assemblies of 1319-20 and the Crusade', BIHR forthcoming; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes et curia/es re/atiνes ιi Ια France, ed. Α Coulon and S. Clemencet, Paris 1906-72, nos. 23,471,473,479,491,505, 511-13, 1005 and 1262; Finke, Acta, ί, 475-6. 23 John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, nos. 53-6, 67, 74-6, 491, 1227, 1262, 1445 and 1710. 24 Tyerman, 'Philip V', passim.

III 174 years John ΧΧΙΙ had complained of the vagueness of French proposals. Ιη 1323 French ambassadors presented detailed ideas for a primum passagium ίη 1323 and a passagium particulare ίη 1324 or 1325. 25 As a result the debate shifted from consideration whether the moment was auspicious to mount a crusade to wrangles over the measure of French authority over any papal grant. This, ίη itself, was a step towards realising a passagium. During these discussions, Charles IV relied οη regular spokesmen, Bishop Pierre Mortemart of Viviers, the designated leader of the crusade vanguard, Louis de Clermont and Mathieu de Varennes, who had organised a crusade fleet ίη conjunction with papal officials ίη 1319. 26 They were not going to be side-tracked. Their briefs were narrow and the crusade was ηο longer seen as part of an elaborate scheme of quid pro quo. Το John XXII's disquiet, Charles IV treated the crusade as an issue apart. There was a broad consensus οη crusading strategy. The supply by Christian, mainly Italian, merchants of food , arms, ships and other raw materials used for war had been seen by an eye-witness, Thaddeo of Naples, as one cause for the loss of Acre ίη 1291. 27 Plans for an embargo οη Egyptian exports and imports had subsequently won general acceptance. Many also saw that a general passagium needed at least one preliminary campaign to establish a base οη the mainland of the Levant whence the main crusade could operate. Preliminary passagia were advocated by experienced campaigners such as Foulques de Villaret and the Armenian Hayton and accepted by organisers such as Clement V. 28 The French need not have been under any illusions about the complexities of logistics and finance either. The financial records of Louis IX's first crusade and crusading bulls of the thirteenth century were available ίη the royal archives. 29 Any commander could refer to Joinville's memoires, completed ίη 1309, for details of equipment, supplies, ships and tactics. Expert advice abounded, from ambassadors, travellers, Hospitallers and writers, Villaret, Hayton, Guillaume d' Adam, the bishop of Angers and Sanudo. 30 Nogaret filed advice from the king of Cyprus and both he and Guillaume Durand, bishop of Mende, wrote crusade tracts of their own. 31 Anthologies of crusade plans were compiled. 32 But the complicated structure of multiple passagia confused two different objectives, practical and professional help for Armenia, Cyprus and Rhodes and the infinitely more ambitious and less practical recovery of the Holy Land 25 For the diplomatic exchanges, Ν .J . Housley, 'The Franco-papal crusade negotiations in 1322-3', Papers of the British School at Rome χlνίίί, 1980, 166-185 . 26 J. Viard, Lesjournauxdu tresor de Char/es IV /e Bel, Paris 1917, lν-lνίί; Ronciere, Έscadre', passim. 27 Thaddeo of Naples, Historia de deso/acίone et concu/cacίone Acconensis, ed. Comte Riant, Geneνa 1873, 37-8. 28 Regestum Cfementis V, πο. 2986; Atiya, 56-7 and 62-4. 29 Recueil des historiens de France χχί, 403-5 and 512-15; Archiνes nationales MS J 453-6. Two bulls of Clement IV, dating from 1268, one of them detailing crusader priνileges, were copied and witnessed οπ 14 October 1305, Archiνes nationales MS J 442, nos. 13-14. 30 Atiya, 29-127; Tyerman, 'Sanudo', 57-9. 31 C.V. Langlois, 'Les papiers de Nogaret et de Plaisians', Notices et Extraits des MSS de Ια Bibliotheque Natίona/e χχχίχ, 1909, 224 πο. 85; Archiνes nationales MS J 456 πο. 36 2 and πο. 36 2 bis; ΒΝ MS Latin 7470 fols 117 recto-123 recto. 32 ΒΝ MS Latin 7470, probably compiled during the reign of Charles IV.

III 175

Sed

Nίhil Fecίt?

itself. Successive theorists had assisted this confusion, especially those with interests in the Levant, Henry II of Cyprus, Hayton, Villaret, the Hospitallers of Rhodes and Sanudo. By associating local relief with the general crusade they could hope to convince nostalgic western leaders of the importance of their limited objectives. But even these, as the calculations of French officials demonstrated in 1323, were almost prohibitively expensive. The response of French leaders was not always straightforward. There was ηο shortage of willing commanders, Charles de Valois, Louis de Clermont, Gaucher de Chiitillon, Robert de Boulogne or Philip de Valois. Eager crucesignati were everywhere. Ιη 1323 Amaury de Narbonne was even plucked from a prison cell to lead a primum passagium. 33 But crusade leadership, as any other position of influence, was open to faction. Philip IV's will had indicated the precedence of Charles de Valois as leader of the crusade after the king's sons. 34 But Charles opposed Philip de Poitiers' coup of 1316 and Louis de Clermont, a more distant relative but closer friend of Philip, superseded Charles as leader of the proposed crusade vanguard. 35 After Charles IV's accession, Charles de Valois returned to favour. Ιη March 1323, Louis de Clermont, still officially the leader of the particulare passagium, presented the pope with a plan for a campaign of 1,000 knights to be led by himself and Gaucher de Chiitillon ίη 1324. 36 But in May this plan was contradicted by one devised by Charles de Valois for a larger force to embark ίη 1325 under Charles' command. 37 The French appeared to be speaking with two voices and the curia needed little encouragement to become suspicious. Such rivalry was damaging to the crusade, but at the same time indicates that the court factions took the matter seriously. The crusade also provoked tensions between enthusiasts and financial officials. Ιη 1313 Philip IV 'et quasi omnes consiliarii' had enthusiastically agreed to Clement's request for money to pay for galleys to police the eastern Mediterranean. But later, in private, Enguerrand de Marigny, single-handed, reversed the decision complaining that 'ipse solus haberet onus expensarum faciendarum et de hoc alii consiliarii ηοη curarent'. 38 It was not simply a matter of retrenchment versus profligacy, but a question of priorities. For Marigny, as for Philip V, Flanders and the royal debts preceded the crusade. Nevertheless, some officials and royal advisers treated the crusade as more than a diplomatic expedient. Ιη January 1313 an assembly gathered ίη Paris to discuss the crusade. It had a wide attendance and a record of its proceedings was kept by Nogaret who, with Guillaume de Plaisians, collected practical information and advice οη crusade preparation and organisation. 39 However, activity faded with the deaths of Philip IV and Clement V, the long papal vacancy, the hostile reaction to Philip IV' s policies ίη 1314-15 and the 33 Archives nationales MS JJ 61, ηο. 456. 34 Archives nationales MS J 403, ηο. 18 . 35 Tyerman, 'Sanudo', 65-66. 36 John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, nos. 1683-5. 37 John ΧΧΙΙ , Lettres secretes, nos. 1686-9 and 1710-11. 38 Schwalm, 'Beitrage', 562-66. 39 Roucaute and Sache, 141; Ρ.Η. Morice, Memoires pour servir de preuves ά l'histoire de Bretagne i, Paris 1742, col. 1243; Langlois, 'Papiers', 224 nos. 33-7, 240 ηο. 448, 242 nos. 491 and 510 and 243 ηο . 617.

III 176 succession crisis of 1316-17. The collection of the crusade tithe was Jeft to the church authorities and plans for the crusade were, until 1319, only the parttime concern of a few councillors, notably Bishop Guillaume Durand and Louis de Clermont. lt was characteristic of this Jack of administrative commitment that, when the pope agreed to set aside 100,000 florins of the 1312 tithe ίη 1318 to build a Franco-papal fleet to guard the seas of the Levant, although the construction and collection of the fleet was to be conducted by a French admiral, Mathieu de Varennes, all his actions required papal authority, presumably as he was using clerical money. But that money had come νία the royal tresor. The accounts of the venture are ίη the papal archives. Mathieu's original French colleague was replaced by a papal official and even the fate of the fleet and its diversion to the siege of Genoa was decided by the pope and the king of Naples, not the French. 40 At almost the precise moment that Mathieu was gathering his fleet at Marseilles ίη 1319, Louis de Clermont was completing an entirely independent set of proposals for clerical funding for his particulare passagium. 41 Ιη spite of some historians' easy assumptions, there is ηο discernible, let alone precise connection between Mathieu's fleet, Louis' plans and the advice Louis received from Marseilles. 42 There is ηο mention in either set of evidence of the other operation. But they had one thing ίη common. Philip V was not prepared to move towards the crusade without clerical funding and peace with Flanders. The latter he achieved ίη 1319-20, but the former only weeks before he was struck down with mortal illness. 43 Philip V' s policy ίη 1316-19 echόed his father's response to the Hospitaller crusade of 1308-11 and the proposed flotilla of 1313. But, also like his father's policy, this was dictated by prudence rather than hypocrisy. Charles IV was Jess cautious and detailed scrutiny of his actions reveals his departure from precedent. Although negotiations with the papacy remained incomplete, if not bogged-down, ίη the spring and summer of 1323, Charles began to prepare a smallpassagium for 1323, organised by Bishop Durand and Jed by Amaury de Narbonne and the admiral, Berengar Blanchi. 44 At Jeast twenty galleys, two three-decked naves and four galioti were to be equipped for one year. The total complement of crew was 4,800 as well as 3,000 infantry and thirty cavalry who were to be landed ίη Armenia. After a year the fleet was to return to Marseilles to be available for future campaigns. Amaury was to receive 30,000 /. tournois (20,000 Ι. parisis) immediately, the balance of the 200,000 Ι. parisis set aside for the campaign being payable one month before embarkation for Cyprus. The king extended his protection to those who accompanied Amaury and their property. Volunteers were welcome. If the passagium never sailed, any expenses incurred by Amaury above the amount 40 John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettressecretes, nos. 511,515,531, 672-3, 705,780, 784-5, 846-8, 852-3, 865, 885-8, 925-7, 983, 1032 and 1147; Archives nationales MSS Κ 40, no. 30, JJ 56, πο. 334, JJ 59, no. 74; Α Muratori, Antiquitates ltalicae Medii Aevi vi, Milan 1742, cols. 131a and b; Ronciere, Έscadre' passim; N.J. Housley, The ltalian Crusades, Oxford 1982, 100-101. 41 Archives nationales, MSS JJ 59, πο. 76 and JJ 60, πο. 100. 42 Ronciere, Έscadre', 399-400; Housley, ltalian Crusades, 100. 43 John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, no. 1262; Nangis ίί, 37-8. 44 Housley, 'Crusade negotiations', 171-180; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettressecretes, nos. 1683 and 1685; Archives nationales MS ΚΚ 1, fol. 298; Viard, Journaux, no. 2897.

III 177

Sed Νίhί/ Fecit?

given by the king would be reimbursed. 45 Since Vienne, all money for crusading purposes, excepting Greece, had come from the church. Even when large sums of the Vienne tithe were illegitimately misappropriated by Louis Χ and his brothers, ίt remained possible to keep account of what the crusade tithe had raised. 46 Royal accounts itemised tithes separately and distinguished between them. When Philip V's treasurer, Giraud Gayte, received crusade money, ίt could be traced to a particular collection ίη the diocese of Rheims. 47 When Charles IV's treasurer, Pierre Remi, was paid a sum of 37/. 4s. 16d. parisis the journal of the royal tresor carefully distinguished between the 28/. 16s. parisis from the crusade tithe and the rest which came from other tithes. 48 Although gathered by clerics, the 1312 tithe found its way more or less directly into the royal tresor, yet it would have been possible over a decade later to estimate how much ίt alone had raised. There was ηο attempt at concealment even though none of ίt, except ίη 1318-19, was spent οη the crusade. Ιη 1323, unlike 1313, the planned passagium of Louis de Clermont or the 1319 fleet, crusade money was not to come exclusively from ecclesiastical sources. Charles IV may have hoped for retrospective church funding, but he also authorised a lay subsidy for Amaury de Narbonne's passagium and a purchase tax for subsequent campaigns. 49 Meanwhile, for Amaury's expedition, Charles was prepared to borrow money. Ιη April he secured 24,000/. tournois from the Scali and 12,000/. tournois from the Peruzzi. 50 Amaury began to borrow from Florentine bankers and Blanchi, acting as Amaury's agent, twice approached Α vignonese bankers. 51 Hiring ships was not so easy. Blanchi made a deal at Marseilles with one Pierre Medici of Toulon for the provision of 'certa ligna, usserios scilicet et galeas et navem quamdam', all fully equipped. Medici, a man of some local eminence, was a less than scrupulous businessman. Οη 23 July, Medici was arraigned by Blanchi before a Marseilles judge for breach of contract. Medici had delayed fulfilling his side of the contract and the day before, Blanchi claimed, Medici had despatched out of Marseilles harbour two of the huissiers already sold to Blanchi. Οη being confronted with this, Medici blustered, denying that these boats were those he had promised to Blanchi. The judge was suspicious. He postponed his judgement until the following Mol)day (the case was heard οη a Saturday) but had Medici arrested, only releasing him οη bail of 1,000 marks and a promise not to leave Marseilles until the suit had been decided. 52 Unfortunately, ηο record of the outcome appears to have survived, but Medici suffered ηο permanent damage to his position. Ιη 1334 he was engaged by the pope to supply a galley for the fleet being raised to fight the 45 For these and other details, ΒΝ Nouvelles acquisitions franςaises MS 7600, fols. 130 recto-130 verso; ΒΝ MS Doat 16, fols. 141 recto-146 recto; Archives nationales MS J 456, ηο. 37. 46 C. Samaran and G. Mollat, Lafiscalite pontifica/e en France au xive siecle, Paris 1905, 14-15; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, no. 23. 47 Archives naιionales MS· JJ 60, ηο. 66. 48 Viard, Journaux, no. 4701. 49 John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, nos. 1683 and 1685. 50 Viard, Journaux, nos. 2755-6 and 2897. 51 C. de la Ronciere, Histoire de /α marine franι;aise i, Paris 1889, 226. 52 ΒΝ Nouvelles acquisitions franςaises MS 7373, fols. 15 recto-17 verso; Ronciere, Histoirede marine i, 226 note 6.

III 178

Turks ίη the Aegean. 53 His was a world of ruthless entrepreneurs and profiteers. The king knew what he was doing when he inserted ίη the agreement with Amaury a clause directed against those who hindered the organisation of the passagium. 54 Ιη spite of the problems, at least six vessels were gathered from Narbonne and Montpellier as well as Marseilles; two large transports, the San Nicolau and the Coquebaille, four horse-carriers, the San Jalicador, the San Peyre et son Aloy, another San Nicolau and the San Geneys, and two galleys, the Santa Victoria and the Santa Martha. Of the stipulated numbers, the transports and small galleys had been acquired, but only two of the proposed twenty troopcarriers had been obtained. 55 Perhaps at this late season the plan was being modified to a less ambitious, solely maritime expedition as advocated earlier ίη the year by Sanudo and Cardinal Stefaneschi. 56 But when the final accounts were presented ίt was noticed that the ships had been cheap and that Blanchi, who died sometime between July and December 1323, had not spent all the crusade money. 57 The loss of the admiral was a severe blow, but the collapse of Anglo-French relations after the St. Sardos incident ίη October was fatal. By the end of the year, the passagium was abandoned. 58 The fate of Amaury's flotilla vindicated the views of the Cypriot and Armenian ambassadors who never believed that Amaury would be ready ίη time and of those, such as Cardinal Stefaneschi, who thought that the expedition had been conceived οη too grand a scale, the constant mistake of western crusaders. 59 Unfortunately, Amaury was bound to his agreement with the king which prevented him from embarking with less than the specified number of ships. This added to the delay caused by the difficulties of hiring ships, the suspicious attitude of the papacy and the deterioration of Anglo-French relations. This was not the end of the business from an administrative point of view. Having repaid the Scali ίη December 1323, Charles IV wanted his money back. 60 Ιη November 1324, Charles recorded that he had ordered Amaury to account for 30,000/. tournois outstanding. As Amaury 'n'a voulu fayre', the seneschal of Carcassonne commanded Amaury to appear ίη Paris before the following Candlemas to deliver his account to the chambre des comptes. If he refused, his lands would be confiscated 'sans rendre et sans recours'. The threat worked. Amaury paid 4,770/. tournois to the seneschal of Carcassonne. Another 2,000/. tournois went to Charles de Valois οη the king's orders, presumably to assist the Gascon campaign. Ιη 1325 Amaury's final accounts were challenged by Blanchi's heir and successor as 'patronus et rector' of the crusade fleet, Jean Fouquin of Narbonne. Fouquin's objections were over53 John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, no. 5418. 54 ΒΝ Nouvelles acquisitions franςaises MS 7600, fol. 134 recto. 55 ΒΝ Nouvelles acquisitions franςaises MS 7373, fols. 10 recto, 12 verso, ί48 recto-verso; Ronciere, Histoire de marine ί, 228 note 1; C. de Vic and J. Vaissete, Histoire general de Languedoc, ed. Α. Molinier etc., Toulouse 1872-1904, ίχ, 420. 56 Tyerman, 'Sanudo', 63 and note 45. 57 ΒΝ Nouvelles acquisitions franςaises MS 7373, fol. 11 verso; Archives nationales MS JJ 62, no. 355. 58 ΒΝ Nouvelles acquisitions franςaises MS 7373, fols. 10 recto and 15 recto. 59 John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, nos. 1690-1. 60 Viard, Journaux, no. 4436.

III 179

Sed Nihίl Fecit?

ruled and he appears to have fled the country, but the matter dragged on into the reign of Philip VI. 61 Amaury's accounts illustrate how much had been done. Το support them, Amaury presented to the chambre des comptes documents concerning the administration of the crusade finances and the acquisition of ships. They were accepted by officials as solid evidence of Amaury's and Blanchi's honesty in accordance with their instructions and may be accepted by historians as evidence of the earnestness and industry of the French endeavour, even if it was only for a small-scale passagium. 62 The continuing importance of finance was further emphasised by the destiny of Blanchi's ships themselves. They became an exploitable asset of the French crown. The San Nicolau, probably the larger one, was given to Mathieu de Varennes in settlement of a royal debt and the remaining huissiers were converted into cargo ships available for charter by merchants from Narbonne and Montpellier, with the king retaining a stake in the business. When, in 1325, one of these ships was captured by the Aragonese off Sardinia and its cargo sold to help pay for their war against Pisa, Charles IV received compensation and damages from James 11. lt was significant that a ship hired to clear the Mediterranean of Moslem shipping and transport the vanguard of a crusade was captured, laden with merchandise, off Sardinia in one of the interminable feuds which precluded any effective response by Christendom to the victories of Islam. 63 The plans of 1323 were a major concern of the French government. Ιη his Jnformacio Brevis, probably dating from 1320, Bishop Durand had urged the king to appoint 'certos et approbatos viros per quas. haberetur iam cura de navigio, de victualibus, equis et armis necessariis pro passagio'. 64 Το some extent the 1323 passagium was served by such a group. There were the collectors of the French subsidy led by Durand and Abbot Courpalay of St. Germain .des Pres. 65 Preparations were conducted by Durand, Amaury and Blanchi. Their work drew in others. From the chambre des comptes came Pierre de Condet and from the tresor des chartes came its guardian, Pierre d'Etampes. 66 Louis X's keeper of the Seals, Etienne de Mornay was involved in the financial transactions and negotiations with the papacy. 67 Bishop Mortemart led three crusade embassies to Α vignon within a year. 68 Further down the hierarchy, a notary, Etienne de Gien was paid 'pro pluribus factis per eum super passagium transmarinum'. 69 Louis de Clermont wrote letters to 61 Ε. Martin-Chabot, Les archives de Ια cour des comptes, aides et finances de Montpellier, Paris 1907, 199, note I and ηο. 606; Viard, Journaux, no. 6585; ΒΝ Nouvelles acquisitions franςaises MS 7373 fols. 9 recto-13 verso; Archives nationales MS JJ 62, ηο. 355. 62 ΒΝ Nouvelles acquisitions franςaises MS 7373, fols. 12 verso-13 verso, exhibits Α, Β, C, D and Ρ. 63 Archives nationales MS ΚΚ 1, fol. 447; Ronciere, Histoire de marine ί, 228, note Ι; ΒΝ Nouvelles acquisitions franςaises MS 7373, fols. 147 recto-152 verso; L. d'Achery, Spicilegium, Paris 1723, ίίί, 712-13. 64 G. Dϋrrholder, Die Kreuzzugspolitik unter Papst Johann ΧΧΙΙ, Strassburg 1913, 108. 65 John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, no. 1683 . 66 Archives nationales MS J 456, ηο. 37; Viard, Journaux, no. 2688. 67 Viard, Journaux, Ιν-Ινί and ηο. 6907. 68 Viard, Journaux, Ιν-Ινίί. 69 Viard, Journaux, no. 5534.

III 180

'pluribus militibus regni Francie propter viagium transmarinum'. 70 Maps were purchased. 71 lt is possible that Durand commissioned a collection of useful crusade tracts, his own included, to instruct those about to go οη crusade. 72 At every stage the king consulted his councillors and assorted experts and, at the pope's insistence, was able to produce a detailed budget of crusade expenses right down to the costs of espionage. 73 But as little of the scheme eventuated, the administrative organisation remained amorphous. The chroniclers largely ignored the plans of 1323, a reflection that despite the papal grant of crusade privileges ίη December 1322 ηο widespread preaching, or even tax-raising, campaigns were conducted. 74 Charles IV himself was contradictory ίη his estimates of the popularity of the passagia and uncertain ίη his negotiating tactics, whether to say too little or to promise too much, whether to bully or flatter, whether to support Clermont or Valois. Ιη spite of the failure ίη 1323, Charles IV maintained an interest ίη the Holy Land. Ιη 1326 there were rumours of a relief expedition to Armenia led by Louis de Clermont and the master of the Hospital, a rapprochement with Byzantium was attempted and Charles even tried to negotiate a peaceful return of Christian rights and possibly territory from the Mamluk sultan ίη 1327, although this attempt was expertly sabotaged by Aragonese agents. 75 The context for the 1323 plans was not a never-never dream-land. For Charles IV and his courtiers, help for Armenia and the crusade appeared as a serious political option for which they were prepared to expend effort and cash. As one cardinal observed, it was Charles' 'first great policy'. 76 However, when confronted by Cypriots and Armenians speaking for themselves, instead of theorists speaking οη their behalf, the French, perhaps to their surprise, discovered considerable disagreement. The French ultimately wanted a general crusade. The pope, more ίη touch, perhaps, with local feeling and, anyway, more concerned with Italian crusades, saw immediate aid to Armenia as the priority. The Cypriots were concerned lest the Mamluks overran the sea-lanes between Cyprus, Asia Minor and Syria. Armenia, οη the other hand, wanted military or financial assistance for defence against the regular invasions by the Mamluks. French plans were distorted by the emotional charge of the crusade, although this was vital for recruitment. The theorists Durand and Sanudo, tried to hold the ring. Ιη the end the French tinkered with the plans of the experts and ignored the views of the locals and their obsession with large passagia, ίη which neither the pope nor the Levantines were much interested, caused fatal delay. But any suggestion that Charles tagged onto a genuine relief plan for Armenia an extragavant and insincere plan for larger passagia ίη order more easily to be granted tithes cannot, given 70 Viard, Journaux, no. 1710. 71 Fawtier, Comptes royaux, no. 13902; Tyerman, 'Sanudo', 68. 72 ΒΝ MS Latin 7470. 73 John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, nos . 1562, 1685 and 1848; Archives nationals MS J 1026, nos. 43 and 34 bis. 74 John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, nos . 1571-2. 75 Finke, Acta, ίί, 742; Α. Laiou, Constantinop/e and the Latins, Cambridge, Mass. 1972, 324-8; Η . Lot, 'Projets de croisade sous Charles le Bel' , Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Chartes χίχ, 1859, 503-9 and Έssai d'intervention de Charles le Bel en faveur des chretiens d'Orient', Bibliotheque de l'Ecole des Chartes χχχνί, 1875, 588-600. 76 John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, no. 1704.

III 181

Sed Nihil Fecit?

the administrative and political efforts, be credited. Charles IV's blunder was to try to prepare Amaury's fleet with inadequate resources. lt was to this that Sanudo, who was closely involved in the planning, attributed Amaury's failure. 77 The difficulties of 1323 left their mark. In the 1330s Philip VI deliberately kept plans for the defence of Romania against Turkish pirates separate from his plan for a general passagίum .. 78 Although the conversion of the French commitment into practical help for beleaguered Outremer had been hesitant and slightly incompetent, the preparations of 1323 did provide a model for a crusading future which lay with small forces not huge military leviathans. For the first time since 1270, large practical problems of strategy, tactics, diplomacy and finance were tackled. Charles and Amaury's failure illustrated to those who came after that the crusade in the fourteenth century, as in earlier centuries, needed to be simple in conception, direct in appeal and loaded with money. Yet the events of 1323 also demonstrated that in spite of dissensions within Christendom it was possible to order priorities so as to organise at least a small campaign against the Infidel, a lesson remembered in 1334 and 1343-44. Charles IV's methods and experience helped to dispel contemporary crusade myopia and reintroduce an element of realism into schemes to recover the Holy Land. For diplomatic and personal reasons the last Capetians could not abandon or ignore the Holy Land. Their devotion was sincere. Their attempts to reignite the glorious tradition of St. Louis failed partly because of the distracting clash of political priorities, but more fundamentally because of the financial crisis after 1314, consistent and serious disagreements over the crusade with the papacy especially as regards finance, Italy and leadership, and muddled strategic thinking on the crusade itself. Simply, the crusade was much more difficult to realise than had been imagined. Charles IV's exertions served to illustrate that problems identified are not problems solved. Sed nίhίlfecίt? The remarks of Cardinal du Four provide a clue. Writing in 1323, he commented that anyone who criticised crusade inactivity and followed the 'νίa obloquendi ... nescit negotii veritatem et difficultatem'. 79

77 J. Bongars, Gesta Dei Per Francos, Hanover 1611, ίί, 297. 78 L. de Mas Latrie, 'Commerce et expeditions militaires de la France et de Venise au moyen iίge', Melanges historiques, Choix de documents, Paris 1873-86, ίίί, 101-2. 79 John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, ηο. 1693.

III

IV

Court) Crusade and City: The Cultural Milieu of Louis I Duke of Bourbon

The career of Louis Ι duke of Bourbon (c. 1280-1342), last surviving grandson of Louis ΙΧ in the male line, was primarily distinguished by his intimate engagement over a generation with plans for a new French crusade. While in recent years it has become customary to use the commitment of such individuals to illustrate the continued vibrancy of crusading, it is instructive to follow Maurice Keen's lead, when in pursuit of English fourteenth-century crusaders, and turn the lens the other way, back towards the social, cultural and political contexts of crusade policy and noble life in early fourteenth-century France. This c:ulture can be analysed institutionally but also personally. Louis of Bourbon, prominent from the Flemish wars of the 1290s to those of the 1340s, reveals something of how, in this case, a grand prince of the blood operated, from political ambition, dynastic networking or cultural tastes to relationships with non-noble urban elites and wider political society; and how these circumstances framed an attachment to chivalric and pious causes such as the crusade. Louis was the son of Robert, count of Clermont-en-Beauvaisis (d. 1318), sixth son of Louis ΙΧ, an invalid since sustaining severe head injuries at a tournament in 1279. Κnighted in 1297 prior to his first major campaign, Louis subsequently fought in Flanders in 1299, 1302 (some accusing him of running away from Courtrai) and 1304. He emerged fully as a political figure with clout in 1310 when he inherited the lordship of Bourbon in central France οη the death of his mother (he inherited his father's county of Clermont-en-Beauvaisis in 1318) and was appointed chambrier of France. 1 Although making the Bourbonnais the focus for his territorial ambition, Louis remained close to the royal court 1

Guillaume de Nangis, Gesta Philippe Tertii, Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de /α France, ed. Μ. Β. Bouquet et α/. (Paris, 1738-1876), 20, pp. 512-14; Guillaume de Nangis, Chronique /atine de 1113 iΊ 1300 avec les continuations de 1300 iΊ 1368, ed. Η. Geraud (Paris, 1843), l, pp. 299, 319; 2, p. 5; Comptes royaux 1285-1314, ed. R. Fawtier et α/. (Paris 1953-54), ηο. 27024; Registres du Trέsor des Chartes: Inventaire analytique, 1, ed. R. Fawtier (Paris 1958), ηο. 1560; Ρ. Lehugeur, Histoire de Philippe le Long (Paris, 1897, 1931) 2, p. 117; Actes du Parlement de Paris, ed. Ε . Boutaric (Paris, 1864-67), ηο. 7122; ίη general, J.-M. de la Mure, Histoire des ducs de Bourbon et comtes de Forez (Paris, 1860-68), 2, pp. 5-32; Α. de Boislisle, 'Projet de croisade

IV 50

and politics, sustained by a capacity for business and his proximity to the crown in blood. 2 His repeatedly proclaimed descent from Louis ΙΧ assumed increasing significance as the royal saint's reputation grew in seeming direct proportion to the thinning out of his descendents in the male line between 1314 and 1328. Louis, his brother John (d. 1316) and his aged father Robert were paraded at a cross-taking ceremony in July 1316, where Louis was first declared leader of the French crusade schemes. 3 Ιη 1327, Charles IV described Louis as the senior male Capetian and one contemporary legal observer of the succession crisis of 1328 even speculated that had Louis's father still been alive, Robert of Clermont not Philip of Valois would have possessed the best claim to the throne. 4 Α central figure in royal politics and a provincial magnate in his own right, Louis provided the sort of personal link between court and country that lent late Capetian France much of its apparent unity. Louis's speciality rested in diplomacy, political arbitration (e.g. Flanders 1310 and 1320; Artois 1319) and in the perhaps surprisingly frequent enquiries into fiscal, financial or administrative abuses in central government (e.g Enguerrand of Marigny 1315; Gerard Gayte 1321; Henry of Sully 1321). 5 His twenty-year engagement (1316-36) in planning a new crusade frequently took him to the Roman Curia at Avignon, which also provided a welcome source of patronage and income for his clerical servants and proteges. 6 This still left time for domestic affairs: the Saint Sardos war of 1324; the peace negotiations with Queen Isabella of England in 1325 that ended with the espousal of her son, the future Edward ΠΙ, to Philippa of Hainault, Louis's niece by marriage; the Flanders campaigns

2

3

4

5

6

du premier duc de Bourbon', Annuaire Bulletin de /α societe de l'histoire de France 14 (1872), 230--6, 246-55. For the Bourbonnais, Α. Leguai, 'De la seigneurie iι l'etat: le Bourbonnais pendant le guerre de Cent Ans', Bulletin de /α Societe d'Emulation du Bourbonnais 52-4 (1964-69) and his Les ducs de Bourbon, le Bourbonnais et /e royaume de France ά /α fin du moyen age (Moulins, 2005). Lehugeur, Philippe /e Long, !, pp. 28-45; Nangis, Chronique, 1, pp. 427-8; Chronographia Regum Francorum, ed. Η. Moranνille (Paris 1891), !, pp. 230-3; Chronique parisienne anonyme de 1316 ά 1339, ed. Α. Hellot, Memoires de la societe de l'histoire de Paris et de l'Ile de France 11 (1884), pp. 25-6. Titres de /α maison ducale de Bourbon, ed. Α. Huillard-Breholles (Paris, 1867-74), no. 1850; Α. R. Lewis, Royal Succession in Capetian France (Cambridge, ΜΑ), pp. 167-70, 183-4, 306 η. 132; Paris BnF, Jj 56 no. 413; Titres, no. 1509 for Louis in 1318 citing his grandfather's crusade precedent. Foedera, 3, p. 412; CPR, 1307-1313, p. 569; J. Favier, Philippe le Bel (Paris, 1978), p. 420; Paris BnF, JJ 50, no. 115; JJ 55, nos 110, 128, 134; JJ 60, nos 65-7; Registres du Tresor des Chartes: Inventaire analytique, 2:ί, ed. J. Guerout (Paris, 1966), nos 16, 1568, 1586, 1592, 3435-7; Lehugeur, Philippe le Long, 2, p. 117; Paris BnF, J 563Α, no. 39; Actes de Parlement, no. 6817. Boislisle, 'Projet', passim and my articles, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello and the Lost Crusade', TRHS 32 (1982), 57-73; 'Philip V of France, the Assemblies of 1319-20 and the Crusade', BIHR 57 (1984), 15-34; 'Sed Nihil Fecit? the Last Capetians and the Recovery of the Holy Land', War and Government in the Middle Ages, ed. J. Gillingham and J. Holt (Cambridge, 1984), pp. 170--81; 'Philip VI and the Recovery of the Holy Land', EHR 100 (1985), 25-52; for papal provisions showered on one of Louis's officials, John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres communes, ed. G. Mollat (Paris, 1904-46), nos 206, 3824, 12623, 15879, 59594, 60800, 61110, 61111.

IV COURT, CRUSADE AND CITY

51

of 1328; and the early days of the Hundred Years War. Only a few months before his death in January 1342, he was negotiating an extension to the treaty of Esplechin. 7 His status was reflected in his children's marriages. His eldest son Peter married Isabelle of Valois, daughter of Philip VI; Jeanne married Guy VII, count of Forez, opening a later realised possibility of territorial acquisition; Mary married the heir of the king of Cyprus (in 1330); Beatrice married John of Luxembourg, king of Bohemia (ίη 1334). After Louis's death, Mary married a second time into the Angevin royal house of Naples. 8 Louis's family commitment to the crusade anticipated the 1316 ceremony. Count Robert had taken the cross before 1306. Louis had followed suit ίη 1313 and remembered the Holy Land ίη his will of 1316. He would take the cross a third time ίη 1333.9 Louis's involvement stretched to Greece, Cyprus, Armenia and the Holy Land, as well as the details of recruitment, finance and organisation, his schemes entrenched ίη French crusade planning for two decades. High stakes were involved ίη such open promotion of a crusade. Ιη July 1319, Philip V warned Louis that if he failed to embark οη crusade, 'il seroit desplaisir a dieu et acqueroit la honte du monde', dire fates ίη the canon of contemporary chivalric values. 10 Louis's ambitions ίη the eastern Mediterranean drew him briefly, if abortively, into the tangled dynastic politics of Frankish Greece. Ιη 1320-21 he unsuccessfully bid against the Angevin rulers of Naples for the auctioned Burgundian rights ίη the region. 11 More promisingly, Mary of Bourbon's marriage to Guy of Lusignan opened the prospect of one of Louis's grandchildren ascending the throne of Cyprus. Ιη the event Guy predeceased his father, Hugh IV, and his and Mary's son Hugh (1343-79) had to be content with lands and the imposing title of prince of Galilee. This Hugh bequeathed his rights to his cousin, Duke Louis ΙΙ of Bourbon (1337-1410) who, as late as 1408, apparently voiced his intention to assert his claim to Cyprus ίη person, evanescent testimony to the scope of Louis I's vision. 12 Ironically, the closest Louis himself came to the Holy Land was as the butt of diplomatic sabotage. 7

8

9 10 11

12

Note 1 above and The War of Saint Sardos, ed. Ρ. Chaplais (Camden Society 3rd series 87, London, 1954), pp. 51, 187, 244, 267, 269. Louis had attended Isabella when she went to England to be married ίη 1308; R. Cazelles, La societι! politique et /α crise de la royaute sous Philippe de Valois (Paris, 1958), pp. 1 ΙΟ-11, 125, 3!0 and η. 3, 422; Les Journaux du Trι!sor de Philippe VI de Valois, ed. J. Viard (Paris, 1899), nos 5377, 5937; Titres, nos 2229, 2231, 2261-2; Η. S. Lucas, The Low Countries and the Hundred Years War (Αηη Arbor, 1929), p. 466. Α. Leguai, 'La famille de Bourbon: les marriages des ducs et leurs consequences politiques', Les ducs de Bourbon, chapter VII, esp. pp. 115-16; Ο. Troubat, 'Beatrix de Bourbon, reine de Boheme', Annales de /Έst, 5th series 4 (1988), 259-79. Titres, nos 1169, 1419, 1471; Comptes royaux 1285-1314, ηο . 27648; Chronographia Regum Francorum, ί. 211; Chronique parisienne, p. 154. Paris BnF, JJ 59, ηο. 76; reregistered JJ 60, ηο. !00. Titres, nos 1589-90, 1595, 1604; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secrι!tes et curiales relatives ά /α France (Paris, 1900-), ed. Α Coulon, nos !005-7, !046, 1354; Ρ. Topping, 'The Morea 1311-64', Α History of the Crusades, gen. ed. Κ. Setton, 3 (Madison, 1975), pp. !08-17. Ο. Troubat, 'La France et le royaume de Chypre au xive siecle', Revue historique 278 (1987), 3-21; Chronique du Bon Duc Loys de Bourbon, ed. Α.-Μ. Chazaud (Paris, 1876), p. 291.

IV 52 Ιη 1330, Marie of Bourbon's chaperones to Cyprus, Bishop William Durand of Mende and Peter of la Palu, patriarch of Jerusalem, proceeded after the wedding to Egypt, where they held futile negotiations with Sultan al-Nasir. This mission followed two other French embassies to Egypt since 1326, the first of which had collapsed when pacific letters of credential from Charles IV had been branded by an Aragonese agent provocateur as having been forged by Louis of Bourbon who was accused of bribing royal offi.cials to attach the king's seal, a very bizarre linkage of Louis's identification with French royal administration and eastern affairs, but backhanded testimony to his position in both. 13 Louis's leadership of the crusade was not confined to council chambers and court ceremonial. Crusading elicited responses far beyond the ruling elites. Some constituted a form of collective critique of official policy from those often excluded from active participation by more professional fundraising and recruitment. Such popular crusades were political demonstrations not social revolts, even when they dissolved into local mayhem and riot once political demands had been refused or patronage withdrawn. Although often described by contemporaries as the result of spontaneous combustion or direct celestial visions, the link between court and country is inescapable. Ιη 1320, the socalled Pastoureaux, many coming from areas such as Normandy that had supplied representatives to a series of crusade meetings in 1319-20 organised by, among others, Louis of Bourbon, entered Paris. However, some bore Louis's arms, indicating a direct reaction to a precise political moment in crusade organisation, one not necessarily opposed by the authorities. John XXII's dismay at Philip V's initial lack of hostility to the Pastoureaux was echoed ίη contemporary chronicles. 14 While the extent, if any, of Louis of Bourbon's direct involvement is unclear, it fitted his efforts to persuade nobles and towns to agree to crusade financial levies, suggesting a scrutiny of government actions ίη regions around the Ile de France witnessed again in the 1350s Jacquerie. Subsequent denigration of the 1320 insurgents as a dangerous rabble ignored any hint of noble association or evidence of internal cohesion ίη organisation and policy that undoubtedly existed. By contrast, the social origins of the aborted - and largely ignored - crusade of 1326 appear to have been more elevated. Apparently comprising many who had sold property, bands of 'peregrini' converged from all parts of the kingdom οη Paris, probably moved by recurrent rumours of a new Armenian crusade. Once again, the authorities were complicit. Louis of Bourbon addressed an assembly of the crucesignati at the royal palace οη the Ile de la Cite οη Good Friday 1326, in a scene familiar both from the 1313 crusade fete and an earlier gathering held there ίη January 1323 to discuss help for Armenia. After pleading poverty - justifiably given his own debts and the lack of papal subsidies - Louis

13 14

F. Lot, Έssai d'intervention en faveur des chretiens d'Orient', Bibliotheque de /Έcole des Chartes 36 (1875), p. 595. Nangis, Chronique, 2, pp. 25-8; Chronique parisienne, pp. 46-8; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, ηο. 1116; Μ. Barber, 'The Pastoureaux of 1320', Journal of Ecclesiastical Histσry 32 (1981), 143-66.

IV COURT, CRUSADE AND CITY

53

promised to muster crusaders the following year at Lyons. Unconvinced, the crowds dispersed to their homes feeling, so observers imagined, defrauded, scandalised and contemptuous. 15 Το deflect opprobrium, the following year Louis took an oath ίη Notre Dame to exile himself from Paris until his crusade vow had been fulfilled. This chivalrous gesture proved νaίη, attracting little but inconvenience and ridicule, as ίη subsequent years Louis was to be found skulking at the Temple, with its fine views of Notre Dame, or the Louvre, technically outside the city walls but only a stone's throw away from his own hotel οη the right bank of the Seine. Temporarily lifted by the pope ίη May 1332 to allow Louis to attend the marriage of Philip VI's son John, the vow was only finally absolved ίη February 1333, Philip V's gibe of 'la honte du monde' possibly echoing in Louis's mind. 16 While much attention has been paid to the place of formal summoning of national, provincial and urban assemblies ίη the operation of late Capetian government, regular, ad hoc meetings of citizens, presumably mainly Parisians, evidently constituted a well-honed method of disseminating publicity and propaganda to gain some sort of popular legitimacy, 'pour yce publier au peuple', a:s a Parisian chronicler commented οη the 1323 meeting at the royal palace. 17 Those putative crusaders who gathered ίη Paris at Easter 1326 included, a local (Parisian or St Denis) chronicler noted, 'pluseurs gens des bonnes villes'. 18 Just as participation ίη crusading was as much an urban as a rural phenomenon, so royal and court patronage of bourgeois crusaders was also far from exceptional. Ιη May 1326, a few weeks after the Easter crusade gathering, the foundation stone was laid for a church commissioned by another self-identified group of urban crucesignati, those Parisians who had taken the cross ίη 1313. Here, Louis of Bourbon's patronage was explicit. Ιη 1317, he and a group of fellow crucesignati established 'la confrarie du Saint-Sepulchre Nostre Seigneur'. Οη Holy Cross Day 1317 (14 September), Louis and his companions, dressed ίη red robes, held a service at the church of Sainte-Croix ίη the rue St Merri ίη Paris - a church founded by St Louis himself - 'pour l'honneur de Dieu et de saint voiage'. 19 The contrast between this gesture, inclusive of noble and bourgeois crucesignati of 1313 and 1316 alike, and later local secular orders of chivalry, such as Louis's own grandsons' Order of the Golden Shield (Escu d'or), established ίη the winter of 1363-64, is revealing. 15

16

17 18 19

Continuations of the chronicles of Girard de Frachet and John of St Victor, Receuil des historiens de France, 21, pp. 66 and 686; Nangis, Chronique, 2, 65-6 and η. 1; Grandes chroniques de France, ed. ). Viard (Paris, 1924- ), 9, pp. 49-50; for 1313 festivities, Ε. Α. R. Brown and Ν . F. Regalado, 'La grant feste. Philip the Fair's Celebration of the Κnighting of His Sons ίη Paris at Pentecost 1313', City and Spectacle in Medieνal Europe, ed. Β. Α. Hanawalt and Κ. L. Ryerson (Minneapolis, ΜΝ, 1994), pp. 56-86. Receuil des historiens de France, 21, pp. 69, 687-8; Grandes chroniques, 9, p. 64; Nangis, Chronique, 2, 81; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, nos 3315, 3342, 3343, 3437, 4872-3, 5064. Chronique parisienne, p. 77. Receuil des historiens de France, 21, p. 686. Chronique parisienne, pp. 29-30; 102-3.

IV 54

Louis II's order was restricted, quite broadly but specifically, to his knights, squires and nobles. Louis II's early fifteenth-century biographer makes much of the fact that the duke was actually staying with a local Moulins bourgeois at the time, who had acted as his agent during his captivity in England (135663). Beside the account of the founding of the Order of the Golden Shield, the biographer describes the bourgeois's failed attempt to foist οη the duke a dossier outlining noble depredations during his absence. The duke threw the document in the fire, accusing the bourgeois in turn of malpractice and corruption. This pointed tale of class skirmishing may reflect how across northern France wealthy bourgeois were increasingly becoming fixtures of courtly life, even of courtly festivities and entertainments, prompting a consequent hardening of expressions of social distinction. 20 For nobles in Louis I's Paris earlier in the century, with the riots in 1307 of discontented workers against increased rents fresh in the memory, alliance with urban elites made sound political sense. 21 Equally, for those bourgeois directly involved, royal or princely service offered a slippery ascent up the social ladder, where the distinction insisted upon by Louis II's biographer could not be applied. The Parisian bourgeois family of Braque is a case in point. Arnoul was ennobled at the instigation of the queen in 1339 and insisted οη formally renouncing his status as a bourgeois of Paris; his son Nicholas, however, called himself a bourgeois until becoming a knight in 1353. Ιη 1319 John Bilouart, for many years a leading figure in the chambre des comptes, had been ennobled but retained his status as a bourgeois.22 The opportunities for Parisian bourgeois self-advancement offered by Louis's confrarie cannot have been the least of its attractions. Where Louis II's order of chivalry excluded, Louis I's confrarie embraced. Parallels for Louis's confrarie lay more in urban religious guilds and confraternities of the thirteenth century, some dedicated to the crusade, or even with the political associations that emerged at the same time in urban Italy ostensibly to combat heretics and enemies of the papacy, rather than in later chivalric orders. 23 Louis's confrarie boasted an explicitly urban context, not exclusively based οη aristocratic clientage, but additionally οη shared religious obligation, the crusade. Despite later shibboleths of birth and education, courtly life ίη Paris as elsewhere exhibited an intimate and necessary urban and bourgeois dimension, at odds with the elitist imagination of chivalric writers such as the biographer of his grandson. The 1317 ceremony represented more than a flamboyant ephemeral gesture.

20

Chronique du Bon Duc Loys, pp. 8-15; cf.

Μ. Vale, 'The World of the Courts', Fauvel Studies, ed. Bent and Α. Wathey (Oxford, 1998), pp. 591-8 and, generally, Μ . Vale, The Princely Court (Oxford, 2001). Grandes chroniques, 8, pp. 250-2. Cazelles, Sociέtέ politique, pp. 293-4. Ν. Housley, 'Politics and Heretics in Italy: Anti-Heretical Crusades, Orders and Confraternities 1200-1500', Journal of Ecclesiastical History 33 (1982), 193-208; C. Tyerman, England and the Crusades 1095-1588 (Chicago, 1988), pp. 261, 285. Μ.

2ι 22 23

IV COURT, CRUSADE AND CITY

55

As part of the ratcheting up of crusade interest under Charles IV, ίη 1325 Louis sought to provide the confrarie with a church and hospital of its own ίη the rue St Denis, designed, ίη common with other, less grandly patronised confraternities elsewhere ίη Europe, to minister to the needs of pilgrims and crusaders and to help members fulfil their crusade vows, deepen their devotion to the Holy Land and increase their numbers. Louis presided over the laying of the foundation stone οη 18 May 1326 by the archbishop of Auch, assisted by Bishop Durand. As with the 1317 inauguration and the fete of 1313, nobles and bourgeois came together, ίη Ε. Α. R. Brown's phrase, 'ίη a festive experience of communitas'.24 lt is possible that rumours of these plans helped convince some outside Paris that the crusade itself was imminent, encouraging their appearance at Easter 1326. The confrarie drew ίη Louis's wider network of political associates. Among the other witnesses to the dedication, were Queen Isabella of England, her son Edward and the dowager Queen Clemence, widow of Louis Χ. Isabella had taken the cross, conditional οη her husband's participation, ίη 1313, and so qualified as a member of the confrarie. She had been ίη France for a year, negotiating peace after the Saint Sardos War, the homage of young Edward to Charles IV (September 1325) and the marriage alliance to Philippa of Hainault (August 1326). Throughout, she had regular social as well as political contacts with Louis of Bourbon, whose niece by marriage was young Edward's intended bride. She paid regular visits to religious foundations, one of her first acts being to venerate the relics of the Passion ίη the Sainte Chapelle. The political resonance of the May 1326 ceremony could not have been missed. Having definitively broken with Edward ΙΙ the previous autumn, Isabella was about to embark οη the road that would lead to her invasion of England and coup d' έtat. Public display of her and her son's place at the heart of the French royal family and association with its most cherished moral ambition, the crusade, was hardly neutral or purely sociable. 25 The confraternity of the Holy Sepulchre initially flourished. Louis promised 150 livres tournois to found five chapels. The first mass was celebrated ίη the new church ίη December 1327. Ιη January 1329, Philip VI extended royal patronage to the confrarie at the urging of Louis and Bishop Durand. By the mid-1330s, membership had apparently grown to over one thousand, including kings, princes and men of all conditions; sixteen canons were attached to the church. The royal Sainte Chapelle provided the model. Ιη 1336, Louis wrote to all the metropolitans ίη France asking permission to collect money for the

24

25

Brown and Regalado, 'La grant feste', p. 56; Χ. du Boisrouvray, 'L' eglise collegiale et la confrerie du St Sepulchre a Paris 1325-1791', Positions des theses de / 'ιicole nationale des Chartes (Paris, 1953), pp. 33-5. Chronique parisienne, pp. 102-3; Brown and Regalado, 'La grant feste', p. 64; Α. Wathey, 'The Marriage of Edward ΠΙ and the Transmission of French Motets to England', ]ournal of the Arnerican Musicological Society 45 (1992) , 1-29, esp. p. 4; Chaplais, War of Saint-Sardos, pp. 267-70 for Isabella's itineraries and dining companions and p. 244 for the archbishop of Auch as the leading clerical witness to Prince Edward's homage ίη Sept. 1325.

IV 56

confraternity hospital for Holy Land pilgrims, unavailingly it seems. However, Louis himself promised 60s each to pilgrims bound for the Holy Land and 30-40s for those coming back. Relics given to the church included three pieces of the True Cross, a key to one of the gates of Jerusalem, a piece of stone from the Holy Sepulchre and other items associated with the Holy Land and its saints, such as an arm of St George donated by John ΠΙ of Brittany. 26 Such devotional charity may not, in Louis's case, have been empty convention. His major religious foundation was the Sainte Chapelle at Bourbon l'Archambault, which became his family's mausoleum. Here too were Holy Land relics of the Passion, in imitation of his grandfather Louis IX's foundation, including pieces of the True Cross and Crown of Thorns. 27 Louis's crusade commitment was of a piece with his religious as well as political and chivalric ambitions. The confrarie also shared features with other such associations springing up οη the prosperous, commercial right bank of the Seine. lt attracted as confreres men such as Peter Lieuvillier, auditor of the Chatelet, who championed the confraternity in a 1327 dispute with the bishop of Paris and in 1335 received money from Philip VI to fund a chaplaincy in its church. 28 Louis of Bourbon held extensive links with prominent Parisian bourgeois as a consequence of his involvement in royal administration, his domestic arrangements in Paris, and his debts. Between 1303 and 1312, Louis had bought property οη the right bank of the Seine just upstream from the Louvre where he constructed the first H6tel de Bourbon. 29 Official duties and living in Paris brought Louis in contact with lesser as well as prominent citizens, including the tombier John of Huy and the goldsmith Peter of Besancon. 30 One of Louis's creditors was Laude Belon, who also lent money to Κing Charles IV for the Saint Sardos War of 1324. 31 John Bilouart, from the chambre des comptes, royal treasurer and briefly argentier to Charles IV, acted as one of Louis's agents in the royal tresor. 32 Ιη 1314, Gautier Dammartin, an important wax merchant, received an annual rent of 50 livres

26

27

28 29

30 31

32

Du Boisrouvray, 'L' eglise collegiale', pp. 33-5; S. Jaillot, Recherches sur /α ville de Paris, 1 (Paris, 1772), pp. 22-4; A.-L. Millin, Antiquitiι!s nationals (Paris, 1791), 3, pp. 4, 6, 7; Μ. Felibien and G. Α . Lobineau, Histoire de la ville de Paris (Paris, 1725), 1, pp. 402, 566-8; R. Cazelles, Nouvelle histoire de Paris 1223-1380 (Paris, 1972), p. 62; Ε . Molinier, Ίnventaire du Tresor de l'Eglise du St Sepulchre de Paris', Mι!moires de /α sociι!tι! de l'histoire de Paris et de ΙΊ/e de France 9 (1882), 258-9, 271; Β. Α. Pocquet du Haut Jusse, Les papas et les ducs de Bretagne (Rennes, 1929), 1, pp. 215-20. John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres communes, nos 3888, 3891, 6756, 15941, 16795, 58069, 61035; C. Billot, 'Les Saintes-Chapelles', Revue d'histoire de l'ι!glise de France 73 (1987), 243, 245, 246. Felibien and Lobineau, Histoire de Paris, 1, p. 566; Paris BnF, JJ 69, ηο. 148; Documents parisiens du regne de Philippe VI de Valois (Paris, 1899-1901), 1, p. 219. Α. Berty, Topographie historique de vieux Paris: Region du Louvre et de Tuileries (Paris, 1866-68), 1, pp. 33-4, illustration p. 135; 2, p. 168; de la Mure, Histoire des ducs de Bourbon, 3- ίί, pp. 144-5. Titres, no. 1815; Journaux du Trι!sor de Philippe VI, nos 5242, 5538. Les journaux du Trι!sor de Charles IV le Bel, ed. J. Viard (Paris, 1917), nos 5833, 7950. Journaux du Trι!sor de Charles IV, nos 1837, 6631 and p. 2 η. 3.

IV COURT, CRUSADE AND CITY

57

from Louis for his services. 33 Peter d'Essars, another argentier of Charles IV and under Philip VI lay maitre in the chambre des comptes, dealt closely with Louis, being described by the duke ίη 133las 'nostre ame vallet'. 34 Other contacts with Parisian citizens ίη royal service included the Coquatrix, pere et fils, the father, Geoffrey, being involved in commerce as well as military provisioning which may have brought him into association with Louis as chambrier or as overseer of the Champagne fairs, a post to which Louis had been appointed ίη 1317. 35 Such links were common and inevitable, witnessed by the role the citizens played ίη the 1313 festivities celebrating the knighting of Philip IV's sons and their taking the cross. Ιη some respects, the culture of these rich, inter-related urban oligarchs, some ennobled through royal service, differed only ίη degree from that of the high nobility. Ιη 1320, Louis attended a joust held by the Parisian bourgeoisie to celebrate the marriage of Louis of Nevers. 36 Ιη 1330, Louis of Bourbon helped obtain royal permission for an elaborate tournament at which Parisians challenged citizens from other French towns. The Parisians presented themselves as King Priam and his twenty-five sons; Louis had direct dealings with at least two who took part, Peter Flamenc and John Bilouart. 37 As an active chambrier, Louis may have had rather closer ties than others of his status with such urban elites and financiers. As controller of the Champagne fairs, Louis appointed as magister in 1317 an intimate from his household, Richard Pilon, a bourgeois from Clermont-en-Beauvaisis, later preνot of Compiegne. Pilon became embroiled ίη a dispute over taxing profits from the Lagny fair with some Italian merchants, including the Piacenzan Ruffin Doussan, later both Louis's creditor and banker. 38 This close-knit circle could be extended to include the chancellor of the fairs, William Guenaut, a collaborator of Peter Remy, Charles IV's finance minister who lent Louis 1,300 liνres tournois early ίη 1327. 39 The wider Italian commercial community featured regularly ίη Louis's business. Apart for Doussan, Sadoc Doria was ίη Louis's entourage ίη 1321. Ιη 1329, he organised Mary of Bourbon's journey to Cyprus, with Paris representatives of the Bardi of Florence as bankers. Doria was allowed to form a company and to trade with Egypt. Another Genoese importer was helped to French nationality

33 34

35

36

37 38

39

Paris BnF, J 378, ηο. 6; Titres, no. 1364 Β; Actes de Parlement, no. 4091; he supplied wax for Louis X's funeral, Comptes royaux 1314-28, ed. F. Maillard (Paris, 1961), ηο. 14458. Documents parisiens de Philippe VI, no. 74, p. 112; cf. nos 14, 21; Titres, no. 1863Α; Comptes royaux 1314-28, ηο. 14212; Journaux du Tresor de Charles IV, no. 17 η. 2, p. 6; Cazelles, Societe politique, p. 182. Documents parisiens de Philippe Vl, no. 106, pp. 169-70; Journaux du Tresor de Charles IV, no. 88, η. 2, p. 18. Cazelles, Societe politique, pp. 59, 390 for an example of the close family ties between Louis's Paris bourgeoisie contacts. Titres, nos 1291, 1297 for chambrier. Chronique parisienne, p. 49. Chronique parisienne, pp. 135-40; note 33 above; Journaux du Tresor de Philippe VI, nos 5197 and 5775. Titres, nos 1419, 1604, 1807, 1823-25; Actes de Parlement, nos 6817, 6199; Journaux du Tresor de Charles IV, no. 3938; Cazelles, Societe politique, p. 276 and ηη. 5 and 6. Titres, nos 1792Α, 1824, 1825, 2208.

IV 58

in 1320 through Louis's good offices. 40 Louis's confrarie underlined that such associations were not simply bureaucratic; the bourgeois crusaders of 1313, 1316 and 1326 and the jousters of 1330 shared in the chivalric culture that drew much of its force from the patronage of noble courtiers. Louis's household business extended the social range of his patronage. Το deal with his contracts, litigation, debts, property, vassals, even recruits for the crusade, his legal advisers included John of Halles, who also worked extensively for the royal government. 41 His chief lawyer appears to have been Peter Champion from Berry, also employed by Philip IV and Charles IV; Louis secured extensive clerical preferment for Champion's son and nephew. 42 From his Parisian base, Louis maintained connections with the university of Paris. Ιη a list of university members for the year 1329-30, at least two were clients of the duke of Bourbon, both having already been associated with him for over a decade, one apparently belonging to the Bardi banking family. It is perhaps noteworthy that Louis is the only princely patron mentioned in the list. Guidomarus, probably of Mezle, identified as a 'clericus domini Burboni cum socio', lived in the parish of St Germain dΆuxerre, presumably in Duke Louis's hotel. 43 Another of Louis's entourage between 1316 and 1334 was John of Henin from Artois, a 'magister de medicina'. 44 One observer noted that magistri took the cross with Louis and others in October 1333. 45 Given such academic associates, Louis's attendance in December 1333 at the conference to discuss the Beatific Vision, packed with highbrow clerics of Louis's acquaintance, may not have been an entirely formal parade. 46 Τοο often, perhaps, the intellectual lives of medieval nobles are reduced to religious devotion or vernacular literature, yet men of business and government, such as Louis, regularly had to cope with wider issues of principle, practice and conscience. As works such as Geoffrey de Charny's Book of Chivalry indicate, the business of war could stimulate laymen to conceptual thought. Discussion of pragmatic military details could be couched in academic terms; a collection of crusade materials prepared for the French king in the 1320s included Vegetius. 47 Good administration required organised information; the earliest inventory 40 41

42

43 44

45

46 47

Titres, nos 1604, 1878, 1887, 1888, 1897, 1994; Troubat, 'La France et le royaume de Chypre'. Inventaire de Robert Mignon, ed. C. V. Langlois (Paris, 1899), nos 1633, 1659, 1679, 1680 and p. 362; Actes de Parlement, nos 5451, 4482Α, 5899Α, 6930Α; Lehugeur, Philippe le Long, 2, pp. 152, 192; Journaux du Tresor de Charles IV, nos 3697 (and η. 2), 8471; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres communes, nos 3802, 14897, 54468; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, no. 1354; Titres, nos 1604, 1727. Registres, 1, nos 1027, 2266; Titres, nos 1419, 1878; ]ournaux du Tresor de Charles IV, nos 439, 443; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres communes, nos 192, 3794, 3822. W. J. Courtenay, Parisian Scholars in the Early Fourteenth Century (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 105, 150, 151, 207, 245. Titres, nos 1419, 1604, 1878, 1900, 1914, 2041, 2083; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres communes, nos 207, 3825. Nangis, Chronique, 2, pp. 134-5. Chartularum universitatis Parisiensis, ed. Η. Denifle and Ε. Chatelain (Paris, 1889-97), 2, ηο. 981. BnF MS Lat. 7470.

IV COURT, CRUSADE AND CITY

59

of Bourbon charters dates from Louis's time. 48 Οη crusading, Louis sought advice from veterans, experts, professionals and theorists. Ιη the early years of his involvement, he commissioned an unusually precise statement of the costs of shipping from Marseilles that remained sufficiently relevant to be registered years later during Philip VI's preparations for a passagium. 49 At Avignon in 1322, the Venetian businessman, historian and lobbyist Marino Sanudo Torsello presented Louis with his great crusade compendium Secreta Fidelium Crucis. Ιη Paris a year later, Sanudo provided Louis with maps (probably by Pietro Vesconte). The pair continued to correspond for another dozen years, in 1334 Sanudo entertaining Louis's agent in the eastern Mediterranean, an Englishman William Badin.50 The intellectual frame of his crusading, like his patronage of the confrarie, went beyond the conventional. His closest crusade collaborator in the 1320s and fellow patron of the confrarie, Bishop William Durand of Mende, was a scholarly controversialist of distinctly independent views, notably οη church government, by ηο means a run-of-the mill royal official, legist or clerical time-server. Durand's crusade Informacio Brevis was probably composed in response to the crusade assemblies of 1319-20 ίη which Louis was equally closely involved. 5 1 This literary and learned dimension hints at Louis's possession of a wide cultural hinterland that sat well in a court milieu that embraced Arabic translators and, ίη 1322, purchased a map of Outremer for 30 sous. 52 Louis's Sanudo/Vesconte ones were almost certainly better. Consideration of Louis's associates and household opens up further circles. By 1321, and possibly since 1315, the administrator, poet, musician and polymath Philip of Vitry was employed by Louis, precisely the time to which some ascribe his revolutionary motets. Although also acting as a royal clerk from the late 1320s, by 1334 Philip was one of Louis's three most senior clerical officials, operating οη Louis's behalf both at the royal court and ίη the Bourbonnais. Ιη January 1342, he was the chief clerical executor of Louis's will. Philip acted as Louis's procurator at Avignon and much of his work ίη chancery was conducted either as Louis's agent or ίη association with him. 53 This placed Louis at the 48 49

50

51

52 53

Titres: Notices sur les archiνes des anciens ducs de Bourbon, Pie ces justificatiνes, no. 1, pp. xxiiixxiv. Boislisle, 'Projet', pp. 248-55. J. Bongars, Gesta Dei Per Francos (Hanau, 1611), 2, pp. 296, 300; F. Kunstmann, 'Studien uber Marin Sanudo', Konigliche Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften. Abhanglungen Phil-Historische Classe 7 (1855), 812, 815-16; for Badin's English career as a sea captain in royal pay, CPR 1327-30, p. 9; CCR 1327-30, p. 9. Tyerman, 'Philip V', pp. 27-9; for text, G. Durrholder, Die Kreuzzugspolitik unter4 Papst Johann ΧΧΙΙ 1316-34 (Strasbourg, 1913), pp. 104-10; cf. C. Fasolt, Council and Hierarchy: The Political Thought of William Durant the Younger (Cambridge, 1991). des archiνes nationales: Documents originaux de l'histoire de France exposέe dans l'hotel Soubise (Paris, 1872) , ηο. 328; Comptes royaux 1314-28, no. 13902. Titres, esp. nos 2041, 2303; Α. Wathey, 'Gerves du Bus', Fauνel Studies, pp. 606--7; Α. Wathey, Έuropean Politics and Musical Culture at the Court of Cyprus', The Cypriot-French Repertory of the Manuscript Torino J.11 .9, ed. U. Gunther and L. Finscher, Musicological Studies and Musέe

Documents 45 (Neuhaussen and Stuttgart, 1995), esp. pp. 38-44.

IV 60

centre of a web of court and princely patrons and officials who acted and interacted ίη politics, administration and the arts. It is the circle that produced the famous Fauvel (1314-17) and, later, Fauvain (1326-27), the latter possibly linked to the marriage of Edward ΠΙ of England to Louis's niece by marriage Philippa of Hainault. It has been argued that these sharp allegorical satires οη the contemporary French political scene owed much to increasing bourgeois involvement ίη courtly entertainment as well as government, precisely the context of Louis of Bourbon's own household and career. While Philip ofVitry's participation ίη the development of the Fauvel texts remains conjectural, they certainly emanated from his and his patron's milieu. 54 Philip's close ties with Louis may have helped inspire his moralising poetic sermon οη Philip VI's crusade, Le Chapel des fleurs de lis, composed within months of a visit to Bourbon ίη February 1334 when he witnessed the ennoblement and crusade service contracts of two of Louis's Bourbonnais vassals. 55 Philip fitted easily into Louis's entourage. For instance, Louis was also a patron of Watriquet of Couvin, commissioning from him an elegy for his old companion, Gaucher of Chatillon. 56 He employed a minstrel, Plumion, for whom Charles IV bought an expensive new flute. 57 The fashionable translator, John of Vignay, dedicated to Louis a translation of Vincent of Beauvais's Miroir Historial. 58 Louis cultivated elevated taste. Although Louis's spiritual life must remain conjectural, his Sainte Chapelle ίη Bourbon and his Paris confrarie matched his public commitment to the crusade and the Holy Land. While he spread his religious largesse widely, he may have had a special interest ίη the house of the Blind Poor ίη Paris if, as is possible, his father's tournament injury had left him blind. 59 More suggestive, perhaps, is his possession of a manuscript of the Somme le Roi, a hugely popular penitential handbook for laymen compiled ίη 1279 by Philip III's confessor, the Dominican Lawrence du Bois of Orleans. The miniatures of the coats-of-arms of Louis, his wife and the counts of Flanders and Holland that decorate the manuscript have been attributed either to the Fauvel master or, more likely, someone heavily influenced by him, known as the 'Sub-Fauvel master', again placing Louis ίη a circle of up-to-date artists, musicians and poets. 60 The manuscript may cast light οη his devotional inclinations. Lawrence du Bois of Orleans, ΟΡ, compiler

54

Bent and Α. Wathey, Ίntroduction', Fauνel Studies, esp. pp. 1-16; Ε. Α. R. Brown, 'Rex ioians, ionnes, iolis', Fauvel Studies, pp. 54, 59; Vale, 'World of the Courts', pp. 596-8; Wathey, 'Gerves du Bus'; D. Leech-Williams, 'The Emergence of ars nονα', Journal of Musicology 13 (1995), esp. Α.

315. Piaget, 'Le Chapel des Fleurs de Lis', Romania 27 (1898), 55-92; Titres, no. 2041. Α. Scheler, Dits de Watriquet de Couνin (Brussels, 1868), pp. 47-53, 423-4. Comptes royaux 1314-28, no. 14214. Abbe Lebeuf, Histoire de /α νille et tout de diocese de Paris (Paris, 1883 edn), 1, p. 156. John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres communes, no. 3905. Ε. V. Kosmer, Α Study of the Style and Iconography of α Thirteenth Century 'Somme /e Rοί' (Ann Arbor, ΜΙ, 1996), Part Ι, pp. 8-14, 18-21, 43; Part ΙΙ, pp. 34-7; Α. Stones, 'The Stylistic Context of Fauνef, Fauνel Studies, pp. 529-67 esp. p. 532.

55 Α. 56 57

58 59 60

IV COURT, CRUSADE AND CITY

61

of the Somme, may possibly be identified as the Dominican 'Laurent di Orlians', an executor of a will of Louis's father Robert, probably pre-1280.61 If so, young Louis may have been brought up οη its edifying stories and injunctions. The Somme was designed to appeal to the 'well-informed laymen' who wished to be entertained as well as instructed. 62 The care taken with the armorial illustrations could indicate personal interest. Louis may also have noted the anecdote about St Germain d' Auxerre, Louis's local parish saint ίη Paris, condemning meanness ίη charitable giving while reassuring the givers of divine reward. Elsewhere, the Somme attacked usurers whose terms of repayment 'destroy the people, and namely the poor knights and squires, and also great lords that been going and gone to jousting and tournaments and over the great sea and into Prus'. 63 Louis was an indefatigable and possibly reckless jouster, despite his father's injury. At each of three tournaments ίη 1297-99, he managed to lose a horse. 64 Yet, despite his best efforts, he never crossed the Mediterranean, the 'great sea', and, unlike his son-in-law John of Luxembourg, he never campaigned in the Baltic either. For the former failure, ίη 1326 he had pleaded insufficient funds. 65 Louis was ηο saint. He fathered at least one illegitimate child. 66 However, even if Louis did not take the Somme le Roi to heart, his association with the crusade imposed a laborious penitential dimension to his life. Public and private unease at unfulfilled vows and promises balanced the appealing combination of piety and chivalry. Louis's cultural interests, however wide in embracing the poetry and music of Philip of Vitry, the social, moral and political critique of Fauvel and the Somme le Roi, or the academic concerns of the Paris masters and lawyers, remained rooted ίη the chivalric code of his ancestors and contemporaries, the qualities Watriquet of Couvin extolled ίη his elegy οη Gaucher of Chatillon: prouesce, courtoisie, honneur, largesse, loiaute 'qui de noblesce toutes les autres vertus passe'. 67 Philip of Vitry's poem οη Philip VI's crusade identified the three fleurs de lis as faith, wisdom and chivalry 'S'en yront en la sainte terre / Pour essaucier la foy et querre / Nostre general sauvement'. 68 Ιη February 1332, Louis's colleague Archbishop Peter Roger, the future pope Clement VI, proposed as necessary crusader virtues faith, spiritual confidence, Christian charity, wisdom, justice, determination and sobriety. 69 Yet pure idealism was just that. Implicit also in the observations of high priests of chivalry such as Geoffrey de Charny lay what could be called conviviality 61 62

63 64 65 66 67 68

69

De la Mure, Histoire des ducs de Bourbon, 3, p. 156. Kosmer, Somme le Roi, p. 14. The Βσσk of Vices and Virtues, trans. W. Nelson Francis (EETS, Old Series 217, London, 1942), p. 32; cf. p. 196. Titres, ηο. !043; Chronique parisienne, pp. 49, 135-40, 151; cf. for his hunting, ηο. 1390 and John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, ηο. 1898 for a gift of venison to the pope. Above, note 15. Guy, seigneur of Cluys ίη Berry, Dictionnaire de /α Noblesse (3rd edn, Paris, 1864), 3, p. 744. Scheler, 'Dits', p. 44. 11. 30--3. Paiget, 'Le Chapel', 11. 786-94; Titres, ηο. 2041. Bibliotheque Ste. Genevieve, MS 240, fol. 270 verso, col. 1.

IV 62 underpinning much of chivalric society and courtly life, from the household accounts groaning with details of food and wine to the public displays at feasts, festivals and tournaments. Conviviality was a part and consequence of practical courtoisie. Rare sightings of Louis of Bourbon in private, at social events such as dinners both in France and Avignon, suggest he knew and exploited this. During crusade negotiations at Avignon in 1322, he conducted an energetic schedule of dining out with, among others, the king of Naples and a number of cardinals. 70 Ιη 1326, Louis used his social wiles to gain an estate from the count of Flanders that had belonged to the late Count Robert of Boulogne. Although estimated at 5001 p.a., Louis claimed it was worth only 601. and had once been part of Bourbon family lands, although privately admitting the discrepancy to the bailli of Amiens and one of the count of Flanders's councillors. Consequently, they strongly advised the count not to surrender the lands. However, after a meal attended only by Louis, the count and his councillor 'sine militibus et aliis', Louis worked οη the count 'verbis dulcibus et blandatoriis', but adding, with a hint of possibly confected menace ('quasi motus ad iram' - note the 'quasi'): 'detis mihi propria voluntate, si vultis. Ego bene possum tantum prodesse et nocere.' The count took the hint; Louis got the land.71 Of itself insignificant, this anecdote indicates the intimate complexity of wealth and power; attractive, often pleasurable, but not easy. The work of a great noble could be intellectually as well as physically demanding, testing of wits and personality. The variety of contexts in which Louis acted is eloquent: battle fields and tournament lists; public ceremonies and private dinner parties; work ίη government departments; administering his estates in northern and central France; managing his Paris hotel; extending his power-base in the Bourbonnais; arranging royal or papal patronage for his proteges; agreeing charitable donations; organising marriages for his children; securing credit; avoiding the political shoals at the head of the royal family; for two decades taking the lead of a major international policy that involved travel, diplomacy, mastering complex briefs and appearing ίη public as spokesman at assemblies and other conferences at which the audience was not necessarily wholly sympathetic. Οη top of all that, Louis ran a household for his private tastes as well as public duties; business and entertainment. Occasionally this required tiresome interventions to protect his own, as during a lengthy wrangle in the late 1330s over the role played by one of his valets de chambre in the death of a local Parisian publican whose widow at one stage appealed directly to Louis. 72 Ιη this texture of prosaic experience the crusade was normative, not eccentric, sustained by and reflecting many other aspects of noble life. Later, as different priorities pressed in, crusading retained its resonance but ίη very different circumstances. Both Louis's sons were killed in battle, but neither against the

° Chaplais, War of Saint Sardos, pp. 267, 269; F. Guessard, Έtienne de Mornay', Bibliotheque de

7

71

l'Ecole des Chartes 5 (1843-44) 593-6; cf. John Titres, no. 1801Α.

72

Documents parisiens de Philippe VI, 2,

ηο.

ΧΧΙΙ,

Lettres secretes, no. 1419.

263, pp. 108-14.

IV COURT, CRUSADE AND CITY

63

infidel: Peter of Bourbon at Poitiers against the English (1356), James of La Marche at Brignais against the Free Companies (1362). When his grandson, Louis ΙΙ, led the Franco-Genoese promenade in Tunisia in 1390, despite attracting indulgences, there was ηο public funding, by church or state, nor taking the cross. The 1390 campaign combined Genoese commercial sabrerattling with a chivalric package tour identified within a sort of league table of credit. The Soldich de la Trau calculated that the unsuccessful siege of alMahdiya was nonetheless equivalent in prestige to 'three great battles'. 73 Ιη many ways, such almost parodic precision in chivalric accounting, even the physical presence of Louis ΙΙ of Bourbon's Christian army οη the shores of 'hethenesse', failed to outdo the richness and scope of cultural, social and political vision and engagement witnessed by the abortive schemes of his grandfather. pp. 50, 51, 57 (notes 4, 5, 10, and 33), references to the JJ and J seήes should be cited as from the Archives nationa\es de France, not the Bibliotheque nationale de France. Ν.Β. Οη

73

Chronique de Bon Duc Loys, p. 248; discussed by p. 170.

Μ.

Keen, Chivalry (New Haven, CT, 1984),

IV

IV

V Ρ hilip

VI and the Recove1J' of the Ho!J Land

of the more persistent features of the turbulent politics of the 13 30s was the widespread talk of a new crusade to recover the Holy Land. Ιη Froissart's hyperbole, 'en ce tempore que ceste crois estoit en si grant fleur de renommee et que οη ne parloit ne devisoit d'aultre cose' .1 Between 133 ι and 1336, the recovery of the Holy Land was proclaimed by Philip VI of France as his chief ambition. His plans were debated by the curia at Α vignon and parliament in London. As the cross was preached, indulgences granted and tithes sanctioned, courts of western Europe hummed with crusade diplomacy, rhetoric and gossip. The fate of Philip's schemes, the sincerity ofhis proposals and of Edward III's reaction to them became central elements in the propaganda battle at the beginning of the Hundred Years War. Contemporaries recognized the importance of the crusade in French foreign and domestic policies. Yet since the doyen of the study of Philip VI's reign, Jules Viard, produced a bare chronology almost fifty years ago, Philip's crusade has received only tangential consideration. 2 Whereas Scotland and the internal erosion of support and loyalty to the Valois have been appreciated as causes of the outbreak of Anglo-French hostilities, the connection of Philip's crusade with both has received less attention. Although the formal break occurred in 133 7, the transfer to the Channel in the summer of 1336 of the crusade fleet gathered at Marseilles marks a definite period in Philip's reign and in Anglo-French relations. The end of the crusade brought with it a more openly aggressive attitude to English aspirations in Scotland and Gascony and allowed a concentration of French political, military and administrative energy against England which hitherto had been precluded by the preparations for the recovery of Outremer. More widely, the cancellation of Philip VI's crusade in ι 336 saw the collapse of the last organized attempt in the tradition of St Louis and Richard Ι to recover the Holy Land from the Infidel. Thereafter the enemy was the Turk, and the prospect of a large international expedition led by the rulers of the west was removed from the sphere of practical politics by the Hundred Years War. Philip VI's crusade raises questions which are applicable to all those later medieval crusades which were planned but not executed. Was Philip serious in his intention to recover the Holy ΟΝΕ

1. 2.

J. Froissart, Chronίquιs, ed. S. Luce et al. (Paris, 186~ ), ί. 118. J. Viard, 'Les projets de croisade de Philippe VI de Valois', Bίblίothique de f Ecole dιs Chartes

(hereafter B.E.C.), xcvii (1936), 305-16. See also R. Cazelles, La socίίti polίtίque et la crίse de Ια royauti sous Phίlίppe VI de Valoίs (Paris, 1958), pp. 95, 97, 107-12; and J. Β. Henneman, Royal Taxatίon ίn Fourteenth Century France, ί, The Development of War Fίnancing η22-;6 (Princeton, 1971), ch. 3, pp. 80--115.

V 26

PHILIP

VΙ

AND

ΤΗΕ

Land, did his subjects and allies believe him, did he receive support from his councillors, nobles and taxpayers, how great were the administrative and diplomatic efforts directed towards the crusade and what happened to the money raised for it? More specific to the 1330s are the reactions to Philip's schemes of the papacy and Edward ΠΙ, the effect of his plans on his relations with his subjects and neighbours and what his crusade policy reveals of Philip and his perception of kingship. Finally, what light does the failure of Philip's crusade shed on fourteenth-century crusading and the prospects for the recovery of the Holy Land in the later middle ages? Το answer such questions and to observe the unfolding of Philip's crusade in clear perspective it is best to review the story as it happened, chronologically. In trying to imitate his Capetian cousins, Philip was, in his first years, remarkably successful. He crushed the Flemish at Cassel, forced personal liege-homage from the king of England, withstood the fall of his closest adviser, Robert of Artois, and sat in judgement on the orthodoxy of a pope (over the Beatific Vision controversy)---' a position which even Nogaret had failed to engineer for his master. Before the gloom of the Hundred Years War, Philip's prospects looked bright. One cherished ambition of the Capetians was the recovery of the Holy Land. This concern was refuelled by the fall of Acre in 1291, the establishment of the Hospitallers in Rhodes and the long retreat of the Frankish princelings in Greece and the Aegean in the face of Byzantines, Catalans and Turks. Yet, although Philip IV and his three sons all vowed to assist the Christians of Outremer and maintained close contacts with Cyprus, Rhodes, Armenia and Romania, despite outbursts of administrative and planning activity in 1308, 13 16, 1318, 1321and1323 and the collection of ships in 1319 and 1323, ambition was impotent. 1 Philip ofValois 'comme saint Louis .... songe a la croisade'. 2 He had taken the cross in 13 13 and in 1326 had thought of joining a crusade against the Moors of Granada. 3 His lifelong concern for the crusade was widely known and as early as February 1329 rumours reached Venice that the new king of France was interested in going on crusade to Outremer. 4 The first crusading venture which caught the attention of Philip's court, the crusade against the Granadine 1. J. Delaville le Roulx, La France en orienl αιι xiv, siecle (Paris, 1881 - 6); Α. S. Atiya, The

Crusade in the Later Middle Ages (London, 1938), and 'The crusade in the fourteenth century', History of the Crusades, ed. Κ. Setton, ίίί (Wisconsin, 1971), 3-26; Α. Luttrell, 'The crusade in the fourteenth century', Europe in the Late Middl, Ages, eds. J. Hale, R. Highfield and Β. Smalley (London, 1961), pp. 122- 14; Κ. Μ. Setton, The Papacy and the Lιvanl 1204- IJJI, i (Philadelphia, 1976); Ν. J. Housley, 'Franco-papal crusade negotiations of 1322-3 ', Papers of the British School at Rome, xlviii (1980), 166-81; C. J. Tyerman, 'Marino Sanudo Torsello and the Lost Crusade', Transactions of the Royal Historical .fociety, jth ser., χχχίί (1982), 17-73. 2. Cazelles, .focιiti politique, p. 97. 3. Letires secrέtes et curiales du pape Jean ΧΧΙΙ reiatives α la France, eds. Α. Coulon and S. Clcmencet (Paris, 1900-72), no. 2739. 4. BibliothCque Ste Genevieve, MS. 240, fo. 272.V, col. ίί; J. Bongars, Gesta Dei Per Francos (Hanover, 16 ι ι ), ίί. J 14.

V RECOVERY OF

ΤΗΕ

HOLY LAND

Moors, faltered because of Aragonese-Castilian disunity, the damaging case of Robert of Artois and Edward 111's continuing recalcitrance over homage. 1 Yet between the autumn of 1328 and the summer of 1 33 1, there was a chance of F rench assistance for the Spanish kings. Interest was shown by the counts of Hainault, Foix, Alenς:on, Armagnac and Julich, Robert of Artois, the lords of Albret and Craon, John ofHainault, Bertrand-Jordan de l'Isle Jourdain, the king of Navarre, the duke of Brittany, and the constable. 2 Attempts were made to entice English support. 3 The adherence of Plantagenet vassals - Amaury of Craon (formerly Edward III's seneschal in Gascony) and the lords of Armagnac, Albret and l'Isle-Jourdain and others who were to fight for the English before the decade was over, the count of Julich, the Hainault family and Robert of Artois was important ίη demonstrating loyalty to the Valois, especially as Philip was, at this precise time, forcing Edward 111 to pay liegehomage. However, the willingness of these and other nobles to entertain projects of foreign adventure was equally important for its own sake for, as the prospect of a Spanish crusade dimmed, the issue of the Holy Land was suddenly re-asserted. Ιη 1329-30, after escorting the duke of Bourbon's daughter to her marriage ίη Cyprus and visiting the Holy Sepulchre, the new patriarch of Jerusalem, Pierre de la Palud, and the veteran crusade organizer, Bishop Guillaume Durand of Mende, visited the Mamluk sultan of Egypt ίη an attempt to pursue recent French efforts to negotiate the return of Christian pilgrims' rights ίη Palestine and, possibly, even the establishment of a Christian-Moslem condominium between Ascalon and Caesarea. Predictably, after acrimonious debate, the embassy failed. 4 Οη his return to the French court, Palud delivered a dramatic, apparently persuasive and certainly well-publicized sermon denouncing Mamluk oppression and calling for a new crusade. This provided the spark which rekindled official French crusading enthusiasm. 5 As influen1. J. Miret y Sans, 'Negociacions diplomatiques d'Alfons ΠΙ de Catalunya-Arago ab el rey de Franςa per la croada contra Granada 1328-μ', Inslilul d'Esludίs Caιalans: Annuarί (1908), 16j-336; Μ. Mahn-Lot, 'Philippe d'Evreux roi de Navarre et un projet de croisade', Bulletin hίspanίqιιe, xlvi ( 1944), 117-33; R. Cazelles, Lellres closes de Phίlίpp, de Valoίs (Paris, 19j 8), pp. 36 no. 13, 38- 9 no. 18- μ, 41 no. 36; Η. Finke, Acla Aragonensίa (Berlin, Leipzig, 1908-66), ίίί. 544-j, docs. no. 1j6, 1j6- i. 1. Miret y Sans, op. cίΙ., pp. 169, 174, 183, 186-7, 310--11. 3. Τ. Rymer, Foedera, convenlίones, lίlerae elc. (London, 1704-3j), ίν. 441. 4. Grandes chronίqιιes d, Franc,, ed. J. Viard, ίχ (Paris, 1937), 106--7, 130; G. De Nangis, Chronίqιιe lalίne de Il ιJ ά ηοο avec les conlίnιιalίons d, ι300 ά IJ68, ed. Η. Gi:raud (Paris, 1843 ), ii. 110, 130--3 1; for the negotiations, Chronicle ο/ Lanercost, trans. Sir Η. Maxwell (Glasgow, 1913), pp. 301-3 and Th, Anonimalle Chronicl,, ed. V. Η. Galbraith (Manchester, 1917), p. 8 and, from the Moslem side, G . Golubovich, Biblioleca bίo-bίblίographia della Terra Sanla e delfOrienle Francescano (Florence, 1906-17), ίίί. 366- 7. 5. Grandes chroniqιιιs, ίχ . 130; Nangis, ii. 1;0- 31; BibliothCque nationale, Paris (hereafter Β.Ν.) MS. Latin 3293, fo. 164', col. ί; Bibl. Ste Genevieve, MS. 140, fo. 171', col. ί. For the date, probably late September, notice the lack of reference to the Holy Land ίn negotiations from April to August (Cazelles, Lel/res closes, pp. 39-41, nos. 31-6) and the mention of the Holy Land in the credentials of the English ambassadors on lj October (Rymer, ίν. jo1). If Palud did address the September meeting, see Β.Ν. nouvelles acquisitions franςaises (NAF), MS 7603, fos. 44r- 45v for the impressive attendance list.

V 28

PHILIP VI AND

ΤΗΕ

tial, perhaps, was the news of renewed Mamluk pressure οη Cilician Armenia and the presence of Armenian ambassadors at Α vignon and in France seeking aid. 1 Domestically, the crusade appeal was a convenient distraction from the case of Robert of Artois, but it was also more than that and was taken up by Philip VI's government with vigour. Οη 5 December 1331, at the request of the French, Pope J ohn ΧΧΙΙ instructed the French episcopate to preach the cross throughout the kingdom, to collect donations and to institute special weekly masses to be sung οη behalf of the crusade. 2 But the transfer of rhetoric to reality required money which, the pope was told in February 1332, the French alone did not possess. 3 The negotiations to secure papal grants of tithes and privileges which lasted from February 133 2 to J uly 13 3 3 were laborious, detailed and frequently bad-tempered, but vital for the crusade. 4 All aspects of the operation were discussed: form, timing, arrangements for raising, keeping, employing and repaying funds such as bequests, the details and incidence of the tithe, the scope and amount of indulgences, the obligations of heirs of crucesignati who had failed to fulfίl their vows and of those crucesignati who were to remain in France to govern the realm. Both sides searched assiduously for precedents. The king wanted free control of crusade legacies, tithes, and other funds raised outside France. Throughout, the pope was flexible except that he angrily rejected French demands for non-French revenues and the use of Hospitaller wealth. Philip was concerned lest the papal grants fail to meet the cost of the expedition in the event of a curtailed passagium or his own death (which, in view of Philip's recurrent illnesses, was not an academic point). 5 At Melun, οη 25 July 1332, Philip repeated his intention of going 'in propria persona' οη crusade. 6 The quid pro quo was the pope's reservation of 'certas decimas, dona, legata et nonnulla alia' for the preparation of the crusade, with the king pledging his own property as security against any failure to reimburse the pope should the crusade be abandoned. 7 These stipulations, designed to push forward the Α vignon talks, were witnessed by the king's fίve closest 1. Chronicon Η. Knighton, ed. J. R. Lumby (Rolls Series), ί (London, 1889), 460; John ΧΧΙΙ, Leltres secrίtes, no. 4685; Rymer, ίν. 5 Ι 5. 2. Β. Ν. MS franςais 28 33, fos. 202'-4'; G. Mollat, Lettres communes de Jean ΧΧΙΙ (Paris, 1904- 46), ηο. j 8207. 3. Bibl. Ste Genevieve, MS. 240, fo. 275', col. ίί; for Philip's financial plight, Henneman, RΙ!Jal Taxation, pp. 90, 348 and, generally, Ε. Α. R. Brown, 'Customary aids and royal fiscal policy under Philip VI of Valois', Traditio, χχχ (1974), 191- 258. 4. John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres communes, nos. 61324-7. 5. John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, nos. 4038, 49j6-7; Grandes chroniques, ix. 146. 6. Archives nationales, Paris (hereafter Α.Ν.) J 45 5, ηο. ΙΙ, and cJ. the now lost Α.Ν. J 4j j, ηο. 12 forwhich see Ρ. Dupuy's MS Inoentairedeslayettesdu TrίsordesChartes(161 j, revised 1891 ), ii. fo. 465 v_ Atiya's and Dίirrholder's statements that Philip took the cross οη this occasion Dϋrrholder, Die Kreuzzugspolitik unter

have ηο supporting evidence; Atiya, Crusade, p. 96 and G. Papst ]ohann ΧΧΙΙ (Strassburg, 1913), p. 67. 7. Α.Ν. J 455, ηο. 14; Α.Ν. Κ 42, ηο. 12.

V RECOVERY OF

ΤΗΕ

HOLY LAND

Finally, the king renewed the credentials of his male existing negotiators, the archbishop of Rouen, the bishop of Therouanne, Henri of Α vaugour and Pierre Trousseau, and added Gui Baudet to their number. 2 Behind the ceremonial, the reservation of existing tithes for crusade expenses, although designed to allay ecclesiastical fears of exploitation, placed some strain οη royal finances as the tithes of 1328 and 13 30 had had ηο specific reservation.3 Το reinforce the written promises, Philip formally announced his determination to go οη crusade in the Sainte Chapelle on 2 October 1 3 32, three days after the knighting of his son, J ohn of Normandy, whom Philip designated guardian of the realm in his absence and to whom oaths of loyalty were extracted as part of the ceremony of 2 October. 4 Still John ΧΧΙΙ needed convincing of Philip's sincerity. At an assembly at Orleans in March 1333, Philip instructed royal officials to travel the kingdom to secure individual sworn promises of support for the crusade redeemable by cash payments, a lay version of an established ecclesiastical technique. 5 The king 'in suo magno concilio' agreed to the appointment by the pope of two French prelates to decide whether any delay in Philip's preparations was the king's fault and to the establishment of a committee of four prelates to safeguard crusade funds and materials in the event of cancellation. The administration of crusade money was not to be conducted by the royal tresor, but by a separate body of receivers. As demanded by the pope, Philip gave plenipotentiary powers to his five ambassadors to swear οη the king's and his son's behalf that the crusade would embark on I August 13 36. 6 Final agreement was reached on 24 May. 7 On 16 July, at a crowded consistory at Avignon, the French ambassadors swore in their master's place to abide by the agreed terms. 8 Archbisop Roger delivered a sermon in which he emphasized the immediate value of the crusade in relieving the danger to Armenia, Rhodes and Cyprus and in reversing Turkish advances in Romania. He defended Philip from charges that ίη two years 'non videtur quod unam galeam fecit'. relatives. 1

1. John ofNormandy, Charles of Alenςon, Philip ofNavarre, Louis of Bourbon and Charles of Etampes; Α.Ν. J 455, ηο . 15. 2. Α . Ν. J 4j5, ηο. 14. 3. For the bull of 16 June 1330, Β.Ν. MS. franςais 4425, fos. 282'-6',pace Atiya, Crusade, p. 96, and Henneman, R()Jal Taxation, p. 92 . 4. Grandes chroniques, ix. 133; Nangis, ii 134; Β. Ν. NAF ms. 7603, fo. 185' for a summary of Bernard of Albret's oath of loyalty. Before the end of the decade Bernard was fighting for Edward ΙΙΙ. 5. Henneman, R()Jal Taxafion, p. 97. 6. Α.Ν. JJ 66, ηο. 1502 and Α.Ν. J 1029, ηο. 5 for Philip's letters and John's endorsement; if. John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres communes, no. 61324, esp. items 3- j . 7. John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres communes, no. 61299; J. Viard, 'Lettres d'etat sous Philippe VI', Annuaire bulletin de Ια Sociitέ de l'histoire de France, χχχiν ( 1897), 212-1 3, nos. 54, 55. 8. Η. Schroder, 'Die Protokollbϋcher, der papstlichen Kammerkleriker', Archiv fiir Kulturgeschichte, xxvii ( 193 7), 203- 4; Heinrich νοη Dissenhoven, Vita Johannis ΧΧΙΙ; Ε. Baluze, Vita, paparum Avinionsium, ed. G. Mollat (Paris, 1914- 27), i. 174.

V PHILIP VI AND

ΤΗΕ

As only the pope could inaugurate a crusade, Philip had had to await papal authorization. Now Philip, Christ-like, was calling οη each Christian, 'tollat crucem suam et sequitur me'. 1 Ιη bulls of 26 July, Philip was appointed Rector and CaptainGeneral of the crusade. Ιη his absence, all his and his followers' lands were to enjoy papal protection. Any who attacked France during the crusade would be excommunicated and those left as regents and defenders of the kingdom were to receive crusade indulgences. Permission was given for a hundred crucesignati to remain behind to administer France without contravention of their vows. 2 Α sexennial crusade tithe was to be levied οη the model of that of 13 12. The cross was to be preached, with preachers and audience receiving varying indulgences. Plenary indulgences and exemption from debts were available to all crucesignati, even those who died before fulfilling their vow. Also settled were details of payment for clerical crusaders, almsgiving and prayers. The financial aspects were so important that the royal chambre des comptes prepared a special list of them. 3 The sexennial tithe was to be levied ίη two instalments each year provided ηο other tithe was concurrently levied. Exemptions included the Hospitallers and all clerical crucesignati. The French were allowed access to receipts from all French sees, including those parts of the provinces of Lyons and Rheims which lay outside the borders of the kingdom. All unspecified legacies bequeathed for the good of the testator's soul were to be collected for the crusade. Annates were to be given to the king only when the crusade was near departure. For his part, the pope promised to fulfil the terms of Clement V' s crusade legacy of r 50,000 florins. 4 The crusade money was to be controlled by a group of burgesses under papal scrutiny. 5 Ιη September, the pope appointed a committee to investigate the preparations and administration of the crusade and its finances. 6 Late ίη September, at an assembly ίη Paris, Philip confirmed these arrangements and took the cross with his barons from Archbishop Roger οη r October ίη the Pres aux Clercs. 7 The preaching campaign began. However, ίη spite of Philip's gestures, some of his subjects from the 'bonnes villes', perhaps those very towns represented at Paris ίη September, 1. Β.Ν. MS. Latin ,z9,, fos. 245', col. ί, 248', cols. ί-ίί; Matthew 16:24. 2. John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres Secrefes, no. 5207. For all the crusade bulls dated 26 July 1 ,Β, ibid, nos. 5207-z 7. ,. Β.Ν. MS. franςais 283,, fo. 204'; cf. John ΧΧΙΙ, Leffres secrέtes, no. 5211, and Letfres communes, no. 61324, items 11-14. 4. Schrϋder, 'Die Protokollbϋcher', p. 204. This was half the original legacy. 5. John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secrtles, no. 5 z 11. 6. Α.Ν. J 45 5, no. 9; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres Secretes, no j 261 and Lettrεs communes, no. 63871. 7. Nangis, ίί. 134-5; Grandes chronίqιιes, ix. 133; Chronique parisienne anonyme de η16 Ο 1JJ9, ed. Α Hellot, Mίmoires de la sociίtί de f histoire de Paris, χί ( 188 5), 154; Chronique dεs quafre premiers Valois, ed. S. Luce (Paris, 1862), pp. 5-6; Inventaire sommaire dεs archives communales de Pίrigueux antίrieures de 1792, ed. Μ. Hardy (Perigueux, 1894), p. 72 (CC 52).

V RECOVER Υ OF

ΤΗΕ

HOLY LAND

The appeals of the preachers were seen as another were means of levying a general tax, such feelings possibly being exacerbated by the extraction of redeemable oaths by secular officials. Such cynics were not alone. Archbishop Roger talked at Α vignon of the beauty of peace, but events ίη Scotland soon justified the inclusion of clauses threatening excommunication for any who attacked France during the crusade ίη the papal bulls of July 1333. 2 After the expulsion of Edward Balliol and the 'disinherited' from Scotland ίη December 13 32, Edward ΠΙ prepared to impose his will οη Scotland directly. 3 Edward's involvement ίη Philip's crusade plans had been the result of mutual self-interest. For France, English participation would reduce the risk of a 'stab in the back', and for Edward, crusade overtures gave him time to perfect his Scottish and Gascon policies. Parliament discussed the French invitation to join the crusade in March 133 2 and, while voicing general approval, suggested that the date of departure be delayed from March 13 34 to February 13 3 5.4 Thereafter, Philip tried hard but unsuccessfully to ascertain Edward's intentions towards Scotland and the crusade. 5 Once the papal negotiations had been concluded, it was important for Philip to know where Edward stood. Hitherto apparently willing to join the crusade unconditionally, after Halidon Hill ίη July 1333 Edward declared that his participation depended οη agreement over Gascony. 6 However, if Edward could associate Gascony with the crusade, Philip could introduce Scotland into the equation. Ιη the summer of 133 3 a French plan for naval intervention was only thwarted by the weather. 7 Edward was sufficiently alarmed to send a secret agent to Normandy ίη July, probably to spy οη naval preparations at Rouen rather than to effect more general subversion as Cazelles suggests. 8 Ιη 1 3 34, although facing mounting diplomatic problems ίη the Low Countries and with Edward ΠΙ offering peace only if he was left a free hand ίη Scotland and if the Gascon question was restored to its pre- 1 33 1 uncertainty, Philip became more aggressive. He announced that the problems of Gascony and Scotland were inseparable and that the Franco-Scottish alliance of the 1290s was still effective. David Bruce took refuge ίη France, the earl ofMoray rallied the Bruce faction and Robert Stewart rebelled ίη the west of Scotland, sceptical. 1

1. Grandes chroniques, ίχ. 133-4; Archίves de Pirigueιιx, p. 72. 2. Bibl. Ste Genevieve, MS. 240, fo. 272', col. ί; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres Secretes, no. 5207. On the diplomacy of this period, Ε. Deprez, La papauti, la France et /' Angleterre ΙJ28-μ (Paris, 1902), ch. ίν, esp. pp. 83-1μ. 3. R. Nicholson, Edward ΠΙ and the Scots (Oxford, 196j), pp. j7-104, esp. 97-8, 107- 8; G. Ρ. Cuttino, English Diplomatic Administration ιη9-η39 (Oxford, 1940), p. 17; Rotuli Parliamentorum, ii. 69; Calendar of Patent Rolls IJJ0-34, pp. 400-1. 4. Rotuli Parliamentorum, ii. 64; for the surrounding diplomacy 133 1- 2, Cal. Pat. Rolls ΙJJO-J4, p. 233; Calendar of Close Rolls ΙJJO-JJ, p. j 33; Rymer, iv. j 18-19. j. Rymer, ίν. jj7, j62; Grandes chroniques, ίχ. 134. 6. Grandes chroniques, ίχ. 1 34. 7. Grandes chroniques, ίχ. 138; Nangis, ίί. 139. 8. Cazelles, Societi politique, p. 144.

V PHILIP VI AND

ΤΗΕ

thus ending all hopes of an early reconciliation. 1 Nevertheless, the English persisted with talks οη the crusade throughout 1 3 34. 2 Edward summoned parliament to discuss the passagium, although now he gave ηο firm commitment. 3 Diplomacy was an inνestment in peace which Edward, planning the Roxburgh campaign of 1 334-5, badly needed. Α year's truce was agreed with the French.4 But instead of deciding details of the passagium, parliament νoted more money for Scotland. The failure of the Roxburgh campaign and the new English offensiνe of 133 5 made the prospects for the crusade eνen dimmer. Edward had ηο intention of joining the crusade οη Philip's terms. As he saw it, his Scottish policy alone would achieνe the peace required, and Philip's support for Bruce stood in the way of this. 5 Philip, οη the other hand, trusted that diplomacy backed by only the threat of νiolence might preνail. 6 Despite the bellicose moνes of ι 3 33, Philip, as captain of the crusade, increasingly could not afford open military action against Edward, morally or financially. The crusade tithe alone was dependent upon a show of peace. As a result, Edward was a direct beneficiary of the restraint imposed οη Philip by his crusade policy. The depressing diplomatic outlook failed to stop Philip's preparations. Α group of nobles, clerics and officials were consistently inνolνed in the crusade. The Aνignon negotiators were Archbishop Pierre Roger ofRouen, Jean ofVienne, bishop ofTherouanne, Henri of Α νaugour, Pierre Trousseau and, after the first round of talks, Gui Baudet. 7 This was a powerful and well-balanced delegation. Roger, the future Pope Clement VI, 'νir eloquentissimus', had risen in two years from being abbot of La Chaise Dieu in Fecamp to the archbishopric of Rouen ίη ι 330 and had worked in the chambre des enquetes of the Paris parfement. 8 Jean of Vienne, bishop of Therouanne since 1330, had been one of Charles of Valois' financial agents and chancellor of the young Philip of Valois. Αη experienced diplomat, Jean also had experience in parfement, was inνolνed in pacifying 1. Deprez, Le papauti, pp. 96-7; Nicholson, Edward ΠΙ, pp. Ιj6-8, 163-7; for French troubles in the Low Countries, Η. S. Lucas, The uιw Counlries and Ιhe Hundred Years War (Michigan, 1929), ch. 5, esp. pp. 133- 41, 14j - 66. Philip's declarations that his intervention here was in the interests of the crusade were doubted by at least one witness, Hoscemius, scholaslicιιs of Liege, ibίd. pp. 156 and 168, n. 3. ι. Rymer, ίν. 604; Cal. Pat. Rolls ΙJJ0-31, p. j μ 3. Deprez, Le papauli, pp. 100- 1; Chronica Α. de Murίmuth ef R. d, Avesbury, ed. Ε. Μ. Thompson (Rolls Series, London, 1889), p. 73; Chronίcon Gaufridί le Baker, ed. Ε. Μ . Thompson (Oxford, 1889), p. 54; Annales Ραu/ίnί, Chronίcles of the Reίgns of Edιvard Ι and ΙΙ, ed. W. Stubbs (Rolls Series), ί (London, ι88ι), ι53-70. 4. Rymer, ίν. 629- 30. j. Canon of Bridlington, Gesla Edwardί Τerιίί, Chrons. Edward Ι and ΙΙ, ii. 1 ι6. 6. Cf the offer of papal mediation, ίbίd. ii. tz j. 7. John ΧΧΙΙ, Lellres secreles, nos. 4830, 4978; for Baudet, the now lost Α.Ν. J 4j j, no. 13 in Dupuy's MS Inventaίre des layelles, VI. ίί., fos. 465'-6'. 8. Nangis, ίί. tz 1; Cazelles, Sociέfi polίΙίque, p. 70.

V RECOVERY OF

ΤΗΕ

HOLY LAND

33

Flanders, and was later a riformateur ίη the Agenais and Toulousain.1 Henri of Avaugour, a Breton, was a Valois vassal and partisan ίη Normandy and Brittany, while Pierre Trousseau, a royal chamberlain, had been ίη Philip of Valois' household since 1319 and was close to the king. 2 They were all new men of 1328. Gui Baudet's loyalty was more institutional than personal. Αη experienced parlement official, he rose to be maitre des enquetes of the household, a leading diplomat who helped create the anti-Turkish Christian alliance of 1334, and, ίη 133 5, chancellor of France. 3 The concentration of the administrative talents of these men οη one subject for eighteen months indicates Philip's earnestness. Once the tithes and privileges had been secured, other royal servants became involved. Ιη 133 3-5, that great political survivor, Jean of Marigny, bishop of Beauvais, conducted an important mission to the Levant allegedly, but incredibly, to issue a formal defiance to the Sultan. 4 Marigny certainly made contact with the Hospitallers ίη Rhodes. 5 He also visited Naples and Sicily ίη an attempt to arrange peace between them and to investigate means of raising crusade supplies. Ιη Italy he was accompanied by Aubert of Roye, bishop of Laon. 6 Both were οη the tribunal of scrutineers appointed to judge the legitimacy of potential hindrances to the passagium. 7 They also received papal licences to accompany the king οη crusade, as did Roger and Jean of Vienne. 8 Other agents and spies sent east included Pierre of Asnieres, who visited Cyprus and Armenia, Eustace of Montigny, and Guillaume, viscount of Ροίχ. 9 More prominent were Jean of Cepoy and Hugh Quieret. Quieret, Philip's maitre d' hotel, helped plan the ι 334 Francopapal fleet against the Turks which was commanded by Cepoy; Quieret then went to discuss crusade plans with the Angevins ίη

1. Cazelles, Sociίti politiquε, pp. 60-61; Finke, Acta Aragonensia, ίίί. 726, doc. ηο. 41. 2. Cazelles Sociίtί politiqιι,, pp. 65, 143, 154; J. Viard, 'L'hόtel de Philippe VI', B.E.C., Ιν (1894), 604; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lιllres secreles, ηο. 4ΙΙ 5 and Lιllrescommιιnes, ηο. 9509; L. d'Alauzier, 'Un compte du xive sii:cle', Bulletin philologiqιι, ει historiqu, (1951 - 2), 373, art. 97. 3. Cazelles, SociίN politiqιιe, pp. 11-ΙΖ and ΙΙ2, η. 2; Viard, Ήόtel de Philippe VI', p. 599; R.-H. Bautier, 'Recherches sur la chancellerie royale au temps de Philippe VI', B.E.C., cxxv (1964), 162-70; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lιllres commιιnes, nos. 43489, 46127, 50069, 5 3 136; Μ. Jassemin, 'Les papiers de Mile de Noyers', Βιι/1,ιin philologiqu, el hisloriqιιε ( 191 8), 2 16; L. de Mas Latrie, 'Commerce et expCditions militaires de la France et de V enise au moyen .ige', Mίlange1 historiques: Choix dε, docιιmenls (hereafter Mίlanges hisloriqιι,s), ίίί. 104-6. 4. Chronographia regιιm Francorιιm, ed. Η. Moranvilli: (Paris, 1891), ίί . 21; Grandes Chroniqιιes, ίχ. 148; Nangis, ii. 145. 5. John ΧΧΙΙ, Lellres secreles, ηο. 5110; F. Kunstmann, 'Studien ϋber Marin Sanudo der Alteren', Kόniglich, Bayεrischε Akodεmi, dεr Wissenschaften. Abhandlungen Phil-Historisch, Classe, νίί (185 5), 811-21; L. Dorez and C. de la Roncii:re, 'Lettres inedites de Marino Sanudo', B.E.C., lvi (1895), 36.

6. Jassemin, 'Papiers', p. zz 1 (not Baudet as Jassemin thinks).

7. Α.Ν. J 455, ηο. 9· 8. John ΧΧΙΙ, Lιllres secrelεs, ηο. 5483 and Lεllres commιιnεs, ηο. 6145 5. 9. J. Viard, Lιsjournaux de Ιrίsor dε Philipp, VI de Valoi, (Paris, 1899), nos. 5287, 5288, 5860; Viard, 'Lettres d'i:tat', p. 215, ηο. 65 and pp. 217-18, ηο. 78.

V 34

PHILIP VI AND

ΤΗΕ

Naples. 1 Within France, administrators included the Gayte family from Clermont-Ferrand, the Savoyard Etienne of la Baume and the royal treasurer, Nicholas Behuchet. Ιη July 1334, Philip VI annulled the sentence passed by parlement under Charles IV barring the relatives of Philip V's treasurer, Giraud Gayte, from royal service, and within two years the family was dominating the crusade trisor. 2 Ιη r 33 5, Etienne of la Baume, a protege of Louis of Bourbon, and Behuchet, a long-standing V alois official, were commissioned to assemble provisions for the crusade. 3 Behuchet and Quieret saw action together ίη the Channel ίη the late r 330s. Both died at Sluys, Quieret from his wounds, Behuchet οη a felon's gibbet. 4 The laymen who prepared the crusade would have seen the business through ίη the field and at sea. The bureaucrat and the general were the same person. Pierre Flote had died οη the field of Courtrai. Miles of Noyers, Philip's chief minister after r 334, has been seen as the head of a chambre des comptes faction at court. He also carried the Oriflamme at Cassel. 5 Crusade planners were not singled out for their especial devotion to the crusade. Guillaume of Ste Maure, chancellor until ι 33 5, possessed such devotion yet was not centrally involved. 6 Loyalty and dependence οη the king were the important qualifications. ΑΙΙ but two of the prelates who received permission to go οη crusade were royal councillors or peers of the realm. 7 Crusade organization under Philip VI was as much an integral part of royal administration as it had been ίη the ι 240s under Louis ΙΧ. 8 Το assist ίη deciding the route and method of the crusade, Philip established a special committee to receive advice, analyse it and produce opinions of its own. Το this committee the Venetian am bassadors reported ίη ι 332, and it was the same body of 'sapientes' which drew up a detailed defence of the sea route and a critique of the land route. 9 Although not likely to have been of fixed member1. For Quieret, Α.Ν. JJ 6ja, ηο. 42; Α.Ν. JJ 68, nos. 7, 8; Viard, Ήόtel de Philippe VI', p. 604; Milanges historiques, iii. 104-6; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres Secrites, nos. j406, j48j; C. de la Ronciere, Histoire de Ια marine franςaίse, i (Paris, 1889), z37, η. 4; for Cepoy aι Cassel, Chronographia, ii. 7. Cepoy's faιher had served Charles of Valois in Greece; J. Petit, 'Un capitaine du regne de Philippe le Bel', Le Moyen Age, ser. z, i (1897), z31-6. z. Α.Ν. JJ 66, ηο. 1418; Cazelles, Sociiti politique, pp. 107- 11. 3. Α. VayssiCre, 'Fragment d'un compte d'Etienne de la Baume', Bulletin historique ef philologίque ( 1884), 314- 1 j; Α. Merlin-Chazelas, Documenls relatifs αι, C/os des Galies de Rouen, ii (Paris, 1978), 10-11, doc. no. ίν; Jassemin, 'Papiers', p. 221; J. Β. Henneman, Έnqutteurs­ reformateurs and fiscal officers ίη fourιeenth-century France', Traditίo, xxiv (1968), 337; Cazelles, Sociiti politique, pp. 6j - 6, z68; Α.Ν . JJ 6ja, ηο. zo1 for Behuchet's ennoblement and Α.Ν. J 73, ηο. 9j for la Baume's intention to go οη crusade. 4. Grandes chronίques, ix. 160, 184; Nangis, ii. 168-9. j. Grandes chroniques, ix. 81; Nangis, ίί. 98; Henneman, Royal Taxation, p. μ. 6. For his crusade legacy of 4,000 livres, Bautier, 'Chancellerie de Philippe VI', p. 149. 7. Β.Ν. NAF MS. 7603 , fos. 44'- j Ό The bishop of Senlis, Pierre Barriere, had been involved in crusade negotiations in ι 3 1 3 and 1; 2. 3. 8. J. Richard, 'Fondation d'une eglise latine en Orient: Damietta', B.E.C., cxx (196z), 39- Η, esp. p. 4j; and, generally, W. C. Jordan, Louis ΙΧ and the Challenge of the Crusade (Princeton, 1979), esp. pp. 6j-10j. 9. Milanges historiques, iii. 99, 101; Delaville le Roulx, France en Orienl, ii. 7-11.

V RECOVERY OF

ΤΗΕ

HOLY LAND

35

ship, this crusade council probably included those most concerned the ambassadors to Α vignon, Louis of Bourbon, Quieret, possibly Marigny, the constable, Raoul of Eu, and, perhaps, the king's brother, the count of Alenς:on. The committee's prime requirement, as Philip acknowledged, was information. 1 There were formal embassies from Armenia and Cyprus and advice from V enice and Naples. The king, Louis of Bourbon and William of Hainault received letters from the V enetian expert Marino Sanudo full of news of ltaly, the eastern Mediterranean and beyond. 2 Philip heard of the Turkish threat in the Aegean from 'rumore valido et clamore oribilί'.3 Men such as Guillaume Badin and Andreas of Antioch reported recent experience of the east. 4 Queen Jeanne's doctor, Guy of Vigevano, was commissioned to write a treatise οη how the king could remain healthy οη crusade and avoid being poisoned. This Texaurus Regis Francie acquisitionis Terre Sancte also contained descriptions, designs and sketches of a number of elaborate and bizarre siegemachines, pontoon-bridges, barges and even wind-propelled land troop-carriers. 5 Ιη 13 32, an anonymous Dominican, hearing of Philip's crusade plans in the autumn of 1331, sent the king the lengthy Directorium ad passagium faciendum which included random information οη the lands and peoples of the east as well as a discussion of the ideal nature and itinerary of any expedition. 6 The Directorium's advocacy of the traditional land-route or, perhaps, the similar ideas of Guillaume of Adam's De Modo Saracenos Extirpandi written twenty years earlier, met a very hostile reception from the crusade committee.7 Adam himself, in illicit retirement at Narbonne, was possibly consulted. 8 lt was probably the crusade committee which enregistered the advice given to Louis of Bourbon ίη 1317 by the citizens of Marseilles and instituted the search through the royal archives which resulted in Louis IX's lists of crusade expenses being copied. 9 Gradually a plan of action emerged. Because of the time consumed by the Franco-papal negotiations, early suggestions for

1. Melanges historiques, iii. 98. z. E .g. the letters in Kunsτmann, (Studien', pp. 791 - 813, 815 - 16. 3. Α.Ν. J 442, ηο. 18 5• 4. Kunstmann, 'Studien', pp.812, 815-16; Matteo Villani, Istorie, νίί. ch. ;, Rerum ltalicarum Scriptores, ed. L. Α. Muratori, xiv (Milan, 1729), cols. 406-7. j. Β.Ν. MS. Latin 1101 j, fos. 32'-54'. 6. Directorium ad passagium facίendum, Recueil des historίens des croisades, Documents Armίniens, ίί . (Paris, 1906), 36j - j 17. 7. Delaville le Roulx, France en Orient, ii. 7-11; De Modo Saracenos Exlirpandi, Rec. Hist. Croisades, Docs. Arminiens, ii. 5z 1- 5 5. 8. John ΧΧΙΙ, Letιres communes, no. 64232. 9. Β.Ν. MS. Latin 12814, fo. 227'; J. Petit, Essai de restilulion des plus anciens mimoires de la chambre des comptes de Paris (Paris, 1899), p. 84, ηο. 446; Recueil des historiens des Gaules et de la France, ed. Μ. Bouquet etal. (Paris, 1738- 1876), χχί. 403-j, jI2- 1j: ίη the first list Philip is called 'rex modernus' (p. 4oj) and the second contains ηο items after Philip's reign.

V PHILIP VI AND

ΤΗΕ

departure in 1334 or 1335 were rejected and 1 August 1336 chosen. 1 The approaches to the Venetians and Genoese confirmed that the searoute was favoured. The crusade committee insisted upon it. 3 The land-route was too long, expensive and dangerous, attracted more useless non-combatants, provoked more dissension among the crusaders and gave the Moslems more time to prepare their defences. The sea-route was that of St Louis, advocated by most experts, including the Hospitallers. Ιη February 133 2 Archbishop Roger implied acceptance of the sea-route by using the word passagium for the crusade. 4 The committee's advice dealt with the passagium only as far as Naples, the importance attached to Italy pointing to the wider diplomatic considerations inherent in Philip's crusade plans. Prevailing strategic orthodoxy advocated triple-passagia. Α preliminary armed flotilla to interfere with Egyptian trade was one of the Venetian proposals in 1332. But the crusade committee did not mention any particufare passagium, and the French negotiators at Α vignon explained that a single general passagium would be more effective than a particufare passagium. There was ηο suggestion either of a blockade of Egypt or any preliminary passagium, although the possibility was not ruled out.5 One clue to French strategy appears in June 1332 when Philip VI ordered the chambre des comptes to collect 10,000 gold florins over three years to send to the king of Armenia, declaring that Armenia 'est pays convenable, si comme l'en dit, a recevoir nous et nos gens se nous nous y transporterons pour saint voyage d'outremer'. 6 The drift of Philip's thought may be reflected by Sanudo who, in 13 32, sent the king copies of plans for the relief of Armenia first written for Charles IV in 1323. 7 United Christian action against the Turks had been suggested by the Venetians in 133 2, and the pope tried to interest Philip. But there remained in France considerable suspicion of the Greeks. 8 However, the situation in the Aegean was deteriorating as leaders of sea-borne warbands, such as Yashi, Mehmed and Umar, harried the Christians, and the Catalans of Athens remained unreliable allies. Negroponte was attacked in 1 332 and there was a rising against the V enetians in Crete the following year. More Turkish attacks prompted Venice to

1. Β.Ν. MS. franςais 28;; fo. 202'; Rotulί Parlίamenlorum, ii. 6j; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettrescommunes, 61324, item 1; Α.Ν. JJ 62, ηο. ΙjΟ2. 2.. Jassemin, 'Papiers', p. 2.21 . 3. Delaville le Roulx, France en Orient, ii. 7- 11. 4. Β.Ν. MS. Latin 3293, fo . 164', col. ί . j. Mίlanges historiques, ίίί. 99- 100; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres communes, no. 61324, p. zz4; Α.Ν. J 62, ηο. 1 j02. 6. C. du Fresne, seigneur du Cange, Familles d'Outremer, Documenls inidits de l'hi,toire de France, ed. Ε. G . Rey (Paris, 1869), pp. 142- 3; L'art de vίrifier les date,, i (Paris, 1783), 466. 7. Kunstmann, 'Studien', p. 796; Bongars, Gesta Dei, ίί. 5-6. 8. Delaville le Roulx, France en orient, ii. 9. ηο.

V RECOVERY OF

ΤΗΕ

HOLY LAND

37

But in November 1333, Philip openly approach Philip declared that he was only prepared to join an alliance against the Turks provided it did not obstruct the 'emprise du general passage'. 2 It is clear that Philip originally had ηο plans for a preliminary expedition and the grant to Armenia may even have been a substitute for one. Nevertheless, after further papal pressure, agreement was reached by 8 March for a fleet of forty galleys (ten Hospitaller, ten Venetian, six Cypriot, six Byzantine, and eight Franco-papal) to sail to the Aegean. After assembling at Negroponte in May, the expedition was to last for five months. Α second campaign was planned for 13 3 5 to include 800 knights, galleys and huissiers of which the Francopapal contribution was to be 400 knights and sixteen huissiers. 3 Philip despatched Jean of Cepoy to prepare for the campaign. 4 Ιη spite of some delay in raising ships at Marseilles, the Franco-papal flotilla joined the Venetian and Cypriot contingents in the Aegean for a successful series of assaults οη Turkish shipping in September culminating in a victory over the fleet ofYashi in the gulf of Adramittion.5 Although some complained of the small scale of the operation, the expedition had fulfilled its purpose by relieving the pressure οη Negroponte. 6 However, one contemporary account commented that Cepoy sailed east 'ad explorandos portus et passus, ad faciendas aliquas munitiones et praeparationes victualium pro passagio Terrae Sanctae'. 7 If true, this was part of a wider effort. Quieret went to Genoa to elicit Angevin assistance, and Marigny, already in the east, joined Cepoy's fleet, probably at Rhodes. 8 The crusading connotations of the 1 334 campaign were strong: Cepoy and his companions received plenary indulgences. 9 The final size of the allied fleet cannot have been very different from that proposed for a particulare passagium by the Venetians in 133 2. 10 The 133 5 expedition was to send military directly. 1

1. For these negotiations, Ρ. Lemerle, L'Emίraf d'Aydίn, Byzance et l'Occίdent (Paris, 19j7), pp. 74-101, 118; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettr,s secrites, nos. μ47, j 276, j μ4; Mίlanges hίstorίques, ίίί. 98-109; Finke, Acta Aragonensίa, iii. 754, doc. no. 57; Cazelles, Lιttres close1, pp. 51-2, no. 53; G. Μ. Thomas, Dίplomaforίum Venefo-Levantίnum (Venίce, 1880), pp. 241-3, no. 124; Ο. Raynaldus, Annales Ecclesίastίci, νi. 1332., para. χχίiί ί 133;, paras. xiii-xvi; 1334, paras. ίί, ίίί; Ν. J. Housley, 'Robert the Wίse and the naval league of 1334', Byzantίon, lί (1981), j48-j6; Β.Ν. MS. Latίn 3293, fo. 24j ', cols. i- ii for Roger's reference in July 133 3 to the Turkish threat to Romania. z. Milanges historiques, ίίί.

3.

Ibίd. ίίί.

104-6; John

101-2..

ΧΧΙΙ,

Lettres

secrίfes,

nos. j406, j412; Viard, 'Lettres d'etat', p.

2.14, no. 63.

4. Viard, 'Lettres d'etat', nos. 63, 6j. j. John ΧΧΙΙ, Letlres secrίtes, nos. j4Ιj, j486. 6. Nangis, ίί. 14 j. 7. Nangis, ii. 145; Grandes chroniqNes, ίχ. 148.

8. John ΧΧΙΙ, Leltres secrίtes, no. 5406; Jassemin, 'Papiers', p. 2.21; Kunstmann, 'Studien', pp. 811-1 z; Grandes chroniqιιes, ίχ. 148; Nangis, ίί. 14s; Dorez and Ronciere, 'Lettres de Sanudo', p. 36. 9. Α.Ν. J 442, no. 18 1. 10. The Venetians had suggested 20-30 galleys (Mίlanges hίstorίqι,es, ίίί. 99- 100), and the 1334 fleet possίbly totalled as many as μ galleys (Lemerle, L'Emίraf, pp. 96-7).

V PHILIP VI AND

ΤΗΕ

help to Armenia and was to be led, at his own request, by the duke of Bourbon. 1 Louis of Bourbon was at the heart of the crusade administration. 2 In 13 32, he was absolved from an oath of 13 27 never to set fοοι in Paris until he had fulfilled his crusade vow because Philip needed his advice. 3 Almost certainly, Louis was the leading layman on the crusade committee of 'sapientes', his absolution coinciding with the presentation to the committee of the V enetians' advice. Louis was at Α vignon discussing the crusade in August 1 33 3 and took the cross that October. In the spring of 13 34 he talked about shipping with the Venetian ambassador, Giovanni Gradenigo. 4 By October 1334, however, there was a change of plan. Louis' appointment as commander of the 1 335 campaign was cancelled by the king, so Sanudo wrote to Louis, 'ut vos reservaret pro generali passagio'. 5 In the event, the 1 335 expedition was on a smaller scale than originally planned. In April, the new pope, Benedict ΧΙΙ, commissioned four galleys and Philip hired five more. 6 The French fleet, led by Quieret, was destined for Rhodes. On his return Quieret was rewarded with an annual pension of 400 /., but what he achieved remains obscure. 7 He may indeed only have been preparing for the 13 36 passagium, scrutinizing ports, harbours, anchorages and allies or, simply, spying. The relative failure of the anti-Turkish alliance forced Philip back to his original idea to flout orthodoxy and expert opinion and to stake all on a single, large and uncomplicated campaign. 8 For this, Philip had to press on gathering information, popular support, money, ships and soldiers. One source of intelligence was a member of Louis of Bourbon's household, Guillaume Badin, who visited Greece, Constantinople, Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, Cilician Armenia, Crete, Cyprus, Egypt, Palestine, and Syria. The king ofCyprus helped Badin to reach Cairo where he may have met the sultan. In 1334, en route for Venice (where he encountered Sanudo), Avignon and France, Badin joined the Veneto-Hospitaller fleet in the Aegean. 9 Philip also had to keep his subjects informed. Sometime in 1332-3, a courier arrived in Perigueux carrying a royal letter on the 'fach de la crozada'. In December 1 335, an assembly of the inhabitants of Perigueux 1. John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, nos. 5412, 5485. 2. Ibid. no. 4309 for his 1330 scheme for reinforcing Rhodes. 3. Ibid. nos. 4870, 4872, 4873. 4. Ibid. no. 5276; Chronique Parisienne, p. 114; Milanges historiques, iii. 106-9. 5. Kunstmann, 'Studien', p. 809. 6. J. Μ. Vidal, Benoit ΧΙΙ, Lellres communes (Parίs, 1903-11), nos. 2425, 2467; Benoit ΧΙΙ, Lettres c/oses, patentes el curiales se rapportanf tl /a France, ed. G. Daumet (Paris, 192.0), nos. 19, 40, 54; Α Jal, Archίologie navale (Parίs, 1840), ίί. 326- 3 3. The orίgίnal complement of 400 knίghts was abandoned. The same hirers were used as in 1334; John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secrites, no. ~41~. 7. Jal, Archίologie navale, ίί. 327; Pere Anselme et al., Histoire ginialogique de /α maison royale de France (Paris, 1726- 1890), νίί. 745; Β.Ν. MS. franςais 20691, fo. 641. 8. It is important to realize the separateness ofthe plans of 1332.- 3 for a generalpassagίum in 1336 and the scheme for a double attack οη the Turks worked out in 1333-4. Some, eg. most recently, Housley, 'Robert the Wίse', p. \ 53, haνe blurred this distinction. 9. Kunstmann, 'Studien', pp. 812, 815-16.

V RECOVERY OF

ΤΗΕ

HOLY LAND

39

listened to royal ordinances asking for money for the crusade. 1 Local assemblies were matched by a series of national assemblies at which the details of the crusade were discussed, for example those at Orleans and Paris in 133 3. Coupled with the political was the preaching campaign led by Roger. Through sermons the details of the spiritual and temporal privileges were conveyed to potential crucesignati. Congregations were exhorted to donate alms, gifts and legacies. 2 In some areas, such as the province of Rouen in September 133 5, the preaching effort faltered but elsewhere, at Paris in October 1333, at the court of Humbert ΙΙ of the Dauphine or in Tournai cathedral, the cross was preached with apparent success. 3 There was some antagonism towards crusade preachers, but the abbot of St Martin at Tournai recorded that many nobles and non-nobles all over the kingdom followed Philip VI's example. 4 Formal ceremonies, at Melun in J uly 1 332, Paris in October 1 332 and 1 33 3, and Α vignon in July 1333, provided external symbols of French commitment, essential for the receipt of tithes and to persuade taxpayers of royal sincerity. Philip made direct contact with taxpayers and crucesignati during his journey south to visit Benedict ΧΙΙ in the winter of 1 33 5- 6. Such a tournie was something of a novelty for Philip's officials who, unprepared for southern weather, allowed documents to disintegrate in the unexpected humidity, rendering them illegible and impossible to copy verbatim into the registers of the trisor des chartes. 5 Nevertheless, the promise or threat of the king's proximity elicited offers of contributions from Rouergue and Perigueux. 6 The need for money was pressing. The carefully unearthed records of Louis ΙΧ indicated that his first crusade, excluding shipping to the Levant, had cost approximately 1,000 /.t. per day. 7 There was also the expense of diplomacy, ceremonies, unavoidable largesse, and espionage. 8 Philip's problems were intensified by the chronic lack of silver which closed the mints for almost two years from March 133 5 and by the delay in the collection of the tithe. Not until late 133 5 1. Archίves de Pirίgueux, pp. j j, 7z, 74; Brown, 'Customary Aids', p. z44, η. 183. z. John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secretes, nos. μ10, μ69 and Lettres communes, no. 63881; Β.Ν. MS. Doat 16, fos. 157\ 175\ 186r-gr_ 3. J. Mansi, Sacrorum Consiliorum nova et amplissima collectio, χχν (Venice, 178z), col. 1043 ; Chronique Parisienne, p. 154; Marquis de Valbonnais, Histoire de Dauphini, ii. (Valence, 1722 ), z83 - 4; Chronίcon Jacobί Muevίn, Recueίl des Chroniques de Flandres (Brussels, 1837- 41 ), ίί, ed. ].- ]. Smet, 467. 4. Grandes chroniques, ίχ. 13 3- 4; Chronographie, ii. 19 (the continuator of Nangis does not mention this); Chronicon majus Aegidii di Muisis, Rec. Chron. Flandres, ίί. 216. Tournai, with its annual fair to celebrate Holy Cross day, may have provided particularly receptive crowds (Α.Ν. JJ 66, no . 671), but notice the immediate response to Palud's sermon in 13μ. 5. Α.Ν. JJ 69, no. z97; J. Viard, Ίtineraire de Philippe VI', B.E.C. , Ιχχίν (1913), 118- zo. 6. C. de Vic and J. Vaissete, Hίstoire ginirale de Languedoc, ed. Α Molinier et al. (Toulouse, 187Ζ-1 904), ίχ. 484; Archives de Pirίgueux, pp. j j, 74 (CC 54). Philip's progress is reminiscent of the tournies of Louis ΙΧ in 1z48 and Charles IV in ι μ3. 7. Rec. Hisl. France, χχί. 5 t 5. 8. E.g. the large grant to Armenia in 133z and other smaller gifts to men from the east, Α.Ν. ΚΚ

5, fos.

17ον, zοον.

V 40

PHILIP VI AND

ΤΗΕ

did large sums begin to reach the royal tresor, and arrears continued unpaid into the next decade. 1 There were possible hints of clerical opposition in September 133 5 in the dioceses of Rouen and Albi.2 John XXII's death and inevitable administrative sloth increased the delay. The Carmelite prior ίη Albi only received a copy of the bull of J uly 13 33 authorizing the tithe after z 3 March 13 34, while the precentor of Lodeve was notified of the papal instructions οη r 8 August 1334. 3 Facing large deficits ίη any case, Philip had to increase existing revenue, reduce unnecessary expenditure and, if possible, exploit new sources of income. 4 For example, ίη 1334 ίt was arranged that the Flemish should pay off their indemnity debts to the king of France at a rate of 40,000 l.p. each May, or 80,000 l.p. that year if the king 'mouvoit pour aler oultre mer'. 5 Another expedient was to cut government expenditure. Ιη the early 1340s it was estimated that, since Philip IV's reign, wages ίη parfement alone had risen by over 4 5 per cent. 6 Ιη 1334, Philip VI decided to abolish 'tous droiz et croissance des gaiges' enjoyed by his treasurers and by members of the chambre des comptes, chambre des enquetes, parfement and household 'pour cause des despens qui estoient necessaries pour le saint voiage'. The shock-waves sent through the administration were severe. Mutual recrimination began. Who had suggested the idea to the king? The treasurers blamed the 'gens de comptes' and vice versa. Το calm the bickering, the king announced that none of them advised this course. The 'culprit' was Pierre Forget, a royal treasurer who, conveniently, had since died. Needless to say, the bureaucratic vested interests forced the king to withdraw. 7 Efforts to exploit new sources of revenue were also fraught with problems. Successful resistance to lay taxation ίη 1314- 15 and 1321 had seriously restricted the king's scope for manoeuvre. Opposition to the knighting and marriage aids between 133 z and 133 5 limited it still further. Other traditional sources, such as the Jews or Lombards, were not inexhaustible. 8 As Charles IV had done in 132 3, Philip VI tried to obtain papal approval to compel the Hospitallers to contribute. John ΧΧΙΙ adhered to the exemption of 131 z, merely suggesting that the

1. Henneman, Royal Taxation, pp. 95 and refs., 339, 343; Α.Ν. ΚΚ 5, fos. 5', 7v; Α.Ν. 72, no. 182 (June 1341). 2. Mansi, Sacrorum Consiliorum, χχν. col. 1043; Β.Ν. MS Doat 16, fos. 147ν-5 5v. 3. Benedict ΧΙΙ, Lettres closes (France), no. 66 (cf. the similar situation in 13 14, Regeslum Clementis Papae V (Rome, 1885-92), no. 10243); Β.Ν. MS. Doat 16, fos. 157v-75', 186'- 8'. 4. Viard,Journaux du tresor, pp. xlii; Α.Ν. ΚΚ 5, fos. 14', 16 ', 17'.ln 1336, the deficit was 24, 307 l.p., and the suφlus in 133 7 was entirely due to the large sums received from the crusade

JJ

treasurers. 5. Jassemin, 'Papiers', p.

180.

6. Η. Moranvillc, 'Rapports a Philippe VI sur l'etat de ses finances', B.E.C., xlviii (1887), 393. 7. Cazelles, Lettres closes, pp. 53-4, no. 56 and p. 54, n. 1. 8. Henneman, Royal Taxation, pp. 80-83, 305.

V RECOVERY OF

ΤΗΕ

HOLY LAND

41

order should see if it could spare some money for Philip's crusade and the campaign against the Turks. 1 Το meet the 1 3 36 deadline, Philip decided οη a feudal aid, a device not employed by any of his four predecessors. 2 The response was derisory. From Rheims to Languedoc there was resistance. Only Paris, apparently, offered a significant sum, 40,000 l.p. 3 Perigueux offered 400 l.t., one half to be paid when the king sailed, the other a year later, all conditional οη a guarantee of ηο liability if the king failed to depart. 4 Such a reaction cannot be ascribed to 'a declining interest' or a 'lack of enthusiasm' for the crusade. 5 Rather it was the result of a generation of suspicion and resentment at unscrupulous and unsuccessful fiscal and monetary policies. The attempt to levy the knighting and marriage aids had left a residue of bitterness. Ιη the south, dislike of the dominance of northern interests erupted into violence during Philip's progress through Languedoc when citizens of Cahors attacked members of the king's household crying 'death to the French'. 6 There was a pattern to urban attitudes to the crusade aid. Although Nimes and La Rochelle claimed traditional exemption, Paris, Perigueux, Niort and Aurillac were prepared to contribute provided the crusade actually occurred.7 The citizens of Rheims argued that they were too poor to contribute because of the costs of the recent unprecedentedly frequent coronations and the fluctuating value of money, but they encouraged individual, voluntary grants. 8 Similarly, the senechaussee ofRouergue offered money as a gift, but not an obligation. 9 The evidence for the crusade aid of 1335-6 is sparse. The campaign to levy it appears haphazard. Nothing is heard of the scheme of 1333 to redeem crusade vows. The geographic spread is partial: Nimes, Perigueux, Aurillac and Rouergue in the south, Niort in Poitou and only Rheims and Paris in the north. This may reflect the chance survival of evidence, but it is hard to see a concerted effort 1. John ΧΧΙΙ, Lellres sιcreles, nos. 529,, Η'9 and Leιιres commιιnes, no. 61μ4, p. 227. Fo r the order's considerable French assets, C. L. Tipton, 'The I J 30 General Chapter of the Knights Hospitaller at Montpellier', Tradilio, χχίν (1968), 30,. ,. Brown, 'Customary Aids', pp. 191-,58; Henneman, Rqya/ Taxalion, pp. 90--107. 3. Chroniqιιe Parisienne, p. 165. Henneman's dismissal seems unnecessarily complicated (Rqyal Taxalion, p. 105, η. 145). Given the stipulation of Philip's active participation, the genuineness of the offer is plausible and fits the evidence from elsewhere. 4. Brown, 'Customary Aids', p. 244 and η. 183 . 5. Henneman, Royal Taxalion, p. 106. 6. Ε. Martene and U. Durand, Thesaιιrιιs Anecdolorιιm, ί (Paris, 1717), col. 1385 . 7. L. Menard, Hisloire de /α ville de Nismes, ίί . (Paris, 175 1), 79 and preιιves p. 89, col. li; Α. Barbot, Hisloire de Ια Roche/le, ί, Archives historiques de la Saintonge el de /' Αιιnίs, χίν (Paris, 1886), 140 (if. similar claims in 13 17, Α.Ν. JJ 5 3, no. 145); Archives de Ρίrίgιιeιιχ, pp. 5 5, 74; Brown, 'Customary Aids', p. 244 and η. 183; Η . Hervieu, Recherches sur les premiers ilafs gίniraux (Paris, 1879), p. ,οο; L. Faνre, Hisloirede Ια villede Niorl (Niort, 1880), p. 59; Henneman, Rqyal Taxalion, p. 10 5 and η. 144; Chronique Parisienne, p. 165. 8. Archives adminislralives de Ια ville de Rheims, ed. Ρ. Varin (Paris, 1843), ίί. 664- 5; if. Rheims' poverty after the 13 28 coronation; J. Viard, 'Les ressources extraordinaire de la royaute sous Philippe VI', Revue des qιιeslions historiques, χlίν (1888), 169. 9. Hist. de Languedoc, ίχ. 484.

V PHILIP VI AND

ΤΗΕ

to levy a thorough feudal aid. It was tackled piece-meal and with caution. The enthusiasm of the country was less unquestioning than that of the court. It is difficult to establish how much was raised for the crusade. The crusade treasurers did handle large sums oftithe money. Ιη the twelve months from December 133 j, they paid into the royal tresor j 0,000 l.p. 1 The major profits only began to reach the royal tresor in 1337: 3j,I4j /. 3 d.p. in March and jo,ooo l.p. in May. 2 The royal tresor made a payment of j,joo l.p. in February 1336 to the crusade treasurers who, in the autumn of 13 3 j had had enough money to provide Etienne of la Baume with 11,200 l.t. to buy provisions for the passagium. 3 Money was spent οη Cepoy's galleys in 1334. For the five galleys hired in April 1 33 j for Quieret's expedition, Paul Giraud, the king's agent, committed the French government to spending between 8,62j and 17,2jo florins. 4 Established at papal insistence to handle the crusade tithe, the tresor du saint passage was a group of tresoriers rather than a formal department of the royal tresor. This may explain the payments to the royal tresor, the crusade tresor possibly not having anywhere to store its money. Nevertheless, a record was kept of all transactions between 13 34 and 1 342, and payments to the royal tresor were carefully distinguished. 5 The creation of the crusade tresor and its Journal may have coincided with the annulment οη the ban of the Gayte family in 13 34. 6 Mathieu Gayte became the leading tresorier du saint passage authorizing payments to the royal tresor and to agents in the field; also involved were Mathieu's nephew, Raynard, Jean of Chavant, and Girert Lalamant. 7 Tithe money could, however, be paid directly to royal agents by local receivers οη the instructions of the tresoriers. Lay sources of crusade funds were administered by the royal tresor in the normal way.s When trying to raise money from Perigueux, Berengar Fredol offered citizens indemnities for any obligatory payments if they went on crusade in person. 9 Money alone could not win a crusade. Philip VI fixed a scale of wages for crusaders - 20 s.t. per day for a 'bannerez', 1 ο s. for a 'chevalier' and j s. for a squire - and established Ι. Α.Ν. ΚΚ

5, fos. 5\ 7v, 8\ 9\

2. Α.Ν. ΚΚ 5, fos. 16\ 17v.

10\ 11\ 12.ν.

3. Α.Ν. ΚΚ 5, fo. 187'; Vayssiere, 'Fragment d'un compte', pp. 314- 15; Merlin-Chazelas, Docs. de CJos des Gaiίes, ίί. 10-11. 4. Jal, Archiologie navale, ίί. 3 30. 5. John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettressecrέles, ηο. 5211; Viard,Journauxdutrisor, p. lx; Α.Ν. ΚΚ 5,passim. 6. Α.Ν. JJ 66, ηο. 1418. 7. Α.Ν. ΚΚ 5, fos. 8', 9'; Vayssiere, op. cit., pp. 314- 15; Marιin-Chazelas, op. cit., p. 11; Brown, 'Customary Aids', p. 24ι; Bencdict ΧΙΙ, Lellres communes, no. 2.937; Cazelles, Sociίfi polιΊique, pp. 109- 10; Viard, Journaιιx du trisor, no. 1. 8. For instances, Les Olim: Regislres des arrέts, ed. Μ. Beugnot (Paris, 1839- 48), 111. ί . 62, ηο. χχί; J. Viard, Journaux du Ιrιisorde Charles IV (Paris, 1917), nos.6261, 6907; Acles de Parlemenl de Paris 1328-ηJο, ed. Μ. Furgeot, ί (Paris, 1920), nos. 3306, 5975. 9. Archives de Pirigueux, p. 55 (CC 9).

V RECOVERY OF

ΤΗΕ

HOLY LAND

43

joining the crusade.1 a commission to receive men-at-arms intent After taking the cross ίη 1333, the barons at the Pres-aux-Clercs made their agreements with the king. At least two survive. Guy, count of Blois, promised to accompany Philip οη crusade for three years, barring legitimate hindrances, οη two conditions. Philip had to go ίη person and Guy was to have the sole discretion ίη deciding whether the terms of the contract had been fulfilled. 2 More severe was the agreement with Amaury, viscount of Lautrec, witnessed by Archbishop Roger. Amaury promised to join Philip οη crusade with three knights and six domicefli, equipped with arms and horses. Refusing to be bound to a set period of service ίη Outremer, Amaury insisted that if the king augmented his force, the king must pay. If the viscount fell ill or the king failed to honour his part of the bargain, ηο obligation was to remain attached to Amaury. 3 Guy and Amaury saw their obligation as voluntary. The king's emphasis was, perhaps, slightly different when, in 133 3, he complained about the alienation of some lands of the count of Foix which prevented the count providing adequate service to the king οη crusade. The count's service, although technically voluntary as were all crusader obligations, was assumed. 4 Clientage supplied recruits for Louis of Bourbon. Ιη 13 34, he ennobled two brothers, Jean and Guy, and gave them money to buy land ίη the Bourbonnais. Ιη return they agreed to hold their lands from Louis and, for the good of their souls, they promised to go οη crusade with him at their own expense with four men-at-arms. As recompense, Louis granted 400 l.t. for their crusade expenses. 5 Α year later, an almost identical contract was arranged between Louis and Bremond of la Voute. 6 By such means the web of obligation, voluntary, conditional or mercenary, spread over the whole kingdom: ίη Tournai, Blois, Lautrec, Paris, the Bourbonnais, Foix, the Dauphine. It is impossible to calculate the number of crucesignati by 13 36, but a considerable effort had been made. Material preparations had begun by August 1 335 when la Baume and Behuchet were appointed commissioners 'a fayre garnisons et pourveances pour le saint voiage d'eultremer'. Between September and November, they received 11,200 l.t., mainly from the Maconnais, to buy wine, horse-feed and waggons. 7 By the spring of 1336, οη

1. Β.Ν. NAF MS. 7603, fos. 145'-6'; cf. Charles of Valois' scale of crusaders' pay in 1323, 20 s. for a baron, 10 s. for a knight, 7 s. 6 d. for squires and 2 s. for infantry, John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secrefes, no. 1688; L'art de virifter les dates, ii. 602 for the commission of Anseau de Joinville, Constable Raoul d'Eu and the marshal of Briquebec. 2. Α.Ν. Κ 1246; Musίe des archives nationales: Docιιments orίginaux de l'histoire de France exposie dans l'hόtel Soubise (Paris, 1872), p. 197, no. 342. 3. Le trίsor des chartes d'Albret, ed. J.-B. Marquette, i (Paris, 1973), 459-60, no. 400. 4. Hist. de Langιιedoc, χ. cols. 731-2. 5. Α Hui1lard-Breholles, Titres de Ια maison ducale de Bourbon (Paris, 1867- 74), i. no. 2041. 6. Ibid. ί. nos. 2082, 2083. 7. Vayssiere, loc. cit.; Merlin-Chazelas, loc. cit.; Jassemin, 'Papiers', p. 221.

V 44

PHILIP VI AND

ΤΗΕ

galleys had been gathered at Beaucaire and Marseilles and a number of war-horses were being kept at Chalons-s-Saone. These must have been destined for the crusade, not England. Macon and Chalons-sSaone are οη the road south, to the Rhone, Α vignon and Marseilles. From the papers of Miles de Noyers and other central records it appears that ίη r 335-6 two distinct fleets were being assembled, one for the crusade ίη the Mediterranean, the other ίη Normandy and Brittany to threaten Edward ΠΙ. Philip was preparing for the crusade ίη almost every possible way. There was an air of expectancy. Ιη October 133 5, news arrived of another Mamluk invasion of Armenia. 1 But there remained a scarcely hidden flaw ίη Philip's plans, the discrepancy between time and money: the money only began to reach the crusade treasurers when the time-limit had almost expired. Miles de Noyers' emergence as Philip's leading adviser at this moment has been identified with a 'declining interest in the crusade'. 2 For a generation a leading official ίη the chambre des comptes, Noyers might have been expected to countermand the extravagant policies of Ste Maure. But the shift ίη attitude should not be exaggerated. Baudet was chancellor. Noyers himself had connexions with Romania, and Sanudo claimed that Noyers was saddened by the loss of the kingdom of Jerusalem and the principality of the Morea and was eager to recapture them. 3 It may be a mistake to see a new French policy ίη 13 3 5- 6 intent οη disentangling Philip from the crusade, even though Noyers' embassy to Avignon ίη February 13 3 5 did disturb Franco-papal relations. The contentious issue was the crusade. Supported by Baudet, Noyers requested help, ίη particular access to the tithe levied outside France. Benedict found Noyers' proposals extreme, obscure, and dangerous. The ensuing wrangle ended with Noyers hurling 'verba inordinata et indecencia' at Benedict. Later some of the French bishops admitted that Noyers, not the king, had been the author of the proposals. 4 Daumet thought the French were suggesting using the crusade tithe for other purposes. The organization of the tithe was discussed, but nothing new was actually proposed beyond the extension of French control to funds outside the kingdom which had been a feature of the Francopapal crusade negotiations ίη 1323. 5 Ιη 1335, Noyers was probably trying, although maladroitly, to renegotiate terms with a new pope whom he misguidedly hoped could be bullied. Benedict may also have been afraid of French misappropriation of crusade funds - and 1. Benedict ΧΙ!, Letfres c/oses (France), ηο. 109; Rymer, ίν. 678, 679. Henneman, Royal Taxation, p. 106; Cazelles, Sociίti polίlique, pp. 115-zz.. 3. Ε. Petit, Histoire des ducs de Bourgogne de la race capitienne, vii (Paris, 1901), 41; Κ. Hopf, Chronίques greco-romanes (Berlin, 187 3), p. 1ο 1. 4. Benedict ΧΙ!, Lettres closes (France), nos. 44, 82, 103; Jassemin, 'Papiers', pp. 213-7 for 2..

Noyers' version. j. Housley, 'Franco-papal negotiations', passim.

V RECOVERY OF

ΤΗΕ

HOLY LAND

45

he would have had a point. For example, at the same time as he was buying crusade provisions in Burgundy with tithe money, Behuchet was also preparing maritime defences against the English. 1 What is clear is that after early enthusiasm, Benedict cooled towards Philip's plans. 2 Faced by disputes in Scotland, Italy and Germany and possibly encouraged by the Anglo-Scottish truce of November 13 3 5, Benedict began to separate the crusade from attempts to obtain peace in Christendom. 3 Ιη January 1336, the pope suspended the preaching of the cross in Cyprus, calling it dangerously provocative, and he issued dire warnings to Philip about the dissension in Christendom. 4 Benedict may already have decided οη the cancellation of Philip's passagium which came οη ι 3 March 13 36. 5 Daumet calls it a 'quasi-certitude' that the initiative for the cancellation came from Philip VI. 6 Yet cancellation would lead to the suspension of the crusade tithe cessanfe causa and financial disaster for Philip. Cazelles argues that Philip was, from 1 33 3, increasingly influenced by a 'war party' at whose head Henneman places Noyers. 7 The disposition of military resources in 1335-6 fails to support this. There was ηο dramatic or consistent shift in policy. As early as March ι 332, Philip had described Edward ΠΙ as 'nostre enemi', yet as late as November 1335 the French helped to engineer an Anglo-Scottish truce. 8 Philip had always kept his options open and had consistently sought the best interests of France. What is sometimes missed is that he perceived the crusade to be in France's interests just as much as dealing with Edward ΠΙ. At most, therefore, Noyers' predominance coincided not with declining interest in the crusade but with declining optimism. That Philip had ηο intention of abandoning his passagium is shown in his negotiations with James ΙΙ ofMajorca at Montpellier in February 1336. Philip informed James that he had decided to embark with fifty ships (twenty huissiers, twenty galleys and ten cargo ships, nez) and that he hoped James would obtain crusade tithes and privileges to join him. 9 There is ηο reason to dismiss this as a sham. Fifty ships constituted a considerable but feasible fleet. Ιη ι 33 2, the Venetians had proposed an expedition p. 142; Viard, 'Ressources extraordinaires', p. 175. 2. Benedίct ΧΙΙ, Lιtlres closes (France), nos. 19, 28, j6, 90, 139 and Letlres communes, nos. 242j, 2478. 3. Rymer, iv. 676-7; Η. Jenkίns, Papal Efforts for Peace undtr Benedicl ΧΙΙ (Phίladelphίa, 1933), esp. pp. 22-j. 4. Benedicl ΧΙΙ: Lιllres closes el palentes interessanl les pays autres qιιe /α France, ed. J. Μ. Vίdal (Parίs, 1913-jo), ηο. 732; Benedict ΧΙΙ, Lιllres closes (France), ηο. 139. j. Benedict ΧΙΙ, Lιttres closes (aulres pays), ηο. 786; Deprez, La papaulέ, pp. 410-13. 6. Benedict ΧΙΙ, Leιtres closes (France), p. Η. 7. Cazelles, Socifli politique, p. 413; Henneman, Royal Taxalion, p. 108. 8. J. Miret y Sans, 'Lettres closes des premίers Valois', L, Moyen Age, xxix (1917-18), 62-3, no. vii; Rymer, ίν. 676-7. 9. Viard, ΊtinCraire', p. 120; Jassemin, 'Papiers', pp. 22.2.-; where the meeting is misdated. 1. Cazelles, .fociέti politique,

V PHILIP VI AND

ΤΗΕ

galleys and huissiers to transport a total of 3 j ,οοο troops and οη less than half that number of vessels, his force could still have been j ,οοο strong or more, and this presumably excluded whatever his nobles were to contribute individually. 1 At Avignon ίη March 1336, Philip admitted that his preparations were incomplete. He had only twelve galleys at Beaucaire, downstream from Avignon. 2 Ιη the original draft of a speech to the pope, Philip asked for Benedict's advice and help 'afίn que cest Sainz Voiages se face du jour et au temps que il a empris', i.e. 1 August 1336. But this was amended to read 'afίn cest Sainz Voiages se peusse faire'. 3 Apparently, therefore, Philip initially wanted immediate papal help to meet the deadline, but changed his mind, possibly as a result of papal refusal to grant more aid. He may have resigned himself to a postponement, but what Philip did not ask for was cancellation. He may have been dissembling, although there is ηο evidence that he was. Ιη ηο sense was Bendict's cancellation the culmination of French policy. Philip had brought with him to Α vignon the heads of the crusade administration (Mathieu Gayte, Baudet, la Baume and Louis of Bourbon), and even Benedict confessed that Philip's ardour for the passagium was uncooled. 4 Αη examination of what Philip claimed to have done by March 1336 bears this out. Philip recalled his diplomatic efforts to interest the kings of England, Aragon, Navarre, Bohemia, Majorca and Scotland ίη the crusade and to secure peace ίη the Low Countries, Scotland and Italy. 5 This account was rose-tinted but essentially accurate. The king of Navarre had taken the cross; Edward ΠΙ had been invited to join the passagium, and the king ofMajorca was willing to participate. David Bruce was a guest at the French court and Philip was trying to reconcile Aragon and Naples. Ιη the Low Countries, Philip had been the architect of the treaty of Amiens ίη 1 334, and the French had been involved in the latest Anglo-Scottish truce. Philip reported the provisioning activities of la Baume and Behuchet, adding that once peace had been restored ίη Italy they would extend their operations to Apulia and Calabria. The expeditions of Cepoy and Quieret and the galleys at Beaucaire were also cited. Future diplomacy was to include Naples, Sicily, Castile, Byzantium, the of

1 οο

5,οοο horses. Even though Philip was calculating

1. Cf the calculations of the ratio of ships to men in 132; (John ΧΧΙΙ, Lettres secrέtes, 1685; Β.Ν. NAF MS. 7600, fos. 1;0'- ;6', Bongars Gesta Dei, ii. 5- 6), in 1;;z (Milanges historiques, iii. 100- 101) and in 1;;5 (ίbίd., iii. 104- 6). 2. Jassemin, 'Papiers', p. 221. 3. lbid. p. z 19 and η. z. 4. Brown, 'Customary Aids', p. z41; Α . Ν. JJ 69, fo. 124; Huillard-Breholles, Titres de Bourbon, i. ηο. z I z4a; Benedict ΧΙΙ, Lettrιs closes (autres pays), ηο. 786. 5. Jassemin, 'Papiers', pp. zzo-zz. ηο.

V RECOVER Υ OF

ΤΗΕ

HOLY LAND

47

Tartars. 1

kings of Armenia, Cyprus and Georgia and the Benedict was unmoved. The crusade was cancelled indefinitely. Philip put a brave face οη it. Transferring his fleet to Marseilles, he concealed his disappointment by a lavish regatta held ίη the harbour. Α mock-sea battle was staged which culminated ίη the combatants pelting each other with oranges.2 One purpose of the crusade was not forgotten. Philip suggested to Benedict that some of the crusade tithe should be sent to Armenia to alleviate the famine caused by the Mamluk invasion of the previous year. Benedict rejected the idea, arguing legalistically that the tithe was for the crusade alone. But Benedict did agree to organize a subsidy of 10,000 gold florins to buy grain for Armenia, and ίη May, invited all Christians ίη the eastern Mediterranean to help Armenia. 3 But the crusade fleet was to have a notorious future. Under the command of Jean Bidos, who had been involved ίη Charles IV's crusade flotilla of 1323, and Hugh Quieret, it was transferred to the Channel by the beginning of September. 4 This provocative move supplied Edward ΠΙ with a propaganda weapon of immeasurable force. The use of the crusade fleet ίη the Channel supplied the 'proof' Edward needed to support a central plank of his anti-French polemics, that all along Philip had been planning to attack England.5 One source notes Philip's remorse at the turn of events, but he had not neglected to prepare for a possible Anglo-French conflict. 6 He had inspected the Channel defences before visiting Α vignon ίη 1336, and ίη June an English spy reported that the French intended to help the Scots by creating a diversion, beginning with an attack οη Portsmouth. 7 Although Edward had never made the slightest material effort to further the crusade, he maintained a superficial enthusiasm ίη futile diplomacy designed for domestic consumption. Ιη December 13 3 5 he promised to help Armenia and throughout 13 36 he talked of the crusade. Even ίη November 13 37, he declared himself willing to join a crusade with 1 ,οοο men-at-arms. 8 Such protestations were insincere propaganda, but potentially damaging to French prestige. By the summer of 133 7, with war inevitable, each side was 1. Chronique Parisienne, p. 154; Cazelles, Lettres closes, pp. 46-7, 51 - 2., nos. 53, j6, 61; Cazelles, Socίiti polίtίque, p. 109; Jassemin, 'Papiers', pp. 222- 3; for the French approach to the king of Georgia, Golubovich, Biblioteca, iii. 414- 15. 2.. Grandes chroniqιιes, ix. 15 3; Nangis, ii. 150. 3. Benedict ΧΙ!, Lettres closes (France), nos. 15 5, 175, 176; Υ . Renouard, 'Une expedition de cereales des Pouilles en Armenie', Milanges d'archiologίe et d'hίstoire, Ιίίί (1936), 287- 329. 4. Ronciere, Hist. de marine, i. 390, η. 6, 391; Rymer, ίν . 708; Deprez, La papauti, p. 117; for Bidos, Β . Ν. NAF MS. 7373, fos. 149'-μ'. 5. Canon ofBridlington, Gesta Edwardί Terlii, p. 152; Rymer, ίν. 709,806. 6. Chronographίa, ii. 2 1 . 7. Viard, Ίtineraire', pp. 118- 20; Origίnal Lellers Illus/ralive of Englίsh Hislory, ed. Sir Η . Ellis, μd series (London, 1846), ί . 29- 33 . 8. Rymer, ίν. 679, 70;, 705 , 706; Cal. ΡαΙ. Rolls IJJ4- 8, pp. 301, 30;; Cal. Close Rol/s I}JJ-7, pp. 702- ;; Canon of Bridlington, Gesla, pp. 129- ;1; Chronίcle of Lanercosl, p . ;09.

V PHlLlP Vl AND

ΤΗΕ

accusing the other of having hindered the crusade. The chroniclers lined up obediently οη either side. Memories of this sniping persisted. Ιη the Songe du Vieif Peferin, Philippe de Mezieres blamed the English for thwarting Philip VI's crusade and thereby depriving many souls of Heaven. 1 Rhetorical abuse has blurred the course of events. Το apportion guilt was and is unprofitable. Given Edward's policy in Scotland, Philip's support for the Bruce faction, the position of Gascony, the rivalries in the Low Countries, and the tensions within France itself, the pope had been correct ίη March 1336 when he said that the time was not right for a crusade. Events had overtaken it, and, even if Philip did not fully realize ίt, the balance of French selfinterest had shifted irrevocably away from his passagium. But Benedict's cancellation itself pushed western Europe nearer war. Νο longer had Philip a higher motive for his actions. Νο longer had he to play or be seen to play the honest broker. The autumn and winter of 1336 saw an undignified scramble for allies. As there was now ηο prospect of the crusade embarking, the crusade tithes were redundant, Benedict refusing to consider their use for other purposes. 2 Ιη December 1336, collection was stopped. 3 Philip's financial nightmare had come true. His crusade was over. Tradition and self-esteem lay at the heart ofValois kingship. Philip VI called himself 'rex Francorum' not 'rex Franciae'; he levied feudal aids and he planned crusades. 4 Although beset by family tragedy, ill-health, doubts of his title to the throne and barely suppressed aristocratic and popular discontent, Philip portrayed himself as the paradigm of chivalry. His was a martial spirit, reared οη the use of arms and devoted to the crusade. 5 His attachment to the crusade was shared by most of his relatives and courtiers. But his determination to put his devotion into practice had wide repercussions. lt led to the invasion of Armenia in 133 5, the strengthening of Syrian, Palestinian, and Egyptian maritime defences and the expulsion from Egypt of suspect westerners. 6 Philip gave to the alliance against the Turks ίη the Aegean a western dimension which bore fruit ίη the next decade with the capture of Smyrna. According to the unreliable Froissart, the Levant waited expectantly. The French prior of the Hospitallers was sent by Philip to secure provisions in 133 5-6 and a force of Venetians and Hospitallers planned to gather ίη Crete to await 1. Le .fonge du Vieil Pelerin, ed. G. W. Coopland (Cambridge, 1969), ii. 398-9. z. Benedict ΧΙΙ, Lettres closes (France), nos. z40, z8o. 3. Benedict ΧΙΙ, Lettres closes (France), nos. z8o, 443 and Letfres communes, 3954, 5139- 40. 4. 'Rex Francorum' appears οη Philip's seal. 5. Frojssart, Chroniques, iν. 270; Bibl. Ste GeneviCve, MS 240, fo. 272.ν, col. ii for Roger's assertion; Α. Jeanroy, 'Joan de Castelnou, troubadour', Histoire liιtίraire de la France, xxxviii. 90 and η. z for a contemporary poet's view and for Philip's own crusade legacy of 1 5,οοο Ι.v., Α.Ν. J 404, no. 34 and cf. nos. 33, 33 bis. 6. James ofVerona, Liber Peregrinalionis, ed. R. Rϋhricht, Rivue de l'Orienl Latin, iii (1895), 244-5; Μ. Villani, Istorie, νiί. ch. 3 (see p. 3 j, η. 4 supra), col. 406; Heinrich νοη Dissenhoven in Baluzc, Vitae, i. zz 1.

V RECOVER Υ OF

ΤΗΕ

HOLY LAND

49

Philip's arrival. 1 In Europe, Philip's espousal of the crusade did not divert the French from their local interests. Intervention, aggression and acquisition continued on the east bank of the Rhone, in the Low Countries, Gascony, and Scotland. Philip's offers of mediation were genuine, but on his own terms. Edward ΠΙ he treated like a subordinate which, unsurprisingly, was unacceptable to the English. lndeed, throughout, Philip seems to have underestimated Edward. Yet while the prospect lasted, the crusade restrained overt hostilities between England and France. lt provided a means of binding important neighbours, such as the counts of Flanders and Hainault, the duke ofBrabant, the king ofBohemia, as well as powerful lords from Gascony and Languedoc, bankers, merchants and shipbuilders, to French interests. Philip had invested considerable moral and political capital in the crusade. lts cancellation snatched aside the veil of international cooperation and national unity. The r6le of the failure of the crusade in the outbreak of the Hundred Years War was more than rhetorical. Were Edward IIl's charges of deceit justified in any respect? Το avoid the mistake of 132 3, when crusade preparations began before tithes had been secured, Philip deliberately delayed his preparations until after the grant of the tithes. Crusade money was not returned to the pope after 1336 and was used by Philip for the war against England, as the king freely admitted to Clement VI in 1344 when trying to extract absolution from his ι 333 vow to repay crusade funds. Philip's tendentious argument was that what was good for France was good for the crusade in the end. 2 But it is impossible to prove that crusade funds were misappropriated before March 1336, and it is difficult to see in Philip's crusade policy an original intent to divert them. The French were surprisingly open about their lack of preparations in 13 3 3 and ι 336. 3 There were also practical problems in allocating revenue according to source, especially as many officials were involved in both the crusade and the Channel preparations. After the disbursal of crusade money on the Channel war in 1336-7, the misuse of it evidently weighed on Philip's conscience. In a codicil to his will written on campaign in October 13 39, Philip ordered that all funds originally intended for the crusade were to be repaid in their entirety to the pope before any other bequests were executed. 4 Sensitive to hostile popular reaction, Philip and John ΧΧΙΙ had tackled these problems by establishing a separate financial organization with its own officials and records, under the scrutiny of a jointly appointed ecclesiastical tribunal. Crusade revenue Ι.

Froissart,

180-203.

Chronίques, ί.

118;

for the Smyrna crusade, see Lemerle, L' Enrίrai, pp.

2. C/ίment VI: Letfres closes, patenfes et cιιrίales, eds. Ε. Deprez ef α/. (Paris, 1901---{)ι), no. 914; cf. Benedict ΧΙΙ, Letfres closes (France), nos. 280, 443. 3. Β.Ν. MS. Latin 3293, fo. 248', col. ί; Jassemin, 'Papiers', p. ιιι. 4. Α.Ν. J 404, no. 32.

V jO

PHILIP VI AND

ΤΗΕ

was kept distinct from general revenue. Apart from the Journal of the crusade tresoriers, the royal tresor itself itemized crusade monies clearly. Philip was able to contemplate restoring the crusade money en bloc in 1339 because the money could be traced through the offίcial accounts. The system of control was broken after 1336, but it is too easy to dismiss French policy as consistently hypocritical. Deliberately to invite the inevitable obloquy hurled at false crusaders would have been extraordinary folly. Before March 13 36, money was spent on the crusade and designated funds were handled with some scrupulousness. Unless an incredible degree of complicated, comprehensive duplicity is seen in all areas of French government, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that Philip took his responsibilities as crucesignatus and captain of the crusade seriously. In the early 1330s, perhaps naively, he was trying to plan a crusade without compromising French interests in the west. The policy was doomed, but its failure was not intended and it gave him no joy. Philip underestimated the problems of launching a large crusade as much as later historians have underestimated his endeavours to solve those problems. Diplomatically, he made his crusade the vehicle for achieving peace as well as peace's justification. But Philip's interpretation of peace entailed disadvantage for others, notably Edward ΠΙ. Given that the crusade was dependent on events quite outside French control, Philip's plans were extremely vulnerable, especially when Benedict ΧΙΙ divorced the crusade from papal efforts to pacify western Christendom. Even John XXIl's broad acquiescence in Philip's policies may be seen as evidence of advancing years; when younger, John had always stoutly resisted demands for large passagia to recover the Holy Land in preference for smaller relief projects for Armenia and Cyprus and anti-Ghibelline crusades in Italy. Politically, support for the crusade undoubtedly existed within France. However, it was neither universal nor unthinking. Yet such is the nature of all enthusiasms, including the crusade - some are for and some against - a point often ignored by historians. Philip's problem was that the enthusiasts themselves were determined to extract a price. The manner in which Philip's agents and officials had to negotiate the adherence to royal plans of those who had made personal vows to join the crusade is eloquent on the lack of trust of royal motives inherited by the Valois. The appeal of the crusade could unify, but it could also demonstrate the limitations of that unity. The financial preparations confirm this. Since the council of Vienne, the French clergy had been wary of royal deals with the papacy over ecclesiastical, and specifically crusade taxation. Thus in 1332, money for the crusade was sequestered from existing grants. Any attempt by the king to tax the church, even with papal approval, required a delicate judgement of the balance between clerical opposition and royal solvency; it is therefore unsurprising that the collection of the 1333

V RECOVERY OF

ΤΗΕ

HOLY LAND

j1

tithe was marked by resistance and delay. In fact the crusade actually inhibited royal rapacity. In 133 3 Hospitaller wealth remained inviolate despite Philip's overtures, whereas in 13 39 he simply appropriated it for his war effort. 1 With the laity, their loudly proclaimed individual and communal rights, privileges and traditions are reminders of the extent of the failure of the last Capetians to establish and maintain any coherent national secular taxation. In sum, Philip did not have enough money for the crusade and it was unlikely that he ever would. On top of these limiting factors, it may be questioned whether Philip and his ministers, despite the despatch of embassies, agents and spies to the east, had an accurate grasp of the logistical complexities of a large passagium to Armenia, Syria or Egypt. Α crusade controlled by a western ruler in his own interests might not have appealed to the Cypriots or Armenians, let alone those western mendicants who were trying to cooperate with the Mamluk governors of the Holy Places. 2 Both King George V of Georgia and the Italian traveller James ofVerona attested to the disruption in the Near East provoked by rumours of a new crusade. 3 Furthermore, Philip's strategic advice was derived either from the experience of men more acquainted with small commercial fleets, notably French and ltalian merchants, or from theorists, including Sanudo, whose detailed ideas tended to be coloured by wishful thinking and V egetius. The Hospitallers were exceptions to both these categories, but their perceptions of the problems and those of the French failed to coincide. Nevertheless, Philip's crusade was planned in an entirely traditional manner. ΑΙΙ the elements of the papal grants of J uly 1333 were steeped in the precedents of the thirteenth century and display no originality. The cross-taking ceremonies, the vows and the rhetoric were all traditional. Yet it was a living tradition. Whatever the practical use of the crusade in gaining political unity, diplomatic advantage or additional revenue, crusading in ltaly, Spain, the Baltic or the Levant still satisfίed individual and collective needs by its warfare and its indulgence. Criticism of Philip's crusade was levelled less at his plan to recover the Holy Land than at his failure to achieve it. Philip launched his crusade policy from personal conviction and political expediency. Νο French monarch of the fourteenth century could ignore the legacy of Louis VII, Philip II and Louis ΙΧ. Crusading had become part of the essence of French kingship. The crusade was to confίrm Philip VI's position in France, in Europe and, even, in Paradise. For that, any amount of administrative and diplomatic effort was justifίed. 1. Benedict ΧΙ!, Lettres closes (France), no. 548. 2. Golubovich, Biblioteca, ίίί. e.g. p. 272; Atiya, Crιιsade, pp. 5 ΙΟ- 16 and Έgypt and Aragon 1300-1330', Abhandlιιngenfiir die Kιιnde des Morgenlandes, χχίίί, 7- 71. 3. Tupra, p. 48, η. 6 and Golubovich, Biblioteca, iii. 414-1 j for George V's remarks.

V 52

PHILIP VI

The failure of 13 36 was not fatal to the crusading spirit. Once the general crusade was impossible, smaller enterprises flourished. The count of Foix and the king of Navarre died in Spain in the cause of the cross, Frenchmen appeared in the Baltic in r 33 7, and the r 340s witnessed the capture of Smyrna and the crusade of Humbert of Vienne. 1 The power of crusade oaths remained strong. Το break them, in Benedict XII's words, was to attract 'murmurationes et oblocutiones'. 2 Philip VI had to wait until June r 344 for papal absolution from his commitment to repay crusade funds, and William of Hainault only received absolution from his crusade vow because of age and infirmity. 3 Crusading retained its allure. Ιη r 342 Philip had to forbid some Languedoc nobles from campaigning against Granada and, according to one version of Froissart's chronicle, in 1341, after J ean of Montfort had established control of Brittany, at least eleven barons went οη crusade, some to Granada, some to the Levant and some to Prussia, rather than pay Jean homage. 4 Philip had inherited the popular unease at the gap between promises and action which manifested itself in suspicion of the motives behind crusade preaching and taxation. Because he came nearer than any of the last Capetians to embarking on crusade, his failure was more open to scorn and mockery. His failure also showed that without a degree of peace and stability unobtainable in the fourteenth century, ηο general passagium was possible. The future of the crusades belonged to the small expeditions, often little more than chevauchees οη the frontiers oflslam, to specific relief campaigns, such as Nicopolis and Varna, or to alliances based more οη the Holy League of r 334 than the general crusade of 1336. The French failure of 1336 was not the sole cause of these developments. The changing strategic requirements dictated by the advance of the Ottomans leading to the gradual abandonment of the crusade initially aimed at the Holy Land were more immediately responsible. Above all, the Hundred Years War altered the context of crusading by presenting new national foci for chivalric endeavour and even crusade indulgences. The crusade to the east became a justification and occupation of truces, a means of distracting the F ree Companies or of protecting eastern Europe. This had not been what the crusade had meant for St Louis or for his Valois great-grandson.

1. Grandes Chroniques, ίχ. 2.40-41; Anselme, Hist. ginialogiqιιe, iii. 348; cf. Cazelles, Sociίtί politique, p. 153 and η. 4 for Henri de Tilly in 1341; Chronik Wigands von Marburg, ed. Τ. Hirsh, Scriptores rerum Prussicarum, ίί (Leipzig, 1863), 490--91. 2. Benedict ΧΙΙ, Lellres closes (France), no 713. 3. Clement VI, Lellres closes, no. 914; Α Fierens, 'Lettres de Benoit ΧΙΙ', Analιcta Vaticano-Belgica (Rome, 1910), 19 June 1335. 4. Ρ. Contamine, Guerre, ilal el sociitί ά Ια ftn du moyen άge (Paris, 1972), p. 4; Froissatt, Chroniques, ii. 2.91.

V

VI Were There Any Crusades in the Twelfth Century? GuIBERT OF NoGENT, in a famous phrase, described the First Crusade as a new path of salvation which allowed laymen to earn redemption without changing their status and becoming monks. 1 This theme was taken up by later apologists and recruiters of further military expeditions to the Holy Land, notably St Bernard ίη his praise of the Templars ίη the late 1120s and his preaching of the Second Crusade ίη the 1140s, where the new opportunity was restyled as a unique bargain which God was offering his faithful. This identification of a fresh means of grace, a new form of holy war, has been generally accepted by modern historians. Ενeη Carl Erdmann, for all his painstaking excavation of the roots of crusading, insisted οη the novelty of the First Crusade. The events of 1095-9 have been commonly regarded as marking an epoch in the Church' s acceptance of secular militarism; ίη the development of theories of holy war; and in opportunities f or the legitimate expression of lay military and chivalric ambitions. Υ et the evidence from the eighty years after the capture of Jerusalem hardly supports such categorical assumptions. With hindsight, we may see the First Crusade as spawning a new movement which both characterized and shaped western Christendom for centuries. Contemporaries clearly did not. Their twelfth-century hindsight led them το different conclusions, namely that the First Crusade was unique and, especially after the fiascos of 1101 and 1146-9, unrepeatable. 2 The First Crusade was remembered as a symbol of loyalty and honour, a focus and inspiration for traditional secular qualities, not as a new way of salvation or a new form of holy war. Thus the English baron, Brian FitzCount, c.1143, saw the First Crusaders as supremely loyal knights (boni milites). 3 Given the loyalist axe he was grinding at the time, ίt could be argued that FitzCount was merely scoring a debating point. Although ίη a different style, Eugenius ΠΙ said much the same in the bull Quantum praedecessores of 1146 which launched the Second Crusade. lt was to the memory of the First Crusaders and to the honour of their descendants that Eugenius

1. Guibert of Nogent, 'Gesta Dei per Francos', ίη R[ecueil des} H[istoriens des} C[roisades, ed. Academie des Inscriptions et Belles Lettres (Paris, 1841-1906), Documents] Occ[identaux], ίν. η4. 2. Robert of Rheims, Ήistoria Jherosolimitana', RHC Occ., iίί. 723; J. Riley-Smith, Tbe First Cτusade and tbe ldea of Crusading (London, 1986), ch.6. 3. Η. W. C. Davis, Ήenry of Blois and Brian FitzCount', ante, χχν (1910), 301-3.

VI 554

WERE THERE

ΑΝΥ

CRUSADES

appealed. 1

His lead was followed by the popularizers and propagandists. 2 Far from being a new way of salvation, the crusade was an old way of gaining reward, by loyal service το a master (the pope or, more generally, Christ), only writ large. Besides the need το emulate the heroism of the First Crusaders, Pope Eugenius identified two desired consequences of the proposed expedition: 'so that the dignity of the name of Christ may be enhanced ... and your reputation for strength, which is praised throughout the world, may be kept unimpaired and unsullied'. Ιτ is the 'ancestral laws' which need defending. Thus the religious rhetoric was underpinned by traditional themes of obligation, defence, honour and glory. Eugenius showed litt!e interest in creating a new ecclesiastical institution or movement. He sought a specific response to a specific problem -the threat το Christian Outremer- and found it in calling for a repetition of the 1096 expedition. The lack of a clearly identifiable crusade institution by 1146 is further suggested by the ease with which Bernard of Clairvaux transmuted the enterprise into an occasion for mass repentance and spiritual reform. It is often argued that Quantum praedecessores marked a new stage in institutionalizing the crusade, indicated by the statement of secular privileges, sumptuary regulations and the indulgence. However, the Second Crusade led nowhere. Although the papal bulls and the experience of the preaching and military campaigns provided a fresh set of precedents and memories, it is hard to see in, for instance, Eugenius' s association of his indulgence with that offered by Urban ΙΙ the presence of a definite current ideology, nor is it obvious that he wished to develop one. 3 Ιη this Eugenius was typical of the period before the Third Crusade, when what we call 'the Crusades' in fact covered a fragmented series of military and religious activities that lacked coherence: general expeditions (only one between 1101 and 1188); private armed and unarmed pilgrimages, not all of which can be proved to have been undertaken in response to specific or general papal authorization; the interest of settlers in the east, such as Fulcher of Chartres or even William of Tyre, to create a process of constant reinforcement; and the birth and growth of the military orders. Each activity was distinct in motive, appeal and implementation, with nobody seriously trying to 1. P[atrologiae cursus completus. Series] L[aιina, ed. J. Ρ. Migne (1844-64)], clxxx, cols. 1064-6. Ε. Caspar, 'Die Kreuzzugsbullen Eugens ΙΙΙ', Neues Archiv der Gesellschaft fur iiltere deutsche Geschichιskunde, xlv (1924), 285-305, at 300--5; for an English translation, L. and J. Riley-Smith, The Crusades: Idea and Reality (London, 1981), pp. 57--9. 2. Bernard of Clairvaux, Opera, ed. J. Leclercq et al. (Rome, 1957-77), vols. vii-viii, Epistolae, nos. 256,288, 363-5, 371, 380, 467-9. Letteτs of Sι Bernard of Clairvaux, trans. Β . S. James (London, 1953), nos. 391-6, 398-401, 408,410; J. Bedier, Les chansons de croisade (Paris 1909), pp. 8-11 ('Chevalier, Mult Estes Guariz', esp. 1.4: 'Ki li vut fait tels deshenors'). 3. For Quantumpraedecessores, see supra,p. 554, n. 1; cf. J. G. Rowe's comment that the bull was 'a shoτ in the dark': Όrigins of the Second Crusade', in The Second Crusade and the Cistercians, ed. Μ. Gervers (New York, 1992), p. 86; in general, see G. Consτable, 'The Second Crusade as Seen by Contemporaries', Traditio, ix (1953), esp. 247-65.

VI ΙΝ ΤΗΕ TWELFTH CENTURY?

555

incorporate these diverse strands into one institution, theory, or even name. The inability of an otherwise articulate and categorizing intellectual elite το agree or even propose a term for the activity which later was named 'crusade' has tended το be noted without too much comment by modern observers. Yet the terminological vagueness of the twelfth century may be significant. Το put it crudely, we know there were crusaders: they did not; or, if they did, their perception was far from the canonically or juridically precise definition beloved of some late twentiethcentury scholars. The hesitancy of twelfth-century canonists has been tellingly exposed by Professor Gilchrist in two acutely revisionist articles ίη the 1980s. 1 His arguments can, however, be extended to wider aspects of twelfth-century crusading, ίη order to suggest that the impact of this type of holy war was less distinctive than many, myself included, have assumed. Ιη a non-crusading context, crusading, popular or not, appears more as an extension of existing social or religious activities than as a radical departure from them. Compare it with becoming a monk, as did some contemporary apologists. 2 U nlike monasticism, crusading was not a lifetime's vocation, guided by carefully elaborated rules which inspired a culture distinct from the rest of lay society. Ιη law and action, its operation remained confused with other habits and forms. As an awareness of a continuing tradition - as opposed το a glittering memory of the First Crusade - ίt grew haphazardly. For clarity, definition and uniformity, one must look at Innocent ΠΙ and beyond. The twelfth century is crusading's Dark Ages. Αη obvious question το ask concerns the effect of crusading οη ίts participants. The charter evidence from the First and Second Crusades points το a strong pious impulse: the desire for active repentance and forgiveness of sins. The mechanism of the armed pilgrimage was different, but the inspiration - the desire for salvation - was traditional. It was closely allied το customary expressions of piety, especially donations το, and associations with, monasteries which, conveniently, acted as both material and spiritual bankers for crusaders. 3 Crusading motiνes, where religious, were solidly embedded ίη contemporary spiritual anxieties and aspirations. However, the campaigns themselves did possess the 1. J. Gilchrist, 'The Erdmann Thesis and theCanon Law, 1083-1141',in CrusadeandSettlement,ed. 1985), pp. 37-45; id., 'The Papacy and War against the "Saracens", 795-1216', The lnternational History Review, χ (1988), 174--97. Cf., for a different recent view, Η. Ε. J. Cowdrey, 'Canon Law and the First Crusade', in Horns of Hattin, ed. Β. Ζ. Kedar(Jerusalem, 1992), pp.41-8. For a similar, more general perspective: C. Moπis, The Papal Monarchy (Oxford, 1989), pp. 277-80. 2. Cf. J. Α. Brundage, 'St. Bernard and the Jurists', Second Crusade and Cisteτcians, pp. 29-30; Riley-Smith, Fiτst Cτusade, esp. pp. 15-2. 3. Constable, 'Second Crusade', 241-4; id., 'Medieval Charters as a Source for the History of τhe Crusades', in Cτusade and Settlement, pp. 73-89; id., 'The Financing of τhe Crusades in the Twelfτh Cenτury', in Outτemeτ: Studies in the History of the Cτusading Kingdom of Jeτusalem Pτesented to Joshua Ρταweτ, ed. Β. Ζ. Kedar et al. (Jerusalem, 1982), pp. 64-88. Cf. Μ. Bull, Knightly Piety and the Lay Response to the First Cτusade (Oxford, 1993), esp. chs. 4 and 6. Ρ. Edbury (Cardiff,

VI WERE THERE

ΑΝΥ

CRUSADES

special quality of a mission, with the element of pilgrimage central. During the Second Crusade, when Jerusalem was ίη Christian hands, the expedition to the East was, to Odo of Deuil, the 'via Sancti Sepulchri' and to Louis VII the 'sacrosanctae peregrinationis iter'. 1 The sanctity of the enterprise was reflected ίη attendant miracles and the belief that casualties were martyrs. 2 With martyrdom, however, the new cloaked the old. Radulfus Glaber, ίη the mid-eleventh century, had assumed that those who fell fighting the infidel merited Paradise, even if ίt could be argued that technically they were not martyrs. Ιη his Decretum, Gratian cited Carolingian authorities who recognized the same spiritual reward. 3 If perceptions of crusaders were formed by preexisting attitudes, their experiences were often extraordinary. The physical circumstances of such long and hazardous campaigns made them so. Υ et the expeditions were finite; experiences became memories, models of conduct and good stories. These hardly provided the basis for a new institution or formal ideology. Veterans of the First Crusade were accounted heroes (or, ίf they had deserted, villains). 4 They could gain material favours, as with Robert of Normandy, who received especially pleasant conditions of custody between r ro6 and r r 34 because Henry Ι decided to treat him 'not as an enemy captive but as a noble pilgrim', a reference to Robert's inflated reputation as a leader of the Crusade. 5 Responses to the survivors of the largely unsuccessful Second Crusade were, inevitably, more muted and confused. Their actions were not obviously taken as models or precedents - even, it appears, at the time of the Third Crusade. 6 But crusading exerted ηο general influence οη future behaviour, to the occasional

1. Odo of Deuil, De profectione Ludovici VII ίn orientem, ed. V. G. Bcrry (New York, 1948), pp. 2-3; R[ecueil des] h[istoriens des] G[aules et de Ια] F[rance], ed. Μ. Bouquet et al. (Paris, 1738-1904), xv. 488; Constable, 'Second Crusade', 216-44. 2. J. Riley-Smith, 'Death on the First Crusade', ίη The End of Strife, ed. D. Μ. Loades (London, 1984), pp 14-31; id., First Crusade, esp. pp.91-100, 112-19. Cf. the Iberian experiences during the Second Crusade of Duodechlin of Lahnstein: M]onumenta] G[ermaniae] H[istorica], S[criptores] (Hanover etc., 1826- ), χνίi. 28; 'De Expugnatione Scalabis', ίη Portugalίae Monumenta Hίstoτia, Scriptores, vol. ί (Lisbon, 18 56), pp. 94-5. Perhaps miracles were more a feature of successful campaigns; marτyrs

were common το all sorts: Constable, 'Second Crusade',

221-2.

3. Radulfus Glaber, Historiae Libri Quinque, ed. J. France (Oxford, 1989), pp. 82-5; Gratian, Decretum, ed. Α. Friedberg (Corpus Iuris Canonici, vol. ί, Leipzig, 1879), Causa ΧΧΙΙΙ: Quest. V, c.xlvi; Quest. VIII, c. vii.

4. Compare Robert of Flanders ('his memory will live for ever') with the deserters Stephen of Blois or the Grandmesnil brothers: Henry of Huntingdon, Hίstoria Anglorum, ed. Τ. Arnold (R[olls] S[eries], London, 1879), p.238; Orderic Viτalis, Eccl[esiasticalj Hist[ory], ed. Μ. Chibnall (Oxford, 1969--80), ν. 98, 106,268,324, νί . 18. 5. C. W. David, Robert Curthose (Cambridge, Mass., 1920), p. 179 and η. 17; Robert of Torigni, 'Chronicle', ίη Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Henry ΙΙ and Richard Ι, vol. lv, ed. R. Howlett (RS, London, 1889), pp. 85~. 6. Ρ. Edbury, 'Looking Back at the Second Crusade', ίη Second Crusade and Cistercians, pp. 163-9; compare the tone and content of Audita tremendi (infra, p. 560, η. 4) wίιh Quantum praedecessores.

VI ΙΝ ΤΗΕ TWELFTH CENTURY?

557

disquiet of the church authorities. Unlike in the thirteenth century, there was ηο continuing institutional presence of crusading after the event, such as special prayers or parish collecting boxes. Returning Jerusalemites ίη 1099, for all the expressions of contrition evident ίη their charters of three years earlier, appeared eager to pick up the familiar threads of their secular lives. Raimbold Croton was one of the heroes of the First Crusade, especially in the region of Chartres, where he enjoyed the reputation of being the first crusader το enter Jerusalem. Ralph of Caen, Albert of Aachen and Baldric of Dol all mention his heroism at Antioch and J erusalem. 1 Υ et, a few years after his return, Raimbold, incensed at a local monk who had beaten some of his servants for stealing hay, had the unfortunate cleric castrated. For this the church authorities forbade the former miles christi from bearing arms for fourteen years. Raimbold, apparently shocked ίηtο penitence, appealed το Bishop Ινο of Chartres who, knowing his canon law, declined to get involved directly but, ίη view of Raimbold's bravery at Jerusalem, sent him το Pope Paschal ΙΙ for absolution. This Raimbold presumably received, for soon afterwards he met his death ίη one of the interminable and sordid petty wars ίη the 1le de France. 2 The First Crusade may have widened the scope of knightly endeavour and provided fresh heroes, but it did little to alter the realities of life, a point echoed by Orderic Vitalis when lamenting the death of Robert of Flanders, trampled in the royal retreat from Dammartin, a sad fate for a 'bellicosus J erosolimitae'. 3 The squalid career of Raimbold Croton, illustrating the political success and the many personal failures of the ideal and practice of the First Crusade, may be seen το have consolidated a close relationship between the Church and the ordo pugnatorum, at the very least an increased recognition of the mutual benefits. From all sides of religious debate, from Peter the Venerable of Cluny, Suger of St Denis and Bernard of Clairvaux, there was agreement about the potential virtue of the knightly order and its violent actiνities, specifically when protecting ecclesiastical interests. 4 Υet, consciously or not, these apologists were following a long tradition, stretching back to papal approval of Carolingian militarism in the eighth century and beyond, for example the

χ. Orderic Viτalis, Eccl. Hίst., ν. 168; Petrus Tudebodus, ~Im.itatus eτ Conτinuatus Historia Peregrinorum' in RHC Occ., iii. 218-19; Ralph of Caen, 'Gesta Tancredi', ibid. iii. 689; Alberτ of Aachen, Ήisτoria Hierosolymitana', ίbίd. ίν.410; Baldric of Dol, 'Hisτoria Jerosolimitana', ibid. ίν. 49, η . 12, 71,

7, 102, η. 8. 2. PL, clxii, cols. 144-5, no. 13 5; Ordeήc Vitalis, Eccl. Hisι., νi. 158. 3. Ibid. 162. 4. Suger, Vie de Louis le Gros, ed. Η. Waqueτ (Paris, 1929), pp. 78--9; Lettersof Peter the Venerable, ed. G. Constable (Cambridge, Mass., 1967), i. 409; Letters of St Bernard, no. 391, p. 461; Bernard, η.

Opeτa, ίίί. 2 Ι 5.

VI WERE THERE

ΑΝΥ

CRUSADES

praise ίη Bede's Ecclesiastical History for Edwin, Oswald and Oswy. 1 Ιη February 114 5, Pope Lucius ΙΙ died from wounds received leading his troops ίη an attempt το secure control of the city of Rome. Βuτ τhis was not a sign of any new dispensation ίη favour of acceptable holy violence. Ιη the tenth century, both John Χ (914-28) and John ΧΙΙ (95 5-63) personally took part ίη fighting. 2 W arrior bishops are not unusual ίη the twelfth century: Ralph of Bethlehem; or Rainald νοη Dassel of Cologne; or Hubert Walter, then of Salisbury. But they represented an old habit which, if anything, was dying out, as the logic of Gregorian separation of functions and powers seeped into law, custom and expectations, alτhough there remained some vigorous episcopal campaigners, such as Bishop Despenser of Norwich in the fourteenth century, and episcopal war administrators who occasionally donned armour, as, apparently, did Archbishop Boniface of Canterbury, preparatory to mugging the prior of St Bartholomew's, London, in 1250. 3 The First Crusade was part of an old process of justifying wars against pagans and enemies of the pope in an atmosphere where war was a familiar, necessary burden, not an inevitably abhorrent evil. Even Burchard of Worms, ίη the early eleventh century, a man usually regarded as extremely hostile to Christian approval of war, saw a role for legitimate warfare fought with good intent. 4 The First Crusade only appeared as the beginning of a coherent movement retrospectively when that movement existed, after 1187. This impression is confirmed by a closer look at papal responses. Here we find a reluctance to define the crusade as an institution, maybe because it was not regarded as such. Colin Morris has suggested one reason for this. Because Jerusalem was ίη Christian hands, 'there was ηο plan for an unrestricted offensive against the heathen and ηο need to discuss its justification.' He adds that 1. Bede, Ecclesiastical History, ed. Β. Colgrave and R. Α. Β. Mynors (Oxford, 1967), esp. bks. ίί and Gilchrist, 'Papacy and War', 179-83; Άnnals' and 'Revised Annals of τhe Kingdom of the Franks', in Charlemagne: Translated Sources, ed Ρ. D. King {N.p., 1987),passim; cf. p. 85, for papal absoluτion in ίίί;

the war against Tassilo of Bavaria. For contemporary Carolingian acceptance of church militancy, see

Veronese poem of the late eighτh century on Pippin of Iτaly's vicτory over τhe Avars, verses 4 and 13, and Ernoldus NigelJus's pre-840 poem 'In Honorem Hludovici Pii' regarding τhe Frankish conquesτ of the Frisians and Saxons, lines 275 and 281-4: both in Ρ. Godman, Poetry of the Carolingian Renaissance (Oxford, 1985), pp. 188-91, 254-5. Βuτ cf. Alcuin's essenτially pacifisτ response το τhe sack of Lindisfarne in 793 (ibid., pp. Ι26-39). 2. For Lucius 11, see τhe references in J. KelJy, The Oxford Dictionary of the Popes (Oxford, 1986), p. 172; Η. Zimmermann (ed.), Papstregesten, 911-1024 (Vienna, 1969), ηο. 34, p. 14, and no. 3 5, p. 15; Liutprand of Cremona, Ήistoria Ottonis', Opera, ed. J. Becker (Hanover/Leipzig, 191 5), pp. 166-7; Gilchrisτ, 'Papacy and War', 179 ff. 3. Ralph of Beτhlehem: William of Tyre, Ήisτoria Rerum in Partibus Transmarinis Gestarum', RHC Occ. , i-2, p. 162; Β. Hamilτon, The Latin Church in the Crusader States (London, 1980), pp.117-18, 123, !25, 13-1, 157, 164-5. Rainald νοn Dassel: R. Munz,Frederick Barbarossa (London, 1969), esp. p.95 and refs. Hubert Walτer: ltinerarium Peregrinorum et Gesta Regis Ricardi, ed. W. Stubbs (RS, London, 1864), p. 116. Boniface of Savoy: Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, ed. Η. R. Luard (7 vols., RS, London, 1872-83), v. 121-2. Bishop Despenser: R. Β. Dobson, The Peasants' Revolt (London, 1970), pp. 236-8, 259--61. 4. Gilchrist, 'Papacy and War', 174-9. τhe

VI ΙΝ ΤΗΕ TWELFTH CENTURY?

559

pilgrimage and the military orders, not the crusade, provided the link between the Holy Sepulchre and the West. 1 But this ίs only part of the answer. Between the rare papally-launched general expeditions, men took the cross to go east, and many were armed and fought: for example, during Hugh de Payens' recruitment tour ίη 1128 and οη the departure of Fulk of Anjou ίη 1129, the military objectives were explicit. 2 Although ίt was only ίη 1146-8 that a general expediτion was achieved, the papacy was involved ίη a number of plans which, if effected, could have led to similar campaigns, as ίη 1106, ΙΙ 50, 1157, 1165, 1169, 1181, and 1184-5. 3 Each occasion demonstrated the limitations of papal power and, after 11 50, commitment. Ιη 1106, Paschal ΙΙ gave Bohemond a papal banner and appointed as legate Bruno of Segni, a veteran of Urban II's preaching tour of 1095-6. Α new via sancti sepulchri or ire Hierusalem was preached at a council held ίη Poitiers. The only practical result was Bohemond's unsuccessful attack οη Epirus ίη 1107-8, a final outcome, for all Steven Runciman's chill condemnation, not necessarily envisaged by the pope. 4 Papal loss of control of crusades was, after all, a constant feature of the Middle Ages. Ιη 11 5ο, Eugenius ΠΙ was involved ίη a scheme to redeem the disasters of the Second Crusade by a new expedition to the East. St Bernard himself tentatively accepted leadership of this enterprise, perhaps to vindicate his role ίη launching the Second Crusade. Any prospect of a new expedition was vitiated by conflicting objectives: either Outremer, after the military disaster of Inab ίη 1149, or an assault οη Byzantium, as preferred by the Sicilians and some French. But Eugenius ΠΙ, ίη his bull Immensum pietatis opus of April 1150, was distinctly lukewarm. 5 What finally killed the idea was the explosion of criticism of the Second Crusade, and even of the crusading ideal itself, hostility which was still vivid twenty years later. Ιη a letter of ΙΙ69 from the entourage of Thomas Becket, the Second Crusade was condemned as 'grievous το the Church', being an illustration that 'gifts offered from theft and wrongdoing are not pleasing το God'. The same letter mocked the reputation as a holy warrior of William IV of Nevers, who had died in Palestine of a Papal Monarchy, pp. 277-80. Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, sub anno Ι 128, in English Historical Documents, νο1. ii, ed. D. C. Douglas (London, 1953), p. 195; William of Tyre, Ήisτoria', p. 40; Gesta Ambaziensium Dominoτum, Chroniques d'Anjou, ed. Ρ. Machegay and Α. Salmon (Paήs, 18 56), p. 205 (cf. Fulk's visiτ of 1120 which was, apparently, explicitly penitential: Orderic Vita!is, Eccl. Hist., vί. 310). Cf. Calixtus II's auτho­ rization of a crusade and the Venetian response in 1122-4: J. Riley-Smith, 'The Venetian Crusade of 1122-4', in / communi italiani nel regno di Gerusalemme, ed. Β. Kedar (Genoa, 1986), pp. 337-50. 3. On papal policy in the twelfth century, see E.-D. Hehl, Kirche und Krieg im 12. Jahrhundert (Stuttgart, 1980), and Morήs, Papal Monarchy. More specifically: R. C. Smail, 'Laτin Syria and τhc West, 1ψ/-Ι 187', T[ransactions of thej R[oyal} H[istorical] S[ociety, μh ser.J, χίχ (1969), 1-20. 4. S. Runciman, History of the Crusades (Cambridge, 1951-4), ii. 46-9 (p. 48: 'The interests of Chrisτendom as a whole werc to be sacrificed to τhe interests of Frankish adventurers'); J. G. Rowe, 'Paschal ΙΙ, Bohemond of Antioch and the Byzanτine Empire', Bulletin of the John Rylands Library, xlix (1966), 165-202; Orderic Viτalis, Eccl. Hist., vi. 68-73; Suger, Vie de Louis le Gros, pp.44-51. 5. Ε. Vacandard, Vie de Saint Bernard, abbe de Clairvaux (2 vols., Paris, 1895 ), ii. 4 39-46. RHGF, xv. 457, no.65. 1.

2.

Morήs,

VI WERE THERE

ΑΝΥ

CRUSADES

fever, and who, said the writer, 'was not even killed by Parthian darts or Syrian swords, so that ηο hero's glorious death could bring him consolation; but widow's tears, poor men's sorrow and complaints of churches are thought to have snuffed him out ingloriously.' 1 Ιη such an atmosphere, papal approval of crusading was liable to be cautious. Repeated calls for assistance from the East received muted replies. One reason for this was the widespread suspicion of the pullani, the inhabitants of Outremer (who were in ηο formal sense crusaders at all). W esterners, reared οη the increasingly embroidered legends of heroism from the First Crusade, often failed to grasp the policies and habits of those who lived permanently in the Levant. 2 Moreover, as Morris remarks, with Jerusalem in Christian hands the rhetoric of Clermont was inappropriate. 3 When it became suitable, after r r 87, the response from a generation wedded to the Jerusalem pilgrimage was massive. Domestic problems also distracted papal attention: enemies in Italy (from the r r 30s to r r70s) and Germany (from the r r 50s to r r 70s); the feuding of French provincial dynasties, characteristic of the period to the r r40s, then partly subsumed in the feuding between Capetians and Angevins from the r r 50s; and οη the frontiers of Christendom, in Spain and Germany, local holy causes which occupied putative crusaders to Palestine. Inevitably, with this absence of political concentration οη the Holy Land (often forgotten by crusader historians), papal responses lacked originality. Ιη r r65, Alexander ΠΙ replied to appeals from the East merely by reissuing Quantum praedecessores; and two other of his encyclicals, lnter omnia (r r69) and Cor nostrum (r r8 r), were heavily, if inconsistently, dependent upon Eugenius III's model, a pattern of unadventurous plagiarism continued by Lucius ΠΙ when he reissued Cor nostrum in r r 84-5. The contrast between these cautious and conservative encyclicals and Gregory VIII's explosive Audita tremendi of r r 87 is striking in urgency, originality, theological apparatus and tone. Υ et even here the indulgences, legal immunities and sumptuary proposals followed very closely those of Quantum praedecessores. 4 Ιη r r 76, when Pope Alexander called upon the chivalry of France to go to assist Manuel Ι Comnenus secure a road to the Holy Sepulchre across Asia 1. Letters of ]ohn of Salisbury, ed. W. J. Miller and C. Ν. L. Brooke, νοl. ίί (Oxford, 1979), p.6μ, no. 187; C. J. Tyerman, England and the Crusades (Chicago, 1988), pp. 37-8; Ε. Siberry, Criticism of Crusading (Oxford, 1985), esp. pp. 190-1 (cf. pp. 77-80). 2. On τhe early developmenτ of these legends, see Μ. Bennett, 'First Crusaders' Images of Muslims: The Influence of Vernacular Poetry', Forum fοτ Modern Languages Studies, xxii, no. 2 (1986), 101-22; for a different emphasis, Ν. Daniel, Heroes and Saracens (Edinburgh, 1984), passim. Roberτ of Normandy even had false legends - such as his refusal of the crown of Jerusalem and his splitting of a Muslim emir into rwo- concocted during his lifetime: e.g. pre-1125 (Robert died in 1134), William of Malmesbury, Gesta regum Anglorum, ed. W. Stubbs (2 vols., RS, London, 1887-9), ίί . 433,460,461. 3. Morris, Papal Monarchy, pp. 277-8. 4. PL, clxxx, cols. 1064-6; cc, cols. 384-6, 599-601, 1294-6; Smail, 'Latin Syήa and the West', 18; R. Hiesτand (ed.), 'Papsωrkunden fίir Templer und Johanniτer', Abhandlungen deτ Akademie der Wissenschaften in Gδttingen, lxxvii ( 197 2), nos. 165, 175. For Audita tτemendi ( 29 Oct. 1 187 ), see Roger of Howden, Gesta regis Henrici Secundi, ed. W. Sωbbs (2 vols., RS, London, 1867), ii. 15-19, and Α. Chroust (ed.), Ήistoria de Expeditione Friderici Imperatoris', MGHS (Berlin, 1928), ν. 6-10.

VI ΙΝ ΤΗΕ TWELFTH CENTURY?

Minor, he did not explicitly mention any spiritual rewards. 1 For much of the 1160s and 1170s, Alexander appeared more concerned το use the cause of the Holy Land as a diplomatic lever το move Henry ΙΙ and Louis VII towards reconciliation. 2 One novel approach was proposed in 11 57 by the English pope, Hadrian IV. Apart from appealing for warriors το hasten το free and defend the Holy Places, he offered indulgences το those who, unable το campaign in person, instead sent horses, military equipment and other aid. This extension of penitential advantages το those indirectly involved was το become a pivotal feature of crusading from the reign of lnnocent ΠΙ onwards. But there is little sign of Hadrian's offer being taken up, let alone built upon in practice or theory. 3 Yet it was not as if τwelfth-century popes held back from sanctioning war or associating spiriτual benefits with it, any more than they had in the previous three centuries, as in the cases of Leo IV (847-5 5) and John VIII (872-82). 4 Papal supporters in Flanders, Germany and ltaly continued to receive remission of sins. At Pisa in 113 5 those who fought against the antipope Anacletus were offered the same indulgence as Urban granted at Clermont.5 Elsewhere, good causes were frequently described by clerical commentators as attracting spiriτual rewards. Ιη 111 5, French royal troops attacking the bandit lord Thomas of Marle (himself a veteran of 1096-9) were described as 'the general assembly of the Christian army', who attacked Thomas's castle as an act of penance meriting salvation. 6 According to Henry of Huntingdon, the English soldiers who defeated the Scots at the Battle of the Standard in 1138 were assured by the bishop of the Orkneys of the justice of their cause, and that those who perished would enjoy remission of the penalties of their sins. 7 Across Europe national or communal interests attracted spiritual rewards. Full indulgences for the casualties of battle were offered το those who fought against routiers in Languedoc in I r 39 and against enemies of Norway in r 164. 8 Ιη1148, the German campaign against τhe W ends was explicitly linked to the Second Crusade by St Bernard. 9 Contemporaries depicted numerous campaigns in the lberian 1. Ρ. Jaffe, Regesιa Pontificum Romanorum, vol. ii (Leipzig 1886), p. 296, no. 1Ζ684. 2. Tyerman, England and the Crusades, ch. 2, esp. pp. 40-5. 3. RHGF, χν. 681-2; cf. Gelasius II's idea of indulgences commensurate wίτh material contributίons from non-parτicipants towards the siege of Saragossa, 10 Dec. 11 r8: ΡL, clxiii, col. 508, ηο. 2. 5. 4. MGH, Epistolae, vol. v (Berlin, 1898), p.601 ; vol. vii (Berlin, 19ΖΙ), pp. ΙΖ6--7. 5. On τhis aspect of τhe council of Pisa, see Ν. Housley, 'Crusades against Christians', Crusade and Settlement, p. 23. 6. Suger, Vie de Louis le Gros, pp. 174-6; Guibert of Nogent, Autobiogτaphie, ed. E.-R. Labande (Paris, 1981), p. 410; Orderic Viτalis, EccL Hist., vi. 258--9. 7. Henry of Huntingdon, Historia Angloτum, pp. 262-3; cf. his account of τhe speeches before τhe baττle of Lincoln (1141) by τhe leaders of boτh sides, each of which appealed το a just cause and God's active favour, alτhough wiτhout mention of indulgences: ibid., pp. 268-73. For a similar account of τhe bishop of τhe Orkneys: John of Hexham, in Simeon of Durham, Opeτa, ed. Τ. Arnold (RS, London, 1885), ii. 293. 8. Housley, 'Crusades againsτ Christians', pp. 24-6. 9. Bernard, Epistolae, no. 467; Letteτs of St Beτnaτd, no. 394.

VI WERE THERE

ΑΝΥ

CRUSADES

peninsular and western Mediterranean in 1147-9 in ways equivalent to expeditions to the Holy Land, although they were essentially continuations of local enterprises aimed at territorial or commercial gain. The Genoese attack on Almeria in 1146 was described in an entirely secular way, but the same writer, Caffaro, placed the successful capture of Almeria the following year in the context of religious conflict and papal authorization. 1 Ιη 1166, the Synod of Segovia promised anyone who fought for Castile remission of enjoined penance 'as he would gain by going to Jerusalem', although whether this can be taken as meaning the Jerusalem pilgrimage or crusade is typically unclear. 2 Α diversity of ecclesiastical authority for such indulgences, by no means all papal, is evident, suggesting that, despite the activity and rhetoric, the papacy did not construct a new institution and that, in any case, it would have been difficult to achieve any uniformity of application. This is not to say that the events of the First Crusade had no effect. The model of U rban ΙΙ' s holy war was adapted and applied to campaigns against the Moslems in Spain and the western Mediterranean. Members of the Italian and Catalan expedition to the Balearic islands (1114-16) were given crosses and indulgences, an offer applied by Calixtus ΙΙ in 112 3 more generally to all who fought the infidel in Spain. At the Lateran Council of 1123, the Jerusalem privileges of 1095 were explicitly associated with campaigning in the Iberian peninsular. However, this application was not universal or consistent. In 1 118, in the pre- 109 5 tradition, Gelasius ΙΙ offered plenary remission of sins only to those who died in the siege of Saragossa. Similarly, the northern ltalian involvement in the Balearic campaign should be compared with the Pisan and Genoese attack οη Mahdia in 1087, which had equally been surrounded by the language of pilgrimage and holy war. The account of the successful siege of Santarem in March 1147 talked of God choosing 'new wars in our days' and called the achievement miraculous. But there are no specifically crusading elements, such as indulgences or pilgrimage. The banner raised over Santarem was that of the king of Portugal. Α few months later, at Lisbon, it was the banner of the cross the same king displayed in triumph. 3 Here, as elsewhere, novelty and tradition are difficult to disentangle, probably because contemporaries were unaware of distinctions observed by modern historians. 1. Caffaro, Άnnales lanuenses', ed. L. Τ. Belgrano, Fonti per 1a storia d'ltalia, vol. ii (Rome, 1890), pp. 33-5; Ύstoria captionis Almarie et Turtuose', ibid., pp. 79-89; Constable, 'Second Crusade', 226-35. 2. Ρ. Linehan, The Synod of Segovia (1166)', Bulletin of Medieval Canon Law, χ (1980), 42. 3. PL) clxii, col. 5 ι 5, for Lorenzo of Verona's accounτof recruiτmenτ forthe Balearic campaign. For Calixtus's letter of 2April1123: D. Mansilla, La documentacion pontifica hasta /nnocencio /// (Rome, 1955), no.62; and for the ΙΙ23 Lateran decree: J. D. Mansi, Sacrorum Conciliorum Collectio (FlorenceNenice, 1759-98), χχί, col. 284. ForGelasius Il's !etterof 1 ΙΙ8: PL, clxii, col. 508, no. 25; Η. Ε. J. Cowdrey, 'The Mahdia Campaign of 1087', ante, χcίί (1977), 1-29; 'De expugnatione Scalabis', pp.94-5; De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi, ed. C. W. David (New York, 1936), p. 175. ln general: R. Α. Fletcher, 'Reconquest and Crusade in Spain, c. 1050-11 50', TRHS, xxxvii (1987), 31-47; Bull, Knightly Piety, ch. 2 .

VI ΙΝ ΤΗΕ TWELFTH CENTURY?

The same can be said of the formulae of crusading which infected political responses to national wars, as ίη Spain ίη 1166 or the Baltic ίη 1148, and the literature of war. In Geoffrey of Monmouth's History of the Kings of Britain (1136), before Arthur's battle with the pagan Saxons, Archbishop Dubricius exhorts the Christian troops: Ύou who have been marked with the sign of the Christian faith .. . if any of you ίs killed ίη this war that death shall be to him as a penance and an absolution for all his sins.' 1 These motifs would have been familiar alike to the educated cleric who had heard the eρic accounts of the First Crusade and the layman who had listened to the early redactions of the crusade chansons. But ίt is almost impossible to identify what is old and what new: honour; justice; defence of home, country and comrades; God's favour; salvation for those who die; absolution; and remission of sιns.

One source which, perhaps more than most, illustrates this confluence of tradition and innovation is the anonymous, possibly eyewitness account of the siege of Lisbon ίη 1147, the De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi, long taken as an example of the establishment and extension of crusading. 2 What actually emerges from the De Expugnatione is an enterprise ideologically much less distinct or coherent than might be expected after the celebratory accounts of the First Crusade by contemporaries -or even modern crusader camp-followers. Ιη its lack of clarity and definition, the De Expugnatione shows how the actiνity of crusading could not, and cannot, be disassociated from pre-existing and concurrent attίtudes to legitimate war, and how crusading as a distinct attitude to war, at least by the time the text was written, probably ίη mid-century, had failed to alter patterns of military endeavour, even when that endeavour was part of a crusade. Α key passage ίη the De Expugnatione is the famous speech ίη which the Bishop of Oporto tries to persuade the crusaders to turn aside from their voyage to Palestine and help the king of Portugal capture Lisbon from the Moors. Often quoted is the Bishop's remark: 'The praiseworthy thing is not to have been to Jerusalem but to have lived a good life while οη the way.' 3 Yet ίη some ways this sermon, whether delivered or not, was unnecessary. It had long been accepted that fighting the infidel was meritorious, not least ίη the Iberian peninsular. Crusaders ίη 1096-9 had stopped en route το capture Moslem cities both οη and off the route. The Bishop of Oporto seems to be trying to persuade crusaders to do what they would have been happy to do anyway, their stated reservations being pragmatic and tactical, not ideological. Of course, although sometimes taken as such, the Bishop' s speech was not a crusade ,. Geoffrey of Monmouτh, Historia Regum Britanniae, ed. Α. Gήscom and R. Ellis Jones (London, 1929), pp. 437-8; L. Thorpe's τransla1ion, History of tbe Kings of Britain (London, 1966), p. 216, infers, almost certainly correcτly, that 'professione insigniti' implies the sign of the cross. 2. De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi. 3. Ibid., pp. 70--85 (p. 78 for τhe quoτaτion, which is a play on words from a letter of Sτ Jerome το Paulinus).

VI WERE THERE

ΑΝΥ

CRUSADES

sermon. Το divert the crusaders' iter, he falls back οη the traditional themes of the bellum justum: self-defence, right intent, rightful possession, just cause, divine authority. Here at least, despite Gilchrist's argument that there was little Augustinian theory ίη twelfth-century martial rhetoric, is a strongly Augustinian justification. Although the weight of quotation is biblical, there are references to Ambrose, J erome, Isidore of Seville and John Chrysostom as well as Augustine, all of which suggest that the author, or his source, was ηο run-of-the-mill hedge-priest. 1 lndeed, the whole speech parallels Gratian's Causa 23. The Bishop of Oporto, in his initial appeal, stops short of offering explicit spiritual rewards, merely a share in the loot. Oblivious to the irony, he is following long custom when he declares: 'Quit you like good soldiers; for the sin is not waging war, but in waging war for the sake of plunder.' 2 With the right intent, then, the crusaders could - and did receive generous material payment. When, during the assault itself, the Bishop and an anonymous cleric, possibly the author, offer absolution and remission of sins- but only for those who die ίη battle and only after fresh absolution, beyond the contract of the crusaders' vows - they are also following a tradition which had papal approval as far back as the early ninth century. 3 Like those who attacked Constantinople in 1204, the troops who assaulted Lisbon ίη 1147 ( or those who sacked Messina in 1 190 or Cyprus in 1191) were conducting battles familiar long before 1095: they were crusaders, in that they had taken the cross, but these battles did not fulfil their vows. 4 The reaction of the lay crusaders in De Expugnatione is equally devoid of any awareness of a new knighthood. The Flemish and Rhinelanders are portrayed as bloodthirsty and greedy despite 'the guise of pilgrimage and religion'. One group of Anglo-Normans preferred to push οη into the Mediterranean unless payment and subsistence could be guaranteed. Most telling of all are the views attributed to the hero of the account, Hervey de Glanvill. Ιη persuading the doubters to join the Lisbon siege he appealed, like Brian FitzCount and Eugenius ΠΙ, to 'the vίrtues of our ancestors', the valour of the Norman race, glory and 'the counsels of honour', harqly specific crusading qualities. 5 Unlike accounts of the First Crusade, there is little consciousness of uniqueness, of being the new Maccabees, the militia of Christ. (There is not much more in the account of Louis VIl's crusade by Odo of Deuil 1. Ibid., pp. 78-82 (the patήstic references were almost certainly not taken directly from the originals); Gilchrist, 'Papacy and War', 189-90; Cowdrey, 'Canon Law and the First Crusade', passίm . 2. De Expugnatίone Lyxbonensί, p. 83. 3. Ibid., pp. 126-7, 146-59; Gilchrist, 'Papacy and War', 182 and n. 43, for references and quotations. 4. Cf. the renewed absolution for the crusaders at Constantinople in the winter of 1202-4 and the arguments employed by the clergy then: Geoffrey de Villehardouin, De Ια conquete de Constantinoble, ed. Ρ. Paris (Paris, 1838), pp. 71-2. 5. De Expugnatίone Lyxbonensi, pp. 134-5; pp.104-11, for Glanvill's spcech; pp. 104-5, for the rcsistance of the V eils; passim, for hosτjle comments οπ τhe actions and motiνes of the Flemish and Rhinelanders.

VI ΙΝ ΤΗΕ TWELFTH CENTUR Υ?

either.) 1

At Lisbon, even the final military confrontation is seen in terms which owe nothing to crusading as such. Α parley was arranged with the Moors 'so that we might not appear to be attacking except unwillingly'. Το establish a just ι:ause, the Moslems are requested το surrender their rule of what had b~en Christian land. Then, in the manner of twelfthcentury chansons de geste, Christian indignation is aroused by Moslem blasphemy and taunts at the possible misbehaviour of the crusaders' wives left at home. ln general, a chivalric gloss is given το the conflict, which is called a 'trial of the sword', with God as the judge. 2 This chivalric strain is echoed in the precisely contemporary crusading song, 'Chevalier, mult estes granz', where the Second Crusade is described as a tournament between Hell and Paradise ('un turnei enpris entre Enfer e Pareis').3 The fusion of traditional behaviour and fresh attiτudes is apparent throughout the Second Crusade. As has already been remarked, the freedom with which St Bernard shaped and developed his preaching, even to the point of apparently embracing Sibylline prophecies of the Last Emperor, testifies to a lack of definition in the crusade. 4 Observers recognized that some of the expeditions of 1146-8 had particular features, especially those destined for the Holy Land. But in many τheatres of war, in Spain, the western Mediterranean and the Baltic, religious elements were grafted on το existing political ambitions. Normal temporal aspirations were not suspended. Possibly because of the Second Crusade's outcome, the language of its participants tended το be less spiritually intense than that used of the First. 5 lt is a measure of the combination of the secular and the spiritual that Conrad 111 and Louis VII, like Hervey de Glanvill, thought their crusades offered hope of temporal fame . In July 1147, in a letter to Wibald of Corvey, Conrad expressed the hope that his journey would lead to 'the prosperity of the whole Church and the honour of our realm'. Louis echoed the sentiment, writing from Antioch in the spring of 1148: Έither we shall never return or we shall come back with glory for God and the kingdom of the Franks.'6 The central point is that there was little that was new. However, this continuation of earlier church attitudes and papal policy has been misinterpreted as being a consequence of the First Crusade or, at least, of the initiatives of the Gregorian papacy. The First Crusade may have confirmed or extended existing beliefs in the goodness of battle and may 1. Odo of Deuil, De Pτofectione, passim. z. De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi, pp. 122-3, for the 'τrial of the sword'; pp. 1 ι4-25, for τhe challenge and τhe Muslim reply; pp. 130--μ, for Muslim taunting. 3. Bedier, Chansons de cτoisade, p. ,ο. 4. H.-D. Kahl, 'Crusade Eschatology as Seen by St Bernard in the Υ ears ι 146-8', Second Cτusade and Cisteτcians, pp. 35-47, esp. pp. 42-3. 5. E.g. the unemotional account, by τhe priesτ Duodechlin of Lahnsτein, of τhe capture of Lisbon by a naval expediτion. Miracles only appeared as post hoc signs of divine approval: MGHS, xvii. 27-8. 6. Ρ. Jaffe, Monumenta Coτbeiensia (Berlin, 1864), p. 126, no. 48; RHGF, χν. 495-.

VI WERE THERE

ΑΝΥ

CRUSADES

eventually have aided the growth of intellectual structures within which the perception of that goodness could be translated into specific, popularly intelligible rewards, spiritual and material. But, as Gilchrist has suggested, ίt can hardly be said to have done so ίη Causa 2 3 of Gratian' s Decretum (1140). Despite its extensive and detailed discussion of ecclesiastically sanctioned warfare, Causa 2 3 ignores anything that could be called specifically crusading, an omission not rectified by canonists for more than half a century. 1 Thus the debate about the centrality or not of so-called 'political' or non-Holy Land 'crusades' misses the point. There was holy war ίη the twelfth as ίη earlier centuries which attracted spiritual benefits of various sorts. For some of these wars, fairly randomly except when they were directed towards the Holy Land, warriors adopted the cross, perhaps to evoke the morale of the First Crusade. But to worry, with Professor Housley, as to whether in such cases 'the full apparatus of the crusade was brought to bear' is to suppose that such apparatus existed. 2 If, as Housley claims, there had emerged 'by 1198, a fairly stable group of crusading instίtutions centring on the legal ceremony for taking the cross', ίt was a development which largely post-dated 1187. 3 The main institutional novelty before 1187 connected wίth crusading was the development of the military orders. They were quickly accepted. By the early 1140s, the conservative Orderic Vitalis was describing their members as 'admirable knights who devote their lives to the bodily and spiritual service of God and, rejecting all things of this world, face martyrdom daily'. 4 But to join the Templars, at home or, as many did, ίη the East, was not synonymous with becoming a crusader: ίt was an alternatίve. The commitment and experience were of a different nature. The military orders were obviously one inheritance from the First Crusade, but they served a minority and did not necessarily accelerate the elaboration of the theory or practice of crusading. 5 Rather they were seen, as by St Bernard, as a new stage ίn the much older process of the Christianizing of knighthood. 6 The legacy of the First Crusade certainly included distinctive ceremonial adoption of the cross and the enjoyment of some sort of remission of the penalties of sin (or, 1. Gilchrisτ, Έrdmann

Thesis',passim and esp.

η.63 .

Housley, 'Crusades against Christians', p. 3 1. 3. Ibid. Hoυsley's argument, sτressing continuity and fusion of forms, supports my contentions,

2.

a misleading τypology which seτs 'crusade' and 'ecclesiastical warfare' at odds, in need fusion' by Innocent !11. My argument is τhaτ lnnocent ΠΙ transformed one sort of

buτ he mainτains

of

'juήdical

ecclesiastical warfare into juridical crusading.

4. Orderic Viτalis, EccL Hist., νi. 310. 5. Οη the contrast wiτh secular knighthood, Α. Grabois, 'Militia and Malitia: The Bernardine Vision of Chivalry', Second Cτusade and Cisteτcians, pp. 49-56; in general, Μ. Barber, The New Knighthood (Cambridge 1993), pp. 1-114. Cf. also τhose whotemporarily attached τhemselves το τhe orders, but had not taken τhe cross. 6. Ίτ is ηοτ from the accident of war but from the disposition of the heart that either peril or victory is allotted το the Christian': St. Bernard, 'De Laude Novae Miliτiae, ίη Opeτa, iii. 215; translaτed by L. and J. Riley-Smiτh, The Cτusades, pp. 102-3.

VI ΙΝ ΤΗΕ TWELFTH CENTURY?

as Eugenius ΠΙ called iτ simply, 'remission of sins') and an array of temporal privileges associated with those of pilgrims: in Quantum praedecessores these included protection by τhe Church, legal immunity for the duration of the expedition, permission to raise mortages and a moratorium οη the repayment of debts. 1 However, formal organization was rudimentary and papal and ecclesiastical control unsystematic. The origins of crusade institutions at a local level are extremely obscure. Contemporaries, ηο less τhan modern historians, could be perplexed. 2 The First Crusade lent pilgrimage το the Holy Land a new dimension, but did not create a separate tradition. The twelfth century was the golden age of pilgrimage to the Holy Land, not least for reasons of practicality. However, the distinction between a pilgrim and a crusader is often hard to detect, an uncertainty which reflected reality. Not all armed pilgrims fought, and not all westerners who did fight in Syria had necessarily taken the cross. Ιη r r 72, Henry the Lion, Duke of Saxony, led a substantial armed pilgrimage to Jerusalem, but neither the images of crusading nor the intent to fight were involved. It is wholly unclear whether the pilgrims described by Albert of Aachen as eager for the fray ίη r 102 or r ro7 had adopted the cross or not. The sources do not mention ίt, not do they distinguish between crusader and pilgrim because all are called peregrini. Those settled in the East ίη defence of the Holy Land rarely if ever took the cross. 3 Pilgrimage and crusade were fused together. Crusaders bore the staff and satchel of the pilgrim; pilgrims bore crosses and carried arms. Both shared an indiscriminate vocabulary of the peregrinatio, as well as some of the privileges and the status of quasi-ecclesiastics. Louis VII of France took τhe cross at Vezelay at Easter r r 46 and the pilgrim' s wallet at St Denis ίη June Ι 146, his response to the pull of crusade as distinct from pilgrimage being decidedly ambivalent if Professor Grabois is το be believed. 4 Ιη charters of the twelfth century, it is rarely possible το distinguish the two exercises: Giles Constable's analysis of charter evidence which claims το show how crusades were funded applies equally, indeed identically, to pilgrims. As Constable himself admits: 'The charters gave ηο evidence ... that [the crusader] differed in any

1. Caspar, 'Kreuzzugsbullen', 300-5; PL, clxxx, cols. 1064--6. For τhe confusion of a panel of clerics facing a claim το crusader immuniτy ίn 1106-7: PL, clxii, cols. 176-7 and infra, p. 571, n. 2. 3. J. S. C. Riley-Smiτh, 'Peace Never Established: The Case of τhe Kingdom of Jerusalem', TRHS, xxviii (1978), 87-8, 94-5 and n. 47, 102; cf. id., 'Venetian Crusade'; William of Tyre, Ήisτoria',p. 549, ίs silent on τhe doge's status in 1124, the implication being τhaτ he was a pilgrim; Albert of Aachen, Ήisτoria Hierosolymitana', pp. 595-7, 600-1, 632-4; Κ. Jordan, Henry tbe Lion, trans. Ρ. S. Falla (Oxford 1986), pp. 150-4. 4. Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, pp. 8-11, 14-19; Α. Grabois, 'The Crusade of Louis VII: Α Reconsideraτion', Crusade and Settlement, pp. 94-104; cf. τhe disτincτly non-marτial τοηe of the reference το Louis's crusade in the Second Crusade song ~cheνalier, Mult Estes Guariz': Bedier, Cbansons de croisade, p. 8. 2.

VI WERE THERE

ΑΝΥ

CRUSADES

essential respect from other pilgrims, or that he was required to go with any army or to fight the pagans, though many of them did.' 1 lt is often presumed that those who adopted the cross, following the action of the First Crusaders, did so consciously to signal their martial intentions. Those who abandoned Robert of Normandy's army at Bari in 1096 marked their departure by 'taking up again their pilgrim staves'. 2 The cross was closely identified with the special form of penitential warfare begun in 1096 and, as Michael Markowski has noticed, came to be associated panicularly, although not exclusively, with expeditions to the Holy Land. 3 Although commonly referred to as peregrini, from 1097 at the latest crusaders were distinguished as being 'signed with the cross'. 4 The GestaFrancorum describes how crusaders sewed crosses οη to their garments. 5 By the first Lateran Council of 112 3, beside the language of pilgrimage, popes referred to warriors assuming the cross: for instance Eugenius 111 ίη 114 5 and 1148, Alexander ΠΙ in 1169 and 1181, and Gregory VIII ίη 1187.6 Υ et chroniclers continued to use the word 'pilgrim' indiscriminately, even eyewitnesses such as William of Tyre. Perhaps he did not see much of a difference? The notions of unarmed pilgrimage and armed crusade were less discrete than the apparent conτradiction of purpose and function might imply. The cross tended to suggest violence. But this was not universal. The English hermit, Godric of Finchale (d. 1170 ), according to his late twelfth-century biographer, visited Palestine twice. Οη each occasion he conτented himself wiτh seeing the Holy Places, fasting and other selfimposed physical privations. Υet Godric had apparently taken the cross both times and had borne the vexillum crucis throughouτ his pilgrimages.7 The biography gives pause to those seeking easy categorization of crusade and pilgrimage. Orderic Vitalis, writing a few years afτer the event, describes the reaction of those supporters of William Clito ηοτ pardoned by Henry I after William's death in 1128: ' ... many others, distressed by their master's death, took the Lord's cross and, becoming exiles for Christ's sake, set οuτ for his sepulchre in Jerusalem.' 8 This 1. Constable, 'Medieval Charters', p. 77; for τhe relevant discussion on the invisibility of crusading in charters, pp. 74-7 and, generally, pp. 73-89. Cf. id., 'Financing of the Crusades', which suffers from the same evidentia] problem. 2. Fulcher of Chartres, Ήistoria Iherosolymitana', RHC Occ., iii.329. 3. Μ. Markowski, 'Crucesignatus: !ts Origins and Early Usage',Jouma/ of Medieval History, χ (1984), 157--{i5 . For bearing the cross against the Moors of the Balearic islands and Spain: Lorenzo of Verona, Όe Bello Balearico', PL, clxiiί, col. 515; Mansilla, La documentacion pontifica, no. 62; and supra, p. 562, η . 3. 4. Η. Hagenmeyer, Die Kreuzzugsbriefe aus den Jahren 1088- 1100 (lnnsbruck, 1902), p. 142. 5. Gesta Francorum et aliorum Hierosolimitanorum, ed. R. Hill (London, 1962), p. 7. 6. Mansi, Collectio, χχί, col. 2.84; PL, clxxx, cols. 1065, 1320; cc, co]s. 599-601, 1294-6; Howden, Gesιa Henrici, ii. 18-19. 7. Libellus de Vita et Miraculis S. Godrici Heremitae de Finchale , ed. J. Stevenson (Surtees Soc., 1847), pp. 33-4, 52-7; cf. William of Newburgh's account of Godric's visit το Jerusalem barefoot and ίη poverτy: Ήisτoria rerum Anglicarum', ed. R. Howlett, in Chronicles of the Reigns of Stephen, Η enry ΙΙ and Richard, vol. i, pt. 1 (RS, London, 1884), p. 149. 8. Orderic Viτalis, Eccl. Hist., vi. 379.

VI ΙΝ ΤΗΕ TWELFTH CENTURY?

may be regarded as euphemistic cover for a prudent act of selfpreservation in the face of political disaster. But whether they intended to fight or not is impossible to judge. This elision of themes, so characteristic of the period, is neatly summed up in a charter of r r 20, written οη behalf of one Guillaume le Veneur from Τ ouraine who was declared to have 'accepted the cross as a sign of his pilgrimage (in signum peregrinationis )' .1 The development of the liturgical rite for taking the cross confirms this conjunction of practices. ]. Α. Brundage finds ηο expliciτ evidence of formal liturgical ceremonies from the first half of the τwelfth century. However, they may be presumed. Sτ Bernard dispensed crosses aτ V ezelay in r 146. Godric of Finchale had, his biographer claims, been given the cross on one occasion by a priest, and Guillaume le Veneur's charter indicates thaτ taking the cross was already, by r 120, a formal solemnization of a special pilgrimage νοw. The ceremony began explicitly to be associated with a particular form of pilgrimage: Guillaume le Veneur's charter describes τaking the cross as 'the habit of these kinds of pilgrims', and a mid-τwelfτh-cenτury Angevin observed τhat Fulk of Anjou's assumpτion of the cross in π28 was 'following τhe custom of such pilgrimages'. 2 Unfortunately, the sources fail to make clear exactly what was disτinctive about these journeys. Was it that they had military intent (unlikely, in view of Godric's experience), or, perhaps, that they were directed towards Jerusalem? Perhaps each region was different. If so, that may account for a flexibiliτy of application in, say, Iτaly, while in northern France (where the two sources were written), the cross implied a Jerusalem pilgrimage. This uncertainty in the evidence may itself support the idea τhat even the giving of the cross implied no sharply defined or uniformly applied institution. All surviving τwelfτh-century rites for taking the cross so far discovered are closely associated with ceremonies for departing pilgrims. 3 Two particular feaτures of such ceremonies are worth emphasizing. First, in papal references, taking the cross marked the moment when the offered privileges came into force, the wearing of the cross being a sign of the validity of the claim to protection. As Michael Clanchy has shown, such a ceremonial guarantee of a contract was commonplace in a society in which literacy was still patchy among the secular elites. 4 The symbol rather than the letter secured the contract. Some of the surviving rites from the twelfth century confirm the papal linkage between taking 1. Chartes de St. Julien de Tours, ed. L. J. Denis (2 vols., Le Mans, 1912-13), ί. 87-8, no. 67. J. Α. Brundage, 'Crucesignari: The Riτe for Taking τhe Cross in England', Traditio, χχίί ( 1966), 289-310; Odo of Deuil, De Profectione, pp. 8-11; Vita Godrici, p. 33 (where the cross was given by a pήest); Chronica de Gestis Consulum Andegavorum, Chroniques d'Anjou, p. 152; Chartes de St. Julien de Tours, ί, ηο. 67. 3. Brundage, 'Crucesignari',passim; Κ. Penningτon, 'The Riτe for Talcing τhe Cross ίη the Twelfτh Cenrury', Traditio, χχχ (1974), 429-35· 4. See supra, p. 566, η. 3; Μ. Clanchy, From Memory to Written Record (London, 1979), esp. pp. 244-8, for crosses. 2.

VI WERE THERE

57°

ΑΝΥ

CRUSADES

the cross and protection, but οη a much broader and more fundamental level. As the so-called Lambrecht Pontifical of the second half of the twelfth century has it, the cross is a sign of God's protection and a surety of personal immunity from dangers both physical and spiritual: Άccept the sign of the cross of Christ in heart and body so that you may be protected from all your enemies and from all wiles of the Devil.' 1 This formula remained unchanged for centuries. The cross was more than a focus of piety, a symbol of devotion, a public confirmation of a vow or, like a pilgrim's badge, a sign of the wearer's special status. lt was a talisman, appealing to the deepest anxieties of the traveller and warrior, a guarantee of safety as well as salvation. As such, the pacific Godric of Finchale had as much need of it as Richard the Lionheart. Another significant aspect of the surviving twelfth-century rites is that while they are all linked το pilgrim ceremonies, they are different from each other. 2 The impression is that there was ηο standard ceremony for taking the cross. lndeed, despite the inclusion of a rite in the thirteenth-century Roman Pontifical, there remained ηο standard ceremony for the rest of the Middle Ages. Ιη the face of increasing attempts το impose uniformity and in view of the importance attached by the papacy to crusading after ΙΙ 87, this is remarkable. But it exposes one characteristic of twelfth-century crusading too easily belittled by those historians in search of precise canonistic definitions: diversity of local custom and individual response was the norm. The papacy was not in control of a homogeneous movement. Disparity of practice, uncertainty of focus and the absence of legal definition suggest an elusive and protean phenomenon. The crusade meant different things for different people, both at different times and at the same time. That is not το deny the seriousness of crusading, nor the new range of experiences associated with it. But these functioned as part of existing habits and traditions and, in the twelfth century, marked ηο sharply defined new era beyond the occupation, and thus accessibility, of the Holy Places. The development of crusading as an institution depended οη its familiarity, not its novelty; οη its acceptability, as much as its challenge. If the activity was innovative in being especially physically demanding, the tensions which it assuaged - spiritual, social, political or economic - were not. This new exercise was obviously not without effect. Crusaders' privileges, for example, had extensive implications, their legal and fiscal immunity being guaranteed by the Church and upheld, in theory, by the

1.

Pennington, 'Rite', 4 3 3, laτe twelfτh-century, possibly Italian; cf. similarly wide protecτive powers

in the so-called Bari Pontifical (ibid. 432). For a fourteenth-century example: Α. Franz, Die kirchlichen Benediktionen im Mittelalter, vol. ii (Freiburg im Breisgau, 1909), p. 284. 2. See the examples in Brundage, 'Crucesignari', and Pennington, 'Riτe'. As Pennington noτes (p. 43 Ι ), the differences, even when not great, suggest 'an ad hoc basis, without having many established models on which to rely .... Perhaps the crusade was ηοτ considered το be more than an ephemeral ecclesiasτical insτitution,

and

τhe liτurgical τeχτs reflecτ τhis

attitude. •

VI ΙΝ ΤΗΕ TWELFTH CENTURY?

57 1

authorities. 1 The

secular effectiveness or consistency of either is hard το assess, the evidence from the twelfth century being limited and contradictory. Ιη 1106, Hugh du Puiset, who had taken the cross το join Bohemond's crusade, appealed to Pope Paschal II το defend his and his vassals' property, threatened by Count Rotrou of Perche. Hugh claimed protection under papal decrees as a Ήierosolymitanus'. Paschal passed the buck το the archbishop of Sens and Ινο of Chartres. The latter, ίη turn, submitted the case το a committee of clerics who, ίη some confusion, were unable to decide between feudal rights and ecclesiastical immunity, not least because 'the institution of committing το the church's care the possessions of milites going το Jerusalem was new'. Ινο, ίη spite, or perhaps because, of his expertise as a canon lawyer, sent the case back to the Pope unresolved. Even if this instance is taken as a sign of the operation of crusading institutions, ίt is apparent that the local clergy had little idea of what το do. Furthermore, the immunity claimed by Hugh itself derived from Urban 11's association of the privileges of crusaders with those which existed under the earlier eleventh-century provisions of the Truce of God, as well as those customarily enjoyed by pilgrims. 2 Ιη Hugh du Puiset's case, any superior lay power was absent, which, although unsurprising ίη the final year of King Philip the Fat, may explain the ineffectiveness of the immunity. Local ecclesiastical officials remained unsure of their ground. Ιη November 1146, Eugenius 111 had to instruct the bishop of Salisbury that church jurisdiction did not extend το disseisin committed before the victim took the cross. Quantum praedecessores had itemized the crusaders' immunities, but some still found their operation confusing. Being promulgated for specific journeys, such as the 114 5-6 call το arms, the privileges had ηο permanent application, hence the repeated papal renewals up to Audita tremendi in 1187. 3 However, later ίn the century, at least in north-west Europe, the secular, not the ecclesiastical arm seems to have taken the lead in defining protection and, perhaps, even extending the range of the temporal privileges. The De legibus et consuetudinibus attributed to Glanvill (c. 1180) described special immunities for pilgrims to J erusalem, including a unique variant of the writ mort d'ancestor, but failed to draw a distinction between crusade and pilgrimage. Significantly, perhaps,

r. In general, see the classic survey, J. Α. Brundage, Medieval Canon Law and the Crusader (Madison, 1969). 2. PL, clxii, nos. 168-70, 173, cols. 17-4, 176-7. For Urban ΙΙ and τhe application of the Truce of God provisions: Riley-Smith, First Crusade, pp. 22, 26 and refs.; and Bull, Knightly Piety, pp. 21-69. 3. Epistolae Pontificum Romanorum ineditae, ed. S. Lowenfeld (Leipzig, 1885), no. 199, pp. 103-4; Howden, Chronica, ii. Ι 5-19.

VI 57 2

WERE THERE

ΑΝΥ

CRUSADES

that had to await the lawyers of the thirteenth century.1 Ιη 1188, the Anglo-French crusade ordinances, ηοτ papal bulls, extended the financial privileges with a precision and detail not seen before. 2 Although as early as 1166 Alexander ΠΙ had offered plenary indulgences to those who fought in the Holy Land for at least two years, the first mention of the crusader's term of immunity and protection in action is οη the Pipe Roll of π91/2. 3 During the Third Crusade, as in the First, the practice of crusading fashioned the institution, not vice versa. Ιη a wider social dimension, it is equally hard to assert much independent or unique impact. The financial needs of departing crusaders certainly aided the concurrent opening of freer local land markets through mortgages and sale of property. Warfare in the East gave fresh scope for military enterprise, but, by its nature, was of limited significance. There was ηο channelling of violence away from domestic conf1icts. There was only one general expedition between 1101 and 1188. Successful crusaders were those who had trained ίη the hard school of European war. If war ίη twelfth-century western Europe was more ordered, less anarchic or fragmented than ίη the tenth century, then crusading, with ίts large capital sums and structured recruitment, was a symptom of change, not a cause. The same can be said for the variety of motiνes contemporaries observed ίη crusaders, from those such as Eτienne de Niblens (c. 1100), who was said to lament the pollutionof his life, and Ulric Bucel, who was described as being 'more concerned for the health of his soul than the honour of his earthly existence', to those who, ίη the words of the hostile Wίirzburg annalist, 'lusted after novelties and went in order to learn about new lands'. 4 The crusade was not the only outlet for such diverse emotions: not all adventurers bothered to seek Jerusalem; nor did all pious lay knights. W arfare nearer home or the patronage of monasteries could, and did, serve just as well. 5 Pursued by a minority of free society, crusading provided an extension of prevailing habits rather τhan an alternative to them. 1. Glanvill, Tractatus de legibus eι consuetudinibus regni Angliae, ed. G. D. G. Hall (London, 1965 ), pp. 16--17 and 15 1; for τhe disτinctions drawn berween pilgήmages and crusades, Henry de Bracτon, De legibus et consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. Τ. Twiss (6 vols., RS, London, 1878-83), ν. 159-65 (although as Professor Thorne has shown, Bracτon was almosτ certainly nοτ τhc auτhor); John de Longueville, Modus Tenendi Curias (c. ηο7), The Court Baron, ed. F. W. Maiτland and W. Ρ. Baildon (Selden Soc., London, 1891), p. 82. Cf. Jean dc Joinville's reference (c. 1290s) το τhe 'pelerinaige de la croix': Histoire de St. Louis, ed. Ν. de Wailly (Paris, 1868), p. 2. 2. Councils and Synods, with Other Documents Relating to the English Church, gen. ed. F. W. Powicke {Oxford, 1964-81), vol. ί, pτ. 2, pp. 1028-9, for the crusader's τerm of three years. 3. ln quantis pressuris, 29 June 1166: Hiestand, Papsturkunden fiir Templer und ]ohanniter, no. 53; Pipe Roll3 Richard [, ed. D. Μ. Sτenτon (London, 1926), pp. 33 (where, in line wίτh τhe 1188 ordinances, Richard of Clare pleads for a moraτorium for his debτs 'ad τerminum crucesignatorum') and 76. !η general, ίτ may bc noτed τhaτ mosτ of τhe evidence used by Brundage, Μedieval Canon Law and the Crusader, το show how privileges worked comes from τhe Public Record Office, i.e. τhe archives of secular, not ecclesiastical government. 4. Recueil des chartes de l'abbaye de Cluny, ed. Α. Brucl, vol. ν (Paήs, 1894), no. 3737, p. 87; Cartulaire de l'abbaye cardinale de Ια Trinite de Vendόme, cd. C. Meτais (Paήs, 1893-7), ίί, no. 402, pp. 157-8; Άnnales Herbipolenses', ed. G. Η. Perτz, MGHS, χνί. 3. 5. For τwο recent regional sτudies of τhis: C . Β . Bouchard, Sword, Miter and Cloister: Nobility and the Church in Burgundy, 980-1198 {Iτhaca, ΝΥ, 1987); Bull, Knightly Piety.

VI ΙΝ ΤΗΕ TWELFTH CENTURY?

573

Crusading was far from escapist; it was integrated into existing patterns of thought and behaviour, a reflection, not a rejection of social attitudes. Το take one example, companionship and comradeship formed a central feature ίη contemporary accounts of crusading, as in society ίη general. Ιη both, the cohesive power of friendship and association should not be ignored. Where institutional bonds lacked either strength or inspiration, the group, community or commune formed by mutual self-interest provided a necessary sense of belonging and a structure of material support. Το such emotions did the Cistercians appeal with great initial success. It is ηο coincidence that Ailred of Rievaulx, one of τhe Cistercians' more effective recruiters, wrote a treatise De Amicitia; nor that the Cistercians played a central role in the inspiration of, and recruitment for, the Second Crusade. St Bernard himself saw crusade armies as sworn associations, modelled οη monastic communities, bound together by love of God. 1 The important ties of the f amilia can be traced in the vernacular romances of Chretien de Τ royes ηο less than in the growth of corporate identity among the clerks and courtiers of Angevin kings, as chronicled by Walter Map. 2 Crusading fitted this pattern. It is not just ίη τhe stories of campaigning that we find evidence of camaraderie: repeatedly in descriptions of crusade recruitment there are references το groups of relatives, friends and neighbours. Some entered into formal communes, as ίη 1147, 1189 and 1217.3 The young crusaders described as coniurati, who terrorized the Jewish communities of England ίη Lent 1190, were not untypical, bound together by shared location, kinship, class and friendship. 4 Crusading could create or more often reinforce such communion, inexplicable if divorced from its social and cultural context. Did crusading create new patterns of virtue το admire? Ιτ may be that U rban ΙΙ had some hopes of it. Those who inτerpreted U rban' s τhoughts in the subsequent generation depicted him as offering the crusade as an alternative, which brings us back to Guibert of Nogent. But the idea of the holy warrior was not new and the Jerusalem iter soon became the consummation, not τhe expiation, of a chivalric career. 5 Crusading 1. C. Morris, The Discovery of the lndividual, 1050-1200 (London, 1972), esp. pp. 96-107; Brυn­ dage, 'St Bernard', pp. 29-30. For possible Cistercian influcnce on popular crυsade songs on the theme of love, Μ. Switten, 'Singing the Second Crυsade', Second Crusade and Cistercians, pp. 67-76. 2. Walter Map,De Nugis Curialium, ed. Μ. R. Jamcs etal. (Oxford, 1983); W. L. Warren, Henry 11 (London, 1973), ch. 8; Chretien de Troyes,Arthurian Romances, trans. D. D. R. Owen (London, 1987). 3. De Expugnatione Lyxbonensi, pp. 56-7, 104-5; 'Dc !tinere Frisonum', in Quinti belli sacri scriptores minores, ed. R. Rohricht (Geneva, 1879), pp. 59, 69; 'Gesta Crυcegerorum Rhenanorυm', ibid., p. 30; Ralph of Diceto, Ύmagines Hisτoriarum', in Opera Historica, ed. W. Sτubbs (2 vols., RS, London, 1876), ii. 65; Tyerman, England and the Crusades, pp. 69-79, 182-3. 4. Ralph of Diceto, Ύmagines', ii. 65; William of Newburgh, Historia, pp. 308-24; Tyerman, England and the Crusades, esp. pp. 71-4 and refs.; generally, id. 'Who Went on Crusades το the Holy Land?', Horns of Hattin, pp. 1-26. 5. There were elements of this by the Second Crusade: cf. St Bernard's appeal το 'the mighty men of valoυr', Letters, no 391; BCdier, Chansons de croisade, pp. 8-11. The implication ίs plain in FitzCount's or Orderic Vitalis's admiration of ιhe Firsτ Crusaders and ιheir essentially chivalric rather τhan ιheir

VI 574

WERE THERE

ΑΝΥ

CRUSADES

heroes were regarded in terms of existing typology, such as honour and loyalty. It is consistent with this response that Peter of Blois, in his panegyric οη Raynald of Chatillon, the Passio Reginaldi, written shortly after 1187, should be eager το claim his hero as an example of aposτolic poverty, i.e. not a specifically or exclusively crusading virtue. 1 The Passio Reginaldi has been described as a piece of crusade hagiography. Although standing in the long, pre-crusading tradition which justified violence and sanctified holy warriors, the Passio marks a new beginning in its intensity, imagery, and purpose. There is a distinctive quality which can only be called crusading. Peter of Blois chose το describe the celebrated killing of Raynald by Saladin ίη the Sultan's tent after the battle of Hattin (4 July 1187). Reynald's opportunistic career of excess and self-advancement is transmuted into one of moderation and self-denial. Claiming that his knowledge of Reynald's last moments came from an eyewitness, Aimery of Lusignan, Peter has Raynald display fortitude and constancy ίη the face of the infidel' s blandishments and threats. Facing death, Raynald attempts το convert Saladin. At the end, Raynald's death is seen as a victory, a memoryof Christ's passion, a doorway το everlasting life, a consummation of his pilgrimage. The image of τhe cross is everywhere, just as ίτ was το be ίη most surviving crusade sermons from the 1190s onwards. The concentration οη the cross in this and other Third Crusade excitatoria was fuelled by the loss of a relic of the Holy Cross at Hattin. For Peter of Blois the cross is 'the Ark of the NewTestament, the bannerof salvation, the title of sanctity, the hope of victory ... the foundation of faiτh, the conqueror of Hell', etc. Oddly echoing Saladin' s own nickname for Raynald, Peter declared: Άs elephants are roused το battle by the sight of blood, so, and more fervently, does the sight of the Holy Cross and the remembrance of the Lord's Passion rouse Christian knights.' 2 At last, crusade propagandists had worked out a coherent imagery, concentrating οη the cross as an all-purpose symbol of militant loyalty το Christ and spiritual redemption, and allied το a strong vein of secular romance ίη depicting both Christian warriors and their infidel foes. The sacrifice demanded of the faithful soldier of Christ is distilled into a vision of glory which shines with remorseless consistency through the exempla of later crusade

spiriτual reputations (eg. Raimbold Croton). Υ et τhe parallel strand of renunciation or substiτution of chivalry remained. Cf. τhe remarks of Josserand de Brancion during St Louis' first crusade, 'Lord . . . take me οuτ of these wars among Christians . . .': Joinville, Vie de St Louis, p. 99. ι. Peter of Blois, 'Passio Reginaldi principis olim Antiocheni', PL, ccvii, cols. 957-76; Μ. Markowski, 'Peter of Blois and τhe Conception of τhe Third Crusade', Horns of Hattin, pp. 261--9; R. W. Southern, 'Peτer of Blois and the Third Crusade', Studies in Medieval History Presented to R. Η. C. Davis, ed. Η. Mayr-Harting and R. 1. Moore (London, 1985), pp. 207-18; cf. Riley-Smith's comments, Histoτical Reseaτch, lxiii (1990), 233. 2. PL, ccvii, col. 974; cf. Β. Hamilton, 'The Elephant of Chrisτ: Reynald of Chatillon', Studies in Chuτch History, νο!. χν, ed. D . Baker (Oxford, 1978), pp. 97-108. For Saladin's use of the nickname: Abou Chamah, 'Le Livre des deux Jardins', RHC, Documents oτientaux, ίν. 233.

VI ΙΝ ΤΗΕ TWELFTH CENTURY?

575

sermons and propaganda, as well as forming a growing theme of vernacular poets. 1 The Passio Reginaldi is just one instance of the new impetus towards defining the crusade provided by the battle of Hattin, the capture of a relic of the Holy Cross and loss of Jerusalem in 1187. Almost immediately the customary vagueness in describing crusaders vanished. Perhaps in consequence of recruiting requirements and the implications of crusader privileges for raising money as well as men, the status of a crusader, contrasted το a pilgrim, was defined with precision. The adoption of the cross was now clearly established as separating the two actiνities of crusading and pilgrimage. The terms of the Saladin Tithe of ΙΙ88, in both Angevin and Capetian lands, granted exemption from payment of the tax to those who had taken the cross, a privilege widely abused, according to a contemporary crusade song. 2 For the first time οη a Pipe Roll the term crucesignatus was used in 1191/2, although crusiatus appears οη the Pipe Roll of 1188/9.3 By the mid-1190s, the designation in Latin was standard: crusaders were crucesignati (or equivalent words ), and merited an order of privileges different from those of pilgrims as they performed a markedly different function. Ιη the vernacular, although the language of pilgrimage persisted as long as crusading, a distinctive crusading vocabulary was soon developed. Ιη French, the verb croisier or croiser can be found at the time of the Third Crusade, as well as in the chroniclers of the Fourth Crusade, Robert of Clari and Geoffrey de Villehardouin. By extension, croisie described those who had taken the cross.4 Words for the institution itself are contained in William of Tudela's poem (c. 1213) οη the Albigensian Crusade: crozada, crozea, crozeia. 5 lt could be argued that the difference between pilgrimage and crusade had been inherent since 1095, but only after 1187-8 was it recognized in law and government action, that is secular law and secular government. The running was made not by canonists or curial legists, but by servants of temporal powers. lt has even been suggested that Innocent ΠΙ himself was introduced to the word 'crucesignatus' by Gerald of Wales in 1199 (previously popes had favoured more laborious phrases based οη crucem 1. Bedier, Chansons de croisade, pp. 34 and 70 for two songs of c. 1189 associaιed wiιh ιhe Third Crusade (and, more generally, pp. 67-73); cf. the tone of the slighιly earlier Chanson d'Antioche, ed. S. Duparc-Quioc (Paris 1977-8); C. Morris, 'Propaganda for War: The Disseminaιion of ιhe Crusading Ideal in ιhe Twelfιh Cenτury', Studies in Church History, vol. χχ, ed. W. Shiels (Oxford, 1983), pp. 79-101; Όrdinatio de predicatione S. Crucis in Angliae', in Quinti belli scriptores, ii. 1-26; Tyerman, England and the Crusades, pp. 16ο-6 and refs.; Ρ. Cole, The Preaching of the Crusades to the Holy Land, 1095-1270 (Cambridge, Mass., 1991), esp. chs. 1-7. 2. Councils and Synods, loc. ciι.; Bedier, Chansons de croisade, p.41 ('Bien me Deusse Targier', verses 3 and 4). 3. Pipe Ro/1 / Richard /, ed. J. Hunter (London, 1844),p. 20; Pipe Roll3 Richard /,pp. 28, 33, 18, 76; cf. Markowski, 'Crucesignaωs', passim. 4. Bedier, Chansons de croisade, p. 21, l.36 of 'Vos qui ameis de vraie amor', and, Ρ· 41, verse 3 of 'Bίen me Deusse Targicr'; Villehardouin, La Conquete, p. 1 ('Tuit cil qui se croiseroient'); Robert of Clari, La Conquete de Constantinople, ed. Ρ. Lauer (Paris, 1924), p. 4 (croisiέs). 1· La chanson de Ια croisade contre les Albigeois, ed. Ρ. Meyer (Paris, 1871-9), ΙΙ.393, 409, 2410.

VI WERE THERE

ΑΝΥ

CRUSADES

accipere ). Gerald, a clerk of Henry

ΙΙ and a preacher of the cross in Wales in rr88, had been using the word since before rr9r. 1 The distinctive word for crusaders did not first appear after r r 87. The phrase had occurred since the First Crusade. In letters, chronicles, and in some of the rites for taking the cross, 'crux' and 'signare' appear together. Α solitary source from the Second Crusade uses the word 'cruziatur'. 2 However, it was only during and after the Third Crusade that the term 'crucesignatus' (and 'crucesignata') gained wide currency; and the initiative seems to have come from temporal authorities, not the papacy. It would be entirely in keeping with a view of crusading as not at first a clearly defined phenomenon if the pressure for its legal and practical definition came from secular, not ecclesiastical, law and government, as long as we remember always that both were administered by educated clerics. Whatever else, the Third Crusade marked a watershed. Ι have argued for this in institutional terms. It also appears to have been true in more popular aspects. In the corpus of surviving crusade sermon exempla (mainly thirteenth-century and later) there are few stories which refer το crusades before r r 87; not even the First Crusade ίs exploited. 3 There are two good reasons for this. One is that Hattίn and its aftermath redefined crusading in practice and then, with Innocent ΠΙ, in theory. The other is that crusading before Hattin was hardly a discrete activity. Like King Lear's wit it was pared on both sides, by pilgrimage and holy war. Ironically, the essence of pre-r r87 crusading is to be found not in the content of Peter of Blois's Passio Reginaldi, but in its subject. Raynald first appears as a mercenary of Baldwin ΠΙ at the siege of Ascalon in r r 53. Two excellent marriages made him successively prince of Antioch and then lord of Kerak and Oultejordain. He believed in aggression as the best method of advancement. In his career he pillaged Cyprus and terrorized the Red Sea. He became identified with an actively hostile policy towards Saladin. His end, hacked to death by Saladin himself, was entirely appropriate: extreme violence in the best of company. He was an adventurer who had tasted the pleasures of success as well as the miseries of a Moslem prison for sixteen years. His opportunism ended in death and his transfiguration into a martyr: an 'athlete of the Lord' indeed, as Peter of Blois put it in a cliche famous long before r 09 5. But 1.

Markowski,

'Crυcesignatus•, 160-1 .

2. Άnnales S. lacobi Leodicensis', MGHS, χνί. 641. 3. Look, for example, at the English Ordίnatio of HΙ6, passim (supra, p. 575, η . 1), where there is only one First Crusade exemplum, and none about the period 1099--1187; or the exmpla of Jacques de Vitry: G. Frenken, Die Exempla des Jacob von Vitry (Munich, 1914), nos.lxxii, χcνί, and p. 149. The anecdote about Jocelin I of Edessa's beard is hardly crusading, ηο. Ιχχί; Τ. F. Crane, The Exempla of Jacques de Vitry (Folk Lore Soc., London, 1890), nos. lxxxv, lxxxix, cxix, cxxii, clxiii, cccxi, cccxii; nos. cχχίν and cxxi are τimeless; only nos. χχχνί and xc, both concerning Templars, are clearly about evenτs pre-1187, perhaps an intentional commenτ on what Jacques saw as the order's decadence (ηο. xc).

Tyerman, England and the Crusades, pp. 163-5 and refs.; Cole, Preaching of the Crusades, pp. 115, 123-5, 131-3, 195, 197--9; F. C . Tubach, lndex Exemplorum (Helsinki, 1969), nos.238, 1041, 1043-4, 1390-5, 2497, 3087-8, 3802, 3804, 4005, 4114-17, 4538, 4722-4, 5199.

VI ΙΝ ΤΗΕ TWELFTH CENTURY?

577

cross. 1 Ιη

there is ηο evidence that Raynald ever took the the twelfth century he did not have to, because, ίη some senses, there were ηο crusades to fight.2

1. PL, ccvii, co!. 969; William of Tyre, 'Historia', pp. 796, 802; Hamilτon, Έlephant of Christ', passim, where the point is missed by assuming, wrongly, that all who lived and fought in Frankish Outremer were crusaders: cf. Riley-Smith, 'Peace Never Established', 87-8, 102. 2. E.-D. Hehl, 'Was ist eigentlich ein Kreuzzug', Historische Zeitschrift, cclix (1994), 297-336,

appeared

τοο

late for me

το

incorporate into this

arτicle.

VI

VI

VII

Henry of Livonia and the Ideology of Crusading The Chronicle of Henry of Livonia provides a rich mine for historians with a wide variety of interests: literary, religious, ecclesiastical, political, economic, ρhilological, ethnological, archaeological, military and nationalistic. The concern here is with the context of the development across Latin Christendom of ideas justifying and promoting a particular form of religious warfare known to us as the crusades. Το what extent does Henry's text display the penetration into his north German and Baltic ecclesiastical world of theories of holy war current elsewhere? How does Henry fashion them to suit his local and immediate ρurρoses? Does Henry indicate a coherent ideology at all? Henry's chronicle is far from an artless compilation. Behind the descriptive recitation of annual events lie clear threads that bind the whole together. It is a work of didacticism and advocacy, a sermon and a manifesto, its seemingly autobiographical tone concealing some of its main ρurρoses. Henry does not seem to have been a chronicler or historian ίη the sense of soρhisticated literati such as Gerald of Wales (c. 1146-1223), another who described a conquest ( ίη his case of Ireland), or William of Tyre (c. 1130-86), who similarly wrought a creation myth for a new Christian state (the Latin kingdom of Jerusalem). The Livonian chronicle may have been Henry's sole contribution to the genre. Henry was writing an advocate's brief οη behalf of the close group of pioneering clergy, often related to one another, with whom he had been associated as a protege and deρendant since before arrivingin Livonia ίη about 1205. As Henry himself remarked, he had been persuaded to write by 'his lords and companions', probably ίη the light of the mission to Livonia of the ρapal legate William of Modena (c. 1184-1251) ίη 1225-27. Henry wrote to order; and that order probably came from Albert νοη Buxhovden, bishop of Riga (r. 1199-1229). If so, this may help ρrovide a terminal date for the final version of the chronicle: 1229, the year ofBishoρ Albert's death. Even if it was, as often argued, begun as a sort of briefing report for the legate, inconsistencies between Henry's account and papal ρolicy suggest a more precise context. The chronicle's final version,

VII 24

completed afi:er February 1227, promotes an episcoρal Rigan narrative of the conquest of Livonia in contradistinction to rival versions. The years 1227-29 might aρρear ρropitious for this task, with the captivity ( 1223) and subsequent defeat at Bornhoved (1227) ofWaldemar II ofDenmark (r. 1202-41) reducing the potency of Danish claims to primacy and the deρarture of Legate William ίη 1227 allowinga Rigan viewto be asserted ίη oρρosition to that of the ρaρacy. 1 Another difficulty concerns what is meant by crusade ideology and where it can be discovered. Writing ίη the earliest years of the twelfi:h century, the Benedictine Guibert ofNogent (c. 1053-c. 1124) memorably distinguished the praelia sancta, the new holy war ofJerusalem, from the just war or legitime bella of its ρredecessors ίη defence of the church. 2 The model of what haρρened between 1095 and 1099 provided both the practical distinctive features of this manner of war - cross-taking, remission of penalties of sins and, by the 1140s at least, various temporal privileges - and the ideological justification. The latter leached into reformist evangelizing and was taken uρ esρecially by Bernard of Clairvaux (c. 1090-1153) and the Cistercian order, which later played such an important role ίη Livonia. However, crusade ideology followed ηο coherent or single line of development, being as much subject to nostalgia for the great deeds of the First Crusade, local enthusiasms and the reactive oρρortunism of the ρaρal Curia as to carefully argued theology. Until the 1180s, theory, ρromotion, rhetoric, reception and imρlementation disρlay ηο simρle ρattern of understanding and belief beyond the association with the Jerusalem war and the institutions linked to ίt, such as the exhortatory sermon, the givingof the cross, spiritual rewards and the promise of martyrdom. Away from Cistercians, the ρaρal curia, universities and certain restricted aristocratic and clerical circles, crusade ideology was a thing of shreds and ρatches, ill-formed and far from a universal formula for war against enemies of the Christian church. Causa 23 of Gratian of Bologna's Decretum, almost all of which aρρeared ίη the first redaction of 1139/40 and remained unrevised ίη the text's subsequent reworking, makes ηο reference to Η CL ΧΧΙΧ.9, p. 237; Brundage, p. 215. Pau!Johansen, 'Die Chronik als Biogι·aphie. Heinrich νοη Lettlands Lebensgang und Weltanschauung: jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, n.s. 1 (1953), 1-24; Gerald of Wales, Expugnatio Hibernica: The Conquest of lreland, ed. and trans. A.D. Scott and F.X. Martin (Dublin, 1978); William of Tyre, Chronicon, ed. R.B.C. Huygens (Turnhout, 1986). Οη the Danish context for Henry's work, see now Anti Selart, '1am tunc ... The Political Context of the First Part of rhe Chronicle of Henry ofLivonia', ίη The Medieval Chronicle, vol. 5, ed. Erik Kooper (Amsterdam and New York, 2008), pp. 197-209. 2 Guibert of Nogent, Gesta Dei Per Francos, Recueil des historiens des croisades: Historiens Occidentaux (Paris 1844-95), vol. 4, p. 124; Jonathan Riley-Smith, What Were the Crusades?, 3rd edn (London, 2003); Christoper Tyerman, The lnvention ojthe Crusades (Basingstoke, 1998). 1

VII Henry ofLivonia and the Ideology ofCrusading

25

specifically crusading ideology or institutions. 3 Ιη their accounts of wars between Christians and non-Christians other than papally proclaimed wars of the cross, writers such as Helmold of Bosau (c. 1120-afier 1177) or even William ofTyre, the latter at least ίη touch with much of the latest smart thinking ίη the Western clerical elite, do not characterize these conflicts ίη identifiably crusading terms.4 So, far from crusade ideology dominating justifications of inter-religious war, crusading appeared as ofien subsumed into the theology of pilgrimage, a rationalizing of the radical ideas of Pope Urban 11 (r. 1088-99) within a familiar, safe, traditional and conservative frame, even if at times an uneasy fit. The use of pilgrimage as a prism through which crusading could be viewed was followed ίη the later twelfih century by the increasingly legalistic attempt, by popes and university academics, to harness the crusade - a transcendent, redemptive holy act ίη answer to the direct command of God - to the temporal constraints of just war theory. 5 Deus Vult provided inadequate precision as more care was bestowed on the justice and detail of cause, authority, intent, proportionality and so on. Of course, many of these elements had occupied commentators since 1095, but they now featured more centrally ίη the rhetoric, even if applied in practice with less scrupulous attention to legal norms. By 1200, afier the convulsive efforts surrounding the Third Crusade ( 118992), crusade motifs and institutions became increasingly embedded in the religious culture of Roman Christianity, at least as conceived and promoted by interested clerical elites. Α range of associated ideas revolved around the cross and the Crucified Christ, a redemptive power accessible to the penitent faithful through the offeΓ of remission of sins in return for an overt deιηonstrative act of taking the cross. The full indulgence was not unequivocally offered by popes to crucesignati until Pope lnnocent 111 (r. 1198-1216), although ίη many quarters - and some papal correspondence - a simple elision of ideas had led to a de Jacto belief ίη the remission of sin and not just penance before that. Linked to this was the idea - which long pre-dated 1095 - that those who died fighting 3 Anders Winrorh, The Making of Gratian's Decretum (Cambridge, 2000) for rhe dare of composirion and which passages were ίη each redacrion; John Gilchrisr, 'The Erdmann Thesis and rhe Canon Law: in Crusade and Settlement, ed. Perer W. Edbury (Cardiff, 1985 ), pp. 37-45, esp. η. 63; for rexr, Grarian, Decretum, ίn Corpus Iuris Canonici, ed. Emil Alberr Friedberg, vol. 1 (Leipzig, 1879), Causa:XXIII. 4 Helmold of Bosau, Chronica Slavorum, ed. Johann Marrin Lappenberg, MGH rer. Germ. (Hanover, 1937); William of Tyre, Chronicon, ΧΙΧ.12, pp. 879-81 for his elire Western education. 5 H.E.J. Cowdrey, 'Christianity and the Morality ofWarfare during rhe Firsr Cenrury of Crusading; ίη The Experience of Crusading, ed. Marcus Bull and Norman Housley, 2 vols (Cambridge, 2003), vol. 1, pp. 175-92.

VII 26

for the faith were ipso jάcto martyrs. The crusade became a metaphor for the Christian life, a struggle in which each soul was tested, as was the sinfulness of Christendom itself. 6 The crusader imitated Christ in bearing His cross. However, local issues coloured this elevated association. Ιη the Baltic, conversion, not a prime feature of crusades in Palestine or even Spain, strongly shaped how crusading ideology was harnessed to the interests of ecclesiastical, commercial and aristocratic empire builders. Το jιιst war theorists, it became necessary to argue that pagans presented either a living threat to Christians as individuals or as a commιιnity, or that they were contumacious apostates. Pagans could not, according to some theorists, be attacked simply becaιιse they were pagan. 7 This probleιn stalks HenryofLivonia's text, and he took much care to get the solution to it legalistically correct. At the opposite end of the spectrum to just war came the association with the rights and status of pilgrimage, giving crusaders - or at least their apologists' descriptions of them - the sense that they were marching with saints to saints. The most Holy Land of Palestine was therefore re-sited wherever crιιsaders hoped to gain remission of sins. 8 Cross, Christ, penance and indιιlgence, martyrdom, just war, conversion, Holy Land and crιιsade as pilgrimage were conseqιιently decked οιιt ίη regional trappings. Α historiographical point might be made here, as it helps highlight how Henry differs from his predecessors ίη describing northern wars of Christians against pagans. War deo auctore was not an invention of the crusade. Nor, afi:er 1099, were all such wars crusades, nor were they perceived as such. There has been a recent tendency to lump all Baltic religious war together under the banner of crusades, which seems both unhistorical and unnecessary. When Saxo Grammaticus (c. 1150-1220) described Archbishop Absalon ofLιιnd (r. 1178-1201) 'making an offering to God not of prayers bιιt of arms: he was not describing crypto-crιιsaders. 9 He was reflecting older traditions that then allowed imported crusade institutions to germinate. Crusading was always a sιιb-set of holy war. Fighting the infidel was - and had long been - seen as meritorious with 6 John Gilchrist, 'The Papacy and the War against "Saracens'", lnternational History Review 10 ( 1988), 174-97; Christopher Tyerman, God's Wάr: Λ New History ojthe Crusades

(London, 2006), esp. pp. 477-500. 7 Benjamin Ζ . Kedar, Crusade and Mission (Pι-inceton, 1988); James Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers and Infidels (Liverpool, 1979), esp. pp. 3-28. 8 Christopher Tyerman, Fightingfor Christendom: Holy Wάr and the Crusades ( Oxford, 2003), pp. 155-89. 9 Saxo Grammaticus,Danorum Regum Historia, Books X-XVI, trans. Eric Christiansen (Oxford, 1980-81), vol. 2, ρ. 611; Kurt Villads Jensen, 'Denmark and the Second Crusade : Ί1ιe Foι-mation of a Crusader State ?', ίη 'Jhe Second Crusade, ed. Jonachan Phillips and Martin Hoch (Manchester, 2001), pp. 164-79.

VII Henry ofLivonia and the Ideology ofCrusading

27

or without the occasional Baltic crusading bulls of the half century afi:er 1147, provided, Helmold of Bosau might lament, participants were moved by faith and charity, not greed and brutality. 10 What makes Henry of Livonia of interest ίη this context is that, unlike Saxo or Helmold, and more so even than Arnold of Lίibeck (c. 1150-1211/ 14), his chronicle is shot through with shards of crusade ideology. 11 Defining all anti-pagan warfare as crusading ίη twelfi:h century Scandinavia is more than a semantic choice; it presents a category muddle, is ιnisleading as historical shorthand and obscures the novelty and progress of specifically crusading ideas in northern Europe in the two or three generations afi:er 1150. Henry of Livonia's use of crusade ideology is revealed ίη his treatment of warrior remission of sins; canon law; the crusade as pilgrimage; the cross; papal authority; the legitimacy of war, conquest, rule and conversion; the Holy Land and the cult of the Virgin, coloured throughout by Henry's providential tone, use of sources, chiefly scriptural and liturgical, and clear bias. Both the structure of the narrative and the language employed serve the object of demonstrating God's immanence and the unique favours bestowed οη and earned by the church of Riga. The work literally begins with Divine Providence and thereafi:er God is repeatedly said to be taking a direct hand ίη protecting and assisting His people. 12 Events are located ίη a double frame; incessant sordid local warfare set ίη a world vision that embraces even the apocalypse. Thus ίη 1224 the enemies of the Estonian church are likened to the dragon from Revelations. 13 The repeated pun οη the name 'Riga' irrigating the faithful, and its portrayal as the City of God, rest at the centre of Henry's message. 14 That the chronicle is an account of the creation of a new holy city is signalled ίη the reference ίη the very first sentence to Raab and Babylon from Psalm 87 where they are contrasted with Ζίοη, city of God, of which glorious things are spoken. 15

Helmold, Cronica Slavorum, pp. 122, 129. Arnold of Lίibeck, Chronica Slavorum, ed. Johann Marrin Lappenberg, MGH rer. Germ. (Hanover, 1868). 12 HCLI.l,p. l;Brundage,p.25. 13 Η CL XXVIII.4, p. 201; Brundage, p. 222; the sentence continues with a reference to Behemoth from the Book of Job also cited by Innocent ΠΙ ίη his Livonia bull of 12 October 1204, LUB 1/1, ηο. 14; Peter Auksi, Ήenry ofLivonia and Balthasar Russow: The Chronicler as Literary Artisr:JBS 6 (1975), 107-19, esp. p. 108. 14 HCL ΙΧ.4, p. 28; Brundage, p. 49; Nils Blomkvist, Ίhe Discovery ofthe Baltic: Ίhe Reception of α Catholic World System in the European North (AD 1075-1225) (Leiden, 2005), esp. p. 511. 15 HCL Ι.1 p. l; Brundage, p. 25. 10 11

VII 28

The heroic story is carefully devised. The opening 'there was a man' motif that introduces the missionary Meinhard (r. 1186-96), with its echoes ofJohn 1:6, develops into an account of the Christian mission that requires defence, by Meinhard's successor Bishop Bertold (r. 1196-98), whose death ίη battle supplies both the mission's first martyr and the site of the future holy city of Riga. The detail that Bertold died because he could not prevent his horse from bolting into enemy lines merely adds a patina of pathetic realism, a technique that characterizes the whole of Henry's narrative. 16 While the realism of the subsequent accounts of Bishop Albert of Riga's struggles to establish and extend his diocese and temporal rule occupies the foreground of the story, it is sustained by a series of standard providential historiographical conventions. The evangelical cliches of sowing seed, the Lord's vineyard, wolves and lambs, shepherds, and potters' vessels serve to remind an audience of the true heritage of the Livonian plantation, which is Christ's injunction ίη Mark 16:15, 'Go ye into all the world and preach the gospel to every creature'. 17 Some of these associations caught οη ίη sympathetic circles elsewhere. When referring to a particular monk's desire to join the Livonian mission, the Cistercian Caesarius of Heisterbach (c. 1180-c. 1240), weH connected with the Cistercian hierarchy ίη Livonia, uses exactly the same image as Henry of expanding the vineyard of the Lord when telling the story of a missionary there, as did Innocent ΠΙ ίη his 1201 encouragement of pacific evangelism ίη Livonia. 18 These metaphors were commonplace, not least within contemporary crusade propaganda. The image Henry employed when commenting οη the divine element ίη the defeat of the Estonians ίη 1204, 'Almighty God does not cease to test his elect ones, now placed in various tribulations, like gold in fire: was taken from Job 23: 1Ο. It was also used by Innocent ΠΙ ίη his great crusade bull Quia Maior of 1213, although neither Henry nor Innocent employed exactly Job's text ίη the Vulgate, nor each other's. 19 16 HCL Ι.2-14; ΙΙ . 6 for Berrold's death and ΙΙ.1-6 for Berrold's mission; Χ.6 for Berrold as a marcyr, pp. 2-1 Ο, 36; Carsten Selch Jensen, 'The Nacure of the Early Missionary Activities and Crusades ίη Livonia, 1185-1201 ', ίη Medieval Spirituality in Scandinavia and Europe: Α Collection ofEssays in Honour of Tore Nyberg, ed. Lars Bisgaard et al. (Odense, 2001), pp. 121-37, esp. p. 135. 17 Auksi, Ήenry of Livonia', pp. 110-11 . 18 Caesarius of Heisterbach, Dialogus Miraculorum, ed. Joseph Strange, 2 vols (Cologne, 1851 ; repr. New Jersey, 1966), vol. 2, p. 93; Michele Maccarrone, Ί papi e gli inizi della christianizzazione della Livonia: ίη Gli inizi del christianesimo in Livonia-Lettonia, ed. Michele Maccarrone (Vatican Cicy, 1986), pp. 31-80 (here 78-80). 19 HCL VIII.3, ρ. 25: 'quasi aurum ίη igne probare'; Quia Maior, ed. ίη PL 216, col. 817: 'in quo fidem eorum velut aurum ίη furnace probaret'; Job 23:10: 'et probavit me quasi aurum quod per ignem transit:

VII Henry ofLivonia and the ldeology ofCrusading

29

Henry's chronicle is a literary pastiche and coιηpilation of familiar biblical sources. By far the most frequently used scriptural model was the Books of the Maccabees, closely, although not exclusively, associated with crusaders. It has been suggested that roughly 149 sections of the chronicle contain material from Maccabees with about 64 different borrowings, far outstripping those from any other single book of the Bible. 20 The Arbusow-Bauer edition suggests, οη my count, that individual quotations, paraphrases and echoes from the two Books of the Maccabees amount to nearly 250. Although some of these verbal echoes are insignificant, Henry's heavy use of the Maccabees as a literary model cannot have been unconscious or accidental. His story was a new chapter in the heroic militant defence of the faith fit to stand comparison with the heroes of the Bible. Ifhe intended his audience to appreciate the connection, that would identify it as not extendingfar beyond the clerical elite. Less subliminally, the comparison with the Israelites is rammed home in almost the final words of the text as we have it, praising the victory of the Rigan church 'when all the people are baptized, when Tharapita is thrown out, when Pharaoh is drowned'. lnnocent ΠΙ used the same image from Exodus in summoning the Fourth Crusade (1202-04) in August 1198. 21 This is what Henry's chronicle is about, a universal triumph in which the crusade played a necessary, even ίf, in Henry's eyes perhaps, not an entirely sufficient, part. From its language alone, it is evident that Henry of Livonia's chronicle was purposeful and, as such, far more engaging and significant than a domestic narrative or closet autobiography. The central canonical feature of crusading, the offer of remission of sins triggered by the adoption of the cross, pervades Henry's text. However, his treatment is far from straightforward, reflecting his concerns to present the origins of Christian Livonia in a very particular way. By the 1220s, after the clarification of the crusade indulgence by Innocent ΠΙ and its increasingly regular promotion through the sustained preaching campaigns associated with the Fourth and Fifth Crusades (1213-21), and crusades in Spain and Languedoc, the offer of remission of sins had become standardized. This had not necessarily been the case in the l 190s nor in the Baltic. Pope Alexander ΠΙ's ( r. 1159-81) bull for the Estonian crusade in the l 170s spoke rather equivocally of remission of penance of confessed sins for a year for those who joined up and 'remission of all their sins' for those who died. 22 Innocent ΠΙ did not initially apply it to the Baltic theatre of war. However, Henry portrays the succession 20 Leonid Arbusow, 'Das entlehnte Sρrachgut in Heinrichs "Chronicon Livoniae". Ein Beitrag zur Sρrache mittelalterlicher Chronistik: Deutsches Archiv fur Erfόrschung des Mittelalters 8 (1951), 100-153 (here 109). See also Chapter2 by Jaan Undusk in thisvolume. 21 HCL ΧΧΧ . 6, ρ. 222; Brundage, ρ. 246.; PL 214, cols 308-12. 22 PL 200, cols 800-801.

VII 30

of ρaρal grants of full indulgences as consistent. Thus Ρορe Celestine ΠΙ (r. 1191-98) is said to have granted 'the remission of all sins to all those who would take the cross' to helρ Bishoρ Meinhard's mission ρerhaρs in 1195/ 96, an offer reρeated for Bishoρ Bertold in 1197 /98, Henry noting 'as he [the ρορe] had to his ρredecessor'. Α third grant, ρerhaρs by Celestine ΠΙ, ρerhaρs by Innocent ΠΙ, is said to have been discussed at Philip of Swabia's ( 1177 -1208) Christmas court in 1199. Οη this occasion, Henry adds that the ρlenary remission of sins was equal to that granted for the Jerusalem crusade. 23 This is ρaralleled by Arnold of Lίibeck's statement that Celestine's grant of indulgences οη behalf of Bishoρ Bertold was equated with those for the Jerusalem war.24 These bulls do not survive. Innocent III's bull of 5 October 1199 merely offers indulgences equivalent to those granted to pilgrims to Rome. Although afi:er the stalling of the Fourth Crusade ίη 1204, lnnocent suggested that Holy Land vows could be commuted to fighting in Livonia, he consistently regarded the Baltic crusades as less important than those to the Holy Land.25 Henry of Livonia ignores this for two reasons. Firstly, there is ηο clear evidence that he had direct access to ρaρal letters, and secondly, he - or those who commissioned the chronicle - wished to present Livonia as ηο less meritorious than the more glamorous crusade to the Holy Land. The frequency of Henry's noting of remission of sins highlights the central theme of the spiritual efficacy and value of the Livonian mission, rendering wars of ρolitical conquest into exercises in penance and salvation, establishing the legitimacy of the Livonian enterprise and the efforts of Bishoρ Albert and his annual recruiting drives ίη Germany. Henry's treatment of remission of sins sρeaks of the context of the 1220s and the need to balance continuing ρaρal suρρort for the Livonian mission with the autonomous authority of the bishoρ of Riga ίη particular. That the indulgence was attractive can be attested across Christendom. However, Henry's account of its use and development ίη Livonia represents an over-simplification of the past to suit the present of the 1220s, exaggerating ρapal commitment while exposing the essentially freelance nature of Bishop Albert's recruitment and propaganda. Ιη Henry's νίsίοη, the Livonian ecclesiastical authorities reρeatedly underρinned their aggressive and exρansionist activities by aρρeal to the formula of remission of sins, ρrobably reflecting actual ρolicy. Equally, Henry's invariable and repetitive formula reveals how an otherwise rather complicated, reactive and changing official ρolicy HCL 1.12; ΙΙ.3; ΙΙΙ.2, ρρ. 7, 9, 12; Bι-undage, ρρ. 30, 32, 35-6. Arnold ofLίibeck, Chronica Slavorum, pp. 214-15. 25 LUB 1/1, nos 12 and 14. See now Iben Fonnesberg-Schmidt, The Popes and the Baltic Crusades 1147-1254 (Leiden, 2007), esρ . ρρ. 99-104, 111. See also Chapter 8 by Iben Fonnesberg-Schιnidt ίη this volume. 23

24

VII Henry ofLivonia and the Ideology ofCrusading

31

regarding crusade spiritual privileges could be perceived οη Christendom's wild frontline. What William of Modena, a former official of the papal chancery, might have made of Henry's distortion of papal correspondence can only be imagined, his potential dissent arguing for a completion date for the chronicle after his departure.26 Another feature of Henry's description of the crusades and crusaders that placed him within contemporary constructions of crusading was his use of the language of pilgrimage. Although by 1200 the connection between crusading and pilgrimage had become umbilical to the extent that it was even applied by some observers to the Albigensian crusade, there was nothing neutral about this. 27 Helmold of Bosau, in his description of the Second Crusade, rather pointedly distinguished between the Spanish and Palestinian campaigns, which he called pilgrimages, and the Baltic enterprise, which he did not. 28 Ιη his bull authorizing a holy war against the Estonians ίη 1171 /72, Alexander ΠΙ (r. 1159-81) equated the participants' remission of penance for one year to that granted 'to those who visit the sepulchre of the Lord'. 29 Α generation later, eager to place the Baltic wars ίη the same conceptual frame as papal holy wars elsewhere, Arnold of Lίibeck appropriated the pilgrimage in his account of Bishop Bertold's military intervention in Livonia. 30 Henry first refers to Livonian crusaders as pilgrims when describing the discussion of crusader privileges at Philip of Swabia's Christmas court ίη 1199: here, he draws an exact parallel between the Livonian enterprise and theJerusalem crusade. 3 1 Thereafter the association is ubiquitous. This manipulation of perceptions should be placed ίη the context of the famous Lateran Council declaration of Livonia as the land of the Virgin Mary, holy ground under the protection of the mother of God and increasingly irrigated by the blood of martyrs.32 By insisting relentlessly οη the crusaders as pilgrims, Henry reinforces the status of the Livonian mission. By the 1220s, this perspective may have seemed more reasonable, accommodating 26 Fonnesberg-Schmidt, Popes, chapters ] and 2; Barbara Bombi, Novella Plantatio Fidei: Missione e crociata nel nord Europa tra la fine del ΧΙΙ eti i primi decenni del ΧΙΙΙ secolo (Rome, 2007), esp. pp. 270-77; Blomkvist, Discovery ofthe Baltic, esp. pp. 509-60, 623-56; 664-6; Se!art, Ίαm tunc ... Ίhe Political Context'. 27 Layettes du Trι!sor des chartes, ed. Alexandre Teulet et al., vol. 2 (Paris, ] 866), ηο. 1789. 28 Helmold, Cronica Slavorum, pp. 115, 117, 118. 29 PL 200, cols 800-801 ;James Brundage, 'Ίhe Thirteenth Cenωry Livonian Crusade : Henricus de Lettis and the First Legatine Mission ofBishop William ofModena:Jahrbucher fur Geschichte Osteuropas, n.s. 20 (1972), 1-9 (here 2-3). 30 Arnold ofLίibeck, Chronica Slavorum, pp. 214-15. 31 HCL 111.2, p. 12; Brundage, pp. 35-6. 32 HCL ΧΙΧ .7, p. 132; Brundage, p. 152.

VII 32 Henry's shaping of the foundation narrative of Christian Livonia according to a carefully crafi:ed model of sanctity. At the centre of this lay the cult of the Virgin Mary, its association with Livonia constituting a major element in Henry's chronicle. Henry's promotion of Livonia as the land of Christ's mother mirrors the policy of Bishop Albert, indicating the variety of responses to crusading as well as a localism easily overlooked in general accounts of crusade ideology. His missionary-oriented mo11astery of Segeberg was dedicated to the Virgi11 Mary, as was Riga and its cathedral. The idea of taking 'the cross to the la11d of the blessed Virgi11' provided Livonia with unassailable credentials, the land of God's Mother a suitable destination for a 'pilgrim knight', as Henry describes one admittedly corrupt German crusader. 33 As Henry tells it, Livo11ian crusaders marched u11der ban11ers of the Virgin. The earliest surviving Livonia11 charter confirmed the a11nexatio11 by Bishop Albert of Gerzike (Latv. Jersika) ί11 1209 as a do11ation to the church of the Virgin Mary, an association explicitly recorded by Henry, signalling his dependence οη Bishop Albert. 34 With the papacy more concerned to place Baltic conquests under the protection of St Peter and the Roman see, Henry's need to insist 011 this disti11ctive status was apparent i11 papal refusal to elevate Livonia to the importance ofJerusalem, witnessed by Innocent's customary avoidance of standard Holy Land crusade terminology in his correspondence; his indifference to controlling preaching, recruitment or seemingly even Bishop Albert's regular grants of crusade i11dulgences; and Pope Honorius III's (r. 1216-27) demand for Livonia11 ecclesiastical tithes to assist the Fifi:h Crusade ίη the Mediterra11ean i11 1219. 35 The Livonian cult of the Virgin cut little ice in Rome. Henry's insistence that the pope accepted Bishop Albert's claim at the Fourth Lateran Council - which Henry probably attended - for parity between 'the land of the Mother' and the 'land of the Son' smacks of invention and false propaganda, reflecti11g 110 general political or ideological accepta11ce of this formulation but rather Henry's carefully constructed weaving of the Virgin into his accou11ts of the missionary wars. 36 Campaigns against the Estonians in 1216, 1218 and 1224 were said to have begun οη the Feast of the Virgin Mary; the Christians captured Fellin (Est. Viljandi) οη that day in 1223. 37 Just before his account of the Lateran Council, Henry's narrative prepared the ground by Η CL XV.4, ΧΙ.4, ρρ. 92, 50; Brundage, ρρ. 113, 70. LUB 1/1, no. 15; HCL ΧΙΙΙ.4, ρ. 71; Blomkvist, Discovery ojthe Baltic, pp. 646, 664; Bombi, Novella Plantatio Fidei, p. 277. 35 Fonnesberg-Schmidt, Popes, pp. 99-131; Innocent III's and Honorius III's letters fail to echo Livonian Mariolatry; LUB 1/1, ηο. 42 for Fifi:h Crusade money. 36 HCLXIX.7, p. 132. 37 HCLXX.2;XXll.2;XXVll.2;XXVIII.5,ρp. 135, 148,195,202. 33

34

VII Henry ofLivonia and the Ideology of Crusading

33

attributing to the Virgin the defeat of an Estonian/Oselian attack οη the fleet carrying the Rigan clerical embassy to Rome. The Mother of God had been invoked by the praying clergy and she had answered the call, provoking Henry's comment: 'The Blessed Virgin freed us that day, as She has freed the Livonians from all their troubles up to the present day.' 38 The subsequent, and perhaps consequent, Lateran Council starement stands as a guarantor of the authority and independence that the cult of the Virgin provided to Bishop Albert's Livonian plantation. Henry's promotion of this image reaches a climax in a bloodcurdling passage ίη chapter 25, where it is shown in detail how the ~een ofHeaven saw off all the enemies of the Rigan settlement, including Christians, massacring a list of pagan notables, slaughtering apostates, expelling the Danes, repulsing the Swedes, engineering the captivity of Waldemar ΙΙ, killing Vladimir of Pskov and Vetseke of Kokenhusen, despoiling the kings of Novgorod and so οη: 'See how many kings ... princes and elders of treacherous peoples She has wiped off the earth.' 39 This comprehensive, uncompromisingly brutal and violent catalogue is only mildly toned down by reference to Her gentleness to faithful believers and later, at the end of chapter 29, possibly where an earlier drafi: ended, by association with Christ. 40 The end of the current final chapter 30 sums it up ίη describing the Christian victory over the Oselians ίη 1226: 'what kings [a dig at the king of Denmark] have hitherto been unable to do, the Blessed Virgin quickly and easily accomplishes through Her Rigan servants to the honour of Her name.' 4 1 That such veneration for a distinctly martial Virgin was not as universal in the north in the early thirteenth century as it later became is witnessed by Arnold of Lίibeck. While collapsing chronology in attributing the foundation of Riga dedicated to the Virgin to Bishop Meinhard, Arnold later remarked that Bishop Albert and the Livonian church's protector was God Himself, with ηο mention of His mother. 42 The apparent discrepancy between Henry's Marian enthusiasm and papal indifference borh to rhe Livonian cult of the Virgin and to the association of the crusade there with that to the Holy Land raises τhe question of papal authority, a key element in formal crusading. Henry is well aware of the importance of this ίη justifying the Livonian crusade and ecclesiastical establishment. One of the most notable features of Henry's chronicle is the almost complete absence of any acknowledgement of the role of the archbishop of Hamburg-Bremen in the early mission and conquest. Archbishop Hartwig (r. 1185-90/92 and 38 39 40 41 42

HCL ΧΙΧ.5, pp. 129-30; Brundage, p. 150. HCL XXV.2, ρ. 180; Brundage, ρ. 199; Blomkvist, Discovery ofthe Baltic, p. 646. HCLXXIX.9,p. 215. HCLXXX. 6, p. 221; Brundage, p. 245. Arnold ofLίibeck, Chronica Slavorum, pp. 210-11 and 212.

VII 34

1194-1207) gets hardly a mention and then only ίη terms either neutral consecrating Meinhard - or passive - the Livs sent to him for a new bishop afi:er Meinhard's death. 43 Henry was determined to portray Livonia as autocephalic and autogenous but, at the same time, enjoying direct papal approval. By initially em phasizingthe bulls ofCelestine ΠΙ, Henry deliberately reduces the primary role of the archbishop of Hamburg-Bremen ίη the Livonian enterprise of the l 180s and l 190s, reflecting Bishop Albert's later efforts to assert his independence. 44 Ίhe care with which Henry charts continuing papal authorization for Bishop Albert's actiνities also speaks of the world ίη which Henry was writing ίη the 1220s, the circumstances of William of Modena's mission. Yet even William's mission, according to Henry's account, came not from a papal initiative but at Bishop Albert's request. 45 Ίhis follows an almost invariable pattern of Livonian petitions and embassies to the Curia, leading to papal grants that reinforced the image ofBishop Albert's jurisdictional independence ίη justifyinghis policies of violence, forced conversion and ecclesiastical imperialism. Ίhis duality of papal authority and Livonian autonomy was summed up by Henry's phrase 'Roma dictat iura, Riga vero rigat gentes'. 46 Ίhe patina of order and orthodoxy was certainly important ίη the context of William of Modena's mission, even if it hardly encompassed the reality of Bishop Albert's freelance crusade recruiting that extended to the determination of a crusader's term, one campaign season, a local variant of admittedly rather confused conventions. Ίhe vexed relationship of the bishop and the Livonian Sword Brethren, an issue needing careful negotiation by Legate William, was neatly prejudged by Henry's insistence that lnnocent ΠΙ had placed them ίη obedience under Bishop Albert ίη 1202. Henry glossed over the sharp competition for authority that lay behind the papal arbitration of the 1210 division of Livonia between the bishop and the Brethren, implying the bishop's pre-existing superior local jurisdiction.47 Papal patronage of the violent mission ίη Livonia was illustrated by the story of the convert Caupo's visit to Rome and lnnocent's gifi: to Bishop Albert of a Bible allegedly written by Gregory the Great (r. 590-604), a pope famous for his sponsorship of the conversion of the English, a fact pressed οη the Rigan church by Innocent ΠΙ himself ίη HCL 1.8; ΙΙ.1, pp. 4, 8. Bombi, Novella Plantatio Fidei, pp. 270-71; Fonnesberg-Schmidt, Popes, pp. 84-5. 45 Η CL ΧΧΙΧ.2, p. 208; LUB l / l, ηο. 69 for William's appointment οη 31 December 1224; Brundage, 'Thirteenth Century Livonian Crusade'; Fonnesberg-Schmidt, Popes, pp. 170-76. 46 HCL ΧΙΧ.7, p. 132. 47 HCL Vl.4; ΧΙ.3, pp. 18, 48-50; LUB 1/1, nos 16-19 for the 1210-11 papal and imperial arbitration; nos 74, 78, 82-4, 86-8, 93 for William's arbitration ίη 1225-26. 43 44

VII Henry ofLivonia and the Ideology ofCrusading

35

1201, although ίη the context of urging a moderate and sympathetic process of evangelizing alien to Bishop Albert, an ironywholly lost οη Henry. 48 Even when Honorius ΠΙ failed to resolve disputes between Bishop Albert, the Danes and the Russians, Henry creates a general impression of unwavering, if somewhat vague, papal approval. 49 The bishop ofRiga as loyal son of the Roman church, but with quasi-archiepiscopal power, the right to recruit crusaders and the special protection of the Mother of God: this was the careful juggling act insinuated by Henry's chronicle, diverting attention from the extent of private enterprise and absence of papal supervision. Α comparison of Henry's account of papal support with papal letters reveals how far the chronicler exaggerates the precise authority granted Bishop Albert, although even he cannot lend Bishop Albert the crusade legatine status that his account indicates the bishop simply appropriated. 50 The Lateran Council exchange merely stands as the most blatant or ben trovato of such constructions. Henry's concern to establish papal authority - like his mention of Bishop Albert's attempts to receive German imperial sanction and patronage - occupies just one corner of a much larger canvas of legitimization of the Livonian war, forced conversion, Bishop Albert's rule and the Christian conquest. Henry treads carefully but firmly along a path of legalistic respectability that both marks out his vision of the Livonian crusade as distinctive while simultaneously fitting early thirteenth-century concerns to apply just war categories to the holy war of the crusade. Canon law forbade forced conversion. How much canon law Henry knew must remain conjectural, yet from the very start of his narrative, Henry is careful to establish the legal case for the crusades that followed. Meinhard promised to build strong forts for the Livs in return for their conversion. They accepted the deal, swearing oaths that they would receive baptism, sworn commitments that were explicitly repeated. Once the stone fort had been completed, the Livs apostatized. Later, afraid that Meinhard was intending to bring an army to coerce them, the Livs once more promised to adhere to the Christian faith, but once again proved deceitful. This led to the mission ofTheodoric ofTreiden (d. 1219) to Celestine ΠΙ and to the first, ίη Henry's account, crusade bull granted οη the grounds that the Livs Όught to be forced to observe the faith which they had freely promised'. Ιη Henry's version, remission of sins was offered to those who took the cross 'to restore - ad resuscitandam - that newly founded church'. 51 While baptism at sword point was far from unknown ίη the Baltic and features ίη late twelfth-century German 48

49 50 51

HCL VII.3 pp. 20-21; Maccarrone, Ί papϊ: pp. 70, 78-80. HCLXXIV.4, p.173. HCL ΧΙ.9, p. 57 for Bishop Albert's offer offresh indulgences co Gerιnan crusaders. HCL Ι.5-12, pp. 3-7, quotation at 7; Brundage, pp. 26-30.

VII 36

literature, for example, ίη the Rolandsleid, Henry'5 argument ί5 5Ubtler. 52 He 5eem5 anxiou5 to avoid the 5tartling extravagance of lnnocent 111'5 approval ίη 1209 of the Danί5h war again5t the Finn5 'to extirpate the error of ρaganism and extend the frontier5 of Chri5tendom' by forcing the pagan5 to become Chri5tίan5. 5 3 Such uncompromi5ίng and legally 5u5pect doctrine had ηο ρlace ίη the cultivated intellectual world of Legate William ofModena, a man noted for hi5 clo5e connection5 with the Dominican5. Henry'5 later rehear5al of the Meinhard apo5ta5y epi5ode, for example, ίη hi5 account of the campaign of 1205, 5Ugge5t5 it5 5tructural and conceptual importance. 54 Henry'5 initial ju5tification of apo5ta5y and threat found an echo ίη Innocent 111'5 bull ofDecember 1215, reminί5cent of that of 1204, with its talk of using the material as well a5 5pίritual arm5 to protect the 'new plantation of the Chri5tίan faith agaίn5t the barbarian nation5'. 55 However, ίη 50 far a5 the papacy bothered with the fine detail5 of the Livonian cru5ade at all, the Curia'5 ju5tίfication fitted a pragmatic dimen5ίon of ρaρal ρolicy rather than, a5 Henry would have it, any more gloriou5 or tran5cendent cau5e. Henry's initial ju5tification5 for the Livonian war re50und through the whole of the re5t of hi5 work, embracing conflict5 with local apo5tate5, ρagan5 and Ru55ian Orthodox Chri5tians. 56 lt is the central distortinglen5 that allow5 Henry's audience to view Βί5hορ Albert's war5 as exercise5 ίη defence and 5uppre5sίon of apo5ta5y and rebellion rather than foreign inva5ίon, conque5t and civil war. lt ί5 perhap5 a mea5ure of Henry'5 5en5ίtivity to the mί55ίoηary dimen5ίon of the Livonian conflict, born of hi5 own experience a5 a pa5tor to the newly converted, that he is 50 determined to portray the conque5t a5 legitimate. Hi5 care may al5o reflect an under5tanding that not everyone felt a5 ea5y with 5UCh militant Chri5tίanity a5 did Henry or Βί5hορ Albert. Ιη that sen5e, Henry'5 chronicle provides an ίη5ίght into the thirteenth-century debate over the relation5hip of cru5ade and mi55ίon. While not doubting the validity of the Livonian crusade, Henry doe5 5eem to go to inordinate and repetitive length5 to ίη5ί5t οη ίt5 ju5tίce, 52 Jeffrey Ashcrofi:, 'Konrad's Rolandslied, Henry the Lion and the Northern Crusade: Forum Jόr Modern Language Studies 22 (1986), 184-208; Horst Richter, 'Militia Dei: Α Central Concept for the Religious Ideas of the Early Crusades and the German Rolandslieά, ίη his]ourneys Towards God, ed. Barbara Ν. Sargent-Baur (Michigan, 1992), ρρ. 107-26. 53 PL 216, cols 116-17; trans. Jonathan and Louise Riley-Smith, The Crusades: Jdea and Reality 1095-1274 (London, 1981), ρρ . 77-8. 54

HCLIX.8andll,ρp.29-30,31.

DD 1: 5, ηο. 61; cf. LUB 1/1, ηο. 14. 56 Blomkvist, D iscovery of the Baltic, pp. 627-42; Anti Selart, 'Confessional Conflict and Political Co-operation: Livonia and Russia ίη the Thirteenth Century: ίη CCBF, pp. 151-76, esp. pp. 153-8. 55

VII Henry ofLivonia and the Jdeology ofCrusading

37

and to do so οη conventional Augustinian grounds: defence or restitution; right intent; due authority; charity for enemies as well as allies; to which was added the traditional crusading twist of legitimate revenge for past wrongs. From the initial supposed grant of Celestine ΠΙ, the pattern oflegitiιnization remained consistent. Hostile local peoples are dismissed as pagans and, routinely, as perfidia, who habitual!y apostatize, break the peace and their oaths. 57 Perfidy is the characteristic of barbarians - the Oselians are deceitful tricksters; 'apostate peoples' in the account of a campaign in 1223 - in contrast to the constancy of the faithful even in the face of martyrdom. War οη the Lithuanians is just because they are 'enemies of Christ: a crude blanket cover for victims of German aggression. The Livonians' capacity for repeated backsliding justified conquest and dispossession: 'the Livonians were unworthy ofsuch a large fort for, although they had been baptised, they were still rebels and unbelievers', but, once they genuinely or, perhaps more accurately, obediently accepted Christianity, those who seemed 'justly [non immerito] to haνe lost villages and fields and other possessions were permitted to regain them: as if it were not the Germans who were the interlopers and dispossessors. 58 Perhaps that is what worried Henry. Ιη the developing theories of natural law, unprovoked conquest of the lands of others was controversial if not actiνely condemned. Specific injustices, such as piracy, holding Christians captiνe and atrocities against the faithful, were emphasized as just grounds for attack, even though the Christians indulged in identical practices in reverse. 59 Once established, however, the Livonian church provided its own justification, Henry deploying standard rhetoric to portray the beleaguered Christian outpost, including the language of liberation, one of the very seeds of crusade ideology in 1095. 60 Yet Henry's continued insistence οη supporting his narratiνe with the lexicon of just war may point to a conscious need to persist in arguing the justice of the Christian Livonian cause. Henry also justifies German aggression in terms of revenge, a crusade motif that reached back to the First Crusade, and one that is implicit in certain biblical texts well used by holy war advocates, such as Psalm 137: 'happy shall he be that 57 See Henry's accounts ofcampaigns ίη 1200, 1206, 1210, 1211, 1212, 1217, 1223, 1224; Tiina Kala, 'The lncorporation of the Northern Baltic Lands into the Western Christian World', ίη CCBF, pp. 3-20 (here 15-16). 58 Η CL ΙΧ.11 and 13, pp. 31, 32; Brundage pp. 52-3 for quotations; cf. Η CL VII. l; XXVII.l; ΙΧ.3, pp. 19, 27, 195. 59 Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers and lnfidels, esp. chapters 1-3; for exarnple, captives, Η CL ΧΙ.5, p. 52; pirates, Vll.3, ΧΙΙ .6, ΧΙΧ . 5, pp. 24, 62, 129; for atrocities justifying retaliation, HCL ΙΧ . 11, Χ.5, Χ.7, XVIII.8, ΧΙΧ . 3, ΧΧΙΙ . 8, ΧΧΙΙΙ. 5, pp. 31, 35-6, 37, 121-2, 124-5, 152, 158-9. 6 For exarnple, Η CL ΧΙ.5, XV.3, ΧΙΧ.6, XXVI.11, pp. 52, 90, 130, 192.

°

VII 38

rewardeth thee as thou hast served us.' Οη occasion, Henry is meticulous ίη presenting revenge as a legitimate response. Ιη 1208, the Rigans moved against the Estonians, largely because they threatened the commercial interests of the German merchants. The casus belli was the Estonians' refusal to make reparation for injuries done to Christian Letts. Ιη reply to messages 'to demand satisfaction for all the injuries which they had suffered', the Estonians 'rendered ηο justice' and so the Letts and Rigans 'avenged their injuries with fire and sword'. The tone is legalistic: Ύοu have not restored the goods stolen from the Germans and also the things ofi:en stolen from us.' 61 Thereafi:er the theme of vengeance is especially associated with wars against the Estonians, 'vindictamjάciant'. 62 Once conversion had spread, Estonian opponents of the Rigans could be dismissed ίη secular terms as traitors or rebels. The mechanisms of vengeance could be extended to the Orthodox Russians ίη retaliation for Russian attacks οη Catholic Livonia. 1η 1221, the Rigans and their Lettish allies plundered Orthodox churches: 'for all the harm which the Russians had brought upon the Livonians, they received double or triple that year.' 63 The goal of the Livonian wars was both the protection of the new Christian plantation and the conversion of the pagans. Α deliberate contrast is drawn with the alleged motiνes of the Russians who desired land 'not with the hope of regeneration in the faith ofJesus Christ, but with the hope ofloot and tribute'. 64 Conversion is central to Henry's story and acts as the ultimate justification for the warfare. As the conquered are given the chance of salvation, the intention of the conquerors is just and good, doubly so as they are also defendingtheir existingcoreligionists and the infant Livonian church from assault and recidivism. Pagan defeat is followed by baptism which is followed by actiνe conversion by priests such as Henry himself in mission churches and monasteries. Those who initially 'freely' (whatever that meant) conνerted were then encouraged to remain in or forced to return to the faith by arms. 65 Forced baptisιη was a familiar theme of Baltic warfare ίη the second half of the twelfi:h century, in official policy of some German ecclesiastics, famously Bishop Berno of Schwerin (d. 1191) towards the Rugians; in the wars of the Danes against pagan neighbours; and in the HCL ΧΙΙ.6, pp. 62-4; Brundage, pp. 83-5. HCL XV.3, p. 90; see also Χ.13, XIV.10; XVIIl.5, ΧΧΙΙΙ.8; XXV.4; XXVIII.6 (justifying a massacre of women and children), ΧΧΧ.1, pp. 43, 82, 119, 164, 205, 216; for God's own vengeance, XXVI.10, p. 191. 63 HCL XXV.5-6, pp. 184-5; Brundage, pp. 203-4. 64 Η CL XXVIII.4, p. 202; Brundage, p. 222. 65 For example, HCL 1.12, p. 7; for rhe Livonian conversion, see Bombi, Novella Plantatio Fidei; Kala, Ίncorporation'; Fonnesberg-Schmidt, Popes, pp. 52-78, 113-31, 162-79. 61 62

VII Henry ofLivonia and the Jdeology ο/ Crusading

39

wider secular cultural setting, for example, of twelfi:h-century German stories of the wars of Charlemagne.66 lt has been argued that Henry's account of the Livonian mission reveals a military dimension from the start, during Meinhard's ιηίssίοη. 67 Yet the issue of legitimacy is not e11tirely shirked or assumed. He11ry allows the paga11 Livs to put the i11vaders i11tellectually 011 the spot whe11 he has them tell Bishop Bertold he could have peace provided he removed the threat of viole11ce except 011 those who had already co11verted, a11d co11ducted his missio11ary work 'with words 11ot with blows'. But the Livs immediately revealed their perfidious 11ature a11d so battle was joi11ed a11d, afi:er the Germa11 victory, baptism imposed. 68 The story merely co11firms the 11ecessity of military force. This approach was rei11forced by the role played ί11 the Livo11ia co11quest by the Cistercia11s. Si11ce Bernard of Clairvaux's 'co11vert to extermi11ate' call ί11 1147, Cistercia11s had 11ot 011ly bee11 vociferous ίη their support for crusade as well as co11versio11, but some had appeared to see 110 problem with e11forced baptism.69 l11 1208, 011e of the leadi11g figures ί11 the Livo11ia11 settleme11t, Theodoric of Treide11, Cistercia11 abbot ofDίi11amίi11de (Latv. Daugavgrϊva), led a11 army agai11st Selburg (Latv. Selpils). Afi:er a sharp siege, the fort's garriso11 was allowed to surre11der 011 co11ditio11 they accepted baptism. l11 1200 Theodoric had gone to Rome 011 Bishop Albert's behalf to ask l1111oce11t ΠΙ to authorize crusade privileges fοι· German soldiers ίη Livonia.111 1219, he met his death οη the Danish expedition to Estonia that he himself had urged οη King Waldemar ΙΙ the year before. 70 The embrace of viole11ce by the Cistercia11s ί11 the cause of expanding the church is well demo11strated by the career of 011e of Theodoric's compa11io11s of 1218 ί11 aski11g for a Da11ish attack οη Esto11ia, his successor as abbot of Dίi11amίinde, Ber11ard of Lippe (c. 1140-1224). Α battle-harde11ed warrior, a debilitati11g malady of his feet persuaded him to aba11do11 his secular life a11d become a Cistercia11. l11 1211 he arrived ί11 Livo11ia with that year's crusaders, appare11tly as a missio11ary. Yet, ίη He11ry's accou11t, he is said to have take11 the cross, a11 act rhat instantly cured his lameness. 7 1 Originally, Urba11 ΙΙ 66 Helmold, Cronica Slavorum, pp. 173-4, 211-14; Kedar, Crusade and Mission, p. 140, η . 16; Ashcroft, 'Konrad's Rolandsleitf, pp. 190-201; ίη general, Friedrich Lotter, 'Ίhe Crusading Idea and the Conquest of the Region East of the Elbe; ίη Medieval Frontier Societies, ed. Robert Bartlett and Angus MacKay (Oxford, 1989), pp. 267-306. 67 Jensen, 'Nature of the Early Missionary Activities: 68 HCL ΙΙ.5-7, pp. 9-10; Brundage, pp. 32-3. 69 Bernard of Clairvaux, Opera Omnia, ed. Jean Leclerq eτ al. (Rome, 1957-), vol. 8, p. 433, letter ηο. 457. 70 HCLXI.6, IV.6,XXII.l, ΧΧΙΙΙ.2, pp. 53-4, 14, 146-7, 155; Henry also records his involvement ίη founding the Sword Brethren, VI.4, p. 18. 71 HCLXV.1,XV.3, XV.4, XXII.l , pp. 88, 91, 92,146.

VII 40

had forbidden monks from becoming crusaders. 72 Ιη his letter of October 1204 allowing Jerusalem crucesignati to commute their vows to Livonia, Innocent ΠΙ had rather pointedly referred to the Cistercians in Livonia as fighting 'spiritualibus armis', in contrast to the Sword Brethren's secular warfare. 73 Yet empathetic cross-taking by monks was not unknown, especially as they, like secular clergy, were to be found at the head of crusade armies; Otto ofFreising, another Cistercian, took the cross ίη 1147; Bernard of Clairvaux was touted as non-fighting leader of a planned crusade in 1150; Abbot Martin of the Swiss Cistercian house of Pairis, took the cross as a preacher of the Fourth Crusade; another ofBeι-nard of Lippe's contemporaries, Arnaud Aimery, abbot of Citeaux itself, organized the early sanguinary stages of the Languedoc crusade from 1208-09 and joined the crusade in Spain in 1213. 74 Το have a monkish preacher as a crucesignatus added to the aura of elevated community that suffused crusade rhetoric and promotion, characteristic of thirteenth-century crusading. Another approach was to stress the regenerative power of taking the cross spiritually and, in this case, physically, the outward symbol of the inner dedication to God's cause. The healing associated with taking the cross that Henry introduces ίη his story ofBernard of Lippe alludes to this familiar trope and places his thought-world squarely ίη the mainstream of hagiographic and evangelical writing surrounding the efficacy of crusading ίη the thirteenth century. 75 Bernard ofLippe and Theodoric ofTreiden, ηο less than Bishop Albert, operated ίη an international context. Both feature in their fellow Cistercian Caesarius of Heisterbach's Dialogus Miraculorum (1219-23). 76 The Cistercian network helped prevent Livonia descending into complete provincialism. For Henry, the Cistercian connection provided one of a number of channels for the receipt and transmission of ideas: his own education ίη Germany; perhaps the Hamburg-Bremen historiographic tradition; the Augustinians; the immigrant clergy; the commercial elites of Riga; visiting crusaders; possibly the theology lessons given by Archbishop Anders Sunesen of Lund (r. 1201-28) ίη Riga in

Urban ΙΙ to the religious ofVallombrosa, 7 October 1096, Wilhlem Wiederhold, 'Papsturkunden ίη Florenz: ίη Nachrichten von der Gesellschaji der Wissenschaften zu Gottingen, JJhil. hist. Kl. (Gottingen, 1901), pp. 313-14. 73 LUB 1/1, ηο . 14. 74 Abbot Martin ίs the closest parallel, Gunther of Pairis, Hystoria Constantinopolitana, ed. and trans. Alfred J. Andrea (Philadelphia, 1997), p. 68. 75 Η CL XV.4, p. 92; Tyerman, Invention, p. 82. 76 Caesarius of Heisterbach, Dialogus, vol. 2, pp. 93, 149, 193, 243; see also pp. 287 and 297. 72

VII Henry ofLivonia and the Ideology ofCrusading

41

the winter of 1206-07; and his own and Bishop Albert's travels to Rome and the courts of Germany. 77 Ιη this wider community, debate over the balance of crusade and conversion remained vigorous. Henry seems to have followed the Cistercians ίη a duality of approach to pagans and infidels. His attitude is congruent to, but far less nuanced than, say, the classic formulation of the link between violence and conversion later proposed by lnnocent IV (r. 1243-54). 78 Where lnnocent argued that violence was legitimate if non-Christians refused, hindered or mistreated Christian missionaries, Henry follows the more basic line of Bishop Albert and the German-Livonian elite: effective conquest and German rule depended οη conversion as a means of social and political control, cohesion and discipline that, for the faithful, could be presented as an enforced lesson for the converts' own good, as paraded ίη the prominence given to the convert grandee Caupo and Henry's trite equation of Christianity with material success and wellbeing.79 Most of these issues are present ίη the account of the siege of Fellin ίη 1211. Ίhe besieged were offered a deal: accept Christianity and their captured comrades would be spared and they themselves would be received (colligo) 'in the charity of frateι-nity with us and the bond of peace'. After refusing the initial peace conditions, the defenders ultimately accepted terms, overwhelmed by the technological superiority of the German military machinery, by casualties and by a shortage of water: 'We acknowledge your God to be greater than our gods. By overcoming us, He has inclined our hearts to worship him. We beg, therefore, that you spare us and mercifully impose the yoke of Christianity upon us as you have upon the Livonians and Letts: Α pre-baptism ritual then occurred amidst the slaughter, but even the Germans felt squeamish about actually administering the baptismal sacrament surrounded by such carnage. 80 However, the language - and reality - of dominance invited problems over the treatment of the new converts. One clear object of William of Modena's mission was to secure the conversion by settling disputes among the ruling 77 For che Hamburg-Breιnen concext, see Linda Kaljundi, 'Waiting for che Barbarians: Reconstruction of Otherness ίη the Saxon Missionary and Crusading Chronicles 11 th- l 3th Cencuries: ίη The Medieval Chronicle, vol. 5, ed. Erik Kooper (Amscerdam and New York, 2008), p.113-27; for Sunesen, HCL Χ . 13, pp. 43-4; Torben Κ. Nielsen, 'The Missionary Man: Archbishop Anders Sunesen and the Baltic Crusade 1206-21: ίη CCBF, pp. 95-118, esp. pp. 106-8; HCL XIX.S, pp. 127-30 implies - but does not state conclusively - that Henry cravelled co Rome in 1216. 78 Οη lnnocenc IV, Kedar, Crusade and Mission, pp. 159-69; Muldoon, Popes, Lawyers and Infidels, pp. 29-48. 79 HCL VIl.3, X.I0,X.13,XIV.8,XIV.IO, XVl.3, ΧΧΙ.2, ΧΧΙ.4,ΧΧΙΧ.Ι, pp. 20-21, 40,44, 79,82, 105,142, 143-4,207. 80 HCL XIV.I 1, pp. 83-5; Brundage, pp. !05-7.

VII 42

German elites and regulating the treatment of converts who, despite the best efforts of parish priests such as Henry himself, existed as second-class citizens and second-class Christians in a German church state. Ιη passages that sit uneasily as ίmplicίt crίticίsm of much of the rest of Henry's narratίve, Legate Willίam, echoing Innocent 111's ίnjunctίon of 1201, told the Germans not to impose 'any harsh, unbearable burden uροη the shoulders ofconverts'. The Sword Brethren in Estonia were warned against harshness 'either in taking tίthes or in any other matter whatsoever'. 81 These strictures contradict Henry's optimistic praίse for an almost Edenίc peace and security that he claίmed had descended οη Lίvonia by 1225, convenίently to coίncide with the legatίne mίssίon. 82 Such peace, according to Henry, unknown even before Meinhard's missίon, depended οη the Livs' acceptance of Christianity. Ιη reality, the legate appeared worried by the conditions imposed οη converts, such as, for examρle, the reparations, tribute and tithes instituted, according to Henry, by Bishop Albert ίη 1212. The legate's concerns may have been theologίcal; he was later, in 1238, to be in correspondence with Gregory ΙΧ (r. 1227-41) over the plight of converted Lίνοηίaη slaves. 83 They may have been more pragmatic, as when he urged a policy oflenίency οη the Sword Brethren 'eίther ίη taking tίthes or ίη any other matter whatsoever lest through such conditions [the Estonίans] shall agaίn be forced to return to paganism'. The desίre for temporal power and the threat of force was seen by some as a positive hindrance to conversion, famously by Roger Bacon in his attack οη the Teutonic Κnights' ρolicy in Prussia in his Opus Maius ( 1268 ). 84 However, even if Henry shared the legate's queasiness over some methods practised by the Germans ίη Livonίa, lest any ίη his audience ίmagine that the representatίve of the Roman Church could possibly disapprove, Henry closes the final version of his chronicle with the account of Legate William's campaign in Osel, from preaching the cross and recruiting German crusaders in Gotland to the subsequent massacres and mass coerced conversions. 85 Henry's message was clear. God, His Mother and the ρορe all support the wars foughr for rhe Lίνοηίaη church wirhout any equίvocatίon, a mίχ oflocal, ίnternatίonal and rranscendent perspectives rhar distinguish rhe whole work. Therefore, Henry of Livonia's chronicle borh is and ίs not what ίt seems, a sίmple narrative of conquest and conversion. The influences οη it are lirerary, theological, evangelical, ρolitical and ρolemic. Henry was clearly not in the orbit Η CL ΧΧΙΧ . 3, pp. 209-1 Ο; Brundage, ρ. 231; Maccarrone, Ί papi: pp. 78-80. HCL ΧΧΙΧ . 1, ρρ. 207-8. 83 Η CL XVI.4, ρρ . 109-11 ; Kcdar, Crusade and Mission , p. 214, Appendix 2d. 84 HCL ΧΧΙΧ.3, ρρ. 209-10; Brundage, ρ . 231; for Bacon, see Kedar, Crusade and Mission, pp. 177-80. 85 HCLXXX, pp. 215-22; Brundage, 238-46. 81 82

VII Henry ofLivonia and the Ideology ofCrusading

43

of the smart Paris set of intellectuals that set the tone of crusading rhetoric ίη the early thirteenth century, men such as Jacques de Vitry or Robert Curzon. He was influenced by his own experience and the circumstances of his frontier career. Henry also provides evidence of the circulation of ideas by writing, a significant element ίη forging Christendom into a seemingly coherent reality ίη the early thirteenth century. He talks of papal bulls defining the nature of the holy war being sent not just to Bishop Albert or the Master of the Sword Brethren but, as ίη 1211, circulated among potential recruits. 86 Yet Henry himself seems to have been largely immune to this written dimension of the Livonian crusade. His knowledge of the papal correspondence appears second hand, general, imprecise, if not downright distorted. Henry's chronicle, ίη this and other respects, bears comparison with Gerald ofWales's Expugnatio Hiberniae ( 1188) of a generation earlier, another frontier narrative that slants papal authorization towards legitimizing a brutal secular conquest and shares a persistent concern with legitimacy, military details, the imposition of ecclesiastical tithes, and the recidivist treachery of those being conquered that helps justify the violence meted out to them. 87 Henry's chronicle reveals how far specifically crusade motifs had spread into Livonia by the 1220s, received ίη rather broad terms by a Christian German culture accustomed to religiously sanctioned warfare. Of course, Henry cannot speak for all the German Livonian elite - a Sword Brethren chronicle would read very differently -, but he was a well-connected participant as well as observer. The repeated formula of taking the cross for remission of sins demonstrates both the adoption of international crusading norιns and the crudeness of their reception. Henry's care to assert papal authority maps a different world to that described by Helmold of Bosau, while, at the same time, showing clearly how consistently Rome reacted to Livonian demands rather than initiated them, a useful corrective to those who view papal uniformity and plenitude of power as actua! rather than aspirational. The insistence that the Livonian crusade be equated with the Holy Land crusade confirms how crucial the Holy Land element was ίη lending religious war respectability, particularly as ίη fact the Livonian crusade exposed the papal scale of value as placing Livonia well short of the Holy Land. Henry's chronicle illustrates how diverse, disparate and lacking ίη legalistic precision the idea and practice of crusading could be ίη the early thirteenth century, but also how certain features were becoming standardized, if only rhetorically. Yet literary equivocation was marginalized by the brutal experience of the annual tours of German crusaders. HCLXIV.13,p. 87. Gerald of Wales, Expugnatione Hiberniae; Robert Bartlett, The Making ofEurope: Conquest, Colonization and Cultural Change 950-1350 (London, 1993 ), pp. 97-8. 86 87

VII 44 Henry's creation myth for Christian Livonia may not have been widely circulated. However, compared with the Livonian Rhymed Chronicle of the late thirteenth century, for instance, ίt is evident that his vision matched later perceptions: the role of Meinhard; pagans provoking violence; early papal authorization; remission of sins; the cult of the Virgin. 88 However, ίη the Rhymed Chronicle, composed for the Teutonic Knights, there is none of Henry's anxiety to establish the justice of the military enterprise: by the l 290s and ίη that audience, the legitimacy of the war is assumed. Henry, by contrast, is creating, not confirming, a myth and a historical perspective. Το do this he imposes clear but misleading guidelines: a unity among Germans questioned by his own narrative; papal authority denied by papal documents; defence not conquest; suppression of rebellion not civil war; Bishop Albert subordinating the roles of the mercantile elite and the Sword Brethren; a denial of the pre-existing political interest of the Russians ίη the region, and so οη. Behind the compelling detail, the scheme ofHenry's account emerges as optimistic, imaginative, manipulative and self-serving, itself part of the exercise of state building. However false or partial the vision, Henry's chronicle stands as a monument to the pervasive exploitation of religious war by conquerors and missionaries alike, a cultural traction that played so potently οη the remotest frontiers of medieval Christendom, where brutal invasion could be portrayed as waking the idolatrous 'from the sleep of idolatry and of sin', a miracle for its times. 89

88 The Livonian Rhymed Chronicle, ed. and trans. Jerry C. Smith and William L. Urban (Bloomington, 1977), esp. pp. 5-7, 19. The ameliorative legatine mission of 1225-27 is not mentioned. 89 HCL 1.1, pp. 1-2; Brundage, p. 25.

VII

VIII

Some English Evidence of Attitudes to Crusading ίη the Thirteenth Century

When, sometime ίπ the early thirteenth century, a Hampshire crucesignatus, William of Muntford, was raising money for his journey to the Holy Land, he described the crusade as 'my great business'. 1 He was ίπ good company. All three English kings of the century took the Cross, as did hundreds if not thousands of their subjects. Men from England played prominent parts in crusades to the East ίπ 1217 - 21, 1227 - 9, 1240- 1, 1248 - 50 and 1270- 2, their need for money having its effect οπ the land market, and hence the distribution of local power, their privileges posing legal problems, criminal and tenurial. Large sums were raised from inactive or non-crucesignati at regular intervals through taxation, νοw redemptions, the sale of indulgences, gifts and legacies. Ιπ the familiar words of F. Μ. Powicke 'the business ... of the Holy Land was a political and economic function of society'. 2 As this was also the century ίπ which crusading was being consolidated by popes and canonists as an institution with wide spiritual and temporal application, it is perhaps worthwhile trying to see how the product was received by some of the customers, what underpinned their reactions and how far they accepted what the authorities, notably the papacy, were selling. Unfortunately the crusade presents the historian with a moving target. For one thing active crusading was becoming increasingly Balkanised into a series of local campaigns against a shifting variety of opponents of the papacy. For another, involvement with the crusade operated at different levels. Most obviously there were those who actually set out to fight. Then there were those who redeemed their vows or bought indulgences, and increasingly ίπ this century the administrative emphasis shifted from an appeal for men to an appeal for money, the growth of this market from the pontificate of Innocent ΠΙ producing highly significant changes to the crusade movement by extending indirect participation as wide as possible. However, the motivation of the purchasers had πο necessary connection with the specific object of fund-raising, although often ίt did, but rather with the benefits for sale, a respectable and available method of obtaining extensive remission of sins (or, οπ occasion, of legal punishment) and, as was to be demonstrated ίπ later centuries, the popularity of the indulgences did not depend οη active crusading. 3 Α third 1 Cartulary of the Priory of St. Denys near Southampton, ed. Ε. Ο. Blake (Southampton Rec. Ser., ί 1981), 26, ηο . 39. 2 F. Μ. Powicke, The Thirteenth Century (Oxford, 1953), 81 . Οη priνileges see J. Α . Brundage, Medieva/ Canon Law and the Crusader (Madison, 1969). Οη finance see W. Ε. Lunt, Financia/ Relations of the Papacy with England (Cambridge, Mass., 1939-62), ί. 3 For England, see Lunt, ίί. 525 -620.

VIII 169

group comprised those, perhaps many, who from the Third Crusade, at Ieast, took the Cross primarily to enjoy the temporal privileges associated with the status of being crucesίgnatus, notably legal protection. 4 Ιη the thirteenth century most crucesίgnatί never personally fulfilled their vows, their exposure to the crusade belonging firmly to domestic history. From domestic records the crusade emerges as an integrated feature of secular society as well as a popular spiritual exercise; ίη them, too, can be detected outline impressions of how people reacted to the crusade, not only ίη chronicles or the more obvious literary or academic works, but also ίη the records of justice, administration and the land market: episcopal registers, monastic cartularies and the multiferous rolls kept by the royal government. William of Muntford's 'great business', and contemporary attitudes to ίt, had a temporal as well as spiritual frame. Obviously, the evidence is limited by its bias towards those whose arrangements came to the attention of the courts, to those writers with axes to grind, and to a socially restricted group: propertied freemen, beneficed clergy or servants of the great. However, the social sample, at least, may be representative, for the vast majority of active English crucesίgnatί either possessed disposable property or were employed by those who did. Finance prevented the indigent from going οη crusade, or even buying remission, and the law prevented the unfree. Traditional guides to medieval attitudes outside the schoolroom have been the chroniclers, but interpretation of their witness is controversial, never more so than when ίt concerns the most vociferous thirteenth-century commentator οη contemporary attitudes to crusading, his own and others, Matthew Paris. Paris was anti-papal and a nationalist, but he was not a little Englander and he was an enthusiast for a certain form of crusading. His criticisms concentrated οη two particular features of the administration of the crusade: creeping papal control.of the English church and the misuse of crusade funds which this made possible, and, hence, some of the destinations for crusades proposed by the papacy. He drew attention to the confusion caused ίη the late 1240s by the conflicting crusade objectives, now the Holy Land, now Romania, now Frederick 11, and he perhaps best encapsulated his attitude in the remarks he attributed to King Haakon of Norway, to the effect that the king was always willing to fight the enemies of the church but not all the enemies of the pope. 5 The positive side to Paris' opinions are here implied as well. His enthusiasm for campaigns against external enemies of Christendom, especially ίη the East, is evident ίη such passages as the obituary of Philip d'Aubigny, his praise of those who died οη Richard of Cornwall's crusade or his eulogy οη the fate of William Longsword at Mansourah ίη 1250. 6 However, Paris' opinions have been dismissed as 'notoriously unreliable', especially where reactions to the anti-Hohenstaufen crusades are concerned. 7 Υ et even if modern historians do not agree with him, some contemporaries The list includes King John (Gerald of Wales, Opera, ed. J. S. Brewer (RS, 1863), ίίί. 285); Hubert de Burgh (Annals of Tewkesbury, in Ann.Mon., ί. 86); and Bishop Philip of Durham (C. R. Cheney, lnnocent ΠΙ and England (Stuttgart, 1976), 254). See CR 1237-42, 95, for the effectiveness of crusader privileges ίη securing the release of a violent criminal, William Goscelin, from the Tower. 5 Paris, ίίί. 287-8, 373-4; ίν. 9, 133-4; ν. 67, 73-4, 201. 6 Paris, ίίί. 373; ίν. 175; ν. 150-4. 7 Ν. J . Housley, The Ita/ian Crusades (Oxford, 1982), 82. 4

VIII Thirteenth Century England Ι

170

did. The rectors of Berkshire argued in 1240 that the emperor was not a legitimate target for a crusade as he was not a heretic, that the pope should pay for the defence of his own patrimony, and that the goods of the church could be used for war only in very few cases, not, that is, against Frederick 11. Ιη 1255 the clergy of Lincolnshire rejected the proposed diversion of Holy Land money to the Sicilian enterprise and, in the same year, the clergy of Lichfield denounced this re-direction of funds 'since the reason for the levy which at first sight appeared pious now, it seems to us, is changed and is not pious'. 8 These clerical worries were exactly the same as Paris': jurisdiction, encroaching papal power, the misuse of Holy Land funds and crusades against Christians. Given the establishment by the papacy in England of a uniquely centralised and effective system for the extraction of ecclesiastical funds, this unanimity is not surprising: Paris and his colleagues squealed louder than some οη the continent because they had more to squeal about. 9 Both opposition and support for the different goals of crusading was based οη material unease, vested interests and intellectual traditionalism, and such reactions were not confined to the clergy. At Amiens ίη 1264 the baronial opponents of the Crown complained about the conversion of a crusade 'against the Saracens who are the foes of Christ's Cross into an attack οη fellowsubjects of the same Christian religion', and the consequent misuse of money. 10 Judged by such responses the papacy was being too radical in its wide application of crusade institutions and its development of the concomitant adminstrative machinery, and it appears that the lessons of opposition to the anti-Hohenstaufen crusades were learnt as crusades later ίη the century against Ghibellines or Aragonese were not preached in England where, after 1265, crusade appeals by the papacy concentrated οη the relief of the Holy Land. Thirteenth-century Englishmen voted with their feet, only the eastern crusade attracting them in any significant numbers. Recruitment for the Albigensian campaigns was not aimed at England and English involvement in them was fortuitous. 11 Ιη the Iberian peninsula, although some Englishmen were possibly among those Christians who captured Valencia in 1238 and repopulated Seville after 1248, there were ηο substantial forays against the Moors to compare with expeditions ίη the twelfth or fourteenth centuries, the Anglo-Castillian Crusade against Morocco ίη the 1250s remaining solely a diplomatic device. 12 Similarly, English crusaders ίη the Baltic, so familiar ίη the fourteenth century, are hard to find ίη the thirteenth: 1 can put a name to Annals oj Burton, ίη Ann.Mon., ί. 265-7, 360-3 . W. Ε. Lunt, Papal Revenues in the Middle Ages (New York, 1965), ί. 41-2. 10 DBM, 278- 9. 11 The legate, Robert de Courςon, was a native of Kedleston, Derbyshire, but only two men with close English connections, Walter Langton and Hugh de Lacy, played significant roles ίη the early Albigensian campaigns and they, as exiles from King John, were distinctly available. See Peter of Vaux-de-Cernay, Historia Albigensis, ed. Ρ. Guebin, Ε. Lyon (Paris, 1926-39), ί. 247, 253-4; ίί. 129-32, 155; ίίί . 86-7; La Chanson de /a croisade albigeoise, ed. Ε. Martin-Chabot (Paris, 1931-61), ί. 93,213; ίί. 121,175,293; ίίί. 23, 75-7, 85, 93, 95,121,173,175,189,213,265,293. Later, Poitou as well as Languedoc fell prey ιο Capetian aggrandizement, and cynicism of crusader mot.iνes appears ίη Roger of Wendoνer, Flores Historiarum, ed. Η. Howlett (RS, 1886-9), ίί. 305. 12 History of the Crusades, ed. Κ. Μ. Setton, ΠΙ (Wisconsin, 1975), 430; Α. Mackay, Spain in the Middle Ages (London, 1977), 69. 8

9

VIII 171 only one, Robert de Morley (d. 1288). 13 Crusading against the Greeks, although frequently hitched to the needs of the Holy Land, consistently failed to capture English imaginations and it may not have been accidental that when Urban IV authorized preaching for expeditions to Greece and the Holy Land in 1263, his instructions to preachers in England only mentioned the Holy Land. 14 There was a persistent reluctance by Englishmen to respond to papal encouragement to support the anti-Hohenstaufen crusades, although it was recognized that the crusading status of the Sicilian enterprise was primarily a convenient, if inadequate, method of raising money. Ενeπ so, Henry 111's enthusiasm, more a function of foreign policy than crusading ardour, was not universally shared. Although the papacy was selective iπ where it sought recruits and funds, not all Christendom being involved ίη all crusading appeals, nevertheless the English evidence indicates a considerable gap between papal desires and local wishes: ίπ 1239 Richard of Cornwall swore a special oath to reinforce his refusal to be diverted from the Holy Land to Greece or Italy, and iπ 1247 Bishop Walter Cantelupe, iπ similar circumstances, secured a papal guarantee that πο crusaders should be compelled either to redeem their vows if able to fight or to campaign against anybody but Saracens. 15 Such reactions could be influenced by non-crusading considerations of foreign policy or political advantage; however. as with the suspicious clergy, there appears aπ underlying reluctance to follow the Cross wherever the pope carried it. Rejection of papal crusade plans did not imply any general decline in support for the ideal. Whilst ίt is difficult to find examples of Englishmen who had vowed to crusade elsewhere than the Holy Land, a trawl through the printed archives alone reveals hundreds of individuals who had taken oaths to go οπ 'the pilgrimage' or 'the journey' to Jerusalem or the Holy Land. Indeed, where the destination is specified, primarily iπ connection with essoins, property and inheritance cases, royal safe-conducts, licences permitting mortgages, the appointment of attorneys and many land charters, no other objectives are mentioned. 16 Of course, there may be a number of technical reasons for this. Α crusade to the Holy Places earned a longer essoin and term of protection than other journeys, including simple pilgrimages to Jerusalem. 17 The 13 This according to deponents at the Court of Chivalry in 1385/6. See GEC, ίχ. 210 and n. 4. For Henry III's institution of an annual pension for the Teutonic Knights in 1235, see Comte Riant, 'Privileges octroyes aux Teutoniques', Archives de l'Orient Latin, ί (1881), 418. Roger Bacon was sufficiently familiar with events in the Baltic to attack the campaigns of the Teutonic Knights on the grounds that they prevented the conversion of the Slavs. See Opus Majus, ed. J. Η. Bridges (London, 1897-1900), ίίί. 120-2. 14 The preaching campaigns of 1237 and 1246 and the attempt at a subsidy in 1262 all flopped. See Lunt, Financial Relations, ί. 434-5, 436-7; Flores Historiarum, ed. Η. R. Luard (RS, 1890), ίί. 479; Les Registres d'Urbain IV, ed. L. Dorez, J. Guiraud (Paris, 1899- 1958), nos. 392, 397, 466- 8, .472. 15 Paris, ίίί. 620; Calendar σf Papal Registers, ed. W. Η. Bliss, 1 (London, 1893), 234. For Richard's anti-papal and pro-Hohenstaufen entourage, see Ν. Denholm-Young, Richard ofCornwall (Oxford, 1947), 38-42; Paris, ίίί. 485. 16 Full references would need a book. As a sample look at the citations in Brundage, passim. 17 Glanvill, Tractatus et Legibus et Consuetudinibus Regni Angliae, ed. G. D. G. Hall (London, 1965), 16- 17, 151; Henry de Bracton, De Legibus et Consuetudinibus Angliae, ed. Τ. Twiss (RS, 1882), ν. 159-69; and John de Longueville, Modus Tenendi Curias (c.1307), in The Court Baron, ed. F. W. Maitland, W. Ρ. Basildon (Selden Soc., 1891), 81. The last two sources draw a clear distinction between a general passagium and a simple pilgrimage to the Holy Land.

VIII 172

Thirteenth Century England Ι

chances of lengthy absences, loss of communίcatίon and suspected or actual decease (all of whίch provoked lίtίgatίon and hence records), were possίbly greater with journeys to Palestίne whίch were also perhaps more expensive; thus the need to sell or mortgage property could have fallen more acutely οη Holy Land crusaders and so more of their transactions survive. Simίlarly, the fact that the few extant wills show that money was not bequeathed to Spain, ltaly, Greece, or the Baltic may be due to tradίtίonal testamentary habίts and the exίstence of a diocesan structure to collect Holy Land legacies, and, moreover, many testators had unfulfίlled Holy Land vows. 18 But such explanations do nothίng to dίminίsh the cumulatίve ίmpressίon of the overwhelmίng primacy of the Holy Land as opposed to the alternatives, especίally as the socίal embrace of the sources is probably not unrepresentatίve : artisans, small landowners and parίsh priests to the greatest prelates and princes ίη the land; that ίs, all sections of the community with somethίng to be sold, mortgaged, protected, ίnherited or bequeathed. Such preferences do not, however, necessarily, reflect sentimental nostalgίa or mass hysteria. Whatever the spiritual and social divίdends, active crusadίng constίtuted a heavy and risky material investment whίch was recognized by the crucesignati themselves who placed the crusade ίη a secular order of priorίties, private and public, as ίη Peter Langtoft's comment οη the Scottish crisίs of 1293: And if Κίηg Edward had gone towards Acre Greatly would the kingdom and royalty have been in

perίl. 19

War was war, whether or not ίt was also holy, and thus reactions to the crusade were influenced by factors which determined the progress of any military enterprise. Politίcal and diplomatic cίrcumstances had to be favourable. Troops had to be organίzed like any others around the households of great men (Richard of Cornwall, Simon de Montfort, Wίllίam Longsword or the Lord Edward) and to pay for them money had to be made available, not always a simple matter as the efforts of all four magnates mentioned to raise or raid funds ίllustrate . But just as Longsword needed capίtal to retaίn his paid knίghts and sergeants ίη 1249, so lesser men had to mortgage or sell land, often to the disadvantage of family and heίrs. 20 Ιη the history of the crusades, fίnance could be as sίgnificant as faίth. Typical was Hugh de Nevίlle's preoccupation, when drawing up his will at Acre ίη 1267, to secure payment and return fares for members of his retίnue, a concern which was probably mutual. 21 Neville's escapism, as his mother might have put ίt, or Longsword's See, at random, CRR, νίίί. 297; CR 1247-51, 352; CR 1256-9, 485; Register of Bishop William Ginsborough of Worcester, ed. J. W. Willis Bund (Worcester Historical Soc., 1907), 283,

_18

312, 388.

19 Chronicle of Pierre de Langtoft, ed. Τ . Wright (RS, 1866- 8), ίί. 267. Cf. Henry IIl's similar sentiment ίη 1245 when trying ιο discourage recruits for Louis IX's crusade. See Paris, ίν . 488-9, and hostility to his and Louis IX's crusades ίη the l240s and l260s . 20 Paris, ίίί. 614, 635-6; ίν. 7, 71; ν. 1, 98 - 9, 131, 134-5; Lunt, Financial Relations, ί. 432-4; S. D. Lloyd, 'The Lord Edward's Crusade 1270-2', ίη Warand Government in the Midd/e Ages: Essays in Honour of J. Ο. Prestwich, ed. J. Β . Gillingham, J. C . Holt (Woodbridge, 1984), 120-33 . 21 Μ. S. Giuseppi, 'Οη the Testament of Sir Hugh de Neville', Archaeologio, Ινί (1899), 352-4.

VIII 173

enthusiasm, required careful planning and the direction of a traditionally hallowed cause: the plight of the Holy Land. The primacy of the eastern passagium was dictated by the seriousness of the investment involved in crusading because only the Holy Land was spiritually, emotionally and in terms of social repute commensurate with the material outlay. The fundamental appeal of crusading had changed little: the spiritual goal was the remission of sins which was attained by the penitential exercise of the pilgrimage. ΑΙΙ sources reveal that remission of sins, at least formally, remained central to the drive to fight for the Cross. 22 For the active crusader the path to remission was the characteristic pilgrimage, by which the crusade was distinguished from other holy or just wars. In consequence, the prominence of Jerusalem and the Holy Places was inevitable. 23 The failure of attempts to divorce crusading from Jerusalem in the attitudes of laymen is partly explained by this continued potency of traditional imagery, witnessed, for example, in stone by the chapel of the Holy Sepulchre in Winchester Cathedral, which may itself be associated with the crusade of Peter des Roches, and partly by long standing habits of patronage and spiritual investment, for instance in the Holy Land military orders. 24 Furthermore the very language used to conceal the separation of the ideal from its original objective was inadequate. One of the commonest euphemisms for the crusade was, fairly enough, the 'business of the Cross', a phrase which could be used, as in the anti-Hohenstaufen preaching of the 1250s, to deterritorialize the phenomenon and concentrate attention on a less earth-bound image of Christ. 25 Crusade sermons often accompanied a mass and their contents frequently emphasised general service to Christ and the mystical symbolism of the Cross. 26 The cult of the Holy Cross, stimulated by such imports as the Holy Rood of Bromholm, was widespread. 27 Yet the concentration on the Cross failed to distract attention away from the scene and physical reality of the Passion, possibly the reverse; and ίt evidently left active crusaders unconvinced that the negotium Crucis was the same as the negotium papae. There was thus a basic weakness in the policy of extending the crusade which in many other ways had proved so useful to kings and popes alike: the Holy Sepulchre could not be hidden in the shadow of the Cross. This was indeed implicitly recognized in papal bulls and by papal agents, whose main tactic to establish in the minds of the customers that the privileges being offered were the real thing was to equate them with those granted to crusaders 22 Eg., Simon de Montfort ίη 1248 (Paris, v. Ι); Giuseppi, 362. 23 See, in general, F. Η. Russell, The Just War in the Middle Ages (Cambridge, 1975). 24 Ε. W. Tristram, English Medieval Wa/1 Painting: The Thirteenth Century (Oxford, 1950), 163 - 6. Following the example of his early protector William Marshal, Henry ΠΙ originally plan-

ned to leave his body to the Templars before deciding in middle age to bequeath it to Westminster Abbey. See Foedera l, i. 496. 25 Ann.Mon., ί. 351, 353; Monumenta Franciscana, ed. J. S. Brewer (RS, 1858), 620, for Henry ΠΙ asking the Dominicans to preach the verbum crucis in August 1255; cf. Ann.Mon., ί. 240; iii. 40 and CPR 1247-58, 507, for the king's injunction to continental subjects to assist the collector of the crusade tax ίη November 1255, 'for the love of the Crucified One whose business is principally engaged ίη this behalf', although the money was already destined for Sicily. 26 'Ordinatio de predicatione S. Crucis in Angliae', in Quinti Belli sacri Scriptores Minores, ed. R. Rδhricht, Societe de l'Orient Latin, ii (1879), vii - χ, 1 - 26. The emphasis οη the Cross is standard in thirteenth- and fourteenth-century western Europe. See also C. Morris, 'Dissemination of the crusading ideal in the twelfth century', Studies in Church History, χχ (1983), 79- 101. 27 Ann.Mon., iii. 56, 97; iv. 495; Wendover, ίί. 274-6; Gesta Abbatum Monasterii Sancti Albani, ed. Η. Τ. Riley (RS, 1867-9), ί. 282, 291-2.

VIII Thirteenth Century England Ι

174

to the Holy Land. It was precisely the contrast between this sort of rhetoric and reality which, so Paris maintained, undermined the preaching against Manfred. 28 Ιη England, removed from the passions of Languedoc and Italy, only the Holy Land inspired miraculous signs ίη the Heavens (often, we may note, Crosses) or the literary dilemma of the crusader ίη love. 29 Paris even managed to extract national pride from deeds ίη the East: he made William Longsword into an English martyr and added his own gloss to Wendover's account of the crusade of the bishops of Winchester and Exeter ίη 1227 describing ίt as having been 'to the salvation and honour of many, especially of all Englishmen', an emotion echoed by Gregory Χ ίη 1272 when he wrote of the glory bestowed οη the English people by the Lords Edward and Edmund ίη Palestine. 30 English authors took particular pride ίη the legends of Richard Ι. The ambassador from Bohemund VI ofAntioch, who, ίη 1255, flattered Henry ΠΙ that he was Richard's heir not only by hereditary right but ίη virtue, would have struck a chord with a king who a few years earlier, ίη his first enthusiasm after taking the Cross, had festooned his palaces with heroic images of Richard's combat with Saladin. 31 It was into Richard's shoes that the Lord Edward stepped after he had trod his footsteps ίη the Holy Land: 'behold he shines like a new Richard' was one enthusiastic contemporary comment. 32 The Richard Ι of legend inhabited a world of chivalric verities, central to which was the duty to .recapture Jerusalem. The Holy Land was traditional and spiritually powerful and few Englishmen who considered the matter looked further, or nearer, for inspiration. For a variety of reasons, secular and spiritual, they were not converted to a papal view of the world or the crusade. Whether or not this conservatism ίη a European context was eccentric is another matter.

Paris, ν . 519-22, 536; and notice the papal attempts to concentrate οη Manfred's Moslem mercenaries at Lucera: Paris, ν. 681; Ann.Mon., i. 350- 3. 29 Eg., during the recruitment for the Fifth Crusade and the 1227 crusade: Ann.Mon., iii. 53; Wendover, ii. 323. Cf. Paris, iν. 345 -6, for portents of disaster of the loss of Jerusalem, 1244. For a late thirteenth-century version of the common literary theme, see 'The Dialogue between Henry de Lacy and Walter Biblesworth οη the Crusade', Reliquae Antiquae, ed. Τ. Wright, J. Ο. Halliwell (London, 1841-3), i. 134-6. 30 Paris, iii. 127; ν . 150-4; Register of Archbishop Walter Giffard of York, ed. W. Brown (Surtees Soc., 1904), 39-41 . 31 Ann.Mon., i. 369-70; Tristram, 70- 1, 132, 184-5, 215; CLR 1245-51, 362. Henry was also keen οη pictures of the siege of Antioch and notice his display of Richard I's shield, perhaps tactlessly, at the Temple, Paris, in 1254. See Paris, ν. 480. 32 Political Songs of England, ed. Τ .Wright (Camden Soc., 1839), 128, in a poem celebrating Edward's accession. 28

VIII

VIII

IX

The Holy Land and the Crusades ofthe Thirteenth and Fourteenth Centuries THERE IS one interest amongst histoήans of the crusades which shows ηο sign of fading, namely the pursuit of an adequate definition of the phenomenon itself. What were the crusades? There has emerged an orthodoxy through the works ofhistoήans such as Villey, Brundage, Russell and Riley-Smith which, linked to the investigation of canon law, papal policy and intellectual debates, posits an inclusive definition. More recently, this has been developed a stage further by the suggestion ofDr. Housley that what used to be thought of as deviant or mutated forms, the papal crusades ίη Italy against political enemies, were not only intellectually as coherent but also as acceptable or popular as crusades against the infidel. Not everybody has followed this bandwagon. The most widely read modern dissenter is, of course, Professor Mayer. But the debate, οη all sides, has been conducted οη what appears to be a seήes of blinkered judgements which ignore clear, pragmatic signals from the past which, perhaps because they are so obvious, have tended to get obscured by over-intellectualized or apologetic research pursued ίη the quest for neat, comprehensive patterns. It may be thatwhat we have here is another good example of the dangers of modern intellectuals studying medieval intellectuals: there is a tendency to become too ήgid or too involved. The thirteenth century witnessed the application of crusading ideology and machinery to wide problems of the defence, expansion and policing of Chήstendom. 1 Crncesignati were found ίη Syήa, Egypt, Greece, Spain, France, the Baltic and ltaly, οη battlefields as far apart as Mansourah and Lincoln, Lewes and Lake Chud. Crncesignati fought for and against Fredeήck 11, for and against Henry 111. 2 Enemies of the cross included Muslims, Russians, Albigensians, Aragonese, Greeks and Italians, Slavs, Moors and Mamlίiks, infidels, heretics, rebels and political ήvals of the papacy. Fashionable and influential intellectual opinion managed to reconcile these diverse perceived interests ofLatin Chήstendom (or, rather, the papacy) with the initially narrower concept of the armed pilgήmage to conquer or recover the Holy Places of Syήa and Palestine. It is, therefore, impossible to restήct the defιnition of a crusade to expeditions to the eastern Mediterranean. It is unhelpful to call papal crusades ίη ltaly 'pseudo-crusades'. 3 But the acceptance of the legal validity (or, ίη the case of Hohenstaufen and Montfortian crusaders, legal invalidity) of the vows and pήvileges so liberally spread amongst the faithful ίη all parts of Chήstendom should not impose its own myopia. The view from the papal cuήa is not the only one. There is little to be gained by an histoήan refusing to be a Ghibelline only to become a Guelph. 4 There are nuances ίη the response to the diversification of crusading practice which do not allow mechanistic interpretations based οη the prejudices of dons and politicians, medieval or modern. Cήticism of crusading did exist, although, paradoxically, ίt often demonstrated not the decline but the continued attraction and importance of the ideal. Nevertheless not everybody accepted the theoήes of the canonists or the special pleading of the papacy. Many people, so Matthew Paήs noted, thought monetary redemption of crusade vows very absurd. s Almost every crusade directed elsewhere than to the Holy Land attracted cήticism from the faithful. The diversion of the F ourth Crusade was opposed by the supporters of the abbot of Vaux,

IX 106 English and German crowds were hostile to the preaching of crusades against the Hohenstaufen ίη the 1250s and the Baltic crusades were condemned as unnecessary by Humbert ofRomans ίη the 1270s. 6 Joinville and the Lord Edward disapproved ofthe course of the Tunis campaign of 1270. 7 Philip V and Charles 1V of France refused to support crusades against the Visconti ίη the 1320s. 8 English peers doubted the wisdom or respectability ofBishop Despenser's crusade ίη 1383 and Thomas Walsingham condemned the persistent campaigns of the Teutonic Κnights against the Poles and Lithuanians. 9 Ιη many cases the motives of cήtics were partial and self-interested, but this does not nullify their comments. Οpίηίοη inevitably is a matter of taking sides which can be as objective or as biased as each other. Cήtics of papal crusades ίη ltaly, for example, included Matthew Paήs, Ramon Muntaner, Dante, Pieπe Dubois, Marsilius of Padua, Μaήηο Sanudo,John Wyclif, Edward 1 ofEngland and Philip V and Charles 1V ofFrance. Some were indeed Ghibelline or anti-papal propagandists. ΑΙΙ had axes to gήnd. But by ηο means all were consistendy hostile to papal policy. Some were allies. When Sanudo was encouraging the papacy to make peace ίη ltaly he identified the Wars ofthe Sicilian Vespers as the pήme cause ofthe loss ofthe Latin East. Yet at the time, he was a pensioner at the Angevin court ίη Naples. 10 Το suggest that 'the argurnents deployed by the cuήa to justify the crusades ίη Italy were greeted with sympathy by all who were not predisposed to be cήtical of papal policies' smacks of exaggerated cuήal optimism. 11 The point is much simpler than has often and recendy been supposed. Take any crusade and some, for a host of reasons, were ίη favour of ίt and others, for an equally vaήed selection of motives, were against. Neither was more or less representative, more ήght or more wrong, wiser or more foolish, more honest or more devious, nobler or more selfish. They merely differed. Histoήans should recognize and respect the differences. It is impossible to calculate accurately the relative populaήty of controversial crusades. Numbers of crncesignati and the weight of cήticism are hazy indicators for obvious reasons of evidence and partiality. Some may attempt to use vows and the acceptance ofthe indulgence as a guide. But the separation by the papacy of the indulgence from active crusading which degenerated ίηtο a system of regular 'After-Life Insurance' makes such attempts difficult as the appeal of the general remission obscured the appeal of the particular campaign. But ίt ίs possible to observe ίη the grurnblings against certain crusades the obvious feature of the continued pήmacy of the Holy Land which provided an emotional and theoretical, if not practical, context for crusade and anti-crusade propagandists alike. Enemies were cast as hindeήng the defence or recovery of the Holy Land, compared to Saracens or even characteήsed as a worse threat than Saracens. 12 The crucial indulgences and pήvileges granted to crusaders οη all internal and external fronts were related to those granted to crusaders to the Holy Land, as much by Boniface ΙΧ ίη 1397 as by Innocent 111 ίη 1199. 13 However, this inevitable association ofideas and practices, redolent of a central paucity ίη the ideology of Chήstian Holy War, could backfire because, regardless of canonist theory- which itself drew the distinction between the cnιx cismarina and cnιx transmarina although it turned ίt οη its head - cuήal rhetoήc or political propaganda, the obvious practical difference between the Holy Land and other crusading theatres was appreciated. 14 Ιη the Baltic, which significandy only became a regular goal of western crusaders after the loss of the East and when most of the Latin conquests ίη Prussia and Livonia had already been achieved, the crusade was organised by the Teutonic Κnights as an almost entirely autonomous enterpήse . " The regular visits to the Baltic by French crusaders only began ίη 1337 after all hopes of Philip Vl's passagium to the Holy Land had vanished. 16 Ιη Spain, interest, certainly ίη the fourteenth century, tended to wax and wane according to the prospects for an expedition to the Levant and, increasingly, Spanish kings used the reconquista and its consequent

IX ΊΉΕ

HOLY LAND AND ΊΉΕ CRUSADES

107

ecclesiastical funds for their own, independent ends, not all of them crusading. The secular complications of the later stages of the Wars of the Sicilian Vespers, the crusades against the Colonna and John XXII's campaigns ίη Lombardy at the very least diluted ίntemational crusading fervour ofthe sort organised for Char\es of Anjou's crusade ίη the 1260s. Words and theoήes could not be used indίscήminately. Ιη 1318 the French attempt to identify the Flemish as suίtable targets for a crusade as excommunίcates impeding the passagium to the East and thus οη a level with Saracens (the classίc thirteenth-century papal p\oy) proved too much even for John ΧΧΙΙ. 11 Ιη 1383, despite the papal crusading bulls and the traditional crusade epithets employed by participants and observers alike, Despenser's crusade was understood and cήticised for being precisely what ίt was, the Hundred Years War ίη disguίse. 18 Thus although the possibilίties for the extension of the crusade were, ίη theory, infinite, ίη practice there were lίmίts. This could be true especially where the interests of the Holy Land ίtself conflίcted, or were broadcast as conflίcting, with those of other crusades. The Italian crusades aroused just such opposition ίη the second half of the thίrteenth century accordίng to such diverse witnesses as Matthew Paήs, Hostiensis, Augustinus Tήumphus and the Templar Ricaut Bonome\. 19 Hίstoήans sympathetic to papal policy may argue that such reactions were mistaken, that the 1talian crusades did not hίnder the defence or recovery of the East, yet the advisers of Philip V and Charles IV of France and the close observer of papal, Italian and Medίterranean affairs, Μaήηο Sanudo, none of them Ghibellines, thought and argued otherwise. Indeed some popes themselves tacίtly admitted these cήticisms. John ΧΧΙΙ argued agaίnst a general passagium citing the homets' nest he hίmselfkept stirrίng ίη Italy and Benedict ΧΙΙ cancelled Philip VI's crusade precisely because of discord ίη ,vestem Chήstendom which was, ίη ίts Italian and German dίmensions, partly, at \east, the papacy's responsibilίty. 20 Ιη the cήticism of papal crusading policy a consistent strand of opposition, not all of ίt Ghibelline or anti-papal, some ofit, as ίη the policies ofGregory Χ, even papal, was based οη a recognition that crusading against Chήstians ίη Europe was ίη ηο sense except legally open to equation with crusading to the Holy Land. 21 Spanish, Baltic and Italian crusades could be and were popular but essentially, even for supporters, second best. C\ement V might have authoήzed crusades against Venice but he \eft his money to recover the Holy Land. 22 The Holy Land remained the chief ideal object of crusadίng. Even the crusade agaίnst Muslίms was not ίmmune from this bias. There is the widely reported outburst of the Lord Edward against the policy of Charles of Anjou after the Tunis debacle that he would go to Acre ίf necessary only with his groom rather than leave hίs vow to help the Holy Land unfulfιlled. 23 Ιη 1311 Clement V had to explain to Aragonese ambassadors that because of the Tunis affair ίη 1270 the prelates from England and France would not countenance any other goal for a crusade than the Holy Land, not even the Moors ofSpaίn. 24 Ιη the 1330s Philip VI was even reluctant to fight Turkish pirates ίη the Aegean because of the possible diversion of men and resources from his general passagium. 25 Crucially, most non-Levantine crusades were cήticised because they happened, but crusades to the Holy Land, apart from attacks by radicals such as Roger Bacon, Gower or Wyclif, were cήticised because they did not. Jerusalem remained the centre of the crusaders' wor\d, ίη maps, poems, romances and sermons. The fonnulae ίη pontificals ίη use at the cuήa c. 1300 as well as the great pontifical of Guillaume Durand the Elder assume that a cτucesignatus was ίntending to go to Jerusalem or 'ίη subsidium Teπae Sanctae'. 26 Once swom, a vow to help the Holy Land if made by a potential combattant was not lightly commuted or absolved despite Marsilius of Padua's ίnsinuations to the contrary. 27 lnnocent IV initially refused to commute Henry 111's vow ίη 1254. 28 Although the pope cancelled his crusade ίη 1336, Philip VI had to wait eightyears to be released from his

IX 108 obligations. 2• Α common theme of fourteenth-century political rhetoήc was the shame and obloquy directed against the crusader who never fulfilled his vow, a device not merely to inspire crusaders to action but reflecting a generous stream ofloud, actual cήticism. More pήvately, it remained common from all social groups to bequeath money for the Holy Land. It is hard to see any such widespread specific legacies for Spain, the Baltic or ltaly. Marsilius was aiming for a sensitive nerve when he suggested that the papacy was tryίng to divert testamentary bequests for the Holy Land to support papal crusades. 30 The thoughts of dying men frequendy turned to teπestήalJerusalem. Kings Alfonso ΧΙ ofCastille and Robert 1 of Scodand both wanted their hearts to be buήed ίη the Holy Land.3 1 The holiness of the Holy Land was its special attraction with which ηο other crusade objective could compete. The crusade to the East provided the language of crusading. It provided the best stoήes from the past, stoήes which inspired the young Philippe de Mezieres to begin his career as crusader and propagandist. 32 It provided the most potent present inspiration both ίη ideal and practice for poets such as Philippe de Vitry and Guillaume de Machaut. Throughout the thirteenth and fourteenth centuήes men wrote, read, heard and talked about the Holy Land incessandy. The loss of Acre ίη 1291, which generated a mass of what could be called 'recovery' literature, supplied additional stimulus to moralist as to strategist. Furthermore, politicians, planners and propagandists recognised that the Holy Land presented practical problems unlike any other theatre of crusading, problems of logistics, quartermastery, strategy, diplomacy, military---especially siege-technology, · garήsoning, colonisation and government. 33 The courts of western Europe, especially the French court, received constant appeals for aid from Syήa and, later, Cyprus and Cilician Armenia for whom, despite the Ottoman advance, the Mamlίiks continued to present the most urgent threat. Thus, even ίη the fourteenth century, the Holy Land remained at the centre ofthe strategic debate. The Holy Land crusade was always conceived as an international cause and it is misleading to see ίt becoming increasingly nationalised. All large campaigns to the Holy Land, actual or planned, were truly international, with preaching and taxation embracing the whole ofLatin Chήstendom from Greenland to Naples. 34 Contingents from England, Germany and ltaly combined ίη Louis α's 'French' crusade to Egypt.3' Philip IV's planned crusade was to include Englishmen and crusaders from the western impeήal lands. 36 The sack of Alexandήa (1365) was a genuinely international enterpήse. lndeed, by 1300 a theoretical orthodoxy was being established which advocated the creation of a united international military Order to reconquer and colonise the Holy Land. Ιη addition, the Holy Land crusade implied peace and unity, a general reconciliation of waπing parties, for Urban 11, Gregory Χ ίη the 1270s and Richard II and Charles VI ίη the 1390s.3 7 Crusades ίη Italy, Spain or the Baltic, οη the other hand, demanded 110 such ideal of unity, the last two because of their small scale and the first because they were the result of-and even exacerbated-political disunity within Chήstendom: whatever the theory, the ltalian crusades depended οη the reverse of the conditions deemed necessary for a crusade to the East. Enthusiasm for the defence or recovery of the Holy Land also cut across social divisions. The knights ofTheobald ofChampagne or Louis α were matched by the lower orders whose particular devotion to the Holy Land was noted by Villehardouin, Hostiensis and Augustinus Tήumphus. 38 ln England ίη 1208 an entire Yorkshire vill was cruisiatus and the humble oήgins of some of the crusaders ίη 1250 are well known. 39 Which other crusading cause inspired popular outbursts comparable to the movements for the Holy Land ίη 1212, 1251, 1309 and 1320? Despite the huge logistical problems, the Holy Land crusade was, ίη essence, straight forward: the enemy was the infidel who was occupying the Holy Places. The crusaders of

IX ΊΉΕ HOLY

LAND AND ΊΉΕ CRUSADES

109

1217-21, 1239-41 and 1248-54 and the putative crusaders ofthe 1330s and 1390s knew precisely who their enemy was. How different for the confused and anxious followers of Boniface of Montfeπat, for strategists trying to overcome resentment of the Greeks ίη planning the defence of the Aegean and, later, eastem Europe, or the soldiers ofMalatesta da Verrucchio of Rimini who set out along the Via Emilia ίη 1248 a Ghibelline but retumed a Guelph. 40 The Holy Land, although ηο more redemptive ίη terms of the indulgence, was more ennobling. It was, as almost all fourteenth-century theoήsts and propagandists insisted, every Chήstian's duty to recover the unique heήtage won for him by his Saviour. 41 The lure of Jerusalem transcended aήd crusading ideology. Crusaders, if lacking martial opportunity, became, with Philippe de Mezieres (1346), Marshal Boucicaut and the count ofEu (1388/ 9), pilgrims. 42 Crusaders to the Holy Land were prepared throughout the peήod to resist papal discouragement. 43 The familiar contrast ίη England between the relative populaήty of the preaching campaigns for the Holy Land (ίη the 1240s and 1260s) to those ίη the 1250s against Manfred may also serve to emphasise the special attraction of the Holy Land. ln the fourteenth century ηο other crusades inspired literature to compare with the sermons, tracts, memoranda and poems suπounding the planned passagia of Philip IV or Philip VI or generated the same concentration of devotion, art and politics as the elaborate plans of the 1390s symbolised by the works of Philippe de Mezieres and the Wilton Dyptych. 44 The character of the crusade to the East was perceived distinctively. Al\ crusaders were justified within the familiar intellectual topos which descήbed them as defensive, recovery of birthήght (Syήa, Spain) or defence against attacks οη the fabήc of the Church (by Slavs, heretics, schismatics and tyrants). However, despite the individual's chances of sa\vation, the movements elsewhere were as a whole couched ίη essentially negative terms. Not so the crusade to the Holy Land, the 'nearest way' to heaven as an early fourteenth-century Hospitaller tract put it. 45 Its role was more positive. Since its inception, the crusade movement was seen as a part and a process of spiήtual regeneration for the individual and for Chήstendom, an integra\ element ίη the moral programme of the high medieval papacy. The expeήences of the century 1250-1350 might have cast some doubt οη the wider regenerative properties of crusading ίη Spain, Italy or the Baltic. Whatever the theoήsts argued, the grimy reality of these theatres ofwar produced few upliftingfrίssons to compare with the legends ofSt Louis ίη Egypt and Acre. The crusade to the Holy Land was positive militaήly and morally. Ιη the fourteenth century there was little to be conquered for the cross ίη Spain, almost nothing ίη the Baltic and conquests ίη Italy were subject to cήteήa rather less easily descήbed ίη purely religious terms. Not so Jerusalem. Ιη 1332, Venetian ambassadors to the French court prefaced their sober and practical advice οη crusade shipping with a prayer. 46 Not only could such an expedition solve practical intemecine problems such as that of the Free Companies, but, ίη Sanudo's phrase, the crusade to the Holy Land would destroy Islam and conserve the faithful. 47 Dubois, Sanudo and de Mezieres saw ίη the Holy Land crusade the chance for the regeneration of Chήstendom through expansion, the winning of new empires and new markets and, perhaps more significandy, through what could best be descήbed as a restoration of optimism. De Mezieres's military crusading Order of the Passion was to be, ίη addition, the summa peifeaio, the model and agent of spiήtual and moral reform. 48 For fourteenth-century theoήsts, the Holy Land crusade alone was physically, morally and spiήtually a public method of Chήstian renewal. Enthusiasm for other crusades came and went. By the late fourteenth century Spain had ceased to attract large, regular crusading contingents. After Tannenberg, western support for the Teutonic Κnights etfectively stopped. The heyday of the ltalian crusades, for foreign

IX 110 involvement, was ίη the thirteenth century. But the Holy Land, its appeal recognisably the same as when first developed ίη the early twelfth century, was not so obviously subject to fashion. The acme of Chήstian respectability and resolve, it was a fιxed point ίη a changing world. Admitting as much is not, however, to reject the genuineness or appeal of other crusades. The indulgences, after all, were, οη the whole, the same. The courts ofEngland, France and Burgundy may have concentrated ίη the 1390s οη prepaήng a new seήes of passagia to the East, but ίη 1397 John Holland, earl of Huntingdon, was receiving full crusading indulgences to fight the schismatic opponents of Boniface α ίη ltaly. •• All crusadingwas potentiallypopular, ίη 1400 as ίη 1200. But the appeal ofthe Holy Land was of a different order and remained consistently and persistently more attractive than any other. In July 1333, Pieπe Roger summed up the special combination ofmotives ofthe crusaderto the Holy Land ίη a sermon to the papal cuήa larded with the traditional rhetoήc ofSt Bemard's De Laude Nσvae Militiae: love of God which inspired devotion to the Holy Land, obedience to the law which obliged Chήst's vassals to regain their inheήtance, compassion for the beleaguered Chήstians of the East, the desire for personal redemption and, fmally, the crusade tradition itself, fuelled by histoήes and romances.5° Even today, an academic society can be founded for histoήans of the crusades under the banner of the 'study of the crusades and the Latin East'. Such a bias is, 1 suggest, entirely ίη keeping with the longest and most potent traditions of the crusade movement.

IX ΊΗΕ HOLY LAND AND ΊΗΕ CRUSADES

111

NOTES

7

10

12

" 1•

" 16 17 18

1•

20

21

" " 24

" 2•

27

"

As many of the arguments and much of the evidence rehearsed here are very familiar, ίt has not been thought necessary to load the text with detailed references. For Lincoln 1217, see Τ. Wήght, Political Songs ofEngfand (Camden Society, 1839), 22-3; for Lewes 1264, William of Rishanger, Chronide, ed. J .O. Halliwell (Camden Society, 1840), 31; for the Russian crusade of 1240-2, Ε. Chήstiansen, 77ιe Northem Crusades (London, 1980), 126-30; for the anti-papal crusades of Fredeήck 11, Μ. Purcell, Papal Crusading Po/icy 1244-1291 (Leiden, 1975), 20-1 ; for the crosses wom by both sides at Evesham (1265), Rishanger, Chronide, p. 46. As ίη Μ .Η . Keen, 'Chaucer's Κnight, the English Aήstocracy and the Crusade', English Court Culture in the Later Midd/e Ages, ed. V.J. Scattergood andJ.W. Sherbome (London, 1983), 46. For the extremes of opinion which help define the debate, Η .Ε. Mayer, 77ιe Crusades (London, 1972), 281-6 and J.S.C . Riley-Smith, What Were the Cnιsades? (London, 1977), esp. p. 74. · The contrast, perhaps, between Ρ.Α. Throop, Criticism of the Crusade (Amsterdam, 1940) and N.J. Housley, 77ιe ltalian Cnιsades (Oxford, 1982). Matthew Paήs, HistoriaAng/onιm, ed. F . Madden (RS 44; London, 1866-9), ίί, 431. Matthew Paήs, Chronica Majora, ed. H .R. Luard (RS 57; London, 1872-84), ν, 522; Housley, Ιια/ίαn Crusades, p. 37 and refs.; Throop, Criticism, p. 112; Chήstiansen,Northem Cnιsades, p. 146. Jean de Joinville, Histoire ι:k St. Louis, ed. Ν. de Wailly (Paήs, 1868), 261-2; Wtlliam Rishanger, Chronica, ed. Η.Τ. Riley (RS 28; London, 1865), 66-8; Thomas Wykes, 'Chronicon', inAnna/es Monastici, ed. H .R. Luard (RS 36; London, 1869), ίν, 237-40. Housley, ltalίan Crusades, pp. 84-6 and refs .. 77ιe Westminster Chronicle, ed. and trans. L.S. Hector and 8.F. Harvey (Oxford, 1982), 37; Thomas Walsingham, HistoriaAng/icana, ed. Η.Τ. Riley (RS 28; London, 1863-4), ίί, 84, 284-5. J. Bongars, Gesta Dei Per Francos (Hanover, 1611), ίί, 293, 305; F. Kunstmann, 'Studien ϋber Marino Sanudo', Ahhand/ungen ιkr historische Classe ιkr Kiinig/iche hayerischen Akaι:kmie ιkr Wissenschaften, νίί (1855), esp. 766-7, 770, 772-3, 784-6, 799, 803, 809. For other cήtics, see notes 7 and 8 above, Throop, Criticism, passim and, recendy and with a different slant, Housley, Ιια/ίαn Crusades, pp. 71-11 Ο, esp. pp. 78-9 (Muntaner) and pp. 87-8 (Edward 1). Despite his later comments οη papal crusades, Matthew Paήs accepted Wendover's view that Fredeήck II was to blame for papal disapproval and opposition, hardly the position of a blinkered GhibeUine; Hist. Ang/onιm, ίί, 298. Housley, ltalίan Crusades, p. 252. F .H . RusseU, 77ιe Just War in the Midd/e Ages (Cambήdge, 1975), 195-212; PurceU, Crusading Policy, passim; Housley, ltalίan Cnιsades, pp. 35-70. The Hohenstaufen patronage ofMuslims at Lucera was a pήme propaganda weapon. PL, ccxiv, col. 781; Calendar of Papal Leners relating to Great Britain and lreland, ed. W.H. Bliss and C. Johnson (London 1897), ίίί (1342-62), 294-5. For the decretalists' distinctions, Russell,Jusι War, p. 205. Chήstiansen, Northem Cnιsades, passim esp. p. 148; PurceU, Crusading Policy, pp. 88-91, esp, notes 185 and 195. Wigand of Marburg, 'Chronilι', ed. Τ. Hirsch, Scriptores Renιm Pnιssicanιm, ίί (Leipzig, 1863), 490-1. Ε. Baluze, Miscellaneonιm, ί (Paris, 1678), 165-95. Some English peers thought that ecclesiastical leadership might compromise English secular interests ίη France; Westminster Chronide, p. 37. Matthew Paήs, Chronica Majora, v. 522; Housley, Ιιa/ίαn Crusades, p. 37 and refs.; Throop, Criticism, pp. 61-2. Eg. John ΧΧ:11, Lettres secretes eι curia/es relatrves ά /α France, ed. Α. Cοώοη and S. Clemencet (Paήs, 1906-72), nos. 1227 (1319/ 20), 1445 (1322); Benedict ΧΙΙ, Lettres doses eι patentes intίrissant /es pays autres que /α France, ed. J .M. Vidal {Paήs, 1913-50), ηο. 786. Ιη 1337 Benedict ΧΙ! authoήsed a new crusade against Loώs IV; Benedict ΧΙ!, Lettres closes, no. 1609. . For Gregory Χ, Throop, Criticism, passim. Clement V, Regestum, ed. 0 .S.8 . (Rome 1885-92), nos. 5081-2, 5084; F. Ehrle, 'Process ϋber den Nachlass Clemens V', Archiv fur Literatur und Kirchen-geschichte de, Mittelalters, v (1889), 1-158. Rishanger, Chronica, p. 68, cf. John ofTrokelowe and Henry ofBlandford, Chrιmica etAnnales, ed. Η.Τ. Riley (RS 28; London, 1866), 29. Η. Finke, Papsttum und Unteτgang de, Temp/erorι:kns (Mϋnster, 1907), ίί, 241 . L . de Mas Latήe, 'Commerce et expeditions nιilίtaires de la France et de Venise au moyen age', Mίlanges historiques: Choi:ι: ι:ks documents (Paήs, 1873-86), ίίί, 101-2 (November 1333). Μ . Andήeu, Le Pontifical Romain au M'!)'enAge (Vatican, 1940), ίί, 27, 418-20; ίίί, 541. Cf.J.A. Brundage, 'Cruce Signaή: the Rite for Taking the Cross ίη England', Traditio, χχίί (1966), 289-31 Ο. Marsilius of Padua, Defensor Pacis, ed. C .W. Pre~te-Orton (Cambήdge, 1928), 416. Τ. Rymer; Foeιkra, (London 1704-35), ί, 517-18. This was, of course, onlytemporary, but, nevertheless, the pope

IX 112

30

" 33

"

42 43

displayed a much less relaxed attitude to the Holy Land vow than Henry 111. Clement VI, Lεttres closes, patentes et aιriales, eds. Ε. Deprez et al. (Paris, 1901-61), πο. 914. Marsilius, Defensor Pacis, p. 417. Paήs, Archives nationales, MS lπventaire des layenes du Trisor des Chartes, vii, fols. 442v_443r G600, πο. 32); Ca/endarofPatent Ro/1s /327-1330, 436; Rymer, Foedeτa, iv, 400. Ν. Iorga,Phίlippede Mι!zίeres (Paήs, 1896), 71 and note 1, 73-4. The standard accounts remainJ. Delaville le Roulx, La France en Orient au :m/ sίec/e (Paris, 1885-6) and A.S. Atiya, 11ιe Crusade ίn the Laιer Midόle Ages (London, 1938). For Greenland crusade taxation, Ε. Riant, Pι!/erinages des Scandίnaves en Terre Saίnte (Paris, 1865), 398. Matthew Paήs, Chronica Majora, v, 76, 130-1; Rymer, ί, 447; Β.Ζ. Kedar, 'The Passenger Listof a Crusader Slrip 1250', Studί Medicvali, 3rd. ser., χiίί (1972), 267-79. Edward 11, the counts ofHainault and St. Pol. and the Dauplrin ofVienne all took the cross ίπ 1313, Geoffi-oi de Paήs, 'Chronique ήmee', RHGF, xxii, 135; Η. Finke,AaaAragvnensιa (Berlin and Leipzig, 1908-22), ί, 459-60. J .J .Ν. Palmer, Englanιζ France and Christendom 13 77-99 (London, 1972), 180-21 Ο, 240-4. Geoffi-oi de ViUehardouin, D, Ια crmquι!te dε Constantinople, ed. Ρ. Paήs (Paήs, 1838), 31; Housley, Ιια/ιαn Crusades, p. 37. Pipe Ro/1 /Ο John, Michaelmas 1208, ed. D.M. Stenton (Pipe RoU Society vol. 61 ; London, 1947), 150; Kedar, 'Passenger List'. J. Larner, 11ιe Lords o/Romagna (London, 1965), 38. Eg. Hethoum, RHC Arm., ίί, 220-1; Pseudo-Brocard, 'Directoήum', RHC Arm., ίί, 389; the sermons of Pieπe Roger, Paήs, Bibliotheque nationale, MS Latin 3293, fol. 243r col. i; or the verypopώartravelogue ofMandeville's Truvels, ed. M .C. Seymour (Oxford, 1967), 1-2. Philippe de Mezieres, Le Songedu Vιei/Pι!lerin, ed. G.W. Coopland (Cambήdge, 1969), i, 5; Atiya, Crusade, p. 183. Eg. Theobald of Champagne's crusaders ίπ 1239, French crusaders in 1251 and governments such as the French who 1313-1336 consistendy put pressure to modify papal policy. The French crusade plans of the early fourteenth century stimώated works from Pieπe Roger, Pieπe de la Palud, Nogaret, Dubois, Guillaume Durand the Younger, Ramon LuU, the author of the Direaorium, Guy ofVigevano, Μaήπο Sanudo etc .. For the association of the Wilton Dyptych with the crusade plans of the 1390s, Palmer, Englan,ζ Franceand Christendom, pp. 242-4. Β.Ζ. Kedar and S. Schein; 'Un projet de "passage particulier" propose par l'Ordre de l'Hδpital', Biblioιheque dε /'Ecole des Chartes, cxxxvii (1979), 221. Mas Latήe, 'Commerce et expeditions', p. 99. Bongars, Gesta, ίί, 1-2, 8 ίπ the fuU tide ofSanudo's magnum opus, the Secreta Fidelium Crucis. Atiya, Crusade, p. 141 and note 5. Ca/endar ο/Ραpα/ Lεtters, ίίί, 294-5. Paήs Bibliotheque nationale MS Latin 3293, fols. 241v col. ii-246r col. ii.

VIII

X

WHAT

F

ΤΗΕ

CRUSADES EUROPE

ΜΕΑΝΤ ΤΟ

or Edward Gibbon, the crusades concerned nothing less than 'the world's debate'. Two centuries later, ίt can still be argued that crusading 'was of central importance to nearly every country in Europe and the Near East until the Reformation' with profound implications for modern politics, notably anti-Semitic violence, hostility between Orthodox and Catholic Christians and the escalating tensions between Moslems and Christians in the Balkans, Near East or elsewhere (Riley-Smith 1997: 1). Although lacking medieval definition in law or language, crusading is portrayed as a 'movement', implying a degree of coherence and unity of purpose, attitude or behaviour. Western historians have subsequently read into the crusades European colonialism; racial and cultural superiority; the triumph of faith over materialism or reason; nationalist epic; the opening of Europe to eastern trade, inventions and learning; the climax of shining chivalry or bestial barbarism; even 'the central drama' of the medieval period 'to which all other incidents were in some degree subordinate' (Archer and Kingsford 1894: 450-1). Yet in many respects, the dynamism of the crusade was derived from the culture that gave ίt birth and sustained it for half a millennium rather than the other way round. Just war ίη medieval Europe boasted a Christian pedigree as old as Constantine the Great and Augustine of Hippo in the fourth and fifth centuries, with a much older parentage in Roman public war and the scriptural battles of the Israelites from Moses to the Maccabees. As Christendom appeared increasingly threatened by pagans and Islam in the eighth and ninth centuries, wars fought ίη defence of the Church were perceived as being ίη a holy cause, attracting spiritual rewards. This association sat easily ίη the culture of western Europe where war and religion were inseparable and Christ Himself could be portrayed as a warrior leader of a warband, ίη the vernacular eighth-century Anglo-Saxon Drearn of the Rood or the ninth-century Germano-Saxon translation of the Gospels, the Heliand. Acceptance of Holy War, where fighting was regarded not simply as justified by circumstance, cause or legal authority but as a holy act ίη itself, percolated through Western aristocratic religious culture. Remission of sins was occasionally granted to warriors by popes (eg . Leo IV, 847-5 5; John VIII, 872-82). From the late tenth century some churchmen and their lay neighbours and relatives combined together to maintain their political and ecclesiastical order and security by esrablishing what were called Truces and Peaces

X

of God. Just as the values of the arms-bearing classes appeared to be increasingly Christianised, so, in some aspects, was the Church militarised. The vernacular Song ο/ Roland affirmed a warrior ethic with a Christian gloss: 'Christians are right; pagans are wrong', while contemporary eleventh-cenrury popes employed armies ω fight their wars and Gregory VII (1073-85) planned a militia Sancti Petri (knighthood/ army of St Peter). The Church depended οη military aristocrats for patronage and protection. Ιη rerurn churchmen, especially monks, tried to incline these patrons if not to godliness at least to an awareness of their relationship to God through His Final Judgemenr. If the sentimenrs expressed in numerous charters of laymen granting property to monasteries are ω be believed, donors took seriously the prospect of punishment for their sins in some after-life. This symbiosis of interesrs and values, encouraged by developing canon law and the beginnings of a coherent and accessible penitential system, was lent focιιs by the political agenda of the reformed papacy after 1050. Across Western Europe during the so-called Investiture Contest ecclesiasrical interests were pursιιed through secιιlar politics, issιιes of the legitimacy of lay behavioιιr being interpreted in a spiritual context. This extended beyond German civil wars or the struggle for dominance in Italy to evenrs sιιch as the Norman conqιιest ofEngland, which received enrhusiasric sιιpport from the modernisers at rhe Roman curia. Previoιιsly the preserve, almost perqιιisite of emperors or kings, religioιιs political ideology now reached the knights who were thereby lent respectability and an identifiable place in rhe church-created world hierarchy to match their growing material status. While contemporaries of Urban ΙΙ saw his radical extension of penitential war lirerally as a God-sent opportιιnity to channel the activities of such men towards alternative, meritorioιιs ends, sιιch holy war soon became rhe acme ofknightly ambition, which it remained until the end of the Middle Ages, an ideal as lιιstrous for Dιιke Philip the Good of Bιιrgundy in rhe fifreenth centιιry as for King Richard rhe Lionheart in the rwelfth. The heroes and legends that sιιstained the bright image of the Wars of the Cross were military. The glamoιιr of much crιιsade story-relling, in essence based οη physical, not spirirual, fighting, depended οη rhe confluence of war memoirs and moral homilies, epic meeting hagiography, althoιιgh this was not the unique preserve of the crιιsade . Crusading thιιs emerged from an existing tradirion as well as a specific context. Many apparently distincrive crιιsading fearures were hardly novel: ecclesiastical acceptance of holy war; indιιlgences for Christian warriors; encouragement to fight rhe Infidel; rhe concept and reality of pious knights. The symbolic use of rhe Holy Cross, adopred as a sign of their vow by all who wished to enjoy the indιιlgences, was not invented for the crusade. It had been characteristic of rhe devorions of Perer Damian, one of the consciences of early papal reform, and was adopted by German pilgrims to Jerιιsalem in 1064. Holy Land pilgrims with ηο intention of fighting continued to adopt the Cross in the twelfrh cenrury. The term crucesignatus - signed with the Cross - was shared in the thirteenth century by reformed heretics. Yet Urban II's call to arms in 1095 to recaptιιre Jerusalem and assist the Eastern churches, althoιιgh seen by some at the papal Cιιria as fιιlfilling the programme of Gregory VII, did present ιιηiqιιe and novel fearures.Those who had fought for William of Normandy at Hastings in 1066 ιιnder a papal banner ίη what the pope 132

X - What the Crusades Meant to Europe had proclaimed a just cause nonetheless were enjoined to underrake penance for their acts of violence οη the battlefield. Ιη 1095, by contrast, Urban ΙΙ proposed that the campaigning itself, slaughter included, was a satisfactory penitential act that remitted at the least the entire penalties of all the crusader's confessed sins. The implications were not restricted to spiritual health. Urban 'preached a holy war and thus sanctified holy pillage' (France 1996). The opportunity was provided by appeals from the East for aid, notably from the Byzantine emperor, but the concept of the relief of Jerusalem as both a physical goal and a means of grace derived in general from papal policy to impose a new hierarchic order upon clergy and laity and in particular from Urban II's perception of the naωre and progress ofChristian history. Thus, from its inception, crusading was a phenomenon of the culture of Wesrern Christendom even where its implementation was not. Whatever else, the crusades have attracted judgement. Arguably, those who planned the Wars of rhe Cross invited ηο less: such expeditions were seen as tests of the spiritual healrh or, more usually the 'iniquity' or malaise of Christendom, rhrough, as Pope Innocent ΠΙ put it in 1213, a contest devised by God to try the faith of Christians 'as gold ίη the furnace', a 'trial of the sword', even, ίη the words of a Second Crusade song, a 'tournament berween Hell and Paradise' (Riley-Smith and Riley-Smith 1981 : 65, 119; Tyerman 1998: 18). For its promoters, the stakes could not be higher. Given the successive defeats οη the eastern Mediterranean front from the mid-twelfth century, this proved awkward, the ultimate failure of the Holy Land crusades haunting th e imaginations of later medieval polemicists such as Philippe de Mezieres (1327-1405) as a symbol of moral decadence and spiritual as well as political weakness. This judgementalism has by ηο means always been positive. Wars, holy or not, claim victims. Jews and Moslems lament their dead, massacred by the First Crusaders: rhe Rhineland ίη 1096 and Jerusalem in 1099 retain the power to chill even rhe strongest Catholic apologist. Many southern Frenchmen had little to celebrate and much to curse ίη the crusades of the early thirteenth century that destroyed the Albigensian heretics and much more. Few Greeks forgave or forgot the sack of Constantinople ίη 1204 and the subsequent annexation of substantial parts of Greece and rhe Aegean by Westerners. Το some later historians, such as Joseph Franςois Michaud in the nineteenth century or Steven Runciman in the twentieth, the rape of Byzantium allowed the later conquest of south-eastern Europe by the Ottomans. Needless to say, Moslem writers are less upset at this outcome. The pagans of the Baltic lacked literacy to arriculate their response to the Teutonic Knights' 'eternal crusade' of the rhirteenth and fourteenth centuries in all its redium, viciousness and squalor (or alternatively devotion, bravery and excitement) until at the Council of Constance (1414-18) the now-Christian victims found a voice that condemned the very basis of the northern crusades. Sixteenth-century Protestants thought the whole exercise of papal power corrupt and corrupting, noting with fraternal outrage the crusades launched against critics of the medieval Church, such as the Hussites. Religious fanaticism itself prompted the disdain of rhe Enlightenment, David Hume famously standing for a whole world-view ίη describing the crusades as 'the most signal and most durable monument ofhuman folly that has yet appeared in any age or nation'. Beside the admiration and sense of tradition crusading inspired among 13 3

X

medieval enthusiasts and Romantics ίπ the nineteenth century ran the appreciation of waste, of loss, never better understood than by observers ίη the late twentieth century. However, most critics and champions share a sense of the importance of the subject . Yet crusading was hardly free-standing. Many of the Wars of the Cross, especially ίη Europe - ίπ Italy, Spain, France, Germany, England, the Baltic or the Balkans - would have been fought whatever the precise formal justification and apparatus of recruitment and propaganda. Crusading did not make western Europe a violent place; violent Europe created crusading. However significant an ideological leap was U rban II's invention of pentitential war in 1095, the practical differences were, in many instances, minimal. As often as not, crusading reflected desires and policies to which holy wars were useful but tangential: the moral, political and ecclesiastical ambitions of popes; the devotional pracrices of the laity, especially the nobility and propertied classes; the development of the cult of chivalry and code of aristocratίc honour; the economic expansion of parts of western Europe; the religious initίatίves of Church reformers. Even in the eastern Mediterranean, the one area where Urban II's vision had a unique impact, crusading - as opposed to the sort of warfare the Greeks had been conducting for centuries - was a product not of the frontier conflict with Islam but of preoccupations ίη the heartlands of western Christendom. Throughout, crusading was contίngent οη those who saw ίη its associated forms, rituals, rhetoric and traditions means to fulfil wίdely disparate and changίng needs, temporal and spίrίtual. The crusades were a form of Chrίstian Holy War originally associated with the armed pilgrimage summoned by Urban ΙΙ to recover Jerusalem from Moslem rule ίη 1095-9. Partίcίpants, who signalled their commitment by ceremonially receίving the cross and, from the later twelfth century, contributors as well earned spiritual prίvίleges, most importantly plenary remission of sins, as well as the Church's protection for their property, immunity from repayment of debt and delays οη law suits. Legal authority for such Holy Wars ostensibly derived from the pope . Yet emotίons and actίons allied to fighting under the Cross were never the sole prerogative of papally sanctίoned expedίtions. Ιη 1110 King Sigurd of Norway, without any papal involvement, was recruited by King Baldwin Ι of Jerusalem 'to the servίce of Christ', perhaps even receiving the Cross ίη J erusalem, ίπ order to capture Sidon (Hollander 1964: 688-97). Ιη 1228-9, the excommunicated Emperor Frederick ΙΙ recovered Jerusalem οη what cannot be regarded as anything other than a crusade, if that term has any meaning. True, papal authorisation and organisation, including diplomacy, propaganda, finance, at times even mίlitary recruitment, lay at the heart of most practίcal crusading, which became one of the most potent weapons ίη the armoury of the papal monarchy of the High Middle Ages. Nonetheless, at ηο time was a legal theory of crusading, as distinct from other forms of just or holy war, proposed let alone established. Ιη a period and intellectual climate fond of legal codification and academic definitions, the omission is remarkable. The great Dominίcan theologian Thomas Aquinas, almost two centuries after the First Crusade, was still debating with students ίπ Paris some of the unresolved technical niceties of the operation of the crusade vow and indulgence (Spiazzi 1949: ίχ). 134

X - What the Crusades Meant to Europe -

The Church ofthe Holy Sepulchre (Photo: C. Tyenηan , 1987)

135

X

Although a clear and lasting primacy of respect was afforded campaigns to the Holy Land, which, large and small, continued ίη practice to the end of the thirteenth century and ίη aspiration until the sixteenth, wars ίη defence of the Church more generally defined were understood to be legitimate οη similar terms . Thus, from the early twelfth century, popes awarded privileges associated with the Jerusalem expedition to some Christian campaigns against the Moslems in Spain and, from 114 7, to certain German wars against pagans in the Baltic. This form of Holy War was also employed within Christendom against Christians who presented a political threat to papal interests, such as supporters of the anti-pope Anacletus in 1135, Markward of Anweiler in Sicily ίη 1198 or the Hohenstaufen in Germany and Italy from the 1230s. Papal allies, such as the king ofNorway in 1164 or the thirteenth-century kings John and Henry ΠΙ of England, were defended by crusades which were also used to enforce political control or order, as over the routiers of Languedoc ίη 1139, or recalcitrant peasants ίη the Netherlands and north-west Germany in the 1220s. Crusades against Christian enemies of the Papacy became the most characteristic - and most controversial - form of crusading in the thirteenth and fourteenth cenωries.The other main targets of crusades in Europe were heretics, notably the Cathars (or Albigensians) between 1208 and 1229, although charges of heresy could be employed by unscrupulous rulers, such as the kings of Hungary against the Bosnians ίη the 1230s, driven by zeal to acquire more land and power, a motive not far from the thoughts of King Louis VΠΙ of France when campaigning against the Cathars ίη 1226. As the anti-Hussite crusades ίη Bohemia in the fifteenth century show, the combination of religious outrage and political ambition retained its potency. Ιη the thirteenth century, the need to defend the Latin Empire of Constantinople and the western conquests in Greece and the Aegean established after the Fourth Crusade ίη 1204 led, especially after the 1230s, to regular appeals for crusades against the Byzantines.The flexible nature of the crusade as a political device is further revealed in its use from the fourteenth century in the conquest and conversion of pagan lands ίη Africa, the Atlantic and the Americas where the underlying justification of defence and reconquest was expanded to include the extension of Christendom . Static neither ίη application nor ίη administration, the range of the wars of the Cross, from Russia to Spain, from England to Egypt, the involvement of so many diverse communities and the longevity of at least some associated ideals, reflected crusading's part ίη three powerful social and cultural forces: the expansion of western Christendom beyond its early medieval frontiers; the development of internal structures of authority and order ίη Church and State; and the religious reformation of the laity, spearheaded by the crusader pope Innocent ΠΙ and the Fourth Lateran Council of 1215. Nevertheless, while ίt may have been a characteristic feature of western European politics and Church, crusading was not a monolithic movement. Many modern historians have regarded the crusades as an autonomous force, exerting profound influence οη medieval culture of which crusading was a 'defining characteristic' (Lloyd 1995: 36). When likened to a 'cancer inside the body of medieval Christendom ... carried to every part of the organism', crusading's discrete existence is still acknowledged (Morris 1998: 201). However, the crusade was not defined ίη law, 136

X - What the Crusades Meant to Europe -

canon or secular. The names used ω describe the acrivity had little consistency, there being no accepted word for crusade beyond euphemisms (holy business, cross etc.) or banalities (holy passage, voyage, journey, expedition etc.). The one technical word that retained currency and force, both ίη literary works and the records oflaw courts, was pilgrimage, an association that crusading never cast off and from which it was often hard put ω distinguish itself. Charters drawn up οη behalf of those departing οη crusade illustrate this clearly. Even ίη the thirteenth century, in such diverse settings as secular law courts, eye-witness accounts by crusaders such as the Frenchman Jean de Joinville or illustrated manuscripts of crusade texts, pilgrimage and crusading continued ω be inseparably, at times indistinguishably, woven rogether. The institutions of crusading remained firmly attached to their cultural setting, reflecting rather than illuminating their surroundings. The changing and disparate needs of society drove crusading, not the other way round. When the valuesystems that sustained ίt changed, so it ceased ω be relevant. lt was not military defeat by Islam but the Reformation that brought crusading ω an end. lt proved ω have been less a cancer than a parasite. Equally, for all its importance in papal policy throughout the three centuries after 1100 and for many rulers during the same period, crusading was not universal. lts distinctive institutions - indulgence, penitential warfare, martial Christ-centred rheroric, the Cross, legal immunities, etc. - did not rouch every member of society or every region ofChristendom evenly or at all. Οη the spiritual level, crusading was not a compulsory religious exercise, ίη the manner of oral confession after 1215 . Except for Holy Land crusades, few expeditions were preached throughout Western Christendom. Crusading for most people, especially after 1200, was a local or regional affair not only ίη the organisation of preaching and recruitment, which was inevitably the case with all crusades, but ίη the nature of the declared objective: northern Frenchmen fought in Languedoc and northern Spain; ltalians ίη ltaly; Germans in Germany, the Baltic and, later, Bohemia; Hungarians ίη the Balkans. There were obvious exceptions, notably Charles of Anjou in ltaly in the 1260s. Not all wars of cultural, religious or political aggression attracted crusading features; there were crusades ίη Bosnia but not in Ireland. The srory of the First Crusade, which dominated the subsequent highly self-referential literature οη later expeditions, was transmitted ίη significantly different regional versions . The picture of medieval crusading - as of medieval Europe in general - ίs one of fragmentation and disparity of regional interests dictating ω the Curia as much as papal directives inspiring uniformity of reaction; of local perceptions, traditions and responses . Active crusading was a minority activity. Το become a crucesignatus implied both legal freedom and economic substance, either personal or derived from a profitable dependent relationship. As enquiries ίnω defaulting crusaders show, for example ίη England ίη the 1190s, paupers could not go οη crusade; neither could serfs. The social composition of crusade armies was little or ηο different from any other of the period, even if, at times, their objectives were unique . As with all secular armies, and, indeed, political society in general, recruitment was based upon the military households, affinities, employees, kindreds and geographical networks of the dominant arms-bearing class and urban elites. Crusader armies, like any others, were held rogether by a mixture of loyalty and cash, assembled and disciplined not by 137

X

religious enthusiasm alone, but by traditional bonds of lordship, kinship, shared locality, sworn association and, from the late twelfth cenωry, formal and specific contracts between leader and led. Written lists of such recruits survive from Italy ίη the early 1220s; contracts ίη England from 1240 . With expeditions ro the Holy Land, the increasing awareness, at least from the later twelfth century, of the requirement for more effective soldiers and the necessity of transport by sea, accelerated a narrowing of recruitment ro the exclusion of non-combatants and hangers-on. Crusaders had ro have access ro money, whether theirs, their patrons' or their masters': ηο money, ηο crusade. The point was well taken by Innocent ΠΙ after the Fourth Crusade had become the victim of its own indebtedness. The evidence of chronicles, land transactions, financial deals, lawsuits, vernacular songs, sermons and poems reveals crusading as sustained by magnates and knights, landed arisrocrats trained ίη arms, surrounded by their dependents: tenants, servants, relatives and foot-sloggers. With them were those who could ply their skills οη crusade, wage earners and artisans. The sources reveal merchants, goldsmiths, dyers, bowmen, carpenters, drapers, farriers, blacksmiths, laundresses, prostitutes, millers, cobblers, tailors, fowlers, doghandlers, butchers, barbers, vintners, cooks, masons and fishmongers. Perhaps a characteristic non-aristocratic rural crusader was the sort of man who, ίη the different circumstances of the fourteenth cenωry, might have fought ίη the Hundred Years War as an English archer, known then as a yeoman, a substantial freeman. Crusading was attractive ro criminals seeking legal protection or escape. Beneficed clergy were prominent ίη praying, diplomacy, writing letters, composing chronicles, organising poor relief, burying the dead and even fighting. Wives rook the Cross in their own right but, according ro numerous widely ignored crusade ordinances, unattached women were forbidden, except for older women of good repute who acted as menials, laundresses and de-lousers. They all, however, shared the same requirement for funds, their own or somebody else's. Many chroniclers and not a few modern historians have noted the importance of the poor on crusade, the pauperes, the plebs. However, the evidence of charters of French crusading rustici, or peasants, suggests they had property to dispose of, however modest. If free, the poor could in theory take the Cross, but they did not in fact embark. Some accounts explictly state that the so-called poor on crusade were those who had run out of money, called by Odo ofDeuil on the Second Crusade 'new paupers', a common enough fate even for the most gently born crusader (Berry 1948: 13 7). 'Poor' was also used as a relative term in a literary convention that, for example, drew a pointed moral from describing the successful crusaders who captured Lisbon ίη 1147 as 'poor' in contrast ro the 'rich' kings of Germany and France whose expeditions failed even though their participants were substantial landowners and merchants who had funded their own campaign. Using a similar euphemism of the Fourth Crusade, Robert of Clari described as 'poor' minor but well-ro-do Flemish knights. Elsewhere, preachers as well as chroniclers were often more concerned with spiriωal standing than with economic condition. This could lead ro contradictions. Preaching the Cross under Innocent ΠΙ (1198-1216) was often combined with calls ro follow the vita apostolica, i.e. a renunciation of material wealth, itself suggestive of the economic standing of the desired audience, or paralleled by attacks οη usury and denunciations of the sinfulness ofborrowing as well as lending. Taken literally, 138

X - What the Crusades Meant to Europe -

acceptance of such preaching would render the would-be crusader impotent to fulfil his vow. The image ofhordes of impoverished peasants leaving their fields to employ their pitchforks ίη the service of the Cross is a myth. Despite its later title, the Peasants' Crusade of 1096 was led by magnates, possessed a central fund of treasure and laid siege to fortified towns ίη Hungary: hardly the work of a rabble of military novices fresh from the plough. Whatever else he was, Walter Sans Avoir, one of the leaders, was not penniless, Sans Avoir being a place not a condition. Those who did set out, ίη 1096 or οη the Children's (1212) and Shepherds' (1250) Crusades, hoping to rely οη charity alone, could not complete the journey unless taken οη by those with funds. Οη the Third Crusade in 1189 the German emperor, Frederick Barbarossa, tried to insist that those who enrolled in the crusade host were able to support themselves. There was little or ηο mass involvement of whole communities or populations . When Martino da Canale recorded that 'the whole of the Venetian popolo' took the Cross ίη the papal cause ίη 1256, it is not necessary to take him literally (Housley 1982: 126). Collectively, some crusading armies may have been massive; perhaps as many as 70,000 to 80,000 reached Asia Minor οη the First Crusade. The armies and fleets of the general expeditions east of 1147-8, 1189-92, 1202--4, 1217-21 and 1248-50 were impressive in size. However, with the possible exception ofLouis ΙΧ of France who took farming equipment with him to Egypt in 1249, there was ηο sense or reality of a mass demographic movement. That is not to say that the wars of the Cross were not popular nor that their home communities remained untouched, rather that much of their impact and popularity rested οη indirect or non-military features. Civilians were unavoidably engaged through the material requirements of preparing armies: the shipbuilders of the Venetian Arsenale in 1202; the iron workers of the Forest ofDean or the cheesemakers of Hampshire ίη 1190. More generall y, funds were raised for crusades by taxation which could, in theory, have affected more or less everyone: William Rufus's tax οη England in 1096 to pay for his brother's crusade; the Saladin Tithe of 1188. By 1200, taxation of the Church for 'the public business of the cross' had become an established feature of crusading, a cost that could fall heavily οη the extensive estates held by ecclesiastical corporations. Towns were tallaged in France for the crusades of their kings. Taxes reached out to all of society, pressing most heavily perhaps οη those at the bottom of the economic system who were unable to become crusaders ίη their own right but equally unable to avoid contributing. The more positively engaged and comfortably off parishioner, from c.1200, would regularly find ίη the parish church a chest for voluntary donations to the cause. It also became fashionable and spiritually meritorious to bequeath money or goods to the crusade . Thus crusading caught the efforts of labourers, the imagination of the faithful and the thoughts of the dying, through the pockets of them all. There was also a sense in which crusaders were regarded by their communities as expressing the repentance of all Christendom. They were sent off - literally - with the prayers of the local faithful, lay and religious, ringing ίη their ears. From this, the church authorities progressively and deliberately knitted crusading more tightly into the communal devotions of western Europe. By the mid-thirteenth century regular prayers, processions, bell-ringings and feast-days were dedicated to the cause, 139

X

thus involving the ordinary parishioners through the liturgy and the communal round of church services and religious ceremonial. These observances formed only one part of a growing institutiona!isation of the crusade, from the beginning of the Third Crusade in 1187 onwards, aimed by the Papacy at producing a more effective military response and more comprehensive, coherent and popular religious participation. One of the central paradoxes that emerged during the twelfth century was that within the developing penitential system of the Western Church, the crusade indulgence was almost uniquely advantageous, promising, as ίt did, full remission of sin, both casualities and survivors enjoying the prospect of salvation. Despite the horrific and arduous penance of campaigning, ίt was, as Bernard of Clairvaux suggested, a very good bargain Games 1998: 462). However, this indulgence was limited to those who actually took the Cross and fulfilled their vow by at least having the intention of setting out. After the First Crusade the numbers of such people were limited and socially unequal. Beginning with Clement ΠΙ at the time of the Third Crusade, popes began to allow the faithful to take the Cross ίη order to redeem their vow not by military action but by payment of money. This trend was completed ίη Innocent ΠΙ's bull Quia maior (1213) summoning the Fifth Crusade which allowed crucesignati to commute their vows by sending proxies and encouraged 'anyone who wishes' to redeem crusade vows for money according to means, with non-crucesignati contributors receiving an appropriate proportion of the indulgence. Innocent was being deliberately inclusive, wishing ω use the institutions of the crusade as part of a wider religious revival among the laity. Thus he instituted the monthly processions, fasting and almsgiving and the special prayers incorporated into the Mass (RileySmith and Riley-Smith 1981: 119-24). Thereafter, personal contact with crusading did not depend οη military service. Crusade preaching increasingly concentrated οη vow redemptions and general amendment of spiritual life, as armies became more professional with fewer crucesignati ίη their ranks. Innocent and his agents saw taking the Cross as a form of religious conversion, meritorious ίη itself as a sign of a commitment to a new spiritual life. One prominent contemporary crusade preacher, Jacques de Vitry, described crusaders as consriωting an order, a religio. By 1250, ίt appears that taking the Cross formed part of a pious layman's devotional programme, as a sign of purity almost without direct reference to fighting ίη the Wars of the Cross. Ιη the words of Eudes de Chateauroux, papal crusade legate ίη France in the 1240s, 'by assumption of the Cross men are marked and distinguished as servants of God against the servants of the devil' (Tyerman 1998: 83 ). So powerful and attractive was the crusade indulgence that popular demand persuaded Innocent IV to sancrion the transferabiliry of the benefits of taking the Cross to wives and children. Even deceased relatives were regarded by some as able ω share rhe spiritual rewards of the crucesignatus. Into this inclusive embrace could be admitted, for the first time ίη significant numbers, the less wealthy (who could not have afforded or been capable of a military excursion) and women. Nonetheless, social elitism remained. Redemption of vows and purchase of indulgences cost money, openly disbursed. Although according to Innocent ΠΙ the spiritual rewards were calculated relative to the wealth of the recipient, within a 140

X - What the Crusades Meant to Europe -

Louis

!Χ

of France's fortifications at Caesarea, 1250- 54 (Photo: C. Tyerman, 1987)

cenrury of 1215 crusade indulgences were bought and sold outright, without any intervening redemption of the Cross, encouraging a parallel of spirirual advantage with social starus. As with many other aspects of medieval devotion, the procedure seemingly favoured those who could afford and contribute most towards their spiritual well-being. One of the most characteristic images of crusading is that of the inspirational preacher arousing his audience ro paroxysms of emotion and enthusiasm. Yet most if not all such events were carefully stage-managed for crowds or groups who were already primed to receive the call to take the Cross or contribute to the cause: Bernard at Vezelay ίη 1147; Josias of Tyre at Gisors or Baldwin of Canterbury ίη Wales ίη 1188; Fulk of Neuilly before the Fourth Crusade; Oliver of Paderborn ίη Frisia before the Fifth. The audiences were expectant, neither indifferent nor surprised, willingly caught ίη a rirual which was challenging only within carefully subscribed limits. Often associated with the lirurgy of the Mass, crusade sermons tended to focus devotion ίη a ceremonial as much as an evangelical manner. Crusading was not a spontaneous act, ίη recruitment or propaganda. The social bias of vow redemptions is confirmed by the audiences of the preachers who rarely even formally aimed their appeals at peasants. The very few sermons that are described ίη the twelfth cenrury, the small number of sermon texts from the thirteenth, the preaching manuals and surviving regional instructions to teams of preachers, all suggest that crusade preaching was primarily urban or based at the courts of the great. Increasingly, as the thirteenth century progressed, the religious purpose was generally revivalist, rhe 141

X

tangible result financial donations, the target a far wider community than that of potential warriors. With preaching as with the indulgence, the wider social popularity of crusading came as part of its incorporation into schemes of spiritual reform rather than solely as an aspect of Christian militarism or intolerance. It was in the thirteenth century, rather than with the sporadic outbursts of militant enthusiasm of the century before, that crusading became a secure social phenomenon ofWestern Christendom, ironically precisely because the links between taking the Cross and fighting for the Cross were being severed. The non-military aspects of the institutions surrounding the 'holy business' ensured its survival until the Reformation not simply as a martial ambition of the knightly classes but as a religious exercise of the fai thful. The effect of the crusades οη Europe and Europeans tended to be of three sorts: direct, as with the crusaders themselves and the families they left behind; indirect, in the responses of the wider community to the material needs of the enterprises and to the ecclesiastical mechanisms that wove crusading into the pattern of popular spirituality; and destructive, in the fate of the victims of the exercise. The crusade proved inadequate in providing the firm, lasting focus of identity for Christendom as a whole which, arguably, some popes and apologists hoped for from it. By contrast, ίt successfully exacerbated alienation between Westerners and those outside the stockade of papal Christianity. When considering what the crusades meant to Europe, ίt ίs worth remembering that besides those who could be regarded as Christians in communion with Rome, there were Greek Christians. There were also non-Christians: EuropeanJews ίη well-established communities ίη France, Spain, Germany and Italy; European Moslems in Spain and Sicily. There were European pagans, notably around the Baltic. There were European heretics, both Christian and non-Christian . There were Europeans for whom the claims of official religion meant little. The crusades may have been a signal demonstration of the penetration of religiosity in secular culture, but their social context was probably ηο more or ηο less an age of faith than ίs our own . Crusading , if anything, narrowed understanding, ofGreeks, pagans,Jews, even Moslems, contact with whom perversely was encouraging ignorant notions of Islam as polytheistic, or as a Christian heresy or as a religion with Mulμmmad as its god . Westerners increasingly appeared unable even to comprehend their cousins who had settled in Outremer who, within less than a century after 1099, were viewed with suspicion or contempt by many. This resulted in a failure to match military aid to the Holy Land with the need for it. As the First Crusade had been summoned in 1095 to suit internal politics within western Europe, so subsequent crusading, to the east ηο less than elsewhere, while opening avenues of commerce (especially to the entrepreneurs ofltaly and the western Mediterranean), of travel, pilgrimage, advancement and adventure, confirmed a paradoxical narrowing and hardening of vision. Material and political expansion seemed to have provoked a sort of introspective self-sufficiency. Ιη the eyes of Western observers, Outremer could be remade in the image of the West (which of course ίt could not) while the West was, at the same time, engaged ίη projecting onto itself all the culture and learning necessary for a comprehensive Christian polity, including relics from the east and replicas of holy shrines, as in round naves of churches in imitation of the Holy Sepulchre. Contact and conquest created a self-sustaining, self-congratulatory, 142

X - What the Crusades Meant to Europe -

yet paranoid ideology of superiority and rightness (righteousness?), suspicious, fearful, uncomprehending of outsiders, while enjoying their plunder. It need not have worked out that way. There is evidence of genuine Christian fraternity during the First Crusade: cooperation between Greeks and Latins; an absence of bitterness against the Byzantines from rerurning crusaders below the level of grasping or disappointed magnates of the High Command; and a lasting sense of comradeship and support from Armenian Christians who saw the crusaders at Antioch andJerusalem as liberarors, not conquerors, much as Urban ΙΙ may have intended. At least during the twelfth cenrury there were always voices raised to defend the idea of Christian fellowship, just as in the thirteenth cenrury, among the friars, conversion of infidels was seen by some as preferable to conquest. However, given the function assigned by the Papacy to Wars of the Cross ίη the twelfth and early thirteenth cenruries, ίt is hard not to conclude that, within Christendom at least, ίt was inevitable that crusading took its place as a vehicle of a persecuting society. Though Europe, like the crusade itself, was a scarcely defined medieval concept, for those Europeans within Christendom who were not seen as within the pale of orthodox Roman Christianity, the crusades were almost unremittingly disastrous, from the massacres of Jews that accompanied all the first three main expeditions to the east, in 1096, 1146 and 1190, to the carnage of the Albigensian crusades to local policing operations such as that to f!ush out the Italian Dolcino in the early fourteenth century to the Hussite wars over a cenrury later. Yet crusading of itself was hardly the cause of this persecution, merely the instrument. It is not accurate to reverse this process of active intolerance. The crusades did not bring about the definition of orthodoxy or of the papal monarchy nor did they cause that elevation of discipline and authority within society and the Church which lay behind many accusations of heresy. While demonstrably inciting ίt, the crusades did not create anti-Semitism; there were pogroms in France and Spain that long pre-dated 1095. Crusading was a symptom of new strands ίη lay and clerical spirituality, of the fresh perspectives and policies of a reinvigorated papacy, of the greater order and prosperity ίη western Europe, of the emergent status and consequent social arrangements of the arms-bearing or knightly class, of a reinvigorated Christian aggression, the harsh side ofUrban II's vision ofChristian history. The expeditions that resulted ίη the capture of Jerusalem ίη July 1099 exerted a significant influence οη the cultural development of western Europe. The experiences and story of the journeys and campaigns between 1095 and 1099 provided contemporaries and their descendents with a new model of military and spiritual behaviour and an unexpected example of Christian triumph ίη a world long accustomed to images of defeat or defence - for U rban ΙΙ a reversal of the long retreat of Christianity. Others could take more immediate encouragement, collectively from the victory ίη the east and individually from the indulgences. The First Crusade's fresh, although not exclusive, articulation of Christian Holy War provided a political weapon of great potential for the emergent Papacy; supplied an additional focus for pious martial ambition; offered a new opportunity to achieve and justify political and economic expansion; presented a unique process for individuals to achieve salvation; and left a series of indelible images ίη the minds of writers, poets, singers, artists 143

X

and architects as well as propagandists, moralists and conquerors. Islam could be more precisely identified - or, rather, misidentified - as a demonic foe and Jews as enemies of Christ because of the new attention given to Jerusalem, the scene of Christ's life, Passion, death and Resurrection, its liminal status between Heaven and Earth consolidated and modified first by temporal control of the terrestrial city to which pilgrims as well as settlers and warriors travelled ίη unprecedented numbers, then by the efforts to recapture ίt after its loss to Saladin ίη 1187. Το this central set of images could be attached all wars in defence of the Church in a process of Christian repentence masking triumphalism. More tangibly, crusading created a new vocabulary of salvation for the military classes and brought the foundation of new religious orders, such as the Templars, Hospitallers and Teuωnic Knights, some of which lasted for many centuries. Through contact with and control of areas beyond the confines of Latin Europe, individuals and communities from western Christendom found a sharper self-identity in relation to neighbours, including co-religionists, hitherto barely encountered. The crusades by no means caused, but did form a part of, a process of opening western Europe to a wider world, politically, culturally and commercially. The fate of the material legacy of the First Crusade in the eastern Mediterraneran, Europe's Outremer, was used by some to define the spiriωal and political health of papal Christendom for more than ten generations after 1099. The aesthetic imprint of crusading on art and literaωre survived as long. While the potency of other theatres of crusading ebbed and flowed in contemporary imagination, the place of Jerusalem and the Holy Land remained stubbornly entrenched in Western medieval mentalities. Protean in name, essence and act, not a movement but rather a series of institutions that varied in time, space, detail and application, uniform neither in naωre nor in support, reflecting rather than shaping cultural, political and religious trends, the wars associated with those to recover or defend Jerusalem constituted a vivid part of the life of medieval Christendom. Europe in the Middle Ages could be a very nasty place to live: the crusades made ίt marginally nastier.

REFERENCES Archer, Τ. and C. Kingsford (1894) The Crusades, London: Unwin. Berry, V. (ed.)(1948) Odo ο/ Dettil. De profectione Lttdovici VII in orientem , New York: Columbia U niversity Press. France, J. (1996) 'Les origines de la Premiere Croisade', in Μ. Balard (ed.)Autour de la Premiere Croisade, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 43-56. Hollander, L. (ed.) (1964) Heimskringla: the history ο/ the Kings ο/ Norway, Austin, ΤΧ: University ofTexas Press. Housley, Ν. (1982) The ltalian Cru.rades, Oxford: Clarendon Press. James, Β. (trans.) (1998) The Letters ο/ St Bernard ο/ Clairvaux, 2nd edn, Stroud: Sutton. Lloyd, S. (1995) 'The crusading movement', inJ. Riley-Smith (ed.) Oxford lllzιstrated History ο/ the Crusades, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Morris, C. (1998) 'Picturing the crusades: the uses of visual propaganda c.1095-1250', in J. France and W. Zajac (eds) Crusades and their Sottrces: essays presented to Bernard Harnilton, Aldershot: Ashgate, 195-216. 144

X - What the Crusades Meant to Europe Riley-Smith,J. (1997) Ίntroduction', inJ. Phillips (ed.) The First Crusade: origins and impact, Manchester: Manchester University Press, pp. 1-14. - - and L. Riley-Smith (eds) (1981) The Crusades: idea and reality, London: Edward Arnold. Spiazzi, R. (ed.) (1949) Thomas Aquinas. Quaestiones quodlibetales, Turin and Rome: Marietti. Tyerman, C. (1998) The lnvention ο/ the Crusades, Basingstoke: Macmillan.

145

IX

IX

XI

HOLY WAR, ROMAN POPES, AND CHRISTIAN SOLDIERS: SOME EARLΥ MODERN VIEWS ΟΝ MEDIEVAL CHRISTENDOM

S

OME time in 1608, there arrived at Corpus Christi College, Cambridge a distinguished foreign visitor who, through the good offιces of the Chancellor of the University, Robert Cecil, earl of Salisbury, and of Merlin Higden, a Fellow of Corpus, had been given permission to examine a manuscript in the college library. The visiting scholar had secured access to the library through a network of contacts that included his friend, a naturalized Frenchman and diplomat working for Cecil, Sir Stephen Lesieur, and a Chiswick clergyman, William Walter. What makes this apparently unremarkable (and hitherto unremarked) incident of more than trivial interest is that the industrious researcher was Jacques Bongars, veteran roving French ambassador in Germany and staunch Calvinist, and that his text was William of Tyre's Historia Ierosolymitana. 1 That Bongars produced, in 1611, the fιrst printed edition of this, and * other, major texts οη what we now call the crusades, and what sixteenth-century scholars tended to describe as the 'holy wars', may, at fιrst sight, appear surprising. Υet he was one of a group of Lutheran and Calvinist scholars who were among the fιrst to engage in the scholarly editing of manuscripts of crusading history. Their interest was not without ulterior polemic purpose. However, in addition to exposing how the papacy corrupted and misled both the Church and the faithful, there was a clear desire to extract positive lessons, to embrace as well as confront the medieval past. Across Christendom the religious changes of the sixteenth century led to fresh scrutiny of the European Christian inheritance, οη all sides of the confessional divides. Especially, perhaps, for those who claimed to be representing or 1 MS letter of William Walter, minister of Chiswick, pasted into the Bodleian Library, Oxford copy of the Gesta Dei Per Francos Ε.2.8. Art. Seld. after fol. 6; cf. Gesta Dei Per Franι:os (Hanau, 1611), Contents item 11 where Bongars thanks Higden and Lesieur, although not Walter. For Lesieur's contacts with Cecil, Historical Manuscripts Commission, Third Report (London, 1872), pp. 172, 175 (letters of 1607 and 1609); there are numerous other examples of the Lesieur correspondence ίη the Cecil papers.

*Bongars was not the first to print William of Tyre's Hίstorίa in 1611. This was in 1549 in Basel by Nicholas Brysinger.

XI

creating a pure form of religion, there was a search for continuity as much as condemnation. The literary career of Archbishop Matthew Parker exemplifιes this quest for justifιcation ίη the past ίη Elizabethan England. Appropriately, it was one of Parker's own manuscripts that Bongars consulted at Corpus. 2 Given their prominence in papal apologetics and continued relevance in political conflict, ίt is unsurprising that the crusades attracted the attention of intellectuals, Protestant and Catholic, or that their study was a signifιcant feature of in a process of re-interpreting the past to suit and legitimize the present. The re-creation of the crusades was nothing new, responses to the holy wars had been consistently remoulded to suit current fashion. For Protestant scholars, tke assimilation of crusade history into their fresh perspectives οη the past signalled an important integration of tradition into the new world of reformed religion and national identity. Νο less intriguing is the extent to which the sixteenth-century re-examination of crusading was in tune with ideas current from the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. Ιη addition to fuelling contemporary anti-papal polemic and a growing market for antiquarianism, Protestant study of the crusades appears as part of a tradition of criticism reaching back centuries, evidence of certain continuities ίη attitudes as much as of a parting of ways of thought and belief. What appears ostensibly as Protestant critique of the Middle Ages has clear Catholic ancestry. Why and how else would Parker collect the xenophobic Matthew Paris or Bongars edit the nationalist Pierre Dubois? The crusade appeared to sixteenth century savants ίη a number of guises, at once a subject of contemporary political concern and of religious controversy. With the Ottoman advance threatening central Europe and the western Mediterranean, traditional means of funding, recruiting, and justifying international warfare against the infιdel could not be ignored by those living near the front line, such as Germany. Neither, for church reformers of any persuasion, could a religious exercise dependent upon papal authority and indulgences remitting sin be regarded with indifference. So far from being a matter of merely antiquarian or, in the hands of a Tasso, romantic interest, crusading touched upon two of the most engrossing problems of sixteenth2 Cambήdge, Corpus Christi College MS 95; Μ R James, Descriptive Catalogue of the Manuscripts in the Libraιy ofCorpus Christi College, Cambridge (Cambήdge, 1911-12), pp. xxxiv,

182-3.

294

XI Early Modern Views on Medieval Christendom

century Europe: the apparatus of papal legal and penitential authority, and the Ottoman threat to Christendom itself.3 Responses to one could be modifιed by the imperatives of the other. Both Luther and Calvin trimmed initial condemnation of holy war against the Turks when faced with the reality of Suleiman the Magnifιcent.4 Under the pressure of religious dispute and political reality, perceptions of resistance to Islam shifted from wars of religion to wars of territory. Traditional epithets and mentalities wore thin. In the fιfteenth century, while humanists such as Benedetto Accolti fashioned a literary revival of crusading, some suggested a new role for the Holy Roman Emperor as defender of Europe as much as of the Faith.5 The secularization of war against the infidel, in an academic context at least, is evident in Juan de Segovia's critique of holy war, where he rejected the legitimacy of war fought for religious motives while accepting the legitimacy of secular resistance to Moslem aggression, essentially the line later adopted by Luther after 1521.6 Leaving aside the tenaciously academic opposition to holy war by Erasmus, whose intellectual pose de haut en bas allowed for such principled stances, acceptance of the traditional appeal of crusading became attenuated. At Rome successive popes attempted to break the ideological stranglehold of tradition and Habsburg self-interest over indulgences, crusade or otherwise.7 Even Leo Χ, at the Fifth Lateran Council, had distanced himself from the

3 ln gcneral, Κ. Setton, The Papacy and the Levant, 4 vols (Philadelphia, 1976-84), 2-4; Ν. Housley, The Later Crusades (Oxford, 1992), esp. ch. 4; R Schwoebel, The Shadow of the

Crescent: The Renaissance Image of the Turk (Nicukoop, 1967). 4 Α. Fischer-Galati, Ottoman Imperialism and German Protesl4ntism (Harvard, 1959), pp. 17-18; Houslcy, Later Crusades, p. 380; J. W. Bohnstedt, The Infidel Scourge of God: The Turkish Menace as seen by pamphleteers of the Reformation Era, Transactions of the Λmerican Philosophical Society (Philadelphia, 1978), pp. 12, 14, 20, 32, 46-51; MJ. Heath, Crusading Commonplaces: La Noue, Lucinge and Rhetoric (Gcneva, 1986), p. 15. Cf. Luther's original stance attacked in the papal bull Exurge Domine (1520) with his later thoughts, Vom Kriege widder die Turken (1529) and the Exhortation (1541); on the impact of thesc changcs, Μ J. Heath, Έrasmus and war against the Turks', Ac14 Conventus neo-Latini Turonensis, ed. J.-C. Margolin (Paris, 1980), pp. 991-9. J. Pannier, 'Calvin et les Turcs', RH, 180 (1937), pp. 268-72. 5 Housley, Later Crusades, csp. pp. 99-100, 380, 383-8, 390-1, 393, 398, 409; R Black, Benedetto Accolti and the Florentine Renaissance (Cambridge, 1985), esp. pp. 226-40; idem, 'La storica della Prime Crocial4 di Benedetto Λccolti', ASI, 131 (1973), pp. 2-25; see also the gcncral books cited in ΙL 4 above and Α. S. Atiya, The Crusade ίn the Later Midd/e Ages (London, 19 38), chs 9, 11 and 19. 6 Schwoebel, Shadow of the Crescent, p. 223 . 7 Setton, Papacy and Levant, 3 & 4, chs 12, 13 and 18; Houslcy, Later Crusades, pp. 312-15, 410-20.

295

XI

rhetoric and legal forms of previous conciliar decrees on the crusade.8 Protestants could not claim a monopoly on reforming ideas of the holy war. In I s32, ίn a sermon delivered at Mossburg, a Catholic preacher, Matthias Κretz, whose recorded utterances suggest close knowledge of crusade history, condemned as 'Turkish' motives for a Christian waπior such as honour, glory, material gain, anger, or vengeance, that ίs, ίη most instances, precisely the incentives lauded by St Bernard of Clairvaux and three centuries of subsequent crusade propaganda.9 Thus rejection of some of the characteristics of the crusade emphasized by papal apologists then and since was not confιned to anti-catholic dialectic or experience. At the Council of Trent, Paul ΠΙ attempted to restrict the use of bulls granting indulgences, which were only fιnally abolished ίn 1567. 10 Even before that, indulgences were given minimal space ίη Catholic tracts οη fιghting the Turks, such as the German Turkenbuchlein of the I sI os to I s40s. By the I s80s, when the Savoyard Catholic crusade enthusiast Rene de Lucinge was urging the overthrow of the Ottomans, the indulgence and much of the scriptural justifιcation had been abandoned. 11 Such developments were by ηο means orderly, progressive or universal. Numerous popes continued to employ the rhetoric and mechanisms of traditional crusading. However, ίη doing so they exposed a feature of crusading apparent since the thirteenth century. After Innocent ΠΙ (1198-1216) the ideology of holy war, crusading polemic, and apologia, except where applied to the conquests ίn the Atlantic and the Americas, had become sclerotic. Foundations of patristic not scriptural authority looked increasingly awkward ranged against biblical fundamentalists. More generally, crusading's emphasis οη external demonstrations of communally ordained and executed spiritual exercises - vow, taking the cross, fιghting, purchasing indulgences, giving alms - appeared at odds with the increasing concentration οη inner piety, common to Catholic as well as Protestant reformers. Neither politics nor intellectual fashion assisted traditional perceptions, as the Most Christian kings of France, let alone the heretic 8 Tanner, Decrees, pp. 609-14 (Postquam ad universalis of 1514), 651-4 (Constitutio iuxto verbum of 1517). Κ. Setton, 'Leo Χ and the Turkish peril', Proceedings of the American Philosophical Society, 11 3 (1969), pp. 367-4249 Bohnstedt, Infide/ Scourge, pp. 14, 34-5, 41-6. 10 R Naz, ed., Dictionnaire de droit canonique, 4 (Paris, 1949), col. 781, and note 7 above. 11 Bohnstedt, Infidel Scourge, pp. 43-4, where Κretz talked of martyrdom but not indulgences; Heath, Crusading Commonplaces, pp. 10, 24, 88.,

XI Early Modern Views on Medieval Christendom

Queen of England, entered into political and commercial alliances with the Turks, and theorists such as Gentili and Grotius, in elaborating theories of secular international laws of war, discounted religion as suffιcient just cause.12 Although carefully describing current and past ideas of religious wars, as well as criticisms of them, in his Advertisement Touching on holy Warre (1622), Francis Bacon summed up the new consensus in 1624: Όffensive wars for religion are seldom to be approved, or never, except there be some mixture of civil titles.' 13 Prudence and law, not faith and religion, now appeared the touchstones. The secularization of holy war in the sixteenth century was a prime cause of the disintegration of crusading as an ideal and religious institution. lt also provided a bridge over which empathy for the inspiration and enthusiasm which underpinned such wars was conveyed to those otherwise confessionally hostile to them, from the German Lutheran Ulrich von Hutten ίη the 1520s to the Huguenot Franςois de la Noue ίη the 1580s. 14 Ιη 1585, the Calvinist-trained James VI of Scotland published a poem ίη praise of the victory of Lepanto which, as he later admitted, some regarded as 'far contrary to my degree and religion' appearing as it did as 'praise of a forraine Papist bastard' (i.e. Don John of Austria, the Christian commander). 15 As king of England, James retained a sentimental ambition to lead a united Christian league against the Ottomans. Such enthusiasm was possible within the increasingly popular ecumenical concept of Europe, a non-denominational sense of a common Christendom which led to the virulently anti-Catholic Bishop Jewell of Salisbury, among other English diocesans, authorizing prayers for the survival of Malta ίη 1565, and provoked a service of thanksgiving at St Paul's, bonfιres, and dancing ίη the streets of London οη news of Lepanto ίη 1571, ίη the words of Raphael Holinshed, 'for a victorie of so great importance unto the whole state of Christian commonwealth'. 16 Cf. Heath, Crusading O,mmonplaces, pp. 21-2. J. Spedding et α/., ecls, Tne Works of Francis Bacon, 7 (London, 1859), p. 414 Schwoebel, Shadow of the Crescent, p. 217; Setton, Papacy and Levant, 3, pp. Ι 79, n. 28, 89-90, n. 72; Fischer-Galati, Ottoman Imperialism, esp. pp. 9-10; Heath, Crusading Commonplaces. 15 Lepanto,J. Craigie, ed., Τ1ιe Poems ofjames VI ofScotland, Ι (Edinburgh, 1955), pp. 198 and, in full, 197-257. 16 F. L. Baumer, Έngland, the Turk and the Common Corps of Christendom', AHR, 50 (1944-5), pp. 26-48, esp. 31, 36-8, 43-7; C. J. Tyerman, England and the Crusades 1095-1588 (Chicago, 1988), pp. 348.- 50. 12 13

297

XI

Υet such superfιcial ecumenism, while helping to provide a general circumstance within which interest ίη crusading could be sustained ίη varying religious traditions, was initially less signifιcant than religious dispute ίη provoking the fιrst academic studies of medieval crusade texts and history. Only at the very end of the sixteenth century were the crusades beginning to be examined outside a precise religious context, contemporary or historical. Whereas until the 1 520s, crusading formed part of a lively and accepted political, literary, and intellectual culture, thereafter, οη both sides of the theological divide, ίt was observed from fractured perspectives. Loyola, it has been argued, borrowed aspects of crusade spirituality for his own ideals of internal purifιcation and external 'reconquest' of Protestants. 17 For obvious reasons, crusading, and thus crusade texts, appealed to those eager to identify the Reformers with Turks. Α fairly typical example was Franςois Moschus who, ίη his edition ofJacques de Vitry's Historia Orientalis (1587), compared the wars against Islam with those against 'Lutherans and other Evangelical pseudo-prophets', equating the teaching of Luther with that of Mohammed. Moschus was more than a pamphleteer, having searched widely for manuscήpts of his thirteenth-century text. 18 This harnessing of scholarship to the chariot of controversy was, however, to be especially the preserve of Moschus's confessional opponents. The dismissal by Protestant scholars of the legal and theological framework of crusading did not mean they necessarily followed Erasmus ίη rejecting the concept of armed resistance to the Infιdel. Ιη his Histo,y oJ the Turks (1566), the English martyrologist, John Foxe (1516-87) agreed that Moslems were 'the enemies of Christ'. He praised the defence of Rhodes by the Hospitallers ίη 1 522 and was clear that much effort, courage, and preparation had gone ίη to the holy 'viages'. One of his explanations for the failures of the crusade was traditionally medieval, ratione peccati: evil-living Christians did not merit God's support. The other was predictably polemic, 'the impure idolatry and profanations' of the Roman Church. 'We war against the Turk with our works, masses, traditions and ceremonies,: but we fιght

Crusade spirituality in St. Ignatius', Ignatius of Loyola: His ed. F. Wulf (St Louis, ΜΟ, 1977), pp. 97-134; Ν. Ρ. Tanner, 'Medieval Crusade decrees and Ignatus's Meditation on the Kingdom', Heythrop journal, 3 Ι (1990), pp. sos-1s. 18 Jacques de Vitry, Historia Orientalis, ed. F. Moschus (Douai, 1597), Preface to Reader.

17 Η. Wolter, Έlements of Personalitγ and Spiritual Heritage,

XI Early Modern Views on Medieval Christendom

not agaίnst him with Christ.' Foxe's diatήbe encapsulated the standard Protestant critique: the laudable desire to fιght the Infιdel had been corrupted by Rome.19 This theme was taken up by Foxe's younger contemporary, Matthew Dresser (153 6- 1607). Α Lutheran, Dresser held a number of chairs of classical language, rhetoric, and history ίη northern Germany, as well as being official historiographer to the elector of Saxony and protege of the duke of Brunswick. Ιη his academic circle, the editing of classical and medieval texts and the writing of history of remote periods of the past was flourishίng. One of Dresser's acquaintances, the editor, historian, and antiquarian Reinier Reineck (154195), persuaded him to write a commentary οη the causes of the holy war for an edition of an anonymous compendium of crusade texts, Chronicon Hierosolymitanum, which Reineck published at Helmstadt ίη 1584.20

Dresser's approach was subtler than Foxe's. 'This war had a double cause: one by the Roman popes, the other by Christian soldiers.' 21 This distinction allowed him to explain the failure of what was ostensibly a good cause. Throughout he insisted οη the selflessness and piety of the crusaders, while condemnίng the papacy and church for poisoning the truth and justice of their ambition with superstition. Thus Dresser was able to point out that Frederick Barbarossa's drowning οη crusade ίη 1190 was ηο reason to doubt his pious intent. Lack of settlers and high mortality rates may, Dresser argued, have assisted ίη the loss of Christian Outremer, but the enterprise was fatally undermined by the papal greed and lust for temporal power, a theme he pursued with much erudition. While the First Crusaders were likened to the Argonauts, he insisted that Urban II's promotion of the First Crusade had more to do with his campaign against Henry IV of Germany than any genuine desire for defendίng Christendom or spiritual renewal (an idea which, had Dresser but know ίt, had occurred to William of Malmesbury four and a half centuries earlier). Consistently popes placed their trust ίη earthly not heavenly Jerusalem. The crusaders'

19

J. Foxe, Acts and Monuments, ed. S. R

Cattley (London, 1837-41), 4, pp. 18-21, 27-8,

33-4, 38, 52-4, 69, 113, 120-1.

2ο Reineήus Reineccius Steinhemius, Chronicon Hierosolymitanum (Helmstadt, 1584) (Part 2 (1585) contains Dresser's Commentary); idem, Liber Epistolarum Historicarum, pp. 44, 60 for correspondence between Dresser and Reineck in 1583. 21 Chronicon Hierosolymitanum, 2, fol. 2v.

299

XI

fault was to have been obedient to duplicitous popes and profane monks. 22 The suggestion that crusaders were pious but ignorant and misled rather than themselves mischievous became and remains a familiar convention of crusade historiography, one that had its parallels in the Middle Ages. Such an interpretation permitted Dresser to conclude that the only thing wrong with sixteenth-century resistance to the Turks was papal and episcopal interference, to which he attributed the collapse of Hungary in the I μοs. 23 By implication, an army free from clerical direction and composed of faithful, honest, and virtuous soldiers (i.e. Protestant ones) would attract divine approval and the good fortune that had so palpably eluded the crusades .. Here, too, Dresser was clinging to a basic set of assumptions about popular religion that would not have seemed out of place in earlier centuries. Dresser's commentary was also a form of dialogue with the medieval past, part of scholarly effort to understand, even identify with it. This effort was to a large degree carried forward through the editing of medieval texts, in which endeavour Reinier Reineck was prominent. Reineck, who conducted a wide correspondence with fellow scholars, himself wrote mainly about ancient history. However, as an editor he specialized in German medieval history, publishing editions of the Annals of Charlemagne, Helmold's Chronica Slavorum, as well as chronicles by Thietmar of Merseberg and Widukind of Corvey. Apart from the Chronicon Hierosolymitanum, he edited a number of other texts linked to the crusade, including Hayton's Flowers of the History of the East, a perennial favourite found widely in the sixteenth century, a collection known as the Historia Orientalis, and Albert of Aachen's account of the First Crusade. Reineck was a conscientious editor, claiming to have collated and compared the Chronicon Hierosolymitanum with William of Tyre and Robert of Rheims, as well as referring to a number of Greek sources and to Otto of Freising. Here was a man steeping himself in medieval history for a purpose beyond providing ammunition for religious debate. This purpose is evident both in the nature of the texts he edited and by his own comments in his introduction to the Chronicon. As he declares to his patron the duke, the First Crusade brought glory to the house of Brunswick.24 The 22

23 24

Chronicon Hierosolymitanum, 2, fols. ι r-7v. Ibid., 2, fol. 7r. Ibid., ι, Introduction; his rnain publishing activities of texts date frorn the last fifteen 300

XI Early Modern Views on Medieval Christendom

German bias throughout is unmistakable, as ίt was ιη Dresser's commentary. Thus the crusade was employed to support a sense of national identity or pride, explicitly derived from the pre-Reformation past and deliberately non-confessional. Dresser and Reineck were rescuing German crusading heroes and a signifιcant part of German history for Protestant Germany, just as Archbishop Parker rescued many of his medieval predecessors from the condescension and disapproval of the new Anglicans. This desire to reconcile the present with a possibly controversial past was similarly evident in the work ofJacques Bongars ( 1 554-1612), one of the greatest of all editors of crusade texts. As with his German colleagues, Bongars was intent on using the past to inform and interpret the present. Although only a part of his scholarly output, he appropriated the crusade to support an abiding myth of French nationhood and monarchy. Bongars was a career diplomat working for Henry of Navarre, later Henry IV, from 1585. Between 1593 and 1610, as resident ambassador in the Holy Roman Empire, he acted as Henry's agent to the Lutheran princes of Germany, including the duke of Brunswick, patron of Dresser and Reineck. 25 Bongars was also an indefatigable bibliophile and histoήan, interests which he pursued with an energy and passion that impressed itself on his acquaintances. At his death he left a collection of between fιve and six hundred manuscripts and over three thousand printed books. 26 In his twenties he had worked ίη the Vatican Library and had begun publishing texts in 158 1. Fluent in Latin, French, German, and English, he travelled widely throughout Europe, from Constantinople (in 1585-6, when he called himself a 'peregrinator') to England (at least twice). Although not a violent sectarian, he did not follow his master in converting to Rome, retaining his Calvinist beliefs as well as a loathing of 'la superstition papistique' which he described in a letter of 1602 as 'contre la crainte et le service de Dieu, l'amour du roi et de la patrie'. 27 years of his life, while he had made his reputation as a scholar of, ίη particular, Ancient Greece at Wittenberg and Leipzig in the 1570s. 25 G. Ε. Lothholz, Commentatio de Bongarsio Singulisque eius aequalibus (Leipzig, 1857), pp. 4-14; L. Anquez, Henri W et IΆllemagne (Paris, 1887), pp. xiii-lxxxvi, Jacques Bongars', for the biographical details and academic influences based on Bongars' extensive correspondence. 26 Anquez, Henri W et /Άllemagne, pp. xli-xlii. 27 Ibid., p. xv, in a letter to the Landgrave of Hesse; p. χχ for his description of himself in 1s87 as a pilgrim to Constantinople. 301

XI

Bongars' link with the German Lutheran scholars was dίrect. He had studied at Jena shortly before Dresser had taken the chair of rhetoric and history there. At various times he had helped Reineck with his researches. 28 When Bongars came to compile his collection of crusade texts the only chronicle he was content to reprint rather than edit afresh was Reineck's Albert of Aachen. 29 Wherever he went, Bongars searched archiνes and libraries and met fellow scholars, such as, in England in 1608, the prominent English antiquarian Sir Henry Saνile. 30

The great edition Bongars published in 1611 was signifιcantly published under the title Gesta Dei Per Francos. It was a Herculean achieνement, the two parts comprising oνer 1,500 closely printed pages, containing almost a million words. Ιη scope, originality, and detail of scholarship, the Gesta Dei Per Francos was stupendous. Based οη scrutiny of νariant manuscripts wherever he could get access to them, from Rome to Cambridge, the work stands as the most signifιcant single contribution to the editing of crusade texts before the nineteenth century. Among the sources edited are the main narratives of the First Crusade: the anonymous Gesta Francorum; Robert of Rheims; Baldric of Dol; Raymond of Aguilers; Albert of Aachen; Fulcher of Chartres, and Guibert of Nogent (from whom Bongars took his title). Ιη addition he included not only William of Tyre's Historia, but also that of Jacques de Vitry, and Oliνer of Paderborn's account of the Fifth Crusade. Ιη all, ίη Part One, there were thirteen separate chronicles or fragments, many, such as William of Tyre, Fulcher of Chartres, and the Gesta Francorum, published tor the fιrst time, as well as a selection of thirteenth-century papal bulls, a number of letters written by or about crusaders and, tellingly, documents οη the canonization of Louis ΙΧ ίη 1297. Ιη the second part were edited, from a bewildering array of manuscripts, the Secreta Fidelium Crucis (fιnal redaction 1321), a work of crusade advice and history by the Venetian Marino Sanudo Torsello, as well as the De recuperatione Terrae Sanctae (1306/7) of the anti-papal Norman lέgiste Pierre Dubois, and a collection of Sanudo's correspondence and maps (these last from a Vatican manuscript). 31

28

29 30 31

Anquez, Henri IV et l'Allemagne, p. χχί; Lothholz, Commentatio, pp. 4-5. See the introduction to the table of contents of Gesta Dei Per Francos, ι. Anquez, Henri IV et l'Allemagne, p. Ιχν, according to a letter dated 2 ι March ι 6 ΙΙ . Vatican Codex Reginae Cήstinae 548.

302

XI Early Modern Views on Medieval Christendom Bongars' Gesta Dei Per Francos is, in effect, a complete history of the holy wars to capture and hold the Holy Land froιn the fιrst expedition in the 1090s to the abortive scheιnes of the early fourteenth century. On one level the ιnotive was acadeιnic. In the words of Williaιn Walter, one of Bongars' interιnediaries in England in 1608, the aiιn was to produce 'the ιnost correct' editions.32 On another, there are traces of the diploιnat. The dedication of the second part to the Senate of Venice not only dwells on the city's historic role in ιnaintaining the crusaders in Outreιner and in conquering Constantinople, but also praises the Republic's conteιnporary independence and the assistance she gave Henry IV against the Habsburgs. 33 The ιnost striking feature, however, is the sight of a Calvinist devoting such energy to studying events inspired by doctrines he rejected yet describing theιn as 'ιnost dangerous and ιnost glorious'. 34 Bongars was aware of the incongruity. Ιη the preface to Book One, he acknowledged that readers would fιnd details of impiety, superstition, and shaιne. Υet, unlike Dresser, ιnuch of whose critique of ιnotive and value he adopted, Bongars avoided cheap anti-Catholic or even antipapal poleιnic, coιnιnenting simply that such things are the coιnmon experience of ιnankind and that history 'is a ιnirror of huιnan life'. 35 Calvin hiιnself had rejected a thorough pacifιst response to the Turkish probleιn, arguing that there was a difference between resistance organized to suit papal self-interest and legitiιnate opposition in the hands of divinely ordained lay ιnagistrates. 36 As already noted, this approach, which equated service of God and love of ruler and country, appealed to Bongars. His position is clear froιn the title, the prayer with which he concluded his introduction, and the dedication. The title proclaiιned that the crusades were God's deeds performed by Frenchιnen, hardly original as it followed a ιnisleading tradition that had begun as early as the 1100s. The prayer looked to princes to impleιnent God's comιnands as being next to Hiιn in power. The dedication of Book One was to the young Louis ΧΙΙΙ, 'the Most Chήstian' king, descended froιn St Louis, heir to the royal line which, of all pήncely

32 33 34

Part 35 36

Walter's letter at fol. 6, Bodleian Library copy of Gesta Dei Per Francos, Ε.2.8 . Αrι Seld. Dedication to Gesta Dei Per Francos, 2. 'Peήculosissimis ita gloriosissirnis expeditionibus', frorn the dedicatory Preface to ι.

In the author's Preface to Part ι . Pannier, 'Calvin et les Turcs', pp. 278-86.

303

XI

families, had the crusade as their especial concern. Bongars was chauvinist and royalist. In a new secular cult of kingship the Calvinist was reconciled to crusading. Bongars was not alone either in his interest in crusading nor its association with the French monarchy. Two panegyrists of Henry IV, Jean-Aimes de Chavigny and Jean Godard, both published works concerning the crusade and the eastern question, as had a relative of Bongars' wife, Franι;:ois de la Noue in 1587. 37 Bongars, however, goes further than his contemporaries in implicitly attempting to defuse or divert a potentially divisive aspect of this piece of French history. One problem with any discussίon of the holy war was whether or not religious opponents were legitimate targets for crusading. In France where, under Henry IV, religious accommodation was government policy, this was an especially sensitive issue. Catholic writers in France at the end of the Religious W ars, such as the Celestine Pierre Crespet or the Savoyard diplomat Rene de Lucinge, equated Protestants with the Turks, as did Florimond de Raemond in works published in 1597 and 1605.38 Bongars' purpose was to render crusading as a national achievement, therefore ecumenical, free from the stultifying grasp of contemporary theological debate. Thus could the old world be recruited to the aid of the new. This did not mean that Bongars saw the crusaders as teaching lessons that were politically neutral. Citing William ofTyre as tutor to King Baldwin IV of Jerusalem, Bongars regarded history as a good teacher. His choice of texts reveals something of what he wished to be learnt. This is especially obvious in the case of Pierre Dubois's De recuperatione Terrae Sanctae, published for the fιrst time by Bongars. Dubois was a fιerce French natίonalist, ίη the context of his time. In Part Ι of the De recuperatione, he advocated a general attack on the East, embracing Constantinople as well as Syria, an idea cuπent in late sixteenth-century French. He suggested, as a prerequisite to a successful crusade, radical reform within Christendom, including disendowment of the Church, educational reform, and an end to clerical celibacy. 39 Just as English reformers in the 1530s had sought medieval

37 Heath, Crusading Commonplaces, pp. 10, 53, 84, 103-4; for the family relationship, Anquez, Henri IV et IΆl/emagne, p. xliv. 38 Heath, Crusading Commonplaces, pp. l 3, 39, 49, 66, 74. 39 For the most comprehensive study, Pierre Dubois, 11ιe Recove,y of the Holy Land, trans. W. 1. Brandt, Introduction, pp. 3-65; pp. 69-198 for the text.

304

XI Early Modern Views on Medieval Christendom precedents for the creation of an erastian church, including a tract, Disputacio inter clericum et militem once attributed to Dubois, so Bongars had hit upon a crusade writer whose attitudes paralleled his own. 40 Dubois was not only an advocate of ecclesiastical administrative reform, he was also a vivid exponent of royal power, a theme which permeates Part II of the De recuperatione, where it is proposed that the king of France should dominate Europe by, among other things, administeήng the temporalities of the pope and controlling the Empire. 41 Ιη such points of contact and reference, scholars such as Bongars or Dresser are found to be the intellectual heirs of those medieval authors whose works they edited. Discussion and debate as to the legitimacy and nature of crusading was not a creation of the sixteenth century. It had existed from the start. The themes of sin and abuse were apparent in the histories of William of Tyre, Jacques de Vitry, and Sanudo, as well as Dubois and other fourteenth-century critics.42 The spectacle of Christian faith overcoming great obstacles was a leitmotif of all crusade narratives. The threat of Islam was a common expeήence. By separating crusading from religious polemic and accepting that there was good ίη a holy war even where corrupted by papal dogma, the Reformed Church could demonstrate itself to be a lineal successor to its medieval predecessor. This process was immensely assisted by the association of crusading with national identity, by Reineck ίη Germany or Bongars ίη France. Bongars' national bias was considered and selfconscious, as ίη private, if his correspondence is to be believed, he saw himself almost as a naturalized German. That his message was popular or fashionable, if not influential (its bulk perhaps precluding that for many of those likely to own a copy), is witnessed by the large numbers of copies of the 1611 edition that survive ίη libraries all across Europe, public, academic, aristocratic, collegiate, and private. lt seems as

G. Dickens, The English Reformatίon, 2nd edn (London, 1989), p. 317. Dubois, The Recove,y, trans. Brandt, pp. 167-98; Μ de\la Piane, Vecchio e Nuovo nelle idee politiche di Pietro Dubois (Florence, 1959), pp. 106-43. 42 On fourteenth-century critics, Ε. Siberry, 'Cήticism of crusading ίn fourteenthcentury England' and C. J. Tyerman, 'The Holy Land and the Crusades of the thίrteenth and fourteenth centuries', Crusade and Seιιlement, ed. Ρ. W. Edbury (Cardiff, 1985), pp. 12734 and 105-12; Α. Luttre\l, 'Chaucer's Κnight and the Mediterranean', Libra,y of Mediteπanean Histo,y, 1 (1994), pp. 127-60; C. J. Tyerrnan, The Invention of the Crusades (London, 199 8). 40

Α.

41

305

XI

though few major libraήes of western Europe can have been without a copy.43 Not all responses to the crusades in Bongars' generation were so solemn. Torquato Tasso's popular and much translated Gerusalemme Liberata (1s80) reinvented the First Crusade as a romantic story of chivalry, love, and magic. Others, such as Pierre de Bourdeille, seigneur de Brantδme (c.1540-1614), regarded the age of crusading as hopelessly distant and quaint, a fund of good stories, not moral, political, or religious instruction. 44 In the 1620s, Francis Bacon could examine the holy war dispassionately, as an exercise in dialectic and antiquaήanism, even, in places, as a joke, like the Philosopher's Stone a 'rendez-vous of cracked brains that wore their feather in their head instead of their hat'.45 However, the academic heroics of scholars such as Bongars and Reineck opened the way to a fundamental transformation in attitudes to the crusades ironically precisely because, uώike Moschus for instance, they lacked the confessional acceptance of the religious dogma attached to ίt. Some might argue that this prevented them from understanding or empathizing with their subject. In fact, avoidance of knee-jerk condemnation (or approval) liberated the history of the crusades, if not the surviving phenomenon itsel( In a long-standing medieval tradition, the faith of the Christian soldiers was admired by these Protestant observers even if the leadership of the pope was excoriated. With many thirteenth- and fourteenth-century critics, the Protestant crusade historians were outraged by holy wars against Christians. Υet instead of treating the past as an alien land of monsters and freaks, these scholars integrated their vision of the past into the interpretation of their own times. In this small way, at least, the veil of the Temple was not rent. The past remained alive, of more than literary or anecdotal concern. By neither rejecting the past nor being condescending to ίt, these editors ensured the survival of the crusades as a model as well as a warning, a familiar, perhaps the most familiar, aspect of the Middle Ages in the mentality of modern European culture. In Gordon Leff's words, 'the crusades were part of a 43 On a personal, tiny, and random sample there exist or existed until recently two copies in the Bodleian Library, Oxford, and copies in the college libraries ofNew College, Queen's and All Souls'; there was also a copy at Castle Howard. 44 Pierre de Bourdeille, seigneur de Brantόme, Oeuvres compleres, ed. L Lalanne, 9 (Paris,

Ι 876), ΡΡ· 43 3-4, 450. 45

Works of Francis Bacon, 7, p. 24 and, generally, pp. 1-36 for the Advertisement.

306

XI Early Modern Views on Medieval Christendom

European movement under papal direction'. 46 The Protestant scholars of the late sixteenth century dug new channels for the reception of the history of that movement which allowed ίt to fructify or astonish observers of all religious persuasions and to form part of a continuing secular, non-denominational European consciousness.

46

Leff, Medieval Thought, p. 86. 3ο7

X

X

XII

'Principes et Populus': Civil Society and the First Crusade*

[127) Α recent article οη the years 1640--42 leading to the outbreak of the English Civil War identified elements that encouraged the development of public involvement in the political process: 'Elections, sermons, processions, petitions, demonstrations, pamphlets and politicized conversations brought 'men that did not rule' (and sometimes women too) into active engagement with public affairs'. The author argued that in these years 'it was as if ordinary people had gate-crashed the political arena'. 'The genie was out of the botde.' Ά revolution from which there was ηο going back.' 1 Each item οη the list of features supporting this revolutionary change may strike medievalists as farniliar, as does the presence in political action of those beyond the normal pale of the powerful elites of church and state. When Charles Ι raised the spectres of Jack Cade and Wat Tyler in rebutting his critics, he was οη surprisingly solid historical ground. 2 The rebellious events of 1450 and 1381 exposed what Steven Justice has described as a 'political culture in the countryside', the rebels forrning 'a rational and disciplined community with a coherendy articulated program'. 3 This perception is strengthened by Samuel Cohn's recent work οη popular protest and social rebellion further back in time, from the mid-thirteenth century, with its emphasis οη the coherence and effective political challenge to existing elites presented by peasant and artisan generated and led protests and revolts. 4 David Carpenter has pointed to peasant engagement in the [128) English civil wars of the 1260s. 5 Thirteenth century chroniclers were impressed - not entirely favourably - at * Originally published in Cross, Crescent and Conversion. Studies on Medieval Spain and Chtistendonι in of Richard Fletcher, eds S. Banon and Ρ. Linehan (Leiden: Brill, 2008), pp. 127-51. This arcicle has been reset and given a new pagination, with the original page numbers in brackets ,vithin the text. Used by permission of the original publisher. David Cressy, 'Revolucionary England 1640-42', Past & Present, 181 (2003), pp. 68, 71. Quoted ibid. p. 68 and note 155 for source. Steven Juscice, Wtiting and &bellion: England in 1381 (Berkeley 1994), pp. 5, 258. Samuel Cohn, 'Popular revolt and the rise of the early modern state', T/1e Histotian, 89 (2006), 26-33, and his Popular Protesls in Later Medieval Europe (Manchester 2004). David Carpenter, Έnglish Peasants in policics 1258-67', Pasl & Presenl, 136 (1992), 3-42.

Menιoιy

XII 2

'Principes et Populus': Civil Society and the First Crusade

the independent involvement of viles personae, low born, and the vulgus, crowd or commons, in the wars in Languedoc to suppress the Cathar heretics and their patrons.6 Evidence both from crusader armies and the societies from which they sprang confirm the existence a wide civil society of informed public opinion and action that required rulers and leaders to expand their customary range of counsel, consent and, ultimately, in the later Middle Ages, control and repression. The example of how the First Crusade (1095-99) conducted itself is suggestive. The image of First Crusade armies created by early twelfth century Benedictine observers has been likened to a 'military monastery on the move'. 7 Yet, away from such cloistered myth making, a more apt metaphor might liken them to secular models, derived from civilian society. When combined in Asia Minor during the spring of 1097, these armies, ίη ways similar to the large Viking forces of the ninth century, later mass crusading expeditions to the eastern Mediterranean and successive eruptions of mercenary routiers, condottieri and adventurers, such as the fourteenth century Catalan Company, operated as a self-reliant, autonomous political and social community, generating an evanescent, temporary patria or people in a microcosm of a state. The First Crusade possessed its own clergy, judicial systems, markets, currencies and exchange rates. Members of the community developed their own unigue stories, songs, traditions, favoured relics, religious ceremonies and sense of identity. 8 The circumstances of recruitment imposed a collective leadership in which the high command ,vas a council of generals, each with their own independent divisions for which they were paymasters and lords. Study of decision-making [129] and the implementation of policy both by that high command and by individual commanders reveals that the mechanics of authority and obedience owed as much to the habits of urban and village government as to the patriarchal spiritual bonds of a religious community. Jonathan Riley-Smith in a recent paper has sketched the pathology of communal politics during the Fourth Crusade 1202-04, with

For their presence at the attack οη Beziers ίη 1209, La Chanson de Ια Croisade Albigeoise, ed. and trans. Eugene Martin-Chabot (Paris 1931-61), Ι: 48-62, trans. Janet Shirley, The Song of the Cathar Wars (Aldershot 1996), pp. 19- 22; William of Puylaurens, Chronicle, trans. William Α. and Michael D. Sibly (Woodbridge 2003), p. 33 and note 6; pp. 127-8 for the legates' sniffy comments; Peter of les-Vaux-de-Cernay, History ο/ the Albigensian Crusade, trans. William Α. and Michael D. Sibly (Woodbridge 1998), pp. 48-51 and pp. 289-93. Jonathan Riley-Smith, The Firsl Crusade and the Iclea of Crusading (London 1986), p. 2. The best modern account of the military aspects of the expedition that touches οη its organisation is John France, Victory in the East (Cambridge 1994).

XII 'Principes et Populus': Civil Socie!J and the First Crusade

3

crucial and controversial decisions being reached, in the language of eyewitness memories, by the comun de !Όst in parlements of knights and popular representatives. 9 Given the nature of the enterprise, that assumed a sort of spiritual equality between all those who had taken the cross, it might be argued that the First Crusade demonstrated a form of proto-democracy. Such an interpretation would be anachronistic as well as unsupported by the evidence. Nonetheless, the behaviour of leaders and led during the march to Jerusalem exposed methods of political involvement and action that, while not being democratic, were certainly communal, dependent οη consent, often formally achieved, as much as οη command or shared conviction, confirming in this military context Susan Reynolds' 'assumption of collectivity' in medieval civilian law, politics and government. 10 Such an understanding is consistent with some of Timothy Reuter's general conclusions about medieval 'assembly politics'. Not only did the language of armies and assemblies overlap, exercitus becoming in places a synonym for a civil gathering; military campaigns themselves, he argued, 'were often enough a kind of assembly οη the march'. 11 This had particular consequences if it is recognised that, in a medieval setting, the widest self-conscious political community, or 'public', regularly manifested its corporate existence and exerted a collective influence through assemblies, particularly those summoned in times of crisis. The assemblies of the First Crusade proceeded, at least from the siege of Antioch in the autumn of 1097, in an almost permanent state of crisis which encouraged the participation in its conduct of a permanent 'public' or, in the communal language readily apparent elsewhere in [130] contemporary western society, what eyewitnesses recorded by the collective noun 'populus', defined by Reynolds as 'a community of custom, descent and government - a people'. 12 From their surviving letters, as well as the earliest literary accounts by participants, it is evident that members of the army of the First Crusade saw themselves as just such a community, the 'army of

The paper was delivered in Oxford in January 2004; see Geoffrey of Villehardouin, La de Constantinople, ed. Edmond Faral, (Paris 1961, 1: 200; cf. Roberr of Clari, La Conquete de Con.rtantinople, ed. Pfιilippe Lauer (Paris 1924), p. 81. 10 Susan Reynolds, Κingdottιs and Conιmunities in Western Europe 900-1300 (Oxford 1984), p. 244. 11 Timothy Reuter, Άssembly l)olitics in Western Europe from the Eighth to the T,velfth', The Meclieval World, ed. Peter Linehan and Janet Nelson (London 2001), p. 440, cf. p. 435; generally pp. 432-50. 12 Reynolds, Κingdottιs and Communities, p. 256. Conq,ιete

XII 4

Principes et Populus': Civil Society and the First Crusade

Christ', the 'army of the Lord', 'the militia of the Lord', 'the army of God'. 13 This community is usually seen in religious terms, as in the 'monastery' motif referred to already. Yet the sources describing how the crusade army actually worked expose a matching, and ηο less decisive secular identity, whose existence and political operation proved central to the expedition's cohesion and therefore to its ultimate success. Α most striking account of the involvement of the wider community of crusaders is provided by Raymond of Aguilers, chaplain of Count Raymond of Toulouse, in his description of events in northern Syria in the autumn and winter of 1098-99. Ιη late September, Raymond of Toulouse attacked the town of al-Bara, forty miles south east of Antioch, which the westerners had captured three and half months earlier. With the count, so his chaplain recorded, went 'populo pauperum et paucis militibus'. After seizing the town and massacring or enslaving much of its population, Count Raymond proceeded to appoint a bishop, Peter of Narbonne, the first Frankish bishop in the lands conquered b}τ the crusaders. The process of Peter's elevation, in its dependence οη the will of a secular ruler, ran counter to the fondest reformist principles of the crusade's instigator Pope Urban ΙΙ. As described by Raymond of Aguilers, perhaps to cover this awkwardness, the count deliberately went through an elaborate procedure of consultation, first with a council of clergy and princes, in this case nobles, 'capellanis suis et principibus'. Then at a general assembly ('convocatis omnibus qui ibi secum aderant'), held in the open air, one of Count Raymond's chaplains announced the choice as bishop to Όmηί conventui'. The assembly - designated by the collective noun 'populus'- insisted οη a form of election ('populus multum instaret ut electo fieret') and was asked by the count's representative whether there was anyone who could gain their support ('qui [131] fidelium vota susciperet'). Α convenient silence ensued after which Peter of Narbonne was presented to the assembly, and, following his public agreement to undertake the office, gained its unanimous assent. ('laudavit eum omnis populus unanimiter'). 14 This show of constitutional propriety may have been concocted by Raymond of Aguilers to establish Bishop Peter's legitimacy, the count's nomination being possibly over praised as 'satis laudabiliter et honeste'. If

13 The phrases used respecάvely by Stephen of Blois (March 1098), Anselm of Ribemont (Feb. 1098), the parriarch of Jerusalem and the other bishops on crusade Qan. 1098) and Stephen of Blois Qune 1097), Heinrich Hagenmeyer, Die Krettzzttsbriefe atts den Jahren 1088-1100 (Innsbruck 1901), pp. 138, 144,146,149. 14 Raymond of Aguilers, Histoιia FrancortttJJ, Recueil des f-listoriens des Croisades. Documents Occidentaux (Paris 1844-1906), (hereafter RHC Occ.), 3: 266.

XII Ψrincipes

et ]Jopulus': Civil Society and the First Crusade

5

an accurate account, it shows how important formal political theatre was in running affairs within the crusade armies, just as it was in the political communities in Western Europe from which they sprang. Hardly the stuff of constitutional wrangling, nonetheless the ritual of consultation and assent lent cohesion to the army, as well as unimpeachable validation to the episcopal appointment. The al-Bara assembly hardly suggests a debate, more a ritual of choice. However, popular activism in Raymond of Aguilers' account acted as more than mere window dressing for Count Raymond's exercise of patronage. Throughout the winter of 1098-99, the populus played a significant and increasingly dissident role in the direction of crusade policy not as an amorphous rabble but as a coherent body with specific demands and quasiinstitutional means of expressing them. Returning from al-Bara to Antioch, the need to appear to defer to the wishes of the mass of crusaders to press οη to Jerusalem forced the crusade leadership to hold a council (Όmnes principes convenissent') ίη the cathedral of St Peter to resolve whether or not to confirm Bohemund in possession of Antioch or await the approval of the Byzantine emperor Alexius Ι. The public nature of this council backfired, as the leaders almost came to blows. Again the populus - distinguished by Raymond of Aguilers from the poor (pauperes) whose precarious plight the leaders' dissension appeared to aggravate took a hand. Negatively, Godfrey of Bouillon, duke of Lower Lorraine and Count Robert of Flanders concealed their true inclinations towards allowίng Bohemund's claim to Antioch for fear of public opprobrium. Positively, the populus began to agitate among themselves against further delay. They regarded the princely dispute over Antioch and Raymond of Toulouse's argument for maintaining the Byzantine alliance equally as ploys to prevent the march οη Palestine. Their pressure was politically precise and effective, [132] including a plan to elect ('eligamus') a new leader prepared to undertake the Jerusalem mission. Their tactic seemed to have worked. The rivals Raymond of Toulouse and Bohemund of Taranto were forced into a 'discordant peace' ('discordem pacem'). 15 This pattern of intervention by the wider crusader community was continued at the siege of Ma'arrat al-Numan, twenty-five miles east of alBara (c. 27 November-12 December 1098), and during the following month while the commanders negotiated οη the next move. As in the dark days of the previous June, when the crusaders had been penned in the city of Antioch between the stubbornly resisting Turkish garrison in the citadel and the large

15

RHC 0cc, 3: 267- 8.

XII 6

'Principes et Populus': Civi! Society and the First Crusade

relief army of Kerbogha of Mosu1 camped outside the walls, the supernatural was pressed into the service of the arguments of the populus. As food ran short at Ma'arrat, Peter Bartholomew, the well-connected partially educated Provenςal peasant whose visions and tenacity in promoting them had led to the 'discovery' of the morale-boosting Holy Lance in Antioch in June, once more proclaimed he had been visited by the Apostles Peter and Andrew. Their mission was to reassure the besiegers that Ma'arrat would fall, but also to insist οη a moral reform of the Christian army. The saints were evidently politically informed and partisan. They expressed concern at the famine in the ranks, but, more pointedly, relayed via Peter Bartholomew specific instructions for the sharing of property confiscated from those who oppressed the pauperes, a reference to the elaborate internal judicial system within the crusade armies and the existence of a common fund, both run by the princes, and, perhaps, a more general dig at the richer elements, including the nobles themselves. The day after hearing of this vision, Count Raymond and the bishops of al-Bara and of Orange, οη whom part of the mantle of the dead papal legate Bishop Adhemar of Le Puy had descended, summoned as assembly of the populus ('convocavit populum') at which prayers and, more tangibly, alms ('largissimas eleemosynas') were forthcoming, the distinction between populus and pauperes again being evident. This round of politicised vision, publicity, assembly and targeted action was shortly followed by the capture of Ma'arrat during which the social and economic fissures ίη the army manifested themselves when the pauperes stole a march οη the milites by looting the town during the night before the knights launched their attack. That Peter Bartholomew's vision had been - or [133] had been used as - a political weapon became further apparent when the Normans under Bohemund ridiculed the communal force of the Apostles' instructions, retaining a major share of the spoils, despite, as Raymond of Aguilers remarked ίη some dudgeon, the Provenςals having earlier revealed the divine orders to the populus. While reflecting his attempt to portray the visions and the Provenςals in a morally favourable light against the behaviour of the rest of the army, Raymond acknowledged that the alliance of divine intervention and the attempts of the Provenςal leadership to seize control of the crusade's strategy and decisions inevitably provoked resistance in other contingents. More worrying for Raymond of Toulouse, whatever the chronicler's slant, the policy did not seem to be working. 16 Events after the fall of Ma'arrat (11-12 December 1098), while further demonstrating Count Raymond's feeble and contested grasp οη the expedition,

16

Ibid., 3: 268-70.

XII 'Principes et Populus': Civil Society and the First Crusade

7

exposed even more clearly a structure of wide political exchange within the army. Bohemund and Count Raymond both tried to use Ma'arrat as a counter ίη their play for control of Antioch. For once this united the other ranks, milites and populus, knights and people or commons, who petitioned the pn·ncipes, a tripartite division familiar across western Christendom, for example ίη later twelfth century evidence of the legislative and constitutional arrangements of the Angevin kings of England. Receiving ηο joy from Bohemund, a section of the army, called by Raymond of Aguilers 'popul[us] pauperum', probably chiefly Provenς:al, met with the bishop of al-Bara and some nobles (nobiles) . Together they confronted Count Raymond. The bishop preached, presumably οη the virtue of an immediate expedition southwards to Jerusalem. Ιη another staged ceremony, the 'milites et omnis populus' knelt before the count begging him to lead them to Jerusalem. If Raymond refused, they suggested he hand over the talisman of the Holy Lance to the popul[us] an echo of the earlier scheme to choose a new commander. Reluctandy, Raymond appeared to bow to the pressure and agreed to embark ίη a fortnight. However, he immediately aroused further suspicion by calling a conference of principes (Godfrey, Robert of Normandy, Robert of Flanders and Tancred of Lecce) ίη the Ruj valley, away from the demotic politics of the army at Ma'arrat. Without waiting to learn the outcome of this meeting, but alarmed at news that Count Raymond planned to establish a garrison at Ma 'arrat, the pauperes [134] decided οη direct action to prevent further princely squabbling over profit in northern Syria. Flouting the wishes of the bishop of al-Bara and members of Count Raymond's household, the populus systematically and thorougWy demolished the walls of Ma'arrat, thus rendering the town untenable as a new base for the count ίη the region. This devastating, deliberate, organised and wholly effective operation, conducted ίη the teeth of official disapproval, exerted a decisive influence οη subsequent events. Οη his return from the Ruj conference, where he had tried to hire his fellow princes into his service, Count Raymond was furious ('graviter irascebatur') at finding himself so outmanoeuvred by his followers. He had ηο option but to submit when he learnt that the populu[s] were impervious to the 'threats and beatings' ('minis vel verberibus') of the bishop of al-Bara or other leaders. 17 Α modern translation renders populu[s] here as 'mob'. 18 If so, it was a mob of the sort examined by George Rude and others ίη the early modern and modern world, a sensitive and forceful political agent, Ibjd., 3: 270-72. Raymond of Agwlers, Histoιia Francort;m, trans. John 1968), p. 82. 17

18

Η.

and Laurita L. Hj[] (Phj[adelphia

XII 8

Ψrincipes

et T>opulus': Civil Society and the First Crusade

not some mindless rout. Yet, as has been noted,populuswas a term that could carry far less disreputable connotations, the translation of 'mob' saying more about the translators' presumptions than the reality of political structures of eleventh century societies, including constructed societies such as armies. Ιη the teeth of the opposition of their leaders, the populus got its way, not least by understanding the commanders' difficulties and by exploiting the channels of contact and communication to present and refine an independent, contrary policy. As revealed by the career of the layman Peter Bartholomew, a man who knew at least bits of the liturgy, there were some among the populus well able to exploit their opportunities to impose their will οη their lords, by confrontational but largely peaceful and deliberative means. 19 Perhaps too much weight should not be placed οη Raymond of Aguilers' use of language or even his narrative. It is always difficult to deduce precise allusions to social or political institutions from non-legal or non-academic texts. Raymond of Aguilers, in common with others writing of the First Crusade, wished to emphasise the special role of the poor and unmighty as the vehicles for God's purpose, especially in moral [135] opposition to the actual power of the often venal and selfish wealthy. The visions and miracles he recorded were cast to originate mainly, although not exclusively, among the common crusaders not the elites, an exception being Anselm of Ribemont's vision of the recently killed Engelrand of St Pol who prophesied Anselm's own death at the siege of Arqah (c. 25 February 1099).20 However, in certain places, a deliberate distinction was drawn between the pauperes, necessarily indigent, and the populus, a collective noun for a group not necessarily starved of funds and certainly not outside the scope of political action. What matters perhaps as much as whether such things actually occurred in the manner described is how Raymond chose to portray events and how much his account of the social and political exchanges of the winter of 1098-99 finds corroboration elsewhere in his own chronicle and in those of other contemporary accounts. The themes of election, consultation, debate and formally acquired consent of the wider community do not seem to have been an eccentric gloss, Raymond's invention or an over-technical misreading of literary language. The necessity to choose or to elect leaders presented a familiar feature of the crusading expeditions as of other enterprises involving disparate groups thrown together for long periods or to travel long distances. Even the 49er

19 20

For Peter Bartholomew's travels and liturgical knowledge, RHC Occ., 3: 254-5, 257-8. Ibid., 3: 276-7.

XII 'Principes et Populus': Civil Society and the First Crusade

9

prospectors from the eastern United States during the 1849 Californian Gold Rush elected captains, lieutenants and quartermasters. The First Crusade was little different, even if the nuggets ίt sought were less directly convertible into cash. The high command repeatedly agreed οη Bohemund taking the battlefield lead during the sieges of Antioch (October 1097 - June 1098). They also elected ('elegerant') Stephen of Blois 'ductor' of the army (before 29 March 1098) and Godfrey of Bouillon ruler of Jerusalem ίη July 1099. The Gesta Francorum described how Italian and German crusaders of the first wave elected ('elegerunt') their own separate leaders once they had crossed over the Bosporus to Nicomedia ίη August 1096. 21 Secular elections were not uncommon ίη western Europe, a process of achieving consensus through discussion rather than hustings. Ecclesiastical elections were more controversial. [136] Again, Raymond of Aguilers appeared more interested ίη the details of such events than other writers, the Gesta Francorum being content merely to mention that Peter of Narbonne was chosen as bishop of al-Bara by the 'sapientissimj'. 22 Raymond of Aguilers echoed his version of the alBara appointment in his brief account of the election of Robert of Rouen as bishop of Ramla in J une 1099 by 'the leaders and all the people' ('majoribus et omni populo'), a phrase reminiscent of one he employed regularly when describing corporate action or decisions, 'principes et populus', an almost formal designation of the public body that constituted the crusade's political legitimacy in public discussions. 23 The mere fact of 'popular' elections should not itself excite surprise; elections to town councils even kingdoms were familiar across western Europe; in parts of Italy and Germany parishioners regularly 'elected' their priests. 24 Consultation lay at the heart of medieval lordship and government, οη crusade as at home. Νο single unit of the First Crusade, still less its collective leadership, could operate without regular and well-oiled systems, both ritualistic and practicaJ, of communication and consent. According to Ralph of Caen, Alexius Ι, apparently accurately, ascribed Tancred's desire to possess the emperor's imperial tent to his need to accommodate assemblies

21 Gesta Fι·ancorιιm et aliorιιm Hierosolimitanorum, ed. and trans. Rosalind Hill (London 1962), pp. 3, 65-6, 75, 92-3; cf. Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolynιitana, RI-iC Occ., 3:361 (Όmnis populus dominici exercitus . ... elegit') Godfrey; Raymond of Aguilers, Historia, lU-IC Occ.,3: 301 'ut aliquis eligeretur in regnum'; Όb hoc partier elegerunt (i.e the principes) ducem'. 22 Gesta Francorutn, p. 75. 23 RI-J:C Occ., 3: 292. 24 H.eynolds, Κingdoms and CotJtmunities, p. 93.

XII 10

'Principes et Populus': Civif S ociety and the First Crusade

of his growing band of clients ('congestos satis explicitura clients'). 25 Albert of Aachen noted how Peter the Hermit, Gottschalk, Emich of Flonheim and Godfrey of Bouillon all consulted their leading followers over matters of diplomacy, policy and tactics. 26 Οη arrival in the Balkans in the autumn of 1096, Bohemund established disciplinary rules for this army at a council of his men (Όrdinavit concilium cum gente sua'). Raymond of Toulouse, according to the Gesta Francorum, held conferences at Coxon and Arqah to discuss military strategy ('in suo invenit consilio'; 'consilium habuit cum suis et mandet'). 27 Ralph of Caen's Gesta Tancredi reported Count Raymond holding a public assembly ('concione habita') to discuss the first ne\vs of Peter Bartholomew's vision of the Holy Lance. The urgent need for such regular parleys was indicated by Ralph of Caen's mention of Tancred's [137] nighttime conferences ('et deliberandis opportuna consiliis ηοχ ruit') at the siege of Tarsus (September 1097). 28 The exchange was not all in one direction. The Gesta Francorum described how men from northern France ('Francigenae') publicly begged Bohemund for leniency towards their countryman William the Carpenter, viscount of Melun, who had been caught trying to desert from the siege of Antioch. 29 While Raymond of Toulouse had begun besieging Arqah in February 1099, according to Ralph of Caen, pressure was put successfully - οη Godfrey of Bouillon and Robert of Flanders to join Raymond by the 'Franci militia', a phrase seemingly designed to suggest a collective action by the army (a modern published translation of 'militia' as 'troops' perhaps not entirely catching the word's flavour or contemporary polemic resonance). 30 Albert of Aachen noted the 'magni et pauci' who petitioned Godfrey of Bouillon at Arqah to lead them to Jerusalem, a phrase similar to one ( 'magnis et parvis') he used elsewhere to describe a general assembly at Antioch (probably, although misdated, that of 1 November 1098) that agreed to a muster date, 1 March 1099, for the march to Jerusalem. Much earlier in the campaign, according to Albert, during a planning conference or assembly at Kibotos in October 1096, the populus, in this case seemingly the infantry, united behind their spokesman Godfrey Burel, to contradict the caution of the leaders left behind by Peter the Hermit and successfully insist Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi, RHC Occ., 3: 631 . Albert of Aix, Historia Hierosoly111itana, RHC Occ., 4: 279,291,293,301,309. 27 Gesta Fra11corum, pp. 8, 26, 84. 28 RHC Occ., 3: 631,677. 29 Gesta Francorum, p. 34. 30 RHC Occ., 3: 682; Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tancredi trans. Bernard S. and Davjd S. Bachrach (Aldershot 2005), p. 125. 25 26

XII 'Principes et Populus': Civil Society and the First Crusade

11

on an immediate attack on the Turks of Nicaea, with disastrous and fatal consequences. 31 None of this is surprising. Nor was the range and natu.re of the authority of the collective leadership, the council of principes or mqjores, including the higher clergy that quickly became established at the siege of Nicaea. The committee of princes dealt with the major executive decisions. These ranged from diplomacy, with Alexius Ι, the Egyptian Fatimids or Kerbogha; to strategy, such as the decision to send Tancred and Baldwin of Boulogne to Cilicia or for the main army to travel through the Armenian Anti-Taurus mountains; and military decisions such as the foraging expedition into the Ruj valley in December 1097, Bohemund's night-time commando raid to enter Antioch in June 1098 and the day to day conduct of the sieges of Antioch and Jerusalem. The [138] princes dealt with patronage, such as the choice of Peter of Alipha as governor of the Armenian town of Comana (September/ October 1097), Tancred to man the fort built outside the walls of Antioch, Stephen of Blois as 'ductor' or 'gubernator' of the army and Godfrey of Bouillon as ruler of Jerusalem. The council of princes played a central role in handling the increasing appearance of miraculous visions ίη the ranks dαιing and after the siege of Antioch and, as we shall see, they acted as judges in the army's judicial procedures. 32 The princes established and administered the common fund, which may have been set up as early as the aftermath of the battle of Dorylaeum in July 1097 and was certainly in place early in 1098, being described by Raymond of Aguilers as a 'fraternitas' and 'confraternitas', a formal brotherhood into whose coffers leaders such as Count Raymond at Antioch donated money which was then communally distributed according to military need. At Jerusalem, the common fund was still being operated by the northern lords to pay construction teams for the siege engines. The confraternity, a device familiar in both secular and religious contexts in the west, also echoed the sworn procedures surrounding the establishment of Peace and Truces of God, like the one proclaimed by Urban ΙΙ at Clermont. Employed repeatedly in later crusading expeditions, the confraternity reveals that arrangements within the army of the First Crusade were not merely ad hoc, but possessed public institutional structure. 33 Within this, the collective princely council's authority was based, as Albert of Αίχ remarked, on its RHC 0cc, 4: 286-7, 450, 455. See, e.g., Gesta Francorum, pp. 25-6, 39, 43, 44, 45, 58-9, 60, 63, 65-6., 72, 75-6, 80, 87, 92-3; RHC 0cc, 3: 245,251 ,258,285, 300-301, 303,688; 4: 328,332,370,378, 380-81,420, 470, 485- 6. 31

32

33

RHC Occ., 3: 245, 297; iv, 332, 370, 378; cf. Reynolds,

ΊGngdonιs

and Commιιnitie.r, p. 69.

XII 12

Ψrincipes

et JJopulus': Civil Society and the First Crusade

members being the army's divisional commanders ('ductores et columnae exercitus'). 34 However, the princes - principes as distinct or even opposed to populus - could not act unilaterally or make decisions in isolation. They naturally relied οη negotiations with the wider community, 'the people'. Here again, caution is required. When sources talk of 'common counsel', as Raymond of Aguilers did when describing the princes' oaths not to flee Antioch inJune 1098 'nisi de communi consilio', this did not necessarily imply consultation of a wide formal body of crusaders, although in this case it did suggest the requirement for public transparency [139] in decision-making. However, Bohemund, Godfrey of Bouillon and Robert of Flanders were despatched to reconnoitre breaking into Antioch οη the night of 2/3 June 1098 similarly, in Raymond of Aguilers' account, 'communicato consilio', which obviously did not imply either general public approbation or public transparency.35 Nonetheless, there are sufficient references to consultation of a wider assembly of crusaders to suggest this was a regular and necessary part of managing the army and, alongside an accepted system of public justice, rituals of the official clerical establishment and the corporate assessment of miracles and visions, imposed control and order. Such consultation beyond the high command is reflected in the language used by those in the army in their letters to the west. Patriarch Symeon of Jerusalem and Adhemar of Le Puy wrote of taking the 'communi[s] concili[um]', bishops, clerks, monks, dukes, counts and 'ceteri boni laici', clearly an elite group. Stephen of Blois revealed he had been chosen gubernator of the expedition by the princes, but only after wide, even if formal, consultation 'communi consilio totius exercitus'. Anselm of Ribemont reported that Bohemund and Raymond of Toulouse had been sent from Antioch to the coast to fetch supplies and reinforcements 'communi ergo consilio' and it was later explained that the penitential procession around the walls of Jerusalem prior to the final assault had been agreed after 'habito consilio'. 36 The need to consult illustrated the power of the populus as a body and the leaders' requirement to control it. The language of the chroniclers consistendy endowed the non-noble elements involved in consultation and debate in collective terms: plebs orpopulus, as opposed to the individual and plural language when describing the leaders: principles, mqjores, nobi/es etc., although in at least one occasion, describing a moment during the siege of Jerusalem, Ralph of Caen collectivized both

34 35 J6

RHC Occ., 4: 332. Ibid., 4: 251 , 256. Hagenmeyer, Kreu:({ugsbriefe, pp. 141 , 149, 158, 170- 71.

XII Ψrincipes

et JJopulNs': Civil Society and the First CrtJsade

13

elements : 'plebs reclamans ....nobilitas reluctans'. 37 The lexicon of eleventh and twelfth century historiography was infused by the vocabulary of social orders and discrete communities. Yet there may have been more to it than a convenient literary device, especially as in a number of places writers draw distinctions between not just the great and the less grand but between different sorts of assembly and consultative processes. The contrast evident in some references [140) between the led as collective, poptJlus etc., and the leaders as individuals, pιincipes etc., bears strong echoes of the manner in which many western European political gatherings were summoned, from Charlemagne's armies to the taxation assemblies of Angevin England. 38 Ιη addition to the regular meetings of the leaders, sources identify a formal process of obtaining consensus and consent. The Gesta Francorum noted that, in planning the construction of a fort opposite St Paul's Gate at Antioch, the leaders ('maiores nostri') met and constituted a council, whether just of themselves or afforced by others is unclear: Όrdinaverunt concilium'. The councils that sent Bohemund and Robert of Flanders to forage in the Ruj valley and planned for the battle of Lake Antioch comprised 'seniores et prudentissirni milites'. 39 Raymond of Aguilers distinguished between meetings of the leaders; the leaders and clergy; and assemblies of the 'princes and people'. The assembly at Ramla in early June 1099 that debated whether to attack Egypt was called by Raymond of Aguilers a colloquium ('habuimus ibi colloquium'), the same word Albert of Aachen used about the meeting at Antioch a few months earlier that tried to force an invasion timetable οη the leadership.40 Οη his return from his embassy to Kerbogha inJune 1098, Peter the Hermit reported to all the leaders \vho had gathered ('conglobantur') with the knights, 'cum ceteris Christiani milites'. Wider still was the assembly addressed at Antioch by a Lombard priest in the desperate days after the flight of many leaders οη 10-11 June 1098: knights, clergy, laymen, nobles and non-nobles. Not only did such inclusion make sense and was feasible in

RHC Occ., 3: 688. For lexicon, Reynolds, Kingdoιtιs and Comιtιunities, passim. Cf. Franςois L. Ganshof, The Carolingians and the Frankish Monarch)ι (London 1971), p. 128 and note 27, p. 138, where the instrucrions for mobilisation clear]y clistinguish bet\veen those summoned to the army personally and those raised by genera1ly by the loca1 ιtιissus; Magna Carta, clause 14. 39 Gesta Francorum, p. 30. 40 RHC Occ., 3: 292; 4: 450. 37

38

XII 14

'Principes et Populus': Civil Society and the First Crusade

the context of the relatively limited confines of an army, it matched similarly inclusive, large crowds at assemblies in the west. 41 Alongside the consultative procedures at al-Bara reported by Raymond of Aguilers, another notable demonstration of an almost constitutional process was described by Ralph of Caen in his highly fanciful account of events before the capture of Antioch 2/3 June 1098. Ιη order to establish Bohemund's rightful claim to rule in Antioch over against [141] other crusade leaders and the Greeks, Ralph had Bohemund, before the night assault οη the city, address a representative assembly: 'exercitum rectores convocat et qui erant in populo majores'. The upshot of Bohemund's rousing exhortation was the agreement of the assembly to allow whoever captured the city to keep it. This agreement was secured by oaths sworn in hierarchic order: Άd haec universes consilii favour: prius qui primi, qui post primos posterius, pro dignitate sua singuli assonant'.42 While by ηο means the engagement of the populus as at al-Bara, Ralph of Caen evidendy wished to convey the creation of a formal, open, legally and morally binding political consensus over the future disposal of Antioch and chose the model of a sworn, representative popular commune rather than that of a council of princes to do it. While community and hierarchy were similarly features of monastic houses, the lack of overt hierarchical diktat and the emphasis οη the breadth of individual and collective decision and commitment speaks more of the secular not religious community. Such mutual binding together by leaders and representatives of the army finds a close parallel in the chaplain Raol's description of the deliberations of the commune established at Dartmouth during the Second Crusade in 1147. After much wrangling at Porto, that commune agreed a contract with Afonso Henriques of Portugal to help capture Lisbon which, as its captors, they would be have the right to occupy and setde. The communards sealed the agreement with oaths. The process Ralph of Caen was describing or inventing was, in oudine, hardly distinguishable, except that the Dartmouth commune was described with secular overtones, as a 'coniuratio', instead of the more religiously tinged 'confraternitas' of the First Crusade sources. 43 What emerges from these accounts of the First Crusade can be viewed from a number of perspectives. The expedition itself relied οη a corporate consensus in order to exist in the first place and to surmount the great 41 Ibid., 4: 415, 421; cf. for example, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle s.a. 1087; Martin BiddJe, 'Season Festivals and Residence', Anglo-Nor111an Sttιdies, 8 (1985), 51-72, esp. pp. 57-8. 42 RHC Occ., 3: 654. 43 De expugnatione Lyxbonensi, ed. and trans. Charles W David (Ne,v York 1936, reprint 1976), pp. 97-115, esp.100-101; 104-5.

XII 'Principes et Popu!us': Civi! Society and the First Crusade

15

challenges it faced. Mechanisms, including a network of differently constituted assemblies, regular and wide consultations by the high command, the prmcely confraternity, the trappings of a general sworn commune, were constructed to allow for the imposition of unity and the acquiescence of the led to the policies of the leaders. Occasionally, [142] as at Antioch, al-Bara and Ma 'arrat, the populus asserted power to which the leaders, at least temporarily, had to accede. The operation of formal, deliberative consensual politics, in literary and, in all likelihood, actual life, supported the success of the campaign by enforcing cooperation, complicity and agreement. Nowhere is this displayed more prominently than in the process of justice. Even during the settlement of issues that concerned the leadership alone, procedures were depicted as operating not just according to the model of a sworn commune but with a realisation of the importance of judgements being made in public. Secrecy produced suspicion which then forced leaders into embarrassing public commitments or surrenders, as over their promises to pursue the Jerusalem campaign in the autumn of 1098 or the decision seemmgly forced οη Raymond of Toulouse to march south from Ma 'arrat, both products of popular suspicion of leaders' motives. As described by the Gesta Francorum, the inconclusive debate over whether Bohemund should be granted Antioch held οη 1 November 1098 took place in the cathedral of St Peter, both a public and a sacred place. Judgement between the cases presented by Bohemund and his opponent, Raymond of Toulouse, rested with the chief commanders - Duke Godfrey, the counts of Flanders and Normandy and 'aliique seniores'. The protagonists insisted οη judgement by their peers ('nostri pares').These, the other leaders, m their capacity as judges, removed themselves from the main body of the cathedral while deliberating their verdict. The whole ritualized judicial show was almost certainly conducted in public, hence the large venue and the theatrical elements of a trial. When the arbitration failed to deliver a clear verdict, both parties agreed οη the delaying compromise that they would continue the journey to Jerusalem and subsequently abide by the judges' further decisions. This delay was secured by the attendant bishops receiving the contenders' oaths to this effect. 44 The whole elaborate show, some might have thought charade, only worked if the operation was witnessed. Across western Europe, such assemblies as law courts were designed to resolve conflicts, often m a highly ritualised manner and in the context of religious ceremonial. Such judicial assemblies - hundred or shire courts in England; the mallus publicum m Francia

44

Gesta Francorum, pp. 75-6.

XII 16

Ψrincipes

et Populus': Civil S ociety and the First Crιπade

- relied for their effectiveness οη being witnessed by locals who each held a communal interest rather than any personal litigious [143] advantage in seeing arbitration achieved. Οη crusade, the involvement of the clergy, unnecessary for the essentially secular judgement being sought but common in the west, pointed not just to the customary ritualised nature of such gatherings but also to the increasing importance of divine approval in underpinning the popular acceptability of the leadership's decisions. That this was not necessarily the invariable context for judicial decisions may be deduced from Ralph of Caen's account of the arbitration after the fall of Jerusalem in July 1099 between Tancred and Arnulf of Chocques over the distribution of booty from the Temple Mount, specifίcally the Dome of the Rock, the crusaders' Temple of the Lord. The smooth-talking Arnulf presented Tancred's offence as a crime against the all the leaders and thus the expedition as a whole. The high command acted as the judges,judicii and, as at Antioch, reached a compromise arbitration. Even if this is another example of Ralph's special pleading, the manner portrayed of the possibly fictional judicial hearing is clear enough. 45 Another instance of judicial review by the leaders conducted in public with the support of oaths was recounted by Raymond of Aguilers in his description of the reception of news of Stephen of Valence's vision of Christ and the Virgin Mary at Antioch, c. 11 June 1098. Shortly before, Peter Bartholomew had presented his vision of St Andrew only to the Provenς:al high command who immediately placed the visionary under close, almost proprietorial guard (of Raymond of Aguilers himself ). By contrast, Stephen submitted himself to the judgement of the leadership (excepting the absent Godfrey) at a 'convocata concione', a convened public meeting ( a contio/ concio clearly implying a public rather than a private meeting). 46 At this assembly, Stephen asserted his and, by inference, his vision's veracity by swearing οη the cross and promising to submit to the ordeal of fire. The public element was important for Raymond of Aguilers to stress, as he acted as a sort of semiofficial recorder of the Antioch visions and keeper of the relics. It bears some credibility, perhaps, as it also stood in marked difference to his description of the Peter Bartholomew case, possibly caused by the very different outcome to the layman's vision, even in Raymond's sympathetic account, an outcome that also confirmed the central, if largely passive, role of [144] popular involvement in the judicial systems of the army that mimicked the operation

45 46

note 89.

RHC Occ., 3: 699-702. RHC Occ., 3: 256; cf. Reynolds,

Κingdonιs

and

Conιnιunities,

p. 188 and (for 'concio')

XII Trincipes et Populus': Civil Socie!J and the First Crusade

17

of public courts in the west. 47 Even the Lance's fiercest critic, Ralph of Caen, noted that Raymond of Toulouse summoned an assembly ('concione habita') to hear about Peter Bartholomew's vision, a meeting Raymond of Aguilers mentioned apropos Stephen of Valence's vision but not Bartholomew's. 48 The judicial position of the leaders within the wider context of the public witness was well established. Albert of Aachen noted that at a low point in the siege of Antioch the princes, in consultation with the bishops and clergy, established rules governing financial and commercial transactions and the exchange of money, a potentially combustible problem in an army that, according the Raymond of Aguilers, used seven different currencies in the markets of army outside Arqah. The communal good was the stated reason for these regulations, lest any cheat his fellow Christian ('confratrem christianurn'). Transgressions of these ordinances, as later in the 1147 Dartmouth ordinances, were to be heard and punished by appointed justices, but the impact of such measures in raising morale and confidence in the financial system of the army, depended οη public witness. 49 Albert went οη, imrnediately after describing these arrangernents, to describe a sirnilar procedure, where justice \vas played out οη the most public of stages, when he recounted the fate of the fornicating adulterous couple who were stripped and paraded before the whole army ('coram omni exercitu'), who thus acted as additional judges and witnesses. 5°Careful, ritualised recognition of popular power was further confirmed in the handling of the potentially disastrously divisive and morale sapping case of Peter Bartholornew at Arqah in April 1099, a case that showed the populus taking a decisive and active part in tricky political and judicial debates. One of the problems with the Antioch visions of Peter Bartholomew, and the subsequent discovery of the Holy Lance lay in the narrowness of the group who accepted the visionaries' initial testimony and the Lance's authenticity. This undermined the Provenς:al hopes of making the Lance the army's totem and, by extension, its guardian, Raymond of Toulouse, [145] the expedition's undisputed leader. More generally, it jeopardised the unifying potential of stories of miraculous visions of dead crusaders' in paradise and

For these eveots/visioos RI-IC Occ., 3: 253-6. RI-IC Occ., 3: 677. For the role of visions, C. Morris, 'Policy and Visioos. The case of the Holy Lance at Antioch', in John Gillingham and James C. Holt, eds, War and Governmeιιt in the Midd!e Ages (Woodbridge 1984), pp. 33-45. 49 RI-IC Occ., 4: 378-9; 3: 278 (for currencies); De expugnalione Lyxbonensi, pp. 56-7 (for 1147 Ordinances). 50 RHC Occ., 4: 379. 47

48

XII 18

'Pn'ncipes et Popu/us': Civi/ Socie!J and the First Crusade

prophecies of ultimate success that, ίη Raymond of Aguilers' admittedly highly slanted picture, became increasingly important ίη forging the necessary conviction to achieve the successful assault οη Jerusalem. The presence of the story of Peter Bartholomew's trial at Arqah ίη other narratives testifies to the importance to the expedition of establishing the credentials of visions, miracles and relics. One of the silliest assumptions about the Middle Ages imagines an unthinking credulity οη the part of believers. As intimations of the divine were regarded as so important, the establishment of their authenticity required a high degree of reasoned scrutiny and inquiry, not blind faith. Ιη April 1099, the doubts over Peter Bartholomew and the Holy Lance threatened the unity of the whole enterprise, just at the moment when it had finally united for the final push to the Holy City. The difficulty ίη this lack of popular acceptability across the army's political, regional and national divisions was recognised ίη the methods adopted to resolve the issue. Raymond of Aguilers reported οη what amounted to a public trial of the visionary's testimony, especially surrounding the claims for the Lance. The witnesses included the Lance's leading critic, Arnulf of Chocques, chaplain to Robert of Normandy, as well as a number of priests whose evidence supported Peter Bartholomew's claims. This inquisition was crucial ίη Raymond of Aguilers' scheme of presenting the Lance, his Lance, as legitimate. His description highlighted the religious environment ίη calling the wider body of the army who had begun to express doubts about the Lance as 'brothers' or the brethren and the assembly before which the inquiry was held as comprising 'brothers and bishops' ('fratr[es] et episcop[i]'). The public dimension was made even clearer ίη Arnulf's alleged promise to do penance for his doubting the Lance 'coram omni populo', a gesture unsurprisingly absent from other, less or differently partisan accounts. 51 The evidence is less contradictory ίη charting the course of the ordeal by fire Peter Bartholomew undertook οη 8 April outside Arqah, whether at his own insistence (Raymond of Aguilers) or that of the leaders acting as judges (Ralph of Caen). 52 Ιη Raymond of Aguilers' account, Peter's [146] decision to put his truthfulness to the test was aimed at reassuring the wider constituency of the army, and, as a gesture independent of any outcome, it worked ('placuerunt haec omnia nobis'). 53 Central to this strategy was that the ordeal was witnessed by the all the elements within the army, ίη Raymond's familiar phrase 'principes et populous', princes and people. This recognised that onl}τ 51 52 53

lbid., 3: 279- 85 for the whole Bartholomew trial. Ibid., 3: 283, 682. Ibid., 3: 283.

XII 'Principes et Popu!us': Civi/ Society and the First Crusade

19

if the populus gave their approval could this increasingly divisive issue be resolved or set aside. As the opposition and support for the Lance had become a proxy for a struggle for authority within the army, the political resources of the leadership alone were inadequate. Whatever individual beliefs or alliances, the leaders had to submit the matter, formally at least, to the arbitration of God (through the ordeal) and the people, who witnessed and assessed the verdict. The 'people' were being called upon to redress the imbalance among the princes. Although wholly contrary to Raymond's account in attitude and tone, Ralph of Caen confirmed this. Peter Bartholomew had been summoned to appear before the council, 'accito itaque in concilium', presumably of leaders, but equally presumably in public. Its form established, the trial was witnessed by 'another' ('iterum') assembly, implying the previous council had comprised more than just the leaders. 54 As was the way with trials by ordeal, the verdict was neither clear-cut nor universally agreed, dependent, as ever, οη hardly unbiased observers' interpretation of the extent, nature and causes of the wounds. Peter died of his wounds, but each side argued that this nonetheless proved their case. If the public trial had been designed to flush out Provenςal influence, rather than create unity, then it succeeded. Yet, in a sense, this merely recognised the new political reality ίη the face of the arrival of the non-Provenςals at Arqah only three weeks before. Either way, as a mechanism of unity, by itself the trial of Peter Bartholomew failed, even though his death removed an increasingly discordant and unpredictable voice, and so served to assist accommodation. There appeared to be a general understanding of the need for reconciliation. The wishes of 'the people', in some accounts (others ignore them almost entirely) became crucial in restabilising the army. According to Raymond of Aguilers, the attack οη Tripoli, perhaps launched to take minds off Peter Bartholomew's grisly fate, was prompted by shared discontent within the ranks [147] of the army. 55 Α few days later, and more surprisingly, popular opinion intervened in the intense leadership disagreements over diplomacy and strategy provoked by the arrival at Arqah of a Byzantine embassy. The public involvement went beyond the customary receiving of diplomatic embassies at assemblies, as was the habit at English crown-wearings under the first AngloNorman kings. Now the audience came onto the stage of discussion, debate and decision. Over whether to stay at Arqah and restore a Greek alliance or to march οη Jerusalem, a move opposed by Raymond of Toulouse who saw

54 55

Ibid., 3: 682. Ibid., 3: 285.

XII 20

'Principes et Populus': Civif S ociety and the First Crusade

his authority diluted by the day, the princes and the people faced problems. The populus supported a march οη Jerusalem, but Raymond of Toulouse did not, so 'consilia principum [except Raymond] et populi vota impediebant'. 56 Once again Raymond of Aguilers' formula of 'principes et populus', suggests an almost constitutional relationship and mutual recognition. The impasse was resolved, in Raymond of Aguilers' configuration, by the elevation, thanks to another vision received by Stephen of Valence, of Adhemar of Le Puy's cross as a sort of substitute Provenς:al relic to the now controversial Lance. Both this vision and another experienced by Peter Desiderius, that urged an immediate assault οη Jerusalem, acted as spiritual validation of the popular pressure οη Raymond to march south. The power of this force was recognised, according to Raymond of Aguilers, by Godfrey of Bouillon who encouraged popular pressure for a resumption of the march ('et plebem ad hoc commonfaciebat' ).57 It may be, of course, that his hand lay behind the apparent 'popular' pressure all along. If so, it remains instructive that Godfrey felt the need to proceed under the cover of the populus. Ralph of Caen, although dismissive of what he saw as the fraudulent Lance, agreed not only with the public nature of the justice meted out to Peter Bartholomew, but also the role of the populus in subsequent attempts at unity and reconciliation. Where Raymond of Aguilers concentrated οη a new relic being promoted specifically it seemed to restore Provenς:al morale, Ralph described a rather peculiar attempt to create a new totem for the whole army. Ιη order to provide a 'new source of consolation' within the army now, in Ralph's version, the Lance had been utterly discredited, a new assembly was summoned, [148) 'denuo fit conventus', at which it was proposed by the populus ('proponitur populo') that a golden statue of Christ be moulded to act as the crusaders equivalent of the Old Testament Israelites' tabernacle. The assembly saw discussion if not debate, led by Arnulf of Chocques and his friend, the scantily educated bishop of Marturana. 58 The impression left was that the renewal of devotion and united purpose came from the mass of the faithful crusaders rather than, as could possibly be read into Ralph's account, simply a partisan act of populist politics by two Norman clerics οη the make. Either way, Ralph was assuming, as did Raymond of Aguilers, that the common people mattered, certainly in the literary and religious scheme of things, and probably the political as well; hence their portrayal as playing active parts in the internal organisation of power. 56 57 58

Ibid.,3: 286. Ibid., 3: 289. Ibid., 3: 683.

XII Trincipes et Populus': Civil Society and the First Crusade

21

The question remains whether the role of the populus reflected actual events or operated solely within a series of conventional (or unconventional) representations that owed everything to invention and nothing to what actually may have occurred. One way of tackling this issue is to take a comparative approach. Between the different sources, there runs a common thread that picks out the active participation of a wider community of the crusade army, even if it is most evident ίη Raymond of Aguilers' work. That these chroniclers slipped so easily into describing a measure of constitutionalism and an active commons itself may be suggestive and instructive; they and their audience recognised what was being described, even if it never happened precisely ίη that way. More widely, the political structures depicted match those in the crusaders' home circumstances, from urban, suburban and rural communities where assemblies formed part of the basic organisation of social and economic exchange; to local public law courts where decisions were tests and conformation of social solidarity and power, only effective because engaging the locally powerful - knights and freemen of varying social and economic standing; to the model of a religious community or, more relevant perhaps ίη the chroniclers' minds' eyes, the Israelites of Exodus or the Maccabees; to princely assemblies οη which effective eleventh century rule, at least ίη western Europe, depended. That these secular assemblies, like the army itself, embraced men beyond the nobility was evident. More difficult is to determine the extent of any wider [149) social catchment. Armies threw up their own social structures, not least because of the fluidity of status, a knight one day; a footsoldier without money, food or, crucially, a horse the next, a common enough story οη the First Crusade. The involvement of all armsbearers in large assemblies who then occasionally acted in their own interests was not beyond reason or expectation. More frequently and more clearly, this wider involvement revolved around communal acceptance and validation of the actions of the leaders and nobles, a formal but ηο less political act. The commanders of the First Crusade and their followers were products of a sophisticated political culture which they carried with them under arms. Another comparison would be chronological, with later crusades that shared some structural features and for which evidence may be more plentiful or less reliant οη dramatic narratives. Formal sworn communes, that included all participants ίη disciplinary provisions, were features of the fleets that assembled at Dartmouth ίη 1147 and those of the Third and Fifth Crusades. The leadership of the Fourth Crusade acted as a commune and consulted the 'commons of the host' and held parlements at moments of peril or urgency, descriptions of which, mutatis mutandis, look, ίη outline, very similar to parts of

XII 22

'Principes et Populus': Civil Society and the First Crusade

Raymond of Aguilers' account of how the First Crusade reached decisions in Syria and Palestine. Individual bands of crusaders were familiar with forming their own communal bands where ηο hierarchy lent immediate cohesion to a regional group, as during recruitment for the Second Crusade. Even leaders could be forced into divesting themselves of authority and setting up a communal structure of command, as Louis VII did ίη Asia M:inor οη the march to Adalia in the desperate early days of 1148. Wherever leaders, such as Frederick Barbarossa in 1189 or Richard Ι in 1190, imposed judicial ordinances οη a crusade army or fleet, a formal community was created. 59 The commune provided a key and regular feature of crusade organisation in the period before central fundraising and church taxation placed the power of organisation into the more defined hierarchical grip of monarchs and rulers who used cash not consent as the prime cohesive agent before and during any campaign. As for the influence of the populus, even Richard Ι of England found [150] himself outmanoeuvred when his critics and opponents οη campaign were able to harness the force of the wider commons of the army, as happened in southern Palestine in May 1192, forcing Richard to concede a second assault οη Jerusalem against his will. Like Raymond of Toulouse at Ma 'arrat and Arqah, he could do little except sulk, and would have been foolish to try. The decision to withdraw from the attack in July 1192 was reached by a committee formally constituted to represent the different sections of the army, excluding Richard's own, a form of constitutionalism regularly found, for example, during political crises in thirteenth century England.60 More generally still, the involvement of knights and freemen, the commons, the populus, in the government of the First Crusade, would hardly have surprised attenders at public courts across western Europe. One of the great fallacies of medieval historiography is encapsulated in the self-image of kings, nobles and some of their neat-minded clerical apologists, that of a monolithic hierarchy. The First Crusade, like the society that produced it, demonstrated that the reality was far otherwise, a world of political activity that not only matched the diversity of society and the economy but reflected some of the most tenacious habits of western European political and judicial organisation, embracing knights and freemen, the wider public, and legal procedures, consensual assemblies granting approval, validity and legitimacy to issues of communal importance. 59

Οη

these larer crusading examples, see Christopher T)'erman, God's War: Α new History

of the Crusades (London 2006), pp. 299-301 , 327,414,510, 530-31, 547,627 and 631 . 60 Οη these political experiences of Richard and 469 and refs.

Ι οη

crusade, T)'erman, God's War, pp. 467

XII Trincipes et Populus': Civil Society and the First Crusade

23

Το return to where this investigation began, political activity within the army of the First Crusade displayed precisely the features of the so-called seventeenth century 'public' revolution: elections, sermons, processions, petitions, demonstrations and political conversations, everything, ίη fact except pamphlets. Written protests only appear in a crusading context with the popular crusades of the thirteenth century, unless, of course, credence is given to William of Tyre's account of the exhortatory letters carried by Peter the Hermit.61 What is clear is that the collective action and ideology displayed οη the march to Jerusalem were hardly new, as witnessed ίη the operation of Carolingian politics (151] and law, and that they very soon became even more evident in the legal procedures of Angevin England, the communes of Italy and Flanders or London, and the constitutionalism of Aragόn, the kingdom of Jerusalem or the Lombard leagues. But these are other stories - or perhaps part of the same one.

61

\'{lilliam of Tyre, Chronicon, 1. 11 , ed. Robert B.C. Huygens (Turnholt 1986), p. 126 .

X

X

XIII

Who Went

οη

Crusades to the Holy Land?

However the crusades to the Holy Land are regarded, the question of who undertook the journey to Jerusalem is of central importance. Was such crusading a truly popular movement, embracing all classes and groups of whatever degree or status? lf so, why did it fail to produce sufficient recruits for whom settlement in the east was attractive? Το what extent were crusades organized, controlled and recruited in ways identical to other contemporary armies? Any conclusions are likely to be tentative, especially as the active crusader can be studied as a fund-raiser, an employee, a member of his surrounding social hierarchy as well as a pilgrim and a soldier. Crusading was not a spontaneous act. Preparations could be as hasty as Peter the Hermit's or as protracted as Frederick II's or Louis IX's, but they were invariably characterized by raising money, collecting supplies, and gathering followers. The individual vow, a response either to public appeal or per,sonal crisis, may have been a private decision; its implementation could not be. The departure of any crusader came at the end of a process whereby the crucesίgnatus obtained communal approval and, frequently, assistance for his pilgrimage. The consent of parish priest, landlord, and family; the material help of those lay or clerical neighbors through whom the crusader converted assets into cash or pack animals; the religious ceremonies attendant on taking the cross; and, in many cases, the pious bequests and contracts with local monasteries were the familiar prerequisites of the journey to Jerusalem. For prudential reasons crusaders did not travel alone; neither did crusading armies assemble at random or by accident. Whether we are looking at general passagίa or the innumerable crusade-pilgrimages, conducted by individual great lords or small groups, it is clear that all expeditions to the east were planned and structured. At the very least crusaders were surrounded by their households, relatives, and friends. 1 Most, if not all armies, medieval or modern, are held together by a varying mixture of loyalty-to cause, leader or comrades-and cash. Specifically, crusading armies were assembled and maintained by the bonds of lordship, kinship, geography and swom association, these ties being ltinerarium peregrinorum et gesta regis ρ. 147.

Rίcardi,

ed. W. Stubbs, RS 38: 1 (London, 1864),

XIII 14 supplemented, confirmed or replaced by pay, in kind or ίη cash. This is attested by Peter the Hermit's carts of treasure and Bohemund's payment for his vassals and relatives to cross the Adriatic ίη 1096; the retained troops of Richard Ι, Richard of Cornwall, Louis ΙΧ, Alphonse of Poitiers, and the Lord Edward; and the saddlebags of William Longsword ίη 1249, stuffed with money. 2 Implicit here is the assumption that crusades to the Holy Land were essentially military. Ιη the twelfth century, at any rate, this may not have been as self-evident as we see it, since the distinction between a simple pilgrimage and a crusade remained blurred. The pilgrim companions of Saewulf ίη 1103 proved "ready to die for Christ" ίη stoutly resisting the attack of a Muslim fleet off Acre. They were clearly prepared for action as were many similar contingents of pilgrims. Conversely the repentant English merchant, Godric of Finchale, although having formally adopted the "banner of the Lord's Cross," as his contemporary biographer put it, behaved like a pilgrim not a crusader during his time ίη Palestine with ηο hint of military activity or intent. (His identification with the pirate Godric who arrived at Jaffa in 1102 is speculative and, albeit convenient, unlikely in view of Godric's Vίtα, unless its author, Richard of Coldingham, was over-egging the pudding by insisting οη his hero's pacifism, in which case the fact that he saw πο contradiction in a peaceful crucesίgnatus iς itself significant.) 3 Οη the other hand, the small army led by Henry the Lion, duke of Saxony, to the Holy Land in 1172 contained well-equipped and- funded knights but saw ηο military action in the east and, it has been argued, had little interest in doing so. 4 Nevertheless, what did distinguish the crusader was that, in addition to being a pilgrim, he bore arms to use οη the infidel. Fulcher of Chartres describes the plight of the "common people" with the contingent of Robert of Normandy and Stephen of Blois in ltaly ίη the autumn of 1096. Left to their own resources they "feared privation in the future, sold their weapons and again took up their

2

3

4

Albert of Aachen, Historia Hieroso/ymitana, RHC HOcc. 4:281; Gesta Francorum et a/iorum Hierosolimitanorum, ed. R. Hill (London, 1962), p. 8; ltinerarium, p. 291 ; Roger of Howden, Chronica, ed. W. Stubbs, RS 51 {London, 1868-71), 3:8; idem (wrongly attributed to Benedict of Peterborough), Gesta regis Henrici secundi et Ricardi regis, ed. W. Stubbs, RS 49 (London, 1867), 2: 112; Matthew Paris, Chronίca Majora, ed. H.R. Luard, RS 57 (London, 1872-83), 4:71 and 5: 131; idem, Historia Ang/orum, ed. F . Madden, RS 44 (London, 1866-69), 3:55; S. Lloyd, "The Lord Edward's Crusade 12702," ίη War and Goνernment in the Midd/e Ages, ed. J. Gillingham and J.C. Holt (Woodbridge, 1984), C. Devic, J. Vaissete and Α. Molinier, Histoire gι!nι!ra/e de Languedoc (Toulouse, 1872-1904), 8: 1221-1222 and 1314-1316. Re/atio de peregrinatione Saewulfi ad Hieroso/ymam et Terram Sanctam, ed. Α . Rogers, PPTS 4.2 (London , 1896), p. 50; Libe/lus de νίtα et miracu/is S. Godrici heremitae de Fίnchale, ed. J. Stevenson, Surtees Society 20 {London, 1847), pp. 33-34 and 52-57; William of Newburgh, Historia rerum Ang/icarum, ed. R. Howlett, RS 82 {London, 1884), 1: 149; Albert of Aachen, RHC HOcc. 4: 595. Κ. Jordan, Henry the Lion (Oxford, 1986), pp. 150-155; ίη the fullest account, by Arnold of Lίibeck, there is ηο indication that the pacific pilgrimage was anything but intentional, ίη contrast to a similar expedition of Philip of Flanders ίη 1177.

XIII WHO WENT

ΟΝ

CRUSADES?

15

pilgrims' staves and returned home as cowards." 5 Ιη the thirteenth century, the contrast between the pilgrim and the crusader became more clearly defined, for example ίη dissimilar legal protection ίη English secular courts. 6 Ιη the early twelfth century, the practical distinction Iay ίη the military purpose of the crusader and, hence, as Fulcher implies, ίη the additional cost of a crusade as opposed to a pilgrimage. The nature, exten~ and structure of aristocratic and popular involvement were directly related to this additional expense of crusading. From Urban ΙΙ onwards crusade planners and preachers wished to recruit effective military forces. This dictated appeals to the leaders of society and to the increasingly distinct and powerful class of knights . The bargain offered by St. Bernard was to "mighty men of valour," "young and vigorous men" and, significantly, if perhaps metaphorically, merchants, all members of a social elite who would bring ίη tow the necessary footsloggers . Preachers like Bishop Henry of Strasbourg and Gerald of Wales ίη 1188 or Abbot Martin of Pairis ίη 1201 wished to recruit "milites egregii" and others familiar with the use of arms. 7 Το encourage such recruits, the content of sermons and other propaganda material, including songs, was carefully directed at the fighting classes. Recently there has been some discussion of the relationship of the preaching by the poverty and apostolic movements of the late eleventh, twelfth, and thirteenth centuries to the crusade, but ίt should be noted that the message of such preachers was, by definition, aimed, like crusade sermons, at those with wealth and position . For example, the passages οη poverty ίη the early thirteenthcentury English preaching manual, the Ordίnatίo de predίcatίone S. Crucίs, were clearly designed for a wealthy, martial audience. Equally significant is the language of sermons. The punch lines of the Ordίnatίo's exempla are ίη French, the language of the English aristocracy. Ιη 1188 Gerald of Wales preached ίη French and Latin to a Welsh audience many of whom, he admitted, could not understand a word he said. 8 Almost as exclusive as the language of the sermons were the audiences themselves. Throughout the twelfth and thirteenth centuries 5 6

7

8

Fulcher of Chartres, Α History of ιhe Expediιion to Jerusa/em, trans. F.R. Ryan , ed. H .S. Fink (Knoxville, 1969), pp. 75-76. Henry de Bracton (sic), De /egibus eι consueιudinibus Angliae, ed. Τ. Twiss, RS 70 (London, 1878-83), 5: 156-169; John de Longueville, Modus ιenendi curias (c. 1307). The Courι Baron, eds. F.W. Maitland and W.P. Baildon (London, 1891), p . 82. Historia de expediιione Friderici imperatoris, ed. Α. Chroust (1928), MGH Scr. rer. germ., NS 5:12-15; Gerald of Wales, The Journey ιhrough Wa/es, _trans . L. Thorpe (London , 1978), p. 204; Gunther of Pairis, Historia Consιanιinopoliιana, ed. Ρ. Riant (Geneva, 1877), 1:62-64. Ιη general, C. Morris, "Propaganda for War: The Dissemination of the Crusading Ideal ίη the Twelfth Century," Sιudies in Church Hisιory 20 {1983), 79-ΙΟΙ. Ordinaιio de predicaιione S. Crucis in Anglia, ίη Quinti bel/i sacri scripιores minores, ed. R. Rδhricht (Geneva , 1879), pp. 1-26; Gerald of Wales, De rebus α se gesιis, c. 18, in Gira/di Cambrensis Opera, ed. J.S. Brewer, RS 21 (London , 1861-91), 1:76. For the poverty movement and the crusade, see Ρ. Raedts, "The Children's Crusade of 1212," Journal of Medieva/ History 3 (1977), 279-323 and J.M. Powell, Anaιomy of α Crusade, 1213-/221 (Philadelphia, 1986).

XIII 16 the most characteristic settings for crusade sermons were assemblies of one or more princely households, sometimes inside a church or cathedral, sometimes not: the grand gatherings at Vezelay (1146) or Gisors and Mainz (1188) contrasting ίη size but not ίη nature with the conference at Reading ίη 1185 or the meetings of Welsh princelings ίη 1188. Alternatively, preachers went where-in the words of instructions given by the Archbishop of York to Franciscan crusade preachers ίη 1291-there was or was believed to be a large congregation, ίη towns or marketplaces. This dimension of recruitment efforts, obvious and practical as it was, should not be underestimated. Urban 11 preached at Clermont, Angers, Tours, and Limoges. Peter the Hermit was reported to have concentrated his efforts ίη "urbes et municipia." Ιη 1146-7 the renegade Rudolph inflamed many thousands ίη Cologne, Mainz, Worms, Speyer, Strasbourg, and neighboring cities, towns and villages, and St. Bernard followed his example ίη Speyer, Mainz, and Regensburg. 9 Crusading was based, like Western society, upon the extended households and affinities of the military aristocracy and urban elites with their dependants. This is confirmed by charters and other financial, administrative, and legal records. lt might be argued that such evidence is biased towards the wealthier sections of the community, those with something to sell, mortgage, protect, donate, or abandon . Το a degree this is true, but the amounts of property involved ίη surviving transactions often amount to ηο more than a few acres, sous, or shillings. Furthermore, the social sample contained ίη such documentation accurately represents the main constituents of any crusade, men who could raise enough money to subsidize at least partially their journey and pay for necessary armor, food, clothing, etc., for which not all crusaders could depend οη the leaders or common funds, at least at the outset of an expedition. 10 Documentary evidence also points to a distinctive rural element beyond the immediate households of the nobility, a group with disposable assets but whose status was clearly non-noble . Cartularies reveal the organization of crusades around great lords and knights, with substantial or less extensive estates, and other propertied freemen and clerics all of whom converted fixed assets, usually land and rents, into cash. With the money raised they supported their immediate entourages. Alongside the Englishman Hugh de Neville at Acre ίη 1267 when he was drawing up his will was a small group of companions, including his chaplain and page, who acted as executors. Ιη his will Hugh provided, as unavoidable expenses of any independent crusader, money and goods for another clerk, a servant he was expecting to join him from the West, two farriers, a groom, a draper and a moneychanger. Some of these were almost certainly locals, however to those ίη 9 10

Historica/ Papers and Leιιersfrom Northern Registeι-s, ed. J. Raine , RS 61 (London , 1873), ρρ. 93-96; Guibert of Nogent, Gesta Dei per Francos, RHC HOcc. 4: 142; Otto of Freising, The Deeds of Frederick Barbarossa , trans. C.C. Mierow (New York, 1966), ρρ. 74-75. Note Frederick Barbarossa's insistence ίη 1189 οη his followers ' ability to pay for themselves.

XIII WHO WENT

ΟΝ

CRUSADES?

17

his household Hugh tried to guarantee return fares to the West. Hugh also had with him a number of unnamed soldiers, horses, armor, weapons, jewels and other goods. Ιη general it must be emphasized that servants, traveling with their masters or hired en route, provided a prominent and constant feature of crusade armies. 11 Those crusaders lower down the social scale, such as burgenses and rustίci referred to ίη the Saladin Tithe ordinances of 1188, had one thing ίη common with their social superiors: they had property. One of the crusaders from the Maconnais ίη the twelfth century, described by Georges Duby as a peasant, was able to raise 13s. for one of his fields to subsidize his expedition, and this was certainly not the sum of his holdings. One difficulty, of course, with such contracts is that there is ηο guarantee of-indeed there is a probability against-our having evidence of the crusader's complete financial transactions or of his total assets. Charters are extremely vague about social status, but there are a few suggestive glimpses. Ιη 1202, a Flemish vίllίcus raised 140 livres of Hainault from his hereditary holding. Α generation earlier a vίllicus of Rosiere ίη the Loire valley pledged his patrimony for 300s. Where descriptions do appear they are ηο guide to economic status. For instance a French rustίcus, preparing for his crusade ίη the 1140s, gave his local abbey rent worth 20s. which the monks had previously paid him each year. Such men could not compete with prosperous knights, but as small farmers their incomes were not negligible, although ίt is obvious that 20s. would not have got anybody very far. 12 Not all crusaders had to rely οη what they took with them or οη what they were given as vassals and servants of the rich. From England, for instance, there is evidence of the involvement ίη crusading of artisans, wage earners who could just as well ply their skills ίη crusading camps as elsewhere. Οη the Pipe Rolls of 1207 and 1208 appear lists of crusaders that include a dyer, a bowman, and a butcher alongside the more expected rural aristocracy of merchants, provosts, squires, chaplains and serjeants. Ιη an l 190s list of Cornish crucesίgnatί there are skinners, a blacksmith, a miller, a cobbler, and a tailor, a social cross-section matched by a contemporary Lincolnshire list ίη which are found a skinner, a potter, a butcher, a blacksmith, a vintner, a ditcher, and a baker. Elsewhere, ίη the 1220s the Master Carpenter of Chichester Cathedral inconvenienced his employers by seeking permission to go οη crusade. 13 This picture is matched by 11 12

13

G. Constable , "Financing of the Crusades ίη the Twelfth Century," ίη Outremer, pp. 6488; M.S. Giuseppi, 'Όη the Testament of Sir Hugh de Neville," Archaeologia 56 (1899), 352-354. G . Duby, La Sociι!tι! aux Xle et Xlle siec!e dans Ια rι!gion Maconnaise (Paris, 1953), p. 378; Recueil des Pancartes de !' abbaye de Ια Ferιι!-au-Crosne. 1113-1178, ed. G . Duby (Aix-enProvence, 1953), p. 114, Νο . 120; Chartes du Chapitre de Sainte Waudru de Mons , ed . L. Devillers (Brussels, 1899-1913), 1: 84-86, Νο. 45; Cartu!aire de Chama!ieres-sur-Loire en Velay , ed. Α. Richard, Archives historiques du Poitou 16 (Poitiers, 1886), pp. 349-350, Νο . 331. Pipe Rolls 9 John (1207), 72-73 and 10 John (1208), pp. 150-151; Royal Commission on Historical Manuscripts: Fifth Report (London, 1872), Appendix, p. 462; idem, Report on

XIII 18 continental evidence. The crusaders stuck at Messina ίη 1250 included barbers and shoemakers, and elsewhere can be discovered butchers, master chefs, masons, carters and fishmongers as well as notaries, physicians , advocates and other significant figures ίη urban and rural society. 14 It could be argued that these artisans and professionals, whether or not they expected to continue their trades οη crusade, were more likely to take the cross than their neighbors as, on the one hand , they had access to cash as wage earners and, on the other, they were less tied to the soil and freer of movement . Beside the aristocrats, their servants, the rural elites and artisans, were townsmen and clerics about whose heavy involvement the documentary evidence leaves no doubt. Το take one example at random, Londoners had a habit of crusading which reached back to before 1130. This culminated in extensive contributions to crusades in 1147, 1189 and 1190, and the foundation of the Order of St. Thomas Becket in Acre during the Third Crusade which, even if not established by a London cleric, as one account had it, nevertheless retained close links with the city. Elsewhere ίη Europe this feature is equally apparent with urban crusaders not being confined to mercantile seaports. 15 Just as towns were foci for preaching so they were for recruitment. One of the more misleading ideas about the crusades is that the ideals did not attract those engaged in nonnoble, urban or commercial activities except ίη so far as those ideals promised profit and extended markets. Cynical profiteering by urban crusaders fails entirely as an explanation of their consistent and often distinguished service in the cause of the cross. Clerical crusaders are no less prominent ίη documentary sources. Although participation by monks excited disapproval in some quarters, for the secular clergy crusading became acceptable and common . These clerics behaved much as any other aspirant crusader ίη selling property and mortgaging their benefices . ΑΙΙ ranks of the hierarchy were involved. For example, the clergy from England on the Third Crusade who actually reached Palestine included an archbishop , a bishop, and an abbot as well as archdeacons, canons, chaplains, parsons, clerks, and the vicar of Dartford. These were fully integrated into the army. They prayed, exhorted and encouraged the crusaders; they wrote and witnessed their charters; they conducted negotiations with the enemy; they

14

15

Varίous Co/lectίons (London , 1901), 1:235-236; W.H. Blaauw, "Letters of Ralph de Neville," Sussex Archaeo!ogίcal Co!!ecιίons 3 (1850), p. 75. Β.Ζ. Kedar, " The Passenger List of a Crusader Ship , 1250: Towards the History of the Popular Element οη the Seventh Crusade," Studί Μedίeνα!ί 3: 13 (1972), 267-279. See below passίm and note 18 for other examples of artisans; W.C. Jordan , Louίs ΙΧ and the Challenge of the Crusade (Princeton, 1979), p. 69, for a Vermandois butcher; cf. Powell, Anatomy of α Crusade, pp . 209-251. Pίpe Rol/ 31 Henry 1 (] 130) , 33; De expugnaιίone Lyxbonensί, ed. C.W. David (New York , 1936), p. 56 and note 2; Pίpe Ro/115Henry11 (] 169) , p. 172 for an 1164 example; Roger of Howden , Gesta, 2:89-90 and 116-118; Ralph of Diceto, Ymagίnes hίstorίarum , ed. W. Stubbs, RS 68 (London, 1876), 2:80-81 ; A.J. Forey, "The Military Order of St. Thomas of Acre," Englίsh Hίstorίca! Revίew 92 (1977), 481-486; Regίstro del Cardίnale Ugolίno d'Osιia , ed. G . Levi, Fonti per la Storia d'Jtalia 8 (Rome , 1890), pp. 128-133.

XIII WHO WENT

ΟΝ

CRUSADES?

19

buried the dead; they organized relief for the poor; and, like Hubert Walter, bishop of Salisbury, or Ralph Hauterive, archdeacon of Colchester, they fought . 16 How many ordained priests donned armor to fight the temporal battle against evil is unclear, but these Englishmen were not alone. Narrative literary sources supply further evidence of the structure of crusading armies. Even the most apparently chaotic of expeditions, the so-called Peasants' Crusades of l096, possessed some col1esion , leadership and funds. The disintegration of these forces was the result of weak discipline and poor leadership rather than the absence of either or the preponderance of nonfighting men . Even if these armies lacked mounted knights and contained more infantry, and even if some bands resembled more the mass armed pilgrimages of the mid-eleventh century than the centralized military units of later crusades , they were, as Duncalf pointed out sixty years ago, capable of sustained and occasionally effective military action against stubborn opposition. 17 Whatever else he was, Walter Sans Avoir was not Penniless. The implosion of order and discipline was not, ίt might be added, the prerogative of the Peasants' Crusades. Again and again the armies of the great threatened to fall apart ίη the face of appalling privations and dangers οη the First Crusade, and the armies of Louis VII and Louis ΙΧ did ίη fact disintegrate ίη 1148 and 1250. The usual distinctions drawn by chroniclers ίη descriptions of crusading armies were between the great, the knights, the serjeants-mounted or not-and the infantry, including bowmen. Το those fighting could be added the necessary camp followers of any medieval army, including families, household officials, clerics, servants, sailors, prostitutes, laundresses-who, ίη Ambroise's account of the Third Crusade, doubled as de-lousers-and an array of other supporting personnel. Ιη a crisis all could be useful ; the women who ferried water to the troops at Dorylaeum or who helped fill the moat at Acre ίη 1190; the butchers and women who sold provisions and who raised the alarm at Man~ιϊrah when the count of Poitiers became surrounded; or the horse-boys and cooks who, according to Robert of Clari, were equipped \Vith quilts, saddlecloths, copper pots, maces and pestles to guard the crusader camp during the first assault οη Constantinople ίη 1203. 18 The chronicle accounts are rich ίη 16

17 18

Roger of Howden, Gesta, 2: 142 and 147-150; Pipe Ro/11 Richard 1 (1189), p. 20; Ralph of Diceto, Ymagines , 2: 80-81 and 84; Curia Regis Ro/1s 1194-95, ed. F. W. Maitland (London , 1891), p. 113; Select Cases for the Ecclesiastical Courιs of the Province of Canterbury, c. 1200-1301 , ed . Ν. Adams and C . Danehue, Selden Society (London, 1891), p. 45; Ralph of Coggeshall, Chronicon Anglicanum, ed. J. Stevenson, RS 66 (London , 1875), p. 54; ltinerarium (note 1 above), pp. 91-93, 116 and 192-193; Ambroise, L'Estoire de Ια Guerre Saίnte, trans. as The Crusade of Richard the Lion-Heart , by M.J. Hubert and J .L. La Monte (repr. New York, 1976), lines 1607-1616. F. Duncalf, "The Peasants' Crusade," American Hίstorical Revie1v 26 (1921), 440-453; a view shared recently by J . Riley-Smith, The First Crusade and the ldea of Crusading (London, 1986), pp. 49-52. Ambroise, lines 3635-3660, 5695-5698; Gesιa Francorum (note 2 above), p. 19; Jean de Joinville, Life of Sι. Louis, trans . M.R.B . Shaw, p. 233; Robert of Clari, La Conquete de Constantinople, ed. Ρ. Lauer (Paris , 1924), p . 46.

XIII 20 mention of such useful common people whose presence can hardly be described as random. Even if not attached ιο the households of the great , they were unlikely to have traveled alone or without the support of employer, lord, family or sworn companion, as the Messina ship's company ίη 1250 shows. Either at the outset of each expedition or certainly by the time the Holy Land was reached, combatants and non-combatants were linked together ίη a series of formal, partly casual, or mutually dependent relationships, many of which had emerged from necessity and the quest for the next meal. One description of the distribution of the spoils of Damietta ίη 1220 allotted different tariffs ιο knights , priests and turcopoles and c/ientibus. Long before Louis ΙΧ hired Olivier de Termes ιο attend the crusade ίη 1247 with five knights and twenty crossbowmen at the king's expense, clientage of one sort or another had been at the very heart of crusade organization at all levels. 19 Apart from the magnates, the dominant group, ίπ terms of influence rather than numbers , were the knights. Some milites were scarcely distinguishable from magnates while others slid all too easily into the class of serjeants, infantry or even non-combatants. Regularly, knights had ιο be bailed out-at Antioch ίπ 1098, Adalia 1148, Acre 1191, Venice 1202, Acre 1240, and Cyprus 1248. Το avoid such difficulties men banded together, like the coniurati, who attacked the Jews ίπ England ίπ Lent I l 90, or Jean de Joinville and his cousin , the count of Sarrebruck . But only the resources of great lords or unusually fortunate knights could secure other knights from penury . What was true for the knights was even more true for their social inferiors. 20 Throughout the emphasis is οη wealth . Caffaro talked of the "better sort" (melioribus) of Genoese taking the cross ίη 1096. Many of the crusaders οπ the Second Crusade came from the economically expanding and prosperous areas of the Rhineland and Flanders as well as the English trading centers of London, Dover, Hastings , Southampton, Bristol, and Ipswich. Roger of Howden argued that the 1188 appeal ιο take the cross was answered primarily by the well-to-do who had most to gain from avoidance of the Saladin Tithe. During the Fifth Crusade recruitment seems ιο have been highest ίη areas of underlying wealth : southern England, the Rhineland, north Italy. 2 1 Successful crusade leaders were , by definition, rich and few chronicle accounts of any crusade fail ίη some way to allude ιο the financial security of the operation .22 Pooling resources came naturally . Lordship was complemented by sworn association and common funds. The first crusade common fund appears to have 19 20 21 22

John of Tubia, De Iohanne Rege /erusa/em ίη Quinti bel/i sacri scripιores minores (note 8 above), p. 139; Hisιoire ginirale de Languedoc, 8: 1221-1222. William of Newburgh , Historia, 1:308-324; Joinville , Sι. Louis, p. 191. Caffaro, De liberatione cίνίιαιum Orienιis, RHC HOcc. 5:49; De expugnatione Lyxbonensi, p. 54; Roger of Howden, Gesιa , 2:32; Powell, Anaιomy of α Crusade , esp. pp. 67-87. E.g. , successive counts of Flanders and Champagne ; Richard I of England; Boniface of Montferrat, who received the huge crusade legacy of Theobald of Champagne; and Richard of Cornwall who, thanks to his control of the Cornish tin industry, was ίη 1240 one of the richest uncrowned laymen ίη Europe.

XIII WHO WENT

ΟΝ

CRUSADES 7

21

been that of Peter the Hermit ίη central Europe . At the siege of Antioch the expedient was again employed, this time secured by oaths: the first crusade commune perhaps . The polyglot fleets that gathered at Dartmouth ίη England ίη 1147 and 1217 formed communes , as did, ίη all likelihood, that of 1189.23 Το the basic ties of who paid for or supplied food for whom , could be added others such as geography. Ιη the camp at Acre ίη 1190-91, for instance, the royal clerk Roger of Howden witnessed a charter of a local landowner from the neighborhood of his parish and recorded ίη his chronicle the names of some local Humberside worthies who had died in that terrible year: minor nobility, local clergy and gentry. 24 Another feature of crusade recruitment emerges uniquely in the narrative sources. Like any other army, much of the appeal attracted the young. Albert of Aachen singled out the young men in Peter the Hermit's army as causing dissension and indiscipline. The anonymous eyewitness account of the attack οη Lisbon ίη 1147 commented οη the heroics of youths from the Ipswich area. In 1190 the Jews ίη England were attacked, some contemporaries wrote, by young crusaders. 25 The young are supposed to be vigorous, and crusading, if ίt demanded wealth , also demanded strength . Although chroniclers may speak with respect of the older, hale crucesignati, crusade organizers discouraged the aged and proportionately few actually embarked οη crusade unless they enjoyed the status where the heat of the day, if not the battle, could be borne by their servants or relatives . Another group to whom crusading was traditionally attractive were criminals. The most complete legal records of the period, those of the English royal courts, provide numerous examples of men absconding to the Holy Land before they could be arraigned or tried for alleged crimes. Ιη addition, some convicted felons were sentenced to go οη crusade with ηο other option, a process reflected in the story of Becket's murderers ending their days fighting ίη the Holy Land . This may indeed be a legend, but ίt represents a regular procedure, although there seems ηο obvious pattern either of crimes or criminals. The export of undesirable elements to serve ίη a good cause had a history as old as the movement itself (and, ίη the imposed penitential pilgrimage, even older). Jacques de Vitry might have deplored the riffraff he found at Acre, but there is every reason for supposing that those engaged ίη active and violent criminal careers would, militarily-and if suitably repentant, morally-make good fighting crusaders .26 23 24 25 26

De expugnatione Lyxbonensi, 56-57 and 104-105; De Itinere Frisonum in Quinti belli sacri scriptores minores (note 8 above ), pp. 59 and 69; Gesta Crucigerorum Rhenanorum, ibid., p. 30; Ralph of Diceto, Ymagines, 2:65. Roger of Howden, Gesta (note 2 above), 2: 149; D. Stenton, "Roger of Howden and Benedict," English Historical Review 68 (1953), 576-577. Albert of Aachen, RHC HOcc. 4:280; De expugnatione Lyxbonensi, p. 161; William of Newburgh , !oc. cit.. For English criminals, see my England and the Crusades, 1095-1588 (Chicago, 1988),

XIII 22 Crusade narratives also confirm the involvement of merchants. Some like Godric of Finchale, sought escape; others, like the Viels of Rouen and Southampton οη the Second Crusade, were eager to prey upon the easy pickings, as they thought, of Mediterranean shipping. The merchant could turn pirate without difficulty. Other merchants used their experience to organize and supply provisions within crusading armies, as noted prominently by Odo of Deuil, Ambroise, and Joinville .27 Chroniclers also speak of crowds of "common people." Many of these, described by a variety of blanket terms, pedίtes, peregrίnί, medίocres, etc., were clearly the infantry. For example, the menu peuple who rioted at Aigues Mortes ίη 1270 were armed, well capable of sustaining a violent contest. 28 But what of those non-combatants whose presence οη the Second Crusade was so lamented by Odo of Deuil? 29 Armed expeditions almost inevitably attracted pilgrims ίη their wake who had ηο military ambition. But, as we have seen, many noncombatants, so-called, could and were prepared to perform other useful functions ίη support of the troops. As many crusaders traveled with their servants, extended households and families, even the most tightly organized campaigns were not free from those who had little directly to contribute to the military effort. The style ίη which some crusaders embarked was extravagant. Bohemund ΙΙ of Antioch was not alone ίη sending east with his soldiers his fowlers and dog-handlers. 30 What is at issue, however, is whether crusades attracted large numbers of unattached pilgrims who did not fight and, ίη consequence, to what extent crusading was a spontaneous and popular movement as some of the chronicle accounts seem to imply. Fulcher of Charters has some interesting observations οη the composition of the combined host gathered at Nicaea ίη 1097. There were those with coats of mail and helmets, the knights; other fighting men "accustomed to war," probably footsoldiers ίη the main; and, finally, those not bearing arms, identified as "clerics, monks, women and children." 31 If we look once more at John of Tubia 's list of beneficiaries at the distribution of the spoils of Damietta, a fourth category were wives and children. 32 Not only the great or the knights took their spouses with them. Ambroise wrote of the "dames and wives" οη the Third Crusade, one heroic woman killed while helping to fill ίη the moat of Acre being the wife of one of the humbler crusaders. The presence of women and children οη the First Crusade had been one of its qualities especially noted by

27 28 29 30 31 32

chapter 8; for the possibly legendary fate of Becket's murderers , see F. Barlow, Thomas Becket (London, 1986), pp. 258-259. Odo of Deuil, De profectione Ludovici VII in Orientem , ed. V.G. Berry (New York, 1948), p. 23; Ambroise, lines 4350-4354, 4498-4512; Joinville, St. Louis, pp. 233 and 263; IJbe!lus de vita S. Godrici, pp. 33-34 and 52-57; De expugnatione Lyxbonensi, pp. 100-102. Guillaume de Nangis, Gesta Ludovici, RHGF 20 :440-442. Odo of Deuil, De profectione, p. 95. Fulcher of Chartres (note 5 above ), p. 298. Ibid., p. 81. De Iohanne Rege (note 19 above), p. 139.

XIII WHO WENT

ΟΝ

CRUSADES?

23

Anna Comnena and the tradition continued: both Louis ΙΧ and Edward I had children born ίη the East. lt might appear, therefore, that many of the noncombatants were dependant relatives. So far it has been suggested that crusades possessed structure, that the mass of common people οη the expeditions were men of some means, enough for instance to buy a pack animal or pay for transit, often wage-laborers with freedom of maneuver and with skills of potential use, as well as domestic servants, officials and clerics. Crusaders of all sorts were grouped around rich patrons or survived ίη communal parties united by geographical origins and oaths. That such crusaders existed is incontravertible. After all, the burgesses ίπ the Latin principalities ίη the East came from somewhere, even if there were never very many who wished to settle in proportion to the numbers traveling east. Perhaps not all of these humbler were crucesίgnatί. This may especially have been the case with hired soldiers and household servants. Certainly, from Cardinal Ugolino's register of north ltalian recruits for the Fifth Crusade it emerges that not all of them had or were expected to have taken the cross. 33 This ίη itself suggests a certain exclusivity in becoming, let alone being a crucesίgnatus.

Mention of the burgesses ίη the crusader states points to another quality of the crusader. We have already seen how he needed money; he also had to have a measure of freedom. The privileges granted to crusaders assumed his right to plead in public courts and his ownership of property οη which he could raise his travel expenses. The burgesses ίη the east were automatically free, less because of any theory or practice of racial superiority but more, perhaps, because those humbler crusaders who settled, if not ίη the train of a magnate, were free to start with. The servile had πο claim to the protection of free courts and, increasingly in some parts of Europe as the twelfth century progressed, he had no claim on any property. In that sense he could hardly even take the cross voluntarily because, in doing so, he was alienating his lord's property. Without permission, too, he could not leave his lord's Iand. Just as under canon Iaw serfs were excluded from Holy Orders, so they were from taking the cross. The serf could be a footslogger in his master's crusader army, but he could not technically be a crucesίgnatus unless he had been granted his freedom of action, choice and status, also a prior condition to being ordained. For someone of servile status to become a crucesignatus implied manumission. Thus in early thirteenth-century England Hugh Travers, a bondman of William of Staunton, was manumitted when about to go on crusade as his lord's proxy. On his return Hugh's lands were released from servile tenure. 34 Some corroboration of the free status of crusaders is found in those chronicles and sermons which dwell οη the crusaders' sacrifice of homes, families, and 33 34

de/ Cardίnale Ugolίno, pp. 128-133. F.M. Stenton, 'Έarly Manumission at Staunton," English Historίca/ Review, 26 (191 95-96; P.R. Hyams, Kings, Lords and Peasants (Oxford, 1980), p. 32 and note 37.

Regίstro

Ι),

XIII 24 possessions ίη order· to serve Christ; the piquancy of such accounts depends οη the crusader having something of his own to relinquish as well as his freedom to travel. Of course, just as the incidence of freedom and servility varied across Europe so would the barriers to becoming a crucesignatus. Also it must be said that freedom was often more a question of domestic, economic, or geographical freedom than of legal constraints or theorems . There was an obvious exception to this ίη the German unfree ministeriales who occupied a conspicuous place ίη Frederick Barbarossa 's army ίη 1189- but then the German ministerίales were a very unusual class of unfree men. 35 It does seem to have been the case that, at least where serfdom was a practical , enforceable legal category, as ίη England, serfs did not become crusaders. Ιη his list of participants οη the Fifth Crusade, Professor Powell describes an English crusader as a serf. Ιη fact , although he was accused of being a villein by a litigant before royal justices at Gloucester ίη 1221, it was held that he possessed his land freely as a freeman. 36 Such exclusivity, ίη the twelfth century at least, should occasion ηο surprise because it reflected contemporary practice ίη raising armies. Henry II's Assize of Arms (1181), for instance, contemplated arming only freemen and it might be noted that this Assize was applicable not only ίη Henry's English and continental possessions but was copied by the king of France and the count of Flanders. Obligation was extended ίη the following century to include the unfree, but servile peasants did not become regular features of levied armies until the wars of Edward I and Philip the Fair. 37 Given the financial outlay, even from the humblest, and the legal disincentives, ίt is small wonder if, as Matthew Paris alleged, Louis ΙΧ was left bemoaning the lack of agricultural workers to settle his hoped-for conquests ίη Egypt. 38 Active crusading was the preserve of some, not all, sections of society. Only ίη the thirteenth century with the construction of a system of vow redemptions, purchase of privileges, and efficient collection and disbursement of donations did crusading embrace the widest possible audience with the friars' preaching aimed, so critics cynically but not entirely inaccurately remarked, more at raising money than men. But the majority of their audience were, and were intended to be, passive. What of the plebs, the masses of poor whose appearance lends such color to crusade narratives? What of the tradition ίη modern historiography that lays especial emphasis οη the poor and their emotions and can suggest, with Michel Mollat, that "the crusade was originally, and ίη its very essence, an affair of the 35 36 37

38

Historia de expeditione Friderici , pp. 22 and 97; cf. ρ. 112 for ministerialis crusades, 1195. Powell, Anatomy of α Crusade, p. 246; Ro/1s of Justiι·es in Eyre, G/oucestershire, Warwickshire and Staffordshire, 1221, 1222, ed. D.M. Stenton, Selden Society (London, 1940), pp. 59-60, no. 156. The Assize of Arms is translated in English Historical Documents, 2: !042-1189, ed. D .C. Douglas (London, 1953), pp. 416-417; for foreign imitations, Roger of Howden, Gesta , 1:269-70; H.S. Bennett, Life on the English Manor, 1150-1400 (Cambridge, 1956), pp. 118125. Matthew Paris, Chronica Majora, 5: !07 and 6: 163.

XIII WHO WENT

ΟΝ

CRUSADES?

25

poor?" 39 It would be impossible to deny that there were a number of pilgrims οη many crusades, especially perhaps the First, who relied less οη their own resources than οη charity. But such pilgrims had little or ηο chance of reaching their destination without the active and systematic material assistance of the richer elements within the crusade itself. It is ηο coincidence that the so-called Children's Crusade of 1212 and the Shepherds' Crusades of 1251 and 1320 failed, οπ their own resources, to get beyond the northern shores of the Mediterranean, although each of these expeditions was the result also of social, emotional, and local pressures as well as enthusiasm which had little or nothing to do with crusading. Aside from these expeditions there is a constant tradition ίπ crusade narratives and sermons which emphasizes the participation and the special spiritual qualities of the pauperes. But what is meant by poor? Does it mean indigent or merely the unrich? Is it applied as a term to describe material circumstances or spiritual grace? Το what extent was talk of the poor a literary device? Frequently, when chroniclers talk of the poor οπ crusade they mean the recently impoverished. The notorious king of the Tafurs οη the First Crusade was a Norman k'hight fallen οπ hard times .4° Certainly, few who embarked without funds of their own or employment by others could have reached Syria. Οπ the Second Crusade, a similar pattern can be detected from Odo of Deuil who appears to include ίπ the crowd of the poor "rich merchants.. . and moneychangers." The poor at Adalia were swelled by the recently impoverished, "the poor since yesterday" ίπ Odo's phrase, but those they joined οπ foot were not themselves helpless. They included "seasoned youths" adept with the bow, and Odo described the poor abandoned by their leaders to march overland to Antioch as an exercίtus, an army of infantry not a rabble. Interestingly, exercίtus was one of the words applied by Albert of Aachen to Peter the Hermit's force. 41 Elsewhere, "the poor" is a term used relatively. Robert of Clari has a list of pcor crusaders who performed noble deeds οπ the Fourth Crusade. Οπ investigation, these turn out to be, ίπ the main, knights of some local prominence ίπ Picardy, Artois, and Flanders, definitely members of the aristocracy with close links to local barons and the count of Flanders. Later, οπ hearing that the Venetians were, after all, going to transport the army, the "poor," so Robert claimed, celebrated by fixing torches to the ends of their lances. Here, at least, the poor were fighters with equipment, however rudimentary, just as οπ the First Crusade the plebs had weapons, even if by the time Antioch was reached these had become rusty. 42 39 40 41 42

Μ. Mollat, The Poor in the Middle Ages (New Haven and London, 1986), p. 72. Guibert of Noget, RHC HOcc. 4:242; Albert of Aachen , ibid. , p. 427. Odo of Deuil, De profectione, pp. 23, 122-123, 137-141; Albert of Aachen, RHC HOcc. 4:279. Robert of Clari, La Conquete (note 18 above), pp. 3-4 and 11-12; J. Longnon , Les compagnons de Ville-hardouin (Geneva, 1978), pp. 156-157, 163, 179-180, 199 and 205; Gesta Francorum (note 2 above), p. 51.

XIII 26

Commentators had an equally selective view ofwhat they meant by poor. The English historian Henry of Huntingdon celebrated the capture of Lisbon ίη 1147 as a triumph of the poor, which is a distinctly misleading description ofthe Iikes of Hervey de Glanville and his fellow crusade Jeaders. 43 But Henry of Huntingdon used the term deliberately to heighten a dramatic and moral contrast with the failure of the crusade campaigns led by Louis VII and Conrad ΠΙ. Clerical observers and preachers were less concerned w.ith economic or legal status than with spiritual standing. Although superficially inconvenient ίη an expanding society held together by the dominance of the rich and powerful, ίη church ηο Iess than state, Christ's teaching οη poverty could be used by contemporaries as a vehicle for moral rather than social reform. Poverty was next to Godliness, but this was not necessarily the poverty of St. Francis or the Lincolnshire crusaders of the l 190s designated as pauperrίmus. 44 Material poverty was not the issue. Ιη a crusade sermon to be used οη the Feast of the Exaltation of the Cross, 14 September, a day especially sacred to crusaders, Alan of Lille emphasized that ίt was the poor who received Christ's favor, by whom he meant the spiritually humble, not the economically destitute. He made this clear by citing ίη support of his argument Matthew 5.3, the Sermon οη the Mount, beatί pauperes spίrίtu. 45 As argued above, crusade preachers urged poverty of spirit οη prosperous audiences, the poverty movements being aimed at moral regeneration not social reform or the redistribution of wealth. The poor therefore were not necessarily the indigent, but the spiritually humble or the materially unrich. That is not to say that all crusaders were comfortably off, rather that, to be crusaders, they had to have adequate funding, their own or another's. Ιη real life the poor do not inherit the earth; nor did the destitute go οη crusade. The idea of hordes of peasants leaving their fields ίη sporadic outbreaks of mass hysteria to travel to the far ends ofthe known world relying οη nothing but God and charity is a myth. The conclusion that suggests itself is hardly profound or surprising. The complexion of crusading armies reflected contemporary society, dominated by princely households, emergent knightly classes, towns growing ίη wealth and self-confidence, and an increasingly variegated work force ίη which skilled workers, be they clerics or craftsmen, possessed greater mobility and had the potential to achieve greater prosperity as the increasing population bred an increase ίη demand for specialized labor. More generally it could be argued that it was only when such social and economic structures had become established that the circumstances for crusading existed. Only an expanding, rich and economically and socially diverse, yet ordered, Europe could have sustained a movement that depended so crucially οη organization and money. 43 44 45

Henry of Huntingdon, Hίstorίa Ang/orum, ed. Τ. Arnold, RS 74 (London, 1879), p. 281. H.M.C. Report on Varίous Col/ectίons (note 13 above), 1:235-236. Alan of Lille, Sermo de cruce domίnί, in Textes ίnedίts, ed. Μ.Τ. d'Alverny, Etudes de philosophie medievale 52 (Paris, 1965), pp. 281-282.

XI

XIV

Paid Crusaders 'Pro honoris vel pecunie'; 'stipendiarii contra paganos'; money and incentives οη crusade

Writing a decade after Urban II's launch of the First Crusade at the Council of Clermont οη 27 November 1095, Robert of Rheims presented the pope as offering terrestrial as well as spiritual riches, calling for the Holy Land, the Ίand flowing with milk and honey', to be colonised ('eamque vobis suijicite'). Robert was an eyewitness and his account may not have been based entirely οη hindsight. At much the same time, but two and a half thousand miles away ίη Jerusalem, Fulcher of Chartres, who had met Urban at Lucca ίη 1096 and seems to have had access to a written version of the Clermont decrees, presented the pope as promising the crusaders the double reward of becoming joyful and wealthy (Ίaeti et locupletes'; the latter, however metaphorically intended, specifically implying landed prosperity). 1 God and Mammon; a familiar if contested trope of crusade studies. Α less discussed, more mundane dimension to the materialism and piety debate offers a slightly different lens through which to examine the typology of social structures and economic circumstance as well as the unnecessarily Manichaean debate οη crusaders' motives. 2 However analysed, the First Crusade and its successors were dominated by arms-bearing fighting men. They required payment, wages, ίη cash and kind, a fundamental sinew of crusading as of all warfare, Fulcher of Chartres, Historia Hierosolymitana, &cueil des historiens de.r ct-oisades; Docu111ents (Paris 1844-95 hereafter RHC Occ.), iii, 324; trans. F.R. Ryan and Η. Fink, Α I-Iislory of the Expedition to Jerusalem (Κnoxvίlle 1969), p. 67; Robert of Rheims, Historia Iherosoli111ιfana, RHC Occ., ίiί, 728; trans. C. Sweetenham, Robert the Monks History of the First Crusade (Aldershot 2005), p. 81. For a discussion of Fulcher, Urban and Clermont, see now Lean Νί Chleirigh, 'The Impact of rhe First Crusade οη Western opi nion to\νards rhe Byzanάne E mpire', The Crιιsades and the Near East: Cultural Histories, ed. C. Kosάck (London 2011), pp. 177-80. For a recent debaάng surνey of opinion, see Ν. Housley, Contesting the Crusades (Oxford 2006), esp. chaps. 1, 2 and 4; for a new attempt at a materialist interpretaάon, C. Kosάck, The Social Structtιre of the First Crιιsade (Leiden 2008); for a ,vider argument, C. Tyerman, The Debate on the Crιιsade.r (Manchester 2011). For a recent discussion of paid crusaders, Α. Murray, 'Money and Logisάcs ίη the First Crusade', The Logistics of Waιfare in the Age of the Crιιsades, ed. J.H . l'ryor (Aldershot 2006), pp. 246-8. Occidentatιx

XIV 2

Paid Crusaders

so obvious as to be, like Father Brown's postman, easily overlooked. Robert of Rheims understood the reality. He had Urban ΙΙ urging the rich to subsidise the less well off and to lead and pay for armed crusaders. 3 Examining the role of paid service obviates crude generalisations about the search for profit and gain, land, wealth, reputation or favour, as opposed to piety and the desire for penance and spiritual reward. From this, a 1ess polarised analysis both of crusade incentives and the conduct of crusading warfare may be approached. The Jerusalem canon of the Council of Clermont, despite a tenuous manuscript tradition, has been regarded as a sort of found.ing charter for the crusade to the Holy Land, the only direct formal record of what occurred at the initiation of this distinctive type of holy war: Quicumque pro sola devotione, ηοη pro honoris vel pecunie adeptione, ad liberandam ecclesiam Dei llierusalem profectus fuerit, iter illud pro omni pen.itentia ei reputetur. (Whoever for devotion alone, not for the acquisition of honour or money, goes to liberate the church of God in Jerusalem (or goes to Jerusalem to liberate the church of God), that journey is to be assigned to him for all penance.) 4 Beside the slight ambiguity over whether the campaign was to liberate 'the church of God ίη Jerusalem' or to go 'to Jerusalem to liberate the church of God' and the penitential clause substituting the journey for 'all penance' for sin (presumably understood as all confessed sin), the Canon imposed a blanket rejection of the motive of material gain, usually translated as 'honour (or glory) and money'. However, honoris may probably better be translated, ίη line with common usage of the period, as possessions, 'honour' as ίη fief, lands, status or office, rather than honourable reputation. 5 Of course, Robert of Rheims, RHC Occ., iii, 729; trans. p. 82 R. Somerville, The Councils of Urban ΙΙ. Ι. Decreta Claromontensia (Amsterdam 1972), p. 74. The literature on this is huge; for a recent not wholly successful attempt to chaUenge previous discussion, Ρ.Ε . Chevedden's nvo arcicles, 'Canon 2 of the Council of Clermont', Ann11ariu1n historia Conciliorunz, xxxvii (2005), pp. 57-108, 253-322. For a view of the priιηacy of spirituality, see ]. Riley-Smith, The First Crtιsade and the Idea of Cr11sading (London 1986); idem, 'The Mocives of the earliest crusaders and the sett1ement of Lacin Pa]estine 1095-1100', English Historical RevieNJ, xcviii (1983), 721-36 presents evidence of more materia1 elements, whi]e not denying the religious imperacive. Mediae Latinitatis Lexicon Minus, ed. J.F. Niermeyer et α!. (Leiden 1984), cols. 495-8; Dictionaιy of Medieval Latin from British S011rces, ed. D.R. Howlett et α!., Fascicule IV (Oxford 1989), p.1169.

XIV Paid Criιsaders

3

the emphasis οη purity of motive reflects the formal legalistic trappings of penance and just war. Right intent is crucial to both. However, this clear nod in the direction of the less elevated ambitions of soldiering recognised a central conundrum in the crusade project. While almost all literary, promotional and contractual sources are at pains to emphasise again and again the spontaneity, free will and religious compulsion behind taking the cross and fighting the holy war, the reality of recruitment and military service insisted that, at the heart of crusading, as of any war, was money, in particular wages. This tension was widely recognised. Ιη a wellknown example, in 1070, while William of Normandy's troops who fought under a papal banner at Hastings received a moderate penance as they had served their lord in public war, different penances \vere devised for those who had fought only because of the inducement of reward (tantum praemio).The key here is tantum, Όnly'. 6 Neither the 1070 penances nor the Clermont decree outlaw or condemn hiring warriors or fighting for pay. The combination of a just cause - public or holy war - and the right intent legitimised the necessary arrangements for assembling an army. Consequently, given the right intent of fighters, there is ηο explicit or inherent contradiction between the inner state of mind and the mercenary mechanics of recruitment. Just as William of Normandy spent vast sums, according to William of Poitiers, οη paying the troops assembled in northern France in the late summer of 1066, so all Holy Land crusade armies from Peter the Hermit's and Bohemund's to those of Frederick ΙΙ and Louis ΙΧ a century and a half later, depended οη paid troops. 7 For his attack οη Byzantium under the guise of assistingJerusalem in 1107, Bohemund 'almost drained his treasury' by supporting both those who had volunteered and those he had recruited. 8 Το use the phrase Orderic Vitalis employed to describe the Normans fighting in southern Italy in the early eleventh century, the crusades, despite the formulae of clerical commentators, Eng!ish Historica! Documents, ii, ed. D.C. Douglas and G. Greena,vay (London 1953), p. 606 and nn . 6, 7; full text, Councils and Synods, Ι, 871-1204, ii, 1066-1204, ed. D. Wh.itelock, Μ. Brett, C.N.L.Brooke (Oxford 1981), pp. 581-4. \Villiam of Poitiers, Gesta Gtιtllelnti, eds R.I-I.C. Davis and Μ. Chibnall (Oxford 1998), p. 102; for a relevant if occasionally specu]ative account of the organisation of the 1066 campaign, Β. Bachrach, 'Some observations οη the military organisation of the Norman Conquest', l/7aιfare and Military Organisation in Pre-Crtιsade Europe (AJdershot 2002), XIV, pp. 1-25; cf. the discussion in J.O. Prestwich, The Place of War in Eng!ish History 1066-1214, ed. Μ. Prestwich (Woodbridge 2004), pp. 63-4 and generally pp. 49, 65, 77, 91-2, 94-7, 105, 112-16, 118-19, 130; belowpp.17-19. Orderic Vitalis, Ecc!esiastical History, ed. and trans. Μ. Chibnall (Oxford 1969-80), vi, 100-101.

XIV 4

Paid Crusaders

were conducted by 'sripendiaries against the pagans' (stipendiarii contra paganos) or, in the context of Baldwin Ι of Jerusalem's campaigns in Palesrine, 'sripendiaries who laboriously struggle against the pagans for the name of Christ'. 9 For all the rhetoric of spiritual conversion and religious volunteerism, this was the reality of crusading and its attracrion for the vital consrituency of fighring men. These were broadly of four kinds, each of which could merge with any other according to circumstance: volunteers; the paid members of a lord's household or Jamilia, which even for princes of the church included fighring men; wider circles of neighbours, clients, vassals, relarions, proteges and hangers-on bound by ries of allegiance and dependence; and those hired οη an ad hoc basis for or during specific campaigns. For all of these, the distinct incenrives of pay and faith were complementary, not contradictory. 10 It is a historiographic cliche that power in western Europe in the eleventh century rested οη the threat, potenrial, applicarion and control of violence. As recently re-stated by Thomas Bisson, but seriously explored in the context of the crusades at least since Carl Erdmann in the 1930s, ambirious fighters seeking status, as lords or as ftdeles of the powerful, found welcome legirimacy in ecclesiasrically sponsored warfare. 11 Church approval conferred more than rhetorical respectability. Thus, as proteges of the papacy, the land-grabbing Robert Guiscard, his brother Roger and other Norman adventurers could aspire to dignified legirimacy as recognised rulers of southern Italy and Sicily. Despite ecclesiasrical gloss, their incenrives and ambirions remained fiercely secular, from the prospect of respectable reputarion to public acceptance of status and legirimate ritle to land and rule. For a swathe of reasons, therefore, the imprimatur of the church was eagerly sought by arms bearers. Urban II's

Orderic Vitalis, Ecclesiastical History, ii, 58; νί, 432 The literature is vast, but for a succinct account of the complexiry of recruitment, incentive and motive, Μ. Prestwich, 'Money and mercenaries in E nglish medieval armies', Eng!and and Gerttιany in the High Midd!e Ages, eds Α Haverkamp and Η. Vollrath (Oxford 1996), pp. 129-50, esp. pp. 144--50 and R. Bart1ett, Eng!and under the Norman and Angevin Κings (Oxford 2000), pp. 265-9; cf. J. Flori, Ίdeology and motivations ίη the First Crusade', The Cnιsades, ed. Η. Nicholson (Basingstoke 2005), pp. 15-36, esp. pp. 27-30. Ιη general, οη interaction of patterns of belief with other social responses and pressures, see J. Arnold, Be!ief and Unbelie/ in Medieval Ezιrope (London 2005), pp. 1-26. For a parallel secu]ar later n1edieval combination of profit and honour , Ν. Saul, For Honour and Fattιe (London 2011 ), p. 128. 11 Τ.Ν. Bisson, The Crisis ο/ the T111elfth Century (Princeton 2009), pp. 64--5, 71-4; C. Erdmann, Die Ent.rtehung des KtΊ!UZ'{!lgsgedanken (Stuttgart 1935); trans. M.W Ba]d\vin and W Goffart, The Oιigins ο/ the Idea ο/ the Crusade (Princeton 1977). But the outlines have long been apparent, e.g Ed,vard Gibbon, The Decline and Fall ο/ the Roman Ettιpire, ed. W Smith (London 1862), νίί, 188. ιn

XIV Paid Crusaders

5

prospectus of 1095 further refined this. According to Fulcher of Chartres, originally a member of the Jerusalem expedition, Urban ΙΙ contrasted the illicit state of internecine secular war between Christians with the proffered just battle against pagans. Bandits (raptores, literally 'robbers') were now 'soldiers of Christ'. 12 Famously, Guibert of Nogent lauded this new form of war which promised salvation through conformity with rather than rejection of the habίts of mi!ites. 13 Consolidating rather than contradicting the social and cultural supremacy of the fighting classes, the aura of respectability clung to crusaders even after Jerusalem was won, however vicious and profane their subsequent careers. 14 For all crusading's spiritual vestments and social kudos, the church recognised that many responses were essentially secular. Beneath this very familiar general pathology of support for religious war, the practical conditions of fighting reinforced the inescapable material dynamics of crusading. Fulcher of Chartres again: 'Now they, who were recently mercenaries for a few shillings (pro so!idis paucis mercenaιii fuerunt), find eternal re\vard'. 15 Whatever intrinsic appeal caught the individual imagination, payment and the prospect of payment lay at the centre of crusade recruitment, a process ίη which many, especially among the fighting classes, lacked genuine free choice. This obvious feature of crusade history has rarely been highlighted. Α quarter of a century ago, Jonathan RileySmith, while charting the importance for the First Crusade of dependence οη a lord both as a reason for crusading and for the structure of the armies and subsequent settlement ίη Palestine, chose to characterise the relationship primarily ίη terms of 'emotional ties'. 16 Ιη a fine recent study of the experience of crusading, Norman Housley passingly recognises that 'payment was a reasonably secure guarantee of service', but goes οη to contrast fighting for wages with 'the practice of armed pilgrimage' and to imply that until the late thirteenth or fourteenth century, crusades were fought οη different bases. 17 Yet ίη operation, there was little difference.

RHC Occ., ili, 324. Guibert of Nogent, Gesta Dei Per Francos, RHC Occ., iv, 124 14 C. Tyerman, The Invention of the Crusades (London 1998), pp. 11-12. For the social role and importance of reputation, see Τ. Fenster and D.J". Smail, Fa1Jιa. The ])o/itics of Talk and &pιιtation in Medieval Eιιrope (Ithaca 2003), pp. 1- 12, esp. p. 4; N.L. Paul, Ά Warlord's Wisdom: Literacy and Propaganda at the Time of the First Crusade', Specιιlιιm, lxxxv (201 Ο), p. 561 . 12

13

RHC Occ., ίii, 324. Riley-Smith, 'Motives', p. 734. 17 Ν. Housley, Fightitιgjor the Cross (Ne,v Haven and London 2008), p. 110; but cf. the suggestive comments, pp. 124-5, 160- 62. 15

16

XIV 6

Paid Crusaders

Of course, the importance of pay must be acknowledged in conjunction with, not to the exclusion of other incentives: the search for spiritual reward and assuaging guilt in penance; the excitement of adventure; the deftly imagined and promoted Turco-Islamic threat to Christendom and Christians inviting emotions of revenge; the prospects for favour, preferment and reputation; or the pressures exerted by lordship, kindred, locality and peers. Specifically relevant in this context were the patronage networks, the lord's mouvance described a dozen years ago by John France, based οη a paid military household or mesnie. 18 Choice could be at a premium. Ιη 1106, the bishop of Nevers complained that some of his men had been forced to accompany Count William II's crusade of 1101. 19 Ιη these complex cats' cradles of necessity, compulsion, imagination and desire, for most involved in the Jerusalem war, unfettered personal discretion had little place or meaning. Το insist οη the motivational priority of penitential guilt, spiritual exhilaration or the image of Christ is not in fact to insist οη very much . Piety was inseparable from the means of its expression and implementation, informed and sustained by circumstance and secular aspirations. The monetary element need not, therefore, be consigned to a crude typology of greed. Ralph of Caen, early twelfth century biographer of Tancred of Lecce, puts into his hero's mouth at Antioch a compelling almost moral justification for the cash relationship of commander and crusader: My soldiers are my treasure. It causes me ηο concern that they are provided for when Ι am in need, so long as Ι command men for whom provision has been made. They load their pouches with silver; Ι load them with cares, arms, sweat, tremors, hail and rain. 20 Το admit the required, formal element of altruistic free will in taking the crusade vow should not obscure the fact that probably the vast majority of crusaders - including great lords - received direct monetary payment for their service at some stage, some at every stage of their crusading. The poor and landless needed money to fight at all; those in the service of lords would have expected ηο less. Aside from any hopes of profit, money was required to buy food and other supplies, such as animal feed, the ubiquity of coin and 18 J. France, 'Patronage and the crusade's appeal', T/;e First Crtιsade, ed. J. Phillips (Manchester 1997), pp. 5-20; cf. Flori, Ίdeology and motivations', esp. pp. 29-30. 19 Ε. Siberry, 'The Crusacling Counts of Nevers', Nottingham Medieval Studies, 34 (1990), p. 65 and note 5. 20 Ralph of Caen, Gesta Tat1credi, RHC Occ., ili, 644; trans. B.S. and D.S. Bachrach (AJdershot 2005), p. 77.

XIV Paid Crusaders

7

the prominence of markets being a notable feature of crusade narratives. 21 1096, Peter the Hermit sensibly travelled with a wagonload of cash to provide for his followers. 22 The same need of pay was true for servants and for specialists, from physicians and surgeons to the Genoese engineers at the siege of Jerusalem in 1099 or the poor who were paid to carry the corpses of the massacred outside the city after its capture. 23 At the siege of Nicaea in 1097, a Lombard 'master and inventor of great defences and siege works', while admitting the need of God's aid for his plans, only offered his services to the crusade leadership in return for pay and the provision by the crusade's general fund of the necessary materials. 24 Service, God's included, cost. The idea that all propertied crusaders initially paid for themselves is a myth, one created by the nature of surviving evidence: charters, records of the deals of paymasters not the paid; clerical interpreters and their chivalric copiers. It is as misleading as is the idea that medieval armies were raised by some sort of non-monetary 'feudal' levy. The economy of service embraced payment - in cash and kind - as well as, often in conjunction with self-provisioning. Not all who fought the crusades were crucesignati. However, even those who had taken the cross could rarely afford to ignore the cash component of their undertaking, their motives perforce constituting a heterogeneous mix that did not, could not exist in a world of idealism divorced from compromised reality which required paymasters. The greatest crusade historian, William of Tyre, well understood the process when describing recruitment for the First Crusade in his Hzstoria. After cataloguing a variety of non-pious crusader motives, he precisely depicted the operation of lordship and service: Ιη

21 See an excellent account of the use money on the First Crusade by A.V. Murray, 'Money and Logistics in the forces of the First Crusade', Logistics and Waifare in the Age of ίhe Crusades, ed. J.H. Pryor (Aldershot 2006), pp. 229--49. 22 Albert of Aachen, 1-IiJ'loria Ierosolimitana, ed. and trans. S. Edgington (Oxford 2007), ΡΡ· 24-5. 23 Raymond of Aguilers, Historia Francorut11 qιιi ceperunt lherusalem, RHC Occ., ili, 297 (Raymond of Toulouse paid 'de censo .rιιο'); trans. J.H. and L.L. Hill (Philadelphia 1968), p. 124; Baldric of Dol, Historia Jerosolimitana, RHC Occ., iv, 103 ('dato pretio'). For medical practitioners in service on crusade, P.D. Mitchell, Medicine in the Cnιsades (Cambridge 2004), pp. 11 and 16-30. 24 Albert of Aachen, Historia, pp. 120-23; discussed by R. Rogers, Latin Siege Waifare in the Tιvelfth Centuιy (Oxford 1982), pp. 19-20. Cf. the salary paid to Haveclic, an Armen.ian from Antioch and expert (instructissinιus) on the accurate firing of siege engines at the siege of Tyre in 1124 'so that he might maintain himself in his accustomed magn.ificence', William of Tyre, Chronicon, ed. R.B.C. Huygens (Turnhout 1986), i, 598; trans Ε.Α. Babcock and A.C. Κrey, Α Histoιy of the Deeds Done Beyond the Sea (Ne\v York 1941), ii, 15.

XIV 8

Paid Crusaders For whenever it was rurnoured that a prince had taken the νοw to rnake the pilgrirnage, the people (populz) flocked thither in throngs and begged perrnission to join his cornpany (comitatuz).They invoked his narne as their lord for the entire journey and prornised obedience and loyalty. 25

Although written three-quarters of a century later, William's model, as will be seen, reflected First Crusade practice. Any religious commitment of the great princes and lords should not be confused with the secular pressures and imperatives loaded on their putative followers. Until recently, discussion of paid troops in the middle ages has frequently been vitiated by describing them as mercenaries. Το a great extent, the term, with its pejorative overtones of fickleness and brutality, is a confusing misnomer. 26 Medieval sources usually refer to paid troops - stipendiarii- rather than mercenaries. Horror stories attached to them tend to focus on their behaviour and licence not specifically on their paid status - as with the Flemish troops of King Stephen of England, the routiers in southern France in the late twelfth century or the Free Companies of the fourteenth. In these cases, the criticisms \Vere political and moral, such groups being castigated as symptoms of a collapse in social order, a crisis of lordship, not as signs of rampant materialism, although the prominence of paid captains and their intimacy with their roγal paymasters could inspire social and political resentment amongst those who regarded themselves as a cut above in the hierarchy. 27 When critics of the management of crusades mentioned money, they tended to focus on peculation, misuse or hypocrisy. Despite the aspersions cast on untrustworthy 'hirelings' in the parable of the Good Shepherd Oohn 10:12-13), pay was not of itself regarded as indicative of amorality; John the Baptist urged baptised

William of Tyre, Chronicon, i, 137; trans. Babcock and Κrey, Α History of the Deeds, i, 94. For a recent collecrion of useful essays, see J. France, Λ1.ercenaries and Paid Men (Leiden 2008), especially the contriburions of France, Κ. DeVries, Ν. Prouteau and R. Λbels. Cf. the classic J. Verbruggen, The Art of Wa,fare in Western Europe dzιιing the Middle Ages (trans. S. Willard et α!. Woodbridge 1997), pp. 127-44; Ρ Contamine, War in the Middle Ages (trans. Μ. Jones Oxford 1984), pp. 90-101, 150-65; J. France, Western Wa,fare in the Age of the Crusades (Ithaca 1999), pp. 60-63, 70-75; J. Boussard, 'Les mercenaires au xiie siecle', Bibliotheque de /Έcole de.r Chartes, cvi (1945-46), 189-224; J. Prest\vich, P!ace of War, Μ. Prest\Vich, 'Money and Mercenaries'; Μ. Clιibnall, 'Mercenaries and the familia regis under Henry Ι', History, lxvi (1977), pp. 15-23; S. Bro\vn, 'Military Service and Monetary Re\vard in the 11 th and 12th Centuries', History, lxxiv (1989), pp. 20-38. For a discussion of German literary and legal evidence to the same effect,J. Bumke, The Concept of Knighthoocl in the Middle Ages (Ne,v York 1982), esp. pp. 33-4, 41-3, 47-54. 27 D. Crouch, 'William Marshal and the Mercenariat', Mercenaries and Pazd Men, ed. France, pp. 15-32. 25

26

XIV Paid Crusaders

9

solcliers to 'be content with your wages' (Luke 3:14). 28 Το distinguish between the professional solclier and the arnateur rneant little or nothing in a rnedieval context, especially when it carne to payrnent and reward. Even if not the rnost effective warriors, having rnany other duties and distractions, the wealthiest and rnost socially elevated received long and often sophisticated rnilitary training and spent rnuch of their lives fighting, threatening to fight, preparing to fight or drearning of fighting. Chivalry, as it developed by 1200, ernphasised codes of conduct not the rneans of support. However, the latter were essential to the forrner.29 Although sornething of a cliche, the career of Williarn Marshal rnakes the point, not just as regards his incorne frorn the profits of a successful professional tournarnent tearn but that his rnaster, Henry, the eldest son of Henry ΙΙ of England, was willing to expend his resources and to borrow lavishly so that he could retain as large a paid retinue as possible. The paid status of Henry's knights in ηο way dirninished their honour or that of the Young Henry. Money rnade the world go around for princes, nobles and sons of nobles as for everybody else. 30 Organised violence provided one structural basis of lordship, rule and the irnposition of social order; another was projecting the irnage of authority and power. Central to both ran the pursuit of profit, a cornrnon thread linking lords and followers. The nature of this relationship also fitted wider structures within aristocratic affinities where shared locality, farnily, favour or interest beyond or instead of tenurial bonds tended to be secured by payrnent. Money was as rnuch a feature of lordship and clientage as was the holcling of land, theories of social hierarchy, or the exercise of political and legal protection. Ιη a rnore narrowly rnilitary context, as Philippe Contarnine has it, 'rnoney was the alrnost obligatory link between authority and solcliers'. 31 The cornrnercial dirnension supported rather than challenged the essentially rnoral understanding of the relationship of lord and retainer. For the fighting classes, lordship and loyalty were not an either/ or to pay. John of Salisbury, an often shrewd observer of the secular scene in

28 Noted by R. Abels, Ήousehold men, mercenaries and Vikings ίη Anglo-Saxon E ngland', Mercenaries αιιd Paid Μeιι, ed. France, p. 144 and generally pp. 143-65; Brown, 'Military Service', p. 21.

29

J. Flori, L'Essor de Ια chevalerie, XIe-XII siecles (Geneva 1986); cf R. Kaeuper, Chivalry and

Meclieval Europe (Oxford 2001). D. Crouch, William Marshal (Harlo,v 1990), pp. 26-52. Ιη general see his recent summary remarks on the service and culture of krughts, idem, The EιιglishAristocracy 1070-1272: Α Socia/Traιzgόrmatioιz (New Haven and Lοηdοη 2011), pp. 25-36 Violeιzce iιι

31

Contam.ine, War iιι the Midd!e Ages, p. 90.

XIV 10

Paid Crusaders

the mid-twelfth century, regarded payment as a privilege of knighthood, not its antithesis. 32 By paid knights here we do not only mean the hired peasant with a strong arm. Until the late twelfth century at the earliest, perhaps, the term mi/es still referred to function and status not class and could thus cover soldiers of widely different social standing. The knights who assassinated Duke Charles the Good of Flanders in 1127 were offered four marks each for their pains and came from relatively humble but far from impoverished or servile backgrounds. Drawn from the household (jami/ia) of one of the chief conspirators, bound by wages, they were hand picked for their ferocity (animosiores et audaces), all features many recruits must have shared in 1096. 33 Ιη a set of regulations of 1165 concerning payment of the unfree knights of the archbishop of Cologne, knights with an income of over five marks a year (the equivalent of a comfortably off English knight) , if required to join an expedition to an imperial coronation that might involve fighting, were to be paid ten marks each by the archbishop, as well as 150 feet of cloth for their retinues; once over the Alps for their own and their retinue's expenses, each knight would get one mark a month. 34 Yet, at the highest end of the social hierarchy, among those who contracted to provide soldiers for pay can also be included two future leaders of the First Crusade, and possibly a third. Robert, count of Flanders, potentially one of the richest lords in western Europe, accepted money from the king of England - i.e. was retained - in 1093 and again in 1101 to provide troops. 35 Ιη 1085, to repel a threatened Danish invasion, William the Conqueror collected an army of paid knights, archers and infantry that included, according to the usually quite well-informed and always critically alert William of Malmesbury, Count Hugh of Vermandois, brother of King Philip Ι of France. Interestingly, William of Malmesbury links this hiring of Hugh to Robert Guiscard using his mercenary status in southern Italy in the 1040s to carve out a principality for himself. 36 The third crusade leader who may have occupied a not dissimilar position to Robert and

As discussed by Bro,vn, 'Military Service', pp. 22-3 and notes 16 and 18. Galbert of Bruges, Hirtoire dtι meutre de Charle.r le Bon, con1te de Flandre, ed. Η. Pirenne (Paris 1891) p. 20; The Mιιrder of Charles the Good, cozιnt of Flanders, trans. J.B. Ross (New York 33

1967),p.111. 34

Discιιssed

by

Mιιrray,

'Money and Logistics in the First

Crιιsade',

Logistics

of

Waιfare,

pp. 231-2. 35

Oksanen, "Γhe Anglo-FJem.ish Treaties and Flemish soldίers in England 1101-1163', and l'aid Men, ed. France, pp. 261-3 for a recent discussion. William of Ma1mesbury, Gesta Regunz Anglorzιm, ed. W. Stιιbbs (London 1887-89), ίί, 320. Ε.

Mercenaιies 36

XIV Paid Crusaders

11

Hugh was Godfrey of Bouillon when he served Henry IV in the invasion of Italy and capture of Rome in 1084. Such 'service for gain' became a literary trope, the figure even of sons of kings accepting service for pay being familiar in twelfth and thirteenth century German vernacular literature. 37 Some general contextual points need to be made at this point. First, all medieval commanders included some, often many paid troops beyond their own - also paid - military households and those of their chief supporters. Such requirements demanded taxes and other additional financial levies to pay these vital troops in cash. Heavy extraordinary taxation was an integral feature of crusading, for the same reason. The idea that anyone would rely solely on raising an army from tenants and sub-tenants scattered across the realm with their own domestic ties and varying degrees of fitness, military skill or training is both inherently unlikely and contradicted by evidence. Α host simply based on land tenure did not exist. Given its relatively urbanised and monetised economy, it may be unsurprising that much of the levy of knights in the kingdom of Jerusalem depended οη money fiefs; and, at least in the thirteenth century and probably earlier, vassals supplied waged servise des compaignons, for whom there was a common rate of pay. 38 More generally, mercenaries and paid retainers were commonplace in the Frankish east. Ιη a charter of 1158, Count Amalric of Jaffa and Ascalon, the future king, referred to 'stipendiariis meis'. 39 However, much the same model existed in agrarian northern Europe. This is hardly a novel insight; as John France recently remarked, 'by the twelfth century it is apparent that most men serving as soldiers were paid'; or, in the words of Kelly DeVries, 'good soldiers were always needed to fill the ranks of medieval armies, and they were always paid', an observation corroborated from a different corpus of evidence by Joachim Bumke: 'the second decisive factor beside suzerainty over men capable of

37 J.C. Andressohn, The Ancestry and Life of Godfrey of Boui/lon (Bloomington 1947), pp. 38- 9 and refs. nn. 51-3; Prest,vich, P/ace of War, pp. 96-7 for refs. to Henry IV paying troops on previous Italian campaigns; Bumke, Concept of Knighthood, pp. 52- 3 for 'dienen umbe guot' and the lcing's son who Όffered his service for pay, as a knight very often does'. 38 C. Marshall, Waifare in the Latin East (Cambridge 1992), pp. 53-4 and note 26. 39 J. France, 'Crusading warfare and its adaptation to eastern conditions ίn the t\velfth century', Mediterranean History Πevieιι;, χν (2000), p. 58, citing R. Rδhricht, ed., fugesta Πegni Hierosolymitana (Berlin 1892), p. 86. Ι am grateful to the publisher's anonymous reader for th.is reference.

XIV 12

Paid Criιsaders

waging war is money'. 40 Ιη this 'economy of paid feudal warfare', crusading was ηο different from other wars.41 The nearest thing to standing armies in this period, excluding the Military Orders, existed in the military households of the great. It was an ambition of many to enter the patronage of such a household. At its closest, membership of the familia would be rewarded with equipment, housing, money and board (such as free meals, bread, wine and candles). 42 It appears that benefits exceeded mere subsistence or rations and included spending-money. It was understood that material benefits were central to familiaritas, constituting the essential, praiseworthy but highly pragmatic magnanimity of a great lord. The importance of this dimension to payment cannot be underestimated ίη terms of military effectiveness and cohesion as \vell as the legitimate expectations of followers and recruits. Both moral and material aspects underpinned the flexibility of leadership, revealed οη a number of crusades when the highest bidder could attract the largest retinue. It is characteristic of every military household or mesnie that, in addition to a permanent or semi-permanent core of knights, others would be recruited into a larger but srill intimate rerinue for service οη particular campaigns. 43 The fluidity in size of crusader lords' retinues remained a prominent feature of eastern Mediterranean expeditions for at least 150 years after 1095, the attraction of new lords depending almost entirely οη their material resources and ability to reward and pay. 44 Ιη a typically astute observation, Karl Leyser noted that our views of the First Crusade come from accounts provided by two participants who, in his phrase, had 'access to their master's stewpots', Fulcher of Chartres and Raymond of Aguilers, and from another source, the Gesta Francorum, that preserves many more stories of the urgent difficulties experienced by those who either enjoyed ηο such familiaritas or who had been left destitute when their own or

40 Mercenaries and Paid Men, ed. France, pp. 7 and 56; Bumke, Concept of Knighthood, p. 34; cf Crouch, English Aristocracy, pp. 5, 25, 27. 41 Contamine, War in the Middle Ages, p. 94, quoting Ρ. Sclimitthenner. Cf. the comments οη the ,veakness of obligatory military service ίη eleventh century France, S. Reynolds, Fieft arιd Vas.rals (Oxford 1994 ), pp. 131-2 and, genera!ly,passim. 42 For a mid-twelfth century example , the Englisl, Corιstitutio Dotntιs Regis, ed. C. Johnson, Dialogus de Scaccario (London 1950), pp. 128-35; for kniglicly pay and board, pp. 133-4; ίη general, Crouch, Erιglish Aristocracy, esp. pp. 31-3; J.O. Prestwich, 'The Military Household of the Norman I